China And The World War

127239

CHINA AND
F: WORLD -WAR

CHINA AND THE WORLD-WAR

THE MACMILLAN COMPANY

WXW YORK BOSTON - CHICAGO DALLAS
ATLANTA SAN FRANCISCO

MACMILLAN & CO., LIMITED

LONDON - BOMBAY * CALCUTTA
MBLBOURNK

THE MACMILLAN CO. OF CANADA, LTD.

TORONTO

Courtesy of Far Eastern Bureau.

Hsu Shih-chang, elected President of the Chinese Republic,
September 4, 1918.

WORLD-WAR

BY

W. REGINALD WHEELER

OF THE FACULTY OF HANGCHOW COLLEGE.
HANGCHOW, CHINA

ILLUSTRATED

gotfe

THE MACMILLAN COMPANY
1919

Ml riffhtf reserved

COPYRIGHT, 1919
BY THE MAOMILLAN COMPANY

Set up and electrotype^. Published, January, 1919

TO

THE BEST OF COMPANIONS
THE BRAVEST OF COMRADES
WISEST OF COUNSELORS
MY WIFE

the war, the attention of the world will
more and more shift to China and the Far East.
The greatest potential market of the world lies there:
the greatest need for industrial and economic develop-
ment is there. The Far East, in general, and China, in
particular, have been profoundly affected by the war:
they will be even more deeply influenced during the
peace which is to follow. All of the great powers
have financial interests in China; after the war, these
interests will come into sharp competition and rivalry.
In their relations with China and with each other, the
nations will face two alternatives: on the one hand,
a policy leading to an imperialism and oppression which
eventually will endanger the dearly-bought world-
peace : on the other, a course of action based on inter-
national justice and the development of a democracy
in the Far East that will be safe for the world. These
alternatives in Asia are, and will be, the same as those
which the world is facing in Europe today : ( the writer
believes they should be viewed in the fight of the
principles for which the larger part of mankind is now
fighting and that unless this is done, on the Eastern
horizon will surely gather the .dark clouds of another
world-storm.

In this volume accordingly, the author who has
lived in China for the past three years has tried to

Vlll PREFACE

trace the more recent development of this largest of
the Asiatic nations, indicating some of the problems
which it is now facing, especially as they appear
against the background of the world-war, and attempt-
ing to point out some of the ultimate issues to which
these problems, if they remain unsolved, will lead. To
these issues the world at large cannot remain indiffer-
ent; and the attempt has been made in this volume to
present as fairly and clearly as possible the facts of the
present trans-Pacific situation. Throughout the vol-
ume, quotations have been made from original docu-
ments and statements of the press, in order to avoid,
as far as possible, any subjective coloring of the
facts. Further, in the interests of international har-
mony and good-will, the more extreme and less char-
acteristic utterances of the press and of publicists of
the nations involved, have been omitted. To this sit-
uation in the Far East, it is hoped that the standards
and ideals formulated by the free peoples of the world
will be applied; and the writer believes that in the
application of these standards and ideals will be found
a solution and the only solution of problems
which are of momentous consequence for the rest of
the world.

The author desires to express his grateful obliga-
tion to Professor F. Wells Williams, of Yale Univer-
sity, and to Dr. John E. Williams, Vice-President of
Nanking University, who have given helpful advice,
and made valuable criticisms of the manuscript. To
the Peking Gazette, formerly under the able editorship

PREFACE IX

of Mr. Eugene Chen, the author is indebted for many
excerpts from contemporaneous documents and articles
of value. Acknowledgment is made of the permission
of D. Appleton & Co. to use the summary of Treaties
Concerning the Integrity of China and Korea, and
The Maintenance of the Open Door which appears in
Dr. Hornbeck's volume, Contemporary Politics in the
Far East; and the permission of Dodd, Mead & Co. for
the use of the translation of The Memorandum of the
Black Dragon Society, contained in Mr. Putnam-
Weale's book, The Fight for the Republic in China.
Some of the material in this book was originally pub-
lished in the Current History Magazine of the New
York Times, and in the Evening Telegram of Portland,
Oregon; acknowledgment is made of the courteous
permission of the publishers to use this in the present
volume. In the absence of the author in China, Dr.
D. Johnson Fleming has kindly consented to supervise
the publication of the book and for his willingness to
undertake this task the writer is grateful

In conclusion, the author wishes to express his
appreciation of the services of Miss G. D. O'Neill and
her co-workers, of Pasadena, in preparing the manu-
script for the press, and his gratitude for the courtesies
of his publishers.

Westmoreland Place,
Pasadena, California,
October I, 1918.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER PAGE

PREFACE vii

I THE ATTACK UPON THE CHINESE REPUBLIC
FROM WITHOUT, DURING THE FIRST YEAR
OF THE WAR i

II THE ATTACK UPON THE CHINESE REPUBLIC
FROM WITHIN, DURING THE SECOND YEAR
OF THE WAR 25

III THE PROGRESS IN CHINESE REPUBLICAN

GOVERNMENT, LEADING TO A NEW FOR-
EIGN POLICY 48

IV CHINA'S SEVERANCE OF DIPLOMATIC RELA-

TIONS WITH THE CENTRAL POWERS , . 59

V THE DECLARATION OF WAR AGAINST GER-
MANY AND AUSTRIA 76

VI THE LANSING-ISHII AGREEMENT BETWEEN

AMERICA AND JAPAN CONCERNING CHINA 102

VII THE CHINESE-JAPANESE MILITARY AGREE-
MENT OF 1918 127

VIII CHINA'S FUTURE AS AFFECTED BY THE AIMS

OF THE ALLIES 145

APPENDICES 184

AN INTRODUCTORY BIBLIOGRAPHY ON CHINA . . 252

JST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

Hsu Shih-chang, elected President of the Chinese

Republic, September 4, 1918 . . . Frontispiece

FACING
PAGE

An Outpost of Tsingtao, the German Stronghold in
China 12

Yuan Shih-kai, First President of the Chinese Re-
public 36

Li Yuan-hung, Second President of the Chinese Re-
public 54

Feng Kwo-chang, Third President of the Republic,
and Staff, in Peking, October 10, 1917 ... 90

Viscount Ishii, Japanese Ambassador to America,

and Reception Committee in New York, 1917 . 116

Review at Peking of Chinese Troops, a Detachment

of whom have joined the Allied Forces in Siberia 134

Japanese Troops, in Allied Expeditionary Force in
Siberia 140

Chinese Labor Battalions ready for Embarkation to
France 158

Dr. V. K. Wellington Koo, Chinese Minister to
America, after receiving an honorary degree
from Columbia University in 1917 .... 172

CHINA AND THE WORLD-WAR

CHAPTER I

THE ATTACK UPON THE CHINESE REPUBLIC FROM

WITHOUT, DURING THE FIRST YEAR

OF THE WAR

JAPAN'S CAPTURE OF TSINGTAO AND THE TWENTY-
ONE DEMANDS

THE Great War first burst forth in Europe, but its
effects were felt at once on the opposite side of the
globe. These effects were both immediate and far-
reaching. Momentous as were the results of the first
year of the war in Europe, they were equally signifi-
cant in Asia, and the making of the new map of the
Orient was one of the most important features of the
first stage of the great conflict.

On August i, 1914, Germany declared war on Rus-
sia and France; just two weeks later Japan sent an
ultimatum to Germany, demanding its complete with-
drawal from its possessions in the Pacific. On August
23rd, Japan declared war ; within three months, Tsing-

i

2 CHINA AND THE WORLD-WAR

tao, the Oriental stronghold of the Germans, with the
co-operation of a small British force, was captured,
and the Japanese were installed in Germany's place in
the province of Shantung. Two months later, Japan
presented a series of demands on China, divided into
five groups, the acceptance of which would have placed
China definitely in the position of a vassal state.
After less than four months of negotiations, on May
8, 1915, China accepted four groups of these demands,
leaving the fifth open for future discussion. Thus, in
the first nine months of the first year of the Great War,
Germany's political and military power were eliminated
in the Orient ; Japan had taken over its possessions in
China ; and China had been forced to concede to Japan
extensive territorial rights, economic privileges, and
military concessions of great strategic importance.
Thus the ante-bellum situation in the Far East was
entirely altered, and new problems of international
policy and relations were created. The spark struck
at Sarajevo had, indeed, kindled a world-wide flame;
Europe and Asia, the Occident and the Orient, alike
were to feel its transforming force.

In order fully to comprehend the action of both
China and Japan during this period, an understanding
of their development and international position is
necessary. The summer of 1914 found China still in

THE ATTACK UPON THE CHINESE REPUBLIC 3

the throes of the attempt to gain political stability
within its own boundaries ; to make its newly founded
republic a stable reality. Less than three years before,
on October 10, 1911, a revolution against the existing
Manchu dynasty had broken out; on February 12,
1912, the Manchus signed their Edict of Abdication.
A republican form of government had already been
set up at Nanking, with Doctor Sun Yat-sen as Pro-
visional President; when the Manchus abdicated, Dr.
Sun voluntarily gave place to Yuan Shih-kai, who be-
came the first President of the Chinese Republic. A
provisional constitution was adopted and Peking was
chosen as the capital. Elections to the new National
Assembly were held in the following winter and the
two houses met in Peking in April, 1913. Ever since
the establishment of the Republic, two clearly recog-
nized parties had been in existence; one composed of
the Radicals and the Liberals, made up chiefly of
Southerners, with Dr. Sun as their leader; the other
consisting of Conservatives and the Military Party
who supported Yuan. The writing of the Provisional
Constitution had been done by the Southerners ; it lim-
ited the power of the President and gave Parliament
a large measure of authority. The majority of the
first Parliament were Radicals. There was much fric-
tion between Yuan and the Assembly ; it was increased

4 CHINA AND THE WORLD-WAR

by Yuan's signing, without the consent of Parliament,
a loan with the bankers of the Five Powers, includ-
ing Japan, the United States having withdrawn; by
Yuan's expulsion of various Southerners from of-
fice; and by the assassination of one of their
prominent leaders x in Shanghai, Yuan's govern-
ment being charged by many Southerners with his
murder. Finally the President's command to the
Military Governor of one of the Southern provinces
to give up his office, together with the sending of
Northern troops to enforce the order, brought on
armed resistance and the rebellion of the summer of
1913. Nanking was captured by the Northern troops
and the rebellion collapsed. Dr. Sun Yat-sen and
many of his associates fled to Japan. In October the
Assembly passed the laws which provided for the elec-
tion of the President. On October 6th, Yuan Shih-
kai was elected President by the two Assemblies for
a term of five years; and on the next day, Li Yuan-
hung was elected Vice-President. The United States
and several South American republics had already rec-
ognized the Chinese Republic; now the European
Powers and Japan did the same. Thus the Republic
acquired a recognized international status.

But the drafting of the new constitution was ac-
1 Sung Chiao-jen,

THE ATTACK UPON THE CHINESE REPUBLIC 5

companied by more friction, and finally, on November
4th, Yuan purged the Parliament by expelling the Rad-
ical members; the National Assembly was dissolved
and an Administrative Council was formed in its place.
On May i, 1914, a constitution designated as the
Constitutional Compact, which had been drawn up by
a conference organized in March, was promulgated.
Professor F. J. Goodnow, of Columbia University,
who had been appointed Constitutional Adviser, had
a large influence in forming this instrument. This
constitution gave large powers to the President, grant-
ing him practically an absolute veto-power and the
right to re-election after a term of ten years. It pro-
vided for a One-chamber Parliament. After drawing
it up, the Constitutional Compact Conference worked
out provisions for a Council of State with the vice-
president as speaker, which would act as a legisla-
tive body until a new assembly could be elected. This
Council of State began its work on June 30, 1914. It
had before it the amendment of the laws governing the
presidential elections, to make them conform to the
new compact; and the laws concerning the formation
of the new Parliament.

This, then, was the situation in China at the out-
break of the Great War. From her own viewpoint,
her problems were almost entirely internal ; her whole

6 CHINA AND THE WORLD-WAR

mind was bent on the task of building up a republic
in place of the old empire. She faced enormous diffi-
culties in the lack of a system of universal education,
of adequate transportation facilities, of modern means
of industrial production and manufacture, and of any
general development of her natural resources. She
had to adjust her meagre finances to the pressure and
demands of a government of the twentieth century,
and she seemed to be tending toward an autocratic gov-
ernment under the guise of a republic. She had little
energy to spare for new foreign relations and, when
the war broke out, as a matter of course, she at once
announced her neutrality.

There was some hope that Chinese territory would
not be involved in the military operations of the con-
flict; but the ultimatum of Japan to Germany on
August 1 5th at once brought the war to China's doors.
Japan, in sending this ultimatum, avowedly acted as the
ally of Great Britain. The rise of Japan in power
and international prestige had been meteoric. In com-
paratively few years she had broken away from her
seclusion; had set up a monarchy in place of a feudal
state; and had definitely turned her face toward prog-
ress and reform. In this step she was a full generation
in advance of China, from which country she had or-

THE ATTACK UPON THE CHINESE REPUBLIC 7

iginally drawn her written language, her arts, and much
of her civilization. As a result of two victorious wars
she had sprung into the front-rank of world powers.
In 1895 s h e had won Formosa and the neighbouring
Pescadores Islands from China ; Korea had been made
independent, and the Liaotung Peninsula, including
Port Arthur, had been ceded to Japan. This last terri-
tory Japan was forced to return to China on representa-
tions of Russia, Germany and France; but in 1905,
after the victory over Russia, Port Arthur and the Rus-
sian railways and privileges in that section were finally
won. All Russia's concessions and powers in Southern
Manchuria were given to Japan, and her paramount in-
terests were recognized in Korea. In 1910, Korea was
formally annexed. In 1911, at the time of the Chi-
nese revolution against the Manchus, Mongolia became
virtually independent, and Japan began to turn her
attention to the eastern and inner portions of that
province which bordered the Japanese possessions in
Southern Manchuria.

In the meantime in Europe, friendly relations were
being built up between Great Britain, France and Rus-
sia ; their community of interests was evident at Alge-
ciras and in Persia. Japan was admitted into this
friendship first in 1902, by the formation of the Anglo-

8 CHINA AND THE WORLD-WAR

Japanese alliance, which was revised and extended in
1905 and 1911: and, in 1907, in the agreement be-
tween France and Japan regarding Far-Eastern affairs,
which paved the way for a reconciliation with France's
ally, Russia. In 1909, the United States suggested in
the interests of the open-door that the Manchurian
railways be neutralized but, as an answer, in July,
1910, Russia and Japan entered into an agreement to
preserve the status quo 1 without compliance with the
American request. Thus in two decades the Japanese
Empire had risen to a place of equality among the
great nations, and it had gained the power to adapt
and enforce her own foreign policy in the world-tur-
moil produced by the Great War.

The Anglo-Japanese Alliance contained the follow-
ing stipulations :

" If by reason of an unprovoked attack or aggres-
sive action, wherever arising, either of the High Con-
tracting Powers should be involved in war in defence of
its territorial rights or special interests, ... the other
High Contracting Party will at once come to the assist-
ance of its ally and will conduct the war in common
and make peace in mutual agreement with it."

1 This was to be followed in 1016 by a Russo-Japanese agree-
ment providing for mutual assistance in case cither's posses-
sions in the Far East were threatened by a third power.

THE ATTACK UPON THE CHINESE REPUBLIC 9

When Japan accordingly mobilized its army and its
fleet and, on August 15th, sent its ultimatum to Ger-
many, its demands were two-fold:

" First, to withdraw immediately from Japanese
and Chinese waters German men-of-war and armed
vessels of all kinds, and to disarm at once those that
cannot be withdrawn.

" Second, To deliver on a date not later than Sep-
tember isth to the Imperial Japanese authorities, with-
out condition or compensation, the entire leased terri-
tory of Kiaochow, with a view to the eventual restora-
tion of the same to China."

A reply* within a week was demanded and, none
being received, Japan declared war.

Considerable uneasiness was evident in the Orient
concerning Japan's ultimate intentions, and several
statements were made by Japanese statesmen to allay
these suspicions. Thus on the day Japan's ultimatum
was delivered to Germany, Count Okuma, the Pre-
mier, sent a telegram to the press in America, saying:
" Japan's proximity to China breeds many absurd ru-
mours ; but I declare that Japan acts with a clear con-
science in conformity with justice, and in perfect
accord with her Ally. Japan has no territorial ambi-
tions and hopes to stand as the protector of the peace
in the Orient." Again, in August 24th, he tele-

10 CHINA AND THE WORLD-WAR

graphed a message to The Independent (New York),
saying in part : " As Premier of Japan, I have stated
and I now again state to the people of America and
of the world- that Japan has no ulterior motive, no
desire to secure more territory, no thought of depriv-
ing China or other peoples of anything which they now
possess. My government and my people have given
their pledge, which will be as honourably kept as Japan
always keeps promises."

On September 2, Japanese troops were landed on the
coast of Shantung Province from where they marched
overland to Tsingtao. China's fears concerning the
possibility of its neutrality being violated seemed jus-
tified, as the Japanese army took possession of various
towns and cities in the interior, as well as the railroad
to the provincial capital; assumed control of the means
of communication; and made requisitions upon the
Chinese population. A small force of British troops
were landed inside the German leased territory and
co-operated nominally in the siege of Tsingtao. On
November 16, the city surrendered and the German
military and naval power in the Far East was elim-
inated.

Japan now had an opportunity to survey the world
situation as affected by the war and to orient itself in
relation to it By the end of 1914 it was apparent

THE ATTACK UPON THE CHINESE REPUBLIC II

that the war would not end quickly: momentous
changes in national alignments were in progress; and
an unequalled opportunity seemed to present itself in
Japan for satisfying various territorial and economic
ambitions. As later events demonstrated, these ambi-
tions and aims were five in number. First, to suc-
ceed Germany in its position and possessions in Shan-
tung; second, to consolidate the Manchurian territory-
won in the war with Russia and to add to it a part
of Mongolia; third, to gain a controlling share in the
iron output of China; fourth, to secure the military
safety of Japan by rendering impossible the lease of
any of China's ports or coastal islands; fifth, if pos-
sible, to enter into such close economic, military and
political relations with China, as to make it, with all
its vast resources, tributary to Japan. These five aims
were expressed in the Twenty-one Demands served on
China on January 18, 1915.

The review of these demands by any true friend of
Japan is not a pleasant task. It is only fair to say
that the liberal-minded statesmen of the Empire, be-
cause of the international suspicion aroused, look upon
these demands with regret Every friend of Japan
and China hopes that the agreements will be reviewed
at the final Peace Conference in the light of the prin-
ciples for which the Allies are fighting.

12 CHINA AND THE WORLD- WAR

Before the demands were presented to China there
were various rumours current concerning them.
Many Japanese statements were made advocating a
more aggressive policy towards China. Perhaps the
most important of these was a secret memorandum
of the Black Dragon Society (so-named from its con-
nection with the " Black Dragon " province of Man-
churia). 1 This statement was by chance disclosed
some months after the serving of the Twenty-one De-
mands. After outlining the world's situation as it
affected China and Japan, it emphasized the necessity
of solving the Chinese question at once and of form-
ing a defensive military alliance with China, and named
most of the objectives which were sought later in the
Japanese Demands. It also contained a surprisingly
accurate forecast of Japanese foreign policy as a re-
sult of the war.

As already indicated in the ultimatum to Germany
and in Count Okuma's message to America, Japan
had made statements concerning the return of Kiao-
chow and concerning any attempt to secure more ter-
ritory or privileges from China. But a change of
mind was indicated in December by certain statements
made in the Japanese Parliament by Baron Kato, Min-
ister of Foreign Affairs. Having been asked if Kiao-
1 See Appendix I

THE ATTACK UPON THE CHINESE REPUBLIC 13

chow would be returned to China, he stated that the
question regarding its future was at present unan-
swerable, and further that Japan had never committed
herself to return Kiaochow to China. This changed
attitude was revealed again in the ultimatum which
Japan presented to China in May to force acceptance
of the Twenty-one Demands. In this ultimatum Japan
used the non-restoration of Kiaochow as a weapon
with which to coerce China into an acceptance of the
Demands. In the ultimatum, she said in part, " From
the commercial and military points of view, Kiao-
chow is an important place, in the acquisition of which
the Japanese Empire sacrificed much blood and money,
and after its acquisition, the Empire incurs no obliga-
tion to restore it to China." Then, in an accompany-
ing note, she added : " If the Chinese Government ac-
cepts all the articles as demanded in the ultimatum, the
offer of the Japanese Government to restore Kiaochow
to China, made on the twenty-sixth of April, will still
hold good." In other words, Japan was holding Kiao-
chow as a pawn to bargain with, and would continue
to hold this territory, unless her other demands were
satisfied.

The entire group of requests concerning Shantung,
as contained in Group I of the original Twenty-one
Demands, was as follows :

14 CHINA AND THE WORLD- WAR

GROUP I

" Art. i. The Chinese Government engages to give
full assent to all matters- upon which the Japanese
Government may hereafter agree with the rights of
the German Government relating to the disposition of
all rights, interests and concessions, which Germany,
by virtue of treaties or otherwise, possesses in rela-
tion to the Province of Shantung.

"Art. 2. The Chinese Government engages that
within the Province of Shantung and along its coast
no territory or island will be ceded or leased to a third
Power under any pretext.

"Art. 3. The Chinese Government consents to
Japan's building a railway from Chefoo or Lungkow
to join the Kiaochow-Tsinanfu railway.

" Art. 4. The Chinese Government engages, in the
interest of trade and for the residence of foreigners,
to open by herself as soon as possible certain important
cities and towns in the Province of Shantung as Com-
mercial Ports. What places shall be opened are to be
jointly decided upon in a separate agreement"

The second group of demands dealt with the Jap-
anese sphere in Manchuria and Mongolia: As the
result of the war with Russia, Japan had secured a

THE ATTACK UPON THE CHINESE REPUBLIC 15

twenty-five year lease on Port Arthur and control of
the neighbouring railways and Russia's rights in
Southern Manchuria. She was looking with longing
eyes towards Eastern Inner Mongolia, but as yet had
no rights there. Now, in a preamble to this second
group, Japan stated that the " Chinese Government
has always acknowledged the special position enjoyed
by Japan in South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mon-
golia," and demanded a ninety-nine year lease of Port
Arthur and the important railways of that region ; and
privileges of trade and mining and residence in both
Manchuria and Mongolia alike. These privileges
went far beyond any granted in other provinces of
China, They practically transformed Southern Man-
churia and Eastern Inner Mongolia into Japanese de-
pendencies. The detailed Demands were:

GROUP II

" The Japanese Government and the Chinese Gov-
ernment, since the Chinese Government has always
acknowledged the special position enjoyed by Japan in
South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia, agree
to the following articles:

"Art. i. The two Contracting Parties mutually
agree that the term of lease of Port Arthur and Dalny

l6 CHINA AND THE WORLD-WAR

and the term of lease of the South Manchurian Rail-
way and the Antung-Mukden Railway shall be ex-
tended to the period of 99 years.

"Art. 2. Japanese subjects in South Manchuria
and Eastern Inner Mongolia shall have the right to
lease or own land required either for erecting suitable
buildings for trade and manufacture or for farming.

" Art. 3. Japanese subjects shall be free to reside
and travel in South Manchuria and Eastern Inner
Mongolia and to engage in business and in manufac-
ture of any kind whatsoever.

" Art. 4. The Chinese Government agrees to grant
to Japanese subjects the right of opening the mines
in South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia.
As regards what mines are to be opened, they shall be
decided upon jointly.

"Art. 5. The Chinese Government agrees that in
respect of the (two) cases mentioned herein below the
Japanese Government's consent shall be first obtained
before action is taken:

" (a) Whenever permission is granted to the sub-
ject of a third Power to build a railway or to make a
loan with a third Power for the purpose of building a
railway in South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mon-
golia.

THE ATTACK UPON THE CHINESE REPUBLIC I/

"(t>) Whenever a loan is to be made with a third
Power pledging the local taxes of South Manchuria
and Eastern Inner Mongolia as security.

" Art. 6. The Chinese Government agrees that if
the Chinese Government employs political, financial or
military advisers or instructors in South Manchuria or
Eastern Inner Mongolia, the Japanese Government
shall first be consulted.

" Art. 7. The Chinese Government agrees that the
control and management of the Kirin-Changchun Rail-
way shall be handed over to the Japanese Government
for a term of 99 years dating from the signing of this
Agreement."

Japan has not a sufficient supply of iron ore ; China
is rich in this mineral; and the solution was obvious.
In Group III the largest iron company in China was to
be made a joint concern, and the future mining opera-
tions of the Yangtze Valley were to be placed within
Japanese control. The Agreement read:

GROUP III

" The Japanese Government and the Chinese Gov-
ernment, seeing that Japanese financiers and the Han-
yehping Co. have close relations with each other at

1 8 CHINA AND THE WORLD-WAR

present and desiring that the common interests of
the two nations shall be advanced, agree to the follow-
ing articles :

"Art. i. The two Contracting Parties mutually
agree that when the opportune moment arrives the
Hanyehping Company shall be made a joint concern
of the two nations and they further agree that without
the previous consent of Japan, China shall not by her
own act dispose of the rights and property of whatso-
ever nature of the said Company nor cause the said
Company to dispose freely of the same.

" Art. 2. The Chinese Government agrees that all
mines in the neighbourhood of those owned by the
Hanyehping Company shall not be permitted, without
the consent of the said Company, to be worked by
other persons outside of the said Company; and
further agrees that if it is desired to carry out any un-
dertaking which, it is apprehended, may directly or in-
directly affect the interests of the said Company, the
consent of the said Company shall first be obtained/'

Group IV involved Japanese control over Chinese
coasts, which would ward off any future military
measure by another Power. It read :

THE ATTACK UPON THE CHINESE REPUBLIC 19

GROUP IV

" The Japanese Government and the Chinese Gov-
ernment with the object of effectively preserving the
territorial integrity of China agree to the following
special articles :

" The Chinese Government engages not to cede or
lease to a third Power any harbour or bay or island
along the coast of China."

But the real extent of the Japanese ambitions was
revealed in Group V. A new sphere Fukien was
named, and the right to build strategic railways from
the coast up the Yangtse River Valley was requested.
In addition, China was to employ Japanese advisers in
political, financial and military affairs ; police-courts in
important cities were to be jointly administered;
China's arsenals and war munitions were to be con-
trolled by Japan. These demands, if granted, would
have put China definitely in the position of a vassal
state of Japan. They were practically the same as
the terms forced upon Korea before its annexation.
In detail they were :

V

"Art. i. The Chinese Central Government shall
employ influential Japanese advisers in political,
financial and military affairs.

20 CHINA AND THE WORLD-WAR

" Art. 2. Japanese hospitals, churches and schools
in the interior of China shall be granted the right of
owning land.

"Art. 3. Inasmuch as the Japanese Government
and the Chinese Government have had many cases of
dispute between Japanese and Chinese police to settle,
cases which caused no little misunderstanding, it is for
this reason necessary that the police departments of
important places (in China) shall be jointly adminis-
tered by Japanese and Chinese or that the police de-
partments pf these places shall employ numerous Jap-
anese, so that they may at the same time help to plan
for the improvement of the Chinese Police Service.

" Art. 4. China shall purchase from Japan a fixed
amount of munitions of war (say 50% or more) of
what is needed by the Chinese Government; or that
there shall be established in China a Sino-Japanese
jointly-worked arsenal. Japanese technical experts
are to be employed and Japanese material to be pur-
chased.

" Art 5. China agrees to grant to Japan the right
of constructing a railway connecting Wuchang with
Kiukiang and Nanchang, another line between Nan-
chang and Hangchow, and another between Nanchang
and Chaochou.

" Art. 6. If China needs foreign capital to work

THE ATTACK UPON THE CHINESE REPUBLIC 21

mines, build railways and construct harbour-works
(including dock-yards) in the Provinces of Fukien,
Japan shall be first consulted.

" Art. 7. China agrees that Japanese subjects shall
have the right of missionary propaganda in China." 1

These Twenty-one Demands were rather curiously
prefaced by the statement : " The Japanese Govern-
ment and the Chinese Government, being desirous of
maintaining the general peace in Eastern Asia and
further strengthening the good neighbourhood between
the two nations, agree to the following." They were
presented by the Japanese Minister directly to the Pres-
ident, Yuan Shih-kai. The utmost secrecy was main-
tained and, when rumours became current, the Japanese
Government officially denied their existence. A
month later, it issued a statement listing only eleven
demands, Group V and the more objectional requests
being omitted. On April 26th, in place of the original
Twenty-one Demands, twenty-four were presented
with slightly different wording. On May 7, an ulti-
matum was sent by Japan, demanding the immediate
acceptance of the first four groups and threatening
force if a favourable answer was not received. The
fifth group was to -be held over for future negotiations.

1 Refers to preaching Buddhism.

22 CHINA AND THE WORLD-WAR

On May 8, China submitted, at the same time affirming
in a supplementary statement that it was forced to take
this step and that it would not be responsible for any
consequent infringements upon the treaty rights of
other nations or the principle of the " Open Door."

The conclusion of these negotiations marked the
winning by Japan of most of its original objectives.
The hope of making China entirely subservient had not
been realized, but Japan's power over the Republic had
been enormously increased and the acquiring of final
control seemed only a matter of time. The situation
was summed up by Dr. Stanley K. Hornbeck, a lead-
ing authority on Far Eastern affairs, as follows :

" Whatever her intentions, Japan has accomplished
in regard to China at least five things : she has consoli-
dated her own position in her northern sphere of influ-
ence, Manchuria; she has driven the Germans out of
their former sphere of influence, Shantung, and has
constituted herself successor to Germany's rights; she
has given warning that she considers Fukien Province
an exclusive sphere for Japanese influence ; she has un-
dertaken to invade the British sphere of influence ; and
she stands in a position to menace and to dictate to
the Peking government. A glance at the map of
North China will show how completely Peking is at
Tapan's mercv. In control of Port Arthur and nf th^

THE ATTACK UPON THE CHINESE REPUBLIC 23

Shantung Peninsula, Japan commands the entrance to
the Gulf of Pechili, which is the doorway by sea to
Tien-tsin and Newchwang. In possession of Tsing-
tao, Dairen, and (virtually) of Antung and New-
chwang, Japan thus commands every important port
and harbour of the Yangtse. With the Manchurian
railways penetrating the heart of Manchuria and the
Shantung Railway extending to the heart of Shantung
and with the right to extend the latter line to join
the Peking-Hankow line Japan is in a position,
should she so choose, at any moment to grind Peking
between the millstones of her military machine. So
far as strategy is concerned, Japan has North China
commercially, militarily, and politically at her mercy." x

The interest aroused among the nations by these ne-
gotiations was, of course, keen, and the matter at-
tracted world-wide publicity. The United States was
the only great power not involved in the war in Eu-
rope, and it was perhaps natural that it should be the
one country openly to voice a protest against the set-
tlement. On May 16 she delivered the following note
to the Chinese Government at Peking and to the Japan-
ese Government at Tokyo :

" In view of the circumstances of the negotiations

1 S, K. Hornbeck, Contemporary Politics in the Far-East, page

24 CHINA AND THE WORLD-WAR

which have taken place or which are now pending be-
tween the Government of China and the Government
of Japan and the agreements which have been reached
and as a result thereof, the Government of the United
States has the honour to notify the Government of the
Chinese Republic that it cannot recognize any agree-
ment or undertaking which has been entered into, or
which may be entered into between the Governments
of China and Japan impairing the treaty rights of the
United States and its citizens in China, the political or
territorial integrity of the Republic of China, or the
international policy, commonly known as the open door
policy."

Thus the first year of the Great War brought
changes of the most vital importance to the Orient.
Whether or not these changes shall become permanent
can be decided only at the conference which will come
at the close of the world-conflict.

CHAPTER II

THE ATTACK UPON THE CHINESE REPUBLIC FROM

WITHIN, DURING THE SECOND YEAR

OF THE WAR

THE ATTEMPT OF YUAN SHIH-KAI TO RESTORE THE
MONARCHY

THE first year of the war brought vital changes in
China's foreign relations, especially in those with
Japan. The second year saw changes within the coun-
try of almost as great importance.

These changes, in their ultimate result, were in line
with the world tendencies of the present time toward
democracy and popular government Writing in
August, 1916, to the New York Times, the author
tried to sum up the events of the preceding months,
saying in part :

" If it were not for the all-absorbing cataclysm in
Europe, all eyes would be turned toward the Orient
and the great movements now in evidence there. Cer-
tainly the developments in India and Japan since the
Great War began are of vast importance in the mould-
ing of the future of Asia. But it is in China, espe-

25

26 CHINA AND THE WORLD-WAR

cially during the past year, that events of unique inter-
est have taken place. The sudden clamour for the
change of the infant republic into a monarchy, which
began last fall ; the continued agitation for this trans-
formation in the form of government, culminating on
Dec. ii in the unanimous vote of the Convention of
Representatives of the Citizens for a Monarchy, with
Yuan Shih-kai at its head; the gradual appearance of
a most serious opposition, resulting in the revolt of the
southern provinces; the sudden cancellation of the
monarchial project by Yuan Shih-kai on March 22;
the effort to oust Yuan as President, ending dramat-
ically with his death on June 6, and the election of Li
Yuan-hung as President in his stead; these are a
few of the main events in a most absorbing, hard-won
fight between democracy and autocracy in the Far
East. , . . In this fight for the republic in China,
America should have a very real interest and sym-
pathy."

The summer of 1915 found China just recovering
from the shock of the Japanese aggressions ; in retalia-
tion, the country was entering upon a nation-wide boy-
cott of Japanese goods and productions. Attempts
were being made to raise a National Salvation Fund to
be applied toward strengthening the nation in every
possible way. The gifts toward this latter cause were

THE ATTACK UPON THE CHINESE REPUBLIC 2/

from all classes ; one ricksha coolie in a certain city was
said to have given to the fund forty Mexican dollars,
the saving of his entire lifetime:

Ever since the dissolution of Parliament in Novem-
ber, 1913, Yuan Shih-kai had been moving toward a
centralized government, with the power in the hands of
a few of his lieutenants. There were open suggestions
of a return to a monarchy. The Japanese demands
hastened this entire movement. In support of a return
to the monarchy the arguments were in the main three :
first, that a monarchy, and one of militaristic tenden-
cies, was stronger than a Republic. Germany and
Japan were cited as examples. Second, that at the
close of the war, if there were not a strong govern-
ment if the right of succession were not clear
and if civil strife, which seemed common in a Repub-
lic, continued ; the other nations would step in and
take control of China and would put a ruler of their
own choosing on the throne, just as Japan had done in
Korea before its annexation. A third reason was the
wish of the eldest son of Yuan Shih-kai to succeed his
father as Emperor.

Shortly after the Japanese ultimatum in May, the
Chou An Hui (Society for the Preservation of Peace)
was organized with the purpose of spreading propa-
ganda in support of the monarchical idea. A pamphlet

28 CHINA AND THE WORLD-WAR

by a scholar called Yang Tu was circulated in August,
giving the reasons for the proposed change. It was
entitled " A Defence of the Monarchical Movement,"
and was in the form of a dialogue between a stranger
and a citizen of the Republic. Three excerpts will be
sufficient to exhibit its type of reasoning.

" The people of a republic are accustomed to listen
to the talk of equality and freedom which must effect
the political and more especially the military adminis-
tration. . . . But the German and Japanese troops ob-
serve strict discipline and obey the orders of their
chiefs. That is why they are regarded as the best
soldiers in the world. France and America are in a
different position. They are rich but not strong. The
sole difference is that Germany and Japan are ruled
by monarchs while France and America are republics.
Our conclusion therefore is that no republic can be
strong. . . . The best thing for us to do is to adopt
part of the Prussian and part of the Japanese in our
constitution-making. . . .

" The vital question of the day, setting aside all
paper talk, is whether or not China has a suitable man
to succeed President Yuan Shih-kai. . . . Confusion
and disturbance will follow with great rapidity. Then
foreign countries which have entertained wild am-
bitions, availing themselves of the distressful situation

THE ATTACK UPON THE CHINESE REPUBLIC 29

in China, will stir up ill-feelings among these parties
and so increase the disturbances. When the proper
time comes, various countries, unwilling to let a single
country enjoy the privilege of controlling China, will
resort to armed intervention. In consequence the east-
ern problem will end in a rupture of the international
peace. Whether China will be turned at that time into
a battleground for the Chinese people or for the for-
eign Powers I cannot tell you. It is too dreadful to
think of the future which is enshrouded in a veil of
mystery. However, I can tell you that the result of
this awful turmoil will be either the slicing of China
like a melon or the suppression of internal trouble with
foreign assistance which will lead to dismemberment.
As to the second result some explanation is necessary.
After foreign countries have helped us to suppress in-
ternal disturbances, they will select a man of the type
of Li Wang of Korea, who betrayed his country to
Japan, and make him Emperor of China. Whether
this man will be the deposed emperor or a member of
the Imperial family or the leader of the rebel party,
remains to be seen. In any event he will be a figure-
head in whose hand will not be vested political, finan-
cial and military power, which will be controlled by
foreigners. All the valuable mines, various kinds of
industries - and our abundant natural resources, will

30 CHINA AND THE WORLD-WAR

likewise be developed by others. China will thus dis-
appear as a nation." *

Here in very glaring terms was shown the fear of
attempting to work out a democracy in a world of sup-
posedly militaristic nations. China was afraid to go
on with the experiment. The only safety seemed to
lie in a reversion to armed autocracy. The Asiatic
world was not " safe for democracy," and China had
no friend whom she could trust to make it safe for
her to continue her attempts in that direction.

All these factors became clear later, but to observers
living in China, the political situation in the fall of
1915 was full of mystery. Since the dissolution of
Parliament the republic had been one in name rather
than in fact; but the speed with which the monarchical
movement gained headway surprised most onlookers.
The sentiment among the middle and lower classes of
the Yangtze Valley and the south seemed strongly
against the monarchy and against Yuan Shih-kai for
apparently supporting it. The writer talked with men
of all classes ricksha-coolies, Confucian scholars,
Buddhist priests, and returned students, and every one,
after taking due precaution against being overheard,
came out in support of the republic and denounced

1 Putnam-Weale, The Fight for the Republic in China, pages
151 and 161.

THE ATTACK UPON THE CHINESE REPUBLIC 31

Yuan. Dr. Morrison, after a tour of inspection of the
Yang-tse Valley, described the sentiment of the people
as one of " solid resentment " against the whole move-
ment. The feeling was even stronger in the south.

There were certain indications even then that Yuan
Shih-kai was acquiescent in, if, indeed, not a supporter
of, the monarchical movement. Persistent rumours
came from close friends of his in the capital that he
was influenced by his son to make the change for the
latter's benefit as his successor. Only former officials
and friends of the administration were allowed to vote
in December. The editor of one of the Monarchist
newspapers in Shanghai, which was blown up by the
Republicans, stated outright amid the smoking ruins
of his office that he had special permission from the
Central Government for his propaganda. But the
publication by the Republican Government in the fol-
lowing summer of over sixty secret communications of
Yuan Shih-kai's Government preceding and during the
election in the Fall brought out clearly the entire situa-
tion; the whole monarchical effort, in the words of
Putnam Weale of Peking, was stamped as " a cool and
singular plan to forge a national mandate which has
few equals in history."

In publicly beginning its propaganda in August, fol-
lowing the publishing of the pamphlet by Yang Tu,

32 CHINA AND THE WORLD-WAR

the monarchical movement very cleverly used a state-
ment of Dr. Francis J. Goodnow, President of Johns
Hopkins University, and political adviser to the Chi-
nese Government. Dr. Goodnow's opinion was purely
an academic one; he stated that a change from a repub-
lic to a monarchy could be successfully made under
three conditions: first, that the peace of the country
was not thereby imperiled; second, that the laws of
succession should first be securely fixed; third, pro-
vision should be made for some form of constitutional
government. Of course, the Monarchists, in quoting
this opinion, entirely omitted these conditional clauses.

On Aug. 16 the Chou An Hui published its first
manifesto referring to this statement. Yuan Shih-kai,
in a speech before the State Council, said among other
things : " I regard the proposed change as unsuitable
to the circumstances of the country." But on Aug. 30
the first secret telegram was dispatched from Peking
concerning the proposed change of government. It
was a code telegram to the Military and Civil Gov-
ernors of the provinces, to be deciphered personally by
them with the Council of State code. After certain
initial steps are mentioned in detail, the document
reads :

" The plan suggested is for each province to send ir
a separate petition, the draft of which will be made ir

THE ATTACK UPON THE CHINESE REPUBLIC 33

Peking and wired to the respective provinces in due
course. . . . You will insert your own name as well
as those of the gentry and merchants of the province
who agree to the draft. These petitions are to be
presented one by one to the Legislative Council as soon
as it is convoked. At all events, the change in the
form of the State will have to be effected under colour
of carrying out the people's will." *

The Monarchical Society, realizing that matters had
progressed sufficiently by this time for it to assert
itself, on Sept. 27, under the leadership of Yang Tu
0$d Sun Yu-chun, dispatched a code telegram to the
Military and Civil Governors, asserting that all danger
of a true expression of provincial wishes must be erad-
icated. The telegram offers suggestions regarding the
government of the different districts and then con-
cludes :

" In order to clothe the proceedings with an appear-
ance of regularity, the representatives of the districts,
though they are really appointed by the highest mili-
tary and civil officials of the province, should still be

1 The telegrams and communications quoted in this chapter ap-
pear in full in a publication of the Republican Government of
China with the title: "The People's Will: An Exposure of the
Political Intrigues at Peking Against the Republic of China," and
in the columns of the Peking Case tie.

34 CHINA AND THE WORLD-WAR

nominally elected by the districts. As soon as the
representatives of the districts have been appointed,
their names should be communicated to the respective
district magistrates, who are to be instructed to draw
up the necessary documents in detail, and to cause a
formal election to be held. Such documents should,
however, be properly antedated."

On Sept. 29 Chu Chi-chun, Military Governor of
Mukden, representing the Administrative Council,
telegraphed as follows :

" While the plan of organization is determined by
the Administrative Council, the carrying out of tf*t
ulterior object of such plan rests with the superinten-
dents in chief of the election. They should, therefore,
assume a controlling influence over the election pro-
ceedings and utilize them to the best advantage. The
representatives of the citizens should be elected, one
for each district wherever possible, from among the
officials who are connected with the various Govern-
ment organs in the provincial capital, so that there
may be no misunderstanding as to the real object of
voting."

This telegram indicated that the representative or-
gan of the people was under the control of high officials
and was " utilized " by them " to the best advantage,"
and that the representatives themselves were to be

THE ATTACK UPON THE CHINESE REPUBLIC 35

chosen from among those connected with the Govern-
ment organizations in the various provincial capitals.

On October 1 1 the National Convention Bureau sent
the following telegram :

" The future peace and safety of the nation depend
upon the documents exchanged between the Govern-
ment organs and Peking and those in the provinces.
Should any of these come to the notice of the public,
the blame for failure to keep official secrets will be laid
upon us. Moreover, as these documents concern the
very foundation of the State, they will, in case they be-
come known, leave a dark spot on the political history
of our country. Upon their secrecy depends our na-
tional honour and prestige in the eyes of both our own
people and foreigners. . . . We hope you will appoint
one of your confidential subordinates to be specially
responsible for the safe custody of the secret docu-
ments/'

. Despite the increasing unrest among the people, a
circular telegram was dispatched on Oct. 23, which
apparently " drove the last nail into the coffin of the
Chinese Republic." It was a nomination of Yuan
Shih-kai, and read :

" The letters of nomination to be sent in after the
form of state shall have been put to the vote, must
contain the following words : * We, the citizens' rep-

36 CHINA AND THE WORLD-WAR

resentatives, by virtue of the will of the citizens, <io
hereby respectfully nominate the present President
Yuan Shih-kai as Emperor of the Chinese Empire, and
invest him to the fullest extent with all the supreme
sovereign rights of the State. He is appointed by
Heaven to ascend the Throne and to transmit it to his
heirs for ten thousand generations.' These characters,
forty-five in all, must not be altered on any account.

" Before the form of the State has been settled, the
letters of nomination must not be made public. A
reply is requested."

A few days later Oct. 28 the attention of the
Central Government was drawn by Japan, England,
and Russia (later supported by France and Italy as
allies) toward the inadvisability of taking steps that
would threaten the peace of China; but Lu Cheng-
hsiang, Minister of Foreign Affairs, replied that it
was too late to retract, as the matter had already been
decided. When their surprise over this unexpected
reply had subsided, those in charge of the plot sent the
following state telegram to the provinces :

t A certain foreign power, under the pretext that
the Chinese people are not of one mind and that
troubles are to be apprehended, has lately forced Eng-
land and Russia to take part in tendering advice to
China. In truth, all foreign nations know perfectly

Copyright by unacrwood & Underwood, N, Y.
Yuan Shih-kai, First President of the Chinese Republic.

THE ATTACK UPON THE CHINESE REPUBLIC 37

well that there will be no trouble, and they are obliged
to follow the example of that power. If we accept
the advice of other powers concerning our domestic
affairs and postpone the enthronement, we should be
recognizing their right to interfere. Hence, action
should under no circumstances be deferred. When
all the votes of the provinces unanimously recommend-
ing the enthronement shall have reached Peking, the
Government will, of course, ostensibly assume a waver-
ing and compromising attitude, so as to give due re-
gard to international relations. The people, on the
other hand, should show their firm determination to
proceed with the matter at all costs, so as to let the
foreign powers know that our people are of one mind.
If we can only make them believe that the change of
the republic into a monarchy will not in the least give
rise to trouble of any kind, the effects of the advice
tendered by Japan will ipso facto come to naught/' l
On Dec. 21 was played the last act in the drama.
Forty-eight hours before General Tsai Ao threw down
the gauntlet in Yunnan, because of the strange quiet
that pervaded the country the Monarchists boldly de-
termined to pay no further heed to any suggestion that

i There is evidence for the view that Japan at first encouraged
Yuan in his monarchical aspirations, and then suddenly reversed
its position.

38 CHINA AND THE WORLD-WAR

they withdraw from their purpose, even though force
be threatened. For it had been discovered, after the
ballot boxes were opened on Dec. u that every voter
had cast his ballot for Yuan Shih-kai to be Emperor !
And he, isolated in his palace from the populace and
deceived by his followers, had accepted the nomina-
tion.

All that remained now was to blot out every trace
of the conspiracy, that the deceit " should not stain the
opening pages of the history of the new dynasty,"
as a later telegram read, which is in part quoted below :

" No matter how carefully their secrets may have
been guarded (it asserts), still they remain as perma-
nent records which might compromise us; and in the
event of their becoming known to foreigners we shall
not escape severe criticism and bitter attacks, and, what
is worse, should they be handed down as part of the
national records, they will stain the opening pages of
the history of the new dynasty. The Central Govern-
ment, after carefully considering the matter, has con-
cluded that it would be better to sort out and burn the
documents so as to remove all unnecessary records and
prevent regrettable consequences. For these reasons
you are hereby requested to sift out all telegrams, let-
ters, and dispatches concerning the changes in the form
of the State, whether official or private, whether re-

THE ATTACK UPON THE CHINESE REPUBLIC 39

ceived from Peking or the provinces (excepting those
required by law to be filed on record), and cause the
same to be burned in your presence."

Such intrigues were certain to bear fruit, and on
Dec. 23, Tsai Ao and Tang Chi-yao, Governors of
Yunnan, revolted, and blazed the way for the rebel-
lion which ultimately should oust Yuan from power.
They declared that Yuan had been guilty of "delib-
erately misrepresenting the people's will by induce-
ments and threats/' and took their stand once more for
the republic. Yunnan was followed by Kweichow.

Despite- this protest, the beginning of the new
dynasty 1 was set for January i, 1916, and the
Government buildings in the larger cities were dec-
orated with the national flag in honour of the event
Memorials praying for an early ascension of the
throne were sent to Peking by various Monarchists.
But on January 26, Yuan Shih-kai, dubbed the " Ta
Huang Ti" ("Great Emperor") by the Peking
Gazette, a Republican sympathizer, announced that
the enthronement would be postponed : " The Prov-
ince of Yunnan is opposing the Central Govern-
ment and under some pretext a rebellion has been
raised in these regions. . . . We are profoundly
grieved to confess that a portion of the people are dis-

1 Called Hung Hsien.

40 CHINA AND THE WORLJD-WAR

satisfied with us. ... To perform the ceremony of
enthronement at this juncture would, therefore, set our
heart on thorns. The enthronement will have to be
postponed to a date when the affairs in Yunnan are
again under control/*

The month of February was one of speculation and
of discouragement on the part of the Republicans.
The control of the military forces of the north was
tightened in all suspected centres ; Nanking, which had
been the hotbed of revolution for the last four years,
was practically under martial law; soldiers with fixed
bayonets patrolled the streets ; signs were put up in the
tea houses and Government schools forbidding any dis-
cussion of political affairs; infractions of this rule
were severely punished. But the unrest continued, a
statement of one of the scholars in Nanking being in-
dicative of public sentiment in general. On being
asked by the author what he thought of the new flag
which the Monarchists proposed for the nation, he said
he thought the best design would be a white flag with
a great black spot in the centre (for Yuan Shih-kai).

This dissatisfaction found active expression in the
revolt on March 17 of Kuangsi, which made, among
others, the following demands upon the Central Gov-
ernment : The cancellation of the empire and reinsti-
tution of the republican form of government; the abdi-

THE ATTACK UPON THE CHINESE REPUBLIC 4!

cation of Yuan Shih-kai; and the convocation of a
legislative body which should represent and be capable
of expressing the authentic " will of the- people."

On March 22 this was answered by a mandate from
Yuan cancelling the whole monarchical movement. In
it he said : " I am still of the opinion that the desig-
nation petitions submitted are unsuited to the demands
of the time, and the official acceptance of the imperial
throne is hereby cancelled. ... I now confess that the
faults of the country are the result of my own faults."

Although Yuan had relinquished his ambition for
the throne, he was not willing to abdicate entirely, and
nothing short of this would satisfy the Southerners.
Chekiang Province revolted and its Governor fled;
Kwangtung followed. The press was full of fiery
articles calling for Yuan's retirement. On April 27
General Tsai Ao, the great military leader of the Re-
publicans, sent a long telegram to Peking urging Yuan
to retire, and concluding with a threat : " If, how-
ever, you should continue to linger and delay to make
a prompt decision in the sense of retirement and com-
pel the people to elaborate their demands in plainer
language, your retirement will be compulsory instead
of voluntary, and your high virtue will be lowered/'
This was followed by a similar appeal by Dr. Wu
Ting-fang.

42 CHINA AND THE WORLD-WAR

Yuan remaining obdurate, on May 10 the southern
provinces elected Li Yuan-hung as President. On
May 17 Liang -Chi-chao, the Republican leader, who
had the highest reputation among the scholars of
China, telegraphed Peking : " Since Hsaing-Cheng
(Yuan Shih-kai) has been morally defeated in the eyes
of Chinese as well as foreigners, the iron verdict has
been passed on him demanding his retirement. " This
was backed on May 18, the following day, by a state-
ment of 300 members of the former National Assem-
bly, which Yuan had dissolved in 1913.

Through all this discussion Nanking had remained
neutral. On May 15 General Feng Kuo-chang held
a conference of the representatives of the ten provinces
which were still loyal. The conference accomplished
little except to emphasize the growing demand for
Yuan's retirement. On May 24 Szechuan revolted,
and two days later Yuan first publicly announced his
intention to retire, saying: " My wish to retire is my
own and originated with myself. I have not the
slightest idea of lingering with a longing heart at my
post." On May 29 Yuan issued a long statement in
which he reviewed in detail his action in connection
with the attempted change of Government. Two sen-
tences are rather interesting in the light of the present
knowledge of the entire situation:

THE ATTACK UPON THE CHINESE REPUBLIC 43

" I, the great President, have done everything I
could to ascertain the real will of the people by taking
measures to prevent every possible corruption, the
same being in pursuance of my wish to respect the will
of the people. ... In dealing with others I, the great
President, have always been guided by the principle of
sincerity/'

The comment upon this mandate by the editor of
the Peking Gazette, himself a Chinese, is indicative of
the sentiment of the country at that time :

"If there were not a growing danger with every day
that the Chief Executive tarried in office, moderate
Chinese might be inclined to read with some patience
and in a sense of sympathy the mandate issued on
Monday night, which we translate in full today. It is
obviously the attempt of Yuan Shih-kai to set himself
right with posterity and to state for the future his-
torian his own version of a transaction that has made
him weaker than the child-ruler who preceded him.
There is no time to reread what has already been as-
severated time and again to a skeptical world. There
is no time to shed a tear for a fall from greatness that
is without parallel in history. The nation's perils
thicken and the voice of the people clamours for the
retirement that is to bring surcease of their harass-
ment. Again we bid him be wise and leave the work

44 CHINA AND THE WORLD-WAR

that must be done by other hands under surer knowl-
edge of the great new forces in our midst."

During the following week Yuan Shih-kai became
seriously ill, and on June 6 he died, the cause of his
death being urinaemia. A few hours before his death
he issued his last mandate, in which he handed over
the Government to the Vice-President. His closing
words were not without pathos : " Owing to my lack
of virtue and ability, I have not been able fully to trans-
form into deed what I have desired to accomplish ; and
I blush to say I have not realized one-ten-thousandth
part of my original intention to save the country and
the people. ... I was just thinking how I could retire
into private life when illness has suddenly overtaken
me. . , . The ancients once said, * It is only when the
living do try to become strong that the dead are not
dead/ This is also the wish of me, the great Presi-
dent/'

President Li Yuan-hung at once entered upon his
office, beginning on June 7, according to the Peking
Gazette, " the work that ought to have been begun four
years ago." His first mandate was as follows:

I

" Yuan-hung has assumed the office of President on
this the 7th day of the sixth month. Realizing his lack

THE ATTACK UPON THE CHINESE REPUBLIC 45

of virtue, he is extremely solicitous lest something may
miscarry. His single aim will be to adhere strictly to
law for the consolidation of the republic and the
moulding of the country into a really constitutionally
administered country. May all officials and people act
in sympathy with this idea and with united soul and
energy fulfil the part that is lacking in him. This is
his great hope."

The issuing of the mandate was followed by tele-
grams from most of the provinces, stating their loyalty
to the new President and to the Republican Govern-
ment. A few days later Liang Shih-yi, the chief
counsellor and adviser of Yuan Shih-kai among the
Monarchists, resigned from his position in the Govern-
ment ; thus the chief obstacle to harmony was removed.
The efforts of the new Republican Government were
then directed toward the establishment of a Parlia-
ment, according to the Provisional Constitution
adopted at Nanking in 1912. The Constitutional
Compact adopted in May, 1914, was discarded. Par-
liament was reconvened on August i, and the follow-
ing month a Cabinet was formed with Tuan Chi-jui as
Premier. Feng Kwo-chang was elected Vice-Presi-
dent. Thus the Republic of China again took up its
course as a national entity.

The first year of the war had brought grave dangers

46 CHINA AND THE WORLD-WAR

to the Chinese Republic from without. In the second
year it encountered equally grave dangers from within.
The overthrow of militarism, for a time at least,
within its own borders, prepared the way for a more
sympathetic understanding of the great world situation
in which a similar principle was at stake. In its best
ideals and traditions China had always been an oppo-
nent of military power unfettered by the will of the
people. The right of rebellion against tyrants had
brought to a close many of its ancient dynasties. The
scholar had stood the highest in the social scale: the
soldier the lowest. The Confucian Classics, which
have had a greater influence than any other writing in
moulding the mind of the people, contain many pas-
sages emphasizing the importance of the government
being founded on the popular will, and designating the
ruler as a servant of the people. " In a state, the peo-
ple are most important: the ruler is of least impor-
tance." "Heaven (or God) sees as my people see:
Heaven (or God) hears as my people hear." " The
commander of the forces of a large state may be car-
ried off, but the will of even the humblest of its sub-
jects cannot be taken from him." In the Analects, the
essentials of government had been named: imperfect
as was the comprehension of the average Chinese in
1915-16 of all that democracy and popular govern-

THE ATTACK UPON THE CHINESE REPUBLIC 47

ment meant, there seemed to have been some glimmer-
ing understanding concerning the principles at stake :
principles which were named by the Great Sage of
China over twenty- four hundred years ago.

Tsze-kung asked about Government. The Master
(Confucius) said, " The essentials of Government are
that there be sufficient food, sufficient military equip-
ment, and the confidence of the people in their rulers."

Tsze-kung said: "If it cannot be helped, and one
of these must be dispensed with, which of the three
should be foregone first?"

" The military equipment," said the Master.

Tsze-kung again asked : " If it cannot be helped,
and one of the remaining two must be dispensed with,
which of them should be foregone? "

The Master answered: "Part with the food.
For, from of old, death has been the lot of all men; but
if the people have no faith in their rulers, the State
cannot stand/' *

i Analects of Confucius, Book 12, Chapter 7.

CHAPTER III

THE PROGRESS OF CHINESE REPUBLICAN GOVERN-
MENT LEADING TO A NEW FOREIGN POLICY

ON the third anniversary of the outbreak of the
Great War, Parliament was re-convened in China, and
a new start was made upon Republican paths. Fol-
lowing the death of Yuan Shih-kai in June, Li Yuan-
hung had been made President; Feng Kwo-chang,
Governor of Kiangsu Province, and recognized leader
of the Yangtze Valley region, had been elected Vice-
President; and General Tuan Chi-jui, appointed Pre-
mier of the Cabinet, which was organized in Septem-
ber. On Sept. 1 5th, Parliament set to work on the
drafting of the permanent constitution. The Chinese
ship of state seemed to be sailing on comparatively
smooth waters. This calm was not broken until the
bursting of the storm over the declaration of war with
Germany and Austria eight months later.

The general satisfaction over the progress in consti-
tutional government is shown by a description of state
affairs sent to America by the writer on Feb. 1 1, 1917.

CHINESE REPUBLICAN GOVERNMENT 49

" Hangchow, China.

" The prophecy made in verse by Rudyard Kipling
concerning the fate of the man who should try to
' hustle the East ' is fast becoming an anachronism. It
is especially inapplicable to the evolution of the govern-
ment of China. A year ago the infant republic appar-
ently had been strangled and a monarchy reared in its
stead; January i, 1916, was set as the beginning of the
new dynasty with Yuan Shih-kai at its head ; and prep-
arations were being made for the enthronement ; no dis-
cussion of political affairs was allowed, signs forbid-
ding it being put up in all public places. A protest
against the monarchy by Liang Chi-chao, one of the
chief Republican leaders, involved him, as he himself
admitted, ' in serious difficulties, exposing his life to
grave dangers/ Now, however, all this is changed.
The republic has been re-established, Parliament hav-
ing been in session over seven months ; Yuan Shih-kai
is dead, and President Li Yuan-hung is at the head of
the Government ; the draft constitution for the republic
has passed the first reading, with its articles guaran-
teeing freedom of speech and freedom of worship;
Liang Chi-chao himself has visited Peking where he
was honoured as few Chinese have been honoured by
their countrymen. A concrete illustration of the com-
parative strength of Yuan Shih-kai's government and

5O CHINA AND THE WORLD-WAR

the present one is afforded by the situation in this
city of Hangchow, the capital of Chekang Province.
Ten months ago following the lead of Yunnan, Kwei-
chow, and Kuangsi, Chekiang revolted against Yuan
Shih-kai and declared itself in favour of a real republic.
The Governor, who was a friend of Yuan, was forced
to flee ; and all connection with Peking was severed.
Today as a result of a minor quarrel among the Hang-
chow officials, the central Government has sent down
its own appointee, Yang Shan-teh, as Governor, and
he has been accepted by the people without disturbance.
This is the first time that an outside representative of
the central Government has been Governor of Che-
kiang, and in the judgment of experienced foreigners,
his acceptance by the people is a valuable indication
of the strength of the present government. In the
words of Putnam Weale, of Peking, ' President Li
Yuan-hung' s seven months' quiet tenure of office has
indeed brought the prospects of ultimate success much
nearer than it was at any time under Yuan Shih-kai's
so-called iron rule, proving conclusively that in civil-
ized communities, reason has many times the value of
that disruptive and criminal agency, force/

" The whole political situation, marking the emer-
gence of China from the realm of mediaeval, autocratic

CHINESE REPUBLICAN GOVERNMENT 5!

government into that of modern, representative govern-
ment, is a drama of intense interest. The Chinese are
passing through the same stages in political philosophy
that America and France and other democratic nations
have traversed. They are settling now their " Magna
Charta " and their " Bill of Rights." The discussion
of the constitution was begun on September 15, with
C. T. Wang, whom I knew at Yale, now the Vice
President of the Senate, as Chairman of the Prelim-
inary Examination meetings. The first reading was
finished and a report made on January igth. The
eleven original chapters and several additional ones
were discussed. The chapters concerning the " form
of State/' that of a republic; the rights of citizens,
including freedom of speech, and freedom of worship;
the two-house system of parliament; the appointment
of a Premier and Cabinet; the organization of law
courts ; were all passed by the necessary three-quarter
vote of the quorum made up of two-thirds member-
ship of the two houses."

There were three subjects which aroused special
discussion at the Capital. They were the budget,
local self-government and State religion. The matter
of finance was always a trying one, as China had to
rely largely on foreign loans. The money advanced

52 CHINA AND THE WORLD-WAR

by America was generally welcomed, and the announce-
ment that America intended to encourage investment
in China was greeted with satisfaction.

The provincial self-government bill was passed in
the first reading January loth after much discussion,
and the President issued a mandate supporting it.
He said in part :

" In the olden days the district and prefect system
formed the beginning of an excellent system of gov-
ernment, and the services of the village elders and
district councillors were reported as valuable aids to
good administration. The spirit of self-government
had therefore already been developed in ancient times.
... In the Tsing Dynasty a beginning was made
in self-government, and a system far from complete
and satisfactory was set up. When the republic was
formed the work was continued . . . and at this
time of general reform, when it is necessary to build
up a strong foundation of democratic administration,
we should draw up a suitable system, and enforce the
same within a definite time limit. ... By such a
system we may reach the stage of universal peace.
This is my ambitious hope."

The question of a state religion was brought up in
connection with Chapter Three of the Constitution,
guaranteeing religious liberty for all. An article of

CHINESE REPUBLICAN GOVERNMENT 53

that chapter stated that the Confucian ethics should
be used as a basis in primary education. A move-
ment was started among the older, conservative mem-
bers of Parliament to have Confucianism as a state
religion, but of the twenty " parties " or groups in
Parliament, a canvass revealed that only four supported
this measure, although most of them favoured an
emphasis upon Confucian ethics in the school system.
During the first week of February the discussion was
most lively while this article was undergoing a second
reading. Various arguments were advanced on either
side, several of them sounding rather strange in the
ears of foreigners. Some of the points in favour of
Confucianism were: (i) The great influence of Con-
fucius in China in the past and present ; (2) the foreign-
mission schools teach the " Four Books " of Confu-
cius; (3) most of the Western Nations have discarded
Christianity ; and China should not seek to pick it up.
Against the measure: (i) Confucius was a teacher
of ethics, not religion; (2) his teaching has more to do
with the sovereign than the people, and is not fitting
for a republic; (3) a state religion was not republican;
(4) such a measure would conflict with the chapter on
religious freedom. Finally, on February gth it was
voted to cease discussion, and five different amend-
ments advocating a state religion were defeated. The

54 CHINA AND THE WORLD-WAR

Peking Gazette, edited by a young progressive Chinese,
commented thus upon the m'eeting :

" Yesterday's meeting of the Conference on Con-
stitution was historic for the reason that the question
whether the Republic of China shall create a prec-
edent, in the history of Republicanism by making one
of the many religions, if Confucianism can be called
a religion, the State religion of the country, was
settled after a long and serious struggle. The Con-
fucianists resorted to every possible means to win but
the odds against them were too strong. The question
of freedom of religious belief is by no means settled
but the attempt to give the Republic a State religion
has been definitely defeated."

A few quotations from the native press of the coun-
try will reveal the spirit of the people at that time. It
should be remembered that a year before practically no
expression of public opinion was allowed.

On January I2th the Min-Kwo-hsin-pao spoke as
follows :

" Coming as we do in sight of the sacred instru-
ment of Government which is to protect us from
tyranny and misrule and assure to us the blessings of
liberty and democracy, it is fitting that we recall the
bloodshed and tribulations through which we have
triumphed over monarchy and autocracy. . . . The

Copyright by Underwood & Underwood, M. Y.
Li Yuan-hung, Second President of the Chinese Republic.

CHINESE REPUBLICAN GOVERNMENT 55

mere possession of a Constitution is one thing, and
its enjoyment is another. We care for no hollow
Constitution, but we are willing to die for a Consti-
tution that is a reality. We know the spirit of our
people, so ' Ten Thousand Years ' to our Constitu-
tion/' On January i/th the Kung-min-pao expressed
itself thus : " We have a Republic but not a demo-
cracy. The Republic was established by the revolu-
tion of 1911. But Democracy is still in the making.
By wresting from the Monarchy our form of govern-
ment, half of the battle was won; and now we have
to bend our energy to training our people in demo-
cracy."

On January 2/th the Peking Jih-pao emphasized the
need of moral strength back of all political changes
its message was a thoughtful and valuable one at
that time :

" Signs of progress in the country are not lacking.
Intellectually the people have taken a leap forward.
The idea of democracy and general knowledge of
modern learning are gradually being spread among the
people. This is a hopeful sign. But knowledge with-
out moral backbone is worse than ignorance. The
morality of our people, we are sorry to say, has not
kept pace with their advance in knowledge. We are
in the same predicament as France was immediately

56 CHINA AND THE WORLD-WAR

after her great revolution. The people have cut adrift
from old traditions, but have not assimilated new ideas
and principles rapidly enough to supply the resulting
moral vacuum. We can say without fearing challenge
that the morality of the people is everything in the
life of a nation. While we may be busy instituting
reforms and improving the minds of the people, we
must not for a minute lose sight of this signal fact
the soul of the nation."

In conclusion, the opinions of two foreigners, one
an Englishman, the other an American, concerning
the situation as it then appeared, are worthy of quota-
tion. The first is Mr. Putnam Weale, for many years
a correspondent in Peking, and author of several stand-
ard books on the Far East. On January i6th, he
wrote in the Peking Gazette as follows :

" The conviction which the writer has consistently
cherished, that the situation in this country is as good
as could possibly be expected and gives reasonable
promise of peaceful development in the future seems
based on sound premises. . . . The Chinese as a
people are temperamentally suited to representative
government; they are reasonable, tactful, conciliatory
and humorous; four saving graces which will carry
them very far along the road to political success. Like
a solid piece of iron which binds the nation together

CHINESE REPUBLICAN GOVERNMENT 57

is its immense, majestic, abiding common-sense."
At a recent dinner in Shanghai given by the Ameri-
can Consul General, which was attended by prominent
Chinese and Americans, the Honourable Victor Mur-
doch spoke as follows:

"The Republic is here to stay in China; the same
brand of democracy which has built up the United
States can build up China. ... I have observed a
great deal of this spirit while I have been here in
China. . . . Here is a wonderful people, industrious
beyond any other people, sober beyond others, good-
humoured, and law-abiding. ... No one can reach
the limits of China. China is the place of the future.
I have been impressed by everything I have seen in
this country, with its promise of future development,
but one thought that lingers longest in my mind is
this: China's future development and prosperity lie
in her form of government. It must be a republic
to obtain results. What the old flag has done for
America, the Chinese flag can do for the Chinese peo-
ple. It is a banner of no dynasty but a people's flag,
and people who are industrious and sober and self-
governing, can endure for ever and so can the
United States and China."

This was the situation in China when the announce-
ment of Germany's unrestricted submarine warfare

58 CHINA AND THE WORLD-WAR

was made to the World. That policy irrevocably
changed the course of the Nations, and brought the
American Republic to the brink of war; the great Re-
public in the Orient was not to escape similar effects.

CHAPTER IV

CHINA'S SEVERANCE OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS
WITH THE CENTRAL POWERS

AT the outbreak of the World War, as has been
related, China declared its neutrality, and bent all its
energies to the building up of its newly-founded repub-
lic. But before the middle of the third year of the
war had passed, it became apparent that the Republic
must take some stand in relation to the issues of the
great struggle. Four conditions, influenced it in this
regard. The Republic seemed at last to be making
headway toward stability and permanence, and with
the new national consciousness came a clearer reali-
zation of the principles at stake in the war. Secondly,
China desired a place at the Peace Conference which
would settle the question of the disposal of Kiaochow
and the German interests in Shantung and, as she
hoped, would review the Twenty-one Demands. In
1905 in the Portsmouth Treaty, Japan had negotiated
directly with Russia concerning Manchuria, although it
was a province of China, and China was not admitted
until the final decisions were reached. This was a

59

60 CHINA AND THE WORLD-WAR

precedent which China could not afford to see repeated
in Shantung, if she were to continue as a sovereign
state; and so she was ready to make any effort tc
gain a voice in the eventual international conference,
In the third place, America seemed to be more and
more turning toward some sort of active participation
in the conflict, and China desired to keep its foreign
policy close in accord with that of the nation which
it regarded as its best friend. Finally, two incidents
in its foreign relations in the latter part of 1917 had
aroused China afresh to a consciousness of its weak-
ness and its lack of international standing. These
two events were the Chengchiatun dispute with Japan
in Manchuria, and the Lao-hsi-kai incident in Tientsin
with the French Government.

Chengchiatun was a Manchurian market-town sit-
uated near the Mongolian border. It was of some
importance as a trade centre and had been menaced
by one of the Mongol brigands at the time of the
Manchu restoration. The Twehty-eighth Division of
the Chinese army had been stationed there to protect
the town and preserve order. In August a detach-
ment of Japanese troops was sent there to carry out
manoeuvres. Their presence in that portion of Man-
churia could be justified only by a most liberal inter-
pretation of Japanese treaty-rights. On August 13,

SEVERANCE OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS 6 1

a dispute arose between a Japanese merchant named
Yoshimoto and a Chinese fish-pedlar; the Japanese
attempted to punish the pedlar; a Chinese soldier
interfered ; other soldiers of both nationalities came up ;
and a melee resulted, in which several Japanese and
Chinese were wounded and killed. Exaggerated re-
ports were published in the Japanese press and its
Government at once took up the matter and demanded
a series of privileges and concessions in that region
and the neighbouring territory. The first demands
were :

1. Punishment of the General commanding the
Twenty-eighth Division.

2. The dismissal of officers at Chengchiatun respon-
sible for the occurrence as well as the severe punish-
ment of those who took direct part in the fracas.

3. Proclamations to be posted ordering all Chinese
soldiers and civilians in South Manchuria and Eastern
Inner Mongolia to refrain from any act calculated to
provoke a breach of the peace with Japanese soldiers
or civilians.

4. China to agree to the stationing of Japanese
police officers in places in South Manchuria and
Eastern Inner Mongolia where their presence was con-
sidered necessary for the protection of Japanese sub-
jects. China also to agree to the engagement by the

62 CHINA AND THE WORLD-WAR

officials of South Manchuria of Japanese police ad-
visers.

And in addition:

1. Chinese troops stationed in South Manchuria and
Eastern Inner Mongolia to employ a certain number
of Japanese military officers as advisers.

2. Chinese military cadet schools to employ a cer-
tain number of Japanese military officers as instruc-
tors.

3. The Military Governor of Mukden to proceed
personally to Port Arthur to the Japanese Military
Governor of Kwantung to apologize for the occur-
rence and to tender similar personal apologies to the
Japanese Consul General in Mukden.

4. Adequate compensation to be paid by China to
the Japanese sufferers and to the families of those
killed.

These privileges if granted would have paved the
way for a Japanese Protectorate over Southern Man-
churia and Eastern Mongolia. Negotiations continued
during the fall and final agreement was reached on
the five following terms:

1. The General commanding the Twenty-eighth Di-
vision to be reprimanded.

2. Officers responsible to be punished according to

SEVERANCE OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS 63

law. If the law provides for severe punishment, such
punishment will be inflicted.

3. Proclamations to be issued enjoining Chinese
soldiers and civilians in the districts where there is
mixed residence to accord - considerate treatment to
Japanese soldiers and civilians.

4. The Military Governor of Mukden to send a
representative to Port Arthur to convey his regret
when the Military Governor of Kwantung and
Japanese Consul General at Mukden are there to-
gether,

5. A solatium of $500 (Five Hundred Dollars) to
be given to the Japanese merchant Yoshimoto.

This settlement was generally satisfactory to the
Chinese; but the original demands had caused them
much anxiety, and impressed upon them the necessity
of securing a better understanding of their rights as
a sovereign power.

The Lao-hsi-kai incident with France was of less
importance. The French Consular authorities of
Tientsin desired to have their concession extended and
had been negotiating with the Chinese Government
for additional space. The negotiations had dragged
on for some years and a final agreement had been
practically reached concerning this additional grant of

64 CHINA AND THE WORLD-WAR

land which was to be put under the jurisdiction of a
joint Franco-Chinese Administration. Some addi-
tional opposition was raised by the Chinese, and finally
the French Consul-General sent an ultimatum demand-
ing that the Chinese police be removed and the addi-
tional territory be placed under French supervision
and control. The time-limit of the ultimatum having
expired, a French detachment of soldiers took posses-
sion of the property; the Chinese policemen were re-
moved and imprisoned ; and French sentries were sta-
tioned along the boundary. Protests arose from the
Chinese of the city and of North China; the native
servants and employes of the French Concession left in
a body. The arrested Chinese police were ultimately
released but no immediate settlement was reached con-
cerning the matter in question/ The incident could
easily have been averted and was not of great im-
portance, except as it was used by German propa-
gandists, but it served to increase China's desire to
be treated as an equal by the European Powers.

For the reasons cited, the country was ready in the
fall of 1916 to step out into a more active participa-
tion in the world's events, and when President Wilson
sent out his peace inquiry of December 19, 1916,
China answered at once, expressing its willingness to

SEVERANCE OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS 65

join in the international effort to eradicate wars of
aggression ; " to assure the respect of the principle
of the equality of nations, whatever their power may
be, and to relieve them of the peril of wrong and vio-
lence." The note of the Chinese Minister of Foreign
Affairs to the American Minister at Peking was as
follows :

" I have examined with the care which the gravity
of the question demands the note concerning peace
which President Wilson has addressed to the Govern-
ments of the Allies and the Central Powers now at
war and the text of which Your Excellency has been
good enough to transmit to me under instructions of
your Government

" China, a nation traditionally pacific, has recently
again manifested her sentiments in concluding treaties
concerning the pacific settlement of international dis-
putes, responding thus to the voeux of the Peace Con-
ference held at The Hague.

" On the other hand, the present war, by its pro-
longation, has seriously affected the interests of China,
more so perhaps than those of other Powers which
have remained neutral. She is at present at a time
of reorganization which demands economically and
industrially the co-operation of foreign countries, a

66 CHINA AND THE WORLD-WAR

co-operation which a large number of them are unable
to accord on account of the war in which they are
engaged.

"In manifesting her sympathy for the spirit of
the President's Note, having in view the ending as
soon as possible of the hostilities, China is but acting
in conformity not only with her interests but also
with her profound sentiments.

" On account of the extent which modern wars are
apt to assume and the repercussions which they bring
about, their effects are no longer limited to belligerent
States. All countries are interested in seeing wars
becoming as rare as possible. Consequently China
cannot but show satisfaction with the views of the
Government and people of the United States of Am-
erica who declare themselves ready, arid even eager,
to co-operate when the war is over, by all proper means
to assure the respect of the principle of the equality
of nations, whatever their power may be, and to re-
lieve them of the peril of wrong and violence. China
is ready to join her efforts with theirs for the attain-
ment of such results which can only be obtained
through the help of all."

Thus China was ready to act, when the German
Government threw down the challenge to the civilized
world by its declaration of unlimited submarine war-

SEVERANCE OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS 67

fare. 'America severed diplomatic relations, and on
February 4th sent a note to China, as to all neutrals,
suggesting that they follow its example. In less than
a week the Chinese Republic actually took this step.
Writing from China on February i6th, the author
described the decision as follows :

Hangchow, China, February 16.
"The severance of diplomatic relations between
America and Germany has had far-reaching effects in
China. I was in Shanghai when the news came and

the city, in which there are over 20,000 foreigners,

including 1000 Germans, was greatly stirred. Crowds
gathered around the bulletin boards, just as they did
in Europe during the first days of August, 1914. The
English and French were openly elated; the Germans
were correspondingly depressed; and the Chinese
appeared in doubt as to their action in this crisis. The
American gunboats and cruisers in the harbour were
loading supplies and coaling, in preparation for de-
parture in case a declaration of war necessitated such
action.

"The indecision which at first marked the action
of the Chinese and their government, has been cast
aside by the decision of the government on February
9, when it boldly followed the course of America by

68 CHINA AND THE WORLD-WAR

sending a similar declaration to Germany. This ac-
tion has been greeted on all sides as a sign of the
virility of the present republican government, and the
first step in modern participation in world affairs.

" After America severed relations with Germany
there was serious discussion at Peking of China's
future action. The younger element in the govern-
ment were eager to follow America's example; the
older, more conservative leaders counselled caution and
a maintenance of neutrality. The most experienced
statesmen, including Liang Chi-chao, who is so largely

responsible for the present Republican government,

were summoned to the capitol for conference. Fi-
nally, after an all-day meeting on February 9, decisive
action was agreed upon, and notes were sent to Ger-
many and to America. The note to Germany follows :

" ' A telegraphic communication has been received
from the Chinese minister at Berlin transmitting a
note from the German government dated February i,
1917, which makes known that the measures of
blockade newly adopted by the government of Ger-
many will, from that day, endanger neutral merchant
vessels navigating in certain prescribed zones.

" ' The new measures of submarine warfare in-
augurated by Germany, imperiling the lives and
property of Chinese citizens to' even a greater extent

SEVERANCE OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS 69

than the measures previously taken which have already
cost so many human lives to China, constitute a vio-
lation of the principles of public international law at
present in force; the tolerance of their application
would have as a result the introduction into interna-
tional law of arbitrary principles incompatible with
even legitimate commercial intercourse between neutral
states and belligerent powers.

" ' The Chinese government, therefore, protests en-
ergetically to the imperial German government against
measures proclaimed on February i, and sincerely
hopes that with a view to respecting the rights of
neutral states and to maintaining the friendly rela-
tions between these two countries, the said measures
will not be carried out.

" ' In case contrary to its expectations its protest be
ineffectual the government of the Chinese republic will
be constrained to its profound regret, to sever diploma-
tic relations at present existing between the two coun-
tries. It is unnecessary to add that the attitude of
the Chinese government has been dictated purely by
the desire to further the cause of the world's peace
and by the maintenance of the sanctity of international
law/

" On the same day China, through its Foreign Min-
ister, sent the following note to the American Minister

70 CHINA AND THE WORLD-WAR

in Peking for transmission to the United States Gov-
ernment :

" f I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of
your excellency's note of the 4th of February, 1917,
informing me that the government of the United
States of America, in view of the adoption by the
German government of its new policy of submarine
warfare on February ist, has decided to take certain
action which it judges necessary as regards Germany.

" ' The Chinese government, like the President of the
United States of America, is reluctant to believe that
the German government will actually carry into excu-
tion those measures which imperil the lives and
property of citizens of neutral states and jeopardize
the commerce, even legitimate, between neutrals as
well as between neutrals and belligerents and which
tend, if allowed to be enforced without opposition,
to -introduce a new principle into public international
law.

" ' The Chinese government also proposes to take
such action in the future as will be deemed necessary
for the maintenance of the principles of international
law/

" The China Press, an American newspaper of
Shanghai, comments thus upon this action :

" ' The note of warning to Germany marks a bold

SEVERANCE OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS 7 1

and heroic departure from historic precedent for China.
It shows that things are moving in the republic, and
moving rapidly, and we believe that it will be fully
justified by events/ In commenting on the action, the
Peking Gazette, a native paper, says that ' The decision
arrived at is in every sense a victory of the j^ounger
intellectual forces over the older mandarinate, whose
traditions of laissez faire and spineless diplomacy have
hitherto cost China so much/

" These sentiments are re-echoed in various other
native papers that decry ' Prussian militarism ' and
advise China's following America's action. The rea-
sons underlying the decision are expressed fairly well
by the Kun Yuan Pao in an editorial which appeared
under the headline * Now or Never/ the day before
the government acted :

" ' This is the time for action. We must range our-
selves on the side of justice, of humanity and of inter-
national law. We must also win a place for our-
selves, friends, in the council of nations by prompt
and decisive action. Now, Germany's submarine
policy and the United States' resolute stand against
lawlessness and wholesale atrocity have given us the
opportunity.

" ' Germany's submarine policy is a challenge to the
world. America has accepted the challenge. Shall

72 CHINA AND THE WORLD-WAR

we do otherwise? If we have a particle of respect for
ourselves, the way pointed out by the United States
is the road to honour and self-respect.

" ' Then, is it not altogether unprofitable to join the
allies if we consider the question only from a national
point of view? In the present state of the world,
it is impossible for any nation to stand alone. We
must have allies, if not so sanctified in treaties, yet in
a mutual bond of sympathy. This is the best oppor-
tunity for us to win friends among the powers.
Possibly we will have only a little say in the peace
conference, but since we have been willing to help
Great Britain, France, Russia and the United States,
our appeal will not be unheeded when we should be in
difficulties. Although we have been observing the
strictest neutrality in the war, there are many questions
at the peace conference which will touch us vitally.
There is, for instance, the question of Tsingtao to
settle, and the Japanese actions in Manchuria and
in connection with the Twenty-one demands will have
to be brought up in review. Cultivate friendship
when our friends are in need, and not when they are
above wants. Now or never must we show the world
that this is a nation which is not always on the sick
list, but living, pulsating and with a fighting spirit.' "

After the sending of the Chinese note to Germany

SEVERANCE OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS /3

nothing was heard from that quarter for several weeks.
Then came the torpedoing of the French ship, Atlas,
on which were over five hundred Chinese labourers.
The Cabinet was in favour of breaking off relations,
and on March loth the question was sent to Parlia-
ment for decision. The Lower House upheld the
Cabinet decision and the next day the Senate did the
same.

The long-awaited German answer arrived on the
day the Lower House voted. In part it was as fol-
lows:

" The Imperial German Government expresses its
great surprise at the action threatened by the Govern-
ment of the Republic of China in its note of protest.
Many other countries have also protested, but China,
which has been in friendly relations with Germany,
is the only State which has added a threat to its pro-
test.

. . . " Germany's enemies were the first to declare
a blockade on Germany and the same is being per-
sistently carried out. It is therefore difficult for Ger-
many to cancel her blockade policy. The Imperial
Government is nevertheless willing to comply with
the wishes of the Government of the Republic of
China by opening negotiations to arrive at a plan for
the protection of Chinese life and property, with the

74 CHINA AND THE WORLD-WAR

view that the end may be achieved and thereby the
utmost regard be given to the shipping rights of China.
The reason which has prompted the Imperial Govern-
ment to adopt this conciliatory policy is the knowledge
that, once diplomatic relations are severed with Ger-
many, China will not only lose a truly good friend
but will also be entangled in unthinkable difficulties."

This note arrived too late to have any effect on
Parliament, which upheld the decision of the Cabinet
as indicated.

The mildness of Germany's note of March loth was
rather a surprise to the inhabitants of China, who re-
membered the seizure of Tsingtao in 1898, and other
actions in Shantung as the result of the murder of
two German missionaries; and the ruthlessness of the
German troops at the time of the Boxer uprising.
A leading Chinese lawyer commented on the change
of attitude, his remarks being an indication of the
new position won by China in world-politics :

" The troops under Count Waldersee, leaving Ger-
many for the relief of Peking, were instructed by
the War Lord to grant no quarter to the Chinese;
on the other hand, the latter were to be so disciplined
that they would never dare look a German in the
face again. 1 The whirligig of time brings in its

!Jt is interesting to note that the armies under Attila were

SEVERANCE OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS 75

own revenge, and today, after the lapse of scarcely
seventeen years, we hear the Vossische Zeitung com-
menting on the diplomatic rupture between China and
Germany, lamenting that even so weak a State as the
Far Eastern Republic dares look defiantly at the Ger-
man nation ! "

On March I4th the German and Austrian Ministers
and their staffs were handed their passports and the
German and Austrian interests were turned over to
the Dutch Legation. Thus did China take its first
step toward participation in the cause of the Allies.

held up as examples for the German soldiers to follow, by Kaiser
Wilhelm in 1900, in his speech to the German troops embarking
for China. This was perhaps the first association of the term
" Huns " with German forces. The Kaiser's exact words were :
"As soon as you come to blows with the enemy he will be
beaten. No mercy will be shown! No prisoners will be taken!
As the Huns, under King Attila, made a name for themselves,
which is still mighty in traditions and legends to-day, may the
name of German be so fixed in China by your deeds, that no
Chinese shall ever again dare even to look at a German askance.
, . , Open the way for Kultur once for all,"

CHAPTER V

CHINA'S DECLARATION OF WAR AGAINST GERMANY
AND AUSTRIA

ON March 14, 1917, China severed diplomatic re-
lations with Germany; exactly five months later, on
August 1 4th, she declared war. The strain of reach-
ing this final decision shook the Republic to its founda-
tions, temporarily causing a complete breakdown of
the Central Government, and indirectly making pos-
sible the brief restoration of the Manchus which took
place in July. But eventually the Chinese ship-of-
state righted itself and emerged on the broad seas
of world-relationships as a recognized member of the
league of the Allies.

The breaking off of relations with Germany brought
to light the state of discord which had existed for
some time between the Premier, Tuan Chi-jui, and
the President, Li Yuan-hung. The former was a
military leader and had been trained in the Manchu
type of government. The latter was a real republi-
can in spirit and had insisted that every act of the
State be carried out according to the existing Con-

DECLARATION OF WAR AGAINST GERMANY 77

stitution. The Premier desired to break off relations
without consulting Parliament; the President insisted
on the latter step, and after Tuan had threatened to
resign, and had actually left the capital for Tientsin,
the President persuaded him to return and to present
the question to Parliament. This was done with the
result already indicated.

Having taken two steps, the next move was to de-
clare war. Here, however, appeared many difficulties.
It is hard for a foreigner to judge Chinese public
opinion, but after a trip through the coast cities into
the interior, the following arguments for and against
the declaration seemed to the writer to be involved. 1

The reasons in favour of the declaration seemed to
be four in number. First, the intelligent Chinese
sympathized deeply with the cause of the Allies, espe-
cially in their championing the rights of small or weak
nations, with the protection of such countries from
aggression and the assurance to them of the right to
work out their own destinies unafraid. This formula
seemed to fit the facts of China's relationships in the
Orient. She was trying to build up a republic; she

1 An interesting account of events in Peking preceding the war
declaration is given in an article by Carson Chang, Secretary
to the President, entitled " The Inside History of China's Decla-
ration of War," Millard's Review, Aug. 17, '18.

78 CHINA AND THE WORLD-WAR

had made many costly mistakes; but ultimate success
seemed possible if she could be protected from attack
by predatory powers. The Allies promised such pro-
tection to all such weak nations, and China could not
but be in sympathy with their aims.

Secondly, China desired a place in the Peace Con-
ference which would be held at the close of the war.
There were many questions affecting its own terri-
tory and rights which would come up then, and China
desired a voice in their settlement. The German rights
in Shantung which seemed likely to fall to Japan;
the subject of the Twenty-one Demands; the future
of the Boxer Indemnity; the principle of ex-terri-
toriality and foreign control of some of China's
sovereign rights; all these and many other matters
might be reviewed at this future conference. China
wished to be heard there, and the best hope of securing
a place at the Council Table seemed to lie in joining
the Allies.

China has always been influenced by the United
States ; she trusts American friendship ; and is willing
to follow its leadership. The United States is the
only great nation which has never deprived China
of any of its territorial possessions; by the return of
the unused portion of the Boxer Indemnity, she had
impressed China with the genuineness of her friend-

DECLARATION OF WAR AGAINST GERMANY 79

ship; through the Chinese students who have gone to
America, the best traditions of the Republic had been
brought to China. The Chinese Republic was striv-
ing after American ideals of freedom and democracy,
and in shaping its international policy it was ready to
listen to America's voice. Morever, the American
Minister at Peking, Dr. Paul S. Reinsch, had a wide
influence among Chinese officials. 1 Thus, when the
United States severed relations with Germany, China
at once followed suit; when America declared war
in April, the Chinese leaders were ready to do the
same, and were delayed only by the internal situation
which at once arose.

In the fourth place, the joining of the Allies seemed
to promise to the party in power which made this de-
cision, considerable advantages in strength and pres-
tige, and the Chinese politicians were not slow to
grasp this fact.

An example of the reasoning of those in favour
of a declaration of war was that of the scholar Liang
Chi-chao, whose services to the Republic have already
been mentioned,

ir The personal influence of the American Minister and his
associates at Peking, throughout all the negotiations leading
up finally to a declaration of war, was one of the strongest fac-
tors in inducing China to join the Allies.

80 CHINA AND THE WORLD-WAR

" The peace of the Far East was broken by the
occupation of Kiaochow by Germany. This event
marked the first step of the German disregard for
international law. In the interests of humanity and
for the sake of what China has passed through, she
should rise and punish such a country, that dared to
disregard international law. Such a reason for war
is certainly beyond criticism.

..." Some say that China should not declare war
on Germany until we have come to a definite under-
standing with the Entente Allies respecting certain
terms. This is indeed a wrong conception of things.
We declare war because we want to fight for humanity,
international law and against a national enemy. It
is not because we are partial towards the Entente or
against Germany or Austria. International relations
are not commercial connexions. Why then should
we talk about exchange of privileges and rights ? As
to the revision of customs tariff, it has been our
aspiration for more than ten years and a foremost
diplomatic question, for which we have been looking
for a suitable opportunity to negotiate with the foreign
Powers. It is our view that the opportunity has come
because foreign Powers are now on very friendly
terms with China. It is distinctly a separate thing

DECLARATION OF WAR AGAINST GERMANY 8 1

from the declaration of war. Let no one try to con-
fuse the two.

..." In conclusion I wish to say that whenever a
policy is adopted we should carry out the complete
scheme. If we should hesitate in the middle and be-
come afraid to go ahead we will soon find ourselves
in an embarrassing position. The Government and
Parliament should therefore stir up courage and boldly
make the decision and take the step."

Opposed to the four general reasons given for par-
ticipation on the side of the Allies, there were five
groups of arguments. The first was the difficulty
China had in reconciling the professed aims of the
Allies with its experienced relations with Japan.
Rightly or wrongly, for the past twenty years, China
had stood in mortal terror of its island neighbour.
It had lost to it Formosa, Korea, portions of Man-
churia and Mongolia, Tsingtao and the German hold-
ings in Shantung, and had just recently gone through
the humiliation of the Twenty-one Demands. The
Allied program in Europe called for reparation and
restitution for international injuries; China could not
understand why this principle should not be accepted
in Asia, especially as it applied to its relations with
Japan. The existing Terauchi government professed

82 CHINA AND THE WORLD-WAR

to be friendly to China, but the Chinese felt that
such a friendly attitude could not now be reciprocated,
unless reparation were made for the acts of the past.
Thus fear of Japan was an undoubted obstacle to
China's believing in the Allied aims as applied to
the Orient.

In the second place, the Chinese were still afraid
of Germany's power and feared the eventual vengeance
of its army if China should dare to declare war. Ger-
man propaganda had skilfully magnified German
successes and Allied losses, and in 1917 the average
Chinese believed firmly that Germany would win the
war. German officers had trained the Chinese army,
as they had the Japanese troops, and they stood for
military efficiency and power in the eyes of the Chinese.

Furthermore, Germany, despite its harsh treatment
in the past, had energetically and cleverly conducted
a campaign to win the favour of the Chinese, sending
out consuls and diplomatic officials who were scholars
in Chinese literature and philosophy with sufficient
funds to entertain Chinese officials as they like to be en-
tertained ; on the other hand, the Allies had at various
times, perhaps unconsciously, offended the Chinese.
The opium trade, carried on largely by citizens of
the Allied countries in the foreign settlements, which
followed the British " opium war " and the seizure of

DECLARATION OF WAR AGAINST GERMANY 83

Hongkong and other territory; the recent Lao-hsi-
kai affair in Tientsin, where French officials attempted
to appropriate property which the Chinese thought
was theirs; the advice of the American adviser, Dr.
Goodnow, to return to the Monarchy; the ineffectual
enforcement of the Open Door; all these facts tended
to produce a pessimism in the minds of the Chinese
regarding idealistic words which seemed to be un-
backed by deeds. This pessimism was shared by many
of the younger foreign educated leaders in regard to
the favourable outcome of the Conference at the close
of the war; to many it seemed immaterial whether
or not China should have a voice in the council.

In the fourth place, the younger progressive element
of the republic feared the new power which would
accrue to the more conservative party in control of
the government at the time of the war-decision. They
were afraid that the new power would be used as
Yuan Shih-kai had used the financial support of the
five Powers in 1913, to restrict and harm the more
democratic tendencies of the Republic.

Other factors were a realization that their own
military power was slight, and a fear of " losing face "
by comparison with the Allies; the fear that food
prices would increase; the devotion to peace, which
is deep rooted in the nation; and finally the policy

84 CHINA AND THE WORLD-WAR

of "proud isolation," which until recent years had
marked all China's relations with other nations. It
was a long step for a people ruled for centuries by
an alien dynasty to attempt republican self-govern-
ment: it was an almost incredible act for China as a
whole to grasp the existing world situation and to
take its proper place in relation to it.

An illustration of this general opposition against
the declaration of war was the statement of Kang
Yu-wei, formerly a fellow-reformer of Liang Chi-
chao. In it he said in part :

..." The breach between the United States and
Germany is no concern of ours. But the Government
suddenly severed diplomatic relations with Germany
and is now contemplating entry into the war. This
is to advance beyond the action of the United States
which continues to observe neutrality. And if we
analyse the public opinion of the country, we find that
all peoples high and low, well-informed and igno-
rant betray great alarm when informed of the rup-
ture and the proposal to declare war on Germany,
fearing that such development may cause grave peril
to the country.

. . . "Which side will win the war? I shall not
attempt to predict here. But it is undoubted that all
the arms of Europe and the industrial and financial

DECLARATION OF WAR AGAINST GERMANY 85

strength of the United States and Japan have proved
unavailing against Germany. On the other hand,
France has lost her Northern provinces ; and Belgium,
Serbia and Rumania are blotted off the map. Should
Germany be victorious, the whole of Europe not
to speak of a weak country like China would be
in great peril of extinction. Should she be defeated,
Germany still can after the conclusion of peace
send a fleet to war against us. And as the Powers
will be afraid of a second world-war, who will come
to our aid? Have we not seen the example of Korea?
There is no such thing as an army of righteousness
which will come to the assistance of weak nations.
I cannot bear to think of hearing the angry voice of
German guns along our coasts ! " *

Such was the situation in general, following the
severance of diplomatic relations with Germany. Pub-
lic opinion seemed about evenly divided, but never-
theless it seemed fairly certain that the " third step "
of the declaration of war against Germany would be
taken in due time. Thus, on April 16, following the
detention of the Chinese Minister at Berlin, the Peking
Gazette, the most influential of the papers published
by the Chinese, requested an early decision. But at
this point the Premier thought fit to summon a council
1 Putnam-Weale, The Fight for the Republic in China, page 334.

86 CHINA AND THE WORLD-WAR

of Military Governors and their representatives to
hasten the decision of the country, and the ultimate
consequences were disastrous.

The conference met April 25. After much arguing
and exhorting, the majority of the conference were
won over to the view of the Premier. But signs of
opposition on the part of the Parliament against the
Premier and his supporters began to develop. There
was also the feeling that the Premier had promised
certain returns from the Allies, such as increase of the
Chinese customs duties, and relief from the Boxer
indemnity, but that on account of the opposition of
Japan, and for other reasons, these returns could not
be secured.

On May i, however, the Cabinet passed the vote
for war without asking conditions or returns, and on
May 7 the President, through the Cabinet, sent a
formal request to Parliament to approve of this declar-
ation. Parliament delayed, and then, on May 10, an
attempt was made to force it into a decision by a mob
which gathered outside the National Assembly and
threatened the members of both houses. There seems
to be little doubt that some official of the Government
had incited and promised protection to the mob, as
it collected at 10 o'clock in the morning, and was not
dispersed until n at night, when the report was cir-

DECLARATION OF WAR AGAINST GERMANY 87

culated that a Japanese journalist had been killed.
The Peking Gazette openly accused the Premier of
being behind the riot. Telegrams from all parts of
the country poured in protesting against this attempted
coercing of Parliament; all the Ministers of Tuan's
Cabinet resigned, leaving him standing alone.

On May 18, the Peking Gazette, edited by Eugene
Chen, a Chinese born and educated in England and
a British subject, a brave opponent of Yuan Shih-kai
and the monarchical schemes, and a staunch supporter
of the republic, published an article entitled " Selling
China," in which it accused the Premier of being will-
ing to conclude with the Japanese Government an
agreement which much resembled Group V of the
Twenty-one Demands of 1915. That night Mr. Chen
was arrested, and later, without any fair trial, he
was sentenced to four months' imprisonment. The
case stirred .up much comment, and finally, as a result
of the intercession of C. T. Wang and others, on
June 4, the President pardoned him.

Meanwhile events were marching swiftly. The
contest between militants and democrats was clearcut.
Demands were made for Tuan's retirement from the
Premiership; his military friends on the other hand
urged his remaining in office. On May 19, the de-
cision was reached in Parliament .that there was a

88 CHINA AND THE WORLD-WAR

majority for war, but that the question would not be
decided while Tuan was Premier. The Military Gov-
ernors left on May 21 amid much speculation and
some fear as to their future action. Before going
they sent a petition to the President, indirectly attack-
ing Parliament, by criticizing the Constitution which
it had practically finished and asking that Parliament
be dissolved if the Constitution were not corrected.
The three points to which they objected were :

" i. When the House of Representatives passes a
vote of lack of confidence in the Cabinet Ministers,
the President shall either dismiss the Cabinet or dis-
solve the House of Representatives, but the said House
must not be dissolved without the approval of the
Senate. (The French system.)

" 2. The President can appoint the Premier without
the countersignature of the Cabinet Ministers.

" 3. Any resolution passed by both houses shall have
the same force as law."

Obviously these three points gave more power to
the President and to Parliament than an autocratic
Premier and his supporters would desire. The answer
to this petition was an increased demand for the re-
tirement of Tuan and the formation of a new Cabinet.
The Premier refusing to resign on May 23, the Presi-
dent dismissed him from office. Wu Ting-fang was

DECLARATION OF WAR AGAINST GERMANY 89

appointed acting Premier, and there was a feeling of
relief. Li Ching-hsi, nephew of Li Hung-chang, was
nominated on May 25 for Premier, and on May 28 his
nomination was passed by the House of Representa-
tives, and next day by the Senate. On May 30, C T.
Wang, Chairman of the Committee for Writing the
Permanent Constitution, published a statement saying
that the second reading was practically finished and re-
viewing the chief points of interest in the new docu-
ment ready for promulgation.

The Chinese ship of state seemed to have weathered
another of its many storms. But suddenly rumour
came from Anhwei that General Ni Shih-chung had
declared independence, and that he was backed by
Chang Hsun, an unlettered " war lord " of Anhwei,
and by most of the other Northern Generals and Gov-
ernors, who, as Putnam Weale put it, looked upon
Parliament and any Constitution it might work out as
" damnable Western nonsense, the real, essential, vital,
decisive instrument of Government in their eyes being
not even a responsible Cabinet, but a camarilla behind
that Cabinet which would typify and resume all those
older forces in the country belonging to the empire
and essentially militaristic and dictatorial in their
character." This declaration of revolt was received
without approval by the people of the country. The

90 CHINA AND THE WORLD-WAR

writer talked with men from many sections of the
country, and they all agreed that the Military Gover-
nors had no definite ideal or purpose, except their
own glory and power.

All waited for the President to speak. His answer
to this defiance came in no uncertain tones and was
received by patriots with enthusiasm. Some of the
more important passages in his message were:

" It is a great surprise to me that high provincial
officials could have been misled by such rumours into
taking arbitrary steps without considering the correct-
ness or otherwise of the same. . . , You accuse the
Cabinet of violating law, yet, ^with the assistance of
a military force, you endeavour to disobey the orders
of the Government The only goal such acts can
lead to is partition of the country like the five Chi
and making the country a protectorate like Korea;
in which case both restoration of the monarchy and the
establishment of the republic will be an idle dream.
You may not care for the black records that will be
written against you in history, but you ought certainly
to realize your own fate. . . .

" I am an old man. Like the beanstalk under the
leaf I have always been watching for any possibility
of not seeing and understanding aright. Yea, I walk
day and night as if treading on thin ice. I welcome

DECLARATION OF WAR AGAINST GERMANY 9!

all for giving me advice and even admonition. If it
will benefit the country, I am ready to apologize.

" But if it be your aim to shake the foundations
of the country and provoke internal war, I declare
that I am not afraid to die for the country. I have
passed through the fire of trial and have exhausted
my strength and energy from the beginning to the
end for the republic. I have nothing to be ashamed
of. I will under no circumstance watch my country
sink into perdition, still less subject myself to become
a slave to another race.

" Of such acts I wash my hands in front of all the
elders of the country. These are sincere words from
my true heart and will be carried out into deeds.

"Li YUAN-HUNG."

May 31, 1917.

Following the declaration of independence of the
northern provinces, most of the southern ones declared
their opposition to this stand. They were led by
Yunnan, Kweichow, Kwantung, and Kwangsi, who
originally opposed the monarchical movement of Yuan
Shih-kai in 1916. . Some of the loyal Generals' tele-
grams were hotly worded. From Tang Chi-yao, Gov-
ernor of Yunnan :

" Chi-yao is unpolished in thoughts and ignorant

92 CHINA AND THE WORLD-WAR

of the ways of partisanship or factionism. All he
cares and knows about is to protect the republic and
be loyal to it. If any one should be daring enough
to endanger the Chief Executive or Parliament, I vow"
I shall not live with him under the same sky. I shall
mount my steed the moment order is received from
the President to do so."

From a General in Kwantung:

" The reason why the rebels have risen against the
Government is that they are fighting for their own
posts and for money. That is why their views are
so divergent and their acts so ill-balanced. It is hoped
the President will be firm to the very last and give
no ear either to threat or inducement. This is the
time for us to sweep away the remnants of the mon-
archist curse and reform the administration. With
my head leaning against the spear I wait for the order
to strike and I will not hesitate even if I should return
to my native place a corpse wrapped up in horse-skin ! "

The military party nevertheless met at Tientsin and
elected Hsu Shih-chang, Generalissimo. But soon
signs of dissension appeared among them. On June
7 was made public a friendly warning from America.
The American Minister, Dr. Reinsch, transmitted the

DECLARATION OF WAR AGAINST GERMANY 93

following message to Dr. Wu Ting- fang, the Minister
of Foreign Affairs:

" The Government of the United States learns with
the most profound regret of the dissension in China
and desires to express the most sincere desire that
tranquillity and political co-ordination may be forth-
with re-established.

" The entry of China into war with Germany or
the continuance of the status quo of her relations with
that Government are matters of secondary consid-
eration.

" The principal necessity for China is to resume and
continue her political entity, to proceed along the road
of national development on which she has made such
marked progress.

"With the form of government in China, or the
personnel which administers that government, the
United States has an interest only in so far as its
friendship impels it to be of service to China. But
in the maintenance by China of one central united
and alone responsible government, the United States
is deeply interested, and now expresses the very sincere
hope that China, in her own interest and in that of
the world, will immediately set aside her factional
political disputes, and that all parties and persons will
work for the re-establishment of a co-ordinate gov-

94 CHINA AND THE WORLD-WAR

ernment and the assumption of that place among the
powers of the world to which China is so justly en-
titled, but the full attainment of which is impossible
in the midst of internal discord."

This note was welcomed by Chinese as a pledge to
support the Central Government. It aroused some
resentment in Japan because the Japanese had not
been first consulted. On June 9 an ultimatum was
sent from Tientsin either by Chang Hsun or by Li
Ching-hsi, threatening to attack Peking if Parliament
was not dissolved. The President was isolated and
members of Parliament and other democrats could
not reach him. Rumour reported that he was about
to give in and dissolve Parliament. The British ad-
viser to the Chinese Government advised him not to
do so. The Japanese adviser gave the opposite
counsel. Wu Ting-fang, Acting Premier, refused to
sign the mandate. Finally, on June 12, the mandate
was issued, countersigned by General Chiang Chao-
tsung, commander of the Peking gendarmerie. The
next day an explanation was made by President Li
in which he admitted he was forced to issue a man-
date against his will, but that he did it to save Peking
and the country from war and destruction. He de-
clared he would resign as soon as opportunity came.

On June 15, Chang Hsun arrived in Peking with

DECLARATION OF WAR AGAINST GERMANY 95

Li Ching-hsi. Eight of the provinces that week can-
celled their independence, stating that their desire for
the dissolution of Parliament had been satisfied. The
members of the Parliament made their way, many of
them in disguise, to Shanghai and there held meet-
ings and sent out manifestoes. Affairs were apparently
at a standstill with the country thus divided when the
great coup d'etat was carried out by Chang Hsun.
Affairs thereupon moved swiftly.

On June 30, Kang Yu-wei, a well-known advocate
of the monarchy, arrived in Peking. He had travelled
incognito from Shanghai. His first visit was to Chang
Hsun. On July i at 4 A. M. Chang Hsun and his
suite called on the Manchu boy-Bmperor l and informed
him of his restoration, and seated him on the throne.
President Li Yuan-hung was requested to resign, but
refused. He was then practically held prisoner.
Numerous imperial edicts were issued, countersigned
by " Chang Hsun, member of the Privy Council."

On July 3, Feng Kuo-chang repudiated any connec-
tion with the restoration, his name having appeared
in the edicts as one of the petitioners. The Military
Governor of Canton issued proclamations that the
Cantonese would fight to maintain the republic. Many
similar messages were sent by other provinces.
1 Hsuan Tung.

96 CHINA AND THE WORI-D-WAR

Japanese troops proceeded to the Forbidden City,
took President Li Yuan-hung out of the custody of
Chang Hsun's men and escorted him to the Japanese
Legation. On July 4 the President issued a pledge
to support the republic. On July 5 hostilities broke
out at Lang Fang on the Peking-Tientsin railway.
The diplomatic body notified the Peking authorities
that the Procotol of 1901 providing for open railway
communication between Shanhaikwan and Peking
must be observed. On the same date trains out of
Peking were packed to overflowing with Chinese flee-
ing to Tientsin.

By this time the entire country, with the exception
of three provinces, had declared its opposition to the
Manchu movement. Tuan Chi-jui came out of his
retirement, offering to take command of the Repub-
lican army. Liang Chi-chao, who was such a force
against Yuan Shih-kai, denounced the whole movement.

The Republican troops advanced upon Peking, and
on July 7, American, Japanese, and British soldiers
arrived at the capital. An airplane later dropped a
bomb over Fengtai station and wrecked the shed.
Chang Hsun's troops at Paoma Chang retired inside
the capital without fighting and concentrated at the
Temple of Heaven. Another airplane flew over the
Forbidden City and dropped bombs. Chang Hsun, on

DECLARATION OF WAR AGAINST GERMANY 97

July 8, resigned, but the abdication of the Emperor
was not published, his protector holding out for favour-
able terms.

Vice-President Feng Kuo-chang assumed the office
of Acting President at Nanking, which was declared
the capital of the Provincial Government. Dr. Wu
Ting-fang arrived in Shanghai with the seal of the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Several Ministers of
the Manchu Cabinet on this day were captured while
attempting to escape. Chang Hsun refusing to sur-
render and 50,000 Republican troops having surrounded
Peking, on July 12, at four in the morning, the attack
was begun in earnest. Several foreigners were
wounded; fire broke out in the Forbidden City; Chang-
Hsun took refuge in the Dutch Legation, and the
Republican flag was raised over the Forbidden City.

On July 14, Tuan Chi-jui arrived in Peking. It is
rather interesting to note that on July 4 practically the
entire country voiced its " declaration of independ-
ence " from this Manchu Government; on July 14, the
victorious Republican generals entered the capital.
This opposition and this victory of the Chinese Repub-
licans took place on the Independence Days of the
American and the French Republics ; the coincidences
seemed both significant and symbolic. On July 15
Tuan Chi-jui assumed the office of Premier, though

98 CHINA AND THE WORLD-WAR

the southern provinces showed opposition to him. On
July 17 President Li, in a telegram to the provinces,
refused to resume office, and Acting President Feng
Kuo-chang expressed his willingness to succeed Li
Yuan-hung.

The attitude of liberal Chinese during this crisis was
revealed by two speeches made by former officials, July
13, in Shanghai. Dr. Wu Ting-fang, formerly Min-
ister to the United States, who had stood so firmly
against any unconstitutional action on the part of the
monarchists, said:

" The war in Europe is being fought to put an end
to Prussian militarism; and I want the Americans
here to understand that China's present troubles are
due to exactly the same causes. We are engaged in
a struggle between democracy and militarism. Be-
tween 55 and 60 per cent, of the taxes of China are
now going to support militarism in China. This must
be changed, but the change must be gradual. I ask
Americans to be patient and give China a chance.
Democracy will triumph. Please be patient with us.
Study China and try to see us from our own point
of view instead of your own.

" I hope to see the day when the Stars and Stripes
and fire-coloured flag of China will be intertwined in

DECLARATION OF WAR AGAINST GERMANY 99

an everlasting friendship. These nations believe in
universal brotherhood; in the rights of the people of
small nations to manage their own affairs, as out-
lined by the great American President in his war
declaration. I make this statement with hostility to
no nation."

Hon. C. T. Wang, Vice-President of the Chinese
Senate, spoke in the same vein :

" The real issues are : Shall there be government
by law or by force? Shall the will of the people as
expressed through the Assembly prevail, or that of
a privileged few? Shall the military forces of the
nation be used to uphold the country, or to uphold
certain individual generals? Upon these issues the
country and the free and democratic nations of the
West should be called upon to pass judgment.

" With the strongly ingrained love for democracy
and the firm belief in the necessity of subordinating
military authority under the civil, in the character
of our people, we do not hesitate for a minute to
affirm that in China, just as it is in free and democratic
nations of the world, constitutionalism shall prevail
over militarism. We, like the Entente Allies, have
time on our side. We shall have to make the same
sacrifices for the final victory of constitutionalism and

IOO CHINA AND THE WORLD- WAR

democracy as they are making in their titanic struggle
on the battlefields of Europe. Let us resolve that we
will."

During this period of intense disturbance there was
a general feeling among foreigners that assistance
should be given to the democratic elements in China
in their attempt to defend the Republic. Especially
was American sympathy aroused, and various state-
ments were made by journalists and others, that since
America was assisting the newest Asiatic Republic of
Russia in its struggle against autocracy, it should also
extend its support to the Republicans who were fight-
ing the same battle in China. Thus Mr. T. F. Mil-
lard, a well-known journalist and authority on matters
in the Far East, on July 21 voiced his idea of America's
duty:

" Yes, it is very inconvenient for democracy, at the
time when the issue of a world-war is narrowing down
to a test of the fate of democracy, to have two great
nations like Russia and China trying republicanism
for the first time, and under precarious conditions;
for the difficulties of Russia approximate the internal
difficulties of China with republicanism. But just be-
cause the local and general conditions are rather un-
favourable, and further because of the linking of these
experiments with the cause of democracy throughout

DECLARATION OF WAR AGAINST GERMANY IOI

the world by reason of the war, it becomes virtually
impossible for the United States to remain a mere
spectator of the course of events in Russia and China.
Action to hearten, encourage, and support Russia al-
ready has been taken by the United States Govern-
ment. Action to hearten, encourage, and support
China in her effort to maintain a republic ought to be
devised and undertaken without cfclay."

But the Republicans regained control of the gov-
ernment without foreign assistance, and on August I,
Feng Kwo-chang succeeded Li Yuan-hung as Presi-
dent. Before the new President had been in office a
week the subject of the declaration of war was again
brought up. There was little opposition now to the
decision, and on August I4th, 1917, the Chinese Re-
public formally declared war on the German and
Austrian empires.

CHAPTER VI

THE LANSING-ISHII AGREEMENT BETWEEN JAPAN
AND AMERICA CONCERNING CHINA

ON November 2, 1917, the Lansing-Ishii Agree-
ment between America and Japan was signed at Wash-
ington. The agreement, embodied in an exchange of
notes, defined the future attitude of these two countries
toward China. Its important clauses were two in num-
ber : that the United States recognized Japan's " special
interests " in China; and that both the United States
and Japan repledged themselves to observe the principle
of the " open door " and the territorial integrity of
China. The agreement was the most important one
which had been reached by America in relation to the
Orient since the Hay proposal, in 1899, to uphold the
principle of the " open door " ; and its future bearing on
international relations in the Orient will be large.

The general affirmation of the " open door " policy
was the remedy proposed by America eighteen years
before, to meet the dangerous situation fast develop-
ing in China. 1 At that time the prospect of national

a The principle of the "open-door," or equal opportunity, in
China, was potentially present in Great Britain's first treaty

THE LANSING-ISHII AGREEMENT IO3

disintegration and partition by the world powers
seemed imminent. The history of China's relations
with the other nations, with the single exception of
the United States, was a long story of defeat and
losses of Chinese territory and sovereign rights. In
1842, as a result of the victorious " Opium War,"
Great Britain had taken the Island of Hongkong and,
later, portions of the neighbouring mainland; in 1860,
Russia acquired Manchurian territory east of the
Ussuri River, including Vladivostok and the right to
make the city a terminus of the trans-Siberian Rail-
way; in 1864, France had taken Cochin China, and in
1885, proclaimed a protectorate over the nearby terri-
tory of Annam and Tongking. A year later > Great
Britain conquered and annexed Burma. As a result
of the Japanese-Chinese War in 1895, Japan took
Formosa and the neighbouring Pescadores Islands ; the
independence of Korea was recognized, and the Liao-

relations with China in 1842, and the influence of Great Britain
in general has been in line with this principle. Anson Bur-
lingame, the first American minister to China, who went out
in 1861, was a strong champion of the same ideal Accord-
ingly the idea was generally current in the Orient long before
it was formally recognized in the agreements initiated by Sec-
retary Hay in 1899. The exact phrase, "open-door," was first
used in American state-documents in the ultimatum sent to
Spain on November 21 st, 1898, in reference to the future
economic relations with the Philippines.

104 CHINA AND THE WORLD- WAR

tung Peninsula, including Port Arthur, was ceded to
the Japanese, though Russia, Germany and France at
once compelled them to give up the latter territory.
Following this war, the spirit of imperialism grew
and a scramble for concessions began. As a result of
the killing of two missionaries, Germany seized Kiao-
chow Bay, including the port of Tsingtao, demanding
a ninety-nine year lease, and appropriated the mining
and railway rights in Shantung ; Russia then requested
a similar lease of Port Arthur, and took over prac-
tical control of Manchuria; England leased the forti-
fied port of Wei-hai-wei, in Shantung; France gained
a port in South China; and Italy asked for, but was
refused, territory in Central China along the coast.

Not content with leases, the powers began to stake
out " spheres of interest " within which they desired
special economic and commercial rights. England's
" sphere " was in the Yangtze Valley; Russia's, in the
territory north of the Great Wall; France's, in South-
west China; Germany's, in Shantung. If China should
be partitioned, these sections would become definite
possessions of these nations. The supervision of
certain governmental functions of China had already
been placed in the hands of citizens of the foreign
powers, including the collection of the maritime cus-
toms, and later the postal administration and salt-

THE LANSING-ISHII AGREEMENT. IO5

customs. In the earliest treaty relations, the principle
of " exterritoriality " had been recognized, through
which foreigners were tried by their own laws and
not by the laws of China; later foreign " settlements "
had grown up in various important cities, which were
under complete alien jurisdiction. Following the
marking out of u spheres of interest " came the first
rush for railroad concessions. At this time and within
a few succeeding years, a Franco-Belgian firm, backed
by Russia, acquired the right to build the Peking-
Hankow line; the British, the building of the railway
which joined Shanghai to Nanking and Tientsin, divid-
ing the Shantung rights of the road with the Germans ;
American capitalists secured the right of" building the
road from Hankow to Canton, but later sold it to the
Chinese government.

This was the situation in China at the end of 1898.
In that year it was to be affected by a policy suggested
by the United States. Up to that time America's for-
eign policy in the Far East consisted chiefly in an
insistence upon the general principle of non-interfer-
ence and non-aggression. In 1844, preceding its first
treaty with China, the United States had said: " We
do not desire any portion of the territory of China,
nor any terms and conditions whatever which shall
be otherwise than just and honourable to China as well

IO6 CHINA AND THE WORLD- WAR

as to the United States," and it had lived up to that
statement. But, in December, 1898, as a result of the
Spanish-American War, the United States was put in
possession of the Philippine Islands and there arose
at once a need for a formation of a Far Eastern Policy.
Great Britain, especially, had begun to look with con-
cern on the situation developing in China and she
greeted with cordiality the proposal of Secretary Hay,
in 1899, that th e principle of the *' open door " should
be henceforth formally recognized; signifying that
thereafter no part of China should be reserved by any
nation for its own particular economic or political
advantage. This principle was again stated in 1900
in an agreement between Great Britain and Germany
and was accepted later by all the Powers, Russia alone
making certain reservations. Its important clauses
were as follows: first, that no power would in any
way "interfere with any treaty port or any vested
interest within any so-called 'sphere of interest' or
leased territory which it might have in China " ;
second, "the Chinese treaty tariff of the time being
shall apply to all merchandise landed or shipped to all
such ports as are within said ' sphere of interest ' (un-
less they be ' free ports '), no matter to what nation-
ality it may belong, and . . . duties so leviable shall
be collected by the Chinese government " ; and, third,

THE LANSING-ISHII AGREEMENT IO/

" it will levy no higher harbour dues on vessels of
another nationality frequenting any port in such
' sphere ' than shall be levied on vessels of its own na-
tionality, and no higher railroad charges over lines
built, controlled, or operated within its * sphere' on
merchandise belonging to citizens or subjects of other
nationalities transported through such ' sphere ' than
shall be levied on similar merchandise belonging to its
own nationals transported over like distances."

In brief, this statement was a pledge by the Powers
not to discriminate against each other's business inter-
ests in their respective " spheres " ; and was a guaranty
to maintain the status quo.

The various infringements of Chinese territory and
rights, which preceded the formation of this agree-
ment, had naturally had a disturbing effect upon the
minds of the inhabitants and the government of China.
This found expression in the Boxer outburst in 1900
in which a final attempt was made by force of arms
to oust the dreaded foreigner. The attempt was futile
and China emerged in 1901, saddled by an indemnity
of over $300,000,000, the payment of which was se-
cured by pledges of the customs revenues, the native
customs, and a portion of the salt revenues ; and with
the loss of the liberty to import arms for a limited pe-
riod, to maintain jurisdiction over the legation quarter

I08 CHINA AND THE WORLD-WAR

in Peking, and certain other national rights. No more
territory was given up, however; the "open door"
principle was again affirmed; and with certain excep-
tions in Manchuria, due to the action of Russia, the
status quo was maintained until the close of the Russo-
Japanese War.

New changes took place at the conclusion of the war
between Japan and Russia in 1905, and other altera-
tions in the Far Eastern situation followed, with
China again as the victim. By the terms of the Ports-
mouth Treaty all of Russia's privileges and powers in
Southern Manchuria, including Port Arthur and the
Russian railways section, were transferred to Japan;
Japan's "paramount political, military and economic
interests in Korea " were recognized by Russia. Chi-
nese sovereignty in Manchuria was nominally recog-
nized by Russia, but it soon became practically non-
existent. In 1910, Korea was formally annexed by
Japan. Three years later, as a result of the disturb-
ances of the Republican Revolution, Mongolia becom-
ing temporarily independent, Russia attempted to gain
a protectorate over Outer Mongolia, and China was
forced to acknowledge Russia's extensive commercial
and political privileges there in return for a nominal
recognition of its own suzerainty over the region.
Japan began to manoeuvre in Eastern Inner Mongolia

THE LANSING-ISHII AGREEMENT 109

and, in 1915, attempted to clinch its activities by the
Twenty-one Demands, in which it affirmed that China
had " always recognized its special position in South
Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia " ; other ambi-
tions were also put forth, as already discussed in an-
other chapter. In Manchuria, further, according to
consular reports, Japan had apparently not followed
the " open door " agreement of 1899. Such was the
changed situation in the China of 1915, as compared
to that of 1899. The situation was summarized by
Dr. Hornbeck, as follows:

" The settlement at the end of the Russo-Japanese
War materially altered the political and geographical
alignment. A new status was created. New pledges
were made for the maintaining of the newly created
status quo. Japan's activities in Manchuria during
the next ten years further modified the alignments.
In 1914 Japan's conquest of the German possessions
in Shantung again abruptly altered the situation.
And, finally, Japan's demands upon China in January,
1915, and the granting of the special privileges and
concessions which China has been forced to make to
Japan constitute a complete upsetting of the balance of
power and suggest all the possibilities of a reversion,
after the European War shall have been concluded,
to speculation, apprehensions, competition, and conse-

IIO CHINA AND THE WORLD- WAR

quent developments such as marked the years 1895-

L" 1

This situation, as portrayed, aroused various sus-
picions of Japan's ultimate intentions toward China,
and there seemed a need for some official statement to
clear the air. This was made by the Japanese Govern-
ment in the fall of 1917 in an exchange of notes signed
in Washington by Viscount Ishii and Secretary Lans-
ing.

There were three general reasons for the formula-
tion of this agreement. The first was the apprehen-
sion of America and of the world in general concern-
ing Japanese intentions in China. These apprehen-
sions were mentioned in the notes exchanged and in a
supplementary statement issued by Secretary Lansing.
In the notes appears the clause, " In order to silence
mischievous reports that have from time to time been
circulated, it is believed by us that a public announce-
ment once more of the desires and intentions shared by
our two Governments with regard to China is advis-
able " ; and in Secretary Lansing's statement, he said,
" There had unquestionably been growing up between
the peoples of the two countries a feeling of suspicion
as to the motives inducing the activities of the other
1 Contemporary Politics in the Far East, page 242.

THE LANSING-ISHII AGREEMENT III

in the Far East, a feeling which, if unchecked, prom-
ised to develop a serious situation. Rumours and
reports of improper intentions were increasing and
were more and more believed." German propaganda
was referred to as having a large part in increasing
this suspicion. This apprehension seemed general not
only in America, but in other nations as well, and was
one of the reasons for the drawing up of the new
agreement.

Another reason, which was not so generally recog-
nized, was Japan's apprehension concerning America's
intentions in China. Japan had long cherished the
hope of becoming the recognized leader of the Orient.
Especially did it desire unquestioned supremacy in its
leadership over China. During the past two years the
United States had taken certain action which seemed
to question its leadership. At the time of me Twenty-
one Demands, as already stated, America was the only
nation to protest against any infringement of China's
rights. In the summer of 1917, during the turmoil
which accompanied the attempt to overthrow the Re-
public and to restore the Mandms, the United States
had sent definite advice to China concerning the situa-
tion. Statements were made by experienced Japanese
journalists, such as, " In the Japanese-American rela-

112 CHINA AND THE WORLD- WAR

tions, the powder-chest has ever been China not
California "; and that the United States might " go to
Japan and tell her that America had taken upon her-
self the role of the guardian and guide of China, that
she was to dictate the policy of the Chinese Republic
according to what America thought to be just and
righteous, and that Japan's policies and actions in the
Far East, and more especially in China, were to be sub-
ject to the approval of the United States/' * The
formation of the closest possible ties with China
seemed vital to the future greatness of Japan, and any
interference in such a program was looked upon with
apprehension. Accordingly an assurance from Amer-
ica of a continuation of its present relations with China
was much desired.

A third factor was the need of the Allies for closer
co-operation as a result of the loss of Russia from
their ranks. There was a decided need of unity of
counsel and of effort, if the handicap of this loss were
to be overcome. As has already been pointed out,
there had not always been a clear unity of understand-
ing and policy between Japan and the Allies; Japan
had special aspirations in the Orient; and there seems
reason for the belief that a certain amount of pressure

1 Adachi Kinnosuke, in Asia, December, 1917.

THE LANSING-ISHII AGREEMENT,

was brought to bear on America to recognize the as-
pirations of Japan in China. This America appar-
ently attempted to do with justice to China in the
Lansing-Ishii Agreement

After a series of conferences in Washington be-
tween Viscount Ishii and Secretary Lansing, the fol-
lowing statement was issued on November 2 :

" DEPARTMENT OF STATE,

" WASHINGTON, Nov. 2, 1917.
" EXCELLENCY :

" I have the honour to communicate herein my un-
derstanding of the agreement reached by us in our
recent conversations touching the questions of mutual
interest to our Governments relating to the Republic
of China.

" In order to silence mischievous reports that have
from time to time been circulated, it is believed by us
that a public announcement once more of the desires
and intentions shared by our two Governments with
regard to China is advisable.

" The Governments of the United States and Japan
recognize that territorial propinquity creates special
relations between countries, and, consequently, the
Government of the United States recognizes that

114 CHINA AND THE WORLD-WAR

Japan has special interests in China, particularly in the
parts to which her possessions are contiguous.

" The territorial sovereignty of China, nevertheless,
remains unimpaired, and the Government of the
United States has every confidence in the repeated as-
surances of the Imperial Japanese Government that,
while geographical position gives Japan such special
interests, they have no desire to discriminate against
the trade of other nations or to disregard the com-
mercial rights heretofore granted by China in treaties
with other powers.

" The Governments of the United States and Japan
deny that they have any purpose to infringe in any
way the independence or territorial integrity of China,
and they declare, furthermore, that they always ad-
here to the principle of the so-called ' open door/ or
equal opportunity for commerce and industry in China.

" Moreover, they mutually declare that they are op-
posed to the acquisition by any government of any
special right or privileges that would affect the inde-
pendence or territorial integrity of China, or that
would deny to the subjects or citizens of any country
the full enjoyment of equal opportunity in the com-
merce and industry of China.

" I shall be glad to have your Excellency confirm this
understanding of the agreement reached by us.

THE LANSING-ISHII AGREEMENT, 1 15

" Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurance of my

highest consideration.

"ROBERT LANSING.

" His Excellency, Viscount Ki-
kujiro Ishii, Ambassador
Extraordinary and Plenipo-
tentiary of Japan, on special
mission."

" THE SPECIAL MISSION OF JAPAN,

"WASHINGTON, Nov. 2, 1917.
"Sir:

" I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of
your note today, communicating to me your under-
standing of the agreement reached by us in our re-
cent conversations touching the questions of mutual
interest to our Governments relating to the Republic
of China.

" I am happy to be able to confirm to you, under
authorization of my Government, the understanding
in questions set forth in the following terms :

(Here the Special Ambassador repeats the language
of the agreement as given in Secretary Lansing's note.)

"K. ISHII,

"Ambassador Extraordinary and
Plenipotentiary of Japan, on
special mission.

1 1 6 CHINA AND THE WORLD- WAR

" Honourable Robert Lansing,

Secretary of State."

In addition to reaching an agreement on this matter,
the Japanese representatives had also discussed with
the representatives of the United States Government
various other subjects, especially in relation to their
joint participation in the conduct of the war. Secre-
tary Lansing's statement concerning these negotia-
tions was in part :

" The Japanese Commission accomplished a further
purpose in expressing Japan's earnest desire to co-
operate with this country in waging war against the
German government. The discussions covered the
military, naval and economic activities to be employed
with due regard to relative resources and ability. . . .
Complete and satisfactory understandings upon the
matter of naval co-operation in the Pacific have been
reached. * . . At the present time it is inexpedient to
make public the details of these conversations,"

The two most important statements in the pub-
lished agreement were: that both the United States
and Japan repledged themselves to the recognition of
the principle of the " open door " and the territorial
integrity of China; but that the United States also
recognized that Japan had " special interests " in
China, particularly in territory which adjoined its own

THE LANSING-ISHII AGREEMENT

possessions. It was, indeed, a happy result that
China's rights were thus formally recognized and that
an assurance was made that the policy of the " open
door " was to continue. In this respect the agreement
did much to clear away the clouds of suspicion which
had been long gathering, and marked a new era in the
good relations between the United States and Japan.

On the other hand, there were four main lines of
criticism directed against the agreement. In the first
place, its terms seemed to be self -contradictory; sec-
ondly, the phrase " special interests " was decidedly
vague ; third, the principle upon which these " special
interests '' was built, that of territorial propinquity, did
not seem to be wholly valid ; finally, China was not in-
cluded in the negotiations.

By reaffirming the principle of the " open door "
and of China's territorial integrity, Japan and America
seemed to guarantee equal opportunities to all nations
in commerce, agreeing also to prohibit any country
from acquiring political rights which would infringe
China's sovereignty. No commercial or political priv-
ileges were to be given to any country. But on the
other hand, " special interests " imply special priv-
ileges; these privileges must be either commercial or
political ; and at once a contradiction of meaning seems
to arise. The same sort of contradiction had seemed

Il8 CHINA AND THE WORLD- WAR

to exist in the treaty between Great Britain and Japan,
made in 1905, concerning Korea, when the alliance
between the two nations was renewed. Article III
of this treaty said, " Japan possessing paramount po-
litical, military and economic interests in Korea, Great
Britain recognizes the right of Japan to take such
measures ... in Korea as she may deem proper . . ,
provided that such measures are not contrary to the
principle of equal opportunities for the commerce and
industry of all nations." * If the phrase " special in-
terests " were substituted for the one " paramount in-
terests/' the two affirmations would be more or less
similar. Three months after the treaty between Great
Britain and Japan was signed, a Japanese protector-
ate was established over Korea ; five years later Korea
was formally annexed. After the publishing of the
Lansing-Ishii treaty with these similar terms there
was some fear, especially on the part of China, that
history would repeat itself.

In the second place, the phrase " special interests "
was obviously vague. In the agreement they were
not defined and there have been various conjectures
by the publicists of the three nations involved con-
cerning their meaning. In a magazine published in
Japan shortly after the concluding of the treaty ap-

1 See Appendix V.

THE LANSING-ISHII AGREEMENT 1 19

peared two articles which attempted to define these
" special interests." The first article maintained that
they were special commercial privileges in Japan's va-
rious spheres in China; the second insisted that polit-
ical privileges were designated. In this vagueness of
meaning there is possibility of future misunderstand-
ing.

In the third place, the reason for the recognition
of these " special interests " was found in Japan's ter-
ritorial propinquity to China, the principle being stated
in the agreement that " territorial propinquity creates
special relations between countries " and that conse-
quently Japan was entitled to the " special privileges "
named. If China were willing to enter into these
special relations with Japan, resulting from the terri-
torial proximity of the two countries, the situation
would be different. But any one who has lived in
China, whatever his theoretical views may be of the
subject, must admit the fact that the Chinese as a
whole do not wish to enter into these closer relations
with Japan. They are not afraid of loans in which
the United States or the other Powers as a group are
represented, but they do object to transactions of a
commercial or political type with Japan alone. The
matter then resolves itself into the question, " Is ter-
ritorial propinquity a sufficient reason for acquiring

I2O CHINA AND THE WORLD-WAR

special privileges against the will of the people con-
cerned ? " The answer in America and in some coun-
tries of Europe, in recent years at least, has always
been in the negative. Territorial propinquity exists
between the United States and Canada; the former
desired special relations of reciprocity; but, when Can-
ada did not wish to enter into these relations, there
was no question of using force to accomplish them.
Germany, on account of Its territorial proximity to
Belgium and Russia, desires its special commercial re-
lations with them to be recognized, but there is no
expectation of this being done. If this principle of
self-determination as to special relations, whether
commercial or political, applies in America and Europe,
why should it not apply in Asia? Further, if terri-
torial propinquity were generally recognized by the
other powers as creating special relations, the results
might be serious. Russia's boundaries are contiguous
with those in China for hundreds of miles ; Great Brit-
ain could logically claim " special interests " near its
port at Hongkong; France could do the same with
Cochin China ; and America would have a claim in the
proximity of the Philippines to the Chinese coast.
The Chinese regions implied by reason of their prox-
imity to Japanese possessions would seem to be Man-
churia, Mongolia, Shantung, and Fukien; but, if

THE LANSING-ISHII AGREEMENT 121

special interests and privileges were to be conceded in
these provinces and in the regions bordering the hold-
ings of other nations as well, what of the future of
the policy of the " open door " and of equal oppor-
tunity, which originally was formulated to check and
control just such spheres of interest?

A fourth objection was that China was not included
in the negotiations. Since the " special interests "
mentioned in the treaty were to be granted to Japan
in China, it would seem that the latter had a right to
a voice in the matter ; otherwise its sovereignty seemed
to be ignored. The same action had been taken by
Japan and Russia in the Portsmouth treaty when a
part of the Chinese province of Manchuria was divided
between them and China was not notified until after
the decision concerning the disposal of this territory
had been reached. Although later they ratified this
settlement, the Chinese felt that at that time their rights
as a sovereign nation had not been considered, and the
repetition of this act continued the precedent which
seemed harmful to their national interests and pride.

These were some of the objections made against the
terms of the treaty. Its meaning and influence were
shown more clearly by its reception in each of the three
nations concerned.

As soon as the Chinese government was informed of

122 CHINA AND THE WORLD- WAR

the agreement at issue, an official statement " in order
to avoid misunderstanding," addressed to both the Jap-
anese and American Governments, was issued. It
stated that " the Chinese government had in its rela-
tions with foreign governments always followed the
principles of justice and equality; that the rights ex-
tended to friendly nations by treaty had been con-
sistently respected ; that the special relations created by
territorial contiguity were provided for in the treaties ;
and that henceforth as formerly, the Chinese Govern-
ment would adhere to these principles, but that it could
not allow itself to be bound by any agreement entered
into by other nations." In other words, China recog-
nized special interests only in so far as they existed by
virtue of treaties and agreements to which she was a
party.

The Chinese as a whole seemed to appreciate the
promises of America and Japan concerning the pro-
tection of their territorial rights ; but they were in doubt
as to the exact meaning of the agreement, due to the
double interpretation of the various " special inter-
ests." An American authority has characterized it as
" a harmless recognition of a simple fact, or a cargo of
diplomatic dynamite, according to interpretation and
application." He went on to say: 1 "There is no

1 Article on " The Lansing-Ishii Agreement," in Asia, Decem-
ber, 1917. .

THE LANSING-ISHII AGREEMENT 123

question but that for a long time the people of the
United States and the people of Japan did not under-
stand the term ' open door ' in the same sense. Do
they now? Have the American and the Japanese
governments achieved a meeting of the minds as to
the connotation of the term 'special interests'? In
case of disagreement as to whether a given measure
does or does not infringe China's independence or the
principle of equal opportunity, who is to decide? . . .
In 1915 the Japanese Government insisted that its de-
mands upon China did not infringe treaty rights;
China insisted that they did. When China, under
pressure of an ultimatum, agreed to some fifteen of
the things demanded, the United States, without com-
mitting itself as to whether they did or did not do so,
merely went on record to the effect that it would not
recognize any agreement impairing the rights of the
United States, the integrity of China, or the principle
of the ' open door.' "

Some of the less well-informed Chinese viewed the
agreement as a sign of America's tacit approval of
Japan's recent action in China. The general attitude
seemed to be one of anxiety as to the eventual meaning
and implications of the agreement.

Concerning Japan's pledge not to allow any attack
upon Chinese territorial integrity, or independence, the

124 CHINA AND THE WORLD- WAR

China Press, as quoted in Millard's Review of Oct.
6th, said:

" Baron Ishii announces that Japan is ' prepared to
defend the independence of China against any aggres-
sion.' This is all to the good. There is only one na-
tion that threatens China, and if Japan will defend
China against the aggression of that nation, China will
survive. If Japan, to put it plainly, will defend China
against Japanese aggressions, all will be well."

A final comment was that " no two powers could
guarantee between themselves a continuation of
China's independence as a sovereign state, or could
make certain a preservation of its national territorial
integrity. The only way in which these aims could be
accomplished seemed to be in a growth of power on
China's own part, which would enable it to defend
its domains from any aggressions by a foreign
power." x

The Japanese, although there were some who criti-
cized the agreement because it did not seem definite
enough as to their desired powers in China, were gen-
erally satisfied with the agreement. The best indica-
tion of their approval was the immediate selection of
Viscount Ishii as Ambassador to America. They be-
lieved that the way was open for their recognized

a ln the Lansingr-Ishii Agreement quoted above.

THE LANSINOISHII AGREEMENT 125

leadership in the Orient. One of their publicists, writ-
ing in an American magazine, said : " The new un-
derstanding between the United States and Japan will
be held in Japan as the greatest piece of constructive
achievement of the diplomatic history of the Far
East for many a generation. To Japan it is a double
triumph. . . . Japan has been the ally of the British
Empire for years. That the greatest power in the
two Americas now recognizes her leadership of the
Far Eastern states must mean a good deal . . . to
my countrymen. Besides laying a pretty solid founda-
tion stone of the future peace of Japan, the achieve-
ment of the Ishii Mission crowns high the cup of
Japan's political aspirations." x

The view of the treaty taken in the United States,
followed a middle course, as compared with these two
estimates. The chief criticism was along the lines al-
ready indicated, but America was hopeful that it had
solved a difficult situation with satisfaction to both
China and Japan. This attitude was expressed in a
statement by Secretary Lansing, accompanying the
publication of the treaty. He said : " By openly pro-
claiming that the policy of Japan is not one of aggres-
sion, and by declaring that there is no intention to take
advantage commercially or industrially of the special

1 Adachi Kinnosuke, in Asia, December, 1917.

126 CHINA AND THE WORLD- WAR

relations to China created by geographical position, the
representatives of Japan have cleared the diplomatic
atmosphere of suspicion. . . . The principal result of
the negotiations was the mutual understanding which
was reached as to the principles governing the policies
of the two governments in relation .to China. This
understanding is formally set forth in the notes ex-
changed, and now made public. The statements in the
notes require no explanation. They not only contain
a reaffirmation of the ' open door ' policy, but intro-
duce a principle of non-interference with the sover-
eignty and territorial integrity of China, which, gen-
erally applied, is essential to perpetual international
peace, as clearly declared by President Wilson, and
which is the very foundation, also, of Pan- American-
ism, as interpreted by this government.' 5

True friends of China and Japan warmly hope that
this estimate of the outcome of the agreement will be
borne out by future events.

CHAPTER VII

THE CHINESE-JAPANESE MILITARY AGREEMENT
OF 1918

THE situation in Russia following the abdication
of the Czar in March, 1917, was of special concern
to the Allies. It was of vital importance to the two
neighbouring oriental supporters of the Allies, Japan
and China. The northern boundaries of the Chinese
Republic are contiguous for hundreds of miles with the
boundaries of Siberia; any German penetration there
would be felt at once in China. Japanese shipping,
which included practically all of the vessels on the
Pacific, would be menaced at once if the Germans
should gain control of Vladivostok. Further, in its
larger aspect of German control of Russia's resources
and territory, presaging the establishment of a vast
empire stretching from the North Sea to the Pacific,
the Japanese saw a grave menace. The military dan-
ger of the German forces in Siberia seems to have been
exaggerated, but there was every probability of eco-
nomic control and domination. Japan could not take
military measures to meet this situation unless it had

127

AJND THE WORLD- WAR

the consent and support of its neighbour on the main-
land, and consequently, soon after the revolution in
Russia, negotiations were begun leading to a military
agreement between China and Japan. The military
agreement was signed May 16, 1918; the naval agree-
ment, May 1 9th; the first public announcement was
made in Tokio, May 3Oth. The whole affair was
shrouded in much secrecy, and was the cause of endless
comment and even suspicion in both countries, which
was not wholly dispelled by the explanatory statement
finally published.

The first report concerning the proposed agreement
became current in China in the Spring of 1917. Un-
fortunately it was associated in the minds of the Chi-
nese with Group Five of the Twenty-one Demands
made by Japan in January, 1915. These demands
were forecasted by the secret statement of the Black
Dragon Society, already mentioned, which spoke of a
" Defensive Military Alliance " between China and
Japan as the ultimate goal of Japanese foreign policy.
The fifth group of the Demands, it may be remem-
bered, was the most severe, involving certain rights
which, if granted to Japan, would infringe the sov-
ereignty of China and make it practically a vassal
nation.

In its ultimatum of May 7, 1915, Japan, under

CHINESE-JAPANESE MILITARY AGREEMENT 12$

threat of force, demanded the acceptance of the first
four groups and agreed to hold the fifth group in
abeyance, with the exception of the article in relation
to Fukien Provinces, saying, " The Japanese Imperial
Government will undertake to detach the Group Five
from the present negotiations and discuss it separately
in the future." Commenting on this clause, a leading
journalist in the Orient, Mr, Putnam-Weale, had said,
" It is this fact which remains the sword of Damocles
hanging over China's head; and until this sword has
been flung back into the waters of the Yellow Sea the
Far-Eastern situation will remain perilous," * The
Twenty-one Demands were prefaced by the statement
that they were being made for the purpose " of main-
taining the general peace in Eastern Asia," and it was
not surprising that, when Japan began negotiations for
a military alliance, having a similar purpose, last year,
many Chinese began to fear that the long-dreaded
" sword of Damocles " was about to fall.

The first specific mention of the proposed alliance
was made in the Peking Gazette, the most influential
native newspaper, on May 18, 1917. The editor,
Eugene Chen, who has already been mentioned, was a
fiery supporter of the Republic and an opponent of the
Japanese. In an editorial entitled "Selling China,"

1 The Fight for the Republic in China, page 117.

130 CHINA AND THE WORLD- WAR

he asserted that the Premier, Tuan Chi-jui, was con-
templating making an agreement with Japan which
would involve practically all the concessions mentioned
in the original Group Five. Mr. Chen was promptly
arrested and thrown into prison without a trial; later
his newspaper was suppressed and its property confis-
cated. Subsequently Mr. Chen was pardoned land
made his escape from Peking; but his accusation lin-
gered in the minds of the Chinese public and became
associated with any mention of a military alliance with
Japan.

Matters remained at a standstill until the early
months of the year 1918, when reports again began to
circulate, saying that the agreement was soon to be
made. The wildest and most extravagant stories be-
came current. The statement was freely made that the
northern officials were selling China for their own
interests. In March it was recorded that a preliminary
agreement had been signed, and protests from all the
country were sent to Peking.

An example of these rumours was a letter published
in the China Press in April. It was written by a Chi-
nese who claimed to have gained his information
directly from one of the high officials in Peking. The
China Press published it with the following com-
ments :

CHINESE- JAPANESE MILITARY AGREEMENT

" The China Press some weeks ago received from its
Peking correspondent word that new demands or ' re-
quirements ' had been presented by Japan. Since
then Renter's Agency has also carried the reports. In
the light of those facts, the following letter, although
its authority cannot be vouched for, is interesting :

" * I hope you have perused my last letter. Since
then there has been another exceedingly alarming oc-
currence. This is in connection with the revival of the
negotiations with a certain country to form a certain
alliance for participation in the great war. Its inside
facts are as follows :

"' (i) Warfare alliance, including the training of
soldiers under their supervision.

" (2) Arms alliance, including the organization
of arsenals with joint Chinese and interest.

" ' (3) Industrial alliance, including the practical
surrender of all the mines of the republic.

" ' (4) Financial alliance, including a loan to China
amounting to $60,000,000, the control of the issue of
banknotes and the reorganization of the banks of China
and communications.

" ' (5) Educational alliance.

" c (6) Diplomatic alliance.

" ' (7) Transportation alliance/

" This is certainly more alarming than Group Five

132 CHINA AND THE WORLD- WAR

of the Twenty-one Demands presented in the fourth
year of the Republic. Another demand included in
the present negotiations is that China shall not sign
any treaty or agreement with any foreign power with-
out the consent of the government in question.

"This new pact went into force on May i. It is
learned that it was officially signed and sealed. The
special mission of the Minister of the nation con-
cerned was solely for the purpose of effecting the con-
clusion of the alliance.

" Although it appears on the surface as a document
of an alliance for participation in the war, it really
amounts to a bill of sale of the nation. This is a con-
tinuation of what was intended to be effected in the
fourth year of the republic, only it has been immensely
enlarged upon and is a hundred times more detri-
mental.

" This piece of news is obtained through Chow Tse-
chi from the e Money Joss/ (Liang Shih-yi.)"

Finally, on May i6th, an official statement from
both Peking and Tokyo was published, stating that an
agreement had been reached. The fears of the Chi-
nese were heightened by the fact that the officials would
not publish the terms of the alliance. Similar secrecy
had surrounded the serving of the Twenty-one De-

CHINESE- JAPANESE MILITARY AGREEMENT 133

mands in 1915, and many alarmists recalled this fact.
The editor of the chief native newspaper in Peking
committed suicide, saying that he would not live to
become a slave of a foreign country. The Chinese
students in Japan attacked the Chinese embassy in
Tokyo and then left in a body for China. The leaders
of the Southern party in China telegraphed Peking
that they would give up their opposition to the Central
Government if it would cancel the agreement. Even
in Japan there was much adverse criticism of the se-
crecy maintained by the Imperial Government, Fi-
nally this feeling grew so strong that on May 30th an
official statement was made concerning the agreement.
It took the form of a denial of the many rumours which
had arisen, rather than a clear exposition of the agree-
tiient itself. It mentioned certain notes which had
been exchanged on March 25th between the Japanese
Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Chinese Minister
in Tokyo. These notes were of the greatest import-
ance, as they stated that the military agreement had
relation only to the hostile penetration into Russian
territory, and the assurance was given that Japanese
troops, stationed within Chinese territory for the pur-
pose of defence, would be completely withdrawn upon
the termination of the war. The period within which

134 . CHINA AND THE WORLD- WAR

the notes were to remain in force was to be determined
by the military and naval authorities of the two
powers. The notes follow :

Mr. Chang to Viscount Motono
"Tokyo, March 25, 1918. I have the honour to
communicate to Your Excellency that the Government
of China, believing that in the present situation co-
operation with the Government of Japan on the lines
hereinafter indicated is highly important in the interest
of both countries, have authorized me to approach
your Government with a view to arranging for such
co-operation.

" i. Having regard to the steady penetration of hos-
tile influence into Russian territory, threatening the
general peace and security of the Far East, the Gov-
ernment of China and the Government of Japan shall
promptly consider in common the measures to be taken
in order to meet the exigencies of the situation, and
to do their share in the Allied cause for the prosecution
of the present war.

" 2. The methods and conditions of such co-opera-
tion between the Chinese and Japanese armed forces in
the joint defensive movements against the enemy for
giving effect to the decision which may be arrived at
by the two Governments in common accord under the

CHINESE- JAPANESE MILITARY AGREEMENT 135

preceding clause, shall be arranged by the competent
authorities of the two powers who will from time to
time consult each other fully and freely upon all ques-
tions of mutual interest. It is understood that the
matters thus arranged by the competent authorities
shall be confirmed by the two Governments and shall
be put into operation at such time as may be deemed
opportune."

Viscount Motono replied on the same day with an
identic note recapitulating Mr. Chang's statements
and adding :

" The Imperial Government, fully sharing the views
embodied in the foregoing proposals, will be happy to
co-operate with the Chinese Government on the lines
above indicated."

Viscount Motono to Mr. Chang
"Tokyo, March 25, 1918. With reference to the
notes exchanged on March 25 between the Govern-
ments of Japan and of China on the subject of their
joint defensive movements against the enemy, I have
the honour to propose on behalf of my Government
that the period within which the said notes are to re-
main in force shall be determined by the competent
military and naval authorities of the two Powers.
At the same time the Imperial government are happy

136 CHINA AND THE WORLD- WAR

to declare that the Japanese troops stationed within
Chinese territory for the purpose of such defensive
movements against the enemy shall be completely with-
drawn from such territory upon the termination of the

war."

Mr. Chang to Viscount Motono

"Tokyo, March 25, 1918. I have the honour to
acknowledge the receipt of Your Excellency's com-
munication under today's date, proposing on behalf of
your Government that the period within which the
said notes are to remain in force shall be determined
by the competent military and naval authorities of the
two Powers. I am happy to state in reply that the
foregoing proposal is accepted by my Government. I
am further gratified to take note of the declaration
embodied in your communication under acknowledg-
ment, that the Japanese troops stationed within Chi-
nese territory for the purpose of defensive movements
against the enemy shall be completely withdrawn from
such territory upon the termination of the war."

These notes were apparently the foundation of the
reports current during the last of March in China,
although there is evidence for the view that the
first demands of the Japanese were more extreme than
these notes indicate. In addition to these notes the

CHINESE- JAPANESE MILITARY AGREEMENT 137

Japanese government issued a supplementary state-
ment categorically denying all such interpretations of
the agreement. The statement follows:

" Having regard for the steady penetration of hos-
tile influence into Russian territory, jeopardizing the
peace and welfare of the Far East, and recognizing
the imperative necessity of adequate co-operation be-
tween Japan and China to meet the exigencies of the
case, the Governments of the two countries, after
frank interchange of views, caused the annexed notes
to be exchanged, March 25, between the Minister of
Foreign Affairs and the Chinese Minister in Tokyo.

" In pursuance of the purport of the notes the Im-
perial Government subsequently sent Commissioners
representing the Imperial Army and Navy to Peking,
where they held conferences with the authorities of the
Chinese army and navy. The negotiations progress-
ing smoothly, two agreements were concluded, one re-
lating to the army being signed May 16, and the other
relating to the navy, May 19.

" These agreements only embody concrete arrange-
ments as to the manner and conditions under which
the armies and navies of the two countries are to co-
operate in common defence against the enemy, on the
basis of the above mentioned notes exchanged on
March 25. The details of the arrangements consti-

138 CHINA AND THE WORLD- WAR

tuting as they do a military secret, can not be made
public, but they contain no provision other than those
pertaining to the object already defined. Currency
has been given to various rumours, alleging that the
agreements contain for instance such stipulations as
that a Chinese Expedition is to be under Japanese com-
mand, that Japan may construct forts in Chinese terri-
tory at such places as she may choose, that Japan will
assume the control of Chinese railways, shipyards, and
arsenals, and even that Japan will assume the control of
China's finances, will organize China's police system,
will acquire the right of freely operating Chinese mines
producing materials for the use of the arsenals, etc.
It cannot be too emphatically stated that these and
similar rumours are absolutely unfounded.

" May 30, the 7th year of Taisho,
" Ministry of Foreign Affairs,

"Tokyo, Japan."

In this statement there is no definite information
given concerning the details of the arrangement.
Considerable speculation has taken place in regard to
these details. President Feng was rumoured to have
shown them to a delegation of students who came to
him to protest against the agreement. Various ver-
sions have been published unofficially; a translation- of

CHINESE- JAPANESE MILITARY AGREEMENT 139

one of them which comes from semi-official sources,
read as follows :

" Article i. In view of the penetration of enemy in-
fluence into the eastern territory of Russia, and of the
likelihood of the peace of the two contracting parties
being disturbed thereby, China and Japan mutually
agree actively to undertake the obligations of war-par-
ticipation by measures designed jointly to guard against
the action of the enemy.

" Article 2. The two countries shall mutually rec-
ognize and respect the equality of the other regarding
position and interests in carrying out joint military
measures.

"Article 3. When it is necessary to take action
based on this agreement, orders will be issued by both
China and Japan to their troops and people, calling
on them to be frankly sincere in dealing with each other
in the area of military operations; and the Chinese
officials shall co-operate and assist the Japanese troops
in the area involved so that there may be no hindrance
to military movements. Japanese troops shall on their
part respect Chinese sovereignty and shall not cause
any inconvenience to the Chinese people by violating
local customs and traditions.

" Article 4. Japanese troops in Chinese territory
shall withdraw from China as soon as war is ended.

I4O CHINA AND THE WORLD-WAR

" Article 5. If it be found necessary to send troops
outside of Chinese territory, troops will be jointly sent
by the two countries.

" Article 6. The war area and war responsibilities
shall be fixed by mutual arrangement of the military
authorities of the two countries as and when occasion
arises in accordance with their respective military re-
sources.

"Article 7. In the interests of convenience, the
military authorities of the two countries shall under-
take the following affairs during the period necessary
for the execution of joint measures:

" i. The two countries shall mutually assist and
facilitate each other in extending the means of com-
munications (post and telegraph) in connection with
military movements and transportation.

"2. When necessary for war purposes construction
operations may be carried on and the same shall be
decided, when occasion arises, by mutual consent of the
chief commanders of the two countries. The said
construction-operation shall be removed when the war
is ended.

" 3. The two countries shall mutually supply each
other with military supplies and raw materials for the
purpose of jointly guarding against the enemy. The
quantity to be supplied shall be limited to the extent

Copyright by Underwood & Underwood, N. Y.
Japanese Troops, in Allied Expeditionary Force in Siberia.
Half of this force is composed of troops from Japan; General K. Otani is the
Commander-in-Chief.

CHINESE- JAPANESE MILITARY AGREEMENT

of not interfering with the necessary requirements of
the country supplying the same.

"4. Regarding questions of military sanitation in
the war area the two countries shall render mutual
assistance to each other.

" 5. Officers directly concerned with war operations
shall. mutually be sent by the two countries for co-
operation. If one party should ask for the assistance
of technical experts, the other shall supply the same.

" 6. For convenience, military maps of the area of
war operations will be exchanged.

" Article 8. When the Chinese Eastern Railway is
used for military transportation, the provisions of the
original treaty relating to the management and protec-
tion of the said line shall be respected. The method
of transportation shall be decided as occasion arises.

" Article 9. Details regarding the actual perform-
ance of this agreement shall be discussed by mutual
agreement of the delegates appointed by the Military
Authorities of the two countries concerned.

" Article 10. Neither of the two countries shall dis-
close the contents of the agreement and its appendix,
and the same shall be treated as military secrets.

"Article n. This Agreement shall become valid
when it is approved by both Governments after being
signed by the Military representatives of the two coun-

CHINA AND THE WORLD-WAR

tries. As to the proper moment for the beginning oi
war operations, the same shall be decided by the highesl
military organs of the two countries. The provisions
of this agreement and the detailed steps arising there-
from shall become null and void on the day the joint
war measures against the enemy end.

" Article 12. Two copies of the Chinese and of the
Japanese text of this agreement shall be drawn;
one of each shall be kept by China and Japan. The
Chinese and Japanese texts shall be identical in
meaning." *

The main feeling In the Orient concerning the alli-
ance was one of relief and of surprise at the long
period of secrecy that shrouded the negotiations a
secrecy which tended to increase any misunderstand-
ing which might have arisen. A general explanation
of this secrecy by Japanese, as well as Chinese writers,
was that Japan attempted to gain more than was
contained in the final agreement; that her original plan
had to be modified by the counter-proposals of the Pe-
king Government. There was also a tendency to criti-
cize the statement for not being more explicit. Thus,
according to the Japan Advertiser of May 3ist, " Mr.
Yuko Hamuguchi, a prominent member of the Kensei-
kai, remarks that the agreement has caused misunder-

i Millard's Review, May 25, 1918.

CHINESE- JAPANESE MILITARY AGREEMENT 143

standing and much excitement among many Chinese,
and though an official statement has now been pub-
lished the agreement will remain as much a conundrum
as ever, inasmuch as the important clauses are kept
secret. It seems problematical whether the official
statement just published will have the desired effect in
removing the suspicion of the Chinese/'

On the other hand, there was a general appreciation
of the promises of Japan to retire when the military
necessity permits, and a feeling that, because of the
alliance, Japan and China were the better prepared to
do their part in the final phases of the great war. Thus
the Japan Advertiser commented editorially upon the
alliance; its views were seconded by the hopeful-
minded press of the Orient. " The categorical denial
of the rumours so widely current in China is a conclu-
sive reply to the sensation-mongers who have been so
active. The present emphatic disclaimer will have
great value in restoring China's confidence in Japan,
and may mark a turning point in the relations of the
two countries. That may be counted positive gain, in
addition to the confounding of malicious rumours.
The other positive gain is that the way is clear for
whatever action may be called for by further enemy
penetration of Russian territory. . . . There is ample
justification for the agreement, and the Allies will sin-

144 CHINA AND THE WORU3-WAK

cerely rejoice that the way is clear for action, if action
should be necessary."

Since these words were written an Allied force has
entered Siberia. After a wise and prolonged delibera-
tion, the United States government decided to send a
military force to join with troops from Japan and
China and others of the Allied nations, in the attempt
to strengthen the Czecho-Slovaks in their revolt
against the Bolsheviks and the Germans in Russia. 1
Solemn assurances have been made to the people of
Russia, that this Allied force has no intention of in-
fringing any of the nation's rights, but that its presence
is merely a guarantee of Allied support in the attempt
of Russia to free itself from the invader and the
traitor. The ranking officer in the expeditionary force
of the Allies is the Japanese General, K. Otani ; Chinese
troops are co-operating under his command ; and from
elsewhere along the frontier, reports have come of
other Chinese soldiers having repulsed forces of the
Red Guards. Thus, China is realizing its ambition of
assisting in a military way, as well as industrially, in
the world-war for international justice and freedom.

1 Note : The Allied Force numbered about 24,000 in the sum-
mer of 1918. Of this number half were Japanese and the bal-
ance was composed of American, Chinese, British, French and
Italian soldiers.

CHAPTER VIII

THE FUTURE OF CHINA AS AFFECTED BY THE
AIMS OF THE ALLIES

WHEN the American Republic joined the Allies in
the Great War, President Wilson summarized its ideal
and purpose in so doing, by the sentence: "The
World must be made safe for Democracy," The Al-
lied Nations have generally accepted this expression of
their ideal and purpose. When President Wilson's
words were cabled to the Orient they produced a pro-
found impression there. At once observers pointed
out that the President had not limited the application
of this ideal to Europe or to America alone, but that it
was all-inclusive and was to apply to Asia as well. At
once came a realization of the greatness of the ideal
and of its possibilities as a solution for the problems of
the Orient. Further, the view was widely expressed
that these Asiatic problems must be solved if the cause
of the Allies was to be permanently successful.

Many considerations seemed to point to that conclu-
sion. This is a world-war and nothing less than a
world-peace would seem to be adequate. From this

145

146 CHINA AND THE WORLD-WAR

world-peace, Asia cannot be excluded. Half of the
world's population is in Asia ; in India, Asiatic Russia,
in China, and Japan. China is the largest and oldest
nation in the world ; its future cannot be ignored. A
recent writer 1 has pointed out that after the war there
will be three great groups of world-races ; the Anglo-
Saxons, the Slavs and the Mongolians. The first
group has far outdistanced the other two in political
development and progress; it has bravely taken the
stand that its ideals of democracy and liberty shall be
permitted to become world-wide. In the Orient, the
Chinese people have thrown off the restraints of an
alien autocratic dynasty, and are groping unsteadily
towards the light of democracy in the form of a re-
public. Russia has only recently taken a similar step ;
in both lands there is confusion and disorder; but both
peoples are on the right road, and if given time and
sympathetic support, they will reach their goal.
America and the Allied nations have expressed their
faith in Russia, and have pledged themselves to stand
by her; they will certainly do no less for China. In
Japan, as well, liberal tendencies are appearing; the
country is at the cross-roads of its history; on the one
hand, facing an imperialistic course that cannot but
mean danger, and aggression upon its neighbours; on
1 William S. Howe, Asia, July 18, 1918.

THE FUTURE OF CHINA

the other hand, halting before the decision to align
itself with the international tendencies of the age in a
fair and friendly national policy toward all the world.
These aspirations and tendencies in Asia must be con-
sidered in the Peace Conference. The writer makes
bold to say that unless this is done, the consequences
from the standpoint of a maintenance of the world-
peace will be disastrous.

Before the great war two political storm-centres
were recognized in the world : the Balkans in the Near
East and China in the Far East. 1 In both " legitimate
interests " of the various nations clashed and this clash
in Europe was the immediate occasion of the outbreak
of the great wan It is hoped that the Allied peace
terms will permanently remove the causes of future
conflict in the Balkans at the close of the war; they
should aim at no less satisfactory a solution of the
problems in China.

A future outbreak in the Far East might come in
one of two ways : either as a result of international fric-
tion in China; or through a war between China and
Japan which would involve the other powers. The
story of the growth of the competitive spheres of inter-

1 " China will become, through the jealousy and the indiffer-
ence of the Western Powers, the most dangerous storm-centre
in the world after a European peace is concluded." F. W.
Williams, The Nation, November 22, 1917.

148 CHINA AND THE WORLD- WAR

est in China; the attempted check to their rivalry and
enforcement of the status quo by an agreement as
to the principle of the " open door " and equal oppor-
tunity ; the upsetting of this situation by encroachments
of Russia and Japan; has already been told. At the
close of the great war there will be a renewed compe-
tition for China's trade and control of her natural re-
sources and the means of transportation and produc-
tion. Japan has tried to forestall the other powers by
its action in the Twenty-one Demands and the Cheng-
chiatung affair. Japanese and British interests as a
result definitely clash. Russia, France and Belgium
are also involved. If no clearly recognized principle
of justice and equity is to be enforced, there seems
grave probability of the growth of friction and dissen-
sion which may lead to future armed conflict.

The second line which future hostilities might take
would be in a clash between China and Japan which
would eventually involve the other nations. The lack
of friendship and mutual trust between the Chinese
and the Japanese is a disturbing factor in the Orient.
These feelings of ill-will and distrust have been the
outgrowth of a lack of justice and fair play in their
relations with each other. At present Japan has the
ascendancy, and China is no match for her in military
power or national strength; but if China goes forward

THE FUTURE OF CHINA 149

in development, as it would seem she must, an armed
struggle in the future seems inevitable. Russia and
Great Britain are both involved in defensive alliances
with Japan, but they, as well as all the other great na-
tions, have relations with and interests in China, and
it would seem they might eventually be dragged into
such a conflict.

Such possibilities are not pleasant to contemplate ; the
common-sense view would seem to be, not to ignore
them, but to take action at the close of the war, to pre-
vent their development. The solution would seem to
lie along the line taken in the adjusting of the interna-
tional difficulties of Europe.

With the principles of this adjustment, China is in
sympathy and although hampered by internal difficul-
ties, she has made what contributions she could to the
Allied cause. When the war broke out, Germany's
commercial interests were strongly entrenched through-
out China; Germany's trade was increasing rapidly;
German interests were being aggressively and success-
fully pushed. An effort had been made to secure the
adoption in the higher schools of China, of German
as the only foreign language to be taught there; and
this effort very nearly succeeded. Germany had seized
and fortified an important military and naval base on
the Chinese coast ; by a widespread campaign of propa-

I5O CHINA AND THE WORLD- WAR

ganda, German victories in the war were magnified
and Germany's future importance was impressed upon
the Chinese. As a result, during the first two years of
the war, the Chinese were, in general, mildly pro-Ger-
man. The change of sentiment expressed by the sev-
erance of diplomatic relations and the declaration of
war, was great indeed, and already has had important
effects in frustrating Germany's hope of dominance in
the Far East. German and Austrian property and
banks have been taken into custody and their ships
turned over to the Allies ; German and Austrian sub-
jects have been registered and interned. In the sum-
mer of 1918, arrangements were made in compliance
with the request of Great Britain and her Allies to
transport all enemy aliens to Australia. This step
aroused such violent threats of reprisals by Germany
that the Allies, led by Japan and Great Britain, re-
quested China not to carry it out. The desire of Ger-
many to keep her nationals in China, reveals her esti-
mate of the importance of her interests there, and it is
no small thing from the standpoint of the future power
of Germany, that these interests have been virtually
rendered non-existent. 1
In the second place, China -has sent large forces of

Allies in October made a joint statement requesting
more stringent control over German activities in China.

THE FUTURE OF CHINA

labour battalions to France to carry on work behind
the lines and thus relieve soldiers for the front. They
number about one hundred and seventy-five thousand
and they have performed very efficient service. 1

In a military way, Chinese troops are co-operating
with the Allied force which has entered Siberia and
will help to safeguard the long boundaries stretching
from the coast into inner Russia.

Finally, China is one of the great storehouses of the
world's food supply ; large shipments of rice and eggs
and other staples have been made to the Allies, and
these shipments will increase as the war continues.

On August ipth, announcement was made that
the Chinese Government had received a thirty million
dollar contract for building ships for the Allies in the
shipyards at Shanghai.

Concerning China's future contribution to the Allies,
if a prolongation of the war should make this neces-
sary, Dr. V. K. Wellington Koo, the Chinese Minister,
speaking on Oct. ist, China Day of the fourth Liberty
Loan Campaign, in New York, said as follows :

" It is practical to say that with a fair supply of

distribution of these labour-battalions, according to a
report received at the Chinese Legation in Washington, in Oc-
tober, 1918, was as follows: With the British forces, 125*00;
with the French, 40,000; with the Amerkans, 6,000; in Meso-
potamia and Africa, about 4,000. Total, 175,000.

152 CHINA AND THE WORLD- WAR

equipment in ships, not only labour battalions, but
fighting soldiers, not only thousands of them but mil-
lions of them, can be dispatched to Europe. It is
equally practical to say that with a fair amount of cap-
ital the natural resources of China, the resources of
coal and iron, of copper and zinc, of antimony and
tungsten all essential articles of war, can be devel-
oped and utilized to untold advantage. Even produc-
tion of foodstuffs can be so increased as to make China
the world's great granary for the sustenance of the En-
tente troops."

After China entered the war, the Allies granted a
temporary suspension of the payment of the Boxer In-
demnity and an increase in the tariff rates to an ef-
fective 5 per cent. But the Chinese feel that the only
ultimate solution for their national difficulties is a
recognition by the other powers of their rights as a
sovereign nation, with all that this implies in the com-
ing world-situation. Their deepest hope is that the
principles for which the Allies are fighting will be ap-
plied to the Orient. Thus a prominent Chinese lawyer
and scholar, Dr. M. T. Z. Tyau, in 1917, expressed the
national attitude:

" For the great powers to welcome China into their
charmed circle in one breath and in the next, deny her
what are her proper attributes and prerogatives as an

THE FUTURE OF CHINA 153

independent sovereign state is ingenious and disin-
genuous. The status of membership in the Family
of Nations having been acknowledged, it is but just
that "all her sovereign rights should be completely
restored to her. Unless this is done, it seems that this
terrible war will have been fought in vain. We are,
however, not despondent and we remain confident that
at the post-bellum peace conference full justice will be
done to her rightful claims, because out of this ordeal
of fire there will evolve a world in which, as Lord Grey
said on March 22, 1915, all nations will be ' free to live
their independent lives, working out their form of gov-
ernment for themselves, and their own national de-
velopment, whether they be great nations or small
states in full liberty/ "

Dr. Koo, the Chinese minister to the United States,
in an address in New York last year, expressed the
national hope of the present time, and paid a tribute
to the example America had set in its relations to China
which might be prophetic of future relations with the
world at large. He said :

" In the first place, the people of the Far East feel
that in any reconstruction which may take place after
the war, the Far East should be included; that the
problems of the Far East should receive due consider-
ation. ... In the second place, the reflective minds of

154 CHINA AND THE WORLD- WAR

the Far East feel that not only the problems of the Far
East should be given full consideration, but also the
voices of the Far East should be freely heard at the
council board of nations. . . . There is, in the third
place, yet another thought which is quickening the
hearts of a very large portion of the people in the Far
East, particularly of the people in China, and that is,
that in any reconstruction to take place hereafter, the
base of the foundation should be built upon justice,
international justice. The people of the Far East in
general feel that every act of aggression, wherever
arising, should be a matter of concern, not only of the
victim and oppressed, but should also be of serious
interest to the world at large; for every act of aggres-
sion or oppression, unchecked and uncondemned, is
sure to react to the detriment of the international so-
ciety.

" Here between China and the United States, for in-
stance, we have a concrete example of how two na-
tions, always basing their mutual intercourse on jus-
tice, could get along in cordial relationship and in per-
fect understanding; more than a century of trade inter-
course, eighty-seven years of missionary work, seven
decades of diplomatic relations and nearly half a cen-
tury of educational co-operation, have all been charac-
terized by a sustained feeling of friendliness and cor-

THE FUTURE OF CHINA 155

diality, so that Chinese and Americans, wherever they
meet, can always talk to each other without hidden
thoughts and with perfect confidence in the good will
of each toward the other. There is no suspicion or
friction between them. The two countries are living
in a happy state of friendship that grows from day to
day. What two countries have done can be accom-
plished by the world at large." *

The problems which China will face at the end of the
war will be many and various. Most of them come
as a result of the attempts to adjust a civilization and
political organization, which have come down practi-
cally unchanged from past centuries, to the new na-
tional and international life of the twentieth century.
Three problems especially are serious: those related
to the political, the economic, and the educational con-
ditions of the country.

The development of the Republic since 1911 has
already been treated in some detail. At present
(October, 1918) the country is divided into a progres-
sive South with headquarters at Canton; a conserva-
tive North with Peking as its capital; and a more or
less neutral centre situated along the Yangtze Valley,
with Nanking as its chief city. Until September the
administration was in the control of the Northerners

i Current History Magazine, November, 1917.

156 CHINA AND THE WORLD-WAR

and the neutrals, with Tuan Qii-jui, as Premier, rep-
resenting the first group, and Feng Kwo-chang, from
Nanking, as President, representing the second. On
September 4th, Hsu Shih-chang, a representative of
the Northern party, was elected President to succeed
Feng Kwo-chang, by a Parliament which was con-
vened on August 1 2th in Peking. The South has pro-
tested against the Parliament and the election and on
October 6th formally declared its opposition to the
President.

The development of this unsatisfactory situation
followed the dissolution of Parliament, on June I2th,
1917. Later a national council was organized by the
Northerners which revised and passed laws for a new
parliamentary organization and election. These new
laws were promulgated in February, 1918, and elec-
tions were held in the spring and summer. On August
1 2th, the new parliament was convened at Peking.
The membership of the former assembly had been 870 ;
that of the new one was reduced to 573 (274 Senators
and 405 representatives). It was composed largely of
former officials and their friends and relatives, al-
though there was a sprinkling of returned students.
The two speakers elected, Liang Shih-yi of the Senate,
and Wang Yih-tang of the House, had both held im-
portant positions under Yuan Shih-kai; the former as

THE FUTURE OF CHINA 157

his chief Secretary and Acting Minister of Finance;
and the latter as military adviser and military governor
of Kirin. Liang especially was associated with the
movement to restore the Monarchy. On September
4th, in accordance with the new election law, Parlia-
ment elected a president to succeed Feng Kwo-chang,
who had followed Li Yuan-hung, who in turn had
taken office at the death of Yuan Shih-kai. The new
President's term of office began October loth, when
the first presidential term dating from 1913 was held
legally to have expired. Five provinces of the south
and southwest abstained from any participation in the
preceding events, as has already been indicated.

The new president has held various positions of im-
portance under the Manchus, being Viceroy of Man-
churia in 1907, President of the Privy Council under
Prince Ching, and one of the two guardians of the Boy
Emperor. He was Secretary of State of the Republic
under Yuan Shih-kai in 1915, and was a close friend,
being called one of the four "sworn brothers," of
Yuan. At the time of his election to the presidency he
did not hold an official position, and although he was
the candidate of the military party, he was not a mili-
tary leader; so it was hoped he would prove acceptable
to the Southern Republicans. After his election he
sent out a circular telegram calling on all those with

158 CHINA AND THE WORLD- WAR

administrative experience to come forward to assist in
solving the difficulties confronting the country, the
chief of which he enumerated as the unfinished state of
the constitution, the emptiness of the treasury, internal
strife and brigandage, and the certainty that after the
European war, China would be the centre of a vigorous
commercial contest.

The hope that the new President would command
the support of the South has not been realized and the
South is ranged solidly against him. Ever since the
dissolution of the National Assembly, and the coup
d'etat of Chang Hsun in July, 1917, the South has been
in a state of revolt, its two chief demands being the
reconvening of the dissolved Parliament and the return
to the Provisional Constitution until a permanent one
can be finally drafted. Among the Southern leaders
are some of the ablest Chinese. The Administrative
Council includes Sun Yat-sen, the first Provisional
President of the Republic; Wu Ting-fang, former
Minister to America; Tang Shao-yi, former Premier;
Lu Yung-ting, formerly military Governor of Kwang-
tung; and Tsen Chun-hsuan, President of the Board of
Communications. Members of the former Parliament
had gathered at Canton and on August 8th both houses
had a quorum and set about completing the permanent

THE FUTURE OF CHINA 159

Constitution, and drafting new election and parliamen-
tary-organization laws. C T. Wang, formerly vice-
president of the Senate, and chairman of the committee
for drafting the permanent constitution, which had
practically finished its work before the dissolution of
Parliament in June, 1917, is acting chairman of the
new Senate.

Aside from this direct issue between the North and
the South, the chief menace to a national unity has been
the independent control of the various provincial gov-
ernors over large bodies of troops who are loyal to
them rather than to the central government, and
through whose support the governors can carry out
individual policies regardless of their effect upon the
welfare of the nation as a whole. The leaders in the
Northern Government have also adopted a reckless
course of borrowing capital from Japan in order to
gain support for their military operations against the
South. As security, they have apparently mortgaged
some of China's native resources. Further, their re-
cent attempt to revive the opium trade has called forth
a protest from the United States and Great Britain. 1
But despite these deficiencies and dissensions, there are

1 0n November 20th the announcement was made in Peking
that the government had purchased and would destroy the entire
stock of opium remaining in China.

160 CHINA AND THE WORLD- WAR

grounds for hope for the future. The Chinese have
shown themselves much more restrained than the
Russians in their attempt to set up a democracy and
should gradually achieve national unity and efficiency,
even though allied mediation and assistance may be-
come a temporary necessity to this end.

Economically, China is in a low stage of develop-
ment* She has not passed from the agricultural and
commercial levels to the industrial and manufacturing
stages, and poverty is general and oppressive. The
standards of sanitation and public health are among the
lowest in the world. There is a decided lack of means
of transportation by road or by rail. There is no ex-
act system of coinage, and the country is on a silver
basis, and is subject to its many fluctuations. 1 The
governmental resources, such as the maritime tariff
and the salt customs, are under the control of foreign-
ers, and cannot be increased without their consent.
Further, the payment of the Boxer indemnity has taken
much of these revenues. The only course open to the
government has been to borrow, and this action has
saddled upon it heavy foreign debts. With these loans
has often come control over rights within the country.
Since the beginning of the war, Japan alone has loaned

1 A hastily-devised scheme to change to a gold standard simi-
lar to that of Japan, which was announced Aug. loth, 1917, was
greeted with protests by the international interests concerned.

THE FUTURE OF CHINA l6l

to China over $100,000,000,* thereby, in the view of
the Chinese, increasing its hold on the country. On
the other hand, when compared to the enormous war
debts which the other nations will face at the close
of the present struggle, China will be comparatively
well off, its total foreign debt in 1917, exclusive of rail-
road debt, being about $750,000,000,2 or less than
$2.00 per capita. Already attempts are being made to
improve the hygienic condition of the cities, and to
build up modern industries. Commerce is growing
rapidly. 8 The Allies have granted a temporary sus-
pension of the Boxer indemnity and an increase in
the tariff; and a four-power group, consisting of Amer-
ica, Great Britain, France and Japan, is contemplating,
under certain conditions, a loan of $50,000,000.*

iThe exact sum was 198430,000 yen, according to Millard's

Review, on Aug. 10, 1918. More loans have been made since then.

( 2 Putnam-Weale, The Fight for the Republic in China, p.

379)

8 Despite the most adverse conditions, the year 1917 was a
very prosperous one, the maritime customs collections amount-
ing to over $40,000,000, an increase of nearly $10,000,000 over
those of the preceding year. The foreign trade in 1917 totalled
more than a billion taels, which at the present rate of exchange
equalled gold $1,032,699412.

4 The gravity of this economic situation from an international
standpoint was clearly indicated in a recent article by Dr. Walter
E. Weyl (Harper's Magazine, October, 1918) :

"The urgent and increasing need of industrial progress
renders all obstruction unavailing. The world is pressing in on

1 62 CHINA AND THE WORLD- WAR

In the third place, the educational problem is a seri-
ous one. A comparatively small percentage of the
Chinese can read or write their own language. The
old system of education was classical and literary, and
was open in fact only to a limited number; the new sys-
tem will be practical and democratic, available for the
many. In 1906, the first step was taken in this direc-
tion ; but the new educational movement is too young
to have attained its fullest success. Missionary insti-

China and the Chinese can no more hold off this advance then
they can withstand modern artillery fire with their ancient city
walls. Year by year the European nations acquire greater rights
and wider powers; year by year they start new enterprises and
secure new concessions, until the question comes to be not
whether China will be developed, but merely whether the Chinese
themselves will do the job or step aside and permit strangers
to do it. Upon the answer to this question, upon China's proved
capacity to take care of her own resources and utilize them
wisely, hangs the immediate independence of China and her
whole place in the world. China will either grow into an effec-
tive and capable industrial nation or will be held subject, at least
temporarily, to international control and internatiqnal_exploita-
tion. She will develop herself or be developed compulsorily by
other nations in the interest of other nations. . . . Imperialism,
which has divided up Africa and much of western Asia, now
knocks at China's door. . . . How it will all end, by what means,
if any, China will be enabled to hojd her own, to develop her-
self and take her equal place among the great nations is a
baffling, haunting question, a challenge not only to the Chinese,
but to those friends of China in the Western World who wish
this problem to be settled justly and in peace."

THE FUTURE OF CHINA 163

tutions, staffed and financed largely by foreigners, have
had a large share in the awakening of the people to the
new learning, and still contribute much to the solving
of the problem. The Central Ministry of Education
has advised the teaching in all the schools of one form
of the Chinese language mandarin, instead of the
various dialects now prevalent. As in Japan, English
is the best known foreign tongue, and is becoming the
general language of the educated class, as French was
once in universal use in Europe. A republic cannot
exist without sufficient means of transportation, gen-
eral education, and a strong sentiment of national
patriotism, and all these requisites are to be gained only
by a solution of the educational, economic and political
problems of the nation.

The Chinese are among the first to admit that it will
take a full generation to solve these problems, and to
bring their nation within measurable distance of the
present stage of civilization in other countries ; but they
believe they can solve them, if given time, and if freed
from the menace of foreign attack or invasion of their
rights, whether military, political or economic. They
hope that the Peace Conference will guarantee them
safety and freedom to work out their destiny unafraid.
In brief, the Chinese feel that if the Allies will apply to
the Orient the principles for which they are fighting in

164 CHINA AND THE WORLD- WAR

the present war, the future of their Republic will be
secured.

Opposed to the out-and-out application of such prin-
ciples to China, there have been suggested two alterna-
tives, both of which are based on the assumption that
the sovereign rights of the Chinese should be taken
from them and given over to the foreign control, either
of one, or of a group, of nations, which would under-
take the development and control of China's resources
and powers. A temporary supervision of her finances
might be justified, but in general these alternatives do
not seem to be in line with the international tendencies
of the day ; they would open the way for an imperialism
which in turn might lead to new discords and interna-
tional rivalries, as already indicated in an earlier por-
tion of this chapter. The challenge is a direct one to
the Chinese to prove by their unity and efficiency that
this course should not be taken.

Instead of a further subtraction of the sovereign
rights of the Chinese, the better course would seem to
be in their gradual restoration with possibly tempo-
rary assistance and regulation in an economic way,
somewhat along the lines indicated by Dr. Wellington
Koo, the Chinese Minister, in his speech before the
National Conference on Foreign Relations of the

THE FUTURE OF CHINA 165

United States held at Long Beach, N. Y., May 3ist,
1917:

" What then is China's relation to the world's fu-
ture ? The answer really depends upon what policy the
other nations adopt toward China, and what treatment
they accord her. To be more definite, it depends upon
whether they continue to permit themselves or any one
of them, to commit one assault after another on her
sovereignty; or seeing the injustice of these acts, ac-
knowledge her right of existence and extend sympathy
and support to her plans for progress. It depends
upon whether they continue to keep the shackles of
extra-territoriality, treaty tariffs, leased ports, railway
zones and the like around her body ; or, recognizing the
unwisdom of such a policy, aid her to remove them and
restore to her full liberty of development. It depends
upon whether they remain indifferent to attempts on
the part of some of them to revive the doctrine of the
spheres of influence and to close the open door within
her borders ; or appreciating the ultimate consequences
of such a course and the desirability of keeping the
Chinese market open to international trade on a footing
of equality, help China batter down this pernicious doc-
trine of spheres of influence, foil these selfish attempts,
and maintain the principle of equal opportunity for

1 66 CHINA AND THE WORLD- WAR

the trade of all nations in all parts of China. It de-
pends upon whether they permit any nation to wrest
away her rich resources and immense man-power from
her own possession, and utilize the one as means of
aggrandizement and mould the other into instruments
of conquest; or realizing the possibilities of danger to
the peace of the Orient and the world, aid China to con-
serve these resources of wealth and power in her own
hands and develop them, not as selfish means for ag-
gression, but as instruments for the common purposes
of peace. In short, it all depends upon whether they
continue, in regard to China, to pursue a selfish policy
of obstruction, interference and aggression, hoping
thereby to get a share ifi whatever spoils may come; or
whether they realize that such a course is sure to lead
to conflicts, rivalry and antagonism, a disturbance of
the peace of the nations; and that the best guarantee
for the open-door policy, for the principle of equal op-
portunity and impartial trade for all, and for the devo-
tion of her wonderful resources of wealth and power
to peaceful purposes, lies in a strong and powerful
China ; and upon whether, realizing all this, they accord
her that respect for her rights which they demand of
her for their own rights, and conscientiously assist her
to attain the end which is to be desired as much in the

THE FUTURE OF CHINA 167

common interest of the world as for the sake of her
own welfare." *

An out-and-out application of the principles of the
Allies, as expressed especially by recent pronounce-
ments of their statesmen, would seem to be the only
course consistent with this point of view. The latest
statements of the aims of the Allies were made by
President Wilson on July 4, and on September 27th,
1918. On July 4th, he named four principles. The
first was :

" The destruction of every arbitrary power any-
where that can separately, secretly, and of its single
choice disturb the peace of the world ; or, if it cannot
at present be destroyed, at the least its reduction to
virtual impotence/ 5

Ever since the establishment of the Republic, China
has been afraid of an attack by a foreign power ; she
has endeavoured to build up her military power ; over
half of her present income goes to the support of her
military forces. If China could be assured, by a joint
agreement of the nations, that the peace of the Far
East could not be " separately and secretly disturbed "
by any power, it could turn with a free mind to a solu-
tion of all of its internal problems of adjustment to the

1 The New China and Her Relation to the World. Proceed-
ings of the Academy of Political Science f Volume 7, No. 3.

1 68 CHINA AND THE WORLD- WAR

present century. The money which is now being spent
to maintain its army could be invested in much needed
industrial development and improvement, and the prog-
ress of the whole country would be greatly accelerated.

The second principle enunciated by President Wilson
was:

" The settlement of every question, whether of ter-
ritory, of sovereignty, of economic arrangement, or of
political relationship, upon the basis of the free accept-
ance of that settlement by the people immediately con-
cerned, and not upon the basis of the material interests
or advantage of any other nation or people which may
desire a different settlement for the sake of its own
exterior influence or mastery."

This principle would have a most vital effect upon
China's future. Nearly every settlement, of territory,
of sovereignty, or of economic arrangement, with a
foreign power, in the past, with the exception of those
concluded with the United States, has been made upon
the basis of the " material interest or advantage " of
that power, and not " upon the basis of the free accept-
ance of that settlement " by China. Practically every
settlement has been made on an exactly opposite princi-
ple to that expressed by President Wilson. As a re-
sult, the present treaty-relations between China and
the other powers are distinctly disadvantageous to the

THE FUTURE OF CHINA 169

former. A typical Chinese view of the resulting in-
consistencies appeared in Millard's Review of August
24th, 1918, written by Chuan Chao:

" Among the nations China has been least understood
and most criticized. She tried to adapt herself to the
western civilization by adopting the republican form of
government. But the world Powers say that she is
unfit because in the period of her reconstruction, as in
that of France and of the United States after their
revolutions, there is disorder. She attempted to live
up to the open-door policy of John Hay. But the
United States recognizes the special interests of Japan
in China, especially in the places where her possessions
are contiguous. After the foreign Powers have pre-
vented her from developing her resources except ac-
cording to their dictation, they blame her for industrial
backwardness. After they have almost deprived her
of tariff revenue, denied her the right of tariff legisla-
tion, forced her to lay heavy internal taxes on necessi-
ties, and burdened her with war loans for wars forced
upon her, they blame her for financial insolvency.
After they have negatived her territorial jurisdiction
in the extraterritorial areas by lending these for the
refuge of revolutionists, hot-beds of intrigue and
sources of vice, they blame her for governmental in-
efficiency. After they have forced her to raze all f orti-

I/O CHINA AND THE WORLD- WAR

fications between the capital and the sea, leased the
important ports for their naval stations and stationed
troops constantly on Chinese soil, they blame her for
military impotency. As a friendly neighbour, she was
presented a series of twenty-one demands. As a neu-
tral, her territory was invaded in spite of her protest.
As an ally of the Entente, her alliance has been util-
ized for the consolidation of one of her ally's position
in China/'

This viewpoint is perhaps open to criticism, as many
of the treaty agreements mentioned were the result of
infringements by China of the rights of other nations.
But there seems to be little question of the necessity
of revising the treaties if justice is to be done. This
course has been strongly advocated by both Chinese
and American and British economists and writers.
Thus Dr. M. T. Z. Tyau, writing in 1917, names two
reasons for this revision ; first because of the vagueness
of the wording of the present treaties which have
caused and will cause serious misunderstanding; and
secondly, because most of the obligations were con-
tracted half a century ago, so that they now " fetter the
free growth and the natural development of the new
Republic, to the serious menace of even its self-preser-
vation. - . . If peace in the Far East, as well as the
rest of the world, is to be preserved, the contracting

THE FUTURE OF CHINA

parties will have to treat one another with equal respect
and consideration. The injustices, the inequalities,
the inconsistencies of the past, must be abolished, and
rational bases of mutual intercourse substituted" 1
Dr. Wu Ting-fang, writing in a similar vein, said:
"We have heard the public pronouncements of the
statesmen of the powers, that after the war, justice and
equality will rule among the nations. We believe in
them, and have great hopes of them. We expect that
in carrying them out into practice in China, one of the
first things that will be done will be a reasonable and
equitable revision of our treaties." 2 Doctor S. K.
Hornbeck, speaking before the National Conference
on Foreign Relations of the United States, June ist,
1917, said: "Various of the old far-eastern agree-
ments should, by international agreement, be legislated
out of existence. There should be a cleaning of the
old slate, with its entries of individualism. There
should be new agreements, entered into by all the inter-
ested powers, drafted on the principle of fair play for
all, with full respect for the rights of all, and establish-
ing effective limitations upon the hitherto assumed
right of each state, because independent, to act inde-

1 Legal Obligations Arising out of Treaty Relations between
China and other States, pages 207-217.

2 Introduction to above, page 8.

CHINA AND THE WORLD-WAR

pendently and with a view to its own peculiar and
selfish interests." Mr. B. L. Putnam-Weale, a British
writer, has asserted that " the entire politico-economic
relationship between the Republic and the world, must
be remodelled at the earliest possible opportunity; every
agreement which has been made since the Treaties of
1860 being carefully and completely revised/' *

Finally, the friendship between China and Japan
would be increased if their economic relations were
governed by the principle of voluntary mutual agree-
ment. There has been growing up a cloud of sus-
picion and distrust between the two countries which
only a recognition of such a principle can clear away.
If this principle were recognized and upheld, an impor-
tant step forward would be taken toward making the
peace of the Orient secure.

President Wilson's third principle was :
" The consent of all nations to be governed in a con-
duct toward each other by the same principles of
honour and of respect for the common law of civilized
society that govern the individual citizens of all modern
States in their relations with one another; to the end
that all promises and covenants may be sacredly ob-
served, no private plots or conspiracies hatched, no

1 Putnam-Weale, The Fight for the Republic in China, page
375-

Copyright by Underwood & Underwood, N. Y.

Dr. V. K. Wellington Koo, Chinese Minister to America, after receiv-
ing an Honorary Degree from Columbia University in 1917.

Dr. Koo is a graduate of Columbia University and has received the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy from that institution He is the youngest member of the
Diplomatic Corps at Washington. On his left is Professor John Bassett Moore
of Columbia University.

THE FUTURE OF CHINA 173

selfish injuries wrought with impunity, and a mutual
trust established upon the handsome foundation of
a mutual respect for right."

The present situation in China is analogous in a
lesser degree to that in Russia; both countries offer
supreme opportunities for exploitation, or for disinter-
ested assistance. Like Russia, China needs help. She
needs help in every phase of her new life. She looks
to the Occident for that help ; and if this principle were
applied, she would not look in vain. The definite as-
sistance which other countries, and especially America,
could give China, was outlined by C. T. Wang, for-
merly Vice President of the Senate, in a speech made in
1917. This speech was delivered before the Lansing-
Ishii Agreement was concluded. Mr. Wang sug-
gested political, financial and industrial assistance.
His remarks were made just after the attempted
restoration of the Manchus, when there seemed to be
doubt as to the ability of the Republic to survive, with-
out external assistance. Mr. Wang said:

" In this vital struggle, where shall America, the
champion of democracy, stand? We entirely agree
with Mr. Millard (an eminent journalist) in his views
expressed through the editorial columns in the last issue
of his paper, which we will reproduce here for em-
phasis :

174 CHINA AND THE WORLD- WAR

" ' A primary requisite is that, as between reversion
to an archaic monarchy, or the retention of a military
oligarchy, or a graduated advance toward genuine re-
publicanism, the influence of the United States ought
to be thrown definitely to bring about the latter alter-
native. If this leads to quasi-interference in Chinese
politics, then that responsibility must be faced. It is
becoming rather ridiculous, at a time when America is
engaged in a world-war, when the whole life of the
American people is being readjusted to meet these war
conditions, and with the avowed principal object, of
saving democratic principle of government from being
smothered by autocratic militarism, that the power and
influence of the United States should be applied in one
place abroad, and should not be applied in another place
abroad; that direct American assistance should be
accorded to some nations that are trying to cast off the
yoke of autocracy, and be denied to other nations that
are making the same effort/

" Besides political assistance America is also in an
excellent position to aid China financially of which
she stands so much in need.

" A third way in which America can help China is to
bring into China a sufficient number of experts who can
aid China to establish and develop large industrial
plants and factories and to train and bring up a large

THE FUTURE OF CHINA 175

force of native industrial and technical leaders.
" We beg to advance these three ways for America
to aid China. The political assistance aims to renew
the open door policy and to influence the Entente Pow-
ers to maintain the same principles of liberty, constitu-
tionalism and democracy in China as they are fighting
to maintain on the battlefield of Europe. The financial
aid is to be directed at the industrial, commercial and
other productive development of the country. The in-
troduction of industrial and technical experts has for
its objective the improved methods of administration
of existing revenue-producing organs of the govern-
ment, the establishment of other productive organiza-
tions, and the training of Chinese youths in sufficient
numbers to direct, maintain and develop such organiza-
tions." 1

1 Note on Investment of Foreign Capital in China.

The following extract is taken from an address by Dr. S. K.
Hornbeck before the National Conference on Foreign Relations
of the United States at Long Beach, N. Y., June 1st, 1917.

"China needs capital. She must get it, she is eager to have
it. She has repeatedly asked it of us. Without capital she
cannot develop her resources. Upon the development of her
resources depends the increasing of her power to sell and to
buy. Upon this depends her economic and probably her po-
litical salvation. All this means that there must be investments
capital from abroad. But investments in China require, un-
der existing conditions, the giving and taking of concessions,
with a certain amount of foreign supervision. There is noth-

1/6 CHINA AND THE WORLD- WAR

The final principle before the Allies was :

" The establishment of an organization of peace

which shall make it certain that the combined power of

free nations will check every invasion of right, and

serve to make peace and justice the more secure, by

ing inherently evil in the process. The thing that is desirable
is that investments and concessions those on a large scale at
least be subjected to regulation. The present evil lies in ab-
sence of regulations, in extreme individualism. There should
be regulation through a group of governments including the
Chinese on a basis of co-operation. We should offer our
capital only where we are assured that it will not be used to
further political ends of which we do not approve. If we think
to avert rather than to precipitate conflict, if we are seriously
interested in the problem of developing China's resources with
a minimum of friction, we must work for something more
promising than a new application of the old individualistic prin-
ciple. . . . This suggests nothing short of general, that is, ex-
tended, international co-operation for the placing of capital in
China. ... It would require frank co-operation on the part of
the governments of those states which have capital for foreign
investment ... As a group, the co-operating states, including
and with the consent of China, could determine the distribution
and guarantee the security of capital accepted for Chinese en-
terprises. . . . Administration of special securities, where re-
quired, should be subject to international personnel, after the
model of the Chinese Customs Service. It should be under-
stood that no concession should be taken and no investment
be made which had not the approval of the Chinese government
... If there is any region in the world today in which it is
practicable to attempt the experiment of a league of forces,
economic and political, for the preservation of the peace, that
region is to be found in the field which has long been a battle

THE FUTURE OF CHINA 1 77

affording a definite tribunal of opinion to which all
must submit, and by which every international read-
justment that cannot be amicably agreed upon by the
peoples directly concerned, shall be sanctioned."

Both China and Japan desire inclusion in the mem-
bership of this " league of nations." If they are not
thus included, a new international alignment may
occur, which would have potential possibilities for a
new outbreak of hostilities. The question has been put
directly to Japan as to the possibilities of an alliance
with Germany, after the war, and Premier Terauchi
answered that this were possible only if Japan found
herself isolated from the rest of the powers. In a
written interview published in the Outlook (New
York) of May ist, 1918, in reply to the question of
Mr. Mason, a representative of the Outlook, " What
are the chances for an alliance between Japan and Ger-
many ? " Count Terauchi replied : " That will depend
entirely on how the present war may end. It is impos-
sible to predict the changes which the conclusion of the

ground of trade, concessions and investments the Far East."
F. N. (Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science (N. Y.),
Vol. VII, No. 3, pp. 92-98).

The announcement made on July 2pth of the intention of the
United States Government to support bankers in joining in a
loan of $50,000,000, with Great Britain, France and Japan, seems
to be in line with these principles.

178 CHINA AND THE WORLD- WAR

war may bring. If the exigencies of international re-
lationships demand it, Japan, being unable to maintain
a position of total isolation, may be induced to seek an
ally in Germany. But, as far as I can judge from the
existing conditions of affairs, I see no such danger.
In other words, I believe that Japan's relations with the
Entente Allies will continue unaltered after the present
war."

This statement of the Premier has been generally
criticized by the Japanese press, and on Sept. 3Oth he
was succeeded by Kei Hara, a commoner, and the
leader of the Seiyukai Party (constitutionalists), but
it indicates a possibility which might develop in the
Orient if the nations there are not included in a world-
organization. If such a world-league and a tribunal
of world opinion were set up, it would at once prevent
any new acts of aggression against either Japan or
China. Such a solution would be a welcome one.
China especially is pacific, and its ideals are in line with
those of such an organization. Dr. W. C. Dennis, the
new American Legal Adviser to the Chinese Govern-
ment, in August, voiced the approval of the Chinese of
such a proposed league. After discussing its possi-
bilities and its drawbacks, he said :

" The proposed plan, if practicable, is of the great-
est possible interest to those nations which, like the

THE FUTURE OF CHINA

United States and China, have, taking their history as
a whole, consciously sought the victories of peace
rather than those of war. It is in accordance with
the genius of their institutions and the desires of their
peoples." x

On September 27th, 1918, President Wilson again
expressed the attitude of the American Government
toward Peace. His main emphasis was upon the
necessity of absolute justice regardless of whom this
principle might affect; upon the necessity of absolute
publicity of all treaties and agreements; and a decided
opposition to any special alliances or economic com-
binations within the league itself. All these condi-
tions have a peculiar applicability to the situation in
the Orient, especially in reference to China. At times
there seems to be a tendency on the part of the Amer-
ican and European public to be indifferent to the fate
of the Orientals, but President Wilson's first condition
was that " impartial justice which is meted out must
involve no discrimination between those to whom we
wish to be just and those to whom we do not wish to
be just. It must be a justice that plays no favourites
and knows no standard but the equal rights of the sev-
eral peoples concerned." Further, there has seemed

1 From the Chinese Social and Political Science Review,
quoted in Millard's Review, Aug. 10, 1918.

ISO CHINA AND THE WORLD- WAR

to be a disposition on the part of people in the Occi-
dental world to allow Japan, or any other nation or
group of nations, to make any terms which they could
with China, but President Wilson's second principle
would rule this out, as " no special or separate inter-
est of any single nation or any group of nations can be
made the basis of any part of the settlement which is
not consistent with the common interests of all." The
principle of the " open door " and " equal opportun-
ity " would be enforced by the third and fourth re-
quirements of this Allied peace program ; namely, that
" there can be no leagues or alliance or special cove-
nants and understandings within the general and com-
mon family by the league of nations; or specifically
there can be no special, selfish economic combinations
within the league and no employment of any form of
economic boycott or exclusion except as the power of
economic penalty by exclusion from the markets of
the world may be vested in the league of nations itself
as a means of discipline and control." Finally, there
are to be no more secret agreements, as " all interna-
tional agreements and treaties of every kind must be
made known in their entirety to the rest of the world."
This point alone would free the relations of China and
Japan from much of the suspicion which is gathered
about the secret negotiations following the Twenty-

THE FUTURE OF CHINA l8l

one Demands, the Sino-Japanese Military Agreement,
and frequent accusations of the Chinese press that their
officials were about to " sell China " to Japan.

Summarizing his principles in the form of questions,
President Wilson, on Sept. 27th, said, " Shall strong
nations be free to wrong weak nations and make them
subject to their purpose and interest? Shall there be
a common standard of right and privilege for all peo-
ples and nations, or shall the wrong do as they will and
the weak suffer without regrets?" As if in answer
to these questions comes the cry of Kang Yu-wei and
his countrymen from the other side of the world:
" There is no such thing as an army of righteousness
which will come to the assistance of weak nations! " l
The issue for the Orient as well as the Occident seems
to be clear-cut. The President has said : " These
issues must be settled by no arrangement or compro-
mise or adjustment of interests, but definitely and
once for all and with a full and unequivocal acceptance
of the principle that the interest of the weakest is as
sacred as the interest of the strongest."

No human being can view the incalculable loss of
human life and wealth that is being wrought by the
Great War, and remain unmoved. " For what pur-
pose is this waste ? " Only in the achievement of some
1 See page 85.

1 82 CHINA AND THE WORLD- WAR

such principles as given above can any such loss be
reconciled. These principles must be no less than
worldwide in their application; they should extend
not only to the free peoples of Europe and America,
but also to the newborn democracies of the Mongol
and the Slav. Especially do they concern the vast re-
public across the Pacific, whose future relations with
the rest of the world are so full of potential possibili-
ties for discord or for peace. The importance of these
relations was summarized twenty years ago by John
Hay in two sentences : " The storm-centre of the
world has gradually shifted to China. . . . Whoever
understands that mighty Empire socially, politically,
economically, religiously, has a key to world-politics
for the next five centuries." Against the background
of the great democratic upheavals in the East that are
just beginning to take concrete shape and expression,
and of the costly cataclysm in the West which seems
at last to be nearing its concluding phases, these state-
ments have a new meaning, both as a warning and a
prophecy, concerning the new age which is to come.

APPENDICES

APPENDICES

1. The "Black-Dragon" Statement of Japanese

Policy in China as a result of the European
War. (Written in 1914.)

2. Documents relating to the Twenty-one Demands

made by Japan on China, in 1915.

3. Official Statements in Relation to the Lansing-

Ishii Agreement between America and Japan
concerning China, in 1917.

4. Summary of Treaties and Agreements with Refer-

ence to the Integrity and Sovereign Rights of
China, and the "Open Door" Policy and
" Equality of Opportunities."

5. Summary of Treaties and Agreements with Refer-

ence to Korea.

An Introductory Bibliography on China.

APPENDIX I

THE "BLACK-DRAGON" STATEMENT OF JAPANESE

POLICY IN CHINA AS A RESULT OF THE

EUROPEAN WAR. (WRITTEN IN 1914.)

EXPLANATORY NOTE

THE following statement of Japanese foreign policy
was surprisingly accurate in its forecasting of future
events. It is interesting to note how these events are
suggested in this paper. The statement is made that
on account of the absorption of the European nations
in the Great War, " now is the most opportune mo-
ment for Japan to quickly solve the Chinese question.
We should by all means decide and act at once/'
Within a month, or two months after this statement
was made, the Twenty-one Demands were served on
China. Most of their terms were mentioned in the
list of objections under the " Secret Terms of the De-
fensive Alliance." This Defensive Alliance was even-
tually concluded three years later in May, 1918. The
share of Japan in assisting the revolutionists to stir
up trouble in China was also mentioned. " We should
induce the Chinese Revolutionists, the Imperialists and
other Chinese malcontents to create trouble all over
China." Yuan Shih-kai was considered an avowed
enemy of Japan; and the Black Dragon Society ad-
vised his overthrow. " The whole country will be

1 86 APPENDICES

thrown into disorder and Yuan's Government will con-
sequently be overthrown." The Agreement concluded
with Russia in 1916 was forecasted in the statement:
" At this moment it is of paramount importance for
Japan to come to a special understanding with Russia
to define our respective spheres in Manchuria and Mon-
golia so that the two countries may co-operate with
each other in the future." The Lansing-Ishii agree-
ment in 1917 was suggested in the phrases: "what
Japan must now somewhat reckon with is America;
but America in her attitude towards us regarding our
policy toward China has already declared the principle
of maintaining China's territorial integrity and equal
opportunity, and will be satisfied, if we do not impair
America's already acquired rights and privileges."
Even the very phrases which Count Terauchi used in
May, 1918, in answer to the question as to the possi-
bility of a Japanese alliance with Germany appeared
in this document. " Japan will be isolated from the
European powers after- the war, and will be regarded
by them with envy and jealousy just as Germany is
now regarded."

Thus practically all the great decisions in Japanese
foreign policy since the Great War, as they affected
her relations with China, with Russia, and with Amer-
ica, were forecasted in this Black Dragon Memoran-
dum. Consequently, the statement as a whole, and any
objectives it mentions, which have not as yet been
reached, have more than an ordinary interest.

APPENDICES 187

THE BLACK DRAGON MEMORANDUM

PART I. THE EUROPEAN WAR AND THE CHINESE
QUESTION

The present gigantic struggle in Europe has no
parallel in history. Not only will the equilibrium of
Europe be affected and its effect felt all over the globe,
but its results will create a New Era in the political
and social world. Therefore, whether or not the
Imperial Japanese Government can settle the Far
Eastern Question and bring to realization our great
Imperial policy depends on our being able to skilfully
avail ourselves of the world's general trend of affairs
so as to extend our influence and to decide upon a
course of action towards China which shall be prac-
tical in execution. If our authorities and people view
the present European War with indifference and with-
out deep concern, merely devoting their attention to
the attack on Kiaochow, neglecting the larger issues
of the war, they will have brought to naught our
great Imperial policy, and committed a blunder greater
than which it can not be conceived. We are con-
strained to submit this statement of policy for the
consideration of our authorities, not because we are
fond of argument but because we are deeply anxious
for our national welfare.

No one at present can foretell the outcome of the
European War. If the Allies meet with reverses and
victory shall crown the arms of the Germans and
Austrians, German militarism will undoubtedly domin-

1 88 APPENDICES

ate the European Continent and extend southward and
eastward to other parts of the world. Should such a
state of affairs happen to take place the consequences
resulting therefrom will be indeed great and exten-
sive. On this account we must devote our most seri-
ous attention to the subject If, on the other hand,
the Germans and Austrians should be crushed by the
Allies, Germany will be deprived of her present status
as a Federated State under a Kaiser. The Federa-
tion will be disintegrated into separate states and
Prussia will have to be content with the status of a
second-rate Power. Austria and Hungary, on ac-
count of this defeat, will consequently be divided.
What their final fate will be, no one would now ven-
ture to predict. In the meantime Russia will annex
Galicia and the Austrian Poland; France will repossess
Alsace and Lorraine; Great Britain will occupy the
German Colonies in Africa and the South Pacific:
Servia and Montenegro will take Bosnia, Herzegovina
and a certain portion of Austrian territory; thus mak-
ing such great changes in the map of Europe that
even the Napoleonic War in 1815 could not find a
parallel.

When these events take place, not only will Europe
experience great changes, but we should not ignore the
fact that they will occur also in China and in the South
Pacific. After Russia has replaced Germany in the
territories lost by Germany and Austria, she will hold
a controlling influence in Europe, and, for a long
time to come, will have nothing to fear from her west-

APPENDICES 189

ern frontier. Immediately after the war she will make
an effort to carry out her policy of expansion in the
East and will not relax her effort until she has acquired
a controlling influence in China. At the same time,
Great Britain will strengthen her position in the
Yangtze Valley and prohibit any other country from
getting a footing there. France will do likewise in
Yunnan province, using it as her base of operations
for further encroachments upon China and never hesi-
tate to extend her advantages. We must therefore
seriously study the situation, remembering always that
the combined action of Great Britain, Russia and
France will not only affect Europe but that we can
even foresee that it will also affect China.

Whether this combined action on the part of Eng-
land, France and Russia is to terminate at the end of
the war or to continue to operate, we can not now
predict. But after peace in Europe is restored, these
Powers will certainly turn their attention to the ex-
pansion of their several spheres of interest in China,
and, in the adjustment, their interests will most likely
conflict with one another. If their interests do not
conflict, they will work jointly to solve the Chinese
Question. On this point we have not the least doubt.
If England, France and Russia are actually to com-
bine for the coercion of China, what course is to be
adopted by the Imperial Japanese Government to meet
the situation? What proper means shall we employ
to maintain our influence and extend our interests
within this ring of rivalry and competition? It is

I9O APPENDICES

necessary that we bear in mind the final results of
the European War and forestall the trend of events
succeeding it so as to be able to decide upon a policy
towards China and determine the action to be ulti-
mately taken. If we remain passive, the Imperial
Japanese Government's policy towards China will lose
that subjective influence and our diplomacy will be
checked forever by the combined force of the other
Powers. The peace of the Far East will be thus
endangered and even the existence of the Japanese
Empire as a nation will no doubt be imperiled. It
is therefore our first important duty at this moment
to enquire of our Government what course is to be
adopted to face that general situation after the war.
What preparations are being made to meet the com-
bined pressure of the Allies upon China? What
policy has been followed to solve the Chinese Ques-
tion? When the European War is terminated and
peace restored we are not concerned so much with the
question whether it be the Dual Monarchies or the
Triple Entente which emerge victorious, but whether,
in anticipation of the future expansion of European
influence in the Continents of Europe and Asia, the
Imperial Japanese Government should or should not
hesitate to employ force to check the movement be-
fore this occurrence. Now is the most opportune
moment for Japan to quickly solve the Chinese Ques-
tion. Such an opportunity will not occur for hun-
dreds of years to come. Not only is it Japan's divine
duty to act now, but present conditions in China favour

APPENDICES 191

the execution of such a plan. We should by all
means decide and act at once. If our authorities do
not avail themselves of this rare opportunity, great
duty will surely be encountered in future in the settle-
ment of this Chinese question. Japan will be isolated
from the European Powers after the war, and will be
regarded by them with envy and jealousy just as
Germany is now regarded. Is it not then a vital neces-
sity for Japan to solve at this very moment the Chi-
nese Question?

PART II. THE CHINESE QUESTION AND THE
DEFENSIVE ALLIANCE

It is a very important matter of policy whether the
Japanese Government, in obedience to its divine mis-
sion, shall solve the Chinese Question in a heroic man-
ner by making China voluntarily rely upon Japan.
To force China to such a position there is nothing
else for the Imperial Japanese Government to do but
to take advantage of the present opportunity to seize
the reins of political and financial power and to enter
by all means into a defensive alliance with her under
secret terms as enumerated below:

The Secret Terms of the Defensive Alliance
The Imperial Japanese Government, with due re-
spect for the Sovereignty and Integrity of China and
with the object and hope of maintaining the peace of
the Far East, undertakes to share the responsibility of
co-operating with China to guard her against internal
trouble and foreign invasion and China shall accord to

APPENDICES

Japan special facilities in the matter of China's Na-
tional Defence, or the protection of Japan's special
rights and privileges and for these objects the follow-
ing treaty of Alliance is to be entered into between
the two contracting parties :

1. When there is internal trouble in China or when
she is at war with another nation or nations, Japan
shall send her army to render assistance, to assume
the responsibility of guarding Chinese territory and
to maintain peace and order in China.

2. China agrees to recognize Japan's privileged po-
sition in South Manchuria and Inner Mongolia and
to cede the sovereign rights of these regions to Japan
to enable her to carry out a scheme of local defence
on a permanent basis.

3. After the Japanese occupation of Kiaochow,
Japan shall acquire all the rights and privileges here-
tofore enjoyed by the Germans in regard to railways,
mines and all other interests, and after peace and
order is restored in Tsingtao, the place shall be
handed back to China to be opened as an International
Treaty port.

4. For the maritime defence of China and Japan,
China shall lease strategic harbours along the coast
of the Fukien province to Japan to be converted into
naval bases and grant to Japan in the said province
all railway and mining rights.

5. For the reorganization of the Chinese army
China shall entrust the training and drilling of the
arniy to Japan.

APPENDICES 193

6. For the unification of China's firearms and muni-
tions of war, China shall adopt firearms of Japanese
pattern, and at the same time establish arsenals (with
the help of Japan) in different -strategic points.

7. With the object of creating and maintaining a
Chinese Navy, China shall entrust the training of her
navy to Japan.

8. With the object of reorganizing her finances and
improving the methods of taxation, China shall en-
trust the work to Japan, and the latter shall elect com-
petent financial experts who shall act as first-class ad-
visers to the Chinese Government.

9. China shall engage Japanese educational experts
as educational advisers and extensively establish
schools in different parts of the country to teach Japa-
nese so as to raise the educational standard of the
country.

10. China shall first consult with and obtain the
consent of Japan before she can enter into an agree-
ment with another Power for making loans, the leas-
ing of territory, or the cession of the same.

From the date of the signing of this Defensive
Alliance, Japan and China shall work together hand-
in-hand. Japan will assume the responsibility of safe-
guarding Chinese territory and maintaining the peace
and order in China. This will relieve China of all
future anxieties and enable her to proceed energetically
with her reforms, and, with a sense of territorial se-
curity, she may wait for her national development and
regeneration. Even after the present European War

194 APPENDICES

is over and peace is restored China will absolutely
have nothing to fear in the future of having pressure
brought against her by the foreign powers. It is
only thus that permanent peace can be secured in the
Far East.

But before concluding this Defensive Alliance, two
points must first be ascertained and settled, (i) Its
bearing on the Chinese Government. (2) Its bear-
ing on those Powers having intimate relations with,
and great interests in, China.

In considering its effect on the Chinese Govern-
ment, Japan must try to foresee whether the position
of China's present ruler Yuan Shih-kai shall be perma-
nent or not ; whether the present Government's policy
will enjoy the confidence of a large section of the
Chinese people; whether Yuan Shih-kai will readily
agree to the Japanese Government's proposal to en-
ter into a treaty of alliance with us. These are points
to which we are bound to give a thorough considera-
tion. Judging by the attitude hitherto adopted by
Yuan Shih-kai we know he has always resorted to
the policy of expediency in his diplomatic dealings,
and although he may outwardly show friendliness
towards us, he will in fact rely upon the influence of
the different Powers as the easiest check against us
and refuse to accede to our demands. Take for a
single instance, his conduct towards us since the Im-
perial Government declared war against Germany and
his action will then be clear to all. Whether we can
rely upon the ordinary friendly methods of diplomacy

APPENDICES 195

to gain our object or not it does not require much
wisdom to decide. After the gigantic struggle in Eu-
rope is over, leaving aside America, which will not
press for advantage, China will not be able to obtain
any loans from the other P'owers. With a depleted
treasury, without means to pay the officials and the
army, with local bandits inciting the poverty-stricken
populace to trouble, with the revolutionists waiting
for opportunities to rise, should an insurrection actu-
ally occur while no outside assistance can be rendered
to quell it we are certain it will be impossible for
Yuan Shih-kai, single-handed, to restore order and con-
solidate the country. The result will be that the na-
tion will be cut up into many parts beyond all hope
of remedy. That this state of affairs will come is
not difficult to foresee. When this occurs, shall we
uphold Yuan's Government and assist him to suppress
the internal insurrection with the certain assurance
that we could influence him to agree to our demands,
or shall we help the revolutionists to achieve a suc-
cess and realize our object through them? This ques-
tion must be definitely decided upon this very mo-
ment so that we may put it into practical execution.
If we do not look into the future fate of China but
go blindly to uphold Yuan's Government, to enter into
a Defensive Alliance with China, hoping thus to secure
a complete realization of our object by assisting him
to suppress the revolutionists, it is obviously a wrong
policy. Why? Because the majority of the Chinese
people have lost all faith in the tottering Yuan Shih-

ig6 APPENDICES

kai who is discredited and attacked by the whole na-
tion for having sold his country. If Japan gives Yuan
the support, his Government, though in a very pre-
carious state, may possibly avoid destruction. Yuan
Shih-kai belongs to that school of politicians who are
fond of employing craftiness and cunning. He may
be friendly to us for a time, but he will certainly aban-
don us and again befriend the other Powers when the
European war is at an end. Judging by his past we
have no doubt as to what he will do in the future. For
Japan to ignore the general sentiment of the Chinese
people and support Yuan Shih-kai with the hope that
we can settle with him the Chinese Question is a blun-
der indeed. Therefore, in order to secure the perma-
nent peace of the Far East, instead of supporting a
Chinese Government which can neither be long con-
tinued in power nor assist in the attainment of our ob-
ject, we should rather support the 400,000,000 Chi-
nese people to renovate their corrupt Government, to
change its present form, to maintain peace and order
in the land and to usher into China a new era of pros-
perity so that China and Japan may in fact as well as
in name be brought into the most intimate and vital
relations with each other. China's era of prosperity
is based on the Chino-Japanese Alliance and this Alli-
ance is the foundational power for the repelling of
the foreign aggression that is to be directed against
the Far East at the conclusion of the European War.
This Alliance is also the foundation-stone of the peace
of the world. Japan therefore should take this as the

APPENDICES 197

last warning and immediately solve this question.
Since the Imperial Japanese Government has con-
sidered it imperative to support the Chinese people,
we should induce the Chinese revolutionists, the Imper-
ialists and other Chinese malcontents to create trouble
all over China. The whole country will be thrown
into disorder and Yuan's Government will consequently
be overthrown. We shall then select a man from
amongst the most influential and most noted of the
400,000,000 of Chinese and help him to organize a
new form of Government and to consolidate the whole
country. In the meantime our army must assist in
the restoration of peace and order in the country, and
in the protection of the lives and properties of the
people, so that they may gladly tender their allegiance
to the new Government which will then naturally con-
fide in and rely upon Japan. It is after the accom-
plishment of only these things that we shall without
difficulty gain our object by the conclusion of a De-
fensive Alliance with China.

For us to incite the Chinese revolutionists and mal-
contents to rise in China we consider the present to
be the most opportune moment. The reason why
these men can not now carry on an active campaign
is because they are insufficiently provided with funds.
If the Imperial Government can take advantage of
this fact to make them a loan and instruct them to
rise simultaneously, great commotion and disorder
will surely prevail all over China. We can intervene
and easily adjust matters.

APPENDICES

The progress of the European War warns Japan
with greater urgency of the imperative necessity of
solving this most vital of questions. The Imperial
Government can not be considered as embarking on a
rash project. This opportunity will not repeat it-
self for our benefit. We must avail ourselves of this
chance and under no circumstances hesitate. Why
should we wait for the spontaneous uprising of the
revolutionists and malcontents? Why should we not
think out and lay down a plan beforehand? When we
examine into the form of government in China, we
must ask whether the existing Republic is well suited
to the national temperament and well adapted to the
thoughts and aspirations of the Chinese people. From
the time the Republic of China was established up to
the present moment, if what it has passed through is
to be compared to what it ought to be in the matter
of administration and unification, we find disappoint-
ment everywhere. Even the revolutionists themselves,
the very ones who first advocated the Republican form
of government, acknowledge that they have made a
mistake. The retention of the Republican form of
Government in China will be a great future obstacle
in the way of a Chino- Japanese alliance. And why
must it be so? Because, in a Republic the funda-
mental principles of government as well as the social
and moral aims of the people are distinctly different
from that of a Constitutional Monarchy. Their laws
and administration also conflict. If Japan act as a
guide to China and China model herself after Japan,

APPENDICES 199

it will only then be possible for the two nations to
solve by mutual effort the Far East Question without
differences and disagreements. Therefore, to start
from the foundation for the purpose of reconstruct-
ing the Chinese Government, of establishing a Chino-
Japanese Alliance, of maintaining the permanent peace
of the Far East and of realizing the consummation
of Japan's Imperial policy, we must take advantage
of the present opportunity to alter China's Republican
form of Government into a Constitutional Monarchy
which shall necessarily be identical, in all its details,
to the Constitutional Monarchy of Japan, and to no
other. This is really the key and first principle to be
firmly held for the actual reconstruction of the form
of Government in China. If China changes her Re-
publican form of Government to that of a Constitu-
tional Monarchy, shall we, in the selection of a new
ruler, restore the Emperor Hsuan T'ung to his throne
or choose the most capable man from the Monarchists
or select the most worthy member from among the
revolutionists? We think, however, that it is ad-
visable at present to leave this question to the exigency
of the future when the matter is brought up for de-
cision. But we must not lose sight of the fact that
to actually put into execution this policy of a Chino-
Japanese Alliance and the transformation of the Re-
public of China into a Constitutional Monarchy, is, in
reality, the fundamental principle to be adopted for
the reconstruction of China.

We shall now consider the bearing of this Defensive

2OO APPENDICES

Alliance on the other Powers. Needless to say, Japan
and China will in no way impair the rights and in-
terests already acquired by the Powers. At this mo-
ment it is of paramount importance for Japan to come
to a special understanding with Russia to define our
respective spheres in 'Manchuria and Mongolia so
that the two countries may co-operate with each other
in the future. This means that Japan after the acqui-
sition of sovereign rights in South Manchuria and
Inner Mongolia will work together with Russia after
her acquisition of sovereign rights in North Manchuria
and Outer Mongolia to maintain the status quo, and
endeavour by every effort to protect the peace of
the Far East. Russia, since the outbreak of the Eu-
ropean War, has not only laid aside all ill-feelings
against Japan, but has adopted the same attitude as
her Allies and shown warm friendship for us. No
matter how we regard the Manchurian and Mongolian
Questions in the future she is anxious that we find
some way of settlement. Therefore we need not
doubt but that Russia, in her attitude towards this
Chinese Question, will be able to come to an under-
standing with us for mutual co-operation.

The British sphere of influence and interest in
China is centred in Tibet and the Yangtsze Valley.
Therefore, if Japan can come to some satisfactory
arrangement with China in regard to Tibet and also
give certain privileges to Great Britain in the Yangtze
Valley, with an assurance to protect those privileges,
no matter how powerful Great Britain might be, she

APPENDICES 201

will surely not oppose Japan's policy in regard to this
Chinese Question. While this present European War
is going on Great Britain has never asked Japan to
render her assistance. That her strength will cer-
tainly not enable her to oppose us in the future need
not be doubted in the least.

Since Great Britain and Russia will not oppose
Japan's policy towards China, it can readily be seen
what attitude France will adopt in regard to the sub-
ject. What Japan must now somewhat reckon with
is America. But America in her attitude towards
us regarding our policy towards China has already
declared the principle of maintaining China's terri-
torial integrity and equal opportunity and will be
satisfied, if we do not impair America's already ac-
quired rights and privileges. We think America will
also have no cause for complaint. Nevertheless Amer-
ica has in the East a naval force which can be fairly
relied upon, though not sufficiently strong to be feared.
Therefore in Japan's attitude towards America there
is nothing really for us to be afraid of.

Since China's condition is such on the one hand
and the P'owers' relation towards China is such on
the other hand, Japan should avail herself in the mean-
time of the European War to definitely decide upon
a policy towards China, the most important move
being the transformation of the Chinese Government
to be followed up by preparing for the conclusion of
the Defensive Alliance. The precipitate action on
the part of our present Cabinet in acceding to the re-

2O2 APPENDICES

quest of Great Britain to declare war against Ger-
many without having definitely settled our policy to-
wards China has no real connection with our future
negotiations with China or affects the political condi-
tion in the Far East. Consequently, all intelligent
Japanese, of every walk of life throughout the land,
are very deeply concerned about the matter.

Our Imperial Government should now definitely
change our dependent foreign policy which is being
directed by others into an independent foreign policy
which shall direct others, proclaiming the same with
solemn sincerity to the world and carrying it out
with determination. If we do so, even the gods and
spirits will give way. These are important points
in our policy towards China and the result depends
on how we carry them out. Can our authorities
firmly make up their mind to solve this Chinese Ques-
tion by the actual carrying out of this fundamental
principle? If -they show irresolution while we have
this heaven-conferred chance and merely depend on
the good will of the other Powers, we shall eventually
have greater pressure to be brought against the Far
East after the European War is over, when the pres-
ent equilibrium will be destroyed. That day will then
be too late for us to repent our folly. We are there-
fore impelled by force of circumstances to urge our
authorities to a quicker sense of the situation and to
come to -a determination.

Translation from The Fight for the Republic in China, by
B. L. Putnam- Weale. (Copyright 1917 by Dodd, Mead & Com-
pany, Inc.)

APPENDIX II

DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE TWENTY-ONE DE-
MANDS MADE BY JAPAN ON CHINA IN 1915.

(A) JAPAN'S REVISED DEMANDS ON CHINA

Presented April 26, 1915

Following- the original Twenty-one Demands on China
presented Jan. 18, 1915

NOTE ON ORIGINAL TEXT

(The revised list of articles is a Chinese translation
of the Japanese text. It is hereby declared that when
a final decision is reached, there shall be a revision of
the wording of the text.)

GROUP I

The Japanese Government and the Chinese Govern-
ment, being desirous of maintaining the general peace
in Eastern Asia and further strengthening the friendly
relations and good neighbourhood existing between the
two nations, agree to the following articles:

Art. i. The Chinese Government engages to give
full assent to all matters upon which the Japanese
Government may hereafter agree with the German
Government, relating to the disposition of all rights,

203

2O4 APPENDICES

.interests and concessions, which Germany, by virtue
of treaties or otherwise, possesses in relation to the
Province of Shantung.

Art. 2. (Changed into an exchange of notes.)

The Chinese Government declares that within the
Province of Shantung and along its coast no territory
or island will be ceded or leased to any Power under
any pretext.

Art. 3. The Chinese Government consents that as
regards the railway to be built by China herself from
Chefoo or Lungkow to connect with the Kiaochow-
Tsinanfu Railway, if Germany is willing to abandon
the privilege of financing the Chefoo-Weihsien line,
China will approach Japanese capitalists to negotiate
for a loan.

Art. 4. The Chinese Government engages, in the
interest of trade and for the residence of foreigners,
to open by China herself as soon as possible certain
suitable places in the Province of Shantung as Com-
mercial Ports.

(Supplementary Exchange of Notes)
The places which ought to be opened are to be
chosen and the regulations are to be drafted, by the
Chinese Government, but the Japanese Minister must
be consulted before making a decision.

GROUP II

The Japanese Government and the Chinese Govern-
ment, with a view to developing their economic rela-

APPENDICES 2O5

tions in South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia,
agree to the following articles :

Art. i. The two contracting Powers mutually
agree that the term of lease of Port Arthur and
Dalny and the terms of the South Manchuria Rail-
way and the Antung-Mukden Railway shall be ex-
tended to 99 years.

(Supplementary Exchange of Notes)

The term of lease of Port Arthur and Dalny shall
expire in the 86th year of the Republic or 1997.
The date for restoring the South Manchurian Railway
to China shall fall due in the gist year of the Republic
or 2002. Article 12 in the original South Manchur-
ian Railway Agreement stating that it may be re-
deemed by China after 36 years after the traffic is
opened is hereby cancelled. The term of the Antung-
Mukden Railway shall expire in the g6th year of
the Republic or 2007.

Art. 2. Japanese subjects in South Manchuria may
lease or purchase the necessary land for erecting suit-
able buildings for trade and manufacture or for prose-
cuting agricultural enterprises.

Art. 3. Japanese subjects shall be free to reside
and travel in South Manchuria and to engage in busi-
ness and manufacture of any kind whatsoever.

Art. 3-a. The Japanese subjects referred to in the
preceding two articles, besides being required to regis-
ter with the local authorities pass-ports which they
must procure under the existing regulations, shall also

2O6 APPENDICES

submit to police laws and ordinances and tax regula-
tions, which are approved by the Japanese consul.
Civil and criminal cases in which the defendants are
Japanese shall be tried and adjudicated by the Japa-
nese consul; those in which the defendants are Chi-
nese shall be tried and adjudicated by Chinese Authori-
ties. In either case an officer can be deputed to the
court to attend the proceedings. But mixed civil cases
between Chinese and Japanese relating to land shall
be tried and adjudicated by delegates of both nations
conjointly in accordance with Chinese law and local
usage. When the judicial system in the said region
is completely reformed, all civil and criminal cases
concerning Japanese subjects shall be tried entirely
by Chinese law courts.

Art. 4. (Changed to an exchange of notes.)
The Chinese Government agrees that Japanese sub-
jects shall be permitted forthwith to investigate, select,
and then prospect for and open mines at the follow-
ing places in South Manchuria, apart from those min-
ing areas in which mines are being prospected for or
worked; until the Mining Ordinance is definitely
settled methods at present in force shall be followed.

PROVINCE OF FENG-TIEN

Locality District Mineral

Niu Hsin Tai Pen-hsi Coal

Tien Shih Fu Kou Pen-hsi Coal

Sha Sung Kang Hai-lung Coal

T'ieh Ch'ang Tung-hua Coal

Nuan Ti Tang Chin Coal

APPENDICES 2O7

An Shan Chan region From Liao-yang to Pen-
hsi Iron

PROVINCE OF KIRIN

(Southern Portion)

Sha Sung Kang Ho-lung Coal and Iron

Rang Yao Chi-lin (Kirin) Coal

Chia P'i Kou Hua-tien Gold

Art. 5. (Changed to an exchange of notes.)
The Chinese Government declares that China will
hereafter provide funds for building railways in South
Manchuria ; if foreign capital is required, the Chinese
Government agrees to negotiate for the loan with Japa-
nese capitalists first.

Art. 5 -a. (Changed to an exchange of notes.)
The Chinese Government agrees that hereafter, when
a foreign loan is to be made on the security of the
taxes of South Manchuria (not including customs and
salt revenue on the security of which loans have al-
ready been made by the Central Government), it will
negotiate for the loan with Japanese capitalists first.
Art. 6. (Changed to an exchange of notes.)
The Chinese Government declares that hereafter if
foreign advisers or instructors on political, financial,
military or police matters, are to be employed in South
Manchuria, Japanese will be employed first.

Art. 7. The Chinese Government agree speedily
to make a fundamental revision of the Kirin-Chang-
chun Railway Loan Agreement, taking as a standard

2O8 APPENDICES

the provisions in railroad loan agreements made here-
tofore between China and foreign financiers. If, in
future, more advantageous terms than those in exist-
ing railway loan agreements are granted to foreign
financiers, in connection with railway loans, the above
agreement shall again be revised in accordance with
Japan's wishes.

All existing treaties between China and Japan re-
lating to Manchuria shall, except where otherwise pro-
vided for by this Convention, remain in force.

1. The Chinese Government agrees that hereafter
when a foreign loan is to be made on the security
of the taxes of Eastern Inner Mongolia, China must
negotiate with the Japanese Government first

2. The Chinese Government agrees that China will
herself provide funds for building the railways in East-
tern Inner Mongolia; if foreign capital is required, she
must negotiate with the Japanese Government first

3. The Chinese Government agrees, in the interest
of trade and for the residence of foreigners, to open
by China herself, as soon as possible, certain suitable
places in Eastern Inner Mongolia as Commercial Ports.
The places which ought to be opened are to be chosen,
and the regulations are to be drafted, by the Chinese
Government, but the Japanese Minister must be con-
sulted before making a decision.

4. In the event of Japanese and Chinese desiring
jointly to undertake agricultural enterprises and in-
dustries incidental thereto, the Chinese Government
shall give its permission.

APPENDICES 2O9

GROUP III

The relations between Japan and the Hanyehping
Company being very intimate, if those interested in
the said Company come to an agreement with the
Japanese capitalists for co-operation, the Chinese Gov-
ernment shall forthwith give its consent thereto. The
Chinese Government further agrees that, without the
consent of the Japanese capitalists, China will not con-
vert the Company into a state enterprise, nor confiscate
it, nor cause it to borrow and use foreign capital other
than Japanese.

GROUP IV

China is to give pronouncement by herself in ac-
cordance with the following principle:

No bay, harbour, or island along the coast of China
may be ceded or leased to any Power.
Notes to be exchanged.

A

As regards the right of financing a railway from
Wuchang to connect with the Kiu-kiang-Nanchang
line, the Nanchang-Hangchow railway, and the Nan-
chang-Chaochow railway, if it is clearly ascertained
that other Powers have no objection, China shall grant
the said right to Japan.

B

As regards the rights of financing a railway from
Wuchang to connect with the Kiu-kiang-N.anchang
railway, a railway from Nanchang to Hangchow and

2IO APPENDICES

another from Nanchang to Chaochow, the Chinese
Government shall not grant the said right to any
foreign Power before Japan comes to an understand-
ing with the other Power which is heretofore inter-
ested therein.

NOTES TO BE EXCHANGED

The Chinese Government agrees that no nation what-
ever is to be permitted to construct, on the coast of
Fukien Province, a dockyard, a coaling station for
military use, or a naval base; nor to be authorized
to set up any other military establishment. The Chi-
nese Government further agrees not to use foreign
capital for setting up the above mentioned construc-
tion or establishment.

Mr. Lu, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, stated as
follows :

1. The Chinese Government shall, whenever, in fu-
ture, it considers this step necessary, engage numerous
Japanese advisers.

2. Whenever, in future, Japanese subjects desire
to lease or purchase land in the interior of China for
establishing schools or hospitals, the Chinese Govern-
ment shall forthwith give its consent thereto.

3. When a suitable opportunity arises in future,
the Chinese Government will send military officers to
Japan to negotiate with Japanese military authorities
the matter of purchasing arms or that of establishing
a joint arsenal.

Mr. Hioki, the Japanese Minister, stated as follows :

APPENDICES 211

As relates to the question of the right of missionary
propaganda the same shall be taken up again for ne-
gotiation in future.

(B) CHINA'S REPLY TO JAPAN'S REVISED DEMANDS

China's Reply of May i, 1915, to the Japanese Revised

Demands of April 26, 1915*

GROUP I

The Chinese Government and the Japanese Govern-
ment, being desirous of maintaining the general peace
in Eastern Asia and further strengthening the friendly
relations and good neighbourhood existing between
the two nations, agree to the following articles :

Article I. The Chinese Government declare that
they will give full assent to all matters upon which
the Japanese and German Governments may hereafter
mutually agree, relating to the disposition of all in-
terests which Germany, by virtue of treaties or re-
corded cases, possesses in relation to the Province of
Shantung.

The Japanese Government declares that when the
Chinese Government give their assent to the disposi-
tion of interests above referred to, Japan will restore
the leased territory of Kiaochow to China; and fur-
ther recognize the right of the Chinese Government
to participate in the negotiations referred to above
between Japan and Germany.

Article 2. The Japanese Government consent to be
responsible for the indemnification of all losses occa-

212 APPENDICES

sioned by Japan's military operation around the leased
territory of Kiaochow shall, prior to the restoration
of the said leased territory to China, be administered
as heretofore, for the time being. The railways and
telegraph lines erected by Japan for military purposes
are to be removed forthwith. The Japanese troops
now stationed outside the original leased territory of
Kiaochow are now to be withdrawn first, those within
the original leased territory are to be withdrawn on
the restoration of the said leased territory to China.

Article 3. (Changed into an exchange of notes.)

The Chinese Government declare that within the
Province of Shantung and along its coast no terri-
tory or island will be ceded or leased to any Power un-
der any pretext.

Article 4. The Chinese Government consent that
as regards the railway to be built by China herself
from Chefoo or Lungkow to connect with the Kiao-
chow-Tsinanfu Railway, if Germany is willing to aban-
don the privilege of financing the Che-foo-Weihsien
line, China will approach Japanese capitalists for a
loan.

Article 5. The Chinese Government engage, in the
interest of trade and for the residence of foreigners,
to open by herself as soon as possible certain suitable
places in the Province of Shantung as Commercial
Ports.

(Supplementary exchange of notes.)

The places which ought to be opened are to be
chosen, and the regulations are to be drafted, by the

APPENDICES 213

Chinese Government, but the Japanese Minister must
be consulted before making a decision.

Article 6. If the Japanese and German Govern-
ments are not able to come to a definite agreement
in future in their negotiations respecting transfer, etc.,
this provisional agreement contained in the foregoing
articles shall be void.

GROUP II

The six articles which are found in Japan's Re-
vised Demands of April 26, 1915, but omitted herein,
are those already initialed by the Chinese Foreign
Minister and the Japanese Minister.

The Chinese Government and the Japanese Govern-
ment, with a view to developing their economic rela-
tions in South Manchuria, agree to the following arti-
cles:

Article 2. Japanese subjects in South Manchuria
may, by arrangement with the owners, lease land re-
quired for erecting suitable buildings for trade and
manufacture or for agricultural enterprises.

Article 3. Japanese subjects shall be free to re-
side and travel in South Manchuria and to engage in
business and manufacture of any kind whatsoever.

Article 3 a. The Japanese subjects referred to in
the preceding two articles, Besides being required to
register with the local authorities passports, which they
must procure under the existing regulations, shall also
observe police rules and regulations and pay taxes in
the same manner as Chinese. Civil and criminal cases

214 APPENDICES

shall be tried and adjudicated by the authorities of
the defendant's nationality and an officer can be de-
puted to attend the proceedings. But all cases purely
between Japanese subjects, and mixed cases between
Japanese and Chinese, relating to land or disputes
arising from lease contracts, shall be tried and adjudi-
cated by Chinese Authorities and the Japanese Con-
sul may also depute an officer to attend the proceed-
ings.

When the judicial system in the said Province is
completely reformed, all the civil and criminal cases
concerning Japanese subjects shall be tried entirely by
Chinese law courts.

RELATING TO EASTERN INNER MONGOLIA

(To be exchanged by notes)

Article i. The Chinese Government declare that
China will not in future pledge the taxes, other than
customs and salt revenue, of that part of Eastern In-
ner Mongolia under the jurisdiction of South Man-
churia and Jehol Intendency, as security for raising
loans.

Article 2. The Chinese Government declare that
China will herself provide funds for building the rail-
ways in that part of Eastern Inner Mongolia under
the jurisdiction of South Manchuria and the Jehol
Intendency; if foreign capital is required, China will
negotiate with Japanese capitalists first, provided this
does not conflict with agreements already concluded
with other Powers.

APPENDICES 2IS

Article 3. The Chinese Government agrees, in the
interest of trade and for the residence of foreigners,
to open by China herself certain suitable places in that
part of Eastern Inner Mongolia under the jurisdiction
of South Manchuria and the Jehol Intendency, as
Commercial Marts.

The regulations for the said Commercial Marts will
be made in accordance with those of other Commercial
Marts opened by China herself.

GROUP III

The relations between Japan and the Hanyehping
Company being very intimate, if the said Company
comes to an agreement with the Japanese capitalists
for co-operation, the Chinese Government shall forth-
with give their consent thereto. The Chinese Gov-
ernment further declare that China will not convert
the Company into a state enterprise, nor confiscate it
nor cause it to borrow and use foreign capital other
than Japanese.

Letter to be Addressed by the Japanese Minister to
the Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs

Excellency:

I have the honour to state that a report has reached
me that the Chinese Government have given permis-
sion to foreign nations to construct on the coast of
Fukien Province dock-yards, coaling stations for mili-
tary use, naval bases and other establishments for mili-
tary purposes and further that the Chinese Govern-

2l6 APPENDICES

ment are borrowing foreign capital for putting up the
above-mentioned construction or establishments. I
shall be much obliged if the Chinese Government will
inform me whether >r not these reports are well
founded in fact.

Reply to be Addressed by the Chinese Minister of

Foreign Affairs to the Japanese Minister
Excellency :

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your

Excellency's Note of . In reply I beg to

state that the Chinese Government have not given
permission to foreign Powers to construct, on the coast
of Fukien Province, dock-yards, coaling stations for
military use, naval bases or other establishments for
military purposes ; nor do they contemplate borrowing
foreign capital for putting up such constructions or
establishments.

(c) MEMORANDUM READ BY THE MINISTER OF FOREIGN
AFFAIRS TO MR. HICKI, THE JAPANESE MINIS-
TER, AT A CONFERENCE HELD AT WAICHIAOPU,
MAY I, IQIS

The list of demands which the Japanese Govern-
ment first presented to the Chinese Government con-
sists of five groups, the first relating to Shantung,
the second relating to South Manchuria and Eastern
Inner Mongolia, the third relating to the Hanyehping
Company, the fourth asking for non-alienation of
the coast of the country, and the fifth relating to the
questions of national advisers, national police, national

APPENDICES 217

arms, missionary propaganda, Yangtze Valley rail-
ways, and Fukien Province. Out of profound regard
for the intentions entertained by Japan, the Chinese
Government took these momentous demands into grave
and careful consideration and decided to negotiate with
the Japanese Government frankly and sincerely what
were possible to negotiate. This is a manifestation
to Japan of the most profound regard which the Chi-
nese Government entertains for the relations between
the two nations.

Ever since the opening of the negotiations China
has been doing her best to hasten their progress, hold-
ing as many as three conferences a week. As regards
the articles in the second group, the Chinese Govern-
ment, being disposed to allow the Japanese Govern-
ment to develop the economic relations of the two
countries in South Manchuria, realizing that the Japa-
nese Government attaches importance to its interests
in that region, and wishing to meet the hopes of Japan,
made a painful effort, without hesitation, to agree to
the extension of the 25-year lease of Port Arthur and
Dalny, the 36-year period of the South Manchuria
railway and the 1 5-year period of the Abtung-Mukden
railway, all to 99 years; and to abandon its own cher-
ished hopes to regain control of these places and prop-
erties at the expiration of their respective original
terms of lease. It cannot but be admitted that this is
a most genuine proof of China's friendship for Japan.
As to the rights of opening mines in South Man-

2l8 APPENDICES

churia, the Chinese Government has already agreed
to permit Japanese to work mines within the mining
areas designated by Japan. China has further agreed
to give Japan a right of preference in the event of bor-
rowing foreign capital for building railways or of mak-
ing a loan on the security of the local taxes in South
Manchuria. The question of revising the arrange-
ment for the Kirin-Changchun railway has been settled
in accordance with the proposal made by Japan. The
Chinese Government has further agreed to employ
Japanese first in the event of employing foreign ad-
visers on political, military, financial and police mat-
ters.

Furthermore, the provision about the repurchase
period in the South Manchurian railway was not men-
tioned in Japan's original proposal. Subsequently,
the Japanese Government alleging that its ^meaning
was not clear, asked China to cancel the provision alto-
gether. Again, Japan at first demanded the right of
Japanese to carry on farming in South Manchuria, but
subsequently she considered the word " farming " was
not broad enough and asked to replace it with the
phrase " agricultural enterprises." To these requests
the Chinese Government, though well aware that the
proposed changes could only benefit Japan, still ac-
ceded without delay. This, too, is a proof of China's
frankness and sincerity toward Japan.

As regards matters relating to Shantung, the Chi-
nese Government has agreed to a majority of, the de-
mands.

APPENDICES 219

The question of inland residence in South Manchuria
is, in the opinion of the Chinese Government, incom-
patible with the treaties China has entered into with
Japan and other Powers, still the Chinese Government
did its best to consider how it was possible to avoid
that incompatibility. At first, China suggested that
the Chinese Authorities should have full rights of jur-
isdiction over Japanese settlers. Japan declined to
agree to it. Thereupon China reconsidered the ques-
tion and revised her counter-proposal five or six times,
each time making some definite concession, and went so
far as to agree that all civil and criminal cases between
Chinese and Japanese should be arranged according
to existing treaties. Only cases relating to land or
lease contracts were reserved to be adjudicated by
Chinese Courts, as a mark of China's sovereignty over
the region. This is another proof of China's readi-
ness to concede as much as possible.

Eastern Inner Mongolia is not an enlightened region
as yet and the conditions existing there are entirely
different from those prevailing in South Manchuria.
The two places, therefore, cannot be considered in the
same light. Accordingly, China agreed to open com-
mercial marts first, in the interests of foreign trade.

The Hanyehping Company mentioned in the third
group is entirely a private company, and the Chinese
Government is precluded from interfering with it
and negotiating with another government to make
any disposal of the same as the Government likes, but
having regard for the interests of the Japanese capital-

220 APPENDICES

ists, the Chinese Government agreed that whenever,
in future, the said company and the Japanese capital-
ists should arrive at a satisfactory arrangement for
co-operation, China will give her assent thereto. Thus
the interests of the Japanese capitalists are amply
safeguarded.

Although the demand in the fourth group asking for
a declaration not to alienate China's coast is an in-
fringement of her sovereign rights, yet the Chinese
Government offered to make a voluntary pronounce-
ment so far as it comports with China's sovereign
rights. Thus, it is seen that the Chinese Government,
in deference to the wishes of Japan, gave a most serious
consideration even to those demands which gravely af-
fect the sovereignty and territorial rights of China as
well as the principle of equal opportunity and the trea-
ties with foreign Powers. All this was a painful effort
on the part of the Chinese Government to meet the
situation a fact of which the Japanese Government
must be aware.

As regards the demands in the fifth group, they all
infringe China's sovereignty, the treaty rights of
other Powers or the principle of equal opportunity.
Although Japan did not indicate any difference be-
tween this group and the preceding four in the list
which she presented to China in respect of their char-
acter, the Chinese Government, in view of their pal-
pably objectionable features, persuaded itself that these
could not have been intended by Japan as anything
other than Japan's mere advice to China. Accordingly

APPENDICES 221

China has declared from the very beginning that while
she entertains the most profound regard for Japan's
wishes, she was unable to admit that any of these
matters could be made the subject of an understand-
ing with Japan. Much as she desired to pay regard to
Japan's wishes, China cannot but respect her own sover-
eign rights and the existing treaties with other Powers.
In order to be rid of the seed for future misunderstand-
ing and to strengthen the basis of friendship, China
was constrained to iterate the reasons for refusing
to negotiate on any of the articles in the fifth group,
yet in view of Japan's wishes China has expressed her
readiness to state that no foreign money was borrowed
to construct harbour works in Fukien Province. Thus
it is clear that China went so far as to seek a solu-
tion for Japan of a question that really did not admit
of negotiation. Was there, then, evasion on the part
of China?

Now, since the Japanese Government has presented
a revised list of demands and declared at the same time
that it will restore the leased territory of Kiaochow, the
Chinese Government reconsiders the whole question
and herewith submits a new reply to the friendly Japa-
nese Government.

In this reply the unsettled articles in the first group
are stated again for discussion. As regards the sec-
ond group, those articles which have already been
initialed are omitted. In connection with the ques-
tion of inland residence the police regulation clause
has been revised in a more restrictive sense. As for

222 APPENDICES

the trial of cases relating to land and lease contracts
the Chinese Government now permits the Japanese
Consul to send an officer to attend the proceedings.
Of the four demands in connection with that part of
Eastern Inner Mongolia which is within the jurisdic-
tion of South Manchuria and the Jehol Intendency,
China agrees to three. China, also, agrees to the
article relating to the Hanyehping Company as re-
vised by Japan.

It is hoped that the Japanese Government will appre-
ciate the conciliatory spirit of the Chinese Government
in making this final concession and forthwith give her
assent thereto.

There is one more point. At the beginning of the
present negotiations it was mutually agreed to observe
secrecy, but unfortunately a few days after the pres-
entation of the demands by Japan an Osaka newspaper
published an " Extra " giving the text of the de-
mands. The foreign and the Chinese press has since
been paying considerable attention to this question and
frequently publishing prcnChinese or pro-Japanese
comments in order to call forth the world's conjecture,
a matter which the Chinese Government deeply re-
grets. The Chinese Government has never carried on
any newspaper campaign and the Chinese Minister of
Foreign Affairs has repeatedly declared it to the Japa-
nese Minister.

In conclusion, the Chinese Government wishes to
express its hope that the negotiations now pending be-
tween the two countries will soon come to an end and

APPENDICES 223

whatever misgivings foreign countries entertain to-
ward the present situation may be quickly dispelled.

(D) JAPAN'S ULTIMATUM TO CHINA

Japan's Ultimatum delivered by the Japanese Min-
ister to the Chinese Government, on May 7th, 1915.

The reason why the Imperial Government opened
the present negotiations with the Chinese Government
is first to endeavour to dispose of the complications
arising out of the war between Japan and China,
and secondly to attempt to solve those various ques-
tions which are detrimental to the intimate relations
of China and Japan with a view to solidifying the
foundation of cordial friendship subsisting between
the two countries to the end that the peace of the Far
East may be effectually and permanently preserved.
With this object in view, definite proposals were pre-
sented to the Chinese Government in January of this
year, and up to today as many as twenty-five confer-
ences have been held with the Chinese Government in
perfect sincerity and frankness.

In the course of negotiations the Imperial Govern-
ment have consistently explained the aims and objects
of the proposals in a conciliatory spirit, while on the
other hand the proposals of the Chinese Government,
whether important or unimportant, have been at-
tended to without any reserve.

It may be stated with confidence that no effort
has been spared to arrive at a satisfactory and amicable
settlement of those questions.

ArrjG.iMjuu.uiLa

The discussion of the entire corpus o the proposals
was practically at an end at the twenty-fourth con-
ference; that is on the I7th of the last month. The
Imperial Government, taking a broad view of the
negotiation and in consideration of the points raised
by the Chinese Government, modified the original pro-
posals with considerable concessions and presented to
the Chinese Government on the 26th of the same month
the revised proposals for agreement, and at the same
time it was offered that, on the acceptance of the re-
vised proposals, the Imperial Government would, at a
suitable opportunity, restore, with fair and proper con-
ditions, to the Chinese Government the Kiaochow ter-
ritory, in the acquisition of which the Imperial Gov-
ernment had made a great sacrifice.

On the first of May, the Chinese Government de-
livered the reply to the revised proposals of the Japa-
nese Government, which is contrary to the expectations
of the Imperial Government. The Chinese Govern-
ment not only did not give a careful consideration
to the revised proposals but even with regard to the
offer of the Japanese Government to restore Kiaochow
to the Chinese Government the latter did not manifest
the least appreciation for Japan's good will and diffi-
culties.

From the commercial and military point of view
Kiaochow is an important place, in the acquisition of
which the Japanese Empire sacrificed much blood and
money, and, after the acquisition the Empire incurs no
obligation to restore it to China. But with the ob-

APPENDICES 225

ject of increasing the future friendly relations of
the two countries, they went to the extent of proposing
its restoration, yet to her great regret, the Chinese
Government did not take into consideration the good
intention of Japan and manifest appreciation of her
difficulties. Furthermore, the Chinese Government
not only ignored the friendly feelings of the Imperial
Government in offering the restoration of Kiaochow
Bay, but also in replying to the revised proposals they
even demanded its unconditional restoration; and
again China demanded that Japan should bear the re-
sponsibility of paying indemnity for all the unavoid-
able losses and damages resulting from Japan's mili-
tary operations at Kiaochow; and still further in con-
nection with the territory of Kiaochow China ad-
vanced other demands and declared that she has the
right of participation at the future peace conference
to be held between Japan and Germany. Although
China is fully aware that the unconditional restora-
tion of Kiaochow and Japan's responsibility of in-
demnification for the unavoidable losses and damages
can never be tolerated by Japan, yet she purposely
advanced these demands and declared that this reply
was final and decisive.

Since Japan could not tolerate such demands the
settlement of the other questions, however compromis-
ing it may be, would not be to her interest. The con-
sequence is that the present reply of the Chinese Gov-
ernment is, on the whole, vague and meaningless.

Furthermore, in the reply of the Chinese Govern-

226 APPENDICES

ment to the other proposals in the revised list of the
Imperial Government, such as South Manchuria and
Eastern Inner Mongolia, where Japan particularly has
geographical, commercial, industrial and strategic re-
lations, as recognized by all nations, and made more
remarkable in consequence of the two wars in which
Japan was engaged, the Chinese Government overlooks
these facts and does not respect Japan's position in
that place. The Chinese Government even freely al-
tered those articles which the Imperial Government,
in a compromising spirit, have formulated in accord-
ance with the statement of the Chinese Representa-
tives, thereby making the statements of the Representa-
tives an empty talk ; and on seeing them conceding with
the one hand and withholding with the other it is
very difficult to attribute faithfulness and sincerity to
the Chinese authorities.

As regards the articles relating to the employment
of advisers, the establishment of schools and hospitals/
the supply of arms and ammunition and the establish-
ment of arsenals and railway concessions in South
China in the revised proposals, they were either pro-
posed with the proviso that the consent of the Power
concerned must be obtained, or they are merely to
be recorded in the minutes in accordance with the state-
ments ,of the Chinese delegates, and thus they are not
in the least in conflict either with Chinese sovereignty
or her treaties with the Foreign Powers, yet the
Chinese Government in their reply to the proposals,
alleging that these proposals are .incompatible With

APPENDICES 227

their sovereign rights and treaties with Foreign Pow-
ers, defeat the expectations of the Imperial Govern-
ment. However, in spite of such attitude of the Chi-
nese Government, the Imperial Government, though
regretting to see that there is no room for further nego-
tiations, yet warmly attached to the preservation of
the peace of the Far East, is still hoping for a satis-
factory settlement in order to avoid the disturbance of
the relations.

So in spite of the circumstances which admitted no
patience, they have reconsidered the feelings of the
Government of their neighbouring country and, with
the exception of the article relating to Fukien which
is to be the subject of an exchange of notes as has al-
ready been agreed upon by the Representatives of
both nations, will undertake to detach the Group V
from the present negotiations and discuss it sepa-
rately in the future. Therefore, the Chinese Gov-
ernment should appreciate the friendly feelings of the
Imperial Government by immediately accepting with-
out any alteration all the articles of Groups I, II, III,
and IV and the exchange of notes in connection with
Fukien province in Group V as contained in the re-
vised proposals presented on the 26th of April.

The Imperial Government hereby again offer their
advice and hope that the Chinese Government, upon
this advice, will give a satisfactory reply by 6 o'clock
p. M. on the 9th day of May. It is hereby declared
that if no satisfactory reply is received before or at

228 APPENDICES

the specified time, the Imperial Government will take
steps they may deem necessary.

EXPLANATORY NOTE

Accompanying Ultimatum delivered to the Minister
of Foreign Affairs by the Japanese Minister, May 7th,

1. With the exception of the question of Fukien to
be arranged by an exchange of notes, the five articles
postponed for later negotiation refer to (a) the em-
ployment of advisers, (b) the establishment of schools
and hospitals, (c) the railway concessions in South
China, (d) the supply of arms and ammunition and
the establishment of arsenals and (e) right of mis-
sionary propaganda.

2. The acceptance by the Chinese Government of
the article relating to Fukien may be either in the
form as proposed by the Japanese Minister on the
26th of April or in that contained in the Reply of the
Chinese Government of May ist. Although the Ul-
timatum calls for the immediate acceptance by China
of the modified proposals presented on April 26th,
without alteration, but it should be noted that it merely
states the principle and does not apply to this article
and articles 4 and 5 of this note.

3. If the Chinese Government accept all the articles
as demanded in the Ultimatum the offer of the Japa-
nese Government to restore Kiaochow to China, made
on the 26th of April, will still hold good.

APPENDICES 229

purchase of land, the terms " lease " and " purchase "
may be replaced by the terms " temporary lease " and
" perpetual lease " or " lease on consultation/' which
means a long-term lease with its unconditional re-
newal.

Article IV of Group II relating to the approval of
police laws and Ordinances and local taxes by the
Japanese Council may form the subject of a secret
agreement

5. The phrase " to consult with the Japanese Govern-
ment " in connection with questions of pledging the
local taxes for raising loans and the loans for the con-
struction of railways, in Eastern Inner Mongolia,
which is similar to the agreement in Manchuria re-
lating to the matters of the same kind, may be re-
placed by the phrase "to consult with the Japanese
capitalists."

The article relating to the opening of trade marts
in Eastern Inner Mongolia in respect to location and
regulations, may, following their precedent set in Shan-
tung, be the subject of an exchange of notes.

6. From the phrase " those interested in the Com-
pany " in Group III of the revised list of demands,
the words " those interested in " may be deleted.

7. The Japanese version of the Formal Agreement
and its annexes shall be the official text or both the
Chinese and Japanese shall be the official texts.

(E) REPLY OF THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT TO THE
ULTIMATUM OF THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT,

230 APPENDICES

DELIVERED TO THE JAPANESE MINISTER BY THE
MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS ON THE 8TH OF
MAY, 1915

" On the 7th of this month, at three o'clock P. M.,
the Chinese Government received an Ultimatum from
the Japanese Government together with an Explana-
tory Note of seven articles. The Ultimatum con-
cluded with the hope that the Chinese Government by
six o'clock P. M. on the gth of May will give a satis-
factory reply, and it is hereby declared that if no sat-
isfactory reply is received before or at the specified
time, the Japanese Government will take steps she
may deem necessary.

" The Chinese Government with a view to preserving
the peace of the Far East hereby accepts, with the ex-
ception of those five articles of Group V postponed
for later negotiations, all the articles of Groups I, II,
III, and IV and the exchange of notes in connection
with Fukien Province in Group V as contained in the
revised proposals presented on the 26th of April,
and in accordance with the Explanatory Note of seven
articles accompanying the Ultimatum of the Japanese
Government with the hope that thereby all the out-
standing questions are settled, so that the cordial rela-
tionship between the two countries may be further con-
solidated. The Japanese Minister is hereby requested
to appoint a day to call at the Ministry of Foreign Af-
fairs to make the literary improvement of the text
and sign the Agreement as soon as possible."

APPENDICES 231

(F) EXTRACT FROM OFFICIAL STATEMENT ISSUED BY
.THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT AFTER THE ACCEPT-
ANCE OF THE JAPANESE ULTIMATUM, MAY 8TH,

1915

" In considering the nature of the course they should
take with reference to the Ultimatum the Chinese
Government was influenced by a desire to preserve the
Chinese people, as well as the large number of foreign
residents in China, from unnecessary suffering, and
also to prevent the interests of friendly Powers from
being imperiled. For these reasons the Chinese Gov-
ernment were constrained to comply in full with the
terms of the Ultimatum, but in complying the Chinese
disclaim any desire to associate themselves with any re-
vision, which may thus be effected, of the various con-
ventions and agreements concluded between other
Powers in respect of the maintenance of China's terri-
torial independence and integrity, the preservation of
the status quo, and the principle of equal opportunity
for the commerce and industry of all nations in
China." *

*For the full text of this statement, see Our Eastern Ques-
tion, by T. F. Millard. The texts of the treaties concluded be-
tween China and Japan as a result of the Twenty-one Demands
is contained in that volume, and also in Contemporary Politics
in the Far East by S. K. Hornbeck,* and The Fight for the Re-
public in China, by B. L. Putnam-Weale.

APPENDIX III

OFFICIAL STATEMENTS IN RELATION TO THE LAN-

SING-ISHII AGREEMENT BETWEEN AMERICA

AND JAPAN CONCERNING CHINA, IN 1917.

(A) STATEMENT BY SECRETARY LANSING AFTER
PUBLICATION OF THE ISHII AGREEMENT

"Viscount Ishii and the other Japanese commis-
sioners who are now on their way back to their coun-
try have performed a service to the United States
as well as to Japan which is of the highest value.

"There had unquestionably been growing up be-
tween the peoples of the two countries a feeling of
suspicion as to the motives inducing the activities of
the other in the Far East, a feeling which, if unchecked,
promised to develop a serious situation. Rumours
and reports of improper intentions were increasing and
were more and more believed. Legitimate commer-
cial and industrial enterprises without ulterior motive
were presumed to have political significance, with the
result that opposition to those enterprises were aroused
in the other country.

" The attitude of constraint and doubt thus created
was fostered and encouraged by the campaign of
falsehood, which for a long time had been adroitly
and secretly carried on by Germans, whose government,
as a part of its foreign policy, desired especially to
so alienate this country and Japan that it would be
at the chosen time no difficult task to cause a rupture

232

APPENDICES 233

of their good relations. Unfortunately, there were
people in both countries, many of whom were entirely
honest in their beliefs, who accepted every false rumour
as true, and aided the German propaganda by declar-
ing that their own government should prepare for the
conflict, which, they asserted, was inevitable, that the
interests of the two nations in the Far East were
hostile, and that every activity of the other country
in the P'acific had a sinister purpose.

" Fortunately, this distrust was not so general in
either the United States or Japan as to affect the
friendly relations of the two governments, but there
is no doubt that the feeling of suspicion was increas-
ing, and the untrue reports were receiving more and
more credence in spite of the earnest efforts which
were made on both sides of the Pacific to counteract
a movement which would jeopardize the ancient
friendship of the two nations.

" The visit of Viscount Ishii and his colleagues has
accomplished a great change of opinion in this country.
By frankly denouncing the evil influences which have
been at work, by openly proclaiming that the policy
of Japan is not one of aggression, and by declaring
that there is no intention to take advantage commer-
cially or industrially of the special relations to China
created by geographical position, the representatives
of Japan have cleared the diplomatic atmosphere of
the suspicions which had been so carefully spread
by our enemies and by misguided or overzealous peo-
ple in both countries. In a few days the propaganda

234 APPENDICES

of years has been undone, and both nations are now
able to see how near they came to being led into the
trap which, had been skilfully set for them.

"Throughout the conferences which have taken
place, Viscount Ishii has shown a sincerity and candour
which dispelled every doubt as to his purpose, and
brought the two governments into an attitude of con-
fidence toward each other which made it possible to
discuss every question with frankness and cordiality.
Approaching the subjects in such a spirit and with the
mutual desire to remove every possible cause of con-
troversy, the negotiations were marked by a sincerity
and good will which from the first ensured their suc-
cess.

"The principal result of the negotiations was the
mutual understanding which was reached as to the
principles governing the policies of the two govern-
ments in relation to China. This understanding is
formally set forth in the notes exchanged, and now
made public. The statements in the notes require no
explanation. They not only contain a reaffirmation
of the ' open door ' policy, but introduce a principle
of non-interference with the sovereignty and terri-
torial integrity of China which, generally applied, is
essential to perpetual international peace, as clearly
declared by President Wilson, and which is the very-
foundation, also, of Pan-Americanism, as interpreted
by this government.

"The removal of doubts and suspicions and the
mutual declaration of the new doctrine as to the Far

APPENDICES 235

East would be enough to make the visit of the Japanese
commission to the United States historic and memor-
able, but it accomplished a further purpose, which is
of special interest to the world at this time, in ex-
pressing Japan's earnest desire to co-operate with this
country in waging war against the German govern-
ment The discussions, which covered the military,
naval and economic activities to be employed with
due regard to relative resources and ability, showed
the same spirit of sincerity and candour which char-
acterized the negotiations resulting in the exchange
of notes.

" At the present time it is inexpedient to make
public the details of these conversations, but it may
be said that this government has been gratified by
the assertions of Viscount Ishii and his colleagues
that their government desired to do their part in the
suppression of Prussian militarism and were eager to
co-operate in every practical way to that end. It
might be added, however, that complete and satisfac-
tory understandings upon the matter of naval co-
operation in the Pacific for the purpose of attaining
the common object against Germany and her allies
have been reached between the representative of the
imperial Japanese navy, who is attached to the special
mission of Japan, and the representative of the United
States Navy.

" It is only just to say that success which has at-
tended the intercourse of the Japanese commission
with American officials, and with private persons as

236 APPENDICES

well, is due in large measure to the personality of
Viscount Ishii, the head of the mission. The natural
reserve and hesitation, which are not unusual in nego-
tiations of a delicate nature, disappeared under the
influence of his open friendliness, while his frankness
won the confidence and good will of all. It is doubt-
ful if a representative of a different temper could in
so short a time have done as much as Viscount Ishii
to place on a better and firmer basis the relations
between the United States and Japan. Through him
the American people have gained a new and higher
conception of the reality of Japan's friendship for
the United States which will be mutually beneficial
in the future.

" Viscount Ishii will be remembered in this country
as a statesman of high attainments, as a diplomat
with a true vision of international affairs, and as a
genuine and outspoken friend of America."

(B) STATEMENT OF CHINESE GOVERNMENT CONCERN-
ING THE LANSING-ISHII AGREEMENT

WASHINGTON, NOVEMBER 12, 1917
"The Government of the United States and the
Government of Japan ha^e recently, in order to silence
mischievous reports, effected an exchange of notes at
Washington concerning their desires and intentions
with regard to China. Copies of the said notes have
been communicated to the Chinese Government by
the Japanese Minister at Peking, and the Chinese
Government, in order to avoid misunderstanding,

APPENDICES 237

hastens to make the following declaration so as to
make known the views of the Government.

" The principle adopted by the Chinese Government
toward the friendly nations has always been one of
justice and equality, and consequently the rights en-
joyed by the friendly nations derived from the treaties
have been constantly respected, and so even with the
special relations between countries created by the fact
of territorial contiguity it is only in so far as they have
already been provided for in her existing treaties.

" Hereafter the Chinese Government will still adhere
to the principles hitherto adopted, and hereby it is
again declared that the Chinese Government will not
allow itself to be bound by any agreement entered
into by other nations."

APPENDIX IV

TREATIES AND AGREEMENTS WITH REFERENCE

TO THE INTEGRITY AND SOVEREIGN RIGHTS

OF CHINA, THE "OPEN DOOR" POLICY

AND " EQUALITY OF OPPORTUNITIES "

I. Circular Note of Secretary of State John Hay,
for the United States, sent on Sept. 6, 1899, to the
diplomatic representatives of the United States at
London, Paris, Berlin, and St. Petersburg, and in
November to Rome and Tokyo, asking the govern-
ments of the countries to which they were respectively
accredited to make a " formal declaration of an * open
door policy ' in the territories held by them in China."

The request made of each government was that it:

" First. Will in no way interfere with any treaty
port or any vested interest within any so-called * sphere
of interest * or leased territory it may have in China.

" Second. That the Chinese treaty tariff of the
time being shall apply to all merchandise landed or
shipped to all such ports . . . (unless they be * free
ports'), . . . and that duties so leviable shall be col-
lected by the Chinese Government.

" Third. That it will levy no higher harbour dues
on vessels of another nationality frequenting any port
in such * sphere ' than shall be levied on vessels of
its own nationality, and no higher railroad charges

238

APPENDICES 239

over lines built, controlled, or operated within its
' sphere ' on merchandise belonging to citizens or sub-
jects of other nationalities transported through such
* sphere ' than shall be levied on similar merchandise
belonging to its own nationals transported over equal
distances."

Each of the governments so addressed gave its assent
to the principles suggested, whereupon Secretary Hay,
having in hand and having compared the replies, sent,
on March 20, 1900, instructions mutatis mutandis, to
the ambassadors to inform the governments to which
they were respectively accredited that in his opinion the
six powers in question and the United States were mu-
tually pledged to the policy of maintaining the commer-
cial status quo in China, and of refraining each within
what might be considered its " sphere of influence "
from measures " calculated to destroy equality of
opportunity." The seven powers thus mutually
pledged were France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy,
Japan, Russia, and the United States. (The United
States had, however, no special " sphere of influence.")

II. Circular Telegram sent by Mr. Hay to the
diplomatic representatives of the United States at
Berlin, Brussels, The Hague, Lisbon, London, Madrid,
Paris, Rome, St. Petersburg, Tokyo, and Vienna, July
3, 1900.

"... the policy of the Government of the United
States is to seek a solution which may bring about
permanent safety and peace to China, preserve China's
territorial and administrative entity, protect all rights

240 APPENDICES

guaranteed to friendly powers by treaty and inter-
national laws, and safeguard for the world the princi-
ple of equal and impartial trade with all parts of the
Chinese Empire."

III. Lord Salisbury, English Prime Minister, in an
interview with the United States Ambassador to Eng-
land, July 7, 1900, " expressed himself most emphat-
ically as concurring " in the policy of the United States
as set forth in the above telegram.

In a statement made in the English House of Com-
mons, Aug. 2, 1900, regarding the policy of the Brit-
ish Government, it was declared :

"Her Majesty's Government are opposed to any
partition of China, and believe that they are in accord
with other powers in this declaration."

IV. Agreement, Great Britain-Germany Oct. 16,
1900.

" i. It is a matter of joint and permanent inter-
national interest that the ports on the rivers and the
littoral of China should remain free and open to trade
and to every other legitimate form of economic ac-
tivity for the nationals of all countries without dis-
tinction, and the two agree on their part to uphold the
same for all Chinese territory so far as they can
exercise influence.

"2. Her Britannic Majesty's Government and the
Imperial German Government will not on their part
make use of the present complication to obtain for
themselves any territorial advantages in Chinese
dominions and will direct their policy toward main-

APPENDICES 241

taining undiminished the territorial conditions of the
Chinese Empire."

V. Mr. Hay, Oct. 29, 1900.

" When the recent troubles were at their height this
government, on the 3d of July, once more made an
announcement of its policy regarding impartial trade
and the integrity of the Chinese Empire and had the
gratification of learning that all the powers held simi-
lar views."

As the above Note indicates, the eleven countries
addressed by Secretary Hay in his telegram of July
3 had all signified in one way or another their approval
of the principles to which he asked attention in that
telegram.

VI. For the Anglo-Japanese Treaty of Aug. 12,
1902, see Appendix V, under "Treaties . . . Korea,"
V.

VII. Mr. Hay to United States Ambassadors to
Germany, Austria-Hungary, Belgium, France, Great
Britain, Italy, and Portugal, Jan. 13, 1905. (During
the Russo-Japanese war.)

"... the United States has repeatedly made its
position well known and has been gratified at the
cordial welcome accorded to its efforts to strengthen
and perpetuate the broad policy of maintaining the
integrity of China and the * open door ' in the Orient,
. . . Holding these views, the United States disclaims
any sort of reserved territorial rights or control in
the Chinese Empire, and it is deemed fitting to make
this purpose frankly known and to remove all appre-

242 APPENDICES

hension on this score so far as concerns the policy of
this nation. . . . You will bring' this matter to the
notice of the Government to which you are accredited,
and you will invite the expression of its views thereon/'
By Jan. 23 replies had been received from the Gov-
ernments of Germany, Austria-Hungary, France,
Great Britain, and Italy, entirely agreeing with the
position taken by the United States and declaring
their constant adhesion to the policy of the integrity
of China and the open door in the Orient.

VIII. Treaty, Great Britain and Japan Aug. 12,
1 905 . ( Renewing the Alliance. )

Preamble. " The Governments of Great Britain
and Japan . . . have agreed upon the following ar-
ticles, which have for their objects :

" (a) The consolidation and maintainance of the
general peace in the regions of Eastern Asia and of
India.

" (b) The preservation of the common interests of
all the powers in China by insuring the independence
and the integrity of the Chinese Empire and the prin-
ciple of equal opportunities for the commerce and
industry of all nations in China."

For reference in this treaty to Korea, see Appendix
V, under " Treaties . . . Korea," IX.

IX. Dispatch (Accompanying a copy of the fore-
going) from the Marquis of Lansdowne to his Ma-
jesty's Minister at St. Petersburg, Sept. 6, 1905.

" Sir: I enclose ... a copy of a new Agreement.
. . . The Russian Government will, I trust, recognize

APPENDICES 243

that the new Agreement is an international instrument
to which no exception can be taken by any of the
powers interested in the affairs of the Far East. You
should call special attention to the objects mentioned
in the Preamble as those by which the policy of the
contracting parties is inspired. His Majesty's Gov-
ernment believe that they may count upon the good
will and support of all the powers in endeavouring
to maintain peace in Eastern Asia and in seeking to
uphold the integrity and independence of the Chinese
Empire and the principle of equal opportunity for
the commerce and the industry of all nations in that
country."

X. Treaty (of Portsmouth), Russia- Japan Sept.
5, 1905. (At the end of the Russo-Japanese War.)

Article 3. "Japan and Russia mutually engage
... 2. To restore entirely and completely to the
exclusive administration of China all portions of Man-
churia now in the occupation or under the control of
(their troops), with the exception of the territory
above mentioned (the Liaotung peninsula).

" The Imperial Government of Russia declare that
they have not in Manchuria any territorial advantage
or exclusive concessions in impairment of Chinese
sovereignty or inconsistent with the principle of equal
opportunity."

Article 4. " Japan and Russia reciprocally engage
not to obstruct any general measures common to all
countries which China may take for the development
of the commerce and industry of Manchuria."

244 APPENDICES

XL Treaty, China- Japan Dec. 22, 1905.

(Confirming arrangements made in the Portsmouth
Treaty. )

Article 12. The two governments " engage that in
all matters dealt with in the treaty signed ' this day
or in the present Agreement the most favourable treat-
ment shall be reciprocally extended."

XII. Convention, France- Japan June 10, 1907.
" The Governments of Japan and France, being

agreed to respect the independence and integrity of
China, as well as the principle of equal treatment in
that country. . . ."

XIII. Convention, Japan-Russia July 30, 1907.
Article 2. " The two High Contracting Parties

recognize the independence and the territorial integrity
of China and the principle of equal opportunity in
whatever concerns the commerce and industry of all
nations in that Empire, and engage to sustain and
defend the status quo and respect for this principle
by all the pacific means within their reach."

XIV. Exchange of Notes, Japan and the United
States November, 1968.

1. "It is the wish of the two Governments . , .

2. " They are also determined to preserve the com-
mon interests of all powers in China by supporting
by all pacific means at their disposal the independence
and the integrity of China and the principle of equal
opportunity ... in that Empire."

XV. Convention, Japan-Russia July 4, 1910.
The two governments, "sincerely attached to the

APPENDICES 245

principles established by the convention concluded be-
tween them on July 30, 1907, ..."

Article 2. " Each . . . engages to maintain and
respect the status quo in Manchuria resulting from
the treaties, conventions and other arrangements con-
cluded up to this day between Japan and Russia, or
between either of those two Powers and China."

XVI. Treaty, Great Britain-Japan July 13, 1911.
(Renewing the alliance for the second time.)

Preamble: (The two governments declare as
among their objects) : " The preservation of the com-
mon interests of all Powers in China by insuring the
independence and integrity of the Chinese Empire and
the principle of equal opportunities for the commerce
and industry of all nations in China."

XVII. Agreement, United States- Japan Nov. 2,
1917.

" The Government of the United States recognizes
that Japan has special interests in China, particularly
in the parts to which her possessions are contiguous.
. . . The territorial sovereignty of China, neverthe-
less, remains unimpaired . . . and the Japanese Gov-
ernment . . . has no desire to discriminate against
the trade of other nations or to disregard the com-
mercial rights heretofore granted by China in treaties
with other Powers. The Government of the United
States and Japan deny that they have any purpose
to infringe in any way the independence or territorial
integrity of China, and they declare furthermore, that

246 APPENDICES

they always adhere to the principle of the so-called
' open door/ or equal opportunities for commerce and
industry in China/'

With the exception of Clause XVII, this summary appears
in Contemporary Politics in the Far East, by S. K Hornbeck,
copyrighted by D. Appleton Co., and is here used by permission
of authors and publishers.

APPENDIX V

TREATIES AND AGREEMENTS WITH REFER-
ENCE TO KOREA

I. Treaty, Japan-Korea August 26, 1894. (At
the beginning of the war between Japan and China.)

Article I. " The object of the alliance is to main-
tain the independence of Korea on a firm footing
and ... "

II. Treaty (of Shimonoseki), Japan-China April
17, 1895. (At the end of the war.)

Article I. " China recognizes definitely the full and
complete independence and autonomy of Korea."

III. Agreement, Japan-Russia April 25, 1898.
Article i. "The (two governments) recognize

definitely the sovereignty and entire independence of
Korea and pledge themselves mutually to abstain from
all direct interference in the internal affairs of that
country."

IV. Treaty, Korea-China Sept. n, 1899.
Article I. "There shall be perpetual peace and

friendship between the Empire of Korea and the
Empire of China. . . . "

V. Treaty, England-Japan. (Making the Anglo-
Japanese Alliance) Jan. 30, 1902.

Preamble. " The Governments of Great Britain

and Japan, actuated solely by a desire to maintain

247

248 APPENDICES

the status quo and general peace in the Extreme East,
being, moreover, specially interested in maintaining
the territorial integrity of the Empire of China and
the Empire of Korea, and in securing equal oppor-
tunities in those countries for the commerce and in-
dustry of all nations, hereby agree ..."

Article i. " The High Contracting Parties, having
mutually recognized the independence of China and
Korea, declare themselves to be entirely uninfluenced
by any aggressive tendencies in either country."

VI. Convention, France-Russia March 3, 1902.
The two governments " have received a copy of the

Anglo-Japanese agreement of Jan. 30, 1902, concluded
with the object of maintaining the status quo and
the general peace in the Far East, and preserving the
independence of China and Korea, which are to remain
open to the commerce and industry of all nations . . .
" The two Governments consider that the observance
of these principles is at the same time a guarantee of
their special interests in the Far East."

VII. Rescript, by the Emperor of Japan, Feb. 10,

1904 (declaring war against Russia).

" The integrity of Korea is a matter of gravest
concern to this Empire, ... the separate existence of
Korea is essential to the safety of our realm.

(

"... the absorption of Manchuria by Russia
would render it impossible to maintain the integrity
of China, and would, in addition, compel the aban-

APPENDICES 249

donment of all hope for peace in the Extreme
East

VIII. Protocol, Japan-Korea Feb. 23, 1904.
Article i. " For the purpose of maintaining a

permanent and solid friendship between Japan and
Korea and firmly establishing peace in the Far East,
the Imperial Government of Korea shall place full
confidence in the Imperial Government of Japan, and
adopt the advice of the latter in regard to improve-
ments in administration."

Article 2. "The Imperial , Government of Japan
shall in a spirit of firm friendship insure the safety
and repose of the Imperial House of Korea."

Article 3. " The Imperial Government of Japan
definitely guarantee the independence and territorial
integrity of the Korean Empire."

IX. Treaty, Great Britain-Japan August 12,
1 905 . ( Renewing the Alliance. )

Article 3. " Japan possessing paramount political,
military and economic interests in Korea, Great Britain
recognizes the right of Japan to take such measures
... in Korea as she may deem proper . . . provided
that such measures are not contrary to the principle
of equal opportunities for the commerce and industry
of all nations."

X. Treaty (of Portsmouth), Japan-Russia Sept.

5> 1905-
Article 2. " The Imperial Russian Government,

acknowledging that Japan possesses in Korea para-
mount political, military, and economic interests, en-

250 APPENDICES

gage neither to obstruct nor to interfere with the
measures . . . which the Imperial Japanese Govern-
ment may find it necessary to take in Korea."

XL Convention, Japan-Korea Nov. 17, 1905.

Preamble. The two governments, "desiring to
strengthen the principle of solidarity which unites the
two Empires, have . . . concluded:

Article I. "The Government of Japan . . . will
hereafter have control and direction of the external
relations and affairs of Korea , . . "

In 1906 Marquis Ito was made (Japanese) Resi-
dent-General in Korea.

In 1907 Japan prevented the representatives of the
Korean Emperor from being given a hearing at The
Hague Conference.

XII. Convention, Japan-Korea July 24, 1907.

" The Governments of Japan and Korea, desiring
speedily to promote the wealth and strength of Korea
and with the object of promoting the prosperity of
the Korean nation, have agreed. . . "

" i. In all matters relating to the reform of the
Korean administration the Korean Government shall
receive instructions and guidance from the (Japanese)
Resident-General . . .

"4. In all appointments and removals of high
officials the Korean Government must obtain the con-
sent of the Resident-General

" 5. The Korean Government shall appoint to be
officials of Korea any Japanese subjects recommended
by the Resident-General.

APPENDICES 251

" 6. The Korean Government shall not appoint any
foreigners to be officials of Korea without consulting
the Resident-General."

In 1908 Prince Ito declared publicly that it was no
part of Japan's purpose to annex Korea.

In 1909 Prince Ito declared that Korea must be
" amalgamated " with Japan.

XIII. Treaty, Japan-Korea Aug. 22, 1910.

Article i. "His Majesty the Emperor of Korea
makes complete and permanent cession to his Majesty
the Emperor of Japan of all rights of sovereignty
over the whole of Korea."

Article 2. "His Majesty the Emperor of Japan
accepts the cession mentioned in the preceding article,
and consents to the complete annexation of Korea
to the Empire of Japan:"

On August 29, 1910, Japan formally declared
Korea annexed to the dominions of his Imperial
Majesty the Japanese Emperor.

(This summary appears in Contemporary Politics in the Far
East, by S. K. Hornbeck, copyrighted by D. Appleton & Co.,
and is here used by permission of author and publishers.)

AN INTRODUCTORY BIBLIOGRAPHY
ON CHINA

(THE SO-CALLED "FIVE-FOOT SHELF" OF BOOKS
ON CHINA.)

The list of books given below, with one exception, 1
is that which was awarded the first-prifce in a com-
petition conducted in China for the selection of a
limited list of the best books on China and its various
phases of life and development. The competition was
under the direction of an American periodical of the
Orient, Millard's Review of the Far East, Shanghai,
which announced several prizes for an " authoritative
list of books which might serve as a foundation for
a library dealing with all phases of Chinese life, art,
trade, finance, customs, politics, international relations
and history." Later this list was called a " five-foot
shelf " of books on China. The competition was
judged by Dr. Wu Ting-fang, former Chinese Min-
ister to America, and Premier of China under Presi-
dent Li; Mr. Julean Arnold, American Commercial
Attache, American Legation, Peking; and Dr. F. L.
Hawks-Pott, President of St. John's University of
Shanghai. On Oct. 27, 1917, the following list sub-

1 Village Life in China, by A. H. Smith, substituted for Pillage
and Town Life in China, by Y. K. Leong and L. K. Tao.

252

APPENDICES 253

mitted by the writer was awarded first prize. This
list is obviously an introductory one ; it could be easily
expanded to twice its present proportions; on the
other hand, it is difficult to reduce it without losing
valuable information and a balanced perspective.

GENERAL AND INTRODUCTORY

1. An Official Guide to Eastern Asia. Vol IV. China: Im-
perial Japanese Government, Rwys., ToTcio 1915 Al-
though inaccurate in certain respects, at present the best
"Baedeker" of China.

2. The Changing Chinese. "The Conflict of Oriental and
Western Cultures in China." E. A. Ross. Century Co., N.
Y., 1912. A scientific, sociological view of China and its
changes during the past decade. The East as it appears to
the Western student.

3. China: An Interpretation. James W. Bashford. Abing-
don Press, N. Y., 1916. A general view of present-day China
by a competent observer and a missionary-statesman.

4. The Middle Kingdom. S. Wells Williams, 2 Vols. Chas.
Scribner's Sons, N. Y., 1882. Revised edition, 1907. A
standard work which still holds an authoritative place.

MANNERS AND CUSTOMS

5. Chinese Characteristics. A. H. Smith. Fleming H. Revell
Co., N. Y. Fifteenth edition. First published, 1894. An in-
teresting, though not very complimentary, description by a
missionary author long resident in China.

6. Village Life in China. A. H. Smith. Fleming H'. Revell
Co., N. Y., 1899. A more detailed account of village cus-
toms by the same author. A standard work, which has
passed the "thirteenth thousand" mark.

254 APPENDICES

HISTORY

7. The Ancient History of China, to the end of the Chou
Dynasty, 240 B. C. Frederich Hirth, Columbia Univ, Press,
N. Y., 1908. Reprinted 1911. The best ancient history of
China.

8. A Sketch of Chinese History. F. L. Hawks-Pott. Revised
edition, 1915. Kelly & Walsh, Shanghai. The best con-
densed outline for an introductory study, for one familiar
with Chinese names.

9. Outlines of Chinese History. Li Ung-bing. Commercial
Press, Shanghai, 1914. A fuller treatment from the view-
point of a Chinese writer; slightly inaccurate but interest-
ing.

10. China Under the Empress Dowager. J. 0. P. Bland and E.
Backhouse. Wm. Heineman, Lon.don, 1910. Revised edition,
1914. A fascinating description of life in Peking before the
days of the Republic, compiled from original documents. The
authenticity of one of these documents has of late been ques-
tioned, but the book is nevertheless typical and of interest.

POLITICAL RELATIONS

11. Intellectual and Political Currents in the Far East. Paul
S. Reinsch. Houghton Mifflin Co., N. Y., 1911. A balanced

' discussion of the subject by the present American Minister,

12. Contemporary Politics in the Far East. Stanley K. Horn-
beck. D. Appleton & Co., N. Y., 1916. The clearest and
fairest statement of the present situation.

13. Our Eastern Question. Thomas F. Millard. The Century
Co., 1916. A strong argument concerning the present and
future relations of China, Japan and America.

FINANCE

14. The Trade and Administration of the Chinese Empire. H.
B. Morse. Longmans, Green & Co., N. Y., 1908. The best
general work.

APPENDICES 255

15. The Gilds of China. H. B. Morse. Longmans, Green & Co.,
London, 1909. A study of these particular organizations.

16. The New Atlas and Commercial Gazetteer of China. North
China Daily News & Herald. Shanghai, 1917.

"The biggest and best book on the resources of China"
(Millard's Review.)

AGRICULTURE

17. Farmers of Forty Centuries. F. H. King. Macmillan Co.,
N. Y. Second edition. The most interesting and readable
discussion of the subject.

PHYSIOGRAPHY AND GEOLOGY

18. Letters of Baron Von Richthofen, 1902. Shanghai. Con-
taining the gist of his standard but untranslated work, China.

GEOGRAPHY

19. Richard's Comprehensive Geography of the Chinese Empire.
Translated and revised by M. Kennelly, T'usewei Press.
Shanghai, 1908.

TRAVEL

20. A Yankee on the Yangtze. W. E. Geil. A. C. Armstrong &
Son, N, Y., 1904. A well written description of scenes and
experiences on this great water-way.

RELIGION AND ETHICS

21. The Three Religions of China. W. E. Soothill. Hbdder &
Stoughton, London, 1913. Oxford lectures by a recognized
authority. The best "popular" presentation of Buddhism,
Taoism, Confucianism.

22. The Religion of the Chinese. J. J. M. de Groot Mac-
millan, N. Y., 1910. Reprinted 1912. Lectures given at
Hartford Seminary. A summary of the contents of his
longer work, The Religious Systems of China, 6 volumes,
1892-1910. Emphasis on the animistic religion of the people
rather than upon the " three religions " treated above.

256 APPENDICES

23. The Ethics of Confucius. M. M. Dawson, with introduction
by Wu Ting-fang. G. P. Putnam Sons, N. Y., 1915. Sec-
ond impression. The sayings of Confucius and his dis-
ciples, arranged according to their original order, with com-
mentary.

LITERATURE

24. A History of Chinese Literature. H. A. Giles. Wm. Heine-
man, London. D. Appleton, N 1 . Y., 1901. "The first at-
tempt in any language to produce a history of Chinese litera-
ture."

PHILOSOPHY

25. Brief History of Early Chinese Philosophy. D. T. Suzuki.
Probsthain & Co., London 1914, A concise treatment by an
Oriental scholar of high reputation.

26. L'Bcole Philosophique Moderne de la Chine. Charles de
Harlez. Vol. XLIX in Memoirs of the Belgian Academy
of Sciences. The only description of the speculative philoso-
phy of Chu Hi and the Sing-Li School.

MISSIONS

27. The China Missions Year Book. (Annual) Christian Litera-
ture Society, Shanghai. The most up-to-date and complete
description of such work.

EDUCATION

28. The Chinese System of Public Education. P. W. Kuo.
Originally a thesis written at Columbia University. Repub-
lished by Commercial Press, Shanghai, 1915. A sketch of
the history and present-day problems of education in China.

29. Educational Directory of China. (Annual) Edward Evans
& Sons, Shanghai. A manual of detailed information and
statistics.

ART

30. Chinese Art. Stephen W. Bushell. Victoria and Albert
Museum, London, 1904. Thrice reprinted. 2nd edition 1914.
A general survey of the subject. A standard work.

APPENDICES 257

31. Chinese Pottery and Porcelain. R. L. Hobson, 2 vols. Funk
& Wagnalls, N. Y. Cassell & Co., London, 1913. Two
volumes with handsome plates and pictures and the fullest
and most detailed criticisms.

REFERENCE (GENERAL)

32. The China Year Book. (Annual) H. T. Montague Bell,
& H. G. W. Woodhead. George Routledge Sons, London.
E. P. Button & Co., N. Y. A valuable reference book.

33. Encyclopedia Sinica* Samuel Couling. Kelly & Walsh,
Shanghai, 1917. A very valuable new work on "Things
Chinese."

REFERENCE (CUSTOMS AND MANNERS)

34. Researches into Chinese Superstitions. Henry Dore.
Translated by M. Kennelly. T'usewei Press, Shanghai,
Thus far, 4 volumes, 1914-1918. The fullest and most ac-
curate description of present customs and superstitions.
Profusely illustrated.

REFERENCE (RELIGION AND LITERATURE)

35. The Chinese Classics. Original text and English translation
by James Legge. 7 volumes. Oxford University Press,
2nd edition, 1893. "The introduction and commentary with
the translation make this incomparably the most useful work
in its field." (G. F. Moore.)

Three books have appeared since the compilation of
this list which the author should like to add to it.

HISTORY

The Development of China. K. S. Latourette. Houghton Mif-
flin Co., N. Y., 1917. A concise, scholarly history of China,
free from burdensome dates and details, with a final chapter
on present-day problems and tendencies. The best brief
history for the student and general reader.

258 APPENDICES

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT

The Fight for the Republic in China. B. L. Putnam-Weale.
Dodd, Mead & Co., N. Y., 1917. A detailed and optimistic
account of the development of the Chinese Republic contain-
ing all the most important documents and data from 1911 to
1917. Indispensable for the student of that period.

DESCRIPTION IN VERSE

Profiles from China. Eunice Tietjens. Published by Ralph
Fletcher Seymour, Chicago, 1917. A collection of sketches
in free verse "of people and things seen in the interior."
The familiar sights of China are pictured in striking and
accurate phrase, in this "most unique volume of verse of
the year."

INDEX

Administrative conference, 5.

Administrative council, 34.

America. See United States.

Analects, 47.

Anglo -Japanese Alliance, 8.

Annam, 103.

Assembly, national. See Par-
liament.

Assemblies, provincial. See
Provincial self-government

Atlas, steamship, 73.

Balkans, 147.

Bibliography on China, 252.
Black Dragon Memorandum,

12, 128, Appendix I.
Bolshevik, 144.

Boxer Indemnity, 86, 107, 152.
Boxer uprising, 107.
Boycott, against Japanese

goods, 26.

British. See Great Britain.
Budget, 52.

Burlingame, Anson, 103*
Burma, 103,

Cabinet, Chinese, 45, 86, 87.
Cabinet, Japanese, 178.
Chang, Chinese Minister to

Japan, 134 &

Chang, Hsun, 89, 04, 95 ff.
Chekiang, 50.
Chen, Eugene, 87, 129-130.

See Peking Gazette.
Chengchiatung, 60 ff.

Chiang Chao-tsung, 94.

China Press, on China's sever-
ance of relations with Ger-
many, 70-71 ; on Baron Ishii
pledge, 124; on Sino-Japa-
nese military agreement,
130-132-

Chou An Hui, 27, 32.

Christianity, 53-54-

Chuan Chao, 168, 169.

Cochin China, 103, 120.

Commerce, 161.

Concessions, 104.

Confucian Classics, 46.

Confucianism, 53-54.

Constitution, provisional, 3, 45 ;
permanent, 48, 5*, 54, 88, 89,
158.

Constitutional compact, 5.

Constitutional compact confer-
ence, 5.

Council of State, 5.

Currency, 160.

Customs duties, 80, 86, 104, 106,
107, 152, 169.

Czecho-Slovaks, 144.

Democracy in China, 26-28,
30 ff., 46, 47, 51, 52, 54-57,
100, tor, 146, 159, 182.

Dennis, W. C, 178.

Economic Problems, China,

159-161.
Education, 162-163.

259

260

INDEX

Election laws, 4, 157.
England. See Great Britain.
Exterritoriality, 78, 105, 165 f.

Feng Kwo-chang, 42, 45, 95,

97-98, 101, 155.
Five- Power loan, 4.
Formosa, 7, 103.
France, Lao-hsi-kai incident,

63, 64, 83; possessions in

China, 103-105.
Fukien, 21.

/

Germany, receives ultimatum
from Japan, 9; war with Ja-
pan, 10 ; loses Tsingtao, 10;
rights in Shantung taken by
Japan, 14; rights at Peace
Conference, 59-78 ; diplo-
matic relations severed by
China, 59 ff., 67 ff.; China's
note concerning submarine
warfare, 68-69; the answer,
73; Kaiser's speech in 1900,
75; reasons for China's dec-
laration of war, 72 ff.; argu-
ments against, 81-84; decla-
ration of war, 1 01 ; ousted
from China, 149 ff. ; .Terauchi
on Japanese Alliance, 177.

Goodnow, Dr. F, J., 5, 32, 83.

Great Britain, opium war, 82;
adviser against dissolving
parliament, 94 ; possessions
in China, 103-105; supports
open-door policy, 106; affect-
ed by Ishii Agreement, 120;
war aims quoted, 153.

Hangchow, 50.

Hanyehping, Iron Company, 18.

Kara Takashi, 178.

Hay, Secretary, 102, 106, 182.
See Open Door.

Hongkong, 83, 103.

Hornbeck, S. K., on Twenty-
one Demands, 22, 23; on
Open Door situation in 1915,
109; on revision of treaties
with China, 171 ; on Allied
financial policy in China,
175-176.

Howe, W. S., 146.

Hsu Shih-chang, 92, 156-158.

Hsuan Tung, 95.

Hung Hsien Dynasty, 39.

Ishii, Viscount, 102 ff., 124, 125,

Appendix III.
Italy, 104.

Japan, growth and power, 7-8;
ultimatum to Germany, 9;
declaration of war against
Germany, 9 ; disclaims terri-
torial ambitions, 9-10; cap-
ture of Tsingtao, 10; new
aims as result of world-war,
ii ; Twenty-one Demands, 2,
n, 13-23, 72, 78, 109, 123,
128, 165, 169, 180; Appendix
II ; boycott by China, 26 ; re-
lation to Chinese monarchi-
cal movement, 37; feared by
China, 81, 82, 149; attitude
toward American advice, 94;
adviser on parliament, 94;
relations with Russia, 108;
attitude toward Lansing-Ishii
agreement, 124, 125; mili-
tary agreement with China,
127 ff. ; terms of agreement,
139-142; relation to Allied

INDEX

26l

ideal, 146; Terauchi on alli-
ance with Germany, 177.
Japan Advertiser, 142, 143-144.

Kaiser, Wilhelm II, 75.

Kang Yti-wei, 84, 85, 95.

Kato, 12.

Kiaochow, 13, 80, 104.

Kinnosuke, Adachi, 112, 125.

Koo, V. K. Wellington, on
China's contribution to Al-
lies, 1,51-152; on Allied ideals
in the Orient, 153 ; on United
States' relations with China,
154, 155; on China's future,
164-166.

Korea, 7, 85, 103, 108, 118, Ap-
pendix V.

Kun Yuan Pao, 71, 72.

Labor Battalions, Chinese, in
France, 150-151.

Lang Fang, 96.

Lansing, Secretary, iioff. ; on
Ishii agreement, 125-126. See
Lansing-Ishii Agreement.

Lansing - Ishii Agreement,
102 ff.; reasons for, 110-113;
notes exchanged, 113-116;
supplementary statement, 116 ;
criticism of agreement, 117-
121 ; Chinese attitude, 122--
124, Appendix III; Japanese
attitude, 124-125 ; American
attitude, 126, Appendix III.

Lao-hsi-tai incident, 63-64, 83.

Leases, 104.

Li Ching-hsi, 89.

Li Hung Chang, 89.

Li Yuan-hung, 4, 41, 44, 45, 52,
77, 90, 9i, 94, 96, 98.

Liang Chi-chao, 42, 68, 80, 81,

Liang Shih-yi, 95, 132, 156.
Liaotung Peninsula, 7, 104.
Lu Cheng-hsiang, 36.
Lu Yuang-ting, 158.

Manchu, 3, 95, 97-

Manchuria, 7, 8, 15-17, 59, 61-
63, 103, 108, 109.

Mason, 177.

Millard's Review, on duty of
the United States in China,
100, 101, 173, 174; terms of
Sino- Japanese military agree-
ment, 139-142; prize-list of
books, 252 f.

Min-kwo-hsin-pao, 54-55.

Mission schools, 163.

Monarchical movement, 32 ff.

Monarchical society, 33 ff.

Mongolia, 7, 15, 17, -61-63, 108,
109.

Morrison, Dr., 31.

Motono, 134 ff.

Mukden, 62-63.

Murdock, Victor, 57.

Nanking, 3, 4, 5', 4P, 42, 155-
National Convention Bureau,

35-

National Salvation Fund, 26.
Ni Shih-chung, 89.

Okuma, Count, 9, 10.

Open Door, 83, 102 ff., 106, 107,
108, 121, 126, 165, 166, 169,
Appendices, II, F; IV and V.

Opium trade, 82, 159.

Opium War, 103.

Otani, General, 144.

Outlook, The, 177.

Parliament, 3, 5, 42, 45, 86, 88,
94-

262

INDEX

Parliament, northern, 156.

Parliament, southern, 158.

Parties, 3, 79, 93, isSff.

Peace, conference, 24, 59, 72,
78, I47-U9, 153, 163, 167, 171.

Peking, 95 ff., 133, ISS-

Peking Gazette, on retirement
of Yuan, 43 ; on severance of
relations with Germany, 71 ;
on war with Germany, 85;
accuses Premier of "selling
China, 87, 129-130.

Peking Jih-pao, 55-56.

Port Arthur, 7, 104, 108.

Portsmouth Treaty, 108, 121.

Postal service, 104-105.

Protocol of 1901, 96.

Provincial self-government, 52.

Putnam-Weale, on monarchi-
cal plot, 31; on administra-
tion of Li Yuan-hung, 50, 56 ;
on military governors, 89;
on Twenty-one Demands,
129; on revision of Chinese
treaties, 171.

1

Railroad concessions, 105.

Rebellion of 1913, 4.

Recognition of Chinese Repub-
lic, 4-

Reinsch, Dr., 79, 92.

Religion, state, 52-54.

Revolution of 1911, 3.

Russia, possessions and leases
in China, 103-105; relations
with Japan, 108, 121 ; situa-
tion in 1917, 112, 127, 128,
144; affected by Ishii Agree-
ment, 120. See Manchuria
and Mongolia.

(

Salt monopoly, 104, 105.

Shantung, 14, 78, 104.

Siberia, 127, 144.
Spanish-American War, 106.
Spheres of interest, 104-105.

See Open Door.
Sun Yat-sen, 3, 4, 158.
Sun Yu-chun, 32.
Sung Chiao-jen, 4.

Tang Chi-yao, 39, 9O, 91 -

Jang Shao-yi, 158.

Terauchi, Premier, 81-82, 177.

Tongking, 103.

Tsai Ao, 37, 41.

Tseng Chun-hsuan, 158.

Tsingtao, 10, 81, 104. See
Kiaochow, and Shantung.

Tuan Chi-jui, 45, 76, 86, 87, 88,
96, 129-130, 15-5.

Twenty-one Demands, 2, n,
13 if., 72, 78, 87, 109, 123, 128-
129, 165, 169, 180, Appendices
I and II.

Twenty-four Demands, 21, Ap-
pendix II.

Tyau, M. T. Z,, 152, 153, 170.

United States, recognition of
Chinese Republic, 4; protest
against Twenty-one De-
mands, 24, 123; influence on
China's relations with Ger-
many, 60, 78, 79; peace in-
quiry, 64; China's reply, 65-
66; severance of relations
with Germany, 67; Chinese
note concerning similar ac-
tion, 70 ; note to China on in-
ternal dissensions, 93-94 in;
"sells" railroad concession,
105; treaty relations with
China, 105, 106; Open Door
policy, see above ; sends

INDEX

263

troops to Siberia, 144; rela-
tions with China, 154-155.
Usstiri River, 103.

Vladivostok, 103, 127.

Wang, C. T., 51, 87, 89, 99, 158,
I73-I75.

Wang, Yi-tang, 156.

Waldersee, Wei-Hai-Wei, 104;
Count, 74.

Weyl, Walter E., 161-162.

Williams, F. W., 147.

Wilson, President, 64, 145 ff.,
167-176, 178-181. See Unit-
ed States,

World War, effects in Orient,
1-2; situation in China at its
outbreak, 6; situation in Ja-
pan, 6-8 ; Japan declares war
on Germany, 9; capture of
Tsingtao, 10; new aims,

i if.; China's severance of
relations with Germany,
59 ff.; declaration of war
against Germany, 72 ff., 101;
Allied ideals in Asia, 145-
147, 176 ff., 178, 181; China's
contribution to Allies, 149-
152; Japanese foreign policy
resulting from war, Appen-
dix I. See Germany, United
States, Japan, Russia.
Wu Ting-fang, 41, 88, 94, 97,
98, 99, 158, 170, 171-

Yang Shan-teh, 50.

Yang Tu, 28-30.

Yangtze Valley, ,104, 155.

Yuko Hanuguchi, 142, 143.

Yoshimoto, 61, 63.

Yuan Shih-kai, 3, 4, 5, 30, 31 ff.,

38, 41, 44, 83.
Yunnan.

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