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I^acbarb College librars 




FROM THE FUND BSqySATHSD 

CHARLES SUMNER ' 

IClmtm oOSjp) 

SENATOR FROM MASSACHUSETTS 
" For book* reliting to Politic! ud Fine Art* " 




THE CHINA-JAPAN WAK 




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CHINA-JAPAN WAE 



COMPILED FROM JAPANESE, CHINESE, AND 

FOREIGN SOURCES 



VLADIMIR 

LATELY OF THE * ♦ ♦ * DIPLOMATIC MISSION' TO OOUEA 



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. . . WROTE THE HISTORY OF THE WAR . . . 



HA VINO BEGUN FROM IT8 VERY OUTSET, WITH THE 
EXPECTATION IT WOl'LD PROVE A GREAT ONE." 

ThticyditUs, Book h 



ILLUSTRATED 



NEW YORK 

CHARLES SC^RIHNEirs SONS 

15H-ir)7, Fifth Avknuk 

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LONDON': 
rniXTED BY WILLIAM CLOWES AND SONS, LiutTBD. 

STAHFOltD STREET AND ClIABINa CROSS. 



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TO MY READEES. 



My principal object in writing this book has been to 
render it clear and • interesting. This object was 
not easily attained ; the history of a war .to be correct 
and complete must, to a certain degi^ee, he technical, 
jind when it has to treat of distant places with diffi- 
cult names, it risks to become unintelligible and 
wearisome to the majority of readers. I have had, 
therefore, to refrain as far as possible from details, 
and give as few names of places and persons as was 
c^)nsistent with a perspicuous narration. I have used 
only a small part of the materials collected for the 
purpose. These have been olitained fnrni all avail- 
able sources ; from ( -hinese and Japanese accounts, 
and from the reports of foreigners, whenever any 
were present, either on men-of-war or on land. My 
acknowledgments are chiefly due to the Japanese 
war publications, without which it would have been 
impossible, at least at present, to have compiled an 
intelligent account of the war. It is not one of the 
h*ast surprising incidents of the war that rJapan should 
have been able to {U'oduce, simultaneously with her 
irreat efforts bv lainl and sea, a rich literature on the 




VI TO MY READERS, 

subject of the war. Besides numerous pamphlets, two 
periodical publications, exclusively dedicated to the 
war, were issued during its progress, forming before 
its conclusion several volumes. The amount of 
information of every kind contained in them was 
extraordinary, and nothing was neglected to render 
the subject clear to the Japanese public. 

My preference of Japanese sources does not affect 
the impartiality of the narration — the Japanese have 
been uniformly fair to their adversaries, far more just 
than their own countrymen ; and it has always been 
easier to find the truth in the histories of the victors 
than in those of the vanquished. The former have 
greater self-possession, see events more clearly, and 
(tan afford to be impartial. 



CONTENTS. 



PART I. 
THE HISTOKY OF THE GOREAN QUESTION. 

CHAPTKB PACK 

I. Short Historical Sketch of the Relations of the Three 

Countries . 

Wars of the T'ang Dynasty. 
Kublai Khan's Armada. 
Hideyo6hi*s Invasions of Corea. 
II. Sketch of Modem History of Corea . . . . .35 
III. Events immediately preceding the Outbreak of Hostihties 51 

The Assassination of Kim-ok-Kiun. 
The Tong-Haks. 
Army and Navy of China. 
Army and Navy of Japan. 



PART 11. 

THE COREAN CAMPAIGN. 

I. The Outbreak of Hostilities . .... 88 

The Attack on t^c King's Palace at Seoul. 
The Naval Battle at Phung Island. 

II. The First Military Operations 104 

The Asan Camjiaign. 
The Declaration of Wai. 

The Naval Demonstrations at Port Arthur and Wei- 
hai-wei. 

III. The Phyong-yang Cami^aign 120 

Preliminary Description. 
Advance of the Mixed Brigade. 
Advance of the Sak-ryong Detachment. 
Advance of the Main Body. 
Advance of the Gensan Detachment. 
Phyong-yang and the Chinese Army. 



vui CONTENTS. 

CITAFTKR PAOt 

TV. The Attack on Phyiiug-yang ...... 149 

The Mixed Brigade. 

The Sak-ryong and Gknsan Detachments. 
The Main Body. 
The Retreat of the Chinese and Capture of Phyong-yang. 



PABT III. 

THE CAMPAIGN IN CHINA. 

I. The Naval Battle at Hai-yang Island .164 

II. The First Army's Invasion of China . . . 18G 

The Crossing of the Yalu. 
Operations of the Fifth Division. 
Operations of the Third Division, 
in. The Campaign in the Regent Sword's Peninsula . . 203 

The Landing of the Second Army. 
The Advance and Capture of Chin-chow and Talien Bay. 
The Capture of Port Arthur. 
IV. The First Army in Manchuria ..... 237 

Fifth Division or Right Wing of the First Army. 
Third Division or Left Wing of the First Army. 
V. The Advance of the Second Army .2(51 

VI. The Wei-hai-wei Campaign ...... 2(59 

VII. The First Peace Embassy 305 

VIII. The Continuation of the Manchurian Campaign . 308 

rX. The Second Peace Embassv 322 



APPENDICES. 

Appendix A. Otori's Programme of Reforms for Corea . . 335 

„ B. Diplomatic Correspondence preceding the War . 338 

C. Statements of some of the Survivors of the Kowshing 349 

D. The Declarations of War of China and Japan . . 370 

E. Corrcsix)ndence relating to the two Jfipancsc in 
Shanghai ....... 375 

F. Corresiwndence between Admiral I to and Admiral Ting 380 
„ (t. Capitulation of Wei-hai-wei ..... 387 
„ H. Correspondence between Taotai Niu and Admiral Itu 389 
„ L The Peace Confe rence at Hiroshima . . 391 
„ J. The Armistice ..... 403 
„ K. Peace Negotiations and Text ol Treaty 405 

Index 438 



if 



LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS. 



COREA 



KXPLOHING TH 
DONO lUvEK 



Japanese Dollar-note, with the Head of Empress Jikqu, who 
INVADED Cork A ........ 

The Tai-Wen-Kl'n, Father of the Present King of Core a, 
AND Regent during his Ministry . 

KlM-Ox-KlUN 

MaJi IB-General Osiiima 
Otobi, Japankse Minister in Corea 
Yuan-Shi-kai, Chinese Minister resident in 
Tnp Kino of Corea .... 

I'aFTAIN MaTSL'SAKI, killed at AN-Si)NG 

The Blglkk Shir ak a mi Genjiro . 

JSUB-LlElJTENANT TaKE-NO-UcHI, KILLED WHIL 

Movements of the Cuinkse on the Tai- 
Flan of Phyon'g-yano City and Environs 
Major-Geseral Tachimi 
rk>LONEL Sato ..... 

Harada, the Hero of the Gemmu Gate 
YOSHINO ...... 

Akiim'shima ...... 

HlY'EI ....... 

Lai-yukn ...... 

Saikio Maru ..... 

TiNO-YUEN 

Chen- YUEN ...... 

CUIYODA ..... 

it8ukumuiiia ...... 

IIashidate .... 

Admiral Ito ..... 

Makmial Yamagata .... 

Major-Geneual (Jheko .... 

MARhHAL OYAMA ..... 

Gate or Chin-ch(»w .... 
Private Onoguchi, of the Enginkehs, wii(» iu 
Caitain Asakawa saved hv PravATE Ti(» 



•:NV IP THE Gatf 



PACK 

18 

40 
52 
64 
90 
1)0 
92 
108 
112 

121 

148 

155 

156 

157 

169 

170 

171 

173 

175 

176 

177 

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180 

182 

190 

197 

•J04 

211 

212 

2lt» 



X 



LIST OF TLLUSTBATJONS. 



LiEUTKN ant-General Yamaiu ...... 

IIUANG-CHIK-8HAN (GoLDEN HiLL) FoRT . . , . . 

soutik of unarmed japanese coolies on a liody of fugitivi 

Chinese Soldiers in the Nkiohbourhood of Ciiin-ch^av 
General Oshima and his Troops fighting in the Snow 
Japanese Army advancing through the Snow 
Major-Gi.neral No'Ji ...... 

Japanese Soldiers advancing on the Ice 
Major-General Uteka, killed at W ei-hai-wei 
Japanese Officer saving Girl and Baby 
Captain Toda, Commander of the 'Jvd Torpedo Flhthi 
Lieutenant Imai, Commander of the .'3kd Tokpkdo Flotili a . 
Lieutenant Jauushima, Commander of Torpedo IJoat No. *J'J 
Caitain Mochihara, Ct mmander of the 1st Torpedo Flotilla 
KOTAKA ..... 

Torpedo Boat No. 7 . . . 

Admiral Ting .... 

Lieutenant-General Katsura 
Lieutenant-General Nodzu . 



TAG K 

227 
230 



2.S4 
253 
257 
2G4 
205 
2711 
283 
2S6 
287 
2W0 
291 

2i)5 
303 
'6lo 
318 



MAPS. 



Map of the Operations during the China-Japan War Frontispiece 
Diagrams illustrating the Naval Battle at IIai-yang 

Island ....... Facing page 169 



THE CHINA-JAPAN WAR. 



INTRODUCTION. 

The China-Japan War cannot be considered as one of 
those distant struggles between outlandish nations, 
only interesting to the curious reader, who seeks to 
^satisfy his craving for the strange and the little- 
known. It is an event which has already produced 
great results, and it bids fair to produce even greater 
ones and to rank as one of the great events of the 
century. Indeed, for the magnitude, nature and 
duration of its results we think it w411 rank as the 
great war of the century. Even in a few months, 
after the first battles, we find that it produced a most 
rapid and startling change of public opinion. Japan, 
which it was fashionable to deride as a country of 
ridiculous little beings, who aped everything though 
with such inconsistent levity that no permanent 
results could be expected from their childlike imita- 
tions ; the country which was supposed to possess 
but a '* veneer " of civilisation was found by the 

B 



2 THE CHINA-JAPAN WAR. 

astonished world to possess an army and a navy 
which could rank with the same institutions of 
Europe and America. Her victories were the more 
conspicuous, because so unexpected ; none of the 
grave writers who had formed western opinion of the 
Far East had ever given a thought to the military 
power of Japan ; all serious consideration was given 
to China, and she was supposed to be carefully nursed 
to become the ally of Great Britain, as the only 
nation sufficiently powerful to arrest the eastern 
expansion of Russia. All wrote about the undeveloped 
latent military power of the Chinese Colossus, and 
Japan was relegated to the domain of art and 
prettiness. 

People who had imbibed their opinion from these 
sources considered the war at first as a ludicrous 
one ; they were irresistibly moved to laughter by the 
idea of little Japan (forgetting that most nations of 
Europe are inferior to her in population and territory) 
daring to grapple with the Chinese Empire. These 
popular errors seemed moreover plausible on account 
of the numerical disparity of the two powers ; 
(quantity is more easily appreciated than quality : it 
requires less mental exertion. Those who had 
studied Japanese history, had travelled over the 
country with an attentive eye, even for a short time, 
or who had known educated Japanese, formed a far 
different opinion about the prospects of the war. 
They reflected that the Japanese had always been a 
warlike nation, that they had stopped even the 



INTRODUCTION. 3 //""^^ 

conquests of the. TV^ongola wh r n t .h ry iv r vr in t hr ^^^^^^ ^ 
height^of^their glory, that the progress achieved by (^ N'^^'^ 
Japan in the last twenty years was not fictitious but U f { 
spread through the whole people and their institu- 
tions ; on the other hand China had never been fond 
of war, and in her encounter with European troops in 
the present century had always cut a poor figure. 
At the same time, the warmest admirers of Japan, 
probably even her own statesmen, did not expect 
such a brilliant series of extraordinary successes. 

Nobody doubted the valour of her soldiers, but the 
war was a revelation to the world of the strategical 
ability and coolness of her generals and admirals. To 
appreciate justly the merit of Japan, and the rapidity 
of her assimilation of foreign civilisation, it is necessary 
to bear in mind that the present war is the first 
foreign war that Japan has waged for the last three 
centuries, and that it was her first experiment with 
the new weapons and tactics which she has so lately 
adopted from the West. Notwithstanding this, every- 
thing passed smoothly, as if general manoeuvres were 
being carried on. It is but fair to add one more 
remark ; the war being carried on in CWea and 
IVIanchuria required that soldiers, ammunition, stores, 
etc., should all be transported by sea, thus causing 
an immense increase of difhculty to the Japanese 
transport department. These difficulties were faced ) 

with coolness and overcome without effort. European 
officers who had an opportunity of witnessing the 
landing of considerable bodies of Japanese troops 

B 2 



4. THE CHINA-JAPAN WAR. 

confessed that the operation could not have been 
performed better by well-trained Western troops 
provided with an efficient transport service. 

The secret of these unexpected successes is revealed 
by an attentive consideration of the ancient and 
recent history of Japan ; the many centuries of 
insular isolation and the feudal system had trained 
the mass of the Japanese people to sentiments of 
loyalty, of unswerving devotion to their chieftains, 
and developed a spirit of heroic fortitude and love of 
war. The last quarter of a century had initiated the 
higher classes to all the science and progress of the 
West. When, therefore, Japan resolved to put forth 
her strength in a foreign war, she found herself 
possessed with an army composed of soldiers who 
were ready to advance joyfully to death at the 
bidding of the emperor and for the glory of their 
country, and of officers and generals who had profited 
by the experience of centuries of Western wars, and 
who had taken up the study of military science just 
as it had reached perfection at the hands of Napoleon 
and Moltke. 

Japan had also great advantages in her vicinity and 
long intercourse with China, from whom she has 
received her early civilisation, and her writing. The 
peculiar nature of the Chinese characters — which 
express ideas rather than sounds, resembling thus our 
Arabic numerals, which have the same meaning from 
Finland to Portugal, though with such different 
sounds — enables the educated Japanese to understand 



INTRODUCTION. 5 

Chinese books and writing even when they cannot 
speak a word of the language. This common written 
medium not only facilitates the preparatory study of 
the enemy's country and forces, but is an incalculable 
benefit in the course of a campaign. All information 
which can be conveyed by writing can be obtained 
easily, without fear of mistakes, and needs no inter- 
preters, which are only necessary in communicating 
with the illiterate and ignorant. This prompt means 
of information is a great advantage in modern 
warfare, where knowledge of every kind is the 
principal element of success. To such a cause must 
l>e attributed the relatively greater success of the 
Japanese as compared with the French and English 
in the China campaigns. 

While we note the brilliant qualities of the Japanese 
army, we must not overlook that they are set off by 
corresponding defects on the part of China. Tha 
country, throughout her long history, has seldom been 
remarkable for military success : she has often been 
fon([uered by smaller nations, and for the last two \ 
centuries and a half has been governed by a handful 
of Manchus, a hardv northern race. The education 
of the Chinese people and public opinion all tend 
to discourage any latent warlike tendency of the 
nation. The military profession is looked down upon ; 
mandarins of that class always ranking below civil 
mandarins ; and a soldier is considered as the lowest 
of tlie people, as a person who cares for no decent 
calling and is unfit for it. Under such conditions, it 



ft THE CHINA-JAPAN WAR. 

is natural that the Chinese soldiers should not be very 
brave, and generally unwilling to throw away their 
lives for a country which does not appreciate their 
services. Their pay is meagre, and often curtailed 
by dishonest superiors ; far from any pensions being 
given to the disabled, and to the relations of the 
killed in battle, even medical assistance and care of 
the wounded are not provided, and the end of a war 
generally means the dismissal of all those who have ' 
been hastily enli&ted at the moment of danger. 

While the lower classes in China are not warlike 
and are not encouraged to become so, the upper 
classes are almost totally ignorant of the scientific 
civilisation of the West and averse to it, as they 
consider its advent as a certain forerunner of the fall 
of their oligarchy. They consider that the only hope 
of continuance of their system lies in keeping the 
people ignorant, not only of what happens in other 
nations, but even in other provinces of the Chinese 
Empire. All attempts to achieve what we regard as 
freedom is completely smothered ; railways are not 
allowed to be built, and even good common roads 
are very seldom to be found in the interior, so that 
water-carriage of some kind is the general means of 
travelling over the greater part of the country. In 
the intellectual field matters arc even w^orse : the 
ignorance even of the most learned Chinese is in- 
credible ; they lack that mathematical training Tvhich 
is considered necessary to all educated persons in the 
West, and which has produced those bold general- 



JNTBODUCTIOK 7 

isations in all branches of science which have 
revolutionised the thought of Europe and America* 
In China the only military examinations consist in 
hendirig tough bows, lifting heavy weights and 
handling the sword. 

If we keep in view all these simultaneous facts 
which operate in directing the conduct of the two 
countries, we shall find that the struggle in the Far 
East was not simply a war between two nations, but 
a war between the past and the present, between 
Western civilisation and a sporadic survival of the 







worn-out Eastern civilization ; an encounter between M^ 
such tactics as were employed by Agamemnon at Troy ^ jt 
and those that might have been conceived by Moltke. aJ/ ^ 
Though we point out China as the champion of th^^ ^^ i 
past, we must not consider that she enacts her part 'T! Cy 
consistently : the worship of her ancient world is 6t 
rather a pretext to avoid the trouble of reform than Y^ 
a sincere attachment to the great men of the past : ' y)^ 
she does not follow their precepts, and there isA^*". ^>t 
perhaps no country in the world where there is such^ fy^ 
a scarcity of ancient monuments — in fact, they may ^ ( 
l>e said to be entirely absent. At the same time it is 
necessary to dispel the error bred by ignorance, that 
China has never changed ; there is hardly any country 
that has undergone so many political vicissitudes. 
Her history counts twenty-four dynasties, many of 
whi(!h were foreign, and established themselves by a 
bloody concjuest of the country : every political 
change has brought with it a complete change of 



7^. 



S THE CHINA-JAPAN WAR. 

dress and customa, and a considerable change in the 
internal administration. In the points just dealt 
with, Japan may be considered far more conservative 
than China ; she has had but one dynasty in the 
course of her whole history, and the internal changes 
up to the last generation have been far less than those 
of her neighbour ; at the same time she has a worship 
for the great n^en of the past, and their heroic exploits 
are ever present in the mind of the people. 

It has been fashionable among writers on the Far 
East to lay stress on the mysterious and awe-striking 
process which threatened the world in a near future : 
the '* Awakening of China." These speculations about 
the future blinded them to what was really happening, 
the awakening of Japan : the phenomenon of a race 
that had slumbered for centuries in its beautiful ocean 
home, in those clusters of islands that remind one of 
Hellas, almost ignorant of the world that surrounded 
it, «ave for the casual advent of a Buddhist missionary, 
a Corean artist or a wave-tossed European, suddenly 
awakening to consciousness that it held a place in the 
world and resolved that it should be one of glory and 
honour. 



PART I. 

THE HISTORY OP THE CORE AN QUESTION, 



■«o«- 



CHAPTER I. 

SHORT SKETCH OF THE HISTORICAL RELATIONS OF 

THE THREE CiJlNTRIES. 

The Corean (|uestioii which has caused the war 
between China and Japan has its origin far into the 
past, and, to understand it clearly, a glance at the 
historical relations of the three countries is absolutely 
necessary. 

China, Corea, and Japan form a group of nations 
connected by a bond of a peculiar nature, which it 
is diffi(-ult for a European reader to understiind. It 
is not alone by their geographi<3al proximity, and 
by the ancient civilisation bom in the North of 
( 'hina, which gradually spread into Corea and Japan : 
nor by the diffusion of Buddhism, whicrh China 
receiving from India passed on to her Eastern neigh- 
bours, that thev feel bound to<^ether, but still more 
so by the use of the characters, invented in China, 
which spread into Corea and Japan, and are still 
used, notwithstandincj both those countries have an 



i 



j 



10 THE CHINA-JAPAN WAIi. 

alphabetical writing of their own. Chinese characters 
do not necessarily express a sound, their primary 
use is to represent an idea or object, and they have 
thus become the written medium of communication 
for three nations whose languages are totally different. 
It is difficult to render this fact intelligible to those 
who are unacquainted with Chinese characters, but 
the following parallel case in the West may be of 
^ome assistance. All the nations of Europe use the 
KMlrabic figures, though they correspond to very 
different sounds in the various languages of the 
^iT continent, and a traveller is able to understand the 
K/ numbers on shop-doors, and the hours of departure 

of a railway train, though he is unable to read them 
\ with their foreign pronunciation. What happens 
\ in these few cases in Europe occurs in all cases 

where writing is used in the Far East. A well- 
educated Chinese, Japanese, or Corean can under- 
stand almost everything which is written in either 
of the other two neighbouring countries, though he 
cannot speak a word of their languages. This 
common medium of communication, which is espe- 
cially useful for all those higher forms of thought 
which are best expressed and transmitted by writing, 
has created a deep-seated bond between nations 
which, by nature, would have little in common. 

In fact, the three nations are very different both 
physically and intellectually : the Japanese are viva- 
cious, artistic, warlike, and ever ready to adopt 
improvements from abroad ; the Chinese are mostly 



RELATIONS OF QBlNAy COREA AND JAPAN. 11 

4|uiet, laborioils, pacific and averse to change ; and 
the Coreans, through centuries of oppression, have 
become slothful and indifferent to a degree which 
would be incredible to one who did not know them. 
The languages are different in structure, and have 
nothing in common except what has been imported 
by literature and religion. Modern Japanese is full 
of Chinese words and expressions, but these are like 
French and Latin words in English, or Arabic ones 
in Persian, a mere borrowing of convenient ready- 
made phrases, which has not affected the structure 
of the language, though it has increased the mental 
stock-in-trade of the people. 

According to Chinese tradition, Corea owes its 
civilisation and even its political existence to a 
Chinese political refugee called iChi-tzti, who emi- 
grated thither about 1100 B.c. The country, which 
he founded with the name of Chao-hsien (Morning 
Freshness) was not conterminous with modern Corea ; 
it contained only the northern part of that country ; 
but, on the other hand, a portion of the present 
Empire of China was within its boundaries. The 
.southern part of the peninsula was divided into 
several states, and these, after several centuries of war 
among themselves and with Chao-hsien (which after- 
wards changed its name to Korai through the invasion 
of a northern people of that name), gradually united 
to form one country at the beginning of the tenth 
century of our era. Before this unity was achieved, 
Corea had to sustain many foreign wars, which were 



I 






12 TBE CHINA-JAPAN WAR. 

often provoked by one of the warring* states calling 
in assistance either from China or Japan. 

The most persistent and terrible wars undertaken 
by China agaijMttrCJorea were during the SuiJSS^--* 
618_ a,d) a^^^HaO a.d) dynasties. The 

celebrated and iiilaniSTtS "Emperor Yang-ti, who 
extended the Grand Canal, and who distinguished 
himself by his debauchery, cruelty, and protection of 
literature, planned a series of gigantic invasions of 
Corea both by land and sea. The first expedition, 
said to have consisted of 300,000 men, met with 
disaster. The land force marched during the rainy 
season, which converts some parts of Liao-tung * into 
an impassable bog ; the provision-carts could not 
proceed, and the army was decimated by famine and 
an epidemic. The naval force started from Lai-chou, 
a port in Shantung, but met with storms vhich 
destroyed most of the vessels. Yang-ti was not 
discouraged, and began preparations for a new expe- 
dition on a vast scale. His disordered mind seems 
to have had a craving for the abnormal and the 
gigantic ; his accession to the throne was sullied by 
incest and parricide ; the lives of his subjects were 
wasted in excavating the (irand Canal, which, com- 
pleted in after years, is one of the greatest works of 
man ; and, if historians have not exaggerated, he 
collected the largest army which China has ever put 
into the field. More than a million of men are said 
to have been assembled for the invasion of Corea, but 

* The north-eastern part of China near Corea. 



ItELATIONS OF CHINA, CORE A AND JAPAN. 13 

they performed very little. The different divisions 
of this unwieldy force, after having suffered much 
from mutual over-crowding, were arrested before the 
fortified cities of the Coreans. One general reached 
the capital (the present Phyong-yang), but was 
deceived into believing that the Coreans were far 
superior in numbers, and commenced a retreat, which 
became a rout, owing to the harassing attacks of the 
Coreans and the scarcity of provisions. A naval force, 
which had also reached the capital, remained ignorant 
of the proximity of the army, and also retreated. It 
cannot be supposed that such a large army should 
fail so miserably ; it is therefore probable that the 
historians exaggerated the original numbers, and that 
very few of those who started ever marched into 
Corea, the majority deserting by the way. Even 
after these deductions it must have been a great 
military disaster ; and though Yang-ti stubbornly 
persisted in scheming new plans of invasions, he did' 
not live to execute them — a band of conspirators, 
who could no longer bear his tyranny, put an end to 
his life and to his dynasty. 

The Chinese people had been unwilling to support 
the mad schemes of Yang-ti, but they felt the humilia- 
tion which they had suffered from Corea, and the new 
dynasty, the Tang, so famous in Chinese history,* 

• The T'ang dynasty is the Augustan age of Chinese poetry, 
anil the Southern Chinese delight to call themselves ** T'ang- 
jcn " (men of T'ang), while the Northerners prefer to call 
themselves " men of Han/' 



li ' • THE OBINA-JAPA N ' WAR. 

was obliged to continue a policy of hostility towards 
Corea. There were many reasons to provoke a war, 
besides the desire of wiping out the disgrace of the 
former campaigns : Corea still held t^erritory, which 
once had belonged to China, and a usurper had killed 
the King of Corea* and several ministers at a 
banquet. These difficulties were at first overcome, 
and the Chinese Emperor consented to recognise the 
usurper as tributary sovereign of the disputed terri- 
tory ; but when Shinlo (one of the small states of 
Southern Corea) asked China for protection against 
the usurper, and he would not listen to the orders to 
desist from his invasions, the Emperor resolved to 
make war on Corea. 

The war thus commenced lasted about half a 
century, through the reigns of several Chinese 
emperors, and ended with the conquest of northern 
and western Corea (then divided into the states of 
Korai and Po-chi). It introduces us also to one of 
the most beautiful figures in Chinese history — to a 
monarch who can be compared with some of the best 
of the Roman Empire. T ai-tsung, the son of the first 
T*ang emperor, was the real founder of the greatness 
of his house. When both were in a private station 
he urged his father to rebel, and with his abilities he 
secured him the throne, which had been dishonoured 
by the vices of the tyrant Yang-ti. He commanded 

* Political assassination seems indigenous to the soil of Corea. 
After twelve centuries, parties unfortunately still employ the 
same methods. 



DELATIONS OF CHINA, COREA AND JAPAN. 15 

in person the expedition sent against Col'ea ; he 
encouraged his troops by his example, and comforted 
them with his kindness ; he lived on the simplest food 
and saddled his horse himself ; and inquired person- 
ally about the sick and wounded soldiers. His army 
was conducted with great skill, and- won several 
victories, and the abilities of the general were adorned 
by the bravery of the man. At the siege of a town, 
when the soldiers were busy forming a mound to 
overtop the walls, the emperor picked up a large piece 
of earth, and galloping under the walls, placed it on 
the top of the rising mound. His campaign was not 
entirely successful, and he was foiled in his last siege. 
But this check did not arouse his vanity, and he 
preserved unruffled the sweetness of his disposition. 
When the orders to raise the siege were given, the 
Corean governor, who had bravely defended the place, 
appeared on the battlements and bowed to the retiring 
emperor. T ai-tsung sent rich presents to his chi- 
valrous adversary as an acknowledgment of his 
bravery. This was not the only instance of the T ang 
emperor's magnanimity. When his soldiers com- 
plained that they were not allowed to sack a town, he 
replied that their reward should be given by the 
imperial treasury. At the end of the campaign, all 
the Corean prisoners, instead of being sold as slaves 
to enrich the tr<Kjps, were ransomed and set free by 
the emperor, whose kind heart could not bear to tear 
apart children from their mothers, and wives from 
their husbands. The widow of a Corean general, who 



16 THE CHINA-JAPAN WAIL 

had offered the most stubborn resistance, having 
fallen into his hands, he gave her rich silks and a fast 
cart that she might convey the dead body of her 
husband to Phyong-yang. These episodes of a man, 
great by his position and his deeds, who could lead 
the rough life of a soldier, brave the dangers of the 
field, and still keep a kind and generous heart, are 
pleasant to read in the light of present events. They 
form a contrast to the actions of the present age, and 
they show that China may still be a great nation if, 
in her reverence for the past, she aim rather at 
imitating the noble actions recorded in her history, 
than at preserving customs which through the lapse 
of time have lost their significance. They show that 
the Japanese are right when they sing in their war- 
songs that China formerly was a land of sages and 
heroes. 

T'ai-tsung died shortly after (a.d. 650), and the war 
I'ontinued in a desultory way during the reign of his 
successors until the Empress Wu (a.d. 684-705) (one 
of the most remarkable characters in Chinese history) 
usurped the throne. This vindictive but strong- 
minded woman pushed on tlie war with such vigour 
that the greater part of Corea wa^ conquered. After 
these long and bloody wars Corea submitted to the 
>?uzerainty of China ; and if she occasionally relapsed 
from her allegiance, a short war was generally suffi- 
cient to recall her to sentiments of loyalty. 

We have examined one aspect of the question : 
The ancient political relations between China and 



RELATIONS' OF CHINA, CORE A AND JAPAN 17 

Northern and Western Corea. We have now to study 
another aspect : The relations of Japan with Eastern 
Chorea. From the inter-action of these two series of 
historical events arises the third and later aspect, 
when all three nations berime engaged in long 
<lisastrous wars. From a very early age Corea was 
invaded by the Japanese. According to Japanese tra- 
ditions about 202 a.d., the celebrated Empress Jingu, 
to revenge the death of her husband, who had been 
killed by the rebels in Kiushiu, undertook an expedi- 
tion to Corea. This Amazon, celebrated in Japanese 
legends as the mother of Ojiu, the god of war, 
suspected that the rebellion in Kiushiu had been 
instigated by Shinra,* a small kingdom which occupied 
the south-eastern part of the Corean peninsula, where 
the modern provinces of Kang-Won and Kyong-Sang 
are now situated, and was determined to inflict an 
exemplary punishment. . The King of Shinra was 
unable to resist such a formidable invasion, and 
submitted to great humiliations. He declared himself 
the slave of Japan, and Jingu hung her bow over the 
gate of the palace, and is even said to have written /^/i 
on the gate, ** The king of Shinra is the dog of Japan." 7^^ . 

^The account of this expedition is legend ary, but / ^ / 
t he Japanese maintain it 6 truth , adorn their paPCr ^^ v\ 
mone y with illustrations of it, a nd supported their 
right of suzerain t} ^_over Corea on the basis of this 
submission of Shinra to Jingu. This claim of suze- 
rainty was not officially relih(|uished until 1870, 

* It ifl read Shin-lo by the CJhinese. 




/ 



rs ; 



< 



THE CmSA-JAPAN WAS. 



when Japan concluded the treaty which led to the 
opening of Corea to foreign trade. 




Sixteen centuries is a long time to keep up an 
imaginary sovereignty, but we must remember that 



RELATIONS OF CHINA, CORE A AND JAPAN. 19 

tinie seems to run slower in the East, where history is 
reckoned by dynasties rather than by reigns ; and 
even in European history we have the parallel case of 
England claiming for centuries the throne of France 
and her sovereigns assuming the title of kings of that 
country. 

The expedition of Jingu has influenced Japanese 
policy towards Corea since the third century; that 
ancient episode impressed itself on the popular mind, 
and led all the restless warriors and politicians of 
Japan to embroil themselves in Corean wars, in the 
hope of rivalling the glory of Jingu. It also led to 
the third phase of th^. question : Hostility between 
< *hina and Japan. As early as the seventh century, 
the Japanese sent an expedition to assist one of the 
small Corean States against China, but it was un- 
successful, being surprised by the Chinese fleet and 
almost destroyed.* A great militiiry expedition 
of the thirteenth century had, however, greater in- 
fluence on the mutual relations of China, Japan, and 
(*orea. Kublai Khan's attempted invasion revealed 
to Japan the strength of her position and her relative 
power among nations : after that national crisis Japan 
begins to appear as an aggressive factor in the politics 
of the Far East. 

This famous expedition, whose defeat was lately 
commemorated by the Japanese, and whose historv 
was recently re- written by Imperial order, has often 
been compared to the Invincible Armada of Philip II. 

• This happened during the reign of Kao-isung, a.d. G50-084. 

C 2 



20 THE VBIXA-JAPAN WAIt. 

The incidents of the latter are well known to every 
English reader, and it will be interesting to give 
a few of the most striking features of the former. 
Kublai Khan, or Shih Tsu as he is called by Chinese 
historians, ruled over almost the whole of the conti- 
nent of Asia ; and the Mongol power extended even 
far into Europe to the frontiers of Germany. There 
was only a small outlying country in the sea which 
had not yet acknowledged his power. He tried at 
first to achieve its submission by diplomacy, and 
ambassadors w^ith haughty messages were sent to- 
Japan ; but the Mongols had now met at last a 
people who could withstand their hitherto invincible 
/ arms. The Japanese, imbued with the pride and 

I V' ssirit of independence characteristic of all islanders, 

t*'- ^ , ; ^d not deign even to answer the summary intimation 
\ f" j^Ho submit of Kublai Khan. The Mongol emperor 
V C \ then tried the effect of arms, and sent an expedition 
\A yl of 300 vessels and 15,000 men, which was totally 

y ^ C defeated by the Japanese near the Island of Iki. 
y \A These diplomatic and military failures convinced the 

. ^v^ ' Mongol emperor that he had under-estimated the 

^\ (^ unknown enemy, and he prepared an expedition on a 

(J far larger scale. It is said that he assembled a fleet 

of 3,500 war-junks, and an army of above 100,000 
men. This vast armada was unlucky from the 
beginning : the commander-in-chief fell sick, and his 
successor was unequal to the task of directing such an 
unwieldy host. Marco Polo asserts that dissension 
prevailed among the Mongol general:?. As scon as it 



RELATIONS OF CHINA, COREA AND JAPAN 21 

reached Japan a dreadful tempest (the Japanese 
attribute it to the divine intervention of the goddess 
Ise, whose aid had been invoked by the emperor) 
destroyed the greater part of the fleet, and the few 
remaining vessels, together with the shipwrecked 
?>urvivors, were cut to pieces by the Japanese. 

This great victory over the Mongol arms, which 
had swept unresisted from the Yellow Sea to the 
frontiers of Silesia and Egypt, naturally exalted the 
self-confidence of the Japanese, who were determined 
to l)e revenged on the Chinese and Coreans wlio had 
been forced to assist the Mongols. Japan was for a 
long time a prey to feudal wars, iind her government 
was not able to undertake foreign wars, but her 
people had ample opportunities to secure revenge. 
During the end of the Yuan dynasty, and almost all 
through the Ming period, a.d. 1368-1642, Japanese 
pirates infested the coast of China. Their ravages 
were so considerable that Ilung-wu, the first Ming 
emperor '(a.d. 1368-1399) had to organise a special 
iKxly of militia for coast defence, and ordered watch- 
towers to be built along the coast. 

The Japanese pirates scoured the whole coast of 
China, and no place was safe from their bold raids. 
The central provinces were of course those most 
affected, and from the reign of Ilung-wu to the end 
of that of Shih-tsung (a.d. 1370-1567) they were 
flevastat^d by Japanese adventurers, who not only 
raided the coast, but often established themselves 
jishore in strong positions, from which they used to 



22 THE CHINA-JAPAN WAB. 

sally forth to plunder, destroy and burn. But they 
never lost their hold on the sea, and kept their ships, 
either to retreat to Japan when their situation became 
hopeless, or to remove to some other part of the coast. 
The Chinese in opposing their raids, often succeeded 
in destroying their *' nests " (as they called their for- 
tified positions) and burning their ships, in which cases 
there was an indiscriminate slaughter of the Japanese. 

But the Chinese historians also record many victories 
of the Japanese, who then used to sweep over the 
whole country, at a considerable distance from the 
sea, plundering and slaying as they liked. They 
describe very well the national traits of the Japanese : 
their love of warfare, their indifference to danger and 
death, and their readiness to fight against superior 
numbers. 

It would be tedious to describe, even summarily, 
the yearly and often monthly inroads of the Japanese. 
To give an idea of their character and extent it will 
suffice to give a few examples. In the I7th year of 
Cheng Tsu (a.d. 1419), in Liao-tung, near the present 
Port Arthur, 2,000 Japanese were destroyed by a 
series of ambushes and skilful stratagems of a Chinese 
general. In the 32nd year of Shih Tsung (a.d. 1553), 
during whose reign the Japanese raids were most 
frequent and terrible, the pirates attacked all the 
coast from Wenchow to Shanghai. There was no way 
to subdue these formidable invaders, who had always 
a retreat by the sea, and could transfer their opera- 
tions rapidly from one province to another. 



BELATI0N8 OF CUINA, CORE A AND JAPAN. 23 

In the following year they defeated the Chinese 
troops with heavy loss, and spread all over the 
country to plunder. They defeated again the Chinese 
troops, and ravaging the country, they cut their way 
to the sea through another district. The losses 
through these incursions were immense ; historians 
calculate that during the seven or eight years when 
they were most terrible, China lost several millions' 
worth in goods and slaves carried oflf, and over 
100,000 soldiers and people were killed or drowned. 
Tf) find anything to parallel it in our histories, we 
must go back to the dark ages, when the fairest part* 
of Europe were exposed to the fierce raids of Normans 
from the north and Saracens from the south. 

These piratical forays were the spasmodic efforts of 
private adventurers, but they were followed by the 
greatest war in Japanese history. The evil govern- 
ment of the Ashikaga family, which rent Japan with 
civil wars, was finally put an end to by Nobunaga and 
Hideyoshi. The latter had risen from the position 
of a menial to the first rank in the empire ; but by 
his courage and military skill he made men forget his 
low origin, and he ruled with absolute power the 
whole country in the name of the emperor. He was 
beloved by his army, which had won in every battle, 
and he was eager to employ it abroad, now that no 
enemy had been left in Japan. The shadowy 
suzerainty claimed by Japan over Corea for centuries 
was a ready pretext to provoke a war with that 
country, which was however only a first step towards 



24 THE CHINA-JAPAN WAR, 

an invasion of China, a gigantic scheme which he 
might have realised if he had been a younger man. 
It is said that this scheme arose very early in the 
miiid of Hideyoshi, and it recurred at intervals until 
he possessed the means of putting it into execution. 
Once when he was at the Kiyomidzu temple at Kioto, 
in the midst of the beauties of nature which all 
tourists have admired, grieving for the loss of his son, 
lie turned to an attendant and said : " A great man 
ought to employ his army beyond ten thousand miles, 
and not give way to sorrow.'' He tried to smother 
his grief by gigantic schemes, and he parcelled out 
China among his generals in his day-dreams of 
conquest. The pride and ambition of this extra- 
ordinary man are well shown in the letter he sent to 
the King of Corea, when he said that, " he, the last 
scion of a humble stock had been predestined," that 
" wherever the sun shines, there will be no place which 
shall not be subject to him, and that his career had 
been like the rising sun, illuminating the whole 
earth." 

The proposal of a joint invasion of China was 
rejected because the King of Corea considered the 
enterprise absurd, and compared it to a bee attempting 
to sting a tortoise. Hideyoshi prepared a formidable 
invasion of Corea. A large army, said to have been 
of 150,000 men, and supported by powerful reserves, 
was landed in Corea near Fusan. The soldiers were 
not only warlike, and accustomed to victory, but they 
were much better armed than the Coreans, and had a 



DELATIONS OF CHINA, CORE A AND JAPAN. 25 

«^oocl many firearms, whose use the Japanese had 
leamt from the Portuguese. The Japanese were 
<*ommandecl by two generals, Konishi Yukmaga and 
Kato Kiyomasa, very different in age and character ; 
Konishi was young and an ardent Christian, while 
Kato, a much older man, was a bigoted Buddhist. 
These differences soon created a bitter rivalry between 
the two generals, and the dissensions that followed 
probably influenced the result of the campaign. 

A curious incident happened before the departure 
of the expedition ; the Japanese warriors of that age 
were almost as ignorant as our mediaeval knights, and 
they told Hideyoshi that they would be very much 
embarrassed if they received letters from the Chinese 
generals. Hideyoshi then appointed some bonzes 
learned in Chinese characters to assist them. 

At first the rapid success of the Japanese was 
justonishing. The impetuous young Konishi, by 
skilful seamanship, was able to land first in (^orea, 
and immediately, the same day, took the castle of 
Tong-nai (near Fusan), then, proceeding by the 
valley of the Nak-tong, he attacked and took Sang- 
ju, and C^hhung-ju. He made such despatch that he 
was able to enter the capital, Seoul, within eighteen 
days from his first landing. The joy of Hideyoshi, 
on hearing of these rapid successes, was so great that 
he exclaimed, *' Now mv own son seems risen from 
the dead." 

Kato, who had landed the next dav, was very much 
annoyed at l>eing everywhere forestalled by his youth- 



26 THE CHINA-JAPAN WAU. 

ful rival, who made every effort to retard his march, 
even removing the boats that were necessary for 
crossing the river in front of the capital. Notwith- 
standing these delays, he entered Seoul about the same 
time as Konishi. 

The rapidity of the invasion utterly disconcerted 
the Corean Court, which was unprepared for war, and 
when the news of the fall of Chhung-ju reached 
Seoul, it caused such a panic, that the courtiers 
abandoned the king, and fled with the horses taken 
from the royal stables. The king was obliged to 
escape into Liao-tung and implore , the assistance of 
China, while the royal princes were sent into the N.-E. 
provinces. The two Japanese generals, having found 
it impossible to act in concert, agreed to separate, 
Kato proceeding eastward to conquer Ham-gyong, 
and Konishi pushing on to Phyong-yang, which he 
reached about three weeks after leaving Seoul. Here 
the Japanese had some difficulty in crossing the Tai- 
dong river, but by a stratagem they succeeded, and 
defeated the Coreans, who were obliged to abandon 
Phyong-yang. 

The fall of this city, the ancient capital of the 
kingdom and a strong fortress, spread terror through 
all Corea and the Chinese province of Liao-tung, 
whither panic-struck fugitives repaired in great 
numbers. 

The impetuous Konishi wished to follow up his 
victory and invade China, but he was so distant from 
his base of operations, that he was obliged to ask for 



INFLATIONS OF CHINA, COREA AND JAPAN, 27 

the co-operation of the Japanese fleet, which was 
lying at Fusan. It was ordered to sail round the 
western coast, and proceed up the Tai-dong river. 
Had such a junction been achieved, it i& prol)able that 
Hideyoshi's dreams might have been realised. If the 
Japanese could have kept up their rapid advance, no 
resistance could have been offered to them ; neither 
Chinese nor Coreans were yet quite ready for war, and 
the army, which in a few weeks had conquered almost 
the whole of Corea, would have found no difficulty in 
passing through Liao-tung in a somewhat longer 
time. But unfortunately for the brilliant projects 
of Hideyoshi and his generals, the fleet was unable to 
reach the rendezvous. The Coreans, staggered at 
first by the impetuous onslaught of the Japanese, 
gradually recovered themselves, and, imbued with the 
courage of despair, attacked with success the Japanese 
fleet, while on its way, at the island of Ko-je and 
drove it back to Fusan. This naval success was owing 
to the Corean vessels being stronger than the Japanese, 
and having thick boards for protection against arrows 
and bullets. This defeat prevented any further 
advance of Konishi, and as the Tai-dong river and 
Phyong-yang marked the extreme limit of Japanese 
military operations during the celebrated invasions of 
the 16th century, the defeat of the Japanese fleet 
may be considered the turning-point of the war, and 
might be chosen as a far Eastern illustration of C^apt. 
Mahan s theories of the influence of sea-power upon 
history. 



28 THE CHINA-JAPAN WAR. 

While Konishi had advanced to Phyong-yang, Kato 
marched to the northern frontier of Corea and 
besieged Hoi-ryong, where the royal princes had fled 
for refuge : the princes were delivered up to him and 
the fortress was surrendered. Not satisfied with this 
success, Kato crossed the frontier and invaded the 
country of the Orankai : * here a touching episode is 
said to have taken place, which forms a favourite 
subject for Japanese artists. Towards the east, across 
the sea, the Japanese saw the dim outline of a 
mountain which they mistook for their beloved Fuji- 
san : Kato at once took off his helmet and reverentlv 
saluted his native land.f 

When the King of Corea fled to Liao-tung, to 
implore assistance from the Chinese, the latter sent a 
small army, which was promptly routed by the 
Japanese. The Chinese, now realising the power of 
their enemy, prepared to send a larger force, and to 
gain time they entered into negotiations with the 
enemy. This was only the first of many diplomatic 
missions. During the long war there were many 
others in the field, and at Peking. Of course, the 
Chinese were at a great advantage in their negotia- 
tions, as they employed cunning agents, whom they 
could disown at pleasure ; while the Japanese em- 
ployed their generals, who were only bluff*, ignorant 

* At present it formB part of the Bussian Amur province. 

t The Japanese say the mountain may have been Yo-tei-rei 
in the northern island of Yezo. It was probably some island 
off the coast. 



BELATIONS OF CHINA, COREA AND JAPAN 29 

warriors, who could not even read Chinese chai-acters, 
and were obliged to have recourse to their l)onzes. 

The Japanese had been promised by a wily Chinese, 
who had been sent to cajole them into waiting, the 
whole of Corea up to the Tai-dong river, i.e., the 
territory they had conquered. But while they were 
waiting for the answer from Peking ratifying such 
arrangements, a large Ming army silently advanced 
to attack them at Phyong-yang. The position of the 
Japanese was very critical ; all the Corean peasantry 
were in revolt, and the Chinese army was upon them. 
Konishi 8 courage and presence of mind did not fail 
him. He disdained to retreat, and l)oldly prepared for 
battle. Notwithstanding the great numerical supe- 
riority of the Chinese, the Japanese held their ground 
at Peony Mount (a strong position near Phyong- 
yang), but during the night they were obliged to 
retreat. The Chinese were then commanded by 
Li-yu-sung, a veteran who had already distinguished 
himself by subduing rebellions and warring with the 
then rising Manchus. He was angry at the escape of 
the Japanese, and proceeded at once to Seoul with an 
army estimated at 200,000 men, most of whom must 
have been ill-armed Corean peasants. Konishi re- 
solved to make a stand at Seoul, where he had asked 
Kato and other generals to join him. The Chinese 
and Coreans defeated the Japanese advanced guard, 
and moved on to the capital, where a dreadful battle 
was fought, the most bloody of the war. At first the 
Japanese were overcome by the superior numbers of 



30 THE CHINA-JAPAN WAR. 

their enemies, but they finally succeeded in driving 
them back with heavy loss, through the tactics of an 
old general, who employed a favourite stratagem of 
ancient warfare. He kept aloof with a strong reserve, 
and when the Chinese fell into confusion, pursuing 
the Japanese, he attacked and defeated them. This 
victory gave very undecided results. The Chinese 
had lost heavily, and were afraid that Kato, whom 
they thought had not yet joined Konishi, might 
attack them in flank, so they retired to Phyong-yang. 
The Japanese advanced, and took some castles 
garrisoned by the Coreans, but they were weary of 
the length of the campaign, and harassed by the 
incessant guerilla warfare of the Coreans. They 
were also hard pressed for food, as tlie protracted 
hostilities had caused a famine. At last the Japanese 
generals consented to listen to terms of peace. Japan 
was promised the three southern provinces of Corea, 
and the recognition of her suzerainty. Hideyoshi 
wished also to be considered as the equal of the 
Emperor of China — this petty piece of vanity finally 
frustrated the negotiations. Pending the discussion 
of these conditions the Japanese evacuated Seoul and 
retired to the coast, where they could receive their 
supplies from Japan. This was the end of the 
first invasion. The Japanese, through discord 
among their generals, insufficient support from 
their fleet, and incapacity to judge the crafty 
diplomacy of the Chinese, had lost all the results of 
their first brilliant military achievements, which for 



RELATIONS OF CHINA, CORE A AND JAPAN. 31 

their rapidity must be considered as wonderful for 
that age. 

The negotiations were undertaken with very little 
sincerity on the part of the Chinese, and with an 
arrogant desire on the part of Hideyoshi to assert his 
personal power. The consequence of all these 
discordant causes was that the Chinese took umbrage 
at some Japanese attacks on the Coreans, and 
Hideyoshi was offended by an insufficient recognition 
from the Emperor of China. A second invasion of 
Corea was at once planned, and an army as powerful 
as the first invaded that unfortunate country. The 
success of this second invasion was inferior to the 
first. The Coreans were prepared, and had been 
trained by the former campaigns, while a large 
Chinese army was already in the country to support 
them. The Japanese armies, after several victories, 
advanced only as far as the capital ; but they were 
obliged to retire almost at once, a defeat of their 
fleet, as in the former advance to Phyong-yang, 
depriving them of all means of obtaining supplies. 
As winter was approaching, and the country had l>een 
devastated by years of warfare, they had to retire 
down to the coast near Japan. The Japanese, now 
conscious they were leaving the country for ever, 
resolved to enrich themselves and to inflict as nmch 
injury as they could on the unfortunate Coreans. 
They sacked andlmrnt all the towns during their 
slow march south. The retreating army took up its 
positions at Fusan and Urusan,,at which latter place 



32 THE CHIN A- JAPAN WAR. * 

they were forced to stand at bay, as an immense 
army of CJhinese and Coreans was coming up to 
avenge former defeats and the ruthless devastation of 
the country. The siege of Urusan was the last 
important episode of the war, and it was a fitting end 
to the succession of liorrors which had afflicted Corea 
for so many years. The Japanese, knowing the 
numbers and fury of their enemies, fortified their 
position. A triple enchjsure of strong high w^alls, 
flanked by towers protected three sides of their camp, 
which was guarded by the sea on the fourth side. 
During the whole severe (^orean winter the Japanese 
withstood furious assaults, amidst the horrors of 
famine and thirst. The lively imagination of the 
Japanese, so fond of the liorrid and grotesque, has 
handed down innumerable incidents of that dreadful 
siege. The arrows shot into the fortress were so 
numerous that the besieged used them as fuel to cook 
the flesh of the frozen corpses of their horses. Every 
device was employed to eke out their scanty 
provisions. Rats and mice were caught and eaten, 
and even paper was chewed to allay the pangs of 
hunger. The famished soldiei-s suffered from the 
intense cold, and many were found frozen to death 
sitting on the sunny side of the walls, where they had 
vainly sought a little warmth. In the first assault 
the Chinese had won the first enclosure, and the 
Japanese found themselves in great straits for water, 
as the enemy guarded every stream and source. It 
is said the Japanese were reduced to lick the wounds 



BELATIONS OF CHINA, COREA AND JAPAN. 33 

of the corpses, and chew the Hesh to allay their thirst. 
Amidst famine and thirst they had to make such 
^'iolent exertions that in the extreme cold their 
armour was covered with frozen sweat Japanese 
historians amusingly relate that the warriors found 
their greave-bands constantly slipping down, as their 
legs had become like bamboo sticks. Amidst all these 



Siorrors one is charmed to find a few romantic episodes 
•well befitting the chivalrous character of the feudal 
•Japanese. Asano, one of the generals at Urusan, 
livrote of his distress to Kato, and as tlie latter had 
sworn to Asano's father to ever help his son, he at 
once proceeded to Urusan to share the dangers and 
privations of his friend. The distressed garrison of 
Urusan had sent many urgent messages for relief, but 
it was not until they were almost reduced by famine 
that an army marched from Fusan, and, after a 
•ilesperate struggle, defeated the besiegers. 

Both armies were too much exhausted by the 
•winter campaign to engage in any decisive battle, 
and the military operations were confined to guerilla 
warfare. The death of Hidevoshi, the autlior of the 
•war, soon after put an end to it ; one of his last orders 
was to recall all his troops from Corea. Tlie war, 
together with the different attempted negotiations, 
had lasted over six years — from the middle of 151)2 
to the end of 1598. During all this time Japan had 
fought against (Wea and China, but thougli sucress- 
ful in most battles, want of supplies had obliged her 
.gradually to retreat. The only practical result of the 



34 THE CHINA-JAPAN WAR. 

two terrible invasions was the occupation of Fusan, 
which was kept and garrisoned by the Japanese, who 
probably clung to it as a souvenir of their military 
achievements, just as the English, after they had been 
driven out of France, long retained a hold of Calais, 
and were attached to it far beyond its intrinsic 
importance, as the last remnant of their continental 
possessions. 

A long account has been given of Hideyoshi's 
campaign,* but it is not superfluous, as that event 
forms a conspicuous episode of Japanese history which 
has deeply impressed itself on the national mind. 
Modern Japanese writers say that it is similar to the 
Crusades, and as those romantic expeditions have 
greatly contributed to fix the European mind on the 
East, so Hideyoshis invasions have kept Japan's 
attention riveted to Corea. 

* Besides native historians, an article in a foreign paper 
published in the Far East has been of great use in coinpiling^ 
this description. 



( So ) 



CHAPTER II. 

SKETCH OF MODERN HISTORY OF COREA. 

Soon after Hideyoshi's death and the eoUapse of his 
ambitious schemes, great changes took place in China 
and Japan. In the former country tlie JMing dynasty 
grew feebler every day, and was finally supplanted 
by the Manchus, who govern the country still. In 
the latter, the Tokugawas, l)y rendering the post of 
Shogun hereditary in their family, monopolised the 
power in the country up to the restoraticm in 1868. 

The terrible experiences of the Japanese invasions 
encouraged the love of isolation of the Coreans ; every 
measure was adopted to prevent foreigners penetrating 
into the countrv. Aloni]: the northern frontier a 
desolate tract of land called the Neutral Zone divided 
C*orea from the Chinese Empire. The subjects of the 
two countries were only allowed commercial inter- 
course once a year at an appointed fair hehl at a 
l>order town. After the fair was closed, any Chinese 
(or Manchu) who was found on C<jrean territory was 
liable to l)e put to death. ( Ireat vigilance was exer • 
rised along the coasts, and an ori^fanised svstem of 
beacon-fires on tlie hill-tops served to convey rapi<l 
intelligence to the capital of the approach of any 

I) 2 



36 THE CHINA-JAPAN WAR. 

strange vessel. Any foreigners who were cast ashore 
hy shipwreck, were kept in strict confinement and 
not allowed to return to their country, or even to be 
seen by the Chinese envoys ; this was the lot of the 
Dutch sailors of the seventeenth century, who were 
detained fourteen years before they could effect their 
escape. 

To avoid collisions with her neighbours, Corea con- 
sented to send tributary missions to Pekin and Yedo, 
which were more flattering to the pride of China and 
Japan than burdensome to the Corean exchequer. 
The strict loyalty to the Western suzerain involved 
Corea in the beginning of the seventeenth century in 
some wars with the Manchus, who were then menacing 
the Chinese dynasty of the Ming. Two invasions in 
1627 and 1637 forced the Coreans to transfer their 
allegiance to the Manchus, but as the latter soon after 
became the occupants of the Dragon throne, the 
Coreans were no longer embarrassed about the choice 
of their Western suzerain, and w^ere able to enjoy 
over two centuries of immunity from foreign wars. 
Unfortunately, strife of some kind is inseparable from 
all forms of society, as it is a law which rules the 
whole organic world, and the care employed by Corea 
to avoid w^ar with her neighbours and encroachment 
from more distant and enterprising nations, instead of 
producing a state of peace and tranquillity, developed 
a number of factious parties in the country which have 
rent her with conspiracies, political assassinations, and 
family feuds up to the present time. 



SKETCH OF MODERN HISTORY OF CORE A. 37 

This strange isolation, which earned for Corea the 
names of the Hermit Nation and the Forbidden Land, 
lasted until quite recently, and was a curious anomaly, 
when her two powerful neighbours had been forced 
open to the commerce of the world, and when 
steamers were constantly passing within sight of her 
coasts. Attempts of all kinds w^ere made by per- 
sons of all descriptions, actuated by the most oppo- 
site motives to overcome this stubborn seclusion. 
Christianity, which had penetrated into the peninsula, 
about the end of last century through the conversion 
of some Coreans at Peking, soon inspired some French 
missionaries to enter the country in disguise (the only 
means open to them) ; the success of their mission 
soon caused a violent persecution. The French 
Government, which has always protected Catholic 
missionaries, tried in several ways to obtain religious 
toleration for their protefje.s. The first expedition of 
La Gloire and La Victorieuse was shipwrecked, owing 
to faulty charts and the high tides of the Corean 
coast. No redress having been obtained from the 
Chinese Government for the increasing persecution, 
in 1866 the French undertook to coerce the Coreans 
directly. On the 25th September the Deroulede and 
Tardif, with Bishop Ridel and three Corean converts 
as guides, anchored in front of Seoul, and caused such 
panic in the Corean capitid, that no fooil was pro- 
curable from the neighbouring country. Had the 
French remained, they might have dictated their 
terms, but Admiral Roze refused to listen to the 



38 THE CHINA-JAPAN WAR. 

entreaties of the bisliop, and returned to Chefoo to 
organise a more powerful expedition. This consisted 
of the frigate Guerrihre^ the corvettes Laplace and 
Primauguet^ the despatch vessels Deroulede and 
Kien-chan^ and the gun-boats Tardif and Lehreton 
with 600 soldiers. The French w^ere successful at first, 
taking the city of Kang-hwa, and defeating the 
Coreans in several engagements ; but growing careless, 
they were repulsed in the attack on a fortified 
monastery, which might have been shelled from the 
ships. This slight defeat was suflicient for . the 
admiral! to order a retreat, to the great disgust of 
the whole fleet. This unaccountable retreat was 
magnified by the Coreans into a national victory, 
and the persecution of the Christians became more 
violent. 

At the same time attempts were made to establish 
commercial relations with Corea. In 1862, the 
Government of Emperor Napoleon III. tried to get 
the envoys of the Shogun (Tycoon) to obtain freedom 
for French trade in the peninsula, and Lord Russell 
wished that England should also enjoy the commer- 
cial privileges the Japanese had at Fusan : the 
Russians also established a station at Tsushima, 
which, however, they were obliged to abandon. In 
1866, the Russians sent a war- vessel to Broughtons 
Bay to demand right of trade, but were told to apply 
at Peking. In the same year the adventurer Oppert 
(the author of the * Forbidden Land'), who had set 
his mind to open Corea to the trade of the world. 



SKETCH OF MODERN HI810RY OF CORE A. 39 

\4sited the country twice, first in the Rona, and 
then in the Emperor; and the American schooner 
(jreneral Sherman, in attempting to trade in the 
Tai-dong river, was destroyed and all her crew 
massacred. 

A double current of feeling impelled men to seek 
to break through Corea's seclusion : religious zeal 
for the diffusion of the Gospel, and the spirit of 
commercial enterprise which dreamed of countless 
wealth in the opening of a new country. These 
sentiments of such different nature united in inspir- 
ing one of the most extraordinary expeditions known 
in history. The French missionaries, under the 
pressure of the furious and relentless persecution 
which obliged them to hide like wild beasts, must 
often have been driven almost to insanity, and were 
led to countenance the mad schemes of their ignorant 
and persecuted converts. Some Coreans asserted 
that the Regent, or Tai-wen-Kun, who was the 
fiercest persecutor, was so superstitious that, if they 
could secure the bones contained in some royal 
mausoleum, they could obtain freedom of religion 
and commerce as ransom for the contents of the 
tombs. 

Oppert, whom we have already mentioned, had 
entered into communication with the French priests 
and their Corean converts, during his two experi- 
mental commercial trips in 1866, so that when a 
French priest with four Corean Christians came to 
Shanghai, early in 1867, they laid before him the 



40 THE CHINA-JAPAN WAS. 

plan of rifling the royal tombs. The scheme was 
approved by Oppert, who, with the assistance of 
some merchants in Shanghai, fitted out an expedi- 
tion consisting of the s.s. China, of 680 tons, and a 
steam tender of 60 tons, manned hy eight Europeans, 
twenty Manilamen, and about one hundred Chinamen. 
This strange coml)ination of missionaries and adven- 
turers had for its object the cessation of religious. 




persecution and the opening of Corea to the commerce 
of the world. All this was to be obtained through 
the mystorious tombs which were not easily acces- 
siltle. The nearest route lay in Priuce Jerome'& 
Bay, up a river which was only navigable on cer- 
tain days of the month with favourable tides. As 
happens in such nicely calculated schemes, any 
delay meant failure ; there was some loss of time. 



SKETCH 01 MODERN HISTORY OF CORE A. 41 

and the expedition, after coaling at Nagasaki, reached 
Prince Jerome's Gulf on the 8th of May, 1867, and 
did not get up the river, in the tender, until almost 
the last favourable period of the tide. With the 
utmost despatch the tombs were found, and the 
work of excavation commenced, but, unfortunately, 
the work was stopped by a rocky slab, which could 
not be removed with the shovels they had brought. 
There was no time to go back to the ship for better 
instruments, as the favourable tide was almost 
over, besides the country was becoming alarmed at 
the nature of their proceedings. Thus the whole 
expedition failed through the unexpected presence of 
a stone slal). 

In 1871, America, whose attention to Corea had 
]>een repeatedly drawn on account of the loss of the 
General Sherman^ which had never been satis- 
factorily explained, made a vigorous attempt to 
open Corea as she had opened Japan. An expedition 
was fitted out, consisting of the flagship Colorado, 
the corv'ettes Alaska and Benecia, and the gun- 
IxMits Monocacy and Palos. They proceeded near 
Kang-hwa Island, where the French expedition 
had been a few years before. After some fruitless 
parleying, the American ships being fired upon, the 
Coreau forts were shelled and silenced, and a force 
of 759 men landed, which stormed another Corean 
fort. In all five forts were captured, but notliing 
else was effected. Admiral Ro<lgers, like the French 
Admiral Roze, preferred to retire, and (Korean 



42 THE CHINA-JAPAN WAR. 

-conceit was not slow in imagining that America, 
like France, had been successfully repulsed by 
native valour. 

While America and Europe, both Governments 
and indi^dduals, were making frequent but feeble 
attempts to open Corea, great changes were taking 
place in the interior of that country, and in its 
relations with its two immediate neighbours, Japan 
and China. In 1864, the Ni dynasty, which had 
lasted since 1392, was abruptly terminated by the 
death of the last king before he had chosen an heir. 
After a series of palace intrigues the present king, 
then quite a boy, was elected under the regency of 
his father, who assumed the title of Tai-wen-Kun, a 
name familiar to foreigners in the Far East on 
account of his merciless persecution of the Christians, 
and endless intrigues, which have so often disturbed 
his country and its neighbours. Japan, by one of the 
most extraordinary revolutions in history, changed 
her whole political organisation and social customs, 
and, breaking away from Chinese influence, began to 
follow European models. These measures, which 
startled the whole Far East, were peculiarly obnoxious 
to the Tai-wen-Kun, who was strenuously opposing 
all foreign encroachments, religious and commercial, 
in Corea, and when Japan rather imprudently sent 
an invitation to Corea to resume her ancient vassal- 
age, he took the opportunity of refusing in an 
insolent way. This insult caused deep indignation 
in Japan, and a war party, with Saigo of Satsuma 



SKETCH OF MODERN HISTORY OF CORE A. 43 

at its head, was immediately formed. Japan, however, 
then could not afford to go to war, and the question 
was left for later solution. 

In 1875, there occurred two events which then 
passed almost unobserved, but which now must be 
considered of great importance, as they were the 
beginning of a persistent line of conduct which 
insensibly but inexorably has led China and Japan 
to war. 

The neutral strip of land left uncultivated and 
ownerless, between China and Corea, had become the 
haunt of robbers, whose depredation ravaged the 
neighbouring Chinese districts. Li-Hung-Chang sent 
a body of troops across the border, a gun-boat on the 
Yalu, and destroyed the marauders. This military 
expedition had as its natural consequence the regular 
annexation in 1877 of the whole country to China, 
whose frontier thus extended to the Yalu river. 
Corea and China, having now a common boundary, 
became more closely connected, and the latter was 
forced to take greater interest in the affairs of the 
peninsula. On the other hand, in September of the 
same year, 1875, some Japanese sailors of the Unyo 
Kan, having landed for water on Kang-hwa Island, 
were fired upon by the Coreans. A party of thirty 
Japanese at once landed, stormed a fort, destroyed 
its defenders, and dismantled it ; in fact, they accom- 
plished almost as much as the 600 Frenchmen of 
Admiral Roze, and 759 Americans of Admiral Rodgers, 
and keen observers might have seen even then what 



44 THE CHINA-JAPAN WAR. 

advantage the Japanese would have over European 
troops engaged in a war against either Coreans or 
Chinese. After such an outrage, all parties in Japan 
agreed to take strong measures : China's neutrality 
was secured, and an expedition of two men-of-war 
and three transports, with less than 800 men, was sent 
to Corea. The Japanese played oflf on the Coreans 
what had been done to them twenty-two years before 
by the Americans : they imitated Commodore Perry's 
stratagems by making a great display of their ships 
and men in sight of Seoul ; and after three weeks, 
on the 27th February, 1876, a treaty was signed 
opening Fusan to Japanese trade. In 1880, Fusan 
and Chemulpo were also opened, and Japan found 
herself gradually committed to a policy of progress in 
Corea. 

Japan's success in opening Corea soon aroused 
the rivalry of other nations. In 1882, Commodore 
Shufeldt signed the treaty which opened Corea to- 
the trade of the United States, and in the same and 
following years most of the European States concluded 
treaties. 

The Hermit Kingdom was, however, a disappoint- 
ment to foreigners, the resources of the country were 
found to be very meagre, and the people indolent ;: 
no trade of any consequence passed through the hands 
of Europeans : Corea remained the field of enterprise 
of Chinese and Japanese. 

The latter, especially, established themselves from 
the beginning in a way which show^ed they intended. 



SKETCH OF MODERN HISTORY OF COREA. 45 

to be paramount in the country which they had drawn 
from its secular seclusion. They built imposing 
•Consulates, laid out flourishing settlements, and tried 
to play the part in Chorea which for the last half 
•century had been played by the Europeans in the 
open ports of China. Of course they met with the 
some opposition : all the Coreans averse to progress, 
either through ignorance or laziness, became enemies 
of the Japanese. The old party denominations which 
lad satisfied the Coreans for centuries and had suf- 
ficed to fill the country with bloodshed and strife, 
were inadequate to the new and strange conditions of 
the peninsula. A Progressionist and a (Conservative 
party now arose, and each tried to find support in one 
of the neighbouring countries. 

The common name for China in Corea was Ta-kuc 
(the Great Country), and we know that nations are 
often willing to endure the greatest sacrifices to keep 
such proud designations. 

The Chinese felt that they had responsibilities in the 
peninsula, and were disinclined that it should become 
a practising ground for that form of civilisation 
which the Japanese had imported from the West, and 
were desirous to acclimatise in the Far Eiist. China 
was irresistibly led to give sooner or later her supp6rt 
to the Corean (Conservative party. ^ 

On the other han<l, Japan Telt herself bound to 
supjKirt the Progressive party, which aimed at con^ 
tinuing the policy inaugurated by the Treaties, and 
wished to introduce into Corea the foreiirn customs 



46 TEE CfflNA'JAPAN WAB. 

and learning adopted by the Eastern neighbour. The 
support of two opposite parties in a country which 
China and Japan wished to control, was a sufficient 
cause to provoke a conflict between the two powers, 
but there was a still greater cause of danger in the- 
distrust and suspicion which each felt for the other. 
Every political disturbance (and they happen often in 
a disordered country like Corea, which has been the 
prey of family feuds for centuries) was sure to be 
attributed to the machinations of the rival nation. 
The prudence of statesmen was able to defer the 
conflict, but it was not likely to prevent it in- 
definitely. 

The first complication in Corea which threatened 
the peace of the three countries of the Far East 
happened in July, 1882. Kim-Ok-Kiun and other 
Coreans had been over to Japan. Surprised and pleased 
at the wonders which they had seen, they came back 
partisans of progress and enthusiastic supporters of 
Japanese influence. These ideas were not favourably 
received by the ex-Regent or Tai- Wen-kun, who was 
a hater of everything foreign, and he began to- 
intrigue with the Min, a powerful faction in Corea. 
It was decided to drive the Japanese out by violence. 
The soldiers were infuriated by having their rations 
diminished, and then malicious reports against the 
Japanese were spread about the capital. A furious 
mob began to hunt to death all the defenceless- 
Japanese that could be found. A Japanese officer, 
who had been drilling the Corean troops, and seveiv 



SKETCH OF MODERN niSTORT OF CORE A. 47 

others were murdered in one day ; the Legation \va& 
attacked and burnt ; and the minister, with twenty- 
eight Japanese, had to fight their way through the 
streets of Seoul and through the country to the sea, 
where they embarked on a j unk and were picked up 
hy the British gun-boat Flying Fish, which took them- 
t» Nagasaki. 

The Japanese Government at once took measures 
to obtain redress for the outrage : troops were got 
ready for any emergency, and the minister was sent 
back to Seoul with a military force. The C^hinese 
also sent a body of troops to Corea, but it was not 
with the object of opposing the Japanese, it was with 
the laudable intention of making a serious effort to« 
establish peace in that distracted country. In fact, 
as soon as the Japanese had obtained satisfaction, 
the Chinese succeeded in capturing the Tai- Wen-kun,. 
the chief originator of all mischief in the peninsula, 
and conveyed him to China, where he was detained 
for several years. The Corean Government had to 
send a special embassy to tender apology to Japan, to 
pay an indemnity to the families of the victims and 
to Japan, and allowed a certain numl^er of Japanese 
soldiers to remain in Seoul for the protection of 
the Legation. In consequence of this last condi- 
tion China also stationed a body of troops in the 
capital. 

The peace thus established lasted only a little over 
two years. The Min faction occupied the most 
important posts in the government, and this was 



48 THE CHINA-JAPAN WAR. 

resented by the Progressive party, who, seeing they 
could not triumph by pacific means, resolved to have 
recourse to violence and assassination, the usual 
political methods of Corea. In December, 1884, 
to celebrate the opening of the post-office, an official 
dinner was given in Seoul, to which all the Foreign 
Ministers were invited, most of the Corean high 
officials being also present. During the dinner 
there was an alarm of fire, and Prince Min (one of 
the Conserv^ative party) left the banquet-room to 
ascertain where the fire was, when he was attacked 
by assassins, who almost killed him with their swords. 
The banquet broke up in great confusion, most of the 
guesfcs escaping in the scuffle. This was but the 
beginning of the plot. During the night several of 
the Conservative Ministers were killed, and the next 
morning a new government was formed b^ Kim-Ok- 
Kiun and other members of the Progressive party, 
who invited the Japanese troops to protect the 
Koyal Palace. The Min party, however, soon re- 
covered from the blow, and, with the assistance of the 
Chinese troops, they attacked the Japanese who 
guarded the Palace. The king fled during the fight, 
and the Japanese thus lost all object in continuing 
the defence, as they were no longer supported by the 
only generally recognised Jtluthority of the country. 
They retreated to their Legation, fighting their way 
through the streets. The same scenes of 1882 were 
now enacted on a grander scale. Tlie Legation was 
.attacked and ])urnt, and the Japanese soldiers, forniinii^ 



SKETCH OF MODERN HISTORY OF CORE A. 49 

in a square, cut their way, with characteristic bravery, 
through Chinese troops and Corean mobs from Seoul 
to the sea. 

Though this second sedition in the Corean capital 
resembled so much the first that had happened only 
two years before, it was much graver and might lead 
to more serious consequences. The Japanese Legation 
had been burnt and the soldiers driven out, not by a 
Corean mob alone, but also by Chinese soldiers, and 
this might involve the two countries in a war. The 
Japanese, with their usual discriminating clearness, set 
themselves to settle the two questions separately. A 
Minister was sent to Corea to obtain redress from 
that Government, and conditions similar to those of 
the convention of 1882 were demanded and granted : 
Corea had to (xpologise, to pay an indemity, to punish 
the murderers of a Japanese ofticer, and to rebuild the 
Legation at her own expense. Both China and Japan 
had sent military and naval forces to protect their 
interests in Corea at that juncture, but fortunately all 
further collision was avoided. 

After settling with CVirea, Japan sent Count Ito 
and a special embassy to negotiate with ('hina, who, 
on her side appointed Li-IIung-Chang as her Pleni- 
potentiary (assisted by Wii Ta Cheng). On the 
18th April, 1885, the Tientsin Convention was sighed. 
It consisted of three articles : in the first it was 
Htipulated that both countries should withdraw their 
troops from Corea ; in the second that no more ofticers 
Hhould be sent by either country to drill the (V)rean 

K 



50 THE CEINA-JAPAN WAB. 

troops ; and in the third, that if at any future time, 
in case of disturbances, either country should send 
troops to Corea, it must inform the other country. 
The Tientsin Convention secured peace in Corea for 
nine years, a very long period for such a restless and 
turbulent country ; this fact redounds to the credit 
of the sagacity of the two negotiators, Li-Hung-Chang 
iind Count Ito. 



-( 51 ) 



CHAPTER III. 

EVENTS IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING THE OUTBREAK OF 

HOSTILITIES. 

The Assassination of Kini-Ok-Kiun. 

On the 28th of March, 1894, the pacific residentij of 
Shanghai, whose tranquil existence is only excited by 
the result of the races and the fluctuations of exchange, 
were startled by the news that a political assassination 
of an extraordinary character had taken place on the 
Foreign Settlements. Kim-Ok-Kiun, the leader of 
the Corean Revolution of 1884, had fled to Japan 
after the defeat of his party, and lived there together 
with Boku-Eiko, another Corean refugee, up to March, 
1894. At that time he \vas prevailed upon to go to 
Shanghai by a Corean, Hung Tjyong-Ou, who had 
i^ieen abroad and spent several years in Paris, where 
he had made many accjuaintances, amongst whom the 
<;elebrat^d Pere Ilyacinthe Loyson. Kim-Ok-Kiun 
4irrived in Slianghai on the 27th of March, accom- 
panied by his Japanese servant, by the Corean Hung 
and by a C-hinese, the whole party stopping at a 
Japanese hotel on the American Settlement. On the 
following day, Kim gave Hung a cheque for $5,000 

to cash on a Chinese bank ; it was a bogus cheque, as 

E*> 



52 



THE CHINA-JAPAN WAR. 



no such bank was to be found in Shanghai. Hung 
returned, saying that the manager was out, and he 
must return later to get the money, at the same time 
he sent away the Japanese servant on some triHing 
errand. There were no witnesaes to what happened 
afterwards, but circumstances indicate that the drama 
was enacted as follows :■ — ^Kim-Ok-Kiun was on the 
Ijed on hia right side when Hung drew a revolver and 




fired at him, first at his left cheek, and then at his 
stomach as lie turned round ; Kim-(_)k-Kiun then 
jumped up and rushed out in the corridor, but Hung 
pursued him and with a third shot in the back, below 
the shoulder-blade, killed him. Hung then esaiped. 
The people who rushed in at the sound of tlie firing 
found the body of Kim-()k-Kiun in a pool of blood at 
the top of the stairs, whence it was removed back to 
his room. The assassin was tracked b}' the ihmicipal 



THE ASSASSINATION OF KIM-OK-KIUN 53 

police and arrested on the following morning. He 
seemed to glory in liis deed and said he had instruc- 
tions from the King of Corea. At the inquest held 
over the body the assassin seemed totally unconcerned, 
except when he saw the Japanese servant of Kim-Ok- 
Kian slowly approaching hiixi — then he trembled 
and felt relieved when the police kept the Japanese 
away. 

The foreigners in Shanghai, though not feeling 
much sympathy for the victim, were shocked at the 
'Crime that had been committed in their Settlements. 
One of the newspapers published the following appro- 
priate reflections : — " He is a very dangerous man 
«afely out of the way ; but whether his assassin was 
doing well for his country or not in removing him, he 
has no business to make our Settlement the scene of 
his crime. We do not want our Settlement made an 
Alsatia for political refugees from Corea and Japan, 
and for this at any rate Mr. Hung should be punished. 
Assassins commissioned by royalty should be warned 
that the foreign Settlement of Shanghai must be 
respected." Notwithstanding this expression of public 
opinion, Hung was given up to the Chinese authorities, 
and afterwards even the body of Kim-Ok-Kiun, which 
the Japanese servant wished to take back to Japan, 
^as also delivered to them. While detained, Hung 
was visited by a Corean official, who prostrated himself 
before him ; and on the 6th of April, at night, with 
the greatest precaution, surrounded by armed men, 
Hung was taken on board a Chinese man-of-war, which 



54 THE CHINA-JAPAN WAR. 

also conveyed to Corea the body of his victim — the 
man he had treacherously decoyed to Shanghai. On 
their arrival in Corea, rich rewards were heaped upon 
Hung, while the body of Kim-Ok-Kiun was quartered 
and the mutilated fragments exposed in the different 
provinces of the kingdom. 

The moral sentiment of the foreign community at 
Shanghai was shocked at this solution of the question^ 
and it was vaguely felt that a mistake and a fault had 
been committed, though none could foresee the con- 
sequences it would bring. The crime of Hung had 
started a very complicated conflict of jurisdictions. 
The Foreign Settlements of Shanghai are in a very 
anomalous position ; they may be best compared to- 
the city of Cracow in 1815, which was declared 
independent under the protection of Austria, Prussia, 
and Kussia. The foreigners residing in them are 
subject to the laws of their own country, and judged 
by their own Consuls ; while the Chinese, if they are 
in the service of foreigners or in cases connected with 
foreigners, cannot be tried by their own magistrate 
unless he acts in concert with a foreign assessor. 

Kim-Ok-Kiun and his murderer were both Coreans, 
but as Corea is not a Treaty Power and is considered 
to be a tributary State of China, it was difficult to 
decide by what law and by what judge the case should 
be tried. The question was much debated by the 
Consular Body. J. M. Travassos y Valdez, the 
Portuguese Consul-General and Senior Consul, treated 
the matter in an exhaustive manner. He showed 



THE ASSASSINATION OF KIM-OK-KIUN. 55 

that the Consuls and the Municipal Council between 
them possessed the legislative, executive and judicial 
powers — all that constitutes a true sovereignty. He 
quoted articles of the different treaties and conventions 
between China and foreign powers which did not in- 
validate this sovereignty and proved that the payment 
of a small land-tax to the Chinese Emperor (who, by 
Chinese law, is the proprietor of all land in the empire 
and only leases it to his subjects) does not affect the 
question of sovereignty wdthin the Settlements, no 
more than the payment of tribute by a tributary 
state lessens its sovereign rights within its frontiers. 
He demonstrated that by the rules of the Mixed Court 
the Chinese Magistrate had the least power ; while all 
the Consuls had full power over their nationals in 
each and every case ; the authority of the Chinese 
Magistrate was limited by the presence of a foreign 
assessor in many cases. After discussing the different 
legal theories which might be brought to bear on the 
ease, he completely demolished the absurd assumption 
that, Corea being a tributarj^ state, Coreans were to 
be treated like Chinese subjects ; the suzerainty of 
China not affecting the sovereign rights of Corea, 
which had moreover been recognised by the different 
Treaties and by the diplomatic relations of that 
country. He concluded that the case should be tried 
by a membev of the Consular Body and according to 
the laws of his country. Some opposition in the 
Consular Body prevented this rational conclusion, and 
Hung was delivered to the Chinese authorities with 



56 THE CniNA-JAPAN WAR. 

the result we have seen. Mr. Valdez deplored this 
measure as an outrage to the foreign flags which 
defended the Settlements, as a violation to the sacred 
rights of asylum, and as a dangerous precedent which 
might lead to endless crimes. Any Corean Minister 
obnoxious to his Court might be murdered with 
impunity in the Fofeign Settlements of Shanghai, 
and the assassin would be handed over to the Corean 
authorities to be handsomely rewarded. 

Indeed it is regrettable that any foreigner should 
have forgotten the high mission which it behoves him 
to fulfil in China, where every European or American 
should consider himself as the pioneer of a nobler 
civilisation which has to be engrafted into the aged 
empire. The delivery of Hung and the body of Kim 
was a foolish and base action. It showed weakness, 
and it pandered to the vilest instincts of barbarism. 
It was sad that white men, forgetful of all the glories 
of their race, should descend from the high place to 
which they have been elevated by centuries of 
Christian and philosophical progress, and become 
accomplices in the shameful practices of the barbarous 
government of Corea. But it is not necessary to 
waste words to stigmatise this action, because it 
brought its own punishment on all those concerned. 
(^ The rest of this book will show that the false step 
taken at Shanghai was the primary cause of that 
acute state of the Corean question which led to the 
war between China and Japan. The war had already 
been prevented on two former occasions, and it 



THE ASSASSINATION OF KIM-OK-KIUN 57 

might still have been averted for many years if 
further provocation had been spared to the excited 
political parties of the Corean Peninsula. China 
would not have lost thousands of lives and millions of 
money, and foreign merchants would not have suffered 
from a painful depression. If the step was taken 
in deference to the Chinese Government it showed 
an erroneous appreciation of the true aspects of the 
questions of the Far East ; in that case, as in all others, 
the most friendly action towards China is firmly to 
prevent her committing those mistakes which her 
ignorance of international law and usage renders her 
liable. True friends are niever servile ; they never 
renounce their convictions and their feelings to sub- 
serve the weakness and prejudices of those in whom 
they feel an interest. 



The Tong-IIaks. 

It has been already mentioned that Corea, after the 
Japanese invasions of the 16th century, was rent by 
domestic factions, and that during the present century 
the Roman Catholic propaganda had aroused a violent 
persecution, which in late years was headed by the 
7a/- Wen-Kun, the great hater of foreigners and their 
•doctrines. These facts had greatly disturbed the 
people ; internal dissension had produced misgovern- 
ment and dreadful oppression, every kind of com- 
mercial activity was burdened with taxes, and the 
peasants were liable to th^corire, which could only be 



58 THE CHINA-JAPAN WAR. 

avoided by the payment of a fine ; the teaching of 
the foreign missionaries, which was brought forcibly 
into public notice by official persecution, awakened 
men's minds to the existence of a body of doctrines 
totally different from those that had been taught for 
centuries and which compared favourably with them. 
In the second half of this century, the Corean people, 
debarred from all commercial and agricultural activity 
by vexatious taxation, and forced to do as little work 
as was sufficient for immediate subsistence to escape- 
extortion, had plenty of leisure to occupy theii* minds 
with the moral problems imported from the West. 
The consequence was the birth of a new religious sect, 
which, from the conditions of the country, ended by 
becoming another political party. 

In 1859, in the city of Kyeng-Jin, a walled town- 
forty miles north of Fusan, in the province of Kyong- 
Sang (the south-eastern province of Corea), a man 
called Choi-Chei-Ou, who had been very much 
impressed by the progress of Catholicism, fell sick, 
and, like other enthusiasts in such circumstances, had 
a vision which suggested a remedy for his sickness' 
and a new doctrine for the welfare of the people. 
After his recovery, he composed a book under the 
name of 'Great Sacred Writings/ It consisted 
principally of doctrines taken from the three great 
religions of China, which are also known in Corea. 
He took the five relations * from Confucianism, the 

* A doctrine of Confucius giving moral guidance in the 
relations of mankind, i.e., between sovereign and subject, father 



TEE TONG'HAKS. 59" 

law of heart-cleansing from Buddhism, the law of 
cleansing the body from moral as well as material filth 
from Taoism.* To give these old doctrines soma 
fresh flavour he added a few Christian ideas ; the 
rejection of transmigration and the existence of one 
God, for whom he used the Catholic name Chun Chu 
(Heavenly Master). The religion was called Tong- 
Hak Eastern Doctrine to distinguish it from the 
AVestern or Eoman Catholic. This national reaction 
against the foreign teaching soon spread from Kyong- 
Sang into the neighbouring provinces oi Chhung- 
Chhong and ChoUa, that is to say, through the 
whole of Southern Corea. In 1865, during a perse- 
cution of the Eoman Catholics, Choi was arrested as 
one of them and beheaded. Probably the officials 
could not discriminate nice points of doctrine, and 
considered one head more, even though not orthodox,, 
would add to their merits with the Government. The 
unjust death of their founder naturally exasperated 
the Tong-Haks ; this grievance against the govern- 
ment was the first provocation to become a political 
party, and they yielded to it as soon as the general 
di8ex)ntent encouraged them to do so. 

In the spring of 1893 a number of Tong-Haks 
came to the king s palace at Seoul to expose their 

and son, elder brother and youuger, husband and wife, friend 
and friend. 

* This account of Choi and his doctrines is taken from au 
article of Will. Jenkin in the Corean Eepository, the only 
account of the sect to ray knowledge. 



60 THE CHINA-JAPAN WAR. 

grievances ; they demanded that their martyred 
leader be declared innocent and rewarded with post- 
humous rank,* that they should not be confounded 
with the Roman Catholics, and that their religion 
should not be condemned. They declared they would 
drive out all foreigners if these demands .were not 
granted. They were sent away with soothing words, 
but some of them were arrested when they got back 
to their villages. 

About a year afterwards, in the months of March 
and April, 1894, the Tong-Haks began to put their 
threats into execution. The first outbreak was at 
Ko-pho in the province of ChoUa, and this was soon 
followed by another at Kim-Hai in the neighbouring 
province of Kyong-Sang. At first the Tong-Haks 
tried persuasion with the people, but whenever this 
failed they did not hesitate to use violence, ill- 
treating the stubborn and smashing their furniture. 
By these means they soon formed bands of several 
thousands, which moved about the country, putting 
to flight the officials and plundering pul)lic granaries 
and armouries. It was difficult to suppress them, as 
when they were atfaicked in one place they fled to 
another. But in a month or two their numbers had 
increased to such an extent that they required such 
tactics no longer ; they were a})le to keep the field 
and engage the government troops. 

In May, 1894, the insurrection became very serious ; 

* The Government of Corea, like that of China, grants 
honours even after death. 



THE TONG'HAKS. 61 

it had spread to different places of the three southern 
provinces, and in one place alone, the Tong-Haks. 
were said to be 20,000 or 30,000 strong. This was 
probably an exaggeration, ))ut sucli a rumour showed 
the alarm of the country. The Government sent 
some troops by sea on two small steamers to the 
province of ChoUa, and despatched another force by 
land. The Tai- Wen-Kun, when he was in power, had 
organised a kind of popular army or militia which was 
supposed to muster 50,000 or 60,000 men for the 
whole kingdom, and now the Seoul contingent was 
marched south to Cholla province. The Government 
troops had some success at first, and defeated the 
rel)els, who then retreated to Paik-san, a mountain 
stronghold. This fastness can shelter several thousand 
men, and has perpendicular rocks 150 feet high on 
three sides. The Ton^i^-Haks, feigning flight, inveigled 
the troops into a pursuit which led them into an 
ambus(!ade artfully prepared. The rebels were 
completely successful, routing their enemies with the 
loss of a high officer and over :^00 men. The next 
day, .'31st of May, the Government at Seoul were 
informed of this disaster, an<l the greatest consterna- 
tion prevailed in the capital. The ministers were 
consulting day and night, an<l the people expected 
theTong-IIaks at the gates. The dan^rer, though not 
so imminent, was still-great. On the 1st of June the 
rebels had taken the capital of ('holla province, and 
the report of their success encouraged insun'ectitm in 
ever}' <juarter. The most extraordinary rumours 



<52 THE CHINA-JAPAN WAB. 

circulated amongst the idle and ignorant people of 
Corea ; it was said that in the vanguard of the Tong- 
Haks, leading them to victory, could Ije seen a misty 
figure with a white helmet and cuirass, and tliis misty 
figure was believed to be the ghost of Kim-Ok-Kiun. 

The death of Kim-Ok-Kiun, by his political promi- 
nence and by its sensational character, had deeply 
impressed the idle Coreans, and it was still more 
brought into public notice by the exultant Min faction 
^hen they displayed the fragments of his body all 
over the kingdom. It was therefore natural that all 
those who were friendly to his party, or who hated 
the Min faction, should see a retribution brought 
about by superhuman means in the revolution which 
so quickly followed his death and the dismemberment 
of his body. 

The Min faction were so frightened by the news of 
the defeat of the Government troops, and of the capture 
of the provincial capital of ChoUa, that they resolved 
to invoke foreign aid and ask China to send troops 
to quell the rebellion. By the third article of the 
Tientsin Convention, Japan had an equal right to 
send troops to Corea, but it was hoped that the 
Japanese Government had too many internal diffi- 
culties with the Parliamentary opposition to be able 
to pay much attention to foreign complications. 
The application to China was made in the first days 
of June, and on the 8th of that month a small Chinese 
force was landed at Asan ; some additional troops 
were sent a few days later, when the Chinese soldiers 



THE TONG'EAKS. '63 

numbered probably about 2,000 men. It was a small 
force, but it came in the name of China, a country 
which is looked up to with sentiments of awe by the 
•Corean people, who call it the Great Country. The 
moral effect of the landing, and a small victory of 
the Corean troops, soon checked the progress of the 
Tong-Haks, who abated their military activity, though 
they were still ready to recommence their reign of 
violence when an opportunity offered itself. The 
Chinese Government also sent some men-of-war : the 
Yang-iceiy Ping-yiten, and Tsao-kiang to Chemulpo 
{the sea-port of the capital), and the Cki-yuea and 
Chih-yuen to Asan. 

The Japanese Government had been informed by 
China that a force was being sent to Corea, and, 
profiting by the third clause of the Tientsin 
Convention, it resolved to follow the same course. 
Otori, the Japanese minister to Corea, who was 
then in Japan on leave, received orders to rejoin 
his post, and he made such despatch that on the 
9th of June he arrived in Chemulpo. In that port there 
were six Japanese men-of-war, and a bofly of marines 
was landed to escort Otori to the capital. The Japanese 
minister left Chemulpo at 5 a.m. on the 10th of June 
and reached Seoul the same day ; the marines, about 
400 men, were (juartered in the aipital. This was 
only a preliminary measure. Japan prepared a much 
larger force to guard her interests in ( 'orca : on the 
3th June orders were issued to the military and naval 
authorities to prepare an expedition for the nei<^h- 



64 THE CUIIfA-JAPAN WAS. 

bouring peninsula. It was composed of troops of the- 
5th Division under the command of Major-General 
Oshima, and from its irregular formation it after- 
wards acquired the name of Mixed Brigade, a name- 
which the exploits of the war has rendered familiar 
throughout Japan. The military preparations were 
carried out with such rapidity, that the firat detach- 
ment was able to leave Ujiiia (the port of Hiroshima, 
headquarters of the 5th Division) on the 9th of June. 




The people of Japan are intensely patriotic, and have 
always felt deep interest in Corea ; they manifested 
therefore the greatest enthusiasm at the departure of 
the troops. From the 9th to the 11th of June, while 
the embarkation was going on, all the houses in Ujina 
and Hiroshima displayed the national Hag. 

The first detachment of Japanese troops reached 
Chemulpo on the 1 2th of June, and they proceeded at 
once to the capital to relieve the marines. Other 



THE TONQ'HAKS, 65 

detachments arrived afterwards, and it has been stated 
that before the outbreak of hostilities the Japanese 
had 8,000 men around Seoul : this number, as will 
be shown later, was probably an exaggeration, but 
they certainly had a force superior to the Chinese in 
Asan. 

The simultaneous presence of Chinese and Japanese 
soldiers in Corea created a situation full of difficulties, 
which were greatly increased by mutual distrust. 
Unfortunately, even in the diplomatic correspondence, 
the two countries could not find a common basis for 
discussion. The Chinese Government, though com- 
municating the departure of their troops for Corea in 
compliance with the Tientsin Convention, considered 
they had a special right to send troops, as Corea was 
their tributary country, and had asked for assistance. 
The Japanese Government, on the other hand, only 
asked in conformity with the Tientsin Convention^ ^ 
which gave equal riglit to th^^two countries to send 
troops, and they refused to recognise Corea as a 
tributary state of China. On this last point, no agree- 
ment was possible ; China continued asserting lier 
suzerainty, and Japan refused to acknowledge it. 
By the treaty of 1876, Japan had renounced her 
claims to suzerainty, and treated with Corea as an 
independent power, thus virtually ignoring Chinas 
protectorate. In the succeeding treaties, Corea had 
always informed the European powers of C.-hina s 
suzerainty, adding, however, that such suzerainty did 
not affect her sovereign rights, cither in internal or 

F 



66 THE CHINA-JAPAN WAB, 

foreign affairs, nor limit her powers of treaty-making. 
The people of Japan were quite as sensitive as their 
Government on this point, and an unlucky proclama- 
tion of the Chinese general at Asan, in which, besides 
promises of pardon to the rebels who submitted, and 
dreadful threats to those who resisted, Corea was 
mentioned as a tributary state of China, was loudly 
commented on in the Japanese press, and aroused 
great indignation. 

Another difficulty also arose in the course of the 
negotiations. The Japanese Government considered 
the Tong-Hak movement not an accidental occurrence, 
but the inevitable consequence of the persisting mis- 
government of the country, and argued that the 
rebellion could not be suppressed, nor its recurrence 
prevented, unless radical reforms were carried out in 
Corea. Japan proposed that reforms should be . 
instituted, and asked China to assist her in enforcing 
them. China refused to join in such measures, not 
deeming them necessary, and not wishing to interfere 
in the internal affairs of the peninsula. 

The suggestion of the Japanese Government, 
which had thus created another difficulty, was a very 
clever move ; it placed China in a dilemma : the mis- 
government of Corea was evident and difficult to be 
denied, yet China could not act against the party 
which caused the misgovernment, because they were 
her friends, and she had sent troops to support 
them. 

Notwithstanding these reasons, it would have been 



TBE TONQ'HAKS. 67 

better for China to have accepted Japan's proposals ; 
Corea, a poor country, was not worth a war, and the 
nominal suzerainty was only a question of puerile 
vanity. 

Besides showing greater diplomatic ability, Japan 
possessed great political and military advantages 
quite from the beginning of the crisis. While the 
Chinese had onlv a small force in an obscure corner 
of the country, the Japanese were masters of the 
capital, and had the Government under their control. 
They lost no time in using these advantages. Otori 
insisted that reforms should be carried out, and 
obtained the nomination of a special commission to 
that effect His programme of reforms was very 
complete, and comprised five principal headings 
.subdivided into minor ones.* 

The Coreans, though yielding apparently to Otori's 
persistent importunity, had no real desire to carry out 
such a thorough reorganisation of the country. They 
procrastinated, and later on answered that the reforms 
could not be initiated until the Japanese troops had 
left Corea. The situation became very grave. 
Neither China nor Japan would yield, and Corea 
hesitated in coming to a decision. Her sympathies 
were with China, but Japan held her capital, and 
«!Ould enforce what she liked. 

Although the negotiations had been carried on all 
the time, and friendly Powers had otl'ered their good 
offices in the cause of peace, no settlement could ))c 

* See Appendix A. 

F 2 



68 THE CHINA-JAPAN WAS. 

arrived at. Japan resolved to take her stand with 
China and Corea on the questions of reforms. She 
closed her correspondence with China, declaring that 
the latter country's refusal to entertain the proposal 
of reforms relieved the Japanese Government of all 
responsibility for any eventuality which might arise 
out of the situation.* With Corea she determined to 
urga the reforms, employing all means, even force, 
when other methods had failed. In the latter half of 
July the prospects of peace were almost hopeless. It 
became only a matter of speculation what incident 
would precipitate hostilities. On the 16 th of July 
the Chinese Government asked Japan to send no 
more men-of-war to the treaty ports (probably a 
renewal of the Foochowf affair was feared), and 
on the 24 th of July it was known in Shanghai 
that the Japanese Government had promised not 
to include that port in their sphere of military 
operations. 

Before describing the outbreak of hostilities and 
the course of the war it will be useful to cast 
a glance on the armies and navies of the two 
countries. 

* The whole correspondence which preceded the war is 
contained in Appendix B. 

t The French fleet went up the Foochow river in 1884 before 
hostilities commenced, and blockaded the Chinese fleet, which 
afterwards they destroyed. 



^ 69 ) 



Tlie Chinese Army. 

The army of the Chinese Empire is nominally 
formed of four classes of troops : — 

I. The Eight Banners. 

11. The Green Standard (or Chinese Army). 

III. The Braves (or Volunteers). 

IV. The Drilled or Trained Army. 

(I). The first class received its name because it 
was divided by the first sovereigns of the Manchu 
dynasty, now reigning in China, into the following 
divisions : — 



J. Bordered yellow 

2. Plain yellow . 

3. Plain white 

4. Bordered white 

5. Plain red . 

6. Bordered red . 

7. Plain blue . 

8. Bordered blue . 



Three superior banners. 



Five inferior banners. 



Each of these banners is composed of Manelius, Mon- 
gols and Chinese, who form each a kusai, so that the 
whole banner force is divided into twentv-four kusai. 
The men (they cannot be called soldiers) who are en- 
rolled in this force are the descendants of the army 
which conquered China about two hundred and fifty 



70 THE CHINA-JAPAN WAS. 

years ago, and established the present dynasty. That 
army, originally composed of Manchus and Mongols, 
was afterwards reinforced by the defection of a part 
of the Chinese army who forsook the Ming dynasty. 
This united force of three nationalities conquered the 
whole country and established itself in garrisons in 
the principal cities of China. Where the hardy 
sold^^ers were placed two centuries ago, to guard the 
fortresses and curb rebellion, now their descendants 
can be seen, living peacefully among the Chinese, 
enjoying privileges, but totally indistinguishable 
from the rest of the people. There is not the slightest 
trace of that bravery and spirit of adventure which 
led the mixed horde from the barren north down 
to the fertile plains of China in the members of 
the present banner force. They consider that their 
ancestors earned glory enough for the succeeding 
generations, and limit themselves to drawing their 
pay. 

The numerical strength of the Eight Banners may 
be estimated at about 250,000 men, of whom nearly 
two-thirds are either in Peking or the metropolitan 
province of Chihli, the rest are in garrisons in the 
principal cities of the empire. This distribution is 
in accordance wdth the ancient policy of the Dynasty, 
who at first treated China as a conquered country, 
and had to establish garrisons to check any incipient 
rebellion, and to keep the bulk of their army near 
Peking, ready to march in any direction on every 
emergency. 



TEE CHINESE ABMY. 71 

The subdivisions of the Eight Banners at Peking 
are as follows : — 

Men. 

The " Proud Riders " (called " Paid Division " by^ 

Sir Thomas Wade), composed of Manchus, Mon-l ^g ^^^ 
gols and Chinese. Each kasai furoishes 1 camp [ 
(battalion), t.e., 24 camps . * ' 

Guards or Flank Division, Manchus and Mongols,) . ,. ^^q 
8 camps I ' 

Vanguard Division, Mancbus and Mongols, 4) . p.^^ 
camps about) 

Light Division, Manchus and Mongols, 2 camps • 2,000 

Imperial Guard, Manchus and Mongols of three] , -^^ 
superior banners, 1 camp I ' 

Gendarmerie Division, Manchus, Mongols and) <^. ^^^^ 
Chinese, 8 camps . . \ ' 

Artillery and Musketry Division, Manchus and) g ^oo 
Mongols, 4 camps about! 

Peking Field Force, Manchus, Mongols and) oq qoo 
Chinese about) 

Total . . . 96,400 

Of the above force only about 20,000 or 30,000 
can in any way be considered as soldiers. 

IL The second class, the Green Standard (or Chinese 
Army), is composed entirely of Chinese, and is but a 
modification of the ancient army which the Manchus 
found in existence when they conquered China. It 
numbers about 500,000 or 600,000 * men, distributed 

• According to a memorial of Tseng-Kwo-Fan, the Green 
Standard from the reign of Yung-cheng (1723-36) to the forty- 
fifth year of Chien-Lung (1781), though nominally consisting 
uf 640,000 men, was only about 60,000 or 70,000 strong. In 
the forty-sixth year (1782) about 60,000 more were added. 
This will show how unreliable Chinese military' figures are. 



72 TEE CHINA-JAPAN WAR. 

in torpid garrisons which have a variety of duties, 
most of which are performed by the police in Europe^ 
In fact, both the Eight Banners and the Green 
Standard are rather of the nature of a constabulary 
than an army ; they are only useful for maintaining 
the peace and suppressing small riots. They are 
called armies by the Chinese, whose geographical and 
political ideas are limited to their own empire, which 
they consider conterminous with the world. With 
such notions the duties of a police and an army are 
easily confounded, and a rebellion is a small war, and 
a war a great rebellion ; the use of force is necessary 
in both cases. 

Owing to the profound tranquillity enjoyed by 
China for a long time after the conquest, the two 
classes we have described gradually lost all their 
military ^ffiqieijcy, and became simply an instrument 
for controlling the people in ordinary times. This 
was proved by the T'ai-ping rebellion, when a rabble 
from the Kuangtung and Kuang-Hsi provinces 
overran half the empire and nearly overthrew the 
Government. It was then that some public-spirited 
men, seeing the inefficiency of the regular forces of 
the empire, started enrolling bands of volunteers 
amongst the peasantry of Hunan and Hupeh to assist 
the Government in suppressing the rebellion. This 
movement was taken up by Tseng-Kwo-Fan in the 
above-mentioned provinces and imitated by Li-Hung- 
Chang, who enlisted similar bands in the province of 
An-hui. These volunteers, enrolled to assist the 



THE CHINESE ARMY. 73 

hereditary and professional soldiers of the regular 
army, led to the formation of the third class. 

III. The Braves. — This class is formed of Chinese 
of different provinces ; men of the same province are 
kept together, and they are transferred from province 
to province when there is occasion for their services. 
Their number is naturally very uncertain, because 
being formed of volunteers enlisted on emergencies, 
their strength fluctuates with the internal conditions 
of the country ; a certain force, however, is always 
supposed to be kept on hand. 

IV. The Trained Army. — This is composed of 
soldiers mostly from the Braves who have been drilled 
in the European fashion.* Their number is very 
uncertain ; different authorities estimate them at from 
50,000 to 100,000 men. 

Every war or rebellion affecting the Chinese Empire 
has awakened the Government to the inefficiency of 
its military organisation, and some reform has been 
attempted ; but such laudable efforts have been 
smothered by the inertia of the nation and by 
bureaucratic corruption and conservatism. The T'ai- 
ping rebellion led to the formation of the Braves ; the 
war with France and England encouraged a slight 
adoption of European drill ; and the complications 
with Russia about Kuldja started the formation of a 

• This is an important distinction to lemembor when con- 
tidering the Chinese army. During the course of the war a 
GrOTemor reported on the proficiency of his soldiers in the use 
of the bow and arrow. 



74 



THE CHINA-JAPAN WAR. 



special army in Manchuria. This last army, which 
deserves special consideration in the present war, has 
been estimated at 70,000 men, armed in the European 
fashion ; but this number probably indicates the 
intentions and not the results of the reform. A 
Japanese war publication says that, though the 



Province. 



BaoDer Army. 



Chibli 

Sbansi 

Shantung .... 

Honan 

Kiang-8U .... 

A.n-hui 

Kiang-Hsi .... 

Ohe-idang 

Fu-kien 

Kuang^ung . . . . 

Kuang-hBi 

Sza-chuan 

Hu-peh 

Hnnan 

ShenBi 

Kan-su 

Yun-nan 

Kuei-chou 

Sben^ohiDg, Manchuria. 
Kiriu, Manchuria . . . 
Amur, Manchuria 

Turkestan 

Hi 



:} 



162,646 
4,149 
2,405 
1,011 

6,539 

4,055 
2,781 
5,356 

2,065 
5,842 

6*719 
5,791 



19,592 
10.712 
11,061 
7,623\ 
7,925/ 



Total I 266,872 



Gre«i 
Standard. 



47,138 

26,288 

25.406 

8,943 

46,840 / 

11,074 
37,546 
62,573 
69,015 
11,535 
34,790 
22,603 
26,470 
43,261 
43,519 
36,110 
30,613 



15,295 



Braves. 



22,700 

5,700 

6,500 

4,500 
22,700 , 

4,400 

2, "850 j 
5,500 I 
3,000 i 

12,900 I 
6,000 I 



Trained 
Army. 



4,000 
5,000 



3,000 



599,019 I 96,750 i 12,000 



soldiers on the registers of the three Manchurian 
provinces amounted to about 175,000, most of them 
were of no military value. It mentions also that 
Wu-Ta-Cheng, during his special appointment in 
Manchuria from 1884 to 1889, organised for each 
province a force of eight batta,lions of infantry (4,000 
men) and two of cavalry (500 men) with twenty 



THE CHINESE NAVY. 75 

guns, which would give a total of 13,500 men with 
sixty guns for the whole of Manchuria. Though this 
information dates from 1888, it is probable, as we 
shall see from the forces engaged in the war, that it 
was not increased in later years. 

The table on the preceding page showing the 
territorial distribution of the armies of China is taken 
from a Japanese war-publication. 



The Chinese Navy 

Is far superior to the Army, as they have had 
many foreign instructors, and for a time had the 
services of Captain Lang, R.N., as Admiral of their 
Navy. Even the native officers were many of them 
well instructed in their profession, and presented a 
strange contrast to their brother officers of the land 
service. This difference is not surprising ; the navy, 
€ven in time of peace, requires constant care and a 
certain professional knowledge ; a ship cannot be 
navigated unless some of the officers at least have 
received a scientific education. 

The Chinese Navy was divided into four squadrons 
-^the Pei-yang or Northern Squadron, the Nan-yang 
or Southern Squadron, and the Foochow and C?anton 
Flotillas. The following tables give the list of the 
different vessels, with a brief description of their most 
striking points. 

For the purposes of tliis book the Pei-yang 



/ 

/ 



TBB CITINA-JAPAN WAS. 







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78 THE CHINA-JAPAN WAR. 

Squadron is the only one which deserves any 
attention, as it was the only one engaged. Besides, 
it was the most formidable fleet of China, specially 
formed for the defence of the capital, and possessing- 
two splendid fortified harbours at Port Arthur and 
Wei-hai-wei. 



Japanese Army. 

When Japan started to reorganise the whole 
national system she naturally introduced great re- 
forms in her army : a proud warlike people felt the 
necessity, after the severe lessons of Shimonoseki and 
Kagoshima, of keeping up with the military progress 
of the age. It is said that during the war of the 
Restoration (only about thirty years ago) some 
warriors even used armour : though this could have 
been only a sporadic survival of antiquity, still, the 
whole military system of Japan was more adapted for 
feudal squabbles than for foreign warfare. When 
the feudal system, which recognised and maintained 
a military caste to whom the exclusive use of arms 
was confined, had been abolished, it was necessary to 
adopt other methods for the formation of an army ; it 
was a period when military re-organisation was going 
on all over the world, when the astonishing results of 
the Franco-German War had awakened all nations to 
the necessity of enlisting all able-bodied men for 
military purposes. Japan adopted that system which, 
originating in Prussia, has been accepted with very 



THE JAPANESE ARMY. 79 

slight modifications by all the Continental nations of 
Europe. 

By the law of 28 November, 1872, which was 

further extended by the law of 21 January, 1889, 

every Japanese subject is liable to military service at 

the age of twenty ; remains for three years in the 

active army (or four years in the navy), four years in 

the reserve (or three years in the naval reserve), and 

five years in the territorial army. Besides these 

forces, every male between the ages of seventeen and 

forty forms part of the national army. It is perhaps 

necessary to inform the English reader that this 

sweeping conscription is not, and never can be, 

entirely carried out in any country : even France and 

Germany, with their huge standing armies of half a 

million, only take about half of the young men liable 

to service ; and Japan, that has no invasion to fear 

and no heavy taxation to furnish the funds, takes into 

the active army but a very small fraction of the men 

who, by law, are compelled to serve. A good many 

are refused for physical weakness, and others are 

exempted for family reasons, such as the necessity 

of providing for parents, or the service of another 

brother in the army : after this repeated winnowing, 

there arc still too many for the recjuirenients of the 

state, and the necessary contingent is selected by 

drawing lots. 

The organisation of the Japanese army is slightly 
different from that of European annies ; it has no 
corps darmee — the largest military unit is the divi- 



80 THE CHINA-JAPAN WAR. 

« 

sion. It possesses six of these, besides the Imperial 
Body Guard, which may also be considered as a 
division, which it almost equals in numerical strength. 
The formation of these divisions is not entirely 
uniform ; they all have two brigades or four regiments 
of infantry, but the artillery, cavahy, engineers and 
train attached to each division vary slightly in number. 
An infantry regiment is formed by three battalions of 
four companies each ; a cavalry battalion is composed 
of three companies ; a regiment of artillery is divided 
into two battalions and four companies of field artillery 
and one battalion of two companies of mountain 
artillery (the body guard regiment of artillery has 
only two battalions) ; a battalion of engineers consists 
of three companies (in the l)ody guard of two only) ; 
a battalion of train has two companies. Table I. gives 
the territorial distribution of the six divisions as well 
as of the brigades and regiments of infantry : it also 
shows what troops form each division. 

Besides this general organisation for the whole 
empire, there are two special local corps : troops for 
the Island of Yeso (the most northern of the archi- 
pelago), composed of four battalions of infantry (of 
two to six companies each), one corps of cavalry, one 
corps of mountain artillery, one corps of engineers, 
the Tsushima (two small islands between Japan and 
Corea) defence corps, composed of one corps of infantry 
and one corps of fortress artillery. There are also 
.six corps of gendarmerie, one for each of the divisional 
districts. 



THE JAPANESE ABMY. 81 

As for the numerical strength of each corps and of 
the whole army, a careful comparison of different 
authorities, Japanese and foreign, leads to the following 
results, which are as exact as it is possible under the 
circumstances. The numbers of an army are not only 
subject to constant fluctuations, which give different 
figures at different dates, but they may be estimated 
differently at the same time by authors who include 
or leave out certain classes either of auxiliary troops 
or of non-combatants attached to the army. Table 
IL gives the peace strength of each military unit of 
the Japanese army, with all the subdivisions of the 
combatant and non-combatant class. If we apply 
these figures to the different corps we shall get the 
following result : — 

Men. 

Infantry 48,440 

Cavalry 2,570 

Field artillery 5,169 

Fortress artillery .... 1,698 

Engineers 2,596 

Train 3,810 

I'otal .... 64,303 

To which must be added about 1,000 gendarmes and 
about 4,000 Yeso troops. The final total thus obtiiined 
is slightly higher than that generally given for the 
peace-strength of the Japanese army, l)ut it represents 
its regulation numbers, and would be nearer the truth 
at the commencement of a war, when every regiment 
would be brought up to its effective strength. 

G 



82 



THE CHINA-JAPAN WAB. 



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THE JAPANESE ARMY. 



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84 



THE CHINA-JAPAN WAR. 



The numbers contained in each division are as 
follows : — 



Body-guard 


• • • • • 


. . 7,359 


1st Divisior 


I (Tokyo) , . . 


. . 10,243 


2nd „ 


(Sendai) . 


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3rd „ 


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4th „ 


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5th „ 


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. . 8,898 


6th „ 


(Kumamoto) 

Total . . 


. . 10,271 




. . 03,693 



The Reserve contains 91,190 men, and the terri- 
torial army 106,088 men, so that in time of war each 
Japanese division is reinforced by about 13,000 men, 
ready to be marched to the seat of war, besides about 
15,000 which remain for the defence of the country. 
But the cadres are insufficient for such a large force, 
and it is doubtful whether on a war-footing a 
Japanese division ever reaches 20,000 men. Of 
course the surplus men are always useful and readily 
used to fill up the gaps produced by the enemy and 
by sickness. 

The infantry regiment of three battalions and twelve 
companies has 120 soldiers in each company on a 
peace-footing, and 210 in time of war, thus raising its 
war strength to 2,810 men, of which 2,744 are 
combatants. If the other corps are proportionately 
increased we should have the war strength of a 
cavalry battalion equal to about 800 men, of an 
artillery regiment about 1,200 men, of an engineers 



THE JAPANESE AliMl. 85 

battalion about 600, and of a train battalion about 
1,000 men.* This would give nearly 15,000 men for 
a division on the war-footing. Any higher number 
must be obtained by an increase in the men attached 
in sundry capacities to the train. The Japanese 
statistical tables indicatinor the distribution of the 
men allot a large portion of the reserve and terri- 
torial army to the transport. Such an arrangement 
explains the excellent commissariat organisation of 
the Japanese army in its distant expeditions. 

The artillery regiment consists of six batteries, each 
battery having four pieces on a peace-footing and six 
pieces in time of war ; four of these batteries are of 
field-pieces, and two of mountain-guns. 

The Japanese infantry, at the time of the war, was 
armed with the Murata rifle, a breech-loader invented 
by a Japanese officer of that name ; it had then no 
magazine. The cavalry was armed with sal)res and 
Murata carbines, only the cavalry of the Imperial 
Guard having lances. The artillery had 7-centimetre 
pieces of compressed l)ronze of the Italian mode], 
made at Osaka, where a cannon-foundry was 
established and directed by Italian officers specially 
engaged for the purpose. 

* Some of these details of the Japanese forces on a war- 
footiog are extracted from a lecture dclivored by Captain 
Uchijama at the Education Meeting of Kioto. 



86 THE CHINA-JAPAN WAR. 



The Japanese Navy. 

This requires little description, as the navies of all 
countries are similarly organised, but it calls for some 
remarks. It is strange that Japan, an empire con- 
stituted solely of islands, with such an extensive sea- 
coast and numerous maritime population should have 
such a relatively weak navy. While her army, so 
superior in discipline and military science, was also 
actually superior in numbers to the Chinese, her navy 
was inferior and possessed no vessels powerful enough 
to cope with the Chen-yuen and Tivg-yuen, the two 
big ironclads of the Pei-yang squadron. Japan had 
several fast vessels ; one of them, * the Yoshino, the 
fastest in the world, l)ut her victories were due to 
the skill and daring of her sailors and not to the ships 
which they manned. 

Japan has three military ports, Yokosiika, Kure 
and Sasebo, to each of w^hich a squadron is attached ; 
but during the war the fleet was divided into several 
small squadrons of four vessels (rarely of more), which 
acted as tactical units in their military operations. 

The following table gives the most important 
particulars of the Japanese war- vessels : — 



TBE JAPANESE NAVY. 





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88 THE CHINA-JAPAN WAR. 



PART II. 



THE COREAN CAMPAIGN. 



-•o«- 



CHAPTER I. 

THE OUTBREAK OF HOSTILITIES. 

The Attack on the King's Palace at Seoul. 

It has been already shown that in the middle of July 
the Corean question became so complicated, that it 
was well-nigh impossible to resolve it by pacific 
means. The Japanese Government had proposed a 
programme of reforms, which China thought unneces- 
sary, and had refused her co-operation ; the Corean 
Government had consented at first, but afterwards 
procrastinated, urging that the withdrawal of the 
Japanese troops must precede any measures of reform. 
This tergiversation of Corea was attributed to the 
machinations of China, and the Japanese Government 
determined to deprive the Min party of that power 
which they used in the interests of China. Even if 
the Japanese Government had been unwilling, it 
would have been compelled to adopt this strong line 
of policy : popular feeling throughout Japan was 



ATTACK ON THE KING'S PALACE AT SEOUL. 89 

very excited, and the whole nation was resolved to 
suffer no more humiliations in Corea. The pacific 
policy, which led to the first treaty with Corea in 
1876, had been distasteful to a party in the country, 
and the consequent discontent caused, in 1877, the 
Satsuma Rebellion, which cost Japan thousands of 
lives and millions of money during the seven months 
of civil war. The two attacks on the Japanese 
Legation at Seoul had deeply hurt the proud suscep- 
tible character of the Japanese, who considered the 
apologies and indemnities of the Corean Government 
an insufficient atonement for the murders and out- 
rages committed on their fellow-countrymen. On 
this occasion, Japan must assert itself, and wdth an 
energy which would render impossible any further 
trifling with her dignity. 

On the other hand, the opportunity was so favour- 
able that it must not be allowed to slip ; the Japanese 
had been quicker and more clever. They had offered 
China a share in the re -organisation of the country, 
and she had refused ; they had a strong force in the 
capital, aiid they could act without her assistance. 
The question could not be settled without a war, and 
in such a case rapidity would be the chief element of 
success. 

The march of events was very rapid. On the 
18th of July the Corean Government informed Otori, 
the Japanese Minister, that the prcsen(*e of sucli a 
large Ixxly of Japanese soldiers trou])led the minds of 
the people, and that they could not undertake the 



90 THE CEINA-JAPAN WAR. 

reforms until after the withdrawal of the Japanese 
troops. On the lOtli, Yuan-Shi -kai, the Chinese 
Minister, who had been at Seoul since 1885, and who 
was suspected by the Japanese to be encouraging the 
Coreans in their resistance, left the capital, and, 
embarking on a Chinese man-of-war at Chemulpo, 
returned to China. On the 20th July, Otori sent an 
ultimatum to the Corean Government ; he reminded 




them that by the Convention of 1885, Corea had 
bound itself to build barracks for the Japanese soldiers 
(he thus insinuated that Japan had a perfect right 
vis-a-vis of Corea to send troops in the country) ; he 
added, that the presence of soldiers, who had publicly 
proclaimed * their object of protecting a dependent 
state was incompatible with the independence of that 

* He alluded to the proclamation of tbe Chinese generals. 



ATTACK ON THE KING'S PALACE AT SEOUL. 91 

country, and he gave the Corean Government three 
days' time for a final answer to his demands ; if it 
were not satisfactory Japan would carry out the 
reforms by force. The Corean Government, con- 
sidering its helplessness, showed considerable resolu- 
tion. On the night of the 22nd it answered that the 
Chinese troops had come at their request, and would 
not leave until similarly requested. 

Orders were at once given to the Japanese troops 
encamped near the capital to attack the King's Palace 
next morning. Two battalions, led by Majors Mori 
and Hashimoto, marched out of their camp early in 
the morning ; their object was declared to be an 
attack on the Chinese troops at Asan, but they soon 
changed their direction, and moved towards the front 
and rear of the palace. After a short engagement 
they drove out the Corean troops and took possession 
of the person of the King, to whom they declared the}' 
had come to guard the Palace and deliver him from 
an obnoxious faction. There was another short 
scuffle with some C^orean troops outside the Palace, 
but with the loss of only two killed and five wounded 
in both engagements, the Japanese became masters of 
the capital and the Government. The Japanese 
loudly declared that the 23rd July marked the 
Wginning of a new era for Corea, and set themselves 
to remodel the Government ; tlie Min party were 
flriven out and replaced by progressive politicians. 
The notorious Tai-Wen-Kun, the father of the King, 
who had not been allowed to see his son for vears, was 



92 THE CHINA-JAPAN WAS. 

called to the Palace and entrusted with high authority. 
Strange changes take place in the polities of the Far 
East as well as in those of Western countries, and it 
was indeed extraordinary that one of the first steps in 
the revolution brought about by Japan, in the name of 
progress and civilisation, was to replace in power the 
Tai-Wen-Kun, the relentless persecutor of Christianity, 




the hater of all foreigners, the man who had been 
confined for years in China because he was suspected 
to have promoted the attack on the Japanese 
in 1883. 

The occupation of the Palace and the change in the 
Government gave the Japanese legal sanction for all 
their future proceedings ; they at once received a 
request from the Coiean Government to drive out 



THE NAVAL FIGHT AT PBUNG ISLAND. 93 

from Asan the Chinese, who now instead of defenders 
were considered intruders. With the feeble resistance 
at the Palace, hostilities between Japan and Corea 
commenced and ended ; it now became only a question 
of a few days when hostilities would break out 
between China and Japan. It was conjectured that 
the first engagement would take place somewhere 
between Seoul and Asan. But circumstances ruled 
a far different and more startling opening to the 
orreat drama that was to be enacted in the Far East. 



The Naval Fight at Phung Island. 

When the situation in Corea became critical, China, 
as well as Japan, began to reinforce her troops in that 
country. On the 21st of July and following days, 
eleven stealers carrying over 8,000 soldiers were 
despatched from Tientsin to Corea. They were sent 
in two directions, some to the Yalu, the boundary 
river of Corea, and others to Asan, to increase the 
strength of the small expedition which originally had 
been sent simply to intimidate the Tong-Haks. The 
object of the Chinese was to reinforce the Asan 
detachment to such an extent that it could resist any 
attack of the Japanese, while at the same time troops 
should be constantly sent to the frontier, to form a 
large army to march south to the capitiil and drive 
out the Japanese, who thus would be attacked on 
lioth sides and driven into tlie sea. Tlie plan was 
goody but to be eflective it recjuired rapid liiobilisaticm, 



94 THE CHINA-JAPAN WAR. 

a condition which all the subsequent history 6f the 
war shows to have been impossible for China. 
Besides a defective military organisation of her few 
fighting troops, the absence of railways and good 
roads rendered a rapid concentration by land im- 
possible. China, though possessing a long frontier 
with Corea, was compelled to depend on the sea for 
the rapid conveyance of troops to the neighbouring 
country. 

Japan, from her insular conditions, found herself in 
the same position ; the sea was the only open route. 
The relative situation of the two forces in Corea 
rendered this sea route longer and more dangerous. 
The Japanese at Seoul had a Chinese force on the 
south, which could intercept all communication with 
Fusan, the Corean port nearest to Japan ; their 
communications therefore had all ta pass vid 
Chemulpo. The Chinese at Asan had a strong 
Japanese force in the north, and could only com- 
municate by sea with China. As Asan is a little 
south of Chemulpo even the sea-routes of communi- 
cation intersected. The immediate object of the 
Japanese was to prevent the troops in Asan receiv- 
ing reinforcements ; their own troops at Seoul were 
in sufficient numbers not only to hold their own, but 
to crush the enemy at Asan, and the Chinese army 
coming from the north was not near enough to 
constitute a danger for some time ; if this object 
(!Ould not be attained, the position of the Japanese 
troops at Seoul might become dangerous. Indeed, 



THE NAVAL FIGHT AT PHUNG ISLAND. 95 

for a moment, the situation of both annies seemed 
critical, the Chinese at Asan and the Japanese at 
Seoul were equally far from their base of operations, 
and it was doubtful which would succeed in strength- 
ening its own position or weakening that of its 
adversary. 

The Japanese Government was informed of the 
departure of the Chinese transports, and on the 
23rd of July the Akitsushima, Yoshino, and Naniwa 
left Sasebo ; these three vessels are the fastest in the 
Japanese navy and eminently qualified for the work 
that was expected from them. On the 25th, at 7 A.M., 
when they were near the islands of Phung and 
Shapain, they met two Chinese men-of-war, the 
Tsi-yuen and the Kuang-yi; the Chinese vessels 
came from the neighbourhood of Asan, where, as we 
know from other evidence,* the attack of the Japanese 
troops on the King's Palace at Seoul was known at 
5.20 P.M. of the preceding day. They therefore knew 
that war was all but declared, and probably expected 
to be attacked by the enemy's vessels. The Japanese 
vessels, on the other hand, had been at sea for two 
ilays and knew nothing of the grave events that had 
taken place at Seoul on the 23rd, but they must have 
known that such events would happen, and they 
probably had instructions to stop all transports. They 
were, however, astonished that the Chinese did not 
salute their flag and that they were cleared for action. 
The Japanese likewise made preparations, and as the 

^ The log of th3 ss. Feichinj, published in tho Shanghai papers. 



96 THE CHINA-JAPAN WAR. 

passage among the islands was very narrow they 
changed their course south-west to go out into the 
open sea, when the Chinese vessels which had come 
very near opened fire. 

The action was short and decisive. In about an 
hour the Kuang-yi was crippled, and had to be run 
into shallow water. The Tsi-yuen had her bow gun 
disabled, twenty of the crew were killed, and she had 
to fly to Wei-hai-wei, so riddled with shot, that some 
eye-witnesses of her condition said she looked like a 
pepper-box. During the engagement it is said the 
Tsi-yuen hoisted a white and a Japanese flag, and 
when one of the Japanese men-of-war approached, 
discharged a torpedo, which missed. She was pursued 
for some time by the Yoshino. 

The above is the Japanese account. The Chinese 
say the Japanese fired first, but the Tsi-yuen fought so 
well that a Japanese man-of-war was obliged to hoist the 
white flag, and only the arrival of other vessels saved 
her from capture. Further details were also added, 
that a shot had demolished the bridge, killing the 
Japanese admiral, who was seen to turn several 
somersaults in the air. This account is contradicted 
by the fact that several Europeans * saw the Tsi-yuen 
running away with a white and Japanese flag. Un- 
fortunately Chinese military and naval oflicers are 
obliged to spread exaggerated reports to please the 
taste of the majority of the nation, who are thoroughly 

* Von Hannecken, Mr. Muhlenstedt and the officer of the 
Koicshinj, 



THE NAVAL FIGHT AT PHUNG ISLAND, 97 

ignorant of military matters, and would not be satisfied 
with the plain recital of the most heroic action. 
Throughout the war the Japanese have been far more 
just in their appreciation of the Chinese generals and 
officers than their own countrymen. The fight of 
the Tsi-yiien and Kaancj-yi with the three Japanese 
men-of-war, each of which would have been more tlian 
a match for both of them, was certainly a plucky 
atfair. It is the boldest action of the war — the only 
one in which the Chinese engaged overwhelming odds, 
and it is strange that Fong, the captain of the Tsi-yuen, 
was beheaded two months afterwards for cowardice, 
ft is the duty of history to correct the mistakes and 
prejudices of the transient moment, when men's 
passions are excited and their judgment blinded ; and 
against the hasty death-sentence pronounced by 
literary mandarins ignorant of warfare, it is fair to 
adduce the opinion of the competent Japanese naval 
officers * who had fouglit against Fong, and the testi- 
mony of the German engineer, j who had served on his 
.ship. 

The engagement was certainly imprudent on the 
part of the Chinese, and if they commenced firing, the 
only explanation that can be suggested is that they had 

* When the Ja|>ancse captured the t()rpeclo-l)oafB at Wei-liai- 
wei the next year, among the questions they asked the Chinese 
prisoners wan : Why was Fong, who fouglit so well at Phung 
Island, decapitated? and the Chinese officers answered that 
they did not know, but Admiral Ting ha<l tried to save him. 

t.Mr. Hoffmann, who made a declaration in a Shanghai paper 
that FoDg had fought his ship well at the battle of the Yalu. 

H 



98 THE CHINA-JAPAN WAR, 

orders to protect the transports at any cost, and they 
hoped either to disable the Japanese vessels, or draw 
them away from the Corean coast by a rimning fight. 

While the Yoshino was pursuing the Tsi-yuen two 
other vessels came in sight, the Tsao-Kiang, a small 
Chinese despatch vessel, and the British s.s. Kowshing. 
The Akitsushima gave chase to the former, and soon 
captured her, as she could oflfer no resistance. The 
Naniwa took charge of the latter, and through 
ignorance and mistrust a bloody drama was enacted 
which cost over a thousand human lives. 

The Naniica, at about 9 a.m., signalled to the 
Koicshing to anchor, and emphasised the signal by 
two blind guns, then, after some more signals and 
consultation with the other men-of-war, she sent a 
boat with an officer to board the steamer. The officer 
examined the ship s papers, and found she was a 
British steamer which had been chartered by the 
Chinese Government to convey troops to Corea (she 
had on board about 1,200 men, besides twelve guns, 
ammunition, etc., and Mr. von Hannecken, a German 
officer who had been employed by the Chinese for 
many years in constructing their forts, travelling 
as a passenger). After putting several questions the 
Japanese officer informed the captain of the Kowshing 
that he must follow the Naniwa^ and left so abruptly 
that the captain had only time to say that he was 
obliged to obey a man-of-war, though he would do so 
under protest. 

After the Japanese boat had left, and when 



THE NAVAL FIGHT AT PHUNG ISLAND. 99 

preparations were being made to follow out the orders 
received, there was a scene of terrible confusion. 
When the Naniwa had stopped the Kowshing, the two 
Chinese generals who were in charge of the troops, had 
l>ecome very excited, and had informed von Hannecken 
that they would perish rather than be taken prisoners. 
Von Hannecken was the only European who could 
speak Chinese, and had to negotiate the whole 
business. He informed Captain Galsworthy of the 
intentions of the Chinese, and they agreed together 
that he should insist to be allowed to return to Taku, 
the port he had left on the 23rd of July before any 
declaration of war. But the Japanese officer had 
departed so suddenly that the captain had no time to- 
make objections nor call for von Hannecken. 

As soon as the Chinese generals understood what 
was proposed to be done, their excitement increased, 
and was communicated to their soldiers, who began 
rushing about the deck in a wild manner. Arms and 
ammunition were served out to some of the soldiers 
by the generals, who declared they would not follow 
the Naniwa, but would fight the Japanese ; and when 
the oflScers of the Kowshing declared they would 
leave the ship if the Chinese intended to fight, armed 
.soldiers were detached to guard all Europeans with 
threats of instant death if any sign was shown of 
obeying the Japanese orders or of abandoning the 
vessel. It was truly a pitiable sight that such a 
number of officers, amongst whom were two generals, 
should not have sufficient military experience to 

H 2 



100 THE CHINA-JAPAN WAR. 

understand the absurdity of attempting resistance in 
a merchant vessel against a powerful man-of-war. 
But in their ignorance of international law, they 
probably trusted to the protection afforded by the 
foreign flag, and by the presence of the Europeans on 
board, and concluded they were safe as long as they 
could keep these hostages. They had paid for their 
passage, and paid a large price, and they considered 
they were entitled to be landed either at Asan or 
Taku. Their ignorance sealed their fate and that of 
the poor wretches who were under their orders. 

While the Chinese had taken possession of the 
steamer, the Japanese were signalling to follow, so 
then von Hannecken asked Captain Galsworthy to 
ask the Naniwa by signal to send the boat again, 
which was immediately done. This time von 
Hannecken himself went to parley with the Japanese, 
and the scene was truly dramatic. The deck was 
swarming with armed and excited soldiers who were 
kept back with difficulty. Von Hannecken, a man of 
commanding presence, was at the gangway ; the 
Japanese officers were on the ladder with their hand 
on the sword-hilt. Von Hannecken explained that the 
captain was not free to obey. The Chinese would not 
allow him to follow the Naniwa and wanted to return 
to Taku. This request seemed reasonable to von 
Hannecken and to the captain. The Japanese officer 
promised to refer the question to the captain of the 
Naniwa. 

The only answer which came from the Naniwa 



THE NAVAL FIGHT AT PHUNG ISLAND. 101 

after some time, which was probably employed in 
deliberation, was the signal *' quit the ship at once." 
This of course was meant for the Europeans, but they 
could not leave, as the Chinese soldiers guarded all the 
davits. Captain Galsworthy signalled : " We are not 
allowed," and then **send a boat," to which the 
Japanese answered : " Life-boat cannot come." Then 
the Naniwa steamed around and placing herself 
alongside of the Kowshituj at 150 metres on the port 
side, launched a torpedo and fired two broadsides. It 
is not certain whether the torpedo struck the ship, but 
there was a terrific explosion whi(*h filled the air with 
coal-dust and obscured everything. In the confusion, 
von Hannecken and the Europeans jumped overboard, 
and swam for their lives under a hail of l)ullets ; the 
Chinese soldiers who could not swim and knew thev 
must die, were firing wildly both at the Japanese and 
at their comrades in the water. The Naniwa opened 
fire at about 1 p.m., and in half-an-hour the Kowshhi;/ 
was sunk. The capbiin, first officer, and a quarter- 
master were picked up by a Japanese boat : von 
Hannecken and some of the soldiei-s swam ashore, 
others clung to the masts of the Koic^hinrf and were 
rescued next morninfi: bv the French Wn-boat Lion, 
but the total lives saved did not exceed 170, so tliat 
over 1,000 died.* 

The sinking of tlie Kotcshin;/, on account of the 
European lives lost, and the international (juestion it 

• The statements of some of the survivors will l>e found in 
Appendix C. 



102 THE CHINA-JAPAN WAR. 

raised, led people to forget the other incidents of that 
eventful morning, and obscured the salient points of 
that memorable day. If it had not been for these 
extraneous considerations, the 25th July would have 
revealed to the world the business-like rapidity with 
which the Japanese carried on warfare — even at that 
early date the military qualities of the Japanese 
would have been understood. The Japanese men-of- 
war met the Tsi-yuen and Kuang-yi at 7 A.M., and at 
1.30 P.M. the Kowshing was sunk. In about six hours 
a man-of-war had been destroyed, another disabled, a 
despatch vessel captured and a transport sunk. 
Though the Japanese were supposed to be an ex- 
citable people, all this had been done without flurry 
and without losing sight of the principal points of 
each question. The engagement with the Tsi-yueii 
had not tempted the Japanese to pursue and destroy 
the disabled ship ; they remained to intercept the 
transports. The Kowshing presented a complicated 
question of international law, which the Japanese 
officers had to settle in a few hours just after an 
engagement, and with the apprehensions that at any 
moment other Chinese vessels might arrive to renew 
the battle. This question was resolved correctly, but 
it must be remembered that such a solution entailed 
firing upon the British flag — a flag which commands 
respect all over the world, and in the Far East is 
looked upon with sentiments of awe. It was there- 
fore an act of singular boldness for the Japanese to 
act so resolutely on so short a reflection. 



THE NAVAL. FIGHT AT PHUNG ISLAND. 103 

From a military point of view the events of the 
25th were very important. The sinking of the Kow- 
^<hing with 1,000 picked soldiers was equal to the 
loss of a bloody battle, and it may be said that 
fate of the troops at Asan, and the prospects of the 
the Chinese plan of campaign, were settled on that 
day. If the Kowshing had arrived at Asan, the landing 
of 1,200 fresh soldiers, the presence of a brave, skilful 
officer like von Hannecken, and the encouragement 
felt by the Chinese in finding themselves always able 
to receive reinforcements, would have materially 
afi'ected the results of the first land engaorement. 
Perhaps the Japanese, who have shown always so 
much prudence together with their boldness, might 
have hesitated to attack the position at Asan before 
receiving reinforcements. It produced also other 
consequences which lasted during the whole war. It 
made neutrals more careful in embarking in doubtful 
enterprises, and it showed the Chinese that the con- 
veyance of soldiers by sea was fraught with difficulty 
and danger. 



104 THE CHINA-JAPAN WAR. 



' CHAPTER II. 

THE FIRST MILITARY OPERATIONS. 

The Asaii Campaign. 

When the Japanese assaulted the Palace and changed 
the Gorean Government on the 23rd July, they pre- 
pared to face the Chinese armies which were already 
in the country. The northern army was of uncertain 
numbers, and its exact position was unknown ; but as 
it did not constitute an immediate danger, it was 
considered sufficient to despat(*h on the 23rd a small 
party of cavalry scouts to watch the movements of 
the Chinese. The southern force at Asan was verv 
near, and though not formidable in numbers might 
be reinforced, and in any case must be destroyed 
l)efore the northern army approached, as otherwise 
the Japanese would be exposed to a double attack. 
Besides these military reasons, there were others of a 
different kind, which imperatively required a prompt 
defeat of the Chinese at Asan : the wavering attach- 
ment of the Corean party favoura])le to the Japanese 
must be strengthened by some striking military 
success evincing the manifest superiority of Japan ; 
and the further presence of C^hinese troops might 



THE ASAN CAMPAIGN. 105 

spread disaflfection in the already disturbed southern 
provinces. 

On the 25th July, General Oshima, leaving a small 
force to guard the aipital, started with the bulk of 
his troops for Asan. The Japanese advance was 
i"apid : on the 26th they w^ere at Su-Won, on the 
27th at Chin-we, and on the 28th at Su-sa-chang, 
within sight of the Chinese camps. The march had 
l>een full of difficulties, beasts of burden were not 
easily procured, and the Corean coolies who had been 
hired as carriers * decamped on the first day ; for a 
short time the advanced guard, which was about a 
day's march in front of the main body, was blocked at 
Su-Won and could not proceed : the commander. 
Major Koshi, was so chagrined, that after fruitlessly 
spending day and night in endeavouring to re(|uisition 
coolies and beasts, he committed suicide. On the 
26th, when the rest of the troops reached Su-Won, 
the difficulties were gradually adjusted. Otori wTot<> 
from Seoul, that the t^orean Government had entrusted 
to Japan the tiisk of driving out the Chinese from 
Asau, and had issued a proclamation to all officials, 
that the Japanese army should be provided w^ith 
beasts of burden and coolies, whose services would be 
properly paid. The t^orean peasants, accustomed to 

• The European reader shoald know that in the Far Ea«t 
men are employed for a variety of work confined to animals 
in Europe ; they pull small carriageti and carry loads great 
distances. During the whole war the Japanese army was 
accompanied by largt^ numbers of coolies, wlio did almost all 
the tranaport 



106 THE CHINA-JAFAN WAE. 

be plundered by their own troops, scarcely believed 
the possibility of being paid for anything that was 
taken, but they joyfully accepted the strange custom 
of the Japanese and furnished all the assistance re- 
quired. On the 26th, General Oshima also received 
from Otori the news of the naval engagement oflF the 
coast, which had taken place the preceding day, and 
the troops w^ere immediately informed of the victory, 
which filled them with enthusiasm and impatience to 
rival the success of the navy. 

The Chinese, when they foresaw the probability of 
a Japanese attack, decided not to resist it at Asan, 
where their retreat would have been cut off by the 
sea, but chose, with great skill, a strong defensive 
position near Song-liwan, which they fortified with 
great pains. The road from Seoul to Asan at Su-sa- 
chang has to cross two small rivers, one of which 
forms a pond : the ground is entirely without cover 
and cut up with paddy-fields ; beyond these, there is 
a ridge of hills. The Chinese broke the bridges, 
dammed the rivers, and built six redoubts protected 
by abattis on the hills. 

The Japanese arrived at Su-sa-chang, five miles 
from the Chinese position, before noon of the 28th of 
July ; the officers, with their field-glasses, soon dis- 
covered the Chinese entrenchments, gaily bedecked 
with a liberal supply of flags. Some Japanese officers 
disguised themselves, and approached very near to 
the Chinese lines : when they returned in the evening, 
General Oshima summoned a hasty council, in which 



THE ASAN CAMPAIGN. 107 

it was decided that, owing to the strength of the 
position, and the difficulty of approach through paddy- 
fields exposed to the enemy's fire without shelter, a 
night attack was necessary. The troops were not 
informed of the plan, but suddenly awakened at mid- 
night, when noiselessly and without confusion they 
marched towards the enemy. The Japanese were 
divided into two wings : the right wing, under 
Lieutenant-Colonel Takeda, consisted of four com- 
pjmies of infantry and one company of engineers, and 
was to make a strong diversion on the enemy's left ; 
the left wing, under General Oshima, consisted of nine 
companies of infantry, one battalion of artillery, and 
one company of cavalry ; by a circuitous route it 
was to attack the flank and rear of the Chinese riglit 
wing. 

Captain IVIatsusaki, with a company of infantry, was 
at the head of the right wing ; the two streams were 
forded with difficulty, the water reaching to the 
.shoulders, and a narrow road turning to the left led 
across a pond and through paddy-fields to a hamlet. 
The darkness of the night and the difficulties of the 
road soon threw the Japanese into confusion. Some 
detachments lost their way, and Leiut.-Col. Takeda 
<-alled to the interpreters to inquire the road at the 
Corean houses, when suddenly a white figure darted 
past and shouted. The Chinese soldiers ambushed in 
the hamlet immediately opened a heavy fire. The 
Japanese lying down behind the embankments 
returned the fire, but they were in a very embarnussing 



108 



THE GHINA-JAPAN WAR. 



position ; the nature of the ground hampered their 
movements, and they were crowding up under the 
enemy's fire. Lieutenant Tokiyama with twenty men, 
in their anxiety to push forward to the assistance of 
the vanguard, jumped into the pond where it was 
deepest, and were drowned. 




Captain Matsusaki encouraged his men to hold 
their ground, standing up on the embankment of the 
rice-field and waving his sword ; a bullet hit him in 
the thigh, but he still continued to brave all danger 
until another bullet killed him. Gradually reinforce- 
ments came up, and the Japanese charged the Chinese, 
driving them out uf the village into the paddy-field.'i 
to the south. This skirmish, which was called after 



THE AS AN CAMPAIGN. 109 

the name of the ford of An-song (the second of tlie 
two streams), lasted from 3.0 to 3.30 a.m. 

At 5.0 A.M. the battle was renewed by an attack 
on the redoubts. At this time the left wing, under 
Oshima, came into action, and a heavy artillery fire 
was directed on the Chinese entrenchments. The 
Chinese are said to have made ])ad practice with their 
guns, while the Japanese shells bursting inside the 
forts made great havoc amongst the ('hinese. Under 
<over of the smoke the Japanese stormed the extreme 
forts on the right and left ; the Chinese, hemmed in 
on both sides, abandoned all their forts at 5.30 a.m. 
and retreated in disorder. General Oshima, with 
the 11th Regiment, pursued the Chinese along the 
road to Chhon-an, w^hile Lieutenant-Colonel Takeda, 
with the 21st Regiment, marched on Asan. The 
Japanese expected to meet a desperate resistance 
at this place, but they found it evacuated by the 
Chinese, who had preferred to make their stand at 
Siing-hwan, where they had a good line of retreat to 
i'hhon-an. 

The forces engaged in this l)attle were exaggerated 
at the time : as w^e have seen the two wings of the 
Japanese consisted of thirteen companies of infantry, 
one of engineers, one of cavalry, and a battalion of 
artillery. These, on a peace-footing (they could not 
have received their reserves at that time), would give 
A total of about 2,500 men. The Chinese force, 
according to the prisoners captured by the Japanese, 
amounted to 3,000 men, but only a portion were 



110 THE CHINA-JAPAN Vf'AR, 

engaged at Song-hwan ; the commander-in-chief, Yeh- 
chih-chao, had already retired, so that probably no 
more than 1,500 fought against the Japanese. 

The Chinese lost eight guns, a great many flags 
(these do not count much, as there is such a large 
supply in the Chinese army), large quantities of stores 
and ammunition, and according to Japanese accounts 
500 killed and wounded. The Japanese losses were 
six ofiicers and eighty-tw^o men killed and wounded. 
The proportion of ofiicers deserves to be noted. If we 
take as a basis the regimental tables given in the 
account of the Japanese army, we shall find that out 
of a total loss of eighty-eight, only three or four 
should have been officers ; the greater actual loss 
redounds to the credit of the officers of the Japanese 
army. It shows better than any words, better than 
the fiorid descriptions of the Japanese newspapers 
and war publications, how the Japanese officers 
exposed their lives to encourage their men. 

The first reports of the battle announced that the 
Chinese had been annihilated, afterwards it -was found 
that some of the routed Chinese, about 1,500 men, 
had succeeded, by a circuitous route, in escaping north 
and joining the Chinese army at Phyong-yang. This 
retreat was described by General Yeh as a l)rilliant 
strategical movement (he incidentally described the 
battle of Song-hwan as a heavy loss to the Japanese), 
and it gradually became so magnified that he received 
honours and rewards from his emperor, and the 
Japanese were contemptuously criticised for allowing 



THE AS AN CAMPAIGN. Ill 

him to escape. The truth lies away from all these 
exaggerations. General Yeh, when he heard of the 
loss of the Kowshing and knew that he could get no 
further reinforcements, was right in saving a portion 
of his army, though with such a splendid military 
p)sition he ought to have made a much better 
resistance at Siing-hwan. General Oshima, on the. 
other side, was quite right in neglecting the small 
band of fugitives, and attending to the more im- 
portant duties of the campaign. 

One of the great merits of the Japanese throughout 
the war has been to waste no attention on details and 
to keep always in mind the principal object of the 
campaign. On the 29th of July General Oshima 
had to sacrifice all minor points and to reserve 
his forces for maintaining Japanese supremacy in 
the capital, and for opposing the large Chinese 
army which was expected to march down from the 
north. 

The Japanese left Asan on the ^Hst of July, and 
arrived at Seoul on the 5th of August, when a 
triumphal entry was made ; all the spoils of the 
campaign, guns, flags, etc., were displayed to dazzle 
the Coreans and convince them of Japan's military 
superiority over the country they had been accustomed 
to consider the greatest in the world. But the victory 
of Song-hwan, though unimportant as regards the 
number of troops engaged, has in some points a high 
historical value. It was the first battle fought by 
Japan in a foreign war since three centuries, and it 



112 THE CmXA-JAPAN WAn. 

was the first experiment of the new army organised 
entirely on the European system. Although the 
Japanese were confident of success, it must have been 
satisfactory to them to find their expectations so fully 
realised. The Asan campaign was a small affair, but 
its prompt execution showed that the generals knew 
how to command, and that the army organisation 




worked smoothly, even in a country unprovided with 
good roads. Officers and men behaved with steady 
valour, and there were some instances of lieroisni 
which proved tliat the foreign-looking uniform had 
not changed the spirit of the old samurni. Captain 
Matsusaki, who had shi:>wn such bravery in the critical 
moment of the battle, encouraging his men until he 



THE DECLARATION OF WAR. 113 

died, and the poor bugler, Shirakami Genjiro,* who 
was by his side, and mortally wounded, and continued 
blowing his bugle until he breathed his last and fell 
dead, became the first popular heroes of the war. 

The Declaration of War, 

The naval and land engagements of the 25th and 
29th of July had taken place without any formal 
declaration of war, which was issued simultaneously 
by China and Japan on the 1st of August. In an 
Appendix! will be found the text of these two 
interesting documents. Chinese subjects in Japan 
and Japanese subjects in China were placed under 
the protection of the United States. The official 
announcement of a state of war produced very 
different impressions in the two countries. The 
people of Japan, always so susceptible about the 
national honour, and who had desired the war, hailed 
the news with joy, and prepared themselves for the 
greatest sacrifices for the purpose of securing a 

^ When the local M.P. was asked to give some .presents to 
the bugler's family, the bereaved father answered like a true 
Japanese : " It is the lot of all men to die. My son had to die 
sometime. Instead of falling asleep in a comer of this 
miserable hovel, nn mourned save by a few relatives, he has 
fidlen on the field of honour and received the encomiums of a 
mnltitade of his superiors. Hence his mother and I cannot 
look upon this as a mournful occasion. We rejoice that our son 
has been loyal to Japan, even to the point of shedding his 
blood in defence of her honour." — (Taken from the Japan Mail,) 

f See Appendix D. 

I 



114 THE CHINA-JAPAN WAR. 

glorious victory to their country. Notwithstanding 
the alleged poverty of Japan, the war loans were 
covered with facility, and the country was able to 
bear all expenses without having recourse to foreign 
capital. Societies of all kinds were formed to nurse 
the wounded and to provide the soldiers with every 
imaginable comfort. Offers of money and useful 
articles came not only from the noble and rich, but 
even the poor stinted themselves that they might 
contribute their mite for the good of the men who 
were battling far away for the glory of Japan. When 
the soldiers travelled by train to embark for the seat 
of war, crowds welcomed them at every station, 
oflfering them delicacies and shouting farewell. Each 
report of a military success was solemnised by dis- 
playing the national flag at every house, land by 
walking through the streets it was always possible to 
know when a victory had been achieved by the 
Japanese arms. China presented a far diflferent 
spectacle. The people are not warlike, and are 
indifierent to military glory ; moreover, they felt 
no deep interest in the Corean question. Some 
attempts were made to excite hostility against Japan, 
but it never rose above rough assaults on quiet, 
inoffensive Japanese by the rowdies of the treaty 
ports. Shanghai unfortunately was the scene of a 
disgraceful episode. Immediately after the outbreak 
of hostilities the Chinese became frenzied with the 
suspicion that the country was full of Japanese spies 
(considering the want of military preparation, and 



THE DECLARATION OF WAR. 115 

the small numbers of the army, it is inconceivable 
-what they could report) ; every individual in foreign 
clothes with a dark skin was supposed to be a 
Japanese spy. At first an Arab, a stoker in a 
French steamer, was arrested and released ; but later 
on two genuine Japanese, dressed as Chinese, were 
seized in the foreign settlement and delivered to 
the American Consul, who was supposed to protect 
Japanese subjects. That the men should have been 
tried by a fair court, and, if found guilty, shot, would 
have been perfectly right by the laws of war. But 
they were unconditionally surrendered to the Chinese 
authorities, taken to Nanking, frightfully tortured, 
and beheaded. The United States Consul at Shanghai 
was not responsible for this crime, as he acted under 
orders from Washington, but it was the greatest dis- 
grace that ever sullied the American flag — the flag 
which is supposed to symbolise freedom and progress. 
The men who had so fearlessly trusted to its pro- 
tection should not have been delivered to courts 
where the employment of torture precludes all 
justice and invalidates every decision. This de- 
plorable action of the American Government has 
lowered its dignity and destroyed its prestige in the 
Far Elast, and it will take many years before she can 
recover them and cancel the memory of that dark 
deed. It was, moreover, an infringement of the 
rights of the foreign settlements, where a mixed 
court can judge even the Chinese in certain cases. 
If America declined to try Japanese in China, she 

I 2 



116 THE CHIN A- JAPAN WAR. 

could not renounce doing so on the foreign settle- 
ments. It was also a doubtful favour to China. She 
gained little by the death of those two poor wretches^ 
and she was disgraced in the eyes of the whole 
civilised world. Foreigners, for the honour of their 
own civilisation, and for the gradual improvement of 
China, should never let an opportunity escape ta 
prevent the blind, irresponsible action of the anti- 
(juated laws of that empire. 

The Chinese authorities also offered rewards for the 
lieads of Japanese, and for the destruction of men-of- 
war, quite unconscious that such primitive methods^ 
were of no practical utility and only paraded her 
barbarism before the world. Other methods equally 
futile were employed to meet the urgent requirements 
of the war. It was supposed, on no substantial 
evidence, that Japan was suffering from scarcity of 
food, and the exportation of provisions to Japan was 
prohibited. The only persons that could be injured 
by such a measure were the C'hinese producers. 

Military operations had been pushed on very 
vigorously during the days preceding the formal 
declaration of war, but very strangely, after that 
solemn act, there was a lull which lasted nearly two 
months. The foreign spectators became tired of 
waiting, and they supposed that the efficiency of the 
Japanese army had been exaggerated, and augured 
ill for its final success. In fact, it was the general 
opinion, of foreigners in Europe and the Far East 
that the only chance of victory for Japan was in 



NAVAL DEMONSTRATION AT PORT ARTHUR. 117 

jst liking a few rapid, stunning blows before China 
<M)uld gather together her mighty strength, i.e., the 
countless multitudes of coolies that it was fashionable 
to call raw material for soldiers. 

But Japan had planned her campaign and -was 
iletermined not to carry it out until all preparations 
were complete. Any slight check caused by over 
haste would raise the courage of the enemy and 
diminish the prestige of the Japanese arms. 



The Naval Demonstration at Port Arthur and 

Wei-hal-icei. 

On the 10th of August Admiral Ito with the 

Japanese fleet — about 20 vessels — made an attack on 

l^ort Arthur and Wei-hai-wei, the two naval ports of 

^ ^hina. It was a very slight affair — an exchange of 

^hots at lonor ranjo^e between the forts and the men- 

' *f-war. 

For some time people were puzzled to find out the 

Tueaning of this reconnaissance. It was generally 

Thought an attempt to provoke Admiral Ting, the 

^«)mmander of the Chinese fleet, to come out and 

vngage a great naval battle ; but after about a month 

the true object became evident : it was to cover thi» 

movements of tlie Japanese transports, who were 

pouring troops into Corea all the time. The fear of a 

naval engagement before they were ready kept the 

< *hinese fleet inactive during that precious time. 

When the Japanese l)ecame convinced that China 



118 THE CHINA-JAPAN WAB. 

would not yield until severely defeated they pushed 
on their preparations with marvellous rapidity. 
Eealising the diflBculties of a campaign across the sea 
they purchased all the steamers they could buy. It 
is said they bought 47 — most of them large vessels — 
during the war. This number, added to their re- 
spectable mercantile navy, formed an imposing fleet 
of transports for the conveyance of troops, ammunition^ 
and other necessaries for a campaign. To strengthen 
their position in Corea, they concluded a defensive 
treaty with that country on the 25th of August for 
the purpose of establishing its independence. To this 
object Japan contributed the necessary military force, 
and Corea promised to render evejy assistance for the 
easy transit of the troops through the country. In 
the first half of September another important measure 
was decided upon in Japan. The headquarters of 
the army, which had been established in the imperial 
palace, were transferred to Hiroshima, a town on the 
Inland Sea conveniently situated for the despatch of 
troops to the seat of war. The Emperor arrived there 
on the 15th of September — a day which will be cele- 
brated in the annals of Japan — and at once dedicated 
his whole time to the conduct of the war. His quarters 
were modest — two small rooms — and he passed al- 
most the whole day there in the despatch of business, 
rising early and retiring late. The imperial physi- 
cians became alarmed lest this incessant occupation 
should injure his health, but the vigorous constitution 
of the sovereign enabled him to resist all fatigue. 



NAVAL DEMONSTRATION AT PORT ARTHUR. 119 

During this lull of military operations, which 
extended from the 29th of July to the middle of 
September, the Japanese landed troops at Chemulpo 
(Yinsen), Gensan and Fusan. The latter port was how- 
ever soon abandoned, as it lay too far from the seat of 
war, and Yinsen and Gensan became the chief landing- 
places for their forces, especially the former. The 
Chinese were also hurrying forward their troops both 
by sea and land. The armies of the three Manchurian 
provinces were slowly marching south, some to Phy- 
ong-yang and others to the banks of the Yalu, the 
border river between China and Corea, where a second 
army was being formed. Near the mouth of this 
river was the chief landing-place for the Chinese 
troops which were conveyed by sea. 



120 THE CHINA-JAPAN TfJ/?. 



CHAPTER III. 

THE PHYONG-YANG CAMPAIGN. 

Preliminary Description, 

The origiual plan of the Chinese was to send troops 
to Corea by two routes : by sea direct to Asan, and 
l)y land over the Yalu. The former were to keep the 
Japanese in check while the latter, a much larger 
force, thus gained time to advance south and drive 
the enemy out of the peninsula. The Japanese were 
to be attacked on both sides, and as the Asan force 
was situated between the Japanese troops and their 
country, it would impede the facility of communica- 
tions and at least render impossible tlie erection of a 
telegraph line. 

In the account of the Asan campaign we have 
seen that the first part of the plan was rendered 
abortive by the prompt and successful attack of the 
Japanese. 

There still remained the second part of the plan : 
the army descending from the north, whose numbei-s 
were magnified by rumour, and which the Chinese 
confidently supposed would be able to sweep the 
Japanese out of Corea. The movements of this army 
had been closely watched by the Japanese, even when 



THE PHYONG'YANG CAMPAIGN. 121 

they had other matters to attend to. On the 23rd of 
July, when they had uot yet commenced their march 
a<;;ain3t Asan, a small party of mounted scouts under 
Machida, lieutenant of the line, and Takc-no-Uchi, 
aub-lieutenant of cavalry, were sent north to recon- 
noitre. 

The adventures of this small party read like a 
cliapter of romaDce, and show what a spirit of enter- 
prise and daring animates the Japanese army. 




From Seoul they rode tlirough an unknown countiy, 
lull of natural obstacles, up to the Tai-dong river, 
"ippositc to Phycing-yang, where they knew that the 
<Jhine8e troops were being concentrated. In tlii« 
neighbourhood, almost within sight of the enemy, 
they remained nine days, observing his movements 
and attempting the most desperato and daring 



122 TEE. CHINA-JAPAN WAli, 

ventures to annoy, him. In the hopes of destroying 
a telegraph station of the Chinese, they tried re- 
peatedly to get boats and cross the river by night, 
but no ferry-boats could be found. Then Sergeant 
Kawasaki boldly swam across the river, and when 
discovered, swam back amidst a hail of bullets and 
returned to his companions, who received him clapping 
their hands at his bravery. 

Their persistence in spying the enemy cost most of 
them their lives. On the night of the 9th of August 
they were attacked by 200 Chinese, and after a brave 
resistance all were killed except two, who succeeded 
in escaping, and returned to the Japanese army. 
This successful skirmish gave courage to the Chinese, 
who advanced to Hwang-ju. The Japanese, in re- 
cording the brave swimmer's exploits, remark that in 
Hideyoshi's time a similar feat was performed. 

A more serious advance was made shortly after by 
Major Ichinohe, who, commanding the vanguard of 
the Japanese army, started north from Seoul on the 
8 th of August. 

The same day they rested at Ko-yang, and the 
next day they reached Pha-ju. On the 10th they 
crossed the river Chhong with boats which had been 
prepared beforehand. 

As the opposite bank is formed by high hills, the 
place constitutes an important strategic position on 
the high road from the capital northwards. On the 
11th Major Ichinohe arrived at Kai-song, an im- 
portant city, which once was the capital of Corea, and 



THE, PHYONQ'YANQ CAMPAIGN, 123 

which the Japanese compared to Kioto, their ancient 
capital. 

The Japanese remained two days in this place, and 
received the report of the survivors of the party of 
cavalry scouts, which had advanced as far as Chung- 
kwa. After their desperate escape they had retired 
to So Heung, while the Chinese who had crossed the 
Tai-dong river advanced to Phung-san. 

On account of this news the Japanese, when they 
left Kai-song on the 13th of August, proceeded with 
great caution. They might almost be considered 
to be marching in the enemy's country, and besides, 
the nature of the ground was such i that the advance 
was full of danger. The road from Kai-song to Kim- 
chhon at first winds round the southern side of a 
mountain range, and presents great natural difficulties 
to an advancing enemy. The Japanese mention one 
pass of several ri which a few men could have defended 
against thousands, and which would have formed, well 
defended, an impregnable stronghold. The Japanese 
passed these defiles without opposition and rested at 
Kim-chhon on the same day. 

On the 14th the Japanese advanced to Ehung-san, 
a small town among the hills, and sent detachments 
to reconnoitre, but they found no Chinese. The 
Japanese, as they approached the enemy, advanced 
slower. It was not until the 17th that they marched 
to Nam-chhon-chon. Here they heard that the 
Chinese were advancing south from Ilwang-ju. Up 
to Xam-chhon-chiin the Japanese army had been 



124 THE CHINA-JAPAN WAB. 

accompanied by a Coreaii official, who had been 
despatched by the central Government for the purpose 
of informing officials and people that tJie Japanese 
were advancing with the consent of the King of Corea, 
who was allied with Japan. This official, as soon as 
lie got to Kai-song, feigned illness and telegraphed 
to be recalled, but he was ordered to remain with the 
Japanese. He. did so until they arrived at Nam- 
chhon-chhon, when he ran away, together with the 
local officials. 

On the 19th the Japanese made a farther advance 
of two ri, pushing a detachment under Captain 
Machida even to So-Heung ; and they remained in 
these positions for the whole of the 20th, reconnoitring 
the movements of the Chinese army, which, having 
the Tai-dong river as a line of defence, and Phyong- 
yang as base of operations, had pushed a body across 
the river to build forts. The position of this Japanese 
force, so far advanced in the enemy's country, was 
<onsidered hazardous, as it could not be properly 
supported from its distant base, and it suffered also 
from scarcity of provisions. In consequence of this 
Major Ichinohe received orders to retire. On the 
21st he withdrew to Kim-chhon, and on the 22nd to 
Kai-song. 

At this juncture a very curious thing happened. 
The Chinese who had crossed the Tai-dong, probably 
thinking themselves too much exposed, and imagining 
that the Japanese were advancing in force, also 
retreated, so that the two vanguards, which had 



THE PHYONQ-YANG CAMPAIGN. 125 

approached within ten ri of each other, recoiled 

simultaneously, leaving the whole country from Kai- 

song to Phyong-yang free of troops. The Chinese 

however only reported that all the country north of 

Kai-song was free of Japanese on the 23rd of August, 

and they filled up the preceding days with a variety 

of engagements in which they were victorious. It 

was popularly supposed in C^hina that the Japanese 

were being exterminated in detail, and the Chinese 

confidently expected to hear that their troops, after 

these desultory skirmishes, had entered Seoul. 

The prudence of the Chinese would have been 
justified if Major-General Oshima had followed out his 
fij^t plan, which was to attack the C^hinese and drive 
them out of Phyong-yang without awaiting reinforce- 
ments from Japan, and only with the force which he 
commanded, and which was called the Mixed Brigade. 
But on the 19th of August Lieutenant-General 
Xodzu arrived at Seoul, having come overland from 
Fusan. He at once informed himself of the enemy's 
position and movements. He justly argued that the 
Chinese would not easily abandon their base of opera- 
tions at Phyong-yang, because it was the strongest 
place in the north-west of Corea, protec^ted by a river 
and surrounded by hills, easily defended, and the ke\* 
to all operations for the defence of the Chinese 
frontier or the attack of the Corean capital. He 
knew also that the Chinese would relin(juish witli 
difficulty their old habit of always resting on 
strong places in warfare. He concludcil that there 



126 THE CHINA-JAPAN WAR. 

was very little apprehension of a Chinese advance. 
On the other hand, as the orders he had received 
from headquarters were to drive the Chinese com- 
pletely out of Corea and not leave a single man in 
the country, he had no option but to attack Phyong- 
yang, and occupied himself with the arrangement of 
his forces and plans to achieve that end. 

Besides the forces which Oshima had at Seoul and 
Kai-song, he had sent a battalion to Sak-riong, a 
small town about as far from the capital as Kai-song, 
but on another road leading to Phyong-yang. On 
the other hand, a small reinforcement had approached 
the capital and was awaiting for orders. On the 
8th of August a battalion of infantry of the 12th 
Regiment (10th Brigade) and a company of artillery 
had reached Gensan and marched at once for the 
capital. On arriving at a short distance frona Seoul 
they reported their arrival. Division-Commander 
Nodzu at once ordered them to turn back and proceed 
to Sak-riong and reinforce the battalion of the Mixed 
Brigade which was already there. This united force 
came to be called the Sak-riong detachment, and 
consisted of two battalions of infantry and one com- 
pany of artillery. 

On the 23rd of August orders were given to General 
Oshima to advance north with his Mixed Brigade, and 
he encamped that day at Kim-chhong, and on the 
next day entered Kai-song, where Major Ichinohe 
with the retreating vanguard had been waiting since 
the 22nd. On receiving this reinforcement Major 



THE PHYONQ'TANG CAMPAIGN. 127 

Ichinohe pushed on north the following day, the 25th 
of August. 

On the 21stMajor-General Tadzumi, commander of 
the 10th Brigade, reached Chemulpo and proceeded 
to the capital the following day. He was appointed 
to command the Sak-riong detachinent. Thus the 
Japanese forces were so disposed that they could 
advance on Phyong-yang by two roads : by the one 
which passed through Sak-riong, and by the main 
road, which had been already traversed by Major 
Ichinohe in his first advance at the })eginning of 
August. 

This attack by the front, though by two different 
roads, was not thought adequate to the purpose at 
headquarters, and General Nodzu was informed 
telegraphically that on the 26th of August a Mixed 
Brigade of the third division had landed at Gensan, 
and, though belonging to another division, was put 
under his orders. The plan for the attack of Phyong- 
yang, now decided upon by Marshal Yamagata, was 
as follows : General Nodzu with the main body and 
General Oshima with the Mixed Brigade were to 
advance by the main road ; General Tadzumi with 
the detachment at Sak-riong was to advance by that 
road ; and Colonel Sato (General Oseko not being 
able to arrive in time to take command) was to 
advance from Gensan with the troops of the third 
division, which had been put under the orders of 
General Nodzu. It was hoped in this way ti) be 
able to surround and destroy the Chinese army at 



128 THE CHINA-JAPAN WAR. 

Phyong-yang. As the country to be traversed wa^ 
in some places little known and full of difficulties, 
owing to the want of proper roads, fifteen days were 
allowed for the execution of the plan. The different 
detachments were to reach Phyong-yang between the 
31st of August and the loth of September, but the 
real attack was not to be delivered until the last date, 
and the movements of all the detachments, with 
the exception of the Mixed Brigade, were to be 
kept as secret as possible, and Phyong-yang was 
not to be approached \oo near before the 15 th of 
September. 

Before describing the execution of the plan it is 
necessary to show what movements were made prior 
to the 31st of August. The Mixed Brigade had 
reached Kai-song on the 24th of August, and it re- 
mained there up to the 28th, when it advanced to 
Kim-chhon, and on the 29th arrived at Phyong-san. 
It was still there on the 31st, the date fixed for the 
concentric advance on Phyong-yang. The Sak-riong 
detachment by the 31st of August had reached Sin-ge. 
The Gensan force was still at that port and the main 
body was stationed along the main road, divided in 
two columns at about two days' distance from each 
other, one at Kai-song and the other at the capital, 
Seoul. The following table gives the particulars of 
the different detachments : — 



THE PHYONG-YANG CAMPAIGK. 



129 



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130 TBE CHINA-JAPAN WAR. 

Besides the above there were the following 
Japanese troops stationed in Corea : — 



Infantry. i Cavalry. 



Detachment for protection oH f 2nd battalion of 22nd Regi- 
Seoal (Major Yasumitsu) . . | \ ment (less 1 company). 

^O^kor*!''^''°''°.^*^*-'"^°|6*>»^«8imeiit .... 1 company 

Detachment for protection of tele-] ' 

graph I 8th company of 2l8t Regi- 

Detachment for protection of com- 1 : ment. 

munications Jl 

Detachment at Jinsen . . . . f^^ company of 22nd Regi- I 

^ ( ment. 

Detachment at Ryong-8an . • {^'*^enTT^.''^^^*!' ^.^^.'y ^ *'^P 



The Sak-riong detachment, the main body, and 
the Mixed Brigade might be considered the right 
wing, centre, and left wing of the Japanese army 
marching on Phycing-yang by three routes, two of 
which often intersected each other. The Chinese army, 
however defective in reconnoitring arrangements, 
must have had some information of this simultaneous 
advance, and been informed of the approximate force 
of each detachment. Before the battle of Phyong- 
yang the Chinese had numerous adherents all over 
Corea ; even in the capital and amongst the favourites 
of the Japanese they had their informers and secret 
supporters. The Tai-wen-kun himself corresponded 
with the Chinese generals and encouraged them to 
march on the capital.* 

* His correspondence fell into the hands of the Japanese 
after the capture of Phyong-yang. 



THE PHTONG-YANG CAMPAIGN. 131 

The departure of large forces from Seoul and its 
neighbourhood could not be concealed, so that the 
Chinese must have expected to be attacked in strong 
force in front, with strong demonstrations on the 
right and left. As will be seen later on, even in this 
very just anticipation they were deceived 1)y the 
strategic ability of the Japanese. 

Tlie force which advanced from Gensan is some- 
times called the Reserve by the Japanese, as well as 
by the name of Gensan detachment. The C^hinese 
remained totally ignorant of the approach of this 
body, even when it was at a small distance. This 
purpose was achieved by the .strict orders which all 
the Japanese forces — with the exception of the Mixed 
Brigade — had, to keep as quiet as possible until the 
15th of September. 

For greater clearness we have to describe separately 
the advance of each corps, but whenever the simul- 
taneous movements or position of another detachment 
have any relation to the subject in hand we shall 
briefly allude to it. 



The Advance of the Mived Briyade. 

The Mixed Brigade had reached Pliyong-saii on the 
29th of August, and it did not leave that place until 
the 3rd of September, when it advanced to Tsung- 
Ilsin. General Tadzumi (tlie commander of the 
8ak-riong detachment) had a<rompanied (Jeneral 

K U 



132 THE CHINA-JAPAN WAR. 

Osliima up to Phyong-san, and on the 3rd left for 
Sin-ge to take up his command. Tsung-Hsin is a 
small sequestered place among the hills, which could 
not afford accommodation for the Japanese army, so 
that the troops slept in tents. From this place a 
plain stretches to So-Heung for above twenty Corean 
ri. Since the Japanese left the capital it was the first 
plain they had met. This circumstance is a sufficient 
indication of the difficulties the Japanese must have 
faced in marching through such a mountainous country. 
On the 4th they reached So-Heung, on the 5th 
another small place, and on the 6th Phung-san. 
While the army was advancing to Phung-san, about 
^seventy Chinese who were there fled in great fear and 
recrossed the Tai-dong. They hid their military stores, 
which were subsequently discovered by the Japanese, 
Avho were astonished to find amongst them about 
10,000 caultrops, probably intended to retard the 
Japanese advance, but which they considered merely 
iis playthings. 

All this time tlie advanced guard was about half- 
\vay between Phung-san and Hwang-ju, and Nishi- 
shima, with his regiment, was at Phung-san. On 
the 6th Nishishima advanced to She-jeu-kwan, to 
support Major Icliinohe, who marched to Hwang-ju 
and had the first encounter with the enemy. Scouts 
had reported that there w^as a force of Coreans and 
diinese in that city, hut they made a very feeble 
resistance, and the Japanese pursued them into the 
city and out again into the country at the opposite 



THE PnTONG-YANG CAMPAIGN. 133 

side. The capture of Hwang-ju did not cost the 
Japanese the life of a single soldier, and they became 
masters of a city of over 1,000 liouses, protected 
by a good stone wall, and conveniently situated, at 
about ten ri, from Phyong-yang. There was good 
accommodation for the army, and Oshima arrived 
here on the 7th and remained up to the 10th of 
September. 

The days passed at Hwang-ju were employed in 
reconnoitring the enemy, and as there were no indica- 
tions of his advancing in force, the Japanese, on the 
10th, marched to Chung-hwa, the next town on the 
road to Phvons^-vanf]^. On the wav there was a 
touching episode. They passed the spot wliere 
Lieutenant Machida and sub-Lieutenant Take-no-l'chi, 
with the handful of horsemen, had been surrounded 
and cut to pieces by the Chinese. By the information 
of the survivors they were able to trace each spot — 
the hillock on the wayside, and the pine-wood where 
Take-no-Uchi had been killed. Farther on thev saw 
the place where he had fallen from his horse — the bones 
of thc'poor animal were still there. The vivid imagin- 
ation of the Japanese pictured the whole scene of 
desperate bravery and siid slaughter, and tears cam(* 
to the eyes of many. Seven wooden tablets, brought 
for the purpose, were erected to the memory of their 
dea<.l comrades, and the soldiers sil(»ntly pros(»nted 
arms as a respe<!tful homage to the manes of the dead. 
This incident reveals the secret spring of rbipanese 
heroism. It is the ever-present bond l>etween the 



134 THE CHINA-JAPAN WAB, 

living and the dead which makes every Japanese 
soldier ready to throw away his life for his country's 
benefit. He knows that his name will be ever remem- 
bered and cherished, and for this hope of immortal 
glory he thinks he can well sacrifice a few years of 
vulgar existence, with its deceptive pleasures and 
wearying cares. 

On their march to Chung-hwa the Japanese found 
strewn on the road several hundreds of those oil-paper 
covers which the Chinese soldiers use to put on their 
hats and protect themselves from the rain. At the 
same time the scouts were informed by the Coreans 
that there had been fighting in the neighbourhood. 
The whole Japanese force, expecting to find itself 
soon in the presence of the enemy, marched ready for 
action ; but no farther traces of the Chinese were 
found, and stricter inquiries from the country people 
elicited the following information. 

On the preceding night 3,000 Chinese who were 
encamped in that neighbourhood had, in the dark- 
ness and heavy rain, mistaken some Coreans for the 
advancing Japanese. The outposts began at once a 
general fusillade, and retreated wildly to the main 
body, which, catching the alarm, took them for 
Japanese also, and a sharp action took place between 
different detachments of the Chinese force. Firing 
continued from 8 to 11 p.m., and when the mistake 
was discovered the Chinese had lost heavily in killed 
and wounded. The next morning they hastily buried 
their dead and retired to Phyong-yang. The hat- 



THE PEYONG-TANG'CAMPAIGN. 135 

covers for the rain had been thrown away in this 
night scuffle.* , 

The Japanese remained at Chung-hwa on the 10th 
and 11th of September. 

It is now necessary to make a slight digression 
and consider a little the movements of the main 
body, which, under General Nodzu, had been 
advancing from Seoul along the road to Phyong-yang, 
almost in the track of the Mixed Brigade. This 
digression of the present moment will enal)lc us to 
appreciate an important strategical evolution. Up to 
the present time the main body, whenever possible, 
had kept to the right of the Mixed Brigade, in its 
proper place as centre of the army advancing from 
Seoul ; but from the 10th of September the direction 
of these bodies changed. The Mixed Brigade, as we 
have seen, pushed on to Cliung-hwa, moving to the 
right, and General Nodzu advanced towards the left, 
marching to Hwang-ju, and making preparations for 
the passage of the River Tai-dong. The two detach- 
ments crossed each other, the centre becoming left 
wing. This evolution, performed at a short distance 
from the enemy, and only a few days before the date 
of the real atfaick, was a part of the general phm to 
keep the Chinese ignorant of the direction when? the 
real attack was to be <lelivere<l. 

On the 12th, at 4 a.m., tl)e ]\Iixed Briga<le left 
Chuncr-hwa, and at 9.25 the van en<j:a<(ed th(» Chinese 

• Probably the reports of the Corean peasants were 8« miowhat 
euggerated. 



136 THE CHINA-JAPAN WAR. 

in the neighbourhood of their first fort, on the left 
bank of the Tai-dong, opposite to Phyong-yang. The 
Chinese were driven into the forts. Orders came 
from headquarters to explore the country, and the 
Japanese forces were disposed as follows : — 

Right wing under Nishishima. 

11th Regiment, infantry, with eight guns (including two 

captured from the Chinese at Asan). 
Left wing under Takeda. 
21st Regiment,* infantry, with about ten gtins. 

The Chinese began a cannonade from their forts 
which the Japanese did not answer. They evidently 
expected to be attacked in force, and made great 
preparations. Several thousand Chinese soldiers came 
out of Phyong-yang and, crossing by the bridge of 
boats which had been built for the purpose, they 
manned the forts on the left bank. Cavalry was sent 
out to reconnoitre the Japanese ; a constant fire of 
rifles and cannon was kept up, and flags were waved 
in the fields and on the hills. 

The 13th was employed by the Mixed Brigade in 
making a series of demonstrations calculated to 
strengthen the Chinese opinion that the main body 
of the Japanese forces was in front of them, and 
intended to take the bull by the horns with a front 
attack. Some sergeants, with a handful of soldier& 
belonging to the 3rd company of the 21st Regiment 
undertook one of those enterprises of reckless daring 

* Less one battalion which formed part of the Sak-riong 
detachment. 



THE PIIYONG'YANG CAMPAIGN. V67 

s^ congenial to the Japanese soldier. They crossed 
the Tai-dong river and attacked twenty of the enemy's 
"vessels moored on the opposite shore, and, though 
exposed to heavy artillery and rifle fire, they 
succeeded in coming back with five Chinese vessels of 
different sizes. On their way back they also rescued 
fifty or sixty Coreans who had been left to starve in 
an island on the river. The Japanese artillery also 
kept up a brisk cannonade with the forts. The object 
of this latter feint was to discover the num])er of the 
enemy s guns, and they were ascertained to be a})out 
ten to fourteen. The capture of the junks w^is to 
convince the Chinese that the Japanese were making 
preparations to cross the river in the neighbourhood 
of Phyong-yang, and to mask the real passage which, 
about that time, was being effected lower down the 
river by General Nodzu with the main body. 

The 14th was a very clear day, and the Chinese 
commenced their cannonade at 0.30 a.m., but the 
Japanese did not answer ; their otticers were ])usy 
with their field-glasses watcliing all the movements 
of the Chinese. It was feared they might suspect 
what was coming on the next day, and divide their 
forces, but it was soon discovered that their principal 
apprehensions were for the front attack of the Mixed 
Brigade. The last preparations were made for the 
coming action, which was to commence at 3 a.m. of 
the next day, the 15 th of September. The ambulance 
was brought forward to head<|uart<Ts. The left win<x 
was to send a detachment, under Major Okuyama^ 



138 THE CHINA-JAPAN WAR. 

across the river in boats to attack the enemy's flank, 
and all the artillery was transferred to the right wing 
to cannonade the Chinese forts outside the Tai-dong 
gate of Phyong-yang city. 



Advance of the Sak-riong Detachment. 

We have already stated that this body was formed 
of a battalion of infantry detached from the capital, 
and of a battalion of infantry and company of artilleiy 
which, on their march from Gensan to Seoul, had 
received orders to alter their destination and reinforce 
the battalion stationed at Sak-riong. This place being 
the rendezvous, gave the name, to the detachment. 
We have also seen that General Tadzumi, who was to 
command it, had proceeded by the main road, together 
with General Oshima and the Mixed Brigade, up to 
Phyong-san. From this place, on the 2nd of Sep- 
tember, he altered his route and reached Sin-ge on 
the 3rd, where he found his troops awaiting him 
under Majors Yamaguchi and Tomita. Sin-ge had 
been a populous and wealthy place on the road from 
Sak-riong to Phyting-yang, but a short time before the 
routed Chinese, flying from Asan, had passed through, 
the town had been devastated and the people had 
fled. The Japanese suflered from great scarcity of 
food wliile they remained there. 

On the Gth of September they advanced five ri, 
and on the 7th they advanced four ri more, to Su-an, 
a town of about 1,000 houses. On the 8th, aft^r 



THE PHTONG'YANG CAMPAIGN. 139 

<^limbing a steep pass, they reached a small village 
'^rtth no accommodation, so that the troops had to sleep 
in a pine forest. On the 9th they started for Sam- 
<ieung, detaching the eighth company of the 21st 
Regiment, under Captain Tanabe, to reconnoitre on 
the road to Sang-won. The road to Sam-deung was 
Arery difficult, and they had to cross a river with no 
V)ridge and with only a few boats. As there was a 
heavy rain-storm the troops had to sleep in their 
^wet clothes in the fields. At Sam-deung they found 
that all the inhabitants had fled. As they were now 
only eight ri from Phyong-yang, and the attack had 
heen arranged for the 15th, they rested for three days 
^9th to 11th). Captain Tanabe returned from Sang- 
won and reported that the Chinese fugitives from 
Asan had been at that place for several days. 

On the 12th the Japanese advanced again. Major 
Yamaguchi, with the vanguard, at 8 a.m. reached the 
Tai-dong. On the opposite bank they saw a])Out fifty 
Chinese cavalry, who soon dispersed, but were replaced 
by about 1,000 infantry. Two sections of Japanese 
infantry then deployed on the hills and fired several 
volleys at the Chinese on the opposite bank, who soon 
entirely disappeared. Preparations were made for 
croBsing the river. At first they could only find one 
damaged vessel, which, however, they nianaired to 
convert into a ferry-boat, and Major Yamaguclii 
crossed the Tai-dong, which at this place narrows to 
a breadth of 330 yanls. lie occupied a .small village 
of some strategical importance and threw out outp)sts. 



140 THE CHINA-JAPAN WAR, 

rieneral Tadzumi, with the main body of the detach- 
ment, had intended to advance only as far as Kang- 
dong, but on hearing the firing he advanced. The want 
of boats prevented the passage that night, and it was 
only at 10 a.m. of the 13th that five vessels were 
requisitioned and the whole detachment crossed to 
the right bank of the Tai-dong. 

On that same day Major Yamaguchi, with the 
advanced guard which had crossed the day before^ 
pushed forwards. The Japanese proceeded very 
cautiously, and as they reached the top of some high 
ground a mounted scout returned reporting that the 
enemy's forts were in sight. The Japanese halted, 
and their officers were busy with their field-glasses. 
They could plainly see the streets of Phyting-yang and 
the flags of the Chinese generals.* On the right and 
in front of the city there was Mok-tan-son, a high 
hill which has historical associations for the Japanese, 
as it was there that their General Konishi, during 
Ilideyoshi's first expedition, made a stand against the 
united Chinese and Corean force and was defeated. 
Behind this, on a hill, they could see a great number 
of tents. The Japanese soldiers were forbidden to 
advance, as the appointed time for attack had not yet 
come ; but they heard artillery firing in the distance, 
and knew that General Oshima, advancing from the 
main road, was engaging the enemy's attention. 

* Chinese generals liave largo flags, with their names written 
in gigantic characters, flying from high staffs at their head- 
quarters. 



THE PHYONG'YANG CAMPAIGN. 141 

General Tadzumi remarked that when an army im- 
mures itself in fortifications it is in no hurry to fight. 
On the 14th the Japanese had their lines from 
mount Tai-song on the right to the top of Kuk-chu-si 
on the left, and made ready for the attack of the 
ensuing morning. The night, that of the autumnal 
equinox, was beautiful, and the full moon shone 
on Phyong-yang and the enemy's camps, where so 
many thousands were sleeping, all unconscious of the 
slaughter that awaited their awakening. 



The Advance of the Mala Bod;/. 

This detachment, which formed the centre of the 
forces advancing on Phyong-yang by two routes from 
Seoul, marched in two columns, w^hich proceeded 
almost by the same road employed by the Mixed 
Brigade. Up to the 10th there were only occasional 
unimportant divergences, but on that date, when the 
]SCxed Brigade moved up to Chung-hwa, the first 
column reached Ilwang-ju and the second column 
Phung-san, and, as we have already explained, the 
centre became left wing, and vice versn, Tlie main 
body, to follow up this plan, had to proceed to Kang- 
5«> on the other bank of the Tai-dong, which had 
therefore to be crossed. Preparations for that purpose 
were made on the same day. Major Baba, of the 
engineei's, soon reported that he had se<ured some 
ferry-boats in the neighl)ourhood of Iron Island, and 
later on he sent a further report that twenty-five 



144 THE CHINA-JAPAN WAR. 

away a small force of Chinese cavalry which he found 
in his way. The brisk cannonade and the busy 
preparations of General Oshima had thoroughly con- 
vinced the Chinese that the main attack was to be 
delivered where they expected it, on the southern 
bank of the Tai-dong. 



Phymg-yatuj and the Chinese Army. 

Phyong-yang is an important city of about 20,000 
inhabitants in the north-west of Corea. It is the 
capital of the province of Phyong-an, and has played 
an important part in the history of the country. 
For some time the capital of ancient Corea, which 
extended far north of its present limits, it was the 
constant object of Chinese attacks by land and sea 
when the Celestial emperors were engaged in war 
with their small neighbour. It marked the farthest 
northern advance of the Japanese armies during the 
invasions of Hideyoshi, and the Chinese victory gained 
at Mount Mok-tan (Peony), on the north side of the 
city, saved t^hina and Corea from the Japanese 
armies. 

Phyong-yang is very strong, both by nature and 
art. On the east it has the Tai-dong river, which 
wdnds almost round three sides of the city. On the 
north there is a very high hill, Mok-tan-san (Peony 
Mountain), where Konishi w^as defeated in 1592, and 
the banks of the river are steep and convenient for 
defence. The city is surrounded l)y high strong w^alls, 



THE CHINESE FORCES OF PHYONG-FANG. 145 

«nd the Chinese had added very considerably to the 
defences they had found. 

The Chinese forces consisted of what they called 
four armies : — 



TOie Sheng-tztt army, under) ^^, ^^ulf^y'!!!S}!I^'\ AKnntfionn^In 

^^SirL^'H ^'^"^^-C?^^^^^^ „ 3,500 „ 

em iiM>-pao.^ei • • •( i battaUon of artillery.) 

^''*!Sl?*'flL^l"'^F!;?^^ 2 battaliona of infantry) ,^ 

ondw^ Geneial ^eng-j 2 battalions of cavalry.) " _^ " 

Total . . . 13,000 



•hang-a 



^ Tbe Chinese camp is a military term indicating a body of about 500 men. 

Each camp or battalion occupied a square fort. The 
number and disposition of these forts were approxi- 
mately as follows : — 

Forta. 

On the south of the city (which were covered by] 
a line of entrenchments for a length of about/ 15 
2,000 metrefl, forming the first line of defence) . ) 
Outside the Tai-dong gate on the left bank (besides) ^ 

a very strong tite-de-pont) I 

On the north, on hills outside tbe city .... 4 

Ifok-tak-san (Peony Mountain) 1 

In tbe north comer, inside the city . . . . li 

Total 27 

These fortifications were constructed with OTcat 
<are, and were far stronger than anything tlie Japanese 
«ver imagined they should find. They were well 

L 



146 THE CHINA-JAPAN WAB. 

provided with field and mountain guns, and the 
troops were armed with magazine rifles. The Chinese^ 
generals were so confident of the strength of their 
position, and of the measures of defence they had 
taken, that they boasted that they could hold the 
place for years against myriads * of Japanese. It is^ 
but fair to add that though the Japanese did not 
know the strength of the fortifications, they ha^ 
prepared for a possible check in the attack intended 
for the 15 th. On the 12th of September large 
reinforcements reached Yinsen, and were at once sent 
to the front. They were under the command of 
Marshal Yamagata, the new commander-in-chief of 
the Japanese forces in Corea, but their presence was^^ 
not required at Phyong-yang, which fell before they 
reached the Tai-dong river. 

* The Chinese and Japanese use myriad (or 10,000) as a 
unit of calculation. Thus they say ten myriads for 100,000^ 
100 myriads for 1,000,000. 



L 2 



( 14:9 ) 



CHAPTER IV. 
The Attack on Phyong-yaxg. 

The Mixed Brigade. 

In describing the advance of this body, it has been 
noted that skirmishing had been going on during all 
the days from the 12th to the loth of September. 
To understand the events of those days, as well as 
the grand attack of the 15th, it will be necessary to 
throw a glance on the map of Phyong-yang city. It 
will be seen that the road from Chung-hwa (along 
which the Mixed Brigade had to advance) turns north 
as it approaches the Tai-dong river, and after passing 
between two forts, and crossing a small stream, it runs 
nearly parallel to that river, flanked by forts, until it 
reaches the tetc-de-pont which the Chinese had built 
to protect the bridge of ])oats. When the Japanese 
advanced on the 12th of September they <)c(*upied 
the two first forts, which were a])and()ned ])y the 
Chinese, and then proceeded to a ])ridge across the 
small stream. Here they met a few Chinese, who 
exchanged shots. The Japanese drove the C^hinese 
Uick, but did not pursue them, as the road beyond 
the stream was unsheltered hy trees, and exposed to 
the flank fire of the Chinese forts on the other side of 



150 TEE CEINA'JAFAN WAR. 

the Tai-dong river. To prosecute the attack on 
Phyong-yang, the Mixed Brigade had to advance iu 
unsheltered ground, under the fire of three strong 
forts, built near the bridge of boats, and the flank fire 
of the forts across the river ; at the same time it 
received little assisfamce from its own artillery, as the 
only favourable ground for placing the guns was at a 
considerable distance from the Chinese forts. 

On the 1 4th of September arrangements were made 
for the attack of the following morning. The Mixed 
Brigade was divided into several detachments. One 
was pushed north to join with the Sak-riong detach- 
ment ; another was to advance between some hills and 
«,ttack the Chinese forts in front ; another body was 
to advance by the main road from Chung-hwa, while 
Another detachment, under Major Okuyama, was to 
cross the Tai-dong and attack the south-eastern corner 
of Phycmg-yang, co-operating with the main body 
under Lieutenant-General Nodzu. 

The attack began before daylight, at 4.30 A.M., on 
the 15th of September, with a furious cannonade. 
The Japanese guns were directed on the forts on 
the left bank of the river, which protected the 
bridge of boats, and on the forts of the opposite 
shore, which could direct a dangerous flank fire on 
an advancing enemy. The Chinese answered vigor- 
ously, but they fared worst in this artillery duel, 
as their aim. was much inferior to the Japanese. 
Gradually, under cover of the artillery, the Japanese 
iidvanced, but they met a stubborn resistance. The 



THE ATTACK ON PHYONG-YANG. 151 

best Chinese troops, under General Ma-yii-kun, besides 
the defeated troops of Asan — who were placed in the 
firont to redeem their lost reputation — had all been 
stationed in the forts on the left bank, and, well armed 
with Mauser repeating rifles, they poured a hail of 
bullets on the advancing enemy. The Japanese could 
find no shelter in the open ground in front of the 
forts, and the rising sun revealed their position to the 
enemy. The Japanese officers, always at the head of 
their troops, kept shouting and encouraging their 
men. With a desperate effort the Japanese succeeded 
in capturing the outworks of the two first of the four 
forts which the Chinese were defending on the left 
bank, and planted the flag of the 11 th Regiment on the 
earthworks. But the Chinese, retiring to the central 
part of the forts, kept on the same incessant fire, 
before which the Japanese soldiers fell like chessmen, 
to use their own graphic expression. The Chinese 
had an abundant supply of ammunition in their 
redoubts, and fresh supplies were being constantly 
sent across the bridge of boats, which the Japanese 
artillery in vain tried to destroy. The Japanese 
exhausted their ammunition, and were o])liged to 
search for cartridges on the bodies of their killed and 
wounded comrades, and at last had only their 
bayonets to oppose to the dreadful cross-fire (^f the 
Chinese forts, which were so placed that the enemy 
had to advance between them in the attack. 

For a moment the position was so critical that 
Ensign Omori, fearing the regimental colours might 



152 TEH CHINA-JAPAN WAB. 

fall into the hands of the Chinese, ran with them to 
the side of the outwork, and digging a hole, buried 
them in the ground, showing the place to some soldiers^ 
that they might recover the flag in case he wa& 
killed. 

A fresh body of Japanese troops, the 2nd battalion 
of the 21st Kegiment, with half the 9th company, made 
a desperate attempt to rush the Chinese forts, but the 
earthworks were too high and steep, and they had to- 
retire with heavy loss. The Japanese soldiers had 
been from three in the morning up till past noonb 
without any food, and having exhausted their ammu- 
nition, they were forced to slowly retire to their old 
positions. The object of their attack was a simple 
demonstration to draw away the Chinese troops, but 
they had carried it out with such earnestness that^ 
had the Chinese resistance been less vigorous, they 
would have taken the forts and the bridge of boats. 
The Chinese troops on this side of the river were 
probably more numerous than the Japanese attacking 
force, and with their fortifications and advantage of 
position they were able to repulse them easily. 

The losses of the Japanese were very heavy. The 
11th Kegiment had three captains and one lieutenant 
killed ; the 2nd and 10th companies of the 21st Regi- 
ment had all their officers killed and wounded, and 
the 4th company had only one ensign left. Even 
General Oshima was wounded. He had shown the 
most reckless bravery. During the heat of the action, 
he had ridden up to the flag of one of the regiments 



THE ATTACK ON PEFdNG-TANG. 15? 

and declared to the soldiers he would die there unless 
they took the forts. 

Major Okuyama, with the left wing, was more 
fortunate in his share of the attacks. He crossed the 
Tai-dong river and succeeded in setting fire to the 
houses in the neighbourhood of the Chinese forts. 



The Sah-riong and Gensan Detachments. 

As thes^ two detachments, though starting from 
such distant places, converged on the same side of the 
city of Phyong-yang, their attack must not be dealt 
with separately. The north side of the city — the 
object of this combined attack — was defended by five 
forts, one of which was on the celebrated Peony 
Mountain, a hill that commands the whole of Phyong- 
yang. The forts were disposed in a zigzag line, 
which presented three forts as a first defence and two 
(including that on Peony Mount) as a second line of 
defence. The Sak-riong defcichment was to attack 
the right (the side nearest the Tai-dong river) and the 
Gensan deta(;hment the left of this line of forts. The 
latter detachment had been very Ibrtunate in its 
approach on Phyong-yang. As its advance was not 
expected by the Chinese — fully occupied with the 
demonstrations of General Oshima's MIxcmI Bri<j[ade — 
it had l)cen able to bike fK)sition on a hill favourably 
sitmited at 1,500 metres from thci extreme Chinese 
fort on the left ^Mountain guns were at once 



•154 THE CHINA-JAPAN WAR, 

^Iragged on the top of this hill, on the 14th of 
September, in readiness for the attack of the following 
morning. 

The Sak-ricing detachment began the attack at 
daybreak in two bodies — Major Yamaguchi, with one 
battalion on the Chinese right, and Major Tomida, 
with another battalion on the Chinese centre. The 
Chinese, with their Mauser magazine rifles, kept up 
a steady fire on the advancing Japanese, but Major 
Yamaguchi's battalion made such a desperate assault 
that with heavy loss it captured the first Chinese fort 
(the one nearest the river) by 7.30 a.m. The third 
fort (the one in the centre of the first line) opposed a 
longer resistance, but the company of artillery brought 
up its guns to a hill at 800 metres and shelled the 
Chinese with such accurate aim that they fell into 
confusion, and Major Tomida, seizing the opportunity, 
stormed the third fort at 8 a.m. 

The Gensan detachment in the meantime had 
taken, without much difijculty, the fifth fort, the 
Chinese probably becoming bewildered by the mul- 
tiple attacks to which they were exposed — the can- 
non roaring in every direction on both sides of the 
river. The first line of forts being taken, the two 
detachments converged ou the two remaining. The 
smaller was abandoned without resistance, but the 
fort on Peony Mount held out for a short time. 
General Tachimi,* the commander of the Sak-riong 
detachment, ordered Major Yamaguchi to move from 

* It is the same as Tadzumi : both pronunciations are correct. 



TBE ATTACK ON PHTONG-TANa. 155 

the fort he had taken and attack Peony Mount in 
front, while Major Tomida was to advance in tlie rear 
from the third fort Colonel Sato, with two battalions, 
also advanced from the fifth fort towards Peony 
Mount, whieh thus was attacked on three aides. As 
it constituted the principal defence of Phyong-yang 
it was obstinately defended for a short time, but the 
Japanese artillery (tlie company of the Sak-riong and 




the battalion of the Gensan detachments), which had 
been attempting to breach the city walls, seeing the 
difficult position of the infantry, turned the guas on 
Peony Mount This artillery fire was so lieavy that 
the Chinese began to waver, and the Japanese infantry, 
swarming up the hill on three sides like ants (tt» 
borrow their expression), took the cck'brate<l I'eimy 
Mount at 8.30 a.m. 



166 



TEE CniNA-JAPAN WAS. 



As sooii as Colonel Sato saw that Peony Mount 
had been taken he directed his efforts against the 
Gemmu * Gate, the nearest on that side of the city. 
The Chinese defended the walls so well and kept up 
such a brisk fire that the Japanese assault was 
repulsed. The soldiei"s were reluctantly retreating, 
regretting the wasted lives of their brave comrades, 
when an episode happened which resembles rather a 




feat of a romance of chivalry than an incident in the 
sober scientific warfare of modern times. Lieutenant 
Mimura, burning with shame at the repulse, shouted 
to his men, " Who will come with me to open that 
gate 1 " and at once rushed towards the (iemmu Gate. 

■ This is the Japanoso proiiuuciatiim of the characters. In 
Corcan it should be Uyon-mn, but aftor Haraila'a celebrated 
exploit the gate lieeervea tu be called by a Japanese name. 



THE ATTACK ON PnYONO-TANG. 157 

Harada, one of the soldiers of Mimuia, then said, 
" "Who will be the firat on the wall ? " and flew after his 
officer. They ran so quickly that only eleven other 
soldiers were able to join them under the wall after 
passing through a rain of lead. Mimura and his 
small band of heroes found the gate too strong to be 
forced, so the lieutenant gave the order to scale the 




walls. The Chinese were busy filing in front, keeping 
the Japanese troops back, and never imagined that a 
handful of men would have the boldness to climb 
the walls like monkeys under their very eyes. 
Mimura and his men came upon them witli such 
surprise that they were scattered in an instant. The 
Japanese at once jumped down inside the walls and 



158 TEE CHINA-JAPAN WAB. 

rushed to the gate, killing three of its defenders and 
dispersing the rest, Mimura cutting right and left with 
his sword. - 

The gate was difficult to open, and while they were 
striving to succeed, the Chinese, who began to- 
increase in numbers, kept firing from a distance. 
Soon one soldier was killed and another wounded^ 
The lieutenant ordered that the rest of the company 
should be called from without, but another soldier 
was killed before Harada succeeded in unbolting and 
opening the gate to the astonished Japanese who- 
were outside. 

With the taking of Peony Mount and the Gemmu 
Gate, Phyong-yang was virtually captured. The 
glory of this brilliant achievement was due to General 
Tachimi and Colonel Sato, with their troops, who were, 
however, also greatly aided by fortune. Colonel Sato- 
was able to occupy a favourable position, on the 
14th of September, which had been neglected by the 
Chinese ; and during the fierce engagement of the loth 
the death of Tso-pao-kuei, the bravest Chinese general 
that the war has produced, disheartened his troops and 
facilitated the Japanese victory. The easy capture of 
Peony Mount was due to this event. General Tso* 
was wounded early in the fight, but he tore up his 
clothes, bound up his wound, and continued encourag- 
ing his men ; another wound did not abate his 
courage, and he still cheered on his soldiers until a 
third bullet killed him. His death threw disorder into- 
his troops, who broke up and fled in every direction. 



TEE ATTACK ON FHYONG-YANG. IS^" 

Shortly after the storming of the Gemmu Gate 
white flags were displayed at the principal gates of 
Phy6ng-yang. General Tachimi advanced on horse- 
back to find out the cause of these flags, but he found 
difliculty in communicating with the Chinese — they 
could not understand him : and when he had recourse 
to writing he could only obtain a letter from the- 
Corean . official of the city. As the Chinese soldiers- 
were gathering in numbers on the walls, and looked 
threatening, Tachimi thought it useless to expose 
himself and his men to a sudden attack from an- 
enemy whose intentions were not clear. He therefore- 
retired, and, as a heavy storm began at the time, the* 
Japanese troops were withdrawn to Peony Mount. 

TTie Main Body. 

General Nodzu with his troops did not begin the 
attack till 8 a.m., when his artillery opened a heavy 
fire upon the Chinese forts on the south of the city. 
Under cover of this fire a company of Japanese 
infantry approached the forts, when, at the same time, 
a body of Chinese cavalry over 100 strong issued from 
the forts. The Japanese artillery saw at once this 
sortie of the enemy, as well as the danger of their 
in&ntry, who had not yet discovered the approach of 
the Chinese cavalry, and they turned their guns from 
the forts on to the horsemen. The fire of the artillery 
revealed to the infantry tlie advance of the C^hinese, 
and the unfortunate cavalry was welcomed with such 



160 THE CHIN A' JAPAN WAB. 

a dreadful artillery and rifle fire that very few escaped. 
A few were made prisoners, and from them it was 
ascertained that they belonged to the army of Tso- 
pao-kuei, which had broken up after the death of its 
leader. 

Soon after over 1,000 cavalry were seen escaping 
behind the forts, and as they passed through the 
fields they were exposed to a murderous fire. The 
troops of the main body were thus reduced to the 
condition of spectators of the consequences of the 
fierce fight which had been fought on the north of 
the city and won by the Gensan and Sak-riong de- 
tachments ; they had only to stop the flight of the 
routed Chinese. 

Major Okuyama, of the Mixed Brigade, who had 
crossed the river and set fire to the houses near the 
•Chinese forts, assisted the easy work of the main 
body. At 2 P.M. a body of infantry assaulted the 
forts and, after driving out the Chinese without 
difliculty, set fire to them. They then retreated to 
their original positions. 

The Retreat of the Chinese and Capture of 

Phyong-yang. 

The white flags had been hoisted only to gain time. 
The Chinese had no heart to remain and defend the 
place. Even on the preceding day, in a council of war, 
Yeh-chih-chao and other generals had advised a 
retreat, and it was only owing to the angry expostu- 



THE ATTACK ON PHYONG-YANG. 161 

lations of Tso-pao-kuei that any defence was made. 
When Tso died Phyong-yang lost its only brave 
defender, and all officers and soldiers were only 
anxious to escape as rapidly as possible. During the 
whole night of the 15th a mob of soldiers streamed 
out of the gates of Phyong-yang. Unfortunately, the 
two roads of escape were guarded by the main body 
and the Gensan detachment, and the Chinese had to 
run the gauntlet of the Japanese fire. The work of 
slaughter lasted the whole night up till morning, and 
the light of day revealed the sickening sights of war : 
heaps of corpses and dead horses were strewn about 
right and left of the two fatal roads. It is estimated 
that the Chinese lost about 1,500 men in that dread- 
ful night of disorderly flight. 

The next morning not a single Chinese soldier was 
left in Phyong-yang, and the Japanese marched 
through the different gates and occupied the city with 
cheers to their emperor. 

The spoils captured by the Japanese were of 
every possible kind : 35 good guns, over 500 maga- 
zine rifles, 500 ])reech-loader3, an immense <|uantity 
of ammunition for cannon and rifles, tents, horses, 
money, and an endless variety of sundries, such as 
drums, trumpets, carts, etc., which the Japanese, 
with amusLUg precision, carefully enumerate. 

The fortifications erected ])y the Chinese formed 
the marvel of the Japanese, who did not expect to 
find such finished work, and could not imagine liow 
it had been possible to execute it in the forty-two 



162 



THE CHINA-JAPAN WAR. 



days the city had been occupied. On inquiry it was 
found that not only all the Chinese troops, but all 
Coreans, from seventeen to fifty years of age, had 
been compelled to work, so that each fort, besides its 
garrison of about 500 men, had had 360 Corean 
coolies to assist in building it. 

The loss of the different Japanese detachments in 
the battle of Phyong-yang was as follows : — 





1 Killed. 


Wounded. 


Missing. 




Mixed Brigade — 

Officers 

Rank and file 


6 
110 


; 18 

257 


• • 

13 


Sak-riong detachment — 

Officers 

Rank and file 



9 


1 

45 


• •• 
1 


Gensan detachment- 
Officers 

Rank and file 


1 

2 
31 


5 

87 


■ ■ 

19 


Main body — 

Officers 

Rank and file 



4 


1 
22 


• • 

• • 


Total . . . 


162 


438 


33 



Giving a total of 8 officers killed and 27 wounded, 
and 154 soldiers killed and 411 wounded, besides 33 
missing. The Japanese lists of losses were most 
carefully compiled, the name and native village of 
every common soldier being published. The Chinese 
losses cannot be so accurately known ; but the 
Japanese, who are not addicted to exaggeration, 
estimate that dui-ing the Ijpttle and the retreat about 
2,000 Chinese were killed ^ besides a larger number 
of wounded, 600 prisoners were taken. 



THE ATTACK ON PHYONG-YANG. 163 

The consequences of the victory at Phycing-yang 
'were enormous. The strongest city of Corea had 
^3een taken in a day ; the great Chinese army, which 
was to enter Seoul, had been dispersed ; all hopes of 
assistance from China were lost by the Conservative 
party in Corea. With the battle around Phyong-yang 
the Corean campaign may be said to have finished ; 
no further resistance was offered, and the Chinese 
retired beyond the Yalu to defend the frontiers of 
their empire. Hostilities commenced on the 25th of 
July, and on the .15th of September Corea was 
•conquered — in less than two montlis — and at a very 
trifling cost of life. It is estimated that in battle, 
from wounds and sickness, the Japanese only lost 
663 men in Corea. 

If we are astonished at the rapid ooncjuest of the 
Japanese we must not forget that their an<,*estors 
three centuries ago were almost as ijuick. In a little 
over two months from the date of landing, Konishi 
liad taken Phyftng-yang, and he had to march his 
troops through the country, without steamers, to 
convey them to convenient landing-places on the 
coast. The difference lies in the sciiuel. AVnile the 
Japanese invasion of the sixteenth century stopped 
at Phyttng-yang — which marked their last jrreat victory 
— ^in the war of the nineteenth centurv the battle of 
Phy5ng-yang was only the first of a series of brilliant 
and unexpected victories. T^e reasons of the diti'erent 
success of the two campaigns will appear in the next 
part of this book ^ 

M 2 



164 THE CniNA'JAPAN WAS^ 



PART III. 



THE CAMPAIGN IN CHINA. 



CHAPTER I. 

THE XAVAL BATTLE OF HAI-YANO ISLAND. 

During the period preceding the battle of Phyong- 
yang the Japanese navy had been very busy. Afteir 
the demonstrations at Port Arthur and Wei-hai-wei, 
on the 10th of August, it had confined itself to patrol- 
ling the Corean coasts and protecting the Japanese 
transports which conveyed the reinforcements for the 
army in Corea. The last of these expeditions arrived 
at Cheumlpo (Yinsen) on the 12th of September. 
It consisted of 30 transports, and had on board 
Marshar Yamagata, the new commander-in-chief of 
the Japanese amiy in Corea, 10,000 soldiers, 4,000 
coolies, and 3,500 horses. The troops were landed 
and despatched to the front with such rapidity that 
it ciilled forth the admiration of the foreign men-of- 
war that were in harbour. This Heet of transports 
was protected by a strong force of men-of-war divided 
into several squadrons. 



NAVAL BATTLE OF HAI-YANG ISLAND. 165 

On the 14th, after the landing of the troops and 

'tores had been completed, a portion of the fleet left 

r the mouth of the Tai-dong river, where some of 

"tlie vessels and a fev? torpedo-boats were detached to 

X>roceed up the river and assist the troops that were 

preparing to attack Phyong-yang. The rest of the 

fleet anchored at Cape SKoppek. On the 16th of 

September the Main and 1st Flying Squadrons 

proceeded towards Hai-yang Island to watch the 

enemy's movements. As the Japanese did not expect 

to fight a battle, they had left their torpedo-boats in 

the Tai-dong river. 

Al)Out this time the Chinese fleet was similarly 
employed. On the 14th of September five steamers 
left Taku with 4,000 troops destined for the Yalu 
river, where the Chinese were concentrating a second 
army to support the first one at Phyong-yang. 
These transports were convoyed at first by six 
cruisers and four torpedo-boats, but when they passed 
near Talien Bay they were joined by the bigger 
vessels of the Pei-yang squadron. The whole fleet 
then proceeded to the Yalu, where the troops were all 
disembarked by the 16th, and on the morniHg of the 
17th, their object being attained, the Chinese prepared 
to return to their ports. 

On the same morning the Japanese fleet reached 
the island of Hai-yang, and after exploring it they 
advanced towards Tahi Island, when, a little after 
y A.M., smoke was seen in the distance, and at 1 1.40 
the Chinese fleet came in sight. Admiral I to at once 



k •, 



use THE CHINA-JAPAN WAJR. 

ordered his vessels to prepare for action. His squad- 
ron was composed of vessels of very diflFerent speed 
and power, and it was a difficult task to conceive a 
plan which should enable them to act in concert witk- 
out incurring the loss of any of the weaker, slower 
vessels. His fleet was formed : by the 1st Fly in g^ 
Squadron, a fine gi'oup 'of four cruisers with speed 
from 19 to 23 knots ; by the Main Squadron, six 
vessels of very difterent speed, as the first four ranged 
from 17*5 to 19 knots, and the two last could only 
steam 13. Besides these he had the Ahagi^ a guu* 
vessel of a little over 600 tons, and the Saikio Marui^ 
an armed merchant steamer. Neither of the latter 
could be considered as fighting vessels, and they 
were ordered to place themselves to the left of the 
two squadrons, which thus covered them from the 
Chinese fleet. It will be seen in the sequel that 
Admiral Ito*s anxiety for the * safety of these ves- 
sels, and of one of the slow vessels of the Main 
Squadron, the Hiyei, obliged him often to modify hi» 
tactics. 

The Chinese fleet, composed also of twelve* vessels^ 
with six torpedo-boats, was possessed of much more 
uniform though far inferior speed to the Japanese. 
It was also somewhat at a disadvantage, because two 
of the vessels with the torpedo-boats, having delayed 
their departure from the Yalu, were separated from 

* Some statements give the Chinese fourteen vessels, but 
as only ten were effectively engaged the total number is 
unimportant. 



NAVAL BATTLE OF ITAI-TANG ISLAND. 167 

the rest of the fleet. The Chinese thus had only ten 
vessels in the line of battle, which was also the number 
of the Ja^nese fighting ships. 

To render clear the following description there 
is attached a table with the names, tonnage, speed 
and guns of all the vessels engaged. Each vessel 
has also a number by which its position may be 
traced in the diaOTams illustratinjc^ the evolutions 
of the battle. As for these diagrams, of course, 
their accuracy can only be approximate. The re- 
lative positions of vessels and their evolutions can 
only 1)0 judged with imperfect precision, especially 
in the heat of an action, which was fought generally 
at lon«c ranjsce. 

The ten Chinese vessels were placed in order of 
1 cattle, in a single line, with the strongest vessels in 
the centre and the weaker ones on the wings. 
Admiral Ito disposed his fleet in a single column, led 
l)y the 1st Flying Squadron, with the YorJuno at the 
head. As the two fleets approached, the Chinese 
opened fire at 0,000 metres, but the Japanese reserved 
their fire until they were at 3,000 metres. The 
action began about 1 p.m. The Japanese fleet at first 
seemed as if it intended to atta(*k the Chinese centre, 
for which reason perhaps Ting, the Chinese admiral, 
placed his largest vessels there, but as tliey approached 
the Ist Flying Squadron swerved from its original 
direction, so as to pass by the right wing of the 
Chinese fleet, at the same time it increased its speed 
from ten to fourteen knots. Dia^jram I. shows the 



168 



THE CHINA-JAPAN WAR. 



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NAVAL BATTLE OF IfAI-TANQ ISLAND. 169 

position of the two fleets at this moment of the 
battle.* 

The Main Squadron, after following for a short time 
the original course, also deviated in the same direction 
as the Ist Flying Squadron. The Yoshino [1], which 
hA the movement, was for a moment a target for the 
whole of the Chinese Heet, but her speed soon enabled 




her and her consorts of the Flying Squadron to sweep 
past their right wing, pouring a deadly fire on the 

* The snmber [1] indicates Chinese veasela, tind [1] indi- 
<»tea JapftneBO. By referring to the table their names and 
pfttticalan will be ascertained. Aa the c volutions of the 
Japanese fleet become very ooiii]>licated in the successive 
di^ramp, different colours hav£ Iwen need to mark the course 
of the vessels. The Ist Flying ISquadron's path is marked red, 
that of the Main Squadron blue, and the manceuvrea of the 
Saikio Maru, Akatji and Bigei are marked with green lines. 



170 THE CHINA-JAPAN WAR. 

weak vessels that had been placed at the end of the 
line. The poor little Yanij-weiiy] was in flames, a» 
the first Japanese vessels steamed past. 

The object of this skilful evolution of Admiral Ito- 
had been to take advantage of his superior speed 
and circle round the Chinese ; in following this- 
course, his ships kept at a distance from the large 
vessels and heavy guns of the centre and concentrated 
their fire, with fatal effect, on the small flanking 




vessels that they could approach without danger. 
Tlie original plan had been to continue the circle, and 
come round the otlier wing, and the Flying Squadroni 
had already begun to port when it saw two other- 
Chinese vessels with six torpedo-boats coming up to 
join tlie rest of the fleet. 

The Flying Squadron then starboarded to attack 
these new enemies, who prudently retired from the- 



yAVAL BATTLE OF IIAI-YANG ISLAND. I"l 

unequal contest. Admiral Ito observed this uew 
course, and signalled to the Flying S(juadron that 
they should change again and follow the Main 
S(|Uttdnm. Diagram II. shows the Yanii-wei [I] in 
Hanies after the passage of the Japanese vessels, and 
the l-'lying Squadron c-ommcncing to sfairlioard to 
pui-sue the new Chinese ve.ssel«. 




Tilt* Main Stjuadron, following in the wake of the 
Flying 8<iuadD>n, .swept imst the Chinest' right wing, 
and ciinccntrating it** iirtilh'ry on the Cluio-i/iiiui |'J|, 
:^et that vessel on fire. While full suicoss attendt-d 
llie iiiaX vcssul.s of the .(a|«ine.<e fleet, the slow ones 
were e.\(«ised to great danger, whiili they only 



172 THE CHINA-JAPAN WAR. 

avoided by the display of skill and intrepidity. The 
Hii/ei [9], one of the slowest, was lagging in the rear, 
unable to keep up with her consorts of the Main 
Squadron ; she now found herself obliged to run the 
gauntlet of the whole Chinese fleet which was fast 
approaching. Kather than run such a risk, the 
commander boldly resolved to pass through the 
Chinese line ; by such a course he shortened the 
distance which separated him from the rest of his 
squadron — he followed the chord of the arc — ^and was 
exposed to the fire of fewer vessels for a shorter time. 
He passed between the Thig-yuen [6] and King- 
yuen [7] at the distance of 500 metres, and 
escaped two torpedoes which were launched at him. 
He had, however, to sustain the fire of several Chinese 
vessels, and the lliyei [9J was in flames when he 
successfully brought her out of the enemy's line. 

Diagram HI. shows thelliyei [9] passing through the 
Chinese fleet, and the Flying Squadron starboarding 
all the time to follow up the Main Squadron. 

The Hiyei [9] signalled at 1.55 p.m. that she was 
in flames, and the little Akagi [12], whose slowness 
had kept her behind, bravely went to her assistance. 
The Akagi [12] had been hotly pursued by the Lai- 
yiien [4], whose guns had killed her commander and 
destroyed the steam-pipe, so that the supply of shells 
at the forecastle was cut off*. The Akagi [12] fought 
on bravely, and when her main-mast was struck down, 
the flag was reset upon the stump. At one time the 
Liii-yuen [4] was only at 300 metres distance, and 



NAVAL BATTI.E OF HAI-YANO ISLAND. 175 

her shells caused great havoc, but a lucky shot froia 
the Akagi [12] set her on fire, after which she had ta 
give up the pursuit. 

Admiral Ito, who, with the Main Squadron, was 
circling round and approaching the Chinese fleet, did 
not lose sight of the distress of the Hiye't [9] and 
Akagi [12], and he signalled to the Flying Squadron ta 




alter their course again, and sbirhoanl so that they 
might interpase between those vessels and the ('hinc.-je. 
Diagram I\'. shows the Akaiji [12] near the IIi\i/ei 
[9] and the Chinese vessels in pursuit ; the Flying 
SfjuadroD is about to starboanl again ; tlie Main 
Sfjuadron is approaching the rear of the (.'hinetM? Heet. 



174 TtlE CHINA-JAPAN WAB. 

* 

At the same time the Saikio Mam [11] is star- 
boarding. 

At 2.23 P.M., as the Main Squadron passed the 
Chao-yuru/ [2] ait 800 metres, that vessel sank. The 
Japanese say that the cries of the drowning men could 
be heard above the roar of the cannon, and that it 
was quite heart-rending. The Saikio Maru [11] that 
by her speed had escaped hitherto from the advancing 
Chinese fleet, now perceived that the detached Chinese 
vessels and torpedo-boats, which had turned ofi" at 
first, when the Flying Squadron swept round the right 
wing of the enemy's fleet, were approaching again 
in an attempt to join the rest of the Chinese fleet. 
To avoid running into them, the Saikio Maru [11] 
had to alter her course, and in Diagi-am IV. she was 
shown to be starboarding. In avoiding this danger, 
she approached the Hii/ei [9] and Akagi [12] and 
T)ecame exposed to the fire of the Chinese fleet that 
was pursuing those vessels. For some time the Saikio 
Maru was in extreme danger ; one of the 30 ^-centi- 
metre shells from the Ting-yuen [6] struck her, and 
destroyed the boiler connected with her steering-gear ; 
she had to lower speed before a hand-wheel could be 
fixed. In the meantime the detached Chinese vessels 
[11] [12] and some torpedo-boats came up on the 
other side, and the Saikio Maru [11] was between 
two fires. One of the torpedo-boats crossed her bows 
and discharged two torpedoes, which luckily missed; 
as she was going full speed at the time ; one torpedo 
is said to have passed right under her coming up on 



NATAL BATTLE OF HAI-YANQ ISLAND. 175 

the other aide. It has already been mentioned that 
Admiral Ito had signalled to the Flying Squacbon to 
alter their course again, and instead of following the 
Main Squadron, to advance in an opposite direction 
and protect the Hiyei [9] and Akai/i [12]. The 
approach of the Flying Squadron also saved the 
Saikio Maru [11], and the three weak vessels were 
able to escape from the battle. 




Diagram V. shows the position of the Hects after 
these evolutions had taken place ; the lHnri [Q [ and 
Akniji [12]'are safely out of the battle, and the SuilAo 
Mam [11] -has already turned round to effect her 
escape. It is a pity that none of the .lapinese 
diagrams show the torpedo attack on the Saikio 
Mnru [11], but carefully noting the suieeft.sive position?) 
of that vessel, the reader's imagination can sujtply the 



176 TEE CHINA-JAPAN WAR. 

omission. The Flying and Main Squadrons have swept 
round the Chinese fleet almost in a circle, but in 
opposite directions. The position where the Ckao- 
yunij [2] sank is also marked. 

When the two Japanese squadrons closed on the 
Chinese fleet on both sides, the fiercest encounter 
of the battle took place. The two flagships the 
Matsnshima [5] and the Ting-yuen [G] exchanged 




shots with dreadful effect ; the Chinese ship was soon 
in flames, while one of her 30 ^-centimetre shells- 
bursting on the Matsushima [5] set fire to a heap of 
ammunition and killed or wounded eighty of the 
crew ; a fire also broke out, but it was soon ex- 
tinguished. The Japanese stood the dreadful carnage 
with great courage ; almost all the gunners were 
killed, but even the band players offered to work the; 



NAVAL BATTLE OF SAI-YANO ISLAND. 177 
guns. On the Chinese aide, when the fire broke out 
on the flagsliip and she was unable to work her guns, 
the C/ien-yuen [o] came bravely to her assistance and 
remained by her all the time ; it was owing to this 
inten'cntion that the flagship was not destroyed. 
The fire was finally put out by von Hanneken* and 
some other foreigners on board the Tiivj-yuen [6], 
■who encouraged the disheartened Cliinese. 




At about 3.30 P.M. the Ckih-i/uen [8] wiis sunk, 
and then the Japanese directed their attention to the 
K'mg-ytten [7], After passing round the Chinese 
fleet, the two Japanese S'luadrons came liai;k hemming 



* Mr. von Hanneken, tUe pasacngor of the Ki'imhing, was ncnt 
-ia assist Admiral Ting. The Eiin>ix.'aii render luimt nut be 
KQTprised that a land officer was cliuscn for tfaia jiiir]>uHu, Itccunso 
th» Chinese admirat himself was un old cnvalrj- officer. 



178 THE CHINA-JAPAN WAS. 

in the Chinese vessels who now were in great disorder, 
some escaping and none keeping in any order. When 
the Flying Squadron swept back it repeated the 
attack on the King-yuen [7], which sank at 4.48 p.m. 
Now again the two squadrons surrounded the scattered 
Chinese vessels, directing their fire principally against 
the two large Chinese ironclads, the Ting-yuen [6j 
and Chen-1/uen [5]; but the 14-inch armour belts of 




these veascls were proof against all the guns of the 
Japanese ; though their upper works were burnt and 
riddled with shot, they still floated and could continue 
to fight. Some months afterwards, a Japanese officer 
said that the resistance of these ironclads had shown 
their value to the Japanese navy, which could not 
feel safe until they were either captured or sunk. 
The same officer, however, remarked that had the 



NAFAL BATTLE OF BAI-TANO ISLAND. 



179 



>)attle lasted nn hour longer the two ironclads must 
have been taken. At sunset the Flyinj; Squadron 
was recalled from her pursuit of the Chinese vessels. 

Diagram VI. shows the last phase of the battle 
when the two squaclrous are turning back to surround 




the ChinoKC again ; thepkces where the Chih-yuenl^l 
and Kinij-;/mn [7] wink are also niarkcd. 

At sunset, as the torpeiln-boiit-s had joined (lie 

Chen-tfueH[o\ and Tinij-i/ntn [(ij, tliu Jaiuini-se fi'iiivd 

t« risk a night engagement, and fullowed the Chinese 

at a distance, but next morning they lust .siglit of 

X 2 



180 TBE CBINA-JAPAN WAR. 

them. It is probable that both fleets were exhausted 
by the long fight. The losses of the Chinese were 
very heavy ; four vessels, the Yang-wei [1] Chao- 
yung [2] King-yrien [7] and Chik-yuen [8], besides one 
which ran aground in the retreat near Talien Bay, 
and was blown up by her crew lest she should fall 
into the hands of the Japanese. The Japanese did 
not lose any vessels, but the Matsushima [5] and 




Hiyei [9] were badly damaged ; their loss in men was 
also very slight, only 115 killed and 103* wounded 
for the whole fleet, but to this total the flagship con- 
tributed fifty-one killed and forty-one wounded — 
ninety-two out of 360 on board. The Chinese loss of 
life was far more considerable ; they lost about 600 

• These are only those who were attended to in hospital; 
Bomo more remained on hoard. 



NAVAL BATTLE OF HAI-TANG ISLAND. 181 

men by the sinking of three vessels, but on the other 
vessels there were only about 100 killed and 200 or 
300 wounded. 

The naval battle of Hai-yang Island was the only 
considerable one of the war, and is one of the most 
remarkable of modem times. It is the first naval 
engagement between two fleets provided with modern 
improvements in the art of war, and it was carried 
out on an entirely original plan ; the beautiful evolu- 
tions of the Japanese fleet were totally different from 
ancient tactics, but they are the only ones adapted to 
the high speed and heavy armament in quick-firing 
guns of modern navies. Rapid concentration and a 
crushing fire on the enemy's weak point can now be 
easily effected by a skilful admiral, and the ancient 
line of battle, with its series of single engagements 
between vessels battering away at each other until 
one struck its flag, is to be completely discarded. 
Some critics have contemptuously remarked that a 
naval battle between two European fleets could never 
have lasted nearly five hours without the complete 
destruction of one or both of the fleets. This is a 
false conclusion drawn from a confusion of modern 
vessels with ancient tactics. They imagine two fleets 
running alongside of each other in the good old- 
fashion and discharging their (juick-firing guns 
incessantly until one side surrenders or is destnned. 
They do not understand that the introduction of 
quick-firing guns has modified naval warfare like 
breech-loadin<j rifles transformed infantrv tactics ; as 



182 



TDE CHINA-JAPAN WAS. 



in land warfare, infantry has to advance in open order 
and profit by every shelter the ground may offer to 
escape the shower of bullets that greets its approach, 
so in naval'warfare ships will have to trust to their 
speed to avoid being crushed by a rapid fire, and by 




skilful evolutions choose the time and the distance of 
the engagement. 

Admiral Ito has also been blamed for not having 
destroyed the whole Chinese fleet, but it must be 
remembered that history offers few instances of the 



NAVAL BATTLE OF HAT' TANG ISLAND. 183 

<lestruction of an entire fleet, and in such cases, like the 
battle of the Nile, the fleet was at anchor or had its 
movements cramped by the land ; but even in such 
cases, as at Salamis and Lepanto, a large number of 
vessels often succeeded in escaping. 

In the present instance the Chinese lost four vesels, 
nearly a third of their fighting force, and when we 
<^nsider that most of the naval battles of the last 
<5entury were decided by the loss of only a small part 
of one of the fleets, we shall not hesitate to recognise 
that the Chinese had a crushing defeat. It must also 
"be remembered that Admiral Ito had three weak 
vessels which hampered his movements, and that he 
43ucceeded in not losing one of them, though one was 
41 merchant steamer that could have been disabled by 
s single lucky shot in the engines, and another a 
gun-boat of about 600 tons. We cannot tell what 
the Japanese might have done without these vessels. 
They also had no torpedo-boats, and considering the 
way the Japanese handled these craft a few months 
later at Wei-hai-wei, it may be logically inferred that 
had any of them been present at Ilai-yang Island, 
very few of the Chinese vessels would have escaped 
during die night. 

We miist feel a deep admiration for Admiral Ito 
when we consider how, surmounting all these difti- 
coldeSy he was able to win the battle by a scries of 
beautiful evolutions, which, guarding the weak vessels, 
Always had for their ultimate aim the destruction of 
the enemy • As he did not expect to meet the Chinese, 



\ 



184 THE CniNA'JAPAN WAB. 

and had to form his plans on the spur of the moment^. 
his merit is all the more surprising : he had, in 
about an hour, to conceive evolutions for which he 
had no historical precedents, as no considerable naval 
battle had yet been fought with ironclads and none 
with quick-firing guns. The battle at Hai-yang 
Island, by its originality claims the attention of all 
students of naval tactics. It is truly wonderful that 
lessons in^modem naval warfare should be given by 
Japan, a nation that a little over thirty years ago had 
nothing but a fleet of junks. 

This naval battle exercised great influence over the 
whole war. In the Japanese campaign of 1592, 
Konishi, after the capture of Phyong-yang, was arrested 
in the triumphant march through China, which he 
meditated, by the failure of the Japanese fleet to co- 
operate with him, after its defeat at the island of Ko-je. 
That was the turning-point in the Japanese invasion of 
the sixteenth century. It would be attributing an ex-, 
aggerated influence to sea-power, to infer that without 
the victory at Hai-yang Island, the Japanese campaign 
in China in the present war would have failed. 
Japan's military superiority was so overwhelming and 
China's coUapse so complete, that no single event 
could have altered the fortunes of the war. But the 
crushing defeat of the Chinese, the consequent com- 
mand of the sea held by the Japanese, facilitated all 
their operations and enabled them to land their 
armies when and where they chose, and to conceive 
bold plans of campaign which would have /been too 



( 
I 
I 



NAVAL BATTLE OF HAI-YANG ISLAND. 185 

hazardous without such a naval supremacy. It is for 
this reason, that, though the battle of Hai-yang Island 
'was fought only two days after the battle at Phyong- 
yang, and while all the Japanese troops were still in 
Gorea, and remained there for over a month longer 
before invading China, this naval engagement is placed 
in its present place at the beginning of the campaign 
in China. The naval battle had no influence over 
the Corean campaign, which had already been decided 
two days before, but it. was a most important factor 
in the next campaign of the Japanese, and contributed 
to their brilliant success. 



186 THE CHINA-JAPAN WAR. 



CHAPTER 11. 

THE FIRST army's INVASION OF CHINA. 

The Crossing of the Yalu. 

The battle of Phyong-yang ended the war in Corea. 
The Chinese troops attempted no further resistance 
in that country, and retired to the Yalu, the river 
which forms the boundary between the Chinese 
empire and Corea. If they had been less dispirited 
they might have made a stand at two places offering 
good defensive positions. At An-ju, a strong town 
with very high walls, the main road passes through a 
-defile which could have easily been defended by a 
small force ; and during a retreat of forty miles the 
Chinese should have had time to recover their courage. 
At Ch5ng-ju, thirty miles farther away from PhyOng- 
yang, instructions had been given to prepare some 
resistance, but the troops were disheartened and in 
a hurry to put the Yalu between them and their 
pursuers, so the place was abandoned. 

The Japanese army, after the capture of Phy5ng- 
yang and a short rest, advanced north towards the 
frontier. Tachimi, with the advance-guard, was at 
An-ju on the 5th of October, at Ka-san on the 6th, 
^t Chong-ju on the 7th, at Son-chhon on the 9th, and 



THE CROSSING OF THE YALU. 187 

•at Wi-sun (near Wi-ju and the Yalu) on the 10th. 
But the Japanese scouts were at Wi-ju as early as the 
6th of October, and a telegraph line from that place 
to Phyong-yang was completed on the 18th of that 
month. The Japanese found the roads in Northern 
•Corea from Phyong-yang to Wi-ju much better than 
any they had met before. They had to thank the 
Chinese for this, as they had been obliged to mend 
the roads to convey their artillery to Phyong-yang. 
About the 20th of October the whole Japanese army 
was around Wi-ju, on the southern bank of the Yalu. 
It was composed of the 3rd and 5th Divisions, which 
had now been formed into a corps dCarmee, a novelty 
in the Japanese army, whose largest unit had 
hitherto been the division. This force was called 
the First Army, and was commanded by Marshal 
Tamagata. 

The naval victory of the 17th of Septeml)er, the 
-consequent command of the sea, opened new views to 
the staff of the Japanese army, and they decided to 
^continue on a vaster scale the principle which had 
hitherto governed their strategical movements. They 
were now able to use army corps as they had used 
•detachments in the Corean campaign, and to advance 
them simultaneously, subservient to the great scheme 
of the invasion of China. A force, composed of a 
•division and a brigade, and styled the Second Army, 
was being prepared, while the First Army was 
advancing in Corea towards the Yalu, and it was 
arranged that the invasion and advance into China of 



188 THE CHINA-JAPAN WAR. 

these two armies should be almost synchronous and 
directed in such a way that in the unlikely hypothesis 
of a strong advance on the part of the Chinese, one 
army could relieve the danger of the other. To' 
preserve continuity of narration it is impossible ta 
describe the action of the two armies simultaneously,, 
but cross-references will be made whenever any 
advance or engagement affects the other army. 

The Yalu, between China and Corea, is a broad, 
deep river forming a formidable natural obstacle. 
The Chinese general Sung, the new commander-in- 
chief, wisely chose it as the first line of defence 
against the threatened invasion of the empire. As- 
the defence of this river has always been an important- 
consideration both for China and Corea, two strong 
towns are placed on the opposite sides of the river, 
Chiu-lien-ch'eng on the northern, and Wi-ju on ther 
southern bank. These two cities now were the head- 
quarters of Sung and Yamagata. As soon as the. 
Japanese troops reached .the Yalu they began to make 
preparations for crossing it. The engineers of the. 
5th Division, who had arrived about the 12th of 
October, proceeded to ascertain the width of the 
river, no easy matter, as the opposite shore was^ 
swarming with Chinese soldiers. The daring of the^ 
Japanese found a solution to the difficulty. Mihara, a. 
soldier of the engineers, a strong swimmer, volunteered 
to swim across with a line, but the numbing coldness of 
the water deprived him of the use of his limbs, and he 
was drowned, his corpse floating away to the other shore.. 



TEE CROSSING OF THE YALU. 189 

Not discouraged by his fate, Sergeant Miyake, of the 
engineers, with a soldier, whose name is not recorded, 
plunged into the icy stream, and succeeded in swim- 
ming across with a line, and coming back with the 
•desired information. It seems that the Japanese 
found they had not enough pontoons to bridge the 
river, because they began to collect timber and build 
.rafts. The life of the poor soldier drowned in the 
Yalu was therefore of some use to his country. 
About the 20th of October the Japanese troops began 
to make demonstrations on the southern bank of the 
Yalu, now appearing in one place, and then in 
another, with the object of tiring the Chinese and of 
rendering them less watchful, an easy task, as that 
people are very careless in military matters. 

Marshal Yamagata had chosen for his residence a 
building on high ground, called the Oenerars Pavilion. 
A beautiful view was enjoyed from this place ; below 
flowed the Yalu river ; on the right Su-ku-chong and 
Li-tzu-yiian ; on the left An-tung and Wu-tiao-kou, 
and in the centre Chiu-lien-ch'eng studded the vast 
plain which stretched before the eye. Only on the 
right, there was a hill, which from its resemblance to 
A crouching tiger is called Hu-shan (Tiger Mountain). 
Its height is only about 100 metres. Near C'hiu-lien- 
-ch'eng and Wi-ju the Yalu receives a tril)utary, the 
Ai-ho or Ai river, and is divided by several islands. 
Marshal Yamagata in the Generars Pavilion, after 
carefully studying the country and comparing it 
-with his maps, saw that tlie key of the position lay 



190 THE CHINA-JAPAN WAB. 

at Hu-shau (Tiger Mountain), and formed his plans. 
accordingly. On the night of the 23rd of October 
orders were sent to Colonel Sato to proceed up the 
river to Su-ku-chOng and cross the Yalu. 

Colonel Sato, with seven companies of the 18th 
Regiment, a small force of cavalry and two guns, 
proceeded to Su-ku-ch6ng, and on the 24th crossed 
the Yalu. The Chinese forts fired upon the Japanese, 




and a small force of 300 infantry and 60 cavalry 
attacked them ; but the Japanese drove them back 
and stormed a fort, capturing two mountain guns,, 
ammunition and a quantity of winter clothing. It 
was a very tame affair, as the Japanese had only one- 
soldier slightly wounded. The Chinese fled when the 
Japanese approached at 600 metres. Colonel Sato, 
as soon as he had secured his position on the left 



THE CROaSINF OF THE YALU. 191 

bank of the Yalu, sent a mounted messenger to in- 
form the headquarters of his victory, and proceeded 
to complete the soundings of the river. 

Marshal Yamagata decided to make a general 
attack on Hu-shan (Tiger Mountain) on the following 
day, and on the night of the 24th of October gave 
orders for the distribution of the troops. 

The army was divided into five bodies as 
follows : — 

Brux}e Division. 
(Colonel Yabuki of the Engineers.) 

One battalion of infantry. 
Two battalions of engineers. 
Pontoons of the third division. 

Third Division. 

(Lientenant-General Katsura.) 

One brigade of infantry. 
One battalion of cavalrj-. 
One regiment of artillery. 

Fifth Division. 

(Lientenant-General Nodzu.) 

One brigade of infantry. 
One battalion of cavalry. 
One regiment of artilleiy\ 

Mixed Brigade. 

(Major-Oeneral Tachimi.) 

One brigade of infantry. 
One battalion of cavalr}% and 
Artillery. 



192 THE CHINA-JAPAN WAB. 

Eeserve Park of Artillery. 

(Major-General Kuroda.) 

Batteries of mortars and field-pieces. 

During the night from the 24th to the 25th the 
engineers completed a bridge with pontoons and rafts. 
The Yalu at that place divides into three branches, 
the first 60 metres wide, and 80 centimetres deep, 
the second 150 metres wide and 3 deep, and the third 
about 110 metres wide. At 4.30 a.m. on the 25th 
the 3rd Division crossed the river and moved to-- 
wards Hu-shan (Tiger Mountain), the artillery park 
under Kuroda taking a position N.E. of Wi-ju, to 
protect the passage with the mortars. Tachimi's 
Brigade followed the 3rd Division and took up a 
position on its left wing, the 5th Division remaining 
on the other bank ready to give assistance. 

The Chinese, in their usual way, had been building 
forts for a long time as if they intended to oppose a 
determined resistance, but the sudden appearance of 
the Japanese army on their side of the river 
surprised and disheartened them. After an engage- 
ment which lasted from 6.15 to 7.45 a.m. they broke 
and retreated across the Ai river in the direction of 
Chiu-lien-ch'eng. The Chinese general now became 
conscious of the important event which had taken 
place, and fresh troops from Chiu-lien-ch'eng advanced 
in three columns to attack the Japanese. Oseko and 
Tachimi attacked the Chinese right wing, while 
Katsura engaged them in front, and after a short 



THE CROSSING OF THE YALU. 193 

struggle they were defeated, some retreating again 
across the Ai river, and others dispersing in the 
mountains. The battle was over at 10.30 a.m. 
and at half-past eleven Yamagata was already at 
Hu-shan. 

Preparations were made during the night for 
attacking Chiu-lien-ch'eng on the following day (26th). 
General Katsura with the 3rd Division was to attack 
in the rear, while General Nodzu with the 5th 
Division advanced along the right bank of Ai river ; 
but the next morning when the Japanese advanced 
to attack, they found that the Chinese had evacuated 
the town during the night. The Jiapanese, though so 
near to the enemy, had been obliged to light fires in 
the night to dry their drenched clothes, and the 
Chinese kept up a harmless fire with their guns, 
probably to protect their retreat. The Japanese 
acknowledge their imprudence in fighting a battle 
with a river at their backs, but considered such a risk 
legitimate in the face of an enemy ignorant of the 
art of war. 

While these events had taken place up the river. 
Major Okuyama with three companies of infantry had 
descended opposite to An-tung on the 25th, and liad 
made demonstrations against that place to prevent 
the sending of reinforcements to Chiu-lien-clrcng. 
The Chinese kept firing volleys with their rifles all 
night, but it was not until the morning of the 26th 
that the Japanese began to fire witli two field-pieces. 
As the Chinese made no answer. Major Okuyama 

o 



194 TEE CHINA-JAPAN WAB. 

■ 

crossed over at 9 a.m. and found that the Japanese 
army had already occupied An-tung. They captured 
several Krupp guns not yet used, and 900 magazine 
rifles in unopened cases. An-tung had been the resi- 
dence of General Sung, and his house was occupied 
by General Katsura, who used the furniture of his 
adversary ; amongst it, there were the Chinese 
military works of Sun* and Wu f and a variety of 
maps of Corea and Japan. The Japanese were 
much amused to find their country of an elliptical 
figure. 

The Japanese losses in the battles around Chiu-Iien- 
ch'eng were one officer and thirty-two men killed, and 
three officers and 108 men wounded : they buried 
495 Chinese, but many more must have been drowned 
in the Ai river. The spoils were : 

74 field-pieces and 4 macliine-guns. 
4,395 rifles. 

30,384 rounds of artillery ammunition. 
4,300,600 rounds of small arm ammunition. 

The Japanese were surprised at the forts they 
found, and they observed that from Song-huan to 
Phyong-yang up to Chiu-lien-ch'eng, there was a con- 
stant improvement. But good soldiers were wanting, 
and they remarked that war depends more on men 
than things. 

• A commander of the sixth century B.C. to whom a celebrated 
military treatise is ascribed. 

f A famous general of the beginning of the fourth century b.c. 



THE CROSSING OF TEE YALU. 195 

The defeated Chinese troops under General Sung 
retreated to Feng-huang-cheng (Phoenix City), which 
'was held by General Sin with fourteen or sixteen 
camps. It is necessary now to remind the reader, 
that up to 1875 a neutral zone forty miles broad, and 
uncultivated, existed between China and Corea ; in 
the historical sketch at the beginning of the book this 
has been mentioned. Feng-huang was a border town 
on this neutral zone, and several roads converged 
there : it is therefore a place of considerable strategical 
importance. The Japanese resolved to attack it on 
the 3rd of November, their emperor s birthday, as 
they wished to solemnise that day by a victory. But 
these hopes w^re frustrated by the Chinese, for when 
Greneral Tachimi reached Tang-shan, a town five ri 
from Feng-Huang, his cavalry scouts reported that 
on the 29th of October the Chinese had set fire to the 
town and retreated. Tachimi entered Fencr-huann: on 
the 30th of October without any resistance. The 
Japanese captured two mountain guns, three mortars, 
and a quantity of rifles and tents. From the reports 
of prisoners, they ascertained that the Chinese army, 
discouraged of fighting, had dispersed : the greater 
part of the soldiers had fled seawards to Ta-ku-slian 
(Great Orphan Hill), while General Sung with a few 
of his men had retreated north towards Mukden. 

After the capture of Feng-huang, the two divisions 
of the First Army were separated ; the third division 
continuing the campaign westwards, while the fifth 
carried on operations to the north and east. The 

2 



196 THE CHINA-JAPAN WAR. 

headquarters of the First Army were at Chiu-lien- 
ch'eng, and afterwards at An-tung, and Generals Oseko 
and Tachimi led the van of the third and fifth divisions. 



Operations of the Fifth Division, 

General Tachimi, on the 9th of November, sent out 
detachments on the two roads leadinor from Fenor- 

o o 

huang to Mukden ; the first on the western road 
proceeded up to Lien-shan-kuan (United Mountain 
Pass) on the 11th of November, and on the 12th 
explored the celebrated Mo-tien-ling (Heaven-touching 
Pass), which is the strongest place on that road to 
Mukden. It found the pass strongly defended by the 
Chinese, and after a skirmish, in which one soldier was 
killed and three wounded, it retired to Lien-shan-kuan, 
the object of the reconnaissance having been attained. 
As the Chinese kept appearing in the neighbourhood 
of Tsao-ho-kou (Grass River Pass), thus threatening 
to cut the communication of the Japanese at Lien- 
^han-kuan, Tachimi sent orders that the detachment 
should concentrate on Tsao-ho-kou. The other 
Jetachment advanced on the northern road ; but when 
it passed Ta-hsi-kou (Great Western Ditch), it found 
the enemy in force ; and as its object was t<) 
reconnoitre, it retired. General Tachimi was now- 
aware that the enemy was in the neighbourhood of 
Lien-shan-kuan (United Mountain Pass) and Tsao-ho- 
kou (Grass River Pass) on one route, and near Ai- 
yang-pien-men on the other route. 



TDK CROSSING OF THE YALU. 197 

Operations of the Third Division. 

General Oseko, who was in command of the van of 
the third division, which was to act westwards, on the 
5th of November pushed on to Ta-tung-kou (Great 
Eastern Ditch) and Tai-ku-shaii (Great Orphan 




llAJUn-GKXEnAL 



Mountain). One of the prisoners taken at the batth* 
of Phyiing-yang was a native of Tai-ku-shan, and had 
been very kindly treated by (Jencial I tsoko ; he now 
tjecame very useful in obtaining information. He 
reported that the disbanded soldieis flying from Feng- 
huang had conamitted great excesses, pillaging and 



198 THE CHINA-JAPAN WAU. 

ravishing in all the villages ; some of them had fled 
to Chin-chow and others to Hsin-yen. As the 
latter was a place of considerable strategical import- 
ance, where roads converged from every direction, 
it was decided to attack it. As usual, the Japanese 
planned a double attack. While General Oseko was 
to advance from Tai-ku-shan on one road, Major 
Mihara, detached by General Tachimi, was to proceed 
from Feng-huang on another, and the Chinese were to 
be puzzled by a simultaneous attack in front and rear. 
General Oseko, with three battalions of infantry, 
i^ne company of cavalry, and one battalion of artillery 
(minus a company) started from Tai-ku-shan on the 
14th of November. On the 16th, after a slight 
skirmish w^ith the Chinese cavalry, he entered Tu- 
men-tzii (mud-door) at 11.30 a.m. ; several bodies of" 
Chinese cavalry and infantry attacked the place, but 
they were repulsed. On the morning of the 17tli 
no trace of the Chinese could })c seen, and Oseko 
advanced to Hung-chia-po-tzu (Red-House Village) ; 
at 11.20 A.M. firing was heard in the distance, and he 
knew that Mihara was attacking Hsin-yen on the 
north-east. Oseko*s vanguard continued to advance, 
and met a body of Chinese, who commenced firing at 
long range, while the guns of Hsin-yen also joined 
in the attack. The Chinese were gradually reinforced 
until at 2 p.m. they were about 2,000 strong, and they 
threatened the Japanese flanks. The Japanese de- 
ployed, and as they advanced the Chinese retreated 
(like a coy maiden the Japanese observed) ; they 



THE CROSSING OF THE YALU. 199 

■ 

preferred fighting at a distance, and considered 600 
metres as uncomfortably near. The fall of night 
prevented the Japanese taking Hsin-yen, and its 
<:apture was reserved for the next day ; but on the 
morning of the 18th, when they advanced, they found 
the town abandoned : the double attack of the pre- 
ceding day had entirely disconcerted the Chinese, who, 
fearing to be surrounded, retreated westwards. The 
main body of Oseko's detachment at 8.30 p.m. entered 
Hsin-yen, where they found nine guns and a number 
of rifles. 

Colonel Mihara, who led the flank attack, left Feng 

Huang on the 14th of November with a battalion of 

infantry and a troop of cavalry videttes. On the 

15th the cavalry had reached Huang-hua-tien 

(yellow-flower field), and the infantry Lau-yeh-mias 

(gentleman temple). On the 16th the infantry 

arrived at Ling-kou (collar-hook) ; as the cavalry was 

insuflicient, a section of foot-soldiers assisted as scouts. 

This mixed vanguard met the Chinese near Huang- 

chin-tzu (yellow-peak), and had a sharp engagement. 

On the 17th Mihara came up with his whole force and 

attacked Huang-chin-tzu (yellow-peak). The Chinese 

had already engaged Oseko's force at Tu-men-tzii 

(mud-door) on the 16th, and they were ol)liged now 

to divide their forces to meet the double attiick. At 

Huang-chin-tzii (yellow-peak), the Chinese stationed 

four camps'of infantry and one camp of cavalry ; * 

• This should give a force of 2,250 men ; but probably after 
«o many defeats the Chinese cadres were very deficient. 



200 THE CHINA-JAPAN WAR. 

this force, availing itself of its advantageous position 
oh the brow of the hill, opposed a determined 
resistance to the Japanese. Mihara ordered two 
companies to deploy on the right and left of the road, 
and to climb up the hill. Lieutenant Machida, who 
commanded the forty picked soldiers of the vanguard, 
distinguished himself on the right, driving the 
Chinese from rock to rock ; but as soon as the 
Japanese had taken one height, they found, as is 
usual in a very mountainous country, another height 
to be stormed. After a succession of these attacks 
they took the crowning height Huang-chin-tzu 
(yellow-peak) itself, and captured a mountain gun. 
The Chinese retired to Hsing-lung-kou (eminent 
hook), but the principal force at Hsin-yen, during the 
night, retired to To-mu-cheng (knocker-wood town). 
While engaged with Oseko at Tu-men-tzu (mud door), 
the unexpected attack of Mihara from the rear 
alarmed them, and they retired for fear of having 
their communications cut off. A rear-guard was left to 
defend Hsin-yen, and delay the Japanese advance, 
but Colonel Mihara soon defeated this force and 
entered the city. 

From the names on the captured flags, and from 
the reports of the inhabitants it was ascertained that 
Generals Feng, Nieh, and Chia were in Hsin-yen, 
with about ten camps of infantry and 1,000 cavalry. 
The Japanese mention, that, during Mihara's advance. 
Sergeant Kawasaki with a cavalry soldier were sent 
by another road to keep up communications with 



THE CROSSING OF THE YALU. 201 

Oseko's detachment. On passing through a village, 
the sergeant separated from his companion for a 
short time, but when he came back, he only found his 
headless trunk. This was the second narrow escape 
of Sergeant Kawasaki ; he was one of the mounted 
scouts that were sent towards Phyong-yang at the 
end of July, and after swimming across the Tai-dong 
he luckily saved himself during the Chinese surprise 
at Chung-hwa, where almost all his comrades were 
killed. 

The combined attack of Oseko and Mihara who 
started from Tai-ku-shan (Great Orphan Mountain) 
and Feng-huang-cheng (Phoenix City), two points 
over fifty miles distant, was so exactly timed that it 
succeeded completely. A garrison was left in Hsin- 
ycn with the captured guns, but Oseko with his main 
body withdrew to Tai-ku-shan. The Japanese did 
not intend to advance the First Army until the 
Second Army, which had already landed and was 
marching on Port Arthur, should be in a condition to 
co-operate by advancing north. The First Army 
confined itself to spreading out detiichments like a 
fan, radiating from Chiu-lien-ch'eng ; the outposts 
were situated at Tai-ku-shan, Hsin-yen and Lien- 
shan-kuan, in touch with the enemy, and ready to be 
reinforced if the enemy advanced. The Japanese in 
these advanced stations suffered great hardships ; 
they were often without food for days, the provisions 
having to l>e brought over very steep mountain roads 
in carts dragged by Japanese army-coolies. 



202 TEE CHINA-JAPAN WAR. 

For the present the plan was a defensive one, and 
had for its object to keep up a line of communications 
by driving away any attack from the north. Of 
course this plan was not divulged, and it >vas 
popularly supposed that the First Army intended to 
march on Mukden, a city which from its having been 
the ancient capital of the Manchu dynasty, and 
containing the imperial ancestral tombs, had a great 
moral importance for the Chinese Government This 
grand scheme which was openly discussed, and 
probably feared by the Chinese, kept a large force 
occupied in defending the northern passes. People 
were astonished at the Japanese delay in taking 
Mukdfen. This rest in the military operations of the 
First Army, will enable us to turn our attention to 
the Second Army which was very active about this 
time. 

The First •Army, as soon as it had occupied a part 
of Manchuria, began to organise a civil administration 
in the principal places, with the the civil employes 
w^hich were sent over from Japan. The successes in 
Manchuria deeply moved the hearts of the people of 
Japan ; their soldiers had crossed the Yalu, the river 
which their poets had always sung should slacken the 
thirst of their war-horses. A civil administration in 
Manchuria — the extension of Japanese laws to a 
portion of the great Asiatic continent — roused the 
pride of an insular people that for millenniums had 
been confined by the ocean. 



( 203 ) 



CHAPTER III. 

THE CAMPAIGN IN THE REGENT S SWORD PENINSULA. 

The Landing of the Second Army. 

After the naval victory of the 17th of September 
the Second Army was rapidly prepared for the war. It 
was to consist of a division (the first) and a Mixed 
Brigade (from the sixth division), commanded re- 
spectively by Lieutenant-Gen eral Yamaji and Major- 
General Hasegawa. The former is considered the 
representative of stern determination in the Japanese 
army, and from having lost an eye he is called the 
One-eyed Dragon.* The mobilisation of the first 
division took place on the 22nd of September, and 
on the 27th the whole division was (juartered at 
Hiroshima, the imperial headquarters. On the 26th 
ilarshal Oyama, Minister of War, was appointed 
<:ommander-in-chief. 

Ilie brigade was first landed in Corea near the 
mouth of the Tai-dong, and on the 15th of October 
transports were ready at Ujina (the port of Iliros- 
liima) to embark the division, which left at various 
dates from the 15th to the 20th of October. As on 
former occasions, the greatest popular enthusiasm 

* A name which the Jaj^nesc have givon also to Gambetta. 



204 THE CEINA-JAPAS WAR. 

prevailed at the departure of the troops, and the 
members of both houses of the diet accompanied 
Marshal Oyama to Ujiiia. 

The Japanese fleet for some time had been exploring 
the coasts of Manchuria to discover a suitable landing- 
place, and when their choice was made they found 
disagreement amongst the staff of the Second Army, 
who complained that the chosen spot was too far 
from Port Arthur, the principal object of attack. 




Tlie naval officers, recognising the justice of tlie 
observation, maintained that no other place could be 
selected. The sea along the coasts of Manchuria is 
shallow, and in most places the land cannot be ap- 
proached for miles. Landing under such circumstances 
entails wading for a long distance. At the place 
chosen by the fleet it was possible to land on the 
rocks at high water. 



THE LANDING OF THE SECOND ARMY. 205 

On the 23rd of October the transports conveying 
the brigade of the Second Army left the mouth of the 
Tai-dong river, convoyed by fourteen men-of-war. 
On the momino: of the 24th the whole fleet anchored 
at five miles from Hua-yiian-kon (Flower Garden 
Port), a small village at the mouth of the Hua-yiian- 
chiang (Flower Garden River). The weather was misty 
and the shore could only be dimly discerned, but 
l>efore daybreak a party of marines landed and planted 
a Japanese flag on a hill as a signal for the transports. 
Soon after the marines were relieved by a detachment 
of infantry. The engineers landed soon after, and 
with pontoons built a landing-stage for the horses 
and guns. 

The quiet inhabitants of the village were struck 
with amazement at the arrival of this armada in the 
cjuiet harbour only casually visited by junks ; many 
fled in terror, but were captured and brought back to be 
convinced of the peaceful intentions of the Japanese. 
Four peasants were brought on board and asked to 
sell their clothes, which were promptly put on by 
Japanese interpreters, who wore pigtails, and only 
required the local dress to be able to explore the 
country like natives. A proclamation in the name of 
Marshal Oyama was published to tranquillise the in- 
habitants and enforce discipline in the army. It 
declared that, by international law, an army in the 
enemy's country had the right to levy contributions. 
but such a jight was vested in the whole army and 
not in any single individual. Therefore any soldier 



206 THE CHINA-JAPAN WAB. 

who took things without the consent of the owner, 
and without having paid him his price, would be 
severely punished. Later on (29th of October) a set 
of regulations for the guidance of those who had to 
levy requisitions were also published. 

The Japanese army pushed inland almost as soon 
as it landed. On the 25fch a detachment was sent 
six miles up river, and a battalion under Major Saito 
matched towards Pi-tzii-wo, a town about thirty 
miles distant on the road to Port Arthur, and which 
at first had been chosen as the landing-place, but 
afterwards abandoned on account of the shoals and 
shallow water which extended five miles from the 
shore. On the 26th Marshal Oyama with his staff 
arrived. He had boldly started from the Tai-dong 
on the 25th without the escort of a single man- 
of-war. 

The Chinese fleet did not give any trouble to the 
transports, and these vessels were able even to take 
the offensive, the Asaki Marti and another cap- 
turing 15 or 16 junks laden with timber and mortars. 
The Japanese fleet was not idle. Some men-of-war 
took on board two or three land officers and explored 
the coast. They caught some fishermen to use as 
pilots, in addition to four which had been brought 
over from the mouth of the Tai-dong. A torpedo- 
boat cruising near Ta-lien Bay captured a small 
steamer of 30 tons, which was utilised as a steam- tug. 

The disembarkation of such a larore force took a 
long time, and it was not before twelve days that all 



CAPTUIiE OF CHIN' CHOW. 207 

the horses were landed. It is worthy of n6tiee that 
the landing at Hua-yiian-kon, on the 24th of October, 
occurred on the same day that Colonel Sato crossed 
the Yalu. 



The Advance and Capture of Chin-chow and 

Ta-lien Bay. 

Port Arthur, or Lii-shun-kou, as it is called by the 
Chinese, is not only very strongly defended by sea 
and land, but its approaches offer such natural ad- 
vantages that, properly defended, they are almost 
impregnable. The southern part of Sheng-cliing, one 
of the three Manchurian provinces, juts out into the 
sea, forming at its extremity an elongated peninsula 
with a very narrow isthmus called the Regent s Sword. 
Port Arthur is at the extremity of this peninsula, and 
the neck or isthmus is defended by the fortified city 
of Chin-chow and by the forts of Ta-lien Bay, the 
anchorage of the Chinese fleet. In their march to 
Port Arthur the Japanese were obliged to attack 
Chin-chow, but when they had captured that city 
and the forts of Ta-lien Bav, not onlv was the road 
to Port Arthur open, but they held its defenders 
closed in a bag, to use the Japanese expression. The 
distance from Ilua-viian-kon to Chin-chow is about 
DO miles, and it was decided to attack that place on 
the 6th of November. 

On the 2nd of November ^lajor Saito left Pi-tzft- 
wo, which is about 38 miles from Chin-chow, with a 



208 THE CHINA-JAPAN WAR. 

reconnoitring detachment. It was composed of on 
battalion of infantry, one battalion of engineers, an 
a company of cavalry. Besides reconnoitring the 
enemy's position he was to mend the roads for the 
march of the main body. On the 4th Major 
met a small body of Chinese at Liu-chia-tun (Liu- 
house Village) that were easily dispersed. This was 
the first engagement of the Second Army after its 
landing in China. Major Sai to was followed by the 
first division, which left Pi-tzu-wo on the 3rd o 
November, under General Yamaji, its van, composed 
of a regiment of infantry, a troop of cavalry and a 
company of mountain artillery, was commanded by 
Major-General Nogi, and its rear was under Major- 
General Nishi. 

To understand the operations against Chin-chow 
it is necessary to bear in mind the configuration of 
southern Sheng-king. The promotory, as it advances 
into the sea, narrows until at the south of Chin-chow 
the land is only about two miles broad. Therefore 
the two roads which run along the coasts gradually 
approach each other and join at Chin-chow. This 
town can be approached by two main roads, one from 
Hua-yiian-kon and Pi-tzu-wo, and the other from 
Fuchow and Pu-lan-tien (Port Adams). When the 
Japanese approached Chin-chow, it was not diflficult 
for them to pass from one road to the other and 
employ their usual tactics of disconcerting the simple- 
minded Chinese by a double attack. 

Advancing by the Pi-tzu-wo road, the Japanese 




CAPTURE OF CHIN-CHOW. 209 

rery soon sent detachments on the other road. On 
the 4th Major Saito sent his company of cavalry 
m the Fuchow road to cut the telegraph-line : a 
messenger was also captured bearing despatches from 
Port Arthur to Fuchow announcing the approach of 
the Japanese. This Chinese prisoner attempted to 
kill himself by dashing out his brains against the 
stones. Major Saito, admiring his courage, informed 
him that the Japanese never killed their prisoners,, 
and asked if he had a father and mother. The 
Chinaman was moved at these words, and answered 
that he had a mother who was praying day and night 
for his return. 

On the 5th of November the Japanese came upon 
the first defences of the Chinese ; these consisted of 
two forts built on hills flanking the road, and each 
mounted with four guns. At first the Japanese only 
Qiade a reconnaissance and retired. General Yamaji 
being informed that the Chinese position was very 
strong in front, while comparatively weak on the 
Fuchow road, diverged towards that road with the 
bulk of the division ; the remaining forces were 
partly on the Pi-tzu-wo road and partly between the 
two roads. The detachment wliich had first en<i:aored 
the forts renewed the fight at noon, and firing 
continued until 2 p.m., when the Japanese, finding 
their position too disadvantageous, retired. Of course 
these slight checks had elated the Chinese, who 
considered them as victories. 

During the night orders were given that a general 



210 THE CHINA-JAPAN WAS. 

attack should be made on the following morning (6th). 
At 4 A.M. Major Saito led his detachment over the 
mountains to turn the right flank of the first fort. 
This was reached about 6 a.m., and the Japanese 
stormed both forts in about half-an-hour. Major 
Saito himself took part in the fight, for, seeing a 
Chinese soldier about to fire a mine, he rushed into 
the fort amidst a hail of bullets and, with one blow of 
his sword, cleft the man's skull to the teeth. 

It was probably during this engagement that the 
French military attach^ with the Japanese troops 
remarked that they had manoeuvred in a way that 
would have been creditable to the French Alpine 
troops. 

After the capture of the forts the Pi-tzu-wo road 
to Chin-chow was open. General Yamaji in the 
meantime had advanced from the Fuchow road, and 
at 8 A.M. began to plant his batteries against Chin-chow. 
In a short time thirty field pieces were thundering 
on the town. The Chinese answered with Krupp 
guns for about fifty minutes, when their fire stopped, • 
General Yamaji then galloped through the ranks and 
ordered the assault. Chin-chow, like most towns of 
northern China, is a perfect square with its sides to 
the four points of the compass. The assault was 
delivered on the northern and eastern sides. The 
walls are 30 feet high and very steep, so the Japanese 
could not climb up, but the engineers were brought 
forward to blow up the gates. On the northern side 
there is the Yung-an-Men (Eternal Tranquillity Gate), 



CAPTURE OF CNIN-CnOW. 



211 



ich is 50 feet high and plated with iron. Lieu- 
ant Yanome rualied towards it, commanding the 
achment which was to blow it open. Private 
oguchi carried the <^ase of gun-cotton and advanced 
ile the Chinese firmi the loop-holes were raining 




lets upon liim. lie was wounded in th(^ arm, Init 

iigh drippinij with liloitd hi' tonk liis Imrdcn to 

*liib; wliicli wfis shattcivtl tn juitcs liv thf 

ilasiiin. The .lapani'dt; rushed tliroujrh the <{.itc 

!■ 2 



212 



TBE CHINA-JAPAN WAR. 



and right across the town to the eastern side, where- 
they opened the gate to their companions, the Chinese 
in the meanwhile escaping by the western gate to- 
Port Arthur. 

During this attack there was a curious episode. 
Major Tseiji had advanced at first to the gate, buU 




finding it couKl not be stormed he retired about 
1'20 yai;ds, when he remarked on the ground a cross- 
30 feet long. Not liking tlicse suspicious marks he 
advanced again, and, the gate having been blown up, 
entered the city. Afterwards tlie engineers dug up 



CAPTURE OF CHIN- enow. 213 

the place and found a mine which by its explosion 
might have killed nearly 100 men if the officer had 
not withdrawn in time. The Chinese put great faith 
in such contrivances, which require great labour and 
^^aste of powder, and seldom produce any effect. At 
*he taking of Feng-Huang-cheng the Japanese had a 
Tnine exploded right in front of them, but which only 
lolled a luckless dog. Another in the same place was 
exploded by lightning. 

The Japanese pursued and killed some of the 
Chinese, who, in their hurry to escape, even threw 
themselves from the walls. But the fighting around 
Chin-chow on the 5th and 6th of November was very 
tame, as the Japanese had no killed, and only a few 
wounded. They remark themselves that it was an 
event unparalleled in military history, but it was 
surpassed by the events of the next day. 

After the capture of Chin-chow the next object of 
attack was Ta-lien Bay, the anchorage of the Chinese 
navy, whose land forts protected the narrow isthmus 
of the Regent's Sword peninsula. As this place was 
considered next in importance to Port Arthur and 
AVei-hei-Wei, the Japanese made elaborate prepara- 
tions for an attack on the morning of the Tth of 
November. Three detachments, each, consisting of a 
regiment of infantry, besides cavalry and artillery, 
were to advance on the various forts. The soldiers, 
in high spirits after their victory, swore they would 
<lie rather than retire without talking the place. These 
noble resolutions were, however, (juite unnecessary, 



214 



THE CHINA-JAPAN WAJR. 



for when the Japanese advanced the small remaining- 
garrison ran away after firing a few rounds. On 
taking the forts the Japanese found some of the 
cannon still loaded. It is unnecessary to waste 
details on such an incredible affair. 

The forts had been built by von Hannecken on the 
most approved modem system, and they were very 
heavily armed. Hoshang-tao had three batteries, one 
with two 21 -cm. and two 15-cm. guns, and the other 
two had each two 24-cm. guns. The Hsu-chia fort 
had four 15-cm. guns. Lao-lung fort two 24-cm. and 
two 21 -cm. guns, and Huang-shan fort two 24-cm. 
guns and two 12-cm. guns. These heavy guns- 
were besides flanked by smaller and machine guns. 
A Japanese officer, on inspecting one of the forts,, 
said that with one company he could hold it against 
a division. 

The garrison, if it had remained, was amply suffi- 
cient to oppose a successful resistance. It has been, 
estimated that between Chin-chow and Ta-lien the 
Chinese had the following troops : — 



infantry 

Huai-tzti anny { „ 

cavalry 
infantry 

Hou-ying army I cavalry 

( artillery 

Drilled bannemion army . . . .| ^^yai^ 

I 
I 

Hunan amy { '^^H^ 





MeD. 


6 camps 


3,000 


1 company 


200 


1 „ 


50 


3 camps 


1,50(» 


1 camp 


2.50 


1 ,, 


500 


• • 


500 


• • 


200 


Total . 


. 6,200 


i ■■ 


Unknown 



CAPTURE OF CHIN' CHOW. 215 

The sp(Hls taken by the Japanese were enormous, 
will be seen by the following list : — 

621 rifles (70 modern German ones and many other 

magazine rifles) ; 
129 gnns (7 Galling, many made at Nankin, not yet used, 
and on the sea all Kmpp guns) ; 
^3,8 14,300 rounds of small arm ammunition ; 
2,468,271 rounds of cannon ammunition ; 
6,000 dollars in specie, 

l)esides rice, horses and other sundries. As the 
Japanese carefully enumerate everything, their officers 
must have been more busy with the pen than with 
the sword. 

The Japanese also found the plan of the mines and 
torpedoes defending the entrance to the bay, and they 
were thus able to render them harmless without the 
laborious process of "sweeping." The common 
characters used by both nations enable any educated 
man to read the documents and despatches of the 
other country. 

The Japanese fleet had intended to assist the army 
in its attack on Ta-lien, not suspecting the easy 
nature of that task, and at 6 a.m. of the 6th Novem- 
ber it left for Ta-lien Bay, disposed in the following 
order : — 

Main Squadron : — Hashtdate^ Chiyoda^ Itsukmhimuj JVantira, 

Maiwshima. 
1st Flying Squadron : — Yoghino, Takachiho^ Akitsiuihima* 
2nd Flying Squadron : — Faso^ KaUfuragi, KomjOy Takab, 
4th Flying Squadron : — Tsukmihi^ Akatji^ Maya, Oshima^ 

Chokai. 



216 . TEE CHINA-JAPAN WAR. 

The fleet reached its destination in the afternoon, 
and knowing that the entrance to the bay was guarded 
by torpedoes it proceeded very cautiously. A small 
squadron of six steam launches was ordered to " sweep " 
the bay and remove the torpedoes. All the time firing 
could be heard in the distance, and as it was known 
that the army was attacking Chin-chow the men in 
the fleet were very much excited. 

On the next day a scene was enacted which, from 
its comical nature, seems discordant with the usual 
notions of war, though it was but a consequence of 
the absurd conduct of the Chinese in the morning. 
At six A.M. of the 7th November the Japanese vessels 
slowly entered the bay — at first only the 4th Flying 
Squadron, w^hich fired some shots at the forts, but no 
answer was made. At 9 a.m. the Main Squadron 
entered Ta-lien Bay. At 10 o'clock some more shots 
were fired, which elicited no reply. The fleet was 
greatly puzzled at the harmless nature of the grim- 
looking forts around the bay, until at last, after care- 
ful examination, they saw the dark caps and uniforms 
of the Japanese infantry, and later on they saw their 
national flag flying over the forts. Boats were sent 
ashore and came back with the joyful news that all the 
forts had been taken that morning by the land forces. 

The capture of Ta-lien Bay was a most important 
step in the campaign against Port Arthur. Not only 
were the formidal)le approaches, which should have 
constituted the true land defence of that port, taken, 
but the possession of that anchorage, with its wharves 



THE CAPTURE OF PORT ARTHUR, 217 

4ind appliances for the landing of heavy guns, enabled 
the Japanese to land their siege-train ^t a short 
Stance from Port Arthur instead of painfully drag- 
-ging it along from Hua-yiian-kou or Pi-tzti-wo. 

The Capture of Port Arthur. 

After the taking of Chin-chow and Ta-lien, Marshal 
Oyama waited for the arrival of the Mixed Brigade, 
. and after leaving a small garrison at Chin-chow to 
<iefend the isthmus and guard the rear, he advanced, 
on the 17th of November, with the whole army. 
There are two roads leading to Port Arthur, one along 
"the northern shore, and the other along the southern 
^hore of the peninsula. The Japanese, following their 
Tisual tactics, advanced along both routes ; the detach- 
ment which advanced south was very small and was 
only meant to create a diversion. It consisted of two 
l)attalions of infantry, a troop of cavalry, a company 
of mountain artillery, and two companies of engineers 
under Lieutenant-Colonel Masumidzu, and formed the 
left column. The rest of the army, with the exception 
of three battalions, two at Chin-chow, and one to guard 
the communications, advanced along the northern route, 
which had been found the best by the reconnoitring 
parties. It proceeded in the following order : — 

1st. The reconnoitring cavalr}-, two battalions (minus five 

troops), under Major Akiyama. 
2nd. The First Division and the Mixed Brigade (less the 

troops stationed at Chin-chow, or forming part of the 



218 THE CHINA-JAPAN WAR, 

Both these bodies proceeded by the same route^ ^ 
passing through Nan-kuo-ling (Difficult Pass), Ying- 
cheng-tzu (Camp Town), Shuang-tai-kou (Double^ 
Terrace Ditch), and Tu-cheng-tzu (Mud Town), to- 
Shui-shih-ying (Naval Camp), which is close to Port- 
Arthur. The whole distance was covered in four days,, 
and by the 20th of November the whole army was in 
position and ready to attack Port Arthur. 

There had been some slight engagements during* 
these days. On the 18th, Major Akijama, advancing' 
from Tu-cheng-tzu (Mud Town), with a single company 
of cavalry, met a body of Chinese from Shui-shih- 
ying (Naval Camp), which gradually increased to' 
about 3,000 men, who completely surrounded tiie 
Japanese horsemen. These fought with great bravery,, 
and succeeded in cutting their way through the enemy 
and retreating to Shuang-tai-kow (Double Terrace- 
Ditch). On hearing of the engagement, Major Mami 
had sent a company of infantry to assist the cavalry,. \ 
and they now in turn were attacked and surrounded by 
the Chinese. Seeing the danger of their rescuers, a. 
handful of cavalry, under Captain Asakawa, made a. 
desperate charge to extricate them. The infantry 
and cavalry succeeded in retiring, but they were: 
obliged to abandon their- wounded, who preferred to* 
kill themselves rather than be tortured by the enemy. 
Lieutenant Nakaman was severely wounded, and*. 
his servant cut off his head and brought it back to the- 
camp to be honourably buried. Captain Asakawa. 
was also wounded, and his horse shot under him ; but 



THE CAPTURE OF PORT ARTHUR. 221 

private Tio, though mortally wounded, gave his horse 
o his officer, and led him out of danger, when he fell 
lown dead. Major Marui, with the rest of the 
battalion, came up to rescue the advanced guard, but 
16 was not able to repulse the Chinese, who now had 
mounted four guns on a hill. It was not until the 
artillery of the advanced guard arrived and unlim- 
bered their guns that the Chinese retired. The 
Japanese lost one officer and eleven men killed, and 
one officer and thirty-two men wounded. 

Encouraged by this success, on the 20th of Novem- 
ber, when the whole Japanese army lay before Port 
\rthur, the Chinese made a sortie with over 3,000 
aen. Greneral Yamaji, informed of their movements, 
aade his preparations very quietly, and when the 
nemy surrounded a hill occupied by a Japanese 
egiment, they received a severe flank attack from the 
rtillery, which obliged them to retire, leaving about 
00 dead on the field. 

It will now be useful to throw a glance on the 
lefences of Port Arthur ; these were ))()th on the land 
.nd sea, and so arranged that they could mutually 
^st each other. Around the oval harbour, divided 
nto two basins, there was an almost continuous chain 
>f forts. On the land side, on the northern shore of 
he harbour, beginning at the west, we find three forts 
>n the I-tzft-shan (Chair Hill), which were respectively 
ailed I-tzu-shan (Chair Hill), An-tzu-shan (Table 
Bmi), and Wang-tai (Hope Terrace) forts ; their 
leight is 86, 128, and 137 metres, and as they lie 



222 THE CHINA-JAPAN WAB. 

rather behind the general line of defence, they 
can fire on the back of the other forts which they 
command by their superior elevation. They form the 
key to the whole defence of Port Arthur. Proceeding 
eastwards we find another fort on Sung-shu-shan 
(Pine-Tree Hill), 103 metres high. Farther east and 
sloping south we find a group of seven forts on Erh- 
lung-shan (Two Dragon Hill), 82 metres high, and on 
Chi-huan-shan (Cock s-comb Hill), 126 metres high. 
These forts almost surround Port Arthur on the land 
side ; the enceinte is completed by two forts near 
the sea, one on Fan-tao Hill, 84 metres high, and the 
other, Lao-li-tsui (Old Oyster Mouth), close to the 
shore, which may be considered a coast fort. Pro- 
ceeding now along the sea in a westerly direction we 
meet the fort on Huang-chin-shan (Golden Hill), 
78 metres high, which is one of the most important 
of the whole defence ; its guns were mounted in such a 
way that they could sweep round in every direction, 
and not only repel a sea-attack, but co-operate also in 
the land defence. We now have to cross the mouth 
of the harbour and proceed to an elongated strip of 
land which runs into the harbour and which the 
Chinese have appropriately called Lan-hu-wei (Tiger s 
Tail). On this strip of land, and on the peninsula to 
which it is attached, there are eight forts, whose names 
need not trouble us, as they played an insignificant 
part in the great military drama which was to follow. 
One of them on Man-ton-shan (Bread Hill), 111 metres 
high, is also important for tlie land defence, as it 



TBE CAPTURE OF PORT ARTHUR. 223 

can fire across the harbour and protect the land 
forts. 

The guns mounted on these forts were numerous, 

and many of them of the best pattern ; the following 

is a list of some of them : — 

1-Tsft Hill Forts :— Not given. 
Song-flhu (Pine-tree) Hill : — 

Two 20-cm.; two 9-cm. ; one quick-firing; one 12-oni. 
Kmpp ; two mountain Krupp ; one mountain ; one 7-cm. 
mountain. 
£rii-lung (Two Dragon), Chi-huan (Cock's Comb) ; — 
let fort. Three quick-firing. 
2nd „ Two quick-firing ; one 9-cm. 
3rd „ Two quick-firing; two 12-cm. Krupp. 
4t]i „ Two quick-firing ; three 9-cm. 
5tli „ Four 9-cm. Krupp ; one quick-firing; two 12-cm. 

Armstrong. 
6th „ One 9-cm. Krupp ; two quick-firing. 

7th „ Two 12-cm. Armstrong; one 15-cm. and one 9-ciu. 
Krupp ; one quick-firing, 
^'an-tao : — Not given, 
^^u-li-tsui : — Not given, 
-^[uang-ehin (Golden Hill) : — 

Three 24-om; four field-guns; four 9-cm. Krupp; two 
21-cm. Krupp ; two 18-cm. ; four 9-cm. 
Siin-ha-wei (Tiger's Tail)J:— 

Ist fort. Two 21-cm. Krupp ; three 9-cm. 
2nd „ Three 9-cm. Krupp. 
3rd „ Two 15-cm. Krupp. 
4th „ Four 16-cm. Krupp ; one 9-cm. 
6th „ Four 15-cm. Krupp ; two 12-cm. 
MantonHill:— 

Three 24-cra. Krupp ; two 12-cm. Krupp. 
Cheng-ton :— 

Two 12-cm. Krupp; six 9-cm. Krupp. 
Lflui-tieh : — 
Nine 9-cm. 



224 



THE CHINA-JAPAN WAR. 



The guns liere enumerated total up to over a 
hundred, but they form only a small part, as the 
Japanese captured 330 guns. 

The garrison troops were estimated as follows : — 



Gbia-ching army 8 camps 

Knei-tzti army .4 

Ho-tzfl army 3 



Sheog-tztl army 

Hnai-tztt army (fled from Chinchow) 

Knng-wei army 



I 



5 
6 



4 

1 cavalry 

Ming-tza army . . . | 6 companies 

I Total 



Men. 
4,000 

2,000 

1,500 

2,500 

1,800 

1,200 
200 

400 



13,600 



Even if we admit that the Chinese camps, as is 
usually the case, did not contain their full complement 
of men, still there must have been about 10,000 men 
in the place, a force fully adequate for a stubborn' 
resistance. General Yamaji expected it, and talking 
with an officer, while marching to Port ilVrthur, he 
calculated losing over a thousand men before taking 
this formidable fortress, which Admiral Courbet con- 
sidered could hold out a long time against a strong 
fleet and an army of 20,000 men. 

The attack was fixed for the morning of the 21st 
of November, but the heavy siege guns did not arrive 
till the night from the 20th to the 21st; they had 
been dragged over the difficult mountain roads by 
the transport coolies, who, in their patriotic ardour, 
worked incessantly for two days and nights to bring 



THE CAPTURE OF FORT ARTHUR. 225 

^p the artillery. General Yamaji naturally relied 
very much on his siege-train for the success of the 
assault which he meditated for next morning : the 
•attack on Chin-chow had shown him that a heavy 
preliminary cannonade soon demoralised the Chinese, 
and rendered an assault possible. He intended to 
concentrate on Port Arthur the fire of thirty-six siege 
^ns and sixty-four field-pieces : the assault was to 
he delivered in the order in which we have described 
the forts. The division was to take first the three 
forts on I-tzu-shan (Chair Hill), and then the one on 
Sung-shu-shan (Pine-tree Hill) ; the Mixed Brigade 
'was to wait for the capture of these forts, and then 
attack the seven forts on Erh-lung-shan (Two Dragon 
Hill) and Chi-huan-shan (C*ock's-comb Hill) ; the left 
column, which had marched to Port Arthur by another 
route, was to make a demonstration to the north- 
east of the line of forts and divert the attention of 
the Chinese from the main attack, which was to 
be delivered at the opposite extremity of the land 
defences. These directions were thought sufficient 
for the day, but the attack proceeded with such rapid 
success that the programme was exhausted a little 
after noon, and it had to be extended during the 
battle. 

The Japanese marched to take up their positions at 
midnight, and at 2 a.m. all was ready for the attack. 
Before daybreak, siege, field and mountain guns 
opened fire, arousing theC-hinese from their .sluml)ers : 
on the I-tzu forts alone forty guns were pointed and 



226 THE CniNA- JAPAN WAE. 

fired incessantly. These forts answered vigorously 
and were assisted by Sung-shu-shan (Pine-tree Hill) 
and Huang-chin-slian (Golden Hill) forts, the latter 
also employing the heavy coast guns, which could be 
pointed in every direction. After about an hour, the 
guns on I-tzu-shan (Chair Hill) were silenced, and 
the Japanese infantry, which had taken up its position 
to the west of that hill, rushed to the assault. Major 
Marui, who had been driven back by the Chinese at 
Tu-cheng-tzii (Mud Town), burned to revenge this 
disgrace, and with his battalion he rushed into the 
first fort, killing or driving out the garrison. The 
Japanese lost eighty killed and wounded in this 
assault. The capture of I-tzu-shan (Chair Hill) fort, 
which was effected at 8 a.m., so scared the Chinese in 
An-tzti-shan (Table Hill) and Wang-tai (Hope Terrace) 
forts, that they all fled, but were met by General 
Nogi, who, with a regiment, was advancing to the 
parade-ground between I-tzu-shan and Sung-shu-shan. 

Man-tou-shan (Bread Hill) fort began firing shells 
to assist them, but the fugitives were all dispersed ; 
and as they tried to escape north, after running along 
the side of the harbour, they were shelled by the 
Japanese men-of-war, which were cruising to the west 
of the Port Arthur peninsula. Tlie poor hunted 
Chinese were oWiged to take refuge on the rocks of 
Lao-tieh-shau (Old Iron Hill). 

Now the field guns were l)rought up to attack the 
Sung-shu-shan (Pine-tree Hill) fort, but the Chinese 
were so disheartened, that a few rounds of shell 



THE CAPTVBE OP POUT ARTHUR. 227 

sufficed to put them to flight. The capture of I-tzu- 
shan forts, from their elevation, and position slightly 
behind the line of defence, enabled the Japanese to 
fire down on the rear of the other forts. When General 
Yamagi, who has a very grim, saturnine expression, 
saw the fall of the Sung-shu-shan (Pine-tree Hill) fort, 
ke smiled, and the circumstance was thought so ex- 
traordinary that an otticer at once communicated the 




itiformation that he had seen liis General smile. The 
Sung-shu-shan fort was taken at 11 A.M. 

The Mixed Brigade had the haideat fighting of the 
(lay. Great part of it« force had been detached to 
the Left Column, so that it was reduced to a single 
regiment ; moreover, as there were no field-pieces on 
that side, and the siege guns were too far, only 
mountain guns coidd 1« brought to play on the aevcn 
forts which it was their olycct to attack. But the 

a 2 



228 THE CHINA-JAPAN WAR. 

Japanese say that the Kiushiu* men were worth 
more than a siege train. 

The attacking force was composed of the 3rd 
battalion against the Chi-huan-shan (Cock's-comb 
Hill) forts, and the 2nd battalion against the Erk- 
lung-shan (Two Dragon Hill) forts, as these troops 
were not found sufficient. Three companies of the 
1st battalion were sent to reinforce them. The 
Japanese advanced under such a heavy fire that they 
had to take refuge in a small hamlet, and then after- 
wards in a spot where the guns could not fire, and 
which was too far for the enemy's rifles. For a time, 
before Sung-shu-shan fell, they were exposed to a 
double flank fire from that fort and those on Chi- 
huan-shan. It was resolved then to take the latter 
first, and at 11.30 a.m. the 3rd battalion took the 
Chi-huan-shan (Cock's-comb Hill) forts. At 12.30 
the 2nd battalion took the Erh-lung-shan (Two 
Dragon Hill) fort, and the whole land defences of Port 
Arthur had fallen. 

Tliere are two dramatic episodes connected with 
this attack of the Mixed Brigade. Major Hanaoka 
was mortally wounded, but still he rushed up to the 
fort shouting, " Long live the Emperor ! Long live 
our flag ! " When afterwards taken to the hospital, and 
asked if he had any parting words to say, he replied : 
he died for his country, and begged his mother to 

* Kiushiu is the southern island of Japan, which has pro- 
duced the statesmen that have reformed their country, and 
most of the principal leaders of this war. 



THE CAPTURE OF PORT ARTHUR. 229 

take care of herself, and his children to study. Asked 
if he had any words for his soldiers, he answered : his 
good wishes. The officers around his death-bed com- 
forted him by saying that he had earned eternal glory 
in taking such a strong fort ; but he replied, *' What 
iave I to do now with the glory of this world ? " The 
bystanders then mournfully said what a pity he can- 
not see Pekin ! This last observation sounds strange 
those who do not know the wild enthusiasm in the 
apanese army to enter the great capital of China. 
Kani, the captain of one of the companies detached 
attack the Erh-lung-shan (Two Dragon Hill) forts, 
lad long been suffering from dysentery, but on the 
^^lay of the assault he overcame his weakness and 
^^narched at the head of his men ; but when within 
100 yards of the fort, he broke down, and had to lie 
on the ground, while his men rushed on. Taken to 
the hospital, he never could forgive his weakness, and 
on the morning of the 28 th of November (a week 
after the battle) he escaped from the hospital, went to 
the spot where he had succumbed, and killed himself 
with his sword. 

The following letter was found by his side : — 

" It was here that disease compelled mo to halt and suft'er my 
men to attaok the fort without me. Never can I wipe out the 
disgrace while I live. To vindicate my honour I die here, and 
leave this letter to speak for me." ♦ 

The programme assigned by Yamaji was exhausted 
at 12.30 P.M. It was therefore resolved to utilise the 

• From the Japan Mail, 



230 THE CHINA-JAPAS WAR. 

remainder of the day, and the 2iid Regiment wl 
had not yet been engaged, was oideied to att 
Huang-chin-sban (Golden Hill) fort, which was 
principal coast fort, and had rendered import 
assistance to the defence during the morning. ' 
Japanese passed through the streets of the town 




Port Arthur, and charged up the hill, taking the i 
without much difficulty. There -still remained 
forts on the Tiger's Tail, and the othei's on the oppos 
side of the entrance of the harbour, huX as the Chin 
abandoned them and fled during the night, it may 
said that the formidable fortress of Port Arthur \ 
taken in a single day. 



THE CAPTURE OF PORT ARTHUR. 231 

This wonderful result was owing to the fundamental 
€rror of the Chinese, wlio consider that war consists 
in preparing a vast amount of first-class war material, 
regaixlless whether the soldiers that are to use it 
are a mere undisciplined rabble enlisted on the spur 
of the moment. The Chinese fired their guns 
willingly, but did not employ much infantry fire ; 
^and when they used their rifles it must have been at 
v-ery long range, judging from the small proportion 
killed to wounded among the Japanese troops. 
By the fall of Port Arthur the Japanese were in 
ion of the best dockyard in the Far East, 
^Npovided with every requisite for repairing their 
"^^eBBels. They had now a splendid naval base of 
^^opraations at the enemy's door. It is calculated that 
the Baachinery, docks, etc., at- Port Arthur represented 
-a value of 60 million yen, about six million pounds 
-fterling. 

.. All this was purchased at a very small cost of life ; 
<«ly 270 hors de combat, of which the ridiculously 
small number of eighteen represent those actually 
killed in battle, though of course many afterwards 
auccumbed to their wounds. The Chinese lost over a 
thousand killed. 

The Japanese celebrated their niarvelhjus victory 
by great rejoicings ; the soldiers assembled on the 
parade-ground, and shouted " Banzai I " (*' Long 
live ! " ) to their emperor and to (ireat Japan. 
Mai-shal Oyama gave a great l)an<|uet, at which 
General Kishi sang a well-known Japanese verse : 



232 THE CHINA-JAPAN WAR. 

" that he would need a voice like the fall of a 
mountain to celebrate the great victory of his 
country." 

But the Japanese did not allow theii*- enthusiasm 
to interfere with business. On the 26th of November 
a telegram from Hiroshima (the imperial head- 
quarters) announced, with Spartan terseness, that the 
naval base of operations was transferred to Port 
Arthur. It was the epitaph of the Chinese strong- 
hold, which had cost so many millions and years of 
labour to Viceroy Li-Hung-Chang. 

The Regent s Sword peninsula was for administra- 
tive purposes divided into two districts, and Japanese 
officials appointed. On the 1st of December, Marshal 
Oyama transferred his headquarters to Chin-chow. 

The Japanese fleet had prepared to take part in the 
operation, hoping that the Chinese admiral. Ting, 
would strike a blow in defence of Port Arthur ; but 
though Admiral Ito on the 1 1 th of November, with a 
squadron of twelve vessels and six torpedo-boats, tried 
to tempt him out of Wei-hai-wei, Ting wisely declined 
to risk his remaining fleet. 

On the day of the assault on Port Arthur (21st of 
November), the Japanese fleet cruised around the 
harbour, exchanging long-range shots with the coast 
forts, and, as wc have seen, shelled the Chinese 
fugitives ; but their co-operation was purely per- 
functory. At the time Port Arthur was taken, a 
report went abroad that the Japanese torpedo-boats- 
made a daring dash into the liarl)our, distracting the 



THE CAPTURE OF PORT ARTHUR, 235 

attention of the forts, and coutributiug to the fall of 
the fortress, but no such incident is mentioned in the 
Japanese war publications, and it is unlikely they 
would have omitted such an heroic exploit so 
congenial to the daring (character of the Japanese 
people. 

While the Japanese army was taking Port Arthur, 
the small garrison which had been left at Chin-chow to 
guard the isthmus was exposed to a dangerous attack 
ficom the Chinese, who suspected that the place was 
insufficiently defended, and might be taken by a coup 
de main. The garrison, though far inferior in 
numbers, made a most gallant resistance. A few 
marines from the fleet taught the infantry to handle 
the fortress guns captured at Chin-chow, and even the 
transport coolies volunteered to fight, and on one 
occasion made a desperate sortie, armed only with 
cudgels against a body of Chinese fugitives. Chin- 
chow was for some time exposed to danger on ])oth 
sides. While the Chinese troops were advancing 
south by the Fuchou road, bodies of fugitives from 
Port Arthur were advancincr north — their onlv wav 
of escape. The Japanese, with coolness and bohlness, 
succeeded, however, in warding oft' the danger from 
both sides. 

The fall of Port Arthur caused an inimensc sensa- 
tion. The foreigners in the Far East ha<l been 
inclined to discount the Ja})anese victories. These 
had Wen won in o])scure (*orners of Corea and tlie 
Chinese frontier, and they suspected exaggeration in 



236 THE CBINA-JAFAN WAB. 

the Japanese accounts. They also considered that 
China had not had time to put forth her whole 
strength, and imagined that with a few months of 
preparation the Chinese could repulse any Japanese 
attack on such a formidable fortress as Port Arthur. 
All these surmises were refuted by a day s fighting, 
and it caused great sensation. 

At Peking, for the first time, serious alarm was 
felt and acknowledged. The despised enemy now 
seemed to be at the gates. An attempt was hurriedly 
made to avert the imminent danger, and a peace 
mission was projected. But Chinese love of subter- 
fuge was not yet crushed, and instead of sending 
well-known statesmen with full powers, a few irre- 
sponsible Europeans with inadequate credentials were 
forwarded to Japan. Mr. Detring, the Commissioner 
of Customs at Tientsin, and the trusted adviser of the 
Viceroy Li-Hung-Chang, was sent, bearing a letter 
from the Viceroy to Count Ito, the Japanese minister, 
in which there was some reference to an Imperial edict 
about the peace. The Japanese Government naturally 
refused to open negotiations with such an envoy, and 
politely sent him back. The people were indignant, 
and considered the mission as an insult to the national 
dignity. 



( 237 ) 



CHAPTER IV. 

THE FIRST ARMY IN MANCHURIA. 

It has been already showu that up to about the 
middle of November the operations of the two divi- 
sions of this army had been confined to two objectives. 
General Tachimi, with the van of the fifth division, 
had pushed out numerous reconnaissances to clear 
the roads north and east, and keep in touch with the 
Chinese, who might descend south and threaten the 
Japanese line of communications. General Oseko, 
with the advanced guard of the third division, had 
pushed west and captured Hsin-yen on the 18th of 
Noveml>er, as a preliminary step to an important 
strategical movement which would be carried out as 
soon as the second army, having captured Port 
Arthur, was free to march north. We must now 
consider the further operations of the two divisions. 

Fifth Division f or Rujht WnKj of the First Artiuj. 

To understand the operations in this part of Man- 
churia it is necessary to cast a glance on the roads 
which intersect the country. There is, first, the 
main road which, from Chiu-lien-ch'eng and Feng- 
huang, leads to Liao-yang and Mukden. The 



238 THE CHIN A- JAPAN WAR. 

celebrated Mo-tien (Heaven-touching) Pass lies 
this road, and we have seen that the Japanese, aft^^ 
a reconnaissance, renounced attacking it, and wit 
drew their outposts first to Lien-shan-kuan and th 
to Tsao-ho-kou. Then there is another road whi 
from Chiu-lien-ch'eng takes a circular sweep east a 
north, and by Chang-tien, Tuan-tien, Kuan-tien, 
yang-pien-men, and Sai-ma-chi joins the main ro 
at Tsao-ho-kou. Between these two roads there 
three cross-roads, two of which form a loop between: 
Feng-huang and Ai-yang-pien-men ; there is, besides^ 
a road at Sai-ma-chi which leads to northern Man — 
churia. We need, not notice the roads from Chiu- 
lien-ch'eng to Tai-ku-shan, and from Feng-huang to 
Hsin-yen, as they lead to that part of the country 
where the third division intended to operate. 
Towards the end of November two reconnaissances 
were made by the fifth division : one by the circular 
road from Chiu-lien-ch'eng to Sai-ma-chi, in which 
the Japanese met only a slight resistance from a few 
Chinese soldiers supported by peasants armed with 
matchlocks ; the other, led by Tachimi himself, had 
a far more important object. The Japanese were 
informed that a body of well-trained Tartar troops 
from the Amur province, led by General I-ko-teng-a, 
were marching south by the road which abuts at 
Sai-ma-chi on the circular road just mentioned. The 
object of the Chinese general was to retake Feng- 
huang, and at the same time cut off the Japanese 
outposts at Lien-shan-kuan. As the Japanese had 



THE FIRST ARMY IN MANCHURIA. 239 

already a Chinese force in front of them at Mo-tien 

Pass, it became important to prevent the junction of 

these two armies. The Tartars of I-ko-teng-a and the 

Chinese at the Mo-tien Pass could unite in two wavs, 

eitK^r by the road from Tsao-ho-kou to Sai-ma-chi^ 

or l>y the mountain roads to the north, out of roach 

of tie enemy. To prevent the junction of the two 

^I'ttxies, it was sufficient for the Japanese to hold 

1 aa,o-ho-kou, which is placed at the intei*section of 

th^ main road with the road to Sai-ma-chi. Therc- 

^^^^, on the 23rcl November, the outpost at Lien- 

^'^^^:ii-kuan was withdrawn, as too much exposed and 

^^ i nferior strategical importance. 

^ )n the 25th of November the Chinese at Mo-tien 

^^-^?3S came down about 1,500 strong with two guns, 

^^^^ attacked the Japanese outpost at Tsiio-ho-kou ; 

*^ile General I-ko-teng-a, with 4,000 infantry and 

> OOO cavalry and six guns, from Sai-ma-chi, attacked 

^^^^ the other side. The Japanese were hard pressed, 

^^^t finally drove the enemy back after a sharp 

^^gagement. If the Chinese had succeeded, they 

^^""^uld have had the road from Tsao-ho-kou to Sai- 

;-chi open, and could have joined with the Tartars 

I-ko-teng-a. 

(ieneral Tachimi in the meanwhile sUirted from 

l^eng-huang on the 26th of Xovem])er, and, taking 

^lie other road by Ai-yang-pien-men and Sai-ma-chi, 

t>U8hed on north-east of Tsao-ho-kou, where, at a 

l^lace cjalled Tsui-chia-fang, he defeated the Chinese ; 

t-hey were said to be 5,000 strong, and were probably 



S40 THE CnJNA'JAPAN WAB. 

the force which had attacked Tsao-ho-kou- a few days 
before. The Japanese suffered great hardships, having 
to ford torrents over ten tiines, and having their wet 
clothes frozen by the cold night wind. After this 
success General Tachimi returned by the main road, 
and was at Fcng-huang on the 5th of December. In 
ten days he had made a circular march by Ai-yang- 
pien-men, Sai-ma-chi, Tsao-ho-kou, and back to Feng- 
huang ; he had also pursued into the mountains the 
force which had been defeated at Tsao-ho-kou on the 
25 th of November. Thus far the Japanese had not , 
only prevented the junction of the two Chinese forces 
along the road from Mo-tien Pass to Sai-ma-chi, but 
they had rendered such a junction difficult, even by 
the mountain roads. 

The Japanese, however, were obliged to retire after 
these successes. It is probable that they found great 
difficulty in provisioning their outposts ; and, as these 
were always liable to attack, they probably thought 
it better to allow the enemy to advance, and then 
give him such a lesson that would enable them to 
enjoy a protracted rest. The outpost at Tsao-ho-kou 
was withdrawn, and General Tachimi took up a 
position south. 

The road from Mo-tien Pass to Sai-ma-chi, which 
had been hitherto blocked by the Japanese outpost, 
was now open to the Chinese, who could join with^ 
the Tartars. General I-ko-teng-a seized the oppor- 
tunity, and prepared to attack Feng-huang ; his 
forces advanced by three roads, the main road from 



THE FIRST ARMY IN MANCHURIA. 241 

Tsao-ho-kou to Feug-huang, and the two roads wliich 
from the latter place, forming a loop, join again at 
Ai-yang-pien-men. The 'Tartar general himself led 
the detachment on the main road. 

General Tachimi, being informed of the enemy's 
advance, left Feng-huang on the 9th of December, and, 
marching north, met the enemy near Pan-chia-tai. 
At this place the road and a small river run between 
two hills about 250 metres high, and from 1,200 to 
2,000 metres apart. General I-ko-teng-a had 2,000 
drilled troops and over 1,000 new levies, with two 
guns : the Japanese had three battalions, with a 
small force of artillery. General Tachimi made a 
vigorous attack on the Chinese centre, and broke the 
enemy's force in two, dispersing it right and left. 
The engagement lasted from 10 a.m. to 4 p.m. The 
Chinese losses were over 100 killed, and the Japanese 
pursued the enemy all the next day. 

The rest of the Amur army, estimated at 6,000, 
inarched towards Feng-huan by the two roads from 
Ai-yang-pien-men. The Japanese were obliged to 
call up reinforcements, and a battalion stationed at 
Tanrf'shan was sent to Feng-huang, its place being 
taken by a battalion from Chiu-lien. Thus reinforced, 
Colonel Tomoyasu marched out of Feng-huan<]^, and 
met the diinese on the morning of the 1 4th of Decem- 
ber, and defeated them, capturing four guns. At the 
<)ame time General Tachimi, who was far awav in 
front on the main road, was informed of the cnemv's 
approach, and ordered to send a detachment to inter- 

R 



242 THE CIJINA' JAPAN WAR. 

cept their retreat. This unexpected attack in the 
rear completed the rout of the Chinese, and they 
gave no further trouble in this part of Manchuria. 

We now take leave of General Tachimi, who earned 
such glory in the first great battle of the war, when, 
together with Colonel Sato, he stormed the Peony- 
Mount at Phyong-yang, and decided the fall of that 
city. Since that brilliant exploit he had no chance 
of distinguishing himself in any considerable action ; 
his time was spent in mountain marches and desultory 
warfare, which, though requiring eminent qualities, 
and of considerable importance to the safety of the 
line of communications of the Japanese army, Avere 
not of a nature to attract popular attention. His 
soldiers, however, appreciated him, because the 
Japanese say that Tachimi possessed the qualities of 
Napoleon in knowing how to make the enemy's 
country support an army ; his men were always w^ell- 
provided, although they had to camp and march in a 
mountainous country during a rigorous winter. In 
fact, the sufferings of the Japanese were of no 
ordinary character, and could not have been borne 
without the foresight of the staff and the excellent 
arrangements of the commissariat. As soon as it 
became evident that a winter campaign was necessary, 
the Japanese Government purchased a large quantity 
of sheepskin* overcoats, w^hich were distributed to 
the troops. Throughout the whole campaign the 

* Most of these skins were said to have been bouffht in 
China. 



THE FIRST ARMY IN MANCHURIA. 243 

columns of transport coolies dragged carts over the 
mountain roads to the Japanese outposts, eonsUmtly 
supplying them with all that was necessary. 

General Tachimi was confronted in Manchuria l)y 
the ablest and boldest of the C-hinese generals ; the 
Japanese remark that I-ko-teng-a was the first who 
iissumed the offensive ; the other generals at Song- 
huang, Phy6ng-yang, and Chiu-lien, ensconced behind 
their forts, apathetically waited for the enemy to 
come. I-ko-teng-a also showed some strategical 
ability in the disposition of his forces, which might 
have been attended with suc'cess if some of the 
detachments had advanced sooner, so as to combine a 
simultaneous attack. His attempts to take Feng- 
huang were most persistent, and he probably would 
have renewed them if the bold advance of the third 
division had not obliged him, for strategical reasons, 
to retreat and take his forces to a re<jion where a 
greater danger threatened the armies of his country. 

The Third Division or Left Wintj of the First Army. 

We have just seen how the fifth division repulsed 
the Chinese attempts to recover Feng-huang, and 
^^reak the Japanese line of communications ; we have 
^Xow to follow the movements of the other portion of 
the first army — the third division — which about this 
time performed one of the most brilliant strategical 
Operations of the war. Yvom the time the Japanese 
crossed the Yalu they declared thev had two 

R 2 



\ 



214 TEE CHINA-JAPAN WAB, 






objectives in .the campaign — Mukden and Peking- • 
The first was more of the nature of a feint to mislea 
the enemy ; but the Japanese, as we have seen wit 
Oshima's attack at Phyong-yang, carry out thei 
demonstrations with an earnestness which rende: 
them true attacks, and, besides, the genius 
Yamagata evolved a plan which menaced bo 
objectives at -the same time. It is truly surprisi 
what complexity of results the Japanese can produ 

from the simplest military movement. They obtai zn 

tliis by never losing sight of the principal object 
the campaign ; the details then naturally follow as a. 
inevitable consequence. 

A glance at the map of Northern China an 
Manchuria will show that the main road from Peking-"^ 
to Mukden, after running parallel to the coast and 
nearly straight up to the neighbourhood of Chin-chow 
(not the Chin-chow near Port Arthur), there takes a 
sweep eastward to Mukden. At the same place there 
is another road w^hich continues along by Ying-kow 
(modern Newchwang) to Kai-ping, and at the latter 
town, after sending off a braneli road to Hsin-yen 
and Chiu-lien, continues along the coast to Port 
Arthur. There is also another road from Chiu-lien- 
cheng and Hsin-yen, which leads to Hai-cheng, and 
thence by Newchwang * (old) to the main road from 
Peking to Mukden. Resuming, we may say that the 
»rapanese armies at Port Artliur, and near the Yalu, 

* It is called old to distinguish it from Ying-kow, the treaty 
port, which iuicigners generally cull Newchwang. 



THE FIRST ARMY IN MANCHURIA. 245 

lad three roads to advance towards China proper : 
►ne that keeps, always along the coast from Port 
Vrthur, by Fuchow, Kai-ping, and Ying-kow, which 
vas destined for the second army ; another from 
Feng-huang, by the Mo-tien (Heaven-touching) Pass 
ind Liao-yang to Mukden, where the main road 
would lead to Peking ; this road, besides being very 
L-ircuitous, was strongly guarded at the Mo-tieu 
(Heaven-touching) Pass ; and, finally, there was the 
third route, between the two former, which leads from 
Feng-buang by Hsin-yen to Hai-cheng. It was now 
the object of the third division to occupy Hai-cheng. 
[f this object could be achieved, the following results 
vould follow : the defence of Mukden at the formid- 
tble Mo-tien Pass would be destroyed, as that pass 
vould be turned, and the Japanese could approach 
iirectly by Liao-yang ; the Chinese armies stationed 
ilong the line — Mukden, Liao-yang, Hai-cheng, and 
Kai-ping — would be cut in two, and as Hai-cheng in 
a centre of roads irradiating in every direction, the 
Japanese could advance and beat in detail their 
scattered adversaries ; lastly, as Hai-cheng is only 
seventy-five miles from Shih-san-shan (near (liin- 
chow (Thirteen Hills)), while Mukden is 135 miles 
from that point, the Japanese could at any time con- 
tinue their direct advance by the chord of the arc 
described by the main road, and completely, cut oft' 
from China the troops stationed at liiao-yang and 
Mukden. By a simple march the Japanese would be 
able, while attackinji: the enemy's front, to threaten 



246 THE CHINA-JAPAN WAR. 

his line of retreat, and force him either to retire or be 
broken in two and defeated in detail. 

A preliminary step to this strategical movement 
had already been made when Oseko occupied Hsin- 
yen, but his force was inadequate to carry out the 
entire operation, so the third division was organised 
to act independently. On the 3rd of December the 
main body of this division left the headquarters at 
An-tung, and on the 8th had reached Hsin-yen, when 
it was joined by its commander. General Katsura, 
who had started from An-tung on the 5th of Decem- 
l)er. A day's rest was granted to the troops, and on 
the 10th they started for Tomu-cheng (knocker-wood 
town), where it was ascertained the Chinese had a 
force to defend the road to Hai-cheng. The day 
before (the 9th) two detachments had been sent out, 
one under Colonel Sato, to advance towards Kai-ping, 
and guard against any flank attack from the Chinese 
army stationed in that neighbourhood ; and the other, 
under General Oseko, to advance upon Tomu-cheng 
by another route. On the 11th of December the 
main body met Chinese forces at Erh-tiio-ho-tzu (two- 
road river) and Pai-tsao-wa-kou (white-grass-hollow- 
ditch), respectively a1)0ut 4,000 and 2,000 strong; 
after a short engagement these troops were defeated, 
and on the r2th the main body entered Tomu-cheng 
at the same time with General Oseko, who had taken 
another road, and defeated a body of 3,000 Chinese 
Tne next day (the 1 3th) the Japanese advanced on 
Hai-cheng, where the Chinese had taken a position 



THE FIRST ARMY IN MANCHURIA. 247 

on two hills flanking the town ; after a very short 
resistance they retired, and the Japanese occupied the 
to\\Ti. It is not necessary to give defaiils of these 
skirmishes, because during the fighting on the 11th 
and 12th the Japanese only lost seven wounded, and 
on the 13th they captured Hai-cheng without any 
loss. Considering the great strategical importance of 
that town, it was very cheaply purchased. For the 
rest of the campaign Hai-cheng was the pivot of all 
the operations of the two hostile armies. 

As soon as they had abandoned Hai-cheng, the 
Chinese began to feel the importance of that loss ; 
they probably did not grasp at once the remote con- 
tingencies of tlie position, and recognise the danger 
of a Japanese advance direct to Shih-san-shan 
(thirteen hills) or Chin-chow, thus cutting oft' all 
the Manchurian armies from China ; but they felt 
immediately the inconvenience of an enemy thrust in 
l^tween their armies. The direct (.'ommuniciation 
between Liao-yang and Ying-kow (modern Newch- 
Waiig) passes through Hai-cheng, and was therefore 
intercepted by the Japanese ; the Chinese could com- 
tnunicate by a circiuitous route through Newchwang 
(old), but even this was dangerous, as the Japanese 
Cit Hai-cheng, ])y advancing on Newcliwang, could 
<nit that route also. Not onlv were the Chinese (torn- 
muuicati<ms rendered difficult, but to avoid losing 
them, they liad to further disperse their forces by 
detaching troops to prot<*ct Newchwang. For tlie 
rest of the war the Chinese annies were staticmed in 



248 THE CHINA-JAPAN WAR, 

the environs of Liao-yang, Newchwang (old), and 
Ying-kow (modern Newchwang), and the Japanese, 
situated in the midst of them, at Hai-cheng, kept 
beating ))ack their advances and preventing their 
junction. Of course, the Japanese accepted great 
risks by taking up such a position ; but events 
showed they had been justified in running these 
hazards against a slow, inactive foe like the Chinese. 
Katsura's march to Hai-cheng had been undertaken a 
month before the advance of the second army on 
Kai-ping ; he was therefore unsupported, and if the 
Chinese had attacked him simultaneously with all 
their armies, before he could fortify his position, he 
would have been exposed to great danger ; but such 
concerted action was wanting, and the Chinese neg- 
lected the opportunity. Katsura, when he marched 
from Hsin-yen, had foreseen the possible dangers of 
his advance, and had detached Colonel Sato towards 
Kai-ping to guard his flank ; that officer proceeded as 
far as Chien-ma-lio-tzu (thousand horse river) on the 
1 3th of December, and remained there watching the 
movements of the enemy. 

General Sung advanced from Ying-kow (modern 
Newchw^ang) with about 10,000 men, hoping to dis- 
lodge the Japanese from their advantageous position. 
Katsura. being informed of this movement by his 
scouts, feared that if lie gave the Chinese time, the 
Liao-yang army might attack on the other side and 
crush him ; he, therefore, resolved to assume the 
offensive and defeat Sung before the other generals 



THE FIRST ARMY IN MANCHURIA. 249 

had fixed their plans. The two armies met at Kang- 
wa-sai (vat-brick village), where Sung had commenced 
to entrench himself, probably with the intention of 
waiting until the Liao-yang army was ready for a 
combined attack. 

General Katsura left a small force to guard 
Hai-cheng, and advanced with the bulk of his forces 
to Pa-li-ho (eight li river), a village situated at the 
junction of two roads, one leading by Ta-shih-chiao 
(great stone bridge) to Kaiping, and the other by 
Kang-wa-sai (vat-brick village) and Kao-kan (high 
cutting) to Ying-kow (modern Newxhwang). He 
was thus able to protect Hai-cheng from an advance 
from either road. On the morning of the 19th 
of December, Major-General Oseko was ordered to 
advance towards Kang-wa-sai, with a regiment of 
infantry, some cavalry and three lotteries of artillery : 
his force probably numbered about 2,500 men. Oseko 
arrived at Kai-chia-tun (covered house village) about 
11 A.M., without encountering Chinese troops, but his 
cavalr}^ videttes informed him that they were massed 
in great numl)ers at Kang-w^a-sai. He reported the 
news to Katsura and attacked the enemy. 

The road from Hai-cheng to Ying-kow, between 
Kai-chia-tun ((covered house village) and Kang-wa-sai, 
takes a bend south, passing through the villages of 
8hang-chia-lio (upper extra river) and Hsia-chia-ho 
(lower extra river). At ihe latter place a side road 
leads to Ma-chiian-tzu (horse pen), and from thence 
another road passing thr<jugh Ilsiang-shui-pao-tzii 



250 THE CHINA-JAPAN WAR. 

(fragrant water bubbles) goes to Kang-wa-sai. These 
roads form a rough triangle, which contains a hillock 
and a pine-wood. Chinese troops were observed in 
Kang-wa-sai and Ma-chiian-tzii (horse pen), and 
when the Japanese, advancing by the main road, 
arrived at Hsia-chia-ho (lower extra river), they saw 
the necessity of first attacking Ma-chiian-tzii, other- 
wise the Chinese from that place could deliver a 
dangerous flank attack, threatening to cut them oflf 
from the rest of the army which was on the road to 
Hai-cheng. 

A battalion (consisting only of three companies) 
was detached for this work. One company was kept 
back as a reserve, and the other two advanced 
towards Ma-chiian-tzu, but were exposed to a heavy 
fire on the left flank by the Chinese ambushed in the 
pine- wood. This necessitated another change of 
front, the enemy in the wood having to be dealt 
with first. The Japanese turned, and drove back 
the enemy on their left flank ; but while the Chinese 
in the wood were retreating, those in Ma-chlian-tzii 
opened fire on the right flank of the new Japanese 
formation. This brought about a new change of 
front, which was executed with great difficulty, the 
soldiers having to march knee-deep in the snow. 
The third company was now brought forward, and 
the eighteen guns originally intended for the attack 
of Kang-wa-sai concentrated their fire on Ma-chiian- 
tzu, which was taken by a rusli of the Japanese 
infantry. 



THE FIRST ARMY IN MANCHURIA. 251 

eko, having defeated the Chinese left wing and 
ed his right flank, proceeded with the original 
k on Kang-wa-sai, directing all his artillery 
ist that place, but the superior numbers and 
g position of the Chinese were too much for his 
force, and it was not until 4 p.m., when Major- 
ral Oshima* arrived with reinforcements, that 
as able to deliver a serious attack. At that 
the battalion which had taken Ma-chiian-tzii 
able to co-operate, attacking the Chinese left 
; but the enemy had placed four guns in Kang- 
li, had cut loop-holes in the mud walls, had 
furniture on the top of them, for shelter against 
apanese fire, and opposed a stubborn resistance. 
IS not until 5 p.m. that the Japanese became 
irs of the place. 

e whole Japanese force engaged in the battle 
nted to 4,537 men, but the brunt of the fighting 
m Oseko with about half that number. The 

were verv severe, nearlv 400 killed and 
ded, about 9 per cent, of the total number 
;ed. The Chinese loss could not be ascertained, 
ey carried away their wounded and even their 
; but it was estimated at about 200 killed and 
)r 300 wounded. The Japanese remark that 
ras the first time during the war that the losses 
>th sides were nearly equal : hitherto, contrary 

military experience, thouj^h the Japanese had 
alwavs the attackers, and the Chinese the 

• Not the Oshima of Asaii and Phyung-yang. 



252 THE CHINA-JAPAN WAR. 

defenders, of strong positions, the C-hinese losses 
had been much greater in every engagement. Various 
reasons are suggested to explain the relatively heavy 
Japanese losses ; the most probable are, that, owing 
to the snow which covered the ground, the dark 
outline of the advancing Japanese beciime an easf 
target for the Chinese guns and rifles; and t^t^u 
the battle ended at night-fall, there was no pursuit^ 
during which the greatest slaughter of a routed 
enemy takes place. 

General Sung's^^ forces can be enumerated 
follows : — 



I-tzii army 


• 


• 


. 5 camps. 


MiDg-tzii array . 


• 


• 


• 13 „ 


Sung-wu „ 


• 


• 


. 4 „ 


Other soldiers 


• 


• 


• 6 „ 



Total . . .28 



>» 



This would give a nominal strength of 14,000 men, 
but as most of the troops had already been engaged, 
and defeated, it is probable they had dwindled down 
to less than 10,000 men. Though Sung was attacked 
at Kang-wa-sai, yet as he liad advanced from Kaiping, 
we may consider him to have undertaken an offensive 
operation, which in itself is a remarkable feat for a 
(Chinese general ; moreover, with the support of 
hastily constructed entrenchments, he succeeded in 
inflicting on the Japanese the heaviest percentage of 
losses of the whole war. We cannot therefore deny 
liim exceptional praise, especially when we consider 




/ 



THE FIRST ARMY IN MANCHURIA, 255 

le was a very old man : properly supported 
e Liao-yang army, he might have seriously 
rassed Katsura s advanced position at Hai-cheng. 

left Colonel Sato in observ^ation at Chien-ma- 
i (thousand horse river). There he witnessed 
ovements of the Chinese army as they advanced 
&aiping by Tang-chih (soup-pond) and Ta-shih- 
(great stone bridge) towards Hai-cheng. On 
ght of the 18th of December, he received orders 

General Katsura to retreat to Tomu-cheng 
ier-wood town), as General Sung was reported 

advancing with 20,000 men. On the 19th 
ard tiring in the direction of Kang-wa-sai, and 
e same night left for Tomu-cheng, which place 
,ched on the 22nd of December, 
leral Sung, after his defeat, retreated with the 
3f his forces to Kao-Kau (high cutting), pro- 
g the road to Ying-kou : another portion of his 
retreated to Newchwang (old). 
; severe check inflicted on Sung at Kang-wa- 
iscouragcd the Chinese army at Liao-yang, 
secured a month's rest to Katsura, which he 
ritly employed in fortifying his position, 
leng is surrounded by hills : on the south there 
hiao-moi-shan and Tan-wan-shan, on the east 
-chia-shan, and on the north Huan-hsi-shan 
iiountain) and Shuang-lung-shan (double dragon 
tain). These hills form an excellent line of 
}e, within which Katsura kept his army, only 
ig out recijnnoitring parties to watch the 



256 THE CHINA-JAPAN WAR. 

enemy's movements. Major-General Oseko was 
entrusted with the south-western defence and Major- 
General Oshima with the north-eastern. 

On the 13th of January it was reported that a 
Chinese force of about 20,000 men was coming from' 
Liao-yang. The advance was slow and cautious: 
on the 14th they were about ten miles from Hai-cheng, 
on the 15th about five or six, and on the night of the 
16th the Chinese line in some places approached to 
within 2\ miles of Hai-cheng. On the 17th the 
Chinese commenced firing at dayl)reak, and continued 
until night-fall : as they never approached closer 
than 1,600 metres, the Japanese did not answer up 
till noon, in the vain hope of encouraging the enemy 
to advance. But the Chinese were not caught by 
this artful trick, and kept firing from a safe distance. 
About 1 P.M. the Japanese, finding it useless to wait, 
pushed forward their artillery, and a brisk cannonade 
soon threw the Chinese into disorder, and thev 
commenced a retreat which was hastened by the 
advance of the Japanese infantry. This brief sum- 
mary is quite sufficient for such a paltry affair, which 
was justly considered as the most ridiculous battle 
on record (though it was to be surpassed later on). 
About 14,000 Chinese with artillery fired at Hai-cheng 
all day, and the Japanese losses were only one killed 
and forty-nine wounded : they evidently hoped to 
frighten the Japanese out of the place by making a 
OTcat noise. 

Throughout the latter part of the war the Chinese 



THE FIRST ARMY IN MANCHURIA, 259 

infantry seem to have preferred long-range firing, 
while the Japanese invariably reserved their rifles 
for 600 metres, and continued up to 200 metres, 
when they employed the bayonet. 

The Chinese losses had been very slight, and 
encouraged by the arrival of reinforcements which 
brought up their number to about 20,000, they 
advanced in a similar manner against Hai-cheng on 
the 22nd of January. This time they were a little 
bolder, and advanced to within 600 metres of the 
enemy's positions, when the Japanese, with seven 
battalions and three batteries, drove back their right 
wing, while with another force they threatened their 
line of retreat. The Chinese retreated with a loss 
of about 200 or 300 men : the Japanese loss was 
even more insignificant than on the former occasion 
— one killed and twenty-six wounded. What makes 
these trifling engagements worthy of an historical 
notice is, that at the time rumours were circulated 
in China and Japan that the first army (at least that 
portion in Hai-cheng) had been annihilated. The 
two soldiers killed in the engagements of the 17th 
and 22nd of January were, we must suppose, the 
foundation of this colossal *' canard." 

The only difticulties the Japanese had to encounter 
at Hai-cheng came from the climate, and the distance 
of their source of supplies. The cold was intense, 
l*eaching 20° Fahrenheit below zero ( — 29 ( 'entigrade), 
l)ut the Japanese are a hardy race, capable of resisting 
very low temperatures, and during the cold winter of 

s *> 



260 THE CHINA-JAPAN WAR. 

northern China the soldiers used to strip naked in the 
freezing wind to enjoy their favourite national pastime 
of wrestling.* Though supplies were scarce, and even 
the generals reduced to a ration of one bad candle per 
night, still food was always at hand, and the soldier 
never went without his three substantial meals a day. 
While the third division had to endure nearly a 
month of military inactivity, we may glance back at 
what had been done in another direction by the second 
army. 

* This was actually witnessed by foreigners near Wei-hai- 
wei, but probably the same was done in Manchuria. 



( 261 ) 



CHAPTER V. 

THE ADVANCE OF THE SECOND ARMY. 

We have already explained that Lt. -General Kat- 
sura's advance on Hai-cheng was hazardous, and would 
have been inexcusable in the face of any except a 
Chinese army ; it is strange he was left to advance 
alone when the second army could have co-operated 
by advancing northward at the same time. On the 
10th of December Katsura commenced his march on 
Hai-cheng ; by that time the second army had not 
only rested after the Port Arthur campaign, but had 
fixed its headquarters at Chin-chow since the 1st of 
December. It could have marched forward immedi- 
ately, and arrived at Kaiping about the time that 
Katsura occupied Hai-cheng, but instead it delayed its 
departure for a month. It is probable that diffic'ulties 
of transport rendered long preparatory work necessary 
before commencing an advance. Winter had set in, 
and the roads were difficult. The Japanese gave up 
coolie transport and resorted to the natives, who pro- 
vided bullock carts for the use of the commissiiriat ; 
the road to be traversed was divided into stations, 
each station being provided with relays of carts and 
bullocks. 



262 THE CHINA-JAPAN WAR. 

There must, however, have been reasons of another 
nature that dictated a certain delay before prosecuting 
the campaign with vigour. Soon after the first battles 
of the war, probably after the crossing of the Yalu, 
the Japanese staff must have known that they could 
carry on the campaign as they liked, and that China 
was a mere dummy on which they were experiment- 
ing. There were also political reasons : it was gene- 
rally supposed that Japan could win only by a rush, 
taking China by surprise — the Japanese were resolved 
to explode this error, by beating their adversary 
leisurely, and convince the world that they could win 
as they liked. A prolongation of the hostilities, more- 
over, would gradually inform all the inhabitants of 
China that there was a war, and permeate throughout 
the vast empire the consciousness of defeat. Besides 
the Japanese troops had a unique occasion to practise 
the modern art of war and to carry on huge experi- 
ments in c&rpore vili. Whether any or all these 
reasons actuated the Japanese Gov^ernment, it is cer- 
tain that the second army remained over a month in 
complete inactivity. 

On the 30th of December, a mixed brigade, under 
the command of Major- General Nogi, was ordered to 
march north : it consisted of two regiments of infantry, 
a battalion of cavalry, a company of engineers, and a 
battalion of artillery, probably al)out 8,000 men. It 
started on the 1st of January, 1895, for Pu-lan-tien 
(Port Adams), whence, by two roads, it advanced to 
Hsimig-yo-<'heng (Bear Rock Town), a town about 



THE ADVANCE OF THE SECOND ARMY, 263 

eighteen miles from Kaiping, where the two roads 
meet again. General Nogi reached this place on the 
8th of January. On the following day a further advance 
was made to within eight miles of Kaiping, where 
the scouts had ascertained the Chinese were in force. 
On the 8 th of January an officer and a few soldiers of 
the first army from To-mu-cheng joined the mixed 
brigade, establishing the first communications between 
the two armies. The Japanese in their march from 
Chin-chow, a distance of about 115 miles, met with 
very severe weather, but each soldier was provided 
with a fur-coat, which was sent on ahead to the station 
where he was to bivouack. 

Kaiping has about 15,000 inhabitants, and is sur- 
rounded by a wall thirty feet high and ten feet thick. 
The Kaiping river, from fifty to seventy metres wide, 
runs in front of it, and in the space of about 300 
metres between the town and the river, the Chinese 
had built semicircular redoubts. As the river was 
fix>zen, the Chinese, following one of their old military 
rules, had cut up the ice so as to make the passage 
difficult. The defending force was about 4,000 or 
5,000 strong, and the position so formidable that the 
Japanese officers afterwards declared, that if they had 
kno\Mi it, they would have hesitated in attacking. 

General Nogi made the following dispositions for 
the attack : Colonel Kano, with two battalions of 
infantry, was to make a feint on the Chinese right ; 
Colonel Oki, on the right, with two batbilions, was to 
attack the enemy's left wing, while Nogi himself, with 



264 



THE CIIIKA-JAPAS WAR. 



two battalions of infantry and the artillery and 
eogineei-s, wius to attack the centre. 

On the morning of the 10th of January at 5.30 a.m., 
tlie Japanese commenced their march on Kaiping — 
the battle commenced at about 7 a.m. Colonel Oki, 
looking; at the enem)''s position, saw on their left a 




hill called Feng-Huang-shan (Pha?nix Hill), which he 
at once compared to Teni-san,* and ordered the first 
bat'talioii to cross the frozen river and dislodge the 
Chinese. The luittalion advanced and occupied Fcng- 



• A moimtaiii -that ])lnj-cd : 
brateil Jajiaiioso lattlu of Ynmi 
and Akctclii. 



iii])urtant part in the cele- 
fiiugUt iHjtween Hideyoslii 



THE ADVANCE OF THE SECOND AJiMY. 267 

lang-shan (Phoenix Hill), throwing the Chinese left 
ig into great disorder. Oki then ordered the second 
talion to cross the river and attack the wavering 
inese, following himself with two companies. The 
my's left wing was broken and retreated west into 

fields, receiving a heavy flank fire from the 
>anese battalion on Feng-huang-shan, which killed 
r 100 of them. Ensign Ogawa, at this time 
bed through a hail of bullets and, though wounded, 
ibed on the south-western corner of Kaiping, 
ating the flag of the first regiment on the walls, 
n the meantime the Japanese centre had made 
le progress, and the left wing was threatened with 
ank attack by reinforcements which were coming 
from Ying-kow. It became necessary to finish the 
tie soon, and the reserves were called up ; a simul- 
.eous advance was made by the centre and the two 
igs, and at 9.40 a.m. Kaiping was in the hands of 
Japanese. 

rhe Chinese tactics in this battle were far superior 
those in any previous engagement. Instead of 
Jag behind walls, their troops were stationed on 
north bank of the river, presenting a line of fire 
,000 metres to the advancing Japanese ; they also 
ised the river in a proper military way, as an 
^cle to retard the enemy while he was exposed to 
r fire. They dispensed with the foolish custom 
U'aving a lot of flags, and did not waste their 
tiunition at long ranges, but reserved their fire for 

and 500 metres. There was also another point 



268 THE CHINA-JAPAN WAR. 

in which they showed improvement : the Japanese 
troops, attacking a position, always advance by a 
succession of rushes, lying down from time to time ; 
hitherto the Chinese fired all the time, regardless 
whether the enemy was advancing or lying down, but 
at Kaiping the Chinese only fired when the Japanese 
were advancing. In consequence of these tactics, tlie 
Japanese losses were heavy, forty-six killed and 263 
wounded in about three hours' fighting. 

The Chinese retreated towards Ying-Kow in good 
order, covering their retreat with a rear-guard, and 
stopped at'Ho-chia-tien, about four miles from Kai- 
ping. The Japanese outposts were advanced to Hai- 
shan-sai (Sea Hill Village). 

The capture of Kaiping was of great strategical 
importance : not only was Katsura's position at Hai— 
cheng rendered perfectly safe, and communicatiarxs 
estal)lishcd l)etween the two armies, which could, i* 
necessary, render each other assistance, but by tlt^ 
possession of Kaiping and Hai-cheng the Japane^^ 
commanded all the roads leading to China. Tb-^ 
former place being a centre of the coast routes, ao^ 
the latter of the inland roads. With a secure positio*^ 
and the means of striking when they pleased in arx^' 
direction, the two Japanese armies halted for sorXB-^ 
time, until more favourable weather, and the progm^^^ 
of military events in another region, rendered 
vigorous prosecution of the campaign easy and pro] 
able. 



( 269 ) 



CHAPTER VI. 

THE WEI-HAI-WEI CAMPAIGN. 

riE forces at Hai-cheng and Kaiping had decided to 
t on the defensive until their proper time of action 
lould come ; but those at the latter place represented 
Hy a small part of the second army. Only one 
■igade under General Nogi had been advanced, thus 
aving two in the Regent's Sword Peninsula. One 
is required to guard the important fortresses of 
i-lien and Port Arthur ; but the other, the Ku- 
Unoto Brigade, could be employed in a naval 
pedition during the remainder of the winter, while 
erations were arrested in Manchuria. The second 
siidai) division was now mobilised and sent to 
""lien, which had become the Japanese naval base 
operations since the capture of Port Arthur. 
^ishal Oyama, with his staff, took command of this 
^ army, composed, like his former one, of a brigade 
^ a division. 

TTie Japanese, when they wisely judged that a 
pid prosecution of the Manchurian campaign was 
^^visable, sought some other object which should 
^ploy their troops and contriljute to the general 
^^ of the war. Wei-hai-wei answered all these 
^ws. It was conveniently situated near Ta-lien 
^y ; it was the second naval stronghold of China, or, 



270 THE CHINA-JAPAN WAR. 

to use the picturesque language of the Emperor of 
Japan, it was one of the leaves of the gate of China, 
the other being Port Arthur ; it also sheltered the 
Pei-yang squadron. That fleet, though severely 
handled at Hai-yuan Island, was still a formidable 
collection of vessels, and the Japanese could never 
feel entirely secure until it was destroyed. That 
factor eliminated from the campaign, the Japanese 
could prosecute the war at their pleasure, and advance 
their armies by land or sea, or by both ways. Taken, 
in such a light, the capture of Wei-hai-wei would be 
more important than was the fall of Port Arthur, as 
in all probability the C/binese fleet would be either 
taken or destroyed. 

The Japanese, as usual, commenced by a feigned 
attack. On the 18th of January a squadron of three 
vessels, the Yoshhio, Allfsushnna, and Naniwa, left 
Ta-lien and proceeded towards Teng-chou, a city of 
10,000 inhabitants, about 100 miles west of the- 
Shantung promontory. Owing to a snow-storm the 
Japanese could not commence the attack until 4 p.m.,. 
when they fired blank cartridges at a Chinese fort ;. 
they soon employed shells, as the enemy answered 
vigorously with a battery of eight guns, amongst 
which was one of 1 2 centimetres. On the following 
morning it snowed again, but as soon as it cleared up 
the Japanese recommenced firing, and were briskly 
answered by the forts. During this bombardment 
one of the most comic incidents of the war occurred : 
in this out-of-the-way town some missionaries lived 



TEE WEI-HAI-WEl CAMPAIGN. 271 

the kind of life the Spaniards lived in California, so* 
inimitably described by Bret Harte in his *Eye of 
the Comandante ; ' they were ruthlessly awakened 
from their dreamy existence by the sound of the 
Japanese artillery, and flattering themselves that the 
seat of war was being transferred to their neighbour- 
hood, one of them, with visions of the Pope stopping 
Attila in his mind, embarked in a small boat with a 
white flag and an American flag. His object was to 
go and " try and induce the ships to refrain from 
cruel and wanton destruction of innocent lives and 
property." The Japanese naturally imagined that 
he had come out to enjoy the fight, and left him to 
his devices. What rendered the situation still more 
comical is, that the whole operation was a diversion ; 
while the three men-of-war were firinof at Tenof-chou, 
the real expedition was starting in a different direc- 
tion, and the missionary with his small boat con- 
tributed to the realistic mise-en'scene of the Japanese 
feigned attack. The Chinese had been fearing au 
attack on Teng-chou, as there are excellent landing- 
places in the neigh]x)urhood, and the news of the 
bombardment sent all the disposable Chinese forces 
in Shantung in the direction of Teng-chou. 

The real expedition started from Ta-lien Bay on 
the 19th of Januar}^ It was composed of fifty trans- 
ports, and reached the coast of Shantung in three 
squadrons on the 20th, 21st, and 23rd respectively ; 
it was protected by almost the whole Japanese fleet of 
twenty vessels, some escorting and others watching 



272 THE CHINA-JAPAN WAR. 

the Chinese fleet in Wei-hai-wei. The place chose 
for the landing was a convenient beach near the cit ^ ^ 
of Yung-cheng, sheltered from the northerly winds^ -,«. 
The Chinese had made some slight preparations iomr^x 
resistance, and there were about 200 or 300 soldicrat^rs 
with four guns, who opened fire on the Japanese boats ms 
as they attempted to land. The Yaeyama, on per-=ur- 
ceiving this, signalled to the boats to come back, anc^ d 
opened fii'e with shell on the Chinese battery. A fe\"^irfW' 
rounds were sufficient to disperse the defending fdvo i > ^ 

and the Japanese landed and captured the guni -j . 

Arrangements ^ere made at once for the landing cj^tmi 
the troops ; to avoid confusion, the naval office] 
divided the beach into sections, allotting one to eacl 
regiment or battalion, and though there was a heav; 
fall of snow, all proceeded with order and rapidity. " 

The landing of such a large force required severa. 3 
days ; it was not until the 26th of January that th<3 
Japanese army, divided into two columns, marched hyr 
the two roads which lead from Yung-cheng to Wei- 
hai-wei. The inland route was taken by the second 
(Sendai) division, and the sea-route by the Kumamoto 
brigade. The roads were found to be wretched, 
impassable even for field-pieces, so that the amiy had 
to advance only with mountain guns. The city of 
Yung-cheng had been occupied shortly after the 
landing, and though five battalions of 350 men were 
supposed to defend it, the Chinese oftered hardly any 
resistance ; six Japanese soldiers scaled one of the 
gates and threw it open to their comrades. There 



THE WFJ-nAI-WEI CAMPAIGN. 273 

were a few skirmishes on the way to Wei-hai-wei, 
but nothing worth recording happened until the 
Japanese were in the neighbourhood of that fortress. 

The Heet had been, all this time, very active, 
watchincr Wei-hai-wei and the Chinese Heet. On the 
2 1 St of January, a squadron of eleven vessels steamed 
near that port, and when it retired, a man-of-war 
was left to keep constant watch ; this duty was 
undertaken by several vessels who relieved each other 
by turns. On the 25th the British man-of-war 
Severn * carried to Wei-hai-wei a letter from 
Admiral Ito to Ting, the C^hineae admiral, advising 
lim to surrender. This step was not a new one on 
:he part of the Japanese ; before the attack on Port 
\rthur, a Japanese officer, who had resided long in 
*hina, addressed a letter to the Chinese generals 
idvisiug surrender, as resistance was useless. When 
the Japanese took Port Arthur they found the draft 
)f a contemptuous answer which was, however, never 
jcnt. The present letter from Ito to Ting will be 
lUuded to again when the whole correspondence 
aliout the surrender of Wei-hai-wei is mentioned ; it 
is contained in an appendix, and is worth reading, as 
it is a remarkable document, showing great breadth 
Df views and historical knowledge. 

• This letter, written in Engliish, was puhlishol in the Japan 
Mail^ but without any date, and no mention of its liaving been 
Iclivered by a British niun-of-war. The latter statement is 
lerived from a Japanese war publication ; if it is correct, it 
nronld explain why Admiral Tin^ proposed •that the British 
idmiral shouhl be guarantor of the surrender of Wei-hai-wei. 

T 



274 THE CHINA-JAPAN WAR. 

Wei-hai-wei, the last refuge of the Pei-yang 
squadron, is a semicircular bay whose coasts measure 
about eighteen or twenty miles in length. The 
entrance is protected by two islands, Liu-kung, 
500 feet high and about six miles in circumference, 
and Jih, which is small and only contains a fort. The 
water is mostly shallow, but near the western corner 
of Liu-kunff Island there is excellent anchora«:e. The 
large island at the mouth of the bay naturally forms 
two entrances ; the eastern is the widest, but has Jih 
Island in the centre. Around the bay and on the 
two islands at its mouth, numerous batteries and 
forts had been erected to guard against attacks from 
land and sea. In describing the fortifications, it w^ill 
be advisable to follow the order in which they were 
attacked by the Japanese, to render the following 
narrative clearer. 

On the southern shore, near the eastern entrance, 
coming from the sea, three littoral forts presented 
themselves in the following order ; — 

^, • . • I three 24-centimetre guns. 

Cliao-pei-tsui . . -^ ° 



1 two 28- 
Lu-chueli-tsui . . four 24- 

Lunff-Miao-tsni . . J 






'o 



two 15- „ „ 



These batteries were protected on the land side by 
four forts mounting respectively — 

I^our 15-centiinetre guns. 

Two 12- „ „ quick-firing. 

Four 1£- 

Two 12- „ „ quick-firing. 



THE WEI'HAI-WEI CAMPAIGN. 275 

On Jih Island there was a fort with 

Two 26-centimetre guns, 

Two 12- „ „ quick-firing, 

tri^vo of which were mounted on disappearing carriages. 
On Liu-kung Island there were forts on the eastern 
a.:xid western comers : — 

Eastern . . two 24-centiinetro guns. 

Western . .six 24- 



♦> »» 



here also were disappearing guns. 

On the northern shore, near the western entrance, 
Iiere were likewise three forts, which, coming from 
he sea, were in the following order :— 

First Poshan . six 24-centimetre guns. 

Second „ . . two 21- ' „ „ 

Third „ . . 'J'^'f/ " 

(two lo- „ „ 

To the back of these forts, for protection against 
land attack, there were two forts : — 

_. jtwo 1 5 -centimetre guns. 

(two 12- „ „ quick-firing. 

Second ^^^^ ^^" 

(two 12- „ „ quick-firing. 



Besides all these forts there were some unfinished 
batteries on the western side of the harbour, between 
the northern and southern shores. To defend all the 
forts on land and on the islands, there must have 
lieen nearly 10,000 men * — a force fully ade(|uate for 
a stubborn resistance if properly trained and well led 
There were a few foreigners stationed in the batteries, 

• This probably includes the sailors of the fleet, 

X 2 



276 THE aniNA-JAPAN WAR. 

but tliey had little professional training, and w 
destitute of any real authority. 

The above description of the forts, their armamen 
and garrisons, does not exhaust the defences of Wei 
hai-wei : Admiral Ting had with him the remainde 
of the Pei-yang squadron, a formidable array o 
twenty-five vessels. Their particulars are as fol 
lows : the Chen-yuen^ Tiiuj-yuen^ Tsi-yuen^ Lai-yuen^ 
Ping-yuen, Kuang-ping^ Wei-yuen, Ching-yuen^ an 
Kang-cki; six small gun-boats, seven large torpedo 
boats and four small. All these vessels could b 
used for the defence of the harbour, the small gun 
boats from their shallow draught being able t 
approach the land, and sweep the shore with thei 
guns. On board the fleet there must have been at- 
least 4,000 sailors, and, as they were well disciplined, 
they constituted a really valuable force. 

To guard against torpedo attacks, and to prevent 
the Japanese fleet forcing its way into the bay, two 
formidable booms had been constructed across the 
two entrances ; they consisted of hawsers, 2^ metres 
apart, formed of three strands of steel wire, each 
strand from three to four centimetres in thickness ; at 
intervals of nine metres, baulks of timber forty centi- 
metres thick were attached, and the whole boom was 
fixed by chains and anchors, and torpedoes were 
placed in front of l)oth })ooms. 

The Japanese army commenced its advance on the 
26th of January. On the 25th orders had l)een given 
that the right column (the Kumamoto brigade) 





THE WEI'HAI'WEI CAMPAIGN. 277 

sliould advance as far as Pao-chia (Awabi-house), 
keeping up communications with the fleet; the left 
C3olumn should advance to Chang-chia-kou-lzfi (Chang- 
l:iouse Pass), keeping touch with the right column. 
DBoth columns were to throw out scouts to reconnoitre 
enemy's position. On the 29th the troops had 
eached their destination, and it was ascertained that 
*he Chinese were massed in large numbers around 
To-chih-ya-so (Place of the 100-foot Cliff), the head- 
land which closes the bay to the east. At Feng-lin-chi 
^Phoenix -grove) there is a junction of several roads, 
^imongst which the one that serves for the communi- 
cations of the eastern defences with the town of Wei- 
tai-wei and the western forts : an attack, therefore^ 
on Feng-lin-chi (Phcenix-grove) threatened the re- 
treat of the defenders at Po-chih-ya-so (Place of the 
100-foot Cliff*). The Japanese employed their usual 
tactics, attacking the front, and at the same time 
threatening the line of retreat. On the night of the 
29th of January orders were issued that, on the follow- 
ing morning, the second division should advance and 
take the hills to the south and east of Feng-lin-chi, while 
the Kumamoto brigade should attack Po-chih-ya-so 
and the land defences of the three eastern littoral 
forts. The fleet was to co-operate by bombarding 
those forts from the sea. 

The second division advanced at G a.m. on the 
30th of Januarv, and at 7 a.m. it encount<*red the 
Chinese, and gradually drove them, without much 
resistance, from height to height, until it i)ursued 



> 




278 TUB CHINA-JAPAN WAR. 

them to the sea-shore. The retreat of the defender- 
of the eastern forts was thus cut olBF; but a ne^ 
military element appeared on the scene, which de- 
stroyed the results of the Japanese tactics : thi 
Chinese fleet approached the shore, and shelled th< 
Japanese troops so heavily * that they had to retir^^ 
to Feng-lin-chi. It w-as now 9.50 A.M., and tht 
second division pushed on to Mo-tien-ling (Heaven — 
touching Pass),f and after taking it occupied Lung— 
miao-tsui, the third of the littoral forts. The guns 
were found in good order, and w^ere at once directed- 
on the Chinese ships and island forts ; but the Ting- 
f/uen, which wdth the gunboats had shelled back the 
Japanese infantry, now steamed quite close to the 
fort, and in about half-an-hour silenced it. One of 
the 24-centimetre guns in the fort was struck by a 
shell and broken in two, the free end flying away 
about forty feet. 

The Kumamoto brigade began to advance at 3.30 
A.M., and at 7 a.m. it was in action. The Chinese 
entrenchments extended in successive lines from Mo- 
tien-ling to Po-chih-ya-so, and the Japanese met 
vigorous resistance. At 10 a.m. the Mo-tien-ling 
entrenchments were stormed, and at the same time 
the fleet began firing on the littoral forts ; by 1 p.m. 
the three sea batteries and the four land forts were 
taken ; the latter were in some instances blown up by 

* One shell alone killed fourteen men. 

t The reader will remember that there is a pass of this name 
in Manchuria. 



THE IVEl-lIAI'WEI CAMI'AIGS. 279 

liiiese soldiers, but the sea forts remained intact, 
leir guns were at once utilised by a hotly of 




8 wliifh had been landed fin- the purpose, and 
:omj>aiiicd the Kumaranto l>rij:ade. Before the 



r 



\ 



280 THE CHINA-JAPAN WAR. 

attiick, Admiral Tiug had vainly urged on 
Chinese generals to accept a body of volunteers froi 
the fleet, who could have served the guns and d< 
stroyed them before leaving. The refusal of thi 
wise suggestion materially hastened the fall of We 
hai-wei. The Japanese had brought up no siege gun Mm 
and the state of the roads would not have allowe^^( 
any to be transported for a long time, so that the ^ 
only chance of injuring the Chinese -ships and islaii^</ 
forts lay in the guns which they might capture from 
the enemy. In the eastern forts the Japanese founc? 
twelve powerful guns, well-protected, at their dis- 
posal, and when properly officered and manned by the 
navy, they were able to keep the Chinese fleet con- 
fined in the western part of the harbour. 

The Japanese losses were not at all commensurate 
with the results obtained ; the second division lost 
<mly twenty-eight killed and fifty-four wounded, the 
Kumamoto brigade about one hundred killed and 
wounded ; but this included many ofticers, amongst 
whom Major-General Otera,* who was wounded by 
splinters of a shell, and died in two hours. 

A romantic episode is said to have taken place 
during the attack of the 30th of January. A Japanese 

* The news was conveyed to liis wiie by the following^ 
message : " The Miijor-Geueral has died a glorious death : do 
not give way to grief." As Mis. Otera was prepared for such 
news she was not surprised. His mother, 87 years old, le- 
marked that her eon had fallen in the discharge of his duty\ 
and she regretted that he was not permitted to live longer, and 
be of more service to his Sovereign. 



TOE WEI'UAI-WEI CAMPAIGN. 281 

officer, on entering one of the forts, found a beautiful 
Chinese girl crying ; with great gallantry he at once 
ordered two non-commissioned officers to accompany 
her to the next village. Later on the same officer 
found a baby, two years old, in a basket ; he at once 
picked it up, and the child, without evincing the 
slightest fear, stretched out its aims and smiled. 
When the fort was entirely captured, the officer chose 
the least ill-favoured of the Chinese prisoners, and 
released him on condition that he shouhl take the 
child to its parents. It is said that the baby showed 
reluctance to be separated from the protector in whose 
aims it had been sheltered during the fight. 

The Japanese were determined to push on the 
attack Aigorously. On the first night (30th of January) 
the torpedo-boats tried to get through the boom at 
the eastern entrance. This })old attempt had been 
planned so rapidly that the land forces were not 
warned, and the Japanese troops in the eastern forts, 
thinking the Chinese were attacking, fired on the 
torpedo-boats, which were obliged to retreat. On 
the following day arrangements were made, and the 
army informed of the operation the torpedo-boats 
intended to perform during the night of the 3 1st of 
January. But at the appointed time a terrific storm 
broke out, which compelled, not only the torpedo- 
boats, but the greater part of the fleet, to seek a 
refuge. The torpedo-boats went to a neighbouring 
island, and their absence caused Admiral Ito great 
anxiety until the storm abated : he had left only 



282 THE CHINA-JAPAN WAR, 

the first Flying Squadron to watch Wei-hai-wei, and 
prevent the Chinese escaping ; the rest of his vesseb 
went to Yung-cheng Bay, where the British fleet and 
the other foreign vessels which followed the opera- 
tions had already anchored. The storm was attended 
by such intense cold that blocks of ice were frozen 
into the mouths of the guns. 

The storm raged the whole day and night of the 
1st of February. It was a very unlucky occurrence 
for the Japanese, as it compelled them to suspend all 
military operations for two days. Admiral Ting 
seized the opportunity, and knowing from former 
experience how worthless would be the resistance of 
the soldiers, he landed on the 1st of February with a 
body of volunteers from the fleet, and destroyed all 
the guns in the western forts. This act of the 
Chinese admiral prolonged the resistance, probably 
for a week. The Japanese occupied the city of Wei- 
hai-wei and the western forts in the afternoon of the 
2nd, the Chinese soldiers having fled to Chefoo ; if 
they had found the guns in a serviceable condition, 
they could have bombarded the Chinese fleet and Liu- 
kung Island from a comparatively short range, and a 
surrender would have been inevitable in a few days. 
The storm of the 31st of January and 1st of Feb- 
ruary prevented the Japanese from following up their 
rush, which probably would have been too quick to 
allow the Chinese soldiers time to destroy the guns. 
This short respite was admirably utilised by Ting, who 
also destroyed all the junks and boats in the harbour. 



THE WEI'HAI'WEI CAMPAIGN, 285 

The situation of the two hostile forces was now 
'cry strange. The Japanese completely enveloped 
lie Chinese : on the sea a powerful fleet prevented 
^11 exit, and the whole coast was occupied by their 
irmy. Ting had only his ships, island forts, and the 
:>ooms to protect liim. But now that the Chinese 
aavy showed foresight and bravery, there seemed to 
oe even in their desperate conditions some hopes of a 
protracted resistance. The island of Liu-kung is 
ilmost perpendicular on the seaside, and landing is 
mpossible ; there was no chance for those desperate 
•ushes wdth which the Japanese hitherto had carried 
ill the defences they could approach. The forts on 
Liu-kung Island were too strong and too sheltered to 
>e silenced by the fire of the fleet, especially as the 
Tapanese did not wish to risk their vessels, and had 
lo armoured ship that could approach with impunity. 
The captured forts on the eastern side were too far to 
nflict any damage to the forts on Liu-kung Island and 
he fleet which they sheltered, so that the Chinese, 
hough completely surrounded, were able, owing to 
he length of Wei-hai-wei Bay, to lie at anchor in 
:omplet« security. It was thought by many that 
n this strange position the Chinese could hold out 
ndefinitely, as long as they had provisions and 
immunition. 

The Japanese were, however, determined to refute 
hese prognosticaticms. They had powerful reasons 
<> urge them t^ make the most desperate efforts ; 
hey could not allow the Pei-yang s<{uadron to escape 



286 THE CHINA-JAPAN WAB. 

capture or destruction now that it was almost in their 
grasp ; they felt also that their military prestige w^ s 
at stake on the rapid success of this military operatiojBH- 
The few unprofessional foreigners with the Chines3.e 
forces must not baffle them, in the sight of the wa.i7 — 




vessels of the principal nations of the world. As soon 
fls the storm subsided the Japanese pushed on theiv 
operations with unceasing pertinacity. 

On the 3rd of February the second, third, and 
fourth Flying Squadrons {12 vessels) attacked the 
Chinese island forts, with the assistance of the eastern 



THE WEI-HAI-WEI CAMPAIQK. 287 

teriea, and many Chinese were killed, according to 
Lr own accounts. The Chinese fleet moved about 
harlwur shelling the Japanese forts. At night 
torpedo-boats made another attempt to break 
ough the boom at the eastern 'entrance, but though 
y even employed dynamite they could not break 




; they then turned their attention to its extremity 
■ax the sliore, and they succeeded in widening the 
terval which separated it from the rocks. 
On the night ui the 4th of February preimrations 
ere made for a second attempt with the torpedo- 
»ts, which were divided into three stjuadrons ; the 



\ 



288 



THE CHINA-JAPAN WAR, 



\ 



first watching outside, and the second and thi 
passing througli the interval of the boom which h 
widened on the preceding night. There is soar^ « 
discrepancy in the minor details of the operatir>:Kja. 
According to one ac6ount, the torpedo attack w 
preceded by a diversion of two small gun-boats, t 
Chokai and Otago, which, piloted by Captain Tog* 
an officer who had studied the China coast, and comL<J 
navigate through the bay of Wei-hai-wei even in tli ^ 
dark, steamed into the harbour after the moon set, a. t 
1 A.M. of the 5th, and advanced close to the Chinese 
squadron and opened fire.* While this action wa^ij 
going on, the torpedo-boats crept along the east^rxi 
shore at half-speed (11 knots), and waited for thexJ 
opportunity. 

The rest of the operation is described almost iden - 
tically in the different accounts. The flotilla w.xs 
composed of ten torpedo-boats, which advanced ii* 
the following order, one behind the other : — 



No. 6. 



Third Squadron . 



Second Squadron . 



n 


22. 


»» 


5. 


»» 


10. 


No. 


21. 


»i 


8. 


»» 


14. 


»» 


9. 


»♦ 


18. 


»» 


19. 



* This diversion of the gun-l)oat8 is not mentioned in the 
official reports of the engagement. 



THE WEI'HALWEI CAMPAIGN, 239 

Third Squadron, 

6. When she reached the south of the harbour, she 
steered west, and passing between the Chinese 
vessels fired two torpedoes which were not dis- 
charged owin;;- to ice in the tubes. She was struck 
by forty-six rifle bullets and one Hotchkiss shell. 

22. Fired three torpedoe-*, but the Chinese cannonade was 
so warm that she had to retire without ascertaining 
the result. On her way back she ran aground near 
the Lung-miao-tsui fort (one of the eastern ones). 
5. Aimed two torpedoes at tho Lai-ijaen which apparently 
missed. 

10. Fired a torpedo at the Ting-yuen which seemed to 
hit her. She received ten rifle bullets. 

Second Squadron, 

21. Had steered for centre of Liu-kung Island, but 
emerged in the neighbourhood of Jih Island — as 
she turned into the harbour again, she found No. 8 
disabled and towed her out. 

8. Was injured by fouling the boom or a sunken rock. 
14. Fared like the preceding boat (No. 8). 

9. Observing that the boats ahead of her were aground, 

she steered north, and seeing two Chinese torpedo- 
boats approach tlie Ting-ynen she steered between 
them, and discharged two torpedoes — the i^econd, 
which was fired from the side-tube, seemed to Htrike 
the slern of the big vessel. Immediately after- 
wards she received a shell in her boiler, and most 
of the men near the engines were scalded to death : 
steam esca^wd, and she lay helpless at 200 or 300 
metres from the Chinese fleet. 

18. Ran ashore near lK)om. 

19. Was the last, and fearing to be late, steeri'd for the 

flashes of the enemy's guns, when she came upon 
No. lying helpless aftor the explosion in the 
l)oiler : she attempted to tow No. 9, but finding 
that task impossible she took out the crew and 
retreated just l)efori> dawn. 



^0 TEE CHINA-JAPAN WAS. 

From the above description, it appears that on^-^-y 
four bouts discharged eight torpedoes ; one boat k ^^»d 
her tubes frozen, and the other five were either injur-^ 
by running ashore or delayed by the assistance t^ :3 
dered to damaged consorts, and took no part in t^3 
attack. The injuries received were mostly slig H^ 




only Nos. 8 and 14 were sent to Port Arthur for 
repairs. Two boats were lost ; No, 9 abandoned 
after the explosion in the boiler, and No. 22, which 
ran aground near the eastern forts, and was fired 
upon by^the Chinese forts. Some of the crew escaped 



TBE WEI-HAI-WEI CAMP.UGlf. 291 

lore, but others fell into the icy water and were 
zen to death ; the remainder were obliged to keep 
iet for fear of being noticed by the Chinese, until 
!y were rescued on the evening of the 5th of 
bruary. 




several torpedo-boats reported that they had .struck 
Tiu'j-yuen, and the Japanese were much di.s- 
)ointed at seeing her still afloat on the morning of 
5th. She gradually sank, her decks remaining 
; of water. The Chinese had lost their most 
oiidable vessel. 

u 2 



292 THE CHINA-JAPAN WAB. ^ 

On the 5th of February it was decided to make 
another night-attack with the torpedo-boats. Ad- 
miral Ito has afterwards confessed that he felt more 
pain in giving that order than for any other he had 
given during the campaign. On the preceding night 
some had been scalded, others frozen to death, and as 
it was probable that the Chinese fleet would now keep 
better watch, it seemed as if he was sending his men 
to an inevitable and horrible death ; yet the order 
was given, and executed with the utmost promp- 
titude. C-omraander Mochihara, the chief of the 
flotilla, told his men that there was hardly any 
chance of escaping, and death was almost certain ; it 
was better to remove all unnecessary articles, a hand- 
lamp being sufficient, no signals except port aB^ 
starboard being required for such a desperate enter- 
prise. " Our boats and our bodies are the enemy's. 
He accordingly sent away all the naval records, sign^^ 
sheets, and written orders. But there was not tl^^ 
slightest trepidation ; all the men were overjoyed ^' 
the dangerous duty on which they were debich^^- 
At 4 A.M. of the 6th of February, while the secor^^ 
and third torpedo squadrons were watching outsi^^ 
the bay, the First Squadron entered the harbour. ^^ 
was composed of the following boats : — 

Kotaka. 
No. 23. 

» 13. 

„ 7. 

„ 11. 



THE WEl-HAI'WEI CAMPAIGN. 293. 

Nos. 13 and 7 had their screws fouled and could 
•t approach the enemy, but the other three boats 
scharged seven torpedoes and destroyed three of the 
emy's vessels : the Lai-yuen, Wei-ywu, and a 
in-boat, the Pao-hua, None of the Japanese crews 
3re wounded in this attack. The Chinese lost about 
10 men drowned, but the moral effect of this 
eadful night-attack must have been appalling, 
lien on the followino; morning: the fleet witnessed 
5 num])ers dwindling away beneath the insidious 
ows of the fearless enemy. It was on this day 
at the su])ject of a surrender was first mooted : the 
habitants, male and female, of Liu-kung Island 
sembling around the jetties and begging the autho- 
:ies to save their lives. 

The two torpedo attacks in the nights preceding 
e mornings of the otli and Gth of February decided 
iC fate of Liu-kung Islaml and of the remaining 
jssels of the Pei-vansc S(|uadron : from that moment 
1 successful resistance was impossible, and the 
irrender was onlv deferred by the ol)stinarv of 
illen despair. 

The Japanese observe that the results obtaine<l by 
le heroism of the torpedo-boats compare favourably 
itb those a<hieved bv the fleet at Hai-vuan Ishmd. 
1 the battle of the 17tli of September, 12 Japanese 
essels encountering 14 Chinese with 8 torpedo-boats, 
icceede<l in burning or sinking 5 ships, with trifling 
amaue to themselves and with a loss of 01) killed 
nd 100 wounded. In the torpedo attacks at Wei- 



234 



THE CBJNA-JAPAN WAlt. 



hai-wei a total force of 14* boats succeeded in sinking 
an ironclad and 3 other vessels, with a loss of 2 
torpedo-boata, 9 killed, 31 wounded, and 5 drowned. 
The indirect result of these attacks was also the fall 
of the island forts and the capture of the remaining 
vessels. 

The last days of the siege were sufficient to un- 
nerve the stoutest troops : the hulls of the sunken 




ships were a constant reminder to the survivors what 
their fate might be any night : this wearying appre- 
hension must have told with even greater efl'ect than 
the attacks themselves. The Chinese report another 
torpedo attack, which was repulsed, at 4.30 a.m,, of 
the 7th of February, but as it is not mentioned bj' 
the Japanese, it must have been a false alarm of the 

■ It should bo fifteen according to the lists given before, 
probably tbo Kotaka ig uot rcclioucd. 



TEE WEISAI-WEI CAMPAIQU. 295 

excited crews. The real attack was made by the 
Japanese fleet — by the captured forts near the eastern 
entrance — and by some rifled mortars which the 
Japanese had now planted on the northern shore. 
The eastern forts, by a heavy cannonade, succeeded in 
blowing up, at 8 A.M., the magazine on Jih Island ; that 
fort was now lost to the unfortunate defenders. Later 
in the morning, all the Chinese torpedo-boats and two 
steam-launches, 13 vessels, escaped by the western 
entrance, bvit they were pursued hy the First Flying 




Squadron* and al! captured, some in a serviceable 
condition, and others only needing repairs for the 
injuries sustained by the rocks when run aground. 

After dark the Chinese soldiers on Liu-kung Island 
begged their commanders tn save their lives, but 
were finally picified by Admiral Ting and (Jcneral 
Chang. 

The Chinese report another unsuccessful torpedo 

* The Yothino could certainly stcuin fiister than any of thoni, 
and probably ber consorts could do tho Manic. 



296 THE CHINA-JAPAN WAR. 

attack befoi:e dawn of the 8tli, but it is not mentioned 
by the Japanese, though it may have been a feint to 
fatigue the defenders. After dawn the eastern forts 
again opened fire, and one of their shells struck the 
Chincj-yuen^ killing and wounding about 40 sailors. 
Fresh petitions were made to Admiral Ting, who 
said it was the duty of both sailors and soldiers to 
fight to the end ; but if he did not receive reinforce- 
ments l)y the 11th of February he w^ould find means 
to save their lives. 

On the 9th of February the Japanese made another 
combined attack by sea and land ; the Ching-yuen 
having steamed out to shell the forts, Captain Naruta 
of the Japanese Navy, by very careful sighting, 
succeeded in hitting her near the water-line with two 
shells from one of the 28-centimetre guns of tha 
forts. The Chhyz-yuen sank so rapidly that her crew"^ 
had not time to haul down her flag. 

The Chinese fieet was now reduced to four vesselp==s?s^ 
and a few gun-l)oats, with crews much diminished b} 
the enemy's fire : the soldiers and inhabitants o 
Liu-kung Island were dispirited by the effects of th 
Japanese shells : almost every night a torpedo attack 
is reported, and though such reports are not con- 
firmed, the constant alarm must have had a terribly 
demoralising effect. Their ammunition also had 
almost run short. It was under these circumstances 
that Admiral Ting, on the night of the 11th of 
Februaiy, receiAcd a telegram from Li-Hung-chang 
announcing tho^ reinforcements could not be sent, 



THE WEMIAI'WEI CAMPAIGN. 2i97 

«Lnd advising the fleet to escape to some other port. 
There was no possibility of following this advice : 
the powerful Japanese squadron was ever watchful, 
and the Chinese men-of-war had very low speeds. 
At the same time sailors, soldiers, and inhabitants 
clamoured for a surrender, alleging that the promised 
time had come and no reinforcements had arrived. 

The heroic resolution of Admiral Ting had to 
yield at last, and on the same night he made arrange- 
ments for sending Captain Chang of the Kuan;/'pin;/ 
with a letter to Admiral Ito proposing a capitulation. 
The messen<jer left on the morning of the 12th of 
February on the Chen-pei, flying [a whit€ flag, and 
returned the same day with a favourable answer from 
Admiral Ito, together with some presents of cham- 
pagne and other luxuries. Admiral Ting then 
wi'ote another letter (it was to be his last) to Admiral 
ko, in which, after thanking him for saving the lives 
of his men, he reijuested a prolongation of the time 
allotted for the surrender of the forts and ships. 
He declined accepting the presents, as their two 
countries were at war.* After finishing this letter, 
he wrote a telegram to Li-IIung-chang, retired to his 
cabin and committed suicide by swallowing a large 
do.se of opium. 

The correspondence between the two admirals 

• A system of petty Buspiclon is rampant in China, and if 
Admiral Ting had acce]ited Ito's prcBeiits, ho would have l)een 
snspected by raillionK of his countrymen of having been hiilx'd 
to surrender by a cat^e of champagne. 



298 THE CHINA-JAPAN WAR. 

forms a noble page of history. The first letter from 
Ito, which is rather in the form of a memorial, was 
sent, according to a Japanese review, through the 
British man-of-war Severn on the 25th of January, 
some days before the attack on Wei-hai-wei com- 
menced. It will seem strange to European readers 
that an invitation to surrender was sent so early, 
but the Japanese were so fully aware of their ow^n 
superiority, and of the rottenness of the Chinese mili- 
tary system, that they thought it generous to give a 
fellow-soldier timely warning. This document is a 
remarkable production ; it shows a wonderful grasp 
of the modern history of the world, and the warmest 
friend of China could not point out better the defects 
of her social organisation, and indicate their remedies, 
than did Admiral Ito in his letter forwarded a few 
days before the Japanese army and navy were to 
destroy China's last stronghold and capture her only 
fighting fleet. No summary can give it justice, and 
the reader is earnestlv entreated to refer to the 
appendix in which it is contained.* China in her 
hour of shame and disgrace may seek consolation 
by the reflection that she has fallen before a nation 
of heroes, who, in the exultation of unparalleled 
triumphs preserved those rare sentiments of equa- 
nimity which dictate friendship even to the enemy. 

Admiral Ting has been blamed for not having 
destroyed all his ships and war material before sur- 
rendering, but to these ungenerous critics it may 

* Sec Appendix F. 



THE WEI'HAI'WEI CAMPAIGN. 299 

be pointed out that he vainly tried to induce his 
sailors to destroy the ships, and that in most 
European capitulations the war material is delivered 
intact to the enemy. Others have blamed him for 
committing suicide. To the [latter accusation it is 
sufficient to answer that in the ethical code of China 
suicide is not blameworthy in certain cases. It may 
also be added that in his peculiar circumstances 
suicide would have been excusable even for a Euro- 
pean : the barbarous laws of China involve the whole 
family in the guilt of one of its members, and if 
Ting had not committed suicide he would have 
brought ruin on his relations. Even after perform- 
ing that supreme act of self-sacrifice he was denied 
posthumous honours by his Government. 

Ting was honoured only by strangers. On hearing 
of his death Admiral Ito, deeply moved, ordered 
that one of the captured Chinese vessels should be 
returned, to convey his body with befitting decorum 
to Chefoo. Before this ship left, the Japanese 
officers paid a visit to his mortal remains — the pro- 
found respect they showed greatly touched the 
Chinese and foreigners who beheld them. At Chefoo 
the foreign men-of-war sent detachments to accom- 
pany the bier. 

The death of Admiral Ting, which was followed by 
the suicide of the Chinese general and other chief 
officers, left the Japanese in great em])arrassment how 
to continue the negotiations for the surrender. They 
refused to treat with any foreigner, and insisted that 



300 THE CHIN A- JAP AN WAR. 

the highest Chiuese official on Liu-kung Island should 
arrange the capitulation. Taotai Niu was the highest 
surviving official, and on him devolved the duty to 
sign with the Japanese admiral a stipulation * in 
11 articles for the surrender of forts, ships, etc., and 
for the departure of the Chinese soldiers and sailors. 

The Chinese were much touched when Admiral Ito 

gave back the Kamj-chi that she might convey Ting s 

coffin to Chefoo. Taotai Niu wrote a letter thanking 

him for the gracious act. Up to this moment the 

negotiations had proceeded with the dignity befitting 

such a grave occasion, but at the last moment a 

comic incident was introduced. The Kuang-ping^ 

one of the vessels to be delivered to the Japanese, 

did not belong to the Pei-yang squadron, but had 

been detached, together with the Kuang-yi and Kiiang- 

chin from Canton, to take part in the manoeuvres of 

the northern fleet. They had been detained for some 

time when the war broke out, and they were not 

allowed to return. The Kuang-gl was destroyed at 

Phung Island on the 25th of July, the Kuang-chia 

ran aground and was blown up after the battle of 

Hai-yuan Island on the 17th of September; the 

Kuaiig-jfing was the only remaining vessel. Her 

captain, Chang-Pi-kuang, felt rather uneasy at the 

idea of returning alone to Canton without any ships, 

and he asked the Japanese to return the Kuang-ping^ 

alleging that she l)elonged to the Canton squadron 

which had taken no part in the war. This comic 

* For tho text of this stipulation, see Appendix F. 



THE WEl-HAI'WEI CAMPAIGN. 301 

request was afterwards repeated by Taotai Niu. As 
it is probably the most ridiculous incident which ever 
happened in any war, the letter is given in an 
appendix. * It shows better than a lengthy descrip 
tion the utter absence of national feeling in China, 
and the childish ideas of the Chinese in all inter- 
national relations either of war or peace. 

The Chinese set free by the terms of the capituhi- 
tion were as follows : — 

( 183 officers. 
Navy . . . ' 30 students. 

I 2,871 warrant officers and marines. 
. ) 40 officers. 

^^ • ' • I 2,000 rank and file. 



Total . . 5,124 

The vessels delivered up were the Clten-yiuni 
(7,430 tons), Pint/'j/wni (2,850 tons), Tsi-yuen (2,355 
tons), Kuang-pbuj (1,050 tons), and 6 small gun- 
boats : these with the 7 torpedo-boats ctaptured when 
tliey attempted to escape, and with some of the 
sunken ships that could be Hoated, constituted a 
respectable fleet : its value was estimated at 30 
million yen,^ 

After the evacuation, the Japanese troops abandimed 
all the land forts and destroyed them, removing 
onlv the serviceable artillerv and war material. A 
garrison was put in Liu-kung Island, and the remainder 

* Sec Appendix II 

I A 1m Hit tliree million sterling. 



302 THE CHINA-JAPAN WAR. 

of the army re-embarked for Ta-lien to join the 
of the forces in Manchuria. 

The capitulation was settled by Admiral 
entirely on his own responsibility, and he was v^ 
anxious to know how his Government would vi^ 
his conduct, but it met with the most enthusiast 
approval. 

The Wei-hai-wei campaign was very short ; tt 
first troops landed on the 20th of January, and o 
the 16th of February they were in possession of forts 
and ships. In four weeks the army had disembarked, 
advanced, attacked and won the place ; they were 
even able to spare four days for the convenience of 
the departing Chinese. The fighting only lasted two 
weeks, from 30th of January to 12th of February, 
and it would not have lasted so long but for the 
storm, which suspended all operations for two days 
and gave the Chinese time to destroy the guns in the 
western forts. It was the most dramatic episode of 
the war, and nothing was wanting to enhance its 
spectacular effect. The hills encircling the bay 
formed a gigantic amphitheatre from which the 
vicissitudes of the struggle could be observed : 
military attaches and men-of-war of the principal 
navies of the world followed with intense curiosity 
all the operations, and the Japanese, conscious that 
they were acting before a gallery of nations, deter- 
mined \>o display day by day all the resources of their 
skill and daring. Nulla dies sine linea was the motto 
which governed their actions. The stubborn resist- 



TB£ WEI-HAI-WEI CAMPAIGN. 303 

« of Liu-kung Island, which recalls to mind the 
"ence of the island of Sphacteria in the Peloponne- 
n war, so vividly described by Thucydides, lent 
element of momentary uncertainty which rendered 
! interest more intense. In a few days the 




panose exhibited all the metlinds of modem warfare 

land and sea ; dashing assaults on tlie forts, 

JIful handling of guns and shifw, daring torpedo 

acka whicli strewed tlie ]iarlx>ur with sunken hulls. 



304 THE CniNA'JAPAN WAR. 

The Japanese never relaxed their relentless hold ou 
the foredoomed fleet until the inevitable surrender 
came. Then followed the striking correspondence 
})etween the admirals ; the tragic fate of Ting, 
victim to the unfortunate defects of his country, as 
Ito had foretold in his first letter ; and the imposing 
scene of the Japanese officers reverently visiting the 
remains of Ting, which may be compared with the 
most striking pages of the history of chivalry. 



je 



( 305 ) 



CHAPTER VII. 



THE FIRST PEACE EMBASSY. 



^T has been recorded that after the fall, of Port Arthur 
» kind of informal Peace Mission was sent to Japan ; 
l)ut the Japanese politely refused to treat with persons 
unprovided with proper credentials. Later on, while 
the Wei-hai-wei expedition was being prepared, 
another Peace Embassy was appointed to negotiate 
with Japan. It consisted of two high officials, one 
of whom had been Minister to Washington, and the 
services of Mr. Foster were secured as unofficial 
adviser ; a long time was lost waiting for his arrival 
from America, and when he came, the two Chinese 
Ambassadors showed no haste to depart. At last, 
the news of the landing at Yungcheng, and of the 
Japanese advance on Wei-hai-wei hurried the de* 
parture of the PeacQ Em])assy, which arrived at 
Hiroshima on the 31st of January. A pompous list 
of the personnel attached to the mission was given ; 
it was as follows : — 

n. E. Chang-yu-yuan, Minister Plenipotentiary and Envoy 
Extraordinaiy-. 

H. E. Shao-yu-Hon, Minister Plenipotentiary and Envoy Extra- 
ordinary. / 

X 



306 THE CHINA-JAPAN WAR. 

• 

Wu-ting-fang (barrister-at-law), First Secretary (Expectant 
Taotai). 

Ku-Cha-hsin, Second Secretary (Secretary Judiciary Depart- 
ment). 

Jiu-Liang, Second Secretary (Secretary to Tsung-li Yamen). 

Liang-Ching, Third Secretary (Expectant Taotai). 

Kuang-Shang-i, Third Secretary (Expectant Taotai). 

Ching-Fah, Translator (Expectant Governor). 

Lo-Kan-lei, Translator (Expectant Governor). 

Lu-Yow-ming, Translator (Expectant Governor). 

Chien-Sha-tai, Attache (Expectant Vice-Go vemor). 

Ohang-Tao-Kuan, Attach^ (Expectant Governor). 

Chang-Yu-ping, Attache (Expectant Vice-Go vemor). 

Shang-Nu-tsai, Translator (Ex-Governor, Shantonshen). 

Chao-Shih-lien, Translator (Expectant Chief Salt Commis- 
sioner). 

Ching-Yin-chang, Translator (Expectant Educational Official). 

Hsui-Chan, Business Manager (Expectant Provisional Secre- 
tary). 

Hsiii-Po-ming, Business Manager (Expectant Provisional Secre- 
tary). 

Chang-Hua-fang, Student. 

I Ching-ki, Student. 

Wang Yu-yen, Student. 

Li Wang-to, Officially Appointed Merchant (Candidate for 
Guai-yo). 

Shih Hung-shing, Officially Appointed Merchant (Fifth rank). 

Shih Shang-chee, Officially Appointed Merchant (Fifth rank^. 
»Liu Sui-lin, Officially Appointed Merchant (Sixth rank). 

' All this pomp was to disguise the real nature of 
the mission, for, when on the 1st of February, the 
plenipotentiaries of the two nations exchanged cre- 
dentials, those of the Chinese envoys were found 
insufficient. On the 2nd of February, the Japanese 
plenipotentiaries presented a memorandum stating, 
that as the Chinese envoys had not full powers, and 



THE FIRST PEACE EMBASSY. 307 

were obliged to refer all matters to Peking, the negotia- 
tions were terminated. Japan was always willing to 
reopen them when China sent duly accredited pleni- 
potentiaries. 

This extraordinary termination surprised the whole! 
\^orld. China had given every outward assurance of 
being in earnest in her desire for peace — an American 
.statesman had been specially engaged as unofficial 
adviser to the mission ; the American Minister at 
Peking had been requested to draft a form of cre- 
dentials ; but at the last moment his draft was 
secretly set aside and substituted by vague and 
unmeaning credentials. Mr. Foster and the American 
Minister were placed in a ridiculous position ; but 
that is trivial compared to the loss sustained by 
China ; she exposed herself to the derision of the i 
whole world, thousands of lives and millions of money | 
were wasted, and the whole Pei-yang squadron was j 
destroyed or captured. All this was sacrificed for j 
the pleasure of attempting a childish trick which did J 
not succeed. 

The texts of the credentials and the whole corre- . 
spondence of the plenipotentiaries are contained in 
an appendix.* 

* Sec Appendix I. 



x 2 



308 THE CniNA-JAPAN WAB . 



CHAPTER VIll. 

CONTINUATION OF THE MANCHURIAN CAMPAIGN. 

When we last described the operations of the Japanese 
in Manchuria, the First Army (represented by the 
Third Division), under Lt. -General Katsura, was at 
Hai-eheng, where it had repulsed three attempts of 
the Chinese to re-capture the town on the 19th of 
December and 17th and 22nd of January ; the Second 
Army (represented by a brigade) under Major-General 
Nogi had taken Kaiping on the 10th of January. 
The two armies starting from the Yalu and Chin-chow 
liad conversfed towards the Liao river, and ended bv 
forming one army, of which the Third Division con- 
stituted the right wing, and General Nogi's brigade 
the left wing. It will, therefore, be unnecessary to 
treat their movements separately. 

While the fate of Wei-hai-wei was being decided 
in the beginning of February, neither of the hostile 
armies in Manchuria showed any activity. But later, 
the Chinese made two advances, for they cannot be 
called attacks, on Hai-cheng. This town is surrounded 
by five hills, of which the Japanese occupied four, the 
fifth being unnecessary for the defence, and being 
situated on their line of communications to Tomucheng, 



THE MANCHURIAN CAMPAIGN. 309 

ivliich was secure against any attack in force from the 
enemy. The four fortified hills are thus situated : — 

Tan-wan-shan about 2J^ miles S.W. of Ilai-cheng. 
Ching-chia-shan about 1 mile W. of Hai-cbeng. 
Huan-hsi-sban over 1 mile N. of Hai-cbeng. 
SbuaDg-lung-sban over 1 mile N.E. of Hai-cbeng. 

To the east and south of Hai-cheng the country is 
mountainous ; but to the west and north there is a 
large plain with two hills N.N.E. of Hai-cheng. From 
the south, the Newchwang river runs . in a north- 
westerly direction up to Hai-cheng, where it takes a 
sharp bend around Ching-chia-shan and flows on 
almost due west to the Liao river. Tan-wan-shan, 
Ching-chia-shan, Huan-hsi-shan, and the two hills in 
the plain are almost in a line perpendicular to the 
course of the river. 

On the 16 th of February the Chinese advanced from 
Newchwang (old) and from the positions they held on 
the Liao-yang road, along the whole front of the 
Japanese line. At first, the Japanese did not answer 
the fire of the Chinese to encourage them to c(mie 
closer; but at 11 a.m., finding this expectation w^as 
useless they opened fire with their artilleiy, and the 
Cliinese gradually retreated out of range. (.)n the 
two wings, at Tan-wan-shan and Shuang-lung-shan, 
the Chinese advanced within rifle-range ; but a few 
volleys sent them back rapidly. It was not a battle, 
but an exchange of cannon-shots, an<l, owing to the 
l>ad marksmanship of the Chinese gunners, the Japanese 
lost only three killed and eleven wounded. At the 



310 THE CniNA'JAPAN WAR. 

same time it must be noted that the Japanese found 

the enemy had made great improvements — shots came 

much nearer on this than on any previous occasion. 

But three killed is a very small result for a day's « 

practice with twelve guns. The Chinese forces ,« 

numbered about 1G,000; and the Japanese counted J] 

150 killed. 

In the Chinese account of this battle, three Japanese 
guns were said to have been captured ; but a retreat 
had to be made owing to the severe artillery fire. .^ 
The following sentence deserves to be quoted in full : r 
'' On letreating we laid an ambush and designedly ^^r 
threw our ranks into disorder for the purpose of "i^f 
drawing the enemy aft^r us ; but we failed in our tm: r 
purpose." 

All these successive attacks on Hai-cheng had been 
directed by Generals Sung and I-ko-teng-a ; but now ^^ 
a new leader appeared, who made another and Iast;=ft^«t 
attempt to recover the town. Wu-ta-cheng, who has<^=s -ts 
been already mentioned as assisting Li-Hung-chang^^, g 
during the negotiations of the Tientsin ConventiouMZKi^n 
of 1885, had been sent north to fight the Japanese.— ;^^e. 
On his arrival at the seat of war, he published ar^ a 
proclamation which caused much amusement. H^IEe 
informed the Japanese that he had come to destroj^ ^dj 
them; but he expressed compassion for their sa»-0Dd 
condition, and generously invited them to come t» 
his camp and submit, when, he feelingly added, 
would treat them like his own soldiers. As Chin( 
soldiers are ill-fed, ill-treated, and often swindled 




THE MANCHURIAN CAMPAIGN. 311 

heir pay, such a ridiculous promise would be the last 
Qducement which could lead soldiers to desert. . 

Wu-ta-cheng's advance was preceded by an attempt at 
trategy — the Chinese attacked Tomu-cheng, threaten- 
n^ the Japanese line of communications, before they 
tdvanced on Hai-cheng on the 2l8t of February. On 
his occasion the Chinese repeated their manoeuvres of 
he 16th with even greater timidity — one body ad- 
vanced to within 1,700 yards of the Japanese position, 
md retired before the Japanese opened fire ; others 
idvanced a little closer, but retreated at the first* 
jhots ; and others finally kept firing their rifles at a 
Japanese entrenchment — evidently hoping to scare 
the Japanese with a big noise. The Chinese were 
20,000 strong, and had twenty guns, but only 
mcceeded in killing two and wounding six Japanese ; 
iheir own losses were about 100, due principally to 
:he precision of the Japanese artillery. 

The time had now come for the Japanese to assume 
:hc long-deferred offensive. It was undertaken with 
juch rapidity, and the different divisions worked so 
liarmoniously that a fortnight sufficed to defeat and 
lisperse the greater part of the Chinese armies by a 
iuccession of crushing blows. The operation was 
commenced by the left wing of the united Japanese 
umies. (ieneral Yamaji had now joine<l General 
Xogi, and the Japanese forces around Kaiping 
amounted to about 12,000 men. With these troops 
\n advance was made to Tai-ping-shan, which was 
Dccupied without much difficulty, but the Chinese, 



\ 



312 THE CHINA-JAPAN WAR. 

under General Sung, advanced from three directions * 
about. 12,000 strong, with 12 guns. They were 
repulsed to their entrenchments, which were suc- 
cessively stormed ; three f were taken without much 
difficulty, but at the fourth J the Chinese made, a 
stubborn resistance. They withstood the fire of the 
Japanese artillery at 1,600 metres, and the assault of 
three battalions on the front and two flanks. It was 
4 P.M., and a portion of the attacking force had ex- 
hausted its ammunition, and was obliged to lie down 
for shelter against the enemy's fire. Two companies 
were sent forward as reinforcements, and the officers 
telling their men to cease firing and use the bayonet, 
the Japanese charged the entrenchment, Major Saito 
rushing forward with uplifted sword and cutting down 
the defenders. The Chinese retreated to Po-miao- 
tzu at 5.30 P.M. Some of their troops were armed 
with the new German repeating rifles and used smoke- 
less powder, so that their armament was superior to 
the enemy. 

The Japanese troops had marched out at 2 a.m., 
and did not return to their quarters until 11 p.m., 
marching under arms for 21 hours through the snow* 
In the First Regiment 394 men had their feet frost- 
bitten, and in the Fifteenth Regiment there were even 
more cases. 

The advance on Tai-ping-slian and its surrounding 

* Po-miao-tzu, Tang-chia-pu-tzu, and Lau-ye-miao. 

I Hsiao-ping-shan, Ta-tzu-wo, and Tang (eastern) tzu-li. 

X Hsi (western) tzfi-li. 



THE MANCHURIAN CAMPAIGN. 313 

positions had a twofold object — it broke the Chinese 
line, and occupying Sung's troops at Ying-kow, pre- 
sented them co-operating with the other Chinese 
armies at Newchwang (old) and Liao-yang, which 
"were to become the object of an important series of 
military operations in a few days. 

The two Chinese armies, whose headquarters were 
at Newchwang (old) and Liao-yang, after their frequent 
repulses from Hai-cheng, never retired very far. They 
had hitherto been left unmolested, as it did not enter 
into the Japanese plan of campaign to pursue to any 
distance. At the same time the Japanese forces were 
not large enough for a bold offensive ; but towards 
the end of February a portion of the Fifth Division, 
which was no longer required to protect the line of 
communications, since the Chinese general had re- 
moved to Liao-yang, was sent to Hai-cheng. General 
Katsura was now in a condition to assume the 
offensive. 

The roads from Hai-cheng to Newchwang, from 
Hai-cheng to Liao-yang, and from Newchwang to 
Liao-yang form a triangle, and there are four other 
roads (besides cross paths) radiating from Hai-cheng. 
The Chinese troops w^ere situated across tlie three 
eastern roads and the road from Hai-cheng to Liao- 
yang. It was the object of Katsura, taking advantage 
of the favourable position of Hai-cheng, to push back 
the Chinese along these divergent roads, inevitably 
separating the Liao-yang from the Newchwang troops. 
On the 28th of February the Third Division marched 



314 THE CHINA-JAPAN WAR. 

out of Hai-clieng at 3 a.m. ; the Seventh Regiment, 
charging with the bayonet, took Shi-to-shan at 4 A.M. ; 
the Sixth Regiment attacked Sha-ho-yen in front, 
while the Sixth Brigade attacked its left, and moved 
towards Chang-hu-tai. By 7 a.m. all these positions 
on the two innermost of the four roads we have 
described were occupied ; and the Fifth Brigade, 
advancing by the most westerly toad, took Ta-fu- 
tun by 10 a.m., when the whole Chinese line was 
pushed back. Some of the 15,000 Chinese engaged 
retreated to Pu-lai-tien and others to Newchwang 
(old), as had been foreseen by General Katsura. There 
still remained the fourth, the road from Hai-cheng to 
Liao-yang, and the Sixth Brigade, with some artillery, 
diverged in that direction, and by 2 p.m. had occupied 
the high ground near Tung-yen-tai. The Japanese 
lost I officer and 85 men wounded, and 10 killed ; the 
Chinese left IGO dead. 

On the following day, 1st of March, this last move- 
ment — the pursuit of the Liao-yang troops — w^as 
continued. The Third Division had bivouacked at 
Tou-ho-pu, and at 7 a.m. it marched towards Kan- 
hsien-pu, where the Chinese were stationed : at 11.45 
A.M. that position was taken, and the Japanese pushed 
on to the point where the Hai-cheng, Liao-yang, and 
Liao-yang-Newchwang roads meet. The two Chinese 
armies had now been completely separated, and 
General Katsura, by the peculiar disposition of the 
"roads, was able to deal with them in detail. 

The pursuit of the Liao-yang army was continued 



THE MANCnUSIAN CAMPAIGN. 315 

the 2nd of March for some distance beyond the 
jction of the two roads just mentioned, when 
ueral Katsura, having reunited all his troops, 
ered his order of march, converting his van into a 
ir-guard, and marched along the Liao-yang-Newch- 
ng road to attack the latter town. On the 4th 

March Newchwang (old) was attacked by three 
umns advancing from the north, north-west, and 
it. The column acting on the north-west took a 




rTENAKT-OESEBJL EATSUBA. 



iition near Li-chia-wo-fu, so as to command the 
ids leading to Ying-kow and Tien-chw^ang-tai ; the 
janese, with their usual tactics, had marched round 
! Chinese and threatened tlieir line of retreat with 
} part of their forces, wliile another part attacked 
front The liattle commenced at i) a.m., and the 
3anese met a vigorous resistance ; the Chinese had 
istructed tliick eartliern parapets and had loop^ 
ed the houses ; they liad, moreover, gatHug guns, 



316; THE CBINA-^APAN WAB. 

and used smokeless powder for their rifles, so that 
the open ground which had to be traversed by one of 
the Japanese columns was swept by a hail of bullets. 
If the Chinese troops had been of equal quality to 
their own, the Japanese confess that the ground 
would have been impassable. But by 2.30 p.m. the 
town was entered, and the defenders fled in the 
direction of Ying-kow. A portion, about 5,000 or 
6,000, were unable to escape, and with them the 
Japanese had to engage in a desperate house-to-house 
conflict which inflicted heavy losses ; the fighting 
lasted late into the night, the sound of rifles being 
heard up to 11 p.m. A large body of Chinese en- 
trenched in a wineshop offered an obstinate resistance 
until the Japanese engineers blew down a portion of 
the wall with dynamite, which caused such terror 
that they threw down their arms to the number 
of 300. 

The Japanese had forty-two killed and 174 wounded, 
the Chinese about 1,800 killed and over 2,000 prisoners. 
The heavy losses of the latter were also due to their 
retreat being commanded by the Japanese guns. A 
large list of spoils taken was compiled by the Japanese 
with that precision almost amusing in its minuteness. 
It was as follows : — 

2,138 rifles. 

1,518,000 rounds of small arm ammunition. 

1 field piece. • 
12 mountain guns. 

2 guns of position (6-centimotre). 
216 flags. 



THE MANCHURIAN CAMPAIGN. 317 

42 fusils de rempart, 
1,648 boxes of gunpowder. 
1,120 koku* of rice. 
150 kokn of barley. 
1 10 koku of Indian com. 

Horses enough to carry the baggage of the whole army. 
80 or 90 tents. 
213 horse shoes. 

A quantity of clothing, fur coats, field ovens, and other 
articles. 

Immediately after the capture of Newchwang (old) 
General Katsura with the Third Division marched 
towards Yinsr-kow, situated lower down on the Liao 
river ; but he had been forestalled by Yamaji. That 
general, on the 6th of March, advanced to Hou-chia- 
ying-fang at the junction of the Ying-kow-IIai-cheng 
and Ying-kow-Tien-chwang-tai roads. General Sung, 
who had so long defended Ying-kow, had been obliged 
to evacuate that town and retreat to Tien-chwang-tai, 
as he was threatened to be crushed between the two 
wings of the Japanese army. Ying-kow was defended 
by a small garrison which offered very little resistance, 
and on the 7th of March the Japanese took all the 
forts situated on l)oth banks of the Liao river, which 
presented no obstacle in its frozen condition. 

General Yamaji sent officers to inform the foreign 
<*onsuls that the Japanese intended to occupy the 
foreign settlement of Ying-kow. In the port the 
Japanese captured another vessel of the Pei-yang 
Squadron, which had been icebound during the 

* A koku is nearly five bushels. 



318 THE CHINA-JAPAN WAS. 

winter ; now only two vessels of tlie squadrou 
remained undestroyed or uneaptured. 

The Third and First Divisions, constituting the 
right and left wings of the Japanese army, after the 
capture of Newchwang (old) and Ying-kow, had drawn 
together, and now they marched together against 
Tieu-chwang-tai, which for three months had been the 
general headquarters of the Chinese armies of Newch- 
wang and Ying-kow. 




The attat-k was delivered on the 9th of March, and, 
as at Ncwi;hwang, the Japanese attacked in three 
columns. The action commenced at 7 a.m., and at 
10.30 A.M. the place was taken. A column had been 
stationed on the line of retreat, and the routed 
Chinese were exposed to its deadly fire, which de- 

* He had been in command uf llie First Army after Marshal 
Yam^a loft (shortly after the ])a8siiig of tho Yalu). He was 
gazetted a marshal after the capture of Newchwang. 



TUE MANCHURIAN CAMPAIGN. 819 

stroyedover 1,000 men ; their total loss was estimated 
at 2,000, while the Japanese lost only about eighty 
killed and wounded. There were only about 10,000 
Chinese engaged, so that a portion of the defeated 
armies of Newchwang and Ying-kow must have already 
retreated further into the interior. 

The Japanese offensive commenced by Yamaji's 
diversion at Tai-ping-shan on the 24th of February, 
was followed up by the defeat of the Liao-yang army 
on the 28 th of February and 1st of March ; and by 
the capture of Newchwang on the 4th, of Ying-kow on 
the 7th, and of Tien-chwang-tai on the 9th ; this fort- 
night's campaign was the last one of the war, and it 
could not have been otherwise. China was now 
entirely at the mercy of the Japanese armies. By a 
short and brilliant series of manoeuvres the troops at 
Liao-yang had been cut oft* from the rest of the 
empire, the remaining armies had been irretrievably 
broken, and the Japanese had nearly 100,000 men on 
the enemy's soil ready to strike a fatal blow. The 
possession of Ying-kow, shortly to be opened to navi- 
gation by the melting of the ice, gave them a new 
naval base of operations nearer to Peking ; the de- 
struction of the Pei-yang squadron at Wei-hai-wei 
had left them the command of the sea without the 
slightest fear of hindrance, and they could attack 
when, how, and where they pleased. 



Tliere were no further operations of importance ; 



820 THE CniNA-JAPAN WAH. 

but two incidents may be mentioned. A Third 
Expedition started from Japan on the 15th of March, 
and went to the Pescadores, a group of islands 
between the mainland and Formosa, and excellently 
situated for a base of operations against the latter. 
After some reconnoitring, an attack was made on the 
23rd on Peng-hu Island (the principal one of the 
group). The Japanese fleet cannonaded the forts, 
which answered, but without ever hitting the ships. 
The Yoshino was damaged, but by a sunken rock 
unmarked in the charts. A force was landed, and 
the forts taken without much opposition, the Japanese 
only losing about three killed and twenty-eight 
wounded. The garrisons fled like frightened sheep, 
the men trampling on each other in their panic 
hurry to get to the shore and escape in junks and 
boats. In this last engagement of the Chinese troops 
amidst such disgraceful demoralisation it is grateful 
to record some singular instances of rare bravery. 
In one fort, while all the garrison fled w^ithout offering 
any serious resistance, half-a-dozen soldiers placed 
themselves here and there and tried to inflict some 
injury on the enemy ; on another occasion, two bands 
of twenty and thirty men boldly resisted the advance 
of the whole Japanese force. Considering how a 
panic will spread amongst the l)cst troops, the excep- 
tional conduct of these obscure heroes deserves special 
praise, and it is to be regretted that their names have 
not been recorded to serve as rallying words to 
awaken a brighter future for their country. 



CASE OF THE YIKSANG. 321 

The expedition to the Pescadores was not import- 
ant enough to employ the whole Japanese fleet, and 
a portion of the squadron was busy in the north, 
searching the foreign vessels which crowded to 
Tientsin after the opening of the Pei-ho.* The 
Japanese officers performed their work very politely 
but very thoroughly. The search on the sea proved 
fruitless, but while the Yiksang was discharging her 
cargo in lighters at Taku (at the mouth of the Pei-ho) 
a boat from a Japanese man-of-war came alongside and 
asked to have a case opened — it was found to contain 
cartridges ! It formed part of a shipment of 240,000 
cartridges. This contraband had been shipped on a 
false declaration, that it was bamboo-steel, but of 
course the Japanese took the ship before a Prize- 
court, which, after having detained the Yihattf/ for 
some time, finally released her and all her cargo 
except the contral)and. It was a strange freak of 
fate that one of the first acts of war of the Japanese 
navy should have been the sinking of the Koirshin;/ 
and the last the capture of the Yiksiinn, both steamers 
belonging to the same company. 

• The river of Tientsin which is closed to navigation in 
winter by ice. 



322 THE CHINA-JAPAN WAB. 



CHAPTER IX. 

THE SKCOND PEACE EMBASSY. 

Attempts had been made to hurriedly amend the 
failure of the First Embassy, by oifering to amend 
telegraphically the credentials, and when that pro- 
posal appeared too unconventional for such an^ 
important matter, to forward new and satisfactorj^ 
credentials to the envoys. But it became apparentiz 



that after such a fiasco Shao and Chang were not th 
proper persons to continue the negotiations. More 
over, it was perceived that a treaty of peace in th 
present critical circumstances could only be concludec 
by a statesman of unquestioned authority and wh 
f could bear the heavy responsibility. In China 
amidst so much autocracy, there exists unbounde 
; liberty of criticism ; in fact, there is a special body o 
i officials — the censors — whose duty it is to expose al 
abuses and condemn all measures injurious to th 
State. It was well known that peace could not be 
obtained from Japan without great sacrifices : it was 
therefore necessary to choose as plenipotentiary a 
statesman of sufficient authority to be able to bear 
the burden of responsibility, to defy the storm of 
slanderous criticism, and of such influence that his 
actions could not be disowned ])y the Government. 



TJ 






THE SECOND PEACE EMBASSY, 323 



There was only one man in China who possessed 
»se requisites — Li-Huug-ehang, the Viceroy of 
ihli. Whatever conditions he thought necessary 
accept would be ratified by the Emperor, as his 
grace would involve almost all the high officials in 
I Empire. Since the outbreak of the war, Li- 
inor-chanfir had been under a cloud : it is the 
tem of the Chinese Government to mete out 
lishments for every error ; officials are expected 
petition the Emperor informing him of their mis- 
aeanours and requesting punishment. At every 
erse of the Chinese arms some dearly purchased 
lour had been withdrawn from the aged Viceroy, 
w a Peacock's Feather, now a Yellow Jac-ket. But 
the great national crisis, created by the war with 
)an, the Government became conscious of the 
iness of such proceedings, and the man who had 
itributed to save the dynasty at the time of the 
-ping rebellion by enrolling bands of volunteers 
[lis native province of Anhui, the man who in the 
) decades had represented China in all her dealings 
h foreign powers, was reinstated in all his honours | 
I called to Peking to confer with the Emperor and j 
press-d<jwager. The result of these audiences ! 
\ to entrust to him the mission of treating fori 
ce with Japan. 

^otwithstandinij his enormous influence over the 1 
I'iaLs and people of China, Li-IIung-chang felt that j 
4ucli a critical moment he could not bear alone 
h a heavy responsibility, and deliver his reputa- 

Y 2 



324 THE CHINA' JAP AN WAR. 

> tion to the easy after-criticism of those who would 
be bold as soon as the danger was passed. A subtle 
plan was devised to shift the responsibility amongst 
all the high officials of the Empire, by inviting them 
to send telegraphic memorials on the advisability of 
concluding peace. Strengthened by the expressed 
opinions of all the influential men of China and pro- 
vided with unimpeachable credentials Li-Hung-chang 

(^tarted for his mission. 

On the 1 9th of March he reached Shimonoseki, the 
place chosen by Japan as the site of the peace 
conference. He was accompanied by General Foster 
and Wu-Ting-fang, who had formed part of the First 
Embassy, and also by his adopted son Lord Li, a 
statesman who had resided in England, and who 
w^as specially qualified for the mission, having been 
for some years Chinese Minister at Tokio. The 
whole suite consisted of 132 persons, but there 
was no useless display of names and titles as on 
the preceding occasion : it was a serious mission 
which had come to transact business of the highest 
order. 

On the 20th of March tlie Viceroy landed, on the 
21st a conference was held and the credentials ex- 
changed without any difficulty. The negotiations 
were proceeding with perfect smoothness, when one 
of those extraordinary incidents happened which 
seem contrived bv an ironical Fate to defeat the 
expectations of men and to prove the vanity of all 
human foresight. On the 24th of March, as the 



THE SECOND PEACE EMBASSY. 325 

Viceroy Li-Hung-chang was returning from the con- 
ference, a fanatic of the name of Koyama, approached 
his palanquin and fired a pistol at him, the bullet 
entering the left cheek beside the nose. 

The wound luckily was slight and caused no 
inconvenience, but the event caused a profound 
sensation and produced the most unexpected results, 
which from their deep seat in the recesses of the 
humian heart have scarcely been recognised. Japan 
had striven hard to humble the arrogance of China, 
and had forced her foremost statesman in his old age 
to come as a suppliant for peace, and to her un- 
speakable shame his life was attempted on her soil. 
She had posed before the world, and spared no pains 
to shine by the valour of her soldiers, the skill of her 
generals and the humane treatment of the enemy's 
subjects and soldiers, and her unsullied record was 
broken l)y the senseless act of a miscreant. 

For the first time she felt humbled before her 
adversary, (iovernment and people vied in their 
efforts to atone for the disgratteful act. The Governor 
of the town and the Chief of Police were dismissed 
for remissness in their duties ; the Emperor sent his 
p}iysician to attend the wound ; the Empress prepared 
with her own hands bandages for the illustrious 
invalid; more than 10,000 letters were sent in a 
week from all [rnvts of Japan to Li-Hung-chang 
expressing their abhorrence of the act. Yet proba}>ly 
this abominable incident contributed larixclv to the 
re-establishment of cordial relations between the two 



326 THE CHINA- JAPAN WAR. 

countries. It had a salutary effect upon Japan ; 
though she had kept singular composure amidst her 
victories, there was a danger she might become in- 
toxicated by such an uninterrupted series of successes 
of every nature ; Koyama acted the part of the slave 
that walked by the side of the victorious general in 
the Roman Triumph. It also had a favourable effect 
on China ; the human heart is so strangely constituted 
that we are more inclined to forgive than to ask 
forgiveness, and China was flattered by finding Japan, 
at last, humbled before her, and she felt happy she 
could be generous. At the same time, all the Chinese 
belonging to the Embassy were surprised and deeply 
gratified by the spontaneous and universal manifesta- 
tions of regret of the Japanese nation. Swayed by 
such sentiments the two nations were led to feel 
esteem and sympathy for each other. 

It had also political efl'ects of a very different 
nature. All the enemies of the aged Viceroy, all the 
snarling censors were ready to denounce him as a 
traitor to his country if he concluded a disadvantage- 
ous peace, but the edge was taken off their arguments 
when the old statesman returned with a bullet lodged 
I in his skull. 

Li-Hung-chang behaved with courage and dignity ; 
he walked out of his palanquin without assistance, 
and when the bandages prepared l)y the Empress 
were shown to him, he took them up reverentially 
and said : *' In truth the benevolence of Her Majesty 
the Empress of Japan is profound as the sea. When 



THE SECOND PEACE EMBASSY. 327 

I return home and tell my Imperial ^Mistress what 
has been done for me, she will be very satisfied." 

The Japanese Government recognising that the 
Peace Negotiations were unavoidably delayed ])y the 
crime of Koyama, agreed to grant an armistice binding 
all the troops in Manchuria, Chihli and Sliantung.* 
This armistice in the north was to last 21 days, from 
:\Oih of March to 20th of April. 

Li-Hung-chang was soon able to resume work, 
with the assistance of his son Lord Li, and on the 
17 th of April the treaty of peace between China and 
Japan was signed. The armistice was extended until 
the date for the exchange of ratifications, which was 
not to take place later than the 8th of May. Ratifi- 
cations were exchanged on that date at Chefoo, the 
place indicate<l in the Treaty of Peace.f 

* See Appendix J. 

t Appendix K contains the text of the treaty, and the 
negotiations that preceded it. 



328 THE CHINA-JAPAN WAR. 



Conclusion. 

By the treaty of Shimonoseki, besides a large war 
. indemnity, Japan was to receive Formosa, the Pesca- 
dores islands, and the Liao-tung peninsula, with the 
great naval stronghold of Port Arthur. This latter 
condition of the treaty was considered excessive by 
some of the European powers, who feared that the 
possession of such a formidable strategical position 
would enable Japan to exercise an undue influence at 
Peking. A coalition was formed by Kussia, France, 
and Germany, who advised Japan, in the interests of 
tlie permanent peace of the Far East, to relinquish 
her claims on the Liao-tung peninsula. Japan con- 
sented to this proposal, showing to the world that the 
wisdom of her statesmen was equal to the skill of her 
generals. The European intervention caused much 
excitement in Japan, and there was some sharp 
censure of the ministers who yielded to its advice. 
Nothing could have been more unjust. A refusal to 
abandon the Liao-tung peninsula would have pro- 
bably brought on a terrible war, which, though it 
might have been very glorious for Japanese daring, 
would have sacrificed all the practical results of the 
war. Besides, there was no dishonour, even to the 
most punctilious patriotism, to yield a little to the 



CONCLUSION. 329 

courteous remonstrances of the three greatest military 
3owers of the world. This alliance, the most formid- 
ible recorded in history (if we bear in mind the 
gigantic military developments of modern Europe), is 
-he most flattering testimonial to the power of Japan 
Q the Far East, and to the skill she displayed in the 
ast war. It is a proof from the highest quarters that 
he China-Japan War is one of the most remarkable 
vents of the century, and justifies the opinions 
xpressed in the Introduction to this book. 

The wonderful military successes of Japan are of 
uch a peculiar nature, and suggest such complex 
onsiderations, that a careful analysis is necessary. 
Jince the capture of Constantinople in 1453, and the 
ise of the Osmanli power which threatened Christian 
Curope for over two centuries, until crushed at 
jepanto and Vienna by John of Austria and Sobieski, 
he world has not witnessed tlie growth of military 
K)wer in an Eastern people. ^loreover, the power of 
he Japanese is of a far higher order than that of the 
)smanli Turks ; the latter achieved their conquests 
y numbers and the courage of fanaticism, and were 
;enerally assisted by renegades in the skilled depart- 
ments of warfare ; the Japanese have conducted tlieir 
lilitary operations cm scientific principles, and were 
ot aided by a single European officer. If we con- 
ider the accessories of warfare, the difference excludes 
omparison ; while the conquests of the Osmanlis 
ere marked bv wholesale massacres and outraijes of 
very kind, the Japanese have shown a humanity and 



330 THE CHINA-JAPAN WAR. 

moderation which would honour any Christian nation. 
Peaceful inhabitants were never ill-treated, and the 
ambulances and field hospitals extended the same 
treatment to the wounded of both sides. If we con- 
sider the numerical disparity of the two nations, we 
must look back to the conquests of Alexander and of 
the British in India to find an historical parallel, as 
there is little doubt that, left to themselves, the 
Japanese could have conquered the whole Chinese 
Empire. 

There is another feature in the war which deserves 
attention : the whole invading force had to be trans- 
ported by sea. In a few months Japan landed about 
80,000 men on the enemy's coasts ; we must go back 
to the Punic wars to find a nation that has accom- 
plished such a mighty eff^ort. Moreover, this was- 
done with a fleet little, if at all, superior to the 
enemy's, and with transport steamers mostly pur- 
chased during the war. 

Of course, the rapid successes of the Japanese must 
be discounted Ijy the fact that the war was under- 
taken against an unwarlike people destitute of military 
organisation ; but it must be remembered that the 
absence of any cfiicient military resistance was com- 
pensated by obstacles of another nature — the want of 
roads, difiicult country, and the severe winter prevail- 
ing during the latter part of the campaign. These 
difficulties successfully and rapidly overcome by a 
nation carrying on the war across the sea, show that 
Japan possesses a very efficient military organisation, 



CONCLUSION. 331 

and a commissariat which can provide against any 
emergency. The Japanese were not surprised at 
their success, and their only astonishment was that 
foreigners should ever have doubted the result. 

The war has l)een a revelation to the world of the 
power of Japan, and has won for her universal recog- 
nition as a great civilised nation ; but those who 
have not watclied closely this enterprising nation 
must bear in mind that her military development is 
only a part of the general national progress ; there 
are many other facts, less known, which are more 
important. Japan lias carried on an expensive war 
without the assistance of forei^^n loans, entirely with 
her own financial resources, and has bouglit in the 
few mopths the struggle lasted 120,000 tons of 
shipping ; the country did not feel the strain, and 
trade flourished. Her manufactures are steadily 
improving, and there is hardly an article produced 
in Europe or America which cannot be made now in 
Japan. In science she is advancing rapidly ; an 
officer of her arniv has invented a rifle, and when the 
plague broke out at Hong Kong in 1894 Japanese 
experts were sent to make bacteriological studies on 
the disease ; during the 'war. Dr. Kikushi (Surgeon- 
in-<-]iief of the second armv) discovered that the ashes 
from burnt straw (a material easily procurable, and 
necessarily clean from the process it has undergone) 
could be advantageously sul)stituted for the lime- 
bandages advo<ated in France for the treatment of 
wounds. 



332 THE CHINA^APAN WAR. 

^ But far above all these material results must be 
placed the magnificent burst of earnest patriotism 
pervading all ranks of society which was occasioned 
by the war. The whole nation felt and acted like 
one man ; political parties, so violent in ordinary 
times, were silent during the war and all vied in 
self-sacrifice and patriotism. A country which has 
shown such sentiments possesses the chief element of 
national greatness. 

^i The practical results of the war are very important 
for Japan : tlie Pescadores give her a fine strategical 
position, commanding maritime access to China, and 
the Island of Formosa, with its rich produce of tea, 
sugar and camphor, gives her a territorial increase 
which will greatly develop her trade. She now 
forms a splendid island empire stretching for nearly 
30° of latitude up to Kamschatka, along the eastern 
shores of the Asiatic continent over which she is 
destined to exert great infiuence. The indemnity of 
200 millions of taels * will increase the national 
capital, and under the skilful management of her 
financiers it will probably produce a commercial and 
industrial expansion which will astonish the world as 
much as her military successes. 

If the future of Japan promises to be bright, it 
must be confessed that she deserves it. For the last 
thirty years the best part of the nation has been 
quietly but steadfastly studying and working to rise 
to the level of the foremost nations of the earth. 

* Over thirty million sterling. 



CONCLUSION. 333 

he youth of Japan have been exploring the whole 
orld in search of everything which might contribute 
) the welfare and greatness of their ('ountry. Every 
teamer to Europe and America had Japanese pas- 
3ngers of every class, all bent on study and self- 
tnprovement. No branch of human activity has 
een neglected, and each nation has had to yield its 
est knowledge to the acquisitive curiosity of the 
apanese ; even Ceylon has been visited by Japanese 
ealous to improve their knowledge of Buddhism, 
)iiring the last generation Japan has been like a 
ast bee-hive, whose inmates were busy everywhere 
athering the essence of the best they saw, and it is 
list they should now begin to enjoy the fruits of 
heir industry. 

This phenomenon is not a new one in the history 
>f Japan : in the past she assimilated the learning of 
!:*hina so thoroughly, that at present Chin.ese litera- 
ture is l)etter cultivated in Japan than in the land of 
ts origin. If the same success attends her present 
ittempt to absorb the science and culture of Europe 
md America, Japan may become a crucible in which 
the knowledge accumulated by the secular experience 
jf the Eiist and the West will be fused and amalga- 
mated, giving forth as its product a new form of 
civilisation on a wider basis. 

The severe lesson of the war ouglit to produce a 
beneficial effect on China, but unfortuiiat<»ly there 
are no signs of it at present. The IJow, materially, 
has been a very trifling one to the huge empire : the 



334 'llJE CHINA-JAPAN WAIi, 

loss of territory is insignificant, and the war indem 
nity only appears large owing to tlie want of financia 
organisation in the country. If we take the popula- 
tion of China at the lowest estimatie, 200 millions 
the indemnity amounts to less than ^^ ^^ what wa? 
paid by France in 1871 without its affecting he 
national prosperity. Though the wealth and re 
sources of China are probably exaggerated, yet sh 
can pay the sum without feeling any inconvenience 
Her defeat has deeply wounded her pride, but thi* 
should produce a healthy reaction and the resolutio 
to reform her institutions and national life. Unless 
this resolution is carried out and C'liina succeed i 
imitating the material progress of Japan, and most o 
all in adopting her civic and military virtues, he 
future looks very dark. 



( 335 ) 



APPENDICES. 



APPENDIX A. 
Trogramme of Reforms presented to tiIe Coreax (JrovERX- 

MENT BY THE JAPANESE MINISTER OtORI. 

/. — Reform in central and 2^^*oin7icial governments and 
appointment of able officials. 

1. To define clearly the duties of all officials. All domestic 
and foreign affairs are to be under the control of the Giseifu 
(administrative council), and at the heads of the departments 
are to be placed the six Sohausho (ministers) as hitherto. 
Palace officials are to be distinguished from administrative 
officials, and the former should under no circumstances be 
connected with national administrative affairs. 

2. As diplomatic and conmiercial relations with foreign 
countries are of the greatest importance they shouhl be dealt 
with circumspectly, and a responsible minister be entrusted 
with them. 

3. Offices which are necessary to carry out administrative 
orders should be retained, but all sinecure offices should be 
abolished. Offices should be amalgamated to simplify matters 
as much as possible. 

4. Tlie present provincial districts are too numerous. They 
should be reduced in number so as to diminish exptmses ; 
but special care should be taken not to interfere with adminis- 
trative efficiencv. 



336 THE CHINA-JAPAN WAR. 

5. All officials should have fixed duties. Only those 
whose offices are absolutely necessary should be retained, and 
superfluous officials should be dismissed. 

6. Appointment through family descent, position, or prece- 
dent should be abolished, and all offices should be opened to 
talent. 

7. Appointment by payment of money should be abolished, 
as it is liable to gross evils. 

8. All officials' salaries should be clearly fixed at such sums 
as may enable them to live honestly. 

9. The acceptance by officials of pecuniary and other bribes 
should be strictly prohibited by law. 

10. Private trading by all officials of the central and 
provincial governments should be strictly prohibited by law. 

//. — To increase national toealth hy financial reorganisaiioa, 

11. The national revenue and expenditure should be ex- 
ammed and clearly defined by a fixed system. 

12. All affairs relating to public accounts should be strictly 
managed. 

13. The monetary system should be immediately re- 
organised. S 

14. The agricultural products of the provincial divisions 
should be ascertained and the rate of taxation reformed. 

15. All taxes should be reformed by law and new sources 
of revenue opened. 

16. Where expenditure is not absolutely necessary reduc- 
tions should be made, and where increase is necessary every 
effort should be made to meet it. 

17. The government roads should be level and wide. 
Eailways should be constructed between Seoul and the treaty 
ports ; and there should be telegraphic communication with 
the cities, district offices, and garrisons, so as to increase the 
facilities of communication. 

18. The business of the custom-houses at the treaty ports 
should be entirely managed by Corea, witliout any external 
interference. 



APPENDIX A. 337 

IIL — To reorganise law and law caicrts. 

19. Such existing laws as are considered unsuitable to the 
times should be suspended or reformed, and new laws should 
tbe established to meet new requirements. 

20. By reforming the law of judicial procedure the equity 
•of the judiciary should be proved. 

IV. — By reorganisin/jf the army and police to suppress 
internal rebellion and maintain peace. 

21. Military officers should be educated. 

22. Tlie present army and navy should be reformed, and 
as many corps in new style should be established as the 
national finances permit. 

23. As the establishment of police is most necessary, police- 
stations shoidd be set up in Seoul and other important towns, 
and strictly disciplined. 

V. — Tofx tJte educational system. 

24 The entire educational system should be appropriately 
reformed, and in every locality elementary schools established 
for the education of children. 

25. After the establishment of elementary schools, middle 
schools and colleges should in the course of time be established 
when required. 

26. The ablest among students should be sent abroad to 
study. 



% 



338 TEE CHINA-JAPAN WAR. 



APPENDIX B. 

Despatches between the Chinese and Japanese Govern- 
ments ON THE COREAN QUESTION BEFORE THE COM- 
MENCEMENT OF Hostilities. 

The subjoined official translations of the despatches laid bjr 
Count Ito before the House of Peers on the 19th of October 
were given in the Japan Mail of 22nd of October, 1894 

No. 1. 

Chinese Legation, Tokyo, the Zrd day* tJie 5th month, tlic 20th 
year of Kwang-su (tJw 7th day, the 6th month, the 27th 
year of Meiji). 

Monsieur le Ministre, — I have the honour to inform your 
Excellency that I am in receipt of a telegram from His 
Excellency Li, Superintendent of Commerce of the Pei-yang, 
to the effi^ct that in the convention of the 11th year of 
Kwang-su (the 18th year of Meiji) between China and Japan 
it is provided that, should there arise in future the necessity 
on the part of China to despatch troops to Korea owing T& 
the existence of any disturbance in that country, the fact 
shall be previously communicated to Japan, and that the 
troops shall be withdrawn at once on the cessation of the 
disturbance and none shall be left behind, and the telegram 
adds that a communication had been received from the 
Korean Government containing the following statement : — 

The people in Zeura-do, who are vicious in habit, havings 

* 7th of JuDc, 1894. 



APPENDIX B, 83» 

Hnder the leaders of the Togaku-to,* attacked and taken 
several towns and villages, proceeded northward and took 
possession of Zenshu. The government troops which were 
despatched to suppress the revolt have not been successful. 
If this disturbance continues to spread and is allowed to 
exist for a long time much trouble may be given to Cliina. 
When in the years 1882 and 1884 we suffered from internal 
commotions, the uprisings were in each case suppressed by 
the troops of China on our behalf. In accordance with those 
precedents we hereby present an earnest application for de- 
spatch of some troops to speedily quell the disturbance. As 
soon as the revolt is quelled we will request the withdrawal 
of the troops and shall not ask for their longer detention, so 
that they may not suffer the hardships of being abroad for a 
long period. 

The telegram further states that the application upon 
examination is found to be urgent both in words and in fact, 
and that it is in harmony with our constant pnictice to protect 
our tributary states by sending our troops to assist them. 

These circumstances were accordingly submitted to His 
Imperial Majesty, and, in obedience to his will, General Yeh, 
commander of troops in Chihli, has been ordered to proceed at 
once to Zeura and Chinsei in Korea with selected troops, and 
to speedily suppress the disturbance in such manner as he 
may deem most convenient in order to restore the peace of 
our tributary state, and to dispel the anxiety of the subjects 
of every nation residing in Korea for commercial purposes,^ 
and at the same time the general is comuianded to return 
with the troops as soon as the desired object is attiiiued. 

The telegram finally declares that His Excellency, the 
minister to Japan, is required to make communication in 
pursuance of the said convention and is telegraphed to that 
effect, and is accordingly instructed to at once communicate 
the matter to the Japanese Foreign Office. 

In making, therefore, the foregoing communication to Ycur 

♦ The Tong-liak j^arty. 

z 2 



840 THE CHmA'JAFAN WJB. 

Excellency I avail myself to renew to you the assurance^ of 
iny highest consideration. 

(Signed) Wang. • 

His Excellency Monsieur Mutsu, 
H. I. J. M/s Minister for Foreign Affairs. 



No. 2. 

Department of Foreign Affairs, Tokyo, the 7t?i day,* the &th 

month, the 27th year of Meiji, 

Monsieur le Ministre, — I have the honour to acknowledge 
the receipt of Your Excellency's note of to-day, acquainting 
me, in accordance with the provision of the convention of the 
18th dayt of the 4th month of the 18th year of Meiji between 
our two Governments, that your Government have despatched 
troops to Korea. 

In reply, I beg to declare that although the words " tribu- 
tary " state appear in your note, the Imperial Government 
have never recognised Korea as a tributary state of China. 

I avail myself, &c, &c, 

(Signed) Mutsu Munemitsu, 

Minister for Foreign Affairs. 
His Excellency Monsieur Wang, 

H. I. C. M.'s K K and M. P. 



No. 3. 

Japanese Legation, Peking, the 7th day,X the 6th month, tJie 

27th year of Meiji. 

Messieurs le Prince et les Ministres, — In pursuance of 
instructions which I have just received from His Imperial 
Majesty's Government I have the honour, in accordance 

♦ 7th of June, 1894. 
t 18th of AprU, 1885. 
t 7th of June, 1894« 



APPENDIX B. 341 

with the provision of the Convention of the 18th day of the 
4th month of the 18th year of Meiji between our two 
Grovemments, to acquaint Your Highness and Your Excel- 
lencies, that owing to the existence of a disturbance of a 
grave nature in Korea necessitating the presence of Japanese 
troops there, it is the intention of the Imperial Government 
to send a body of Japanese troops to that country. 

I avail myself, &c. 

(Signed) Komura Yataro, 

H. I. J. M/s Charge d' Affaires. 
His Highness and Their Excellencies 

of the Tsung-li Yamen.* 

No. 4. 

Tmngli Yamen, the 6th day,^ the 5th months the 20th year of 
Kwang su (the 9th day, the 6th month, the 27th year of ^ 
Meiji). 

Monsieur le Charge d* Affaires, — ^We have the honour to 
acknowledge the receipt of your note under date of the 4th 
instant (the 7th day the 6th month of the Japanese Calendar) 
informing us that you have been instructed by your Govern- 
ment to acquaint us, in accordance with the provision of the 
Convention between the two countries, that owing to the 
existence of a disturbance of a grave nature in Korea. 
Japanese troops will be despatched to that country. 

Our country has despatched troops to Korea in compliance 
with an application from that country, for the purpose of 
assisting her to suppress the insurgents, and the measure is 
in accordance with the practice hitherto pursued by our 
country in protecting tributary states. Besides, the sole 
object being the suppression of tlie insurgents in the interior, 
the troops are to be withdrawn as soon as that object is 
attained. Although the condition of Jinsen and Fusan is 

• Chioese Foreign OflBce. 
t 9th of June, 1804. 



342 THE CHINA-JAPAN WAR. 

at present quiet and peaceful, our war vessels will be for a 
while stationed there for the protection of commerce carried 
on at those ports. 

The sole object of your country in sending troops is 
evidently to protect the Legation, Consulates, and com- 
mercial people in Korea, and consequently it may not be 
necessary on the part of your country to despatch a great 
number of troops, and besides, as no application therefore 
has been made by Korea, it is requested that no troops shall 
proceed to the interior of Korea, so that they may not cause 
alarm to her people. And moreover, since it is feared that 
in the event the soldiers of the two nations sliould meet on 
the way, cases of unexpected accident might occur, owing to 
the difference of language and military etiquette, we beg to 
request in addition that you will be good enough to telegraph 
the purport of this communication to the Government of 
Japan. 

Accept, Sir, the renewed assurances, &o., &c., &c., 

President ?ind Members of Tsung-li Tamen. 
T. Komura, Esq., 
H. I. J. M.'s Charge d'Affaires. 



No. 5. 

Japanese Legation^ Peking , tJw 12th day* tlic 6th mojUh, the 

27th year of Meiji. 

Messieurs le Prince et les Ministres, — Having received 
your note under date of the 9th instant, acquainting me that 
the despatching of troops to Korea is in accordance with the 
practice hitherto pursued by China in protecting her tribu- 
tary states, and that no necessity exists on the part of Japan 
to send a large number of troops there, and requesting that 
those troops shall not be sent to the interior of Korea, I did 
not fail to at once communicate by telegram the purport of 

♦ 12th of June, 1894. 



APPENDIX B. 343 

that note to my Government, and I have now the honour to 

inform Your Highness and Excellencies that I am in receipt 

of a reply by telegram to the following eflfect : — 

The Imperial Japanese Government have never recognised 

Xorea as a tributary state of China. Japan despatched her 

troops in virtue of the Chemulpo Convention, and in so 

•doing she has followed the procedure laid down in the 

Treaty of Tientsin. As to the number of troops, the Japanese 

<Jovemment are compelled to exercise their own judgment. 

Although no restriction is placed upon the movement of the 

Japanese troops in Korea, they will not be sent where their 

presence is not deemed necessary. The Japanese troops are 

under strict discipline, and the Japanese Government are 

confident that they will not precipitate a collision with the 

Chinese forces. It is hoped that China has adopted similar 

precautions. 

I avail myself, &c., &c., &c. 

(Signed) Komura, 

H. I. J. M.'s Charge d' Affaires. 

His Highness and Their Excellencies 

of the Tsung-li-Yamen. 

No. 6. 

jDepdHment of Foreign Affairs — Tokyo, the 17th day* the 6th 

month, 27th year of Mciji, 

Monsieur le Ministre, — I have the honour to inform Your 
Sxcellency that the following is a resume of the proposals 
made in my interview with you yesterday to your Govern- 
ment on behalf of the Imperial Government in respect of 
the present events in Korea as well as with a view to the 
adjustment of her affairs in future: — As to the present 
events, Japan and China to unite their efforts for the speedy 
suppression of the disturbance of her insurgent people. 
After the suppression of the disturbance, Japan and Cliina, 

♦ 17th of June, 1804. 



344 TEE CEINA-JAPAN^ WAJR. 

with a view to the improveinent of the internal administra- 
tion* of. Korea, to respectively send a number of Commissioners 
charged with the duty of investigatirijg measures of unprove- 
inent, in the first place on the following general poixits :— 

(a) Examination of the financial administration. 
• (6) Selection of the Central and Local Officials. 

(c) Establishment of an army necessary i for national 
defence in order to preserve the peace of the land. 

In making the foregoing communication, I avail myself, 
&c., &c., &c. ' 

(Signed) MuTSU Munemitsu, 

Minister for Foreign Affairs. 
His Excellency Monsieur Wang, 

H. I. C. M.'s E. E. and M. P. 



No. 7. 

Chinese Legation, Tokyo ^ the l^th day* the 5th month, the 
20th year of Kwangsu (the 22nd day, the 6th month, of 
the 27th year of Mciji). 

Monsieur le Ministre, — I have the honour to inform Your 
Excellency that I am in receipt of a telegram from my 
Government to the effect that having carefully considered 
the proposal made by your Government in respect to the 
events in Korea and the adjustment of her affairs in future, 
the Chinese Government would reply as follows :— 

As the disturbance in Korea has already been suppressed, 
it is no longer essential to trouble the Chinese forces on 
Korea's behalf, and therefore no necessity exists to consider 
the proposition that our two countries shall co-operate in 
suppressing the disturbance. 

In regard to the adjustment of Korean affairs in future, 
the idea may be excellent, but the measures of improvement 
must be left to Korea herself. Even China herself would 

• 22nd of June, 1894. 



APFENDIX B. a*5; 

not interfere with the internal administration of 'Korea, and 
Japan having from the very first recognised the indepen- 
dence of Korea can not have the right to interfere with the 
same. 

As to the withdrawal of troops from Korea after the sup- 
pression of the disturbance, provision on that subject exists 
in the Treaty of 1885, concluded between the two countries, 
and therefore it is not required to discuss the matter over 
again on this occcasion. 

The above has already been communicated to Your Ex- 
cellency in our interview, and in now repeating it for your 
further consideration, I avail myself, &c., &c., &c. 

(Signed) Wang, 

H. I. C. M/s E. E. and M. V. 
His Excellency Monsieur Mutsu, 
H. I. J. M/s Minister for Foreign Affairs. 



No. 8. 

Department of Foreign Affairs, Tokyo, tlie 22nd day* the 

6th month, the 27th year of Meiji. 

Monsieur le Ministre, — I have the honour to acknowledge 
the receipt of Your Excellency's note of the 22nd inst., in 
which Your Excellency, in pursuance of instructions from 
the Imperial Chinese Government, rejects the proposals 
advanced by His Imperial Majesty's Government for the 
tranquillisation and amelioration of Korea. 

The Imperial Government, much to their regret, find it 
impossible to share the hopeful views entertained by Your 
Excellency's Government regarding the actual situation in 
Korea at the present time. 

Sad experience teaches us that the Peninsular Kingdom is 
the theatre of political intrigues and civil revolts and dis- 
turbances of such frequent recurrence as to justify the 

• 22nd of June, 1894. 



846 THE CHINA-JAPAN WAR. 

conclusion that the Government of that country is lacking in 
some of the elements which are essential to responsible 
independence. 

The interests of Japan in Korea, arising from propinquity 
as well as commerce, are too important and far-reaching to 
allow her to view with indiflferenee the deplorable condition 
of affairs in that kingdom. 

In this situation an attitude of unconcern on the part of 
Japan would not only be a denial of the sentiments of 
friendship and good correspondence which the Imperial 
Government entertain for Korea, but it would be a censur- 
able disregard of the law of self-preservation. 

The necessity for the adoption of measurea looking to the 
peace and tranquillity of Korea is, for the reasons already 
given, a demand which the Imperial Government cannot 
permit to pass unheeded, for so long as those measures are 
delayed so long will the cause of the disorder exist. 

In the estimation of the Imperial Government, therefore, 
the withdrawal of their forces should be consequent upon the 
establishment of some understanding that will ser\^e to 
guarantee the future peace, order, and good government of 
the country. That coui-se of action is moreover, it seems to 
His Imperial Majesty's Government, not only in perfect 
harmony with the spirit of the Tientsin Convention, but it 
accords with the dictates of reasonable precaution. 

Should the Government of China continue to hold views 
antagonistic to those which I have frankly and in good faith 
presented to Your Excellency, it cannot be expected that the 
Imperial Government will under the circumstances feel at 
liberty to sanction the present retirement of their troops 
from Korea. 

I avail myself, &c., &c., &c., 

(Signed) MuTSU Munemitsu, 

Minister for Foreign Affairs. 

His Excellency Monsieur Wang, 
H. I. C. M/s E. E. and M. P. 



^ 



APPENDIX B. 347 



No. 9. 

Japanese Legation, PekiiU/, the l^th day* the 7th month, the 

27th year of Meiji, 

Messieurs le Prince et les Ministres, — Having communi- 
cated to H. I. J. M.*s Minister for Foreign AfiTairs on the 
same day, the particulars of the statement made by Your 
Highness and Excellencies on my interview with you at the 
Tsung-li-Yamen on the 9th day, the 7th month, the 27th 
year of Meiji, I have the honour to inform you that I am 
just in receipt of a telegram from the minister to the 
following effect : — 

The disturbances which are of frequent occurrence in 
Korea have their source in the derangement of interual 
administration of that country. Consequently, the Imperial 
Government believe it best to encourage the Korean Govern- 
ment to eradicate the cause of disturbance by introducing 
internal administrative reforms, and the Imperial Govern- 
ment considered that for the purpose of enabling Korea to 
accomplish the desired reforms, nothing would be better than 
the conjoint assistance be given to Korea, but to their 
surprise, the Imperial Chinese Government definitely rejected 
the proposal of Japan and limited themselves solely to a 
recjuest for the withdrawal of the Japanese troops from 
Korea. Recently Her Britannic Majesty's Minister at 
Peking, animated by friendship and good-will towards Japan 
and China, tendered his good offices and endeavoured to 
reconcile the differences existing between the two countries, 
but the Imperial Chinese Government still continued solely 
to insist upon the retirement of the Japanese forces and 
manifested no disposition to acquiesce in the view of the 
Imperial Japanese Government. The only cQjicljision 
•deducible from these circumstancg^ is rt^t thJ* Chinese 

• 14th of July^ 1894. 



34d TEE CHINA-JAPAN WAB. 

Government are disposed to precipitate complications; and 
in this juncture the Imperial Japanese Government find 
themselves relieved of all responsibility for any eventuality 
that may, in future, arise out of the situation. 

In enclosing herewith the translation of the above tele- 
gram, I avail myself, &c., &c., &c. 

(Signed) Komura, 

H. I. J. M/s Charge d'Affaires. 
His Highness and Their Excellencies 

of the Tsupg-li-Yamen. 



.^^AJ^PENDIXO. ' 349- 



APPENDIX C. 

The Destruction of the " Kowshing." Statement of the 

Survivors. 

On Wednesday mornmg at half-past ten o'clock, Mr. Detring 
and Mr. Loh FSng-luh sat at the Imperial Chinese Ad- 
miralty, Tientsin, as agents of His Excellency Li-Hung- 
chang, to take the statements of two of the crew and three 
soldiers who had escaped from the massacre on board the 
Kowshing, There were present the United States, Bussian, 
French and German Consuls, Mr. Edmund Cousins repre- 
senting the owners of the Kowshing, Mr. Cockburn of the 
British Consulate, and others. 

Mr. Detring, in opening the proceedings, said that the 
Chinese Government wishing to have the statements of those 
«aved from on board the Kowshing formally made, had 
directed them to invite the consuls of the difierent nations 
and those interested in the fate of the people on board the 
K(yw8hing to meet and take part in the proceedings. The 
Kowshing was a British merchant steamer of l,35S.tons, 
chartered by the Chinese Government to take troops and 
arms to Korea on an appeal from the King of Korea to 
support his Government, Under the treaty of 1888 the 
Chinese Government had a right so to send troops to Korea, 
and it was not expected that the act would lead to hostilities. 
They were aware that it had done so, and to ascertain the 
circumstances was the object of their intended inquiry. 
With these few preliminary remarks he would at once open 
the proceedings. 

Pedro Oriate, aged 42, bom at ^lanila, said: He had 
been three months in the JCowshing. She left Taku bar at 
9.30 P.M. on Monday, the 23rd of July.. Nothing ocQuired 



350 THE CHINA-JAPAN WAR. 

on the voyage. He first saw the islands of the Korean coast 
at about 8 a.m. on the 25th, and soon after sighted the main- 
land. He first saw a Japanese man-of-war at 9 A.M. She 
first hoisted a signal to them to stop and then a signal to* 
anchor. After thev were anchored she sent a boat, and two 
officers and a sailor came on board. He saw the officers^ 
speak to the captain. He (Oriate) was on the ladder going 
up to the bridge. 

Mr. Cousins said a person standing on the ladde^' could 
see and hear what took place on the bridge. 

Oriate (continuing): The Japanese officers spoke to the 
captain, the pilot and a passenger. (Shown a photograph of 
Mr. von Hanneken). Did not see him speak to the Japanese, 
who examined the ship's papers and then returned to the 
launch. The Kowshiivg was at anchor. They had not passed 
any islands. From her first anchoring the steamer had 
never moved. He did not know that fighting was going on 
between Chinese and Japanese men-of-war. He saw three 
Japanese men-of-war. Two left and one remained and sent 
a launch on board. The men-of-war remained about a mile 
from the Kowshing, He did not see any other boat come. 
It came a second time. The Japanese spoke to the captain. 
No one on board the Kowshing fired, not one shot. When 
the Japanese fired first he was below, but was looking out at 
the men-of-war. They were all about a mile or less away. 
They fired from 12.40 to 1.30, when the Kowshiiig went 
down. He saw the firing. As soon as the fire began he 
went forward and stooped below the bulwarks to escape the 
shot. As soon as he felt the steamer settling down slowly,, 
he climbed the foremast where he was when the French 
gunboat took him off. He could not say what became of the- 
Europeans, there was such a crowd in the water. He 
believed they jumped into the water, but he did not see 
them. Some jumped into the water, some into boats which 
they swamped and went down. There were eight boats on 
board. Two were so made fast they could not be launched- 



APPENDIX a 35r 

He was very frightened and did not see if any boats were 
desti'oyed by shot. There was great bloodshed. He was on 
the mast with four soldiers. There were about thirty-six on 
the other mast. There was little sea. He saw no bodies 
floating about. He was from 1.30 p.m. to 7 next morning 
on the mast. They saw no more of the Japanese ship. She 
had two masts and one funnel. She was painted wliite and 
was a large ship. He did not know how many men she 
carried. The French gun-boat took them off about 7 a.m. 
next day. They sent two boats and saved them all, himself, . 
forty-two from the masts, and two in the water, one fireman * 
who was swimming. The Kowshing was about a mile from 
the island. Mr. von Hanneken was on deck, but not on the* 
bridge. The Japanese officers went into the chart-room. 
Mr. von Hanneken could hear what the Japanese officers 
said to the captain. Did not know if any one escaped by 
swimming to the island. Did not know if any people were 
shot in the water. The Japanese used revolving guns. The 
last time they boarded was at 12 o'clock. Only one Japanese 
came on board, and he said something in English and went 
back ; he was a young man and he had come both times. He 
was not sure that any soldiers were on deck when the 
Japanese boarded. (It should be understood that the 'A1:>?'-- 
skiiujs main deck was a flush deck from stem to stern only 
broken by the mast, funnel, sky-lights and captain's cabin 
and chart-house, above which was the bridge.) The soldiers 
were watching the men-of-war when they boarded. The 
British flag was flying before they sighted the Japanese. 
The house flag was flying at the mainmast, nothing at the 
foremast. 

Tung Ila-hsin said he was a Canton man of Fung Sun and 
a fireman on the Koirshiiuj. He was 26 years old and 
had been on l>oard 12 years. At 8 o'clock he was in tlie 
engine-room. At 9.30 they anchored. He heard a gun and 
the ship was stopped. At 12.30 he came up and went to 
the forecastle to wash and get his food. At 1 o'clock he 



S52 THE QEINA-JAPAN. WAB. 

climbed the mast At 1.15 he swam to the long boat. The 
Japanese fired at them and eight men in the boat were 
killed. Forty or more were in that boat, which was sunk. 
Its rudder had been shot away. He CQuld not swim to shore 
for the strong .current. They stopped firing, at 4 o'clock. 
He judged the time by the sun. It was the small gun-boat 
that filled on thieir long-boat. He was very frightened. He 
thought the gun-boat had three masts. There was a gun- 
boat that fired on his boat and the people swimming, after 
the Kowsliing was sunk. The shot fell like rain among the 
-swimming people. He was picked up by the French gun- 
boat at 6 o'clock next morning. He stuck to the boat all 
vnight. He only saw the second mate jump into the water. 
One boat with ten or more men reached the island. He 
thought some in that boat were foreigners because they wore 
white clothes. He saw them land. He saw Gorean junks 
at a distance. The French gun-boat went to the Kowshing, 
b^t did not go to the island. He did not tell the French 
gun-boat that people were on the island. He did not know 
if it was inhabited. 

Chang Yu-lin, an Anhui man, 40, said he was a soldier, 
a " sho.-peh " (captain). He was below when the first shot 
was fired. He remained below till the vessel was sinking. 
Two torpedoes broke the vessel's bottom. He saw the 
torpedoes coming when looking through the port. He was 
about mid-ships. A number of soldiers were killed by the 
escaped steam. He saw in the place where he was many 
people killed. One shot came into his room and he went up. 
There was no steam in his room. He got hold of the rigging 
when the vessel went down. He sank with the ship. He 
<^nnot swim. He got up the mast by climbing the rigging. 
'^Thirty-three were on the mast where he was, and four on the 
other mast. He saw the quick-firing gun fired from the gun- 
boat at the people swimming. The people on the mast were 
not fired at. The Japanese gun-boat had two masts. He 
-saw four white and. one grey Japanese men-of-war. He saw 



APPENDIX C. 353 

one man on each mast firing the quick-firing gun. (He 
described the turning of the handle and the whirring sound 
of the machine-gun). He did not know the Chinese and 
Japanese men-of-war had fought. They could see nothing of 
a Chinese man-of-war burning. It was the gun-boat that 
sank the Koioshing, that fired at the men in the water. He 
saw no boats go to the island. 

Mou Ching-sing, 24, soldier, was amidships below when 
the firing began. When the vessel was sinking he jumped 
overboard and got hold of a floating ladder, and on getting to 
the mast got on it and left the ladder. He saw five Japanese 
ships ; only one fired at the Kowshiiuj. The Japanesf gun- 
boat stayed after the Kowshhuj sank and fired on the boats 
and people in the water. Only one steamer fired on the 
people in the water. They lowered two gigs, but took in no 
people. He did not see what they were doing. The gigs would 
hold about ten men. He saw a number killed by the steam. 
Wang Kwi-fung, a soldier, saw Mr. von Hanneken seize a 
life-buoy and jump overboard. He did not see any one reach 
the shora The sea was bad ; there was a strong breeze from 
land. He saw the Japanese fire from the masts on the 
people swimming. It was the same gun-boat that sunk the 
Kowshuuf that fired on the people. Three boats put off with 
loads. The Japanese sank two. All round the ship was 
like a fog (from the steam). 

Tliis concluded the statements of the survivors. Tlie 
remainder of the men rescued by tlie French gun-boat Lion 
were in the hall. Some of them seem to have slight wounds 
and contusions. They were in general able-bodied looking 
men capable of doing good service. Those who made the 
statements above recorded did so in a i)lain straightforward 
way which was very impressive. In the main facts and 
most of the details tliey were in complete accord. The 
description of the action, of the machine-guns by two of the 
survivors was unmistakable and graphic. It may still be 
hojxid that more Kuroi)eans have escaped. 

2 A 



354 THE CHINA-JAPAN WAB. 

Mr. von Hannekens Report. 

The s.s. Kowshing left on the 23rd of July Taku with a caigo 
of soldiers ; all told 1,220 men and 12 guns, except of the 
rifles and ammunition, etc., etc. She arrived in the morning 
of the 25th in sight of the islands of the Corean Archipelago 
outside the Prince Jerome Gulf. 

At this time she sighted a big man-of-war on her port 
bow. This man-of-war was moving very fast towards west 
(about direction of Port Arthur) ; she looked to me like the 
Chinese Ting-yuen type ; she passed us on a great distance 
and we did not see any more of her. 

At about 7 o'clock we sighted on our star-board bow a 
vessel under sail bound in the direction of Chemulpo, so that 
she would have had to cross our bow (or stern) if she kept 
on her course, and we kept our course for Yashau. At about 
8 o'clock we sighted a large man-of-war coming out from 
behind the Island of Hsutau, and some ten minutes later we 
saw first one, then two (altogether three) more big ships 
coming out from behind the same island. All these vessels 
were of large ironclad type as far as we could make out. 

At about 9 o'clock we made out on the most forward vessel 
the Japanese flag, above which was flying a white flag. She 
moved rapidly towards us, and when passing us saluted us by 
dipping her flag. 

Our position at that time was thus : — 

Island X 6 

4 
1 

3 

X Island. 

1. Kowshing. 

2. Man-of-war with Japanese and white flag. 

3. Chinese despatch vessel Tsaokiang. 

4. 5 and 6, other men-of-war. 



APPENDIX C. 355 

The ship which we had sighted under sail, and which had 
turned out to be the Tsaokiang had meanwhile lowered her 
sail and turned backward in the direction on Wei-hai-wei. 

If we had been somewhat uneasy about this large display 
of Japanese fleet we were quite reassured about the peaceful 
intentions towards us when tlie passing ship dipped her flag 
to us and we thought they were chasing the Tsaokiang, The 
ships Nos. 4, 5, and 6, which had altogether turned out to be 
Japanese men-of-war, had been following their course, and 
such was our position. 

Island X G 

5 • 



< , 



: X Island 
3 

when signals wene hoisted on No. 4 Japanese ship and two 
blind guns told us to stop and drop anchor. We did so. 
The next signal was *' Stop where you are or take the 
consequences." No. 4 Japanese ship then turned to port 
and approached No. 5, which was with No. 6, together moving 
on. All three ships moved on probably to semaphore tf) 
each other, being puzzled what to do after recognising the 
British flag on a ship which was evidently a Chinese transport 
as it appeared. 

The No. 4 ship then turned back to us'with all her guns 
run out and iM)inted at our ship, and stopped at a distance of 
about a (|uarter of a mile. We saw a boat lowered and 
coming towards us. Tlie commander of the Chinese troops on 
l)oard told me, and asked me to tell the captain, they would 
rather go down on the sjxit than to be made firisoners. Tliey 
were very excited, and I had difliculty to appea.se them an<l 
to impress ui)()n them that it was utterly necessary to keep 
order on board as long as parleying was going on. 

I told ( ai>tain (Jalsworthy what the intentions of the 
commanders were. 

2 A 2 



356 THE CHINA-JAPAN WAR. 

The Japanese boat and several oflicers came on board ; 
the men in the boat were armed with rifles and sabres. The 
Japanese officers repaired to the captain's cabin ; he had to 
show his papers, etc., etc., and to prove that he really was in 
charge of a British vessel. He then was told curtly to 
follow the Japanese man-of-war. I was not present at this 
interview ; I had told the captain to send for me if need was. 
I was busy keeping commanders and soldiers at peace. We 
had arranged, Captain Galsworthy and I, before the Japanese 
boat came alongside that he should insist on being allowed 
to return to Taku, the port where we started from, since we 
had started from there before any declaration of war. 

It seems that the Japanese parlemcntairc did not give 
any time to Captain Galsworthy to insist on anything when 
he told him to follow the Japanese man-of-war, and neither 
did I hear of this order before the Japanese officers left the 
ship. 

When then Captain Galsworthy told me of the result of 
the parley, which I interpreted to the Chinese commanders, 
there was a great uproar amongst them and their soldiers. 
They menaced with swords and rifles captain and crew and 
all Europeans on board in case the captain dared to get up 
his anchor. Again I had to do my utmost to appease this 
turmoil, and then I told the captain to hoist a signal for the 
parlementaire boat to come back. She came, and this time 
I myself went to the gangway to speak with the Japanese 
officers. We could not risk to let the Japanese parlementaire 
come on board because soldiers with rifles and swords were 
flocking about, and surely would have made short business of 
them if they had shown any signs of not giving in to our 
request. 

I told the Japanese officers, who arrived on the gangway 
ladder with their right hand to the sword hilt, " The 
captain's hands are forced; he is not able to obey your 
orders ; the soldiers on board would not allow him to do so. 
Commander and soldiers insist to be allowed to return to the 



APPENDIX a 357 

port where they started from. The captain and I thuik that 
this is a just and fair request even if war should be already 
declared, considering that we started in time of peace." 

I made sure that the parlementaire understood me. They 
left saying they would refer the matter to their captain. 

After the boat arrived at the Japanese man-of-war we had 
to wait some time for an answer. At last the signal was 
hoisted : " Quit the ship as soon as possible." This could 
only be meant for the Europeans and crew, but there was no 
chance, and perhaps no intention to follow this advice. 

The Chinese soldiers had taken charge of every davit. 
Captain tJalsworthy then hoisted the signal " We are not 
allowed." The only answer which we got was an answering 
pennant. Then we saw the Japanese man-of war moving 
and coming around, leaving us quite at amiss about her 
intentions. She came around, and when she was at a 
4listance of about 150 metres— exactly alongside of our port 
side — she stopped. I saw a torpedo leaping from her torpedo 
p^)rt, and immediately afterwards all six guns opened fire. 
They discharged their guns twice before the torpedo arrived 
at its aim. It hit the ship amidshii>s, probably exactly at 
lier coal bunkers. The day became night — coal, splinters, 
water were filling the air. I believed we then all jumped 
and swam. 

In swimming I saw the ship going down — she went stem 
first. 

During this the firing continued, which was bravely 
answered with rifles by the j)oor wretches, who knew they 
had no chance in trying to swim. I saw a Japanese boat 
lowered, heavily armed with men. I thought they were 
coming to the rescue of the remaining men : but I was sadly 
mistaken — they fired into the men on board the sinking ship. 
1 do not know what their puriK)se was in doing so. The fact 
is that the swimming men were fired at from the Jai)ane8e 
man-of-war and from the sinking ship, the men on board the 
hitter one probably having the savage idea that if they had to 



358 THE CHINA-JAPAN WAR. 

die their brothers should not live either. The Kowshing went 
down entirely after about half-an-hour or so from the time 
when the torpedo was fired. 

There would have been plenty of chance for her to try for 
a better fate, by slipping her chain when she had been told 
to stay where she was or to take the consequences, and again 
by having recourse to a ruse, showing intentions to carry out 
the order of the Japanese man-of-war and then running into 
the island. This had all been suggested at the proper time. 

But the perfect confidence of captain and officers in the 
protection of the ship against any warlike undertaking by 
the fact of her being a British vessel flying the British flag 
sealed her fate, and I am grieved to say also the fate of 
officers, crew, and soldiers of which, as much as I know, only 
about 170 men saved their life by swimming. So far I don't; 
know of any other European who reached the shore. 

(Sg.) CONSTANTINE VON HaNNEKEN* 

Signed before me the 30th of July, 1894. 
(Sg.) W. H. Wilkinson, 

H. B. M.'s Vice-Consul, 

Chemulpo. 



Tlic Sinking of the Koicsldng, TJie Cliief Officer's Account. 

The Kowshing left Taku on the evening of the 23rd of 
July, 9.30. She had embarked her troops, about 1,100, on 
the afternoon of the same day, and was the last of the ten 
transports up to that time engaged, and one of three English 
steamers, the other two being the Irene and Feiching. 

All went well on board till the morning of the 25tL The 
troops behaved generally in a (j[uiet and orderly manner, and 
seemed to be very happy and contented ; but they had 
apparently little idea as to how or where they were to be 
engaged. I w^as on watch from 4 a.m. till 8 A.M. on the 
25th, and about 7.30 I observed a man-of-war steaming 
rapidly towards us. She had Japanese naval colours flying 



APPENDIX a 359 

with a white flag above it. As she neared us, thinking her 
to be a Japanese man-of-war, and in accordance with our 
usual custom, the red ensign was hoisted and dipped and 
hoisted again ; but to our surprise — the captain having now 
come on the bridge — she took no notice of it, and continued 
steaming away in a N.E. direction. The next thing observed 
was a small schooner-rigged vessel coming in from the S.E. ; 
but she was too far off' to determine her nationality. We 
heard afterwards, wlien on board the Nanhca, that the first 
seen was a Chinese man-of-war, the Tsiyuen, which had 
suffered severely in a previous encounter with the Naimva, 
and was running away. The second was afterwards captured 
and proved to be the Tsaokian//, an old wooden despatch 
vessel built in Shanghai thirty years ago, and bound from 
Chefoo with despatches to Chemulpo. 

We then were nearing Shopaioul Island, and when about 
a mile S.E. of it, saw three men-of-war (Japanese), one of 
which approached us and signalled us to stop, enforcing the 
order by firing two guns across our bows. We stopped and 
signalled having done so. Then we were ordered by signal 
to anchor, which was also done, the anchor being lowered 
down in 11 fathoms (high water). The man-of-war then 
steamed away and joined her two consorts, and a conference 
was evidently held. As she was going we asked by signal 
" if we were allowed to proceed ; " but were answered by the 
signal, " Heave to, or take the consequences." There was 
much excitement amongst the Chinese at this time, and arms 
were being got up and ammunition was being served out, and 
the two generals were very anxious to know what we were 
.signalling. The troops, by the advice of Major von Hanneken, 
the passenger above refeiTed to, were all ordered below. The 
men-of-war now separated and one approached us covering 
us with her guns. She then sent an armed boat's crew 
alongside with two officers, who came on board and examined 
the ship's register, and also were infurmed of the fact that 
war had not been declared up to the date of our leaving port. 



360 THE CHINA-JAPAN WAR. 

After examining our papers the officer informed the captain 
that he was to follow the Naniica — that beinir the name of 
the man-of-war that had stopped us. The difficulty we were 
in was explained to the officer, and he was asked to obtain 
permission from his captain to allow us to return to China. 
He then returned to his ship for instructions. 

The Chinese generals on having the order explained to 
them were very indignant and excited, and told Major von 
Hanneken to explain to us, that at the least sign of our 
complying with the orders of the Japanese war-sliip, or at the 
slightest attempt on our part to leave the vessel, we should 
be killed at once. The general accompanied his threat with 
many significant gesticulations intimating that our throats 
would be cut. He detailed soldiers to attend immediately 
on the captain and myself and served out ammunition tx) his 
bodyguard. We tried to explain to the general through 
Major von Hanneken the absolute futility of attempting to 
resist the Japanese man-of-war ; that one shot from her 
would sink us, and that it would be best to obey ; but it was 
of no use, the general declaring his intention of dying wliere 
he was sooner than submit, and threatening us again. The 
Naniica now signalled, " Weigh, cut or slip ; wait for 
nothing.'* We answered with the signal, ** Send a boat, I 
wish to communicate personally," and the Naniwa answered 
*' Send immediately." A boat then started from the Naniwa 
and the Chinese soldiers crowded the gangway, and it was 
only after repeated efforts that the officers managed to keep 
them out of the way. We were not allowed to go to the 
gangway to meet the officer in charge of the boat, as the 
Chinese general seemed suspicious that we wanted to leave 
them. On the boat coming alongside the officer was met by 
the Chinese generals and Major von Hanneken as interpreter. 
The captain was also sent for. He explained to the officer 
the position we were placed in and the impossibility of our 
complying with his commander's orders, adding at the same 
time, that a solution of the difficulty might be found in our 



APPENDIX a 361 

being allowed to return to China. The officer promised to 
inform his commander and left. 

All our officers and Major von Hanneken gathered on the 
bridge now to try and discuss events, and the Chinese were 
noisily arguing on the upper deck. I left the bridge and 
went aft to get my papers, and met on the after-deck the 
chief and second engineers, to whom I stated the grave 
nature of the case and added that, if the Japanese fired at us 
we should have to take to the water. This was the last I 
saw of them. On regaining the bridge I found that the 
man-of-war was flying the signal, "Quit the ship imme- 
diately," and we at once sent a quartermaster aft, with 
warning to the engineers to prepare for the worst. We then 
signalled ** I am not allowed ** and followed that by " Send a 
boat." The signal to quit the ship was still flying when 
another signal was hoisted from the man-of-war " Lifeboat 
cannot come." The Naniwa then steamed into position 
immediately abeam of us and whistled with her syren whilst 
doing so. She then, still keeping the two previous signals 
flying, ran up a red flag to her foremast-head and almost 
immediately afterwards discharged a torpedo at us. We 
watched this coming, and it stopped or turned short of the 
ship. The Naniwa being a quarter of a mile away and 
seeing this, the whole starboard broadside of five guns was 
discharged and the machine guns on the top were used. 
This broadside took her somewhere amidships and she listed 
over to starboard. 

I then left the bridge and, getting hold of a spare life-belt 
jumjied overboard from forward, coming up foul of the chain, 
down which numbers of the crew were swarming. I got 
clear and struck out for the island. Just then a loud 
explosion as of a shell bursting occurred on board and the 
air was full f)f falling cinders and other debris. I saw the 
ca[)tain ahead of me with his face all black, and further I 
saw Major von Hanneken swimming strong, and not far 
from him another European. Just after this, and when 



362 THE CHINA'JAPAN WAR. 

about seventy or eighty yards from the ship, I found that 
rifle bullets were striking the water all around me ; I turned 
and saw the Chinese soldiers shooting at me from the deck 
and gangway ports. I then protected my head with the life- 
belt and swam and drifted wath the tide past the ship. After 
getting clear of the ship I again made for the island, but 
seeing many Chinese ahead of me I reflected that it would 
be just as dangerous getting on to the island with them as it 
had been on board, so I again turned and taking oft* all my 
clothes made for the Nannra, which had now drifted con- 
siderably away from the ship and was not using her guns, as 
far as I can remember. I was not swimming long when I 
saw her lowering two of her boats, and one coming towards 
me, I was picked up. I explained to the officer the direction 
in which I had last seen the captain and the major swimming, 
and he directed the other boat to pull that way. No attempt 
was made to rescue the drowning Chinamen. Two volleys 
were fired from our boat with the object of sinking two of 
the lifeboats, which, having got clear of the ship, were filled 
with Chinese. Our boat was then recalled and I was taken 
on board, and dry clothes given me. Almost immediately 
after the captain was brought below in a very exhausted 
condition, and the quartermaster, Lucas Evangelista by name, 
who had a shot wound in his neck, and was immediately 
treated by the medical staff on board. We were very well 
treated, clothes and food being given to us, and even the 
sailors bringing presents of sweet biscuits and things for us 
to eat. I was called aft and asked to write an account of all 
that had transpired, which I did. The captain also was 
separated from me and given a state-room, whilst the 
quartermaster and I w^ere lodged in the sick bay ; this was 
to separate us. We were under guard the whole time and 
unable to leave the room. The vessel cruised about for some 
time, and then at 8 p.m. anchored in company with another 
man-of-war which was convoying the small Chinese gun-boat. 
The officers and men of the Naniwa were continuous in their 



APPENDIX a 363 

efforts to give us all they could and to make things pleasant 
for us as far as lay in their power. 

On Thursday, the 26th, at 4 a.m. we got underway again 
and proceeded till 10 a.m., when we met tlie admiral and 
the fleet. Here we anchored, and I was again called aft to 
correct a copy of my written deposition. Clothes made on 
board were provided for us, and at noon we were transferred 
to the transport Yayci/amdy the crew of the Naniwa waving 
us farewell. On getting on board the Yai/ci/ayna, Captain 
Hirayama received us very kindly and told us to make 
ourselves at home. We found on board the officers and crew 
of the TsaoJcian//, Chinese despatch boat, also a Dane who 
was in the vessel at the time of her capture. We wen? 
berthed in the captain's own cabin, and the officer joined in 
making us welcome, inviting us to the ward-room and offering 
us clothes and other necessaries. 

At 1.30 P.M. the anchor was hove up and we steamed away 
for Japan. At 7 p.m. met and signalled two Japanese trans- 
ports. 

Friday, 27th. — Met and signalled Japanese transport in the 
morning at 7 a.m. off northern shore of Quelpart Island. At 
7 P.M. off north end of Goto Island, where we slowed till 
daylight. 

Saturday, 28th. — Found ourselves confined to our cabins in 
the morning entering Sasebo Bay. At 7 a.m. we anchored. 
Barges with an armed guard came alongside for the Chinese 
and for the Danish gentleman. We were introduced to 
Lieut C. Taniari, Admiral's A.D.C., and taken with him 
in his steam-launch to the jetty. We were then conducted 
to the hospital, where a room was prepared for us on the 
ground floor. Lieut. Tamari gave us to understand that 
anything that we could ask for should ])e supplied. We 
begged him to notify our consul that many Europeans might 
still be alive on the island, and also to notify our agents. 
(Tailor and bootmaker were in attendance; soap, towels, aid 



366 THE CHINA-JAPAN WAR. 

23. The position and number of the Peiyang squadron and 
torpedo-boats. 

24. How many transports engaged by the Chinese Govern- 
ment. 

25. What equipment had the Chinese troops on board the 
Kowshiiig. 

26. What preparation had the Chinese squadron for action. 

27. The fortifications and defensive power of the north 
coast of China. 



Ca])tain Galsworthy's Report 

The British s.s. Koicshing, owned by the Indo-China Steam 
Navigation Co., left Shanghai on the 17th of July, bound to 
Taku, under charter to carry Chinese troops from that port to 
Yashan, on the coast of Corea. Arriving at Taku on the 
20th, arrangements were made to ship the troops, and on the 
23rd, 1,100 came on board, including two generals, a number 
of other officers of various rank, and a German ex-army 
officer named Hanneken, who came as an ordinary passenger. 
At 9.50 P.M. on the 23rd the ship proceeded on her voyage to 
Yashan. All went well until the morning of the 25th, when, 
off Shopeiul Island, we passed a man-of-war flying the 
Japanese naval ensign, with a white flag above it. This 
vessel proved to be the Chinese w^ar-ship Tsiyuen. Shortly 
afterwards we sighted three Japanese men-of-war, the 
Naniwa, Yoshino, and another (probably the Akitsushima). 
The Kaniwa at once steamed towards us, flying a signal 
ordering us to stop. Slie also fired two blank charges, and 
signalled us to anchor, wliich we at once did. The Naniwa 
then steamed away, apparently to communicate with the 
other ships. I at once inquired by signal if I might proceed, 
to which the Naniica replied : " Heave to, or take the con- 
sequences." A boat then came from the Naniwa^ and an 
officer came on board. He was received at the gangway, and 
he asked to see the ship's papers. They were shown to him. 



APPENDIX C. 367 

and his attention particularly called to the fact that she was 
a British ship. Numerous other questions were asked and 
answered, the most important one being: "Would the 
Kowshing follow the Naniwa ? " 

Beihg utterly helpless against a man-of-war, I replied that 
there would be no alternative but to do so, under protest, if 
ordered. The officer then left the ship, and proceeded to the 
Naniiva. Shortly after, being still at anchor, I was ordered by 
signal to cut, slip, or weigh immediately. The Chinese generals 
learning the meaning of the signals, and finding preparations 
were being made to follow the Naniwa, objected most 
emphatically. They were told how useless it would be to 
resist, as one shot would sink them in a short time. The 
generals then said they would rather die than obey Japanese 
orders, and as they had 1,100 men against about 400 on the 
Naniway they would fight sooner than surrender. They were 
told that if they decided to fight, the foreign officers would 
leave the ship. The generals then gave orders to the troops 
on deck to kill us if we obeyed the orders of the Japanese or 
attempted to leave the ship. With gestures they threatened 
to cut off our heads, to stab, or shoot us ; and a lot of men 
were selected to watch us and carry out the order. A signal 
was then made requesting the Naniira to send a boat, in 
order to communicate the state of affairs. A boat was at 
once sent ; but a crowd of armed Chinese took possession of 
the gangway, until I prevailed on the generals to send them 
away. Eventually the officers came alongside, and a message 
for the commander of the Naniwa was serft, stating that the 
Chinese refused to allow the Kowshing to be taken prisoner, 
and insisted upon returning to Taku. It was again pointed 
out that she was a British ship, and that she had left port 
l>efore war had been declared. The boat then returned to the 
Naniwa, and on her arrival a signal was hoisted, ordering the 
Europeans to leave the ship at once. A reply was given that 
they were not allowed to leave, and asking for a boat to be 
sent. Notice was sent to the engineers to be handy on deck 



368 THE CHINA-JAPAN WAJR. 

in case the Japanese fired. The Naniwa shortly afterwards 
replied that a boat could not be sent. 

The Naniwa then hoisted a red flag at the fore, which was 
apparently a signal for discharging a torpedo, as one was fired 
at the Kmvshin/ji but missed her. A broadside of five' guns 
was then fired. At the time I was on the bridge, my officers 
having left it, and seeing that the soldiers set to watch me 
had left their station at the foot of the ladder, I rushed to the 
wheel-house, and, after obtaining a life-l>elt (the last one 
remaining) I jumped over the ship's side. In doing so I 
heard a terrific explosion, and upon returning to the surface 
of the sea I found the atmosphere was thick with smoke and 
fine coal-powder. I at once struck out for the shore, distant 
about 1^ mile. There were many Chinese in the water ; but 
I only saw one European, Mr. von Hanneken. As the air 
cleared, a bullet struck the water close to my ear, and was 
followed by a shower of bullets. Knowing that shot from 
the Naniwa could not strike near me, owinfj to beinir 
sheltered by the hull of the Kowshing, I turned on my back, 
and saw Chinese soldiers firing at me from the deck and the 
'tween deck ports. As far as possible, I protected the back of 
mv head with the life-belt, and swam as low in the water as 
I could. Firing from the Naniva's broadside and machine 
guns was continued until shortly before the Kowshlrnj went 
down, stern first. 

After being in the water some time I was picked up by 
the Naniva's cutter in a very exhausted condition. The 
same boat had already rescued one of the quarter-masters, 
who had been wounded in the neck with a rifle-bullet. On 
arriving at the Naniwa we found that the chief otticer was 
the only other person saved by the Japanese, leaving five 
Europeans connected with the ship and the passenger missing. 
I requested another boat to be sent, but am afraid no 
further attempts were made to find them. We anchored off 
Shopeiul about 9 A.M. The firing commenced about 1 p.m., 
and we were taken aboard the Naniwa about 2.30 p.m. 



APPENDIX a 369 

During the evening the Kanitra steamed away, arriving the 
next A.M. at the rendezvous of tlie Japanese fleet in Corea. 
We were then transferred to the Yojjetjama, together with a 
Danish electrician named Miihlenstedt, and about sixty 
Chinese who were taken prisoners from the Chinese s.s. 
Tsaohiang the same day. .The Yaijcijama then proceeded to 
Sasebo, arriving on tlie a.m. of the 28th. From Sasebo, my- 
self and Mr. Tamplin, tlie chief officer, came here in a small 
tender at noon on Saturday last, having in the meantime 
been interviewed by Mr. Suyematsu Kencho, President of the 
Imperial Board of Legislature, who came down from Tokio 
for that purpose. The quarter-master remained behind owing 
to his wound not having properly healed up, whilst Mi\ 
Miihlenstedt is being further detained. During out detention 
we received ever}' care and attention necessarj' for our comfort. 
After arriving here we proceeded to H.M.'s Consulate, and 
made an affidavit of the entire circumstances. The Naniica, 
I may mention, had been]damaged on the port-quarter from a 
shot fired from the Tsiyurn in the morning. I can ix)sitively 
say I did not see the Japanese fire on the Chinese in the 
water. The Chinese killed many of their own people." 



2 B 



370 TEE CHINA-JAPAN WAR. 



APPENDIX D. 

The Declarations of War of the Two Countries, 

The Declaration of War ly Japan, 

" We, by the grace of Heaven, Emperor of Japan, seated 
on a Throne occupied by the same dynasty from time imme- 
morial, do hereby make proclamation to all our loyal and 
brave subjects, as follows : — 

" We hereby declare war against China, and we command 
each and all our competent authorities, in obedience to our 
wish and with a view to the attainment of the national aim, 
to carry on hostilities by sea and by land against China, with 
all the means at their disposal, consistently with the Law of 
Nations. 

" During the past three decades of our reign our constant 
aim has been to furtlier the peaceful progress of the countrj' 
in civilisation ; and, being sensible of the evils inseparable 
from complications with foreign States, it has always been 
our pleasure to instruct our Minister of State to labour for 
the promotion of friendly relations with our Treaty Powers. 
We are gratified to know that the relations of our Empire 
with those Powers have yearly increased in goodwill and in 
friendship. Under the circumstances, we were unprepared 
for such a conspicuous want of amity and of good faith as 
has been manifested by China in her conduct towards this 
country in connection with the Corean affair. 

" Corea is an independent State. She was first introduced 
into the family of nations by the advice and under the 
guidance of Japan. It has, however, been China's habit to 



APPENDIX D. 371 

designate Corea as her dependency, and both openly and 
secretly to interfere with her domestic affairs. At the time 
of the recent civil insurrection in Corea, China despatched 
troops thither, alleging that her purpose was to afford a 
succour to her dependent State. We, in virtue of the treaty 
concluded with Corea in 1882, and looking to possible 
emergencies, caused a military force to be sent to that 
country. 

" Wishing to procure for Corea freedom from the calamity 
of perpetual disturbance, and thereby to maintain the peace 
of the East in general, Japan invited China's co-operation for 
the accomplishment of that object But China, advancing 
various pretexts, declined Japan's proposal. Thereupon 
Japan advised Corea to reform her administration so that 
order and tranquillity might be preserved at home, and so that 
the country might be able to discharge the responsibilities 
and duties of an independent State abroad. Corea has already 
consented to undertake the task. But China has secretly 
and insidiously endeavoured to circumvent and to thwart 
Japan's purpose. She has further procrastinated and endea- 
voured to make warlike preparations both on land and at sea. 
When those preparations were completed she not only sent 
large reinforcements to 'Corea, with a view to the forcible 
attainment of her ambitious designs, but even carried her 
arbitrariness and insolence to the extent of opening fire 
ujwn our ships in Corean waters. China's plain object is to 
make it uncertain where the responsibility resides of pre- 
serving peace and order in Corea, and not only to weaken 
the position of that State in the family of nations — a position 
obtained for Corea through Japan's efforts —but also to obscure 
the significance of the treaties recognising and confirming 
that position. Such conduct on the part of China is not only 
a direct injury to the rights and interests of this Empire, but 
also a menace to the permanent peace and tranquillity of the 
Orient Judging from her actions, it must be concluded that 
China from the beginning has been bent upon sacrificing 

2 B 2 



372 THE CBINA'JAPAN WAR. 

peace to the attainment of her sinister object In this situa- 
tion, ardent as our wish is to promote the prestige of the 
countr}'^ abroad by strictly peaceful methods, we find it 
impossible to avoid a formal declaration of war against China. 
It is our earnest wish that, by the loyalty and valour of our 
faithful subjects, peace may soon be permanently restored 
and the gloiy of the Empire be augmented and completed. 

" Given tliis 1st day of the eighth month of the 27th year 
of Meiji." 

(His Imperial Majesty's Sign-manual.) 

Counter-signatures of the Minister President of State and 
^f the other Ministers of State. 



Declaration of War hj the Emperor of ChiTUL- 

Corea has been our tributary for the past two hundred odd 
years. She has given us tribute all this time, which is a 
matter known to the world. For the past dozen years or so 
Corea has been troubled by repeated insurrections, and we, in 
sympathy with our small tributary, have as repeatedly sent 
succour to her aid, eventually jJacing a Eesident in her capital 
to protect Corea's interests. In the fourth moon (May) of 
this year another rebellion was begun in Corea, and the king 
repeatedly asked again for aid from us to put down the 
rebellion. We then ordered Li-Huug-chang to send troops to 
Corea; and they having barely reached Yashan the rebels 
immediately scattered. But the Wojen,* without any cause 
whatever, suddenly sent their troops to Corea, and entered 
Seoul, the capital of Corea, reinforcing them constantly until 
tliey have exceeded ten thousand men. In the meantime 
the Japanese forced the Corean king to change his system of 
government, showing a disposition every way of bullying the 
Coreans. 

It was found a difficult matter to reason with the Wojen. 

* An ancient name for the Japanese expressive of contempt. 



APPENDIX D. 373 

Although we have been in the habit of assisting our tribu- 
taries, we have never interfered with their internal govern- 
ment. Japan's treaty with Corea was as one country with 
another ; there is no law for sending large armies to bully a 
country in this way, and compel it to change its system of 
government. The various Powers are united in condemning 
the conduct of the Japanese, and can give no reasonable name 
to the army she now has in Corea. Nor has Japan been 
amenable to reason, nor would she listen to the exhortation 
to withdraw her troops and confer amicably upon what 
should be done in Corea. On the contrary, Japan has shown 
herself bellicose without regard to appearances, and has been 
increasing her forces there. Her conduct alarmed the people 
of Corea as well as our merchants there, and so we sent more 
troops over to protect them. Judge of our surprise then 
when, half-way to Corea, a number of the Wojen ships 
suddenly appeared, and taking advantage of our unprepared- 
ness, opened fire upon our transports at a spot on the sea- 
coast near Yashan, and damaged them, thus causing us to 
sufter from their treacherous conduct, which could not bo 
foretold by us. As Japan has violated the treaties and not 
observed international laws, and is now nmning rampant 
with her false and treacherous actions, commencing hostilities 
herself, and laying herself open to condemnation by the 
various Powers at large, we therefore desire to make it known 
to the world that we have always followed the paths of 
philanthropy and perfect justice throughout the whole com- 
plications, while the Wojen, on the other hand, have broken 
all the laws of nations and treaties which it passes our 
patience to bear with. Hence we commanded Li-Hung-chan<; 
to give strict orders to our various armies to hasten with all 
speed to ix>ot the Wojen out of their lairs. He is to send 
successive armies of valiant men to Corea in order to save 
the Coreans from the dust of bondage. We also command 
the Manchu generals, vicerovs, and governors of the maritime 



374 THE CHINA-JAPAN WAR. 

provinces, as well as the commanders-in-chief of the various 
armies, to prepare for war and to make every eflFort to fire on 
the Wqjen ships if they come into our ports, and utterly 
destroy them. We exhort our generals to refrain from the 
least laxity in obeying our commands in order to avoid severe 
punishment at our hands. Let all know this edict as if 
addressed to themselves individually. 
Eespect this ! 



APPENDIX E, 375 



APPENDIX E. 

Correspondence relating to the Delivery of the Tsvo 

Japanese in Shanghai. 

All the papers concerning this affair were printed in con- 
sequence of the resolution of the Senate on 3rd of January, 
1895. They form an interesting collection of fifty documents, 
despatches, telegrams, etc. From a careful perusal it is 
evident that the man who judged the case most correctly was 
Mr. Jernigan (U. S. Consul-General at Shanghai), the man who 
by his proximity to the locus in quo was best qualified to 
judge the affair. As we get farther away from Shanghai 
we find perceptions dimmer ; at Peking there is a hazy 
uncertainty, and at Washington the case is totally misunder- 
stood. Mr. Gresham (Secretary of State), who had the power 
to overrule the better judgment of his subordinates and 
foolishly used his power, did not understand and would not 
have explained to him a single point in the question. 

As soon as the state of the Corean question became critical, 
?ind war between China and Japan seemed inevitable, the 
Oovernment of the latter country asked the United States to 
protect Japanese subjects in China. The Chinese Govern- 
ment consented to this proposal, and asked for similar 
protection for her subjects in Japan. The United States 
Oovemment committed the first mistake in assuming this 
4louble protection of the subjects of two nations at war, and 
w^e shall see that this original oversight weakened her position 
and rendered her protection utterly useless. Documents 1 to 6 
(24th of July to 3rd of August) treat of this question, and 
the American officials in both countries were instructed only 



376 THE CHINA-JAPAN. WAR. 

to use friendly offices for protection of Japanese in Cliina 
and Chinese in Japan. 

In Documents 7 and 8 (8th and 14th of August) Mr. Denby 
(U. S. Charg^ d* Affaires at Peking) communicates (to Washing- 
ton) despatches of the Chinese Foreign Office complaining 
of Japanese spies in disguise travelling about the country. 
Mr. Denby (aware of the absurd and barbarous criminal laws 
of China) advised leniency and prudence lest innocent persons 
should be hastily condemned. 

On the 13th of August two Japanese (Kusunchi and 
Fukuhara), dressed in Chinese clothes (which they had worn 
for three years), were arrested on the French Concession in 
Shanghai. The French Consul-General (who is also the <;hief 
authority in the French Concession), according to international 
stipulations, delivered the two Japanese to Mr. Jemigan, who 
was supposed to protect Japanese subjects. As the powers 
of Mr. Jemigan to this effect had been carefully limited, he 
was very much embarrassed by the case ; the wisest and most 
correct course would have been to send back the two Japanese 
to the French Consul (that is to say, if he was not allowed 
to protect them). In fact, if he could do nothing for the 
Japanese, he could not accept charge of them. 

Document 9 (August 18) contains Mr. Ciresham's enquiries 
on the subject, as the Chinese Minister at Washington com- 
plained that the U. S. Consul at Slianghai was detaining two 
Japanese. Mr. Gresham had to l)e enlightened telegraphically 
by the Charge d'Affaires at Peking, wlio in his turn had to 
receive explanations from Mr. Jernigan at Shanghai — natur- 
ally all this telegraphing failed to throw light on the real 
issues of the question. These explanations fill up the docu- 
ments up to No. 21 (August 31), when Mr. Gresham repeated 
his orders that the two Japanese should not be detained by 
U. S. Consul at Shanghai. Mr. Denby unfortunately added 
to these instructions, deliver to Taotai (Chinese official), and 
the two Japanese were delivered on the 3rd of September 
and beheaded on the 8th of Octoljer. 



APPENDIX E. o I . 

During all this deplorable correspondence, Mr. Gresham 
takes the trouble to show that he was totally ignorant of the 
juridical aspect of the question. In Document 12 (August 21) 
he frankly acknowledges he does not understand why the 
French Consul had taken charge of the two Japanese and 
delivered them to the American Consul. In Document 18 
(August 29) there are the following extraordinary statements. 
He writes to Mr. Denby : you cannot give asylum nor invest 
Japanese with extra-territoriality. *' In a word Japanese 
subjects in China continue to be the subjects of their own 
sovereign " [an absurdly evident proposition] *' and answer- 
able to the local law to the same extent as heretofore " [a 
proposition which is false, and exposes Mr. Gresham's grosa 
ignorance of the question on wliich he presumptuously took 
upon himself to lay down tlie law — .Japanese had never been 
subject to local law and enjoyed extra-territoriality by treaty.} 
" The employment of good offices in their belialf by another 
power cannot alter their situation in this regard." 

Only in Document No. 17 (a telegram to Mr. Denby, 
August 29) Mr. Gresham had a glimmer of the tnith, which was 
however so ambiguously expressed that it led to tlie death of 
the two unfortunate youths who for three weeks had trusted to 
the protection of tlie American flag. In that telegram Gresham 
says : " Consul-General should not have received tuv Japanese, 
and is not authorized to hold them." In tliis phrase the 
whole ([uestion is put into a nut-shell by the man who per- 
versely blinded himself to the correct solution. If the U. S. 
Consul could not receive Japanese, if he was forbidden to 
jKjrform any official act on their behalf, why was he autho- 
rized to deliver Japanese, who were not amenable to Chinese 
law in the Foreign Settlements of Shanghai, to the Chinese 
officials ? AVhy could he perform an official act against those 
I)eople he was forbidden to protect officially? It is this 
which makes the whole affiiir so repugnant and casts such 
grim ridicule on tlie American flag and the protection it was 
supposed to ofler. In the whole proceeding, the American 



378 TEE CHINA-JAPAN WAR. 

Consul acted as jailor and police officer of the Chinese Govern- 
ment — the only thing he did for the people he was supposed 
to protect, and whose protection he had assumed, was to 
deliver them unconditionally to their enemies. And what 
makes the matter still more poignant to an American is, that 
it was done in direct opposition to the conduct of the French 
Consul, the Consul of a nation which had not assumed the 
protection of Japanese subjects; that official had already 
settled the matter of jurisdiction by not delivering the two 
Japanese to the Chinese officials, but sending them to the 
U. S. Consul. If the latter could not protect nor hold them, 
he was bound not to alter their status nor exercise an hostile 
action against them ; he should have returned them to the 
authorities (French) from whom he had received them. 

Mr. Gresham's conduct in the whole transaction is inex- 
cusable ; he committed more than errors of judgment ; not 
only was his ignorance of the legal question unpardonable, 
but his haste in precipitating his decision by telegram, instead 
of waiting for full details of the case and reading the clear 
explanations which he might have asked and received by post 
from his able subordinates who were on the spot, and were 
better qualified to see the true aspect of the question, throws 
the full responsibility of the horrible sufferings and death of 
those two poor young men on him, and he is answerable 
before history for the dis^^rrace which fell on the American 

flag. 

The rest of the Documents are principally filled with 

attempts at justification by the persons concerned in this sad 
affair. The only one who succeeds in clearing himself is 
Mr. Jernigan : with the constant limitations to his power 
enforced upon him from Washington, and with the explicit 
orders received, he had no option but to act as he did. Mr. 
Denby made laudable efforts to stem the wave of panic- 
struck barbarity which was sweeping through Chinese official- 
dom, but he failed in making one more effort to save the 
lives of the two Japanese, by omitting to give a reasonable 



APPENDIX E. 379 

interpretation to the orders received from Mr. Gresham. The 
latter in his telegram (Document 17, August 29) had said : 
" Consul- General should not have received two Japanese, and 
is not authorized to hold them." The logical consequence, 
as we have seen, would have been to give them up to the 
French authorities from whom they had been received. Tliis 
would have been a litei^al compliance with the orders from 
Washington, but Mr. Denby preferred to interpret the spirit 
of Mr. Gresham's instructions, and ordered Mr. Jernigan to 
deliver to Taotai, 

Mr. Gresham, in his feeble attempts at exculpation, tries 
to bring to his assistance the declarations of Japanese officials 
that American jurisdiction over Chinese in Japan during the 
war would not be allowed. This only shows up the falseness 
of the position which had been taken up by the U. S. Govern- 
ment in consenting to protect the subjects of both belligerents : 
her action being hampered in both countries by the conduct 
and princijile of the two belligerents, and by her wish to 
seem impartial and not support one nation in a matter which 
it could not carry through in the other. The declaration of 
the Japanese Minister has no value in the question, as there 
u nothing in Japan similar to the peculiar conditions of the 
Foreign Settlements in Shanghai. 



380; TBE CHIN A- JAPAN WAR. 



APPENDIX F. 

Correspondence between Admiral Ito and Admiral Ting. 

Letter No. 1. — From Admiral Ito to Admiral Ting, 

I have the honour to address this letter to your Excellency. 
The vicissitudes of the time have made us enemies. It is a 
misfortune. Yet it is our countries that are at war. There 
need be no hostility between individuals. The friendship 
that formerly existed between you and me is as warm as 
ever to-day. Let it not be supposed that in writing this 
letter I am actuated by any idle purpose of urging you to 
surrender. The actors in great affairs often err ; the 
onlookers see the truth. Instead of calmly deliberating 
what course of procedure of his own part is best for his 
country, best for himself, a man sometimes allows himself 
to be swayed by the task in which he is actually engaged 
and takes a mistaken view ; is it not tlien the duty at* his 
friends to advise him and turn his thoughts into the right 
channel ? I address myself to you from motives of genuine 
friendship, and I pray you to appreciate them. What is the 
origin of the repeated disasters that have befallen the 
Chinese anus ? There is, I think, little difficulty in dis- 
covering the true reason if one look for it calmly and 
intelligently. Your discernment has doubtless shown you 
the cause. It is not the fault of one man that has brought 
China into the position she now occupies ; the blame rests 
with the en'ors of the (Jovernment that has long administered 
her atiairs. She selects her servants by competitive exam- 
ination, and literary attainments are the test. Thus it 
results that her officials, tlie repositories of administrative 



APPENDIX F. 381 

power, are all literate, and literature is honoured above 
everything. Her practice in this respect is as uniform 
to-day as it was a thousand years ago. It is not necessarily 
a defective system, nor does it necessarily produce a bad 
jjovemment. But a country can never preserve its indepen- 
dence in practice by such means. For you know well what 
troubles Japan had to encounter thirty years ago, what 
perils she had to surmount. She owes her preservation and 
her integrity to-day wholly to the fact that she then broke 
away from th^ old and attached herself to the new. In the 
case of your country also that must be the cardinal course at 
present ; if you adopt it, I venture to say that you are safe ; 
if you reject it, you cannot escape destruction. In a contest 
with Japan it has long been fated that you should witness 
results such as are now before you. Can it be the duty of 
faithful subjects of the empire, men really solicitous for its 
welfare, to swim idly with the tide now sweeping over the 
country by the decree of an ancient fate, making no effort to 
stem it. A country with a history running back thousands 
of years, and territories stretching tens of thousands of miles, 
the oldest empire in tlie world, can it be an easy task to 
accomplish for such a country a work of restoration, 
replacing its foundation on a i>ermanently solid basis. A 
single pillar cannot i)revent the fall of a gi-eat edifice. Is 
there any latitude for choice between the impossible and the 
disadvantageous? To hand over s([uadrons to the foe, to 
surrender a whole army to an enemy; these are mere 
bagatelles compared with the fate of a country. By whatever 
reputation a Japanese soldier possesses in the eyes of the 
world, I vow that I believe your wisest course is to come to 
Japan and wait there until the fortunes of your country are 
again in the ascendant, and until the time arrives when your 
.services will be again needed. Hear these words of your 
true friend. Need I remind ycju that the annals of history 
contain many names of men who have removed a stain from 
their names and lived to perioral great deeds. McMahon, of 



382 THE CHINA-JAPAN WAR. 

France, having surrendered and passed over into the enemy's 
country, came back after a time and assisted in reforming 
the French administration, the French not only forgetting 
his disgrace, but even elevating liim to the post of President. 
Similarly, Osnian Pasha, after losing the fortifications at 
Plevna, and being himself captured, came home to Turkey, 
where he rose to be minister of war, and acquired a high 
reputation in connection with his military reforms. If you 
come to Japan I can assure you of the good treatment you 
will receive and of the Emperor's favour. 'Not alone has 
His Majesty pardoned subjects of his own that raised the 
standard of rebellion, but has rewarded their talents by 
elevating them to positions of high trust, as in the case 
of Admiral Yenomoto, now a member of the cabinet, and 
Otori Keisuke, a Councillor of State. There are many such 
instances. In the case of men of note that are not His 
Majesty's subjects, his magnanimous treatment of them 
would certainly be even more marked. The great question 
that you have now to determine is whether you will throw 
in your lot with a country that you see falling to ruin, and 
be involved in a result inevitable under unchanged adminis- 
trative circumstances, or whether you will preserve the 
strength that remains to you and evolve another plan here- 
after. It has generally been the habit of warriors of your 
country to use haughty and rough language in addressing 
their foes, but I address this letter to you from motives of 
pure friendship, and I entreat you to credit my sincerity. 
If happily, reading these words, you accept my counsel, I 
will with your permission address some further remarks to 
you on the subject of giving practical effect to the idea. 

(Signed) Ito Yuko, &c. 



APPENDIX F. 383 

Letter No. 1. — Fi-am Admiral Ting to Admiral Ito. 

I RECEIVED the letter of suggestions addressed to me by the 
officer in command at Sasebo (evidently a mistake of the 
officer commanding the united squadrons),* but did not 
reply because our countries were at war. Now, however, 
having fought resolutely, having had my ships sunk and my 
men decimated, I am minded to give up tlie contest, and to 
ask for a cessation of hostilities in order to save the lives of 
my people. I will surrender to Japan the ships of war now 
in Wei-hai-wei harbour, together with the Liukung Island 
forts and the armament provided that my request be 
complied with, namely, that the lives of all persons connected 
with the army and navy, Chinese and foreign, be uninjured, 
and that they be allowed to return to their homes. If this 
be acceded to, the Commander-in-Chief of the British naval 
•squadron will become guarantor. I submit this proposal, 
and shall be glad to have a speedy reply. 

(Signed) Ting Zhuchang, 

Tituh of the Peiyang Fleet. 

(Dated) 18th day of the 1st month of the 

22nd year of Kwang-su 
(February 12th, 1895). 

To His Excellency Ito, Commander- 
in-Chief of the squadron. 



Letter Xo. 2. — From Admiral Ito to Admiral Tirifj. 

I have received your letter and noted its contents. To- 
morrow I am prepared to take over the ships, forts, and all the 

• As we have shown, there is prolability that the first letter from 
Admiral Ito to Admiral Ting was delivered by the British man-of-war 
Severn^ in which case "Sasibo** n^ight be a nmtake for Severn, as it is 
very difficult to decipher foreign i:ames written with the Japanese 
alphabet* 



381 THE CHINA-JAPAN WAR. 

other material of war in your possession. With regard to the 
hour and other particulars, I shall be glad to consult with 
you when I receive a definite reply to this communication. 
Wlien the transfer of everything has been concluded, I shall 
detail one of our ships-of-war to escort all the persons 
indicated in your despatch to a place convenient to both 
parties, but I desire to offer an expression of opinion on one 
point. As I had the honour to advise in my recent com- 
munications, I venture to think that for the sake of your own 
security and in the future interests of your country, it would 
be best that you should come to Japan and remain there 
until this war is over. If you decide to adopt that course, I 
offer you the strongest assurance that you shall be treated 
with every consideration and shall receive the fullest 
protection. But if you prefer to return to your own country, 
your wishes shall be respected. With reference to the 
suggestion that the British Naval Commander-in-Chief will 
act as guarantor of this arrangement, I think such a 
precaution wholly unnecessary. I place implicit reliance on 
your assurances as an officer. I trust that I shall receive a 
reply to this letter by 10 o'clock to-morrow morning. 

(Signed) Ito Yuko, 

Commander-in-Chief of the Squadron, 
on board H.I.J.M.S. Matsushina. 

(Dated) February 12th. 

To H. E. Ting Zhuchang, Commander- 
in-Chief of the Peiyang squadron. 



Letter No. 2. — From Admiral Ting to Admiral Ito, 

Your answer, just received, gives me much satisfaction on 
account of the lives of my men. I have also to express 
gratitude for the things you have sent me, but as the state 
of war existing between our countries makes it difficult for 
me to receive them, I beg to return them herewith, though I 






'4J^FENBix :f\ V " :385 



'thank yoti for the thought. Your letter states' that the 
• arms, forts, and ships should be handed over tOMuorrow, 
-but that leaves us a very brief interval at oi^ir disposal. 
Some time is needed for the military and naval folk to 
exchange their uniforms for travelling garments, and it 
would be difficult to conform with the date named by 
you. I therefore beg that you will extend the period, and 
enter the harbour from the 22nd day of this month, accord- 
ing to the Chinese calendar (16th of February), appointing 
a day for taking over the Liukung forts, the armament, 
and the ships now remaining. I pledge my good faith in 
the matter. 

(Signed) Ting Zhuchang, 
18th day of the 1st month (Feb. 12th). 

To H. E. Ito, Commander-in-Chief, &c. 

Returned with the above three parcels of articles. 



Letter No. 3. — From Admiral Ito to (he Officer 
commaridiiuj the Peiijany Stjuaflron. 

On receipt of Admiral Ting Zhuchang's despatch, dated the 
18th day of the 1st month, Chinese calendar (12th of 
February), I learned verbally from its bearer that Admiral 
Ting had killed himself. The information has caused me 
])rofound pain. With regard to the transfer of the ships, forta, 
and armament, the late AdmiraFs request that tlie date be 
deferred until the 22nd of tlie 1st Chinese month (tlie ir)tli 
of February) is consented to on the following conditions, 
namely, tliat a responsible ( 'hinese officer come to my flag- 
ship by i) P.M. to-day (February 13th) for tlie puq)ose of 
entering into a definite agreement as to the handiniu over of 
the alM)ve ships, forts, and weapons of war, and the release 
<»f the Chinese and foreigners in AVei-hai-wei. In my last 
letter to the late Admiral Ting, I expresseil a wish to meet 

2 (' 



386 THE CHINA-JAPAN WAR. 

him on the following day, and consult about the hour of the 
transfer and other details. I now desire to settle these 
points in conference with some Chinese oflBcer duly autho- 
rised, but I wish to state distinctly that the officer coming 
to my ship for the purpose must be a Chinese oflBcer not a 
foreigner. If he be a Chinese officer, he may count on being 
heartily welcomed. 

(Signed) Ito Yuko, 

Commander-in-Chief, &c. 
(Dated) February 13th. ' 

To H. E. the officer in immediate 
command of the Peiyang squadron. 



APPENDIX 0: 387 



APPENDIX G. 

Capitulation of Wei-hai-wei. 

Art. 1. — There shall be furnished a full list of the Chinese 
soldiers and sailors and of the foreigners in Chinese employ 
who are to be set free in accordance with the present 
stipulation. 

Art. II. — Tlie Cliinese officers and the foreign employes 
shall sign promises not to again take part in the present war 
between Japan and China. 

Art. III. — The military equipment of Liukung shall be 
collected at certain definite places, which shall be reported 
to the Japanese, and the Chinese soldiers and sailors shalF 
be landed at Peshantsin between 5 p.m. of the 14th and 
noon of the 15th, thence to be sent under escort of Japanese 
troops from Wei-hai-wei beyond the lines. 

Art. IV.— The Chinese officer duly competent to represent 
the Chinese army and fleet in Wei-hai-wei shall appoint 
committees for the purpose of handing over the warships and 
forts, and shall cause them to submit by noon of the 15th 
a full list of the arms found in the ships and forts placed 
under their charge. 

Art. V. — The Cliinese officers and the foreigners in 
Chinese service shall be allowed to leave Wei-luii-wei on 
board the Kamj-chi as set forth in Art. X. 

Art. VI. — The officers shall l^e allowed to carry away 
tlieir personal effects, with the exception of arms. 

Art. VII. — The inhabitants of Liukung shall be advised to 
live on the island as before. 

Art. VIII. — The landing of the Japanese on Liukung shall 

*> i* o 



•^8 THE CHIN'A'JABAN WAR. 

begin at 9 a.m. of the 16th, and steps shall be taken to hand 
over the ships, forts, and so forth at once. 

Art. IX. — Any inhabitants or other non-combatants that 
wish to leave the place shall be permitted to do so in 
Chinese junks, from the morning of the 15th, after having 
undergone inspection by Japanese naval officers. 

Art. X. — In order to pay due respect to the memory of 
Admiral Ting, who died in the discharge of his duty to his 
country, Admiral Ito shall decline to receive the steamer 
Kang-diiy but shall leave it at the free disposal of Taotai Niu, 
who shall carry away in it the remains of the Admiral and 
others that died with him ; these steps to be taken between 
noon of the 16th and noon of the 23rd of February. The 
ship shall be inspected by Japanese naval officers on the 
morning of the 15th. 

Art. XI. — Should the Chinese in Liukung after the 
conclusion of this agreement offer any resistance to the 
Japanese, the agreement shall entirely lose its validity, and 
the Japanese will at once resume military operations. 



APPENDIX 27. 389 



APPENDIX H. 

Correspondence between Taotai Niu and Admiral Ito. 

Excellency. — I beg to express my sincere thanks for your 
having permitted our soldiers to leave the island, as intimated 
in your answer to Admiral Ting's letter. I am also grateful 
for your having been so good as to consult with me twice 
subsequently. I learn from Chang Pi-kuang that your 
Excellency has signified your intention of restoring to us 
the Kang-chi, that she may carry the coflBn of Admiral Ting 
as well as our oflBcers out of the Bay. I beg you to accept 
my profound thanks. 

(Signed) Niu-Chang-ping. 
(Dated) 22nd day of 1st moon (Chinese calendar) 

16 th February. 



Excellency, — I have the honour to point out that the 
Kuang-ping belongs to the Kwangtung Squadron. In the 
spring of last year, at the usual inspection by Li-Chung-tang, 
the Kuang-chia, the Kuang-yi and the Kicang-ping came to 
attend the assembly of the Northern Squadron, and at its 
conclusion ought to have returned, but for certain reasons 
remained with the Peiyang fleet temporarily. The Kuang- 
chia and the Kiiang-yi have both been lost, and of the three 
Kuangtung ships only the Kuang-ping remains ; Kuangtung 
had nothing to do with the present war, and if it loses 
all three ships we shall have no excuses to offer to the 



390 THE CHINA-JAPAN WAB. 

Kuangtung Commander-in-Chief. Should your Excellency, 
sympathising with us, restore the KuuTig-ping, I promise that 
she shall not again take 'part in the war. If you cannot 
consent to that, perhaps you will agree that the armament 
be taken from the ship, and that her hull only be restored, 
in which case Chang Pi-kuang will not be disgraced, but will 
have some apology to offer to his commanding officer. Trust- 
ing that your Excellency will appreciate the situation, I 
await your reply. 

(Signed) Niu Chang-ping, 

&c. &c. 



APPENDIX L 391 



APPENDIX I. 

The Peace Confekence at Hikoshima. 

[The following are official translations of the documents 
laid before the Imperial Diet by the Vice-Minister of State 
for Foreign Affairs on the 6th of February, 1895.] 

{^Translation?^ 

Viscount Mutsu Munemitsu, Junii First Class of the Imperial 
Order of the Sacred Treasure, His Imperial Majesty's Minister 
of State for Foreign Affairs, has the honour to announce to 
Their Excellencies the Plenipotentiaries of His Majesty the 
Emperor of China, that His Majesty, the Emperor of Japan, 
has appointed His Excellency Count Ito, Hirobumi, Junti 
Grand Cross of the Imperial Order of Paullownia, His 
Imperial Majesty's Minister-President of State, and the 
undersigned as His Plenipotentiaries to conclude with the 
duly authorised Plenipotentiaries of China, Preliminaries of 
Peace, and has confided to them full powers for that purpose. 
(L.S.) Viscount Mutsu Munemitsu, 

H.I.M/s Minister of State for Foreign Affairs. 
Hiroshima, the 31st day of the 1st month of the 28th year 
of Meiji. 



{Translation). 

The undersigned. His Imperial Majesty's Plenipotentiaries, 
have the honour to acquaint Their Excellencies the Pleni- 
potentiaries of Hifl Majesty the Emperor of China, that the 



3i9^» THE CBINA-irAPAIf'WAB. 

meeting of the Plenipotentiaries of the two Powers is ap- 
pointed to take place at the Hiroshima Kencho, on the 
1st day of the 2nd month of the 28th year of Meiji, at 
11 o'clock A.M. 

The undersigned will on that occasion be prepared to make 
with the Chinese Plenipotentiaries a reciprocal exchange of 
Full Powers. 

Count Ito Hirobuma; 
Viscount Mutsu Munemitsu, 
H.I.M/s Plenipotentiaries. 
Hiroshima, the 31st day of the 1st Month of the 28th 
year of Meiji. 

The 6th day of the 1st moon, the 21st year of Kwang-Su. 



Their Excellencies Count Ito and Viscount Mutsu, Pleni- 
potentiaries of His Majesty the Emperor of Japan — 

We have the honour to inform Your Excellencies that in 
obedience to the command of His Majesty the Emperor of 
China, we proceeded to Japan with the Imperial letter and 
arrived at Hiroshima on the 6th day of the 1st moon of the 
21st year of Kuang-Su. 

We beg to acknowledge the receipt of Your Excellencies^ 
note to the efifect that you have been especially appointed by 
His Majesty the Emperor of Japan to be Plenipotentiaries 
for the purpose of concluding with us Preliminaries of Peace^ 
and to express high appreciation of the fact that Japan has 
not forgotten her old friendsliip. 

We were about to request Your Excellencies to meet us by 
asking you to appoint the time of such meeting, when we had 
again the honour to receive your note communicating to us 
that the meeting will be opened at the Hiroshima Kencho at 
11 o'clock on the 1st day of the 2nd month. 

We beg in reply to say that we will, in compliance with 
your desire, attend the meeting at the appointed day and 



APPENDIX z : 3&3 

hour. We have the honour to convey to Your Excellencies 
the assurance of our highest consideration. 

Chang in Hoon, 

Holding the Bank of President of a Board, Minister of the 
Tsung-li Yamen and Junior Vice-President of the Board of 
Eevenue. 

Shag yu Lien, 

An oflBcer of the Button of the 1st Eank and Acting 
Grovemor of Hunan, 

Plenipotentiaries of His Majesty the Emperor of China. 



{Translation.) 

Mutsuliito, by the Grace of Heaven, Emperor of Japan 
and seated on the Throne occupied by the same Dynasty from 
time immemorial. 

To all to whom these Presents shall come, Greeting. 

With a view to restoration of peace between Our Empire 
and that of China in order to maintain the peace of the 
Orient, 

We, reposing special trust and confidence in Count Ito 
Hirobumi, Junii Grand Cross of the Imperial Order of 
Paullownia, Our Minister-President of State, and Viscount 
Mutsu Munemitsu, Junu First Class of the Imperial Order 
of the Sacred Treasure, Our Minister of State for Foreign 
Affairs, and having full knowledge of their wisdom and 
ability, do hereby name them as Our Plenipotentiaries. 

We have given to Our Plenipotentiaries Full Powers to 
meet and treat, either separately or conjointly, with the 
Plenipotentiaries of China, and to conclude and sign 
Preliminaries of l*eace. 

We shall examine all stipulations which Our said Pleni- 
jjotentiiiries may agree upon and, finding such stipulations 
projKir and in good and due form, We shall ratify them. 



394 THE CEINA' JAPAN. WAR. 

la witness whereof, We have hereunto set Oar signature 
and caused the Great Seal of Lhe Empire to be affixed. 

Done at Hiroshima, this thirty-first day of the month of 
the twenty-eighth year of Meiji, corresponding to the two 
thousand five hundred and fifty-fifth year from the Coronation 
of the Emperor Jimmu. 

(Seal of the Empire.) (Sign Manual.) 

-(Countersigned.) COUNT Ito Hirobumi, 

Minister-President of State, 



{Translation.) 
Memorandum. 

His Imperial Majesty's Plenipotentiaries have the honour 
to announce that the Full Powers which they have just com- 
municated to the Plenipotentiaries of His Majesty the 
Emperor of China embody all the authority wliich His 
Majesty the Emperor of Japan has confided to them in 
connection with the negotiation and conclusion of peace. 

In order to avoid, as far as possible, any future misunder- 
standing, the Japanese Plenipotentiaries desire reciprocally to 
be categorically informed in writing, whether the Full Powers 
which have been communicated to them by the Chinese 
Plenipotentiaries, but which they have not as yet examined, 
embody all the authority confided by His Majesty the 
Emperor of China to the Chinese Plenipotentiaries in con- 
nection with the negotiation and conclusion of peace. 

Hiroshima, the 1st day of the 2nd month of the 28th year 
of Meiji. 



APPENDIX I. 395 



(English Translation accompanied by the Chinese original.) 

[To the Plenipotentiaries of His Majesty the Emperor of 
Japan.] 

We have the lionour to state that you handed, to us on the 
7th day of the 1st moon of the 21st year of Kuang-su, your 
Commission from your Imperial Majesty, and at the same 
time a Memorandum in which you ask of us a written reply 
respecting our Full Powers. 

We beg to state in reply that our Commissions handed to 
you at the same time in exchange, embody Full Powers given 
by our Imperial Majesty for tlie negotiation and conclusion 
of peace, with authority to conclude articles to that end and 
to sign them. In oixler to ensure the more prompt execution 
of the treaty we may agree upon, we shall wire the terms for 
Imperial sanction, and fix the date for signature ; after which 
the same shall be taken to China for examination by His 
Imperial Chinese Majesty, and being found proper and in 
good and due form, will be ratified. 

8th day of the 1st moon of the 21st year of Kuang-su. 



{As translated hy the Japanese Government.) 

By Decree We do appoint Cliang In Hoon, holding the 
Rank of President of a Board, Minister of the Tsung-li 
Yamen and Junior Vice-President of the Board of Revenue, 
and Shao Yu Lien, an Officer of the Button of the First 
Rank, and Acting Governor of Hunan, as Our Plenijjotenti- 
aries to meet and negotiate the matter with the Plenipotenti- 
aries apiKiinted by Japan. 

You will, however, telegraph to the Tsuug-li Yamen for 
the ])urpose of obtaining Our commands, by which you will 
abide. 



396j THE CHINA-JAPAN WAR. 

The members of your mission are placed under your 
control. 

You will carry out your mission in a faithful and diligent 
manner and will fulfil the trust We have reposed in you. 

Eespect this ! 

Seal of Imperial Command. (The dace.) 



[Speech addressed by His Excellency Count Ito to Their 
Excellencies Chang In Hoon and Shao Yu Lien at the 
Conference of the 2nd of February, 1895.] 

The measure which my colleague and myself find it necessary 
at this moment to adopt, is the logical and inevitable result 
of a situation for which we are in no wise responsible. 

China has hitherto held herself almost entirely aloof from 
other Powers, and while she has in some instances enjoyed 
the advantages accruing to her as a member of the family of 
nations, she has perhaps more frequently denied the responsi- 
bilities of that relation. She has pursued a policy of isolation 
and distrust, and consequently her external relations have 
not been characterised by that frankness and good faith 
wliich are essential to good neighbourhood. 

Instances are not wanting in which Chinese Commissioners, 
after having formally agreed to international compacts, have 
refused to affix their seals, and cases might be cited in which 
treaties solemnly concluded have been unceremoniously and 
without apparent reason repudiated. 

Those unfortunate occurrences find a sufficient explanation 
in the fact that China was not on those occasions seriously in 
earnest, but beyond that it might be said with truth that the 
officials who were designated to carry on negotiations had not 
been clothed with the necessary authority for the purpose. 

It has from the first been the wish of Japan to avoid 
results which history teaches her are liable to be the outcome 



'APTENDIX /. : "897 

of negotiations with Chinese officials who are not clotHed With 
full powers in the sense in which that term is usually under- 
stood. Consequently the Imperial Government made it a 
condition precedent to any peace negotiations that the 
Chinese Plenipotentiaries should be furnished with full 
powers to conclude peace, and it was only upon receiving 
positive assurance from the Chinese Government that that 
condition precedent had been complied with and that the 
Chinese Plenipotentiaries were on their way to Japan, that 
His Majesty the Emperor of Japan conferred upon my 
colleague and myself full powers to conclude and sign 
Preliminaries of Peace with the Plenipotentiaries of China. 

That Your Excellencies' powers are, notwithstanding that 
assurance, fatally defective is to me a sure indication that 
the Government of China is not yet really solicitous for 
peace. 

Criticism is nearly exhausted by a simple comparison of 
the two Instruments which were reciprocally exchanged at 
this board yesterday ; but it is not out of place to point out 
that one fulfils the definition which is usually given among 
civilised States to the term Full lN)wers, while the other is 
ilcstitute of nearly all those qualities which are regarded as 
essential to such powers ; it even fails to indicate the subject 
upon which Your Excellencies are to negotiate ; it does not 
uuthorise Your Excellencies to conclude or sign anything; 
it is silent on the subject of the subsequent Imperial rati- 
fication of Your Excellencies' acts. In short, it would seem 
tlmt the authority which has been conferred upon Your 
Excellencies would be completely fulfilled by your reporting 
to your (iovernment what my colleague and myself might 
have to say. In this situation it would be imi>ossible for us 
to continue negotiations. 

It may l»u urged that usi\ge has not been entirely ignored 
in this instance. I cannot admit the sulliciency of such an 
exi)lanatiun. 1 disclaim any riglit to interfere with the 
purely domestic customs of China, but I deem it not only 



398 THE CHINA-JAPAN WAR. 

my right but my duty to insist that in international concerns 
affecting my own country, the peculiar methods of China 
shall yield to the superior rules of international intercourse. 

The restoration of peace is a matter of the greatest 
importance. To bring about a re-establishment of amicable 
relations it is not only necessary that Treaties with that 
object in view should be signed, but it is imperative that the 
engagements should bo fulfilled in good faith. 

While Japan has found no reason to approach China on 
the subject of peace, she nevertheless feels bound in deference 
/ to that civilisation M'^hich she represents, to listen to any 
hona fide overtures which China may advance, but she will 
decline to take part in the future in any fruitless negotiations 
or to become a party to a paper peace. The terms which 
Japan agrees to will be scrupulously observed by her, and she 
will at the same time insist upon a like observance of the 
terms by China. 

Whenever, therefore, China finds herself seriously and 
sincerely desirous of peace and will confide actual full powers 
to Chinese officials, whose names and positions will serve as 
an assurance that the terms which they may agree to will be 
confirmed and carried out in good faith, Japan will be 
prepared to enter upon new negotiations. 



{Translation.) 
Memorandum. 

The Imperial Government repeatedly declared through the 
United States representatives at Tokyo and Pekin, that the 
appointment of Plenipotentiaries with Pull Powers to con- 
clude peace was an indispensable pre-requisite to negotiations 
on the subject of peace. 

His Imperial Majesty's Plenipotentiaries, however, find 
that the authorisation which Their Excellencies the Pleni- 



APPENblX I: ' '3d9 

potentiaries of His Majesty the Emperor of China communi- 
cated to thetn on the 1st instant, is wholly inadequate for 
the purpose for which it is claimed it was issued. It lacks 
nearly all the essential attributes of Full Powers as usfually 
understood. ' 

The Imperial Government have not receded from the 
position which they announced to the representatives of the 
United States that they had taken on the subject of Full 
Powers, and the Imperial Japanese Plenipotentiaries, having 
been entrusted by His Majesty the Emperor of Japan with 
actual, proper, and complete Full Powers, cannot consent to 
treat with Plenipotentiaries of His Majesty the Elnperor of 
China who are only authorised to discuss matters, to report 
to the Tsung-li Yamen, and to obtain subsequent commands 
of the Throne by which they are to be guided. 

Under these circumstances it only remains for Plenipoten- 
tiaries of His Majesty the Emperor of Japan to declare the 
present negotiations at an end. 

Hiroshima, the 2nd day of the 2nd month of the 28th 
year Meiji. 



[Despatch addressed by the Chinese Envoys to the 
Japanese Plenipotentiaries after the termination of the 
negotiations.] 

To the Plcnijyotcntiaries of His Majesty the Emperor of Japan, 

Excellencies, — In the conference held with Your Excellen- 
cies to day, after listening to the speech of His Excellency 
Count Ito, of which a copy was handed to us and a memo- 
randum setting forth the reasons why negotiations for peace 
were terminated, Your Excellencies took leave of us, with 
the information that arrangement would be made for our 
early transportation from your country. 

Before our departure we deem it our duty to our Govern- 



(^ THE (?HINA'JAPAN WAS. 

.ment and to ourselves that we should leave with Your 

'Excellencies the following statement. The commission 

•whicli we handed you in our conference of yesterday, as we 

have, fully explained, does confer upon us full powers to 

negotiate a treaty, and we have stated to Your Excellencies 

.that we were prepared to sign with you a treaty of peace, if 

our negotiations should reach a satisfactory conclusion. This 

lis confirmed in the most solemn and authoritative manner in 

• the letter of our August Sovereign addressed to His Imperial 

Majesty the Emperor of Japan, which we exhibited to you in 

.our first conference, and which we solicited the privilege of 

delivering to His Imperial Majesty, but which request Your 

Excellencies declined to grant. A translation of that letter 

, accompanies this communication. 

We cannot agree with Your Excellencies that the in- 
.struction in our commission to wire for Imperial sanction 
.the result of our negotiation in any way impairs or modifies 
our powers to sign a treaty. As we have already stated to 
joja, its object was to ensure the more prompt ratification and 
execution of the treaty when signed. 

That our interpretation of our power is supported by our 
Government is proved by the fact that at the request of your 
Government the United States Minister at Peking received 
from the Tsung-li Yamen an assurance that we were clothed 
with full powers to negotiate and sign a treaty of peace. 
Besides, we offered in our conference to-day to have any 
technical defects which you thought existed in our com- 
mission corrected by telegraph. 

The commission which we submitted to you is similar 
in form to those with which His Imperial Majesty the 
Jlmperor of China has been accustomed to invest His Pleni- 
potentiaries when despatched to other lands for the negotia- 
tion of treaties, and so far as we are aware, this is the first 
instance such credentials have been rejected. 

Ours is a mission of peace, and it does not become us at 
this time to discuss the unfriendly.^Jlusions contained in the 



APPENDIX I 401 

speech respecting the Government of China. We need only- 
express our deep regret that the earnest efiforts which we 
have put forth to carry out the wishes of our August 
Sovereign for a speedy and satisfactory termination of the 
war which now distracts the two neighbouring nations have 
proven fruitless. 

We cannot, however, close this communication without 
expressing our surprise at the manner in which we have been 
deprived of the customar}' privileges of Plenipotentiaries on 
a mission of peace. We have been informed by Count Ito 
that telegraphic communications in cypher with our govern- 
ment would not be permitted, and we have been notified by 
an official of the Japanese Foreign Office that a cypher tele- 
gram addressed to us has been received, but that it could not be 
delivered until we furnish the private code of our government 
for its translation. Before our departure from Peking we 
were assured by the Minister of the United States in 
that capital that we would be permitted, in accordance with 
international practice, to freely communicate in cypher witli 
our government by telegraph. 

We conclude with the expression of our thanks for the 
trouble the Japanese Government has taken in bringing us 
to this city and for its hospitable entertainment while here,, 
and with assurances to your Excellencies of our distinguished 
consideration. 

(Signed) Chang. 

Shag. 

This despatch was forthwith returned by Mr. Nakada, 
private secretary of the Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, 
who lianded the following note to the envoys : — 

I have the honour to state that the ambassadorial capacity 
of their Excellencies Chang Yin Wan and Shao Yiulien 
having ceaseil to be recognisable simultaneously with the 
breaking off of the negotiation, their Excellencies Count Ito 

2 D 






402 THE CHINA-JAPAN WAR. 

« 

and Viscount Mutsu are precluded from holding any com- 
munication with their Excellencies Chang and Shao. I am 
therefore instructed by their Excellencies the Minister- 
President of State and the Minister of State for Foreign 
Affairs to return the accompanying despatch to their 
Excellencies Chang and Shao. 

(Signed) Nakada Kkiji. 
To their Excellencies, &c. 



APPENDIX J. 403 



APPENDIX J. 

His Majesty the Emperor of Japan, in consideration of 
the fact that the progress of the Peace Ne<^otiations has been 
interrupted by an untoward incident, issued instructions to 
the Empire's Peace Plenipotentiaries to agree to a temporary 
armistice. Consequently, His Imperial Majesty's Plenipo- 
tentiaries, Count Ito, Minister-President of State, etc., and 
Viscount Mutsu, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, etc., 
have concluded the following convention with Earl Li, 
Viceroy of Chihli, etc., the Plenii)otentiary of His Imperial 
Majesty the Emperor of China : — 

Art. I. — The Governments of Japan and China liereby 
agree that the land and sea forces of the two countries shall 
observe an armistice in the districts of Mukden, Cliihli, 
and Shantung, in accordance with the stipulations of this 
convention. 

AuT. II. — Th3 forces required to cease fighting in virtue of 
tliis convention shall be entitled to retain possession of all 
the ])laces now in their occupation. Provided that, under no 
circumstiinces whatever shall any advance be made beyond 
tlie aforesaid places during the peritxl covered by tliis 
convention. 

Art. III. — the Governments of the Empires of Japan and 
< 'hina ln'reby agree that, during the perioil covered by this 
convention, neitlier party, wliether for offensive or defensive 
purposes, shall augment its armies now in the field, or shall 
send reinforcements, or shall in any other way increase their 
combative Oiii»aeity. It shall, nevertlieless, be within the 
comjyetonce of the Government of either empire to make 

2 D 2 



404 TEE CEINA'JAPAN WAB. 

redistribution or transportation of its troops, provided that 
such redistribution or transportation be not intended to 
augment the armies now actually engaged in the field. 

Art. IV. — With regard to the maritime transport of 
military necessaries or other contraband of war, seizures 
made in accordance with the laws of war shall be per- 
missible. 

Art, V. — The Governments of the two Empires of Japan 
and China agree to carry into effect the armistice agreed 
upon by this convention for a period of twenty-one days, 
counting from the day of signature. With respect to 
positions now occupied by the troops of each empire and not 
within reach of communication by telegraph, rapid methods 
of transmitting the order to cease hostilities shall be 
employed, and the officers in command of the forces of the 
two empires, upon receipt of such order, shall mutually 
convey information of the fact to each other, and shall make • 
arrangements for an armistice. 

Art, VI. — It is agreed that, without any further inter- 
communication, this convention shall cease to have binding 
force at noon on the 20th day of the 4th month of the 28th 
year of Meiji, namely, the 26th day of the 3rd month of the 
21st year of Kwang-su. But should the peace negotiations 
be broken off before that date, this convention shall simul- 
taneously terminate. 

(Dated) Shimonoseki; the 30th day of the 3rd month 

of the 28th year of Meiji; namely, the 5th 
day of the 3rd month of the 21st year of 
Kwang-su. 

(Signed) — Here follow the signatures and seals of Count 

Ito, Viscount Mutsu, and the Viceroy Li. 



AFPENDTX K 405 



APPENDIX K. 
Documents relating to the Treaty of Peace. 

(^From the Peking and Tientsin Times,) 



Japans First Draft of Treaty of Peace. 

Shimonoseki^ 1st Jpril, 1895. 

His Majesty the Emperor of Japan and His Majesty the 
Emperor of China, desiring to restore the blessings of peace 
to their countries and subjects and to remove all cause for 
future complications, have named as their Plenipotentiaries 
for the purpose of concluding a Treaty of Peace, that is to 
say: 

(Here are inserted names and titles of Plenipotentiaries.) 

Who after having exchanged their Full Powers, which 
were found to be in good and proper form, have agreed to the 
following articles : 

^ Article I. — China recognises definitively the full and com- 
plete independence and autonomy of Corea, and in conse- 
<|uence the payment of tribute and the performance of cere- 
monies and formalities by Corea to China in derogation of 
such independence and autonomy, shall wholly cease for the 
future. 

Article II. — China cedes to Japan in perpetuity and full 
sovereignty the following territories together with all forti- 
fications, arsenals and public proi)erty thereon : 

(a.) The southern portion of the province of Shengking 
witliin tlie following boundaries : 

The line of demarcation b^ins at the mouth of the Biver 



406 THE CHINA-JAPAN WAR. 

Yalu, and ascends that stream as far as Sanchatsn, thence it 
runs directly north to Yiishutihsia ; thence it runs directly 
west until it strikes the Eiver Liao ; it follows from thence 
the course of that river southward to 41° north latitude; 
from thence it coincides with that parallel of latitude to the 
westward as far as 122° longitude east of Greenwich, and 
from that point of intersection it follows the same meridian 
of longitude southward to the coast of the Bay of Liaotung, 
where it terminates. 

This cession in clude^ all Islands appertaining or belonging 
to the province of Shengking situated in the eastern portion 
of the l^ay of Liaotung and in the northern part of the 
Yellow Sea. 

(&.) The Island of Formosa, together with all Islands 
adjacent or belonging to the said Island of Formosa. 

(c.) The Pescadores Group, that is to say, all Islands lying 
between 119° and 120° longitude east of Greenwich, and 23°" 
and 24° north latitude. 

Article III. — The alignments of the frontiers described in 
the preceding Article and shown on the annexed map, shall 
be subject to verification and demarcation on the spot by a 
Joint Commission of Delimitation consisting of two or more 
Japanese and two or more Chinese Delegates, to be appointed 
immediately after the exchange of the ratifications of this 
Act. In case the boundaries laid down in this Act are found 
to be defective at any point, either on account of topography 
or in consideration of good administration, it shall also be the 
duty of the Delimitation Commissioners to rectify the same. 

The Delimitation Commission will enter upon its duties as 
soon as possible, and will bring its labours to a conclusiott 
within the period of one year after appointment. 

The alignments laid down in this Act shall, however, be 
maintained until the ratifications of the Delimitation Com- 
mission, if any are made, shall have received the approval of 
the Governments of Japan and China. 

Article IV.— China agrees to pay to Japan as a war in- 



APPENDIX K. 407 

demnity the sum of 300,000,000 Kuping taels. The said 
sum to be paid in five instalments ; the fii'st instalment 
being 100,000,000 taels, and the four remaining instalments 
being 50,000,000 each. The first instalment is to be paid 
within six months after the exchange of ratifications of tliis 
Act, and the four remaining instalments are to be respec- 
tively paid on or before the same date of the four succeeding 
years. Interest at the rate of 5 ^^^r cent. ^)er annum shall 
begin to run on all unpaid portions of the said indemnity 
from the date the first instalment falls due. 

Article V. — The inhabitants of the territories ceded to 
Japan who wish to take up their residence outside the ceded 
districts shall .be at liberty to sell their real property and 
retire. For this purpose a period of two years from tlie date 
of the exchange of the ratifications of the present Act shall 
be granted. At the expiration of that period those of the 
inhabitants wlio shall not have left such territories shall, at 
at the option of Japan, be deemed to be Japanese subjects. 

Article VI. — All treaties between Japan and China having 
come to an end in consequence of war, China engages imme- 
diately upon the exchange of the ratifications of this Act to 
appoint Plenipotentiaries to conclude with the Japanese 
rieuipotentiaries a Treaty of Commerce and Navigation and 
a Convention to regulate Frontier Intercourse and Trade. 
Tlie Treaties, Conventions and Kegulations now subsisting 
between China and European Powers shall serve as a basis 
for the said Treaty and Convention between Japan and China. 
From the date of the exchange of the ratification of this Act 
until the said Treaty and Convention are brought into actual 
operation the Japanese Government, its officials, commerce, 
navigation, frontier intercourse and trade, industries, ships 
and subjects shall in every respect be accoixled by China 
most favoured nation treatment. 

China makes in addition the following concessions, to Uike 
ett'ect six months after date of the present Act : 

1st. — Tlie following cities, towns and ports, in addition to 



*»■<■ 



408 THE CHINA-JAPAN WAB. 

those abeady opened, are opened to the trade, residence, 
industries and manufactures of Japanese subjects, under the 
same conditions and with the same privileges and facilities 
as exist at the present open cities, tovms and ports of China: 

1. — Peking. 
•' 2. — Shashih in the province of Hupeh. 

3. — Siangtan in the province of Hunan. 
^ 4. — Chungking in the province of Szechuen, 

5. — Wuchow in the province of Kuangsi. 

* 6. — Soochow in the province of Kiangsu. 

• 7. — Hangchow in the province of Chekiang. 

The Japanese Government shall have the right to station 
Consuls at any or all the above-named places, 

2nd. — Steam navigation for vessels under the Japanese 
flag for the conveyance of passengers and cargo shall be 
extended to the following places : 

1. — On the Upper Yangtsze Eiver from Ichang to Chung- 
king. 

2. — On the Siang Eiver and Lake Tungting from the 
Yangtsze Eiver to Siangtan. 

3. — On the West Eiver from Canton to Wuchow. 

4. — On the Woosung Eiver and the Canal from Shanghai 
to Soochow and Hangchow. 

The Eules and Eegulations which now govern the naviga- 
tion of the inland waters of China by foreign vessels shall, 
so far as applicable, be enforced in respect of the above- 
named routes, until new Eules and Eegulations are conjointly 
agreed to. 

3rd. — All goods imported into China by Japanese subjects, 
upon the payment, either at the time of entry or subsequently 
at the option of the importer or owner, of a commutation tax 
or duty of two per cent, upon the original cost, shall there- 
after in every part of China, be exempt from all taxes, 
imposts, duties, charges and exactions of whatever nature or 
under whatever denomination levied in the name or for the 
profit of the Government, public functionaries, private in- 



APPENDIX K. 409 

dividuals, corporations or establishments of any kind. In 
like manner and to the same extent, but without the payment 
of any commutation tax or duty whatever, an equal immunity 
from every kind of taxation shall be accorded by China in 
respect of all Chinese goods and produce purchased in China 
by Japanese subjects and declared to be for export, such 
immunity from taxation shall exist, from the date of such 
declaration up to the time of actual exportation. All Chinese 
goods and produce intended for home consumption, when 
conveyed in Japanese vessels from one open port to another 
open port in China, shall, upon the payment of the coasting 
trade dues existing at this time, be in the same manner and 
to the same extent, exempt, during the whole process of such 
conveyance, from all kinds of taxation, including import and 
export duties. It is, however, unSerstood that the foregoing 
stipulations do not in anywise affect any arrangement for the 
time being in force regarding the taxation of imported opium. 

4th. — Japanese subjects purchasing goods or produce in 
the interior of China or transporting imported merchandise 
into the interior of China, shall have the right temporarily 
to rent or hire wareliouses for the storage of the articles so 
purchased or transported, without tlie payment of any taxes 
or exactions whatever and without the interference of any 
Chinese otTicials. 

nth. — The Kuping tael shall be taken to be the tael in 
which all taxes, duties and fees are payable by Japanese 
subjects in China, and all such taxes, duties and fees may be 
IMiid in standard Japanese silver yen at their face or repre- 
.sentative value. 

Gth. — Japanese subjects shall be free to engage in all kinds 
of manufacturing industries in China, and shall be at liberty 
to import into China all kinds of machinery, paying only the 
.stipulated import duties tliereon. 

All articles manufactured by Japanese subjects in China 
shall in res^^ect of inland tninsit and internal taxes, duties, 
charges and exactions of all kinds, and also in respect of 



410 THE CHINA-JAPAN WAR. 

warehousing and storage facilities in the interior of China, 
stand upon the same footing and enjoy the same privileges 
and exemptions as merchandise imported by Japanese, 
subjects into China. 

7th. — China engages to at once proceed under the advice 
of experts to remove the Woosung bar at the mouth of the 
Huongpu Eiver in such a manner as to maintain constantly 
a clear channel of at least twenty feet in depth at low water. 

In the event of additional Rules and Regulations being 
necessary in connection with these concessions, they shall be 
embodied in the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation 
provided for by this Article. 

Article VII. — Subject to the provisions of the next 
succeeding Article, the evacuation of China by the armies of 
Japan shall be completely effected within three months after 
the exchange of the ratifications of the present Act. 

Article VIII. — As a guarantee of the faithful perform- 
ance of the stipulations of this Act, China consents to the 
temporary occupation by the military forces of Japan of the 
following places : 

Fengtienfu (Moukden) in the province of Shengking. 

Weihaiwei in the province of Shantung. 

Fenr^tienfu shall be evacuated by Japan upon the payment 
of the first two instalments of the war indemnitv herein 
stipulated for, and Wei-hai-wei shall be evacuated upon the 
payment of the final instalment of said indemnity. It is 
however expressly understood that no evacuation shall take 
place until after the exchange of the ratifications of the 
Treaty of Commerce and Navif^ation. 

All expenses connect<3(l witli this temporary occupation 
shall be defrayed by China. 

Article IX. — Immediately upon the exchange of the ratifi- 
cations of this Act, all prisoners of war then held shall be 
restored, and China undertakes not to ill-treat or punish 
prisoners of war so restored to her l)y Japan. China also 
engages to at once release all Japanese subjects accused of 



JlPPENDIX K. 411 

being military spies or charged with any otlier military 
offences. Cliina further engages not to puuisli in any 
manner nor to allow to be punished tliose Chinese subjects 
who have in any manner teen compromised in their relations 
with tlie Japanese army during the war. 

Article X. — All offensive military operations shall cease 
upon tlie exchange of the ratifications of this Act. 

Article XI. — The present Act shall be ratified by their 

Majesties the Emperor of Japan and the Emperor of Ciiina, 

and the ratifications shall be exchanged at on the 

day of the month of the 28th year of Meiji, 

corresponding to 

In Witness whereof the respective Plenipotentiaries have 
signed the same and have affixed thereto the seal of their 
arms. 

Done at Shimonoseki in duplicate, this day of the 

month of the 28th year of Meiji, corresponding to 



Chinas Reply, 

Shimonotekif 5'A April, 1895. 

In the brief time agreed upon within which I was to 
make my examination and reply to the draft of Treaty 
proposed by Their Excellencies the Japanese Plenipotentiaries, 
I have given to the imi)ortant subject the most earnest study 
and care which it has l>een i)0S8ible to devote to it, in view 
of the pliysical disability under which, unfortunately for my 
country, I am now suffering. If, therefore, this memorandum 
sliould n(»t 1^ as complete as might be desired, I can only 
ph*ad these causes in excuse, and trust that within a few 
days I shall be able to answer fully and sj^ecifically all the 
I)oints desired by the Japanese PlenijMjtentiaries, 

Without taking up every Article in detail, I have sought 
to group together my views under the four important ques- 
tions involved in the negotiations and embraced in the draft 



412 2EE CHINA-JAPAN WAR. 

of Treaty, namely; 1st, Corea; 2nd, Cession of Territory 
3rd, Indemnity ; and 4th,. Commercial Privileges. 

1. — Corea. 

The Chinese Government some months ago indicated its 
willingness to recognise the full and complete independence 
and guarantee the complete neutrality of Corea, and is ready 
to insert such a stipulation in the Treaty; but in due 
reciprocity, such stipulation should likewise be made by 
Japan. Hence the Article will require to be modified in this 
respect. 

2. — Cession of Territory, 

The preamble to the proposed draft of Treaty sets forth 
that the object of making it is " to remove all cause for future 
complications." But this Article, in place of promoting that 
object, contains provisions which, if insisted upon and 
enforced, will be the sure and fruitful source of complications 
which may be transmitted through many generations. 

It is the duty of the Plenipotentiaries of the two Govern- 
ments, and it is a part of wise statesmanship, to negotiate 
such a peace as will make true friends and allies of these two 
great nations of tlie Orient, who are and must remain 
neighbours, and who have in common so many things in their 
history, literature, art and commerce. Territory long held by 
a nation, through many centuries and dynasties, becomes a 
priceless heritage. Nothing will so arouse the indignation of 
tlie people of China and create in them a spirit of undying 
hostility and hatred, as to wrest from their country important 
portions of their territory. 

This will be especially the case with that portion of 
territory described in clause {a) of this Article, because it 
gives Japan a foothold and base for military and naval 
operations within easy reach of and constantly threatening 
the capital of the empire, and because it takes from the 
present dynasty of China a portion of its ancient possessions. 



' APPENDIX K. 413 

In this clause China hears Japan, saying : "I am going to be 
your ever-threatening and undying enemy, with my aixnyt 
and navy ready to pounce do\^ai upon your capital when iti: 
suits me ; and I propose to humiliate your Emperor by taking, 
from him a valuable portion of his ancestors' home." 

It further means a line of fortifications along the whole 
co-tenninus frontier ; large standing armies and navies near 
at hand at great expense to both nations, and constant danger 
from frontier broils and from the lawless on both sides of the 
dixiding line. 

Japan, in inaugurating the war, announced her object to 
be to secure the complete independence of Corea, and her 
diplomatic ministers in Europe and America declared that it 
was not the purpose of their Government to wage a war of 
conquest. If if should be consistent with these declarations, 
it is entirely possible to so modify Article II. and other 
Articles to be specified, as to make a lasting peace and one 
which will in the future make the two great peoples of the 
East sincere friends, and thus stand as an immovable bulwark 
against the encroachments of the hostile nations. But if a 
]>eace is to be exacted by Japan through the successful 
fortunes of war, which will necessarily awaken in the Chinese 
l)eople a spirit of hostility and revenge, it may well be antici- 
pated that both nations, without any bond of sympathy or 
interest, will fall a prey to outside enemies. 

3. — Indemnity, 

China does not think it is just to require her to pay an 
indemnit}' for the expenses of a war in which she does not 
regard herself as the aggressor, and during which she has not 
inva<le<l Japanese temtory ; hence it seems illogical for China 
to ])ay an indemnity. But in view of tlie fact that my 
CJovemment, desiring to bring the unfortunate war to a close, 
so as to relieve the pt»ople from suffering, in October last 
promised through the American Minister to pay indemnity, 
and in view of the further fact that an indeninitv was one of 



4U- THE CHINA-JAPAN WAR. 

the conditions mentioned among the terms announced by 
Japan, on the 17th of February last, through the Minister of 
the United States in Peking, I am prepared to insert in the 
Treaty a provision for a reasonable indemnity. 
"^ In the first place, it is to be noted that Jap^n stated the 
object of tlie war was to secure the complete independence of 
Corea. On November 22nd of last year it was announced tx) 
the foreign Governments that China was ready to acknow- 
ledge the independence of Corea; and the expenses of the 
war beyond that time ought not to be included in the 
indemnity. 

In requiring an indemnity of China it should not be fixed 
at a sum beyond her ability to pay, as her failure to pay 
would be held by Japan to be a violation of the Treaty, and' 
might lead to a renewal of the war. The amount demanded 
is beyond the ability of China to pay under her present 
system of taxation. To increase the internal or domestic 
taxes at this time would lead to great discontent, and pro- 
bably to insurrection, especially when added to the dissatis- 
faction of the people with the Emperor and his Government 
for making what they will style a humiliating and dishonour- 
able peace. The Customs tariff on imports and exports 
cannot be increased, because of treaties with foreign Govern- 
ments, which require ten years* notice and the unanimous 
consent of the Governments concerned. 

This latter source of revenue is the only available fund 
which can be hypothecated or pledged to bankers or capitalists 
in negotiating foreign loans. It is already so fully pledged 
for war loans that only a part of it can be made available for 
a loan to pay off the indemnity. From a statement prepared 
by the Commissioner of Foreign Customs at Shanghai, on the 
1st of March last, it appears that the Customs revenues of 
China were on that date pledged for the payment of war 
loans, in 1895, of Haikuan taels 3,937,420 ; in 1896, of Hk. 
taels 6,281,620 ; in 1897, of Hk. taels 5,142,238 ; and that 
upon these war loans it will be necessary within twenty 



APPENDIX K. 4la 

years to pay Hk. taels 78,017,103 out of the Customs 
revenues. It is to be noted that since the 1st of March the 
amount of these loans has been considerably increased. 

The credit of the Chinese Government and its ability to 
negotiate a loan have been greatly injured by the war. It 
has been compelled to pay 7 and even 8 J per cent, interest, 
and the lowest rate it has obtained abi*oad (and that for small 
sums only) was 6 per cent., with a heavy discount on the face 
value of the bonds. It is claimed by prominent and ex- 
perienced bankers that the best rate which can be obtained at 
the conclusion of peace is 6 J to 7 per cent, on the full value 
of the bonds. 

The average annual total revenue received from Chinese 
Customs, including transit dues and opium likin, from 1890 
to 1893 inclusiv^e, amounts to Hk. taels 22,548,150 ; and of 
this sum it has heretofore been customary to pay over to the 
provincial authorities six-tenths. If this important sum of 
ready cash is diverted to pay the indemnity, new taxation 
will have to be imposed in the provinces, and the people 
would complain. If a foreign loan is sought to be made to 
meet the indemnity asked by Japan, it would require in 
principal and interest, at 6J^ per cent., if redeemable in twenty 
years, the enormous sum of Ha. taels 690,000,000, an amount 
entirely beyond the possibility of the Chinese Government 
to negotiate, and beyond its ability to meet by taxation. 

This will be apparent to any one at all acquainted with 
Chinese revenues, when it is remembered that the indemnity 
to Japan is not the only financial burden which has been 
brought upon China by the war, and which must be imme- 
diately provided for. As already mentioned, the terms of 
peace when made known will cause the present dynasty and 
the Government to l)ecome unpopular with many of the 
Chinese people, and local discontent and disorder may be 
expected. Besides, there have been called into the field large 
numbers of raw and undisciplined troops, which with the 
conclusion of peace must be disbanded, and there is great 



416 THE CHINA-JAPAN WAR. 

danger that they will commit acts of robbery and lawlessness 
which will seriously tax the Government to suppress. The 
energies of the Government will be tried to the utmost to 
preserve the peace, and without peace and order it will be 
impossible to raise even the usual revenues. It will, there- 
fore, become necessary, in order to preserve internal tran- 
quillity, to organise and equip an army according to modem 
methods of warfare, and to rebuild the navy which has been 
practically destroyed by the war. These will require large 
and immediate expenditures of money, but it will be impos- 
sible to raise the money for these purposes if this heavy 
indemnity is to be paid. The Government is contemplating 
various reforms and improvements in the country, but all 
these will be paralysed if Japan does not largely reduce her 
demand. 

The indemnity is tenned in the draft the proposed treaty 
" a war indemnity,'* which it is supposed means an indemnity 
to pay the expenses incurred by Japan in the prosecution of 
the war. But if that is the case, I think the Japanese Pleni- 
potentiaries must admit that the sum demanded is largely in 
excess of that amount It is not possible for one not pos- 
sessed of the official details to know the exact amount of the 
war expenses of Japan up to the present time, but there are 
certain official and public data and statements which would 
seem to fix the limits within which that sum may be approxi- 
mately estimated, and the Japanese Plenipotentiaries will be 
able to confirm or correct it. It is understood that there was 
in the Public Treasury of Japan, at the opening of the war, 
about 30,000,000 yen. How much of this sum was used for war 
purposes is not known to the public, but it may be assumed 
that all of it was appropriated for that purpose. Soon after 
the opening of hostilities a war loan of 150,000,000 yen was 
authorised. According to the report in the public press of 
Japan, the Prime Minister, His Excellency Count Ito, made 
a speech in the Lower House of the Japanese Parliament on 
the 20th of February last, in which after referring to the 



APPENDIX K. 417 

failure of negotiations at Hiroshima early in that month, he 
used this language : " From the subsequent state of the war 
and under the present circumstances it is difficult to tell 
when peace will be restored, and it is not improbable that the 
war fund may become insufficient." He thereupon asked 
the Parliament to authorise an additional war loan to meet 
the emergency of a considerable prolongation of the war. 

It seems fair to infer from this speech that the first war 
loan had. not been exhausted and would not be unless the 
war was continued for some time. The Japanese vernacular 
newspapers, in referring to this speech and the action of the 
Parliament on the subject, stated that " the actual need of 
the fund will be some time in June or July next, and the 
Government is said to have submitted it to the Diet, not 
because the money is in urgent need, but because the Diet is 
just now sitting." (See Asahi^ quoted in the Yokohama 
Gazette^ February 23rd) ; and the following, " of the first war 
loan there remains 50,000,000 yeii to be raised, and of the 
80,000,000 already floated a considerable sum was still to be 
jmid up." (See Kohtmin, as quoted in the Japan Mail of 
February 23rd.) In addition account is to be taken of some 
popular contributions. But if these statenienta are to be 
accepted as approximately correct, it would seem reasonable 
to believe that the total money expenditure of Japan in the 
war up to the present time does not exceed 150,000,000 i/eri. 

In estimating the war expenditure of Japan, it should not 
be forgotten that victory has given that country many valu- 
able spoils of war, such as the captured naval vessels and the 
large amount of military material and supplies, which should 
fairly be deducted in fixing the gross amount of the 
indemnitv. 

To charge China with interest on the deferretl payments of 
the indemnity is an onerous and unreasonable provision, and 
Ijecomes doubly so when the enormous amount demanded is 
/considered. 



2 E 



418 TEE CHINA-JAPAN WAS. 

4. — Commercial FHvileges. 

In the very brief time allowed for an examination and 
reply to the Treaty draft, it has not been possible to study 
fully the complex and detailed questions to which the com- 
mercial privileges and stipulations asked for give rise. The 
following must be taken as merely an expression of views- 
and full reservation is made to add to or correct them here- 
after. It is hoped, however, that the following statement 
may aid the Japanese Plenipotentiaries in understandiug some 
of the clauses to which China is disposed to agree and some 
respecting which modifications will be asked. 

War having suspended the operation of the late Commercial 
Treaty, a new agreement is recognised by China ais necessary^ 
and she is ready to accept the existing treaties with Foreign* 
Powers as the basis of negotiations ; it will require, however^ 
in due reciprocity that a stipulation ))e added to the intro- 
ductory paragraph of the Article, granting favoured nationi 
treatment to China in Japan. 

Keply is for the present reserved on the 1st and 2nd clauses. 

The 3rd clause provides for a reduction of the transit dues 
on Japanese imported goods to two per cent., or a practical 
decrease of one-half of one per cent. ; and it is proposed to 
abolish altogether the existing transit dues on goods exported. 
When it is remembered that this same Treaty contains an 
Article demanding of China the payment of an indemnity^ 
beyond her present power to make, it seems most inappro- 
priate to ask China to give up any of her existing sources of 
revenue. Eather ought Japan, in view of what has been 
stated respecting the Customs revenues, to agree to an increase 
of that tariff. At the same time that Japan is negotiating- 
mth Foreign Powers to secure an increase of her own tariff, 
it is hardly consistent to demand of China a reduction of her 
already low tariff. 

The effect or object of the 3rd clause appears to be to* 
exempt foreign goods from any dues or likin tax whatever 



APPENDIX K. 419 

after they had passed out of the hands of the importer or 
foreign owner. This is a subject which has been often con- 
sidered with foreign diplomatic representatives at Peking, 
and the fairness of such a claim has never been shown. There 
is no Grovernment which more jealously guards its commercial 
privileges than Great Britain, and her subjects engaged in 
the Chinese trade have often moved her Ministers to secure 
relief from the likin tax, but without success. Lord Elgin, 
who accompanied the British army to Peking, and exacted 
from China after the occupation all the commercial privileges 
which he deemed just on the part of the victor, rejected the 
claim as now proposed and said he " did not see his way clear 
to further protection of imports against taxation once they 
have passed into the hands of a Chinese purchaser." (British 
Government Blue-book on Bevision of Treaty of Tientsin, 
1871, p. 443.) The British Board of Trade, having official 
supervision of foreign commerce, examined this subject at the 
request of the British Office of Foreign Affairs, and decided 
that " to insure the sale of the (imported) goods to their 
ultimate consumer with no enhancement of cost derived from 
taxation .... is a view which cannot be entertained by Her 
Majesty's Government. There is nothing in the Treaty which 
appears to my Lords to justify such a sweeping demand, and 
in view of the internal taxation to which native goods are 
subject in China, it would be in their opinion both unjust 
and inexpedient to enforce such a demand, even if it were 
warranted by the terms of Treaty stipulations " (lb. p. 347), 
Sir Tliomas Wade, so familiar with Chinese trade, and so long 
the able representative of Her Majesty's interests at Peking, 
said the likin tax " is not in its nature more open to objection 
than our income tax, nor, indeed, to any extraordinary tax 
by wliidi a State short of money may recruit its finances." 
And aj^in, referring to the abuse to which the privilege asked 
for in the 3rd clause would give rise, he said, " it is hard 
enough on the Provincial (xoveminents that they must give 
up their tolls on goods that are foreign-owned ; but it wiU 

2 E 2 



420 THE CHINA-JAPAN WAB. 

be harder still if Chinese, armed with foreigners' certificates, 
are to carry Chinese-owned goods toll free from one end of 
the Empire to the other " (lb. pp. 444 and 447). In view of 
these declarations, so well founded in justice and propriety, I 
feel sure the Japanese Plenipotentiaries will be willing to 
modify their proposition so as to secure the protection of 
imported goods only so long as they remain in the possession 
.of the foreign owner. This will be secured by granting to 
Japan favoured nation treatment, and Japan should be 
satisfied with tliat 

It may be remarked on the 4th clause that, laying aside 
for the present the consideration of the justice of this claim, 
its prudence may be seriously questioned. To allow foreign 
merchants. to temporarily establish themselves at great dis- 
tances from the treaty ports, beyond the protection and con- 
trol of their Consuls, would seem to be inconsistent with the 
practice of extra- territoriality, and greatly embarrassing to 
the Chinese authorities. Sir Thomas Wade, in discussing a 
similar proposition presented by British merchants, said : " I 
am decidedly against any sweej)ing demand with reference to 
it. . . . We are bound to ask nothing from, her (China) 
except when we see our way to a fair provision for the con- 
trol of the extra- territorialised foreigner." And again, " if 
our merchants are to congregate in any number in a Chinese 
town or suburb inland, I shall be much mistaken if we do 
not soon find the necessity of a land concession forced upon 
us " (lb., pp. 435 and 449). 

The 6th clause refers to the privilege of importing machinery 
into China to convert Chinese raw materials into manu- 
factured goods, a question which has been much discussed 
with the Diplomatic Corps at Peking, and which has been 
settled against the privileges asked for in this clause. Tiie 
prohibition of foreigners from engaging in China in manu- 
facturing industries has been one of long standing and iu 
which Foreign Governments have acquiesced, as a prohibi- 
tion which properly belongs to the sovereignty and indepen- 



APPENDIX K. 421 

dence of a nation. To allow foreigners to enter and establish 
factories for converting the natural products into manufac- 
tured goods would tend to destroy the livelihood of the 
Chinese and work a serious injury to native industries which 
it is the duty of the Government to protect. The regulation 
is one which has been in existence for many years, and ontr 
which has been adopted by other nations, and should not now 
be abolished. The provision inserted in the 6th clause 
exempting all articles manufactured by Japanese in China 
from all internal taxation is most objectionable and unduly 
discriminating. Besides, if these privileges are granted to 
Japanese subjects, they must necessarily be extended to all 
nations which have treaties with China, and the ruin of the 
native industries would be swift and certain. 

The provisions contained in Article VIIL, making the 
evacuation of the places named therein dependent upon the 
conclusion of the Treaty of Commerce provided for in 
Article VI., seems an unnecessary and unreasonable provi- 
sion. By the terms of the latter Article Japan is at once 
guaranteed the most favoured nation treatment, and thereby 
placed on an equality in respect to commerce with all 
competitors. 

The foregoing embraces a review of all the important and 
essential provisions contained in the draft of Treaty sub- 
mitted for my consideration, and to which I have made as 
frank and as complete a reply as has been possible under the 
circumstances. A few Articles of minor importance or of 
mere detail have not been noticed, but it is believed that if 
an accord should liappily be reached on the four questions 
above discussed, the Articles not treated of may be arranged 
in due time. 

I trust I may be pardoned for saying that I have served 
my country for half a century, and it may be that I am 
nearing the end of my days. This mission is probably the 
last inn>ortant service I will be permitted to render my 
Sovereign and his subjects. It is my sincere desire and my 



422 THE CHINA-JAPAN WAR. 

highest ambition to reach such a conclusion of our negotia- 
tions as will bring lasting peace and friendship to the people 
and Governments which we represent. 

We should listen* to the voice of reason ; we should be so 
controlled by the highest principles of statesmanship as to 
safeguard the interests and the future welfare of these two 
great peoples, whose destinies and happiness for many gene- 
rations are now in our hands. 

It matters little to Japan, in this time of her abounding 
prosperity and greatness and in the abundance of able men, 
whether she to-day receives a larger or smaller indemnity, 
or whether she enlarges her boundaries by the annexation of 
a greater or smaller portion of the territory now within the 
reach of her armies ; but it is a matter of vast moment to her 
future greatness and the happiness of her people, whether or 
not by the negotiations now in hand her Plenipotentiaries 
make of the Chinese nation firm friends and allies or invete- 
rate foes. As their representative I stand ready to join 
hands with Their Excellencies the Plenipotentiaries of Japan, 
in making such a peace as will leave no seeds of enmity to 
spring up and curse us in future generations, and such a 
peace as will bring honour to us and blessing and enduring 

friendship to the two great nations of the Orient. 

Li Hung-chang, 

Ambassador Plenipotentiary of 

His Majesty the Emperor of China. 



Cliina (tsked to Formulate Ji^r Proposals, 

Shimonoseki, 6th Aprils 1895. 

At the meeting of the 1st day of the 4th month of the 
2^th year of Meiji (April 1st, 1895), the Plenipotentiaries of 
His Majesty the Emperor of Japan, proposed that in pre- 
senting the conditions of peace, a mode of procedure should 
be adopted by which the draft Treaty of Peace would be pre- 



APPENDIX K. 423 

«ented article by article and the Plenipotentiary of His 
Majesty the Emperor of China should express his acceptance 
•or non-acceptance of the several articles one by one, thus 
disposing of each article in succession. 

In view, however, of a desire repeatedly expressed by the 
Chinese Plenijwtentiary that the draft Treaty might be pre- 
sented to liim en bloc, the Japanese Plenipotentiaries finally 
complying mth his wishes, presented to him the draft Treaty 
in its entirety under an assurance that he would, witliin the 
space of four days' time, either signify his acceptance of the 
Treaty as a whole or indicate the particulars in which it was 
unacceptable. 

In now examining the memorandum presented by the 
Chinese Plenipotentiary, the Japanese Plenipotentiaries are 
disappointed to find that the communication is confined to an 
elaborate recital of the domestic difficulties of the Empire of 
China coupled with a request to the Japanese Plenipoten- 
tiaries for a reconsideration of the conditions of peace. 

The memorandum not only cannot be taken as a reply to 
the draft Treaty presented by the Japanese Plenipotentiaries, 
but it fails even to definitely express the wishes or desires of 
the Cliinese Plenipotentiary. 

In conclusion, reminding the Chinese Plenipotentiary that 
the domestic difficulties of China do not properly fall within 
the sphere of the present discussion, and that demands arising 
as a consequence of war cannot be regarded as matters for 
n^otiation in the ordinary acceptation of that term, the 
Japanese Pleniix)tentiaries beg to express their desire that 
the Chinese Plenipotentiary will, without additional delay, 
definitively announce his acceptance or non-acceptance of the 
draft Treaty of Peace already presented, either oi bloc or 
severally article by article, and in case any alterations are 
desired, that he will present them in concrete form. 



424 THE CHINA-JAPAN WAR. 



Counter-proposal by CJiinese Plenipotentiary. 

Shimonosekt, dih Aprils 1895. 

It is a source of much regret and disappointment to me 
that the Memorandum which I sent to the Japanese Pleni- 
potentiaries on the 5th instant should not have been regarded 
as satisfactory. So far from its bein^^ confined to a recital of 
the domestic difficulties of China, it will be found to be a 
specific expression of my views on every important Article 
and paragraph in the draft of Treaty submitted for my 
consideration. 

But in my earnest desire to conform to the utmost of my 
power to the wishes and convenience of the Japanese Pleni- 
potentiaries, I have prepared and send herewith a counter- 
draft of Treaty which will be found to constitute a reply to 
every Article in the draft of Treaty submitted by the Japanese 
Plenipotentiaries. It will be noted that a new Article has- 
been added, which I trust will be found acceptable. 

The counter-draft made under my responsibility as a 
Plenipotentiary is the extent to which it is possible for me to 
go in the present stage of negotiations. If the propositions 
therein contained do not meet fully the views of the Japanese 
Plenipotentiaries, I feel sure an agreement may be most- 
readily promoted by verbal conferences ; and, in view of the 
short time remaining of the armistice, I hope the Japanese 
Plenipotentiaries will fix a time for a conference with the 
least delay possible. 



China's Counter-draft of Treaty of Peace. 

Shimonoseki, dih April, 1895. 

His Majesty the Emperor of China and His Majesty the- 
Emperor of Japan, desiring to restore the blessings of peace 
to their countries, and to establish upon a solid basis relations 
of friendship and intercourse which shall confer reciprocal 



APPENDIX K. 425^ 

benefits upon the subjects of both, and assure the harmony" 
and mutual confidence which should subsist between good' 
neighbours, have named as their Plenipotentiaries for the 
purpose of concluding a Treaty of Peace ; that is to say : 

His Majesty the Emperor of China . . . and His Majesty 
the Emperor of Japan . . . who, after having exchanged 
their Full Powers, which were found to be in good and proper 
form, have agreed to the following Articles : 

Article I. — China and Japan recognise definitely the full 
and complete independence and autonomy and guarantee the 
complete neutrality of Corea, and it is agreed that the inter- 
ference by either in the internal affairs of Corea in derogation 
of such autonomy, or the peribrmance of ceremonies and for- 
malities by Corea inconsistent with such independence, shall 
wholly cease for the future. 

Article II. — China cedes to Japan in full sovereignty the 
following territories together with all towns and cities, public 
offices, granaries, barracks and public buildings therein. 

(a.) — One prefecture, one sub-prefecture, and two districts 
in the South of the Fengtien province, namely, 

1. — The district of Antung. 

2. — The district of Kungtien. 

3. — The prefecture of Fenghwang. 

4. — The sub-prefecture of Hsiuyen. 

The boundaries of the above-mentioned prefecture, sub- 
prefecture and districts shall be taken in strict accordance 
with the Chinese official surveys. 

(k) — The Pescadores group of islands, lying within the 
23rd and 24th parallels of latitude and the 119th and 120th 
degrees of longitude East. 

Article III. — (Japanese text accepted without change.) 

Article IV. — China aj^rees to pay to Japan as a war in- 
demnity the sum of 100,000,000 Kuping Taels. The said 
sum is to be paid in five instalments, the first instalment 
being 28,000,000 Kuping Taels, and the four remaining in- 
stalments being 18,000,000 Kuping Taels each. The first 



426 * THE CHINA-JAPAN WAR. 

instalment is to be paid within six months after the exchange 
of ratifications of this Treaty, and the four remaining instal- 
ments are to be respectively paid within each of the four 
succeeding years which terminate six months after the 
exchange of ratifications of this Treaty ; but China shall have 
the right to anticipate at her pleasure any or all of said 
instalments. 

Article V. — The inhabitants of the territories ceded to 
Japan, who wish to take up their residence outside the ceded 
districts, shall be at full liberty to sell their real and personal 
property and retire, without their being subjected, on this 
xiccount, to any contribution, tax, or charge whatever. For 
this purpose a period of two years from the date of the ex- 
<;hange of the ratifications of the present Treaty shall be 
granted. At the expiration of that period those of the 
inhabitants who shall not have left such territories shall be 
•deemed Japanese subjects. 

The property in the ceded territories, real and personal, 
owned by non-resident Chinese shall be respected by the 
Japanese Government, and shall enjoy the same guarantees 
as if belonging to Japanese subjects. 

Article VI. — All treaties between China and Japan having 
•come to an end in consequence of war, China and Japan 
engage immediately upon the exchange of the ratifications of 
tliis Treaty, to appoint Plenipotentiaries to conclude a treaty 
of commerce and navigation and a convention to regulate 
frontier intercourse and trade. The treaties, conventions and 
regulations now subsisting between China and European 
powers shall serve as a basis for the said Treaty and conven- 
tion between China and Japan, and as regards all the open 
ports, navigation, taxation, storage of goods, the mode of 
taxation, etc., Japan will be treated in the same way as the 
most favoured nation. From the date of the exchange of the 
ratifications of the Treaty until the said Treaty and convention 
are brought into actual operation, the Japanese Government, 
its officials, commerce, navigation, frontier intercourse and 



APPENDIX K. 427 

trade, industries, ships and subjects shall in every respect be 
accorded by China most favoured nation treatment. 

And reciprocally from the date of the exchange of the 
ratifications of this Treaty until the said Treaty and con- 
vention are brought into actual operation, the Chinese 
Government, its officials, commerce, navigation, frontier 
intercourse and trade, industries, ships, and subjects shall in 
every respect be accorded by Japan most favoured nation 
treatment. 

Article VII. — Subject to the provisions of the next suc- 
ceeding Article the evacuation of China by the armies of 
Japan shall be completely eflTected within one month after the 
exchange of the ratifications of the present Treaty. 

Article VIII. — As a guarantee of the faithful performance 
of the stipulations of this Treaty, China consents to the 
temporary occupation by the military forces of Japan of 
Wei-hai-wei, in the province of Shantung. Upon the payment 
of the first two instalments, of the war indemnity herein 
stipulated for, one-half of the Japanese forces stationed there 
shall be withdrawn, and ujx)n the payment of the final 
instalment of the said indemnity, the said place shall be 
evacuated by the remaining Japanese forces. 

Article IX. — (Japanese draft accepted without change.) 

Article X. — All offensive military operations shall cease 
upon the signing of this Treaty by the Plenipotentiaries of 
both countries. 

Article XI. — In order to avoid future conflict or war 
between China and Japan, it is agreed that should any 
question arise as to the interpretation or execution of the 
present Treaty of Peace, or as to the negotiation, interpretation 
or execution of the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation and 
the Convention for Frontier Intercourse proWded for in 
Article VI. of this Treaty, which cannot be adjusted by tlie 
usual method of dij)lomatic conference and correspondence 
between the two Crovernnu»nts, th<»y will submit such question 
to the decision of an arbitnitor to be designated by some 



428, THE CHINA-JAPAN WAR. 

friendly Power to be selected by mutual accord of the two 
Governments, or, in case of failure, to agree as to the selection 
of said Power, then the President of the United States shall 
be invited to designate the arbitrator ; and both Governments- 
agree to accept, abide by, and carry out in good faith the 
decision of said arbitrator. 

Article XII. — The present Treaty shall be ratified by Their 
Majesties the Emperor of China and the Emperor of Japan,. 

and the ratifications shall bo exchanged at on the 

day of the month of.. 

In Witness whereof the respective Plenipotentiaries have 
signed the same and have affixed thereto tlfe seal of their 
arms. 



Japan Replies to Counter-proposal and reduces Demands. 

Shimonoseki, 10th April, 1895. 

Preamble. 

The Japanese Plenipotentiaries cannot consent to any" 
amendments of the Preamble. 

Article I. — The Japanese Plenipotentiaries find it necessary^ 
to adhere to this Article as originally presented to the 
Chinese Plenipotentiary. 

Article II. — The Japanese Plenipotentiaries find it im- 
possible to accept the amendment hereunder, proposed by 
the Chinese Plenipotentiary. They consent, however, to 
modify their original demand, so that it shall read as 
follows : — 

" China cedes to Japan in perpetuity and full sovereignty 
the following territories, together with all fortifications,, 
arsenals, and public property thereon : 

" (a.) — The southern portion of the province of Shengking. 
within the following boundaries : 

" The line of demarcation begins at the Eiver Yalu and 
ascends the stream to Anpinghokou; from thence the line* 



APPENDIX K. '429 

runs to Fenghuang; from thence to Haicheng, and from 

thence to Yingkou, where it terminates. The places above 

named are included in the ceded territory, 

" This cession also includes all Islands appertaining or 

belonging to the province of Shengking situated in the 

eastern portion of the Bay of Liaotung and in the northern 

part of the Yellow Sea. 

"(6.) — The Island of Formosa together with all islands 

adjacent or belonging to the said Island of Formosa. 

"(c) — The Pescadores Group, that is to say, all Islands 

lying between the 119° and 120° longitude east of Greenwich 

and the 23° and 24° north latitude." 

Article IV. — The Japanese Plenipotentiaries cannot accede 

to the proposal of the Chinese Plenipotentiary hereunder. 

They will, however, consent to amend their original demand 
as follows : 

" China agrees to pay to Japan as a war indemnity the 
sum of 200,000,000 Kuping taels. The said sum to be paid 
in eight instalments. The first instalment of 50,000,000 taels 
to be paid within six months, and the second instalment of 
oO,000,000 taels to be paid within twelve months after the 
exchange of the ratifications of this Act. The remaining 
sum to be paid in six equal annual instalments as follows : 
The first of such ec^ual annual instalments to be paid within 
two years ; the second within three years ; the third within 
four years ; the fourth within five years ; the fifth within six 
years ; and the sixth within seven years after the exchange 
of ratifications of this Act. Interest at the rate of 5 j^'' 
centum per annum shall begin to run on all unpaid portions 
of the said indemnitv from the date the first instilment falls 
due. China shall, however, have the right to pay by antici- 
pation at any time any or all of said instabnents." 

Article V. — The Japanese Plenijxitentiaries cannot consent 
to the Amendments jiroi)osed to this Article. 

Article VI. — The Japanese Plenipotentiaries are unable to 
give their adhesion to the counter j)ropo8al hei*eunder of the 



430 THE OBIKA'JAPAN WAB. 

Chinese Plenipotentiary. They will, nevertheless, consent 
to the following modifications of the original Article : 

" All treaties between Japan and China having come to an 
^ end in consequence of war, China engages, immediately upon 
the exchange of the ratifications of this Act, to appoint 
Plenipotentiaries to concludie with the Japanese Plenipoten- 
tiaries a Treaty of Commerce and Navigation and a Conven- 
tion to regulate Frontier Intercourse and Trade. The Treaties, 
Conventions and Regulations now subsisting between China 
and European Powers shall serve as a basis for the said 
Treatj' and Convention between Japan and China. From 
the date of the exchange qi the ratifications of this Act until 
the said Treaty and Convention are brought into actual opera- 
tion the Japanese Government, its Officials, Commerce, 
Navigation, Frontier Intercourse and Trade, Industries, 
Ships and Subjects shall in every respect be accorded by 
China most favoured nation treatment. 

" China makes in addition the following concessions to 
take effect six months after the date of the present Act : 

" 1st. — The foUowinjx cities, towns and ports, in addition 
to those already opened, shall be opened to the trade, resi- 
dence, industries and manufactures of Japanese subjects, 
under the same conditions and with the same privileges and 
facilities as exist at the present open cities, towns and ports 
of China : 

1. — Shashih in the province of Hupeh. 

2. — Chungking in the province of Szechuen. 

5. — Soochow in the province of Kiangsu. 

4. — Hangchow in the province of Chekiang. 

" The Japanese Government shall have the right to station 
Consuls at any or all the above-named places. 

"2nd. — Steam navigation for vessels under the Japanese^ 
flag for the conveyance of passengers and cargo shall be 
extended to the following places : 

1. — On the Upper Yangtze lliver from Ichcmg to Chung- 
king, 



APPENDIX K. .431 

2. — On the Woosung Eiver and the Canal from Shanghai 
to Soochow and Hangchow. 

" The Eules and Eegulations which now govern the naviga- 
tion of the inland waters of China by foreign vessels shall, so 
far as applicable, be enforced in respect of the above-named 
routes until new Eules and Eegidations are conjointly 
agreed to. 

" 3rd. — Japanese subjects purchasing goods or produce iui 
the interior of China or transporting imported merchandise 
into the interior of China, shall have the right temporarily to- 
rent or hire warehouses for the stomge of the articles so 
purchased or transported, without the payment of any taxes 
or exactions whatever and without the interference of any 
Chinese officials. 

*' 4th. — The Kuping tael shall be taken to be the tael in 
which all taxes, duties and fees are payable by Japanese 
subjects in China, and all such taxes, duties and fees may 
be paid in standa^I Japanese silver yen at their face or 
respective value. 

" 5th. — Japanese subjects shall be free to engage in all 
kinds of manufacturing industries in China, and shall be at 
liberty to import into China all kinds of machinery paying 
only the stipulated import duties thereon. 

" All articles manufactured by Japanese subjects in China 
shall in respect of inland transit and internal taxes, duties, 
charges and exactions of all kinds, and also in respect of 
warehousing and storage facilities in the interior of China, 
stand ujK)!! the same footing and enjoy the same privileges 
and exemptions as merchandise imported by Japanese subjects 
into China. 

" In the event of additional Eules and Eegulations being 
necessary in connection with these concessions, they shall 
be embodied in the Treatv of Commerce and Na\i*mtion 
provided for by this Article." 

Article VII. — The Jajmnese Pleniiwtentiaries are unable^ 
to accept the amendment hereunder. 



432 THE CHINA-JAPAN WAR. 

Article VIII. — The Japanese Plenipotentiaries cannot 
accept the substitute proposed hereunder, but they will agree 
to amend the original Article as follows : — 

" As a guarantee of the faithful performance of the stipula- 
tions of this Act China consents to the temporary occupation 
by the military forces of Japan of Wei-hai-wei in the 
province of Shantung. 

" Upon the payment of the first two instalments of the 
war indemnity herein stipulated for and the exchange of the 
ratifications of the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation, the 
said place shall be evacuated by the Japanese forces, provided 
the Chinese Government consents to pledge, under suitable 
and suflScient arrangements, the Customs Eevenue of China 
as security for the payment of the principal and interest of 
the remaining? instalments of said indemnitv. In the event 
of no such arrangements being concluded, such evacuation 
shall only take place upon the payment of tlie final instal- 
ment of said indemnity. 

" It is, however, expressly understood that no such evacua- 
tion shall take place until after the exchange of the ratifica- 
tions of the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation. 

" All expenses connected with the temporary occupation 
shall be defrayed by China." 

Article X. — The Japanese Plenipotentiaries find it neces- 
sary to adhere to this Article as originally drafted by them. 

Article XI, (New.) — The proposal hereunder cannot be 
accepted by the Japanese Plenipotentiaries. 



Japans Ultimatum, 

Shimonoseki, llth April, 1895. 
His Excellency Count Li-Hung-chang, 

His Imperial Chinese Majesty's Plenipotentiary. 

Excellency, — I deem it advisable to confirm in writing the 
substance of the observations which I had the honour to 



APPENDIX K. 483 

verbally address to your Excellency yesterday in connection 
with the modified conditions of peace which I then presented 
to you. 

I informed your Excellency and I now desire to repeat 
that those modified demands must be regarded as final, and 
that a categorical reply will be expected within the space of 
four days from yesterday. 

I acquainted your Excellency that the Japanese Plenipo- 
tentiaries had not failed to take into serious consideration 
the remarks which your Excellency had made respecting the 
demands of the Imperial Japanese Government as originally 
formulated, and I stated that a reduction in those demands 
to the lowest possible point of concession had been made in 
consequence of those remarks in which your Excellency had 
pointed out the difficulties that would confront China if the 
full measures of Japanese original conditions were insisted 
upon. 

The reduction of the indemnity by one-third ; the adoption 
of easier terms of payment; the acceptance of one place 
instead of two for temporary occupation ; the opportunity of • 
substituting a financial in place of a territorial guaiuntee ; 
the suppression of the clause regarding commutation and 
other internal taxation, and the withdrawal of the claim for 
the removal of the obstruction to navigation at the mouth of 
the Huangpu river, would, I explained, relieve China of 
those financial embarrassments which in your Excellency's 
estimation rendered the full realisation of Japan's monetiiry 
demands extremely difficult. 

I also made it clear to your Excellency's appreciation, I 
trust, that the same spirit of conciliation liad also contributed 
to bring about the very large abridgment of Japan's territorial 
demands. 

In conclusion I permit myself to repeat what I have 
fre([uently endeavoured to impress upon your Excellency's 
wind, that war is progressive in its consequences as well as 
its operations, and that it is not to be expected that con- 

2 F 



434 • THE CHINA-JAPAN WAR. 

ditions of peace which Japan is now happily able to accept 
will be possible later on. 

I renew to your Excellency the assurance of my dis- 
tinguished consideration. 

Ito Hirobumi, 
H. J. M. Plenipotentiary. 



China's last Protest and Appeal. 

Shimojiosekiy 12th April, 1895. 
His Excellency Count Ito Hirobumi, 

Plenipotentiary of His Majesty the Emperor of Japan. 

Excellency, — The note which your Excellency did me the 
honour to address to me yesterday respecting the progress 
and incidents attending the Peace negotiations makes it 
necessary, in justice to my Government and myself, that I 
should submit thereto a brief reply. 

It is to be borne in mind that I was required to present in 
writing a categorical reply to the terms of peace demanded 
by Japan before I should be granted any conference with the 
Japanese Plenipotentiaries for discussing the terms of peace, 
and at the first conference granted me for that purpose I was 
met by the Japanese final proposal as now urged by your 
Excellency before any oral discussion had taken place. 
Under such circumstances it can hardly be claimed that 
Japan's final proposal had been reached after a full oppor- 
tunity had been afforded me to make known the views of my 
Government. 

While it is gratifying to know that the enormous indemnity 
originally demanded has been somewhat reduced, it still 
remains an amount far greater than the cost of the war, and 
constitutes a burden too heavy for China to bear, and one- 
which would make it impossible to carry out much-desired 
reforms and improvements in the country. 



APPENDIX K. 435 

It lias not been possible for me to understand how the 
conditions of peace have been made much less onerous by 
what your Excellency terms " the very large abridgment of 
Japan's territorial demands." The line of demarcation in 
the final proposal includes, with slight exceptions, all th& 
territory in the province of Shengking which has ever been 
occupied by the Japanese forces ; and in addition the final 
proposal has demanded the cession of a rich, populous, and 
important i>art of the Empire (Formosa) whereupon no Japa- 
nese soldier has as yet set foot. Such a demand is not in 
accord with the practice of nations negotiating for peace. 

While I cheerfully recognise the action of the Japanese 
Plenipotentiaries in abating some of their objectionable com- 
mercial demands, the final proposal still remains unprece- 
dented and unreasonable in its terms in this regard and 
highly derogatory to the sovereignty of an independent 
nation. It requires the negotiation of a Commercial Treaty 
and frontier regulations under the duress of retaining Chinese 
territory, and refuses to submit any question of variance to 
the arbitration of a friendly Power. Pending the negotiation 
of the Commercial Treatv it demands favoured nation 
treatment for Japanese in China, and refuses the same 
guarantee or any stipulation for Chinese in Japan. It claims 
the privilege for Japanese to rent warehouses and import and 
purchase goods, and produce at any place in the interior of 
China away from the Treaty ports, without the interference 
of any oflicials; also, that the flajmnese should have the 
right to engage in manufacturing industries anywhere in 
China, and without the payment of any domestic taxes on 
tlie gooils manufactured ; and that Japanese coin be made 
receivable at its face value for payment of duties and taxes. 

I have written the foregoing, not with the view of provoking 
furtlier discussion, but with the object of concisely repeating 
what I said to your Excellency when the final proi>osal 
was pres*»nted to me at the only conference affonled me for 
discussing terms of jHiace, and in the \\o\}e that the objections 

2 F 2 



436 THE CHINA-JAPAN WAR. 

here set forth may be carefully considered by your Excellency 
and that I may be informed of the result thereon at the next 
Conference promised me by your Excellency, at which I 
expect to submit the reply to the final proposal which my 
Emperor shall authorise me to make. 

I renew to your Excellency the assurances of my high 
consideration. 

Ll HUNG-CHANG, 

Ambassador Plenipotentiary of His Majesty 
the Emperor of China. 



Final. 

Shimonosekif ISth April, 1895. 

His Excellency Count Li Hung-chang, 

His Imperial Chinese Majesty's Plenipotentiary. 

Excellency, — I have had the honour to receive your 
Excellency's Note of yesterday, wliich professes to be in 
reply to mine of the day previous. 

The object of my communication of the 11th inst. was, by 
repeating in writing what I had previously verbally declared, 
to make your Excellency fully alive to the actual situation. 
I wished your Excellency to understand that full consideration 
had been accorded to your Excellency's representations, and 
that the modified demands of the Imperial Government must 
be regarded as final, admitting only of a categorical reply. 

I fear, from the Note now under acknowledgment, that my 
purpose was misinterpreted, since your Excellency, while dis- 
claiming any wish to provoke a discussion, criticises the 
final demands of the Imperial Government, as well as the 
course of procedure which has been followed, and expresses 
the hope that your Excellency's objection may be taken into 
consideration. 



APPENDIX K. 437 

It only seems necessary for me to say in response to your 
Excellency's Note, that the demands which I handed to your 
Excellency on the 10th inst. being final, are no longer open 
to discussion. 

Demands arising as a result of war are not proposals in the 
ordinary sense of that word, and the Japanese Plenipoten- 
tiaries by permitting the demands of the Imperial Govern- 
ment to be made the subject of discussion went to the 
extreme limit of concession in the interest of peace, and if 
their spirit of conciliation has been misunderstood they have 
the right to disclaim all responsibility for the consequences. 

It only remains for me to add, in order to prevent future 
misunderstanding, that my refusal at this time to enter upon 
a new examination of Japan's demands does not imply an 
acquiescence on my part in your Excellency's observations 
or conclusions. 

I renew to your Excellency the assurance of my distin- 
guished consideration. 

Ito Hirobumi, 
Plenipotentiary of His Majesty 

the Emperor of Japan. 



INDEX. 



Ai-HO river, the, 189, 192 

Akagi, Japanese war-ship, 87 ; at the 

battle of Hai-yang Island, 166-185, 

at Ta-lien Bay, 215, 216 
Akitsushima, Japanese war-ship, 87, 

95, 170; at the naval battle of 

Hai-yang Island, 167-185 

ofif Teng-chou city, 270, 271 

Akiyama, Major, 217, 218 
Amagi, Japanese war-ship, 87 
America, and Corea, in 1871 . . 41 ; 

Corea opened to trade of, 44 ; 

Mr. Jernigan, Consul of Shanghai, 

115, 116, 375-379 
An-ju, town of, 186 
An-sonjr, skirmish at the ford of, 

108, 109 
An-tung, capture of, 193, 194 
Armistice, granted by Japan, 327 ; 

text of the, 403, 404 
Army of the Chinese Empire, 69-75 

Japan, 78-85 

Asakawa, Captain, 218; saved by 

Private Tio, 219, 221 
Asaki MarUf s.s., 206 
Asan, Chinese force landed at, 62, 

63, 66, 93-95 ; campaign at, 

104-113 
Asano, Japanese general, 33 
Assassination of Kim-Ok-Kiun at 

Shanghai, 51-57 
AiagOj Japanese war-ship, 87 

Baba, Major, 141 

Battles. See Asan ; Chinchow ; 



Battles (co^it) 

Haicheng ; Hai-yang Island ; 

Kaiping ; Newchwang ; Port 

Arthur ; Phyung-yang ; Ta-lien 

Bay ; Wei-hai-wei, &c. 
Booms constructed by the Chinese 

across Wei-hai-wei Bay, 276, 281 
Braves, the, part of the Chinese 

army, 69, 73 

Canton squadron of the Chinese 

navy, 75, 77 
Chang, Greneral, at Wei-hai-wei, 295, 

299 
Captain of the Chinese ship 

Kuang-ping, 297, 300 
Chang-chia-kou-tzti, 277 
Chang In Hoon ; peace conference at 

Hiroshima, 391-402, 408-437 
Chang Yu-lin, of the Kowshing, 352, 

353 
Chao-wu, of the Foochow squadron, 77 
Chao-yung, Chinese man-of-war, 76 ; 

the naval battle at Hai-yang Islandi 

167-185 
Chemulpo, opened to Japanese trade 

in 1880.. 44; Chinese war-shij^s 

sent to, 63 ; Japanese trooi>s at, 

63, 64, 119 
Chen-aiiy Chinese man-of-war, 76 
Chen-chingj Chinese man-of-war, 77 
Chen-chuiig, Chinese man-of-war, 76 
Chai-hai, Chinese man-of-war, 76 
Chiii'hong, Chiuese man-of-war, 77 
ClitU'Ihiy Chinese man-of-war, 76 



INDEX. 



439 



Clien-naiij Chinese man-of-war, 76 
Chen-peiy Chinese man-of-war, 70,297 
Chen-pien, Chinese man-of-war, 70 
Chen-ttingy Chinese man-of-war, 70 
Chen-yuen, Chinese man-of-war, 70, 
86, 177 ; the naval battle at Hai- 
yang Island, 167-185 ; at Wei-hai- 
wei, 276, 301 
Chhong river, 122 
Chia, Chinese general, 200 
C/iih-1/uenj Chinese man-of-war, 70 ; 
sent to Asan, 63 ; the naval battle 
of Hai-yang Island, 167-185 
China ; the soldiers of, 5-7 ; histoiical 
relations of Japan, Corea and, 9-34, 
45, 46; wars undertaken by, 
against Corea, 12-16; coasts of, 
infested by Japanese pirates, 21- 
24; assists the Coreans ngainst 
Japanese invasion, 28-33; the 
Manchus in, 35, 36 ; tributary 
missions sent by Corea to, 30 ; land 
between Corea and China annexed 
by, 43; sends troops to Asan to 
check the Tong-haks, 62-68, 93 ; 
army of, 69-75 ; navy of, 75-78 ; 
naval battle at Thung Island, 93- 
103; camixaign at Asan, 104-1 13; 
declaration of war between Ja]Kin 
and, 113-117 ; attack on the army 
of, at Phyong-yang, 120-103; 
army of, at Phyung-yang, 144- 
146 ; the naval battle of Hai-yang 
Island, 164-185 ; cani|xiign of 
Japanese first army in Manchuria, 
186-202, 237-260, 308-321 ; cam- 
paign of Japanese second anny 
corps in the Regent's Sword 
Peninsula, 2Q3-236, 261-268 ; 
the Wei-hai-wei campaign, 269- 
304 ; first jwace embassy sent by, 
to Japan, 305-307 ; second peace 
cmliassy, 322-327; the treaty of 
{)eace at Shimonoseki, 328, 329; 
]>nictical results of the war, .')32- 



CiiiXA (cont.) 

334; documents relating to peace 
treaty, 391-402 ; text of the treaty 
o{ pt-ace, 405-437 ; despatches be- 
tween the governments of Japan 
and, on the Corean question, 338- 
348 ; text of the armistice between 
Japan and, 403, 404 ; text of the 
declaration of war by, 372-374 

Chin-chow, advance on and capture 
of, 207-213, 234, 235, 261 

Chinese troops, at Chin-chow and 
Ta-lien, 214; at Port Arthur, 224 

C'hing-chia-shan, 309 

Chimj-yiien^ Chinese man-of-war, 76, 
77 ; the naval battle of Hai-yang 
Island, 107-185; at Wei-hai-wei, 
270, 296 

Chi-t/.G, Chinese political refugee, and 
Corea, 11 

Chiu-licn-ch'eng, town of, 188, 192- 
194, 238 

Chiyod'if Japanese war-ship, 87, 178 ; 
nt I he naval battle of Hai-yang 
Island, 167-185; at Ta-lien Bay, 
215, 216 

Choi-Chei-Tu, and his doctrines, 58, 
r>9 

Chokaiy Japanese gnn-b<«at, 87 ; at 
Ta-lien Bay, 215, 210 ; at Wei-hai- 
wei, 283 

Chr>lla, province of, disturbances in, 
(;0-02 

Chr»ng-ju, 180 

Christians, iHjrsecution of, in Corea, 
37, 38, 42 

Chung-hwa, town of, 133-135 

Cockburn, Mr., 349 

Commercial privileges granted to 
Japan by China in the Treaty of 
Peace, 407-410, 418-122 

Consular Ikxly at Shanghai ; and the 
munler of Kim-Ok-Kiun, 54-57, 
375-379 

Corea ; historical relations of China, 



440 



INDEX. 



CoBEA (cont,) 
Japan and, 9-34, 45, 46 ; invaded 
by the Japanese under Hideyoshi, 
23-34 ; sketch of modern history 
of, 35-50 ; France and, in 1866 . . 
37, 38 ; persecution of Christians 
in, 37, 38, 42 ; Oppert's ex- 
peditions to, on the 8.s. China, 
39-41 ; America and, in 1871. .41 ; 
China annexes ^mrt of, 43; the 
Japanese in front of Seoul in 1876. . 
44; opened to trade with the 
United States, 44 ; Japanese in 
Seoul attacked by the Corean8,46- 
49 : the Tientsin Convention and, 
50; Chinese and Jai)anese troops 
sent to, in 1894.. 62-67; reforms 
in, suggested by Otori, 67, 68, 335- 
337 ; outbreak of hostilities in, the 
King's Palace at Seoul attacked 
by the Japanese, 88-93 ; the King 
of, 92; naval battle at Phung Island, 
93-103 ; the Asan campaign, 104- 
113 ; Japanese troops stationed in, 
130; advance on, and capture of 
town of Phyorjg-yan^ in, 120-163 ; 
Jajian and, 37i)-372 ; China nnd, 
372-374; complete neutrality of, 
412 

Corean question, despatches between 
the Governments of Cliina and 
Jajxm on the, before tlie com- 
mencement of hostilities, 338-348 

Correspondence between Adniiral Ito 
and Admiral Ting, 380-386 

relating to the delivery of the 

two Japanese in Shanghai, 375- 
379 

Cousins, Mr. Edmund, 349, 350 

Declaration of War by China, 

text of the, 372-376 

by Japan, text of the, 370-372 

Denby, Mr., and the Japanese spies 

arrested in Shanghai, 376-379 



Despatches between the Governments 
of China and Japan on the Corean 
question before the commencement 
of hostilities, 338-348 

Detring, Mr., sent as peace envoy Uy 
Japan, 236 ; and the destruction 
of the Kowshing, 349 

Dockyard at Port Arthur, 231 

Drilled or trained army of China, 
69,73 

Eight Banners, the, part of the 

Chinese army, 69-71 
Emperor of Japan, the, at Hiroshima, 

118 

Fei-ting, Chinese man-of-war, 77 
Feng, Chinese General, 200 
Feng-huang, 238, 240-243 
Feng-huang-cheng (Phojnix City), 

195, 213 
Feng-huang-shan (Phoenix HillX 

264, 267 
Feng-liu-chi (Pha?nix Grove), 277, 

278 
Fengtienfii, 410 

First army, Japanese, 191,192; in- 
vasion of China, 186-202 
Flags of the Chinese general, 140 
Fleet, Japanese, at Ta-lien Bay, 

215, 216 
Fong, Captain of the Tsi-yu^^n, 97 
Foochow squadron of the Chinese 
Forbidden Land, the, 37. See Coreaa 

navy, 75, 77 
Formosa, Japan and, 328, 332, 406 
Forts at Chin-chow, 214 

at Port Arthur, 221-225 

at Phyong-yang, 145, 146, 161 

at Wei-hai-wei, 274-276 

Foster, General, 324 
France, and Corea, in 1866 .. 37, 38 
French missionaries in Corea, 37-41 
Fn-chingy of the Foochow squadron, 

77 



INDEX. 



441 



Fuji-san, Japanese and, 28 
Fukubara, a Japanese arrested in 

Shanghai, 375-379 
Fu-pOf of the Foochow squadron, 77 
Fusan, opened to Japanese trade in 

1876.. 44; Japanese troops landed 

at, 119 
Ftaiby Japanese war-ship, 87 ; at the 

naval battle of Hai-yang Island, 

167-185; at Ta-lien Bay, 215, 

216 

Galsworthy, Captain of the s.s. 
KowMng, 98-103, 355-358 ; re- 
port of, 366-369 

Gemnu Grate, Phyiing-yang, stormed 
by the Japanese, 156-159 

General Sherman, American schoon- 
er, destroyed by the Coreans, 39, 
41 

Gensan, Japanese troops landed at, 
119, 146 

detachment, march on 

Phyong-yang, 128, 129, 131, 143, 
144, 153-15i^ 

Green Standard, the, part of the 
Chinese army, 69, 71-73 

Gresham, Mr., U. JS. Secretary of 
State, 375-379 

Ilai-an, Chinese man-of-war, 77 
Uai-ching of the Canton squadron, 

77 
Hai-clien?, Japanese attack on, 245- 

260, 268, 308-313 
Hai-yang Island, naval liattle of, 

164-185 
Hanaoka, Major, mortally wounded, 

228, 229 
Hanneken. See Von Hanneken. 
Harada, the hero of the Gemnu Gate, 

Phyr.ng-yang, 157, lf>8 
Hasegowa, 3Iajor-General, 203 
I/asJtidate, Ja()ancsc war-ship, 87, 

180; at the naval battle of Ilai- 



yang Island, 167-185; at Ta-lien 

kiy, 215-216 
Hashimoto, Major, 91 
Heaven-touching Pass, 196, 238-241 
, in Manchuria; also near 

Wei-hai-wei. See Mo-tien-ling. 
Hermit nation, the, 37, 44. See 

Corea. 
Hideyoshi, invasion of Corea, 23-34, 

140, 144 
Hirayama, Captain, 363 
Hiroshima, 64; headquarters of the 

Japanese army transferred to, 118 ; 

peace conference at, 391-402 
7/iyet, Japanese war-ship, 87, 171 ; 

at the battle of Hai-yang Island, 

166-185 
Hoffmann, Mr., and Captain Fong, 

97 
Hoi-ryong, besieged by Konishi, 28 
Hsin-yen, capture of, 198-201, 237; 

occupied by Oseko, 246 
Hsiung-yo-cheng, town of, 262 
Huang-chin-shan (Golden Hill) fort, 

230 
Huang-chin-tzil (Yellow Peak), 199, 

200 
Huan-hsi-shan, 309 
Huan-tai, Chinese man-of-war, 77 
Hua-yiian-chiang (Flower Garden 

River), 205 
Hua-yiian-kou (Flower Garden Port), 

205, 207 
Hung-chia-po-Azii (Red House Vil- 
lage), 198 
Hung-Tj} ong-Ou assassinates Kim- 

Ok-Kiun, 51-57 
Hung-wu, first Ming Emperor, 21 
Hu-shau (Tiger Mountain), 189-192 
Hwang-ju, capture of, 132, 133 

IcHiKocHE, Major, 122, 124, 126, 132 
I-ko-teng-a, general of Tartar troops, 

238-243, 310 
Imai, Lieutenant, 287 



442 



INDEX. 



iDdemnity to be paid by China to 
Japan, 406, 407, 413-417 

Ito, Admiral, 117, 182; battle of 
Hai-yang Island, 165-185 ; and 
the Chinese fleet at Wei-hai-wei, 
"232; attack on, and capture of, 
Wei-hai-wei, 273-304 ; correspond- 
ence with Admiral Ting, 380-386 ; 
correspondence with Niu-chang- 
ping, 389, 390 

Ito Hirobunii, Count, and the Tientsin 
Convention, 49, 50; and Mr. 
Detring, 236; ^xjace conference at 
Hiroshima, 391-402, 405-437 

Jtsukushima, Japanese war-ship, 87, 
179; at the naval battle of Hai- 
yang Island, 167-185; at Ta-lien 
Bay, 215, 216 

Iwaki, Japanese war-ship, 89 

Jahushima, Lieutenant, 290 
Jai)an ; people of, always a warlike 
nation, 2, 3 ; history of, 4, 5, 8 ; 
historical relations of China, Corea, 
and, 9-34, 45, 46 ; paper money ol, 
17, 18 ; invaded by Kublai Khan, 
19-21 ; pirates of, infest the coast 
of China, 21-24 ; under Hideyoshi 
invade Corea, 23-34; insulted by 
the Tai-wen-Kun of Corea, 42, 43 ; 
sends troops to Corea to check the 
Tong-Haks, 63-66; reforms in 
Corea, suggested by, 67, 68, 335- 
337; army of, 78-85 ; navy of, 86, 
87 ; campaign in Corea : attack on 
the King's JPalace at Seoul, 88-93 ; 
naval battle at Phung Island, d'A- 
103 ; the Asan campaign, 104- 
113; declaration of war between 
China and, 113-117,370-372; naval 
demonstration of the fleet at Port 
Arthur, 117-119 ; attack on, and 
capture of Phyung-yang, 120-163 ; 
the naval battle of Uai-yang Island, 
164-185; campaign of first army 



Japan (cant.) 

in Manchurin, 186-202, 237-260, 
308-321; campaign of second 
army corps in the Regent's Sword 
Peninsula, 203-236,261-268; the 
Wei-hai-wei campaign, 269-304; 
first peace embassy sent to, by 
China, 305-307 ; second i>eace 
embassy, 322-327; the treaty of 
peace, 328, 329, 405-437 ; the i)ower 
of Japan, 329-332 ; practical results 
of the war, 332-331; despatches 
between the Governments of China 
and, on the Corean question, 338- 
348 ; the treaty of jieace at Sliimo- 
noseki, 328, 329 ; documents relating 
to the treaty of peace, 391-402 ; 
text of the, 405-437 ; text of the 
armistice between China and, 403, 
404 

Japanese in Seoul, attacked by the 
Coreans in 1882 . . 46, 47, 89 ; second 
attack in 1884. .48, 49, 89 

Jernigan, Mr., and the Japanese spies 
arrested in Shanghai, 375-379 

Jill Island, at entrance to Wei-hai- 
wei, 274, 275, 295 

Jingu, Queen, 17, 18 

Kai-chi, Chinese man-of-war, 77 
Kaimo/i, Japanese war-ship, 87 
Kaiping, tuwn, capture of, 263-268, 

311-313 
Kai-song, city of, 122, 123 
Kang-chl, Chinese man-of-war, 76, 

388 ; at Wei-hai-wei, 276, 300 
Kang-hwn, city of, taken by ilie 

French in 1866.. 38 
Kang-hwa Island, Japanese sailors 

fired on at, in 1875. .43 
Kang-wa-sai, 249-252 
Kani, Captain, suicide of, 229 
Kano, Colonel, 263 
Kato Kiyomasa, General, invasion of 

Corea, 25-33 



INDEX. 



443 



Katsura, General, in Manchuria, 191- 

193, 246-255, 261, 308-319 
Kdtsuragif Japanese war-ship, 87 ; at 

Ta-lien Bay, 215, 216 
Kawasaki, Sergeant, 122, 200, 201 
Kencho, Mr. S., 364, 369 
Kikushi, Dr., 331 
Kim-chhon, 123, 126 
Kim-Ok-Kiun, 46; government of, 

48 ; assassination of, 51-57 ; effect 

of the death of, on the Coreans, 62 
King*s Palace, Seoul, attacked by the 

Japanese, 88-93 
JKing-yiten, Chinese man-of-war, 76 ; 

the naval battle at Uai-yang 

Island, 167-185 
Kiushiu, rebellion in, 17 ; men of the 

Japanese army, 228 
Komura Yataro, Japanese minister, 

despatches of, on the Gorcan ques- 
tion, 340-348 
Kongo, Japanese war-ship, 87; at 

Ta-lien Bay, 215, 216 
Konishi Yukinaga, General, invasion 

of Corea, 25-33, 140, 144, 163, 184 
Korai, (leople named, 11 
Koshi, Major, suicide of, 105 
Kotaka, Japanese torpedo-boat, 294 
Koivshing, British s.s. sunk by the 

Nanittxi, 98, 103, 321 ; statement 

of the survivors, 349-369 
Koyaraa, fires a pistol at Li Hung- 

chang, 325, 326 
Kuang-chia, Chinese man-ol-war, 76, 

300,389 
Kwiug-kij Chinese man-of-war, 77 
Knang'kiiigj Chinese man-of-war, 

77 
Kvaiig-ping, Chinese man-of-war, 76, 

389 ; the naval battle of Hai-yang 

Inland, 167-185 : at Wai-hai-wei, 

276, 297, 300, 301 
Kuang-ting, Chinese man-of-war, 77 
Ktutng-yi, Chinese man-of-war, 76, 

96, 97, 102, 300, 389 



Kublai Khan's invasion of Japan, 

19-21 
Kumamoto brigade of the Japanese 

army, at Wei-hai-wei, 269, 276- 

277,' 278, 281 
Kure, Japanese squatlron of, 86, 87 
Kuroda, Major-General, 192 
Kusunchi, a Japanese, arrested in 

Shanghai, 375-379 
Kyeng-Jin, city of, 58 

Lai-yuen, Chinese mnn-of-war, 76, 
173 ; the naval battle at Hai-yang 
Island, 167-185; at Wei-hai-wei, 
276, 293 

Lang, Captain, Admiral of the 
Chinese navy, 75 

Li, Lord, son of Li Hung-cliang, 324, 
327 

Liao river, 308, 317 

Liao-tung, Chinese province of, 12, 
22, 26, 27 

Liao-tuDg Peninsula, the, 328. 

Liao-yang, 313, 314,319 

Lien-shan-kuan (United Mountain 
Pass), 196, 201 

Li-Hung Chang; annexes neutral 
country between Corea and China 
• in 1877 .. 43 ; and the Tientsin Con- 
vention, 49, 50 ; enlists volunteers 
in the Chinese army, 72, 73; sends 
Mr. Detring as peace envoy to 
Japan, 236; Admiral Ting and, 
296, 297; sent by China as i)eace 
embassy to Jai»an, 322-327, 391- 
402, 405-437 ; tliut by a fanatic, 
325, 326 

Lion, French i:un-l>oat, rescues some 
men of the Koirshing, 101, 353 

Liu-chia-tun, village <»f, 208 

Liu-tung Lsland, at entrance to Wei- 
hai-wei, 274-304 

Li-yu-sung, Chinese general, 29 

Loh Peng-luh, Mr., and the destruc- 
tion of the KuK'shiug, 349 



444 



INDEX. 



Loyson, Pcre Hyacinth, 51 
Lii-shuQ-Kow. See Port Arthur. 

Machida, Lieutenant, 121, 124, 133, 

200 
Ma-chiian-tzti, 250 
Main body of Japanese troops ; inarch 

ofand attack on Phyong-yang, 127, 

129, 135-138, 141, 142, 159, 160 
Manchuria ; Japanese first army in, 

186-202, 237-260, 308-321 
M>inchup, the, in China, 35, 36 
Marui, Major, at Port Arthur, 218, 

221, 226 
Masumidzu. Lieutenant-Colonel, 217 
Matsusaki, Captain, killed at An-song, 

107, 108. 112 
Matsushima^ Jai>anese war-ship, 87 ; 

at the naval battle of Hai-yang 

Island, 167-185 ; at Ta-lien Bay, 

215, 216 
Maya, Japanese war-ship, 87 ; at Ta- 
lien Bay, 215, 216 
Ma-yii-Kun, Chinese general, 151 
Mei-yun, Chinese man-of-war, 76 
Mihara, attempt to swim the Yalu 

river, 188 
Mihara, Colonel, 199-201 
Military service compulsory in Japan, 

79 
Mimura, Lieutenant, 156, 153 
Min, the powerful faction in Coren, 

46, 48, 62, 91 
Min, Prince, 48 

Min-chieh, Chinese trooping-vessel, 76 
Mines, Chinese, and powder, 212, 213 
Mixed Brigade, march of and attack 

on city of Phyong-yang, 128, 129, 

131-138, 149-153 
Miyake, Sergeant, swiras the Yalu 

river, 189 
Mochihara, Captain, 291, 292 
Mok-tan-son,hill near Phyung-yang, 

140-144 ; taken by the Jaj^anese, 

153-159 



Mongols under Kublai Khan invade 
Japan, 19-21 

Mori, Major, 91 

Mo-tieu-ling (Heaven-touching Pass) 
in Manchuria, 196, 238-241 ; near 
Wei-hai-wei, 278 

Mou Ching-sing, soldier aboard the 
Kowshingy 353 

Muhlenstedt, Mr., of the s.s. Koto- 
shing, 96, 365, 369 

Mukden, Japanese march on, 202, 244 

Musashif Jaj aneso war-ship, 87 

Mutsu Munemitsu, Viscount, Japan- 
ese Minister for Foreign Aflfairs^ 
despatches of, on the Corean ques- 
tion, 340-348 ; peace conference at 
Hiroshima, 391-402 

Nakada, Mr., 401, 402 

Nakaman, Lieutenant, 218 

Nam-chhon-chon, 123, 124 

Naniwa, Japanese war-ship, 87 ; the- 
sinking of the s.s. Kotvshingf 95- 
103, 359-369 ; at the naval battle 
of Hai-yang Island, 167-185 ; at 
Ta-lien Bay, 215, 216 ; off Teng- 
chou city, 270, 271 

Nan-Juif Chinese man-of-war, 77 

Nan-shen, Chinese man-of-war, 77 

Kan-yang (or Southern) squadron of 
the Chinese navy, 75, 77 

Naruta, Captain, 296 

Niival battles. See Hai-yang Island,. 
Phung Island, Wei-Hai-wei. 

Navy, the Chinese, 75-78 

the Japanese, 86, 87 

Newchwang river, 309 

(old), 309 ; attack on, 313- 

317 

Nieh, Chinese general, 200 
1 Nishi, Major-General, 20!?, 231 
' Nishin, Japanese war-ship, 87 
' Niu-chang-ping of Wei-hai-wei, 300,. 
I 301 ; correspondence with Admiral 
Ito, 389, 390 



INDEX. 



445 



Nodzii, Lieutenantr General, attack 
on PhyoQg-yang, 125-120 ; in 
Manchuria, 135, 150, 159, 160, 
191-193, 318 

Nogi, Major-General, in Manchuria, 
208, 226, 308, 319; capture of 
Kaiping, 262-268 

OoAWA, Ensign, at battle of Kaiping, 
267 

Oki, Colonel, 263, 264, 267 

Okuyama, Major, 137, 138, 150, 153, 
160, 193 

Omori, Ensign, 151, 152 

Onoguchi, Private, at Chin-chow, 
211, 212 

Oppert, Mr., in Corca, 38-41 

Orankai, coimtry of the, 28 

Oriate, Pedro, of the KowsMng, 349- 
351 

O^ko, Major-General, 127; opera- 
tions of, in China, 192, 197, 202, 
237, 246, 249, 256 

Oshima, Major-General, 64 ; and the 
Asan campaign, 104-113; attack 
on Phyung-yang, 126-129, 140, 
142, 144 ; wounded before Phyiing- 
yang, 152; in Manchuria, 251, 
253, 256 

Oshima, Japanese war-ship, 87; at 
Ta-lien Bay, 215, 216 

Otago, Japanese gun-hoat, at Wci- 
hai-wei, 288 

Oteni, Major-(Jeneral, killeil at Wei- 
hai-wei, 279, 280 

Otori, Japanese minister to Corca, 
63, 89, 90, 105 ; insists on reforms 
in Corra, 67, 68, 335-337 

Oyama, Marshal, commander-in-chief 
of Japanese army cor|i8 in Regent's 
Sword Peninsula, 203-236, 269 

Pa IK-SAN, mountain strong) jold of 
theToiig-lIak8,61 



Pan-chia-tai, place called, 241 

Pao'hua, Chinese gun-boat, 293 

Pao-min, Chinese man-of-war, 77 

Paper money of Japan, 17, 18 

Peace conference at Hiroshima, docu- 
ments relating to, 391-402, 40;;- 
437 

Peace embassies sent by China to 
Japan, 305-307, 322-327 

Pei-ho river, 321 

Pei-j'ang (or Northern) squadron of 
the Chinese navy, 75, 76,165,270, 
317, 319; at Wei-hai-wei, 274- 
304 

Peng-hu Island, 320 

Peony Mount, Phyoug-yang; Jap- 
anese under Konishi attacked at, 
29. See also Mok-tan-son 

Pescadores Islands, 328, 3:i2, 40G ; 
Japanese ex])edition to the, 320, 
321 

PhuDg Island, naval tight at, 93-103 

Phung-pan, 132 

Phyong-yang ; Japanese under 
Konishi retreat from, 26, 29, 140, 
144 ; attack ou ami capture of by 
the Japanese, 120-163; Chinese 
army at, 110, 130, 144-146; plan 
of, 148 

PifiJ-yf^cn, Chinese man-of-war, 70 ; 
sent to Chemulpo, 63; the naval 
battle of Hai-yang Island, 167- 
185; at Wei-hai-wei, 270, 301 

Pi-tzu-wo, town of, 200, 207 

Po-chih-ya-8o, attack on, 277 

Polo, Marco, and the Mongol invasion 
of Japan, 20, 21 

Po-miao-tzG, 312 

Port Adams, 202 

Port Arthur, 273, 328; harbour at, 
78 ; naval demonstration by the 
Japuese fleet at, 117-119; posi- 
tion and defences of, 207, 221-225 ; 
cafturc of, by tlie Ja|t:ineso, 217- 
2'M 



446 



INDEX. 



Ports opened to Japanese trade by 

the Treaty of Peace, 408 
Powder-mines, the Chinese and, 212, 

213 
Pu-lan-tien (Port Adams), 262 

Reforms in Corea, suggested by 

Japan, 67, 68, 335-337 
Regent's Sword Peninsula, campaign 

in the, 203-236, 261-268 
Ridel, Bishop, 37 
Roze, Admiral, before Seoul, 37, 38, 

41 

Saioo of Satsuma and Corea, 42, 43 

Saikio Maru, Japanese armed mer- 
chant steamer, 166, 175; at the 
battle of Hai-yang Island, 167-185 

Saito, Major, 312 ; advance on Chin- 
chow, 206-210 

Sak-riong detachment, march to, and 
attack on Phyong-yang, 126-129, 
138-141, 153-159 

Sam-deung, town of, 139 

Sasebo, Jajmnese scjuadron of, 86, 87 

Sato, Colonel, march to and attack ou 
Phyong-yang, 127-129, 143, 144, 
155-158 ; crosses the Yulu river, 
190 ; in Manchuria, 246, 255 

Satsuma rebellion in Japan, 89 

Second army corps, Japan's ; cam- 
paign of the, in Regent's Sword 
Peninsula, 203-236, 261-268 

Seoul, entered by General Konishi, 
25, 29, 30 ; the French in front of, 
in 1866 .. 37, 38 ; Japanese before, 
in 1876 . .44 ; Japanese in, attacked 
by the Coreaus, 46-49 ; entered by 
Japanese troops in 1894.. 63; 
attack on the king's palace at, by 
the Japanese, 88-93 

Severn, H.M.S., at Wei-hai-wei, 273, ' 
298 

Shanghai; assassination of Kim-Ok- 
Kiun at, 51-57 ; disgraceful episodic , 



at, 114-116; correspondence relat- 
ing to the delivery of the two 
Japanese at, 375-379 

Shao Yu Lein; peace conference at 
Hiroshima, 391-402, 405-437 

Sheepskin overcoats, purchased by 
the Japanese Government for the 
troops, 242, 243 

Shibada, Lieutenant-Colonel, 129 

Shibayama, Rear-Admiral, 364-366 

Shih Tsu. See Eublai Khan 

Shimonoseki, treaty of peace arranged 
at, between China and JapaD, 324- 
329, 391-402, 405-487 

Shinra, King of, 17 

Shirakami Genjiro, bugler, 112, 113 

Shuang-lung-sban, 309 

Shufeldt, Commodore, and Corea, 44 

Sin, General, 195 

Sin-g6, town of, 138 

S()-Heung, 124, 132 

Song-clilon, town of, 143 

Song-hwan, Chinese troo^is at, 106^,. 
110, 111 

Six)ils captured by the Japanese ; at 
Phyong-yang, 161; at Chiu-lien- 
ch'eng, 194; at Chin-chow, 215; 
at Newchwang, 316, 317 

Storm, a terrific, at Wei-hai-wei, 281 , 
282 

Su-ku-chr>ng, 190 

Sung, Chinese general, 188, 192, 
248-252,255; residence of, at A n- 
tung, 194; retreat of his trooris 
towards Mukden, 195; attack ou 
Hai-cheng, 310-313 ; at Ying-kow, 
317 

Su-sa-chang, Japanese troops at, 105, 
106 

Su-Won, Japanese troops at, 105 

Tachimi, General, crosses the Yalu 
river, 186-196, 237 ; enters Fen?;- 
huaug, 195, 196; in Manchuria,. 
239-243 



INDEX. 



44T 



Tactics of the Chinese troops at tattle 
of Kaipinir, 267, 268 

Tadzumi, Mnjor-General, 127, 129, 
131, 138-141, 154, 155, 158, 159 

Ta-hsi-kou (Great Western Ditch), 
196 

Tai-dong, Kiver, 121, 124, 205 ; cross- 
ing of the, 139-142 

Tai-ku-shan (Great Oq^han Moun- 
tain), 197, 201 

Tai-ping rebellion, the, 323 ; Chinese 
anny in the, 72, 73 

Tai-ping-shan, advance on, 311-313 

Tai-tsung, son of Emperor Tung, 
14-16 

Tai-wen Kiin, or Regent of Corea, 39, 
40, 42, 47, 57; army of, 61; 
placed in power by the Japanese, 91, 
92 ; corresix>nds with the Chinese 
generals at Phyong-yang, 130 

TakachichOy Japanese war-ship, 87; 
at Ta-lien Bay, 215, 216 ; at battle 
of Hai-yang Island, 167-185 

Takah^ Japanese war-ship, 87 ; at 
Ta-lien Bay, 215, 216 

Takeda, Lieutenant-Colonel, 107, 109 

Take-no- Uchi, Sub-Lieutenant, 121, 
133 

Ta-lien Bay, 271 ; advance on and 
capture of, 207-217 

Tamari, Lieutenant-Colonel, 363, 364 

Tamplin, chief officer of the s.s. Koir- 
tfnttgf report of, 358-306 

Tanabr', Captain, 139 

T'ang dynasty, the, 13 

Tang-slian, town of, 195 

Tan-wan-shan, 309 

Tartar troops under General I-ko- 
tenir-a, 238-243 

Ta-tung-kou (Great Eastern Ditcli), 
197 

Tem-san Mountain, 204 

Teng<hou, city of, 270-1:72 

TfUff'tfiuf^ltou, Chinese Uian-of-war, 
77 



TenryOf Japanese war-shij^ 87 

Tien-chwang-tai, 318, 319 

Tientsin Convention, the, 49, 50, 62,. 
63, 65 

Tiger Mountain, 189-192 

Ting, Admiral, commander of the 
Chinese fleet, 117; and Captain 
Fong, 97; the naval battle of 
Hai-yang Island, 164-185; Vou 
Ilannekcn sent to assist, 177 ; at 
Wei-hai-wei, 232 ; defence of 
Wei-hai-wei, 273-30i; death «.f, 
297-299 ; correspondence wiih 
Admiral Ito, 380-386 

Ting-Jut i, of the Foochow squadron,. 
77 

Ting-yuen, Chinese man-of-war, 76,. 
86, 176; the naval battle at Hai- 
yang Island, 167-185 ; at Wei- 
hai-wei. 276, 278, 289, 291 

Tio, Private, s;ive8 Captain Asakawa,. 
219, 221 

Toda, Captain, 286 

Togo, Captain, 288 

Tokiyama, Lieutenant, drowning of, 
108 

Tomida, Major, 154, 155 

Tomu-cheng, Chinese attack on, 311 

Tomoyasu, Lieutenant-Colonel, 129,. 
241 

Tong-Haks, the (religious sect), in. 
Corea, 57-66, 93, 339 

Torpedo-boats, attack of Japanese, at 
Wei-hai-wei, 281-297 

Tsao-ho-kou (Grass River Pass), 196, 
239, 240 

TMO'Kuiiifj^ Chinese man-of-war, 
76; sent to ( 'lienmliw, 63; cai>- 
tured by the Akitsushhua^ 9:*,. 
359 

Du'-haif Chinese man-of-war, 77 

Tsciji, Major, 212 

Tseng-Kuo-Fan, and the "Oiccn. 
Standani " army, 71, 72 

T»i'ttn'f, Cliini'se man-of-war, 77 



448 



INDEX. 



Tsi-an, Chinese man-of-war, 76 
Tsi-yuen^ Chinese man-of-war, 76; 

chased by the YoMnOt 96, 98, 

102, 359, 369 ; the naval battle at 

Hai-yang Island, 167-185 ; at 

Wei-hai-wei, 276, 301 
TtfO-pao-Kuei, Chinese general, 158, 

160, 161 
Tsui-chia-fang, Chinese defeated at, 

239, 240 
^mhmhi, Japanese war-ship, 87 ; at 

Ta-lien Bay, 215, 216 
Tsung-Hsin, place called, 132 
Tu-men-tzii, 198, 199 
Tung-Ha-hsin, fireman of the 

Kowshing, 351, 352 

Ujixa, port of Hiroshima, 64 
Urusan, the siege of, 31-33 

Valdez, Mr., Portuguese consul at 
Shanghai, 54-57 

Von Hanneken, German officer, and 
the 8.8. Kowshiny, 96-103, 350- 
369 ; his report on, 354-358 ; sent 
to assist Admiral Tinii, 177 ; forts 
at Chin-chow built by, 214 

Wako, Chinese minister, despatches 
of re the Corean question, 338-348 

Wang Kwi-fung, soldier on board the 
Kowshingf 353 

War indemnity to be paid by China 
to Japan, 406, 407, 413-417 

Wars undertaken by China against 
Corea, 12-16 

Wei'Ching, Chinese man-of-war, 77 

Wei-hai-wei ; harbour at, 73 ; naval 
demonstration by the Japanese | 
fleet at, 117-119; attack on and ' 
capture of, 269-304, 410 ; fortifi- | 
crttiona of, 274-276; capitulation , 
of, 387, 388 , 

Wei-yuen, Cliineso man-of-war, 76; 
the naval battle at Hai-yang i 



Island, 167-185; at Wei-hai-wei, 

276, 293 
Wi-ju, Japanese scouts at, 187, 

188 
Wrestling, Japanese soldiers and, 200 
Wu, Empress, 16 
Wu-Ta-Cheng, Chinese General, 310 ; 

army organised in Mauchuria by, 

74,75 
Wu-Ting-fang, 324 

Yabuki, Colonel, 191 

YcbeyaiYha^ Japanese war-ship, 87, 
363, 369 ; off Yung-cheng, 272 

Yalu river, 119; landing of troops 
at, 165 ; the crossing of the, 18G- 
190 ; naval battle off the : see Hai- 
yang Island. 

Yamagata, Marshal, 164, 190 ; attack 
on rhyiing-yang, 127-129, 146 ; in 
command of the First Army, 186- 
202 

Yamagi, General, in Machuria, 311, 
317-319 

Yamaguchi, Major, 139, 140, 154 

Yamaji, Lieuteuant-General, cam- 
paign in the Rejjent's Swurd Pcnin- 
sida, 203, 208-236 

Yauiato^ Ja})anesc war-ship, 87 

Yaug-dok, town of, 143 

Yang-wei, Chinese man-of-war, 76 ; 
sent to Chemulpo, 63; the naval 
battle of Hai-yang Island, 168- 
185; in flames, 170, 171 

Yang-ti, Emperor, 12-14 

Yanonie, Lieutenant, 212 

Yeh-chih-chao, Chinese commander- 
in-chief, 110, 111, 100 

Yiksang, capture of the, 321 

Ying-kow, 317, 319 

Yinsen : see Gensaii. 

Yokosuka, Japanese squadron of, 86, 
87 

Yoshino, Japanese man-of-war, 86, 
87, 95, 109, 295 ; pursues the Tsi- 



lyDKX. 449 

ynen, 95, 96; at the lattle of H*;- Y .in-S:.:-kji, CLir.c^e r.-^i-.ierst n;i;i- 

vftiig Island, IGT-lSo ; a: Ta-Iies Ker i:i Lorei, l*? 

Bay, 215, 2l»> ; otf IVng-chou city, Yunz-cLenj, city of, 27- 

270, 271 ; damaged off Peng-b.u Biy. 2^2 

Isl-iDd, 32^) Y*iit'j'j'i'\ •': :"-o Cani-.*:. 5qv.a-i.- !, 

yuan-Kaiy of ihe Fouc:.ow si)ua«i- 77 

roil, 77 J'»i-y»?'Ji', Chine -t man-'f-wMr, 77 



•2 c 



LONDON: 
I'lllNTEI) BY WILLIAM OLOWRs AND SONS, Limitko. 

BTASJIOKD »rUF.!n- AND CirABDCO CliOm.