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i4 


Y 


BT 


THE  CHRISTIAN  DOCTRINE 


OF 


JUSTIFICATION  AND  RECONCILIATION 


THE  CHRISTIAN  DOCTRINE 


OF 


JUSTIFICATION  AND  RECONCILIATION 


By    ALBRECHT^RITSCHL 


THE  POSITIVE  DEVELOPMENT  OF  THE  DOCTRINE 


ENGLISH    TRANSLATION 

EDITED  BT 

H.  E.  MACKINTOSH,  D.Phil. 

MINI8TBR  OP  niB  KRBB  CBURCH,  TATFORT 
AND 

A.  B.  MACAULAY,  M.A. 

1I1K18TBK  OP  THB  BAST  PRE!  CHURCH,  POBPAR 


EDINBURGH 
T.  &  T.  CLARK,  38  GEORGE  STREET 

1900 


PRIKTBO  BY 
MORKtSOK  AND  OIBB,  LIMITBD, 

roB 
T.    &   T.    CLARK,    EDINBURGH. 

LONDON:   SIMPKIK,  MARSHALL,  HAlflLTON,   KEKT,  AND  CO.   LIMITRD. 

SHEW  YORK  :  CHARLB8  SCBIBNBR'B  BONB. 

TORONTO  :    THB  PUBLTBHXRB'  BYNDICATB  LIMITED. 


EDITORS'    PREFACE 


Thsre  is  reason  to  believe  that  an  English  translation  of 
Ritschl's  greatest  work  is  not  inopportune  at  the  present 
moment.  The  attention  paid  in  Britain  to  this  theologian's 
doctrinal  system  has  been  steadily  deepening  for  some  years. 
Such  works  as  Denney's  Studies  in  Theology,  Orr's  The 
Eitschiian  Theology  and  the  Evangelical  Faith,  and  Garvie's 
The  Rii&cMian  Theology,  are  enough  to  prove  how  profound 
is  the  interest  felt  here  in  the  methods  and  conclusions  of  a 
movement  which  has  had  so  remarkable  an  influence  in 
Germany.  Of  this  movement  the  primary  source  was 
Bitschl's  monumental  work,  The  Christian  Doctrine  of 
Justification  and  Reconciliation  (1870—1874).  Not  since 
Schleiermacher  published  his  Christliche  Olavhe  in  1821 
has  any  dogmatic  treatise  left  its  mark  so  deeply  upon 
theological  thought  in  Germany  and  throughout  the  world. 
Schleiermacher's  masterpiece,  unfortunately,  is  inaccessible 
to  the  English  reader ;  and  it  was  felt  that  were  the  rnagnum 
opus  of  his  most  notable  successor  also  to  remain  untrans- 
lated, the  loss  to  English  students  of  theology  would  be 
doubly  regrettable.  The  first  volume  of  the  German  work, 
containing  the  history  of  the  doctrine,  was  published  in  an 
English  rendering  as  far  back  as  1872.  The  third  volume, 
of  which  a  translation  is  now  furnished  for  the  first  time, 
has  the  supreme  interest  of  presenting  us  with  Bitschl's  own 
theolc^cal  system. 

The    translation   has    been    executed    by  several  hands. 
Chap.  V.  and  part  of  Chap.  I.  were  translated  by  the  Eev. 


vi  editors'  preface 

A.  B.  Macaulay,  M.A.,  of  Forfar ;  Chap.  II.  by  the  Eev.  A.  R. 
Gordon,  M.A.,  of  Monikie;  Chap.  VI.  by  the  Rev.  R.  A. 
Lendrum,  M.A.,  of  Kirkliston ;  Chap.  VIII.  by  the  Rev. 
Jas.  Strachan,  M.A.,  of  St.  Fergus;  and  the  Introduction, 
Chaps.  III.  IV.  VII.  IX.  and  part  of  Chap.  I.  by  the  Rev. 
H.  R.  Mackintosh,  D.Phil.,  of  Tayport.  Dr.  Mackintosh, 
however,  is  responsible  in  every  case  for  the  rendering 
finally  adopted.  The  thanks  of  the  Editors  are  due  to  the 
Rev.  A.  Grieve,  Ph.D.,  for  valuable  advice,  and  especially 
to  the  Rev.  A.  R.  Gx^rdon,  who  read  most  of  the  work 
both  in  manuscript  and  in  proof,  and  to  whose  ungrudging 
help  and  accurate  scholarship  it  owes  much. 

The  translation  of  the  hymns  on  pp.  186,  187  is  by 
Mr.  Macaulay. 

The  references  to  Vols.  I.  and  II.  are  to  the  paging  of 
the  second  German  edition. 


AUTHOR'S    PREFACES 


FEOM  THE  PEEFACE  TO  THE  FIEST  EDITION 

In  publishing  this,  the  third  volume  of  the  Doctrine  of 
Justificaiion  and  Reconciliation,  I  think  I  may  assume  that 
many  questions  excited  by  the  History  of  the  Doctrine  which 
appeared  four  years  ago  will  find  their  answer  here.  In 
order  to  make  what  is  the  central  doctrine  of  Christianity 
intelligible  as  such,  I  have  been  compelled  to  give  an  almost 
complete  outline  of  Systematic  Theology,  the  remaining 
parts  of  which  could  easily  be  supplied.  No  one  who  has 
given  any  attention  to  Vol.  II.  will  be  surprised  at  the  fulness 
of  the  exposition.  ...  I  need  not,  it  seems  to  me,  make  any 
statement  in  advance  regarding  what  has  been  my  aim  in  the 
positive  explication  of  the  doctrine.  For  one  thing  my  path 
and  the  goal  it  leads  to  were  marked  out  for  me  by  what 
I  have  exhibited  in  Vol.  II.  as  the  Biblical  material  of  the 
doctrine;  while  for  the  rest  I  think  I  have  already  made 
it  sufficiently  clear  in  Vol.  I.  that  my  'theology  has  no  place  in 
the  ordinary  classification  of  theological  parties. 

GoTTiNGEX,  JvZy  10,  1874. 


PEEFACE  TO  THE  SECOND  EDITION 

The  last  remark  in  the  Preface  to  the  First  Edition  has 
not  been  understood  by  all  who  have  thought  fit  to  express  an 
opinion  on  my  theology.  In  proportion  as  for  the  past  two 
years  the  question  has  been  raised  of  using  force  against  me, 
certain  of  my  opponents  have  made  it  their  aim  to  brand  me 
with   all   possible   heretical   names,    by   perverting  or   even 


▼11 


viii  author's  prefaces 

directly  falsifying  what  I  intended  to  convey.  I  find  myself 
in  a  situation  like  that  of  the  prophet  Jeremiah,  whose 
enemies  said :  "  Come  and  let  us  smite  him  with  the  tongue, 
and  let  us  not  give  heed  to  any  of  his  words  "  ( Jer.  xviii.  1 8). 
I  therefore  decline  to  allude  particularly  to  the  kind  of 
opposition  which  I  have  experienced  in  the  majority  of  cases. 
In  the  present  volume,  which  is  almost  two  sheets  larger 
than  before,  much  will  be  found  which,  if  read  connectedly, 
strengthens  my  point  of  view. 

G^TTINOBN,  June  4,  1883. 


PREFACE  TO  THE  THIRD  EDITION 

It  affords  me  satisfaction  that  after  five  years  a  new 
edition  of  this  third  volume  of  the  Doctrine  of  Justification 
and  Reconciliation  has  become  necessary.  Yet  I  cannot  help 
saying  that  anyone  who  thinks  he  can  dispense  with  a  know- 
ledge of  the  first  and  second  volumes  of  this  work  increases 
his  own  difficulty  in  understanding  the  third.  Apart  from 
minor  improvements  in  style,  and  alterations  serving  to  make 
my  views  clearer,  which  have  been  adopted  in  this  new 
edition,  fresh  material  has  been  introduced  only  in  §§  27,  29, 
34,  44,  56,  60,  61.  The  controversial  situation  which  I 
described  five  years  ago  stiU  lasts  on  ;  my  opponents,  indeed, 
have  quite  recently  extended  the  scope  of  their  exertions,  and 
in  part  have  taken  to  a  harsh  and  common  tone  of  writing, 
which  redounds  not  to  my  discredit,  but  to  their  own.  At 
the  same  time  I  perceive  that  in  a  surreptitious  and  frag- 
mentary way  individual  principles  of  mine  which  have  been 
vehemently  assailed  are  being  admitted  even  by  my  opponents. 
Lastly,  from  the  growing  sale  of  my  writings  I  may  draw 
the  conclusion  that  the  number  of  those  is  increasing  who  are 
not  to  be  intimidated  from  learning  from  me  directly,  by  the 
methods  which  have  been  employed  to  falsify  and  cast 
suspicion  upon  my  theological  views. 

GoTTiNGBN,  Augxist  24,  1888. 


CONTENTS 


INTRODUCTION 

§  PAOB 

1.  The  standpoint   of    Systematic  Theology    in  the  Christian 

community      .......  1 

2.  The  conception  of  the  Christian  religion  as  the  framework  of 

Systematic  Theology  ......  8 

3.  The  scientific  conditions  of  Systematic  Theology  14 

4.  Division  of  the  present  subject   .  .  .  .  .25 


A,—TKE  CONCEPTION  OF  JUSTIFICATION  AND  ITS 

RELATIONS 

CHAPTER  I 


ITS    DEFINITION 

5.  The  general  conditions  of  the  religious  conception  of  justifica- 

tion     ........        27 

6.  Homogeneity  of  the  conceptions  "Kingdom  of   God"  and 

"justification"  ......        30 

7.  The    diflference  between  the  Evangelical  and  the   Catholic 

conceptions  of  justification     .  .  .35 

8.  Justification  equivalent  to  forgiveness  of  sins     .  .38 

9.  Forgiveness  of  sins  equivalent  to  remission  of  Divine  penalties        40 

10.  Forgiveness  of  sins  as  the  removal  of  the  separation  of  the 

sinner  from  God  acknowledged  in  the  feeling  of  guilt  47 

11.  Forgiveness  of  sins  as  removal  of  guilt  .        .  .54 

12.  Forgiveness  of  sins  as  removal  of  the  opposition  of  the  sinful 

will  to  God      .......        67 

13.  Forgiveness  of  sins  as  pardon      .....        59 

14.  Forgiveness  of  sins,  as  a  negative  operation,  distinguished 

from  justification  as  a  positive  .  .  .  .64 

15.  Forgiveness  of  sins  or  justification  equivalent  to  reconciliation        72 

16.  The  synthetic  form  of  the  justifying  judgment  of  God .  .        79 

ix 


X 


CONTENTS 


CHAPTER  II 


THE  OENERAL  RELATIONS  OF  JUSTIFICATION 


17.  Justification  as  a  judicial  act  of  God      .  .  .  . 

18.  Justification  as  an  act  of    God    the    Father   equivalent  to 

adoption  ....... 

19.  Faith  as  a  condition  of  justification        .... 

20.  Justification  referred  to  the  community  of  believers  and  to 

the  individual  in  it     . 

21.  Freedom  of  believers  from  the  law         .... 

22.  Particularity  or  universality  of  the  Divine  purpose  of  justifica- 

Lion      ....»••• 


I'AGK 

86 

93 

100 

108 
114 

120 


CHAPTER  III 

THE  SUBJECTIVE  ASPECT  OF  JUSTIFICATION   CONSIDERED   IN   DETAIL 

23.  Faith  as  trust  and  individual  assurance  of  justification  .       140 

24.  Methods  of  gaining  individual  assurance  of  salvation    .  .159 

25.  Justification  as  ground  of  the  positive  freedom  given  by  faith 

in  providence .  .  .  .  .  .168 

26.  The  place  of  this  idea  in  tradition  .  .181 


5.— THE  PRESUPPOSITIONS 


CHAPTER  IV 


THE  DOCTRINE  OF  GOD 

27.  The  nature  and  leading  characteristics  of  religion  .193 

28.  The  peculiar  character  of  religious  knowledge  .  203 

29.  The  so-called  proofs  of  the  existence  of  God  .211 

30.  The  personality  of  God  ......      -226 

31.  The  Socinian  conception  of  the  moral  world-order  238 

32.  The  orthodox  conception  of  the  moral  world-order  245 

33.  Possibility  of  reconciliation  in  the  latter  view  .  262 

34.  Love  as  determination  of  the  nature  of  God  in  relation  to  the 

Son  and  the  Kingdom  of  God  ....      270 

35.  Difference  between  the  Kingdom  of  God  and  the  Church  284 

36.  Relation  between  the  dependence  of  men  upon  God  in  the 

Kingdom  of  Grod  and  freedom  ....  290 

37.  The  eternity  of  God        ......  296 

38.  Civil  society  a  pre-condition  of  the  Kingdom  of  God    .  .  303 

39.  Possibility    of    reconciliation    derived    from    God's    love   as 

directed  to  the  Kingdom  of  God        .  .318 


CONTENTS  xi 

CHAPTER  V 

THE  DOCTRINE  OF  BIN 

§  PAOE 

40.  The  standard  of  the  Christian  idea  of  sin  .  327 

41.  The  kingdom  of  sin         .  334 

42.  Evil  and  Divine  punishment      .....  350 

43.  Sin  and  the  possibility  of  its  forgiveness  367 

CHAPTER  VI 

THE  DOCTRINE  OF  THE  PERSON  AND  LIFE-WORK  OF  CHRIST 

44.  The  Divinity  of  Christ  as  religious  knowledge  .  385 

45.  The  Divinity  of  Christ  as  a  problem  of  theology  399 

46.  The  scheme  of  the  two  states  and  the  three  offices  417 

47.  The  contradistinction  between  the  religious  and  the  ethical 

estimate  of  Christ       ......       434 

48.  The  ethical  estimate  of  Christ  according  to   His  vocation 

carries  with  it  the  religious  recognition  of  Him  as  Revealer 

of  God  .......  442 

49.  The  characteristics  of  Christ's  Divinity  ....  462 

50.  Christ's  execution  of  the  priestly  office  for  Himself  472 


(7.— THE  PROOF 
CHAPTER  VII 

THE  NECESSITY  OF  THE  FORGIVENESS  OF  SINS  OR  JUSTIFICATION 

IN  GENERAL 

51.  The  necessity  of  the  forgiveness  of  sins  compared  with  the 

necessity  of  good  works  .....      485 

52.  The  teleological  relation  of  forgiveness  to  eternal  life  .  495 

53.  The  necessity  of  ethically  good  action  arising  from  the  supra- 

mundane  end  of  the  Kingdom  of  God  and  the  blessedness 
present  in  good  action  .....      507 

54.  The  necessity  of  the  forgiveness  of  sins  in  view  of  the  goal  of 

eternal  life  or  freedom  over  the  world  523 

CHAPTER  VIII 

THE  NECESSITY  OF  BASING  THE  FORGIVENESS  OF  SINS  ON  THE  WORK 

AND  PASSION  OF  CHRIST 

55.  Objections  of  Socinian  and  AufklUrung  theologians  536 

56.  Proof  derived  from  the  intention  of  Christ  to  found  His 

religious  community  ......      543 


xu 


CONTENTS 


§  PAOB 

57.  Objection  arising  from  the  fact  of  sin'e  continuing  in  the 

community  of  Christ  ......      556 

58.  Views  of  Christ's  saving  work  from  predominantly  negative 

standpoints      .......      564 

59.  V^iews  of  Christ's  saving  work  on  individuals  apart  from  the 

mediating  conception  of  the  community        .  .  .       577 

60.  Personal  conviction  of  faith  in  Christ  as  the  form  of  the 

reconciliation  of  the  individual  ....      590 

61.  Relation  between  the  new  birth  of  the  individual  and  justi- 

fication ........      599 


£).— th£  conseque:n^ces 


CHAPTER  IX 


THB  RELIGIOUS  FUNCTIONS  SPRINGING  OUT  OP  RECONCILIATION   WITH 
GOD,   AND  THE  RELIGIOUS  FORM  OF  MORAL  ACTION 


62.  Religious  lordship  over  the  world  not  negation  of  the  world 

63.  Faith  in  the  Fatherly  providence  of  God 

64.  Patience  . 

65.  Humility 

66.  Prayer 

67.  Christian  perfection 

68.  Action  in  our  moral  calling 


609 
614 
625 
632 
640 
646 
661 


Index . 


671 


INTRODUCTION 


§  1.  The  exposition  of  Biblical  Theology  contained  in  my 
second  volume  was  undertaken  in  order  to  ascertain  what  idea 
of  the  forgiveness  of  sins,  justification,  and  reconciliation — 
together  with  their  relations — had  been  called  into  existence 
by  Jesus  as  the  Founder  of  the  Christian  Church,  and  main- 
tained by  the  apostles  as  its  earliest  representatives.  In  view 
of  the  many  distortions  and  obscurations  which  the  intel- 
lectual content  of  Christianity  has  suffered  in  the  course  of 
history,  my  aim,  in  harmony  with  the  theological  principles  of 
the  Evangelical  Church,  was  to  discover  the  conceptions  origin- 
ally held  of  the  religious  relation  of  Christians  to  God  which 
the  above-mentioned  notions  express.  Once  this  authentical 
exposition  of  the  ideas  named  has  been  given,  however,  the 
interests  of  theology  are  satisfied.  For  succeeding  thinkers 
have  been  guided,  in  part  intentionally,  in  part  unconsciously, 
by  the  models  of  the  New  Testament,  or  should  not  be 
followed  when  they  in  point  of  fact  diverge  from  them. 

Now  it  is  not  suflBcient  for  my  purpose  to  bring  out 
what  Jesus  has  said  about  the  forgiveness  of  sins  attached  to 
His  Person  and  His  death.  For  even  if  His  statements  might 
seem  perfectly  clear,  their  significance  becomes  completely 
intelligible  only  when  we  see  how  they  are  reflected  in  the 
consciousness  of  those  who  believe  in  Him,  and  how  the 
members  of  the  Christian  community  trace  back  their  con- 
sciousness of  pardon  to  the  Person  and  the  action  and  passion 
of  Jesus.  For  thus  we  are  made  aware  that  Jesus'  purpose  of 
pardon  has  not  failed.  Its  success,  however,  not  only  serves 
to  make  more  clear  what  His  purpose  was :  it  also  forms  an 


2  JUSTIFICATION   AND   RBCONCILIATION  [2 

essential  condition  of  our  religious  and  theological  interest  in 
the  matter.  We  should  pay  no  special  attention  to  this  pur- 
pose of  Jesus,  nor  should  we  seek  to  discover  its  value  and 
its  meaning,  did  we  not  reckon  ourselves  part  of  the  religious 
community  which  first  attested,  through  the  writers  of  the 
New  Testament,  its  possession  of  the  forgiveness  of  sins  as 
effected  by  Christ.  On  the  other  hand,  the  necessity  of  this 
connection  with  the  Church  is  ignored  by  those  who  think 
themselves  competent  to  arrive  at  or  reproduce  "  the  religion 
of  Jesus " ;  as  also  by  those  who  acknowledge  in  Jesus  only 
the  Author  of  new  moral  legislation,  or  one  of  those  who  have 
helped  to  perfect  humanity's  ideaL  Those  who  comprise  in 
the  latter  view  the  results  of  their  historical  criticism,  either 
ignore  Jesus'  sayings  about  forgiveness  as  attached  to  His 
Person  and  His  death,  or  regard  them  as  merely  casual  ex- 
pressions, or  content  themselves  with  supposing  that  in  Jesus' 
view  forgiveness  flows  directly  of  itself  from  moral  obedience 
to  the  law  (vol.  ii.  p.  50).  The  advocates  of  "  the  religion  of 
Jesus  "  are  quite  well  aware  that  some  value  belongs  to  the 
religious  example  of  Jesus,  apart  from  His  moral  legislation 
and  His  moral  example.  But  in  thinking  that  His  significance 
can  be  stated  completely  in  terms  of  personal  imitation,  they 
overlook  the  very  fact  that  Jesus  withdraws  Himself  from 
imitation  when  He  sets  Himself  over  against  His  disciples  as 
the  Author  of  forgiveness.  The  minds  of  His  disciples  are  so 
far  responsive  to  His  teaching  on  this  point,  that  they  become 
convinced  that  pardon  must  first  be  appropriated  before  it  is 
possible  to  imitate  His  piety  and  His  moral  achievement. 

Authentic  and  complete  knowledge  of  Jesus'  religious 
significance — His  significance,  that  is,  as  a  Founder  of  religion 
-—depends,  then,  on  one's  reckoning  oneself  part  of  the  com- 
munity which  He  founded,  and  this  precisely  in  so  far  as  it 
believes  itself  to  have  received  the  forgiveness  of  sins  as 
His  peculiar  gift.  This  religious  faith  does  not  take  an 
unhistorical  view  of  Jesus,  and  it  is  quite  possible  to  reach  an 
historical  estimate  of  Him  without  first  divesting  oneself  of 
this  faith,  this  religious  valuation  of  His  Person.    The  opposite 


3]  INTRODUCTION  3 

view  is  one  of  the  characterifltics  which  mark  that  great 
untruth  which  exerts  a  deceptive  and  confusing  influence 
under  the  name  of  an  historical  "  absence  of  presuppositions." 
It  is  no  mere  accident  that  the  subversion  of  Jesus'  religious 
importance  has  been  undertaken  under  the  guise  of  writing 
His  life,  for  this  very  undertaking  implies  the  surrender  of 
the  conviction  that  Jesus,  as  the  Founder  of  the  perfect  moral 
and  spiritual  religion,  belongs  to  a  higher  order  than  all  other 
men.  But  for  that  reason  it  is  likewise  vain  to  attempt  to 
re-establish  the  importance  of  Christ  by  the  same  biographical 
expedient.  We  can  discover  the  full  compass  of  His  historical 
actuality  solely  from  the  faith  of  the  Christian  community. 
Kot  even  His  purpose  to  found  the  community  can  be  quite 
understood  historically  save  by  one  who,  as  a  member  of  it, 
subordinates  himself  to  His  Person. 

Thence  follows  for  our  present  task,  however,  that  the 
material  of  the  theological  doctrines  of  forgiveness,  justification, 
and  reconciliation  is  to  be  sought  not  so  much  directly  in  the 
words  of  Christ,  as  in  the  correlative  representations  of  the 
original  consciousness  of  the  community.  The  immediate 
object  of  theological  cognition  is  the  community's  faith  that 
it  stands  to  God  in  a  relation  essentially  conditioned  by  the 
forgiveness  of  sins.  So  far,  however,  as  this  benefit  is  traced 
back  to  the  personal  action  and  passion  of  Christ,  His  proved 
intention  to  adopt  such  means  makes  the  mediation  of  the 
commuDity  more  intelligible.  Such  being  the  position  of 
affairs,  we  have  now  a  basis  for  the  practice  of  theology  in 
attaching  its  terminology  directly  to  the  apostolic  circle  of 
ideas.  It  would  be  a  mistaken  purism  were  anyone,  in  this 
respect,  to  prefer  the  less  developed  statements  of  Jesus  to 
the  forms  of  apostolic  thought.  Nay  more,  we  are  justified 
in  not  paring  down  the  most  developed  forms  of  the  Pauline 
system,  but  preserving  them  in  theological  usage,  for  they  serve 
to  express  most  sharply  the  opposition  between  Christianity 
and  Judaism.  What  urges  us  to  this  is  not  solely  the  pre- 
dominant custom  of  the  Western  Church  and  the  Eeformed 
tradition,  but  the  fact  that  by  means  of  the  Pauline  formulas 


4  JUSTIFICATION   AND   RECONCILIATION  [4 

the  uniqueness  of  Christianity  is  marked  off  from  the  Phari- 
saic falsification  of  the  religion  of  the  Old  Testament,  and 
thereby  the  Christian  Church  most  securely  protected  against 
a  recrudescence  of  the  latter  error. 

The  precondition,  thus  indicated  as  essential  for  the 
understanding  of  forgiveness,  justification,  and  reconciliation, 
which  are  assured  through  Christ,  holds  good  for  every  part 
of  the  Christian  circle  of  thought.  We  are  able  to  know  and 
understand  God,  sin,  conversion,  eternal  life,  in  the  Christian 
sense,  only  so  far  as  we  consciously  and  intentionally  reckon 
ourselves  members  of  the  community  which  Christ  has  founded. 
Theology  is  boimd  to  take  up  this  point  of  view,  and  only  so 
is  there  any  hope  of  constructing  a  theological  system  which 
deserves  the  name.  For  in  order  to  comprehend  the  content 
of  Christianity,  as  a  totality  composed  of  rightly  ordered 
particular  data,  we  must  occupy  one  and  the  same  standpoint 
throughout.  The  form  in  which  theology  has  hitherto  been 
elaborated — after  the  model  of  Melanchthon's  Loci — disobeys 
this  principle.  It  takes  up  its  standpoint,  first  of  all,  in  the 
far-off  domain  of  man's  original  perfection,  which  it  makes 
correlative  to  a  certain  rational  conception  of  God,  correlative 
that  is  to  the  necessary  twofold  recompense  which  God 
awards  to  men,  bound  as  they  are  to  conform  to  His  law. 
The  formula  of  the  foedus  operuvi,  which  Cocceius  invented 
for  this  combination  of  ideas,  is  thoroughly  well  suited  to  the 
exposition  of  this  doctrine  given  earlier  and  later  by  Lutheran 
and  Beformed  theology.  The  traditional  doctrine  of  man's 
original  state,  consequently,  implies  that  theology  takes  up 
its  standpoint  within  either  a  natural  or  a  universally  rational 
knowledge  of  God  which  has  nothing  to  do  with  the  Chris- 
tian knowledge  of  Him,  and  is  consequently  indifferent  to  the 
question  whether  the  expositor  who  expounds  the  doctrine 
belongs  to  the  Christian  community  or  not.  The  nature  and 
the  extent  of  sin,  accepted  as  a  fact,  is  thereafter  determined 
by  the  standard  of  the  first  man's  original  perfection.  Passages 
of  Scripture  may  be  used  as  well,  but  that  makes  no  difference, 
for  they  are  not  read  in  the  light  of  the  fact  that  the  Apostle 


6]  INTRODUCTION  5 

Paul's  view  of  the  effect  on  the  human  race  of  the  first  trans- 
gression is  determined  by  its  contrast  to  the  effect  of  Christ 
upon  His  community.  Traditional  theology,  in  using  the 
passage  Bom.  v.  12,  rather  keeps  to  the  lines  of  Augustine, 
who,  on  thoroughly  rational  grounds,  deduced  original  sin  from 
the  sin  of  the  first  human  pair.  Next,  theology  takes  up  its 
standpoint  on  the  fact  of  the  universally  inherited  sin  of  the 
human  race,  and  undertakes  to  deduce  from  this  the  necessity 
of  a  redemption,  the  method  of  which  is  brought  out  by 
comparing  sin  with  the  Divine  attribute  of  retributory  right- 
eousness in  the  purely  rational  style  which  Anselm  has 
applied  to  this  topic.  Then  follows,  at  the  third  stage  of 
the  traditional  theological  system,  the  knowledge  of  Chi*ist's 
Person  and  work,  and  its  application  to  the  individual  and 
the  fellowship  of  believers.  Not  until  it  has  to  deal  with 
this  topic  does  theology  take  up  the  standpoint  of  the  com- 
munity of  believers,  but  it  does  so  in  such  a  way  that  the 
above-mentioned  rational  conception  of  redemption  is  held  to 
throughout  the  exposition  of  its  actual  course.  No  system 
can  result  from  a  method  which  thus  traverses  three  separate 
points  of  view  in  accomplishing  the  different  parts  of  its 
task.  A  method  which  is  so  predominantly  inspired  by 
purely  rational  ideas  of  God  and  sin  and  redemption  is  not 
the  positive  theology  which  we  need,  and  which  can  be 
defended  against  the  objections  of  general  rationalism. 

Advocates  of  this  method,  who  are  unaware  of  its  defects 
and  feel  no  need  to  get  rid  of  them,  are  therefore  likewise 
incapable  of  understanding  an  exposition  of  Christian  doctrine 
which  views  and  judges  every  part  of  the  system  from  the 
standpoint  of  the  redeemed  community  of  Christ.  When 
they  confront  a  rounded  exposition  of  theology,  represented 
on  a  single  surface,  with  their  many-angled  mirror,  of  course 
they  get  nothing  but  a  broken  reflection.  But  the  blame  falls 
not  on  one  who  has  ventured  to  employ  the  systematic  method 
in  theology,  but  upon  the  critics  who  cherish  the  belief  that 
their  own  fragmentary  knowledge,  which  loses  itself  in  a 
variety  of  tentative  efforts,  complies  with  the  couditions  of 


6  JUSTIFICATION   AND   RECONCIUATION  [6 

systematic  thought.^  But  system  proper  must  all  the  more 
certainly  be  conditioned  by  the  fact  that  every  part  of 
theological  knowledge  is  construed  from  the  standpoint  of  the 
Christian  community,  since  only  so  can  the  worth  of  Christ  as 
Bevealer  be  employed  throughout  as  the  basis  of  knowledge 
in  solving  all  the  problems  of  theology.  This  constituted 
the  new  principle  which  Luther  set  forth  in  various  passages, 
collected  in  Schultz's  treatise  (cited  vol.  i.  p.  219).  Reference 
is  made  there  to  the  fact  that  Luther  admits  no  *'  disinterested  " 
knowledge  of  God,  but  recognises  as  a  religious  datum  only 
such  knowledge  of  Him  as  takes  the  form  of  unconditional 
trust.  This  knowledge,  however,  is  so  exclusively  boimd  up 
with  Christ,  that  whatever  knowledge  of  God  exists  alongside 
of  it  does  not,  as  the  Scholastics  suppose,  arrive  at  a  neutral 
idea  of  God,  but  issues  solely  in  contempt  or  hatred  of  Him. 
This  line  of  thought  is  to  be  found  not  only  in  Luther's 
Larger  Catechism,*  but  also  in  the  Augsburg  Confession, 
XX.  24.®     In  1543  Melanchthon  merely  echoes  in  a  feeble 


^  I  refer  to  Ereibig*s  work,  Die  Versdhnungslehre  auf  Orund  des  ckrisUicken 
Bennisstseins  dargestdlt  (Berlin,  1878).  In  the  introduction  he  identifies,  in  a 
trice,  the  authority  of  the  Bible  and  the  Church  with  his  Christian  consciousness, 
deduces  the  method  of  reconciliation  before  proving  the  act  of  reconciliation, 
and  on  p.  242  betrays  his  rationalism  by  recognising  belief  in  a  twofold  Divine 
recompense — which  he  affirms  is  the  content  of  the  biblical  idea  of  righteous- 
ness— ^as  an  idea  common  to  all  men,  and  present  originally  in  the  moral 
conscioTisuess.  In  his  scattered  and  often  falsified  representation  of  my  views, 
Kreibig's  method  is  to  concede  to  me  in  one  breath  what  previously  and  sub- 
sequently he  disputes.  He  ignores  altogether  the  researches  in  Biblical  Theology 
contained  in  my  second  volume,  but  continues  to  assure  us  cheerfully  that  his 
assumptions  are  based  on  Scripture  without  even  in  a  single  word  mentioning 
what  I  have  proved  to  the  contrary. 

'  "  Quid  est  habere  deum  aut  quid  est  deus  ?  Deus  est  et  vocatur,  de  cuius 
bonitate  et  potentia  omnia  bona  certo  tibi  pollicearis  et  ad  quem  quibuslibet 
adversis  rebus  atque  periculis  ingruentibus  confugias,  ut  deum  habere  nihil 
aliud  sit,  quam  illi  ex  toto  corde  fidere  et  credere  .  .  .  Siquidem  haec  duo, 
fides  et  deus  una  copula  coniungenda  sunt. " 

'  ** Qui  scit,  se  per  Christum  habere  propitium  patrem,  is  vere  novit  deum" ; 
further,  in  the  Apology,  iii.  20 :  *'Per  Christum  acceditur  ad  patrem,  et  accepta 
remissione  peccatorum  vere  iam  statuimus,  nos  habere  deum,  hoc  est  nos  deo 
curae  esse,  invocamus,  agimus  gratias,  timemus,  <liligimus."  II.  34:  **Hn- 
manus  animus  sine  spiritu  sancto  (outside  the  community  of  believers)  aut 
securus  contemnit  indicium  dei,  aut  in  poena  fugit  et  odit  iudicantem  deum." 
II.  18:  "Ratio  nihil  facit,  nisi  quaedam  civilia  opera,  interim  neque  timet 
deum,  neque  vere  credit  se  deo  curae  esse." 


7]  INTRODUCTION  7 

way  the  principle  that  God  is  knowable  only  through  the 
mediation  of  Christ,  a  principle  which  in  the  Lod  of  1535 
he  had  recognised  with  a  certain  emphasis.^  The  while,  he 
builds  Christian  doctrine  on  a  foundation  of  natural  theology, 
after  the  model  of  the  Scholastics.  All  this  is  a  result  of  his 
return  of  Aristotle.  Not  only  does  the  close  affinity  between 
Humanism  and  Scholasticism  betray  itself  here,  but  Melan- 
chthon  abandons  the  task  of  constructing  theology  according 
to  Luther's  principle.  That  task  I  essay  in  the  full  con- 
sciousness that  my  action  is  justified  and  rendered  imperative 
by  the  standard  writings  of  the  Keformation.  But  if  we  can 
rightly  know  God  only  if  we  know  Him  through  Christ,  then 
we  can  know  Him  only  if  we  belong  to  the  community  of 
believers.  Not  only,  however,  are  God  and  all  the  operations 
of  His  grace  to  be  construed  through  the  revelation  in  Christ, 
but  even  sin  can  be  appreciated  only  in  virtue  of  the  for- 
giveness of  sins  which  is  Christ's  special  gift:  for,  as  the 
Apology  puts  it,  ii.  62:  Evangelium  arguU  omnes,  quod  sint 
8ub  peccato.  Y.  29 :  ffaec  est  summa  praedidionis  evangeli% 
arguere  pecccUa  et  offerre  remissionem  pecccUorum} 

This  theological  method,  too,  is  the  legitimate  solution  of 
the  dilemma  in  which  Spener  places  us  between  theologia  re- 
genitorum  a%it  irregenitorum?  That  theology  no  less  than  the 
Christian  faith  should  possess  the  marks  of  the  regenerate  Ufe, 
is  obvious ;  as  it  is  also  intelligible  that  Spener  should  find 
those  marks  awanting  in  the  pedantic  theology  cultivated  in 
his  day.  But  if  the  point  was  to  prove  that  those  super- 
natural characteristics  were  present,  that  was  impossible  so 
long  as  theology  retained  its  traditional  arrangement  and 
form.  For  opponents  might  rejoin  that,  provided  their  system 
were  materially  correct,  it  came  to  them  from  the  Holy  Spirit. 

*  Cf.  Theoloffie  und  Metaphysik,  p.  57  ff.  (2n(i  ed.  p.  61  ff.). 

'  In  the  Apol,  C.  A.  v.  63,  it  is  true,  we  meet  with  the  formula  which 
Melanchthon  in  the  Vmtationsbuch  defended  against  Agricola*s  objections : 
Lex  osUndU,  arffuit,  et  candemnal  peccaia.  Evangelium  est  projnissio  graiiae. 
This  formula  indicates  that  the  ground  for  our  knowledge  of  sin  lies  outside 
faith  in  Christ.  But  Luther  admitted  this  only  in  the  sense  that  general  saving 
faith  is  included  in  the  law  (vol.  i.  p.  201). 

'  Cf.  OeschiehU  des  Pietismus,  ii.  p.  117  ff. 


8  JUSTIFICATION    AND   RBCONCILIATION  [8 

And  Spener's  principle  that  theology  is  to  be  learned  through 
prayer  and  moral  discipline  either  ends  in  fanaticism,  or  is 
susceptible  of  a  practicable  meaning  only  when  it  is  taken  as 
a  suggestion  for  making  a  fruitful  application  of  theology  in 
the  pulpit  and  pastoral  work.  Spener/  however,  claimed  for 
theology  a  yet  wider  point  of  view — it  is  to  make  good  its 
derivation  from  the  Holy  Spirit  in  virtue  of  the  truth  that 
"  whoever  willeth  to  do  the  will  of  God  will  know  the  truth 
of  Christ's  doctrine"  (John  vii.  17).  This  implies  a  complete 
revision  of  the  matter  of  theology ;  for  the  traditional  system 
was  and  is  not  adapted  to  this  ethical  proof  of  the  truth  of 
Christianity.  What  Spener's  principles  indicate,  however,  is 
the  way  to  such  a  conception  of  the  Christian  view  of  the 
world  and  of  life  as  can  hope  for  success  only  when  it  is 
attempted  from  the  standpoint  of  the  community  of  believers. 
This  standpoint,  however,  conforms  likewise  to  the  maxim  that 
theology  must  emanate  from  the  Holy  Spirit.  But  if  any- 
one builds  Christian  theology  on  a  substructure  of  pretended 
Natural  Theology,  the  rationalistic  arguments  of  Augustine 
about  original  sin,  and  those  of  Anselm  about  the  nature  of 
redemption,  he  thereby  takes  his  stand  outside  the  sphere 
of  regeneration,  which  is  coterminous  with  the  community 
of  believers. 

§  2.  The  form  of  systematic  theology  is  bound  up,  first 
of  all,  with  the  correct  and  complete  idea  of  the  Christian 
Religion,  The  latter  is  reached  by  an  orderly  reproduction 
of  the  thought  of  Christ  and  the  apostles ;  it  is  confirmed  by 
being  compared  with  other  species  and  stages  of  religion. 
The  specifically  peculiar  nature  of  Christianity,  which  at 
every  turn  of  theology  must  be  kept  intact,  can  be  ascertained 
only  by  calling  the  general  history  of  religion  to  our  aid. 
Schleiermacher  was  the  first  to  adopt  this  method  (vol.  i.  p. 
440  ff.).  It  is  this  that  makes  his  definition  of  religion  so 
important,  even  though  when  more  closely  examined  it  by  no 
means  justifies  its  claims.     "  The  Christian  religion  is  that 

^  Pia  desidcria  and  Allgemeine  OoUeagelahrtheit  (1680),  i.  i).  36.     CorisUia, 
iii.  p.  54. 


9]  INTEODUCTION  9 

monotheistic  form  of  faith  within  the  teleological  (moral) 
class,  in  which  everything  is  referred  to  the  redemption 
wrought  hj  Jesus,"  The  relation  between  this  special  char- 
acteristic and  the  generic  qualities  of  Christianity  is  not 
stated  with  the  clearness  we  desire.  For  if  the  Divine  final 
end  is  embodied  in  the  Kingdom  of  God,^  it  is  to  be  expected 
that  the  redemption  which  has  come  through  Jesus  should 
also  be  related,  as  a  means,  to  this  final  end.  But  as  this 
relation  is  not  expressed,  the  result  is  that  Schleiermacher 
construes  the  wholS  Christian  consciousness  of  God  by  refer- 
ence now  to  redemption  through  Jesus,  now  to  the  idea  of 
the  Kingdom  of  God,  without  coming  to  any  decision  regard- 
ing the  mutual  relations  of  this  final  end  and  the  function  of 
the  Mediator.  The  natural  consequence  of  this  want  of 
lucidity  is  that  no  topic  receives  less  justice  in  the  general 
argument  of  his  Glaubenslehre  than  what  he  admits  to  be  the 
teleological  character  of  Christianity.  The  latter  is  constantly 
crossed  by  the  neutral  idea  of  religion  by  which  he  is  guided, 
by  the  abstract  Monotheism  which  he  follows,  and  finally  by 
everything  being  referred  solely  to  redemption  through  Jesus. 
His  obscure  definition  betrays  the  fact,  at  the  very  outset,  that 
Schleiermacher  had  not  taken  his  final  bearings  in  the  realm 
of  the  history  of  religion.  Here  he  was  impeded,  beyond  all 
doubt,  by  his  underestimate  of  the  religion  of  the  Old  Tes- 
tament, which,  as  the  stage  prefatory  to  Christianity,  is 
possessed  of  characteristics  analogous  to  those  of  Christianity 
itself.  For,  in  the  Old  Testament  no  less,  the  concrete  con- 
ception of  the  one,  supernatural,  omnipotent  God  is  bound  up 
with  the  final  end  of  the  Kingdom  of  God,  and  with  the  idea 
of  a  redemption.  But  that  end  is  conceived  under  the  limits 
of  the  national  commonwealth;  while  the  condition  of  the 

'  Olaubenslehre,  §  9,  2  :  "  Whatever  in  the  domain  of  ChristiaDity  belougs 
to  our  consciousness  of  God,  must  also  be  referred,  through  the  idea  of  a  kingdom 
of  God,  to  the  totality  of  our  activities  .  .  .  This  figure  of  *the  Kingdom  of 
God,'  so  significant,  so  all-inclusive  in  Christianity,  is  only  a  general  expression 
of  the  fact  that  in  Christianity  all  pain  and  all  joy  are  religions  only  in  so  far 
as  tbey  are  related  to  activity  in  the  Kingdom  of  God,  and  that  every  iiions 
emotion,  which  arises  from  a  passive  state,  ends  in  the  consciousness  of  a  transi- 
tion to  activity." 


10  JUSTIFICATION   AND   RECONCILIATION  [lO 

end  being  realised  is  conceived,  it  is  true,  as  purification  from 
sin,  but  partly  also  under  the  garb  of  the  chosen  people's 
political  independence ;  partly  it  is  accompanied  by  the  hope  of 
outward  prosperity  destined  to  arrive  with  the  perfect  rule  of 
Jehovah.  In  Christianity,  the  Kingdom  of  God  is  represented 
as  the  common  end  of  God  and  the  elect  community,  in  such 
a  way  that  it  rises  above  the  natural  limits  of  nationality 
and  becomes  the  moral  society  of  nations.  In  this  respect 
Christianity  shows  itself  to  be  the  perfect  moral  religion. 
Eedemption  through  Christ — an  idea  which  embraces  justifica- 
tion and  renewal — is  also  divested  of  all  conditions  of  a 
natural  or  sensuous  kind,  so  as  to  culminate  in  the  purely 
spiritual  idea  of  eternal  life.  Nor  do  the  outwardly  sensible 
circumstances,  amidst  which  Christ's  passion  took  place,  affect 
its  redeeming  significance.  That  significance  attaches  to  His 
willing  acceptance  of  His  sufferings,  to  the  obedience  which, 
under  these  circumstances,  He  displayed  in  His  God-given 
vocation.  And  inasmuch  as  redemption  through  Christ 
comprises  justification  and  renewal,  what  is  obtained  is  such 
an  emancipation  from  evils  as,  being  a  spiritual  process,  is 
specifically  distinct  from  Old  Testament  anticipations. 

In  both  these  respects  we  have  in  Christianity  a  cul- 
mination of  the  monotheistic,  spiritual,  and  teleological 
religion  of  the  Bible  in  the  idea  of  the  perfected  spiritual 
and  moral  religion.  There  can  be  no  doubt  that  these  two 
characteristics  condition  each  other  mutually.  Christ  made 
the  universal  moral  Kingdom  of  God  His  end,  and  thus  He 
came  to  know  and  decide  for  that  kind  of  redemption  which 
He  achieved  through  the  maintenance  of  fidelity  in  His 
calling  and  of  His  blessed  fellowship  with  God  through  suffer- 
ing unto  death.  On  the  other  hand,  a  correct  spiritual 
interpretation  of  redemption  and  justification  through  Christ 
tends  to  keep  more  decisively  to  the  front  the  truth  that  the 
Kingdom  of  God  is  the  final  end.  Now  theology,  especially 
within  the  Evangelical  Confessions,  has  laid  very  unequal 
emphasis  on  these  two  principal  characteristics  of  Chris- 
tianity.    It  makes  everything  which  concerns  the  redemptive 


11]  INTRODUCTION  11 

character  of  Christianity  an  object  of  the  most  solicitous 
reflection.  Accordingly  it  finds  the  central  point  of  all 
Christian  knowledge  and  practice  in  redemption  through 
Christ,  while  injustice  is  done  to  the  ethical  interpretation 
of  Christianity  through  the  idea  of  the  Kingdom  of  God. 
But  Christianity,  so  to  speak,  resembles  not  a  circle 
described  from  a  single  centre,  but  an  ellipse  which  is  deter- 
mined by  two  fod.  Western  Catholicism  has  recognised 
this  fact  in  its  own  way.  For  it  sets  itself  up  not  merely  as 
an  institution  possessed  of  the  sacraments  by  which  the 
power  of  Christ's  redemption  is  propagated,  but  also  as  the 
Kingdom  of  God  in  the  present,  as  the  community  in  which, 
through  the  obedience  of  men  and  States  to  the  Pope,  Divine 
righteousness  is  professedly  realised.  Now  it  has  been  a 
misfortune  for  Protestantism  that  the  Beformers  did  not 
purify  the  idea  of  the  moral  Kingdom  of  God  or  Christ  from 
sacerdotal  corruptions,  but  embodied  it  in  a  conception  which 
is  not  practical  but  merely  dogmatical.  Apart  from  Zwingli, 
whose  views  on  this  point  are  peculiar  to  himself,  Luther, 
Melanchthon,^  and  Calvin  define  the  Kingdom  of  Christ  as 
the  inward  union  between  Christ  and  believers  through 
grace  and  its  operations.  The  dogmatic  theologians  of  both 
Confessions  unanimously  propagate  this  view  by  deriving  an 
argument  for  religious  consolation  from  the  protection 
against  powers  hostile  to  redemption  enjoyed  by  believers  in 
the  Kingdom  of  Christ.  Kant  (vol.  i.  412  flf.)  was  the  first 
to  perceive  the  supreme  importance  for  ethics  of  the  "  King- 
dom of  God "  as  an  association  of  men  bound  together  by 
laws  of  virtue.  But  it  remained  for  Schleiermacher  first  to 
employ  the  true  conception  of  the  teleological  nature  of  the 
Kingdom  of  God  to  determine  the  idea  of  Christianity.  This 
service  of  his  ought  not  to  be  forgotten,  even  if  he  failed  to 
grasp  the  discovery  with  a  firm  hand.  For  none  of  the 
theologians  who  found  in  him  their  master,  with  the  exception 

^  Once,  however,  in  the  Apoloyy  of  the  (7.  A,  iii.  68,  71,  72,  he  expresses 
the  true  idea.  Similarly  Luther,  in  his  SmaUer  Catechism,  sec.  2,  art.  2, 
with  which  the  parallel  statement  in  his  Larger  Catechism  really  agrees. 


12  JUSTIFICATION   AND   RECONCILIATION  [l2 

of  Theremin,^  has  taken  account  of  the  importance  of  this 
idea  for  systematic  theology  as  a  whole.  Modem  pietists 
are  accustomed  to  describe  their  favourite  undertakings, 
especially  foreign  missions,  directly  as  the  Kingdom  of  God  ; 
but  in  doing  so,  while  they  touch  upon  the  ethical  meaning 
of  the  idea,  they  narrow  its  reference  improperly.  This 
circle,  too,  have  brought  the  word  into  use,  e,g,  to  describe 
the  public  affairs  of  the  Church  as  discussed  in  periodicals. 
This  use  of  the  name,  however,  involves  that  interchange  of 
"  Church  "  and  "  Kingdom  of  God  "  which  we  find  dominating 
Boman  Catholicism. 

Since  Jesus  Himself,  however,  saw  in  the  Kingdom  of 
God  the  moral  end  of  the  religious  fellowship  He  had  to 
found  (vol.  ii.  p.  28);  since  He  understood  by  it  not  the 
common  exercise  of  worship,  but  the  organisation  of  humanity 
through  action  inspired  by  love,  any  conception  of  Chris- 
tianity would  be  imperfect  and  therefore  incorrect  which  did 
not  include  this  specifically  teleological  aspect  We  must 
further  remember  that  Christ  did  not  describe  this  moral 
task,  to  be  carried  out  by  the  human  race,  in  the  form  of 
a  philosophical  doctrine,  and  propagate  it  in  a  school:  He 
entrusted  it  to  His  disciples.  At  the  same  time  He  con- 
stituted them  a  religious  community  through  training  of 
another  kind.  For  when  good  action  towards  our  fellow-men 
is  subsumed  under  the  conception  of  the  Kingdom  of  God, 
this  whole  province  is  placed  under  the  rule  and  standard  of 
religion.     And  so,  were  we  to  determine  the  unique  quality 

^  Dit  Lehre  vom  goUliehen  Jteiche  (1823),  p.  2  :  ''Although,  in  view  of  the 
great  multiplicity  of  moral  ideas  contained  in  Christianity,  it  is  di£Scult  to 
discover  the  most  comprehensive,  yet  it  is  impossible  not  to  perceive  that  its 
highest  ideal  is  a  society,  and  that  its  doctrines  and  precepts  become  luminous 
only  when  they  are  subordinated  and  related  to  it.  For  as  a  unity  of  essence 
and  a  moral  unity  of  spirit  exists  eternally  between  the  Father  and  the  Son, 
so  the  Son  must  likewise  become  the  Head  of  all  humanity,  in  order  that  it 
may  be  raised  to  the  perfection  which  is  to  be  seen  in  Him,  and  be  led  through 
Him  into  a  fellowship  with  the  Father  similar  to  that  in  which  He  Himself 
lives.  This  union  is  appropriately  named  the  Kingdom  of  God."  P.  4  : 
**  When  we  consider  the  relation  of  God  to  man,  and  the  work  of  redemption  in 
the  light  of  this  idea,  many  doctrinal  conceptions  lose  the  appearance  of 
arbitrariness  which  they  may  have,  and  gain  a  closer  connection  and  a  firmer 
foundation." 


13]  INTRODUCTION  1 3 

of  ChriBtianity  merely  by  its  teleological  element,  namely,  its 
relation  to  the  moral  Kingdom  of  God,  we  should  do  injustice 
to  its  character  as  a  religion.  This  aspect  of  Christianity, 
clearly,  is  meant  to  be  provided  for  in  Schleiermacher's 
phrase — "  in  which  everything  is  referred  to  the  redemption 
wrought  by  Jesus."  For  redemption  is  a  presupposition  of 
the  Christian's  peculiar  dependence  on  God ;  but  dependence 
on  God  is,  for  Schleiermacher,  the  general  form  of  religious 
experience  as  distinct  from  a  moral  relationship.  Now  it  is 
true  that  in  Christianity  everything  is  "  related  "  to  the  moral 
organisation  of  humanity  through  love-prompted  action  ;  but 
at  the  same  time  everything  is  also  "  related  "  to  redemption 
through  Jesus,  to  spiritual  redemption,  i,e,  to  that  freedom 
from  guilt  and  over  the  world  which  is  to  be  won  through  the 
realised  Fatherhood  of  God.  Freedom  in  God,  the  freedom 
of  the  children  of  God,  is  the  private  end  of  each  individual 
Christian,  as  the  Kingdom  of  God  is  the  final  end  of  all 
And  this  double  character  of  the  Christian  life — perfectly 
religious  and  perfectly  ethical — continues,  because  its 
realisation  in  the  life  of  the  individual  advances  through  the 
perpetual  interaction  of  the  two  elements.  For  the  life  and 
activity  of  the  Founder  of  Christianity  issued  at  once  in  the 
redemption  and  the  setting  up  of  the  Kingdom  of  God.  The 
same  fidelity  in  His  Divine  vocation  enabled  Him  to  preserve 
and  secure  both  His  own  fellowship  with  the  Father,  and  the 
power  to  lead  sinners  back  into  the  same  fellowship  with 
God;  and  the  same  effect  has  two  aspects — His  disciples 
acknowledge  Him  as  the  Hecul  of  the  Kingdom  of  God,  and 
God  as  their  Father. 

Christianity,  then,  is  the  monotheistic,  completely  spiritual, 
and  ethical  religion,  which,  based  on  the  life  of  its  Author  as 
Redeemer  and  as  Founder  of  the  Kingdom  of  God,  consists  in 
the  freedom  of  the  children  of  God,  involves  the  impulse  to 
conduct  from  the  motive  of  love,  aims  at  the  moral  organisa- 
tion of  mankind,  and  grounds  blessedness  on  the  relation  of 
sonship  to  God,  as  well  as  on  the  Kingdom  of  God. 

This  conception  is  indispensable  for  systematic  theology 


14  JUSTIFICATION   AND   RECONCILIATION  [14 

if  the  material  correctly  obtained  from  Biblical  ideas  is  to  be 
fully  used.  The  history  of  theology  affords  only  too  many 
examples  of  the  construction  of  what  is  either  merely  a 
doctrine  of  redemption  or  merely  a  system  of  morality. 
But  it  must  also  be  observed  that  we  are  not  to  base 
theology  proper  on  the  idea  of  redemption,  and  ethics  upon  the 
idea  of  the  Kingdom  of  God.  On  the  contrary,  so  far  as 
theology  falls  into  the^e  two  sections,  each  must  be  kept 
under  the  constitutive  influence  of  both  ideas.  Dogmatics, 
that  is,  comprises  all  the  presuppositions  of  Christianity 
under  the  form  of  Divine  operation ;  ethics,  presupposing  the 
former  discipline,  comprises  the  province  of  personal  and 
social  Christian  life  under  the  form  of  personal  activity} 
Now  since  the  revelation  of  God  is  directed  not  only  to  the 
goal  of  redemption,  but  also  to  the  final  end  of  the  kingdom 
which  He  realises  in  fellowship  with  the  redeemed,  dogmatics 
cannot  dispense  with  the  latter  guiding  idea.  And  as  the 
spiritual  activity  of  those  who  are  called  to  the  Kingdom  of 
God  and  redeemed  does  not  manifest  itself  merely  in  their 
moral  influence  on  others,  but  also  in  the  peculiar  functions 
of  Divine  sonship,  ethics  must  be  conditioned  likewise  by 
the  idea  of  redemption. 

§  3.  The  scientific  understanding  of  the  several  truths 
of  Christianity  depends  on  their  correct  definition.  The  first 
task  of  systematic  theology  is  correctly  and  completely  to 
outline  and  clearly  to  settle  the  religious  ideas  or  facts  which 
are  included  in  the  conception  of  Christianity.  The  so-called 
proof  from  Scripture  has  to  do  with  the  correctness  of  these 
ideas,  but  it  does  not  really  yield  more  than  the  correctness 
of  the  ideas  of  Christianity  in  their  original  sense.  Theological 
form,  however,  requires  that  their  correctness  shotJd  be  of 
another  kind.  And  so  we  cannot  reach  dogmatic  definitions 
simply  by  summing  up  the  exegetical  results  of  Biblical 
Theology.  For  the  writers  of  the  New  Testament  are  not  in 
the  least  guided  by  the  wish  to  define  their  ideas ;  and  when, 

^  Cf.  Schleiermacher,  ChrisUiche  Siite,  p.  28 ;  Nitzsch,  System  der  christ- 
lichen  Lehre  (6th  ed.),  p.  4  ;  Harless,  Christliche  Ethik  (6th  ed.),  p.  8. 


15]  INTRODUCTION      .  15 

as  in  Heb.  xi.  1,  we  have  for  once  a  tendency  to  definition, 
yet  the  definition  is  not  complete.  The  ideas  of  Christ  and 
of  the  apostles,  which  we  regard  off-hand  as  substantially 
in  agreement,  often  enough  employ  divergent  means  of 
expression,  or  link  themselves  to  different  Old  Testament 
symbols.  Now  exegesis  itself,  certainly,  deals  with  many 
particular  passages  in  such  a  way  as  to  reduce  the  cognate 
symbolical  expressions  they  contain  to  one  conception  of  the 
greatest  possible  clearness.  For  in  part  exegesis  must  view 
the  particular  in  the  light  of  its  relationship  to  everything 
which  resembles  it,  in  part  it  has  to  fill  up  the  chasm 
between  our  way  of  thinking  and  the  Israelites'  symbolical 
maimer  of  speech,  in  part  its  task  is  to  clear  away  false 
ideas  forced  upon  certain  Biblical  symbols  by  exegetical 
tradition.  Under  these  circumstances,  the  exposition  of  re- 
ligious ideas  furnished  by  Biblical  Theology,  which  supplies 
the  matter  of  theological  knowledge,  itself  contains  attempts 
to  define  these  ideas.  But  it  gives  no  guarantee  that 
they  are  completely  and  distinctly  defined  in  organic 
relation  to  the  whole.  Each  definition  can  only  be  made 
complete  as  it  receives  its  place  in  a  system  of  theology, 
for  the  truth  of  the  particular  can  be  understood  only 
through  its  connection  with  the  whole.  This  gives  us 
the  certainty  that  theological  propositions,  which  have 
been  defined  with  logical  correctness,  are  not  mutually 
contradictory.^ 

The  formally  correct  expression  of  theological  propositions 
depends  on  the  method  we  follow  in  defining  the  objects  of 
cognition,  that  is,  on  the  theory  of  knowledge  which  we 
consciously  or  unconsciously  obey.  The  theory  of  knowledge, 
in  the  sense  here  intended,  is  identical  with  "  the  doctrine  of 

^  Gf.  Dilthey,  Einleitung  in  die  Oeiatesicissenaehaftenf  i.  p.  5.  By  Bcience  is 
undentood  in  ordinary  UBage  a  system  of  propositious,  the  elememts  of  which 
are  conceptions,  i,e,  ideas  completely  determined,  constant,  and  universally 
valid  throughout  the  whole  connection  of  thought.  The  coigunotions  of  ideas 
in  the  system  must  he  hased  in  fact ;  and  finally,  its  parts  must  he  combined 
into  a  whole  to  facilitate  teaching,  either  because  a  pai't  of  reality  is  completely 
constmed  in  thought  by  this  combination  of  propositions,  or  because  some 
branch  of  human  activity  is  determined  by  it. 


16  JUSTIFICATION   AND    RECONCILIATION  [l6 

the  thing  or  things  "  ^  which  forms  the  first  part  of  metaphysics.' 
Dififerent  philosophers  interpret  metaphysics  differently.     I 
have  therefore  explained  elsewhere  what  I  mean  when  I  use 
the  word  metaphysics  by  reference  to  Aristotle,  whose  usage 
determined  philosophical  terminology  until  Kant.       And  I 
cannot  refrain  from  repeating  that  explanation  here.     "  First 
Philosophy,"  according  to  Aristotle,  "  is  devoted  to  an  investi- 
gation of  the  universal  grounds  of  all  being.     Now  the  things 
with  which  our  knowledge  deals  are  divided  into  nature  and 
spiritual   life.       When    we   are    investigating   the   grounds 
common  to  all  being,  we  abstract  from  the  particular  qualities 
which  constitute  for  us  the  difference  between  nature  and 
spirit,  and  enable  us  to  regard  them  as  heterogeneous  entities. 
Natural  and  spiritual  phenomena  concern  metaphysics  only 
in  so  far  as  they  may  be  conceived  as  things  in  general.     For 
the  conditions    of   knowledge   common    to    them    both   are 
crystallised  in  the  conception  of  'the  thing.'     Thus  meta- 
physical conceptions,  it  is  true,  include  and  regulate  all  other 
acts  of  knowledge  which  involve  the  specific  pecuharity  of 
nature  and  of  spirit.     They  explain  how  it  is  that  the  human 
mind,  having  had  experientially  perceptions  of  special  kinds, 
differentiates  things  in  consequence  into  natural  things  and 
spiritual  beings.     But  it  does  not  follow  from  the  position  of 
metaphysics  as  superordinate  to  experiential  knowledge,  that 
metaphysical    conceptions    give   us   a   more   profound   and 
valuable  knowledge  of  spiritual  existence  than  can  be  gained 
from  psychology  and  ethics."     Compared  with  natural  science 
and  ethics,  metaphysics  yields  elementary  and  merely  formal 
knowledge.     If  others  understand  by  metaphysics :  not  that 
elementary  knowledge  of  things  in  general  which  ignores  their 
division  into  nature  and  spirit,  but  such  a  universal  theory 
as  shall  be  at  once  elementary  and  the  final  and  exhaustive 
science  of  all  particular  ordered  existence,  they  do  so  at  their 
own  risk.     At  any  rate  my  method  is  neither  unjust  nor 

^  Die  Lehre  van  dem  Dinge  und  den  Dingen, 

'  With  what  follows  compare  my  pamphlet,  2%eologit  und  MetaphysUc :  zur 
Veratdndigung  und  Ahwehr^  Bonn,  1881 ;  2n(l  ed.,  1887. 


17]  INTRODUCTION  1 7 

unhistorical  when  I  explain,  with  express  reference  to 
Aristotle,  what  extent  of  knowledge  I  include  under  the 
name.  For  in  the  last  resort  the  question  is  one  more  of  the 
thing  than  of  the  name. 

The  first  consequence  of  this  is,  that  there  are  no  sufficient 
grounds  for  combining  a  theory  of  things  in  general  with  the 
conception  of  God.  That  is  done,  however,  when  Aristotle 
gives  the  name  God  to  the  idea  of  the  highest  end  which 
he  postulates  as  winding  up  the  cosmic  series  of  means  and 
ends,  and  so  as* an  expression  of  the  unity  of  the  world. 
This  conjunction  of  the  two  forms  the  content  of  the 
teleological  argument  for  God's  existence  constructed  by 
Scholastic  theology.  We  have  a  similar  case  in  the  cosmo- 
logical  argument.  It  exhibits  a  metamorphosis  of  the  Keo- 
platonic  view  of  the  world,  which  rests  merely  upon  the  idea 
of  things  and  their  causal  connection.  Now  in  religion  the 
thought  of  God  is  given.  But  the  religious  view  of  the 
world,  in  all  its  species,  rests  on  the  fact  that  man  in  some 
degree  distinguishes  himself  in  worth  from  the  phenomena 
which  surround  him  and  from  the  influences  of  nature  which 
press  in  upon  him.  All  religion  is  equivalent  to  an  explana- 
tion of  the  course  of  the  world — to  whatever  extent  it  may 
be  known — in  the  sense  that  the  sublime  spiritual  powers 
(or  the  spiritual  power)  which  rule  in  or  over  it,  conserve 
and  confirm  to  the  personal  spirit  its  claims  and  its  independ- 
ence over-against  the  restrictions  of  nature  and  the  natural 
effects  of  human  society.  Thus  the  thought  of  God,  when 
by  the  word  is  understood  conscious  personality,  lies  beyond 
the  horizon  of  metaphysic,  as  metaphysic  is  defined 
above.  And  both  these  proofs  for  God's  existence,  whose 
construction  is  purely  metaphysical,  lead  not  to  the  Being  the 
idea  of  which  Scholastic  theology  receives  as  a  datum  from 
Christianity,  but  merely  to  conceptions  of  the  world-unity 
which  have  nothing  to  do  with  any  religion.  This  use  of 
metaphysic,  consequently,  must  be  forbidden  in  theology,  if 
the  latter's  positive  and  proper  character  is  to  be  maintained.^ 

^  FlUgers    instructive    book,    Die   speculative    Theoiogie   der    Oegenwart, 

2 


18  JUSTIFICATION    AND   RECONCILIATION  [l8 

A  theory  of  "  things "  is  employed  merely  formally  in 
theology  as  a  method  of  settling  the  objects  of  knowledge, 
and  defining  the  relation  between  the  multiplicity  of  their 
qualities  and  the  unity  of  their  existence.  The  rules  which  it 
is  possible  to  set  up  here  form  the  conditions  of  experience  by 
means  of  which  the  specific  nature  of  things  is  cognised.  In 
the  theory  of  things  it  is  taken  for  granted  that  our  Ego  is 
not  of  itself  the  cause  of  sensations,  perceptions,  etc.,  but  that 
these  peculiar  activities  of  the  soul  are  stimulated  by  its  co- 
existence with  things  of  which  the  human  body  is  also 
reckoned  one.  Accordingly,  ontology  and  psychology  mutu- 
ally presuppose  each  other,  and  their  results  harmonise.  This 
is  so  even  if  the  conceptions  of  thing  and  sovl  are  denied  in 
their  current  sense.  For  Buddhism  concedes  the  validity  of 
each  of  these  entities  only  as  a  multiplicity  of  qualities  or 
sensations,  in  which  there  is  supposed  to  be  no  normal  identity 
or  self-equivalence.^  Heraclitus  has  a  similar  thought,  but 
it  found  no  acceptance  among  the  Greeks.  Within  the 
domain  of  European  thought,  however,  we  have  to  do  with 
three  forms  of  the  theory  of  knowledge.  The  first  is  due  to 
the  stimulus  received  from  Plato,  and  found  a  home  in  the 
realm  of  Scholasticism.^  Wherever  its  influence  extends,  we 
find  the  idea  that  the  thing  works  upon  us,  indeed,  by  means 

kritiseh  beleuchtet  (1881),  has  not  conyinced  me  that  the  rational  theology 
inrolyed  in  Herhart's  metaphysics  is  right  as  against  the  arguments  I  have 
given  above.  Though  the  task  of  this  metaphysic,  according  to  FlUgel  (p. 
823),  may  be  quite  the  same  as  that  of  natural  science,  since  it  aims  at  exhibit- 
ing that  which  is  given  as  free  from  contradiction,  yet  it  moves  within  the 
limits  of  a  conception  of  things,  their  multiplicity  and  their  interaction,  which 
is  abstract  and  indifferent  to  the  distinction  between  nature  and  spirit.  Such 
a  context  offers  us  no  prospect  of  any  conception  of  God  which  might  even, 
resemble  the  Christian  idea.  When,  with  Herbart,  FlUgel  uses  the  purposive 
nexus  of  things,  as  ascertained  by  experience,  as  a  ground  for  the  probabiliiy  of 
a  creative  intelligence,  that  is,  of  God,  the  result  he  reaches  is  neither  necessary 
from  the  standpoint  of  scientific  knowledge,  nor  capable  of  being  used  as  the 
starting-point  of  a  philosophy  of  religion  which  should  be  just  to  Christianity. 
The  latter  assertion  is  confirmed,  indeed,  by  the  most  important  arguments  of 
Fltigel's  book.  For  by  his  criticism  of  views  which  make  the  necessity  of  the 
thought  of  God  equivalent  to  scientific  knowledge  of  His  reality,  he  shuts  out 
the  metaphysical  argument  of  probability  for  His  existence. 

*  Cf.  Oldenberg,  BvMha,  p.  258  ff. 

*  Cf.  Theologie  und Metaphydk,  p.  30  ff.  (2nd  ed.,  p.  32  ff.). 


19]  INTBODUCTION  1 9 

of  its  mutable  qualities,  arousing  our  sensations  and  ideas, 
but  that  it  really  is  at  rest  behind  the  qualities  as  a  per- 
manently self-equivalent  unity  of  attributes.  The  simplest 
example  of  this  view  to  be  found  in  Scholastic  dogmatics  is 
the  explication  given  on  the  one  hand  of  the  essence  and 
attributes  of  God,  and  on  the  other  of  the  operations  of  God 
upon  the  world  and  for  the  salvation  of  mankind.  Here 
there  may  still  be  seen  an  idea  which  is  peculiar  to  this 
theory — the  idea  that  we  can  know  the  thing  in  itself  apaxt 
from  its  effects.  The  fact  is  forgotten  that  the  thing  in  itself 
is  merely  the  stationary  memory-picture  of  repeated  intuitions 
of  effects  by  which  our  sensation  and  perception  have  been 
stimulated  all  along  within  one  definite  space.  The  fault  of  this 
conception  of  the  thing  or  object  of  knowledge  appears  in  the 
inconsistency  that  the  thing  is  conceived  to  be  at  rest  and  at 
the  same  time  is  to  work  upon  us  by  its  manifested  qualities. 
This  inconsistency  makes  itself  apparent  in  yet  another  form, 
when  the  thing,  as  at  rest,  is  represented  as  occupying  a  plane 
behind  the  plane  in  which  its  supposed  qualities  are  placed. 
This  makes  it  impossible  to  understand  these  plienomena  as 
quaUties  of  the  thing  in  itself  thus  separated  from  them. 
The  second  form  of  the  theory  of  knowledge  we  owe  to  Kant. 
He  limits  the  knowledge  of  the  understanding  to  the  world  of 
phenomena,  but  declares  imknowable  the  thing  or  things  in 
themselves,  though  their  interdependent  changes  are  the  ground 
of  the  changes  in  the  world  of  phenomena.  The  latter  part 
of  the  statement  contains  a  true  criticism  of  the  Scholastic 
interpretation  of  a  "  thing."  The  first  part,  however,  is  too 
near  the  Scholastic  theory  to  avoid  its  errors.  For  a  world 
of  phenomena  can  be  posited  as  the  object  of  knowledge  only 
if  we  suppose  that  in  them  something  real — to  wit,  the  thing 
— ^appears  to  us  or  is  the  cause  of  our  sensation  and  percep- 
tion. Otherwise  the  phenomenon  can  only  be  treated  as  an 
illusion.  Thus  by  his  use  of  the  conception  of  phenomenon 
Kant  contradicts  his  own  principle  that  real  things  are 
unknowable.  The  third  form  of  the  theory  of  knowledge  is 
due  to  Lotze.     He  holds  that  in  the  phenomena  which  in  a 


20  JUSTinCATION   AND   RECONCILIATION  [20 

definite  space  exhibit  changes  to  a  limited  extent  and  in  a 
determinate  order,  we  cognise  the  thing  as  the  cause  of  its 
qualities  operating  upon  us,  as  the  end  which  these  serve  as 
means,  as  the  law  of  their  constant  changes.  I  have  essayed 
a  discussion  and  proof  of  this  theory,  with  which  I  agree,  in 
my  little  book,  Theologie  und  Metaphysik,  to  which  I  hereby 
refer  the  reader. 

Theology  has  to  do,  not  with  natural  objects,  but  with 
states  and  movements  of  man's  spiritual  life ;  in  our  arrange- 
ment of  the  conceptions  which  belong  to  theology,  accordingly, 
we  must  leave  a  place  for  psychology.  Here  there  are  two 
colliding  views,  which  correspond  respectively  to  the  first  and 
the  third  forms  of  the  theory  of  knowledge.  With  the  idea 
of  the  thing  as  remaining  at  rest  behind  its  efiects  and 
qualities  is  bound  up  the  Scholastic  psychology,  which  is  a 
principal  factor  in  the  theory  of  mysticism.  Its  assumption 
is,  that  behind  its  special  activities  of  feeling,  thinking,  and 
willing,  the  soul  remains  at  rest  in  its  self -equivalence,  as  the 
unity  of  its  diverse  powers,  the  faculties.  This  level  of  the 
soul's  existence,  further,  is  regarded  as  the  region  in  which  it 
experiences  the  operations  of  Divine  grace.  This  self-enclosed 
life  of  the  spirit,  above  all,  is  conceived  as  the  scene  of  the 
unio  mystica,  that  indwelling  of  the  Father,  Son,  and  Holy 
Ghost,  in  which  culminate  all  the  gracious  operations  which 
our  spirit  undergoes.  Nothing  else,  it  is  maintained,  can 
explain  how  the  changing  functions  of  the  spirit,  its  feeling, 
knowing,  and  willing,  take  on  throughout  a  religious  chai*acter, 
and  become  active  in  the  service  of  God.  This  separation 
between  the  activities  of  the  soul  and  its  self -existence  having 
been  enlisted  in  the  service  of  theology,  it  becomes  observable 
in  the  method  of  Dogmatics  after  the  middle  of  the  seventeenth 
century.^  Now  this  theology  culminates  in  its  scheme  of 
individual  salvation,  which  dominates  likewise  the  doctrines  of 
the  Church  and  of  the  Christian  hope.  Consequently  what 
it  has  to  prove  is  that,  besides  the  enlightenment  of  the  under- 
standing, and  the  renewal  of  the  will,  there  occurs  an  invisible 

^  Geschichte  des  Pietisimcs,  ii.  p.  29. 


21]  INTRODUCTION  2 1 

union  with  God  at  the  basis  of  the  soul — i.e.  within  the 
region  of  its  self-existence — a  union  which  is  the  ground  of 
blessedness,  even  when,  as  quietistic  mysticism  bids  us  add, 
the  feeling  of  blessedness  is  interrupted  or  in  great  degree 
fails.  The  separation  of  the  activities  of  the  soul  from  its 
onafiected  faculties,  thus  introduced  into  the  more  modem 
form  of  orthodox  theology,  is  an  error  of  the  same  kind  as  the 
distinction  between  the  phenomenal  effects  of  a  thing  and  the 
thing  in  itself,  unknowable  as  the  latter  is  apart  from  its 
quaUties.  We  know  nothing  of  a  self-existence  of  the  soul,  of 
a  self-enclosed  life  of  the  spirit  above  or  behind  those  functions 
in  which  it  is  active,  living,  and  present  to  itself  as  a  being  of 
special  worth.^  It  is  a  contradiction  when  the  faculties  of  the 
soul  are  supposed  to  exercise  their  effects,  and  at  the  same  time 
to  constitute  in  repose  the  proper  being  of  the  soul  thus  cut  off 
from  its  functions.  Besides,  the  conception  of  the  tmio  mystica, 
which  without  this  false  distinction  is  untenable,  lies  outside  the 
horizon  of  our  Church  standards.  To  the  question :  Quid  est 
habere  deum  ?  Luther  answers,  not :  InhaMtcUio  totius  trinUatis 
in  homine  credente :  he  answers  with  psychological  correctness 
that  for  man  the  possession  of  God  consists  in  his  active  trust 
in  God  as  the  highest  good.  While,  therefore,  God  com- 
municates Himself  to  man  in  order  to  his  salvation,  the 
experience  is  not  an  object  of  knowledge  in  such  a  way  as  to 
he  fixed  and  explained  in  this  form ;  rather  it  is  evidenced 
by  an  activity  of  the  human  spirit  in  which  feeling,  knowing, 
and  willing  combine  in  an  intelligible  order. 

For  all  causes  which  affect  the  soul  work  upon  it  as 
stimuli  of  the  special  activity  with  which  it  is  endowed.  The 
relation  of  the  soul  to  all  the  causes  which  work  upon  it  is 
not  one  of  simple  passivity :  all  actions  upon  it,  rather,  it  takes 
up  in  its  sensation,  as  a  reaction  in  which  it  manifests  itself 
as  an  independent  cause.  The  use  of  passive  predicates  to 
describe  the  human  spirit  is  always  an  inaccurate  mode  of 
speech.  Pain,  which  represents  suffering  in  the  soul,  exists 
only  in  sensation ;  sensation,  however,  is  the  elementary  act 

^  Theoloffic  und  AfUaphysikj  p.  28  (2iid  ed.,  p.  25). 


22  JUSTIFICATION   AND   RECONCILIATION  [22 

by  which  the  soul  makes  it  known  that  it  is  reacting  in  its 
own  way  upon  the  stimulus  received  from  another  cause ;  and 
through  the  feeling  of  discomfort  it  represents  to  itself  the 
fact  that  the  painful  sensation,  corresponding  to  the  stimulus, 
is  a  disturbance  of  its  condition  as  a  whole.  Now  sensations 
are  not  only  the  material  of  feelings  of  pain  or  pleasure,  but 
likewise  the  necessary  occasions  of  ideas  and  other  acts  of 
knowledge;  feelings,  further,  are  the  immediate  impulses 
leading  to  acts  of  will.  All  causes,  therefore,  which  act  upon 
the  sold,  are  only  excitations  of  the  soul's  activity,  which  even 
in  sensation,  as  the  element  from  which  all  else  is  bom, 
reveals  itself  as  independent  and  distinctive.  Now  the 
peculiarity  of  the  soul»  in  comparison  with  other  causes,  is 
expressed  by  the  dissimilarity  between  the  sensation  and  the 
stimulus  which  causes  it.  Sensations  of  light  and  sound, 
indeed,  are  something  quite  different  from  the  experimentally 
ascertained  vibrations  of  the  aether  and  the  air  by  which  these 
sensations  are  called  forth.  The  sensation  of  pain  is  unlike 
the  antecedents  which  arouse  it,  for  it  is  the  same  whether 
one  is  struck  or  pushed  or  falls  upon  a  stone.  The  sense  of 
wrong  may  attach  itself  to  the  words  of  another  who,  probably 
with  all  sincerity,  disclaims  the  intention  to  offend.  From  this 
fundamental  rule  of  psychology,  there  devolves  on  scientific 
theology  the  task  of  verifying  everything  which  is  cognisable  as 
belonging  to  the  gracious  operations  of  God  upon  the  Christian, 
by  the  corresponding  religious  and  moral  acts  which  are  called 
forth  by  Revelation  as  a  whole,  and  by  the  particular  means 
included  in  Revelation.  We  must  give  up  the  question — 
— derived  from  Scholastic  psychology,  but  insoluble — how 
man  is  laid  hold  of,  or  pervaded,  or  filled  by  the  Holy 
Spirit.  What  we  have  to  do  is  rather  to  verify  life  in  the 
Holy  Spirit  by  showing  that  believers  know  God's  gracious 
gifts  (1  Cor.  ii.  12),  that  they  call  on  God  as  their  Father 
(Rom.  viii.  15),  that  they  act  with  love  and  joy,  with  meek- 
ness and  self-control  (Gal.  v.  22),  that  they  are  on  their 
guard  above  all  against  party  spirit,  and  cherish  rather  a 
spirit  of  union  (1   Cor.  iii.   1—4).     In  these  statements  the 


23]  INTRODUCTION  23 

Holy  Spirit  is  not  denied,  but  recognised  and  understood. 
Nor  is  this  method  of  procedure  anything  new.  On  the 
contrary,  it  has  been  employed  by  Schleiermacher,  and  the 
explanation  of  justification  by  faith  to  be  found  in  the 
Apology  of  the  Augsburg  Confession  follows  the  same  plan. 
If  Christianity  is  to  be  made  practically  intelligible,  no 
method  but  this  can  be  adopted.  For  Christianity  is  made 
unintelligible  by  those  formulas  about  the  order  of  individual 
salvation,  which  are  arrived  at  on  the  opposite  view  and  pre- 
scribed to  faith  without  a  directly  appended  explanation  of 
their  practical  relations  and  their  verification.  Luthardt  de- 
clines to  grant  that  divergences  between  different  forms  of 
theology  are  to  be  traced  back  to  differences  in  epistemology 
and  psychology.  He  prefers  to  argue  that  these  divergences 
point  to  different  kinds  of  Christianity.  Waiving  the  fact 
that  thus  he  erroneously  confuses  theology  and  religion,  I 
can  agree  with  him  thus  far,  that  the  Christianity  which  is 
expounded  with  the  help  of  Scholastic  ontology  and  mystical 
psychology  is  unintelligible  and  Neoplatonic,  while  with  the 
other  method  it  is  an  intelligible  and  practical  Christianity 
that  is  set  forth. 

The  principles  of  logic,  epistemology,  and  psychology 
constitute  the  ratio  or  intellectus  without  which,  in  Hollatz' 
judgment,  Divine  Eevelation  cannot  be  comprehended  at  all, 
and  in  any  case  cannot  be  made  the  subject  of  theological 
exposition.  He  adds  very  convincingly :  Sicut  enim  siTie  oculis 
nihU  videmtis,  sine  auribus  nihil  audimus^  ita  sine  ratioru 
nihil  intelligimus}  But  the  controversy  regarding  the  meta- 
physic  and  psychology  which  are  admissible  in  theology  com- 
pels us  to  limit  this  principle.  As  we  hear  only  with  our 
own  ears,  and  see  only  with  our  own  eyes,  so  we  can  understand 
only  with  our  own  mind,  not  with  that  of  another.  But  the 
Scholastic  distinction  between  the  thing  in  itself  and  its  effects 
upon  us,  between  the  proper  life  of  the  spirit  and  its  active 
functions,  is  alien  to  our  minds.  For  it  might  easily  be  shown 
that  even  those  theologians  who  in  their  scientific  work  go 

'  JExamen  theologicum^  p.  69. 


24  JUSTIFICATION   AND   RECONCILIATION  [24 

by  this  distinction,  judge  elsewhere  of  things  and  persons  by 
principles  which  they  would  declare  invalid  in  theology.  The 
correct  forms  of  the  understanding,  no  less  than  the  Scholastic 
forms,  are  subject  to  the  truth  of  the  principle  that  Revelation 
goes  beyond  reason  (revelatio  supra  rationem).  Revelation 
must  be  given  in  order  that  our  experience  of  it  may  be 
apprehended  and  interpreted  with  ontological,  logical,  and 
psychological  correctness.  For  if  that  principle  meant  any- 
thing else  than  this,  it  would  contradict  the  defence  of  rcUio 
in  theology  as  offered  above.  JRatio,  however,  is  given  a 
different  signification  when  the  further  principle  is  asserted 
that  revelation  goes  contrary  to  retison  (contra  rationem).  By 
reason  here  is  meant  a  connected  view  of  the  world  which 
interprets  the  order  of  nature  and  spiritual  life  with  instru- 
ments of  knowledge  which  have  no  relation  to  Christianity. 
The  Christian  view  of  the  world  and  of  life  is  opposed,  there- 
fore, both  to  that  produced  by  Materialism  and  to  those  views 
which  are  presented  in  systems  of  monistic  Idealism.  These, 
however,  are  not  the  only  cases  in  which  this  principle  may 
be  applied. 

Theology  has  performed  its  task  when,  guided  by  the 
Christian  idea  of  God  and  the  conception  of  men's  blessedness 
in  the  Kingdom  of  God,  it  exhibits  completely  and  clearly, 
both  as  a  whole  and  in  particular,  the  Christian  view  of  the 
world  and  of  human  life,  together  with  the  necessity  which 
belongs  to  the  interdependent  relations  between  its  component 
elements.  It  is  incompetent  for  it  to  enter  upon  either  a 
direct  or  an  indirect  proof  of  the  truth  of  the  Christian 
Revelation  by  seeking  to  show  that  it  agrees  with  some 
philosophical  or  juridical  view  of  the  world ;  for  to  such 
Christianity  simply  stands  opposed.  And  as  often  as  systems 
even  of  monistic  Idealism  have  asserted  their  agreement  with 
Christianity,  and  its  leading  ideas  have  been  worked  up  into 
a  general  philosophic  view,  the  result  has  only  been  to 
demonstrate  over  again  the  opposition  between  even  such 
systems  and  Christianity.  The  scientific  proof  for  the  truth  of 
Christianity  ought  only  to  be  sought  in  the  line  of  the  thought 


25]  INTRODUCTION  25 

already  singled  out  by  Spener  :  "  Whosoever  willeth  to  do  the 
will  of  God,  will  know  that  the  doctrine  of  Christ  is  true  " 
(John  vii.  17).  Here  it  is  indicated  that  Christianity  can  be 
verified,  not  when  our  aim  is  to  understand  the  domain  of 
spiritual  life  and  of  social  human  action  by  means  of  universal 
grounds  of  speculation,  but  only  when  we  mark  off  the  know- 
ledge of  that  domain  from  the  knowledge  of  nature  and  her 
laws.  To  subordinate  the  ethical  to  the  idea  of  the  cosmical 
is  always  characteristic  of  a  heathen  view  of  the  world,  and 
to  its  jurisdiction  Christianity  is  not  amenable;  before  it 
Christianity  will  never  succeed  in  justifying  itself.  Even  when 
such  an  explanation  of  the  world  starts  from  an  idea  of  God, 
it  offers  no  guarantee  that  it  can  prove  the  truth  of  Chris- 
tianity. Christianity  includes  as  one  of  its  elements  the 
distinction  of  the  ethical  from  the  world  of  nature  in  respect 
of  worth,  inasmuch  as  it  attaches  blessedness  for  man,  as  the 
highest  and  all-dominating  notion  of  worth,  to  participation 
in  the  Kingdom  of  God  and  lordship  over  the  world.  The 
theological  exposition  of  Christianity,  therefore,  is  complete 
when  it  has  been  demonstrated  that  the  Christian  ideal  of 
life,  and  no  other,  satisfies  the  claims  of  the  human  spirit 
to  knowledge  of  things  universally. 

§  4.  These  presuppositions  of  systematic  theology  of  neces- 
sity lie  within  the  horizon  of  the  following  monograph,  for 
(§  13)  everything  that  falls  witliin  the  domain  of  redemption 
through  Christ  must  be  referred  to  the  supreme  end  of  blessed- 
ness in  the  Kingdom  of  God,  if  it  is  to  be  understood  as  a 
necessary  element  in  the  Christian  view.  The  exposition  of 
the  doctrine  of  Justification  and  Reconciliation  is  given  here 
in  four  principal  sections.  First,  we  ascertain  what  is  meant 
by  justification  and  reconciliation ;  through  what  attribute  of 
God  we  are  to  conceive  justification,  in  what  relation  to  men, 
and  how  far  extending ;  finally,  in  what  subjective  functions 
this  Divinely-originated  relationship  expresses  itself  actively. 
Secondly  J  we  develop  the  positive  and  negative  presuppositions 
of  the  religious  truth  of  justification,  the  idea  of  God,  the  view 
that  is  to  be  taken  of  human  sin,  and  the  religious  estimate 


26  JUSTIFICATION    AND   BECONCILIATION  [26 

of  the  Person  and  lifework  of  Christ  Thirdly,  we  prove 
why  the  thought  of  justification  by  faith  is  necessary  at  all  in 
Christianity,  and  why  justification  is  dependent  on  Christ  as 
the  Eevealer  of  God  and  the  Representative  of  the  Church. 
FourtfUy,  we  show,  by  way  of  conclusion,  why  justification 
manifests  itself  precisely  in  those  religious  functions  which 
come  into  view,  and  what  the  relation  is  between  them  and 
moral  activity. 


1 

1 
I 


CHAPTER   I 

THE   DEFINITION   OF   JUSTIFICATION 

§  5.  The  Justification  and  Beconciliation  of  sinners  with 
God,  considered  as  an  operation  of  God  effected  through  the 
instrumentality  of  Christ,  are  strictly  religious  conceptions.  By 
religious  conceptions,  we  mean  such  as  are  comprised  within 
the  scheme  of  His  operation  on  men — taking  the  word  "  opera- 
tion "  in  its  widest  sense.  The  conception  of  sin  committed 
by  men  is  also,  it  is  true,  a  religious  one,  as  distinct  from  in- 
justice and  crime.  But  it  expresses  merely  a  judgment  upon 
the  unworthiness  of  such  actions  when  contrasted  with  God's 
precepts  and  honour.  Sin,  therefore,  is  a  religious  conception 
of  an  indirect  kind,  as  it  does  not  lend  itself  to  interpreta- 
tion as  an  operation  of  God  upon  men.  Those,  therefore,  who 
have  supposed  that  this  idea  of  sin  should  be  assimilated  in 
form  to  those  that  are  directly  religious,  in  order  to  produce  a 
system  formally  homogeneous,  have  been  in  error.  But  the 
ideas  which  represent  what  Christianity  puts  forward  as  the 
fundamental  operations  directed  by  God  against  sin,  necessarily 
take  the  form  of  directly  religious  conceptions.  Moreover, 
two  characteristics  are  perceptible  in  religious  conceptions 
which  must  be  stated  at  the  very  outset.  They  are  always 
the  possession  of  a  community,  and  they  express  not  merely  a 
relation  between  God  and  man,  but  always  at  the  same  time 
a  relation  toward  the  world  on  the  part  of  God,  and  those 
who  believe  in  Him.  All  religions  are  social.  And  if  in 
particular  cases  we  may  observe  that  the  founder  of  a  religion 
is  for  a  time  the  sole  supporter  of  his  convictions,  this 
circumstance  is,  for  one  thing,  counterbalanced  by  the  other, 
that  he  intends  to  share  his  possession  with  others,  that  is,  to 

«7 


28  JUSTIFICATION   AND   RECONCILIATION  [28 

form  a  community.  But  then,  before  that  has  taken  place,  he 
appears  rather  as  the  bearer  of  a  revelation,  and  only  in  a 
subordinate  way  as  the  subject  of  his  particular  religion.  To 
come  under  our  scientific  observation,  consequently,  every 
religion  must  take  shape  as  the  religion  of  a  community 
whose  members  agree  in  recognising  certain  Divine  operations 
on  them,  and  show  that  they  are  thus  conscious  of  a  common 
salvation.  If,  therefore,  we  attach  our  more  exact  knowledge 
of  a  religion  to  a  single  individual,  whom  we  isolate  from  the 
rest  of  his  fellows,  in  that  case  we  shall  have  to  take  care 
not  to  leave  out  of  account  the  given  fact  of  fellowship  in 
religion.  For  fellowship  includes,  among  its  preconditions, 
more  than  the  similarity  of  all  its  members.  It  will  not 
do,  therefore,  aftei*  we  have  previously  analysed  the  indi- 
vidual subject  as  a  type  of  all  the  rest,  to  bring  in,  in  a 
merely  supplementary  way,  the  social  character  of  religion. 
On  the  contrary,  when  examining  the  typical  individual  sub- 
ject, the  complete  conditions  of  fellowship  must  be  taken 
into  consideration  from  the  outset.  When  this  is  neglected 
in  the  scientific  investigation  and  explanation  of  the  pheno- 
mena of  religion,  mistakes  are  made  which  tell  on  the  sub- 
sequent discussion  of  the  social  character  of  a  religion.  If, 
therefore,  justification  and  reconciliation  of  sinners  are  the 
leading  features  of  the  Christian  religion,  they  can  be  correctly 
examined  and  explained  in  the  case  of  the  individual  only 
when  at  the  same  time  we  take  note  of  his  place  in  the 
Christian  community. 

From  the  social  character  of  religion  we  can  gather  that,  in 
a  complete  view  of  it,  its  relation  to  the  world  must  necessarily 
be  included.  For  the  majority  of  those  who  exhibit  attach- 
ment to  a  common  religion  employ,  in  the  commerce  and 
outward  expression  of  it  in  worship,  such  means  as  are 
characteristic  of  mankind's  situation  in  the  woi*ld.  But  for  a 
religion  this  circumstance  cannot  be  without  importance. 
On  the  contrary,  since  even  the  thought  of  God  or  of  gods 
includes  some  kind  of  relation  to  the  world,  every  religious 
society,  as  such,  must  take  up  an  attitude,  either  positive  or 


2»-9]  THK    DEFINITION   OF   JUSTIFICATION  29 

n^ative,    towards   the    world  in   which  it   exists.      Every 
religion,  on  closer  examination,  is  found  to  consist  in  the 
striving   after  "  goods,"  or  a  mmmum  bonurriy  which  either 
belong  to  the  world,  or  can  only  be  understood  by  contrast 
with  it.     And  this  striving  rests  upon  belief  in  some  Divine 
Being  who  professes  to  possess  a  more  comprehensive  author- 
ity over  the  world  than  is  within  the  reach  of  man.     For 
these  reasons  no  religion  can  be  properly  understood  unless  it 
be  interpreted  on  some  other  principle  than  the  most  usual 
one,  that  religion  consists  in  a  relation  between  man  and  God. 
Three  points  are  necessary  to  determine  the  circle  by  which 
a  religion  is  completely  represented — God,    man,  and    the 
world.      For   the    central   point   is   always   this,  that   the 
religious  community,  as  situated  in  the  world,  endeavours  to 
obtain    certain   goods   in    the    world,   or   above  the    world, 
through  the  Divine  Being,  because  of  His  authority  over  it. 
And  even   when,  as  in  Brahmanism  (or,  for   that   matter, 
Neoplatonism),  it  is  sought  to  negate  the  world  for  the  sake 
of   God,   yet  the  framework  of   this  religion  embraces  the 
world,  which  exists  by  God,  and  for  the  sake  of  man,  in  order 
to  be  negated  by  man's  religious  activity.     Christianity  has  a 
right  to  ask  to  be  interpreted  on  the  same  principle.     Theo- 
logy, it  is  tnie,  is  not  as  a  rule  prepared  for  this.     It  states 
the  problem  of  the  content  of  religion,  as  Melanchthon  stated 
it,  in  terms  of  the  position  of  the  mystic,  in  which  the  soul 
which  sees  God  sees  Him  as  though  it  alone  were  seen  by 
God,   and    as  though   apart  from  Him  and  it  naught  else 
existed.*     Schleiermacher,  too,  so  far  from  abandoning  this 
method,  rather  confirmed  it.     His  interpretation  of  religion 
as  the  feeling  of  absolute  dependence  on  God,  involves  in  its 
intention  the  complete  neutrality  of  both  factors  towards  the 
world,  the  latter  being  held  in  reserve  as  the  object  of  discrete 
cognition    and  volition.      Only  in   a  secondary  way  is  the 
world  brought  into  relation  to  the  religious  faculty,  inasmuch 
as  feeling  must  combine  with  knowing  or  willing  if  it  occu- 

*  Bernhardus  in  Cant.  Canticorum,  69,  8.     Cf.  Ocschichte  des  Putis)nus,  i. 
p.  59. 


30  JUSTinCATlON    AND   RBCONCILIATION  [29-30 

pies  a  moment  of  time,  or,  in  other  words,  enters  into 
experience.  But  this  is  an  assumption  quite  as  obscure  as 
the  conception  of  religious  feeling  itself,  and  it  has  not 
succeeded  in  preventing  this  conception  from  being  errone- 
ously confounded  with  the  principle  of  mysticism.  These 
conditions  lead  us  to  conclude  that  the  religious  conceptions 
of  justification  and  reconciliation,  to  be  explained,  must  not 
be  applied  in  isolation  to  the  individual  subject,  but  to  the 
subject  as  a  member  of  the  community  of  believers.  Nor  do 
they  express  a  change  of  standing  relatively  to  God,  without 
at  the  same  time  implying  a  change  of  attitude  to  the  world 
on  the  part  of  those  who  aforetime  were  sinners.  Theo- 
logical tradition  recognises  this  fact,  for  it  makes  justification 
equivalent  to  the  forgiveness  of  sins,  but  explains  the  latter 
as  the  abrogation  of  the  Divine  penalties.  And  these 
penalties,  as  regards  their  substance,  invariably  consist  in  some 
relation  on  man's  part  to  the  world.  It  is  objected  to  the 
principle  we  have  just  considered,  that  religion  is  a  relation 
between  man  and  God,  while  to  refer  it  to  the  world  is  part 
of  its  application.  This  is  an  untenable  distinction.  The 
reference  of  religion  to  the  world  cannot  be  regarded  as  an 
accident  which  may  be  present  or  absent  without  altering  its 
substance,  for  in  Christianity,  e,g,,  we  must  conceive  God  as 
the  Creator  and  Buler  of  the  world,  and  ourselves  as  parts  of 
the  same.  Whoever  overlooks  this  fact  makes  an  imperfect 
commencement  in  the  subject  he  wishes  to  understand,  and 
so  falls  into  error. 

§  6.  The  Kingdom  of  God  likewise  is  a  directly  religious 
conception.  This  is  clear  when  we  consider  the  phrase  as  it 
stood  originally — Sovereignty  of  God.  For  this  combination 
of  words  distinctly  expresses  an  operation  of  God  directed 
towards  men.  The  conception  contains  two  different  things. 
The  Kingdom  of  God  is  the  summum  bonum  which  God 
realises  in  men ;  and  at  the  same  time  it  is  their  common 

« 

task,  for  it  is  only  through  the  rendering  of  obedience  on 
man's  part  that  God's  sovereignty  possesses  continuous  exist- 
ence.      These    two    meanings    are    interdependent.       Here, 


30-1]  THE   DEFINITION   OF   JUSTIFICATION  31 

however,  we  have  the  reason  why  the  conception  of  the 
Kingdom  of  God  has  the  appearance  of  being  a  religious 
conception  of  a  different  order  from  justification  and  recon- 
ciliation. In  these  operations  of  God  upon  sinners,  so  far  as 
they  have  already  been  elucidated,  no  room  is  left  for  a 
corresponding  self-determined  activity  on  the  part  of  man. 
On  the  other  hand,  the  moral  action  demanded  by  the 
KiDgdom  of  God  or  the  Sovereignty  of  God,  and  therefore 
itself  a  part  of  the  latter  conception,  is  committed  to  men  as 
God's  independent  and  responsible  subjects.  The  range  and 
the  character  of  the  separate  tasks,  which  make  up  the  total 
task  of  the  Kingdom  of  God,  are  of  such  a  kind  that  we  have 
to  devote  definite  attention  and  continuous  purpose  to  their 
separate  fulfilment,  and  to  the  ties  which  bind  them  together. 
In  this  respect  the  conception  of  the  Kingdom  of  God  differs 
in  a  peculiar  way  from  those  other  operations  of  Divine  grace. 
The  question  remains  whether  this  diversity  in  nature 
amongst  the  chief  ideas  of  Christianity  does  not  put  an 
obstacle  in  the  way  of  our  vindicating  the  general  Christian 
view,  and  whether  the  definition  I  have  given  of  this  religion 
(p.  13)  can  surmount  the  difficulty. 

In  our  desire  to  get  rid  of  the  appearance  of  contradiction, 
it  is  possible  some  may  revert  to  the  fact  that  the  two  sets 
of  ideas  occupy  different  planes,  inasmuch  as  justification  and 
reconciliation  concern  men  as  sinners,  while  the  Kingdom  of 
God  concerns  them  as  reconciled.  Such  a  statement,  how- 
ever, is  not  quite  exact.  For  it  would  imply  that  at  the 
moment  of  justification,  which  logically  precedes  the  call  to 
the  Kingdom  of  God,  the  predication  of  sin  loses  its  validity 
altogether.  But  this  is  not  the  case;  for  the  meaning  of 
justification  is  that  it  encompasses  the  whole  life  of  the 
Christian,  and  in  this  constitutive  sense  forms  likewise  a 
continual  reminder  of  sin  and  guilt,  and  thus  emphasises 
the  necessity  for  its  own  continued  existence  (p.  7).  If 
what  this  means  is  that,  as  a  direct  result  of  justification,  the 
presence  of  sin  is  felt  so  long  as  a  Christian  lives,  then  the 
call  to   participate   independently  in   the  Kingdom   of  God 


32  JUSTIFICATION   AND   KKCONCILIATION  [31-2 

arises  simultaneously.     But  in  that  case  the  proposed  solu- 
tion of  the  difficulty  is  inadequate. 

Two  lines  of  thought  have  been  employed  to  establish  the 
homogeneity  of  these  two  sets  of  ideas.  In  the  first  place, 
human  activity,  conceived  as  independent, — be  its  aim  salva- 
tion or  good  works, — is  subordinated  to  the  grace  of  Grod,  or 
included  in  God's  operation  upon  men.  Certain  apostolic 
expressions  point  in  this  direction.  Paul  (Phil.  ii.  12,  13) 
summons  every  man  to  work  out  his  own  salvation  with  fear 
and  trembling ;  because  He  who  works  in  believers,  both  to 
will  and  to  do,  is  God.  The  author  of  the  Epistle  to  the 
Hebrews  (xiii.  21)  expresses  the  wish  that  God  would  make 
his  readers  perfect  in  every  good  work  to  do  His  will,  while 
He  Himself  works  in  them  that  which  is  well-pleasing  to  Him 
through  Jesus  Christ.  John  (1  John  ii.  5,  iv.  12)  sees  in 
the  exercise  of  love  on  the  part  of  Christians  the  real  con- 
summation of  the  love  of  God  to  us,  %,€.  its  complete 
revelation  (vol.  ii.  p.  374).  This  consummation,  therefore, 
would  not  take  place  if  God's  action  extended  only  so  far  as 
to  give  believers  the  mere  potentiality  of  exercising  love. 
Later  teaching  also  has  adhered  to  this  religious  estimate  of 
moral  action  in  Christianity.  In  Catholic  theology  the 
validity  of  the  conception  of  the  merits  of  believers,  which 
depends  on  their  being  voluntary,  is  ultimately  counter- 
balanced by  the  proposition  that  all  merit  is  but  an  effect  of 
grace,  understood  in  its  full  significance  (vol.  i.  pp.  108,  111). 
In  the  same  way  in  Lutheran  theology  the  moral  activity  of 
believers  is  included,  as  an  effect  of  regeneratio,  under  the 
gracious  operation  of  God ;  and  the  same  thought  is  still 
further  emphasised  by  Calvin  by  his  conception  of  persever- 
antia  gratiae.  Now,  the  leading  statements  of  the  apostles 
have  never  been  interpreted  in  these  systems  of  theology  as 
giving  a  mechanical  explanation  of  the  process  in  question, 
and  as  thus  requiring  us  to  abandon  the  idea  of  human  self- 
determination  formerly  admitted.  The  theology  of  Calvinism 
itself  stipulates  for  the  reality  of  human  freedom,  in  contra- 
distinction  from   nature  as  such,  imder    the    operations  of 


32-3]  THE   DEFINITION    OF   JUSTIFICATION  33 

Divine  grace.  That  is  to  say,  the  psychological  fact  is  kept 
in  view  throughout,  that  even  the  operations  of  Divine  grace 
merely  stimulate  man  to  appropriate  them  in  the  way  which 
is  peculiar  to  himself.  We  may  ask,  consequently,  what 
cognitive  interest  is  satisfied  by  the  thought  that  one  who 
is  working  out  his  own  salvation  by  his  own  effort,  regards 
God  as  the  author  of  his  purpose  and  his  self-activity  ? 
What  suggests  this  twofold  way  of  looking  at  the  matter? 
I  think  it  is  suggested  by  the  claims  both  of  the  individual 
case  and  of  the  moral  order  of  the  world  as  a  whole.  The 
occupation  of  the  individual  in  his  life's  task,  his  performance 
of  duty,  and  his  formation  of  character,  demand  the  form  of 
independence  and  responsibility.  This  always  stands  out  in 
the  forefront,  however  definitely  he  leans  on  Divine  grace. 
But  if,  in  his  own  estimation  of  himself,  he  merges  himself 
in  the  whole  which  his  activity  serves,  if  he  spends  his  life 
upon  a  service  which  can  only  be  understood  in  the  light  of 
that  whole,  and  which  he  has  come  by  without  being  able  to 
urge  the  existence  of  previous  purpose  due  to  himself,  then 
the  judgment  expressed  by  Paul  is  the  true  standard  of  the 
humility  which  befits  a  Christian. 

On  the  other  hand,  a  closer  examination  of  the  concep- 
tion of  justification  reveals  the  fact  that  this  Divine  operation 
does  not  imply  the  occurrence  of  any  mechanical  process  in 
man.  For  part  of  the  significance  of  its  relation  to  faith  is, 
that  this  self-active  faculty  in  man,  without  regard  to  which 
justification  cannot  be  fully  understood,  is  included  under 
this  Divine  operation ;  part,  that  justification,  as  calling  forth 
the  reaction  of  faith  in  man,  is  in  this  sense  a  property  of 
the  believer,  and  continues  to  be  the  motive  of  the  religious 
demeanour  which  it  behoves  him  to  adopt.  In  both  relations, 
therefore,  the  conceptions  of  the  Kingdom  of  God  and  justi- 
fication are  homogeneous.  This  holds  true  in  so  far  as,  for 
one  thing,  both  notions  express  operations  of  Divine  grace ; 
and,  for  another,  the  results  of  these  operations  manifest 
themselves  solely  in  activities  which  exhibit  the  form  of 
personal  independence.  They  offer,  therefore,  really  no 
3 


' 


34  JUSTIFICATION    AND   RECONCILIATION  [33-4 

obstacle  to  their  being  linked  together  in  a  complete  view 
of  Christianity.  But  in  Dogmatics  this  alternating  use  of 
the  two  principles  cannot  be  avoided.  Dogmatics  compre- 
hends all  religious  processes  in  man  under  the  category  of 
Divine  grace,  that  is,  it  looks  at  them  from  the  standpoint 
of  God.  But  it  is,  of  course,  impossible  so  thoroughly  to 
maintain  this  standpoint  in  our  experience,  as  thereby  to 
obtain  complete  knowledge  of  the  operations  of  grace.  For 
the  standpoint  of  our  knowledge  lies  in  formal  opposition  to 
God.  Only  for  an  instant  can  we  transfer  ourselves  to  the 
Divine  standpoint.  A  theology,  therefore,  which  consisted 
of  nothing  but  propositions  of  this  stamp  could  never  be 
understood,  and  would  be  composed  of  words  which  really 
did  not  express  knowledge  on  our  part.  If  what  is  wanted 
is  to  write  theology  on  the  plan  not  merely  of  a  narrative  of 
the  great  deeds  done  by  God,  but  of  a  system  representing 
the  salvation  He  has  wrought  out,  then  we  must  exhibit  the 
operations  of  God — ^justification,  regeneration,  the  communi- 
cation of  the  Holy  Spirit,  the  bestowal  of  blessedness  in  the 
summum  bonum — in  such  a  way  as  shall  involve  an  analysis 
of  the  corresponding  voluntary  activities  in  which  man 
appropriates  the  operations  of  God.  This  method  has  been 
already  adopted  by  Schleiermacher.  Now  those  who  are 
strangers  to  the  work  of  theology  urge  against  this  method, 
that  what  they  are  concerned  about  is  the  objective  bearing 
of  theological  doctrines  and  not  the  interpretation  of  them 
as  reflected  in  the  subject,  and  that  this  method  renders 
the  whole  matter  uncertain.  Such  a  view  is  at  variance 
with  the  right  theory  of  knowledge ;  for  in  knowledge  we 
observe  and  explain  even  the  objects  of  sense- perception,  not 
as  they  are  in  themselves,  but  as  we  perceive  them.  If 
what  is  intended  in  Dogmatics  is  merely  to  describe  ob- 
jectively Divine  operations,  that  means  the  abandonment  of 
the  attempt  to  understand  their  practical  bearing.  For  apart 
from  voluntary  activity,  through  which  we  receive  and  utilise 
for  our  own  blessedness  the  operations  of  God,  we  have  no 
means  of  imderstanding  objective  dogmas  as  religious  truths. 


34-5]  THE    DEFINITION    OF   JUSTIFICATION  35 

Objective  knowledge  in  this  region  is  disinterested  knowledge. 
Such  knowledge,  it  is  true,  is  quite  in  place  in  natural 
science ;  but  in  theology,  however  coolly  we  may  sketch  out 
its  formal  relations,  we  have  to  do  with  spiritual  processes 
of  such  a  kind  that  our  salvation  depends  on  them.  Merely 
objective  delineation,  therefore,  far  from  exhausting  theological 
cognition,  does  the  work  in  a  most  inadequate  fashion.  Who- 
ever thinks  that  the  method  to  be  followed  in  this  book  is  such 
as  to  evaporate  the  truths  of  Christianity  and  expose  them 
to  the  perils  of  doubt,  betrays  in  the  last  resort  the  paucity 
of  his  religious  experience,  and  especially  his  ignorance  of 
the  fact  that  the  more  objectively  the  truths  of  Christianity 
are  handed  down  in  narrative  form,  the  closer  at  hand  will 
doubt  be  found. 

§  7.  Justification,  reconciliation,  the  promise  and  the 
task  of  the  Kingdom  of  God,  dominate  any  view  of  Chris- 
tianity that  is  complete.  The  outstanding  ethical  character 
of  this  religion  comes  out  in  the  fact  that  the  summum 
honum — the  Kingdom  of  God — is  promised  only  as  the 
ground  of  blessedness,  while  at  the  same  time  it  is  the  task 
to  which  Christians  are  called.  Now  the  teleological  relation 
of  justification  to  this  aim  may  be  understood  either  directly 
or  indirectly.  In  other  words,  either  we  may  interpret  justi- 
fication as  the  bestowal  of  ability  to  perform  those  moral 
offices  towards  men  which  make  up  the  task  of  the  Kingdom 
of  God  ;  and  here  the  relation  would  be  direct  Or  we  may 
interpret  justification  as  the  restoration  of  the  religious  rela- 
tion to  God  which  the  sinner  neither  has  nor  of  himself  can 
attain;  and  this  would  mean  his  being  endowed  with  an 
independent  valuable  quality  which,  while  manifesting  itself 
in  its  own  peculiar  functions,  would  stand  related  to  moral 
activity  towards  men  only  as  a  conditio  sine  qud  non.  Those 
interpretations  are  held  respectively  by  the  Catholic  and  the 
Evangelical  Church.  The  controversy  between  the  theologians 
of  the  two  Churches  turns  on  the  question  which  of  the  two 
meanings  is  valid.  True,  as  the  controversy  is  usually  carried 
on  by   the  spokesmen  of  Catholicism,  they  generally  show 


36  JUSTIFICATION    AND    RECONCILIATION  [35-6 

themselves  ignorant  of  the  fact  that  on  the  two  sides 
different  implications — which  respectively  prove  Christianity 
to  be  a  religion  and  a  moral  life — are  associated  with  the 
same  terms.  For  the  Eoman  doctrine  of  justification  pro- 
fesses to  state  the  causes  and  the  means  through  which  a 
sinner  becomes  actively  righteous ;  that  is,  it  professes  to 
explain  how  one  who  believes  in  Christ  is  made  capable  of 
his  moral  vocation.  Consequently  it  likewise  maintains  the 
co-operation  of  human  freedom  with  grace.  On  the  other 
hand,  the  Reformed  doctrine  of  justification  professes  to 
provide  reasons  why,  to  a  Christian  who  has  been  regenerated, 
there  is  secured,  in  spite  of  the  permanent  imperfection  of 
his  moral  achievement,  communion  with  God,  salvation,  and 
blessedness,  or  in  other  words  the  actual  realisation  of  that 
religious  character  which  Christianity  aims  at ;  and  why  he 
is  able  to  exercise  that  character  by  trust  in  God  in  all  the 
situations  of  life  (vol.  i.  pp.  142,  181).  Accordingly,  it  looks 
as  if  the  controversy  between  the  two  great  Western  Confes- 
sions could  be  brought  to  a  close,  if  only  the  one  were  to  see 
that  the  other  applies  the  same  term  to  different  problems,  or 
if  we  could  expect  either  to  alter  its  dogmatic  phraseology. 
For  the  difiBculty  seems  to  lie  merely  in  the  Catholic  error 
of  supposing  that  we,  with  our  different  interpretation  of 
justification,  mean  to  get  at  the  same  fact  as  the  Catholics 
express  by  their  conception.  Now,  as  we  acknowledge  under 
the  rubric  of  regeneration  and  sanctification  what  the 
Catholics  call  justification,  the  Catholic  rubric  of  "  making 
righteous"  (Gerechtviachting)  might  perhaps  be  accepted  for 
the  former,  and  our  conception  of  justification  be  replaced 
by  the  rubric  of  reconciliation  or  restoration  to  God.  Such  a 
change  in  phraseology  would  allay  the  controversy,  if  it  really 
were  a  verbal  one.  But  a  readjustment  of  the  kind  described 
would  only  make  it  more  evident  that  a  real  discrepancy 
exists.  For  what  we  call  justification  or  reconciliation,  what 
we  understand  as  the  religious  character  of  the  individual's 
life  and  as  radically  independent  of  moral  activity,  and  what 
we  are  able,  therefore,  to  show  at  work  in  definite  religious 


36^7]  THE   DEFINITION    OF   JUSTIFICATION  37 

functions,  Catholic  doctrine  includes  under  the  conception  of 
hope.     This  function,  however,  is  placed  subsequent  to  the 
functions  of  faith  and  love,  in  the  exercise  of  which  iusti- 
fieaiio  is  attained.    The  Catholic  system  is  primarily  arranged 
80  as    to  explain  the  moral  activity  of  the  Christian  life. 
Since  this  activity  properly  arises  from  the  effort  put  forth 
by  the  free  will  in  harmony  with  gratia  co-operans,  so  likewise 
hope,  which  may  in  an  imperfect  degree  precede  love,  attains 
the  perfection  of  its  nature  because  we  most  confidently  set 
our  hope   in   those  whom  we  know  as  friends.     Now  the 
essential  object  of  hope  is  eternal  blessedness.     But  in  this 
highest  object  it  embraces  every  operation  of  the  omnipotence 
and  compassion   of   God,  in  other  words,  the  evidences  of 
His  providence.^     On  the  other  hand,  the  Evangelical  con- 
ception of  justification  is  intended  to  explain  the  religiotts 
character  of  the  individual's  life.     That  character  includes 
the  certainty  of  eternal  life ;  and  instead  of  dependence  on 
the  world  through  sin  has  obtained  freedom  over  the  world 
and  trust  in  God's  providence,  and  therefore  fonns  the  pre- 
condition of  the  discharge  of  moral  tasks.     This  method  of 
formulating  the  contrast  between  the  two  Confessions  shows 
that  that    contrast  is  qualitative.       At    the    same    time,  it 
proves  that  the  saving  operations  of  God  can  only  be  under- 
stood from  the  corresponding  independent  functions  of  those 
who  receive    them.     This    law,    indeed,   is    stated    in  such 
general  terms  that  as  yet  it  does  not  embrace  the  grounds 
which  condition  the  opposition  between  the  religious  inde- 
pendence of  the  Evangelical  Christian  and  the  dependence 
of  the  Catholic.     Nevertheless,  this  practical  version  of  the 
contrast   between    the  two   Confessions  leads  to  a  peculiar 
Umitation  of  the  problem  presented  to  theology  in  the  con- 
ception  of   justification.       The   Divine    operation    which    it 
expresses  must  be  interpreted  as  being  such  that  the  religious 
appropriation  of  it  guarantees  to  the  believer  an  independence 
which  specifically  distinguishes  his  position  from  the  depend- 
ence which  is  imposed  by  Catholicism. 

^  Tliomas  Aquinas,  SumDia  theoL  ii.  2  qu.  17,  art  8. 


38  JUSTIFICATION   AND   RECONCILIATION  [37-8 

If  the  opposition  between  the  Confessions,  which  attaches 
to  the  controversy  about  the  conception  of  justification, 
extends  so  far  as  this,  then  the  divergence  from  the  doctrine 
of  the  Eeformation  which  DoUinger^  perceives  in  certain 
formulae,  used  by  Evangelical  theologians,  gives  but  little 
prospect  of  reunion  between  the  Churches.  For  those 
Evangelical  theologians  who  interpret  justification  as  an 
analytical  judgment  upon  the  value  of  subjective  faith,  will 
hardly  agree  to  those  conclusions  which,  in  the  Catholic 
system,  are  bound  up  with  the  conception  of  ''making 
righteous  "  (Oerechtinachung),  Their  apparent  approximation 
to  the  Catholic  form  of  doctrine  is  to  be  accounted  for  partly 
by  Pietism  and  partly  by  dialectical  difficulties  attending  the 
old  Lutheran  view  of  justification  as  a  synthetic  judgment 
regarding  the  individual  sinner,  and  that,  too,  a  judgment 
conditional  on  the  sinner's  faith,  which  springs  out  of  regener- 
ation (voL  i.  pp.  304,  550).  These  difficulties,  however,  must 
and  can  be  removed  by  another  form  of  statement. 

§  8.  Justification,  as  understood  by  the  Evangelical 
Church,  signifies  in  general  the  act  of  God  which  gives  to 
believers  in  Christ  their  peculiar  religious  character.  The 
Divine  operation  on  the  believer,  indicated  in  this  conception, 
ia  a  positive  one.  Yet  not  only  does  Paul,  to  whom  we  owe 
this  terminology,  interchange  at  will  the  positive  term — 
justification — with  one  which  has  a  negative  ring — t/ie  for- 
giveness of  sins;  but  in  the  discourses  of  Christ  (with  the 
exception  of  Luke  xviii.  14)  we  meet  with  the  latter  form 
alone.  This  is  due  to  the  fact  that  it  rests  directly  on  Old 
Testament  modes  of  thought,  whQe  the  conception  coined  by 
Paul  is  designed  to  oppose  the  Pharisaic  perversion  of  the 
idea  of  active  righteousness  (vol.  ii.  p.  308).  It  was  possible 
for  Jesus,  like  the  men  of  the  Old  Testament,  to  rest  satisfied 
with  the  negative  term,  inasmuch  as  they  alike  employed  it 
in  estimating  sinful  phenomena  in  the  life  of  the  people  of 
Israel.  For  however  much  the  sins  of  the  Israelites,  for 
which  forgiveness  is  either  expected  or  bestowed,  are  regarded 

*  Kirche  und  Kirchen,  p.  429. 


3&-9]  THE   DEFINITION    OF   JUSTIFICATION  39 

as  ipso  fddo  disturbing  their  proper  fellowship  with  God, 
yet  the  actual  continuance  of  that  fellowship  for  the  people 
of  Israel,  according  to  the  terms  of  the  Old  Covenant,  is 
taken  for  granted  both  by  Old  Testament  witnesses  and  by 
Christ.  On  the  other  hand,  Paul  was  directly  led  to  con- 
struct the  positive  conception  of  justification ;  for  he  opposes 
it  to  his  view  of  the  total  sin  of  humanity,  in  which  he  on 
principle  disregards  the  fact  that,  in  the  community  consti- 
tuted by  the  Mosaic  law,  the  Jews  possessed  a  form  (though 
inferior)  of  fellowship  with  Divine  grace.  For  while,  in 
particular  cases,  he  can  hardly  divest  his  mind  of  the  im- 
pression he  had  of  the  advantages  possessed  by  the  Israelites 
over  the  heathen  in  virtue  of  their  having  the  law  (Rom.  ii. 
17-20,  iii.  1,  2,  ix.  4,  5),  yet  these  advantages  are  ignored 
in  his  decisive  utterances  about  the  sin  of  the  human  race, 
and  about  the  function  of  the  law  in  multiplying  sin.  Since 
Paul,  therefore,  finds  justification  through  Christ  foreshadowed, 
not  in  the  legal  community  of  Israel,  but  only  in  the  promise 
connected  with  Abraham  and  in  the  sayings  of  later  prophets, 
and  since  he  sees  in  justification  a  saving  operation  of  God 
on  the  totality  of  mankind  which  is  counteractive  of  uni- 
versal sin,  he  prefers  the  conception  which  is  imquestionably 
positive,  and  only  employs  the  term  "  forgiveness  of  sins," 
which  he  borrows  from  the  Old  Testament,  to  clear  up  the 
meaning  of  his  own. 

Now  the  fact  that  the  Reformers  used  these  two  concep- 
tions by  turns,  and  expressly  ascribed  to  them  complete 
equivalence  and  identical  scope,  is  explained  by  the  influence 
of  their  situation  within  the  Church  as  the  sphere  of  positive 
fellowship  with  Divine  grace.  When  contrasted  with  this 
organisation  of  grace,  even  the  sinfulness  of  men  within  the 
Church,  however  severely  he  judged  it,  appeared  to  Luther 
exceptional,  so  that  he  found  the  negative  expression  clear 
enough  for  describing  the  counteractive  force.  Yet  the 
positive  expression  "  justification "  was  recommended,  not 
merely  by  Paul's  usage  of  it,  but  also  by  its  antithetical 
relation  to  universal  sin;   and   so   the    Reformers    did    not 


40  JUSTIFICATION    AND    RECONCILIATION  [39—10 

scruple  to  treat  both  terms  as  synonymous  even  in  this  con- 
nection. For  while,  to  begin  with,  they  steadfastly  kept  the 
positive  grace  of  God  in  sight  as  the  basis  of  the  whole 
saving  dispensation,  and  asserted  in  consequence  that  the 
relation  established  by  grace  constitutes  the  acknowledged 
standing  of  Christians  before  God,  it  seemed  to  them  all  one 
whether  grace,  in  the  form  of  justification,  stood  opposed  to 
man's  general  state  of  unrighteousness,  or,  in  the  form  of 
the  forgiveness  of  sins,  served  to  remove  the  derangement  of 
Christians*  gracious  fellowship  with  God.  The  attempt  to 
distinguish  the  two  conceptions  appeared  in  Dogmatics  for 
the  first  time  after  there  had  been  elaborated  the  idea  of  the 
justice  of  God  and  of  the  law  as  the  original  dispensation 
determining  the  relation  between  men  and  God ;  and  there- 
upon grace  retired  into  the  position  of  a  Divine  dispensation 
which  is  merely  relative.  Not  until  the  circumstances  had 
thus  changed  do  we  find  the  forgiveness  of  sins  discriminated 
as  the  negative,  and  justification  as  the  positive  effect. 
Nevertheless,  side  by  side  with  this  later  view,  there  re- 
asserted itself  from  time  to  time  the  contention  of  the 
Reformers,  that  the  two  expressions  differ  only  verbcditer, 
while  in  respect  of  the  fact  which  they  denote  they  are 
identical  (vol.  i.  p.  279).  Historical  reasons  therefore 
demand  that  our  definition  of  the  idea  of  justification  should 
base  itself  on  the  assumption  that  justification  is  synonymous 
with  forgiveness  of  sins. 

§  9.  Now  orthodox  theologians  of  the  Lutheran  as  well 
as  the  Reformed  school  understand  by  forgiveness  of  sins 
the  remission  of  those  penalties  which  according  to  Divine 
justice  necessarily  follow  sins.  Now,  since  the  same  theo- 
logians regard  the  whole  human  race  in  every  single  instance 
as  80  sunk  in  sin  that  all  particular  actual  transgressions 
of  the  commandments  of  God  can  add  nothing  to  the  guilt 
which  descends  from  our  first  parent  to  all  his  posterity,  the 
forgiveness  of  sins  through  Christ  is  taken  to  signify  the 
removal  of  the  penalties  which  our  first  parent  brought  on 
himself  and  his  race.     They  believe  that  a  mere  reference 


40-1]  THE   DEFINITION   OF   JUSTIFICATION  41 

to  this  hereditary  connection  entirely  exempts  them  from 
the  task  of  proving  emancipation  from  penalties  a  fact  in  the 
life  of  believing  and  justified  persons.  What  we  must  rather 
investigate  is  the  connections  of  punishment  in  the  doctrine 
of  sin  which  is  premised,  and  there  we  discover  what  im- 
munity from  penalties  signifies  for  believers.  The  old 
theologians  take  the  conception  of  g-uilt  as  a  consequence 
of  sin  into  consideration  only  in  so  far  as  it  expresses  the 
objective  liability  of  sinners  to  suffer  penalties  (vol.  i.  p. 
407).  The  latter  are  then  described  and  divided  into 
various  categories.  The  penalties  of  sin,  which  ensue  if  they 
are  not  averted  by  the  forgiveness  of  Christ,  are,  according  to 
Hollatz,  partly  temporal  and  partly  eternal,  partly  positive 
(sive  sensm)  and  partly  privative  {sive  damni\  partly  personal 
and  partly  public  and  common.  The  middle  classification 
embraces  the  whole  series  of  painful  evils,  and  death  in  its 
threefold  sense,  as  bodily,  spiritual,  and  eternal.  Hollatz^ 
remarks  about  this  customary  division,  that  it  is  not  logical; 
that  for  one  thing  bodily  and  spiritual  death  as  phenomena 
in  time  are  together  opposed  to  eternal  death ;  that  eternal 
death,  again,  must  be  conceived  as  the  continuation  of  spiritual 
death ;  and,  finally,  that  bodily  death  is  only  a  result  of  the 
separation  of  the  soul  from  the  body,  and  not  a  privation  in 
itself  as  spiritual  death  is.  It  would,  he  thinks,  be  advisable 
to  include  bodily  death  among  the  evils  of  the  earthly  life, 
over  against  which  stands  spiritual  and  eternal  death  as 
poena  damni.  This  is  the  view  taken  by  Wendelin  *  when  he 
divides  punishment  into  temporal  and  eternal  death,  and  the 
former  again  into  bodily  death,  inclusive  of  every  ill,  and 
spiritual  death,  which  embraces  bondage  to  the  devil,  the 
world,  and  sin. 

Nevertheless,  if  we  try  to  discover  from  these  theologians 
what  the  conception  is  which  all  these  different  phenomena 
of  punishment  exemplify,  we  shall  hardly  find  it  anywhere 
developed  purposely  and  completely.     It  is  true  that  so  far 

^  Examen  theoloffieum,  ii.  2.  20,  p.  504. 

^  Ckristianae  theologian  libri  duo.  i.  9.  9,  p.  204. 


42  JUSTIFICATION    AND   RECONCILIATION  [41-2 

as  the  relation  to  God  of  punishment  for  sin  is  concerned, 
it  is  conceived  of  as  His  counteractive  to  sin,  demanded  by 
His  retributory  justice,  and  necessary  to  His  honour.     But  j 

we  also  want  to  know  what  it  is  for  men,  and  under  what 
common  characteristic  all  the  various  penal  phenomena  may 
be  grouped.  No  one  belonging  to  the  old  Lutheran  school 
has  directed  his  attention  to  this  problem.  Instead,  Baier  ^ 
offers  us  an  even  more  detailed  account,  de  morte  sen  damna- 
tione  aetema  and  de  morte  temporali.  It  is  only  in  Reformed 
theologians  and  the  later  Lutherans,  Hollatz,  Buddeus, 
and  Fresenius,  that  suggestions  of  varied  range  occur  which 
serve  to  determine  the  meaning  of  the  whole  series  of  ideas. 
They  amount  to  this,  that  punishment  of  sin,  in  so  far  as 
it  is  conceived  as  a  permanent  consequence  of  sin,  and 
is  not  annulled  by  redemption,  expresses  tloe  separation  of 
sinners  from  God,  the  suspension  of  man's  proper  fellowship 
with  Him.*  The  statements  quoted  from  these  theologians 
.  all  more  or  less  explicitly  start  from  the  Biblical  view  that 
the  proper  welfare  and  common  good  of  men  lies  in  the 
presence  of  God;  and  in  contrast  therewith  it  is  rightly 
inferred  that  the  greatest  evil  which  follows  sin  as  its  con- 
sequence is  the  ultimate  withdrawal  of  His  presence.  Sup- 
posing, then,  that  no  other  difficulty  exists,  it  is  in  keeping 

^  Tfieol,  posiL  i.  cap.  7,  8. 

^  Conf,  Helv,f  post  8 :  '*  Poenis  subiicimur  iustis,  adeoque  a  deo  abiecti 
esscmus  omnes,  nisi  nos  reduxisset  Christus  liberator."  Amesius,  Medulla,  i. 
16:  "  Consumiuatio  mortis— est  amissio  boni  iofiniti.  Spiritualis  mortis  con- 
summatio  est  totalis  ac  finalis  derelictio,  qua  homo  separatur  penitus  a  facie, 
praesentia  vel  favore  dei."  Witsius,  De  oeeonomia  foederum  dei,  iii.  6.  5  : 
'*  Mortui  sumus  in  Adamo  omnes,  hoc  est,  a  deo  remotissime  seiuncti,  sive  at 
Paulus loquitur,  alienati  a  vita  dei."  Heidegger,  Corp,  thsol, ,  Loc.  ix. 59 :  ''Poena 
mortis  nomine  comprehensa  .  .  .  Est  autem  in  universum  mors  separatio 
eorum,  quae  prima  origine  sua  coniuncta  fuerunt.  Cum  igitur  homo  integer 
a  deo  creatus  et  ipse  cum  dei  sanctitate  per  imaginem  dei  actu  coniunctus 
fiierit,  .  .  .  horum  omnium  separatio  mortis  nomen  et  omen  habuit."  Rodolf, 
Catcchesis  Palal,  p.  70  :  "Non  miruni,  omnes  istos  unius  poenae,  puta  mortis, 
gradus  id  habere  commune  inter  se,  quod  notionem  privationis  vel  separa- 
tionis  animae  totiusque  honiinis  a  bono,  cuius  possessio  felicitatem  affert, 
includant."  Hollatz,  ii.  2.  20:  "  Mors  spiritualis  est  separatio  a  gratioso  dei 
consortio  ;  aetema  est  separatio  a  visione  et  fruitione  dei  beatifica."  Buddeus, 
ii.  3.  13:  "Sequitur,  damnatos  omnibus  istis,  quae  communiouem  cum  deo 
consequuntur,  destitui."  Fresenius,  Rechtfertigung,  iv.  7  :  "the  ground  of  all 
punishment  is  8ei>aration  from  God." 


43-3]  THE   DEFINITION   OF   JUSTIFICATION  43 

v^ith  the  facts  to  define  the  forgiveness  of  sins — as  consisting 
in  the  removal  of  the  total  penalty  attached  to  original  sin 
— as  that  operation  of  God  which  restores  sinners,  separated 
as  such  from  Him,  to  the  presence  of  God  and  their  proper 
fellowship  with  Him.  And  this  operation  on  God's  part, 
too,  would  take  place  despite  the  fact  that  those  who  have 
been  brought  back  out  of  a  state  of  separation  from  God 
are  sinners  by  their  own  action  and  hereditary  nature.  This 
definition  of  forgiveness,  it  is  true,  was  not  arrived  at  by 
any  of  the  old  theologians.  Nevertheless,  the  interpretation 
we  have  given  of  the  remission  of  sins  is  in  harmony  with 
their  suggestions  regarding  the  punishment  of  sin. 

And  yet,  of  the  theologians  referred  to,  none  but  Rodolf 
and  Heidegger,  properly  speaking,  are  tied  to  this  conclusion. 
This  is  due  to  their  identifying  the  conception  of  separation 
from  God  with  death  in  its  general  sense  as  punishment 
for  sin.  The  others  put  that  interpretation  solely  on  the 
privative  penalties  of  spiritual  and  eternal  death  (poena  damni\ 
not  on  bodily  death  and  the  equivalent  evils  of  our  earthly 
life  (poena  sensus).  There  is,  however,  no  doubt  that  the 
identification  of  forgiveness  with  remission  of  punishment 
primarily  implies  the  removal  of  evils,  which,  indeed,  are  not 
to  be  described  as  bodily,  in  the  sense  that  they  do  not 
concern  the  spirit  at  all,  but  which  are  always  marked  by 
sensible  excitations,  and  thereby  differentiated  from  the  privat- 
ive or  purely  ideal  character  of  the  other  species  of  punish- 
ment for  sin.  The  intense  longing  for  forgiveness  which  we 
find  in  the  Psalms  regularly  includes,  as  has  been  shown  (vol. 
ii.  p.  58),  an  expectation  of  the  deliverance  of  the  nation  from 
political  servitude.  Thus  the  demand  of  the  righteous,  that 
God  would  acknowledge  their  righteousness  as  such,  always 
includes  the  condition  that  they  shall  be  spared  the  evils  of 
persecution.  So  far  as  these  evils  excite  pain,  they  pertain 
to  their  feeling  for  the  honour  of  the  nation,  or  of  individual 
righteous  persons ;  but  in  this  connection  they  are  also  invari- 
ably bound  up  with  external  circumstances.  The  view  which 
the  old  theologians  take  of  poena  sensus  is  undoubtedly  deter- 


44  JUSTIFICATION   AND   RECONCILIATION  [43 

mined  by  these  experiences  and  impressions,  so  that  the 
division  of  positive  penal  evils  into  outward  and  inward, 
which  we  find,  e.g,  in  Heidegger  (x.  83),  neither  gives  a  correct 
representation  of  the  facts  of  the  case,  nor  harmonises  with 
the  necessary  psychology  of  the  subject.  Accordingly,  the 
various  evils  of  the  earthly  life,  those  which  are  individual 
as  well  as  those  which  are  common,  in  which  an  outward 
stimulus  communicated  through  the  senses  is  bound  up  with 
a  feeling  of  pain  at  the  contraction  of  life,  are  interpreted  by 
most  of  the  old  theologians  as  pimishment  for  sin,  in  such  a 
way  as  to  contrast  it  with  the  privative  poena  damni,  ideal 
separation  from  God.  And  although  Heidegger  and  Eodolf 
subsume  the  former  species  under  the  latter,  instead  of  oppos- 
ing them,  and  thus  exalt  separatio  a  Deo  to  the  rank  of  a 
generic  conception,  including  all  punishments  for  sin,  they 
have  certainly  not  earned  the  right  to  do  so  by  proof.  There- 
fore the  above-mentioned  definition  of  forgiveness  or  remission 
of  punishment,  which  makes  it  consist  in  the  removal  of  the 
sinner's  separation  from  God,  and  which  has  been  maintained 
as  following  from  their  view,  cannot  yet  be  affirmed  to  be 
such  as  would  express  the  mind  of  Protestant  orthodoxy  as  a 
whole. 

In  the  old  theology,  however,  though  the  manifold  evils 
of  earth  and  bodily  death  are  regarded  as  penalties  for  sin, 
yet  this  estimate  is  everywhere  accompanied  by  a  peculiar 
reservation.  The  leaders  of  the  old  school,  while  making  this 
affirmation  regarding  earthly  evils,  lay  down  the  principle 
that  while  these  evils  have  tlie  significance  of  punishment  for 
sinners  who  remain  such,  on  the  other  hand,  for  the  redeemed, 
reconciled,  believing,  and  pious,  they  possess  the  value  of  chas- 
tisement and  ti'iaU     To  emphasise  the  importance  of  this  dis- 

*  Gerhard,  Loci  theol.,  Loc.  x.  125  (torn.  iv.  p.  366):  "Quamvis  credentes 
originalis  et  alioruni  peccatorum  remissionem  per  Christum  et  propter  Christum 
obtineant,  nihilo  tamen  minus  calamitatibus  huius  vitae  et  temporali  morti 
manent  obnoxii.  Causae  huius  ret  sunt,  1.  ut  peceatum  in  came  adhuc  haerens 
mortificetur  ;  2.  ut  peccati  gravitate  agiiita  simus  remission  is  grata  roente  per- 
petuo  memores ;  3.  ut  excrcitia  fidei,  patientiae  et  obedientiae  in  cruce  nobis 
proponantur.  Magnum  interea  discrimen  est  inter  poeuas  impoenitentibus  et 
fucredulis,  deo  uondum  reconciliatis  debitas,  et  inter  has  patemas  castigationeii 


44-5]  THE    DEFINITION    OF   JUSTIFICATION  45 

tinction,  let  me  add  that  it  was  not  won  at  the  first  onset. 
For  Melanchthon,  who  devotes  his  attention  to  the  subject  in 
a  division  of  the  third  edition  of  the  Loci  theologici, — that  is, 
in  what  is  clearly  a  supplementary  way, — has  not  yet  anived 
at  the  necessary  demarcation.  He  distinguishes  four  kinds 
of  Bufferings  (calamitates),  rificopicu,  hoKifiaa-lai,  fiaprvpcov, 
\vTpov,  Of  these  the  last  term  applies  exclusively  to  Christ. 
The  first  applies  to  believers  and  unbelievers  alike ;  it  is 
differentiated,  by  the  Divine  purpose  to  incite  to  repentance, 
from  punishment  as  mere  retribution,  yet  comes  under  the 
principle  of  Divine  wrath.^  Next,  however,  this  element  of 
Divine  wrath  is  expressly  abandoned  and  replaced  by  patema 
castigatio  piorumy  Alting  and  Wendelin  using,  for  believers, 
alternately  the  terms  rifMopva  and  iraiZela,  and  differentiating 
from  them  hoKifiatria  and  fiaprvpiov.  Finally,  later  writers, 
Cocceius,  Heidegger,  Baier,  HoUatz,  have,  in  the  first  place, 
the  term  TraiBeia,  while  they  expressly  reserve  rificDpia  for 
punishment  as  retribution,  a  species  which  does  not  apply  to 
believers.  The  evils,  therefore,  which  come  upon  believers 
are  not  inconsistent  with  their  state  of  salvation,  but  are  the 
progressive  instruments  and  marks  of  its  attainment.  De- 
finite transgressions  on  the  part  of  believers,  it  is  true,  give 
occasion  for  chastisements  (or  educative  penalties).  Never- 
theless, these  evils  must  be  put  down  as  relative  goods  from 
the  point  of  view  of  salvation,  because  God's  guiding  purpose 
is  to  induce  repentance  by  their  means.  Those  evils  which 
serve  to  test  believers  may  be  viewed  in  the  same  light  with 
all  the  more  certainty  that  they  are  not  occasioned  by  distinct 
instances  of  sin.  Finally,  affliction  in  the  form  of  martyrdom, 
as  direct  testimony  to  the  standing  in  salvation  of  those  upon 

piis  et  reconciliatis  impositas  ;  iUae  enim  procedunt  ab  irato  iudice,  hae  vero  a 
benignlasimo  patre ;  illae  sunt  initia  aeternanim  poenaruin,  hae  vero  cam  hac 
vita  desinunt"  Baier,  ii.  1.  15,  p.  426 ;  Hollatz,  ii.  2.  19,  p.  508 ;  Henr. 
Alting,  i.  9,  p.  138 ;  Wendelin,  i.  12.  2,  p.  234 ;  Coccejus,  de  foed,  et  test,  dei, 
cap.  XV.  p.  608 ;  Heidegger,  Loc.  x.  92,  94. 

^  O.  K  xxi.  p.  953  :  "Sunt  opera  iustitiae  divinae,  per  quae  vult  deus  com- 
monefieri  et  noa  et  alios  de  sua  iustitia.  .  .  .  Quamquam  autem  hae  poenae  sunt 
opera  iustissimae  irae  dei,  tamen  exstant  in  ecdesia  promissiones,  quae  affirmant, 
in  hac  ipsa  ira  deum  tamen  velle,  ut  ad  filinm  mediatorem  confugiamus." 


46  JUSTIFICATION    AND    RECONCILIATION  [45-(J 

whom  it  falls,  contributes  in  the  fullest  sense  to  their  honour. 
And  it  is  simply  as  an  inference  from  the  conception  of 
fatherly  chastisement  and  of  the  abrogation  of  the  penal 
significance  of  all  earthly  ills,  so  far  as  concerns  the  person 
of  the  quondam  sinner,  that  certain  of  the  Reformed  divines 
deny  even  to  bodily  death  a  penal  character  in  the  case  of 
believera^  Finally,  light  is  thrown  on  the  distinction  of  casti- 
gatio  piorum  from  poena  by  the  fact  that  the  Evangelicals 
repudiate  the  Catholic  doctrine  of  "  satisfactions  "  in  the  sacra- 
ment of  penance.  This  doctrine,  as  found  in  the  decree  of 
the  fourteenth  session  of  the  Tridentine  Synod,  cap.  viii.,  aims 
at  showing  that  the  "satisfactions  "  which  priests  impose  in  the 
sacrament  of  penance  serve  "  non  tantum  ad  novae  vitae  cus- 
todiam  et  infirmitatis  medicamentum,  sed  etiam  ad  praeteri- 
torum  peccatorum  vindictam  et  castigationem  " ;  and  the  1 3th 
Canon  adds :  "  pro  peccatis  quoad  poenam  temporalem  dec 
per  Christi  merita  satisfieri  poenis  ab  eo  inflictis  et  patienter 
toleratis  vel  a  sacerdote  iniunctis."  Accordingly,  those  evils 
which  are  to  be  considered  consequences  of  sin  are  still  viewed 
as  of  a  penal  character,  even  for  such  as  are  reconciled 
through  the  sacrament  of  penance,  inasmuch  as  they  are 
either  borne  with  patience  or  have  their  place  supplied  by 
Church  exercises  prescribed  by  the  priest.  In  opposition  to 
this,  Calvin  and  Chemnitz  *  bring  forward  that  very  distinction 
between  the  punishment  of  unbelievers  and  the  chastisement 

^  Baier,  iii.  5.  11,  p.  672,  states  the  principle  :  "  Beatus  peooatonun,  licet  non 
toUatur  ab  ipsis  peccatis,  quia  hoc  ipso,  quod  peccata  sunt,  poena  quoque  digna 
sunt,  tollitur  tamen  ab  homine  peccatore."  More  distinctly,  Wendelin,  p.  234 : 
"Pertinet  ad  raidelap  mors  corpondis  piorum,  quae  non  est  satisfactio  pro 
peccato,  sed  peccati  deo  maximopere  displicentis  indicium  et  abolitio  peccati, 
necessarium  ingressus  in  gloriam  antecedens.  *'  Heidegger,  p.  369 :  ' '  Neque  mors 
fidelium  poena  proprie  dicta  est,  quia  eorum,  in  quibus  Christus  est,  corpus 
dicitur  mortuum  propter  peccatum  (Bom.  viii.  10).  Non  enim  corpus  moritur 
propter  peccatum  vindicandum  vol  expiandum,  sed  deponendum  et  abolendnm." 

'  Irutitulio  Christ,  relig,  iii.  4,  pp.  31,  32  :  **  Ubicunque  poena  est  ad  ultionem, 
ibi  maledictio  et  ira  dei  se  exserit,  quam  semper  a  fidelibus  continent.  Casti- 
gatio  contra  et  dei  benedictio  est  et  amoris  habet  testimonium,  ut  docet  scrip- 
tura."  JExamen  cove,  Trid,  (Genev.  1641)  p.  400:  **Omnino  statuendum  est 
discrimen  inter  poenas  et  afflictiones,  quae  infiiguntur  impiis  et  quae  imponun- 
tur  reconciliatis.  .  .  .  Tales  igitur  temporariae  poenae,  quas  deus  reconciliatis 
in  hac  vita  imponit,  uequaquam  sunt  ita  interpretandae,  quasi  sint  vel  merita 
remissionis  peccatorum  vel  compensationes  poenae  aeternae." 


46-71  THE    DEFINITION   OF   JUSTIFICATION  47 

of  the  pious,  according  to  which  no  evil  has  for  the  latter  the 
significance  of  punishment  such  as  would  legally  counter- 
balance their  sin. 

§  10.  The  older  theology  rested  satisfied  with  the  con- 
clusion that  earthly  evils,  including  death,  as  consequences 
of  sin,  have  for  those  sinners  who  remain  so  the  value  of 
punishment,  but  for  those  who  are  reconciled  the  value  of 
means  of  education  and  of  trial.     Both  conclusions,  the  one 
as  well  as  the  other,  were  drawn  from  Holy  Scripture,  and  no 
need  was  felt  for  knowledge  which  should  advance  beyond  this 
standard.     Both  cases  were,  as  Divine  ordinances,  viewed  as 
subordinate  to  the  universal  end  of  the  Divine  glory ;  for  the 
rest,  the  question  was  not  raised  whether  any  other  relation 
than  that  of  opposition  obtains   between   the   two  afiirma- 
tions,  and  whether  it  is  possible  to  observe,  in  the  domain  to 
which  they  belong,  still  other  analogous  but  divergent  bonds 
of  connection.     Nevertheless,  an  investigation  of  this  kind, 
advancing  beyond  Scripture  proof,  is  necessary,  in  order  to 
test  the  correctness  and  the  completeness  of  the  above  two 
propositions.     These  propositions,  now,  are  unlike  in  form, 
and  heterogeneous  in  their  ruling  principles.     Earthly  evils 
are  conceived  as  punishments  for  sin,  without  any  stress  being 
laid  on  the  consideration  whether  those  who  are  punished 
feel  and  acknowledge  them  as  punishments  or  not.     For  the 
guHt  of  sin  {reatus)  is   understood  as  meaning  merely  the 
dbligatio  ad  poenam  imposed  by  the  legislator  and  judge,  not 
the  subjective  acknowledgment  of  the  righteousness  of  the 
punishment.       On    the    other  hand,  earthly  evils  are  inter- 
preted as  educative  penalties,  because  the  reconciled  sinners 
necessarily  view  them  in  the  same  sense  as  that  in  which  God 
inflicts  them.     In  their  ruling  principles  the  two  propositions 
are  heterogeneous.     For  the  view  which  regards  evils  as  means 
of  education  and  trial  is  governed  by  the  idea  of  the  Divine 
love,  or  the  highest  moral  end ;  the  view  which  regards  them 
as  punishment  denotes  a  simple  legal  procedure.     For  every 
end  is  determined  as  a  moral  end  by  the  fact  that  it  must 
likewise  be  conceived  as  a  means  to  other  ends  which  concern 


48  JUSTIFICATION   AND   RECONCILIATION  [47 

men.  Those  evils  which,  as  consequences  of  sin,  are  inflicted 
on  the  reconciled,  are  conceived  as  being  in  themselves 
divinely  purposed,  but  also  and  predominantly  as  means  of 
their  education ;  thus  they  are  given  the  form  of  moral  ends. 
On  the  other  hand,  the  interpretation  of  evils  as  punishments 
carries  with  it  the  implication  that,  on  the  principle  of  retri- 
bution, they  are  an  end  in  themselves.  In  this  sense,  too,  it 
is  considered  a  matter  of  indifference  whether  the  penal  value 
of  evils  is  acknowledged  by  those  who  are  punished  or  not ; 
in  the  same  sense,  the  only  point  of  importance  is  the  object- 
ive congruity  between  the  degree  of  evil  and  the  sin.  Both 
features  are  characteristic  of  the  judicial  punishment  of  the 
single  crime.  For,  considered  in  this  limited  range,  punish- 
ment ranks  as  an  end  in  itself,  inasmuch  as  it  is  measured 
by  the  gravity  of  the  crime,  and  has  nothing  to  do  with  the 
question  whether  it  is  recognised  by  the  punished  person  as 
punishment,  or  is  felt  as  an  untoward  accident  or  a  wrong. 
The  older  theology,  moreover,  treats  those  two  so  hetero- 
geneous propositions  in  such  a  way  that  the  judicial  punish- 
ment of  sin  by  God  appears  the  rule,  the  moral  education  of 
the  reconciled  by  suffering  the  exception.  That  is  the  sole 
relationship  to  one  another  in  which  the  two  propositions  are 
placed. 

But  for  that  reason  this  form  of  doctrine,  if  it  is  to 
do  justice  to  the  problems  which  it  recognises,  requires  both  to 
be  supplemented  and  to  be  limited  from  its  own  point  of 
view.  The  statement  that  it  is  of  no  consequence  whether  or 
not  the  penal  value  of  evils  is  acknowledged  by  the  persons 
punished,  and  whether  or  not  with  their  offence  they  join  a 
sense  of  its  unworthiness,  cannot  hold  good  to  such  an  extent 
that  conversion  and  the  estimating  of  evils  as  means  of  edu- 
cation become  unthinkable.  For  the  reconciled,  in  whose 
experience  and  judgment  evils  are  means  of  education  and 
trial,  move  out  of  the  circle  of  sinners  upon  whom  evils  are 
inflicted  as  punishments.  Now,  although  in  the  traditional 
representation  the  relation  of  the  two  propositions  is  of  such 
a  kind  that  the  penal  value  of  evils  for  sinners  forms  the  rule, 


47-8]  THE   DEFINITION    OF   JUSTIFICATION  49 

and  their  educative  value  for  them  the  exception,  yet  from  the 
general  character  of  theology  we  may  deduce  another  relation 
between  them.     For  all  theological  propositions  have  for  their 
aim  the  explanation  of  the  phenomena  of  the  Christian  life. 
Accordingly,  the  universal  judgment  affirming  the  penal  value  of 
evils  was  formed  because  the  reconciled,  in  whose  experience 
evils  prove  themselves  means  of  education  and  trial,  formerly 
stood,  as  members  of  the  fellowship  of  sin,  under  the  doom  of 
punishment,  and  not  only  remember  this  but  likewise  gauge 
the  worth  of  their  present  status  of  salvation   by  contrast 
with  their  former  state  of  punishment.     Now  it  is  a  rule  that 
the  change  brought  about  by  reconciliation  does  not  rend  the 
personality  in  sunder,  as  is  betokened  by  the  fact  that  the 
earlier   and    later    states   are    combined    in   a    single    self- 
consciousness.     Now  it  is  essential  for  the  status  of  recon- 
ciliation that  the  evils  which  are  inflicted  by  God  for  our 
education  and  trial  should   be  known   by  us  as  such,  and 
therefore  the  transition  from  the  earlier  stage  to  the  later 
cannot  be  correctly  conceived,  unless  at  the  former  there  has 
existed  a  manifestation  of  self-consciousness  appropriate  to  it. 
That  is,  one  who  is  later  reconciled  must,  in  the  status  of  sin, 
have  been  conscious  of  the  penal  value  of  evils,  if  later  he  is  to 
be  conscious  of  their  saving  worth.    Without  this  the  identity 
of  the  person  at  both  stages  is  not  assured.     Thus,  even  if 
we  had  to  suppose  that  the  status  of  sin  in  general  is  not 
accompanied  by  a  consciousness  of  guilt,  there  would  at  least, 
in  order  to  explain  the  transition  to  reconciliation,  have  to  be 
conceived  a  middle  stage,  at  which  those  who  are  later  recon- 
ciled manifest  their  tendency  towards    this  goal    by    their 
consciousness  of  guilt  in  the  status  of  sin.     And  the  older 
theologians  do  assume  this  middle  stage.     But  it  is  only  in 
the  doctrine  of  poenitentia  that  they  have    made  it    valid. 
Now,  if  their  general  view  of  the  penal  state  of  sinners  is 
correct,  namely,  that  in  the  recUus  as  dbligatio  ad  poenam  there 
is  absolutely  no  question  of  subjective  consciousness  of  guilt. 
then  between  this  proposition  and  the  estimation  of  evils  by 
the  reconciled  as  means  of  education,  there  would  fall  to  be 
4 


50  JUSTIFICATION   AND   RECONCILIATION  [48-9 

considered  the  third  case,  that  bj  those  sinners  who  attain  to 
reconciliation,  evils  are  previously  recognised  as  punishments, 
through  their  consciousness  of  guilt.  Only  so  do  we  exhaust- 
ively cover  the  whole  domain,  and  mediate  a  connection 
between  the  two  other  contrary  cases. 

For  the  present  purpose  this  demonstration,  as  understood 
in  the  older  Dogmatics,  is  enough  to  prove  that,  if  the  forgive- 
ness of  sins  is  likewise  remission  of  penalty,  those  sinners  who 
experience  remission  of  penalty  must  previously  be  conceived 
as  persons  who  trace  back  their  punishments  to  their  guilt 
through  the  consciousness  of  guilt,  in  which  the  right  of 
punishment  is  acknowledged.  Now  the  time  has  not  yet 
come  for  inquiring  what  right  Christian  theology  has  to  take 
for  granted,  as  the  supreme  rule  of  the  Divine  world-order,  the 
recompensing  of  human  actions  by  rewards  and  punishments, 
thus  explaining  the  world-order  on  the  analogy  of  the  State 
or  civil  society.  While  admitting  here,  provisionally  and 
dialectically,  the  correctness  of  this  theological  view  as  a 
whole,  I  wish  to  show  that  in  this  very  circle  the  exclusion  of 
the  consciousness  of  guilt  from  the  necessary  characteristics 
of  human  guilt  against  God  is  untenable,  and  that  the  merely 
objective  interpretation  of  these  characteristics  does  not  har- 
monise with  other  necessary  aspects  of  this  general  view.  In 
this  connection  I  first  of  all  recall  the  fact  that  the  conception 
of  punishment  and  guilt  which  is  before  us  is  borrowed  from 
the  judicial  punishment  of  the  single  crime.  The  meaning  of 
this  is  that  that  conception  does  not  exhaust  the  significance 
of  punishment  for  civil  society  or  the  State.  Certainly  it  is 
of  no  consequence  to  the  judge  who,  in  the  name  of  the  State, 
exercises  the  power  to  punish,  whether  or  not  those  who  are 
punished  acknowledge  their  punishment  as  just,  and  whether 
or  not  they  are  conscious  of  their  crime  as  guilt.  But,  as  a 
whole,  it  is  not  a  matter  of  no  consequence  to  the  State  how 
its  power  to  punish  is  regarded  by  its  citizens,  especially  by 
the  victims  of  punishment  themselves.  Civil  society  exists  at 
all  only  through  the  moral  disposition  of  its  members  in 
favour  of  law  in  general,  and  of  the  existing  legislation  as  a 


49-60]  THE   DEFINITION   OP   JUSTIFICATION  51 

whole.     If   this  disposition  is  shaken  by  the  revolutionary 
temper  of  the  citizens,  so  that  either  the  existent  form  of  the 
State,  or    the  form  of   the  State  in  general,  ceases  to  be 
regarded  as  binding,  the  danger  of  the  situation  comes  out 
especially  in  this,  that  civil  punishments  are  not  regarded  as 
being  such,  but  as  arbitrary  acts  of  violence.     From  the 
relatively  moral  peculiarity  of  character  belonging  to  civil 
society,  therefore,  it  follows  that  it  has  to  aim  at  punishments 
inflicted  by  the  State  being  acknowledged  by  the  punished 
parties'  consciousness  of  guilt.     Now,  if  fellowship  between 
God  and  man  is  to  be  conceived  as  taking  the  form  of  civil 
society,  it  follows  that  the  hitherto  current  theological  inter- 
pretation of  evils  as  punishments  for  sin  is  incomplete.     The 
guilt  of  sinners  ought  not  to  be  conceived  merely  as  an 
objective  dbligatio  ad  poenam,  but  must  also  embrace  the 
feature  of  subjective  consciousness  of  guilt,  through  which 
sinners,  who  are  under  God's  legal  power,  acknowledge  His 
power    to  punish.      If,  on   the    contrary,  sinners  regularly 
accept  the  punishments  inflicted  by  God  as  aimless  accidents, 
or  even  as  wrongs  done  by  God  to  them,  then  the  permanent 
legal  fellowship  between  God  and  sinners  would  become  con* 
fused  and  insecure,  and  thus  the  view  of  the  world  defended 
by   the  older  theologians  would   collapse.     But   there  is  a 
second  circumstance  which,  in  the  traditional  theology,  works 
counter  to  the  above  interpretation  of  guilt.     It  is  just  by  the 
status    of  universal  human  sin  that  theologians  prove  the 
validity  of  the  legal  fellowship  of  God  with  men.     But  this 
necessarily  implies  that  the  sinners  who  experience  at  God's 
hand  nothing  but  punishment,  acknowledge  it  to  be  right. 
For  otherwise  the  Divine  legal  order  would  not  be  valid  for 
them.     This  part  of  Dogmatics  is  under  the  influence  of  the 
models  of  pre-Christian  religions  in  which  the  State  is  directly 
assumed  as  the  sphere  and  the  standard  of  men's  relation  to 
God,  and  in  which,  accordingly,  there  are  called  forth  lively 
expressions  of  guilt  against  the  gods.     But,  further,  this  part 
of  Dogmatics  is  so  framed  as  to  prepare  the  mind  for  under- 
standing  redemption    through    Christ  ;    therefore,    to    the 


52  JUSTIFICATION    AND   RECONCILIATION  [60-1 

universal  fact  of  sin  is  appended  the  universal  need  of 
redemption,  the  fact  of  which  can  only  be  proved  from  a 
lively  feeling  of  guilt.  From  these  considerations  the  ac- 
companying interpretation  of  guilt,  as  a  merely  objective 
relationship,  is  unsatisfactory  even  for  the  older  Dogmatics 
itself. 

That  this  conception  should  be  supplemented  by  the 
inclusion  of  the  consciousness  of  guilt  as  a  normal  feature  is 
rendered  necessary,  secondly,  by  the  consideration  that  for 
sinners  as  sinners  punishment  is  not  to  be  exhausted  by 
earthly  evils  and  natural  death  ;  these  inflictions,  on  the  con- 
trary, are  to  find  their  continuation  and  consummation  in 
spiritual  and  eternal  death.  By  spiritual  death  is  meant  that 
hardening  of  the  sinful  will  which  leaves  no  prospect  of 
conversion  to  good.  Such  a  condition  is  conceivable  only  if 
we  presuppose  that  the  consciousness  of  guilt,  which  as  a  rule 
accompanies  sin,  and  under  certain  circumstances  makes 
conversion  possible,  is  crushed  out.  Nevertheless  this 
process  contains  no  guarantee  that  with  a  heightened  degree 
of  sin  altogether  the  consciousness  of  guilt  will  entirely 
disappear.  It  is  at  work,  without  doubt,  in  the  unhappiness 
and  despair  of  lost  men,  and  that  it  is  entirely  awanting  in 
the  hardened,  is  improbable.  If,  then,  in  orthodox  theology 
it  is  assumed  that  those  who  are  condemned  to  eternal 
punishment  recognise  its  justice,^  it  is  inconsistent  to  deny 
altogether  to  the  hardened  that  consciousness  of  guilt,  without 
which  they  cannot  acknowledge  their  state  of  punishment 
before  God.  If  it  be  said  that  this  knowledge  of  the  damned 
is  the  effect  of  their  condemnation,  and  permits  us  to  draw  no 
conclusion  regarding  phenomena  of  deep-dyed  sin  in  this 
world,  yet  the  feeling  of  guilt  in  which  that  knowledge  takes 
its  rise  cannot  be  awakened  where  it  has  once  been  wholly 
eradicated.  But  if  this  is  to  be  regarded  as  being  the  rule 
with  the  hardened,  then  the  above  assertion  of  Baier  becomes 
all  the  more  uncertain.     At  least  the  view  of  the  world-order 

^  Baier,  i.  7.  6  :  "Damuati  poenanmi,  quibus  affliguiitur,  meritum  animo 
reputant" 


61-2]  THE   DEFINITION   OF   JUSTIFICATION  53 

— ^based  on  the  double  retribution  of  God — which  in  the  older 
theology  is  assumed  as  a  self-evident  truth,  takes  the  appear- 
ance of  a  questionable  hypothesis,  unless  it  be  admitted  that 
even  the  hardened  normally  possess  ultimately  so  much  feeling 
of  guilt  as  to  glorify  God's  justice  in  their  punishment 

This  inquiry  was  set  on  foot  in  order  to  discover  whether 
Rodolf  and  Heidegger  had  good  reason  for  subsuming  under 
the  idea  of  separation  from  God  not  only  the  poena  damniy 
the  privative  and  purely  ideal  punishments  of  spiritual  and 
eternal  death,  but  also  the  poena  sensus,  while  elsewhere 
these  classes  of  punishment  were  opposed  to  one  another 
under  the  categories  of  the  positive  and  the  privative,  the 
sensible  and  the  spiritual.  Since  we  have  seen  that  the 
penal  state  of  sinners  is  not  conceivable  at  all  apart  from 
the  varied  relations  of  its  elements  to  the  consciousness  of 
guilt,  and  especially  apart  from  the  fact  that  the  evils 
of  the  earthly  life  can  be  understood  as  punishment  only 
when  viewed  in  the  light  of  the  consciousness  of  guilt,  the 
question  is  what,  in  this  connection,  is  meant  by  conscious- 
ness of  guilt.  We  must  not  anticipate  a  complete  defini- 
tion of  it.  But  it  always  finds  its  immediate  expression  in 
removal  from  the  person  whom  we  know  ourselves  to  have 
offended.  Thus,  in  relation  to  God,  it  is  ever  a  form  of  the 
separation  of  sinners  from  God,  as  contrasted  with  the 
universal  destination  of  men  for  fellowship  with  God.  If  on 
this  there  depends  the  estimation  of  earthly  evils  as  punish- 
ments, then  these  evils  likewise  come  to  stand  under  the 
principle  of  that  separation  of  our  life  from  God  which  runs 
counter  to  the  destination  of  man.  Thus,  then,  the  view  put 
forward  by  the  theologians  named  above  is  confirmed.  All 
kinds  of  punishment  for  sin  are  the  expression  of  a  separation 
of  sinners  from  God  which  is  counter  to  their  ideal  destiny. 
If,  therefore,  forgiveness  of  sins  is  the  removal  of  the  penal 
state  of.  sinners,  it  follows  that  it  brings  back  those  who  are 
separated  from  God  by  sin  into  nearness  or  fellowship  with  God. 
It  is  to  be  defined,  then,  as  the  removal  of  the  separation  which, 
in  consequence  of  sin,  has  entered  in  between  man  and  God* 


54  JUSTIFICATION    AND   RECONCILIATION  [52-3 

§  11.  Among  the  relations   which  go  to  make   up  the 
separation  of  sinners  from  God,  the  rest  are  overtopped  by  the 
consciousness  of  guilt,  partly  as  a  condition  of  the  varied 
gradations  of  punishment,  partly  in  so  far  as  it  is  not  an 
objective  attribute,  but  a  subjective  function  of  the  sinner. 
We  ought  therefore  rather  to  transpose  "  the  removal  of  the 
separation    of   sinners    from   God"  into   the  removal  of  the 
consciousness  of  guilt.     In  so  far  as  God  is  conceived  as  its 
Author,  it  is,  of  course,  to  be  understood  as  running  counter  to 
the  process  which  takes  place  in  hardening.     Now,  from  the 
ethical  standpoint  which  we  owe  to  Kant,  Tief trunk  contended 
for  the  interpretation  of  forgiveness  as  liberation  from  the 
consciousness  of  offence  (vol.  i.  pp.  436,  466).     The  discovery 
of  the  consciousness  of  guilt  as  the  consequence  and  the  test 
of  the  freedom  of  the  will  and  the  absolute  validity  of  the 
moral  law,  coinciding  with  the  inexplicable  fact  of  the  radical 
strain  of  evil  in  man,  enabled  this  disciple  of  Kant  to  perceive 
clearly  the  rule  of  common  moral  knowledge — that,  if  an 
injured  benefactor  remits  to  his  thankless  beneficiary  outward 
penalties,  but,  nevertheless,  consistently  repudiates  him  with 
undiminishing  contempt,  such  a  species  of  pardon  is  simply 
worth  nothing.     In  making  this   the  measure  of  his  claim 
upon  the  Christian  meaning  of  the  forgiveness  of  sins,  he 
surrendered    the   contention   that  with   forgiveness   there  is 
bound  up  a  direct  liberation  from  the  penalties  (evils)  incurred 
in  the  status  of  sin,  which  work  on  in  accordance  with  the 
universal  Divine  world-order.     Accordingly,  he  likewise  proves 
his  agreement  with  the  Christian  estimate  of  evils  upheld  by 
the  orthodox,  by  concluding  that  the  amended  person,  who 
wins  pardon  and  has  attained  to  a  love  for  the  law,  will  gladly 
bear  the  punishments  which  he  has  merited.     Even  if  this 
conception  stops  short  of  the  precision  of  the  Christian  view 
of  evils  which  continue  to  act,  and  drags  in  the  fact  of  moral 
improvement  in  a  strange  fashion,  yet  even  this  theory  wit- 
nesses to  the  truth  of  the  result  arrived  at  above.     For  as  the 
consciousness  of  guilt,  not  suppressed  yet  also  not  relieved,  is 
a  precondition  of  evils  being  viewed  as  punishments,  so  there 


53-4]  THE   DEFINITION    OF   JUSTIFICATION  55 

follows,  from  the  removal  by  God  of  the  consciousness  of 
guilt,  the  reversal  of  our  judgment  about  them,  and  the  sense 
that  they  are  relative  blessings  which  we  homologate. 

The  dialectic  transformation  of  the  earlier  established 
conception  of  forgiveness  into  this  conception  of  Tieftrunk, 
overleaps  the  distinction  which  served  to  draw  Tollner  away 
from  the  traditional  form  of  doctrine  (vol.  i.  p.  398),  and 
around  which  there  revolve  the  reflections  of  the  Aufkldrung 
theologians.  In  the  process  of  the  historical  development 
of  theology  it  is  significant,  indeed,  that  a  distinction  was 
drawn  by  Tollner  between  guilt  and  the  obligation  to  endure 
punishment,  and  that,  besides  the  discharge  of  the  latter  by 
the  suffering  of  Christ,  a  special  act  of  grace  on  God's  part 
was  insisted  on  for  the  former.  For  here  there  first  appears 
an  impulse  to  an  ethical  criticism  of  the  problem  of  recon- 
ciliation, a  problem  which  could  not  be  exhaustively  treated 
with  legal  conceptions.  But  this  stimulus  remained  in- 
effectual, because  it  apprehended  the  moral  idea  of  guilt 
merely  objectively,  without  respect  to  the  consciousness  of 
guilt.  For  this  reason  Tollner  himself  could  find  no  sure 
determination  of  the  relation  between  the  conceptions  of 
guilt  and  punishment  which  he  had  distinguished,  and  Eber- 
hard  arrived  at  the  idea  that  the  aim  of  punishment  is  to 
convince  men  of  their  offence  (vol.  i.  p.  403).  This  state- 
ment is  incorrect  and  intrinsically  obscure.  If  punishment, 
as  has  been  indicated,  is  to  be  understood  as  a  legal  method 
of  dealing  with  the  single  criminal,  then  the  judge  who 
imposes  the  punishment  has,  as  a  judge,  nothing  to  do  with 
the  moral  impression  made  by  the  punishment  upon  the 
person  punished.  Nor  does  the  result  in  any  way  answer 
to  the  definition  of  punishment  as  stated.  The  conjunction 
of  ideas  which  Eberhard  has  formed,  however,  confuses  two 
domains  of  life,  the  legal  and  the  moral.  For  the  guilt  of 
which  punishment  is  to  convince  men,  is  not  limited  to  these 
features  of  the  case  through  which  the  judge  arrives  at  his 
verdict  of  guilty.  The  judge  has  to  confine  himself  to  ascer- 
taining whether  the  criminal  is  the  cause  of  the  given  illegal 


56  JUSTIFICATION   AND   RECONCILIATION  [54-5 

action,  as  tested  by  his  cognisable  intention  and  his  cognisable 
purpose.  But  if  the  criminal  is  to  be  made  aware  of  his 
guilt  through  his  punishment,  this  means  that  he  is  to  inter- 
pret his  act  and  its  intention  from  the  whole  bearing  of  his 
conduct,  from  his  general  responsibility  for  himself,  in  other 
words,  he  is  to  interpret  it  as  a  datum  of  moral  unworthiness. 
These  elements  of  the  situation  converge  in  the  feeling  of  guilt. 
Hence  it  follows  just  as  distinctly  that  even  moral  guilt  can 
never  be  completely  conceived  without  the  element  of  the 
feeling  of  guilt,  but  also  that  a  judicial  punishment  may 
perhaps,  under  special  circumstances,  awaken  or  intensify 
the  feeling  of  guilt  in  a  condemned  man,  though  this  con- 
summation cannot  be  proved  to  be  the  purpose  of  judicial 
punishment.  He  who  has  the  true  feeling  of  guilt  will  neces- 
sarily understand  and  acknowledge  the  punishment  he  has 
incurred ;  the  opposite  holds  good  only  in  accidental  cases. 

If  we  abstract  from  the  connection  between  punishment 
and  guilt,  we  shall  find  it  impossible  to  form  a  complete, 
universal,  and  practically  applicable  conception  of  moral 
guilt  without  the  element  of  the  feeling  of  guilt.  If  we 
think  ourselves  into  the  case  when  "  thy  brother  sinneth 
against  thee,"  the  ascertainment  of  this  case  is  intended  to 
move  the  other,  by  the  awakening  of  his  feeling  of  guilt,  to 
acknowledge  the  offence  he  has  committed.  For  that  this  is 
the  character  of  his  action  can  only  be  made  out  through  a 
united  and  consentient  judgment.  If  the  other  will  not 
confess  to  having  offended  in  his  action,  even  though  his 
attitude  be  due  to  obstinacy  or  a  lack  of  sensibility,  the 
accusing  judgment  of  the  injured  person  does  not  suflSce 
definitively  to  subsume  the  case  in  question  under  the  idea 
of  guilt.  We  should  be  justified  in  finding  anticipatively  in 
the  accusation  a  judgment  affirming  the  guilt  of  the  other 
only  provided  we  ascertain  that  through  negligence  or  wicked- 
ness he  has  disabled  or  suppressed  his  feeling  of  guilt.  But 
even  in  this  case  our  judgment  has  regard  indirectly  to  the 
element  of  the  feeling  of  guilt.  Without  this  the  assertion 
of  the  moral  guilt  of  another  is  always  uncertain.     But  what 


i)6-6]  THE    DEFINITION   OF   JUSTIFICATION  57 

is  wanted  cannot  be  that  we  should  form  a  conception  of 
moral  guilt  so  little  determinate  that  it  can  never  be  used 
with  any  certainty,  or  only  at  the  risk  of  filling  with  pride 
the  man  who  finds  such  a  conception  satisfactory. 

§  1 2.  If  forgiveness,  according  to  Tollner,  is  to  be  con- 
ceived as  the  removal  by  God  of  the  guilt  of  man,  it  is 
certain  that  the  conception  of  guilt  is  intended  to  be  under- 
stood in  the  moral  sense.  For,  as  has  been  shown,  even  the 
acknowledgment  of  the  punishment  they  have  suflFered  by 
those  who  are  punished,  has  its  basis  solely  in  their  con- 
sciousness of  moral  guilt.  All  the  more  certainly  is  it 
the  removal  by  God  of  moral  guilt  that  is  denoted  in  the 
Christian  use  of  the  term,  because  the  religious-moral  goal  of 
the  Kingdom  of  God  forms  the  standard  of  our  conception 
of  sin  and  guilt.  But  moral  guilt  will  necessarily  come  into 
consideration  here  along  with  the  element  of  the  feeling  of 
guilt,  since  unless  it  is  distinctly  presupposed  the  forgiveness 
of  guilt  cannot  be  thought  as  operating  on  the  guilty.  For 
if,  in  the  contrast  between  existent  guilt  and  its  forgiveness, 
the  identity  of  the  person  in  whom  both  are  reaUsed  is  to  be 
preserved,  then  the  guilty  who  receive  forgiveness  of  their 
guilt  must  be  distinguished  first  by  their  clear  consciousness 
of  their  guilt  and  by  a  lively  feeling  of  pain  about  it.  Con- 
versely,the  removal  of  the  consciousness  of  guilt  must  likewise 
be  so  interpreted  that  it  includes  the  removal  of  real  guilt. 
For  were  this  not  so,  even  hardening  might  be  conceived  as 
a  species  of  forgiveness.  But  this  is  absurd,  for  hardening 
denotes  that  situation  of  the  sinner  which  is  farthest  removed 
from  forgiveness. 

Guilt,  in  the  moral  sense,  expresses  the  disturbance  of  the 
proper  reciprocal  relation  between  the  moral  law  and  freedom, 
which  follows  from  the  law-transgressing  abuse  of  freedom, 
and  as  such  is  marked  by  the  accompanjring  pain  of  the  feel- 
ing of  guilt.  Guilt  is  thus  that  permanent  contradiction 
between  the  objective  and  the  subjective  factor  of  the  moral 
will  which  is  produced  by  the  abuse  of  freedom  in  non-fulfil- 
ment of  the  law,  and  the  unworthiness  of  which  is  expressed 


58  JUSTIFICATION    AND    RECONCILIATION  [5&-7 

for  the  moral  subject  in  his  consciousness  of  guilt.  Guilt  can 
be  the  expression  of  such  a  contradiction  only  provided  that, 
even  subsequent  to  a  transgression  of  the  law,  both  the  law 
and  freedom  continue  to  operate,  the  former  as  expressing 
the  extent  of  ends  which  ought  to  be  realised  by  the  subject, 
and  which  therefore  necessarily  have  an  attraction  for  free- 
dom, while  freedom  is  present  in  the  feeling  of  pain  at  its 
having  missed  its  proper  direction  towards  the  law.  Now, 
in  the  Christian  view  of  the  world,  God  is  conceived  as 
the  Author  and  the  active  Eepresentative  of  the  moral  law, 
because  the  final  end  which  He  desires  to  realise  in  the 
world  must  be  realised  just  through  the  human  race,  and 
because  the  moral  law  represents  the  system  of  ends  which 
are  the  means  to  the  common  final  end.  In  the  Christian 
sense,  therefore,  guilt  denotes  that  contradiction  of  God  on 
which  the  individual  as  well  as  the  totality  of  mankind  has 
entered  through  the  non-fulfilment  of  the  moral  law,  and 
which  is  recognised  as  present  through  the  consciousness  of 
guilt  in  which  the  individual  feels  with  pain  the  unworthi- 
ness  of  his  own  sin  as  well  as  his  share  in  the  guilt  of  all. 
By  this  statement  the  provisional  explanation  of  the  con- 
sciousness of  guilt  as  expressive  of  that  separation  of  men 
from  God  which  enters  in  instead  of  their  proper  fellowship, 
is  completed  and  clarified.  The  form  of  the  idea  of  space, 
which  lies  at  the  foundation  of  the  previous  theory,  is  filled 
out  by  an  expression  of  the  logically  defective  relationship 
existing  between  the  two  factors  which  ought  to  be  in  har- 
mony with  one  another. 

But  the  contradiction  of  God  and  our  own  moral  destiny 
which  is  expressed  in  the  conception  of  guilt,  and  is  felt  with 
pain  in  the  consciousness  of  guilt,  is  by  this  concomitant 
circumstance  marked  as  a  real  disturbance  of  human  nature. 
Duns  Scotus  (vol.  i.  p.  100)  has  asserted  that,  inasmuch 
as  guilt  is  an  ideal  relation,  it  is  nothing  real,  and  therefore 
the  forgiveness  of  sins  is  nothing  real  either,  but  the  colour- 
less presupposition  of  our  being  made  righteous  through 
grace.     For  even  sin,  he  argues,  destroys  nothing  good  which 


57-«]  THE    DEFINITION    OF   JUSTIFICATION  59 

exists,  but  only  something  which  ought  to  exist ;  accordingly, 
even  guilt  denotes  not  a  real  defect  in  the  soul,  but  a  defect 
in  the  relation  of  the  soul  to  its  proper  destiny.     But  in  this 
verdict  no  notice  is  taken  of  the  witness  given  by  the  con- 
sciousness of  guilt,  the  outcome  of   which  is  entirely  of  a 
contrary  kind.     It  does  not  make  use  of  the  distinction  laid 
down  by  Duns.     Eather  does  it  feel  the  logical  contradiction 
of  the  will  to  God,  which  is  contained  in  guilt,  as  a  real 
contradiction,  and  as 'a  real  defect  of  will.     For  the  logical 
contradiction,  of  which  we  are  guilty  in  an  act  of  objective 
knowledge,  betokens  the  fact  that  we  have  taken  a  wrong 
path  in  knowledga     But  in  our  knowledge  of  things  accord- 
ing to  their  peculiar  final  end  we  come  upon  existing  contra- 
dictions between  individual  mediating  members  and  the  end 
of  the  whole.     This  fact  makes  itself  apparent  especially  in 
evil  as  an  effect  of  the  will,  since  the  essence  of  the  will,  or 
its  freedom,  consists  in  its  working  the  good  as  its  final  end. 
If  this  is  baulked  by  the  production  of  evil,  the  «M5Company- 
ing  consciousness  of  guilt  attests  both  the  lasting  validity  for 
the  will  of  the  good  final  end,  and  also  the  real  injury  which 
freedom  has  sustained  through  the  production  of  evil.     Thus 
in  the  domain  of  the  will,  sin,  as  the  disturbance  of  the  ideal 
relation  of  the  will  to  its  final  end,  or  to  God  as  representing 
that  end  in  the  world-order,  is  a  real  contradiction. 

§  13.  How  is  forgiveness,  as  the  removal  of  gnilt  by  God, 
thinkable?  In  the  Old  Testament  there  is  to  be  found 
the  idea,  significant  in  this  connection,  that  God  is  willing 
to  remember  transgressions  no  more  (Jer.  xxxi.  34 ;  Isa.  xliii. 
25),  or  to  hide  them  from  His  sight  and  no  more  regard 
them  (vol.  ii.  p.  195).  But  the  important  point  is  that  in 
the  Divine  act  of  forgiveness  there  is  expressed  an  ideal  re- 
lation, since  likewise  the  real  significance  of  sin  clings  to 
the  subversal  of  the  ideal  relation  of  the  will  to  its  final  end. 
The  Old  Testament  figures,  that  God  covers  sin,  veils  it,  blots 
it  out,  puts  it  away,  express  the  ideal  aspect  of  the  fact, 
that  He  renders  it  inoperative  in  relation  to  Himself.  Now 
this  type  of  representation  works  on  likewise  in  the  ecclesi- 


60  JUSTIFICATION    AND   RECONCIUATION  [58-9 

astical  tradition,  even  though  it  be  with  limited  range,  along- 
side of  the  interpretation  of  forgiveness  as  the  remission  of 
penalty.  This  is  the  case,  for  instance,  in  the  formula  of 
the  Heidelberg  Catechism,  Question  56,  where  it  is  said  that 
"  God  will  never  more  remember  ray  sins,  nor  even  the  sinful 
nature  with  which  I  have  to  struggle  all  my  life  long."  The 
validity  of  this  idea,  however,  comes  into  collision  with 
LofHer's  objection  (vol.  i.  p.  408),  that  the  thought -of  for- 
giveness, as  expressive  of  an  altered  disposition,  is  incom- 
patible with  the  immutability  of  God,  and  the  forgiveness 
of  sins  incompatible  with  His  truthfulness,  which  prohibits 
His  regarding  the  guilty  as  innocent,  or  one  who  in  details 
is  guilty  as  innocent  in  general.  It  is  incompetent  for  this 
objection  as  yet  to  bring  into  play  the  argument  from  the 
immutability  of  God.  But  the  second  argument  was  sup- 
plemented on  the  subjective  side  by  Doderlein  and  Knapp 
(vol.  i.  p.  425),  for  they  reason  to  the  effect  that  even  the 
sinner's  conscience  will  always  testify  to  him  that  he  has 
sinned.  Thus  the  removal  of  guilt  and  of  the  consciousness 
of  guilt  would  be  in  contradiction  with  the  validity  of  the 
law  of  truth  for  God  and  for  the  sinner's  conscience. 

The  importance  which  the  idea  of  Divine  forgiveness  has 
in  Christianity  is  as  far  as  possible  from  demanding  such  an 
eradication  of  the  consciousness  of  guilt  as  would  collide  with 
truth.  Bather  is  it  impossible  to  esteem  the  forgiveness  of 
sins  the  basis  of  the  Christian  religion,  unless  the  memory 
of  that  contradiction  of  sin  to  God  which  is  expressed  in 
the  consciousness  of  guilt  continues  to  operate.  On  the 
contrary,  it  is  actually  acknowledged  that  forgiveness  itself 
keeps  awake  the  memory  of  sin  and  its  unworthiness.  One 
who  could  so  understand  the  forgiveness  of  sins  as  to  forget 
and  consequently  to  deny  his  previous  sins,  would  make  God 
a  liar  (1  John  i.  10) — in  other  words,  would  eviscerate  the 
promise  of  forgiveness  of  its  meaning.  Nor  does  any  contra- 
diction arise  from  the  fact  that,  in  virtue  of  forgiveness,  the 
consciousness  of  guilt  is  removed,  and  the  feeling  of  pain 
thereat  rendered  inoperative  for  the  future  and  the  present, 


59-60]  THE   DEFINITION    OF   JUSTIFICATION  61 

while  the  memory  of  the  guilt  is  preserved,  and  the  recollec- 
tion of  the  pain  previously  felt  likewise  held  fast.  It  is  even 
possible  that  this  recollection  itself  may  call  forth  pain 
directly ;  but  even  that  leads  to  no  contradiction.  For  these 
echoes  of  pain  at  sin  committed  fill  other  parts  of  time  than 
does  the  pleasure  arising  from  forgiveness  received,  and  in 
the  oscillation  of  feeling  to  both  sides  the  pleasure  surpasses 
the  pain  in  strength.  Thus  forgiveness  must  not  be  con- 
strued as  the  eradication  of  the  feeling  of  guilt  altogether, 
but  as  its  removal  in  a  certain  aspect.  On  the  other 
hand,  it  ought  not  to  be  maintained  that  God  can  forget  the 
transgression  of  man  if  He  chooses.  For  the  will  of  God 
cannot  be  thought  of  as  operative  in  any  direction  whatso- 
ever which  might  seem  to  place  Him  in  contradiction  to  the 
knowledge  of  the  truth.  This  formula,  borrowed  from  the 
Old  Testament,  appears,  even  in  the  older  theologians,  for 
the  most  part  in  the  modified  form  that  God  is  willing  not 
to  impute,  not  to  estimate,  the  guilt  of  man  {non  reputare). 
This  expresses  the  truth  that  the  fact  of  man's  transgression 
is  preserved  in  God's  memory,  wliile  the  will  of  God  renders 
invalid  an  aspect  of  that  offence  which  of  itself  it  asserts 
in  the  system  of  things.  The  question  thus  is  to  discover 
the  aspect  of  guilt  which  God  thus  renders  inoperative  by 
His  intention  to  forgive  sin. 

To  this  end  it  must  be  recalled  that  the  discourses  of 
Jesus  (Mark  xi.  25;  Luke  xi.  4;  cf.  Col.  iii.  13)  represent 
God's  forgiveness  as  altogether  of  the  same  nature  as  pardon 
among  men.  Now  the  latter  is  not  at  all  a  truth-contro- 
verting denial  of  the  fact  of  an  injury ;  it  rather  includes 
veraciously  the  recollection  of  the  injury,  although  the  degree 
of  retentiveness  which  belongs  to  the  human  mind  admits  of 
our  losing  the  memory  of  an  injury  altogether.  Pardon 
rather  is  an  act  of  will  by  which  there  is  cancelled  that 
aspect  of  an  injury  received  which  interrupts  intercourse 
between  the  injiu-ed  person  and  the  offender.  An  injury  is 
any  action  which  either  entirely  destroys  A  man's  honour,  or 
diminishes  or  impairs  it.     A  man's  honour  is  his  standing  as 


62  JUSTIFICATION    AND   RECONCILIATION  [GO-l 

an  independent  moral  entity  in  moral  society.  The  normal 
consequence  of  an  injury  is  the  cessation  of  intercourse,  the 
severance  of  moral  fellowship  between  the  injured  person 
and  the  offender.  For  the  injured  person  repels  the  author 
of  the  action  which  has  violated  his  honour.  None  but  men 
of  no  honour  are  accustomed  to  let  mutual  injuries  pass 
without  any  consequence  of  this  kind.  Now  pardon  is 
possible  provided  the  injured  person  is  really  a  man  of 
honour,  whose  honour  has  unjustly  been  offended.  In  that 
case  pardon  is  the  expression  of  the  honourable  man's  in- 
tention to  resume  intercourse,  by  the  cancelling  of  which  he 
has  upheld  his  honour  against  the  unjust  offender — in  other 
words,  to  resume  moral  fellowship  with  the  other.  That  to 
this  end  the  offender  must  have  perceived  and  confessed 
his  wrong  and  thus  besought  pardon,  is  provided  for  in  the 
simplest  injunction  given  by  Christ  regarding  pardon  (Luke 
xvii.  3,  4). 

But  we  ought  not  to  interchange  the  conception  of 
pardon  with  the  right  of  the  magistrate  to  condone.  For 
the  latter  has  reference  to  civil  society,  and  is  manifested 
in  the  remission  or  abridgment  of  a  penalty  inflicted  with 
the  force  of  law.  A  crime  leads  to  the  annulment  of  civil 
society  so  far  as  concerns  the  will  of  the  criminal  himself, 
but  not  universally;  and  punishment  does  not  imply  that 
thereby  civil  society,  as  such,  is  reconstituted  for  the  criminal. 
Eather  would  the  infliction  of  a  punishment  by  the  power  of 
the  State  be  unintelligible  unless,  despite  the  subjective 
breach  of  civil  society,  it  were  so  far  indissoluble  as  not  to 
be  dissolved  by  a  State  mandate  of  punishment,  e,g,  by  a 
decree  of  banishment.  Thus,  from  the  side  of  the  State's 
power,  punishment  is  really  an  action  of  the  civil  society  of 
which  the  criminal  still  remains  a  member.  Thus  condona- 
tion cannot  mean  that  one  who,  by  his  crime,  haa  left  civil 
society  altogether,  is  again  received  into  it.  It  means  rather 
that  judicial  cognisance  by  itself,  or  a  lesser  degree  of  punish- 
ment than  it  has  imposed,  suffices  to  give  expression  to  the 
civil  fellowship  existing  between  the  State  and  the  criminal. 


61]  THE    DEFINITION    OF   JUSTIFICATION  63 

Thence  it  follows  that  the  analogy  between  moral  pardon 
and  State  condonation  is  only  a  remote  one.  The  former 
excludes  all  punishment,  the  latter  merely  modifies  quanti- 
tatively the  punishment  which  has  already  been  expressed 
in  the  penal  sentence;  the  former  is  the  independent  re- 
sumption of  interrupted  moral  fellowship,  the  latter  pre- 
supposes that  the  existing  civil  fellowship  is  really  preserved 
by  the  penal  sentence.  Influenced  by  their  interest  •  in  the 
universal  and  public  significance  of  Divine  forgiveness,  ortho- 
dox theologians  have  compared  Divine  forgiveness  to  the 
State-power's  right  of  condonation  (vol.  i.  pp.  267,  337); 
and  they  believed  that  the  path  they  took  in  this  connection 
was  all  the  safer  that  the  remission  of  the  penalties  of  sin 
was  assumed  to  be  the  content  of  the  conception  in  question. 
But  not  only  has  that  confused  mixture  of  heterogeneous 
principles  lost  the  support  which  is  to  be  found  in  this 
preconception,  but  it  can  no  longer  hold  its  ground  at  all 
against  the  distinction,  expounded  above,  between  moral 
pardon  and  State  condonation. 

On  the  other  hand,  the  moral  explanation  of  pardon 
harmonises  with  all  the  indications  regarding  the  direct 
operation  of  the  Divine  forgiveness  of  sins  which  the  writings 
of  the  New  Testament  attach  to  the  sacrificial  death  of 
Christ.  It  has  been  proved  that  the  forgiveness  of  sins  and 
the  bringing  of  men  to  God  are  both  deduced  in  the  same 
sense  from  the  sacrificial  value  of  the  death  of  Christ  (vol. 
ii.  p.  213).  Paul  especially  uses  as  equivalent  the  two  pro- 
positions that  one  is  justified  by  faith,  and  that  one  has 
reached  in  Christ  the  relation  of  peace  with  God  (voL  ii.  p. 
342).  If,  therefore,  the  forgiveness  of  sins  is  interpreted 
after  the  analogy  of  human  pardon,  it  is  as  far  as  possible 
from  signifying  such  a  removal  of  the  guilt  of  sin  and  of 
man's  consciousness  of  guilt  as  might  come  to  be  incompatible 
with  truth.  The  forgiveness  of  sins  as  pardon,  rather,  merely 
renders  inoperative  that  result  of  guilt  and  the  consciousness 
of  guilt  which  would  manifest  itself  in  the  abolition  of  moral 
fellowship    between    God   and  man,  in   their  separation  or 


64  JUSTIFICATION    AND   RECONCILIATION  [61-2 

mutual  alienation.  God,  in  forgiving  or  pardoning  sins,  exer- 
cises His  will  in  the  direction  of  not  permitting  the  contra- 
diction— expressed  in  guilt — in  which  sinners  stand  to  Him, 
to  hinder  that  fellowship  of  men  with  Him  which  He  intends 
on  higher  grounds.  And  so  far  as  this  intention  works 
determinatively  upon  sinners,  it  does  not,  indeed,  free  them 
altogether  from  the  consciousness  of  guilt,  but  from  that 
mistrust  which,  as  an  affection  of  the  consciousness  of  guilt, 
naturally  separates  the  injured  man  from  the  offender. 
Granted,  too,  that  the  recipient  of  guilt  incurs  no  new  guilt, 
his  recollection  of  his  transgression,  with  its  indirect  excita- 
tion of  pain,  will  form  a  guarantee  that  the  presupposed  fact 
of  guilt  is  not  unveraciously  negatived  by  pardon.  Thus 
the  definition  of  forgiveness  which  Steudel  brings  forward 
(vol.  i.  p.  543)  is  confirmed,  namely,  that  guilt,  which  indeed 
cannot  be  forgotten,  and  therefore  cannot  altogether  be 
annihilated,  at  least  forms  no  restriction  upon  our  re-estab- 
lished relation  to  God.^ 

§  14.  This  definition,  it  is  true,  is  not  taken  account  of 
by  such  theologians  as  think  that  a  distinction  should  be 
made  between  the  forgiveness  of  sins  and  justification,  as 
between  something  negative  and  something  positive.  If  we 
had  to  conceive  the  forgiveness  of  sins  merely  as  the  negation 
of  the  guilty  state  or  penal  state,  then  the  idea  of  it  cer- 
tainly could  not  claim  to  be  of  decisive  importance  for  the 
existence  of  the  Christian  religion.  For  this  end  we  should 
rather  have  to  set  up  a  conception  of  positive  content. 
Duns  Scotus  (vol.  i.  p.  100)  offers  for  consideration  the 
question  whether  God  may  not  forgive  sins  through  His 
boundless  perfection  of  power,  and  in  doing  so  omit  the 
bestowal  of  habitual  grace.  He  decides  against  the  hypothesis, 
possible  as  it  is  from  God's  point  of  view,  on  the  ground 
that  One,  who  through  pardon  of  an  injury  is  no  longer  an 
enemy,   is   not   yet  a  friend,   but  is  neutral.     The   forgive- 

^  This  is  not  yet  the  place  to  inquire  how  the  pardon  of  guilt  in  C(mereto  is 
possible  for  God,  and  especially  how  it  harmonises  with  His  character  as  Law- 
giver and  Representative  of  the  law ;  this  aspect  of  the  conception  we  shall 
determine  in  §  17. 


02-3]  THE   DEFINITION   OF   JUSTIFICATION  65 

ness  of  sins,  he  says,  is  not  the  expression  of  any  positive  result 
of  the  well-pleasingness  of  a  person  to  God ;  to  this  end  there 
must  be  brought  in,  in  addition,  the  idea  of  making  righteous 
{GerecfUmiichung).  The  same  consideration  is  at  the  bottom 
of  the  distinction  made  by  Lutherans  and  Reformed  between 
the  forgiveness  of  sins  and  justification  (vol.  i.  p.  279).  Even 
Schleiermacher  expresses  himself  to  the  same  effect  (§  109, 1). 
But  as  justification  is  no  longer  construed  as  equivalent  to 
making  righteous,  but  shares  in  common  with  the  forgiveness 
of  sins  the  form  of  a  Divine  judgment,  those  who  take  logic 
strictly  come  to  the  conclusion  that  justification  precedes  the 
forgiveness  of  sins.  For  a  positive  judgment  is  only  apparently 
the  supplement  of  the  corresponding  negative ;  in  reality  the 
negative  presupposes  it.  Now  justification  carries  with  it 
the  non-imputation  of  sins,  because  it  is  conceived  as  the 
imputation  of  righteousness — in  other  words,  as  the  imputa- 
tion of  the  righteousness  which  is  contained  in  the  twofold 
obedience  of  Christ  for  sinners  who  believe  in  Him. 

This  thought,  characteristic  of  both  orthodox  schools,  is 
not  derived  from  Paul  (vol.  ii.  p.  326);  nor  do  Luther  and 
Melanchthon  give  it  the  preference.^  The  imputation  of  the 
righteousness  of  Christ  as  a  formula  for  justification,  more- 
over, occurs  in  Calvin,*  in  whose  Institutes  it  is  to  be  found 
ever  since  the  edition  of  1539.  Thereafter  it  is  championed 
by  the  Lutherans  and  the  Eeformed,  with  the  exception  of 
Piscator  and  his  followers.  It  is  clear,  too,  that  as  a  part 
of  the  theological  system  it  forms  a  deduction  from  the 
presupposed  legal  world-order.  It  was  assumed  that  the 
reciprocal  relation  between  God  and  man  is  originally  and 

^  In  the  Apology  of  the  Augsburg  Confession  the  formula  occurs  thrice,  ix. 
19,  xii.  12 ;  most  clearly,  iii.  184 :  **  lustilicare  sigoificat  reuzn  absolvere  et 
pronuntiare  iustnm,  sed  propter  alienam  iustitiam  Christi,  quae  communi- 
catur  nobis  per  fidem.  Itaque  hoc  loco  iustitia  nostra  est  imputatio  alienae 
iustitiae." 

'  In  the  edition  of  1559,  lib.  iii.  11.  2  :  **  lustificabitur  ille  fide,  qui  Christi 
iustitiam  per  fidem  apprehendit,  qua  vestitus  in  dei  conspectu  non  ut  peccator, 
sed  tanqiiam  iustus  apparet.  Ita  nos  iustificationem  interpretamur  acceptionem, 
qua  nos  deus  in  gratiam  receptos  pro  iustis  habet.  Bamque  in  peccatoruni 
remissione  ac  iustitiae  Christi  imputatione  positam  esse  diciraus."  In  the 
editions  1589-1650,  cap.  ii.  (x.)  §  2.     0,  Jl,  xxix.  p.  738. 

5 


66  JUSTIFICATION    AND   RECONCIUATION  [G3— 4 

necesBarilj  bound  to  the  standard  of  the  law  of  good  works. 
This  principle  likewise  determines  the  conditions  of  redemp- 
tion through  Christ.  For  if  men  as  sinners  could  not  them- 
selves fulfil  the  law,  so  as  to  answer  to  the  righteousness  of 
God  and  their  own  blessedness  as  their  end,  then  Christ,  the 
Founder  of  the  order  of  grace,  had  to  prove  His  congniity 
with  the  legal  world-order  by  accomplishing  in  place  of  sinful 
humanity  the  righteousness  which  is  due  to  the  law,  and 
bearing  the  punishment  incurred  by  men,  and  both  of  these 
had  to  be  imputed  by  God  to  each  individual  who  was  to  be 
received  into  the  new  fellowship  of  grace  with  God.  This 
is  not  yet  the  place  for  examining  the  leading  thought  of 
the  significance  of  the  law  in  this  world-order.  The  ques- 
tion rather  is,  firsts  to  ascertain  the  connection  of  thought 
which  explains  the  imputation  of  the  righteousness  of  Christ, 
and  enables  us  to  determine  how  the  forgiveness  of  sins  is 
related  to  this  Divine  act. 

For  the  righteousness  of  Christ  which  is  to  be  imputed 
to  the  believer  is  variously  determined,  according  as  there  is 
ascribed  to  it  the  value  of  satisfaction  for  God  or  the  value 
of  merit  on  men's  behalf  (vol.  i.  pp.  249,  282-286).  As 
satisfaction  for  God  the  righteousness  of  Christ  consists  in 
His  passive  and  active  obedience.  The  former  serves  to 
execute  and  discharge  the  penal  demands  of  the  law  upon 
sinners,  the  latter  serves  to  satisfy  and  discharge  the  legal 
demands  of  the  law  upon  men,  which  are  based  upon  the 
fact  that  the  fulfilment  of  the  law  is  the  originally  ordained 
means  to  blessedness.  As  merit  the  righteousness  of  Christ 
consists  in  His  obedience  as  a  positive  whole,  which  wets 
maintained  even  in  suffering  unto  death.  The  righteousness 
of  Christ  comes  to  be  imputed  to  believers  in  both  aspects. 
When  this  takes  place  under  the  category  of  satisfaction, 
there  results  for  believers  this  negative  predicate,  that  they 
are  released  from  their  penal  obligations  to  the  law,  as  also 
from  their  legal  obligations  to  it — ^in  other  words,  from  the 
necessity  of  attaining  blessedness  through  fulfilment  of  the 
law.     Only  through  the  imputation  of  the  righteousness  of 


64-5]  THE    DEFINITION    OF   JUSTIFICATION  67 

Christ  as  merit  does  there  follow  the  positive  predicate  of 
justification.  Now,  according  to  the  presuppositions  of  this 
doctrine,  Quenstedt  is  consistent  in  making  the  satisfaction- 
value  of  Christ's  righteousness  logically  precede  its  merit- 
value.  For  the  relations  of  sinners'  guilty  obligations  to  the 
law  and  men's  general  legal  obligations  to  it  had  first  of  all 
to  be  met,  ere  God's  order  of  grace  could  be  put  into  opera- 
tion. Now,  if  the  imputation  of  the  righteousness  of  Christ 
likewise  follows  in  the  same  logical  order,  then  the  forgive- 
ness of  sins  as  remission  of  penaltj^  and  release  from  legal 
relations  to  God  must  precede,  and  justification  as  the 
reckoning  to  believers  of  the  whole  obedience  of  Christ  must 
come  after.  But  if ,  as  a  number  of  the  older  theologians 
demand,  justification  must  logically  precede  the  forgiveness 
of  sins,  this  implies  that  the  righteousness  of  Christ  comes 
to  be  imputed,  not  as  satisfaction,  but  as  merit.  For  if  the 
meritorious  effect  of  the  obedience  of  Christ,  as  formulated 
by  Quenstedt,  nos  in  statum  benevolerUiae  diviruie  restituU,  it 
follows  that  God  imposes  no  more  punishments  upon  be- 
lievers, and  no  longer  makes  their  attainment  of  the  goal 
of  blessedness  at  all  dependent  on  their  exercising  a  legal 
relationship  to  Himself. 

These  distinctions  were  not  clearly  realised  by  the  older 
theologians,  and  therefore  they  did  not  view  as  a  controversy 
involving  the  truth,  the  question  whether  forgiveness  and 
justification  follow  in  this  or  the  reverse  order,  or  whether, 
indeed,  they  are  not  synonyms.  But  if  justification  is  once 
distinguished  from  the  forgiveness  of  sins  as  something 
positive,  if  positive  justification  is  the  logically  sufficient 
ground  for  the  forgiveness  of  sins,  and  if,  notwithstanding, 
positive  justification  can  only  be  understood  as  the  imputation 
of  the  merits  of  Christ,  such  an  explanation  cannot  claim  to 
differ  in  effect  from  the  two  diverse  definitions  of  forgiveness 
we  have  discovered  already.  For  these  have  themselves  a 
thoroughly  positive  meaning.  The  forgiveness  of  sins  as 
remission  of  penalties  signifies  the  removal  of  that  separation 
from  God  which  has  been  brought  about  by  sin.     As  separa- 


68  JUSTIFICATION    AND    RECONCILIATION  [fi5— 6 

tion  is  the  negation  of  our  proper  fellowship  with  God,  the 
removal  of  separation  is  to  be  construed  as  the  positive  re- 
establishment  of  the  fellowship  of  sinners  with  God.  This  is 
the  direct  meaning  of  the  definition  of  Steudel  that,  owing  to 
the  forgiveness  of  sins,  guilt  forms  no  hindrance  to  the  rela- 
tionship to  God  which  has  been  established.  Now,  if  through 
the  imputation  of  the  merits  of  Christ  sinners  are  placed  in  such 
a  status  that  God  treats  them  with  goodwill,  such  behaviour 
on  God's  part  is  an  expression  of  the  permanent  character  of 
the  proper  fellowship  of  believers  with  God.  And  when,  in 
consequence  thereof,  He  forgives  sins,  i,e.  remits  penalties, 
the  proof  of  it  is  to  be  found  in  the  fact  that  the  goodwill 
of  God  invalidates  the  penal  significance  of  the  evils  which 
believers  have  to  bear  in  consequence  of  their  sin,  of  which 
the  further  consequence  is  that  believers  likewise  do  not 
fall  under  the  penalties  of  spiritual  and  eternal  death. 

This  argument,  it  is  true,  was  not  completely  stated  by  any 
of  the  older  theologians.  They  did  not  attempt  any  accurate 
or  complete  analysis  of  the  idea  of  forgiveness,  and  therefore 
they  always  ascribed  to  it  a  merely  negative  effect,  and 
thought  that  the  only  way  of  expressing  a  positive  result  was 
through  the  imputation  of  the  righteousness  of  Christ,  whether 
this  was  added  to  the  negative  idea  by  way  of  supplement,  or 
logically  subordinated  to  it  as  its  presupposition.  Thus  we 
must  inquire,  secondly,  whether  this  positive  idea  of  justifica- 
tion is  thinkable.  The  objections  raised  to  it  by  Faustus 
Socinus^  have  reference  to  the  twofold  significance  of  the 
righteousness  of  Christ  as  penal  satisfaction  and  as  positive 
fulfilment  of  the  law  {itcstUia),  for  he  had  before  him  an 
earlier  stage  in  the  development  of  the  Beformers'  doctrine 
than  is  in  ^dew  in  the  foregoing  representation.  But  what  he 
denotes  by  the  imputcUio  iustitiae  ChrisH  has  reference  to  the 
merit-value  of  the  obedience  of  Christ,  and  his  denial  of  the 
imputatio  satisfactionis  Ghristi  is  valid,  not  only  as  regards 
the  bearing  of  the  punishment  imposed  by  the  law,  but  also 
as  regards  the  discharging  of  its  legal  claim  on  men  in  general. 

^  Dc  Christo  aervaton,  lib.  ir.  CAp.  1-6. 


66-7]  THB   DEFINITION    OF   JUSTIFICATION  69 

For  in  this  connection  he  declares,  founding  on  a  principle  of 
Soman  law,  that  satisfaction  and  imputation  mutually  exclude 
each  other.  Imputation  takes  place  in  legal  matters,  he  says, 
only  where  no  service  has  previously  been  rendered ;  if,  there- 
fore, Christ  has  accomplished  satisfaction,  the  matter  is  done 
with,  and  no  imputation  is  required  (voL  i.  p.  328).  But  the 
imputation  of  the  righteousness  of  Christ,  he  maintains,  is 
absurd,  since  in  other  respects  believers  are  bound  to  acquire 
righteousness  of  their  owil  This  basal  presupposition  of 
Christianity  is  annulled  by  the  hypothesis  of  an  imputed 
righteousness. 

Nevertheless  this  principle  of  private  right  does  not  touch 
the  presupposition  of  the  Beformation  doctrine.  On  the  con- 
trary, if  it  is  true  that  the  original  world-order  consisted  in  a 
l^al  relationship  between  God  and  man,  answering  to  the 
pattern  of  the  State,  then  the  cancelling  of  it,  whether  in 
general  or  in  respect  of  penal  demands,  must  be  imputed  to 
believers,  i,e.  they  must  be  expressly  regarded  by  God  in  such 
a  way  that  the  standard  of  the  State  and  of  criminal  law  no 
longer  holds  good  for  their  relationship  to  Himself.  More- 
over, the  imputation  of  the  positive  obedience  (merit)  of  Christ 
is  not  at  all  intended  by  the  orthodox  to  mean  that  thereby 
the  acquisition  of  righteousness  of  their  own  by  believers  is 
excluded.  It  is  regarded  only  as  the  precondition  enabling  God 
to  enter  at  all  into  positive  fellowship  with  them  for  their  salva- 
tion, or  of  His  bestowing  upon  them,  along  with  justification, 
eternal  life  or  the  prospect  of  it.  This  conviction  is  common 
to  both  Confessions,  and  finds  expression  in  symbolical  docu- 
ments on  both  sides ;  ^  while,  as  against  this,  it  is  a  matter  of 
indifference,  to  begin  with,  how  dogmatic  theologians  under- 
stand this  connection.  Now,  that  the  imputation  of  the 
righteousness  of  Christ,  in  this  limited  reference,  is  unthink- 

*  Jpol.  C.  A,  ii.  6  :  **  Christua  promittit  remissionem  peccatornm,  iustifica- 
tionem  et  vitam  aeternam."  F,  C,  iii.  p.  585  :  "  Christo  confidimua,  quod  propter 
solam  ipsitis  obedientiam  ex  gratia  remissionem  peccatorum  habeamns,  saneti  et 
iusti  coram  deo  patre  repntemur  et  aeternam  salutem  consequamur."  CcUeeJi, 
Pal.  59 :  "  In  Christo  iastus  sum  et  haeres  ritae  aetemae."  Crnif.  Helv,,  post. 
15  :  "Somiis  absoluti  a  peccatis,  morte  vel  condemnatione,  iusti  denique  (donati 
iustitia  Cbristi)  ac  haeredes  vitae  aetemae." 


70  JUSTIFICATIOK   AND   RECONCILIATION  [67—8 

able  or  unnecessary,  Faustus  has  not  proved,  as  indeed  he  has 
not  directed  his  attention  to  the  matter  at  alL 

Nevertheless  this  argument  too  is  devoid  of  intrinsic 
utility ;  nor  has  it  any  real  basis  in  Paul's  typical  circle  of 
thought.  For  active  righteousness,  or  obedience  to  the  moral 
law,  is  so  indubitably  bound  up  with  the  personal  intention  and 
disposition  of  the  acting  subject,  that  we  lose  altogether  the 
idea  of  determinate  righteousness  once  we  abstract  from  the 
subject  by  whom  the  righteousness  has  been  produced.  But 
this  is  the  case  when  we  conclude  that  the  righteousness  of 
Christ  is  imputed  to  others  as  though  it  were  their  own  pro- 
duct. Thus  this  idea  is  altogether  false,  because  it  treats  the 
personal  moral  lifework  of  a  person  as  a  thing  which  has  no 
essential  connection  with  its  author,  and  may  change  its 
owner  without  having  its  essence  and  value  altered.^  More- 
over, it  seems  superfluous  to  conceive  the  imputation  of  the 
righteousness  of  Christ  as  a  precondition  of  God's  admitting 
believers  to  religious  fellowship  with  Himself,  when  such  an 
assertion,  if  made  a  rule,  takes  for  granted  the  position  that 
God  enters  into  no  real  fellowship  in  religion  save  with 
morally  perfect  men.  For  the  present  case  there  is  thence 
drawn  the  conclusion  that  God,  to  attain  this  purpose  of 
fellowship  with  believers,  creates  the  moral  perfection  which 
in  themselves  they  lack,  through  the  imputation  of  the  right- 
eousness of  Christ. 

The  formula  of  the  imputation  of  Christ's  righteousness 
can  be  extended  so  as  to  possess  an  excellent  sense,  if  we 
interpret  it  in  the  light  of  other  presuppositions  than  the 
system  of  legal  relations  employed  for  that  purpose  by  the 
dogmatic  theologians  of  the  seventeenth  century.  If  we  take 
our  bearings  from  the  Gospel  of  John,  the  intention  of  Jesus  is 
that  His  disciples  should  become  one  as  the  Father  and  the 
Son  are  in  one  another,  or  that  they  should  become  one  in  this 

^  Limborch,  Theol.  ehrist,  vi.  4.  25  :  **  Unius  iustitia  alter!  imputari  nequit. 
Tota  enim  iustitiae  natura  et  laus  in  eo  sita  est,  ut  quis  libere  et  alacri  animo 
earn  praeatet ;  illam  autem  perlre  necesse  est,  quamprimum  imputatur  illi,  qui 
earn  non  praestitit.  Nee  transferri  potest  ab  uno  ad  alium,  ne  ipso  quidem 
conceptu  mentis,  si  vcrus  illc  couceptus  sit  futurus." 


68-«]  THE   DEFINITION    OF  JUSTIFICATION  71 

fellowship  of   the  Father  and  the  Son;  and  that  it  should 
thereby  be  made  known  that  the  Father  loves  the  Son,  and 
the  disciples  as  the  Son  ;  the  love  of  the  Father,  however,  is 
directed  to  the  Son  before  the  creation  of  the  world  (xvii. 
21—24).     The   nature  and    the    existence    of    the  Son  are 
founded  in  the  love  of  God.     But  now  to  this  we  must  add, 
on    the   other  side,  that  Jesus   maintains  Himself   in    His 
existence  by  carrying  on  the  work  of  God  for  the  salvation  of 
men  (iv.  34).      This  is  exactly  equivalent  to  the  truth  that, 
by  the  execution  of  the  commands  or  commissions  of  the 
Father,  He  maintains  His  position  in  the  love  of  God  (xv. 
9,   10).     Among  these  commissions,  His  willingness  to  lay 
down  His  life  in  the  service  of  the  community  of  disciples  is 
a  ground  of  the  Father's  loving  the  Son  (x.  17) — ^in  other 
words,  a  condition  of  the  continuance  of  the  love  of  God  as 
the  basis  of  the  unique  character  of  Christ.     Now,  this  is  the 
material  content  of  the  righteousness  of  Christ — ^the  execution 
of  the  work  of  God,  the  fulfilment  of  God's  commandments, 
the  sacrifice  of  life  in  the  service  of  the  called  community. 
Bat  these  services  are  not  measured  by  universal  law  and  an 
all-embracing  rule  of  compensation,  but  first  of  all  by  the  end 
aimed  at,  that  Christ  should  maintain  the  unique  position 
which,  as  Son,  He  has  in  the  love  of  the  Father,  and  then 
further  by  the  end  that  the  community  of  disciples  should  be 
effectively  taken  up  into  the  love  of  the  Father.     How  this 
result  is  mediated  is  not  expressed  in  the  Gospel  of  John. 
But  we  can  supply  it  if  we  represent  to  ourselves  the  process 
through  which  the  transference  of  love  from  one  to  another  is 
possible.     That  can  happen  only  through  a  resolve,  in  which 
there  is  included  a  judgment ;  this  judgment,  however,  takes 
the  form  that  the  worth,  which  one  individual  has  as  the 
object  of  love,  is  imputed  to  those  who  in  themselves  lack  this 
worth,  but  belong  to  the  person  who  is  the  primary  object  of 
love.     The  position  of  Christ  relative  to  God  is  imputed  to 
His  disciples  when  God,  for  Christ's  sake,  takes  them  also  up 
into  His  effective  love.     But  Christ's  position  relative  to  God 
also  depends  on    His  righteousness.       Indirectly,  therefore. 


72  JUSTIFICATION   AND   RBCONCILIATIOK  [68—70 

Christ's  righteousness  is  imputed  to  His  disciples  that  they 
may  be  taken  up  into  the  love  of  Grod,  even  as  the  roots  of 
Christ's  being  are  there.  But  in  this  way  the  righteousness 
of  Christ  is  not  severed  from  His  Person,  and  no  prejudice  is 
raised  against  our  own  practice  of  righteousness.  And  while 
the  formula  is  made  intelligible  by  these  modifications,  that 
very  fact  is  proof  of  its  previous  obscurity.  The  point  at  issue 
is  the  imputation  of  the  position  relative  to  God  which  Christ 
likewise  occupies  through  His  practice  of  righteousness,  to 
those  who  as  His  disciples  belong  to  Him  through  faith,  in 
order  that  they  may  be  taken  up  effectively  into  the  love  of 
God.  This  thought,  however,  is  not  at  all  accurately  ex- 
pressed in  the  current  formula,  nor  have  those  theologians 
who  employ  that  formula,  ejg,  Calvin,^  succeeded  in  making 
its  meaning  clear. 

§  15.  In  this  analysis  of  the  formula  of  the  imputation 
of  Christ's  righteousness,  the  position  of  Christ,  relative  to 
God,  which  is  determinative  for  the  idea  of  justification,  is 
construed  otherwise  than  is  done  by  Melanchthon.  As  he  sees 
in  the  promise  of  the  forgiveness  of  sins  the  compassion  of 
Grod  acting  as  cause,  he  interprets  the  precondition  here  pro- 
vided for  by  Christ  (iustijicare  propter  Christum)  as  coming 
under  the  conception  of  satisfaction  as  the  placation  of  God 
(propitiatiOy  placatio  dei).  Apart  from  this,  he  employs  for 
"  justify  "  and  "  forgive  "  a  series  of  synonyms,  by  which  con- 
siderable light  is  cast  upon  the  idea,  and  at  the  same  time 
every  semblance  is  removed  of  making  it  the  chief  point  in 
justification  to  transfer  the  predicate  of  active  righteousness 
— in  other  words,  to  assert  an  untruth  and  cast  uncertainty 
upon  the  task  of  life.     For  Melanchthon  makes  reconcUiaiion 

^  Inst.  iii.  11.  23  :  '*  Hincet  illud  conficitur,  sola  intercessioueiustitiae  Chris ti 
nos  obtinere,  lit  coram  deo  iustificemur.  Quod  perlnde  valet,  acsi  diceretur, 
hominera  non  in  se  ipso  iustum  esse,  sed  quia  Christi  iustitia  imputatione  cum 
illo  conimuuicatur.  .  .  .  Yides,  non  in  nobis,  sed  in  Christo  esse  institiam  nos- 
tram  ;  nobis  tantum  eo  iure  competere,  quia  Christi  sumus  participes,  siquidem 
omnes  eius  divitias  cum  ipso  possidemus.  .  .  .  Quid  aliud  est,  in  Christi 
obedientia  coUocare  nostram  iustitiam  (Rom.  v.  19),  nisi  asserere,  eo  solo  nos 
habeii  iustos,  quia  Christi  obedientia  nobis  accepta  fertur,  acsi  nostra  esset." 
Edition  of  1539,  C,  M.  xxix.  p.  745. 


70-1]  THE   DEnNITION    OF   JUSTinCATION  73 

and  acceptance  or  favour  with  God  the  equivalent  of  justifica- 
tion, as  also  acceptance  as  sons  of  God,  and  finally  the  opening 
of  access  to  God.^     The  word  reconciliare  he  uses  in  this  con- 
nection only  as  applied  to  men  who  are  brought  back  to  God, 
but  never  as  applied  to  God.     The  influence  of  Melanchthon's 
view  Ib  still  visible  in  Chemnitz.^      Moreover,  the  identity  of 
the  forgiveness  of  sins,  justification,  reconciliation,  and  admis- 
sion to  communion  with  God,  receives  really  classical  expression 
in  Calvin,'  despite  the  fact  that  before  and  after  the  passage 
cited  below  he  treats  of  that  distinction  between  the  forgive- 
ness of  sins  and  the  imputation  of  Christ's  righteousness  which 
is  discussed  above.     The  influence  of  the  combination  of  ideas 
before  us  at  present  is  also  to  be  seen  in  the  founder  of 
Lutheran  dogmatism.     Leonard  Hutter  unites  with  the  con- 

'  Loci  iheoi,  C.  K.  xxi.  p.  742:  '*  lustificatio  significAt  remissionem  peoca- 
torum  et  recondliationeni  sea  aoceptationem  personae  ad  yitam  aaternam.  .  .  . 
Sumpsit  Paulus  verbum  instificandi  ex  consaetudiDe  Hebraeorum  pro  remissione 
}ieocatorani  et  reoonciliatione  sea  aooeptatione.  .  .  .  lustificari  fide  in  Christum 
aignificat  consequi  remisslonem  et  iustum  hoc  eat  acceptum  reputari  propter 
mediatorem  filiamdei."  Apol,  C,  A,  ii.  86:  ''Sola  fides  iustifioat,  quia  recon- 
ciliati  repatantur  iusti  etfilii  dei'*;  iii.  20 :  "  Per  Christum  aoceditur  ad  patrem, 
et  accepta  remissione  peccatorum  vere  iam  statuimus,  nos  habere  deam  " ;  v.  37 : 
"  Per  Christum  habemus  accessum  ad  deum." 

^  EoMvumeonc  Trid,  (Gener.  1641)  p.  158 :  *'  Scriptura  docetquicquid  divina 
inatitia  ad  iostificationem  hoc  est  reconciliationem  peocatoris  requiri^  a  Christo 
pro  nobis  impletum  esse."  P.  159  :  ''Habet  fides  suum  proprium  obiectum, 
cnios  reepectu,  merito  et  dignitate  credens  coram  deo  iustificetur,  h.  e.  accipiat 
remiasionem  peccatorum,  reooncilietur  deo,  accipiat  adoptionem  et  acccpteturad 
vitam  aetemam."  P.  161 :  *'  Obiectum  tidei  iustificantis,  cuius  respectu  et  ap- 
prehensione  iustificat,  est  gratuita  promissio  misericordiae  dei  remittentis  peccata, 
adoptantis  et  acceptantis  ad  vitam  aetemam  propter  Christum  mediatorem." 

"Lib.  iii.  11.  21  (1589,  cap.  vi.  (x.)  12,  18.     C.  R  xxix.  p.  744):  "Nunc 
illnd  quam  verum  est  excutiamus,  quod  in  definitione  dictum  est,  iustitiam  fidei 
eve  reconciliationem  com  deo,  quae  sola  peccatorum  remissione  oonstet.     Audi- 
mns  peccatum  esse  divisionem  inter  hominem  et  deam,  raltos  dei  aversionem  a 
peocatore  (les.  59.  1) :  uec  fieri  aliter  potest,  quandoquidem  alienum  est  ab  eius 
ioBtitia,  quicqnam  commercii  habere  cum  peccato.     Quem  ergo  dominus  in  con- 
innctionem  recipit,  eum  dicitnr  iustificare,  quia  nee  recipere  in  gratiam,  necsibi 
•diangere  potest,  qnin  ex  ])eccatore  iustum  faoiat.     Istud  addimus  fieri  per  pec- 
catorum remissionem.     Nam  si  ab  operibus  aestimeutur,  quos  sibi  dominus 
reconciliayit,  reperientur  etiamnum  revera  peccatores,  quos  tamen  peccato  solu- 
toe  porosque  esse  oportet.     Constat  itaque,  quos  deus  amplectitur,  non  aliter 
fieri  instos,  uisi  quod  abstersis  peccatorum  remissione  maculis  purificantur,  iit 
talis  institia  uno  yerbo  appellari  queat  peccatorum  remissio."    §  22  :  *'  Iustitiam 
et  TeconcUiationem  Paulas  promiscue  nominat,  ut  alteram  sub  altero  vicissim 
contineri  intelligamus.    Modum  autem  aasequendae  huius  iustitiae  docct,  duni 
nobis  delicta  non  imputantur." 


74  JUSTIFICATION   AND   BECONCILIATION  [71—2 

ception  of  the  imputed  righteousness  of  Christ  all  the  predicates 
which  have  been  pointed  out  in  the  authorities  just  mentioned.^ 
Now  this  conjunction  of  ideas  has  disappeared  from  tbe 
writings  of  the  Lutheran  theologians.  They  have  not  even 
kept  in  view  that  direct  teleological  relation  of  justification 
to  the  bestowal  of  eternal  life  which  characterises  the  view 
originally  taken  of  the  subject  (p.  69).  They  are  satisfied 
with  adducing  this  aspect,  like  all  others,  under  the  heading 
of  the  effects  of  justification,  and  that,  too,  with  no  other 
interest  than  that  of  registering  the  various  statements  of 
Scripture.  Especially  with  Gerhard  this  list  exhibits  the 
most  motley  variety  of  subjective  phenomena  and  objective 
determinations  of  relation,  of  heterogeneous  and  synonymous 
expressions,  as  though  we  were  dealing  with  a  rubbish- 
heap.  Later  writers  reduce  this  multiplicity  to  a  few  rubrics, 
but  they  think  they  have  done  all  that  is  required  of  them 
in  enumerating  them.^  Under  these  circumstances  the  thought 
of  justification  comes  to  be  isolated  from  all  practical  relations 
by  Lutheran  theologians,  and  condemned  to  barrenness.  We 
have  here  again  the  phenomenon  which  I  have  characterised  as 
the  pervading  feature  of  the  Lutheran  theology  of  that  epoch 
(vol.  i.  p.  270),  that  in  it  no  use  is  made  of  the  conception  of 
end,  but  all  relations  are  represented  under  the  category  of 
efficient  cause.  But  along  with  this  formal  inadequacy,  there 
is  still  another  circumstance  to  which  is  due  the  fading  of  the 
idea  of  justification  among  the  Lutherans.  From  Aegidius 
Hunnius  onwards  this  idea  receives  exposition  only  in  polem- 

^  Comp.  Loc,  iheol.  xii.  2 :  *'  lustificatio  est  opus  dei,  quo  hominem  pecc&torem, 
credentem  in  Christum  ex  mera  gratia  sive  gratis  a  peccatis  absolvit,  eique  pec> 
catorum  remissionem  donat,  iustitiauique  Christi  ita  iniputat,  ut  plenisaime 
reconciliatus  et  in  filium  a<loptatus  a  peccati  reatu  liberetur  at  aeternam  beati- 
tudinem  consequatur." 

'Gerhard,  Loc.  xvii.  72.  8,  torn.  vii.  p.  85.  Baier,  iii.  5.  14:  "Effeeta 
iustificationis  sunt  pax  conscientiae  cum  deo,  adoptio  in  filios  dei,  donatio 
spiritus  saucti,  sanctificatio  et  renovatio,  spes  vitae  aeternae."  To  the  same 
effect  Quenstedt,  HoUatz. — Fresenius,  Jteehtfertlgungf  vii.  88:  **The  beneOts 
bestowed  upon  one  who  possesses  forgiveness  of  sins,  consist  in  free  access  to 
God,  the  right  of  inward  fellowship  with  God,  the  right  of  Divine  sonship,  and 
the  claim  to  the  eternal  inheritance.  All  this  becomes  his  in  Christ,  his  Surety, 
Head,  and  Saviour,  who  Himself  also  has  taken  possession  of  such  glory,  and 
as  the  Head  gives  His  members  a  share  therein." 


72-3]  THK   DEFINITION   OF   JUSTIFICATION  75 

ical  controversy  first  with  the  Tridentine,  and  then  with  the 
Socinian  doctrine.  Thus  it  is  apprehended  only  in  those 
aspects  which  are  directly  challenged  by  these  opponents ;  all 
lying  beyond  these  aspects  hardly  receives  any  consideration. 
In  the  Beformed  theology  of  the  sixteenth  century,  also, 
we  meet  to  begin  with  a  limited  and  pedantic  treatment  of 
the  idea  of  justification.  In  the  seventeenth  century,  how- 
ever, a  series  of  dogmatic  writers  advance  to  a  more  living 
apprehension  of  it,  which  consists  in  this,  that  the  conceptions 
of  reconciliation  and  adoption  are  placed  in  reciprocal  relation- 
ship to  that  of  justification.  To  begin  with,  Amesius  declares 
justification  or  forgiveness  identical  with  reconciliation,  inas- 
much as  these  different  expressions  describe  the  same  thing 
only  in  different  aspects.^  Adoption,  it  is  true,  he  declares 
to  be  a  result  of  justification,  and  denies  that  it  signifies  an 
element  in  it,  on  the  ground  that  those  adopted  are  not  yet 
accounted  righteous.  To  this  distinction  he  clings,  although 
he  recognises  in  justification  its  direct  relation  to  eternal  life, 
and  finds  the  same  character  expressed  in  Divine  sonship. 
His  view,  indeed,  is  that  thereby  believers  possess  a  double 
title  to  anticipation  of  the  blessing  of  life  eternal.  These 
latter  interpretations  are  adopted  by  Heidanus,  but  he  over- 
steps the  scheme  to  which  his  predecessor  held,  in  that  he 
takes  justification  and  adoption  to  be  the  two  parts  of  recon- 
ciliation, and  attaches  to  them  the  saving  effects,  both  positive 
and  negative.  Thus  it  is  brought  about  that  adoption  no 
longer  appears  as  an  accident,  but  as  the  fulfilment  of  the 
idea  of  reconciliation.*     A  somewhat  different  formulation  of 

'  MedtUla,  i.  27.  22 :  "  Absolntio  a  peccatis  vario  reapectu  sed  eodem  sensn 
dicitar  remiasio,  redemtio  et  recondliatio.  .  .  .  Quatenua  statna  peocati  con- 
sideratur  at  inimicitia  quaedam  adversua  deum,  eateniis  iustificatio  dicitur 
reconctliatio." 

'  Corp.  theol.  chrisl.,  Loc.  xi.  torn.  ii.  p.  299 :  ''Reconciliationis  nostrae  duas 
partes  fecimus  iiistificationcm  et  adoptionetn.  .  .  .  Nam  peccatonim  reniis- 
flionem  iaatificationis  beneficio  consequimar,  eoque  in  gratiam  recipimnr. 
Verum  quiaqnis  in  gratiam  recipitnr,  simul  adoptionis  particeps  et  filii  loco 
haberi  cognoscitnr.  Et  quidem  haec  adoptio  sequitnr  instificationem.  Neque 
nempe  adoptions  iusti  conatitnimnr,  sed  instificati  exaltamnr  ad  dignitatem  et 
ins  filiomm.  Si  filii,  haeredes ;  si  haeredes,  etiam  ius  consequimnr  ad  vitam. 
.  .  .  Hinc  fideles,  duplici  qnasi  titulo  vitam  aeternam  iK>8Sunt  a  deo  jietere  ct 


76  JUSTIFICATION    AND   RECONCILIATION  [73-5 

the  matter  is  to  be  found  in  the  youngest  representatives  of 
the  Beformed  orthodoxy,  Fr.  Turretin,  Bodolf,  and  Heid^ger, 
as  also  in  Schleiermacher.  They  distinguish  as  elements  in 
justification  the  forgiveness  of  sins  and  the  award  of  a  right 
to  eternal  life  or  adoption.^  In  general  this  is  the  result  of 
the  eagerness  with  which  the  majority  of  Beformed  theo- 
logians have  maintained  the  direct  reference  of  justification 
to  eternal  life.  The  combination  of  this  aspect  of  it  with  the 
conception  of  Divine  sonship  then  resulted  from  the  fact  that 
the  objective  aspect  of  the  latter  likewise  is  eternal  life. 
Finally,  no  difficulty  could  arise  from  the  form  of  the  idea  of 
justification,  for  acceptance  as  the  children  of  God  must  be 
conceived  as  a  synthetic  judgment.  Why,  now,  has  this  con- 
junction of  ideas  not  been  accorded  recognition  on  all  hands  ? 
In  this  connection  an  explanation  given  by  Baier  is  very  note- 
worthy. Baier  *  brings  forward  the  fact  that  a  minority  of 
theologians  extend  the  terminus  ad  quern  iustijicationis  to  the 
i^i8  JUiorum  dei  et  haereditas  vitae  aetemae,  while  the  majority 
see  here  efifects  of  justification.  Now  he  likewise  concedes 
that  it  serves  to  recommend  the  former  view  that  it  is 
in  formal  agreement  with  the  terminus  a  quo.  For  man  is 
created  with  a  destination  to  eternal  life,  but  through  sin 
this  is  converted  into  a  destination  to  eternal  death.  Now 
if  justification  begins  with  the  removal  of  this  characteristic, 
it  must  be  completed  by  the  restoration  of  the  original 
destiny.  This,  indeed,  has  been  noticed  by  the  majority  of 
Beformed  writers.  Baier,  however,  decides  against  this  for- 
mulation, because  Scripture  not  infrequently  represents  the 
bestowal  of    Divine  sonship  as  a  new  attribute  over   and 

ezspectant,  titalo  nempe  redemtionis,  quern  habent  ex  iustiiiQatione,  et  titnlo 
quasi  filiationis,  quern  habent  ex  adoptione.*' 

'Heidegger,  Loc.  xxii.  59:  ''lustificatio  remissionem  peccatorum  et  vitae 
seu  haereditatis  adiudicationem  complectitur."  72:  ''Quae  iuris  vitae  con- 
cessio  realiter  cum  adoptione  convenit,  neque  aliter  ab  faac  distinguitur,  qnam 
quod  vita  aetema  in  iustificatione  ut  debitum,  in  adoptione  vero  ut  haereditas 
spectatur,  et  deus  ibi  iudicis,  hie  patris  personam  sustinet."  Rodolf,  Cat,  Pal, 
p.  334.  Turretini,  Thcol,  deTichliea,  torn.  ii.  p.  719.  Compend.,  ed.  Rlissen, 
p.  426.  Schleiermacher,  §  109:  ''That  God  justifies  one  who  is  converted 
involves  that  He  forgives  his  sins  and  recognises  him  as  a  child  of  God." 

5  Thcol.  poiit.  iii.  6.  4,  14,  pp.  661,  677. 


75-6]  THE    DEFINITION    OF   JUSTIFICATION  77 

above  justification,  and  proves  this  by  making  it  subordinate 
to  r^eneration. 

If  justification  places  sinners  in  a  positive  relationship  of 
congruence  towards  God,  and  if  the  declaration  that  they  are 
righteous  is  not  to  make  their  destination  to  active  righteous- 
ness wear  a  semblance  of  superfluity,  it  must  find  its  limit  in 
that  fellowship  with  God  which  is  expressed,  to  begin  with 
and  in  an  indeterminate  way,  by  nearness  to  God,  and  then, 
further,  by  the  right  of  communion  with  God.     Not  only, 
however,  does  this  open  a  prospect  that  all  that  is  still  attain- 
able for  the  salvation  of  believers  and  in  opposition  to  their 
sin,  will  result  from  this  new  and  peculiar  relation  to  God ; 
but  these  results,  up  to  the  goal  of  eternal  life,  are  included 
by  intention  in  justification,  as  surely  as  justification  deter- 
mines the  lasting  and  unvarying  character  of  believers.     If 
Lutheran  theologians  have  been  dull  enough  to  close  their 
minds  to  this  directly  teleological  aspect  of  justification,  it  is 
for  them  to  inquire  how  far  they  are  in  agreement  with  the 
Formula  of  Concord,  which  identifies  the  bestowal  of  blessed* 
ness  with  justification.     But  further,  if  the  right  to  eternal 
life  is  the  objective  aspect  of  Divine  sonship,  which  is  proved 
to   be  an  abiding  attribute  of   believers  just  through   the 
certainty  of  this  right  of  inheritance,  then  adoption  must 
coincide  with  justification.     True,  Heidegger  brings  out  this 
difference  between  the   two  ideas,  that  in  justification  God 
appears  as  Judge,  in  adoption  as  Father ;  but  the  question 
arises  whether  this  distinction  can  be  maintained.     A  con- 
clusion on  this  point  can  only  be  reached  at  a  later  stage, 
and  therefore  we  shall  not  seek  here  to  state  finally  the 
relation    between    adoption    and    justification    {vide    infra, 

§   18). 

In  any  case  the  conception  of  reconciliation  has  a  more 
general  sense  than  adoption,  and  therefore  stands  nearer 
to  justification.  By  Paul,  too,  who  as  the  author  of  the 
idea  of  justification  is  altogether  decisive  for  its  further 
ramification,  it  is  set  in  the  closest  relation  to  that  idea.  As 
has  been   remarked  before  (vol.  ii.  p.  342),  Paul  describes 


78  JUSTinCATION    AND    RECONCILIATION  [76—7 


man's  peace  with  God  as  the  specific  effect  of  justification, 
while  this  effect  directly  coincides  with  reconciliation  as  the 
removal  of  man's  enmity  to  God.  If  we  take  account  merely 
of  this  conjunction  of  ideas,  we  get  the  impression  that  the 
two  conceptions  are  synonymous.  Nevertheless,  the  concep- 
tion of  reconciliation  has  a  wider  range  and  greater  definite- 
ness  than  that  of  justification.  For  it  expresses  as  an  actual 
result  the  effect  ever  aimed  at  in  justification  or  pardon,  namely, 
that  the  person  who  is  pardoned  actually  enters  upon  the 
relationship  which  is  to  be  established.  By  the  idea  of  justi- 
fication sinners  are  merely  passively  determined,  and  it  fails 
to  inform  us  what  stimulus  is  acted  upon  them  by  the  Divine 
treatment  of  their  case.  On  the  other  hand,  the  idea  of 
reconciliation  is  expressive  of  the  fact  that  those  who  formerly 
were  engaged  in  active  contradiction  to  God  have,  by  pardon, 
been  brought  into  a  harmonious  direction  towards  God,  and 
first  of  all  into  agreement  with  the  intention  cherished  by 
Him  in  acting  thus.  From  this  point  of  view  we  may  count 
on  it  that  the  justification  which  is  successfully  dispensed  by 
God  finds  its  manifestation  and  response  in  definite  functions 
of  the  persons  reconciled. 

True,  both  ideas  express  the  divinely-initiated  fellowship 
of  men  with  God  which  is  no  longer  obstructed  by  sin ;  but  the 
sin  which,  to  secure  this  end,  is  rendered  inoperative  is  con- 
sidered under  the  attributes  of  guilt  or  consciousness  of  guilt 
so  far  as  it  is  related  to  justification  or  forgiveness,  but  in  its 
essence  as  active  contradiction  to  God  so  far  as  it  is  related  to 
reconciliation.  Thus  even  from  this  consideration  it  foUows 
that  the  idea  of  reconciliation  has  a  more  comprehensive  range 
than  that  of  forgiveness.  But  it  is  in  this  wider  scope  that  the 
matter  must  be  apprehended,  for  unless  the  removal  of  guilt 
can  be  likewise  conceived  as  the  removal  of  the  contradiction 
of  the  will  to  God,  the  former  result  would  issue  in  a  self- 
delusion  on  God's  part.  Or  if  the  removal  of  guilt  must  be 
thought  only  as  God's  determination  of  relationship  in  regard 
to  sinners,  and  not  as  the  completion  of  a  reciprocal  harmony, 
then  there  is  not  proved  to  exist  here  any  suflBcient  basis  for 


77]  THE   DEFINITION   OF   JUSTIFICATION  79 

a  religion  with  moral  aims.  But  now,  that  the  thought  of 
the  removal  of  guilt  should  he  supplemented  by  the  thought 
of  the  removal  of  contradiction  to  God  follows  necessarily 
from  the  relation  of  the  consciousness  of  guilt  to  both  ideas. 
It  has  been  proved  above  (p.  56)  that  the  idea  of  guilt  as 
au  attribute  of  sin  possesses  validity  only  in  virtue  of  the 
consciousness  of  guilt  by  which  it  is  qualified.  But  this 
consciousness  is  also  the  subjective  expression  of  the  fact 
that  sin  is  active  contradiction  to  God.  Further,  it  has 
been  shown  that  the  removal  of  guilt  and  the  consciousness 
of  guilt  does  not  imply  any  unveracious  denial  of  the  exist- 
ence of  sin;  that,  rather,  pain  at  the  sin  which  has  been 
committed  is  present  in  memory  even  after  the  reception  of 
forgiveness.  But  the  removal  of  guilt  does  signify  that  God 
cancels  the  effect  of  sin,  which  is  to  make  fellowship  with 
Him  impossible;  and  that  accordingly  the  consciousness  of 
guilt  has  its  mistrust  of  God,  to  Whom  we  know  ourselves 
to  be  in  contradiction,  removed.  Thus  the  removal  of  guilt, 
conceived  as  an  actual  result,  includes  this  change  in  the 
consciousness  of  guilt — that  in  it  there  no  longer  works  on 
that  opposition  of  the  will  to  God  of  which  sin  is  the  consum- 
mation. That  is,  even  while  pain  at  sin  committed  is  pre- 
served in  the  memory,  the  effective  removal  of  guilt  on  God's 
part,  namely,  its  non-imputation  as  a  ground  of  separation 
and  alienation,  appears  in  om*  newly-established  confidence 
towards  God  as  the  counterpart  of  our  still  surviving  opposi- 
tion to  Hiin«  Justification  or  forgiveness,  conceived  as 
effective,  thus  is  identical  with  reconciliation  as  expressive 
of  mutual  fellowship  between  God  and  man.  If  this  denotes 
the  basis  of  Christianity  as  a  religion,  the  subjective  functions 
of  reconciliation  will  be  directly  religious.  On  the  other 
hand,  the  functions  of  a  moral  kind,  which  spring  from  the 
independence  of  the  will  that  is  in  harmony  with  God,  must 
stand  in  a  more  remote  relation  to  reconciliation  with  God, 
for  they  cannot  be  deduced  without  taking  into  account  still 
other  points  of  view. 

§  16.  This  conception    of   justification,  which  has  been 


80  JUSTinCATION    AND   RECONCILIATION  [77-9 

developed  in  essential  agreement  with  the  intention  actuating 
the  Lutheran  and  Beformed  theologians,  is,  inform,  a  syfUheiic 
judgment.     This  quality  answers  to  the  fact  that  justification, 
in  the  sense  meant  here,  must  be  thought  as  a  resolve  or  act 
of  the  Divine  will.     For  every  act  of  the  will  moves  analo- 
gously to  the  synthetic  judgment ;  especially  can  a  creative 
act  of  God's  will  only  be  understood  in  this  form.     But  such 
an  act  is  conceived  when  God  through  the  revelation  in  Christ 
receives  those  who  are  separated  from  Him  by  sin  into  fellow- 
ship with  Himself,  to  the  establishment  of  their  salvation. 
Not  even  from    the    standpoint  of  Soman  Catholicism  can 
objection  justly  be  raised  to  this  position.     For  even  if  we 
interpret  the  act  of  deciding  against  sin  as  the  real  com- 
munication* of  the  gratia  gratum  faciens,  or  as  the  material 
inspiration  of  love  to  God  and  men,  yet  this  process,  as  a 
Divine  act,  can  only  be  represented  in  the  form  that  to  the 
sinner  whom  God  makes  righteous  there  is  added  a  predicate 
not  already  included  in  the  conception  "  sinner."     The  opposi- 
tion between  the  two  forms  of  doctrine,  therefore,  in  reality 
consists,  not  in  the  fact  that  the  necessary  form  of  the  Evan- 
gelical conception  of  justification  is  altogether  omitted  in  the 
Catholic  mode  of  doctrine,  but  in  the  fact  that  the  synthetic 
judgment  on  God's  part,  in  the  Evangelical  sense,  is  conceived, 
not  as  having  as  its  content  the  moral  change  of  the  sinner, 
but  merely  as    the  ground    of   his    relationship  to  God  as 
altered  by  God's  will.     The  basis  of  this  opposition,  however, 
lies  in  this,  that   Catholic  doctrine  represents   Christianity 
first  and  foremost  as  the  form  of  a  moral  direction  of  the  will 
set  in  opposition  to  sin,  while  Protestantism  represents  it  first 
and  foremost  as  the  true  religion,  in  contrast  to  the  operation 
of  sin  as  the  ground  of  all  irreligion  and  all  false  religion. 
But  now  Christianity  in  its  genus  is  religion,  in  its  species  it  is 
the  pei-fect  spiritual  and  moral  religion.     The  Evangelical  idea 
of  justification,  accordingly,  is  constructed  so  that  in  this  special 
and  peculiar  relation  of  men  to  God  the  universal  character 
of  Christianity  as  a  religion  may  attain  expression.     For  that 
idea  is  in  harmony  with  the  desire  to  formulate  Christianity 


7fh-80]  THE    DEFINITION    OF   JUSTIFICATION  81 

as  the  true  religion,  in  that  the  fellowship  of  men  with  God, 
in  which  lies  their  salvation,  is  made  independent  of  sin, 
which  is  wont  either  to  negate  or  falsify  religion.  On  the 
other  hand,  the  Catholic  representation  of  making  righteous 
{Gerechtmachung)  as  the  decisive  idea  is  wrong,  for  that  idea 
is  not  modelled  on  the  general  conception  of  Christianity  as  a 
religion,  but  on  its  moral  quality.  And  that  to  proceed  in 
this  way  is  also  unpractical,  may  be  seen  from  the  fact  that 
in  Catholicism  all  possible  falsifications  of  religion,  the  poly- 
theistic and  magical  as  well  as  the  Pharisaic,  enjoy  official 
sanction,  in  spite  of  all  pretended  disclaimers. 

The  synthetic  character  of  the  judgment  of  justification 
is  not  denied  even  by  the  Socinians  and  Arminians,  although 
these  parties  give  the  idea  another  reference  than  the 
Lutherans  and  the  Beformed,  and  therefore  also  invest 
it  with  a  different  significance.  They  interpret  justifi- 
cation and  the  remission  of  penalties  as  a  judgment  upon 
faith  in  Christ,  in  which  is  included  active  obedience  to  the 
law.  Now  as  obedience,  when  compared  with  the  law,  is 
always  imperfect,  and  does  not  of  itself  offer  a  basis  for  the 
predication  of  righteousness,  and  therefore,  also,  does  not 
carry  with  it  entire  freedom  from  punishment,  the  judgment 
of  God,  that  the  believer  is  righteous,  is  not  analytic.  As 
the  basis  of  the  completion  of  salvation,  of  the  remission  of 
penalties,  and  of  eternal  life,  therefore,  it  is  synthetic,  deduced 
solely  from  God's  free  resolve  of  grace :  nevertheless  it  is  not 
to  be  looked  for  apart  from  the  indispensable  precondition  of 
the  moral  obedience  of  faith.^  This  view,  Uke  that  of  the 
orthodox  schools  of  the  seventeenth  century,  is  based  upon  the 
belief  that  the  predicate  of  righteousness  is  properly  attached 
to  the  faultless  fulfilment  of  the  law.  If  this  is  not  to  be 
looked  for  from  believers,  they  must  be  invested  with  it  by 

^  Caieth,  Racov,  452 :  **  Per  fidem  in  Christum  conseqmniur  instificstionem." 
453  :  ' '  lustificatio  est,  cum  nos  deus  pro  iustis  habet,  quod  ea  ratione  facit,  cum 
nobis  peccata  remittit  ct  nos  vita  aoterna  donat."  418  :  ''  Fides  est  fiducia  per 
Christum  in  deum.  Hoc  est  ut  non  solum  deo,  Verum  et  Christo  confidamus, 
delude  et  deo  obtemperemus,  non  in  iis  solum,  quae  in  lege  per  Mosen  lata 
praocepit,  et  per  Christum  abrogata  non  sunt,  verum  etiam  in  omnibus,  quae 
Cbristus  leg!  addidit"  —  Fausti  Socini  Theses  cU  iustificcUione,  B.  F.  P.  i. 

6 


82  JUSTIFICATION   AND    KECONCILIATION  [80-1 

Divine  judgment.  Now,  according  to  the  Socinians  and 
Arminians,  this  is  done,  not  by  the  imputation  of  the  right- 
eousness of  Christ,  but  by  a  free  Divine  judgment,  conditional 
upon  the  partial  realisation  of  the  obedience  of  faith.  The 
decisive  divergence  between  the  two  lies  here,  that  the  imput- 
ation of  another's  righteousness  instead  of  our  own  is  con- 
strued by  the  orthodox  as  the  precondition  of  the  opening  of 
saving  fellowship  with  God,  while  by  the  other  parties  the 
imputation  of  our  own  imperfect  righteousness  as  perfect  is 
viewed  as  the  precondition  of  the  completion  of  salvation. 
Thus  conceptions  expressed  by  the  same  terms  are  of  unequal 
value  for  the  two  groups,  and  therefore  do  not  directly  corre- 
spond to  one  another. 

What  really  corresponds  to  the  Eeformation  idea  of 
justification  in  the  Arminian  doctrine  is  the  idea  of  recon- 
ciliation, in  so  far  as  it  precedes  faith  and  conversion.^ 
This  preliminary  reconciliation  is,  as  a  consequence  of  the 
priestly  work  of  Christ  and  the  reconciliation  of  God,  dis- 
tinguished from  the  complete  reconciliation  of  men,  which 
coincides  with  justification.  The  preliminary  reconciliation 
consists  in  the  establishment  of  the  new  covenant,  under 
which  God  is  prepared  to  forgive  sins  and  to  bestow  eternal 
life  on  condition  of  the  obedience  of  faith  described,  and 
under  which  He  provides  that  the  word  of  grace  shall  be 
proclaimed  until  this  condition  has  been  fulfilled  by  men. 
Now  it  might  seem  as  though  what  is  here  expressed  were 
the  same  as  what  we  have  shown  to  be  the  content  of  the 
Eeformation  idea  of  justification  and  reconciliation.  For 
that  willingness  of  God  and  the  proclamation  of  it  might 
perhaps  convey  the  impression  that  according  to  the  Divine 
intention  the  sins  of  believers  were  forgiven  in  advance. 
Nevertheless,  such  an  interpretation  must  be  put  aside,  for 

p.  603:  ''Deus  ex  para  sua  gratia  et  in isericordia  nos  iustijicat.  .  .  .  £^t  obe- 
dientia  qaam  Christo  praestamus,  licet  nee  efficiens,  uec  nieritoria,  tamen  causa 
sine  qua  non  iustificationis  coram  deo,  atque  aetemae  salutis  nostrae." — ^Tlie 
Arminians  differ  from  this  only  in  that  they  admit  the  validity  of  Christ's  work 
of  satisfaction  (vol.  i.  p.  842).  Otherwise  all  the  conditions  of  the  doctrine  are  iu 
harmony  with  the  Socinian  doctrine.  Cf.  Limborch,  Theol,  christ.  vi.  4.  14-32. 
^  Cf.  Limborch,  iii.  23. 


81]  THE   DEFINITION   OF   JUSTIFICATION  83 

thereby  the  very  essence  of  the  promise  would  be  miscon- 
strued.    The  promise  of  the  forgiveness  of  sins,  it  is  held, 
is   intended   and   is  intelligible    only  on    condition  of    the 
appropriate  faith  and  active  obedience.     But  the  mere  pro- 
clamation, conceived  apart  from  this  condition,  would  be  no 
promise.     Now  this  is  really  to  introduce  quite  another  con- 
nection of  thought  than  is  implied  in  the  Eeformation  view 
of   reconciliation  or  justification.       As  the  latter  is  always 
implicite  directed  against  the  action  of  the  consciousness  of 
guilt  in  separating  us  from  God,  it  must  necessarily  be  con* 
ceived  in  such  relations  that  the  justified  person  recognises 
the  change  in  his  relation  to  God,  or  that  he  comes  to  be 
directed  towards  God  as  his  positive  end.     Even  if,  to  begin 
with,  the  individual  functions  through  which  this  is  done  are 
left  out  of  account,  yet  it  cannot  be  doubted  that  in  them 
there  will  be  expressed  the  religious  recognition  of  the  fact 
that  the  believer  specifically  belongs  to  God — a  fact  which, 
as  a  result  of  justification,  is  included  in  the  idea  of  justifica- 
tion, 80  certainly  as  reconciliation  is  the  equivalent  of  that  idea. 
But  the  Arminian  view  of  the  new  covenant  established  by 
Grod  describes  merely  a  one-sided  willingness  on  God's  part, 
the  response  to  which  on  men's  side  is  left  to  their  purely 
accidental  resolution,  and  limits  the  invitation  to  take  such 
a  resolution  to  a  proclamation  which  is  addressed  to  their 
understanding.     This  interpretation  of  reconciliation  however, 
not  only  falls  short  of  the  simple  sense  of  the  word,  which 
denotes   a   reciprocal  relationship,  but  even  of   the  incon- 
testable religious  signification  of  the  idea,  the  character  of 
which  is  shown  by  its  relation  to  the  idea  of  the  conscious- 
ness of  guilt.      At  bottom    this  belief   regarding  the  pre- 
liminary reconciliation  as  a  result  of  the  priestly  office  of 
Christ  is  expressed  more  openly  and  simply  in  the  funda- 
mental Socinian  doctrine,  that  Christianity  as  a  proclamation 
of  commandments  and  promises  altogether  rests  exclusively 
upon  the  prophetic  office  of  Christ.     If,  therefore,  the  im- 
portance given  to  His  priestly  office  by  the  Arminians  seems 
almost  like   an  accommodation,  designed    to   conceal    their 


84  JUSTinOATION   AND   RECONCILIATION  [81-2 

Socinian  tendency,  conversely  we  may  well  suppose,  with  all 
the  greater  certainty,  that  the  state  of  decomposition  which 
this  idea  exhibits  here  is  partly  due  to  the  orthodox  theo- 
logians.  Everywhere  in  the  history  of  theology  it  appears 
that  inaccurate  and  superficial  forms  of  doctrine  lead  to  the 
connections  of  thought  which  were  originally  intended  being 
distorted  or  dissolved.  Now,  as  orthodox  theologians  never 
clearly  fixed  the  relation  of  justification  or  forgiveness 
to  the  consciousness  of  guilt,  it  became  possible  for  the 
Arminians  to  form  a  conception  of  reconciliation  without  any 
relation  to  the  fact  of  that  consciousness,  a  conception  which 
is  entirely  alien  to  the  recognisable  tendency  of  Eeformation 
doctrine. 

Another  distortion   of  the  idea  of  justification  appears 
in  the  Pietistic  hypothesis  which,  with  manifold  modifications, 
amounts  to  this,  that  justification  is  an  analytic  judgment 
upon  the  moral  worth  of  faith,  in  so  far  as  faith,  as  a  result 
of  conversion,  includes  the  power  of  moral  action.^     It  is 
clear  that  this  thought  is  very  far  removed  from  that  which 
was  laid  down  as  in  harmony  with    the    tendency  of  the 
Beformation.     The  fact  that  it  was  possible  for  the  one  to 
be  substituted  for  the  other,  is  to  be  explained  chiefly  by  the 
attention  which  the  Pietists  gave  to  their  own  struggles  and 
efforts  to  attain  subjective  assurance  of  salvation.     Origin- 
ally, the  thing  aimed  at  in  justification  was  to  look  away 
from  one's  own  states  of  mind,  and  to  turn   to  the  judg- 
ment  which  is  pronounced  in  virtue  of  Christ's  mediation 
according  to    the  free  grace   of    God.      It  is  therefore   an 
inversion  of  the   Reformation   point  of  view  when  Pietism 
makes  the  moral  power  of  faith  the  object  which  God  in- 
vests with  the   value   which   moral  conduct   would  possess 
when    carried   out.       Besides    this,    justification,   when    so 
apprehended,  is   conceived  as  an  accident  of    the   efiective 
moral    change    brought    about   by   regeneration,  and    there- 
fore   does    not   denote  that   turning  -  point  from  the   status 

*  Cf.  vol.  i.   pp.   359,   362.     Gcsch.   des  Fietiamus,   i.   pp.  129  f.,   158;  ii. 

p.  403  tr. 


S2-3]  THE    DEFINITION    OF   JUSTIFICATION  85 

of  sin  to  the  state  of  new  life,  which  the  Beformers  desired 
to  fix. 

This  comparison  of  the  different  explanations  which  have 
been  given  of  justification  is  here  intended  only  to  show  us 
where  we  are ;  for  at  this  point  we  attempt  neither  a  proof 
of  the  necessity  of  one  definition,  nor  a  refutation  of  other 
theories.  The  definition  we  have  reached  only  claims  to  be 
thinkable,  and  to  stand  nearer  than  any  other  to  the  view 
held  by  the  men  of  the  New  Testament  and  the  Beformers. 

1.  Justification  or  the  forgiveness  of  sins,  as  the  religious 
expression  of  that  operation  of  God  upon  men  which  is 
fundamental  in  Christianity,  is  the  acceptance  of  sinners 
into  that  fellowship  with  God  in  which  their  salvation  is  to 
be  realised  and  carried  out  into  eternal  life. 

2.  Justification  is  conceivable  as  the  removal  of  guilt 
and  the  consciousness  of  guilt,  in  so  far  as  in  the  latter  that 
contradiction  to  God  which  is  realised  in  sin  and  expressed 
in  guilt,  works  on  as  mistrust,  and  brings  about  moral 
separation  from  God. 

3.  In  80  far  as  justification  is  viewed  as  effective,  it 
must  be  conceived  as  reconciliation,  of  such  a  nature  that 
while  memory,  indeed,  preserves  the  pain  felt  at  the  sin 
which  has  been  committed,  yet  at  the  same  time  the  place 
of  mistrust  towards  God  is  taken  by  the  positive  assent  of 
the  will  to  God  and  His  saving  purpose. 


CHAPTER  II 

THE    GENERAL   RELATIONS   OF   JUSTIFICATION 

§17.  It  boB  been  impossible  to  define  justification  without 
taking  into  account  its  relation  to  the  subjective  conscious- 
ness of  guilt.  In  order,  however,  to  determine  with  complete 
accuracy  the  place  of  this  thought  within  the  Christian 
rel^ion,  it  is  necessary  both  to  know  the  Subject  or  Author 
of  justification  under  the  corresponding  predicate,  and  to 
estimate  the  characteristic  note  of  faith  which  is  to  be  found 
in  the  objects  of  justification  along  with,  and  apart  from,  their 
consciousness  of  guilt.  Then  we  shall  be  able  to  consider  the 
scope  and  the  definite  sphere  within  which  the  Divine  judg- 
ment of  justification  must  be  conceived  as  operative,  in  order 
to  hold  good  as  the  special  basis  of  the  religious  quality  in 
the  Christian  subject. 

The  attribute  of  God  through  which  the  older  theology 
seeks  to  understand  justification  is  that  of  Lmvgiver  and  Judge. 
It  is  precisely  in  ascetic  representations  of  the  doctrine  that 
this  preconceived  idea  of  God  receives  special  and  intention- 
ally strong  emphasis.^  The  conception  of  God  as  Lawgiver 
and  Judge,  it  is  true,  has  no  direct  bearmg  on  the  general 
idea  of  pardon,  or  the  forgiveness  of  sins :  it  belongs  rather 
to  the  special  means  by  which  the  older  school  attempted  to 

^  Cf.  Joh.  Friedr.  Fresenius,  AbJiaiidlung  iiber  die  Hecht/ei'tigung  eines  annni 
Sanders  var  Qott  (1747.  New  edition  by  A.  F.  C.  Vilmar,  1857),  p.  8 :  **  As 
regards  the  Author  of  justification,  He  can  be  uo  other  than  the  Supreme  Law- 
giver. For  justification  is  a  judicial  act,  which  proceeds  according  to  Divine 
law."  F.  A.  Lampe,  Geheimniss  des  Oimdenbundcs^  part  i.  (1726)  p.  429  : 
*'  Seeing  that  tlie  expression  '  to  justify '  refers  to  a  judicial  act,  it  will  be  most 
fitting  to  represent  the  whole  scheme  of  justifying  grace  under  the  form  of  a 
judicial  process." 


»">]  THE   GENERAL   RELATIONS    OF   JUSTIFICATION  87 

solve  the  contradiction  between  the  grace  and  the  justice 
of  God,  in  order  to  explain  the  forgiveness  of  sins  which 
is  received  in  Christianity.  But  we  meet  the  same  pre- 
conceived idea  of  God  also  in  Tieftrunk  (vol.  i.  p.  462), 
although  his  idea  of  the  waj  in  which  Christ  mediates  the 
forgiveness  of  sins  departs  from  orthodox  lines.  The  special 
influence  which  works  on  Tieftrunk  is  the  Kantian  estimate 
of  the  moral  law.  Recognising  the  facts  of  the  transgressor's 
consciousness  of  guilt  before  the  law,  and  his  feelings  of  awe 
and  shame  in  presence  of  the  Lawgiver — feelings  which  are 
not  removed  by  moral  reformation — he  explains  the  bestowal 
of  pardon  by  the  Judge  as  the  chief  need  of  the  guilty  per- 
son. Here,  therefore,  we  find  a  ground  for  the  common 
assumption  in  a  quite  different  motive  from  that  assigned  by 
the  orthodox  theology. 

This  assumption,  however,  when  compared  with  the  ideas 
with  which  it  stands  connected,  is,  to  say  the  least,  incomplete. 
We  may  at  the  outset  concede  to  the  orthodox  theology  that 
the  imputation  of  the  double  obedience  of  Christ  to  the  law, 
for  the  piupose  of  judging  sinners  as  righteous,  may  be  repre- 
sented as  a  special  instance  of  the  application  of  law  by  the 
Judge.  We  cannot,  however,  represent  this  act  as  isolated 
from  the  antecedent  gracious  purpose  of  God,  His  purpose, 
namely,  to  bless  sinners ;  nor  must  we  lose  sight  of  the 
fact  that  God  has  Himself  brought  into  court  the  Eighteous 
One,  Whose  obedience  to  the  law,  according  to  the  pre- 
supposition, He  judicially  imputes  to  sinners.  On  these  two 
accounts,  God,  in  executing  the  judicial  act  of  imputing  the 
righteousness  of  Christ  to  sinners,  cannot  be  conceived  as 
Lawgiver  and  Judge,  but  as  the  Dispenser  of  grace  and  love 
to  men.  The  act  of  imputation,  moreover,  when  placed  in  its 
true  connection  with  the  whole,  is  only  the  means  to  an  end. 
The  judicial  quality  in  God,  therefore,  can  be  admitted  only 
as  a  co-operating  element  in  the  act  of  justification,  or  as  a 
subordinate  trait  in  the  conception  of  His  character  as  the 
Author  of  justification.  Even  the  above-quoted  writers  are 
compelled  either  to  supplement  their  own  representations  by 


88  JUSTIFICATION   AND    RECONCILIATION  [85-6 

saying  that  "  in  this  work  "  God  reveals  Himself  in  the  char- 
acter of  love,  or,  by  actually  designating  justification  as  an 
"  act  of  grace,"  to  indicate  the  real  principle  of  the  matter. 
One  may,  of  course,  insist  upon  the  fact  that,  in  ascetic  repre- 
sentations, paradoxes  are  used  as  means  of  stimulating  the 
attention.  But  the  above-quoted  expressions  are  not  to  be 
regarded  as  mere  harmless  exaggerations.  Their  e£fect  is 
really  the  dislocation  of  one  member  of  an  organism,  the 
isolation  of  one  proposition,  which,  we  maintain,  can  only 
be  rightly  represented  in  connection  with  quite  different 
propositions. 

But  if  we  fix  our  attention  more  closely  on  this  analogy 
of  the  power  of  the  State,  which  has  been  applied  to  explain 
God's  method  in  bringing  about  the  remission  of  guilt  and 
punishment,  we  find  that  justification  cannot  possibly  be 
represented  as  a  judicial  act.  For  the  right  of  bestowing 
pardon,  which  is  vested  in  the  head  of  the  State,  is  no  pre- 
rogative of  his  power  as  lawgiver  and  supreme  judge ;  it  is 
a  right,  altogether  independent  of  these  attributes,  explicable 
from  an  entirely  difiFerent  aspect  of  the  idea  of  the  State.  As 
lawgiver,  the  head  of  the  State  unites  the  various  members 
thereof  for  the  purpose  of  common  organised  action ;  and  as 
holder  of  the  power  of  punishment,  he  defends  the  legal 
order  of  the  community,  preserving  it  against  the  violations 
to  which  it  is  exposed.  The  right  of  pardon,  on  the  other 
hand,  follows  from  the  fact  that  the  legal  order  is  only  a 
means  to  the  moral  ends  of  the  people,  and  that  consequences 
of  legal  action  are  conceivable,  which  are  incongruous  with  the 
respect  that  is  due  to  public  morality,  as  well  as  to  the  moral 
position  of  guilty  persons.  In  order  to  prevent  such  incon- 
gruous results  of  judicial  condemnation,  the  right  of  pardon 
is  exercised  by  the  authority  to  which  the  case  of  the  moral 
well-being  of  the  community  is  officially  entrusted.  The 
bestowal  of  pardon  thus  appears,  it  is  true,  always  in  the 
form  of  a  judgment  of  the  head  of  the  State — ^not,  however, 
a  judicial,  but  an  extra-judicial  judgment.  This  relation  of 
different  functions  has  remained  for  the  most  part  hidden 


8S-7]  THE   QENKRAL   RELATIONS    OF   JUSTIFICATION  89 

from  the  older  theologians/  partly  because  they  were  not  accus- 
tomed to  determine  accurately  the  meaning  of  the  symbols 
they  used,  and  partly  because  they  combined  two  different 
ideas  in  the  act  of  justification,  namely,  the  vicarious  satisfac- 
tion of  the  law,  and  the  pardon  of  sins  through  imputation  of 
the  righteousness  of  Christ.    A  conception  of  justification  was 
thus  formed,  which  should  correspond,  not  with  the  simple 
idea  of  pardon,  but  also  with  the  judicial  act  of  the  execution 
of  punishment.     By  means  of  this  conception,  therefore,  it 
appears  as  though  justification  could  be  represented  as  at 
least  as  much  a  judicial  as  an  extra-judicial  judgment.     The 
apparent  contradiction  was  explained  through  the  peculiarly 
Divine  character  of  the  judgment,  which  transcends  the  analogies 
derived  from  the  notion  of  the  State.     But  these  two  ideas 
which  have  thus   been   brought   into  relation  in  the  judg- 
ment of  justification  are  not  co-ordinate.      The  extra-judicial 
bestowal  of  pardon  can  alone  be  regarded  as  the  specific  form 
of  the  judgment  of  justification,  the  judicial  acceptance  of  the 
satisfaction  of  the  law  through  a  substitute  being  but  the 
presupposition  of  that  judgment.     In  this  way,  therefore,  we 
cannot  arrive  at  the  conclusion  that  justification  is  judicial 
in   character.     We    should  then   have   to   decide,  with    the 
Reformed  theologians  (vol.  i.  p.   302),  that  the  imputation 
of  Christ's  obedience  to  those   for   whom,   as    their    Head, 
He  rendered  that  obedience,  is    an   act    of    Divine   justice. 
But  this  view  of  the  matter  would  be  least  of  all  able  to 
escape  the  force  of  the  argument  which  Faustus  Socinus  urges 
in  refutation  of  the  orthodox  doctrine  (voL  i.  p.  326),  namely, 
that  the  ideas  of  satisfaction  and  forgiveness  are  absolutely 
self-contradictory.     If,  as  is  assumed,  justification  be  held 
to  be  an  act    of    Divine   justice,  then    it    cannot    conceiv- 
ably be  regarded  as  an  act  of  grace.     But  the  scope  of  this 
argument  extends  even  further;  for  it  raises  the  question 

'  Compare,  however,  Amesius,  MeduUd^  i.  27.  10  :  "  lastificatio  est  gratiosa 

sententia,  quia  non  fertur  proprie  a  iustitia  del,  sed  a  gratia.     Eadeni  enim 

gratia,  qua  Christam  yocayit  ad  mediatoris  miinus  et  electos  ad  unionem  cum 

Christo  attraxit,  ccnset  etiam  eos  iam  attractos  et  credentes  ex  ilia  nnione 

lostos." 


90  JUSTIFICATION   AND    RECONCILIATION  [S7S 

whether  the  judicial  recognition  of  the  satisfaction  and  the 
merit  of  Christ  can  possibly  be  the  ground  of  their  extra- 
judicial imputation  in  the  act  of  pardon.  For  in  the  penal  law 
absolutely  no  provision  is  made  for  the  transference  of  punish- 
ment and  personal  obligations  to  other  persons  than  those 
imder  such  obligations.  If  such  a  procedure  on  the  part  of 
God  be  admitted  in  the  mediation  of  justification,  then  the 
recognition  of  vicarious  satisfaction  as  such  would  have  of 
necessity  to  be  understood,  not  as  the  act  of  the  Judge,  or  the 
Executor  of  the  law,  but  as  an  antecedent  act  of  grace.  And, 
finally,  the  formula  directed  against  the  Catholic  doctrine, 
namely,  that  Divine  justification  is  to  be  understood  sensu 
forensi,  is  anything  but  complete  and  accurate.  Justification, 
it  is  true,  has  the  form  of  a  judgment,  not  of  a  mat^ial 
operation;  but  the  judgment  in  this  case  is  the  synthetic 
judgment  of  a  resolution  of  the  will.  On  the  other  hand, 
every  judicial  judgment  is  an  analytic  judgment  of  knowledge. 
The  consequent  decree  of  punishment  or  acquittal  is  equally 
an  analytic  judgment,  being  a  conclusion  from  the  prohibitive 
or  permissive  law  involved  and  the  knowledge  of  the  guilt  or 
innocence  of  the  person  accused.  Therefore  in  whatever  way 
we  view  the  matter,  the  attitude  of  God  in  the  act  of  justifi- 
cation cannot  be  conceived  as  that  of  Judge. 

The  justification  of  sinners  by  God,  when  explained  by 
the  analogy  of  the  bestowal  of  pardon  by  the  head  of  the 
State,  can  just  as  little  be  deduced  from  the  attribute  of 
Lawgiver.  It  could  rather  be  shown  that  the  bestowal  of 
pardon  is  in  direct  contradiction  to  the  attribute  of  Law- 
giver. For  the  lawgiver  as  such  is  interested  in  the  ab- 
solute validity  and  universal  observance  of  the  law,  whereas 
through  the  bestowal  of  pardon  exceptions  are  admitted. 
Nevertheless  the  combination  of  these  two  attributes  in  the 
full  power  of  the  State  is  perfectly  rational.  No  real  con- 
tradiction exists  between  them,  because,  as  we  have  said, 
they  are  differently  related  ideas,  and  because  they  do  not 
come  into  collision  with  one  another  at  the  same  moment. 
For  the  legislative  power,  which  insists  upon  the  absolute 


83-9]  THE    GENERAL   RELATIONS   OF   JUSTIFICATION  91 

validity  of  the  law,  is  satisfied  when  the  bestowal  of  pardon 
does  not  in  any  instance  interfere  with  legal  procedure,  but 
only  follows  after  a  verdict  of  guilt  has  been  legally  passed. 
Seeing,  however,  that  legal  right  is  not  itself  the  highest 
good,  but  in  all  casejs  only  a  means  to  secure  the  moral 
goods  which  further  the  true  life  of  the  people,  the  full 
power  of  bestowing  pardon  is,  in  order  to  attain  this  end, 
united  with  the  right  of  legislation  in  the  person  of  one 
siipreme  authority,  so  that,  in  individual  instances  of  legal 
procedure,  due  regard  should  be  paid  to  the  question,  whether 
or  not  the  complete  execution  of  the  demands  of  the  law  and 
of  the  judicial  sentence  would  be  more  detrimental  to  the 
public  moral  interests  than  their  non-execution. 

It  is  from  this  side  also  that  Tieftrunk  has  explained  the 
possibility  of  Divine  forgiveness  of  sins,  notwithstanding  the 
strictly  obligatory  character  of  the  moral  law,  of  which  he  is 
convinced.  God  is  recognised  by  Tieftrunk  as  the  correlate 
of  the  final  end  of  practical  reason.  This  end  is  the  common- 
wealth in  which  the  moral  laws  alone  are  authoritative,  the 
Kingdom  of  God.  In  order  to  make  this  end  conceivable  as 
the  standard  of  one's  own  action,  practical  reason  postulates 
the  existence  of  God  as  Creator,  Lawgiver,  Judge,  and  Buler. 
If,  now,  the  moral  end  of  the  world  is  to  be  maintained  in 
spite  of  the  sinfulness  of  men,  God  must  be  thought  as 
the  Author  of  forgiveness,  through  which  act  compensation 
is  made  for  the  transgressions  of  the  moral  law.  In  this 
argument  the  point  has  been  duly  recognised,  the  validity 
of  which  we  have  above  maintained,  namely,  that  the 
attribute  of  lawgiver  in  the  character  of  the  head  of  the 
State  is  not  the  highest,  inasmuch  as  the  judicial  legislation 
is  only  a  means  subserving  the  moral  ends  of  the  people. 
But  the  attribute  in  the  character  of  the  head  of  the  State 
which  corresponds  to  the  moral  destiny  of  the  people,  namely, 
the  right  of  bestowing  pardon,  has  a  narrower  sphere  of  opera- 
tion, and,  80  to  speak,  only  accidental  validity,  because  the  head 
of  the  State  cannot  actually  bring  about  the  fulfilment  of  the 
moral  destiny  of  the  people,  inasmuch  as  he  cannot  play  the 


92  JUSTIFICATION    AND    RECONCILIATION  [89—90 

part  of  moral  Providence  for  the  people.  On  this  point, 
therefore,  the  idea  of  God  and  His  Kingdom  transcends  the 
analogy  of  State  processes.  The  moral  legislation  of  God 
is,  under  all  circumstances,  the  means  toward  the  moral 
commonwealth,  the  Kingdom  of  God.  The  attribute  of  God 
as  Founder  and  Buler  of  His  Kingdom  is  therefore  absolutely 
superior  to  His  attribute  as  Lawgiver.  If  He  recognises 
pardon  as  the  fitting  means  for  the  maintenance  of  His 
Kingdom,  no  general  objection  can  be  brought  against  the 
possibility  of  such  pardon  from  His  attribute  as  Lawgiver. 
It  follows  then  that  pardon,  or  the  forgiveness  of  sins,  is 
connected,  not  with  God's  special  attribute  as  Lawgiver,  but 
with  His  general  attribute  as  King  and  Lord  of  His  Kingdom 
among  men. 

This  result,  which  we  have  reached  under  the  direction  of 
Tieftrunk,  is  free  from  the  contradictions  involved  in  the 
thesis  of  the  older  school,  that  God  carries  out  the  act  of 
justification  as  Judge,  and  therefore  as  Executor  of  the  law 
given  by  Himself.  The  principle  of  the  advance  beyond  the 
older  position  consists  in  this,  that  use  has  been  made  of  the 
idea  of  the  Kingdom  of  God  as  the  common  moral  end  for 
God  and  men,  an  idea  altogether  foreign  to  the  represent- 
atives of  the  older  school.  And  yet  the  idea  of  the  all- 
comprehensive  Divinely-instituted  moral  law,  which  formed 
for  those  theologians  the  inseparable  correlate  of  their  idea 
of  God,  can  hold  good  only  as  a  deduction  from  the  notion 
of  that  moral  commonwealth,  as  certainly  as  every  moral 
and  judicial  law  is  deduced  from  the  nature  of  the  cor- 
responding community.  If,  therefore,  the  thought  of  forgive- 
ness of  sins,  or  justification,  is  to  have  vital  significance  in 
the  Christian  view  of  the  world,  and  if  it  is  to  be  understood 
through  comparison  with  the  right  of  pardon  which  is 
enjoyed  by  the  head  of  the  State,  it  must  be  conceived  only 
as  standing  in  relation  to  the  universal  sovereignty  of  God 
over  the  completed  moral  commonwealth  which  is  to  be 
formed  of  men.  Tieftrunk  has,  however,  at  the  same  time 
taken  into  consideration  the  fact  that  the  Divine  forgiveness 


no-l]  THE   GENERAL   KELATIONS    OF   JUSTIHCATION  93 

of  sins,  as  a  deduction  from  the  final  end  of  the  Kingdom  of 
God  conditioned  by  the  continual  transgression  of  the  law, 
yet  cannot  be  indifferent  to  the  unconditional  authority  of 
the  law.  He  demands,  therefore,  that  the  Divine  forgiveness 
be  conceived,  not  merely  as  a  result  of  the  law,  but  also  as 
an  act  in  harmony  with  the  law.  He  finds  the  first  pre- 
requisite fulfilled,  when  forgiveness  leads  men  to  love  the  law  ; 
the  second,  when  reconciliability  becomes  a  commandment  of 
outstanding  importance  in  the  law,  and  when  irreconciliability, 
conceived  as  the  law  of  a  moral  kingdom,  would  be  self- 
contradictory.  Tieftrunk  has  here,  it  is  true,  raised  an 
important  problem,  but  his  solution  is  sophistical.  Reconcili- 
ability is  certainly  a  principle  which  claims  paramount 
importance  as  between  those  who  are  equal  in  every  respect, 
but  which  has  no  imconditioned  validity  as  between  those 
of  whom  the  one  is  superior  in  authority  to  the  other.  Else 
the  result  would  be,  that  through  unlimited  application  of 
this  particular  principle,  the  universal  legal  order  of  common 
life  would  be  destroyed.  The  solution  of  the  question,  how 
the  Christian  truth  of  the  Divine  forgiveness  of  sins  can  be 
reconciled  with  the  unconditioned  validity  of  the  moral  law, 
must  therefore  be  reserved  for  future  consideration. 

§  18.  In  the  meantime  our  task  is  to  ascertain  in  general 
the  attribute  of  God  through  which  the  positively  Christian 
conception  of  the  forgiveness  of  sins  is  to  be  understood. 
Now  it  is  almost  inconceivable  that  the  oHhodox  theologians, 
in  spite  of  their  endeavours  to  reproduce  the  ideas  of  Holy 
Scripture,  have  been  entirely  oblivious  of  the  fact  that  Jesus 
expUcitly  connected  this  operation  of  God  with  His  attribute 
as  Father.  He  directed  His  disciples  to  invoke  God  as 
Father  when  they  prayed  to  Him  for  forgiveness  of  their 
sins;  and,  to  bring  home  to  them  the  necessity  of  their 
forgiving  their  fellow-men.  He  promised  them  that  their 
Father  in  heaven  would  also  forgive  them  their  sins  (Luke 
xi.  2-4;  Mark  xi.  25;  Matt.  vi.  9-15).  In  so  far,  too,  as 
the  forgiveness  of  sins  is  mediated  through  the  expiatory 
death  of  Christ,  the  apostles  recognise  the  love,  or  the  grace, 


94  JUSTIFICATION   AND   RKCONCIUATION  [91 

or  the  righteousness,  that  is,  the  self-consistent  saving  pur- 
pose, of  Grod  as  the  ground  of  that  scheme  (Rom.  iii.  25,  26, 
V.  8 ;    Heb.  ii.  9).     Moreover,  the  Old  Testament    idea   of 
sacrifice,  through    which    this   whole   circle   of   conceptions 
must    be   understood,   contains    nothing    analogous    to    the 
judicial  procedure  of  vicarious  punishment ;  the  sacrifices  of 
the  law  are  rather  the  symbols  of  a  Divinely-ordered  scheme 
for  the  appropriation  of  the  Covenant-grace  (vol.  ii.  p.  18o). 
It  is  true  that  the  God  whom  we  invoke  as  Father,  has  also 
inherent  in   His   nature  the   attribute   of   impartial   Judge 
(1  Pet.  L  7);  but  He  acts  as  Judge  only  in  vindicating  the 
rights  of  His  people.     The  title  of  Judge  as  applied  to  God 
has  therefore  for  Christians  no  real  place  alongside  of,  or 
over,  the  relation  in  which  He  stands  to  them  as  Father. 
It  is  only,   therefore,  when   the  love    of    God,  regarded  as 
Father,  is  conceived  as  the  will  which   works  toward   the 
destined  end,  that  the  real  equivalence  of  forgiveness  and 
justification,  which  is  represented  in  the  religious  conception 
of  things,  can  be  made  good.     If,  however,  God  be  precon- 
ceived as  Judge  in  the  forensic  sense,  the  two  ideas  come 
into  direct  antagonism  with  one  another,  as  was  indeed  ex- 
plicitly maintained  by  the  leading  representatives  of  the  older 
theology.     The  man  who  has  gone  through  the  punishment 
he  hcus  merited  can,  of  course,  be  no  more  looked  upon  as  a 
criminal,  but  he  cannot  by  any  means  yet  be  regarded  as  an 
active  and  successful  member  of  the  moral  community;  in 
order  to  attain  this  place,  the  discharged  culprit  must  give 
special  evidence  of  his  fitness  for  membership  in  the  com- 
munity.    If,  therefore,  a  judicial  procedure  on  the  part  of 
God  is  recognised  in  this,  that  He  regards  sinners  as  free 
from  punishment  and  guilt  on  account  of  the  satisfaction 
which  Christ  has  made.   He  must  also,  in  order    to   judge 
them  as  positively  righteous,  impute  to  them  the  merit  of 
Christ.      It    has    been    shown    (p.    89)    that    this    train   of 
thoughts   carries   us   beyond   the  limits   of    the   conceptions 
derived  from  the  analogy  of  the  human  judge.       But    the 
forgiveness   extended  by  a  father  to  his  child  combines  in 


91-2]  THB   GBNBKAX   BKLATIONS    OF   JUSTIFICATION  95 

one  act  the  judgment  that  a  fault  comiuitted  by  the  child 
ought  to  bring  about  no  alienation  between  father  and  child, 
and  the  expression  of  the  purpose  to  admit  the  child,  as  a 
right  and  gracious  action,  to  the  unfettered  intercourse  of 
love. 

The  attribute  of  father  stands  in  relation  to  the  peculiar 
moral  and  legal  fellowship  of  the  family.  Therefore  aU  the 
preceding  arguments  regarding  the  attitude  of  God  to  the 
forgiveness  of  sins,  which  have  been  derived  from  the  analogy 
of  the  head  of  the  State,  that  is,  the  legal  and  only  relatively 
moral  society  of  the  people,  are  found  to  be  incongruous  with 
the  Christian  idea  of  God.  The  representation  of  God  under 
the  attribute  of  Father  corresponds  exactly  to  the  trans- 
ference to  the  whole  of  mankind  of  His  relative  moral  and 
legal  Lordship  over  the  people  of  Israel  for  the  bringing 
about  of  the  highest  moral  end.  Now,  not  only  does  this 
universal  destination  of  the  Kingdom  of  God  •exclude  com- 
parison with  the  form  of  government  of  any  definite  people, 
but  the  designation  of  God  as  our  Father  shows  expressly 
that  the  real  analogy  for  the  Kingdom  of  God  should  be 
sought,  not  in  the  national  State,  but  in  the  family.  The 
consequences  which  this  principle  involves  for  the  representa- 
tion of  the  Christian  view  of  the  world  cannot  yet  be  brought 
out.  One  result,  however,  is  the  confirmation  of  a  formerly 
established  position  (p.  62),  namely,  that  the  forgiveness 
of  sins  by  God  as  Father  finds  no  real  standard  of  comparison 
in  the  right  of  pardon  which  belongs  to  the  head  of  the 
State.  The  difference  between  the  two  is  seen  in  this,  that 
the  right  of  pardon  is  only  exercised  in  individual  instances 
of  legal  condemnation,  which  as  such  stand  in  no  con- 
nection with  one  another  and  always  form  exceptions  to  the 
recognised  legal  order,  while  the  forgiveness  of  sins  by  God  as 
Father  is  a  universal,  though  not  unconditioned,  fundamental 
law,  established  in  the  interest  of  the  community  of  the 
Kingdom  of  God. 

If,  then,  justification  in  the  Christian  sense  is  related  to 
Grod   under   the    attribute — to    use    a    human    analogy — of 


96  JUSTIFICATION   AND   RBCONCIUATION  [92-3 

Father,  not  of  Judge,  the  ground  on  which  Heidegger  dis- 
tinguished   justification     and     adoption    (p.     77)    becomes 
untenable.      The   only    valid    distinction    between    the    two 
ideas    is   that  forgiveness,  or  justification,  or  reconciliation, 
refers  generally  to   the  admission  of    sinners  to  fellowship 
with  God  in  spite  of  sin,  whereas  in  adoption  the  confidential 
relation   to    God   which   is   thereby   established  is  specially 
described  in  terms  of  the  normal  relation  of  children  to  a 
father.      The  connection  being  such,  the  idea  of  reconcilia- 
tion is  shown  to   be  of    equal  constitutive  significance  for 
Christianity  with  the  name  of  God  as  the  Father  of   our 
Lord   Jesus    Christ.      But    the    ideas    of   reconciliation   and 
adoption  agree  with  one  another  also  in  a  formal  respect. 
For  adoption  must  also  be  conceived  as  a  resolution  of  will 
in  the  form  of  a  synthetic  judgment  (p.  80).     The  Keformed 
theologians,    who    alone    give    the    idea    of    adoption    an 
independent  place  in   the   Christian  system,  occupy  them- 
selves with  describing  the  distinctions  between  the  notions 
of  Divine  and  human  adoption.     But  we  ought  rather  to 
seek  to  ascertam  the  harmony  between  the  two.     Now  such 
harmony  cannot  be  found  in  the  idea  of  the  establishment 
of  a  right  of  inheritance  for  a  person  of  alien  descent.     For 
those  persons  who  have  in  the  Christian  sense  been  adopted 
by  God  as   His  children,  attain  that   rank  only  under   the 
presupposition  that  in  a  certain  real  sense  they  derive  their 
being  from  God,  that  is,  that  they  have  been  created  in  His 
image.      In    harmony    therewith,   and    in    contrast    to    the 
alienation    which    sin    causes    between    God   and   men,    the 
adoption  of  the  believing  signifies  their  reception  into  that 
peculiar  fellowship  with  God  which  is  represented  under  the 
analogy  of    the  family.     Xow,  the  moral  fellowship  of  the 
human  family  rests  not  only  on  national  descent,  but  on  a 
judgment  of  the  value  of  this  fellowship  by  the  husband  and 
wife,  and  on  the  purpose  of  the  father  to  educate  his  children 
to  become  spiritual  and  moral  persons.     The  father's  moral 
relation  to  his  children  therefore  rests  in  every  case  on  an 
act  of  vloO^aia,  so  that  this  idea  is  not  exclusively  applicable 


93-4]  THE    GENERAL   RELATIONS    OF   JUSTIFICATION  97 

to  children  of  alien  descent.  The  certainty  of  blood- 
relationship  is  not  the  sufficient  ground  of  the  father's 
care ;  for  there  are  fathers  who  shirk  their  responsibilities. 
Therefore  the  resolution  to  bring  up  one's  children  does 
not  follow  from  the  analytic  judgment  that  one  is  the  author 
of  the  children's  life.  On  the  contrary,  this  resolution,  like 
every  other  resolution,  is  a  synthetic  judgment,  even  though 
it  usually  appears  as  a  logical  conclusion  from  the  recognition 
of  blood-relationship.  The  latter,  however,  is  the  case  only 
when  the  resolution  to  give  moral  education  to  the  children 
is  included  in  the  resolution  to  form  the  marriage  union. 
On  the  other  hand,  the  resolution  to  assume  charge  of  a 
natural  child  for  the  purpose  of  moral  education  is  usually 
absent,  imless  the  purpose  or  resolution  to  enter  upon  the 
marriage  state  be  combined  with  the  sexual  connection.  If, 
therefore,  the  Divine  vloBeaia  in  the  Christian  sense  is 
understood  in  reference  to  the  closest  conceivable  spiritual 
fellowship  between  man  and  God,  then  the  form  of  the 
resolution,  which  is  a  synthetic  judgment,  is  in  exact  harmony 
with  that  of  the  analogous  resolution  in  the  relationship  of 
the  human  family,  which  we  have  taken  as  our  standard  of 
comparison.  Seeing,  however,  that  the  resolution  to  admit 
children  to  moral  fellowship  applies  not  only,  as  a  general 
rule,  to  children  of  the  blood,  but  also,  in  extraordinary  cases, 
to  alien  children,  and  that  the  resolution  can  extend  in  these 
cases  only  to  the  transmission  of  property  rights,  the  idea 
of  the  Divine  vioOeaia  cannot  be  held  to  be  completely 
harmonious  in  these  essential  respects  with  its  human 
analogue.  For  those  who  are  admitted  to  the  rank  of 
children  of  God  are  all,  by  virtue  of  their  innate  moral 
destiny, "  of  Divine  race,"  but  all  in  reality,  because  of  sin, "  as 
alien  children "  to  God.  Through  the  paramount  influence 
of  this  fact,  therefore,  the  Divine  vioOetrla  appears  as  most 
closely  analogous  to  the  human  legal  form  of  adoption.  If, 
now,  justification  is  an  operation  in  which  God  appears  imder 
the  attribute  of  Father,  then  the  adoption  of  men  as  God's 
children  is  a  substantially  equivalent  idea.  The  latter 
7 


98  JUSTIFICATION    AND   RECONCILIATION  [M-5 

modifies  the  former  only  in  this  respect,  that  the  fellowship 
with  God  to  which  sinners  are  admitted,  is  conceived  to  be  as 
close  as  that  which  exists  between  the  head  and  the  members 
of  a  family.  Therefore  the  functions  in  which  the  believing 
make  manifest  their  justification  and  reconciliation  must  also 
be  conceived  as  the  functions  of  sonship  to  God. 

The  imion  (Gleichfieit)  with  God,  which  must  be  included 
among  the  privileges  which  the  justified  enjoy  as  the 
children  of  God,  finds  expression  in  the  formula,  that  justi- 
fication brings  the  believing  into  possession  of  eternal  life. 
In  Luther's  proposition  (in  chap,  v.),  "Where  the  forgive- 
ness of  sins  is,  there  is  life  and  blessedness,"  this  attribute 
is  conceived  as  a  present  possession.  It  will  be  sufiicient  to 
recall  propositions  of  similar  import  in  the  Apology  of  (he 
Aicgsburg  Confession}  Calvin  holds  precisely  the  same 
views.*  To  take  a  final  example,  in  the  Formula  of  Concord, 
Art.  4,  the  connection  between  justification  and  eternal  life  is 
made  so  close,  that  good  works  are  regarded  as  equally 
invalid  as  the  condition  for  eternal  life  as  they  are  for 
justification.  In  these  propositions,  as  contrasted  with  the 
Catholic  view,  the  possession  of  eternal  life  is  brought  from 
the  sphere  of  the  future  and  the  world-to-come  into  the 
present  state  of  the  earthly  life  of  the  believing.  By  this 
interpretation  of  justification  we  also  rise  beyond  the  mystical 
standpoint.  The  mystics  claim  to  enjoy  the  blessedness 
of  the  future  in  moments  of  ecstasy  in  the  present  life. 
They  have,  however,  to  suffer  for  their  elevation  of  spirit  at 
such  moments  through  subsequent  lassitude,  aridity  and 
barrenness  of  the  feelings,  and  the  sense  of  desertion  by  God 
The  Eeformers,  on  the  other  hand,  live  in  the  faith  that 
eternal    life,   and    the   joy   which    attaches    to    it,    namely, 

^  iii.  176  :  ''lustificamurex  promissione,  in  qua  propter  Christum  promissa 
est  reconciliatio,  iustitia  et  vita  aeterna."  233:  '^Sicut  iustificatio  ad  fidem 
pertiuet,  ita  pertinet  ad  fidem  vita  aeterna  .  .  .  Fatentur  enim  adveraarii, 
quod  iustifieati  sint  filii  dei  et  cohaeredes  Christi." 

'  Inst»  iii.  14.  17  :  *^  Efficientem  vitac  aetemae  nobis  comparandae  causam 
scriptura  praedicat  patris  coelestis  misericordiam  et  gratuitam  erga  nos 
dilectionem,  materialem  vero  Christum  cum  sua  obedientia,  qua  nobis  iustitiam 
acqaisiyit ;  formalem  quoque  yel  instrumentalem  quam  esse  dicemus  nisi  fidem  ! " 


96-6]  THE   GENERAL   RELATIONS   OF   JUSTIFICATION  99 

blessedness,  are  present  gifts,  continually  enjoyed  as  the 
result  of  the  forgiveness  of  sins.  But  yet  this  thought, 
although  presented  in  a  series  of  proof -passages,  has  not  been 
made  quite  clear  by  them.  From  the  Catholic  use  of  the 
formula,  which  was  familiar  to  the  Beformers,  we  must 
conclude  that  "  eternal  life,"  in  their  view,  denotes  a  peculiar 
union  and  fellowship  with  God.  In  the  Greek  Church, 
indeed,  **  deification "  is  used  as  an  expression  equivalent  to 
"  eternal  life."  This  usage  has  extended  also  to  the  Western 
Church.  Bernard,  for  example,  started  from  this  idea  in  his 
exposition  of  the  doctrine  (vol.  L  p.  117).  The  mediaeval 
mystics,  although  they  strove  to  attain  blessedness  in  the 
ecstatic  knowledge  of  God,  or  the  annihilation  of  their  own 
wills,  were  yet  led  through  their  Neoplatonic  conception  of 
God  as  the  only  Eeality  beyond  the  idea  of  blessedness  as 
consisting  in  union  with  God,  to  that  of  blessedness  as 
consisting  in  the  losing  of  self  in  the  Divine  essence.  But 
Luther  had  no  such  idea  in  his  mind.  This  is  evident  from 
the  fact  that  ever  since  1518  he  set  himself  in  deliberate 
antagonism  to  all  mysticism.^  Moreover,  the  re-acceptance 
of  the  mystical  view  is  out  of  harmony  with  the  doctrine  of 
justification  (vol.  i.  p,  356).  Therefore  the  original  Lutheran 
sense  of  eternal  life  cannot  be  ascertained  through  the  notion 
of  the  unio  mystica.  To  determine  the  precise  method  in 
which  we  must  conceive  this  relation  of  justification  will, 
however,  require  a  special  investigation. 

'  See  the  corresponding  expressions  on  this  subject  in  his  OpercU.  in  Ps,  v. 

(Cpp.  exeg.  lot,  xiv.  p.  239),  and  Dt  eaptiv,  Babylon,  ecdenae  (0pp.  lot,  var. 

org.  V.  p.  104).     Cf.  also  the  fragment  which  Lbscher,  VdUstdnd.   Timotheus 

Verinus,  i.  p.  81,  communicates  from  a  manuscript  in  his  own  possession: 

''Ad  speculationes  de  maiestate  dei  nuda  dederunt  oocasionem  Dionysius  cum 

sua  mystica  theologia  et  alii  eum  secuti,  qui  multa  scripserunt  de  spiritualibus 

nuptiis,  ubi  denm  ipsum  sponsum,  animam  sponsam  finxerunt.    Atque  ita 

docuerunt,  homines  posse  conversari  et  agere  in  vita  mortali  et  corrupta  natura 

et  carne  cum  maiestate  dei  inscrutabili  et  aetema  sine  medio.     Et  haec  certe 

doctrina  recepta  est  pro  snmma  et  divina,  in  qua  el  ego  aliqucundiu  versaiua 

sum,  non  tamen  sine  magna  meo  damno,      Ut   istam    Dionysii    mysticam 

theologiam  et  alios  similes  libros,  quibus  tales  nugae  continentur,  detestemini 

tanquam  pestem  aliquam,  hortor.     Metuo  enim,  fomaiicos  homiiMs  fviuros,  qui 

toHa  pixiienia   rursum  in  eedesiam  invehant  et  per  hoc  sanam  doctrinam 

obscurent  et  prorsns  obruant"    Cf.  Oesch.  der  Pietisinus^  vol.  ii.  p.  82. 


100  JUSTIFICATION   AND   RECONCILIATION  [96-7 

§  19.  As  an  operation  of  God  upon  men,  justification  is 
correlative  to  faith.  This  is  the  condition  which  prevent* 
justification,  or  the  forgiveness  of  sins,  being  represented  as 
a  contradiction  to  the  presupposed  estimate  of  sin.  Up  to 
this  point,  in  our  definition  of  justification,  man  has  been 
treated  in  his  peculiar  character  as  sinner,  and  the  subject  of 
the  consciousness  of  guilt.  It  was  presupposed  that  with 
sin  a  state  of  alienation  between  God  and  men  was  brought 
about  through  the  existence  of  real  moral  opposition  between 
them.  Justification,  then,  signifies  the  bringing  back  of  the 
sinner  into  nearness  with  God,  the  removal  of  the  alienat- 
ing effect  of  the  existent  opposition  to  God  and  the  accom- 
panying consciousness  of  guilt.  If,  however,  man  in  his 
relation  to  justification  were  to  be  represented  only  as  sinner, 
his  alienation  from  God,  both  in  the  objective  and  in  the  sub- 
jective respect,  would  continue,  and  the  opposite  status,  that, 
namely,  of  justification,  could  not  even  be  conceived.  The 
sinner  must  therefore  be  thought  of  likewise  as  the  subject 
of  faith.  Here,  it  is  true,  a  new  difficulty  may  be  found. 
For  if  the  condition  must  be  fulfilled  before  the  result  can  be 
reached,  the  faith  of  the  sinner  rqally  appears  to  precede  his 
justification.  The  question  then  will  be  whether  and  how  the 
sinner  can  fulfil  this  condition.  This  difficulty  may,  however, 
be  waived  in  the  meantime,  if  we  take  into  account  the  oppo- 
site fact  that  the  idea  of  reconciliation,  in  which  justification  is 
represented  inclusive  of  its  result,  makes  the  faith  of  the  sinner 
to  appear  precisely  as  the  result  of  justification.  Justification 
effects  a  change  in  the  consciousness  of  guilt  in  this  respect, 
that  the  feeling  of  mistrust  towards  God  which  is  bound  up 
with  that  consciousness,  and  the  shrinking  from  Him  which 
results  therefrom,  are  replaced  by  a  consenting  movement  of 
the  will  towards  God  (§  15).  This  new  direction  of  the  will 
to  God  which  is  evoked  by  reconciliation  is,  in  the  Evan- 
gelical view,  faith ;  and,  in  so  far  as  it  expects  to  be  deter- 
mined solely  by  God,  it  belongs  as  a  special  class  to  the 
general  idea  of  obedience  (voL  ii.  p.  324). 

The  meaning  of  the  idea  of  faith,  and  the  relation  in  which 


Vn-%\  THE   GENERAL   RELATIONS   OF   JUSTIFICATION  101 

it  stands  to  justification,  have  indeed  been  accurately  deter- 
mined in  Evangelical  theology.  From  various  passages  in 
Melanchthon^  we  ascertain  that  faith  means  neither  the 
acknowledgment  of  the  correctness  of  traditional  facts,  nor 
the  acceptance  of  orthodox  propositions,  but  trust  in  God's 
grace.  Calvin  has  elucidated  the  idea  of  faith  with  still 
greater  care  than  Melanchthon.'  He  emphasizes  the  fact  that 
the  knowledge  which  is  included  in  faith,  having  for  its 
object  the  goodness  of  God,  is  of  quite  a  different  nature  from 
our  knowledge  of  the  world,  which  consists  in  the  explanation 
of  phenomena  and  perceptions.  Faith  is  emotional  conviction 
of  the  harmony  between  the  Divine  purposes  and  the  most 
intimate  interests  of  man.  A  certain  interest,  it  is  true, 
attaches  to  our  ordinary  knowledge  of  the  world,  as  is  shown 
in  the  act  of  attention.  But  the  interest  which  expresses 
itself  in  emotion — that  is,  interest  not  in  the  discovery  of 
truth  for  itself,  but  in  the  feeling  of  moral  pleasure  and  in  the 
satisfaction  of  our  own  spirit — is  of  quite  a  different  nature, 
inasmuch  as  it  connects  the  maintenance  of  our  whole  person- 
ality with  the  highest  standard  of  our  life,  the  Divine  good- 

^  Apologia  C.  A,  LL  48:  ^' Fides  quae  iustificat,  non  est  tantum  notitia 
liistoriae,  sed  est  assentiri  promissioni  del, — est  Telle  et  accipere  promissionem 
remissionis  peccatorum  et  iustificationis."  77  :  *'  Sola  iide  in  Ghristum,  uon  per 
dilectionem,  non  propter  dilectionem  ant  opera  consequimur  remissionem 
peccatorum  etsi  dilectio  sequitur  fidem."  Loci  theol,  Q,  JR.  xxi.  p.  744 : 
* '  Fides  est  assentiri  universo  yerbo  dei  nobis  proposito,  adeoque  et  promissioni 
gratuitae  reconciliationis,  estque  fiducia  misericordiae  dei  promissae  propter 
mediatorem  Ghristum.  Nam  fiducia  est  motus  in  voluntate,  necessario  re- 
X>onden8  assensioni,  seu  quo  voluntas  in  Christo  acquiescit." 

*  Inst,  ehr,  rel.  iii.  2.  7:  ''Nunc  iusta  fidei  definitio  nobis  constabit,  si 
dicamus  esse  diyinae  erga  nos  benevoUiUiae  Jirmam  certamque  eognilionem,  quae 
gratuitae  in  Christo  promissionis  veritate  fundata  per  spiritum  sanctum  et 
revelatur  mentibus  nostris  et  cordibus  obsignatur."    8:  "Assensionem  ipsani 
iterum  repetam  cordis  esse  magis  quam  cerebri,  et  affeettts  magis  quam  intelli- 
gentiae.     Qua  ratione  obedientia  vocatur  fidei."    14:  ''Cognitionem  non  in- 
telligimus  comprehensionem,  qualis  esse  solet  earum  rerum,  quae  sub  humanum 
scnsum  cadunt  .  .  .  Sed  dum  persiLasum  habet,  quod  non  capit,  plus  ipsa 
j)er8uasionis  certitudine  intelligit,  quam  si  humanum  aliqnid  sua  capacitate 
pcrciperet  .  .  .  Unde  statuimus,  fidei  notitiam  certitudine  magis  quam  appre- 
hensione  contineri."    15  :  *'  Sensus  plcrophoriae,  quae  fidei  tribuitur,  est  nempe 
qui  dei  bonitatem  perspicue  nobis  propositam  extra  dubium  ponat.     Id  autem 
fieri  neqoit,  quin  eius  siiavitcUem  vere  aentiamus  et  experiamur  in  nobis  ipsis. 
Qoare  apostolus  ex  fide  dedncit  fidvctam  .  .  .  Ostendit,  non  esse  rectamfidem, 
nisi  cam  tranguiUis  animis  audemus  nos  in  conspectum  dei  sistere." 


102  JUSTIFICATION   AND   RECONCILIATION  [98—9 

will  and  our  own  blessedness.     In  this  analysis  of  Calvin's 
main  theses  it  will  be  seen  that  the  strong  emphasis  which 
Melanchthon  laid  on  the  will  has  disappeared.     Calvin  does, 
however,  also  recognise  the  place  of  the  will  in  the  act  of  faith, 
when,  in  treating  of  the  emotional  character  of    faith,  he 
brings  out  the  significance  of  faith  as  obedience.     But  his 
treatment  of  the  matter  is  not  quite  clear.     Emotion  is  a 
modification  of  feeling ;  and  many  emotions,  especially  those 
with  which  we  are  here  concerned,  have  a  peculiar  resem- 
blance to  the  will.     But  in  acts  of  will  we  recognise  a  clear 
purpose,  and  this  characteristic  mark  is  just  what  is  wanting 
in  movements  of  emotion.     Here,  then,  a  difference  comes  to 
light  between  Melanchthon  and  Calvin.     This  difference  is 
clearly  expressed  in  Calvin's   statement    that    the    apostles 
derive  trust  from  faith.     Luther  and   Melanchthon,  on  the 
contrary,  define  the  idea  of  faith  accurately,  making  it  pre- 
cisely equivalent  to  the  idea  of  trust  in  G-od.      We  may 
understand  Calvin's  statement  in  the  same  sense  if  we  conceive 
him  to  have  meant  "  derivation  "  analytically.     But  Calvin's 
further  explanations  do  not  make  this  clear.     In   Calvin's 
school,  as,  for  example,  in  the  Heidelberg  Catechism,  §  21,  the 
original  Protestant  interpretation  of  faith  as  trust  continues, 
but  by  the  high  Reformed  Orthodoxy  Calvin  was  understood 
to  maintain   that  fiducia  stands  in  a  synthetic  relation  to 
fdesy  and  therefore  does  not  in  all  cases  accompany  the  latter.^ 
But  trust  is  a  function  of  the  will,  and  therefore  also,  in  the 
case  under  discussion,  conceived,  as  trust  in  the  saving  will 
of  God,  bound  up  with   the  characteristic  mark  of  a  clear 
purpose.     We  trust  in  God,  Who,  through  the  promise  of 
forgiveness,  shows  our  blessedness  to  be  His  aim.     This  con- 
nection of  ideas  governs  the  self -consciousness  of  the  believer, 
as  well  as  all  the  characteristic  marks  of  emotion,  conviction, 
certainty,    obedience,  and  pleasure,   as    Calvin    has     rightly 
shown. 

That  the  will  plays  a  part  in  the  act  of  faith  is  recognised 

1  Gomarus,  Loci  communes,  p.  425,  maintains  that  fiducia  is  effectus  fidei, 
and  denies  that  it  ia  forma  fidei,    Cf.  GeschichU  des  PietismuSy  vol.  i.  p.  328. 


99-100]        THE   GENERAL   RBLATIONS   OF   JUSTIFICATION  103 

also   by  Thomas  Aquinas,  even    when   he   attributes   faith 
specifically  to   the  intellecttis,  and   defines    it   as    assent    to 
the   truths  revealed  by  God.     For,  in  order  to  distinguish 
faith  from  knowledge,  he  lays  down  the    principle  that  in 
knowledge  one  is  moved  to  assent  to  the  truth  through  the 
object  itself,  but  in  faith  and  opinion  not  through  the  object 
of  knowledge   alone,    but   therewith    also    through    the    co- 
operation of  the  will.     If  these  be  the  common  distinguish- 
ing marks,  then  knowledge  is  opinion,  if  it  be  accompanied 
by  doubt,  or  fear  of  the  opposite  possibility ;  and  the  know- 
ledge of  revealed  truth  supported  by  the  will  is  faith,  if  it  be 
accompanied  by  certainty  regarding  what  is  known.^     In  the 
Tridentine  Decree,  Session  vi.,  it  is  recognised  that  faith  in 
this  sense  is  fundamentum  et  radix  jttstijicationis  ;  it  is  acknow- 
ledged, however,  that  something  else  must  accompany  this 
initial  act  of  faith,  in  order  to  attain  justification.     Here  then 
it  is  admitted  that  a  rational  knowledge  of  Bevelation,  compre- 
hended in  a  formal  resolution  of  the  will,  is  not  a  sufl&cient 
ground  for  justification.     It  is  therefore  further  maintained 
that,  in   order  to  attain  justification,  love  must  accompany 
faith,  and  that  in  a  relation  so  close  that  love  becomes  the 
very  essence   of   faith.     Now   the  argument  which  Thomas 
advances  in  support  of  his  thesis  goes  directly  to  prove  that 
love  to  God  as  the  highest  good  gives  its  essential  character 
to  faith.^     If  the  Catholic  idea  of  fides  caritate  formata  were 
here  accurately  and  exhaustively  described,  I  should  see  nothing 
therein  to  contradict  the  Evangelical  idea  of  faith.    For  faith, 
regarded  as  trust,  is  no  other  than  the  direction  of  the  will 
towards  God  as  the  highest  end  and  the  highest  good.     When, 
therefore,  Mohler  *  represents  to  us  that  trust  in  the  love  of 

^  See  Summa  theol.  ii.  2,  qu.  1,  art.  4. 

'  Qu.  4,  art.  3  :  '*  Actus  voluntarii  speciem  recipiant  a  fine,  qui  est  voluntatis 
obiectum.  Id  antem,  a  quo  aliquid  speciem  sortitur,  se  habet  ad  modum 
formae  in  rebus  naturalibus.  Et  ideo  cuiuslibet  actus  voluntarii  forma  quodam- 
modo  est  finis  ad  quern  ordinatur  .  .  .  Actus  fidei  ordinatur  ad  obiectum 
voluntatis,  quod  est  bonum,  sicut  ad  finem.  Hoc  autem  bonum,  quod  est  finis 
fidd,  scilicet  bonum  divinum  est  proprium  obiectum  caritatis,  et  ideo  caritas 
aicitur  fonna  fidei,  in  quantum  per  caritatem  actus  fidei  perficitur  et  formatar." 

'  SymhUik  (6th  ed.  1843),  §  17,  pp.  169,  170. 


J 


104  JUSTIFICATION    AND   RBCONCILIATION  [lOO-l 

God  is  begotten  from  a  corresponding  movement  of  the  human 
soul,  namely,  love  to  God,  he  tells  us  nothing  new  or  startling. 
But  the  above-mentioned  conclusion  of  Thomas  is  not  the 
whole  Catholic  doctrine.  In  the  elaboration  of  the  thema  in 
the  third  article  of  the  Tridentine  Creed — quod  unumquodqiie 
operatur  per  suam  formam :  fides  autemper  dileciioivem  operaim% 
ergo  dilcctio  carUatis  est  fidei  forma — ^^  love  "  is  indeed  used 
strictly  in  the  sense  of  "love  to  God";  but  it  is  undoubtedly 
the  fact,  in  spite  of  Mohler's  fine  colouring,  that  in  the 
Catholic  doctrine  this  Pauline  principle  is  used  as  the  correlate 
of  justificatio  in  the  sense  of  "  active  love  to  men."  ^  For  this 
is  intentionally  not  distinguished  from  "  love  to  God,"  as  the 
unrelated  expression  caritas  shows. 

Thomas,  indeed,  proceeds  to  argue  that  love  to  God  and 
love  to  men  are  not  different  acts,  but  one  and  the  same  act, 
only  with  different  extensions.^  The  principle  on  which  he 
bases  this  argument  is,  that  the  specific  character  of  an  act  is 
determined  by  the  essential  ground  of  the  object  to  which  the 
act  relates.  According  to  this  principle,  the  act  which  relates 
to  a  given  object,  and  that  which  extends  directly  to  the 
essential  ground  of  the  object,  are  specifically  identical  For 
example,  the  seeing  of  light  and  the  seeing  of  colours  on  the 
ground  of  light,  are  specifically  one  act.  In  the  same  way, 
love  to  God  and  love  to  men  are  represented  as  one  act, 
because  God  is  the  ground  of  love  to  one's  fellow-men,  and 
because  the  aim  of  such  love  is  that  every  man  should  be  in 
God,  that  is,  should  find  his  blessedness  in  God.  But  in  my 
opinion  the  essential  ground  of  an  object  is  related  to  the 
object  as  the  universal  to  the  particular.     Therefore  the  act 

^  Cone.  Trid.  Sess.  vi.  cap.  7. 

*  Qii.  25,  art.  1  :  "Habitus  non  diversificantur,  nisi  ex  hoc,  quod  variant 
Bpeciem  actus.  Omnis  enim  actus  unius  spcciei  ad  eundem  habitum  pertinet. 
Cum  autcm  species  actus  ex  obiectu  suniatur  secundum  formalem  ratiouem 
ipsius,  necesse  est,  quod  idem  specie  sit  actus,  qui  fertur  in  rationem  obiecti  et 
qui  fertur  in  obiectum  sub  tali  ratione,  sicut  oadem  est  specie  visio,  qua  videtur 
lumen  et  qua  videtur  color  secundum  luminis  rationem.  Ratio  autem  diligeudi 
proximum  deus  est.  Hoc  enim  debemus  in  proximo  diligcrc,  ut  in  deo  sit. 
Unde  idem  specie  actus  est,  quo  diligitur  deus  et  quo  diligitur  proximus.  Et 
propter  hoc  habitus  carit&tis  non  solum  se  extendi t  ad  dileotionem  dei  sed 
etiam  ad  dilcctionem  proximi." 


101-2]         THB   GKKERAL   llKLATlONS    OP   JUSTIFICATION  105 

which  is  directed  to  the  particular  on  the  ground  of  the 
universal  will  always  have  its  relation  also  to  the  universal ; 
but  not  vice  versd.  Therefore,  if  God  is  the  ground  of  genuine 
love  to  one's  fellow-men,  that  is,  love  which  desires  for  one's 
fellow-men  that  perfection  and  blessedness  which  they  will 
find  in  God,  every  act  of  love  to  one's  fellow-men  will  also  be 
an  act  of  love  to  God ;  but  not  vice  versd,  every  act  of  love 
to  God  will  not  also  extend  to  one's  fellow-men.  It  may  be 
urged  as  an  argument  for  the  latter  thesis,  that  the  seeing  of 
light  is  always  also  the  seeing  of  colours.  But  the  analogy 
is  not  valid.  For  light  appears  only  in  its  colours ;  but  God 
does  not  exist  only  in  men.  The  passage  1  John  iv.  21,  too, 
the  meaning  of  which  Thomas  attempts  to  turn  to  fit  in  with 
his  own  conclusion,  only  contains  the  commandment  that  he 
who  loves  God  shall  love  his  brother  also.  That  is,  love  to 
Gtxi  is  not  in  itself  bound  up  with  love  to  one's  fellow-men ; 
but  the  latter  is  a  special  resolution  of  the  will,  quite  distinct 
from  love  to  GoA 

We  must  accordingly,  it  is  true,  concede  to  the  Eoman 
CathoUc  theologians  that  love  to  God  constitutes  the  essence 
of  faith,  if  in  that  idea  the  thought  is  expressed  that  the  will 
is  directed  to  God  as  its  highest  end.  The  determination  of 
the  specific  character  of  faith  will  then  depend  on  such  con- 
ditions as  the  attributes  under  which  God  is  conceived,  the 
idea  entertained  regarding  man's  own  power  of  will,  and  the 
estimate  of  the  present  capacity  of  the  will  for  faith,  compared 
with  its  former  incapacity.  Through  these  conditions,  and 
others  yet  to  be  considered,  therefore  through  the  necessary 
modes  of  representing  faith,  it  will  be  shown  that  faith  is 
in  intelledu  tanquam  in  subjecto.  That  is,  faith  has  for  its 
material  content  the  ideas  which  mediate  the  movement  of 
the  will  which  is  expressed  in  it.  This  material  element  of 
faith,  however,  is  not  really  faith  in  its  specific  character, 
apart  from  the  essential  form  of  the  love  to  God  which  is 
related  to  it.  The  error  in  the  Thomist  theology  consists  only 
in  this,  that  Jides  informis  is  treated,  contrary  to  the  above 
principle,  as  a  real  stage  of  faith,  and  that  the  qualifying 


106  JUSTIFICATION   AND   ilECONClLIATlON  floa-S 

phrase  formatio  per  caritatem  is  introduced  as  merely  the 
complement  of  the  hitherto  imperfect  faith.  This  method  of 
procedure,  of  course,  involves  a  contradiction  in  itself.  For 
either  carUas  is  forma  Jidei,  in  which  case  Jides  informis, 
regarded  as  actus  intellecttis,  is  formless  matter,  and  therefore 
the  possibility,  not  the  reality,  of  faith ;  or  caritas  is  real 
fides,  in  which  case  the  act  of  will  in  faith  is  merely  accidental, 
not  the  essential  element.  If,  then,  caritas  Dei,  as  Thomas 
h«is  really  shown,  is  to  be  conceived  as  the  essence  of  faith, 
one  is  unable  to  see  how  this  thought  can  be  made  to  appear 
contradictory  to  the  Evangelical  idea  of  faith  as  fiducia  DeL 
The  latter  is  only  a  specialised  mode  of  conceiving  the  same 
idea.  But  the  notorious  Catholic  interpretation  of  caritas  as 
"  the  active  exercise  of  love  to  men  " — the  identity  of  which 
with  "  love  to  God  "  has  not  been  demonstrated  by  Thomas — 
stands  in  direct  contradiction  to  the  Evangelical  idea. 

The  general  ground  on  which  this  Catholic  assumption 
must  be  rejected  is  that  the  characteristic  marks  which  dis- 
tinguish Christianity  as  a  religion,  and  those  which  denote 
its  ethical  purpose,  are  therein  confused  with  one  another ; 
whereas,  if  Christianity  is  not  to  be  distorted  and  falsified 
in  both  respects,  they  ought  to  be  clearly  distinguished. 
Justification  depends  solely  on  faith,  that  is,  trust  in  God,  as 
its  direct  correlate,  because,  in  the  Christian  sense,  it  denotes 
the  definite  relation  of  men  to  God  as  their  Father,  which  is 
necessary  under  the  presupposition  of  sin,  and  possible  in  view 
of  the  consciousness  of  guilt.  Now  the  active  exercise  of  love 
to  men  does  not  enter  as  an  element  into  this  definite  relation 
to  God.  The  recognised  Evangelical  doctrine,  it  is  true, 
maintains  that  the  impulse  to  love  one's  fellow-men,  which  is 
the  fundamental  principle  of  active  human  life,  is  essentially 
bound  up  with  the  very  idea  of  justification.  For  Christianity 
is  the  ethical  religion ;  and  wherever  entrance  into  the 
specifically  Christian  status  before  God  is  realised,  Christianity 
brings  into  exercise  also  the  corresponding  moral  impulse. 
But  for  the  very  reason  that  the  religious  character  of  Chris- 
tianity and  its  ethical  purpose  are  different,  active  love  to 


I 

103-4]         THB   GBKERAt   RELATIONS   OF   JUSTIFICATION  l07 

men,  which  is  directed  towards  the  ethical  end  of  Christianity, 
cannot  hold  good  also  as  the  direct  condition  for  the  religious 
relation  to  God  which  justification  denotes.  The  Christian 
designation  of  God  as  our  Father,  it  is  true,  comprises  also 
the  notion  of  His  Lordship  over  the  Kingdom  of  God.  For 
under  that  title  we  pray  to  God  that  His  Kingdom  may  come. 
Now,  love  to  one's  fellow-men  is  a  deduction  from  the  highest 
principle  which  dominates  all  moral  action,  namely,  regard 
to  the  Kingdom  of  God.  Therefore  the  impulse  to  such  love 
stands  also  in  relation  to  the  idea  of  God  as  Father.  But  the 
mutual  relation  which  exists  between  God  as  Father  and 
believers  means  one  thing  when  represented  as  the  peculiar 
status  before  the  Father  into  which  Christianity  brings 
believers,  and  quite  another  when  represented  as  their  co- 
operation with  the  Father  in  advancing  the  common  end  of 
the  Kingdom  of  God.  The  peculiar  status  before  God  into 
which  Christianity  brings  believers,  therefore,  consists  in  this, 
that  God  receives  believers,  in  spite  of  their  sin  and  their 
consciousness  of  guilt,  into  that  fellowship  with  Himself 
which  guarantees  their  salvation  or  eternal  life.  This 
relationship  extends  to  all  Christians  as  such.  In  so  far, 
therefore,  as  we  are  dealing  with  the  entrance  of  each 
individual  through  faith,  that  is,  trust,  into  fellowship  with 
God,  the  question  of  the  moral  relationship  between  the 
beUevers,  the  impulse  to  which  is  given  therewith,  does  not 
come  directly  into  consideration :  nor  is  it  possible  to  see  how 
this  question  should  come  into  consideration. 

Where  the  faith  which  is  related  to  justification  comes 
into  exercise,  it  is  related  also  to  God.  And  as  it  is  called 
forth  by  reconciliation  on  God's  part,  it  must  be  considered, 
in  its  relation  to  justification,  not  as  a  work  of  man  possessed 
of  independent  value,  but  rather  as  the  act  through  which 
the  new  relation  of  men  to  God,  realised  in  justification,  is 
religiously  recognised  and  actually  established.^  Therefore 
the  Pietistic  wresting  of  the  idea  of  justification  to  mean  an 

^  Apol.  Con/.  Aug.  ii.  56 :  ''Fides  non  ideo  iustificat  aut  salvat,  quia  i^isa 
sit  opus  per  sese  dignum,  sed  tan  turn  quia  accipit  misericordiam  promissam." 


108  JUSTIFICATION    AND   RECONCILIATION  [101-5 

analytic  judgment  on  the  value  of  faith  (§  16),  is  an  approach 
to  the  Catholic  view.  We  must  not,  however,  fail  to  observe, 
as  a  difiFerence  between  the  two,  that  in  the  Pietistic  view 
the  idea  of  love  to  men  is  not  included  as  an  element  in 
faith.  Sather,  in  that  view,  only  the  manifold  strivings  of 
love  to  God,  the  aspirations  after  full  faith,  that  is,  the  desire 
for  the  knowledge  of  saving  truth,  the  hungering  and  thirsting 
after  righteousness,  and,  finally,  the  acceptance  of  Christ, 
through  which  the  knowledge  of  and  assent  to  the  saving 
doctrine  are  raised  from  the  sphere  of  intellect  to  that  of 
personal  conviction  (vol.  i.  p.  359) — only  these,  regarded  as 
worthy  effects  of  union  with  Christ,  are  brought  imder  the 
special  judgment  of  justification.  This  view  is  in  perfect 
harmony  with  the  first  application  of  the  Thomist  notion  of 
fdes  caritate  formata,  namely,  the  proposition  that  love  to  God 
gives  reality  and  value  to  merely  intellectual  faith.  The 
Pietists,  however,  distinctly  avoid  the  further  step  which 
Thomas  takes,  the  attempt  to  pass  ofif  love  to  men  as 
identical  with  love  to  God.  The  language  they  use,  moreover, 
does  not  warrant  our  bringing  any  one  of  them  into  harmony 
with  the  Tridentine  Creed. 

§  20.  The  groimd  of  justification,  or  the  forgiveness  of 
sins,  is  the  benevolent,  gracious,  merciful  purpose  of  God  to 
vouchsafe  to  sinful  men  the  privilege  of  access  to  Himself. 
The  form  in  which  sinners  appropriate  this  gift  is  faith,  that 
is,  the  emotional  trust  in  God,  accompanied  by  the  conviction 
of  the  value  of  this  gift  for  one's  blessedness,  which,  called  forth 
by  God's  grace,  takes  the  place  of  the  former  mistrust  which 
was  bound  up  with  the  feeling  of  guilt.  Through  trust  in 
God's  grace  the  alienation  of  sinners  from  God,  which  was 
essentially  connected  with  the  unrelieved  feeling  of  guilt,  is 
removed.  This  is  evidence  that  the  guilt,  so  far  as  it  prevents 
access  to  God,  is  forgiven  by  God.  The  purpose  of  God  to 
forgive  sinners  is  represented  by  the  Reformers,  under  the 
notions  of  promissio  and  evan^elitim,  not  only  as  an  openly 
revealed  volition,  but  also  as  one  which  lays  the  foundation 
of  a  fellowship  among  men.     In  the  gradation  of  the  bearers 


106--6]  THE   GENERAL   RELATIONS   OF   JUSTIFICATION  109 

of  this  Eevelation,  Christ,  as  the  Mediator  of  the  Gospel,  is 
reckoned  first.     The  next  place  after  Him  is  accorded  to  the 
community  which  He  founded,  every  member  of  which  has 
authority  to  proclaim  the  justifying  grace  of  God,  especially 
the  official  representatives  of  the  Church,  whose  function  is  to 
transmit  the  proniissio  remissionis  pecccUorum  propter  Christum. 
Besides  these  human  organs,  who  by  their  word  make  the 
revelation  of  Grod  in  Christ  efficacious  for  the  community 
which  He  founded,  the  sacraments  are  channels  of  the  same 
sin-forgiving  grace,  inasmuch  as  they  contain  the  Word  or 
Gospel  of  God  as  their  essence,  and  apply  the  Gospel  in  a 
peculiar  way  to  the  members  of  the  community.     Therefore 
the  unity  of  the  Church  is  essentially  bound  up  with  the  pure 
preaching  of  the  Gospel  and  the  proper  administration  of  the 
two  sacraments,  and  in  the  same  degree  with  nothing  else. 
Now  the  pure  Gospel  is  defined  in  the  Augsburg  Confession 
chap.   viL,  as  the  preaching  of  justification  in   the   above- 
represented  sense,  namely,  as  depending   on   the  merit  of 
Christ,  and  thus  excluding  the  idea  of  human  merits.^     This 
preaching  of  the  Gospel  is  the  distinctive  mark  of  the  exist- 
ence of  a  community  of  believers ;  for,  according  to  the  same 
Confession  chap,  v.,  it  is  only  through  the  Word  of  God,  in 
preaching  and  sacraments,  that  faith  is  called  into  existence. 
It  follows,  then,  that,  through  the  operation  of  the  Holy 
Spirit,  faith  is  identical  in  each  individual  case,  and  common 
to  all  the  members  of  the  community.     Against  this  repre- 
sentation, however,  the  objection  has  been  made  that  faith 
may  be  awakened  in  men  through  their  own  efforts,  without 
the  regular  instrumentality  of  the  publicly  preached  Word. 

But  these  fundamental  views  of  the  Beformation  are  not 
disproved  by  the  fact  that  very  many  hear  the  preaching  of 
the  Word  without  being  led  through  any  mechanical  compul- 
sion to  the  point  of  faith,  and  the  contrary  fact  that  very 
many  attain  to  faith  without  being  directly  led  thereto 
through  the  hearing  of  a  preached  sermon.  The  principle 
was  not  arrived  at  from  the  consideration  of  such  instances. 

» Apol,  C.  A,  iv.  20,  21 ;  ii.  101 ;  viii.  42,  43,  58-60. 


110  JUSTIFICATION   AND   REOONCTLUTION  [l06 

Therefore  it  ought  not  to  stand  in  the  way  of  a  full  investiga- 
tion of  the  manifold  experiences  of  life.  The  recognition  of 
the  principle,  in  reality,  only  involves  the  proviso,  that  one 
cannot  arrive  at  and  maintain  individual  conviction  of  faith 
in  isolation  from  the  already  existing  community  of  faith,  and 
that  that  community  is  coextensive  with  the  spread  of  the 
Gospel,  that  is,  the  public  preaching  of  the  forgiveness  of  sins. 
And  even  if  a  man's  conversion  were  as  far  as  possible  from 
being  occasioned  by  the  hearing  of  such  preaching,  yet  the  thesis 
in  the  5  th  Article  of  the  Augsburg  Confession  would  be  proved 
true  by  the  fact  that  all  the  spiritual  ideas  which  are  effective 
in  bringing  about  a  conversion  are  derived  from  the  Gospel, 
and  become  known  to  the  converted  person  only  through  the 
Gospel ;  that,  therefore,  his  conversion  is  entirely  dependent  on 
the  purpose  of  God  revealed  in  the  Gospel.  The  maintenance 
of  this  principle  is  necessary  for  the  welfare  of  the  Church,  in 
order  that  the  individual's  own  struggle  for  faith  may  not  be 
esteemed  as  independent  of,  or  opposed  to,  the  public  preach- 
ing of  the  Word.  The  eflfect  of  such  individualistic  ideas 
would  be,  as  seen,  for  example,  in  the  history  of  the  Anabap- 
tists, that  the  Church  would  be  given  over  to  the  conflicts  of 
sectarianism,  and  that  the  faith  itself  would  be  falsified. 
The  connection  of  faith  with  the  revelation  of  grace  through 
the  Word  was  also  plainly  recognised  by  Calvin.^  If, 
therefore,  the  community  of  believers  is  coextensive  with  the 
influence  of  the  Gospel,  and  if  the  Gospel  has  no  other  sphere 
for  the  proclamation  of  its  glad  tidings  of  God's  readiness  to 
forgive  sins,  then  those  striking  statements  of  Luther  are 
intelligible,  namely,  that  "  the  Church  is  full  of  the  forgive- 
ness of  sins  " ;  that  "  within  the  fold  of  the  Christian  Church 
God  daily  and  richly  forgives  me,  the  individual,  all  my 
sins " ;  and  that  "  the  Church,  as  a  mother,  bears  and 
nurtures  every  individual  through  the  Word"  (vol.  L  pp.  161, 
176).      Calvin  repeats  the  latter  statement  (Tnst.  iv.  1.  4). 

^  Inst,  chr.  rel,  ill.  2.  6 :  '*  Principio  admonendi  suxnus,  perpetaam  eaae  fidei 
relationem  cum  verbo,  nee  magis  ab  eo  posse  divelli,  quam  radios  a  sole,  unde 
oriuntur." 


106-7]  THE   GENERAL   RELATIONS    OF   JUSTIFICATION  111 

Finally,  Luther  pursues  the  same  thought  in  a  characteristic 
way.  He  loves,  namely,  to  represent  the  Church  as  the 
Bride  of  Christ,  with  whom,  in  accordance  with  marriage 
right,  Christ  joins  in  a  mutual  exchange  of  benefits,  He 
taking  upon  Himself  the  sins  of  the  believing,  and  Himself 
imparting  His  righteousness  to  them.^  In  this  representation 
of  the  process  of  justification  by  faith,  however,  Luther  insists 
on  the  fact  that  the  blessings  which  accrue  to  the  individual 
are  only  imparted  to  him  in  common  with  all  the  others 
with  whom  he  is  bound  up,  through  the  same  salvation,  in 
the  unity  of  the  Church. 

This  idea,  that  the  benefit  of  justification  accrues  to 
individuals  as  constituting  the  community  of  believers, 
corresponds  to  the  significant  expressions  used  in  the  New 
Testament  regarding  the  sacrifice  of  Christ.  For  the  con- 
ception of  Christ's  sacrifice  through  the  types  of  the  covenant 
sacrifice  and  the  yearly  sin-oifering  of  the  Israelites  brings 
the  forgiveness  of  sins  which  results  from  Christ's  sacrifice 
into  direct  relation  to  the  community  founded  by  Him  (vol. 
ii.  p.  216).  The  individual  can  therefore  appropriate  the 
forgiveness  of  sins  by  faith  only  when  he  tmites  in  his 
faith  at  once  trust  in  God  and  Christ,  and  the  intention 
to  connect  himself  with  the  community  of  believers.  For 
the  individual  who  is  led  to  faith  always  finds  the  domain 
of  human  life  which  is  determined  and  governed  by  the 
forgiveness  of  sins  already  marked  out  for  him;  and, 
moreover,  he  has  to  attach  himself  to  the  community  of 
beUevers  all  the  more  decisively  that  he  is  indebted  to  that 
community  for  the  knowledge  of  salvation  and  for  stimuli 
of  incalculable  strength  urging  him  to  appropriate  salvation. 
The  relation  of  justification  to  the  community  of  believers 
has  been  recognised  not  only  by  Brenz,  who  followed 
strictly  in  Luther's  footsteps  (vol.  i.  p.  209),  but  also  by 
successive  ascetics  and  theologians  from  Spener  to  Jer.  Friedr. 
Eeuss,*     The  idea  has  disappeared,  however,  in  the  orthodox 

*  Of.  OeschichU  des  Pietismue,  vol.  iii.  p.  122. 
«  Cf.  ibid.  vol.  ii.  p.  26  ff. 


112  JUSTIFICATION   AND  RECONCILIATION  [107-8 

Lutheran  Dogmatics,  because  Melanchthon,  the  founder  of 
that  Dogmatics,  rejected  the  above-quoted  statements  of 
Luther.  The  first  edition  of  his  Lod  theologid  contains  no 
article  at  all  on  the  Church.  Here,  therefore,  he  explains 
justification  as  exclusively  an  experience  of  the  individuaL 
In  the  following  editions  he  has  appended  a  chapter  on 
the  doctrine  of  the  Church.  He  has,  however,  preserved 
unaltered  his  former  scheme  of  justification.  Melanchthon 
has  indeed  kept  in  view  the  factor  of  the  Gospel,  or  the 
Word,  of  God,  or  the  Divine  promise.  But  he  has  nowhere 
made  it  clear  that  the  community,  to  which  the  ministry  of 
the  Gospel  is  committed,  thereby  comprehends  within  its 
scope  the  process  which  he  analyses  as  the  experience  of 
the  individual.  He  testifies  on  several  occasions  that  the 
community  is  the  bearer  of  the  Gospel;^  but  he  nowhere 
brings  this  idea  into  connection  with  the  explanation  of 
justification  as  mediated  through  the  promises,  or  the  Gospel, 
of  God.  The  Reformed  theology,  on  the  other  hand,  follow- 
ing Calvin's  example,  has  rightly  understood  and  maintained 
Luther's  view  (vol.  i.  p.  205),  and  has  accordingly  represented 
the  justification  of  the  individual  as  conditioned  by  the  exist- 
ence of  the  community  (voL  i.  p.  309).  In  spite  of  this 
representation,  however,  the  mystical  conception  of  the  scheme 
of  salvation,  which  completely  isolates  the  individual  from  con- 
nection with  the  Church,  has  gained  a  place  within  the  sphere 
of  the  Reformed  Church  as  well  as  the  Lutheran. 

Mysticism  (voL  i.  pp.  120,  356),  which  claims  to  lead 
men  to  the  attainment  of  essential  union  with  God,  is  quite 
different  from  the  Evangelical  doctrine  of  justification  by 
faith;  and  its  sentimental  communion  with  Christ  as  the 
Bridegroom  is  quite  different  from  trust  in  Christ  as  the 
Bearer  of  the  Divine  promise.  The  mystical  communion  of 
love  with  Christ,  it  is  claimed,  transcends  trust  in  the  merits 
of  Christ.     The  true  believers,  says  Wilhelm  Brakel,  receive 

^  Apol.  C.  A,  iv.  :  "  Ecclesia  proprie  est  columna  veritatis  ;  retinet  enim 
puram  evangelium."  Tractatas  de  potestate  papae,  24 :  ''Tribuit  Christus 
principaliter  claves  (i.  e.  evangeliam}  ecolesiae  et  immediate." 


108-9]  THE    GENBBAL   RELATIONS    OF   JUSTIFICATION  113 

the  Lord  Jesus  into  their  hearts ;  they  do  not  remain  content 
with  the  benefits  guaranteed  by  Him,  but  turn  for  full  satis- 
faction to  the  Source  Himself.  Union  with  God,  says  Johann 
Arndt,  in  agreement  with  Tauler,  is  found  in  one's  own  heart ; 
for  "  the  Kingdom  of  God  is  within  you."  "  In  our  heart 
is  the  real  school  of  the  Holy  Ghost,  the  real  workplace  of 
the  Holy  Ghost,  the  real  house  of  prayer  in  spirit  and  in 
truth."  In  this  statement,  so  little  account  is  taken  by 
Arndt  of  the  authoritative  instrument  of  grace,  the  preached 
Word  of  God,  that  he  expressly  maintains  the  revelation  of 
the  eternal  Word  within  the  pious  soul,  the  communication 
of  God's  mind  witliin  the  loving  heart.^  The  doctrine  of 
justification  in  the  usual  orthodox  representation  is  indeed 
recognised  by  the  mystics  as  the  presupposition  of  these 
inner  experiences,  but  has  no  influence  on  their  circle  of 
thought.  If  that  doctrine  had  been  still  rightly  imder- 
stood,  they  would  not  have  returned  to  the  mediaeval  types 
of  religious  Ufe  which  had  been  condemned  by  Luther. 
Wherever  Mysticism  is  found,  the  thought  of  justification 
no  longer  retains  its  true  significance  as  the  key  to  the 
whole  domain  of  Christian  life,  but  is  so  depreciated  as  to 
become  a  mere  formal  precondition  of  the  immediate  union 
with  God,  or  the  immediate  communion  with  Christ,  which 
Mysticism  strives  to  attain.^  One  of  the  chief  marks  of 
distinction  between  the  two  opposite  views,  however,  is  that, 
wherever  men  give  way  to  mystical  states  or  aspirations, 
they  imagine  that  the  sphere  of  the  preached  Word  and  the 
promises  of  grace,  therefore  the  necessary  subordination  to 
the  public  Bevelation  in  the  Church,  is  transcended  and  may 
be  forgotten.  The  falsehood  of  this  pretended  immediate 
communion  with,  or  immediate  relation  to,  Christ,  in  which 
men  endeavour  to  enjoy  all  possible  forms  of  blessedness 
apart  from  and  beyond  the  forgiveness  of  sins,  has  also 
been  shown  by  Calvin  in  the  passage :  "  ITaec  vera  est  Christi 
cognitio,  si   eum   gualis   offeHur   a   patre^  sicsdpimus,  nempe 

^  Oesehichte  des  Pietismus,  vol.  i.  p.  296,  vol.  ii.  p.  50. 
*  Op.  cU.  Yol.  iL  p.  23. 

8 


114  JUSTIFICATION    AND   RECONCILIATION  [109-10 

evangelio  suo  vestitum"  {Inst,  iii.  2.  6).  Now  the  Song  of 
Songs,  from  the  allegorical  exposition  of  which  all  those 
plays  of  fancy  are  derived,  does  not  belong  to  the  Gospel 
with  which  Christ  is  invested  {vestUiLs),  The  whole  myst- 
ical scheme,  in  fine,  lies  outside  the  spiritual  horizon  of  the 
Eeformers ;  it  has  no  point  of  agreement  with  their  doctrinal 
standards ;  it  stands  in  contradiction  to  both  the  direct  and  the 
indirect  estimate  of  the  value  of  the  community  of  believers 
and  the  public  preaching  of  the  Word  of  grace,  which  the 
standards  attest ;  and,  judged  in  its  own  special  character,  it 
is  no  improvement  on  the  Reformed  type  of  religious  life,  as 
certainly  as  it  is  derived  from  the  practice  of  Monasticism. 

§  21.  With  justification  by  faith  in  the  Evangelical  sense, 
there  is  bound  up  the  attribute  of  Christian  freedom  fr(m  the 
law.  Under  the  heading  libertas  Christiana  the  older  theologians 
bring  together  various  heterogeneous  ideas.  The  place  of  the 
doctrine  in  the  theological  system  is  thus  rendered  uncertain. 
One  hardly  knows  at  the  first  glance  whether  Melanchthon, 
in  closing  his  principal  theological  work  with  the  doctrine  of 
Christian  freedom,  means  thereby  to  distinguish  freedom  as 
the  highest  mark  of  Christian  life,  or  is  merely  adding  a 
supplement,  the  content  of  which  he  was  unable  to  insert 
elsewhere.  As  he  deduces  the  principal  points  in  the  doc- 
trine of  Christian  freedom  from  the  redemption  mediated 
through  Christ,  the  place  which  he  has  selected  for  the 
exposition  of  the  doctrine  is  certainly  not  rightly  chosen; 
the  section,  indeed,  actually  appears  to  be  merely  a  supple- 
mentary treatment  of  sundry  hitherto  forgotten  points.  In 
any  case  the  Lutheran  divines  have  regarded  the  matter  in 
this  way ;  for  not  only  has  the  locus  "  de  libertate  christmna " 
entirely  disappeared  from  their  systems,  but  they  have 
introduced  the  various  elements  of  the  idea  scattered  here 
and  there  in  all  possible  places,  and  mentioned  only  inci- 
dentally. Not  only  so,  but  later  divines,  like  HoUatz  and 
Buddeus,  omit  the  idea  altogether.  On  the  contrary,  in 
Calvin's  Irtstitutio  the  doctrine  of  Christian  freedom  imme- 
diately follows  that  of  justification,  and  is  related  to  it  by 


llO-ll  THE   GENERAL   RELATIONS   OF   JUSTIFICATION  115 

the  express  statement  that  it  is  necessary  for  the  understand- 
ing of  the  meaning  of  justification.^  Therefore,  in  the  great 
majority  of  the  Reformed  divines,  the  "  locits "  entitled  "  de 
libertcUe  Christiana'*  either  appears  in  its  true  place,  or  the 
subject  is  treated  in  connection  with  the  ideas  of  justification 
and  adoption. 

Melanchthon  enumerates  four  grades  of  freedom — freedom 
from  sin  and  the  wrath  of  God,  the  freedom  of  the  new  life 
inspired  by  the  Holy  Ghost,  freedom  from  the  Mosaic  law, 
and  freedom   from  the  yoke   of   human   ordinances   in  the 
worship  of  the  Church.     Under  the  aspect  of  freedom  from 
the  Mosaic   law,  Melanchthon  also  maintains  the  right  of 
the  different  national  legislations.     Now,  if  we  compare  this 
combination  of  ideas  with  Calvin's,  we  find  that  Calvin  omits 
the   first — freedom   from   sin  and  the  wrath   of  God  (and 
rightly,  because  this  attribute  is  not  co-ordinate  with,  but 
rather,  as  an  expression  of  redemtio,  the  basis  of  the  follow- 
ing), and  also  the  third — freedom  from  the  Mosaic  law  (again 
rightly,  because  the  Mosaic  law  not  only  belongs  to  a  quite 
different  order  of  things  from  the  Christian  faith,  but  is  intro- 
duced into  the  Christian  system  merely  through  an  entirely 
false  conception  of  the  significance  of  the  Old  Testament  for 
the  Christian  community).     While  Calvin  has  thus  retained 
only  the  second  and  fourth  of  those  four  grades  of  Christian 
freedom,  he    has   put  in    the    forefront    another   aspect   of 
freedom,  to  which  he  was  necessarily  led  from  regard  to  the 
true  nature   of  justification.      It  is  just  the   other  side  of 
justification   by  faith,   that  nothing  of  law  or   legal  works 
should  play  a  part  in  it.^     To  this  fundamental  principle  we 

^  iii.  19.  1:  ' '  Tractandum  nunc  de  Christiana  libertate,  cuius  explicatio 
praetermitti  minime  ab  eo  debet,  cui  summam  evangelicae  doctrinae  conipendio 
complecti  propositum  est.  Est  enim  res  appriine  necessaria,  ac  citra  cuius 
cognitionem  nihil  fere  sine  dubitatione  aggredi  conscientiae  audent;  prae- 
sertim  vero  est  appendix  iustificationis,  et  ad  vim  eius  intelli^endam  non 
parum  valet." 

^  iii.  19.  2  :  '*Sublata  legis  mentione,  et  omul  operum  cogitatione  seposita, 
unam  dei  misericordiam  amplecti  convenit,  quum  de  iustificatione  agitur,  et 
averso  a  nobis  aspectu,  unum  Christum  intueri.  Non  enim  illic  quaeritur, 
quomodo  iusti  simus,  sed  quomodo,  iniusti  licet  ac  indigni,  pro  iustis 
habeamur." 


116  JUSTIFICATION   AND   RBCONaLIATION  [111—2 

must  reduce  the  last  of  the  aspects  of  Christian  freedom,  the 
right,  namely,  to  regard  human  ordinances  in  the  Church  as 
indifferent.  There  remain,  therefore,  two  principal  forms 
of  freedom — freedom  from  all  considerations  alike  of  Divine 
and  of  human  law  in  the  act  of  justification  itself,  and  the 
freedom  from  legal  compulsion,  that  is,  the  freedom  of  will 
in  rendering  obedience  to  the  Divine  law,  which  one  enjoys 
as  the  result  of  justification  in  the  status  of  faith.  Luther's 
treatment  of  the  subject  of  freedom  also  leads  to  these  two 
results.^  It  is  easy,  however,  to  see  that  these  two  aspects 
of  freedom  are  heterogeneous,  and  that  the  second  does  not 
belong  to  the  explanation  of  justification  as  a  religious  rela- 
tion to  God.  For  it  describes  the  nature  of  the  moral  conduct 
which  goes  along  with  justifying  faith,  but  yet  cannot  be 
derived  solely  from  that  faith — even  though  the  Reformers, 
on  grounds  which  cannot  yet  be  considered,  entertain  that 
notion.  We  have  here,  therefore,  to  take  account  only  of 
the  freedom  from  Divine  law  and  from  human  Church  laws 
which  is  asserted  when  justification  is  referred  to  faith 
alone. 

As  the  definite  form  of  this  doctrine  has  without  doubt 
been  modelled  on  Paul's  arguments  in  the  Epistle  to  the 
Galatians,  it  might  be  asked  what  practical  interest  we  have 
in  still  retaining  it  in  mind.  For  since  the  time  when 
Jewish  Christianity  disappeared  from  history,  the  error  of  the 
"  foolish  Galatians  "  has  only  reappeared  among  the  Pasagians 
in  North  Italy  (in  the  eleventh  century),  and  the  Bussian 
Sabbatniki  (since  the  end  of  the  fifteenth  century);  while 
against  the  temptation  to  relapse  into  Jewish  Christianity  we 
Protestants  are  quite  secure.      If,  then,  the   conception  of 

^  Opera  latinu  ad  rrform.  pertin^  ed.  Schmidt,  torn.  iv.  p.  225:  "Clamm 
est,  homini  christiano  suam  (idem  sufficere  pro  omnibus,  nee  operibus  ei  opus 
fore,  ut  iustificetur.  Quodsi  operibus  non  habet  opus,  nee  lege  opus  habet ; 
si  lege  non  habet  opus,  certo  liber  est  a  lege.  Atque  haec  est  Christiana  ilia 
libertas,  lides  nostra,  quae  facit  non  ut  otiosi  aimus  aut  male  vivamus,  sed 
ne  cuiquam  opus  sit  lege  aut  operibus  ad  iustitiam  ct  salutem."  P.  229: 
''Non  operando  sed  credendo  deum  glorificamus  et  veracem  confitemur. 
Hoc  nomine  fides  sola  est  iastitia  christiani  hominis  et  omnium  praeceptorum 
plenitude.     Qui  enim  primum  implet,  cetera  omnia  facili  opera  implet." 


112-3]  THE   GENERAL   BELATIONS   OF   JUSTIFICATION  ll7 

Divine  law,  from  which  by  virtue  of  justification  the  believer 
is  free,  be  understood  in   a  less  accurate  sense  than  Paul 
intended,  the  thought  of  freedom  from  Divine  law  will  mean 
that  justification  in  the  Evangelical  sense  does  not  include 
the  conditions  which  the  Catholic  view  of  justification  claims 
to  be  essential — in  short,  that  the  two  homonymous  ideas 
are  directly  incommensurable.     For  if  active  love  to  one's 
neighboui'  be  an   essential  element  in   justification,  as    the 
Catholic  view  represents,  then  the  law  plays  a  part  in  the 
process  of  justification ;  and  if  the  value  of  justification  be 
enhanced    through    obedience    to    Divine   and    ecclesiastical 
commandments  (Trid,    Sess.    vi.    10),  then    human    Church 
ordinances    are   obligatory  for  justification.       Therefore  the 
notion  of  Christian  freedom  from  the  law  has  for  us  only  this 
meaning,  that  justification,  as  we  understand  it,  is  quite  different 
from  justification  in   the  Catholic   view.      Thus  it  is  quite 
evident  why  Luther,  in  comparing  his  present  with  his  former 
monastic   life,  and   Calvin,  like  Luther,  from  his  Beformed 
opposition  to  the  Catholic  practice,  had  so  strong  an  interest 
in  maintaining  the  principle  that  moral  action  is  no  part  of 
the  process  of  justification,  and  that  justification  has  nothing 
to  do  with  the  performance  of   ceremonial  rites,  therefore 
that  the   believer  as   such  is    free  from   the  law.     On   the 
contrary,  where   Evangelical  life   has   gained   possession  of 
the  field  independently  of  Catholic  type^  of   doctrine,  one 
may,  as  is  actually  shown  to  be  the  case,  have  no  personal 
interest  in  the  notion  of  freedom  from  the  law,  but  regard 
it  as  merely  the   test  of   the    difference    between    the  two 
opposed  conceptions  of  justification. 

The  matter,  however,  is  not  yet  settled.  The  Pauline 
principle  that  "through  the  works  of  the  law  no  man  is 
justified,"  is  indeed  only  the  negative  side  of  the  prophetic 
expression  that  "the  just  shall  live  by  faith"  (vol.  ii.  p. 
309).  But  Pharisaism,  the  falsification  of  Christianity  by 
which  is  here  guarded  against,  has  a  significance  which  has 
extended  quite  beyond  its  immediate  historical  appearance. 
The  error  of  Pharisaism  consists  in  this,  that  it  transforms 


118  JUSTIFICATION   AND   RECJONCILIATION  [113-4 

the  religious  relation  of  men  to  God  into  a  legal  relation, 
and  represents  ceremonial  rites  as  the  substantial  elements 
in  the  formation  of  moral  character,  and  therefore  as  works 
of  merit  for  God  and  men  (vol.  ii.  p.  277).  This  error  was 
fallen  into  not  only  by  that  Jewish  party,  but  also  by  many 
within  the  Christian  Church.  It  is  met  with  especially  in 
various  Catholic  positions  which  are  most  closely  connected 
with  the  idea  of  justification.  It  is  Pharisaic,  when  the 
assertion  is  made  that  the  justification  which  is  grounded  on 
grace  is  enhanced  in  value  through  obedience  to  the  Church's 
commandments ;  for  the  Church's  commandments  have  only 
a  ceremonial  content,  which  is  of  no  value  for  the  public  well- 
being.  It  is  Pharisaic,  when  increase  of  grace  is  derived 
from  good  works,  reckoned  as  merits  (Trid,  Sess.  vi.  can.  32) ; 
for  "  merit "  signifies,  at  least  according  to  Thomas,  a  legal 
claim  upon  God,  even  though  the  claim  be  due  to  grace  (voL 
i.  p.  71).  Therefore  the  principle  of  freedom  from  the  law 
and  of  freedom  as  against  human  Church  ordinances  is  valu- 
able as  a  standard  for  the  recognition  of  the  Pharisaic  error 
in  the  Christian  religion.  Even  Evangelical  Christianity  has 
not  altogether  avoided  that  error. 

A  specially  significant  application  of  the  relation  of 
freedom  from  the  law  to  the  idea  of  justification  has  recently 
been  made  by  Schweizer.  He  arranges  the  whole  history  of 
religion  according  to  that  principle.  Between  the  religion 
of  nature  and  the  religion  of  redemption  he  places  a  second 
necessary  stage,  namely,  the  religion  of  law,  asserting  that 
in  that  stage  the  pious  soul,  in  harmony  with  the  influenoe 
of  the  moral  world,  acknowledges  its  dependence  on  the 
wisdom,  creative  power,  providence,  and  judicial  authority 
of  God.^  This  assumption,  however,  is  of  doubtful  value, 
For  the  definition  is  not  applicable  to  the  religion  of  the 
Old  Testament.  The  latter,  moreover,  did  not  degenerate 
into  "  mere  religion  of  law  and  Judaistic  holiness  of  works  " 
through  having  first  shut  itself  against  the  possibility  of 
advance  to  the  religion  of  redemption.     For  Pharisaism  is 

^  Cf.  ChrUUiche  Olaubenslehre,  vol.  i.  p.  311. 


114]  THE   GENEEAL   RELATIONS    OF   JUSTIFICATION  119 

older  than  Christianity.  And  again,  it  is  not  in  harmony 
with  the  description  of  Pharisaism  as  a  "  mere  religion  of  law 
and  legal  rights  "  that  the  religion  of  law  is  again  recognised 
as  the  positive  historical  preparation  for  the  religion  of 
redemption,  and  also  as  an  abiding  element  of  that  religion 
in  the  act  of  penitence.  When,  however,  Schweizer  says 
that  once  the  religion  has  been  fully  revealed,  the  pious 
consciousness  is  made  absolutely  free  from  the  religion  of 
law,  he  is  merely  giving  expression  to  the  thought  of  libertm 
a  lege}  A  special  significance  is  not  to  be  attached  to  this 
negative  statement.  Schweizer  is  hardly  justified,  however, 
in  concluding  from  these  facts  that  "  the  moral  Bationalism 
of  which  Kant  was  the  founder,  and  also  in  some  measure 
the  older  Socinianism,  were  attempts  to  comprehend  Chris- 
tianity itself  again  as  a  mere  religion  of  law,  excluding  all 
that  claims  to  be  revelation  and  redemption  as  imagina- 
tion or  error."  This  characterisation  does  not  adequately 
describe  even  the  Socinian  position,  far  less  the  Bationalism 
of  the  disciples  of  Kant.  For  both  tendencies  of  thought  are 
averse  to  all  ceremonial  practices.  They  do  not  surrender 
the  significance  of  the  grace  of  God,  and  they  are  far  from 
reducing  religion  to  notions  of  law.  As  a  general  rule. 
Protestantism  is  little  exposed  to  the  Pharisaic  error.  For 
even  where  in  Evangelical  Christianity  ceremonial  practices 
are  esteemed  too  highly,  there  is  found,  as  far  as  one  can 
observe,  no  accompanying  claim  of  right  before  God.  The 
Sabbath  rest,  as  observed  in  the  Puritan  habits  of  life  in 
Scotland  and  England,  is  indeed  in  entire  harmony  with 
the  Pharisaic  conception  of  the  Mosaic  law ;  but  in  as  far 
as  the  practice  is  maintained  as  a  national  custom  it  is  free 
from  the  suspicion  of  a  claim  of  right  upon  God.  It  would 
only  become  the  occasion  of  a  religious  error,  if,  for  example, 
it  were  made  the  basis  for  the  judgment  that  the  Christianity 
of  Germany  is  imperfect  because  it  is  without  that  custom. 
The  case  is  similar  when  Pietists  deny  the  existence  of  faith 
in  those  persons  in  whom  they  miss  the  exact  demeanour 

^  Op.  dU  p.  321. 


120  JUSTIFICATION   AND    RECONCILIATION  [lU— 5 

and  modes  of  speech  which  they  have  made  into  a  ceremonial 
law  for  themselves. 

§  22.  Justification  or  reconciliation  is  the  determination 
of  God  as  Father  to  admit  sinners,  in  spite  of  their  sin  and 
consciousness  of  guilt,  to  that  relation  of  fellowship  with 
Himself  which  includes  the  right  of  sonship  and  the  inherit- 
ance of  eternal  life.  This  relation  to  God  is  subject  from 
the  other  side  to  the  condition  that  faith,  that  is,  the 
direction  of  the  will  to  God  as  the  highest  end,  should  be 
called  forth  in  the  sinner,  and  that  the  feeling  of  mistrust 
which  operates  in  the  consciousness  of  faith  should  be 
converted  into  trust  in  God  as  Father.  And  finally,  since 
justification  or  reconciliation  is  the  fundamental  principle  of 
Christianity  as  a  religion,  through  which  all  other  correspond- 
ing functions  first  become  possible,  and  at  the  same  time 
forms  the  content  of  the  public  preaching  of  the  Gospel, 
it  must  not  merely  be  officially  represented  by  the  existent 
religious  community,  but  must  also  be  realised  in  the  experi- 
ence of  every  individual  within  the  community.  With 
regard,  however,  to  the  question  of  the  exte7it  of  God's 
purpose  of  Justification,  there  still  remains  unsettled  the 
controversy  between  the  Lutheran  and  the  Eeformed  theo- 
logians (vol.  i.  pp.  305—314).  Both  the  contending  parties 
can  appeal  to  definite  expressions  in  the  Epistles  of  the 
New  Testament  in  support  of  their  views  (vol.  ii.  p.  216). 
In  the  Eeformed  view,  the  Divine  purpose  of  justification 
through  Christ  is  limited  to  those  persons  whom  God  has 
eternally  elected  in  their  individual  capacity  as  recipients  of 
salvation.  This  true  community  of  Christ  is  the  primary 
object  of  justification,  which  ia  manifested  in  the  resurrection 
of  Christ ;  the  individual  experiences  that  grace  only  in  so 
far  as  he  belongs  by  election,  call,  and  spiritual  incorporation, 
to  the  true  community  of  Christ.  For  the  eternally  repro- 
bate there  is  neither  a  purpose  of  justification  on  the  part  of 
God,  nor  the  corresponding  purpose  on  the  part  of  Christ, 
even  although  His  work  in  itself  might  have  had  power  to 
secure  pardon  for  all  men.     In  the  Lutheran  view  (vol.  i. 


115-6]  THE   GENERAL   RELATIONS    OF   JUSTIFICATION  121 

p.  308),  the  wish  of  God,  in  accordance  with  which  He  has 
provided  for  the  reconciliation  of  His  justice  through  Christ, 
is  directed  to  the  salvation  of  all  men,  and  Christ  has  also 
in  intention  made  satisfaction  both  for  elect  and  reprobate. 
But  the  oifer  of  salvation  which  is  made  to  all  men  results  in 
justification  effectually  only  in  the  case  of  those  who  exercise 
faith.  On  account,  therefore,  of  this  necessary  condition 
of  an  effective  result,  God  has  eternally  elected  from  the 
mass  of  the  sinful  race  the  individual  persons  whose  faith 
He  foresaw. 

Neither  of  these  opposed  views  is  true ;  for  they  have 
alike  two  errors  in  common.  The  Lutheran  view,  on  the  very 
face  of  it,  shows  inconsistency  in  its  conception  of  God.  For 
according  to  that  view,  God's  openly-expressed  will,  as  made 
known  in  the  Gospel,  is  directed  to  the  salvation  of  all  men ; 
while  His  secret  wiU,  which  alone  is  really  effective,  limits 
salvation  to  a  portion  of  mankind,  those,  namely,  who  fidfil 
the  condition  of  faith.  This  inconsistency,  it  is  true,  does 
not  appear  in  the  Eeformed  system  of  doctrine,  as  oflBcially 
represented.  It  is  involved,  however,  in  that  system.  For 
along  with  the  particular  purpose  of  election  and  justification, 
the  law-giving  will  of  God  extends  the  promise  of  salvation 
to  all  men.  The  other,  the  fundamental,  error  in  both 
theories  consists  in  this,  that  the  human  race  on  the  one 
side,  and  the  community  of  the  elect  on  the  other,  are 
represented  as  sums  of  individuals,  and  that  on  both  sides 
the  real  destination  of  individuals  to  salvation  is  given  out 
as  an  eternal  act  of  God.  Now,  the  only  passage  in  which 
Paul  speaks  of  an  election  of  individuals  (Rom.  ix.  11) 
merely  conveys  the  sense  that  the  Divine  act  is  superordinate 
in  respect  of  relative  temporal  priority  to  the  self-activity  of 
men.^  All  the  other  expressions  of  the  apostles  on  this 
subject  (Eom.  viii.  29;  Eph.  i.  4;  1  Pet.  i.  1)  refer  to  the 
community  as   a  whole.     Eternal  election  of  individuals  is 

^  Accoi-ding  to  the  usual  interpretation,  Gal.  i.  15  also  belongs  to  this 
eatery.  I  am  very  doubtful,  however,  whether  Paul  is  here  speaking  of 
his  election  bj  God  before  his  birth. 


122  JUSTIFICATION    AND   RECONCILIATION  [116-7 

neither  a  Biblical  idea  nor  a  religious  conception,  but  merely 
a  deduction  of  Augustine's  from  his  abstract  idea  of  Grod 
— an  idea  which  makes  all  temporal  history  nothing  but 
unreal  appearance.  Now,  our  intuition  of  time  is  arrived 
at  through  the  distinction  which  we  draw  between  our 
different  ideas;  our  notion  of  time  is  fixed  through  the 
thought  of  the  dependence  of  effects  on  causes.  The 
reality  of  the  world  for  God,  as  we  must  needs  conceive 
it,  depends  on  the  condition  that  in  the  whole  the  indi- 
vidual also,  which  is  subject  to  change,  is  willed  by  Him. 
If  so,  then  the  form  of  time  also  has  its  vaUdity  for  Him. 
Now  the  individual  man  is  dependent  on  a  succession  of 
middle  causes.  God  can  therefore  conceive  the  individual 
only  as  he  appears  in  time.  Eternal  predestination  of 
individuals  to  salvation,  whether  unconditioned  or  conditioned 
by  the  faith  which  God  has  foreseen,  is  altogether  contrary  to 
reason. 

In  the  Lutheran  teaching,  in  particular,  there  is  a  peculiar 
limitation  of  the  ordinary  usage  of  words,  by  which  justifica- 
tion is  made  to  find  its  correlate  in  the  individual  believer  as 
such.  It  has  been  already  observed  how  the  original  close 
relation  of  justification  to  the  end  of  eternal  life,  a  relation 
through  which  the  idea  of  justification  receives  a  quite 
characteristic  colouring,  has  been  overlooked  by  the  Lutheran 
divines  (§  15).  In  the  Reformers  these  two  thoughts 
appear  as  interchangeable  ideas,  which  are  not  to  be  con- 
ceived apart  from  one  another.  The  Lutherans,  on  the  othfer 
hand,  regard  the  Divine  purpose  to  bestow  eternal  life  upon 
all  men  as  belonging  to  the  domain  of  antecedent  grace, 
without  reflecting  that  that  gift  can  only  be  conveyed  as  the 
result  of  justification.  Moreover,  when  they  represent  the 
satisfaction  which  Christ  has  made  for  all  men,  both  elect 
and  reprobate,  as  the  means  whereby  the  antecedent  uni- 
versal gracious  purpose  of  God  is  freed  from  the  restraints 
due  to  His  justice,  they  do  not  add  the  thought  that 
the  grace  of  God  thereby  becomes  efifective  for  all  men. 
Rather,  they  deduce  as  the  only  consequence  of  the  redempt- 


117-8]  THE   GENERAL   RELATIONS    OF   JUSTIFICATION  123 

ive  work  of  Christ  the  public  proclamation  of   the  Divine 
grace  in  the  Gospel,  along  with  the  conditions  brought  into 
existence  by  the  work  of  Christ.     It  is  only  here  that  the 
principle  first  finds  expression,  that  he  who  fixes  his  faith 
thereon    is   justified.       Now,   in    this   scheme    the   idea    of 
justification   is   so   represented   that    the   extension  of   the 
privilege  of  the  new  fellowship  with  God,  which  is  no  more 
fettered  by  sin,  is  made  superordinate  to  all  possible  changes 
in  the  sinners,  especially  r^eneration.     But  justification  does 
not  become  effective  in   the  case    of  the  individual  except 
through  the  condition  of  faith.     Now  faith  is  only  possible 
as    the    result    of    regeneration.       Therefore    regeneration 
necessarily  precedes   justification.     Therefore,  also,  the  idea 
of   regeneration    is    superordinate    to    that    of    justification. 
That  is,  justification  can  only  be  brought  into  relation  with 
the  individual  as  such  by  surrendering  what  the  Lutherans  are 
interested  in  maintaining,  the  superordination  of  justification 
to  regeneratioiL     The  Lutheran  theologians  have  sought  to 
escape  from  their  false    position    by   defining   regeneration 
through    the    Holy    Ghost,   which    they   allow   to    precede 
justification,  in  the  strictest  possible  sense  as  donatio  fidei 
(vol.  i.  p.  304),  and  by  making  renovatio  or  sanctijlcatio,  that 
is,  the  capacity  for  good  works    through    the   Holy  Ghost, 
follow  justification.      But  even  supposing   this  sequence  of 
ideas  were  represented  not  in  the  form  of  time,  but  logically, 
there  can  be  found  within  the  idea  of  the  Holy  Ghost  no 
conceivable    ground    why    the    establishment    of    religious 
susceptibility  and  that  of    moral   capacity   for  good  works 
should  not  take  place  in  one  single  act.     Moreover,  faith, 
even  when  regarded  as  susceptibility  to  the  Divine  grace,  is 
only  conceivable  as   the  positive  direction   of   the   will    to 
God,  and   as  such  is  no  mere  formal  activity,  but  a  real 
power  with  a  definite  content.     Thus  it  is  only  by  means 
of   doubtful  distinctions  that  the    Lutheran   divines  appar- 
ently evade   the  difficulty   which    they   incur    through    the 
exclusive  reference  of  justification  to  the  individual.     If  one 
continues  to  regard  this  method   of  conceiving  the  idea  of 


124  JUSTIFICATION   AND   RECONCILIATION  [118-9 

justification  as  valid,  while  refusing  to  be  bound  by  the 
recognised  distinctions,  then  the  thought  of  justification 
is  distorted  into  an  analytic  judgment  on  the  value  of 
faith  (p.  84). 

The  Lutheran  representation  of  justification  which  we 
have  just  discussed  harmonises  with  the  Reformation  concep- 
tion of  the  problem  in  so  far  as  the  latter  finds  justification 
in  the  experience  which  necessarily  falls  within  the  limits  of 
the  individual  life.  On  this  depends  another  characteristic 
feature  of  the  original  Reformation  view,  namely,  the  repre- 
sentation of  justification  as  the  immediate  result  of  the  work 
of  Christ.  Dogmatic  theology  has,  however,  placed  a  wide 
gulf  between  the  work  of  Clirist  and  the  justification  of  the 
individual,  in  respect  not  only  of  time,  but  also  of  the  object. 
Inasmuch  as  justification  is  the  content  of  the  Divine  purpose 
of  grace,  which  results  from  the  reconciliation  of  that  pur- 
pose with  the  justice  of  God  through  the  work  of  Christ, 
and  is  thereby  distinguished  from  the  antecedent  grace  of  Grod, 
a  formula  comes  into  existence  which  is  worthy  of  special 
attention,  although  it  appeared  in  history  only  before  the 
stereotyping  of  the  Lutheran  doctrine,  and  once  more  in 
the  time  of  its  decadence.  The  work  of  Christ  is  regarded, 
namely,  not  only  as  the  efficacious  means  of  reconciling  God, 
but  also  as  the  expression  of  the  gracious  will  of  God  directed 
to  the  redemption  and  justification  of  the  whole  human  race. 
After  Osiander,  contrary  to  the  original  opinion  of  the 
Reformers,  had  differentiated  both  temporally  and  logically 
the  ideas  of  redemption  and  justification  (Gerecht7nachu7ig) 
through  Christ,  Strigel  sought  to  maintain  the  identity  of 
both  ideas  (vol.  i.  p.  241).  To  this  end  he  had  to  distinguish 
between  the  successive  justification  {Gerechtsprechung)  of  indi- 
vidual believers  and  the  value  of  the  historical  event  which 
revealed  the  justifying  grace  of  God  in  general.  He  was  thus 
led,  through  maintaining  the  Lutheran  universalism,  to  con- 
struct the  formula  that  through  Christ  the  human  race  has 
been  redeemed,  sanctified,  and  justified,  but  that  these  benefits 
are  applied  to  individuals  only  when  they  believe  in  Christ  and 


119-20]         THE   GENERAL   RELATIONS   OF  JUSTIFICATION  125 

are  baptized  in  His  name.  This  formula  recurs  in  Fresenius.^ 
It  is  noteworthy  in  this  connection  that  Fresenius  arrives  in 
the  last  sentence  at  the  view  of  Samuel  Huber,  which  had 
been  rejected  in  its  day  by  the  Lutheran  theologians.^  And 
this  is  no  mere  accident.  For  if  we  bring  justification  into 
such  close  relation  to  the  redemptive  work  of  Christ  as  the 
religious  view  of  Luther  and  Melanchthon  demands ;  if,  further, 
we  attribute  no  particular  "  reference  "  to  the  Divine  purpose 
of  redemption  and  justification;  if,  finally,  we  regard  the 
purpose  to  justify  all  men  as  the  expression  of  the  eternal 
determination  of  the  will  of  God  in .  order  to  give  decisive 
weight  to  the  temporal  revelation  of  the  will  of  God — then  the 
eternal  destination  of  salvation,  or  election,  holds  good  for  all 
men.  But  if  so,  then  the  election  of  all  men,  being  after- 
wards rendered  inoperative  through  the  decision  of  individuals 
for  unbelief,  has  the  character  only  of  a  wish  which  remains 
for  the  greatest  part  unfulfilled.  The  flaw  in  the  Lutheran 
conception  of  the  Divine  scheme  of  salvation  in  the  world, 
therefoi-e,  appears  also  under  these  presuppositions,  although 
at  a  different  point  from  that  in  which  it  appears  in  the 
authoritative  type  of  doctrine  of  the  sixteenth  and  seven- 
teenth centuries. 

Although  Huber's  thesis,  that  God  has  eternally  elected  and 
foreordained  to  life  all  men  through  Christ,  cannot  be  estab- 
lished on  exegetical  grounds,  and  bears  on  the  face  of  it  the 
character  of  a  fixed  idea  rather  than  a  theological  proposition, 
yet,  as  a  protest  against  Calvin's  classification   of  men  as 

^  Cf.  lUeht/ertiguv^f  v.  8  :  "  Since  Christ  has  also  hecome,  hy  virtue  of  His 
manhood,  the  Head  of  the  whole  human  race,  therefore  one  man  is  as  much  to 
Him  as  another :  therefore  all  may  have  equal  part  in  His  satisfaction. "  vii.  82  : 
"  Although  the  real  imparting  of  the  righteousness  of  Christ  to  an  individual 
man  can  only  take  place  when  he  has  come  into  heing  and  has  fulfilled  the 
necessary  conditions,  yet  he  was  reckoned  as  already  present  at  the  time  of 
the  great  atoning  sacrifice  of  Christ,  not  through  a  necessary  predestination, 
but  through  a  free  imputation,  not  only  believers  but  all  men  having  been 
included  in  this  imputation.  .  ,  .  The  ground  of  the  whole  business  of  redemp- 
tion and  justification  is  the  covenant  of  peace  which  the  Father  made  with  the 
Son  in  the  eternities.  In  this  covenant  the  multitude  of  all  men  and  also  the 
all-sofficient  sacrifice  of  Christ  were  regarded  as  present. " 

'Cf.  Schweiser,  Protestant,  Ce7Uraldogm$n,  vol.  i.  pp.  501  ff.,  532 ff. 


126  JUSTIFICATION    AND    RECONCILIATION  [120-2 

either  eternally  reprobate  or  eternally  elect,  it  is  not  without 
interest.     It  was  from  the  very  outset  an  unwarranted  over- 
stepping of    theological  competency  to   define   the   Biblical 
thought  of   Divine  election    more    precisely  by  filling  out, 
through  rational  processes,  the  opposite  thought  of  reprobation. 
For  the  religious  interest  is  only  concerned  with  the  question 
whether  oneself  belongs  to  the  number  of  the  elect,  while  one's 
human  sympathies,  when  not  suppressed  by  dogmatism,  will 
always  rise  in  revolt  against  the  idea  of  eternal  reprobation 
as  represented  by  Luther  {De  servo  arbitrio)  and  Calvin.     And 
besides,  the  cognitive  interest  is  not  satisfied  by  this  idea  of 
reprobation,  since  one  is  not  competent  to  subsume  definite 
men   under  this  predicate.     Therefore  Huber  is  worth  our 
remembrance,  if  only  we  confine  our  attention  to  the  negative 
side  of  the  gratia  universalis  which  he  proclaimed  so  inde- 
fatigably.      Huber   was,  however,  a    very   poor   theologian, 
inasmuch  as  he  did  no  justice  to  the  thought  of  the  election 
of  the  human  race  in  Christ,  which  he  deduced  from  Eph. 
i.  4,  5.     The  doctrine  of  twofold  predestination,  as  held  by 
Augustine,  Luther,  and  Calvin,  has  absolutely  no  connection 
with  the  thought  of  election  in  Christ.     Thus,  when  the  later 
Eeformation    system-builders    saw    themselves  compelled   to 
come  to  an  understanding  with  this  formula,  the  orthodox 
Calvinistic  school  maintained  that  the  predestination  of  re- 
demption through  Christ  was  subordinate  to  the  predestina- 
tion of  the  elect  individuals  to  salvation,  as  the  means  to  the 
end.     But,  as  I  have  already  shown  (vol.  i.  p.  306),  some  of 
the  most  important  Reformed  theologians  have  determined 
the   relation   of   the  two   ideas   difierently.     They  think    of 
Christ,  in  whom  the  community  as  a  whole  is  elected,  under 
the  attribute  of  His  Lordship  over  the  community,  and  accord- 
ingly regard  the  predestination  of  Christ  as  the  chief  Heir  of 
God  as  preceding  the  election  of  the  community  to  participa- 
tion in  His  inheritance,  as  the  ground  precedes   the  conse- 
quence.^    This  view,  which  is  held  by  Amesius,  Heidegger, 

^  To  the  note  on  vol.  i.  p.  306,  I  add  the  following  supplementary  remarks. 
When  I  there  stated  that  Arminius  was  the  first  to  lay  stress  on  the  thought  of 


122]  THE   GENERAL   RELATIONS   OF   JUSTIFICATION  127 

and  Witeius,  involves,  in  truth,  as  much  as  the  orthodox  view, 
the  validity  of  the  idea  of  particular  election  with  all  its 
peculiar  consequences,  therefore  also  the  thought  of  reproba- 
tion. The  latter,  however,  no  longer  rightly.  For  the 
condition  under  which  reprobation  became  co-ordinated  with 
election  has  disappeared.  The  community  is  elected  as 
a  whole  in  Christ,  its  Head ;  the  reprobate,  on  the  other 
hand,  are  reprobated  only  as  individuals.  Amesius  further, 
through  his  expressed  comparison  between  the  solidarity  of 
the  elect  community  in  Christ  and  the  solidarity  of  the 
human  race  in  Adam,  opens  up  a  new  view  of  the  mean- 
ing and  end  of  election.  He  represents  the  creation  of 
men,  namely,  as  completed  through  the  Son  of  God,  Whose 
communion  with  the  human  race  was  predestinated  in  the 
eternal  election  of  God.     This  thought  was  already  indicated 

election  in  Christ,  I  knew  quite  well  that  the  foimula  had  already  found  a 
place  in  theological  usage.  I  did  not  need  to  he  taught  that  it  already  occurs 
in  the  Formula  of  Concord.  But  with  what  degree  of  clearness  is  it  there  used  ? 
The  Lutheran  formula,  which  Musaeus  (in  Baier,  vol.  iii.  pp.  12, 14)  draws  up — 
"Quod  est  causa,  cur  deus  in  tempore  nohis  salutem  conferat,  id  etiam  causa 
est,  cur  ad  salutem  nos  elegerit.  Atqui  meritum  Christi  est  causa,  cur  deus  in 
tempore  nobis  salutem  conferat ;  ergo  meritum  Christi  est  etiam  causa,  cur  deus 
iios  elegerit " — became  possible  for  the  first  time  after  the  lines  of  demarcation 
bad  been  drawn  between  the  Arminians  and  the  Calvinists.  One  sees  quite  easily, 
indeed,  that  the  Lutheran  development  of  doctrine,  from  the  time  of  the  Formula 
of  Concord,  proceeded  on  the  way  towards  this  goal.  But  at  the  beginning 
of  this  process  the  appearance  of  a  difference  on  this  point  between  the  Lutherans 
and  Calvinists  was  anything  but  clear,  especially  as  Zanchi  (in  Gerhard,  Loci 
iked,  viii.  8.  149)  expressed  himself  in  a  characteristically  Lutheran  way  on 
the  subject — ^The  formula  of  Amesius  and  the  later  Calvinists  was  also  antici- 
pated by  Calvin.  But  it  is  very  interesting  to  observe  how  little  the  latter,  in 
the  period  of  his  strongest  dependence  on  Luther,  uas  able  to  discriminate  his 
thought  of  the  election  of  the  community  in  the  Person  of  its  Lord,  and  Luther's 
thought  that  Christ  is  the  ground  of  the  knowledge  of  our  election.  lu  the  first 
edition  of  his  InsiUutio  of  1536  Calvin  says  :  **  Cum  Christus  dominus  noster  is 
sit,  in  quo  pater  ab  aetemo  elegit,  quos  voluit  esse  suos  ac  in  ecclesiae  suae 
gregem  referri,  satis  clarum  testimonium  habemus,  nos  et  inter  dei  electos  et  ex 
ecclesia  esse,  si  Christo  communicamus.  Deinde  cum  sit  ipse  idem  Christus 
constans  et  immntabilis  patris  Veritas,  minime  haesitandum  est,  quin  eius  sermo 
vere  nobis  enarret  patris  voluntatem,  qualis  ab  initio  fuit  et  semper  futura  est. 
Qnando  itaqne  Christum  et  quidquid  eius  est,  fide  possidemus,  certo  statuendum, 
quod  ut  ipse  dilectua  est  patris  filius  haeresque  regni  coelorum,  ita  et  nos  per 
ipsum  in  dei  filios  sumus  adoptati  et  sic  eius  fratres  ac  consortes,  ut  eiusdem 
simus  haereditatis  participes ;  ob  id  certi  quoque  simus,  nos  inter  eos  esse,  quos 
dominos  ab  aetemo  elegit "  {C.  B,  xxix.  p.  74).  It  is  worth  while  to  investigate 
the  history  of  this  point  of  doctrine  in  its  whole  context. 


128  JUSTIFICATION   AND   RECONCILIATION  [122—3 

by  Zwiiigli :  ^  and  it  has  since  been  more  fully  developed   by 
Schleiermacher. 

We  have  to  take  account  of  three  ideas,  in  virtue  of 
which  Schleiermacher  rose  above  the  limits  of  theological 
tradition,  and  which  act  and  react  in  certain  definite  ways  on 
one  another.  Although  the  conception  of  redemption  denotes 
comprehensively  the  whole  work  of  Christ,  yet  it  does  not 
form  a  suitable  expression  of  the  Divine  decree,  inasmuch  as 
it  stands  in  direct  relation  to  the  fact  of  sin.  The  latter  is 
indeed  ordained  by  God,  in  order  that  men  should  realise 
the  formerly-existent  insurmountable  incapacity  of  the  God- 
consciousness  as  a  personal  activity,  and  thus  acquire  the 
longing  after  redemption.  But  as  God  is  not  the  Author  of 
evil,  and  as  the  latter  is  no  creative  thought  of  God,  redemption 
denotes  not  so  much  directly  the  Divine  decree  concerning 
men,  as  rather  the  practical  effect  of  that  decree  in  harmony 
with  the  special  circumstances.  Therefore  the  Divine  decree 
of  redemption  applies  properly  to  the  completion  of  tbe 
creation  of  men  in  the  Person  of  Christ.  In  this  idea  there 
is  expressly  included  the  thought  that  the  attainment  of 
perfect  human  life  was  not  to  be  reached  along  the  lines  of 
mere  natural  development  from  Adam  (§  89,  1).  If,  now, 
the  privilege  of  sonship  to  God  which  is  bestowed  in  justifi- 
cation is  the  positive  new  status  in  which  men  participate 
in  the  life  of  Christ  and  in  His  relationship  to  His  Father, 
then  we  must  not  think  of  merely  isolated  acts  of  justification. 
These  acts  are  only  manifestations  in  time  of  the  one  eternal 
Divine  decree  of  the  justification  of  men  for  Christ's  sake. 
This  decree  is  identical  with  that  of  the  sending  of  Christ 
into  the  world,  and  also  with  that  of  the  creation  of  the 
human  race,  in  so  far  as  human  nature  is  perfected  and  made 
pleasing  to  God  in  Christ  (§  109,  2.  3).     Now  the  election 

^  De  providenliay  cap.  4,  0pp.  iv.  p.  98  :  **Deus  homincm  non  in  hoc  solum 
condidit,  ut  imago  et  exemplum  cius  esset,  sod  in  hoc  qnoque,  ut  ex  his  crea* 
tiiris,  quae  de  terra  factae  sunt,  esset  quae  deo  frueretur,  hie  commercio  et  ami« 
citia,  isthic  vero  possideildo  ct  ainplexando  ;  sed  in  hoc,  ut  umbram  quandam 
praefignraret  eius  commercii,  quod  aliquando  per  filium  suum  cum  mundo  initurus 
erat." 


123-4]  THE    GENERAL   RELATIONS    OF   JUSTIFICATION  129 

of  those  who  are  justified,  and  who  as  such  enter  into  the 
Kingdom  of  God  which  was  founded  by  Christ,  is  an  idea 
which  the  common  Christian  feeUng  applies  to  all  who  are 
already  within  the  circle  over  which  the  influence  of  Christ's 
work  extends,  or  who  may  hereafter  enter  into  that  circle. 
This  idea,  moreover,  is  regarded  as  an  expression  of  the  Divine 
world-order,  which  demands,  as  necessary  conditions  for  salva- 
tion, the  freedom  of  each  individual  and  his  personal  relation 
to  the  world  and  to  the  history  of  the  accomplishment  of 
salvation.     A  judgment  on   the  eternal  and    unconditioned 
reprobation  of  individuals,  therefore,  cannot  possibly  be  de- 
duced from  this  idea  of  election,  but  only  the  judgment  that 
certain   individuals  have  not  yet  been  brought  within  the 
sphere  of  the  operations  of  Divine  grace.     But  if  we  follow 
theological  tradition  in  its  idea  that  those  who  die  outside  of 
the  fellowship  of  Christ  have  no  possible  access  to  fellowship 
with  Him,  this  means  that  those  persons  are  altogether  non- 
existent as  regards  the  domain  of  the  new  creation  of  humanity 
which  was  opened  up  by  Christ.     But,  seeing  that  even  the 
elect  enter  only  gradually  into  this  domain,  the  conception  of 
predestination  cannot  in  any  way  be  related  to  individuals. 
The  following  proposition    results   instead :    "  There   is  one 
Divine  predestination,  according  to  which  the  whole  of  the 
new  creation  is  called  into  being  from  out  the  whole  mass 
of  the  human  race  "  (§  119).     This  is  not  only  an  essentially 
new  definition  of  the  problem  of  election,  but  also  the  open- 
ing up  of  a  way  towards  the  settlement  of  the  controversy 
regarding  the  extent  of  justification.^ 

^  Ho&nann  follows  the  same  line  as  Schleiermacher  ;  but  he  surpasses  him 
in  the  precision  with  which  he  relates  the  reconciliation  which  was  brought 
aboat  by  Christ's  obedience  to  the  new  humanity,  which  he  sees  in  the  com- 
munity of  Christ  (vol.  i.  p.  621).  Cf.  yon  Zezschwitz,  DU  JUcht/ertigung  des 
Sunders  vor  GoU  in  ihrem  VerhaUniss  zur  OnadenmUtdwirJcung  und  der  ewigen 
SrwQJUung  {Die  aUgemeine  lutheriBche  Conferenz  in  Hannover ^  1868),  pp.  96, 
96.  Von  Zezschwitz  relates  eternal  election  in  Christ  not  to  individuals,  but  to 
a  holy  human  race,  as  the  realisation  of  the  Divine  creative  purpose,  in  which 
"eaeh  individual  is  elected,  adopted,  and  justified  as  a  member  of  the  humanity 
in  process  of  perfection,"  but  so  that  '*  one  who  has  been  already  justified  and 
thus  also  predesignated  in  time,  may  through  apostasy  fall  away  from  the  path 
of  perfection,"  and  his  place  in  the  eternal  race  be  taken  by  another. 


130  JUSTIFICATION    AND    RECONCILIATION  [124-5 

The  writers  of  the  New  Testament,  aa  a  general  rule,  con- 
fine the  definite  application  of  the  benefits  of  Christianity  to 
the  Christian  community,  that  is,  to  those  persons  who  there- 
in represent  a  peculiai-  stage  of  humanity.  Whenever  Paul, 
for  example,  treats  of  predestination  and  eternal  electiou, 
he  has  the  community  of  Christ  in  view  (Rom,  viii,  29,  30; 
Eph.  i.  4).  This  limitation  of  horizon  ia  in  harmony  with 
the  fact  that  redemption  and  justification,  regarded  alike 
according  to  Divine  purpose,  according  to  the  purpose  of 
Jesus  Himself,  and  as  matter  of  actual  experience,  are 
correlated  to  the  community  of  believers  (voL  ii.  p.  216)l 
Paul,  indeed,  in  one  instance  (Bom.  v.  18)  relates  justification 
to  all  men,  in  the  same  way  as  he  has  related  the  sentence  of 
condemnation  which  attaches  to  Adam's  transgression.  But 
in  the  explanatory  addition  the  thought  is  restricted  to  "  the 
many,"  an  expression  which  has  been  already  used  as  a 
key-word  in  the  comparison  between  Christ  and  Adam.  The 
"  all,"  whom  God  "  has  shut  up  under  disobedience  "  in  order 
again  "to  have  mercy  upon  them"  (Bom.  xi.  32),  refers, as 
the  context  shows,  not  to  individual  men,  but  to  the  nations, 
which  were  formerly  opposed  to  one  another  as  Gentiles  and 
Jews.  In  2  Cor.  v.  14,  15,  those  for  whom  Christ  died  are 
described  as  "  all,"  but  in  the  following  sentences  this  "  all " 
signifies  only  the  community  of  believers.  In  John  (1  John 
ii.  2),  Christ  in  His  atoning  death  is  recognised  as  the 
Propitiation,  "  not  only  for  our  sins,  but  also  for  the  sins  of 
the  whole  world."  This  antithesis,  however,  in  order  to  be 
made  good,  must  be  supplemented  by  the  qualification  that 
the  community  to  which  the  sacrifice  of  Christ  stands  in 
necessary  relation,  extends  over  the  whole  human  race. 
There  remain,  then,  only  the  two  passages,  Heb.  ii.  9  and 
1  Tim.  ii.  4-6.  In  the  former  of  these,  the  phrase  inrep 
iravTo^  distributes  the  benefits  of  the  death  of  Christ  to 
individual  men.  In  the  latter,  the  expression  "all  men" 
is  not  to  be  understood,  as  it  is  by  Augustine,  as  meaning 
"all  kinds  of  men."  Whether,  however,  the  expression  in 
the  Epistle  to  the  Hebrews  is  in  real  contradiction  with  the 


126-6]  THE   GKNERAL   RELATIONS    OF   JUSTIFICATION  131 

other  line  of  thought,  must  be  questioned.  For  the 
immediately  following  arguments  of  the  writer  in  regard  to 
the  sacrifice  of  Christ  maintain  the  strict  relation  of  that 
sacrifice  to  the  Covenant-community.  Now,  in  comparison 
with  those  fully-developed  arguments,  the  expression  in  ver. 
9  appears  merely  as  a  preliminary  and  incompletely  defined 
remark,  suggested  by  the  language  of  Ps.  viii.,  which  opens 
the  discussion  in  which  the  sentence  in  question  is  found. 
The  first  Epistle  to  Timothy,  again,  is  not  by  Paul.  The 
statements  that  "God  wills  the  salvation  of  all,"  and  that 
"Christ  is  the  ransom  for  all,"  were  without  doubt  called 
forth  owing  to  the  Gnostic  limitation  of  the  benefits  of 
Christianity  to  "the  spiritual"  (TrvevfiariKoC).  On  account 
of  their  entire  divergence  from  the  express  word  of  Christ,  as 
well  as  from  the  apostolical  (especially  Paul's)  conception  of 
Christianity,  they  are  not  to  be  accepted  as  theologically 
authoritative.     The  same  holds  with  regard  to  2  Pet.  iii.  9. 

These  passages  of  the  New  Testament  give  no  confirma- 
tion to  the  Lutheran  theory  of  the  application  of  the  grace 
of  God  to  all  individual  men.  The  Calvinistic  doctrine  of 
the  co-ordinate  relation  of  blessedness  and  reprobation  to 
individual  men  is  equally  without  support  in  the  New 
Testament.  Paul  speaks,  indeed,  of  "  hardening,"  partly  on 
the  occasion  of  his  introducing  definite  quotations  from  the 
Old  Testament  (Rom.  ix.  13,  17),  and  partly,  in  reference 
to  the  Jewish  people,  as  a  temporary  dispensation  of 
God  (Bom.  xi.  7,  26).  But  these  sentences  are  quite 
wrongly  used,  when  mere  temporal  hardening  is  made 
equivalent  to  eternal  reprobation.  How  little,  alike  in  the 
latter  context  and  in  general,  Paul  is  thinking  of  individuals, 
how  much  rather,  when  pursuing  the  theme  of  the  application 
of  the  grace  of  God,  he  has  large  masses  of  mankind  in  view, 
is  evident  from  the  fact  that  he  finds  consolation  for  the 
present  hardening  of  the  people  of  Israel  in  the  prophecy  of 
their  conversion.  He  has  thus  no  interest  in  the  destiny  of 
the  many  individual  members  of  this  nation  who  depart 
life  before  that  consummaticHX.     It  is  in  the  same  light  that 


132  JUSTIFICATION    AND   RECONCILIATION  [120 

we  must  understand  his  declaration  that  be  has  fulfilled  his 
call  to  preach  the  Gospel  from  Jerusalem  to  Illyricum,  and 
that  he  has  no  more  place  in  that  geographical  region  for 
his  activity  (Eom.  xv.  19,  23).  The  apostle  makes  that 
assertion,  not  on  the  ground  that  he  has  brought  the  Gospel 
within  the  hearing  of  every  individual  man  in  every  inhabited 
spot  of  that  region,  but  that  he  has  preached  the  Gospel  and 
established  a  Christian  community  in  the  chief  city  of  every 
province.  He  thus  thought  his  task  accomplished  when  he 
had  made  the  knowledge  of  Christianity  possible  in  every 
nation  of  men.  He  speaks  of  the  universality  of  the  exten- 
sion of  Christianity,  accordingly,  in  view  of  all  the  different 
nations,  Jews  and  Gentiles,  who,  when  God  has  compassion 
upon  them,  are  received  into  the  community  of  Christ  (Horn. 
xi.  28-32). 

As  against  this  scriptural  limitation  of  the  problem 
concerning  the  relation  of  the  universality  of  Divine  grace 
to  the  universality  of  human  sin,  the  theology  of  both 
Confessions  has  failed  to  take  sufficiently  true  bearings.  In 
neither,  whether  in  respect  of  sin  or  of  pardon,  are  the  different 
nations  treated  as  portions  of  humanity.  But  for  that  reason 
the  conception  of  humanity  in  these  systems  of  theology  is 
both  obscure  and  fluctuating.  In  the  peculiar  expression  he 
gives  to  the  doctrine  of  original  sin,  Augustine  views  the 
descent  of  sin  as  a  simple  instance  of  natural  propagation,  and 
regards  the  human  race  as  inassa  perdita,  without  at  all 
attempting  to  distinguish  the  individual  members  of  the  race. 
He  first  forms  his  general  notion  of  men  under  the  attribute 
of  the  sinfulness  transmitted  from  their  ancestors ;  then,  led 
by  his  Platonic  mode  of  thinking,  he  makes  that  general 
notion  equivalent  to  actual  humanity.  In  order,  however,  to 
be  able  to  fit  in  the  quality  of  guilt  into  this  general  notion, 
he  takes  the  human  race  to  mean  all  the  individual  men  who 
in  Adam  sinned  with  their  own  personal  responsibility. 
These  utterly  heterogeneous  propositions,  the  one  of  which 
results  from  a  realistic,  the  other  from  a  nominalistic  con- 
ception, form  together  the  common  doctrine  of  original  sin. 


126-7]  THE   GENERAL   RELATIONS    OF   JUSTIFICATION  133 

The  idea  of  pardon,  whether  conceived  as  applicable  to 
all  men  or  merely  to  a  portion  of  mankind,  takes  its  form 
from  the  latter  of  the  two  propositions.  Pardon  is  conceived 
only  as  applicable  to  individual  men,  who  are  made  the 
objects  of  Divine  grace  entirely  in  reference  to  their  own 
particular  sin,  and  in  no  other  respect. 

The  notion  of  humanity,  however,  can  be  represented  with 
certainty  only  when  the  idea  of  races  and  nations,  of  grades 
and  species  within  the  genus,  receives  attention,  and  when  not 
merely  the  points  of  agreement  and  difference  in   natural 
endowment,  but  also  the  diversity  in  spiritual  activity  within 
these  groups,  are  taken  into  consideration.     For  the  notions 
of   genus    and    species   are   so    mutually    related   that    the 
individual  belongs  to  the  genus  of  men  only  as  sprung  from 
a   definite    nation,  and    further,  from    a   definite   family  of 
nations    or  race.      In   this  respect    the    existence    of   man 
is  subject  to  the  same  conditions  as  all  organic  nature.     For, 
in  this  realm  of  knowledge  also,  the  notions  of  genus  and 
species  are  not  categories  in  the  nominalistic  sense,  merely  for 
the  correct  ordering  of  our  experiences ;  rather,  the  observa- 
tion of  natural   objects  leads  us  directly  to  these  notions. 
Their  objective  validity,  moreover,  is  not  impaired  by  the  fact 
that  in  natural  phenomena  variations  from  the  special  type 
exist,  and   that   transitional  forms  between  different  species 
and  different  genera  are  found,  which  suggest  the  hypothesis 
that  species   have   sprung  from    species,  and    genera   from 
genera.      For  by  the  conception  of   species  we  are  not  to 
understand  an  absolutely  immutable  complex  of  characteristic 
marks.     Sather,  the  peculiar  characteristic  of  a  species  may 
be  thought  of  as  acquired,  without  our  doubting  the  fact  of 
its  fixity  for  the  sphere  of  present  experience. 

The  notion  of  the  human  genus,  now%  comes  directly 
within  the  sphere  of  Christian  theology  in  so  far  as  the 
Christian  view  of  the  world  involves  a  destination  of  men  to 
fellowship  with  God,  and  to  a  common  moral  development, 
which  shall  apply  not  to  one  nation,  but  to  all  nations. 
This  presupposes  that  men,  who  differ  from  all  other  created 


134  JUSTinCATION   AND   RECONCILIATION  [l27-S 

beings  bj  the  capacity  for  rational  thought  and  the  gift  of 
speech,  carry  in  them  also  the  marks  of  an  original  endow- 
ment, which  proves  their  kinship  with  God.     On  the  other 
hand,  the  anthropological    problem  of  the  origin    of  racial 
difiTerences,  which  is  decided  now  for,  and  now  against,  their 
originality,  is  of  no  consequence  for  theology.     In  referring 
the   different  nations  and   the  individual  members  of  the&e 
nations  to  the  common  destination  of  men  in  the  Kingdom 
of  God,  Christianity  takes  for  granted  national  differences, 
whether  these  are  to  be  regarded  as  original  or  as  historically 
developed.       For    this  purpose,  however,  account  is  to  be 
taken,  not  so  much  of  the  peculiar  natural  endowments  of  the 
nations,  as  of  their  spiritual  character.     Now  this  is  always 
something  acquired.     Therefore,  for  the  scientific  treatment  of 
the  relation  between  individual  men  and  the  generic  end  of 
man  as  posited  in  Christianity,  the  imdoubted  fact  must  be 
taken  into  account,  that  every  individual  man  attains  the  full 
development  of  his  spiritual  capacities  within  the  limits  of  his 
national  speech,  and  of  the  peculiar  morale  which  his  nation 
acquires,    partly   of  necessity   through   the  Ideal    conditions 
which  govern  the  maintenance  of  the  common  national  life, 
and  partly  in  the  free  use  of  these.     But  in  the  same  way, 
also,  other  historical  experiences  of  the  nations  influence  the 
peculiar  type  which  Christianity  assumes  among  the  members 
of  these  nations.     The  Christianity  of  the  Western  nations,  for 
example,  is  conditioned  in  a  quite  peculiar  way  by  the  fact 
that  these  nations  at  one  and  the  same  time  became  adherents 
of  the  Christian  religion  and  entered  into  the  spiritual  in- 
heritance of  the  classical  nations.     How  strongly  our  Western 
Christianity  has  been  influenced  by  the  aesthetic  and  intel- 
lectual tradition  of  the  Greeks,  and  by  the  continued  operation 
of  Roman  models  in  law  and  State,  one  can  prove  even  from 
certain   errors   which  have   been  handed   down  in  theology. 
We  must  therefore   recognise   the    fact  that   the  individual 
enters  upon  the  common  human  task  of  Christianity,  never 
merely  as   an  individual,   but  always   under  the  conditions, 
whether  favourable  or  unfavourable,  of  his  peculiar  national 


128-9]  THE    GENERAL   RELATIONS    OF   JUSTIFICATION  135 

education.       The   truth  here  brought  out  is  completed   by 
the  further  observation  that,  in  order  to  fulfil  its  destined 
end,  Christianity  must  win  over  the  nations  as  wholea     That 
is,  it  can  only  really  accomplish  its  universal  human  purpose 
when  it  brings  under  its  influence  all  the  social  conditions 
under  which  the  spiritual  life  of  individuals  exists.     A  Chris- 
tianity which  should  remain  anti-national  in  the  minority  of 
a  people  would  destroy  the  necessary  foundation  on  which  the 
spiritual  existence  of  its  adherents  rests,  and  thus  itself  sink 
into  a  fruitless  particularism.     One  hears,  indeed,  from  Piet- 
istic  circles  precisely  the  opposite  view,  namely,  that  since  the 
time  of  Constantine  Christianity  had  been  led  into  a  path 
quite  foreign  to  its  nature,  inasmuch  as  the  end  sought  was 
no  longer  the  conviction  of  individuals,  but  the  reception  of 
whole   nations  into   the  Church.     This  result,  then,  having 
been  attained  by  force,   the  peculiar  conditions  came    into 
existence  which  had  to  be  amended  after  so  many  centuries 
by  the  conversion  of  individuals  as  such.     This  contradiction 
of  views  ramifies   to  such  an  extent  that  we  cannot  here 
pursue  the  subject  further.      If,  however,  the  nations  are 
destined  for  Christianity,  as  we  may  assume  also  in  accord- 
ance with  the  suggestions  and   the  evangeUstic  method  of 
Paul,  the  universal  destination  of  Christianity  is  not  impaired 
by  the  fact  that  the  members  of  a  Christian  nation  do  not  all 
enter  upon  the  destination  which  validly  obtains  for  them. 
This  position  has  already  been  justified  by  a  Eeformed  theo- 
logian ^  by  the  help  of  analogies,  the  significance  of  which 
cannot  be  denied,  even  though  the  introduction  of  the  idea  of 
reprobation  is  out  of  place. 

'  Wolfg.  Musculus,  Loc,  eomm.  xvii. :  ''Scimns  non  omnes  redemptionis 
fieri  [larticipes  ;  verum  illonim  perditio,  qui  non  servantur,  haudquaqnam  im- 
pedit,  quominus  universalis  vocetur  redemptio,  quae  non  est  uni  genti,  sed  toti 
mando  destinata.  Resolatio  ilia  telluris,  qua  passim  omnia  ad  germinandum 
aestate  solvnntur,  recte  universalis  dicitur,  etiamsi  multae  arbores  et  innumera 
loca  nee  germina  nee  fructus  proferant.  Sol  ille  generalis  totius  orbis  illumina- 
tor est,  qoamvis  mnlti  sint,  qui  nihil  ab  eo  lucis  accipiant.  Ad  eum  modum 
babet  et  redemptio  ista  generis  humani,  de  qua  loquimur,  quod  homines  reprobi 
&c  deplorate  impii  non  accipiunt,  neque  defectu  fit  gratiae  dei,  neque  iustum  est, 
ut  ilia  propter  filios  perditionis  gloriam  ac  titulnm  universalis  redemptionis 
amittat,  cum  sit  {jarata  cunctis  et  omnes  ad  illam  vocentur." 


136  JUSTIFICATION   AND    KECONCILIATION  [l^>— 30 

The  significance  of  Christianity  for  the  human  race  has  to 
stand  a  much  more  difficult  test  in  the  [ascertained  facts  of 
ethnology.     These  facts  were  unknown  to  the  first  advocates 
of  Christianity,  but  they  cannot  be  left  out  of  account  by  us. 
Paul,  speaking   from    the  extent   of   his  knowledge  of   the 
different  nations  of  the  world,  could  maintain  that  Christiaaitj 
was  as  much  appropriate  and  accessible  to  barbarians  and 
Scythians  as  to  Jews  and  Greeks.     We,  on  the  other  hand, 
know  that  the  diversity  in  the  character  of  nations  is  very 
strongly  conditioned  by  graded  dififerences  in  their  spiritual 
endowment  and  acquired   moral  disposition.      This  fact    of 
graded    differences    is   already    cognisable    in    the   different 
families  of  languages.     For  languages  are  regarded  as  more 
imperfect  or  perfect  in  proportion  to  the  degree  in  which 
they  express  less  or  greater  versatility   of  spirit,  or  make 
possible  a  less  or  greater  extent  of  spiritual  culture.      And 
further,  the   lower  or  higher  degree  of  moral  development, 
whether  of  the  community  or  of  the  individual,  which  appears 
tangibly  in   the  difference    between    the    nomadic   and    the 
settled  nations,  is  conditioned  by  the  nature  of  the  land  in 
which    the    nations   live.       These    and    similar    ethnological 
conditions    are    the    grounds    of    the    distinction    between 
the  unhistorical,   the    particular-historical,    and    the    world- 
historical    nations.       Now,    there   is   not    found   an    equal 
disposition  towards  the  Christian  religion  at  each  of   these 
different  stages.      With  regard   to  the  unhistorical  nature- 
peoples,    Martensen^    expresses  the    opinion    that,   regarded 
from  the  natural  point  of  view,  they  are  still  in  an  embryonic, 
and  therefore  imperfect,  condition.     On  the  other  hand,  Stein- 
thal  ^  declares  his  conviction  that  the  difference  between  the 
unhistorical   and  the  prehistoric  nations  (thus,  for  example, 
between  the  Australian  negroes  and  the  Germans  before  the 
"  wandering   of  the  nations  ")  is  precisely  the  same  as    the 
difference  between  sickness  and  health.     The  former  of  these 

'  Bogmatik,  p.  416. 

'  Philologut  Geschichle  und  Psychologic  in  ihren  (jegenseitigen  Beziehungen 
(1864),  p.  89. 


130-1]  THB   GENERAL   RELATIONS    OF   JUSTIFICATION  137 

opinions  is  evidently  formed,  quite  naturally,  on  the  universal- 
istic  principle  of  the  Lutheran  doctrine.  But  the  second  view 
depends  none  the  less  on  theological  considerations,  inasmuch 
as  it  is  based  on  the  assumption  of  a  special  degree  of  moral 
corruption.  On  different  grounds,  particular-historical  nations 
like  the  Chinese  and  the  Hindus  lack  the  disposition  towards 
Christianity  as  much  as  the  nations  which  adhere  to  the  other 
universal  religions.  Buddhism  and  Islam.  Therefore  it  is  only, 
strictly  speaking,  the  world-historical  nations  of  the  West — 
that  is,  those  nations  which,  through  inhabiting  lands  afford- 
ing the  conditions  which  are  favourable  to  mutual  intercourse, 
have  developed  a  common  history— which  have  arrived  at  an 
idea  of  the  natural  and  moral  unity  of  the  human  race  suffi- 
cient to  enable  them  to  embrace  the  practically  thorough- 
going Christian  idea  of  the  unity  of  the  race.  For  the 
common  highest  task  which  devolves  upon  the  world-historical 
nations  which  have  embraced  Christianity  is  essentially  bound 
up  with  the  idea  that  they  are  united  together  in  the  religious 
community  of  the  one  only  true  God. 

No  one,  of  course,  is  in  a  position  to  predict  whether  the 
nations  which  stand  outside  of  the  history  of  Western  culture 
will  be  led  to  embrace  Christianity,  and  whether  Christianity 
will  fulfil  its  universal  destination  in  regard  also  to  them.  In 
any  case,  such  a  consummation  is  only  possible  in  the 
measure  in  which  these  nations  enter,  through  their  own 
effort,  into  the  circle  of  culture  of  the  world-historical  nations. 
For  the  existence  of  the  Christian  religious  community  is 
historically  bound  up  with  this  section  of  humanity.  But 
even  if  the  possibility  of  such  a  consummation  be  denied, 
there  is  still  no  reason  why  we  should  doubt  the  universalism 
of  the  Christian  religion.  Only,  the  extent  of  that  section  of 
humanity  which  is  destined  to  take  part  in  the  highest 
spiritual  task  is  to  be  conceived  as  narrower  than  is  often 
done.  For  that  the  Christian  universalism  does  not  cover 
the  whole  human  race  in  its  natural  existence,  is  evident  from 
the  fact  that  certain  nature-peoples,  through  contact  with 
civilised  Christian  nations,  have  not  advanced  along  the  lines 


138  JUSTIFICATIOIT   AND   RECO^JCILIATION  [131—2 

of  national  development,  but  rather  have  become  enervated 
and  died  out.  One  would,  accordingly,  be  disposed  to  judge 
that  nations  which  show  no  prospect  of  going  over  to  Chris- 
tianity are  prevented  from  doing  so  by  their  own  abnormal 
character,  in  other  words,  by  their  remoteness  from  civilised 
humanity.  I  am  far,  however,  from  denying  a  priori  the 
possibility  of  the  extension  of  the  Christian  community  over 
other  peoples  which  have  not  yet  reached  the  stage  of  the 
world-liistorical  or  particular-historical  nations.  For  the 
means  of  arriving  at  a  scientific  demonstration  are  wanting. 
And  thus  the  expression  of  a  personal  conviction  on  this 
subject  is  of  as  much  or  as  little  value  as  the  expression  of 
the  opposite  opinion. 

If  the  nations  fulfil  their  destined  end,  namely,  their 
development  into  one  whole  supernatural  humanity,  through 
their  reception  into  the  religious  community  of  Christianity, 
then  this  whole  is  also  the  object  of  the  decisive  operation 
of  God  which  determines  its  peculiar  origin  and  existence. 
Justification,  therefore,  is  the  operation  of  God  in  which  He 
receives  sinful  men  into  fellowship  with  Himself,  from  the 
point  of  view  that  they  shall  at  the  same  time,  in  the  King- 
dom of  God,  reach  their  destined  human  end,  namely,  the 
highest  morality.  Now,  just  as  little  as  the  individual, 
whether  in  a  physical  or  spiritual  respect,  can  be  rightly 
represented  outside  of  the  sphere  of  his  nationality,  as  little 
can  the  individual,  regarded  as  an  object  of  Divine  justifica- 
tion, be  represented  outside  of  the  Christian  community — 
whether  he  be  conceived  as  one  justified  equally  with  the 
others,  or  from  the  point  of  view  of  his  education  by  the 
preceding  generation,  meaning  by  "  education "  not  legal 
determination,  but  organic  development  of  character.  There- 
fore justification  is  directly  related  to  the  religious  community 
as  a  whole,  which  in  God's  thought  is  always  antecedent  to 
the  individual  members  of  the  community.  Thus  justification 
is  the  expression  of  the  establishment  of  the  religious  com- 
munity, whose  character  consists  in  this,  that  sin  forms  no 
barrier  to  the  enjoyment  of  fellowship  with  God.     It  is  also, 


132]  THB   GENEBAL   WBLATIONS   OlT   JtTSTIlflCATION  136 

however,  the  expression  of  the  maintenance  of  this  community, 
which  consists  in  this,  that  every  individual  who  experiences 
justification  within  the  community  becomes,  by  virtue  of  this 
quality,  an  organic  medium  of  the  continued  existence  of  the 
community  in  its  peculiar  character.  For,  in  an  organism,  all 
the  individual  members  work  together  as  means  to  the  welfare 
of  the  whole,  and  apart  from  this  no  member  exists  as  a 
member  of  the  whole. 

1.  Justification,  or  the  reception  of  sinners  into  the 
relation  of  children  of  God,  must  be  referred  to  God  under 
the  attribute  of  Father. 

2.  The  justification  of  sinners  by  God  depends  on  the 
condition  of  faith :  in  other  words,  justification  results  when, 
conceived  as  reconciliation  on  God's  part,  it  calls  forth  in  the 
sinners  that  faith  which,  conceived  as  the  direction  of  the 
will  to  the  highest  end  represented  in  God  and  as  trust  in 
God  in  Himself,  does  not  include  love  to  men,  and,  conceived 
as  freedom  from  the  law,  excludes  all  ceremonial  conditions, 
equally  with  any  co-operating  presupposition  of  a  legal  claim 
before  God. 

3.  Justification,  or  reconciliation,  as  positively  connected 
with  the  historical  manifestation  and  activity  of  Christ,  is 
related  in  the  first  instance  to  the  whole  of  the  religious 
community  founded  by  Christ,  which  maintains  the  Gospel  of 
God's  grace  in  Christ  as  the  direct  means  of  its  existence,  and 
to  individuals  only  as  they  attach  themselves,  by  faith  in  the 
Gospel,  to  this  community. 


CHAPTER   III 

THE  SUBJECTIVB   SIDE    OF   JUSTIFICATION   CONSIDERED 

IN    DETAIL 

§23.  Justification  or  reconciliation  denotes  the  status 
before  God  into  which  sinners  are  brought  through  the 
mediation  of  Christ  within  His  community.  We  belong  to 
God  as  a  child  does  to  his  father,  in  spite  of  the  abiding 
consciousness  that,  in  virtue  of  the  previously  dominant 
tendency  of  self-will,  we  used  to  stand  in  contradiction  to 
Him  as  sinners.  We  know  ourselves  to  be,  in  our  present 
relation  to  God,  entirely  dependent  on  His  purpose  of  grace 
openly  made  known ;  for  the  abiding  recollection  of  the  paiu 
of  the  consciousness  of  guilt  excludes  not  merely  every  1^1 
claim  to  the  Divine  pardon,  but  also  any  possibility  of  our 
having  earned  it  by  any  meritorious  actions  whatsoever. 
Now,  as  this  status  before  God  comprises  none  save  purely 
spiritual  relations,  so  also  the  form  of  its  appropriation, 
faith,  is  a  purely  spiritual  function  which,  as  such,  can 
be  exercised  without  any  sensible  actions  whatever  being 
essential  to  it.  Nevertheless  the  fact  still  remains,  that 
the  opposition  between  man  and  God  which  is  solved  by 
justification  is  not  altogether  eliminated  from  the  experience 
of  the  believer.  If  in  Christianity  the  range  of  forgiveness 
included  merely  the  sins  of  our  past  years,  or,  in  addition  to 
that,  merely  individual  transgressions  of  the  Christian  life, 
the  felt  opposition  between  the  sense  of  guilt  and  what  God 
claims  from  men  would  no  longer  normally  hold  a  place 
among  the  experiences  of  a  Christian.  From  this  point  of 
view  the  Socinians  assign  forgiveness,  as  remission  of  punish- 
ment, to  the  accidental  side  of  Christianity.     The  Evangelical 

140 


134]  THE   SUBJECTIVE   SIDE   OF   JUSTIFICATION  141 

Confessions,  on  the  contrary,  in  so  far  as  they  find  in  justi- 
fication the  fundamental  precondition  of  Christianity  whether 
personal  or  social,  reckon  on  the  regular  continuance  of  the 
consciousness  of    guilt  in   those  who  profess  adherence   to 
them.     If  one  were  to  say,  as  a  Christian,  that  he  had  no 
sin,  he  would  make  God  a  liar ;  for  through  His  promise  of 
the  forgiveness  of  sins,  which  forms  the  fundamental  character- 
istic of  the  Christian  community,  God  affirms  the  presence  of 
sin  in  its  members  (1  John  L  8—10).    From  this  point  of  view, 
according  to  Luther  and  Melanchthon  (p.  7),  our  knowledge 
of   our  own  sin  is  to  be  drawn  directly  from  the  GospeL 
That  fact  makes  daily  prayer  for  forgiveness  of  sin  a  fitting 
thing.     Such  prayer  is  no  more  inconsistent  with  the  general 
assurance    of  this   blessing   which   has    been   given  to  the 
Christian  community,  than  prayer  for  Divine  gifts  is  barred  by 
the  knowledge  we  have  that  God  is  willing  to  bestow  them. 
On  the  other  hand,  if  we  did  not  daily  perceive  occasion  to 
pray  for  it,  we  should  lose  sight  of  the  importance  of  for- 
giveness as  the  foundation-stone  of  the  Christian  religion. 
Thus  the  value  we  set  upon  this  blessing  demands  the  con- 
tinual confession  that  every  one  needs  it.     The  consciousness 
of  this  need,  however,  will  in  the  Christian  life  normally 
extend   to   nothing  which  is  not  forthwith  covered  by  the 
certainty   of  forgiveness  bestowed   by  God.      Now  the  tra- 
ditional form  of  systematic  theology  leads  to  the  contention 
that  in  his  daily  life  every  Christian  must  pass  through  the 
whole   interval  between   the  need  of   redemption   and    the 
acceptance  of   grace — an  interval  the  magnitude  of  which 
finds  expression  in  the  unconnectedness  of  the  doctrine  of 
sin,  as  traditionally  developed,  with  the  doctrine  of  redemp- 
tion  (p.    5).     Such    teaching   gives    special  support  to  the 
demand  of  Pietism,  that  we  should  compel  ourselves  to  such 
a  comprehensive  estimate  of  our  own  sin,  and  should  impress 
upon  ourselves  our  own  inborn  hatefulness  and  worthlessness 
or  nothingness  to  such  a  degree,  that  we  cannot  consistently 
attach  thereto  any  well-founded  assurance  of  grace,  but  must 
wait  for  some  incalculable   deliverance   from  this  state   of 


142  JUSTIFICATION   AND   RECONCILIATION  [lS4~5 

feeling.  This  monkish  method  of  self-abasement  is  proved 
false  by  1  John  iii.  19—21.  Nor  can  dogmatic  theology 
concern  itself  with  such  movements  of  sentiment:  they 
belong  to  the  province  of  pastora}  theology.  For  Dogmatics, 
which  has  to  interpret  the  normal  course  of  the  elements  of 
the  Christian  life,  can  affirm  man's  permanent  need  of  re- 
demption in  no  other  way  than  by  recognising  that  the  for- 
giveness of  sins  is  the  necessary  basis  of  the  Christian 
religion,  both  as  a  whole  and  in  detail.  But  that  is  to 
assert,  not  to  deny,  that  the  need  of  redemption  must  be 
presupposed. 

Faith,  which,  as  related  to  the  promise  attached  to  the 
work  of  Christ,  appropriates  forgiveness,  is  to  be  understood 
as  trust  in  God  and  Christ  (§  19),  characterised  by  peace  of 
mind,  inward  satisfaction,  and  comfort.  The  pain  arising 
from  one's  state  as  a  whole,  which  formed  an  element  of  the 
presupposed  sense  of  guilt,  is  thereby  removed.  This  pain, 
however,  is  an  expression  of  that  opposition  to  God  and  to 
the  purpose  of  our  being  which  forms  the  essence  of  sin — 
and  that  as  a  personal  certainty  for  the  individual  mind. 
Trust  in  the  justification  imparted  in  Christ,  therefore,  is 
attended  by  certainty  of  an  opposite  kind.  The  pain  of  the 
sense  of  guilt  is  a  matter  of  feeling;  the  certainty  which 
accompanies  trust  in  the  justification  assured  by  Christ  can 
therefore  only  be  interpreted  as  a  feeling  of  pleasure.^ 
From  the  nature  of  this  connection  between  Divine  act  and 
promise  and  human  trust,  it  follows  that  the  subjective 
certainty  of  justification  springs  only  from  a  vision   of  the 

^  Melanchthon,  Lod  ikeoL  C.  R,  xxi.  pp.  749-751 :  "Si  fides  non  est  fidnciA 
intuens  Christam  et  aoquieecens  propter  Christum,  certe  non  applicamus  nobis 
eios  beneficium.  Necesse  est  igitur  fide  intoUigi  fidaciam  applicantem  nobis 
beneficium  Christi.  .  .  .  Estque  fides  virtus  apprehendeos  et  applicans  pro- 
missiones  et  qnietans  corda."  Apcl.  C.  A,  iii.  27  :  ''Sola  fides,  quae  intuetur 
in  promissionem  et  sentit  ideo  certo  statuendum  esse,  quod  deus  ignoscat, 
yincit  terrores  peccati  et  mortis."  178 :  "Piae  conscientiae  vident  in  hac  doc- 
trina  uberrimam  consolationem  sibi  proponi,  quod  videlicet  credere  et  certo 
statuere  debent,  quod  propter  Christum  habent  placatum  patrem."  180 :  "Si 
ideo  sentire  debent,  se  habere  deum  placatum,  quia  diligunt,  quia  legem  faciunt, 
semper  dubitare  necesse  est,  utrum  habeamus  deum  placatum  .  .  .  Qnando 
igitur  aoquiescet,  quando  erit  pocata  oonscientia  ?  *' 


136-7]  THE   SUBJECmVB   SIDE    OF   JUSTIFICATION  143 

object  of  faith.^  But  although  this  object  of  believing  and 
peace-bringing  trust  is  clearly  outlined,  and  fitted  by  its 
Divine  origin  to  call  forth  and  to  sustain  the  subjective 
function  of  faith,  yet  experience  shows  that  what  we  have 
here  is  not  a  mechanically  regular  process  of  cause  and  effect. 
The  certainty  of  justification,  without  which  faith  does  not 
fully  satisfy  the  conception  of  it  as  trust,  is  a  characteristic 
which  in  many  cases  is  liable  to  change  in  quantity ;  it  may 
increase,  just  as  it  is  liable  to  interruptions  of  uncertainty. 
Now  it  is  worth  noticing  that  Melanchthon,  when  forming  a 
judgment  on  the  latter  case,  does  not  take  the  view  that  the 
fact  of  justification  is  rendered  inoperative  and  invalid  by  the 
want  of  continuous  subjective  certainty.*  No  doubt,  as  his 
whole  mode  of  thought  moves  within  the  limits  of  the  individual 
hfe,  it  strikes  one  as  contradictory  when,  on  the  one  hand, 
justification  as  a  permanent  status  is  brought  into  relation 
to  believing  trust,  and  conceived  as  operating  only  in  re- 
sponse to  trust ;  while,  on  the  other  hand,  justification  is  held 
to  be  valid  even  when  the  subjective  certainty  of  it  varies. 
Nor  was  Melanchthon  able  altogether  to  remove  this  appear- 
ance of  contradiction  in  the  argument  on  which  I  am  now 
commenting.  The  remark  of  Luther,  indeed,  might  have 
been  recalled  (vol.  i.  p.  162),  that  in  this  struggle  of  repent- 
ance the  very  feeling  of  being  at  an  infinite  distance  from 
God  is  a  product  of  His  grace ;  but  what  is  wanted  here  is 
that  this  conviction,  felt  by  an  impartial  observer  of  the 
soul  tliat  is  passing  through  repentance,  should  be  appro- 

^  Loci  com,  59  :  *'  In  hac  promissioDe  debent  payidae  cosBoientiae  quaerere 
recoQciliationem  et  iustificatiouem ;  bac  promiaeione  debent  ae  sustentare  ac 
certo  atataere,  qnod  babent  deum  propitium  propter  Cbristum,  propter  saam 
promiasionem."  141 :  **  Non  eat  bominia,  praesertim  in  terroribua  peccati, 
sine  oerto  yerbo  del  atatuere  de  yoluntate  dei,  quod  iraaci  deainat." 

^  Loci  com,  229 :  *'  Haec  fides,  de  qua  loqiiimur,  ezaiatit  in  poentitentia.  £t 
inter  bona  opera,  inter  tentationea  et  pericula  confirmari  et  creaoere  debet, 
ut  aubinde  certiua  apnd  noa  atatuamua,  quod  deua  propter  Chriatum  reapiciat 
noa,  ignoscat  nobia,  exandiat  noa.  Haec  non  diacuntur  aine  magnia  et  multis 
oertaminibua.  Quotiea  recurrit  conacientia,  quotiea  aollicitat  ad  desperationem, 
cum  oatendit  ant  yetera  peccata  aut  noya  aut  immunditiem  naturae  t  Hoc 
cbirograpbuxn  non  deletur  aine  magno  agone,  ubi  testatur  ezperientia,  quam 
difficilia  rea  ait  fidea." 


144  JUSTIFICATION    AND    RECONCILIATION  [l37~8 

priated  by  the  latter,  and  thus  his  conscience  be  calmed. 
Only,  the  view  of  the  matter  taken  above  offers  no  ground 
for  this.  Therefore  the  admission  that  within  the  domain  of 
justification  faith  may  be  uncertain,  always  depends  on  the 
presupposition  that  the  struggle  for  assurance  of  Divine  grace 
is  only  a  transition  stage,  leading  in  all  probability  to  the 
goal  of  that  certainty  which  belongs  ideally  to  actual  justi- 
fication. But  as  this  conclusion  is  anything  but  self-evident, 
a  kind  of  categorical  imperative  lays  on  us  the  task  of  gain- 
ing assurance  of  justification  by  faith.  This  is  unequivocally 
expressed  by  Melanchthon  in  a  remark  quoted  above  (p.  143), 
and  holds  good  even  when,  to  aid  the  endeavour  to  gain  the 
assurance  of  faith,  we  recall  the  evidences  of  Divine  grace 
furnished,  not  merely  by  the  sacraments,  but  by  the  good 
works  we  do.^  The  original  view  of  this  matter  held  by  the 
Eeformers,  however,  can  hardly  be  expressed  more  accurately 
or  more  clearly  than  in  the  doctrine  de  iustijicatiorie  hominis, 
which  was  formulated  by  Cardinal  Contarini  at  the  Begens- 
berg  Conference  (1541),  and  received  the  adherence  of  the 
representatives  of  both  parties.^ 

^  Loei  com.  155  :  *'  Ut  baptisrous,  ut  coena  domini  sunt  signa,  quae  subinde 
admonent,  erigunt  et  confirmant  pavidas  mentes,  at  credant  firmius,  remitti 
peccata,  ita  scripta  et  picta  est  eadem  promissio  in  bonis  operibus,  at  haec 
opera  admoneant  nos,  ut  firmias  credamus.  Et  qui  non  bene  faciunt,  non 
excitant  se  ad  credendum ;  sed  pii  gaudent  habere  signa  et  testimonia  tantae 
promissionis." 

'  Carp,  lUf.  iv.  p.  200  :  *'  Quanquam  in  renatis  semper  crescere  debent 
timor  dei,  poenitentia  et  humilitas  et  aliae  virtutes,  cum  renovatio  sit  imper- 
fecta et  haereat  in  els  ingens  infirmitas,  tamen  dooendum  est,  ut  qui  vere 
poenitent  semper  fide  certissima  statuant,  se  propter  mediatorem  Christum 
deo  placere  .  .  .  Quoniam  autem  perfecta  certitudo  in  hac  imbecillitate  non 
est,  suntque  raultae  infirmae  et  pavidae  conscientise,  quae  cum  gravi  saepe 
dabitatione  luctantur,  nemo  est  a  gratia  Christi  propter  eiusmodi  infirmitatem 
ezcludendus.  Sed  convenit  tales  diligenter  adhortari,  at  iis  dubitationibus 
promissiones  Christi  fortiter  opponant  et  augeri  sibi  fidem  sedulis  precibus 
orent."  On  this  extract  cf.  the  admirable  treatise  by  Theod.  Brieger,  De 
formulae  concordiae  JlcUisbonensis  origine  atque  indole^  1870 ;  also,  by  the 
same  author.  Cardinal  CorUarini^s  Doctrine  of  JiLstification^  in  Stud.  %md  KrU, 
1872,  H.  1.  Contarini  is  the  Romish  theologian  who,  as  the  Articles  of 
Regensburg  show,  was  most  successful  in  transporting  himself  exactly  to  the 
point  of  view  and  the  terminology  of  the  Reformation  ;  thus  he  drew  the  most 
advanced  inferences  which  could  be  reached,  by  one  who  remained  Roman 
Catholic,  from  the  experiences  of  grace  enjoyed  by  a  Bernard.  But  the 
Regensburg  Formula  shows  clearly  by  the  proposition :  fides  iuttificans  est 


138-0]  THE    SUBJECTIVE  SIDE   OF   JUSTIFICATION  145 

For  purposes  of  comparison  with  what  I  have  given  as 
Melanehthon's  doctrine,  I  add  the  following  considerations 
from  Calvin.  As  was  shown  above  (p.  102),  they  differ  from 
Melanchthon  in  regard  to  their  conception  of  faith,  in  that  trust 
(Jiducia),  as  the  effect  in  the  will  which  follows  from  faith, 
is  distinguished  from  faith  in  the  sense  of  a  peculiar  kind 
of  knowledge.  Calvin  cannot  hide  from  himself  the  fact, 
nevertheless,  that  the  will,  as  obedience,  participates  in  this 
steadfast  heart-mirrored  knowledge,  this  emotional  conviction. 
But  he  regards  faith  essentially  as  a  kind  of  conviction, 
because  he  puts  great  stress  upon  the  clearness  of  the  object 
to  which  faith  turns.  That  he  does  not  include  trust  in  his 
definition  of  faith  is  to  be  accounted  for,  further,  by  the  fact 
that  he  never  loses  sight  of  the  above-noted  manifestations  of 
incipient  faith — a  faith  which,  like  Melanchthon,  he  regards 
as  saving  faith,  though  it  lacks  the  quality  of  steadfast  trust. 
But  the  true  and  full  faith,  which  applies  the  promise  of  grace 
to  itself,  and  in  the  feeling  of  the  Divine  sweetness  realises 
the  irrefragibility  of  this  application,  brings  in  its  train  the 
trust  and  fearless  conviction  that  we  may  appear  before  God's 
face  with  inward  peace.  Calvin  argues  further,  that  he  who 
has  once  reached  this  stage  is  not,  indeed,  safe  from  fluctua* 
tions  in  his  certainty  of  salvation,  but  will  not  lose  the  trust 
through  which  that  certainty  can  be  reached  again.  But 
he  knows,  too,  an  incipient  faith,  not  as  yet  combined  with 
trust,  which  yet  embraces  the  reconciliation  through  which 

Ula  fidetf  quae  est  ffficax  per  cariUUem,  that  it  was  a  compromise  intended  to 
be  explained  in  either  of  two  ways.  For  while  the  context  of  this  proposition 
suggests  a  Protestant  interpretation,  yet  this  does  not  exclnde  the  Catholic 
interpretation  ;  for  according  to  mediaeval  ideas  in  this  domain  of  thought,  it 
is  possible  to  alternate  between  the  thought  of  '* making  righteous"  {GerecfU- 
machufiff)  through  fides  carUale  formaia^  and  the  trustful  apprehension  of  the 
Divine  compassion.  Now  since  Contarini,  as  Brieger  proves,  while  expressing 
the  latter  experience  in  a  form  which  comes  near  Reformed  doctrine,  under- 
stands iiLSlifiealio  also  in  the  real  sense  of  making  righteoosness,  he  has  not 
abandoned  the  platform  of  Catholic  dogma.  But  thereby  an  obscure  veil  is 
drawn  over  his  approximation  to  the  Protestants  which  shows  it  to  be  less 
valuable  than  Brieger  represents.  For  by  ignoring  the  kindred-spirited  pre- 
decessors of  his  hero,  he  is  led  to  regard  as  Protestant  in  character  a  number 
of  Contarini^s  expressions  which  are  also  in  agi*eement  with  Bernard  and 
Thomas. 

lo 


146  JUSTIFICATION    AND   RBCONCILIATION  [139-40 

access  to  God  is  won.  Faith,  at  its  first  stage,  has  this  in 
common  with  perfect  assurance  of  faith,  that  it  keeps  steadily 
turned  to  a  God  of  grace ;  but  it  is  inferior  to  the  higher 
stage  in  this,  that  the  vision  of  God  it  gives  is  clear,  indeed, 
but  remote ;  while  a  sense  of  the  Divine  sweetness  alternates 
with  a  confusing  impression  due  to  the  consciousness  of  guilt 
— in  other  words,  the  individual  appropriation  of  grace  is  as 
yet  imperfect.  For  it  is  just  from  this  fusion  of  faith  and 
grace  that  there  springs  that  trust  which  constitutes  the  fides 
specialis.  Now  Calvin  does  not  need,  as  does  Melanchthon, 
expressly  to  insist  that  we  ought  to  advance  from  the  earlier 
stage  to  full  believing  trust.  He  can  wait  for  this  develop- 
ment patiently,  for  he  knows  that  saving  faith  from  the  very 
outset  engrafts  the  believer  into  the  community  of  Christ, 
and  that  by  this  means  Divine  election  guarantees  progress 
to  a  complete  faith.  For  the  rest,  he  acknowledges  no  less 
than  Melanchthon  that  the  consciousness  of  good  works  done 
by  the  believer  serves  to  support  and  to  confirm  faith,  because 
in  these  fruits  of  our  calling  appear  evidences  of  Divine 
favour  (iii.  14,  18,  19). 

In  the  main  point,  therefore,  both  are  agreed.  The  sub- 
jective function  which  answers  to  justification  is  faith  as  trust 
in  God's  individual  pardon,  a  trust  which  arises  solely  from 
the  clear  presentation  of  the  universal  promise  of  grace  along 
with  the  sureties  for  it  which  Christ  has  given,  and  which  is 
necessarily  accompanied  by  that  joyful  sense  of  harmony  with 
God  and  with  oneself  which  stands  opposed  to  the  pain  of  the 
sense  of  guilt.  Moreover,  both  equally  declare  that  this 
function  of  faith,  in  the  case  of  many  who  are  to  be  regarded 
as  justified,  is  subject  to  a  development  indicated  by  the 
fact  that  trust  and  the  feeling  of  inward  peace  do  not  con- 
tinuously accompany  the  intentional  turning  of  the  will  to 
God  as  the  Promiser  of  grace,  but  may  be  either  interrupted 
or  altogether  restrained  by  doubt  of  His  grace.  This  stage 
in  the  development  of  faith  can  only  be  overcome  by  a 
deepened  attention  to  God's  gracious  promise.  Now  whether, 
with  Calvin,  one  waits  quietly  for  this  advance  in  those  who 


140-1]  THE   SUBJECTIVE   SIDE    OF   JUSTIFICATIOK  147 

are  elect  and  belong  to  the  community  of  Christ,  or,  with 
Melanchthon,  simply  insists  that  the  advance  shall  be  made, 
in  either  case  the  courage  to  venture  on  full  trust  in  God 
springs  from  the  believer  seeing  in  his  ability  to  perform 
good  works  an  evidence  of  God's  special  pardon  which  will 
overthrow  his  doubts.  This  is  to  assert  a  closer  relation 
between  that  exercise  of  the  moral  goodwill  towards  men 
which  is  essential  in  Christianity  and  the  religious  function 
of  justifying  faith,  than  we  iSnd  expressed  in  the  general 
Evangelical  doctrine  that  the  renovation  or  regeneration  of 
the  will  always  goes  along  with  justification.  Indeed,  only 
on  thiB  assumption  can  the  consciousness  of  actions  which 
spring  from  a  renewed  will  serve  as  a  proof  of  his  justifica- 
tion to  one  who  cannot  gain  assurance  of  it  in  feeling  by  the 
direct  path  of  accepting  the  impression  of  the  promise  of  grace. 
But  in  order  to  understand  the  meaning  and  the  im- 
portance  of  the  assurance  of  faith  contended  for  by  Pro- 
testantism, we  must  compare  its  antithesis,  the  Tridentine 
dogma.  Our  polemic,  as  commenced  by  Chemnitz,  interprets 
the  decree  of  the  Sixth  Session,  the  9th  chapter  of  which 
bears  the  title  contra  inanem  Juiereticorum  Jidudam,  as  though 
the  doctrine  of  the  Roman  Catholic  Church  altogether  vetoed 
the  characteristic  of  certitudo  grcUiae,  and  in  its  place  prescribed 
doubt  of  one's  salvation  as  an  essential  mark  of  faith.  But  if 
this  were  so,  we  should  yet  have  to  confess  that  in  reality  siich 
a  characterisation  of  the  Catholic  Church  does  not  hold  good 
generally.  For  uncertainty  about  salvation  cannot  help  one 
to  a  Christian  character,  while  it  is  beyond  question  that 
examples  of  such  a  character  have  appeared  in  the  Eoman 
Catholic  Church.  Besides,  personal  assurance  of  salvation  is 
indispensable  in  order  that  the  Eoman  form  of  the  Church 
should  be  put  forward  by  its  champions  as  the  only  authentic 
form.  Now  it  is  certainly  a  fact  that  the  principle  of  the 
necessary  uncertainty  of  salvation  had  been  employed  against 
the  Reformers  before  the  Council  of  Trent ;  ^  but  alongside 

*  U.g.  by  Berthold  of  Chiemsee ;  cf.  Lammer,  yorlriderUinische  Theolof/ie, 

p.  lei. 


148  JUSTIFICATION   AND    RECONCILIATION  [l41~2 

of  it  we  find  the  opposite  position  maintained,  not  only  by 
Contarini  (p.  144),  but  also  by  Gropper.^  Even  Thomas 
Aquinas,  in  his  own  way,  may  be  cited  as  a  witness  for  the 
certainty  of  salvation  enjoyed  by  one  who  exercises  faith, 
hope,  and  love.  Faith,  as  a  definite  kind  of  reflective  know- 
ledge of  the  articles  of  the  creed,  is  certain  of  their  truth, 
and  therefore  certain  of  the  omnipotence  and  compassion  of 
God  on  which  hope,  at  its  first  stage,  rests  and  bases  the 
struggle  to  reach  eternal  blessedness.  The  hope  of  the  indi- 
vidual, however,  when  properly  complete,  becomes  certainty 
of  this  goal,  if  faith  be  informed  by  love  to  God.  Now, 
although  hope  is  an  affair  of  the  will,  and  in  this  respect 
subject  to  uncertainty,  yet  as  an  effect  of  faith  it  partakes 
in  the  certainty  of  the  latter,  inasmuch  as  its  aim  is  the 
goal  of  blessedness.  This  goal,  however,  is  made  so  sure 
by  the  Divine  power  and  compassion,  that  those  who  fail  to 
reach  blessedness  do  so  from  theii'  own  will  and  not  from 
any  lack  in  the  Divine  compassion.^  But  the  controversy 
carried  on  in  Reformation  times  does  not  circle  round  this 
representation  of  the  matter.  The  denial  and  the  assertion 
that  assurance  of  salvation  accompanies  faith  are  in  keeping 
rather  with  the  twofold  conception  of  jitstificatio  which  per- 
vades the  Christianity  of  the  Middle  Ages.  The  doctrine 
which  attaches  jmtijicatio  to  faith  and  works  issues  in  the 
conclusion  that  faith  does  not  give  assurance  of  salvation, 
but  that  assurance,  never  more  than  approximate,  can  be 
reached  by  the  exercise  of  moral  action,  especially  action 
prescribed  by  the  ceremonial  law.  On  the  other  hand, 
absorption  in  the  exclusive  value  of  Divine  grace  is  possible 
only  in  the  form  of  trust  in  God ;  trust,  however,  includes 
certainty  of  its  object  and  satisfaction  in  it.  The  connec- 
tion between   them,  therefore,  appears  most  clearly  in  the 

"^Enchiridion  Colonie/ise  (1538),  Ibl.  170:  "Ad  iustificationcm  liominis 
omniuo  requiritur  ut  homo  credat  non  tantum  generaliter,  quod  propter 
Christum  verc  i)oeiiiteutibus  remittantur  peccata,  scd  etiam,  quod  ipsiuiet 
homini  credent!  remissa  sint  propter  Christum  per  fidem."  Cf.  Brieger  in 
Krsoh  and  Gruber,  Allg.  Encyclopaedia^  Erate  Section  xcii.  p.  218  ff. 

'''  Sumtiui  thcoL  ii.  2,  (ju.  18,  art.  1. 


142-3]  THE    SURTECTIVE    SIDE   OF   JUSTIFICATION  149 

exposition  of  Bernard  (vol.  i.  p.  11 3).      Even  at  the  Council 
of  Trent  this  conception  was  so  energetically  championed  by 
Ambrosiits  Catharinus  (Archbishop  of  Minori,in  the  Kingdom 
of  Naples),  that  even  there  no  proper  and  complete  decision 
of  the  question,  in  the  comprehensive  sense  in  which  it  was 
raised,  was  reached  at  all.     For  the  chapter  of  the  decree  of 
the  Sixth  Session  which  is  directed  against  the  Evangelicals 
does  not  exhaust  the  subject,  and  does  not  allow  us  to  draw 
any  inference  as  to  what  assurance  of  salvation  counts  for 
in  the  Christian  life  of  the  Boman  communion.     This  chapter 
was  also  defended  by  Catharinus  against  Dominions  a  Soto.^ 
Now  it  is  usual,  in  consequence  of  the  representations   of 
Chemnitz  and  Bellarmine,  to  suppose  that  the  Catholic  doc- 
trine altogether  excludes  assurance  of  salvation  from  justify- 
ing faith.     But  it  must  be  noted  that  Bellarmine  assumes 
quite  a  different  staUis  eontrovcrsiae  from  that  maintained  by 
Chemnitz,  and  this  merely  in  order  to  be  able  to  contradict 
Chemnitz.     The  Evangelical  position  is  that  if  the  believer, 
who,  as  seriously  changed  in  mind  and  regenerate,  stands  at 
the  b^inning  of  his  renewed  life,  lays  hold  of  the  promise 
of  grace,  he  can  and  must  be  assured  of  forgiveness.^     With 
this,  now,  Bellarmine  declares  himself  in  agreement.      He 
asserts,  however,  that  the  controversy  concerns,  not  this  faith 
conditioned  by  change  of  mind,  but  faith  absolutely.     More- 
over, while  he  does  not  deny  that  assurance  is  an  essential 
mark  of  Jiducia,  he  yet  makes  the  controversy  circle  round 
certitudo  Jidei,  which,  as  distinguished  from  Jidnda,  is  nothing 
but  Jldes  in  iiiiellectu.    But  to  this  last  the  Evangelicals  them- 
selves have  no  wish  to  ascribe  any  subjective  assurance  of 
salvation,  simply  because  with  them  it  does  not  reckon  as 
justifying  faith  at  all.     Thus  Bellarmine's  controversial  dis- 
cussion is  aimless. 

As  follows  from  what  has  been  shown,  the  chapter  cited 
from  the  Tridentine  Decree,  if  read  attentively,  by  no  means 

^  Cf.  Sarpi,  Sistoire  du  Concile  de  Trente  (trans,  by  Amelot),  pp.  188-190  ; 
Gerhard,  Ccmfessio  Galliolica^  pp.  1501-1518. 

^  Chemnitz,  Z.c,  p.  140  (vol.  i.  p.  153) ;  Bellarniiniis,  (2e  iuUificatione,  lib.  iii. 
cap.  2. 


150  JUSTIFICATION    AND   RECONCILIATION  [143-4 

betrays    an  intention    altogether    to  deny  the  assurance  of 
faith.     For  we  must  remember  that  the  Catholics,  in  their 
dispute  with   the   Evangelicals,  took  for  granted    that    the 
Divine  promise  of  grace,  revealed  as  it  is  only  in  connection 
with  the   Church   system,  does  not  exist   for  heretics  and 
schismatics,  and  that  the  believing  trust  of  the  Evangelicals 
is  without  an  object.     For  this  reason  alone  is  it  regarded 
^  mere  subjective  imagination.^     Further,  it  is  denied  that 
justification  takes  place  only  when  the  assurance  of  faith  is 
not  interrupted  by  doubt  at  all,  or  that  only  he  is  justified 
who  possesses  assurance  of   faith,  or   that  assurance  is  so 
essential    to    complete    justification    that    without    it    there 
remains  merely  doubt  of  the  Divine  promise.     But  all  this 
does  not  at  all  touch  the  Evangelical  doctrine,  which  regards 
justification  as  real  in  many  cases  where  for  the  moment 
there  exists  no  specific  assurance,  and  admits  that  assurance 
can  be  disturbed  by  doubt.    Finally,  it  is  a  perfectly  straight- 
forward principle  to  hold  that  a  pious  man  who  does  not 
doubt  the  compassion  of  God  may  yet,  in  view  of  his  weak- 
ness, be   in   anxiety   about   his   salvation;    but    the  reason 
adduced,  that  we   cannot  know  our  standing  in   grace    by 
an  infallible  assurance  of  faith,  loses  its  point  against  the 
Evangelical  doctrine,  when  we  consider  that  it  would  imply 
thinking  away  the  object  of  faith,  namely,  the  promise,  and 
regarding  the  subjective  assurance  of  grace  as  its  own  sufficient 
ground.     The  two  Canons,  13  and  14,  which  deal  with  the 
same    subject,  are    not  inconsistent  with  the  interpretation 
just  given ;  and  while,  at  the  same  time,  the  possibility  of 
assurance  of  eternal   election,  save  when  given  by  special 
Divine  revelation,  is  denied,  yet  this  declares  invalid  merely 
one  particular  form  of  assurance — not  assurance  in  general. 
Yet  again,  the  repudiation  of  assurance  of  election  does  not 
touch  the  Calvinistic  doctrine,  for  the  latter  maintains  that 
it  is  through  Christ  that  we  ought  to  become  assured  of  our 
election,  consequently  through  the  medium  of  justification. 
Both  of    the  opposed  views  upon  this  question    having 

^  Trid.f  Sess.  yL  Deer,  de  iustificatione,  cap.  9. 


144-5]  THE   SUBJECTIVE   SIDE    OF   JUSTIFICATION  151 

been  current  before  the  Council  of  Trent,  they  could  not  but 
maintain  themselves  after  it  as  well.  And  in  fact  the 
Bomish  Church  succeeded  in  deriving  thence  the  advantage, 
partly  of  affording  satisfaction  to  different  kinds  of  men,  partly 
of  controlling  them  so  as  to  suit  its  purpose.  For  the  sake 
of  persons  of  energetic  character,  the  possibility  of  assurance 
must  be  admitted  for  purely  general  reasons,  and  everyone 
who  takes  a  leading  position  in  the  Church  accepts  it  without 
asking  many  questions.  On  the  other  hand,  for  the  sake  of 
the  discipline  of  the  great  mass,  it  is  expedient  to  foster  the 
feeling  of  uncertainty  about  one's  salvation,  in  order  to 
intensify  the  people's  zeal  for  the  works  which  the  Church 
prescribes.  So  that  this  Church  fares  best  by  using  a  double 
measure  and  a  double  weight.  The  Evangelical  principle,  how- 
ever, not  only  strikes  Catholic  opponents  as  strange ;  it  seems 
no  longer  in  any  degree  to  command  real  confidence  among 
ourselves,  whether  in  theory  or  in  practice.  The  fact  is,  very 
good  Evangelical  Christians  would  acknowledge  as  an  expression 
of  their  own  sentiments  the  opinion  of  Mohler,  that  we  ought 
to  embrace  assurance  of  our  own  salvation,  if  we  have  it  at 
all,  very  timidly  and  modestly.^  But,  on  the  other  hand,  we 
decisively  reject  Mohler's  view,  that  on  Protestant  principles 
we  ought  simply  to  ask  everyone  what  he  thinks  of  his  own 
state,  and  that  his  answer  would  compel  us  to  regard  him  as 
a  saint,  since  the  teaching  of  our  symbols  refuses  to  attach 
any  weight  to  the  doubt  which  others  might  feel  of  his  reply. 
This  misconception,  which  regards  the  Evangelical  Christian 
as  a  wax  figure,  on  which  every  single  dogma  is  to  be  tried 
and  proved,  is  one  for  which,  unfortunately,  the  older  theo- 

^  Symbolikf  p.  195 :  ''Certainly,  the  Spirit  witnesses  to  our  spirit  that  we 
are  the  children  of  God  ;  but  this  witness  is  of  so  gentle  a  nature,  and 
requires  such  tender  nurture,  that  the  believer,  feeling  as  he  does  his  own  un- 
worthiness,  draws  near  to  it  only  timidly,  and  hardly  dares  to  receive  it  into 
his  consciousness.  It  is  a  holy  joy,  which  hides  its  face  in  its  own  presence, 
and  would  remain  a  secret  from  itself.  .  .  .  Moreover,  the  same  holds  true  in 
many  other  instances  of  the  spiritual  life.  Innocence  which  becomes  conscious 
of  itself  is  usually  lost  in  the  very  act,  and  reflection  on  the  question  whether 
a  deed  which  one  is  on  the  point  of  doing  is  pure,  not  infrequently  makes  it 
impure.  The  life  of  the  true  saints  unfolds  itself  quiet  and  still ;  they  do  not 
call  themselves  blessed  on  that  account,  but  leave  that  to  God." 


152  JUSTIFICATION    AND    RECONCIUATION  [145 

logians  are  to  blame,  for  they  represent  religious  feelings  and 
emotions  in  a  mechanical  form  as  objects  of  empirical  study 
by  the  understanding.  But  if  anyone  thought  it  his  duty 
"  on  Protestant  principles  "  to  ask  me  whether  I  felt  assured 
of  my  salvation,  I  should  reply  that  that  did  not  in  the  least 
concern  him,  for  it  is  a  matter  between  me  and  God.  And  so 
I  perfectly  understand  Mohler's  protestation  that  he  would 
feel  exceedingly  uncomfortable  in  the  neighbourhood  of  a 
man  who  declared  himself  unconditionally  assured  of  his 
salvation,  and  that  he  could  hardly  escape  the  feeling  of  there 
being  something  diabolical  in  such  a  case.  For  such  a  man 
would  be  anything  but  a  true  Evangelical,  were  he  to  assert 
his  assurance  of  salvation  apart  from  the  condition  of  seria 
contritio.  But  I  should  also  have  the  feeling  expressed 
by  Mohler  in  the  vicinity  of  people  who  indicated,  even 
though  it  were  indirectly  by  the  exclusion  of  other  Christians 
from  the  fellowship  of  salvation,  that  they  themselves  in  their 
own  way  were  quite  certain  of  being  saved. 

Both  Evangelical  Confessions,  in  their  practical  treatment 
of  the  subject  of  personal  assurance,  follow  the  models  which, 
as  has  been  shown  (§  19),  are  set  before  them  in  Melanchthon 
on  the  one  side  and  Calvin  on  the  other.  They  assert  in 
common  that  the  Divine  promise,  as  the  object  of  faith,  is  at 
the  same  time  the  ground  of  the  assurance  which  either  is,  or 
ought  to  be,  combined  with  faith.  They  acknowledge  that  it  is 
through  the  promise  that  the  witness  of  God's  Spirit  leading 
to  personal  assurance  exercises  its  power.  But  since  in  the 
promise,  as  historically  given,  no  individual  recipient  is  named, 
they  look  to  faith  to  make  special  application  and  appropria- 
tion of  the  Divine  intention.  Even  the  Calvinists  determine 
the  idea  of  faith  chiefly  by  the  idea  of  fiducia,  as  the  opposite 
of  diibitatio ;  but  as  a  distinction  must  be  drawn  in  real  life 
between  weak  and  strong  faith,  they  differentiate  from  trust,  as 
the  general  notion,  a  higher  stage  of  itself,  which  carries  with 
it  certitudo,  which  is  the  assurance  and  seal.  Further,  the 
Divine  promise  is  regarded  by  Lutherans  as  universalis,  as 
referring  to  all  individuals,  by  Calvinists  as  indejinita.     There- 


145-^»]  THE    SUBJECTIVE    SIDE    OF   JUSTIFICATION  153 

fore  the  Lutherans  make  its  appropriation  the  subject  of  a 
categorical  imperative,  compared  with  which  all  other  argu- 
ments count  merely  as  persuasives.  The  Calvinists,  on  the 
contrary,  calling  to  their  aid  the  assumption  of  the  eternal 
election  of  individuals,  treat  the  problem  with  the  instruments 
of  theoretical  reflection.  The  Lutheran,  therefore,  who  keeps 
before  him  the  universal  promise  of  grace  in  the  Divine  word, 
has  to  make  the  practical  experiment  of  subsuming  himself 
by  faith  under  this  universal  rule ;  then  the  witness  of  the 
Holy  Spirit,  which  operates  through  God's  universal  word  of 
promise,  extends  itself  likewise  to  him ;  for  the  individual  is 
determined  in  and  with  the  universal.  On  the  other  hand, 
the  Calvinist  knows  the  promise  to  be  valid  for  those  who 
believe ;  through  self -observation,  therefore,  he  makes  sure  that 
he  believes,  and  infers  accordingly  that  he  personally  may  feel 
assured  of  the  promise  of  grace.  The  witness  of  the  Holy 
Spirit  operates  in  this  form  likewise,  for  upon  it  faith  relies 
when  reporting  to  itself  on  its  relation  to  Divine  grace.  This 
theoretical  method  of  obtaining  a  basis  for  assurance  through 
a  regular  logical  inference  {syllogismv^  practicus)  is  a  peculiarity 
of  Eeformed  theology.  But  even  the  Lutheran  "ascetics" 
were  unable  to  refrain  from  employing  this  method.  For  when 
they  attempt  to  help  trembling  faith  to  the  right  path,  Arndt, 
Scriver,  and  Fresenius  of  necessity  draw  attention  to  the 
hidden  traces  of  faith  which  indicate  that  the  individual  con- 
cerned ought  to  apply  the  promise  to  his  own  case;  and 
Ph.  D.  Burk,  in  his  Lehre  von  der  Rechtfertigung  und  ihrer 
Versicherung,  combines  Lutheran  and  Eeformed  forms  of  state- 
ment without  seeming  to  be  surprised  at  the  formal  syllogistic 
method  noted  above.  These  writers  chiefly  urge  that  we  should 
give  heed  to  the  comfortable  invitations  of  Scripture,  but  the 
didactic  style  which  they  follow  leads  them  also  incidentally 
to  adopt  the  syllogistic  method.  Both  methods  therefore  take 
for  granted  that  the  witness  of  the  Divine  Spirit  is  immanent 
in  the  conviction  of  the  human  mind.  Bellarmine  (cap.  8), 
it  is  true,  is  willing  to  grant  that  this  conviction  is  divinely 
grounded  only  provided  that  not  merely  the  major  premise  is 


154  JUSTIFICATION    AND    RECONCIUATION  [146-7 

given  in  the  Divine  word,  but  that  the  minor  premise  too — 
that  I  have  faith — is  certified  by  Divine  revelation,  and  not 
based  on  human  experience.  But  it  is  easy  to  repel  this 
sophistical  suggestion  if  we  remember  that  the  reception  of 
Divine  revelation  is  always  humanly  conditioned.  This  means 
that  there  does  exist  a  possibility  of  delusion  in  this  sphere ; 
but  in  regard  to  personal  assurance,  what  is  in  question  is  not 
infallibility  or  the  impossibility  of  error — ^for  in  no  relation 
can  this  be  claimed  by  any  human  mind — but  the  possibility 
of  sufficient  certainty  subject  to  the  conditions  imder  which 
the  human  spirit  becomes  conscious  of  its  relation  to  God. 
Precisely  in  accordance  with  the  meaning  we  ascribe  to  the 
Holy  Spirit,  therefore,  moral  certainty  and  Divine  certainty 
come  to  coincide.  For  the  Spirit  means  anything  but  an 
inexorable  mechanism,  running  athwart  the  laws  of  the 
human  mind,  but  rather  a  principle  which  leaves  these  laws 
in  full  validity. 

Nevertheless  the  discussion  of  this  earlier  stage  of  faith, 
at  which  assurance  of  salvation  and  the  feeling  of  comfort  are 
absent,  is  carried  out  both  by  systematic  theologians  and 
"ascetic"  writers  with  a  certain  want  of  lucidity.  They 
firmly  maintain  that  saving  faith,  in  the  full  sense,  is  fiduGva 
cum  certitudine  salviis,  and  that  it  includes  the  feeling  of 
comfort  and  of  satisfaction  with  God  and  with  oneself.  Now, 
if  justification  is  granted  to  weak  and  uncertain  faith  also,  it 
must  be  possible  to  bring  the  latter  under  the  conception  of 
fiducia.  And  this  is  what  they  try  to  do ;  for  otherwise 
such  faith,  as  being  Jides  informiSy  would  not  avail  to  justify. 
But  how  can  we  recognise  weak  faith  as  trust  if  the  certainty 
of  salvation  given  by  feeling  is  not  present  at  all  ?  Now  I 
find  that  the  older  theologians  quite  failed  to  make  this 
difficulty  clear  to  their  own  minds ;  only  in  Maccovius  have 
I  met  with  any  attempt  to  solve  it.^     That  attempt  issues 

^  Loci  communeSy  p.  689:  "Fidei  sensus  Don  est  fides ;  hoc  est,  actus  ille 
reflexivus  in  ipsam  fidem,  quo  credo  me  credere,  non  est  ipsa  fides,  sed  potius 
sensus  quidam  fidei."  P.  716:  '^Quemadmodum  dum  homo  deliquium 
animi  patitur,  aut  iu  ecstasin  rapitur,  sensu  omnino  non  privatur  (ubi  enim 
vita  est  animalis,  ibi  sensus  est,  sed  hoc  tantum  incommodi  patitur,  quod  non 


147-8]  THE   SUBJECTIVE   SIDE    OF   JUSTIFICATION  155 

in  his  making  a  distinction  between  the  general  feeling  of 
self  which  is  inseparable  from  every  vital  act,  and  the  feeling 
of  this  self-feeling  which  he  regards  as  the  higher  and  clearer 
stage.  But  as  he  entirely  fails  to  inquii*e  into  the  conditions 
under  which  this  distinction  emerges,  no  complete  and  clear 
insight  into  the  matter  is  attained. 

It  would  not  be  in  accordance  with  ecclesiastical  Pro- 
testantism to  remove  the  treatment  of  these  experiences  from 
the  province  of  the  preaching  of  the  Word,  which  is  the 
general  promise  of  grace.  But  d  propos  of  Gerhard's  dis- 
cussion of  this  point  (vol.  i.  p.  354),  it  has  been  already  shown 
that,  from  the  standpoint  of  the  preacher,  the  personal 
application  of  justification  seems  to  be  possible  merely,  but 
not  necessary.  And  that  is  inevitable ;  for  the  general  truth 
of  the  forgiveness  of  sins  leaves  its  actual  compass  still 
undetermined,  and  therefore  that  compass  cannot  form  a 
sufficient  ground  of  assurance  in  the  case  of  those  whose 
actual  assurance  depends  on  further  special  conditions. 
Hence  arises  the  right  claimed  by  Pietism  to  stimulate  in  a 
different  way  the  assurance  of  salvation  given  in  the  conscious- 
ness of  justification.  But  in  Pietistic  circles  those  special 
conditions  are  imposed  on  every  individual,  and  their  validity 
is  made  independent  of  those  general  principles  which  were 
previously  regarded  as  decisive.  Though  their  interest  in 
justification  is  not  wholly  given  up,  and  though  sanctification 
in  the  sense  of  formal  self-abnegation  or  the  struggle  after 
good  action  is  not  pressed  into  the  foreground,^  yet  the 
consciousness  of  justification,  or  assurance,  is  made  to  depend 
upon  an  acute  experience  of  conversion.  Here  what  happened 
in  the  case  of  A.  H.  Francke  is  typical.  Once  he  becomes 
convinced  that  he  has  no  standing  in  living  faith,  he  goes 
astray,  in  his  hypochondriacal  struggle  to  secure  it,  from  what 
of  faith  he  formerly  possessed ;  doubts  God,  yet  continues  in 

sentit  se  sentiro),  ita  etiam  fit,  dam  homo  fidelis  tentationibus  sic  abripitnr,  ut 
extra  se  poeitus  yidcatur.  Non  desinit  quidem  ille  yita  spirituali  yiyere,  ct 
seosu,  qui  cum  yita  hac  indiyalso  nexu  coniunctus  est,  praeditus  esse,  sed  hoc 
mail  patitur,  quod  non  sentit  se  sentire." 

'  As  by  Jodocus  yan  Lodensteyn,  Oachiehte  des  PietismuSf  i.  p.  158. 


15G  JUSTIFICATION   AND   RECONCILIATION  [148-9 

prayer  to  the  God  Whom  he  no  longer  believes,  and  is  finally 
surprised  by  the  return  of  conviction  with  a  full  measure  of 
assurance,  and  dates  from  that  moment  his  being  pardoned 
by  God  and  the  forgiveness  of  his  sins.^     The  antecedents  of 
this  consummation  may  vary  in  different  cases,  but  in  every 
instance    the    Halle    Pietism,  in    the    conversion    which    it 
demands,  insists  on  a  similar  experience  of  the  intense  con- 
sciousness that  my  sins  are  forgiven,  and  on  the  commence- 
ment of  a  concomitant  feeling  of  joy,  which  puts  an  end  to 
any  unhappiness    that  may  have   gone    before,     Alexander 
Schweizer  (vol.  i.  p.  558)  has  thrown  this  demand  into  dogmatic 
form;    and  in   Pietistic  biographies  similar  experiences  are 
described.     Nevertheless  we  have  no  right  to  deduce  a  general 
rule  from  these  cases,  since  we  cannot  conceal  from  ourselves 
the  fact  that  the  Reformers  and  the  divines  who  follow  them 
do  not  insist  on  any  such  element  when  thinking  of  personal 
assurance.     For  those  who  experience  the  kind  of  conversion 
which  leads  to  this  consciousness  of  forgiveness  relate  it  only 
in  the  loosest  possible  way  to  the  general  credentials  of  salva- 
tion.    They  are  forced  to  admit  that  any  such  conversion  is 
preceded  by  the  preaching  of  the  Gospel,  but  the  latter  they 
regard  as  only  its  occasion,  or  as  a  source  of  information  r^ard- 
ing  the  matters  involved.    But  they  exclude  from  the  province 
of  preaching  the  act  of  grace  in  which  God  operates  on  one 
who  is  being  converted,  and  oppose  it  to  preaching  regarded 
as  a  purely  theoretical  means  of  grace.     Spener,  indeed,  still 
holds  firmly  by  Luther's  principle  that  the  individual's  experi- 
ences all  point  back  to  his  baptism,  and  are  to  be  explained 
as    the  consequences,  or    the    renewal,  of    baptismal   grace. 
Francke,   in    reviewing    his    conversion,   ignores    this    view 
altogether.     Pietism,  so  far  as  it  holds  at  all  to  the  funda- 
mental significance  of  forgiveness,  totally  ignores  the  fact  that 
the  community  of  believers,  which  every  new  convert  finds 
previously  existing,  and  in  which  conversion  only  gives  him  a 
firmer  footing,  is  based  upon  the  forgiveness  of  sin.     A  con- 
verted man  is  not,  by  his  special  experience,  isolated  from  or 

^  Op»  cU,,  ii.  p.  2()0. 


149-150]         THE   SUBJECTIVE   SIDE   OF   JUSTIFICATION  157 

opposed  to  this  body;  rather  it  awakens  within  him  that 
common  sentiment  which  holds  to  the  Word  of  God  and  the 
sacrament  of  baptism  as  the  distinguishing  features  of  the 
community  of  believera.  Instead  of  this,  Pietism  recommends 
its  devotees  to  hold  by  the  society  which,  by  its  special 
attainments  in  piety,  proves  itself  to  be  the  true  community. 
On  this  point,  therefore,  as  in  their  whole  teaching,  the  Church 
and  Pietism  are  utterly  opposed  in  the  way  they  guide  men 
to  assurance.  The  Church  asserts  merely  the  possibility,  not 
the  unfailing  actuality,  of  personal  assurance ;  Pietism  asserts 
only  exceptional  instances  of  conversion,  which  indicate  no 
general  rule,  for  the  simple  reason  that  in  principle  they  bear 
no  relation  to  the  Evangelical  conception  of  the  Church. 
What  would  be  the  result  if  we  were  to  adopt  simultaneously 
the  point  of  view  of  both  ? 

Lohe,  in  a  short  brochure,^  has  described  the  epoch  of 
"  Revival "  as  past.  He  testifies  that  Pietistic  excitations  of 
feeling  are  regarded — even  by  those  who  have  striven  to 
gain  assurance  through  them,  and,  through  the  change  that 
came  over  their  impressions,  have  attained  it — as  youthful 
experiences  whose  return  is  not  to  be  looked  for  in  maturer 
years.  He  sees  in  Pietism  of  this  kind  a  Pharisaic  and  self- 
willed  mysticism,  and  finds  in  it  the  characteristics  of  an 
enervated  age,  which  knows  no  joy  but  that  of  feeling,  and 
understands  no  greatness  but  that  of  the  labours  accomplished 
by  institutions  and  societies,  etc.  He  denies  that  the  approval 
of  the  Apostles  or  the  Reformers  can  be  claimed  for  so 
sentimental  and  Roman  Catholic  a  method ;  he  even  doubts 
whether  feeling  should  be  given  a  normative  place  alongside 
of  knowing  and  willing.  I  am  not  called  upon  to  discuss 
this  verdict  upon  modern  Pietism ;  I  prefer  to  leave  it  to 
others,  who  are  more  nearly  concerned,  to  settle  the  disputed 
question  whether  the  "  Revival "  was  the  product  of  an 
enervated  generation,  or  a  fresh  return  of  springtime  for  the 
spirit  of  man.  Only  it  appears  to  me  that  in  the  question 
before   us  Lohe  has   shaken   himself    clear   of    the   Pietistic 

*  Oil  the  JJiHite  Word  as  the  Light  which  leads  to  Peace,  5th  ed.,  1869. 


158  JUSTIFICATION   AND   RECONCILIATION  [150-1 

solution  without  getting  rid  of  the  Pietistic  problem.     For  he 
considers  it  justifiable  to  address  to  individuals  the  question 
whether  they  are  born  again,  whether  they  are  children  of 
God,  whether  they  are  assured  in  faith  of   their   salvation. 
That  is  the  view  of  the  matter,  indeed,  which  Mohler  holds 
to  be  specifically  Evangelical,  but  which  took  practical  shape 
for  the  first  time  in  the  different  phases  of  Pietism.'    Lohe,  it 
is  true,  rests  with  only  one  foot  upon  Pietism,  the  other  he 
places  on  the  soil  of  doctrinaire  Lutheranism,  by  giving  the 
advice  that  awakened  souls,  who  long  for  assurance,  should 
accept  with  blind  trust  the  immutable  promises  of  the  Word 
of  God.     This,  he  considers,  was  the  meaning  of  the  fact  that 
in  the  age  of  the  Beformation,  alongside  of  knowledge  and 
will,  not    feeling  but  memory  was   regarded  as  a  principal 
function  of  the  mind.     For  the  memory  ought  to  keep  in 
active  operation  bright  and  clear  texts  of  Scripture,  so  as  to 
awaken  believing  confidence ;  in  a  case  of  necessity,  however, 
all  doubts  are  to  be  beaten  down  by  the  believing  confidence 
of  the  pastor. 

But  is  memory,  then,  the  power  which  fills  up  the  gap 
between  intellectual  knowledge  of  the  general  truth  of  God's 
grace,  and  the  personal  satisfaction  and  pacification  of  the 
conscience  ?     And  how  long  will  the  authoritative  assurances 
of  a  believing  pastor  retain  their  power?      Can  his  words 
really  produce  more   than  that  transient  impression  which 
Pietists  gain  anyhow  by  their  tempestuous  prayers  for  assur- 
ance ?     Does  the  continuance  of  the  frame  of  feeling  desired 
really  depend  more  on  the  imperious  words  of  another  than 
on  the  syllogismus  pradicus,  or  on  the  straining  of  the  fancy 
to  lay  hold  of  the  general  promises  of  grace  ?     Feeling,  as  a 
matter  of  fact,  is  unaffected  by  the  will,  by  logical  reasoning, 
by  the  action  of  the  fancy  or  the  memory.     But  we  are  told 
that  feeling  ought  not  to  enter  here  at  all ;  feeling — that 
discovery  of   post-Beformation    times,   that   standard    of   an 
enervated  generation,  pretending  to  a  scientific  character  which 
faith  simply  contradicts  when  it  fills  us  with  its  proper  power ! 
But  unfortunately  a  pastor,  even  though  he  be  as  masterful  in 


151-2]  THE    SUBJECTIVE   SIDE   OF   JUSTIFICATION  159 

his  ways  as  Lohe,  must  accommodate  himself  to  the  way  of 
thinking  of  those  on  whom  he  wishes  to  work ;  he  has  no  right 
to  carry  men  away  by  claims  so  gi'otesque ;  for  the  impression 
which  may  be  thus  momentarily  produced  does  not  last,  and  the 
outcome  of  this  method  probably  is  to  compromise  Christianity. 
Now  feeling  is  simply  that  function  of  mind  in  which  the 
Ego  is  present  to  itself ;  and  reconciliation  with  God  must 
imply  a  modification  of  the  feeling  of  self,  if  the  assurance 
thereof  is  to  occupy  the  mind  at  every  moment  and  become 
a  motive  impelling  the  will.  But  now,  according  to  the 
Lutheran  view,  the  course  of  events  depends  on  the  following 
syllogism.  The  major  premise — namely,  the  truth  of  the 
universal  promise  of  grace — is  presupposed  as  a  judgment 
of  theoretical  cognition;  the  minor  premise — ^that  we  are 
trusting  firmly  enough  in  the  grace  of  God — is  to  be  pro- 
duced by  putting  a  strain  upon  the  will :  and  from  these 
there  is  to  follow,  as  a  perpetual  gain  for  the  feeling  of  self, 
the  conclusion  that  we  are  assured  of  justification.  This 
exercise  in  reasoning,  embracing  aU  the  three  basal  functions 
of  mind,  is  not  rendered  any  easier  by  the  attempt  which  is 
made  to  explain  the  conclusion  by  comparing  it  to  the  success 
of  moral  effort.  For  even  if  the  latter  ought  to  be  inter- 
preted as  an  effect  of  grace,  yet  it  is  not  sufficiently  akin  to 
trust  in  justification  through  Christ  to  give  us  any  light  ui)on 
assurance,  when  assurance  does  not  arise  directly  of  itself. 
Either  that,  or  we  run  the  risk  of  exchanging  for  justification 
a  form  of  self-righteousness. 

§  24.  When  Luther  set  up  his  view  of  justification  by 
faith  in  opposition  to  the  Catholic  sacrament  of  penance  (vol.  i. 
p.  159),  he  not  only  bound  up  the  conception  of  justification 
with  the  value  of  the  Church  for  the  individual  believer,  but 
with  equal  distinctness  secured  it  against  the  predominantly 
legal  practice  of  the  Catholic  system.  The  predominant  import- 
ance of  the  law  in  the  sacrament  of  penance  depends  on  the  fact 
that  from  the  penitent's  confession  the  priest  has  to  ascertain  his 
definite  sinfulness,  in  order  to  gauge  absolution  and  penalties 
accordingly.    If,  therefore,  the  priest's  method  is  conscientious, 


160  JUSTIFICATION   AND    RECONCILIATION  [152-3 

he  will  hold  the  penitent  firmly  to  contritio,  or  the  terrors  of 
the  law.  Against  this  Luther  maintained  in  his  earliest 
reforming  period  that  the  only  genuine  repentance  is  that 
which  springs  from  faith,  and  that  the  penitent  ought  not 
to  be  detained  under  fears  inspired  by  the  law,  but  should 
be  encouraged  to  cherish  that  believing  conviction  which 
appropriates  forgiveness  from  the  absolution  of  the  Church 
(vol.  i.  p.  163).  This  is  the  sense  of  the  new  meaning  given 
to  the  sacrament  of  penance  in  the  Augsburg  Confession,  Art. 
xii.,  and  in  the  Apology,  Art.  v.  Since  the  poenitentia  of  those 
who  commit  sins  after  baptism  is  meant  to  produce  contrUio 
and  fides,  Melanchthon  in  the  Apology  regards  the  subsequent 
absolution  as  sacraynentum  poenitentiae  in  respect  of  those 
actions  which  confession  brings  to  light  (v.  41,  vi.  13). 
Nevertheless,  in  contradistinction  to  the  Catholic  practice, 
what  is  here  aimed  at  is  to  confirm  the  penitent's  faith.  Now, 
in  the  Apology  the  Gospel,  quod  arguit  peccata  (ii.  62,  v.  29), 
is  repeatedly  described  as  the  motive  to  contrUio,  but  along- 
side of  it  the  same  function  is  ascribed  to  the  law  (v.  53),  so 
that  the  two  parts  of  ecclesiastical  poenitentia  are  connected 
with  the  two  heterogeneous  and  graded  parts  of  Divine  revela- 
tion. This  view  which,  though  only  obscurely,  lies  at  the 
basis  of  the  12th  Article  of  the  Confcssio  Augustana,  approxi- 
mates to  the  Catholic  representation  of  the  matter  in  a  way 
that  is  not  altogether  favourable  to  the  Evangelical  character 
of  the  counsel  intended.  For  one  who  stands  in  need  of 
special  forgiveness  for  sins  committed,  really  affirms  the  con- 
tinuity of  his  believing  status  in  the  Church  when,  from  the 
Gospel  of  forgiveness,  he  accepts  the  truth  of  his  guilt.  Were 
he  to  betake  himself  exclusively  to  the  law  for  this  purpose, 
he  would  land  himself  in  serious  uncertainty.  For  in  the 
last  resort  this  path  will  conduct  him  to  the  genuine  repent- 
ance which  is  essential,  only  when  by  faith  he  sees  in  the 
Lawgiver  the  God  of  his  salvation.  Here,  therefore,  within 
the  narrow  province  of  the  quasi  sacramental  system  of 
penance,  we  find  the  influence  of  that  innovation  of  which 
Melanchthon  gave  an  exposition  in  the  Visitationsbuch  (voL  i. 


153-4]  THK   SUBJBCTIVE   SIDE    OF   JUSTIFICATION  161 

p.  200)  in  order  to  make  the  universal  dispensation  of  justifi- 
cation intelligible  to  the  laity.  The  doctrine  of  justification, 
as  exhibited  also  by  Luther  in  the  same  sense,^  narrows  the 
problem  to  the  case  of  individuals  as  such,  and  weakens  its 
direct  reference  to  life  within  the  Church.  The  Church 
remains  in  the  background  as  the  teacher  of  law  and  Gospel 
(voL  i.  p.  189). 

What  disposed  Luther  to  make  this  violent  change  in  his 
teaching  was  the  fact  that  he  leaves  the  believer's  standing  as 
a  Christian  exposed  to  those  agitations  of  feeling  which  he 
had  experienced  as  a  monk,  owing  to  his  erroneous  attitude 
to  the  law.  Not  finding  in  the  prophets  of  Zwickau  the 
same  terrors  of  hell  for  sin,  he  thinks  that  he  ought  to  con- 
clude that  they  are  untrustworthy.  Melanchthon,  too,  is  the 
first  to  insist  on  these  most  torturing  feelings  as  an  element 
in  poenitentia  in  the  narrower  sense ;  *  they  were  next  pre- 
scribed by  both  Reformers  as  a  precondition  of  justificaiio 
in  generaL  The  orthodox  theologians  perpetuate  this  view. 
By  combining  the  narrower  conception  of  poenitentia,  as  equi- 
valent to  cantritio,  with  justification  they  finally  come  to  discard 
the  positive  and  comprehensive  conception  of  poenitentia,  with 
which  Luther  had  opened  his  Theses  of  1517,  though  it  still 
receives  recognition  in  the  Apology  (iii.  229).  In  all  these 
respects  Calvin  (vol.  L  pp.  204,  214)  keeps  to  Luther's  original 
positions.  Justifying  faith,  as  presupposing  the  regenerate 
status  and  poenitentia — which  last  covers  the  whole  of  life — 
and  conditioned  by  the  corporate  existence  of  the  community 
of  which  Christ  is  the  Head,  he  represents  as  consisting  in  the 
imputation  of  Christ's  righteousness;  he  makes  room  for 
the  terrors  of  conscience  only  so  far  as  to  say  that  many 
experience  them  as  preparatory  to  obedience,  while  he  admits 
mortal  terrors  to  be  a  precondition  of  conversion  only  in 
the  case  of  those  who  have  formerly  been  alienated  by 
the  devil  from   the  fear  of   God.      Among  the   Lutherans 

^  E.g.  CommeTUarius  in  ep,  ad  Oalatas  (1636),  ed.  Erl.  torn.  i.  p.  186. 

^  Apol.  C,  A.  y.  46:  *' Mortificstio  (^contritio)  significat  yeros  terrores, 
gicat  sunt  morientium,  quos  sustinere  natura  non  posset,  nisi  erigeretnr 
fide. 

II 


162  JUSTIFICATION   AND   RECONCILIATION  [164-5 

Spener  was  the  first  to  maintain  a  similar  moderate  view 
of  the  matter.^ 

The  doctrine  which  Melanchthon  made  authoritative  for 
the  Lutherans  had  for  a  long  time  no  pernicious  effects.  In 
practice  it  was  counterbalanced  by  the  survival  of  Luther's 
idea  that  baptism  guarantees  our  standing  in  grace,  and 
especially  the  forgiveness  of  sins.  A.  H.  Francke,  and  besides 
him  the  Gotha  Pietists  in  their  Confession  of  1693,  was  the 
first  to  insist  on  contrition,  or  the  pain  which  accompanies 
the  sweeping  away  of  inherited  lust,  as  a  precondition  of 
living  faith ;  and  they  appeal  to  the  Apology  of  the  Augsburg 
Confession,  But  meantime  the  mysticism  adopted  by  Joh. 
Arndt  and  Jodocus  van  Lodensteyn  had  led  to  a  still  more 
incisive  precondition  being  prescribed  than  that  expressed  in 
the  "  conflict  of  penitence  "  (Busskampf).  Formal  self-denial, 
insistence  on  the  hatefulness  and  loathsomeness  of  all  sin  what- 
soever, is  brought  by  them  to  such  a  pitch  as  to  make  man 
contrast  himself  in  his  creaturely  nothingness  with  God,  the 
only  Lord  and  the  only  Existent  One,  in  order  that  his  heart 
may  open  to  the  grace  which  compensates  him  for  the  surrender 
of  his  own  will  by  making  him  one  with  God.  But  this  is  to 
demand  far  more  than  pain  excited  by  the  feelmg  of  one's  own 
guilt.  And  while  Luther  may  have  inferred  from  his  own 
experience  that  terrors  of  conscience  arise  spontaneously  at 
the  remembrance  of  the  law,  yet  when  the  practice  of  monkish 
self-humiliation  is  revived,  meditation  upon  sin  in  general  and 
insistence  on  the  nothingness  of  the  creature  become  tasks 
which  induce  a  constant  tendency  to  morbid  fancies.  The 
Fietistic  conflict  of  penitence  points  us  also  to  the  same 
methods.  The  uselessness  of  these  methods,  however,  is 
plain  from  the  fact  that  they  really  render  uncertain  the 
attainment  of  joyous  trust  in  God  as  the  mark  of  being 
pardoned,  and  that  if  it  is  attained  at  all,  it  is  not  continuous.' 
Besides,  the  Fietistic  or  mystical  directions  are  always  so  stated 

^  Geachichte  des  Pietismus,  ii.  p.  113. 

'  Semler,  Lebenaheschreihurhg,  i.  p.  48  ff. ;  Ph.  D.  Bark,  Di$  jRechtfertigung^ 
i.  p.  152  If.  ;  Albert  Enapp,  LehenshUd,  pp.  188,  140,  166,  179. 


155-6]  THE   SUBJECTIVE   SIDE    OF   JUSTIFICATION  163 

as  though  the  ChriBtian  existed  only  for  contemplation,  and 
as  though  work,  which  interrupts  his  meditations,  were  worth 
nothing.  But  this  is  a  denial  of  the  principle  of  the  Befor- 
mation,  that  justification  in  actual  fact  becomes  matter  of 
experience  through  the  discharge  of  moral  tasks,  while  these 
are  to  be  discharged  in  the  labours  of  one's  vocation.  And 
Heinrich  von  Bogatsky  tells  us  in  his  biography  that  for  the 
half  of  his  lifetime  all  his  pious  exercises  yielded  him  no  lasting 
peace ;  not  till  he  undertook  the  work  of  devotional  writing 
did  he  attain  to  what  he  had  been  seeking.^ 

Spener  repudiated  both  the  conflict  of  penitence  and  the 
testing  of  justification  by  feeling;  and  taught  instead  that 
we  have  to  assure  ourselves  of  the  vitality  of  our  faith  and 
the  certainty  of  our  justification  through  the  practice  and  the 
consciousness  of  moral  action.^  This  argument  had  already 
been  put  forward  by  Melanchthon  and  Calvin  (p.  144) ;  it 
came  to  possess  a  peculiar  importance  in  Calvinism,  which 
teaches  that  good  works  are  to  be  regarded  as  evidence  of 
perseveraniia  gratiae.  This  view,  moreover,  not  merely  is 
inculcated  in  the  Heidelberg  Catechism  (Qu.  86),  but  also 
explains  the  efforts  made  by  the  strict  Calvinists  to  attain 
extreme  precision  in  conduct.*  But  the  principle  is  likewise 
recognised  in  the  Formula  of  Concord  (iv.  15),  and  reiterated 

^  Getekichte  dea  Pietismus,  ii.  p.  588.  Enapp,  too,  testifies  to  the  same 
thing  in  his  own  way,  op.  cU.,  p.  166.  His  ceaseless  conflicts  in  prayer  had 
brought  him  only  an  insignificant  gain,  when  one  afternoon  it  seemed  as  though 
a  gentle  voice  were  urging  him  to  work.  At  the  end  of  an  hour  of  quiet  study 
his  heart  oyerflowed  with  the  blessed  peace  of  God,  so  that  with  triumphant 
adoration  he  gives  vent  to  his  wonder  in  the  question :  How  is  it  possible,  my 
God,  that  Thou  givest  to  me  such  heavenly  peace  in  the  midst  of  this  dry  work  t 
Theuce  he  draws  the  doctrine  that  the  prayers  even  of  an  awakened  man 
are  evil  and  vain  without  work,  thorough  fidelity  to  his  vocation,  and  honest 
industry. 

^  ContUia  laiiTM,  i.  p.  32:  '*Ad  sensum  fidei  internum  provocare,  res 
unbigua  est.  Quoties  enim  eo  destituentur,  qui  fide  valent  maxime,  et  in  ipsa 
sua  imbecillitate,  cum  se  tentati  fide  vacuos  vociferentur,  robore  coelesti  con- 
servantur,  at  etiam  vincant.  Si  iam  ex  sensu  indicium,  desperabunt  aut 
desperare  iubebuntur  ac  morti  adiudicabuntur,  qui  vivebant  ac  vivere  debebant 
.  .  .  Cum  ergo  a  priori,  ut  loquuntor,  ea  dioernere  nequeamus,  a  posteriori 
cognitio  nostra  capienda  est,  videlicet  a  fructibus  arboris  indoles  agnoscenda." 
Of.  0€sehiehte  cU»  Pieiismus,  iL  p.  97  ft, 

'  Oeschiehte  de$  Pietismw,  i.  p.  112. 


164  JUSTIFICATION   AND    RECONCILIATION  [156-7 

by  Lutheran  theologians,  such  as  Quenstedt.  Nevertheless 
this  test  of  the  justified  status,  when  put  into  practice,  turns 
out  to  be  unreliable.  The  extreme  precision  of  the  Eeformed 
leaves  an  impression  as  though  the  thought  of  justification 
had  been  swallowed  up  in  attention  to  the  trivialities  of  life. 
But  Spener  (vol.  i.  360)  lets  us  see  that  partly  he  was  reduced 
to  uncertainty  when  he  asked  himself  what  actions  the  glory  of 
God  calls  on  us  to  perform  or  to  omit,  and  partly  came  to 
take  an  indulgent  view  of  his  sins.  At  bottom,  too,  the 
argument  which  concludes  from  good  works  to  the  truth  of 
the  consciousness  of  justification  by  faith  is  very  suspicious. 
We  ought,  we  are  told,  to  look  away  from  the  good  works 
which  we  perform  as  regenerate,  since  they  are  always  im- 
perfect, and  turn  in  faith  to  the  perfection  of  Christ  as  the 
ground  of  our  standing  before  God.  And  if,  though  we  thus 
turn,  we  become  the  prey  of  uncertainty,  we  ought  again  to 
reflect  that  we  still  have  good  works,  and  have  in  them  an 
evidence  of  our  standing  in  grace.  If  this  be  so,  it  seems  as 
though  we  might  spare  ourselves  this  roundabout  route,  and 
simply  hold  to  the  last-mentioned  consideration.  The  mistake 
in  the  argument  lies  in  this,  that  the  category  of  good  works 
cannot  be  applied  here,  for  when  we  are  sitting  in  judgment 
on  ourselves,  the  real  question  always  is  whether  our  life- 
work  is  manifested  in  the  individual  visible  actions  which  we 
have  before  us  (vol.  ii.  292).  But  we  cannot  set  up  this 
achievement  alongside  of  justifying  faith,  or  in  opposition  to 
it ;  on  the  contrary,  that  faith  is  an  element  in  the  true 
conception  of  a  man's  lifework.  We  cannot,  however,  discuss 
at  present  how  this  comes  to  be  so. 

On  the  other  hand,  insistence  on  a  "  conflict  of  penitence," 
under  the  conditions  laid  down  by  Luther  and  Melanchthon 
— conditions  which  Spener  himself  refused  to  acknowledge  as 
a  rule  for  all — is,  to  begin  with,  inconsistent  with  that  idea  of 
education  through  Church  fellowship  to  which  all  the  other 
principles  of  the  Eeformers  point.  Feelings  of  pain  at  one's 
own  sin,  which  are  compared  to  the  terrors  of  death  and  hell, 
thereby  fall  under  the  category  of  emotions  which  belong  to 


167-8]  THE   SUBJECTIVB    SIDE   OF   JUSTIFICATION  165 

the  domain  of  the  purely  natural  life.     Natural  feelings  of 
pleasure  and  pain,  as  an  original  endowment  of  man,  are  the 
immediate  impulses  of  his  activities,  but  at  the  same  time 
obstacles    to   the    regular   and    continuous    movement   and 
direction  of  his  will.     Now  all  education  consists  in  setting 
limits  to  natural  and  aimless  emotions  by  exciting  feelings 
of   moral   pleasure  and  pain,  and   in   making   possible   the 
consecutive  direction  of  the  will  to  the  good.     This  set  of 
feelings  is  different  from  the  other,  for  they  are  acquired  and 
orderly.      They   are    at  the    same    time    necessarily    more 
peaceful,  for  they  are  modified  by  accompanying  reflection. 
Now,  if   the   transition   from  repentance    to  the  assurance 
of   pardon   forms  a  self-consistent  process,  it  must  belong 
to  the  realm   of   education,  and    therefore    cannot   be    ex- 
perienced  in   those    shifting   feelings    which,    by    the    very 
strength  demanded  of    them,  would  prove  that  the  person 
concerned  was  destitute  of  all  education.     The  moral  pain  of 
repentance  cannot  therefore  consist  in  terrors  comparable  to 
the   natural  fear  of   death  or  the  thought  of   hell.     Such 
an  hypothesis,  besides,  is  rendered  impossible   by  the  mere 
fact  that  the  laeiitia  spirituaiis — which  is  an  expression,  in  the 
religious  feeling  of  self  which  God's  grace  has  restored,  of  the 
reception  of  forgiveness — is  shown  by  the  epithet  spirituaiis  to 
be  moral  pleasure.     Or  are  we  to  suppose  that  this  contrast 
between  the  moral  pleasure  which  forms  part  of  faith  and  the 
merely  natural  emotion  which  characterises   repentance,  is 
really  a  true   one  ?     That  supposition  would  simply  imply 
that  we  surrrendered  the  self-consistency  of  the  process.     If 
the  prescription  of  poenitentia  is  taken  literally,  we  cannot 
escape  this  danger.     The  demand  for  a  "  conflict  of  penitence," 
in  the  sense  of  an  excitation  of  natural  emotions  of  anxiety 
and  despair,  simply  suggests  an  aimless  attitude  of  mind,  in 
which  one  only  removes  oneself   further  from  the   possible 
peace    offered    by    grace.     And    it   is    the    same   with    the 
exaggerated  insistence  on  the  duty  of  our  regarding  ourselves 
in  our   creaturely  nothingness  as   utterly  unworthy  before 
God.      But  just  as  laetitia  spirituaiis  does  not  mean  an  emotion 


166  JUSTIFICATION    AND   RECONCILIATION  [158-9 

of  the  highest  intensity,  similarly  the  disapproval  of  oneself 
involved  in  repentance  does  not  entail  stormy  sensations. 
Otherwise  we  are  in  danger  of  falUng  into  the  mistake  of 
introducing  storm  and  stress  into  our  feeling  of  laetitia  also, 
and  so  forfeiting  that  self-purification  which  yet  ought  to 
be  attained  if  poenitejUia  is  in  general  a  moral  experience. 

The  same  result  follows  when  we  consider  that,  according 
to  Luther's  original  position,  repentance  itself  is  an  efifect  of 
faith,  and  when  a  penitent  suffers  from  terrors  of  conscience  he 
ought  to  have  it  made  clear  to  liim  that  he  is  really  under  the 
educative  grace  of  God  by  which  his  faith  is  set  free.  And  if 
what  calls  forth  these  experiences  is  his  comparison  of  the 
sins  he  has  committed  with  the  Divine  law,  yet  this  points 
back  to  faith  in  the  Lawgiver  as  the  Benefactor  and  the 
Author  of  man's  salvation.  For  if  this  thought  be  absent,  if 
the  Lawgiver  be  regarded  as  indifferent  or  as  an  object  of  mis- 
trust, then  there  results  no  repentance  at  all.  But  he  who  is 
advised  to  go  to  the  Gospel  for  the  knowledge  and  condemna- 
tion of  his  sins,  is  from  the  outset  supposed  to  be  the  subject 
of  specific  faith.  Now  this  principle  of  the  Reformers  has 
hitherto  been  made  use  of  as  meaning  that  God's  promise  of 
forgiveness  is  intended  to  be  our  ground  of  knowledge  in 
estimating  our  own  sin.  When  looked  at  more  closely,  this 
conception  requires  to  be  drawn  out  into  the  further  thought 
that  the  sight  of  Christ  in  His  perfecting  on  the  Cross  both 
elicits  from  us  condemnation  of  our  sins,  and  makes  God's 
grace  to  sinners  certain.  Such  a  conception  has  a  deeper 
bearing  on  repentance  than  the  law  has,  for  it  offers  us  the  ideal 
of  the  God-pleasing  life  exhibited  by  Christ  as  the  standard 
by  comparing  ourselves  with  which  we  come  to  know  and 
repent  of  our  sins.  For  that  model  of  what  life  should  be 
embraces,  in  the  unity  of  an  ordered  whole,  all  those  relation- 
ships which  are  set  forth  separately  in  the  law.  And  this, 
the  model  of  our  own  faith  and  effort,  excites  our  condemna- 
tion of  those  instances  of  unfaithfulness  of  which  we  have 
been  guilty,  in  the  same  degree  as,  by  its  moral  perfection 
and  beauty,  it  impresses  on  us  the  revelation  of  God  for  our 


159-60]  THE    SUBJECTIVE   SIDE    OF   JUSTIFICATION  167 

salvation  as  the  supreme  motive  of  our  faith  in  Him.  For 
part  of  the  meaning  of  repentance  is  that  the  sense  of  our  own 
moral  dignity,  too,  should  be  a  motive  to  condemnation  of  our 
sin.  This  fact  is  ignored  when  the  demand  is  made  that  we 
should  learn  our  sin  from  the  law,  and  estimate  it  by  the 
standard  of  the  law;  but  it  is  acknowledged  when  we 
draw  our  knowledge  of  our  sin  from  a  comparison  of  it  with 
the  ideal.  For  by  recognising  a  model  we  do  homage  to  our 
own  ideal,  and  that,  too,  from  the  standpoint  of  our  own 
honour  and  dignity. 

I  shall  recapitulate  the  results  attained  up  to  this  point, 
in  order  to  determine  accurately  the  question  still  awaiting 
solution.      Justification    is    God's    forgiveness    or    pardon, 
reconciliation    with    Him,   adoption    into    the    position    of 
children ;  and,  in  God's  revelation  of  grace  through  Christ,  it 
operates  as  the  imputation  of  Christ's  righteousness  in  such  a 
way  that  the  position,  given  to  Him  and  maintained  by  Him, 
as  Son  of  God  and  original  object  of  God's  love,  is  also  im- 
puted to  those  sinners  who  belong  to  the  community  of  Christ 
by  faith,  and  thus  they  are  accorded  the  acceseus  ad  patrem. 
Trust  in  God's  grace,  which  includes  emotional,  i,e.  personal, 
conviction  of  what  is  thus  connected  with  grace,  and  which 
takes  the  place  of  the  mistrust  involved  in  the  feeling  of 
guilt,  is  possible  to  every  individual,  provided  that  by  this 
faith  he  ingrafts  himself  into  the  community  of  Christ,  which 
presents  to  all  its  members,  under  the  conditions  described,  the 
promise  of  forgiveness  as  the  proximate  reason  of  its  own 
existence,  and  offers  it  to  them  for  their  salvation.    Since  for- 
giveness through  Christ  is  the  fundamental  form  in  which  each 
one  receives  the  guarantee  of  his  salvation,  so  likewise  the 
continuance  of  the  consciousness  of  sin  and  of  the  need  of 
forgiveness,  and  therefore,  too,  repentance  for  our  recurring 
oifences,  are  called  for  by  the  very  fact  that  in  Him  Who 
brings  us  the  revelation  of  grace  we  recognise  the  moral  ideal 
— but  in  such  a  way  that  our  education  in  the  Church  as  a 
rule  excludes  that  passionate  and  acute  form  of  conversion 
which    occurs   in   special   cases.      What   we   still   need    to 


168  JUSTIFICATION   AND   RECONCILIATION  [lGO-1 

discover  is  how  the  general  truth  of  the  promise  of  grace,  for 
which  each  individual  has  the  testimony  of  the  community, 
is  to  become  a  personal  conviction  in  every  believer.  The 
conditions  of  this  have  not  yet  been  found.  For  as  trust,  in 
regard  to  justification,  may  change  from  stronger  to  weaker, 
a  weaker  trust  is  evidence  of  a  lack  of  personal  conviction 
which  cannot  be  supplied  by  an  intellectual  acknowledgment 
of  the  general  truth,  cannot  be  confirmed  by  passionate  and 
morbid  effort,  but  is  rather  rendered  impossible  by  the 
heightening  of  the  feeling  of  guilt  present  in  the  "  conflict  of 
penitence,"  and  in  any  case  cannot  be  gained  through  feelings 
which  are  isolated  and  liable  to  change.  All  these  methods 
assume  that  we  are  to  receive  assurance  passively  as  an  opera- 
tion of  God  or  through  the  influences  of  the  Holy  Spirit,  perhaps 
even  in  a  fashion  definitely  marked  oS  from  the  normal 
context  of  mental  life,  or,  in  other  words,  through  inspiration. 
But  every  point  which  we  have  hitherto  been  able  to  establish 
has  gone  to  signalise  the  spiritual  activities  of  the  sinner. 
He  exercises  faith,  he  accounts  himself  a  member  of  the  com- 
munity of  Christ,  he  feels  trust  towards  God,  and  no  longer 
mistrust;  in  recognising  his  ideal  he  condemns  his  sin,  he 
seeks  personal  conviction  of  his  salvation,  in  order  that 
amid  all  other  changes  of  his  action  and  feeling  he  may 
hold  fast  to  the  accessus  ad  patrem.  How  are  these  two 
aspects  to  be  reconciled  with  one  another? 

§  25.  If  justification  by  faith  is  the  basal  conception  of 
Evangelical  Christianity,  it  is  impossible  that  it  can  express 
the  relation  of  men  to  God  and  Christ  without  at  the  same 
time  including  a  peculiar  attitude  of  the  believer  to  the  toorld 
founded  upon  that  relation  (p.  29).  This  fact  is  recognised  by 
Paul  when,  in  Eom.  v.  1-5,  viii.  32-39,  he  describes  the  appli- 
cation of  justification  (vol.  ii.  pp.  343,  349,  353).  It  creates 
in  man  a  peculiar  feeling  of  self  which  evidences  itself  in  his 
hope  of  permanent  acknowledgment  by  God  and  in  patience 
under  suffering,  and  which  is  charged  with  a  power  superior 
to  all  the  forces  and  dispensations  of  this  world.  But  the 
world  is  likewise  the  correlative  of  patience  and  hope.     For 


161-2]  THE   SUBJECTIVE   SIDE   OP  JUSTIFICATION  169 

sufferings  arise  out  of  the  believer's  position  in  the  world,  and 
his  acknowledgment  by  God — which  is  the  final  verdict  on 
him — is  always  conceived,  on  the  Old  Testament  model,  as 
installing  him  in  his  right  relation  to  the  world.  This  aspect 
of  the  matter  was  not  forgotten  by  the  Beformers.  Only, 
the  two  classical  expositions  of  this  subject  are  not  given  in 
connection  with  the  statements  of  Paul.  On  the  contrary,  in 
his  de  libertcUe  Christiana  Luther  uses  £ev.  v.  10  as  the  text 
of  his  argument  that  those  who  are  righteous  by  faith  are 
made  kings  and  priests — priests,  through  the  opening  of  the 
a4xess^ls  ad  patrem  and  the  right  of  prayer  to  God ;  kings, 
through  their  trust  in  God  Who  governs  all  things  for  the 
best,  and  will  help  the  believer  to  surmount  all  obstacles 
(vol.  i.  p.  181).  This  line  of  thought,  it  is  true,  though  with- 
out its  leading  terms,  finds  the  clearest  echo  in  the  Gonfessio 
Atigtistana,  xx.  24,  25  (voL  p.  i.  184).  On  the  other  hand, 
Melanchthon,  in  the  Apology  of  the  C,  A.,  relates  justification 
to  the  fact  that  it  renders  possible  the  fulfilment  of  the 
Commandments  of  the  first  Table  of  the  Decalogue,  which 
are  beyond  the  ability  of  the  natural  man. 

This  doctrine,  which  pervades  the  whole  of  the  Apology, 
stands  in  a  peculiar  connection  with  the  other  parts  of  the 
system.  It  does  not  recur  in  any  other  of  Melanchthon's 
theological  writings,  and  it  had  no  influence  on  his  successors. 
It  is  all  the  more  fitting,  therefore,  to  attempt  to  elucidate  its 
meaning.  A  new  interpretation  is  put  upon  the  first  three 
Commandments — according  to  the  Lutheran  enumeration — 
when  their  content  is  reduced  to  true  reverence,  love, 
invocation,  trust  in  God  under  all  sufferings,  patience  and 
endurance  in  them;^  though  certainly  the  First  Command- 
ment   must    be    explained    in    this    sense.     Nevertheless, 

*  Apol.  C.  ^.  ii.  8:  "Decalogus  requirit  non  solum  externa  opera  civilia, 
quae  ratio  utcunqae  efficere  potest,  sed  etiam  requirit  alia  longe  supra  rationem 
poflita,  scilicet  vere  timere  deum,  vere  diligere  deum,  vere  invocare  deum,  vere 
statuere,  quod  deus  ezaudiat,  et  exspectare  auxilium  dei  in  morte,  in  omnibus 
afflictionibus,  denique  requirit  obedientiam  erga  deum  in  morte  et  omnibus 
afflictionibus,  ne  has  fugiamus  aut  aversemur,  cum  deus  imponit."  18.  *' Ratio 
nihil  facit,  nisi  quaedam  civilia  opera,  interim  neque  timet  deum  neque  credit 
se  deo  curae  esse"  (the  same  expression  as  in  C,  A,  xx.  24,  25). 


170  JUSTIFICATION    AND    RBOONCILIATION  [162-3 

Melanchthon's   interpretation   agrees   with   Luther's    Larger 
Catechism ;  for  he,  at  least  in  his  exposition  of   the  First 
Commandment,  has  interwoven  statements  which  approximate 
to  Melanchthon's  view  (Pars  i.  64,  70).     On  the  other  hand, 
the  place  of  the  Christian  virtues  just  enumerated  is,  under 
the  head  of  Christian  Perfection,  described  by  Melanchthon  in 
the  C,  A.  xxvii.  49,  50.     Now,  in  the  latter's  position  noted 
above,  it  is  observable,  first  of  all,  that  he  draws  a  distinction 
of  worth  between  the  content  of  the  first  and  the  content  of 
the  second  Table    of   the  Decalogue.     The  first  transcends 
reason,  the  second  corresponds  with  reason.     The  Command- 
ments contained  in  the  latter,  therefore,  as  embodiments  of 
ivMitia  civilis,  it  is  possible  for  the  natural  man  to  fulfil,  at 
least  relatively;  the  former  are  beyond  him.     The  natural 
man   cannot    exercise    reverence    or   trust   in    God,  not    to 
speak  of  the  further  obligations  of  patience,  for  as  a  sinner  he 
is  altogether  sine  metu  dei,  sine  fiduda  erga  deum.     These 
characteristics  had  first  of   all  been  enumerated   under  the 
head  of  original  sin  in  the  2nd  Art.  of  the  C.  A.,  before 
concupiscentia  in  the  Latin  text,  after  it  in  the  German.     In 
the  1st  Art.  of  the  Apology  Melanchthon  had  endeavoured  to 
refute  the  objection  raised  in  the  Confutatio  pontifida^  that 
none  save  actual  sins  are  to  be  understood  under  co^wupts- 
centia.     We  may  pass  over  this  aspect  of  the  matter  just  now. 
Nevertheless  the  article  of  the  Augsburg  Confession  itself,  for 
all  its  dependence  on  Augustine,  exhibits  a  change  in  the  con- 
ception of  sin  which  is  all  the  more  worthy  of  remark  that  it 
is  not  adopted  in  the  later  theology  of  the  Lutherans. 

In  regarding  inherited  sin  as  equivalent  to  c&Jicitjnsceniia, 
Augustine  conceived  the  basal  relationship  of  men  to  God, 
which  sin  has  overthrown,  as  being  constituted  by  the  law, 
and  the  field  of  unlimited  desires  as  being  the  domain  of 
moral  action  which  God's  law  is  bo  regulate.  On  the  other 
hand,  Luther  does  not  consider  the  relation  of  the  first  man 
to  God  as  ordered  by  the  law;  for  him  it  consists  in  the 
reciprocation  of  Divine  goodness  and  human  gratitude.  And 
therefore  he  finds  the  chief  evil  of  original  sin  in  the  perver- 


■ 


ie3-4]  THE   SUBJECTIVE   SIDE   OP  JUSTIFICATION  171 

sion  of  man's  original  reverence  for  God  into  its  opposite.^ 
He  reproaches  the  Scholastics  for  neglecting  this  feature,  but 
he  might  have  passed  the  same  censure  on  Augustine  also. 
In  his  treatment  of  this  point  Luther  is  epochmaking,  for  he 
distinguishes  between  the  irreligious  and  the  immoral  aspect 
of  sin,  and  subordinates  the  latter  to  the  former.  It  is  pos- 
sible for  him  to  do  so,  because,  when  explaining  the  perfection 
of  the  first  man,  he  lays  more  stress  upon  his  free  and  spiritual 
reUgion  than  upon  all  his  other  sapientia  et  ivMitia,  With 
this  agrees,  finally,  that  articulated  conception  of  Christian 
perfection  to  which  Melanchthon  gives  most  felicitous  expres- 
sion in  the  Augsburg  Confession.  For  if  the  end  contem- 
plated is  the  restoration  of  original  perfection  through  Christ, 
the  religious  aspect  of  things  takes  precedence  of  the  moral. 
Moreover,  though  the  Eeformers  allow  that  it  is  possible  for 
the  sinner  to  attain  a  certain  measure  of  iustitia  Uvilis, 
namelj,  the  fulfilment  of  the  Commandments  of  the  second 
Table,  yet  grace  is  needed  to  produce  reverence  and  trust 
towards  God  in  sinners  who  have  hitherto  lived  in  indifiference 
or  mistrust  towards  Him.  For  these  virtues,  looked  at  in 
the  light  of  their  state  as  sinners,  are  supra  rationew,.  The 
opposition  held  to  exist  between  this  fulfilment  of  the  first 
Table  of  the  law  and  the  antecedent  perversion  of  man's 
relation  to  God  through  sin,  serves  to  explain  the  Lutheran 
interpretation  of  poenitentia.  The  latter  experience,  as  set 
forth  in  the  Augsburg  Confession  and  the  Apology,  is  meant 
as  a  substitute  for  the  Catholic  sacrament  of  penance,  and 

^  EntarratUmes  in  Oertesin.  Opp,  exeg,  lot,  ErU  i.  p.  133  :  "  Dens  Adae  ver- 
bum,  cultam  et  religionem  dedit  nudissimam,  purissimam  et  simplicissimam. 
Non  enim  praecipit  mactationem  tauronim,  non  fumum  thuris,  non  vota,  non 
ieiuDia,  non  alias  afflictiones  corporis :  hoc  tan  turn  vult,  ut  laudet  deum,  ut  gratias 
ei  agat,  nt  laetetur  in  domino,  et  ei  in  hoc  obediat,  ne  ex  vetita  arbore  comedat. 
Huios  cultus  reliquias  habemus  per  Christum  restitntas  .  .  .  quod  nos  quoque 
landamus  et  gratias  ei  agimus  de  omni  benedictione  spirituali  et  corporali." 
142  :  **  Sophistae  cum  de  pcccato  originis  loquuntur,  tantum  de  misera  et  foeda 
libidine  sen  concnpiscentia  loquuntur.  Sed  p.  o.  est  yere  totus  lapsus  naturae 
humanae,  qnod  est  intellectus  obscuratus,  ut  non  amplius  agnoscamus  deum  et 
Toluntatem  eius,  ut  non  animadvertamus  opera  dei ;  deinde  quod  etiam  volun- 
tas mire  est  depravata,  ut  non  fidamus  misericordiae  dei  et  non  metuamus  deum  ; 
sed  secori,  omisso  verbo  et  voluntate  dei,  sequimur  concupiscentiam  et  impetus 
camis."    Cf.  pp.  77,  78,  82  on  the  content  of  the  image  of  God. 


172  JUSTIFICATION   AND   BECONCILIATION  [164-6 

receives  that  title  even  in  the  Apology  (v.  41)  as  well  as  in 
the  Lod  of  1535.  Now  it  is  striking  that  in  the  Confession 
(xii.),  and  in  the  Apology  (v.  28,  45),  good  works,  as  frudtis 
poenitentiae,  are  distinguished  from  its  two  elements,  corUritio 
and  Jides,  Though  in  the  passage  cited  from  the  Apology 
Melanchthon  makes  no  objection  to  their  being  regarded  as  a 
third  element  in  poenitentia,  he  nevertheless  conserves  their 
character  as  fructus  poenitenticLe.  For  the  former  view  is 
admissible,  provided  that  poenitentia  is  interpreted  in  the  com- 
prehensive sense  which  it  has  in  Luther's  first  thesis,  a  sense 
deliberately  adopted  by  Calvin.  On  the  other  hand,  we  have 
poenitentia  used  again  (vol.  ii.  45)  in  a  sense  limited  in  the 
narrowest  way  to  the  terrores,  and  therefore  equivalent  to 
contritio.  But  the  very  limitation  of  poenitentia  to  contrUio 
and  Jides — a  sense  which  it  received  in  later  Lutheranism,  as 
being  incumbent  on  saints  and  backsliders  alike,  as  both  the 
beginning  of  justification  and  a  daily  duty — possesses  a  prac- 
ticable meaning  only  when  sin  is  regarded  primarily  as  a 
defect  in  reverence  or  trust  in  God,  and  only  in  the  second 
place  as  an  offence  against  the  moral  law.  Save  on  this  pre- 
supposition, the  doctrine  is  unintelligible. 

But  what  relation  has  the  idea  of  justification  or  forgive- 
ness to  the  capacity  of  rendering  to  God  reverence,  love,  and 
trust ;  of  interpreting  aU  worldly  dispensations  in  this  spirit, 
and  of  bearing  sufferings  patiently  as  Divine  means  of  educa- 
tion ?  The  difference  between  the  Evangelical  and  the 
Catholic  view  was  reduced  above  (p.  36)  to  this,  that  the 
latter  is  designed  to  explain  the  moral  capacity  of  the  justified 
sinner,  the  former  to  explain  his  religious  character.  Now  the 
outcome  of  Melanchthon's  statement  in  the  Apology  is  that 
forgiveness  renders  possible  obedience  to  the  commandments 
of  the  first  Table.^     This  may  be  proved  by  combining  the 

^  One  statement  seems  inconsistent  with  this.  We  read,  iii.  228:  "Ideo 
iustificamur,  ut  iusti  bene  operari  et  dbcdire  legi  incipiamus.  Ideo  regeneramur 
et  spiritum  sanctum  accipimus,  ut  nova  vita  habeat  nova  o])era,  noYOS  affectus, 
timorem,  dilectionem  dei,  odium  concupisoentiae,"  etc.  229  :  "  Haec  fides,  de 
qua  loquimur,  exsistit  in  poenitentia.  Et  inter  bona  opera,  inter  tentationes  et 
t)ericula  confirmari  et  creacere  debet,  ut  subinde  certius  apud  nos  stataanius, 


165-6]  THE   SUBJECTIVB    SIDE   OP   JUSTIFICATION  173 

following  propoBitions  from  the  Apology : — ii.  34  :  "  Humanus 
animus  sine  spiritu  sancto  aut  securus  contemnit  indicium 
dei  (sine  metu),  aut  in  poena  f ugit  et  odit  iudicantem  deuni 
(sine  fiducia)."  36.  "  Impossibile  est  diligere  deum  nisi  prius 
fide  apprehendatur  remissio  peccatorum.  Non  enim  potest 
cor,  yere  sentiens  deum  irasci,  diligere  deum,  nisi  ostendatur 
placatus."  44.  "  Promissio  nobis  afifert  gratis  reconciliationem 
propter  Christum,  quae  accipitur  sola  fide."  45.  "  Haec  igitur 
fides  specialis  iustificat  nos,  regenerat  nos,  et  affert  spiritum 
sanctum,  ut  deinde  legem  dei  facere  possimus,  videlicet  dili- 
gere deum,  vere  timere  deum,  vere  statuere,  quod  deus 
exaudiat,  obedire  deo  in  omnibus  afflictionibus,  mortificat  concu- 
piscentiam,"  etc.  In  this  argument  it  is  to  be  noticed,  first, 
that  Melanchthon  illustrates  the  operation  of  forgiveness  or 
the  process  of  justification  exclusively  by  bringing  out  the 
aspects  of  the  correlative  faith ;  and  further,  that  he  uses 
regcTurare  as  interchangeable  with  instificare.  This  is  the  case 
also  in  ii.  72,  78, 118,  with  this  additional  difficulty,  that  even 
ittstum  efficere  is  employed  as  equivalent  to  the  other  two  terms. 
Wherever  the  formula,  that  faith  justifies,  occurs  in  the 
Apology,  it  is  added  that  such  language  is  not  to  be  taken 
literally.  Properly  speaking,  justification  is  bestowed  by  God 
for  Christ's  sake ;  faith  merely  accepts  it.  But  clear  as  the 
latter  statement  seems,  it  introduces  a  difficulty  into  the 
argument  when  a  formula  not  meant  to  be  taken  literally  is 
used  alongside  of  the  true  description.  Might  this  formula  not 
have  been  avoided  by  the  exercise  of  a  little  care,  especially 
when  it  was  so  liable  to  be  misconstrued  by  opponents  ?  And 
yet  it  is  indispensable,  for  the  operation  of  God,  which  is  called 
justification,  works  a  change  in  the  person  concerned.  That  this 
change  has  taken  place,  that  the  Divine  cause  has  produced  its 

quod  deoB  propter  Christum  respiciat  nos,  ignoscai  nobis,  exaudiat  nos."  Yet, 
as  the  second  statement,  agreeing  with  the  first,  shows,  eTen  in  this  connec- 
tion  Melanchthon  means  merely  the  Commandments  of  the  first  Table  as  the 
aim  and  end  of  iustificcUio  or  regeneratio.  The  riova  cpera  are  only  to  be  under- 
stood as  instances  of  that  trust  in  God  and  patience  which  are  opposed  by 
the  tenUxHonei,  Through  the  overcoming  of  tenkUioneSf  by  means  of  such 
religions  actions,  faith  is  represented  as  growing  stronger  even  in  its  direct 
relation  to  the  forgiveness  of  sins. 


174  JUSTIFICATION    AND   RECONCILIATION  [16C-7 

effect,  baa  its  evidence  only  in  the  faith  excited  by  God's  pardon, 
and   in    those    various   relationships   which   faith   embraces. 
Here  we  have  the  inevitable  psychological  character  of  this  con- 
ception (p.  21)  from  which  no  explanation  of  the  matter  can 
escape.    For  however  earnestly  we  may  strive  to  bring  out  man's 
passivity  in  this  respect,  yet  we  can  never  get  over  the  fact  that 
he  receives  and  apprehends  the  unconditioned  operation  of 
God.     And  that  means  that  he  is  spiritually  active,  whether 
as  experiencing  lively  joy  at  the  thought  of  pardon,  or  as 
listening  to  such  a  statement  as,  "  Thy  sins  are  forgiven  thee." 
These  possibilities,  however,  do  not  enter  into  Melanchthon's 
view,  in  so  far  as  he  includes  obedience  to  the  Commandments 
of  the  first  Table  under  the  faith  which  is  the  correlative  of 
our  being  declared  righteous.    A  man  does  not  experience  the 
fact  of  his  justification  so  much  in  a  contemplative  act  which 
presents  to  his  mind  justification  or   Divine  pardon  in  an 
isolated  way,  but  rather  in  trust  in  God,  which  embraces  like- 
wise the  believer's  situation  in  the  world.     He  has  a  right  to 
feel  this  trust,  and  is  led   to  exercise  it,  just  because    he 
acknowledges  Christ  as  the  Reconciler  of  the  community  which 
He    founded,  of    which  he  deliberately   reckons   himself    a 
member.      As  it  is  most  simply  expressed  in  the  C.  A.  xx. 
24,  faith  verifies  the  forgiveness  of  God  experimentally  when 
it  reaches  out  to  grasp  God's  care  and  providence  over  the 
whole  of  life,  and  relies  thereon  even  under  those  suiSerings 
involved  in  the  believer's  situation  in  the  world.     For  in  his 
changing  aspects  as  sinner  and  believer,  man  is  not  only  face 
to  face  with  God;  he  is  also  in  relationship  to  the  world.     This 
is  indisputable  so  long  as  he  remains  in  a  state  of  sin ;  but 
neither  can  it  be  denied  or  thought  away  even  in  the  believer 
as  justified,  unless  we  are  to  land  ourselves  in  a  fatal  obscurity. 
The  sinner  who,  by  his  former  mistrust  of  God,  shows  himself 
to  be  dependent  on  the  world,  can  be  proved  to  have  under- 
gone a  change  through  his  trust  in  God's  forgiveness,  only  if 
with  that  trust  there  is  combined  a  new  lordship  over  the 
world  due  to  confidence  in  God's  all-embracing  care.     Thus, 
too,  this  exercise  of  faith  in  providence  and  of  patience  under 


167--8]  THB   SUBJECTIVE   SIDE   OP   JUSTIFICATION  175 

divinely-ordained  sufferings  is  the  form  in  which  the  believer 
attains  assurance  of  the  salvation  guaranteed  to  him  through 
Christ  alone.  For  since  the  dominion  over  the  world,  exer- 
cised through  faith  in  the  Beconciler,  brings  with  it  its 
corresponding  feeling  of  pleasure,  the  laetitia  sjnrUualis 
contaias  in  itself  the  conditions  of  its  continuity  and  inward 
equipoise.  Apart  from  these  functions  of  trust  and  patience, 
we  can  find  no  place  for  assurance  of  our  justification  by 
faith.  Auditory  hallucinations  conveying  anything  of  the 
kind  have  nothing  to  do  with  the  case. 

There  are  theologians  who  meet  an  explanation  such  as 
this  with  a  charge  of  Pelagiauism.  They  are  of  opinion 
that  if  the  conception  of  grace  be  the  principle  which  is 
determinative  for  the  data  of  the  Christian  life,  man  must  be 
thought  of  as  occupying  a  purely  passive  attitude  towards  it. 
Every  interpretation  of  Divine  grace  which  moves  within  the 
limits  of  the  subjective  functions  determined  and  set  in 
motion  by  it,  they  regard  as  a  negation  of  Divine  grace  alto- 
gether. For  they  detect  the  errors  of  Pelagius  wherever  the 
human  subject  is  represented  as  possessed  of  self-dependence. 
Unfortunately,  they  themselves  alone  are  guilty  of  these  errors, 
for  they  forbid  us  to  combine  in  thought  the  grace  of  God  and 
the  self-dependence  of  the  human  spirit.  The  Pelagian  con- 
ception of  himian  freedom  is  that  which  makes  it  the  sufficient 
ground  of  religion  and  morality  in  such  a  way  as  to  abstract 
the  subject  from  his  connection  with  the  religious  and  moral 
community.  But  in  the  view  given  above  there  is  this 
reservation,  that  the  justification  of  the  individual  takes  place 
only  within  the  community  of  believers,  which,  as  bearer  of 
the  promise  of  grace,  proves  itself  an  educative  influence  on 
those  who  are  to  belong  to  it  (p.  109),  and  so  this  doctrine 
is  not  Pelagian.  If,  on  the  other  hand,  it  is  asserted  that  the 
human  spirit  does  not  consist  merely  in  feeling,  knowing,  and 
willing,  but  exists  behind  all  these  as  a  definite  kind  of  being 
and  life — ^in  other  words,  as  a  kind  of  substance  {Natur)  ^ — 
that  this  dark  background  is  acted  on  by  grace  in  a  purely 

^  Of.  Theologie  und  Metaphysik,  p.  42  ;  2iid  ed.,  p.  45. 


176  JUSTIFICATION    AND    RECONCILIATION  [l68 

passive  way,  and  that  this  relationship  must  first  be  ascer- 
tained before  its  consequences  can  be  observed  in  spiritual 
actions — then  this  mystical  psychology  is  simply  useless, 
whether  for  theoretical  or  practical  purposes.  This  kind  of 
mysticism  takes  upon  itself  to  explain  intelligible  processes  by 
unintelligible  formulae  ;  it  is  a  fruitless  juggling  with  words. 
It  is  utterly  alien  to  Melanchthon's  style  of  thought,  or 
rather,  the  charge  of  Pelagianism  strikes  also  at  the  Apology 
of  the  AwgSmrg  Confession. 

Lastly,  the  fact  that  in  the  document  just  mentioned  the 
expressions  iustificarty  itistum  efficere,  regenerare  are  used  as 
equivalents  in  describing  the  connection,  explained  above, 
between  justification  and  the  functions  of  religious  freedom, 
does  not  imply  a  relapse  into  Catholic  methods  of  thought. 
The  Formula  of  Concord,  iii.  Epit.  7,  8,  Sol.  decl.  17,  18, 
provided  against  regenerare  in  the  Apology  being  understood 
in  any  other  sense  than  as  ahsolvere  a  pecccUis.  But  this  does 
not  explain  how  Melanchthon  not  only  comes  to  use  as 
equivalents  those  expressions  which  elsewhere  he  differenti- 
ates, but  also  gives  the  same  meaning  to  vustum  ejlcere.  He 
does  not  understand  this  latter  phrase  in  the  Catholic  sense  of 
caritas  ivfusa;  and  anyone  who  charged  him  with  doing  so 
would  do  him  as  grave  an  injustice  as  Fricke  ^  does  to  me 
when,  in  spite  of  my  express  repudiation  of  this  Catholic 
conception,  he  represents  it  as  my  view.  By  speaking  of 
iustiftcatio  as  iu^um  efficere,  Melanchthon  can  only  mean  to 
remove  the  impression,  which  might  be  created  by  the 
imputatio  iicstitiae,  that  by  the  latter  is  meant  the  predication 
of  an  imaginary  attribute.  But  the  real  change  in  the  sinner 
is  proved  by  the  fact  that  he  is  impelled,  by  the  forgiveness 
of  his  sins,  by  the  Divine  decision  that  for  Christ's  sake  he  is 
deo  acceptus  (p.  73)  to  exercise  that  reverent  trust  in  God 
which  is  the  characteristic  activity  of  the  new  life.  This 
change  at  the  same  time  depends  on  the  Holy  Spirit,  yet  not 
in  such  wise  that  His  working  is  mechanical  like  that  of  a 

^  Metaphysik  und  Dogmatik,  p.  7.    Of.  the  first  edition  of  this  volume  (Germ. ), 
p.  531. 


l6ft-9]  THE   SUBJECTIVE    SIDE    OF   JUSTIFICATION  177 

supernatural  physical  force,  but  in  such  a  way  that  His  action 
on  the  individual  can  be  shown  to  exist  only  when  the  indi- 
vidual is  a  member  of  the  community  of  believers.  The  Holy 
Spirit  necessarily  coincides  with  this  relationship.  Melan- 
chthon's  usage  was  not  repeated  by  himself,  for  he  did  not 
again  state  the  direct  practical  relation  of  justification  to  the 
religious  functions.  In  reasserting  the  rights  of  this  import- 
ant doctrine,  I  reserve  the  question  whether  the  conception 
of  regeneratiOy  which  it  involves,  demands  or  permits  a  more 
extended  use. 

Eeverent  trust  in  God's  protection  and  providence  in 
every  situation  in  Ufe,  the  invocation  of  God  in  prayer,  and 
patience  under  the  sufferings  which  He  ordains,  constitute, 
according  to  the  teaching  of  Luther  and  Melanchthon  in  the 
two  documents  under  discussion,  the  content  of  the  religious 
freedom  over  the  world  in  which  the  believer  experiences  his 
justification;  they  constitute  the  activity  which  is  called 
forth  by  the  pardoning  grace  of  God,  when  it  moves  one 
who  was  formerly  a  sinner  to  lay  aside  the  mistrust  of  God 
which  goes  along  with  the  unrelieved  sense  of  guilt.  This 
religious  change,  which  estabUshes  the  beUever's  independence 
of  the  world,  in  addition  makes  it  possible  for  him  to  attain 
to  moral  independence  of  character.  The  corresponding 
element  in  Catholicism  is  not  to  be  sought  under  the  heading 
of  faith.  For  faith,  in  the  Catholic  sense,  means  knowledge 
accepted  on  God's  authority,  and,  as  related  to  justification 
(ivMum  efficere),  consists  essentially  in  active  love  of  one's 
neighbour.  Through  the  exercise  of  this  love,  moreover, 
hope  comes  to  its  proper  perfection ;  and  hope,  as  directed 
to  eternal  blessedness,  embraces  also  the  other  evidences  of 
God's  compassion  furnished  by  the  believer's  situation  in 
the  world  (p.  37).  But  according  to  the  delineation  of  hope 
given  by  Thomas  Aquinas,  it  is  subjected  to  a  peculiar 
limitation,  due  to  the  sense  attached  to  timor  filialis.  On 
this  point  the  teaching  of  Thomas  is  as  follows  (Pars  ii.  2, 
qu.  19).  Fear  has  for  its  direct  object  some  evil  which  is 
to   be  avoided.      Now  God  is  not  an  evil,  and  therefore 

12 


178  JUSTIFICATION   AND   RECONCILIATION  [169-70 

cannot  be  feared  directly ;  but  He  can  be  feared  in  so  far 
as  some  evil  impends  which  comes  from  Him  or  is  in  contrast 
to  Him.  And  this  is  either  punishment  or  guilt.  Punish- 
ment, as  the  deprivation  of  a  particular  good,  is  an  evil, 
though  in  the  light  of  the  final  end  it  is  in  itself  good ; 
guilt  is  essentially  evil,  for  it  is  incompatible  with  a  proper 
relation  to  the  good  final  end.  One  fears  punishment  as 
inflicted  by  God ;  one  fears  guilt  as  contrasted  with  God. 
Fear  of  punishment  is  slavish ;  fear  of  guilt  is  childlike,  for 
a  child  fears  to  wrong  his  father.  A  mixture  of  the  two 
kinds  is  timor  initialis,  as  it  occurs  at  the  beginning  of  the 
Christian  life.  Slavish  fear  is  bad,  so  far  as  its  aversion  to 
punishment  rests  upon  the  lust  of  the  world :  it  is  essentially 
good  when  what  is  feared  in  punishment  is  its  coming  from 
God,  and  proof  is  thus  given  that  love  to  God  is  bound  up 
with  it.  But  this  does  not  annul  the  generic  difference 
between  slavish  and  childlike  fear.  This  is  shown  by  the 
fact  that  both  may  be  regarded  as  the  beginning  of  wisdom. 
Slavish  fear,  however,  turns  human  life  away  from  sin  out  of  a 
regard  for  the  punishment  of  sin ;  childlike  fear  governs  life 
directly  by  the  Divine  motives  of  reverence  for  God,  sur- 
render to  Him,  and  shame  of  abandoning  Him.  Childlike 
fear,  therefore,  is  a  gift  of  the  Holy  Ghost,  and  identical  with 
being  poor  in  spirit ;  inasmuch  as  one  who  surrenders  him- 
self to  God  seeks  no  glory  for  himself  and  sets  no  value  on 
external  goods. 

The  last-named  characteristic  indicates  that  childlike 
fear  of  God  is  meant  to  be  regarded  as  the  principle,  not 
only  of  action,  but  of  our  estimate  of  self  and  our  view  of 
the  world.  This  aspect  betrays  its  similarity  to  the  freedom 
of  the  Christian.  But  at  the  same  time  the  opposition  between 
the  two  standpoints  comes  out  clearly.  For  the  Catholic 
mode  of  feeling  looks  exclusively  to  the  ever-threatening 
possibility  of  offending  against  God :  that  of  the  Eeformers 
looks  to  the  divinely-guaranteed  certainty  that  guilt  has  been 
blotted  out,  and  the  recurring  sense  of  guilt  deprived  of  its 
power  to  separate  us  from  God.     I  do  not  say  that  Christian 


170-1]  THE   SUBJECTIVE   SIDE   OF   JUSTIFICATION  179 

liberty,  in  Luther's  view,  implies  the  certainty  in  advance 
that  all  offences  which  we  may  conceivably  commit  are 
forgiven ;  but  while  the  liberty  of  the  children  of  God  does 
not  express  any  such  prospect,  it  is  just  as  little  a  prey  to 
the  fear  of  new  offences.  But  though  Christian  liberty  be 
maintained  as  a  standpoint  both  possible  and  necessary, 
this  does  not  make  it  impossible  that  any  man's  poeniteritia 
may  long  enough  be  attuned  to  the  tone  of  timor  JilialiSy  and 
that  while  life  lasts  this  tone  may  enter  momentarily  into 
the  feeling  of  reconciliation.  But  the  liberty  of  the  children 
of  God  implies  that  the  standpoint  of  childlike  fear  is  not  the 
highest  possible  goal,  but  at  best  enters  into  experience  as  a 
transitional  stage.  In  the  education  of  children  one  must  on 
occasion  take  measures  to  prevent  certain  bad  habits  or  faults 
of  disposition  from  breaking  out :  to  this  end,  the  children's 
attention  must  be  so  directed  that  they  come  to  be  on  their 
guard  against  such  offences,  and  therefore,  when  temptation 
arises,  remember  the  possibility  of  their  committing  them. 
But  education  would  defeat  its  own  object  if  it  were  to  aim 
at  producing,  as  the  dominant  tone  of  children's  minds,  a 
terror  of  disobeying  the  commands  of  their  elders.  Such 
children  would  never  attain  independence  of  character : 
according  to  their  temperament,  either  this  kind  of  education 
would  render  them  timid  and  useless  in  life,  or  their  anxious 
attitude  of  mind  would  swing  round  into  shameless  im- 
morality. The  superiority  of  Christian  freedom,  however, 
may  be  seen  from  the  fact  that  no  rounded  rehgious  view  of 
the  world  is  compatible  with  childlike  fear,  in  the  sense  in 
which  Catholicism  makes  the  latter  a  pervasive  characteristic 
of  the  Christian  life.  For  one  who  has  always  to  be  on  his 
guard  lest  in  one  of  the  multifarious  situations  of  life  he 
should  transgress  against  the  highest  end,  and  so  against  the 
moral  order,  cannot  take  a  survey  of  his  own  attitude  towards 
the  world,  nor  estimate  it  as  a  whole  in  relation  to  himself, 
as  it  is  necessary  and  possible  to  do  when,  on  the  basis  of 
reconciliation,  one  feels  unconstrained  trust  in  God.  Lastly, 
in    childlike    fear   we    have   a    positive    expression   of   that 


180  JUSTIFICATION   AND    RECONCILIATION  [171-2 

uncertainty  about  one's  own  salvation  which  is  prevalently 
recommended  in  Catholicism. 

Catholicism,  however,  furnishes  yet  another  counterpart 
to  the  reUgious  freedom  which  springs  from  justification  by 
faith.  This  is  the  freedom  of  familiar  intercourse  with  God, 
Who  reveals  His  love  in  Christ,  and  it  is  accorded  to  perfect 
Christians,  to  monks  and  nuns,  as  the  crown  of  their  sancti- 
fication.^  This  freedom  consists  in  the  contemplative  exercise 
of  responsive  love,  which  arises  from  compassion  infused  into 
the  soul  at  the  sight  of  God  humbling  Himself  out  of  love. 
Such  freedom,  however,  implies  for  its  exercise  a  footing 
of  equality  with  God  as  thus  contemplated.  Christ,  the 
Bridegroom,  is  divested  of  all  the  qualities  of  loftiness  and 
sublimity,  and  all  considerations  of  reverence  are  laid  aside, 
in  order  that  the  believer  may  exchange  with  God  in  this 
form  all  the  delights  of  sensuously  -  coloured  tenderness. 
Such  freedom,  which  strives  after  mystical  union  and  dis- 
tinctionless  identity  with  God,  becomes  the  basis  of  an 
assurance  of  salvation  which  leaves  timor  filialis  far  behind 
it ;  but,  as  being  a  deliberate  straining  of  feeliug,  is  only  too 
quickly  dispelled  by  the  sense  of  desolation,  desertion,  and 
dryness  of  soul.  In  two  respects  such  freedom  of  intercourse 
with  God  is  differently  constituted  from  that  which  arises 
from  justification  by  faith.  The  latter  is  experienced  by 
the  Evangelical  Christian  when  by  his  trust  in  God  he 
incorporates  himself  into  the  commimity  of  believers,  and 
makes  its  public  standing  in  the  pardoning  grace  of  God 
his  own.  The  monk,  on  the  other  hand,  gains  the  right 
to  the  freedom  of  intercourse  described  above  when  he 
has  climbed  the  heights  of  active  sanctification,  or,  in  other 
words,  when  he  has  marked  himself  off  from  others.  Be- 
sides, the  Evangelical  Christian  is  called  on  to  exercise 
the  freedom  arising  from  justification  amid  the  trials  and 
hardships  of  life ;  the  monk  has  no  occasion  for  anything 
of    the    kind,    for    he    has    withdrawn    himself    from    them. 

^  See  Geschichte  dtis  Pietismtis^  vol.  i.  p.  46  ff.,  for  the  features  of  this  style 
of  piety  as  described  by  St.  Bernard  (vol.  i.  p.  116). 


172-3]  THE   SUBJECTIVE    SIDE    OF   JUSTIFICATION  181 

Is  it  permissible    to    regard    these   two    forms  of   piety  as 
equivalent  ? 

§  26.  It  has  been  already  shown  (vol.  i.  p.  348)  that  the 
connection  between  justification  and  the  religious  functions 
of  the  new  life,  which  Melanchthon  expounds  in  the  Apology 
of  the  Atcgsburg  Confession^  and  which  is  an  answer  to  the 
question  about  the  nature  of  personal  assurance,  does  not 
recur  in  the  Beformer's  later  writings.  The  same  thing 
happens  here  as  with  Luther's  attachment  to  justification  of 
positive  world-dominating  freedom.  In  all  his  later  writings 
he  limits  the  freedom  which  flows  from  justification  to  its 
n^ative  sense  of  freedom  from  the  law  and  from  sin.  In 
the  same  way,  hardly  anywhere  save  in  Luther's  Catechisms 
is  the  individual's  experience  of  forgiveness  made  dependent 
on  his  connection  with  the  Church.  The  most  practical 
ideas  of  the  Beformation,  therefore,  disappeared  from  later 
Lutheran  theology.  And  this  defect  made  its  appearance  even 
in  the  writings  of  the  Beformers  themselves,  until  the  mis- 
chief was  brought  to  an  acute  stage  by  Johann  Gerhard's 
making  faith  in  God's  providence  a  part  of  Natural  Theology. 
The  fidelity  of  this  orthodox  divine  to  the  Augsburg 
Confession  is  such  that  he  declares  possible  to  the  natural, 
that  is,  sinful  man,  that  very  trust  in  God  which  the  chief 
standard  of  the  Church  expressly  denies  to  him  !  Neverthe- 
less, ascetic  writers  continue  to  take  the  same  estimate  of 
these  religious  functions,  though  they  are  influenced  by 
different  motives — Amdt,  for  instance,  by  the  example  of 
Christ,  Scriver  by  our  Divine  sonship.  By  Stephan 
Praetorius  alone  is  the  joy  of  the  Christian's  view  of  life 
and  personal  attitude  directly  deduced  from  justification. 
Founding  on  the  view  of  the  Apostle  Paul,  the  Bef ormed  divine 
Peter  Dumoulin  the  younger  ^  develops  the  connection  which 
Melanchthon  had  indicated.  He  starts  from  the  fact  that 
reconciliation    through  the  merits  of   Christ  has  won  peace 

1  Canon  of  Canterboiy,  died  1684.  TraU6  de  la  paix  de  Vdme  et  du 
contentcTnenl  de  Vesprii,  Amsterdam,  1675.  Of  the  five  books  of  this  work, 
the  first,  de  la  paix  avec  dieu,  has  to  do  with  our  subject.  The  contents  of 
the  others  are  ethical.    A  reprint  of  this  treatise  appeared  in  Paris  in  1840. 


182  JUSTIFICATION   AND   RECONCILIATION  [173-4 

with  God  for  all  those  who  turn  to  Christ  with  true  faith. 
In  reconciliation  they  have  received  the  forgiveness  of  sins 
and  the  rights  of  the  children  of  God,  and  thereby  are  filled 
with  joy.  Even  though  they  need  to  pray  for  forgiveness 
daily,  yet  that  does  not  disturb  their  peace  with  God,  for 
He  to  whom  they  pray  is  their  Father.  As  sin,  however, 
laid  the  foundation  not  only  of  enmity  between  man  and 
God,  but  likewise  of  discord  both  between  man  and  the 
world  and  between  man  and  himself ;  so  the  peace  with  God 
which  is  gained  through  reconciliation  brings  in  its  train, 
first  of  all,  man's  peace  with  himself,  then  peace  with  the 
creatures  ajid  with  other  men.  The  latter  appears  in  his 
readiness  to  forgive ;  the  former,  in  his  enjoyment  of  every 
temporal  blessing  as  evidence  of  the  goodness  of  a  reconciled 
God.  Thus  we  make  experimental  proof  of  the  fatherly 
care  of  God  throughout  the  whole  of  life;  welfare  and 
calamity  are  felt  to  be  equally  good  as  dispensations  of  His 
goodness;  for,  as  Paul  says,  all  things  are  ordered  for  our 
good,  and  sufferings  when  endured  in  this  spirit  heighten 
our  love  to  God.  In  order  to  maintain  peace  with  God, 
service  to  Him,  or  prayer,  is  needed.  Prayer,  issuing  as  it 
does  from  the  assurance  that  we  are  reconciled  to  God 
through  Christ,  and  manifesting  as  it  does  our  subjection  to 
God,  is  at  the  same  time  an  exercise  of  the  freedom  to 
approach  God  which  we  have  gained  through  Christ.  When 
by  it  we  seek  to  preserve  the  peace  of  God  throughout  all 
the  wants  and  needs  of  life,  it  produces  faith,  love,  hope, 
patience.  The  chief  use  of  prayer,  however,  is  to  praise  (Jod 
for  His  benefits  in  general,  and  for  the  manifestation  of  His 
saving  compassion  in  particular;  and  in  this  we  have  the 
beginning  of  eternal  life.  Peace  with  God  is  founded, 
throiigh  Christ's  work,  in  the  love  of  God.  Now,  as  this 
love  calls  forth  our  responsive  love,  this  attitude  of  our  will 
continually  strengthens  the  believing  trust  which  embraces 
the  peace  won  for  us  by  Christ.  That  trust  is  supported  by 
hope,  exercises  itself  in  a  good  conscience,  and  finally  attests 
its  genuineness  by  the  practice  of  good  works. 


174-5]  THE   SUBJECTIVE   SIDE    OF   JUSTIFICATION  183 

In  the  meantime,  however,  the  idea  of  justification  had, 
in  tradition,  lost  its  practical  theological  aspect  and  become 
unintelligible.  Consequently,  among  both  Lutherans  and 
Calvinists  the  mediaeval  methods  of  communing  with  the 
Saviour  as  with  a  Bridegroom,  of  formal  self-denial,  and  of 
mysticism,  were,  for  the  purposes  of  edification,  brought  into 
operation  again.  Johann  Arndt  revived  this  method,  and  at 
the  same  time  found  in  the  example  of  Christ  a  prefiguration 
of  the  active  religious  virtues  of  Lutheran  Protestantism. 
In  this  we  may  detect  a  mixture  of  views,  uninfluenced  by 
Luther's  decision  against  mysticism.  Already  at  the  be- 
ginning of  the  seventeenth  century  there  is  to  be  found  in 
general  the  commencement  of  that  falsification  of  the  history 
of  the  Eeformation  which  was  due  to  the  inferences  drawn 
from  Luther's  commendation  of  the  Theologia  Oermanica,  and 
his  approval  of  Tauler.  From  his  acting  so  people  thought 
they  could  prove  that  Luther  had  really  led  mysticism  to 
victory,^  but  they  failed  to  observe  that  subsequent  to  1518 
we  have  declarations  of  an  opposite  character  by  Luther  on 
the  subject  of  mysticism  (p.  99).  Later,  the  hostile  attitude 
adopted  by  the  Catholic  authorities  towards  the  Quietists 
misled  people  into  supposing  that,  as  Zinzendorf  says 
(voL  i  p.  595),  the  Molinist  doctrine  of  disinterested  love 
to  God  is  in  exact  agreement  with  the  20th  Article  of 
the  Augsburg  Confession,  (rottfried  Arnold  and  Tersteegen, 
too,  lauded  the  Quietistic  hermits  and  nuns  of  Spanish, 
Italian,  and  French  blood  as  the  spiritual  kindred  of  the 
Lutheran  Heformers.  Alongside  of  this,  it  is  true,  in  those 
hymns  which  came  to  be  used  in  public  worship,  an  emphasis 
not  in  the  least  corroborated  by  the  public  teaching  of  the 
Church  continued  to  be  laid  on  the  providence  of  God. 
Even  those  hymn-writers  who  devote  themselves  chiefly  to 
expressing  the  various  aspects  of  the  Church's  bridal  love, 
and  to  sensuous  contemplation  of  the  wounds  and  blood  of 

*  On  the  other  side,  it  is  still  instructiye  to  read  Gottl.  Wemsdorf, 
AufridUiffe  und  in  OotUs  Wort  gegrUndeU  Meinung  von  der  mystiachen 
Thtologie^  Wittenberg,  1729.     Cf.  Oeschichte  des  Pittismus^  vol.  ii. 


184  JUSTIFICATION    AND  RECONCILIATION  [175-6 

Christ  after  mediaeval  models,  are  likewise  capable  of  giving 
full  expression  to  gratitude  for  Divine  benefits.  But  no  one 
of  all  these  sacred  poets  asks  himself  the  question,  from  what 
principle  their  trust  and  their  submission  to  God,  their 
thanksgiving  and  their  avowals  of  patience,  ai-e  to  be  deduced. 
For  that  very  reason  they  are  far  from  taking  for  granted, 
with  Johann  Gerhard,  that  they  are  merely  giving  expression 
to  the  rights  of  the  natural  man.  But  this  of  itself  is 
suflScient  proof  of  the  fact  that  the  practical  gain  involved 
in  Luther's  view  of  the  world  and  of  life  was  not  lost  by  the 
Church  which  bore  his  name.  The  same  character  pervades 
the  Pietism  which  sprang  up  on  the  soil  of  Lutheranism. 
It  is  the  most  prominent  feature  of  Francke's  life.  Evidences 
of  the  providence  of  God  constitute  the  chief  theme  of  the 
autobiographies  and  diaries  which  make  their  appearance 
with  Pietism,  by  Petersen,  Canstein,  Joh.  Jak.  Moser, 
Bogatsky,  Jung-Stilling.  Iinier  alia  all  kinds  of  trivialities 
find  their  way  into  their  pages,  and  occasionally  even  selfish- 
ness, as  when  Petersen  points  out  how  God  has  visited  his 
enemies  with  sudden  death  or  other  calamities.  Even 
Edelmann,  when  he  went  over  to  Natural  Religion,  retained 
this  style  of  thinking  from  his  Pietistic  days.  Originally 
this  sort  of  "conduct  of  life"  was  alien  to  the  Pietism  of 
the  Seformed  Church ;  its  dominant  note  is  awe  rather  than 
trust  in  God.^  Stilling  therefore  follows  rather  the  path 
of  Lutheran  Pietism. 

The  hymns  adopted  by  the  Lutheran  Church,  which 
celebrate  the  Divine  Providence,  furnish  the  clearest  proof 
of  what,  in  this  Church's  view,  constitutes  personal  and 
social  piety.  I  should  become  tedious,  I  fear,  were  I  not  to 
limit  myself  to  the  hymns  of  Paul  Gerhardt  in  bringing  out 
the  characteristic  features  of  these  writers'  circle  of  thought. 
In  a  chronological  series  of  hymns,  covering  what  lies  between 
birth  and  death,  Gerhardt  gives  repeated  expression  to  that 
special  faith  in  Providence  which  brings  every  experience  of 
joy  and  sorrow  under  the  goodness  of  God.     In  this  series 

^  Of.  GeschicMe  des  Pictismus,  vol.  i,  p.  309. 


176-7]  THE   SUBJECTIVE   SIDE,  OF   JUSTIFICATION  185 

there  likewise  appears  a  thankful  acknowledgment  of  re- 
demption through  Christ,  as  one  item  among  others.  But 
this  does  not  in  the  least  mean  that,  apart  from  redemption, 
the  poet  is  convinced  of  Divine  Providence  as  an  object  of 
natural  cognition,  as  was  assumed  bj  the  theologians.  On 
the  contrary,  every  hymn  of  the  kind  is  written  from  the 
standpoint  of  redemption  through  Christ  as  an  incontestable 
presupposition — a  fact  which  is  suflBciently  indicated  even 
by  such  slight  allusions  as  those  contained  in  saying  that 
"  God  is  my  God,"  or  that  "  I  am  His  child."  The  numerous 
imitations  of  the  Psalms  to  be  found  among  Gerhardt's 
hymns  hardly  admitted  of  any  other  kind  of  character.  But 
in  two  hymns  it  becomes  palpably  evident  that  for  him 
fellowship  with  God  through  Christ  is  the  true  basis  of  his 
knowledge  of  God's  general  Providence,  and  that  reconcilia- 
tion is  the  fountain  of  that  religious  sense  of  freedom  in 
which  the  soul  enjoys  salvation.  I  refer  to  the  hymn, 
Warum  solW  ich  mich  denn  griimen  ?  hcif  ich  doch  Christum 
noch  ;  wer  will  mir  den  nehmen  ?  and  the  hymn  drawn  from 
Kom.  viii. :  1st  GoU  fllr  michy  so  trete  gleich  (dies  wider  mich. 
True,  the  scholastic  conception  of  justification  is  not  echoed 
by  any  of  these  hymns;  and,  indeed,  I  do  not  know  how 
that  conception  would  look  in  a  poetical  guise.  But  who 
can  deny  that  these  hynms  form  the  classical  expression  of 
the  practical  faith  which  takes  its  stand  upon  justification 
and  reconciliation  through  Christ  ? 

In  what  may  be  said  to  consist  the  difference  between 
the  spiritual  poems  of  Gellert  and  those  of  Paul  Gerhardt  ? 
It  would  be  a  great  mistake  to  regard  the  later  poet  merely  as 
a  representative  of  nationalism.  On  the  contrary,  as  regards 
dogma  he  is  absolutely  orthodox,  and  his  hymns  dedicated  to 
the  great  Christian  festivals  express  his  agreement  with  the 
traditional  views  of  Christ's  birth,  death,  resun-ection,  and 
exaltation  to  lordship  over  the  world,  with  great  warmth 
and  indisputable  sincerity.  Now  alongside  of  these  hymns 
we  find  others  which  praise  God  as  the  Governor  of  the 
world  and  the  gracious  Euler  of  human  fortunes :  they,  too. 


186  JUSTIFICATION    AND    RECONCILIATION  [177-R 

commend  themselves  to  us  by  their  freshness  of  feeling  and 
the  earnestness  of  their  trust  in  God.  But  Gellert's  Chris- 
tianity issues  from  the  school  of  dogmatic  theology ;  and  in 
the  tradition  of  this  school  the  truth  of  God's  government 
of  the  world  and  special  Providence  simply  stands  on  the 
same  level  with  the  truth  of  His  reconciliation  through 
Christ  in  order  to  the  forgiveness  of  sins.  The  one  is  an 
article  of  faith,  and  so  is  the  other.  But  the  truth  of  God's 
Providence  is  not  merely  claimed  by  Dogmatics  as  a  part  of 
Eevelation ;  it  is  also  declared  to  be  a  product  of  natural 
cognition.^  Now  it  would  be  inconsistent  with  the  character 
of  poetry  if,  in  the  hymns  celebrating  the  Divine  Providence 
and  government  of  the  world,  we  were  given  a  reflective 
treatment  of  either  source  of  knowledge;  and  this  is  the 
less  to  be  expected,  since  even  the  series  Ehre  Gottes  aus  der 
Natur  definitely  follows  the  model  of  the  Psalms.  But  the 
want  of  connection  between  these  hymns  and  those  which 
deal  with  the  history  of  redemption  is  unmistakable ;  so  much 
so,  that  if  the  latter  are  put  aside,  the  poet  who  wrote  the 
former  might  actually  be  a  Deist.  This  impression,  however, 
is  due  to  the  fact  that  Gellert's  hymns  on  the  Providence  of 
God  lack  that  positive  background  of  reconciliation  from 
which  Gerhardt  draws  his  peace  -  pervaded  view  of  the 
world.  A  second  feature  of  the  difference  between  the  two 
is  this,  that  Gellert's  mind  is  in  process  of  transition  from 
the  dogmatic  orthodoxy,  in  which  he  had  been  educated,  to 
Eationalism ;  for  to  some  extent  he  mixes  up  incentives  to 
virtue  with  his  treatment  of  God's  redeeming  grace,  and  to 
some  extent  subordinates  experiences  of  this  Divine  grace  to 
these  incentives.^     It  might  be  said,  indeed,   that  the  in> 

^  Baier,  i.  5.  8  :  ''Dari  providentiam  divinam,  praeterquam  quod  ex  lumine 
naturae  constat,  ex  scriptura  darissimum  est." 

^  In  his  collected  works  (1775),  vol.  ii.  pp.  199,  200,  the  following  strophes 
are  to  be  found  in  the  beautiful  Passion  -  hymn,  Lord  strengthen  mf,  Thy 
PasgUm  to  remember : — 

"Eternal  Joy !     For  us  Thou  wast  reviled, 
Even  me  Thy  precious  blood  hath  reconciled, 
Thou  on  the  Cross,  for  me  a  free  oblation, 

Earn'dst  my  salvation. 


178-9]  THE    SUBJECTIVE   SIDE   OF   JUSTIFICATION  187 

stances  I  have  cited  are  not  dogmatically  erroneous,  inasmuch 
as  our  assurance  of  forgiveness  is  to  be  trusted  only  provided 
we  are  at  the  same  time  devoting  ourselves  to  moral  activity ; 
since,  too,  the  elements  of  experience  through  which  we 
become  certain  of  Divine  pardon  through  Christ  belong  to 
the  active  life.  In  general,  indeed,  it  is  clear  that  devotion 
and  Dogmatics  are  guided  by  difiTerent  interests.  In  devo- 
tion we  look  at  ourselves  altogether  in  the  light  of  subjection 
to  God;  and  every  thought,  be  it  never  so  limited,  which 
is  given  to  our  personal  activity,  interrupts  devotion.  On 
the  other  hand,  a  hymn  like  the  second  quoted  below  is 
not  a  religious  poem  at  all,  for  it  depicts  the  independent 
moral  activity  of  the  saint.  The  fact  that  such  moral  re- 
flections are  thought  identical  with  devotion  betrays  that 
intermingling  of  religion  and  morality  which  is  characteristic 
of  Bationalism.  But  this  is  still  far  beyond  Gerhardt's 
horizon. 

This  is  not  the  place  to  revert  to  the  rise  of  nationalism 
(voL  i.  p.  366),  but  I  cannot  refrain  from  observing  that  the 
position  taken  up  by  Gellert  is  not  favourable  to  the  hypothesis 
that  Bationalism  is  simply  an  apostasy  from  dogmatic  belief. 
For  in  his  personal  convictions  Gellert  combines  elements 
which  subsequently  fell  apart  everywhere ;  and  that  he  does 
not  interpret  the  general  providence  of  God  in  the  light  of 

Is  bliss  then  mine  even  here  through  faith  prevailing? 
Secure  my  crown  'gainst  every  foe  assailing? 
One  day  shall  I  within  these  courts  supernal, 

Gain  life  eternal  ? 

Yes,  if  I  stray  from  virtue's  pathway  never, 
Fight  faith's  good  fight,  keep  watch  and  pray  for  ever: 
Since  Jesus  lives,  my  victory  stands  assured, 

As  now  procured." 

On  the  other  hand  we  read,  p.  128 — 

"His  peace  alone  is  great,  who  aye  God's  way  pursue th, 
Vile  passions  yield  before  his  zeal ; 
He  fights,  he  knows  God's  prize  which  to  the  strife  accrueth, 

Rejoices  in  his  virtue  leal. 
Ever  before  his  eyes  and  in  his  heart  God  reigneth, 

A  daily  suppliant  at  the  throne  ; 
His  faults  he  oft  repents,  his  sins  remission  gaineth 
Through  grace  of  Jesus  Christ  alone." 


188  JUSTIFICATION    AND    RECONCILIATION  [179-80 

reconciliation  through  Christ,  is  to  be  laid  to  the  charge  of 
orthodox  Dogmatics.  When  the  theology  of  the  AufJdarung^ 
however,  renounced  dogma  in  order  to  place  the  moral 
character  of  Christianity  in  an  untroubled  light,  it  yet  kept 
its  foot  firmly  planted  upon  faith  in  providence  as  the 
properly  religious  function.  The  emphasis  with  which  this 
truth  was  brought  to  the  front  as  the  expression  of  religion 
is  enough  to  refute  the  supposition  that  we  have  here  at 
work  the  theoretical  reflection  which  elsewhere  dominates  this 
movement.  The  faith  in  providence  which  Bationalism 
proclaimed  before  and  after  Kant,  is  a  continuation  of  the 
subjective  Christianity  to  which  Luther  originally  gave  ex- 
pression.^ It  is  true,  indeed,  that  Bationalism  makes  an 
alteration  in  the  form  and  contents  of  this  function.  For 
one  thing,  we  have  the  erroneous  belief  that  the  love  of  God 
is  a  truth  of  Natural  Religion  (voL  i.  p.  403),  and  thus  the 
acknowledgment  of  God's  Providence  is  robbed  of  its  con- 
nection of  reconciliation  through  Christ.  A  further  conse- 
quence of  this  is  that  surrender  to  God's  will  takes  on  an 
altered  tinge  of  sentiment.  What  intensity  and  courageous- 
ness  of  feeling  are  theirs  who  take  for  their  own  the  declara- 
tion of  Paul  that  nothing,  neither  life,  nor  death,  things 
present  nor  things  to  come,  can  shake  the  believer,  to  whom 
everything  belongs  as  his  possession !  The  feeling  which 
accompanies  the  AufTcldimng  faith  in  providence,  on  the 
other  hand,  is  in  many  cases  trivial,  weak,  sentimental. 
Lastly,  from  the  reason  indicated  above,  it  follows  that  the 
AufkldruTig  became  entangled  afresh  in  the  Old  Testament 
dilemma  between  merit  and  felicity,  and  could  only  solve 
it  by  postulating  compensations  in  the  future  life ;  while  the 
Christian  consciousness  of  reconciliation  already  transcends 
the  antinomy  of  merit  and  happiness  in  every  moment  of 
the  present  life. 

Unfortunately    German    theology,  in    its   reaction  from 

^  Cf.  J.  F.  W.  Jerusalem,  "  FortgesetzU  Belraektungen  ilher  die  vomehmMen 
JFahrheilen  der  Jieligiont"  Posthumous  Works,  Pt.  I.  1792.  Heinr.  Sander, 
**  Ueher  die  Vorsehung,**  three  Parts  (2nd  ed.  of  Parts  I.  and  II.),  1784,  1785. 
Especially  Wegscheider,  Institutimies  theologicaef  ii.  5.  1 07. 


180-1]  THK   SUBJECT! VB   SIDE    OP   JUSTIFICATION  189 

Bationali&m,  has  almost  entirely  failed  to  appropriate,  in  a 
comprehensive  and  genuine  way,  that  whole  circle  of  thought 
which  so  unfolds  into  the  doctrine  of  justification  by  faith, 
as  to  become  the  basis  of  religious  independence  of  the  world 
through  trust  in  the  Father  of  Jesus  Christ.  Schleiermacher 
limits  himself  to  expressing  in  the  conception  of  reconciliation 
— ^the  second  characteristic  of  Christ's  work,  redemption  being 
the  first — the  abrogation,  for  those  who  are  redeemed,  of  the 
penal  significance  of  evil  (vol.  i.  p.  515).  This  is  to  do  no  more 
than  add  to  the  doctrine  of  the  work  of  Christ  a  feature  which 
older  divines  had  appended  as  an  incidental  note  to  the  doctrine 
of  the  punishment  of  sin.  Nitzsch,^  on  the  other  hand,  touches 
on  the  subject  in  its  entire  range ;  and  it  is  all  the  more  to 
be  regretted  that  he  has  not  developed  it  in  detail  from  the 
subjective  point  of  view,  as  might  have  been  expected  from 
the  plan  of  his  work.  Eecent  theologians,  so  far  as  they 
have  been  guided  by  the  form  of  Lutheran  Dogmatics  in  the 
seventeenth  century,  were  bound  to  miss  the  connection 
between  justification  by  faith  and  the  religious  functions 
described  above.  Now  we  might  expect  that  these  functions 
would  find  their  place  in  Ethics,  especially  when  such  theo- 
logians as  Harless  mean  by  Ethics  an  exposition  of  Christian 
self-knowledge  and  of  our  knowledge  of  subjective  Christianity. 
But  in  the  Christian  Ethics  of  the  writer  named  I  have 
not  found  the  least  indication  of  how  the  believer  knows 
himself  to  be  a  child  of  God,  or  what  view  of  the  world  and 
estimate  of  self  follow  from  justification  and  reconciliation. 
This  topic  appears  to  find  a  place  neither  in  Dogmatics  nor 
in  Ethics;  probably  because  it  ought  rightly  to  be  dis- 
cussed  in  both.     This  Martensen  admits,*  though  strangely 

^  System  der  Christlichen  Lehre  {6th  ed.),  §  144 :  "Faith  in  the  name  of 
the  Lord,  aa  the  precondition  of  all  acceptance  with  God  and  all  blessedness, 
always  includes  the  adoration  of  the  God  of  grace  and  truth,  and  in  every  case 
consists  in  an  abandonment  by  self-feeling  of  the  feeling  of  one's  own  power 
and  worth  and  right,  and  in  recourse  instead  to  the  ever  attested  mediatorship 
of  God,  and  is  not  merely  related  to  our  original  trust  in  God*s  invisible  action, 
but  produces  from  itself,  even  in  the  presence  of  calamity  and  the  trials  of  need 
and  death,  all  trust  and  fidelity  and  comfort." 

'  ChrUUiehe  DogmaHk,  p.  427. 


190  JUSTIFICATION    AND    KKCONCILIATION  [181—2 

enough  he  makes  it  a  consequence  of  the  doctrine  of  election. 
He  describes  the  elect  as  the  real  foci  which  reveal  the  Divine 
Providence,  and  in  illustration  of  this  view  he  quotes  Bom.  viii. 
28-39.  But  he  fails  to  trace  prayer  back  to  this  connection, 
and  he  ignores  the  fact  that  it  is  the  thought  of  their  justifica- 
tion, not  the  thought  of  their  election,  which  Paul  makes  the 
basis  of  the  assurance  which  raises  believers  superior  to  all 
things.  Ch.  Fr.  Schmid,^  on  the  other  hand,  finds  a  place  for 
the  doctrine  of  Divine  sonship  in  Christian  Ethics.  Here  he 
brings  in  resignation,  thankfulness,  and  trust  in  God,  then 
prayer,  and  finally  humility,  as  the  functions  of  the  Christian 
life,  and  lays  down  their  scriptural  basis.  It  is  unessential  for 
our  purpose  to  ask  whether  the  particular  virtues  of  Christian 
self-preservation  and  self -culture  ought  rightly  to  be  derived, 
as  is  done  by  Schmid,  from  those  religious  functions.  But 
that  he  should  have  dealt  with  the  subject  as  an  ethical  one, 
proves  how  well  founded  his  reputation  was  as  a  Biblical 
theologian  in  the  best  sense.  Hofmann,  too,  shows  his  in- 
dependence of  the  forms  of  theological  tradition  by  giving  a 
place  to  the  religious  functions  in  his  Schrifibeweis,  In  the 
7th  Division,  2nd  Half,  §§  2-4  of  that  work,  he  describes  the 
Christian's  attitude  towards  God  as  consisting  in  this,  that 
he  proves  his  freedom  by  his  love  and  humility  towards  God, 
and  proves  his  blessedness  by  his  joy  in  God  and  thankfulness 
to  Him;  further,  as  concerns  his  own  human  nature,  he 
proves  his  freedom  by  his  hatred  of  sin  and  his  faith  in  God, 
and  he  proves  his  blessedness  by  the  pain  he  feels  regarding 
death  and  by  his  hope  toward  God.  This  scheme  is  likewise 
applied  to  the  Christian's  relation  to  the  world,  thus — 
humble  love  for  the  world  and  thankful  joy  in  it  are  com- 
bined with  hatred  of  sin  and  pain  at  it,  and  with  faith  and 
hope  for  the  world.  Finally,  to  these  there  is  appended 
prayer,  as  the  manifestation  of  this  disposition  in  direct 
relation  to  God.  In  this  scheme  homeless  religious  functions 
find  a  resting-place.  But  they  are  bound  up  with  things  of 
an  alien  character,  such  as  hatred  of  sin,  and  pain  felt  in 

*  Christliche  SiOenlehre,  p.  688  ff. 


182-3]  THB   8UBJECTIVB    SIDE   OF   JUSTIFICATION  191 

view  of  death — which  last,  besides,  is  put  forward  as  a  proof 
of  blessedness.  On  the  other  hand,  we  miss  a  statement 
of  the  truth  that  the  Christian's  relation  to  the  cross  of 
suffering  is  the  reverse  of  that  of  the  natural  man.  Now 
what  was  wanted  was  that  the  scriptural  proof  for  these 
statements  of  Hofmann  should  be  drawn,  fully  and  cor- 
rectly, from  the  ideas  of  the  apostles.  But  to  this  side 
of  the  matter  Hofmann  has  failed  to  give  an  adequate 
representation. 

In  defining  justification  or  reconciliation,  and  in  fixing 
their  relations,  I  have  made  use  of  materials  drawn  partly 
from  the  dogmatic  theologians  of  the  classical  age,  partly 
from  the  Seformers  and  the  Lutheran  symbols.  It  has 
been  impossible  to  combine  and  arrange  these  materials 
without  modifying  particular  aspects  to  which  importance 
has  always  been  attached  from  the  very  outset.  Concep- 
tions, which  we  find  alongside  of  each  other  in  the  pages  of 
the  theologians  without  correlation,  have  at  the  same  time 
either  been  reduced  one  to  the  other  or  sifted  out  altogether. 
But  on  the  whole  the  doctrine  of  justification  set  forth  in 
these  three  chapters  stands  in  the  line  of  direct  continuity 
with  the  intention  of  the  Beformers  and  the  standards  of 
the  Lutheran  Church.  Especially  is  this  the  case  as  regards 
the  practical  aspect  of  justification,  its  significance  as  ex- 
plaining the  peculiar  character  of  that  view  of  the  world 
and  of  life  which  we  owe  to  the  Eeformation.  On  this  point 
we  get  no  help  from  the  theology  which  is  haunted  by 
the  prejudice  that  it  must  follow  the  symbolical  books  at 
every  step.  And  yet  it  has  shown  itself,  and  that  not 
merely  in  the  present  case,  very  indifferent  to  the  standards 
of  the  Beformation. 

Accordingly,  1.  The  problem  of  personal  assurance  is 
insoluble  if  it  be  conceived  in  a  form  which  represents  the 
subject  as  passive. 

2.  Personal  assurance  can  be  attained  neither  through 
the  active  "  conflict  of  penitence  "  {Busskampf)  nor  by  obser- 
vation of  the  moral  activity  which  accompanies  it. 


192  JUSTIFICATION   AND   RECONCILIATION  [l83 

3.  Personal  assurance,  springing  from  justification,  is 
experienced  in  and  through  trust  in  God  in  all  the  situations 
of  life,  and  especially  in  patience,  by  him  who  through  his 
faith  in  Christ  incorporates  himself  into  the  community  of 
believers. 


CHAPTER    IV 


THE   DOCTRINE   OF   GOD 


§  27.  The  endeavour  to  construct  theology  in  the  Gentile- 
Christian  Church  arose  from  the  belief  that  the  positive 
conception  of  God  as  the  Father  of  Christ,  and  of  Christ  as 
the  Son  of  God,  must  be  demonstrated  as  a  universal  truth 
of  reason,  in  relation  to  the  knowledge  of  the  world  which 
men  had  then  attained.  This  belief  has  been,  not  confirmed, 
but  rather  shaken  to  the  very  foundation,  by  the  manifold 
turns  which  the  history  of  theology  and  philosophy  has  taken. 
For  one  thing,  we  can  no  longer  conceal  from  ourselves  the 
fact  that  the  Greek  Fathers  carried  the  thought  of  God 
and  Christ  out  into  notions  of  the  ultimate  and  the  mediate 
ground  of  the  world,  which  are  peculiar  to  the  later  eclectic 
philosophy  of  Greece,  and  neither  cover  nor  exhaust  the 
original  sense  of  the  former  conceptions.  On  the  other  hand, 
Gentile-Christian  theology  always  insists  on  the  reservation 
that  the  Christian  religion  presents  an  element  which  tran- 
scends all  merely  secular  knowledge,  namely,  the  end  and  the 
means  of  the  blessedness  of  man.  Whatever  content  may 
have  been  ascribed  to  this  word  blessedness,  it  expressly 
denotes  a  goal,  the  knowledge  of  which  is  unattainable  by 
philosophy,  and  the  realisation  of  which  cannot  be  secured 
by  the  natural  means  at  the  command  of  men,  but  depends 
upon  the  positive  character  of  Christianity.  Consequently, 
the  theology  of  the  Greek  Fathers  is  not  merely  cosmology, 
but,  above  all,  a  doctrine  of  redemption ;  the  cosmology  upon 
which  the  doctrine  of  redemption  is  built,  however,  is  de- 
veloped by  means  of  ideas  borrowed  from  Plato  and  the 
Stoics.  The  Scholastics  carry  on  this  method,  and  Thomas 
13 


194  JUSTIFICATION    AND   RECONCILIATION  [184—5 

Aquinas  makes  a  statement  on  the  point  which  harmonises 
with  the  foregoing  criticism  of  Greek  theology.  For,  in  the 
assurance  of  blessedness  given  by  Christianity,  he  sees  a 
destiny  for  men  which  was  not  provided  for  in  their  creation 
by  God,  nor  included  in  their  natural  constitution,  and  which 
cannot  be  understood  merely  by  the  use  of  their  reason.  But  he 
does  not  make  this  special  feature  of  Christianity  the  key  to 
his  view  of  the  world  as  a  whole ;  rather,  it  is  underpropped 
by  a  thoroughly  rational  theology,  the  material  of  which  has 
no  relation  to  Christianity,  and  which  is  unmistakably  derived 
from  Greek  Philosophy.  The  same  procedure  is  still  adhered 
to  by  the  traditional  theology  among  ourselves  (p.  4).  Never- 
theless the  division  of  the  material  of  theology  into  proposi- 
tions given  by  reason  and  propositions  given  by  revelation  is 
a  method  whose  validity  can  no  longer  be  maintained.  In 
opposition  thereto  there  has  gradually  come  into  force  the 
contrary  principle,  that  religion  and  theoretical  knowledge  are 
different  functions  of  spirit,  which,  when  they  deal  with  the 
same  objects,  are  not  even  partially  coincident,  but  wholly 
diverge.  This  heterogeneity  must  be  accurately  established 
ere  it  can  be  decided  what  use  is  to  be  made  of  general 
theoretical  knowledge  in  the  scientific  exposition  of  Christi- 
anity. 

If  religion  in  every  case  is  an  interpretation  of  man's 
relation  to  God  and  the  world,  guided  by  the  thought  of  the 
sublime  power  of  God  to  realise  the  end  of  this  blessedness 
of  man,  advancing  insight  into  the  history  of  religions  has 
forced  on  us  the  task  of  formulating  a  universal  conception  of 
religion,  under  which  all  the  particular  species  of  religion 
might  find  their  peculiar  features  determined.  But  this  task 
involves  no  slight  difficulties,  and  contributes  less  to  the 
understanding  of  Christianity  than  is  often  expected.  The 
formula  by  which  this  very  thing,  religion  in  general,  has 
just  been  described,  makes  no  claim  to  be  a  definition  proper 
of  the  generic  conception  of  religion.  It  is  too  definite  for 
that.  The  ideas  which  it  employs — God,  world,  blessedness 
— have  so  directly  Christian  a  stamp,  that  they  apply  to 


185-6]  THE    DOCTRINE    OF   GOD  195 

other  religions  only  in  a  comparative  degree,  ie,  in  order  to 
indicate  the  general  idea  of  religion,  we  should  have  to  specify 
at  the  same  time  the  different  modifications  which  they 
undergo  in  different  religions.  For,  besides  belief  in  the  One 
God,  there  falls  to  be  considered  the  ascription  to  the  Godhead 
of  multiplicity,  or  duplicity,  or  difference  in  sex,  and  there 
is,  further,  the  recognition  of  superhimian  power  in  the  spirits 
of  the  dead.  Again,  the  relation  of  the  Godhead  to  the 
world  undergoes  modification  according  as  the  world  is  con- 
ceived as  a  unity,  or  this  point  is  left  obscure,  or  the 
immediate  surroundings  of  a  particular  wild  tribe  are  taken 
as  its  world.  It  is  modified,  further,  according  as  the  Divine 
beings  are  identified  with  the  forces  and  phenomena  of  nature, 
or  distinguished  from  nature  and  creation,  or,  in  the  latter 
case,  occupy  a  more  negative  or  more  positive  relation  to  the 
world.  Lastly,  as  regards  blessedness,  we  have  to  consider 
the  different  cases  in  which  what  is  sought  through  adoration 
or  adjuration  of  the  superhuman  powers  is  merely  some 
chance  benefit,  or  the  idea  of  a  supreme  good  is  formed,  and 
this  again  is  sought  in  the  world,  or  apart  from  the  world,  or 
in  a  combination  of  both  forms.  As,  therefore,  the  historical 
religions  offer,  under  each  of  these  heads,  a  rich  supply  of 
specific  and  sub-specific  characteristics,  which  have  no  place 
in  the  general  conception  of  religion,  language  can  furnish  no 
terms  sufficiently  neutral  and  indeterminate  to  express  the 
general  conception  of  religion  desired.  But,  besides,  it  would 
be  impossible  to  state  in  their  proper  place  the  above- 
discussed  modifications  of  the  several  parts  of  the  definition, 
without  making  obscure  the  very  point  which  is  professedly 
of  importance. 

If,  however,  we  have  once  arrived  at  a  general  conception 
of  religion  more  or  less  distinct  in  outline,  it  serves,  as  do  all 
general  ideas,  as  a  clue  by  which  to  determine  the  chief 
characteristics  of  the  various  species  of  religion.  Now  we  have 
no  difficulty  in  ascertaining  by  an  examination  of  all  other 
religions,  that  the  secular  knowledge  which  they  involve  is 
not  disinterestedly  theoretical,  but  guided  by  practical  ends. 


196  JUSTIFICATION   AND   RECONCILIATION  [186-7 

This  circumstance,  therefore,  when  given  a  place  provisionally 
in  the  general  conception,  suggests,  first,  that  objection  may 
justly  be  taken  to  the  exactly  contrary  use  of  secular  know- 
ledge which  has  made  its  way  into  the  Christian  Church ; 
and  next,  that  the  later  should  be  expelled,  as  something 
accidental,  from  the  idea  of  the  Christian  religion.  In  the 
investigation  of  Christianity  the  general  conception  of  religion 
should  be  used  regulatively.  I  desire  to  distinguish  myself 
very  precisly  in  this  respect  from  those  who,  in  interpreting 
Christianity,  make  a  constitutive  use  of  the  general  conception. 
For  when  this  method  is  employed,  no  longer  as  Scholasticism 
employes  it,  but  in  such  a  way  that  the  influence  of  the 
general  conception  of  religion  makes  one  even  for  a  moment 
neutral  towards  the  Christian  religion  itself,  in  order  to  be 
able  to  deduce  its  meaning  from  the  conditions  of  the  general 
conception,  then  the  only  effect  of  this  is  to  undermine 
Christian  conviction.  Christian  conviction,  however,  is 
necessarily  left  intact  when,  as  a  theologian,  one  forms  a 
general  conception  of  religion,  whatever  the  nature  of  that 
conception  may  be,  for  regulative  use.  For  the  observation 
and  comparison  of  the  various  historical  religions  from  which 
the  general  conception  is  abstracted,  likewise  shows  that  they 
stand  to  one  another  not  merely  in  the  relation  of  species, 
but  also  in  the  relation  of  stages.  They  exhibit  an  ever 
more  rich  and  determinate  manifestation  of  the  chief  features 
of  religion ;  their  connection  is  always  more  close,  their  aims 
more  worthy  of  man.  Such  a  way  of  looking  at  them  opens 
up  more  fruitful  vistas  than  are  offered  by  the  abstraction  of 
a  general  conception  of  religion,  followed  by  the  comparison 
of  the  historical  religions  as  species  of  this  genus.  For  in 
this  case  the  various  religions  are  treated  merely  as  natural 
phenomena ;  in  the  other  case  they  are  viewed  as  elements 
in  the  spiritual  history  of  humanity.  To  prove  that  rehgions 
are  related  to  one  another  as  stages,  is  a  scientific  problem 
which  still  awaits  an  impartial  and  unprejudiced  solution. 
Consequently  we  have  to  consider  that  several  religions,  such 
as  Christianity  and  Islam,  claim  to  occupy  the  highest  stage 


187-8]  THE   DOCTRINB   OF   GOD  197 

above  all  others ;  and  that  Buddhists  and  Hindus  who  have 
become  acquainted  with  Christianity  put  forward  reasons 
which  are  meant  to  demonstrate  the  superiority  of  their 
faiths  over  the  Christian.  When,  therefore,  as  Christians,  in 
reviewing  the  series  of  stages  presented  by  the  religions  of 
the  world,  wo  judge  them  by  the  principle  that  Christianity 
transcends  them  all,  and  that  in  Christianity  the  tendency  of 
all  the  others  finds  its  perfect  consummation,  the  claim  of  the 
science  of  religion  to  universal  validity  may  seem  to  be 
sacrificed  to  the  prejudice  arising  from  our  own  personal  con- 
victions. But  it  is  aimless  and  impracticable  to  attempt  to 
prove  the  universal  validity  of  the  view  that  religions  can 
be  arranged  in  an  ascending  series.  Do  people  expect  to 
discover  thus  a  way  of  demonstrating  scientifically  to  a 
Mohammedan  or  a  Buddhist  that  the  Christian  religion,  and 
not  theirs,  occupies  the  highest  rank  ?  In  carrying  out  the 
task  we  have  indicated,  we  have  no  such  aim.  It  were 
indeed  a  desirable  result,  in  the  case  of  people  who  have  been 
bom  Christians,  and  now,  e,g,,  declare  the  verdict  of  their 
scientific  knowledge  to  be  the  inferiority  of  Christianity  to 
Buddhism,  if  we  could  detach  them  from  their  error.  But 
it  is  impossible  for  us,  when  arranging  religions  in  a  series 
of  stages,  to  shut  our  eyes  to  the  claim  of  Christianity  to 
occupy  the  highest  place.  For  those  qualities  in  other 
religions  by  which  they  are  religions  are  intelligible  to  us 
chiefly  as  measured  by  the  perfection  which  they  assume  in 
Christianity,  and  by  the  clearness  which  distinguishes  the 
perfect  religion  from  the  imperfect.  The  arrangement  of 
religions  in  stages,  consequently,  amounts  to  no  more  than  a 
scientific  attempt  to  promote  mutual  understanding  among 
Christians ;  and  assent  to  the  statement  that  Christianity  is 
the  highest  and  most  perfect  religion  is  therefore  no  obstacle 
to  the  scientific  character  of  the  theory. 

Here,  therefore,  our  task  is  not  to  elaborate  the  serial 
arrangement  of  religions,  but  to  seek  a  solution  of  the 
question  how  Christianity,  as  a  religion,  is  related  to  general 
philosophical  knowledge.     Consequently,  it  is  desirable  that 


198  JUSTIFICATION   AND   RECONCILIATION  [188-9 

the  qualities  by  which  Christianity  reveals  its  religious 
character  should  be  brought  out  with  that  distinctness  which 
they  claim  to  possess  at  the  level  of  Christianity.  If  in 
doing  so  we  glance  at  other  religions,  our  business  will  just 
be  to  point  out  the  modifications  for  the  worse  which  they 
exhibit  when  compared  with  Christianity.  The  various  his- 
torical religions  are  always  of  a  social  character,  belonging  to 
a  multitude  of  persons.  Thence  it  follows  that  to  assign  to 
religion  a  merely  psychological  complexion,  in  particular  to 
refer  it  to  feeling,  is  not  a  solution,  but  only  an  abridgement 
of  the  problem.  In  a  community  the  influence  of  the  indi- 
vidual is  conditioned  by  two  factors,  inasmuch  as  he  is  both 
like  and  unlike  the  others,  alternately  dependent  on  them 
and  affecting  them  actively.  Consequently  a  psychological 
explanation  of  religion  is  inadequate,  for  it  deals  only  with 
those  phenomena  of  spirit  in  which  all  men  are  alike,  and 
one  is  the  type  for  all.  The  above-mentioned  dissimilarity 
of  men  within  the  common  life  of  a  religion  falls  under  the 
scope  of  ethics.  Now  the  multiplicity  pertaining  to  a 
religion  is  one  of  distribution,  partly  in  space  and  partly  in 
time.  An  illustration  of  the  latter  is  presented  by  the  suc- 
cessive stages  of  life.  Thence  it  follows  that  every  social 
religion  implies  a  doctrinal  tradition.  The  dispersion  in 
space  of  the  members  of  the  same  religion  is  a  direct  obstacle 
to  their  fellowship,  but  it  is  compensated  for  when  the 
religion  takes  real  shape  in  the  gathering  for  worship.  Feel- 
ing, as  pleasure  or  pain,  as  blessedness  or  suffering,  is  the 
personal  gain  or  the  personal  presupposition  which  impels 
individuals  to  participate  in  religious  fellowship.  Nor  in  all 
religions  does  this  aspect  stand  out  so  clearly  and  distinctly 
from  the  other  functions  as  it  is  customary  to  suppose.  In 
orgiastic  faiths,  contending  emotions  of  feeling  are  the  very 
material  of  worship  ;  in  the  Roman,  religious  feeling  assumes 
the  form  of  painful  attention  to  the  correctness  of  ceremonial 
actions ;  in  the  Greek,  the  same  factor  appears  in  the  serenity 
and  the  seriousness  which  affect,  and  are  affected  by,  the 
worship.      Hence  it  follows  that    for  different  reasons  the 


189-90]  THE   DOCTRINE    OF   GOD  199 

historical  religions  claim  service  from  all  the  functions  of 
spirit — ^knowledge,  for  the  doctrinal  tradition,  i.e,  for  a  par- 
ticular view  of  the  world  ;  will,  for  the  common  worship ; 
feeling,  for  the  alternation  of  satisfaction  and  dissatisfaction, 
moods  by  which  religious  life  is  removed  from  the  ordinary 
level  of  existence.  No  religion  is  correctly  or  completely 
conceived  when  one  element  of  this  succession  is  regarded  as 
more  important  or  more  fundamental  than  the  others.  At 
the  same  time  the  question  is  reserved  whether  our  scientific 
explanation  of  the  total  fact  of  religion  shall  give  the  prefer- 
ence to  one  or  other  of  the  functions  of  spirit. 

In  every  religion  what  is  sought,  with  the  help  of  the  super- 
human spiritual  power  reverenced  by  man,  is  a  solution  of 
the  contradiction  in  which  man  finds  himself,  as  both  a  part 
of  the  world  of  nature  and  a  spiritual  personality  claiming  to 
dominate  nature.  For  in  the  former  rdle  he  is  a  part  of 
nature,  dependent  upon  her,  subject  to  and  confined  by  other 
things ;  but  as  spirit  he  is  moved  by  the  impulse  to  maintain 
his  independence  against  them.  In  this  juncture,  religion 
springs  up  as  faith  in  superhuman  spiritual  powers,  by  whose 
help  the  power  which  man  possesses  of  himself  is  in  some 
way  supplemented,  and  elevated  into  a  unity  of  its  own  kind 
which  is  a  match  for  the  pressure  of  the  natural  world.  The 
idea  of  gods,  or  Divine  powers,  everywhere  includes  belief  in 
their  spiritual  personality,  for  the  support  to  be  received  from 
above  can  only  be  reckoned  on  in  virtue  of  an  affinity 
between  God  and  men.  Even  where  merely  invisible  natural 
powers  are  regarded  as  Divine,  they  are  conceived  in  a  way 
analogous  to  that  in  which  man  distinguishes  himself  from 
nature.  For  the  rest,  the  ease  with  which  definite  stupend- 
ous natural  phenomena,  whether  beneficent  or  destructive, 
are  personified,  proves  that  it  is  in  the  spiritual  personality 
of  the  gods  that  man  finds  the  foothold  which  he  seeks  for 
in  every  religion.  The  assertion  that  the  religious  view  of 
the  world  is  founded  upon  the  idea  of  a  whole  ^  certainly 
holds  true  of  Christianity :  as  regards  the  other  religions  it 

^  Lotze,  Mikrokosmus,  iii.  p.  331. 


200  JUSTIFICATION    AND   BKCONCILIATION  [l90-l 

must  be  modified  thus  far,  that  in  them  what  is  sought  is  a 
supplementary  addition  to  human  self -feeling  or  to  human 
independence  over  against  and  above  the  restrictions  of  the 
world.  For  in  order  to  know  the  world  as  a  totality,  and 
in  order  himself  to  become  a  totality  in  or  over  it  by  the 
help  of  God,  man  needs  the  idea  of  the  oneness  of  God,  and 
of  the  consummation  of  the  world  in  an  end  which  is  for 
man  both  knowable  and  realisable.  But  this  condition  is 
fulfilled  in  Christianity  alone.  For  in  the  religion  of  the 
Old  Testament  the  presuppositions,  indeed,  are  given,  but  the 
world-end  aimed  at  is  merely  the  perfecting  of  the  one  chosen 
people  in  moral,  political,  and  economical  independence ;  the 
human  perfecting  of  the  individual  Israelite,  each  in  his  own 
personal  character,  is  not  kept  in  view,  as  it  is  in  the  Chris- 
tian conception  of  life  and  blessedness.  Nevertheless,  in 
heathen  and  even  in  polytheistic  religions  there  is  always 
a  tendency  at  work  towards  belief  in  the  unity  of  the  Divine 
power,  and  in  the  measure  in  which  this  is  the  case  the  sup- 
plement to  his  own  resources  which  man  seeks  in  religion 
becomes  more  clear  and  more  worthy.  When,  as  in  Brah- 
minism,  the  world  which  has  sprung  from  the  original  Being 
is  so  constituted  that  it  returns  to  the  distinctionless  unity 
of  real  existence,  what  takes  the  place  of  the  maintenance 
of  selfhood  is  its  absorption  in  the  Divine  Being.  In  its  own 
way,  this  too  is  a  kind  of  unity,  for  it  is  viewed  as  the  con- 
summation of  asceticism  and  quietistic  piety. 

Christianity,  by  its  completely  rounded  view  of  the  world, 
guarantees  to  believers  that  they  shall  be  preserved  unto 
eternal  life  in  the  Kingdom  of  God,  which  is  God's  revealed 
end  in  the  world — and  that,  too,  in  the  full  sense  that  man 
is  thus  in  the  Kingdom  of  God  set  over  the  world  as  a  whole 
in  his  own  order.  Not  only  the  Christian's  tone  of  feeling, 
but  also  his  estimate  of  self  is  determined  by  this  highest 
and  all-inclusive  good.  For  this  religion  ofifers  no  passionate 
impulse,  no  vacillation  between  changing  tones  of  feeling 
arising  from  confused  ideas,  no  voluptuous  alternation  of 
aesthetic  pleasure  and  pain ;  on  the  contrary,  such  emotions 


191-2]  THE   DOCTRINE    OF   GOD  201 

must  be  viewed  in  the  light  of  the  antitheses  of  sin  and  grace, 
of  bondage  as  to  what  is  good,  and  liberty  to  give  God  thanks 
and  to  act  aright.  The  temper  produced  by  these  conclu- 
sions, therefore,  normally  issues  in  the  reverence  for  God 
proper  to  the  level  reached  by  Christianity.  This  combina- 
tion is  the  rule  in  other  religions  also.  Those  religious 
affections  of  feeling  which  are  called  forth  by  the  effort  to 
secure  blessings  obtainable  from  the  gods,  and  which  have  a 
complexion  of  their  own,  universally  manifest  themselves 
solely  in  correlative  acts  of  worship.  At  this  point,  however, 
in  the  sacrifice  of  acquired  property,  and  in  religious  and 
moral  self-abnegation,  there  comes  into  view  a  universal 
characteristic  of  all  religions.  In  this  way  the  domain  of 
religious  action  is  marked  off  from  secular  life  as  a  sacred 
domain ;  at  the  same  time,  however,  the  value  of  the  blessings 
bestowed  by  the  gods  is  gauged  by  pleasurable  feelings  of 
another  class  than  those  which  accrue  to  man  naturally  or  as 
a  result  of  work.  Seligious  feeling,  with  or  without  the 
accompaniment  of  a  clear  estimate  of  self,  will  always  be  found 
to  be  the  material  of  worship;  but  the  form  which  such 
feeling  assumes  witnesses  at  the  same  time  to  a  decision  of 
the  will,  which  gives  reality  to  the  acknowledgment  of  God 
and  the  personal  satisfaction  this  entails.  The  idea  of  God 
is  the  ideal  bond  between  a  definite  view  of  the  world  and 
the  idea  of  man  as  constituted  for  the  attainment  of  goods 
or  the  highest  good.  Worship  is  the  realisation  of  the 
blessing  sought  by  the  practical  acknowledgment  of  the 
power  that  bestows  it.  In  Christianity,  thanksgiving  for 
God's  grace,  prayer  for  its  continuance,  and  service  of  God 
in  His  Kingdom,  have  attached  to  them  eternal  life  and  that 
blessedness  which  corresponds  to  the  highest  good,  the  King- 
dom of  God. 

Common  worship  has  a  still  closer  relation  to  the  revela- 
tion which  forms  the  organic  centre  of  every  connected  reli- 
gious view  of  the  world.  This  factor,  too,  appears  with 
various  modifications  at  the  various  stages  of  religion.  In 
the  religion  of  sorcery,  acts  of  worship  are  employed  to  elicit 


202  JUSTIFICATION   AND    HECONClLlATlON  tl92-3 

revelations  from  mysterious  superhuman  powers.     In  Chris- 
tianity, revelation  through  God's   Son  is  the  jmnctum  starts 
of  all  knowledge  and  religious  conduct.     In  the  developed 
natural  religions,  success  in  obtaining   Divine  revelations  is 
bound  up  with  their  being  regularly  acknowledged  in  worship. 
No  idea  of  a  religion  complete  after  its  own  order  can  be 
formed  if  the  characteristic  of  revelation  which  belongs  to  it 
is  either    denied  or  even    merely  set    aside   as  indifferent. 
True,  this  very  method  has  long  been  customary.     People 
think  themselves  justified  in  abstracting  from  the  character- 
istic of  revelation  found  in  every  religion,  inasmuch  as  they 
regard  the  myths  of  natural  religions,  and  the  doctrines  of 
the  religions  of  the  Bible,  as  veiled  or  undeveloped  philosophy. 
But  the  original  purpose  of  myths  is  to  explain  why  parti- 
cular acts  of  worship,  intended  to  do  honour  to  Divine  self- 
manifestations,  are  performed  at  some  definite  spot  and  at 
regularly  recurrent  intervals.     What  we  may  regard  as  the 
doctrinal  material  of  the  religion  of  the  Old  Testament — the 
free  creation  of  the  world  by  God,  and  His  intention  that 
man,  who,  as  spirit,  is  the  image  of  God,  should  bear  rule 
over  it — denotes  the  presuppositions  of  the  belief  that  the 
Israelites  are  called  by  God  in  an  especial  covenant,  under 
which  they  have  to  achieve  their  historical  destiny  in  the 
world   under  the  government  of   their  Divine  King.      The 
speciality  of  the  spot  at  which  a  god  has  ordained  that  he 
shall  be  adored,  the  speciality  of  the  times  at  which  the  gods 
move  through  the  land  and  summon  their  worshippers  to 
celebrate  their  festivals,  the  speciality  of  the  choice  of  Israel 
by  the  Lord  of  all  nations — in  short,  speciality  is  the  element 
which  impels  men  to  grasp  the  different  aspects  of  religion, 
and  to  combine  them  practically  in  worship.    The  significance 
which  revelation  thus  has  for  common  worship  also  indicates 
an  indispensable  precondition  of    our  understanding  Chris- 
tianity.    The  Person  of  its  Founder  is  not  only  the  key  to  the 
Christian  view  of  the  world,  and  the  standard  of  Christians' 
self-judgment  and  moral  effort,  but  also  the  standard  which 
shows  how   prayer    must  be  composed,  for  in  prayer  both 


193-4]  ME   DOCTRtNK   OF   GOb  203 

individual  and  united  adoration  of  God  consists.  At  the 
same  time  the  acknowledgment  of  the  revelation  of  God  in 
Christ  yields  this  pre-eminent  exceUence  of  Christianity, 
namely,  that  its  view  of  the  world  is  a  rounded  whole,  and 
that  the  goal  it  sets  to  life  is  this,  that  in  Christianity  man 
becomes  a  whole,  a  spiritual  character  supreme  over  the 
world.  For  speciality  is  ever  the  condition  under  which  a 
universal  end  is  realised  through  the  combination  of  indi- 
vidual things  and  relations. 

§  28.  How,  then,  is  religious  knowledge  related  to  theo- 
retical or  philosophical  knowledge  ?  This  question,  indeed, 
has  already  been  raised  by  the  very  fact  of  Greek  Philosophy ; 
still,  much  more  tangible  and  comprehensive  reasons  for 
raising  it  are  to  be  found  in  the  mutual  relations  of  Chris- 
tianity and  philosophy.  Accordingly,  it  is  best  that  we 
should  limit  the  question  to  Christianity  in  so  far  as  it  is  a 
religion,  intelligible  as  such  from  the  characteristics  noted 
above.  The  possibility  of  both  kinds  of  knowledge  mingling, 
or,  again,  colliding,  lies  in  this,  that  they  deal  with  the  same 
object,  namely,  the  world.  Now  we  cannot  rest  content  with 
the  amiable  conclusion  that  Christian  knowledge  compre- 
hends the  world  as  a  whole,  while  philosophy  fixes  the  special 
and  universal  laws  of  nature  and  spirit.  For  with  this  task 
every  philosophy  likewise  combines  the  ambition  to  compre- 
hend the  universe  under  one  supreme  law.  And  for  Christian 
knowledge  also  one  supreme  law  is  the  form  under  which 
the  world  is  comprehensible  as  a  whole  under  God.  Even 
the  thought  of  God,  which  belongs  to  religion,  is  employed  in 
some  shape  or  other  by  every  non-materialistic  philosophy. 
Thus  no  principle  of  discrimination  between  the  two  kinds  of 
knowledge  is,  at  least  provisionally,  to  be  found  in  the  object 
with  which  they  deal. 

Now,  in  order  to  elicit  the  distinction  between  the  two 
from  the  realm  of  the  subject,  I  recall  the  twofold  manner 
in  which  the  mind  (Oeist)  further  appropriates  the  sensations 
aroused  in  it.  They  are  determined,  according  to  their  value 
for  the  Ego,  by  the  feeling  of  pleasure  or  pain.     Feeling  is  the 


204  JUSTIFICATION    AND    RECONCILIATION  [194—5 

basal  function  of  mind,  inasmuch  as  in  it  the  Ego  is  originally 
present  to  itself.  In  the  feeling  of  pleasure  or  pain,  the  Ego 
decides  whether  a  sensation,  which  touches  the  feeling  of  self, 
serves  to  heighten  or  depress  it.  On  the  other  hand,  through 
an  idea  the  sensation  is  judged  in  respect  of  its  cause,  the 
nature  of  the  latter,  and  its  connection  with  other  causes : 
and  by  means  of  observatitn,  etc.,  the  knowledge  of  things 
thus  gained  is  extended  until  it  becomes  scientific.  The  two 
functions  of  spirit  mentioned  are  always  in  operation  simul- 
taneously, and  always  also  in  some  degree  mutually  related, 
even  though  it  be  in  the  inverse  ratio  of  prominence.  In 
particular,  it  must  not  be  forgotten  that  all  continuous  cog- 
nition of  the  things  which  excite  sensation  is  not  only 
accompanied,  but  likewise  guided,  by  feeling.  For  in  so  far 
as  attention  is  necessary  to  attain  the  end  of  knowledge,  will, 
as  representing  the  desire  for  accurate  cognition,  comes  in 
between ;  the  proximate  cause  of  will,  however,  is  feeling  as 
expressing  the  consciousness  that  a  thing  or  an  activity  is 
worth  desiring,  or  that  something  ought  to  be  put  away. 
Value-judgments  therefore  are  determinative  in  the  case  of 
all  connected  knowledge  of  the  world,  even  when  carried  out 
in  the  most  objective  fashion.  Attention  during  scientific 
observation,  and  the  impartial  examination  of  the  matter 
observed,  always  denote  that  such  knowledge  has  a  value  for 
him  who  employs  it.  This  fact  makes  its  presence  all  the 
more  distinctly  felt  when  knowledge  is  guided  through  a 
richly  diversified  field  by  attention  of  a  technical  or  practical 
kind. 

But  even  if  we  have  made  up  our  mind  that  religious 
knowledge  in  general,  and  therefore  Christian  knowledge  too, 
consists  of  value-judgments,  such  a  definition  is  as  lacking  in 
precision  as  it  would  be  to  describe  philosophical  knowledge 
contrariwise  as  disinterested.  For  without  interest  we  do 
not  trouble  ourselves  about  anything.  We  have  therefore 
to  distinguish  between  concomitant  and  independent  value- 
judgments.  The  former  are  operative  and  necessary  in  all 
theoretical   cognition,  as  in   all    technical    observation   and 


195-6]  THE    DOCTRINE   OF   GOD  205 

combination.  But  independent  value-judgments  are  all  per- 
ceptions of  moral  ends  or  moral  hindrances,  in  so  far  as  they 
excite  moral  pleasure  or  pain,  or,  it  may  be,  set  in' motion  the 
will  to  appropriate  what  is  good  or  repel  the  opposite.  If  the 
other  kinds  of  knowledge  are  called  "  disinterested,"  this  only 
means  that  they  are  without  these  moral  effects.  But  even 
in  them  pleasure  or  pain  must  be  present,  according  as  they 
succeed  or  fail.  Beligious  knowledge  forms  another  class  of 
independent  value-judgments.  That  is,  it  cannot  be  traced 
back  to  the  conditions  which  mark  the  knowledge  belonging 
to  moral  wUl,  for  there  exists  religion  which  goes  on  without 
any  relation  whatever  to  the  moral  conduct  of  life.  Besides, 
in  many  religions  religious  pleasure  is  of  a  purely  natural 
kind,  and  is  independent  of  those  conditions  which  lift 
religious  above  natural  pleasure  (p.  165).  For  only  at  the 
higher  stages  do  we  find  religion  combined  with  the  ethical 
conduct  of  life.  Beligious  knowledge  moves  in  independent 
value-judgments,  which  relate  to  man's  attitude  to  the  world, 
and  call  forth  feelings  of  pleasure  or  pain,  in  which  man 
either  enjoys  the  dominion  over  the  world  vouchsafed  him  by 
God,  or  feels  grievously  the  lack  of  God's  help  to  that  end. 
This  theory  is  almost  more  easily  intelligible  if  it  be  tested 
by  religions  which  possess  no  moral  character.  Orgiastic 
Ttrorships  represent  contending  natural  feelings  with  extra- 
ordinary intensity  and  with  abrupt  changes,  in  virtue  of  their 
recognition  of  the  value  which  the  identity  of  the  Godhead 
with  the  vegetation  as  it  decays  and  again  revives,  has  for  the 
man  who  modifies  his  attitude  towards  the  world  of  nature  in 
sympathy  with  the  Godhead  which  he  adores.  The  peculiar 
nature  of  religious  value-judgments  is  less  clear  in  the  case  of 
religions  of  an  explicitly  ethical  character.  Nevertheless,  in 
Christianity  we  can  distinguish  between  the  reUgious  functions 
which  relate  to  our  attitude  towards  God  and  the  world,  and 
the  moral  functions  which  point  directly  to  men,  and  only 
indirectly  to  God,  Whose  end  in  the  world  we  fulfil  by  moral 
service  in  the  Kingdom  of  God.  In  Christianity,  the  religi- 
ous motive  of  ethical  action  lies  here,  that  the  Kingdom  of 


206  JUSTIFICATION    AND   RECONCIUATION  [196—7 

God,  which  it  is  our  task  to  realise,  represents  also  the 
highest  good  which  God  destines  for  us  as  our  supramundane 
goal.  For 'here  there  emerges  the  value-judgment  that  our 
blessedness  consists  in  that  elevation  above  the  world  in  the 
Kingdom  of  God  which  accords  with  our  true  destiny.  This 
is  a  religious  judgment,  inasmuch  as  it  indicates  the  value  of 
this  attitude  taken  up  by  believers  towards  the  world,  just  as 
those  judgments  are  religious  in  which  we  set  our  trust  in 
God,  even  when  He  condemns  us  to  suffering. 

In  its  day  the  Hegelian  philosophy  represented  theoret- 
ical knowledge  as  not  merely  the  most  valuable  function  of 
spirit,  but  likewise  the  function  which  has  to  take  up  the 
problem  of  religion  and  solve  it.  To  this  Feuerbach  opposed 
the  observation  that  in  religion  the  chief  stress  falls  upon  the 
wishes  and  needs  of  the  human  heart.  But  as  the  latter 
philosopher  also  continued  to  regard  professedly  pure  and 
disinterested  knowledge  as  the  highest  achievement  of  man, 
religion,  and  especially  the  Christian  religion — which  he  held 
to  be  the  expression  of  a  purely  individual  and  therefore 
egoistic  interest,  and  a  self-delusion  in  respect  of  its  object, 
God — was  by  him  declared  to  be  worthless,  as  compared  not 
merely  with  the  knowledge  of  philosophic  truth,  but  also  with 
purely  moral  conduct.  But  an  interest  in  salvation  in  the 
Christian  sense,  when  rightly  understood,  is  incompatible  with 
egoism.  Egoism  is  a  revolt  against  the  common  tasks  of 
action.  Now,  people  might  say  that  faith  in  God  for  our 
salvation,  and  a  dutiful  public  spirit  towards  our  fellows,  have 
nothing  to  do  with  one  another,  and  that  therefore  there  is  no 
conceivable  reason  why  religion,  as  a  rule,  should  not  be 
egoistic  But  in  Christianity  precisely  faith  in  God  and 
moral  duty  within  the  Klingdom  of  God  are  related  to  one 
another.  As  a  rule,  therefore,  it  is  impossible  that  Christian 
faith  in  God  should  be  egoistic.  On  the  other  hand,  theoretical 
knowledge  in  itself,  as  has  been  shown,  is  not  disinterested  ; 
but  moral  conduct  is  still  less  so.  For  in  the  latter  domain 
the  vital  point  is  that  one  realises  as  one's  own  interest  the 
interest  of  others  to  whom   the  service  is  rendered.     The 


197-8]  THE   DOCTRINE   OF   GOD  207 

moral  disposition  can  nowhere  strike  root  save  in  such 
motives.  It  is  true  that,  contrary  to  the  rule,  faith  in  God 
may  be  combined  with  egoistic  arrogance  towards  others. 
But  the  same  danger  attaches  to  both  of  the  other  kinds  of 
activity  which  have  been  compared.  It  is  possible  for  one 
occupied  with  theoretical  knowledge  to  be  vain  and  haughty, 
and  for  one  devoted  to  the  moral  service  of  others  to  be 
tyrannical  or  sycophantic. 

Scientific  knowledge  is  accompanied  or  guided  by  a 
judgment  afiBrming  the  worth  of  impartial  knowledge  gained 
by  observation.  In  Christianity,  religious  knowledge  consists 
in  independent  value-judgments,  inasmuch  as  it  deals  with 
the  relation  between  the  blessedness  which  is  assured  by  God 
and  sought  by  man,  and  the  whole  of  the  world  which  God 
has  created  and  rules  in  harmony  with  His  final  end.  Scien- 
tific knowledge  seeks  to  discover  the  laws  of  nature  and  spirit 
through  observation,  and  is  based  on  the  presupposition  that 
both  the  observations  and  their  arrangement  are  carried  out 
in  accordance  with  the  ascertained  laws  of  human  cognition. 
Now  the  desire  for  scientific  knowledge  carries  with  it  no 
guarantee  that,  through  the  medium  of  observation  and  the 
combination  of  observations  according  to  known  laws,  it  will 
discover  the  supreme  universal  law  of  the  world,  from  which, 
as  a  starting-point,  the  differentiated  orders  of  nature  and 
spiritual  life,  each  in  its  kind,might  be  explained,and  understood 
as  forming  one  whole.  On  the  contrary,  the  intermingling  and 
collision  of  religion  and  philosophy  always  arises  from  the  fact 
that  the  latter  claims  to  produce  in  its  own  fashion  a  unified 
view  of  the  world.  This,  however,  betrays  rather  an  impulse 
religious  in  its  nature,  which  philosophers  ought  to  have  dis- 
tinguished from  the  cognitive  methods  they  follow.  For  in 
all  philosophical  systems  the  affirmation  of  a  supreme  law  of 
existence,  from  which  they  undertake  to  deduce  the  world  as 
a  whole,  ia  a  departure  from  the  strict  application  of  the 
philosophic  method,  and  betrays  itself  as  being  quite  as  much 
an  object  of  the  intuitive  imagination,  as  God  and  the  world 
are  for  religious  thought.     This  is  the  case  at  all  stages  and 


208  JUSTinCATION   AND    RECONCILIATION  [198-9 

in  all  forms  of  Greek  philosophy,  especially  in  those  forms  in 
which  the  ultimate  universal  grounds  of  existence,  through 
which  the  universe  is  interpreted,  are  identified  with  the  idea 
of  God.  In  these  cases  the  combination  of  heterogeneous 
kinds  of  knowledge — the  religious  and  the  scientific — is 
beyond  all  doubt ;  and  it  is  to  be  explained  by  the  fact  that 
philosophers  who,  through  their  scientific  observation  of 
nature,  had  destroyed  the  foundations  of  the  popular  faith, 
sought  to  obtain  satisfaction  for  their  religious  instincts  by 
another  path.  In  a  certain  respect,  too,  they  were  able  to 
follow  this  tendency  with  especial  confidence,  so  far  as  they 
succeeded  in  making  out  the  unity  of  the  Divine  Being  to  be 
the  ground  of  the  universe.  But  in  another  respect  they 
failed  to  satisfy  the  essential  conditions  of  the  religious  view 
of  the  world,  partly  in  so  far  as  they  surrendered  the  person- 
ality of  the  Godhead  thus  identified  with  the  ground  of  the 
world,  partly  because  they  had  to  give  up  the  active  influence 
of  a  personal  God  upon  the  world.  Nor,  under  these  circum- 
stances, could  any  worship  be  deduced  from  the  idea  of  God. 
Thus  the  collision  of  Greek  philosophy  with  the  popular  faith 
was  twofold,  and  in  both  respects  inevitable.  For  one  thing, 
the  actual  observation  of  nature  and  her  laws  is  incompatible 
with  the  religious  combination  of  popular  views  of  nature  and 
the  idea  of  God.  Further,  the  rigidly  unified  view  of  the 
world  held  by  philosophers  is  incompatible  with  the  religious 
view  of  the  world  which  is  only  loosely  developed  in  poly- 
theism. But  the  real  force  of  the  latter  incompatibility  is  to 
be  found  in  the  fact  that,  under  the  guise  of  philosophic 
knowledge,  what  was  really  only  the  religious  imagination 
has  been  operative  in  designing  the  general  philosophic  view 
of  the  world,  the  supreme  principle  of  which  is  never  proved 
as  such,  but  always  merely  anticipatively  assumed. 

The  opposition  to  Christianity  which  has  been  raised  by 
Pantheism  in  its  various  modifications  and  by  materialism, 
arises  likewise  from  the  fact  that  the  law  of  a  particular  realm 
of  being  is  set  up  as  the  supreme  law  of  all  being,  though  the 
other  forms  of  existence  neither  would  nor  could  be  explained 


1 


199-200]  THE   DOCTRINE    OF    GOD  209 

by  its  means.  It  may  be  admitted  that  natural  science  is 
right  and  consistent  in  explaining  the  mechanical  regularity 
of  all  sensible  things  by  the  manifold  movement  of  simple 
limited  forces  or  atoms.  But  within  this  whole  realm  of 
existence,  which  is  interpretable  by  the  cat^ory  of  causality, 
observation  reveals  to  us  the  narrower  realm  of  organisms, 
which  cannot  be  exhaustively  explained  by  the  laws  of 
mechanism,  but  demand,  besides,  the  application  of  the  idea 
of  end.  But  among  organic  beings,  again,  one  section,  differ- 
entiated in  manifold  ways,  is  animate,  that  is,  endowed  with 
the  capacity  of  free  movement.  Finally,  a  still  smaller 
section  of  animate  beings  is  so  constituted  as  to  act  freely 
from  the  conception  of  ends,  to  discover  the  laws  of  things,  to 
conceive  things  as  a  whole,  and  themselves  as  in  ordered 
interaction  with  them,  further  to  identify  all  these  activities 
with  their  own  Ego  by  means  of  the  manifold  affections  of 
feeling,  and  to  exchange  their  spiritual  possessions  with  others 
through  speech  and  action.  Now  the  claim  of  materialism 
to  invalidate  the  Christian  view  of  the  world  rests  on  the 
belief  that  it  must  succeed  in  deducing  the  organic  from  what 
is  mechanical,  and  similarly  the  more  complex  orders  of  being 
from  those  immediately  below.  The  materialistic  interpreta- 
tion of  the  world  busies  itself  with  the  pursuit  of  these  empty 
possibilities.  Its  scientific  character  is  limited,  however,  by 
the  fact  that  it  can  only  suggest  chance  as  the  moving  force 
of  the  ultimate  causes  of  the  world,  and  of  the  evolution  of 
special  realms  of  being  out  of  those  which  are  more  general ; 
for  this  is  really  to  confess  that  science  cannot  penetrate  to 
the  supreme  law  of  things.  In  all  the  combinations  exhibited 
by  the  materialistic  theory  of  the  genesis  of  the  world,  there 
is  manifest  an  expenditure  of  the  power  of  imagination  which 
finds  its  closest  parallel  in  the  cosmogonies  of  heathenism — 
which  is  of  itself  a  proof  that  what  rules  in  this  school  is  not 
scientific  method,  but  an  aberrant  and  confused  religious  im- 
pulse. Thus  the  opposition  which  professedly  exists  between 
natural  science  and  Christianity,  really  exists  between  an 
impulse  derived  from  natural  religion  blended  with  the  scien- 
14 


210  JUSTinCATION   AND   BECONaLIATION  [20O-1 

tific  investigation  of  nature,  and  the  validity  of  the  Christian 
view  of  the  world,  which  assures  to  spirit  its  pre-eminence  over 
the  entire  world  of  nature. 

The  same  holds  true  of  the  various  forms  of  Fantheifim 
which  have  alternately  assumed  the  guise  of  the  Christian 
view  of  the  world,  and  entered  the  lists  against  it.  The 
deceptive  power  of  the  imagination  has  to  be  called  in  to 
deduce  all  the  diversified  orders  of  reality  from  the  laws 
either  of  spatial  construction,  or  of  vegetable  life,  or  of  lyrico- 
musical  sensation,  or  of  logical  thought.  None  of  these  laws 
is  the  key  to  an  adequate  view  of  the  world  as  a  whole ;  none 
has  been  elevated  by  the  use  of  properly  scientific  method, 
i.e,  by  means  of  observation  and  orderly  inferences,  into  the 
supreme  principle  of  interpretation;  but  philosophers  have 
been  surprised  into  accepting  one  or  other  by  the  religious 
desire  for  a  complete  view  of  things  which  they  did  not  dis- 
tinguish from  their  scientific  cognition.  The  claims,  adverse 
to  the  Christian  view  of  the  world,  which  have  been  made  as 
a  consequence  of  this  self-deception,  are  further  supported  by 
the  assumption,  by  which  philosophical  idealism  is  dominated, 
that  the  laws  of  theoretical  knowledge  are  the  laws  of  the 
human  spirit  in  all  its  functions.  From  the  standpoint  of  such 
a  principle  many  aspects  of  the  Christian  view  of  the  world 
and  6t  the  Christian  estimate  of  self  appear  contradictory, 
and  consequently  untrue.  But  as  certainly  as  feeling  and 
will  cannot  be  reduced  to  ideational  knowledge,  the  last- 
named  is  not  justified  in  imposing  its  laws  upon  the  former. 
Feeling  is  admittedly  not  susceptible  to  what  are  called  the 
"  reasons  of  the  understanding,"  and  the  verdict  of  logic  upon 
a  contradiction,  that  it  denotes  something  which  is  impossible 
and  therefore  unreal,  is  incommensurate  with  the  moral  ver- 
dict we  peiss  on  a  bad  wilL  It  is  true,  the  responsibility 
for  the  pretensions  addressed  by  philosophy  to  the  Christian 
religion  often  lies  in  part  with  the  champions  of  Christianity 
themselves.  It  is  so  when  they  represent  as  the  Christian 
faith  some  imperfect  form  of  theology,  that  is,  some  system  of 
the  ideas  of  God  and  humanity  which  is  as  far  away  as  pos- 


201]  THE   DOCTRINE   OF   GOD  211 

sible  from  expressing  the  whole  view  of  the  world  impUed 
by  the  religious  estimate  of  self  which  Christians  are  known 
to  exercise,  and  by  the  character  of  their  worship  of  God. 
Under  these  circumstances,  philosophy  often  enough  regards 
it  as  sufficient  to  demonstrate  that  the  law  of  faith  outlined 
in  theology  collides  with  laws  of  experience,  and  then  declares 
religion  untenable  as  an  illegitimate  trespass  of  the  fancy 
upon  the  field  of  rigorous  science.  But  the  fact  is,  Pantheism 
is  very  far  from  rising  to  that  estimate  of  the  destiny  and 
worth  of  human  personality  which  is  determinative  in 
Christianity.  Whenever  the  boundary-line  between  the 
X)ivine  nature  and  the  world  is  erased,  whenever  the  universe 
in  any  one  of  its  aspects  is  defined  as  the  Absolute,  there  is 
nothing  for  man  but  to  regard  himself  as  a  transient  emana- 
tion of  the  World-Soul,  or  as  an  element  in  the  spiritual 
development  of  humanity,  whose  progress  leaves  him  behind 
and  degrades  him  to  a  position  of  dependence.  Nor  is  this 
result  of  the  pantheistic  view  of  the  world  sufficiently  com* 
pensated  for  by  the  permission  it  accords  us  to  cherish 
aesthetic  sympathy  with  the  universe,  or  to  exercise  ethical 
resignation  in  presence  of  the  ceaseless  advance  of  intellectual 
culture.  These  sentiments  have  already  appeared  on  the  soil 
of  heathenism,  and  they  indicate  no  reason  why  we  should 
interest  ourselves  in  free-thought.  He  who  thinks  that  this 
view  of  the  world  is  to  be  preferred  to  the  Christian,  ignores 
the  principle  of  the  Christian  estimate  of  self  —  that  the 
individual  is  worth  more  than  the  whole  world,  and  that 
each  soul  can  test  and  prove  this  truth  through  faith  in 
God  as  His  Father,  and  by  service  to  Him  in  His  Kingdom. 
For  the  Christian  view  of  the  world,  disclosing  as  it  does 
the  all-inclusive  moral  and  spiritual  end  of  the  world, 
which  is  also  the  proper  end  of  God  Himself,  evidences 
itself  as  the  perfect  religion. 

§  29.  That  religious  knowledge  consists  of  value-judg- 
ments is  brought  out  in  a  felicitous  way  by  Luther  in  his 
Larger  Catechism,  in  the  explanation  of  the  First  Command- 
ment :    *'  Deus  est  et  vocatur,  de  cuius  bonitate  et  potentia 


212  JUSTIFICATION    AND    RECONCILIATION  [201-2 

omnia  bona  certo  tibi  pollicearis,  et  ad   quern    quibuslibet 
adversis  rebus  ac  periculis  ingruentibus  confugias,  ut  deum 
habere,  nihil  aliud  sit,  quam  illi   ex   toto  corde  fidere   et 
credere.  .  .  .  Haec  duo,  fides  et  deus,  una  copula  coniungenda 
sunt."     In  these  sentences  are  expressed  various  truths  of 
which  the  theology  of  the  schools  both  earlier  and  later  has 
taken  no  account,  and  which  its  modern  successors  combat 
even  yet.     Knowledge  of  God  can  be  demonstrated  as  religious 
knowledge  only  when  He  is  conceived   as  securing  to  the 
believer  such  a  position  in  the  world  as  more  than  counter- 
balances its  restrictions.     Apart  from  this  value-judgment 
of  faith,  there  exists  no  knowledge  of  God  worthy  of  this 
content.     So   that  we  ought  not   to  strive  after  a  purely 
theoretical  and  "disinterested"  knowledge  of    God,  as  an 
indispensable  preliminary  to  the  knowledge  of  faith.     To  be 
sure,  people  say  that  we  must  first  know  the  nature  of  God 
and  Christ  ere  we  can  ascertain  their   worth  for  us.     But 
Luther's  insight  perceived  the  incorrectness  of  such  a  view. 
The  truth  rather  is  that  we  know  the  nature  of  God  and 
Christ  only  in  their  worth  for  us.     For  God  and  faith  are 
inseparable  conceptions ;  faith,  however,  confessedly  doea  not 
consist  in  abstract  knowledge,  or  knowledge  which  deals  with 
merely   historical    facts.       On    the    contrary,  it    cannot   be 
conceived  save  as  possessed  of  those  qualities  which  Luther 
vindicates  for  it.     But,  finally,  his  explanation  of  the  First 
Commandment    is    bound    up    with   the    revelation   of    God 
in    Christ,    and    is   unintelligible    apart   from    it.     For    the 
**  goodness  and  power  "  of  God,  on  which  faith  casts  itself,  is 
in    Luther's    view  revealed    in    the    work   of    Christ  alone. 
Apart  from    Christ,  apart  from    the   reflection  of    God   in 
Him,  Luther  finds  the  idea  of  God  to  be  accompanied  by 
terrors  and  annihilating  effects.     This  dilemma  (pp.   6,  7) 
absolutely  excludes  the  possibility  of  "  disinterested "  know- 
ledge of  God,  as  in  some  way  correlative  to  the  idea  of  the 
world. 

While  I  am  explaining  that  I  maintain  the  religious  con- 
ception of  God  as  conditioned  in  the  way  Luther  describes,  I 


202-3]  THK   DOCTRINE   OF   GOD  213 

should  also  like  to  adduce  these  further  remarks  of  his :  "  quern- 
admodum  saepenumero  a  me    dictum  est,  quod  sola  cordis 
fiducia  deum  pariter  atque  idolum  faciat  et  constituat.     Quodsi 
fides  et  fiducia  recta  et  sincera  est,  deum  rectum  habebis, 
contra  si  falsa  fuerit  et  mendax  fiducia,  etiam  deiun  tuum 
falsum  et  mendacem  esse  necesse  est.  .  .  .  lam  in  quacunque 
re  animi  tui  fiduciam  et  cor  fixum  habueris,  haec  baud  dubie 
deus  tuus  est."    For  here  the  religious  character  of  the  know- 
ledge of  God  seems  to  be  reduced  to  the  arbitrary  feeling  of  the 
subject,  and  we  seem  to  be  furnished  with  a  corroboration  of 
the  maxim  that  a  man's  God  varies  as  his  faith.     But  this 
interpretation  of  Luther's  words  cannot  be  the  true  one,  for 
this  reason,  that  he  distinguished  between  two  kinds  of  faith, 
that    which   is   sincere,  and    that   which   is    infected   with 
illusion.     If  he  reduced  everything  to  arbitrary  caprice,  he 
would  not  make  this  distinction,  which  depends  on  whether 
one  takes  or  does  not  take  the  right  way  to  knowledge  of 
God,  namely,  through   Christ.     For  faith  which  is  genuine 
and  sLQcere  can  be  exercised  only  in  response  to  the  true 
revelation  of  God.     This  is  as  far  as  possible  from  the  case 
referred  to  in  Luther's  last  sentence  above,  when  it  is  said 
that    everything   on   which  a   man    sets   his   heart,   be   it 
sensual  pleasure,  or  honour,  or  power,  has  the  value  of  an  idol. 
Between  the  two  stands  the  case  of  trust  infected  with  self- 
deception,  with  which  an  illusory  idea  of  God  is  so  combined 
as  to  show  clearly  that  the  person  concerned  will  only  consent 
to  believe  in  a  God  Whose  nature  he  can  first  determine  in 
general  by  disinterested  knowledge  through  analysis  of    his 
experience  of  the  world.     Not  only  is  such  an  idea  of  God 
false,  but  it  is  contrary  to  truth  to  separate,  in  relation  to 
Him,  between  knowledge  and  trust.     Now  theology  is  not 
devotion ;  as  a  science,  rather,  it  is  "  disinterested  "  cognition. 
But  as  such  it  must  be  accompanied  and  guided  by  a  sense 
of  the  worth  of  the  Christian  religion.     The  theologian,  in 
his  scientific  work,  must  so  far  keep  this  degree  of  "  interest " 
in    sight   as    to   conserve    all   those    characteristics   of   the 
conception  of  God  which  render  possible  t^he  trust  described 


214  JUSTIFICATION   AND   RECONCILIATION  [203-4 

above.  All  other  theological  ideas — e.g,  the  idea  we  have  to 
form  of  Christ  and  His  Divinity — ^must  be  treated  either  in 
quite  the  same  way,  or  with  the  most  careful  reference  to  the 
nature  of  these  supreme  ideas. 

Thus  we  secure  a  criterion  by  which  to  judge  the 
so-called  jwoo/s /or  the  being  of  God.  Since  the  Middle  Ages 
these  arguments  have  been  intended  to  prove  that  the  idea  of 
God,  presupposed  as  given  in  Christianity,  is  scientifically 
valid.  When  people  set  about  proving  the  existence  of 
God,  they  did  not  thereby  assume  that  the  reality  of  God  for 
faith  was  not  sufficiently  certain,  or  that  as  a  religious  idea  it 
excited  doubts  of  its  own  truth  which  a  diflferent  kind  of 
knowledge  was  needed  to  allay.  On  the  contrary,  to  the 
Scholastics  who  adduce  these  proofs,  the  correctness  and 
truth  of  the  judgment  of  faith,  that  God  exists,  are  absolutely 
indubitable.  But  they  wished  to  prove  that  the  Christian 
idea  of  God  is  valid  likewise  within  the  realm  of  science. 
This  enterprise,  again,  does  not  imply  the  intention  to  exhibit 
the  specifically  Christian  idea  of  God  as  that  of  universal 
reason.  This  distinction,  which  might  have  given  a  useful 
sense  to  a  scientific  demonstration  of  the  Christian  idea  of 
God  at  the  beginning  of  theology,  has  not  been  drawn  by  the 
Scholastics  up  to  the  present  time.  Christian  thought  about 
God,  and  scientific  thought  about  God,  it  is  supposed,  will 
coincide  and  harmonise.  Only  it  becomes  clear  later,  that 
besides  the  characteristics  that  are  common  to  both,  Chris- 
tianity carries  with  it  a  further  and  special  knowledge  of 
God^,  The  traditional  proofs  of  the  being  of  God  are  them- 
selves the  expression  of  this  confusion.  Here  we  have 
to  deal  with  the  cosmological,  the  teleological,  and  the 
ontological  arguments.  They  are  not  co-ordinate,  it  is 
true,  but,  as  Duns  Scotus  observes,  are  so  related  to  one 
another  that  the  first  two  must  be  supplemented  by  the 
third.  But  even  when  so  arranged,  it  is  not  difficult  to  see 
that  they  fail  to  prove  the  objective  existence  of  God  as 
contrasted  with  His  existence  in  thought,  that  they  fail  to 
prove  the  existence  of  God,  and  that  they  cannot  be  con- 


2M-fi]  THE   DOCTRINE   OF   GOD  215 

structed   save   in   dependence   on   the   very  presupposition 
which  distinguishes  the  Christian  view  of  the  world.^ 

The  import  of  the  cosmological  and  teleological  arguments 
is  that,  at  the  stage  of  the  interpretation  of  the  system  of 
things  given  by  metaphysics,  when  things  are  not  yet  differ- 
entiated as  nature  and  spirit,  disinterested  science,  if  it  is  to 
comprehend  the  world  as  a  whole,  is  led  to  conceptions  of  God 
which  coincide  with  the  Christian  idea  of  Him.     The  wish 
to  comprehend  the  whole  is  itself  something  additional  to 
disinterested  science,  and  betrays  the  interest  religious  faith 
has   in    conceiving   the   world   as   a    rounded    unity.     This 
interest,  it  is  true,  already  appears   in  Greek    Philosophy, 
and  thus  is  not  exclusively  Christian.     But  in  Greek  thought, 
it  is  an  expression  of  that  religious  way  of  looking  at  the 
world  which  could  no  longer  rest  satisfied  with  the  popular 
worship.      Now  it  is  customary  to  state  the  cosmological 
argument  thus — that  if  we  seek  a  conclusion  for  the  series  of 
causes  and  effects  in   which  things  are  arranged,  we  must 
conceive  the  first  cause  as  caiLsa  sui,  which  is  not  also  a  res 
catLsata,  and  which  therefore  is  God.     And  the  teleological 
argument  runs  as  follows,  that  if  we  seek  a  conclusion  for 
the  series  of  means  and  ends  in  which  things  are  arranged, 
we  must  think  the  final  end,  which  is  no  longer  itself  a 
means,  as  God.     Now  it  is  true  that  the  Christian  idea  of 
God,  our  Father  in  Christ,  includes  in  itself  the  ideas  of  First 
Cause  and  Final  End,  as  subordinate  characteristics.     But, 
posited  as  independent  things,  the  conceptions  of  first  cause 
and  final  end  fail  to  transcend  the  conception  of  the  world, 
and  therefore  fall  short  of  the  Christian  idea  of  God.     For, 
to  begin  with,  the  idea  of  cavsa  sui  is  not  at  all  a  specific 
notion,  capable  of  rounding  off  the  world  as  a  whole.     Every 
single  thing  is  causa  sui  as  the  unity  of  its  qualities,  and  this 
notwithstanding  the  fact  that  at  the  same  time  everything 
must  be  conceived  as  the  effect  of  other  things.     We  can 
reach  a  conclusion  of  the  series  only  by  assuming  or  postu- 

*  With  what    follows    cf.    Julias    Kostlin,  Die  Beiceise  filr  dcu   Dascin 
Octtes,  in  Stud,  u.  KrUiken,  1875,  Heft  4  ;  1876,  Heft  1. 


216  JUSTIFICATION    AND   RECONCILIATION  [205-6 

lating  a  cause  which  is  likewise  causa  omnium  in  the  same 
respect  as  it  is  causa  suL  For  this  alone  excludes  the 
possibility  of  this  thing  being  the  effect  of  other  causes.  But 
the  thing  thus  fitted  to  be  the  cause  of  all  other  things 
is  simply  the  world-substance,  the  multiplicity  of  things 
regarded  as  a  unity.  And  this  has  no  resemblance  to  the 
idea  of  God.  For  while  we  must  conceive  the  world  as  a 
unity,  in  order  to  explain  interaction  between  things,  yet  in 
this  sense  the  world-substance  becomes  more  intelligible 
when  viewed  as  a  universal  law  of  the  connection  of  its  parts 
than  when  viewed  as  a  cause.  The  teleological  argument  is 
surrounded  by  similar  difl&culties.  If  its  construction  is  the 
outcome  of  a  priori  metaphysical  reflection,  there  is  in  this 
implied  a  preconception  which  has  still  to  stand  the  test  of 
experience.  Granted,  now,  that  it  stands  this  test  better 
than  we  can  assert  it  does,  yet  it  is  premature  to  make  the 
conception  of  Final  End  equivalent  to  the  Christian  idea  of 
God.  For  what  Aristotle  calls  God  not  only  falls  far  short 
of  the  Christian  idea  of  God  in  definiteness  and  richness,  but 
the  metaphysical  conception  of  the  World-End  {Weltssweck) 
to  which  the  series  of  means  leads  up,  altogether  fails  to 
transcend  the  idea  of  the  world,  the  unity  of  which  it 
expresses.  But  even  if  we  could  overlook  the  distance  which 
separates  the  results  of  both  argimients  from  their  intended 
goal,  they  require  to  be  supplemented  before  they  conduct  us 
to  the  objective  existence  of  God.  For  they  are  merely  the 
expression  of  the  idea  that,  if  we  wish  to  cognise  the  world 
as  a  whole,  we  must  of  necessity  think  God  in  addition  as  its 
First  Cause  and  Final  End.  This,  however,  gives  us  no 
guarantee  that  anything  real  corresponds  to  the  thought  in 
our  minds,  which  is  necessary  on  the  condition  stated. 

According  to  Duns  Scotus,  the  ontological  argument  is 
adapted  to  fill  up  this  hiatus.  Anselm  constructed  it,  it  is 
true,  independently  of  any  such  motive,  but  it  can  be  accom- 
modated to  the  circumstances  without  trouble.  For  the 
conception  of  a  Perfect  Being — ^Anselm's  term  for  God — 
must  include  the  results  of  the  other  arguments :  if  the  form 


206-7]  THE   DOCTRINE    OF   GOD  217 

of  proof,  therefore,  is  at  all  correct,  it  covers  also  the  validity 
of  the  two  arguments  discussed  already.  Anselm's  onto- 
logical  argument  runs  thus:  The  conception  of  a  Perfect 
Being,  than  which  nothing  greater  can  be  thought,  is  im- 
possible, unless  Its  existence  is  certain ;  the  quality  of 
existence,  consequently,  follows  from  our  idea  of  a  Perfect 
Being.  But  this  inference  is  true  only  for  our  ideas,  not 
for  the  reality  which  stands  opposed  to  our  thought:  the 
argument  therefore  fails  of  its  purpose.  The  attempt  made 
in  the  same  direction  by  Descartes  is  no  more  convincing. 
He  holds  that  we  could  not  have  the  idea  of  the  positively 
Infinite  unless  it  existed  in  reality.  For,  said  he,  as  this 
idea  includes  no  negation,  we  do  not  gain  it  by  abstraction ; 
it  is  therefore  called  forth  in  us  by  the  Infinite  itself ;  it  is 
therefore  in  itself  proof  of  the  reality  of  the  Infinite.  But 
this  train  of  thought  is  merely  an  analysis  of  the  pretended 
innate  knowledge  of  God  asserted  by  the  Scholastics.  Such 
knowledge,  however,  is  nothing  but  what  is  gained  by  abstrac- 
tion from  the  world,  and  is  therefore  of  a  negative  kind.  The 
argument  itself  establishes  nothing  save  the  way  in  which 
every  form  of  religious  faith  expresses  the  reality  of  its  gods. 
This  mode  of  reflective  thought,  which  can  go  on  within 
the  sphere  of  religious  knowledge,  is  exceedingly  often  re- 
garded as  the  product  of  general  theoretical  cognition.  In 
this  respect  the  example  of  Descartes  has  perpetuated 
confusion  among  philosophers  and  theologians.^  For  the 
proposition,  that  we  are  compelled  to  posit  the  thought  of 
God  as  real  in  order  to  explain  our  own  belief,  is  merely  an 
analytic  judgment,  which  is  deduced  from  religious  belief 
because  it  is  already  contained  there.  But  it  is  not  the 
synthetic  judgment  of  theoretical  knowledge,  which  is  what 
people  undertake  to  make,  or  fancy  they  are  making.  In 
fact,  that  is  unattainable  by  the  method  in  question.  But, 
on  the  other  hand,  no  theoretical  negation  of  God  has  the 
right  to  reject  the  reality  of  God  or  gods  affirmed  by  re- 
ligious cognition ;  for  the  relation  between  these  entities,  and 

^  Examples  in  Flllgel,  op.  cit.t  p.  157. 


218  JUSTIFICATION   AND   RE(X)NCILIATION  [207-8 

the  attitude  to  the  world  taken  up  by  the  believer  in  the 
feeling  of  blessedness  produced  by  his  trust  in  God,  does  not 
fall  under  the  jurisdiction  of  theoretical  cognition  when  con- 
scious of  its  own  limitations.  For  religious  cognition  the 
existence  of  God  is  beyond  question,  for  the  activity  of  God 
becomes  to  us  a  matter  of  conviction  through  the  attitude  we 
take  up  to  the  world  as  religious  men.  And  while,  from  the 
standpoint  of  Christianity,  we  must  maintain  that  the  inter- 
pretations of  this  relation  afforded  by  heathen  religions  do 
not  correspond  to  the  reality,  yet  at  the  same  time  they  are 
to  be  regarded  collectively  as  proofs  of  a  striving  after  the 
true  solution.  Further,  while  theoretical  cognition  must  for 
this  reason  take  religion  into  account  as  a  normal  fact  of  the 
human  spirit,  it  must  regard  these  very  circumstances  as 
among  its  essential  characteristics. 

Since,  whenever  religion  appears,  it  is  subject  to  the  pre- 
supposition that  man  opposes  himself,  as  spirit,  to  surroimding 
nature,  and  to  human  society  acting  on  him  through  the 
media  of  nature,  it  is  a  mistake  to  employ  the  idea  of  God 
as  Author  or  Creator  of  the  forces  of  nature  in  order  to 
compel  natural  science,  aware  of  its  limits,  to  recognise  God's 
existence.  Inferences  drawn  from  the  observation  of  nature 
lead  us  to  consider  the  multiplicity  and  interaction  of  material 
forces  as  the  causes  of  natural  things;  many  therefore 
suppose  that  they  are  justified  in  concluding  further  that 
this  multiplicity  of  forces — which  must  all  be  conceived  as 
limited — is  derived  from  one  creating  and  limiting  Will. 
But  this  special  modification  of  the  cosmological  argument 
for  God's  existence  is  just  as  incorrect  as  its  metaphysical 
and  academic  form.  Were  the  presupposition  of  the  elements 
of  nature,  thus  sought,  really  conceived  as  God,  such  a  con- 
clusion could  not  be  justified  by  natural  science.  Besides, 
the  affirmation  of  a  creative  Will,  desiderated  as  the  ground 
of  the  elements  of  nature,  would  not  be  a  religious  judgment, 
and  to  use  the  name  God  to  designate  the  entity  thus  sought 
would  be  premature.  For  we  never  exercise  religious  cogni- 
tion in  merely  explaining  nature  by  a  First  Cause,  but  always 


208-9]  THE    DOCTBINB   OF   GOD  219 

and  only  in  explaining  the  independence  of  the  human  spirit 
over  against  nature.  The  same  confusion,  therefore,  as  that 
of  which  Scholasticism  is  guilty  when  it  treats  the  idea  of 
of  God  as  an  element  in  metaphysical  science,  is  to  be  de- 
tected in  the  combination  we  are  now  discussing  of  natural 
science  with  the  idea  of  God. 

In  religious  cognition  the  idea  of  God  is  dependent  on 
the  presupposition  that  man  opposes  himself  to  the  world  of 
nature,  and  secures  his  position,  in  or  over  it,  by  faith  in 
God.  Consequently  no  proof  of  God's  existence  starts  pro- 
perly save  that  which  accepts  as  given  man's  self-distinction 
from  nature,  and  his  endeavours  to  maintain  himself  against 
it  or  over  it.  This  condition  is  satisfied  in  the  case  of  the 
so-called  moral  argument,  stated  by  Kant  in  his  Ci^igue  of 
JvdgToent.  It  is  true  that  Kant  directly  attaches  to  this 
theistic  argument  the  cautious  limitation,  that  it  is  necessary 
to  think  God  in  order  strictly  to  explain  the  existence  in  the 
world  of  rational  beings  under  moral  laws,  who  view  their 
own  action,  when  worthy  of  their  nature,  as  the  final  end  of 
the  world.  For  this  involves  likewise,  as  its  precondition,  the 
hope  of  felicity:  the  supreme  good,  therefore,  which  shall 
express  the  final  end  of  rational  beings  under  moral  laws,  is 
the  combination  of  virtue  and  felicity,  of  moral  and  physical 
good  (vol.  i.  p.  439).  Both  orders  of  existence,  which  follow 
laws  quite  different  in  kind,  are  conceived  as  meeting  in  this 
goal.  The  supreme  good,  thus  determined,  depends  neither 
on  our  use  of  freedom  nor  on  natural  causes;  consequently, 
in  order  to  set  the  final  end  before  us  as  the  moral  law 
directs,  we  must  assume  a  moral  Creator  of  the  world.  That 
is,  it  is  necessary  to  think  God  as  vouching  for  the  satis- 
faction of  the  moral  necessity  we  are  under  of  conceiving 
the  supreme  good  as  a  combination  of  virtue  and  felicity  or 
lordship  over  nature  (Critique  of  Judgment,  §  87).  To  begin 
with,  there  can  be  no  doubt  that  Kant  is  in  agreement  with 
the  Christian  idea  of  God  in  his  description  of  the  Moral 
Creator  and  Buler  of  the  world.  For  everywhere  in  this 
connection  God  denotes  the  ethical  Power  Who  assures  to 


220  JUSTIFICATION    AND   RECONCILIATION  [209-10 

man  the  poBition  above  the  world  befitting  his  ethical  worth, 
and  this,  too,  as  the  final  end  of  the  world.  Moreover,  the 
argument  is  not  merely  the  outcome  of  the  reflection  of 
religious  knowledge  upon  the  connection  of  its  own  elements. 
For  its  starting-point — the  estimate  of  moral  action  as 
springing  from  freedom,  and  the  hope  of  the  union  of  felicity 
and  virtue — ^is  conceived  independently  of  the  authority  of 
God.  But,  lastly,  it  appears  from  Kant's  further  explana- 
tions that  he  himself  puts  considerable  limitations  upon  the 
necessary  validity  of  this  conception  of  God  as  the  explana- 
tory ground  of  the  supreme  good  above  described.  He 
insists  that  the  necessity  of  the  thought  of  God  can  be 
adequately  demonstrated  solely  for  the  practical  Reason,  for 
the  idea  of  final  end  itself  is  rooted  solely  in  the  use  of  free- 
dom according  to  moral  laws,  and  does  not  arise  out  of  the 
investigation  of  nature,  and  thus  possesses  only  subjective- 
practical  reality.  He  asserts  that  the  argument  in  question 
does  not  comply  with  any  form  of  theoretical  proof,  not  even 
with  that  of  an  hypothesis  set  up  to  explain  the  possibility 
of  a  given  fact.  For  we  lack  the  material  for  the  idea  of  a 
supersensuous  being ;  and  therefore  it  is  impossible  to  deter- 
mine such  an  idea  specifically,  and  employ  it  as  a  basis  of 
explanation.  He  maintains,  accordingly,  that  the  idea  of 
God  is  only  a  conviction  of  personal  faith,  i,e,  necessarily  to 
be  conceived  as  standing  in  relation  to  the  dutiful  use  of  the 
practical  Season.  So  also  the  idea  of  the  final  end  of  the 
world,  by  which  we  judge  the  use  of  freedom,  can  claim 
reality  for  us  solely  in  a  practical  sense,  and  is  therefore  a 
matter  of  faith  {Critique  of  Judgment,  §  88).  These  explana- 
tions of  Kant  are  for  one  thing  in  accord  with  the  dualism 
which  in  general  he  maintains  between  the  theoretical  and 
the  practical  Season,  and  at  the  same  time  obey  the  prin- 
ciple that  the  reflective  judgment  attains  merely  to  subjective 
truth. 

Under  these  circumstances  Kant's  line  of  thought  implies 
that,  as  his  philosophy  is  incapable  of  combining  into  one 
whole  the  two  heterogeneous  theories  of  practical  reason  and 


210-1]  THE   DOCTRINE    OF   GOD  221 

of  nature,  he  hands  over  the  task  of  solving  the  problem  to 
the  Christian  religion.  I  have  already  remarked  (p.  207)  that 
philosophical  systems  secure  the  unity  of  their  view  of  the 
world  either  directly  by  introducing  a  tentative  idea  of  God 
or  by  employing  conceptions  of  the  world,  which,  being 
neither  proved  nor  provable,  belong  to  the  imagination,  and 
are  therefore  to  be  assigned  to  the  sphere  of  religious  know- 
ledge rather  than  to  that  of  theoretical  cognition.  It  is 
instructive  to  observe  how  Kant's  procedure  diverges  from 
such  methods.  He  does  not  start  dogmatically  from  the  idea 
of  God,  nor  from  a  preconceived  idea  of  the  world;  rather, 
he  finds  the  final  unity  of  his  knowledge  of  the  world  in  the 
Christian  idea  of  God,  and  that,  too,  expressly  in  such  a  way 
as  to  limit  that  idea  to  the  sphere  of  religious  knowledge. 
Whether  this  procedure  wins  for  him  the  suspicion  of  philo- 
sophers or  the  gratitude  of  apologists,  at  all  events  the  moral 
Theistic  argument,  thus  limited,  adds  nothing  to  the  proof  of 
the  reality  of  God  as  distinct  from  the  necessity  of  think- 
ing Him  in  order  to  explain  certain  relations  of  man  to  the 
world — notliing,  that  is,  to  the  proof  of  the  reality  of  God  as 
an  object  of  theoretical  cognition.  The  latter  purpose  Kant 
had  not  the  least  desire  to  accomplish.  Even  when  he 
declares  that  he  has  proved  the  reality  of  a  supreme  Moral 
Legislator  Who  is  also  Creator  of  the  world,  yet  the  limita- 
tion of  this  proof  "  to  the  merely  practical  use  of  our  reason  " 
{Critique  of  Judgment^  §  88)  simply  means  that  for  religious 
knowledge  the  reality  of  God  is  self-evident.  But  this  limit- 
ation hangs  together  with  his  separation  of  the  spheres  of 
the  theoretical  and  practical  Eeason,  in  which  Kant  failed  to 
estimate  the  practical  Eeason  at  its  proper  value.  If  the 
exertion  of  moral  will  is  a  reality,  then  the  practical  Eeason 
is  a  branch  of  theoretical  cognition.  These  two  positions 
Kant  never  reached.  The  reason  of  this  failure  lies  in  the 
fact  that  with  him  sensibility  is  the  characteristic  mark  of 
reality.  Therefore,  too,  he  declares  the  conception  of  God  to 
be  theoretically  impossible,  and  abandons  it  to  the  practical 
Reason.      For,   says   he   {Critique    of  Judgment,   §    90),   we 


222  JUSTIFICATION   AND   RECONCILIATION  [211-2 

possess  no  material  for  determining  the  idea  of  the  super- 
sensuous,  seeing  we  should  have  to  derive  it  from  the  things 
of  sense,  and  such  material  is  absolutely  incongruous  with  the 
object  in  question. 

If  it  is  possible  at  all  to  give  a  proof,  first  of  all,  of  the 
scientific  validity  of  the  conception  of  God,  which  shall  not 
merely  be  an  utterance  of  the  religious  consciousness  reflect- 
ing on  its  own  contents,  it  can  be  done  only  by  the  proper 
deUmitation  of  that  sphere  of  experience  which  nothing  save 
the  religious  conception  of  God  can  adequately  explain. 
What  I  mean  by  this  is  that,  besides  the  reaUty  of  nature, 
theoretical  knowledge  must  recognise  as  given  the  reality  of 
spiritual  life,  and  the  equal  binding  force  of  the  special  laws 
which  obtain  in  each  realm.  With  respect  to  this,  theoretical 
cogaition  must  simply  accept  the  fact  that  while  spiritual  life 
is  subject  to  the  laws  of  mechanism  so  far  as  it  is  interwoven 
with  nature,  yet  its  special  character  as  distinct  from  nature 
is  signalised  by  practical  laws  which  declare  spirit  to  be  an 
end  in  itself,  which  realises  itself  in  this  form.  Kant  wrongly 
let  himself  be  persuaded,  by  this  specific  quality  of  spiritual 
life,  to  oppose  practical  Beason  as  one  species  of  Eeason  to 
theoretical  Beason  as  another.  And  yet  knowledge  of  the 
laws  of  our  action  is  also  theoretical  knowledge,  for  it  is 
knowledge  of  the  laws  of  spiritual  life.  Now  the  impulses 
of  knowledge,  of  feeling,  and  of  aesthetic  intuition,  of  will  in 
general  and  in  its  special  application  to  society,  and  finally 
the  impulse  of  religion  in  the  general  sense  of  the  word,  all 
concur  to  demonstrate  that  spiritual  life  is  the  end,  while 
nature  is  the  means.  This  is  the  general  law  of  spiritual  life» 
the  validity  of  which  science  must  maintain  if  the  special 
character  of  the  spiritual  realm  of  existence  is  not  to  be 
ignored.  In  so  far  as  we  consider  spiritual  life  in  itself,  this 
law  holds  good  in  a  subjective-practical  way,  for  spirit  exists 
in  the  form  of  subjects  alike  in  character.  But  since  men,  as 
spiritual  beings  who  exercise  through  their  natural  organism 
particular  effects  on  nature  and  on  one  another,  constitute  a 
special  realm  of  reality  in  the  world,  and  since  the  moral 


212-3]  THE   DOCTRINE    OF    GOD  223 

goods  they  call  into  existence  are  no  less  real  than  the  natural 
i^orld,  therefore  knowledge  of  the  practical  laws  obtaining  in 
this   sphere  falls  under  theoretical  cognition   no  less   than 
natural  science  does.     But  it  is  likewise  the  task  of  cognition 
to  seek  for  a  law  explaining  the  coexistence  of  these  two 
heterogeneous  orders  of  reality.     Kant,  however,  abandons  the 
attempt  to  discover,  by  the  methods  of  theoretical  cognition, 
a  principle  which  will  unite  spirit  and  nature  in  one,  and  bids 
us  explain  the  combination  of  both  in  a  single  world  through 
practical  faith  in  God,  conceived  as  endowed  with  the  attri- 
butes which  Christianity  ascribes  to  Him.     One  circumstance 
-which  co-operated  to  produce  this  conclusion  is  doubtless  the 
fact  that  all  knowledge  of  nature,  as  subject  to  law,  depends 
on  the  practical  presupposition  that  nature   exists  for  the 
human  spirit.     Now  religion  is  the  practical  law  of  the  spirit, 
in  accordance  with  which  it  sustains  its  fundamental  character 
as  an  end-in-itself   against   the  restrictions  it  suffers  from 
nature.     This  practical  law  attains  its  complete  development 
in  Christianity,  for  Christianity  lays  down  the  principle  that 
persontd  life  is  to  be  prized  above  the  whole  world  of  nature, 
which  is  the  realm  of  division  (Mark  viii.  36,  37) ;  and  con- 
sequently repudiates  that  intermixture  of  nature  and  spirit  by 
maiutaining  which  the  heathen  religions  betray  their  compar- 
ative failure.     For  in  the  Christian  religion  the  soul  gains  the 
assurance   of   its  peculiar  value  as  a  totality  through   the 
consciousness  of  blessedness — a  consciousness  conditioned  by 
the  idea  of  the  purely  spiritual  God,  Who  as  Creator  of  the 
universe  governs  all  things  on  the  principle  that  mankind  are 
ordained  to  be  the  final  end  of  the  world,  through  trust  in 
God  and  as  members  of  His  spiritual  kingdom.      Now  we 
must  either  resign  the  attempt  to  comprehend  the  ground  and 
law   of   the  coexistence  of  nature  and  spiritual  life,  or  we 
must,  to  attain  our  end,  acknowledge  the  Christian  conception 
of  God  as  the  truth  by  which  our  knowledge  of  the  universe 
is  consummated.     In  the  former  case,  science  would  disobey 
the  impulse  to  complete  itself  which  arises  from  the  percep- 
tion of  the  fact  that  nature  is  knowable  and  is  known  only 


224  JUSTIFICATION    AND    RECONCILIATION  [213-4 

because  it  exists  for  spirit.  Such  a  renunciation  of  the 
systematic  completion  of  theoretical  knowledge  would  not 
impair  the  practical  validity  of  religious  faith  in  God  in  the 
Christian  sense.  But  still,  as  all  cognition  of  nature  is 
subject  to  the  precondition  described  above,  knowledge  has 
laid  on  it  the  task  of  comprehending  the  coexistence  of 
nature  and  spiritual  life.  If  so,  however,  nothing  remains 
but  to  accept  the  Christian  idea  of  G-od,  and  that,  too,  as  an 
indispensable  truth,  in  order  that  we  may  find  both  the 
ground  and  the  law  of  the  real  world  in  that  Creative  Will 
which  includes,  as  the  final  end  of  the  world,  the  destination 
of  mankind  for  the  Kingdom  of  God. 

While,  then,  by  following  this  path  we  find  that  science 
is  bound  to  accept  the  Christian  idea  of  God,  it  is  likewise 
true  that  this  argument  is  directly  based  upon  necessary  data 
of  the  spiritual  life  of  man  which  lie  outside  of  the  religious 
view  of  the  world,  and  must  be  explained  either  by  recognis- 
ing the  Christian  idea  of  God  or  not  at  all.  Now,  when  we 
mark  the  attitude  taken  up  by  the  human  spirit  towards  the 
world  of  nature,  two  analogous  facts  present  themselves.  In 
theoretical  knowledge,  spirit  treats  nature  as  something  which 
exists  for  it ;  while  in  the  practical  sphere  of  the  will,  too,  it 
treats  nature  as  something  which  is  directly  a  means  to  the 
realisation  of  the  common  ethical  end  which  forms  the  final  end 
of  the  world.  The  cognitive  impulse  and  the  will  both  take 
this  course  without  regard  to  the  fact  that  nature  is  subject 
to  quite  other  laws  than  those  which  spirit  obeys,  that  it  is 
independent  of  spirit,  and  that  it  forms  a  restraint  on  spirit, 
and  so  far  keeps  it  in  a  certain  way  in  dependence  on  itself. 
Hence  we  must  conclude  either  that  the  estimate  which  spirit, 
as  a  power  superior  to  nature,  forms  of  its  own  worth — in 
particular,  the  estimate  which  it  forms  of  moral  fellowship, 
which  transcends  nature — is  a  baseless  fancy,  or  that  the  view 
taken  by  spirit  is  in  accordance  with  truth  and  with  the  sup- 
reme law  which  is  valid  for  nature  as  well.  If  that  be  so, 
then  its  ground  must  lie  in  a  Divine  Will,  which  creates  the 
world  with  spiritual  life  as  its  final  end.     To  accept  the  idea 


214]  THE   DOCTRINE   OF   GOD  225 

of  God  in  this  way  is,  as  Kant  observes,  practical  faith,  and 
not  an  act  of  theoretical  cognition.  While,  therefore,  the 
Christian  religion  is  thereby  proved  to  be  in  harmony  with 
reason,  it  is  always  with  the  reservation  that  knowledge  of 
Grod  embodies  itself  in  judgments  which  differ  in  kind  from 
those  of  theoretical  science. 

The  meaning,  therefore,  of  this  moral  argument  for  the 
necessity  of  the  thought  of  God  differs  altogether  from  the 
aim  of  the  other  arguments ;  and  for  that  reason  the  success 
it  attains  surpasses  that  of  the  others.  The  cosmological  and 
teleological  arguments  are  intended  to  show  that  the  concep- 
tion of  God — necessary  to  complete  the  circle  of  knowledge — 
is  BJTnilar  in  kind  to  the  results  of  science.  A  truth  which 
for  religious  faith  is  certain  is  thus  proved,  it  is  held,  to  be 
at  the  same  time  the  result  of  scientific  cognition  as  it 
advances  from  observation  to  observation  and  crystallises  into 
conclusions,  and  should  be  set  up  as  the  criterion  of  theolog- 
ical science.  But  this  method  ends  in  failure,  partly  because 
neither  argument  takes  us  beyond  the  limits  of  the  world, 
partly  because  their  pretended  results,  even  if  they  were  correct, 
differ  from  the  Christian  conception  of  God  in  this,  that  they 
fail  to  express  His  worth  for  men,  and  in  particular  His 
worth  for  men  as  sinnera  On  the  other  hand,  while  Kant 
r^ards  practical  faith  in  God,  conceived  as  endowed  with  the 
attributes  which  Christianity  ascribes  to  Him,  as  necessary  to 
complete  our  knowledge  of  the  world,  yet  he  does  not  posit 
this  idea — which  is  an  object  merely  of  practical  faith,  and 
cannot  be  proved  apart  from  such  faith — as  a  conception  which 
is  theoretical  or  rational  in  the  sense  of  general  science.  On 
the  contrary,  he  maintains  it  in  its  original  and  specific  char- 
acter. Now  it  is  the  duty  of  theology  to  conserve  the  special 
characteristic  of  the  conception  of  God,  namely,  that  it  can 
only  be  represented  in  value-judgments.  Consequently  it 
ought  to  base  its  claim  to  be  a  science,  when  looked  at  in 
itself,  on  the  use  of  the  method  described  above  (p.  15),  and, 
when  looked  at  in  its  relation  to  other  sciences,  by  urging 
that,  as  Kant  was  the  first  to  show,  the  Christian  view  of 
IS 


226  JUSTIFICATION   AND   REC50NCILIATI0N  [214-5 

God  and  the  world  enables  us  comprehensively  to  unify  our 
knowledge  of  nature  and  the  spiritual  life  of  man  in  a  way 
which  otherwise  is  impossible.  When  we  have  once  got  a 
true  conception  of  this  point,  a  review  of  the  moral  constitu- 
tion of  man,  based  upon  the  principles  of  Kant,  will  serve  as 
the  ratio  cogTWscendi  of  the  validity  of  the  Christian  idea  of 
God  when  employed  as  the  solution  of  the  enigma  of  the 
world.  Such  an  argument  would  form  a  close  analogy  to  the 
declaration  of  Christ  (John  vii.  17),  that  whoso  wiUeth  to  do 
the  will  of  God,  shall  know  whether  His  doctrine  is  of  God  or 
of  merely  human  origin.  Probably,  too,  this  saying  of  Christ 
has  quite  as  wide  a  range.  For  if,  through  actively  fulfilling 
the  will  of  God,  one  becomes  convinced  that  Christ  has  really 
revealed  God,  that  implies  that  it  is  by  the  same  path  that 
we  come  to  perceive  that  the  practical  end  set  before  men  in 
Christianity  is  at  the  same  time  the  final  end  for  which  the 
world  is  created  and  governed  by  God.  This  is  the  essential 
characteristic  of  the  idea  of  God  valid  in  this  domain.^ 

§  30.  The  conception  of  God  with  which  Scholastic 
theology,  whether  mediaeval  or  Protestant,  sets  to  work,  is 
very  different  from  that  which  we  find  in  Luther's  Larger 
Catechism,  To  begin  with.  Scholastic  theology  posits  as  God 
the  conception  of  limitless  indeterminate  being,  a  conception 
which  is  already  current  in  the  earliest  Apologists.  In  its 
origin,  this  idea  is  simply  the  general  conception  of  the  world, 
the  predicate  which  belongs  to  all  things  alike,  and  which, 
therefore,  when  abstracted  from  them,  constitutes  according  to 
Platonic  standards  the  idea  of  the  world.  But  being  in 
general  is  so  different  from  the  concrete  fulness  of  the  world, 
that  it  rather  impresses  the  mind  as  Tiot  being  the  world. 
And  this  impression  leads  to  indeterminate  being  in  general 
being  posited  as  God.     Now  this  idea  has  to  be  verified  as 

*  The  line  of  thought  set  forth  here  has  been  met  by  the  contemptuous  objec- 
tion that  it  bases  Christianitj  upon  morality.  The  sapient  persons  who  thus 
prefer  the  charge  that  I,  like  Kant  in  his  Religion  within  the  Limits  of  Mere 
Reason,  make  religion  a  subordinate  appendix  to  morals,  though  my  mode  of 
doctrine  shows  the  very  opposite,  would  do  better  to  acquire  a  thorough  knowledge 
of  the  elementary  distinction  between  the  ratio  essendi  and  the  ratiQ  cognosoendi^ 
inste^^d  of  sitting  in  judgment  on  me, 


215-6]  THE   DOCTRINB   OF   GOD  227 

scientifically  true  in  its  relation  to  science  in  general.     Ac- 
cordingly, the  cosmological  and  teleological   arguments   are 
employed  to  prove  that  the  conception  of  First  Cause  and 
Final  End  is  equivalent  to  the  conception  of  indeterminate 
being.     Nothing,  indeed,  was  to  be  gained  by  keeping  to  the 
Platonic  theory ;  for  the  abstraction  from  the  world,  of  which 
it  is  the  expression,  of  course  serves  any  purpose  rather  than 
that  of  explaining  the  world.     Accordingly,  the  conception  of 
cause  was  foisted  upon  it,  and  this  again,  by  a  similar  inter- 
polation of  the  conception  of  final  end,  raised  to  the  level  of 
personality — since,  according  to  Aristotle,  the  perfection  of 
the  Final  End  consists  in  His  thinking  of  Himself.     Lastly, 
there  was  ascribed  to  these  conceptions,  which  have  no  aflSnity 
with  one  another,  the  whole  content  of  the  Christian  idea  of 
God,  although  no  necessary  connection  could  be  shown  to 
exist  between  them  and  the  Divine  attributes  of  self-revelation 
and  love  to  man.     This  false  conjunction  of  ideas,  with  its  four 
different  stages,  does  not  give  even  a  semblance  of  scientific 
necessity  to  the  Christian  idea  of  God.     In  reality,  what  a 
doctrine  of  God  so  constructed  does  is  merely  to  introduce  an 
explication  of  the  content  of  the  Christian  view  of  the  world 
which  has  no  affinity  with  the  scientific  notions  of  limitless 
being,  first  cause,  and  self-conscious  end.     The  theology  of  the 
Middle  Ages  and  Protestant  orthodoxy,  therefore,  can  claim  a 
positively  Christian  character  only  so  far  as  they  neglect  the 
scientific  presuppositions  of  their  doctrine  of  God.     But  when 
these  presuppositions  are  taken  seriously,  there  arise  out  of 
this  element  in  "  ecclesiastical "  theology  the  different  species 
of  Rationalism — Deism  and  Pantheism.     We  must  not  permit 
ourselves  to  be  blinded  to  this  fact  by  the  circumstance  that 
the  champions  of  Positivism  and  Rationalism  derive  mutual 
hatred  from  a  mutual  comparison  of  their  respective  tenden- 
cies.    For  as  these  hostile  brethren  have  a  common  origin, 
so  they  are  also  bound  together  by  the  value  which  each  sets 
upon  the  other.     Neither  will  admit  the  possibility  of  a  third 
kind  of  theology,  for  each,  besides  believing  in  itself,  believes 
only  in  the  other,  even  though  it  be  with  trembling,  as  the 


228  JUSTIFICATION   AlO)   RECONCILIATION  [216-7 

demons  believe  in  God.  Circling  round  one  another  in  end- 
less controversy,  they  only  further  unintentionally  each  other's 
interests  ;  and  the  champions  of  both  schools,  as  would 
appear,  can  as  little  dispense  with  mutual  service  as  with 
mutual  vituperation.  A  specially  conspicuous  place  in  this 
circle  of  speculators  is  occupied  by  those  who  follow  Jacob 
Bohme  in  construing  the  nature  of  God  apart  from  the  world. 
Yet  they  ought  to  know,  from  the  experience  of  Mysticism  on 
which  they  plume  themselves,  that  he  who  abstracts  from  the 
world  so  becomes  one  with  God  both  in  knowledge  and  in 
will,  that  even  his  personal  individuality,  his  thinking  and  his 
speaking,  cease  to  be.  To  describe  the  inward  evolution  of 
God  outward  into  the  world  is  therefore,  to  say  the  least,  to 
use  language  without  thought. 

The  explanation  offered  in  §  29  has  made  it  clear  why 
theology  takes  as  its  fundamental  truth  the  full  conception  of 
God  as  a  Person,  Who  establishes  the  Kingdom  of  God  as  the 
final  end  of  the  world,  and  in  it  assures  to  every  one  who 
trusts  in  Him  supremacy  over  the  world.  Such  a  conception 
may  be  differentiated  without  further  remark  from  limitless 
being,  regarded  as  the  substance  of  the  universe,  from  the  idea 
of  a  First  Cause  which  need  not  be  personal,  and  from  the 
self-conscious  but  self -enclosed  Final  End  of  the  world.  The 
conception  of  God  thus  set  up  is  of  such  a  nature  that  it 
simply  cannot  be  distorted  into  Pantheism  or  Deism.  A 
theology  based  upon  it,  therefore,  is  not  rationalistic.  On  the 
contrary,  it  is  positive,  for  it  starts  from  the  Christian  idea  of 
God ;  and  it  is  scientific,  for  the  Christian  idea  of  God  must 
be  acknowledged  to  be  the  fundamental  principle  which 
explains  the  coexistence  of  nature  and  morality — morality 
being  viewed  as  the  final  end  of  the  world — ^if  their  co- 
existence admits  of  any  explanation  at  all.  We  have  yet, 
however,  to  justify  the  claim  of  theology  to  be  a  science,  by 
proving  that  the  conception  of  personality  can,  without  con- 
tradiction, be  applied  to  God. 

The  aversion  felt  to  this  truth  is  due  to  the  change  in 
aesthetic  criteria  which  began  about  a  hundred  years   ago. 


217-8]  THB   DOCTBINE  OP   GOD  229 

Tn  the  previous  era  the  feeling  of  the  beautiful  was  guided 
by  stereotyped   traditions  of   artistic    form.     In    particular, 
the  presuppositions  which  legitimately  influence  architecture 
dominated  taste  also  in  regard  to  the  music  of  the  fugue  and 
dramatic  poetry,  bound  as  the  latter  was  to  the  unities  of 
time  and  place.     To  this  preponderance  of  a  priori  theory, 
by  which  artistic  taste  has  been  shackled  since  the  Benais- 
sance,  corresponds  that  physico-theological  estimate  of   the 
relation  of  the  world  to  God  by  which  it  was  sought  to  test 
the  conception  of  His  personahty.     The  rapid  growth  of  this 
mode  of  thought  as  a  consequence  of  the  philosophy  of  Wolfif 
is  full  of  significance,  in  the  first  place,  as  indicating  the  lines 
which   feeling  and  taste  followed  in  that  age,  and,  in   the 
second,   as    throwing   light    on    the    conception    of   religion 
current  at  that  time.     The  tendency  just  noted  has,  since 
Goethe,  been  superseded  by  an  unfettered  feeling  for  the 
naturally  beautiful,  and  thus  lyrical  poetry  and  lyrical  music 
have  gained  supreme  influence  over  the  regrilation  of  aesthetic 
taste.     Lyrical  feeling,  which  adapts  itself   to  the  various 
aesthetic  objects  by  which  amid  all  the  changes  of  impression 
its  continuity  is  sustained,  and  which,  by  producing  subjective 
harmony,  balances  the  varying  values  of  objective  things,  is  a 
powerful  impulse  towards  a  pantheistic  view  of  the  world. 
Under  the  influence  of  this  feeling  people  think  they  have 
discovered  a  sufficient  explanation  of  the  real  world,  when 
they  find  in   the  impersonal  principle  of   development  the 
force    which    produces   equilibrium    amid    all    the    shifting 
phenomena  of  nature,  and  see  the  moral  order  of  the  world  in 
the  actual  purposiveness  of   human  society,  which  uncon- 
sciously brings  all  the  aberrations  of  moral  forces  into  accord 
with  their   substantially  concurrent    tendency.     These  pre- 
suppositions lead  to  the  view  that  "the  universe"  is  the 
highest  conception  of  all. 

There  is  hardly  anything  better  fitted  to  throw  light  upon 
this  conjunction  of  ideas  than  Strauss'  ^  unadorned  statement 
of  the  notion  of  the  Universe,  on  which  he  undertakes  to 

^  Die  aUe  und  neue  Olaubey  p.  140. 


230  JUSTIFICATION    AND   RECONCILIATION  [21ft-9 

found  his  new  faith,  his  substitute  for  religion.     He  finds 
that  the  Universe,  on  which  we  are  absolutely  dependent,  is 
constructed  not  hy  supreme  reason,  but  for  supreme  reason. 
If,  arguing  that  every  effect  must  have  a  cause,  we  incline  to 
the  former  belief,  this,  he  maintains,  is  only  to  betray  the 
limitations  of  our  intellect,  for  the  Universe  is  really  at  once 
cause  and  eflfect,  inner  and  outer.     In  these  disclosures  the 
mask  of   science  is  finally  laid  aside,  and   the  successor  of 
Eomanticism  displays  his  true  physiognomy.     For  his  sub- 
stitution of  the  conception  of  the  Universe  in  place  of  the 
conception  of  a  personal  God  is  now  no  longer  set  up,  as  a 
pretended  result  of   science,  in  opposition  to   the  religious 
fancy:   it  is  opposed   as  the  content  of   one  faith  to  the 
certainties  of  another.     We  are  not  permitted,  however,  to 
decide  between  the  two  on  the  principle  of  knowledge  that 
an  effect  must  have  a  cause  which  corresponds  to  it.     The 
new  faith,  it  is  true,  repudiates  the  idea  of  the  personality  of 
God,  on  the  assumed  ground  that  the  implications  of  the 
Absolute  and  of  personality  are  contradictory.     But  we  must 
regard  this  argument  merely  as  the  expression  of   a  fixed 
aversion,    for    otherwise    this    creed    finds    no    diflSculty    in 
maintaining   contradictions.      A   universe  which   is   at  once 
cause  and  effect,  inner  and   outer,  is  already  by  those  de- 
scriptions withdrawn  from  the   very  conditions  of  scientific 
knowledge.     It  is  an  object  of  the  imagination,  a  generalisa- 
tion of  aesthetic  feeling,  due  in  fact  to  the  lyrical,  especially 
the  musical,  balancing  of  feelings  of  pleasure  and  pain  excited 
simultaneously — that  is,  without  a  clear   interval  of    time 
between    them — and  by  the  influence  of   identical  objects. 
Here  cause  and   effect,  inner  and  outer,  vanish   into    one 
another !     In   particular,  the  position — inevitable  once  this 
line  of  thought  has  been  entered  on — that  the  laws  of  reality 
are  at  the  same  time  the  forces  at  work  in  reality  (and  this, 
looked  at  logically,  is  as  much  as  to  say  that  what  is  passive 
is  ipso  facto  active),  is  only  the  reflex  of  an  aesthetic  emotion. 
For  artistic  enjoyment  represents  an  impression  of  phenomena 
connected  together  in  an  orderly  way,  of   a  unified   multi- 


219-20]  THE   DOCXRIKE   OF   GOD  231 

plicity  which  operates  as  such,  i.e.  on  the  feeling  of  the 
observer.  But  in  this  way  of  looking  at  things  it  is 
altogether  forgotten  that  a  law,  as  imposed,  refers  us  back  to 
a  legislative  and  imposing  Spirit  and  Will,  and  that  the  moral 
order  of  the  world  implies  a  Creator  Who  lays  down  laws 
and  governs  according  to  a  fixed  purpose.  For  such  con- 
siderations would  interrupt  the  feeling  of  artistic  or  natural 
beauty  and  of  poetic  justice.  But  it  is  only  a  leap  of  the 
imagination  when  the  aesthetic  effect  upon  our  feeling  of  a 
law  discerned  in  nature  and  history  is  thrown  into  objective 
form  as  the  principle  that  every  known  law  of  reality  is  eo 
ipso  the  efficient  force  and  sufficient  groimd  of  that  which  is 
reaL  Nor  need  we  let  ourselves  be  intimidated  by  the 
further  assurance  that  it  is  a  mark  of  limited  intelligence  to 
demand  an  ordaining  Will  as  the  pritis  of  a  law,  and  from 
that  Will  to  deduce  likewise  the  active  force  exhibited  in  the 
phenomena  embraced  by  the  law.  Our  thinking  certainly 
has  its  limitations,  but  in  the  department  of  scientific 
thought  we  are  called  upon  to  set  bounds  to  the  aesthetic 
fancy,  and  to  forbid  it  to  intrude  into  a  realm  where  it  has  no 
jurisdiction.  The  idea  of  a  universe  which  should  be  at  once 
cause  and  effect,  inner  and  outer,  which  should  be  constructed 
for  supreme  reason,  on  which  man  should  feek  himself 
absolutely  dependent  and  yet  never  be  tempted  to  think  that 
possibly  it  had  its  origin  in  an  independent  Mind — such  an 
idea  accords  very  well  with  one  of  Beethoven's  symphonies,  by 
which  one  is  wholly  carried  away  without  ever  reflecting  on 
the  question  by  whom  and  how  it  was  composed,  or  how 
many  are  performing  it.  But  we  cannot  but  have  ideas, 
other  than  those  which  visit  us  when  enjoying  a  romantic 
piece  of  music,  about  the  universe  in  which  we  exercise  moral 
freedom  in  the  consciousness  that  each  of  us  is  a  whole  in 
Ms  own  order,  and  no  mere  part  of  the  world  For  the 
principle  of  lyrico-musical  feeling  is  not  the  principle  of  the 
universe. 

An    objection  to  the    personality  of  God,  which  Strauss 
is    never    weary    of    repeating,    is    that    the    predicates   of 


232  JUSTIFICATION    AND   RECONCILUTION  [220-1 

the    Absolute   and    of   personality   are    mutually    exclusive. 
"  Personality  is  that  selfhood  which  shuts  itself  up  against 
everything  else,  which  it  thereby  excludes  from  itself;  the 
Absolute,  on    the   other   hand,   is    the   comprehensive,   the 
unlimited,  which  excludes  nothing  from  itself  but  just  the 
exclusivity  which   lies  in  the  conception  of  personality."^ 
This  idea  of  the  Absolute  is  simply  that  of  space,  and  that 
one   cannot  combine   the  idea  of   space    with    the  idea  of 
personality  is  undeniable.     On  the   other  hand,  we  define 
personality  incompletely  when  we  limit  it  to  the  character- 
istic it  possesses  of   distinguishing  between  everything  else 
and  itself ;  for  this  is  merely  the  precondition  which  renders 
it  possible  for  human  personality  to  comprise  its  multitudin- 
ous contents.     We  find,  too,  that  the  personality  of  man  is 
more  developed  the  greater  the  compass  of  his  knowledge, 
the  more  susceptible  his  feeling  to  diverse  impressions,  the 
stronger  his  will  in  the  capacity  to  change  the  form  of  things 
and  to  rule  other  persons.      Personality,  as  we  have  it  in 
our  experience  of  manhood,  is  conditioned,  it  is  true,  by  the 
natural  endowments  of  the  individual.     The  development  of 
personality  from  this  foundation,  in  the  directions  mentioned 
above,  always  issues  likewise  in  that  peculiar  cast  of  character 
which  proves  the  original  endowment  of  each  to  have  been 
different  from  that  of  all  others.     A  person's  peculiar  cast  of 
character,  however,  always  indicates  his  acquired  difiference 
from   all  other  persons.      For  that  very  reason  it   caAnot 
coincide  with  that  formal  and  original  self-distinction  of  the 
individual  from  all  others,  to  which  Strauss  limits  his  con- 
ception of  personality.     Every  healthy  human  being,  indeed, 
oversteps  this  function  of  personality  perpetually,  whenever 
he  assimilates  any  material  for    his  spiritual  development. 
One  who  succeeded  in  living  such  a  self-enclosed  life  as  to 
shut  himself   off  against  everything  that  was  not  himself, 
would  display  none   of  the  marks  of  spiritual  life  at  all. 
Consequently,  for  the  purposes  of  the  present  discussion  he 
simply   would    not    exist.      Or   if   a    man,  in   his   spiritual 

^  Die  christL  Olaubenslehrn,  i.  p.  504. 


221-2]  THB   DOCTRINB   OF   GOD  233 

appropriation  of  things,  lived  an  exclusive  life — even  though 
only  for  the  most  part — lived,  that  is,  indifferent  to  the  pro- 
blems of  knowledge,  insensible  to  the  different  values  of  things, 
irresponsive  to  stimuli  of  the  will,  regardless  of  the  common 
interests  of  mankind,  current  terminology  would  not  account 
him  a  personality  at  alL  When  his  reason  is  not  affected, 
these  characteristics  may,  in  a  perceptible  degree,  be  traced  to 
a  selfish  opposition  to  the  social  conditions  of  moral  action, 
and  then  we  speak  of  bad  individuality.  Or  they  are 
accompanied  by  mental  derangement;  and  no  one  professes 
to  find  the  ideal  of  personality  in  the  maniac  or  the  imbecile. 
On  the  other  hand,  acquired  individuality  of  character  is  the 
form  assumed  both  by  the  highest  possible  degree  of 
receptivity  to  the  general  relations  of  things  and  the  common 
interests  of  mankind,  and  by  the  highest  possible  degree 
of  spiritual  influence  over  other  men  in  any  direction. 
Individuality,  therefore,  certainly  denotes  an  impassable  limit 
of  human  personality,  for  the  single  soul  can  be  pervaded 
with  the  common  elements  of  spiritual  life,  and  the  universal 
norms  necessary  for  their  appropriation,  only  when  the  form 
assumed  ia  particular.  But  the  fact  of  acquired  individuality 
iSy  for  that  very  reason,  not  inconsistent  with  the  subjugation 
of  the  world  by  spirit,  with  the  appropriating  reception  of 
very  diverse  contents  into  "  the  self -comprising  Ego,"  or  with 
the  latter's  operating  efficaciously  upon  a  certain  portion  of 
the  world,  and  a  more  or  less  extensive  section  of  human 
society.  Thus  Strauss'  criticism  of  the  notion  of  personality 
is  not  in  harmony  with  ordinary  usage,  and  is  as  far  as 
possible  from  being  based  on  that  complete  and  precise 
observation  of  phenomena  which  usage  points  to. 

The  conceivability  of  the  personality  of  God  is  to  be  reached 
rather  through  the  study  of  what  is  so  worthy  of  esteem 
among  men — ^independent  personality.^  For  those  objections 
to  the  personality  of  God  which  rest  upon  the  contention  that 
we  only  know  personality  as  a  product  of  the  interaction 
between  our  Ego  and  the  given  world,  or  as  a  self-evolution 

^  Of.  Lotze,  3fiJnvko9mu8,  iii.  p.  565  ff. 


234  JUSTIFICATION   AND   RECJONOHJATION  [222-3 

of  the  Ego  which  is  essentially  conditioned  by  the  stimulus 
of  the  environment,  point  to  the  fact  that  we  are  created  /or 
personality,  and  that  even  under  the  category  of  "  persons " 
we  are  limited,  growing,  mutable.     But  such  considerations 
are  more  than  balanced  by  the  fact  that  an  independent  per- 
sonality, when  acquired,  has  open  to  it  a  range  of  activity 
beyond  the  sway  of  the  above-mentioned  conditions.     What 
we  have  become  during  life,  through  the  interaction  of  ex- 
perience and  native  endowment,  the  Ego  opposes  through 
memory  as  a  connected  reality  to  all  possible  stimuli  arising 
from  the  world.     Further,  the  Ego  draws  a  multitude   of 
incentives  from  the  reciprocal  action  of  its  own  memories  and 
from  the  principles  it  has  acquired,  and  is  thus  able  both  to 
repel  the  synchronous  stimuli  it  receives  from  surrounding 
persons  and  things,  and  to  demonstrate  its  independence  by 
influencing  others.     Developed  personal  individuality  consists 
in  the  power  to  take  up  the  inexorable  stimuli  of  the  environ- 
ment into  one's  plan  of  life,  in  such  a  way  that  they  are 
incorporated  in  it  as  means  under  firm  control,  and  no  longer 
felt  as  obstacles  to  the  free  movement  of  the  self.     In  such 
a  case,  the  emotions  can  no  longer  be  regarded  as  x>&s8ive 
mental  experiences,  but  come  rather  to  involve  principally 
an  exercise  of  power  which  the  independence  of  one's  charac- 
ter is  felt  to  justify.    The  stage  of  spiritual  and  moral  culture, 
to  seek  and  to  maintain  which  gives  human  life  its  true  worth, 
likewise  brings  with  it  that  specific  experience  of  eternity  for 
which  our  spiritual  constitution  in  general  is  adapted.      The 
idea  of  eternity  would  mean  absolutely  nothing  for  us,  and 
even  as  an  attribute  of  God  would  be  for  us  an  empty  name, 
if  the  two  current  conceptions  of  it,  as  timelessness  and  as 
time  without  beginning  or  end,  were  correct.     For  neither 
can  we  abstract  from  time  during  waking  consciousness,  nor 
in  the  idea  of  time  without  beginning  or  end  can  we  distin- 
guish  God  from  the  world.     Indeed,  we  can  conceive  neither 
the  beginning  nor  the  end  of  the  world,  since  if  we  abstracted 
from  the  existence  of  the  world  we  should  also  have  to  abstract 
from  our  thought,  for  as  thinking  spirits  we  are  parts  of  the 


223-4]  THE   DOCTRINB   OF    GOD  235 

world.  Time  is  our  intuition  and  idea,  in  which  we  first 
distinguish  our  ideas  from  one  another,  then  arrange  our 
experiences  according  to  the  relations  of  cause  and  effect. 
But  we  abrogate  it  again  in  every  act  of  knowledge,  when 
we  combine  words  heard  consecutively  in  the  unity  of  the 
judgment,  qualities  perceived  consecutively  in  the  unity  of 
the  conception,  and  experiences  acquired  consecutively  in  a 
view  of  the  world.  The  positing  and  the  abrogation  of  time 
in  our  simplest  and  most  habitual  acts  of  knowledge  is  itself 
an  instance  of  the  eternity  of  spirit.  It  manifests  itself  still 
more  characteristically  in  the  power  of  the  will  actively  to 
pursue  a  single  end  throughout  the  ordered  succession  of 
intentions  and  resolves  derived  from  it,  and  this  even  when 
some  of  the  latter  have  to  be  modified  or  withdrawn.  For 
eternity  is  in  general  the  power  of  spirit  over  time.  Nor 
is  this  general  conception  affected  by  the  fact  that  this  cha- 
racteristic cannot  be  verified  with  equal  facility  in  the  realms 
of  knowledge  and  of  will,  and  that  this  difference  is  connected 
with  the  distinction  in  worth  which  exists  for  personality 
itself  between  theoretical  knowledge  and  moral  will 

These  facts  are  enough  to  prove  that  the  human  spirit, 
designed  as  it  is  for  personality,  even  though  in  its  activity 
and  development  it  is  conditioned  by  stimuli  received  from 
things — that  is,  by  the  non-Ego — must  still  be  supposed  to 
exist  anteriorly  in  its  own  peculiar  character,  if  its  evolution  by 
means  of  these  conditions  is  to  be  understood.  It  is  true  that 
the  human  spirit  always  remains  conditioned  by  these  external 
stimuli,  even  when  it  has  reached  the  stage  of  independent 
personality,  and  thereafter,  guided  by  its  own  principles  and 
impulses,  utilises  things  for  its  own  ends,  and  exerts  an 
influence  upon  the  society  of  its  compeers.  For  in  both 
directions  independent  action  must  be  guided  by  the  laws 
which  have  been  found  to  obtain  in  the  natural  and  moral 
worlds.  Moreover,  the  conscious  connection  between  one's 
acquired  individuality  and  one's  fixed  plan  of  life  is  limited 
at  every  moment  by  movements  of  feeling  and  vague  ideas 
which  form  an  accompaniment  to  the  rest ;  and  even  though 


236  JUSTIFICATION   AND    RECONCILIATION  [224-6 

we  know  as  a  whole  what  we  are  and  what  we  desire,  yet 
the  manner  in  which  we  have  come  to  possess  our  nature  is 
present  to  our  memory  only  in  a  very  defective  form.  From 
these  characteristics  we  learn  experimentally  that,  as  persons, 
we  are  always  in  a  state  of  becoming,  and  that  this  is  what 
we  are  created  for.  But  the  personality  of  God  is  thinkable 
without  contradiction  just  because  it  stands  contrasted  with 
the  restraints  which  we  find  by  experience  imposed  on  our 
personality.  As  the  cause  of  all  that  happens,  God  is  affected 
only  by  such  forces  of  influence  as  He  has  conferred  upon 
His  creatures,  and  as  He  sees  transparently  to  be  the  effects 
of  His  own  will.  Nothing  which  affects  the  Divine  Spirit  is 
originally  alien  to  Him  ;  and  there  is  nothing  which,  in  order 
to  be  self-dependent,  He  must  first  appropriate.  Every- 
thing, rather,  that  the  world  means  for  Him  is  at  bottom  an 
expression  of  His  own  self -activity ;  and  whatever  of  the  move- 
ment of  things  reacts  upon  Him  He  recognises  as  the  recurrent 
sweep  of  that  reality  which  is  possible  through  Himself  alone. 
As  comprising  all  that  happens  in  the  unity  of  His  judgment 
and  the  unity  of  His  purpose,  He  is  eternal ;  and  no  break  in 
this  being  or  this  consciousness  is  conceivable,  for  no  impres- 
sion can  arise  either  from  things  or  from  ideas  which  He  has 
not  taken  up  beforehand  into  the  unity  of  His  knowledge 
and  His  wilL  Our  mind,  it  is  true,  can  lend  no  colour  or 
music  to  this  conception,  for  sensuous  vivacity  belongs  only  to 
perceptions  acquired  within  that  limited  circle  to  which  our 
creaturely  nature  confines  us.  Yet  neither  the  truth  nor 
the  validity  of  our  ideas  depends  on  whether  they  are  rein- 
forced by  perceptions  of  a  sensuous  or  an  aesthetic  kind. 
The  truth  of  the  idea  of  the  personality  of  God  rather  is 
verified  just  by  our  finding  in  it  the  standard  which  deter- 
mines whether,  and  in  what  degree,  the  same  predicate  is  to 
be  ascribed  to  us.  For  that  we  are  independent  personalities 
we  judge  by  reference  to  the  conception  of  that  Personality 
which,  inasmuch  as  it  has  the  whole  ground  of  its  activity 
within  itself,  is  normative.  At  that  stage  of  human  develop- 
ment, therefore,  which  we  describe  as  independent  personality. 


225-6]  THE   DOCTRINB   OF   GOD  237 

it  becomes  clear  that  the  disputed  idea,  so  far  from  being 
alien  and  remote,  is  vitally  bound  up  with  the  specific  ^orth 
which  we  ascribe  to  spiritual  culture. 

Personality  is  the  form  in  which  the  idea  of  God  is  given 
through  Bevelation.  As  theology  has  to  do  with  the  God 
revealed  in  Christ,  this  is  justified  scientifically  as  the  only 
practicable  form  of  the  conception  of  God.  The  content  of 
the  Divine  will  is  to  be  deduced  from  the  revealed  reciprocal 
relations  between  Christ  and  God,  and  from  no  other  prin- 
ciple. Thus  a  full  elucidation  is  given  of  the  starting-point 
of  theology,  as  fixed  by  Luther.  One  would  have  thought 
that  this  method  of  procedure  would  have  been  safe  from  the 
objections  of  those  who  generally  pique  themselves  on  their 
loyalty  to  the  symbolical  books  of  the  Lutheran  Church.  Yet 
Frank  has  contended  against  me  that  when  stating  the 
theological  doctrine  of  God  we  ought  to  begin  with  the  con- 
ception of  the  Absolute,  in  order  to  keep  the  attributes  of 
love  and  personality  in  God  distinct  from  their  existence  in 
man.^  This  scholar  understands  by  the  Absolute,  the  qual- 
ities of  existence  in,  through,  and  for  self,  in  which,  he 
maintains,  God  must  be  conceived  before  we  can  ascribe  to 
Him  the  predicates  of  love  and  personality.  This  Absolute, 
however,  may  be  described  as  God  because,  under  the  qual- 
ities named,  we  conceive  Him  in  Whom  we  make  our  refuge. 
Now,  when  judged  by  the  Larger  Catechism^  the  trustful 
confidence  thus  attested  by  Frank  is  hardly  right,  for  it  sets 
up  an  idol  instead  of  God.  For  his  Absolute  is  nothing  but 
an  incomplete  conception  of  a  thing,  in  which  abstraction  has 
been  made  from  its  cognisable  relations  to  other  things.  So 
little  is  this  conception  fitted  to  ensure  the  distinction  be- 
tween God  and  the  world,  that  there  is  nothing  to  which  one 
might  not  attribute  the  qualities  which  he  enumerates,  though 
in  doing  so  one  would  be  further  ofiP  from  real  knowledge  of 
it  than  ever.  And  even  if  in  either  case  we  fancy  that  by 
their  means  we  have  reached  a  complete  conception  of  some- 
thing in  its  true  character,  yet  no  attributes  of  relation  such 

^  Of.  Theoiogie  wnd  Meiaphynk,  p.  18  ff.  ;  2iid  ed.  p.  15  if. 


238  JUSTIFICATION   AND   BKOONCILIATION  [226—7 

as  personality,  love,  or  righteousness  can  be  combined  with 
such  a  subject  without  the  conception  of  it  being  abrogated. 
For  the  qualities  of  the  Absolute  which  Frank  gives  include 
likewise  the  quality  of  lacking  external  relations.  The  whole 
conception,  therefore,  when  relations  such  as  love  and 
righteousness  are  combined  with  it,  is  transformed  into  the 
conception  of  the  Eelative.  But  that  Personality  which  is 
love  is  the  conception  which  Luther  describes  as  God.  Per- 
sonality, indeed,  is  likewise  a  predicate  of  man ;  but,  as  has 
just  been  proved,  only  in  a  derivative  fashion.  Again,  men 
too  exhibit  love ;  but  the  fulness  of  the  idea  is  applicable  to 
God  alone,  for,  according  to  Christian  ideas,  all  man's  love 
springs  from  the  revelation  of  God  in  Christ.  And  this 
every  theologian  ought  to  know;  indeed,  I  have  taken  it  for 
granted  as  a  familiar  truth  (vol.  ii.  p.  99).  Finally,  the 
method  which  Frank  adopts  simply  betrays  a  disinclination 
or  an  incapacity  to  think  spirit  as  self-dependent.  When, 
therefore,  he  wishes  to  comprehend  God,  Who  is  Spirit,  he 
manufactures  first  of  all  an  indeterminate  Thing,  a  kind  of 
frame  or  skeleton  on  which,  if  he  is  going  to  maintain  their 
validity,  he  must  then  hang  the  attributes  of  spirit.  But 
this  framework,  the  Absolute,  is  an  idol ;  and  if  Frank  makes 
it  his  refuge,  his  trust  is  different  from  that  of  all  the 
saints  of  the  Old  and  New  Testaments — ^a  trust  which  Luther 
describes  by  saying  that  it  builds  upon  the  goodness  of  God. 
Now  things  are  either  spirit  or  matter.  There  exist  no 
things-in-general,  which  are  neither  the  one  nor  the  other. 
When  contrasted  with  the  reality  given  in  experience,  "  a 
thing"  in  the  merely  metaphysical  sense  is  a  conception 
indeterminate  as  to  its  kind.  Now,  if  the  Absolute  is  to  be 
taken  as  real,  and  yet  not  to  be  taken  as  spirit,  it  must  be  a 
material  thing.  And  this  shows  all  the  more  clearly  that 
the  Absolute,  which  Frank  posits  as  God,  has  the  form  and 
impress  of  an  idoL  I  do  not  say  that  Frank  has  any  inkling 
that  this  is  implied  in  his  position ;  but  to  my  mind  there 
is  an  element  of  materialism  in  his  view. 

§  31.  The  Christian  conception  of  God,  with  which  theo- 


227-8]  THB   DOCTMNB   OF   GOD  239 

logy  sets  out,  has  combined  with  it  an  idea  of  the  world,  and 
of  the  destination  of  man — who  is  made  in  God's  image — ^in 
the  world,  or  above  it,  which  is  at  the  same  time  God's  final 
end  of  the  world.  Without  these  implications,  which  the 
Larger  Catechism  also  indicates,  the  Christian  conception  of 
God  is  qiute  incapable  of  being  expressed.  The  assertions 
which  are  made  regarding  God,  as  He  was  before  the  world 
and  before  the  moral  order  existed  for  man,  are  either  purely 
formal  determinations  which  have  no  force  until  the  content 
of  Revelation  is  taken  into  account — e,g.  the  conception  of 
the  personality  of  God — or  they  are  words  without  meaning. 
Now,  save  where  theology  has  taken  on  a  pantheistic  colour, 
the  general  relation  of  God  to  the  world  is  conceived  as  that 
of  creation  and  preservation,  and  His  free  omnipotent  will  is 
given  as  the  sufficient  ground  for  these  operations.  On  the 
other  hand,  theology  has  in  two  ways  made  the  attempt  to 
supplement  the  idea  of  God  by  the  idea  of  a  moral  world- 
order.  The  one  theory  depends  on  the  position  that  God  as 
the  unrestricted  Sovereign  over  all  His  creatures,  out  of  His 
mere  good  pleasure  treats  mankind  with  equity  {BUligkeit\ 
though  in  themselves  they  have  no  rights  against  Him.  The 
other  theory  defines  the  relation  of  God  to  humanity  thus — 
that  He  regulates  the  inter-relations  of  the  reciprocal  rights 
subsisting  between  Himself  and  men  by  a  law  and  dispensa- 
tion of  justice  which  is  a  necessary  outcome  of  His  own 
nature.  The  former  theory  is  dominant  in  the  theology  of 
the  Middle  Ages,  attains  its  classical  expression  in  Duns 
Scotus,  develops  its  consequences  in  Socinianism,  and,  with  a 
diminished  lucidity  of  inference,  is  adopted  by  Arminianism. 
The  other  theory  appears  in  the  orthodoxy  of  the  Lutheran 
and  Reformed  Churches,  in  the  latter  case  assuming  a  form 
such  that  at  the  same  time  one  position  which  follows  from 
the  first  theory  is  affirmed  in  the  Reformed  doctrine 
of  the  twofold  predestination.^      Both  theories,  though  they 

^The  various  forms  of  the  first  theory  are  dealt  with  in  Tiiy  ''Studies 
towaids  the  Christian  Doctrine  of  God''  (three  articles),  in  the  JahrhUcher 
far  cM^che  Theologis,  1865,  1868. 


240  JUSTIFICATION   AND   RECONCILIATION  [228-9 

build  upon  different  elements  in  the  Biblical  mode  of  thought, 
yet  betray  the  form  and  features  of  natural  theology;  and 
each  of  them  likewise  claims  to  expound  what  a  rational 
criticism  of  the  moral  order  takes  to  be  self-evident.      In  > 

both  conceptions,  the  idea  of  God  represents  both  the  law  of 
the  moral  world  and  the  power  which  realises  it.  As  the 
Christian  doctrine  of  reconciliation  is  judged  by  these  criteria, 
they  also  determine  the  decision  of  the  question  whether  it 
and  the  mediatory  processes  involved  in  it — ^processes  for 
which  different  kinds  of  proof  are  offered — are  in  harmony 
with  reason. 

The  first  theory,  which  represents  baseless  Willy  caprice, 
dominium  absolvtum,  as  the  supreme  law  of  the  world  in 
general  and  the  moral  world  in  particular,  has  never  received 
such  consistent  expression  as  the  other.  Its  employment,  on 
the  one  hand  by  the  theologians  of  the  Middle  Ages,  and  on 
the  other  by  the  Sodnians  and  Arminiaufl,  led  to  its  being 
modified  in  various  ways.  The  reason  was  that  the  latter 
sects  had  before  them  the  Lutheran  and  Calvinistic  theory  of 
the  a  priori  validity  of  law  even  for  God,  and  only  succeeded 
in  carrying,  out  their  contrary  view  by  making  concessions  to 
the  correctness  of  the  other.  The  average  position  taken  by 
those  who  adopt  the  first  theory  may  be  summarised  as  fol- 
lows. The  relation  of  God  to  the  world  is  based  on  His 
arbitrary  will.  That  is,  God  could  have  made  the  world 
otherwise  than  He  did,  and  no  decisive  ground  can  be 
discovered  why  He  created  it  such  as  it  is.  Moreover,  as 
against  all  His  creatures,  even  man.  He  is  unfettered  Lord. 
They  have  no  innate  right  against  their  Creator  and  Lord, 
but  as  contrasted  with  Him  are  as  destitute  of  rights  as 
slaves.  If,  nevertheless,  they  are  not  treated  by  God  as 
chattels,  this  rests  on  a  free  resolve,  a  positive  ordinance  which 
He  has  made,  and  which  imposes  on  His  own  action  the  prin- 
ciple of  equity  (Billigkeit)  towards  men.^     The  Scotists  and 

^  Within  this  general  framework  there  appear  modifications.  The  Nominal- 
ists represent  God  as  having  the  power  to  grant  or  not  to  grant  salvation  to 
any  one  ;  the  Socinian  Crell  limits  the  Divine  onmipotenoe  over  the  creatures  at 


229-30]  THE    DOCTRINE   OF   GOD  241 

Nominalifits  even  illustrated  the  unrestricted  omnipotence  of 
God  by  the  hypothesis  that  He  might  have  given  the  moral 
law  a  directly  opposite  content  to  that  which  it  actually  has. 
The  Socinians  and  Arminians  avoided  this  inference  by  con- 
ceding that  the  Divine  omnipotence  is  limited  beforehand  by 
regard  for  public  order,  both  as  concerns  the  permissible  and 
the  obligatory.  And  although  the  attempt  was  made  to 
maintain  the  guiding  conception  of  the  arbitrary  will  of  God, 
by  contending  that  "  the  permissible,"  as  the'  more  general 
conception,  is  superordinate  to  "  the  commanded,"  yet  Socin- 
ianism  could  not  altogether  ignore  the  only  true  view,  that 
"  the  permissible  "  denotes  in  extent  those  actions  which,  while 
not  commanded,  are  yet  not  in  contradiction  to  that  which 
is  commanded.  Socinians  decline,  however,  to  draw  from  this 
the  inference  that  the  relations  between  God  and  man  are 
determined  by  the  a  priori  rules  of  universal  justice  incum- 
bent on  God,  and  thus  by  the  necessity  of  the  case.  For  this 
would  be  to  corroborate  the  opposite  theory  and  renounce  con- 
troversy with  it.  To  obviate  this  diJG&culty,  recourse  is  had  to 
the  position  that  men,  as  slaves,  have  originally  no  rights  in 
common  with  God.  For  thence  it  follows  that  God  treats 
them  in  accordance  with  special  justice — which  holds  good 
alongside  of  general  justice — i,e.  He  deals  with  them  in 
accordance  with  His  special  purpose  of  equity  (BUligkeU). 
Thence  follows,  further,  that  God  is  under  no  necessity  to 
punish  human  transgressions  of  His  laws,  but  is  free  to  for- 
give them  as  injuries  or  as  infractions  of  His  private  rights. 
Thomas  is  guided  by  this  principle  when  he  remarks,  d  propos 
of  the  Christian  doctrine  that  the  forgiveness  of  sins  depends 
on  the  satisfaction  and  merit  of  Christ,  that  God  could  have 
attained  the  same  end  in  another  way ;  similarly  Duns  con- 
siders it  possible  that  a  man  might  merit  forgiveness  for 
himself  had  God  not  determined  otherwise;  the  Socinians, 
finally,  declare  that  to  render  forgiveness  possible  the  satis- 
least  thus  far,  that  God  may  not  bring  into  existence  any  innocent  creature 
destined  to  eternal  torments ;  the  Arminian  Episcopius  views  the  lordship  of 
God  over  men  as  limited  a  priori  by  respect  for  His  own  dignity,  and  for  the 
natural  situation  of  men. 

i6 


242  JUSTIFICATION    AND    IIECONCILIATION  [230-1 

faction  of  Christ  is  superfluous  (vol.  i.  pp.  49,  69,  300). 
Moreover,  Duns  views  the  equity  of  God  as  the  ground  of 
His  reckoning  voluntary  good  actions  as  deserving  of  salva- 
tion; while  on  God's  treatment  of  men  thus  the  Socinians 
base  the  principle  that  He  regards  the  obedience  of  faith, 
imperfect  though  it  be  in  each  particular  case,  as  sufiQcient  to 
win  eternal  life. 

The  conception  of  the  Divine  equity,  which  links  the 
Socinian  view  of  the  order  of  the  world  to  the  Scotist  concep- 
tion of  merit,  serves  to  impose  restrictions  on  the  attribute 
which  has  been  premised — namely,  the  dominium  dbsolutum. 
This  denotes  the  exclusive  right  possessed  by  God  as  Creator, 
the  consequence  of  which  is  that  originally  men  have 
absolutely  no  rights.  This  legal  conception  is  now  modified 
and  supplemented  by  the  introduction  of  the  moral  conception 
of  equity,  which  recognises  men  not  only  as  the  subjects  of 
rights,  but,  still  further,  as  possessed  of  moral  worth.  For 
usage  generally  connects  "  right "  and  "  equity "  {Recht  und 
Billiffkeit)  with  one  another,  and  thereby  indicates  a  varying 
line  of  conduct  accompanied  by  the  desire  to  supplement  the 
one  by  the  other.  The  right  which  equity  comes  in  to  sup- 
plement always  signifies  the  right  arising  out  of  a  compact, 
in  which  human  action  is  regulated  by  the  ascertained 
interdependence  of  two  individual  aims.  Now,  one  who 
strictly  adheres  to  the  standard  of  right  ignores  the  fact  that 
the  legally  obligated  subject,  as  a  moral  personality,  is  entitled 
to  be  viewed  otherwise  than  merely  in  the  light  of  the  com- 
pact. The  legal  obligation  to  perform  a  service  which  has 
been  contracted  for,  however,  never  denotes  more  than  a  small 
element  in  the  man's  whole  nature,  considered  as  a  person  cap- 
able of  action.  When,  therefore,  the  superior  to  the  contract 
judges  of  the  service  contracted  for  in  the  light  of  the  helpful 
or  hindering  influences  which  the  inferior's  whole  situation 
exerts  upon  his  performance,  and  when  the  view  thus  taken 
by  the  superior  is  not  subsumed  under  the  principle  that 
each  is  bound  to  do  the  other  all  the  good  he  can,  then  we 
have   an   instance  of   equity.      For  equity    expresses   itself 


231-2]  THE    DOCTRINE   OF    GOD  243 

either  in  forbearance,  when  a  man's  other  obligations  or  his 
unfavoui'able  circumstances  impede  the  discharge  of  his  legal 
obligation,  or  in  the  bestowal  of  a  reward  when,  by  the  special 
promptitude  with  which  he  performs  the  service  agreed  upon, 
he  shows  that  he  is  in  earnest.  In  both  cases  the  legal 
standard  is  supplemented  by  a  moral  standard,  inasmuch  as 
account  is  taken  either  of  the  man's  moral  freedom,  or  of  the 
probable  obstacles  which  it  encounters  in  his  discharge  of  the 
contracted  service.  But  the  standard  which  equity  applies  is 
in  its  nature  purely  relative,  and  does  not  exhaust  the  pos- 
sible methods  of  moral  judgment.  For  it  confines  itself  to 
the  same  field  as  is  prescribed  by  the  relations  of  private 
right,  and  abstracts  from  the  highest  criterion  of  morality, 
which  is  based  on  the  principle  that  the  society  of  moral 
agents  ought  properly  to  be  as  comprehensive  and  as  open 
as  possible.  Indeed,  we  refrain  from  criticising  self  by 
the  conception  of  moral  duty,  just  when,  by  exercising 
equity,  we  express  such  a  private  and  moral  concern  for 
a  neighbour  as  dovetails  into  the  presupposed  relations  of 
private  right. 

A  moral  order,  then,  which  makes  the  equity  of  God  its 
highest  criterion,  splits  up  necessary  human  action,  as  we 
actually  find  it,  into  simple  cases  of  private  relations  between 
God  and  the  individual,  and  can  therefore  be  regarded  as  a 
moral  order  only  in  an  erroneous  sense.  This  result  of  the 
Socinian  theory,  even  with  the  otherwise  clear  opposition 
between  law  and  equity,  accords  in  a  singular  way  with  the 
presupposed  Divine  dominium  dbsolutum  over  man.  For  if, 
from  this  point  of  view,  men  are  to  be  conceived  as  slaves, 
then  God  is  represented  as  the  owner  of  property.  Such  a 
relation,  however,  can  only  be  estimated  from  the  standpoint 
of  private  right  (Privatrecht),  and  cannot  of  itself  become  the 
source  of  public  law  (bffentlichcs  Becht).  Now,  if  God  bestows 
rights  upon  men  out  of  equity,  it  is  only  in  appearance  that 
we  can  deduce  from  this  the  existence  of  public  law.  For 
the  idea  of  public  law  always  depends  solely  on  the  existence 
of  common  aims ;  but  common  public  aims  are  precisely  what 


244  JUSTIFICATION   AND   RKCONaLIATION  [232 

is  excluded  by  the  supreme  principle  of  God's  equity  in  deal- 
ing with  individual  men. 

The  development  of  this  Socinian  theory  is  occasioned,  it 
is  true,  by  certain  similitudes  used  by  Christ  (Luke  xvii  1 0), 
and  therefore  stands  in  a  certain  analogy  to  the  feeling  of 
interest  by  which  the  Christian  religion  is  sustained.     The 
doctrine  of  man's  dependence  on  God,  in  fact,  is  strained  to 
its  utmost  possible  limit.     Everything  which  raises  man  above 
the  level  of  things,  exactly  so  far  as  it  is  not  ascribed  to  his 
original  endowment,  is  traced  back  to  the  Divine  bestowal. 
Even  man's  destination  to  eternal  life — a  privilege  transcend- 
ing the  nature  he  receives  at  birth — is  granted  him  merely 
through  God's  free  resolve.     In  the  most  extreme  contrast 
with  this,  however,  stands  the  fact  that  this  view  regards 
human  life,  even  though  subject  to  universal  moral  law,  as 
always  dependent  on  the  Divine  equity  alone — an  equity  which 
passes  judgment  on  each  individual  as  such,  and  that  by  a 
fortuitous  and  relative   standard,  which  just  for  that  very 
reason  is  neither  necessary  nor  universally  valid.     But  it  is  an 
absurdity  that  the  definite  principle  of  moral  fellowship,  when 
traced  back  to  God,  should  be  made  subordinate  to  the  incal- 
culable private  considerations  of  mere  equity,  while   equity 
can  be  brought  into  play  only  by  neglecting  the  strict  obliga- 
tions of  the  moral  law.     Equity,  which  is  admissible  only  as 
an  exception,  imder  special  circumstances,  to  the  universal 
validity  of  duty,  cannot,  even  as  an  attribute  of  God,  form  the 
basis  of  an  obligation  binding  men  to  God  and  to  one  another. 
Consequently,  this  theory  would  justify  men  in  taking  a  view 
of  themselves  which  is  utterly  devoid  of  inward  consistency. 
The  very  persons  who  have  to  regard  themselves  as  originally 
destitute  of  rights  against  God,  are  then  again  to  be  convinced 
that  they  stand  to  God  in  a  private  relationship,  such  that  they 
may  count  on  His  indulgence  and  His  rewards.     The  sense  of 
being  as  far  from  God  as  the  utter  difference  between  Creator 
and  creature  implies,  is  to  give  way  to  a  feeling  of  co-ordinate 
equality,  such  as  obtains  between  subjects  capable  of  rights, 
and  such  as  awakens  the  expectation  that  each  will  regard 


23^-4]  THE   DOCTBINE    OF   GOD  245 

the  other  also  as  the  subject  of  equal  moral  freedom.  This 
theory,  therefore,  as  combining  the  Divine  attributes  of 
dominium  aisolutum  and  aequitas,  not  only  is  composed  of 
heterogeneous  elements,  but,  so  far  as  it  represents  a  moral 
order,  it  is  intrinsically  absurd ;  for  no  adequate  basis  for  a 
public  and  universal  order  can  be  found  in  the  indeterminate 
private  moral  relationship  of  equity  (Billigkeit).  To  be 
strongly  convinced  of  this,  one  only  needs  to  remember  the 
factors  which  confessedly  go  to  make  up  the  argument.  A 
slaveowner,  who  out  of  equity  treats  the  men  who  are  his 
chattels  as  persons  capable  of  rights,  who  in  this  confidence 
imposes  on  them  a  law  of  reciprocal  behaviour,  but  indulgently 
tolerates  infractions  of  it  except  when  they  are  characterised 
by  obstinacy,  and  rewards  the  well-meant  fulfilment  of  his 
law,  however  imperfect  it  be — ^here,  in  this  domestic  regime, 
we  have  the  model  of  the  Socinian  moral  order !  But  it  is 
more  than  probable  that  a  r^ime  of  this  kind  would  simply 
break  down  when  confronted  with  cases  of  obstinate  trans- 
gression which  must  be  punished.^  There  is  only  one 
argument  which  could  make  this  moral  order  credible,  the 
argument,  namely,  which  the  orthodox  employ  when  they  find 
themselves  embarrassed  in  theology — that  what  is  impossible 
for  men  is  for  that  very  reason  befitting  God  !  But  in  this 
way,  as  is  well  known,  any  absurdity  can  be  proved. 

§  32.  The  other  theory  regards  the  destiny  of  eternal  life 
as  forming  part  of  the  inborn  nature  of  man,  and  therefore 
puts  man  forward  from  the  outset  as  the  subject  of  personal 
rights  even  against  God.     But  the  right  to  eternal  life  has 

^  Although  Sodnianism  is  an  obsolete  form  of  theology,  the  theory  it  offers 
deserves  to  be  reviewed  here.  Another  inference  drawn  from  the  dominium, 
ohsolutum  of  God  is  quietistic  mysticism,  which  derives  its  principles  from  Dnns 
Scotus.  From  the  same  conception  of  God  as  the  orthodox  of  the  Reformed 
Chnrch  have  extracted  from  the  doctrine  of  predestination,  the  Pietists  of  the 
Beformed  Ohnrch  have  drawn  the  same  quietistio  inference — that  the  believer 
ought  to  lose  himself  in  God  through  formal  self-abnegation,  i.e.  as  judging  that 
before  God  we  are  nothing,  and  that  our  own  will  as  such  is  not  steadfast.  The 
way  to  this  goal  should  be  sought  in  loving  interplay  with  God  after  the  mode 
of  the  Song  of  Solomon.  In  this  method,  therefore,  there  are  also  combined 
unwarranted  equality  with  God,  and  an  utter  absence  of  rights  against  Him 
in  the  status  of  grace. 


246  JUSTIFICATION   AND    RECONCILIATION  [234-5 

first  to  be  realised,  and  that  too  under  the  condition  that  the 
moral  law,  in  its  relation  to  God's  authority  and  His  fellow- 
ship with  men,  shall  be  fulfilled  by  action.     Without  this  the 
right  to  eternal  life,  the  basis  of  all  personal  rights,  would  be 
lost.     In  this  scheme  of  the  moral  world-order,  also,  it  would 
seem  at  first  as  though  the  form  of  private  contract  alone 
were  employed.     To  counterbalance  this  impression,  however, 
we  have  the  fact  that  the  law,  the  fulfilment  of  which  is 
required,  is  not  one  of  arbitrary  content,  but  the  expression 
of  the  Divine  will — such,  indeed,  as  is  essential  to  God  Him- 
self, must  of  necessity  be  ascribed  to  Him,  and  is  ordained  to 
be  in  all  its  concreteness  the  indispensable  and  universal  rule 
of  the  moral  order.     Not  only  is  the  moral  law  represented 
as  the  mirror  of  the  Divine  justice,  to  which  men  can  become 
subject  only  through  obedience,  but  its  fulfilment  or  non-fulfil- 
ment is  brought  into  close  connection  with  the  Divine  justice, 
seeing  that  the  rewarding  of  good  works  and  the  punishment  of 
transgressions  are  unconditionally  necessary  for  God.    Thus  the 
Divine  law  (Gesetz)  is  given  the  form  and  impress  of  public  law 
(Eecht).    That  this  is  implied  is  clear  enough,  though  Cocceius 
traces  it  back  to  the  foedtcs  operum,  a  contract  between  God  and 
man ;  for  that  is  only  an  expression  of  the  tendency  displayed 
in  the  seventeenth  century  to  derive  the  State  from  a  private 
contract.     In  any  case,  this  form  of  representation  neither 
intentionally  nor  necessarily  eliminates  the  distinction  between 
public  and  private  law.     Now,  public  law  is  an  expression  of 
the  fact  that  the  rights  which  individuals  have  against  society 
are  inferior  to  the  rights  which  society  has  against  individuals, 
and  that  their  permanence  depends  on  the  performance  of 
social  duties.     But,  under  these  conditions,  individuals  are 
recognised  as  the  subjects,  even  as  against  the  State,  of  rights 
which  the  State  does  not  create,  but  can  only  acknowledge. 
The  conception   of   the  moral  order  now  under  discussion, 
accordingly,  is  modelled  on  the  idea  of  the  State.     For  God, 
as  Maker  and  Executor  of  the  law — though  He  creates  man 
as  the  subject  of  rights  against  Himself — represents  the  State 
with  its  acknowledgment  of  the  rights  of  its  citizens ;  while 


235-6]  THE   DOCTRINE   OF   GOD  247 

men,  in  their  capacity  as  members  of  the  State,  are  so  sub- 
ordinated to  the  Divine  law  that  it  depends  on  their  fulfil- 
ment or  non-fulfilment  of  it  whether  they  realise  their 
personal  right  and  claim  to  eternal  life,  or  lose  it  altogether. 
The  civil  character  of  this  conception  of  the  moral  world- 
order,  further,  appears  clearly  enough  from  the  assertion  that 
Grod  must,  out  of  His  justice,  both  reward  the  fulfilment  of 
His  law  and  punish  men  for  its  transgression,  and  that  of 
Himself  it  is  simply  incompetent  for  Him  to  display  that 
indulgence  and  forgiveness  which  a  private  individual  may 
exercise.  For  the  legal  community  of  the  State  can  continue 
to  exist  only  if  it  asserts  itself  against  the  law-breaker  by 
the  infliction  of  a  judicial  penalty.^ 

These  criteria,  derived  from  public  law,  are  now  applied 
to  a  system  of  things  which  transcends  civil  relationships. 
The  question  at  issue,  in  the  Divine  ordering  of  human  life 
which  we  are  now  discussing,  is  the  realisation  of  eternal  life, 
the  realisation,  that  is,  of  a  good  very  different  from  the  ends 
which,  in  the  State,  are  controlled  by  public  law.  But  in 
order  to  produce  the  impression  that  the  civil  order,  thus 
conceived,  is  likewise  adequate  to  realise  this  supra-civil  end, 
every  infraction  of  the  Divine  law  is  represented  as  being 
visited,  like  treason,  with  the  severest  possible  penalty,  the 
penalty  of  death  or  everlasting  damnation.  Finally,  the 
doctrine  of  original  sin  is  called  in,  and  the  position  taken  up 
that  all  men  whatsoever,  who  enter  this  world,  are  straight- 
way subject  to  the  sentence  of  death.  Thus  is  conceived  the 
order  of  human  life,  an  order  from  which,  it  is  true,  reconcilia- 
tion liberates  us.  But,  on  the  foregoing  presupposition,  the 
fact  of  reconciliation  is  interpreted  in  such  a  way  that  the 
action  of  the  Eeconciler  is  regarded  as  illustrating  the  legal 
world-order,  which  therefore  works  on  indirectly  even  in  the 
Christian  life.  The  conclusion  drawn  from  this  connected 
series  of  ideas  is  conditioned  by  the  doctrine  of  origintd  sin, 

^  I  borrow  this  general  conception  of  punishment  as  a  legal  institution  from 
Heinze, — **Strafrechtstheorien  und  Strafrechtsprincip,"  in  Ilandluch  des  deui" 
'Chen  Slra/reehts,  vol.  i.  p.  321  ff. 


248  JUSTIFICATION   AND   RECONCILIATION  [236-7 

accepted  on  scriptural  authority  but  interpreted  by  reason ; 
the  earlier  judgments  composing  the  arguments,  however, 
are  affirmed  in  quite  a  rationalising  way ;  and  whenever  any 
position  of  the  Apostle  Paul  gives  them  support,  his  state- 
ment is  credited  with  the  value  of  a  universal  truth  of  reason 
(p.  4).  Accordingly,  we  are  called  upon  to  investigate  the 
rationality  of  this  theory,  i.e.  its  consistency  with  itself  and 
with  experience. 

The  first  question  is,  whether  the  conception  of  God  on 
which  it  is  based  accords  with  the  presuppositions  which  must 
be  fulfilled  ere  that  conception  can  form  the  highest  conceiv- 
able criterion  of  all  reality.  Now  the  Socinians  have  already 
raised  the  objection,^  that  the  justice  of  God  which  furnishes 
the  immutable  principles  of  the  Divine  legislation,  and  which 
imposes  upon  the  Divine  will  the  necessity  of  punishment,  in- 
dicates a  power  superior  to  God,  and  that,  as  Will,  He  is  subject 
to  this  justice  as  a  natural  necessity.  Now  we  cannot  escape 
this  difl&culty,  even  by  making  this  very  power  a  part  of  the 
Divine  attribute  of  justice.  For  then  the  conception  of  God 
falls  asunder  into  two  strata,  distinguished  by  the  super- 
ordinate  attribute  of  passivity  and  the  subordinate  attribute 
of  active  will.  Such  a  diremption  of  the  idea  of  God,  how- 
ever, is  incompatible  with  the  necessity  we  are  under  of 
thinking  God  as  the  unity  posited  by  religious  experience. 
Neither  is  the  Lutheran  and  Eeformed  theory  justified  by  the 
fact  that  the  conception  of  God  held  by  the  Scotists  and 
Socinians  involves  the  opposite  error,  namely,  that  of  sup- 
posing that  the  groundless  will  of  God  can  wiU,  create,  or 
command  either  of  two  opposites,  and  that  He  deals  with 
men,  not  on  a  fixed  plan,  but  according  to  His  arbitrary 
aequitas.  Both  of  these  positions,  that  a  thing  is  good  because 
God  wills  it,  and  that  He  wills  a  thing  because  it  is  good,  are 
equally  unsatisfactory.  The  rare  attempts  made  by  orthodox 
theologians  to  support  their  view  by  reasons  ^  only  prove  that, 

'  Of.  Jahrh.f,  detUsche  TheologU,  1868,  p.  286  ff. 

'  Op,  cit.  p.  291 :  I  there  brought  forward  from  Hoombeck,  Soeinianisfnus 
confutatus,  an  attempt  of  the  kind,  which  utterly  failed. 


237]  THE   DOCTRINE   OF   GOD  249 

with  the  materials  of  thought  at  their  command,  it  was  impos- 
sible for  them  to  reach  that  unity  of  the  conception  of  God 
at  which  they  aimed.  For  if  it  follows  strictly  from  the 
assumed  personality  of  God  that  He  is  real  only  in  the  form 
of  will,  then  it  is  bad  metaphysics  to  attribute  righteousness 
to  Him  as  a  passive  quality  possessed  by  Him  apart  from 
His  form  as  will.  What  means  a  passive  quality  at  all,  if 
the  qualities  of  things  must  necessarily  be  conceived  as  their 
particular  ways  of  acting,  and  especially  of  acting  on  our 
perception  ?  The  idea  of  a  passive  quality  is  due  to  the 
self-delusion  which  arises  when  our  attention  is  uninter- 
ruptedly enchained  by  the  way  in  which  something  acts  on 
us  continuously.  For  our  idea  of  action  and  cause  is  always 
called  forth  originally  by  the  changes  of  phenomena,  and  unless 
we  give  stricter  attention  to  the  ways  in  which  we  get  our 
knowledge,  it  is  only  from  intermittent  similar  perceptions 
that  we  receive  the  idea  of  the  action  of  a  thing.  But 
though  our  vision  cannot  discern  the  changes  of  phenomena 
at  a  distance  as  it  can  those  near  at  hand,  it  does  not  follow 
that  the  remoter  objects  are  really  at  rest,  as  they  seem  to 
us  to  be.  The  error  in  the  conception  of  God  now  under 
discussion  is  occasioned  specially,  it  is  true,  by  the  imprudent 
use  of  the  analogy  of  human  personality.  Our  consciousness 
of  personality  teaches  us  that  it  depends  upon  natural  endow- 
ment, and  that  it  is  further  guided  by  acquired  principles,  of 
which  we  know  that,  even  apart  from  our  assent,  they  pos- 
sess certainty  for  others.  And  therefore  our  inaccurate  way 
of  judging  marks  off  character,  as  a  self -enclosed  entity,  from 
every  individual  action  which  proceeds  from  it,  in  such  a  way 
that — to  use  the  spatial  terms  "  near  "  and  "  remote" — we  think 
that  what  is  remote  is  in  this  case  just  as  much  at  rest  as  to 
our  limited  vision  it  appears  to  be.  Now  our  natural  endow- 
ments determine  beforehand  the  kind  and  range  of  our 
action,  and  we  become  conscious  of  our  acquired  character 
as  a  second  nature,  so  that  we  thus  know  ourselves  to  be 
created  personalities.  But  it  is  wrong  to  repeat  these  char- 
acteristics in  our  conception  of  God.      For  even    our   own 


250  JUSTIFICATION   AND   RECONCILIATION  [237-8 

character  we  do  not  really  possess  in  passivity,  but  in  its 
proper  activity ;  and  if  it  were  not  ever  being  reproduced  anew 
by  activity,  it  would  not  exist  at  all,  or  would  be  lost.  To  affirm 
a  necessity  for  God,  which  cannot  be  intelligibly  derived  from 
His  will  but  is  deduced  from  some  latent  "  natural "  quality, 
is  to  describe  Him  as  a  finite  and  growing  personality.^  The 
orthodox  doctrine  of  God,  therefore,  is  altogether  impracticable. 
The  second  question  is,  whether  the  form  of  public  law 
harmonises  with  the  assumed  contents  of  the  Divine  law,  and 
whether  it  is  at  the  same  time  fitted  to  embrace  within  itself 
the  necessary  relations  between  man  and  God.  In  regard  to 
the  former  point,  it  must  be  remembered  that  the  principles 
of  love  to  God  and  to  our  ne^hbour  to  which,  as  the  supreme 
commandments  of  the  Mosaic  law,  Jesus  ascribed  funda- 
mental authority  in  His  Church,  are  regarded  by  the  older 
school  as  forming  the  content  of  the  universal  law  which  Grod 
not  only  implanted  in  human  reason,  but  publicly  proclaimed 
in  the  prohibition  He  addressed  to  our  first  parents,  aild  then 
later  through  Moses  and  through  Jesus.  The  righteousness 
in  which  man  was  created,  it  is  held,  satisfied  this  standard, 
the  covenant  of  works  was  based  upon  obedience  to  these 
commandments,  and  the  bestowal  of  eternal  life  would  then 
have  followed  as  a  common  right.  Now  law  is  the  ordering 
of  social  action  with  a  view  to  the  realisation  of  those  ends 
which  combine  a  people  into  a  State,  and  in  order  to  ensure 
that  freedom  which  each  individual  has  to  exercise  in  pursu- 
ing those  aims  which  lie  beyond  the  province  of  the  State. 
Law  is  either  private  law  or  public  law.  Private  law  controls 
the  mutual  commerce  of  individuals,  which  is  due  to  the  fact 
that  several  individuals  (or  groups,  which  may  be  treated  as 
individuals)  may  simultaneously  make  the  same  articles  or 
the  same  particular  work  the  object  of  their  desires.  Public 
law  controls  reciprocal  or  social  action,  which  arises  from  the 
fact  that,  in  the  State,  men  are  combined  for  universal  ends. 
The  ends  controlled  by  public  law,  however,  never  possess 

^  For  this  reason  the  theosophical  assertion  of  a  "nature  in  God"  is  likewise 
false.     Bat  I  cannot  enter  n^on  a  special  examination  of  snch  theories. 


238-9]  THE    DOCTRINE    OF   GOD  251 

more  than  relative  universality.  For  the  highest  end  which 
can  be  proposed  to  action  forms  the  basis  of  the  domain  of 
morality.  It  proves  itself  the  highest  end  conceivable,  in 
that  it  prescribes  rules  not  merely  for  action,  but  also  directly 
for  our  purposes  and  intentions  and  disposition,  and  regu- 
lates action  by  regulating  these  determinants  of  the  will.  It 
proves  itself  the  highest  end  conceivable,  moreover,  because 
it  embraces  all  law  and  all  action  conformable  to  law.  For 
thus  law  is  seen  to  be  a  means  to  the  end  of  moral  action,  or 
a  precondition  of  the  exercise,  by  each  member  of  the  com- 
munity, of  the  freedom  to  pursue  moral  ends ;  while  at  the 
same  time  law  is  intelligible  as  a  product  of  the  principle  of 
moral  freedom.  Lastly,  it  thus  becomes  possible  to  regard 
law,  and  the  association  of  a  people  under  law,  as  a  relative 
moral  good,  and  to  found  it  upon  such  a  degree  of  moral 
disposition  as  is  necessary  for  the  continued  existence  of  any 
civil  society.  So  far  as  it  is  possible  to  regard  civil  society 
as  an  end  in  itself,  the  validity  and  efficacy  of  law,  it  is  true, 
is  independent  of  the  question  whether  its  provisions  are  sub- 
mitted to  voluntarily,  or  are  enforced  by  fear  and  compulsion. 
But  the  derivation  of  all  law  from  moral  freedom,  and  the,  in 
general,  moral  character  of  civil  society  are  proved  by  the 
fact  that,  if  civil  society  is  to  be  permanent,  its  foundations 
must  be  laid  in  the  moral  disposition  of  its  members  (p.  50). 
This  disposition  the  law  of  the  State  can  neither  demand  nor 
enforce ;  indeed,  on  the  lines  of  State-law  nothing  more  can  be 
secured  than  legality  of  action.  Only  when  law  is  regarded 
as  a  product  of  moral  will  can  we  perceive  the  possibility  and 
the  necessity  of  moral  disposition  for  the  existence  of  law. 

Law,  therefore,  has  to  do  with  a  material  of  narrower 
extent  than  morality.  Nothing  is  subject  to  law  but  those 
conjoint  or  mutual  actions  which  render  possible  the  existence 
of  the  State.  Morality,  on  the  other  hand,  likewise  embraces 
the  inward  tenor  of  the  will  as  such,  which  may  be  discerned 
behind  visible  action ;  it  embraces,  besides,  all  actions  which 
the  standard  of  law  leaves  undetermined,  or  are  merely  per- 
missible.    To  it  belongs  everything  which  concerns  the  inter- 


252  JUSTIFICATION   AND   RECONCILIATION  [23&-40 

course  of  men  as  moral  beings,  as  distinct  from  the  fact  that 
in  the  State  thej  have  to  take  each  other  into  account  as 
fellow-countrymen.  When  the  State  is  described  as  the  social 
form  of  morality  as  such,  an  utterly  confused  and  incorrect 
conception  of  its  nature  is  the  result.  For  the  production 
and  the  criticism  of  moral  disposition  lie  just  as  much  out- 
side the  competency  of  the  State — i.e.  the  nation  as  a  civil 
society — as  the  duty  of  universal  love  to  man  transcends  the 
limits  of  nationality.  Moral  fellowship  as  such  neutralises 
national  distinctions,  for  it  springs  from  the  subjective  motive 
of  love,  which  differs  from  that  natural  hereditary  friendliness 
of  fellow-countrymen  to  one  another  which  is,  as  a  rule,  an 
accompaniment  of  civil  society.  Moral  fellowship,  viewed  in 
these  two  characteristics  of  possessing  the  widest  possible 
extension  and  being  animated  by  the  most  comprehensive 
motive,  can  only  be  conceived  as  the  Kingdom  of  God.  This 
idea  Christ  expresses  in  such  a  way  that  He  transcends 
the  view  of  the  national  State,  and  takes  up  an  attitude 
essentially  opposed  to  it.  In  harmony  with  this  is  the  follow- 
ing distinction.  Civil  law  is  the  system  embracing  those 
actions  which  necessarily  follow  from  the  ends  for  which  a 
particular  State  exists.  Moral  law  is  the  system  which 
embraces  those  dispositions,  intentions,  and  actions  which 
necessarily  follow  from  the  all-comprehensive  end  of  the 
Kingdom  of  God,  and  from  the  subjective  motive  of  universal 
love.  It  is  clear  that  these  two  conceptions  are  not  co- 
extensive. Since  the  one  has  a  narrower  compass  than  the 
other,  it  must  be  confessed  that  we  might  have  a  kind  of 
action  which  would  satisfy  the  civil  law,  and  yet,  more  or 
less,  might  be  immoral.  Not  only  is  it  the  case  that  action 
in  accordance  with  State  law  may  be  barely  legal  and 
destitute  of  moral  consideration  for  civil  society- — and  there- 
fore, so  far  as  disposition  goes,  egoistic — but  it  may  happen 
that  the  whole  disposition  is  preoccupied  with  ends  of  State, 
and  accompanied  by  indifference  to  the  more  universal  ends  of 
humanity.  Conversely,  the  general  moral  disposition  will 
also  embrace  the  disposition  to  obey  the  laws  of  the  State. 


340-1]  THE  DOCTRINB   OF   GOD  253 

But  even  in  this  connection,  we  could  conceive  a  case  where 
we  have  a  single  infraction  of  the  laws  of  the  State,  taking 
even  the  form  of  crime,  while  yet  the  general  moral  disposi- 
tion of  the  offender  is  beyond  all  question.  Those  are  the 
cases  of  tragic  inward  conflict,  which  in  the  highest  degree 
engage  the  interest  of  those  who  combine  the  most  educated 
moral  disposition  with  insight  into  the  difficulty  of  carrying 
it  into  practical  effect. 

Our  discussion  has  shown  that  it  is  a  self-contradiction 
to  conceive  the  moral  law  under  the  form  of  public  law. 
Tliis  error,  however,  is  chargeable  to  that  view  of  the  world 
which  forms,  in  the  theology  of  the  Lutheran  and  Eeformed 
Chiu*ches,  the  presupposition  of  the  doctrine  of  reconcih'ation. 
To  say  that  God  rewards  obedience  to  the  law  by  promoting 
man's  personal  end,  t.e.  by  bestowing  on  him  eternal  life,  is 
not  a  position  in  harmony  with  the  law  of  love,  the  authority 
of  which  is  based  in  the  very  nature  of  God.  However,  the 
connection  of  thought  here  is  so  obscure  in  the  ordinary 
exposition  of  the  theory  under  discussion,  that  a  special 
analysis  of  its  relevant  aspects  is  still  necessary  to  vindicate 
the  judgment  I  have  expressed. 

When  orthodox  theology  teaches  that  the  law  of  love, 
by  which  the  action  of  men  to  one  another  and  to  God  is 
regulated,  is  a  reflection  of  God's  essential  righteousness,  this 
is  to  give  an  extremely  imperfect  account  of  its  origin.  Any 
law  of  action  can  be  explained  solely  from  the  final  end  of 
the  society  which  the  law  is  designed  to  serve.  If  that  end 
is  to  render  a  nation  capable  of  the  social  life  through  which 
a  nation  as  such  exists,  and  through  which  protection  is 
secured  for  every  citizen  and  for  every  society  possessing 
conjoint  interests  to  pursue  their  particular  aims,  limited 
as  they  are  by  the  common  interest  of  the  nation,  but  other- 
wise legitimate,  then  the  law  in  question  is  the  civil  law  of 
the  State.  If  the  end  is  to  unite  men  in  the  closest  conceiv- 
able way  by  disposition  and  by  action,  then  we  come  to  the 
law  of  love  as  the  law  of  morality.  The  moral  law  affords 
no  basis  for  any  expectation,  such  as  follows  from  the  civil 


254  JUSTIFICATION   AND   RECONCILIATION  [241-2 

law,  that  obedience  to  the  universal  law  will  be  rewarded  by 
the  protection  and  furtherance  of  our  individual  rights;  on 
the  contrary,  the  moral  law  forbids  us  to  reckon  thus  on  a 
reciprocal  relation  between  duties  and  rights.  Even  though 
such  an  expectation  were  accidentally  bound  up  with  the  per- 
manence of  a  moral  community,  yet  it  is  not  an  essential 
condition  of  the  individual's  performance  of  duty.  He  who 
acts  dutifully,  finds  his  enjoyment  rather  in  the  action  itself : 
at  all  events,  he  does  not  count  on  being  recompensed  for  his 
moral  acts  by  others  reciprocating  what  he  has  done.  Now 
if,  in  the  theory  before  us,  God  represents  the  society  in 
relation  to  which  men  have  to  act  as  the  law  commands,  it  is 
impossible  to  combine  in  thought  these  two  positions — that 
they  are  to  discharge  the  obligations  of  love,  and  that  they 
may  expect  a  legal  compensation  for  them  in  the  satisfaction 
of  their  personal  claim  to  eternal  life.  For  of  necessity  it 
is  only  in  civil  society  that  men  receive  rights  as  a  compensa- 
tion for  duties ;  in  the  moral  fellowship,  based  on  action 
prompted  by  love,  such  a  compensation  may  occur  accident- 
ally, but  it  is  not  necessary  as  a  precondition.  In  the  theory 
before  us,  therefore,  the  fundamental  principle  of  the  moral 
world-order  is  composed  of  heterogeneous  and  incompatible 
elements. 

Lastly,  the  following  circumstance  goes  to  prove  the  same 
thing.  While,  in  this  theory  of  the  moral  world-order,  God 
represents  the  commonwealth,  yet  there  must  also  be  ascribed 
to  Him  His  proper  significance  as  the  personal  Power  on 
whom  man  is  religiously  dependent.  This  requires  that 
nothing  by  which  the  estimate  of  human  nature  is 
conditioned,  shall  be  left  outside  the  compass  of  man's 
acknowledged  dependence  on  God.  Now  the  theory  is  so 
constructed  that  it  assumes  a  graduated  relationship  of 
dependence  upon  God.  That  men  have  a  right  to  eternal 
life  ia  deduced  from  their  creation  by  God :  that  this  right  can 
be  made  good  only  through  fulfilment  of  the  Divine  law, 
depends  on  God  as  the  Sustainer  of  the  moral  order.  Thus 
it  is  solely  in  reference  to  creation  that  dependence  on  God  is 


242-3]  THE    DOCTRINB   OF   GOD  255 

considered  complete ;  as  regards  the  moral  order,  it  is  limited 
by  a  relative  co-ordination  of  men  with  God,  corresponding  to 
the  reciprocity  which  holds  within  the  State  between  duties 
and  rights.  This  scarcely  gives  expression  to  the  Christian 
view  of  the  world ;  but,  apart  from  that,  we  cannot  admit  with- 
out more  ado  the  rationality  and  self -evidence  of  the  theory. 
For  the  Socinian  view  makes  exactly  the  same  pretensions 
(p.  241).  It  derives  every  right  possessed  by  man  within 
the  moral  order  not  from  his  creation,  but  from  the  special 
grant  made  to  him  by  God  out  of  equity  (Billigkeit),  and  this 
last  it  likewise  regards  as  the  basis  of  the  moral  order.  This 
gives  consistent  expression,  such  as  is  wanting  in  the  other 
theory,  to  the  complete  dependence  of  man  upon  God  in 
mQral  respects.  But  we  shall  have  to  consider  later  the 
elucidation  of  this  contradiction  of  the  two  theories — a 
contradiction  which  was  never  fought  through  to  the  end. 

If  we  look,  thirdly,  at  the  conditions  under  which  this 
moral  order  is  applied  to  man,  no  point  shows  more  clearly 
how  inadequate  for  its  expression  is  the  analogy  of  civil  law, 
than  the  assertion  that  God  is  compelled  to  punish  infractions 
of  His  law.  This  necessity,  which  arises  from  the  Divine 
justice,  is  equally  pressing  with  the  necessity  He  is  under  to 
recompense  the  obedience  of  man  with  eternal  life.  The  co- 
ordination of  these  two  exemplifications  of  the  Divine  justice 
corresponds  to  the  two  branches  of  public  civil  law,  the 
so-called  police  force  and  the  penal  law,  and  their  employment 
positively  to  further  and  defensively  to  protect  the  common- 
weal. But  since  Divine  justice,  in  relation  to  human  sin, 
operates  merely  in  a  one-sided  way,  namely  in  its  character  as 
penal  power,  the  juridical  complexion  of  this  theory  comes 
out  still  further  in  the  notion  that  the  primitive  justice  of 
God  manifests  itself  in  the  same  positive  impartiality  as 
befits  a  judge  when  hearing  each  particular  case  of  accusation. 
Just  as  a  judge,  when  forming  his  opinion  of  a  punishable  act, 
must  disregard  everything  of  the  nature  of  moral  dis- 
advantage which  the  punishment  of  the  criminal  will  entail 
upon  his  relatives  and  himself,  so  God,  it  is  maintained,  is 


256  JUSTIFICATION   AND   RECONCILIATION  [243-4 

bound  80  strictly  by  His  punitive  justice  that  He  is  entirely 
indiflTerent  to  the  form  which  the  fate  of  the  human  race  may 
take  as  a  result  of  punishment.  The  proverb  which  is  used 
to  illustrate  the  impartiality  which  ought  to  characterise  any 
particular  sentence — -jiaJt  itcstitia,  perecU  mundus — ^is  literally 
applied  to  the  alleged  Divine  dispensation.  It  is  impossible 
to  prove  that  this  theory,  in  and  by  itself,  is  in  harmony  with 
reason.  For  it  is  unintelligible  how  God  could  be  compelled 
by  His  justice  to  punish  our  first  parents  with  eternal  death 
on  account  of  their  disobedience  on  a  well-known  occasion, 
and  at  the  same  time  to  consign  the  whole  race  for  their 
ancestors'  trangression  to  a  state  of  punishment  directly 
contrary  to  His  plan.  Among  the  standards  of  civil  society 
by  which  this  theory  is  dominated,  there  is  also  to  be  found 
the  principle  of  penal  law,  that  punishment  must  be 
determined  by  the  degree  of  crime.  The  basis  of  the  whole 
argument  is  abandoned,  consequently,  when  the  transgression 
of  our  first  parents,  which  was  anything  but  wicked,  is 
represented  as  being  visited  by  the  heaviest  of  all  penalties, 
and  that,  too,  embracing  their  whole  posterity.  There  may  be 
a  religious  necessity  for  such  a  position,  but  the  structure 
of  the  theory  before  us  supplies  but  poor  reasons  for  it  But 
if  that  theory,  thus  constructed,  constitutes  the  proper 
criterion  of  the  moral  order,  it  has  no  connection  whatever 
with  the  view  that  the  first  transgression  was  punished  by 
the  condemnation  of  the  whole  race. 

But  this  view  reckons  as  punishment  not  merely  the 
eternal  condemnation  which  embraces  the  whole  race  for 
their  ancestors'  sin,  but  also  all  evik  which  come  upon 
individual  men,  including  physical  death.  It  is,  however, 
very  far  from  being  proved  that  the  conceptions  of  evil  and 
punishment  are  equivalent.  The  slightest  observation  is 
enough  to  show  that  the  former  conception  is  used  with  a  wider 
extension  than  the  latter ;  but  if  we  were  to  regard  punish- 
ment, for  that  reason,  as  a  species  of  evil,  we  should  be  at 
once  confronted  with  the  question,  what  the  two  conceptions 
really  have  in  common.     In  general  that  which  ministers  to 


244-6]  THE   DOCTRIKE   OF    GOD  257 

our  end  is  good,  and   so  that  which   impedes   our  end,  by 
injuring  our  means,  is  eviL     Natural  evils  are  either  such 
effects   of  mechanical  natural  causes  as  render  our   bodilj 
organism   wholly   or    partially   useless    for   its    purpose    of 
executing  our  ends,  or  such  as  spoil  or  destroy  the  property 
which  we  have  acquired  as  the  regular  means  for  accomplish- 
ing our  ends.     Social  evils  are  such  disturbances  of  our  free- 
dom to  follow  out  our  ends,  or  of  the  intended  result  of  our 
activity,  as  arise  from  the  actions  or  expressed  opinions  of 
our  fellow-men.     Now  punishment,  as  a  civil  institution,  is 
always  a  social  evil,  for  it  is  inflicted  by  other  men.     As  put 
in  force  by  civil  society  against  a  criminal,  however,  it  is  a 
special  kind   of   social   evil,  for  it  encroaches    upon   those 
blessings  which  in  ordinary  circumstances  are  protected  by 
the   State,  namely,  personal  rights  of  property  and  liberty. 
Punishment  is  that  social  evil  which  consists  in  a  diminution 
of  rights,  and  that  not  merely  in  virtue  of  the  execution  of  a 
sentence,  i.e,  the  deprivation  of  property  (money  fine)  or  of 
freedom  (imprisonment,  exile),  but  in  virtue  of  the  very  fact 
of  condemnation,  the  ideal  negation  of  rights  which  are  ideal 
attributes    of    personality.       Now    this    conception   of    civil 
punishment  certainly  admits  of  being  applied  to  the  relation 
of  man  to  God.     If  man  be  conceived  as  entitled  to  eternal 
life  in  fellowship  with  God,  then  banishment  from  God  and 
exclusion  from  our  proper  fellowship  with  Him — which  we 
have    found    to    be    the  all-inclusive    conception   of   Divine 
punishment  (p.  42) — ^may  be  subsumed  under  the  general 
notion  of  "  diminution  of  rights."     But  just  as  the  conception 
of  civil  punishment  is  not  complete  unless  it  be  acknow- 
ledged by  the  criminal  as  a  legitimate  retaliation  on  the  part 
of  society,  so  there  is  nothing  which  can  detect  the  presence  of 
Divine  penalties  but  the  consciousness  of  guilt  of  the  man  who 
counts  an  evil  a  punishment  sent  by  God,  because  he  acknow- 
ledges the  opposition  of  his  will  to  God  which  broke  forth  in 
his  transgression  (p.  49).    This  introduces  a  complication  with 
which  the  authors  of  the  orthodox  theology  did  not  reckon, 
but  which  threatens  to  destroy  our  belief  in  its  general  truth. 
17 


258  JUSTIFICATION   AND   RECONCILIATION  [246-6 

It  18  certainly  a  fact  that,  in  the  circle  of  pre-Christian 
religions,  it  was  common  to  combine  the  ideas  of  evil  and 
Divine  punishment.  Through  great  calamities  men  were  led 
to  believe  that  some  great  enormity  had  been  committed 
against  the  gods :  and  conversely,  they  expected  or  demanded 
that  penal  ills  should  light  upon  the  foes  of  God  or  of  human 
society.  And  so  these  currents  of  thought,  appearing  equally 
among  the  Israelites  and  the  classical  peoples,  seem  directly 
to  favour  the  dogmatic  theory.  These  considerations  seem 
to  prove  it  thoroughly  in  harmony  with  reasoiL  However, 
another  fact  counteracts  this  impression.  In  the  pre-Christian 
religions  no  application  of  the  connection  between  the  ideas 
of  evil  and  Divine  punishment  is  made,  save  to  special  and 
specially  conspicuous  cases  of  misfortune  and  of  human 
wickedness.  The  insignificant  sufferings  of  life,  and  death  as 
a  normal  phenomenon,  were  not  regarded  as  Divine  punish- 
ment, but  as  something  quite  natural.  This  is  true  even  of 
the  religion  of  the  Old  Testament,  where  the  record  of  the 
conjunction  of  death  with  sin  is  as  far  as  possible  from  laying 
down  a  dogma.  Though  the  fate  of  death  is  considered 
a  special  calamity  by  the  psahnists,  this  does  not  imply  a 
specific  consciousness  of  guilt,  but  rather,  on  the  contrary,  a 
specific  consciousness  of  innocence,  accompanied  by  the  feel- 
ing that,  through  their  fellowship  with  the  true  God,  they  are 
raised  above  the  ordinary  level  of  mankind  by  nature.  It  is 
thus  within  that  civilisation  which  is  independent  of  Chris- 
tianity and  of  Old  Testament  conceptions  of  a  Divine 
revelation  of  grace,  that  we  find  the  idea  of  evils,  especially 
natural  ills,  combined  with  that  of  Divine  punishment  in 
connection  with  specially  conspicuous  degrees  of  wickedness 
and  misfortune.  But  this  "  natural "  view  of  the  matter  is 
not  all  equivalent  to  the  principle,  assumed  as  natural  by 
Dogmatics,  that  the  conceptions  of  evil  and  Divine  punish- 
ment are  coincident.  Dogmatic  theologians,  it  is  true,  treat 
the  phenomena  described  above  as  though  they  could  draw 
this  general  principle  from  them  by  a  trustworthy  induction. 
But  this  is  an  unjustifiable  assumption.     For  while  special 


246-7]  THE   DOCTRINE   OF   GOD  259 

cases  of  wickedness  followed  by  striking  misfortunes  are 
interpreted  by  religious  thought  in  the  light  of  the  concep- 
tion of  Divine  punishment,  slighter  ills  are  in  point  of  fact 
not  viewed  in  the  same  way;  for  no  attempt  is  made  to 
reach  a  general  rule.  And  this  very  combination  of  ideas 
betrays  its  religious  character  by  the  fact  that  it  does  not 
presuppose  the  theoretical  principle  of  Dogmatics,  that  all 
evils  are  Divine  punishments.  We  shall  find  (§42)  that  it 
is  likewise  impossible  to  represent  this  principle  as  an 
element  in  the  view  of  the  world  which  Christianity  justifies 
us  in  holding.  Nowhere,  therefore,  in  the  range  that  is 
claimed  for  it,  does  it  possess  practical  validity.  But  it 
cannot  claim  theoretical  truth,  if  it  has  no  practical  validity 
in  the  sense  that  any  religion  exists  in  which  the  conscious- 
ness of  guilt  is  so  comprehensive  as  to  acknowledge  aU  evils, 
felt  as  such,  to  be  consequences  of  personal  sin.  Con- 
sequently, if  anyone,  relying  on  this  theory,  expects  to 
succeed  in  convincing  men  of  the  truth  of  Christianity  by  the 
force  of  argument,  he  will  find  that  the  conception  of  the 
moral  order  now  under  review  is  accepted  by  no  one. 

For  vfhQn,  fourthly,  we  investigate  the  origin  of  this  theory, 
we  find  that  its  dominant  idea,  that  God  must  requite  the 
diverse  actions  of  men  in  one  of  two  ways  [ie.  by  reward  or 
punishment],  is  not  the  fundamental  conception  of  Christi- 
anity. Even  the  writers  of  the  New  Testament,  when  dealing 
with  the  wider  ramifications  of  the  moral  order,  may  show 
their  belief  in  the  Divine  requital  of  human  action,  yet  Christ 
fills  out  God's  attribute  of  perfection  with  an  exactly  opposite 
content.  God,  He  says,  causes  the  sun  to  rise  on  the  evil  and 
the  good,  and  lets  the  rain  fall  on  the  just  and  the  unjust. 
This  being  the  Divine  perfection  which  Christ  declared.  He 
can  prescribe  love  to  one's  enemies  as  a  Christian  duty  (Matt. 
V.  44-48).  This  truth  is  ignored  by  those  who  harp  upon 
the  fact  that  penal  retribution  is  a  general  ethical  idea  which 
had  been  realised  in  history  long  before  the  institution  of  civil 
and  legal  society  was    ever  thought  of.^     This  idea,  it   is 

^  Kreibig,  FersShnungslehre,  p.  142. 


260  JUSTIFICATION   ANl)   RECONCILIATION  [247-8 

asserted,  theology  found  present  to  begin  with  as  an  element 
of  conscience,  and  transferred  it  to  God  under  the  guise  of  the 
attribute  of  justice.     But  the  question  for  Christian  theology 
is  not  what  idea  of  God  can  be  shown  to  be  the  presumptive 
content  of  natural  conviction,  but  what  declarations  of  Christ 
we  have.     In  the  present  case  it  is  simply  a  falsification  of 
Christianity  to  maintain  that  the  attribute,  from  which  the 
twofold  co-ordinate  requital  is  derived,  is  that  fundamental 
element  in  the  conception  of  God  which  should  dominate  all 
other  aspects  ;  and  it  proves  but  little  acquaintance  with  the 
Bible    to   assert    that  such   an  idea   is    Scriptural   without 
attempting  to  bring  it  into   harmony    with  the  sayings   of 
Christ  adduced  above.     Lastly,  it  would  be  worth  while  to 
prove  that  the  idea  of  punishment  had  appeared  before  the 
existence  of  civil  society !     Theologians  who  are  accustomed 
to  copy  second-rate  models,  might  learn  from  Calvin  (Inst.  i.  2) 
that  the  natural  religion  of  our  first  parents  before  the  Fall 
did  not  rest  at  all  upon  the  attribute  of  Divine  retribution,  for 
the  latter  has  no  meaning  until  God  has  given  His  law.     But, 
according  to  Calvin,  the  recognition  of  God  as  Lawgiver  is 
properly  to  be  derived  from  the  fact  that  God's  goodness  and 
providence  are  reckoned  the  source  of  all  blessings  for  men. 
Not  till  we  come  to  the  third  rank  of  the  Divine  attributes 
do  we  meet  with  the  attribute  of  retribution.     Foremost  of 
all  stands,   as    Christ    testified,  the  goodness  of  God.     And 
that  is  as  it  should  be :  for  the  religion  of  our  first  parents 
is  nothing  but  the  prophetic  shadow  of  Christianity.       What 
Calvin  says  upon  the  subject,  however,  is  based  upon  Luther's 
discussions  of  Genesis  (p.  171). 

The  tendency  to  fill  up  the  idea  of  God  with  the  attribute 
of  a  twofold  co-ordinate  requital,  is  not  so  innate  or  so 
universal  as  Kreibig  imagines ;  for  we  can  localise  it  historic- 
ally in  the  religion  of  the  Greeks.  Here  it  fundamentally 
determines  the  relation  between  gods  and  men,  who  are  not 
regarded  as  dependent  on  the  gods  through  creation.  That  is, 
to  punish  and  to  reward,  as  co-ordinate  acts,  are  the  functions 
of  the  State  as  conceived  by  the  Greeks ;  and  they  are  ascribed 


348-^9]  THE   DOCTRINE   OF    GOD  261 

to  the  gods,  because  in  this  religion  the  State  constitutes  the 
summum  bonum.     In  these  functions  the  Greeks  discern  the 
justice  of  the  State,  and  the  justice  of  the  gods.^      It  is 
characteristic  of  them  that  they  viewed  the  punishment  of 
crime  and  the  rewarding  of  merit  as  the  co-ordinate  duties  of 
civil  justice.*     That  is  not  a  self-evident  view,  nor  is  it  a  view 
which  obtains  everywhere.     For,  according  to  our  ideas,  the 
single  duty  of  the  State  is  to  maintain  public  law  and  order, 
and  so  assure  everyone  of  protection  in    the  pursuit  of  his 
legitimate  ends,  in  order  to  promote  which  purposes  the  State 
likewise  employs  the  forces  of  punishment  against  criminals. 
But  the  rewarding  of  individual  merit  is  only  an  accidental 
addition  to  its  functions ;  the  fulfilment  of  their  civil  duties  is, 
rather,  the  very  condition  of  all  enjoying  the  protection  of  the 
State.     This  more  mature  conception  of  the  State  betrays 
itself  even  in  the  idea  of  God's  justice  which  obtains  in  the 
Old  Testament  (vol.  ii.  pp.   107,   138);   for  here,  too,  the 
foundation  is  supplied  by  the  civil  order.     But  in  the  Old 
Testament   the    bestowal   of    rewards   and  the   infliction  of 
punishments  are  not  co-ordinated  under  the  Divine  attribute 
of  justice.     Eather,  the  justice  of  God  is  regarded  as  assuring 
the  righteous  of  their  rights  and  of  protection  within  normal 
civil  society ;  the  destruction  of  the  godless,  however,  effected 
as  it  is  by  God's  wrath,  is  the  means  used  to  enforce  law  and 
order  to  the  advantage  of  those,  too,  who  hitherto  have  been 
deprived  of  their  full  rights.     Thus  to  suppose  that  the  con- 
ception of  the  twofold  retribution  of  God,  as  an  innate  idea 
and  as  an  element  of  natural  religion,  is  likewise  the  funda- 
mental conception  of  the  moral  order  which  must  be  pre- 
supposed in   Christianity — to  suppose  this,  is   in  reality  to 
acknowledge  the  Greek  idea  of  the  relation  between  gods  and 
men  as  the  supreme  criterion  of  every  part  of  the  Christian 
system.     As  has  already  been  shown,  therefore,  the  God  who 
is  conceived  under  this  attribute  is  an  idol,  and  so  also  the 

'  I  refer  tlie  reader  to  Leopold  Schmidt,  DU  Ethik  der  alten  Oriechen  (1882), 
2  vols. 

*  Op.  eil,  ii.  p.  258.   * 


262  JUSTIFICATION   AND   RECONCILIATION  [249-50 

trust  placed  in  Him  by  His  theological  devotees  must  be  false 
and  deceptive.  But  how  comes  it  that  every  attempt  to 
correct  this  falsification  of  the  Christian  idea  of  God  is  so 
obstinately  resisted  as  we  find  to  be  the  case  ?  The  primary 
cause  is  the  slovenly  and  thoughtless  use  of  the  Bible  which 
prevails  in  theology.  If  any  statement  whatever  of  God's 
retributive  justice  can  be  pointed  to  in  its  pages,  then  that  is 
taken  as  constituting  the  Divine  attribute  of  justice  which  is 
fundamental  in  Christianity  !  Thus  Kriebig  says,  in  conclud- 
ing the  remarks  to  which  I  formerly  adverted  :  "  Even  though 
the  Biblical  idea  of  God  may  differ  in  diflFerent  passages,  yet 
the  idea  of  a  God  Who,  as  such,  is  a  holy  dispenser  of  justice, 
is  incontestably  Scriptural."  But  the  point  at  issue  is 
whether  this  Scriptural  idea  is  the  fundamental  element  in 
the  conception  of  God.  In  the  second  place,  theologians  of 
this  school  are  influenced  by  the  fact  that  the  twofold 
co-ordinate  retribution,  in  the  eschatological  form  which  Plato 
had  already  given  it,  was  represented  by  Justin  Martyr  as  a 
leading  feature  of  Christianity,  and  a  correlative  of  its  legalistic 
character.  This  doctrine  of  the  Apologists,  which  we  can 
likewise  perceive  to  have  been  the  Christian  conviction  of  the 
earliest  community  in  Eome  (vol.  ii.  p.  317),  implies  that  the 
chief  idea  of  Hellenic  religion  is  being  carried  over  into 
Christianity.  Thus  it  is  that  theologians  of  orthodox  repute, 
who  at  bottom  are  rationalistic,  foster  the  prejudice  that  they 
must  believe  in  God  under  this  attribute  first  of  all,  before 
they  can  agree  upon  the  further  attributes  which  the  revelation 
in  Christ  offers  to  their  faith. 

§  33.  Such  a  moral  order,  which  is  based  upon  the 
Hellenic  juridical  conception  of  Divine  justice,  and  which, 
moreover,  in  virtue  of  our  first  parents'  sin  issues  in  the 
condemnation  of  the  whole  human  race,  leaves  no  room  for 
the  possibility  of  tlie  reconciliation  of  man  with  God.  So  far 
from  being  a  positive  presupposition  of  the  governing  idea  of 
Christianity,  it  is  an  obstacle  to  our  understanding  the  Chris- 
tian faith.  This  conclusion  is  still  further  confirmed  by  the 
following  considerations.     Eeconciliation   with   God  may  be 


250-1]  THE   DOCTBINB   OF   GOD  263 

taken  as  the  basis  of  the  perfect  religion.  But  we  are  told 
that  the  original  dispensation  consisted  in  a  reciprocal  legal 
relationship  between  God  and  man.  Now  law  and  religion, 
at  least  in  the  experience  of  evangelical  Christians,  are  con- 
ceptions quite  opposed  to  one  another  in  species.  Species 
cannot  be  derived  the  one  from  the  other ;  they  are  mutually 
exclusive.  The  species  of  fellowship  with  God  which  we 
know  as  reconciliation,  therefore,  cannot  be  derived  from  the 
presupposed  reciprocity  of  rights  between  God  and  men. 
Accordingly,  if  the  religion  of  reconciliation  is  derived  from 
God,  it  must  be  based  upon  a  different  conception  of  God's 
relation  to  man  from  that  on  which  stress  has  been  laid 
hitherto,  namely,  upon  His  grace.  This  thought,  however,  is 
treated  by  Protestant  orthodoxy  in  such  a  way  that,  instead 
of  repudiating  altogether  the  ideas  which  follow  from  the  idea 
of  Divine  retribution,  it  endeavours  to  preserve  them  in  force 
alongside  of  the  inferences  from  Divine  grace.  This  is 
accomplished  by  means  of  a  compromise,  the  artificiality  and 
pretended  profundity  of  which  are  no  guarantee  of  its  truth. 

An  artificial  solution  of  the  contradiction  contained  in  the 
premises  was  already  offered  by  the  theory  of  Anselm,  the 
result  of  which  is  to  remove  the  contradiction  to  a  different 
point  from  where  it  stood  originally.  For  the  presupposition 
of  this  theory  is  that  the  honour  of  God  forms,  with  equal 
necessity,  the  ground  both  of  His  condemnation  of  the  sinful 
human  race  and  of  His  intention  to  bless  them  with  salvation. 
In  order  to  exhibit  this  intention  as  attainable  and  attained 
despite  the  sway  of  condemnation,  he  demonstrates  that  satis- 
faction to  God  for  sin  is  necessary,  and  that,  through  the 
Person  and  the  Death  of  Christ,  it  is  possible  and  effectual. 
But  he  derives  the  necessity  for  satisfaction  from  a  conception 
of  the  justice  of  God  which  implies  an  equality  in  private 
rights  between  God  and  man.  It  is  impossible,  however,  to 
combine  this  relationship  in  thought  with  the  truth  that  God 
is  the  absolute  end  of  man ;  consequently,  the  first  contradic- 
tion is  solved  only  by  the  admission  of  a  second  (vol.  i. 
p.  39  ff.).     Moreover,  a  plain  contradiction  is  involved  in  the 


264  JUSTIFICATION    AND   RECONCILIATION  [251-2 

way  in  which  Luther  derives  reconciliation  from  the  love  of 
God,  but  at  the  same  time  derives  from  the  wrath  of  God  the 
satisfaction  which  Christ  has  to  work  out  through  the  vicarious 
endurance  of  punishment  (vol.  i.  p.  221).  For  it  is  impossible 
to  conceive  sinners,  at  the  same  time  and  in  the  same  respect, 
as  objects  both  of  God's  love  and  God's  wrath. 

The  doctrine  of  the  scholastic  theologians  of  the  Eefor- 
mation  exhibits  no  inconsistencies  so  plain  and  open  as 
these.  To  be  sure,  they  start  with  the  assumption  of  an 
antinomy  in  God.  In  His  justice  He  must  condemn  the  sin- 
ful race  of  man ;  in  His  goodness  and  grace  He  desires  to 
bless  them.  But  for  God  Himself  these  two  attributes  have 
not  equal  importance :  in  their  simultaneous  reference  to  one 
and  the  same  object,  therefore,  they  form  no  contradiction. 
Eather,  from  the  very  outset  greater  importance  is  ascribed  to 
justice  than  to  grace.  The  same  may  be  said  of  their 
explanation  of  the  mediatorial  rdle  in  which  Christ  brings  into 
operation  for  sinful  man  the  order  of  grace  instead  of  the 
order  of  law.  The  decree  by  which  Christ  is  sent  forth,  it  is 
true,  springs  from  the  Divine  grace ;  but  if  that  decree  were 
conceived  to  include  all  the  consequences  of  His  mission,  the 
result  would  be  the  outlining  of  a  series  of  Divine  operations 
which  would  come  into  collision  with  the  necessary  results  of 
His  justice.  But  the  gracious  purpose  of  Christ's  mission  is 
limited  to  this,  that  He  should  satisfy  Divine  justice  for 
sinners  by  enduring  punishment  and  fulfilling  the  law,  and 
thus  realise  the  essential  precondition  of  their  pardon.  This 
act  of  grace  is  made  subordinate  as  means  to  the  Divine 
justice  in  such  a  way  that,  even  when  it  is  no  longer  put  in 
force  against  sinners  directly,  justice  still  obtains  satisfaction 
for  its  claims  in  a  roundabout  way.  Moreover,  this  implies  that 
the  dispensation  of  grace,  which  springs  from  Christ,  does  not 
run  counter  to  the  dispensation  of  justice.  For  the  Mediator 
of  grace,  in  achieving  satisfaction,  is  subject  throughout  to 
the  standard  of  Divine  justice,  and  He  opens  the  door  of  the 
realm  of  grace  only  through  bearing  testimony,  by  His  twofold 
satisfaction,  to  the  inviolability  of  the  justice  of  God.     While 


253-3]  THE   DOCTRINE   OF    GOD  265 

the  diBpensation  of  grace  remains  dependent  on  His  person,  it 
likewise  remains  permanently  bound  up  with  the  validity  of 
Divine  justice  in  virtue  of  the  aforementioned  significance 
which  belongs  to  what  He  suffered  and  did. 

The  twofold  satisfaction  rendered  by  Christ  imports  that 
the  law  makes  no  claim  to  punish  such  sinners  as  are  believers, 
and  does  not  demand  from  them  obedience  to  it  as  a  precon- 
dition of  salvation.  Thus  the  direct  authority  of  the  original 
Divine  law  over  believers  is  put  in  abeyance.  If,  now,  the 
mission  of  Christ,  as  an  eflect  of  grace,  were  given  its  properly 
unlimited  significance,  then,  as  the  satisfaction  rendered  by 
Christ  would  have  set  aside  for  believers  the  dispensation  of 
law,  the  impediment  in  the  way  of  Divine  grace  would  have 
ceased  to  exist,  and  Christ  would  have  to  be  described  as  the 
Mediator  of  grace  to  believers,  in  consequence  of  God's  first 
decree.  In  the  theory  under  discussion,  however,  this  is  not 
the  case.  God's  first  gracious  resolve  to  send  Christ  is  not 
conceived  as  including  its  possible  consequences.  For  the 
merit  of  Christ  is  the  moving  power  which  first  puts  in  force 
for  men  the  Divine  dispensation  of  grace,  which  is  depend- 
ent on  Him.  Through  endurance  of  punishment  and  entire 
obedience  to  the  law.  He  vicariously  satisfies  both  of  the 
legitimate  demands  made  on  sinners  by  Divine  justice,  and 
abrogates  for  believers  the  dispensation  of  law,  to  the  end  that 
they  may  attain  blessedness.  Thus,  hy  the  merUorious  value 
of  His  whole  righteousness.  He  determines  the  resolve  of  God 
to  open  through  Him  for  believers  the  dispensation  of  grace. 

But  what  means  the  employment  of  this  notion  of  merit 
when  we  are  comparing  the  Person  of  Christ  with  the  domi- 
nant conception  of  God?  Merit  is  the  necessary  correlate 
of  equity  {BiUiykeU\  This  discovery  of  Duns  Scotus  meets 
us  again  in  the  less  lucid  theory  of  Thomas  Aquinas.  The 
Divine  grace  towards  believers,  which  the  merit  of  Christ  puts 
in  operation,  is  nothing  else  than  arbitrary  goodwill,  which  as 
such  implies  no  inconsistency  with  the  assumed  justice  of  God. 
Here  the  scholastic  theology  of  the  Eeformation  appears  to 
coincide  with  Socinianism,  and  it  seems  as  though  the  circuit- 


266  JUSTIFICATION   AND   RECONCILIATION  [253-4 

ous  paths  which  it  follows  to  reach  this  goal  might  have 
been  spared.  Yet  their  agreement  is  very  limited,  and  more 
theoretical  than  practical.  To  begin  with,  we  ought  to 
observe  that  grace  in  the  sense  of  equity,  as  a  concomitant 
of  the  dispensation  of  public  law,  wears  another  form  when 
likened  to  the  right  of  pardon  which  resides  in  the  State, 
than  when  it  is  taken  as  supplementing  a  prior  private  rela- 
tionship existing  between  God  and  man.  The  right  of  pardon 
as  a  coiTelative  of  the  penal  law,  is  certainly  also  a  manifesta- 
tion of  equity  arising  out  of  consideration  for  the  moral 
circumstances  of  the  condemned  criminal  (p.  91);  but  the 
opposite  standpoints  occupied  by  public  law  and  private 
right  lead,  in  the  two  theories  which  we  are  comparing,  to  the 
drawing  of  different  inferences  from  their  common  conception 
of  grace  as  equity.  On  the  basis  of  private  right  sins 
reckon  as  injuries,  the  equity  of  God  is  taken  to  be  a  matter 
of  course,  and  the  forgiveness  of  sins  to  be  a  private  affair 
between  God  and  the  individual.  When  the  form  of  public 
law  is  followed,  sins  reckon  as  crimes :  the  exercise,  prompted 
by  equity,  of  the  right  of  pardon,  must  next  be  artificially 
secured  as  a  concession  from  the  inviolability  of  penal  justice, 
which  then  forms  the  basis  de  twvo  of  a  general  dispensation 
for  the  Christian  community,  in  virtue  of  the  merits  of  its 
Founder.  The  only  question  is,  whether  the  conception  of 
equity,  as  fixing  the  value  of  grace,  is  strong  enough  to 
justify  its  being  applied  in  this  way. 

By  employing  the  arguments  I  have  described,  this  theory 
prevents  any  inconsistency  between  the  grace  and  the  justice 
of  God  from  appearing  at  any  point.  By  using  the  concep- 
tion of  equity  to  express  the  grace  of  God,  the  latter  is  made 
to  appear  as  an  accident  of  His  justice  which  can  be  exercised 
without  the  essence  of  that  justice  being  in  any  way  altered. 
But  this  benefit  is  counterbalanced  by  a  peculiar  disadvantage. 
It  has  been  remarked  already  that  Divine  justice,  in  the 
traditional  sense,  cannot  be  a  positive  presupposition  serving 
to  explain  the  Christian  dispensation  of  grace  (p.  263).  As 
grace  is  now  explained  to  be  an  accident  of  justice,  it  at  once 


254]  THE   DOCTRINE   OF   GOD  267 

becomes  clear  that  this  accident  is  called  into  action  in  the 
will  of  God  from  without,  by  the  merits  of  Christ.  Now  it 
comes  to  the  same  thing  whether  we  trace  the  dispensation 
of  grace  to  this  cause,  or  maintain  that  it  rests  upon  God's 
arbitrary  volition.  A  contradiction  between  the  Divine  attri- 
butes of  justice  and  grace  had  been  avoided  earlier  by  saying 
that  God  has  to  act  according  to  justice,  but  might  act 
according  to  grace  if  He  chose.  With  this  the  conclusion, 
that  the  dispensation  of  grace  rests  upon  God's  arbitrary  will, 
is  in  entire  agreement.  This  is  really  as  hostile  to  the  true 
interests  of  Christian  theology  as  the  Socinian  representation 
of  grace  as  being  arbitrary  will  unaccompanied  by  universal 
laws.  We  are  brought  here  again  merely  to  the  same  con- 
clusion as  before,  that  the  conception  of  God  which  dominates 
the  argument  is  not  thought  as  a  unity.  Necessity  and 
freedom  are  not  comprised  within  the  conception  of  the 
Divine  will  as  elements  which  mutually  condition  one 
another;  but  necessity  is  maintained  to  be  at  work  in  His 
action  as  prompted  by  justice,  freedom  (arbitrary)  in  the 
method  by  which  His  grace  is  put  in  motion.  Their  correlates 
in  the  work  of  Christ,  satisfaction  and  merit,  are  materially 
identical  indeed,  but  formally  they  are  as  disparate  as 
necessity  and  freedom  in  God.  As  rendering  satisfaction, 
Christ  is  both  subject  to  Divine  justice  and  indebted  for  His 
mission  to  the  grace  of  God ;  as  possessing  merit,  the  range 
of  His  influence  is  not  determined  beforehand  by  God's 
action;  in  this  r6le^  rather.  He  is  regarded  as  putting  in 
motion  the  Divine  grace.  But  this  is  to  offend  against  a 
fundamental  presupposition  of  theology.  It  was  right,  by 
denying  merit  to  man,  to  ensure  the  recognition  of  the 
essential  unity  of  the  Divine  world-order,  but  this  principle  is 
M  fatally  endangered  by  the  apocryphal  formula, "  the  merits 
of  Christ,"  as  by  any  belief  in  human  merit  which  existed  in 
the  Middle  Ages.  For  even  though  the  merits  of  Christ  are 
based  materially  on  His  Godhead,  and  thus  made  subordinate 
to  the  being  of  God,  yet  formally  they  are  referred  to  His 
human  freedom,  and  through  their  being  recognised  as  merits 


268  JUSTIFICATION   AND   RECONCIHATION  [254-5 

a  range  of  activity  is  ascribed  to  Him  which  is  not  a  priori 
subjected  to  the  government  of  God. 

This  criticism  of  the  way  in  which  Lutheran  and  Eeformed 
theology  has  derived  the  Christian  dispensation  of  grace,  is 
not  to  be  confounded  with  the  objections  which  have  been 
raised  by  Faustus  Socinus.  What  I  mean  is  that  this  theory, 
in  spite  of  a  tendency  opposed  to  that  of  Socinus,  is  not 
sufiBciently  far  removed  from  the  Socinian  view  of  the  world, 
but  has  too  much  in  common  with  it.  I  trust,  therefore,  that 
I  shall  not  be  misunderstood  if  I  homologate  particular 
objections  which  Socinus  has  raised  (vol.  i.  p.  326).  Duo  si 
dicunt  idem,  non  est  idem.  The  world-order  which  lies  at  the 
foundation  of  the  theory  in  question  is  the  moral  law  under 
the  form  of  public  law.  It  has  already  been  shown  that  this 
combination  of  ideas  involves  a  contradiction  (p.  250).  This 
contradiction  naturally  influences  those  inferences  which 
condition  the  view  taken  of  reconciliation  through  Christ. 
That  is,  if  the  moral  law  as  such  constitutes  the  original 
dispensation  under  which  God  deals  with  man,  then  the 
necessity  of  punishing,  which  follows  from  the  moral  law,  will 
be  no  hindrance  to  God's  resolving  to  forgive  sins,  and  carry- 
ing out  that  resolution  in  a  dispensation  open  to  all.  Sinners, 
upon  whom  educative  penalties  are  laid,  may  without  incon- 
sistency be  conceived  as  objects  of  pardon.  But  that  the 
need  for  punishment  is  regarded  as  an  obstacle  in  the  way  of 
pardon,  and  that  in  order  to  reconcile  them  the  punishment 
of  a  substitute  is  accepted,  is  simply  a  consequence  of  the 
presupposed  judicial  character  of  the  law.  There  is  no 
immediate  relation,  however,  between  moral  good  and  the 
moral  act  of  pardon  and  legal  punishment,  whether  it  is 
borne  by  the  guilty  themselves  or  by  their  substitute.  What 
legal  punishment  does  is  to  expunge  legal  guilt,  without  any- 
thing remaining  over  which  civil  society  can  forgive ;  and 
therefore  the  moral  judgment  of  pardon  has  nothing  to  do 
with  it.  For  we  can  pardon  criminals  although  we  lay 
punishments  on  them,  while  we  do  not  pardon  every  criminal 
because  he  has  been  punished.      These  conceptions  and  no 


256-6]  THB   DOCTRINB   OF   GOD  269 

other  we  must  apply  to  God's  dealings  with  men,  for  we 
must  keep  moral  law  and  civil  law  altogether  distinct.  More- 
over, according  to  the  moral  law,  it  is  conceivable  that  an 
innocent  man  should  feel  the  legal  punishment  which  falls 
upon  a  relative — a  member  of  his  family  or  a  friend — ^to  be 
a  legal  diminution  of  civil  rights  also  for  himself,  since  in 
consequence  of  the  punishment  of  the  other  he  has  to  suffer 
certain  evils.  But  in  civil  society  it  would  be  a  plain  offence 
against  judicial  equity  to  inflict  penalties  upon  an  innocent 
man  in  order  to  spare  the  guilty.  When  punishment  takes 
the  form  of  fines,  the  innocent,  it  is  true,  can  pay  for  the 
guilty ;  but  that  does  not  mean  that  the  former  is  punished 
for  the  latter.  For  the  pains  and  penalties  intended  by  the 
judge  fall,  qud  sentence,  upon  the  guilty  man;  and  when 
the  innocent  man  discharges  the  fine,  the  action  does  not 
imply  a  compulsory  deprivation  of  civil  status,  but  only  a 
voluntary  surrender  of  property.  But  from  this  we  can  draw 
no  valid  inferences  regarding  punishments  which  concern 
liberty  and  life,  in  which  deprivation  must  be  executed  on 
the  person  of  the  guilty.  In  holding  it  possible  to  draw 
such  inferences  (vol.  i.  p.  334),  orthodox  theologians  have 
fallen  into  the  Socinian  error  of  supposing  that  sin  possesses 
the  character  of  an  offence  which  can  be  wiped  out  by  a  fine. 
According  to  civil  law,  punishment  which  affects  the  liberty 
of  the  subject  can  fall  on  no  one  but  the  offender  himself, 
and  cannot  justly  be  transferred  by  the  judge  to  one  who  is 
innocent  Just  as  little  possible  is  it,  according  to  the  moral 
law,  to  reckon  the  moral  achievement  of  one  man's  life  to 
another  as  his  own,  in  such  a  way  as  to  dispense  the  latter  in 
any  respect  from  striving  after  it  for  himself.  For  moral 
action  is  not  a  thing  which  can  even  be  conceived  as  detached 
from  its  author  (p.  70).  And  it  is  impossible  according  to 
civil  law  likewise,  for  moral  actions  do  not,  as  such,  fall  under 
civil  law.  For  these  reasons  the  theory  of  the  twofold 
satisfaction  of  Christ,  which  characterises  the  scholastic 
theology  of  the  Eeformation,  is  a  confused  inference  from 
contradictory  presuppositions. 


270  JUSTinCATION   AND   RECONCILIATION  [256-7 

§  34.  The  theories  of  the  Socinians  and  of  the  scholastic 
theologians  of  the  Beformation  regarding  the  original  dis- 
pensation of  fellowship  between  God  and  man,  from  which 
they  sought  to  derive  the  special  dispensation  of  fellowship 
between  them  in  Christianity,  are  intended  by  their  authors 
to  be  understood  as  wholly  based  on  reason,  though  points  of 
support  for  both  were  found  in  the  New  Testament.  We 
have  seen  that  the  Socinian  theory  was  directly  designed  to 
express  the  character  of  Christianity  as  the  religion  of  for- 
giveness. But  the  conception  of  the  Divine  equity  which 
dominates  it  does  not  furnish  a  basis  for  a  universal  order  of 
moral  action,  nor  can  it  form  the  foundation  of  Christianity  as 
a  general  dispensation  taking  its  rise  in  forgiveness.  It 
really  leads  to  a  splitting  up  of  the  moral  and  religious 
dispensation  desiderated,  into  purely  private  relationships 
between  God  and  individual  men.  The  theory  of  Protestant 
scholasticism  bases  the  general  order  of  human  action  upon 
the  conception  of  Divine  justice  as  a  presupposition  of  reason, 
while  it  bases  forgiveness  as  a  general  dispensation  on  the 
Christian  Eevelation.  But  it  does  not  find  in  Divine  justice 
the  positive  ground  of  forgiveness ;  it  rather  sees  in  forgive- 
ness merely  an  exception  to  Divine  justice  which,  while 
certainly  controlled  or  conditioned  by  the  latter,  is  yet 
combined  with  it  in  the  conception  of  God  in  a  merely 
accidental  way.  Lastly,  in  the  normative  view  of  the  law 
which  answers  to  God's  justice,  the  properties  of  the  moral 
law  and  of  the  civil  law  are  conjoined  in  so  absurd  a  way, 
that  the  presuppositions,  thence  resulting,  of  the  significance 
of  Christ  as  the  organ  of  Divine  grace  issue  in  contradictory 
conceptions.  The  basis  of  this  train  of  thought  is  to  be  found 
in  the  Hellenic  idea  of  the  twofold  requital  dispensed  by  God ; 
it  is  intelligible,  therefore,  that  Christianity  should  not  be 
deduced  from  that  idea,  but  proved  to  be  an  exception  to  the 
rule.  This  is  a  misfortune  which  can  neither  be  concealed 
nor  compensated  for  by  using  the  conception  of  vicarious 
satisfaction  to  explain  the  position  of  Christ  within  this 
order.     For  that  conception  has  no  essential  relation  to  the 


257-8]  THE    DOCTRINE   OF   GOD  271 

moral  law,  it  contradicts  the  civil  law  and  even  the  moral 
law  at  times,  and  least  of  all  can  it  be  proved  sound  by 
confusing  these  two  standards  together. 

The  formal  error,  from  which  this  theory  of  the  Divine 
world-order  suffers,  lies  in  its  neglect  of  the  question,  what 
end  God  has,  or  can  have,  in  common  with  the  human  race. 
For  the  nature  of  fellowship  is  determined  by  the  end 
common  to  both  parties;  and  the  law  of  action  emanates 
from  the  will  of  the  lawgiver  not  arbitrarily,  nor  from  any 
other  necessity  than  that  of  the  preconceived  end  of  the 
fellowship  which  the  law  is  meant  to  serve  as  a  means. 
Theologians  of  the  older  school  have  set  these  considerations 
aside  because,  under  the  influence  of  the  Areopagitic  concep- 
tion of  God,  they  cannot  bring  themselves  to  assume  a 
real  fellowship  between  God  and  man.  The  God  who  is 
conceived  only  as  not  being  the  world,  must  always  be 
negatively  related  to  everything  that  is  real.  Thus,  even 
when  He  is  conceived  as  a  spiritual  Person  Who  thinks 
Himself  and  wills  Himself,  this  idea — an  idea  which  is 
superinduced  upon  the  Areopagitic  theory,  and,  so  far  from 
being  specifically  Christian,  is  Aristotelian — ^is  really  robbed 
of  all  its  force  by  the  remark  of  Thomas  Aquinas  that 
God's  personal  end  lies  incomparably  above  and  beyond  the 
end  or  purpose  of  the  world  (voL  i  p.  62),  Therefore 
the  creation  of  the  world,  even  when  explained  by  Divine 
love,  is  yet  derived  from  God's  arbitrary  volition.  The 
revelation  of  Him  given  in  Christianity,  moreover,  appears 
equally  arbitrary ;  and  though  it  leads  men  to  the  vision  of 
God,  yet  this  end,  transcending  human  nature  as  it  does,  has 
as  little  relation  to  man's  essential  being  as  God's  end  has  to 
the  world  which  He  has  created.  The  scholastic  divines  of 
the  Eeformation  break  through  this  rigid  conception  of 
mediaeval  theology  by  contending  that  the  purpose,  embodied 
in  Christianity,  to  realise  the  spiritual  and  blessed  fellow- 
ship of  man  with  God,  is  originally  included  in  the  notion 
of  human  nature.  This  truth  had  to  be  fought  for  and 
won,  if  monasticism  was  to  be  deprived  of  its  claim  to  be 


272  JUSTIFICATION   AND   RECONCILIATION  [258-9 

the  perfect  Christianity,  because  it  realised  the  supernatural 
life,  the  life  of  the  angels,  in  fellowship  with  God.  But  these 
divines  did  not  clearly  understand  how  much  this  involved 
for  their  whole  doctrine  of  God.  If  the  proper  destiny  of 
the  human  race  includes  spiritual  and  blessed  fellowship 
with  God,  this  end  cannot  be  unrelated  to  God's  personal 
end  Between  the  creation  of  man  for  this  end  and  the 
creative  will  of  God  it  is  impossible  to  think  the  relation  as 
accidental;  it  must  be  necessary.  The  conception  of  God, 
therefore,  which  consists  simply  in  thinking  Him  as  equivalent 
to  what  is  not  the  worlds  is  not  exhaustive.  Or  rather,  He 
is  not  thought  at  all,  until  we  gain  that  positive  conception 
which  ensures  His  differentiation  from  the  world.  Instead 
of  perceiving  this,  the  leaders  of  the  theology  which  is 
extolled  as  loyal  to  the  Church  never  oflFer  us  anything  more 
than  the  shadow-play  of  Areopagitic  negations  and  affirma- 
tions, which  explain  absolutely  nothing,  which  constitute 
neither  scientific  nor  Christian  knowledge,  and  which  simply 
must  be  thrown  aside  if  the  Christian  view  of  the  world  and 
the  practical  interests  of  Protestantism  are  to  be  exhibited  as 
necessarily  and  universally  valid.^ 

Theology,  in  delineating  the  moral  order  of  the  world, 
must  take  as  its  starting-point  that  conception  of  God  in 

'  Instead  of  this,  Philippi  {Kirchliehe  Dogmatik,  ii.  p.  20  ff. )  arranges  the 
attributes  of  God  according  to  the  "  three  moments  in  which  the  Divine  nature 
discloses  itself  to  us  in  an  ascending  series"  :  God  (1)  as  absolute  Substance, 
a.  eternity,  5.  omnipresence ;  (2)  as  absolute  Subject,  a.  omnipotence,  &.  omni- 
science ;  (3)  as  holy  love,  a.  wisdom,  h,  justice,  c  goodness.  The  first  of 
these  strata  is  the  Areopagitic  conception  of  God,  in  so  far  as,  through 
affirmation,  it  is  brought  into  relation  to  tlie  world ;  the  second  is  the 
Aristotelian  conception.  Now  this  ''Church"  theologian  assures  us,  indeed, 
that  "  there  is  here  no  development  successively  from  lower  to  higher  ;  rather, 
we  merely  separate  out  the  lower  from  the  higher  for  preliminary  examination." 
For  what  purpose  this  is  necessary,  he  does  not  say :  in  my  opinion  it  may  be 
used  to  prove  that  this  kind  of  theology  contains  the  germ  of  all  rationalism. 
The  Socinian  Crell  [Jcihrh,  filr  dciUscJie  Theol,  xiii.  p.  266)  proceeds  exactly  as 
does  Philippi.  Now  if  Philippi  meant  the  remark  seriously,  that  the  prior 
strata  in  the  conception  of  God  are  separated  out  merely  provisionally,  in  order 
to  exhibit  their  defectiveness,  then  he  ought  to  have  deduced  all  the  attributes 
of  God  afresh  from  the  conception  of  holy  love.  As  he  does  not  do  so,  he  haa 
no  conception  of  the  unity  of  God,  and  leaves  open  to  rationalism  the  possibility 
of  accepting  only  so  much  of  the  Christian  conception  of  God  as  harmonises 
with  the  first  or  the  second  stratum. 


269-260]  THE   DOCTMNB   OF   GOD  273 

which  the  relation  of  God  to  His  Son  our  Lord  is  expressed, 

a  relation  which,  by  Christ's  mediation,  is  extended  likewise 

to  His  community.     For  when  the  Apostles,  in  the  Epistles 

of  the  New  Testament,  describe  God  as  our  Father,  that  is  an 

abbreviated  expression  for  the  Christian  name  for  God,  which 

when  fully  stated  runs,  "  the  God  and  Father  of  our  Lord 

Jesus  Christ "  (2  Cor.  i.  3,  xi.  31 ;  Eom.  xv.  6 ;  Col.  i.  3  ; 

1  Pet.  i-  3 ;  Eph.  i.  3).     As  the  name  of  God  is  always  used 

in  Scripture  as  a  compendious  description  of  His  revelation, 

it  is  clear  that,  when  God  reveals  Himself  as  Father  through 

His  Son  Jesus  Christ,  the  process  is  only  completed  when 

the  community  accepts  the  revelation  by  acknowledging  the 

Mediator  who  brings  it  as  its*  Lord.    Any  attempt,  therefore, 

to  construct  a  scientific  doctrine  of  God  must  be  wrong  which 

fails  to  keep  in  view  all  the  aspects  of  this  name.     The  name 

God  has  the  same  sense  when  used  of  Father,  Son,  and  Holy 

Spirit  (Matt,  xxviii.  19).     For  the  name  denotes  God  in  so 

far  as  He   reveals   Himself,  while  the  Holy   Spirit  is  the 

power  of  God  which  enables  the  community  to  appropriate 

His  self-revelation  as  Father  through  His  Son  (1  Cor.  ii.  12). 

That   the    revelation   of    God    through    His    Son,    however, 

embraces  the  community  which  acknowledges  His  Son  as  her 

Lord,  and  how  it  does  so,  is  explained  by  saying  that  God 

manifests  Himself    to    the    Son  and   to   the  community  as 

loviTig  Will  (voL  ii.  p.    96  ff.).     As  this  conception  of  God 

is  recognised  as  coming  from  the  source  of  knowledge  which 

is   authoritative  for   the   Christian  community,   it   likewise 

follows  that  the  goodness  of  God  to  all  men,  in  bestowing  on 

them  the  good  things  of  nature  (Matt.  v.  45  ;  Acts  xiv.  17), 

is  an  inference  which  Christ  drew  from  the  knowledge  He 

possessed  of  the  love  of  God  to  Him  and  to  His  community. 

Thus  the  goodness  of  God,  as  the  general  presupposition  of 

everything,  is  embraced  in  the  specific  attribute  of  the  Divine 

Fatherhood;  or,  in  other  words,  the  truth  that  He  has  revealed 

Himself  to  the  Christian  community  as  love.     There  is  no 

other  conception  of  equal  worth  beside  this  which  need  be 

taken  into  account.     This  is  especially  true  of  the  concep* 
i8 


274  JUSTIFICATION   AND   BECONCILIATION  [2G0-1 

tion  of  the  Divine  holiness,  which,  in  its  Old  Testament 
sense,  is  for  various  reasons  not  valid  in  Chiistianity,  while 
its  use  in  the  New  Testament  is  obscui'e  (vol.  ii.  pp.  89,  101). 
Even  the  recognition  of  the  personality  of  God  does  not 
imply  independent  knowledge  apart  from  our  defining  Him 
as  loving  Will.  It  only  decides  the  form  to  be  given  to  this 
content,  for  without  this  content  of  loving  Will  the  concep- 
tion of  spiritual  personality  is  not  sufficient  to  explain  the 
world  as  a  connected  whole.  The  step,  therefore,  which  we 
take  now  in  bringing  forward  the  truly  Christian  view  of  God 
ought  not  to  be  understood  as  though  in  His  contrast  to  the 
world  God  were  conceived,  first  of  all,  in  general,  as  person- 
ality, and  secondly,  in  particular,  as  loving  Will ; — and  this  in 
such  a  way  that  while  consistent  knowledge  of  the  world  might 
be  drawn  from  the  first  conception,  the  second  would  yield 
simply  more  knowledge  of  the  same  sort.  What  I  mean  is 
rather  this,  that  the  conception  of  love  is  the  only  adequate 
conception  of  God,  for  it  enables  us,  both  to  understand  the 
revelation  which  comes  through  Christ  to  His  community, 
and  at  the  same  time  to  solve  the  problem  of  the  world. 
For  this  purpose  the  merely  formal  conception  of  personality 
is  insufficient:  for  it  leaves  us  free  to  ascribe  all  possible 
kinds  of  content  to  the  Divine  Will.  Now,  if  an  entirely 
different  sort  of  world  were  just  as  possible  for  God  as  the 
world  which  actually  exists,  there  is  no  perceptible  reason 
why  the  actual  world  was  ever  raised  by  God  above  the 
level  of  possibility.  And  therefore,  either  the  formal  con- 
ception of  the  Divine  personality  is  as  unserviceable  as  a 
pantheistic  notion  would  be,  or  it  can  be  successfully 
employed  only  as  the  form  whose  special  content  is  love. 
It  cannot  be  doubted,  as  a  historical  fact,  that  indi- 
viduality (Besonderheit)  is  everywhere  a  characteristic  of  the 
religious  idea  of  God.  But  the  Scotists  on  the  one  hand,  and 
the  Spinozists  on  the  other,  regard  with  distrust  and  aversion 
the  suggestion  that  a  conception  of  God  marked  by  this 
characteristic  is  an  appropriate  expression  of  a  scientific  prin- 
ciple of  knowledge.      Both  follow  the  maxim :  omnia  deter- 


261-2]  THE    DOCTRINE   OF   GOD  275 

minatio  est  negcUio,  and  negation  seems  altogether  incompatible 
with  the  idea  of  God.  Scotism,  however,  fails  to  explain  the 
fact  that  there  is  a  real  world,  while  Spinozism  fails  to  explain 
the  world  as  it  really  is.  But  modern  Pantheism  is  not  at 
all  averse  to  the  view  that  the  Absolute  forms  the  reality  of 
the  world  by  the  gradual  particularisation  of  itself,  so  as  to 
reach  its  full  realisation  through  the  special  organ  of  the 
human  spirit  and  its  special  functions  of  intuition  and  method- 
ical knowledge.  If  we  think  God  as  the  universal  ground 
of  all  reality,  we  cannot  avoid  ascribing  individuality  to  Him 
in  some  way  or  other.  For  even  in  logic  the  particular  comes 
under  the  universal  only  because  it  comes  under  the  indi- 
vidual The  will,  too,  becomes  the  universal  ground  of 
particular  real  acts  only  by  keeping  to  a  definite  direction, 
and  Bimultaneously  refraining  from  other  possible  directions. 
On  the  other  hand,  the  Spinozistic  principle  that  every 
special  determination  implies  negation,  amounts  to  no  more 
than  the  logical  law  that  the  conceptions  of  the  individual 
and  the  differentia  always  hold  good  together,  or  that  we  dis- 
tinguish things  by  their  species.  If,  therefore,  the  conception 
of  individuality  is  inapplicable  to  God,  God  cannot  be  distin- 
guished from  things,  nor  things  from  God.  Either  everything 
is  God,  or  everything  is  world.  Either  the  distinction  of 
things  from  one  another  and  from  the  universal  substance  is  a 
delusion,  or  it  is  a  self-deception  to  assume  the  existenco  of 
an  intelligent  Creator  of  the  world  which  is  distinct  from 
Him,  and  differentiated  within  itself.  But  this  latter  assump- 
tion was  found  necessary  to  explain  the  world,  differentiated 
as  it  is  into  nature  and  spiritual  life,  with  this  further  cir- 
cumstance, that  men  regard  their  common  moral  life  as  the 
final  end  of  the  world  (§  29).  To  eliminate  individuality 
from  the  conception  of  God,  therefore,  is  wrong,  for  it  leads 
to  absurd  conclusions. 

God's  personal  will,  like  any  other  force,  can  be  thought 
as  the  cause  of  effects  only  when  acting  in  a  definite  direc- 
tion. As  Will,  God  can  be  thought  only  as  in  conscious  relation 
to  the  end  which  He  Himself  is.     Nevertheless,  this  formal 


276  JUSTIFICATION   AND    REOONCIIJATION  [262-3 

truth  is  inadequate  to  explain  anything  which  is  not  God ; 
it  is  inadequate,  therefore,  to  explain  the  world.  Unless  it 
can  be  shown  that,  and  how,  the  world  is  embraced  in  the 
personal  end  which  God  sets  before  Himself,  then  even  this 
analysis  of  the  Divine  Will  leads  to  nothing.  We  shall  find 
that  the  conception  of  love,  which  is  the  key  to  the  revelation 
of  God  in  Christianity,  carries  us  past  the  difficulties  which 
accompany  that  analysis.  Still,  the  preliminary  question 
arises,  whether  to  determine  the  Divine  Will  in  this  specific 
way  is  not  to  menace  the  value  of  the  conception  of  God. 
For  if  God,  conceived  under  the  special  attribute  of  love,  is 
subordinated  to  a  generic  conception  of  will,  it  might  be 
argued  that  this  generic  idea,  as  the  higher,  might  claim  to  be 
in  value  the  equivalent  of  God.  Here  the  difficulty  solved 
above  returns  in  another  form.  Nevertheless,  the  specific 
character  assigned  to  God's  Will  is  not  such  that  the  affirma- 
tion of  it  is  the  negation  of  some  other  specific  character 
which  in  itself  might  possibly  belong  to  Him,  nor  is  it  such 
that  some  other  being  might  have  to  be  viewed,  imder  some 
other  category,  as  deserving  comparison  with  God.  The  truth 
rather  is,  that  only  through  the  special  attribute  of  love  is  it 
possible  to  derive  the  world  from  God ;  this  quality  of  love, 
therefore,  serves  in  general  to  discover  to  us  in  God  the  ground 
of  the  unity  of  nature  and  spirit,  and  the  law  of  their  co- 
existence. It  cannot,  therefore,  be  regarded  as  lessening  the 
cosmic  significance  of  God.  The  logical  superiority  of  the 
genus  to  the  species  never  implies  that  the  genus  has  an 
existence  apart  from  the  species.  The  conception  of  God, 
therefore,  when  it  is  specifically  determined  as  love,  is  not  to 
be  regarded  as  being  subordinated  to  some  hypothetical  sub- 
stance, called  "  Will  in  general "  or  "  indeterminate  Will,"  and 
thus  possessed  of  the  absoluteness  which  does  not  belong  to 
Will  when  defined  as  love.  For  we  have  seen  that  indeter- 
minate Will  is  incapable  of  explaining  anything. 

The  word  "  love  "  is  frequently  used  to  denote  the  feeling 
of  the  worth  of  an  object  for  the  Self.  But  as  such  feeling 
always  sets   the  will  in  motion,  either   to  appropriate   the 


263-4]  THE   DOCTKINE    OF   GOD  277 

loved  object  or  to  enrich  its  existence,  ordinary  usage  com- 
prises these  kinds  of  movement  of  the  will  also  under  the 
designation  of  love.     Nor  is   common  usage   ambiguous  in 
doing  so,  for  the  two  aspects  of  the  emotion  are  closely 
related  to  one  another.     Love,  as  feeling,  fulfils  its  nature 
when  it  excites  the  will ;  and  love,  as  will,  includes  the  feeling 
of  the  same  name.     The  conception  of  love,  therefore,  is  com- 
pletely expressed  by  combining  both.     Love  is  will  aiming 
either  at  the  appropriation  of  an  object  or  at  the  enrichment 
of  its  existence,  because  moved  by  a  feeling  of  its  worth. 
But  this  definition  needs  to  be  supplemented  by  special  quali- 
fications.     First,  it  is  necessary  that  the  objects  which  are 
loved  should  be  of  like  nature  to  the  subject  which  loves, 
namely,  persons.      When   we   speak  of  love  for   things  or 
animals,  the  conception  is  degraded  beneath  its  proper  mean- 
ing.   Secondly,  love  implies  a  will  which  is  constant  in  its  aim. 
If  the  objects  change,  we  may  have  fancies,  but  we  cannot 
love.     Thirdly,  love  aims  at  the  promotion  of  the  other's 
personal  end,  whether    known  or  conjectured.      To  render 
assistance  in  ordinary  matters  does  not  require  love,  but  only 
good-feeling,  a  less  definite    thing.      Love,  however,  is  not 
merely  interested  in  the  loved  one's  aflfairs,  which  may  perhaps 
have  simply  an  accidental  connection  with  him.     What  love 
does  is  rather  to  estimate  everything  which  concerns  the  other, 
by  its  bearing  on  the  character  in  which  the  loved  one  is 
precious  to  the  lover.     Whatever  valuable  spiritual  acquire- 
ments the  other  may  possess,  or  whatever  is  still  necessary  for 
his  perfection,  becomes  the  content  of  the  definite  ideal  which 
the  lover  sets  before  himself.    Love  desires  either  to  promote, 
to  maintain,  and  through  sympathetic  interest  to  enjoy  the 
individuality  of  character  acquired  by  the  other,  or  to  assist 
him  in  securing  those  blessings  which  are  necessary  to  ensure 
the  attainment  of  his  personal  ideal.     Fourthly,  if  love  is  to 
be  a  constant  attitude  of  the  will,  and  if  the  appropriation 
and  the  promotion  of  the  other's  personal  end  are  not  alter- 
nately to  diverge,  but  to  coincide  in  each  act,  then  the  will 
of  the  lover  must  take  up  the  other's  personal  end  and  make 


278  JUSTIFICATION   AND   RECONCILIATION  [264-5 

it  part  of  his  own.  That  is,  love  continually  strives  to 
develop  and  to  appropriate  the  individual  self-end  of  the 
other  personality,  regarding  this  as  a  task  necessary  to  the 
very  nature  of  its  own  personal  end,  its  own  conscious  indi- 
viduality. This  characteristic  implies  that  the  will,  as  love, 
does  not  give  itself  up  for  the  other's  sake.  To  take  up  this 
position  is  not,  as  some  have  objected,  to  introduce  the  ele- 
ment of  egoism  into  the  conception  of  love.  For  the  will  is 
egoistic  when  it  sets  itself  in  opposition  to  the  common  aims 
of  others ;  but  in  the  present  case,  the  will  is  directed  to  the 
closest  fellowship  with  another  and  to  a  common  end.  This 
conception  of  love  may  without  difficulty  be  tested  by  being 
applied  to  all  sub-species  of  love,  such  as  friendship,  conjugal 
aftection,  paternal  affection,  and  love  for  one's  parents. 

When,  now,  we  apply  this  conception  to  God,  it  becomes 
clear  that  neither  the  indeterminate  notion  of  a  cosmos,  nor 
the  notion  of  the  natural  world,  can  be  conceived  as  the  corre- 
late of  this  particular  aspect  of  the  Divine  will ;  for  in  them 
there  is  nothing  akin  to  God.  The  proposition,  that  God 
created  the  world  out  of  love,  is  useless  to  begin  with,  so  far 
as  it  can  bear  the  meaning  that  God  communicates  Himself 
to  mere  creatures,  and  gives  their  existence  realisation  as 
though  it  were  the  ultimate  aim  of  His  personal  end.  We 
can  find  an  object  which  corresponds  to  His  nature  as  love 
only  in  one  or  many  personal  beings.  We  cannot,  of  course, 
decide  from  the  conception  of  love  itself  whether  the  forth- 
bringing  of  one  loved  person,  or  the  forth-bringing,  education, 
and  perfecting  of  a  world  of  spirits,  constitutes  the  end  which, 
under  the  conception  of  love,  must  be  thought  as  embraced 
within  the  personal  end  of  God.  But  the  world  also  is  for  us 
a  given  fact,  and  an  examination  of  the  various  aspects  of  the 
conception  of  God  cannot  but  have  some  bearing  upon  the 
existence  of  the  world,  in  which  a  multiplicity  of  persons 
exist  as  members  of  a  race.  These  come  into  existence  as  a 
multitude  of  individuals,  participating,  as  they  do,  in  material 
and  organic  nature.  For  matter  is  the  original  expression  of 
the  multiplex,  and  the  precondition  of  all  multiplicity ;  while 


266-6]  THB   DOCTRINE   OP   GOD  279 

organic  matter  is  the  expresaion  of  the  difierentiation  of  a 
living  multiplicity  conditioned  by  the  nexus  of  species  and 
genus.  Consideration  of  the  world,  therefore,  shows  that  a 
multiplicity  of  persons,  together  composing  a  race,  may  be 
the  object  of  the  Divine  love;  while,  apart  from  this  em- 
pirical observation,  it  is  at  least  as  conceivable  that  God's 
personal  end  should  be  bound  up  with  that  of  a  single  kindred 
spirit  as  with  that  of  a  multiplicity  of  spirits. 

Now,  if  we  follow  out,  in  the  first  instance,  the  connection 
given  in  experience  between  the  world  of  spirits  and  nature,  we 
find  that  we  may  draw,  from  the  relation  between  the  world 
of  spirits  and  God's  character  as  love,  a  necessary  conclusion 
regarding  the  origin  of  the  world  of  nature.     If  it  be  an 
essential  part  of  God's  personal  end  that  He  should  create  a 
multitude  of  spirits,  formed  after  their  own  kind,  and  that  He 
should  bring  them  to  perfection  in  order  to  manifest  Himself 
to  them  as  love,  then   the  world  of  nature,  viewed  in  its 
separate  formation  as  distinct  from  the  world  of  men,  cannot 
be  viewed  as  a  mere  arbitrary  appendix,  but  must  rather  be 
regarded  as  a  means  to  the  Divine  end.     The  rest  of  nature 
might  be  an  arbitrary  appendix  to  the  existence  of  the  human 
race,  were  it  not  called  into  existence  by  a  Divine  Will  whose 
character  is  love — were  it,  in  other  words,  the  creation  of  a 
purely  indeterminate  Divine  Will.     But  absolutely  nothing 
definite  or  real  can  be  derived  from  such  a  ground  as  this. 
Nature,  therefore,  must  likewise  be  explained  from  the  Divine 
Will  in  its  self-given  character  of  love.     But,  owing  to  its 
lack  of  kinship  with  God,  it  cannot  be  the  direct  object  and 
the  last  end  of  His  loving  will.     And  so  nothing  rem£iins  but 
to  conclude,  that  nature  is  called  into  being  to  serve  as  a  means 
to  God's  essential  purpose  in  creating  the  world  of  spirits.     In 
this  way  the  statement  that  God  has  created  the  world  out  of 
love  receives  its  proper  limitations,  and  the  creation  of  nature 
by  God  is  given  the  value  of  a  relative  necessity,  the  necessity, 
namely,  of  serving  as  a  means  to  God's  previously  chosen  end 
of  caUing  into  being  a  multitude  of  spirits  akin  to  Himself. 
Granted,  therefore,  that  the  world  o{  nature  in  general  cannot 


280  JUSTIFICATION   AND   RECONCILIATION  [266-7 

be  known  directly  as  the  creation  of  God,  and  that,  on  the 
other  hand,  the  moral  development  of  men  as  individuals,  and 
their  union  through  progressive  fellowship  in  good,  demand 
for  their  explanation  the  idea  of  God,  it  must  still  be  remem- 
bered that  these  results  cannot  be  attained  save  through 
the  means  furnished  by  our  natural  endowment.  For  the 
apparatus  by  which  the  individual  life  and  all  commerce  in 
things  spiritual  is  carried  on,  presupposes  for  its  permanent 
existence  the  whole  immeasurable  system  of  the  world, 
mechanical,  chemical,  organic.  Consequently,  if  we  must 
conceive  God  as  necessary  to  guarantee  our  personal  morality 
and  our  moral  fellowship,  we  must  recognise  that  the  entire 
universe  is  designed  to  serve  this  Divine  end ;  for  otherwise  we 
could  not  view  even  our  moral  life  as  an  object  of  Divine  care. 
The  whole  universe,  therefore,  considered  thus  as  the  precon- 
dition of  the  moral  kingdom  of  created  spirits,  is  throughout 
God's  creation  for  this  end. 

"We  have  now  provisionally  recognised  a  multitude  of 
spirits,  together  forming  a  race,  as  a  possible  object  of  the 
Divine  love.  But  the  question  may  be  asked  whether, 
since  multiplicity  is  a  necessary  characteristic  of  them,  they 
can  really  be  akin  in  nature  to  the  one  Divine  Will.  For  the 
human  race,  in  virtue  of  its  attribute  of  multiplicity,  is  in- 
volved in  the  conditions  under  which  the  genera  and  species  of 
all  organic  creatures  exist.  Qud  multiplicity,  therefore,  the 
human  race  is  akin  to  nature  and  not  akin  to  God.  In  order 
to  prove  its  kinship  with  God,  it  would  be  necessary  to  con- 
ceive the  human  race  as  a  unity  in  spite  of  its  natural 
multiplicity,  a  unity  which  is  other  than  its  natural  generic 
unity.  The  conception  we  are  in  search  of  is  given  in  the 
idea  of  the  Christian  community,  which  makes  the  Kingdom 
of  God  its  task.  This  idea  of  the  moral  unification  of  the 
human  race,  through  action  prompted  by  universal  love  to 
our  neighbour,  represents  a  unity  of  many  which  belongs 
to  the  realm  of  the  thoroughly  defined,  in  other  words,  the 
good  will.  The  multitude  of  spirits  who,  for  all  their  natural 
and  generic  affinity,  may  yet,  in  the  practical  expression  they 


267-8]  THB   DOCTRINE   OP   GOD  281 

give  to  their  will,  be  utterly  at  variance,  attain  a  supernatural 
unity  through  mutual  and  social  action  prompted  by  love, 
action  which  is  no  longer  limited  by  considerations  of  family, 
class,  or  nationality — and  this  without  abrogating  the  multi- 
plicity given  in  experience.  It  is  an  essential  characteristic 
of  the  Kingdom  of  God  that,  as  the  final  end  which  is  being 
realised  in  the  world  and  as  the  supreme  good  of  created 
spirits,  it  transcends  the  world,  just  as  God  Himself  is  supra- 
mundane.  The  idea  of  the  Kingdom  of  God,  therefore,  gives 
a  supramundane  character  to  humanity  as  bound  to  Him,  i.e, 
it  both  transcends  and  completes  all  the  natural  and  particular 
motives  which  unite  men  together.  Consequently,  the  unity 
of  the  human  race  thus  reached  is  so  far  akin  to  the  unity  of 
the  Divine  Will  that  in  it  may  be  seen  the  object  of  the 
Divine  love.  But  the  community,  which  is  called  on  to  form 
itself  by  union  into  the  Kingdom  of  God,  and  whose  activity 
consists  in  carrying  out  this  assigned  task,  depends  entirely 
for  its  origin  on  the  fact  that  the  Son  of  God  is  its  Lord,  to 
Whom  it  rendei-s  obedience.  The  community,  as  the  object  to 
which  God's  love  extends,  cannot  even  be  conceived  apart  from 
the  presupposition  that  it  is  governed  continually  by  its 
Founder  as  its  Lord,  and  that  its  members  go  through  the 
experience  of  being  transformed  into  that  peculiar  character  of 
which  their  Lord  is  the  original,  and  which,  through  Him,  is 
communicated  to  them  (2  Cor.  iii.  18;  Eom.  viii.  29).  The 
community  of  Christ,  therefore,  is  the  correlative  of  the  love  of 
God,  only  because  the  love  in  which  God  embraces  His  Son 
and  assures  to  Him  His  unique  position  (Mark  i.  11,  ix.  7  ; 
John  XV.  9,  xvii.  24 ;  Col.  i.  13  ;  Eph.  i.  6),  comes  through  Him 
to  act  upon  those  likewise  who  belong  to  Him  as  His  disciples  or 
His  community  (vol.  ii.  p.  97).  Every  aspect  of  this  relation- 
ship to  Christ,  however,  is  comprised  under  the  principle,  that 
the  Son  of  God  is  acknowledged  as  the  Lord  of  His  com- 
mimity,  and  under  this  condition  transfers  to  it  His  own 
relation  to  God.  The  perfect  name  of  God,  by  which  He 
reveals  Himself  to  this  community,  owes  its  interpretation, 
accordingly,  to  these  progressive  manifestations  of  His  love. 


282  JUSTIFICATION   AND   RECONCILIATION  [268-9 

God  is  love,  inasmuch  as  He  reveals  Himself  through  His  Son 
to  the  community,  which  He  has  founded,  in  order  to  form  it 
into  the  Kingdom  of  Grod,  so  that  in  designing  for  men  this 
supramundane  destiny  He  realises  His  own  glory,  or  the 
fulfilment  of  His  personal  end.  Herein  is  the  love  of  God 
perfected,  that  we  love  our  brethren  in  the  Kingdom  of  God 
(1  John  iv.  12).  But  as,  from  our  point  of  view,  this  con- 
summation always  appears  as  one  yet  to  be  attained,  our 
progress  towards  it  is  guided  by  our  perception  of  the  truth 
that  for  us  the  love  of  God,  in  His  relation  to  His  Son  our 
Lord,  is  an  assured  fact.  Lastly,  it  becomes  clear  in  this 
connection  that  the  destination  of  man  for  the  Kingdom  of 
God,  in  the  form  of  the  community  of  God's  Son,  is  to  be 
included  in  the  Christian  conception  of  man,  and  not  to  be 
distinguished  from  it  as  something  lying  above  and  beyond  it 
If,  now,  the  creation  and  government  of  the  world  are 
accordingly  to  be  conceived  as  the  means  whereby  created 
spiritual  beings — men — are  formed  into  the  Kingdom  of  God 
in  the  community  of  Christ,  then  the  view  of  the  world  given 
in  Christianity  is  the  key  to  solve  the  problem  of  the  world  in 
general  The  fact  that  this  religion,  in  its  origin,  wears  a 
particular  historical  guise,  is  no  hindrance  to  its  being  destined 
to  become  the  imiversal  faith  of  humanity.  The  conception 
of  God,  however,  through  which  this  result  is  reached,  avoids 
the  difficulties  in  which  is  entangled  the  conception  of  God 
held  by  the  older  school  of  theologians  (§  32),  and  rises  above 
the  dilemma  in  which  the  orthodox  and  the  Scotist  theories 
circle  aimlessly  round  one  another.  When  God  is  conceived 
SLB  love,  through  the  relation  of  His  will  to  His  Son  and  the 
community  of  the  Kingdom  of  God,  He  is  not  conceived  as 
being  anything  apart  from  and  prior  to  His  self-determination 
as  love.  He  is  either  conceived  as  love,  or  simply  not  at  all. 
If  anyone  thinks  it  necessary,  after  the  analogy  of  human 
personality,  to  conceive  God  first  as  infinite  Being,  or  as  inde- 
terminate Will,  or  as  quiescent  Character,  which  may  advance 
within  itself  to  self-determination  as  love,  what  he  conceives 
under  these  prefatory  ideas  is  simply  not  God.    For  they  mean 


269]  THE   DOCTRINE    OF   GOD  283 

something  that  becomes.  But  God  is  conceived  as  loving  Will, 
when  we  regard  His  Will  as  set  upon  the  forth-bringing  of  His 
Son  and  the  community  of  the  Kingdom  of  God ;  and  if  we 
abstract  from  that,  what  we  conceive  is  not  God  at  all.  At 
the  same  time,  the  eternity  of  God  is  guaranteed  by  the  very 
fact  that  we  are  compelled  to  think  God  in  that  self-deter- 
mination as  love  in  which  we  actually  do  think  Him ;  for  the 
content  of  our  thought  would  not  be  really  God,  if  we  still 
posited  something  as  prior  in  order  to  deduce  from  it  His 
character  as  love.  Nor  is  the  act  of  thought  which  I  am 
describing  at  all  difficult.  It  has  its  analogy  in  the  feeling  of 
self  and  the  judgment  upon  self  of  which  we  are  conscious  in 
exalted  moments  of  moral  will,  and  in  which  we  discover  ex- 
perimentally our  power  of  self-determination  towards  good,  and 
rise  above  all  the  obstacles  which  are  present  within  us  and 
without. 

Lastly,  these  results  decide  the  twofold  question,  whether 
God  wills  the  good  because  it  is  the  good  a  priori  for  Him 
also,  or  whether  a  thing  is  good  merely  because  God  wills  it. 
Both  suppositions  are  false.  We  cannot  at  all  conceive  a  will 
which  is  not  definitely  directed  to  some  end.  The  Scotists 
held  that  God  could  as  easily  command  as  forbid  deceit ;  the 
will,  however,  which  they  thus  ascribe  to  Him  is  a  will  with- 
out direction.  And  a  will  which  should  receive  its  direction 
from  an  a  priori  substantive  righteousness  is  not  the  self- 
determination  befitting  God.  Now  the  conception  of  good 
employed  in  the  twofold  question  stated  above  ought  to  be 
deduced  exclusively  from  the  consistent  aim  of  the  highest 
human  fellowship,  i,e,  from  the  law  of  the  Kingdom  of  God. 
But  if  the  Kingdom  is  the  necess€kry  correlate  of  God's 
personal  end,  to  which  the  Divine  will  is  directed,  then  it  is 
inconceivable  that  God  could  command  deceit  or  theft,  for  they 
are  contrary  to  the  personal  end  of  God  as  expressed  in  His 
Kingdom.  On  the  other  hand,  the  thought  of  the  Kingdom 
of  God  as  the  content  of  His  personal  end  is  a  datum,  it  is 
true,  for  our  knowledge,  but  not  for  God  before  He  determines 
Himself  in  His  own  Will,     The  truth  is  rather  that  it  is 


284  JUSTIFICATION   AND   RECONCILIATION  [269-270 

brought  forth  eternally  in  God's  self-determination  as  love ;  it 
holds  good  for  God,  therefore,  not  before,  but  in  His  self- 
determination,  as  expressing  the  direction  His  self-determina- 
tion cannot  but  take  in  order  to  realise  His  purpose.  And 
we  simply  cannot  have  a  right  conception  of  the  good  as 
defining  the  relations  of  the  multitude  of  persons  who  com- 
pose the  Kingdom  of  God,  if  we  abstract  from  the  form  of  the 
Divine  WUl,  and  from  its  content  as  love. 

§  35.  The  Christian  idea  of  the  Kingdom  of  God,  which 
has  been  proved  the  correlate  of  the  conception  of  God  as 
love,  denotes  the  association  of  mankind — an  association  both 
extensively  and  intensively  the  most  comprehensive  possible 
— through  the  reciprocal  moral  action  of  its  members,  action 
which  transcends  all  merely  natural  and  particular  considera- 
tions. Now  it  has  been  shown  (vol.  ii.  p.  295)  that  this, 
the  ruling  idea  of  Jesus,  failed  to  maintain  itself  as  central 
in  the  'practical  interest  of  the  apostles,  and  came  to  possess 
only  the  limited  sense  of  the  redemptive  consummation 
expected  in  the  future.  Cares  about  the  formation  of 
congregations  came  so  much  to  the  front,  that  the  entire 
moral  interest  was  concentrated  on  their  internal  consolida- 
tion. In  order  to  preserve  the  true  articulation  of  the 
Christian  view  of  the  world,  it  is  necessary  clearly  to 
distinguish  between  viewing  the  followers  of  Christ,  first, 
under  the  conception  of  the  Kingdom  of  God,  and  secondly, 
under  the  conception  of  the  worshipping  community,  or  the 
Church.  This  distinction  depends  on  the  difference  which 
exists  between  moral  and  devotional  action,  despite  the  fact 
that  in  Christianity  moral  action  likewise  can  claim  the  value 
of  service  to  God.  Now  every  devotional  act,  in  the 
technical  sense  of  the  word,  is  an  end  in  itself  to  this 
extent,  that  it  never  can  be  at  the  same  time  a  means  to  an 
act  of  the  same  kind.  One  may  intend  sacrifice  and  prayer 
to  be  the  means  of  winning  Divine  favour  and  Divine  gifts ; 
but,  among  all  the  various  possible  devotional  rites,  it  is 
neither  conceivable  nor  justifiable  to  subordinate  any  one  of 
them  to  another  as  a  means  to  an  end.     Each  devotional  act, 


270-1]  THE   DOCTRINE   OF   GOD  285 

rather,  just  like  artistic  action,  possesses  in  itself  its  end  and 
its  power  to  satisfy  the  human  heart.  On  the  other  hand, 
every  moral  act,  whatever  its  range,  has  this  peculiarity,  that 
it  must  be  conceived  at  once  as  an  end  and  as  a  means  to  all 
other  possible  moral  acts.  This  is  true  even  when  the 
agent's  original  intention  does  not  include  the  thought  of 
morality  as  a  means  to  itself,  but  the  fact  is  brought  out 
only  subsequently  that  those  moral  goods,  which  are  produced 
by  action,  always  stimulate  action  afresh.  Those  who 
believe  in  Christ,  therefore,  constitute  a  Church  in  so  far  as 
they  express  in  prayer  their  faith  in  God  the  Father,  or 
present  themselves  to  God  as  men  who  through  Christ  are 
well-pleasing  to  Him.  The  same  believers  in  Christ  con- 
stitute the  Kingdom  of  God  in  so  far  as,  forgetting  distinc- 
tions of  sex,  rank,  or  nationality,  they  act  reciprocally  from 
love,  and  thus  call  into  existence  that  fellowship  of  moral 
disposition  and  moral  blessings  which  extends,  through  all 
possible  gradations,  to  the  limits  of  the  human  race.^  The 
fellowship  of  Christians  for  the  purpose  of  religious  worship 
manifests  itself  in  the  sphere  of  sense,  and  therefore  betrays 
its  peculiar  nature  to  every  observer.  On  the  other  hand,  the 
moral  Kingdom  of  God,  even  while  it  manifests  itself  sensibly 
in  action,  as  a  whole  reveals  its  peculiar  nature  to  Christian 
faith  alone.  Moreover,  the  fellowship  of  Christians  for 
worship  gives  rise  to  legal  ordinances  which  it  requires  for 
its  own  sake ;  but  the  Kingdom  of  God,  while  not  injuriously 
affected  by  the  fact  that  moral  action  under  certain 
circumstances  assumes  the  garb  of  legal  forms,  does  not  in 
the  least  depend  on  them  for  its  continued  existence. 

The  importance  of  this  distinction,  for  theology  as  well  as 
for  practical  life,  will  appear  if  we  remember  what  confusion 
and  obscurity  have  gathered  round  this  point.  The  early 
Church,  it  is  true,  was  saved  from  confounding  the  two  con- 
ceptions by  the  fact  that,  following  the  example  of  the  apostles, 
it  regarded  the  Kingdom  of  God  as  denoting  in  general  the 

^  To  both  may  be  applied  Schleiermacher's  distinction  between  action  that  ia 
sjmbolic  (representative),  and  action  that  ia  organising  (difiseminative). 


286  JUSTIFICATION   AND    RKCONCIUATION  [271-2 

object  of  the  Christian  hope,  but  the  Church  as  a  present 
institution,  representing  the  task  to  be  accomplished  during 
the  period  of  earthly  life.  Instead  of  this  view,  which 
is  incomplete  and  yet  not  positively  incorrect,  Augustine 
introduced  into  the  Western  Church  the  fatally  erroneous 
opinion,  that  the  Kingdom  of  God,  which  stretches  down  the 
whole  of  human  history  parallel  with  the  kingdom  of  sin, 
exists  at  present  in  the  form  of  the  Catholic  Church,  and 
that  Christ's  reign  of  a  thousand  years,  which  occupies  the  last 
epoch  of  the  world's  history,  does  not  still  lie  in  the  future, 
but  has  begun  with  the  founding  of  the  Church.  In  the 
Kingdom  of  God,  he  teaches,  true  righteousness  is  realised ; 
the  State,  on  the  other  hand,  as  the  kingdom  of  this  world,  has 
sin  for  its  principle,  and  can  be  brought  into  harmony  with 
the  Divine  order  only  by  subordinating  itself  to  the  govern- 
ment of  the  Church.  This  theory  has  determined  the  policy 
of  the  Papacy  in  opposition  to  the  State  up  to  the  present 
moment.  History,  however,  has  brought  to  light  the  fact 
that  in  this  "  Kingdom  of  God,"  governed  by  His  earthly  vice- 
gerent, righteousness  consists  in  the  most  selfish  quarrelsome- 
ness, and  in  the  employment  of  all  means,  whether  of  violence 
or  of  falsehood,  which  may  be  found  of  use  for  tlus  purpose. 

Nothing  shows  so  clearly  that  the  Eeformers  have 
broken  with  this  theory,  in  which  culminates  Augustine's 
view  of  the  world,  as  their  recognition  of  the  State  as  a 
directly  Divine  institution,  and  of  civil  justice  as  a  positive 
moral  good.  They  ofifer  no  deliberate  criticism  upon  the  above- 
mentioned  theory,  especially  as  Augustine's  argument,  as 
such,  does  not  seem  to  have  been  known  to  them.  The  truth 
is,  they  wholly  lose  sight  of  the  idea  of  the  Kingdom  of  God 
so  far  as  its  eschatological  sense  was  not  forced  upon  them  by 
the  New  Testament.  But,  on  the  other  hand,  they  construct 
an  idea  analogous  to  it  under  the  title  of  the  "  Kingdom  of 
Christ."  From  this  idea  sprang  the  theoretical  opposition,  and 
the  more  important  practical  alienation,  which  arose  between 
Luther  and  Zwingli.  Luther,  as  a  theologian,  had  arrived  at  a 
clear-cut  antithesis  between  religion  and  the  State ;  and  so  by 


272-3]  THE    DOCTRINE   OF    GOD  287 

the  Kingdom  of  Christ  he  understood  the  inward  union 
between  believers  and  the  Mediator,  which  subsists  exclus- 
ively through  the  Word  of  God  and  faith,  and  is  bound  by 
no  law  or  legal  government:  regnum  Christi  est  spirituale, 
Zwingli,  on  the  other  hand,  was  so  far  influenced  by  the 
theocratic  aspirations  of  the  later  Middle  Ages,  in  line  with 
Wiclif,  Huss,  and  Savonarola  (vol.  i.  p.  134),  that  he  directly 
assigned  to  the  State  the  function  of  realising  the  true 
reUgion  by  means  of  its  laws  and  government.  Accord- 
ingly, in  conscious  opposition  to  Luther  and  his  followers,  he 
defended  the  principle :  regnum  Christi  est  externum.  This  is 
the  standard  by  which  his  reforming  and  political  activity 
must  be  gauged;  this  also  explains  the  tragic  close  of  his 
life.  The  principle  he  asserted,  however,  has  not  remained 
determinative  for  the  ecclesiastical  constitution  which  owes 
its  origin  to  him,  nor  for  that  which  Calvin  founded,  but  was 
brought  into  operation  again  only  by  the  Puritans,  and  that 
under  completely  altered  circumstances.  Calvin,  rather, 
holds  to  a  theory  in  evident  agreement  with  Luther's.  He 
regards  the  Kingdom  of  Christ  as  the  inward  spiritual  union 
of  believers  with  Christ,  which  means  that-  Christ,  through 
His  Spirit,  guarantees  to  them  the  certainty  of  eternal  life, 
leads  them  to  victory  over  all  obstacles  hostile  to  salvation, 
and  ministers  support  to  them  for  the  patient  endurance  of 
all  their  cares  and  sufferings.  But  as  Luther's  idea  of  the 
spiritual  Kingdom  of  Christ  did  not  suggest  any  legal 
constitution  for  the  Church,  and  the  State  had  to  be  called 
in  to  assume  this  latter  responsibility,  Melanchthon,  Luther, 
and  Calvin  come  back  to  this,  that  they  admit  the  Zwinglian 
principle  that  the  State  has  a  religious  function,  and  concede 
its  validity  as  a  practical  measure,  alongside  of  the  theoretical 
distinction  between  the  State  on  the  one  hand  and  religion 
and  the  Church  on  the  other.  This  comes  out  in  the  theory 
put  forward  first  of  all  by  Melanchthon,  that  the  State  is 
called  upon  to  protect  both  tables  of  the  Divine  law,  and 
therefore  has  not  only  to  prevent  the  false  worship  of  God, 
but  also  to  provide  for  the  true.     The  only  way  in  which  it 


288  JUSTIFICATION   AND   RECONCILIATION  [273—4 

was  possible  to  avoid  the  plain  inconsistency  between  these 
two  positions  was  hj  holding  that  the  legal  constitution 
of  the  Church,  which  it  receives  from  the  State,  forms 
no  part  of  the  conception  of  the  Kingdom  of  Christ,  and  that 
the  only  organs  of  Christ's  Kingdom  are  the  religious  factors, 
the  preaching  of  the  Gospel  and  the  administration  of  the 
sacraments.  It  was  only  from  the  point  of  view  which  affirms 
that  discipline  maxima  ex  parte  a  potestcUe  clavium  et  spirituali 
iurisdidione  pendet,  that  Calvin  ventured  to  vindicate  that 
also  as  an  essential  note  of  the  Church;  while  he  omitted 
to  consider  theoretically  the  important  practical  influence 
exercised  upon  discipline  by  the  civil  power.^ 

Luther's  conception  of  the  Kingdom  of  Christ  also 
coincides  with  the  general  Reformation  conception  of  the 
Church  as  the  fellowship  of  believers,  in  so  far  as  the  latter 
conception  is  taken  in  a  purely  religious  sense,  and  defined 
exclusively  with  reference  to  the  creative  action  of  God  upon 
believers,  and  not  as  relating  to  their  corresponding  activity, 
namely,  the  worship  of  God.  But  this  conception  of  the 
Kingdom  of  Christ  is  very  far  indeed  from  expressing  the 
fellowship  of  moral  action  prompted  by  love.  This,  the  content 
of  the  original  idea  of  the  Kingdom  of  God,  is  simply  not 
apprehended  at  all  in  this  form  by  the  Eeformers  and  their 
orthodox  successors,  with  the  single  exception  of  Luther's 
Catechism  and  the  Apology  of  the  Augsburg  GonfessAon  (p.  11). 
This  indicates  an  essential  defect  in  the  Beformers'  compass 
of  thought  and  in  the  scholastic  theology  which  is  counted 
loyal  to  the  Church,  when  we  compare  these  with  the 
authority  of  Christ  Himself.  Besides,  there  is  a  tenet, 
peculiar  to  Melanchthon,  which  might  end  in  assigning  to 
the  Church  or  the  Kingdom  of  Christ  such  a  significance  as 

*  Cf.  Kostlin,  Luther^ 8  TheologU^  ii.  p.  380 ;  Melanchthon,  Loci  theol. 
C.  E.  xxi.  pp.  619,  920  ;  my  lecture  on  **Ulrich  Zwingli"  {Jahrb,  fur  deiUsche 
Thcol,  xvii.  pp.  109-137) ;  Zioinglii  Opera,  viii.  pp.  174-184  (Letter  to 
Ambrosius  Blarer) ;  C,  R.  iii.  pp.  240-258  {de  iure  re/ormandi) ;  Schenkel,  On 
the  original  relation  of  the  Church  to  the  State  within  the  hounds  of  German 
Protestantism  {Stvd.  u,  Krit.  1850,  pts.  1,  2) ;  Calvini  InH.  chr.  rel.  ii.  15.  4, 
5  ;  iv.  12.  1 ;  20.  1-3,  9  ;  Weingarten,  Th^  Churches  of  the  English  HevolrUion, 
pp.  35  f.,  128  ff. ;  Conf.  Scoticana  (1560), cap.  24,  in  Niemeyer's  Coll,  Conff.  p.  355. 


274-5]  THB   DOCTRINE    OF   GOD  289 

to  smuggle  in  Eoman  Catholic  error  regarding  the  legal 
authority  of  the  Church  in  matters  of  faith.  Melanchthon, 
that  is  to  say,  in  his  conception  of  the  Kingdom  of  Christ, 
expressly  accepts  preaching  as  a  means.  Now  preaching  is 
a  legal  institution  of  the  Church,  incongruous  therefore  with 
the  spiritual  and  inward  nature  of  the  union  of  the  believers 
with  Christ  expressed  in  the  notion  of  His  Kingdom.  But 
to  assert  this  connection  between  preaching  and  the  Church, 
as  is  further  done  by  Gerhard  and  Quenstedt,  and  also  by 
Seformed  divines,  is  to  maintain  in  principle  the  same  idea 
as  is  implied  in  the  claim  made  by  the  Catholic  Church  to 
be  the  fellowship  of  godly  righteousness  and  blessedness,  on 
the  ground  that  she  is  constituted  a  unity  through  the  hier- 
archy as  a  legal  institution.  If,  following  the  Eeformers,  we 
regard  the  Kingdom  of  Christ  or  the  Church,  understood  in 
a  purely  religious  way,  as  the  fellowship  of  believers  brought 
into  existence  by  God  through  the  preaching  of  His  Word, 
and  essentially  characterised  by  that  fact,  then,  in  harmony 
with  Melanchthon's  Smalcald  Confessional  tract,  de  potestate 
et  iurisdicticme  episcoporum  (§  68),  we  conceive  the  community 
of  believers  as  the  subject  by  which  the  Divine  Word  is 
proclaimed,  without  thinking  of  any  special  office  for  the 
discharge  of  this  task.  'But  when  we  think  of  this  special 
office  as  a  means  essential  to  the  Church,  this  is  to  conceive 
the  Church  as  a  society  of  a  legal  character.  And  so 
Melanchthon,  in  connecting  the  office  of  preaching  as  he  did 
with  the  Kingdom  of  Christ,  committed  an  indiscretion 
erroneous  in  theory,  and  in  practice  calculated  to  have 
serious  consequences.  A  legally  constituted  Church,  be  it 
Catholic  or  Lutheran,  is  not  the  Kingdom  of  God  or  the 
Kingdom  of  Christ,  for  the  simple  reason  that  the  Church 
is  not  the  Kingdom  of  God.  Activity  of  the  most  important 
kind  for  the  service  of  the  Church  may  be  of  no  value  what- 
ever for  the  Kingdom  of  God.  Nor  is  devotion  to  the  Church 
a  virtue  which  could  in  any  way  compensate  for  the  absence  of 
conscientiousness,  justice,  truthfulness,  uprightness,  tolerance. 
While  we  must  at  present  put  up  with  a  great  deal  which  con- 
19 


/ 


290  JUSTIFICATION   AND    RECONCIUATION  [275-6 

tradicts  this  principle,  I  have  always  counted  what  Christ  says 
in  Matt.  vii.  21-23  as  part  of  the  consolations  of  the  Gospel. 

According  to  the  canons  of  the  New  Testament,  then,  we 
find  that  the  self -same  subject,  namely,  the  community  drawn 
together  by  Christ,  constitutes  the  Church  in  so  far  as  its 
members  unite  in  the  same  religious  worship,  and,  further, 
create  for  this  purpose  a  legal  constitution ;  while,  on  the 
other  hand,  it  constitutes  the  Kingdom  of  God  in  so  far  as 
the  members  of  the  community  give  themselves  to  the  inter- 
change of  action  prompted  by  love.  These  two  modes  of 
activity,  however,  are  not  unrelated  to  one  another.  They 
rather  condition  one  another  reciprocally.  For  Christians 
must  get  to  know  one  another  as  such  in  the  exercises  of 
Divine  worship,  if  they  are  to  make  sure  of  occasions  to 
combine  together  in  mutual  action  from  love.  On  the  other 
hand,  the  whole  range  of  this  loving  activity  serves  to  support 
the  maintenance  and  extension  of  fellowship  in  Divine  wor- 
ship. For  there  is  nothing  from  which  the  latter  sufiers 
more  than  from  slackness  in  discharging  the  tasks  of  the 
Kingdom  of  God,  even  though  that  Kingdom  consists  in 
righteousness  and  peace  and  joy  in  the  Holy  Ghost  (Rom. 
xiv.  17,  18). 

§  36.  The  Kingdom  of  God,  then,  is  the  correlate  of 
God's  love  in  so  far  as  it  is  the  association  of  men  for 
reciprocal  and  common  action  from  the  motive  of  love — 
an  association  which  is  determined,  no  longer  by  the 
natural  conditions  of  afl&nity  in  the  narrower  sense,  but 
by  the  unity  of  man's  spiritual  constitution.  So  far  as 
this  association  comes  to  be  a  reality  through  the  media- 
tion of  Christ  in  His  community,  it  is  always  due  to  the 
operation  of  God,  and  only  subject  to  this  condition  can  it 
be  completely  conceived.  And  this  does  not  mean  merely 
that  the  individuals  combined  in  the  Kingdom  of  God  are 
subject  to  Divine  action  as  creatures  and  members  of  the 
natural  world ;  it  means,  besides,  that,  as  possessed  of  moral 
freedom  and  in  accordance  with  their  spiritual  constitution 
and  destiny,  they  stand  in  the  line  of  that  purpose  which. 


276-7]  THB   DOCTRINE   OF   GOD  291 

from  our  interpretation  of  love,  we  have  found  to  be  the 
content  of  God's  personal  end.  Accordingly,  the  instances  of 
human  action  from  love  which  are  comprehended  under  the 
Kingdom  of  God  constitute,  as  the  correlate  of  God's  personal 
end  and  as  His  specific  operations,  the  perfect  revelation  of 
the  truth  that  God  is  love.  What  is  here  stated  by  way  of 
deduction  is  anticipated  by  John,  when  he  says  that  if  we  love 
one  another,  God  dwelleth  in  us,  and  His  love  is  perfected 
in  us  (1  John  ii.  5,  iv.  22  ;  cf.  vol.  ii.  p.  376).  The  creation 
of  this  fellowship  of  love  among  men,  accordingly,  is  not 
merely  the  end  of  the  world,  but  at  the  same  time  the 
completed  revelation  of  God  Himself,  beyond  which  none 
other  and  none  higher  can  be  conceived.  This  principle 
supplies  a  basis  for  that  religious  and  theological  way  of 
looking  at  the  world,  which  sets  itself  in  opposition  to  those 
Areopagitic  conclusions  whose  baneful  after-effects  are  present 
in  all  forms  of  orthodoxy.  Instead  of  holding  with  Thomas 
Aquinas  that  God's  personal  end  has  no  relation  to  the 
end  of  the  world,  we  find  not  only  that  God's  personal 
end  and  the  end  of  the  world  are  one,  but  also  that  the 
knowledge  of  the  end  of  the  world  attainable  by  us  coincides 
with  the  Christian  idea  of  the  nature  and  the  completed 
revelation  of  God. 

On  the  basis  of  these  results  we  may  approach  certain 
difficulties  which  spring,  partly  from  a  closer  examination  of 
the  theory  we  have  arrived  at,  partly  from  a  comparison  of 
it  with  our  historical  experience.  The  first  question  is,  how 
dependeTice  on  God,  as  the  form  of  human  action  from  love, 
is  compatible  with  freedom ;  for  not  only  is  it  necessary  to 
conceive  such  action  as  free,  but  freedom  is  attested  by  the 
immediate  feeling  of  self  (§6).  I  should  not  venture  to 
touch  upon  this  classical  question  of  theology,  were  it  not 
that  by  pursuing  the  path  we  have  adopted  it  is  possible  so 
to  limit  it  as  to  facilitate  its  solution.  The  controversy 
between  Pelagius  and  Augustine  has  become  the  regular 
model  for  theological  discussion  of  the  problem,  but  on  these 
lines,  certainly,  no  solution  of  it  is  to  be  looked  for.     For 


y 


292  JUSTIFICATION   AND   RECONCILIATION  [277-8 

the  dilemma,  between  freedom  of  choice  ( WahlfreiheU)  and 
the  Divinely-imposed  necessitation  by  original  sin  and  elect- 
ing grace,  involves  merely  a  small  section  of  the  problem  in 
its  philosophical  form ;  and  the  shifting  opinions,  which 
appear  in  ecclesiastical  theology,  regarding  the  relation 
between  grace  and  freedom,  have  never  been  determined  by 
the  principles  which  suggest  themselves  most  readily  in 
theology.  For  within  Christianity  experience  teaches  that 
it  is  just  in  and  through  a  special  kind  of  dependence  on 
God  that  we  possess  freedom  to  do  good.  Theology,  there- 
fore, is  only  concerned  with  the  question  whether  the  law  of 
freedom  cannot  be  found  by  an  analysis  of  tliis  special 
experience ;  whereas  Pelagius,  by  his  general  conception  of 
freedom  of  choice,  excluded  a  priori  every  law  of  the  kind, 
and  Augustine  merely  maintained  as  against  freedom  a  law 
of  sin  and  predestination.  Between  these  two  positions  there 
is  no  medium,  and  a  theology  shut  up  to  this  dilemma  is 
condemned  to  help  itself  out  by  a  circumvention  of  the 
diflBculty,  which  certainly  takes  a  different  form  with 
Thomists,  Scotists,  Lutherans,  and  Calvinists,  but  is  always 
equally  unsatisfactory. 

If  freedom  signifies  that  in  which  personality  is  unlike 
nature,  although  in  virtue  of  its  bodily  organisation  person- 
ality is  interwoven  with  nature  and  receives  from  it  impulses 
of  a  coercive  kind,  yet  freedom  is  not  the  indeterminate  in 
general,  or  that  which  is  incapable  of  determination.  Free- 
dom, rather,  is  something  quite  as  determinate  as  the  system 
of  nature,  for  only  so  can  it  be  conceived  as  decidedly  distinct 
from  or  opposed  to  the  latter.  Freedom,  to  begin  with,  is 
the  quality  of  self-determination-  by  universal  ideals.  Con- 
scious self-determination  in  general  would  not,  by  itself,  be 
an  adequate  expression  for  freedom:  for  even  the  coercive 
operation  of  particular  impulses  assumes  in  the  soul  the 
form  of  conscious  self-determination.  Nothing  short  of  self- 
determination  by  universal  ideals  constitutes  that  capacity 
of  the  spirit  which  sets  a  limit  to  the  propensities  and  their 
compulsion,  and  thus  makes  itself  known  as  a  force  opposed 


278-9]  THE   DOCTRINB   OF   GOD  293 

to  them.  If  now  the  spirit  determines  itself  miinterruptedly 
hj  a  single  end,  then,  as  a  power  ruling  over  its  individual 
impulses,  it  is  free.  For  freedom  from  compulsion — the 
negative  sense  of  the  conception — is  actually  realised  only 
when,  in  a  positive  sense,  power  is  attained  over  such 
influences  as  can  in  themselves,  or  under  certain  conditions, 
exercise  a  compulsion  which  has  its  basis  in  nature.  Free- 
dom, as  the  power  of  self-determination  supreme  over  our 
impulses,  is  not  attained,  however,  when  the  end  which 
dominates  our  self-determinution  is  bad,  or  when  it  consists 
in  the  satisfaction  of  a  single  impulse.  For  in  that  case 
we  have  only  a  partial  power  over  our  impulses,  while  the 
pursuit  of  a  bad  end  implies  a  defect  of  freedom  as  against 
the  single  dominant  impulse.  Even  though  the  general 
ends  of  our  family,  or  class,  or  nationality  form  our  personal 
end,  self-determination  exclusively  by  regard  for  family  feel- 
ing, the  interest  of  a  class,  or  patriotism,  may  be  bad  if  it 
sets  itself  in  opposition  to  common  ends  that  are  higher  still. 
In  such  cases  what  binds  the  will  is  certainly  not  a  form  of 
personal  selfishness;  but  yet  the  limitation  of  our  moral 
interest  to  these  ends  of  merely  relative  universality  implies 
a  refined  or  idealised  selfishness,  and  therefore  a  defect  of 
freedom  as  against  the  impulse  arising  from  natural  partiality 
for  one's  relatives,  for  those  who  follow  the  same  occupation, 
or  for  public  law  and  the  State.  Freedom,  therefore,  consists 
in  self-determination  by  that  end  which,  by  possessing  the 
most  universal  content,  makes  it  possible  to  subordinate  to  it 
all  individual  impulses  and  all  moral  aims  which  may  be 
particular  in  their  range.  In  other  words,  freedom  is  per- 
manent self-determination  by  the  good  end,  the  standard  of 
which  is  to  be  found  in  the  law  of  universal  love  for  man,  or, 
in  Christian  terminology,  permanent  self-determination  by 
the  Kingdom  of  God  as  final  end.  The  Kingdom  of  God, 
however,  is  at  the  same  time  the  end  of  the  world  in  general  ; 
accordingly,  action  which  is  guided  by  its  aims  proves  itself 
free  in  the  positive  sense  likewise,  in  so  far  as  it  is  controlled 
by  the  consciousness  that  all  interaction  between  surrounding 


294  JUSTIFICATION   AND   REC0NC5IIIATION  [279-280 

nature  and  one's  own  natural  character  is  to  be  estimated 
solely  as  a  means  subservient  to  the  agent.  If,  now,  this 
action  within  the  Kingdom  of  God  be  regarded  in  its  com- 
pleteness, viewed,  i.e,,  according  to  its  religious  idea,  then  the 
man  who  perceives  himself  to  be  free  in  the  relations  alluded 
to,  must  at  the  same  time  conceive  himself  as  dependent  on 
God  throughout  the  whole  range  of  his  activity.  For  the 
Kingdom  of  God,  in  which  we  come  to  know  freedom 
experimentally,  being  as  it  is  the  highest  universal  end  by 
which  our  self-determination  can  be  guided,  is  included  as  the 
object  of  Divine  love  in  God's  personal  end ;  in  other  words, 
it  is  dependent  upon  God  as  a  whole,  and  therefore  also  in  all 
the  particular  relations  which  go  to  make  up  the  whole.  Thus 
there  is  no  inner  contradiction  in  this  theory.  And  if,  never- 
theless, human  knowledge  in  this  field  can  conceive  freedom 
of  action  and  dependence  on  God  only  as  alternatives,  this  is 
so  because  men  cannot,  like  God,  survey  simultaneously  the 
system  of  the  whole  in  all  its  parts  and  connections.  It  is 
their  part,  therefore,  to  aim  in  their  individual  action  at  the 
final  end  of  the  whole,  and  thus  become  conscious  of  their 
freedom ;  and,  while  doing  so,  they  may  hope  to  come  to 
possess  the  sense  that,  as  members  of  the  whole,  they  are 
dependent  on  God,  and  that  in  particxdar,  as  active  members 
of  the  Klingdom  of  God,  they  form  part  of  God's  highest 
revelation  of  Himself. 

Hence  arises  a  new  reason  why  we  should  criticise  both  the 
Lutheran-Calvinistic  and  the  Socinian  theories  of  the  moral 
order.  Both  are  out  of  harmony  with  Christianity  exactly  in 
so  far  as  they  are  not  guided  by  the  Kingdom  of  God  as  a 
positive  end  which,  as  common  both  to  God  and  man,  follows 
from  the  conception  of  Divine  love.  It  is  for  this  reason  that 
both  schools  have  failed  to  reconcile,  at  any  single  point, 
moral  freedom  and  dependence  upon  God.  In  various  forms 
they  give  fixity  to  the  customary  experience  that  freedom  and 
dependence  are  mutually  exclusive.  The  Socinians  begin  with 
the  position  that  men  are  created  by  God  like  slaves  without 
rights,  and  therefore,  as  mere  chattels,  are  dependent  on  His 


280-1]  THE   DOCTRINK   OP   GOD  295 

pleasure.     It  ifi  added  that  He  has  given  them  a  claim  upon 
His  equity  (Billiffkeit),  and  the   result  is  a  dispensation  in 
which  God  and  men  co-operate,  alternately  free  and  dependent 
on  each  other,  just  as  in  a  private  relationship  one  who  has 
more  power  compounds  with  those  who  have  less.     The  theory 
of  the  Lutherans  and  Calvinists  begins  with  the  position  that 
men,  created  by  God  with  an  innate  right  to  blessedness,  have 
a  range  of  action  not  embraced  in  any  knowable  Divine  end, 
but  only  Umited  by  the  condition  of  good  works  imposed  by 
God     True,  one  might  say  that  this  domain  of  human  life, 
directed  as  it  is  to  the  goal  of  blessedness,  is  still  subservient 
to  the  glory  of  God,  and  therefore  to  His  personal  end.     But 
a  consideration  such  as  that  is  in  its  nature  ineffectual ;  for 
this  reason,  that  the  punishment  of  Adam's  sin  by  the  con- 
demnation of  his  race,  or  at  least  the  eternal  rejection  of  the 
greater  part  of  mankind,  is  declared  to  be  as  appropriate  a 
means  to  God's  glory  as  the  salvation  of  mankind,  or  of  the 
eternally  elect.     In  fact,  we  find  here  no  concrete  idea  of  the 
Divine   end,  in  and  through   which  a  specific  relationship 
between  God  and  man  is  essentially  involved,  and  a  basis 
given  for  some  necessary  form  of  Eevelation.     And  so,  after 
man's  relative  freedom  and  relative  dependence  on  God  had 
been  affirmed  as  the  original  form  of  the  world-order,  the 
latter,  in  consequence  of  the  treatment  awarded  to  Adam's  sin, 
veers  round  into  an  assumption    of   human  dependence  on 
Divine  arrangements,  so  complete  that  neither  in  the  status  of 
sin  nor  in  the  status  of  grace  is  freedom  conceded,  or,  as  in 
Lutheranism,  conceded  only  by  an  inconsistency.     However 
irrational  these  positions  turn  out  in  particular  respects,  yet 
the  starting-points  of  both  theories  are  rationalistic,  in  the 
same  way  as  the  opposed  theories  of  Pelagius  and  Augustine 
are  dominated  by  the  common  experience  that  freedom  and 
dependence  are  mutually  exclusive.     But  it  is  not  for  Chris- 
tian theology  to  start  from  such  commonplaces  of  superficial 
experience  ;    otherwise    it    cannot    interpret    those    special 
experiences,  belonging  to  the  Christian  life,  in  which  moral 
freedom  and  dependence  on  God  coincide.     But  if  we  start. 


296  JUSTIFICATION   AND   EECONCILIATION  [281 

as  we  must,  from  the  analysis  of  freedom  as  subservient  to  the 
final  end  of  the  Kingdom  of  God,  then  we  are  not  only  forced 
to  regard  this  use  of  freedom  as  being  eo  ipso  entire  depend- 
ence on  God,  but  there  results  this  further  rule,  that  we  must 
employ  these  two  ways  of  looking  at  things  alternately, 
because  we  cannot,  like  God,  include  in  one  view  the  whole  of 
the  Kingdom  of  God  and  our  incorporation  in  it.  Simultane- 
ously, however,  this  practical  principle  emerges,  that,  provided 
we  continually  guide  our  action,  in  all  its  special  relations,  by 
the  highest  and  universal  end,  we  thereby  take  our  place  in 
the  system  of  the  Kingdom  of  God,  the  object  of  Divine  love. 

§  37.  A  peculiar  diflBculty  arises,  however,  when  we 
institute  a  comparison  between  this  principle  and  the  history 
of  the  human  race.  What  we  are  in  search  of  is  a  moral 
order  for  mankind  in  general ;  the  order  represented  by  the 
Kingdom  of  God,  however,  holds  good  merely  for  the  Christian 
portion  of  mankind.  Accordingly,  the  general  truth  that  God 
is  love  seems  to  be  imperilled  if  the  correlate  of  the  Divine 
love,  the  Kingdom  of  God  and  its  law,  is  realised  merely 
in  a  particular,  temporally  and  spatially  limited,  domain  of 
human  history,  and  has  not  governed  the  development  of 
humanity  from  the  beginning.  The  theological  schools,  whose 
theories  we  have  rejected,  deserve  to  be  pardoned,  at  least  for 
this  reason  if  for  no  other,  that  they  have  undertaken  to 
exhibit  a  moral  order  which  shall  embrace  all  mankind  as 
related  to  the  one  God.  Without  this,  we  are  apt  to  repeat 
Marcion's  error  and  make  the  God  Who  is  love,  and  has 
created  His  Kingdom  through  Christ,  distinct  from  the  God 
Who  made  the  world,  and  rules  over  natural  humanity,  or  at 
least  over  the  Jewish  people. 

Now  it  is  worthy  of  remark  that  Augustine  escapes  from 
this  dUemma  by  assuming  that  the  Kingdom  of  God,  of  which 
Christianity  is  the  completion,  has  always  existed  ever  since 
there  were  men,  that  it  constituted  the  dispensation  under 
which  our  first  parents  lived  before  the  Fall,  that  after  the 
Fall  it  resumed  its  course  with  Abel  and  then  again  with  Seth, 
and  that  it  has  had  a  connected,  though  oftentimes  a  hidden, 


281-2]  THE   DOCTRINE   OP   GOD  297 

existence  during  the  whole  course  of  human  history.  Augustine 
vindicates  this  conception  by  pointing  to  the  fact  that  righteous 
Israelites,  in  believing  the  promises  of  their  religion,  really 
exercised  faith  in  Christ ;  and  at  the  same  time  he  infers,  from 
the  example  of  Job  the  Idumean,  that  even  those  belonging  to 
other  peoples  could  live  according  to  God,  could  please  God, 
and  belong  to  His  Kingdom  {Be  civUate  dei,  xviii.  47).  Now 
we  cannot,  it  is  true,  follow  him  in  this  view  of  history ;  it 
does  not  solve  the  difficulty  as  to  how  the  universal  signifi- 
cance of  the  Kingdom  of  God  for  the  relationship  between  the 
human  race  and  God  is  to  be  reconciled  with  its  temporal 
limitations,  as  commencing  with  Jesus.  And  this  difficulty 
Augustine  himself  felt  still  more  deeply ;  for  he  puts  to  him- 
self the  question  how  God  can  be  thought  as  Lord  under  all 
conditions,  if  He  did  not  always  have  creatures  to  serve  Him. 
This  question  he  answers  by  referring  to  the  world  of  angels, 
which  existed  eternally,  even  though  created  in  time  and  not 
equally  eternal  with  God  (xii.  15).  But  just  in  this  theory 
we  find  a  precise  expression  of  the  difference  between  time 
and  eternity,  which  in  part  seems  to  admit  merely  of  a  casual 
relationship  between  God  and  creation,  and  in  part  throws  upon 
God  the  semblance  of  temporal  change.  How  to  escape  this 
difficulty  is  the  peculiar  problem  which  arises  out  of  the  course, 
as  hitherto  followed,  of  our  investigation  into  the  relation  which 
exists  between  the  conception  of  God  as  love  and  the  Kingdom 
of  God  which  has  been  called  into  life  by  Christ.  Augustine 
thinks  that  the  difficulty  described  above  is  due  to  an  im- 
prudent use  of  the  analogy  of  human  life.  In  this  he  is 
right ;  but  the  brilliant  antitheses  in  which  he  describes  the 
conditions  of  the  Divine  volition  and  action  have  no  meaning 
save  the  negative  one,  that  these  conditions  lie  beyond  our 
powers  of  thought.^ 

If  any  further  knowledge  whatever  on  this  point  is 
possible,  it  can  be  attained  only  by  distinguishing  accurately 
those  elements  in  the  idea  of  the  eternity  of  God  which  are 

*  De  civ.  tUi,  xii  17  :  "  Non  alitcr  deus  afficitur  cum  vacat,  aliter  cum  oper- 
atur.  .  •  •  Kovit  quiesoens  agere  et  agens  quiescere." 


298  JUSTIFICATION    AND   RECONCILIATION  [282-3 

treated  by  Augustine  himself.  For  him,  the  eternity  of  God 
implies,  first,  the  iuward  continuity  and  identity  of  God's 
purpose ;  secondly,  existence  without  beginning  or  end.  These 
two  ideas  are  heterogeneous,  and  have  no  necessary  relation 
to  one  another.  If  by  eternity  we  understand  the  unchang- 
ing continuity  and  identity  of  the  Divine  will  in  relation  to  its 
goal,  then  we  cannot  place  existence  without  beginning  or  end 
on  a  par  with  the  former  element,  for  it  does  not  necessarily  ex- 
clude a  change  of  will.  Besides,  this  formula,  for  one  thing,  is 
not  a  positive  conception ;  for  another,  it  must  in  a  certain 
sense  be  predicated  of  the  world,  just  as  we  are  accustomed  to 
apply  it  to  God  (p.  234).  For  in  every  act  of  knowledge  we 
presuppose  that  the  world  and  its  orderly  system  always 
exist,  for  if  we  were  to  suppose  the  world  non-existent,  our 
knowledge  would  cease.  And  this  holds  true  not  merely  of 
our  knowledge  of  parts  of  the  world,  but  also  of  our  know- 
ledge of  God.  For  there,  too,  we  cannot  abstract  from  the 
world.  If,  therefore,  we  are  unable  to  place  ourselves  in 
thought  before  the  beginning  or  after  the  end  of  the  world, 
without  being  forced  to  think  ourselves  away  and  cease  to 
think,  we  are  shut  up  either  to  conceiving  the  world  as 
without  beginning  or  end,  or  to  holding  that  it  always  exists. 
But  such  a  conclusion  has  only  the  negative  value  of  saying 
that  we  cannot  represent  to  ourselves  the  characteristics 
which  would  actually  belong  to  the  beginning  of  the  world, 
and  that  we  cannot  abstract  from  its  existence.  Now,  the 
existence  of  God  without  beginning  or  end  likewise  signifies 
that,  in  comparing  the  world  with  God  and  explaining  it  as 
arising  from  His  will,  we  cannot  think  God  as  non-existent. 
But  just  as  the  conception  of  endless  existence,  when  applied 
to  the  world,  merely  expresses  the  limits  of  our  faculties,  and 
accordingly  does  not  exclude  the  possibility  that  on  other 
grounds  the  world  has  a  beginning,  so  one  might  discover 
grounds  showing  that  God,  Who  always  exists,  nevertheless 
has  a  beginning  in  Himself.  This,  at  least,  is  what  the 
theosophy  of  the  school  of  Bohme  comes  to.  No  guarantee, 
therefore,  which  would  ensure  the  essential  distinction  between 


283-4]  THE   DOCTRINB   OF   GOD  299 

God  and  the  world  is  to  be  got  by  following  this  line  of 
thought.  Besides,  if  we  express  that  distinction  hj  applying 
the  pi'edicate  "  eternal "  to  God,  then  it  is  inadmissible  to 
speak  of  the  eternity  of  the  world.  For  the  world,  besides 
existing,  is  always  liable  to  change,  and  to  say  that  the  world 
always  exists  implies  merely  that  we  cannot  conceive  its 
beginning  or  its  end.  If,  on  the  other  hand,  the  idea  of  the 
eternity  of  God  is  taken  as  referring  to  the  continual  and 
immutable  aim  with  which  His  will  is  directed  towards  His 
purpose,  and  towards  the  Kingdom  of  God  as  within  that 
purpose,  then  the  positive  meaning  of  this  conception  of 
eternity  is  given  when  we  compare  it  with  the  changing  action 
of  God  in  time,  from  which  we  can  no  more  abstract  in  theology 
than  in  religion.  If  we  tried  to  escape  from  this  idea,  we 
should  have  to  deny  the  reality  of  all  individual  existence. 
On  the  other  hand,  it  is  impossible  to  explain  the  world 
successfully  either  from  the  conception  of  a  universal  sub- 
stance, or  from  that  of  an  indeterminate  wilL  Any  attempt 
at  such  explanation  can  succeed  only  if  we  conceive  the  Will 
of  God,  the  presupposed  ground  of  the  whole,  as  set  in  a 
certain  direction.  God's  Will,  permanent  and  certain  of  itself, 
directed  towards  the  realisation  of  the  Kingdom  of  God  as 
the  ethical  and  supramundane  unity  of  a  multitude  of  souls, 
forms,  for  the  sake  of  this  end,  the  ground  of  everything, 
whether  multiplex  or  individual,  which  serves  as  a  means  to 
its  accomplishment.  We  must  therefore  conclude  that  God 
creates  in  time  the  multiplicity  of  things,  which,  as  superior 
or  inferior  to  each  other,  become  causes  and  effects. 

But  now,  is  it  a  defect  for  God  that  the  Kingdom  of  God 
is  realised  only  at  an  enormous  distance  of  time,  not  only 
from  the  beginning  of  the  human  race,  but  still  further  from 
the  beginning  of  creation  ?  For  it  was  under  this  impression 
that  Augustine  felt  himself  compelled  not  merely  to  date  the 
beginning  of  the  Kingdom  of  God  from  the  creation  of  the 
first  man,  but  to  carry  back  its  existence  to  the  original 
creation  of  the  angels — both  to  the  detriment  of  the  religious 
value  to  be  put  upon  the  claims  which  Christ  makes  for  His 


300  JUSTIFICATION   AKD   RECONCILUTION  [284r-6 

unique  work.  But  the  goal  of  human  history  and  of  creation, 
though,  measured  from  the  beginning  of  both,  it  is  late  in  being 
reached,  does  not  therefore  stand  in  a  more  remote  relation 
to  the  permanently  identical  will  of  God  than  do  the  acts  by 
which  His  diverse  creations  are  called  into  existence.  On 
the  contrary,  the  end,  embraced  as  it  is  in  the  Divine  self- 
end,  stands  nearer  to  His  eternal  will  than  the  creatures, 
which  are  merely  means  to  its  realisation.  Moreover,  in 
every  act  of  creation  and  of  government  performed  by  Him 
as  a  means  to  this  end,  God,  as  omnipotent  will,  is  equally 
certain,  not  only  of  His  end  in  an  ideal  sense,  but  also  of  its 
being  realised  by  every  means  employed,  however  diversified 
and  remote.  This  may  be  seen  from  the  fact  that  we  are 
conscious  of  the  very  opposite,  as  a  defect  arising  from  our 
creaturely  position.  When  we  are  carrying  out  a  plan  piece 
by  piece,  we  may  have  a  sure  and  firm  grasp  .of  it  in  thought ; 
and  though  it  should  be  that  each  successive  link  in  the  chain 
is  not  yet  thought  out  in  advance  with  perfect  clearness,  even 
this  may  leave  us  still  unconscious  of  our  imperfection.  But 
when  we  remember  our  manifold  dependence  on  nature  and 
society,  or  the  weakness  of  our  will,  we  see  that  the  attain- 
ment of  a  preliminary  aim  by  no  means  implies  that  thereby 
we  enjoy  already  the  realisation  of  the  whole  enterprise.  On 
the  contrary,  partial  satisfaction  makes  us,  likewise,  always  the 
victims  of  unrest  and  fear  for  the  completion  of  the  intended 
whole.  On  the  other  hand,  through  the  very  arrangement  of 
our  conduct  in  accordance  with  a  plan  of  life,  we  gain  experi- 
mental knowledge  of  the  fact  that  our  spirit  is  destined  for 
eternity :  and  just  as  certainly  we  come  to  know  the  eternity 
of  God  from  this,  that  through  the  continuity  of  His  will  as 
directed  to  the  end  of  the  Kingdom  of  God,  there  is  cancelled 
for  Him  the  significance  of  time,  in  which,  to  serve  that  end. 
He  calls  the  individual  into  existence  or  causes  it  to  appear — 
in  other  words,  that  the  temporal  interval  between  His  pre- 
paratory creations  and  the  realisation  of  the  goal  of  revelation, 
means  nothing  for  Him.  The  realisation  of  each  subordinate 
means  by  the  Divine  will  is  reflected  in  God's  self-feeling  or 


285-6]  THE   DOCTRINE   OF   GOD  301 

blessedness  as  the  realisation  of  the  whole.  For  this  reason, 
too,  there  lies  no  inconsistency  for  our  knowledge  in  the  fact 
that  the  Kingdom  of  God  is  contained  in  the  eternal  purpose 
of  God  as  the  correlate  of  His  loving  Will,  while  our  historical 
experience  tells  us  that  it  is  realised  only  at  the  close  of  the 
first  era  of  the  world's  existence.  The  religious  reflection — 
arising  out  of  the  Christian  view  of  the  world — which  affirms 
that  God  "  has  chosen  us/'  the  Christian  community  of  the 
Kingdom  of  God,  "  in  Jesus  Christ  our  Lord  before  the  founda- 
tion of  the  world"  (Eph.  i.  4;  cf .  1  Pet.  i.  20),  no  doubt 
merely  asserts  the  truth  that  the  final  end  of  the  world — 
which  is  contained  within  the  purpose  of  the  supramundane 
God  as  its  essential  object — is  for  God  assured  of  fulfilment, 
quite  apart  from  the  creation  of  the  whole  system  of  things 
which  stands  to  that  end  in  the  relation  of  means.  At  the 
same  time  the  statement  just  cited  from  the  New  Testament, 
by  also  employing  the  temporal  idea  "  before  the  foundation 
of  the  world,"  indicates  the  interval  of  time  which  lies 
between  the  Divine  decree  and  its  accomplishment.  Possibly 
this  leaves  the  impression  that  the  duration  of  the  world 
forms  an  obstacle  to  the  accomplishment  of  the  Divine  decree, 
and  we  seem  to  be  asked  to  do  what  is  impracticable,  viz.  to 
call  up  an  idea  of  time  existing  before  time,  while  as  a  matter 
of  fact  we  never  can  think  the  world  as  non-existent.  But 
all  that  the  positive  conception  of  the  Divine  eternity  contains 
is  the  logical  superordination  of  the  election  of  the  community 
over  the  creation  of  the  world.  Accordingly,  the  idea  of  the 
cjommunity's  eternal  election  denotes  only  the  value  which 
belongs  to  the  community  of  the  Kingdom  of  God,  as  the 
Divine  final  end,  in  contrast  with  the  world,  which  is,  in 
comparison,  merely  a  means.  We  therefore  reject  the  misuse 
which  is  made  of  this  idea,  as  though  the  world  formed  an 
obstacle  even  for  God,  as  so  often  it  does  for  us ;  for  we 
recognise  that  at  every  step  of  creation  God  not  only  remains 
sure  and  certain  of  His  plan,  but  enjoys  the  consciousness  of 
the  realisation  of  the  intended  whole  as  such. 

For  though  the  idea  of  time  must  so  far  hold  good  for 


302  JUSTIFICATION    AND   RECONCILIATION  [286-7 

God  also  that  He  distinguishes  the  individual  thing  as  such 
from  its  causes,  its  effects,  and  all  similar  existences  (p.  122), 
yet  we  do  not  assert  that  our  idea  of  time  should,  in  all  its 
aspects,  be  imputed  to  the  Divine  knowledga  For  our  idea 
of  time  is  conditioned  by  the  fact  that  we  find  ourselves 
occupying  a  place  in  the  series  of  causes  and  effects  which 
come  and  go  in  time.^  So  that,  although  the  form  of 
temporal  succession  is  overcome  and  abrogated  by  our 
cognition  in  the  unification  of  impressions,  and  by  our  will  in 
the  imposition  of  a  plan  upon  a  multitude  of  objects  (p.  235), 
yet  the  self-consciousness  of  each  individual  as  a  whole 
remains  chained  to  the  form  of  time.  This  is  manifest  from 
the  fact  that  we  regard  ourselves  and  surrounding  things  as 
real  only  in  the  present,  while  that  which  has  been  and  that 
which  will  yet  be  are  regarded  as  non-existent.  No  doubt 
reflection  rises  superior  to  this  impression  by  recollecting 
that  very  much  that  has  been,  and  no  longer  exists  in  exactly 
the  same  form,  still  survives  as  a  cause  in  its  recognisable 
effects.  Still,  we  do  not  venture  to  apply  a  similar  mode  of 
looking  at  things  to  the  future,  in  which  things  now  present 
will  continue  to  exist  as  causes  even  though  their  present  form 
is  altered.  Thus  it  is  only  in  our  presentiment  of  the  future, 
and  when  reviewing  the  past  in  a  very  fragmentary  way,  that 
we  are  able  transiently  to  escape  from  the  subjection  of  our 
self -consciousness  to  time,  and  to  raise  ourselves  above  those 
limitations  of  our  knowledge  which  arise  from  the  fact  that, 
as  individuals,  we  are  only  parts  of  the  system  of  the  world. 
But  the  very  circumstance  that,  at  least  in  this  degree,  we 
can  understand  the  system  of  things,  compels  us  to  suppose 
that  a  similar  abrogation  of  the  idea  of  time  is  the  rule  for 
the  Spirit  to  Whom,  as  the  Creator  of  the  system  of 
individual  things,  that  system  is  perfectly  transparent.  So 
far  as  the  world  is  subject  in  all  its  individual  facts  to  a 
process  of  becoming,  it  can  be  represented  by  God  only  under 
the  form  of  time ;  and  so  far  also  the  distinction  of  past  and 
future  necessarily  holds  good  for  God's  knowledge  of  things. 

^  or.  Lotze^  MicrocosmuSf  iii,  599  ff, 


287-8]  THE   DOCTRINE   OF    GOD  303 

But  80  far  as  individual  things  are,  through  God,  parts  of  the 
world's  system  and  organically  related  to  its  purpose,  their 
reality  for  God  consists  precisely  in  their  being  members  of 
the  whole,  for  through  His  prevision  of  individual  things  and 
His  insight  into  them  as  persistent  causes.  He  is  conscious  of 
the  realisation  of  the  whole.  On  the  other  hand,  if  the  future 
formed  a  limit  to  the  knowledge  and  self -feeling  of  God,  they 
would  not  attain  satisfaction  and  equipoise  until  the  end  of 
the  ages.  On  this  presupposition,  we  should  be  forbidden 
even  to  believe  that  satisfaction  with  the  world,  previously 
lacking,  had  arrived  for  God. with  the  historical  commence- 
ment of  the  Kingdom  of  God;  for  then  God  would  be 
dependent  on  His  Kingdom  for  the  completion  of  the  possible 
satisfaction  still  awaiting  Him  throughout  all  the  future.  But 
if  this  is  an  absurd  supposition,  then  no  limit  of  time  can  be 
affirmed  to  exist  in  the  life  of  God,  after  which  He  should  be 
more  certain  of  His  goal  than  before.  Rather  must  we  abide 
by  the  statement  that  God  not  only  is  certain  of  His  self-end 
and  His  world-plan  at  every  point  in  its  realisation,  but  that, 
through  the  congruence  of  His  knowledge,  which  penetrates  the 
whole,  with  His  will,  which  moves  the  whole.  He  is  continuously 
conscious  of  the  realisation  of  the  whole  at  every  single  point. 
§  38.  But  what  inferences,  now,  does  the  conception  of 
God  as  love  allow  us  to  draw  for  the  affirmation  of  a  moral 
order?  This  conception  of  God  has  as  its  correlative  the 
association  of  mankind  in  the  Kingdom  of  God,  while  the 
latter,  so  far  as  our  experience  goes,  forms  a  special  section 
of  universal  human  history,  more  limited  in  space  and  in  time 
than  that  history  as  a  whole.  Consequently,  from  this  idea 
of  God  we  can  directly  derive  such  a  conception  of  the 
relations  which  obtain  between  human  life  and  the  world  as 
holds  good  for  those  who  are  members  of  the  Kingdom  of 
God.  Within  this  special  sphere  the  supreme  principle  of 
the  Divine  love  is  to  be  applied  on  the  analogy  of  the 
paternal  education  of  children.  Thence  it  follows  that  all 
evils  which  fall  upon  members  of  the  Kingdom  of  God  have, 
as  Divinely  decreed,  the  significance  of  educative  punishments, 


304  JUSTIFICATION   AND    RECONCILIATION  [288-9 

and  therefore  of  relative  benefits ;  while,  on  the  other  hand, 
we  have  the  assurance  that  all  things  work  together  for 
good  to  them  that  love  God  (Kom.  viii.  24).  It  cannot  be 
doubted,  however,  that  to  this  there  contributes  the  influence 
of  the  reconciliation  likewise  proclaimed  in  Christianity. 
But  we  are  not  concerned  just  now  to  follow  out  this  special 
dispensation  of  human  life,  for  we  are  interested  in  the 
doctrine  of  God  only  in  so  far  as  it  forms  a  general 
presupposition  which  makes  reconciliation  possible.  The 
question  just  now  is,  whether  the  knowledge  we  have,  that  the 
Kingdom  of  God  as  grounded  in  the  Divine  love  is  the  final 
end  of  the  world,  throws  any  light  on  the  character  of  the 
existence  which  the  nations  led  up  to  the  entrance  of  Chris- 
tianity into  history,  and  which  even  Christian  nations  lead, 
so  far  as  we  can  abstract  from  their  belonging  to  the  King- 
dom of  God.  For  if  the  moral  association  of  nations  in  the 
Elingdom  is  the  end  which  God  is  pursuing  in  the  world,  then 
the  inference  is  unavoidable,  that  the  previous  history  of  the 
nations  must  have  stood  in  some  teleological  relation  to  that 
higher  stage  of  development,  and  in  some  positive  degree 
prepared  the  way  for  its  advent,  and  that  a  similar  order  of 
things  must  obtain  also  in  every  Christian  nation  as  a  pre- 
condition of  its  Christianity.  Observation,  therefore,  would 
have  to  verify  the  indications  of  the  connection  thus  suggested, 
by  demonstrating  with  some  measure  of  certainty  that  the 
human  race  is  educatively  prefpared  for  the  Kingdom  of  God, 
When  that  was  done,  perhaps  principles  might  thence  be 
drawn  explaining  God's  dealings  with  individual  men. 

The  writers  of  the  New  Testament  do  not  expend  reflec- 
tion upon  this  problem.  The  history  of  the  Jewish  people 
alone  presented  them  with  the  spectacle  of  a  government  by 
God  so  extraordinary  that  it  could  be  regarded  as  a  positive 
preparation  for  the  Christian  Kingdom  of  God.  Only  two 
statements  of  Faul  in  the  Acts  of  the  Apostles  (xiv.  15-17, 
xvii.  25-30)  deal  directly  with  the  rest  of  the  nations.  They 
indicate  a  very  remote  relationship  between  the  general 
history  of  the  nations  and  the  Divine  government     God  is 


289-90]  THE   DOCTKlNK  OF   GOD  305 

represented  as  having  worked  upon  the  Gentiles  only  through 
the  blessings  of  nature  and  through  the  temporal  and  spatial 
delimitation  of  their  territories,  in  order  to  move  them  thereby 
to  search  after  Him ;  in  the  activities  of  their  moral  history 
He  left  them  to  themselves  without  interference.  The 
standard,  measured  by  which  the  condition  of  the  nations  is 
made  out  to  be  corrupt,  is  not  moral  goodness,  which  is  the 
real  question,  but  their  defective  knowledge  of  God,  while  yet 
very  meagre  opportunities  had  been  given  them  of  acquiring 
it.  The  authentical  statements  of  Paul  in  the  Epistle  to  the 
Bomans  express  a  still  more  unfavourable  judgment,  for  they 
depict  the  entire  life  of  the  Gentiles  as  given  over  to  sin, 
nay,  to  unnatural  vices.  Nay  more,  Paul  takes  so  dark  a 
view  of  the  character  of  the  Jewish  people,  that  he  represents 
the  law  as  given  merely  to  enhance  sin,  not  to  afford  moral 
guidance.  But  his  judgment  is  imperfect;  it  is,  especially 
when  tested  by  the  contents  of  the  Mosaic  law,  historically 
incorrect,  and  it  has  never  been  seriously  adhered  to  by 
theology.  For  what  we  have  to  concern  ourselves  with  at  this 
point  is  not  Paul's  formulation  of  the  contents  of  the  Christian 
religion,  but  his  reflections  upon  history  in  its  contrast  to 
Christianity,  which  had  just  embarked  upon  its  course. 
These  would  have  taken  a  different  form  if  the  apostle  could 
have  surveyed  the  history  of  the  Christian  Church  as  we 
can.  But,  finally,  these  positions  affirmed  by  Paul  are  not 
decisive  in  the  question  at  present  before  us  —  how  the 
general  history  of  the  nations  is  related  to  the  final  end  of 
the  Kingdom  of  God  —  for  this  reason,  that  Paul,  viewing 
mankind  exclusively  as  the  subject  of  sin,  takes  Christianity 
merely  as  a  dispensation  of  reconciliation. 

If  that  is  the  point  at  issue,  then,  it  is  true,  the  universal 
sin  which  we  find  in  pre-Christian  history  is  only  a  negative 
presupposition  of  reconciliation.  But  the  Kingdom  of  God, 
in  the  Christian  sense,  can  be  proved  the  final  end  of  human 
history  only  if  there  existed  even  previously  standards  some- 
how analogous,  which  determined  the  worth  of  human  life  and 

prepared  the  way  for  the  appearance  of  the  perfect  moral 
20 


306  JUSTIFICATION   AKD   RECONCILIATION  [290-1 

standard.     The  judgment  pronounced  by  Paul  upon  universal 
sin  is  a  reflection  of  the  value  he  attached  to  the  Christian 
reconciliation ;  but  it  is  no  less  a  reflection  of  the  value  we 
attach  to  the  moral  and  religious  content  of  Christianity  when 
we   speak  of  God's  education   of  the  human  race,  guiding 
them  to  the  Christian  ideal  of  morality.     For  by  this  hypo- 
thesis the  religious  interpretation  of  the  moral  development 
of  the  individual  which  is  involved  in  Christianity — an  inter- 
pretation derived  from  the  presupposition  of  Divine  sonship 
— is  further  applied  in  a  wider  sense  to  God's  leading  of  the 
nations  to  the  supreme  good.     I  use  the  phrase — the  educa- 
tion of  the  human  race — in  another  sense,  it  is  true,  than 
Lessing  has  given  it  in  his  interpretation  of  the  history  of 
religion.     For  one  thing,  Lessing  has  in  his  eye  merely  the 
narrower  domain  of  Israelitish  and  Christian  religion ;  next, 
he  limits  the  idea  of  education  to  instruction  through  the 
medium  of  revelation ;  finally,  his  idea  of  this  medium  is  such 
that  it  cannot  fail  to  lose  its  applicability  when  Christian 
culture  has  reached  the  stage  of  maturity.     This  is,  no  doubt, 
a  quite  consistent  view  to  take,  if  the  idea  of  education  is 
limited    to   instruction   given    in    school.     Every  man  who 
reaches  a  mature  age  grows   out   of   school;    if    revelation, 
therefore,  is  defined  as  a  kind  of  school-teaching,  it  becomes 
superfluous  for  one  of  independent  character.     But  in  thus 
following  the  customary  theological  prejudice  which  looks  on 
revelation  as  instruction,  Lessing  ignores  the  fact  that  the 
value  which  Christianity  places  upon  human  Ufe,  in  virtue  of 
the  mutual  relations  between  God  as  our  Father  and  us  as 
His  children,  bids  us  view  education  by  God  as  the  highest  and 
the  unsurpassable  criterion.     Moreover,  it  is  certainly  a  part 
of  education  that  at  the  proper  time  the  pupil  should  have 
disclosed  to  him  both  the  aims  and  the  conditions  of  personal 
life ;  but  education  consists  still  more  in  the  timely  restraint 
and  stimulus  of  his  volitions  by  the  authority  of  the  teacher. 
It  is  in  a  much  more  comprehensive  sense  that  Lotze^ 
discusses  the  applicability  of  the  phrase  "  the  education    of 

^  MicrocosinuSf  ill.  p.  20  AT. 


291]  THB   DOCTRINE   OF   GOD  307 

humanity  "  to  the  course  of  history.  Under  that  conception 
he  comprises  all  the  material  of  cultui*e  which  is  the  product 
of  man's  spiritual  nature,  and  is  handed  down  from  generation 
to  generation.  But  he  expresses  a  doubt  as  to  whether  what 
these  conditions  produce  is  the  education  of  mankind  as  a 
whole.  It  is  always  the  individual,  he  contends,  whom  we 
must  conceive  as  the  subject  of  education  ;  humanity,  whose 
spiritual  acquisitions  we  see  augmenting  with  time,  is  divisible 
into  a  sum  of  individuals ;  but  of  that  sum  those  who  come 
earUer  know  nothing  of  the  progress  achieved  by  their  suc- 
cessors ;  while  the  latter,  it  may  be,  receive  the  acquisitions  of 
their  predecessors  in  the  form  of  prejudices,  and  thus  are  put  in 
the  possession  of  the  very  opposite  of  what  is  really  imparted 
by  education,  and  makes  it  valuable  to  the  individual.  Be- 
sides, progress  in  assimilating  the  materials  of  culture  and 
advance  in  their  formal  elaboration  are  never  observable  save 
in  the  minority  of  men,  while  crudity  and  dulness  remain 
the  lot  of  the  great  mass  in  every  generation.  Finally,  evea 
though  we  take  no  account  of  the  many  interruptions  and 
retrogressions  exhibited  by  the  history  of  culture,  and  allow 
the  minority  of  really  educated  persons  to  count  as  humanity, 
yet  even  these  are  incapable  of  surveying  the  course  of  the 
education  of  the  whole  race  with  such  certainty  of  vision  as 
gives  the  individual  assurance  of  the  success  of  his  own  edu- 
cation. For  that  would  demand  an  amount  of  knowledge 
such  as  is  possible,  indeed,  for  scholars,  but  is  not,  at  every 
moment,  at  the  command  of  those  who  in  a  particular  age  may 
rank  as  men  of  culture  and  education.  There  is  an  obvious 
objection  that,  if  we  suppose  ourselves  to  have  unravelled 
the  meaning  of  history  by  styling  it  the  education  of  the 
human  race,  the  above  observations  might  rather  produce  an 
impression  of  the  unconnectedness  of  the  individual's  existence 
with  the  life  of  humanity,  and  of  the  vanity  of  all  things.  It 
is  true,  he  admits,  that  the  sentiment  of  fidelity  in  work  is 
directly  opposed  to  this  despair  of  comprehending  the  course 
of  human  vicissitude,  and  that  it  is  closely  accompanied  by  an 
estimate  of  the  worth  of  individual  activity  for  the  whole, 


308  JUSTIFICATION    AND   RECX)NCILUTION  [291-2 

which  is  the  basis  of  faith  in  the  success  of  such  activity  in 
the  present  and  the  future.  But  that  very  fact  makes  it 
certain  that  the  idea  of  "  the  education  of  humanity "  does 
not  guarantee  our  insight  into  the  laws  of  historical  life 
as  a  whole. 

This  self-feeling,  which  belongs  to  patient  and  public- 
spirited  moral  work,  and  which  repudiates  the  idea  of  the 
vanity  of  all  things,  testifies  to  the  validity  of  the  funda- 
mental truth  that  the  fellowship  which  arises  out  of  these 
individual  contributions  is  the  supreme  good,  the  final  end 
of  the  world.  Moreover,  the  hope  we  base  thereon,  that  the 
effect  of  one's  personal  work  for  the  whole  will  not  be  lost 
even  in  the  future,  always  springs  from  a  religious  view  of 
tlie  whole  as  a  purposive  order.  The  attitude,  therefore, 
which  forms  our  substitute  for  insight  into  the  course  of 
history  is,  stated  plainly,  that  of  practical  activity  in  the 
Kingdom  of  God.  But  in  that  case  the  question  recurs 
yhether  the  idea  of  an  "  education  of  humanity,"  by  being 
limited  in  another  way,  might  not  be  found  suitable  for  inter- 
preting the  historical  preparation  for  the  stage  we  have 
reached  in  our  estimate  of  self  and  the  direction  of  our  will. 

We  must  not,  it  is  true,  expect  to  be  able  to  embrace 
every  nation  in  the  framework  of  a  theory  fitted  to  solve 
the  problem  before  us.  We  can  pass  no  judgment  whatever 
on  nations  which  have  played  no  part  in  history.  Since  the 
question  concerns  the  meaning  of  the  history  of  the  world, 
none  but  the  nations  which  have  participated  in  that  history 
can  be  taken  into  account.  But  even  when  considering  these, 
we  do  not  find  that  though  one  or  other  of  them  may  have 
taken  a  step  in  the  direction  of  the  goal,  it  must  therefore  of 
necessity  have  reached  the  goal  of  its  development,  and 
maintained  itself  at  the  height  of  that  attainment.  Finally, 
in  the  answer  we  seek,  we  shall  not  consider  it  an  objection 
to  the  idea  of  *'  the  education  of  humanity  "  that  the  acquisi- 
tions of  the  preparatory  generation  should  actually  assume, 
for  the  generation  which  follows,  the  form  of  prejudices  ; 
though  in  the  case  of  the  education  of  the  individual  that 


292-3]  THE   DOCTRINE   OF   GOD  309 

form  might  as  easily  be  taken  to  imply  a  hindrance  as  a  help. 
What  I  mean  is  that  the  idea  of  the  Kingdom  of  God,  as  the 
moral  fellowship  of  men  proper  to  their  nature,  had  its  way  to 
influence  prepared  by  the  fact  that  it  was  preceded  by  the  moral 
fellowship  of  the  Family,  national  fellowship  in  the  State,  and, 
lastly,  the  combination  of  several  nations  in  the  World-empire . 
The  Christian  conception  of  the  Kingdom  of  God  in   part 
stands  in  the  closest  analogy  with  all  these  graduated  forms, 
and  in  part  it  is  genetically  derived  from  them.     So  that  it 
could   not  be  understood    had    these   forms  not   previously 
entered  into  human  experience,  and  their  peculiar  value  been 
recognised.     In  every  case  the  family  is  the  original  form  of 
human  fellowship ;  but  if  the  healthy  conditions  of  independent 
moral  conduct  are  to  be  realised,  it  requires  to  be  supple- 
mented by  the  civil  fellowship  of  the  State.^     For  nothing 
but  intercourse  with  those  whom  one  gets  to  know,  not  as 
members  of  the  same  family,  but  rather  as  strangers,  affords 
that  fulness  of  reciprocal  social  relationships  by  which  our 
respect  for  others  and  for  our  own  rights  can  be  tested.     The 
tendency  towards  equality  of  rights  regularly  manifests  itself 
even  in  the  relation  between  brothers  and  sisters ;    but  it 
depends  very  much  upon  the  form  assumed  by  the  father's 
power  over  the  children,  whether  it  does  not  rather  reduce 
them  under  itself  in  an  equality  destitute  of  all  rights  what- 
soever.    In  the  history  of  the  world,  at  any  rate,  the  task  of 
supplementing  family  existence   by   the   civil  order  of    the 
State  has  not  been  of   such  easy  accomplishment  as  seems 
necessary  to  us.    Nomadic  tribes  exist  only  in  an  extended 
form    of   the  family,  without    distinct  ideas  of   law    being 
developed,  or  fixed  legal  ordinances  being  extorted  from  the 
caprice  of  the  chief  of  the  tribe.     Nomads,  therefore,  either 
remain  outside  history,  or  come  into   prominence    only   as 
destroyers  of  higher  culture,  while  they  maintain  their  existence 
in  the  form  of  the  family  only  at  the  price  of  the  corruption 
of  mamage,  polygamy.    In  order  to  rise  above  this  level  at  all, 
and  in  any  degree  become  a  State,  a  nation  must  be  numerous 

*  liotze,  Microcosmus,  iii.  p.  380  ff. 


310  JUSTIFICATION   AND   RECONCILIATION  [293-4 

enough,  and  must  settle  down  in  a  comparatively  narrow 
territory.  The  importance  for  a  purely  nomadic  people  of 
this  advance  cannot  he  more  clearly  indicated  than  by  the 
fact  that  the  tribal  legends  of  Israel  make  the  acquisition  of 
a  fixed  abode  the  proximate  aim  of  the  Divine  revelation  to 
Abraham.  This  people  is  distinguished  from  their  Oriental 
neighbours  by  the  energetic  expression  given  in  their  law  to 
the  consciousness  of  right ;  and  the  theocratic  principle  con- 
fines even  the  rights  of  the  monarchy  over  the  people  within 
very  definite  limits.  For  among  the  settled  peoples  of  Asia 
which  play  a  part  in  history,  the  conception  of  the  public 
powers  possessed  by  the  king  is  modelled  so  predominantly 
on  the  patriarchal  type  of  the  nomadic  chieftain,  that  among 
them  the  private  rights  of  the  subject,  even  in  their  reciprocal 
relations  to  one  another,  had  no  chance  of  developing.  Within 
this  circle  only  a  loose  and  uncertain  support  is  given  to  the 
idea  of  special  rights  by  the  fact  that,  under  the  regime  of 
the  Oriental  world-empires,  subject  peoples  were  permitted  to 
retain  their  customs  and  their  social  system.  Now  the 
Israelites  did  not  exert  an  opposite  influence  of  a  different 
kind,  for  they  never  gained  an  extensive  and  permanent 
dominion  over  other  nations ;  on  the  contrary,  the  monarchy 
in  their  case  rather  diverged  from  its  prescribed  path  to 
follow  the  models  of  the  surrounding  nations.  The  Boman 
people  was  the  first  to  establish  the  community  of  the  State 
on  a  solid  framework  of  ordinances  securing  private  rights, 
and  thus  it  also  imparted  to  its  world-empire  a  different 
character  from  that  which  previous  enterprises  of  the  kind 
had  borne.  For  even  the  Hellenic  world-empires  relapsed 
into  the  Oriental  type,  the  reason  being  that  the  Hellenic 
idea  of  the  State  maintained  the  entire  dependence  of  the 
citizen  on  the  State,  and  allowed  no  proper  play  within  the 
State  to  the  moral  rights  of  individual  families  and  individual 
persons.  But  the  Eomans,  by  elaborating  a  large  number 
of  institutions  which  reposed  on  private  rights,  succeeded  in 
conferring  on  the  individual  citizens  of  the  State  the  assurance 
of  personal  independence  as  against  one  another,  and  a  higher 


294-5]  THB   DOCTRINE   OF   GOD  311 

proportion  of  rights  even  as  against  the  State ;  by  their  strict 
and  noble   conception  of   marriage  they  infused  a    deeper 
content  into  the  power  of  the  father  over  the  family ;  finally, 
by  legally  investing  aliens  with  rights  of  their  own,  they 
diminished  the  prejudice  of  antiquity  which  held  that  the 
alien  is  a  foe,  and,  as  such,  destitute  of  rights.     The  history 
of  the  world,  all  down  the  succession  of  world-empires  imtil 
that  of  the  Bomans,  is  at  bottom  the  outcome  of  self-seeking 
and  violence ;  but  the  moral  sense  finds  a  compensation  for 
this  in  the  fact  tliat  the  nations,  even  under  these  conditions, 
arrived  at  a  consciousness  of  their  affinity  as  integral  parts  of 
humanity.     For  the  injustice  of  each  conquest  was  certainly 
atoned  for  by  the  benefits  of  a  higher  culture  conferred  upon 
the  subjugated  peoples.     The  other  nations  which  in  antiquity 
dominated  the  world  cannot,  it  may  be,  claim  this  merit ;  but 
it  does  belong  to  the  Bomans,  in  spite  of  all  the  oppression  and 
extortion  which  their  provincial  populations  had  to  endure. 
Their  government  called  forth  in  the  peoples  that  dwelt  on 
the  shores  of  the  Mediterranean  a  common  sentiment  of  their 
historical  a£Snity,  though  in  varying  degree;    and,  by    the 
extension  of  the  sway  of  Boman  law,  confirmed  by  the  pro- 
gressive bestowal  of  Boman  citizenship,  they  paved  the  way 
for   the  recognition  of   the   individual   as    an   independent 
personality.    These  results  of  Boman  supremacy  are  important 
enough  to  be  reckoned  as  a  positive    preparation  for  the 
ethical  tendencies  of  Christianity,  even  though  as  victories  of 
humane  feeling  they  were  lamentably  counterbalanced  by  the 
prevalence  of  slavery,  that  fountain  of  every  kind  of  immort- 
ality.    A  further  fact  is  that  educated  society  in  the  Boman 
Empire    was   still   more   directly   influenced    by   the    Stoic 
philosophy    towards  belief   in  the  moral   solidarity  of   the 
human  race,  and  in  the  obligation  to  respect  the  individual, 
and  that  in   these  principles   the  Hellenic  spirit  made  its 
contribution   to  the  culture  of   the   Boman  Empire,  while 
remaining  inferior  in   political    force  to   the  spirit    of    the 
Boman  people. 

These  results  of  cUssical  culture,  indeed,  are  not  sources 


312  JUSTIFICATION   AND   RECONCIUATION  [29fr-6 

from  which  the  Christian  idea  of  the  Kingdom  of  God  is 
directly  drawn.  For  it  finds  its  presuppositions  proper  solely 
in  the  religion  of  the  Old  Testament ;  in  the  fact,  that  is, 
that  the  One  God  is,  to  begin  with,  the  Buler,  as  He  is  the 
Father,  of  the  chosen  people,  and  that  He  stands  Surety 
for  that  personal,  independent,  religious  morality  which  follows 
from  His  righteousness.  Jesus  elevated  these  features  into 
validity  for  all  nations.  But  the  understanding  and  accept- 
ance of  them  by  the  nations  within  the  Roman  Empire  was 
conditioned  by  the  fact  that  the  claim  to  act  independently 
and  with  personal  responsibility  presuppposes  the  legal  recog- 
nition of  the  individual,  that  the  idea  of  the  moral  government 
of  God  demands  a  measure  of  common  moral  sentiment 
between  nations,  and,  finally,  that  the  principle  of  brotherly 
equality  in  the  Christian  community  could  count  on  a 
responsive  feeling  of  the  same  kind  in  the  people  of  that 
time.  The  very  presence  of  these  favourable  prejudices 
among  the  population  of  the  Roman  Empire — even  when 
men  were  unaware  of  the  special  grounds  of  their  influence 
and  of  their  origin — must  be  viewed  as  the  outcome  of  a 
very  highly  complex  historical  development,  which,  when 
looked  at  in  the  light  of  the  goal  revealed  by  the  foundation 
of  Christianity,  may  be  regarded  as  "  the  education  of 
humanity." 

These  considerations  might  possibly  find  a  place  in  the 
framework  of  traditional  theology,  as  evidences  of  the  Pro- 
vidence of  God.  But  I  think  that  for  the  purposes  of  a 
theological  system  they  claim  more  serious  attention,  even 
though  they  cannot  be  proved  to  have  come  within  the  obser- 
vation of  any  New  Testament  writer.  The  traditional  form  of 
theology  only  admits  incidentally  the  hypothesis  of  a  positive 
preparation  for  Christianity.  The  reason  is  that,  following 
explicit  trains  of  thought  in  Paul,  it  seizes  only  upon  the 
factor  of  reconciliation  in  Christianity ;  and  for  reconciliation 
there  is  no  precondition  to  be  found  in  the  prior  history  of 
mankind,  save  the  negative  one  of  universal  sin.  But 
Christianity  in  its  last  and  loftiest  aspect  aims  at  the  final 


296-7]  THE   DOCTRINE   OF   GOD  313 

end  of  the  Kingdom  of  God ;  the  authority  of  Jesus,  which 
deserves  to  be  set  above  that  of  Paul,  makes  this  conception 
snpreme.  In  the  light  of  the  significance  which  Christianity 
thus  receives,  the  dominion  over  man  gained  by  law  must  be 
recognised  as  a  positive  preparation.  Law,  as  a  system  directed 
to  the  realisation  of  common  ethical  ends  of  a  subordinate 
order,  must  be  reckoned  as  a  dispensation  established  by  the 
purposive  will  of  God,  not  as  though  legal  conduct  possessed 
equal  worth  with  moral  conduct  prompted  by  religious 
motives,  but  in  such  wise  that  the  former  must  be  recognised 
as  a  precondition  of  the  latter.  And  indeed  this  does  not 
merely  follow  for  the  past  from  the  view  taken  above  of 
history  in  general ;  it  holds  good  even  in  the  present  for  the 
Christian  conduct  of  every  individual.  For  were  this  not  so, 
then  even  the  historical  continuity  of  development  which  has 
been  proved  could  only  in  a  very  problematical  way  be 
ascribed  to  the  Providence  of  God. 

The  Evangelical  system  of  doctrine  includes  the  elements 
of  this  argument  in  two  respects.  I  refer,  first  of  all,  to  the 
view  it  takes  of  the  possibility  of  iustitia  civilis  as  contrasted 
with  original  sin,  and  the  loss  of  freedom  which  that  implies. 
Boman  Catholic  controversialists  usually  proceed  as  though 
they  derived  a  great  advantage  from  their  assertion  of  the 
reality  of  freedom  in  the  state  of  sin,  as  opposed  to  its  denial 
in  the  Evangelical  system.  But  when  looked  at  more  closely, 
this  denial  of  freedom  proves  to  be  not  absolute  but  relative, 
in  so  far,  that  is,  as  it  refers  to  the  discharge  of  duty  from 
religious  motives.  On  the  other  hand,  a  relative  freedom  is 
acknowledged  to  belong  even  to  the  state  of  sin,  in  regard  to 
what  is  relatively  good,  i.e,  the  possibility  of  iustitia  civilis  is 
recognised.  Whether,  now,  it  is  fitter  to  ascribe  to  the  state 
of  sin  a  relative  freedom  in  regard  to  that  which  is  com- 
pletely good,  or  to  limit  the  acknowledged  relative  capacity 
of  sinners  to  that  which  is  relatively  good,  is  a  question  I 
shall  not  here  discuss  further.^     The  topic  of  iustitia  civilis, 

*  Cone,  Trid.  Seas.  vi.  Deer,  de  iustificatione,  1 :  "  Etsi  in  eia  (servis  peccati) 
liberum  arbitrium  mipime  exstinctum  esset,  viribus  licet  attenuatum  et  inclina- 


314  JUSTIFICATION   AND    RECONCILIATION  [297-« 

however,  is  treated  in  a  merely  one-sided  way  by  the  Ke- 
formers  and  the  theological  tradition  dependent  upon  them. 
They  discuss  the  conception  merely  as  correlative  to  the  state 
of  sin,  and  as  in  its  nature  contrary  to  iustitia  spiritualis. 
We  must,  however,  further  view  both  kinds  of  iustitia  in  their 
analogy  to  one  another  and  in  respect  of  their  difference  of 
degree,  apart  from  the  conditions  of  their  realisation.  This 
they  omitted  to  do,  clearly  for  the  reason  that  they  looked  at 
the  relations  between  the  two  exclusively  in  the  light  of  the 
current  antithesis  between  law  and  the  promise  of  grace.  For, 
in  accordance  with  the  usual  conception  of  law,  they  took 
iicstitia  civUis  in  the  sense  of  legality,  without  combining  with 
it  the  idea  of  a  law-abiding  disposition,  though  the  latter  is 
one  stage  of  the  moral  disposition. 

The  reason  why  the  theology  which  is  loyal  to  the  Re- 
formation cannot  but  attribute  to  the  conception  of  iustitia 
civilis  a  significance  which  involves  more  than  merely  the 
correct  determination  of  the  notion  of  freedom  in  the  state 
of  sin,  lies  in  the  consistent  estimate  of  the  State  as  a  posit- 
ively Divine  institution.  It  was  only  because  he  recognised 
the  independent  significance  of  the  State  as  a  direct  insti- 
tution of  God,  that  Luther  was  able  to  construct  his  con- 
ception of  itistitia  civilis  at  all,  and  to  wrest  a  domain  for  its 
exercise  from  the  Augustinian  theory  of  original  sin.  The 
opposite  theory  taught  by  the  Papacy  is  rooted  in  the  view 
which  Augustine  held  of  the  civitas  terrena.  This  dvitas  he 
finds  realised  in  the  existence  of  the  Soman  Empire,  which, 
as  reposing  upon  violence  and  conquest,  perpetuates  the  char- 
acter of  the  fratricide  and  city-founder  Cain,  and  which, 
through  its  dependence  on  heathen  idol-worship,  is  marked 
with  the  stamp  of  unrighteousness.  Augustine  never  perceived 
that  to  the  Boman  people  was  due  the  creation  of  private 
rights.  And  so  it  actually  leaves  quite  a  comical  impression 
to  find  him  demonstrating,  at  the  very  climax  of  his  exposi- 

tum."  Conf,  Aug,  xviii.  :  "Humana  voluntas  habet  aliquam  libertatem  ad 
efiiciendam  iustitiam  civilem  et  deligendas  res  ration!  subiectas,  sed  non  h&bct 
vim  sine  spiritu  sancto  efBciendae  iustitiae  dei  seu  iustiti^ie  spiritu^ilis/' 


298-9]  THE   DOCTRINB   OF   GOD  315 

tion  {De  dvitate  dei,  xix.  21),  that  the  Boman  commonwealth, 
according  to  Cicero's  own  definition  of  it  as  a  society  united 
by  uniformity  in  law  and  by  common  interests,  never  really 
existed.  For,  he  argues,  law  (Secht)  implies  righteousness 
(Ghrechtigheit) ;  now,  righteousness  can  be  had  only  through 
faith  in  the  true  God ;  the  Bomans,  consequently,  could  not 
claim  to  have  a  legal  or  civil  commonwealth,  for  in  particular 
they  had  violated  the  legal  maxim  suum  cuiq^ie  by  making  man, 
who  belongs  to  God,  the  slave  of  impure  demon&  We  may 
learn  the  real  value  of  this  verdict  on  the  Boman  State — a 
verdict  which  lies  at  the  basis  of  the  medisbval  view  of  the 
State  in  general — from  the  fact  that  Augustine  also  defends 
the  opposite  opinion.  For  he  is  not  so  perverse  as  to  repre- 
sent the  empire  as  simply  a  devilish  counterpart  of  the  King- 
dom of  God,  and  civil  laws  as  expressions  of  established 
injustice,  or  the  law  of  property,  for  example,  as  veiled 
robbery.  Bather,  he  recognises  peace,  aimed  at  internally 
by  the  State,  as  a  mark  of  that  struggle  after  good  which 
men  cannot  abandon  even  in  sin.  However  strongly  he  may 
emphasise  the  truth  that  the  attainment  of  this  peace  can  be 
purchased  only  by  much  violence  and  oppression  of  the  weak, 
yet  he  does  not  reckon  these  means  as  necessary  elements 
in  the  conception  of  earthly  peace.  And  so  Augustine  finds 
that  there  is  an  ascending  succession  from  the  peace  of  the 
home  to  the  peace  of  the  State  and  the  peace  of  the  heavenly 
Kingdom  —  a  succession  which  expresses  the  generic  unity 
subsisting  among  the  aims  of  every  human  society,  and 
therefore  proves  that  each  of  the  spheres  thus  compared  is, 
in  its  own  way,  independent  of  the  others.  He  therefore  states 
it  as  his  conclusion  that  God  has  ordained  for  men  temporal 
peace  and  the  means  necessary  thereto,  and  this  as  a  stage 
preliminary  to  religious  morality  and  a  preparation  for  eternal 
life  in  loving  fellowship  with  God  and  men.  Whoever  abuses 
the  means  of  temporal  peace,  indeed,  fails  to  attain  the  stage  of 
peace  with  God,  and  misses  the  humbler  goal  as  well.^     Here 

^  Dc  cimlcUe  dei,  xix.  13 :  "  Deus  dedit  hominibus  quaedam  bona  huic  vitae 
congrna,  id  est  pacem  temporalem  pro  modalo  mortalis  vitae  in  ipsa  salute  et 


316  JUSTIFICATION   AND    RECONCILIATION  [299-300 

we  have  the  principle  stated  which,  in  my  opinion,  the  meaning 
of  Reformation  theology  requires  us  to  add  as  a  supplement  to 
the  conception  of  iustitia  civilis.  However  defective  the  latter 
may  prove  in  reality,  yet  it  ought  not  to  be  regarded  merely 
as  a  possible  accident  of  the  state  of  sin,  but  as  a  necessary 
and  integral  part  of  God's  moral  order.  Viewed  in  isolation, 
it  wears  a  character  opposed  to  religious  morality.  For  the 
disposition  which  limits  itself  to  the  domain  of  law  may  for 
that  reason  come  even  to  be  in  contradiction  to  the  disposi- 
tion which  aims  at  the  highest  end  of  all.  But  of  the  suc- 
cessive kinds  of  human  fellowship,  that  defined  by  law  is  of 
narrower  limits  than  that  of  moral  action,  and  is  so  constituted 
as  to  need  the  latter  as  its  supplement ;  for  law  is  intelligible 
only  as  a  means  to  morality,  and  requires  for  its  success  a 
measure  of  moral  feeling.  It  merely  confirms  this  conclusion, 
and  at  the  same  time  suggests  the  necessary  limitation  of  the 
doctrine  of  universal  sinfulness,  which  is  usually  determined 
exclusively  by  the  idea  of  reconciliation,  when  we  find  Peter 
and  Paul  (1  Pet.  ii.  13—16  ;  Rom.  xiii.  1—7)  prescribing  obedi- 
ence to  the  State  absolutely,  and  this  too  as  expressive  of 
religious  conscientiousness.*  Such  teaching  would  be  impos- 
sible unless  the  State  and  the  law  were  magnitudes  of  per- 
manent moral  value  when  viewed  from  the  standpoint  of 
Christian  reflection  on  the  world,  and  unless  the  capacity  to 

incolumitate  ac  societate  sui  generis,  et  quaeque  huic  paci  vel  tuendae  vel  recu- 
perandae  necessaria  sunt :  eo  pacto  aeqaissitnus,  vt  qui  mortalis  talibus  bonis 
paci  mortalium  acconimodatis  recte  usus  fuerit,  accipiat  ampliora  atque  meliora, 
ipsam  scilicet  immortalitatis  pacem,  eique  convenientem  gloriam  et  honorem  in 
vita  aeterna  ad  fniendum  deo  et  proximo  in  deo :  qui  autcm  pcrperam,  nee  ilia 
accipiat  et  haeo  amittat." 

^  In  the  abore-cited  passage  Paul  says  expressly  that  whoever  resists  the  govern- 
ment is  opposing  what  God  has  ordained.  The  Augsb.  Conf.  xvi.  here  subjoins 
the  exception,  nisi  cum  vuigistratua  iubent  peccarCf  tunc  enim  Christiani  magia 
dchent  obedire  deo  quarn  hominihus.  But  no  command  to  sin  is  to  be  found  in 
State  laws  which  make  the  privileges  of  definite  denominations  dependent  on 
positive  legal  conditions.  The  Christian  owes  obedience  to  these  laws  as  in- 
direct Divine  ordinances,  and  it  is  a  misuse  of  Scripture  to  oppose  them,  as 
human  ordinances,  to  any  Divine  commandment  whatsoever.  For  Peter's  declar- 
ation in  Acts  V.  29  is  aimed,  not  at  State  laws  as  human  and  infra-Divine,  but 
at  an  injunction  of  the  Church  authorities ;  bishops  and  pastors'  conferences, 
therefore,  fall  under  the  principle  that  we  ought  to  obey  God  rather  than 
them. 


30O-1]  THB   DOCTBINE   OF   GOD  317 

satisfy  the  demands  of  the  State  were  still  preserved  even  in 
the  state  of  sin. 

The  question  which  has  given  rise  to  this  discussion  was 
whether,  from  the  interrelations  between  the  love  of  God 
and  the  Kingdom  of  God,  there  results  such  a  moral  order 
that  it  prepares  the  way  for  the  Kingdom  of  God  among  men. 
Our  conclusion,  that  law  and  the  State  in  general  are  precon- 
ditions of  the  Kingdom  of  God,  is  of  a  form  different  from 
that  of  the  sketches  of  a  world-order  which  we  owe  to  the 
orthodox  and  the  Socinians.  What  they  attempt  is  to  furnish 
information  in  regard  to  the  individual's  original  relation  to 
God,  and  the  principles  which  God  follows  in  His  treatment 
of  him.  The  theory  put  forward  here  to  determine  generally 
the  relation  between  law  and  the  Divine  Kingdom  has  nothing 
to  say  to  this  interest  in  the  fate  of  the  individual.  Yet  it 
harmonises  with  the  conception  of  an  education  which  places 
men  under  special  institutions,  in  order  to  render  them  capable 
of  the  free  appropriation  of  the  most  universal  principle  of 
life.  This  is  what  is  meant  by  saying  that  the  reciprocity  of 
private  rights  and  the  obligations  which  bind  men  to  civil 
society  have  both  to  be  impressed  on  the  mind  before  we  can 
order  our  behaviour  to  those  farthest  off,  as  well  as  to  those 
who  are  nearest,  by  the  motive  of  love.  Now  we  find  that 
if  the  only  motive  of  an  action  be  a  legal  one,  it  cannot  be 
considered  as  coming  under  the  head  of  our  religious  rela- 
tion to  God ;  but  we  also  find  that  the  motive  of  religious 
morality  yields  the  principle  of  obedience  to  law,  which  raises 
an  action  done  in  the  particular  sphere  of  civil  law  into  the 
domain  of  moral  law  and  the  Kingdom  of  God.  Thus  it 
becomes  all  the  more  clear  that  individual  legal  works  as 
individual — and  in  this  light  the  doctrine  of  the  foedus 
operum  views  them — cannot,  save  incorrectly,  be  regarded  as 
the  material  in  which  man's  religious  relation  to  God  takes 
shape,  and  by  which  it  can  be  judged. 

The  only  question  which  might  still  arise  is  whether  the 
result  we  have  reached  is  not  invalidated  by  certain  of  Jesus 
sayings.     For  in  Matt.  v.  38-42,  He  pronounces  against  the 


318  JUSTinCATION   AND   RECONCILIATION  [301—2 

legal  principle  of  retaliation  in  the  intercourse  of  men  with 
one  another,  and  demands  from  His  disciples,  as  proof  of  their 
belonging  to  the  Kingdom  of  God,  that  on  all  conceivable 
occasions  they  should  surrender  their  private  rights.  This 
section  of  the  Sermon  on  the  Mount  is  lacking,  indeed,  in  the 
lucidity  of  expression  and  connectedness  to  be  desired ;  never- 
theless, it  is  quite  impossible  to  doubt  that  it  does  not  intend 
the  subversion  of  the  institution  of  private  rights  altogether. 
What  is  forbidden,  rather,  is  that  in  our  intercourse  with 
fellow-members  of  the  Kingdom  of  God,  we  should  insist  on 
our  private  rights  unconditionally,  on  the  principle  that 
services  must  be  reciprocal;  and  the  command  is  given  to 
surrender  one's  rights  in  particular  cases  for  the  sake  of  moral 
fellowship.  That  is  to  say,  recourse  to  law  between  members 
of  the  Kingdom  of  God  is  thereby  modified ;  but  the  validity 
of  law  for  their  life  is  not  abrogated  altogether.  Its  validity 
is  of  necessity  presupposed ;  for  the  independence  of  moral 
action  and  of  personal  virtue  in  general  is  unthinkable  apart 
from  legal  independence.  The  exhortation  addressed  to 
slaves,  that  they  should  patiently  submit  to  being  without 
rights  (1  Pet.  ii.  18-20;  Col.  iii.  22-25),  is  to  be  regarded 
as  an  exception  dictated  by  circumstances,  for  the  existence 
of  slavery  in  the  Christian  world  is  a  standing  menace  to 
public  and  personal  moraUty. 

§  39.  We  have  found  that  the  institution  of  the  State  is 
a  means  to  the  Kingdom  of  God,  and  that  it  is  not  to  be 
applied,  contrariwise,  as  a  standard  of  Divine  authority  by 
which  to  gauge  the  possibility  of  realising  His  Kingdom.  In 
this  consideration,  therefore,  there  lies  no  obstacle  to  our 
deriving  reconciliation  from  the  love  of  Ood,  as  well  as  from 
His  justice,  when  properly  understood  as  denoting  the  method 
in  which  He  carries  out  His  loving  Will  for  the  salvation  of 
all  mankind,  as  well  as  of  individuals  (vol.  ii.  p.  113).  If  it 
is  conceivable  at  all  that  'God  should  bestow  His  love  on 
sinful  man,  then  the  justice  with  which  that  love  has  to 
reconcile  itself  is  not  such  as  it  would  be  if  God  originally 
stood  to  man  in  the  relation  of  reciprocity  characteristic  of 


302-3]  THE   DOCTRINE   OF   GOD  319 

private  right  or  civil  law.  Rather  is  it  God's  perfection, 
according  to  Christian  ideas,  that  He  does  good  to  men  even 
when  they  are  His  enemies  (Matt.  v.  44,  48).  In  this  respect 
He  is  set  up  as  a  model  to  men.  Thus  Christian  love  to  one's 
enemies,  or  forgiveness  to  one's  debtors,  is  not  dependent  on 
their  rendering  satisfaction.  No  more  can  Jesus  have  foimd 
any  difSculty  in  the  fact  that  God,  intent  on  reconciliation, 
should  love  men  even  though  they  are  His  foes.  Nevertheless, 
we  have  not  yet  completely  solved  the  question  (§17)  how 
the  principle  of  forgiveness,  and  the  attribute  which  issues  in 
moral  legislation,  can  be  combined  in  our  conception  of  God. 
Tieftrunk's  contention  that  Divine  pardon  accords  with  the 
moral  law,  because  irreconcilability,  conceived  as  the  law  of  a 
moral  kingdom,  would  be  self-contradictory,  we  found  to  be 
unconvincing.  For  reconcilability  is  a  principle  of  moral 
duty  which  is  binding  only  between  equals,  and  even  then 
not  unconditionally,  while,  between  one  possessed  of  moral 
authority  and  a  subordinate,  it  holds  good  only  in  a  con- 
ditional way.  If  the  moral  law  is  the  highest  expression  by 
which  we  can  define  the  relation  between  God  and  man, 
then  it  is  only  in  an  accidental  fashion  that  pardon  or  the 
forgiveness  of  sins  can  be  conjoined  with  it.  For  that  reason, 
however,  the  solution  proposed  by  Kant  (vol.  i.  p.  456),  namely, 
that  the  forgiveness  of  sins  is  determined  by  the  individual's 
amount  of  moral  performance,  does  not  harmonise  with  the 
Christian  view  of  the  matter.  On  the  other  hand,  the  path 
which  we  must  take  is  indicated  by  the  other  theory  put 
forward  by  Tieftrunk,  that  pardon  and  law  are  not  contra- 
dictory if  pardon  be  bestowed  for  the  sake  of  the  law — ^if ,  that 
is,  the  realisation  of  the  universal  ethical  end,  especially  love 
to  the  law,  is  impossible  without  previous  forgiveness  (vol.  i. 
p.  463). 

For  if  God  is  conceived  in  general  as  love,  in  order  to 
explain  the  Kingdom  of  God  as  the  final  end  of  the  world 
and  therefore  the  world  itself  (§  34),  then,  from  the  signi- 
ficance which  the  Kingdom  has  for  God,  there  follows  the 
content  of  the  moral  law  and  its  absolute  stringency  for  the 


320  JUSTIFICATION   AND   RECONCILIATION  [303-4 

members  of  the  Kingdom.  The  practical  union  of  a  multitude 
of  persons,  so  that  as  homogeneous  with  God  they  become 
the  object  of  His  will  manifested  as  love,  is  effected  by 
obedience  to  the  law  of  love  to  God  and  our  neighbour. 
The  love  of  God  is  already  intent  upon  men,  in  so  far  as  His 
aim  is  to  elevate  them  to  the  Kingdom  of  God,  even  though 
at  the  time  their  will  may  not  actually  be  directed  to  the 
highest  moral  end.  For  love  ever  aims  first  of  all  at  the 
possible  ideal  of  another's  self-end,  and  its  proper  strength 
resides  in  the  other's  improvement  and  education.  If,  there- 
fore, God  eternally  loves  the  community  of  the  Kingdom  of 
God  (Eph.  i.  4,  6),  He  also  loves  already  the  individuals  who 
are  to  be  gathered  into  it,  in  so  far  as  He  purposes  to  bring 
them  into  the  Kingdom.  Now,  if  we  must  assume  that  they 
are  sinners,  then  God  loves  even  sinners  in  view  of  their 
ideal  destiny,  to  realise  which  He  chooses  them.  Why  sin 
should  make  this  relationship  unthinkable  it  is  impossible 
to  see.  For  even  though  sin  is  active  opposition  to  God's 
final  end,  yet  persistence  in  such  a  course  would  make  the 
love  of  God  to  sinners  impossible  only  if  in  all  cases  sin  were 
definitive  and  conscious  opposition  to  His  final  end.  But  if, 
on  the  other  hand,  the  degree  of  sin  in  individual  cases  is  less 
than  this,  and  if  it  is  therefore  possible  that  the  direction  of 
the  will  in  this  respect  may  be  altered,  then  the  love  of  God 
may  operate  on  sinners  through  His  purpose  to  realise  their 
ideal  destiny.  Now,  if  we  may  thus  presuppose  that  sin 
involves  different  degrees,  the  founding  and  the  existence  of 
the  Kingdom  of  God  cannot  be  deduced  from  God's  love, 
unless  God  removes  the  separation  from  Himself  which 
operates  in  the  sin  which  is  common  to  men.  For  as  the 
moral  perfection  of  man  in  the  Kingdom  of  God  must  at  the 
same  time  be  regarded  as  God's  final  end  in  the  world,  sin  is 
an  obstacle  to  its  realisation.  And  it  is^  so  not  merely  as 
immorality,  but  above  all  as  a  defect  in  reverence  towards  and 
trust  in  God  (to  use  the  words  of  the  C.  A.  ii.),  or,  to  use  a  positive 
expression,  as  indifference  and  mistrust  of  God.  Viewed  in 
this  light,  the  pardon  which  is  a  precondition  of  the  Kingdom, 


304-5]  THE   DOCTBINE   OF   GOD  321 

the  forgiveness  of  sins  which  invalidates  the  guilt  and  the 
consciousness  of  guilt  which  separates  men  from  God,  likewise 
flow  from  the  love  of  God,  as  a  universal  dispensation  for 
behoof  of  the  members  of  the  Kingdom.  Forgiveness,  however, 
cannot  come  into  collision  with  God's  moral  legislation.  For 
the  latter,  as  the  moral  qrder  prevailing  in  the  Kingdom  of 
God,  comes  to  be  valid  only  for  those  whom  God,  through  His 
forgiveness,  has  led  to  trust  His  love.  The  result  of  this 
discussion,  therefore,  is  that  pardon  or  reconciliation^  as  a 
fundamental  precondition  of  the  Kingdom's  coming  into 
existence  and  as  presupposing  universal  sin,  can  be  conceived 
in  harmony  with  the  love  of  God,  and  that  it  is  in  no  way 
inconsistent  with  the  Divine  attribute  of  moral  legislation. 

But  the  question  arises,  whether  still  other  reasons  than 
the  rejected  notion  of  civil  justice  are  not  likely  to  call  forth 
objections  to  this  conclusion.  This  consideration  makes  it 
necessary  to  examine  the  sketch  of  the  doctrine  of  recon- 
ciliation put  forward  by  Schoeberlein,  to  the  importance  of 
which  I  have  already  drawn  attention  (vol.  i.  p.  650).  He 
and  I  agree  in  our  general  definition  of  the  problem  of 
reconciliation,  in  holding,  that  is,  that  its  ground  is  the  love 
of  God  and  its  end  the  Kingdom  of  God,  and  that  to  estimate 
its  possibility  by  the  principles  of  civil  law  involves  a  doctrinal 
aberration.  Schoeberlein  starts  so  decisively  with  the  idea 
that  God  is  love  that  he  will  hear  nothing  of  a  Divine  right- 
eousness exercised  in  relation  to  the  world  of  morality,  and 
either  preceding  or  accompanying  it.  However,  he  allows 
the  conception  of  righteousness  to  operate  as  a  modification 
of  love  as  related  to  sinful  humanity,  inasmuch  as  the 
entrance  of  sin  altered,  not  indeed  the  basal  tendency  of 
Divine  love,  but  its  method  of  revelation.  For,  as  a  recogni- 
tion of  the  independence  of  man,  respected  by  God,  he 
contends  that  God  manifests  to  sinners  His  love,  which  pain 
has  altered,  by  the  wrath  and  curse  which  make  themselves 
felt  in  the  consciousness  of  guilt  and  the  ills  of  life.  But  as 
wrath  is  not  the  opposite  of  Divine  love  but  a  modification 
of  it,  these  manifestations  of  wrath  possess  a  significance  of 

21 


322  JUSTIFICATION   AND   RECONCILIATION  [305 

their  own  as  means  preparatory  to  reconciliation.  For  when 
looked  at  completely,  the  wrath  of  God  is  accompanied  by 
compassion  for  human  sin;  thence  springs  grace;  and  in 
grace  the  pain  of  God's  love  is  eternally  swallowed  up  in  His 
blessed  joy  in  humanity,  beloved  by  God  in  His  Son.  These 
are  the  principal  features  of  the  theory,  so  far  as  it  concerns 
the  doctrine  of  God.  The  inferences  it  is  made  to  yield  for 
the  interpretation  of  Christ's  life  are  not  in  place  here. 

There  can  be  no  doubt  whatever  that  a  very  imperfect 
view  was  taken  of  God's  spiritual  personality  in  the  older 
theology,  when  the  functions  of  knowing  and  willing  alone 
were  employed  to  illustrate  it.  Religious  thought  plainly 
ascribes  to  God  affections  of  feeling  as  well.  The  older 
theology,  however,  laboured  under  the  impression  that  feeling 
and  emotion  were  characteristic  only  of  limited  and  created 
personality ;  it  transformed,  e.g.,  the  religious  idea  of  the 
Divine  blessedness  into  eternal  self-knowledge,  and  that  of 
the  Divine  wrath  into  the  fixed  purpose  to  punish  sin.  The 
revolt  against  this,  which  finds  vent  in  Schoeberlein's  analysis 
of  the  Divine  emotions,  is  on  the  whole  fully  justified.  But 
it  seems  to  me  imperative  to  proceed  very  cautiously  in  this 
respect.  The  blessedness  of  God  is  a  lucid  and  intrinsically 
clear  conception,  as  expressive  of  His  own  feeling  of  His 
eternity.  Now,  as  God's  eternity  is  knowable  by  us  through 
the  continuity  and  immutability  of  the  necessary  relation 
between  His  nature  and  His  world-plan,  Schoeberlein  rightly 
declares  that  the  blessedness  of  God  likewise  includes  eternally 
joy  in  the  humanity  which  He  loves  in  His  Son.  We  must 
judge  thus,  if  we  are  to  give  a  theological  representation  suh 
specie  detemitatis  of  the  whole  domain  covered  by  the  Christian 
view  of  the  world.  On  the  other  hand,  all  our  reflections 
about  God's  wrath  and  compassion,  His  long-suffering  and 
patience.  His  severity  and  sympathy,  are  based  upon  a  com- 
parison of  our  individual  position  with  God's,  under  the  form 
of  time.  However  indispensable  these  judgments  may  be  in 
the  texture  of  our  religious  experience,  still  they  stand  in  no 
relation  whatever  to  the  theological  conception  of  the  whole 


305-6]  THE   DOCTKINE   OF   GOD  323 

from  the  view-point  of  eternity.  That  these  different  lines 
of  thought  do  not  merge  in  one  another,  is  precisely  the 
truth  expressed  by  Schoeberlein's  principle,  that  the  pain 
suflTered  by  God's  love  is  eternally  taken  up  by  the  good 
pleasure  of  His  grace  into  the  unity  of  His  blessed  joy  in 
mankind.  For  by  taking  this  view  we  eliminate  from  our 
thought  the  pain  which,  as  an  act  in  time,  we  formerly  con- 
ceived as  resulting  from  the  contrast  between  the  love  of  God 
and  the  sin  of  man.  From  the  point  of  view  of  theology, 
therefore,  no  vaUdity  can  be  assigned  to  the  idea  of  the 
wrath  of  God  and  His  curse  upon  sinners  as  yet  unreconciled ; 
still  less,  from  this  theological  standpoint,  is  any  special 
mediation  between  the  wrath  and  the  love  of  God  conceivable 
or  necessary  in  order  to  explain  the  reconciliation  of  sinners 
with  Him. 

Nevertheless,  the  following  consideration  serves  to  make 
the  matter  clearer.  According  to  Scripture,  we  are  not  justi- 
fied in  regarding  God's  wrath  as  an  altered  form  of  His  love, 
nor  in  relating  it  to  sin  as  such  (vol.  ii.  pp.  129,  137); 
according  to  the  New  Testament,  God's  wrath  signifies  His 
determination  to  destroy  those  who  definitively  set  themselves 
against  redemption  and  the  final  end  of  the  Kingdom  of  God 
(vol.  ii.  p.  154).  The  authority  of  Holy  Scripture  gives  us 
no  right  to  relate  the  wrath  of  God  to  sinners  as  such,  for 
ex  hypothesi  we  conceive  sinners  to  be  known  and  chosen  by 
God,  as  partakers  in  His  Kingdom  and  objects  of  His  re- 
demption from  sin.  If  we  assume  that  God  foresees  their 
final  inclusion  in  His  Kingdom,  as  theologians  we  have  no 
alternative  but  to  trace  their  redemption  back  to  His  love  in 
an  unbroken  line,  even  though  these  very  redeemed  ones 
may,  as  their  ideas  take  a  temporal  form,  have  the  impression 
of  a  change  from  Divine  wrath  to  Divine  mercy  (vol.  i.  p.  163). 
We  must  come  to  the  same  conclusion,  too,  regarding  the 
phenomena  of  those  cases  where  men  are  conscious  of  guilt  and 
regard  evils  as  the  effects  of  God's  curse.  For  while  these 
experiences,  looked  at  from  God's  side,  may  also  be  regarded 
as  means  to  convemon,  yet  from  the  standpoint  alike  of 


324  JUSTIFICATION   AND   RECONCILIATION  [306-7 

reconciliation  as  an  accomplished  fact  and  of  God's  overruling 
will  of  love — that  is,  from  the  only  standpoint  of  interpreta- 
tion open  to  theology  —  they  appear  with  their  meaning 
reversed,  as  dispensations  of  God's  goodness  and  grace.  The 
notion  that  there  is  a  temporal  change  in  God's  attitude  and  even 
in  God's  feeling  towards  us  may  therefore  remain  safe  and 
intact  within  its  own  domain,  for  our  individual  lives  being 
parts  of  the  whole,  we  cannot  like  God  survey  the  entire 
world-order.  But  when  in  our  theological  study  of  the  whole 
we  place  ourselves,  even  temporarily,  at  God's  standpoint,  we 
cannot  combine  the  idea  of  a  change  in  His  tone  of  feeling 
towards  the  individual  situation  of  individual  men  with  the 
conception  of  the  Divine  knowledge  and  government  of 
the  whole.  And  so  even  Paul  clothes  the  idea  of  God's 
wrath  against  those  who  are  lost  in  the  guise  of  a  perpetual 
determination  of  His  will,  all  the  characteristics  of  a  passing 
emotion  being  stripped  away — even  though,  from  the  stcmd- 
point  of  experience  in  time,  he  also  recognises  a  manifestation 
towards  them  of  Divine  long-suffering  (Rom.  ix.  22).  (Con- 
versely, the  knowledge  of  God  as  Father  possessed  by  those 
who  must  ultimately  be  viewed  as  children  of  God,  impUes 
that  every  evil  they  experience  even  in  consequence  of  sin 
should  be  reckoned,  never  as  a  destructive  penalty,  but  as  a 
means  of  education  (§  9).  Whatever  in  this  respect  may  excite 
a  different  feeling  for  the  moment  may — when  we  look  at  it 
later  from  the  standpoint  of  the  reconciliation  and  Divine 
sonship  we  have  gained — be  traced  back  to  the  antecedent 
and  never-failing  love  of  God,  any  feelings  we  may  have  of 
an  opposite  kind  being  set  aside  as  delusive.  But  according  to 
this  view — and  it  is  the  ultimately  valid  one — any  theology 
which  keeps  to  the  standpoint  of  the  reconciled  community 
must  assert  that  into  the  life  of  the  reconciled  there  can 
come  from  God's  side  no  curse  or  damnatory  punishment,  and 
that  God's  love,  as  the  antecedent  groimd  of  reconciliation, 
cannot  be  modified  by  any  such  feeling  or  action  on  His  part 
towards  those  who  are  to  be  reconciled.  For  it  is  unthink- 
able that  there  should  be  for  God  a  gulf  between  His  inten- 


307-6]  THB   DOCTBINB   OF   GOD  325 

tion  and  its  accomplishment,  such  as  might  prove  a  ground 
of  uncertainty  or  of  an  alteration  in  His  judgment  and  His 
attitude. 

It  is  of  the  greatest  importance  for  the  systematic  pro- 
cedure of  theology  that  this  difference,  between  our  individual 
religious  thinking  and  the  form  of  theological  cognition  sub 
specie  alternitatis,  should  never  be  forgotten.  Our  self-con- 
sciousness is  bound  up  with  time,  and  it  is  never  given  us  to 
survey  the  whole  of  the  Divine  order  within  which  we  move 
as  parts,  so  that  we  simply  cannot  but  regard  and  judge  our 
relation  to  God  under  the  form  of  time ;  and  thus  we  repro- 
duce, in  the  idea  that  God's  relations  to  us  change,  the 
alterations  of  our  own  experience.  But  if  this  way  of  looking 
at  things  were  made  determinative  for  theology  too,  either  we 
should  never  get  further  than  a  history  of  Divine  revelations, 
or  we  should  drag  the  being  of  God  down  into  the  process  of 
historical  change.  In  orthodox  theology  itself  this  error  is 
found  in  combination  with  its  attempt  to  represent  God  as 
pure  Being  and  as  the  latent  moral  character  of  perpetually 
self-identical  justice.  By  the  very  fact  that  to  these  presup- 
positions is  added  a  delineation  of  God's  revealing  acts,  the 
conception  of  God  is  made  subject  to  the  form  of  becoming 
(§  32).  This  procedure  was  facilitated  by  the  fact  that 
eternity  was  likewise  regarded  as  equivalent  to  endless  time, 
in  which  God  is  just  as  much  liable  to  change  as  the  world, 
while  neither  can  we  ever  conceive  the  world  as  non-existent 
(§  37).  Not  till  the  conception  of  God  had  been  correctly 
defined  as  the  love  of  a  Will  perpetually  directed  to  the  eter- 
nally beloved  community  of  the  Kingdom  of  God,  was  there 
attained  a  positive  idea  of  eternity  according  to  which  temporal 
change  in  God's  action  does  not  appear  as  change  in  His 
being.  Now  it  is  not  to  be  wondered  at  that  this  should 
mean  the  rejection  of  all  those  theological  theories  which 
introduce  change  into  the  essential  relations  of  the  Divine 
will.  For  a  method  which  in  one  respect  is  inevitably  fol- 
lowed by  unsophisticated  religious  thought,  is  not  determinat- 
ive for  the  systematic  construction  of  theology,  even  though 


326  JUSTIFICATION   AND   RECONCILIATION  [308-9 

the  Biblical  writers  simply  could  not  avoid  attaching  their 
lines  of  religious  thought  to  temporal  change  in  the  Divine 
intentions  and  operations. 

(1)  The  conception  of  God  which  is  given  in  the  revela- 
tion received  through  Christ,  and  to  which  the  trust  of  those 
who  are  reconciled  through  Christ  attaches  itself,  is  that  of  a 
loving  Will  which  assures  to  believers  spiritual  dominion  over 
the  world  and  perfect  moral  fellowship  in  the  Kingdom  of 
God  as  the  summum  honum, 

(2)  This  final  end  of  God  in  the  world  is  the  ground 
from  which  it  is  possible  to  explain  the  creation  and  govern- 
ment of  the  world  in  general,  and  the  interrelations  between 
nature  and  created  spirits. 

(3)  The  reconciliation  of  sinners  by  God,  if  it  is  to  be 
conceived,  is  conceivable  without  inconsistency  as  the  means 
used  for  the  establishment  of  the  Kingdom  of  God  by  God's 
love. 


CHAPTER  V 


THE  DOCTRINB  OF   SIN 


§  40.  Sin  is   the    negative  presupposition  of   reconciliation. 
Or,  to  put  it  more  accurately,  since  in  the  Christian  religion 
reconciliation  is  recognised  as  an  attribute  of  the  humanity 
which  Christianity  is  to  unify,  it  must  be  presupposed  that 
all  men  are  sinners.      Even  those  who  enjoy  reconciliation 
must  acknowledge  that  they  are  sinners  who   never  cease 
to  need  it      These  judgments    are  necessary  parts   of    the 
Christian  view  of  the  world  and  the  Christian  estimate  of 
self.     Since  we  have  to  comprehend  the  fact  of  sin  from  the 
standpoint  of  the   reconciled  community,   the   Gospel    of    the 
forgiveness  of  sins  is  actually  the  ground  of  our  knowledge  of 
our  sinfulness  (p.  7).     And  this  agrees  with  the  statement  of 
John,  that  we  should  make  God  a  liar  if  we  as  Christians 
affirmed  that  we  had  no  sin.     Now,  the  sin  of  which  one  is 
conscious  when  one  believes  in  forgiveness  or  reconciliation  as 
presented  in   Christianity   is   conceived  as   actual.      In  the 
New  Testament  we  invariably   jfind  that   only  offences  and 
transgressions  are  indicated  as  the  object  of  Divine  forgive- 
ness, while   the  point  to  which  reconciliation  refers  is   the 
active  disposition  of  enmity  to  God  (vol.  ii.  pp.  222,  230). 
We  must  reserve  the  question  whether  there  is  any  indica- 
tion that  the  fellowship  of  sin  among  men  should  and  can 
be  conceived  in  another  form  than  that  of  actual  sin.     The 
assumption  of  sin  as  common  to  all,  however,  is  one  which, 
supplementing  as  it  does  the  personal  guilt  of  the  individual, 
can  only  be  arrived  at  in  the  connection  just  indicated,  when 
we  have  ascertained  our  individual  sin  as  such  for  ourselves. 
That  we  are  sinners,  as  individuals  and  in  conjunction 

827 


328  JUSTIFICATION   AND    RECONCIUATION  [311 

with  all  others,  is  a  necessary  part  of  the  view  of  the  world 
and  of  life  which  we  share  with  the  community  of  Christ. 
And,  following  our  practice  above,  we  have  to  derive  the 
proper  definition  of  sin  from  the  New  Testament.     That  does 
not  imply,  however,  that  the  fact  and  the  explanation  of  sin 
were    first  made    certain   by  revelation,  or   that   they  are 
articles  of  faith  like  other  elements  of  the  Christian  view 
as  a  whole.     For  men  were  familiar  with  the  fact  of  sin  even 
apart  from  Christianity.    But  the  determination  of  its  nature, 
and  the  estimate  of  its  compass  and  its  worthlessness,  are 
expressed  in  a  peculiar  form  in  Christianity ;  for  here  there 
obtain  ideas  of  God,  of  the  supreme  good,  of  the  moral  destiny 
of  man,  and  of  redemption,  different  from  those  which  are  to 
be  found  in  any  other  religion.     As  a  sinner  every  man  has 
to  judge  himself  rightly  and  completely  in  the  light  of  the 
realities  and  blessings  just  named,  and  thereby  also  to  determine 
the  nature  of  the  interconnection  of  sin  within  the  human 
race.     But  we  have  not  to  believe  in  sin  in  general,  or  in  a 
definite  general  conception  of  sin  such  as  would  fall  outside  of 
experience.     Luther  deviates  from  this  principle  when,  in  his 
Smalcald  Confession  (iil  1),  he  puts  forward  the  notion  of 
original  sin  as  a  complete  expression  of  the  matter,  with  the 
qualification,  ut  nvllius  hominis  ratione  intelligi  possUy  sed  ex 
scripturae  patefactione  agnoscenda  et  credenda  sit.    If,  therefore, 
this  conception  is  an  article  of  faith,  then  we  have  to  believe 
in  original  sin  in  the  same  way  as  we  believe  in  God,  etc ; 
but  that  is  absurd,  for  original  sin  is  not  a  channel  of  salva- 
tion.    But  if  original  sin  is  an  article  of  doctrine  which  we 
believe,  then  this  belief,  if  it  cannot  be  tested  by  experience, 
is  a  mere  opinion  both  as  regards  its  relation  to  theological 
knowledge  and  in  its  bearing  on  the  religious  view  of  the 
world.     And  so  the  sense  of  that  dogma  veers  round  into  the 
opposite  of  what  it  was  intended  to  convey.     In  reality,  the 
notion  of  original  sin  was  adopted  by  Augustine  in  no  other 
way  than  the  above  discussion  has  suggested  for  the  notion 
of  sin  as  such — namely,  as  an  inference  from  his  estimate  of 
the  worth  of  the  Christian  salvation.      Augustine,  in  fact. 


311-2]  THE   DOCTRINE   OF   SIN  329 

framed  the  conception  of  original  sin  in  order  to  uphold  the 
sacramental  character  of  infant  baptism,  in  other  words,  as 
an  inference  from  the  special  worth  of  this  instrument 
of  the  Divine  revelation  of  salvation  (vol.  i.  p.  504).  This 
connection,  however,  was  forgotten,  when  the  thought  to 
which  Augustine  had  given  his  imprimatur  became  supreme 
in  tradition. 

The  only  way  in  which  an  idea  of  sin  can  be  formed  at  all 
is  by  comparison  with  an  idea  of  the  good.  The  more  or  the 
less  complete  the  latter,  the  deeper  or  the  shallower  will 
be  our  conception  of  the  worthlessness  of  sin.  Now  for  the 
Christian  faith  it  is  certain  that,  as  the  compass  and  the 
obligatoriness  of  the  good  first  come  out  into  full  cognisability 
in  the  task  of  the  Kingdom  of  God,  especially  as  that  task 
was  faultlessly  discharged  in  the  life-course  of  Jesus,  so 
likewise  sin  can  only  be  understood  as  the  contrary  of 
this,  the  highest  moral  good.  Hence  it  is  absurd  to  expect 
that  we  can  reach  the  Christian  estimate  of  sin,  in  general  as 
well  as  in  the  individual,  in  practical  self-judgment  as  well  as 
in  theory,  before  grasping  and  appreciating  that  moral  ideal. 
As  far  as  individual  experience  is  concerned,  Luther  first,  and 
after  him  Calvin,  maintained  the  opposite  and  true  principle, 
by  the  explicit  maxim  that  hatred  of  sin  proceeds  from  love 
of  the  good,  a  love  which  entirely  coincides  with  faith  in 
reconciliation  through  Christ.^  Before  we  attain  to  faith  in 
Christ,  it  is  perhaps  possible  to  acquire  from  the  law  a  theo- 
retical knowledge  of  the  characteristics  of  sin,  but  not  that 
estimate  of  it  which  should  express  itself  in  the  decisive 
estrangement  of  the  will  from  it.  For  such  a  movement  is 
thinkable  only  as  the  negative  reverse-side  of  the  good  will. 
If,  then,  Luther's  principle,  originally  discovered  by  him  in  his 

*  Of.  Tol.  i.  pp.  168,  199,  214.  Of.  also  Spangenberg,  Idea  fidei  fralrum^ 
p.  246 :  **  Althongh  an  individual,  who  turns  to  God  from  his  heart,  is  imme- 
diately conscious  of  his  sinful  misery  and  forthwith  obtains  forgiveness,  yet  we 
must  not  think  that  he  is  sensible  of  his  corruption  all  at  once.  For  after 
pardon  has  been  granted  him,  he  is  given  more  and  more  light  from  time  to 
time ;  and  so  it  happens  that  a  man,  after  fifty  years  of  faithfulness  in  the  ways 
of  the  Saviour,  is  a  much  greater  sinner  in  his  own  eyes  than  he  was  at  the 
moment  of  his  conversion." 


330  JUSTinCATION   AND   RECONCILIATION  [312-3 

controversy  against  the  sacrament  of  penance,  proves  itself  right 
as  against  Melanchthon's  alteration  of  it,  then  the  theological 
doctrine  of  sin  will  also  need  to  adjust  itself  accordingly.  Or 
if,  on  the  other  hand,  the  practical  as  well  as  the  theoretical 
interpretation  of  sin  is  held  to  be  both  possible  and  necessary 
apart  from  the  knowledge  and  valuation  of  the  Christian 
good,  every  Christian  will  be  bound  to  follow  the  method 
which  leads  to  "  the  conflict  of  penitence "  {Busskarrvpf), 
although  past  experience  shows  that  it  issues  in  either 
despair  or  hypocrisy  (p.  164). 

Traditional  Dogmatics  avoids  determining  the  idea  of  sin 
by  comparison  with  the  life-portrait  of  Christ  or  with  the  in- 
struction He  gave  in  the  righteousness  of  the  Bangdom  of  God, 
by  affirming  the  iustitia  originalis  of  our  first  parents  before 
they  sinned.  In  this  connection  we  still  have  a  divine  of 
modern  times  recording  of  the  progenitors  of  the  human  race 
that  their  self-consciousness  was  a  pure  unclouded  conscious- 
ness of  God,  their  will  positively  good,  and  the  inclination  of 
their  heart  childlike  love  to  God.  The  higher  these  predi- 
cates run,  the  more  profound  appears  to  be  the  state  of  sin 
which  has  come  about  in  them  and  their  descendants  through 
the  transgression  of  the  known  prohibition  of  God.  The 
record  in  Genesis,  however,  partly  contains  no  trace  of  this 
characterisation  of  our  first  parents,  and  partly  contains  its 
very  opposite  ;  and  it  is  foreign  to  Paul's  knowledge  of  Scrip- 
ture as  well,  certain  as  it  is  that  the  comparison  he  draws 
between  the  first  and  the  second  Adam  is  as  far  as  possible 
from  indicating  that  the  first  was  originally  the  counterpart 
of  the  second  (1  Cor.  xv.  45-47).  But  the  theology  which 
carries  back  to  the  beginning  of  human  history  that  normal 
condition  which  Christianity  has  first  made  possible  for  man, 
and  declares  it  to  be  the  natural  state  of  human  life,  entails 
upon  itself  the  disadvantage  of  having  to  conceive  the  Person 
of  Christ  as  an  anomalous  phenomenon  in  human  history. 
For  on  that  basis  Christ  can  be  understood  only  as  the 
Bearer  of  God's  operation  against  sin.  But  if  sin  is  a 
fortuitous  and  abnormal  fact  in  human  history,  we  are  bound 


313-4]  THE   DOCTRINE    OF   SIN  331 

to  pass  the  same  judgment  even  on  Christ  Himself.  Thus  the 
plan  of  orthodox  Dogmatics  serves  to  make  the  historical 
appearance  of  Christ  unintelligible.  But  if,  on  the  contrary, 
in  the  Christian  religion  Jesus  Christ  is  the  standard  of  His 
believers'  view  of  the  world  and  estimate  of  self,  then  in 
Dogmatics  His  Person  must  be  regarded  as  the  ground  of 
knowledge  to  be  used  in  the  definition  of  every  doctrine. 

Hence  even  the  dogmatic  doctrine  of  man  must  not  be 
filled  up  by  adducing  elements  from  the  Biblical  creation- 
document,  but  by  that  spiritual  and  moral  conception  of  man 
which  is  revealed  in  the  life-course  of  Jesus,  and  His  inten- 
tion to  found  the  Kingdom  of  God.  The  doctrinal  statements 
in  the  Confessions,  too,  regarding  the  original  state  of  man, 
have  no  other  significance  than  that  of  antedating  the 
Christian  ideal  of  life.  When  this  fact  is  recognised,  they 
are  seen  to  be  characteristic  representations  of  the  Catholic  and 
the  Evangelical  conceptions  of  that  ideal.  In  other  words,  the 
Evangelical  doctrine  of  iustUia  origiTudis  expresses  the  thought 
that  the  Christian  ideal  should  form  an  element  of  the  concep- 
tion of  man.  On  the  other  hand,  the  Catholic  interpretation  of 
the  subject,  according  to  which  original  righteousness  was  added 
to  human  nature  as  a  gift  of  grace,  implies  that  the  Christian 
ideal  falls  outside  the  essential  constitution  of  man.  There- 
fore the  alleged  marks  of  the  perfect  Christian  life,  namely, 
renunciation  of  the  family,  of  private  property,  and  of  the 
entire  circuit  of  personal  honour,  are  not  demanded  from  all 
Christians,  but  only  from  monks;  and  what  they  are  expected 
to  lead  under  these  conditions  is  not  a  human  life,  but  the  vita 
angelica.  The  Evangelical  assumption,  on  the  other  hand, 
that  our  first  parents  were  created  with  righteousness  as  the 
content  of  their  tiature,  is  an  expression  of  the  fact  that  the 
Christian  ideal  falls  within  the  limits  of  man's  constitution, 
and  that  in  Dogmatics  the  general  nature  of  man  ought 
to  be  interpreted  in  the  light  of  this  standard.  Conceived 
in  this  fashion,  the  idea  of  iustitia  oriffinalis  is  confes- 
sionally  important  and  dogmatically  significant;  it  is  in 
comparison  a  matter  of  indifference  that  no  ground  exists 


332  JUSTIFICATION   AND   RECONCILIATION  [314-5 

for  supposing  that  our  first  parents  were  endowed  with  this 
attribute. 

This  supposition  is  also  rejected  when  Schleiermacher 
strives  to  view  the  sending  of  Christ  for  the  purpose  of  re- 
demption as  at  the  same  time  the  completion  of  God's 
creation  of  man  (p.  128).  This  is  an  important  step  towards 
vindicating  the  conception  of  Christ's  Person  as  the  all-round 
principle  of  knowledge  in  Dogmatics.  To  be  sure  the  ex- 
pression used  by  Schleiermacher  is  not  altogether  felicitous. 
Since  we  usually  define  the  idea  of  creation  by  distinguishing 
it  from  Divine  preservation  and  government,  the  expression 
suggests  the  idea  that  it  is  intended  to  cover  the  birth  of 
Jesus,  and  nothing  more.  But  that  cannot  be  the  point  in 
question,  since  Jesus  in  respect  of  His  birth  is  not  distin- 
guisable  from  any  other  man.  His  unique  worth  lies  in  the 
manner  in  which  He  mastered  His  spiritual  powers  through 
a  self-consciousness  which  transcended  that  of  all  other 
men,  and  by  His  will  brought  them  all  to  bear  upon  His 
personal  destination.  Now,  as  this  activity  of  His  personal 
force  must  be  conceived  as  embraced  by  the  peculiar 
operation  of  God  in  Him,  it  ought  to  be  acknowledged  that 
in  Him  we  have  a  manifestation  of  Divine  creation ;  but,  in 
that  case,  in  "  Divine  creation "  we  include  what  we  other- 
wise distinguish  from  it  as  preservation  and  government 
Further,  it  must  be  taken  into  account  that  the  transforma- 
tion of  the  human  race  which  is  traceable  to  the  peculiar 
work  of  Christ  fulfils  itself  in  individuals,  whose  existence  is 
due  to  natural  descent,  in  a  manner  compatible  with  their 
freedom,  while  to  be  free  and  to  be  created  are  contrary 
notions.  Thus  the  expression  chosen  by  Schleiermacher  is 
paradoxical.  What  is  meant  by  it  is  more  suitably  expressed 
by  saying  that  the  common  destiny  of  men,  through  which 
they  attain  their  distinction  from  nature  and  their  lord- 
ship over  the  world,  was  first  realised  in  its  full  compass 
in  the  self-consciousness  of  Christ,  and  thi'ough  Him  made 
manifest  and  efiTective.  As  compared  with  earlier  known 
degrees  of  possible   moral  fellowship  and  spiritual  freedom 


315-^]  THE   DOCTRINE   OF   8IN  333 

over  against  nature,  Christ  experienced  the  latter  in  perfect 
measure,  and  realised  the  former  to  the  highest  imaginable 
extent,  inasmuch  as  He  passed  His  life  in  the  vocation  of 
founding  the  Kingdom  of  God,  without  once  deviating 
from  it  —  and  both  in  the  strength  of  a  fellowship  or 
unity  with  God  such  as  no  one  before  Him  had  ever 
known. 

The  Christian  ideal  of  life,  as  the  opposite  of  which  we 
have  to  conceive  sin,  includes  two  different  kinds  of  functions, 
the  religious  and  the  moral — trust  in  God,  by  which  we  rise 
superior  to  the  world,  and  action  prompted  by  love  towards 
our  neighbour  and  tending  to  produce  that  fellowship  which, 
as  the  mmmum  bonumy  represents  at  the  same  time  the 
perfected  good.  When  we  make  it  our  personal  end — as  far 
as  time  and  place  and  calling  demand  or  permit — to  second 
and  assist  all  others  in  respect  of  their  true  destiny,  we  act 
from  a  good  will  and  according  to  the  law  of  God.  In  the 
conception  of  sin  there  will  therefore  have  to  be  distinguished 
the  two  sides  which  are  respectively  opposed  to  these 
functions.  Now  this  view  is  indicated  in  the  Confesaio 
Augustana^  Art.  II.,  and  in  its  Apology  when,  as  the  content 
of  universal  or  inherited  sin,  there  is  brought  forward  first 
man's  being  sine  metUy  sine  fiducia  erga  deum,  while  in  the 
second  place  concupiseentia  is  mentioned.  Probably  both 
expressions  denote  the  religious  defect,  which  brings  the 
moral  defect  in  its  train.^  At  all  events  the  emphasis  laid 
upon  these  religious  defects  introduces  an  innovation  in  the 
hitherto  accepted  tradition,  which  is  in  harmony  with  other 
features  of  the  Keformers'  view  as  a  whole.  Stress  has 
already  (p.  170)  been  laid  on  the  fact  that  if  the  principal 
thing  in  Christian  perfection  is  reverence  and  trust  in  God, 
the  opposite  of  both  must  be  affirmed  as  the  leading  char- 
acteristic of  sin ;  and  further,  that  the  Lutheran  doctrine  of 
poenitentia  can  issue  in  the  regaining  of  faith  only  provided 
what  is  pre-eminently  regarded  in  sin  is  its  anti-religious  side. 

^  Eichliorn,  Die  RechtferiigungsUhre  der  ApdogiCy  in  Stud,  u,  Krit.,  1887, 
p.  420  ff. 


334  JUSTinCATION   and   REOONCILUTION  [816-7 

Augustine  knows  nothing  of  these  considerations,  inasmuch  as 
he  defines  original  sin  simply  as  concujriscentia,  selfish  desire. 
Now,  as  the  Reformers  prove,  it  is  indeed  possible  to  find  in  this 
conception  likewise  an  anti-religious  attitude  towards  God,  and 
to  give  specific  expression  to  it  accordingly.  But  yet  Augustine 
and  all  his  successors  have  not  taken  this  step.  And  the 
explanation  of  this  circumstance  is  to  be  found  in  the  fact 
that  Augustine  assumes  the  moral  law  as  the  original  dis- 
pensation between  God  and  men,  a  dispensation  which  is 
violated  by  the  entrance  of  sin.  Luther,  however,  recognised 
the  kind  providence  of  God  and  man's  trust  in  it  as  the  basal 
form  of  religion,  in  which  men  lived  and  moved  before  the 
fall.  Accordingly,  a  defect  in  reverence  and  in  trust  in  God, 
or  indiflference  and  mistrust  of  Him,  was  proved  to  be  the 
basal  form  of  the  sin  of  our  first  parents,  and,  if  that  sin  is 
transmitted  to  all  men,  as  the  basal  form  of  original  sin, 
which  then  has  as  a  special  consequence  selfish  desire  directed 
against  the  claims  of  the  moral  society.  We  can  interpret 
sin  exhaustively  if  we  use  this  doctrinal  position  as  a  clue,  for 
its  worthlessness  can  only  be  measured  by  the  perverted 
attitude  which  the  sinner  adopts  towards  God.  For  the 
point  of  importance  is  to  distinguish  sin  from  wrong-doing 
and  crime.  A  given  action,  in  the  light  of  human  society 
and  the  law  of  the  State,  is  a  wrong  and  a  crime.  But  the 
same  action  is  sin  when  it  springs  from  indifference  towards 
God,  as  the  Benefactor  and  Governor  of  human  life.  By 
bringing  out  this  aspect  we  stauip  sin  as  a  religious  idea,  as  a 
characteristic  value-notion. 

§  41.  A  more  complete  estimate  of  the  anti-moral  aspect 
of  sin  than  is  expressed  in  the  conception  of  the  concupiscentia 
of  each  individual,  is  to  be  found  by  comparing  it  with  the 
common  good  which,  according  to  Christian  standards,  ought 
to  be  realised  through  the  co-operation  of  alL  The  good 
in  the  Christian  sense  is  the  Kingdom  of  God,  in  other  words 
the  uninterrupted  reciprocation  of  action  springing  from  the 
motive  of  love — a  Kingdom  in  which  all  are  knit  together  in 
union  with  every  one  who  can  show  the  mai*ks  of  a  neigh- 


317-8]  THE   DOCTRINE   OF    SIN  335 

bour ;  further,  it  is  that  union  of  men  in  which  all  goods  are 
appropriated  in  their  proper  subordination  to  the  highest 
good.  Now  sin  is  the  opposite  of  the  good,  so  far  as  it  is 
selfishness  springing  from  indifference  or  mistrust  of  God,  and 
directs  itself  to  goods  of  subordinate  rank  without  keeping  in 
view  their  subordination  to  the  highest  good.  It  does  not 
negate  the  good  as  such ;  but,  in  traversing  the  proper 
relation  of  goods  to  the  good,  it  issues  in  practical  con- 
tradiction of  the  good.  Now,  if  we  are  to  find  in  the 
conception  of  the  Kingdom  of  God  the  standard  for  the 
full  determination  of  sin  as  its  opposite,  then  sin  cannot  be 
completely  represented  either  within  the  framework  of  the 
individual  life,  or  in  that  of  humanity  as  a  natural  species. 
The  subject  of  sin,  rather,  is  humanity  as  the  sum  of  all 
individuals,  in  so  far  as  the  selfish  action  of  each  person, 
involving  him  as  it  does  in  illimitable  interaction  with  all 
others,  is  directed  in  any  degree  whatsoever  towards  the 
opposite  of  the  good,  and  leads  to  the  association  of  individuals 
in  common  evil.  This  definition,  which  is  in  the  closest 
formal  agreement  with  Schleiermacher  (vol.  i.  p.  503), 
transcends  the  dilemma  which  hovers  between  Pelagius  and 
Augustine,  and  to  which  the  problem  of  sin  has  always  been 
restricted.  Pelagius  recognises  exclusively  the  individual 
will  as  the  form  of  sin.  He  reflects,  indeed,  on  the  fact  that 
through  example  and  imitation  sin  comes  to  be  something 
common  to  many.  But  example  operates  only  when  one 
receives  and  welcomes  it  from  another,  and  thus  by  the  path 
described  the  dissemination  of  sin  does  not  transcend  the 
limits  of  the  individual  wilL  Moreover,  the  imitation  of 
moral  or  immoral  actions  is  a  rare  phenomenon  in  maturer 
years.  It  is  limited,  rather,  to  the  stage  of  childhood  and 
youth,  and  consequently  it  cannot  be  a  universal  basis  for  the 
fellowship  of  sin.  But  even  though  that  fellowship  came 
into  existence  by  means  of  example  and  imitation,  yet  it 
would  rather  imply  merely  a  similarity  of  all  individuals  in 
possessing  a  sinful  will:  sin  would  thus  be  proved  to  be 
something  logically,  but  not  really,  common.     On  the  other 


336  JUSTIFICATION   AND   RECONCILIATION  [318-9 

hand,  Augustine  takes  the  subject  of  sm  to  be  humanity  as  a 
natural  species,  in  its  original  embodiment  in  the  person  of 
the  original  parent,  the  first  sinner.  Now  since  the  sin 
pertaining  to  the  whole  race  is  conceived  as  marked  by  the 
highest  possible  degree  of  worthlessness — ^a  degree  which  no 
actual  sin  can  possibly  enhance — since,  further,  the  individual 
members  of  the  race,  unless  conceived  as  acting,  are  absolutely 
independent  of  each  other  as  persons,  Augustine's  doctrine  of 
original  sin  has  for  its  outcome  the  thought  that  each  individual 
descendant  of  our  first  parents  is  of  necessity  burdened  with 
the  highest  degree  of  sin,  and  that  in  this  respect  all  men  are 
alike  (p.  132).  Since  in  relation  thereto  no  notice  whatever 
is  taken  of  the  interaction  of  actual  sins,  Augustine's  form  of 
doctrine  no  more  than  that  of  Pelagius  succeeds  in  giving 
expression  to  the  idea  of  the  fellowship  of  many  persons  in 
sin;  what  it  expresses  is  their  similarity  in  this  respect — 
only  that  this  similarity  is  transferred  to  another  point 
than  that  favoured  by  Pelagius.  Nor  is  the  tenor  of  the 
Augustinian  doctrine  corrected  at  any  stage  of  orthodox 
theology,  as  for  instance  by  consideration  being  given  in  the 
doctrine  of  redemption  to  the  thoroughgoing  reciprocation 
which  marks  sinful  action  throughout  the  human  race. 
Bather  do  we  invariably  find  the  idea  of  redemption  or 
reconciliation  formed  exclusively  in  view  of  original  sin  and 
the  actual  sins  of  the  individual. 

Granted,  then,  that  the  conception  of  original  sin  is  an 
intrinsically  clear  and  necessary  thought,  yet,  to  say  the  least, 
it  cannot  express  the  highest  possible  sense  of  sin.  Actual 
sins  are  more  than  manifestations  or  accidents  of  original  sin 
in  the  individual.  If  we  first  of  all  realise  how  superficial  a 
view  of  things  it  is  which  limits  itself  to  the  categories  of 
being  and  appearance,  substance  and  accident,  we  shall  find  it 
necessary  to  lay  less  stress  on  the  Augustinian  formula  of 
original  sin.  Individual  actions,  which  are  traced  back  to  the 
will  as  their  source,  are  not  phenomena  of  will  which  may  or 
may  not  exist  without  changing  its  nature ;  rather,  through 
actions,  according  to  the  direction  they  take,  the  will  acquires 


319-20]  THE   DOCTRINE   OF   SIN  337 

its  nature  and  develops    into  a  good  or   an  evil  character. 
This  view  is  directly  opposed  to  that  which  is  expressed  in 
the  conception  of  original  sin.     Nevertheless,  it  is  the  prin- 
ciple which  governs  our  practical  judgment  of  evil,  and  apart 
from  which  we  never  set  ourselves  to  coimteract  evil  in  our- 
selves or  in  others.      In  the  first  place,  on  it  rests  every  kind 
of  responsibility  for  evil  which  we  impose  upon  ourselves. 
Only  if  we  discern  in  the  individual  action  the  proof-mark 
of  the  independence  of  the  will,  can  we  ascribe  to  ourselves, 
not  merely  individual  actions,  but  likewise  evil  habit  or  evil 
inclination.     But    this  is  tantamount   to   denying  that   the 
individual  action  is  the  involuntary  accident  of  a  determining 
force  of  inborn   inclination.     Even   if   we  find  radical  evil 
working  within  us  to  the  extent  affirmed  by  Kant,  respon- 
sibility for  it  can  only  be  vindicated  if  it  is  assumed  to  be  the 
result  of  the  empirical  determination  of  the  will,  for  it  can  be 
derived  neither  from  the  natural  origin  of  every  man,  nor 
from  a  pretended  intelligible  act  of  freedom  (vol.  i.  p.  449). 
Secondly,  education  is  possible  only  on  the  presupposition  that 
existing  bad  habits  or  evil  inclinations  have  come  to  exist  as 
the  products  of  repeated  acts  of  will.     On  the  other  hand, 
from  the  standpoint  of  original  sin   education   is  quite  un- 
thinkable.     Education  strives  to  direct  the  child  to  the  good 
as  a  whole,  by  offering  inducements  to  what  is  good  in  all  the 
particular  relations   of  life,  and  by  severally  combating  all 
bad  habits.      It  rests  on  the  presupposition  that  there  exists 
in  the  child  a  general,  though  still  indeterminate,  impulse 
towards  the  good,  which  just  falls  short  of  being  guided  by 
complete  insight  into  the  good,  and  has  not  yet  been  tested  in 
the  particular  relationships  of  life.     This  is  the  exact  opposite 
of  the  tendency  of  the  child's  will  to  evil  and  of  the  deter- 
mining power  of  evil,  as  asserted  in  the  doctrine  of  original 
sin.      Thirdly,  the  assumption  we  make  of  distinct  degrees  of 
evil  in  individuals — an  assumption  rendered  indispensable  by 
practical  considerations — is  incompatible  with  the  dogma  of 
original  sin,  which  asserts  of  all  the  descendants  of  Adam  an 
equally  high  degree  of  sinful  inclination,  and  that  the  highest 

22 


338  JUSTIFICATION   AND    RECONCILIATION  [320-1 

possible,  namely,  that  they  have  fallen  into  univei-sal  and 
obstinate  resistance  to  the  Divine  good,  and  into  the  possession 
of  the  devil.  Nevertheless,  from  the  degree  of  wickedness 
which  we  call  devilish  we  distinguish  vice,  selfish  and 
insolent  imperiousness,  vain  and  astute  indifference  to  common 
moral  ends,  and,  lastly,  self-seeking  forms  of  patriotism,  pride 
of  rank,  and  family  zeal,  which  indeed  are  based  upon  parti- 
cular moral  goods,  but  pursue  them  in  a  way  which  comes 
into  contradiction  with  universal  morality. 

All  these  grades  of  habitual  sin  we  include  in  the  vast 
complexity  of  sinful  action  when  we  form  the  idea  of  the 
kingdom  of  sin.  And  indeed  we  can  only  regard  ourselves  as 
sharing  its  guilt  when  we  not  only  attribute  to  ourselves  our 
own  sinfid  actions  as  such,  but  at  the  same  time  calculate 
how  they  produce  sin  in  others  also,  although  we  may  possess 
no  complete  or  distinct  idea  of  the  extent  of  these  effects. 
On  the  other  hand,  we  also  feel  the  reaction  of  this  power  of 
common  sin,  not  only  through  example  or  the  production  in 
us  of  sinful  opposition  to  the  sins  of  others,  but  especially  by 
the  blunting  of  our  moral  vigilance  and  our  moral  judgment 
For  whereas  the  Kingdom  of  God  as  the  supreme  end  rises 
above  all  that  falls  within  the  compass  of  the  world,  and  is 
destined  to  regulate  and  embrace  every  relationship  of  life,  a 
bondage  and  a  false  dependence  on  the  world  are  the  fruit  of 
that  friendship  for  the  world  which  runs  counter  to  that 
final  end.  This  form  of  sinful  federation  with  others,  how- 
ever, affects  everyone,  at  least  in  this  way  that  we  become 
accustomed  to  standing  forms  of  sin,  at  any  rate  in  others,  and 
acquiesce  in  them  as  the  ordinary  expression  of  human 
nature.  To  be  sure,  no  individual,  from  where  he  is  placed, 
surveys  more  than  a  narrow  section  of  this  federation  of 
humanity,  and  his  feeling  of  worthlessness  is  further  modified 
by  the  influences  of  different  stages  of  life,  rank,  calling,  and 
his  degree  of  personal  culture.  But  wherever,  within  the 
domain  in  which  the  Christian  view  of  the  world  prevails,  the 
idea  is  formed  at  all  according  to  the  standard  of  the  value  of 
the  Kingdom  of  God,  it  will  be  qualitatively  identical.     The 


321-2]  THE   DOCTRINE    OF   SIN  339 

special  causes  by  which  each  man  is  led  to  form  the  common 
conception  serve  in  comparison  actually  to  strengthen  our 
conviction  of  the  gravity  of  the  sinful  fate  into  which  human 
life  conducts  us.  For  in  moral  matters  those  motives  are 
always  the  most  effective  in  which  the  general  principle 
attaches  itself  to  the  individual's  particular  situation  and 
particular  experiences.  Now  it  is  without  doubt  a  merit  in 
Schleiermacher  to  have  formed  the  above  conception  of 
common  sin,  in  which  are  to  be  included  all  particular  actions 
(vol.  i.  p.  503).  Only  he  did  wrong  in  inserting  it  under  the 
traditional  heading  of  original  sin,  to  which  it  bears  very  little 
resemblance.  This  proceeding,  however,  is  due  to  the  fact  that 
he  undertook  to  expound  Dogmatics  as  a  representation  of  the 
system  accepted  by  the  Church — which  it  ought  not  to  be. 

Nothing  is  better  calculated  to  emphasise  the  difference 
between  the  idea  of  common  sin,  as  conceived  to  include  all 
sinful  actions,  and  the  idea  of  original  sin,  than  a  knowledge 
of  the  motive  which  first  prompted  Luther  to  adopt  the 
Augustinian  conception.  For  his  reasons  were  not  the  same  as 
those  which  led  Augustine  to  formulate  the  notion  of  original 
sin.  To  the  latter  it  presented  itself  as  a  means  whereby 
the  sacramental  character  of  infant  baptism  might  be  upheld. 
But  with  this  Luther  was  not  at  all  concerned,  as  may  be 
seen  from  his  official  declarations  on  the  subject  of  infant 
baptism,  which  partly  exclude  and  partly  evade  the  Augus- 
tinian point  of  view.^  Augustine's  doctrine  of  original  sin 
found  favour  with  Luther  more  as  a  ground  for  the  negation 

^  It  is  true,  indeed,  that  Luther  occasionally  affirms  quite  unreservedly  the 
eternal  damnation  of  unbaptized  children,  but,  on  the  other  hand,  he  counts  it 
to  their  advantage  that  they  have  not  committed  actual  sins.  The  fact  is  that, 
speaking  generally,  Lnther  never  took  quite  seriously  to  the  above  inference 
from  original  sin.  In  connection  with  this  problem  he  utters  a  warning  against 
seeking  to  penetrate  into  matters  which  God  has  not  revealed  ;  and  hence  he  is 
not  in  favour  of  trying  to  solve  the  problem,  as  Augustine  did,  by  purely 
theoretical  arguments.  He  rather  awakens  hope  in  God's  mercy  towards 
children  who  die  unbaptized,  and,  in  short,  clearly  puts  aside  in  this  question 
the  interest  which  actuated  Augustine.  For  Luther,  therefore,  baptism  becomes 
in  part  an  act  which  proclaims  the  promise  of  grace  to  children,  partly  an  act 
by  which  they  are  dedicated  to  God  (C  A,  ix.  Art.  Smalc,  iii.  5).  Cf. 
Kostlin,  Luther^s  Tfuoloffie,  ii.  pp.  88-100,  375,  511. 


340  JUSTIFIOATION   AND   RECONCILIATION  [322-3 

of  human  merit  before  God,  and  as  an  argument  against  the 
freedom  of  the  will.^  This,  however,  is  both  to  exaggerate 
and  to  minimise  the  idea  of  sin.  For  to  assert  the  doctrine 
of  original  sin  in  order  to  refute  the  validity  of  merits  before 
Grod  is  just  as  appropriate  as  it  would  be  to  use  a  boulder  to 
kill  a  gnat.  On  the  other  hand,  this  affirmation  of  the 
doctrine  in  its  present  application  serves  rather  as  an 
argument  for  human  weakness  than  for  human  guilt.  In 
Augustine's  teaching,  however,  the  latter  is  the  point  of 
supreme  importance.  But  this  aspect  of  sin,  which  unques- 
tionably enters  into  the  connotation  of  "  the  kingdon\  of  sin," 
can  never  be  proved  to  belong  to  original  sin ;  the  two,  in 
fact,  are  mutually  exclusive.  This  can  easily  be  demonstrated 
if  only  we  recall  Augustine's  line  of  thought.  He  first 
deduces  inherited  sin  from  the  natural  relation  between 
children  and  their  sinful  parents.  This,  however,  does  not 
involve  any  guilt  on  the  part  of  the  former.  Consequently, 
to  prove  that  the  quality  of  guilt  is  theirs,  he  affirms  that 
Adam's  descendants  have  an  active  share  in  the  guilt  of  their 
first  parents,  by  dint  of  combining  his  erroneous  exegesis  of 
Eom.  V.  12  with  Heb.  vii.  9,  10.  Granted  that  this  position 
is  true,  then  the  sin  with  which  men  enter  upon  life  is  not 
inherited  at  all,  but  belongs  to  each  in  virtue  of  his  pre- 
existence.  Hence  inherited  sin  and  personal  guilt  cannot  be 
combined  in  thought  without  inaccuracy  or  a  sacrificium 
inteUectus.  And  this  is  confirmed  by  the  literature  of  asceticism. 
Anselm  and  Johann  Arndt  alike,  when  treating  of  hereditary 
sin,  regard  it  as  misery,  deformity,  loathsomeness;  guilt, 
however,  they  never  connect  with  anything  but  actual  sins.* 

Now,  however  strongly  the  guilt  of  original  sin  may  be 
expressed  in  the  second  Article  of  the  Gonfessio  Attgvstana,  yet 
this  very  Article  seems  to  awaken  doubts  regarding  the 
admissibility  of  the  doctrine.  It  has  been  shown  above 
p.  333)  how  momentous  it  was  for  Luther's  religious  theory 

^  C.  A.  u.  i  "Daninant  Pelagianos  et  alios,  qui  yitiani  originis  negant  esse 
peccatum,  et  ut  extenuent  gloriam  meriti  et  beneiiciorum  Christi,  disputant, 
hominein  propriis  yiribus  rationis  coram  deo  iustificari  posse." 

'  QeschichU  des  PietismuSf  ii.  pp.  45,  70. 


323-4]  THE   DOCTRINE    OF   SIN  341 

as  a  whole  that  he  should  have  affirmed  the  characteristics 
sine  metu,  sine  fiduda  erga  deum  alongside  of  concupisceTitia. 
If,  then,  original  sin  be  really  the  basal  conception  of  sin, 
the  next  step  called  for  was  to  describe  these  manifestations 
of  indifference  and  mistrust  towards  God  as  characteristics  of 
original  sin.     But  Melanchthon  in  his  Apology  stops  short  of 
so  including  the  said  defects  in  original  sin  that  the  attribute 
of  guilt  could  be  proved   to  attach   to   them.     He  rightly 
deems  it  an  omission  on  the  part    of    the  Scholastics  that 
they  do  not  speak  of  these  defects  inherent  in  the  status  of 
sin.^     But  he  finds  it  possible  to  assert  them  as  attributes  of 
original  sin  only  by  accepting  the  negative  definitions  of  it 
framed  by  the  Scholastics  in  direct  divergence  from  Augustine. 
Now,  so  far  as  original  sin  has  to  be  verified  in  the  newly- 
born,  what  Melanchthon  uses  the  formula  sine  Tfietu,  sinsjiducia 
erga  deum  to  express  is  either  a  defect  which  in  the  case  of 
children   is  necessarily    blameless,  or  a    positive  something 
which  he  cannot  prove.^     By  comparing  certain  statements 
in  the  New  Testament  (1  Cor.  ii.  14  ;  Eom.  vii.  5),  however,  he 
reaches  all  that  can  really  be  ascertained  in  the  matter,  namely, 
that  the  anti-religious  aspect  of  sin,  in  so  far  as  it  implies 
guilt,  not  merely  is  present  in  single  actions,  but  is  habitual.^ 
But  Melanchthon  here  no  longer  maintains  that  this  antipathy 
towards  God   is  inherited,  not  acquired  in  the  individual's 
life-time.     We  cannot,  therefore,  escape  receiving  the  impres- 
sion from  this  discussion,  that  if  those  characteristics  of  sin 
are  to  be  accepted  as  constitutive  for  the  idea  of  sin  and  as 
grounds  of  its  worthlessness  judged  by  the  religious  standard, 
original  sin  can  no  longer  be  maintained  as  the  basal  foim  of 

^  ApoL  C.  A.\,  8:  "Cum  de  peccato  originis  loquuntur,  graviora  vitia 
humanae  naturae  non  commemoraiit,  scilicet  ignorationem  del,  con  temp  turn  del, 
vacare  metu  et  fiducia  del,  odisse  iudicium  del,  fugere  deum  iudicantem,  de- 
sperare  gratiam,  habere  fiduciam  rerum  praesentium  etc.  Hos  morboa,  qui 
inaxime  adversantur  legi  dei,  non  animadvertunt  scholastic!." 

'  Lx.  i.  29  :  "Hugo  ait,  originale  peccatum  esse  ignorationem  in  mente  et 
concupiscentiam  in  carne.  Significat  enim  nos  nascentes  afferre  ignorationem 
dei,  incrednlitatem,  diffidentiam,  contemptum,  odium  dei." 

•  L,c,  i,  31 :  "  Facile  iudicare  poterit  prudens  lector,  non  tantum  culpas 
actaales  esse,  sine  metu  et  sine  fide  esse ;  sunt  enim  durabiles  defectus  in 
natura  non  renovata." 


342  JUSTIFICATION   AND   RECONCILIATION  [324-5 

thiff  idea.     Or,  if  it  is  still  sought  to  maintain  this,  then  the 
above  defects  in  religion  fall  under  the  heading  of  actual  sins, 
which  alone,  along  with  original  sin,  enter  into  consideration. 
As  regards  the  latter  alternative,  Luther's  Smalcald  Articles 
(iii.  1)  confess  that  the  Catholic  opponents  of  the  Augsburg 
Confession  are  in  the  right.     Original  sin  is  only  described 
metaphysically  as  corruptio  naturae,  and  amongst  its  effects 
— the  mala  opera — the  religious  defects  are  very  strongly 
emphasised  in  the  first  place,  and  that  with  a  greater  wealth 
of  description  than  is  bestowed  later  on  the  moral  offences. 
This  bears  out  the  great  importance  we  have  ascribed  to  this 
conception  of  sin  for  Luther's  religious  theory  as  a  whola 
But  the  very  authors  of  the   Formula  of  Concord  showed 
themselves  incapable  of  understanding  this  side  of  the  subject, 
and    in    the   Lutheran    theology   all   sympathy    with   these 
positions  has  disappeared,  although    apart   from    them   the 
doctrine  of  poenitentia  is  unintelligible.     For  it  is  really  a 
disjunctive  relation  that  obtains  between  the  two  statements 
— (1)  that  concupiscentiaj  i.e.  immoral  desii*e  contrary  to  the 
law   of   God,  constitutes,  in  the  form  of   original   sin,  the 
basal  form  of  the  conception  of  sin,  and  (2)  that  it  is  the 
indifference  and  mistrust  towards  God  which  are  involved  in 
unlawful  and  criminal  conduct  that  mark  such  conduct  as 
sin    according  to  the  religious  standard.     Theologians  have 
taken  their  stand  upon  the  first  view,  and  therefore  they 
have  lost  sight  of  the  other  valuable  idea  of  the  Eeformers, 
just  as   they  ceased    to   realise  that    trust  in   God   is  the 
practical  expression  of  justification  (p.   181).     For  another 
reason  why  these  anti-religious  functions  do  not  harmonise 
with  the  idea  of  original  sin  is  that  they  are  not  coincident, 
but  occupy   different   planes.      Want  of  reverence  towards 
God  involves,  no  doubt,  want  of  trust  in  Him,  but  in  the 
status  of  sin  we  may  also  discern  a  want  of  trust  in  God 
coexisting  with  reverence  towards  Him.     From  this  too  we 
may  learn  that  these  defects  indicate  forms  of    active  am. 
But  these  forms  must  be  regarded  as  the  basal  forms  of  sin 
and  as  determinative  of  its  worth,  if  we  are  to  have  a  correct 


325-6]  THE    DOCTRINE    OF   SIN  343 

and  complete  interpretation  of  sin  at  all.  For  if  by  cdn- 
cupiscentia  we  understand  selfish  desire  contrary  to  the  moral 
law,  then  this  presupposes  indifference  and  mistrust  towards 
God,  just  as  the  recognition  of  that  Divine  law  must  be 
based  upon  the  religious  functions  of  reverence  and  trust. 
But  if  these  anti-religious  functions  can  be  proved  to  be 
merely  habitual,  not  hereditary  defects,  then  by  laying  the 
emphasis  upon  them  we  wreck  the  notion  of  original  sin. 

The  transmission  of  spiritual  endowments,  qualities  of 
temperament,  and  emotional  traits,  which,  guided  by  the 
resemblance  between  parents  and  children,  we  trace  back  to 
natural  descent,  carries  with  it  no  clear  idea  of  how  these 
capacities,  apart  from  their  action,  can  be  set  in  a  wrong 
direction  and  invested  with  guilt.  Still  less  is  it  true  to 
experience  to  say  that  every  man  begins  life  with  that 
extreme  measure  of  opposition  to  God  which  would  result  in 
eternal  damnation.  By  assuming  this,  Augustine  was  led  to 
commit  an  error  in  the  formal  expression  he  gave  to  the  idea  of 
original  sin,  because  as  a  Platonist  he  made  the  condi- 
tionedness  of  knowledge  a  measure  of  the  conditionedness  of 
the  will.  In  the  sphere  of  knowledge  contradiction  arises 
when  predicates  which  are  furthest  removed  from  one  another 
in  the  series  of  predicables,  and  so  far  stand  opposed,  are 
affirmed  of  the  self-same  object  at  the  same  time  and  in  the 
same  respect.  But  contradiction  in  the  will,  or  sin,  arises 
even  when  some  aim  is  striven  after  or  some  particular  good 
realised  which  is  not  duly  subordinated  to  the  universal  good, 
since  the  latter  should  be  realised  in  every  act  of  will. 
Accordingly  sin,  unlike  the  notion  of  logical  contradiction, 
does  not  come  to  exist  in  the  first  instance  as  the  extreme 
opposite  of  the  good  which  ought  to  be  realised;  moral  contra- 
diction, rather,  comes  about  even  when  the  will  does  not  do, 
or  does  something  other  than,  what  corresponds  to  the  perfect 
good.  Even  a  particular  deviation  from  obligatory  truth 
for  a  selfish  purpose  is  sin ;  we  do  not  need  to  wait  for  a 
general  conscious  intention  to  be  untruthful  and  to  suppress 
the  truth,     B^t  in  the  conception  of  original  sin  this  generS;! 


344  JUSTIFICATION    AND    RECONCILIATION  [.^eS~7 

tendency  to  untruthfulness  as  such  is  as  distinctly  predicated 
of  each  individual  as  the  like  tendency  to  oppose  every  other 
form  of  the  good.  Accordingly,  the  conception  is  quite  useless 
as  a  guiding  principle  in  judging  our  own  conduct,  just 
because  the  intensity  of  our  consciousness  of  moral  opposition 
to  the  good  is  much  less,  and  exaggerations  of  that  kind 
could  only  serve  to  make  us  untrue  to  ourselves. 

The  notion  of  original  sin,  regarded  as  the  expression  of 
a  bias  exhibiting  the  extremest  opposition  to  the  good  as  a 
whole,  which  exists  in  every  individual  by  a  natural  necessity, 
and  as  expressing  likewise  a  corresponding  degree  of  personal 
guilt  of  the  highest  kind,  does  not  secure  to  us  the  complete 
Christian  conception  and  estimate  of  actual  sin  in  its  entirety, 
and  is  negatived  by  the  practical  self-judgment  which  we 
exercise  in  regard  to  our  own  sin.  This  notion,  therefore,  in 
the  form  in  which  it  has  hitherto  been  discussed,  is  likewise 
useless  for  the  purpose  of  making  the  idea  of  the  kingdom 
of  sin  more  distinct  or  intelligible.  The  kingdom  of  sin, 
however,  is  a  substitute  for  the  hypothesis  of  original  sin  which 
gives  due  prominence  to  everything  that  the  notion  of  original 
sin  was  rightly  enough  meant  to  embrace.  For  Luther's 
view,  that  the  doctrine  of  original  sin  is  revealed  in  Scripture, 
is  based  upon  an  inaccurate  exegesis  of  particular  expressions. 
It  may  be  taken  as  beyond  doubt  that  the  personal  confession 
in  Ps.  li.  7  cannot  form  the  basis  of  any  universal  doctrinal 
truth.  Further,  the  predicate  "  children  of  wrath  "  (Eph.  ii.  3) 
refers  to  the  former  actual  transgression  of  those  who  now,  as 
Christians,  have  the  right  to  apply  to  themselves  that  Divine 
purpose  of  grace  which  is  the  very  antithesis  of  wrath  (vol. 
ii.  p.  147).  Finally,  Augustine's  exegesis  of  Bom.  v.  12  is 
admittedly  false.  Paul  does  not  say  that  all  have  sinned  in 
the  person  of  Adam ;  and  this  thought  finds  no  more  support 
in  the  grammatical  and  rhetorical  aspects  of  his  language, 
than  does  the  inference  that  all  the  descendants  of  Adam 
consequently  begiu  their  individual  life  with  a  sinful  bias 
and  the  deepest  guilt.  What  Paul  was  actually  thinking  of 
when  he  wrote  this  verse  and  its  parallel  in  ver.  19,  not  only 


327-8]  THE    DOCTRINE   OF   SIN  345 

is  still  a  matter  of  dispute  amongst  exegetes,  but  perhaps  is 
incapable  of  being  determined  at  all.  But  in  that  case  the 
theological  norm  of  the  older  school  itself  makes  it  impos- 
sible to  maintain  the  dogma  of  original  sin.  For  dogmas  can 
be  based  only  on  clear  statements  of  Scripture.  But  what 
is  clear  in  Paul's  presentation  of  the  subject  is  rather  the 
fact  that  he  says  not  a  word  about  the  transmission  of  sin 
and  the  inheritance  of  bias  by  natural  generation. 

On  the  other  hand,  Paul  distinctly  asserts  that,  in  con- 
sequence of  the  one  transgression  of  Adam,  death  is  appointed 
by  Divine  decree  for  all  his  posterity,  as  a  doom  which  has  the 
value  of  a  penal  sentence.  The  sin  of  individual  persons,  as 
Paul  declares,  then  arises  only  because  the  doom  of  death 
is  already  valid  for  all  individuals  in  virtue  of  the  Divine 
judgment.^  For,  as  he  adds,  were  the  actual  sin  of  each 
individual  in  all  cases  a  transgression  of  a  Divine  command 
or  prohibition,  death  would  necessarily  prevail  as  its  conse- 
quence. But  sin  had  no  such  character  during  the  whole 
epoch  which  preceded  the  Mosaic  legislation ;  therefore  the 
fact  that  in  that  epoch  all  men  were  subject  to  death  was 
not  dependent  on  their  own  sin.  Now,  however,  as  Paul 
assumes,  death  is  in  every  case  the  consequence  of  sin ;  if  it 
is  not  brought  about  by  one's  own  sin,  it  must  be  incurred  by 
another's.  And  this  according  to  the  Biblical  record  can 
only  be  the  transgression  of  Adam ;  hence  the  doom  of  death 
imposed  upon  all  men  is  dependent  on  the  sin  of  Adam. 
Paul,  however,  does  not  look  upon  the  relation  between  this 
cause  and  that  effect  as  being  mediated  by  the  law  and  bond 
of  natural  descent.  He  takes  the  mediating  factor  to  be  the 
positive  Divine  appointment  (ver.  16).  But  the  question  is 
whether,  after  all,  another  consideration  should  not  lead  us  to 
take  Paul's  words  as  involving  likewise  the  transmission  of 
the  sinful  condition  from  the  father  of  the  race  to  his 
posterity.      For  he   speaks   of  Adam's  single   actual  trans- 

^  Cf.  Dietzach,  Adam  und  ChrisluSf  p.  68  ff.  The  relative  clause  ^0'  v 
irdvT€i  IjfmpTov  refers  to  ddvaroi.  The  preposition  is  here  used  as  in  Hcb.  ix, 
15 ;  1  Thess.  iii.  7  ;  2  Oor.  vii.  4,  ix.  6 ;  Eph.  iv,  26. 


346  JUSTIFICATION    AND    RECONCILIATION  [328-« 

gression  as  the  means  by  which  sin  entered  the  human  race. 
By  sin  he  means  just  the  phenomenon  in  its  entirety,  and 
accordingly  he  speaks  of  the  first  action  of  a  sinful  kind  as 
inaugurating  that  state  as  a  whole  which  is  distinctly  per- 
ceptible in  the  later  phenomena  of  universal  transgression. 
But  he  still  does  not  say  that  sin,  which  in  its  comprehensive 
sense  becomes  real  on  the  first  act  of  transgression,  becomes 
universal  otherwise  than  by  the  active  transgression  of  every 
descendant  of  Adam.  In  the  statements  which  follow,  it  is 
never  anything  but  the  diffusion  of  the  doom  of  death  that 
he  connects  with  Adam's  transgression,  until  at  last,  in  the 
concluding  19  th  verse,  he  comes  to  speak  of  the  sinful  state 
of  "  the  many,"  which,  in  his  opinion,  is  latent  in  Adam's 
disobedience. 

Now,  as  the  comparison  in  ver.  19  is  really  an  explana- 
tion of  the  previous  comparison  (in  ver.  18),  it  necessarily 
expresses,  in  both  its  clauses,  a  relation  different  from  that 
expressed  in  ver.  18.  In  the  latter  Paul  is  speaking  of  the 
consequences  of  death  and  of  life  which  have  flowed,  and  are 
to  flow,  to  all  men  from  Adam  and  Christ.  This  thought, 
then,  cannot  be  repeated  in  ver.  1 9.  This  of  itself  is  enough 
to  prove  Dietzsch  wrong  in  translating  Karea-TdOrja'av  by 
"  are  made "  (gemacht  werden),  and  he  is  further  wrong  in 
making  the  second  clause  refer  to  the  perfecting  of  moral 
righteousness,  to  which  believers  attain  as  a  future  conse- 
quence of  their  oneness  with  Christ.  For  the  future  tense 
is  only  meant  to  express  the  logical  necessity  of  the  inference 
from  the  analogy  of  the  facts  compared,  and  the  righteousness 
of  "  the  many  "  is  the  righteousness  by  faith  established  by 
God's  decree.  Ver.  19,  therefore,  serves  to  explain  ver.  18 
thus :  the  effects  of  death  and  of  life  flow  from  Adam  and 
Christ  respectively,  in  virtue  of  the  value-content  subsisting 
in  the  disobedience  of  Adam  and  the  obedience  of  Christ 
apart  from  these  effects.  The  value-content  of  Christ's 
obedience  lies  in  the  fact  that  it  constitutes  those  who 
believe  in  Him  righteous  by  the  judgment  of  God  and  for 
that  mdgment  (vol.  ii.  p.  327).     This  beipg  so,  we  are  now 


329-30]  THE    DOCTRINE    OF    SIN  347 

in  a  position  to  ascertain  the  sense  of  the  first  clause  of  the 
verse.  The  value-content  of  Adam's  disobedience  consists 
in  this,  that  his  descendants  are  constituted  sinners  by 
the  judgment  and  for  the  judgment  of  God.  The  relations 
between  the  parallel  sets  of  conditions  being  such  as  we  have 
described,  we  are  at  once  dispensed  from  choosing  between 
the  possible  meanings  of  KaffiaToivai  distinguished  by  Dietzsch 
(namely,  to  represent  or  demonstrate  as,  to  treat  as,  to  assign 
a  place  to,  to  make).  Since  it  is  God  who  judges  that 
believers  are  righteous,  and  righteous  for  Him,  it  is  impossible 
that  this  relation  can  be  merely  apparent,  but  not  real. 
Hence,  if  God,  by  conjoining  Adam's  descendants  with  the 
father  of  the  race  in  the  common  doom  of  death,  decrees  that 
all  men  are  sinners,  then  for  Him  that  predicate  must  belong 
to  them  not  merely  in  appearance  but  in  reality.  An 
evidence  of  the  correctness  of  this  argument  Paul  sees  in  the 
fact  that  the  doom  of  death  is  imposed  upon  men  by  Divine 
judgment  before  they  have  sinned  on  their  own  account. 
Now,  if  we  looked  merely  to  the  law  that  death  is  a  characteristic 
mark  of  the  status  of  sin,  we  might  frame  a  human  judgment 
to  the  effect  that  God,  by  decreeing  death  prior  to  sin  of  the 
individual's  own,  invests  Adam's  descendants  with  no  more 
than  the  semblance  of  being  sinners.  But  human  judgment 
cannot  be  taken  as  a  criterion  in  this  matter.  On  the  con- 
trary, what  is  signified  by  the  decree  of  death,  which  we  per- 
ceive in  operation  prior  to  the  individual's  own  commission 
of  sin,  is  that  by  the  judgment  of  God  Adam's  descendants 
are  really  constituted  sinners  for  God's  judgment.  Now, 
while  this  very  conjoining  of  Adam's  posterity  with  himself 
by  God's  judgment  is  valid  for  God's  judgment,  yet  it  is  to 
be  observed  that  revelation  gives  us  no  further  light  upon  the 
point.  We  must  neither  regard  it  as  mere  empty  appearance, 
nor  strive  to  read  its  secret  by  the  hypothesis  of  the  natural 
entail  of  sin. 

Paul  was  manifestly  led  to  this  exegesis  of  the  Mosaic 
record  by  his  interpretation  of  justification  through  Christ. 
True,  the  nature  of  the  passage  in  Bomans  is  such  es  to 


348  JUSTIFICATION   AND   RECONCILIATION  [330-1 

indicate   a  desire  on   his  part  to  elucidate  the   process  of 
justification  through  Christ  by  means  of  the  analogy  between 
it  and  the  process  of  death  in  Adam's  race.    Genetically,  how- 
ever, it  was  undoubtedly  the  converse  relation  that  obtained ; 
Paul's  exegesis  in  regard  to  Adam  was  due,  by  analogy,  to 
his  conviction  of  the  worth  of  Christ.     So  we  must  conclude 
— not  merely  because  the  Apostle's  estimate  of  Christ  is  the 
foundation  of  all  that  goes  to  form  his  religious  conception  of 
the  world,  but  also  because  the  idea  of  justification  in  Christ 
is  as  distinct  as  the  idea  of  mankind's  sinfulness  in  Adam  is 
obscure.     The   fact   that   God  counts  as   righteous,  by  His 
judgment    and    for  His  judgment,  the  community  which  is 
bound  up  with  Christ,  is  at  the  same  time  a  revealed  truth 
for  the  Christian  faith,  inasmuch  as  the  specific  character  of 
that  faith  rests  solely  on  the  fact  that  God  in  Christ  regards 
believers  as  righteous  before  Him.     On  the  other  hand,  the 
fact  that  God,  in  decreeing  death   to   the    descendants   of 
Adam,  counts  them  as  sinners  in  relation  to  Himself  before  they 
have  committed  sin  on  their  own  account,  remains  mysterious 
and  obscure    unless  some  key   to    this  conception   can  be 
found   from   the   other   side.     Now    the   correctness  of  the 
former    thought    needs   no    elucidation    whatever   from   the 
analogy  of  the  Adamic  humanity.     Our  justification  through 
Christ  being   so   certainly  a  datum  of  our  religious  convic- 
tion, the  mystery  formulated  by  Paul,  that  God  should  regard 
the  descendants  of  Adam  as  sinners,  can  lay  little  claim  to 
rank  as  equal  in  value  to  the  truth  of  our  justification  in 
Christ.     And  finally,  since  Paul  neither  asserts  nor  suggests 
the   transmission   of   sin    by    generation,  he  offers  no  other 
reason  for  the  universality  of  sin  or  for  the  kingdom  of  sin  than 
the  sinning  of  all  individual  men.    For  the  sinful  bias,  which  he 
discovered  as  present  in  himself  when  the  negative  command- 
ment drew  him  into  his  first  conscious  act  of  sin  (Eom.  viL 
7-11),  is  not  described  by  him  as  inherited,  and  can  with 
perfect  reason  be  understood  as  something  acquired. 

Sin   is   not   an   end  in  itself,  not  a  good,  for  it  is  the 
opposite  of  the  universal  good.     It  is  not  an  original  law  of 


331-2]  THE   DOCTRINE   OF   SIN  349 

the  human  will,  for  it  is  the  striving,  desiring,  and  acting 
against  God.  In  the  individual  it  comes  to  be  the  prin- 
ciple of  the  wilFs  direction,  for  it  establishes  itself  as  the 
resultant  of  particular  appetites  and  propensities.  For  as  a 
personal  bias  in  the  life  of  each  individual  it  originates,  so 
far  as  we  are  able  to  observe,  in  sinful  desire  and  action, 
which,  as  such,  has  its  sufficient  ground  in  the  self-determina- 
tion of  the  individual  will.  But  as  it  actually  exists  in  each 
individual  and  in  all  collectively,  the  normal  conditions  of 
spiritual  life  in  men,  as  single  individuals  and  as  mutually 
associated,  furnish  it  with  materials  for  operating  according 
to  law  in  a  way  which  is  foreign  to  it  in  and  for  itself. 
This  is  the  fact  which  the  doctrine  of  original  sin  is  meant  to 
represent,  though  it  does  so  in  an  exaggerated  fashion  and 
with  means  of  explanation  which  are  inadequate  when  it  is 
adduced  as  proof  of  the  bondage  of  the  will.  But  the  "  law 
of  sin "  in  the  will  is  a  result  of  the  necessary  reaction  of 
every  act  of  the  will  upon  the  direction  of  the  will-power. 
Accordingly,  by  an  unrestrained  repetition  of  selfish  resolves, 
there  is  generated  an  ungodly  and  selfish  bias.  Through 
involuntary  reflex  action,  which  a  will  unconfirmed  in  the 
good  way  exerts  upon  our  experience  of  the  influences  received 
from  others,  sin  is  transmitted  from  one  to  another.  And 
here  we  have  to  think  not  only  of  the  facts  of  compliance 
and  weakness  which  appear  in  the  imitation  of  a  bad 
example,  but  also  of  manifestations  of  that  strength  of 
impassioned  resistance  to  will  which  itself  misses  the  proper 
standard  of  action.  Both  these  forms  of  temptation  to  sin 
are  kept  in  view  by  Jesus  and  Paul  in  their  warnings  against 
(TfcdvhaXov,  This  term  presupposes  that  a  person,  who  is 
seduced  by  the  conduct  of  another  and  ensnared  thereby,  has 
not  developed  the  corresponding  sinful  intention  in  himself. 
This  holds  good  even  of  the  conduct  and  the  lot  of  Jesus 
Himself,  which,  in  virtue  of  the  fact  that  neither  His 
adherents  nor  His  opponents  had  a  true  understanding  of 
Him,  became  to  them  the  occasion  of  a  sinful  misapprehension 
of  Him,  or  of  a  sinful  decision  against  Him  (Mark  vi.  3,  xiv. 


350  JUSTIFICATION   AND   RECONCILIATION  [332 

27,  29  ;  Matt.  xi.  6,  xv.  12.  xvii.  27  ;  Gal.  v.  11 ;  1  Cor. 
i.  23  ;  Rom.  ix.  33 ;  1  Pet.  iL  8).  In  this  form,  then,  the 
innocent  person  gives  an  impetus  to  the  consummation  of 
sin,  which  has  first  of  all  been  so  far  prepared  for  by 
varying  degrees  of  ignorance  and  self-will  that  the  impulse  to 
sin  finds  an  entrance.  And  vice  versa  the  indiscreet  €md 
careless  manner  in  which  we  behave  towards  others  is  for 
them  an  occasion  of  sin,  whether  it  consist  in  weak  compli- 
ance (Matt.  xvi.  23  ;  Mark  ix.  42  ;  1  Cor.  viii.  13  ;  Bom.  xiv. 
13,  21,  xvL  17;  Rev.  ii.  14),  or  in  impassioned  resistance 
(2  Cor.  xi.  29).  In  the  former  case  one  incurs  the  danger  of 
acting  against  his  convictions,  and  consequently,  of  committing 
sin  (Rom.  xiv.  23).  But  in  the  other  case  also  the  very 
first  step  bespeaks  the  danger  of  a  selfish  and  uncharitable 
tendency,  unless  moral  watchfulness  is  maintained  against  it 
(1  John  ii.  10).  This  whole  web  of  sinful  action  and  reaction, 
which  presupposes  and  yet  again  increases  the  selfish  bias  in 
every  man,  is  entitled  "  the  world,"  which  in  this  aspect  of  it 
is  not  of  God,  but  opposed  to  Him.  It  is  not  necessary  that 
everyone  should  be  implicated  in  this  sinful  web,  to  the 
extent  of  contributing  to  it  his  own  share  of  wickedness  and 
untruth,  for  the  selfish  bias  can  also  be  associated  with  the 
appreciation  of  particular  goods,  with  family  pride,  the  spirit 
of  caste,  and  patriotism,  or  with  loyalty  to  the  Church's  creed. 
For  the  Church,  as  constituted  by  law  and  infested  with 
partisanship,  is  not  the  Kingdom  of  God  at  alL  The  legal 
organisation  of  the  Church  is  not  the  Christian  religion,  but 
belongs  to  the  world,  and  like  it  is  to  be  distinguished  from 
the  Kingdom  of  God  (§  35).  And  if  anyone  would  be  con- 
vinced of  the  necessity  of  again  inculcating  the  doctrine  of 
(TKavhaXov,  which  has  disappeared  from  theology  since  the 
time  of  Chemnitz,  let  him  but  survey  from  this  point  of  view 
the  present  position  of  Church  parties  and  their  public 
organs. 

§  42.  The  notion  sin  expresses  a  religious  and  universal- 
ethical  estimate  of  what  is  otherwise  distinguished,  according 
to  a  legal  or  particular-ethical  standard,  as  misconduct,  inten- 


332-3]  THE   DOCTRINE    OF   SIN  351 

tional  or  unintentional  wrong-doing,  crime,  vice,  baseness,  or 
wickedness.  On  the  other  hand,  the  notion  evilj  which  even 
Schleiermacher  (vol.  i.  p.  507)  brings  into  the  closest  causal 
connection  with  sin,  and  which,  in  its  entirety,  he  designates 
as  Divine  punishment,  is  as  such  of  no  religious  import.  It 
is  not  our  relation  of  subordination  to  God,  but  always  some 
claim  born  of  our  freedom,  that  furnishes  a  standard  for  what 
we  call  evil.  For  since  we  have  experience  of  our  freedom 
in  the  conception  and  execution  of  our  ends,  evil  signifies 
the  whole  compass  of  possible  restrictions  of  our  purposive 
activity.  Now,  as  these  restrictions  may  arise  both  from 
natural  events  and  from  the  will  of  human  beings,  Schleier- 
macher divides  evils  into  social  or  immediate,  and  natural  or 
mediate.  I  leave  on  one  side,  in  the  first  instance,  the  pre- 
dicates which  accompany  this  division,  for  they  have  been 
evoked  by  a  combination  of  the  notions  of  evil  and  sin 
from  which  I  dissent.  But  the  two  kinds  of  evil  assumed  by 
Schleiermacher  are  not  co-ordinate.  For  all  social  evil  pro- 
ceeds from  the  will  of  others  only  by  operating  upon  us 
through  their  natural  organism.  Were  the  hatred  and 
calumny  of  others  not  natural  events,  no  social  evil  would  ever 
come  into  existence  at  all.  Hence  evil  is  always  a  natural 
event.  Its  division  into  species  depends  on  the  fact  that,  as 
a  restriction  of  our  freedom,  it  is  sometimes  merely  the  result 
of  mechanical  causes,  while  in  other  cases  it  takes  its  rise  in 
the  will.  But  in  the  case  of  the  latter  species  of  evil  we  must 
regard  as  the  ground  of  possible  restrictions  of  freedom  not 
merely  the  will  of  others,  but  also  our  own  will,  and  that  too 
both  in  the  form  of  deliberate  intention  and  of  carelessness. 
For  a  man's  own  freedom  is  limited  by  natural  events  not 
only  when  others  or  he  himself  wills  something  which  they 
ought  not,  but  also  when  they  do  not  will  some  definite  good 
which  they  ought  to  will.  An  illness  contracted  by  anyone 
deliberately  or  through  negligence  takes  its  rise  in  the  will 
no  less  than  an  intentional  or  unintentional  injury  done  by 
others  to  his  health  or  honour.  Hence  evil  is  in  all  cases  a 
natural  event,  restricting  us  in  the  use  of  our  freedom,  and  in 


352  JUSTIFICATION   AND    RECONCILIATION  [333-4 

the  conception  and  realisation  of  our  purposes.  It  originates 
either  in  merely  natural  causes,  and  therefore,  being  non- 
purposive,  is  accidental ;  or  else  it  has  its  roots  in  the  will. 
In  the  latter  kind  of  evil  it  is  either  one's  own  or  another's 
will  that  is  operative  intentionally  or  negligently.  Social 
evil  is  thus  only  a  part,  though  a  very  extensive  part,  of  the 
second  class  of  evils. 

From  the  connection  between  the  general  notion  of  evil 
and  the  restriction  of  our  freedom,  it  follows  that  that  notion 
depends  in  every  case  solely  on  our  own  judgment.  Accord- 
ingly, Schleiermacher's  distinction  of  mediate  from  immediate 
evil  is  invalid.  According  to  him,  evils  arising  from 
mechanical  causes,  i.e.  natural  evils,  are  to  be  reckoned  evils 
because  the  world  appears  different  to  the  sinner  from  what 
it  did  to  the  originally  perfect  man.  But  in  judging  that  an 
accidental  fire,  or  a  flood  which  ruins  our  property,  is  an  evil, 
no  thought  either  of  sin  or  of  a  comparison  with  the  original 
perfection  of  mankind  is  implied,  but  rather  the  presupposi- 
tion that  we  have  need  of  property,  not  only  as  a  means  of 
subsistence,  but  also  to  enable  us  to  serve  our  generation  in 
our  calling.  Social  evil,  e.g.  slander,  is  of  essentially  the 
same  character.  The  feeling  that  our  freedom  has  been 
violated  by  it  is  due  solely  to  our  forming  a  judgment  to  that 
effect,  since  we  might  quite  well  judge  that  the  slander  of 
contemptible  men  does  not  impair  our  freedom  or  our  honour. 
That  the  notion  of  evil  is  subjectively  conditioned  is  also 
proved  in  cases  which  come  under  the  first  class,  by  the  fact 
that  one  man  feels  as  evils  those  accidental  bodily  sufferings 
which  another,  through  having  grown  accustomed  to  them  or 
owing  to  an  effort  of  will,  no  longer  experiences  as  restrictions 
of  hLg  freedom.  Hence  occurrences  substantially  identical 
may  count  as  evils  to  one  man  and  not  to  another.  Finally, 
the  distinction  between  merited  and  unmerited  evils  enters 
into  the  ordinary  mode  of  estimating  evils,  and  that  in  such 
a  way  as  to  affect  each  of  the  two  principal  classes.  Evils 
which  arise  from  mechanical  causes  are  partly  unmerited, 
and  partly  merited,  should  it  be  felt  that  the  possible  means 


334-^]  THE   DOCTRINE    OF   SIN  353 

of  prevention  have  not  been  employed.  Evils  which  arise 
from  our  own  will  are  always  merited,  so  far  at  least  as  that 
term  merely  denotes  their  source,  and  is  not  taken  as  indi- 
cating the  ethical  value  of  the  actions  by  which  the  evil  has 
been  occasioned.  For  should  a  man,  e,g.  a  soldier,  be  com- 
pelled by  his  occupation  to  neglect  his  health,  or  should  he 
draw  down  upon  himself  the  hatred  of  other  men  just 
through  his  veracity  and  advocacy  of  the  good,  then  the  evils 
which  follow  are  ethically  unmerited.  Again,  evils  brought 
upon  a  man  by  himself  may  be  accounted  ethically  merited, 
as  for  instance,  should  a  man  ruin  his  health  by  intemper- 
ance, or  evoke  the  hostility  of  others  by  violating  their 
rights.  What  is  alone  of  importance  here  is  that  a  man 
should  be  practised  in  forming  moral  judgments  on  any  given 
case.  Where  this  is  lacking,  the  very  distinction  between 
ethically  non-merited  and  merited  evil  is  not  fully  made  out. 
But  even  the  judgment  that  we  are  personally  culpable  in 
respect  of  certain  evils  has  per  se  no  connection  with  the 
religious  judgment  of  self,  for  the  guilt  in  this  case  is  measured 
merely  by  reference  to  the  fact  that  our  own  will,  by  commis- 
sion or  omission,  is  the  cause  or  partial  cause  of  restrictions  of 
freedom  which  it  experiences  itself. 

Hence  the  notion  of  evil  has  no  direct  relation  to  the 
notion  of  sin.  It  is  not  a  religious  conception  like  the 
latter.  For  the  notion  of  sin  is  determined  by  comparison 
with  God,  to  Whom  reverence  and  trust  are  due,  and  by  the 
religious  estimate  of  the  universal  moral  law ;  the  notion  of 
evil,  on  the  other  hand,  by  the  relative  standard  of  the  free- 
dom of  the  individual.  In  point  of  fact  the  notion  of  evil  is 
BO  much  a  relative  one,  that  evils  may  be  turned  into  goods 
or  into  means  towards  moral  good,  which  could  never  be 
the  case  with  sin.  For  the  limitations  which  in  certain 
quarters  of  the  globe  nature  puts  upon  the  preservation  of 
human  life  and  man's  instinct  to  enjoy  natural  objects,  are 
the  cause  of  that  richer  and  fuller  ethical  development  of 
humanity  which  could  not  be  attained  in  a  more  favourable 
environment.  In  the  same  way  the  limitations  which  arise 
23 


354  JUSTIFICATION   AND    RECONCILIATION  [336-€ 

from  social  life,  and  by  which  men  are  disciplined  or  discipline 
themselves,  come  to  be  transformed  into  benefits.    Now  these 
experiences  would  be  altogether  impossible  were  evil  an  entity 
as  distinct  and  objectively  defined  as  sin.     So  far,  however, 
as  any  relation   obtains   between    the    two,  it  can   only  be 
indirect  and  restricted  in  degree.      It   was  impossible   for 
the   older  theology  to    ignore   this   way  of   looking  at   the 
subject.     For  although  all  evils,  as  Divine  penalties,  were 
from  the  outset  attributed  to  sin,  and  though  the  two  were 
regarded  as  coincident  in  extent,  yet  it  had  to  be  acknow- 
ledged   not  only    that  evils  lose  their  penal  value  for  be- 
lievers, but  also  that  death  no  longer  wears  the  character 
of  an  evil,  but  is  rather  deemed  a  means  of  release  (p.  44). 
This   exception  itself  forbids  us  to  adhere  to  the  objective 
theory  of  the  interconnection  of  sin  and  evil  as  being  the 
rule;  while   the   transformation   of   evils   into  goods  proves 
true  not  only  in  the  case  of  those  who  are  regenerate  in  the 
Christian  sense,  but  even  in  the  case  of  every  energetic  and 
genuine  character.     Since  the  fact  rather  is  (p.  46)  that  the 
specifically  religious  feeling  of  guilt  is  bound  up  with  our 
reckoning  some  particular  evil  which  befalls  us  as  a  Divine 
pimishment,  that  is  enough  to  demonstrate  that  it  is  an  error 
to  think  of  evil  in  its  entirety  as  the  equivalent  of  Divine 
punishment. 

Schleiermacher  has  not  made  these  relations  any  clearer, 
but  rather  succeeded  in  confusing  them,  by  blending  in  a 
peculiar  way  his  own  observation — which  does  not,  indeed, 
extend  far  enough — with  a  complaisant  accommodation  to 
tradition.  He  points  out  the  relative  character  of,  at  least, 
natural  evil,  though  social  evil,  too,  partakes  of  the  same 
nature.  He  bases  that  conclusion  principally  on  the  fact 
that  natural  evil  arises  out  of  the  opposition  between  the 
world  and  man,  which  opposition  was  originally  designed  as 
a  stimulus  to  the  activity  of  the  God-consciousness  and  an 
incentive  to  moral  resolution,  but  which,  by  reason  of  the 
impotence  of  the  God-consciousness  in  a  state  of  sin,  now 
leads  to  restrictions  of  life.     For  otherwise  Schleiermacher 


336-7]  THE   DOCTRINE   OF   SIN  355 

adopts  in  the  most  unqualified  fashion  the  old  doctrine  that 
all  evil  is  the  penalty  of  sin,  in  the  sense  that  by  God's 
dispensation  it  is  bound  up  with  wickedness  in  the  general 
order  of  things.  He  modifies  the  import  of  this  proposition 
only  so  far  as  to  say  that  the  totality  of  evil  is  the  correlative 
of  sin  considered  as  th^  conjoint  act  of  mankind,  and  is 
coincident  therewith.  For,  as  he  holds,  it  is  a  Jewish  and 
pagan  error,  which  Jesus  Himself  rejected,  to  suppose  that 
the  amount  of  evil  corresponds,  in  the  case  of  every  individual, 
to  that  of  sin  (vol.  i.  p.  507).  To  this  representation  I  reply 
that  the  entrance  of  universal  sin  has  in  no  wise  had  the 
effect  of  abolishing  and  neutralising  the  original  character  of 
the  opposition  between  the  world  and  us,  which  was  to  serve 
as  a  restriction,  and  yet  as  a  stimulus  to  the  development  of 
freedom.  Thence  it  follows,  therefore,  that,  as  has  been  laid 
down  already,  the  conceptions  of  evil  and  sin  are  not  properly 
kindred.  To  be  sure,  not  merely  in  the  Greek  and  the 
Hebrew,  but  also  in  the  Christian,  religion,  it  is  reckoned  that 
an  opposite  religious  and  moral  attitude  in  men  involves  an 
opposite  relation  to  the  world,  i.e.  either  lordship  over  it  or 
restriction  by  it,  and  that,  too,  at  God's  instance.  Within 
Christianity  this  is  an  antithetical  inference  from  the  know- 
ledge we  have  that  the  good,  as  the  warp  and  woof  of  the 
Kingdom  of  God,  is  the  final  end  of  God  in  the  world.  From 
this  point  of  view  the  idea  of  Divine  penalties  is  legitimate 
and  necessary.  But  the  application  of  this  notion  in 
experience  is  not  so  simple  as  unscrutinised  theological 
tradition  would  lead  us  to  expect.  For  evil  in  general 
cannot  be  known  to  be  a  Divine  punishment  of  sin  in  the 
case  of  an  individual  or  of  the  entire  race.  The  view  of 
evils  as  punishments  is  conditioned,  rather,  by  the  specifically 
religious  consciousness  of  guilt ;  not  merely  by  the  judgment 
that  we  have  incurred  a  restriction  of  our  freedom  by  our 
own  act,  but  by  the  judgment  that  the  act  in  question  has 
contradicted  the  Divine  moral  law.  Further,  the  only  way 
in  which  we  can  charge  ourselves  with  guilt  for  the  aggregate 
of  evils  in  society,  is  by  judging  that  by  sinful  action  we 


356  JUSTIFICATION    AND   RECONCILIATION  [337-8 

partly  help  to  produce  this  aggi-egate,  partly  adopt  it.  But 
let  this  interpretation  of  general  evils  as  personal  punishment 
extend  the  individual's  consciousness  of  guilt  never  so  far,  the 
coincidence  asserted  between  evil  generally  and  punishment 
for  sin  still  remains  unproved.  It  is  true  that  the  feeling  of 
guilt  is  a  sufficient  motive  for  our  estimating  evils  as  penalties 
inflicted  on  ourselves,  but  it  is  not  a  principle  which  justifies 
us  in  imputing  as  Divine  punishments  to  others  the  evils 
which  they  experience.  Jesus'  example  shows  that  the 
Christian  view  of  the  world  is  distinguished  from  that  which 
belongs  to  pre-Christian  religions  just  by  the  fact  that 
evils,  which  affect  others,  are  never  to  be  regarded  as  being 
connected  with  their  sin.  Destructive  natural  events,  such 
as  pestilences,  deluges,  congenital  infirmity,  or  even  acts  of 
military  violence,  are,  in  the  religious  theories  of  ancient 
nations,  regarded  objectively  as  Divine  punishments,  people's 
minds  being  awakened  by  such  experiences  also  to  careless 
offences  which  they  might  have  committed  against  law  or 
ceremonial  duty.  Nevertheless,  in  consequence  of  Christ's 
express  declarations  (John  ix.  1—3  ;  Luke  xiii.  1—5),  a  member 
of  the  Christian  society  will  decline  to  have  evils  of  that  kind 
set  down  to  him  by  others  as  Divine  punishments.  When 
a  pastor,  whose  zeal  has  found  Dogmatics  but  an  evil 
counsellor,  undertakes  to  make  use  of  such  calamities  as 
occasions  for  castigatory  sermons  to  his  congregation,  he  excites 
legitimate  irritation,  and  lays  himself  open  to  the  judgment 
of  Jesus,  "  Except  ye  repent,  ye  shall  all  likewise  perish." 
For  the  judgment,  that  those  who  are  visited  by  a  signal 
calamity  have  sinned  in  a  signal  manner,  is  a  pagan  and 
Jewish  error,  and,  should  it  be  propounded  in  Christian 
society,  a  proof  that  a  changed  heart  is  still  lacking.  True, 
the  acceptance  of  Divine  teleology  seems  to  demand  that  we 
should  ascribe,  though  not  to  evil  in  every  case,  at  least  to  a 
signal  and  conspicuous  instance,  the  significance  of  a  special 
Divine  intention  to  punish.  "But  who  has  known  the  mind  of 
the  Lord,  or  who  has  been  His  counsellor?"  In  such  cases  the 
Christian  view  of  the  world  comes  out,  rather,  when  we  infer 


338-9]  THB   DOCTRINE    OF   SIN  357 

from  our  consciousness  of  reconciliation  that  God  is  educating 
us  in  patience  and  humility  and  in  manifestation  of  that 
sympathy  which  becomes  Christians.^  But  when  the  notion 
of  educative  penalties  is  employed  in  this  way,  we  abandon 
the  indiscriminate  application  of  the  dubious  proposition,  that 
all  evils  are  Divine  punishments  in  a  detrimental  sense. 

This  dogmatic  prejudice,  of  which  even  Schleiermacher 
was  unable  to  rid  himself,  rests  on  the  fact  that  in  tradi- 
tional Dogmatics  too  narrow  a  scope  is  ascribed  to  recon- 
ciliation. For  if  it  is  restricted  to  deliverance  from  guilt  and 
the  penalties  of  sin,  then  such  a  view  either  demands  the 
assumption  that  all  evils  were  and  are  punishments  for  sin, 
or  it  provides  the  reconciled  with  anything  but  a  secure  and 
free  attitude  towards  all  the  evils  of  life,  particularly  towards 
those  which  experience  does  not  permit  us  to  reckon  penal. 
Where  that  narrow  interpretation  of  reconciliation  is  main- 
tained, it  leads  in  practice  to  people's  torturing  themselves 
with  the  attempt  to  put  a  penal  construction  upon  all  evils 
which  befall  them,  lest  alongside  of  the  consciousness  of 
reconciliation  there  should  exist  in  their  experience  a  wide 
domain  shadowed  by  alien  necessity.  In  theology  we  should 
have  at  the  same  time  the  corresponding  position — a  position 
which  it  is  impossible  to  prove  from  the  general  notion  of  evil. 
But  reconciliation  is  not  merely  the  ground  of  deliverance 
from  the  guilt  of  sin,  and  from  evils  in  some  way  merited ; 
it  is  also  the  ground  of  deliverance  from  the  world,  and  the 
ground  of  spiritual  and  moral  lordship  over  the  world. 
Through  reconciliation,  too,  we  come  to  cherish  a  diflerent 
estimate  of  self,  and  are  changed  in  disposition,  as  well  as  in 
our  whole  attitude  of  character  towards  unmerited  evils,  which 
are  due  to  the  fact  that  the  created  spirit  is  implicated  in 
the  organised  system  of  nature — that  system  being  understood 
in  the  sense  in  which  it  actually  forms  a  precondition  of 
social  life  amongst  men.  Since  the  effects  of  reconciliation 
are  thus  different  in  degree,  the  difference  between  evils 
recognised  in  our  customary  judgments,  may  or  rather  must 

^  OeschirJUe  des  Ficlis7nus,  ii.  p.  543,  iii.  p.  68. 


358  JUSTIFICATION    AND   RECONCILIATION  [339-40 

be  accepted  by  the  Christian  view  of  the  world  and  theology, 
to  wit,  that  only  a  part  of  them  is  to  be  referred,  qud  punish- 
ment, to  individual  or  common  sin.  The  principle  thus 
adduced,  it  is  true,  has  still  to  be  proved.  But  it  had  to 
be  asserted  here,  partly  because  it  confirms,  as  a  just 
presupposition,  the  distinction — commonly  made  in  spite  of 
Dogmatics — between  the  scope  of  Divine  punishment  and 
that  of  evils,  and  partly  because  the  formation  of  the  theo- 
logical system  generally  is  determined  by  regard  to  the  ideas 
of  the  Kingdom  of  God  and  reconciliation.  Otherwise  we 
expose  ourselves  to  the  danger  of  setting  up  false  premises, 
and  reaching  false  conclusions  regarding  these  leading  concep- 
tions of  Christianity. 

The  religious  and  theological  estimate  of  death  will  like- 
wise have  to  conform  to  the  explanations  now  given  of  the 
relation  between  sin  and  evil.  Although  the  older  school, 
following  Paul,  held  that  the  universal  destiny  of  death  was 
the  objective  result  of  the  first  sin,  yet  it  was  compelled  by 
the  idea  of  reconciliation  to  add  that,  for  those  whose  sin  is 
forgiven,  death  has  no  longer  the  value  of  punishment,  but 
serves  as  a  means  of  their  release  (p.  46).  This  addition 
contains  the  important  implication,  that,  in  the  religious  view 
of  the  world  which  prevails  in  Christianity,  death  at  all  events 
does  not  count  as  the  greatest  evil,  that  the  estimate  which  is 
formed  of  it  stands  in  no  direct  relation  to  the  consciousness 
of  transgression  which  even  one  who  is  reconciled  may  have, 
that,  on  the  contrary,  the  destiny  of  death  at  most  stands  in 
relation  to  the  power  of  sin  to  which  men  are  subject  in  the 
state  previous  to  conversion  (Rom.  viii.  10,  38).  In  the  case 
of  the  reconciled  there  is  not  that  fear  of  death  which  is  an 
evidence  of  the  bondage  in  which  mankind  lay  before  the 
time  of  Christ,  and  which  testifies  to  man's  recognition  of  an 
affinity  between  his  own  sin  and  death  (Heb.  ii.  15).  When 
the  topic  of  death  has  to  be  dealt  with  in  Christian  theology, 
we  must  start  from  the  light  shed  upon  it  by  the  authentic 
Christian  view  of  the  world,  and  not  from  impressions  native 
to  pre-Christian  religions.     It  must  be  added  that,  viewed  in 


340-lJ  THE    DOCTRINB    OF    SIN  359 

the  light  of  the  certainty  of  eternal  life,  which  is  attached  to 
reconciliation,  death  may  indeed  seem  hard  enough  to  each 
individual,  but  it  will  no  longer  appear  as  the  sheer  opposite 
of  that  purposeful  life  in  which  the  soul  is  conscious  of  its 
worth  (Som.  xiv.  8).  As  such  the  pre-Christian  nations 
regarded  it,  a  view  which  directly  corresponds  to  the  deficiency 
or  uncertainty  of  their  hope  concerning  the  restoration  of  life 
after  death.  The  Old  Testament  spokesmen  for  the  people  of 
Israel  partly  lamented  death  as  a  natural  fate,  and  partly 
connected  it  with  sin,  inasmuch  as  in  both  cases  they  chafed 
at  the  contradiction  it  involved  to  the  religious  destination  of 
man  to  communion  with  God.  The  Christian  and  the  Old 
Testament  views,  accordingly,  ai-e  opposed  to  one  another  and 
mutually  exclusive.  They  are  independent  of  each  other,  just 
as  the  religion  of  reconciliation  rises  above  the  highest  mani- 
festations of  that  Old  Testament  piety  which  strives  after 
reconciliation.  For  the  Psalmists  especially  chafed  at  the 
fate  of  death,  just  because  the  religious  thought  of  Israel 
had  moved  them  to  form  a  higher  estimate  of  the  vocation 
of  man,  while  yet  it  afiforded  them  no  assurance  of  recon- 
ciliation with  God  and  the  world. 

Now  it  is  a  defect  in  theology,  due  to  a  mechanical  use  of 
Scripture,  that  not  the  New  Testament,  but  the  Old  Testament, 
estimate  of  death  has  been  employed  in  fixing  the  standard 
conception.  For  the  Christian  view  of  the  subject  is  thereby 
forced  to  occupy  the  position  of  an  exception  to  that  standard. 
This  proceeding  is  quite  analogous  to  the  way  in  which  the 
legal  requital  of  human  conduct  has  been  put  forward  as  the 
principle  of  the  Divine  world-order,  while  the  Christian  regime 
of  reconciliation  and  the  Kingdom  of  God,  which  is  of  an 
exactly  opposite  kind,  is  linked  on  to  that  principle  by  way 
of  exception  (§  33).  True,  Paul  deduced  the  existence  of  the 
universal  destiny  of  death  from  the  sin  of  Adam.  Neverthe- 
less, the  mere  fact  that  this  idea  was  framed  by  the  Apostle  does 
not  straightway  qualify  it  to  become  a  theological  principle. 
It  is  not  a  necessary  element  in  the  Christian  view  of  the 
world,  which,  with  perfect  correctness,  decides  that  death  is 


360  JUSTIFICATION   AND   EBCONCILIATION  [Sa-2 

neither  an  obstacle  to  blessedness,  nor  an  object  to  be  feared, 
since  Christ  has  reconciled  men  and  risen  from  the  dead. 
Moreover,  the  Christian  view  of  the  world  as  such  does  not 
call  for  any  theory  regarding  the  origin  of  death.  Paul 
formed  his  conception  of  the  matter,  too,  solely  by  way  of 
inference  from  the  principle  of  reconciliation  and  eternal  life, 
his  exegesis  of  the  Old  Testament  record  serving  him  as  a 
medium.  But  a  position  which  is  only  related  inferentially 
to  the  Christian  view  of  the  world,  cannot  claim  to  rank,  as  a 
theological  principle,  above  the  essential  content  of  the 
Christian  view.  There  is  now  this  further  fact,  that  not 
everyone  can  convince  himself  that  the  theory  which  Paul 
arrived  at,  of  the  dependence  of  death  upon  Adam's  trans- 
gression, is  correct.  Are  such  persons  any  the  less  able  to 
adopt  the  estimate  of  death  which  springs  from  the  Christian 
idea  of  reconciliation  ?  That  cannot  be  justly  afiBrmed.  Nay 
rather,  our  judgment,  that  we  must  indeed  die,  but  that  we 
die  unto  the  Lord  (Bom.  xiv.  8),  is  entirely  unafifected  whether 
we  regard  that  destiny  as  a  dispensation  of  nature,  or  as  the 
consequence  of  Adam's  transgression.  For  in  both  cases 
the  theory  is  excluded  that  death  is  a  consequence  of  our 
own  sin.  And  that  is  the  point  of  importance  if  the  expecta- 
tion of  death  is  not  to  collide  with  our  consciousness  of 
reconciliation,  if  the  dread  of  death  is  not  to  continue,  and 
cause  the  reconciled  to  doubt  whether  death  is  for  them  an 
ascent  to  the  level  of  eternal  life  with  God,  where  we  are  set 
free  from  the  burden  of  the  transitory. 

For  the  rest,  Paul  has  expressed  his  view  about  the 
doom  of  death  imposed  on  Adam's  descendants  in  such  a 
way  that  it  forms  no  obstacle  to  the  Christian  theory,  of 
which  he  himself  is  a  classical  representative.  If  there  is  no 
condemnation  to  those  who  are  Christ's,  not  even  the  con- 
demnation of  death,  death  is  in  their  case  only  a  phenomenon 
belonging  to  their  life  as  associated  with  an  earthly  body, 
and  their  spirit  is  life  unaffected  thereby  (Eom.  viii.  1,  10). 
This  excludes  precisely  the  Old  Testament  idea  of  death  as 
the  end  of  personal  life,  the  utter  stultification  of  the  created 


342-3]  THE   DOCTRINE   OP   SIN  361 

spirit.  But  the  point  of  importance  for  theology  is,  that 
this  latter  should  not  be  assumed  to  be  the  normal  and 
universal  significance  of  death  in  the  determinate  counsel  of 
God,  since  nothing  can  be  theologically  formulated  as  the 
determinate  counsel  and  dispensation  of  God,  but  what  comes 
to  view  in  connection  with  the  eternally  chosen  community 
of  the  Kingdom  of  God.  Otherwise  theology  never  succeeds 
in  grasping  the  imity  of  the  world-order,  but  can  only  aCBrm 
two  successive  and  mutually  contradictory  decrees  of  God, 
the  first  of  which  has  for  its  import  the  universal  condemna- 
tion of  men  to  death,  while  the  second  is  directed  to  the 
restoration  of  a  section  of  mankind  to  life,  and  thus  has  the 
form  of  an  exceptional  decree.  Even  Paul  lends  no  counte- 
nance to  a  representation  such  as  this.  For  he  declares  that 
God  has  shut  up  Jews  and  Gentiles  together  unto  disobedience 
that  He  might  have  mercy  upon  them  all  (Som.  xL  32).  If 
even  the  judgment  of  the  Jews  turns  upon  Paul's  well-known 
reading  of  the  character  of  the  Mosaic  law,  then  the  similar 
judgment  of  the  Gentiles  can  only  be  understood  in  the  light 
of  that  more  comprehensive  Divine  purpose  which  led  to  the 
original  sentence  of  death  upon  men.  The  fact,  therefore, 
that  this  action  on  God's  part  is  described  in  the  Christian 
revelation  as  a  means  or  a  precondition  of  grace,  suggests 
that  the  right  interpretation  of  God's  earlier  economy  is  to 
be  found  in  its  connection  with  His  final  purpose. 

It  has  thus  far  been  granted  that  the  penal  purpose  of 
God  is  the  source  of  a  narrower  circle  of  evils,  those,  namely, 
conditioned  by  the  religious  feeling  of  guilt.  But  this  idea 
of  a  Divine  purpose  to  punish  requires  to  be  more  precisely 
defined.  It  cannot,  of  course,  be  framed  where  there  is  no 
recognition  of  a  Divine  government  of  the  world,  or  of  the 
conception  of  the  Divine  authority  of  the  moral  law.  Still, 
in  the  religions  of  civilised  peoples  we  do  find  that  certain 
evils  are  wont  to  be  regarded  as  Divine  punishments.  This 
way  of  looking  at  the  matter  proceeds  upon  the  idea  of  a 
reciprocal  legal  relation  existing  between  men  and  God,  an 
idea  which  in  the  case  of  the  Greeks,  the  Bomans,  and  the 


362  JUSTIFICATION   AND    RECONCILIATION  [343-4 

Israelites  derives  its  origin  from  the  fact  that  these  peoples 
regarded  the  State  as,  even  in  a  religious  sense,  the  highest 
good.  Now,  although  Christ's  express  declarations  (p.  356) 
warn  us  against  taking  the  degree  of  evil,  in  legal  fashion, 
as  an  indication  of  the  degree  of  transgression  on  the  part  of 
those  afflicted,  yet  the  traditional  theology  is  content  to  set 
up  the  characteristic  idea  of  retribution  as  a  perfectly 
adequate  expression  of  the  penal  value  of  an  evil.  The 
superficiality  of  this  view  becomes  manifest  in  the  case  of 
the  theologians  of  the  Axifkldrung^  who,  while  willing  to 
recognise  the  orthodox  representation,  yet  do  not  find  it 
corroborated  by  experience,  and  hence  feel  compelled  to 
abandon  it,  and  substitute  in  its  stead  the  quite  differently 
constituted  notion  of  educative  punishments  (vol.  i.  p.  403). 
If  this  procedure  be  erroneous,  then  the  eiTor  must  in  part  be 
attributed  to  orthodoxy,  which  has  never  subjected  the  legal 
conception  of  punishment  to  a  critical  examination,  and  hence 
has  been  unable  accurately  to  define  it  in  its  Christian  usage. 
Now,  punishment  in  its  legal  sense  is  a  deprivation,  entailed 
by  the  authority  of  civil  society,  upon  one  who  has  acted 
contrary  to  his  legal  obligations,  in  order  that  the  absolute 
claims  of  civil  society  may  be  affirmed  (p.  247).  But  the 
Christian  religion  is  not  a  legal  federation  between  God  and 
man.  To  apply,  therefore,  the  legal  conception  of  punishment 
to  certain  evils  within  the  scope  of  our  religious  view  of  the 
world,  cannot  be  right. 

This  want  of  perspicuity,  however,  is  due  solely  to  the 
fact  that,  after  all,  the  Christian  religion  bears  a  certain 
analogy  to  law — an  analogy,  however,  which  does  not  hold 
good  in  respect  of  all  the  essential  characteristics  of  the 
latter.  For  in  point  of  fact  law  always  involves  a  contrac- 
tion of  personal  freedom,  but  its  object  therein  is  to  guarantee 
the  moral  independence  of  each  individual  in  relation  to 
everyone  else.  The  prerogative  of  every  member  of  civil 
society  consists  in  the  right  he  has  to  take  full  advantage  of  all 
permissible,  or  not  legally  proscribed,  means  for  the  develop- 
ment  of  his   moral   personality.     Accordingly,  the  personal 


344-5]  THE    DOCTRINE    OF   SIN  363 

right  of  each  finds  its  scope  in  the  sphere  of  what  is  per- 
missible, which  exists  alongside  of  the  sphere  of  legally 
prescribed  and  proscribed  activity.  Now  the  idea  of  a  right, 
possessed  by  men  in  relation  to  God,  is  framed  in  consideration 
of  what  God  permits  to  them,  with  a  view  to  their  making 
good  their  own  proper  individuality  over  against  Himself. 
At  both  the  stages  of  Biblical  religion  there  comes  out  clearly 
the  conception,  that  in  the  fellowship  granted  or  permitted  to 
men  by  Divine  grace  we  earn  the  enjoyment  of  independent 
personaUty,  just  as  it  is  in  that  fellowship  that  the  idea  of 
God  comes  to  assume  its  proper  form.  It  is  in  this  sense  of 
the  word  "  right "  that  the  Israelites,  on  the  ground  of  their 
having  been  chosen  by  God,  possess  the  priesthood,  as 
representing  the  right  to  approach  God.  And  in  the  same 
sense  dogmatic  theologians  frame  the  idea  of  a  right  of  Divine 
sonship,  as  belonging  to  those  who  are  reconciled  in  Christ 
through  the  grace  of  God.  Comparing,  then,  the  implications 
of  this  notion  with  the  characteristics  of  the  general  legal 
conception,  we  see  that  they  accord  with  each  other  in 
expressing  personal  independence.  But  personal  right  in 
civil  society  has  reference  to  the  material  of  allowable  actions, 
whereas  the  right  of  men  over  against  God  depends  on  the  form 
of  Divine  permission,  inasmuch  as  the  determining  impulse  of 
Divine  grace  makes  its  appeal  to  their  freedom.  Further,  in 
civil  society  what  is  called  personal  right  is  the  antithesis  of 
legal  obligation,  whereas  in  the  religious  sphere  one's  right  in 
relation  to  God  is  also  a  comprehensive  expression  which 
covers  one's  whole  duty  towards  Him.  Finally,  in  civil 
society  each  member  is  conscious  of  his  personal  right  as 
contradistinguished  from  every  other,  whereas  the  right  im- 
plied in  the  priesthood  and  the  right  of  Divine  sonship 
are  bestowed  respectively  upon  the  individual  Israelite  and 
Christian,  in  virtue  of  his  reckoning  himself  part  of  the  entire 
religious  community,  and  thinking  and  acting  in  harmony 
with  it  And  thus  the  thought  of  right  in  relation  to  God, 
as  expressing  personal  independence,  is  counterbalanced  by 
the  relations  of  religious  subordination  to  Him. 


364  JUSTIFICATION    AND   RECONaLIATION  [345 

Now,  if  the  notion  of  punishment,  which  is  indigenous  to 
the  region  of  law,  is  to  possess  validity  in  the  domain  of  the 
Christian  view  of  the  world  and  Christian  self -judgment,  then, 
as  has  previously  been  inferred  (p.  355)  from  the  meaning  of 
the  Kingdom  of  God  as  the  Divine  final  end  in  the  world, 
oui"  experiences  of  evil,  speaking  generally,  will  be  linked  by 
God  to  wicked  conduct.  But  since  a  multitude  of  evils  have 
the  value  for  men  of  being  means  of  education  and  trial,  or 
carry  with  them  the  glory  of  martyrdom,  it  is  not  possible 
for  others  to  determine,  in  a  particular  case,  which  evils  have 
the  significance  of  retributive  penalties.  We  decided,  there- 
fore, that  a  feeling  of  unrelieved  guilt  is  the  only  thing  which 
enables  the  individual,  if  he  thinks  about  God  at  all,  to 
recognise  his  condition  as  penal,  and  set  it  to  his  own  account. 
Now  we  find  this  confirmed  when  the  deprivation  of  the 
right  of  Divine  sonship  is  interpreted  as  a  Divine  punishment 
To  begin  with,  this  form  of  expression  is  only  the  Christian 
phase  of  the  previously  (p.  53)  discussed  idea  of  Divine 
punishment,  understood  as  an  experience  of  separation  from 
God.  For  the  loss  involved  in  such  separation  is  estimated 
in  the  light  of  the  right,  bestowed  upon  the  Israelites,  to 
approach  God.  The  result  of  our  present  inquiry  was  thus 
foreshadowed  by  our  earlier  analysis  of  the  interpretations  of 
Divine  punishment  which  have  become  fused  in  theological 
tradition.  But  at  the  same  tllne  our  present  conclusion 
serves  in  several  ways  both  to  confirm  and  to  give  point  to 
tlie  suggestions  we  have  made  towards  a  definition  of  the 
forgiveness  of  sins.  First,  by  means  of  the  comparative  or 
relative  notion  of  the  forfeiture  of  the  right  of  access  to 
God  or  of  Divine  sonship,  the  hypothesis  of  a  graduated 
series  of  penal  states  is  confirmed  to  this  extent,  that  in 
particular  instances  it  will  be  easier  or  harder  to  regain  the 
privilege  of  access  to  God  or  of  Divine  sonship.  In  any  case, 
either  the  notion  of  Divine  penalties  is  irrational,  or  else  we 
must  abandon  the  supposition  that  all  the  penalties  of  God 
are  objectively  equal  in  severity,  and  that  every  sin  is  in 
itself  deserving  of  eternal  damnation.      Secondly,  the  above 


345-6]  THE   DOCTRINE   OF   SIN  365 

notion  of  Divine  punishment  goes  to  confirm  the  position 
that  external  evils  can  be  demonstrated  to  be  Divine  penalties 
only  from  the  point  of  view  of  the  subjective  feeling  of  guilt 
(§§  10,  11).  For  the  right  of  access  to  God  or  of  Divine 
sonship  cannot  be  thought  of  as  forfeited,  unless  the 
forfeiture  is  consciously  recognised  as  such  by  the  individual 
affected  by  it.  The  sense  of  having  forfeited  one's  right 
of  Divine  sonship,  which  forces  one  to  regard  an  experi- 
ence of  external  evils  as  a  Divine  penalty,  is  the  feeling  of 
guilt  that  separates  from  God.  Again,  then,  the  accuracy 
of  our  previous  investigations  is  confirmed  by  the  idea  of 
Divine  punishment  here  set  forth.  Thirdly,  it  follows  that 
the  unrelieved  feeling  of  guilt  is  not  so  much  one  penal  state 
among  others,  but  is  itself  actually  that  of  which  all  external 
penal  evils  are  but  the  concomitant  circumstances.  Even  in 
the  older  school  of  theology  it  was  maintained  that  the 
feeling  of  guilt  should  be  connected  with  Divine  penalties, 
but  this  supposition  it  was  impossible  to  prove  by  the  modes 
of  thought  to  which  they  confined  themselves.  But  if  the 
forfeiture  of  rights  in  the  sphere  of  law  becomes  real  even 
when  the  sentence  of  punishment  is  passed,  and  does  not 
require  for  its  existence  the  execution  of  sentence  by  forfeiture 
of  the  property  or  of  the  customary  freedom  of  the  convicted 
person,  then  Divine  punishment  must  be  constituted  precisely 
by  the  consciousness  of  guilt,  as  being  an  index  of  the  for- 
feiture of  access  to  God  or  of  Divine  sonship. 

These  results  throw  further  light  on  the  interpretation, 
which  occurs  in  Paul's  Epistle  to  the  Eomans,  of  the  estate  of 
death  in  which  men  stand.  Hitherto  we  have  had  to  leave 
undecided  the  question  as  to  how  far  God,  in  decreeing  death 
upon  the  descendants  of  Adam  before  they  sinned,  constituted 
them  sinners  in  relation  to  Himself  (p.  347).  While  it  is  impos- 
sible that  this  decree  carries  with  it  anything  of  the  nature  of 
mere  appearance,  we  had  for  all  that  to  forego  the  more  precise 
determination  of  the  fact  denoted  by  the  decree  of  universal 
death  prior  to  the  sin  of  individuals.  Now,  if  this  doom  be 
called  a  penal  sentence,  it  is  a  fair  question  whether  that  does 


366  JUSTIFICATION   AND   RECONCILIATION  [346-7 

not  signify  that  God,  in  thus  antecedently  decreeing  death  to 
Adam's  race,  apart  from  the  physical  aspect  of  dying,  has 
really  carried  out  His  purpose  that  mankind  should  not  attain 
to  access  to  God  and  Divine  sonship,  but  should  remain  apart 
from  Him  with  their  consciousness  of  guilt  unrelieved.  This 
would  also  be  the  purport  of  the  statement,  that  in  the  dis- 
obedience of  our  first  parent  God  has  represented  the  multitude 
of  his  descendants  as  sinners  both  by  His  judgment  and  for 
His  judgmenty  has  represented  them,  i.«.,  as  those  who  ought 
not  to  have  any  proper  fellowship  with  Him.  This  conjecture 
is  corroborated  by  the  parallel  statement  regarding  the  sig- 
nificance of  Christ's  obedience.  For  the  relation  of  the 
justified  to  God  as  expressed  in  terms  of  that  great  fact  is, 
according  to  1  Pet.  iii.  18,  precisely  that  of  vouchsafed 
access  to  God.  Hence  the  penal  state  of  all  mankind  who 
lived  before  Christ,  which  Paul  recognises  in  the  sentence  of 
death  antecedently  passed  upon  them,  and  which,  arguing 
from  the  conditions  of  justification  in  Christ,  he  infers 
as  the  counterpart  of  the  other,  consists  in  their  being 
debarred  from  that  fellowship  with  God  which  was  to  be 
first  rendered  possible  through  Christ.  Now,  although  the 
estimate  of  the  religious  community  of  Israel  which  Paul 
adds  in  his  well-known  view  regarding  the  design  of  the 
Mosaic  law  stands,  as  we  see  by  comparing  it  with  the 
Epistle  to  the  Hebrews,  in  considerable  need  of  amendment, 
yet  the  debarring  of  the  Gentiles  from  communion  with  God 
is  an  observation  true  to  fact.  The  singular  element  in  all 
this  is  to  be  found  in  the  fact  that  Paul  combines  the  Divine 
intention  of  it  with  the  sentence  of  death  passed  on  Adam's 
posterity,  and  that  he  maintains  the  existence  of  a  penal 
condition  previous  to  the  actual  demerit  of  individuals.  To 
say  the  least,  that  is  inexact ;  for  personal  demerit  is  necessary 
in  order  that  even  an  evil  common  to  all  may  be  recognised 
through  the  subjective  consciousness  of  guilt  as  a  personal 
punishment,  But  there  will  be  the  less  need  to  repudiate 
these  observations  as  offending  against  the  incontestable 
meaning  of  the  Pauline  passage,  seeing  that  Paul  himself,  m 


347-8]  THE   DOCTRINE   OF   SIN  367 

another  reference  in  the  same  Epistle,  attributes  the  alienation 
of  the  Gentiles  from  God  to  their  own  demerit.  Both  repre- 
sentations are  attempts  on  Paul's  part  to  place  himself  in  the 
true  attitude  to  a  historical  problem  which  necessarily  ob- 
truded itself  with  special  force  on  the  Apostle  to  the  Gentiles ; 
nor  can  we  take  exception  to  the  diversity  in  his  solutions  of 
the  problem,  for  the  point  at  issue  does  not  concern  the  essence 
of  the  Christian  religion,  but  only  a  derivative  question. 

§  43.  The  older  school,  with  their  assertion  that  all  evils 
are  Divine  punishments,  awaken  in  our  minds  the  impression 
of  their  professing  to  have  a  complete  insight  into  all  parts  of 
the  Divine  world-order.  But  even  Schleiermacher,  while  he 
rejects,  indeed,  the  distributive  evidence  adduced  for  that 
thesis,  has  overstepped  the  bounds  of  his  competence  as  a 
Christian  theologian  in  maintaining,  as  a  general  principle, 
that  the  totality  of  evil  in  the  world  is  coextensive  with  the 
existence  of  sin,  regarded  as  a  conjoint  act  of  the  whole 
human  race.  This  thesis,  for  one  thing,  goes  beyond  all 
possible  experience,  and,  moreover,  it  is  explicitly  disproved 
by  the  very  words  of  Jesus  which  Schleiermacher  has  adduced, 
those,  namely,  concerning  the  man  born  blind.  As  Jesus' 
disciples,  according  to  His  teaching  in  this  context,  we  ought 
in  the  case  of  certain  evils  not  to  raise  at  all  the  question 
regarding  their  connection  with  sin.  But  as  regards  this  point 
the  Christian  theologian,  as  such,  is  not  differently  situated 
from  the  individual  Christian.  That  sort  of  omniscience 
which  the  older  divines  actually  claim  on  this  as  on  so  many 
points,  and  which  is  customarily  expected  of  a  theologian  by 
believers  who  have  been  spoiled  by  false  dogmatic  teaching, 
always  serves  only  to  compromise  the  Christian  faith  in  the 
eyes  of  others,  who  adhere  indeed  to  Christianity,  but  will  not 
accept  a  system  of  words  in  exchange  for  religion.  A 
theologian  can  as  little  maintain  conscientiously  the  quanti- 
tative coextension  of  all  evils  with  all  sins,  as  he  can  solve 
with  real  success  the  other  classical  problems  which  belong  to 
this  region  of  thought.  Who  knows,  for  example,  what  are 
the  reasons  why  God  permits  and  endures  at  all,  as  a  pheno- 


368  JUSTIFICATION   AND   RECONCILIATION  [848-9 

menon  extending  over  the  whole  human  race,  the  sin  which 
runs  counter  to  His  own  final  end  ?  And  besides,  it  would 
certainly  be  an  act  of  presumption  to  maintain,  with  Zwingli, 
that  sin,  in  its  whole  extent,  is  called  into  existence  by  God  as 
the  necessary  presupposition  of  the  redemption  which  He  has 
decreed  from  eternity,  and  as  the  opposite  of  the  good,  by 
experiencing  which  men  are  to  acquire  the  knowledge  of, 
and  taste  for,  the  good.  If  we  know  that  the  final  end  of 
the  human  race,  or  the  highest  good,  is  realised  through  the 
bringing  in  of  the  Kingdom  of  God,  and  if  we  possess  in  this 
principle  that  practical  guidance  which  each  Christian  man 
needs  for  salvation,  we  must  refrain  from  passing  any  positive 
judgment  which  would  imply  that  God  has  condemned  the 
rest  of  mankind,  whether  as  guilty  or  as  innocent — even 
though  this  hypothesis  appears  to  be,  logically,  the  reverse- 
side  of  the  former  conviction.  As  theologians,  we  are  justified 
in  explaining  the  practical  conditions  of  our  spiritual  and 
moral  life,  on  which  depends  our  estimate  of  its  intrinsic 
content  and  its  relative  place  in  the  world,  as  following  by 
logical  necessity  from  our  knowledge  of  the  character  of 
God  as  revealed  in  the  Christian  religion ;  but  no  principle 
of  logic  warrants  our  interpreting  the  various  aspects  of  the 
apparently  aimless  and  really  adverse  phenomena  of  human 
life,  which  surround  the  luminous  domain  of  our  religious 
and  moral  duty,  by  the  hypothesis  of  a  positive  eternal 
condemnation  of  the  human  race  by  God  (p.  130).  On  the 
other  hand,  the  pretended  dogmatic  omniscience  and  in- 
fallibility, which  spring  from  the  rationalistic  principle  which 
is  at  the  root  of  all  orthodoxy,  are  fitted  only  to  lead 
theological  knowledge  into  error,  as  also  to  repel  the  sound 
religious  sense  which,  resting  on  experience,  repudiates  such 
dogmatic  propositions  as  stand  outside  of  all  relation  to 
possible  experience. 

The  assertion  that  sin  is  infinite  in  its  nature,  even  when 
removed  by  the  redemptive  work  of  Christ,  is  the  result  of  a 
purely  rational  inference.  How  ill-grounded  this  proposition 
is,  we  see  from  the  way  in  which  Thomas  introduces  it.     "  In 


349-50]  THE   DOCTRINE   OF   SIN  369 

sin,"  he  says,  "  there  are  contained  two  elements.  On  the 
one  hand,  sin  consists  in  turning  away  from  unchangeable  and 
infinite  good.  On  one  side,  therefore,  sin  is  infinite.  On  the 
other  hand,  sin  consists  in  unregulated  turning  towards 
changeable  good.  In  this  respect  sin  is  finite,  especially  as 
the  act  of  turning  is  itself  also  finite.  For  the  acts  of 
a  created  being  as  such  cannot  be  infinite"  (vol.  i.  p.  65). 
Thomas  decides  for  the  adoption  of  the  former  of  these  views 
of  sin,  because  he  likewise  measures  the  worthlessness  of  sin 
by  the  fact  that  it  violates  the  infinite  majesty  of  God ;  for 
even  in  human  affairs,  he  says,  an  offence  is  all  the  more 
heinous,  the  greater  the  person  against  whom  the  ofllence  is 
committed.  This  presupposition,  the  validity  of  which  is 
also  accepted  by  Protestant  orthodoxy,  has  already  been 
refuted  in  the  most  convincing  manner  by  Duns  (vol.  i.  p. 
74).  For  either  the  "infinity  of  sin"  is  to  be  understood 
objectively,  in  which  case  we  land  ourselves  in  Manichaeism ; 
or  the  idea  is  a  subjective  impression,  in  which  case  it  means 
only  that  we  cannot  with  all  our  efibrts  of  imagination  arrive 
at,  nor  with  all  possible  intensification  of  our  own  conscious- 
ness of  guilt  represent  exhaustively,  the  extent  of  sin  in 
space  and  time,  and  its  power  to  disturb  the  orderly  course  of 
human  history.  But  for  that  reason  sin,  as  a  product  of  the 
limited  powers  of  all  men,  is  yet  limited,  finite,  and  quite 
transparent  for  God's  judgment.  And,  moreover,  that  that 
formula  of  Thomas  is  indirectly  expressed  in  Paul's  leading 
train  of  thought,  and  that  the  death  to  which  the  posterity 
of  Adam  are  doomed  is  equivalent  to  eternal  death,  can 
neither  be  proved  exegetically  nor  brought  into  harmony 
with  the  view  of  Paul  as  a  whole.  For  he  excludes  from  the 
posterity  of  Adam  who  are  doomed  to  death  the  community 
of  those  who  are  to  be  saved,  for  whom  death  is  merely  a 
passing  experience,  and  he  adds  the  explicit  proviso  that,  in 
the  case  of  those  who  are  lost,  it  is  the  refusal  to  believe  in 
Christ  which  gives  death  the  intensified  character  of  eternal 
destruction  (Rom.  viii.  10;  2  Cor.  ii.  15,  16).  Inasmuch 
as  the  aay^ofievoL  in  Paul's  sense  can  at  no  stage  of  their 
24 


370  JUSTIFICATION   AND   RECONCILIATION  [350-1 

existence  and  in  no  respect  be  conceived  as  airoXKv^voi,, 
there  can  be  nothing  less  in  accord  with  his  authority  than 
the  assumption  of  a  change  in  the  decree  of  Grod,  such 
as  orthodox  Lutheran  Dogmatics  is  guilty  of  in  the  proposition : 
God  has  in  Adam  condemned  all  the  posterity  of  Adam,  and 
afterwards  brings  some  of  them  to  blessedness  on  account 
of  their  faith.  As  the  latter  decree  is  thrown  back  into 
eternity,  the  proposition  comes  to  mean  that  God  eternally 
resolves  to  bless  those  whom  in  a  temporal  decree  He  con- 
demns for  ever  with  Adam.  This  manifest  absurdity  is 
accepted  also  by  the  Reformed  theology,  since  the  point  of 
distinction  between  the  two  theologies — whether  or  not  God's 
election  is  conditioned  by  the  faith  which  He  foresees — is 
here  of  no  account.  Quite  consistently  with  his  theological 
dependence  on  Luther,  Calvin  has  allowed  himself  to  be  led 
into  adopting  this  view,  by  the  fact  that  for  Luther  both  the 
doctrine  of  predestination  and  that  of  original  sin  have  value 
only  as  evidences  for  the  bondage  of  the  human  will — and 
that  as  co-ordinate  arguments,  completely  independent  of  one 
another.  As  Luther  had  no  intention  at  all  of  constructing 
a  theological  system  from  the  point  of  view  of  the  idea  of 
election,  he  contented  himself  with  establishing  the  bondage 
of  the  will  in  relation  to  salvation  by  affirming  that  God  in 
His  first  decree  placed  the  whole  of  mankind  under  the  ban 
of  original  sin,  and  in  a  decree  subsequent  in  time,  according 
to  His  own  secret  election,  restored  a  portion  of  mankind, 
contrariwise,  to  blessedness.  One  who  believes  that  he  may 
proceed  thus  in  theological  science  of  course  shuts  his  eyes 
to  the  contradiction  which  is  expressly  contained  in  the 
above  formula.  But  even  Calvin  has  not  clearly  grasped  the 
fact  that  his  doctrine  of  providential  to  say  nothing  of  that  of 
eledio,  demands  at  the  very  outset  a  quite  different  conception  of 
common  sin  from  that  which  was  taken  over  from  Augustine. 
Just  here  we  can  see  very  clearly  that,  as  I  have  shown  else- 
where on  different  grounds,^  the  theological  system  of  Calvin 
was  not  developed  from  the  principle  of  the  idea  of  election. 

^  Jahrb.fiir  denUacke  TheologUf  xiii.  p.  108. 


361-2]  THE   DOCTRINE   OF   SIN  371 

Mediaeval  theology,  however,  presents  a  series  of  classical 
authorities  the  tendency  of  whose  views  is  that  the  notion  of 
sin  can  only  in  a  modified  way  be  referred  to  the  elect,  or  the 
redeemed,  if  the  unity  of  the  religious  view  and  the  connected- 
ness of  the  theological  system  axe  to  be  maintained.  In  this 
series  the  place  of  precedence  must  be  assigned  to  Abelard,  in 
so  far  as  he  refutes  the  idea  that  redemption  through  Christ's 
death  means  purchase  from  the  power  of  the  devil,  by  main- 
taining that  the  predestined,  to  whom  redemption  applies, 
have,  on  the  very  ground  of  their  Divine  election,  never 
been  under  the  power  of  the  devil  (vol.  i.  p.  49).  For,  inas- 
much as  the  devil  represents  the  extreme,  that  is,  the  definit- 
ive degree  of  sin,  those  persons  cannot  be  reckoned  as  his 
who  belong  by  eternal  election  to  God.  Duns  Scotus  accepts 
the  view  which  was  quite  rightly  formulated  by  Thomas, 
namely,  that  sin,  in  virtue  of  its  origin  from  created  will,  is 
something  finite  in  its  nature,  and  to  this  he  adds  that  to 
maintain  that  sin  is  intrinsically  infinite  would  be  Mani- 
chaean.  But  while  Duns  accepts  the  terminology  of  Thomas 
so  far  as  to  allow  that  the  "  infinity  of  sin  "  may  be  maintained 
in  a  certain  external  sense,  in  virtue  of  its  opposition  to  the 
infinite  God,  he  explains  at  the  same  time  that  the  punish- 
ment for  deadly  sin  may  be  called  infinite  in  the  merely 
external  sense,  that  is,  when  the  will  persists  finally  in  sin, 
but  not  because  God  could  punish  sin  in  no  other  way 
(vol.  i.  p.  74).  Therefore,  the  full  extent  of  the  penalty 
of  condemnation  is  reserved  by  Duns  solely  for  those  who 
persist  finally  in  sin.  And  yet  for  this  reason  the 
endless  punishment  to  which  they  are  doomed  is  not, 
strictly  speaking,  infinite,  because  the  final  resolve  to  per- 
sist in  sin  also  remains  within  the  limits  of  created  being. 
All  the  more  evident  is  it  that  that  sin  is  finite  which 
finds  forgiveness  through  the  intrinsically  finite  merit  of 
Christ. 

The  following  arguments  of  John   Wessel^  move  within 

'  De  magniivdine  pcusionum  z. :  **  Hie  dolor  debitus  noster  dolor  est,  quern  si 
vereaguQsdei  toUens  peccata  mundi  pro  nobis  portavit,  in  tanta  mensura  portavit, 


372  JUSTIFICATION   AND   RECONCIUATION  [352-3 

the  bounds  of  a  more  concrete  theological  theory.  On  the 
lines  of  Isa.  liii.  4,  he  explains  the  pain  which  Jesus  took 
upon  Himself,  as  the  Lamb  of  God,  as  the  penal  sufTering 
destined  for  us.  As  such,  it  is  equivalent  to  the  penalty 
which  each  single  person  has  incurred.  But  as  penalty  is 
always  incurred  exclusively  in  one's  individual  capacity,  and 
its  measure  to  be  determined  by  the  degree  of  individual 
sinfulness,  therefore  the  purpose  of  Jesus,  when  He  took 
upon  Himself  our  penal  suffering,  must  be  judged  by  the 
measure  of  the  penalty  which  is  due  to  each  individual  At 
the  last  judgment  He  will  urge  against  all  the  damned  the 
valid  charge  that  He  took  upon  Himself  as  much  suffering 
as  would  suffice  in  God's  judgment  for  the  absolution  of  their 
penalties,  but  that  they  despised  Him.  But  for  the  indi- 
vidual elect.  He  has  undertaken  only  so  much  suffering  as 
serves  for  the  remission  of  the  limited  penalties  which  were 
destined  for  each  of  them.  The  measure  of  this  punishment, 
it  is  true,  is  hidden  from  the  eyes  of  men.  But  no  one  of 
the  redeemed  has  of  himself  merited  eternal  damnation,  seeing 
that  they  have  not  fallen  into  the  stiff-necked  sin  of  the 
despisers  of  grace,  but  merely  into  the  sin  of  weakness  aud 
ignorance,  and  that  their  deadly  sins  are  not  sins  unto  death. 
In  the  foregoing  exposition,  this  Augustinian  takes  no  account 

quantus  diatricto  divinae  iustitiae  iudicio  repoaitus  pro  onmibas  omnium  uos- 
tnim  peccatis,  quos  redemit  ex  morte,  languore  et  dolore.  —  Superat  omnia 
divinarum  legum  necessitas,  quibus  statutum,  nihil  finaliter  indecormu  futurnm 
in  regno  destinato.  Non  iam  de  sup}>liciis  inferni  quis  obiiciat.  NuUus  enim 
per  Christum  redemtus  unquam  meruit  tali  supplicio  cruciari,  quia  uuUus  re* 
demtonim  in  illam  obstinaciam  obdurati  cordis  prolapsus  est,  sed  infirmitate 
et  ignorantia,  non  obdurata  malitia  contemtomm  lapsorum  in  profundum. 
Licet  igitur  dicamus,  multos  mortalitcr  peccare  in  hac  nostra  humana  infirmi- 
tate,  nemo  tamen  per  haec  peccat  usque  ad  mortem.  Sunt  igitur  peccata  nostra 
mortalia,  sed  non  niortua,  sicut  nos  mortales  et  non  mortui.  Quae  autem 
mortalia  tantum  sunt,  quanta  poena  divinis  legibus  reposita  sit,  non  puto 
cuiquam  notum  esse  mortalium.  luste  ergo  in  iudicio  lesus  contra  omnes 
perditos  causabitur,  tantam  eius  afi9ictionem  pro  eis  assumptam,  ut  dei  iudicio 
ad  omnem  poenam  pro  eorum  peccatis  abolendis  sufficere  iudicetur,  et  eos  con- 
tempsisse.  Praeterea  pro  singulis  salvandis  tantum  obtulit  deo,  quantum  pro 
illius  Yoluit  abolitione.  Voluit  autem,  quantum  apti.  Apti  autem,  quantum 
mundi  et  conformes  Christo.  Intentio  enim  Ghristi  erat  individua,  quia  solis 
praedestinatis,  et  limitata,  quia  praecise  tantum,  quantum  cuique  in  suum 
locum  et  ordinem." 


363-4]  THE   DOCTRINB   OF   SIN  373 

at  all  of  the  absolute  worthiness  of  punishment  of  original 
sin — a  principle  which  also  he  nowhere  else  maintains;^ 
rather,  he  starts  from  the  idea  that  every  punishment  is  deter- 
mined by  individual  guiltiness,  and  stands  in  quantitative 
correspondence  therewith.  Thence  he  concludes  that,  if 
Christ  in  His  suffering  has  taken  upon  Himself  the  punish- 
ment due  to  all  men,  even  the  damned,  therefore  in  His 
purpose  to  suffer  He  has  discriminated  the  quanta  of  punish- 
ment due  to  every  individual  man.  That  is  indeed  a  piece 
of  psychological  violence,  the  harshness  of  which,  however, 
only  shows  that  the  conception  of  a  universal  purpose  to 
endure  punishment  in  the  stead  of  others  cannot  but  make 
shipwreck  alike  on  the  qualitative  and  the  quantitative  con- 
ditions of  the  notion.  But  yet  it  was  a  profoundly  significant 
insight  into  Biblical  motives  of  thought,  which  led  Wessel  to 
distinguish  between  the  degrees  of  sin  which  either  admit  or 
exclude  the  possibility  of  redemption.  Quite  similar  to 
Wessel's  distinction  is  that  which  Staupitz  *  has  brought  out 
between  the  man  who  is  a  sinner  for  a  certain  time,  and 
therefore  is  punished  for  a  certain  time,  and  the  man  who  is 
a  sinner  always,  and  therefore  is  pimished  always.  If  now 
we  recognise  as  valid  the  fact  of  Divine  Providence,  it  fol- 
lows that  the  sin  of  the  elect  is  temporal  and  not  eternal, 
and  accordingly  also  to  be  punished  with  merely  temporal 
penalties,  which,  however,  have  then  the  value  of  educative 
punishments,  intended  to  purify  the  elect  from  their  stains. 

In  close  agreement  with  these  theologians  is  Zrvingli, 
whose  conception  of  Providence  and  election  stands  nearer  to 
the  theological  type  of  Staupitz  than  can  be  affirmed  of 
Luther.  Zwingli,^  as  is  well  known,  defines  the  inherited 
propensity  to  sin  as  a  malady,  not  as  a  condition  of  personal 
guilt.  As,  however,  he  finds  therein  the  source  and  motive 
of  all  actual  sins,  he  is  by  no  means  of  the  opinion  that  this 
innate   disposition  plays  no  part  in  bringing  about  eternal 

^  Cf.  the  art.  on  Wessel  by  H.  Schmidt  in  Hcrzog's  B,  E,  vol.  xvii.  p.  742. 
'  Von  der  Vollziehung  ewiger  BrwdJUung,  §§  89-93.     Opera,  ed.  Knaake,  i. 
p.  156. 

*  De  peceato  ariginali  dtdaratio,  0pp.  iii.  p.  631  ff. 


I 


374  JUSTIFICATION    AND   RECONCILIATION  [354—5 

damnation.  But,  while  he  raises  the  question  whether  the 
malady  of  original  sin  delivers  all  men  over  to  the  penalties  of 
eternal  death,  he  attempts  its  solution  only  by  bringing  out 
the  interrelations  between  sin  and  redemption.  In  order  to 
make  good  the  truth  of  both  these  conceptions,  he  opposes 
them  first  of  all  in  this  way  :  by  original  sin  we  are  all  lost, 
and  by  means  of  redemption  we  are  restored  to  perfect  life. 
The  latter  proposition,  however,  limits  the  former.  The 
former  is  true  only  when  we  disregard  the  fact  of  redemption. 
This  fact,  however,  being  given,  those  are  in  error  who  main- 
tain universal  damnation  on  the  ground  of  original  sin.  For 
the  children  of  Christians  are  not  condemned  for  original  sin. 
They  are,  rather,  through  the  character  of  the  community 
established  by  the  promise  of  grace,  the  objects  of  Divine 
favour.  For  Christian  believers  are  only  the  extended 
community  of  the  children  of  Abraham,  Isaac,  and  Jacob. 
Now,  in  regard  to  the  last-named,  whom  God  elected  before 
his  birth,  it  follows  that  original  sin  could  not  condemn  him. 
For  he  who  belongs  to  God  stands  to  God  in  the  relation  of 
friendship.  If  so,  then  no  condemnation  takes  place  on 
account  of  innate  qualities  of  character.  Therefore,  from  the 
point  of  view  of  eternal  election,  in  the  positive  community 
of  salvation  the  hereditary  propensity  to  sin  is  not  in  itself 
the  ground  of  eternal  damnation ;  it  becomes  such  only  when 
one  brings  down  destruction  on  oneself  by  personal  trans- 
gression of  the  law,  and  therefore  by  one's  own  guilt  of 
unfaithfulness  towards  God.  In  this  statement  we  have  an 
indirect  admission  of  the  idea  expressed  by  Wessel  and 
Staupitz,  that  he  who  belongs  to  the  number  of  the  elect 
practises  actual  sin  only  in  a  temporal  degree,  or  in  the  degree 
of  ignorance ;  for  within  this  circle  one  never  reaches  the 
stage  of  contempt  of  salvation,  or  of  intentional  unfaithful- 
ness. This  view,  it  is  true,  is  incompatible  with  the 
Augustinian  representation  of  original  sin  as  the  suflScient 
ground  of  eternal  damnation.  If,  therefore,  the  assumption 
of  an  hereditary  transmission  of  sin  be  maintained  at  all,  it 
can  be  understood  only  in  Zwingli's  sense. 


355—6]  THE   DOCTRINE   OF   SIN  375 

JTohann  wn  Laseo  attempts  to  solve  the  same  problem  by 
the  assumption  that,  within  the  mass  of  Adam's  posterity  who 
were  condemned  with  him,  the  grace  of  God  which  was 
proclaimed  to  men  in  the  Protevangelium  was  imparted  from 
the  very  beginning,  by  imputation  of  the  eternally  decreed 
redemption  through  Christ,  to  such  men  as  do  not  reject 
Christ  by  their  own  voluntary  contempt  of  Him ;  for  He  did 
not  undertake  His  vicarious  suffering  for  those  also  who  prove 
themselves  His  despisers.  Lasco,  therefore,  reckons  as  dating 
from  Adam  not  only  original  sin,  but  also  the  existence  of 
the  Church  of  God,  characterised  by  the  note  of  faith  in 
the   promised  redemption.^ 

Following  the  same  path,  I  come,  finally,  upon  the  Lutheran 
von  Oettingen^  and  that  for  this  reason  that,  in  complete 
harmony  with  my  own  position,  he  follows  the  methodological 
principle  that  the  full  extent  of  sin  is  recognisable  only  in 
relation  to  the  Christian  salvation,  and  possible  only  in 
opposition  to  it.  Proceeding  on  these  lines,  Oettingen  not 
only  arrives  at  the  principle  that,  presupposing  the  revelation 
of  salvation,  the  degree  of  sin  varies  according  to  the  definite 
capacity  of  appropriating  salvation,  but  likewise  maintains 
that  eternal  damnation  is  limited  to  the  sin  against  the  Holy 
Ghost,  that  is,  to  stiff-necked  rejection  of  grace.  In  this 
assertion  it  is  indirectly  admitted  that  eternal  damnation  does 
not  inherently  depend  on  original  sin ;  and  thus  one  of  the 
formal  bases  of  traditional  Lutheran  as  well  as  Calvinistic 
Dogmatics  is  given  up.  Oettingen,  it  is  true,  fails  to  draw 
this  consequence.  He  seeks,  rather,  to  create  the  impression 
that  his  position,  which  is  an  entirely  novel  one,  was  already 
in  a  certain  measure  foreseen  by  Luther.  But  the  expression 
which  he  cites  from  Luther*  means  only  that  all  non-Christians, 
who  are  in  the  state  of  eternal  damnation  on  the  ground  of 

^  Ep.  ad  BulliJigerum  (1544).  Confessio  ecclesiae  Londinensis.  Opera,  cd. 
Knyper,  ii.  pp.  587,  298. 

'^  Depecealo  in  spiriium  sanctum  (Dorpat,  1856),  pp.  49,  146. 

'  Calech,  maior,  ii.  66  :  "Quicunque  extra  Christianita tern  sunt — inperpetua 
manent  ira  et  damnatione.  Neque  enim  habent  Christum  dominum,  neque 
uUis  spiritus  sancti  douis  et  dotibus  illustrati  et  donati  sunt."  Cf.  Eustliu, 
Luther*8  Theologie,  ▼ol.  ii.  p.  374. 


J 


376  JUSTIFICATION   AND   RECONCILIATION  [35G— 7 

original  sin,  remain  in  that  state  because  they  are  not 
redeemed  from  it.  Eternal  damnation,  in  so  far  as  it  denotes 
a  degree  and  a  duration  of  punishment,  is  here  attached  a 
priori  to  original  sin.  From  Luther's  subsequent  comparison 
between  damnation  and  redemption,  we  can  conclude  only 
that  he  admits  a  certain  modification  in  the  dui*ation  of 
eternal  punishment,  according  as  redemption  has  been  either 
merely  not  appropriated  or  definitely  rejected.  But  in 
Luther's  view  the  redeemed  also  formerly  stood  under  the 
doom  of  the  highest  degree  of  punishment.  Oettingen,  there- 
fore, is  at  variance  not  merely  (as  he  alleges)  with  several  of 
the  Lutheran  divines,  but  also  with  Luther  himself,  in  limiting 
eternal  damnation,  as  the  punishment  of  the  highest  degree 
and  of  unbroken  duration,  to  the  sin  against  the  Holy  Ghost, 
and  in  measuring  the  degree  of  sin  in  general  by  the  standard 
of  active  susceptibility  to  grace.  Such  being  the  case,  I 
trust  no  one  will  doubt  that  the  nature  of  original  sin,  if  its 
existence  be  maintained  at  all,  can  be  consistently  determined 
only  in  Zwingli's  sense. 

Now,  it  has  been  ascertained  previously  (vol.  ii.  pp.  241- 
246)  that  through  all  circles  of  thought  in  the  New  Testa- 
ment there  runs  the  idea  of  the  graduated  valice  of  sin,  the 
idea,  namely,  that  sin,  in  so  far  as  it  can  be  forgiven  or 
rendered  inoperative  through  conversion,  is  to  be  distin- 
guished from  sin  brought  to  its  full  intensity  in  the  form  of 
final  decision  against  the  Christian  salvation,  or  that  of 
incorrigible  selfishness.  This  estimate  of  sin  is  formed  in 
exact  accordance  with  the  gulf  which  separates  sin  from  the 
Christian  salvation ;  it  stands  likewise  in  analogy  with  the 
fundamental  principle  of  the  Mosaic  law  (vol.  ii.  p.  38),  the 
scope  of  which  is  derived  from  a  quite  similar  standard  of 
value ;  it  corresponds,  finally,  to  the  theological  method  of 
determining  the  conception  of  sin,  the  validity  of  which  I 
maintained  at  the  outset.  This  constant  element  in  the 
religious  view  of  things,  which  Jesus  recognised  as  well  as 
the  writers  of  the  New  Testament,  has  been  rendered  ineffect- 
ive by  the  Augustinian  doctrine  of  original  sin.     The  time 


357]  THE   DOCTRINE   OF   SIN  377 

has  come  at  length  to  restore  that  principle  to  its  rightful 
place. 

The  distinction  between  sin  as  ignorance  and  sin  as  final 
decision  against  recognised  good,  is  thinkable  first  of  all  as 
related  to  the  conception  of  sin  in  general.  Sin  in  general 
is  active  and  habitual  opposition  to  God  and  to  the  good — 
the  good  which  men  discern,  with  some  measure  either  of 
vague  presentiment  or  of  definite  knowledge,  to  be  the  final 
end  guaranteed  by  God  for  the  human  will.  But,  as  has 
been  argued  above  (p.  343),  the  worth  or  the  worthlessness  of 
sin  is  not  determined  by  the  logical  notion  of  opposition, 
v^rhich  would  involve  that  the  extremest  possible  opposition  to 
good  is  realised  in  every  instance  of  sin,  or  that  all  sin  is 
conscious  and  thoroughgoing  wickedness.  If  the  nature  of 
sin  were  to  be  determined  in  this  sense,  it  would  indeed  have  a 
very  Umited  extent  in  actual  experience.  Sin  is,  rather,  in  all 
instances,  opposition  to  the  good,  that  conception  being  defined 
in  the  ethical  sense,  so  that  the  least  deviation  from  the  good  or 
even  the  simple  omission  of  the  good  already  forms  opposition 
thereto ;  for  the  good  must  be  unconditionally  and  completely 
reaUsed  by  the  will  at  every  moment.  Now  ignorance,  as 
experience  teaches  in  the  case  of  children,  is  a  very  significant 
factor  in  the  origin  and  development  of  sin.  Children  when 
they  enter  upon  the  common  spiritual  life  of  men,  are  neither 
equipped  with  a  knowledge  of  good  or  of  the  moral  law, 
either  as  a  whole  or  in  its  special  details,  nor  endowed  with  an 
inclination  to  decide  against  the  good  as  a  whole.  Bather,  they 
must  first  learn  to  value  the  good  in  its  special  details,  and  amid 
the  special  relations  of  life  in  which  they  stand ;  for  they  are 
absolutely  unable  from  the  very  outset  of  life  to  comprehend 
the  good  in  its  universal  character.  But  now  precisely  in  the 
case  of  children  the  will  enters  into  the  sphere  of  active 
operation  with  the  evident  expectation  that  it  possesses 
unlimited  influence  over  surrounding  objects  and  circum- 
stances. Such  being  the  case,  ignorance  is  the  essential 
condition  of  the  conflicts  which  arise  between  the  will  and  the 
order  of  society  regarded  as  the  standard  of  the  good,  and  also 


378  JUSTIFICATION   AND   RECONCILUTION  [357--8 

the  condition  of  the  fact  that  the  will  confirms  itself  in  its 
opposition  to  the  order  of  society.     One  cannot,  it  is  true, 
understand  how  such  a  result  must  ensue.     Sin  has  no  real 
end,  either  for  the  individual  life  or  for  the  advancement  of 
the  whole.     Ignorance,  also,  is  not  the  sufficient  ground  for 
the  confirming  of  the  will  in  sin ;  for  the  will  and  knowledge 
are  not  wholly  commensurable  with  one  another.     Therefore, 
neither  a  priori  nor  yet  in  accordance  with  the  conditions  of 
experience,  is  it  to  be  denied  that  there  may  be  a  sinless 
development  of  life.     For  it  is  likewise  only  by  reckoning  up 
the  sum  total  of  experiences  that  we  arrive  at  our  conviction 
of  the  universal  prevalence  of  sin.     With  this,  theology,  too, 
ought  to  rest  satisfied.     For  the  hypothesis  of  an  innate 
propensity   to   sin,  even    as    Zwingli  understands  the   idea, 
would  also  have  to  be  established  by  means  of  observation ; 
and  even  supposing  the  hypothesis  established,  nothing  more 
would  be  reached  thereby   than  what    ordinary   experience 
ascertains,  even  without  such  means  of  interpretation.     And, 
finally,  though  the  gradation  we  have  recognised  in  active  and 
habitual  sin  be  regarded  as  holding  good  for  diflferent  men, 
yet  the  sin  which  is  inborn  in  all  men  could  be  viewed  only 
under  the  form  of  ignorance.     That  even  in  this  form  a  pro- 
pensity of  opposition  to  the  good  can  be  developed,  experience 
teaches  in  the  case  of  children — ;but  then  only  if  we  pre- 
suppose that  their  will  is  put  to  the  test.    But  how  ignorance 
can    be    a    sinful    propensity,  prior   to  all   activity    of   the 
individual  will,  is  unintelligible.     Thus  even  the  possibility 
of  maintaining  Zwingli's  hypothesis  disappears. 

The  distinction  which  is  made  in  the  New  Testament, 
between  sin  as  ignorance  and  sin  as  final  and  thoroughgoing 
opposition  to  good,  has  a  certain  analogy  to  the  current 
distinctions  made  between  unintentional  and  intentional,  and 
between  venial  and  deadly  sin.  But  the  former  distinction, 
unlike  the  latter  ones,  applies  not  to  individual  actions,  but 
to  habitual  dispositions  of  will  from  which  the  individual 
actions  proceed.  That  distinction,  moreover,  has  not  the 
significance  of   a  standard    to    be  applied   in   forming  our 


[358-9  THE    DOCTRINE    OF    SIN  379 

judgment  of  other  men,  on  the  basis  of  a  complete  experience 
of  the  facts,  just  as  the  other  distinctions  with  which  we  have 
compared  it  are  recognised  as  standards  for  the  practical 
judgments  of  the  educator,  the  judge,  and  the  Catholic  father- 
confessor.  For  the  distinction  belongs  imdoubtedly  to  the 
sphere  of  religious  thought,  and  therefore  holds  good  in  the 
first  place  as  the  standard  for  the  judgment  of  God,  Now,  as 
we  are  not  called  upon  as  Christians  to  pass  judgment  on 
individual  men,  corresponding  to  or  even  forestalling  the 
judgment  of  God,  the  recognition  of  this  distinction  signifies 
anything  but  the  right  to  judge  men  as  individuals,  and  to 
attribute  to  their  sins  the  one  or  the  other  degree.  Rather, 
as  an  element  in  the  Christian  view  of  the  world,  the  distinc- 
tion denotes  the  point  of  view  from  which  the  Divine 
redemption  or  reconciliation  of  sinners  is  possible,  it  being 
presupposed  that  there  also  exists  a  degree  of  sin  which  can 
only  expect  to  be  expelled  from  the  Divine  world-order. 
Now,  inasmuch  as  the  positive  determination  of  men's  capacity 
for  redemption  must  be  reserved  for  God,  we  ought  to  be 
satisfied  with  comprehending  all  these  instances  of  sin  under 
the  negative  category  of  sin  as  ignorance.  We  cannot,  cer- 
tainly, avoid  taking  into  consideration  the  fact  that  there  fall 
under  this  category  those  sins,  likewise,  which  present  them- 
selves to  our  human  judgment  as  a  thoroughly  confirmed 
habit  of  hardening  (Eph.  iv.  17-19).  But  if  we  are  to 
maintain  our  good  faith  that  such  men  are  not  regarded  by 
God  as  past  redemption,  the  conclusion  which  suggests  itself 
is  that  God  looks  upon  their  sin  in  a  different  light,  namely, 
as  ignorance.  This  predicate  has  a  quite  different  importance, 
when  viewed  from  the  standpoint  of  Christianity,  from  the 
presupposition  which  bears  the  same  name  in  the  Mosaic  law 
of  sacrifice.  For  in  the  latter  case  account  is  always  taken 
merely  of  individual  actions,  or  of  such  conditions  of  bodily 
uncleanness  as  we  must  judge  to  be  morally  indifferent. 
By  Christians,  on  the  other  hand,  the  sinful  condition  of 
others,  in  so  far  as  it  does  not  exclude  the  capacity  for 
redemption,  must  be  left  to  God's  decision,  and  His  estimate 


380  JUSTIFICATION   AND   RECONCILIATION  [359-60 

of  sin  as  ignorance  must  be  accepted  with  due  reverence.  At 
the  stage  of  Mosaic  law,  moreover,  it  remains  uncertain  how 
the  relation  of  man  to  God  in  consequence  of  the  sin  of 
ignorance  stands  prior  to  the  sin-ofifering,  since  the  covenant 
grace  of  God  still  remains  in  force.  On  the  other  hand,  as 
regards  the  sin  which  God  views  as  ignorance,  in  virtue  of 
its  finding  forgiveness  through  Christ,  it  is  certain  that  in  its 
character  of  enmity  against  God  it  excludes  the  relation  of 
peace  between  men  and  God. 

If,  now,  the  question  be  raised  how  we  have  to  conceive 
the  relation  of  God  to  sin  regarded  as  ignorance,  above  all  one 
ought  not  to  expect  that  theological  knowledge,  as  such,  will 
reach  further  in  this  direction  than  religious  judgment.  In 
regard  to  the  point  before  us,  our  theology  is  only  com- 
petent to  show  that  the  distinction  between  the  two  stages  of 
sin  is  in  harmony  with  our  ruling  conception  of  God.  In 
general,  our  knowledge  of  how  sin  is  related  to  the  Divine 
world-order  has  very  narrow  limits  indeed.  We  must  guard 
against  describing  sin  as  an  operation  of  God,  and  a  harmoni- 
ous element  in  His  world-order,  for  in  all  instances  sin  is 
the  opposite  of  good,  and  that  which  runs  counter  to  the 
recognisable  moral  end  of  the  world.  It  is  an  apparently 
inevitable  product  of  the  human  will  under  the  given  condi- 
tions of  its  development,  but,  conscious  as  we  are  of  our 
freedom  and  independence,  is  nevertheless  reckoned  by  us  as 
guilt.  Nor  can  we,  with  Schleiermacher,  mediate  between 
these  two  lines  of  thought  by  holding  that  God  regards  sin, 
not  as  opposition  to  good,  but  merely  as  hitherto  unattained 
moral  perfection,  whereas  we  must  regard  our  imperfection  as 
sin,  in  order  to  awaken  in  our  minds  the  longing  for  redemp- 
tion and  perfection  (vol.  i.  p.  536).  For  as  our  theological 
view  must  in  nowise  diverge  from,  or  run  in  opposition  to  the 
religious  view  of  Christianity,  our  judgment  regarding  sin 
must  be  in  harmony  with  the  Divine  judgment.  On  the 
other  hand,  our  estimate  of  sin  as  opposition  to  God  is 
indeed  a  logical  presupposition  of  faith  in  redemption,  yet 
in    itself  no    real  ground   for  the   production  of  this  faith, 


360-1]  THE    DOCTRINB   OF   SIN  381 

but  just   as  easily  a  ground  for  doubt,  or   even    obdurate 
indi£ference. 

If,  therefore,  Grod  loves  sinners  (§  39),  inasmuch  as  His 
thoughts  are  directed  to  their  redemption.  He  does  not  regard 
sin  in  general  ai^ imperfect  good;  rather,  He  regards  that 
special  form  of  sin  which  does  not  exclude  redemption  as  an 
attribute  of  men  which  does  not  exhaust  nor  finally  deter- 
mine their  worth  for  God.  The  question  will  be  raised, 
whether  it  is  conceivable  that  sinful  men  on  such  conditions 
should  be  objects  of  God's  love.  Now,  love  is  that  will  which 
accepts,  as  belonging  to  one's  own  end,  the  task  of  advancing 
permanently  the  end  of  other  personal  beings  of  like  nature 
with  oneself  (§  34).  Moreover,  the  possibility  of  love  is  in 
nowise  bound  up  with  its  being  reciprocated,  that  is,  with 
the  condition  that  the  loved  one  also,  under  all  circumstances, 
recognises  the  personal  end  of  the  lover  as  a  permanent  task 
of  life,  in  the  same  way  as  the  lover  does  to  him.  Bather, 
in  their  natural  estimate  of  moral  relationships,  men  are  at 
one  in  the  opinion  that  the  love  of  a  mother  to  the  infant 
child  which  cannot  respond  to  her  love,  and  the  love  of  a 
father  to  a  lost  son,  represent  a  higher  degree  of  love  than 
that  which  is  found  in  mutual  friendship.  Furthermore,  this 
thought  is  affirmed  in  the  Christian  commandment  to  love 
one's  enemy  (Matt.  v.  44;  Bom.  xii.  20).  That  command- 
ment would  be  absurd,  were  it  the  expression  of  the  view  that 
we  ought  to  support  our  enemy  in  the  aims  in  which  he 
denies  or  combats  our  existence  or  our  essential  interests. 
But  when  we  speak  specifically  of  love  towards  our  enemy, 
this  means  no  more  than  that  we  show  respect  towards  him 
as  a  moral  personality,  by  maintaining  his  existence  and 
desiring  that  his  disposition  should  change.  Hence,  when 
Schoeberlein  reduces  the  relation  of  God  to  sinful  humanity 
to  the  respect  shown  by  Him  to  their  personal  independence 
(vol.  i.  p.  651),  what  he  thereby  conceives  is  merely  a  modi- 
fication of  love,  not  something  different  from  love  in  its 
nature.  His  hypothesis,  however,  is  not  in  harmony  with 
the  original  expression  which  is  given  to  the  motive  of  the 


382  JUSTIFICATION    AND   RBCONCILIATION  [361-2 

Divine  decree  of  redemption.  Bather,  in  His  purpose  of  re- 
demption God  loves  the  world,  i,e.  the  sinners  who  are  filled 
with  enmity  towards  Him  (Rom.  v.  8  ;  John  iiL  16).  If,  now, 
we  attempt  to  ascertain  the  meaning  of  this  conception  through 
the  analogy  of  that  love  towards  enemies  which  is  possible 
to  us,  we  find  that  in  both  cases  the  love  is  conditioned  by 
the  fact  that  we  are  able  to  distinguish,  whether  hypothetic- 
ally  or  categorically,  between  the  momentary  direction  of 
will  which  finds  expression  in  the  other's  enmity,  and  a  per- 
manent element  in  his  personality  which  makes  him  worthy 
of  love.  In  human  affairs  cases  are  met  with  in  which  one 
recognises  an  enemy  as  a  man  who  is  otherwise  distinguished 
by  very  estimable  qualities  of  character,  as  well  as  cases  in 
which  one  can  respect  an  enemy  only  in  view  of  one's  desire 
for  his  complete  change  of  mind.  In  the  relation  of  God  to 
men,  who  as  sinners  stand  in  a  general  attitude  of  opposition 
to  the  Divine  final  end,  it  is  evident  that  only  the  latter 
case  holds  good.  But  now  the  question  arises,  whether,  from 
the  commandment  that  men  should  love  their  enemies,  a  com- 
petent conclusion  can  be  drawn  at  all  in  reference  to  an 
analogous  relation  of  the  Divine  will  towards  sinners.  For 
love  towards  one's  enemies,  in  the  hope  of  their  conversion, 
could  perhaps  be  enjoined  as  evidence  of  one's  own  deter- 
mination to  refrain  from  the  judgment  that  anyone  is  beyond 
conversion.  But  it  is  precisely  from  this  point  of  view  that 
the  doubtfulness  of  the  analogy  comes  to  light.  For,  sup- 
posing that  even  in  countless  instances  within  human  experi- 
ence the  act  of  blessing  and  interceding  for  one's  enemy 
finds  no  encouragement  in  the  desired  result  of  his  conversion, 
the  commandment  of  Christ  would  be  useless  and  ineffectual 
as  a  means  of  virtue,  were  it  not  in  the  first  place  a  direct 
consequence  of  the  religious  view  of  the  world  which  belongs 
to  Christianity  (§  39).  But  in  the  Christian  view  the  love 
towards  our  enemy  which  we  are  commanded  to  cherish,  is 
necessarily  based  on  the  corresponding  trait  of  character  in 
the  idea  of  God.  The  love,  therefore,  which  is  the  expression 
of  the  essential  will  of  God  revealed  in  Christianity,  includes 


362-3]  THE   DOCTBINE   OF   SIN  383 

also  love  towards  sinners  as  the  ground  of  their  conversion. 
For  the  change  of  heart,  which  holds  good,  in  the  case  of 
human  love  towards  one's  enemy,  as  a  condition  which  lies 
beyond  our  power  and  therefore  can  only  be  kept  hypo- 
thetically  before  our  eyes,  takes  in  the  case  of  God's  love  the 
place  of  the  consequence  intended  by  that  love.  But  now, 
in  so  far  as  the  change  of  heart  which  is  to  be  brought  about 
by  God's  love  towards  sinners  must  be  conceived  under  the 
form  of  freedom  of  the  will,  we  cannot  conceive  that  result 
as  taking  place  when  sin,  regarded  as  enmity  against  God, 
has  reached  that  degree  of  self-determination  at  which  the 
will  has  deliberately  chosen  evil  as  its  end.  Where  we  can 
justly  suppose  such  a  case,  there  also  we  must  regard  the 
love  of  God  as  impossible.  Therefore,  the  love  of  God  can 
be  conceived  in  relation  only  to  such  sinners  as  have  not 
fallen  into  that  degree  of  sin  which  excludes  conversion  of 
the  wilL  It  is  just  this  negative  relation  that  is  expressed 
by  the  predication  of  ignorance — and  nothing  more.  The  pre- 
supposition of  such  a  degree  of  sin  in  the  case  of  others  has 
just  this  much  practical  significance  for  us,  that  we  ought  to 
esteem  them  as  capable  of  conversion.  Theoretically,  how- 
ever, this  assumption  of  sin  as  ignorance  has  the  significance 
only  of  a  standard  for  God — a  standard,  therefore,  which  is  con- 
ceived only  negatively,  because  its  specific  application  does  not 
belong  to  us.  The  thought,  therefore,  means  that  the  love 
of  God  to  sinners,  as  the  motive  of  His  purpose  of  redemp- 
tion, and  as  the  ultimate  efficient  ground  of  their  conversion, 
cannot  be  extended  to  those  persons  in  whom  the  purpose  of 
opposition  to  the  Divine  order  of  good  has  come  to  full  con- 
sciousness and  determination.  Whether  there  are  such  men, 
and  who  they  are,  are  questions  that  lie  equally  beyond  our 
practical  judgment  and  our  theoretical  knowledge. 

1.  Sin,  which  alike  as  a  mode  of  action  and  as  a 
habitual  propensity  extends  over  the  whole  human  race,  is, 
in  the  Christian  view  of  the  world,  estimated  as  the  opposite 
of  reverence  and  trust  towards  God,  as  also  the  opposite  of 
the  Kingdom  of  God — in  the  latter  respect  forming  the  king- 


384  JUSTIFICATION   AND   RECX)NaLIATION  [363 

dom  of  sin,  which  possesses  no  necessary  ground  either  in  the 
Divine  world-order  or  in  man's  natural  endowment  of  free- 
dom, but  unites  all  men  with  one  another  by  means  of  the 
countless  interrelations  of  sinful  conduct. 

2.  Of  the  evils  which  make  themselves  perceptible  as 
hindrances  to  human  freedom,  those  have  the  significance  of 
Divine  punishments — presupposing  the  Divine  government 
of  the  world — which  each  individual,  through  his  unrelieved 
consciousness  of  guilt,  imputes  to  himself  as  such  —  that 
consciousness  of  guilt,  as  expressive  of  the  lack  of  religious 
fellowship  with  God,  being  itself  already  the  initial  mani- 
festation of  punishment  as  the  forfeiture  of  the  privilege  of 
Divine  sonship. 

3.  In  so  far  as  men,  regarded  as  sinners  both  in  their 
individual  capacity  and  as  a  whole,  are  objects  of  the 
redemption  and  reconciliation  made  possible  by  the  love  of 
God,  sin  is  estimated  by  God,  not  as  the  final  purpose  of 
opposition  to  the  known  will  of  God,  but  as  ignorance. 


CHAPTER    VI 

THE   DOCTBINE   OF   CHKIST'S    PERSON    AND   LIFE-WORK 

§  44.  The  nature  of  Christianity  as  a  universal  religion  is 
such  that  in  the  Christian  view  of  the  world  a  definite  place 
is  assigned  to  its  historical  founder.  In  the  two  ethnic 
religions  which  come  nearest  to  Christianity  (though  in 
different  degrees),  and  which  have  preserved  some  recollection 
of  their  historical  founders,  namely  in  the  Persian  religion 
and  in  the  religion  of  Israel,"  Zoroaster  and  Moses  are  indeed 
acknowledged  as  the  founders  and  lawgivers  of  the  faith ; 
but  there  is  no  need  of  a  personal  confession  either  of  the 
one  or  of  the  other,  because  for  the  religions  which  they 
founded  the  religious  community  is  the  nation,  and  the 
nation  is  the  community.  In  the  universal  religions,  on  the 
other  hand,  it  is  through  express  recognition  of  the  founder 
of  the  religion  that  membership  in  the  religious  community 
is  described  and  attained  (vol.  ii.  p.  13).  At  the  same  time, 
in  these  religions  a  certain  gradation  presents  itself  in  the 
worth  and  significance  of  personal  adherence  to  the  founder. 
In  Islam  it  is  enough  to  name  the  Prophet  alongside  of  God, 
because  for  this  religion  of  law  he  is  merely  the  lawgiver. 
Nearer  to  the  religious  estimate  of  Jesus  Christ  in  the 
Christian  religion  comes  the  significance  which  in  Buddhism 
is  attached  to  Sakyamuni  Buddha  as  an  incarnation  of  Deity. 
But  in  this  case  there  is  the  difference  that,  whereas  what 
Buddha  aimed  at  was  not  by  any  means  what  his  followers 
believe  themselves  to  have  received  from  him,  Jesus,  on  the 
other  hand,  had  in  view  for  His  own  Person  essentially  that 
significance  which  is  claimed  for  it  in  His  religious  community. 
In  other  words,  Buddha  had  no  intention  of  founding  a 
25 


386  JUSTIFICATION    AND   RECONCILIATION  [364-5 

religion ;  he  did  not  so  much  as  set  forth  any  conception  of 
God,  or  any  explanation  of  the  world  in  its  relation  to  God ; 
he  did  not  explain  how  man  is  to  reach  a  definite  attitude 
towards  the  world  or  a  definite  position  in  the  world :  he 
merely  indicated  the  direction  along  which  man  is  to  achieve 
his  own  redemption  from  the  misery  of  actual  existence, 
namely,  by  the  ascetic  annihilation  of  personal  life.  A 
philosophy  or  ethic  such  as  this,  which  addresses  itself  to 
human  freedom,  may  be  the  basis  of  a  school,  but  not  of 
religious  fellowship ;  therefore,  the  significance  it  secures  for 
its  author  is  that  of  the  founder  of  a  school.  That  it  was 
afterwards  associated  with  the  Indian  idea  of  God,  and  that 
the  corresponding  idea  of  Divine  incarnation  was  applied  to 
Buddha  and  to  his  successors,  was  a  result  utterly  foreign  to 
the  view  of  the  antagonist  of  Brahmanism.  It  is  true  that 
within  the  Christian  community  there  are  those  who  hold 
exactly  the  same  view  with  regard  to  the  purpose  of  Jesus, 
and  the  fate  which  has  befallen  the  doctrine  of  His  Person  in 
the  Christian  Church.  According  to  their  reading  of  the 
Gospels,  Jesus  taught  a  lofty  morality,  but  in  the  exercise  of 
this  vocation  never  transgressed  the  limits  of  a  purely  human 
estimate  of  Himself ;  only  through  influences  that  are  wholly 
external  have  His  followers  been  led  to  regard  Him  as  an 
incarnation  of  the  Deity.  But  this  view  is  historically 
inaccurate.  For  beyond  all  doubt  Jesus  was  conscious  of  a 
new  and  hitherto  unknown  relation  to  God,  and  said  so  to 
His  disciples ;  and  His  aim  was  to  bring  His  disciples  into  the 
same  attitude  toward  the  world  as  His  own,  and  to  the  same 
estimate  of  themselves,  that  under  these  conditions  He  might 
enlist  them  in  the  world-wide  mission  of  the  Kingdom  of 
God,  which  He  knew  to  be  not  only  His  own  business,  but 
theirs.  But  this  involves  the  assumption  that  He  Himself 
means  more  for  His  disciples  than  the  passing  occasion  of 
their  religion  or  a  lawgiver  for  their  conduct,  who  would  be 
of  no  more  account  when  once  the  law  which  He  proclaimed 
was  thoroughly  learned.  In  the  case  of  Buddhism,  on  the 
other  hand,  the  system  as  a  system  does  not  secure  for  itg 


365-6]      DOCTKINK   OF   CHKIST'S    PERSON   AND   LIFK-WOBK        387 

founder  any  abiding  significance.  For  if  Buddha  himself  has 
attained  to  that  personal  annihilation  to  which  he  showed  his 
followers  the  way,  he  can  be  remembered  by  them  only  as  a 
pattern  of  past  days,  because  each  one  becomes  himself  a 
Buddha,  an  enlightened  one,  that  is,  he  too  recognises  the 
worthlessness  of  existence,  and  acts  accordingly,  with  a  view 
to  his  own  annihilation. 

In  Christianity  the  case  is  otherwise.  The  aim  of  the 
Christian  is  conceived  £U3  the  attainment  of  eternal  life.  This 
means  the  consistent  realisation  of  the  personal  self-end,  of 
which  the  test  is  that  the  whole  world  does  not  compare  in 
worth  with  the  personal  life,  and  that  by  the  acquisition  of 
spiritual  lordship  over  the  world,  this,  the  true  worth  of  Ufe, 
is  vindicated  (§  27).  Now  this  religious  vocation  of  the  mem- 
bers of  the  Christian  community  is  prefigured  in  the  person  of 
its  Founder,  and  rests  upon  His  person  as  its  abiding  source 
of  strength  for  all  imitation  of  Him,  because  He  Himself 
made  God's  supreme  purpose  of  the  union  of  men  in  the  King- 
dom of  God  the  aim  of  His  own  personal  life ;  and  thereby 
realised  in  His  own  experience  that  independence  toward  the 
world  which  through  Him  has  become  the  experience  of  the 
members  of  His  community.  This  ideal,  the  true  develop- 
ment of  the  spiritual  personality,  cannot  be  rightly  or  fully 
conceived  apart  from  contemplation  of  Him  Who  is  the 
prototype  of  man's  vocation.  Thus  what  in  the  historically 
complete  figure  of  Christ  we  recognise  to  be  the  real  worth 
of  His  existence,  gains  for  ourselves,  through  the  uniqueness 
of  the  phenomenon  and  its  normative  bearing  upon  our  own 
religious  and  ethical  destiny,  the  worth  of  an  abiding  rule, 
since  we  at  the  same  time  discover  that  only  through  the 
impulse  and  direction  we  receive  from  Him,  is  it  possible  for 
us  to  enter  into  His  relation  to  God  and  to  the  world.^  On 
the  other  hand,  this  specific  estimate  of  their  founders,  even 
when  known,  is  quite  alien  to  the  ethnic  religions,  because  in 

^  By  this  is  meant  that  the  disciples  of  Jesus  take  the  raok  of  sons  of  God 
(Matt.  zvii.  26),  and  are  received  into  the  same  relation  to  God  in  which 
Christ  stands  to  His  Father  (John  xvii,  21-28). 


388  JUSTIFICATION   AND   RECONCILUTION  [366-7 

these  there  is  not  posited  as  ideal  aim  the  independest 
development  of  the  personal  character  to  the  worth  of  a  whole, 
as  against  the  natural  and  particular  impulses  of  life.  The 
genius  of  an  ethnic  religion  is  satisfied  if  there  be  participa- 
tion in  the  fixed  tradition  and  custom  of  the  nation ;  and  such 
participation,  when  regarded  as  the  supreme  standard  of 
human  fellowship,  imposes  on  personal  independence  impass- 
able limits.  Because  this  ideal  of  self-realisation  has  not 
come  within  the  horizon  of  any  of  the  ethnic  religions, 
therefore  in  none  of  these  has  the  founder  received  a  place 
which  can  be  compared  with  the  significance  of  Christ  Even 
in  the  case  of  Zoroaster  and  of  Moses,  the  ideal  interests  of 
their  religions  are  so  bound  up  with  the  natural  consciousness 
of  belonging  to  a  particular  nation,  that  the  decision  of  the 
Parsees  for  Zoroaster,  and  of  the  Israelites  for  Moses,  was 
the  inevitable  result  of  hostility  toward  the  Hindus  in  the 
one  case,  and  toward  the  Egyptians  in  the  other. 

There  is  yet  another  reason  why  the  Person  of  Christ 
maintains  its  place  in  the  Christian  view  of  the  world.  Christ 
founds  His  religion  with  the  claim  that  He  brings  the  perfect 
revelation  of  God,  so  that  beyond  what  He  brings  no  further 
revelation  is  conceivable  or  is  to  be  looked  for.  Whoever, 
therefore,  has  a  part  in  the  religion  of  Christ  in  the  way 
Christ  Himself  intended,  cannot  do  other  than  regard  Christ 
as  the  Bearer  of  the  final  revelation  of  God.  At  the  same 
time,  this  point  of  view  is  conclusive  only  in  connection  with 
what  has  already  been  set  forth.  For  Islam  also  claims  to 
be  the  perfect  religion,  and  yet  is  content  with  a  superficial 
recognition  of  its  prophet,  to  whom,  under  this  title,  there  is 
actually  no  place  assigned  in  the  Mohammedan  view  of  the 
world.  Thus  the  claim  Christ  makes  to  the  perfect  revelation 
of  God  in  Himself  is  only  defined  as  against  the  rival  claim 
of  Mohammed,  by  the  fact  that  on  the  ground  of  His  peculiar 
relation  to  God,  Christ  lived  a  life  of  mastery  over  the  world, 
such  as  makes  possible  the  community  in  which  each  Christian 
is  to  attain  the  similar  destiny  of  the  life  eternal.  Because 
this  goal  is  not   the  reward  of  fulfilling  a   statutory  law, 


367-8]      DOOTKINK   OF   CHMST's    PERSON   AND   UFE-WORK        389 

Christ  does  not  count,  like  Mohammed,  merely  as  a  lawgiver. 
On  the  contrary,  since  the  aim  of  the  Christian  is  to  be 
attained  under  the  form  of  personal  freedom,  therefore  the 
twofold  significance  we  are  compelled  to  ascribe  to  Christ  as 
being  at  once  the  perfect  revealer  of  God  and  the  manifest 
\offenbar\  type  of  spiritual  lordship  over  the  world,  finds 
expression  in  the  single  predicate  of  His  Godhead. 

This  mutual  relation  between  the  Godhead  of  Christ  and 
the  raising  of  the  members  of  His  community  to  mastery  over 
the  world  as  their  true  destiny,  is  set  forth  with  greatest 
clearness  in  that  dogma  of  the  Greek  Church  which  affirms 
the  consummation  of  the  human  race  in  Christ  as  the  Word 
of  God,  Who  is  Himself  God.  The  communication  of 
d<f>0apa'La  through  the  teaching — otherwise  the  incarnation — 
of  the  Divine  Word,  is  regularly  described  also  as  deotroirjat^ 
(vol.  i.  p.  4).  Mastery  over  the  world  is  the  content  of 
both  these  descriptions  of  the  Christian,  as  well  as  the  motive 
for  defining  clearly  the  idea  of  the  Divine  Word.  This 
relation  of  things  is  no  longer  considered  in  present-day 
discussions  of  the  meaning  of  the  Godhead  of  Christ.  The 
Greek  Catholic  formula,  that  God  became  man  in  order  that 
man  might  become  God,  is  indeed  repeated  in  the  West, 
because  it  was  adopted  along  with  the  Nicene  type  of  doctrine 
by  Augustine.  Accordingly  we  find  it  used  by  Thomas 
Aquinas  (P.  iii.  qu.  1,  art.  2),  as  by  Athanasius,  to  explain 
the  incarnation  of  the  Divine  Word.  In  Luther's  hynm, 
"  Vom  Hirmnel  kam  der  Engel  Schaar"  there  is  an  echo  of 
the  same  thought  in  so  far  as  by  the  birth  of  Christ  we  are 
said  to  have  become  of  the  race  of  God.  Also,  in  the  wake 
of  mysticism,  not  only  in  the  Middle  Ages  (vol.  i.  p.  117), 
but  even  to  some  extent  where  mysticism  has  found  acceptance 
in  Evangelical  circles,  we  find  traces  of  this  conception  of  the 
deification  of  man.  Nevertheless,  the  combination  has  remained 
on  the  whole  unproductive  for  the  Western  Church,  because 
the  latter,  since  Augustine,  has  pushed  into  the  foregi'ound  the 
human  personality  of  Christ  and  His  corresponding  activity 
as  mediator  between  God  and  man  (vol.  i.  p.  38).     If,  at  the 


390  JUSTIFICATION    AND   RECONaLIATION  [368-9 

same  time,  His  Godhead  was  in  traditional  fashion  stipulated 
for  or  assumed,  yet  it  followed  that  the  result  of  the  media- 
torial activity  of  the  man  Christ  could  not  be  described  as 
the  bestowal  of  Godhead  upon  men.  For  this  reason,  the 
Godhead  predicated  of  Christ  suggests  always  a  gulf  between 
Christ  and  the  members  of  His  community,  a  gulf  which  no 
salvation  wrought  by  Christ  avails  to  lessen. 

The  Latin  Church  of  the  Middle  Ages  no  doubt  handed 
on  the  primitive  formula  of  the  one  Person  in  two  natures 
— human  and  Divine.     But  neither  in  the  sphere  of  theology 
nor  of  asceticism  did  the  Latins  understand  how  to  make  a 
clear  and  decisive  use  of  Christ's  Divinity.     In  Peter  Lom- 
bard the  interpretations  of  Christ's  redemptive  work  and  the 
doctrine  of  Christ's  Person  stand  side  by  side  without  any 
vital  connection,  and  the  same  is  the  case  with  Lombard's 
theological  successors.     After  all  his  ingenious  inquiries  and 
conclusions  concerning  the  assumption  of  human  nature  by  the 
Divine  Person  of  the  Word,  Aquinas  leaves  the  relation  as 
obscure  as  before.     Or  rather,  amid  all  his  efforts  to  establish 
the  dogma,  he  unconsciously  betrays  the  fact  that  the  only 
conception  he  can  attain  is  that  of  an  undefined  and  inde- 
finable relation  between  the  mutable  human  nature  and  the 
immutable   Divine    Person  in    Christ,  whereby    the   human 
nature    is   in    reality  not   affected.^     The  God-manhood   of 
Christ  is  upheld  as  real,  subject  to  the  alteration,  that  is, 
the  exaltation,  which    the    human  nature    has    experienced 
through   its   connection    with   the    Divine.       The    Godhead 
thus  remains  in  the  background  ;  and  if  we  would  recognise  a 
union  of  natures  according  to  the  strict  standard  of  Godhead, 
this  is  rendered  impossible  by  the  instruction  which  Thomas 
himself  gives  us,  for  he  bids  us  conceive  the  Divine  nature  as 
immutable,  and  involved  only  through  the  relation  which  the 

^  Summa  theol.  P.  iii.  qu.  2,  art.  7  :  "  Unio,  de  qua  loquimur,  est  relatio 
quaedam,  quae  consideratur  inter  diviuara  natnram  ot  humauam,  secundum 
quod  conveniunt  in  una  persona  iilii  dei.  Omnia  relatio  antem,  quae  con- 
sideratur inter  deum  et  creaturani,  realiter  quidem  est  in  creatura,  per  cuius 
mutationem  talis  relatio  innascitur ;  non  autem  est  realiter  in  deo  sed  secundum 
rcUionem  tanlunif  quia  non  innascitur  secundum  mutationem  dei.  '* 


369-70]      DOCTBINB    OF   CHBIST'S   PEKSON   AND   LIFE-WORK      391 

human  nature  assumeB  toward  it, — secundum  rationem  tantum. 
To  this  type  of  doctrine  corresponds  the  contemplative  treat- 
ment of  Christ's  Person  throughout  the  Middle  Ages. 
Nominally,  indeed,  it  is  ever  the  verbum  incamatum  Who  as 
the  Bearer  of  God's  redeeming  love  is  adored  by  Bernard  in 
all  the  sufferings  of  Christ.  But  in  reality  the  Bridegroom, 
the  fairest  of  the  children  of  men,  to  Whom  devout  souls 
give  back  love  for  love,  is  nothing  more  than  the  ideal 
man,  whose  perfectness  is  manifest  in  the  strength  of 
his  self-denial.  Thus  the  Godhead,  assumed  in  theory,  is 
in  practice  denied,  for  the  Divine  majesty  is  set  aside  that 
there  may  be  room,  on  the  footing  of  equality,  for  the  play 
of  mutual  love.  What  is  the  worth,  then,  of  a  confession  of 
Christ's  Godhead,  expressed  in  the  formulas  of  Greek  theology, 
if,  in  the  West,  both  theology  after  the  most  ingenious  efforts 
confesses  itself  unable  to  attain  any  real  knowledge  of  its 
object,  and  piety  treats  Christ  as  if  Godhead  did  not  belong 
to  Him  at  all  ?  ^ 

In  Luther  we  come  upon  a  definite  attempt  to  establish 
theoretically  the  old  Christology  by  proving  the  covimu- 
nieatio  idiomatum,^  At  the  same  time,  Luther's  religious 
estimate  of  Christ  does  not  depend  upon  a  rigorous  realisation 
of  the  theological  formula  of  the  one  Person  in  two  natures, 
although  on  the  whole  he  continues  to  give  to  this  formula  its 
ancient  place.  His  religious  estimate  of  Christ,  as  distin- 
guished from  his  theoretical  exposition  of  Christological 
dogma,  is  expressed  in  his  catechetical  and  to  some  extent 
also  in  his  homiletical  writings.  In  his  earliest  catechetic 
treatment  of  the  main  articles  of  the  faith,^  it  is  evident  how, 
through  the  positing  of  a  new  idea  of  faith,  the  objects  of 
faith  also  are  transformed.  If  faith  no  longer  consists  in 
assent  to  revealed  dogmas,  but  in  confidence  toward  God,  then 
it  follows  that  faith,  i,e.  trust  in  Jesus  Christ  and  in  the  Holy 
Spirit,  is  a  recognition  of  the  Godhead  of  Christ  and  of  the 

^  Cfeschichte  des  Pietismus,  i.  p.  49. 
*  Fon  Conciliis  und  Kirchen,  Walch,  xvi.  p.  2724  ff. 

'  Kune  Form,  die  zehn  OeboU,  Olauben  und  Vaicrunser  zu  bctrachten  {1520), 
Walch,  X.  p.  182. 


392  JUSTIFICATIOK    AND   RECONCILIATION  [370-1 

Holy  Spirit,  since  trust  of  this  kind  can  be  given  to  God 
alone.  Through  this  explanation  of  Luther's  the  Godhead  of 
Christ  is  introduced  as  a  judgment  of  value.  It  is  the  same 
point  of  view  which  in  the  Larger  Catechism  meets  us  in  the 
form  that  God  and  faith  (ie.  trust)  stand  in  necessary 
relation  to  each  other,  so  that  even  in  the  case  of  a  corrupt 
faith  that  idol  becomes  our  God,  to  which  we  offer  our  highest 
and  supremest  trust  (p.  211).  To  this  thought  of  Luther's, 
Melanchthon,  at  a  later  date,  amid  discussions  of  a  scholastic 
order,  was  yet  able  to  give  expression.^ 

The  estimation  of  Christ  as  God,  involved  in  the  act  of 
putting  our  trust  in  Him,  implies  also  a  change  in,  or  at  least 
a  new  interpretation  of,  those  attributes  which  directly  or  in- 
directly are  ascribed  to  Christ  in  the  Creed.  Christ  cannot 
be  the  object  of  our  trust  if  the  description  of  Him  in  the 
Creed  is  meant  to  be  understood  in  a  sense  purely  objective. 
For  this  reason  Luther  in  his  Kurze  Fomi  adds  with  regard 
to  each  attribute  that  it  is  there  "  for  me."  This,  however, 
is  controlled  by  the  preliminary  statement :  "  I  believe  not 
only  that  Jesus  Christ  is  the  true  and  only  Son  of  God,  in  an 
eternal  Divine  nature  and  essence  eternally  begotten,  but  also 
that  all  things  are  subjected  to  Him  by  the  Father,  and  that 
even  in  His  humanity  He  is  appointed  Lord  over  me  and 
over  all  things  which  with  the  Father  in  His  Divinity  He 
created."  With  this  is  to  be  compared,  in  the  first  place,  the 
formula  in  the  Shorter  Catechism :  "  I  believe  that  Jesus 
Christ,  very  God,  eternally  begotten  of  the  Father,  also  very 

^  Loci  ihcol,  1535,  C,  B.  xxi.  pp.  366,  867 :  '^Sicut  scriptura  docet  nos  dc 
iilii  divinitate  non  tantum  speculative  sed  practice,  hoc  est  iiibet,  ut  Christam 
invocemus,  ut  Christo  confidamus — sic  enim  vere  tribuetur  ei  honos  divinitatis 
— ita  yult  nOs  spiritus  sancti  divinitatem  iu  ipsa  consolatione  et  vivificatione 
cognoscere.  .  .  .  Haec  officia  spiritus  prodest  considerare.  ...  In  hac  iuvoca- 
tione,  in  his  cxercitiis  fidei  melius  cognoscemus  trinitatem,  quam  in  otiosis 
speculationibus,  quae  disputant,  quid  personae  inter  se  agant,  non  quid  nobiscnm 
agant." — The  subject  is  discussed  also  by  A.  H.  Francke,  Christus  ».  seripturae 
niiclev^  (Halae,  1724),  pp.  121-150  :  "Ille,  de  quo  omnes  dei  servi  in  V.  et  N. 
test,  unanimiter  testantur,  quod  omnes  homines  in  eum  credere  debeant,  et 
quidem  tarn  excellenti  modo,  quo  sine  gravissimo  idololatriae  crimine  in  rem 
ullam  credere  nemo  potest,  ille  est  cum  patre  verus  vivens  ac  essentialis  deus. 
Atqui  in  Christum  talis  fides  requiritur.  Ergo  Chriatus  una  cum  patre  est 
verus  vivens  ac  essentialis  deus." 


371-2]      DOCTRINE   OF   CHBIST's    PERSON   AND   UFE-WORK        393 

man,  born  of  the  Virgin  Mary,  is  my  Lord,  by  Whom  I,  a  lost 
and  condemned  man,  have  been  redeemed,  gotten,  and  won." 
In  both  cases  the  predicates  of  the  old  Christology  are  re- 
peated, though  in  shorter  form  and  less  definite  outline  than 
would  satisfy  the  old  requirements.    But  the  Kurze  Form  makes 
it  plain  that  the  faith  which  accepts  these  statements  cannot 
be  regarded  as  the  trust  which,  properly  speaking,  is  religious 
faith*     These  predicates  are  simply  taken  for  granted,  and 
trust  in  Christ  has  for  its  object  His  attribute  of  Lordship, — 
that  He  is  Lord  over  me  and  over  all  things.    Both  in  the  Kurze 
Form  and  in  the  Shorter  Catechism  the  recognition  of  Christ's 
Divinity  is  bound  up  with   this  statement.     Should  it  be 
imagined   that  the    traditional  interpretation  and  this  new 
interpretation  of  Christ's  Godhead  mean  for  Luther  the  same 
thing,  or  that  the  latter  stands  in  analytic  relation  to  the 
former,  such  a  conclusion  has  against  it  the  fact  that  in  the 
Larger    Catechism    the  word    Lord   is  made    equivalent    to 
Kedeemer,  and  also  that  it  is  there  declsured  that  the  eternal 
Word  submitted  to  incarnation  and  to  suffering  in  order  that 
He  might  become    our  Lord.     That  Christ  is  "my  Lord" 
depends  therefore  upon  the  whole  scope  of  His  human  exist- 
ence, activity,  and  suffering,  upon  the  effort  "  He  put  forth  in 
daring  to  win  us  and  bring  us  under  His  Lordship."     If  this 
train  of   thought   is    completed    by  supplying    the   missing 
statement  of  the  Shorter  Catechism,  that  it  is  in  the  King- 
dom of   Christ  as  "  my  Lord  "  that  I   serve  Him,  we  can 
scarcely  suppose  that  Luther  in  making  Lord  equivalent  to 
Bedeemer,  disputes  the  equivalence  of  Lord  and  God.     Thus, 
while  assuming  the  formula  of  the  two  natures,  Luther  really 
connects  the  religious  estimate  of   Christ  as  God  with  the 
significance  which  Christ's  work  has  for  the  Christian  com- 
mimity,  and  with  the  position  thereby  given  to  Christ  at  the 
head    of  the  Kingdom  of   God.      According  to  Luther,  the 
Godhead  of  Christ  is  not  exhausted  by  maintaining  the  exist- 
ence in  Christ  of  the  Divine  nature ;  the  chief  point  is  that 
in    His    exertions   as  man    His   Godhead   is    manifest   and 
savingly  effective. 


394  JUSTIFICATION   AND    RECONCILIATION  [372-3 

Luther  here  adopts  a  standpoint  which  is  as  manifestly 
distinct  from  the  Greek  method  as  from  the  Latin.  In  the 
Greek  theology,  the  incarnation  of  the  Divine  Word  is  the 
complete  and  saving  revelation  of  the  Godhead  of  Christ ;  the 
teaching  of  the  God-man,  and  His  yielding  up  of  His  human 
life  to  the  death  to  annul  the  law  of  death,  are  but  sub- 
ordinate proofs  of  His  Godhead  for  subordinate  ends.  In  the 
Latin  Church,  the  Godhead  of  Christ  under  the  form  of 
incarnation  is  no  doubt  recognised,  but  His  mediatorial  and 
saving  work — the  satisfaction  rendered  and  the  merit  acquired 
to  procure  for  men  the  forgiveness  of  sins — ^is  exhibited  only 
in  His  human  activity  as  such ;  the  Godhead  in  Aquinas 
comes  into  account  merely  as  constituting  the  essential  worth 
for  the  expiation  of  sin  of  Christ's  merit  and  satisfaction ;  in 
Duns  Scotus  it  is  not  regarded  at  all.  Luther's  statements  in 
the  Catechisms  amount  to  this,  that  while  the  Church  formula 
is  retained,  it  really  is  in  Christ's  human  achievements  that 
His  Godhead  becomes  for  His  people  manifest,  conspicuous, 
intelligible,  winning  our  faith,  not  in  the  form  of  assent  to  an 
unintelligible  dogma,  but  of  personal  trust  for  our  own 
salvation. 

Luther  never  dreamed  of  rejecting  the  old  Christology 
when  he  attached  to  the  work  of  Christ  a  superior  worth  as 
evidence  of  His  Godhead.  Nor  was  this  attempt  of  Luther's 
without  some  relation  to  a  thought  of  the  earlier  time. 
For  while  in  the  Middle  Ages  the  sufferings  of  Christ 
were  regarded  merely  as  an  attribute  of  His  human  nature, 
the  worth  of  these  sufferings  for  cancelling  the  evil  of  sin 
was  ascribed  by  Aquinas  to  the  fact  that  with  the  human 
nature  there  was  united  the  Divine.  It  is  in  keeping  here- 
with that  in  the  sixteenth  century  those  Anabaptists  and 
Scotists  who  had  ceased  to  regard  the  redemption  of  Christ 
as  universal  and  as  the  foundation-principle  of  His  Church 
(vol.  i.  p.  314),  went  astray  regarding  His  Godhead.  It 
was  therefore  to  this  very  attribute  of  Redeemer  that  Luther 
attached  his  statement  of  Christ's  Godhead,  directing  toward 
it  the  trust  of  the  believer,  because  it  surpasses  every  other 


373-4]       DOCTRINB    OF    CHBIST'S    PERSON    AND   LIFE-WOKK        395 

motive  for  trust.  But  from  this  standpoint  he  seeks,  in  a 
way  of  his  own,  to  throw  further  light  upon  the  elementary 
recognition  of  Christ  under  the  scheme  of  the  two  natures, 
for  these  he  will  not  relinquish.  He  is  not  in  the  least 
concerned  that  the  laity,  to  whose  guidance  the  catechetical 
writings  are  devoted,  should  have  before  their  minds  a  com- 
plete and  exhaustive  conception  of  the  old  interpretation  of 
Christ.  For  the  chief  emphasis,  as  we  saw,  is  laid  upon 
personal  trust  in  the  Eedeemer  and  Lord  of  Christendom. 
But  even  apart  from  any  special  reference  to  the  laity, 
Luther  has  on  one  occasion  ^  sought  to  show  that  the  opposi- 
tion between  knowledge  and  faith,  always  minimised  by  the 
Scholastics,  is  of  the  nature  of  a  contradiction.  While  the 
Scholastics  set  the  one  function  against  the  other  within 
the  common  sphere  of  the  understanding  (intellectus),  Luther 
withdraws  faith  from  the  sphere  of  the  understanding  alto- 
gether, declaring  that  the  Articles  of  the  Creed  anent  the 
Trinity  and  the  Person  of  Christ  are  incomprehensible  to  the 
understanding,  and  that  ''  the  more  we  speculate  about  them 
the  darker  and  less  intelligible  do  they  become."  But  he 
closes  this  discussion  by  declaring  that  the  trust  we  put  in 
Christ  establishes  and  recognises  His  true  Godhead,  since 
Christ's  Godhead  is  understood  as  the  power  which  Christ 
has  put  forth  upon  our  redemption.  It  is  true  that  even  in 
this  connection  Luther  has  no  desire  to  dispense  with  the 
unintelligible  formulas ;  but  the  very  fact  that  they  are  pro- 
nounced unintelligible  forbids  their  being  viewed  as  other 
than  worthless  for  the  faith  which  consists  in  trust.  Allusions 
of  a  similar  kind  are  to  be  found  in  other  sermons  of 
Luther'8.2 

'  Exposition  of  tlie  second  Article  of  the  Creed,  concerning  Jesus  Christ, 
preached  in  the  castle  of  Torgau  (1533).     Walch,  x.  p.  1309. 

' Evangelienpostille  :  Sermon  on  the  fifth  Sunday  after  Easter :  "To  believe 
on  Christ  does  not  mean  to  believe  that  Christ  is  a  person  who  is  both  God  and 
man, /or  thai  will  not  be  any  help  to  any  man,  but  to  believe  that  this  same 
person  is  Christ,  that  is,  that  for  our  sake  He  is  come  out  from  God,  aud  is 
come  into  the  world,  and  then  again  leaves  the  world  and  goes  to  the  Father. 
It  is  from  this  office  He  gets  the  name  Jesus  Christ ;  and  to  believe  this  of  Him 
is  to  be  and  to  abide  in  His  name."    Second  sermon  on  Whitsunday:  ''The 


396  JUSTIFICATION   AND   RECONCILIATION  [374-6 

Melanchthon,  in  his  first  epoch,  interpreted  the  thought 
of  Luther  as  meaning  that  the  formula  of  the  two  natures  in 
Christ  is  unimportant  so  long  as  Christ  is  duly  recognised  in 
His  saving  benefits.  Thus,  in  the  Lod  TheoL  of  the  year 
1521  {0,  B,  xxL  p.  85),  we  read :  "  Hoc  est  Christum  cogno- 
scere,  beneficia  eius  cognoscere,  non  quod  isti  (scholastici) 
decent,  eius  naturas,  modes  incarnationis  contueri  Ni  scias, 
in  quern  usum  carnem  induerit,  et  cruci  affixus  sit  Christus, 
quid  proderit  eius  historiam  novisse  ?  An  vero  medico  satis  est 
novisse  herbarum  figuras,  colores,  lineamenta,  vim  scire  nativam 
nihil  refert  ?  Ita  Christum,  qui  nobis  remedii  et,  ut  scrip- 
turae  verbo  utar,  salutaris  vice  donatus  est,  oportet  alio  quodam 
modo  cognoscamus,  quam  exhibent  scholastici."  This  thought 
persists  also  in  the  Apology  for  the  Augsburg  Confession,  ii.  1 01 : 
"  Quid  est  notitia  Christi,  nisi  nosse  beneficia  Christi,  promis- 
siones,  quas  per  evangelium  sparsit  in  mundum  ?  Et  haec  bene- 
ficia nosse  proprie  et  vere  est  credere  in  Christum."  Faith  in 
Christ  is  under  all  circumstances  the  recognition  of  His  God- 
head ;  Melanchthon,  therefore,  would  have  us  recognise  this 
attribute  in  that  which  makes  Christ  our  Mediator  and  Becon- 
ciler.  Neither  in  this  connection  nor  where  he  criticises  the 
invocation  of  the  saints,  does  Melanchthon  employ  the  formula 
of  the  natural  Godhead  in  Christ.  He  does  not  refute  the 
invocation  of  the  saints  on  the  ground  that  they  lack  that 
Divine  nature  which  would  justify  the  invocation  of  Christ. 
He  gives  Christ  the  advantage  over  the  saints  rather  on  the 
ground  that  Christ  has  laid  us  under  obligation  to  Himself, 
which  the  saints  have  not.  In  this  connection  we  read 
(ix.  23):  "Prorsus  aequantur  (sancti)  Christo,  si  confidere 
debemus,  quod  meritis  eorum  salvemur."  By  these  words 
Melanchthon  certainly  did  not  intend  to  deny  indirectly  the 
Godhead  of  Christ.  Therefore  he  must  be  understood  to 
mean  that  this  attribute  of  Christ  is  to  be  found  in  the  ser- 

devil  can  be  doing  with  &  sinner  who  clings  merely  to  the  man  Christ,  he  is 
even  content  to  let  folk  say  and  hear  the  words  that  Christ  is  true  God  ;  bnt 
one  thing  he  will  not  suffer — that  the  Jieart  should  take  such  a  true  and  insepar- 
able hold  of  Christ  that  Christ's  word  and  the  Father's  word  become  one  and 
the  same  word  and  will"  (Walch,  xi.  pp.  1251,  1443). 


375—6]       DOCTBINB   OF   CHEIST'S   PEBSON   AND   UFE-WdRK        397 

vice  He  renders,  the  benefit  He  bestows,  the  saving  work  He 
accomplishes. 

Against  the  validity  of  this  conception  opponents  raise 
two  objections :  first,  that  hereby  the  true  Godhead  of  Christ 
is  denied,  and  the  attribute  of  Godhead  attached  to  the  human 
Christ  only  in  name ;  and,  second,  that  Christ  is  after  all  only 
acknowledged  as  mere  man,  and  so  in  the   end  there  is  a 
breach  of  the  commandment,  Thou  shalt  have  no  other  gods 
before   Me.      With  regard  to  the   latter   argument,  I  can 
shelter  myself   behind  Luther.^      Also,  to    say  that  in  the 
statement  of  Melanchthon  Christ  is  represented  as  mere  man, 
is  a  pure  inference  of  my  opponents,  to  which  they  have  been 
led  by  their  own  conceptions  of  the  matter.     They  put  the 
alternative — either  Christ  is  the  union  of  Divine  and  human 
nature,  or  else  He  is  mere  human  nature :  now,  in  such  a  state- 
ment as  that  of  Melanchthon  no  use  is  made  of    the  first 
formula ;  therefore  Christ  is  declared  to  be  a  mere  man.     In 
so  far  as  it  is  attempted  by  means  of  this  syllogism  to  prove 
me  in  the  wrong,  I  would  remark  that  this  cannot  possibly  be 
my  view  of  the  matter.     For  by  a  mere  man  (if  I  ever  used 
the  expression),  I  should  mean  man  as  a  material  entity  apart 
from  every  characteristic  of  spiritual  and  moral  personality. 
I  am  far  from  regarding  anyone  even  of  my  opponents  as  a 
mere  man,  for  I  assume,  in  every  one  of  them,  some  good 
results   of  upbringing  and  some   measure  of   moral   worth. 
That  I  speak  of  Christ  at  all  only  in  so  far  as  His  personal 
character  as   the   Bearer    of  the  revelation    of   God  comes 
into    account,   surely  no    one  who   has  read    what   I   have 
written    will   deny.     At   the   least,  therefore,  it  is  a  proof 
of   incompetence  and  hasty  judgment    when   my  opponents 

^  Decern  praeeepta,  WUtenibergensi  praediecUa  popiUo  (1518,  Erl.  lot,  xii. 
p.  5) :  "  Ubi  audis,  quod  Christus  pro  te  passus  est  ct  credis,  iam  oritur  fiducia 
in  eum  et  amor  dulcis  et  sic  periit  omnis  rerum  affectus  ut  inntilium,  et  oritur 
aestimatio  solius  Ghristi  ut  rei  necessariae  vehemeDter,  remansitque  tibi  nounisi 
solus  lesns  solus  satis  et  sufficiens  tibi,  ita  ut  de  omnibus  desperans  unicum 
habeas  hunc,  in  quo  omnia  speras,  ideoque  super  omnia  euni  diligas.  At  Jesus 
est  veruSj.nnus,  solus  deus,  quem  cum  habes  non  babes  alienum  deum.  ludaei 
yero  timontea,  ne  alienum  deum  haberent,  si  hominem  Christum  adorerUj  eo 
peius  ailorant  alienum  deum,  scilicet  idola  cordis  sui,  quae  de  deo  fingunt." 


398  JUSTIFICATION  AND   RECONCILIATION  [376-7 

maintain  that  I  regard  Christ  as  a  mere  man,  and  deny  His 
Godhead. 

But  if  Christ  by  what  He  has  done  and  suffered  for  my 
salvation  is  my  Lord,  and  if,  by  trusting  for  my  salvation  to 
the  power  of  what  He  has  done  for  me,  I  honour  Him  as  my 
God,  then  that  is  a  value-judgment  of  a  direct  kind.  It  is 
not  a  judgment  which  belongs  to  the  sphere  of  disinterested 
scientific  knowledge,  like  the  formula  of  Chalcedon.  When, 
therefore,  my  opponents  demand  in  this  connection  a  judgment 
of  the  latter  sort,  they  reveal  their  own  inability  to  distinguish 
scientific  from  religious  knowledge,  which  means  that  they 
are  not  really  at  home  in  the  sphere  of  religion.  Every  cog- 
nition of  a  religious  sort  is  a  direct  judgment  of  value  (p.  205). 
The  nature  of  God  and  the  Divine  we  can  only  know  in 
its  essence  by  determining  its  value  for  our  salvation.^ 
Let  him  who  denies  this  see  to  it  how  he  reconciles  his 
position  with  the  Larger  Catechism,  and  with  the  fact  that 
we  know  God  only  by  revelation,  and  therefore  also  must 
understand  the  Godhead  of  Christ,  if  it  is  to  be  understood  at 
all,  as  an  attribute  revealed  to  us  in  His  saving  influence 
upon  ourselves.  We  must  first  be  able  to  prove  the  Godhead 
that  is  revealed  before  we  take  account  of  the  Godhead  that 
is  eternal  My  opponents,  however,  being  bent  on  getting 
first  an  acknowledgment  of  the  latter,  imagine  that  they  can 
establish  the  Godhead  of  Christ  upon  the  basis  of  a  scientific 
idea,  that  is,  through  an  act  of  disinterested  cognition,  pre- 
vious to  all  possible  experience,  and  apart  from  all  religious 
experience  of  the  matter.     And  as  representatives  of  a  scien- 

^  This  is  the  attitude  of  Theremin  in  a  sermon  on  the  Divinity  of  Christ,  of 
the  year  1818,  edited  with  a  preface  for  1881  by  Kogel.  The  preacher's  desire 
is  to  convince  his  contemporaries  of  the  Divinity  of  Christ,  if  only  they  believe 
(1)  that  Christ  is  a  good  man,  (2)  that  God  is  our  Father,  and  (8)  that  there 
is  a  future  life  of  blessedness.  *'This  will  suffice  us  to  bring  you  to  the  avowal 
that  Christ  is  the  only- begotten  Son  of  God"  (p.  7).  Com]^)are  herewith  the 
following  sentences  (p.  11) :  ''The  confession  that  Christ  is  true  God  lay  already 
involved  in  your  moral  sense.  .  .  .  Beyond  this,  then,  we  will  not  go.  .  .  . 
That  we  should  be  able  to  understand  and  explain  in  what  way  the  Divine 
nature  unites  itself  with  the  human — this  God  does  not  ask  of  us.  He  has  not 
put  it  within  the  grasp  of  our  understanding.  But  that  holiness  cannot  lie- 
that  we  understand,  and  that  may  suffice  us," 


377-8]      DOOTKINE    OF   CHRIST'S   PERSON   AND   LIFE-WORK        399 

tific  conception  of  the  Godhead  of  Christ,  they  pursue  an 
impracticable  method,  inasmuch  as  their  conception  of  the 
Word  of  God,  eternally  begotten  by  God  before  the  world,  rests 
only  on  tradition,  detached  from  all  the  circumstances  of  its 
origin.  Accordingly,  they  would  have  us  make  confession  of 
the  Godhead  of  Christ  in  this  particular  formula,  before  ever 
His  Godhead  has  been  proved  to  us  in  His  saving  influence 
upon  ourselves,  aye  even  although  the  said  influence  cannot 
possibly  prove  His  Godhead  in  the  aspects  of  it  here  con- 
cerned. These  teachers  must  first  of  all  be  good  enough  to 
tell  us  what  Christ's  Godhead  in  its  eternal  essence  is — what 
it  is  iQ  its  eternal  relation  to  God;  then  it  will  be  time 
enough  to  discuss  whether  and  in  what  way  this  attribute  is 
for  us  savingly  effective  and  actually  revealed.  The  method 
of  cognition  herein  applied  is  false  (p.  19),  and  Luther's 
warning  against  teachers  who  would  determine  the  things  of 
God  a  prioriy  from  above  downwards,  previous  to  all  definite 
Divine  revelation,  holds  good  for  this  problem  also.^ 

§  45.  Such  is  the  limited  order  of  cognition  prescribed 
for  the  theologian  at  this  point.  So  far,  however,  as  the 
doctrinal  system  of  the  Church  demands  consideration,  the 
preceding  discussion  has  shown  that  in  the  Catechisms  of 
Luther  and  in  the  Apology  for  the  Augsburg  Confession  there 
are  hints,  hitherto  neglected,  towards  a  right  conception  of 
the  D^ity  of  Christ.  These  hints  may  the  more  readily  be 
followed,  since  in  the  doctrine  of  the  two  natures  the 
historical  and  religious  conception  of  Christ  finds  no  place. 
The  supporters  of  the  opposite  view  must  lay  their  account 
with  the  fact  that  other  men  who  belong  to  a  different  school 
from  theirs,  also  prove  the   existence  within    the  symbolic 

*  Compare  the  remark  of  Luther  on  John  xvii.  8  (Walch,  viii.  p.  697) : 
'*  Observe  how  Christ  in  this  word  weaves  into  one  web  the  knowledge  of  Him- 
self and  of  the  Father,  so  that  only  through  Christ  and  in  Him  alone  do  we 
know  the  Father.  I  have  often  said  this,  and  I  keep  on  saying  it,  so  that  even 
when  I  am  dead  men  may  remember  it,  and  may  be  on  their  guard  against  all 
teachers,  as  devil-driven  and  devil-led,  who  begin  their  teaching  and  preaching 
about  God  up  in  the  heights,  altogether  separate  and  apart  from  Christ,  in  the 
way  that  hitherto  in  such  schools  they  have  speculated  and  played  with  His 
works  in  heaven  above— what  He  is,  thinks,  and  does  in  Himself." 


400  JUSTIFICATION   AND   RECONCILIATION  [378-9 

books  of  the  maiii  ideas  of  their  own  theological  position. 
They  might  have  learned  long  ago  from  Philippi  that  the 
formulas  which  they  themselves  exclusively  recognise  as  the 
content  of  the  symbolic  books  do  not  define  the  limits  of 
theological  knowledge,  but  are  intended  merely  to  prevent 
those  deviations  from  truth  among  which  is  included  a  cur- 
tailing of  the  problem  of  knowledge  (vol.  ii.  p.  18). 

It  is  also  a  false  assumption  that  a  uniform  doctrine  of 
the  Godhead  of  Christ  can  be  exegetically  constructed  from 
the  New  Testament.  Strictly  speaking,  the  content  of  the 
New  Testament  books  is  not  doctrine  at  all.  Least  of  all 
can  we  discover  in  Christ's  own  words  a  doctrine  of  His 
Godhead.  There,  indeed,  it  is  not  to  be  expected.  For  the 
thought  of  Christ's  Godhead  is  never  other  than  the  expres- 
sion of  that  unique  acknowledgment  and  appreciation  which 
the  Christian  community  yields  to  its  Founder.  But  there 
meet  us  in  the  New  Testament  two  ways  of  conceiving  Christ's 
Godhead  which  do  not  directly  correspond.  On  the  one 
hand,  the  majority  of  the  apostles  connect  the  name  xvpio^, 
which  in  Jewish  usage  is  equivalent  to  God,  with  the  lordship 
over  the  world  on  which  Christ  has  entered  by  His  exaltation 
to  the  right  hand  of  God  (1  Pet.  iii.  22 ;  Jas.  ii.  1 ;  Phil.  iL 
9—11 ;  Heb.  i.  3).  The  frequent  application  of  this  attribute 
to  Christ  is  to  be  xmderstood  in  view  of  the  fact  that  faith 
has  its  necessary  points  of  attachment  always  in  the  present 
Our  faith  in  Christ  is  not  faith  in  Him  as  One  Who  was,  but 
faith  in  Him  as  One  Who  continues  to  work,  namely,  imder 
the  conditions  corresponding  to  His  present  mode  of  existence. 
This  is  the  starting-point  from  which  the  apostles  recall 
even  the  circumstances  of  Christ's  earthly  life,  and  are  con- 
fident, because  of  their  faith  in  Him  as  Lord,  that  even  His 
death  is  an  event  fraught  with  blessing  to  the  community. 
Paul  indicates  a  limit  for  the  conjunction  of  the  name  Kvpioq 
with  the  Person  of  Christ,  in  so  far  as  he  connects  the 
bestowal  of  this  name  by  God  with  the  exaltation,  and  puts 
the  earthly  course  of  Jesus'  life  in  the  opposite  category  of 
an  obedience  rendered  in  the  form  of  a  servant  (Phil.  ii.  6-11). 


379]  DOCTRINE   OP   CHRIST'S    PERSON   AND   LIFE-WORK        401 

With  this,  however,  must  be  compared  the  fact  that  in  Bom. 
V.  1 5  Paul  associates  the  specifically  Divine  attribute  of  grace 
with  the  contemplation  of  the  man  Christ,  just  as  Christ  in 
yielding  His  obedience  is  at  the  same  time  a  revelation  of 
God  As  Lord  over  the  world,  Christ  is  also  Lord  over  His 
community.  But  the  latter  relation  is  the  primary  one, 
partly  because  the  community  acknowledges  Him  as  God, 
and  partly  because,  in  definite  statements,  the  community,  of 
which  Christ  is  head,  is  made  to  share  His  position  toward 
the  world. 

Whatever  in  the  Epistles  goes  beyond  this  practical 
significance  of  the  attribute  Kvpio^  as  applied  to  Christ,  and 
gives  to  His  relation  toward  the  world  a  wider  scope  than  His 
present  lordship  over  it,  belongs  to  the  sphere  of  special  yp&ai^f, 
— that  is,  of  intellectual  cognition,  which  creates  problems 
rather  than  solves  them.  This  at  least  is  the  case  when  in 
1  Cor.  viii.  6  Paul  describes  the  Lord  Jesus  Christ  as  Him 
through  whom  all  things  have  been  created  or  come  to  be. 
It  is  assumed  that  only  God  the  Father  is  the  Creator  of  all 
things,  the  original  source  of  all  that  exists :  the  Lord  Jesus 
Christ,  therefore,  is  the  mediate  source.  But  by  Lord  here 
must  be  understood  the  exalted  Christ.  Therefore  as  mediate 
source  of  creation  we  have  indicated  to  us  an  entity  which  as 
such  appeared  at  a  given  point  in  time.  This  is  the  riddle  of 
which  we  ought  not  to  get  rid  by  pushing  Christ  back  out  of 
post-existence  into  pre-existence.  For  by  an  exchange  of  this 
kind  we  should  invalidate  the  clear  and  definite  meaning  of 
Kvpio^.  The  statements  in  Col.  i.  14-20  also  refer  to  the 
exalted  Christ  into  Whose  Kingdom  God  has  translated  the 
community.  If  these  sentences  are  in  logical  sequence,  it  is 
a  poor  exegesis  that  would  interpret  them  by  referring  the 
relative  pronouns  alternately  to  the  post-existent  and  to  the 
pre-existent  Christ.  Most  certainly  it  is  the  exalted  Christ 
Who  is  the  mediate  source  of  our  redemption  or  forgiveness, 
which  would  not  be  ours  if  Christ  were  not  risen  and  exalted. 
To  this  are  attached  the  two  groups  of  statements  introduced 
in  parallel  fashion  (09  ia-riv)  in  ver.  15  and  ver.  18&.  The 
26 


402  JITSTIFICATION   AND   RECONCILIATION  [379-«) 

second  group  is  at  the  beginning  very  evidently  dominated 
by  the  thought  of  the  risen  Christ;    but  vers.  19  and  20 
take  us   back  to  the  purpose  with  which  on  earth   Christ 
offered  the  sacrifice  of  His  death ;  He  would   have  the  whole 
world  come  in  Him  to  rest,  and  to  this  end  would  bring  all 
things  into  the  new  way  of  which  He  is  the  goal,  and  to 
peace  with  each  other,  through  the  blood  of  His  Cross.     It  is 
manifest,  also,  that  the  first  group  both  begins  and  ends  with 
statements  about  the  exalted  Christ.     It  is  as  the  exalted 
One  that  Christ  is  the  image  of  God  and  the  head  of  the 
community.     Now  the  literal  meaning  of  irptororoKo^  Trdarfi^ 
KTlaecjf:  and  the  words  irpo  TrdvTODv  have  led  to  the  false 
assumption    that    the  intervening   statements  refer    to    the 
temporal  pre-existence  of  Christ  before   the   world,  and    to 
disregard  of  the  fact  that  up  to  this  point  the  dominating 
conception  has  been  the  exalted  Christ.     But  the  temporal 
priority  of  Christ  before  the  world  cannot  be  the  point  at 
issue ;    that  would  be  a  barren  thought.      Superiority  over 
the  world  is  ascribed  to  Christ  in  view  of  the  worth  which 
belongs  to  Him  in  His  position  as  the  image  of  God  and  the 
head  of  the  community.     It  is  as  the  image  and  revelation 
of  the  invisible  God  (2  Cor.  iv.  4)  that  the  exalted  Christ  is 
irptoTOTOKo^i  trda-Tf^  Kriaeoa^.      In  this  connection  TrptoToroKo^ 
can  be  understood  only  in  the  metaphorical  sense  in  which 
the  corresponding  Hebrew  word  is  used,  namely,  he  who  is 
preferred — the  same  sense  in  which  it  is  used  in  BonL  viii.  29, 
and  probably  also  in  Rev.  i.  5.    Christ  is  He  Who  is  preferred, 
Who  belongs  to  God  in  contrast  with  creation  as  a  whole, 
which  is  not  the  image  and  direct  revelation  of  God.     For  all 
things,  so  we  read,  have  been  created  by  God  in  Him,  that  is 
in   the  exalted   Christ.     This  is  the  same  statement  as  in 
1  Cor.  viii.  6.      It  finds  its  more  exact  explanation  in  the 
two  following  and  parallel  pairs  of  sentences.     The  indefinite 
expression  "  were  created  "  is  in  these  sentences  split  up  into 
"  have    been    created "    and   "  consist."      That   is,  first — all 
things   have    been   created    through    and   unto   the    exalted 
Christ,  and  He  is  before  all  things.     The  indefinite  formula 


380-1]      DOCTRINE   OF   CHEIST'S   PERSON   AND   LIFE-WORK        403 

iv  avT&  is  here  more  particularly  defined  to  the  effect  that 
Christ  is  the  mediate  cause  through  which,  and  the  end  for 
which,  all  things  have  been  created ;  and  as  the  CTid  of  all 
things  He  is  before  all  things.  To  introduce  the  idea  of 
Christ's  pre-existence  is  to  make  an  intelligible  explanation 
impossible.  For  only  the  exalted  Lord  is  conceivable  as 
the  goal  of  creation.  Besides,  the  preposition  irpo  applies  to 
place  as  fitly  as  to  time,  and  the  former  application  alone  gives 
a  sentence  of  weight,  in  keeping  with  the  new  thought  eU 
avTov  €KTL<naL  The  second  pair  of  sentences  provides  the 
corroborating  conclusion — He  in  Whom  the  world  as  one 
continuous  whole  at  this  moment  consists,  is  the  exalted  One, 
Who  is  the  head  of  the  community. 

The  same  strain  of  thought  is  re-echoed  in  the  Epistle  to 
the  Ephesians.  Christ,  in  Whom  all  things  are  to  find  their 
ultimate  unity  (i.  10),  in  Whom  also  the  community  of  those 
who  fear  God  was  chosen  by  God  before  the  creation  of  the 
world,  is  the  exalted  Christ,  through  Whom  at  this  present 
time  all  Divine  blessings  are  bestowed  upon  the  community 
(i.  3-6).  In  this  twofold  relation  of  Christ  to  the  world 
and  to  the  community,  the  community  holds  higher  rank  and 
stands  nearer  to  Him ;  it  is  filled  by  Christ,  that  is  to  say,  it 
is  the  organ  of  His  specific  activity,  while  He  fills  Himself 
in  all  ways  with  all  things  (i.  30),  or,  in  other  words,  extends 
His  lordship  over  the  world.  From  the  Divine  standpoint, 
and  in  view  of  the  conditions  that  belong  to  the  very  idea  of 
purpose,  these  combinations  do  not  present  any  special 
difficulty.  For,  according  to  the  rule,  ultimum  in  exsecutione 
est  primum  in  intentione^  the  ultimate  end  of  a  chain  of  means 
exists  in  the  thought  and  purpose  of  the  agent  before  the 
means,  precedes  all  actual  effort,  being  itself  the  motive  of  such 
effort,  and  is  present  to  the  agent,  from  the  beginning  of  his 
efforts  to  the  end,  as  the  mediate  cause.  If,  before  the  creation 
of  the  world,  God  already  recognises  or  ordains  His  Son  to  be 
the  perfect  Lord  of  the  ideal  community  (1  Pet.  i.  20  ;  Eph.  i. 
4),  and  if  it  is  with  a  view  to  Him  that  the  world  is  created, 
then  in  God's  purpose  His  Son  stands  above  and  before  the 


404  JUSTIFICATION   AND   RECONCIUATION  [381-2 

world  as  the  mediate  cause  of  the  same.  Here  also  lies  the 
explanation  of  Heb.  i.  1-3.  In  this  passage  the  Son  of  God 
is  presented  to  us  first  of  all  in  His  capacity  as  Prophet,  but 
at  the  same  time  as  predestined  by  God  to  be  Lord  of  the 
world.  Of  this  Person  it  is  then  declared :  Si  oi  koI  eiroifjaep 
Toif^  al&va^.  The  context  demands  that  the  attribute 
expressed  in  the  first  relative  clause  should  be  recapitulated 
in  the  second  relative  pronoun — Bl  o5,  i,e,  tov  reOevro^: 
KXrfpovofjMv  irdvTCDv,  God  made  the  worlds.  This  is  the  same 
thought  as  in  Colossians ;  and  therefore  the  third  relative 
clause  in  Hebrews  refers  to  the  exalted  Son  of  God  Who  has 
assumed  His  predestined  lordship  over  the  world. 

Alongside  of  this  group  of  interpretations  of  the  Godhead 
of  the  exalted  Christ  stands  the  twofold  statement  of  John, 
that  the  revealing  Word,  which  is  God,  has  in  the  Person  of 
Jesus  Christ  become  a  human  person,  and  that  the  disciples 
recognise  in  Him  the  manifestation  of  the  only  Son  of  God 
by  the  fact  that  He  lived  a  life  full  of  grace  and  truth — ^a  life, 
that  is  to  say,  exhibiting  the  characteristics  by  which  God 
Himself  described  His  nature  to  Moses  (John  i.  14;  Ex. 
xxxiv.  6,  7).  At  this  point  it  must  be  laid  down  clearly  that 
the  attribute  of  Godhead  thus  ascribed  to  Christ  is  based  on 
the  personal  experience  of  His  disciples.  Apart  from  that  rela- 
tion it  is  inconceivable.  This,  and  no  other,  is  the  ground  on 
which  John  ranges  the  figure  of  Christ  under  the  wider  con- 
ception of  the  revealing  Word — a  conception  which  he  applies 
to  the  creation  of  the  world,  etc.,  and  for  which  he  claims  the 
predicate  God.  Thus  the  two  lines  of  thought  which  meet 
us  in  the  New  Testament  are  wholly  independent  of  each 
other,  and  find  their  explanation  in  considerations  of  a  very 
different  order.  The  Johannine  conception  regards  the  his- 
torical manifestation  of  Christ  from  the  point  of  view  of  the 
conjoint  moral  impression  made  upon  the  community  of 
disciples — an  impression  which  agrees  with  the  known  nature 
of  God ;  the  Godhead  of  Christ  as  thus  established  is  not 
directly  associated  with  the  Divine  attribute  of  exaltation 
over   the  world ;    rather  is    the   underlying  assumption  the 


382-3]       DOCTBINE   OF    CHRIST'S    PEKSON   AND   LIFE-WORK        405 

creation  of  the  world  through  the  Word  of  God,  the  Divine 
worth  of  Jesus  being  embodied  in  the  formula  that  the  Word, 
Which  is  the  universal  form  of  Divine  revelation,  has  in  Jesus 
become  a  human  personality.  The  representation  given  by 
the  other  apostles  connects  the  Godhead  of  Christ  with  the 
thought  of  the  eternal  significance  for  God  of  the  Person  of 
Christ  and  the  realisation  of  the  same  in  Christ's  present 
exaltation  above  the  world — also  a  line  of  thought  which 
rests  upon  the  view  that  Christ  in  the  ethical  union  between 
Himself  and  His  community  is  the  revealed  end  of  the 
world. 

Both  these  ways  of  conceiving  Christ's  Godhead  are  dis- 
tinctively religious,  in  so  far  as  they  describe  the  significance 
of  Christ  for  that  view  of  the  world  which  originated  with 
Himself,  and  for  the  corresponding  self-estimate  of  the  indi- 
vidual.    For  John  must  be  understood  to  mean  that  the  life 
of  Jesus  produced  those  same  moral  impressions  which  as  the 
chief  attributes  of  God  attract  to  themselves  all  human  trust ; 
and  the  other  apostles  regard  the  present  lordship  of  Christ 
as  the  determining  motive  which  lays  claim  to  the  whole  of 
human  life,  and  leaves  nothing  over  that  dare  rule  itself  by 
any  other  motive.     Every  other  standard  is  relative;  however 
all-embracing  any  one  motive  in  human  life  may  be,  it  still 
leaves  room  for  others.    An  authority,  therefore,  which  either 
excludes  all   other  standards  or   else  subordinates  them  to 
itself,  which  at  the  same  time  regulates  in  exhaustive  fashion 
all  human  trust  in  God,  has  itself   the  worth  of  Godhead. 
But   these  two  ways  of  conceiving  Christ's  Godhead  are  of 
such  a  nature  that  each  requires  the  other  to  complete  itself. 
Por  what  John  experienced  in  Christ  cannot  be  merely  an 
influence  wielded  by  Christ  in  the  past,  it  must  be  an  influ- 
ence which  still  affects  the  religious  view  of  the  world  and 
the  religious  self-estimate  of  the  individual,  if  these  latter  are 
to  be  determined  thereby.     Conversely,  the  idea  of  the  God- 
head of  the  exalted  Christ  depends  for  its  convincing  power 
entirely  upon  whether  the  marks  of   this   Godhead  can  be 
found  in   His  historical  existence   upon    the  earth.      Paul, 


406  JUSTIFICATION   AND   RECONCILIATION  [383-4 

indeed  (Phil.  ii.  9),  fixes  the  precise  moment  when  the  Person, 
Who  till  then  had  not  been  declared  God,  received  the  Divine 
name  and  the  universal  lordship.    This  involves  the  difficulty 
that  the  identity  of  the  one  Person  in  the  two  forms  of  exist- 
ence is  not  guaranteed.     For  the  marks  by  which  Paul  im- 
mediately before,  and  indeed  always,  denotes  the  superiority 
of  the  man  Christ,  must  surely  first  be  brought  into  harmony 
with  the  predicate  Kvpio^,     If  the  Godhead  of  Christ,  or  His 
lordship  over  the  world  in  His  present  state  of  exaltation,  is 
to  be  a  postulate  of  the  Christian  faith,  an  integral  part  of 
the  Christian  view  of  the  world,  then  it  must  be  demonstrated 
to  us  in  Christ's  influence  upon  ourselves.     But  every  form 
of  influence  exerted  by  Christ  must  find  its  criterion  in  the 
historical  figure  presented  by  His  life.     Therefore  the  God- 
head or  universal  lordship  of  Christ  must  be  apprehended  in 
definite  features  of  His  historical  life,  as  an  attribute  of  His 
existence  in  time.     For  what  Christ  is  in  virtue  of  His  eternal 
destiny,  and  what  the  influence  is  which  He  exerts   on  us 
because  of  His  exaltation  to  God,  would  be  wholly  beyond  our 
ken  if  we  did  not  also  experience  the  effects  of  the  same  in  His 
historical  existence  in  time.     Unless  the  conception  of  His 
present  lordship  receives  its  content  from  the  definite  charac- 
teristics of  His  historical  activity,  then  it  is  either  a  mean- 
ingless formula  or  the  occasion  for  all  kinds  of  extravagance. 
If,  on  the  other  hand,  we  are  to  hold  fast  our  faith  that 
Christ  is  at  this  moment  Lord  over  the  community  of  the 
Kingdom  of  God,  and  is  working  toward  the  gradual  subjec- 
tion of  the  world  to  this  its  true  end,  then  lordship  over  the 
world  must  be  recognisable  as  already  a  conspicuous  feature 
of  Christ's  historical  life. 

Both  the  Confessional  systems  of  theology  which  have 
sprung  from  the  Eeformation  assume  as  the  formative  prin- 
ciple of  the  whole  phenomenon  Divine  nature  with  all 
the  Divine  attributes,  especially  omnipotence  and  omni- 
science, which  are  the  attributes  chiefly  concerned  in  the 
creation  of  the  world.  But  in  the  correlation  of  the  Divine 
with  the  human  nature,  the  two  systems  come  into  direct 


884-5]       DOCTKINB   OF    CHRIST'S    PBRSON    AND   LIFE-WORK        407 

contrast  with  each  other.^     The  Lutheran  doctrine  is  deter- 
mined  by  the  consideration  that  the  fulness  of  the  Godhead 
is  revealed  in  the  human  person  of  Christ ;  with  this  in  view, 
it  maintains  that  through  the  incarnation  of  the  Divine  Word, 
or  through  the  union  of  the  Divine  with  the  human  nature, 
the  latter  Becomes  endowed  with  all  the  Divine  attributes. 
The  Eeformed  doctrine  is  determined  by  the  consideration 
that  the  union  of  the  Divine  Word  with  the  human  nature 
preserves  the  closest  possible  analogy  with  the  nature  of  man 
as  such ;  with  this  in  view,  it  maintains  that  the  Divine  Word, 
in  order  to  become  man,  gave  up  the  fulness  of  His  Divine 
attributes,  more  especially  those  relations  in  which,  as  Creator 
and  Lord,  He  stands  to  the  world.    Now  the  Lutheran  formula 
does  not  correspond  with  the  historical  picture,  which  the 
Eeformed  doctrine  faithfully  follows;  it  requires,  therefore, 
to  be  supplemented  by  the   statement  that    the  Incarnate 
Word  of  God  during  His  earthly  life  regularly  refrained  from 
the  manifestation  of    His  Divine  attributes  {Kpv'^is).      The 
diflTerence  between  the  two  types  of  doctrine  is  specially  con- 
spicuous in  the  way  in  which  the  ideas  of  incamatio  and 
exinanitio  are  contrasted  with  each  other.     According  to  the 
Lutheran  doctrine,  the  verbum  incamatum  is  the  subject  of 
eodnanitio ;  according  to  the  Eeformed,  the  verbum  sese  exin- 
aniens  is  the  subject  of  incamatio.     That  is  to  say,  since  the 
conception  and  human  birth  are  the  first  manifestations  of 
the  exinanitioy  therefore,  according  to  Lutheran  teaching,  the 
union  of  the  human  nature  with  the  Divine,  and  the  transfer- 
ence to  the  former  of  all  the  Divine  attributes,  are  already 
presupposed  at  the  entrance  of  the  God-man  into  the  process 
of  birth,  which  is  the  first  instance  of  His  hiding  His  Divine 
attributes.     According  to  the  Eeformed  teaching,  the  Divine 
Word  empties  Himself  of  His  Divine  attributes  by  entering 
into  the  process  of  birth — in  other  words,  by  entering  into 
union  with  human  nature. 

What  significance,  then,  have  these  two  explanations  for  the 

^  I  refer  to   Schneckenburger,  Zur  kirchlUihcn   Christolo^ie,   1848 ;    2n(l 
edition,  1861, 


408  JUSTIFICATION   AND   RECONCILIATION  [385-6 

apprehension  and  appreciation  of  the  Person  of  Christ  in  its 
historical  manifestation  ?     The  Lutheran  doctrine  corresponds 
with  the  historical  manifestation  only  in  so  far  as  it  is  untrue 
to  itself,  and,  by  its  assertion  of  the  icpvyjnf;,  robs  the  trans- 
ference of  the  Divine  attributes  to  the  human  nature  of  all 
significance  for  Christ's  historical  life.       It  is  therefore  in 
direct  contradiction  to  the  phenomenon  which  it  pretends  to 
explain.     It  claims  to  demonstrate  the  Godhead  of  Christ  in 
the  peculiar  quality  of  His  humanity,  in  accordance  with  the 
line  followed  by  Luther  in  his  Larger  Catechism;  but  the 
means  which  are  employed  to  solve  this  problem  do  not  per- 
mit a  solution,  because  they  do  not  rise  to  the  level  of  the 
view  there  set  forth  by  Luther.     In  this  connection  there  is 
another  point  specially  to  be  noted.     If  the  incamatio  verbi 
is  assumed  to  be  real  because  the  verhim  incamatum  subjects 
Himself  to   the  conceptio  on  which  the  individual  existence 
of  Christ  depends,  this  does  not  in  the  very  least  guarantee 
that  the  personality  which  results  from  the  conceptio  is  co- 
extensive with  the  verbum  incamatum.     It  would  be  equally 
consistent   with  the  main  assumption  to    suppose  that  the 
verbum  incamatum  manifests  Himself  only  in  the  completed 
history  of  the  whole  human  race.     This  has  actually  been 
maintained,  for  Strauss  in  his  day  declared  that  the  human 
race  in  its  gradual  attainment  of  religious  self-consciousness  is 
the  God-man,  and   corresponds   to  the  idea  of   the  verbum 
incamatum.     It  is  probably  more  than  a  mere  accident  that 
this  possible  heretical  consequence  of  the  Lutheran  Christology 
comes    from  the    same  theological   workshop  in   which    the 
Lutheran   formula  itself  was  put  together.      On   the   other 
hand,   the    Eeformed   explanation  of    the  Person    of    Christ 
through   the   kenosis    of    the    Divine   Word    does    certainly 
remain  true  to  those  human  and  temporal  limits  within  which 
it  perceives  the  life  of  Jesus  to  have  been  lived ;  but  in  the 
same  measure  in  which  it  does  so,  it  compels  us  to  refuse  the 
predicate  of  Godhead  to  the  historical  life  of  Christ.     If  the 
eternal    Logos,  by    His    conception    as    an    individual    man, 
emptied  Himself  of  those  attributes  in  which  His  original 


38^7]       DOCTRINB   OF    CHRIST'S    PERSON    AND    LIFE-WORK        409 

relation  to  the  world  is  expressed,  and  in  which  He  is  of  like 
essence  with  the  Father,  then  in  His  historical  existence  He 
is  not  the  possessor  of  Godhead.  It  is  in  this  case  impossible 
to  understand  why  other  men  also,  who  in  their  own  sphere 
are  recognised  as  ideals,  should  not  equally  be  regarded  as 
incarnations  of  the  self-depotentiating  Divine  Season.  For 
this  is  the  possible  heretical  consequence  of  this  type  of  doc- 
trine, which  frankly  acknowledges  that  Godhead  and  manhood 
cannot  be  predicated,  at  the  same  time  and  in  the  same 
relation,  of  the  Person  of  Christ — in  other  words,  that  the 
two  predicates  are  mutually  exclusive. 

Nevertheless,  under  the  pretext  that  it  is  the  logical 
outcome  of  the  Christology  outlined  in  the  Formula  of 
Concord,  the  said  doctrine  has  become  common  among 
theologians  who  pride  themselves  on  their  Lutheran  ortho- 
doxy. The  first  to  tread  this  way,  Gottfried  Thomasius,^ 
believed  himself  called  on  to  expand  the  Lutheran  formula  of 
the  communiccUio  idzomatum,  as  the  consequence  of  the 
incamatio  verbi  divini^  beyond  the  traditional  and  one-sided 
presentation  it  had  hitherto  received.  It  was  one-sided  that 
only  the  human  nature  should  be  invested  with  Divine 
attributes — omnipotence,  omniscience,  and  the  like.  In 
consequence  of  the  incamatio  verbi  divini,  the  Divine  nature 
also  in  Christ  must  be  declared  to  be  the  bearer  of  suffering, 
want,  and  weakness,  if  the  formula  of  the  communicatio 
idiomatum  was  to  be  valid.  This  had  not  been  done ;  nor 
has  it  been  accomplished  by  the  corrections  proposed  by 
Thomasius.  The  latter  falls  completely  out  of  line  with  the 
system  set  forth  in  the  Formula  of  Concord.  It  is  not  the 
verbum  incamatum  which  forms  for  Thomasius  the  frame- 
work within  which  he  ascribes  to  the  Divine  nature  of  Christ 
the  human  attributes  of  sufPering  and  the  like.  On  the 
contrary,  he  maintains  that  the  verbum  divinum,  with  a  view 
to  incarnation,  renounced  omnipotence,  omnipresence,  and 
omniscience,  attributes  which  bear  on  the  relation  of  God  to 

^  Beitrdge  zur  kirchUehen  Ckristologie,  1845.     Of.  on  this  point  Schnecken- 
burger,  op,  eit.  p.  196  ff. 


410  JUSTIFICATION   AND   RECONCILIATION  [387-8 

the  world,  which  therefore  are  for  God  only  relative,  and 
therefore  also  can  be  given  up  by  the  Divine  Logos  without 
abrogating  His  Godhead.  Even  if  this  assumption  were  on  all 
sides  unassailable,  it  would  still  be  in  contradiction  to  the 
Formula  of  Concord.  For  how  can  the  incarnation  of  the  Logos 
invest  the  human  nature  with  those  very  attributes  which  the 
Logos  in  His  union  with  human  nature  no  longer  possesses  ? 
Lutheran,  therefore,  as  judged  by  the  standard  of  the  Formula 
of  Concord,  this  theory  certainly  is  not.  And,  what  is  more, 
it  is  self-contradictory.  For  even  if  omnipotence  and  the 
like  are  only  relative  attributes  of  God  and  of  the  Divine 
Logos,  relative,  that  is,  in  relation  to  the  world,  is  not  this 
very  relation  the  limit  within  which  alone  any  knowledge  of 
God  is  possible,  outside  of  which  God  is  wholly  inconceivable  ? 
Moreover,  the  conception  of  the  Divine  Logos  had  its  origin 
exclusively  in  the  relation  of  God  to  the  world.  So  that  we 
cease  to  conceive  the  Logos  of  God  in  the  way  which  the 
conception  itself  requires,  if  in  any  particular  case  we  think 
away  His  relation  to  the  world,  and  therefore  His  omni- 
potence, or,  in  any  other  relation  into  which  He  can  enter, 
leave  this  out  of  account  as  no  longer  existing.  If  the  Logos, 
for  the  sake  of  His  incarnation,  emptied  Himself  of  His 
omnipotence,  etc.,  then  He  simply  cannot  be  recognised  in 
the  Person  of  Christ  as  the  Logos,  eternally  begotten  of  the 
Father,  and  of  the  same  essence  with  Him.  This  hypothesis 
serves  only  to  prove  that  Christ,  at  least  in  His  earthly 
existence,  has  no  Godhead  at  all. 

Despite  these  considerations,  even  Luthardt  teaches : 
"  When  the  Son  of  God  took  upon  Him  the  earthly  nature  of 
man.  He  still  retained  His  Divine  nature  and  the  essential 
and  inalienable  glory  of  the  same ;  but,  as  concerned  His 
relation  to  the  world.  He  laid  aside  in  His  state  of  humiliation 
the  Divine  conditions  of  existence,  and  the  corresponding 
exercise  of  Divine  power,  not  to  assume  them  again  till  His 
exaltation,  though  then  as  One  who  has  become  man."  From 
the  historical  notices  which  accompany  §§  50,  51  of  his 
Compendium  der  Dogmatik^  we  gather  merely  that  Luthardt 


388]  DOCTRINE   OF    CHRIST'S    PEKSON   AND    LIFE-WORK         411 

is  conscious  of  propounding  doctrine  which  is  the  opposite  of 
what  is  prescribed  to  him  in  the  Formula  of  Concord ;  but 
how  to  conceive  the  above  statement,  or  on  what  grounds 
we  are  to  find  it  intelligible,  he  does  not  tell  us.  What  is 
taught  under  the  head  of  the  Kenosis  of  the  Divine  Logos  is 
pure  mythology.  Not  Luthardt,  to  be  sure,  but  Gess  has 
given  us  the  theory  in  its  wildest  form.  But  the  formula  is 
common  to  both,  and  it  means  a  return  to  the  mediaeval 
interpretation  of  the  matter.  Acknowledgment  is  made  of  a 
Divine  nature  which  stands  behind  the  human  person  of 
Jesus,  but  occupies  only  a  vague  relation  to  it ;  attention  is 
then  concentrated  upon  the  man  Jesus  as  Mediator,  without 
any  effort  to  find  an  indication  of  His  Godhead  in  His  human 
life  upon  the  earth.  This  way  of  confessing  Christ's  Godhead 
is  a  ceremony  that  has  lost  its  meaning.  On  the  other  hand, 
the  hints  thrown  out  by  Luther  and  Melanchthon  in  which 
they  transcend  the  limits  of  Latin  Catholicism,  and  bid  us 
learn  the  meaning  of  Christ's  Godhead  in  Christ  our  Eedeemer, 
are  for  these  Lutherans  or  Pietists  non-existent,  although 
they  occur  in  symbolical  books. 

Another  series  of  attempts  is  associated  with  the  dark 
saying  of  Marheineke  (vol.  i.  p.  582),  that  Christ  in  His  own 
person  is  humanity  itself,  so  far  as  He  presents  in  Himself 
what  is  common  to  all  individual  men.  This  statement  is 
with  all  celerity  exchanged  for  the  other,  that  Christ  in  His 
own  individuality  embraces  dynamically  as  root-principle  all 
human  individuals,  or,  that  He  represents  in  personal  form 
the  totality  of  individuals,  and  gathers  together  the  original 
types  or  ideal  personalities  of  all  separate  individuals  in 
Himself.  That  is,  the  generic  idea  is  conceived  in  the  one 
case  as  an  abstract  unity,  in  the  other,  in  nominalistic  fashion, 
as  the  collective  unity  of  all  the  separate  individuals.  If 
either  one  or  the  other  can  rightly  be  applied  to  Christ, 
there  is  an  end  to  His  human  individualitv.  But  what  have 
statements  of  this  kind  to  do  with  His  Godhead  ?  In  the 
characteristics  here  described,  Christ  is  supposed  to  correspond 
to  the  idea  of  the  second  Adam.    In  the  same  way,  then,  that 


412  JUSTIFICATION    AND   BECONCILIATION  [388- 


the  first  Adam,  as  head  of  the  natural  creation,  reaches  over 
into  the  realm  of  spirit,  so  Christ,  as  Head  of  the  spiritual 
creation,  points  to  what   may  he  called  a   cosmic  or  meta- 
physical significance  of  His  person.     "  And  this,  then,  is  the 
point  where  Christology  borders  on  the  doctrine  of  the  Trinity, 
and  where  the  statement  of  Scripture  about  the  Word  that 
was  in  the  beginning  finds  its  fit  place."     "  That  point  in  the 
cosmos  which  is  the  centre  of  receptivity  for  God  (namely, 
Christ  as  the  central  individual  of  the  human  race),  is  the 
point  where  a  real  world-unity  and  world-consummation  are 
possible ;  but  its  actual  realisation  comes  from  the  personal 
self-communication  of  God.     For  the  idea  of  the  world  as  it 
exists  eternally  before  God  does  not  stop   short   at   mere 
receptivity  for  God,  it  includes  also  the  being  wholly  filled 
with  God,  namely  in  itseK  and  at  the  point  where,  corre- 
sponding to  this  central  receptivity,  there  takes  place    the 
equally  central  fulfilment."     That  is  to  say,  for  the  complete- 
ness of  the  world-idea  the  indwelling  of  God  in  the  central 
Man  is  an  indispensable  supposition.     This  theory  bears  a 
remote  resemblance  to  that  interpretation  of  Christ's  Godhead 
which  Paul  derives  from  the  final  cause  of  the  w^orld.     But 
if  we  put  the  theory  to  the  test,  and  ask  in  what  features  of 
the  historical  picture  Christ's  Godhead  appears,  we  do  not 
find  an  answer  to  our  query  any  more  than  to  the  reflection 
that  the  existence  in  the  Person  of  Christ  of  this  central 
individual  has  never  been  proved.     The  reason  of  this  defect 
lies  in  the  fact  that  behind  this  theory  a  reUgious  interest  in 
the  person  of  Christ  is  nowhere  discernible.    To  guarantee  the 
completeness  of  the  world-idea  may  be  a  philosophical  motive, 
but  it  is  certainly  not  a  religious  one ;  for  no  relation  has 
been  shown  between  the  world-consummation  in  this  central 
man  and  any  saving  good  derived  therefrom.     In  short,  this 
idea  lacks  not  merely  the  requisite  scientific  maturity,  but 
the  religious  kernel ;  it  is  therefore  not  a  theological  concep- 
tion at  all. 

The  religious  estimate  of  Christ,  which  finds  expression 
under  definite  conditions  in  the  predicate  of  His  Godhead, 


389-90]      DOCTRINB   OF    CHRIST'S   PERSON   AND   LIFE- WORK      413 

must  approve  itself  in  the  connection  between  Christ's  visible 
conduct  and  His  religious  convictions  and  ethical  motives ;  it 
does  not  stand  in   any  direct  relation   to   the   presumable 
endowment  of  His  Person  with  inborn  qualities  or  powers. 
For  not  in  this  latter  relation  but  in  the  former  does  He 
exert  an  influence  upon  us.     The  religious  estimate  of  His 
Person  will  stand  related  to  His  moral  conduct  in  so  far  as 
the  latter  is  the  test  and  counterpart  of  His  own  conviction 
that  He   enjoys  a  unique  fellowship  with   God.     For  this 
reason  the  religious  dignity  of  Christ  does  not  depend  upon 
the  imbroken  completeness  of  His  ethical  horizon — a  com- 
pleteness which,  in  fact,  does  not  exist  if  we  compare  the 
ethical  perceptions  of  Christ  with  a  system  of  the  present  day. 
In  his  Life  of  Jesus  for  the  GerTnan  People,  Strauss  maintains 
that  Jesus  has  only  a  relative  significance  for  the  development 
of  the  moiul  ideal,  since  He  betrays  no  sense  of  the  ethical 
significance  of  the  family  or  of  the  joy  of  life,  no  idea  of  the 
moral  worth  of  the  State,  of  trade,  of  art  and  science ;  that, 
therefore,  His  moral  code  is  defective,  and  requires  to  be 
supplemented.     As  if  the  worth  for  the  human  race  of  a 
man  like  Jesus  depended  on  His  having  a  complete  view  of 
all  possible  applications,  both  positive  and  negative,  of  the 
influence   which    He  sought    to  exert  upon  human  life — a 
view  that  is  reached  only  afterwards  in  the  form  of  scientific 
cognition  which  lay  outside  the  range  of  His  vocation  !    With 
the  most  perfect  system  of  ethics   Christ  would  not  have 
altered  the  course  of  the  intellectual  world ;  with  any  such 
system  He  would  long  ago  have  become  antiquated.     For  the 
more  detailed    the    programme   of   any  reformation  in   the 
spiritual  sphere,  the  more  limited  is  its  field  of  action ;  the 
more  indefinite  it  is  in  detail,  the  wider  and  more  lasting  is 
its  influence.     As  a  matter  of  fact,  Jesus  is  not  concerned  to 
provide  a  moral  code  for  the  details  of  life ;  that  is  not  His 
business,  and  any  estimate  of  His  person  that  has  this  for  its 
starting-point  is  historically   unjust.      Jesus  has   the  same 
right  as  every  other  man  to  demand  that  He  be  understood 
in  the  light  of  His  own  individuality.     That  this  individuality 


414  JUSTIFICATION   AND   RECONCILIATION  [390-1 

is  that  of  the  religious  man  and  thereafter  of  the  prophet 
and  founder  of  a  religion,  cannot,  of  course,  be  recognised 
where,  as  in  the  case  of  the  Life  just  mentioned,  the  thought 
of  God  is  simply  suspended.  This  explains  also  why  in  the 
end  the  historical  figure  of  Jesus  became  for  Strauss  quite 
indistinct.  Would  a  man  who  regards  all  music  as  a  dis- 
agreeable noise  undertake  to  write  a  life  and  an  appreciation 
of  Mozart  ?  That  were  the  true  parallel  to  this  atheistic 
method  of  writing  the  history  of  religion. 

Jesus  is  the  bearer  of  the  perfect  spiritual  religion,  which 
consists  in  mutual  fellowship  with  God,  the  Author  of  the 
world  and  its  final  goal.  In  the  idea  of  God  as  the  final 
goal  of  all  things  lies  the  reason  why  Jesus  recognises  as 
binding  upon  Himself  for  God's  sake  the  widest  conceivable 
aim  of  moral  effort,  namely,  the  union  of  mankind  through 
love ;  while  in  the  idea  of  God  as  the  Author  of  the  world 
lies  the  reason  why  Jesus  for  His  own  personal  life  repudiates 
every  motive  that  is  individual,  worldly,  and  therefore  less 
than  Divine.  But  inasmuch  as  Jesus  desired  His  own  atti- 
tude to  God  to  be  shared  by  the  rest  of  mankind,  He  laid 
upon  His  disciples,  as  their  aim  also,  the  union  of  mankind 
through  love,  or,  in  other  words,  the  realisation  of  the  King- 
dom of  God ;  and  through  His  own  personal  freedom  in  rela- 
tion to  the  world.  He  led  His  disciples,  in  accepting  their 
view  of  the  world  from  Him,  to  the  assured  conviction  that 
human  life  is  of  more  worth  than  all  the  world.  By  making 
the  aim  of  His  own  life  the  aim  of  mankind,  who  are  to  be 
called  into  the  fellowship  of  His  community.  He  is  before  all 
else  the  Founder  of  a  religion  and  the  Redeemer  of  men  from 
the  dominion  of  the  world.  He  is  the  author  of  a  moral  code 
only  in  so  far  as  the  raising  of  men  above  the  world,  and  their 
fellowship  in  this  relation,  carries  with  it  the  ordering  of  their 
conduct  towards  each  other  in  the  Kingdom  of  God.  But 
since  this  end  is  served  by  setting  up  the  universal  principle 
of  brotherly  love,  it  is  not  any  defect  in  the  moral  code  of 
Jesus  as  such  that  the  ordering  of  the  separate  provinces  of 
moral  life   is  left  to  the  free   application    of    this  supreme 


391-2]      DOCTRINE   OF    CHRIST'S    PERSON   AND    LIFE-WORK        415 

principle.  Had  Jesus  directed  His  attention  to  the  ethical 
regulation  of  the  separate  provinces  of  human  life,  the  result 
would  have  been — since  He  meant  to  be  the  Founder  of  a 
community — that  He  would  have  drawn  up  definite  legal 
enactments.  Hence  the  objections  of  Strauss  come  in  the 
end  to  this,  that  Jesus  did  not  impose  upon  His  disciples  a 
system  such  as  that  of  Islam.  That  He  did  not  follow  this 
path  marks  His  unique  and  incomparable  supremacy  over 
all  other  founders  of  religions.^ 

If  the  subject-matter  of  Christ's  life,  in  pursuance  of  His 
purpose  to  redeem  mankind  and  reveal  to  men  the  love  of 
God,  serves  to  render  visible  His  Godhead,  then,  within  the 
limits  of  the  dogma  of  the  two  natures,  no  one  has  so  aptly 
stated  this  connection  as  St.  Bernard.^  In  his  in  Cant  canti- 
corum,  sermo  vi.  3,  we  come  upon  the  following :  "  Dum  in 
came  et  per  camem  facit  opera  non  carnis  sed  dei,  naturae 
utique  imperans  superansque  fortunam,  stultam  faciens  sapien- 
tiam  hominium  daemonumque  debellans  tyrannidem,  manifeste 
ipsum  se  esse  indicat,  per  quern  eadem  et  antefiehant,  quando 
fiebant.  In  came,  inquam,  et  per  camem  potenter  et  patenter 
operatus  mira,  locutus  salubria,  ^ossms  indigna  evidenter  osten- 
dit,  quia  ipse  sit,  qui  potenter  sed  invisibiliter  secula  condidisset, 
sapienter  regeret,  henigne  proiegeret  Denique  dum  evangelizat 
tTigratis,  signa  praebet  infidelibits,  pro  suis  crudfixorihxis  oraty 
uonne  liquido  ipsum  se  esse  declarat,  qui  cum  patre  suo  quo- 
tidie  oriri  facit  solem  super  bonos  et  mcUos,  pluit  super  iustos  et 
iniustos  ?  "  These  three  sentences  speak  of  the  God-man,  but 
to  this  effect,  that  the  Divine  Person  of  the  Logos  wears  the 
human  nature — the  flesh — ^as  the  organ  of  His  activity.  On 
these  assumptions  Bernard  develops  the  eommunicatio  idio- 
Toatum  in  both  directions,  ascribing  sufferings  to  the  Divine 
Person  of  the  Logos,  and  acts  of  omnipotence  to  the  human 
nature  of  the  same.  But  these  acts  of  omnipotence,  which 
are  to  be  on  a  level  with  the  creation  and  governance  of  the 
world,  Bernard  exhibits  to  us  in  moral  achievements  of  the 

1  Cf.  Stephan,  Daa  heutige  AegypUn  (1872),  pp.  257-261. 

*  Cf.  Lesefnichte  aus  dem  heiligen  Bernhard,  Stnd,  u,  Krit,  1879,  p.  322. 


416  JUSTIFICATION    AND   RBCONCILIATION  [392-3 

God-man.  That  Christ  overcomes  His  fate,  reveals  to  us  in 
Him  the  Creator  of  the  world ;  that  He  endures  indignities 
which  He  has  not  deserved,  of  course  for  the  good  of  men, 
reveals  in  Him  the  Creator,  the  wise  Ruler,  the  gracious  Pro- 
tector of  the  world ;  finally,  that  He  does  not  withhold  His 
benefits  from  the  unthankful  and  unbelieving,  that  He  prays 
for  those  who  crucify  Him,  proves  His  connection  with  the 
perfect  God,  who  bestows  His  favours  both  on  the  evil  and 
the  good.  The  God-man  has  all  the  Divine  attributes ;  but,  as 
Bernard  says,^  He  exercises  these  attributes  in  the  work  of 
redemption  with  effort,  whereas  in  the  work  of  creation  the 
effort  does  not  occur.  Further,  in  the  work  of  redemption, 
He  exercises  these  attributes  for  the  salvation  of  men,  and 
therefore  in  the  form  of  moral  acts,  especially  in  the  effort  of 
endurance.  These  activities,  having  as  their  aim  redemption 
and  the  revelation  of  love,  are  more  than  human  activities ; 
at  bottom,  they  are  Divine.  Of  the  likeness  between  the 
moral  activities  of  the  God-man  and  the  omnipotence  of 
God,  we  can  be  assured  only  if  we  have  already  estab- 
lished their  Divine  worth  for  our  salvation.  Luther  can 
scarcely  have  known  these  sentences  of  Bernard;  yet  his 
own  exposition  in  the  Larger  Catechism  follows  the  same 
lines.  It  is  as  my  Eedeemer  that  Christ  is  my  Lord ;  what 
is  said  of  Him  in  the  second  Article  of  the  Creed  ex- 
plains redemption,  its  manner  and  means ;  that  is,  how  much 
it  cost  Him  {quanti  constiterit) ;  and  what  He  spent  and 
dared  to  win  us  and  bring  us  under  His  lordship,  namely, 
that  He  became  man,  and  suffered,  and  died,  etc.  etc.  And 
all  this  in  order  that  He  might  be  my  Lord.^    The  theological 

^  Sermo  xx.  2:  *'Multum  laboravit  in  eo  salvator,  nee  in  omni  mundi 
fabrica  tan  turn  fatigationis  auctor  assumsit.  At  vcro  hie  et  in  dictis  suis  sus- 
tinuit  contradictores  et  in  factis  observatorcs  et  in  tormentls  illusores  et  in 
morte  oxprobratores.     Ecce  quomodo  dilexit." 

^  On  this  point  compare  A.  H.  Francke,  *'De  magnitudiiie  et  maiestfUe  lesu 
Christi  {programmata  diversis  tempoHbus  in  acad,  Hal.  proposita^  1714),  p.  170  : 
"  Tantus  cum  esset  dei  filius,  an  in  came  se  manifestantem,  humanam  naturam 
adsumentem  minorem  factum  opinabimur  ?  Absit,  ut  quern  magnwm  earUaU, 
ipsamque  caritatem  esse  agnovimus,  eum  minorem  putemns  in  eo  ipso,  quo 
magnitudiuem  suae  caritatis  non  verbis  aut  promissis  amplius  sod  re  ipsa  decla- 
ravit,  factoque  stupendo,  ipsis  angelis  i^iirabili,  hominibusdepravatis  incredibili 


39»-4]      DOCTRINE   OF   CHRIST'S   PERSON   AND   LIFE-WORK        417 

solution  of  the  problem  of  Christ's  Divinity  must  therefore 
be  based  upon  an  analysis  of  what  He  has  done  for  the  salva- 
tion of  mankind  in  the  form  of  His  community. 

§  46.  This  subject  is  treated  in  Dogmatics  under  the  title 
of  the  three  fundions  or  offices  of  the  God-man.  In  the  most 
developed  form  of  the  dogma  the  aim  is  rightly  to  distribute 
among  the  functions  of  Prophet,  Priest,  and  King  the  activities 
of  Christ  described  in  the  New  Testament,  which  had  for  their 
aim  the  establishment  and  ordering  of  human  salvation,  and 
which  extend  in  time  over  the  status  exinanitionis  et  exalta- 
tionis.  This  application  of  Old  Testament  types  to  the  inter- 
pretation of  Christ's  Person  has  its  first  representative  in 
Eusebius  of  Caesarea ;  but  only  since  the  Eeformation  has  it 
become  a  factor  in  theology.^  The  origin  of  this  threefold 
type  is  to  be  found  in  the  literal  meaning  of  the  word  Christ, 
it  being  regarded  as  legitimate  to  refer  the  anointing  with 
the  Holy  Spirit  not  only  to  the  anointing  of  a  king,  but  also 
to  that  of  a  priest  and  of  a  prophet.  But  in  estimating  the 
practical  worth  of  this  principle  of  division,  we  must  take 
account  of  the  way  in  which  it  gradually  became  current 
with  the  theologians  of  the  Eeformation.  It  is  well  known 
that  the  theologians  who  follow  Melanchthon  and  Luther 
down  to  Hafenreffer  and  Gerhard,  treat  the  saving  work  of 
Christ  only  under  the  two  heads  of  King  and  Priest.^ 
Attention  may  also  be  called  to  the  fact  that  it  was  Calvin 
who  added  the  type  of  the  Prophet  (in  the  Catechismus  Gene- 
vensis  and  Institutio,  ii.  1 5).     The  school  of  Melanchthon  and 

ostendit,  comprobavit  et  ipse  ut  carUcu  in  mnndo  apparuit. "  P.  180 :  "  Detinoit 
nos  diutius  consideratio  magnitudinis  Chriati  in  ipsa  morte  elucevAis,  At  cum 
in  hac  morte  eius,  morte  inquam  Christi,  quern  mors  retinere  non  potuit,  omnia 
yita  et  salos  sita  sit,  imo  omnia  ex  ea  fidei  victoria  et  futura  eorum,  quos  fides 
ad  finem  servata  coronabit,  gloria  dependeat,  de  tanta  re  ne  incepisse  qoidem 
aliquid  dicere  nobis  videmnr." 

^  For  other  upholders  of  this  theory,  since  Eusebins,  compare  Krauss,  Das 
Mittlerwerk  nach  dem  Schema  des  munua  triplex,  Jahrb.ffir  devische  TheoL 
xvii.  (1872)  p.  695  ff. 

'  a.  Heppe,  DogmaUk  des  deutschen  Protestaniismua  im  16  Jahrh,  ii.  pp. 
209-212.  The  statement  holds  of  Strigel,  Hemming,  Hesshns,  Homberger, 
Selnecker,  Heerbrand.  Hafenreffer,  on  the  other  hand,  in  explaining  the  name 
Christ,  has  first  the  two  titles,  and  afterwards  the  three. 

27 


418  JUSTIFICATION   AND   REOONCILUTION  [394-5 

Luther  did  not  by  any  means  ignore  Christ's  work  of  teaching, 
but  the  Old  Testament  type  of  the  high  priest  seemed  to  justify 
its  being  reckoned  part  of  His  work  as  Priest.  Even  in 
Calvin,  in  the  first  edition  of  the  InstUutio  (1536),  we  find 
only  the  Kingship  and  the  Priesthood  assumed  as  exhausting 
the  meaning  of  the  name  Christ.^  The  working  out  of  the 
idea  brings  before  us  in  its  full  extent  the  religious  view  of 
the  world  and  sense  of  personal  worth  which,  in  the  first 
epoch  of  the  Eeformation,  accompanied  every  eflFort  at  theo- 
logical reconstruction.  What  Christ  is  for  us,  must  verify 
itself  in  the  transferring  of  His  worth  to  us.  The  recognition 
of  Jesus  as  the  Christ  has  for  us  no  meaning  unless  through 
Him  we  know  ourselves  raised  to  kingship  or  dominion  over 
the  world,  and  to  priesthood  or  undisturbed  communion  with 
God.  Only  in  relation  to  these  practical  ends  will  even 
an  objective  theological  discussion  of  the  statements  of  the 
Creed  satisfy  the  religious  interest.  But  Calvin's  treatment 
of  this  subject  is  derived  from  Luther's  tract  De  libertate 
Christiana  (vol.  i.  p.  182).  A  comparison  of  the  sentence 
already  quoted  with  this  tract  of  Luther's  proves  for  one 
thing  that  the  immense  significance  of  the  latter  was  not  lost 
upon  Calvin,  and  besides,  the  agreement  between  Luther  and 
Calvin  is  a  confirmation  of  the  method  by  which  thus  far  I 
have  endeavoured  to  pave  the  way  for  a  doctrine  of  the  Person 
or  saving  work  of  Christ.  If,  in  accordance  with  this  view, 
the  aim  of  Christ's  activity  as  King  and  Priest  is  to  secure  for 
us  freedom  with  regard  to  the  world  and  with  regard  to  sin, 
and  freedom  in  our  intercourse  with  God,  then  surely  I  am  in 
line  with  the  real  trend  of  the  Eeformation  when  I  bring  the 
specific  significance  of  the  Person  of  Christ  for  the  Christian 
view  of  the  world  and  sense  of  personal  worth  into  relation 

'  C,  R.  xxix.  p.  69 :  "  Credimus  et  Christum  ipeum  ease,  hoo  est,  omnibus 
sancti  spiritus  gratiis  perfusum,  ut  de  plenitudiiie  eius  omnes  accipiamus,  qui- 
cunque  simul  per  fidem  eius  consortes  ac  participes  ;  liac  denique  unctione  con- 
stitutiim  esse  a  patre  regem,  ut  iu  ii)so  reges  essemus,  imperium  habentes 
supra  diabolum,  peccatum,  mortem  et  inferos ;  deinde  sacerdotem,  qui  suo 
sacriGcio  patrem  placaret  ac  reconciliaret,  ut  in  ipso  sacerdotes  essemus,  ipso 
intercessore  ac  mediatore  patri  preces,  gratiarum  actiones,  nosmetipsos  et  nostra 
omnia  offereutes," 


395-6]      DOCTRINE   OF   CHRIST'S   PBRSON   AND   LIFE-WORK        419 

with  the  attainment  of  our  own  personal  independence  over 
against  the  world.  Finally,  the  order  adopted  by  Luther — 
King,  Priest — explains  not  only  why  the  theologians  who 
followed  Luther  and  Melanchthon  adhered  to  this  appellation, 
even  after  their  attention  was  directed  to  the  significance  of 
Christ's  work  of  teaching,  but  also  why  Calvin,  when  in  the 
Catechismus  Geneveims  he  added  the  type  of  the  Prophet,  put 
it  in  the  third  rank,  and  why,  when  in  the  InMUutio  of  the 
year  1559  he  gave  the  first  place  to  the  office  of  Prophet,  he 
still  put  the  oflBce  of  King  before  the  office  of  Priest.  It  is 
true  that  in  the  Institutio  of  the  year  1539  he  already 
put  the  office  of  Prophet  in  the  forefront  as  evidence  of 
Christ's  anointing.  But  this  does  not  mean  that  he  sought  to 
attach  to  it  the  same  importance  as  to  the  Kingship  and  the 
Priesthood,  the  former  of  these  being  here  expounded  with 
somewhat  more  detail  than  before.^ 

The  complete  presentation  of  the  three  munera  Christi  in 
the  Institiitio  of  the  year  1559  (voL  ii  p.  15)  marks  a  change 
for  the  worse  in  this  respect,  that  the  practical  bearing  of  the 
Kingship  and  the  Priesthood  of  Christ,  in  the  transference  of 
these  attributes  to  believers,  has  disappeared.  Which  shows 
that  the  religious  interest  has  suffered  at  the  hands  of  the 
purely  dogmatic  method,  which  treats  human  salvation  exclu- 
sively from  the  side  of  dependence  upon  God,  without  keeping 
in  view  the  practical  consideration  that  in  Christianity  our 
religious  dependence  upon  God  is  to  form  the  basis  of  our 
personal  independence.      At  the  same  time,  in  distinction 

^  X.c  p.  515 :  "  Qoantam  ad  regnum  attinet,  non  terreniun  aut  oarnale  est, 
sed  spiritaale,  quod  in  coelum  magis,  faturamqiie  et  aetemam  vitam  respiciat. 
Deinde  talis  illi  est  regnandi  ratio,  at  non  tarn  sibi  regnet  quam  nobis. 
Potentia  enim  saa  nos  armat  et  instruit,  decore  et  magnificentia  ornat,  opibns 
locnpletat,  denique  in  regni  participation  em  exaltat  et  evehit.  Siquidem  eius 
commnnlonis,  qna  se  nobis  illigavit  beneficio,  reges  et  ipsi  constituimur,  robore 
eius  ad  certamen  cum  diabolo,  peccato  et  raorte  depugnandum  armati,  iustitiae 
eius  omamentis  ad  spem  immortalitatis  vestiti,  divitiis  sanctitatis  eins  ad 
fructificandum  deo  per  bona  opera  locupletati.  —  At  sacerdotis  functionem 
nihilo  minori  nostro  bono  sustinet ;  non  ideo  tantam,  quod  sua  intercessione 
placatum  patrem  nobis  propitium  reddit,  sed  quod  nos  quoque  in  sacerdotii 
consortium  asciscit,  ut  ipso  freti  intercessore  ac  mediatore  patri  preces,  gratia- 
mm  actiones,  nosmetipsos  et  nostra  omnia  ofTeramus," 


420  JUSTinCATION   AND   RECONCILIATION  [396-7 

from  other  methods  of  treatment,  it  is  important  to  mention 
that  Calvin  still  gives  the  same  definition  of  Christ's  King- 
ship,  so  far  as  subject-matter  is  concerned,  that  he  has  pre- 
viously given,  namely,  that  Christ's  Kingship  verifies  itself  in 
our  assurance  of  eternal  salvation,  in  our  victory  over  sin,  in 
our  patience  in  face  of  the  evils  of  the  world.^     The  scope  of 
the  regnum  Ghristi  in  this  relation  he  expressly  limits  to  the 
status  excUtationis.     On  the  other  hand,  he  extends  not  only 
the  priestly   but  the  prophetic  office  over  both  the    slcUus 
Christi.       For  the  satisfaction  offered  in  Christ's  sacrificial 
death  is  continued  in  the  intercession  of  the  exalted  Christ, 
and  the  exercise  on  earth   of  the  office  of  Prophet  in  the 
C07itinua  evangelii  predicatio  within  the  Church   through  the 
communication  to  the  Church  of  the  Spirit.     This  exclusive 
reference  of    the  kingly  office  to   the  inward  perfection  of 
believers  occurs  elsewhere,  so  far  as  I  know,  only  in  Amesius 
(Medulla,  i.   19.  24,  26);  but  how  far  removed  Amesius  is 
from  the   starting-point  adopted  by  Calvin,  when  he  adds, 
that  the  prophetic  office  of  Christ  admits  of  being  transferred  to 
other  men,  but  not  the  office  of  King  nor  the  office  of  Priest ! 
While  I  reserve  my  right  to  return  at  a  later  point  to 
another   interpretation  due  to  Calvin   of    the   Kingship   of 
Christ,  the  exposition  already  given  justifies  the  conclusion 
that  Calvin  consistently  maintained  that  reference  of  Christ's 
Kingship  to  the  defence  of  believers  and  their  deliverance 
from  sin  and  the  world,  which    he  adopted   from  Luther's 
"Freedom  of  a  Christian   Man."      Meanwhile,  from  Luther 
through  Melanchthon  there  spread  among  the  theologians  of 
the  German  Eeformation  another  definition  of  the  reffnum 
Christi  sprituale.     This  was  the  conception  of  the  community 
of  believers,  in  so  far  as  that  community  is  established,  main- 

^  Lib.  ii.  15.  4 :  **  Undo  colligimus,  ipsum  nobis  magis  regnare  quam  sibi, 
idqne  intus  et  extra,  ut  scilicet  donis  spiritus  referti  ez  iis  primitiis  sentiamus 
vere  nos  deo  coniunctos  esse  ad  perfectam  beatitudinem.  Deinde  ut  einsdem 
spiritus  yirtute  freti  non  dubitemus,  contra  diabolum,  mnndum  et  quodyis 
noxae  genus  nos  semper  fore  victores.  ...  Ad  aetemam  usque  vitam  nos 
attolit,  ut  patienter  banc  vitam  sub  aerumnis,  inedia,  frigore,  con  tern  tu,  probris 
aliisqne  molestiis  transigamus  hoc  uno  contenti,  quod  nunquam  destitnet  nos 
rex  noster,  quin  necessitatibus  nostris  subveniat," 


"  «  "-^    ^w*.- 


597-8]      DOCTRINE   OP    CHRIST'S   PERSON   AND   LIFE-WORK        421 

tained,  and  governed  through  the  Word  of  God.^     Calvin  had 
already  adopted  this  as  the  content  of  the  office  of  Prophet  in 
both  the  states  of  Christ.     But  to  show  how  movable  Calvin 
was  on  this  point,  it  is  worth  noting  that  in  the  Catechismus 
Grenevensis  he  appropriates  the  above  interpretation  of  the 
kingly  office,  in  spite  of  its  inconsistency  with  the  view  he 
had  otherwise  expounded ;  and  since  the  kingly  office  con- 
cerned   the   status   exaltationis,   there    followed    the   further 
change  that  he  limited  the  prophetic  office  in  this  connection 
to  the  stcUtts  eannanitionis}     At  the  same  time  this  inconse- 
quence on  Calvin's  part  has  not  had  any  appreciable  influence 
in  his  own  circle.    On  the  contrary,  the  Heidelberg  Catechism 
adopts  the  statement  of  the  Catechism  of  Geneva  about  the 
office  of  Prophet,  and  combines  under  the  head  of  Kingship 
the  two  references  acknowledged  by  Calvin,  namely,  the  ruling 
of  the  Church  as  such  by  Word  and  Spirit,  and  the  defence 
as  well  as  maintenance  of  the  standing  of  believers.^    The  same 
method  of  statement  meets  us  in  Bodolf,  the  expounder  of  the 
Catechism.    But  all  the  other  Beformed  theologians  accessible 
to  me  retain  the  double  reference  of  the  kingly  office  proposed 
in  the  Catechism,  namely,  that  of  Calvin  and  of  Melanchthon 
and  Luther,  combine  with  it  Calvin's  extension  of  the  pro- 
phetic office  to  both  the  states  of  Christ,  and  land  themselves 
in  a  double  explanation  of  the  origin  of  the  Church,  namely, 
from  the  persistence  of  the  prophetic  office,  and  from  the 
kingly  office  of  Christ.     The  Lutherans,  especially  Gerhard, 
Quenstedt,  and  HoUatz,  follow  suit;  although  in  Baier  we  miss 

1  Cf.  Koatlin,  ii.  p.  880 ;  Melanchthon,  Loci  C.  R,  xxi.  pp.  519,  920 ;  vid. 
stipraf  p.  287. 

*  Niemeyer,  I.e.  p.  129  :  **Regnum  Christi  spiritnale,  quod  verbo  et  spiritu 
dei  continetar,  quae  iustitiam  et  vitam  secum  fenint.  .  .  .  Propheta  Christus 
est,  quum  in  mundum  descendit,  patris  se  legatum  apud  homines  et  interpre- 
tem  professus  est  idque  in  eum  finem,  ut  patris  voluntate  ad  plenum  exposita 
finem  poneret  revelationibus  omoibus  et  prophetiis." 

*L.e.  p.  467  ;  Cat.  Pal.  81 :  "Christus  appellatur  unctiis,  quod  a  patre 
ordinatus  et  spiritu  sancto  unctus  sit  summus  propheta  ac  doctor,  qui  nobis 
arcanum  consilium  et  omnem  voluntatem  x>atri8  de  redemtione  nostri  patefecit, 
et  summus  pontifex,  qui  nos  unico  sacrificio  corporis  sui  redemit,  assidueque 
pro  nobis  apud  patrem  intercedit,  et  rex,  qui  nos  suo  verbo  et  spiritu  gubemat, 
et  partam  nobis  salutem  tuetur  ac  conservat." 


422  JUSTIFICATION   AND   RECONCILIATION  [3»-9 

Calvin's  original  reference  of  the  kingly  office  to  the  defence 
of  believers.    I  may  mention,  aLso,  in  regard  to  the  conception 
of  the  regnum  Christi,  which  originally  was  not  divided  into 
the  regnum  potentiae  and  the  regnum  grcUiae,  that  after  the 
doctrine  of  the  two  natures  became  prominent,  a  distinction 
was   drawn  in  both  schools  between  what  was  due  to  the 
Divine  nature,  and  what  to   the  exaltation  of  the  human 
nature  in  Christ.     And  although  here  also  we  find  traces  of 
the  opposite  views  held  by  the  two  schools  with  regard  to  the 
relation  between  the  two  states  of  Christ,  yet  this  is  of  small 
significance  for  the  theory  of   the  three   offices.      On  the 
contraiy,  our  inquiry  has  shown   that    the  form   in  which 
this  dogma  was  taught  in  the  seventeenth  century  by  both 
sides  alilce,  was  a  compound  of  elements  from  Luther  and 
Melanchthon  on  the  one  hand,  and  from  Calvin  on  the  other. 
When  the  activities  of   Christ  in   His   two  states  are 
divided  according  to  subject-matter  among  the  three  offices, 
the  result  is  a  network  in  which  each  office  appears  under 
both  states,  and  each  of  the  two  states  displays  all  the  three 
offices.     This  method  obtains  even  in  the  case  of  those  who, 
like  Amesius  and  Wendelin,  begin  by  making  the  essential 
order  of  the  offices  evolve  itself  in  the  temporal  sequence 
of  events,  namely,  Christ  first  taught,  then  offered  Himself 
as  a  sacrifice,  and  finally  entered  upon  His  lordship.     For 
these  theologians,  too,  recognise  the  continuance  of  the  pro- 
phetic and  of  the  priestly  office  in  statu  exaltcUionis — ^their 
position  being  that  the  effect  of  what  Christ  accomplished  in 
His  earthly  life  is  brought  to  bear  upon  mankind  through  the 
continuance  of  similar  activity  on  His  part  in  His  exaltation , 
whereby,  according  to  the  theory  in  question,  the  opus  media- 
torium  Christi  becomes  complete.     It  has  been  proved   by 
Krauss  that  in  their  application  of  this  doctrine  the  Lutheran 
theologians  lack  the  necessary  precision.     For  my  purpose 
here  I  select  one  instance  of  this  for  special  notice. 

It  is  a  formal  weakness  in  the  view  under  consideration,  that 
its  advocates  have  from  the  beginning  been  content  to  demon- 
strate the  regnum  Christi  merely  in  statu  exaltationis,  whereas 


399-400]    DOCTRINIB   OF   CHRIST'S   PERSON   AND   LIFE-WORK      423 

they  make  the  other  two  offices  hold  for  both  forms  of  exist- 
ence.    This  betrays  an  ominous  resemblance  to  the  Socinian 
position,  and  throws  doubt  upon  the  possibility  of  success- 
fully opposing  the  latter  in  the  other  points  connected  with 
the  doctrine  of  Christ.    For,  according  to  Luther's  Catechisms 
at  least,  it  is  the  regnum  Christi  which  is  the  direct  test  of 
His  Godhead.     If  the  Kingship  of  Christ  fails  to  approve 
itself  in  statu  exiTuinitionis,  then  the  teaching  of  the  highest 
Prophet  affords  so  much  the  less  ground  for  applying  to  Him 
the  predicate  of  Godhead,  that  His  sufferings  in  the  office  of 
Priest  seem  directly  to  contradict  the  characteristic  attributes 
of  Deity.    Many  of  the  Reformed  theologians,  however,  under 
the  impulse  of  opposition  to  the  Socinians,  have  made  a  brave 
attempt  to  supplement  the  theory  at  this  point.    In  Gomarus, 
Maccovius,  Wendelin,  Heidanus,  Blissen,  I  find  the  following 
adduoed  as  proofs  of  the  Kingship  of  Christ,  namely,  that  He 
was  bom  as  King  of  the  Jews,  that  He  was  worshipped  by 
the  Magi,  that  He  issued  commands  to  evil  spirits,  that  He 
made  changes  in  the  law,  forgave  sins,  wrought  miracles,  and 
made  a  royal  entry  into  Jerusalem.     By  these  things  He 
declared  not  only  His  destination  to  Kingship  in  the  future, 
which  the  Socinians  admitted,  but  His  possession  of  the  right 
to  the  same.     In  conclusion,  the  said  theologians  argue  that, 
if  these  are  not  valid  proofs  of  the  active  Kingship  of  Christ, 
then  that  Kingship  cannot  be  dated  even  from  His  resur- 
rection, but  is  estabUshed  only  by  the  complete  subjection  of 
the  world  to  Him  at  the  last.     These  arguments  have  been 
appropriated  by  the  later  Lutherans  HoUatz  and   Buddeus. 
But  a  makeshift  of  this  sort,  compounded  of  elements  wholly 
incongruous,  is  the  more  powerless  to  produce  conviction  that 
it  betrays  complete  ignorance  of  what  is  universally  recog- 
nised as  the  subject-matter  of  the  regnum  Christi  in  statu 
excUtationis.     This  consideration,  according  to  the  statement 
supplied  by  Krauss,  has  been  regarded  by  one  only  of  the 
Eeformed    theologians  on  the  European  continent,  namely, 
WoUeb.     By  him,  the  effort  Christ  spent  on  the  formation 
of  His  community,  namely.  His  appointment  of  the  apostles 


424  JUSTmOATlON   AND   IIECJONCILIATION  t^OO-l 

and  Hifi  institution  of  the  sacraments,  is  described  as  evidence 
of  His  active  exercise  of  kingly  rights.^  This  assumption 
is  shared  by  the  Helmstedt  Lutheran,  Hornejus,  and  it  re- 
appears in  Schleiermacher  (vol.  L  p.  522),  who  quotes  the 
sending  forth  of  the  disciples  and  the  instructions  given 
for  their  conduct  as  the  historical  marks  of  the  Kingship  of 
Christ. 

Within  the  circle  of  Calvinism,  however,  even  before  its 
contact  with  Socinianism,  there  appeared  a  most  vigorous 
interpretation   of  the  Kingship  of  Christ  in   His  historical 
life,  an  interpretation  with  independent  features  of  its  own. 
The  Puritan  exposition  of  Christ's  Kingship  has  in  view  the 
acceptance  of    Christ  as  Lawgiver    for    the    Church  in  ita 
capacity  as  a  visible,  organised,  and  worshipping  community. 
This  is  a  direct  departure  from  the  conception  of  the  regnum 
ChrisH  spirituale   upheld  alike   by   Calvin  and    by  Luther. 
The  idea  attained  concrete  realisation  owing  to  the  special 
conditions    under    which    the    congregations    of    Dutch  and 
English  exiles  were  forced  to  dispense  with  the  support  of 
the  State,  and  the  English  Puritans,  like  the  Scots,  had  to 
efifect  the  formation  of  a  Eeformed  Church  in  conflict  with 
the  civil  power.     At   the  same   time   it  cannot  be  denied 
that  in   the  editions  of  the   InstittUio   between   1539   and 
1554    there   is   a    statement  of    Calvin's   pointing  in   this 
direction,  which  is   wanting  in   1536,  and  has  again   dis- 
appeared in  1559.     This  statement,  however,  Calvin  makes, 
not  under  the  head  of  the  regnum  ChrisH,  but  by  way  of 
explaining  the  title  dominus  in  the  Creed.*     The  idea  was 
appropriated  by  John  a  Lasco,  along  with  Calvin's  interpreta- 
tion of  the  regnum  Christi,     In  the  Catechism  of  the  Con- 

^  Christ.  theoL  co7npend.  i.  18:  ''Regium  officium  in  humiliationis  statu 
administravit  ecclesiam  verbo  ac  spiritu  sic  congregando  et  conservando,  iit 
nihil  externae  regiae  maiestatis  in  ipso  apparaerit." 

^  C,  R.  xxix.  p.  516:  **Postremo  illi  domini  elogium  adscribitur,  quoniam 
hac  lege  mundo  praefectus  est  a  patre,  ut  eius  dominationem  hie  exerceat.  .  .  . 
Sic  autem  significatur,  non  tantum  praeceptorem  esse  et  magistram,  cat 
aascultandnm  sit  docenti,  sed  caput  ac  principem,  cuius  imperio  parendum 
sit,  caius  nutui  obtemperandum,  cuius  ad  voluutatem  obsequia  nostra  sint 
dirigenda." 


401-2]      DOCTRINB   OF   OHlCIST*S   PERSON   AND   LIFE-WORK        425 

gregation  of  Exiles  in  London  (1551),  he  speaks,  on  the 
one  hand,  of  the  Kingship  of  Christ  as  existing  for  the 
protection  of  believers  from  every  evil,  and  expresses  the 
thought  that  believers  ipsius  plenitudine  in  reges  atque 
Sdcerdotes  domino  in  spiritu  consecrantur.  But  at  the  same 
period,  in  the  Compendium  dodrinae,  following  the  order 
regnum,  prophetia,  sacerdotium,  he  describes  the  content  of 
the  first  of  these  offices  as  being  the  communication  through 
Christ  of  all  eternal  and  unchangeable  laws  for  the  Church. 
This  view  first  finds  a  distinct  echo  in  the  Scots  Confession 
of  1650:  "lesum  Christum  esse  Messiam  promissum, 
unicum  ecclesiae  caput,  iustum  nostrum  legislatorem,  unicum 
nostrum  summum  sacerdotem  confitemur."  Then  the  founder 
of  English  Puritcmism,  Eobert  Browne,^  follows  suit  with 
the  statement:  ''The  Kingdom  of  Christ  is  His  office  of 
government,  whereby  He  useth  the  obedience  of  His  people, 
to  keep  His  laws  and  commandements  to  their  salvation  and 
welfare."  Also,  in  the  Larger  Catechism  of  the  Westminster 
Assembly  of  the  year  1648,  this  thought  certainly  gets  the 
first  place,  before  the  other  acknowledged  attributes  of 
Christ's  Kingship :  "  Christus  exsequitur  munus  regium  dum 
populum  sibi  ex  mundo  vocat,  eosque  officiariis,  legibus  ac 
censuris  donat  atque  instruit,  quibus  eos  visibili  modo  regit 
et  gubemat."*  These  principles  reappear  in  the  Puritan 
theologians  of  the  seventeenth  century,  and  on  them  is  based, 
in  particular,  the  binding  force  of  Christ's  legislation  with 
regard  to  worship.  Yet  it  is  well  worth  noting  that  a 
theologian  so  influential  as  John  Owen  refuses  to  regard  as 
exhaustive  this  reference  of  Christ's  Kingship  to  the  external 
supremacy  of  the  Gospel,  as  seen  in  the  obedience  given  to 
Church  officers.  He  not  only  recognises  that  thereby  injury 
is  done  to  the  significance  of  Christ's  Divine  nature  as  the 
basis  of  His  dominion  over  the  world,  but,  in  the  spirit  of 
Luther  and  Calvin,  he  emphasises  the  internal  and  spiritual 

*  The  Life  and  Maniurs  of  all  True  Christiaivs^  1582. 

^  loh.  a  Lasco,  Opera,  ed.  Kuyper,  torn.  ii.  pp.  416,  430,  304,  306  ;  Niemeyer, 
CoU,  Conff.  p.  345,  Appendix,  p.  54  ;  Weingarten,  Revdutumskirchen  EnglandSy 
p.  21. 


I 


426  JUSTIFICATION   AND   RECONCILIATION  [402-3 

character  of  Christ's  dominion,  as  consisting  in  that  rule  over 
souls  which  alone  gives  obedience  to  Christ  its  worth.^ 

The  Puritan  view  of  Christ's  Kingship  is  undoubtedly 
the  source  of  that  flavour  of  the  ceremonial  law  which 
obtains  in  the  Scottish  Church  and  in  Independency ;  it  also 
opens  the  way  for  that  rejection  or  limitation  of  the  inter- 
ference of  the  State  with  the  Church  which  is  the  mark  of 
Independency,  and  has  dominated  the  ecclesiastical  history  of 
Scotland.  At  the  same  time,  even  for  this  particular  circle 
of  Calvinism,  the  significance  of  the  view  before  us  is  far 
more  ecclesiastical  than  dogmatic.  For  example,  the  fact 
that  in  the  Beformed  Churches  of  the  Continent  this  view  is 
not  current,  has  never  been  felt  by  the  Puritans  to  be  a 
ground  of  ecclesiastical  separation.  On  the  contrary,  we  see 
in  Owen  that  the  directly  opposite  doctrine  of  the  spiritual 
nature  of  Christ's  Kingship  is  maintained  alongside  of  it  as 
the  matter  of  chief  concern.  Ko  doubt,  historically  con- 
sidered Christ's  intention  of  founding  a  community,  and  His 
preparatory  steps  toward  that  end,  are  to  be  viewed  as  the 
material  of  His  Kingship ;  but  the  indications  in  Matthew's 
Gospel  (if  the  words  were  spoken  by  Christ  at  all),  that  His 
community  is  to  assume  a  constitutional  form,  have  not  the 
force  of  statutory  legislation ;  the  legal  element,  which  is  the 
unique  feature  of  Puritanism,  does  not  come  from  Christ. 
The  Puritan  idea  of  the  Kingship  of  Christ,  therefore,  so  far 
as  it  goes  beyond  the  position  of  Wolleb  and  Schleiermacher, 
need  not  further  be  taken  into  account.  Here  and  there, 
however,  in  the  Eeformed  theology  we  get  valuable  hints 
toward  a  restatement  of  the  dogma  of  the  three  offices  of 
Christ.     For  example,  there  is  the  remark  of  Amesius  that 

^  Person  of  Christy  Ood  and  Man,  chap.  vii.  ( WorkSy  London,  1721,  p.  51) : 
"Some  seem  to  imagine  that  the  kingly  power  of  Christ  towards  the  Chnrch 
consists  only  in  external  rule  by  the  gospel  and  the  laws  thereof,  requiring 
obedience  unto  the  officers  and  rulers,  that  He  hath  appointed  therein.  It  is 
true  that  this  also  belongs  unto  His  kingly  power  and  rule.  But  to  suppose 
that  it  consisteth  solely  therein,  is  an  ebullition  from  the  poisonous  fountain 
of  the  denial  of  His  Diyine  person."  P.  58 :  **  The  rule  of  Christ  as  King  of 
the  Church  is  internal  and  spiritual  over  the  minds,  souls,  and  conscienoes  of 
all  that  do  believe." 


403-4]      DOCTRINB   OP   CHRIST'S    PERSON   AND   LIFE-WORK        427 

in  the  statu  exaltationis  the  Kingship  of  Christ  involves  a 
certain  modification  of  the  prophetic  and  the  priestly  oflBce, 
so  that  Christ  regium  sacerdotium  et  prophetiam  regiam  exerceat 
{MeduUay  i.  23,  32).  Does  not  this  remark  apply  also  to  our 
view  of  Christ's  earthly  life  ?  Does  not  the  prophetic  activity 
of  Christ,  so  far  as  it  seeks  the  establishment  of  the  Kingdom 
of  God  from  His  own  person  as  centre,  also  display  the  note 
of  Kingship?  Besides,  have  not  the  Seformed  theologians 
(vol.  i.  p.  275)  made  the  positive  statement  that,  in  discharg- 
ing the  priestly  office  of  satisfaction  by  His  double  obedience, 
Christ  acts  as  capiU  ecdesiae,  that  is  to  say,  exercises  the 
office  of  a  King  ? 

The  reply  to  the  first  question  is  already  given  in  the 
statement  with  which  Ernesti  (vol.  i.  p.  521)  introduced  his 
objections  to  the  customary  definition  of   the  three  offices, 
namely,  that  if  Moses  is  a  type  of  Christ,  then  for  the  latter 
the  kingly  and    the  prophetic  office    fall  into  one.      This 
corresponds  also  to  the  acknowledged  historical  facts.     For 
when  Jesus,  who  appeared  with  the  marks  of  a  prophet  only, 
and  was  so  regarded,  sought  recognition  from  His  disciples  as 
the  anointed  King,  He  ranged  the  material  of  His  prophetic 
activity  under  a  conception  which  must  in  itself  have  had  no 
relation  to  it.     Hence  it  is  a  purely  arbitrary  analysis  of 
the  word  "  Christ "  when  theologians  find  expressed  in   it 
both  the  prophetic  and  the  kingly  office.     Then  the  gradual 
development  of  the  dogma  showed  that  Christ  in  statu  exalta- 
tionis  had  to  act  not  only  as  King  but  as  Priest  in  establishing 
the  Church;  so  that  in  this  connection  also  the  two  titles 
coincide.    On  the  other  hand,  it  follows  from  the  statement  of 
Bef ormed  theologians  already  referred  to,  and  which  has  found 
so  wide  response  in  more  recent  times,  that  the  Kingship  of 
Christ  is  to  be  regarded  as  operative  in  His  priestly  ministry 
also;  which  combination  we  may  reasonably  understand  to 
mean,  in  the  sense  of  Ernesti,  that  Christ,  by  offering  up  His 
life,  gives  the  supreme  proof  of  His  Kingship  in  the  interest 
of  His  subjects.     In  any  case  it  follows  that,  if  Christ  in  His 
priestly  ministry  is  to  be  regarded  as  caput  ecdesiae.  Priesthood 


428  JUSTIFICATION   AND   REOONCILUTION  [404-6 

and  Kingship  cannot  be  set  alongside  each  other  as  independ- 
ent offices,  but  the  former  must  be  understood  as  a  particular 
consequence  and  application  of  the  latter.     Thus  the  analysis 
of  the  title  Christ,  which  led   to  the  scheme  of   the  three 
offices,  is  as  amplj  refuted  in  argument  as  it  lacks  justification 
in  history.     For  Jesus  is  called  the  Anointed  solely  to  denote 
His  sovereign  dignity.      If  He  is  also  called  Prophet  and 
Priest,  it  is  clear  that    His    prophetic  activities  afford    the 
material  for  the  exercise  of  His  Kingship,  and,  in  view  of  the 
previous  discussion,  we  may  surmise  that  His  priestly  activity, 
in  freely  surrendering  His  life,  must  be  regarded  also  as  a 
particular  manifestation  of  His  Kingship,  conditioned  by  the 
special  circumstances  of  the  case.     Beformed  theologians,  e.g. 
Amesius  and  Wendelin,  justify  the  setting  up  of  the  three 
offices  alongside  of  and  in  succession  to  each  other,  from  the 
ordo   conferendae   salutis,  qui  prvus    debuit   expUcari,  deinde 
acquiriy  postea   applicari.     But    this    observation    is    not   of 
sufficient    weight    to  uphold  the  linear  enumeration  of  the 
three  offices  of    Christ    against    the    subordination,  already 
indicated,  of  the  two  other  offices  to  the  office  of  King.     For 
what  is  here  formally  and  theoretically  distinguished,  is  in 
actual  fact  neither  co-ordinate  nor  distinct.    The  whole  opera- 
tion, therefore,  is   of    value  only  in  so  far  as  it  secures  a 
complete  mastery  of  the  material  which  must  be  included  in 
determining  the  significance  of  Christ  as  mediator  scUutia  ;  but 
what  that  significance  is,  the  scheme  of  the  three  offices  does 
not  reveal,  for  the  simple  reason  that  complete  knowledge 
must  take  the  form  of  unity. 

While,  therefore,  in  our  effort  to  grasp  the  significance  of 
Christ's  life,  we  are  at  liberty  to  follow  the  lines  of  the 
scheme  now  before  us,  yet  this  much  we  must  regard  as 
proved,  that  Christ's  exercise  of  His  Kingship,  which  for 
Himself  is  the  chief  thing,  seeing  He  wishes  to  be  recognised 
as  the  Christ,  will  find  expression  both  in  His  prophetic  and 
in  His  priestly  service.  And  since  the  kingly  activity  of 
Christ  pertains  to  the  founding  and  upholding  of  the  religious 
community  of  Christ,  therefore  in  the  statu  exinanitionis  it  is 


405-6]       DOCTRINS   OF   CHRIST'S   PERSON   AND   LIFE-WORK        429 

represented  by  the  purpose  of  Christ  to  accomplish  this  end, 

which  purpose  pervades  His  two  other  activities,  and  is  never 

out  of  their  view.     On  the  other  hand,  the  priestly  and  the 

prophetic  oflBces  refuse  to  be  merged  in  each  other,  for  the 

former  moves  in  the  direction  from  man  to  God,  and    the 

latter  in  exactly  the  opposite  direction,  from  God  to  man. 

The    traditional    theology,   however,   dififerentiates   also    the 

material  presented  to  us  under  these  two  conceptions.     To 

Christ's  prophetic  office  are  reckoned  all  His  words,  to  His 

priestly  office  all  His  deeds.    Moreover,  as  Priest,  Christ  must 

satisfy  the  double  legal  demand  made  by  God  on  sinful  men, 

namely,  through  the  conformity  of  His  whole  conduct  to  the 

moral  law  in  His  intercourse  with  men,  and  through  readiness 

to  endure  all  possible  persecution  as  the  punishment  of  sin. 

Now,  as  is  well  known,  the  distinction  between  active  and 

passive  obedience  is  due  entirely  to  this  consideration  of  the 

double  claim  of  the  law  upon  sinful  men.      Eegarded  in 

themselves,  the  two  conceptions  are  not  mutually  exclusive. 

For  obedience  in  suffering  is  either  non-existent  or  else  it 

exists  in  the  active  form  of  endurance;  suffering  which  is 

not  at   bottom  an  exercise  of  moral  will  would  not  come 

under  the  head  of  obedience  at  all.      These  considerations 

apply  also  to  the  older  Dogmatics,  for  the  latter  distinguishes 

and  co-ordinates  the  two  conceptions  of   obedience  only  in 

regard  to  the  satisfaction  offered  to  God,  whereas,  from  the 

point  of  view  of  merit,  it  combines  them  in  the  one  obedience 

to  the  Divine  will.      This  means  the  setting  up  alongside  of 

each  other  of  two  views  of  the  same  matter,  one  clear  and 

the  other  crooked,  and  the  question  arises  not  only  whether 

this  is  in  itself  conceivable,  but  especially  whether  there  is 

evidence  for  it  in  the  consciousness  of  Jesus.     I  waive  the 

point  as  to  whether  God  regarded  the  life  of  Christ  at  one 

and  the  same  time  from  the  standpoint  of  legal  righteousness 

and  from  that  of  loving  Providence.     But  for  the  individual 

consciousness  of  Jesus  it  is  neither  proved  nor  even  probable 

that  He  regarded  the  details  of  His  life  at  one  moment  as 

satisfaction  to  God,  at  another  as  service  rendered,  at  one 


430  JUSTIFICATION   AND   RECONCILIATION  [406-7 

time  in  the  light  of  the  distinction  between  doing  and  suffer- 
ing, at  another  in  the  light  of  the  subordination  of  suffering 
to  doing.  Yet  this  must  needs  be  the  case  to  satisfy  the 
demands  of  the  traditional  Dogmatics.  For  though,  at  the 
end  of  Christ's  life,  His  sufferings  assumed  for  Him  a  form 
more  intensified  in  degree,  yet  in  essence  they  were  identical 
through  all  the  stages  of  His  public  life,  being  interwoven 
with  His  work  from  the  beginning.  Thus  the  particular 
distinctipns  which  have  been  made  in  the  material  of  Christ's 
priestly  office  do  not  stand  the  test  of  comparison  with  the 
facts  of  His  historical  life. 

The  same  is  true  of  the  distribution  of  Christ's  words  and 
deeds  between  the  two  offices  of  Prophet  and  Priest.  The 
deeds  of  Christ  in  their  conformity  to  the  Divine  law  are 
regarded  exclusively  as  something  rendered  to  God ;  but 
surely,  in  the  first  place,  they  are  something  rendered  to  man, 
to  the  various  classes  of  men  with  whom  Christ  comes  into 
more  or  less  intimate  relation.  The  words  of  Christ  are 
regarded  exclusively  in  their  prophetic  significance  for  man ; 
but  His  words,  equally  with  His  deeds,  must  submit  to  be 
judged  by  the  standards  of  the  moral  law.  And  therefore 
the  truth,  wisdom,  and  self-possession  that  mark  the  words  of 
Christ  are  just  as  much  a  part  of  His  moral  obedience  toward 
God,  as  the  "  grace  and  truth,"  which  pervade  all  His  deeds, 
are  part  of  His  function  as  Prophet  to  reveal  the  will  of  God 
to  men.  Therefore,  just  as  it  proved  impossible  alongside  of 
Christ's  priestly  and  prophetic  activity  to  find  a  separate 
sphere  for  the  exercise  of  His  Kingship,  so  it  is  equally 
impossible  to  assign  to  each  of  these  two  offices  a  separate 
department  of  Christ's  life.  Thus  the  expectation  based 
upon  the  doctrine  of  the  three  offices,  that  thereby  we  should 
reach  a  true  division  of  the  life  of  Christ,  is  shown  to  be 
groundless.  The  kingly  office  of  Christ  finds  expression  only 
in  His  manifest  purpose  by  deed  and  word  to  establish  the 
commimity  of  the  Kingdom  of  God  and  to  lead  it  to  its  goal ; 
and  although  Christ  in  His  life  both  reveals  God  to  men  and 
represents  men  to  God,  or  brings  men  near  to  God,  yet  in 


407-8]       DOCTRINE   OF   CHRIST'S   PERSON   AND  LIFE-WORK        431 

the    light  of  our  preceding  discussion  we  must  not  expect 

that  Christ's  words  and  deeds  as  a  whole  will  permit  of  exact 

subdivision  between  these  diverse  categories.     In  all  these 

respects   the  doctrine  of  the  three  offices  spells  failure.     If, 

however,  the  formal  distinction  between  the  kingly  Priesthood 

and  the  kingly  Prophethood  of  Christ  is  to  be  maintained,  we 

must  show  how  this  distinction,  as  a  means  of  apprehending 

the  homogeneous  life-work  of  Christ,  is  derived   from  the 

manifest  inward  unity  of  the  same.     For  the  older  school  it 

might    be  sufficient  that  in   the  New  Testament  Christ  is 

named  Prophet  and  Priest ;  for  us  that  counts  as  a  valuable 

fingerpost  to  guide  our  inquiry,  but  can  by  no  means  be 

taken  as  the  expression  of  a  complete  understanding  of  the 

life-work  and  religious  worth  of  Christ. 

The  superficial  formalism  of  the  old  method  comes  out, 
also,  in  the  way  in  which  the  contrast  between  the  two  states 
of  Christ  is  applied  to  His  three  official  functions.     For  it  is 
only  in  theory  that  there  is  any  contrast  between  them ;  in 
reality,  whatever  falls  within  the  statvs  excUtcUionis  must  be 
conceived  as  a  continuation  of  the  corresponding  functions  of 
the  status  eadnanitioniSy  if  it  is  capable  of  being  clearly  con- 
ceived at  all.     I  have  already  pointed  out  (p.  406)  that  the 
formula  which  describes  Christ  as  exalted  to  the  right  hand 
of  God,  either  has  for  us  no  meaning,  since  Christ  as  exalted 
is  beyond  our  ken,  or  else  oflFers  an  occasion  for  every  form  of 
extravagance,  unless  regard  be  had  to  the  fact  that  between 
Christ  and  the  community  of  believers,  which  He  designed  by 
His  words,  deeds,  and  patience  to  establish,  there  is  an  abiding 
relation  whereby  Christ  continues  to  be  the  ground  of  its  exist- 
ence and  specific  character.    If  by  His  kingly  Prophethood  and 
Priesthood  Christ  founded  His  community,  then  its  present 
maintenance,  thi'ough  the  continued  exercise  of  these  func- 
tions in  His  exalted  state,  can  only  be  rightly  judged  in  the 
light  of  what  is  recognised  to  have  been  the  content  of  these 
functions  in  His  historical  life.     Indeed,  this   principle  is 
already  systematically  applied    to  explain   the  attribute  of 
intercession  which,  in  the  Epistles  to  the  Bomans  and  to  the 


432  JUSTIFICATION   AND   RECONCILIATiON  [408-9 

Hebrews,  is  ascribed  to  the  exalted  Christ,  and  which  there- 
fore is  regarded  as  a  continuation  of  His  Priesthood.  It  is 
understood  to  mean  that  what  Christ  accomplished  as  Priest 
by  His  sufferings  and  death  for  the  founding  of  His  com- 
munity, remains  the  efficient  ground  of  its  relation  to  God. 
The  continuance  of  the  kingly  Prophethood  signifies  that  the 
power  of  the  Gospel  of  the  Kingdom  of  God,  through  which 
Christ  founded  His  community,  is  that  means  for  its  mainten- 
ance and  extension  which  corresponds  to  the  historical  dignity 
of  Christ,  and  causes  His  person  to  be  recognised  as  still 
efifective  for  that  end.  With  regard  to  Christ's  earthly  life, 
we  had  already  found  that  no  material  was  forthcoming  for 
the  exercise  of  His  kingly  office  which  did  not  fall  in  part 
under  His  prophetic,  in  part  under  His  priestly,  activity. 
This  conclusion  is  further  strengthened  when  we  proceed  to 
examine  more  closely  the  idea  introduced  by  Calvin,  that  the 
exalted  Christ  exercises  His  Kingship  in  the  assurance  which 
believers  have  of  their  salvation,  in  their  victory  over  the 
enemies  thereof,  and  in  their  patience  under  all  kinds  of  evil. 
For  it  will  appear  that  these  are  merely  such  results  as  are 
necessarily  involved  in  His  Priesthood,  so  far  as  by  His 
Priesthood  He  has  reconciled  us  to  God. 

The  traditional  scheme  of  the  three  offices  is  only  a  first 
step  toward  grasping  the  significance  of  Christ  for  the  com- 
munity which  believes  on  Him.  It  is  a  mere  attempt  to 
reach  as  complete  a  mastery  as  possible  of  the  material  at 
our  disposal.  But,  since  it  offers  us  only  distinctions  and 
contrasts  without  reducing  these  to  an  ultimate  unity,  it  is 
far  from  being  an  exhaustive  treatment  of  the  subject,  which 
as  such  is  neither  twofold  nor  threefold,  but  one.  I  have 
endeavoured  to  approach  the  truth  by  reducing  the  different 
data  before  us  to  their  inherent  unity.  From  this  point  of 
view  it  is  necessary,  first  of  all,  that  Christ's  activity  in  statu 
eocaltationis  be  conceived  as  the  expression  of  the  abiding 
influence  of  His  historical  manifestation.  Further,  His  deeds 
and  words  must  be  regarded  as  the  one  common  material  of 
His  prophetic  and  priestly  activities,  and  His  kingly  office 


409]  DOCTRINB   OF   CHRIST'S    PERSON    AND   LIFE-WORK        433 

must  be  included  in  these  as  a  specific  modification  of  the 
same;  or,  more  correctly,  His  Kingship  must  be  shown  to 
consist  in  these  very  same  priestly  and  prophetic  activities 
in  so  far  as  both  are  inspired  by  His  purpose  to  found  and 
maintain  a  community  of  believers.  Only  the  prophetic  and 
the  priestly  activities  refuse  to  coalesce,  because  in  the 
relation  between  God  and  man  they  run  in  exactly  opposite 
directions.  And  yet,  just  because  of  this  twofold  relation, 
they  form  the  unity  of  the  opus  mediaiorium.  It  will  be  our 
business,  by  means  of  further  elucidations,  partly  to  sub- 
stantiate, partly  to  complete,  this  unity  of  the  prophetic  and 
priestly  functions  in  Christ.  This,  however,  we  can  only  do 
by  analysing  the  purpose  which  may  be  seen  to  pervade 
Christ's  life  as  a  whole. 

In  conclusion,  another  point  must  be  noted,  namely, 
that  the  designation  of  the  three  "  offices "  is  not  free  from 
objection.  It  is  quite  true  that  the  equivalence  in  theological 
usage  of  munus  and  officiwrn  is  a  guarantee  that  the  old 
theologians  did  not  conceive  the  first  expression  as  contrasted 
with  the  second.  But  German  usage  has  given  a  preference 
to  the  word  Ami,  and  offers  no  equivalent  for  offidum.  Now 
the  word  Amt  denotes  a  special  calling  such  as  contributes  to 
the  existence  of  a  legally  constituted  community,  or  an  ethical 
community  existing  under  legal  conditions.  But  in  the  case 
before  us  the  circumstances  to  be  dealt  with  are  wholly 
different.  For  by  the  Kingdom  of  God  which  Christ  estab- 
lishes is  meant  a  community  resting,  not  on  legal  rights,  but 
on  loving  conduct ;  among  its  other  characteristics  is  this, 
that  for  love  men  give  up  their  legal  rights,  or  at  any  rate 
do  not  bring  the  standard  of  right  as  such  visibly  into 
application.  That  Christ's  Kingdom  is  not  of  this  world 
(John  xviii.  36),  can  only  mean  that  it  is  exempt  from  the 
standard  of  legal  rights.  Besides,  in  the  Old  Testament 
prophecy  never  was  an  "  Amt " ;  it  was  always  a  free  re- 
ligious vocation.  Finally,  the  Epistle  to  the  Hebrews  sets 
forth  that  the  Priesthood  of  Christ  is  subject  to  other  con- 
ditions than  the  oflBcial  (amtlich)  priesthood  of  the  Old 
28 


434  JUSTIFICATION   AND   RECONCILIATION  [409-10 

Testament.  Therefore  it  is  only  of  the  personal  vocation 
of  Christ  that  we  have  any  right  to  speak  in  these  rela- 
tions. Accuracy  in  the  scientific  use  of  terms  is  not  a 
matter  of  indifference.  Although  the  old  theologians  had 
no  intention  of  drawing  a  distinction  at  this  point  between 
munits  and  offidum,  it  has  happened  all  the  same  that, 
following  in  Melanchthon's  track,  they  have  introduced  as 
the  specific  organ  of  the  regnum  Christi  spirituale  the  ofiBcial, 
that  is,  the  duly  licensed,  preaching  of  the  gospel  and  ad- 
ministration of  the  sacraments  (p.  289).  An  inference  from 
that  position  meets  us  in  the  statement  of  the  Eeformed 
theologian  Polanus :  ^  "  Huius  regis  nostri  prorex  seu  vicarius 
generalis  non  est  papa  Romanus,  sed  omnes  fidi  ecclesiae 
pastores  sunt  Christi  vicarii."  This  is  not  consistent  with 
the  spiritual  character  of  Christ's  lordship,  which  is  mani- 
fested in  the  fact  that  Gospel  and  sacraments  continue  to 
exist  at  all  in  the  community  of  believers.  That  particular 
officials  are  duly  licensed  to  administer  Word  and  sacrament 
follows,  not  from  the  religious  character  of  the  community  as 
such,  in  which,  consistently  with  Christ's  vocation  as  Prophet, 
all  must  be  regarded  as  "taught  of  God,"  but  from  the 
earthly  and  historical  conditions  of  the  existence  of  the 
community.  If,  on  the  contrary,  a  duly  licensed  office  as 
such  is  the  organ  of  Christ's  lordship,  then  the  declarations 
of  Christ  Himself,  that  His  Kingdom  is  not  of  this  world, 
and  that  His  disciples  are  not  to  rule  but  to  serve  (Mark  x. 
42-45),  are  made  of  none  effect.  It  is  better  that  Polanus 
be  declared  mistaken.  But,  to  remove  the  occasion  for  such 
assertions,  and  for  the  hierarchical  pretensions  which  are 
founded  upon  them,  it  is  well  to  withhold  from  the  work 
of  Christ  the  title  of  "office"  {Amt)y  since  this  title  may 
lead  the  holders  of  office  in  the  Church,  because  of  their 
formal  ecclesiastical  distinction  and  prerogative  as  compared 
with  the  ordinary  members  of  the  commimity,  to  pose  as  the 
representatives  of  Christ. 

§  47.  The  religious  view  of  the  world  is  such  tliat  God 

,     _  ^  Syntagma  theoL  vi.  29.  p.  448. 


410-1]       DOCTRINB   OF   CHRIST'S    PERSON   AND    LIFE-WORK        435 

is  recognised  as  the  efficient  cause  at  work  in  the  significant 
phenomena  of  nature  and  of  the  human  mind.  In  the 
sprouting  of  vegetation  the  heathen  sees  particular  gods; 
in  its  decay  he  sees  their  death ;  Zeus  thunders,  and  by 
the  hot  rays  of  the  sun  Apollo  slays.  Nor,  on  this  level 
of  natural  reUgion,  is  any  particular  need  felt  for  any  other 
formula  than  that  the  life  of  the  gods  is  identical  with  the  life 
of  the  corresponding  natural  objects.  For  only  to  the  more 
exact  observation  of  the  scientist  does  Nature  give  the  im- 
pression of  possessing  in  herself  a  relative  independence.  It 
is  otherwise  when  individual  men  acquire  religious  significance, 
since  these  produce  an  unquahfied  impression  of  mental  in- 
dependence. If  in  their  actions  there  is  descried  a  special 
interposition  of  God,  as  when  the  Assyrian  king  inflicts  God's 
judgment  on  the  Israelites,  or  Koresch  is  God's  servant  to 
deliver  them  from  banishment,  then  these  persons  come  into 
consideration  as  instruments  of  the  Divine  action.  In  this 
capacity  they  stand  at  a  greater  distance  from  God,  if  it  be 
assumed  that  the  Divine  purposes  which  they  serve  are  to 
themselves  unknown.  Nearer  to  God  stand  the  prophets; 
but  these,  too,  in  varying  degree.  The  heathen  view  of 
prophecy,  for  example,  assumes  a  curtailment  or  cessation 
of  the  usual  mental  independence  of  the  prophet,  who  is 
accounted  an  organ  of  Divine  revelation  in  the  degree  in 
which  through  ecstasies  and  mania  he  has  ceased  to  have 
control  over  himself.  But  the  prevailing  Old  Testament 
view  of  prophecy  presupposes  both  the  mental  and  the 
moral  independence  of  the  prophets,  and  controls  the 
Divine  impulse  which  is  perceived  in  them  by  the  recogni- 
tion of  their  own  consciousness  of  the  same,  and  their  con- 
vinced assent  to  the  words  of  God  which  are  given  them. 
At  the  same  time  the  religious  value  attached  to  the  prophets 
and  their  words  both  by  themselves  and  their  countrymen 
is  this,  that  they  are  accounted  the  instruments  or  organs 
of  the  self-revelation  of  God.  In  no  way  different  is  the 
estimate  put  by  Jesus  upon  Himself,  save  only  that  the 
essential    and    ultimate    Divine    purpose,    which    Jesus    is 


436  JaSTIFlCATION    AND    RECONCILIATION  [411-2 

conscious  not  only  of  explaining  in  word  but  of  realising 
in  deed,  involves  His  placing  His  own  independent  per- 
sonality in  a  still  closer  relation  to  God  His  Father.  His 
estimate  of  Himself  betrays,  it  is  true,  a  sort  of  sliding 
scale  in  the  way  He  describes  His  own  relation  to  God, 
not  only  in  John,  but  also  in  the  other  Gospels;  yet  amid 
this  variety  of  presentation,  describing  Himself  at  one  time 
as  a  mere  ambassador  who  has  seen  and  heard  God  and 
executes  His  commands,  and  at  another  time  as  the  Son  of 
God  Who  pursues  God's  work  and  in  His  own  person  exer- 
cises God's  lordship  over  men  for  the  ends  of  the  Kingdom 
of  God,  Jesus  attributes  to  His  life  as  a  whole,  in  the  unity 
which  for  His  own  consciousness  it  possesses,  the  worth  of 
being  the  instrument  of  the  complete  self-revelation  of  God. 
This  is  the  purely  religioiis  type  of  self-judgment.  But  the 
unique  feature  of  the  case  is,  that  there  is  not  a  trace  of 
evidence  to  show  that  Jesus  exempts  any  one  relation  of 
His  own  spiritual  life  and  activity  from  the  standard  in 
question.  For  even  when  He  expresses  Himself  in  terms 
of  independent  human  purpose,  that  purpose  is  at  least 
adjusted  to  the  ultimate  Divine  end  for  men  which  He  is 
seeking  to  promote.  The  difference,  namely,  does  not  present 
itself  to  His  consciousness  in  the  form  of  a  contrast,  as 
in  the  case  of  Paul,  who  says  on  the  one  hand  that  Christ 
lives  in  him,  and  on  the  other  that  he  lives  a  natural  life, 
but  in  the  faith  of  Christ  (Gal.  ii.  20).  And  thus  John,  in 
seeking  to  realise  the  impression  made  on  his  own  mind 
of  the  worth  of  Christ's  Ufe  as  a  whole,  was  in  a  position  to 
construct  a  new  formula,  which  implies  more  than  that  Christ 
was  an  instrument  of  Divine  revelation.  His  faith  in  the 
Divine  worth  of  Christ  expresses  itself  in  this  judgment  with 
regard  to  Him — that  the  Divine  revelation  is  a  human 
person. 

This  conception  is  not  framed  to  suit  any  system  of 
scientific  knowledge,  or  to  embody  a  statutory  explanation 
of  the  experienced  fact ;  the  context  on  both  sides  admits 
of  its  being  formulated  in  two  different  ways.     Viewed  in 


412-3]      DOCTRINE   OF   CHRIST'S    PERSON   AND   LIFE-WORK        437 

the  light  of  the  openmg  words  of  John's  exposition,  the 
statement  has  this  meaning,  that  the  Divine  reveaUng  Word 
constitutes  the  form,  and  the  human  individual  the  substance, 
of  the  Person  of  Christ.  This  is  what  in  the  end  the 
doctrine  of  the  Greek  Church  comes  to.  For  the  theory  of 
the  anhypostasis  of  the  human  nature  in  Christ,  the  reverse 
side  of  the  theory  that  both  natures  subsist  in  the  unity  of 
the  hypostasis,  is  intelligible  only  if  the  Divine  Logos  is  the 
form  in  which  this  human  individual  exists,  outside  of  which 
He  has  no  real  existence  at  alL  For  the  form  is  the  basis  of 
reality.  The  anhypostasis  of  the  human  nature  in  Christ 
does  not  mean  that  the  human  nature  is  not  individual,^  or 
that  the  human  soul  in  Christ  is  incomplete ;  it  means  that 
this  human  individual  only  exists  in  such  a  way  that  the 
Divine  Logos  is  the  moving  force  of  all  His  visible  activities, 
and  that  His  human  soul  as  such  has  no  scope  for  in* 
dependent  activity  as  in  other  men.  This  also  is  the  thought 
of  Christ  which  dominates  the  orthodox  exposition  of  His 
prophetic  and  kingly  functions.  But  the  interpretation  of 
His  Priesthood  refuses  to  be  bound  by  the  limits  of  this 
theory.  In  the  conception  of  obedience  to  God  the  human 
soul  is  operative  as  form ;  the  Divine  nature  comes  into 
account  only  in  so  far  as  it  is  made  subordinate  to  the 
power  of  the  individual  will  of  the  man  Christ,  and  defines 
the  infinite  worth  of  Christ's  obedience  in  counterbalancing 
sin.  In  this  respect  the  Lutheran  and  the  Eeforraed  doctrines 
of  Christ's  priestly  function  have  alike  failed  to  transcend  the 
limits  laid  down  by  Augustine,  namely,  that  Christ's  mediator- 
ship  depends  on  His  humanity  (vol.  i.  p.  S8).  Within  the 
limits  of  this  conception  Duns  Scotus  could  even  refuse  to 
the  work  of  Christ  the  infinite  worth  which  Aquinas,  in 
virtue  of  the  union  with  the  Divine  nature,  had  assigned  to 
His  human  satisfaction.  Finally,  Melanchthon  and  the 
Lutherans,  in  opposing  Stancarus,  failed  to  do  more  than 
uphold  the  position  of  Aquinas.  This  doctrine  has  certainly 
fallen  upon  the  right  method,  in  apprehending  Christ's  God- 

1  Cf.  Schneckenburger,  Zur  kircM.  Christologie,  p.  74  ff. 


438  JUSTIFICATION    AND   RECONCILIATION  [413-4 

head  as  the  worth  to  be  put  on  those  human  achievements 
of  His  which  sufi&ce  for  our  salvation.  It  is  at  least  wholly 
wide  of  the  mark  when  many  theologians  of  the  Reformed 
school  attempt  to  refer  the  conception  of  Christ's  priestly 
activity,  which  has  God  for  its  remoter  object,  back  to  God 
ako  as  subject.^  Such  utterances  are  possible  only  for  those 
who  have  not  condescended  to  carry  out  the  notion  of 
obedience  and  satisfaction  to  God  into  that  specific  detail, 
the  propriety  of  which  in  other  matters  they  themselves  have 
acknowledged. 

Even  the  Johannine  prologue,  after  presenting  the  Divine 
Word  as  the  form,  and  the  human  individual  as  the  material 
of  the  revelation  in  Christ,  reverses  its  point  of  view,  and  in 
the  human  personality  as  form  bids  us  recognise  as  substance 
grace  and  truth,  those  distinctive  marks  of  Godhead.  Nor  is 
this  method  accidental  or  arbitrary.  For,  in  the  first  place, 
it  corresponds  to  the  seK-manifestation  of  Christ  in  His  words 
and  actions,  that  is  to  say,  to  the  historical  reality.  Further, 
it  follows  from  a  necessity  of  thought.  For  we  cannot 
surrender  the  position  that  the  soul  which  reveals  itself  in 
the  spoken  "  I "  is  the  self-dependent  form  of  all  its  functions. 
If  God  or  the  Logos,  i.e.  the  universal  self -revealing  function 
of  the  spiritual  God,  is  permanently  assumed  as  the  form  of 
Christ's  Person  and  its  manifestations,  then  the  latter  is 
reduced  to  the  aspect  of  a  mechanism ;  for  the  form  is  at  the 
same  time  the  eflficient  cause.  But  if  we  regard  the  life  of 
Clirist  as  a  mechanism,  we  not  only  do  away  with  the  dis- 
tinction between  Christ  and  nature,  but  give  the  lie  to  our 
own  experience  of  His  spiritual  personality.  Moreover,  we 
should  only  be  justified  in  relinquishing  our  recognition  of 
Christ's  personal  and  human  independence,  if  we  could  per- 
manently, from  the  Divine  standpoint,  trace  the  controlling 
presence  of  God,  and  the  special  limitations  under  which  it 
works.     But  this  we  are  not  in  a  position  to  do.     While, 

^  Schneckenburger,  op.  cit.  p.  47,  quotes  Cocceius,  Defoed,  et  test,  dei,  v.  92 : 
"Deus  sibiiuet  ipsi  satiafecit " ;  Hulsius,  Systema  CoTUroversiarum,  p.  810: 
''  Formale  principium  est  natura  divina  .  .  .  haec  obtulit  victimam  humauae 
naturae." 


414-5]       DOCTRINE   OP    CHRIST'S    PERSON    AND    LIFE-WORK        439 

therefore,  our  religious  judgment  is  to  the  effect  that  God  is 
not  merely  with  Him  (Acts  x.  38;    John  viiL  29),  but  in 
Him  (John  xiv.  10,  xvii.  21),  that  His  characteristic  activities 
are  the  activities  of  God,  that  His  love  to  men,  as  the  motive 
of  all  His  conduct,  is  identical  with  the  love  of  God,  yet  we 
are  compelled  to  alternate  this  judgment  with  others  which 
express  the  ethical  independence  of  Christ  under  the  category 
of  human  freedom.    And  while  we  are  in  a  position  to  imder- 
stand  the  sequence  of  Christ's  life  from  the  latter  point  of 
view,  it  is  a  question  whether  we  may  trust  ourselves  to 
understand  the  special  conditions  of  Christ's  dependence  upon 
God,  however  indefinite    the   formula  in  which    we    might 
express  them.     The  situation  is  exactly  the  same  as  when 
with  Paul,  from  a  reUgious  standpoint,  we  conclude  that  God 
works  in   us   to   will  and   to   do   (Phil.  ii.  13),  or,  with  the 
Epistle  to  the  Hebrews,  that  God  works  in  us  that  which  is 
well-pleasing  in  His  sight  through  Jesus  Christ  (Heb.  xiii.  21), 
or  with  John,  that  the  love  of  God  attains  its  perfection  when 
we   love   the   brethren  (1  John  iv.  12) — only   thereafter  to 
interpret  all  these  phenomena  by  the  law  of  human  freedom. 
Moreover,  the  distinction  does  not  apply  here  that  in  Christ 
the  working  of  God  is  excluded,  because  in  Him  the  Divine 
Word  is  a  human  personaUty.     For  the  Divine  Word  includes 
in  itself   the  characteristic  working  of  God,  and  is  simply 
inconceivable  without  it — even  according  to  the  traditional 
formula.     In  that,  namely,  which  is  eternally  begotten  by 
God,  God   as    the  begetter  is  continuously    and   effectively 
present. 

A  scientific  apprehension  of  the  relation  expressed  in  the 
religious  view  of  Christ  appears  to  be  attainable,  therefore, 
only  on  the  assumption  that  we  have  grasped  the  historical 
manifestation  of  Christ  under  the  form  of  the  human  Ego, 
that  is,  have  viewed  it  in  the  light  of  its  inherent  unity  as 
judged  by  ethical  laws.  The  problem  lies  along  the  same  lines 
by  which  it  has  been  attempted  to  reach  a  unifying  view 
of  Christ's  priestly  activity ;  only  it  is  a  problem  of  wider 
ext<ent»  and  we  have  no  assurance  beforehand  that  the  distinc- 


440  JUSTIFICATION   AND   BECONCILIATIOK  [415-6 

tions   between   satisfaction  and  merit,  between  peissive  and 
active  obedience,  will  be  available  for  its  solution. 

Both  schools  of  Beformation  thqology  adopt  the  ethical 
method  of  apprehending  Christ,  in  so  far  as  they  take  note  of 
His  obedience  to  the  Divine  law,  and  attach  worth  to  the 
same.     But    it    is    only    with    a    section    of    the    Reformed 
theologians  that  this  ethical  tendency  reaches  any  degree  of 
completeness.     In  the  case  of  the  Lutherans  it  is  traversed 
at  the  very  beginning  by  the  twofold  contention,  that  Christ 
for  Himself  had  no  obhgation  toward    the    law,  because  as 
God  He  stands  above  the  law,  and  that  by  fulfilling  the  law 
He  gained  nothing  for  Himself,  because  as  God  He  possesses 
all  things.     The  first  of  these  statements  is  an  after-effect  of 
the  nominalism  of  Luther,  under  circumstances  which  make 
the  wholly  extraneous  and  arbitrary  character  of  this  element 
conspicuous  (vol.  i.  p.  277).     The  other  statement  Eeformed 
theologians  have  sought  to  repudiate,  by  asserting  with  regard 
to  the  Godhead  of  Christ  the  possibility  of  His  earning  dLplenior 
glatnae  patef actio ;  Alting  alone  has  kept  within  the  lines  of 
an  ethical   judgment  of  Christ  by  employing  the  argument 
that  Christ  merited    His    glory    by   completely   identifying 
Himself  with  the  attainment  through  His  own  merits  of  our 
salvation  (vol.  i.  p.  287).    The  ethical  method  is  also  traversed 
by  the  contention  of  the  Lutherans,  that  the  fulfilment  of 
the  law,  to  which  Christ  was  under  no  obligation  for  Himself, 
was  meant  by  Him  to  make  up  for  the  fulfilment  of  the  same 
by  all  mankind.      For  conduct  ceases  to    have  any  ethical 
significance  when,  for  the  agent,  it  is  not  an  end  in  itself  at 
all,  but  so  far  as  he  is  concerned  is  practised  merely  as  a  means 
to  some  other  end.     An  obedience  to  the  law,  by  which  a 
man  is  not  seeking  to  attain  the  end  of  his  own  being,  is  in 
no  sense  a  moral  obedience.     Therefore  the  only  view  that 
remains  on  ethical  lines  is  the  view  of  the  Reformed  theo- 
logians, that    Christ  rendered  obedience  to  the  law,  in  the 
place  of  the  elect,  as  Head  of  the  Church  (vol.  i.  p.  275). 
In  this  special  capacity  of  Christ  a  basis  could  be  found  for 
maintaining  that,  what  Christ  by  fulfilling  the  law  accomplished 


416-7]      DOCTRINE    OF   CHRIST'S    PERSON    AND   LIFE-WORK        441 

OS  the  representative  of  others,  He  accomplished  also  for  Him- 
self, and  vice  versd.     The  ethical  method  is  further  traversed 
by  the   distinction   and   co-ordination   of  the   two   kinds   of 
obedience,  active  and  passive,  which,  in  relation  to  the  two- 
fold demand  of  the  law  upon  sinful  men,  serve  as  satisfaction 
to    God.      For  on    this   condition    Christ's   sufferings   have 
assigned  to  them  only  an  objective,  and  no  personal  worth. 
The  incompatibility  of  this  distinction  with  the  ethical  point 
of  view  at  once  obtrudes  itself  in  the  addition  made  to  it  by 
the  older  Dogmatics,  to  the  effect  that  the  one  obedience  of 
Christ  in  deed  and  suffering,  which  conforms  itself  not  to  the 
universal  law,  but  to  the  special  prescription  of  God,  is  a 
vehicle  of  merit.     This  idea  is  specifically  ethical;  but  it  is  by 
no  means  an  ethical  idea  of  the  first  rank,  and  therefore  the 
application  of  it  to  Christ  is  not  above  suspicion,  either  in 
itself,  or  in  view  of  the  accompanying  circumstances.     For 
it  is  bounded  by  a  conception  of  freedom  which  is  not  subject 
to  the  standard  of  the  moral  law,  or  to  the  universal  validity 
of  moral  duty;  it  originates  in  the  hypothesis  of  a  private 
and   incalculable    relation    to    God,    which    is    inconsistent 
with  the   other  bases  of  the  doctrine.     Finally,  the  older 
theology  betrays  how  very  limited  is  the  interest  it  takes  in 
the  ethical  apprehension  of  Christ,  by  the  fact  that  the  pro- 
phetic and  kingly  functions  of  Christ  are  never  so  much  as 
examined  to  see  whether  they  too  ought  not  to  be  interpreted 
from  this  point  of  view ;  most  of  all,  however,  by  the  further 
fact,  that  the  directly  religious  functions  of  Christ,  which  are 
of  such  significance  in  His  life,  namely.  His  habit  of  prayer, 
and  His  submission  to  the  dispensations  of  God,  have  received 
no  consideration  whatever  in  the  doctrine  of  His  Person.     So 
far  as  the  first  point  is  concerned,  I  have  already  (p.  430) 
recalled   the  fact  that   Christ's  speaking  in   the   place  and 
power  of  God  must  nevertheless  be  subsumed  under  the  duty 
of   truthfulness  and   the   virtue   of    conscientiousness,  if  as 
Prophet  He  is  not  to  be  wholly  unlike  His  Old  Testament 
forerunners.      The   traces   of  His  Kingship  have  not  been 
followed  up  at  all  in  His  historical  life;    only  unwittingly 


442  JUSTIFICATION    AND   RECONCIUATION  [417-8 

did  the  Reformed  theologians,  who  describe  Christ  in  His 
satisfaction  as  the  Head  of  the  Church,  take  sm  ethical  view 
of  His  Kingship.  But  the  point  at  which  the  older  doctrine 
completely  fails  to  meet  the  demands  which  necessarily  arise 
from  the  study  of  the  life  of  Jesus,  is  in  the  interpretation  of 
everything  that  presents  Christ  as  Himself  the  subject  of 
religion.  For  this  aspect  of  His  person  is  easily  seen  to  be 
at  once  the  centre  and  the  circumference  of  all  that  was 
purposely  accomplished  by  Him,  with  a  bearing  on  others. 
And  for  this  aspect  of  His  Person  there  is  no  room,  either  in 
the  scheme  of  the  two  natures  or  in  that  of  the  three  offices. 
Wherefore,  then,  this  determined  opposition  to  a  treatment 
of  the  life  of  Jesus  which  obscures  His  subjectivity,  when  my 
opponents  have  nothing  better  to  offer  in  Dogmatics  than  a 
repetition  of  the  old  formulas,  which  likewise  obscure  the 
subjectivity  of  Christ? 

§  48.  The  fundamental  condition  of  the  ethical  apprelun- 
sion  of  Jesus  is  contained  in  the  statement,  that  what  Jesus 
actually  was  and  accomplished,  that  He  is  in  the  first  place 
for  Himself.  Every  intelligent  life  moves  within  the  lines 
of  a  personal  self-end.  This  the  old  theologians  could  not 
bring  themselves  to  see,  for  they  referred  the  obedience  of 
Christ  exclusively  to  the  end  of  representing  mankind,  that 
is,  to  an  end  other  than  the  personal  self -end  of  Jesua  Even 
Alting  could  attach  validity  to  the  statement  sibi  ipsi  meruit 
only  as  an  addition  to  the  service  Christ  had  rendered  to 
mankind.  Of  course,  this  dislocation  is  due  in  part  to  the 
fact  that  the  two  ways  of  regarding  Christ — from  the  point  of 
view  of  His  Godhead,  and  from  that  of  His  manhood — were 
not  kept  clearly  separate,  the  latter  being  always  obscured  by 
the  former.  At  the  same  time,  it  cannot  be  overlooked  that 
the  ethical  view  of  the  merits  of  Christ,  as  we  here  find  it,  is 
tinged  with  a  certain  egoism,  the  egoism,  namely,  of  onlookers. 
These  claim  Christ  so  exclusively  for  their  own  salvation, 
that  they  will  not  concede  to  Him  the  honour  of  existing  for 
Himself ;  although,  without  this,  how  is  it  possible  to  render 
any  real  service  to  others  ?     And,  indeed,  this  method  of 


418-9]       DOCTRINE   OF    CHRIST'S    PERSON   AND   LIFE-WORK        443 

regarding  Christ  is  in  contradiction  not  only  with  the 
universal  rules  for  estimating  other  personalties,  but  also 
with  the  undeniable  features  of  Jesus'  presentation  of  Him- 
self, especially  in  the  Fourth  Gospel.  In  opposition  to  this 
view,  therefore,  it  is  certain  that  the  human  life  of  Christ 
must  be  viewed  under  the  category  of  His  consciously  pursued 
personal  end,  and  with  allowance  of  His  right  to  self-existence, 
so  that  thereby  His  influence  and  intentions  with  regard  to 
men  may  be  apprehended  as  such.  For  all  such  ends  become 
criteria  of  a  man's  characteristic  and  personal  conduct,  only 
in  so  far  as  they  are  included  in  His  personal  self -end.  This 
leads  to  the  inversion  of  the  Altingian  formula :  Jesus  has 
acquired  merit  at  our  hand  by  identifying  our  interest  with 
His  own,  His  merit  in  our  behalf  follows  from  the  merit  He 
has  acquired  for  Himself.  But,  since  the  idea  of  merit  is 
excluded  if  the  idea  of  duty  is  involved,  we  must  state  the 
matter  thus — In  so  far  as  Christ,  by  His  duly  ordered  speech 
and  conduct,  realises  His  personal  self-end,  it  follows  from 
the  special  content  of  the  latter  that  in  this  form  He  also 
realises  the  ends  of  others,  i,e,  has  ministered  to  the  salvation 
of  mankind  as  a  whole. 

Thus  the  question  falls  to  be  asked.  What  is  the  special 
content  of  the  personal  self -end  of  Christ?  As  such,  the 
older  theology  denotes  the  unbroken  obedience  of  Christ  to 
the  Divine  law,  and  His  obedience  (or  patience)  under  the 
sufferings  which  by  special  dispensation  God  caused  to  come 
upon  Him,  although  in  this  connection  no  necessity  for  these 
sufferings  appears.  I  do  not,  of  course,  mean  these  two  kinds 
of  obedience  in  the  sense  of  the  theory  already  discussed 
(p.  269),  which  assigns  their  place  to  the  doing  and  suffer- 
ing of  Christ  from  the  standpoint  of  satisfaction  to  God,  for 
in  both  these  aspects  the  said  theory  lies  outside  ethical 
treatment.  By  this  theory  the  doing  and  the  suffering  of 
Christ  are  viewed  solely  in  the  light  of  a  certain  objective 
worth,  not  therefore  in  the  light  of  their  unbroken  continuity 
with  His  distinct  personal  life;  nor  is  His  conduct  in 
obedience  to  the  law  viewed  in  the  light  of  its  relation  to 


444  JUSTIFICATION   AND   liECONCILIATION  [419-20 

His  personal  self-end.  Here,  on  the  contrary,  I  am  referring 
to  Christ's  doing  and  suffering  as  the  two  partial  manifes- 
tations of  that  complete  personal  obedience  which  is  treated 
by  the  older  theologians  from  the  point  of  view  of  the  merit 
of  Christ  Under  their  formula,  however,  sufficient  care  is 
not  taken  to  ensure  that  the  doing  and  the  suffering  of 
Christ  can  really  be  understood  as  partial  manifestations  of 
the  one  obedience.  It  needs  to  be  supplemented  by  the 
observation  that  the  sufifering  of  Christ,  through  the  patience 
with  which  it  was  borne,  becomes  a  kind  of  doing.  For  this 
is  the  only  way  in  which  an  ethical  value  can  be  got  out  of 
suffering  at  all.  Apart  from  this  condition,  all  suffering  is 
either  ethically  indifferent,  or  else  it  is  disease ;  more  especially 
mental  suffering,  that  is  not  met  with  the  exercise  of  self- 
control  and  patience,  is  just  mental  disease.  To  Christ  none 
of  these  cases  applies,  since  His  active  patience  kept  pace 
with  His  experiences  of  suffering.  By  His  patience  the 
suffering  inflicted  on  Him  is  as  such  made  His  own;  and 
that,  too,  without  any  deadening  of  feeling,  but  rather  with 
keen  sensitiveness  to  suffering  in  every  degree  and  through- 
out the  whole  course  of  His  public  life.  For  these  con- 
siderations room  is  found  in  the  formula,  that  the  obedience 
of  Christ  in  doing  and  in  suffering  is  identical,  obedience  here 
being  understood  to  mean  activity  of  the  will.  The  expression 
is  certainly  indefinite,  but  we  have  no  option,  for  in  another 
respect,  also,  the  unity  of  Christ's  obedience  in  doing  and 
suffering  is  not  safeguarded  by  the  traditional  formula. 
While,  for  the  necessity  on  Christ's  part  of  obedient  conduct, 
reference  is  made  to  the  universal  moral  law,  for  the  necessity 
of  His  sufferings  we  are  referred  to  the  special  dispensation 
of  God;  and  in  this  connection  tlie  special  dispensation  of 
these  sufferings  by  God  must  remain  unintelligible,  except 
where  it  can  be  explained  from  the  need  of  paying  the  penalty 
for  man.  For  if,  as  regards  the  positive  fulfilment  of  the 
moral  law  by  Christ,  the  ethical  standpoint  of  imiversal 
human  obligation,  as  understood  by  the  Eeformed  divines,  is 
to  be  maintained,  then,  clearly,  the  explanation  of   Christ's 


420]  DOCTRINE   OF    CURIST'S    PERSON   AND   LIFE-WORK         445 

sufferings  from  the  special  need  on  God's  part  of  legal  satis- 
faction belongs  to  a  different  category,  since  this  explanation 
is  not  derived  from  any  consideration  affecting  Christ  Him- 
self. The  inconsistency  can  be  removed  only  by  the  intro- 
duction of  an  idea  which  was  strange  to  the  thinkers  of  former 
days,  but  which  has  been  applied  by  not  a  few  theologians 
since  Schleiermacher.  It  is  the  idea  of  an  ethical  vocation 
(vol.  i.  pp.  529,  648). 

A  man's  vocation  as  a  citizen  denotes  that  particular  de- 
partment of  work  in  human  society,  in  the  regular  pursuit  of 
which  the  individual  realises  at  once  his  own  self-end  and 
the  common  ultimate  end  of  society.  Every  civil  voca- 
tion is  an  ethical  vocation,  and  not  a  means  of  egoism,  in  so 
far  as  it  is  pursued  under  the  view  that,  in  society  as  a  whole, 
and  in  the  individual,  the  moral  law  ought  to  be  fulfilled,  and 
the  highest  conceivable  goal  for  the  race  attained.  The 
varieties  of  ethical  vocation,  according  to  their  natural  origin, 
divide  themselves  in  manifold  fashion  into  vocations  which 
have  their  origin  in  the  family,  vocations  which  are  concerned 
with  the  production,  manipulation,  and  distribution  of  the 
means  of  physical  life,  vocations  connected  with  the  State 
and  with  religion,  vocations  in  the  sphere  of  science  and  art. 
Their  manifoldness  consists  in  this,  that  they  attain  ethical 
distinctness  in  part  directly,  in  part,  like  the  last-named,  only 
indirectly;  that  several  of  them  can  exist  compatibly  with 
each  other  in  the  same  individual,  while  others  cannot ;  that 
some  are  of  a  public,  others  of  a  private  nature.  Rightly 
understood,  every  ethical  vocation  falls  within  the  scope  of 
the  moral  law ;  but  inasmuch  as  each  man's  vocation  forms 
for  him  the  special  sphere  within  which  he  regularly  fulfils 
the  universal  moral  law,  it  follows  that  each  man,  in  the 
ethical  exercise  of  his  own  vocation,  at  once  attains  his  own 
ethical  self-end  and  renders  his  rightful  contribution  to  the 
ethical  end  of  society  as  a  whole.  For  the  particular  is  the 
logical  means  of  reaching  systematic  knowledge  of  universal 
laws,  and  of  the  subsumption  of  the  individual  phenomenon 
under  the  law.     In  the  sphere  of  will,  the  form  under  which 


446  JUSTIFICATION   AND   RECONCILIATION  [420-1 

the  objective  unity  of  the  individual  will  with  the  universal 
law  of  conduct  is  realised,  and  the  condition  of  that  realisa- 
tion, is  that  the  ethical  activity  of  the  individual  forms  a 
whole.  This  is  borne  out,  in  the  first  place,  by  the  fact  that 
men  without  a  civil  vocation,  and  without  its  ethical  standard, 
succumb  in  one  degree  or  another  to  egoism ;  further,  by  the 
fact  that  any  individual  judgment  of  duty  (namely,  that  on 
this  particular,  occasion  of  acting,  the  action  must  needs  be 
in  keeping  with  the  moral  law)  is  reached  through  the  inter- 
mediate idea  of  a  man's  distinct  vocation,  or  through  the 
analogous  judgment  that  in  this  particular  case  he  is  called 
to  obey  the  behest  of  love ;  finally,  by  the  fact  that  a  man's 
ethical  vocation,  in  the  narrower  as  in  the  wider  sense,  b^ets 
those  ethical  principles  in  which  a  mature  and  conscientious 
character  specialises  for  itself  the  moral  law,  and  regulates  at 
the  same  time  the  personal  attainment  of  virtue.  For  con- 
scientiousness not  only  follows  as  a  single  virtue  from  the 
significance  of  a  man's  vocation  for  the  development  of  moral 
character;  it  guarantees  also  the  acquisition  of  the  other 
virtues,  in  so  far  as  the  particular  vocation  forms  the  uniting 
link  for  the  universal  and  the  individual  conditions  of  ethical 
existence. 

The  idea  of  an  ethical  vocation  serves  also  as  a  criterion  for 
the  public  life  of  Christ  as  a  visibly  connected  whole.  When 
Christ  presents  Himself  as  the  Bearer  of  God's  moral  lordship 
over  men,  through  Whose  unique  speech  and  conduct  men 
are  impelled  to  submit  themselves  to  the  power  which  pro- 
ceeds from  Him,  and  in  the  direction  which  is  indicated  by 
Him,  He  understands  the  name  Christ  as  the  expression  of 
His  individual  vocation.  His  conduct  within  this  sphere  is 
as  certainly  in  harmony  with  the  universal  moral  law,  as  the 
end  of  the  Kingdom  of  God,  which  He  pursues  in  His  special 
vocation  as  its  Founder,  is  the  supreme  end  out  of  which  the 
moral  law  arises.  At  the  same  time.  His  conduct  in  pursuit 
of  His  vocation,  being  a  particular  line  of  conduct,  is  one- 
sided, and  excludes  personal  participation  in  other  vocations. 
Indeed,  this  exclusiveness  of  Christ's  vocation  goes   further 


421-2]      DOCTRINE    OF   CHRIST'S    PERSON   AND   LIFE-WORK        447 

than  in  other  cases  of  a  similar  kind.  Old  Testament  pro- 
phets could  at  the  same  time  discharge  a  civil  vocation; 
Other  founders  of  religions  were  at  the  same  time  heads  of 
families  and  heads  of  tribes,  and  waged  war ;  Christ  had  no 
civil  vocation,  at  least  not  after  He  entered  on  His  public 
work ;  He  detached  Himself  from  His  family  without  found- 
ing a  family ;  if  He  ever  occupied  Himself  in  any  systematic 
fashion  with  the  sacred  learning  of  the  Jews,  it  cannot  have 
been  by  way  of  a  vocation,  as  was  the  case  with  Paul.  In 
short,  Christ  combined  no  other  vocation  with  that  to  which 
He  was  conscious  of  being  called.  This  fact  is  explained  by 
the  range  of  the  vocation  to  which  He  devoted  Himself.     For 

the  vocation  of  the  kingly  Prophet,  to  realise  God's  ethical 

* 

lordship,  is  the  highest  of  all  conceivable  vocations ;  it  aims 
directly  at  the  ethical  as  a  whole ;  and  if  this  aim  was  to  be 
pursued  as  the  special  business  of  life,  and  firmly  fixed  before 
the  mind  of  Him  who  pursued  it,  it  had  to  be  separated  from 
all  subordinate  aims,  which  otherwise  are  meant  to  find  a 
place  within  the  whole.  To  fix  His  vocation  as  Christ  firmly 
before  him,  Christ  had  to  forego  all  those  natural  conditions 
in  the  stability  of  which  other  vocations  find  a  guarantee  of 
their  own  stability — a  fixed  dwelling  and  means  of  support, 
attachment  to  a  family,  the  confidence  of  fellow-citizens. 
He  depended  only  upon  the  personal  devotion  of  friends  and 
followers,  and  built  up  about  Him  the  circle  of  His  twelve 
disciples  in  the  view  that  His  vocation  demanded  the  formation 
of  a  separate  religious  community.  On  the  other  hand.  He 
adopted  a  neutral  attitude  toward  all  the  other  interests  of 
human  society,  toward  law  and  State,  industry  and  science ; 
He  was  even  inwardly  indifierent  toward  the  rehgious  usages 
of  His  countrymen  (Matt.  xvii.  24-27),  and  did  not  suffer 
Himself  to  be  shaken  in  the  constancy  of  His  aim  by  the 
presentiment  that,  in  the  nation  to  which  with  scrupulous 
conscientiousness  He  had  exclusively  devoted  himself  (Mark 
vii.  27),  this  aim  would  fail  to  be  realised  (Matt.  viii. 
11,  12).  Equally  far  was  He  from  allowing  His  clear 
consciousness   of  the  universal  scope  of  His  mission   to  be 


448  JUSTIFICATION    AND    RECONCILIATION  [422-3 

impaired  by  the  fact  that  He  was  called  to  work  only  amoDg 
the  Jews. 

Eegarded  as  a  consequence  of  His  loyalty  to  His  vocation, 
Christ's  patience  under  the  varied  sufferings  due  to  the 
opposition  of  the  leaders  and  rulers  of  His  nation  becomes 
intelligible.  For  not  suffering  in  itself,  but  suffering  as  the 
occasion  and  test  of  patience  and  steadfastness,  is  what  comes 
into  account  from  the  ethical  point  of  view.  To  the  contra- 
diction between  Christ's  purpose  of  reform  and  the  authorit- 
ative position  of  the  Pharisaic  scribes,  were  due  all  the 
affronts,  secret  and  open,  to  Christ's  personal  honour,  and  the 
danger  to  His  personal  safety,  and  all  these  brought  in  their 
train  temptation  for  Him.  The  more  intense  realisation  of 
these  temptations  in  the  soul  of  Jesus  immediately  before  the 
final  catastrophe,  was  only  the  climax  of  what  had  occurred 
in  each  case  of  open  persecution  which  He  had  had  to  endura 
In  every  such  case  He  must  have  experienced  in  one  d^ree 
or  another  a  conflict  between  the  impulses  of  self-preservation 
or  personal  honour,  and  of  loyalty  to  His  vocation.  But,  till 
then,  it  had  cost  Him  less  effort  to  put  the  claim  of  His 
vocation  before  the  claims  of  ordinary  existence  and  the 
natural  joy  of  living — so  little  effort,  perhaps,  that  He  may 
never  have  made  clear  to  His  own  mind  the  actual  state  of 
the  case  with  regard  to  these  constantly  recurring  tempta- 
tions. Had  He  succumbed  to  one  such  temptation,  it  would 
have  meant  that,  to  preserve  the  tranquillity  of  His  individual 
existence,  He  had  renounced  His  vocation.  But,  on  the  con- 
trary, all  the  sufferings  that  befell  Him,  and  especially  those 
He  was  ready  to  bring  on  Himself  by  His  appearance  in 
Jerusalem,  He  steadfastly  endured,  without  once  proving 
untrue  to  His  vocation,  or  failing  to  assert  it.  Therefore 
these  sufferings,  which,  by  His  enduring  of  them  even  to  the 
death.  He  made  morally  His  own,  are  manifestations  of  His 
loyalty  to  His  vocation,  and  for  Christ  Himself  come  into 
account  solely  from  this  point  of  view.  This  connection  of 
things  is  the  more  transparent,  since  Christ  faced  the  climax 
of  His  fate  neither  rebelliously,  nor  with  callous  indifference, 


42S--4]      DOCTRINE   OF    CHRIST'S    PERSON   AND    LIFE-WORK        449 

nor  in  any  fanatical  self-deception,  but  under  the  impression 
that,  just  as  His  appearing  in  Jerusalem  was  an  unavoidable 
discharge  of  His  vocation,  so  also  His  violent  death  was 
destined  under  God's  appointment  to  serve  the  same  end. 

In  this  latter  statement,  the  delineation  of  the  ethical 
connection  between  the  suflFerings  and  the  vocation  of  Christ 
already  gives  place  to  the  religious  view  of  the  same,  apart 
from  which  view  Christ  Himself  was  not  conscious  of  His 
unique  and  independent  position  among  men.  The  business 
of  His  vocation  was  the  establishment  of  the  universal  ethical 
fellowship  of  mankind,  as  that  aim  in  the  world  which  rises 
above  aU  conditions  included  in  the  notion  of  the  world.  The 
historical  connections  of  this  idea  may  be  left  out  of  account ; 
in  which  case  it  becomes  all  the  more  evident  that  a  vocation  of 
this  kind  can  only  be  conceived  imder  the  guiding  idea  of  one 
supramundane  God.  But  for  this  reason  Christ  not  merely 
recognises  the  business  of  His  vocation  to  be  the  Lordship  or 
Kingdom  of  God,  He  also  recognises  this  vocation  as  the 
special  ordinance  of  God  for  Himself,  and  His  activity  in  the 
fulfilment  of  it  as  service  rendered  to  God  in  God's  own 
cause.  Since  His  consciousness  of  His  vocation  adjusts 
itself  to  these  conditions.  He  is  led  to  frame  a  conception  of 
self-preservation  which  is  not  at  variance  with  that  conscious- 
ness but  in  harmony  with  it,  and  therefore  is  fitted  to  throw 
light  upon  His  bearing  under  suffering.  The  saying  in  John, 
which  carries  in  itself  the  proof  of  its  genuineness,  "  My  meat 
is  to  do  the  will  of  Him  that  sent  Me,  and  to  finish  His 
work  "  (iv.  34,  cf.  xvii.  4),  applies  to  His  particular  vocation; 
for  deKrffuiy  in  other  applications  also,  usually  refers  to  the 
particular.  The  task  assigned  to  Jesus,  therefore,  is  a  course 
of  conduct  in  which  the  content  is  conceived  as  the  work  of 
God  Himself,  because  the  aim  represents  God's  innermost 
purpose.  The  execution  of  this  purpose  serves  Jesus  as  meat, 
that  is,  as  the  means  of  self-preservation,  and  therefore  as 
satisfaction.  The  joy  He  has  in  it,  the  sense  of  harmony  with 
God  and  with  Himself  (xv.  11 ;  xvii.  13),  follows  inevitably 

from  the  lively  experience  of  the  worth  of  His  vocation  for 
29 


•  \ 


450  JUSTIFICATION   AND   RKCONCILIATION  [424-5 

Himself.  He  found  in  it  a  spiritual  self-preservation,  which 
approved  itself  in  the  clear  anticipation  of  continuance  after 
death  (x.  18),  and  thus,  even  when  the  hope  of  restored  life 
retreated  before  the  actual  terrors  of  death,  He  still  could  not 
be  swayed  by  any  value  attaching  to  the  preservation  of  the 
natural  life.  The  abov^  Baying,  moreover,  likewise  displays 
the  characteristic  feature  of  the  consciousness  of  a  vocation 
wherever  found,  namely,  that  the  more  general  content  of  the 
vocation  is  always  embraced  within  the  category  of  the  per- 
sonal self-end,  and  lends  to  the  spiritual  self  a  support  which 
makes  it  more  or  less  independent  of  the  conditions  of  natural 
existence  in  the  world.  Every  degree  of  moral  loyalty  to  a 
vocation  overcomes  the  world,  inasmuch  as  it  evokes  patience 
to  endure  the  opposing  influences  that  come  from  the  world, 
that  is,  the  evils  of  life — in  other  words,  to  subordinate  these 
unavoidable  experiences  to  our  own  personal  freedom.  But  it 
is  in  Christ  that  we  perceive  the  widest  application  of  this, 
and  our  perception  of  it  in  Him  is  the  source  from  which  we 
draw  the  corresponding  prmciple. 

And  thus  what  Christ  says  in  that  sentence  from  John 
would  approve  itself  as  valid  for  Him,  even  although  we 
sought  no  other  light  upon  His  life  than  what  is  afiForded  us 
by  the  idea  of  vocation  in  general,  and  the  vocation  of  Christ 
in  particular.  But  the  present  investigation  was  undertaken 
with  the  view  of  obtaining  the  correct  ethical  judgment  upon 
the  Person  of  Christ,  in  so  far  as  the  ethical  point  of  view  is 
taken  in  formal  opposition  to  the  religious.  We  have  found, 
however,  that  an  ethical  judgment  of  Jesus  in  the  light  of 
His  unique  vocation  to  establish  the  Kingdom  of  Grod,  if  it 
follow  His  own  judgment  of  Himself,  runs  out  into  a  religious 
judgment,  namely.  His  religious  judgment  of  His  own  Person. 
Therefore,  also,  in  our  own  thinking  on  this  matter,  the  reli- 
gious estimate  of  Christ  must  not  be  set  over  against  the 
ethical,  but  added  to  it,  as  that  without  which  it  would  not  be 
complete.  The  question  arises  as  to  what  is  implied  in  this 
view.  If  the  life-work  of  Christ  is  the  work  of  God,  this 
involves  the  assumption  that  the  personal  self-end  of  Christ 


42S-6]      DOCTRINE   OF   CHRIST'S    PERSON   AND   LIFE-WORK        451 

has  the  same  content  as  is  contained  in  the  self -end  of  God, 
which  content  Christ  knew  and  adopted  as  such,  in  accordance 
with  the  fact  that  He  was  abeady  known  and  loved  by  God 
Himself  as  the  Bearer  of  the  Divine  self-end.  This  statement, 
which  essentially  coincides  with  Matt.  xi.  27,  is  inevitable,  if 
we  hold  to  the  position  that  a  universal  ethical  Kingdom  of 
God  is  the  supreme  end  of  God  Himself  in  the  world,  if  we 
admit  that  historically  this  idea  first  received  shape  through 
Christ,  and  if  we  are  not  satisfied  with  the  vague  conception  of 
a  wholly  accidental  relation  between  God  and  the  world, 
especially  the  moral  world.  Now  the  freedom  and  independ- 
ence of  a  man's  conduct  in  pursuit  of  the  supreme  end  of 
the  Kingdom  of  God  is  proof  that  at  bottom,  and  in  a 
way  suited  to  the  human  spirit,  we  are  dependent  upon  God 
(p.  293);  therefore  Christ,  in  the  exercise  of  His  particular 
vocation,  must  certainly  be  regarded,  not  merely  as  independ- 
ent of  all  the  world,  but  as  upheld  by  God.  Since,  however, 
as  the  Founder  of  the  Kingdom  of  God  in  the  world,  in  other 
words,  as  the  Bearer  of  God's  ethical  lordship  over  men.  He 
occupies  a  unique  position  toward  all  who  have  received  a  like 
aim  from  Him,  therefore  He  is  that  Being  in  the  world  in 
Whose  seK-end  God  makes  effective  and  manifest  after  an 
original  manner  His  own  eternal  self-end.  Whose  whole 
activity,  therefore,  in  discharge  of  His  vocation,  forms  the 
material  of  that  complete  revelation  of  God  which  is  present 
in  Him,  in  Whom,  in  short,  the  Word  of  God  is  a  human 
person. 

The  problem  here  presented  to  theology  is  solved  when 
we  have  shown  that  there  is  no  contradiction  between  the 
ethical  and  the  religious  apprehension  of  Christ,  that  the 
former  finds  its  necessary  complement  in  the  latter,  and  that 
there  is  nothing  here  inconsistent  either  with  the  Christian 
idea  of  God,  or  with  the  complete  conception  of  moral  free- 
dom. The  origin  of  the  Person  of  Christ — how  His  Person 
attained  the  form  in  which  it  presents  itself  to  our  ethical 
and  religious  apprehension — is  not  a  subject  for  theological 
inquiry,  because  the  problem  transcends  all  inquiry.     What 


452  JUSTIFICATION   AND   RECONaUATION  [426-7 

ecclesiastical  tradition  offers  us  in  this  connection  is  obscure 
in  itself,  and  therefore  is  not  fitted  to  make  anything  clear. 
As  Bearer  of  the  perfect  revelation,  Christ  is  given  us  that 
we  may  believe  on  Him.  When  we  do  believe  on  Him,  we 
find  Him  to  be  the  Eevealer  of  God.  But  the  correlation 
of  Christ  with  God  His  Father  is  not  a  scientific  explanation. 
And  as  a  theologian  one  ought  to  know  that  the  fruitless 
clutching  after  such  explanations  only  serves  to  obscure  the 
recognition  of  Christ  as  the  perfect  revelation  of  God. 

§  49.  On  the  other  hand,  we  find  our  results  verified  in 
certain   aspects   of    the   life-work  of    Christ,  which    already 
incidentally  have  come  more  or  less  within  our  view.     The 
Kingdom  of  God,  the  realisation  of  which  forms  the  vocation 
of  Christ,  signifies  not  merely  the  correlate  of  the  self-end  of 
God,  but  also  the  goal  that  constitutes  the  highest  destiny  of 
man.       Christ,   therefore,  would   not   have   rightly  or    fully 
apprehended  His  vocation  if  He  had  not  known  that  He  was 
under  obligation  (Mark  x.  42-45)  to   serve  those  whom,  as 
the  new  religious  community,  He  undertook  to  train  for  that 
destiny,  and  that  this  obligatory  service,  this  obedience  toward 
God,   is  the   specific   form   of   that  lordship  which  He  both 
acquires  and  exercises  over  men.     Now  in  the  idea  of  obli- 
gation the  moral  law  is  identical  with  the  moral  self-deter- 
mination of  the  individual.     For  the  sense  of  obligation — the 
subjective  judgment  that,  in  a  particular  and  definitely  limited 
case,  it  is  necessary  to  act  in  accordance  with  the  moral  law, 
or  some  particular  moral  principle — is  as  much  due  to  the 
moral  disposition  of  the  individual,  as  it  is  derived  from  the 
universal  law.     If,  then,  Christ  was  conscious   that,  in   the 
exercise  of  His  vocation,  even  in  the  resultant  sufferings  and 
voluntarily  endured  death,  He  was  under  obligation  to  serve 
men  for  their  highest  good,  it  follows,  further,  that  here  He 
obeyed  love  as  His  impelling  motive.    For  love  is  the  abiding 
disposition  to  further  spiritual  personalities  in  regard  to  their 
proper   self-end,   under  the   condition   that   in  so  doing  we 
recognise  and  are  seeking  to  attain  our  own  self -end  (p.  277). 
This  condition  is  evidently  present  in  the  case  of  Christ,  since 


427-8]      DOCTRINE   OF   CHRIST'S   PERSON   AND   LIFE-WORK        453 

He  could  never  have  adopted  as  His  vocation  the  founding  of 
the  Kingdom  of  God,  if  He  had  not  regarded  the  loftiest  pos- 
sible destiny  for  mankind  as  the  goal  of  His  work,  which  He 
pursued  for  His  own  sake.     And  indeed  the  whole  picture 
-which  has  come  down  to  us  of  the  life  of  Christ  reveals  the 
loftiness  of  His  love,  and  His  lordship  over  friends  and  foes 
alike  is  made  the  more  conspicuous  by  the  fact  that,  even  in 
the  circle  of  those  who  stood  nearest  Him,  He  found  no  fitting 
help  or  support  from  any  rehable  or  constant  love  toward 
Himself.     In  a  certain  quarter  of  theological  speculation,  we 
are  met  by  the  principle  that  perfect  love  requires  the  similar 
mutual  relation  of  two  personal  wills.     In  so  far  as  love  is 
the    principle    of   perfect   fellowship   between   two   personal 
beings,  this  may  be  true.     But  the  perfect  love,  as  motive 
power  and  guiding  principle  of  the  individual  will,  is  inde- 
pendent of  responsive  love  (Matt.  v.  46) ;  on  the  contrary, 
just  there,  where  it  meets  with  no  answering  love,  perfect 
love  proves  in   every    possible   case  its    peculiar  sublimity. 
Such  a  case  is  the  experience  which  befell  Christ  when  those 
to  whom  He  devoted  His  service,  and  whom  He  sought  to 
save,  on  the  one  hand  repelled  Him  in  every  possible  manner, 
and  on  the  other  hand  so  imperfectly  understood  Him,  that 
even  the   devotion  of   His  most   devoted  disciples   brought 
Him  no  return  for  the  strain  upon  His  own  spririt.     I  do  not 
need  to  complete  in  any  further  detail  the  picture  of  Christ's 
life   to  elicit  the  admission  that  the  formula  oflfered  us  by 
John — "  grace  and  truth  " — reflects  most  aptly  the  impression 
made  by  the  personal  conduct  of  Christ.     For  this  is  the  type 
of  love  which  reaches  far  beyond  all  possible  return,  and  in 
the  face  of  every  rebuff  persists  unchanged.     Inasmuch,  then, 
as  the  love  of  Christ  maintains  its  supremacy  in  all  possible 
service,  and  even  in  the  face  of  every  hindrance,  bent  ever  on 
the  realisation  of  the  Kingdom  of  God — that  goal  in  which 
is  attained,  so  far  as  God  is  love,  God's  own  self-end — it  fol- 
lows that  the  "  grace  and  truth  "  in  Christ's  whole  activity  is 
the  specific  and  complete  revelation  of  God.     This  result  not 
only  corresponds  with  the  reflection  of  John,  but  also  makes 


454  JUSTIFICATION   AND   RECONCILIATION  [428-9 

clear  that  the  revelation  of  God  in  Christ,  when  referred 
to  the  technical  notion  of  the  Divine  Word,  surpasses  those 
revelations  which  are  given  in  creation,  in  the  illumination  of 
the  nations,  and  in  His  presentation  of  Himself  through  the 
name  Jahve.  For  in  the  characteristic  activity  of  Christ  in 
the  discharge  of  His  vocation,  the  essential  will  of  God  is 
revealed  as  love,  since  Christ's  supreme  aim,  namely,  the 
Kingdom  of  God,  is  identical  with  the  supreme  end  of  the 
Father.  At  the  same  time,  however,  we  must  understand 
John  to  mean  that  the  exhaustive  comprehension  of  Divine 
revelation  in  one  human  personality  reckons  on  no  other  test 
than  this  "  grace  and  truth,"  which,  according  to  Old  Testa- 
ment standards,  expresses  the  essential  will  of  God.  If  these, 
then,  are  the  criteria  by  which  the  conception  of  Christ's 
Godhead  is  framed,  it  follows  that  John  does  not  mean  us 
to  seek  in  Christ  for  the  Divine  attributes  of  omnipotence, 
omnipresence,  and  omniscience,  which,  it  is  said,  ought  also, 
or  even  first  of  all,  to  occupy  our  regard.  In  so  far  as  the 
Divine  Eevelation  or  Word  of  God  is  active  in  this  personality, 
or  is  to  be  conceived  as  the  form  of  its  activity,  the  point  at 
issue  is  clearly  the  definition  of  God's  being.  Since  the  being 
of  God  is  spirit,  and  will,  and  above  all  love,  it  can  therefore 
become  effective  in  a  human  life,  for  human  nature  as  such  is 
laid  on  the  lines  of  spirit,  will,  and  love.  On  the  other  hand, 
the  relation  of  God  to  the  world,  in  so  far  as  God  creates  and 
rules  the  world,  could  not  be  brought  to  direct  manifestation 
in  a  human  life,  which  is  itself  part  of  the  world. 

This  remark,  however,  is  confronted  by  the  statement  of 
Jesus  that  all  things  have  been  delivered  unto  Him  of  the 
Father  (Matt.  xi.  27),  a  statement  which  does  not,  it  is  true, 
denote  an  inborn  omnipotence,  but  which  does  describe  power 
over  the  world  as  something  the  possession  of  which  Jesus 
claims  for  Himself,  in  virtue  of  Divine  bestowal.  This 
declaration  cannot  be  got  rid  of  by  saying  that  it  sounds 
too  Johannine  to  be  authentic.  For  on  the  whole  it  stands 
on  no  loftier  level  than  when  Jesus  declares  His  intention  to 
exercise  that  lordship  of  God  over  the  people  of  Israel  which 


429-30]      DOCTRINB   OF   CHRIST'S   PERSON   AND  LIFE-WORK       455 

till  then  had  been  looked  for  in  vain.  With  the  appearance 
of  the  lordship  of  God  there  is  bound  up,  in  the  prophetic 
vision  of  the  future,  the  further  prospect  of  a  transformation 
of  the  natural  world.  As  the  expectations  of  the  prophets 
were  the  norm  by  which  Jesus  formed  His  own  conception 
of  His  vocation,  it  is  a  logical  consequence  that  He  should  be 
convinced  of  a  unique  relation  of  His  own  Person  to  the 
w^orld.  The  religion  of  the  Old  Testament  represents  the 
one  spiritual  God  as  the  Creator  and  Kuler  of  the  whole 
world;  since  the  religious  community  of  Israel  obeys  God 
and  serves  Him,  it  knows  itself  called  not  only  to  lordship 
over  the  other  nations,  but  also  to  the  unfettered  enjoyment 
of  natural  good,  which  is  protected  through  Divine  appoint- 
ment from  the  ordinary  experiences  of  the  opposite.  This, 
however,  betrays  an  inconsistency  in  Israel's  view  of  the 
world,  an  imperfection  in  its  very  nature.  For  while  the 
Divine  purpose  in  the  world  is  bound  up  with  the  naturally 
conditioned  unity  of  the  Israelitish  nation,  the  position  of 
this  nation  in  the  world  is  made  dependent  upon  legal  and 
poUtical  conditions  and  material  advantages,  which  as  such 
are  of  a  mundane  order,  and  do  not  correspond  to  the  supra- 
mundane  position  of  the  one  God.  Thus  there  was  foLd 
upon  Israel  the  necessity  of  always  postponing  to  a  future, 
which  never  became  present,  the  reconciliation  between  its 
position  in  the  world  and  God.  Jesus  rose  above  this  stand- 
point, and  introduced  a  new  religion,  by  setting  free  the 
lordship  of  the  supramundane  God  from  national  and 
pohtical  limitations,  as  well  as  from  the  expectation  of 
material  weU-being,  and  by  advancing  its  significance  for 
mankind  to  a  spiritual  and  ethical  union,  which  at  once 
corresponds  to  the  spirituality  of  God,  and  denotes  the 
supramundane  end  of  spiritual  creatures.  But  since  Christ 
in  this  achievement  of  His  life  is  at  once  the  Eevealer  of 
God  in  the  full  sense,  and  also  a  man  who  according  to 
His  knowledge  of  God  worships  God  and  serves  Him,  it  is 
a  logical  consequence  that  He  asserts  for  Himself  a  position 
toward  the  world  which  corresponds  to  the  idea  of  the  one 


456  JUSTIFICATION   AND   BBCONCILIATION  [430-1 

God  and  to  the  worth  of  God's  spiritual  Kingdom.  If  this 
latter,  in  the  way  Christ  began  to  realise  it,  is  the  final 
aim  of  the  whole  world,  it  follows  that  the  whole  world  is 
subject  to  Christ.  The  peculiar  character  of  the  religion 
founded  hj  Christ  depends,  therefore,  of  necessity  upon  the 
fact  that  He  whom  God  knows,  and  Who  has  perfect  know- 
ledge of  God,  asserts  supremacy  over  the  world. 

But  the  correctness  of  this  assertion  must  be  further 
tested  by  the  definite  content  of  Christ's  life ;  for  a  mere 
claim  upon  the  future  would  not  be  commensurate  with 
the  gravity  of  this  assertion.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  it  does 
not  prove  to  be  true  in  the  sense  that  Christ  had  the  whole 
fixed  system  of  things  at  His  arbitrary  disposal.  For  the 
support  of  His  material  existence  He  was  dependent  on  all 
the  fixed  conditions  of  human  life.  Even  His  power  of 
miracle  did  not  go  so  far  as  to  make  trial  of  itself  in  any 
alteration  of  the  great  mechanism  of  the  world,  such  as 
the  expectation  of  the  prophets  had  associated  with  the 
setting  up  of  the  Kingdom  of  God  (Matt.  xvi.  1—4),  The 
miraculous  power  of  which  He  was  conscious  (Mark  vL  5,  6), 
and  which  He  reckoned  part  of  His  equipment  for  His 
vocation  (Matt.  xii.  28),  is  exercised  within  a  much  more 
limited  sphere.  But  even  if  this  fact  were  less  evident  than 
it  is,  the  narratives  are  not  of  a  kind  to  allow  us  to  dis- 
cover any  rule  as  to  how  far  the  supremacy  of  Christ's 
will  over  external  nature  actually  extended,  the  more  so 
that  we  have  no  similar  experiences  at  our  command  to 
disclose  to  us  the  psychical  and  physical  grounds  of  Christ's 
miraculous  power.  Not  in  itself,  but  because  of  the  enforced 
lack  of  the  means  of  explanation,  this  is  a  sphere  which 
does  not  lend  itself  to  scientific  investigation. 

However,  the  significance  of  the  supremacy  which  Christ 
asserted  over  the  world  is  not  affected  thereby,  nor  is  our 
comprehension  of  this  attribute  rendered  impossible.  If,  as 
we  cannot  but  assume,  this  attribute  stands  in  connection 
with  the  religious  destiny  of  man,  as  that  destiny  was  first 
realised  by   Christ    Himself,   we   may  expect    that   Christ's 


431]  DOCTRINE   OF   CHRIST'S   PERSON   AND   LIFE-WORK         457 

position  of  supremacy  toward  the  world  finds  application 
also  to  other  men,  who,  within  His  community  and  in 
accordance  with  the  view  of  the  world  which  He  pro- 
claimed, enter  into  that  relation  to  God  which  was  His 
aim  for  them,  and  which  has  been  made  possible  to  them 
through  Him.  This  expectation  is  met  by  the  statement 
in  Mark  viii.  35-37.  This  statement  reveals  the  supra- 
mundane  worth,  that  is,  the  worth  as  against  the  whole 
world,  of  the  spiritual  life  of  each  individual  man,  and 
shows  the  way  in  which  this  entirely  new  perception 
attains  objective  reality.  For  the  assuring  of  life  against 
death,  even  when  for  Christ's  sake  life  is  renounced,  is  a 
specific  test  of  that  supremacy  over  the  world  upon  which 
we  enter  through  Christ,  since  death  is  our  most  painful 
experience  of  the  instability  of  all  the  elements  of  this 
world,  among  which,  from  the  natural  point  of  view,  each 
human  individual  is  reckoned.  The  practical  echo  of  this 
rule  is  supplied  by  the  triumphant  conviction  of  Paul — "All 
things  are  yours;  whether  Paul,  or  ApoUos,  or  Cephas,  or 
the  world,  or  life,  or  death,  or  things  present,  or  things  to 
come;  all  are  yours;  and  ye  are  Christ's;  and  Christ  is 
God's"  (1  Cor.  iii.  22,  23);  "I  am  persuaded,  that  neither 
death,  nor  life,  nor  angels,  nor  principalities,  nor  powers, 
nor  things  present,  nor  things  to  come,  nor  height,  nor 
depth,  nor  any  other  creature,  shall  be  able  to  separate  us 
from  the  love  of  God,  which  is  in  Christ  Jesus  our  Lord " 
(Eom.  viii.  38,  39).  This  independence  of  the  religious 
consciousness  over  against  the  world,  and  the  supremacy 
over  the  world  which  is  to  be  realised  within  the  sphere 
of  this  religion,  are  identical.  Every  expression  of  inde- 
pendence is  an  evidence  of  supremacy  in  one  particular 
department  of  life.  Now,  in  this  positive  freedom  of  the 
Christian,  which  is  derived  expressly  from  fellowship  with 
Christ  and  subordination  to  Him  and  to  God,  the  real  point 
is  not  power  to  effect  material  changes  in  the  mechanical 
stability  of  the  world  and  in  the  fixed  conditions  of  the 
social  order,  but  a  changed  estimate  of  all  the  relations  of 


458  JUSTIFICATION   AND    REOONaUATION  [431-2 

natural  and  historical  life.  For,  since  the  Christian  life  is 
determined  by  the  supreme  supernatural  end  of  God,  all 
other  possible  motives  and  impulses  which,  in  the  order  of 
nature,  and  amid  the  ordinary  and  natural  conditions  of 
human  society,  can  affect  human  life  in  the  way  of  creating 
dissatisfaction,  are  either  rendered  powerless  or  are  made 
subordinate  to  that  supreme  motive.  Thus  the  Christian 
in  this  present  life,  in  spite  of  his  lowly,  helpless,  suffering 
state,  has  experience  thi*ough  his  faith  of  an  exaltation  and 
riches  (Jas.  i.  9),  which  are  to  be  understood  as  a  position 
of  supremacy  and  an  amplitude  of  power,  inasmuch  as  re- 
conciliation with  the  supramundane  God  is  consummated  by 
a  power  over  the  world  akin  to  His. 

Our  dependence  on  the  world  under  the  natural  con- 
ditions of  moral' existence  is  such  that  our  horizon  is  bounded 
by  our  own  family  and  our  own  nation,  for  we  adjust  and 
attach  ourselves  to  the  prejudices  and  customs  which  in 
these  circles  have  come  down  to  us.  As  for  eTesus,  His 
connection  with  the  Chosen  People  had  for  Him  the  greater 
significance,  because  the  peculiar  character  of  this  people, 
its  religion,  its  institutions,  and  more  especially  its  hopes, 
were  the  necessary  historical  presupposition  of  His  own 
vocation,  and  because,  in  the  exercise  of  that  vocation.  He 
saw  Himself  confined  to  this  one  people  (Mark  vii.  27). 
But  although  He  was  bound  to  His  nation  by  the  most 
passionate  sympathy  (Matt.  xxiiL  37),  He  not  only  freed 
Himself  from  the  Old  Testament  preconceptions  as  to  its 
political  destiny,  but  also  made  it  known  that  He  did  not 
regard  Himself  as  inwardly  bound  by  any  of  those  ceremonial 
ordinances  in  which  spiritual  adhesion  to  the  Chosen  People 
was  required  to  find  expression  (xvii.  25—27).  Even  if 
for  Him  it  was  not  difficult  to  oppose  the  conditions  of 
the  new  religious  family  to  the  claims  of  the  natural  family 
(Mark  iii.  33-35),  yet  by  so  doing  He  certainly  renounced 
the  support  of  the  family  relation ;  He  also  overcame  the 
natural  sympathy  that  bound  Him  to  His  nation,  despite 
the  powerful  religious   motives  in  its  favour,  through   the 


432-3]       DOCTRINE   OF   CHRIST'S    PERSON    AND  LIFE-WORK        459 

fixed  anticipation  that  He  would  not  complete  His  vocation 
among  the  Israelites ;  that,  on  the  contrary,  the  other  nations 
of  mankind  would  succeed  to  Israel's  destiny  (Matt.  viii. 
11,  12,  XXL  43).  In  spite  of  this,  He  confined  the  actual 
discharge  of  His  vocation  to  the  Chosen  People,  and  never 
apparently  had  to  resist  the  temptation  to  extend  His 
activity  before  the  time  to  other  peoples.  Thus,  although 
it  was  only  as  a  bom  Israelite  and  in  connection  with .  His 
own  nation  that  Jesus  could  fulfil  His  vocation,  yet  He 
raised  Himself  above  these  particular  or  earthly  limitations 
of  His  existence,  not  onlj''  by  the  width  of  His  horizon  which 
embraced  all  mankind,  but  by  His  religious  judgment  of 
Himself,  which  was  independent  of  all  Old  Testament 
standards.  This  instance  of  Christ's  supremacy  over  the 
world  is  the  more  characteristic  that  the  Apostle  of  the 
Gentiles  never  attained  a  like  measure  of  inward  freedom 
from  the  preconceptions  of  Judaism.  Paul  remained  so 
staunchly  loyal  to  the  distinctive  position  assigned  by  the 
Old  Testament  to  his  race,  that,  in  spite  of  all  contrary 
considerations,  he  preserved  imshaken  the  hope  of  the 
ultimate  conversion  of  Israel  to  Christ  (Eom.  xi.  25).  In 
this  respect  he  not  only  falls  short  of  Christ's  inward 
freedom,  but  comes  into  direct  collision  with  the  expectation 
of  Christ.  The  aforesaid  attitude  of  Jesus  is  at  the  same 
time  an  evidence  of  the  degree  in  which  He  realised  in  His 
own  person  that  universal  human  nature  which  is  required 
by  the  idea  of  His  vocation.  The  fact  of  His  belonging 
to  one  particular  nation  in  reality  only  serves  Him  as 
a  means  of  fulfilling  His  vocation ;  inwardly  He  is  un- 
tranmielled  by  any  constraint  of  earthly  prejudice  reflecting 
the  narrow  spirit  of  the  family  or  the  nation. 

Inconspicuous  enough  is  this  exercise  of  supremacy  over 
the  world,  and  I  can  imagine  that  even  those  who  accept  the 
exposition  here  given  of  the  loftiness  of  Christ's  judgment  of 
Himself,  may  yet  regard  the  present  inquiry  as  an  uncalled 
for  digression.  They  may  be  inclined,  that  is,  to  rest  con- 
tent with  the  expedient  of  previous  theologians,  that  Christ 


460  JUSTIFICATION    AND   RECONCILIATION  [433-4 

possessed    supremacy  over    the    world   as  right  and  might, 
but  in  His  existence  as  a  human  individual   would   on   no 
account  exercise  this  supremacy,  postponing  it  to  the  future, 
when,  at  the  right  hand  of  power,  He  should  wield  it  through 
His  community  (Mark  xiv.  62).     But  I  have  already  shown 
(p.   406)  that   this   exercise   of  supremacy   by  the  exalted 
Christ  is  intelligible  only  if,  in  His  life  on  earth,  it  is  not 
confined   to  a  mere   claim  of  right  or  an  unexercised  en- 
dowment.    For    how    can    we    prove   the  existence  of  such 
attributes    unless    by    some    corresponding    activity   of    the 
earthly  Christ  ?     Moreover,  Christ's  exercise  of  power  upon 
His    community,   and    through    His    community    upon    the 
world,  is   anything   but   a    fact    of    objective    and    palpable 
experience.     The  phenomena  in  which  many  seek  the   real 
proof    of    the    might    of    Christianity,   namely,   political    in- 
fluence   and    the    legal   authority    of    Church    officials    and 
ecclesiastical    institutions,   are   the    very    things    that   come 
under  strong  suspicion  of  falsifying  the  intention  of  Christ ; 
indeed,  it  is  only  a  really  strong  faith  in  the  invisible  that, 
amid   the    miry  abominations    and    miserable    trivialities   of 
Church  history,  can   trace  the  advancing  power    of    Christ 
over  this  world  at  all.     Finally,  the  power  over  the  world 
which  Paul  ascribes  to  the  Christian,  and  which  must  serve 
as  our  guiding  analogy  in  interpreting  the  original  assertion 
of  Christ,  falls  entirely  within  the  sphere  of   the  spiritual, 
and  cannot  become  palpable  or  evident  in  any  corresponding 
degree.     If,  therefore,  our  concern  be  to  find  in  the  historical 
portrait  of  Christ  other  proofs  than  those  already  quoted  of 
His  characteristic  independence  of  the  spirit  of  His  nation, 
the  inconspicuous  character  of  these  proofs  cannot  afford  any 
ground  for  doubting  the  correctness  of  the  result. 

What  I  mean  is,  that  Christ's  patience  under  suffering, 
which  has  already  come  under  notice  as  a  consequence  of 
His  loyalty  to  His  vocation,  is  the  real  test  not  only  of  His 
constancy  in  this  regard,  but  also  of  His  unique  power  over 
the  world.  For  the  individual  impulses  of  self-preservation, 
avoidance  of  pain,  and  the  keeping  inviolate  of  personal  honour 


434-5]       DOCTRINE   OF    CHRIST'S   PERSON   AND   LIFE-WORK        461 

— ^impulses  which  in  every  case  He  subordinated  to  the 
consciousness  of  His  vocation — imply  as  their  correlative 
term  the  world  as  a  whole.  No  doubt,  more  immediately, 
it  is  the  hostile  human  world  which  evokes  the  collision 
between  Christ's  life-work  and  His  material  and  social  self- 
preservation,  and  it  is  only  a  very  narrow  section  of  the 
world  of  men  with  which  He  comes  into  painful  contact. 
But  since  Christ  recognised  His  life-work  as  the  cause  of 
God,  His  immediate  opponents  represented  for  Him  the  whole 
world  of  mankind,  so  far  as  it  revolts  against  God's  ruUng 
of  the  world.  Wherefore  He  declares  that,  by  His  deter- 
mination to  submit  patiently  even  to  the  probable  issue  of 
its  opposition  to  Himself,  He  has  overcome  the  world  (John 
xvi.  33).  When  in  steadfast  loyalty  to  His  vocation  He 
refuses  to  bring  the  motive  of  physical  and  social  self- 
preservation  into  harmony  with  the  claims  of  His  opponents, 
who  represent  the  ungodly  tendency  of  the  human  world. 
He  demonstrates  in  their  case  His  power  over  the  world. 
For  unless  this  human  society  had  tongues  wherewith  to 
slander,  and  hands  wherewith  to  strike,  it  would  not  be  an 
object  of  fear  at  all,  or  an  occasion  of  victory.  But  as  every 
evil  is  a  natural  event  (p.  351),  so  any  suffering  imposed 
by  human  society  can  affect  us,  and  become  at  once  a 
temptation  and  an  occasion  of  victory,  only  in  so  far  as  it 
represents  at  the  same  time  the  opposition  of  the  system  of 
nature  as  a  whole.  The  pain  of  soul  caused  by  slander,  as 
by  blows  dealt  to  the  body,  denotes  the  collision  of  the 
wliole  fabric  of  the  material  world  with  the  personal  sense 
of  worth  in  the  individual  spiritual  man.  For  the  whole 
mechanical  and  organic  connection  of  the  individual  man 
with  the  world  is  involved,  when  we  are  aggrieved  by  a 
physical  blow,  or  an  uttered  slander,  as  effects  of  human 
ill-will.  This  connection  of  things  is  not,  as  a  rule,  present 
to  our  mind,  but  we  can  easily  understand  that  Christ  was 
in  a  position  to  take  this  view  of  the  matter,  since  He  drew 
the  sharpest  possible  contrast  between  Himself,  as  the  Bearer 
of  God's  peculiar  purpose  in  this  world,  and  the  world  itself. 


462  JUSTIFICATION   AND   RECONCILIATION  [435-6 

Under  this  assumption  He  knew  not  only  that  power  over 

the  world  had  been  given  Him,  but  also  that  by  the  patient 

enduremce  of  all  suffering,  as  the  test  of  His  loyalty  to  His 

vocation,  He  was  overcoming  the   seductive   opposition   of 

the  world.     This  view  is  involved  in  the  idea  of  God  on 

which  Jesus  based  His  religious  conception  of  the  world  and 

His  judgment  of  Himself,  and  it  is  just  this  worth  assigned 

to  patience  in  His  own    person    which    forms   an   essential 

part  of  that  view  of  the  world  which  He  has  brought  to 

light. 

A  valuable  confirmation  of  this  result  is  afforded  by  the 

words  which  occur  in  Matthew  (xi.  28—30),  in  immediate 
connection  with  the  declaration  of  Jesus  that  all  things  have 
been  delivered  unto  Him  by  His  Father.  The  central  point 
of  this  utterance,  which,  as  a  rule,  is  not  rightly  understood, 
is  the  description  of  Jesus  as  one  who,  despite  His  inherent 
righteousness,  is,  like  the  righteous  men  of  the  Old  Testament, 
in  a  state  of  oppression  and  suffering,  but  who  willingly 
accepts  the  same.  For  the  predicates  irpav^  xal  rairetvi^ 
appear  in  the  LXX  as  equivalent  to  the  Hebrew  13P,  and 
this  word,  or  rather  the  equivalent  Aramaic  word  ^^y,  is  the 
only  word  Jesus  can  have  used.  Now  this  word  is  the  con- 
ventional designation  of  the  righteous  man  in  view  of  the 
consistent  oppression  which  he  has  to  endure  at  the  hands 
of  the  godless;  which  circumstance  is  certainly  included 
here,  since  it  is  the  reason  why  Jesus  compares  Himself 
with  those  who  labour  and  are  heavy  laden.  The  addition 
T§  KapBla,  which  is  equivalent  to  3?"^?^,  is  not  inconsistent 
with  a  state  of  external  oppression,  but  represents  the  latter 
as  that  in  which,  because  of  His  righteousness,  Jesus  ac- 
quiesces. He  thereby  distinguishes  Himself  from  the  men 
to  whom  He  offers  His  help,  but  also  from  the  righteous  of 
the  Old  Testament,  who  always  regard  their  oppressed  con- 
dition with  complaint  and  longing  for  deliverance.  Here, 
therefore,  we  see  the  advance  upon  the  Old  Testament  made 
by  the  righteousness  of  Jesus  in  its  attitude  to  the  world. 
By  acquiescing  in  the  obstructions  of  the  world  as  a  dispensa- 


43^7]      DOCTRINB   OF   CHRIST'S   PERSON   AND   LIFE-WORK        463 

tion  of  God,  Jesus  subordinates  to  Himself  the  relation 
between  Himself  and  the  world,  in  consequence  of  the 
mutual  knowledge  subsisting  between  the  Father  and  the 
Son,  even  as  on  this  same  account  He  recognises  His 
sufferings  to  be  the  yoke  by  which  He  is  led  of  God,  by 
Whom  He,  the  Son,  is  first  recognised.  Wherefore,  when 
He  calls  to  Himself  those  who  would  fain  carve  out  their 
own  fate  and  are  succumbing  under  the  obstructions  to  their 
freedom,  His  aim  is  to  lead  them  to  see  in  their  burdens 
dispensations  of  God ;  on  these  terms  the  said  burdens  will 
become  light,  because,  by .  the  patience  which  springs  from 
the  religious  motive,  men  lift  themselves  above  their  mis- 
fortunes and  the  world.  From  this  point  of  view  their 
sufferings  even  become  for  them  a  helpful  yoke,  which 
brings  them  experience  of  the  guiding  of  God.  This  is  the 
proof  Jesus  Himself  offers  us  of  the  supremacy  over  the 
world  which  belongs  to  Himself  through  the  mutual  know- 
ledge existing  between  Himself  and  God.  It  forms  the 
material  also  of  the  view  summed  up  by  Bernard  (p.  415) 
in  the  predicates  superaifis  fortwnam  and  passiis  indigna,  as 
the  distinctive  marks  of  the  world-controlling  Divinity  of 
Christ. 

According  to  the  hints  given  us  in  the  New  Testament, 
the  grace  and  truth  (faithfulness)  manifested  in  the  discharge 
of  His  vocation,  and  the  loftiness  of  His  self-determination 
as  compared  with  the  particular  and  natural  impulses  which 
spring  from  the  world,  are  the  features  in  the  earthly 
life  of  Christ  which  are  summed  up  in  the  attribute  of  His 
Godhead.  Nor  are  these  two  elements,  when  more  closely 
examined,  really  different.  For  the  patience  in  suffering, 
which  proves  Christ's  power  over  the  world,  is  at  the  same 
time  a  manifestation  of  His  faithfulness  toward  men;  and 
His  persistent  faithfulness  to  the  Jews,  despite  His  anti- 
cipation that  His  work  among  them  would  be  fruitless,  is 
the  proof  of  His  inner  freedom  and  victory  over  the 
external  circumstances  of  His  life.  From  the  human 
point  of  view,  this  patience  and  faithfulness,  as  the  purpose 


464  JUSTIFICATION   AND   RECONCILIATION  [437--8 

pervading  Christ's  life,  have  their  source  in  the  desire, 
inspired  by  His  vocation  and  sustained  by  His  unique 
knowledge  of  God,  to  set  up  the  Kingdom  of  God  among 
men  as  their  supramundane  final  end.  Viewed  from 
the  Godward  side,  this  human  life  falls  to  be  regarded  as 
the  perfect  revelation  of  God,  because  the  supreme  end  of 
the  world,  to  which  Christ's  life  is  devoted,  rests  upon  the 
self-end  of  God,  that  is,  on  His  essential  will  of  love.  The 
notes  of  Christ's  Divinity,  therefore,  have  only  such  scope  as 
is  provided  by  His  life-purpose,  in  so  far  as  that  purpose  is 
the  Divine  end  for  the  world,  and  the  correlate  of  the  self- 
end  of  God.  To  the  creating  and  sustaining  of  the  natural 
world  this  attribute  cannot  directly,  at  least,  be  referred; 
though  it  may  be  so  indirectly,  in  as  far  as  God  creates 
and  sustains  the  world  with  a  view  to  its  final  end,  as 
realised  through  the  special  work  of  Christ.  This  con- 
nection of  ideas  is  indicated  by  Bernard,  when  he  finds  in 
the  predicate  pasms  indigna  a  special  instance  of  God's 
wise  government  of  the  world.  The  expediency  of  innocent 
suffering  endured  for  the  good  of  the  community  is  syn- 
onymous with  God's  wise  government  of  the  world  for  this 
reason,  because  the  Christian  community  is  God's  supreme 
end  in  the  world.  A  complete  definition  of  the  Godhead  of 
Christ  must  therefore  take  account  of  the  fact  that  Christ's 
grace  and  truth  and  world-subduing  patience  have  had  their 
effect  in  the  existence  of  the  community  of  the  Kingdom  of 
God  under  corresponding  moral  attributes.  For  to  Him 
Who  wields  the  lordship  of  God,  or  Who,  to  borrow  Luther's 
phrase,  is  in  virtue  of  His  redeeming  work  "  My  Lord,"  we 
must  reckon  all  those  to  belong  who  experience  this  same 
lordship  in  themselves;  in  this  connection  the  community 
of  the  Kingdom  of  God  must  be  regarded  as  such,  in  so  far 
as  its  members,  through  conduct  prompted  by  universal 
brotherly  love,  and  through  the  various  possible  manifesta- 
tions of  supremacy  over  the  world  and  independence  of 
the  same,  display  in  themselves  the  successful  issue  of 
Christ's  peculiar  work.     Here  also  is  the  explanation  of  the 


438]  DOCTKINB   OP   CHRIST'S    PEHSON   AND   LIFE-WORK        465 

fact  that  the  conception  of  Christ's  Divinity,  or  the  applica- 
tion to  Christ  of  the  Old  Testament  Divine  name,  first  arose 
in  the  Christian  community;  Christ  Himself  was  never 
in  the  position  thus  to  describe  Himself.  Therefore  this 
attribute  can  be  rightly  appraised  by  theology  only  when 
Christ  is  conceived  as  the  living  Head  of  the  community  of 
God's  Kingdom.  For  we  must  bring  Christ  into  relation  to 
His  people,  before  we  are  in  a  position  to  recognise  that 
in  His  own  order  He  is  unique. 

That  this  is  so,  the  religious  consciousness  of  the  Christian 
community  assumes  as  certain.  And  hitherto  theology  has 
done  nothing  more  than  accept  the  assumption ;  she  has 
never  proved  it.  All  forms  of  the  doctrine  of  the  Incarnate 
Word  are  imperfect,  because  none  of  them  faces  the  question 
whether  incarnation  took  place  once  and  for  ever  in  the 
Person  of  Jesus,  or  whether  it  may  not  be  supplemented  or 
repeated  in  the  persons  of  others.  I  have  already  had 
occasion  to  point  out  (p.  408)  that,  neither  in  its  Lutheran 
nor  Eeformed  nor  modem  pietistic  form,  does  Christology 
provide  against  the  possible  inference,  that  the  God-man  can 
be  realised  only  in  the  race  of  mankind  as  a  whole,  or  that 
His  appearance  may  be  repeated  in  each  of  the  several  spheres 
of  moral  and  intellectual  life.  But  our  present  line  of 
thought  makes  it  clear,  that  only  in  the  sphere  of  the  ethico- 
religious  life,  viewed  from  the  standpoint  of  the  Kingdom 
of  God,  does  the  God-man  find  His  place,  because  that 
Kingdom,  and  nothing  else,  is  the  direct  correlate  of  the 
Divine  self -end.  It  follows,  therefore,  that,  as  the  historical 
Author  of  this  communion  of  men  with  God  and  with  each 
other,  Christ  is  necessarily  unique  in  His  own  order.  For  if  a 
second  could  be  produced  who,  really,  was  on  a  level  with  Christ 
in  grace  and  truth,  in  world-conquering  patience,  in  scope 
alike  of  purpose  and  of  achievement,  he  would  yet  stand  in 
historical  dependence  upon  Christ,  and  therefore,  logically, 
would  be  subordinate  to  Him.  Hence,  as  compared  with 
those  who  succeed  Him  in  the  realisation  of  the  Kingdom  of 
God,  the  fact  that  this  end  is  the  self-end  of  God  has  for 
30 


466  JUSTIFICATION    AJfD   RECONCILIATION  [433-9 

Him  quite  a  different  meaning.  For  the  members  of  Christ's 
community  come  to  take  this  attitude  as  those  who  have  had 
within  them,  originally,  another  bent  of  will;  whereas  the 
figure  of  Christ  cannot  be  understood  at  all  unless  it  is  His 
original  and  distinguishing  characteristic,  that  He  finds  His 
own  personal  end  in  the  self-end  of  God.  If  Christ  is  thus 
the  personal  revelation  of  the  will  of  God  as  essentially  love, 
then  certainly,  from  the  point  of  view  of  degree,  the  love  of  God 
finds  its  perfect  revelation  in  the  fact,  that  the  members  of 
the  Kingdom  of  God  fulfil  the  law  of  brotherly  love  (p.  291): 
but  from  the  point  of  view  of  kind,  these  manifestations  of 
brotherly  love  in  their  widest  extent  must  be  regarded  as  the 
intended  result  of  the  Divine  lordship  introduced  through 
Christ  in  grace  and  truth  and  spiritual  freedom  over  the 
world.  Similarly,  the  position  of  power  which  the  Christian 
community  occupies  in  the  world,  the  transformation  through 
the  principle  of  love  of  the  public  conscience,  the  intrench- 
ment  of  the  same  in  public  institutions,  the  progressive 
liberation  of  the  human  mind  from  the  dominion  of  nature, 
and  the  corresponding  subjection  of  nature  through  knowledge 
and  application  of  her  laws  to  human  ends,  must  also  be 
reckoned  results  of  the  Divine  lordship  among  men,  and 
ascribed  to  its  historical  Author.  In  this  estimate  of  Christ, 
the  Christian  faith  approves  itself  as  the  view  of  the  world 
which  corresponds  to  the  recognition  of  God  as  Spirit  and  as 
Love. 

The  exposition  here  given  of  Christ's  Divinity  it  has  been 
thought  to  disparage  by  the  remark,  that  the  attribute  of 
Divinity  is  proved  only  of  the  will,  but  not  of  the  nature  of 
Christ,  and  that  therefore,  even  in  the  case  of  the  will,  it 
remains  unexplained.  Whence  the  further  inference  is  drawn, 
that  Christ's  Godhead  is  by  this  method  not  really  recognised 
at  all,  but  rather  denied.  Now  this  distinction  between 
nature  and  will  is  not  religious  but  scientific,  although  our 
opponents,  as  a  rule,  are  not  aware  of  the  fact,  and  make  the 
dispute  to  be  about  religious  truth.  If  they  are  really  the 
religious  men  and  the  experts  in  religion  which  they  claim  to 


430-40]      DOCTKINE   OF   CHKIST'S    PERSON    AND   LIPK-WORK        467 

be,  let  them  prove  it  by  showing  that,  even  when  they  treat 
religious  and  scientific  knowledge*  as  one,  they  are  capable  of 
distinguishing  between  them ;  else  they  will  not  be  able  to 
maintain  their  claim  to  be  the  most  competent  judges  in 
matters  of  religion.  In  all  other  cases  we  estimate  character 
on  the  supposition  that  its  essence  is  manifest  in  the  will. 
Excellence  of  character  is  that  state  of  the  will  in  which  the 
natural  impulses  are  so  restrained  and  governed  as  to  be  sub- 
ordinate and  subservient  to  the  good  and  unselfish  end  which 
the  will  pursues.  For  the  created  spirit  has  as  his  allotted 
task  to  take  the  inborn  propensities  of  his  soul,  which  corre- 
spond in  some  way  to  his  physical  equipment,  and  are  known 
as  his  natural  disposition,  and,  through  the  development  of 
his  will,  to  transform  these  into  his  obedient  instruments.  It 
is  by  his  measure  of  success  in  this  achievement  that  we 
judge  the  character  of  a  fully  developed  man ;  and  it  must 
appear  to  us  odd  if  a  strong  personality  in  his  more  mature 
years  is  judged  by  the  natural  disposition  which  he  manifested 
in  his  youth,  as  if  the  latter  were  his  real  nature.  It  would 
be  a  parallel  case  to  this  if,  in  estimating  the  character  of 
Christ,  we  were  compelled  straightway  to  disregard  every  trace 
of  Divine  lordship  over  the  world,  on  the  ground  that  this 
constitutes  nothing  essential  in  Him,  but  is  only,  as  it  were, 
the  outward  manifestation  of  the  natural  endowment  with 
which  He  was  born  of  Mary;  for  this,  they  tell  us,  is  the 
correct  description  of  His  nature.  But  the  will  for  good  is 
never  the  simple  mechanical  result  of  the  natural  endowment 
within  which  it  comes  into  being.  Given  a  natural  disposi- 
tion the  most  favourable,  from  a  moral  point  of  view,  that 
can  be  imagined,  it  must  still  be  educated,  and  therefore 
transformed,  by  the  ends  which  it  adopts  at  the  bidding  of  a 
will  bent  on  good.  The  latter  would  cease  to  be  a  will  for 
good,  if  it  had  to  be  regarded  as  the  mechanical  result  of 
an  assumed  natm*al  endowment.  This  is  the  absurd  idea 
suggested  to  us  by  our  opponents,  when  they  require  us 
to  find  the  essential  nature  of  Christ,  not  in  His  world- 
conquering  will,  which  marks  Him  as  the  God-man,  but  in 


468  JusrmcATioN  and  reconciliation  [440-1 

His  physical  origin,  which  has  never  yet  been  reconciled  with 
His  historical  appearance,  and  never  can  be.  If  Christ  is  to 
be  judged  by  categories  that  are  applied  to  no  other  object 
than  Himself,  then  He  is  rendered  unintelligible.  Or,  if  it  is 
not  beyond  me  to  see  from  within  the  working  of  my 
opponents'  minds,  I  should  say  that  they  regard  Christ's  will 
as  a  mere  appendage  of  His  nature,  in  the  same  way  that 
acceptance  of  the  idea  of  God  as  the  Absolute  reduces  what 
is  His  essential  characteristic,  namely,  His  love,  to  a  mere 
appendage  of  His  nature.  If,  as  my  opponents  make  me 
responsible  for  conclusions  which  they,  with  their  alien  ideas, 
have  drawn  from  my  statements,  I  in  like  manner  seek  to 
make  intelligible  to  myself  the  distinction  they  draw  in  the 
case  before  us  between  nature  and  spirit  or  will  (p.  238),  then 
I  find  myself  compelled  to  insist  that  this  distinction  of 
spirit  and  nature  depends  on  the  material  constitution  of  the 
latter.  Even  in  my  conception  of  the  Divine  nature,  I 
cannot  get  away  from  this  characteristic.  Therefore  I  con- 
clude that,  when  my  opponents  will  not  allow  Christ's  good 
and  world -conquering  will,  under  the  other  characteristics 
already  discussed,  to  be  regarded  as  His  true  essence,  because 
they  do  not  believe  in  the  independence  of  the  good  will  as 
against  all  nature,  they  have  fallen  into  a  materialistic  mode 
of  thought. 

When  we  investigated  the  Kingdom  of  God  as  the  corre- 
late of  the  thought  that  God  is  love,  it  appeared  that  this 
organisation  of  men  can  be  construed  as  the  object  and  end  of 
God's  love,  only  in  so  far  as  it  is  conformed  to  the  type  of  ite 
Founder,  the   Son  of  God.      The   harmony  with    God  and 
likeness  to  Him  which  the  Kingdom  of  God  must  maintaiti 
in  order  to  be  understood  as  the  objective  of  God's  love, 
attaches  to  the  said  Kingdom  only  in  so  far  as  it  is  called 
into  being  by  the  Son  of  God,  and  bows  to  Him  as  its  Lord 
(p.  281).    In  other  words,  it  is  on  the  Son  of  God  that  in  the 
first  place  the  Father's  love  falls,  and,  only  for  His  sake,  on 
the   community  of  which  He  is  Lord.     Moreover,  if  these 
relations  are  eternally  involved  in  God's  will  of  love  (p.  301), 


441-2]       DOCTRINE   OF   CHRIST'S   PERSON   AND   LIFE-WORK        469 

it  follows  from  our  recognition  of  this  fact,  that  the  special 
significance  Christ  has  for  us  is  by  no  means  exhausted  in 
our  appreciation  of  Him  as  a  revelation  conditioned  by  time. 
On  the  contrary,  it  is  implied  that,  as  Founder  and  Lord  of 
the  Kingdom  of  God,  Christ  is  as  much  the  object  of  God's 
eternal  knowledge  and  will  as  is  the  moral  unification  of 
mankind,  which  is  made  possible  through  Him,  and  whose 
prototype  He  is ;  or  rather,  that,  not  only  in  time  but  in  the 
eternity  of  the  Divine  knowledge  and  wiU,  Christ  precedes 
His  community.  Of  course,  to  this  statement  a  certain 
qualification  must  be  added.  For  whatever  belonged  to  the 
natural  and  generic  limitations  of  Christ,  more  especially  His 
individual  natural  endowments  and  His  Jewish  nationality, 
cannot  be  taken  as  the  object  of  the  eternal  will  of  God, 
since  these  things  are  by  their  very  nature  bound  up  with 
the  world,  consequently  can  be  fore- ordered,  even  by  God, 
only  through  a  volition  in  time.  But  Christ,  we  know, 
reduced  the  significance  of  these  limitations  to  mere  means 
toward  His  own  spiritual  life,  in  particular  toward  the  appre- 
hension of  His  own  religious  fellowship  with  God,  and  the 
carrying  out  of  the  vocation  He  had  embraced.  Sharing  the 
religious  and  moral  customs  of  the  Jews,  He  yet  knows  Him- 
self, as  the  Son  of  God,  exalted  above  them ;  in  discharging  the 
duties  of  His  vocation  toward  His  countrymen.  He  knows 
His  work  destined  to  be  fruitful,  at  the  same  time  that  He 
distinctly  foresees  its  fruitlessness  among  the  Jews;  in  His 
own  life-conduct,  that  universal  human  morality  of  which  the 
Kingdom  of  God  shall  be  the  perfect  realisation  so  markedly 
preponderates,  that  we  fail  to  notice  in  Him  those  traces  of 
individual  temperament  which  are  wont  to  count  for  some- 
thing even  in  the  most  perfect  of  men.  Yet  Christ's  life  was 
not  a  mere  abstract  presentation  of  universal  human  morality ; 
for  He  gave  the  whole  wealth  of  personal  devotion  to  the 
universal  content  of  His  vocation.  Eather  is  He  Himself 
the  prototype  of  that  life  of  love  and  elevation  above  worldly 
motive,  which  forms  the  distinguishing  characteristic  of  the 
Kingdom  of  God;  and  this  as  the  deliberate  result  of  His 


470  JUSTIFICATION   AND   RECONCILIATION  [442-3 

vocation  to  be  the  Founder  of  that  Kingdom,  not  in  any  mere 
application  of  the  principle  of  the  Kingdom  to  the  separate 
details  of  human  life,  which  is  the  source  from  which  other 
men  derive  their  ethical  vocations.  If,  therefore,  the  Kingdom 
of  God  as  the  correlate  of  the  Divine  self-end  is  the  eternal 
object  of  the  love  of  God,  this  is  so  because  Christ  as  the 
prototype  and  inspiring  force  of  that  union  of  the  many  in 
one,  in  other  words,  as  the  Head  and  Lord  of  that  Kingdom, 
is  the  eternal  object  of  the  love  of  God,  so  that  in  this  special 
form  the  Kingdom  of  God  is  present  eternally  to  the  Divine 
knowledge  and  will,  while  its  individual  members  are  objects 
of  the  knowledge  of  God  in  time  (p.  122). 

The  congruity  between  the  Son  of  God  and  God  as  His 
Father,  by  which  the  conceivability  of  this  eternal  relation 
must  be  determined,  reaches,  however,  still  further.  For  if 
the  idea  of  love  is  necessarily  confined  to  beings  of  a  like 
order,  then,  of  course,  it  cannot  be  applied  to  God  in  any  such 
way  that  the  thought  of  God  must  be  subsumed  under  some 
higher  genus.  Bather  must  everything  that  is  compared 
with  God  be  first  regarded  in  the  light  of  the  distinction 
between  being  and  becoming.  Here  theological  tradition 
comes  to  meet  us  with  the  thesis  that  no  being  shares  in  the 
aseity  of  God.  Yet  the  distinction  between  God  and  all 
forms  of  being  is  specific,  in  so  far  as  it  can  just  as  little 
be  got  rid  of  or  dispensed  with  in  actual  life  as  can  the 
distinction  between  two  members  of  a  species.  On  the  other 
hand,  the  individual  spirit  is  marked  by  every  possible 
characteristic  we  think  of  as  existing  originally  in  God. 
Therefore  we  may  use  the  idea  of  species  in  order  to  compare 
spiritual  beings  with  God,  provided  we  make  the  reservation, 
that  everything  we  class  in  the  same  species  with  God  comes 
ever  from  God,  while  God,  in  regard  to  what  He  is,  does  not 
become,  but  everlastingly  is,  and  that  nothing  we  compare 
with  God  ever  attains  the  character  of  aseity.  With  this, 
theological  tradition  in  so  far  corresponds,  that,  in  affirm- 
ing the  Divinity  of  Christ,  it  expressly  excludes  aseity,  and 
by  asserting  the  eternal  generation  of  the  Son,  applies  the 


443-4]        DOCTRINE   OF   CHRIST'S    PERSON   AND   LIFE-WORK        471 

category  of  becoming,  as  distinct  from  being,  to  that  Existence 
which  is  to  be  denoted  as  the  eternal  object  of  the  Divine 
love.     Under  this  condition,  the  view  expounded  above — that 
the  eternally-beloved  Son  of  God,  on  the  ground  of  the  like 
content  of  His  personal  will,  and  of  the  uniqueness  of  the 
relation  He  holds  to  the  community  of  the  Kingdom  of  God 
and  to  the  world,  is  to  be  conceived  under  the  attribute  of 
Godhead — ^accords  with  the  traditional  theology.     Of  course 
our  time-conditioned  view  of  things   cannot  get  rid  of  the 
antithesis  between  God's  eternal  decree  and  the  realisation 
of  the  same  in  the  empirical  phenomena  of  time,  just  as  our 
conception  of  the  community  of  the  Kingdom  of  God  is  bound 
up  with  the  antithesis  between  the  calling  in  time  and  the 
choosing  before  the  foundation  of  the  world.      At  the  same 
time   we   must  premise  that  this    relation  does  not  mean 
for  God  that  there  is  in  Him  any  want  or  need ;  rather  is 
His  self-sufficiency  everlastingly  satisfied  in  what  to  us,  in 
the  long  series  of  preparatory  stages,  looks  like  the  expression 
of  a  want  (p.  299).     For  this  reason  the  eternal  Godhead 
of  the  Son,   in  the  sense  here  described,   is    perfectly   in- 
telligible only  as  object  of  the  Divine  mind  and  will,  that  is, 
only  for  God  Himself.     But  if  at  the  same  time  we  discount, 
in    the   case    of    God,  the   interval  between    purpose    and 
accomphshment,  then  we  get  the  formula  that  Christ  exists 
for  God  eternally  as  that  which  He  appears  to  us  under  the 
limitations  of  time.     But  only  for  God,  since  for  us,  as  pre- 
existent,  Christ  is  hidden.     Inasmuch,  then,  as  God's  stand- 
point is  impossible  for  us,  we  shall  be  wise  if  we  content 
ourselves  with  this  formal  proof  of  our  religious  estimate  of 
Christ.     Only  this,  too,  may  be  added  by  way  of  conclusion, 
namely,  that  by  the  same  line  of  reasoning  the  Spirit  of  God, 
as  the  Holy  Spirit,  also  becomes  intelligible.     The  Spirit  of 
God  is  the  knowledge  God  has  of  Himself,  as  of  His  own 
self-end.      The  Holy  Spirit  denotes  in  the  New  Testament 
the  Spirit  of  God,  in  so  far  as  the  latter  is  the  ground  of 
that  knowledge  of  God  and  that  specific  moral  and  religious 
life  which  exist  in  th^  Christian  community  (p.  273).      Since 


472  JUSTIFICATION   AND   RECONCIUATION  [444-5 

the  oommuuity  has  for  its  conscious  purpose  the  realisation 
of  the  Kingdom  of  God  as  the  Divine  self-end,  it  is  correct  to 
say,  that  the  practical  knowledge  of  God  in  this  community 
which  is  dependent  upon  God,  is  identical  with  the  knowledge 
which  God  has  of  Himself,  even  as  the  love  of  God  is  per- 
fected in  the  fact  that  within  the  community  love  is  practised 
toward  the  brethren.  But  if  in  His  Son  God  loves  eternally 
the  community  that  is  like  His  Son,  in  other  words,  if  the 
community  is  eo  ipso  the  eternal  object  of  God's  will  of  love, 
then  also  it  is  God's  eternal  will  that  His  Spirit  should  be 
the  Holy  Spirit  in  the  community  of  the  Kingdom  of  God. 
In  the  form  of  this  eternal  purpose,  the  Spirit  of  God  proceeds 
from  God,  inasmuch,  namely,  as  He  is  destined  to  enter  into 
the  community  which  enjoys  the  perfect  knowledge  of  God. 

§  50.  The  ethical  view  of  the  life  of  Christ  in  the  light  of 
His  vocation  found  its  appropriate  sequel  in  the  religious 
estimate  of  His  life  as  the  revelation  of  the  love  of  God,  and 
of  that  freedom  which,  as  the  characteristic  power  over  the 
world,  is  the  mark  of  Godhead.  This  discussion  has  followed 
essentially  the  point  of  view  expressed  in  the  kingly 
Prophethood  of  Christ;  it  diverged  from  the  traditional 
interpretation  of  that  title  only  in  this,  that  the  whole 
moral  conduct  of  Christ,  as  the  presentation  of  the  Divine 
grace  and  truth,  was  included  in  Christ's  activity  as  Prophet 
It  remains  to  be  seen  whether  and  how  the  ethical  view  of 
the  priestly  character,  which  was  at  the  same  time  claimed  for 
the  life  and  sufferings  of  Christ,  may  in  like  manner  be 
turned  to  account  from  the  religious  point  of  view.  Under 
the  head  of  Priest  the  old  theology  attempts  only  an  ethical, 
not  a  religious  interpretation,  for  the  priestly  character  of 
Christ  has  for  its  content  His  obedience,  that  purely  human 
and  voluntary  achievement.  The  estimate  of  this  obedience 
under  the  aforesaid  title  never  for  a  moment  leaves  the  lines 
of  ethical,  in  specie  forensic,  judgment,  nor  does  it  issue  in  any 
distinctively  religious  attitude.  Only  indirectly  does  the 
interpretation  of  Christ's  priestly  work  fall  within  the  view 
of  religion,  namely,  in  so  far  as  it  was  initiated  by  God  and 


445-6]        DOCTRINE   OF   CHRIST'S    PERSON   AND   LIFE- WORK         473 

is  recognised  by  Him ;  but  a  religious  significance  for  us  is 
secured  to  the  content  or  result  of  this  priestly  work  only 
through  its  being  taken  up  into  Christ's  prophetic  activity, 
and  through  the  corresponding  proclamation  in  the  Church 
of  how  Christ  has  determined  God  to  the  grace  of  forgiveness. 
This  formal  inconsistency  with  the  representation  given  of 
the  prophetic  office  becomes  the  more  painful  in  view  of  the 
fact,  that  the  forensic  interpretation  of  Christ's  priestly  work 
conflicts  in  every  respect  with  the  religious  interest  of  the 
Christian.  For,  as  standards  of  conduct,  law  and  religion  are 
in  Christian  experience  diametrically  opposed,  and  the 
assumption  that  in  God  righteousness  and  grace  work  in 
opposite  directions  is  in  so  far  irreligious,  that  the  unity  of 
the  Divine  will  forms  an  inviolable  condition  of  all  confidence 
in  God.  Therefore,  the  introduction  into  the  theology  of 
Protestantism  since  ToUner  of  the  fundamental  position  of 
Abelard  is  a  distinct  advance  upon  orthodoxy.  There  only 
remains  the  question  whether  the  thought  of  Christ's  priestly 
work  can  be  duly  and  logically  combined  with  the  religious 
value  already  attached  to  His  life.  It  is  true  we  cannot  in 
this  case  avoid  a  complete  remodelling  of  the  traditional 
doctrine  of  Christ's  priesthood  and  sacrifice.  But  this  step  is 
forced  upon  us,  on  the  one  hand  by  the  established  facts  of 
Biblical  theology,  and  on  the  other  by  the  ethical  consideration 
that  what  Christ  in  any  way  achieved  for  others  must  be 
included  in  what  He  thereby  achieved  for  Himself. 

It  is  unbiblical,  then,  to  assume  that  between  God's 
grace  or  love  euid  His  righteousness  there  is  an  opposition, 
which  in  its  bearing  upon  the  sinful  race  of  men  would  lead 
to  a  contradiction,  only  to  be  solved  through  the  interference 
of  Christ.  The  righteousness  of  inexorable  retribution,  which 
would  be  expressed  in  the  sentence  Fiat  jitstitia,  perecU  mundus, 
is  not  in  itself  a  religious  conception,  nor  is  it  the  meaning  of  the 
righteousness  which  in  the  sources  of  the  Old  and  New  Testa- 
ments is  ascribed  to  God.  God's  righteousness  is  His  self- 
consistent  and  undeviating  action  in  behalf  of  the  salvation  of 
the  members  of  His  community ;  in  essence  it  is  identical  with 


474  JUSTinCATION   AND   RECONCILIATION  [446-7 

His  grace  (vol.  ii.  p.  102).  Between  the  two,  therefore,  there 
ifl  no  contradiction  needing  to  be  solved.  It  is  unbiblical 
to  assume  that  any  one  of  the  Old  Testament  sacrifices, 
after  the  analogy  of  which  Christ's  death  is  judged,  is  meant 
to  move  God  from  wrath  to  grace  (vol.  ii.  p.  184).  On  the 
contrary,  these  sacrifices  rely  implicitly  upon  the  reality  of 
God's  grace  toward  the  covenant  people,  and  merely  define 
certain  positive  conditions  which  the  members  of  the  covenant 
people  must  fulfil  in  order  to  enjoy  the  nearness  of  the  God 
of  grace.  It  is  unbiblical  to  assume  that  the  sacrificial 
offering  includes  in  itself  a  penal  act,  executed  not  upon  the 
guilty  person,  but  upon  the  victim  who  takes  his  place. 
Bepresentation  by  priest  and  sacrament  is  meant  not  in  any 
exclusive,  but  in  an  inclusive  sense.  Because  the  priest 
draws  near  to  God  when  he  brings  near  the  gift,  therefore  he 
represents  before  God  those  in  whose  behalf  he  is  acting ;  it 
is  not  meant  that  because  the  priest  and  the  sacrifice  come 
near  to  God,  the  others  may  remain  at  a  distance  from  God. 
These  relations  hold  even  when  it  is  sins  of  ignorance  which 
give  occasion  for  sacrifices;  in  the  latter  case  forgiveness 
results  from  the  fact  that,  with  the  sacrifice,  the  priest  has 
indirectly  brought  the  sinners  also  into  the  presence  of  God. 
Lastly,  it  is  unbiblical  to  assume  that  a  sacrifice  has  it« 
significance  directly  for  God,  and  only  under  certain  other 
conditions  also  for  men.  On  the  contrary,  the  sacrificial  act 
is  just  what  combines  these  two  relations. 

The  ethical  conditions  of  a  satisfactory  theory  are  not 
met  by  the  orthodox  doctrine  of  Christ's  priesthood,  in  so  far 
as  the  latter  has  no  regard  for  the  distinct  expression  in  the 
historical  portrait  of  Christ  of  this  fact,  that  Christ  is  first  of 
all  a  Priest  in  His  own  behalf  before  He  is  a  priest  for  others. 
The  traditional  theology  overlooks  this,  since  it  conceives  the 
idea  of  priest  solely  in  the  derivative  sense  of  ofiicial  priest- 
hood, that  is,  as  the  mediation  in  behalf  of  others  with  God. 
But  whoever  is  regarded  as  wielding  an  influence  in  tliis 
direction,  must  surely  in  the  first  place  be  a  priest  in  his 
own  behalf,  that  is,  must  possess  and  exercise  the  right  of 


447]  DOCTBINE   OF   CHRIST'S    PERSON   AND   LIFE-WORK        475 

drawing  near  to  God  (Num.  xvi.  5).  Is  that,  then,  a  complete 
doctrine  of  Christ  which  has  not  one  word  of  explanation  for 
the  fact  that  Christ  prays  regularly  to  God,  and  desires  to 
transmit  to  His  disciples  His  own  religious  fellowship  with 
God  expressed  thereby  ?  The  appreciation  of  this  feature  of 
Christ's  character  is  obscured  by  the  material  conception  of  His 
Gx>dhead,  although  surely  it  is  evident  that  all  specific  action 
of  God  upon  Christ,  in  virtue  of  which  Christ  reveals  the 
Father  and  accomplishes  His  work,  depends  upon  that  spiritual 
interaction  which  appears  in  Christ's  intercourse  through 
prayer  with  God  as  His  Father.  The  error  in  the  interpreta- 
tion of  Christ's  position  as  Prophet  may  be  allowed  to  pass, 
since  in  this  case  the  needful  amplification  and  correction  is 
easily  supplied ;  but  every  interpretation  of  Christ's  activity 
as  Priest  is  for  us  distinctly  incomplete,  which  is  not  based 
upon  the  fact  that  Christ  is  in  the  first  place  a  Priest  in  His 
own  behalf,  that  is  to  say,  that  He  is  the  subject  of  personal 
religion,  or,  more  definitely,  that  He  is  the  subject  of  that 
true  and  perfect  religion,  compared  with  which  no  other  has 
been  able  to  bring  men  to  the  desired  goal  of  nearness  to 
God.  For  since  Christ  was  the  first  to  possess  complete  and 
exhaustive  knowledge  of  God,  He  is  therefore  also  the  first 
who  was  qualified  in  the  true  and  final  manner  to  exercise 
that  fellowship  with  God  which  was  the  aim  of  every  religion, 
and  to  experience  in  Himself  in  its  fulness  the  reciprocal  and 
saving  influence  of  God.  If  with  the  attitude  adopted  by 
Christ  we  compare  the  method  of  the  Old  Testament  sacri- 
fices, then  these  latter  as  separate  transactions  fall  short  of 
the  constancy,  and  as  ceremonial  transactions  of  the  spiritu- 
ality, of  Christ's  nearness  to  God,  and  since  they  express  only 
an  indirect  and  material  approach  to  Him,  necessarily  fail  to 
effect  for  any  man  that  personal  attitude  to  God  which  per- 
vades the  consciousness  of  Jesus  (Heb.  x.  1-4).  A  nearer 
analogy  is  presented  by  the  religious  practice  of  the  Psalmists, 
but  in  this  case  with  an  effort  the  success  of  which  is  not  at 
every  moment  assured,  but  as  a  rule  is  rather  anticipated  for 
the  future.     Besides,  there  is  the  further  difference,  that  the 


476  JUSTIFICATION   AND   RECONCILIATION  [447-8 

piety  of  the  Psalmists  does  not  as  such  possess  the  power  of 
establishing  a  communitj,  whereas  Christ  lives  in  the  inten- 
tion of  transmitting  to  His  disciples  His  own  fellowship  with 
God ;  and  that  we  ourselves  are  able  to  institute  these  in- 
quiries at  all  is  only  possible  because  this  intention  of  Christ 
has  had  success  in  us. 

If,  then,  Christ  is  to  be  thought  of  as  Priest,  the  funda- 
mental form  for  this  priestly  activity  is  contained  in  each 
moment  of  His  unique  consciousness,  that  as  the  Son  of  God 
He  stands  to  Gk)d  as  Father  in  a  relation  of  incomparable 
fellowship,  which  is  realised  in  His  knowledge  of  God,  in  the 
surrender  of  His  will  to  God's  providential  guiding,  and  in 
the  security  of  feeling  which  accompanies  the  same.  When, 
in  prayer  especially.  He  collects  Himself  for  this  fellowship. 
He  asserts  the  nearness  of  God,  and  assures  Himself  of  the 
love  of  God  as  the  ground  of  His  own  position  as  God's  Son 
(John  XV.  10,  11).  At  the  same  time  this  function  is  not 
exercised  outside  His  consciousness  of  His  vocation  and  the 
activity  resulting  therefrom,  but  of  necessity  opens  out  to 
include  the  whole  range  of  this  activity,  even  as  it  receives 
thence  in  return  stimulus  and  support.  For  Christ  recognises 
His  vocation,  and  exercises  it,  as  the  direct  work  of  God ;  the 
aim  of  His  own  efforts  is  known  to  Him  as  the  very  aim  of 
God ;  His  conduct  therefore  is  intelligible  to  Him  as  a  service 
rendered  to  God,  which  in  its  own  way  brings  Him  just  as 
near  to  God  as  prayer  itself.  Thus  the  particular  instance  of 
loyalty  to  His  vocation  to  which  the  circumstances  led, 
namely.  His  readiness  to  die,  served  as  really  to  support  His 
conviction  of  the  love  of  God  toward  Himself  as  did  the 
consciousness  He  enjoyed  of  fulfilling  God's  commands  as  a 
whole  (John  x.  17,  x v.  10).  Paul  has  framed  the  twofold 
conception,  first,  that  the  fruit  of  his  own  efforts  in  his  voca- 
tion, namely,  the  converted  heathen,  are  a  sacrifice  to  God 
in  the  offering  of  which  he  renders  priestly  service  (Eom. 
XV.  16);  and,  on  the  other  hand,  that  that  personal  sancti- 
fication,  which  makes  the  body  the  fit  instrument  of  the 
God-honouring  life  of  the  soul,  is  the  spiritual  sacrifice  which 


448-9]        DOCTRINB    OF   CHRIST'S    PERSON    AND   LIFE- WORK         477 

each  believer  is  to  ofifer  to  God  (xii.  1).  Regarded  in  this 
light,  Christ's  activity  in  His  vocation  and  His  consistent  per- 
sonal virtue  also  fall  within  the  view  of  His  priestly  approach 
to  God. 

But  under  what  conditions  are  we  to  understand  that 
Christ's  loyalty  to  His  vocation  as  a  whole,  and  more  espe- 
cially His  willingness  to  endure  death  as  a  consequence  of 
that  loyalty,  have  the  significance  of  priestly  service  for 
others  t  It  is  true  that  this  extreme  instance  of  obedi- 
ence to  His  vocation  is  the  only  one  which  is  directly 
viewed  by  Christ  Himself  under  the  aspect  of  sacrifice, 
namely,  in  His  words  at  the  Last  Supper,  to  which  the 
less  distinct  references  in  John  (x.  11,  17,  xii.  24,  xv.  13, 
xvii.  19)  add  nothing  that  is  specific.  The  inclusion  of  this 
active  obedience  in  the  priestly  work  of  Christ  for  others  does 
not  rest  on  any  direct  statement  of  the  New  Testament.  At 
the  same  time,  the  value  thus  attached  to  the  active  conduct 
of  Christ,  so  that  His  patience  in  suffering  and  willingness  to 
die  are  included  along  with  it  under  the  one  conception  of 
His  meritorious  obedience,  is  the  one  point  in  the  traditional 
interpretation  which  comes  nearest  to  the  truth.  It  is  not 
the  mere  fate  of  dying  that  determines  the  value  of  Christ's 
death  as  a  sacrifice ;  what  renders  this  issue  of  His  life  signi- 
ficant for  others  is  His  willing  acceptance  of  the  death 
inflicted  on  Him  by  His  adversaries  as  a  dispensation  of 
God,  and  the  highest  proof  of  faithfulness  to  His  vocation. 
Thus  it  is  impossible  to  accept  an  interpretation  of  Christ's 
sacrificial  death  which,  under  the  head  of  satisfaction,  combines 
in  a  superficial  manner  His  death  and  His  active  life,  while 
at  bottom  it  ascribes  to  the  death  of  Christ  quite  a  different 
meaning,  namely,  that  of  substitutionary  punishment.  I 
have  shown  how  alien  this  interpretation  is  to  the  whole 
Biblical  idea  of  sacrifice  as  rightly  understood,  also  how  little 
the  only  utterance  of  Paul  which  points  in  this  direction 
(Gal.  iiL  13)  has  to  do  with  the  idea  of  sacrifice,  how  exactly 
rather  it  corresponds  with  Paul's  apocryphal  conception  of  the 
Mosaic  Law,  a  conception  which  cannot  as  such  be  theologic- 


478  JUSTIFICATION   AND   RECONCILIATION  [449-50 

ally  binding  (vol.  ii.  p.  248).  I  have  shown  that  the  asserted 
necessity  of  a  penal  satisfaction  to  God  as  a  condition  of  the 
exercise  of  His  grace  has  no  foundation  in  the  Biblical  con- 
ception of  God ;  on  the  contrary,  it  is  an  intellectual  infer- 
ence from  the  principle  of  Hellenic  religion  that  the  gods 
practise  a  twofold  retribution,  a  principle  further  supple- 
mented by  the  assumption  that  the  original  adjustment  of 
the  relation  between  God  and  man  is  to  be  interpreted  in 
terms  of  a  legal  ordinance  (§  32).  It  only  remains,  therefore, 
to  show  that  the  idea  of  a  penalty  borne  for  others  in  the 
manner  in  which  this  is  here  asserted,  is  as  inconsistent  with 
the  conditions  of  moral  Ufe  in  the  individual  as  it  is  foreign 
to  the  words  of  Christ. 

The  sufferings  of  Christ  in  His  death  are  said  to  have 
been  equivalent  to  the  penalty  which  through  sin  the  whole 
human  race  has  brought  upon  itself.  This  proposition  is 
based,  not  upon  the  ground  that  in  the  two  cases  the  exact 
amount  of  suffering  is  the  same,  which  is  incapable  of  proof, 
but  on  the  ground  that  there  is  an  equivalence  in  quality  and 
worth,  in  so  far  as  Christ  by  the  imme«wurable  worth  of  His 
Divinity  counterbalanced  the  immeasurable  worthlessness  of 
sin,  and  consciously  accepted  as  the  punishment  of  sin  the 
evils  that  befell  Him,  in  other  words  realised  momentarily 
in  His  own  experience  eternal  damnation.  Certainly  this 
latter  supposition  is  the  indispensable  condition  of  any  value 
as  satisfaction  attaching  in  the  sight  of  God  to  the  suffer- 
ings of  Christ.  A  punishment  which  is  not  felt  as  punish- 
ment lies  beyond  the  horizon  of  a  theology  which  regards 
legal  retribution  in  its  strictest  form  as  the  fundamental 
order  of  the  world.  But  we  have  seen  that  the  idea  of 
punishment  is  not  complete  when  it  regards  merely  these 
objective  conditions  of  legal  order;  to  render  it  complete, 
the  evils  inflicted  by  public  authority,  in  consequence  of 
unlawful  actions,  must  be  accompanied  by  the  sense  of  guilt 
in  the  person  concerned  (§  14).  Apart  from  this,  the  indi- 
vidual does  not  feel  or  reckon  the  punishment  as  punishment, 
but  as  an  unpleasant  interlude,  perhaps,  or  even  as  an  injustice 


450-1]        DOCTKINB   OF   CHRIST'S    PERSON   AND   LIFE- WORK        479 

done  to  himself.  Now  the  doctrine  of  a  penal  satisfaction 
rendered  by  Christ  stands  in  so  direct  a  relation  to  this 
imperfect  conception  of  punishment,  which  is  due  to  inaccu- 
rate observation,  that  this  fact  alone  is  fatal  to  its  validity. 
For  Christ  had  no  sense  of  guilt  in  His  sufferings,  con- 
sequently He  cannot  have  regarded  them  as  punishment, 
nor  even  as  punishment  accepted  in  the  place  of  the  guilty, 
or  in  order  to  deter  men  from  sin.  It  may  well  be  that  an 
innocent  man,  who  is  a  member  of  the  same  community  with 
guilty  men,  shares  the  experience  of  evils  which  the  guilty 
have  brought  upon  themselves  as  punishment.  But  whether 
the  innocent  man,  because  of  his  innocence,  finds  such  evil 
consequences  of  others'  guilt  the  efuaier  or  the  heavier  to  bear, 
he  at  least  cannot  feel  them  as  punishment,  seeing  he  is 
himself  wholly  innocent,  or,  at  any  rate,  not  a  partner  in  their 
guilt.  Crell  has  rightly  remarked  against  Grotius,  that  when 
God  afQicts  a  family  or  a  nation  for  the  crime  of  its  head,  and 
thereby  causes  even  innocent  children  to  suffer,  the  evil  for  the 
latter  is  afflictio,  not  poeria  (vol.  i.  p.  339).  In  the  same  way 
Christ,  Who  was  conscious  of  not  deserving  any  punishment 
when  He  encountered  death  as  a  consequence  of  faithfulness 
to  His  vocation,  cannot  possibly  have  regarded  as  punishment 
the  sufferings  which,  through  the  fellowship  with  sinful 
humanity  attaching  to  His  vocation,  He  brought  on  Him- 
self as  the  consequence  of  man's  hostility  to  good — even 
although  He  cherished  the  compassionate  purpose  of  contri- 
buting by  His  death  toward  the  removal  of  this  guilt. 

While  this  theory  of  Christ's  sufferings  has  resulted  from 
certain  arbitrary  assumptions  anent  the  original  Divine  order 
of  the  world,  assumptions  not  Christian  but  legal  and  Hellenic, 
yet,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  a  certain  religious  interest  has  come 
to  attach  to  the  same ;  the  question  is  whether  the  theory  has 
thereby  become  the  more  convincing.  In  this  connection, 
two  different  arguments  are  presented  to  us.  On  the  one  hand, 
von  Meyer  and  Beck  (vol.  i.  pp.  626,  630)  maintain  that  the 
penal  value  of  the  sufferings  of  Christ  is  reflected  and  con- 
firmed in  the  similar  experience  of  believers,  when  the  latter 


480  JUSTIFICATION   AND    RECONCILIATION  [451-2 

are  crucified  with  Christ.  But  the  alleged  similarity  is 
contrary  to  fact.  Even  the  old  theologians  perceived  that  for 
the  believer  all  evils  are  disciplinary  in  character,  and  serve  to 
purify  and  try  the  soul  (§  9).  In  other  words,  if  the  "  cruci- 
fixion "  of  believers  is  to  be  understood  as  an  inward  process, 
then  it  means  the  transformation  of  the  old  man  into  the 
new,  which  transformation  takes  place  through  self-disciphue 
and  the  attainment  of  virtue,  and  each  act  of  dying  to  the 
flesh  is  immediately  recompensed  by  the  bliss  of  living  to  the 
spirit  These  experiences  of  the  believer  have  no  resemblance 
whatever  to  simple  retributive  punishment.  Granting  that 
they  resemble  the  sufferings  of  Christ,  the  only  conclusion  we 
can  draw  is  the  one  already  arrived  at,  namely,  that  for  Christ 
His  sufferings  served  as  a  means  of  testing  His  faithfulness 
to  His  vocation — this  and  nothing  else.  The  religious 
interest  attaching  to  the  penal  value  of  Christ's  sufferings  has 
been  expressed  in  another  form  by  Philippi  (voL  i.  p.  626). 
Philippi  makes  his  conviction  of  the  truth  of  Christianity 
rest  upon  the  consideration,  that  Christ,  by  the  penal  satis- 
faction He  offered  to  God,  proves  Himself  his  surety  against 
the  wrath  and  retributive  justice  of  God ;  but  for  this,  Philippi 
would  have  been  quite  content  with  the  religion  of  his  fathers. 
Here  the  ([uestion  arises,  by  what  means  is  the  individual  to 
know  that  Christ,  in  offering  a  general  satisfaction,  is  surety 
also  for  him  ?  He  could  be  assured  of  this  only  if  Christ  suffered 
the  particular  punishment  which,  as  regards  quantity  and 
quality,  would  correspond  to  his  own  personal  transgressions. 
But  these  are  by  no  means  the  lines  on  which  the  doctrine 
championed  by  Philippi  is  actually  laid.  Just  as  the  assumed 
conception  of  original  sin  obscures  the  particular  guUt  of 
individual  men,  so  the  penal  satisfaction  offered  by  Christ  is 
made  the  equivalent  of  the  eternal  damnation  due  to  all 
mankind,  and  is  by  no  means  fitted  to  counteract  the  sense 
of  guilt  of  each  separate  individual.  However  much  we  may 
widen  it  out  into  sympathy  with  the  common  guilt  of  men, 
the  fact  remains  that  the  personal  aspect  is  the  point  of  least 
concern  to  the  orthodox  dogma.     The  latter  appropriates  the 


452-3]       DOCTRINE   OF   CHRIST'S    PERSON    AND   LIFE-WORK         481 

sense  of  guilt  so  pre-eminently  for  original  sin  that  an 
individual  sense  of  guilt  cannot  arise,  because  all  separate 
transgressions  are  represented  merely  as  unavoidable  con- 
sequences of  original  sin,  and  add  nothing  to  its  guilt.  In 
the  same  way,  therefore,  that  the  conception  of  original  sin 
admits  no  distinction  of  individual  sin,  so  the  worth  of  the 
satisfaction  offered  by  Christ  for  hereditary  sin  as  a  whole 
provides  no  guarantee  that  He  is  surety  for  the  particular 
sins  of  the  individual,  which  the  latter  distinguishes  from 
original  sin.  To  bridge  the  gap  here  disclosed  is  logically 
just  as  impossible  as  it  has  proved  for  Lutheran  theology 
to  establish  a  logical  reconciliation  between  the  universal 
promise  of  grace  and  its  application  to  the  individual  believer 
(§  24).  One  would  need  to  know  beforehand  that  he  is 
himself  elected. 

But  yet  another  defence  might  be  offered.  I  recall,  with 
this  view,  the  remarkable  position  of  Wessel  (p.  371),  who 
distributes  Christ's  penal  satisfaction  over  the  various  amounts 
of  punishment  merited  by  each  individual,  whether  elect  or 
reprobate,  and  makes  room  for  all  this  punishment  in  the 
consciousness  of  Christ,  Who  is  represented  as  having  made 
satisfaction  for  the  separate  penalty  due  by  each  individual. 
It  has  been  pointed  out  that  this  view  of  Wessel  corresponds 
with  the  fact  that  he  ignores  altogether  original  sin ;  at  the 
same  time  it  is  due  to  a  far  more  exact  appreciation  of  the 
individual  sense  of  guilt  than  was  possessed  by  the  Eeformers, 
whose  own  intention  it  was  to  deepen  this  sense  of  guilt 
to  the  utmost.  In  this  interest  they  adopted  Augustine's 
doctrine  of  original  sin ;  but  there  is  no  doubt  that  thereby 
the  sense  of  individual  responsibility,  which  we  must  regard 
as  one  of  the  strongest  motives  of  the  Christian  religion,  has 
in  part  been  weakened  and  in  part  perverted.  Wherefore 
also  the  religious  interest  which  Philippi  here  manifests  is 
clearly  inconsistent  with  the  theology  which  he  describes  as 
the  theology  of  the  Church.  What  a  pity  that  Luther  did 
not  devote  some  attention  to  the  theory  of  Wessel,  and 
discuss  the  bearing  of  his  own  doctrine  upon  it  I  For  that  it 
3* 


482  JUSTIFICATION    AND    RBCONCILIATION  [453-4 

stands  in  some  direct  relation  to  the  emphasis  needing  to  be 
laid  on  the  individual  sense  of  guilt,  is  confirmed  to  me  by  a 
communication  I  have  received  from  a  pastor,  who,  without 
knowing  anything  of  Wessel,  was  led  by  his  own  experience 
in  dealing  with  men,  to  the  very  same  view.  If,  namely,  the 
individual  sense  of  guilt  is  to  be  met  by  the  thought  of  the 
penal  satisfaction  offered  by  Christ,  then  nothing  is  left  us 
but  the  hypothesis  that  Christ  in  His  sufferings  had  a  distinct 
and  separate  experience  of  the  amount  of  punishment  due  to 
each  separate  individual  of  all  mankind.  The  impossibility 
of  this  supposition  is  at  once  apparent,  for  there  is  as  little 
evidence  in  the  history  of  Christ's  life,  as  there  is  room  within 
the  range  of  His  human  consciousness,  for  an  omniscience  of 
this  kind ;  so  that  we  have  here  a  conclusive  reason  against 
the  interpretation  of  Christ's  sufferings  as  the  conscious 
experience  by  Him  of  the  punishment  due  to  all  mankind. 
Christ's  Priesthood,  therefore,  is  a  well-grounded  expres- 
sion of  the  fact  that,  as  the  subject  of  the  perfect  spiritual 
religion,  Christ  stood  in  the  highest  possible  relation  of 
fellowship  with  God,  and  exercised  this  fellowship  at  each 
moment  of  His  life,  since  every  act  and  word  of  His  voca- 
tion arose  out  of  His  religious  relation  to  God.  The  union 
of  mankind  through  the  motive  of  universal  love.  He 
regarded  as  the  Kingdom  of  God ;  in  bringing  about  this 
union  He  was  conscious  of  exercising  in  His  own  person 
the  lordship  of  God ;  and  this  association  of  His  own 
moral  ideal  with  the  thought  of  God  is  only  possible  as 
the  result  of  His  consistent  religious  attitude,  whether  in 
His  view  of  the  world,  in  His  apprehension  of  Himself,  or 
in  His  worship  of  God.  In  other  words,  the  certainty  He 
enjoyed  as  to  His  own  particular  vocation  of  necessity  pre- 
supposes that  His  apprehension  of  Himself  as  the  Son  of 
God  is  ever  attained  through  the  exercise  of  His  religious 
relation  toward  God,  that  is,  through  the  adoration  of  God 
as  His  Father.  Therefore,  when  we  have  placed  the  one 
common  material  of  Christ's  life.  His  speech  and  conduct 
as  well  as  His  patience  in  suffering,  imder  the  two  separate 


454-5]       DOCTRINE  OF   CHRIST'S    PERSON   AND   LIFE-WORK         483 

categories  of  prophetic  and  priestly  activity,  we  exhaust  the 
significance  of  His  person  as  Bearer  of  the  Divine  lordship, 
or  founder  of  the  Divine  Kingdom.  Inasmuch  as  at  each 
moment  of  His  life  the  same  historical  material  affords 
confirmation  of  His  religious  character  as  subject  of  the 
perfect  religion,  and  of  His  personal  vocation  as  the  am- 
bassador of  God,  He  hereby  displays  His  specific  and  unique 
significance  for  those  who  through  His  kingly  Prophethood 
are  led  to  enter  into  the  same  religious  attitude  to  God,  so 
as  to  adopt  as  the  supreme  aim  of  their  own  life  the  realisa- 
tion of  God's  Kingdom.  To  what  extent  the  priestly 
relation  which  was  exercised  by  Christ  in  His  own  person 
becomes  also  significant  for  others,  forms  the  theme  of  a 
later  discussion. 

1.  In  order  to  determine  the  specific  significance  of  the 
Person  of  Christ  in  Christian  thought,  whether  as  regards 
our  view  of  the  world  or  our  judgment  of  ourselves,  account 
must  be  taken  of  the  whole  range  of  Christ's  activity,  and 
of  these  two  essential  considerations — first,  that  the  Christian 
religion  is  not  a  national  religion;  and,  second,  that  the 
Christian  religion,  as  the  perfect  and  complete  revelation 
of  God,  has  this  object,  namely,  to  render  men,  in  virtue  of 
their  relation  to  the  supramundane  spiritual  God,  free  and 
independent  with  regard  to  the  world. 

2.  In  so  far  as  the  speech  and  conduct  and  patience 
under  suffering,  which  make  up  the  life  of  Christ,  arise  out 
of  His  vocation  to  exercise  the  moral  lordship  of  God  and 
realise  God's  Kingdom,  and  are  the  perfect  fulfilment  of 
this  vocation,  even  to  the  extent  of  His  willingly  and 
patiently  enduring  the  pains  of  death,  it  follows  from  the 
relation  of  this  purpose  of  Christ  to  the  essential  will  of 
God,  that  Christ  as  the  kingly  Prophet  is  the  perfect 
revelation  of  God;  that,  in  virtue  of  the  motive  which 
inspired  Him,  namely,  love,  and  the  lordship  which  in  His 
estimate  of  Himself  and  in  His  patience  He  exercised  over 
the  world,  He  is  equal  to  God;  and  that  He  is  the  eternal 
object  of  the  Divine  love,  and  as  such  also  the  ground  of 


484  JUSTIFICATION   AND   RECONCILIATION  [455 

the  eternal  election  of  the  community  of    the  Kingdom   of 
God. 

3.  In  so  far  as  the  unbroken  faithfulness  of  Christ  to 
His  Yocation  not  only  exhibits  in  detail  the  religious  relation 
of  the  Son  of  God  to  God  as  His  Father,  but  always  arises 
out  of  this  relation,  Christ  maintains  in  His  whole  life  His 
priestly  relation  toward  God.  If,  therefore,  His  Priesthood 
is  to  be  regarded  as  availing  for  others,  it  can  only  be  in 
virtue  of  this  fact. 


CHAPTER    VII 

THE   NECESSITY   OF   FORGIVENESS    OR  JUSTIFICATION 

IN    GENERAL 

§  51.  The  necesBity  of  the  Divine  forgiveuees  of  sins  affirmed 
in  the  Christian  religion  is  always,  in   theological   systems 
subsequent  to  the  Beformation,  viewed  in  the  light  of  the 
relations  assumed  to  obtain  between  the  authority  of   God 
on  the  one  hand,  and  the  destination  of  men  for  blessedness 
and  the  significance  of  their  moral  action  on  the  other.     Our 
historico-critical   preparation   for   the   decision  we  have  to 
arrive  at  on  this  subject  must  limit  itself  to  those  expositions 
of  Christianity  which  sprang  out  of  the  movements  of  the 
sixteenth  century,  for  the  inconsistent  tenor  of  the  Bonmn 
Catholic  scheme  of  salvation  offers  a  twofold  answer  to  the 
question.     I  refer  to  the  fact  that  Thomas  (vol.  i.  p.  93), 
under  the  influence  of   statements  of  Paul,  at  the  outset 
follows  Augustine  in  defining  ivstificatio  as  transmutatio  a 
statu  iniustitiae  per  remimonem  peccatorum,  but,  when  ex- 
panding this  conception,  regards    the    forgiveness    of    guilt 
as    the   completion    of   making   righteous  (Gereehtmachung), 
And   yet,  in  opposition    to    this    dogmatic    principle,  there 
stands  the  individual's  religious  judgment  of  self — asserted  in 
Catholicism    too— which   regards  all  merit  as  the  effect  of 
Divine  grace,  and  therefore  traces  blessedness,  or  acceptance 
into  the  community  of   the   perfected   saints,  back   to    the 
factor  of  grace,  which,  in  contrast  to  the  perpetual  imper- 
fection of  conduct  in    general,  is   described    as    the    grace 
of  pardon  (vol.  i.  p.   136).     According   to   the    first    view, 
forgiveness  is   found  necessary  to   supplement   that  actual 
righteousness   which   exists   through   the   grace   of   God,  a 

486 


486  JUSTIFICATION    AND    RECONCILIATION  [457 

righteousness  which  properly  determines  a  man's  standing 
before  God  and  his  blessedness.  According  to  the  other 
view,  Divine  forgiveness  of  sins  is  found  necessary  as  the 
basis  in  principle  of  the  attainment  of  blessedness;  for  all 
actual  human  righteousness  is  imperfect  and  therefore  un6t 
to  determine  our  relation  to  God,  and,  so  far  as  it  possesses 
any  perfection,  dependent  on  grace.  Thus  it  becomes  plain 
that  the  question  of  the  necessity  of  forgiveness  receives 
no  clear  answer  in  Catholic  Christianity,  for  we  are  always 
referred  alternately  from  the  one  view  to  the  other. 

Now,  these    two  heterogeneous  conceptions  come  to  be 
set  in   opposition   the   one  to   the  other,   inasmuch  as  the 
first   is    adopted    by    Socinianism,    the  second  by  orthodox 
Protestantism,  though  of  course   the  explanations  given   of 
either  by  these  two  parties  are  accompanied  by  modifications. 
Catholicism,  by  its   oscillation  between  the  two,  betrays  an 
endeavour  to  interpret  and  to  realise  Christianity  as  something 
which    wavers  in  equilibrium  between  law  and  redemption. 
Orthodox   Protestantism    makes    the    significance    of    Chris- 
tianity as  law  subordinate  to  its  significance  as  redemption ; 
Socinianism   does   the  opposite.     The  latter  system,  accord- 
ingly, goes  on  the  principle    that   man    owes    his    standing 
before  God  and  the  prospect  of  blessedness  to  his  fulfilment 
of  the  Christian  law.     Accordingly,  the  forgiveness  of  sins 
is  regarded  merely  as  compensating  for  the  imperfection  of 
his  legal   performances;    it   is    formulated    by  God   in    the 
judgment  that  a  good  intention  to  render  the  obedience  of 
faith  is  equivalent  to  complete  performance,  and  that  there- 
fore   the    penalties    due    for   its    infraction    by   sin,   which 
would    prove  an    obstacle    to   blessedness,  are  not   exacted. 
This  result,  it  is  true,  is  entirely  based  on  the  free  will  of 
God,  as  attested  by  Him  in  His  promise ;  still,  the  applica- 
tion  of    God's  redeeming  will  is   made  dependent    on    the 
presence  of  the  active  obedience  of  faith  to  the  law.     The 
meaning  of  the  Socinian  scheme  of  salvation,  consequently, 
is   that  forgiveness,  as  an  equitable  QnUige)  interpretation 
put  by  God  upoi;  the  good  will  perfectly  to  fulfil  the  law,  aod 


457-8]        NECESSITY    OF    FORGIVENESS    OR   JUSTIFICATION  487 

as  remission  of  penalties,  is  necessary  in  order  to  compensate 
for  the  imperfection  of  moral  action,  and  to  maintain  the 
principle  that  blessedness  follows  from  moral  action.  Under 
these  circumstances,  forgiveness  is  interpreted  as  an  accident 
of  the  Christian  life,  inasmuch  as  in  principle  the  standing 
of  men  before  God  is  reduced  to  legal  perfection  or  the 
endeavour  to  reach  it  (voL  L  p.  325).  Now,  although  in 
this  system  an  explicit  basis  is  found  for  the  religious  factor 
in  Christianity  expressed  by  the  conception  of  forgiveness — 
man  being  represented  as  attaining  a  supernatural  destina- 
tion in  accordance  with  the  Divine  promise — ^yet  more  recent 
theories  of  an  analogous  character  have  become  more  in- 
different to  this  consideration  (vol.  ii.  p.  49).  For  when 
once  Christianity  is  regarded  as  essentially  a  system  of 
scholastic  ethics  or  a  legal  mode  of  life,  it  is  immaterial  how 
much  or  how  little  attention  is  given  to  those  characteristics 
of  its  original  form  which  prove  it  to  be  a  religion. 

The  orthodox  Dogmatics  of  the  Lutheran  and  Reformed 
Churches  states  the  ground  of  the  necessity  of  the  forgiveness 
of  sins  in  general  much  in  the  same  way  as  Socinianism  does. 
Forgiveness,  or  justification  by  God's  grace,  appears  as  neces- 
sary because  the  fulfilment  of  the  law  in  the  state  of  grace  no 
less  than  in  the  state  of  sin  is  imperfect,  and  therefore  un- 
fitted to  determine  the  relation  of  man  to  God,  or  to  render 
his  blessedness  possible.  Here  we  have,  therefore,  the 
reservation  that,  if  man's  conduct  had  not  been  disturbed 
and  restricted  by  sin,  on  it  would  have  depended  his  acknow- 
ledgment by  God  and  his  blessedness.  But  as  forgiveness  is 
regarded  as  necessary  to  the  end  which,  under  the  reign  of 
sin  and  its  after-effects,  is  not  attainable  by  moral  action,  the 
imperfection  of  that  action  is  viewed  not,  as  by  Socinianism, 
merely  in  its  quantitative,  but  in  its  qualitative  aspect. 
Thence  it  follows  that  the  forgiveness  of  sins  is  recognised, 
not  as  a  substitute  for  fulfilment  of  the  law,  but  as  the  sole 
criterion,  as  the  principle  of  man's  standing  before  God,  and 
as  the  sufficient  ground  of  his  blessedness.  In  judging  our- 
selves subjectively,  it  is  demanded  that,  when  asking  whether 


488  JUSTIFICATION   AND    RECONCILIATION  [458-9 

we  are  justified,  we  should  look  away  from  all  our  own 
activity  in  what  is  good,  and  turn  to  the  grace  of  God  alone. 
To  this  corresponds  the  common  Evangelical  doctrine   that 
blessedness  is  subject  to  no  other  condition  than  that  which 
determines  justification.     For  on  this  point  there  is  really  no 
significant  divergence  between  the  two  Evangelical  confessions. 
Even  though  on  the  Beformed  side  no  occasion  presented 
itself  for  formulating  this  principle   so  antithetically  as  is 
done  in  the  Formula  of  Concord,  Art.  4,  yet  a  quite  clear 
distinction  was  made  between  the  tenets  that  blessedness  is 
solely  the  effect  of  Divine  grace,  and  that  God  at  the  same 
time  has  so  ordained  the  way  to  blessedness  that  we  shall 
practise  good  works  according  to  His  law.^     With  no  less 
decisiveness  the  Lutheran  doctrine  holds  that,  when  in  a 
soul  justification  by  faith  is  effectual  to  salvation,  the  Holy 
Spirit  at  the  same  time  supplies  the  power  to  fulfil  the 
Divine  law.     But  however  much  in  earnest  one  may  be  in 
believing  that  good  works  merely  exist  synchronously  along- 
side of  justification  by  faith,  without  having  any  share,  not 
even  that  of  a  concomitant  cause,  in  producing  salvation  as 
a  result,  yet  it  will  be  difficult  to  avoid  involuntiarily  dis- 
torting this  relation  into  a  causal  one,  unless  some  explana- 
tion of  the  necessity  of  good  works  in  the  life  of  the  justified 
person  is  found  which   shall  give  the  clearest  possible  ex- 
pression to  the  quite  different  place  they  really  occupy.    This 
is  not  done,  for  instance,  in  St.  Bernard's  phrase,  repeated 
by  Evangelical  theologians — bona  opera  via  regni,  non  causa 
regnandi.     It  may  be  that  a  man  has  attained  to  the  position 

^  CalviD,  Ijuit.  iii.  14.  21 :  "Qaod  praeteroa  bona  fidelium  opera  scriptura 
cansas  esse  ostendit,  cur  illis  dominus  benefaciat,  stat  inooncussum,  effectam 
nostrae  salutis  in  dei  patris  dilectione  sitnm  esse,  materiam  in  filii  obedlentia, 
instrumentum  in  spiritus  illuminatione.  Istis  nihil  obstat,  quominus  opera 
dominus  tanquam  causas  inferiores  amplectatur,  sed  nnde  id  t  nempe  quos  sna 
misericordia  aeternae  vitae  hereditati  destinavit,  eos  ordinaria  sua  dispensationae 
per  opera  bona  inducit  in  eius  possessionem.  Quod  in  ordine  disiiensationis 
praecedit,  posterioris  causam  nominal."  Con/,  Helv.f  post  16 :  "  Nos  sentimus 
per  opera  bona  nos  servari,  illaque  ad  salutem  ita  esse  necessaria,  ut  absque  illis 
nemo  unquam  sit  servatus.  Gratia  enim  soliusquo  Christi  beneficio  servamur ; 
opera  necessario  ex  fide  progignuntur.  Ac  inipropric  his  salus  attribuitur,  quae 
propriissime  adscribitur  gratiae." 


459-60]       NECESSITY    OF   FORGIVENESS    OR   JUSTIFICATION  489 

of  lordship  not  through  merit,  but  through  grace;  still,  if 
in  that  position  he  must  practise  good  works,  then  they 
can  hardly  be  anything  but  conditions,  in  other  words, 
concomitant  causes,  of  his  maintaining  his  lordship.  This 
consideration  is  so  irresistibly  urgent  that  it  becomes  ex- 
ceedingly important  for  the  correct  formation  of  the  doctrine 
to  discover  in  what  motives  the  Evangelical  confessions  base 
the  necessity  of  good  works  in  the  Christian  life. 

They  do  so  by  assigning  two  pairs  of  reasons.  First,  the 
necessity  is  real  because  God  prescribes  good  works,  and 
because  as  tokens  of  the  Holy  Spirit  they  follow  from  true 
and  living  faith.  Again,  good  works  arise  from  the  desire  to 
promote  God*s  glory,  in  particular,  in  order  to  show  gratitude 
for  justification,  and  from  the  desire  to  attain  subjective  assur- 
ance of  salvation.^  But  the  very  plenitude  of  these  reasons, 
which  no  theologian  has  undertaken  to  bring  into  relation 
with  one  another,  betrays  some  uncertainty  as  to  the  position. 
For  if  the  question  were  put  why  God,  Who  attaches  blessed- 
ness to  justification  by  faith,  prescribes  good  works  and  wishes 
to  be  glorified  by  them,  it  would  be  impossible  to  conceal  the 
arbitrariness  of  such  an  arrangement.  Practically  the  same 
answer  would  have  to  be  given  to  the  questions,  on  what 
ground  the  gift  of  the  Holy  Spirit  coincides  with  justification, 
since  the  latter  is  not  mediated  by  Him ;  and  how  faith,  which 
in  the  case  of  justification  is  merely  receptivity  for  Divine 
grace,  can  at  the  same  time  be  an  efficacious  power  acting  on 
our  fellow-men.  Finally,  it  is  not  altogether  obvious  that  good 
works  should  serve  every  believer  as  a  ground  for  believing 
in  his  justification.  The  position  that  they  must  do  so  rests 
on  the  belief  that  both  are  effects  of  Divine  grace.  But  here 
again  the  question  arises,  What  have  justification  and  good 
works  in  common  even  from  this  point  of  view  ?  If  nothing 
save  justification  by  faith  secures  eternal  life,  if  therefore 
good  works  do  not,  how  is  the  assurance  of  justification  and 
of  eternal  life  to  be  gained  from  them,  in  so  far  as  they  are 
effects  of  Divine  grace  ?    And  there  is  this  further  point.     Our 

*  yfjw)?.  C.  A,  iii.  68,  155  ;  Fm'm.  Cone,  4  ;  iTcZr.,  post.  16 ;  Catech.  Pal.  86. 


490  JUSTIFICATION   AND    RECONCILIATION  [460-1 

consciousness  of  justification  expressly  involves  that  in  virtue 
of  their  continual  imperfection  we  must  look  away  from  our 
good  works  as  a  criterion  of  our  standing  before  God  (p.  164). 
But  now,  it  is  maintained,  should  our  faith  in  our  justification 
be  weak,  we  are  to  find  the  authentic  ground  for  our  conscious- 
ness of  being  justified  in  the  fact  that  good  works  are  present 
in  some  degree.  Will  a  man  really  attain  to  that  peace 
which  justification  ought  to  ensure  to  him,  if  placed  between 
these  two  contradictory  estimates  of  his  moral  action,  both  of 
which  he  is  to  accept  simultaneously  ?  Schneckenburger  at 
least  has  asserted  that  such  a  supposition  is  intolerable  to  a* 
Lutheran,  fiut  Schneckenburger  is  mistaken  in  supposing 
that  the  above-mentioned  principle  is  alien  to  the  creed 
and  Dogmatics  of  Lutheranism.^  His  view  is  correct  only  so 
far  as  the  tendency  to  look  for  verification  of  the  justified 
status  to  the  moral  struggle  which  is  going  on  simultaneously, 
does  not  make  its  influence  felt  in  the  practical  religious 
methods  of  Lutheranism  until  Spener.  Otherwise,  Spener 
himself  could  not  have  affirmed  this  principle  as  something 
novel  and  decisive  in  character.  On  the  other  hand,  under 
the  Beformed  system  this  method  of  self-examination  is 
partly  encouraged  by  the  conception  of  perseverantia  gratiae, 
and  partly  rendered  tolerable  by  the  counterbalancing  idea 
of  election. 

Within  the  domain  of  Lutheranism,  self-examination  of 
this  kind,  ever  since  it  was  recommended  by  Spener,  has 
become  the  source  of  a  widespread  change  in  religious  life, 
and  at  the  same  time  the  occasion  of  a  dubious  alteration  in 
the  doctrine  of  justification.  On  the  one  hand,  Spener's 
principle  led  to  the  Illumination  (Aufkldrung),  i,e.  to 
the  result  that  people  spared  themselves  the  roundabout 
path  of  justification  by  Christ,  and  relied  before  God  upon 
any  performance  of  good  works   they  could  claim   (vol.  i. 

^  ComparcU,  Doginatik,  i.  p.  42 ;  cf.  Apol,  C.  A,  iii.  155,  229,  vide  supra  pp. 
143,  144.  Further,  Quenstedt,  P.  iv.  cap.  9,  thes.  8,  not.  2  :  "Per  bona  opera 
iustiiicatio  nostra  quoad  nos  a  posteriori  confinnatur."  Hollatz,  P.  iii.  sec.  2, 
cap.  7,  qu.  22:  ** Quicunque  legem  di?inam,  quantum  in  hac  vitae  infirmitate 
fieri  potest,  sincere  servat,  is  fidei  suae  certns  est." 


461-2]        NECESSITY   OF   FORGIVENESS    OR    JUSTIFICATION  491 

pp.  360,  372).     On  the  other  hand,  in  the  Pietistic  circles 
devoted  to  sanctiEcation,  a  heightened  enthusiasm  for  good 
works,  and  especially  an  ascetic  aversion  to  secular  life,  was 
beyond  all  doubt  originally  fostered  with  the  idea  of  find- 
ing  in    these    marks   of   the    state   of    grace   assurance  of 
justification   through   Christ.      But   such    sanctification   was 
not  viewed  directly  as  an  effect  of  Divine  grace,  but  as  an 
object  to  be  attained  by  personal  effort,  while  at  the  same 
time  it  was  conceived  as  the  ultimate  saving  purpose  of  God. 
Either,  now,  the  saintly  activity  which   was  to   serve  the 
believer  as  an  evidence  of  his  justification  came  to  be  re- 
garded as  possessing  equal  worth  in  God's  sight,  or  the  high 
value  placed  upon  sanctification  lessened  the  attention  given 
to  justification,  or  both  tendencies  appeared  together.     This 
result  comes  out  clearly  in  the  theology  of  Bengel's  school. 
While  referring  the  reader  to  my  previous  exposition  of  the 
views  of  Oetinger,  Menken,  von  Meyer,  and  Beck  (vol.  i. 
pp.  608  if.,  623  ff.),  I  may  describe  as  the  interpretation  of 
redemption  common   to  them  all  that   it   consists   in    the 
communication  of  the  positive  power  of  a  moral,  sinless  life, 
and  as  their  view  of  justification,  that  it  is  God's  acknowledg- 
ment of  the  effectual  obedience  of  faith,  as  a  factor  of  real 
value  even  though  requiring  to  be  supplemented.    The  agree- 
ment between  the  leaders  of  Arminianism  and  this  school, 
which  in  the  case  of  Beck  actually  approximates  to  Catholic 
doctrine,  is  in  the  last  resort  to  be  explained  historically  by 
the  fact  that  the  teaching  of  the  Beformers  did  not  precisely 
settle  the  relation  between   justification   and   good  works. 
The  influence  of  this  "  sanctification  "-pietism,  however,  left 
its  mark  likewise  on  the  dictum  of  Schleiermacher,  repeated 
by  Nitzsch  and  Martensen,  that  justification  and  conversion 
are  the  aspects  to  be  distinguished  in  regeneration  (vol.  i. 
pp.  531,  550).     This  view  may  possibly  express  merely  the 
temporal  coexistence  of  the  two  as  conceived  by  the  He- 
formers.     This  is  the  turn  which  Schweizer,  at  least,  gives 
it.^     But  with  Schleiermacher  the  dictum  really  expresses 

^  Ckristliche  Olavbenslekret  ii.  2,  p.  135. 


492  JUSTIFICATION   AND   EBCONCILIATION  [462-3 

the  dependence  of  justification  on  conversion.  But  the 
inevitable  result  of  this  is  to  encourage  the  idea  that  the 
purpose  of  justification  is  to  make  sanctification  possible 
and  real,  which  is  the  declared  tendency  of  the  Gathohc 
doctrine  of  justification  (GerecJUmachung). 

The  distortion  of  the  idea  of  justification  in  the  schools 
of  Bengel  and  Schleiermacher  is  the  worst  error  brought 
about  by  the  obscurity  of  the  positions  held  by  the  Beformers 
regarding  the  necessity  of  good  works.  Without  going  so  far, 
another  distortion  of  the  idea  meets  us  close  at  hand  in 
practical  teaching.  For,  hardly  anywhere,  even  in  that 
preaching  which  is  most  faithful  to  the  standards,  does  one 
discover  thorough  agreement  with  the  Formula  of  Concord 
in  asserting  that  salvation  depends  solely  on  fuith.  Bather, 
in  order  to  guard  against  Antinomianism,  the  performance 
of  good  works  is  insisted  on  as  a  condition  of  salvation, 
i.e,  good  works  are  admitted  to  be  a  concomitant  cause. 
This  conjunction  of  the  two,  common  in  popular  usage,  is 
thrown  into  sharp  relief  in  Kant's  treatment  of  the 
problem  of  the  forgiveness  of  sins  (vol.  i.  p.  456).  For  he 
draws  attention  to  the  fact  that  the  hope  of  salvation  is 
attached  to  two  conditions,  that  our  transgressions  be 
cancelled  before  the  Divine  Judge,  and  that  we  walk  in  a 
new  and  dutiful  life.  Both  conditions  must  of  necessity 
hang  together,  and  this  is  sought  to  be  proved,  says  Kant, 
by  deducing  the  one  from  the  other.  The  two  possible 
combinations  between  them,  however,  bring  Kant  to  an 
antinomy  of  reason,  i.e.  to  a  contradiction  between  the 
orthodox  and  the  rationalistic  theory.  For,  to  begin  with, 
forgiveness  appears  as  the  necessary  precondition  of  a  good 
life;  on  the  other  hand,  one  cannot  appropriate  for  one's 
own  forgiveness  the  penal  satisfaction  rendered  by  another, 
unless  one  devotes  oneself  to  an  amended  walk  and  conversa- 
tion. This  contradiction  is  not  theoretically  so  insoluble  as 
Kant  supposes ;  and  therefore  that  we  must  decide  practically 
for  the  second  alternative — that  the  forgiveness  of  sins  is 
dependent  on  reformation — is  not  so  inevitable  as  he  repre- 


4(53-4]        NECESSITY    OF   FORGIVENESS    OR   JUSTIFICATION         493 

sents.  For  in  life  one  may,  indeed,  begin  with  what  we 
ought  to  do — that  is  the  principle  of  all  education ;  but 
the  certainty  of  Divine  forgiveness  apprehended  later  is  not 
therefore  necessarily  produced  by  one's  own  activity.  Rather, 
it  may  quite  well  be  viewed  as  the  insight  we  gain  into  the 
determining  ground  of  our  own  activity,  and  as  the  condition 
of  its  merely  relative  worth.  In  that  case,  however,  the 
question  always  recurs,  how  it  can  be  proved  that  forgive- 
ness, as  the  essential  basis,  makes  moral  activity  possible, 
and,  on  the  other  hand,  how  good  works  can  add  anything 
further,  if  forgiveness  has  been  ^xed  upon  by  God  as  the 
sufficient  ground  of  eternal  life.  For  one  would  think  that 
if  the  specific  result  of  justification  or  forgiveness  is  the 
capacity  to  lead  a  new  life,  then  the  Catholic  or  the  Pietistic 
reading  of  justification  as  "making  righteous"  (Gerecht- 
machung),  or  real  purification  from  sin,  is  indicated  as  the 
true  one.  On  the  other  hand,  if  we  cannot  thoroughly 
believe  the  proposition  that  eternal  life  or  blessedness  is, 
under  the  conditions  posited  in  Protestantism,  coincident 
with  justification,  then  the  demand  for  good  works  as  con- 
comitant causes  of  blessedness  can  only  be  understood  as  due 
to  the  silent  influence  of  the  idea  of  merit. 

If,  on  the  other  hand,  the  Reformers'  conception  of  justi- 
fication or  forgiveness  is  rigorously  held  to,  and  if  the  necessity 
for  it  is  to  be  seen  from  the  comparison  of  justification  with  good 
works,  then  what  we  come  to  is  nothing  more  nor  less  than 
the  principle  that  the  forgiveness  of  God  is  necessary  for  the 
salvation  (eternal  life,  blessedness)  of  believers,  because  works 
are  inadequate  to  this  purpose,  owing  to  their  imperfection. 
At  the  beginning  of  the  Reformation,  this  position  supplied 
the  argument  of  most  practical  importance  for  stimulating 
religious  self-examination  as  opposed  to  vulgar  Catholicism; 
but  the  principle  is  really  very  far  from  furnishing  a  positive 
proof  of  comprehensive  range.  For  the  assertion  that  justifi- 
cation is  necessary  to  eternal  life  is,  in  this  connection,  merely 
the  obverse  of  the  negative  judgment  that  good  works  do  not 
suffice  for  eternal  life,  because — it  being  presupposed  that 


494  JUSTIFICATION   AND   RK(X)NCILIATION  [464-5 

even  the  believer  is  relatively  a  sinner  still — they  are  always 
imperfect.  Thus  the  principle  is  held  in  reserve  that,  if  good 
works  were  performed  in  perfect  measure,  they  would  suffice 
to  establish  a  legal  claim  on  God  to  eternal  life.  This  prin- 
ciple, drawn  from  the  dispensation  assumed  as  original,  implies 
that  the  relation  of  men  to  God,  expressed  in  the  Christian 
conception  of  religion,  is  properly  a  legal  one  (§  33).  But 
this  position  is  not  merely  proved  untenable  in  point  of  fact 
by  the  universality  of  sin :  it  is  a  logical  absurdity  to  conceive 
the  necessary  dependence  of  man  on  God  in  respect  of  his 
destiny,  as  being  at  the  same  time  a  relation  involving  recip- 
rocal rights.  Since,  then,  even  as  a  mere  matter  of  fact, 
justification  by  faith  and  not  the  legal  claim  conferred  by 
good  works  leads  to  eternal  life,  the  proof  which  establishes 
the  first  view  by  the  untenability  of  the  second  implies  the 
more  general  truth  that  man's  highest  destiny,  fellowship  with 
God,  is  the  result  of  God's  entering  into  religious  relations 
with  him,  for  it  cannot  arise  from  a  legal  reciprocity  between 
them.  But  either  this  is  a  tautology,  or  the  logical  sequence 
of  these  propositions  must  be  reversed.  The  positive  proof, 
therefore,  that  justification  or  forgiveness  leads  to  eternal  life, 
must  be  led  otherwise  than  by  the  mere  negation  of  the 
methods  furnished  by  vulgar  Catholicism,  with  which  Luther 
tortured  himself  in  vain,  since  at  bottom  they  were  absurd. 
Not  until  the  proof  of  the  connection  between  justification 
and  eternal  life  has  been  formulated  entirely  anew,  shall  we 
also  be  able  completely  to  refute  the  Socinian  view  that  for- 
giveness is  merely  a  supplement  to  the  active  obedience  of 
faith,  which  in  its  turn  has  its  roots  in  the  free  resolve  of  the 
individual.  Under  no  circumstances,  however,  can  the  positive 
proof  of  the  necessity  of  forgiveness  be  derived  from  its 
teleological  relation  to  sanctification  or  good  works,  which, 
indeed,  are  taken  into  account  in  the  Catholic  doctrine  of 
justification  {&ereehtmachung)  as  the  aim  of  the  latter,  but 
never  in  the  Evangelical  doctrine  of  justification  {Gerecht- 
sprechung\  But  this  is  not  to  be  taken  as  foreclosing  the 
question  whether  justification,  even   as  conceived  Evangelic- 


46^-6]        NECESSITY    OF   FORGIVENESS   OR   JUSTinCATION         495 

ally,  is  not  to  be  regarded  as  a  precondition  of  good  works 
and  their  right  performance.  But,  according  to  the  Evan- 
gelical interpretation,  decisively  as  it  is  to  be  distinguished 
from  the  Catholic,  justification  is  certainly  not  the  direct 
means  to  that  end. 

§  62.  But  why  must  so  much  circumlocution  be  expended 
in  establishing  as  a  general  thesis  the  teleological  relation  of 
jvstification  to  eternal  life  t  Not  only  is  this  connection  be- 
tween the  two  so  directly  suggested  by  statements  of  Paul 
(Bom.  V.  17,  18);  it  is  proclaimed  by  the  whole  Beformation. 
How  often  and  how  strongly  does  Luther  emphasise  the  truth 
that  life  and  blessedness  are  directly  bound  up  with  justifica- 
tion !  ^  Why  has  this  connection  not  been  kept  in  sight  with 
sufficient  clearness  to  ensure  its  predominating  influence  in 
theology  ?  In  the  contrary  fact — in  the  fact,  that  is,  that 
any  answer  rather  than  Luther's  is  given  as  to  the  purpose  of 
justification — I  find  a  singular  token  of  uncertain  tradition. 
And  this  uncertainty  goes  pretty  far  back,  at  least  on  Lutheran 
ground.  The  Formula  of  Concord,  it  is  true,  testifies  to 
the  connection  between  justification  by  faith  and  eternal  life 
no  less  staunchly  than  Luther's  Catechism  and  the  Apology  of 
the  C,  A}\  but  one  seeks  it  in  vain  either  in  the  C.  A, 
itself  or  in  Luther's  Articles  of  Smalcald.  Moreover,  while 
we  certainly  find  it  in  Chemnitz  and  Hutter,  the  later  theo- 
logians, who  partly  have  no  sense  for  teleological  relations, 
and  partly  force  the  treatment  of  the  doctrine  of  justification 
into  the  mould  of  controversy  with  Bomish  teaching,  subsume 
the  prospect  of  eternal  life  merely  under  the  effecta  iustifica- 
tionis — that  is,  under  a  particular  heading,  and  without 
distinguishing  it  specifically  from  other  effecta,  especially 
sanctification  (active  moral  renewal).'  Thus  the  connection 
between  justification  and  eternal  life  has  not  had  that  decisive 
weight  given  to  it  in  Lutheran  tradition  which  would  have 
sufficed  to  repel  the  perpetual  temptation  to  make  sanctifica- 

^  Kbstlin,  ii.  p.  461. 

»  Cf.  «Mpra,  p.  67 ;  also  C.  A,  iii.  11,  76,  176,  199,  226.      CaJUcK  Min,  v. 
'*  Where  the  forgiveness  of  sins  is,  there  is  also  life  and  blessedness.'* 
»  Cf.  vol.  i.  pp.  276,  292 ;  aupra,  p.  72. 


496  JUSTIFICATION   AND   RECONCILIATION  [460-7 

tiou  or  the  good  life  the  eud  of  ju8ti6eation.  Besides, 
theologians  were  content  simply  to  enumerate  the  effects  of 
justification — known  to  be  such  from  passages  in  the  Bible — 
without  considering  their  significance  or  their  mutual  relations. 
Have  then  peace  of  conscience  with  God,  free  access  to  God, 
Divine  sonship,  and  the  hope  of  eternal  life,  nothing  in  common 
with  one  another,  or  are  they  ideas  which  require  no  explana- 
tion whatever  ?  It  has  been  shown  that  a  group  of  Seformed 
theologians  analysed  justification  into  the  forgiveness  of  sins 
and  the  bestowal  of  eternal  life  or  adoption  (p.  76) ;  they  thus 
recognised  the  extremely  close  relations  between  the  two,  to 
which  the  Eeformed  symbols  likewise  testify.  Nevertheless, 
all  this  did  not  bring  about  a  more  favourable  state  of  the 
inquiry.  And  though  Schleiermacher  adopted  the  distinction 
which  the  Beformed  theologians  had  made  in  the  idea  of 
justification,  yet  he  never  came  to  see  the  full  meaning  of 
it,  for  he  regarded  Divine  sonship  as  the  guarantee,  not  of 
eternal  life,  but  of  sanctification. 

But  how  are  we  to  explain  the  fact  that  the  sense  for 
the  teleological  aspect  of  justification  indicated  above  should 
have  become  so  enfeebled  that  a  wholly  apocryphal  con- 
nection between  it  and  sanctification  came  predominantly 
to  the  front,  though  without  ever  attaining  to  clear  con- 
sciousness ?  In  my  opinion,  this  is  due  to  the  projection 
of  the  idea  of  eternal  life  entirely  into  the  next  world,  and 
the  demarcation  of  the  thought  of  it  from  all  the  relations  of 
our  present  experience.  Luther,  indeed,  did  not  view  the 
matter  in  this  light;  yet  he  never  devoted  to  the  subject 
the  theoretical  consideration  which  it  demanded.  But 
Melanchthon  and  Calvin  have  already  lost  altogether  that 
freshness  of  insight  into  the  connection  indicated,  without 
which  a  correct  theoretical  representation  of  it  simply  need 
not  be  attempted.  While  justification  has  bound  up  with  it 
the  hope  of,  or  as  in  Calvinistic  circles  it  is  called,  the  right 
to  eternal  life,  yet  this  latter  blessing  itself  was  divested  of 
every  relation  to  the  possible  experience  of  the  present,  and 
its  importance  put  in  the  shade.     There  co-operated  further 


467-8]       NECESSITY   OF   FORGIVENESS   OR   JUSTIFICATION  497 

in  the  same  direction  the  characteristically  Catholic  interpret- 
ation of  eternal  life  which  is  derived  from  Augustine  (vol  i. 
p.  117),  and  survives  in  both  Confessions — the  view,  namely, 
that  eternal  life  consists  exclusively  in  the  vision  of  God.  If 
God,  according  to  the  Neo-Platonic  view,  has  no  relation  to 
the  world,  then  eternal  life,  attached  as  it  is  to  cognition  of 
Him,  has  no  relation  either  to  the  world  or  to  the  common 
life  of  men,  nor  could  it  enter  into  any  connection  with  the 
circle  of  our  present  experiences.  Or,  so  far  as  it  did  so, 
either  there  came  to  the  front  the  significance  of  good  works 
as  concomitant  causes  of  eternal  life,  or  in  both  Confessions 
a  retu^  was  consistently  made  to  the  methods  of  Mysticism, 
by  which  Catholic  piety  anticipates  even  in  this  life  that 
union  with  God  which  consists  in  separation  from  the  world. 
But  if  religion  is  not  only  faith  in  God,  but  always  a  view  of 
the  world  as  well,  then  the  Christian  conception  of  eternal 
life  must  include  not  only  the  perfecting  of  fellowship  with 
God,  but  also  the  specific  attitude  of  the  individual  to  the 
world.  If  our  Beformation  is  really  epoch-making,  it  must 
also  supply  the  elements  of  another  conception  of  eternal  life, 
or  blessedness,  than  obtained  at  the  preceding  stages  of 
Christian  history.  In  the  notion  of  d(f>0apaia  the  Greek 
Church  merely  perpetuated  an  idea  of  blessedness  derived  from 
the  Hellenic  mysteries.  By  its  conception  of  the  knowledge 
or  vision  of  God  the  Latin  Church  merely  gave  its  sanction 
to  the  aims  of  the  Neo-Platonic  philosophy.  If  the  Beforma- 
tion has  no  better  and  more  Christian  idea  of  eternal  life 
and  blessedness  to  o£fer,  then  those  mystics  belonging  to 
the  Evangelical  Churches  who  revert  to  the  Catholic  view 
are  not  to  be  blamed. 

But  if  we  take  our  bearings  from  the  New  Testament, 
then,  besides  the  vision  of  God  (Heb.  xii.  14),  there  enters 
into  the  content  of  eternal  life  also  the  exercise  of  a  royal 
lordship  (Rom.  v.  17  ;  1  Cor.  iv.  8 ;  Col.  iiL  3,  4 ;  Jas.  ii  5  ; 
Heb.  xii.  28).  It  is  all  the  more  worthy  of  note  that  Faustus 
Socinus  has  given  expression  to  this  idea,  since  he  makes  no 
further  use  of  it  in  his  system.  For  recognising  the  chief 
3« 


498  JUSTIFICATION    AND    RECONCIUATION  [468-4 

characteristic  of  the  Divine  Being  is  His  dominium  absotu- 
turn,  and  holding  that  the  Divine  im^e  in  man  relates  to 
his  lordship  over  earthly  things,  Socinus  concludes  that  the 
perfecting  of  the  latter  in  the  next  life  will  consist  in 
complete  lordship  over  the  refractory  forces  of  the  world.^ 
But  Luther  had  already  claimed  this  attribute,  as  a  conse- 
quence of  justification,  for  the  Christian  life  here  and  now : 
"Christianus  homo  omnium  dominus  est  liberrimus,  nulli 
subiectus/'  In  the  pages  of  his  tract  on  Christian  Free- 
dom, the  triad  itistitia^  vUa,  solus  re-echoes  so  powerfully 
throughout,  that  one  receives  an  impression  not  merely  of 
their  necessary  connection,  but  almost  of  their  identity.  For 
Luther  is  so  thoroughly  conscious  of  life  and  salvation 
through  fellowship  with  Christ,  and  in  consequence  of  justifi- 
cation by  faith,  that  for  him  the  whole  present  is  filled  with 
the  sense  of  security  against  death  and  hell.  This  negative 
aspect,  however,  is  not  the  whole.  But ''  as  the  Kingship  of 
Christ  is  repeated  in  the  believer,  he  possesses  the  spiritual 
power  which  reigns  in  the  midst  of  foes,  and  is  strong  in  the 
midst  of  afflictions.  For  as  strength  finds  in  weakness  its 
uttermost  test  and  trial,  in  every  case  we  obtain  salvation,  so 
that  suffering  and  death  are  forced  to  serve  us  and  to  work 
together  for  our  salvation.  This  is  the  Christian's  priceless 
power  and  freedom"  (vol.  i.  p.  182).  The  one  feature  in 
this  picture  to  which  objection  must  be  taken  is  the  conjimc- 
tion  of  the  statements  of  our  priesthood  in  the  ''Christian 
Freedom"  with  these  statements  of  our  kingship.  Luther, 
commenting  on  1  Pet.  ii.  9,  has  developed  the  attribute  of 
kingship  before  that  of  priesthood,  clearly  under  the  influ- 
ence of  the  verbal  sequence  ^ocrtKeiov  lepdrevfjui,  though  he 
analyses  this  combination  into  sacerdotium  regale  et  regnum 
sacerdotcUe.  The  transition  to  the  priesthood  of  Christians, 
now,  he  makes  thus :  '*  Nee  solum  reges  omnium  liberrimi,  sed 
sacerdotes  quoque  sumus  in  aeternum,  quod  longe  regno  excel- 

'  Pradectiones  theol,  cap.  iii.  (B.  F.  P.  i.  p.  589) :  "  Imago  divina,  quam  in 
altero  seculo  habituri  sumus,  in  eo  oonstituta  est,  quod  omnibus  inimicis  nostris 
et  morti  ipsi  atque  infero  plenissime  dominabimur,  nee  aliquid  in  deo  pne- 
stantius  est,  quam  cunctarum  rerum  domiofttus  atque  imperium* " 


469-70]     NECESSITY   OF   FOKGIVENESS   OR   JUSTIFICATION  499 

lentius;  per  sacerdotium  enim  digni  Bumus  coram  deo  apparere, 
etc."  But  he  ought  to  have  demonstrated  this  pre-eminence 
by  showing  that  that  spiritual  lordship  over  the  world  must 
also  be  subordinated  causally  to  the  unimpeded  fellowship 
with  God  which  is  gained  through  justification.  For  if  lord- 
ship over  every  evil  is  a  consequence  of  justification  by  faith, 
then  the  bestowal  of  priestly  rights  and  justification  are 
identical.  Luther  remained  oblivious  of  this,  because  he 
adduced  the  fundamental  idea  of  priesthood — the  right  to 
appear  before  God — merely  as  the  precondition  of  intercession 
on  others'  behalf,  and  of  assuming  the  duty  of  instruction  in 
Divine  things.  But  here,  as  elsewhere,  he  is  under  the 
influence  of  the  confused  idea  that  the  universal  priesthood 
implies  the  reproduction  in  each  individual  of  the  official 
priesthood,  which,  however,  cannot  be  the  case.  In  priesthood, 
as  a  common  attribute  of  believers,  the  whole  stress  lies  on 
this,  that  each  believer  stands  near  to  God,  or  in  fellowship 
with  Him,  without  the  intervention  of  any  other,  save  Christ ; 
that  we  employ  this  privilege  in  interceding  for  others  is  on]y 
to  be  regarded  as  a  remoter  consequence. 

The  question  regarding  the  necessity  of  justification  or 
forgiveness  can  only  be  solved  by  conceiving  eternal  life  as 
the  direct  end  and  aim  of  that  Divine  operation.  But  if  the 
idea  of  eternal  life  be  applied  merely  to  our  state  in  the  next 
life,  then  its  content,  too,  lies  beyond  all  experience,  and 
cannot  form  the  basis  of  knowledge  of  a  scientific  kind. 
Hopes  and  presentiments,  though  marked  by  the  strongest 
subjective  certainty,  are  not  any  the  clearer  for  that,  and 
contain  in  themselves  no  guarantee  of  the  completeness  of 
what  one  hopes,  or  has  a  presentiment  of.  Clearness  and 
completeness  of  idea,  however,  are  the  conditions  of  compre- 
hending anything,  i.e.  of  understanding  the  necessary  connec- 
tion between  the  various  elements  of  a  thing,  and  between 
the  thing  and  its  given  presuppositions.  The  Evangelical 
article  of  belief,  therefore,  that  justification  by  faith  establishes 
or  brings  with  it  assurance  of  eternal  life,  is  of  no  use  theo- 
lo^cally,  so  long  as  this  purposive  aspect  of  justification 


500  JUSTIFICATION    AND    RECONaUATION  [470-1 

cannot  be  verified  in  such  experience  as  is  possible  now.  It 
is  true,  the  predominant  tone  of  the  writers  of  the  New 
Testament  tends  to  project  eternal  life,  under  the  form  of 
hope,  into  the  next  world,  just  as  they  limit  the  idea  of  the 
Divine  Kingdom  to  the  stage  of  its  conauxoxnation  (voL  ii. 
p.  295).  But  they  point  out  clearly  that  the  elements  of  the 
future  life  are  to  be  found  in  our  present  experience  of  joy, 
blessedness,  and  the  feeling  of  elevation  ( Jas.  i.  9—1 2  ;  1  Pet.  L 
5-9 ;  Heb.  vi.  5 ;  cf.  for  Paul  the  use  of  Kav^aaBai,  voL  ii 
p.  343) ;  and  just  as  clearly  Paul  reckons  joy  in  the  Holy 
Ghost  as  part  of  the  present  reality  of  the  Kingdom  of  God 
(Rom.  xiv.  17).  But  Paul  also  asserts  definitely  the  present 
existence  of  a  specific  life  as  the  consequence  of  justification, 
as  indeed  the  connection  between  the  two  is  essential.  *^  If 
Christ  be  in  you,  the  body  indeed  is  dead  because  of  sin,  but 
the  spirit  is  life  because  of  righteousness/'  i,e.  because  of 
justification  through  Christ  (Rom.  viii  10).  Therewith  agree 
the  Johannine  statements  (1  John  iii.  14,  15,  v.  11-13), 
which,  it  is  true,  mention  no  special  mediation  as  leading  to 
this  result,  but  for  the  same  reason,  too,  express  no  divergence 
from  Paul  in  this  regard. 

The  religious  significance  of  "  life,"  at  both  stages  of  the 
religion  of  the  Bible,  depends  on  the  peculiar  value  of  this 
attribute  for  God.  The  "  living  "  God  is  the  comprehensive 
expression  employed  in  opposing  the  true  religion  to  the 
natural  religions,  which  admit  sensuous  representations  of  the 
gods,  or  dead  idols,  because  in  them  the  Divine  Being  is  not 
opposed  to  nature.  The  living  God,  therefore,  is  the  spiritual, 
self-determining  Will,  which  is  supreme  over  its  ends  and  its 
creatures,  and  consequently  must  be  distioguished  from  them 
all.  Life,  as  the  religious  end  of  the  worshippers  of  God,  is 
accordingly  conceived  as  the  purposefulness  of  existence 
attained  by  abiding  in  dependence  on  God  under  the  condi- 
tions which  He  has  ordained,  and  directing  our  path  steadfastly 
towards  Him.  These  conditions  are  given  by  positive  revela- 
tion. For,  80  far  as  concerns  the  religion  of  the  Old  Testament, 
it  holds  fast  to  the  universal  primitive  assumption  that  to 


471-2]       NECEaSITY   OF   FORGIVENESS   OR  JUSHFlCATlON  501 

approach    God    uninvited    leads    to   destruction;    we    must 
therefore  be  invited,  or  possess   God's  verbal  assurance  of 
grace,  or  conform  to  the  laws  of  sacrifice,  in  order  to  retain 
life  when  in  proximity  to  God  (vol.  ii.  p.  201).     At  the  stage 
of  Christianity  the  assurance  of  life  attaches  itself   to  the 
dispensation  of  revelation,  i,e.   to  the  acknowledgment  and 
appropriation  of  the  end  represented  by  the  Son  of  God.     In 
the  Hebrew  religion  the  belief  is  dominant  that  life  in  prox- 
imity to  God,  or  under  His  express  protection,  involves  the 
political  and  economic  welfare  of  the  chosen  people,  and,  for 
its  individual  members,  the  harmony  of  happiness  and  merit ; 
all  the  restrictions  of  life  due  to  irreligious  adversaries  are^ 
therefore  felt  by  the  Psalmists  as  a  deprivation  of  their 
proper  life.     On  the  other  hand,  the  spiritual  character  of 
the  Christian  view  of  the  world  and  self  culminates  in  this, 
that  those  relations  which  fall  within  the  compass  of  outward 
self-preservation  are  not  reckoned  as  essential  to  the  deter- 
mination of  "  life."     "  Whosoever  will  save  his  life  shall  lose 
it,  and  whosoever  shall  lose  it  for  the  gospel's  sake  shall. save 
it"  (Mark  viii.  35).     The  conditions  of  the  life  guaranteed 
by  God  do  not  even  include  the  political  intactness  of  the 
Christian   Church;    on   the  contrary,  the  persecutions,  the 
menaces  by  which  the  life  of  the  community  or  the  individual 
may  be  assailed,  are  regarded  rather  as  subjects  for  rejoicing 
(Matt.  V,  11, 12  ;  Jas.  i.  2  ;  1  Pet.  i.  6  ;  Heb.  x.  34  ;  1  Thess. 
i.  6 ;  Rom.  v.  3). 

These  ideas,  so  opposed  to  men's  ordinary  claims  to  life, 
show  us  that  life  in  fellowship  with  God,  at  peace  with  God, 
and  under  God's  protection,  simply  cannot  be  construed 
religiously  without  at  the  same  time  taking  into  account  the 
relation  between  it  and  the  world.  In  Christianity  the  wor- 
shippers of  God  know  the  Creator  and  Lord  of  the  world  as 
their  Father,  but  yet  regard  themselves  in  their  given  individual 
character,  especially  in  their  corporeal  endowment,  as  parts  of 
the  world ;  it  is  therefore  to  be  expected  that  some  positive 
principle  should  be  set  up,  according  to  which  life  with  God 
includes  independence  of  the  ordinary  outward  conditionedness 


502  JUSTIFICATION   AND   RECONCILIATION  [47^-3 

of  existence.  This  principle  is  indicated  by  Jesus  immediately 
after  the  precept  cited  above :  ''  What  shall  it  profit  a  man  if 
he  should  gain  the  whole  world  and  lose  his  own  life  ?  for  what 
is  a  substitute  or  equivalent  for  his  own  life  ? "  (Mark  viiL  36, 
37).  In  this  connection  ''  life  "  means  that  state  of  spiritual 
self-determination  which  we  distinguish  from  the  conditions 
of  bodily  self-preservation,  by  relating  it  to  common  ends 
which  are  considered  more  valuable  than  bodily  self-preserva- 
tion. But  inasmuch  as  voluntary  fellowship  with  God,  Who 
is  Spirit,  is  regarded  as  the  proper  consummation  to  be  reached 
in  the  line  of  these  spiritual  aims,  it  follows  at  once  that  the 
life  of  an  individual  has  a  higher  worth  than  "  the  whole 
world."  For  God,  with  Whom  we  enter  into  full  fellowship  in 
religion,  is  high  above  the  world,  as  its  Creator  and  as  He 
Who  makes  the  Kingdom  of  God  the  world's  one  aim. 

At  this  point  the  Christian  view  of  the  world  exhibits 
a  most  violent  paradox.  The  individual  man  is  a  part  of  the 
world ;  and  as  what  is  individual,  in  its  reciprocal  relations 
to  multiplicity,  forms  the  element  of  the  created  material 
world,  so  likewise  the  individual  created  spiiit  can  never  con- 
ceive himself  as  outside  the  compass  of  the  world  or  of 
divided  existence.  And  therefore  the  idea  we  have  of  our 
spiritual  individuality  can  never  be  separated  from  the  idea  of 
our  bodily  organism.  Now,  if  the  spiritual  individual  has  a 
higher  worth  than  the  whole  world,  then,  in  such  a  statement, 
he  is  no  longer  regarded  as  a  part  of  the  world,  but  as  in 
himself  a  totality  which  can  stand  being  compared  with  the 
world.  To  make  this  clear,  it  must  be  observed  that  it  is  as 
a  spirit  that  the  individual  realises  the  character  of  a  whole 
in  his  own  order,  whereas  the  world,  as  the  value  of  divided 
existence,  is  conceived  as  belonging  to  nature.  To  nature 
belong  not  merely  natural  objects  proper,  but  likewise  all  the 
social  institutions  of  spiritual  life ;  for  all  the  spiritual  com- 
merce known  to  us  is  mediated  through  nature.  Now  the 
Christian  view  of  the  world  is  so  constructed  as  to  view  the 
world  as  a  whole  from  the  standpoint  of  the  Divine  idea,  for 
this  enables  us  to  raise  ourselves  above  the  world  through 


47^-4]       NECESSITY   OF   FOBGIVBNBSS   OR   JUSTIFICATION  503 

fellowship  with  the  Divine  life  (§  27).     Although  even  man, 
finding  himself  embedded  in  nature,  regards  himself  as  a 
limited  portion  of  the  world,  yet,  in  virtue  of  his  spiritual 
constitution  and  his  Christian  destiny,  his  life  is  a  struggle  to 
reach  a  position  above  the  world.     For  while  neither  know- 
ledge nor  moral  will  gives  him  the  means  of  reaching  this 
goal,  religion  as  such  is  the  function  by  which  the  tension 
can  be  resolved  between  the  given  situation  of  the  created 
spirit  and  his  claims  against  the  natural  world.     In  Christi- 
anity, however,  the   idea  of   the  universally  human,  moral 
Kingdom  of  God  is  posited  as  the  final  end  of  the  world  in 
such  a  way  that  all  the  natural  and  particular  conditions  of 
human  fellowship  are  transcended,  and  humanity  is  raised 
above  the  world  as  a  spiritual  totality.     This  characteristic  of 
the  Christian  religion  of  itself  secures  that  each  individual 
member  of  the  Kingdom  of  Gk)d  is  from  the  first  offered  the 
possibility  of  becoming  a  totality  in  his  own  order,  i.e.  in  a 
qualitative  sense ;  for  in  the  moral  world,  as  a  totality,  each 
individual   member,  so   far  as    he  comes  to  possess  moral 
character,  is  endowed   with  the   worth  of   a  totality.     By 
holding  out  this  prospect,  Christianity  satisfies  the  universal 
religious  impulse  which  at  previous  stages  fell  short  of  its  aim. 
But  that  which  is  prescribed,  in  the  idea  of  the  Kingdom  of 
God,  as  the  kind  of  moral  activity  proper  to  man,  takes,  in 
the  conception  of  eternal  life,  the  form  of  a  corresponding 
view  of  the  world  and  self,  namely,  that  in  actual  fellowship 
with  the  tnie  spiritual  God  the  Christian  feels  himself  as  a 
whole  raised  above  the  world,  inasmuch  as  he  proves  the 
spiritual  worth  of  his  individuality  through  his  dominion  over 
all  possible  restrictions  arising  from  the  divided  world  of 
nature.    This  attitude,  which  is  held  out  as  a  prospect  to 
men  in  the  Christian  religion,  was  deliberately  and  actually 
exemplified  by  its  Founder  (§49).     It  is  intelligible,  there- 
fore, in  view  of  the  mediatorial  position  between  God  and  man 
occupied  by  Jesus,  that  He  should  prescribe  that  one  must  be 
ready  for  His  sake  to  sacrifice  natural  life  for  the  maintenance 
of  personal  life  or  the  attainment  of  that  life,  conceived  as 


S04  JUSTIFICATION   AND   RECONCILIATION  [474-5 

eternal  life.  For  in  that  lordship  over  the  world  which  He 
exercised,  as  representative  of  the  Divine  final  end  of  the 
world,  through  His  independence  of  all  human  authority  and 
His  willing  acceptance  and  patient  appropriation  of  suffering, 
He  realised  directly  in  His  own  person  that  eternal  life  which 
is  opposed  to  the  changes  of  natural  things.  By  attachment 
to  His  person,  and  hy  appropriation  of  His  aim,  the  same 
possession  of  eternal  life  is  gained  and  Christ's  attitude 
towards  the  world  assumed  by  others  also.  The  worth  of 
this  attitude  of  spirit  as  superior  to  the  divided  and  changing 
world  of  nature  is  thus  all  the  more  clearly  brought  out  by 
the  enjoined  surrender  of  the  natural  conditions  of  our  crea- 
turely  existence.  The  willing  acceptance  of  this  consequence  of 
attachment  to  Christ  is  the  highest  proof  of  that  freedom,  pre- 
scribed and  rendered  possible  by  Christianity,  which  belongs 
to  the  spiritual  life  as  capable  of  perfection  in  its  own  order. 
I  do  not  know  that  there  is  any  view  of  the  world  which 
attributes  a  higher  value  to  individual  human  life,  or  any 
form  of  life  of  a  social  kind  which  offers  a  more  adequate 
satisfaction  to  the  universal  human  endeavour  to  transcend 
the  natural  limitations  of  spiritual  existence.  When  men 
have  sought  to  outdo  Christianity  in  freedom  of  thought  {ix. 
surely,  in  appreciation  of  the  freedom  of  the  individual),  by 
the  method  of  Pantheism,  or  have  even  thought  to  surpass 
Christian  freedom  of  thought  by  adopting  the  materialistic 
view  of  the  world,  they  have  really,  as  Strauss  has  most 
recently  done,  set  in  comparison  with  the  new  wisdom  a 
merely  derivative  or  imperfectly  formulated  representation 
of  Christianity.  But  in  its  true  form  Christianity  is  directly 
adapted  to  secure  the  spiritual  freedom  of  the  individual,  and 
to  attain  the  goal  that  each  man,  in  his  spiritual  idiosyncrasy, 
should  become  a  whole ;  for  by  connecting  this,  the  destiny 
of  man,  with  the  perfect  revelation  of  the  supramundane 
Grod,  that  is,  with  the  revelation  of  the  universal  final  end  of 
the  world,  the  spiritual  lordship  of  the  members  of  the  Divine 
Kingdom  over  the  world,  and  their  eternal  life,  are  established. 
Now  the  principle  which  Jesus  enunciated,  and  which  He  was 


475-6]       NECESSITY  OF   FORGIVBNESS   OE   JUSTIFICATION  505 

the  first  to  realise,  finds  a  unanimous  echo  in  the  testimonies 
given  by  the  writers  of  the  New  Testament  By  directing 
our  wills  to  God  as  the  unchangeable  Father  from  Whom 
comes  every  good  and  nothing  but  good  (Jas.  i.  17),  Who,  as 
the  Father  of  our  Lord  Jesus  Christ,  claims  our  firm  trust 

unbroken  by  any  wavering  of  aim  (i.  5,  ii.  1),  we  raise  our- 

■ 

selves  above  the  world.  For  the  elevation  of  soul,  in  which 
the  Christian  glories  even  in  his  lowliness,  i.e.  in  the  midst  of 
persecution,  marks  him  o£f  from  the  real  lowliness  of  the  man 
who  is  rich  in  the  world,  who  passes  away  like  grass  before 
the  scorching  wind  (L  9-11).  Faith,  moreover,  which  is  im- 
movable and  firm,  and  includes  in  itself  a  treasury  of  riches, 
i,e.  a  peculiar  amplitude  of  power,  raises  itself  above  the  tradi- 
tional conditions  of  worldly  society,  the  precedence  of  the  rich 
over  the  poor  (ii.  1—5).  What  are  these  statements  but  descrip- 
tions of  eternal  life,  in  so  far  as  it  sets  itself,  as  consisting  in 
a  steady  direction  of  the  will  towards  God's  end,  in  opposition 
to  the  standards  involved  in  the  changeableness  of  worldly 
life  ?  For  eternity,  as  a  specific  attribute  of  God,  signifies 
the  permanency  of  the  direction  of  His  will  to  His  personal 
end  (§  37).  The  same  conclusion  follows  from  Paul's  assur- 
ance that  the  revealed  love  of  God  makes  us  conquerors  over 
the  evils  which  come  upon  Christians  for  God's  sake,  because 
the  change  from  life  to  death,  the  tension  between  present 
and  future,  the  force,  too,  of  natural  and  social  institutions 
personified  in  the  angelic  powers,  exercise  no  determining 
influence  on  the  life  of  the  Christian  when  compared  with  the 
permanency  of  the  Divine  love  as  revealed  in  Christ  (Eom.  viii. 
35-39  ;  1  Cor.  iiL  21-23).  It  is  specially  worthy  of  remark 
that  Paul  makes  the  status  of  Christian  teachers  subordinate 
to  the  independent  powers  of  believers  as  such,  although 
the  latter  owed  to  the  former  the  fact  of  their  being  Christians 
at  alL  Yet  Christians  are  represented  as  the  superiors  even 
of  Peter  and  Paul,  in  so  far  as  the  estimation  in  which  the 
apostles  are  held  as  party-authorities  might  pave  the  way  for 
schism ;  since  believers  are  rather  taught  to  find  an  experi- 
mental realisation  of  their  power  over  the  world  in  the  unbroken 


506  JUSTIFICATION   AND   RKCONCILUTION  [47fr-7 

union  of  the  religious  community.  For,  as  James  testifies 
again  (iv.  1-4),  it  is  by  schismatic  controversy  that  love  to 
the  world,  which  is  enmity  against  God,  and  therefore  un- 
worthy dependence  on  the  world,  make  their  way  into  the 
Christian  community.  And  all  Church  history  is  a  confirma- 
tion of  this  truth. 

This  potestas  sptritucUis^  as  Luther  calls  it,  cannot  be  judged 
by  ordinary  sensible  standards.  On  the  contrary,  as  the 
Christian  community,  by  its  universal  and  spiritual  tendency, 
roused  its  Jewish  and  heathen  environment  to  suppress  it  by 
force,  its  members,  as  Paul  expresses  it  in  the  Psalmist's  words, 
were  accounted  as  sheep  for  the  slaughter  (Som.  viii.  36),  t.e. 
as  things  most  transitory  and  devoted  to  imminent  destruc- 
tion. The  representatives  of  the  Christian  community,  how- 
ever, exhibit  the  power  over  the  world  which  springs  from 
peace  with  God  by  their  reversal  of  the  common  verdict  upon 
these  evils,  as  upon  evils  in  general.  That  which  in  the 
ordinary  view  is  a  restriction  of  freedom  (§  42),  and  proves 
itself  such  by  exciting  the  feeling  of  pain,  is  invested,  through 
the  joy  which  springs  from  peace  with  God — through  this 
expression  of  the  harmonious  feeling  of  life — with  the  pre- 
cisely opposite  value  of  a  means  which  ministers  to  freedom 
(Bom.  viii  28).  For  when  these  experiences  of  evils  do  not 
become  the  occasions  of  apostasy  from  the  Christian  faith, 
when,  as  temptations,  they  still  do  not  lead  to  bodily  and 
social  self-preservation  being  preferred  to  the  duties  of  the 
Christian  vocation,  then  their  utility  actually  comes  to  be  that 
of  stimuli  to  endurance  in  the  Christian  faith,  i.e.  means  to 
the  assertion  of  freedom  against  the  world  (Jas.  i.  2,  3  ;  Bom. 
V.  3).  In  this  way  confirmation  is  given  of  Christ's  verdict 
that  the  amount  of  affliction  is  not  the  measure  of  the  sin 
present,  and  that  every  conspicuous  calamity  is  not,  as  was 
assumed  by  antiquity,  a  Divine  punishment.  The  evils  of 
persecution  are  rather,  as  no  feeling  of  guilt  exists,  accepted 
simply  as  means  for  testing  the  Christian's  endurance  in 
the  faith.  But  from  the  assurance  of  peace  with  God  pos- 
sessed by  the  Christian  community  there  arises,  even,  in  the 


477-«]       NECESSITY   OF   FORGIVENESS   OE  JUSTinCATION  507 

case  of  single  transgressions,  the  habit  of  regarding  certain 
evils,  even  persecutions,  as  educative  punishments,  which, 
derived  as  they  are  from  God's  fatherly  goodness,  are  in* 
tended  to  purify  practical  conduct,  but  for  that  very  reason 
imply  no  forfeiture  of  rights  as  regards  fellowship  with  God 
(1  Pet  iv.  17-19;  Heb.  xiL  4-11;  1  Cor.  xi.  32).  It 
cannot  be  doubted  that  all  these  characteristics  of  eternal 
life  enter  into  Paul's  conception  of  the  freedom  wherewith 
Christ  has  made  us  free  (GaL  v.  1),  and  of  which  Paul  him- 
self was  conscious  in  the  manifold  relations  of  social  existence 
(Gal.  ii.  4;  1  Cor.  x.  29,  ix.  1,  19).  Therefore  too,  con- 
versely, the  consummation  of  eternal  life,  when  it  is  openly 
confirmed  by  God's  final  judgment,  is  described  by  God  as  the 
liberty  of  the  children  of  God,  which  is  called  ikevOepia  rrj^ 
Sofiy?  because  it  will  be  specifically  acknowledged  by  God,  and 
thus  receive  a  guarantee  of  its  consummation  (Bom.  viii.  21). 

The  result  of  this  argument,  finally,  is  that  the  combina- 
tions, which  the  Lutheran  standards  exhibit,  of  the  idea  of 
justification  by  faith  with  eternal  life  on  the  one  hand,  and 
with  faith  in  God's  providence  on  the  other  (§§  18,  25),  are 
mutually  equivalent,  and  that  the  exercise  of  the  latter  faith 
forms  the  content  of  the  status  of  adoption  by  God,  while  it 
is  just  under  the  attribute  of  eternal  life  that  that  content 
must  reveal  itself  at  first.  In  the  same  way  the  faith  in 
providence  which  dominates  the  woild  coincides  with  eternal 
life ;  for  the  most  general  conception  of  life  comes  to  this, 
that  one  thing  uses  other  things  as  means  to  its  end.  Ac- 
cordingly eternal  life,  in  the  Christian  sense,  is  that  spiritual 
independence,  possible  in  the  realm  of  Divine  grace,  which, 
in  harmony  with  God's  providence,  subdues  all  things  to 
itself,  so  that  they  become  means  to  blessedness,  even  when 
viewed  externally  they  run  counter  to  it. 

§  53.  If,  now,  it  is  thinkable  at  all  that  freedom  and 
spiritual  power  over  the  world  should  be  mediated  through 
good  works,  this  cannot  be  true  in  the  sense  that  they  merit 
eternal  life.  For  the  very  fact  that  God  calls  eternal  life  in 
men  into  being  by  opening  to  them  fellowship  with  Himself, 


508  JUSTinCATION   AND   RECONCILUTION  [478-9 

excludes  every  consideration  of  law  and  equity  (Billigkeit). 
The  acquisition  of  eternal  life  has  a  meaning  only  in  a 
religious  connection ;  for  us  Christians,  however,  law  and 
equity  are  not  forms  of  the  religious  relation.  Still,  are  not 
good  works  possibly  concomitant  causes  of  eternal  life  ?  Even 
this  hypothesis  is,  to  say  the  least,  infelicitous ;  and  to  decide 
upon  it  we  require  a  more  accurate  definition  of  our  ideas. 
It  is  characteristic  of  Luther  that  in  the  tractate  "  On 
Christian  Freedom "  he  should  give  the  negative  reply  he 
does  to  the  question.  For  he  declares  the  realm  of  moral 
action  to  be  the  opposite  of  freedom  and  blessedness,  so  far 
as  in  good  works  we  manifest  our  servitude  and  slavery  to 
other  men  to  whom  we  are  bound  by  life  in  the  body.  The 
latter  circumstance,  indeed,  is  not  an  adequate  argument  for 
moral  fellowship ;  but  Luther's  remark  is  so  far  quite  accurate, 
as  good  works  set  up  a  connection  between  us  and  other  men, 
who,  to  begin  with,  confront  us  merely  as  parts  of  the  world. 
Viewed  at  this  angle,  good  works,  notwithstanding  their  origin 
in  faith,  and  although  the  impulse  to  which  they  are  due  is 
spontaneous  in  form,  occupy  a  position  directly  opposed  to 
freedom  and  blessedness  in  God,  have  so  far  nothing  in  com- 
mon with  Him,  and  therefore  cannot  be  conceived  as  even 
concomitant  causes  of  these  blessings.  This  truth  is  also 
verifiable  by  the  following  observation.  If  we  intend  good 
works  pre-eminently  to  have  an  effect  upon  others,  if,  that 
is,  we  count  on  their  being  thereby  stimulated  to  moral 
concord  and  led  to  enter  into  moral  fellowship  with  us, 
we  shall  find,  in  the  vast  majority  of  cases,  that  the  best 
will  has  no  power  over  the  result,  but  that  in  this  respect  we 
are  limited  by  the  independence  of  others.  In  such  cases 
of  reaction  on  the  part  of  the  world,  however  excellent  our 
intention  may  be,  we  experience  anything  but  freedom  and 
blessedness;  and  if,  nevertheless,  we  were  to  persevere  in 
the  method  of  doing  good  works  for  the  sake  of  the  expected 
results,  we  should  involve  ourselves  in  passionate  impatience, 
and  therefore  also  inwardly  become  slaves.  Good  uDorks. 
therefore,  when  this  aspect  is  emphasised,  cannot  be  r^arded 


479]  NECESSITY    OF    FORGIVENESS   OR   JUSTIFICATION  509 

m 

even  as  concomitant  causes  of  eternal  life ;  for  the  intention 
aimed  at  the  result  is  fitted  neither  to  maintain  freedom  nor 
to  increase  it. 

Nevertheless,  conceived  as  good  works,  they  have  too 
clear  an  affinity  with  the  religious  direction  of  the  will 
towards  God,  and  with  the  freedom  over  the  world  springing 
thence,  for  any  surprise  to  be  caused  by  the  statement  that 
a  man  is  blessed  in  his  morally  good  action  (Jas.  i.  25).  To 
be  sure,  Lutheran  doctrine  seems  to  have  as  little  room  for 
this  universal  experience  as  for  the  connection,  also  asserted 
by  James,  between  law  and  freedom.  Luther  having  once 
for  all  planted  his  foot  on  the  Pauline  assertion  that  law  and 
faith  are  mutually  exclusive  (vol.  iL  p.  309),  which  he  did 
not  imderstand  in  its  originally  limited  reference  to  the 
Mosaic  law,  but  referred  to  the  Christian  life  also,  Lutheran 
theology  consistently  arrived  at  the  position  that  action  in 
the  Holy  Spirit,  which  is  normal  in  the  Christian  sense,  is 
not  mediated  by  any  subjective  reflection  upon  the  moral 
law.  Here  we  must  make  allowance  for  the  fact  that  Luther 
never  arrived  at  the  distinction  between  moral  law  and  civil 
law,  and  that  he  always  included  the  latter  in  his  conception 
of  the  former,  while  yet  he  exhibited  a  justifiable  horror  of 
applying  a  legal  standard  either  to  the  religious  or  to  the 
moral  life,  to  justification  or  to  the  value  of  good  works. 
Thus,  although  good  works,  as  fruits  of  the  Holy  Spirit,  are 
in  merely  objective  harmony  with  the  law,  and  are  not  re- 
garded as  implying  any  subjective  refiection  upon  this  standard, 
they  are  stripped  of  every  relation  to  blessedness.  According 
to  Lutheran  doctrine,  the  experience  of  blessedness  has  no 
relation,  either  objective  or  subjective,  to  the  law;  good 
works,  which  the  regenerate  soul  as  such  performs,  are  in 
agreement  with  the  law  at  least  objectively ;  in  other  words, 
they  contribute  nothing  to  blessedness.  On  the  other  hand, 
by  the  Christian  law  James  means  the  law  of  freedom,  in  so 
far  as  personal  disposition  and  attention  and  fidelity  are  devoted 
to  it.  Blessedness  for  him,  therefore,  is  a  feature  which 
accompanies  the  fulfilment  of  the  moral  law  under  these 


510  JUSTIFICATION    AND   BECONCIUATION  [480-1 

conditions;  for  it  springs  from  free  acquiescence  in  God's 
final  end.  James,  therefore,  holds  to  freedom  in  the  law, 
while  Luther  always  finds  freedom  in  the  removal  of  the  law, 
or  at  least  in  subjective  abstraction  from  it.  Nevertheless, 
Lutheran  teaching  approximates  so  closely  to  James'  line  of 
thought,  that  one  cannot  but  think  it  arbitrary  that  it  should 
omit  the  final  conclusion,  that  one  is  blessed  in  good  works. 
For,  under  the  title  of  Christian  freedom,  Luther  has  also 
brought  in  the  voluntary  character  of  moral  obedience,  which 
realises  the  ends  of  the  law  apart  from  any  legal  compulsion. 
This  idea  ^  is  very  precisely  expressed  in  the  Formula  of 
Concord,  where  it  is  said  that  believers,  as  regenerate,  have, 
according  to  the  Holy  Spirit,  taken  the  law  into  their  hearts, 
and  that  their  voluntary  fulfilment  of  it  is  a  life  in  the  law.^ 
It  does  not,  indeed,  exactly  serve  completely  to  elucidate  this 
idea  of  voluntariness  that  it  is  compared  to  the  motion  of 
the  sun,  regular  with  the  necessity  of  natural  law.  For  a 
disposition  which  regularly  issues  in  obligatory  moral  action 
without  the  necessity  of  forming  a  distinct  judgment  of  duty 
for  each  separate  act,  does  not  therefore  stamp  itself  as  a 
blind  natural  force.  But  it  is  astonishing  that  the  direct 
identity  of  this  temper  in  moral  conduct  with  the  freedom 
and  blessedness  indicated  by  Luther  was  not  perceived,  and 
that  not  even  the  citation  of  passages  from  the  Psalms,  which 
express  the  blessedness  of  the  study  of  the  law,  should  have 
led  to  the  recognition  of  the  fact  that  this  blessedness  ex- 
tends also  to  action  arising  from  an  unselfish  disposition. 
The  result  is  that,  however  closely  Lutheranism  may  ap- 

^  Luther,  De  libcriatc  Christiana^  p.  226,  and  Melanchthon,  Loci  thecl, 
C.  It.  xxi.  p.  1039,  are  less  clear  than  Calvin,  Insi.  iii.  19.  4:  "Altera  forma 
libertatis  est,  ut  oonscientiae,  non  quasi  legis  necessitate  coactae,  1^  oboe- 
quantur,  sed  legis  ipsius  iugo  liberae  voluntati  doi  ultro  obediant." 

'  Farm,  Co7%c.f  Epit.  vi.  5  :  "Fmctus  spiritus  sunt  opera  ilia,  quae  spiritas 
del  per  homines  renatoe  operatur,  et  quae  a  credentibus  fiuut,  quatenits  renati 
sunt,  ita  quidem  sponte  ac  libere,  quasi  nullum  praeceptum  nnquam  acoepissent 
Et  hoc  modo  filii  dei  in  lege  vivunt,  et  secundum  normam  legis  divinae  ritam 
suam  instltunnt."  Sol,  ded,  yi.  §§  4,  5 :  "Justificati  in  lege  divina  quotidie 
oxercere  se  debent,  sicut  scriptum  est :  beatus,  qui  lege  domini  delectatur  et  in 
lege  eius  meditatur  die  ac  noctc.  .  ,  .  Lex  divina  cordibqa  ipsornm  in* 
scripta  est." 


481]  NECESSITY   OF   FORGIVENESS    OB   JUSTIFICATION  511 

proximate  to  the  lines  of  the  principle  affirmed  by  James, 
it  never  comes  to  an  agreement  with  him. 

To  solve  this  antinomy — that  good  works  should  be>  on 
the  one  hand,  an  evidence  of  the  bondage  of  men  to  their 
fellows  as  parts  of  the  world,  and  on  the  other  the  medium 
of  the  experience  of  blessedness  or  freedom — we  must  put 
the  question.  Why  vwrally  good  custion  is  necessary  in  Chris- 
tianity at  all  f  What  we  want  here  is  a  theory  in  which  the 
two  pairs  of  reasons  affirmed  by  the  Beformers  (p.  489)  are 
combined.  The  universal  ground  of  all  moral  conduct  towards 
our  fellow-men  is  that  the  Christian  religion  has  for  its  end 
the  Kingdom  of  God.  This  association  of  mankind,  of  the 
most  comprehensive  nature  both  extensively  and  intensively, 
cannot  be  realised  otherwise  than  through  works,  concrete 
action,  and  speech.  These  works  are  good  in  so  far  as  they 
are  directed  towards  the  universal  end  which  guarantees  the 
usefulness  of  all  the  members  of  the  fellowship.  Now,  the 
moral  law  is  the  system  of  those  ends,  dispositions,  and 
actions,  which  necessarily  arise  out  of  the  universal  end  of 
the  Kingdom  of  God.  Love  is  the  pervading  motive  of  this 
organisation  of  law-determined  action ;  but  it  is  also  the  im- 
pulse which  leads  to  the  knowledge  of  all  those  ends  which 
are  comprehended  in  the  moral  law.  Now,  in  the  Christian 
view  of  the  world,  the  Kingdom  of  God  is  the  supramundane 
final  end  of  the  world,  an  end  which  at  the  same  time  is  fixed, 
by  the  conception  of  God  as  love,  as  the  content  of  the  Divine 
personal  end.  Here,  therefore,  the  arguments  put  forward 
by  the  Beformers,  that  good  works  are  necessary  from  respect 
to  the  Divine  commandment  and  to  the  end  of  glorifying 
God,  find  their  deeper  unity.  The  two  other  arguments,  that 
good  works  are  necessary  as  the  fruits  of  faith  and  as  proofs 
of  one's  standing  in  grace,  might  also  be  reduced  to  this  one. 
For  we  believe  in  God  or  trust  in  Him  perfectly  just  in  so 
far  as  we  find  our  own  most  personal  end  in  realising  His 
Kingdom.  However,  we  ought  not  to  hide  the  fact  that  such 
a  conclusion  does  not  express  the  Beformers'  meaning.  At 
most  they  merely  touch  upon  the  idea  of  the  ethical  King- 


512  JUSTIFICATION    AND   RECONCIUATION  [481-2 

dom  of  Grod,  but  never  grasp  it  seriously.  So  that,  by  the 
faith  which  produces  good  works  and  is  evidenced  by  them, 
they  understand  faith  in  redemption  and  reconciliation,  the 
faith  which  appropriates  justification,  and  possesses  assurance 
of  eternal  life,  to  begin  with,  apart  from  good  works.  This 
theory  is  transcended  in  the  solution  I  have  set  forth.  In 
order  to  prove  that  solution  true,  we  must  turn  our  investi- 
gation of  the  idea  of  the  Kingdom  of  God  to  yet  one  more 
of  its  aspects. 

The  Kingdom  of  God,  as  Grod's  supramundane  final  end 
in  the  world,  is  superior,  of  course,  to  all  motives  which  in 
any  way  may  be  reckoned  as  belonging  to  the  natural  world. 
The  law  of  universal  love  transcends  not  only  the  motives 
arising  out  of  the  physical  self-preservation  of  the  individual 
and  of  the  human  species  as  such,  but  also  the  aims  of 
spiritual  self-preservation  in  the  particular  realms  of  moral 
fellowship,  the  family,  civil  vocation,  social  position,  the  Stat«. 
In  moral  action,  the  goodness  of  which  is  measurable  by  these 
differentiated  social  ends,  we  are  always  dependent  on  the 
natural  conditions  of  spiritual  existence  in  the  world.  This  is 
shown  by  the  fact  that,  in  all  these  provinces  of  life,  with  the 
relative  goodness  of  action  there  may  also  be  bound  up  occasions 
of  sin.  For  apart  from  cases  of  purely  individual  selfishness, 
pride  of  family  may  set  itself  in  opposition  to  the  moral 
interests  of  friendship,  and  the  interests  of  class  in  opposition 
to  the  aims  of  civic  existence,  while  national  vanity  and  love 
of  power  may  militate  against  the  humane  recognition  of  the 
rights  of  other  peoples.  But  the  principle  of  universal  love 
to  men  abstracts  from  all  natural  conditions  and  limitations 
of  spiritual  life  in  common,  and  therefore  can  give  no  stimulus 
to  selfish  emotions.  But  now  the  universality  of  the  King- 
dom of  God  as  final  end  is  proved  by  our  having  to  take  it 
up  into  our  particular  moral  aims.  It  operates  as  supreme 
motive  even  in  the  conduct  through  which  is  realised  fellow- 
ship with  one's  family,  with  friends,  with  those  of  the  same 
class,  with  one's  countrymen*  Thus  we  enjoy  freedom  from 
the   world,   meaning   by  the   world   all   those   determining 


482-3]       NECESSITY   OF   FORGIVENESS   OR   JUSTIFICATION  513 

motives  of  lower  rank  which  constitute  the  dependence  of 
spiritual  life  upon  the  elements  of  the  natural  world.^  For 
the  principle  of  universal  love,  as  the  law  both  subjective 
and  objective  of  the  Kingdom  of  God,  rests  on  the  fact  that 
men,  as  spiritual  beings,  are  equal  and  of  equal  worth,  while 
all  other  relations  by  which  our  spiritual  life  is  interwoven 
with  nature  show  such  marks  of  heterogeneity  that  we  can 
only  in  a  limited  sense  predicate  equality  of  them.  In  the 
circumstances  described,  therefore,  the  acknowledgment  of  the 
Kingdom  of  God  as  the  final  end  in  the  world  involves  the 
supramundane  character  of  the  motive  of  universal  love,  and 
carries  with  it  the  principle  that  conduct  animated  by  uni- 
versal love  constitutes  freedom  over  the  world. 

This  idea  is,  to  begin  with,  not  unrelated  to  that  concep- 
tion of  freedom  in  which  the  human  spirit  as  such  finds  the 
essence  of  its  self-distinction  from  nature.  Freedom,  as 
independence  of  natural  causes,  as  itself  the  cause  which 
breaks  the  chain  of  natural  causes  operating  upon  us,  we  feel 
to  be  real  when,  by  the  universal  conception  of  an  end,  we 
stop  and  deprive  of  their  power  those  impulses  to  action 
which  arise  from  the  correspondence  between  individual  pro- 
pensities and  the  "  goods  "  of  the  world,  and  which  represent 
one  element  of  natural  necessity.  The  higher  experience 
of  freedom  consists  in  this,  that  through  the  conception  of 
a  personal  end  we  completely  moderate  and  order  our  par- 
ticular impulses  in  general,  so  that  they  are  allowed  free 
course  only  in  the  degree  and  at  the  time  that  they  serve 
as  a  means  to  the  final  end  we  have  in  our  mind.  This  stage 
of  freedom,  however,  is  not  the  highest,  for  the  personal  end 
by  which  the  several  sensuous  or  spiritual  impulses  are  con- 
trolled may  be  bad  as  well  as  good.  The  different  species  of 
vice  or  of  systematic  selfishness,  in  which  the  personal  end  is 

^  On  this  point  we  haveacontroyenywith  Catholicism  of  the  following  kind. 
In  the  Catholic  form  of  Christianity,  the  universal  Christian  morality  of  the 
Kingdom  of  Qod  is  realised  in  monasticisro,  i,e,  outside  the  natural  and  parti- 
cular provinces  of  the  family,  friendship,  fellowship  in  ciric  yooation,  and  the 
State.  The  consequence  is  that  the  unirersal  morality  of  Christianity  becomes 
in  monasticism  a  barren  or  even  a  pernicious  particularism.  For  it  is  in  the 
particnlar,  not  alongside  or  outside  of  it,  that  the  anivereal  finds  its  realisation, 

33 


514  JUSTIFICATION    AND   RECONCILIATION  [483-4 

confined  to  the  satisfaction  of  a  single  propensity,  and  the 
different  stages  of  a  morally  good  character,  which  are  devoted 
to  social  aims,  are  identical  in  the  feature  mentioned.  The 
highest  stage  of  freedom,  therefore,  will  be  that  at  which  the 
supremely  universal  end  of  the  association  of  mankind  is  made 
the  personal  end,  and  brought  into  relation  with  narrower 
forms  of  fellowship ;  for  from  an  end  such  as  this  there  can 
arise  no  stimulus  to  selfishness,  whether  coarser  or  more 
refined.  Accordingly,  that  freedom  over  the  world  as  a 
system  of  nature,  which  is  manifested  in  practical  life  in  the 
Kingdom  of  God,  not  merely  lies  in  the  line  of  that  concep- 
tion of  freedom  which  can  be  affirmed  in  general,  but  forms 
the  climax  which  freedom  must  of  necessity  be  conceived  as 
reaching  if  we  are  to  have  a  complete  idea  of  it  at  all. 

The  demonstration  just  given  is  a  refutation  of  Kant's 
position  regarding  the  intelligible  and  non -empirical  sense  of 
freedom.  Freedom  is  not  merely  an  idea  which  we  employ 
to  judge  our  action — action,  however,  which  experience  shows 
not  to  be  free,  but  determined  at  every  step ;  freedom  is  itself 
experience.  And  while  each  act  is  motived,  and  springs  from 
its  motive  necessarily,  yet  in  varying  measure  those  actions 
are  free  whose  motive  is  the  universal  conception  of  an  end 
which  lays  a  restraining  hand  on  the  very  impulse  it  has 
aroused,  Kant's  conclusion  was  not  merely  theoretically  un- 
satisfactory, in  so  far  as  it  left  unsolved  the  contradiction 
between  the  subjective  claim  to  be  free  and  the  objective  fact 
that  action  forms  part  of  the  causal  nexus ;  it  was  practically 
useless  as  well,  for  it  left  no  possibility  open  of  action's  guiding 
itself  by  the  law  produced  by  freedom.  On  the  other  hand, 
this  very  connection  asserted  by  Kant  between  freedom  and 
the  moral  law  is  confirmed  by  the  highest  form  of  freedom  as 
set  forth  above.  The  moral  law,  as  the  system  of  those 
dispositions,  intentions,  and  actions  which  follow  necessarily 
from  the  all-embracing  end  of  the  Kingdom  of  God  and  from 
the  subjective  motive  of  universal  love  (§  32),  cannot  be 
codified  so  as  to  decide,  in  each  possible  case  of  morally  good 
action,  that  such  action  is  necessary.     This  is  a  consequence 


484-5]       NECESSITY   OF   FORGIVENESS   OR   JUSTIFICATION  515 

of  the  divergence  which  exists  between  the  character  of  the 
disposition  and  the  form  the  particular  action  may  assume,  a 
divergence  which  cannot  be  removed.  For  an  objective  regular 
norm  may  quite  well  be  found  for  the  general  disposition  in 
those  correct  inferences  which  follow  from  the  ends  comprised 
in  the  Kingdom  of  God ;  but  no  provision  is  contained  therein 
for  prescribing  when  we  must  act  in  accordance  with  this 
disposition,  and  when  not.  And  so,  whether  in  a  particular 
given  case  it  is  necessary  and  a  duty  to  act  according  to  the 
general  disposition  indicated  by  the  moral  law,  needs  to  be 
settled  by  a  judgment  guided  by  the  particular  circumstances. 
The  formation  of  the  idea  of  duty,  accordingly,  is  conditioned 
not  merely  by  the  general  disposition  to  obey  the  moral  law, 
but  also  by  the  special  virtues  of  conscientiousness,  wisdom,  and 
circumspection.  But  since  the  idea  of  duty  represents  the 
ramification  of  the  general  moral  law  into  particular  actions, 
the  result  is  that  freedom  in  this  sense  is  the  basis  of  the 
moral  law,  in  other  words,  the  basis  of  the  application  of  the 
general  principle  to  the  particular  cases  of  necessary  action. 
Without  the  acquisition  of  moral  freedom  in  the  form  of  a 
good  general  disposition  and  of  a  development  of  special 
virtues,  therefore,  the  moral  law  not  only  cannot  be  carried 
out,  but  cannot  even  in  its  whole  range  be  known  and  object- 
ively fixed.  It  is  further  to  be  considered,  however,  that 
the  variable  element  in  moral  existence  does  not  consist 
merely  in  those  particular  cases  of  action,  as  contrasted  with 
which  the  virtue  and  disposition  acquired  might  be  viewed  as 
unconditionally  immutable.  On  the  contrary,  the  contrast  is 
merely  relative.  Even  virtue,  even  the  general  moral  disposi- 
tion, IB  variable ;  they  may  be  falsified,  and  they  may  be  injured, 
if  at  any  stage  they  are  regarded  as  mechanically  complete. 
They  continue  to  exist  only  in  so  far  as  they  are  being  per- 
petually reproduced.  But  this  takes  place  only  when  the 
will,  bent  upon  the  universal  moral  end,  ever  anew  actually 
produces  for  itself  knowledge  of  the  moral  law,  and  therewith 
the  law  itself ;  for  the  law  does  not  exist  for  us  apart  from 
our  knowledge  of  it. 


516  JUSTIFICATION   AND   RECONCIUATION  [485-6 

In    these  respects  the  aatonomy  claimed  by  Kant  for 
the   will  which  aims  at  the  moral  law  is  vindicated.     The 
same  autonomy  proves  to  be  a  quality  of  the  Christian  law, 
although  Kant  himself  regards  Divine  authority  as  a  mark 
of  heteronomy.     But  in  the  Christian  view,  Divine  authority 
is  very  far  from  involving  necessarily  a  statutory  and  merely 
objective  form   of   the    moral    law.     For   the    principle   of 
universal  love  to  man  does  not  claim  acceptance  originally 
in    the  form  of  an  objective  rule,  but  is   at  work  in  the 
subjective  disposition  of    the  Founder  of   our  religion.     It 
was  capable  of   being   expressed   as   an   objective   formula 
because   Christ  regarded  it  as  the  law  of  the  Elingdom  of 
God  He  was  going  to  found,  and  as  the  motive  of  the  action 
He  devoted  to  it,  and  because  He  took  for  granted  that  the 
members  of  the  community  of  Christ,  believing  in  God  as 
their  Father,  consistently  resolve  likewise  to  obey  the  Lord 
of  the  Kingdom.     Now  the  grade  and  the  character  of  the 
moral  law  are  shown  by  the  fact  that  the  final  end,  from 
which   it  receives    its    form,    transcends    the   natural   and 
particular,  in  other   words,    the   secular   conditionedness  of 
the  spiritual  life.     In  the  principle  of  universal  love  to  man, 
the  motives  of  natural  relationship  in  family  and  nation,  and 
the  natural  alliance  arising  from  the  relations  of  class   and 
vocation,  are  limited  so  far  that  they  do  not  militate  against 
the   fellowship  of  spiritual  life  or  the  true  dignity  of  man 
which  is  in  question.     Or  rather,  while  we  regularly  move 
and  have  our  being  in  intercourse  with   our  family,   with 
those  who  belong  to  the  same  class,  and  with  our  fellow- 
countrymen,   our   limited   natural   goodwill    towards    them 
is  idealised  by  our  universal  regard  for  the  human  dignity 
common  to  alL     In  social  action  for  the  final  end  of  the 
Kingdom  of  God,  too,  no  validity  belongs  to  forms  of  egoism 
which  might,  owing  to  the  struggle  for  pleasure  and  rewards, 
have   the   e£fect  of    forcing   good    action   into  the   position 
of  means  to  an  alien  end.      Ideally  interpreted,  therefore, 
action  for  the  supernatural   final  end  of   the  Kingdom  of 
God  does  not  admit  that  other  mark  of  heteronomy  which 


486-7]      NECESSITY   OF   FORGIVENESS   OR   JUSTIFICATION  517 

is  excluded   by  Kant  from  his  conception  of  the  absolute 
moral  law. 

The  voluntariness  of  action  for  the  end  of  the  Kingdom 
of  God,  however,  which  properly  should  pervade  our  conduct 
in  all  the  narrower  provinces  of  life,  is  homogeneous  with 
the  manifestations  of  *  our  religious  freedom  over  the  world. 
The  final  end,  by  which  such  action  is  guided,  is  as  much 
supramundane   as    the    attitude    taken   up    by    one    whose 
general  mood  is  so  little  affected  by  the  opposition  between 
happiness  and  suffering,  by  the  changes  of  surrounding  things, 
and   the    possible    demands   of    human   authority,   that   it 
preserves  its  identity  in  spite  of  them.     The  homogeneity 
of   both    aspects  of   the  Christian   life  rests,   too,   upon    a 
single  ground,  namely,  on   the  commanding  importance  of 
the  idea  of  God  as  supramundane,  gracious,  and  benevolent. 
Since,    therefore,  eternal   life   and   blessedness   are    experi- 
mentally  enjoyed   in  this  elevation  of  the  feeling  of  self 
over   the   world,   the   motivation    of   action  by  the  supra- 
mundane   end    of    the    Kingdom    of    God   is    necessarily 
reflected    in   blessedness.      James,   therefore,   is   not   quite 
right  when  he  says  that   the  man  who  fulfils  the   law   of 
freedom  is  blessed  in  his  deed.     But  what  be  does  express 
quite  precisely  in  these  words  is  the  truth  that  blessedness 
accompanies  a  good  deed  which  springs   from  the  supreme 
motive,  and  not  from  a  calculation  of  the  result.     For  by 
acting  in  the  latter  way  we  should  impose  upon  ourselves 
a  limitation  of  freedom,  and  so  far  experience  not  blessedness, 
but  its  opposite.     Finally,  we  gain  here  still  another  argu- 
ment against  the  view  that  good  works  can  merit  eternal 
life.    For   if   good  action,  under  the  conditions  prescribed 
above,  produces  blessedness — in  such  a  way,  namely,  that 
it  is  to  us  an  experience  of  eternal  life — the  two  cannot 
enter  into  experience  in  the  form  of  the  legal  equivalents, 
service  and  reward. 

The  homogeneity  which  has  been  proved  between  the 
content  of  the  self-feeling  of  the  Christian  as  free  from  the 
world,  and  action  from    the   supramundane  motive  of  the 


518  JUSTIFICATION   AND   RECONCILIATION  [487-S 

Elingdom  of  God,  serves  to  demonstrate  the  principle  followed 
by  the  Reformers,  that  the  Divine  revelation  given  in  Christi- 
anity both  guarantees  reconciliation  with  God,  or  liberation 
from  the  world,  or  eternal  life,  and  imposes  the  duty  of  good 
works.  Only  when  the  homogeneity  of  both  aspects  is  recognised 
can  we  justify  the  formula  which  adds  the  one  to  the  other. 
But  we  certainly  now  gain  also  a  criterion  by  which  to  test 
the    proposition   that   good  works  are  not  to  be  taken  as 
concomitant  causes  of  eternal  life.     This,  of  course,  is  not 
true,  if  it  is  meant  as  coming  under  the  category  of  merit 
and  reward.     But  still  good  works  and  eternal  life  are  not 
so  unrelated  to  one  another  as  Lutheran  doctrine  strives  to 
make  out.     As  the  disposition  which  finds  its  motive  in  the 
Bupramundane  end  of  the   Kingdom   of  God   itself   comes 
within  the  compass  of  eternal  life,  therefore  good  works  are, 
for  one  thing,  manifestations  of  eternal  life ;    but  further, 
according  to  the  law  that  the  exercise  of  a  power  serves 
to  strengthen  and  maintain  it,  they  are  organs  of  eternal  life. 
Thus  is  proved  the  truth  of  St,  Bernard's  dictum :  non  caum 
regni,  sed  via  regftandi.     Moreover,  the  homogeneity  of  both 
sides    is    shown    by    their    peculiar    inter«w5tion    or    mutual 
conditionedness.     On  the  one  hand,  the  action  which  finds 
its  motive  in   the  supramandane    end   of  the  Kingdom   i£ 
necessarily    subject    to   the    influence    of    the    experiences 
yielded   by   Christian   freedom.      In  order    to  impress   this 
final  end  vividly  on  the  disposition,  and  to  act  in  accordance 
with  it,  one  needs  that  joyous  feeling  which  removes   the 
disabling  and  confining  sense  of  evils,  one  needs  freedom  from 
care  about  the  future,  independence  of  social  prejudices,  and 
superiority   to    the   fascination    of   success.     On    the    other 
hand,  action  for  the  end  of  the  Kingdom  of  God  is  necessary 
in  order  to  prove,  through    the   experience    of   blessedness 
which    it   yields,    that    eternal   life,    even    in    the    directly 
religious  feeling  of  self,  is  no  passive  possession,  but  that 
the  Divine  bestowal  of  this  religious  freedom  over  the  world  is 
really  the  only  thing  which  makes  possible  the  independence 
of  one  8  personal  spiritual  feeling. 


488-9]       NECESSITY    OP   FORGIVENESS.  OR   JUSTIFICATION  519 

All  these  discussions,  however,  are  not  sufficient  to 
remove  the  impression  that  Christianity  issues  in  two  ideals 
for  man,  of  which  the  one  cannot  be  reduced  to  the  other. 
It  does  not  seem  possible  to  get  beyond  what  was  assumed 
in  this  respect  in  our  provisional  description  of  the  Christian 
religion  (§2),  namely,  that  it  has  for  its  aim  the  spiritual 
freedom,  and  the  most  comprehensive  moral  fellowship,  of 
men.  But  while  Luther,  in  his  tract  on  Christian  Freedom, 
affirms  this  two-sidedness,  though  in  a  somewhat  harsh  form, 
he  o£fers  at  the  same  time  another  view  bf  the  matter,  when 
with  all  his  successors  he  adopts  the  affirmation  of  Paul 
(Gal.  V.  6),  that  love  is  the  necessary  consequence  of 
reconciling  faith.  For  that  implies  that  the  determination 
to  act  for  the  final  end  of  the  Kingdom  of  God  finds 
its  sufficient  ground  in  the  fact  of  reconciliation  with  God. 
Now  this  position  is  not  directly  obvious  when  brought  into 
comparison  with  Luther's  view,  that  in  faith  we  address 
ourselves  to  God,  and  in  action  to  men.  It  deserves  to  be 
opposed  for  this  further  reason,  however,  that  the  attainment 
of  that  freedom  over  the  world,  which  is  involved  in  faith 
in  our  reconciliation  with  God,  makes  each  single  believer 
appear  as  a  whole  in  his  own  order,  while  in  action  for 
the  Kingdom  of  God  he  possesses  the  significance  merely 
of  a  part  of  the  whole.  How,  then,  is  a  sufficient  basis 
to  be  found  for  this  converse  relation  in  the  religious  self- 
feeling,  that  as  a  whole  in  his  own  order  a  man  is  worth 
more  than  the  whole  world  ? 

On  the  other  hand,  we  must  remember  that  the  relation 
of  the  individual  to  the  fellowship  of  the  Kingdom  of  God, 
for  whose  good  he  acts,  is  not  exhausted  by  the  distinction 
of  the  part  and  the  whole.  Eather,  it  follows  from  the  very 
nature  of  an  ethical  organism,  that  within  it  every  properly 
articulated  part  counts  as  a  whole.  Any  activity  of  a  part 
in  the  service  of  the  whole  is  a  means  of  furthering  the 
weKare  of  the  whole,  only  when  the  aim  of  the  whole  is 
present  in  the  mind  as  the  motive  of  action.  The  individual 
subject,  however,  who  in  his  special  vocation  acts  from  a 


520  JUSTIFICATION   AND   RECONCIUATION  [489-90 

good  disposition  for  the  promotion  of  the  whole,  himself 
acquires,  through  his  thus  conditioned  development  in  moral 
character,  the  significance  of  a  whole  in  Ms  own  order. 
Now  in  the  morally  good  character  there  must  be  reckoned, 
not  merely  the  permanent  self-determination  to  act  in  accord- 
ance with  the  supramundane  final  end  of  the  Divine  Kingdom, 
but  also  that  religious  independence  of  the  world  through 
which  a  man  first  becomes  conscious  that  in  worth  he  is 
superior  to  the  world.  Independence  of  the  world,  then, 
or  the  Christian  freedom  which  religious  faith  enjoys,  must 
at  the  same  time  involve  the  power  of  bringing  into  play 
the  supramundane  motive  of  universal  love  to  man,  if  what 
is  called  for  is  the  practical  exercise  of  fellowship  with  men. 
But  just  this  side  of  the  matter  is  unprovided  for  in  the  faith 
of  the  individual,  who  through  his  fellowship  with  God  has 
experience  of  eternal  life.  Love,  therefore,  follows  from  faith 
in  reconciliation  only  because  the  God  in  whom  we  put  our 
faith  has  for  His  final  aim  the  union  of  men  in  the  Kingdom 
of  God.  Even  thus,  therefore,  we  faQ  to  transcend  the 
twofold  adspect  of  Christianity. 

To  attain  this  end,  perhaps  we  should  have  to  introduce 
yet  another  consideration.  On  the  one  hand,  the  common 
moral  end  posited  in  Christianity  is  embraced  in  its  religious 
aspect ;  for  in  the  Kingdom  of  God,  as  God's  most  personal 
end,  what  we  do  is,  ultimately,  to  serve  God ;  on  the  other 
hand,  freedom  from  the  world,  or  eternal  life  as  experienced 
in  faith,  is  likewise  adapted  to  the  intercourse  and  fellowship 
of  men  within  the  Kingdom  of  God.  Reconciliation  with 
God,  too,  and  our  corresponding  freedom  over  the  world, 
are  not  merely  a  uniform  characteristic  of  all  individuals 
alike,  but  the  common  quality  through  which  a  plurality 
forms  a  whole.  But  in  order  to  secure  this  end,  in  order 
that  each  individual  should  experience  reconciliation  and 
Christian  freedom  over  the  world,  not  merely  for  himself 
but  in  his  feeling  of  unity  with  all  others,  and  in  order 
that  these  common  experiences  should  be  truthfully  expressed 
in  prayer,  it  is  necessary  that  mutual  union  should  be  sought 


490-1]      NEOKSSITY   OF   FORGIVENESS    OR   JUSTIFICATION  521 

by  means  of  action  in  every  direction  from  the  motive  of 
universal  love  to  men.  Whoever,  accordingly,  is  by  faith 
assured  of  his  reconciliation,  and  at  the  same  time  desires 
to  experience  it  as  a  possession  of  the  community,  has  here 
a  motive  for  seeking,  by  the  exercise  of  love,  union  with 
those  whom  he  needs  to  complete  his  social  feeling  of  recon- 
ciliation. On  this  presupposition  we  can  understand  the 
statement  that  faith  in  reconciliation  operates  through  love. 
But  were  we  to  follow  out  the  line  of  this  proposition,  we 
might  possibly  come  to  the  conclusion  that  we  do  good  in 
order  to  enjoy  the  common  blessedness.  Such  a  conclusion 
would  not  violate  the  principle  that  the  Kingdom  of  God 
must  always  be  conceived  as  the  final  end.  For  that  Elingdom 
proves  itself  to  be  the  highest  good  by  the  fact  that  in  the 
realisation  of  it  we  and  all  others  are  blessed  together.  The 
above  proposition,  therefore,  must  not  be  regarded  as  inad- 
missible ;  still,  it  does  not  exhaust  the  matter.  Sather  must 
action  for  the  end  of  the  Kingdom  of  God  be  directly  deduced 
from  the  truth  that  we  acknowledge  this  final  end  of  God 
in  believing  in  the  Father  of  Jesus  Christ.  What  we  gain 
thereby,  however,  is  not  a  simple  subsumption  of  the  ethical 
under  the  religious  aspect  of  Christianity.  And  this  con- 
clusion, finally,  is  confirmed  by  the  following  consideration. 

The  Pauline  formula,  that  faith  worketh  by  love,  ought 
not  at  all  to  be  understood  in  the  sense  of  a  simple  logical 
deduction,  or  in  the  sense  of  mechanical  necessity.  Belief 
in  such  a  connection  between  love  and  faith  is  refuted  not 
only  by  the  fact  that  an  obvious  lack  of  love  to  man  may  be 
accompanied  by  an  eminent  degree  of  faith  in  reconciliation, 
but  also  by  the  consideration  that  love  appears  in  the  form 
of  a  personal  resolve  which  is  not  as  yet  present  in  faith  in 
reconciliation.  For  after  all  the  direct  relations  of  the  two 
are  different :  faith  faces  towards  God,  and  love  towards  man. 
So  far,  however,  as  faith  in  reconciliation  seeks  in  reconcilia- 
tion fellowship  with  others  by  manifesting  loving  action 
towards  them,  this  forms  a  more  secondary  motive,  which 
is    no    substitute    for   the  special  resolve   to  exercise  love. 


522  JUSTIFICATION  AKD   RKCONClLIATIOK  [491-2 

Thus,  love  to  men  and  good  works  do  not  follow  directly 
from  faith  in  so  far  as  faith  experiences  reconciliation  with 
God  as  an  individual  and  social  possession ;  rather  do  they 
follow  from  fedth  in  so  far  as  it  appropriates  the  final  end 
of  the  Kingdom  of  God,  as  the  personal  end  of  the  God 
with  whom  we  know  ourselves  reconciled.  But  if  in  con- 
scious faith  these  aspects  are  accompanied  by  different 
feelings,  namely,  feelings  of  peace  and  of  stimulus,  then  we 
cannot  get  beyond  the  difference  and  the  alternation  of  the 
religious  and  the  moral  effects  of  Christianity.  The  moral 
impulse,  though  ultimately  it  is  based  on  the  thought  of  God, 
is  not  exhausted  by  the  religious  experience  of  reconcilia- 
tion and  of  freedom  over  the  world.  The  ethical  necessity 
of  love  engendered  by  faith,  which  is  the  only  necessity  that 
can  be  affirmed,  still  retains  the  peculiar  character  belonging 
to  the  moral  resolve  by  which  the  man  who  is  reconciled 
to  God  accepts  the  task  of  the  Kingdom  of  God.  Tlie 
moral  necessity  of  this  connection,  however,  follows  from 
the  fact  that  the  same  God  both  guarantees  reconciliation 
and  freedom  from  the  world,  and  bestows  the  impulse  to 
help  in  realising  the  Divine  Kingdom.  The  heterogeneity 
of  the  two  aspects  of  the  Christian  life,  however,  is 
balanced  in  the  subjective  result — that  we  are  blessed 
in  the  experience  that  all  things  serve  for  our  good,  and 
that  we  are  blessed  in  doing  good.  This  feeling  is  therefore 
the  same  in  both  cases ;  for,  in  the  experience  of  Christian 
freedom,  as  in  action  prompted  by  the  motive  of  the  Divine 
Kingdom,  we  occupy  a  position  superior  to  those  natural 
and  particular  conditions  of  life  which  are  comprised  in  the 
conception  of  the  world.  When  Luther  adopted  the  maxim 
of  Paul,  that  where  faith  reigns  love  likewise  developes, 
he  could  not  accept  this  rule,  which  it  is  impossible  always 
to  verify  empirically,  without  indirectly  admitting  also  the 
truth  of  James'  saying,  that  we  are  blessed  in  doing  good. 
Consequently,  the  authors  of  the  Formula  of  Concord,  follow- 
ing in  his  track  almost  arrived  at  the  same  principle ; 
and  this  tmth  failed  to  receive  public  recognition  at  their 


492-3]      NECESSITY    OP   FORGIVENESS   0&   JUSTlMCATION  523 

hands,  only  because  they  thought  there  was  a  greater  danger 
of  its  being  misused. 

§  54.  The  question  regarding  the  necessity  of  the  idea  of 
jtLstiJiccUion  or  forgiveness  points,  first,  to  that  combination 
of  it  with  eternal  life  which  is  accepted  not  only  by  Luther, 
but  also  by  the  Socinians  ;^  second,  to  the  position  which  is 
given  to  this  operation  of  Divine  grace  [justification],  as 
the  principle  of  the  entire  Christian  life,  by  Luther  and 
his  followers  as  against  the  Socinians.  In  order  to  deter- 
mine the  conception  of  eternal  life,  Luther  gathered  to- 
gether, under  the  conception  of  Christian  freedom,  all  those 
indications  used  by  New  Testament  writers  to  describe  the 
true  elevation  of  believers  about  the  world ;  and  at  the  same 
time  he  demonstrated  the  presence  in  the  believer  of  a 
freedom  or  voluntariness  of  moral  action  which  is  homo- 
geneous with  that  freedom.  Calvin  also  gives  expression  to 
the  latter  idea.*  In  the  circle  over  which  his  influence 
extended,  however,  they  failed  to  reach  that  more  special 
formulation  of  this  truth  which  is  given  in  the  Formula 
of  Concord  (p.  5 1 0),  namely,  the  autonomy  of  moral  action. 
By  the  special  emphasis  which  it  laid  upon  the  duty  of 
sanctification  within  the  community,  Calvinism  was  led  to 
give  the  regulation  of  moral  action  the  impress  of  statutory 
law.  It  never  sought  to  bridge  over  the  gulf  between  this 
and  the  recognition  of  the  voluntariness  of  action  which 
rises  out  of  faith  and  the  Holy  Spirit,^  though  more 
accurate  thought  would  soon  make  clear  the  incongruity  of 
these  two  views.  Nay  more,  in  Puritanism  the  pedantic 
conception  of  statutory  law,  which  was  most  characteristic- 
ally evinced  by  the  prohibition  of  images  and  the  Sabbath 
law,    was    carried    still    further    in    the   principle    that    it 

'  Catech,  Eacov.  453  :  "  lustificatio  est,  cum  nos  deus  pro  iustis  habet,  quod 
ea  ration e  facit,  cum  nobis  et  peccata  remittit  et  nos  vita  aetema  donat." 

^  Insl,  iii.  19.  4  :  "  Conscientiae  legis  ipsius  iugo  liberae  voluntati  dei  ultro 
obediunt." 

'  O&nf,  ffelv.  post.  16 :  "Docemus  vere  bona  opera  enasci  ex  fide  viva  per 
spiritam  sanctum  et  a  fidelibus  fieri  secundum  voluntatem  et  regulam  verbi 
dei  .  .  .  Diximus  autem  antea,  legem  dei,  quae  voluntas  dei  est,  formulam 
nobis  praescribere  bonorum  openim." 


524  JUSTinCATION   and   reconciliation  [493-1 

is  essentially  as  Lawgiver  that  Christ  exercises  His  kinglj 
office  (p.  425).  As  compared  with  Calvinism,  Lutheranism 
attained  to  deeper  knowledge  on  this  point,  in  that  it 
identified  the  voluntariness  of  moral  action  due  to  the  Holy 
Spirit  with  the  taking  up  of  the  law  into  the  disposition. 
But  this  principle  has  not  been  developed  theoretically,  and 
from  other  considerations  the  idea  that  the  form  of  the  law 
is  statutory  still  remains  firmly  established  in  Lutheran 
orthodoxy  also.  We  ought  not,  therefore,  to  ex^gerate  the 
difference  between  the  two  Confessions  on  this  point,  as 
though  it  were  possible  to  prove  a  qualitative  distinction 
between  them  in  ethical  temperament.  Calvinists  and 
Lutherans  are  at  one  in  acknowledging  in  principle  the 
voluntariness  of  moral  action  springing  from  the  Holy  Spirit 
and  from  faith  in  reconciliation ;  in  this  view  they  are  united 
against  the  Socinians.  The  proof  I  am  going  to  attempt  of 
the  Eeformers'  conception  of  justification  requires  that,  first 
of  all,  the  leading  features  of  Socinianism  should  be  con- 
trasted with  the  Lutheran  and  Calvinistic  doctrine. 

The  Socinian  system  likewise  testifies  to  the  closest  relation 
between  justification  and  eternal  life.  The  latter  blessing 
is  made  dependent  on  the  condition  of  faith,  and  thus  derived 
from  God's  free  bounty  in  such  a  way  that  human  merit  is 
excluded.  But  eternal  life  is  not  merely  limited  to  the  next 
world ;  in  accordance  with  the  view  of  the  Middle  Ages, 
it  is  also  represented  as  man's  supernatural  goal,  and  this  in 
such  a  way  as  to  give  it  no  place  in  the  conception  of 
created  human  nature.  Moreover,  the  obedience  which  con- 
sists in  fulfilling  the  law  is  reckoned  as  part  of  the  faith 
which  attains  eternal  life.  But  the  forgiveness  of  sins,  or 
the  removal  of  the  penalties  which  have  been  incurred,  is, 
as  a  condition  of  eternal  life,  at  times  distinguished  from  it, 
at  times  combined  with  it,  in  order  that  the  deficiency  of 
imperfect  fulfilment  of  the  law  may  be  raised  to  the  level 
of  the  perfection  of  eternal  life.  For  the  Socinians  find 
Christianity  objectively  in  its  perfect  commandments  and  its 
perfect  promises  of  eternal  life  and    the  Holy  Spirit,  Who 


494-^]      NECE8SITT   OF   FORGIVENESS   OR   JUSTIFICATION  525 

implants  the  hope  of  life  eternal,  provided  that  the  Divine 
commandments  are  fulfilled,  at  least  so  far  as  the  power  of  the 
individual  will  allow.  These  principles  of  Christianity,  viewed 
as  an  ethical  school  which  still  admits  certain  accidental  re- 
ligious features,  mark  out  good  action  as  the  principal  thing. 
But  good  action  is  kept  firmly  to  the  lines  of  statutory  law. 
And  this  law  is  not  construed  as  possessing  merely  genuinely 
moral  contents:  it  is  viewed  as  containing  also  the  cere- 
monial commandments  which  inculcate  the  worship  of  God 
by  means  of  the  Lord's  Prayer  and  the  Eucharist.  Now, 
between  the  fulfilment  of  this  duty  and  the  supernatural  goal 
of  eternal  life,  no  necessary  and  material  relation,  no  point 
of  identity,  is  demonstrated.  The  two  are  just  as  unrelated 
to  one  another  as,  in  the  Socinian  theory,  the  nature  of  God 
and  the  nature  of  man;  they  are  only  conjoined  with  one 
another  by  the  arbitrary  will  of  God.  Even  the  adoption  in 
Ethics  ^  of  the  Aristotelian  idea  of  virtue  is  not  sufficient  to 
annul  or  to  counterbalance  this  eudaemonistic  conjunction 
of  good  conduct  and  blessedness.  What  becomes  clear, 
rather,  is  that  this  predominantly  ethical  representation  of 
Christianity  is  a  system  of  heteronomy,  just  as  certainly 
as  its  roots  are  to  be  found  in  purely  mediaeval  motives. 
As  regards  the  chief  point,  too,  it  falls  very  far  short  of  the 
Lutheran  doctrine  that,  as  subjects  of  Christian  faith,  we  live 
in  the  law  and  continually  reproduce  the  law  for  ourselves 
through  the  Holy  Spirit,  inasmuch  as  we  voluntarily  act 
for  the  common  final  end  marked  out  by  love. 

But  without  departing  from  these  lines,  other  features  of 
Christian  freedom,  far  richer  and  more  complete,  have  been 
drawn  from  the  New  Testament  sources.  The  human  will, 
which  in  Christianity  is  directed  to  the  final  end  of  the 
Kingdom  of  God,  which  transcends  all  natural  or  particular 
motives  of  moral  action,  proves  itself  to  have  attained  the 
highest  conceivable  level  of  freedom,  both  by  the  independ- 
ence of  its  motive  from  the  natural  texture  of  both  indi- 

^  loh.    Crell,    Mhieea  $eu   doctriwH   4e   moribus  prole^fouwui,      Ethka 
Christiana^  B.  F.  P.  torn.  iy. 


526  JUSTIFICATION    AND   KECONCIUATION  [405-6 

vidual  and  social  life,  and  bj  the  fact  that  it  is  guided  by  a 
free  knowledge  of  the  moral  law,  through  which  it  perpetu- 
ally produces  that  law.  For  the  moral  law  exists  completely 
only  as  a  network  of  those  judgments  of  duty  which  deter- 
mine the  necessary  form  of  good  action  in  each  particular 
case ;  the  judgment  of  duty  in  this  sense,  however,  is  always 
the  product  of  an  independent  application  of  the  universal 
law,  through  particular  moral  principles,  to  the  individual's 
situation  at  the  moment  in  the  moral  society.  This  mcnal 
autonomy,  however,  is  necessary  for  this  special  reason,  that 
the  law  of  universal  love  to  our  neighbour  is  altogether 
incapable  of  being  drawn  out  into  a  statutory  series  of 
general  commandments,  for  it  is  addressed,  in  the  first  place, 
not  to  our  actions,  but  to  our  disposition.  Now  the  meaning 
of  this  truth  comes  out  in  the  distinction  between  legal  and 
moral  action,  and  serves  to  mark  off  the  moral  law  from  all 
kinds  of  civil  law,  both  in  conception  and  in  practical 
application.  For  the  principle  of  autonomy  not  only  holds 
good  within  the  circle  of  the  universal  moral  law  as  such ; 
we  likewise  act  autonomously  in  each  particular  province  of 
life,  even  in  that  of  law  and  of  the  State,  in  so  far  as  we 
deduce  the  principle  of  obedience  to  the  statutory  law,  and 
the  judgments  of  duty  which  embody  it,  from  the  validity  of 
the  universal  moral  law.  On  the  other  hand,  even  Divine 
authority  does  not  imply  the  heteronomous  character  of  the 
Christian  moral  law,  for  it  lacks  the  statutory  quality  on 
which  that  character  depends,  and  excludes  all  egoistical 
regard  for  purely  individual  pleasure  or  reward. 

This  freedom  of  action,  of  which  the  believer  becomes 
capable  as  a  member  of  the  Kingdom  of  God,  is  homogeneous 
with  those  religious  functions  through  which  he  gives  effect 
to  the  attitude  of  superiority  to  the  world  rendered  possible 
to  him  in  Christianity  (p.  516).  Both  sides  belong  together, 
as  certainly  as  Christianity  is  par  exceUmce  the  ethical 
religion.  The  separate  elements  of  the  two  sides,  on  closer 
observation,  likewise  display  features  of  interaction  (p.  518). 
But  at  the  same  time  it  becomes  clear  that,  as  a  whole 


496-7]      NECESSITY    OF   FORGIVENESS   OR   JUSTIFICATION  527 

and  in  principle,  the  religious  functions — trust  in  God, 
humility  and  patience,  thanksgiving  and  petition  to  God — 
through  which  the  believer,  according  to  the  teaching  x)f 
Luther,  maintains  his  position  against  the  world,  take  pre- 
cedence of  the  series  of  moral  functions  in  which  we  devote 
ourselves  directly  to  man.  For,  in  the  first  place,  Christianity 
as  a  whole  is  a  religion;  in  particular,  it  is  the  specific- 
ally moral  religion.  The  religious  functions  peculiar  to  it, 
therefore,  are  the  organs  of  the  Christian  life,  which  assume 
control  of  our  moral  actions.  Now,  since  the  latter  are 
characterised  by  the  fact  that  their  motive  lies  in  the  idea 
of  the  Kingdom  of  God,  no  one  can  make  this  conjunction 
save  he  who  sets  his  trust  throughout  in  God  as  his  Father ; 
for  this  is  the  form  in  which  he  first  really  believes  in  the 
Kingdom  of  God  as  the  destiny  which  rightly  is  his.  More- 
over, connected  moral  action  in  this  province  requires  that 
we  should  be  assured  of  our  position  as  against  the  world,  so 
far  as  this  is  possible,  in  view  of  the  human  weakness  which 
still  remains  to  us.  We  cannot  with  confidence  undertake 
that  self-abnegation  and  patience  and  long-suffering  towards 
men  which  form  a  chief  part  of  moral  duty,  unless  through 
religious  trust  in  God's  guidance  we  are  a  match  for,  or  rather 
superior  to,  those  obstacles,  small  and  great,  which  nature 
and  human  society  present.  That  an  action  is  good  and 
beneficial  to  the  person  whom  it  concerns,  depends  not  only 
on  our  good  disposition  and  intention,  but  also  on  the 
gladness  which,  through  trust  in  God,  we  extract  from 
our  circumstances,  which  for  the  most  part  run  counter 
to  such  a  tone  of  feeling.  Stephan  Fraetorius  has  given 
striking  expression  to  this  thought :  "  It  is  impossible  that 
a  strong  and  glad  temper,  thanksgiving,  and  a  willing  new 
obedience  can  follow  where  blessedness  does  not  precede, 
and  the  Spkit  of  Christ  is  not  present.  This  basis  must 
be  laid  ere  good  works  can  be  brought  forth  and  built  up 
in  us."  ^     Nay  more,  experience  proves  that  through  diligence 

'  MorgenrdtJie  evangel ischer  Weisheitf  vol.  i.  p.  789,  of  the   collection  gf 
treati9e8  cite4  yol,  i.  p.  532  of  this  work.  


528  JUSTIFICATION   AND    RECONCILIATION  [497-8 

in  a  good  life-work,  in  the  exercise  of  a  calling  tbat  furthers 
the  common  weal,  we  can  banish  hindrances  to  joy  which 
harassed  us  when  at  the  beginning  of  the  day  we  entered 
on  its  duties.  But  as  a  whole,  the  statement  of  James  needs 
to  be  supplemented  to  the  effect  that  we  are  already  blessed 
in  doing  what  is  good,  because  we  greet  the  law  of  freedom 
with  that  joy  which,  in  principle,  is  a  possession  of  the 
Christian  in  his  situation  amid  the  temptations  of  the  world. 
Despite  the  homogeneity  which  characterises  the  supra- 
mundane  nature  of  the  morality  of  the  Kingdom  of  Grod, 
and  dominion  over  the  world  through  trust  in  God  and 
patience,  these  religious  functions  have  the  precedence,  for 
they  condition  the  correlative  moral  posture  of  the  mind. 
Thus  the  primary  content  of  eternal  life  or  blessedness  is 
to  be  found  in  those  religious  functions  which  dominate 
the  world.  Why,  now,  is  the  forgiveness  of  sins  by  God, 
the  removal  of  guilt,  necessary  to  this  end  ?  The  answer 
must  be  sought  along  the  lines  of  the  theory  set  forth  in 
the  Apology  of  the  Augsburg  Confession  (§  25).  Sin  is  un- 
righteousness, crime,  etc.,  viewed  in  their  wrong  relation  to 
God.  This  relation  may  be  measured  either  by  the  contra- 
diction between  the  action,  the  intention,  the  disposition,  and 
the  law  of  God,  or  by  the  contradiction  between  these 
and  the  authority  which  God  exercises  over  man  through 
His  providence  or  care.  Now  this  alternative,  it  is  true, 
is  a  false  one.  For  the  validity  of  Divine  law  always  pre- 
supposes the  recognition  of  the  authority  which  God  acquires 
as  man's  Benefactor  and  Provider  (vol.  i.  p.  200).  Thus 
the  basal  form  of  sin,  in  which  it  offends  against  religion, 
is  the  lack  of  reverence,  or  indifference  towards  God,  and 
the  lack  of  trust,  or  positive  distrust  of  God.  These  two 
marks  of  sin  which,  in  the  Augsburg  Confession  and  its 
Apology,  Melanchthon  undertakes,  though  vainly,  to  prove 
the  basal  form  of  sin  even  in  the  case  of  original  sin 
(p.  341),  shade  off  from  one  another,  and  therefore  have 
no  place  in  original  sin,  which  is  posited  as  in  all  cases 
identical      For  a  lack  of  reverence    towai'ds   God  always 


498]  NECESSITY    OF   FOBGIVENESS    OK   JUSTIFICATION  529 

includes  as  well  a  lack  of  trust  in  Him ;  but,  on  the  other 
hand,  there  may  be  a  lack  of  trust  in  God  coexisting  with 
reverence    towards    Him.      This   distinction,  on   the  whole, 
coincides  with  the  distinction  which  relates  to  guilt  against 
God.     For  in  the  first  case  we  must  allow  for  a  dulness  in 
the  feeling  of  guilt,  while  in  the  second  case  that  feeling  is 
present,  perhaps  even  in  an  accentuated  degree.     But  when 
there  is  added  to  it  a  lack  of  trust  towards  God,  what  we 
have  then  is  just  that  complicated  condition  of  guilt,  that 
separation  from   God,  that    bondage  to  the    world,  against 
which  man  cannot  assert  himself  with  his  own  resources, 
for  it  supplies  him  with  all  the  motives  which  impel  him 
to  act  and  strive.     If,  now,  in  place  of  this  condition  there 
is  to  come  its  exact  opposite,  trust  in  God,  not  audaciously 
and  arbitrarily  and  prematurely  entertained,  but  pervaded  by 
reverence  towards  Him — trust,  moreover,  which  introduces 
the  soul  to  the  promises  and  the  tasks  of  the  Kingdom  of 
God,  and  thus  brings  his  wiU  to  direct  itself  to  God's  end, 
and  which,  finally,  makes  the  motives   which  spring  from 
the  world  subordinate  to  the  Divine  final  end — then  his  sin 
must  be  forgiven,  and  his  guilt  removed.     And  indeed  we 
must  here  go  back  to  the  judgment  of  God,  which  makes 
it  possible  for  one  who,  by  appropriating  the  Divine  judg- 
ment, becomes  a  believer,  to  form  the  corresponding  estimate 
of  himself.     For  a  material,  mechanical  transformation  of  the 
sinner  is  altogether  unthinkable,  and  is  out  of  place,  where 
what  is  at  issue  between  him  and  God  is  his  guilty  relation- 
ship to  God.     For  this  relationship  is  simply  not  taken  away 
when  the  sinner  is  made  righteous    mechanically — that  is, 
say,  through  the  infusion  of  love.     Through  the  remission  of 
guilt,  through  pardon,  however,  the  siimer  who  appropriates 
it  obtains  the  right,  in  virtue  of  his  trust  in  the  God  whose 
authority  he  thus  acknowledges,  to  approach  Him,  and  to  set 
himself  above  the  world,  which   is  no  longer  for  him  his 
ultimate  source  of  impulse.     And  thus  the  argument  carried 
on   in  the  Augsburg  Confession    and   its  Apology,  on  lines 
suggested  by  Eom.  v.,  is  proved  true  and  necessary. 
34 


530  JUSTIFICATION    AND   RECONCILIATION  [4!»-9 

This  proof,  it  is  true,  is  nothing  but  a  demonstration  of 
the  harmony  of  the  ideas  which  are  bound  up  together  in  the 
Christian  view  of  the  world  and  the  Christian  estimate  of  self. 
The  man  who  altogether  rejects  this  system  of  ideas  will  find 
this  proof  meaningless  too.  A  refutation  of  contrary  views, 
or  an  indirect  proof  of  the  necessity  of  forgiveness,  cannot  be 
undertaken  unless  the  opponent  concedes  at  least  one  element 
in  the  Christian  view  of  the  world  and  of  self.  Such  a  con- 
cession he  makes,  when  with  Kant  he  finds  in  the  moral 
union  of  men  by  the  law  of  human  worth  the  final  end 
which  is  in  the  world  and  above  the  world,  and  recognises  in 
freedom  the  volitional  cause  which  out  of  itself  produces  the 
absolute  law,  independently  of  motives  arising  from  natural 
causes.  For  these  ideas  are  valid  in  Christianity  also,  or 
rather  it  was  on  Christianity  that  Kant  modelled  them.  But 
just  in  so  far  as  they  ignore  the  supramundane  worth  of  moral 
fellowship,  the  correlative  authority  of  the  moral  law,  and 
its  correspondence  with  the  specific  conception  of  freedom, 
Socinianism  and  the  Aufkldrwnjg  and  ordinary  Bationalism 
remain  entirely  unaffected  by  an  indirect  proof  of  the  valid- 
ity in  principle  of  the  forgiveness  of  sin.  The  statutory 
law  in  Socinianism  is  always  concerned  merely  with  the 
action  of  the  individual,  and  its  acknowledgment  of  the 
lordship  of  Christ  does  not  imply  any  idea  of  moral 
fellowship  as  a  totality.  Here  there  is  no  perception  of 
the  full  importance  of  the  law,  for  the  form  given  to  it  is 
statutory,  and  no  necessary  relation  is  shown  to  exist 
between  obedience  to  it  and  the  eternal  life  which  is  pro- 
mised. Under  these  circumstances,  even  the  forgiveness  of 
sins  which  is  acknowledged  serves  only  to  weaken  the  ob- 
ligatory character  of  the  law.  For  if  forgiveness  implies 
that  God,  with  eternal  life  in  view,  regards  the  imperfect 
obedience  of  each  individual  as  perfect,  this  seems  only  a 
roundabout  way  of  reaching  the  principle  of  the  Anflddrurtg, 
that  God  demands  no  more  from  anyone  than  he  is  in  a 
position  to  render  in  virtue  of  his  individual  endowments 
and  his   particular    situation   in  life  (vol.  i.  p.  393).     This 


499--600]   NECESSITY   OF   FORGIVENESS   OR   JUSTIFICATION  531 

maxim,  however,  is  a  direct  consequence  of  the  fundamental 
tenet  of  the  Wolffian  Ethics — that  the  individual  subject  as 
such  has  for  his  task  the  perfecting  of  his  own  being  in  har- 
mony with  the  law  of  nature.  If  this  be  our  starting-point, 
it  is  likewise  impossible  to  discover  the  possibility  and  the 
necessity  of  moral  fellowship  as  a  whole  in  its  own  order  and 
a  possession  of  supreme  worth ;  and  therefore  the  necessity  in 
principle  of  the  forgiveness  of  sins  can  never  be  proved  to 
the  subject  who  is  thus  thrown  upon  his  own  resources,  and 
condemned  to  seek  a  merely  relative  morality. 

The  general  necessity  of  the  religious  idea  of  forgiveness 
or  justification  thus  results  from  the  presupposition  which 
appraises  sin  as  guilt,  and  as  indifference  and  mistrust  towards 
God ;  as  also  from  its  teleological  relation  to  eternal  life,  or 
that  freedom  over  the  world  which  is  possible  when  man, 
instead  of  being  separated  from  God  and  perpetually  opposing 
His  end,  comes  to  cherish  trust  towards  Him,  and  to  have  his 
will  positively  bent  upon  the  promotion  of  His  end.  This 
radical  change  involved  in  reconciliation  with  God  religious 
knowledge  can  derive  from  God  alone,  and  that,  too,  in  the  most 
general  sense,  from  the  gracious  will  of  God,  the  originality 
and  autonomy  of  which  is  expressed  in  the  form  of  the  syn- 
thetic judgment : — the  sinner  is  right  with  God,  -he  belongs  to 
God,  he  is  brought  near  to  God.  As  expressions  of  objective 
knowledge  these  propositions  would  be  absurd,  even  if  used 
by  God  Himself;  as  expressions  of  His  will,  the  religious 
estimate  of  self  can  never  conceive  them  apart  from  the  result, 
that  the  sinner  justified  by  God,  or  reconciled  with  Him,  is 
brought  to  seek  the- Divine  end.  But  under  the  circumstances 
described,  this  change  in  aim  means,  in  the  first  instance, 
nothing  but  this,  that  human  life,  for  the  sake  of  God  and  of 
salvation,  is  to  be  raised  above  the  motives  which  spring  from 
the  world.  The  application  of  this  result  to  the  conduct  of 
life  in  particular,  to  the  liberation  of  self-feeling  from  the 
restrictions  of  the  world,  to  the  acquisition  of  patience,  further 
to  the  liberation  of  the  moral  disposition  from  sinful  impulses 
and  from  the  statutory  interpretation  of  the  moral  law,  to 


532  JUSTIFICATION   AND   RECONCILIATION  [500-1 

the  production  of  a  facility  in  moral  action  prompted  by 
universal  love  to  one's  neighbour — this  is  not  attained  without 
strain  and  inward  conflict,  and  not  without  manifold  inter- 
mediate causes.  The  moral  necessity  of  these  experiences  of 
personal  freedom,  due  to  the  Divine  act  of  religious  deliverance, 
is  certain ;  but  it  is  subject  to  still  other  conditions  than  is 
the  logical  synthesis  by  which  our  theoretical  knowledge 
attaches  these  consequences  to  the  Divine  end,  which  the 
sinner  appropriates  as  his  own  in  undergoing  the  experience 
of  justification  or  forgiveness  by  God. 

Eeference  has  been  made  (vol.  ii.  p.  355)  to  the  fact 
that    Paul   deduces    Christian   freedom  —  the    experimental 
content  of  which  coincides  with  what  is  meant  by  eternal 
life  —  from  the  same  act  of  Christ  to  which  elsewhere  he 
ascribes  justification  or  forgiveness  (Gal.  v.  1),  but  that  in  other 
passages  he  brings  freedom  into  connection  with  the  Spirit  of 
Q^d  as  the  Holy  Spirit  (Gal.  iii.  14,  iv.  5,  6  ;  2  Cor.  iii  17 ; 
Bom.  viii.  2,  14-16).     It  has  also  been  remarked  that  the 
conjunction  of  the  Spirit  of  God  in  believers  with  their  free- 
dom does  not  imply  that  the  nexus  is  a  causal  one.       The 
co-operation  of  the  Holy  Spirit  does  not  in  this  case  involve 
any  obscuration  of  the  fact  that  freedom  is  derived  from  the 
act  of  justification  dependent  on  the  work  of  Christ     But 
since,  nevertheless,  the  influence  of  the  Holy  Spirit  and  the 
fact  of  freedom  cannot  be  unrelated  to  one  another  in  the 
experience  of   the  same  subject,  we  must  look  for  light  to 
another  combination  of  ideas  employed  by  Paul.     The  hope 
of  eternal  life  which  issues  from  justification  (Bom.  v.  2)  is 
witnessed  to  within  us  by  the  working  of  the  Holy  Spirit 
(viii.   13,  23).     Thus  the  Holy  Spirit,  and  our  exercise  in 
Him  of  self-sanctification,  is  the  groimd  whereby  we  know 
the  certainty  of  eternal  life.     Now,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  no 
distinction    can   be   drawn    between   this   certainty  and  the 
practical  expression  of  Christian   freedom  over  against  the 
world.     Thus  the  Holy  Spirit,  which  coexists  with  freedom, 
is  conceived  by  Paul  precisely  as  the  ground  of  our  knowledge 
of  freedom,  not  as  the  real  ground   of  its  existence.     But 


501-2]       NECESSITY    OF   FORGIVENESS   OR   JUSTIFICATION  533 

now,  what  is  meant  by  the  Holy  Spirit  ?     The  determination 
of  this  idea  has  been  neglected  by  theology  to  such  an  extent 
that  I  cannot  here,  as  we  rapidly  pass  on,  overtake  the  work 
which  the  question  demands.     Neglect  of  the  subject  has  had 
this  unfortunate  practical  consequence,  that  theologians  either 
abstain  from  using  the  idea  altogether,  or  understand  by  it  a 
kind  of  resistless  natural  force  which  runs  athwart  the  regular 
course  of  knowledge  and  the  normal  exercise  of  the  will.     In 
Paul's   usage   of   the   idea,   he  identifies    the    knowledge — 
common  to  Christian  believers — of  God  as  their  Father,  Who 
proves  His  love  to  them  through  Christ  (Gal.  iv.  6  ;  Eom.  viii. 
15,  V.  5  ;  1  Cor.  ii.  11,  12),  and  their  knowledge  of  His  Son 
as  our  Lord  (1  Cor.  xii.  3),  with  the  function  of  self-knowledge 
peculiar   to    God   Himself,   because   the  knowledge  of  God 
v^hich  is  possible  to  Christians  is  at  one  with  the  knowledge 
which  God  has  of  Himself.     Accordingly,  the  Holy  Spirit  is 
described  by  Paul  as  the  power,  common  to  all  Christians,  of 
righteous  conduct  and  of  self-sanctification,  or  the  foimation  of 
moral  character  (Bom.  viii.  4,  13),  which  finds  its  motive  in 
that  perfect  knowledge  of  God  (p.  22).     Although  in  this 
reference  he  points  to  the  involuntariness  of  our  knowledge 
of  God  as  Father  as  a  regular  feature  of  it,  yet  he  represents 
its  ecstatic  mode  as  neither  the  only  nor  the  highest  form  of 
the  knowledge  of  God.     For  if  the  whole  of  moral  practice 
is   derived    from    the    Holy    Spirit,    this   implies    that   the 
knowledge  of  God  as    our  Father  acts    as    the    motive    of 
the  disposition  from  which  spring  righteousness  and  sancti- 
fication.     This,  however,  is  consistent ;  for  the  Christian  con- 
sciousness   that   God   in   Christ   is   our    Father    necessarily 
includes  the  practical  recognition  of  the   final  end  of  the 
Kingdom  of  God. 

Under  these  circumstances,  it  would  cause  us  no  surprise 
whatever  were  freedom  over  the  world  in  religious  experience 
also  causally  connected  with  the  Holy  Spirit  of  God.  For 
this  freedom  follows  from  our  reception,  through  justification, 
into  the  fellowship  of  God,  in  such  wise  that  in  common  we 
find  in  God  our  Father  and  in  His  love  the  ultimate  ground 


534  JUSTIFICATION   AND   RECONCILIATION  [502-S 

of  our  attainment  of  freedom.  To  think  of  the  influence  of 
the  Holy  Spirit,  in  this  connection,  as  a  resistless  natural 
force  is  absolutely  forbidden ;  for  freedom  over  the  world, 
under  all  circumstances,  must  be  learned,  acquired,  fought  for. 
The  above  view,  indeed,  has  yet  another  ground  to  recommend 
it  Our  knowledge  and  invocation  of  God  as  our  Father 
in  the  Holy  Spirit  is  the  effect  of  our  reception  as  children 
of  God  through  the  judgment  of  adoption ;  our  freedom  over 
the  world  is  the  effect  of  the  Divine  judgment  affirming  our 
justification  by  God  our  Father  in  Christ.  These  judgments 
passed  by  God  are  in  point  of  fact  identical  (§  18);  thus, 
too,  our  knowledge  of  God  as  our  Father,  and  our  freedom 
over  the  world,  are  related  to  one  another  simply  as  the 
different  sides  of  the  same  experience.  And  as,  nevertheless, 
freedom  over  the  world  is  dependent  on  our  union  to  God  in 
Divine  sonship  (Eom.  viii.  21),  so  its  basis,  too,  may  properly 
be  placed  in  the  Holy  Spirit.  We  should  be  forbidden  to 
take  this  view  only  if  the  influence  of  the  Holy  Spirit  had 
always  to  be  conceived  as  applying  to  moral  action.  For 
experiences  of  freedom  over  the  world  are  not  related  to  the 
course  of  moral  activity  as  its  consequences,  even  though  they 
are  conditioned  by  the  proper  exercise  of  that  activity  (§  53). 
Thus,  the  freedom  over  the  world  enjoyed  by  believers,  on  the 
ground  that  their  fellowship  with  God  has  been  established 
through  justification  by  God,  likewise  issues  from  the  Holy 
Spirit,  for  justification  is  at  the  same  time  the  reception  of 
sinners  into  Divine  Sonship,  and  it  is  in  the  power  of  the 
Holy  Spirit  that  we  give  expression  to  our  common  acknow- 
ledgment of  God  as  our  Father. 

1.  Justification,  or  the  forgiveness  of  sins,  signifying  as 
it  does  in  principle  that  the  relation  of  men  to  God  is 
changed  from  the  separation  due  to  the  feeling  of  guilt  and 
mistrust,  and  from  the  opposition  or  enmity  of  sin,  into  the 
fellowship  of  trust  and  peace  with  God,  has  for  its  immediate 
end  the  introduction  of  men  into  the  enjoyment  of  eternal  life, 
which  is  present  in  our  experiences  of  freedom  or  lordship  over 
^he  world,  aud  in  the  independence  of  self-feeling  both  from 


503-4]       NKCBSSITV    OF    FORGIVENESS    OR   JUSTIFICATION  535 

the  restrictions  and  from  the  impulses  due  to  natural  causes 
or  to  particular  sections  of  society. 

2.  Although  no  part  of  the  direct  aim  of  justification, 
or  the  forgiveness  of  sins,  is  the  production  of  morally  good 
action — for  the  latter  finds  its  proximate  motive  in  the  supra- 
mundane  final  end  of  the  Kingdom  of  God — still  the  freedom 
of  the  moral  disposition  from  statutory  law,  a  freedom  which 
manifests  itself  in  the  continual  production  of  the  moral  law 
in  the  form  of  special  principles  and  particular  judgments  of 
duty,  is  a  function  similar  in  kind  to  religious  freedom  over 
the  world,  in  the  exercise  of  which  without  regard  to  result 
there  is  also  given  an  experience  of  eternal  life  ;  in  this  respect, 
therefore,  the  course  of  moral  action  is  conditioned  by  justi* 
fication  or  reconciliation. 

3.  Justification,  as  the  reception  into  God's  fellowship  of 
sinners  conscious  of  their  guilt  and  formerly  destitute  of  trust 
in  God,  and  reconciliation,  as  the  directing  of  the  hitherto 
sinful  will  to  the  imiversal  final  end  of  God  Himself,  are,  as 
the  fundamental  precondition  of  the  Christian  life,  necessary  in 
order  to  explain  the  fact  that  believers,  through  trust  in  God, 
humility,  and  patience,  occupy  that  position  of  supremacy 
over  the  world  which  constitutes  eternal  life,  and  in  which  is 
experienced  that  blessedness  which  is  in  harmony  with  the 
God  Who  rules  over  the  world  as  our  Father  through  Christ. 


CHAPTER    VIII 

THB   NECESSITY   OP   BASING   THE   FORGIVENESS    OF   SINS    ON 
THE   WORK   AND   SUFFERING   OF   CHRIST 

§55.  The  validity  of  the  Divine  forgiveness  of  sins  is  recog- 
nised as  a  necessary  element  in  Christianity  in  some  sense  or 
other  by  all  Christian  and  theological  parties.  It  was  the 
Socinians  who  first  and  most  clearly  disputed  the  relation 
between  the  forgiveness  of  sins  and  the  death  of  Christy  which 
had  been  taken  for  granted  in  the  Church  tradition,  although 
it  had  been  interpreted  in  various  ways  in  the  course  of  time. 
The  controversy  stands  in  immediate  connection  with  the 
point  already  discussed — that  every  Church  theory  assigns 
to  forgiveness  an  essential  significance  for  the  Christian 
life,  Socinianism  only  an  accidental.  At  least  it  is  at  the 
outset  analogous  to  say  that  all  Church  theology  connects 
forgiveness  with  the  judgment  of  the  imiversal  or  exclusive 
value  of  Christ's  Person  or  whole  achievement,  whatever  be 
its  outcome,  Socinianism  with  His  prophetic  dignity,  which 
He  shares  with  others.  In  Church  theology,  before  the  ap- 
pearance of  the  Socinians,  it  is  either  the  infinite  value  of 
Christ's  Godhead  and  the  perfection  of  His  satisfaction  or  His 
obedience,  or  the  merit  of  the  unfettered  voluntariness  of  His 
action  in  God's  service,  in  short,  something  which  belongs  to 
Him  alone,  to  which  the  general  ordinance  of  forgiveness  is 
referred.  The  Socinians  derive  the  forgiveness  of  sins  merely 
from  Christ's  spoken  word,  which  they  represent  as  inde- 
pendent of  His  personal  virtue,  inasmuch  as  the  same  benefit 
is  promised  by  other  prophets  to  the  same  extent,  and  also 
by  God  immediately,  without  any  necessary  kind  of  mediation 

having  to  be  ascribed  to  men.     In  particular,  they  call  atten- 

6se 


506-7]    FORGIVENESS   BASED   UPON    THE   WOBK    OF   CHRIST      537 

tion  to  the  fact  that,  as  Christ  repeatedly  gave  the  assurance 
of  forgiveness  by  His  spoken  word  (Mark  ii.  10,  11 ;  Luke 
vii,  48),  this  effect  is  not  necessarily  and  exclusively  bound 
up  with  His  death. 

This  statement  is  in  a  measure  justified  as  against  all 
those  estimates  of  Christ's  death  which  place  that  event,  even 
in  so  far  as  it  is  subsumed  under  Christ's  determination  or 
voluntariness,  in  a  relation  opposed  to  the  estimate  of  His 
active  life  £ts  a  whole.  The  fact  that  Jesus  pronounced  the 
forgiveness  of  sins  in  those  cases  really  refutes  all  those 
theories  which  are  designed  to  show  that  Christ,  by  His  death 
as  a  satisfaction  for  human  sins,  succeeded  in  making  God 
willing  to  forgive,  while  they  either  view  His  morally  normal 
life  as  being  the  expression  of  His  duty,  or  regard  it  as 
enhancing  the  effect  of  His  voluntary  death.  Nevertheless, 
the  two  cases  adduced  do  not  harmonise  with  the  positive 
Socinian  view,  that  Christ  as  a  Prophet  announces  the  for- 
giveness of  sins  in  general  on  the  condition  of  the  active 
obedience  of  faith.  This  view  amounts  to  saying  that  Christ 
in  general  gave  men  a  knowledge  of  the  Divine  law  of  for- 
giveness; His  prophetic  commission  the  Socinians  interpret 
in  the  sense  of  the  vocation  of  a  theoretical  teacher.  On  the 
other  hand,  it  must  be  remembered  that  Jesus,  even  if  we 
refer  His  procedure  to  His  prophetic  dignity,  receives  indi- 
viduals through  forgiveness  into  the  same  communion  with 
God  in  which  He  stands  with  God  as  the  Son  of  Man,  and 
from  which  He  derives  His  correct  judgment  of  particular 
cases.  Moreover,  the  condition  of  the  active  obedience  of 
faith  which  is  laid  down  by  the  Socinians  is  not  fulfilled  in 
any  of  these  cases.  But  when  it  is  acknowledged  that  Christ 
here  acted  in  virtue  of  His  prophetic  right,  this  signifies  for 
Him  not  only  an  assertion  of  the  truth  of  the  words  He  spoke 
in  God's  name,  but  the  agreement  of  the  whole  course  of 
His  life  on  the  one  hand  with  the  grace  and  truth  of  God 
manifested  by  Him,  and  on  the  other  with  His  religious 
relationship  to  God  as  His  Father. 

Viewed  from  this  standpoint,  the  forgiveness  of  the  para- 


538  JUSTIFICATION    AND    RECONCILIATION  [507-8 

lytic,  associated  as  it  is  with  his  cure,  keeps  to  the  lines  of 
the  expectation  made  current  by  the  Old  Testament.  For 
the  removal  of  material  punishment  is  regarded  on  Old 
Testament  ground  as  the  necessary  proof  of  the  restoration 
of  Divine  favour  (vol.  ii.  p.  60).  It  is  clear,  however,  that 
Jesus  here  accommodates  Himself  to  the  intelligence  of  the 
people  around  Him.  But  the  case  of  the  sinful  woman  is  of 
a  different  kind.  It  may,  indeed,  be  maintained  that  she  too 
is  freed  from  the  punishment  which  corresponds  to  sin  like 
hers.  For  the  expulsion  from  respectable  society  which  she 
had  brought  on  herself  is  made  invalid  by  Jesus,  at  least  as 
regards  His  own  Person,  by  His  allowing  the  woman,  to  the 
astonishment  of  the  Pharisee,  to  approach  Him,  and  by  accept- 
ing the  tokens  of  her  trust  and  repentance.  Still  her  social 
position  was  not  thereby  fully  restored ;  it  is  to  be  presumed 
that  other  people  continued  to  hold  aloof  from  the  woman. 
That,  however,  makes  it  all  the  clearer  what  Jesus  understands 
by  the  forgiveness  He  addressed  to  her.  Secognising  as  He 
does  her  penitent  faith  in  God  in  her  sincere  and  humble  trust 
in  Himself,  He  makes  the  Divine  forgiveness  of  sins  actual  by 
the  very  fact  of  His  allowing  the  woman  to  come  near  Him. 
For  just  in  so  far  as  she  has  been  attracted  by  His  elevation 
and  benignity,  Christ  gives  her  access  to  God's  grace  by  ad- 
mitting her  to  that  intercourse  with  Himself  which  is  described 
in  the  story.  Kepresenting,  as  He  does,  in  His  Person  both 
the  grace  of  God  and  the  normal  communion  of  men  with 
God,  He  removes  the  obstacle  to  her  communion  with  God 
arising  from  her  sin,  in  so  far  as  the  impression  of  His  per- 
sonality had  overcome  the  sinful  woman's  natural  distrust 
and  habitual  wantonness.  In  this  connection,  then,  altogether 
different  considerations  force  themselves  on  our  attention  from 
those  which  come  under  our  notice  in  the  Socinian  theory. 
We  shall  therefore  from  the  outset  have  to  modify  our  con- 
fidence in  other  views  of  Socinian  origin. 

If  the  Socinians  and  the  theologians  of  the  Aufkldrung 
still  insist  that  no  necessary  connection  is  to  be  assumed 
between  the  forgiveness  of  sins  and  the  historical  position  of 


608-9]    FORGIVENESS   BASED    UPON    THE    WORK    OF   CHRIST      539 

Christ,  this  view  depends  as  usual  on  certain  assumptions, 
and  not  on  a  careful  consideration  of  historical  facts.     The 
former  thinkers  lay  stress  on  God's  equity,  the  latter  on  His 
love,  as  the  permanent  ground  for  expecting  forgiveness  to 
be,  properly  speaking,  a  matter  of  course  between  God  and 
men.     Now  what  the  writers  of  the  Aufldarung  understand 
by  God's  love  is  distinguished  from  the  equity  asserted  by  the 
Socinians  merely  by  the  fact  that  the  latter  is  deduced  from 
a  special  resolve  of  God,  while  the  former  is  presupposed  as 
God's  natural  attitude.     But  that  positive  assertion  and  this 
natural  presupposition  both  stand  as  much  out  of  relation 
to  a  moral  order  of  the  world  as  they  conflict  with  all  the 
historical  conditions  under  which  religions  exist.     There  is 
no  religion  that  is  not  positive,  and  there  has  never  been ; 
natural  religion,  so  called,  is  an  imagination.     Every  social 
religion  has  been  instituted.     For  not  only  must  every  social, 
and  regular  cultus  be  referred  back  to  special  causes  and  the 
authority  of  individual  men,  but  even  the  myths  of  the  gods 
are  special  combinations  of  natural  phenomena  with  the  idea 
of  God — combinations  which  were  first  made  by  individual  men 
and  recognised  by  others  on  their  authority.     The  general 
ideas  of  God — that  He  is  not  the  world,  that  He  is  absolute 
Power,  that  He  is  the  mild  and  indulgent  Will,  that  He  is 
the  Lawgiver  who  imposes  universal  duties — are  products  of 
scientific  knowledge,  which  as  such  cure  also  subject  for  their 
production  to  special  conditions,  and  have  gained  a  special 
currency  through  the  consent  of  men ;  but  they  are  neither 
innate  in  each  individual  human  mind,  nor  necessary  results 
of  reflection  upon  our  position  in  the  world.     These  ideas 
came  into  vogue  as  substitutes  for  the  religious  knowledge  of 
God,  when  the  understanding  of  the  positive  religions  had 
become  obscure.    However  general  the  adoption  of  these  ideas 
in  such  circumstances  has  become,  their  vogue  as  a  kind  of 
religion  is  proved  to  be  surreptitious  by  the  very  fact  that 
they  have  led  to  no  kind  of  common  cultus.     The  Socinian 
assertion,  that  God  by  a  counsel  of  equity  treats  men  created 
without  rights  as  possessors  of  relative  rights  in  reference  to 


540  JUSTIFICATION    AND  RECONCILIATION  [509 

Himself,  is  so  far  from  being  self-evident  that  it  is  merely  a 
modification  of  the  scientific  hypothesis  current  in  the  theology 
of  the  Middle  Ages.  The  Avfklarwn/g  assumption  of  the 
love  of  God  is  the  expression  of  a  habituation  to  the  Christian 
idea  of  God,  under  the  peculiar  circumstances  in  which  philo- 
sophical naturalism  and  religious  and  moral  individualism 
paralysed  the  persuasive  power  of  the  statutory  Dogmatica 
If,  therefore,  God's  love  or  equitable  forbearance  is  recognised 
as  the  ground  of  forgiveness,  it  is  indispensable,  with  a  view 
to  historical  fulness  of  conviction,  to  connect  the  latter  with 
the  personal  activity  of  Jesus  in  His  vocation  as  the  neces- 
sary intermediate  cause.  To  this  has  to  be  added  the  fact 
that  both  the  Socinians  and  the  theologians  of  the  Auf- 
kldrung  always  relate  the  forgiveness  of  sins  and  the  moral 
order  of  life  merely  to  single  individuals  as  sucL  This 
conception  of  the  religious  and  moral  life,  however,  con- 
flicts with  the  general  rule  that  the  indi\ddual  acts  in 
these  relations  only  as  a  member  of  the  family,  the  tribe, 
the  nation,  the  spiritual  humanity,  and  with  a  more  or  less 
clear  consciousness  of  this  principle.  The  latter  also  regulates 
the  history  of  the  positive  religions  in  so  far  as  they  have 
become  a  cultus,  and  in  so  far  as  they  have  become  operative 
as  a  standard  for  the  valuation  of  all  kinds  of  social  and 
political  institutions.  Finally,  the  existence  of  the  Axif- 
klurung  itself  is  an  example  of  the  same  principle,  for  it  has 
a  persuasive  power  merely  as  a  tradition  in  certain  strata 
of  national  culture,  and  not  as  necessarily  produced  by  an 
independent  knowledge  of  each  individual  as  such. 

Against  the  necessity  of  attaching  the  forgiveness  of  sins 
to  the  personal  work  of  Christ,  the  Socinians  further  appeal 
to  the  fact  attested  by  the  Old  Testament,  that  God  also  com- 
municated forgiveness  in  former  times  without  this  means, 
simply  according  to  His  free  resolve.  We  see  here  a  peculiar 
overestimate  of  what  is  indefinite  and  imperfect  in  its  kind, 
as  against  the  definite  and  perfect.  And  indeed  this  judg- 
ment is  again  determined  less  by  a  full  historical  considera- 
tion of  the  facts,  than  by  the  Socinian  view  of  God  as  in 


609-10]    FORGIVENESS   BASED    UPON    THE    WORK    OF   CHRIST     541 

trinsically  indeterminate  Will.  No  doubt  in  the  religion  of 
the  Old  Testament  a  certain  exercise  of  Divine  forgiveness 
is  statutorily  defined  in  the  ofiferiugs  for  sin  and  guilt ;  still 
the  personal  moral  craving  for  forgiveness  is  not  satisfied  by 
such  an  institution,  all  the  less  because  the  idea  of  sin  which 
accompanies  it  is  generally  confined  to  unavoidable  bodily 
uncleanness,  and  involuntary  violations  of  theocratic  rights. 
In  part,  however,  the  individual  petitions  for  Divine  forgive- 
ness in  the  Psalms  stand  out  of  relation  to  those  acts  of 
worship ;  in  part,  the  prayers  of  the  Psalmists  and  the  pro- 
phetic promises  of  universal  forgiveness  count  on  the  restora- 
tion of  personal  prosperity,  or  of  the  political  integrity  of 
the  nation,  as  the  proper  evidence  of  Divine  favour  (vol.  ii. 
p.  58).  If,  then,  we  recognise  in  cases  of  the  latter  kind, 
particularly  in  Jeremiah's  promise  of  the  new  covenant,  a 
distinct  tendency  to  assure  oneself  of  forgiveness  as  a  general 
dispensation  belonging  to  the  higher  stage  of  the  development 
of  the  religious  community,  the  similar  prayers  of  individual 
Psalmists  appear,  according  to  the  standard  already  found  in 
the  Old  Testament,  as  the  first  and  less  perfect  attempts  to 
reach  that  goal.  But  the  imperfection  of  both  phenomena  in 
comparison  with  Christianity  is  shown  by  the  very  fact  that 
the  restoration  of  outward  prosperity,  protection  from  the 
injuries  of  persecutors,  in  general,  equilibriimi  between  the 
unfettered  use  of  nature  and  spiritual  purity,  is  anticipated 
as  the  necessary  consummation  and  proof  of  inward  holiness. 
According  to  this  standard,  the  Psalmists  can,  of  course, 
scarcely  ever  have  reached  the  conviction  that  their  prayer 
was  fulfilled ;  and  the  promises  of  the  prophets  were  fulfilled 
through  Christ  only  by  their  expectation  of  outward  pro- 
sperity for  the  Chosen  People  being  transformed  into  the 
idea  that  all  sufferings  have  to  be  patiently  borne  for  the 
sake  of  the  forgiveness  of  sins.  Thus  the  Socioian  appeal 
against  connecting  forgiveness  with  the  work  of  Christ 
would  be  valid  only  if  the  Old  Testament  anticipations  were 
verified — the  anticipations,  namely,  that  spiritual  reconcilia- 
tion with  God  would  be  accompanied  by  material  deliverance 


542  JUSTIFICATION   AND   RECONCILIATION  [510-1 

from  all  the  ills  of  life,  or  would  be  followed  by  deliverance 
from  the  material  penalties  of  sin.  For  the  change  of  the 
sinner's  relation  to  God  must  be  verified  by  his  position  relat- 
ively to  the  world.  But  as  experience  never  furnishes  this 
proof  of  forgiveness  which  was  expected  by  the  men  of  the 
Old  Testament  and  again  by  the  Socinians,  and  as  the  formal 
change  of  position  relatively  to  the  world  which  is  asserted  as 
the  consequence  of  forgiveness  in  the  Christian  sense  is  neither 
clearly  expressed  in  the  Old  Testament  nor  looked  for  by  the 
Socinians,  the  Socinian  assumption  of  a  general  order  of  Divine 
forgiveness  which  should  be  independent  of  Christ  is  out  of 
all  relation  to  experience  and  utterly  void  of  meaning. 

On  the  other  hand,  the  particular  cases  in  which  Christ 
bestows  forgiveness  result  from  His  consciousness  of  standing 
in  the  closest  conceivable  relation  to  God,  and  of  being  called 
to  receive  others  into  the  same  relation  in  such  a  way  that 
their  sins  shall  present  no  obstacle  to  their  trust  in  God 
and  God's  commimion  with  them.  In  comparison  with  this, 
it  is  a  matter  of  indifference  whether  the  punishment  due 
to  definite  personal  sin  is  materially  removed,  in  accordance 
with  the  Old  Testament  expectation,  by  Christ's  healing 
power,  or  whether  the  estimate  of  it  is  formally  changed. 
This  personal  method  is  not  inconsistent  with  the  fact  that 
the  representatives  of  the  Christian  community  attach  the 
general  validity  of  forgiveness  to  Christ's  death,  especially  as 
the  idea  of  doing  so  was  suggested  by  Christ's  own  discourse 
at  the  Supper.  For  the  new  covenant  which  He  announces 
that  He  is  about  to  conclude  by  His  sacrificial  death  unites 
the  new  community  with  God,  in  accordance  with  Jeremiah's 
prophecy,  on  the  basis  of  forgiveness.  Now,  if  we  reflect 
that  the  fulfilment  of  Christ's  task  in  His  vocation,  through 
His  willingness  to  die  for  its  accomplishment,  constitutes  the 
highest  proof  of  His  personal  communion  with  God  as  His 
Father  (§  48),  and  that  this  position  of  His  also  establishes 
Christ's  right  to  bestow  forgiveness  on  individuals  in  those 
cases  which  occurred  previously,  it  is  but  logical  to  connect 
with  Christ's  death  the  forgiveness  provided  for  later  genera- 


511-2]    FORGIVEKESS   BASED   UPON   THE   WORK    OF   CHRIST      543 

tions.  For  Christ's  death,  as  it  must  be  explained  by  His 
previous  obedience,  is,  in  the  view  of  the  Apostles,  the  sum- 
mary expression  of  the  fact  that  Christ  maintained  His 
religious  unity  with  God  and  His  position  as  the  Eevealer 
of  God  throughout  the  whole  course  of  His  life.  As  an  in- 
dication of  His  personal  perfection  in  the  life-destiny  which 
fell  to  Him,  and  which  was  recognised  in  His  intention  to 
found  a  new  covenant-community,  Christ's  death,  with  for- 
giveness as  its  purpose,  merely  represents  the  religious  value 
of  Christ's  Person,  fully  exhibited  in  its  nature,  for  later 
generations.  If  we  ascribe  the  cases  of  special  forgive- 
ness by  Christ  to  His  ordinary  authority,  as  His  words  in 
Mark  ii.  10  require  us  to  do,  the  reference  in  the  Supper 
discourse,  which  Matt.  xxvi.  28  appropriately  supplements, 
can  be  explained  in  harmony  therewith  only  provided  we  do 
not  conceive  the  purpose  of  Christ's  death  under  any  principle 
which  would  be  opposed  to  the  purpose  of  His  life.  But 
if  we  still  suppose  that  the  purpose  of  Christ's  death  is  to 
be  interpreted  as  penal  satisfaction,  we  see  ourselves  com- 
pelled to  exclude  the  previous  cases,  contrary  to  the  words  of 
Scripture,  from  Christ's  ordinary  authority,  or  we  should  have 
to  force  on  these  utterances  of  Christ  the  meaning  that 
He  made  them  beforehand  in  view  of  His  vicarious  penal 
sufifering.  This,  however,  would  be  no  exposition,  but  a 
violent  importation,  which  theological  caprice  cannot  allow 
itself  without  pronouncing  its  own  condemnation. 

§  56.  As  Christ  connects  the  bestowal  of  forgiveness  with 
the  prophecy  of  Jeremiah,  forgiveness  is  to  be  regarded  as  the 
common  fundamental  attribute  of  the  community  to  he  founded 
by  Him.  This  goal  quite  distinctly  transcends  the  sporadic 
and  casual  form  of  the  blessing  of  forgiveness,  from  which 
the  Socinians  and  the  theologians  of  the  Aufkldrung  borrow 
their  standard  for  judging  the  matter.  Their  representations 
therefore  set  at  nought  the  specific  character  of  the  Christian 
religion.  Forgiveness,  as  an  attribute  of  that  Christian  com- 
munity, implies  that  in  that  community  men  may  enjoy 
fellowship  with  God  in  spite  of  their  sins  and  in  spite  of 


544  JUSTIFICATION   AND    RECONCILIATION  [512-3 

the  intensifying  of  tJteir  sense  of  guilt  For  this  peculiar 
antithesis,  to  be  found  in  men's  religious  self -judgment  and 
feeling,  has  to  be  taken  into  consideration  in  a  full  account  of 
the  matter  in  hand.  Just  as  forgiveness  on  God's  side  does 
not  mean  that  He  forgets  men's  sin  and  arrives  at  a  judgment 
which  would  belie  the  facts  of  the  case  (§  13),  so  on  men's 
side  the  assurance  of  forgiveness  cannot  be  supposed  to  imply 
that  they  forget  their  sins  as  something  indifferent,  and  pay 
no  regard  to  them  in  their  own  judgment  of  themselves.  On 
the  contrary,  the  impression  of  the  value  of  forgiveness  is 
the  first  thing  that  will  keep  the  sense  of  the  unworthiness 
of  our  own  offences  properly  awake.  For  the  more  highly 
the  Divine  grace  in  this  bestowal  of  forgiveness  is  prized, 
the  more  keenly  must  the  contrast  between  our  offences  and 
our  reception  into  God's  fellowship  make  itself  felt.  This 
fact  is  not  made  quite  clear  by  the  ordinary  doctrine  of 
poenitentia,  which  Lutherans  owe  to  Melanchthon  (vol.  L 
p.  200).  This  doctrine  posits  the  idea  that  the  greatest 
intensity  of  the  sense  of  guilt,  arising  from  a  comparison 
of  sin  with  the  Divine  law,  precedes  the  act  of  faith  which 
embraces  forgiveness ;  and  the  consequence  would  be  that  in 
peace  of  conscience  even  the  recollection  of  former  guilt 
would  be  able  to  cause  no  disturbance  of  feeling.  This 
doctrine,  in  analogy  with  the  Catholic  sacrament  of  penance, 
is  based  on  the  assumption  that  a  loss  of  grace,  and  con- 
sequently an  interruption  of  the  consciousness  of  forgiveness, 
has  taken  place,  and  that  grace  is  to  be  recovered  by  cowLritio 
and  fides.  This  principle,  however,  would  not  only  deny  all 
coherent  development  of  Christian  character,  but  it  is  also 
opposed  to  Luther's  Reformation  principle  that  the  whole  of 
life  is  a  repentance*  The  culture  of  Christian  character  is 
secured  by  the  fact  that  faith  in  Divine  grace  is  always  the 
motive  and  not  the  end  of  contrUiOy  since  all  self-examination 
and  self-discipline  through  the  Divine  law  originates  in  that 
love  of  the  good  which  is  based  on  the  turning  of  the  will  to 
God,  that  is,  on  reconciliation  with  God.  This  is  in  keeping 
with  the  other   principle  that  it  is  just   by  the  gospel  of 


51»-4]    FORGIVENESS   BASED   UPON   THE    WORK   OF   CHRIST      545 

forgiveness  that  we  recognise  our  sin  (p.  160).  For  as 
forgiveness  does  not  remove  the  sense  of  guilt  for  pa^t 
sins,  but  only  its  power  of  separating  us  from  God,  or 
that  distrust  of  God  which  attaches  to  it  (p.  60),  so  the 
assurance  of  forgiveness  is  confirmed  by  the  very  fact  that  it 
intensifies  the  sense  of  guilt  for  sins  which  we  commit,  and 
in  general  awakens  a  sensitive  dread  of  transgression.  For 
if  a  fall  from  the  state  of  grace  as  such  can  be  made  out,  it 
would  hold  good  of  such  a  sin  as  a  man  did  not  immediately 
repent  of,  but  excused  and  palliated  and  refused  to  acknowledge 
as  sin  at  alL  In  so  far,  then,  as  forgiveness  is  experienced 
in  Christianity  by  every  individual  as  the  common  foundation 
and  presupposition  of  the  communion  with  God  which  is 
experienced  in  faith,  it  necessarily  has  associated  with  it 
the  continuance  in  the  memory  of  the  previous  sense  of 
guilt,  and  the  intensifying  of  the  sense  of  guilt  for  subsequent 
cases  of  sin.  But  this  has  no  longer  the  significance  of 
Divine  punishment  attached  to  it,  since  the  confidence  which 
lays  hold  of  God's  promise  is  associated  with  these  phenomena, 
and  excludes  the  unhappiness  of  the  previous  state.  A  want 
of  tenderness  of  feeling  accompanied  by  the  assurance  of 
forgiveness  would  prove  the  latter  to  be  surreptitious,  and 
indicate  a  state  of  religious  hypocrisy  (voL  i.  p.  465). 

If,  however,  the  abiding  assurance  of  communion  with 
God,  which  is  attained  in  spite  of  the  fact  that  we  have 
sinned  and  do  sin,  is  bound  up  with  the  Fatherly  love  of  God, 
and  if  we  are  conscious  of  this  position  relatively  to  God  as 
one  which  is  common  to  many,  and  if  even  the  Socinians  and 
the  writers  of  the  Aufkldrung  will  not  deny  that  it  is  just  in 
the  Christian  community  that  we  exercise  this  relation,  this 
result  will  have  to  be  referred  to  the  action  of  Christ  by 
which  He  became  the  Founder  of  that  community.  This  is 
different  from  the  case  of  Jeremiah,  who,  as  a  prophet,  anti- 
cipated the  forgiveness  of  sins,  under  certain  objective  and 
subjective  conditions,  for  a  future  state  of  human  affairs  which 
was  independent  of  himself.  Bather  does  the  admission  of  the 
members  of  the  Christian  community  to  communion  with  God  in 
35 


546  JUSTinCATION   and   reconciliation  [614-3 

spite  of  their  sins  and  their  sense  of  guilt,  which  is  expressed 
in  forgiveness,  find  its  typical  standard  and  historical  ground 
in  Christ's  communion  with  God,  which  He  maintained  in 
the  whole  course  of  His  life,  especially  in  His  willingness  to 
suffer  for  the  sake  of  His  vocation,  and  in  the  patience  which 
He  exercised  even  unto  death.  Now,  though  the  material 
of  His  vocation  is  one  and  the  same,  yet  in  it  Christ  may  be 
compared  both  to  a  prophet  and  to  a  priest  In  the  course 
of  His  life  He  in  the  first  place  demonstrated  to  men  His 
Father's  love,  grace,  and  truth,  by  exercising  SUs  Divine 
vocation,  to  found  the  Eingdom  of  God,  from  the  same  motive 
of  love  to  men  which  constitutes  God's  proper  will  for  the 
realising  of  their  happiness.  At  the  same  time  we  must 
remember  that  He  exercised  the  love  of  God  in  the  form  of 
obedience  to  God's  commission,  and  that  He  accomplished  this 
task  by  faith  in  His  Father  and  by  prayer,  in  such  a  way  as 
to  continually  assure  Himself  in  this  form  of  His  activity  of 
the  ground  of  His  existence  as  the  Bevealer  of  God  (John  xv. 
10,  X.  17, 18).  This  achievement  of  His  life,  from  this  point 
of  view,  is  also  intelligible  as  being  not  only  for  His  own  sake, 
but  for  the  purpose  of  introducing  His  disciples  into  the 
same  position  towards  God.  If  Christ  assures  Himself  by 
the  obedience  indicated  of  His  nearness.  His  priestly  relation, 
to  God,  that  includes  the  intention  that  the  existing  and  the 
future  community  should  reach  the  same  position.  That  is  to 
say,  Christ  as  a  Priest  is  the  representative  of  the  community 
which  He  brings  to  God  through  the  perfect  fulfilment  of  His 
personal  life  (xviL  19—26).  This  use  of  representation  is 
inclusive,  not,  as  it  generally  is,  exclusive.  The  meaning  of 
the  idea  is  not  that  what  Christ  does  as  a  Priest,  the  com- 
munity does  not  require  to  do ;  but  rather  that  what  Christ 
as  a  Priest  does  first  in  the  place  and  as  the  representative 
of  the  community,  there  the  community  itself  has  accordingly 
to  take  up  its  position.  But  the  community  of  Christ  is  com- 
posed of  sinners,  who  as  such  are  aliens  and  strangers  to  God. 
Their  effective  union  with  God  is  therefore  to  be  thought  of  as 
the  forgiveness  of  their  sins,  as  the  ending  of  their  separation 


515-G]     FORGIVENESS    BASED   UPON    THE    WORK    OF   CHRIST      547 

from  God,  as  the  removal  of  that  sense  of  guilt  which  is 
associated  with  distrust.  This  special  means  of  founding  the 
Church  also  originates  in  Christ's  whole  conduct  of  His  life, 
viewed  in  the  light  of  His  double  relation  to  God.  For  in  so 
far  as  our  aim  is  to  understand  forgiveness  as  proceeding  from 
the  loving  will  of  God  the  Father,  Who  permits  sinners  to 
draw  nigh  to  Himself,  this  will  is  manifested  as  the  grace  and 
truth  in  which  Christ  represents  God  for  men.  On  the  other 
hand,  when  what  we  want  is  to  see  forgiveness  become  operative 
as  the  attribute  of  a  community,  this  aspect  of  it  is  guaranteed 
by  the  community's  Eepresentative,  Whose  inviolably  main- 
tained position  towards  the  love  of  God,  which  is  distinctive  of 
Him,  is  imputed  by  God  to  those  who  are  to  be  accounted  His 
(p.  71).  Because  Christ  kept  Himself  in  the  love  of  God  by  His 
obedience  even  unto  death,  God's  forgiving  love  is  thereby 
secured  beforehand  to  those  who  belong  to  Christ's  community. 
Their  guilt  is  not  taken  into  account  in  God's  judgment,  since 
they  are  admitted  in  the  train  of  God's  beloved  Son  to  the 
position  towards  God  which  was  assumed  and  maintained  by 
Him.  The  verdict  of  justification  or  forgiveness  is  therefore 
not  to  be  formulated  in  such  a  way  that  the  community  has 
its  relationship  to  Christ  imputed  to  it,  but  in  such  a  way 
that  the  community  which  belongs  to  Christ  has  imputed  to 
it  His  position  towards  the  love  of  God,  in  which  He  main- 
tained Himself  by  His  obedience. 

This  argument  is  related  to  the  line  of  thought  which  is 
indicated  in  Christ's  discourses  in  John.  Of  equal  value  with 
this  train  of  ideas  are  Christ's  parables  of  the  flock  for  which 
the  shepherd  cares  and  lays  down  his  life,  of  the  vine  which 
bears  the  branches  and  keeps  them  alive.  In  both  of  these 
figures  He  brings  His  saving,  life-preserving  work  into  rela- 
tion to  the  community  of  His  disciples  as  a  whole.  In  the 
same  way  it  is  the  unmistakable  meaning  of  the  Supper 
discourse  that  the  result  of  Christ's  priestly  offering  or  sacri- 
ficial death  is  designed  for  the  disciples,  in  so  far  as  they  are 
the  community  of  the  new  covenant  to  be  founded  on  forgive- 
ness.   The  Apostles  attach  themselves  to  this  covenant  in 


548  JUSTIFICATION   AND   KECONCILIATION  [51C-7 

that  they  regard  Christ's  death  partly  in  accordance  with  tbe 
pattern  of  the  covenant  sacrifice,  partly  in  accordance  with 
that  of  the  yearly  sin-offering,  both  of  which  are  related  to 
the  Israelitish  community.  Empirically  the  community  always 
comes  into  existence  as  a  collective  unity  of  individuals. 
But  in  80  far  as  the  individual  determines  by  faith  the  mean- 
ing of  the  community  in  the  Christian  view  of  the  world  and 
of  life,  he  must  regard  the  community  as  the  whole  which, 
without  regard  to  enumeration  of  members,  is  founded  by 
Christ  in  consequence  of  God's  purpose  of  salvation,  and 
which  the  individual  always  finds  already  existing  as  the  body 
within  which,  as  a  believer  in  Christ,  he  will  meet  his  own 
kind.  If  we  are  to  explain  forgiveness,  in  accordance  with 
the  teaching  of  the  Church,  by  the  purpose  of  Christ,  we 
inevitably  think  of  it  as  addressed  to  the  community  for  the 
present  and  the  future,  and  not  to  the  twelve  individual  dis- 
ciples and  the  multitudes  who  should  follow  them;  for  no 
human  intelligence  is  capable  of  grasping  the  latter  idea. 

The  introduction  of  the  community  into  the  idea  of  for- 
giveness as  a  benefit  to  be  derived  from  the  love  of  God 
and  the  mediation  of  Christ  (p.  1 1 0),  was  planned  by  Luther 
and  carried  out  in  the  theology  of  Calvin  and  his  followers 
(voL  L  pp.  205, 308).  The  idea  is  also  advocated  by  Lutheran 
ascetics  and  Pietistic  theologians.  On  the  other  hand,  it  is 
not  current  in  Lutheran  Dogmatics,  as  Melanchthon  never 
adopted  Luther's  idea.  Through  Melanchthon's  influence  the 
assumption  became  prevalent  in  the  Lutheran  theology  that 
the  individual  is  the  direct  correlate  of  justification  in  God's 
purpose,  and  this  has  bound  up  with  it  the  expectation  that 
the  assurance  of  justification  can  be  obtained  immediately,  ?>. 
without  the  mediation  of  the  idea  of  the  community.  At  the 
same  time  this  gives  rise  to  the  supposition  that  the  view  for 
which  I  contend  denotes  a  return  to  Catholicism  (voL  i-  p. 
313).  This  objection  is  no  doubt  very  closely  connected  with 
the  formula  in  which  Schleiermacher  expressed  the  contrast 
between  Catholicism  and  Protestantism,  namely,  that  the  one 
makes  the  relation  of  the  individual  to  Christ  dependent  on 


517-8]    FORGIVENESS   BASED   UPON   TttE   WORK   OF   CHRIST      549 

his  relation  to  the  Church,  the  other  his  relation  to  the  Church 
on   his  relation  to   Christ  (vol.  i.   p.  520).     This  formula, 
however,  is  inconsistent  with  the  very  principle  with  which 
Schleiermacher  enters  upon  the  doctrine  of  redemption,  namely, 
that  the  consciousness  of  redemption  through  Christ  is  refen*ed 
to  the  mediation  of  His  religious  fellowship  (vol.  i.  p.  5 1 1 ).    It 
was  only  because  Schleiermacher  was  unable  to  develop  this 
idea  (vol.  i.  p.  51 9)  that  he  lapsed  into  the  opposite  formula  in 
the  introduction  to  the  OlaubensUhre,     This  formula,  however, 
is  fake.     For  even  the  Evangelical  Christian's  right  relation 
to   Christ  is   both  historically  and   logically  conditioned  by 
the  fellowship  of  believers  ;  historically,  because  a  man  always 
finds  the  community  already  existing  when  he  arrives  at  faith, 
nor  does  he  attain  this  end  without  the  action  of  the  com- 
munity upon  him ;  logically,  because  no  action  of  Christ  upon 
men  can  be  conceived  except  in  accordance  with  the  standard 
of  Christ's  antecedent  purpose  to  found  a  community.     This 
position,  however,  is  distinguished  from   the   Catholic  view 
by  the  fact  that  it  pays  no  regard  to  a  legal  organisation 
of  the  community  of  believers.^     For  the  idea  of  the  Church 
which  the  Catholic  doctrine  foists  in  as  a  necessary  medium 
between  Christ  and  the  individual  is  the  ecelesia  repraesentans, 
the  legally  privileged  clergy,  whose  members  are  deemed  fit 
for  that  purpose  even  if,  ex  hypothesi,  they  do  not  belong  to 
the  community  of  believers  at  all,  but,  as  Mohler  says,  are 
on  the  way  to  hell,  or,  as  Melanchthon  has  it,  are  membra 
satanae.     He  who  cannot  distinguish  between  the  legal  and 
the  religious  idea  of  the  Church  is  not  qualified  to  pronounce 
a  judgment  on  this  subject.     Schleiermacher's  formula,  more- 
over, is  merely  the  reflection  of  that  Pietistic  disintegration 
of  the  idea  of  the  Church  which  was  rendered  possible  from 
the  outset  by  the  vagueness  in  which  the  Lutheran  Dogmatics 
left  the  idea  of  the  Church  in  the  order  of  individual  salvation. 
But  this  form  of  doctrine  cannot  lay  claim  to  clearness  and 

^  In  this  sense  even  Calvin  (iii.  2.  3)  admits:  '* Fides  in  dei  et  Christi 
cognitione,  non  in  ecclesiae  reverentia  iacet,"  despite  the  fact  that  in  §  86  he 
says:  '*Huc  redit  snmma,  Christum,  ubi  nos  in  fidem  illuminat  spiritiis  sui 
virtute,  simul  inserere  in  corpus  suum,  ut  fiamus  bononim  omnium  participes." 


650  JUSTIFICATION    AND   RECONCILIATION  [518-9 

completeness  till  it  is  supplemented  by  the  introduction  of 
the  idea  of  the  community.     It  is  a  Lutheran  principle  that 
the  justification  of  the  individual  is  necessarily  conditioned  by 
the  proclamation  of  the  Gospel.    Now  this  cannot  be  regarded 
as   the  function  of  Church  officials,  otherwise  we  reach  no 
antithesis  to  the  Catholic  view,  and  the  religious  texture  of 
the  exposition  is  broken.     The  proclamation  of  the  Gospel, 
by   which  the  justification  of  the  individual  is  conditioned, 
must  rather  be  thought    of  as    the  necessary    function   of 
the  community  of  believers,  cui  daves  principaliter  tradilae 
sunt     If,  therefore,  this  principle  of  Melanchthon's  tractate 
De  PotestcUe  Papae  24  must  be  incorporated  in  the  ordinary 
doctrine  of  justification,  we  are  bound  to  admit  that  the 
community   of   believers   precedes    the  justification   of   the 
individual.     For   how    shall  we   regard  the   community  as 
the   original  subject  of  the  Gospel,  unless  we  consider   it 
at  the  same   time  as  the  original   object  of  the  justifying 
grace    which    continues    to    operate   in    the    Gospel !      If, 
then,    we    duly    supplement  those    parts    of    the    doctrine 
which  shrivelled  up  in  the  hands  of  the  Lutheran  divines, 
we   must  develop    their    view    into    the  formula,  expressed 
by  Luther,  of  the  justification  of  the  community  by  Christ 
Unless  we  do  so,  the  inevitable  supplement  will  end  in  the 
ministerium  verbi  divini  becoming   the   precondition   of  the 
justification  of  the  individual ;  and  it  would  then  be  impos- 
sible to  point  out  any  essential  difference  upon   this   point 
between  Lutheranism  and  Catholicism  (voL  L  pp.  311).     But 
if  we  are  prevented  by  all  kinds  of  reasons,  particularly  by 
the  comparison  with   Luther's  idea  of  the  regnum  Christi 
spirUtiale  (§§  35,  46),  from   regarding    this  supplement  as 
genuine,  there  is  only  the  other  left,  which  corresponds  with 
the  Reformation  principle  of  Lutheran  Dogmatics. 

In  Christ's  purpose,  then,  the  guaranteeing  of  a  general 
forgiveness  to  humanity,  and  the  founding  of  the  community 
whose  members  recognise  in  God  as  His  Father  their  Father 
also,  are  equivalent  ideas.  And  in  the  acknowledged  result  of 
His  work,  our  assurance  of  forgiveness,  i,c.  of  a  communion 


519-20]    FORGIVENESS   BASED   UPON   THE   WORK    OF   CHRIST     551 

with  God  which  is  possible  in  spite  of  our  sin — and  our  be- 
longing to  the  community  of  those  who  believe  in  Christ,  are 
identical     Only  on  the  understanding  that  these  are  equiva- 
lents it  is  possible  to  establish  the  necessity  of  the  connection 
asserted  between  the  forgiveness  of  sins  and  the  personal  life 
of  Christ,  particularly  the  completion  of  His  life  in  His  sacri- 
ficial death.     Now  Christ  is  the  Mediator  of  these  coincident 
effects  just  in  the  twofold  position  which  He  occupies  with 
the  identical  material  of  His  life.     He  is  not  the  Mediator  of 
forgiveness,  because,  as  Head  and  Eepresentative  of  humanity 
or  of  the  community  contemplated  by  Him,  He  exercises  a 
determining  influence  upon  God  to  be  gracious  to  men.     For 
His  priestly  position  towards  God  is  subordinated  to  His  dis- 
playing, as  the  Revealer  of  God,  the  grace  and  truth — the  love 
of  God  to  sinners,  which  purposes  their  reconciliation  without 
having  first  to  be  evoked  by  the  human  merit  of  the  Mediator. 
But  in  so  far  as  Christ's  obedience  includes  an  effect  upon 
God,  Whom  Christ  Himself  at  the   same  time  represents, 
instead  of  the  "  merit "  with  which  Christ  is  supposed  to  win 
something  from  Him,  I  must  again  remind  my  readers  that 
Christ  by  obedience  keeps  Himself  in  the  love  of  God,. and 
further  point  out  that  in  doing  so  He  at  the  same    time 
represents  His  community  before  God  that  it  may  be  the 
recipient  of  the  forgiveness  which   God  first  guarantees  by 
Christ's  grace  and  truth.     This  achievement  has  for  God  the 
value  that  by  its  means  humanity,  entering  into  the  com- 
munity of  Christ,  is  brought  to  the  goal  of  the  Kingdom  of 
God,  which  is  God's  own  most  personal  end. 

The  Kingship  of  Christ,  however,  while  it  includes  under 
His  prophetic  and  priestly  work  one  and  the  same  material 
of  His  life,  has  not  the  same  value  in  both.  Patience  in 
suffering  is  the  possessor  of  dominion  over  the  world ;  it  is  in 
this  respect  the  mark  of  Christ's  Godhead  and  His  solidarity 
with  the  Father.  It  is  at  the  same  time  the  mark  of  the 
perfect  obedience  which  enables  Christ  as  Head  of  the  com- 
munity to  represent  it  before  God  for  the  receiving  of  forgive- 
ness.    But  in  the  former  relation  it  is  Christ's  dominion  over 


B52  JaSTlPlCATION    and    RBCONCILIAnON  [520-1 

the  world,  in  the  latter  His  much  closer  dominion  over  the 
community  that  comes  into  view.  Now  this  gradation  is  just 
the  right  order  of  the  relation.  For  unless  the  dual  position 
of  Christ  in  His  mediatorship  is  to  lead  to  a  contradiction, 
His  priestly  quality  must  be  subordinated  to  His  prophetic 
so  as  even  to  be  embraced  in  it.  This,  however,  cannot  be 
maintained  unless  the  supreme,  that  is,  the  kingly  dignity 
assumes  a  wider  meaning  when  Christ  is  regarded  as  the 
Bevealer  of  God  than  when  He  is  a  Bepresentative  of  the 
community.  No  revelation  of  God  is  complete  apart  from 
recognition  of  the  believing  community.  If,  however,  the 
Christian  community  views  the  revelation  of  God  in  Christ  as 
perfect,  it  must  in  some  way  or  other  be  capable  of  being 
combined  in  thought  with  Christ,  it  must  find  its  own  position 
prefigured  in  the  course  of  the  revelation  in  Christ.  Now 
this  takes  place  when,  along  with  His  quality  as  a  Bevealer, 
and  with  reference  to  the  same  material  of  His  life,  it  likewise 
recognises  Him  as  its  foregoing  Bepresentative,  Who  as  the 
Receiver  of  revelation  represented  it  before  it  gained  its  special 
historical  form.  This  also  shows  that  Christ  as  Lord  and 
King  of  the  Church  has  not  the  directly  cosmical  significance 
which  is  expressed  in  His  Divine  dominion.  It  is  only 
indirectly  that  the  latter  also  has  to  be  considered  in  His 
relation  to  the  community,  in  so  far  as  His  obedience  exalts 
Him  above  the  world,  and  in  so  far  as  the  community  by  its 
endowment  with  the  forgiveness  of  sins  has  received  the 
capacity  for  life  and  blessedness. 

The  only  question  is  whether  this  exposition  is  complete. 
It  will  have  to  be  tested  in  view  of  such  New  Testament  data 
as  have  not  been  specially  considered,  and  may  be  regarded 
as  traversing  the  rounded  conception  of  Christ's  vocation. 
It  will  also  be  necessarv  to  allow  for  the  claims  of  individual 
religious  experience,  which  partly  opposes  the  principle  that 
it  can  assure  itself  of  justification  only  within  the  framework 
of  the  community,  and  partly  connects  with  Christ's  achieve- 
ment expectations  which  cannot  be  biblically  verified.  I 
am  the  more  willing  to  discuss  these  objections  because  the 


521-2]    FORGIVENESS   BASED   UPON   THE   WORK    OF   CHRIST      553 

author^  of  them  agrees  oil  the  whole  with  my  expositions, 
and  merely  endeavours  to  supplement  or  deepen  them.  If  I 
rightly  understand  the  starting-point  of  this  undertaking,  it 
is  the  method  of  the  Pietists,  which  is  at  once  to  long  for  the 
forgiveness  of  sin,  and  to  struggle  against  the  simple  appropria- 
tion of  it  from  the  promise  of  God.  It  is  to  this  phenomenon 
that  Haring  alludes  when  he  brings  into  prominence  the 
twofold  nature  of  the  consciousness  of  guilt,  as  being  at  once 
the  state  of  Divine  punishment,  properly  so  called,  and  the 
condition  of  God's  forgiveness.  He  bases  on  this  an  objection 
to  the  reference  of  forgiveness  to  the  community  and  to  the 
individual  in  it.  For  he  thinks  that  this  combination  of 
ideas  affords  no  adequate  solution  of  tlie  problem  how  the 
individual  becomes  conscious  of  justification,  and  that  this  is 
a  question  which  cannot  be  evaded.  StUl,  the  doctrine  which 
I  have  set  forth  coincides  with  the  view  which  prevailed  from 
the  time  of  Luther  {Cat.  major ^  iv.  41,  44)  till  that  of 
Spener  inclusive — the  view  that  as  members  of  the  Church 
we  are  to  determine  the  reference  of  forgiveness  to  our- 
selves by  the  baptism  which  we  have  received.  When 
Luther  made  this  statement  he  knew  from  his  experience  in 
the  Catholic  Church  the  same  difficulties  as  the  Pietists 
feel  in  their  striving  after  the  assurance  of  salvation. 
Therefore  I  no  more  require  to  be  guided  by  these  arbi- 
trary endeavours  to  reach  assurance  of  forgiveness  than  did 
Luther. 

For  the  satisfaction  of  the  Pietists,  however,  who  are 
never  done  with  their  confession  of  sin  and  repentance,  in 
order  that  they  may  bring  forgiveness  in  Christ  into  relation 
to  themselves,  what  more  is  to  be  assumed  in  Christ's  vicarious 
work  ?  According  to  Haring,  the  point  is  that  the  imperfect 
repentance  wrought  by  men  is  completed  by  an  analogous 
work  on  Christ's  part.  This  does  not  imply  that  Christ 
Himself  repented  of  sin ;  for  as  he  had  no  personal  experience 
or  knowledge  of  sin,  this  work  is  not  to  be  imputed  to  Him. 

"  Theodor  Haring,  Ueher  dca  Bleibetide  im  Olauhen  an  Christus,  Stuttgart, 
1880. 


554  JUSTIFICATION    AND   RECONCILIATION  [522-3 

But  Haring  thinks  it  may  be  assumed  that  Christ's  conscious- 
ness in  His  vocation  included  the  painful  knowledge  of  the 
opposition  of  all  sin  to  God,  and  thus  realised  the  purpose 
of  punishment,  which  sinners  with  all  their  sense  of  guilt  do 
not  perfectly  realise.     I  admit  in  general  that  in  Christ  we 
have  to  count  upon  the  purest  and  tenderest  sense  of  the 
contrariety  of  sin  to  God ;  but  if  such  a  value  is  to  be  put  on 
that  as  is  done  by  Haring,  I  expect  Scripture  proof  to  be 
adduced.     I  regard  a  construction  which  entirely  dispenses 
with  the  latter  as  unreliable;  it  arouses  the  suspicion  that 
the    picture    of    Christ  is   being  touched  up  at  one's  own 
pleasure.     The  various  cases  in  which   Christ  showed  His 
grief  for  the  obduracy  of  certain  classes  (Mark  iii.  5  ;  Matt. 
xxiii.  37)  are  no  sufl&cient  proof  for  the  statement  tliat  Jesus* 
sensibility   was    regularly   excited   by   reflection    on    sin    in 
general  or  as  a  whole.     On  the  contrary,  He  always  regards 
sinners  in  their  gradation  as  redeemable  and  hardened  (vol. 
ii.  p.  38).     It  was  Paul  who  paved  the  way  for  a  general 
and  identical  idea  of  sin,  such  as  appears  in  the  doctrine  of 
original  sin.     It  was,  moreover,  in    the   asceticism    of   the 
Middle  Ages,  from  Anselm  onward,  that  this  idea  received  the 
explanation  which  Haring  regards  as  self-evident ;  and  Pietism 
follows  the  latter  because  it  carries  on  the  mediaeval  mode  of 
thought.     The  Pietist  aspires  to  embrace  the  sin  of  all  men 
in  his  repentance,  although,  as  may  be  observed  in  Amdt's 
Triie  Christianity^  it  is  rather  a  mere  aesthetic  aversion — 
disgust — which  is  set  forth,  than  a  real  imputation  of  guilt 
For  we  are  responsible  only  for  our  own  sin.     It  is  therefore 
a  .mistaken  tendency  which  gives  rise  to  the  requirement  of 
the  Pietists,  for  the  sake  of  which  Haring  postulates  that 
supplementary  work  of  Christ.     As  the  attribute  of  guilt 
cannot  be  proved  to  belong  to  original  sin,  it  is  a  delusion 
to  expect  our  own  repentance  to  make  itself  responsible  for 
sin  as  a  whole.     But  if  it  cannot  do  that,  we  must  not  look 
for  any  supplement  in  Christ's  infinite  grief  for  sin,  which, 
being  in  any  case  dififerent  in  kind  from  repentance,  can  in 
no  way  serve  as  a  supplement.     People  must  rather  be  shown 


623-4]    FORGIVENESS    BASED   UPON   THE   WORK   OF   CHRIST      355 

that  they  are  expecting  of  themselves  something  which  cannot 
be  realised.  I  therefore  reject  the  proposed  deepening  of  my 
exposition  as  something  which  is  not  based  on  Scripture,  but 
called  forth  by  a  use  of  the  doctrine  of  original  sin  which  has 
its  home  in  the  practice  of  monasticism.  But  I  also  reject 
Haring's  assumption  because  it  is  inconsistent  with  the 
blessedness  of  Christ.  We  may  form  an  idea  of  the  latter  by 
bringing  it  into  line  with  the  fact  that  we  count  it  all  joy 
to  be  surrounded  with  persecutions.  In  order  to  fulfil  this 
precept,  we  must,  according  to  the  example  of  Christ,  be  filled 
rather  with  sorrow  for  than  indignation  against  those  who  by 
unjust  persecution  tempt  us  to  retaliate.  If,  however,  to  prove 
our  reconcilability,  we  were  to  fix  ourselves  in  sympathetic 
grief  for  the  obduracy  of  our  adversaries,  little  room  would  be 
left  for  the  joy  which  we  have  to  derive  from  persecutions. 
There  is  no  reason  to  transfer  to  Christ  the  Pietistic  sentiment- 
ality which  never  comes  to  fuU  joy  and  pure  blessedness, 
because  the  effort  from  which  it  springs  is  spurious. 

It  affords  me  satisfaction  that  Haring  has  withdrawn  this 
attempt  to  improve  upon  my  doctrine.^  Only  he  does  not 
rest  there,  but  brings  forward  what  purports  to  be  a  supple- 
ment of  another  kind.  He  agrees  with  me  in  believing  that 
Christ's  passion  is  not  the  punishment  for  the  sins  of  men. 
He  says :  "  Christ  awakens  repentance  essentially  by  the 
mysterious  (?)  fate  of  His  passion ;  the  Cross  is  the  powerful 
sermon-in-action,  telling  of  the  inviolable  earnestness  of  the 
Divine  love,  which  makes  Him  to  be  sin  Who  knew  no  sin. 
He  Himself,  however,  given  up  to  this  dark  fate,  accepts  it  in 
humble  obedience,  because  He  knows  the  Divine  purpose  to 
show  the  guilty  in  this  way  how  earnest  God  is  in  condemning 
sin** ^  Haring  appeals  for  support  to  Domer,  Ktihler,  Gess, 
and  others.  I  need  only  point  out  that  the  idea  here 
expressed  is  that  of  penal  example,  which  Grotius  first 
introduced  under  a  mistake;  and  if  the  theologians  named 
meant  to  express  something  weighty  and  significant  in  this 

*  Zu  RUschVs  Versohnungslehre,  ZUiich,  1888,  p.  39. 
2  Op,  cU.  pp.  40,  41. 


556  JUSTIFICATION   AND   RECX)NCILIATION  [524-5 

way,  it  will  no  doubt  afford  them  satisfaction  to  find  them- 
selves on  the  path  taken  a  century  ago  by  Sender,  Gruner, 
Michaelis,  and  other  adherents  of  the  supernaturalistic 
school  (vol.  i.  pp.  336  ff.,  414,  420  ff.). 

§  57.  The  exposition  of  the  connection  between  justifica- 
tion as  an  attribute  of  the  Christian  community,  and  therefore 
of  its  members,  and  the  completion  of  the  work  of  its  Foimder 
in  His  vocation,  is  conditioned  by  two  considerations,  namely, 
by  the  positive  idea  of  forgiveness  or  justification,  and  by  the 
equally  positive  estimate  of  the  value  of  Christ's  suffering  as 
the  occasion  of  His  patience,  and  the  test  of  His  fidelity  in 
His  calling,  and  steadfastness  in  His  faith.     In  this  our  ex- 
position is  in  harmony  with  the  positive  aim  of  forgiveness  or 
justification  or  reconciliation,  namely,  that  freedom  of  believers 
in  communion  with  God  which  consists  in  dominion  over  the 
world,  and  is   to   be  regarded  as   eternal  life  (§§  52,  54). 
This  result,  however,  must  still  be  tested  on  various  sides. 
First  of  all,  it  seems  to  stop  short  of  the  requirement  that 
there  should   be  derived   from   Christ  not  only  a  changed 
relation  of  men  to  God  as  regards  the  status  of  sin,  but  also 
an  actual  removal  of  sin  in  believers.     Tliat  is  what  the  saying 
in  1  Pet.  ii.  24   points  to  in  its  own  way  (vol.  ii.  p.  258). 
Now  the  assertion  of  an  effective  deliverance   of   believers 
from  sin  seems  to  require  to  be  reached,  partly  that  Christ's 
moral  action  upon  believers  may  remain  in  equilibrium  with 
their  religious  emancipation  by  Him,  partly  that  the  mediating 
position  of  the  community  for  the  latter  purpose  may  be  pre- 
served unimpaired.    For  the  truth  already  ascertained  regarding 
this  position  seems  to  be  threatened  if  we  must  conceive  that 
the  community  of  believers  continues  to  live  and  move  in 
active  sin ;  for  this  fact,  if  admitted,  appears  to  detract  from 
the  genuineness  of  their  religious  knowledge  of  the  truth,  and 
from  the  power  of  the  religious  impulse  which  individuals  in 
the  community  receive.     Certainly  this  latter  consideration 
is  discounted  when  Oetinger  and  especially  Menken  teach  that 
Christ,  by  Himself  resisting  all    temptations  to  sin,  made 
human  nature  sinless,  or  destroyed  the  source  of  ever  fresh 


525-6]     FORGIVENESS    BASED   UPON   THE   WORK    OF    CHRIST      557 

guilt  in  believers.  Menken  declares  that  this  effect  must  be 
attributed  to  Christ,  in  addition  to  the  removal  of  guilt  (vol. 
i.  p.  613).  But  this  is  an  ill-considered  antithesis.  For  the 
removal  of  guilt  must  be  defined  in  a  positive  sense,  as  mean- 
ing that  there  comes  to  exist  communion  with  God  in  which 
the  person  reconciled  with  God  directs  his  will  to  God  as 
his  universal  final  end.  Now  as  this  is  the  opposite  of  the 
sinful  direction  of  the  will,  the  effective  removal  of  guilt 
becomes  the  basis  of  the  positive  possibility  of  a  life  no 
longer  sinful  as  a  whole.  But  this  theory  is  far  from  coming 
up  to  Menken's  view.  For  the  general  direction  of  the  will 
to  the  Divine  final  end  which  is  included  in  the  idea  of 
reconciliation,  does  not  exclude  the  possibility  of  fresh  guilt. 
This  possibility  lies  for  every  individual  in  the  fact  that  the 
general  motive  to  sin  is  complicated  in  each  man  with  special 
inclinations  and  impulses.  If  Menken,  then,  intends  to  affirm 
that  Christ  directly  and  immediately  changes  believers  in  this 
respect,  he  affirms  something  which  is  contrary  to  experience, 
and  which  at  the  same  time  we  know  to  be  impossible.  As 
a  matter  of  fact,  evil  inclinations  are  always  got  rid  of  solely 
by  the  cultivation  of  contrary  good  inclinations;  but  in  so 
far  as  this  requires  special  resolves,  these  never  attain  their 
end  except  where  the  development  of  good  character  is  under- 
taken as  a  whole.  Although  the  general  direction  of  the  will 
to  God — the  direction  received  in  reconciliation — becomes 
operative  as  the  principal  motive  for  the  development  of  good 
character,  there  are  still  required  the  special  moral  resolves 
and  decisions  which  do  not  logically  or  of  themselves  result 
from  the  faith  of  reconciliation,  but  must  always  be  appre- 
hended by  the  will  as  special.  By  the  general  assurance  of 
reconciliation  or  the  general  purpose  of  conversion  alone,  no 
special  vice  is  uprooted ;  we  cannot  thus  evade  that  special 
conflict  with  each  vice  which  consists  in  the  fulfilment  of  the 
contrary  resolutions.  These  processes,  however,  which  serve 
for  the  effective  removal  of  new  offences,  necessarily  fall 
within  the  sphere  of  the  self-active  moral  will  which  is  to  be 
explained  by  grace.     For  tbip  reason,  sinful  depravity,  which 


558  JUSTIFICATION    AND    RECONCILUTION  [526-7 

is  not  only  a  common  but  also  a  special  depravity  in  every 
man,  cannot  be  removed  at  the  outset  and  immediately  by 
the  universal  atonement  of  Christ.    We  may  make  experimeDt 
upon  those  "  believers  "  who  with  a  very  vigorous  conscious- 
ness of  their  reconciliation  and  a  life  in  many  respects  virtuous, 
combine  arrogance  and  dogmatism  in  religion,  and  a  want  of 
respect  and  charity  for  those  who   think  differently  from 
themselves.     Such  men  proceed  in  this  way  as  if  their  honest 
zeal  for  God's  glory  protected  them  without  more  ado  from 
sins  or  errors.     For  I  do  not  suppose  that  such  persons,  if  we 
could  subject  them  to  serious  cross-examination,  would  palm 
off  those  vices  as  virtues,  or  as  their  special  licence.     Probably 
the  fact  of  the  matter  rather  is,  that  they  repose  too  exclusive 
confidence  in  the  general  good  will  which  they  have,  through 
reconciliation,  in  their  being  directed    toward  God  and  the 
end  of  the  Kingdom  of  God,  just  because  it  is  God  who 
guarantees  them  this  good  will.     But  as  the  idea  of  a  genus 
does  not  lead  to  a  knowledge  of  the  species  without  special 
observation  of  the  latter,  no  more  does  the  application  of  the 
will  which  is  good  on  the  whole  to  special  cases  follow  of 
itself  from  the  presence  of  the  general  disposition.     On  the 
contrary,  the  will,  which  in  the  latter  form  is  thought  of  as 
the  general  ground  of  the  corresponding  activity,  must  begin 
to  work  anew  in  every  special  resolution.     In  so  far,  then,  as 
sin  has  its  activity  in  every  man  in  a  special  form,  reconcilia- 
tion through  Christ  implies  anything  but  an  actual  deliverance 
of  beUevers  from  sin. 

Menken's  statement  may,  however,  be  understood  in 
another  sense,  if  we  consider  the  formula,  which  is  also 
advocated  by  Oetinger,  that  Christ,  by  resisting  the  tempta- 
tions of  the  devil,  made  human  nature  sinless.  What  is 
expressed  here  is  not  the  idea  of  single  individuals  as  sinners, 
but  the  idea  of  that  which  is  common  to  them  all.  In  this 
sense,  therefore,  human  nature,  as  it  belongs  to  every  indi- 
vidual, denotes  the  fact  that  our  moral  endowment  has  for  it« 
end  the  moral  destiny  of  the  race.  Every  individual,  however, 
oversteps  this  circle  of  attributes  by  his  special  endowmepte 


627-8]    FOBGIVBNESS   BASED   UPON   THB   WORK    OF    CHRIST      559 

and  his  peculiar  moral  activity;  the  latter  may  even  bring 
about  changes  in  the  subject.  Now,  if  sin,  or,  as  in  Christ,  the 
possibility  of  sin,  is  presupposed  as  a  general  affection  of 
human  nature,  it  is  conceivable  that  human  nature  should 
be  altered  by  moral  activity,  and  thus  raised  above  the 
temptation  to  sin.  This  result  can  be  conceived,  however, 
only  in  so  far  as  the  subject  has  human  nature  in  himself. 
On  the  other  hand,  in  so  far  £is  human  nature  belongs  to 
other  subjects,  the  assertion  that  this  endowment  is  changed 
simply  by  the  normal  moral  conduct  of  another,  is  altogether 
worthless. 

Menken's  view,  however,  in  the  form  of  it  already  criti- 
cised, appears  to  be  re-echoed  in  the  fundamental  formulae  of 
Schleiermacher  (Glaubenalehre,  §§  87,  88) :  "  We  are  conscious 
that  all  approximations  to  the  state  of  blessedness  which 
occur  in  the  Christian  life  are  grounded  in  a  new  divinely- 
produced  common  life,  which  counteracts  the  common  life 
of  sin  and  the  unhappiness  developed  therein."  "In  this 
common  life,  which  goes  back  to  the  activity  of  Jesus, 
redemption  is  effected  by  Him  through  the  communication 
of  His  sinless  perfection."  It  is  necessary  to  come  to  an 
undei'standing  with  these  principles ;  the  more  so  as  Schleier- 
macher here  emphasises  the  importance  of  the  community  of 
redemption  in  a  way,  the  absence  of  which  could  not  but  be 
felt  in  his  special  definition  of  the  ideas  of  redemption  and 
reconciliation  (voL  i.  p.  517).  Now,  if  the  sinless  perfection 
of  Christ,  which  He  communicates  in  redemption  or  in  the 
common  life  founded  by  Him,  were  to  be  understood  as  active 
moral  righteousness,  it  would  have  to  be  objected  that  such 
communication  was  altogether  contrary  to  experience,  and  incon- 
sistent with  the  necessary  conditions  of  moral  righteousness. 
However  much,  even  from  the  religious  point  of  view,  must 
be  regarded  as  divinely  communicated,  and  however  distinctly 
all  our  ethical  endeavours  presuppose  the  reign  of  Divine 
grace,  we  still  experience  the  formation  of  our  moral  character, 
and  the  separation  of  it  from  the  impulses  of  sin  which  are 
peculiar  to  us,  as  an  act  of  our  own  will.    But  Schleiermacber's 


560  JUSTIFICATION   AND    RECONCILUTION  [528-9 

purpose  in  choosing  the  above  expression  is  not  to  be 
understood  in  Menken's  sense.  As  he  defines  the  idea  of  sin 
as  the  restriction  of  the  God-consciousness  (§  66),  so  the 
sinless  perfection  of  Christ  denotes  in  his  sense  nothing  else 
than  the  absolute  potency  of  the  God-consciousness.  That 
this  consciousness  may  be  communicated,  and  that  it  must  be 
specifically  represented  as  communicated  and  received,  follows 
from  the  fact  that  we  necessarily  conceive  our  relation  to 
God  in  the  form  of  God's  action  upon  us.  Since,  then,  we 
can  think  of  ourselves  as  children  of  God  only  in  the  com- 
munity founded  by  Christ,  in  all  our  consciousness  of  the 
activity  which  corresponds  to  the  Divine  sonship  we  regard 
this  status  itself  as  something  received  from  the  historical 
action  of  Christ,  something  appropriated  from  Him.  Schleier- 
macher,  however,  raises  for  himself  the  objection  that  the 
Christian  community  as  a  whole,  and  particularly  in  certain 
periods,  is  seen  to  participate  so  largely  in  the  general  sinful- 
ness, that  we  cannot  help  becoming  doubtful  of  its  fitness 
for  the  mediation  of  salvation  which  is  entrusted  to  it  This 
circumstance  also  demands  a  special  consideration  in  view  of 
the  doctrine  above  developed  (§  56). 

The  reconciliation  of  the  individual  has  been  connected 
with  the  whole  life-work  of  Christ  in  His  vocation  thus,  that 
the  individual  who  knows  himself  reconciled  finds  himself  in 
the  community  founded  by  Christ,  and  reckons  himself  as 
belonging  to  it,  in  so  far  as  Christ  has  established  for  it 
the  right  to  see  in  sin  which,  as  such,  is  repented  of,  no 
hindrance  to  fellowship  with  God,  but  rather  to  assert  the 
Divine  sonship  in  spite  of  sin.  The  Christian  community, 
however,  in  the  course  of  its  history,  has  carried  with  it  so 
much  actual  sin,  that  the  question  must  be  raised  whether  it 
has  not  altogether  forfeited  the  relation  of  Divine  sonship 
bestowed  upon  it  through  Christ's  work  of  reconciliation,  and 
accordingly  become  imfit  in  any  sense  to  mediate  for  the 
individual  the  religious  benefits  which  proceeded  from  Christ 
Is  it  not  this  doubt  which  gives  rise  to  the  claim  that  the 
Church  fulfils  its  commission  to  mediate  salvation  only  if 


529-30]    FORGIVENESS    BASED   UPON   THE   WORK   OF    CHRIST     561 

from  Christ  we  rightly  derive  not  only  reconciliation  but 
effective  deliverance  from  sin,  or  when  the  reconciled  com- 
munity is  limited  in  sectarian  fashion  to  those  members  who 
have  in  the  strength  of  reconciliation  attained  a  recognisable 
degree  of  special  sanctity  ?  The  first  alternative,  however, 
is  impracticable,  and  the  other  is,  to  begin  with,  at  least  sus- 
picious. For  the  moral  and  the  religious  aims  of  Christianity 
do  not  absolutely  coincide.  Good  conduct,  prompted  by  the 
final  end  of  the  Kingdom  of  God,  is  indeed  the  conditio  sine 
qyd  non  for  the  authentication  of  Divine  sonship,  so  that 
doubt  is  cast  upon  the  genuineness  of  the  religious  factor 
where  flagrant  sinfulness  is  found  along  with  the  profession 
of  Christian  truth.  But  the  experience  of  our  Eeformation 
teaches  that  the  discovery  of  prevalent  immorality  and  super- 
stitious perversity  in  the  Christian  Church  may  be  the  very 
means  of  directing  the  attention  more  closely  to  the  redemp- 
tive power  of  the  Christian  religion.  On  the  other  hand,  the 
sectarian  type  of  Church  has  no  succour  to  offer,  partly 
because  the  principle  of  sectarian  Christianity  guarantees  no 
continuity  of  moral  education,  partly  because  the  legal  kind 
of  sinlessness  aimed  at  in  the  sects  usually  leads  to  the  sin  of 
hypocrisy. 

What  other  means,  then,  ai'e  left  us  to  escape  these 
difficulties  ?  Schleiermacher  rightly  showed  the  way  out  of 
them  in  essential  harmony  with  Reformation  and  orthodox 
theology.  He  points  to  an  experience  which  is  possible  in 
the  Church  in  spite  of  its  prevalent  entanglement  with  sin. 
In  this  he  distinguishes  a  personal  and  a  common  element. 
"  The  former  consists  in  the  fact  that  the  individual  still 
receives  from  the  image  of  Christ,  which  exists  in  the  Church 
as  a  common  fact  and  a  common  possession,  the  impression  of 
the  sinless  perfection  (the  absolute  potency  of  the  God- 
consciousness)  of  Jesus,  which  gives  him  at  once  the  perfect 
consciousness  of  sin  and  the  removal  of  unhappiness ;  and  this 
in  itself  is  a  communication  of  that  perfection.  The  other 
consists  in  the  fact  that  in  all  those  confusions  in  the  Church, 
be  they  never  so  like  the  sinful  common  life  of  man,  there  is 
36 


562  JUSTIFICATION   AND   RECONCILIATION  [530-1 

• 

nevertheless  a  settled  tendency  proceeding  from  Christ's  per- 
fection— a  tendency  which  in  all  its  manifestations,  yes, 
even  in  the  assertion  of  the  ideas  of  the  true  and  the  good, 
more  or  less  has  to  yield  to  the  eclipse  of  sinless  perfection, 
but  in  its  essence  or  as  an  impulse  is  worthy  of  its  origin : 
and  this  equally  with  the  first  element  is  a  true  and  real 
communication  of  the  perfection  of  Christ."  The  first  point 
determines  the  way  in  which  the  mediation  of  Christ's  recon- 
ciliation by  the  community  is  to  be  correctly  defined.  On  the 
one  hand,  we  should  have  no  experience  and  no  knowledge  of 
an  operation  of  Christ  upon  later  generations,  unless  a  com- 
munity of  the  children  of  God  existed  due  to  His  impulse, 
and  propagated  itself  throughout  all  the  changes  of  time. 
Yet,  on  the  other  hand,  the  connection  of  the  spiritual  life  is 
of  such  a  kind  that  the  Author  of  Divine  sonship  is  operatively 
present  in  every  genuine  case  of  faith  in  God  as  our  Father ; 
and  His  presence  is  not  so  merged  in  these  manifestations 
and  their  connection  that  the  knowledge  of  the  Founder  of  the 
Church  can  ever  cease  to  be  indispensable  for  the  existence 
and  maintenance  of  Divine  sonship.  On  the  contrary,  the 
religious  possession  of  Divine  sonship  must  always  take  its 
bearings  from  the  Archetype  and  Founder  of  this  state,  just 
as  it  is  always  called  forth  in  the  individual  by  the  idea  of 
Christ.  The  orthodox  doctrine  expresses  this  truth  by 
saying  that  the  preaching  of  Christ  in  the  Church  is  the 
indispensable  condition  of  justification  and  the  awakening  of 
faith,  and  thus  of  the  Divine  sonship  of  individuals.  But 
even  though  the  psychological  scheme  which  the  old  theology 
uses  makes  it  appear  as  though  this  mediation  of  salvation 
were  restricted  to  the  form  of  theoretical  teaching,  yet  nobody 
will  question  the  fact  that  the  Christian  religion  is  not 
propagated  -  and  awakened  in  individuals  in  this  way  alone. 
All  kinds  of  aesthetic  and  moral  motives  of  education  are 
required  even  to  unfold  the  meaning  of  the  image  of  Christ 
to  the  understanding,  still  more  to  use  the  impression  of  this 
image  for  the  awakening  of  childlike  trust  in  God.  But 
although   the  manifold  stimulus  of  the  piety  of  other  men,  of 


531-2]    FORGIVENESS    BASED   UPON  THE   WORK    OF    CHRIST       563 

morale  and  discipline  in  the  family  and  the  school,  is  required 
to  lend  weight  to  religious  instruction  and  preaching,  yet  the 
independent  assurance  of  Divine  sonship  can  completely  stay 
itself  on  nothing  but  the  standard  of  the  living  Figure  of 
Christ,  even  as  fundamentally  it  springs  from  the  power  of 
that  Figure.  This  moulding  of  piety  on  Christ  will  meet 
with  modifications  of  the  most  diverse  kinds ;  but  in  any  case 
it  proves  the  necessity  of  including  the  estimate  of  Christ  as 
the  Foimder  and  Archetype  of  Christianity  in  the  completed 
system  of  this  religion  (§  44).  I  intentionally  choose  these 
wide  and  indefinite  expressions  in  order  to  remind  my  readers 
at  this  stage  of  the  fact,  that  an  inexhaustible  series  of  differ- 
ent kinds  of  religious  estimate  of  Christ  owe  their  existence 
to  the  diversity  of  ages,  sexes,  temperaments,  and  types  of 
Christian  confession.  Who,  then,  will  take  it  upon  himself, 
by  setting  up  an  exclusive  theoretical  formula,  to  decide 
between  the  impressions  of  Christ's  Person,  which,  in  various 
degrees  of  clearness  and  fulness,  with  more  or  less  design, 
provide  a  standard  for  every  form  of  piety  which  is  of 
Christian  origin ;  and  to  decide  between  them  in  such  a  way 
that  one  part  of  such  phenomena  would  be  declared  to  be 
absolutely  false ! 

Here  we  already  touch  the  other  experience  noticed  by 
Schleiermacher,  which  is  not  indeed  very  clearly  expressed 
by  him,  but  is  to  be  understood,  I  think,  in  the  following 
way.  Though  in  large  departments  of  the  Christian  Church 
the  God-consciousness  made  operative  by  Christ  is  so  much 
hindered  by  sin  that  even  the  standards  of  Christian  truth 
and  goodness  are  vitiated,  yet  it  is  always  to  be  placed  to 
the  credit  of  such  phenomena  that  the  hope  of  realising 
true  Christianity  is  working  in  them  as  their  hidden  impulse. 
This  way  of  looking  at  them  is  certainly  the  expression 
of  a  charitableness  which  at  present,  perhaps,  is  scarcely 
intelligible.  Still,  it  does  not  exclude  a  very  decided 
judgment  of  the  errors  by  which  Christianity,  in  large  or 
small  groups  of  its  adherents,  is  theoretically  and  practically 
distorted.     This  view,  however,  is   the  only  right   basis  of 


564  JUSTIFICATION   AND   RECONCILIATION  [633-3 

polemical  theology,  so  tibiat  if  religious  or  theological  con- 
troversy forsakes  this  staudiDg-ground,  it  descends  to  the 
mean  gratification  of  party  spirit  and  dogmatism.     For  if 
we  deny  to  any  Christian  party  the  wish  to  attain  a  right 
understanding  of  Christianity,  we  can  neither  rightly  esti- 
mate the    extent  of   the  error    they  have  committed,  nor 
contribute   to   removing   it.       Schleiermacher's   opinion,   on 
the    contrary,    is    not    only    logically   and    experimentally 
correct,  but  also  in  a  religious  aspect  the  only  seemly  ona 
It  is  a  principle   to  which   Augustine,  for  example,  is  led 
almost  against  his  will  in  his  judgment  of  sin,  that  every- 
thing  evil    has  the  condition  of   its  reality  solely  in    the 
secret  obligation  of  the  will   to  the  good.     No  theoretical 
and  practical  perversion  of  Christianity,  then,  can  as  such 
be   conceived,   imless   there    is  assumed  at  the  same  time 
a  wish,  however  dim  it  may  have  become,  to  realise  Chris- 
tianity as    such,  and  a  working  of  this  purpose,  however 
incalculable    it    may    be    in   amount,   towards   the   desired 
result.      This    explains   not    only   the    striking   phenomena 
of  reformations  which  break  forth  from  a  state  of  general 
corruption,  for  these  have  but  a  limited  area,  but  the  pheno- 
mena, certainly  much  more  frequent,  of  Christian  humility 
and  moral  purity  which  appear  in  the  midst  of  a  general 
state  of  perversion  of  Christian  Churches.     Finally,  however, 
apart  from  all  correctness  of  dogmatic  knowledge,  it  shows 
nothing  but  a   want  of  trust  in  God,  or  despair  as  to  the 
extent  of  the  spiritual  influence  of  Christ,  when  a  polemical 
theologian    does    his    best,   either    by   direct    expression   of 
opinion,   or   indirectly  by  his    style  of  controversy,  to  re- 
present   this  action  as   limited   to  the   party   to   which   he 
himself  is  attached. 

§  58.  Further  objections  to  the  basing  of  reconciliation 
upon  the  above  explained  connection  between  Christ's 
value  as  a  Revelation  and  His  purpose  to  propagate  His 
peculiar  reverence  for  God  as  His  Father  in  a  community 
of  the  children  of  God,  are  to  be  expected  from  the  fact 
that  people  are   generally  in   the  habit  of  interpreting  tJa 


53a-4]    FOKGITENESS   BASED    UPON   THE    WORK    OF   CHUIST       565 

life-work  of  Christ  by  a  negative  formula.     Certain  features 
of  the  theological  tradition  have  a  strong  tendency  in  this 
direction,  all   the  more   because  they  are  liturgically  fixed. 
The  standing  designation  of  Christ  as   the   Redeemer,  the 
interpretation  of   His    peculiar   achievement   as    being    the 
propitiation    for   our   sins,  the  image  of   the  Lamb    which 
bears  the  sins  of  the  world,  disclose  a  different  view  of  His 
saving  work  from  the  one  developed  above,  and  that,  too, 
with  the  assumption  that  the  whole  truth  is  completely  de- 
scribed by  these  formulae,  and  may  be  correctly  and  adequately 
developed  within  the  framework  they  offer.     Here  I  leave 
out  of  account  the  fact  that  the  delineation  of  the  Servant 
of  God  by  the    Old    Testament  prophet,  and  the   formula 
of   the    expiation   of   sins,   are    usually   understood   in    the 
sense    of   vicarious    penal    satisfaction.      For   there   is   no 
ground  for  this  interpretation  either  in  the  words  of  the 
prophet   or    in    any    Biblical    connection   of    ideas.      The 
Scriptural  idea  is  that  the  sufferings  which  the  Servant  of 
God  has  not  merited,  but  which  He  experiences  on -account 
of  His  fellowship  with    the   guilty   people,  and  which  He 
takes  upon  Himself  the  more  patiently  and  therefore  the 
more  completely  on  account  of  His  righteousness  and  fellow- 
feeling,   impel  the  rest  of  His  countrymen  to   repentance 
after  they  have  clearly  perceived  the  fact  of  the  Sufferer's 
innocence  and  their  own  guilt  (ii.   p.    61).     According  to 
this   analogy,  it  is  not   wrong  to   say  that   the    sufferings 
which  Christ  brought  upon   Himself,  without  any  demerit, 
through    the  fulfilment  of  His  vocation  to  His  people,  are 
the  form  in  which  the  sinless  Son  of  God  completely  demon- 
strated His  fellowship  with  sinful  humanity,  for  the  purpose 
of  moving  them  to  repentance  so  soon  as  His  innocence  and 
the  morally  necessary  fellowship  in  suffering  on  the  part 
of  the  Innocent  with  the  guilty  should  be  understood  by 
the  latter.     It  is  questionable,  however,  whether  this  formula 
should  have  so  great  importance  attached  to  it  as  sometimes 
happens,   since    there   is    no  more  indication    of   it  in   the 
discourses  of    Christ  than    in    the  words   of    the  Apostles. 


566  JUSTIFICATION    AND   RECONCILIATION  [5M-6 

Certainly  Christ  traced   His  sufferings,  and  the  measure  of 
them  which  He  might  expect,  not  merely  to  the  pragmatical 
circumstance  that  He  came  into  conflict  with  the  traditional 
claims   of  the  Jewish   theocracy,  but   to   the  more  general 
principle   that   the  righteous  man  suffers  through  his  con- 
nection  with   the  unrighteous  world  (Matt,  xi    28—30,  p. 
462).     Nevertheless,  He  did   not  accept  His  sufferings  as 
an    independent    task,  the   meaning   of   which    was    to   be 
sought  in  an  idea  of  sin  in  general  or  as  a  whole  (p.  554), 
but  bore   them  as  the  accident  of  His  positive  fidelity  to 
His  vocation.     The  idea  of  innocent  suffering  as  the  form  in 
which  the  sufferer  enters  into  sympathetic  fellowship  with 
the  guilty,  implies  in  the  prophet's  words  that  this  association 
with    the   guilty   becomes   operative    through    their    being 
shamed  into  repentance.     The  effect  of  this  association  is 
thus    thought    of    as   the   vrwral  change    of   the   individuals 
who  belong  to   the  already  existing    community,  and  who 
let  themselves  be   brought   by  shame  to  their  right  mind. 
This  goal,  however,  is  a  different  one   from    the   religions 
reconciliation  of  men  with  God  which  Christ  had  in  view, 
when    He    purposed   to    make  a  community  of  forgiveness 
possible  for  the  first  time  by  the  fulfilment  of   His   voca- 
tion   in    the   suffering    of    death.       In    the   allusions   and 
discourses   of   Christ  bearing  on  this    subject,  the    purpose 
of  bringing  His  adversaries  to  repentance  by  the  sense  of 
shame  which  His  sufferings  would  awaken  in  them,  is  not 
so  much   as    casually    mentioned.      Finally,   the    discourses 
in    the   Acts    of  the  Apostles  connect    the  impulse  to  re- 
pentance and  entrance  into   the   Christian  community,  not 
with    a    peculiar    explanation    of   the   sufferings    of    Christ, 
but  with  the  fact  that  He  whom  the  Jews  have  cnicified 
has  been  by  God  installed  as  Lord  (ii.  36-39;  iii.   13-19; 
V.  30,  31). 

Most  nearly  akin  to  this  view  is  that  meditation  upon  the 
sufferings  of  Christ  which  was  elaborated  in  the  Middle  Ages, 
and  continued  with  slight  changes  by  Luther  and  his  followers. 
There  exists  a  Latin  sermon-sketch  of  Luther's  of  the  year 


5a'>]        FORGIVENESS   BASED    UPON    THE    WORK    OF    CHRIST       567 

1519/  in  which  the  way  the  Catholic  preachers  had  of 
evoking  a  sympathy  with  Christ  which  ended  in  superficial 
emotion  is  first  dismissed;  and  then  three  principles  are 
brought  forward :  that  in  Christ's  passion  the  wrath  of  God 
is  manifest  and  compensation  is  made  for  the  sins  of  the 
beholder;  that  in  Christ's  readiness  to  suffer  there  appears 
God's  gracious  will  or  love  to  sinners ;  and  finally,  that  we 
have  to  take  an  example  from  Christ's  patience,  humility,  and 
self-denial.  This  line  of  thought  on  the  part  of  the  in- 
dividual Christian  naturally  presupposes  the  doctrine  of 
redemption ;  it  involves  both  the  principles  of  the  doctrine 
of  redemption,  Christ's  satisfaction  and  God's  love,  but  in  the 
opposite  order  to  that  in  which  they  appear  doctrinally ;  and 
it  ends  in  the  application  of  the  pattern  of  Christ,  which 
goes  beyond  the  doctrine.  Now  in  this  sketch  Luther  has  on 
the  whole  followed  the  mediaeval  models ;  he  also  appeals  to 
Bernard  and  Albertus  Magnus.  Only,  in  the  first  part, 
by  bringing  in  the  wrath  of  God  he  has  given  an  edge  to  the 
motive  for  shame ;  and  he  has  set  aside  that  distribution  of 
the  Bufferings  of  Christ  in  which  the  meditation  of  his  pre- 
decessors deliberately  indulged.  The  men  of  the  Middle 
Ages  intend,  on  the  one  hand,  methodically  to  evoke  sympathy 
and  responsive  love;  on  the  other  hand,  in  doing  so  they 
follow  out  the  idea  that  Christ's  sufferings  are  remedies 
against  sins,  and  the  sufferings  of  the  particular  parts  of 
His  body  means  for  the  restoration  of  our  corresponding 
organs  as  organs  of  righteousness.  This  combination  of  ideas 
suggests  the  prevalent  custom  of  painting  the  blood  and 
wounds   of   Christ.^     Luther  makes  no  use   of  this  in   the 

^  0pp.  var.  arg,  ad  hist  reform,  periin.  iii.  p.  410.   • 

'  Anselm,  Carduar.  Oratio  ii.  :  "Intuere  dolcem  natum  toto  corpore 
extenaum,  ceme  manus  innoxias  pio  manantes  eanguinc,  et  remitte  placatus 
scelera,  quae  patravcrunt  menus  meae.  Considera  inerme  latus  crudeli  per- 
fossnm  CQspide  et  renova  me  sacrosancto  fonte  illo,  quern  inde  iluxiase  credo. 
Vide  immaculata  vestigia,  quae  uon  steterunt  in  via  peccatorum,  sed  semper 
ambulavernnt  in  lege  tua,  diris  confixa  clavis ;  et  perfice  gressus  meos  in 
semitis  tuis,  facque  odio  habere  benignus  omnem  viam  iniquitatis.  .  .  .  Candet 
nudatum  pectus,  nibct  cruentum  latus,  tensa  arent  viscera,  decora  languent 
lumina,  rcgia  pallent  ora,  i»rocera  rig<nt  brachia,  crura  pendent  marniorea,  rigat 
terebratos  pedes  beati  sanguinis  unda.     Bpecta,  gloriose  gcnitor,  gratissimae 


568  JUSTIFICATION   AND   RECONCILIATION  [536 

above-mentioned  sketch  for  the  meditation  of  Christ's  passion. 
Nevertheless  the  mediaeval  models  have  again  come  to  exert 
an  influence  in  the  Lutheran  Church  since  the  seventeenth 
century,  and  have  been  imitated,  sometimes  with  more,  some- 
times with  less,  taste  in  poetry  and  prose.  Among  the  most 
valuable  hymns  of  this  kind  used  in  the  Church  are  Johann 
Heermann's  "  Herzliebster  Jesu,  was  hast  du  verbrochen "  and 
"  Jesu,  deine  tiefe  Wunden**  and  Paul  Gerhardt's  "  0  ffavpt 
voll  Blut  und  Wunden!'  The  last,  as  is  well  known,  is  a 
translation  of  the  seventh  hymn  of  Bernard's  Bhythmica 
CTotio  ad  ununiquodlibet  merribrorum  Christi  patientis  et  a  cruee 
pendentis.  Both  of  Heermann's  hymns  are  composed  after 
passages  from  pseudo-Augustinian  writings;  through  this 
channel  the  second  Oratio  of  Anselm  is  their  source.^  In  the 
first  hymn  the  same  arrangement  may  be  observed  as  that 
sketched  out  by  Luther.  Now  the  beauty  of  these  hymns  i& 
beyond  all  question,  and  I  do  not  mean  to  take  any  exception 
to  their  use  in  the  Church  on  Good  Friday,  though  they  were 
not  composed  for  that  purpose.  But  as  meditations  of  the 
individual  they  do  not  express  that  by  which  Good  Friday 
must  be  signalised  as  a  Festival — the  praise  of  reconciliation 
in  general,  and  the  founding  of  the  community  of  recon- 
ciliation. In  accordance  with  Catholic  models,  they  keep  to 
the  lines  of  the  idea  of  Good  Friday  as  a  day  of  mourning, 
mourning  being  referred  both  to  Christ's  sufferings  and  to 
men's  sins.  The  combination  of  comfort  and  good  resolutions 
with  which  they  close  is  treated,  in  keeping  with  the  character 
of  meditation,  quite  individually,  and  fails  to  stir  the  Chris- 
tian and  Churchly  common  feeling  which  should  be  directly 
excited  at  a  Festival. 

Another  formula  of  negative  meaning  appears  in  the 
statement  that  Christ  expiated  sin  by  His  passion.  Current 
as  this  formula  is  among  many  theologians  of  the  present 
day,  it  has   very    little  warrant  in    the    Biblical   circle   of 

prolis  lacerata  membra,  et  memorare  benignus,  quae  mea  est  substantia  .  .  . 
Vide  redemptoris  supplicium  et  remitte  redemti  delictum." 
^  Oeschichte  dcs  Pietismtis,  ii.  p.  64  ff. 


537]        FORGIVENESS    BASED   UPON   THE   WORK    OF   CHRIST       569 

thought.  For  the  German  word  SuhTVi — expiation — came 
into  use  in  this  department  merely  through  imitation  of  the 
false  Greek  translation  of  the  Hebrew  formula  of  sacrifice  (vol. 
ii.  p.  199).  In  itself  this  word  signifies  either  punishment 
or  peace.  Now,  if  the  formula  is  used  to  express  the  idea 
that  Christ  suffered  the  punishment  for  the  sins  of  humanity 
as  punishment,  I  repudiate  this  view  absolutely,  because  it 
stands  out  of  all  relation  to  the  Biblical  idea  of  sacrifice,  and, 
besides,  does  not  fit  the  facts  of  the  case.  It  is  still  more 
unsuitable  to  use  that  word  in  the  interpretation  of  Christ's 
death  as  a  penal  example.  The  question  remains  to  be 
considered,  then,  whether  it  yields  an  admissible  sense  to  say 
that  Christ  by  His  passion  established  peace  in  relation  to  the 
sins  of  humanity.  If  we  are  not  playing  with  words,  we 
must  not  confound  this  thought  with  the  content  of  the  idea 
of  reconciliation  which  we  have  hitherto  been  expounding. 
When  Christ  reconciles  sinners  with  God,  He  establishes 
peace  for  them  Godwards,  and  does  it  in  such  a  way  that 
they  enter  His  community.  This  is  a  very  different  thing 
from  the  literal  exposition  of  that  formula,  namely,  that 
Christ  reconciled  God  with  the  sins  of  pre-Christian  humanity, 
brought  Him  into  a  state  of  peace  with  their  sins.  For  God 
did  not  enter  into  the  relation  of  peace  with  pre-Christian 
humanity,  but  humanity,  in  the  form  of  the  community  of 
Christ,  attained  to  peace  with  God.  Therefore  Christ's 
expiation  of  the  sins  of  humanity,  or,  as  Hofmann  following 
CoUenbusch  expounds  it.  His  making  men  good  by  the 
counter-working  of  His  obedience  against  the  entire  sin  of 
mankind  (vol.  i.  pp.  611,  618),  can  have  no  reference  to  God. 
Thus  the  proposition  that  Christ  expiated  the  sin  of  humanity 
can  be  understood  only  in  reference  to  our  human,  Christian 
way  of  looking  at  the  matter.  The  compensation  for  the 
entire  sin  of  mankind  made  by  Christ's  personal  goodness, 
and  that,  too,  through  the  proof  He  gave  of  His  goodness  by 
voluntary  suffering,  as  also  through  His  demonstration  of 
loving  fellowship  with  an  apparently  lost  race,  reconciles  us  to 
our  participation  in  the  fate  of  our  race.     That,  however,  is 


570  JUSTIFICATION    AND   RKCONCILTATION  [537-8 

an  aesthetic  judgment,  not  a  necessary  religious  idea.  There- 
fore we  look  in  vain  for  traces  of  this  view  in  the  New 
Testament.  But  seeing  that  the  idea  has  been  once  formed, 
I  am  far  from  disputing  its  truth  in  its  own  sphere  or  its 
value.  For  it  serves  as  evidence  for  the  general  normality  of 
the  Christian  view  of  the  world,  that  the  event  which  denotes 
the  authoritative  revelation  of  God  should  at  the  same  time 
satisfy  our  aesthetic  and  moml  interest  in  the  destiny  of  our 
race.  Accordingly  I  understand  the  formula  to  mean  that 
our  tragic  participation  in  the  apparently  aimless,  and  there- 
fore vain  development  of  the  human  race,  is  brought  into 
harmony  with  our  aesthetic  sense  of  justice  by  the  fact  that 
perfect  human  goodness  not  only  appears  in  the  Person  of 
Christ,  but  also  displays  itself  in  that  condition  of  suffering 
which  falls  to  His  lot  in  accordance  with  the  law  of  history 
that  no  established  form  of  life  willingly  renounces  its  power. 
The  destruction  of  Him  Who  is  lawful  Ruler  in  the  sphere  of 
the  good,  through  the  tenacity  with  which  the  powers  which 
had  hitherto  been  dominant  maintained  themselves,  serves  to 
reconcile  us  aesthetically  even  with  this  despotic  manifestation 
of  sin,  because  in  the  very  sacrifice  of  His  life  we  discern 
Christ's  victory.  In  this  connection  it  is  evident  that  the 
aesthetic  satisfaction  derived  from  the  drama  of  Christ's  death 
presupposes  the  religious  recognition  of  His  worth ;  bat 
this  recognition  is  not  expressed  by  the  above  theory.  The 
formula,  then,  denotes  no  religious  knowledge  properly  so 
called,  and  therefore  is  not  a  proposition  forming  part  of 
Dogmatics.! 

A  definition  of  expiation  (Silhne),  which  was  introduced 
by  Stahl  ^  to  support  the  theory  of  penal  satisfaction  in  the 
suffering  of  Christ,  is  to  be  assigned  to  the  same  aesthetic 
form  of  theory.  Stahl,  indeed,  would  permit  us  to  apply 
this  idea  of  expiation  only  to  the  interpretation  of  Christ's 
death;  but  if  expiation  is  to  be  distinguished  from  passive 

*  The  view  of  Hiilsmann  {Beitragt  zur  ehruilichen  BrkenrUniss,  published  by 
Hollenber^%  1872,  p.  427  if.)  also  goes  on  the  lines  of  aesthetic  reflection. 

'  Fundamente  eiiier  chrisUichen  Philosophies  I  derive  my  knowledge  of  this 
work  from  Philippi,  KircMiehe  Ola^ihensUhre,  iv.  2,  p.  216  ff. 


538-9]    FORGIVENESS    BASED    UPON   THE    WORK    OF    CHRIST       571 

punislmient  by  the  fact  that  it  expresses  the  vohmtariness 
of  the  endurance  of  punishment,  this  sense  of  the  word  is 
also  applicable  to  the  case  of  a  criminal  who  does  not  receive 
his  merited  punishment  passively,  or  at  all  unwillingly,  but 
consents  to  its  infliction  upon  him.  Stahl's  interpretation 
therefore  narrows  the  ordinary  idea  of  expiation.  For  ex- 
piation means  punishment  in  general,  whether  the  criminal 
consents  to  it  or  not.  If,  however,  we  regard  a  case  of  crime 
as  a  drama  in  which  the  criminars  positive  guilt  excites  our 
tragic  sympathy  by  reason  of  its  complication  with  the  com- 
mon guilt  of  the  society  around  him,  yet,  as  soon  as  the 
criminal  acknowledges  his  personal  guilt  and  the  justice  of 
his  punishment,  a  dififerent  impression  is  left  from  that 
received  in  the  opposite  case.  We  have  a  feeling  of 
reconciliation  in  so  far  as  the  criminal  imputes  to  himself 
and  takes  upon  himself  the  culpable  influences  of  society. 
On  this  presupposition  it  follows  that  both  the  possible 
meanings  of  expiation  are  embraced  in  the  definition  of 
the  word  given  by  Stahl.  The  punishment  which  the 
criminal  willingly  takes  upon  himself  awakens  the  sense 
of  aesthetic  satisfaction  in  the  sympathetic  observer,  in  so 
far  as  it  forms  the  moral  conclusion  of  an  immoral  develop- 
ment of  life.  I  would  add,  however,  that  such  a  case  as 
this  has  no  connection  whatever  with  the  interpretation  of 
Christ's  fate.  On  the  contrary,  our  very  sense  of  aesthetic 
justice  would  be  ofifended  if  the  unmerited  suffering  of  the 
Righteous  were  estimated  by  the  value  of  a  vicarious  penal 
satisfaction. 

The  predominantly  negative  mode  of  defining  the  saving 
work  of  Christ  is  favoured,  in  the  last  place,  by  the  fact  that 
in  Protestant  Dogmatics  and  ascetic  literature  the  problem 
of  sanctification  is  generally  treated  in  the  negative  sense 
of  the  renunciation  of  sin  and  the  world.  By  this  negative 
definition  of  the  principle  of  ethics  I  think  I  may  explain  the 
fact,  that  Oetinger  and  Menken  make  their  entirely  positive 
estimate  of  Christ's  personal  righteousness  subordinate  to  the 
negative  purpose  that  human  nature  may  thereby  be  made 


572  JUSTIFICATION    AND    RECONCILIATION  [53»H0 

sinless.  Begarding  the  barrenness  of  this  assertion,  I  need 
add  nothing  to  the  previous  discussion  (§  57).  But  in  the 
theological  circle  which  follows  Bengel  and  Oetinger,  the 
latter's  idea  of  the  conflict  of  Christ  with  the  devil  and  the 
wrath  of  God,  which  goes  farther  back  to  the  authority  of 
Luther,  is  wont  to  be  understood  in  an  essentially  negative 
sense.  Now,  assuming  that  we  understand  the  opposition 
of  Christ's  adversaries  to  Him  better  if  we  interpret  it 
as  a  specific  action  of  the  devil,  we  may  still  inquire 
how  much  light  this  casts  upon  the  valuable  content  of 
Christ's  life.  Christ  did  not  come  into  contact  with  God's 
wrath;  Luther's  utterances  pointing  in  that  direction  are 
based  on  a  misunderstanding.  But  in  what  does  a  spiritual 
conflict  with  the  untruthfulness  and  wickedness  of  others 
consist,  but  in  a  man's  speaking  the  known  truth  and  doing 
his  duty  in  accordance  with  his  vocation  ?  The  idea  of 
Christ's  conflict,  therefore,  does  not  carry  us  a  step  beyond 
the  judgment  of  the  value  of  His  fidelity  in  His  vocation, 
but  shows  that  we  were  right  in  determining  precisely  by 
the  latter  our  estimate  of  the  significance  of  Christ  for 
salvation.  Even  the  polemical  discourses  of  Christ,  by 
which  the  idea  of  His  conflict  with  Satan  must  be  measured, 
denote  nothing  more  than  the  application  of  His  know- 
ledge of  the  true  religion  —  the  knowledge  implied  in 
His  vocation — to  the  judgment  of  the  characteristics  which 
belong  to  the  false  religion  and  its  adherents.  If  the 
idea  of  a  conflict  is '  attached  to  this  because  the  dis- 
courses are  so  pointed  and  therefore  so  humiliating,  and 
because  the  absence  of  all  passion  and  exaggeration,  and  of 
all  violation  of  the  truth  contrasts  so  strongly  with  the 
loathsome  calumny  which  constitutes  the  most  characteristic 
mark  of  Satan  in  the  adversaries  of  Christ  and  everywhere, 
yet  Christ's  conduct,  even  in  this  situation,  only  gives  ex- 
pression to  the  fact  that  He  was  maintaining  the  position 
called  for  by  His  vocation. 

The  idea  of  a  conflict  of  Christ  with  the  devil  is  not, 
however,  confined  to  these  relations,  but  is  supposed  to  be 


540-1]    FORGIVENESS   BASED   UPON   TttE   WORK    OF    CHRIST       573 

proved  by  the  fact  that  Christ,  throughout  His  whole  life, 
offered  resistance  to  all  kinds  of  ever-recurring  temptations, 
and  precisely  in  this  way  fought  and  conquered  the  devil, 
who  wanted  to  make  Him  unfaithful  to  His  task.     This  con- 
ception also  would  issue  in  the  maintenance  of  His  fidelity 
in  His  vocation  being  aflBrmed,  but  would  modify  the  idea  of 
His  fidelity  in  a  peculiar  way.     It  is  therefore  necessary  to 
examine  the  statement  more  closely.     Temptation  is  a  cause 
of  possible  sin,  originating  in  an  impulse,  the  satisfaction  of 
which  appears  on   first  thoughts  to  be  in  itself  legitimate. 
The  excitation  of  an  impulse  which  appears  from  the  outset 
to  be  unlawful,  and  so  evil,  does  not  give  rise  to  temptation,  but 
is  a  phenomenon  of  sinful  propensity.    It  is  therefore  a  signal 
mistake  to  refer  the  well-known  saying  of  James  (i.  14,  15), 
as  is  generally  done,  to  evil  desire.     Christ  was  also  exposed 
to  temptation,  simply  because  a  temptation  is  always  bound 
up  with  an  inclination  which  is  at  the  outset  morally  legiti- 
mate or  permissible.     It  was  the  impulse,  in  itself  lawful,  of 
self-preservation  which  led  to  Christ's  desire  to  be  spared  the 
suffering  of  death.     But  this  gave  rise  to  a  temptation  to  sin, 
because  the  wish  collided  with   His   duty  in  His  vocation. 
Christ,  however,  did   not  consent  to   this   temptation.     He 
renounced  His  self-preservation,  because  He  assented  to  the 
Divine  disposal  of  the  end  of  His  life  as  a  consequence  of 
His  vocation.     If  Christ,  then,  before  His  entrance  upon  His 
public  work  was  tempted  by  Satan,  the  idea  that  the  tempta- 
tions which  affected  Him  were  entangled  with  the  kingdom 
of  sin  cannot  have  been  His  first  impression  of  them.     For 
no  man  of  moral  worth  will  find  a  temptation  in  a  situation 
in  which  he  from  the  outset  recognises  Satan.     Those  ex- 
periences of  Christ  must  therefore  be  understood  to  mean 
that  the  impulses  which  became  temptations  to  Him,  because 
they  at  first  appeared  legitimate,  were  in  due  time  condemned 
by  Him  because  their  satisfaction  would  entangle  Him  in  the 
kingdom  of  evil.     Now,  the  more  mature   the   moral  cha- 
racter is,  the  more  comprehensive  and  penetrating  the  insight 
into  one's  position  relatively  to  the  world,  the  surer  one's  judg- 


574  JUSTIFICATION   AND   RECONCILIATION  [541-2 

ment  of  the  possible  relations  of  the  momentary  situation — 
then  the  more  seldom  does  temptation  occur,  and  all  the 
easier  will  the  decision  against  it  prove. 

On  the  other  hand,  an  inward  conflict  sets  in  under 
these  circumstances,  if  we  swing  round,  and,  under  a  painful 
sense  of  want  of  freedom  and  decision,  bring  before  our 
minds  the  possibility  of  our  adopting  resolutions  of  an 
opposite  moral  tendency.  Is  it  supposed,  then,  that  this 
was  the  regular  course  of  Christ's  inner  life  before  He 
arrived  at  good  and  dutiful  conduct,  and  courageous  utter- 
ance of  the  truth,  and  open  censure  of  His  adversaries? 
For  this  is  the  only  form  in  which  I  can  conceive  a  con- 
tinuous inner  conflict  with  Satan.  Now  he  who  makes 
this  assertion,  even  if  but  indirectly,  in  the  first  place 
imports  into  the  Evangelical  story  aspects  of  which  it 
betrays  just  as  little  trace  as  it  does  of  that  development  of 
Christ's  consciousness  of  Himself  and  His  vocation  which 
others  seek  in  the  sources.  Further,  this  assumption  of  an 
ever-recurring  vacillation  between  extreme  moral  opposites 
shows  but  a  small  degree  of  understanding  of,  and  esteem 
for,  Christ's  character,  a  degree  which  is  least  of  all  com- 
patible with  pretensions  to  a  peculiarly  believing  mind  and 
exclusive  orthodoxy.  If  anything  in  the  Evangelical  story 
is  authentic,  it  is  the  impression  of  Christ's  tranquil  and 
steadfast  character,  withdrawn  into  itself  from  the  vacillation 
which  commonly  prevails,  remote  from  all  passionate  and 
painful  excitement;  and  if  on  occasion  the  perfidy  of  His 
adversaries  moves  Him  to  indignation,  yet  this  is  ennobled 
by  sorrow  for  their  hardness  of  heart,  and  balanced  by  the 
perfect  goodness  of  His  disposition  and  by  His  Divine 
patience.  What  do  people  mean,  then,  by  asserting  a  conflict 
of  Christ  with  Satan,  more  than  is  expressed  by  affirming 
His  positive  fulfilment  of  His  vocation,  with  uninterrupted 
fidelity  to  that  vocation,  with  the  conduct  and  speech  which 
are  worthy  of  it,  with  inviolable  patience  under  aU  the 
suffering,  even  the  most  intense,  which  was  allotted  to  Him 
in  consequence  of    His  vocation,  and   which    He    willingly 


542-3]    FORGIVENESS   BASED   UPON   THE   WORK    OF    CHRIST       575 

accepted  as  the  expression  of  Divine  providence !  In  this 
way  Christ  demonstrated  for  Himself  His  Father's  relation 
to  Him  as  His  Son  and  Bevealer;  in  this  way  He  made 
possible  the  community  of  the  children  of  God,  who  share  His 
nature.  If  Christ,  however,  at  the  same  time  vanquished  the 
devil  for  Himself  by  withstanding  all  the  temptations  which, 
had  they  taken  effect,  would  have  dragged  Him  down  into  the 
kingdom  of  sin,  yet  that  does  not  in  any  way  secure  the  com- 
munity founded  by  Him  against  the  possibility  of  a  countless 
number  of  its  members  falling  away  to  Satan,  and  even  of 
certain  undertakings  in  the  Church  being  drawn  directly 
into  the  service  of  the  devil.  How,  then,  can  it  be  asserted 
in  the  face  of  Church  history  that  Christ  by  His  victory 
over  the  devil  altogether  withdrew  His  believing  followers 
from  the  latter's  power  ? 

Hofmann's  view  of  reconciliation  also  contains  no  refer- 
ence to  Christ's  conflict  with  Satan.  "  Christ's  life,  which 
manifested  itself  in  His  obedience  in  His  vocation  even  unto 
death,  is  itself  reconciliation,  because  in  that  life  God 
carried  out  without  interruption  His  loving  fellowship  with 
the  one  sinless  member  of  humanity,  and  because  Christ 
passed  through  this  experience  not  for  Himself,  but  in  His 
destiny  as  the  Beginner  of  the  new  humanity  which  is  His 
community  "  (vol.  i.  p.  618).  This  is  a  thoroughly  positive 
conception  of  the  matter,  in  which  the  value  of  Christ's  life 
is  quite  positively  defined.  But  the  agreement  between 
Hofmann  and  myself  has  its  limits.  If  we  ask  what  con- 
stitutes the  new  relation  between  God  and  humanity  which 
is  brought  about  by  the  perfecting  of  Christ's  obedience  in 
His  vocation,  Hofmann's  readers  always  stumble  upon  the 
negative  formula  that  this  relation  is  no  longer,  like  the 
previous  one,  conditioned  by  sin.  He,  too,  has  failed  to 
observe  that  this  formula,  which  primarily  exactly  suits  the 
idea  of  forgiveness,  requires  to  be  supplemented  by  the 
positive  idea  of  eternal  life,  or  the  freedom  of  the  children 
of  God  over  the  world.  As  he  did  not  derive  the  latter 
datum  from  the  source  of  his  theology,  and  did  not  extend 


576  JUSTIFICATION   AND   RECONCILIATION  [543-4 

his  investigation  of  Scripture  to  this  point,  his  incomplete 
account  of  reconciliation  le€uls  to  an  effort  to  extract  from 
Christ's  passion  still  another  meaning  than  that  it  is  the 
occasion  of  a  special  proof  of  His  obedience  in  His  vocatioiL 
This  is  how  we  are  to  regard  Hofmann's  formula,  that  in 
Christ's  life  and  suffering  God  manifested  not  onlj  His  will 
of  love  towards  humanity,  but  also  His  hatred  against  sin, 
since  the  creative  beginning  of  a  new  relation  between  God 
and  humanity  did  not  take  place  without  the  corresponding 
conclusion  of  the  previous  sin-determined  relation.  The 
question  has  to  be  considered  whether  Hofmann  himself,  in 
his  view  of  Christ's  life,  has  carried  out  the  intended  co- 
ordination of  both  the  points  of  view — Gt)d's  loving  will 
towards  humanity  and  His  hatred  of  sin. 

We  may  actively  manifest  our  hatred  or  abhorrence  of 
sin,  if  we  have  the  power  and  ability  to  do  so,  in  either  a  l^al 
or  a  moral  way.  We  may,  if  we  have  the  power,  deprive  sin 
of  its  pretended  rights  by  punishment.  Or  we  may,  if  we 
have  the  ability,  show  our  abhorrence  of  it  by  the  practice 
of  the  good,  to  which  there  pertain  as  accidents  censure  of 
sin,  its  contrary,  and  readiness  to  suffer  under  the  sin  of 
others  rather  than  acquiesce  in  it.  Hofmann  himself  would 
not  have  the  first  case  applied  to  Christ's  death.  The 
second  case  he  asserts,  inasmuch  as  he  embraces  all  the 
valuable  phenomena  in  Christ's  life  under  His  obedience  in 
His  vocation,  an  obedience  which  exhibits  God's  fellowship 
of  love  with  Him,  and  at  the  same  time  represents  the 
beginning  of  the  new  humanity.  Now,  in  knowing  as  in 
willing,  every  position  established  in  a  certain  direction  is 
the  denial  of  the  opposite  direction.  It  is  therefore  impos- 
sible to  see  how  God's  hatred  against  sin  could  be  manifested 
in  Christ's  work  of  living  and  suffering  otherwise  them  in  the 
setting  forth  of  the  good  by  His  perfect  obedience  in  His 
vocation,  an  obedience  which  includes  acquiescence  in  the 
sufferings  inflicted  by  the  representatives  of  sin.  Hofmann 
himself,  now,  is  not  in  a  position  to  escape  from  this  line 
of  thought ;  he  cannot  conceive  the  circumstances  of  Christ  s 


544-6]    FORGIVENESS    BASED    UPON   THE   WOBK    OF    CHRIST      577 

suffering  such  that  they  would  be  to  him  an  exhibition  of 
God's  hatred  of  sin  apart  from  their  subordination  to  Christ's 
positive  obedience  in  His  vocation.  For  he  says  that  Christ 
gave  Himself  up  to  God's  wrath  against  men  and  to  Satan's 
power  over  them  in  order  to  perfect  His  obedience  by  sub- 
jecting it  to  the  severest  trial  which  could  befall  it,  and  in 
order  so  to  experience  the  consequences  of  sin  that  His  last 
and  extremest  suffering  should  also  be  the  consummation  of 
His  obedience}  Hofmann's  doctrine,  then,  may  appear  to  enjoy 
the  advantage  of  having  proved  that  Christ's  passion  com- 
prised not  only  His  positive  achievement  towards  reconcilia- 
tion, but  in  addition  to  that  a  negative  operation  of  the 
Divine  hatred  against  sin ;  but  while  he  did,  indeed,  attempt 
to  create  this  impression,  yet  in  reality  he  kept  to  the  lines 
of  that  positive  view  and  interpretation  of  Christ's  achieve- 
ment towards  reconciliation  which  alone  is  fitted  to  establish 
the  positive  inference  of  eternal  life. 

§  59.  The  individual,  too,  can  pronounce  forgiveness  or 
justification,  reconciliation]  and  adoption  into  Divine  sonship, 
to  be  his  possession,  only  in  virtue  of  his  attaching  himself 
to  Christ's  life-work  as  a  whole.  For  we  have  this  pos- 
session only  as  members  of  the  religious  community  of 
Christ,  as  the  result  of  the  incalculable  and  mysterious 
interaction  between  our  own  freedom  and  the  determining 
influences  of  fellowship;  and  this  fellowship  is  possible  in 
its  own  order  only  through  Christ's  unique  life-course  in 
its  weU-known  double  aspect,  and  its  continuous  action 
through  all  the  ages.  The  condition  of  faith,  through  which 
the  individual  knows  himself  to  be  justified  by  Christ  or 
reconciled  with  Christ,  alters  nothing  in  the  connection  of 
ideas  which  I  have  set  forth.  Certainly  there  is  in  no  case 
either  a  mechanical  or  a  logical  necessity  laid  upon  indi- 
viduals to  join  themselves  in  faith  to  the  existing  Christian 
community.  Faith  begins  in  harmony  with  the  law  of 
freedom.  It  cannot  be  calculated  beforehand  whether  Christ 
will  find  faith,  and  the  fact  that  He  found  it  was  no  more 

^  SchiUzsehriftenf  Pt.  i.  p.  9. 

37 


578  JUSTIFICATION   AND    RECONCILIATION  [545-€ 

determined  beforehand  than  the  purpose  in  general  guarantees 
the  result.  But  after,  in  this  case,  the  result  has  happened, 
the  guiding  purpose  of  its  Author  provides  the  standard  by 
which  it  is  to  be  judged.  The  individual  can  experience  the 
peculiar  effect  which  proceeds  from  Christ  only  in  connection 
with  the  community  founded  by  Him,  and  on  the  pre- 
supposition of  its  existence.  The  assurance  of  Divine  grace 
is  bound  up  with  this  economy,  and  with  nothing  else. 
This  is  also  the  meaning  of  the  5th  and  7th  Articles  of  the 
Augsburg  Confession.  For  religion  is  always  social  Christ 
did  not  aim  at  any  action  upon  men  which  would  merely 
be  a  moral  instruction  of  individuals*  On  the  contrary,  His 
purpose  in  the  latter  direction  was  subordinated  to  the  crea- 
tion of  the  new  religion.  The  individual  believer,  therefore, 
can  rightly  understand  his  position  relatively  to  God  only 
as  meaning  that  he  is  reconciled  by  God  through  Christ  in 
the  community  founded  by  Christ.  The  fellowship  with  God 
through  Christ  which  is  thus  conditioned  is  the  intelligible  and 
valuable  content  of  the  faith  which  is  specifically  conscious 
of  itself.  Now  if,  on  account  of  Eom.  iv.  5,  we  are  to  adopt 
the  formula  that  faith  is  counted  for  righteousness,  this 
proposition  can  be  imderstood  in  harmony  with  our  leading 
line  of  thought  only  as  meaning  that  we  esteem  faith  as  tbe 
subjective  manifestation  of  fellowship  with  Christ.  For  it  is 
just  Christ's  value  for  God,  and  the  determining  influence  of 
Christ's  fellowship  with  him  upon  the  subject,  which  forms 
the  ground  on  which  the  latter  is  justified,  i.e,  admitted  in 
spite  of  his  sins  to  fellowship  with  God.^  On  the  other  hand, 
the  proposition  would  not  be  understood  as  Paul  himself 
meant  it,  if  faith  were  interpreted  as  a  self-activity,  with  a 
contcTd  due  to  the  subject  himself 

Bepeated  reference  (vol.  L  pp.  359,  626 ;  supra^  pp.  84, 
107)  has  been  made  to  the  fact  that  this  perversion  of  the 
Eeformation  view  was  brought  about  in  the  circles  of  Pietism. 

^  As  often  as  the  formula  that  faith  justifies  occurs  in  the  Apology  of  th£ 
Augsburg  Cotifession,  wo  see  clearly  that  it  is  an  inexact  expression,  which  has 
to  be  supplemented  and  corrected  bj  the  ideas  expressed  aboTe. 


546-7]    FOBGIVBNKSS   BASED   UPON   THE   WOKK   OF   CHRIST      579 

Now  just  as  the  phenomenon  of  Pietism  was  possible  at  all  in 
the  Lutheran  and  the  Reformed  Church  only  on  the  pre- 
supposition that  the  teleological  relation  of  the  idea  of  justifi- 
cation to  eternal  life  as  consisting  in  freedom  over  the  world 
had  been  forgotten,  so  that  distortion  of  the  conception  of 
justification  is  to  be  explained  especially  by  the  fact  that 
more  attention  was  directed  to  the  efforts  of  the  subject  after 
a  lively  and  sensible  faith  than  to  the  object,  which  was  for 
the  Eeformers  the  principal  thing.  According  to  this  view, 
the  believer  is  justified  ^  on  account  of  his  resolve  to  believe, 
as  subject  of  the  principle  of  the  sinless  life.  This  result  is 
also  partly  due  to  the  circumstance  that  the  idea  of  righteous- 
ness, which  as  an  attribute  of  the  believer  is  derived  from  the 
judgment  of  God,  is  understood,  in  accordance  with  orthodoxy, 
as  equivalent  to  moral  perfection.  The  tacit  assumption  that 
God  can  have  communion  only  with  the  morally  perfect 
(§  14),  led  to  the  interpretation  of  justification  in  the  sense 
that  God  imputes  the  moral  perfection  of  Christ  to  believers, 
and  therefore  regards  them  as  perfect  though  they  are  not  so. 
This  mode  of  arriving  at  the  judgment  of  God  is  abandoned 
in  Fietistic  circles,  but  in  its  place  there  is  constructed  the 
formula  that  God  imputes  to  the  believer  the  moral  perfec- 
tion which  is  contained  in  faith  as  the  principle  of  the 
new  life  that  is  beginning;  and  Getinger  and  Sothe  at 
the  same  time  asserted  that  God  in  this  way  anticipates 
His  judgment  upon  the  course  of  the  believer's  moral  life 
(voL  i.  pp.  552,  610).  We  can  here  perceive  how  much 
this  divergent  account  of  justification  is  dominated  by  that 
definition  of  the  idea  which  prevails  in  the  school  from 
whose  doctrines  in  other  respects  these  very  writers  desire  so 
widely  to  dififer.  This,  however,  is  a  phenomenon  of  frequent 
occurrence  in  theology,  that  the  most  glaring  inconsistencies 
are  connected  with  the  fact  that  we  imconsciously  take 
over  from  our  opponent  the  very  point  on  which  they 
turn. 

It  is  still  necessary  to  subject  to  criticism  this  Fietistic 

^  [Gereehtgeiproehen,  pronounced  righteous.] 


580  JUSTIFICATION   AND   RECONCILIATION  [547-S 

theory  in  a  modernised  form.  Sulze  ^  expresses  himself  as 
follows :  "  In  repentance  the  power  of  Divine  grace  which 
entered  our  soul  at  our  enlightenment  and  was  received  by 
us  in  faith,  i.e.  with  trust,  fights  the  decisive  battle  with  sin. 
The  power  of  sin  is  thus  broken  at  its  centre.  CertaiDly 
that  does  not  yet  make  us  perfectly  righteous  and  sinless. 
The  development  of  life  in  us,  of  which  God  is  the  Author, 
has  only  gained  a  vigorous  beginning  in  us.  God  in  His 
grace  regards  this  beginning  as  the  completion,  for  indeed  He 
is  the  Author  of  it.  God  Himself  best  knows  the  omni- 
potence of  the  Divine  love  which  is  now  in  us.  Therefore 
He  can  have  full  confidence  regarding  us,  that  the  completion 
will  not  fail  the  beginning.  On  the  ground  of  this  assurance 
He  regards  us  as  righteous  though  we  are  not  yet  so.  We 
believe  in  this  judgment  of  God,  and  therefore  also  r^rd 
ourselves  as  righteous,  and  have  the  full  joy  of  our  sancti- 
fication  just  as  if  we  were  already  righteous.  Thus,  on  both 
sides,  faith  is  a  representation  of  the  future  as  present" 
The  rights  of  religion  are  claimed  for  this  interpretation  as 
against  the  traditional  view  that  justification  is  brought  about 
by  God,  because  we  believe  in  the  satisfaction  of  Christ,  which 
He  made  to  God  for  us  and  by  which  the  tension  between 
justice  and  love  in  God  is  removed.  For  this  historical 
knowledge  has  as  such  no  religious  value  and  no  trust- 
worthiness. Further,  the  need  of  satisfaction  before  foi^ve- 
ness  is  provided  for  by  the  fact  that  in  our  earnest  repentance 
the  Spirit  of  God,  Who  is  in  us  through  r^eneration, 
innocently  suffers  for  the  sin  of  the  old  man,  and  by  doing  so 
testifies  that  by  the  rule  of  Divine  justice  punishment  follows 
guilt,  though  punishment  as  such  is  now  removed.  Justi- 
fication, however,  is  bound  up  with  Christ,  since  humanity 
as  a  whole  first  becomes  acceptable  to  God  in  £Um  as  its 
Head,  and  then  the  Divine  life  of  the  individual  believer, 
which  God  regards  as  righteousness,  is  awakened  by  Christ 

^  Die  ffauptpwikie  der  kirMiehen  Gtavhetul^n  mit  den  WorUn  dtr 
Bekewnlniest  dargestellt  vnd  an  der  heil.  Schrift  wttd  den  Farderunffen  da 
Olaubene  gepruft,  1862,  p.  87  ff. 


548-9]    FORGIVENESS   BASED   UPON   THE   WORK   OF   CHRIST      581 

Conformity  to  the  image  of  the  Lord  is  of  course  brought 
about,  not  by  the  inculcation  of  a  system  of  doctrine  regard- 
ing Him,  but  by  free  and  unconstrained  love  to  Him,  and 
in  this  way,  through  the  righteousness  of  Christ,  there  is 
wrought  in  us  the  righteousness  which  justifies  us.  In  par- 
ticular, the  death  of  Christ  serves  to  beget  in  us  the  new 
life,  through  the  power  which  this  event  exercises  upon 
the  heart,  inasmuch  as  by  it  sin  is  broken  at  the  very  heart 
of  the  life  of  this  world. 

The  same  principle,  exhibiting  the  same  opposition  be- 
tween the  religious  and  moral  interest  and  the  juristic  form 
of  the  traditional  doctrine  of  reconciliation,  is  asserted  by 
Hanne^  as  an  expression  of  the  "modern"  religious  view: 
"  That  we  may  stand  as  righteous  before  God,  that  is,  that 
we  may  get  rid  of  the  burden  of  sin  and  the  condemnation 
felt  in  our  conscience,  we  ought  no  longer  to  remain  siimers, 
but  must  become  quite  other  men.     This  takes  place  when 
we  turn  the  whole  heart  to  God  and  receive  Christ  inwardly, 
that  with  Him  and  through  Him,  God's  Son,  we  ourselves 
may  become  children  of  God.     When  we  have  become  one 
with  Christ  by  faith,  that  is,  when  we  begin  to  strive  with 
all  our  energy  to  become  children  of  God,  we  appear  before 
God  as    such — as   His    children  whose   sin   He   graciously 
forgives  in  view  of  the  future   complete  dominion  of  the 
Christian  spirit  in  us.       For  we  are    not,  indeed,  perfect 
forthwith ;  but  we  have  in  us  the  power  which  irresistibly 
changes  us  and  necessarily  brings  us  in  the  end   to  per- 
fection.    In  view  of  this  certain  event  in  the  future  God 
declares    us   righteous,   and    removes   from    our    conscience 
the  burden  of  sin.     The  fact  that  we  are  for  the  present 
still  weak  in  the  new  life,  and  imperfect  beginners,  is  not 
taken  into  account  in  view  of  the  future,  which  must  be 
entirely  different,  and  which  has  already  planted  in  us  its 
shoots  and  sprouts,  from  which  the  full  flower  is  slowly  but 
surely   developed.       Thus  it  is   only  by  actually    receiving 
Christ  into  our  inner  life  that  we  arrive  at  peace  of  conscience 

^  Der  ideale  utuI  der  gescMchUiche  ChrUtus^  1871,  p.  15. 


582  JUSTinCATION   and   reconciliation  [649-50 

and  blessedness.  By  this  path  of  rel^ous  and  moral  renewal 
alone  does  the  sinner,  according  to  the  modem  view,  become 
a  Christian  and  receive  true  salvation." 

Now  this  line  of  thought  is  not  in  truth  so  very  modem ; 
for  it  is  as  a  whole  the  creed  of  Bohme  and  Dippel,  who 
regard   the  imitation  of   Christ's  death  and  resurrection  in 
continual  repentance  as  the  righteousness  which  is  by  faitL 
The  mystical  background    of   this  theory  is  also  indicated 
clearly  enough  by  Sulze,  when  he  makes  the  life  of  God  in 
the  believer  the  central  idea,  and  indirectly  by  Hanne,  when 
he  emphasises  at  the  cost  of  moral  freedom  the  necessity  and 
irresistibility  of  the  principle  working  in  the  believer.     But 
the  direct  descent  of  the  accordant  formulae  of  SuLse  and 
Hanne  can  be  traced  back  through  Rothe  and  Schleiermacher 
to  Oetinger,  and  in  particular  to  Kant.    Exegetical  proof  from 
the  New  Testament  can  be  claimed  for  this  doctrine,  only 
if  we  assume  that  the  contents  of  the  sixth  chapter  of  the 
Epistle  to  the  Bomans  and  Paul's  other  utterances  to  the  same 
effect  do  not  indicate  a  secondary  line  of  thought,  but  the 
central  point  of  his  view  of  Christianity.     But  I  at  least 
cannot  believe  that  (vol.  ii.  p.  226).    In  this  theory  the  moral 
transformation  of  the  individual  is  in  itself  set  forth  as  the 
proper  purpose   of  Christianity,  and  the   religious  factor  is 
taken  into  account  only  in   the  sense  that  God  recognises 
beforehand  the  eflTect  which  the  spiritual  action  of  Christ  will 
have  upon  the  formation  of    the    believer's  good  character. 
The  need  for  this  judgment  of  God  is  explained  by  saying 
that  it  is  the  condition  on  which  the  conscience  is  delivered 
from  the  burden  of  guilt,  and  the  true  joy  of  sanctification 
called  forth.     Now  when  the  individual  as  such  is  compared 
with  Christ  and  brought  into  connection  with  Him,  Christ's 
action  upon  him  is  supposed  to  mean  that  he  receives  Christ 
into  himself  as  his  ruling  ideal,  and  gives  up  the  sinful  direc- 
tion of  his  will  by  a  free  resolution,  the  possibility  of  which 
depends  upon  the  conception  that  Christ  admitted  no  sin  into 
His  own  soul.     For  this  idea  has  still  to  be  supplemented  if 
we   are  to  understand  the  power  which  the  death  of  Christ 


550-1]    FORGIVENESS   BASED    UPON   THE    WORK    OF    CHRIST      583 

must  exercise  upon  the  heart,  in  so  far  as  that  death  effects 
the  destruction  of  sin  as  a  whole. 

The  advocates  of  this  view  are  justified  in  emphasising 
the  opposition  between  their  theory  and  the  traditional  theory 
of  the  Evangelical  Church.  For  they  exalt  the  interest  of  the 
individual's  moral  transformation  above  the  religious  interest 
of  Christianity,  no  less  distinctly  than  the  orthodox  doctrine 
is  calculated  to  exalt  the  common  religious  transformation 
above  the  moral  renewal  of  the  individual.  Thus  we  see 
that  the  modem  theory  is  analogous  to  Socinianism,  though 
it  generally  uses  means  which  are  derived  from  "  holiness  "- 
Pietism.  This  judgment  is  confirmed  in  particular  by  the 
way  in  which  the  Divine  sentence  of  justification  is  inter- 
preted. For  the  principle  of  the  new  life,  which  in  spite 
of  its  imperfect  working  out  in  the  believer  is  to  be  regarded 
as  factually  identical,  with  individual  moral  perfection,  is 
equivalent  to  the  practical  obedience  of  faith  which,  according 
to  the  Socinian  doctrine,  God  regards  in  spite  of  its  defects  as 
empirically  perfect.  Now,  if  the  advocates  of  this  theory  urge 
against  orthodoxy  that  the  imputation  of  the  moral  righteous- 
ness of  Christ  to  the  individual  would  indicate  a  self-deception 
on  God's  part,  and  that  it  is  impossible  to  see  how  this 
assumption  serves  for  the  appeasement  of  the  conscience  and 
for  moral  impulse — I  too  am  unable  to  understand  how  the 
assumption  of  a  Divine  judgment  upon  the  new  life  of  the 
believer,  which  does  not  correspond  with  the  believer's  judg- 
ment of  himself,  can  have  any  value  for  the  latter.  It  may 
be  true  that  God  knows  the  individual  man  more  thoroughly 
than  it  is  possible  for  him  to  know  himself,  and  in  particular 
that  God  for  the  moment  regards  the  man  as  precisely  the 
opposite  of  what  he  appears  to  himself  to' be,  in  good  as  well 
as  in  eviL  But  what  will  the  result  be  if,  in  addition  to 
denying  the  conditions  of  freedom,  we  inculcate  upon  our- 
selves a  faith  in  our  own  perfection  on  the  ground  of  the 
theoretical  persuasion  that  God,  in  accordance  with  conditions 
of  His  knowledge  inaccessible  to  us,  regards  us  as  perfect  ? 
Will  the  appeasement  of  the  conscience  and  the  joy  of  sancti- 


584  JUSTIFICATION   AND   BEOONCILIATION  [S51-2 

fication  keep  theii'  proper  limits  on  these  terms  ?  I  should 
imagine  that  if  this  were  the  case  it  would  be  very  accidental. 
It  is  therefore  probable  that  a  mistake  has  been  committed 
at  this  point,  the  more  so  as  along  with  the  intention  to 
oppose  orthodoxy  there  goes  the  admission  of  the  idea — 
not  clearly  discarded  by  orthodoxy — that  in  justification  the 
question  at  issue  is  the  recognition  of  our  moral  perfection. 

The  same  dependence  on  the  form  of  doctrine  which  is 
regarded  as  orthodox  Lutheran — ^namely,  that  justification  has 
reference  to  the  individual  as  such — leads  in  the  case  of 
another  representative  of  modem  Christianity  to  the  thesis 
that  the  action  of  Christ  is  to  be  appropriated  through  the 
imitation  of  His  religious  and  moral  uniqueness.  Christ's 
decisive  and  permanent  value  for  humanity  consists,  according 
to  Schwalb,^  in  His  beiug  our  example ;  and  he  says  it  is  no 
innovation,  but  the  practice  of  faith  from  the  earliest  times,  to 
strive  after  likeness  to  Christ  in  His  Divine  Sonship,  i,e.  His 
peculiar  consciousness  of  God  as  His  Father,  and,  further,  to 
copy  His  moral  purity.  Now  this  preacher  is  certainly  right 
in  saying  that  his  programme  of  the  imitation  of,  or  assimila- 
tion to,  Christ  is  nothing  new ;  it  is  in  truth  the  formula  of 
practical  Christianity  in  the  Middle  Ages,  which  coincides 
with  the  monastic  endeavour  to  renounce  the  world.  It  will 
have  to  be  shown  later  how  this  task  was  modified  in  the 
Protestant  sense  (§  68);  but  in  any  case  this  change  in  the 
idea  is  not  adverted  to  by  Schwalb.  He  can  only  appeal  to 
the  way  in  which  the  example  of  Christ  is  developed  in  the 
IVue  Christianity  of  Johann  Arndt,  as  the  standard  of  all  the 
relations  of  life.  Likeness  to  Christ  is  set  forth  in  certain 
statements  of  Paul  as  the  end  of  life  in  the  Christian  com- 
munity (2  Cor.  iii.  18;  Rom.  viiL  29).  If  Schwalb,  however, 
according  to  his  principle  of  the  typical  character  of  Christ 
in  His  God-consciousness  and  moral  purity,  makes  it  the 
Christian's  duty  "  to   become  like   the  Lord    Christ,"  -    the 

*  Der  alte  und  der  neue  Olauhe  an  Ch/ristiis,  1868. 

*  So  Haimc,  op.  cii.  p.  42 :  '*  He  who  strives  with  full  earnestness  to  appro- 
priate the  ideal  Christ,  and  to  become  like  Him,  cannot  succeed  in  doing  so 
without  the  historical  Christ." 


55^-3]    FORGIVENESS   BASED   UPON   THE   WORK    OF   CHRIST      585 

question  remains  how  this  is  to  be  done.  Now  among  the 
theologians  of  this  group  it  is,  indeed,  constantly  being  said 
that  "  we  receive  Christ  into  our  hearts,"  or  that  "  we  give 
up  our  hearts  to  Him,"  and  so  it  is  possible  that  what  they 
mean  is  not  exhausted  by  the  phrase  that  Christ  is  our 
example.  But  whatever  relation  the  vague  and  vacillating 
expressions  of  these  theologians  may  have  to  the  claim  they 
make  to  be  "  modernising  "  Christianity,  it  concerns  our  interest 
to  determine  how  far  imitation  really  goes,  for  the  idea  of 
imitation  suggests  itself  as  correlative  to  the  pattern  char- 
acter thus  asserted  to  belong  to  Christ  alone. 

Imitation  has  but  a  very  limited  scope  in  mental  life. 
It  is  a  regular  form  of  mental  acquisition  in  childhood ;  as 
the  form  assumed  by  evil  habits,  it  extends  into  the  years  of 
riper  youth ;  if  it  appears  further  as  the  predominant  form 
of  mental  appropriation,  it  is  the  mark  of  mental  narrow- 
ness or  approach  to  idiocy.  For  imitation  extends  only  to 
particular  relations  of  mental  life,  and  these,  too,  such  as  are 
very  apparent  to  the  senses.  It  is  therefore  quite  impossible 
to  imitate  a  person's  character  as  a  whole,  even  though  it 
expresses  itself  never  so  strongly  and  clearly  in  his  de- 
meanour. If  it  is  possible  to  regard  a  son  as  the  spiritual 
image  of  his  father,  similarity  of  natural  disposition  is  the 
principal  motive  of  his  sympathy  with  his  father's  manner, 
the  appropriation  of  which  in  childhood  and  in  the  father's 
presence  is  assisted  by  the  imitation  of  externals,  but  is  in 
truth  brought  about  by  the  incalculable  aesthetic  attraction 
which  the  father's  well-defined  character  exercises  upon  the 
similarly  constituted  son.  If  imitation  were  the  form  in 
which  likeness  to  the  father's  character  was  to  be  reached, 
the  child  would  have  to  understand  how  to  separate  and  to 
combine  again  in  thought  aU  the  particular  virtues  as  such 
in  which  character  consists ;  but  this  goes  beyond  the  know- 
ledge which  is  possible  in  childhood.  Harmony  of  characters 
is  often  found,  too,  outside  the  hereditary  fellowship  of  the 
family,  between  juniors  and  seniors,  between  scholars  and 
teachers ;  this,  however,  is  the  case  only  in  consequence  of 


586  JUSTinCATION   and   RECONCIUATION  [553-4 

their  free  recognition  of  the  same  life-purpose,  and  the  normal 
special  means  employed  for  its  personal  inculcation.  But 
pre-eminent  men,  the  master-minds  of  history,  cannot  be  in 
any  danger  of  being  matched  by  imitation ;  for  aU  agreement 
of  character  with  them,  the  more  widely  it  extends,  is  the 
more  markedly  accompanied  by  a  sense  of  the  dissimilarity 
that  remains  behind,  all  pointing  to  the  fact  that  these  great 
men  are  originals,  and  matchless  in  their  own  order. 

No  man,  I  suppose,  was  ever  more  in  earnest  about  the 
imitation  of  Christ  than  St.  Francis ;  but  he  laid  hold  upon 
the  outwardly  perceptible  circumstances  of  Christ's  life  of 
poverty,  and  exaggerated  them.  Yet  this  method  was  domin- 
ated by  that  submission  to  Christ  which  is  of  a  general  and 
inward  kind.  Not  only  did  he  assume  that  he  was  subject 
to  Christ  in  virtue  of  redemption,  but  the  resolution  to  imitate 
Christ's  poverty  was  bound  up  with  the  fact  that  Francis 
conceived  his  Model  not  only  in  His  relation  to  God,  but 
also  in  a  relation  to  the  world,  which  implies  that  the  Bearer 
of  the  perfect  religion  renounced  the  world,  inasmuch  as  He 
withdrew  Himself  from  all  the  natural  ways  and  arrange- 
ments of  life.  On  this  assumption,  that  religion  reflects 
itself  in  a  definite  attitude  towards  the  world,  the  imitation 
of  Christ  in  the  features  of  poverty  and  renunciation  of  the 
world  seemed  possible.  This  whole  field  of  course  lies  quite 
outside  the  horizon  of  the  "  modern "  theologian,  who  looks 
upon  Christianity  as  exhausted  in  the  reproduction  in  men  of 
Divine  sonship,  and  thus  sets  aside  the  idea  of  redemption 
or  reconciliation  by  Christ,  not  only  in  a  definite  doctrinal 
form,  but  in  every  form,  or  limits  its  validity  to  the  voluntary 
act  of  the  individual's  self-conversion.  But  how  do  we  come 
at  all  to  imitate  Christ's  Divine  Sonship?  Does  this  task 
possess  no  special  features  which  would  be  worth  discussing  ? 
Is  it  so  much  as  intelligible  without  any  special  presupposi- 
tions ?  What  reply  can  be  made  if  I  again  call  attention  to 
the  fact  that  the  imitation  of  great  men  in  their  distinctive 
character  is  an  impossibility,  not  to  judge  it  more  severely  ? 
But    certainly    the    utterly    unpractical    attitude   and    the 


654-5]    FORGIVENESS    BASED   UPON   THE   WORK    OF   CHRIST      587 

emptiness  of  the  programme  of  "  modem  '*  Christianity  is  not 
to  be  urged  solely  against  the  representative  of  the  standpoint 
which  I  am  at  present  criticising.  On  the  contrary,  the 
error  which  is  primarily  observable  in  this  school  rests  upon 
a  tradition  to  which  people  usually  surrender  themselves 
without  criticism. 

For  since  Schleiermacher  raised  the  problem  of  the 
peculiar  psychological  character  of  religion,  German  theology 
has  never  grown  weary  of  occupying  itself  with  it  afresh. 
Nobody,  indeed,  has  been  able  to  maintain  the  conception  of 
feeling  in  the  sense  asserted  by  Schleiermacher,  as  the 
function  of  absolute  dependence  upon  God ;  on  the  contrary, 
psychological  investigation  has  always  been  led  on  to  other 
lines.  In  one  respect,  however,  Schleiermacher's  precedent 
dominates  all  subsequent  attempts,  namely,  in  the  fact  that 
religion  is  always  represented  simply  as  a  relation  to  God, 
but  not  at  the  same  time  as  a  relation  or  attitude  of  man  to 
the  world  (p.  28).  Schleiermacher  was  able  to  disregard 
this  latter  requirement  because  his  dialectic  led  him  to 
include  in  the  idea  of  God  neutrality  towards  the  world, 
the  indifference  of  undivided  unity  towards  the  manifold  of 
existence.  Certainly  he  satisfied  that  requirement  in  so  far 
as  he  taught  that  the  feeling  of  dependence  on  God  fills  up 
a  moment  of  time,  only  when  it  is  combined  with  an  act  of 
sensuous  feeling  or  with  acts  of  ideation  or  volition  which 
relate  to  the  world.  But  this  view  has  had  no  effect  upon 
his  followers,  who,  in  spite  of  their  proposed  alteration  of 
psychological  theory,  have  regarded  the  contents  of  religion 
only  as  related  to  God  and  never  at  the  same  time  as  related 
to  the  world,  though  the  historical  appearance  of  all  religions 
actually  demands  the  latter  view.  People  reflect  on  the 
relation  of  religion,  especially  the  Christian  religion,  to  the 
world  only  when  they  want  to  determine  the  way  in  which 
moral  conduct  is  related  to  religious  faith.  But  as  in  doing 
so  care  has  to  be  taken  not  to  confound  the  two,  their 
attention  is  never  drawn  to  the  fact  that  there  is  another 
relation  of  man  to  the  world,  the  regulation  of  which  must 


588  JUSTIFICATION   AND    RECONCILIATION  [555-6 

be  directly  provided  for  in  the  idea  of  religion.  I  mean  that 
in  Christianity  we  are  not  religiously  dependent  upon  the 
supramundane  God  without  at  the  same  time  experiencing 
our  religious  freedom  relatively  to  the  world,  and  actively 
manifesting  our  religious  dominion  over  it  in  our  view  of  the 
world  and  our  personal  tone  of  feeling.^ 

What,  then,  do  exhortations  to  imitate  the  God-con- 
sciousness of  Christ  or  to  awaken  the  assurance  of  Divine 
sonship  in  ourselves  signify,  unless  it  is  at  the  same  time 
taught  that  this  form  finds  its  material  in  all  those  relations 
of  man  to  the  world  in  which,  according  to  the  natural  view 
of  things,  he  is  dependent  on  the  world,  while  this  form 
becomes  operative  in  the  material  indicated  when  our 
judgment  regarding  these  relations  and  the  tone  of  feeling 
they  produce  changes  the  impression  we  have  naturally  into 
that  of  dominion  over  things?  But  if  the  Christian  God- 
consciousness  is  conceived,  as  it  must  be,  in  such  a  way  that 
spiritual  dominion  over  our  situation  in  the  world  is  the 
obverse  side  of  our  Divine  sonship,  then  it  is  at  least  a 
dubious  formula  which  prescribes  the  imitation  of  the  God- 
consciousness  of  Christ.     For  those  relations  to  the  world  in 


^  I  have  before  mo  two  popular  theological  treatises  of  recent  date,  the  one 
from  the  field  of  critical,  the  other  from  that  of  apologetic  theology.  It  is 
noticeable  how  little  their  formulae  regarding  justification  and  Divine  sonahip 
differ  from  one  another,  but  at  the  same  time  how  little  practical  fruit  they 
yield,  because  neither  of  them  embraces  the  Christian  goal  of  dominion  over 
the  world.  Bruckner,  JVcis  ist  die  Iteehtfertigung  aus  dem  Olaubenf  (Heidel- 
berg, 1872)  pp.  30,  32:  '*A11  religion  is  a  feeling  of  dependence  on  God. 
Freedom  in  God  is  its  cud  and  aim.  The  phrase  sola  fide  makes  that  de- 
pendence on  God  absolute,  to  the  exclusion  of  every  other  temporally  con- 
ditioned, humanly  mundane,  mediation  or  authority ;  at  the  same  time, 
however,  it  conditions  the  true  ideal  freedom  of  the  spirit  and  conscience  by 
the  idea  of  the  omnipotence  and  love  of  God.  .  .  .  The  idea  of  Divine  son- 
ship  manifests  itself  in  Jesus  Christ  in  its  truth  and  perfection,  tlirough  the 
power  of  the  satisfaction  and  blessedness  which  it  is  capable  of  giving ;  it 
shows  in  Him  as  the  Founder  and  Patteru  of  Christianity  how  absolute  de- 
pendence on  God,  the  Father  of  love,  is  one  with  absolute  freedom  in  God." 
Pfeiffer,  Das  OoUeshindschaftsbeimtsstsein  (Bern  and  St.  Gallen,  1873),  p.  74 : 
"The  right  filial  relation  of  man  to  God,  accoi'ding  to  the  teaching  of  Jesu.s 
is  the  unconditional  surrender  of  the  soul  to  God,  and,  as  the  result  of  accept- 
ance through  grace,  the  consciousness  of  receiving  the  continual  communication 
of  the  Sprit  from  the  Being  of  the  Father  and  of  being  blessed  in  this  communi- 
cation of  life." 


556-7]    FORGIVENESS   BASED   UPON   THE   WORK    OF   CHRIST      589 

which  Christ  experienced  His  God-consciousness  and  made 
proof  of  it  for  Himself  and  for  God,  are  so  distinct  from 
those  in  which  the  members  of  His  community  stand,  that 
Christ  is  withdrawn  from  all  direct  imitation.  The  main- 
tenance of  Christ's  God-consciousness  in  His  relation  to  the 
world  is  especially  expressed  in  the  patience  which  He 
brought  to  bear  on  His  sufferings,  which  were  the  outcome 
of  the  situation  called  for  by  His  vocation  and  of  the  an- 
tagonism to  it  felt  by  the  ruling  society.  His  vocation, 
however,  is  unique  in  its  kind ;  for  its  special  character  is 
directed  to  the  general  moral  task  as  such,  in  other  words 
to  the  founding  of  the  Kingdom  of  God  and  the  community 
destined  for  this  task  (§  48).  Therefore  nobody  can  directly 
imitate  Him;  and  an  imitation  which  selects  particular 
visible  aspects  of  His  life-course  would  still  be  no  imitation 
of  Christ.  For  this  reason  what  even  St.  Francis  presents  is 
by  no  means  a  satisfying,  but  rather  an  unsuccessful  copy  of 
his  Master. 

If  Christ's  pattern  character  is  nevertheless  to  be  used  as 
a  standard  of  the  Christian  life,  what  it  yields  is  nothing  but 
fidelity  in  the  moral  vocation  which  is  assigned  to  everyone 
as  the  special  field  of  his  contribution  to  the  Kingdom  of 
God.^  But  before  we  can  assert  this  idea  as  valid  for 
ourselves,  we  must  remember  that  owing  to  the  difference 
between  Christ  and  us  we  have  primarily  no  right  to  that 
consciousness  of  Divine  sonship  in  which  we  might  copy 
the  God-consciousness  of  Christ.  It  has  been  possible  for 
Schwalb  to  disregard  this  fact  because  he  has  not  clearly  and 
fully  described  the  position  of  those  whom  he  exhorts  to 
imitate  Christ.  The  fact  that  it  gives  us  no  difficulty,  or 
that  we  look  upon  it  as  a  matter  of  course,  to  set  our  trust 
on  God  like  children,  is  due  to  our  having  grown  up  and 
having  been  educated  in  the  Christian  community.  This 
circumstance,  however,  must  be  expressly  recognised  in  a 
theory  of  the  Christian  religion,  and  must  be  declared  to  be 
the  given  presupposition  of  the  desired  imitation  of  the  God- 

^  Apol,  G,  A.  ziii.  45-50. 


590  JUSTIFICATION   AND   RECONCILIATION  [567 

consciousness  of  Christ.  Apart  from  this  practical  social 
foundation  for  every  exercise  of  Christian  piety,  we  must  at 
the  outset  confess  that  through  our  participation  in  the  sin 
of  society  we  stand  far  away  from  God.  We  are  justified, 
however,  in  the  assurance  of  Divine  sonship,  in  spite  of  our 
sense  of  guilt,  because  we  belong  to  the  community  which  is 
founded  by  Christ  as  the  commimity  of  reconciliation  with 
God — founded  through  the  fulfilment  of  His  vocation,  and 
under  circumstances  such  as  to  surround  the  idea  of  our 
imitating  that  vocation  with  the  most  important  limitations. 
On  these  presuppositions,  and  following  the  impulse  of  recon- 
ciliation, we  may,  without  any  intention  of  imitating  Christ 
in  all  the  situations  of  life  in  which  a  natural  dependence  on 
the  world  is  expressed,  prove  our  Divine  sonship  by  a  frame 
of  mind  which  changes  the  sense  of  dependence  into  its 
opposite.  In  the  assurance  that  all  things  work  together  for 
good  to  them  that  love  God,  because  God's  love  is  manifested 
to  them  in  reconciliation  through  Christ,  we  may  exercise  the 
same  dominion  over  the  world  which  Christ  exercised  by  the 
assertion  of  His  consciousness  of  God.  But  we  shall  do  this 
all  the  more  surely,  the  less  we  propose  to  imitate  Christ  in 
this  relation,  and  the  more  we  extend  our  confidence  in  our 
reconciliation  with  God  through  Him  to  trust  in  the  Fatherly 
grace  of  God  in  all  our  experiences.  Without  this  positive 
supplement  given  by  the  independence  of  our  self-feeling 
over  the  world,  the  formula  of  our  freedom  in  God  obtained 
for  us  by  Christ  is  certainly  as  empty  and  meaningless  as  the 
task  set  us  to  imitate  His  God-consciousness.  For  without 
that  content  freedom  in  God  is  the  formula  of  world- 
renouncing  mysticism,  which  attains  its  end  only  with  that 
renunciation  of  spiritual  personality  after  which  it  ako 
strives  (vol.  i.  p.  122).  The  latter,  however,  must  rather  be 
preserved  unto  eternal  life  in  Divine  sonship,  and  the  lord- 
ship over  the  world  corresponding  thereto. 

§  60.  The  statement  that  it  is  inside  the  community  of 
believers  that  experience  of  reconciliation  through  Christ  is 
to  be  had,  corresponds  to  the  general  experimental  truth  that 


557-8]    FORGIVENESS   BASED   UPON   THE   WORK    OF    CHRIST      591 

every  spiritual  acquisition  is  brought  about  by  the  incalculable 
interaction  between  the  freedom  of  the  individual  and  the 
stimulating  and  guiding  impressions  which  he  receives  from 
fellowship  with  others.  That  statement  does  not,  however, 
imply  that  the  value  which  inheres  in  the  personal  work  of 
Christ  for  our  reconciliation  is  superseded  by  the  existence  of 
Divine  sonship  in  the  other  members  of  the  community,  and 
pushed  so  much  into  the  background  that  we  might  disregard 
Christ  as  the  Author  of  our  reconciliation.  Still  less  can  it 
be  maintained  that  Christ's  work  of  reconciliation  is  bound  up 
with  the  privileges  of  an  order  in  the  Church,  and  transmitted 
ex  opere  operate  through  their  sensible  actions.  Christ  comes 
to  act  upon  the  individual  believer  on  the  one  hand  through 
the  historical  remembrance  of  Him  which  is  possible  in  the 
Church,  on  the  other  hand  as  the  permanent  Author  of  all 
the  influences  and  impulses  which  are  due  to  other  men,  and 
like  in  nature  to  Himself ;  and  this  necessarily  takes  place  in 
a  personal,  and  not  in  a  material  form.  Accordingly,  the 
result  of  reconciliation  appears  in  its  normal  completeness  in 
subjective  faith  in  Christ.  Here  it  is  only  necessary  to  repeat 
and  to  bring  in  what  h«wB  already  (pp.  101,  142)  been  set 
forth  as  the  view  of  the  Eeformers  and  as  the  inevitable 
result  of  observation.  To  beheve  in  Christ  implies  that  we 
accept  the  value  of  the  Divine  love,  which  is  manifest  in 
His  work,  for  our  reconciliation  with  God,  with  that  trust 
which,  directed  to  Him,  subordinates  itself  to  God  as  His  and 
our  Father;  whereby  we  are  assured  of  eternal  life  and 
blessedness.  Faith  in  Christ  is  neither  belief  in  the  truth  of 
His  history  nor  assent  to  a  scientific  judgment  of  knowledge 
such  as  that  presented  by  the  Chalcedonian  formula.  It  is 
not  a  recognition  of  His  Divine  nature  of  such  a  kind  that, 
in  afi&rming  it,  we  disregard  His  life-work  and  His  action 
for  the  salvation  of  those  who  have  to  reckon  themselves  as 
belonging  to  His  community.  In  so  far  as  trust  in  Him 
includes  a  knowledge  of  Him,  this  knowledge  will  determine 
the  value  of  His  work  for  our  salvation.  This  value  is  to  be 
decided  by  the  fact  that  Christ,  as  the  Bearer  of  the  perfect 


592  JUSTIFICATION   AND   RECX)NCILIATION  [558-9 

revelation  of  God,  through  His  solidarity  with  the  Father,  in 
the  right  exercise  of  His  love  and  patience  over  the  world, 
demonstrated  His  Godhead  as  man  for  the  salvation  of  thoee 
whom,  as  His  community,  He  at  the  same  time  represented 
before  the  Father  by  His  obedience,  and  still  represents. 
In  this  way  He  awakens  the  trust  in  Himself  which,  as 
passionate  personal  conviction,  overcomes  and  subordinates 
to  itself  all  the  other  motives  of  life,  using  as  it  does  the 
tradition  of  Christ  propagated  in  the  Church,  and  thus 
putting  itself  into  connection  with  all  those  who  believe  in 
Christ.  The  recollection  of  guilt  which  has  been  forgiven  us, 
and  is  daily  forgiven,  combined  as  it  is  with  faith  in  the 
Bedeemer,  and  suffused  with  penitence,  does  not  hinder  us 
from  asserting  a  distinct  self-feeling  over  against  the  world, 
which  no  longer  dominates  us  or  separates  us  from  God. 
Faith,  if  it  is  derived  from  Divine  grace,  will  also  overoome 
the  disturbances  which  arise  from  temptations  due  to  the 
world.  For  either  these  temptations  can  be  repelled,  or,  if 
we  fail  to  do  so,  the  sins  which  we  commit  afresh  are,  in  our 
readiness  to  repent  through  trust  in  Christ,  subordinated  to 
His  forgiving  grace.  As  this  comes  to  be  a  question  of  the 
rule  of  the  Christian  life,  the  view  of  the  world  which  befits 
the  believer  in  Christ  is  designed  to  enable  him  to  assume, 
throughout  the  whole  of  the  world  created  and  governed  by 
God,  the  position  guaranteed  to  him  by  Christ.  For  in 
Christianity  a  direct  claim  is  made  for  the  personal  feeling  of 
self  by  the  assertion  that,  on  the  ground  of  reconciliation 
with  God,  each  man  has,  not  the  significance  of  a  dependent 
part  of  the  world,  but  the  value  of  a  whole — a  value  which 
proves  itself  by  spiritual  dominion  over  the  individual  and 
particular  motives  which  are  contained  in  the  world.  But 
the  key  to  every  conception  of  an  actual  whole  lies  in  the 
knowledge  of  the  special  conditions  under  which  a  universal 
end  may,  in  accordance  with  law,  be  realised  in  a  complex 
of  particular  phenomena.  According  to  this  rule,  personal 
conviction  of  the  Christian  view  of  the  world,  in  which  the 
corresponding  self-feeling  is  assured  of  its  validity,  depends 


559-60]    FORGIVENESS   BASED   UPON   THE   WORK   OF   CHRIST     593 

on  faith  in  the  Divine  worth  of  Christ.  For  His  historieal 
appearance  denotes  not  only  the  organising  centre  of  the 
world -whole  within  which  the  spiritual  self -feeling  of 
Christians  receives  its  permanent  and  specific  satisfaction, 
but  also  the  absolutely  sufficient  ground  of  knowledge  by 
which  we  make  that  view  of  the  world  our  own.  We  make 
this  very  view  of  the  world,  and  the  self-judgment  corre- 
sponding to  it,  valid  for  ourselves  when  we  become  personally 
convinced  of  the  value  of  Christ  as  the  Bevealer  of  the 
Divine  purpose  of  the  world,  and  the  Founder  of  the  com- 
munity reconciled  with  God  by  Him.  At  the  same  time  we 
affirm  the  value  of  the  view  of  the  world  guaranteed  by  Him 
by  making  it  the  supreme  motive  for  our  exercise  of  will, 
and  that  in  the  direction  both  of  reverence  for  God  and  of 
moral  activity  devoted  to  the  final  end  of  the  Kingdom  of 
God.  For  these  reasons,  faith  in  Christ  is  the  full  and  clear 
expression  of  our  subjective  conviction  of  the  truth  of  His 
religion. 

Faith  in  Christ  and  God  falls  within  the  compass  of  the 
idea  of  love  already  defined  (p.  277).  It  is  that  continuous 
direction  of  the  will  to  the  final  end  of  God  and  Christ, 
which  the  believer  maintains  for  his  own  sake.  In  this 
sense  Thomas  rightly  decided  that  love  to  God  is  the  essence 
of  faith,  since  it  raises  the  intellectual  act  to  the  worth  of  a 
religious  function  (p.  103).  Now  in  the  New  Testament,  in 
spite  of  the  commandment  of  love  to  God,  a  very  sparing  use 
is  made  of  this  idea  (vol.  ii.  p.  100),  and  love  toward  Christ 
is  not  expressed  except  in  John  xxi.  15,  16.  There  is  good 
reason  why  it  is  otherwise  in  the  Epistles  of  the  New  Testa- 
ment. As  a  generic  idea  love  to  Christ  is  more  indefinite 
than  faith  in  Him.  The  former  term  leaves  the  point  un- 
decided whether  we  put  ourselves  on  a  level  with  Christ  or 
subordinate  ourselves  to  Him.  But  faith  in  Christ  includes 
the  confession  of  His  Godhead  and  His  dominion  over  us, 
and  thus  denies  the  possibility  of  equality  with  Him.  This 
is  the  evident  purpose  which  leads  the  Beformers  to  elaborate 
the  idea  of  faith  in  Christ.  If  Christ  takes  the  place  of  God, 
38 


594  JUSTIFICATION   AND   RECONCILIATION  [660-1 

faith  in  Him  is  necessarily  a  kind  of  obedience  (Bom.  L  5). 
Nevertheless  the  demand  for  love  to  Christ  occupies  an  ex- 
ceedingly large  place  not  only  in  the  Middle  Ages,  but  also 
in  the  Churches  which  sprang  from  the  Beformation.  Advo- 
cates of  this  trend  of  feeling  have  declared  that  my  exposition 
of  faith,  which  has  kept  to  the  line  of  the  doctrinal  standards 
of  the  Beformation,  is  antiquated.  I  affirm,  on  the  contrary, 
that  the  Beformation  antiquated  that  "  love  to  Christ "  which 
is  here  in  question.  For  love  very  distinctly  implies  the 
equality  of  the  person  loving  with  the  beloved.  St  Bernard 
(vol.  i.  p.  116),  who  gave  to  the  world  the  pattern  of  this 
species  of  piety,  expressly  states  that  in  intercourse  with  the 
Bridegroom  awe  ceases,  majesty  is  laid  aside,  and  immediate 
personal  intercourse  is  carried  on  as  between  lovers  or 
neighbours.^  And  these  features  recur  wherever  love  to  the 
Lord  Jesus  is  expressed  in  the  terms  of  the  Song  of  Songs. 
Now  in  the  Latin  Catholic  Church  this  form  of  devotion  and 
its  excitement  by  sympathy  with  the  sufferings  of  Chiist  are 
logically  consistent.  For  that  Church's  view  of  Christ  is 
dominated  by  a  complete  breach  between  His  Godhead  and 
manhood  (vol.  i.  pp.  38,  47,  56).  In  the  traditional  formulas 
the  Godhead  which  forms  the  background  of  the  man  Christ 
is  confessed,  but  a  living  interest  attaches  only  to  this  latter 
Being,  Whom  Augustine  designated  as  the  Bearer  of  mediation 
with  God,  as  the  Bepresentative  of  God's  love,  and  in  Whom 
later  writers  further  reverence  the  Ideal  of  human  destiny, 
the  fairest  of  the  sons  of  men,  and  Whom  by  the  play  of  fancy 
upon  Him  they  clasp  in  their  arms.  In  the  Latin  Middle  Ages 
people  purchased,  by  the  verbal  confession  of  Christ's  Godhead, 
freedom  to  love  Him  as  a  mere  man,  to  imitate  Him  as  such, 
to  bring  Him  down  to  their  own  level,  to  play  with  Him 
(p.  391).  At  that  time  they  attached  a  practical  idea  to  His 
Godhead  only  when  they  thought  of  His  Judgment.  The 
latter  idea,  however,  held  good  for  a  class  different  from 
those  who  cultivated  familiar  intercourse  with  Him ;  or  if 
such   became  alarmed  at    this  prospect,  then   all  love-play 

^  Geschichte  des  Ptetismus,  i.  p.  49. 


■  ^g    '^>l»"^ 


561-2]    FORGIVENESS    BASED   UPON   THE   WORK   OF   CHRIST       595 

with  the  Lord  Jesus  was  forgotten.  The  Beformers  tran- 
scended these  fragmentary  and  incoherent  views,  inasmuch 
as  by  faith  in  Christ  they  expressed  reverence  for  the  God- 
man,  and  taught  men  by  trust  in  Him  to  banish  their  terror 
at  the  Judge.  These  conditions  of  Protestant  piety  correspond 
to  the  efforts  of  the  Beformers  to  show  that  His  Godhead  is 
present  precisely  in  the  mediatorial  achievements  of  His 
earthly  life  (p.  394).  It  was  therefore  a  reaction  from  the 
clearly  recognisable  purpose  of  the  Beformation  when  the 
Mediaeval  material  of  devotion  was  again  admitted  into 
the  Lutheran  Church  soon  after  the  settlement  of  the  Book 
of  Concord,  and  later  into  the  Beformed  Church.^ 

If,  then,  it  is  claimed  that  the  Beformation  conception 
of  faith  in  Christ  is  transcended  and  superseded  by  familiar 
intercourse  with  the  Saviour,  I  must  assume  that  this  pre- 
tension has  behind  it  all  those  strainings  of  the  fancy  with 
which  I  am  familiar  all  the  way  from  Bernard  to  Spangenberg.^ 
In  my  History  of  Pietism,  however,  I  have  given  reasons  why 
they  mark  no  improvement  upon  the  attitude  of  faith  in 
Christ  described  by  the  Beformers.  The  principal  reason 
against  the  above  contention  is  that  the  excitement  of  the 
fancy  and  the  effort  after  a  more  or  less  sensuous  feeling 
of  pleasure  usually  end  in  the  opposite  result  of  desertion 
and  dulness  of  feeling.  This  method  accordingly  brings  un- 
bappiness  in  its  train,  whilst  blessedness  is  guaranteed  by 
faith  in  Christ  when  rightly  understood.  Perhaps  this 
objection  does  not  apply  to  the  assertion  which  is  made 
by  many  of  my  theological  opponents — that  an  immediate 
personal  relation  to  Christ  and  to  God  is  the  kernel  of  the 
Christian  life.  But  if  they  demand  that  theological  doctrine 
shall  expressly  justify  this  practice  of  theirs  and  determine 
its  conditions,  the  following  facts  have  to  be  considered. 
Every  religious  judgment,  and  so  every  devout  consideration 
of  God's  leadings  and  claims  as  well  as  of  Christ's  benefits, 

1  Op.  cU,  i.  pp.  129,  281,  ii.  p.  48,  iii.  pp.  94,  212. 

^  Spangenberg  (Idea  fidei  fratrum)  first  develops  the  doctrine  of  grace  in 
relation  to  faith,  but  in  addition  to  that  prescribes  love  to  God  as  a  contem- 
plative  exercise  {op.  eiL  iii.  p.  454). 


596  JUSTIFICATION    AND   RECONCILIATION  [5®-3 

is  due  to  our  regarding  God  and  Christ  as  present.  But  we 
find  ourselves  placed  immediately  over  against  that  which 
we  view  as  present.  In  this  sense  Melanchthon  designates 
the  intuition  of  Christ,  or  of  the  promise  of  grace  of  which 
He  is  the  Bearer,  as  the  regular  means  of  impressing  upon 
ourselves  the  forgiveness  of  sins  or  the  assurance  of  salvation 
(p.  142).  Now  this  method  of  devotion  may  keep  wholly 
within  its  own  special  rights,  even  when  theology,  having  as 
a  science  fully  and  clearly  to  determine  the  inner  texture 
of  religion,  is  obliged  to  point  out  that  such  acts  of  religious 
imagination  proceed  from  a  series  of  mediating  causes,  the 
consideration  of  which  is  overleapt  in  the  moment  of  con- 
templation. If  those  who  are  intent  on  the  practice  of  an 
immediate  personal  relation  to  Christ  also  possess  theological 
culture,  they  will  not,  I  hope,  deny  that  their  contemplative 
presentation  to  themselves  of  Christ  as  their  Bedeemer  and 
Lord  is  possible  only  because  they  have  been  brought  up  in 
the  Church,  have  in  it  become  believers,  and  in  it  have  been 
furnished  with  the  right  knowledge  of  Christ ;  and  they  will 
not,  I  hope,  gainsay  Calvin's  statement  that  Christ,  even  as 
He  is  represented  in  devotion,  can  be  rightly  conceived  only 
as  invested  with  His  Word  (p.  113).  One  who  understands 
physiology  and  psychology  acts  like  every  other  man  on  the 
assumption  that  in  his  sense  -  perceptions  he  stands  im- 
mediately over  against  things.  But  in  his  scientific  estimate 
of  such  occurrences  the  physiologist  and  psychologist  points 
out  that  these  include  a  very  complicated  process  of  media- 
tion, in  which  the  judgment  of  the  beholder  modifies  the 
physical  impressions  of  light  on  the  eye  so  as  to  determine 
the  size  and  distance  of  things  in  the  way  which  we  think 
a  matter  of  immediate  perception.  In  the  same  w^ay  the 
theologian  is  obliged  to  trace  back  the  immediate  contempla- 
tion of  Christ  in  the  exercise  of  devotion  to  all  the  historical 
presuppositions  of  that  act,  and  to  remind  his  readers  of 
these,  in  order  that  devotion  may  not  be  taken  up  with 
arbitrary  distortions  of  the  picture  of  Christ. 

For  this  purpose  theology  has   to   insist   that  the  con- 


563-4]    FORGIVENESS    BASED    UPON   THE   WORK    OP   CHRIST       597 

templation  of  Christ  which  befits  the  Evangelical  Christian 
shall  have  mixed  up  with  it  none  of  the  elements  of  the 
Song  of  Songs,  that  is,  no  love-play  on  an  equal  footing 
with  the  beloved.  For  this  whole  domain  lies  outside  the 
Word  with  which  Christ  is  invested  when  He  presents 
Himself  to  contemplation.  But  that  also  implies  that  the 
contemplation  of  Christ  should  not  be  practised  for  the 
purpose  of  deriving  from  it  direct  feelings  of  happinesa 
For  this,  too,  is  merely  a  Catholic  and  not  an  Evangelical 
method;  what  is  sought  in  this  way  is  merely  aesthetic 
enjoyment,  and  not  religious  strength,  which  as  such  we 
prove  by  vindicating  our  reconciliation  with  God  through 
our  attitude  towards  the  world.  What  befits  the  Evan- 
gelical Christian  in  this  respect  may  be  seen  from  the 
prayers  which  in  the  German  Pamonal  of  our  Lord  Jesus 
Christ  (Niimberg,  1548)  are  subjoined  to  the  sections  into 
which  the  story  of  Christ's  suffering  is  divided.^  Here  the 
petitions  are  attached  to  the  contemplation  of  the  suffering 
Christ  in  its  separate  acts — that  "Thou  wouldst  for  Thy 
Passion's  sake  protect  us  from  every  snare  of  the  devil  and 
from  all  the  assaults  of  sin  " ;  that  "  I  may  be  strengthened 
to  overcome  all  afflictions,  sufferings,  and  sickness  in  Thy 
Passion";  that  "I  may  entirely  surrender  all  my  will 
to  Thy  most  perfect  will,  so  that  my  walk  and  life  may 
ever  be  found  in  Thy  service " ;  that  "  I  may  not  be 
moved  by  wicked  slander,  but  may  possess  my  soul  in 
Christian  patience."  And  if  it  is  the  bestowal  of  eternal 
blessedness  which  is  sought  in  the  majority  of  these  prayers, 
that  goal  is  not  conceived  save  as  including  the  joy  of  victory 
over  all  enemies. 

Faith,  marked  by  the  above  described  characteristics,  is 
an  expression  for  the  whole  position  which  the  individual 
assumes  towards  Christ  as  the  Bearer  of  reconciliation  and 
the  Eepresentative  of  God  the  Father.  Now,  not  every 
moment  of  the  Christian  life   is   occupied  by   the  distinct 

^  Thoy  will  be  found  in  the  Prayer-book  published  by  the  Evangelical  Book 
Society  (Berlin,  1849),  pp.  384-410. 


598  JUSTIFICATION   AND   RECONCILIATION  [564-5 

appearance  of  all  the  characteristics  contained  in  faith.     In 
particular  the  emotion  which  attaches  to  faith  is  excited  only 
by   special  adverse  circumstances,  when  it  is  necessary  to 
emphasise  the  weight  of  believing  conviction.     What  Calvin 
meant  by  that  characteristic  (p.  101),  and  what  follows  from 
the  worth  of  God  and  Christ  and  salvation  (p.  211),  is  at  the 
same   time  subject  to  the  limitation   that  all  education  is 
designed  to  set  bounds  to  our  feelings  and  emotions  (p.  165). 
It  follows  that  our  normal  experience  of  the  Christian  religion, 
which  in  the  highest  sense  relies  on  education,  and  is  un- 
healthy without  it,  comes  to  us  through  that  moderate  state 
of  feeling  which  makes  continuity  and  equilibrium  possible. 
The  fact  that  the  temperature  of  this  feeling  will  be  different 
in  individuals  according  to  their  temperament,  need  merely  be 
indicated  here;  for  the  whole  series  of  these  cases  eludes 
scientific  examination.     In  the  full  compass  of  its  character- 
istics faith  in  Christ  marks  the  beginning  of  the  Christian  life, 
if  it  is  attained  through  sudden  conversion.      This  case  pre- 
supposes that  a  man  has  lived  in  vice  or  in  antichristian 
convictions,  and  thus  that  the  Christian  education  expended 
upon  him  remained  fruitless.     But  if,  amid  the  surroundings 
of   Church   life,    education   is    the    normal   form   in    which 
individuals  attain  to  faith  in  Christ,  it  is  not  to  be  expected 
that  faith  should  be  called   forth   in   its    definite    peculiar 
character,  in  the  totality  of  its  characteristics,  prior  to  the 
operations  of  God's  grace  in  the  sphere  of  moral  discipline 
and  action.     Education  is  always  designed   to  deprive  evil 
inclinations  of  their  power  by  particular  impulses  to  moral 
activity,  and  thus  to  attain  the  cultivation  of  character  as  a 
whole.      Accordingly,    the    arousing   of  the    right    religious 
estimate  of  self  can   only  be   brought  about   by  education 
indirectly,  inasmuch  as  the  practice  of  goodness  ought  not  to 
be  accompanied  by  self-complacency,  but  must  be  accompanied 
by  humility.     Out  of  the  practice  of  humility  and  trust  in 
parents  and  teachers  the  right  sense  of  guilt  in  relation  to 
Christ  and  trust  in  Him  will  arise  in  the  maturer  period  of 
life.    Accordingly  that  which  proves  itself  the  comprehensive 


566^]    FORGIVENESS   BASED   UPON   THE   WORK   OF   CHRIST      599 

motive  of  the  Christian  life  in  the  later  period  can  neither 
be  directly  understood  nor  experienced  in  childhood.     Others, 
certainly,  are  of  a  different  opinion  as  to  this.     Because  faith 
in  Christ  is  represented  in  systematic  theology  as  the  supreme 
motive  of  all  good  conduct,  the  attempt  is  made  in  certain 
circles  to  produce  in  young  children  a  love  for  the  Saviour, 
and  to  use  this  argument  systematically  in  guiding  their  edu- 
cation.    It  may  be  granted  that  in  childhood  love  to  the 
Saviour  is  analogous  to  faith  in  Christ.     The  latter,  however, 
is  something  very  serious ;  the  former  is  playful,  for  other- 
wise it  would  not  be  within  the  reach  of  a  child.     But  moral 
education,  which  is  a  serious  business  even  in  nonage,  the 
successes  or  failures  of  which  must  be  taken  eqiially  seriously, 
can  hardly  be  inculcated  upon  a  child  in  the  right  way  by 
means  of   a  playful   idea.     The   mental   development  of  a 
child  is  not  brought  about  by  the  instillation  of  general  ideas 
into  his  mind,  in  order  that  by  their  means  he  may  come  to 
understand  what  is  special  and  particular.     Just  as  little  does 
education  in  Christianity  and  for  Christianity  depend  upon 
imparting  to  the  imagination  a  general  motive  of  obedience 
and  good  conduct,  in  order  that  the  requirements  of  obedience 
may  thence  be  deduced.     The  books  which  represent  children 
of  this  kind  as  patterns  for  others  are  useless  and  injurious 
both  from  the  paedagogic  and  the  Christian  point  of  view. 
Faith  in  Christ  can  be  expected  only  in  maturer  life.     As 
the  general  attitude  which  corresponds  to  reconciliation,  it 
embraces  all  the  particular  acts  of  reconciling  faith,  patience, 
and  humility,  by  which  our  standing  in  grace  is  put  •  to  the 
proof.     These  are  not  something  alongside  of  faith  in  Christ, 
or  something  which  merely  results  from  it,  but  are  the  forms 
in  which  faith  in  Christ  is  applied  to  the  life  which  the 
believer  leads  in  the  world. 

§  61.  One  who,  as  a  believer,  is  no  longer  controlled  by 
natural  impulses — ^impulses,  that  is,  at  once  self-seeking  and 
world-loving — which  bear  the  chief  mark  of  sin  in  their 
indifference  or  mistrust  towards  God,  is  in  the  state  of 
7'effeneration.     Now  justification  or  reconciliation  is  also  con- 


600  JUSTIFICATION   AND   RECONCIUATION  [5»-7 

tained  in  faith  in  God  through  Christ.     The  question  arises, 
accordingly,  how  the  idea  of  regeneration  is  related  to  these 
two.     It  is  apparently  very  easy  to  decide  the  point  if  we 
only  attend  to  the  connections  of  Biblical  phraseology.     For 
on  the  assumption  that  God  receives  us  as  His  children  when 
He  reconciles  us  with  Himself  through  Christ,  reconciliation 
is  equivalent  to  adoption,  and  the  possession  of  justification  or 
reconciliation  is  equivalent  to  Divine  sonship  (§  18).     Now 
if  the  figure  of  generation  is  applied  to  the  establishment  of 
the  latter  status  through  God's  judgment  of  grace,  and  this 
spiritual   generation  is  compared  to  the  antecedent  natural 
generation,  it  follows  that  adoption,  which  is  equivalent  to 
reconciliation,   may  be  designated  as  regeneration  by  God. 
Since,  further,  no  natural  conditions  are  included   in   this 
idea,  it  can  only  be  understood  in  the  same  sense  as  adoption, 
namely,  as  that  for  which  man  is  destined  by  the  Divine  will 
of  grace,  and  that,  too,  in   such  a  way   that    the    believer 
conforms  to  God's  final  end  as  revealed  to  him.     Since  this 
destination  of  man,  which  takes  effect  in   regeneration,  is 
mediated    by  the  revelation  of  God's  Fatherly   grace,   the 
Word  of  God  is  compared  to  the  generative  seed,  but  is  at 
the  same  time  contrasted  with  the  material  means  of  natural 
generation  as  the  incorruptible  seed  (1  Pet.  i.   23).     Thus 
regeneration,  or,  as  we  inaccurately  say,  the  new  birth,  cannot 
as  a  predicate  of  the  individual  believer  be  materially  distin- 
guished from  effectual  justification  or  reconciliation  or  adoption. 
In  this  sense  Melanchthon,  in  the  Apology  of  the  Auydnirg 
Confession  (ii.  45,  72,  78,  117),  treskts  justijicare,  regentrare, 
and  jvstiim  efflcere  as  synonymous  (p.  173),  because  in  the 
connection  he  is  expounding  he  has  in  his  eye  precisely  the 
production  of  the  religious  virtues  of  trust  in  God,  patience, 
etc.,  as  the  goal  of  justification  [Gerecktsprechung]  or  r(^nera- 
tion  or  sanctification  [Gerechtmachung]  (jitstus  being  equivalent 
to  acceptuSf  p.  72).*     For  those  functions  are  just  the  new  life 
which  formerly  did  not  exist,  and  is  now  awakened  by  the 
sin-pardoning  grace  of  God.      The  fact  that  this  conjunction 

1  Eiohhorn  in  Stud.  «.  Krit.  (1887)  pp.  425,  460. 


567-8]    FORGIVENESS    B^ED    UPON    THE   WORE    OF    CHRIST       601 

of  ideas  has  not  been  handed  down  in  theology  is  due  to  the 
action  of  disturbing  influences. 

It  has  been  shown  (vol  L  p.  303)  how  vacillating  the 
usage  of  regeneratio  is  in  such  a  theologian  as  Baier.  Among 
the  different  interpretations  of  this  idea  we  find  Melanchthon's 
view  that  regenercUix)  is  equivalent  to  justijicatio,  qua  con/ertur 
JU8  JUios  dei  fieri,  Tet  this  conception  is  not  asserted  as 
normative  i^inst  the  other  interpretations ;  on  the  contrary, 
he  chooses  to  distinguish  them  thus,  that  regeneratio  is 
coextensive  with  the  donatio  fidei,  and  precedes  it  as  the 
condition  of  justifixxdio.  Now,  if  this  relation  is  to  be  inter- 
preted not  only  theoretically,  but  operatively  and  temporally, 
we  must  remember  that  regeneration  as  the  awakening  of 
faith  also  includes  the  bestowal  of  the  Holy  Spirit.  Though 
Baier  makes  a  restriction  here  by  saying  that  what  is  meant 
by  r^eneration  is  not  the  special  powers  of  good  conduct,  but 
only  the  capacity  ad  credendum  in  Christum  viiamque  adeo 
spirituakm  inchoandam,  yet  other  theologians  have  not  been 
able  to  accept  this  limitation,  but  have  regarded  regeneration 
through  the  communication  of  the  Holy  Spirit  as  the  actual 
turning-point  in  the  life  of  the  believer,  which  the  Divine 
judgment  of  justification  must  appropriately  follow.  It' 
is  beyond  question  that  an  approximation,  though  an  un- 
intentional one,  is  here  made  to  Catholic  doctrine.  It  is 
therefore  a  fitting  thing  that  we  should  try  to  reach  a 
decision  by  examining  the  latter. 

While  the  Catholic  doctrine  takes  justificatio  in  the  Latin 
sense  as  a  "  making  righteous "  by  God,  and  regards  the 
recognition  of  this  operation  by  the  Divine  judgment  as  a 
subsequent  event,  it  includes  the  assertion  of  a  material- 
istically conceived  means,  namely,  the  infusion  of  love  td 
God  By  this  process  is  meant  that  the  contrary  tendency  of 
the  will  is  displaced  from  the  seat  of  the  will,  as  a  lighter 
substance  gives  place  to  a  heavier — for  instance,  air  to  water, 
when  the  latter  is  poured  into  an  open  vessel.  In  itself  the 
application  of  the  idea  of  space  to  express  various  functions 
of  the  mind  is  unobjectionable,  as  it  is  the  indispensable  form 


602  JUSTIFICATION   AND   KECONCILIATION  [568-9 

of  our  intuition  of  di0erences  in  any  unity.  Accordingly,  we 
believe  ourselves  to  be  also  right  in  saying  that  the  good 
will  subordinates  to  itself  the  impulses  working  in  the  mind ; 
we  even  use  from  this  point  of  view  the  metaphor  of  weight, 
when  we  say  that  the  good  will  suppresses  the  movement  of 
the  impulses  to  evil.  But  we  employ  this  method  of  looking 
at  the  matter  with  the  reservation  that  the  will  directed  to 
the  good  end  is,  on  account  of  the  universal  character  of  this 
latter  idea,  a  power  of  a  different  kind  from  the  impulses, 
each  of  which  only  strives  after  something  particular — ^which 
are  therefore  in  themselves  indifferent  to  the  universal  good 
and  the  universal  will,  but  may  be  raised  to  be  means  of  the 
evil  as  well  as  the  good  will.  If,  then,  in  ordinary  speech  we 
judge  many  phenomena  of  a  moral  kind  according  to  the 
difference  of  weight  between  the  good  will  and  impulses 
which  are  inclined  to  evil,  we  do  not  put  this  quantitative 
estimate  of  the  factors  of  moral  conduct  in  the  place  of  its 
qualitative  opposite ;  we  make  the  full  understanding  of  these 
phenomena  dependent  upon  the  latter.  This  reservation, 
however,  is  not  operative  in  the  Catholic  account  of  justifica- 
tion. On  the  contrary,  as  the  infusion  of  love  to  God  is 
meant  quite  literally,  it  is  precisely  the  quantitative  difference 
of  good  from  evil  that  is  here  represented.  Under  this 
category,  love  is  thought  of  in  the  first  instance  as  a  sub- 
stance different  from  the  impulses.  Assuming,  however,  that 
the  qualitative  opposition  to  a  given  sin  exerted  by  love  to 
God  is  taken  into  account,  yet  it  follows  from  the  quantitative 
view,  which  is  reckoned  the  higher,  that  love  to  God  is  still 
co-ordinated  with  the  subjective  impulses  which  are  the 
channels  of  sin,  i.e.  it  is  itself  viewed  as  a  special  impulse 
alongside  of  the  latter.  That  this  interpretation  is  right  is 
proved  by  the  ascetic  view  of  the  Christian  life  which 
prevails  in  Catholicism,  and  with  which  the  dogma  in  question 
must  have  some  connection.  For  this  asceticism  implies  that 
the  particular  impulses  can  assume  no  positive  relation  to  the 
good  end,  that  the  special  goods  to  which  they  are  related 
have  no  validity  within  the  highest  good,  and  thus  that  the  will 


569—70]    FORGIVENESS    BASED   UPON   THE   WORK    OF   CHRIST      603 

is  directed  to  the  latter  only  when  it  renounces  the  special 
goods  of  human  life,  and  therefore  also  the  activity  of 
the  impulses  connected  with  these.  If,  then,  justification 
{GerecJUmachung)  by  God  proves  itself  in  this  way  the  prin- 
ciple of  independent  action,  the  infusion  of  love  to  God  can 
only  mean  that  a  special  and  therefore  qualitatively  deter- 
minate impulse  becomes  operative  as  a  quantum,  the  beneficial 
expansion  of  which  has  to  displace  the  impulses,  not  only  as 
channels  of  sin,  but  in  every  form,  from  the  seat  of  the  will. 

Now    the   approximation    to    the    Catholic   doctrine    of 
justification  which  appears  in  the  exaltation  of  regeneration 
above  justification,  is  occasioned  in  the  case  of  Evangelical 
theologians   by    the    vagueness    with  which    they  hold    the 
conception  of  the  ffoly  Spirit,  which  is  associated  with  re- 
generation.      Indeed,   scarcely   any  part   of    the    Christian 
theological  view  as  a  whole  has  been  so  steadily  neglected 
as  this  conception.     In  well-known  statements  of  Paul,  the 
Holy  Spirit  is  brought  into  connection  with  Divine  sonship, 
so  that  in  particular  the  involuntary  invocation  of  God  as 
Father  is  traced  to  the  Spirit  of  God  (Rom.  viiL   1 5 ;  Gal. 
iv.   6).     Now  as   regeneration    leads   to  Divine  sonship,  so 
again   Dogmatics   has   represented    the    Holy  Spirit  as  the 
Divine  means  whereby  regeneration  is  brought  about.     That, 
however,  not  only  distorts  Paul's  thought,  which  represents 
the  possession  and  the  characteristic  utterance  of  the  Holy 
Spirit  as  the  accompanying  mark  of  Divine  sonship,  but  un- 
intentionally makes  this  Factor  appear  as  if  He  were  to  be 
conceived  as  a  hyperphysical  natural  force.     True,  this  con- 
ception does  not  for  the  most  part  assume  a  distinct  form, 
especially    as    Church    teaching,   with    sound    tact,    usually 
avoids  suggesting  the  practical  application  of   so  vague  an 
idea.     But    sectarian  or  half-sectarian  practice  customarily 
appeals  to  the  Holy  Spirit  just  in  so  far  as  thereby  justi- 
fication  is    supposed   to    be    foxmd    for    passionate   zeal,   or 
pathological  experiences,  or  forced,  vague,  aimless  efforts  to 
reach  passive  assurance  of  salvation.     The  idea  here  expressed 
is  that  this  Divine  Factor  moves  man  with  a  kind  of  natural 


604  JUSTIFICATION   AND   RECONCILIATION  [570-1 

necessity.  If,  then,  the  Holy  Spirit  is  appropriated  as  a 
particular  something  which  manifests  itself  directly,  He  is 
brought  into  the  closest  analogy  to  the  natural  powers  of 
the  mind,  which,  apart  from  the  counteraction  of  the  will 
directed  to  a  universal  end,  work  like  natural  forces;  but 
in  that  case  He  simply  cannot  act  as  a  counterpoise  to 
egoism. 

I  think  that  these  phenomena  of  sectarian  Christianitv 
throw  light  upon  the  meaning  of  the  idea  of  regeneration 
through  the  Holy  Spirit,  which  ecclesiastical  Dogmatics  also 
affirms.  For  if  that  process  is  to  be  distinguished  from 
justification,  which  expresses  the  formal  character  which 
belongs  to  the  believer  by  and  for  the  judgment  of  God, 
regeneration  by  the  Holy  Spirit  can  only  be  understood  as 
a  material  change.  That  is  to  say,  there  is  thought  to  be 
awakened  in  man  by  the  Word  of  God  a  supernatural  aod 
quantitatively  mightier  motive,  which  aims  in  general  at 
pleasing  God  and  in  particular  at  everything  good,  and 
therefore  counteracts  the  old  impulses  to  sin.  Now,  the 
important  point  would  still  be  that  God  declares  a  man 
righteous  for  Christ's  sake,  and  his  conviction  of  his  accept- 
ance with  God  would  depend  primarily  on  this  Divine  act 
But  as  this  judgment  of  G-od  is  conditioned  by  faith,  which 
forms  the  comprehensive  manifestation  of  an  altered  kind 
of  life,  and  as  it  appears  that  God's  formal  decision  regarding 
a  man  in  justification  (GerecMsprechung)  must  find  a  reason 
for  it  in  the  man  himself,  the  placing  of  regeneration  before 
justification  recommends  itself.  This  is  the  way  in  which 
the  theory  arose  to  which  Baier  gives  the  preferenca  This 
theory,  however,  stands  in  distinct  contrast  to  the  Catholic 
doctrine,  for  the  material  change  in  the  individual,  which 
is  indicated  in  the  dmiatio  fdei,  has  no  independent  value 
assigned  to  it  apart  from  formal  justification  (GfereM- 
sprechung),  in  the  sense  that  no  material  is  real  in  its  kind 
apart  from  the  form.  On  the  other  hand,  no  weight  is 
given  to  this  consideration  in  the  Pietistic  and  modem  use 
of  the  formula  that  justification  is  the  Divine  judgment  upon 


671—2]    FORGIVENESS    BASED    UPON    THE   WORK    OF   CHRIST       605 

the  material  change  of  the  believer;  that  change  is  rather 
regarded  as  a  reality  in  the  form  of  the  subjective  spirit, 
which  would  still  have  to  be  subjected  to  the  Divine  deter- 
mination of  fo^  by  justification. 

The  Holy  Spirit,  however,  cannot  be  regarded  as  a  sub- 
stance, nor  is  He  represented  in  the  New  Testament  as  the 
Divine  means  of  the  regeneration  of  the  individual  as  limited 
to  the  beginning  of  the  new  religious  life.  If  this  remark 
seems  to  be  inconsistent  with  John  iii.  5,  Tit.  iii.  5,  I  would 
add  that  both  of  these  passages  refer,  not  to  the  Christian 
baptism  of  the  individual,  but  to  the  renovating  consum- 
mation of  the  common  life  of  the  people  of  Israel  which 
Ezekiel  (xxxvi.  25  ff.)  proclaims.  If,  therefore,  the  sym- 
bolising of  the  Spirit  of  God  by  purifying  and  refreshing 
water  makes  it  appear  as  though  He  were  represented  as 
a  substance,  theological  usage  must  not  be  tied  to  this 
appearance.  On  this  point  we  must  be  guided  by  the  richest 
and  most  distinctive  conception,  which  Paul  supplies.  The 
Spirit  of  God,  or  the  Holy  Spirit,  Who  in  relation  to  God 
Himself  is  the  knowledge  which  God  has  of  Himself,  is 
at  the  same  time  an  attribute  of  the  Christian  community, 
because  the  latter,  in  accordance  with  the  completed  revela- 
tion of  God  through  Christ,  has  that  knowledge  of  God  and 
of  His  counsel  for  men  in  the  world  which  harmonises  with 
God's  self-knowledge.  The  Holy  Spirit,  however,  as  the 
power  of  the  complete  knowledge  of  God  which  is  common 
to  believers  in  Christ,  is  at  the  same  time  the  motive-power 
of  the  life  of  all  Christians — a  hfe  which,  as  such,  is  neces- 
sarily directed  to  the  common  end  of  the  Kingdom  of  God 
(1  Cor.  ii.  10-12;  Eom.  viii.  2-4;  Gal.  v.  22-26).  If, 
then,  in  harmony  with  this  exposition  of  Paul,  the  state  of 
regeneration  or  of  the  new  life  is  in  the  Eeformation  system 
of  doctrine  brought  into  immediate  relation  to  the  Holy 
Spirit,  that  is  to  be  understood  as  meaning,  not  that  each 
individual  is  changed  by  the  specific  power  of  God  in  the 
form  of  a  natural  force,  but  that  he  is  moved  to  patience 
and  humility,  as  well    as  to  moral  activity  in  the  service 


606  JUSTinCATION   AND   RECONCILIATION  [572-3 

of  the  Kingdom  of  God,  by  that  trust  in  God  as  the  Father 
of  our  Lord  Jesus  Christ  which  is  common  to  all  Christiana 
For  this  reason  it  is  not  permissible  for  any  man  to  deter- 
mine his  relation  to  the  Holy  Spirit  by  observation  of 
himself,  in  which  he  isolates  himself  from  all  others.  In 
that  case  there  would  be  reason  to  fear  lest  spiritual 
movements,  the  course  of  which  is  guided  by  laws  of  free- 
dom, might  be  referred  to  some  mechanical  power,  and 
be  made  the  occasion  of  fanaticism.  The  New  Testament 
witnesses  to  a  series  of  ecstatic  phenomena  as  operations  of 
the  Holy  Spirit;  and  even  Paul,  when  he  interprets  such 
phenomena,  indulges  in  mechanical  distinctions  and  inter- 
actions between  the  Spirit  of  God  and  the  spirit  of  man, 
e,g.  in  Rom.  viii.  1 ;  1  Cor.  xiv.  Now,  while  we  may  leave 
it  to  sectarians  to  judge  themselves  according  to  these  models 
of  ancient  times,  it  is  advisable  to  restrict  ourselves  in  for- 
mulating the  doctrine  of  the  Holy  Spirit  to  the  definition 
that  He,  as  the  power  of  the  complete  knowledge  of  God, 
bases  the  co-operation  of  all  individuals  in  the  Christian 
community  upon  trust  in  God  as  our  Father,  and  upon  the 
realisation  of  the  Kingdom  of  God.  This  suffices,  too,  for 
practical  instruction  in  Christianity.  For  if  we  thought  we 
had  to  employ  the  idea  of  the  Holy  Spirit  in  our  practical 
judgment  of  individual  Christians,  such  an  attempt  would 
hardly  deserve  commendation.  For  it  can  be  proved  from 
1  Cor.  iii.  1—4  that  factious  Christians  are  not  to  be  r^arded 
as  possessors  of  the  Holy  Spirit.  Now,  if  we  point  out 
that  so-and-so  are  factious,  and  draw  the  conclusion  that 
they  have  not  the  Holy  Spirit,  we  should  hardly  succeed 
in  convincing  them,  but  should  rather  increase  the  evils  of 
controversy  which  are  rife  enough  in  the  Church.  We 
must  not,  however,  admit  into  Dogmatics  anything  which 
cannot  be  employed  in  preaching  and  in  the  intercourse  of 
Christians  with  one  another.  In  that  case  we  may  rest 
satisfied  with  an  interpretation  of  the  Holy  Spirit,  which 
every  one  can  and  should  put  to  the  test  by  fostering  in 
every  way  the  Christian    sense   of    union,  in  self-judgment 


573-4]    FOKGIVENESS    BASED   UPON    THE    WORK    OF    CHRIST       607 

and  in  conduct,  in  pain  felt  at  the  pernicious  practices  of 
the  factious,  in  restraining  or  even  in  giving  vent  to  righteous 
indignation  against  them,  and  at  the  same  time  in  the  fear 
lest  we  should  contribute  to  their  hardening. 

Regarding  the  justification  and  regeneration  of  the  indi- 
vidual, then,  nothing  further  can  be  objectively  taught  than 
that  it  takes  place  within  the  community  of  believers  as 
a  result  of  the  propagation  of  the  Gospel  and  the  specific 
continuous  action  of  Christ's  personal  character  in  His  com- 
munity, through  the  awakening  in  the  individual  of  faith 
in  Christ  as  trust  in  God  as  Father  and  of  the  sense  of  union 
rooted  in  the  Holy  Spirit,  by  which  are  dominated  our 
whole  view  of  the  world  and  estimate  of  self,  d^pite  the 
continuance  of  the  sense  of  guilt.  How  this  state  is  brought 
about  eludes  all  observation,  like  the  development  of  the 
individual  spiritual  life  in  general.^  Bules  for  the  objective 
operation  of  Divine  grace  upon  individuals  are  not  to  be 
found,  the  less  so  as  the  relations  between  men  and  God 
always  manifest  themselves  in  experience  solely  in  the 
form  of  subjective  self-consciousness.  Thus  the  relations  of 
the  grace  of  God  to  believers  can  be  conceived  only  in  the 
most  general  forms,  as  the  presuppositions  of  that  which 
presents  itself  to  observation  in  the  framework  of  subjective 
experience. 

1.  The  forgiveness  of  sins  or  reconciliation  with  God,  as 
the  common  and  permanent  determination  of  the  relation 
of  men  towards  God,  is  not  recognisable  and  operative 
outside  the  community  founded  by  Jesus  Christ,  and 
dependent  upon  His  specific  action. 

2.  If  forgiveness  or  reconciliation  is  understood  as  the 
right  of  this  community  to  place  itself,  in  spite  of  sin  and 
a  lively  sense  of  guilt,  in  the  relation  towards  God  of 
children  to  their  father,  it  is  indispensable  to  trace  forgive- 
ness  to   Christ  in  the   sense  that  He,  as   the  Eevealer  of 

*  I  take  the  liberty  of  calling  the  attention  of  certain  readers  to  the  fact 
that  I,  too,  recognise  mysteries  in  the  religions  life,  but  that  when  anything  is 
»Qd  remains  a  mystery,  I  say  nothing  ab<mt  it. 


608  JUSTIFICATION   AND   RECONCIUATION  [574 

God,  through  His  whole  conduct  inspired  by  love  to  men, 
manifested  God's  grace  and  truth  for  their  reception  into 
God's  fellowship,  and,  with  the  intention  of  creating  a 
community  of  the  children  of  God,  proved  His  reUgious 
fidelity  to  God  by  the  faultless  discharge  of  the  task  of 
His  vocation ;  and  that  God  vouchsafes  to  sinners  who  are 
or  shall  be  Christ's  disciples,  that  position  relatively  to 
Himself  which  Christ  thus  maintained. 

3.  While  it  is  only  as  a  member  of  this  community  that 
the  individual  becomes  assured  of  his  reconciliation  with 
God  and  his  Divine  sonship,  this  connection  does  not  sen^e 
as  a  means  to  that  spiritual  acquisition  in  such  a  way  as  to 
render  superfluous  his  conscious  subordination  to  Christ  as  the 
Reconciler ;  on  the  contrary,  the  conviction  of  faith  in  Christ, 
within  the  community  which  shares  the  same  faith,  is  the 
permanent  form  of  the  individual's  reconciliation  and  Divine 
sonship,  in  the  sense  that  the  community  both  is  the  medium 
of  our  clear  remembrance  of  Christ,  and,  in  spite  of  all 
defects  of  knowledge  and  of  religious  and  moral  practice, 
exerts  an  impulse  to  the  religious  estimate  of  self  which 
corresponds  to  the  specific  action  of  Christ. 


CHAPTER    IX 

THB  RELIGIOUS  FUNCTIONS  WHICH  SPRING  FROM  RECONCILIATION 
WITH  GOD,  AND  THE  RELIGIOUS  COMPLEXION  OF  MORAL 
ACTION 

§  62.  The  lordship  over  the  world  possessed  hy  believers,  which 
is  the  aim  of  reconciliation  with  God  in  the  Christian  sense, 
has  its  limits.  For  in  so  far  as  we  are  individually  endowed 
with  a  corporeal  nature,  we  are  parts  of  the  world  and 
dependent  on  it  as  a  system.  But  even  "  when  the  earthly 
house  of  this  tabernacle  is  dissolved,"  the  Christian  hope  of 
the  survival  of  the  spiritual  life  in  an  appropriate  body  is 
an  evidence  of  what  is  an  indispensable  assumption,  that  as 
individual  members  of  the  race  of  spiritual  beings  we  can  never 
escape  from  the  environment  of  the  world  (p.  278).  Lordship 
over  the  world,  therefore,  in  the  empirical  sense,  can  be 
attributed  neither  to  the  individual  nor  to  the  human  race  as 
moulded  by  Christianity.  No  one  can  alter  the  mechanical 
conditions  of  sensible  existence  as  such,  no  one  can  create  new 
oi^anic  species ;  each,  to  secure  his  preservation  within  the 
system  of  the  phenomenal  world,  must  submit  to  the  laws 
of  mechanism  and  of  organisms,  laws  which  are  valid  once 
for  all.  Only  within  a  limited  range,  and  in  harmony  with 
the  known  laws  of  nature,  can  man  use  nature's  forces,  or 
artificially  alter  the  given  form  of  matter.  Within  this 
province  the  inventive  faculty  of  the  human  mind  and  the 
exertions  of  conjoint  labour  may  result  in  an  extended  range 
of  power,  the  importance  of  which  is  not  decreased  by  the 
fact  that  certain  species  of  animals  also  exhibit  a  capacity 
for  work  of  an  artificial  character  and  for  division  of  labour. 
The  manifoldness  of  his  work,  the  discovery  of  ever  new 
39 


610  JUSTIFICATION    AND   RECONCILIATION  [575-6 

objects  aiid  new  methods,  still  constitutes  the  specific  difference 
between  man's  spiritual  lordship  over  nature,  and  the  in- 
dustrial instincts  of  social  animals.  The  individual's  field  of 
labour,  however,  is  limited ;  just  as  in  the  application  of  his 
powers  to  it  he  has  to  depend  on  all  the  others  performing 
their  special  part,  and  thus  each  supporting  the  other.  But 
even  if  the  individual  were  to  claim  for  himself  this  whole 
system  of  dominion  over  the  world,  because  he  participates 
in  it  through  his  labour,  yet  such  a  view  is  utterly  inade- 
quate to  counterbalance  the  impressions  received  from  the 
multitude  of  natural  forces  which  man  cannot  tame,  and  the 
multitude  of  hindrances  which  he  has  to  tolerate  from  those 
on  whose  support  he  is  reckoning.  However  many  portions 
of  the  world,  therefore,  man  conquers  by  labour,  no  one  need 
hope  to  conquer  the  whole  in  this  way,  even  though  in  moments 
of  elevated  feeling  he  identifies  himself  with  the  advancing 
forces  of  human  civilisation.  But  man  does  make  a  com- 
parison between  himself  and  the  whole  system  of  nature 
when,  in  his  spiritual  feeling  of  self,  he  apprehends  himself 
as  a  being  who  stands  near  to  the  supramundane  Grod,  and 
claims  to  live  in  despite  of  the  experience  of  death.  This 
religious  estimate  of  self  was  not  called  into  existence  for  the 
first  time  by  Christianity ;  in  every  higher  religion  it  breaks 
forth  as  an  aspiration,  or  as  a  question  addressed  to  the  secret 
of  existence.  Christianity  has  only  unfolded  that  view  of 
the  world  in  which  this  aspiration  finds  its  confirmation,  and 
the  question  about  eternal  life  is  answered. 

The  final  end  of  the  Kingdom  of  God  posits  a  system  of 
united  human  action,  the  motive  of  which  transcends  the 
natural  conditions  of  spiritual  existence.  Universal  love  to 
man,  by  which  distinctions  of  nationality,  position,  and  sex 
are  reduced  to  subordinate  ethical  motives,  is  a  principle 
which  transcends  the  world,  so  far  as  by  the  world  ia  under- 
stood the  system  of  divided  and  naturally-conditioned  exist- 
ence. But  as  the  motive  of  universal  love  to  man  operates 
likewise  in  connection  with  those  who  belong  to  the  same 
country,  or  vocation,  or  family,  not  merely   are  all    these 


576-7]  RELIGIOUS   FUNCTIONS  611 

special  provinces  of  moral  action  combined  in  a  single  whole, 
but  the  individual,  through  his  corresponding  formation  of  a 
good  character,  becomes  conscious  that  he  is  a  whole  to  whom 
the  special  qualities  of  his  family,  his  vocation  and  position,  as 
well  as  of  his  nationality,  are  subservient  as  means.  This 
estimate  of  self,  however,  does  not  rest  exclusively  upon  this 
moral  activity.  On  the  contrary,  if  it  merely  related  to  this, 
it  would  be  liable  to  doubt.  For  the  formation  of  a  good 
character  is  not  only  exposed  to  hindrances  which  have  their 
roots  in  an  actually  present  wrong  relation  between  the  powers 
of  the  will  and  the  tasks  appointed  it ;  it  is  likewise  liable  to 
so  many  disappointments  in  its  expectation  of  results  from 
moral  action,  that  they  outweigh  the  conviction  that  the  self 
is  a  whole  in  its  own  order.  But  these  experiences  of  suffering 
are  counterbalanced  by  the  directly  religious  view  of  the 
world — the  certainty,  in  other  words,  that  the  government 
and  care  of  God,  of  which  we  are  the  objects,  has  for  its  aim 
our  attainment  of  the  supramundane  goal  of  life.  By  this 
thought,  that  for  those  who  love  God  and  are  loved  by  Him 
all  things  must  work  for  good,  the  sense  of  all  natural  and 
social  evils  is  changed  into  the  tone  of  feeling  in  which  we 
exercise  lordship  over  these  experiences.  So  long  as  the  view 
is  held  that  certain  restrictions  of  our  freedom  are  evils 
unconditionally,  our  dependence  on  natural  and  partial 
causes,  that  is,  our  dependence  on  the  world,  is  admitted. 
But  when  we  change  our  feeling  as  to  the  value  of  evils,  not 
merely  do  we  attain  freedom  from  the  particular  things  in 
which  these  evils  take  their  rise,  but  freedom  from  the  world 
as  such.  For  not  only  do  particular  evils  represent  just  those 
aspects  in  which  the  whole  world  is  a  restriction  on  our 
freedom,  but  the  counterbalancing  thought,  that  we  are  the 
objects  of  Divine  care,  implies  that  each  of  us,  as  a  spiritual 
whole,  has  in  God's  sight  a  higher  value  than  the  whole 
world  of  nature.  This  is  the  reason  why  a  man,  when  by 
patient  endurance  of  suffering  he  rules  himself,  likewise 
rules  the  whole  world,  which  is  the  correlative  of  the  suffering 
and  unhappy  Ego. 


612  JUSTIFICATION   AND   MCONCILIATION  [S77-8 

The  lordship  of  the  spirit  over  the  world,  in  other  words, 
over  the  system  of  the  natural  and  particular  motives  of  life, 
is  connected  in  Christianity  with  the  task  of  the  Kingdom  of 
God,  as  well  as  with  that  religious  freedom  in  which  evil  in 
its  many  forms  is  employed  as  a  test  and  purifier  of  character. 
The  task  of  the  Kingdom  of  God,  however,  includes  likewise 
all  labour  in  which  our  lordship  over  nature  is  exercised  for 
the  maintenance,  ordering,  and  furtherance  even  of  the  bodily 
side  of  human  life.  For  unless  activities  such  as  these  are 
ultimately  to  end  in  anti-social  egoism,  or  in  a  materialistic 
overestimate  of  their  immediate  results,  they  must  be  judged 
in  the  light  of  those  ends  which,  in  ascending  series,  repre- 
sent the  social,  spiritual,  and  moral  ideal  of  man.  Otherwise 
civilisation,  which  embraces  the  intellectual  and  technical 
species  of  mastery  over  the  world,  is  placed  in  contradiction 
to  the  religious  and  moral  species.  In  that  case,  however, 
the  farthest  advance  of  civilisation  were  likely  to  bring  in 
its  train  only  moral  and  intellectual  barbarism. 

Becently  a  theologian  has  undertaken  to  point  out  a  way 
of  escape  from  the  aimless  and  confused  animosity  of  theo- 
logical parties — against  which  he  makes  the  complaint  that 
with  one  accord  they  are  striving  to  reconcile  Cliristianity 
with  culture — by  maintaining  that  at  bottom  the  outcome  of 
Christianity  is  merely  negation  of  the  world}  As  establishing 
this  view  he  claims  that  monasticism,  with  its  negation  of  the 
world,  occupies  the  first  period  of  the  existence  of  Christianity, 
covering  a  space  of  fifteen  hundred  years;  that  everything 
that  was  great  in  that  period  was  achieved  by  monasticism ; 
further,  that  the  early  Christian  anticipation  of  the  end  of  the 
world  can  only  be  interpreted  as  expressing  the  principle 
that  between  Christianity  and  the  world  there  is  an  incom- 
patibility ;  lastly,  that  not  only  in  the  principles  of  Paul,  but 
also  in  the  words  of  Christ  in  Matt.  xix.  12,  the  demand  for 
ascetic  negation  of  the  world  is  laid  down.  But  if  it  does  no 
more,  the  original  opposition  between  Buddhism  and  Christi- 

1  Overbeck,  Ueher  die  Ckristltchkeit  unserer  heutigen  Theologie,    Sireit-  wtd 
Fricden8gchr0,  1878.  " 


678-9]  RELIGIOUS   FUNCTIONS  613 

anitj  may  well  continue  to  determine  our  opinion  of  the  two 
as  views  of  the  world.  I  am  far  from  underestimating  the 
significance  of  monasticism  for  Christianity  as  a  counterpoise 
to  its  Byzantine  secularisation.^  But  in  monasticism  itself 
we  find  two  species,  of  which  the  Oriental  comes  little  short 
of  Buddhism  in  its  negation  of  the  world,  but  for  that  very 
reason  is  of  no  more  value  than  the  secularised  Church  life 
of  the  Byzantines.  The  Occidental  species  of  monasticism, 
however,  so  long  as  it  retained  a  general  value  in  history, 
acquired  that  value  because,  while  resting  on  a  basis  of 
certain  world-negating  motives,  it  applied  itself  to  ordered 
labour  in  many  forms,  U  to  the  task  of  world-mastery  in 
the  sense  of  technical  and  intellectual  culture.  The  antici- 
pation of  the  end  of  the  world  in  the  apostolic  age  would 
have  had  to  be  interpreted  as  a  mark  of  world-negation  in 
principle,  if  the  inference  which  certain  Christians  in  Thessa- 
lonica  allowed  themselves  had  been  drawn  from  it  universally. 
But  not  only  did  Paul,  on  the  contrary,  enjoin  that  whoever, 
influenced  by  this  anticipation,  did  not  work  must  not  look 
to  his  fellow-members  for  support,  but  there  is  not  a  trace  in 
any  of  the  New  Testament  writings  which  serves  to  legalise 
beggary,  which  is  the  basal  form  of  Buddhistic  world-negation. 
Hitherto  we  have  been  accustomed  to  regard  the  early 
Christian  expectation  of  the  nearness  of  the  world's  end  as 
belonging  to  the  shell  and  not  to  the,  kernel.  And  there  the 
matter  will  rest,  for  that  anticipation  has  not  acted  prejudici- 
ally on  any  of  the  positive  social  duties  which  follow  from 
Christianity.  That  Paul  should  deprecate  marriage,  in  view 
of  the  calamities  heralding  the  end  of  the  world,  goes  along 
with  his  special  estimate  of  the  marriage  state,  which  is 
anything  but  the  view  common  to  Christians.  This  follows 
directly  from  the  saying  of  Christ  adduced,  which  merely 
describes  exceptions  which  directly  imply  the  general  normality 
of  marriage.  The  fact  that  some  refrain  from  marriage  for 
the  Kingdom  of  God's  sake  indicates  a  principle  which,  under 

*  Adolf  Haniack,  Das  Moiichthum,  seine  Ideale  vnd  seine  Oeschichte,  2nd 
edit.  1882. 


614  JUSTIFICATION    AND    RECONCILIATION  [579-80 

certain  circumstances,  makes  a  similar  sacrifice  a  duty  in  any 
public  vocation. 

Thus  there  attaches  to  Christianity  only  so  much  world- 
negation  as  belongs  to  world-mastery.     What  is  denied  is 
just  the  dominion  of  the  world  over  man ;  for  the  reverse 
relationship  is  set  before  us  as  our  prospect  and  our  task. 
Christianity  favours  pessimism,  too,  only  from  the  unfavour- 
able view  it  takes  of  man's  situation  as  subject  to  the  dominion 
of  the  world  or  of  sin.     On  the  other  hand,  its  faith  in  the 
purposiveness  of  suffering  in  testing  and  purifying  character 
proves    that  its   view  of   the  world  is  opposed  to  that  of 
pessimism.     For  the  rest,  I  need  not  enter  here  upon  a 
special  elucidation  of  pessimism,  for  it  is  a  view  of  the  world 
which   can  only  be   directly  refuted  through  the  personal 
feeling  of  its  representatives.      For  the  charm  of  superior 
knowledge,  by  which  the  pessimistic  theory  is  accompanied, 
is  an  outcome  of  the  rule  that  every  creature  strives  after 
well-being,  and,  if  it  be  possible,  a  well-being  which  transcends 
the  measure  attained  by  others.     While  general  optimism, 
therefore,  must,  as  a  permanent  self-deception,  be  reckoned  as 
part  of  the  badness  of  the  world,  pessimism  in  itself  denotes 
the  possession  of  a  truth  which  is  thought  to  give  one  a  more 
favourable  position  relative  to  reality  than  that  occupied  by 
optimists.     This,  however,  is  simply  to  satisfy  man's  need  of 
well-being,  only  in  a  peculiar  fashion. 

§  63.  The  lordship  over  the  world  which  Christianity 
bestows  upon  men,  is  not  to  be  taken  in  an  empirical  sense. 
So  that  it  is  of  no  consequence  what  position  the  planet,  with 
which  our  existence  is  bound  up,  occupies  in  the  universe. 
True,  the  opinion  is  to  be  met  with  that  the  Christian  view 
of  the  world  has  been  invalidated  by  the  refutation  of  the 
hypothesis  that  the  earth  is  the  centre  of  the  universe,  and 
that  the  sun  was  directly  intended  to  give  light  to  its  inhabit- 
ants. I  do  not  consider  it  the  task  of  theology  to  attempt 
to  prove  as  against  this  view  that,  of  the  planets  of  our  solar 
system,  the  earth  alone  is  suited  to  the  development  of  a 
spiritually-endowed  race  of  organisms.      For    the    materials 


580-1]  RELIGIOUS    FUNCTIONS  615 

for  such  a  proof  are  wanting ;  and  even  granting  that  on  this 
question  more  were  possible  than  a  probable  conjecture,  there 
does  not  exist  the  slightest  evidence  to  prove  that  no  other 
astronomical  system  would  furnish  the  conditions  necessary 
for  the  development  of  spirits.  Thus  it  is  possible  that  the 
earth  is  not  the  only  scene  of  the  history  of  created  spirits. 
But  it  is  impossible  to  perceive  how  this  should  invalidate 
the  estimate  of  self  which  Christianity  leads  man  to  form. 
The  above-mentioned  possibility  or  probability,  which  we  must 
concede  to  natural  science,  has  nothing  whatever  to  do  with 
the  view  we  take  of  our  practical  attitude  towards  the  natural 
world,  partly  because  we  cannot  increase  this  possibility  to 
any  degree  of  actual  knowledge,  partly  because  the  estimate 
we  hold  of  ourselves  as  spiritual  personalities  is  quite  uninflu- 
enced by  our  knowledge  of  natural  laws.  The  man  who,  as 
an  investigator  of  nature,  keeps  ever  so  clearly  before  his 
mind  that  our  earth  is  an  extremely  insignificant  part  of  the 
universe,  behaves  exactly  as  people  did  before  Copernicus. 
Practically  he  behaves  as  though  the.  earth  were  the  firm 
foundation  of  his  existence,  as  though  the  sun  were  intended  to 
give  him  light  and  warmth,  as  though  all  nature,  inclusive  of 
the  mechanical  conditions  of  the  boundless  universe,  existed 
simply  for  him.  For  these  are  the  tacit  presuppositions  of 
our  spiritual  existence,  in  which  we  all  in  some  degree  mani- 
fest the  feeling  that  we  are  the  purpose  of  the  world,  and 
have  the  right  to  be  lords  over  it.  This  fact  indicates  that 
our  spiritual  life  is  subject  to  laws  which  are  not  related  to 
known  natural  laws  as  their  consequences,  but  come  under  an 
exactly  opposite  category.  The  universal  moral  law,  when  it 
really  deserves  the  name,  represents  the  thought  that  the 
moral  fellowship  of  the  human  race  is  the  final  end  of  the 
phenomenal  world,  the  end  supreme  over  all  nature.  The 
religious  view  of  the  world  is,  in  general,  a  normal  function  of 
the  human  spirit  which,  in  its  Christian  form,  has  for  its 
aim  to  make  possible  the  supernatural  independence  of  the 
spirit  in  all  its  relations  to  the  world  of  nature  and  to 
society. 


616  JUSTIFICATION   AND   RECONCILIATION  [581-2 

Collisions  between  religion  and  science,  especially  natural 
science,  arise  only  when  laws  which  are  valid  for  narrower 
realms  of  nature  or  spirit  are  erected  into  world-laws,  and 
used  as  a  key  to  open  up  a  view  of  the  whole.     But  to  pro- 
ceed   thus  is  simply   to  introduce  an  apocryphal  religious 
interest  into  scientific  investigation ;  it  can  claim  none  of  the 
rights  of  science  (p.  207).     On  the  recognition  of  this  truth 
depends  the  prospect  of  appeasing  the  controversy  between 
faith  and  knowledge.     It  would  be  out  of  place  to  devote 
closer  attention   to   this   prospect   here.      But   it   must   be 
possible  to  harmonise  the  scientific  study  of  nature  and  the 
Christian  view  of  the  world  in  the  same  mind ;  therefore  I 
wish  to  notice  one  objection  which  it  is  customary  to  make 
to  the  possibility  of  such  a  combination.    This  is  the  assertion 
that  the  teleological  and  especially  the  miraculous  character 
of  the  Christian  view  of  the  world  is  intolerable  to  one  who 
on  principle  confines  himself  to  the  mechanical  consideration 
of  the  world.     If,  now,  this  issues  in  the  further  contention 
that  the  scientific  view  of  the  world  can  get  along  without 
the  conception  of  end,  and  without  the  assumption  of  miracles, 
this  is  a  self-delusion.     Miracles,  in  the  sense  of  eficcts  which 
are   not   produced  according  to  law,  are  assumed  in  every 
philosophical  or  scientific  theory  of  the  universe ;  for  no  such 
theory  is  without  gaps ;  and  these  gaps  are  discernible  when- 
ever such  effects  are  affirmed  as  are  not  mediated  by  any 
known  law.     Moreover,  without  the  conception  of  end  it  is 
simply  impossible  to  essay  the  explanation  of  organisms,  or 
of  nature  as  a  whole.     If  any  man  professes  to  have  divested 
himself  of  this  conception,  it  is  easy  to  show  that  it  is  still 
tacitly    operative    in   his    thinking.     But  if  it  be  declared 
untrustworthy    in  the   interpretation   of  nature,  because   it 
denotes  a  presupposition  of  spiritual   life,  in  particular  of 
conscious  will,  which   ought  not  to  be  applied   to   nature, 
neither  is  the  principle  of  efficient  cause  abstracted  from  our 
experience,  but  is  a  presupposition  of  our  thought  without 
which  experience  is  impossible,  so  that  it  likewise  ought  not 
to  be  applied  to  the  changes  of  natural  phenomena,  if  in  their 


582-3]  RELIGIOUS   FUNCTIONS  617 

interpretation  we  have  no  right  to  employ  the  conception  of 
end.  Accordingly,  a  view  of  the  world  which  is  teleological, 
and  in  detail  even  miraculous,  which  answers  to  man's  need 
of  religion,  which  guarantees  to  him  his  position  as  a  spiritual 
and  moral  whole  in  his  connections  with  nature  and  human 
society,  is — as  compared  with  our  knowledge  of  nature  and  its 
laws — anything  but  irrational ;  or,  if  it  is  so,  then  the  delu- 
sion to  which  we  submit  in  religion  is  repeated  likewise  in 
every  investigation  of  nature,  even  when  conducted  solely  in 
accordance  with  the  law  of  efficient  cause.  If,  finally,  it  is 
sought  to  throw  suspicion  on  the  trustworthiness  of  the 
religious  view  of  the  world  by  urging  that  it  arises  merely 
from  a  need  of  the  human  heart,  let  it  be  remembered  that 
all,  even  the  simplest,  study  of  nature  guided  by  the  law  of 
efficient  cause  likewise  proceeds  from  a  need  of  the  human 
reason,  and  that  its  cogency  is  liable  to  the  same  suspicion 
that  the  human  observer  finds  something,  which  he  is  con- 
scious of  in  his  own  will,  behind  phenomena  only  because  he 
wishes  to  find  it.  Lordship  over  the  world,  accordingly, 
though  it  is  not  technical  and  empirical,  but  ideal,  is  not 
therefore  unreal.  For  the  will  which  exercises  religious 
dominion  over  the  world  is  the  real ;  and  it  is  at  the  same 
time  as  much  ideal  as  real.  Moreover,  the  spiritual  activity 
which  so  operates  as  to  secure  to  the  spirit  its  independence, 
cannot  be  something  merely  imaginary.  The  truth  is,  if 
everything  with  which  we  are  here  dealing  were  justly  con- 
demned as  subjective  imagination,  then  every  spiritual  activity 
which  evidences  the  self-distinction  of  spirit  from  nature 
would  fall  under  the  same  fatal  judgment. 

Now,  in  general,  the  form  in  which  religious  lordship 
over  the  world  is  exercised  is  fwiih  in  God*s  providence.  For 
that  unified  view  of  the  world,  the  ruling  idea  of  which  is 
that  of  the  supramundane  God,  Who  as  our  Father  in  Christ 
loves  us  and  unites  us  in  His  Kingdom  for  the  realisation 
of  that  destiny  in  which  we  see  the  final  end  of  the  world, 
as  well  as  the  corresponding  estimate  of  self,  constitutes  the 
realm  within  which  come  to  be  formed  all  such  ideas  as  that 


618  JUSTIFICATION    AND   RECONCILIATION  [583-1 

all  things  and  events  in  the  world  serve  our  good,  because  as 
children  of  God  we  are  objects  of  His  Special  care  and  help. 
This  faith  appears  first  of  all  in  the  form  of  a  definite  and 
distinct  judgment,  that  is,  as  an  act  of  knowledge.  We  judge 
that  a  particular  restriction  of  freedom,  which  for  the  first 
moment  is  felt  as  a  special  evil,  is  or  has  been  rather  a 
benefit,  in  so  far  as  it  has  promoted  the  development  of  the 
character  to  its  highest  quality  as  a  whole  within  the  whole 
of  the  moral  order.  But  the  conditions  under  which  faith  in 
providence  makes  its  appearance  as  a  species  of  knowledge, 
distinguish  it  from  every  other  species.  In  it  we  are  guided 
not  by  observation  of  the  attitude  towards  the  world  occupied 
by  others  as  well  as  ourselves,  but  solely  by  our  own  experi- 
ences. For  observation  of  the  fortunes  of  others  would  offer 
as  much  occasion — or  even  more — for  dismay,  as  for  confirma- 
tion of  our  own  conviction.  Often  enough  so  much  that  is 
untoward  is  to  be  found  in  the  lot  of  others,  that  one  who 
felt  himself  called  upon  to  estimate  such  facts  in  the  light  of 
the  idea  of  God  might  easily  feel  himself  tempted  to  adopt 
the  notions,  suggested  by  the  Greeks,  of  Envy,  or  the  indifler- 
ence  of  the  gods  to  mankind.  But  faith  in  providence  affirms 
the  general  truth  of  the  Divine  goodness  not  as  a  law  of 
phenomena  discovered  inductively,  but  as  the  personal  con- 
viction of  each  individual,  drawn  from  the  nexus  of  the 
experiences  he  has  made  of  himself  (§  60).  If,  on  the  other 
hand,  we  will  accept  the  validity  of  this  conviction  only  on 
condition  that  it  be  tested  by  the  lot  of  others,  or  if  we  even 
abandon  it  altogether  because  we  find  that  the  unfavourable 
experiences  in  the  case  of  others  are  more  numerous  than  the 
favourable  in  our  own — this  is  to  miss  the  distinction  between 
the  claims  due  to  the  nature  of  theoretical  cognition,  and  the 
conditions  of  this  religious  knowledge  of  self  and  the  world. 
Theoretical  cognition  of  general  laws,  and  of  truths  which 
are  comprehended  under  such  laws,  is  in  itself  indifferent  to 
the  worth  of  the  individual,  and  is  not  sufficiently  compre- 
hensive to  take  in  the  whole  of  the  world ;  in  cognition 
which  arises  out  of  faith  in  providence,  the  individual's  desire 


584-5]  RELIGIOUS   FUNCJTIONS  619 

is  to  master  his  own  special  position  relatively  to  the  whole 
of  the  world  in  which,  as  a  Christian,  he  himself  possesses 
the  value  of  a  whole. 

The  rejection  of  the  rationality  or  the  validity  of  faith  in 
providence  is  combined  either  with   the  affirmation  or   the 
negation  of  the  peculiar  worth  of  spiritual  personality.     In 
the  latter  case,  Strauss  sees  himself  helplessly  entangled  in 
the  monstrous  world-machine,  with  its  iron-toothed  wheels, 
its  heavy  hammers  and  presses.     While,  as  the  prophet  of 
the  new  faith,  he  confesses  the  horrible  impression  made  on 
man  by  this  situation,  he  adds  the  comforting  consideration, 
that  while   the  wheels  of  the  world-machine  move  round 
mercilessly,  yet  they  are  lubricated  by  a  mollifying  oil.    Under 
this  figure  he  recommends  us  to  convince  ourselves  of  the 
necessity  and  rationality  of  the  movements  of  the  world-machine 
even  when  they  crush  us,  and,  through  the  kindly  influence  of 
custom,  to  accommodate  ourselves  to  those  imperfect  features 
of  our  situation  which  are  disclosed  by  our  experience  of  the 
world.     The  obscurity  of  the  figures  which  Strauss  employs 
is  most  significant  of  the  impossibility  of  his  view  of   the 
world.     If  in  the  world-machine  mollifying  oil  is  poured  upon 
us,  then  men  are  merely  parts  of  the  machine ;  then  they 
have,  as  such,  no  consciousness  of   the  whole  or  of  their 
relation  to  it  as  parts ;  then  they  require  no  comfort  when, 
after  having  become  useless,  they  are  replaced  by  other  parts. 
Or  men  are  distinguished  from  the  world-machine  as  intelli- 
gent observers,  but  at  the  same  time  are  conceived  as  being 
such  that  they  are  crushed  by  its  movements.     Then,  truly, 
it  is  no  alleviation  and  no  comfort,  if,  before  they  are  crushed, 
they  have  a  dash  of  rancid  oil  poured  over  them ;  if,  i.e.  by 
being  reminded  of  the  inevitable  necessity  of  their  annihila- 
tion, they  are  robbed  of  that  sense  of  worth  which  they  draw 
from  the  fact  that,  as  observers  of  the  machine  and  as  under- 
standing its  structure,  they  are  superior  to  it.     Strauss  has 
not  clearly  realised  either  the  one  or  the  other  position  thus 
possible  to  man.     But  while  his  intention  is  to  deny  that 
man  can  be  superior  to  the  world  and  at  the  same  time 


620  JUSTIFICATION    AND   RECONCIUATION  [5ffi-€ 

entangled  in  it,  contrary  to  bis  intention  his  testimony  goes 
to  prove  man's  superiority.  The  confusion  of  the  figures 
which  he  employs  proves  that  if  men  are  actually  what  he  in 
his  new  creed  insists  they  are,  he  must  persuade  them  to 
abandon  altogether  their  craving  for  comfort  regarding  their 
unconditional  subjection  to  the  world.  If,  on  the  other  hand, 
this  craving  is  ineradicable,  he  ought  to  spare  them  the 
alleviating  oil  of  resignation  to  necessity  and  kindly  custom ; 
for,  while  machine-oil  is  useful  for  the  parts  of  a  machine,  it 
does  no  good  to  lookers-on. 

These  discussions,  it  is  true,   bring   clearly   before  our 
minds  the  difl&culty  which  faith  in  God's  providence  solves. 
Man  is  a    part  of  the  world,  and  that  not   merely  in   his 
bodily  limitations,  but  also  as  an  individual  spirit.     And  yet 
as    spirit   he  distinguishes   himself   from    the    world,   gains 
through   the  conception  of  God  the  idea    of   his  worth  as 
against  the  world,  and  rises  in  the  Christian  religion  to  the 
self-feeling  that  the  worth  of  his  spiritual  personality  tran- 
scends that  of  the  whole  system  of  nature.     For  this  estimate 
of  self  is  the  basis  of  the  horror  to  which  Strauss  testifies  at 
the  fact  that,  as  a  spectator  of  the  system  of  the  universe,  one 
is    likewise   in    danger   of   being   drawn,  as. though  by  an 
unavoidable  giddiness,  between   the   wheels   of   the   world- 
machine  and  there  pulverised.     Thus  the  self- feeling  of  man 
over  against  the  whole  world  must  be  accepted,  even  though 
unwillingly,  as  a  fact  on  which  every  merely  mechanical  view 
of  the  world  makes  shipwreck.     But  now  if,  simultaneously 
with  the  assertion  of  this  standpoint,  faith  in  God's  providence 
is  set  aside  as  unjustified  and  baseless,  it  is  very  improbable 
that  such  a  position  can  be  permanently  or  sincerely  main- 
tained.    As  I  understand  this  position,  the  denial  of  DiviDe 
providence  springs  from  the  scientific  knowledge  and  estimate 
of  the  law-governed  system  of  all  nature,  this  knowledge  being 
kept   before  the  mind  along  with  the  certainty  that  as  a 
spirit  man  is  an  independent  part  of  the  system  of  the  world. 
Now  in  this  case  there  is  indicated  a  degree  of  care  for  the 
preservation  of  one's  own  life  which  is  fitted  only  to  blunt  that 


686-7]  REUGIOUS   FUNCTIONS  621 

feeling  of  worth  by  which,  in  the  midst  of  the  incalculable 
system  of  nature,  this  care  is  called  forth.  If  one  is  in 
earnest  with  the  scientific  study  of  nature  in  the  name  of 
which  Divine  providence  is  denied,  the  consistent  outcome  of 
such  a  view  of  the  world  ought  to  be  despair  of  that  value 
of  personal  life  which  we  destroy  in  ourselves  by  the  wakeful 
care  of  every  moment.  If  this  result  does  not  actually  foUow, 
however,  that  is  a  proof  that  the  scientific  view  of  the  world 
is  not  taken  so  seriously  as  the  negative  inference  would 
lead  us  to  expect.  And  this  would  only  be  an  example 
of  the  ordinary  experience  that  scientific  knowledge  and 
practical  conduct  usually  have  very  little  to  do  with  one 
another.  If  the  same  thing  should  possibly  appear  likewise 
in  the  realm  of  ethics,  that  is  really  intelligible  only  if  what 
is  involved  is  a  scientific  knowledge  of  natural  phenomena 
which  does  not  in  itself  comprise  the  conditions  of  spiritual 
life.  The  champions  of  Pantheism,  who  regard  each  spiritual 
individuality  merely  as  a  transient  manifestation  of  the  world- 
soul,  or  as  a  function  of  universal  reason,  to  which,  therefore, 
every  kind  of  theoretical  or  practical  friction  between 
different  men  ought  to  matter  nothing,  take  nevertheless  a 
very  lofty  view  of  their  personal  honour,  as  expressing  the 
permanent  worth  of  the  spiritual  individual  in  distinction 
from  all  others.  The  champions  of  the  theory  of  natural 
descent,  who  do  not  recognise  as  original  the  specific 
differentiation  of  spiritual  life  and  nature,  nevertheless  con- 
duct themselves  as  though  this  very  distinction  were  the 
fundamental  rule  of  their  existence.  And  rightly,  too. 
For  the  feeling  of  self,  which  expresses  the  incomparable 
worth  of  the  personality  as  against  all  other  personalities 
and  the  whole  system  of  nature,  is  also  the  basis  of  all 
scientific  study  of  nature,  and  cannot  be  neutralised  by  its 
results,  whatever  their  character  may  be.  It  is  thus  a 
delusion  to  suppose  that,  by  attaching  importance  to  a 
scientific  theory  of  the  world,  it  is  possible  to  suppress  the 
original  feeling  of  the  worth  of  our  own  personality  and  the 
inferences  which  naturally  follow  from  it.     And  it  is  likewise 


622  JUSTIFICATION    AND    RECONCIUATION  [687-8 

only  an  error  in  cognition  to  make  scientific  knowledge  of 
nature  as  a  system  a  reason  for  declaring  invalid  that  faith 
in  Divine  providence  which  springs  from  our  religious 
valuation  of  our  spiritual  personality,  as  contrasted  with  our 
relative  dependence  on  the  world.  Here,  rather,  there  comes 
to  light  a  law  of  our  spiritual  life  which  is  no  less  valid  than 
the  laws  of  thought  and  the  laws  of  nature.  Men  are  so 
easily  deceived  about  these  matters,  because,  in  estimating  those 
clear  ideas  and  conceptions  which  are  put  forward  as  valid 
in  science,  they  often  forget  that  our  practical  behaviour  is 
often  ruled  more  by  obscure  ideas  than  by  those  which  are 
clear. 

Now  this  is  exactly  the  case  with  regard  to  faith  in 
Divine  providence.  We  believe  it  to  be  true,  not  because  we 
can  follow  or  demonstrate  its  couree  clearly  and  completely, 
in  other  words,  objectively ;  but  we  commit  ourselves  to  it  all 
the  more  decisively,  the  less  we  expose  ourselves  to  the  possible 
danger  of  falling  into  uncertainty  in  our  knowledge  of  it 
through  instituting  a  scientific  kind  of  inquiry  into  its 
grounds.  For  to  become  certain  of  our  own  Ego  we  do  not 
need  a  scientific  analysis  of  its  grounds  and  conditions,  or  an 
empirical  explanation  of  its  origin.  We  are  certain  of  our 
Ego,  even  when  we  have  present  to  our  mind  no  clear  idea 
of  it ;  and  the  professional  psychologist  is  not  practically 
conscious  of  himself  as  an  Ego  in  a  different  way  from  anyone 
else.  The  feeling  of  pleasure  and  pain  in  which  the  Ego 
grasps  itself,  whether  what  happens  be  a  sense  of  our  in- 
dependent activity  or  an  experience  of  restrictions  upon  it,  is, 
indeed,  always  related  to  the  surrounding  world,  and  therefore, 
too,  is  always  accompanied  by  ideas.  But  so  far  as  these 
ideas  are  not  clear,  the  self -feeling  of  the  Ego  is  represented 
by  good  humour  or  dissatisfaction,  according  as  the  sense  of 
self-activity  or  of  restriction  predominates.  Accordingly, 
even  faith  in  Divine  providence  is  normally  a  tone  of  feeling 
which  develops  into  the  form  of  clear  ideas  and  judgments, 
only  if  those  hindrances  to  our  feeling  of  self  which  arise  from 
the  world  appear  in  a  quantity  which  depresses  the  ordinary 


588-9]  RELIGIOUS   FUNCTIONS  623 

amount  of  spiritual  energy.  The  normal  amount  of  good 
spirits,  in  which  the  feeliug  of  self  and  the  sense  of  power 
manifest  themselves,  is  sufBcient  in  the  case  of  many  men  to 
make  them  feel  a  certain  amount  of  hindrances  no  evil  at  all. 
One  does  not  need  to  be  a  Stoic  on  principle  in  order  to  face 
certain  physical  pains  or  social  trials  with  momentary  in- 
difference, without  having  to  call  up  the  definite  thought  of 
God's  providence  and  without  having  to  convince  one's  self 
that  such  evils  are  intended  to  test  us  or  to  make  us  better. 
The  energy  used  in  overcoming  pain,  and  the  justifiable  self- 
confidence  which  is  felt  in  opposing  certain  antagonists, 
actually  lead  men  of  strong  character  to  put  aside  for  the 
moment  the  definite  thought  of  God's  help,  however  much 
they  feel  their  dependence  on  it  as  a  rule.  For  in  certain 
circumstances  that  thought  may  make  us  feel  as  though  the 
degree  of  self-activity  which  duty  calls  for  at  the  moment 
were  being  impaired. 

Now,  it  may  be  said,  the  amount  of  confidence  which 
most  people  possess  is  only  the  result  of  a  custom  which  owes 
its  existence  first  of  all  to  the  child's  ignorance  of  the  hin- 
drances that  may  arise  from  the  surrounding  world,  which 
lasts  until  the  individual  has  gone  through  his  own  special 
experiences,  and  which  either  reconstructs  itself  out  of  these 
experiences  if  he  is  a  man  of  force  of  mind,  or,  in  the  reverse 
case,  gives  place  to  harassing  care.  As  an  anxious  attitude  of 
mind  is  frequently  caused  by  bodily  weakness,  so,  it  is  argued, 
confidence  in  face  of  possible  evils  and  in  spite  of  evils  which 
have  been  experienced,  has  no  necessary  connection  with  faith 
in  Divine  providence,  even  though  it  were  granted  that  this 
religious  estimate  of  self  is  capable  of  strengthening  one's 
confidence  in  life.  Of  course  no  demonstration  is  of  any  use 
against  such  a  view ;  for  the  necessity  of  a  religious  self- 
estimate  and  world-view  is  never  connected  with  the 
experience  of  the  individual  as  such.  But  history,  which 
shows  us  men  associated  together,  by  no  means  confirms  the 
view  that  confidence  in  face  of  possible  hindrances  due  to 
nature  or  human  society,  and  cherished  without  presumption 


624  JUSTIFICATION   AND   RECONCILIATION  [68SMW 

or  moral  perversity,  is  a  matter  of  course.  A  great  tract  of 
feeling  among  heathen  peoples  is  dominated  by  the  fear  of 
nature,  and  there  was  nothing  which  the  most  pious  Israelites 
found  it^  hard  to  rise  above  as  troubles  due  to  other  men. 
Must  not  a  completely  different  feeling,  full  of  confidence  in 
face  of  nature  and  unassuming  towards  men — a  feeling  which 
the  individual,  guided  merely  by  his  own  experience,  regards 
as  due  to  nature  or  custom — be  the  product  of  Christian 
education  ?  Must  it  not  be  dependent  on  the  fact  that 
Christianity  aa  a  matter  of  principle  excludes  the  fear  of 
nature,  and  declines  to  make  it  a  necessary  test  of  our  feeling 
of  self  that  our  worth  should  be  recognised  by  men  ?  If  we 
are  reminded  that  the  fear  of  nature  not  only  continued  to 
possess  men's  minds  in  mediaeval  Catholicism,  but  was  cor- 
roborated even  by  the  Reformers,  and  that  to  this  day  it  is 
strengthened  by  various  kinds  of  belief  in  devils,  still  it  does 
not  thence  follow  that  it  is  an  original  element  of  Christianity. 
The  theology  of  the  Aufkldrung,  from  which  this  feeling 
received  its  death-blow,  is  not  thereby  proved  to  be  a  culture- 
promoting  force  which  surpasses  Christianity,  but  rather  a 
mere  element  in  culture,  the  influence  of  which  in  the  realm 
of  ecclesiastical  Christianity  has,  in  this  respect,  justified 
itself.  There  is  really  no  common  element  in  the  spiritual 
life  of  men  which  is  rooted  merely  in  nature  and  not  rather  in 
history.  The  semblance  of  being  the  product  of  nature  clings 
to  certain  convictions  and  feelings,  only  because  we  are  both 
familiar  with  their  historical  connection  and  not  specifically 
conscious  of  it  When,  therefore,  bound  up  with  a  direct 
denial  of  Divine  providence  based  upon  the  scientific  convic- 
tion that  the  system  of  nature  is  governed  by  necessary  law, 
there  is  to  be  found  a  self-feeling  of  personal  worth,  and  when 
withal  there  is  cherished,  not  a  perpetual  fear  of  annihilation 
by  the  powers  of  nature,  but  a  modest  confidence  in  life- 
then  I  believe  I  am  justified  in  asserting  that  we  have  here  a 
case  of  the  faith  in  God's  providence  which  is  gained  from 
education  working  on  still  as  a  tone  of  feeling. 

The  pbscurity  which  surrounds  this  point,  however,  is  in 


590-1]  RELIGIOUS    FUNCTIONS  625 

an  eminent  degree  due  to  orthodox  theology  itself,  in  so  far 
as  it  represents  faith  in  God's  providence  as  an  element  of 
natural  religion  (p  181).  In  consequence  of  this,  theological 
naturalism  declares  that  we  can  dispense  with  positive  Reve- 
lation, which  seemed  to  furnish  this  natural  piety  with  no 
more  distinct  motive.  What  wonder  if  men  of  science, 
having  demonstrated  the  fallaciousness  of  the  teleological 
argument,  for  that  reason  likewise  assert  the  invalidity  of 
the  religious  use  of  this  formula,  seeing  that  theologians, 
whether  of  the  Bight  or  the  Left,  put  forward  faith  in  Divine 
providence  as  the  result  of  popular  or  scientific  knowledge 
of  nature?  But  the  confidence  with  which,  whether  in 
favourable  or  adverse  positions  in  life,  men  cast  themselves 
on  the  guidance  and  help  of  God,  regarding  themselves  as 
enjoined  by  Him  to  seek  the  one  highest  goal,  dominion 
over  the  world  in  the  fellowship  of  the  Kingdom  of  God,  is  in 
reality  a  product  of  the  Christian  religion.  For  the  God  Who 
is  the  Lord  over  the  world  and  our  Father,  Who  cherishes  no 
envy  and  wrath  against  His  children,  gives  them  the  assur- 
ance that  all  things  serve  for  their  good.  And  this  truth 
stands  firm  only  when  based  upon  our  reconciliation  with 
God. 

§  64.  Nevertheless,  faith  in  God's  providence  is  subject 
to  a  difficulty  which  arises  from  the  religious  conception  of 
God  Himself,  and  finds  precise  expression  in  the  statement 
that  the  judgments  and  ways  of  God  are  unsearchable  (Som. 
xi.  33).  This  statement  of  Paul,  however,  is  not  meant  to 
annul  the  significance  of  God's  revelation.  The  apostle  does 
not  affirm  that  God  is  absolutely  unknowable ;  for  that  would 
contradict  the  certainty  of  His  saving  revelation.  But  he 
affirms  that  the  knowledge  of  God's  general  saving  purpose, 
which  we  possess  in  virtue  of  His  revelation,  does  not  imply 
an  antecedent  knowledge  of  the  special  methods  by  which 
God  guides  to  salvation  particular  bodies  of  men  or  particular 
individuals.  This  special  side  of  God's  government  of  the 
world  remains  concealed  beforehand,  and  can  become  clear  to 

anyone  only  from  experience,  as  the  course  of  the  world  takes 

40 


626  JUSTIFICATION   AND   RECONCILIATION  [591-2 

shape.  On  this  point  the  attitude  of  the  Christian  theory 
is  precisely  the  opposite  of  that  of  pre-Christian  religions. 
In  the  latter  we  find  men  forming  very  decided  judgments 
on  events  as  manifestations  of  Divine  punishment,  while  at 
the  same  time  uncertain  about  the  disposition  of  God  or  the 
gods  as  a  whola  But  in  Christianity  the  full  revelation  of 
God  implies  that  we  can  hardly  comprehend  the  application 
of  God's  saving  will  to  our  own  destiny,  or  its  intertwining 
with  the  history  of  particular  groups  of  men  or  of  the  whole 
of  humanity,  and  that  least  of  all  may  we,  by  our  prayers 
and  counsels,  exercise  an  influence  on  the  Divine  dispensa- 
tions. Indeed,  even  subsequent  reflection  on  historical  events, 
though  guided  by  the  idea  of  the  Divine  government  of  the 
world,  is  not  protected  from  error  by  the  desire  to  acknow- 
ledge that  idea.  It  is  a  common  enough  experience  to  find 
egotistical  obstinacy  mingling  even  with  this  practical  exerdse 
of  religion,  while  all  the  time  seeking  to  justify  itself  by  the 
misuse  of  Scripture.  How  soon  partisans  are  ready  to  pro- 
nounce an  opinion  in  God's  name  on  events  which  are  in 
process  of  development,  just  as  though  they  had  known 
the  mind  of  the  Lord,  or  been  His  counsellors !  How  rash 
they  are  in  exaggerating  the  guilt  of  the  one  party  and 
minimising  that  of  the  other,  speculating,  according  to  the 
side  they  take,  on  the  help  or  the  vengeance  of  God,  and 
deciding  how  much  is  merely  the  work  of  man  and  what  the 
cause  of  God !  Cases  of  this  kind  furnish  really  terrible 
proofs  of  the  weakness  of  the  Christian  faith  of  those  who 
are  loudest  in  their  professions.  True,  the  subjection  of 
.  natural  phenomena  to  their  laws  is  made  out  by  a  more 
or  less  limited  range  of  observation,  and  by  logical  judg- 
ment ;  for  all  phenomena  of  this  kind  are  found  in  space,  and 
the  characteristics  of  natural  objects  clearly  reveal  the  species 
to  which  they  belong.  But  the  historical  events  of  human 
life  are  likewise  in  time,  and  the  nature  of  their  mutual 
intertwining  is  obscure,  for  it  is  always  subject  to  the  inter- 
ference of  human  freedom.  Who,  now,  will  assert  that  he 
has  at  his  command  a  range  of  historical  observation  sufficient 


592-3]  RELIGIOUS    FUNCTIONS  627 

for  forming  a  judgment  on  God's  special  designs ;  and  who  is 
conscious  of  being  so  free  from  personal  guilt  that  he  can 
decide  what  group  of  human  actions  possesses,  in  God's  judg- 
ment, the  character  of  pure  right  or  pure  wrong  ?  Infallible 
people,  who  are  in  the  habit  of  judging  as  though  they  claimed 
this,  profess  to  occupy  a  standpoint  as  far  removed  as  possible 
from  that  of  "  unbelieving "  scientists ;  in  reality,  they  treat 
the  Divine  government  of  the  present  and  the  most  recent 
past  as  though  it  were  simply  an  object  like  the  objects  of 
natural  science ! 

There  are  no  organs  .other  than  those  of  patience  and 
humility,  by  which  all  those  experiences  of  life  which  lie 
nearest — those  which  are  most  special  as  well  as  those  which 
are  common — may  be  comprehended  under  general  faith  in 
God's  providence.  They  yield  that  prudence  which  answers 
to  the  providence  of  God,  and  that  religious  tenderness  of 
feeling  which  is  rendered  possible  by  the  Christian  estimate 
of  self.  Every  logical  judgment  is  incisive,  as  the  word 
(Urtheilen)  itself  directly  indicates;  a  religious  judgment  on 
our  experiences  of  life  is  light  of  touch,  tender  in  feeling, 
pliant.  There  is  no  gift  for  scientific  theology,  no  capacity 
for  ecclesiastical  office,  which  could  make  any  difference  here, 
or  ensure  such  au  infallibility  as  belongs — granting  right 
processes — to  mathematical  or  logical  conclusions. 

The  feeling,  which  views  especially  the  evils  of  life  in  the 
light  of  Divine  providence  is  patience.  It  is  that  attitude  of 
soul  which,  even  apart  from  religion  altogether,  withdraws 
the  sting  from  those  lasting  evils  which  afflict  us.  Patience 
is  quite  different  from  apathy.  For  when  the  latter  is  de- 
manded of  the  Stoic  as  a  duty,  whether  in  reality  it  is  attain- 
able or  not,  it  implies  that  the  pain  due  to  the  evil,  the 
emotional  sense  of  restraint,  is  altogether  suppressed.  But 
patience  in  suffering  implies  that  the  pain  continues.  If  it 
be  possible  to  get  rid  entirely  of  the  sense  of  pain,  whether 
by  Stoical  effort  or  by  the  deadening  of  our  spiritual  force, 
there  remains  no  basis  for  patience.  Wherever,  therefore, 
this  feeling  is  called  for,  it  decidedly  implies  the  continuance 


628  JUSTIFICATION    AND    RECONCILIATION  [00-4 

of  the  sense  of  the  evil  as  a  restriction  of  freedom.  But  by 
patience  the  evil  is  reduced  to  a  relative  degree,  in  so  far  as 
patience  itself  is  a  specific  application  of  freedom.  Time,  the 
range  of  freedom,  in  the  form  of  patience,  is  limited  in  the 
first  place  to  ordering  the  relation  of  sensations  to  the 
personal  feeling  of  self,  or,  more  precisely,  to  the  subordi- 
nation of  a  particular  restriction  of  freedom  to  the  general 
feeling  of  freedom.  But  patience,  as  an  act  of  freedom, 
never  confines  itself  to  the  inward  domain,  but  always  in 
varying  fashion  issues  in  outward  manifestation,  at  least  in 
negative  efTects.  Otherwise  we  should  not  become  clearly 
conscious  of  it.  That  patience  which  we  have  to  exercise  in 
the  training  of  children  will  show  itself  in  a  consecutive  and 
positive  counteraction  of  their  faults  and  defects,  which  we 
perceive  with  pain  because  they  restrict  the  freedom  of  our 
intercourse  with  them.  On  the  other  hand,  patience  under 
bodily  suffering  may,  perhaps,  display  itself  merely  in  cm* 
refraining  from  expressions  of  pain  by  an  exertion  of  the 
sense  of  honour.  Between  these  instances  of  patience  there 
lie  an  immense  number  of  possibilities,  which  represent  the 
reaction  of  the  general  feeling  of  self  and  personal  worth 
against  restrictions  of  freedom,  of  which  we  are  specially 
conscious  only  under  special  circumstances. 

These  general  conditions  of  patience  hold  good  likewise  for 
the  Christian  form  of  this  temper  as  a  religious  virtue.  The 
elevation  of  the  general  human  exercise  of  patience  into  its 
special  Christian  form  depends,  on  the  fact  that  man's  feeling 
of  self  and  of  personal  worth,  by  being  combined  with  the 
thought  of  the  supramundane  God  Who  is  our  Father,  and 
guarantees  to  us  salvation  through  dominion  over  the  world 
and  participation  in  the  Kingdom  of  God,  is  raised  above 
all  natural  and  particular  motives,  even  when  they  are  the 
occasion  of  troubles.  This  still  admits  of  evils  being  felt 
with  pain  even  by  the  Christian.^     True,  he  is  raised  to  such 

1  Calvin,  Inst.  iii.  8.  8  :  **Neque  ea  requiritur  a  nobis  hilaritas,  quae  omnem 
acerbitatis  dolorisque  sen  sum  tollat ;  alioqiii  nulla  in  cruce  esset  sanctonim 
patientia,  nisi  et  dolore  torquerentur  et  angerentur  molestia."  10  :  "Haec  eo 
dicere  volui,  ut  pios  animos  a  desperatioue  revocarem,  ne  studio  patientiae  ideo 


594-5]  RELIGIOUS   FUNCTIONS  629 

a  height  that  he  can  glory  in  the  afflictions  and  persecutions 
which  he  undergoes  for  Christ's  sake  (Jas.  i.  2 ;  Eom.  v.  3), 
while  the  Stoic,  who  resigns  himself  to  the  course  of  the 
Cosmos,  deadens  his  sensibility  to  the  feeling  of  evils.  But 
if  we  apparently  have  to  infer  from  the  series  of  New  Testa- 
ment injunctions  to  rejoice  in  suffering  (vol.  ii.  p.  350),  that 
pain  should  not  form  part  of  a  Christian's  sense  of  social 
af&ictions,  yet  we  can  quote  against  any  such  position,  not 
only  the  explicit  confession  in  Heb.  xii.  11,  but  also  the 
example  of  Jesus  and  Paul.  For  while  joy  in  the  midst  of 
persecutions  is  expected  from  Christians,  yet,  from  the 
equally  clear  commendation  of  patience  (yirofiovrj  koX  fuixpo- 
dvfjUa)  it  follows  that  joyousness  in  suffering,  while  com- 
pensating for  the  feeling  of  pain,  is  not  to  exterminate  it. 
The  consciousness  of  reconciliation  with  God  places  the  assur- 
ance of  personal  worth  firm  above  all  the  special  motives 
which  arise  from  the  world;  and  therefore  the  pain  which 
springs  from  their  oppressive  action  can  be  subordinated  to 
the  joy  which,  in  our  feeling  of  self,  denotes  the  incomparable 
worth  of  Divine  sonship.  But  in  the  case  in  question,  joy 
would  not  last ;  rather,  it  would  veer  round  into  indifference, 
unless  underneath  the  joy  the  pain  still  continued.  More- 
over, the  truth  of  the  Fatherly  care  of  God  for  His  children 
suggests  to  us  not  only  the  inference  that  no  e\dls  arising 
from  the  world  can  overbalance  the  blessing  of  fellowship 
with  God,  but  also  this  further  application,  that  these  evils, 
as  tests  of  our  fidelity  to  God,  are  elevated  into  relative 
blessings.  And  this  comes  about  just  through  the  exercise 
of  patience  as  the  peculiar  and  proper  manifestation  of 
Christian  freedom.  Finally,  so  far  as  a  general  or  special 
feeling  of  guilt  accompanies  experience  of  evils,  that  experi- 
ence is  elevated  through  faith  in  God's  Fatherly  providence 

protinus  renuntient,  quod  naturalem  doloris  affectum  exuere  non  possunt. 
Quod  necesse  est  evenire  iis,  qui  ex  patientia  stuporem,  ex  liomine  forti  et 
coDStanti  stipitem  faciunt.  Sanctis  enim  tolerantiae  laudem  defert  scriptura, 
dum  ita  malorum  duritia  afflictantur,  ut  non  frangantur  nee  concidant :  ita 
amarltudine  punguntur,  ut  sinml  perfundantnr  spiritiiali  gaudio,  ita  premuntur 
anxietate,  ut  dei  consolatione  exhilarati  respirent." 


630  JUSTIFICATION    AND   RECONCILIATION  [B95- 

into  the  idea  of  educative  punishment.  For  experience  of 
evila  has  a  bettering  influence  only  when  it  Ib  looked  at  in 
the  light  of  the  truth  that  the  goodness  of  God  leadeth  us  to 
repentance  (Bom.  ii.  4).  The  goodness  of  God  is  not  one 
ground  of  repentance,  and  punishment  another ;  rather,  it  is 
the  general  principle  under  which  even  Divine  punishment  is 
to  be  brought.  The  idea  of  legal  retribution  no  more  carries 
with  it  the  impulse  to  improvement  than  does  the  thought  of 
experiencing  Divine  wrath.  It  is  therefore  an  error  to  re- 
gard the  preaching  of  an  angry  God  as  a  necessary  element 
in  the  Christian  ordering  of  life.  Those  who  ex  hffpoihesi 
are  overtaken  by  the  wrath  of  God,  are  nothing  bettered  by 
having  the  prospect  foretold  them. 

Besignation  to  God's   will,  which  elevates  patience  in 
suGfering  into  a  religious  virtue,  is  not  to  be  acquired  by 
sober  reflection  or  by  the  exertion  of  the  imagination.     One 
who  is  suffering  from  a  great  sorrow  which  pierces  deeply 
into  his  life,  can  hardly  in  that  way  make  the  religious 
truth  which  he  acknowledges  so  to  operate  upon  his  feeUng 
as  to  banish  the  disabling  power  of  pain.     Patience  under 
such  suffering,  drawn  from  the  acquired  conviction  of  (rod's 
love,  is  exercised  most  surely  when  it  is  supported  by  labour 
in  our  vocation,  for  all  the  true  impulses  of  the  Christian 
religion  can  be  appropriated,  not  in  inaction  and  effortless 
meditation,   but  only  when  brought    into    touch    with   our 
regular   work;   and  for   this  reason  activity  in  our  moral 
vocation,  as  well  as  patience  in    suffering,  is   an   integral 
element  of  Christian  perfection  (§§  67,  68).     In  the  case  in 
question,  the    significance   of   work   for    the  acquisition  of 
patience  is  evident  from  the  fact  that  both  are  united  in  the 
conception  of  the  worthy  exercise  of  independent  freedom. 
As  the  point  of  importance  in  patience  is  that  a  man  should 
hold  firmly  to  his  freedom  as  a  counter-weight  to  the  restric- 
tion of  suffering  and  its  consequences,  though  the  sense  of 
suffering  neither  can  nor  should  be  removed,  work  serves 
as  a  means  of  testing  our  free  activity  as  such,  and  thus 
furthers  the  end  of  maintaining  ourselves  even  against  the 


596-7]  RELIGIOUS    FUNCTIONS  631 

disabling  power  of  pain.  This  process  is  not  to  be  under- 
stood as  though  through  work  ideas  were  excited  which 
suppressed  the  ideas  which  cause  pain.  This  may,  indeed, 
be  the  case  with  many.  They  will  be  in  a  position  to  work 
out  for  themselves  indifference  to  the  cause  of  their  pain ; 
but  in  that  case  they  lose  the  enrichment  of  soul  which  is 
the  outcome  of  the  struggle  of  patience  with  pain,  and 
remains  real  even  when  the  latter  is  still  felt  only  as  a 
gentle  sadness.  For  the  former  reduction  of  pain  to 
indiflference,  though  it  may  often  succeed,  is  yet  far  from 
ethically  satisfactory;  and  inasmuch  as  patience,  not  in- 
difference, is  a  religious  function,  the  case  described  is 
mentioned  at  this  point  only  as  exemplifying  an  aberration 
which  had  to  be  noted  as  well  as  the  true  principle. 

Even  from  the  standpoint  of  deliberate  Christian  faith, 
resignation  to  God's  will  will  be  found  easier  in  the  relations 
of  private  life  than  in  respect  to  those  cases  of  mutual  interest 
in  public  life  in  which  we  may  be  involved  on  one  side. 
Here  appear  the  difficulties  described  above  in  which,  as  has 
been  said^  patience  and  humility  must  decide  what  is  to  be 
regarded  as  appointed  by  God.  In  this  realm  there  exists  a 
great  danger  of  error,  when,  for  example,  a  man  does  not 
maintain  the  necessary  distinction  between  his  Christian  and 
his  political  convictions.  This  error  is  palpable  in  the  case 
of  those  Eoman  Catholics  who  identify  the  continued  exist- 
ence and  the  validity  of  Christianity  with  the  supremacy  of 
an  infallible  Pope.  Should  they,  though  from  no  failure  of 
Ultramontane  intrigues  and  acts  of  violence,  be  disappointed 
in  their  desire  thus  to  amalgamate  religion  and  the  lust  of 
power,  they  preach  all  the  more  passionately  the  imminence 
of  Divine  judgments  upon  their  adversaries.  Quite  analogous 
phenomena,  however,  confront  us  even  in  the  case  of  those 
professors  of  Evangelical  Christianity  who  think  they  are 
serving  it  best  by  making  its  ecclesiastical  administration  an 
item  in  their  political  party  programme.  If  the  latter  is 
shipwrecked,  they  invoke  God's  protection  upon  it,  and 
shrink    from    no   injustice   in    representing    their    political 


632  JUSTIFICATION   AND   RECONCILIATION  [5»7-8 

opponents  as  the  enemies  of  Grod.  They  are  clearly  alto- 
gether unaware  of  the  fact  that  Christian  patience  has  for 
its  field  of  exercise  not  only  the  subjection  of  private  Hfe  to 
the  guidance  of  God,  but  also  the  cautious  criticism  of  the 
history  of  the  present. 

§  65.  Humility  is  the  current  rendering  of  the  Hebrew 
word  njjg.     In  the  few  cases  in  which  it  occurs,  it  denotes 
literally  the  condition  of  the  13J^.     The  epithet  "suffering," 
however,  became  the  positive  description  of   the  man  who 
experiences  oppressions  and  troubles  as  a  worshipper  of  God 
and  a  person  of  moral  righteousness.     Since,  therefore,  the 
suffering  and  wretched  are  regarded  as  those  who  seek  Grod 
and  walk  uprightly  (Ps.  ix*    11,   13;  xxv.  9;  xxxvii.  11: 
Ixix.  33),  nw  really  coincides  with  righteousness  (Ps.  xlv.  5 ; 
Zeph.  ii.  3)  and  the  fear  of  God  which  is  the  beginning  of 
wisdom  (Prov.  xv.   33 ;  xxii.   14),  and  in  this  reference  it 
denotes  the  opposite  of  pride  of  heart  and  scorning,  Le,  of 
godlessness  (Prov.  xviii.  12  ;  iii.  34).    In  the  New  Testament 
the  place  of  these  words  is  taken  by  the  conception  rotretw. 
Apart  from  the  meaning  "  meek  "  (2  Cor.  x.  1 ;  cf .  Num.  xii 
4),  this  adjective  denotes  a  humble  position  in  life  just  in  so 
far  as  it  includes  worthiness  in  God's  sight  (2  Cor.  viL  6 ; 
Luke  i.  52),  raireivo^poavptf  (Acts  xx.  19),  that  temper,  inclin- 
ing to  the  service  of  God,  which  accepts  resignedly  an  oppressed 
and  wretched  condition.     Accordingly,  the  expre^ssion  in  part 
includes  the  whole  compass  of  the  practice  of  the  Christian 
reUgion  as  opposed  to  those  who  are  high-minded  (Jas.  i.  9 ; 
1  Pet.  V.  6 ;  Eom.  xii.  16),  in  part  it  points  to  that  subjec- 
tion to  God  which  is  attested  by  prayer  for  the  forgiveness 
of  sins  (Jas.  iv.   10;   Luke  xviii.   14),  in  part  it   indicates 
Jesus'  religious    subordination   to    God,  manifested   in   His 
obedience    to    His  vocation  (PhiL  ii.  8).     Lastly,  in  Jesus* 
saying  about  Himself  (Matt.  xi.  28-30 ;  cf.  supra,  p.  462), 
TTpav^  and  rairetvo^  are  synonymous,  for  both  words  are  used 
in  the  LXX  for  VV-     Jesus  calls  to  Himself  the  suffering, 
while   He    describes    Himself   as    a   sufferer.     But    by  His 
description  of  His  own  suffering,  differing  from  the  descrip- 


&96]  RELIGIOUS   FUNCTIONS  633 

tion  He  gives  of  that  of  others,  and  further  by  the  addition 
of  the  words  ry  KapBia,  He  indicates  that  He  is  reconciled 
to  His  suffering  because  He  accepts  it  for  God's  sake ;  this 
gives  Him  calmness,  as  well  as  a  sense  that  His  burden  is 
light.  Therefore  He  can  invite  those  to  learn  of  Him  who 
1  :>ad  themselves  with  an  intolerable  burden  of  care,  under  the 
impression  that  they  can  fashion  their  destiny  by  their  inde- 
pendent exertions.  This  group  of  terms,  accordingly,  has  in 
any  case  a  thoroughly  religious  colour,  while  on  the  other 
hand  raweivo^  and  ra7reivo(f>poavvi]  denote  also  modesty  in 
relation  to  men  (Matt,  xxiii.  1 2  ;  Luke  xiv.  1 1 ;  CoL  iii  2  ; 
Eph.  iv.  2 ;  Phil.  ii.  3 ;  1  Pet.  v.  5),  and  in  the  last  two 
passages  this  is  done  in  such  a  way  that  its  close  analogy 
.with  humility  before  God  comes  out.  Lastly,  Tairewo^pocwni 
(CoL  ii.  18,  23)  denotes  an  ascetic  worship  of  God,  marked 
by  a  degradation  of  the  bodily  life,  which  is  foreign  to 
Christianity. 

The  predominating  impression  we  receive  from  the 
Biblical  idea  of  religious  lowliness  is  this,  that  humility  is 
represented  only  in  connection  with  undeserved  suffering. 
Nevertheless,  even  in  the  Old  Testament  this  is  not  the 
case  throughout.  One  could  not  expect,  indeed,  that  the 
rule  of  goodness  (Mic.  vi.  8),  namely,  "  to  do  justly,  to  love 
mercy,  and  to  walk  humbly  with  God,"  should  contain  the 
suggestion  that  action  of  this  kind  will  be  accompanied  by 
adversity.  But  the  delineation  of  the  king  in  Ps.  xlv.  5 
emphasises  eulogistically  the  lowliness — which  is  righteous- 
ness— i.e.  the  humility,  by  which  he  is  characterised,  even 
when  the  marks  of  suffering  disappear.  Nevertheless,  the 
usage  of  the  New  Testament  proves  that  the  idea  of 
religious  lowliness  or  humility  still  maintains  itself  exactly 
in  its  original  meaning,  namely,  as  involving  undeserved 
suffei-ing.  However,  we  find  the  conception  of  humility  in 
the  circle  of  New  Testament  ideas  beginning  to  be  detached 
from  the  presupposition  that  it  implies  outward  misery. 
True,  in  Jas.  i.  9,  10,  the  view  which  obtcuns  in  the  Old 
Testament   appears    again   as    distinctly   as    possible.     The 


634  JUSTIFICATION   AND   RECONCILIATION  [598-0 

Christian  is  as  certainly  regarded  as  occupying  a  miserable 
and  oppressed  position  in  outward  life,  as  the  rich  man  is 
regarded  as  godless.  But  in  another  aspect  this  statement 
differs  from  the  form  predominantly  given  to  the  idea  in 
the  Old  Testament.  The  lowly  and  humble  Christian  does 
not  merely  expect  his  exaltation  in  the  future,  but  is  assured 
of  it  as  a  present  inward  possession,  while  in  the  Old 
Testament  this  feeling  is  devoid  of  influence  even  when  the 
believer  momentarily  claims  peace-bringing  fellowship  with 
God  (Ps.  IxxiiL  25—28  ;  Mic.  vii.  8).  The  idealisation  of  the 
notion  of  humility  makes  its  presence  felt  gently,  though 
clearly,  in  the  words  of  Jesus  Himself  (Matt.  xL  28,  29). 
For  here  the  additional  words  t^  KapBia  are  designed  to 
express  the  acquiescence  of  a  pious  mind  in  His  lowly 
position,  as  in  the  phrase  vtodx^^  ^^  irvevfiari)  while  the 
connection  of  the  words  shows  that  deliberate  submission  to 
God  is  the  power  which  makes  any  situation  of  suffering 
tolerable.  Thus  in  the  idea  of  the  lowly  and  the  wretched, 
the  emphasis  is  laid  on  that  attitude  of  soul  which  finds 
compensation  for  every  burden  of  life  in  deliberate  accept- 
ance of  God's  dispensations,  and  therefore  bears  such  burdens 
patiently.  This  comes  out,  too,  when  Paul  (Bom.  xiL  16) 
represents  the  lowly  as  the  opposite  of  those  who  "mind 
high  things."  The  conception  of  "  lowly  "  is  thus  indirectly 
limited  to  this — that  one  strives  after  lowliness,  i,e.  sub- 
jection to  God,  and  stamps  it  on  his  own  heart  This 
inward  self-abasement  before  God  is  vividly  represented  in 
the  parable  of  the  Publican  (Luke  xviii.  14),  in  his  prayer 
for  God's  forgiveness,  and  in  Jas.  iv.  10,  in  the  repentance 
which  likewise  requires  outward  attestation.  Finally,  it  is 
demanded  in  1  Pet.  v.  6  in  respect  to  all  God's  unavoidable 
dispensations,  just  as  in  Phil.  ii.  8  witness  is  borne  to  it  by  the 
consideration  that  Christ  chose  His  path  in  obedience  to  His 
vocation,  and  therefore  submitted  willingly  to  the  fate  of  death. 
These  indications  point  to  deliberate  submission  to  God's 
dispensations  as  the  common  meaning  of  them  all.  To 
be  sure,  in  most  of  the  cases  adduced  the  occasion  for  this 


69&-600]  EELIGIOUS   FUNCTIONS  635 

temper  of  soul  is  furnished  by  the  sufferings  of  life,  or  the 
social  pressure  under  which  we  stand  against  our  will. 
But  this  occasion  falls  out  of  sight  in  both  the  instances  of 
self-abasement  in  order  to  secure  Divine  forgiveness;  and 
Jesus'  self-abasement  in  obedience  even  unto  death  represents 
noi  merely  this  lot  of  suffering,  but  the  whole  range  of  His 
moral  activity  in  the  vocation  which  He  undertook  and 
freely  carried  out.  But  if  His  resolve  to  fulfil  His  moral 
vocation  coincides  with  His  resolve  to  submit  to  God's 
ordinance,  we  have  opened  up  to  us  the  prospect  of  a  view 
which  transcends  the  original  conception  of  humility.  For 
if  Christianity  even  approximately  corresponds  to  its  destiny 
of  spiritual  dominion  over  human  society,  then  either  we 
may  reckon  on  it  that  moral  fideUty  to  one's  vocation  will 
have  no  hindrances  to  undergo,  but  in  some  degree  will 
obtain  the  recognition  it  deserves ;  or,  since  all  evil  is  con- 
ditioned by  our  judgment  upon  it,  the  believer,  by  his 
humble  estimate  of  the  fidelity  with  which  he  discharges 
his  vocation  before  God,  will  rise  above  the  hindrances  due 
to  society  as  though  they  did  not  exist.  We  thus  retain  the 
inner  essential  quality  characteristic  of  the  suffering  and 
oppressed,  from  the  manifestation  of  which  the  Biblical 
usage  is  derived,  if  by  humility  we  understand  the  resolve 
to  submit  ourselves  to  God.  This  resolve,  indeed,  is  not 
always  present  to  us  as  a  conscious  decision,  but  all  the 
more  does  it  appear  in  a  tone  of  feeling  and  a  sense  of 
pleasure,  which  we  can  only  explain  by  the  obscure  influence 
of  that  resolve.  For  where  you  have  a  distinct  determina- 
tion to  be  humble,  it  is  rather  a  proof  that  it  has  met  with 
restrictive  opposition  in  ourselves.  Humility,  as  one  wpuld 
wish  to  exercise  it,  is,  as  Scriver  strikingly  says,  the  eye 
which  sees  everything  except  itself;  true  humility  knows 
not  of  its  own  existence.  In  this  form,  however,  humility 
in  the  Christian  sense  does  not  at  all  necessarily  involve 
straitened  outward  circumstances,  or  troubles  due  to  society. 

A  more  exact  knowledge  of  this  conception,  and  at  the 
same  time  a  confirmation  of  it,  is  supplied  by  the  importance 


636  JUSTIFICATION   AND    RECONCILIATION  [600-1 

which,  even  for  the  men  of  the  New  Testament,  belongs  to 
"  the  fear  of  God."  This  tone  of  feeling  may  seem  to  be  alien 
to  Christianity  (Eom.  viii.  1 5  ;  1  John  iv.  1 8),  but  that  holds 
time  only  of  that  pain  at  the  thought  of  God  which  clings  to 
Pharisaic  and  ceremonial  piety.  In  the  Christian  sense,  how- 
ever, it  is  the  impulse,  accompanied  by  blessedness,  to  an  open 
acknowledgment  of  God's  glory,  as  in  the  Old  Testament. 
For  the  rest,  in  Phil.  ii.  12,  1  Pet.  i.  17,  the  fear  of  God 
signifies  the  acknowledgment  that  we  are  dependent  on  God 
throughout  the  whole  range  of  our  moral  activity,  so  far  as 
He  is  Judge  and  Father,  i,e,  so  far  as  He  guides  our  life  to 
the  securing  of  our  moral  rights  as  opposed  to  other  men, 
according  to  His  especial  grace.  Now  this  feeling,  as  reU- 
gious  lowliness  or  humility,  is  opposed  to  highmindedness  or 
false  independence  (Eom.  xi.  20;  cf.  xii.  16;  CoL  iii.  22). 
While,  therefore,  in  the  New  Testament  it  assumes  the  form 
of  one  special  motive  of  action  or  self -education  alongside  of 
others  (1  Pet.  iiL  2 ;  2  Cor.  v.  11,  vii.  1),  it  is  properly  to  be 
comprehended  under  the  conception  of  humility.  But  this 
makes  it  clear  once  more  that  humility  may  be  discerned  not 
merely  in  relation  to  the  prevalent  depression  of  our  outward 
circumstances,  but  also  throughout  the  whole  extent  of  our 
conscious  moral  activity. 

This  presupposition  of  our  resignation  to  God  depends  no 
less  distinctly  on  the  fact  that  we  know  Him  as  our  Father, 
and  use  our  freedom  to  realise  His  end,  than  on  the  fact 
that  our  freedom  has  its  dark  side,  and  God's  ways  in  detail 
are  unsearchable.  Humility  equalises  contending  feelings  in 
these  respects  just  in  so  far  as  it  is  a  tone  of  feeling, 
and  the  feeling  of  pleasm^e  predominant  in  it  testifies  in- 
directly to  our  ruling  intention  to  submit  ourselves  to  God. 
Now  ascetic  writers,  e.g.  Scriver,  when  dealing  with  the  con- 
trast, which  humility  overcomes,  between  the  lowliness  of 
man  and  the  sublimity  of  God,  nonnally  take  into  account 
also  the  feeling  of  guilt  against  God.  This,  however,  is  not 
one  of  the  essential  conditions  of  humility,  for  we  know  that 
humility  was  also  an  element  in   Christ's  character.     Still, 


COl-2]  RELIGIOUS   FUNCTIONS  637 

their  conception  of  the  matter  gives  rise  to  the  idea  that 
humility  is  properly  the  whole  of  religion  as  found  in  man. 
For  in  so  far  as  religion,  in  all  its  species  and  stages,  is  the 
acknowledgment — concentrated  in  feeling — of  our  subjection 
to  God,  humility — granted  the  omnipotence  and  grace  of  God 
and  our  reconciliation  with  Him — will  be  subjective  religion 
itself.  Now  this  is  correct,  in  the  sense  that  humility  is  the 
Christian  religion  in  the  form  of  religious  virtue.  But 
patience  must  be  added  to  it  as  the  other  religious  virtue. 
In  other  words,  patience  is  religious  feeling  as  lordship  over  a 
refractory  world,  and  is  supplementary  to  humility  as  the 
feeling  of  submission  to  God.  Humility  and  patience,  how- 
ever, come  under  the  conception  of  virtue  because  they  are 
acquired  frames  of  feeling,  and  at  the  same  time  powers,  inas- 
much as  they  move  and  rule  the  will.  Finally,  the  compass 
of  both  is  such  that  they  both  accompany  moments  of 
special  activity,  and  give  to  compulsory  experiences  of  suffer- 
ing their  importance  as  elements  in  our  active  character. 
The  test  of  both  forms  of  feeling  will  have  to  be  made,  per- 
haps, with  more  intensity  along  the  line  of  moral  action  than 
in  connection  with  unavoidable  suffering.  For  successful  action 
brings  with  it  the  danger  of  our  repudiating  humility ;  and 
our  patience  is  menaced  when  action  brings  with  it  no  visible 
result,  even  though  it  does  not  involve  us  in  actual  suffering. 
To  sustain  patience  in  the  absence  of  success,  and  humility  in 
its  abundance,  is  a  quite  specific  test  of  Christian  piety.  In 
cases  of  an  opposite  kind,  impatience  betrays  a  lack  of  reli- 
gious independence  of  the  world ;  while,  on  the  other  hand, 
arrogant  assurance  of  success  betrays  such  an  irreligious 
independence  in  the  world  as,  for  all  one's  desire  to  defend 
God's  cause,  is  exposed  to  nothing  so  much  as  the  danger  of 
gross  errors  in  the  knowledge  of  God's  purposes. 

As  humiUty  is  not  necessarily  connected  with  unavoidable 
suffering,  so  it  does  not  necessarily  involve  any  definite  out- 
ward manifestation.  It  is  true,  the  language  of  the  New 
Testament  itself  indicates  that  there  is  an  affinity  between 
this  religious  virtue  and  modesty  towards  men,  which,  there- 


638  JUSTIFICATION   AND   RECONaUATION  [fiOa-3 

fore,  will  be  found  to  be  a  regular  feature  of  it.     Modesty  is 
a  principle  of  respect  for  other  persons,  which  rests  on  the 
fact  that  for  one  thing  we  are  bound  together  with  one  another 
to  work  for  a  higher  common  end,  and  on  the  presupposition 
that  in  this  system  each  person  has  a  place  of  his  own,  and  in 
himself  represents  to  us  the  worth  of  moral  fellowship.    Now 
humility,  which  emphasises  the  obligatoriness  of  our  joint 
moral  tasks  and  our  responsibility  to  God,  normally  calls  forth 
likewise  modesty  towards  men.      But  the  validity   of  this 
principle  of  duty,  like  all  others  of  a  similar  kind,  is  limited 
by  circumstances.     One  is  not  obliged  to  be  modest  towards 
insolent  peopla     Of  course  one  is  not  obliged,  nor  has  one 
the  right,  to  be  insolent  towards  the  insolent.     But  since  we 
are  bound  to  be  sincere  towards  them,  this  may  perhaps  relieve 
US  of  the  duty  of  modesty.     Insolent  people,  therefore,  who 
are  so  because  they  profess  as  universal  ends  which  are  really 
particular,  get  into  the  attitude  of  regarding  as  insolent  and 
arrogant  opponents  who  in  reaUty  are  humble,  but  who,  in 
consequence  of  that  very  virtue,  can  only  act  in  such  a  way 
as  to   offend  their    opponents   by   their  candour.      In   this 
respect   the  collection   of  Jesus'  sayings   in  Matt.  xxiiL  is 
worthy  of  our  consideration  as  an  instructive  model    For  the 
humblest  and  most  patient  of  men  there  tells  the  insolent 
representatives  of  a  narrow  religiosity  nothing  but  the  truth ; 
while  the  Pharisees  lived  in  the  belief  that  they  were  die 
legitimate  custodians  of  God's  law  and  the  dispensers  of  His 
salvation,  and  therefore  could  count  on  the  deference  of  all 
their  fellow-countrymen. 

Even  in  ascetic  forms  of  worship  there  is  no  particular 
form  of  expression  necessary  to  humility.  Asceticism  as  a 
whole,  which  found  its  way  into  the  Catholic  Church  from 
the  realms  of  alien  religions,  strives  to  commend  itself  as  an 
expression  of  humility.  For  if  the  contrast  between  human 
and  Divine  nature — for  which,  it  is  considered,  humility 
makes  up — is  reduced  to  the  opposition  between  impure  and 
pure,  then  humility  must  be  identified  with  abstinence  from 
such  relationships  and  activities  as  appear  to  defile  man.    But 


603-4]  RBLIGIOUS    FUNCTIONS  639 

the  assumption  that  certain  foods  and  marriage  are  impure  is 
rejected  in  the  Epistle  to  Titus  and  the  First  Epistle  to  Timothy, 
while  in  the  Epistle  to  the  Colossians  Paul  passes  the  severest 
criticism  on  the  position  that  abstinence  from  the  enjoyment  of 
wine  and  flesh  is  necessary,  as  being  a  rairetvo^pocvmi  which 
possesses,  as  a  means  of  serving  God,  th6  value  merely  of  a 
capricious  device,  and  leads  to  arrogance.     That  this  latter 
judgment  should  be  so  overwhelmingly  confirmed  by  monasti- 
cism  everywhere,  is  easily  intelligible.     As  ascetic  legalism 
represents  the  surviving  influence  of  the  last  forms  assumed 
by  developing  Hellenism,  so  no  two  things  are  more  aUen  to 
one  another  than  on  the  one  hand  the  free  resolve  of  the 
Christian  accompanied  by  his  feeling  of  humility,  accommo- 
dating itself  to  all  the  difierent  experiences  of  life,  and  on  the 
other  hand  a  statutory  list  of  scruples  touching  abstinence,  and 
of  outward  acts  of  worship.     One  who  chooses  such  media  to 
express  his  humility  will  be  seduced  into  arn^nce  by  the 
inward  contradiction  there  exists  between  the  means  and  the 
end,  and  by  his    externally  separating  himself  from  those 
Christians  who  are  content  with  what  he  pretends  is  a  life  of 
defilement.     If  now,  still  further,  humility  towards  God  is 
taken  to  mean  that  one  should  place  himself,  hke  a  corpse,  at 
the  disposal  of  the  Superiors  of  an  Order,  the  consequence  is 
that  his  sense  for  truth  is  falsified  all  round,  a  result  which 
needs  no  special  commentary. 

Nevertheless,  similar  misconceptions  of  Christian  humility 
have  been  called  forth  by  Calvinism  and  Pietism.  They  are 
connected  principally  with  a  more  or  less  distinct  feeling  of 
suspicion  regarding  the  "  impurity  "  of  aesthetic  culture,  and 
of  the  time-honoured  means  of  social  recreation.  Originally, 
therefore,  they  have  nothing  in  common  with  the  after-effects 
of  non-Christian  religions  on  Christianity  at  its  Catholic  stage 
of  development.  Both  tendencies  may  be  excused  on  the 
ground  of  the  historical  situation  of  the  Christian  Church  in 
which  they  appeared.  For  in  the  Middle  Ages  the  seculari- 
sation of  the  Church  was  inevitable,  since  the  Church  was  held 
to  be  the  legal  form  of  Christian  society,  embracing  within 


640  JUSTinCATION    AND   RECONCILIATIOX  [604-5 

itself  all  other  forms  of  life.  Calvinism,  in  imposing  the  duties 
of  sanctification  on  the  entire  Christian  society  in  the  name 
of  the  Church,  acknowledged  the  principle  that  the  Church 
is  the  framework  of  everything  that  is  Christian,  even  of  the 
State.  In  Lutheranism,  on  the  other  hand,  there  was  directly 
perpetuated  the  mediaeval,  i.e.  relatively  secularised,  concep- 
tion of  the  Church,  until  Pietism  appeared  in  this  domain  in 
the  same  fashion  as  Puritanical  Calvinism,  with  the  result, 
however,  of  narrowing  the  significance  of  the  Church,  and,  in 
many  cases,  allowing  Christian  society  to  e8ca])e  from  its 
framework.  Following  a  narrow-hearted  interpretation  of 
Old  Testament  ordinances,  both  tendencies  in  part  cherished 
the  belief  that  no  Divine  sanction  could  be  found  for  social 
recreation,  the  misuse  of  which  had  led  to  moral  corruption, 
and  in  part  restrained  the  artistic  impulse  by  making  public 
worship  as  plain  and  bare  as  possible,  as  the  Second  Com- 
mandment seemed  to  prescribe.  Where  the  customs  of  the 
people  have  been  determined  by  these  principles,  they  give  no 
occasion  to  individual  revolt.  But  when  they  are  combined 
with  a  sectarian  tendency,  the  result  is  that  some  strive  to 
mark  themselves  off  from  their  otherwise-minded  neighbours 
by  abstention  from  social  joys  and  the  rejection  of  artistic 
pleasures,  in  order  thus  to  give  expression  to  the  religious 
complexion  of  their  mind,  that  is,  their  humility.  I  do  not 
say  that  the  conscious  and  deliberate  expression  of  humility 
in  the  way  described  is  a  necessary  characteristic  of  Pietism 
which  holds  good  in  all  cases.  But  I  must  say  I  have  found 
that  when  Pietists  lay  stress  on  these  practices  of  theirs  in 
contrast  to  other  Christians,  and  with  open  or  tacit  con- 
demnation of  the  unbelief  of  others,  they  fall  into  the  error 
of  thinking  that  a  specific  manifestation  of  humility  is  possible 
or  necessary.  This  error,  however,  where  it  obtains,  is  accom- 
panied for  the  most  part  by  all  those  perversities  by  which, 
in  Catholic  monasticism,  arrogant  humility  is  characterised. 
§  66.  In  statements  by  the  Eeformers,^  cited  above,  we 

^  Cf.  p.  169.     Calvin,  Inst.  iii.  20.  1  :  ''Postquam  fide  edocti  sninus,  agnos- 
cere  quidquid  nobis  necesse  est,  nobisquo  apud  nos  deest,  id  in  deo  esse  ac 


606-^]  EELIGIOUS   FUNCTIONS  641 

have  a  recognition  of  the  truth  that  prayer  stands  in  the 
closest  connection  with  faith  in  Divine  providence,  and  that 
the  understanding  of  prayer,  as  well  as  faith  in  Divine 
providence,  issues  directly  from  our  reconciliation  with  God 
through  Christ.  In  every  religion,  prayer,  or,  what  is  equiva- 
lent to  it,  sacrifice,  is  originally  the  product  and  the  proof  of 
man's  resolve  to  recognise  his  subjection  to  God  in  whatever 
character  He  may  be  believed  in.  Accordingly  Evangelical 
theologians  do  not  take  a  very  profound  view  of  the  subject 
when  they  find  no  other  ground  for  prayer  than  God's 
command  (vol.  i.  p.  351).  Such  an  hypothesis  arises  simply 
from  attending  merely  to  the  statutory  stage  of  the  develop- 
ment of  religions.  This  stage,  however,  presupposes  every- 
where an  original  freedom  of  action  in  giving  shape  to  the 
common  forms  of  worship.  The  origmal  form  of  prayer, 
therefore,  can  be  understood  only  from  the  resolves  of 
particular  persons,  as  indeed  it  is  in  this  Umited  sphere 
alone  that  it  is  open  to  observation.  What  is  given  as 
a  desciiption  of  prayer  in  Heb.  xiii.  15  holds  good  for 
every  religion — that  it  is  the  sacrifice  of  praise,  the  fruit 
of  hps  which  acknowledge  the  name  of  God.  The  variety 
of  prayer  in  different  reUgions  depends  on  the  relations  of 
the  Divine  will  to  us  and  to  the  world,  which  are  included 
by  thought  in  the  name  of  God.  Where  prayer  is  regarded 
as  an  equivalent  for  tangible  gifts,  we  find  also,  to  begin 
with,  an  agreement  between  both  forms  of  worship — that 
is,  a  definite  resolve  to  adopt  outward  action.  The  resolve 
to  dedicate  tangible  property  to  God  is  the  characteristic 
which  gives  value  to  all  sacrifice  in  the  ordinary  sense ; 
the  resolve  to  praise  God  calls  forth  the  equally  sensible 
phenomenon  of  prayer,  inasmuch  as  it  either  interrupts 
ordinary  profane  business,  or  breaks  oflf  the  soul's  feeling 
of  uncertainty  and  doubt.     The  name  of  God  as  our  Father, 

domino  nostro  lesu  Gbristo,  in  quo  scilicet  omnem  suae  largitatis  plenitudinem 
pater  residere  voluit,  ut  inde  hauriamus  omnes,  superest,  nt  in  ipso  qnaeramus, 
et  ab  eo  precibus  postalemus,  quod  in  ipso  esse  didicimus."  Petrus  Martyr 
Vermilius,  Lod  comm.  iii.  13 :  ''Hoc  est  ingenium  filioruin  dei,  ut  quam  fre- 
qaentissime  orationibus  vacent ;  nam  illud  est  dei  providentiam  agnoscere." 

41 


642  JUSTinCATION   and   reconciliation  [60G-7 

Whom  in  prayer  we  resolve  to  confess,  embraces  the  attri- 
butes of  almighty  love  and  grace  towards  us,  whose  salvation 
God  has  in  view  in  His  entire  government  of  the  world. 
Thus  prayer  in  the  Christian  sense  is,  on  the  one  hand,  a 
special  manifestation  of  the  faith  in  the  Fatherly  providence 
of  God,  which  springs  from  reconciliation ;  on  the  other 
hand,  a  special  manifestation  of  the  resolve  to  be  humble, 
which  is  distinguished  from  the  ordinary  tenor  of  that  virtue 
by  the  fact  that  the  resolve,  which  is  present  as  an  obscure 
idea  or  as  a  tone  of  feeling,  is  brought  to  clear  representation. 
The  basal  functions  of  the  human  spirit  are  all  participant  in 
each  of  these  religious  acts.  It  is  not  the  fact  that  faith  in 
Divine  providence  is  a  kind  of  knowledge,  humility  a  kind 
of  feeling,  prayer  a  kind  of  willing.  That  faith  rather  in- 
cludes the  resolve  of  the  will  to  submit  to  God,  together 
with  feeling  as  pleasure  or  as  pain ;  humility  is  a  continuous 
feeling  of  pleasure  in  submission  to  God  only  because  it 
springs  from  the  corresponding  resolve,  and  is  accompanied 
by  an  idea — not  a  clear  idea,  it  is  true — of  God's  power 
and  grace ;  prayer,  as  a  resolve  of  the  will,  finds  its  material 
in  our  knowledge  of  Divine  providence,  and  attests  itself 
by  the  attainment  or  the  increase  of  joyf  ulness  which  accom- 
panies the  act  itself.  All  that  can  be  maintained  is  that 
in  each  of  these  religious  functions  the  leading  and  dominant 
place  is  occupied  now  by  knowledge,  now  by  feeling,  now 
by  willing.  Silent  devotion  and  the  feeling  of  humility, 
finally,  rise  into  prayer  from  two  motives — first,  in  order 
that  these  religious  functions  may  be  exercised  by  many 
in  common  and  in  accord ;  and,  further,  that  the  individual 
may  ensure  his  faith  in  providence  and  his  humility  against 
those  hinditinces  which  arise,  partly  from  contact  with  the 
secular  world,  partly  from  causes  which  lead  him  to  doubt 
the  security  of  his  own  religious  convictions. 

This  discussion  is  guided  by  considerations  other  than 
those  which  dominate  Schleiermacher's  doctrine  of  prayer. 
He  says  (§  146,  1):  "Eelatively  to  the  fact  that  success  is 
never  the  result  solely  of  our  independent  activity,  but  also 


607-8]  RELIGIOUS   FUNCTIONS  643 

at  the  same  time  the  result  of  the  Divine  government  of 
the  world,  our  God-consciousness  in  respect  of  those  present 
possessions  which  are  the  result  of  previous  efforts  is  either 
resignation  or  gratitude;  while  in  respect  of  those  which 
are  still  undecided,  it  is  prayer,  i.e.  the  combination  of  desire 
directed  to  the  best  success  with  our  God-consciousness." 
This  limitation  of  the  conception  to  cases  of  petition  directed 
to  God  is  not  in  harmony  with  the  original  sense  of  irpo<T€vyYi, 
in  idea  or  in  practice,  at  either  stage  of  the  religion  of  the 
Bible.  Undoubtedly,  what  predominates  in  the  latter  con- 
ception is  just  that  acknowledgment  of  God  by  thanksgiving 
and  by  devotion  which  balances  the  tension  of  desire.  The 
representation  given  by  Schleiermacher,  which  excludes  from 
prayer  precisely  this  kind  of  acknowledgment  of  God,  appears 
to  have  a  closer  afiBnity  to  that  preference  for  petitionary 
prayer  which  hew  its  home  in  Pietistic  circles,  and  there 
manifests  itself  in  a  didactic  interest  in  the  hearing  of  prayer, 
the  truth  of  which  people  seek  to  demonstrate  empirically 
by  numerous  examples.  This  one-sidedness  is  presumably 
due  to  the  fact  that,  apart  from  German  usage,  which 
designates  the  general  conception  (of  prayer)  by  the  name 
of  a  particular  species  [Beten],  the  discourses  of  Jesus  on  the 
subject  are  concerned  almost  exclusively  with  petitionary 
prayer  and  God's  hearing  of  it.  The  model  prayer  for  Jesus* 
disciples,  too,  is  simply  a  collection  of  wishes.  The  popular 
instruction  of  the  Church,  accordingly,  which  is  based  upon 
this  model  prayer,  recognises  thanksgiving,  indeed,  as  a 
second  kind  of  prayer  alongside  of  petition,  but  only  as  of 
the  second  rank,  as  though  we  had  to  thank  God  only  after 
ascertaining  that  He  has  heard  our  petitions.  -Against  this, 
however,  are  to  be  set  two  characteristic  utterances  of  Paul. 
In  one  (Phil.  iv.  6)  he  desires  that  in  every  petition  their 
requests  should  be  laid  before  God  with  thanksgiving  (vol.  ii. 
p.  346) ;  further,  he  gives  with  strong  emphasis  the  precept 
(1  Thess.  V.  16-18),  "Eejoice  evermore;  pray  without 
ceasing ;  in  everything  give  thanks :  for  this  is  the  will 
of    God  for  you   revealed    In    Christ    Jesus."       This    last 


644  JUSTIFICATION   AND   BECONCILIATION  [608-9 

binding  consideration  refers  to  all  the  three  precepts  with 
which  it  stands  connected.  Now,  these  two  utterances  of 
Paul  yield  the  conclusion,  that  for  the  Christian  Church 
thanksgiving  as  an  acknowledgment  of  Ood  stands  higher 
tlian  petition^  that  thanksgiving  is  not  one  species  of  prayer 
alongside  of  petition,  but  rather  the  general  form  of  prayer, 
while  petition  is  merely  a  modification  of  thanksgiving  to 
God. 

This  certainly  takes  for  granted  that  in  consequence  of 
reconciliation  we  Christians  rejoice  alway,  even  in  distress 
and   persecution ;    otherwise   the  injunction   of  Paul  is  un- 
intelligible (vol.  ii.  p.  344).     But  in  joy  we  have  no  wishes, 
no  intense  desire  for  anything  not  yet  attained  ;  or  if  wishes 
do  arise,  we  have  them  in  joy  without  the  pain  which  springs 
from  their  delayed  fulfilment.     Thus   we  are  in  a  position 
to  present  them  to  God  with  thanksgiving,  with  an  acknow- 
ledgment, reassuring  to  ourselves,  of  His  power  and  goodness. 
It  must  be  confessed  that  this  attitude  of  soul  is  not  present 
at  every  moment  even  in  the  most  sincerely  pious,  and  that 
often  it  must  first  be  brought  forth  in  prayer  by  a  conflict 
with  a  reluctant  or  crippled  frame  of  spirit  which  is  opposed 
to  it.     But  if   Christianity  has  true   reconciliation  to  ofifer, 
then  joy  must   be  recognised  as  the  normal  accompaniment 
of   humility  and   patience.       According   to   Paul's   principle, 
then,  it  is  the  rule  of  prayer  in  the   Christian  community 
that  in  our  joyful  assurance  of  peace  with  God  arising  from 
reconciliation,  we  should  give   thanks  to  God  in  every  case 
and  under  all  circumstances,  and  only  ask  something  when 
thanking   Him    at    the    same    time.      Thanksgiving   always 
combines  the  whole  circle  of  our  own  transitory  experiences 
with  the  thought   that,   within   this  realm,  God  is   guiding 
us   according   to  His  wisdom  and  grace.     Were  anyone  to 
attempt  to  make  a  distinction  between  this  and  the  praise 
or  the  blessing  of  God,  by  urging  that  in  the  latter  case 
we  abstract  from  the  relation  between  God  and  the  special 
causes  of  our  need  or  our  satisfaction,  such  an  idea  would 
not  stand  the  test  of  examination.     For  there  is  no  religious 


609-10]  RELIGIOUS   FUNCTIONS  645 

acknowledgment  of  God  which  cannot  be  applied  to  the 
situation  of  the  man  who  is  praying  to  God.  While,  there- 
fore, in  praising  and  blessing  God,  the  benefits  of  salvation 
may  be  touched  upon  only  in  their  most  general  aspect,  yet 
for  that  reason  such  praise  shows  itself  to  be  thanksgiving. 

As  regards  petition,  however,  its  range  is  more  narrowly 
limited    by    the    assumed    certainty    of    reconciliation    than 
appears  in  the  religion   of  the   Old   Testament.     If  in  the 
Christian  community,  or  in  a  vocation  devoted  to  its  further- 
ance, we  find   ourselves   thwarted  by  prejudice,  mistrust,  or 
calumny,  it  is  not  for  us  to  follow  the   prevailing  practice 
of  the  Psalmists  and  call  upon  God  to  vindicate  our  rights 
and  slay  our  foes,  so  that  we  may  then  be  able  to  thank 
Him.     When  more  closely  examined,  even  the  Lord's  Prayer 
is   very  far  from  being  an   example  of  one-sided  petition. 
For  as  the  invocation  of  the  Father  stands  at  the  head  of 
all  the  particular  sentences  it  contains,  so  all  the  petitions 
in  it  are  subordinate  to  the  thanksgiving  w^hich  forms   the 
content  of  the  invocation.     Further,  the  wish   uttered  for 
the  hallowing  of  the  Father's  name  is  only  an  expression 
of  the  certain  expectation  that  the  Father  wUl  everywhere 
receive  thanks.     Finally,  the  petition  for  our  necessary  food 
is  rather  an  expression  of  thanks  to  God,  if  on  the  one  hand 
it  be  assumed  that  God  is  ready  to  grant  the  necessaries 
of  life  before  we  ask  them  (Matt.  vi.  8),  and  on  the  other 
that  we  earn   what  is  needed  for  life  by  our  own  labour 
But   simply  as   a  model   of   what  should   be  prayed  for  in 
the  name  of  Jesus,  i.e.  in   view  of  the   revelation  of  God 
present    in   Him,   it  serves  to    limit  the    promises    of   the 
hearing  of  prayer  given  by  Jesus  in  Matt.  vii.  7—11.     Our 
prayers  ought  to  be  directed  not  to  every  conceivable  kind  of 
blessing,  such  as  trouble  the  minds  of  the  heathen  (vi.  31-34), 
but  to  the  benefits  of  salvation  in  all  their  possible  relations 
to  blessedness.     To  this  refers  the  saying  that  God  hears  us 
if  we  pray  according  to  His  will,  so  that   we  immediately 
experience  the  fulfilment  of  our  prayer  (1  John  v.  14,  15), 
For  Jesus  proves  by  His  own  example  that  not  every  petition 


646  JUSTIFICATION   AND   RECONCILIATION  [610-1 

is  justifiable  (Mark  xiv.  36).  Since,  then,  there  exists  a 
danger  that  we  should  pray  for  blessings  which  it  is  not 
God*s  will  that  we  should  receive,  the  ultimate  resting  of 
the  soul  in  the  contrary  will  of  God  is  a  manifestation  of 
that  thanksgiving  by  which  every  petition  ought  to  be  ruled 
and,  according  to  circumstances,  limited.  Granting  this  pre- 
supposition, prayer  is  the  expression  of  humility  and  patience, 
and  the  means  of  confirming  oneself  in  these  virtues.  But 
if  this  view  holds  good  for  every  uttered  prayer,  of  the  indi- 
vidual as  well  as  the  community,  it  is  singularly  corroborated 
by  Paul's  injunction  to  pray  without  ceasing.  For  this  de- 
notes that  transformation  of  prayer  back  into  the  voiceless 
feeling  of  humility  and  patience,  which,  as  accompanying 
the  whole  active  life,  is  equivalent  to  prayer  as  the  noimal 
form  of  the  worship  of  God.  On  this  presupposition,  all 
the  believer's  action,  especially  so  far  as  it  exemplifies  the 
principle  of  patience  and  modesty  towards  one's  fellow- 
Christians,  serves  the  glory  of  God  (1  Cor.  x.  31  ;  Phil. 
i.  11). 

§  67.  These  religious  functions,  springing   from  recon- 
ciliation with  God,  are  to  be  assigned  to  the  elements  of 
Christian  freedom  as  affirmed  by  Luther  (§  25),  thus — faith 
in  God's  fatherly  providence  and  patience  correspond  to  the 
kingly  dignity,  humility  and  prayer  to  the  priestly  dignity, 
of  the  Christian.     The  believer,  however,  occupies  a  position 
of  lordship  over  the  world,  in  the  religious  sense  meant  here, 
because  he  stands  so  near  to  God,  and  belongs  so  peculiarly  to 
God  as  to  ensure  his  independence  of  all  the  elements  of  the 
world.     That  independence  is  determined  by  his  adoption  of 
the  end  of  the  Kingdom  of  God,  which  is  seen  to  be  the  end 
of  the  world  and  at  the  same  time  the  most  personal  end  of 
God  Himself.      These  functions  are  the  proper  manifestation 
of  the  reconcihation  and  the  Divine  sonship  accomplished  in 
Christianity  ;  where  they  appear,  they  represent  our  personal 
realisation  of  Christianity  as  a  religion ;  they  are  a  guarantee 
that  it  is  not  merely  a  doctrine  of  morals.     But  at  the  same 
time   they   constitute    the   norm    which    should    determine 


611-2]  RBXIGIOUS   FUNCTIONS  647 

whether  other  religious  functions — or  what  are  practised  as 
such — possess  merely  the  subordinate  value  of  auxiliary 
actions,  or  no  value  at  all.  In  this  respect  it  is  of  practical 
importance  to  observe  that  the  Augsburg  Confession  not 
merely  testifies  that  faith  in  God's  fatherly  providence  and 
prayer  are  the  expression  of  our  consciousness  of  reconcilia- 
tion, but  also  that  these  functions,  together  with  humility 
and  the  moral  activity  proper  to  one's  vocation,  are  the 
expressions  of  Christian  perfection}  The  phrase  "  Christian 
perfection  "  is  employed  here  in  a  sense  not  directly  furnished 
by  the  New  Testament.  What  we  have  there,  rather,  is  two 
other  aspects  of  the  idea.  First,  for  all  His  followers  Christ 
places  the  task  of  perfection  in  the  fulfilment  of  the  command 
to  love  our  enemies  (Matt.  v.  48) ;  on  the  other  hand,  Paul 
describes  a  particular  stage  of  the  development  of  moral 
character  in  Christianity  as  the  stage  of  "  the  perfect," 
among  whom  he  reckons  himself  (1  Cor.  ii.  6 ;  Phil.  iii.  15  ; 
cf.  Heb.  V.  14;  Jas.  iii.  2). 

The  language  of  Catholicism  adopts  this  distinction,  but 
in  such  a  way  as  to  substitute  a  quite  different  content.  For 
monasticism  makes  it  its  aim  to  realise  a  religious  and  moral 
perfection  which  contrasts  with  that  imperfect  kind  of  Chris- 
tianity which  conforms  to  the  world,  by  alienating  its  devotees 
from  civil  callings  and  from  the  family,  and  at  the  same  time 
violating  personal  independence  by  the  prohibition  of  private 
property  and  the  limitation  of  personal  honour  by  its  superiors. 
Since,  now,  this  cast  a  semblance  of  defilement  upon  moral 
life  in  civil  callings,  there  was  added  as  a  kind  of  com- 
pensation the  tenet  that  the  religion  of  the  laity  must  at 
least  approximate  to  the  perfection  of  the  monk  by  practising 

^  C.  A.  XX.  24 :  '*  lam  qai  scit,  se  per  Christum  habere  propitium  patrem,  is 
vere  novit  deum,  scit,  se  ei  curae  esse,  invocat  eum,  denique  non  est  sine  deo 
sicTit  gentes."  xxvii.  49 :  **  Obscurantur  praecepta  dei  et  verus  cultus  dei,  cum 
andiuut  homines  solos  monachos  esse  in  statu  perfectionis,  quia  perfectio 
Christiana  est  (1)  serio  timere  deum  et  rursus  concipere  magnam  fidem  et  con- 
fidere  propter  Christum,  quod  habeamus  deum  placatum,  (2)  petere  a  deo  et  (3) 
certo  exspectare  auxilium  in  omnibus  rebus  gerendis  iuxta  vocationem ;  interim 
(4)  foris  diligenter  facere  bona  opera  et  servire  vocationi.  In  his  rebus  est  vera 
perfectio  et  yems  cultus  dei,  non  est  in  caelibatu  aut  mendicitate  aut  veste 
sordida."    Cf.  xvi.  Apol,  C.  A,  iii.  232,  yiii.  61,  xiii.  37,  45. 


648  JUSTIFICATION   AND   RECONCILIATION  [613-3 

as  Btrenuously  as  possible  the  ascetic  usages  of  the  ceremonial 
law.^  This  is  the  tendency  of  the  reform  of  ecclesiastical  life 
set  on  foot  by  St.  Francis.  Now,  when  the  Reformers  hold, 
in  opposition  to  the  pretended  perfection  of  monasticism,  that 
faith  in  providence,  humility,  and  patience  and  faithful 
activity  in  any  calling,  represent  Christian  perfection,*  they 
mean  this  no  longer  in  the  sense  of  a  stage  superior  to  a 
Christian  imperfection  which  is  unavoidable  and  therefore 
permissible,  but  as  an  injunction  incumbent  on  all  Christians- 
They  revert,  that  is,  from  the  line  of  the  apostolic  usage  to 
the  line  followed  by  Jesus  in  His  demand  for  perfection. 
For  the  perfection  meant  by  Jesus  is  that  which  distinguishes 
the  Christian  life  in  general  from  the  imperfection  to  be 
found  in  other  religions.  Now  that  is  the  meaning  of  the 
Reformers'  principle  too;  it  is  meant  to  exclude  every 
possibility  of  two  kinds  of  Christianity.  Now  the  Reformers, 
it  is  true,  place  a  number  of  religious  and  moral  functions 
under  the  heading  of  perfection  which  Jesus  did  not  conceive 
as  such.  But  still  they  describe  precisely  the  content  which 
really  constitutes  the  proper  character  of  the  Christian  life,  in 
other  words,  the  attitude  which  is  rendered  possible  by  recon- 
ciliation through  Christ.  But  they  have  likewise  the  full 
right  to  go  beyond  the  usage  of  the  New  Testament  in  this 

^C  A.  zzyL  8-11:  *^  Christianismiis  totus  puUbatur  esse  observatLo 
certarum  feriarum,  rituum,  ieiuniorum,  vestitus.  Hae  observationes  erant  in 
possessione  honeatissimi  tituli,  quod  essent  vita  spirituaUs  et  vita  perfecta. 
Interim  mandata  dei  iuxta  vocationem  nuUam  laudem  habebant,  quod  pater- 
familias educabat  sobolem,  quod  mater  pariebat,  quod  priuceps  regebat  rem- 
publicam  ;  haec  putabantnr  esse  opera  mundana  et  imperfecta  et  longe  deteriora 
iUis  splendidis  observationibus.  Et  hie  error  valde  cmciabat  pias  conscientias, 
quae  dolebant  se  teneri  imperfecto  vitae  genere,  mirabantur  monachos  et 
similes,  et  falso  putabant  illorum  observationes  deo  gratiores  esse." 

^  De  votis  inonasticis  I/ulheri  indicium  (1522).  Opera  lot*  ad  reform,  hisi. 
pertiiunUia,  torn.  vi.  p.  254:  ''Perfectionis  status  est,  esse  animosa  fide  oon- 
temtorem  mortis,  vitae,  gloriae,  et  totius  mundi  et  fervente  caritate  omnium 
servum."  P.  261 :  *'Haec  est  vera  via  salutis  subdi  deo,  in  fide  ei  cedere  et 
silere,  ponere  tumultum  praesumtionis  operum,  quibus  quaerunt  impii  eum 
iu venire,  et  sese  ductilem  praebere,  ut  ipse  in  nobis  operetur,  non  nosoperemur." 
P.  344  :  "Melior  et  perfectior  eat  obedientia  fiUi,  coniugis,  servi,  captivi,  quam 
monachi  obedientia.  .  .  .  Igitur  si  ab  imperfecto  ad  perfectum  eanduni  est,  ab 
obedientia  monastica  ad  obedientiam  parentum,  dominorum,  mariti,  tyran- 
norum,  adversariorum  et  omnium  eundum  est." 


613-4]  BELIGIOUS   FUNCTIONS  649 

respect ;  for  the  historical  situation  in  the  midst  of  which  the 
Eeformers  had  to  indicate  the  true  inferences  which  follow 
from  the  Gospel,  did  not  exist  in  the  original  circumstances  of 
the  Church,  and  therefore  could  not  be  foreseen  by  Jesus  or 
the  Apostles. 

The  Catholic  view  of  Christian  perfection,  indeed,  is 
influenced  for  one  thing  by  the  fact  that  the  ascetic  motives 
of  the  later  Hellenism  were  adopted  in  the  Catholic  form  of 
Christianity  (§  65).  Nevertheless,  the  monastic,  and  in 
general  the  statutory,  form  of  Catholicism  had,  in  a  formal 
respect,  still  another  root,  which,  when  it  is  pointed  out,  frees 
the  contradiction  in  question  from  the  appearance  of  chance. 
I  have  shown  (p.  177)  that  the  topic  of  Christian  freedom, 
with  which  coincide  perfection  in  the  Evangelical  sense  and 
the  status  of  Divine  sonship,  has  its  Catholic  counterpart  in 
the  timor  filialis,  as  that  conception  is  developed  by  Thomas. 
The  fear  of  God,  which  corresponds  to  the  Catholic  view  of 
the  Divine  sonship,  is  made  to  consist  in  perpetual  con- 
templation of  the  guilt  which  we  should  incur  by  violation  of 
obedience  to  God.  Now,  if  the  feeling  towards  God  answer- 
ing to  the  status  of  a  Christian  is  the  perpetual  terror  of 
disobeying  the  Divine  commandments  which  confront  the 
Boul  in  all  their  statutory  multiplicity,  and  for  that  very 
reason  confuse  the  memory  and  distract  the  attention,  here 
lies  the  impulse  to  withdraw  into  monasticism  from  life  in 
the  world,  and  cut  off  those  relationships  in  life  which  are 
attended  by  the  most  pressing  danger  of  transgressing  Divine 
commandments.  Since,  therefore,  monasticism  is  the  general 
expression  in  history  of  this  Catholic  fear  of  God,  the  ideal 
set  up  by  the  Eeformation  of  humble  and  trustful  reverence 
before  God  is  the  true  opposite  of  pretended  monastic  per- 
fection. This,  however,  carries  with  it  likewise  the  assurance 
that  every  one  who  in  his  moral  vocation  acts  according  to 
the  law  is  not  confronted  by  the  statutory  multiplicity  of  the 
Divine  commandments,  but  follows  the  inward  law  of  freedom, 
and  thus  is  freed  from  the  terror  of  missing  the  mark  at 
every  moment,  from  the  uncertainty  of  his  knowledge  of  the 


650  JUSTIFICATION   AND   RECONCILIATION  [614—5 

Divine  will.     In  reserving  this  point  for  more  accurate  dis- 
cussion, let    me   add   that  the  Thomistic  interpretation   of 
timor  filialis  is  not  at  all  analogous  to  the  Biblical  idea  of  the 
fear  of  God.     For  the  "  fear  of  God "  which  Old  Testament 
experience  proves  to  be  the  beginning  of  wisdom,  is  itself 
somethijag  quite  diflferent  from  terror  lest  at  any  moment  we 
should  violate  a  commandment  of  God,  even  though  it  be 
against  our  wilL     For  the  saints  who  strive  to  act  in  the  fear 
of  God  and  to  follow  God's  ways,  come  to  know  the  duties 
incumbent  on  them  through  their  disposition  and  not  through 
a  statutory  law.     Even  those  infrequent  appeals  to  the  fear 
of  God  which  occur  in  the  New  Testament,  and  have  been 
interpreted  above  as  referring  to  humility  (p.  636),  reflect  the 
sublimity  of  God — in  other  words,  that  side  of  His  ways  or 
purposes  which  is  inscrutable  a  'priori,  but  are  not  guided  by 
the  consideration  that  we  are  continually  in  peril  of  offending 
God.      Accordingly  reverence  towards  God  is  indicated  as  an 
expression  of  soul  equivalent  to  humility,  a  feeling  of  the 
qualitative  distance  between  man  and  God  which  certainly 
limits  the  natural  feeling  of  self,  but  not  in  such  a  way  that 
the  impression  of   the  Divine  authority  awakens   first  and 
foremost  a  thought  of  the  guilt  one  would  incur  by  offending 
God.     The  interpretation  of  childlike  fear  given  by  Thomas 
is  a  significant  example   of  the  method — very  common  in 
theology — of  affirming  a  sense  which  the  words  may  possibly 
bear,  without  considering  whether  it  really  suits  the  various 
relations  involved.     But  this    cowering  terror   of  offending 
God's  Fatherly  authority  simply  does  not  accord  with  the 
religion  of  reconciliation,  and  the  trust  in  God  arising  thence, 
represented  by  the  Apostles.     All  the  more,  of  course,  does 
this  "  childlike  terror  "  agree  with  the  view  that  Christianity, 
in  its  first  aspect  and  its  last,  is  to  be  regarded  as  statutory 
law.     This  childlike  fear,  therefore,  reappears  wherever  in 
Protestantism  the  standpoint  of  the  law  of  freedom  is  ex- 
changed for  the  predominant  recognition  of  statutory  law. 

The  perfection,  however,  which  is  set  up  as  an  ideal  in  the 
Evangelical  view  of  Christianity,  is  a  conception  which  was 


615-6]  RELIGIOUS   FUNCTIONS  651 

not  called  forth  merely  accidentally  by  the  mieinterpretation 
of  it  in  monasticism,  but  is  necessary  to  the  completeness  of 
Christianity.  It  must  be  asserted,  despite  the  many  imper- 
fections we  perceive  in  our  religious  functions  and  our  moral 
actions.  The  destination  of  men  for  perfection  in  Christianity 
may  likewise  be  se»en  in  the  exhortation  to  rejoice  amid  all 
the  changes  of  life  which,  in  the  New  Testament,  accompanies 
instruction  in  the  Christian  faith  (vol.  ii.  pp.  344,  350).  For 
joy  is  the  sense  of  perfection*  In  the  present  case,  how- 
ever, this  characteristic  has  not  quantitative  but  qualitative 
significance ;  it  marks  the  fact  that  in  Christianity  man  is 
destined  and  is  enabled  to  be  a  whole  in  his  own  spiritual 
order  (p.  502).  Now  there  is  no  contradiction  between  the 
qualitative  sense  of  Christian  perfection,  and  the  fact  that  we 
still  continue  to  be  conscious  of  the  quantitative  imperfect- 
ness  and  defectiveness  even  of  those  functions  in  which  our 
Christian  faith  is  expressed.  The  phenomena  of  hesitancy  to 
put  faith  in  God's  providence,  of  reluctance  to  submit  to  His 
dispensations,  of  momentary  impatience  under  suffering — 
phenomena,  in  short,  of  weak  faith  and  lack  of  joyousness  in 
religious  life — are  well  known.  Nor  can  they  be  explained 
entirely  by  the  fact  that  even  Christian  perfection  is  a  grow- 
ing thing;  rather  do  they  express  often  enough  an  un- 
expected revolt  of  the  natural  man  in  the  Christian  against 
his  religious  purpose;  nevertheless,  in  this  respect  they  are 
not  necessarily  phenomena  of  sinful  egoism,  but  phenomena 
of  temptation.  But  the  reactions  which  are  provoked  in  us 
by  these  vestiges  of  religious  instability  are  themselves  an 
evidence,  in  their  own  order,  of  Christian  perfection.  For 
every  organic  being  which  in  its  order  forms  a  whole,  can 
bear  a  certain  amount  of  defects  without  destruction.  The 
spiritual  life,  however,  is  a  whole  in  this  sense  that  its 
freedom — directed  to  the  final  end  of  the  good — is  prepared 
at  every  moment  to  restrain,  to  order,  or  to  overcome  the 
spiritual  impulses  which  arise  from  the  relation  of  the  spirit 
to  its  own  individual  nature  and  to  the  surrounding  world. 
So  far,  therefore,  as  restrictions  and  disturbances  spring  up  in 


652  JUSTIFICATION   AND   RECONCILIATION  [616-7 

the  proper  functious  of  the  religious  life,  the  perception  of 
these  hindrances  as  such,  if  combined  with  a  determination  to 
overcome  them,  is  itself  an  evidence  of  imperfection  naerely 
in  a  quantitative  respect,  while  in  a  qualitative  aspect  it  is 
really  a  manifestation  of  religious  perfection.  The  faith 
which  breaks  forth  in  the  prayer,  "  Lord,  help  mine  unbelief," 
is  perfect  in  its  own  kind. 

Faith  in  the  Fatherly  providence  of  God,  which  maintains 
a  right  feeling  with    God   through  humility,  and   with   the 
world  through  patience,  and  which  expresses  and  confirms 
itself  through  prayer,  forms  in  general  the  content  of   the 
religious  life  which  springs  out  of  reconciliation  with   God 
through   Christ.     For  in   the  human   mind  clear  trains  of 
knowledge  are  interwoven  with  states  of  feeling  in  such  a 
way  that  conscious  and  intentional  acts  of  submission  to  God's 
will,  and  the  attaining  of  the  continuous  feeling  of  self  to 
humility  and  patience,  condition  each  other  mutually.     These 
phenomena,  combined  as  they  are  in  normal  fashion  with  the 
disposition  to  obey  the  moral  law  and  with  good  action  in 
one's  calling,  are  sufficient  evidence,  to  the  man  himself  who 
is  the  subject  of  them,  of  his  being  in  a  state  of  salvation. 
There  is  no  other  way  of  persuading  ourselves  of  our  recon- 
ciliation  with    God    than  by    finding   reconciliation   experi- 
mentally  in    active    trust   in    God's   providence,  in  patient 
submission  to  sufferings  sent  by  God  as  a  means  of  testing 
and  purifying  us,  in  humble  attention  to  the  nexus  of  His 
dealing  with  our  fortunes,  in  the  sense  of  independence  of 
human  prejudices — and  that,  too,  just  in  so  far  as  they  set 
themselves  up  as  a  rule  to  religion — and,  finally,  in  daily 
prayer  for  the  forgiveness  of  sins,  on  the  understanding  that 
by  the  exercise  of  a  forgiving  spirit  we  prove  that  we  have  a 
place  in  the  community  of  God  (vol.  ii.  p.  34).     Tliese  acts 
are  not  to  be  understood  in   the  sense  that  we  reconcile 
ourselves  to   God   through  them  by  the  power  of  our  own 
determination,  but   in    the    sense    that,  as   springing   from 
Christ's  reconciliation  of  sinners,  they  prove  us  children  of 
God  who  trace  back  our  standing  before  Him  solely  to  the 


617-8]  RELIGIOUS   FUNCTIONS  653 

grace  of  God  revealed  in  Christ.  Thus  these  religious  func- 
tions are  alreacjy  characterised  even  by  Melanchthon  in  the 
Apology  of  the  Augsburg  Confession  as  the  evidences  of 
reconciliation  (p.  169).  While,  therefore,  in  the  fellowship 
of  the  Church,  out  of  regard  for  unavoidable  statutes  and  out 
of  consideration  for  the  needs  of  others,  we  may  aim  ever  so 
much  at  accommodation  and  submission,  yet  in  the  personal 
sanctuary  of  the  unique  knowledge  of  God,  the  view  of  the 
world  and  estimate  of  self  which  belong  to  Christianity,  con- 
sisting as  they  do  more  in  tones  of  feeling  than  in  reflections 
of  the  understanding,  we  stand  absolutely  independent  of  our 
fellow-men — otherwise,  we  have  simply  not  attained  to  the 
enjoyment  of  reconciliation  at  all.  We  shall  not  succeed, 
however,  either  in  helping  others  or  enlightening  ourselves  in 
this  respect,  if  we  employ  the  methods  for  attaining  assurance 
of  salvation  which  have  been  criticised  above  (p.  153).  They 
come  to  this,  that  we  should  derive  our  individual  assurance 
of  salvation  inferentially  from  the  general  article  of  faith  of 
the  forgiveness  of  sins  through  the  merits  of  Christ,  instead 
of  ascertaining  it  directly  from  the  subjective  effects  of  recon- 
ciliation. That  a  method  of  logical  inference  was  devised,  in 
which  the  terminus  medius  is  either  assumed  as  given  or  is  to 
be  produced  by  a  categorical  exhortation  to  strong  faith,  is 
certainly  not  to  be  excused  by  pleading  that  the  only 
functions  of  the  human  mind  with  which  its  authors  were 
acquainted  were  knowing  and  willing,  while  they  as  good  as 
knew  nothing  of  feeling,  or  its  intertwining  with  indistinct 
ideas,  or  its  significance  for  the  excitation  of  the  will.  But 
as  we  cannot  now  divest  ourselves  of  those  discoveries  which 
assure  us  that  personal  life  possesses  a  richer  fulness  than 
men  were  aware  of  in  the  age  of  the  Eeformation,  Lohe's 
proposal  (p.  157)  merely  to  enforce  anew  the  old  dogmatic 
directions  which  had  never  been  proved  by  experience,  has 
neither  a  claim  to  success,  nor  any  prospect  of  it.  For  if  it 
comes  to  this,  that  we  must  really  secure  assurance  of  salva- 
tion, then  Gerhard  was  right  in  comparing  this  demand  of 
Protestantism   to  that  other — that   you   must    be  able    to 


654  JUSTIFICATION   AND   RECONCILIATION  [618-9 

prove  that  you  are  a  man  and  not  a  ghost.^  Now,  if  we 
reach  certainty  in  the  latter  case  by  exercising  human 
activities  as  human  beings,  so  in  the  Christian  community 
we  experimentally  attain  the  certainty  of  pardon  by  exercis- 
ing the  confidence  of  a  child  towards  God  as  our  loving 
Father,  and  submitting  with  humility  and  patience  to  His 
dispensations,  be  they  stimulating  or  depressing.  And  though 
in  these  exercises  we  perceive  in  ourselves  never  so  many 
defects,  yet  in  combating  them  we  have  always  this  to  be 
thankful  for,  that  we  are  living  and  moving  in  the  domain  of 
God's  grace  opened  to  us  through  Christ.  But  just  as  one 
does  not  attain  the  consciousness  of  being  a  man  by  testing 
himself  by  a  list  of  the  characteristics  of  manhood  to  find  out 
whether  he  possesses  them  all,  or  by  straining  himself  to 
produce  them  completely,  no  more  is  it  practicable  for  a  man 
fully  to  attain  to  a  certainty  of  his  salvation  by  the  path  of 
consistent  inference  from  the  general  truth  of  the  promise  of 
grace,  or  for  this  end  to  produce  in  himself  a  special  sense  of 
strong  faith  in  that  truth.  Dogmatic  theologians,  following 
the  steps  of  Melanchthon  and  Calvin,  have  come  to  take  this 
view  only  because  they  have  forgotten,  or  never  were  aware 
of,  the  functions  of  Christian  perfection,  and  especially  their 
consistent  harmony  with  the  facts  of  forgiveness  and  provi- 
dence, to  which  testimony  is  given  in  the  Augsburg  Confession 
and  its  Apology.  All  the  more  significant  is  it  that  Calvin, 
when  describing  fiducia  as  the  completion  of  faith,  involun- 
tarily expands  the  special  relations  of  dogmatic  faith  into 
the  general  relations  of  Divine  providence.*  But  when, 
further,  on  the  soil  of  Pietism,  Methodism,  and  the  Baptist 
movement,  assurance  of  salvation  is  made  dependent  on  one's 
being  able  to  supply  the  date  and  the  exact  circumstances 
of  his  regeneration  in  correct  order,  the  demand  becomes  just 

^  Loc.  theol.  xvii.  §  87,  ed.  Cotta,  torn.  vii.  p.  109.     Cf.  vol.  i.  p.  S54. 

'  In8t,  iii.  2.  16  :  *'  In  summa,  vere  fidelis  non  est,  nisi  qui  solida  persoasione 
deum  sibi  propitium  benevolumque  pattern  esse  persuasus  de  eius  benignitate 
omnia  sibi  poUicetur,  nisi  qui  divinae  erga  se  benevolentiae  promissionibtis 
fretus  indubitatam  salutis  exspeotationem  praesumit.  .  .  .  Fidelis,  inquam, 
non  est,  nisi  qui  suae  salutis  securitati  innixus,  diabolo  et  morti  coufidenter 
insaltet,  quomodo  ex  praeclaro  illo  Pauli  epiphonemate  (Bom.  8.  38)  docemur." 


619]  RELIGIOUS   FUNCTIONS  655 

as  absurd  as  to  say  that  one  cannot  rightly  consider  himself 
a  man  unless  he  is  conversant  with  the  fact  and  the  laws  of 
his  own  procreation. 

In  the  Catholic  system  the  right  and  the  ground  of 
individual  assurance  remained  undecided  (§  23).  Assurance, 
it  is  true,  is  a  consistent  result  of  the  line  of  thought  founded 
upon  grace  which  we  find  in  St.  Bernard.  So  far,  therefore, 
as  the  influence  of  this  original  element  of  mediaeval  Catholi- 
cism survives,  as  it  does  in  the  above-named  contemporaries 
of  the  Eeformation  and  the  Council  of  Trent,  even  in  the 
Eomish  Church  men  may  experience  their  own  individual 
salvation  in  patience  and  humility  and  submission  to  God's 
will.  So  far,  however,  as  these  virtues  are  elucidated  under 
the  heading  of  hope  (p.  37),  Thomas  attaches  them,  as  an 
antecedent  condition,  to  the  exercise  of  love  toward  God  and 
men.  His  interpretation  of  timor  Jilialis,  accordingly,  goes 
to  prove  that  for  the  most  part  he  recommends  uncertainty 
about  our  own  salvation  (p.  177).  But  yet,  just  in  champions 
of  the  Eomish  Church,  we  meet  with  an  assurance  of  salvation 
of  the  strongest  kind,  especially  in  the  form  of  denying  salva- 
tion to  all  who  hold  a  different  faith.  Here  the  case  is 
altogether  different.  For  what  appears  here  is  an  unexpected 
acknowledgment  of  the  importance  of  numbers,  as  though 
quantity  could  ever  take  the  place  of  quality.  •  Under  the 
wing  of  the  Church  of  the  multitude,  men  feel  quite  certain 
of  salvation,  for  that  Church,  in  their  opinion,  must  rule  the 
world  because  it  includes  within  itself  all  salvation  ;  and  thus 
the  question  of  the  right  of  the  individual  to  assurance  is 
overborne.  Just  as,  until  a  few  years  ago,  each  Catholic  bishop 
was  by  himself  liable  to  dogmatic  error,  but  all  together 
in  Council  were  held  to  be  infallible,  so  each  Catholic  is 
bound,  in  tirrwr  filialis,  to  cherish  doubts  of  his  own  salva- 
tion, but  collectively  they  are  the  exclusive  possessors  of 
salvation.  Now,  the  spokesmen  who  have  to  maintain  this 
claim  always  come  forward  with  the  kind  of  courage  which 
draws  its  power  from  assemblages-  of  the  masses.  This  form 
of  infallible  conviction,  therefore,  always  has  about  it  an 


656  JUSTIFICATION   AND   RECONCILIATION  [$1^20 

odour  such  as  one  is  not  accustomed  to  meet  with  in  good 
society. 

It  is  no  mere  accident  that  the  Seformers'  notion  of 
Christian  perfection,  this  expression  of  the  reconciliation  with 
God  which  operates  in  believers,  was  constructed  in  opposi- 
tion to  monasticism.  For  monasticism  had  reintroduced 
into  Christianity  the  religious  error  of  Pharisaism  (voL  ii 
p.  275).  The  Eeformation  of  the  sixteenth  century  would 
not  have  excelled  all  preceding  Beformations  of  the  Church, 
had  it  not  at  this  point  decided  against  the  greatest  corrup- 
tion possible  of  the  Christian  religion.  It  is  to  be  regretted, 
however,  that  the  theologians  of  the  Beformation  were  unable 
to  keep  clearly  in  sight  the  connection  which  has  been  shown 
to  exist  between  Christian  perfection  and  the  idea  of  recon- 
ciliation. In  the  4th  Article  of  the  Augsburg  Confession, 
the  statement  of  justification  by  faith  is  not  accompanied  by 
the  explanation  that  its  purpose  is  to  be  found  in  the  functions 
of  Christian  perfection ;  this  relation  is  touched  upon  merely 
incidentally  in  the  20th  Article,  and  only  in  view  of  its  abuse 
drawn  out  in  Article  27  (p.  647).  Apart  from  the  Apology 
of  the  C,  A.,  the  Confessions  of  both  branches  of  the  Eeforma- 
tion have  preserved  nothing  of  all  this;  and,  as  has  been 
demonstrated  above  (vol.  i.  p.  350),  the  problem  has  been 
neglected  in  Dogmatics,  and  thereby  the  doctrine  of  justifica- 
tion which  it  contains  has  been  mutilated.  The  practice  of 
faith  in  providence,  humility,  and  patience  has  not  therefore 
died  out  in  the  Lutheran  Church ;  it  has  always  been  duly 
nourished  by  the  literature  of  asceticism  and  by  hymns  suited 
for  use  in  the  Church.  But  the  piety  which  grows  up  on 
this  soil  often  stands  in  tense  opposition  to  the  "  Churchly 
theology"  of  those  who  hold  the  office  of  teaching,  and  to  their 
claims  to  guide  the  Christian  knowledge  of  the  community. 
These  unfortunate  relations  are  entirely  due  to  the  "  Churchly 
theology,"  which  possesses  among  its  dogmatic  media  of  tradi- 
tion no  theory  of  the  connection  between  justification  by  faith 
and  the  functions  of  Christian  perfection.  This  circumstance 
helped  to  produce  a  century  ago  the  rationalistic  decomposi- 


620-1]  RELIGIOUS   FUNCTIONS  657 

tion  of  Evangelical  Christianity.  The  reactionary  theologians 
of  this  century  have  not  been  able  thoroughly  to  annul  this 
development,  and  therefore  are  not  in  possession  of  the  means 
of  overcoming  the  Aufkldrung, 

It  is  worthy  of  note,  therefore,  that  the  opposition  which 
Luther  brought  out  between  Christian  freedom  and  the  piety 
of  the  ceremonial  law,  has  a  wider  range  than  is  indicated 
merely  by  its  application  to  the  criticism  of  monasticism  or 
any  similar  feature  in  Catholic  Christianity.     In  themselves, 
ceremonies  are  no  more  absurd  than  doctrines  held  in  common ; 
they  become  useless  and  a  hindrance  to  religion  only  when 
the  significance  which  they  possessed  at  their  original  creation 
has    become  imintelligible.     Then,  even  ceremonial  custom 
becomes  an  alien  law  which,  from  the  point  of  view  of  the 
Evangelical  faith,  may  indeed  be  observed  as  a  matter  of  fact, 
but  only  as  a  concession  to  fellow-members  of  the  Church 
who  have  not  yet  discovered  the  merely  human  and  relative 
worth  of  such  practices  as  ordinances  of  the  Church.^     Luther 
made  this  admission  at  a  time  when  he  had  not  yet  conceived 
the  thought  of  separation  from  the  Church  of  the  ceremonial 
law.     He  supplements  this  teaching,  however,  by  the  asser- 
tion  that  in  our  intercourse  with  unbending  champions  of 
ceremonial  we  should  rather  offer  them  opposition,  and  by 
transgressing  ecclesiastical  ordinances  should  seek  to  excite 
them  to  sin  and  put  them  in  the  wrong.^     These  rules,  how- 

^  Lather,  De  libertcUe  Christiana,  torn.  iv.  p.  247 :  ''Si  qiiis  scienti&m  (de 
iustitia  fidei)  haberet,  facile  se  posset  gerere  citra  periculum  in  infinitis  illis 
mandatia  et  praeceptis  papae,  qaae  aliqui  stulti  pastores  sic  argent,  quasi  ad 
iastitiam  et  salutem  sint  necessaria,  appellantes  ea  praecepta  ecclesiae,  cum  sint 
nihil  minus.  Ghristianus  cnim  liber  sic  dicet :  ego  ieiunabo,  orabo,  hoc  et  hoc 
faciam,  quod  per  homines  mandatum  est,  non  quod  mihi  illo  sit  opus  ad 
iustitiam  aut  salutem,  scd  quod  in  hoc  morem  geram  papae,  ant  proximo  meo 
ad  exemplum  faciam  et  patiar  omnia,  sicut  Christus  mihi  multo  plura  fecit  et 
passus  est,  quorum  ipse  nuUo  prorsus  egebat." 

'P.  251:  ''Occurrunt  pertinaces  obdurati  ceremoniistae,  qui  sicut  aspides 
surdae  nolunt  audire  veritatem  libertatis,  sed  suas  ceremonias  tanquam 
iustificationes  iactant,  imperant  et  urgent  sine  fide  (Rom.  14.  23).  His  oportet 
resistere,  contraria  facere  et  fortUer  scandalisare,  ne  opinione  ista  impia 
plurimos  secum  fallant."  The  word  scandalisare  must  here  be  understood  in 
its  original  sense ;  for  it  is  impossible  to  see  how  the  production  of  genuine 
offence  in  the  minds  of  the  opponents  described  would  deprive  their  assertions 

42 


658  JUSTIFICATION   AND   RECONCILIATION  [621-2 

ever,  are  not  merely  significant  for  the  position  which  Luther 
then  occupied,  but  may  be  applied  to  every  case  in  which  a 
collision  is  indicated  between  the  religious  aims  of  the  Church 
and  any  of  its  legal  forms.     In  relation  to  ceremonies,  says 
Luther,  the  righteousness  of  faith  is  always  in  peril;  but 
religious  faith  must  always  be  confronted  with  this  danger 
so  long  as  legal  ordinances  have  to  be  used  to  maintain  it.^ 
It  is  just  this  which  makes  the  position  of  the  Christian 
religion  under  the  legal  ordinances  of  the  Church  so  tragic, 
that  the  end  which  they  ought  to  serve  as  means  may  be  as 
easily  threatened  as  promoted  by  them.     Now  I  do  not  find 
that  this  relation  has  been  perceived  by  those  who,  for  the 
past  generation,  have  put  themselves  forward  as  custodians 
of  the  "  Churchly  theology,"  as  champions  of  the  legal  ordi- 
nances of  the  Church,  especially  of  the  Church's  confession, 
and  quite  recently  likewise  as  defenders  of  "  the  rights  of 
the  Church  "  against  the  powers  which  in  Germany  since  the 
Eeformation  have  rightly  belonged  in  the  constitution  of  the 
Church  to  the  nobility.     The  ground  of  this  want  of  percep- 
tion, however,  lies  partly  in  the  fact  that  Dogmatics,  by  which 
these  "  Churchly  theologians "  mean  the  Confession  of  the 
Church,  especially  the  Augsburg  Confession,  has  lost  the  con- 
nection between  the  doctrine  of  justification  and  the  duties 
of  Christian  freedom  and  perfection,  partly  in  the  fact  that 
the  Pietism  of  this  century,  from  which  confessional  ecclesi- 
asticism  springs,  has    been    from   the  outset   guided   by  a 
ceremonial  interest  in  the  imperfect  Dogmatics  of  the  seven- 
teenth century.     In  the  "  Revival "  not  only  do  aesthetic  and 

of  the  power  to  deceive  others.    This  result  is  attained,  however,  if  they  let 
themselves  bo  tempted  by  open  resistance  into  doing  what  is  clearly  wrong. 

^  P.  253:  ''In  summa,  sicut  paupertas  in  divitiis,  fidelitas  in  negotiis, 
humilitas  in  honoribus,  abstinentia  in  conviviis,  castitas  in  deliciis,  ita 
iustitiafidei  in  eeremoniis  periditatur.  Numquid  ait  Salomon,  ignem  qais  in 
sinn  gestare  potest,  at  non  comburantor  vestimenta  eius  ?  Et  tamen  ut  in 
divitiis,  in  negotiis,  in  honoribus,  in  deliciis,  in  epulis,  ita  in  ceremoniit  id 
est  in  periculis  versari  oportet,"  Cf.  Luther's  hymn,  "Ye  Christians,  now 
rejoice  together,"  with  its  conclusion — 

"  Of  men's  opinions  be  thou  ware, 
They'll  rob  you  of  your  treasure  fair. 
This  warning  be  my  ending." 


622-3]  RBLIGIOUS    FUNCTIONS  659 

moral   motives    of   revolt  against  Bationalism  prevail   over 
intellectual  interests,  but  in  this  spiritual  movement  a  sacri- 
ficium  intelledics  is  performed   just  as  a   proof  of   earnest 
obedience  to  Christ.     Moved  by  this  ascetic  impulse,  people 
regard  the  confession  of  certain  dogmas — as  these  have  been 
handed   down   in    that   forbidding   and    unintelligible   form 
which  neither  displays  any  relation  to  a  common  end,  nor 
presents  a  complete    practical    outline   of    Christianity — as 
the  condition  and  chief  guarantee  of   Christian  perfection. 
At  the  same  time,  there  may  be  heard  from  these  circles 
depreciatory  judgments  regarding  the  piety  in  which,  as  the 
Augsburg  Confession  testifies,  Christian   perfection   consists, 
and  which    draws   its    continuous   nourishment    from   those 
hymns,  dear  to  the  Church,  in  which  the  healthiest  tradition 
of  Evangelical  Christianity  is  expressed.     In  Pietistic  circles 
people  have  the  appearance  of  regarding  faith  in  providence 
as   something  inferior,^  simply  because  that  faith   was  the 
purport  likewise  of  Bationalism,  and  it  ought  not    to   be 
conceded   that   Bationalism    contains   a    sound    element    of 
Christianity.     There  is  no  diflSculty  in  understanding  how, 
with  the  mass  of  Evangelical  Christians,  faith  in  providence 
has  no  clear  connection  with  Dogmatics ;  for  in  this  century 
theology  has  never  taken  to  heart  the  truth  that,  according 
to  the  Augsburg  Confession,  this  faith  ought  to  be  regarded 
as  the  proof  of  reconciliation  having  been  experienced ;  and 
the  teaching  of  the  Church,  so  far  as  my  observation  goes, 
is  not  directed  to  this  truth.     What  wonder  that  in  Evan- 
gelical Christendom  at  present,  just  as  in  the  Middle  Ages, 
there  should  exist  two  forms  of  religion,  the  lay  Christianity 
of  undogmatic  faith  in  providence,  and  the  perfect  piety  of 
faith  in  dogma,  which,  unless  we  add  a  circle  of  Tertians, 
male  and  female,  is  represented  only  by  the  clergy,  or  at 
least  expected  of  them.     Such  a  state  of  matters  is  intoler- 
able, for  it  runs  counter  to  all  the  principles  of  Evaugelical 
Christianity.     The  interest  of  the  laity  in  the   Church  is 

^  A  friend  informa  me  that  Hengstenberg  once  spoke  to  him  with  scorn  of 
the  '*  Commit- thou-all-thy-wsjs"  Christianity  of  a  third  person. 


660  JUSTIFICATION   AND   RECONCILIATION  [62a-4 

always  growing  weaker,  for  they  find  a  surer  basis  for  their 
Christianity  in  their  private  convictions  than  in  dogmatic 
preaching,  which  contributes  nothing  to  a  better  understand- 
ing of  what  is  involved  in  Evangelical  perfection.     Christians 
who  are  dogmatically  perfect,  however,  are  always  becoming 
less  fitted  to  rule  in  the  Evangelical  Church,  partly  because, 
owing  to  the  ceaseless  agitation  of  Church  politics  neces- 
sary to  maintain  their  influence,  they  become  secularised, 
partly    because    their    hierarchical   aspirations    carry    them 
along  the  lines  taken  by  Jesuitism.     Do  those  on  this  side 
really  think  that  it  is  possible  and  necessary  to  impart  a 
dogmatic  temper  to  the  laity,  in  order  that  what  only  exists 
to  guide  the  teaching  of  the  Church's  ministers  should  become 
operative  as  the  confession  of  all  Church  members  ?     One 
would  expect  that,  if  dogmatically  correct  views  are  to  be 
insisted  on,  at  least  women  would  be  spared,  for  they,  though 
without   clear   dogmatic   knowledge,  mostly  know    how   to 
practise   Christian    perfection    in   exemplary   fashion.     For 
ladies  who  strive  to  make  themselves   perfect  in  dogmatic 
faith,  and  in  criticising  the  faith  of  others,  hardly  please  Grod 
any  more  thereby  than  they  please  men.     I  am  quite  aware 
that  those  who  are  interested  in  the  ecclesiastical  particularism 
which   is  fenced  round  by   the  claim   to  render  the  most 
genuine  and   the  truest   worship,  will  protest  in   the  most 
vehement    way   against    these    remarks,  and    all    the   more 
vehemently  that  their  party  cannot  deny  that  I   have  the 
Augsburg   Confession  and  Luther's  most  original   views   on 
my  side.     Nevertheless,  I   ask   them  to  consider  that   the 
Church,  qud  legal  institution,   belongs   to   the   world;    and 
separate  Churches,  in  so  far  as   they  are  characterised   by 
legal  ordinances,  are  the  most  worldly  of  all.     The  interest 
which    attaches   to  these  Churches  exclusively  or  predomi- 
nantly, is  secular  and  a  motive  to  secularisation.     True,  we 
are  called  on  to  live  and  work  in  a  particular  Church.     But 
the  same  rule   holds  good  «is  was  laid  down  by  Paul   for 
marriage  as  a  worldly  condition  (1  Cor.  vii.  29),  "Let  him 
who  has  his  particular  Church  be  as  though  he  had  none  I " 


624-5]  RELIGIOUS   FUNCTIONS  661 

§  68.  In  the  Augsburg  Confession  moral  action  in  one's 
civic  vocation  is  reckoned  as  one  of  the  features  of  Christian 
perfection,  and  this  is  intelligible  from  the  opposition  felt  to 
monasticism.     On  the  other  hand,  such  a  conception  seems 
to  be  entirely  out  of  relation  to  the  New  Testament.     It  is 
true,  our  civic  vocation   receives  a  peculiar  sanction  from 
Paul's  words,  that  men  should  not  seek  to  escape  from  slavery 
because  of  Christianity,  but  should  remain  in  this  or  any  other 
vocation  in  which  their  calling  to  be  Christians  found  them 
(1   Cor.  vii.  20,  24).     But  this  feature  does  not  appear  to 
find  a  place  among  the  marks   of  perfection,  whether  we 
understand  that  ideal  in  the  sense  Jesus  gives  it,  or  in  the 
particular    distinctive    form   it   receives    from    the    Apostle. 
Besides,  the  position  of  the  Augsburg  Confession  has  against 
it  the  assertion,  always  emphasised  in  Evangelical  doctrine, 
that  even  in  the  state  of  grace  we  must  always  be  mindful 
of  the  imperfection  of  moral  action,  that  we  may  base  our 
salvation,  not  on  good  works  which  always  come  short  of  the 
law's  demands,  but  only  on  faith  in  Christ.     This  doctrine, 
with   the  relations  in  which  it  stands,  must  first  be  more 
closely  examined.     Attention  has  already  been  drawn  to  the 
difficulty  of  making  a  practical  application  of  it  when  taken 
rigorously  (pp.  164,  489).     For  we  are  told  that  we  must 
look  away  from  our  good  works  on  account  of  their  imperfec- 
tion, so  as  to  base  our  salvation  upon  faith  in  Christ ;  but  in 
order  to  have  the  assurance  of  faith  we  must  conclude  from 
our  good  works,  in  spite  of  their  imperfection,  that  we  stand 
under  the  influence  of  grace.     Either  this  leads  to  an  endless 
series  of  alternating  judgments  of  opposite  content,  or  it  is 
an  error  to  estimate  our  works  by  the  standard  of  the  law. 
For  although  the  consciousness  of  imperfection,  which  every 
day  we  find  within,  may  serve  to  emphasise  faith  in  Christ  as 
the  condition  of  salvation,  yet  the  perpetual  consciousness  of 
imperfection   in   our  good  works   is    no   slight    obstacle  to 
enthusiasm  in  discharging  the  moral  tasks  of   Christianity. 
It  is  certainly  no  just  reproach  against  the  Eeformers  that 
by  the  assertion  of  justification  by  faith  they  render  men 


662  JUSTIFICATION   AND   RECONCILIATION  [e2&-6 

indififerent  to  the  tasks  of  moral  activity;  but  from  their 
assertion  of  the  continual  imperfection  of  such  action  and  of 
the  inevitable  inaccessibility  of  its  goal  one  might  easily  draw 
an  inference  of  that  kind.  For  if  we  know  ourselves  un- 
conditionally condemned  beforehand  to  imperfection  in  any 
activity,  the  impulse  to  discharge  it  is  crippled.  The 
possibility  of  perfection  must  be  held  out  in  prospect  if  we 
are  to  expend  our  industry  on  any  branch  of  action. 

Now  the  conception  of  good  works,  such  as  are  measured 
by  the  statutory  law,  expresses  a  task  which  not  merely  is 
impracticable  if  sinfulness  be  presupposed  as  still  operative, 
but  which  it  is  impossible  to  combine  in  thought  with  the 
attribute  of  perfection.    Perfection  is  the  attribute  of  a  whole 
(§  67);    on   the  other  hand,  good  works,  as  related  to  the 
statutory  law,  cannot  be  conceived  as  a  whole.     Not  only  do 
they  form  an  endless  series  in  time ;  they  have  likewise  at  every 
moment  of  time  to  occupy  an   indefinite  expanse  in  space. 
For  the  law,  as  we  conceive  it,  claims  the  will  simultaneously 
for  all  the  possible  ends  which  fall  within  the  compass  of  the 
good.     In  order   to  do  one  good  work,  however,  one  must 
simultaneously  leave  unattended  to  all  other  demands  for 
good  action  and  the  furtherance  of  good  ends,  for  a  single 
action  is  all  we  are  capable  of  at  one  point  of  time.     So  that 
sin,  whether  as  evil  will  or  as  indifference,  is  not  essential  to 
the  thwarting  of  a  quantitatively  perfect  fulfilment  of  the 
moral  law ;  such  fulfilment  is  impossible  per  se,  as  judged  by 
the  statutory  form  of  the  law.     Therefore  the  duty  of  good 
works,  unlimited  as  it  is  in  time  and  in  space,  and  the  duty 
of  perfection,  namely,  to  realise  moral  action  as  a  totality,  are 
mutually  exclusive.     The  unpractical  rigorism,  in  which  both 
demands  are  combined,  has  also  avenged  itself  in  history. 
For  in  the  theology  of  the  Aitfkldrung  this  dogma  has  veered 
round  into  the  contrary  assertion,  that  God  demands  from 
every  man  only  such  and  so  many  moral  services  as  from  his 
endowments  and  his  circumstances  he  is  capable  of  rendering 
(vol.  i.  p.  393).     Nor  did  this  laxity  in  conceiving  the  moral 
task  usurp  the  place  of  the  orthodox  doctrine  by  a  sudden 


626-8]  RELIGIOUS   FUNCTIONS  663 

reversal  of  judgment,  in  the  form,  i,e,,  of  a  declension  from 
truth  ;  nay,  we  meet  with  the  above  principle  in  the  oflBcial 
conduct  of  pastoral  work  even  in  the  halcyon  days  of 
orthodoxy  (vol.  i  p.  418).  Confirmation  of  this  view  is  to  be 
found  in  the  argument  urged  by  Calvin,  that  with  Divine 
sonship  there  is  combined  the  confidence  that  God  will  judge 
imperfect  moral  deeds  not  after  the  strictness  of  the  law,  but 
with  leniency  according  to  circumstances.^  And  although  for 
God  this  rule  is  balanced  by  the  fact  that  to  believers  so 
judged  He  imputes  the  perfect  righteousness  of  Christ,  that 
does  not  touch  the  practical  self -estimate  of  the  believer  in  the 
light  of  this  rule.  But  how,  I  ask,  does  this  principle  of  God's 
leniency  towards  the  believer's  imperfect  moral  action  differ 
from  the  view  put  forward  by  Socinianism  and  the  theologians 
of  the  Aufkldrungt  The  impossibility  of  quantitative  per- 
fection in  good  works,  which  is  admitted,  always  carries  with 
it  likewise  a  limitation  of  the  validity  of  the  moral  law. 

In  still  another  respect  the  rubric  of  good  works,  current 
in  orthodox  theology,  is  unsuitable  as  a  comprehensive  desig- 
nation of  the  ethical  side  of  Christianity.  To  state  our  task 
so  excludes  the  perfection  of  moral  achievement  in  any  sense, 
and  is  thus  at  the  same  time  a  denial  that  in  moral  relations 
the  believer  can  ever  become  a  whole  in  his  own  order. 
But  now  the  Christian  religion  has  it  for  its  aim  that  through 
reconciUation  and  the  spiritual  dominion  over  the  world  which 
answers  thereto,  the  believer  should  gain  and  display  the  value 
of  a  whole.  And  so  it  would  indicate  an  incongruity  in 
Christianity  were  the  state  of  the  believer,  in  religious  and 

*  Inst,  iii.  19.  5  :  "Qui  legis  iugo  adstringuntur,  servis  sunt  similes,  quibus 
certa  in  singalos  dies  opera  a  dominis  indicuntur.  Hi  enim  nihil  effectum 
putant,  nisi  exoctus  operum  modus  conatiterit  Filii  vero,  qui  liberalius  et 
magis  ingenue  a  patribus  tractantur,  eis  non  dubitant  inchoata  et  diniidiata 
opera,  aliquid  etiam  vitii  habentia  ofTerre,  confisi  suam  obedientiam  et  animi 
promtitudinem  illis  acceptam  fore,  etiamsi  minus  ezacte  effecerint  quod  volebant. 
Tales  nos  esse  oportet,  qui  certo  confidamus,  obsequia  nostra  indulgentissimo 
patri  probatum  iri,  quantulacunque  sunt  et  quamvis  rudia  et  imperfecta.  Neque 
haec  fiducia  nobis  parum  necessaria  est,  sine  qua  frustra  omnia  conabimur  ; 
siquidem  nullo  nostro  opere  se  coli  reputat  deus,  nisi  quod  in  eius  cultura  vere 
a  nobis  fiat.  Id  autem  quis  possit  inter  illos  terrores,  ubi  dubitatnr,  offendatume 
deus  an  colatur  opere  nostro." 


664  JUSTIFICATION   AND   RECONCILIATION  [628-^ 

moral  respects,  necessarily  subject  to  contrary  conditions.    In 
the  New  Testament,  however,  the  rubric  of  good  works  is 
never    used   as    though  meaning   that  it   is  an  exhaustive 
expression  for  the  essential  practice  of  morality ;  the  expression 
rather  occurs  as  a  description  of  the  normal  phenomena  of 
that  moral  action  which,  in  important    statements  in  the 
apostoUc  Epistles,  is  diflferentiated  from  good  works  by  being 
entitled  the  one  all-inclusive  good  work  of  life  (voL  ii  pp. 
292,  371).     On  the  other  hand,  moral  perfection  is  to  be 
regarded  not  merely  as  something  demanded  by  Jesus,  but 
also  as  a  fact  attested  by  Paul  (p.  647).     When,  therefore,  in 
Methodism  ^  the  perfection  of  sanctification  is  directly  aimed 
at,  this  idea,  altogether  apart  from  any  relation  to  the  statutory 
law,  is  related  to  the  perfect  character  of  love  to  God,  which 
excludes  sin,  and  in  its  own  order  represents  a  whole,  despite 
the  weaknesses  and  imperfections  which  accompany  it     This 
representation,  it  is  true,  is  partly  obscure,  and  partly  boimd 
up  with  dubious  associations.     For  what  it  really  describes  is 
not  at  all  the  moral,  but  simply  the  religious  character,  and 
this,  too,  only  in  its  most  general  expression.     But  how  per- 
fection of  love  to  man  is  included  in  perfect  love  to  God  is 
not  shown.     Moreover,  it  is  sought  to  confirm  the  statement 
by  arguing  that  it  is  possible  not  to  sin  even  when  actually 
doing  wrong  to  others.     But  the  casuistical  contention  that 
error  of  this  kind  stands  in  no  relation  to  sin,  deserves  no 
more  notice  than  does  the  remark  that  not  every  transgression 
of  the  law  is  sin.     For  this  betrays  an  effort  once  more  to 
conform  Methodist  perfection  to  the  statutory  law,  from  which, 
to  begin  with,  it  had  been  withdrawn.     Thus  the  standard  of 
possible  perfection  is  not  clear.     For  perfection  of  the  ethico- 
religious  character  demands  under  all  circumstances  a  moral 
sensibility    which    guides    self-examination    otherwise   than 
according  to  the  coarse  lines  of  the  moral  law,  conceived  in  a 
statutory  form ;  on  the  other  hand,  Methodist  positions  lead 
to  the  view  that  the  character  of  personal  sinlessness  is  to  be 
attained  by  laying  all  sorts  of  restrictions  on  moral  sensibility. 

^  Of.  Jacoby,  Handbuch  de$  Jfethodismus  (2nd  edit.  1855),  p.  254  ft. 


e29-30]  RELIGIOUS   FUNCTIONS  665 

The  conception  of  moral  perfection  in  the  Christian  life 
ought  on  no  account  to  be  associated  with  the  idea  of  a  fruit- 
less search  for  actual  sinlessness  of  conduct  in  all  the  details 
of  life.  It  rather  means  that  our  moral  achievement  or  life- 
work  in  connection  with  the  Kingdom  of  God  should,  however 
limited  in  amount,  be  conceived  as  possessing  the  quality  of  a 
whole  in  its  own  order.  For  these  are  the  conditions  of  the 
matter  described  by  Paul.  At  the  same  time  it  is  clear  that 
Paul  regards  the  life-work  as  a  totality,  because  he  conceives 
it  as  limited  by  our  special  vocation.  For  it  is  as  mediated 
by  the  species  that  a  multiplicity  of  phenomena,  directed  to  a 
common  end  and  through  it  regularly  connected,  constitute 
a  whole.  And  so  Luther,  even  though  without  thinking 
Paul's  self -estimate  (vol.  ii.  p.  365)  worthy  of  any  special 
consideration,  helped  to  express  a  true  thought  when,  in  his 
"  Address  to  the  Nobility  of  the  German  Nation,"  he  maintained 
that  every  Christian  in  his  civil  vocation,  of  whatever  nature 
it  might  be,  exercised  the  character  of  a  spiritual  personality ; 
and  congruous  with  this  is  the  thought  that  activity  in  our 
calling  is  to  be  reckoned  part  of  the  Christian's  perfection.^ 
Now,  in  spite  of  the  authority  of  the  Augsburg  Confession, 
this  truth,  while  remaining  operative  in  the  practice  of 
Protestantism,  has  not  received  its  proper  weight  in  public 
teaching.  The  predominance  of  a  negatively  ascetic  conception 
of  morality  in  the  era  of  orthodoxy,  indeed,  made  it  possible  for 
Johann  Amdt,  in  his  True  Christianity,  to  judge  our  civil 
vocation  merely  in  the  light  of  the  principle  that  the  heritage 
and  goods  of  the  Christian  are  not  in  this  world,  and  that  there- 
fore they  should  use  temporal  things  as  aliens  to  the  world. 
Of  course,  if  we  conceive  the  example  of  Christ,  as  did  the 
Middle  Ages,  as  the  ideal  of  abstract  self-abnegation,  we  shall 
miss  the  truth  that  we  have  to  seek  in  Christ  no  special  moral 
pattern  other  than  that  of  perfect  fidelity  to  our  calling. 

While  referring  back  to  the  analysis  I  have  given  of  the 

^  Cf.  also  ApoL  C.  A,  iii.  71,  viii.  25,  48-50 ;  farther,  Calyin,  iii.  10.  6 : 
**  Satis  est,  si  noverimus,  yocationem  domini  esse  in  omni  re  bene  agendi  prin- 
cipium  ac  fundaraentum,  ad  quam  qui  se  non  referet,  nunqaam  rectam  in  officiis 
viam  tenebit." 


666  JUSTIFICATION   AND   EECONCILIATION  [630-1 

idea  of  "  vocation,"  which  was  made  in  order  to  explain  the 
religious  value  of  Christ  (§  48),  I  repeat  that  each  individual 
acts  morally  when  he  fulfils  the  universal  law  in  his  special 
vocation,  or  in  that  combination  of  vocations  which  he  is  able 
to  unite  in  his  conduct  of  life.  This  excludes  every  moral 
necessity  to  expend  good  action  on  such  ends  as  do  not  fit 
into  the  individual's  vocation.  Such  good  action,  however, 
as  is  incumbent,  but  is  not  directly  determined  thus,  may  be 
viewed  as  obligatory,  on  condition  that  by  a  judgment  of  duty 
it  can  be  construed  analogously  to  our  vocation,  that  is, 
provided  that  after  consideration  of  all  the  circumstances  one 
is  called  to  discharge  it  as  an  extraordinary  duty  of  love. 
True,  even  when  the  fi^filment  of  the  moral  law  is  confined 
to  one's  calling  and  what  is  analogous  thereto,  the  series  of 
good  actions  which  are  incumbent  is  still  infinite  in  time ;  but 
there  falls  away  thus  the  chief  ground  of  the  imperfection  of 
good  works  as  measured  directly  by  the  universal  moral  law. 
The  fact  that  good  action  is  conditioned  by  one's  calling 
invalidates  the  apparent  obligation  we  are  under  at  each 
moment  of  time  to  do  good  action  in  every  possible  direction. 
But,  further,  just  here  it  becomes  plain  that  the  significance 
of  our  moral  calling  for  good  action  in  general  supersedes  the 
statutory  idea  of  the  moral  law,  on  which  depends  the  intoler- 
able, because  boundless,  demand  for  good  works.  The  autonomy 
of  moral  action  (§  53)  is  realised  in  general  whenever  we  find 
ill  our  moral  vocation  the  proximate  norm  which  specifies  for 
each  individual  the  action  which  the  moral  law  makes 
necessary.  Our  special  calling,  in  fact,  is  seen  to  be  the  field 
of  moral  action  to  which  we  are  summoned,  because  we 
appropriate  it  as  subordinate  to  the  universal  final  end  of  the 
good,  or  as  an  integral  part  of  the  Kingdom  of  God.  On  this 
presupposition,  a  universal  statutory  moral  law  is  unthinkable, 
for  it  would  have  no  point  of  contact  with  the  moral  signifi- 
cance of  special  vocations.  Eather,  out  of  the  moral  disposition 
which,  in  the  field  of  a  special  vocation,  takes  shape  in  action 
for  the  highest  common  end,  we  have  to  evolve  those  principles 
by  which  we  regulate  particular  groups  of  moral  action,  and, 


631-2]  RELIGIOUS   FUNC5TI0NS  667 

in  harmony  therewith,  form  particular  judgments  of  duty 
affirming  that  it  is  necessary  in  a  given  case  to  realise  the 
final  end  of  the  good.  Under  these  circumstances  and  in  this 
form  the  individual,  out  of  his  freedom,  produces  the  moral 
law,  or  lives  in  the  law  of  freedom. 

It  is  under  these  conditions,  too,  that  the  individual's 
moral  achievement  becomes  a  whole.  The  realisation  of  the 
universal  good  within  the  special  limited  domain  of  our 
vocation,  and  in  such  a  way  that  all  extraordinary  actions 
are  regarded  as  essential  from  their  analogy  to  our  vocation, 
is  the  reason  why  the  multiplicity  of  good  works,  in  which 
action  manifests  itself,  forms  an  inwardly  limited  unity,  in 
other  words,  a  whole.  But  even  to  conceive  the  whole  thus 
does  not  yet  show  it  to  us  as  a  magnitude  which  is  also 
limited  externally.  Even  if  the  spatial  unlimitedness  of  good 
works,  as  measured  by  a  universal  statutory  moral  law,  be  set 
aside,  yet  the  temporal  series  of  actions  necessary  in  one's 
moral  vocation  appears  to  be  infinite.  Here,  therefore,  a 
self -torturing  self -scrutiny  might  insert  its  lever,  and  throw 
back  the  discussion  on  to  the  lines  of  the  idea  of  good  works 
from  which  we  are  trying  to  escape.  Does  not  an  impres- 
sion of  perpetual  imperfection,  even  in  the  discharge  of  our 
calling,  follow  from  the  fact  that  every  omission  of  an  action 
possible  in  this  domain  is  to  be  reckoned  as  guilt  ?  How  can 
we  ever  satisfy  ourselves,  even  in  this  domain,  and  how  can 
it  ever  be  right  to  yield  to  the  impression  that  what  we  are 
achieving  is  a  whole  in  its  own  order  ?  But  against  this  I 
set  the  experience  that  though  we  may  have  scruples  about 
many  omissions  of  actions  possible  in  our  calling,  there  comes 
later  the  knowledge  that  the  relaxation  which  we  have 
allowed  ourselves  to  take  has  served  to  increase  our  activity 
in  our  calling.  Moreover,  the  omission  of  possible  useful 
actions  is  not  wrong,  but  only  the  omission  of  actions  which 
are  morally  necessary.  Besides,  the  conception  of  a  whole 
does  not  depend  so  much  on  quantity  as  the  above  objec- 
tion presupposes.  True,  a  whole,  too,  must  be  a  quarUum, 
in  the  present  case,  as  in  all  cases.     But  a  whole  does  not 


668  JUSTIFICATION   AND    RECONCILIATION  [632 

require  as  one  of  its  conditions  a  quantitative  extension  ad 
infiniturriy  which,  indeed,  renders  a  whole  impossible.  And 
he  who  in  the  moral  fulfilment  of  his  vocation  is  more 
indefatigable  than  his  neighbour,  merely  makes  the  whole 
possibly  greater,  while  he  also  possibly  imperils  its  existence ; 
and  prudence  counsels  us  not  to  put  an  excessive  strain  on 
our  powers.  But,  finally,  this  circumstance  brings  before  us 
the  fact  that  a  fulfilment  of  our  vocation,  though  quantitatively 
more  limited,  certainly  possesses  the  value  of  a  whole,  if  at 
the  same  time  we  attain,  in  producing  it,  moral  character  as 
a  whole.  The  Apostle  Paul  already  perceives  this  when  he 
makes  the  practice  of  moral  righteousness  relative  to  the  end 
of  self-sanctification  (Eom.  vi.  19 ;  vol.  ii.  p.  287).  For  this 
signifies  nothing  but  the  formation  of  virtuous  character, 
which  we  cannot  attain  by  a  negatively  ascetic  elaboration 
of  our  previously  existing  defects,  but  only  by  embarking 
on  a  positive  and  broadening  course  of  action.  But  accord- 
ing to  the  laws  of  the  will,  good  action  for  all  the  ends  of 
society  works  reflexly  in  such  a  way  as  at  the  same  time  to 
produce  personal  virtue. 

Moral  action  in  our  calling  is,  therefore,  the  form  in 
which  our  life-work  as  a  totality  is  produced  as  our  contri- 
bution to  the  Kingdom  of  God,  and  in  which,  at  the  same 
time,  the  ideal  of  spiritual  personality  as  a  whole  in  its  own 
order  is  reached.  Thus  freedom  in  the  law  is  realised.  But 
this  is  homogeneous  with  the  religious  functions  of  faith  in 
providence,  patience  and  humility,  and  prayer,  through  which 
the  believer  assures  himself  that  he  possesses,  in  virtue  of 
reconciliation,  the  value  of  a  whole  in  contrast  to  the  world. 
These  aspects  mutually  condition  one  another  in  such  a  way 
that  no  one  of  them  can  occur  in  an  authentic  form  without 
the  others.  One  cannot  practise  action  motived  by  the  law 
of  freedom  without,  in  the  religious  functions,  attesting  his 
freedom  over  the  world ;  and  one  cannot  assure  oneself  of 
forgiveness,  without  exercising  love  in  deed  and  in  truth 
(1  John  iii.  18,  19  ;  vol.  ii.  p.  348).  All  this  goes  to  fill  out 
the  extent  of  Christian  freedom ;  so  also  it  forms  the  content 


632-3]  RBUGIOUS   FUNCTIONS  669 

of  Christian  perfection.  As  in  the  religious  functions  which 
spring  from  reconciliation  we  attain  our  ideal  lordship  over 
the  world  and  are  blessed  therein  as  in  doing  good,  so  the 
goal  of  the  moral  formation  of  character  is  eternal  life 
(Rom.  vi.  22).  Personal  assurance  of  the  indestructibility 
of  spiritual  existence  always  attaches  itself  to  those  ex- 
periences of  the  worth  of  the  religious-ethical  character. 
But,  finally,  Paul  is  also  right  in  maintaining  that  the 
ultimate  standing  of  a  person  in  the  Kingdom  of  God  de- 
pends on  the  goodness  and  the  rounded  completeness  of  the 
life-work  he  achieves  in  his  moral  vocation  (voL  iL  p.  367). 
Although  this  thought  is  expressed  by  the  idea  of  a  reward, 
yet  it  plainly  differs  from  the  meriting  of  blessedness  by  good 
works.  The  latter  combination  of  ideas  is  formed  on  the 
mould  and  measure  of  the  law,  and  even  so  is  unintelligible ; 
for  no  inner  mutual  relation  can  be  shown  between  blessed- 
ness and  good  works.  On  the  other  hand,  what  is  posited  as 
result  in  Paul's  assertion  is  only  what  is  already  produced  in 
the  production  of  a  good  life-work  (GaL  vi.  7,  8).  For  in 
doing  good  we  are  blessed,  and  the  performance  of  our 
vocation  assures  us  of  our  standing  in  the  Kingdom  of 
God,  and  that,  too,  so  far  as  it  is  the  fellowship  of  blessed- 
ness. But  this  is  related  to  reconciliation  as  a  consequence ; 
with  the  appropriation  of  reconciliation,  too,  the  will  receives 
a  direction  towards  the  final  end  of  the  Kingdom  of  God. 
There  is,  therefore,  no  contradiction  between  the  assertion 
that  in  reconciliation  eternal  life  is  bestowed  by  God  through 
Christ,  and  completed  consistently  with  the  grace  of  God 
thus  manifested,  and  the  assertion  that  we  reach  the  con- 
summation of  salvation  through  the  development  of  the 
religious-moral  character,  and  through  the  life-performance 
— perfect  in  its  own  order  —  of  our  vocation.  For  we 
are  blessed  not  only  in  fellowship  with  God,  but  also  in 
fellowship  with  all  the  blessed.  For  the  former  we  have 
only  God  to  thank ;  the  latter  we  produce  through  our  personal 
contribution  to  the  common  weal  of  the  Kingdom  of  God. 
Thus  is  evaded  the  erroneous  view  that  the  measure  of  for- 


670  JUSTIFICATION   AND   RBOONCILIATION  [633-4 

giveness  in  the  case  of  each  individual  is  determined  by  the 
measure  of  his  loving  activity  (vol.  i.  p  645).  For  that 
much  is  forgiven  to  a  particular  person  implies  that  he  had 
to  be  brought  to  God  from  a  greater  distance,  but  not  that  he 
is  brought  nearer  to  God  than  another.  In  forgiveness  all 
are  brought  near  to  God,  but  no  one  nearer  than  his  neigh- 
bour. But  the  intensity  of  love  and  common  feeling  in  the 
work  of  life  which  is  provided  for  in  the  possible  perfection 
of  each  individual,  is  the  condition  of  fellowship  with  all 
those  who  gain  the  prize  of  eternal  life.  Finally,  when  Paul 
speaks  of  the  perfect  as  such,  whom  he  distinguishes  per- 
sonally from  others,  he  does  not  mean  thereby  to  set  up  a 
specific  class-distinction ;  he  only  indicates  the  fact  that,  in 
accordance  with  the  conditions  of  growth,  all  members  of  the 
Christian  Church  do  not  reach  simultaneously  that  stage  of 
religious  and  moral  formation  of  character  to  which  all  are 
called. 

1.  Beligious  dominion  over  the  world,  which  constitutes 
the  immediate  form  of  reconciliation  with  God  through  Christ, 
is  exercised  through  faith  in  the  loving  providence  of  God, 
through  the  virtues  of  humility  and  patience,  and,  finally, 
through  prayer,  and  through  this  last  likewise  receives 
common  expression. 

2.  In  the  exercise  of  trust  in  God  in  all  situations  of  life, 
in  the  production  of  humility  and  patience — these  inward 
activities,  too,  supported  by  prayer — the  believer  experiences 
his  personal  assurance  of  reconciliation. 

3.  The  freedom  of  action  in  the  form  of  a  special  moral 
vocation  which,  motived  by  the  universal  final  end  of  the 
Kingdom  of  God,  imposes  a  law  upon  itself  by  the  produc- 
tion of  principles  and  judgments  of  duty,  and  serves  to 
confirm  the  appropriation  of  reconciliation,  forms,  together 
with  the  foregoing  religious  functions,  that  perfection  invested 
with  which  each  believer  must  show  himself  to  be  a  whole 
or  a  character  who  occupies  a  permanent  place  in  the 
Kingdom  of  God  and  enjoys  practical  experience  of  eternal 
life. 


INDEX 


AbelarD)  871,  473. 

Adoption  as  children  of  God,  75,  96, 

607,  534,  603. 
Anselm,  5,  216,  263,  340,  568. 
Apology  of  the  Augsburg  Confesbion, 

7,   11,   23,  65,  98,  160,  169,  333, 

396,  495,  528,  600,  653. 
Arminians,  81,  239. 
Arudt,  Joh.,  113,  162,  340,  584,  665. 
Asceticism,  638. 
Athanasius,  389. 
Aufkldrung,  188,  362,  490,  530,  538, 

662. 
Augsburg  Confession,  6, 109,  160,  169, 

314,  316,  333,  340,  528,  578,  654. 
Augustine,  5,  170,  286,  295,  314,  328, 

334,  335,  343,  389,  437,  497,  564. 

Baptism,  156,  553. 

Baptism,  infaut,  329,  339. 

Bellarmine,  149,  153. 

Bengel's  School,  491. 

Bernard,  St.,  391,  415,  463,  488,  568, 

594. 
Blessedness,  322,  555,  669. 
Bogatzky,  163. 
Brakel,  Wilh.,  112. 
Brenz,  111. 
Buddhism,  18,  197,  386,  612. 

Calvin,  65,  73,  98, 101, 110, 113, 126, 
145,  161,  260,  287,  417,  623,  654. 
Cartesius,  217. 

Catechisms,  Luther's,  6,    11,   21,  98, 
110,  170,  211,  239,  376,  391,  408, 
416   495   553. 
Catholicism,  11,  35,  80,  103,  286,  485, 

513,  549,  594,  655. 
Ceremonies,  657. 
Chemnitz,  149,  495. 
Christ,  exemplar  of  punishment,  555. 
Head  of  the  community,  440,  465, 
470,  551. 
Christ's  character,  574. 
Divinity,  389,  463,  551. 
marriage  with  the  Church,  112. 
merit,  66,  265,  429,  440,  477. 
offices,  417. 
passion,  566. 
pre-existence,  471. 
priesthood,  472,  646. 


Christ's  righteousness,  70. 

sacrifice.  111,  474,  642. 

satisfaction,  66,  89,  263,  429,  443. 

states  417* 
Christianity,'8,  197,  602. 
Church,  fellowship  of  believers,   109, 
130,    288,    464,   643,    660,    677, 
590. 

fellowship  for  worship  of  God,  284. 
Communicatio  idiomcUum,  391,  416. 
Contarini,  144. 

Contemplation  of  Christ,  391,  697. 
Conversion,  49,  156. 
Crell,  Joh,  479. 
Culture,  612. 

Death,  345,  858,  865. 

Deification,  389. 

Dogmatics,  14,  142. 

Dumouliu,  Peter,  181. 

Duns  Scotus,  68,  64,  214,  241,  266,  369. 

Duty,  462,  616,  666. 

ECGLESIASTICISM,  289,  667. 

Education,  337,  662,  598. 

Election  of  the  community,  126,  300, 

320. 
Equity,  240,  266. 
Ernesti,  427. 

Eternity,  234,  297,  822,  470,  605. 
Ethics,  14. 

Evil,  256,  861,  461,  606,  629. 
Exegesis  of  Matt.  v.  38-42,  817. 

Matt.  V.  44-48,  319. 

Matt.  xi.  28-30,  462,  682. 

Mark  viii.  85-37,  467. 

Luke  vii.  48,  638. 

John  1.  14,  404. 

John  iv.  84,  449. 

Rom.  V.  12-14,  344. 

Rom.  V.  15,  401. 

Rom.  V.  19,  845,  366. 

1  Cor.  viii.  6,  401. 

Eph.  1.  8-6,  X.  30,  4Q3. 

Col.  i.  14-20,  401. 

Heb.  i.  1-3,  404. 

James  i.  14,  16,  673. 
Expiation,  569. 

Faith,  100,  140,  173,  212,  621,  678, 
591. 


671 


672 


INDEX 


Family,  309. 

Feeling,  155,  165,  322,  642,  652. 

Feuerbach,  206. 

Flugel.  17. 

Francis,  St.,  586,  648. 

Francke,  155,  162,  392,  416. 

Frank,  237. 

Freedom,  57,  251,  291,  313,  335,  513. 

Freedom,  Christian,  114, 178,  292,  451, 

498,  532,  646,  657. 
Fresenius,  86,  125. 
Fanctions,    religious,   170,   333,    526, 

599,  637,  654,  663,  668. 

Gellebt,  185. 

Oerhard,  Job.,  184,  653. 

Gerhardt,  Paul,  186,  568. 

God,  Christian  idea  of,  86,  107,  211, 

226,  239,  248,  259,  272,  501. 
sonsbip  of,  589. 
Gospel,  7,  112,  160,  327,  644,  662. 
Grace,  election  by,  120. 
Grace  of  God,  87,  264,  485,  631. 
Guilt,  consciousness  of  guilt,  47,  60,  59, 

78,  141,  840,  355,  364,  544,  553. 

Hakne,  581. 

Haring,  Theod.,  553. 

Harless,  189. 

Heermann,  Job.,  668. 

Heidelberg  Catechism,  102,  163. 

Hofmann,  190,  575. 

Holiness,  274. 

Holy  Spirit,  22,  273,  471,  632,  603. 

Hope,  37,  148. 

Huber,  Samuel,  125. 

Human  race,  124,  132,  295. 

Education  of,  304. 
Humility,  632. 

Ideal,  166,  331,  413. 
Ignorance,  377. 
Imitation  of  Christ,  682,  665. 
Islam,  385,  415. 

James,  505,  509. 
Joy,  651. 

Justificatio  (Catholic),  600. 
Justification,  347,  491,  580. 
Justin  Martyr,  262. 
JuatUia  civiliSf  313. 
origincUiSf  or  man's  primitive  condi- 
tion, 4,  170,  250,  260,  331. 

Kant,  11,  19,  219,  492,  514,  530. 

Kenosis  of  the  Logos,  407. 

Kingdom  of  God,  9,  25,  30,  91,  200, 
252,  280,  289,  293,  296,  309,  319, 
329,  334,  449,  468,  511,  610,  666. 
sin,  338. 

Knowledge,  religious,  203,  211,  398. 

Kreibig,  6,  262. 

Lasco,  Job.  von,  375. 


Life,   eternal,    74,  98,  247,  387,  495, 

507,  523,  669. 
Lodensteyn,  162. 
Lobe,  157,  653. 
Lotze,  19,  199,  233,  306. 
Love,  276,  593,  602. 
as  nature  of  God,  278,  276,  319,  381, 

453,  511,  546. 
law  of,  vide  Moral  law. 
to  Christ,  593. 
Luthardt,  23,  410. 
Luther,  6,  11,  99,  159,  169,  211.  260, 

264,  286,  328,  334,  391,  397,  418, 

495,  498,  606,  523,  544,  666,  657, 

665. 

Marheinekb,  411. 

Martensen,  189. 

Materialism,  209,  238,  601. 

Meditation,  566,  596. 

Melanchthon,   7,   11,   101,  112,   114, 

143,  169,  287,  392,  896. 
Men,  primitive  state  of,  vide  JustUia 

origiTuUis, 
Menken,  556. 

Mercy,  prerogative  of,  62,  88,  266. 
Merit,  340. 

Metaphysics,  16,  237,  249. 
Methodism,  664. 
Modesty,  637. 
Mohler,  151. 
Monasticism,  271,  331,  618,  602,  612, 

639,  647. 
Moral  law,  57,  87,  252,  268,  319,  413, 

446,  487,  509,  526,  661. 
Morality,  206,  261. 
Mysticism,    98,    112,    162,   180,    188, 

389,  497. 

Name  of  God,  273,  641. 

Nature,  world  of,  215,  278,  455,  461, 

602,  609,  619. 
Nitzscb,  C.  J.,  189. 

Oetinoer,  656,  579. 

von  Oettingen,  375. 

Original  sin,  5,  132,  170,  247,  256, 

328,  344,  373,  480. 
Osiander,  Andr.,  124. 

Pantheism,  210,  229,  275. 
Pardon,  61,  93. 

Patience,  443,  448,  460,  589,  627. 
Paul  the  Apostle,  304,  359,  436,  459, 

505,  643,  665,  669. 
Pelagianism,  175,  291,  335. 
Penance,  conflict  of,  161. 

sacrament  of,  160. 
Peoples,  kinds  of,  134. 
Perfection,  Christian,   170,  171,   333, 

647. 
Personality,  228,  281,  272. 
Pessimism,  614. 
Philippi,  272,  400,  480. 


INDEX 


673 


Philosophy,  Greek,  208. 

Pietism,  84,  108,  119,  155,  553,  579, 

639. 
Poeniteniia,  160,  165,  171,  838,  544. 
Prayer,  641. 

Pretoriiis,  Stephanas,  527. 
Priesthood,  universal,  499. 
Proof  of  Christianity,  24. 
Proofs  for  the  existence  of  God,  17,  214. 
Prophet,  office  of,  435. 
Protestantism,  486. 
Providence,   faith  in,   172,  181,  312, 

506,  617,  659. 
Psychology,  20,  172,  204. 
Punishment,    Divine,    40,   241,   247, 

324,  351,  364. 
notion  of,   40,  247,  256,  268,  362, 

478,  571. 
Puritanism,  424,  523,  640. 

Quietism,  183,  245. 

Rationalism,  187,  227,  262,  272. 
Reconciliation,  77,  82,  305,  312,  857, 

519,  571. 
Redemption  through  Christ,  13,  373, 

556. 
Regeneration,  173,  176,  599. 
Religion,  Christian,  8,  197,  517,  610. 

founders  of,  385. 

Greek,  258,  260. 

of  Tfisns   ^ 

notion  of,  17,  27,  194,  539,  587. 
Old  Testament,  258,  261,  312,  359, 

455,  475,  500,  540. 
and  science,  207,  614. 
Responsibility,  337. 
Retribution,    47,    50,   255,  260,   361, 

478. 
Reuss,  J.  Fr.,  111. 

Revelation,  6,  23,  28,  202,  212,  237, 
828,  388,  398,  436,  501,  551,  591, 
625. 
Right,  362. 

Right  of  Divine  sonship,  363. 
Righteousness,  of  God,  248,  263,  318, 
473. 
moral,  69. 
Rothe,  579. 

Salvation    (blessedness),    322,    555, 

669. 
assurance  of,  143, 147,  577,  652,  653. 
Satisfactions  in  Sacrament  of  Penance, 

46. 
Saviour,   intercourse    with    the,   180, 

594. 
Schleiermacher,  9,  23,  29,  34,  65,  128, 

189,  332,  839,  352,  354,  880,  424, 

445,  491,  548,  559,  587,  642. 
Schmid,  Chr.  Fr.,  190. 
Schneckenburger,  490. 
Schoberlein,  821. 
Scholasticism,  19,  226,  341. 

43 


Schwalb,  584,  589. 

Schweizer,  Alex.,  118. 

Scotus,  school  of,  274. 

Scriptural  proof,  15. 

Scriver,  636, 

Sectarian  principle,  561,  603,  640. 

Servant  of  God,  565. 

Sin,  313,  327,  348,  528,  553. 

degrees  of,  338,  378. 

forgiveness  of,  38,  59,  93,  140,  485, 
528,  528,  536,  669. 
Smalcald  Articles,  828,  342,  550. 
Society,  civil.     Fide  State. 
Socinus,  Socinians,   68,   81,   89,  289, 
265,  268,  294,  424,  486,  528,  530, 
663. 
Speaer,  7,  24,  111,  156,  163,  490. 
Stahl,  570. 

State,  50, 69, 88, 246,  250,  260, 310,  314. 
Staupitz,  373. 
Steudel,  64,  68. 
Strauss,  D.  Fr.,  229,  413,  619. 
Strigel,  124. 
Substitution,  474,  546. 
Sulze,  580. 

Temptation,  349,  448,  573. 
Theologia  regenitorum,  7. 
Theology,  Greek,  389,  437. 
Lutheran  and  Reformed,   74,    120, 
264,  294,  370,  406,  420,  437,  465, 
490,  495,  654. 
method  of  Systematic,  4,  24,  33, 193, 

325,  327,  359,  368,  596. 
of  the  Middle  Ages,  239,  389. 
natural,  4,  6,  188,  240,  261. 
Theremin,  12,  398. 
Thomas  Aquinas,  37,    103,  148,  177, 

241,  368,  390,  394,  485,  649. 
Thomasius,  Gottfr.,  409. 
Tieftrunk,  54,  87,  319. 
Time,  123,  301,  323. 
Timor  JUidlis,  177,  649,  655. 
ToUner,  55. 
Trent,  Council  of,  147,  313. 

Universe,  229. 

Value-notions,  206,   211,  834,  392, 

898,  619, 
Vocation,  483,  445,  572,  589. 
task  of  one's,  163,  630,  661. 

WE88EL,  371,  481. 
WiU,  466. 

arbitrary,  of  God,  240,  265,  282. 
Works,  good,  163,  498,  508,  661. 
World,   position  of  the  Christian  in 

the,  30,  168,  456,  609. 
World-empire,  810,  314. 

•negation,  29,  612. 
Wrath  of  God,  321,  572. 

ZwiNOLi,  128,  287,  873. 


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THE 


RITSCHLIAN  THEOLOGY 

CRITICAL  AND  CONSTRUCTIVE. 

AN  EXPOSITION  AND  AN  ESTIMATE. 
By  ALFRED  E.   GARVIE 

M.A.(OXON.),   B.D.^GLAS.). 


SUMMARY  OF  CONTENTS:— 

Chap.  I.  The  Problem  needing  Solution:  Historical  Introduction.  A.  Critical. 
Chap.  II.  The  Exclusion  of  Metaphysics  from  Theology.— III.  The  Rejection  of 
Speculative  Theism.— IV.  The  Condemnation  of  Ecclesiastical  Dogma.— V.  The 
Antagonism  to  Religious  Mysticism.  B.  CoNSTRUcriVE.  Chap.  VI.  The  Value- 
Judgments  of  Religion.— VII.  The  Historical  Character  of  Revelation.— VIII.  The 
Regulative  Use  of  the  Idea  of  the  Kingdom  of  God.— IX.  The  Doctrine  of  the 
Person  and  the  Work  of  Christ.— X.  The  Doctrine  of  Sin  and  Salvation.— XI.  The 
Doctrine  of  the  Church  and  the  Kingdom.— XII.  Critical  Estimate :  The  Solution 
offered. 

'  Mr.  Garvie's  grasp  of  the  subject  is  unsurpassed.  .  .  .  Nothing  could  be  clearer,  or, 
indeed,  more  fascinating  in  theological  writing  than  \\i\s,'— Expository  Times. 

'The  weightiest,  warmest,  and  fairest  work  in  English  on  its  subject.'— Dr.  P.  T. 
Forsyth  in  the  Speaker, 

'  The  influence  of  the  Ritschlian  school  is  by  no  means  limited  to  Germany.  Great 
Britain.  America,  and  France  have  felt  it.  English  readers  will  therefore  welcome  all 
helps  to  a  better  understanding  of  its  position.  .  .  .  We  commend  the  work  for  the  light 
it  throws  on  an  influential  line  of  teaching.  .  .  .  The  statement  of  the  deficiencies  or 
desiderata  of  the  new  school  at  the  close  of  the  volume  is  very  clear  and  cogent.  We 
earnestly  hope  that  so  sympathetic  a  criticism  will  have  weight  with  memt>ers  of  the 
school,  and  so  help  to  accelerate  the  tendency  in  their  ranks  to  come  still  nearer  to 
evangelical  ioiiyi,*— Methodist  Times, 

'Mr.  Garvie's  "The  Ritschlian  Theology  "is  well  timed.  .  .  .  The  book  is  a  fair- 
minded  and  appreciative  discussion  of  an  intricate  subject.  There  are  signs  that  the 
theology  of  Ritschl  is  already  exercising  a  beneficial  influence  on  religious  thought  in 
England. ' — Literature, 

*  We  congratulate  Mr.  Garvie  on  the  production  of  a  thoroughly  sound  piece  of  work 
which  must  have  cost  him  much  labour  and  thought,  but  which  will  certainly  lighten  very 
materially  the  toil  of  future  students  of  Ritschl. ' — Bookman, 


Edinburgh:  T.  &  T.  CLARK,  38  George  Street. 

London:  SIMPKIN.  MARSHALL.  HAMILTON.   KENT.   &  CO.   LIMITED.