The Christian faith, a system of dogmatics

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THE CHRISTIAN FAITH

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THE CHRISTIAN FAITH^

A SYSTEM OF DOGMATICS

^

THEODORE HAERING, D.D.

PROFESSOR OF THEOLOQY IN THE UNIVERSITY OF TOBINGBH

TRANSLATED FROM THE SECOND REVISED AND ENLARGED
' ' X GERMAN EDITION, 1312

BY

JOHN DICKIE, M.A.

PROFESSOR OP SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY IM KNOX COLLBQB, OUMBDIM
AND

GEORGE FERRIES, D.D.

AUTHOR OP "THE GROWTH OP CHRISTIAN FAITa " =,

VOLUME I

'^^ HODDER AND STOUGHTON^;^

^ , LONDON .J NEW YORK TORONTO
^ 1915

/

FEOM THE AUTHOR'S PREFACE TO THE
SECOND EDITION

Throughout the work I have sought to improve the
contents ; e.g. at the outset, in the definition of the
Nature of Religion, the influence of the most recent
discussions on Schleiermacher and Calvin as well as on
the History of Religion and Philosophy will be observed.
The systematic scheme of Apologetics is largely re-
written, the section on Providence, Origin of Sin, etc. By
means of the former alteration I hope that I have met the
objections referring to the epistemological foundation of
my Dogmatics, to the efifect that I have under-estimated
the most recent metaphysical essays, or at all events
have not sufiiciently recognized the task incumbent
on the theologian, of exhibiting not merely the limits of
knowledge, but the unity of faith and knowledge. I
was specially concerned when treating the points that
fall to be considered in the case, to elucidate the prin-
ciple that our Christian Faith has not to do with a
multiplicity of so-called mysteries, but with a real
mystery which forms a unity, one that has been re-
vealed in God's gracious approach to man, but which
also continually occasions fresh enigmas, while giving
the assurance of eternal deliverance from them. With

Preface

good reason we may hope that the future will gain a
new understanding of this mystery ; while the numerous
ostensible mysteries have already lost the power of
impressing the present age, as a result of the whole
development of man's mental life, a development which
has its principal ground in the training imparted by the
Gospel itself. The satisfaction which I have had from
the assent given by critics of different types to this
particular principle, I should like to express by apply-
ing it still more strictly and extensively.

CONTENTS OF THE FIRST VOLUME

PAQB

Introduction.

The Difficulty implied by the Concept of Dog-
matics (Christian Faith and the Modern
Consciousness) ...... 1

The Division of Dogmatics 29

THE CHRISTIAN FAITH AND ITS AN-
TAGONISTS
(The Revelation of God in Christ as standard

and ground of the Christian Faith) . . 33

The Nature of the Christian Religion . 35

The Nature of Religion . . . .36

As respects its content . . . .41

„ „ „ psychical form . . .56

„ „ „ relation to the rest of our

mental life . . .59

„ origin .... 68

The Nature of the Christian Religion . . 78

The Religions 78

Christianity . , 81

Evangelical Christianity . . .96

The Truth of the Christian Religion . 100

Historical Survey 102

Apologetics prior to the thorough in-
vestigation of Faith and Knowledge 102
Domination of Faith over Knowledge 103
Domination of Knowledge over Faith 108

Contents

PAGB

Apologetics after the time of Schleier-

macher and Kant . . . .108
Significance of Schleiermacher for

Apologetics .... 109
The Followers of Schleiermacher . 112

Ritschl 119

The latest tendencies in Apologetics 120
Systmnatic Exposition . . . . .139
Method and Division . . .139
The significance of Knowledge for the

proof of Faith . . . .146
Meaning of a demonstrative proof . 148
How Faith is injured by Knowledge 149
The limits of Knowledge . . . 151
The freedom of Faith . . .156
The proof of Faith from the grounds in-
herent in faith itself . . . 163
The experiential value . . .164
The experiential reality (Revelation) 172
The standpoints . . . .172
Importance of Revelation . .181
Concept of Revelation . . . 199
Historical reality of Revelation . 216
Summary ..... 227

Christian Dogmatics 239

The Nature of the Knowledge 'peculiar to Faith 240
The basal conception .... 240
General view of the Knowledge pecu-
liar to Faith . . . .240
That Knowledge in its scientific form 245
Faith and Knowledge .... 252
The Norm of Christian Dogmatics . . 262

The Old Protestant Doctrine of Holy

Scripture 265

Exposition of the old Protestant Doc-
trine of Holy Scripture . . 265

Contents

PAGE

Criticism of the old Protestant Doc-
trine of Holy Scripture . . 269
The Doctrine of Holy Scripture which
corresponds to the evangelical con-
ception of Revelation and Faith . 277
Importance and Nature of Canonical

Writings . . . .278

The Sacred Writings according to

tradition . . . .282

The use of these in Dogmatics . . 289
Appendix : their origin . 296
Conclusion of this Doctrine of Holy

Scripture .... 298
Holy Scripture and the Confession of the

Church 303

Inferences as to Method

Biblical Theology and Dogmatics
Apologetic matter in Dogmatics
Dogmatics and Ethics
Division of the subject

307

307
308
308
310

THE CHRISTIAN FAITH AS A COHERENT

SYSTEM 315

Faith in God the Father .... 317

God {and the World) 321

Absolute Personality .... 327

Objections to Absolute Personality . 327

The Attitude of Christian Faith . . 332

God as Holy Love 337

Love 339

Holy Love 343

Holy Love and absolute personality . 346

The Heavenly Father .... 352

Imperfect conceptions .... 355

VOL. I. ix

Contents

359
360
360
360

363

The World (God^s) 359

God's World, as yet without reference to

Sin

The World

Exposition

The basal conception
The main questions (Purpose and
Ground, Nature ; Word and
Spirit) ....

Apologetic matter (how theology
passes beyond its limits ; op-
position from Materialism and
Monism ; particular questions) 376

Man 390

Image of God in Man . . .391

The basal conception . . . 391

The Confessional diflference . . 399

Apologetic matter .... 400

Addendum : The Angels . . . 409

God's World in opposition to the love of

God (Sin) 415

Method of inquiry ; historical matter 415
The Nature of Sin . . . . 421
The Nature of Sin as regards its con-
tent 425

The Nature of Sin as regards its form 430
Relation of Sin and imperfection,

Sin and guilt . . . 431
Expressions of will and direction
of will

\j± rr xxi. . ,

Radical evil .

. 437

Kingdom of Sin

. 441

Universality of Sin

. 448

The Origin of Sin

. 450

Theories of Freedom

. 453

Necessitarian Theories

. 459

Contents

PAGE

Mediation Theories .... 466
The remodelled doctrine of the

Church ..... 468

Ultimate questions .... 474

Addendum : The Evil One . . . 481

INTRODUCTION

A SYSTEM of Dogmatics seriously intended to be of
service to the present generation may fitly begin with a
consideration which though very simple and obvious is
yet often lost sight of. When we think of the history
of our religion, and in particular of its theology with
which we get familiar, our first instinctive impression
is of its gi'eat length. As a matter of fact, the contents
are infinitely extensive and infinitely varied. But it
is well to emphasize at the same time that after all
the history is but a short one. Only a century has
elapsed since Kant and Schleiermacher ; it is not yet
two since the Age of the Enlightenment or four since
the Reformation ; everywhere on all hands new circum-
stances and new problems confront us. The Gospel
has scarcely begun to work out the new problems, or
to be at home in the new circumstances : this we
are obliged to confess, if we really believe that the
Gospel purports to be for all times. To remember
that our religion has so short a history is a safeguard
against overweening pretensions, and inspires patience
and hopefulness. To think of the history as very long
is apt to make us disheartened and discontented,
and to lead to unwarranted depreciation of our actual
possessions. We expect too much and in consequence
have less than we might have ; in particular we allow
ourselves to be distressed more than is necessary, when
forms of our faith which have been venerated and dear
to our hearts, cease to be.

VOL. I. 1 1

Introduction

We should be better protected against such dangers,
if only we remembered the nature of religion, and of
our own religion and especially of theology. Religion
lives by the revelation of mystery quite as much as by
the mystery of revelation, by what it is hoping and
struggling for as well as by what it already possesses.
That theology in particular is dead which is not always
gaining for itself anew out of ever new experience the
religious ideas it has inherited from the past. Because
we are so apt to forget this fundamental truth, we are
oppressed by the seeming length of the history, while
under the impression of the length of the history we
lose sight of the fundamental truth. Consequently the
simple observation, to which we referred at the begin-
ning as too little attended to, might furnish our starting
point. It encourages us to face the problem of
Dogmatics from the very outset in all its difficulty.
The very magnitude of our subject is at the same time
its problem.

Every science begins with a view of its scope, says
what it aims at doing, and with this goal before it, fits
itself into the whole of knowledge, defining its special
place there. This initial proceeding in itself occasions
no greater difficulty in the science of the Christian
Faith than in other sciences. Nevertheless even those
introductory statements of the scope of Dogmatics are
received with Suspicion in many quarters, while in other
sciences like statements are often taken for granted
without any foundation being laid for them.

The name of our science does not immediately con-
cern us at this stage. We may use the expression
Science of Faith, as well as the expression Dogmatics ;
as yet we have given no detailed explanation in any
case. Even at this early stage, we might of course

Faith and Modern Consciousness

point out that the word Faith sometimes denotes living
piety in general, and sometimes the religious knowledge
in particular which is inseparably bound up with it.
But meanwhile it suffices to note this variety in the term-
inology : quite too many conditions are wanting at the
outset for us to be able to understand it fully. After
all, it is a dispute about words, when it is asked whether
we are to speak of the Science of Faith or of Dogma-
tics : the expression Science of Faith does not by any
means necessarily imj^ly that objective truth is under-
valued. At the same time we can most quickly explain
the reason for the suspicion of which we speak by
starting with the term Dogmatics. Dogmatics is the
presentation of Dogmas in a coherent system. Dogma
means originally both an opinion and a decree, that
is something settled by intellect or by will and having
application to intellect or will in others. Thus it speci-
fies further only such a matter as has been defined with
the greatest possible precision. Later, the stress comes
to be laid on its being something settled, but settled of
course on good grounds, and so well-established or
generally acknowledged ; and the word is applied especi-
ally to the distinctive fundamental principles of thought
and conduct prevalent in the philosophical schools of
Greece, or in ecclesiastical usage to the saving truths
authoritative in the Christian Church. This claim to
truth is the decisive point ; this claim is the chief ground
on which the very first steps in Dogmatics encounter
a suspicion so widely diffused, and barring all further
progress. But in the light of what we say, it is clear
that though such suspicion is directed with special force
against the term Dogma and Dogmatics, it likewise
exists in principle if we use the expression Doctrine of
the Faith or the scientific presentation of the Christian
Faith, What is really under suspicion is the truth of

3

Introduction

Christianity. Nor does it make any difference, as re-
gards this decisive point, whether we have in view the
old Dogma in the first instance, confining this concep-
tion in the strict sense to the religious doctrines of
Christianity formulated with the help of the Ancient
Philosophy (Harnack), or including the form which
these received when taken up into the Old Protestant
Dogmatics (Loofs) ; or whether we demand a " new
Dogma" (J. Kaftan), or hold a brief for ''undog-
matic Christianity " (Dreyer). Important as these
distinctions are in their own place, they do not come into
consideration here. For both the old Dogma and the
new, and undogmatic Christianity, claim to be true.
Otherwise it would not be worth while to speak of them.
The " endeavour to exhibit the doctrines of the faith in
their universal validity " is common to all theologians.
Thus there arises of necessity for all of them the task
of coming to an understanding with regard to everything
that claims to be truth at each period ; for of course
we are concerned with doctrines of faith as existing in
a definite religion. The dispute referred to about the
word Dogma springs from the Catholic conception of
the Church, one to which a very definite conception of
the truth of faith necessarily corresponds ; whereas our
Evangelical conception of the Church has likewise a
definite, but an entirely different, conception of the
truth of faith corresponding to it (Cf. F. Kattenbusch
and O. Ritschl).

The same decisive question faces us when Dogmatics,
or the science of the Christian Faith, takes its place in
the wider province of Theology, as the science of
Christianity ; Theology itself being classed with Know-
ledge in general. Dogmatics constitutes along with
Ethics, in other words the presentation of the Christian
Faith along with that of the Christian Life, Systematic

Faith and Modern Consciousness

Theology. This is distinguished from Historical (Biblical
Science and Church History) and Practical. Historical
Theology is not directly liable to attack, for it does not
have to decide whether the Christian Faith and Life
which it sets forth are valid for us, or are simply, as some
might hold, a historical fact, full of significance it is true,
but now outgrown. On the other hand, the function of
Systematic Theology is to deal with this very question of
the truth of Christianity, and the answer reached must
determine our attitude towards Practical Theology, the
doctrine of how the truth once it is recognized is to be
applied and appropriated. A thing admittedly untrue
might indeed be upheld on grounds of expediency, but
at the most only for a time. In that case, however, as
time went on, even Historical Theology would cease to
exist as a branch of Theology and would be left for the
general history of religion to deal with. Thus the idea
of Theology in general falls under suspicion with many
on the same grounds as Dogmatics, but not because the
definition and division of it are in themselves either
difficult or doubtful. No more is the suspicion due,
as is often supposed, to the circumstance that theology,
when fitted into its place in the round of knowledge
generally, is designated a positive science (Schleierma-
cher), that is one which combines for a practical purpose
the elements of knowledge which it requires. For in
this sense, medicine is unquestionably a positive science,
since it places the various natural sciences and portions
of psychology at the service of suffering humanity ; or the
science of jurisprudence, which turns to account certain
portions of the mental and moral sciences for behoof
of the State. No one calls in question the right of
medicine so long as there is a sick person, or that of
jurisprudence so long as there is a State. But many dis-
pute the right of the Church, and therefore also the right

6

Introduction

of a science in the service of the Church, and it is because
they dispute the inherent right, that is, the truth of the
religion which the Church represents, that the right of
the Church is questioned by them.

Science of the Faith, they tell us, is a self-contradic-
tion. This is not to say that it is impossible to construct
logically unassailable concepts of the subject-matter of
faith, and to combine these concepts in logically correct
judgments. Surely, for example, mediaeval Scholasti-
cism is a lasting monument of such a type of Dogmatics.
But yet faith and knowledge are regarded as being in
their inmost essence irreconcilable opposites. This pro-
position is understood in three distinct ways. Accord-
ing to one of these, religious experiences have the
peculiarity of defying exact scientific treatment. Op-
ponents of very different types are at one with friends
of religion in the suspicion that knowledge endangers
the (supposed or actual) supernatural character of the
objects of faith, sullying their purity and shattering their
certainty. All doctrine of the f^iith, we are told, kills
the faith ; its concepts are pressed flowers, petrified life,
a strait waistcoat for the spirit of freedom. When
such ideas are taken quite seriously in Church life, the
demand is for lay-preaching, instead of theologically
trained pastors. While among those referred to, the
traditional conceptions of faith are clung to by many as
sacred and unassailable, with more determination in
proportion as a scientific presentation of them is objected
to, others declare them to be more or less of indifferent
significance, on the ground that everything really depends
on immediate experience in feeling. Not a few, who are
influenced by the modern History of Keligion, hold this
conviction in the sense of a vaguely mystical religiosity.
But both classes, though so much opposed to each other
in practice, share the persuasion that faith and knowledge

6

Faith and Modern Consciousness

are incommensurable entities. Still more dangerous is
the other sense of this proposition regarding the contra-
diction between faith and knowledge ; viz. — Christian
Dogmatics does not merely seek generally to furnish us
with true propositions concerning God and His relation
to us : it claims to possess the perfect truth upon these
subjects. Now every science, we are told, is engaged in
approximating to the truth, and searching for it ; to claim
to possess the truth is a palpable absurdity. We all
know how timid even convinced supporters of our faith
have become in speaking of its absoluteness. They
think they must forego this in order to evade at least the
third most serious objection to the proposition that faith
and knowledge are opposites. This proposition, we must
admit, may have the further meaning, and it is the
most prevalent one, that the world of faith confronted
by knowledge necessarily becomes an illusion.

But the full significance of this suspicion under
which Dogmatics labours will not be as clear as it should
be when we are dealing with a subject where suspicion
is so rife, unless we ask more precisely in whatjorm and
to what extent it prevails. Not primarily, nor chiefly, in
the form of clear knowledge. On the contrary, the
ignorance with reference to the subjects dealt with by
Dogmatics is often as marked as the confidence with
which Dogmatics is condemned. We must add indeed
that there is often quite as dense ignorance regarding
the nature of knowledge. It is very usual, as we our-
selves have seen, to condemn faith in the name of know-
ledge, without feeling in any way bound to have anything
like a clear conception of knowledge. In fact, it is in
regard to this latter point that the greatest difficulties
arise ; only a person should at least be conscious of them.
For our own sakes, therefore, as well as for the sake of
our opponents, we recall in passing the division of the

7

Introduction

sciences into those of nature and those of mind, based
upon a distinction of subject-matter, as it presents itself
at all events to the first glance. We next call attention
to the much more important distinction among the
sciences, according as they deal essentially with facts, or
with values and normative principles. What a difference
there is in the meaning of the term " normative science "
as applied to Logic, Esthetics, and Ethics ! How distinct
in kind is the validity of such normative principles in
the respective sciences ! How independent of subjective
judgment is it in Logic ; how dependent, though not in
the same way, in Esthetics and Ethics ! How varied is
the relation of the values to the facts, and how peculiar
is this relation in religion of all subjects (God the reality
of supreme value) ! While all these serious questions
are often scarcely considered by our opponents, we may
pass the judgment that the opposition largely manifests
itself not in the form of clear knowledge, but as a feel-
ing of unfriendliness which refuses to have anything to
do with the matter. This explains the wide diffusion of
the opposition as regards extent. A frame of mind
exerts an influence far beyond the circle where deliber-
ately thought out grounds are found. Lately one might
read that " the Christian faith is for the parsons, for
widows" (formerly the statement used to be at least
more general — for women) " and for children ". Or
" for theologians it is the daily bread, for other men an
affair of festival days, and for those who no longer attend
church it is nothing at all, or only an occasion of fruitless
speculation and still more fruitless discord ". This wide-
spread antipathy is by no means always a matter of
conscious opposition, but rather of self-evident indiffer-
ence. In spite of the enormous differences in the situ-
ation, we may recall the saying of Bishop Butler in the
age of the Enlightenment, in reference to the educated

Faith and Modern Consciousness

classes of his day, that for them Christianity is but a
fiction, a matter which is now not so much as a subject
of inquiry. Only we have to add that, at present, this
does not by any means apply to the educated classes
alone : it is true of the masses in their whole extent.
Thus it is necessary to say something with reference to
the general mental soil on which that antipathy to the
Christian faith grows ; viz., the state of mind known as
the Modern Consciousness.

To be sure, every period has appeared to itself to be
new, in comparison to that which preceded ; and fre-
quently too in history the word " modern " has been
employed to express that feeling. Still it would give
proof of shallow thought if we failed to recognize that
hitherto it has never been so generally used with such
self-consciousness as at present. For many centuries
the Christian civilization of the West, in the sense of
the authoritative Church (Troeltsch), had for one reason
or another been acknowledged as the dominating Power ;
and so it continued to be till the Enlightenment, although
Protestantism introduced some fundamental moderniza-
tions. Autonomy, Subjectivism, Individualism, as against
objective authority ; Immanence as contrasted with
supernatural Transcendence — these positions, under-
stood in the pointed sense which they receive in our
day, are " modern ".

At the close of the century, newspapers of repute
invited opinions as to what had been the most important
acquisition of the century that was nearing its end.
They received from acknowledged representatives of
the Modern Consciousness, the strangest answers :
electricity, colonization, socialism, the emancipation of
woman, extreme individualism, spiritualism and theo-
sophy, the thoroughgoing extension of the law of causal-
ity to nature and history, the doctrine of evolution, the

9

Introduction

feeling for reality, universal nervous sensibility. Some
by no means adversely disposed to the modern spirit
called attention besides to the widely current inclination
to exaggerate some chance popular craze, were it only
vegetarianism, into a philosophy of the universe, and to
the widespread ignorance of the very rudiments of the
conditions which really control the rise of a philosophy
of the universe, an ignorance asserting itself for example
in the naive question whether this or that coterie of
litterateurs have finished their new^ philosophy of the
universe yet. The great problem how all this is to be
brought into one connected view cannot be solved, till
history is in a position to look back upon it, and see
tilings in correct perspective. We of the present day at
all events cannot conceal from ourselves what enormous
contrasts are included in the favourite expression '*'the
Modern Consciousness ". Often indeed it appears a
definite quantity only in its negations, in its shattering
of the old tables, and its prophecy of some unheard of
novelty. This prophecy assumes the form at one time
rather of blas6 inactivity, at another rather of restless
activity, but in both instances the fulfilment falls short
of the promise. Still it is necessary and possible to
inquire into the dominating note of this Modern Con-
sciousness, many and varied as its notes are. Is it not a
consciousness of the infinite fullness and variety of life in
the world as our experience finds it — a world that is al-
ways disclosing itself more broadly and deeply to the
human spirit become conscious of its strength, and assert-
ing its lordship over nature and history by means of new
and delicate methods — a consciousness, therefore, on the
part of the human spirit of itself as infinite, as it consti-
tutes a unity with the infinite world ? But this con-
sciousness of self and of the world as infinitely rich is
more or less distinctly self-sufficient and self-centred.

10

Faith and Modern Consciousness

The world is looked upon as a sum of forces which are
absolutely determined, and work according to law, but
are capable, both in the " natural " and in the " spiritual "
life, of infinite development. The spiritual self is taken
to be creator as well as creature of this world ; the two
together form a unity, and are self-sufficient ; they have
no need of a God in distinction from the world and the
human spirit ; the world is God and the spirit of man
is King as well as servant of the world, prophet and
priest of the God in question, and itself God within
the world. The great watchword of this "Modern
Consciousness," being its product and at the same time
a contributory cause of its growth, is the doctrine of
evolution, a doctrine as fruitful in results that cannot
be disputed as readily applicable for the glossing over
of ultimate mysteries, a doctrine that presents itself
at one time in the aspect of unbounded optimism and
at another in that of gnawing pessimism, and covers the
most intense self-assertion as well as silent resignation.
At first, of course, on account of the supposed or felt
value of the upward trend of the movement, it expresses
optimistic self-assertion ; but on account of the vague-
ness of aim, and the uncertainty of the realization of it,
only too often it veers round to pessimistic resignation.
We note further that it is essentially as an esthetic
feeling that this Modern Consciousness can and doe&
realize itself. In its combination of discordant elements,
which in many cases cannot be clearly thought out, it is
rather experienced as a feeling after a harmony that
transcends all contrasts than intellectually apprehended
as a truth. Hence the attractiveness of ''Monism " as
a creed, presenting as it does the unity of all knowledge
and its methods and of all reality, of Nature and Spirit,
Freedom and Necessity. Very few of its adherents
would be capable of defining it, still less of seeing

11

Introduction

through the great fallacy involved in the confusion be-
tween unity and uniformity. But it is for them not so
much a definite creed, as a sort of notation mark for
their feeling, and it is no mere accident that music is the
art most widely diffused and most highly esteemed (see
further, " Ethics," ^ pp. 39 ff., 46 ff.).

Even this brief statement will help us to understand
the wide-spread disinclination to the Christian Faith of
which we spoke, and also the fact that it is very vague
and assumes many different forms. We have now to
state that upon the whole the number of decided an-
tagonists was even larger ten years ago than it is to-day.
Eor instance, it is not so popular now as it used to be
to dispose of the adherents of the Christian Faith as
either weak-brained or hypocrites. That familiar alter-
native is too clumsy for the greater subtlety of judg-
ment found nowadays. Indeed a number of prominent
authors make the problem of religion central in their
works, and the special attention they receive is partly
owing to their doing so. Examples are Ibsen's unspar-
ing criticism of the eimui which characterizes the " We "
of "The Old and the New Faith," and the various
representations of a "Seeker after God," "an enemy of
theology with an ardent longing for religion," whether
he continues a seeker or finds peace in a gospel like
Tolstoy's. Moreover, there is an undercurrent of feeling
widely prevalent that so far none of the new and loudly
acclaimed theories of the universe, of which so many have
been put upon the market, has won for itself a reliable
and convinced body of adherents. "The man of full-
formed nature, able to realize the deep longing of the
age for material and ideal perfection, the new man who

i"The Ethics of the Christian Life," by Prof. Haering. The
references are to pages of the Translation from the Second German
.edition, by James S. Hill, B.D. ; 1909.

12

Faith and Modern Consciousness

is God and artist of his world," is not yet born ; and th&
picture of this new man is on the whole rather an orna-
ment for the hours of festive elation of the elect than a
power for the hard life-struggle of the many. In the
main, however, interest in mere controversy begins to
slacken, and a longing for the restful calm of settled con-
viction arises. It has been a too frequent experience,
both in our own case and in that of others, that without
such peace the depth and joy necessary for the per-
formance of any important life-work are awanting, and
that the more numerous little tasks suffer from the lack
of a steadying influence. Though we hear much of in-
dividual successes of Buddhism in Western Society, and
even of spiritualism, from the adherents of these cults,
they tend on the whole rather to perplex than to
strengthen the self-confidence of the modern man, at heart
at least. Moreover, there are direct counter effects of
the Old Faith which cannot be overlooked. The unheard
of influence of the Church of Kome becomes an importun-
ate problem, and the despised Protestant Churches wring
admiration from their enemies by their works of charity
if by nothing else, since it can scarcely be mistaken in
the long run that the root of these is faith. Reference
may also be made in this connexion to the attitude of
individuals of acknowledged standing towards Chris-
tianity. To explain the faith of a Bismarck or a Glad-
stone as an accidental peculiarity in their character
satisfies none but the most superficial. But in spite of
all this, it would also be superficial, indeed it would be a
fatal delusion, if we were to assert a living approach on
the part of our generation to the Christian Faith.

To be sure, our generation may show in many re-
spects a new and greater interest in religious questions.
Thousands crowd round the orators who defend the
historical existence of Christ. The circulation of

18

Introduction

^' Books upon Religion for the People" and "Vital
Questions " doubtless marks a rising wave of religious
interest. To this rising wave of religion we must de-
liberately turn our attention, and that too with a feel-
ing of thankfulness ; for where would a Christian be
found who is not made blessed whenever and wherever
the longing for God is stirred, and in whatever way
this is effected ? But we must also maintain our
honesty, not allowing ourselves to be deceived as to
the confused nature of that longing in many cases.
This judgment cannot be withheld, if we bear in mind
the latest widespread trend exhibited by many of our
contemporaries towards mysticism. Mysticism and the
modern consciousness, which were irreconcilable oppo-
sites down to the eighties of last century, are now pro-
ceeding to wed ; and from the blessing attending that
union, those who are by no means the most uninfluential
at present are looking for the Golden Age. Longing
for a full life in a world which has come to be a dead
mechanism, and the need for repose in the painful haste
of the present day, are the causes which originate the
compact. That self-consciousness which has become
infinite through the consciousness of an infinite world
finds in the deepest ground of the personal self the
deepest deep of the universe. " A Something is close
to my inward being ; a good unfathomed manifests itself
there, and with this my spirit is filled." Some conceive
this in quietist fashion ; those of more active habit de-
clare that religion signifies harmony with the Infinite
in that one great process of development which is always
straining in the upward direction ; or it is the inner
self-consciousness of Creation as progressive action
(Bonus). Is it only "bad form in theology," if it is
asked whether all that is chiefly a matter of esthetics or
of religion ?

14

Faith and Modern Consciousness

At all events such facts, and others important as
they are in their way, do not neutralize what we have
just said about the fundamental note of the Modern
Consciousness in its relation to Christianity. A pro-
posal was recently made by men who were earnest in
the matter, that leaders of culture should be requested
to state their attitude towards religion and Christianity,
but there was no adequate result. However, it is ap-
parent, from the few isolated replies that did come to
hand, what the nature of the reply would have been in
the main. That existence as sense-perception can pre-
sent it is not the true reality, that the estimates impressed
upon us by our senses are not the true values, that the
deepest needs of man are not satisfied in this state of
existence, that for us a life of absolute worth, provided
there is such a life, is to be expected only from another
condition than the present, — this seems to be what is
essential in the theory of the universe held by outstand-
ing religious personalities. " This is my religion, if I
have any " (Chr. Schrempf). And again, — I do not
know whether I am now a Christian ; " there is once
more no agreement as to what Christianity is, etc." In
short, God, and above all Christ, is for many people
shrouded in vagueness and uncertainty. Once and for
a long time there was so much definiteness and freedom
from dubiety, that the commandment forbidding the
taking of God's name in vain was often recalled ; but at
present we have again an unknown God, one as to whom
there is no certainty.

In circles where the utmost diversity of opinion pre-
vails there is agreement upon one point at least, namely
that definite Christian Faith is beset by the greatest
difficulties. This idea is becoming increasingly common,
partly owing to the circulation of writings on right and
left, the promoters of which have in view the contrary

15

Introduction

purpose, namely the supplying of aids to Faith. As
a matter of fact the word "difficulties" is much in
vos^ue for the moment. It dominates both chance con-
versation and confidential talk ; it comes freely to the
lips of the most superficial as well as of the most earnest.
This favourite word is perhaps specially characteristic of
our time ; it is indefinite, modest and at the same time
decided as regards the decisive point. The modern man
is learning to know everything that can be known in
nature and history ; to understand and allow for every-
thing that can be understood and allowed for according
to its own particular standard ; but just for that reason
fixed standards have lost their hold upon him ; what is
more, he has become inwardly suspicious of them. This
is true especially of the moral standards, submission to
an unconditioned imperative, the feeling of personal
responsibility in the strictest sense of the term, in parti-
cular with reference to the province of morals in the
narrower sense. All this means that the disposition to
the secular frame of mind of which we spoke, the limi-
tation of self to our unlimited world, is strong enough in
many quarters to lead to a general rejection of the
Christian Faith, however hesitating, contradictory and
unsatisfying the attitude of the individual may be.
Hesitating and undecided about many things, our age
knows its mind upon that point, though the form of its
rejection is often discreetly cautious. Not seldom it
asserts itself in questions such as these ; What then has
Christianity achieved in the long centuries of its exist-
ence ? Is it really for all men, and not merely for those
with a special aptitude for religion ? Is not the pro-
fession of it then, especially in the clerical calling, a
senseless ''sacrifice," which no one could expect in a
matter attended with so much doubt ? Quite obvious
answers, as that the Gospel itself counted upon an un-

16

Faith and Modern Consciousness

paralleled conflict, and yet claims the whole world as its
own, and that it professes to be the pearl of great price
for which everything else should be sacrificed, make
little impression. A thing of that kind looks altogether
too strange in the light of relativity.

Weighing this whole attitude in its bearings upon
our special task, we return to the point from which we
started — " A science of the Christian Faith is a contra-
diction in terms ". Even if the modern Consciousness,
not yet forgetting its limits in the deification of itself,
lets the thought of God stand as a profound mystery,
and indeed magnifies it in high-flown terms, still a know-
ledge of God which is precise and certain, above all if it
admits of no further advance, strikes it as the acme of
the irrational. Thus it is a mistake, nay a crime, if the
Champion of the Faith, the Christian Church, is not fully
and completely alive to the universality and extent of
this opposition. In her own midst she has a proof of the
strength of the enemy, in the esteem accorded Historical
Theology by comparison with Systematic.

It will conduce to a clearer understanding of the
whole subject under consideration, if we note explicitly
that what we are saying refers entirely to the modern
attitude towards conscious profession of the full Chris-
tian Faith, and not at all to the question whether in the
world of to-day there are fewer convinced adherents of
the Christian Faith than formerly. This question needs
no answer for the Christian Church at any rate. For
she believes that the Gospel is never left without faith,
and is often amazed to see how it works faith just where
there seemed to be least hope, even in those most
influenced by the modern spirit ; while on the other
hand she is convinced that in the ages when the
authority of the Christian Faith was in the main unas-
sailed, personal faith was by no means universaL

VOL. I. 17 2

Introduction

Happily personal faith cannot be statistically computed
either for the past or for the present. Indeed the
Church, in the exercise of her faith, must pronounce
the judgment that the wide diffusion of Unchristian and
Antichristian feeling is likely to become a means of
rich blessing, by making as many as possible realize the
personal character of faith, and inducing them to be in
earnest with God, so that He may cease to be for them
a mere word, and become the Reality of all realities.
As a matter of fact there is a " faith," at the disappearance
of which faith must rejoice, even while realizing with
profound sorrow that its disappearance entails the loss
of many serviceable by-products, especially in the sphere
of morals and public order, and the tearing from their
moorings of large numbers who are without firm founda-
tion, so that at first it seems as if there could be no
hope for them. Faith only in the mass, merely imita-
tive (" fides implicita " as it exists even in Protestant
Churches), is dying ; it is more and more coming to be
the case that only personal faith can hold its own ; but
was there ever any other that deserved the name ?
Hence also, much which many look upon as unbelief is
not really such ; perhaps in the decisive judgment of
God it is of more value than much that passes for faith.
Still this is not what we are speaking of, but the actual
attitude of the prevailing frame of mind to the Chris-
tian Faith ; and the Christian Church and her theology
must have as clear an appreciation of this as possible,
because she cannot influence an age which she does not
understand. She fails to understand the present age if
she flatters herself that in the main the generality of
people still take the Christian Faith in God for granted
as was the case in bygone centuries. It is remarkable
how often this illusion is cherished by the very same
people who cannot paint the present unbelief in colours

18

Gospel Eternal; Dogmatics Variable

black enough. These same people often console them-
selves with the thought that the attitude of " the World "
to the Christian faith has always been essentially the
same. But this is simply a further evidence of how
dull and stupid the outlook of such observers is Cer-
tainly individual opponents may have been even more
deliberate and convinced, but the general feeling was
not what we have indicated above, either in depth or in
compass. Hence there are students of history possessed
of unusual courage who are already considering, not
without anxiety, how the next generation may endure
the battle of life, seeing that it does not, like those who
have gone before, inherit the capital of a religious and
moral training which is founded on settled practice.
Certainly it is strange that often it is just those students
who do all they can to lessen and to oppose the influence
of the Church. And yet this too is intelligible from the
nature of the modern consciousness which we have
looked at. Its trend towards what is individual and
personal is doubly strong in the religious sphere ; its
aversion to the use of leading-strings is doubly keen.
And on her part, the Church to a large extent unnecess-
arily exaggerates the emphasis which she lays on ob-
jective teaching, without which of course she cannot
continue ; partly because she is encouraged to do so by
her more active members, who were not gained over in
time to appreciate what is justifiable in the tendency of
the age now referred to.

Should the question arise at this point, whether and
how far Dogmatics is at liberty to make concessions
TO THIS FEELING, the Christian Church knows before-
hand, quite independently of any proof, that she dare
not in principle surrender the claim which causes so much
offence, without surrendering her own raison detre, be-

19

Introduction

cause what is here at stake is not the existence of
Systematic Theology as a science, but of the Christian
Faith. Christianity believes itself in possession of the
saving truth of God upon the basis of God's self-mani-
festation. If it were to exchange this assurance of the
truth of its content for an opinion about God which may
possibly be true, in order to avoid offending the Modern
Consciousness any longer, it would be acting like a
diamond polisher who worked at the precious stone till
he had ground it all away. On the contrary, from the
inconstancy of her opponents and their lack of back-
bone in the matter of personal conviction, the Christian
Church will gain new inspiration to hold fast the
treasure of assured truth, and to give forth her light
with all the more confidence, since she can encourage
herself with the thought that the irreconcilable opposi-
tions and contradictory claims of the Modern Conscious-
ness as we have described them, have only brought into
clearer relief the value of the Gospel in its fullness : now
that the immensity of the world has so grown upon us,
we realize ever so much more clearly the immensity of
our poverty apart from the living God. There can be
no question, therefore, of surrendering the claim which
causes offence that Christianity possesses the truth of
God. It is more intelligible that within the Church the
proposal should be mooted from time to time to give up
all claim to knowledge of the faith (p. 6). Neverthe-
less, with whatever depth of meaning believers may
sound the praises of the distinctive character of faith as
far transcending all knowledge, they cannot in the long
run dispense with knowledge if only for the purpose of
establishing their right to be indifferent to knowledge.
Should they fail in this, their confidence must give way,
though slowly, yet surely.

But if we cannot surrender our claim to a science-

20

Gospel Eternal; Dogmatics Variable

of the faith out of deference either to the unbeliever
or to unintelligent faith, even at this early stage, the
true nature of such a science emerges in principle.
That is to say, it becomes evident that no Dogmatic
of any age is identical with the saving truth of the
Christian Faith. Its office is to set forth this truth for
its own age, and thus it passes away along with the
age to which it belongs. Dogmatics must remember
that in the next generation it belongs to the History of
Dogma. This does not mean a history that contains
nothing but what is temporary and has no influence on
the future ; that would not be a history of Dogma, a
historical appreciation of the ever- valid truth of salvation
based upon the revelation of God. It does mean a
history that really contains temporary elements, other-
wise it would be no history of Dogma. A system of
Dogmatics fulfils its purpose if it helps its own age to
appreciate the eternal Gospel. This must show itself
in its content and form. Its office is to set forth what
we of to-day can and should believe, and how we can
and should believe it, not what we must constrain our-
selves to believe of the faith of our fathers. Only this
view of Dogmatics is not forced upon us by the exigencies
of the age. It is a manifest consequence oj the faith that
the saving truth of Christianity is for all ages. A system
of Dogmatics fully worked out cannot be for all ages,
while on the other hand a system of Dogmatics which
surrenders the Gospel is no exposition of the Christian
Faith. It is, as we shall see, a direct consequence of
the nature of faith that there is no contradiction in what
we are saying ; this could not be the case if faith were
a matter of knowledge, like mathematics for example.
The religious relation is founded on truth ; but the con-
ceptions formed with regard to this experience which is
in itself so certain, are varying. This would be a con-

21

Introduction

tradiction, only if there were no other species of cer-
tainty than that furnished by science. Of course all
this must be proved from the nature of religion and
knowledge. But with this proviso, we must insist at
this early stage that it is a duty imposed by faith itself
fully and freely to recognize the truth of which we speak
that there is no definitive Dogmatics. Here where we are
dealing with the most sacred convictions, a false conser-
vativism without any real foundation has an even more
pernicious effect than in any other sphere, when the one
generation fails to understand and refuses to consider
the new problems of the next. It is intelligible, but
deplorable, when it happens, as it not infrequently does
even yet, that a profound personal experience leads at
once to an untested assumption of an antiquated the-
ology. Real faith in the eternal Gospel is capable of
educating us to do without an infallible system of Dog-
matics, and it is its duty to do so. This conviction is
gaining ground in principle among all parties. "We
cannot take over any form of Christian theory from
previous periods without strict examination " (Hun-
zinger). The reasons for this decisive conviction will
often engage our attention. The course of history brings
into prominence now this and now that aspect of human
nature ; i.e., in the present connection, the sensuous,
the intellectual, the esthetic, the legal and ethical, and
the mystical elements in the nature of religion. This
happens too in combinations which are always new and
peculiar, just as may be expected in history. Great
thinkers have attempted to recognize all the elements
in their own dogmatic system, and to connect them in
one whole, Origen being perhaps the most conspicuous
in this regard. But even he could do so only for his
own age, and in his own distinctive manner. The
Gospel, interacting with the general mental attainments

22

Gospel Eternal; Dogmatics Variable

of any period, shapes a form of Dogmatics which is
suited for that period ; and for each new period it shapes
a new form. In past history, the Dogmatic system,
itself variable while founded on the permanent Gospel,
has always been effective in proportion to the vigour
with which it has been able to set forth the work of
Jesus. Even in the disputes of the present, which are
so exceptionally confused, the disputants of most diverse
type, who appear to have nothing else in common, stand
still in His presence ; and even the discussion of the
hour, whether this Jesus ever lived, hardly touches the
deepest roots of immediate feeling.

Why should not this recognition of the mutability of
Dogmatics and of the permanence of the Gospel be ac-
cepted as a basis by the party, — or rather, why should
not the latter thus become more consciously active, for
it never dies out completely — the party which is almost
more indispensable in religion than it is in politics, the
party which is no distinct party and for that reason
allows all parties to hold fast their truth — nay, first
makes them fruitful — "The Party of Honest People"
(Moltke) ? The conditions, it might be thought, are to
hand in our day in rich measure. We opposed with the
utmost candour a dangerous optimism which overvalues
the religiosity or even the Christianity of present-day life.
We may now point out how this modern world is steeped
in religious aspirations and yearnings, but how ineffective
are its attempts at actual reconstruction. On the other
hand, wherever there is power and truth, it is Christian-
ity which shows them, with the extraordinary adapt-
ability which it has already proved in history at more
than one crisis that threatened to be its end. Once
more the protecting walls on which the vine reared
itself are falling, and " noble tendrils stray unsupported
upon the ground " (Naumann). What are the ideas of a

23

Introduction

new age with which the eternal Gospel will ally itself ?
What belongs to this Gospel itself, and what is perhaps
only a temporary garment for it ? Wherefore and how
far is Jesus its centre, and again coming to be acknow-
ledged as such ? To explain all this is itself the most
important task of any system of Dogmatics, that aims at
serving its generation. We say absolutely nothing of
how all the separate questions may be answered later
on. But a theology, and especially a system of Dog-
matics, which does not, as a matter of principle, raise
these questions is worthless for our day. Or to give
the matter a personal turn, the present day can be in-
fluenced only by a theologian who in his own religious
life has felt as a temptation, and has overcome, the
power of the Modern Consciousness. This means,
however, that so far as it contains truth, he must have
experienced it as a confirming, deepening and enriching
influence. To be sure, we cannot forget here the saying
of Schleiermacher that "one age bears the guilt of
another, but can seldom expiate it except by incurring
fresh guilt ". However, we shall impose a smaller
amount of fresh guilt on our successors, the more truly
we realize the danger in question.

From the nature of the case it is impossible to de-
scribe in advance, even to give in outline, the/orm which
that system of doctrine ivill take, which is to correspond
as closely as possible to the needs of our age, not by
giving up some portion of the Gospel, but by expressing
and establishing for us of to-day that Gospel, which is
really eternal and in itself well defined. However, in
one respect at least, the main tendency of the following
exposition as a whole can be indicated somewhat more
definitely ; viz. in relation to those who are vividly im-
pressed by the crying needs of the Evangelical Churches
at present, and go farther to meet the claims of the

24

Gospel Eternal; Dogmatics Variable

modern consciousness than they are permitted to do by
their own intention to present the old Gospel afresh, as
one which is eternal — an intention which is without
doubt a praiseworthy one. Absorbed by the recent
advances in the knowledge of nature, of history, and of
our own being, they would speak of a "new theology,"
which they contrast as the " theology of consciousness "
with the " old," which is the " theology of facts ". They
say that in strictness we must not speak of a commonly
accepted theory of the universe, or endeavour to attain
a theory of the kind ; that we must and can be satisfied
with " the historical evidences in favour of the ideality
of the human spirit," with ''pulsations of the soul,"
which we " can conceive, if we first look to ourselves,
as they appear in the vibration and music found in the
heart of God Himself", ''God-consciousness is the
form in which we possess God," the "highest natural
idea of reason," which emerges in history, is developed,
and has reached " its climax in Jesus, so far as history
has yet gone " (K. Sell). It is just from a full appre-
ciation of the motives that give rise to such statements,
that we discover the reason for rejecting them. Such
persons desire to secure for the Gospel citizenship in
our modern consciousness ; faith in it is not intended to
be in any way a burden, a compulsory belief, but a free
venture prompted by the deepest necessities of our
spirit. Certainly this is a bold and a noble undertaking,
and to a great extent it is just what was described above
as the ideal. Yet in the precise form described it is
really unattainable ; and if it were attainable, it is not
the highest ideal, because it does not correspond exactly
to the facts. For if one enters fully into the nature of
faith, there can be no doubt that " the possession of God
in the form of God-consciousness," as they put it, is
much too vague a phrase, one which does not thoroughly

25

Introduction

represent the matter of experience. Of course in the
traditional conception, the rights of subjective experi-
ence have been prejudiced, and objective teaching has
been overrated and clothed with external authority ; or
at least the subjective element vras not carefully enough
investigated, and recognized in its real importance.
Yet an analysis of the religious process will teach us
this : however indubitable it is that the process in
question can be real for us only in our consciousness,
it is certain that it is not merely a process in our con-
sciousness ; or, if one were to reply that this is not
denied by any person, the decisive question is this —
By ivhat reasons can we be convinced that it is not merely
such a process, but that the Power which we mean
when we speak of God, the Power which transcends our
consciousness and is independent of it, really manifests
itself in it f And for this purpose, the pious person wha
tries to obtain a full conception of his experience, finds,
as we shall be able to convince ourselves, that it is not
enough to bring forward the idea of God as the " highest
natural idea of reason " ; for this purpose there is re-
quisite, as all religions assert, an actual self-manifesta-
tion of the Deity, a Revelation of God not in our
consciousness merely. But if it should be objected to
this that, with the assertion now made, we are really
setting up an authority which is alien to our spirit, one
would be forgetting that in the process itself, exactly
conceived, there are effective counteracting elements
plainly to be discovered which obviate any such danger.
All external constraint is excluded, if the inmost nature
of piety is recognized, viz., actual personal devotion to
the actual personal God, man's "I will " as the answer
to the Divine appeal, " Wilt thou ? " Then, too, in the
exposition which follows, we discover something else
which is of importance. Faith in this well-defined and

26

Gospel Eternal; Dogmatics Variable

special Kevelation of what is independent of our con-
sciousness, but can with equal certainty be experienced
by our consciousness, and only in it, — that faith, given
as it is in the nature of religion, we shall at the same
time get to understand as by no means an arbitrary
limitation of our knowledge, but as the correlative which
answers to the real nature of it, as the completion of
our human nature as a whole, and not as it is contracted
in deference to some theory. This whole presentation
of the matter will be more convincing when, in the
course of our exposition, the definite content of the
Christian faith can be put in place of those general
terms which were provisionally necessary, — the terms
religion or piety, and actual self-manifestation of God,
or revelation. God as holy, redeeming love is not clear
to us, and still less certain, solely because of the ex-
periential value of this conception, and because it is
anchored in the depths of our consciousness as the chief
idea of reason ; but rather through the actual approach
of God in the same real world which is also full of re-
alities that occasion doubt, an approach which we would
certainly never be able to recognize as real, unless it
approved itself as the fulfilment of our highest destiny ;
while our destiny again would never be either perfectly
conceived or effectively fulfilled, except through the real
approach of God now alluded to.

It is only another expression for the same thing,
contemplating a special aspect of the matter, when our
essay in the field of Dogmatics, as prosecuted in the
following pages, is described as a System of Doctrine
setting forth the Remaled Mystery ; or as the Preface
itself put it, the one Revealed Mystery regarded as a
unity. The Dogmatics of the Roman Church, even
where it attempts in a logical construction to reach a
harmony of results so sublime in its kind as that which

27

Introduction

we have in the Summa of Aquinas, knows of an abund-
ance of mysteries, and authoritatively demands submis-
sive recognition of them. In contra-distinction to this,
the endeavours or promises of a theology of pure con-
sciousness are not only intelligible, but in a large
measure justified, — as we have seen and will yet see.
But however much is said in the latter about the
mystery of religion, often in impressive terms, they fail
to acknowledge the whole depth of that mystery. On
account of this depth by which it is characterized, it is
for us in the last resort impenetrable and therefore
valueless mystery ; or else it is by God's grace mystery
which has been revealed, but revealed in such a manner
that, in virtue of its own nature, it always continues to
be mystery still. On this view, we do not come back
in any way to the numerous mysteries which it was held
that we ought to believe. E-ather with thankful faith
we lay hold of the one mystery which appears as a unity,
viz. God, and this we do through the Revelation which
He has given ; and from this faith there springs the
perception which is always gained afresh of His inex-
haustible perfection. This matter we shall have to re-
call and to explain in all the particular articles of
doctrine. Every age will do so in a new fashion ; both
by entering more deeply into the substance of the
mystery, and by searching out the relation between faith
and knowledge in ways which are always new, and which
also correspond to the varying needs of each period.
But the history of the Gospel, as God has guided it, ought
to have led us to this conclusion, that the conception of
a, system of doctrine as a progressive apprehension of
the Gospel of God's revealed mystery, should no longer
be lost to us. Such an apprehension was plainly asserted
even in the earliest formative period of our religion, and
was what the circumstances of the time required, as

28

Division of Dogmatics

we see from a merely cursory glance at the words
mystery and revelation in the New Testament.

This brief statement which we were able to make in
advance with reference to the nature of the exposition
which follows, was ultimately due to a decisive impres-
sion which has tacitly guided us in this Introduction as
a whole. This is the conviction that in a work on Dog-
matics, we have to make it our aim, from the first page
to the last, clearly and with all seriousness to exhibit
faith in God, as Christianity regards it, in its character
as real faith, as real trust in a real, living God. One
may say this requirement is self-evident ; and it was
expressly pointed out above that any hastily formed
estimate of the amount of faith or of unbelief in any
period is absurd. But in all cases, what has been of
value for the real furtherance of faith in a period was
only those expositions which represented it as requir-
ing invariably from its own nature, to be appropriated
in a personal manner, and to be gained by fresh con-
flicts. Every statement is worthless which does not in
some way testify to this.

The principle according to which we divide what
follows, is the direct outcome of the foregoing discus-
sion. If the science of the Christian Faith at its very
start labours under the reproach mentioned above, that
the idea of it involves a hopeless contradiction, we must
meet this objection by a discussion of fundamental
principles. In other words. Apologetics is necessary.
No exposition of our faith, however admirable, can take
the place of the establishment of its truth, and just as
little can the exposition of the Christian life dispense
with such. Neither Dogmatics nor Ethics can do with-
out Apologetics. Obviously there exists the closest
connexion, reciprocal action indeed, between the ex-
position and the proof ; for we cannot have a relevant

29

Introduction

demonstration of the truth, without accurate knowledge
of the nature, and the latter again cannot be fully
understood without the former. But this does not affect
our claim ; it merely points to a formal difficulty en-
countered and overcome in other sciences as well.
There is no circle in the proof ; we only have it in the
exposition. But there does certainly come to be self-
deception in every instance, if it is supposed that we
can dispense with Apologetics. We are acting in that
case as if we had to do with believers merely, or with
such as are prepared to believe ; whereas every thought
directed to real life convinces us of the opposite. Un-
doubtedly there is no greater task for systematic theology
than that of showing "in what way God makes Himself
knowable through His work as it affects us " (Schlatter).
It is precisely this and nothing else that is the aim of
our Apologetics. But Apologetics there must be, be-
cause we cannot make this work of God clear without
dealing with the peculiarity of religious knowledge : as
a matter of fact that work is by no means acknowledged
by all and sundry.

A subordinate question is — What form should the
necessary Apologetics take ? Manifestly it is most desir-
able to work it out for oneself, and to appeal to it in
Dogmatics and Ethics. This may be done from very
different points of view ; e.g. Frank appeals to his
System of Christian Certainty, J. Kaftan to his works
on the Nature and Truth of Religion, Kahler to the
first part of his Christian Doctrine, Pfleiderer to his
Philosophy of Religion. Those who are not in a position
to refer to such a special Apologetics, preliminary to
Dogmatics and Ethics, will prefer to divide their apolo-
getic material between them, discussing in each the
apologetic problems which are most germane to the
matter in hand. This discussion must not be too brief,

30

Apologetics and Dogmatics

and so it should take the form not merely of an Intro-
duction, as e.g. with Wendt, but of an Exposition with
a. place to itself. So Biedermann in the statement of
Principles in his Dogmatics, and Dorner in his Pis-
teology. Thus we get two main divisions, the proof Sind the
detailed statement of the Christian Faith. The content
of our Ji7'st division is determined by what we have
already seen of its purpose. It deals with the nature
and then with the truth of the Christian religion. As
the outcome of our discussion of these two subjects we
arrive at a clearer understanding of the nature of religious
knowledge, and of the science of the Christian Faith, which
forms the point of transition to our second main
division, Dogmatics proper. But inasmuch as the
Christian Faith claims to rest upon the revelation of
Ood in Christ, to be based upon it and determined by
it, and the proof of its truth is therefore the proof of
this revelation, in order to bring out more clearly the
point of view which is fundamental to the whole of the
first main division, we give it the sub-title of The Revela-
tion of God in Christ as norm {standard) and ground of
the truth of Christian faith. What further is needed for
the elucidation of these conceptions, may be said later
on, more briefly and more convincingly than in this place.

81

THE CHRISTIAN FAITH AND ITS
ANTAGONISTS

The Revelation of God in Christ as the Standard
AND Basis of Christian Religious Truth

VOL. I. 33

THE NATUEE OF THE CHRISTIAN EELIGION

In order to determine the truth of the Christian religion,
we must understand its nature (p. 28 ff.). Only thus are
we guarded against a danger from which the most
recent Philosophy of Religion often suffers : as we are
thinking of the possibility of a proof, we might give out
something as religion, which cannot strictly speaking
be so regarded, but is only a shadow of real religion,
e.g. esthetic and mystical feeling. But if we have
strictly understood the nature of the Christian religion,
then either an adequate proof for it will have to be
found, or else we must give up that religion. Only we
will not imagine that we have established its truth, if
we have, or think we have, established something which
is not that religion at all. The statementwe now make
holds good, moreover, as against many desires which
are expressed in the name of a faith which is of peculiar
vitality. How often have people troubled themselves
in vain about a proof of the legitimacy of Christian
petitionary prayer, because of the failure to distinguish it
both from the impious desire to constrain God, and from
mere resignation ! Then lastly, by setting its nature in
the foreground, the objection is met that a proof of its
truth, preceding Dogmatics, especially as regards Revel-
ation, turns Christianity into a religion of reason, aims
necessarily at a proof contrary to its nature. For it is
just the apprehension of its nature which will show
whether a proof, or what kind of proof, is requisite. We

35

The Nature of the Christian Religion

have already directed the reader's attention to the
interaction which is necessarily implied in these circum-
stances between Apologetics and Dogmatics. But the
nature of the Christian religion cannot be accurately
known, unless we understand the nature of religion in
general. Our first topic therefore is

THE NATURE OF RELIGION

As a guiding principle, we may take the word of
warning, " There is perhaps more artificiality about
religion when it is made the object of thought, than
there is about it as exj^erienced ". In fact, the danger
of scholasticism — elaboration of ideas which are not
always checked afresh by reference to experience — is
specially great in our province. Now we have a first
attempt of an imposing description in Calvin's InstitutiOy
in what he sets forth regarding man's knowledge of God
and his knowledge of himself, and the way in which
both are one at the root . a glance into our hearts to see
what we have and what is wanting in us, ends in an up-
ward glance to God, the source of all good ; and con-
versely it is only a knowledge of God that makes one's
knowledge of self true, and puts an end to one's self-
conceit. So with Zwingli, and with Luther too in his
way ; all of them being stimulated by Augustine's ideas,
while infusing into them the new spirit of the Reforma-
tion. But the reader who honestly grapples with the
subject has the conviction forced upon him that we of
to-day cannot proceed exactly in that fashion. The
inner construction, so to say, of our thought about these
things has become difi'erent. Not as if we desired to
divert our minds, or could divert them, from the impres-
sive seriousness of the presentation of the matter which
has been referred to ; but for us it is no longer possible
to regard such a personal apprehension and an objective

36

Nature of Religion

inquiry as forming a direct unity : that would awaken
the feeling that we were doing violence to the facts.
The same thing which, when stated in proper circum-
stances, cannot fail to produce an impression on us as
on others, except when we would have to admit that
our wish is to evade its influence, readily appears to us,
when pressed on our notice without explanation in a
scientific inquiry, as only an attempt to escape from a
difficulty. The principal reason for this is the circum-
stance that the exact distinction between our mental
faculties, the intellectual and the practical, was not well
known in that former age ; and then we have the preval-
ent conviction that truth, even of the most objective kind,
must be set forth in its subjective reality. It is involved
in each of these considerations that we have to distin-
guish exposition and proof with clearer consciousness ;
and in our case this means the Nature and the Truth of
religion. Certainly we are now in danger of losing an
advantage which those of old possessed, that concen-
trated power which signalizes, e.g. the Introitus of
Calvin. Yet though aware of this danger, we are no
longer able to follow the path adopted by those of old,
but must choose one for ourselves. And at the end of
this path, it will become obvious that the spirit which
once prompted Calvin to write as he did on the Nature
of Religion, may and ought to be still our own.

It is not the case, though it is often asserted, that
the reality of God, and our obligation as towards God,
are for us matters of less serious consequence, when we
seek to penetrate deeply into the nature of religion, in
the way which our faculty of knowledge marks out for
us. Hence we cannot accept the watchword lately given
forth with much emphasis, that the whole of our theology,
not merely the liberal type but indeed the whole that
has succeeded Schleiermacher, down to the ranks of the

37

The Nature of the Christian ReHgion

" most Positive " school, requires to turn away from the
anthropocentric to the theocentric standpoint (Schaeder).
For such a theology itself cannot set aside the confirma-
tion which we have in the form of our own experience.
That we are not concerned in such case with our subjec-
tive experience as an isolated fact, but rather with a real
experience of the reality of God, — this is quite under-
stood as a matter of course. But this truth, which is
indeed inalienable, is not guaranteed by the fact that one
gives the assurance that faith is a " notorious experience
of the self -manifestation of God," unless it is shown in
what way we can conceive and understand that self-
manifestation of God as such. Now for this purpose
an investigation of the nature of religion, one which is
as simple as possible, is an indispensable presupposition.
Why the objectivity of religion, and in particular the
Majesty of God, should be prejudiced in that case in de-
ference to our wishes, we fail to see. Our exposition
itself may, we think, allay this two-fold apprehension,
the root of which in the substance of religion we quite
understand, and the expression of which we welcome
with gratitude, as an utterance which requires to be
borne in mind.

Here then immediately at the outset we give efifect
to the principle which has just been set forth. The
Psychology of Religion and the History of Religion, as
nowadays developed, make the idea of the furtherance
of life the central one by preference, when they expound
the nature of religion. As may easily be conceived, the
objection we spoke of is raised to this procedure, viz.
that religion is viewed in a one-sided fashion as an affair
of man ; that its incomparable seriousness, that reverence
before God, or the sense of obligation as towards God,
is prejudiced. Certainly this is possible, but it is not
inevitable. And on the score of method, the starting-

38

Nature of Religion

point which is objected to seems to us the more correct
one. For we do not clearly include all that appears as
religion in the great world of life and of history, if we
begin with that sense of obligation alone, and lay hold
of it at once in that strength which it undoubtedly
possesses in our religion ; but on the other hand, in our
religion where we have reverential worship of God, this
is also true life for us. Hence we do not lose sight of
the seriousness of religion, when we start with the idea
of the furtherance of life. Rather in this case we can
emphasize the seriousness of our obligation all the more
naturally ; whereas if we give effect to it in the first
instance, there readily comes in the appearance of ex-
aggeration, and the undeniable truth of the idea is con-
cealed rather than recognized.

If we desire to understand the nature of religion,
presupposing what has been said, we need not trouble
ourselves with a consideration of the mere fancies of
self-satisfied dilettanti, who have for some time made
obtrusive pronouncements, asserting their views much
more loudly than there was any occasion for. Simply
as a specimen this dictum may be mentioned here —
" Let us call religion the totality of our higher interests,
the link that binds the soul to itself, to other souls and
to God, the manifestation of goodwill, love and know-
ledge, and the striving after perfection" (E. Reich).
Still more modestly a Willy Wels proclaimed as his
specialty a new system of religion, the nature of which
"is not the union of two entities for the purpose of
combating a third, but the union of two with a view to
their reconciliation with each other ". As we turn now
to the serious inquiry, we may at the outset recall the
fact that the nature of religion is not to be gathered
from investigations of the word religion. More value at-
taches to the obvious sense of the terms current in every-

39

The Nature of the Christian Rehgion

day speech, "Fellowship," "Intercourse," "Communion
with God"; "Life in God"; "Leaving one's self in
God's hands, and letting God live in one " ; or " Know-
ledge of God," " Fear of God," " Love of God," " Blessed-
ness " None of these is without value. The latter,
especially those which are the simplest, point to some
one important aspect of religion, but just on that account
furnish no complete general explanation. The former
are of importance as short comprehensive expressions, if
once they are supplemented by the rich content of
careful separate investigation: "Fellowship," "Inter-
course," " Communion," point indeed directly to the
great fundamental mystery of all religion, and esj^ecially
of Christianity — " God in us, we in God". Only they
are too general to furnish a definite starting-point for
investigation. But like these popular expressions,
many more scientific definitions of the concept of re-
ligion do not insure clearness : for example, " God's
being in us, and our being in God " ; " to know one's
self in God, and God in one's self " ; " feeling of abso-
lute dependence " (Schleiermacher) ; " freedom in God "
(Hegel) ; " assertion of the personal self in opposition to
nature " (Ritschl) ; "a practical living relation to God,
which depends on the involuntary feeling of vital obliga-
tion to God, and by voluntary surrender to Him, raises
the self to a living fellowship with God, and a god-like
position in the world " (O. Pfleiderer). However much
truth there may be in such definitions, they are yet at
times too indefinite, at times — and this is more fre-
quently the case — too definite to apply to all that actu-
ally presents itself as religion — think of the experi-
ences of the mission field. This defect is, at all events,
partly accounted for by the fact that they attend too
little to religion as an affair of the community (ob-
jective religion) and in too one-sided a fashion merely

40

Nature of Religion

to the religious experience of the individual (subjective
religion, religiousness). The latter is certainly the crucial
matter to which we must attend ; but we are not by its
means securely guarded against merely casual observa-
tion without the former. Nor is our own religion alone a
sufficiently broad basis of investigation. We can, it is
true, come to understand other religions only by taking
our own as a starting-point, but it becomes clear to us
only by a comparison as comprehensive and detailed as
possible with all the religions to which we have access.
It has been as a direct result of the progress of the
comparative history of religion that the questions arising
out of Schleiermacher's investigation, which laid the
foundation for subsequent study, have always been
growing more and more definite, as indeed it was he
who first paved the way for a historical treatment of
religion by doing away with the phantasm of " Natural
Religion ". These questions are — What is the nature of
the religious process according to its content ? What
according to its form, its place in the human soul ?
What in relation to the other processes in man's
spiritual life ? Finally — What is the origin of religion ?
This last question has often been discussed, as if it came
first, and is even yet confused with that of the nature.
In any case the question of the nature comes before us
more directly than that of the origin ; in any case the
latter can be answered only on the basis of the former.
This holds good equally of the origin in each individual
possessed of religion, and of the first beginnings in history
— a two-fold sense of the word " origin " which is respon-
sible for much of the ambiguity. First then we discuss

The Nature of Religion According to its Content

In the religious process when investigated after the
method above specified, four fundamental character-

41

The Nature of the Christian Rehgion

istics show themselves. They appear both at the lowest
stage of development, and at the highest, and in every
sort of religion. Luther's conflict in his monk's cell
exhibits them, and so does the piety of a negro tribe.
First, the thought of a supernatural Power, of God (or
powers, gods, as the case may be), who lays claim to
the man that feels himself dependent on Him, and takes
an interest in him. Secondly, a sense of a vital need,
which seeks to be satisfied by means of this Power.
In the third place, the feeling that it is somehow in-
cumbent to do homage thereto by worship and trust,
and a readiness of the will to fulfil this obligation.
Lastly the assurance of some sort of manifestation, or
revelation of the Godhead. Clearly the first three
characteristics go together. They constitute in the strict
sense the content of the religious process, while the
fourth gives expression to the fact that for the religious
consciousness, it is an actuality, distinguished from mere
imagination by being a revelation of God. Whether
this conviction is well grounded or not, does not at all
come into consideration here. It is the centre from
which the circle of the religious life is described round
those three points. The three first-named character-
istics have reference to the interchange of relations
between God and man ; in the fourth, Revelation, lies
the specially express recognition that man is indebted
therefor to God.

By distinguishing and combining these fundamental
characteristics, here at the very outset we get a clear
idea of the essential fact that religion really is nothing
less than fellowship, intercourse, communion between
God and man ; a drawing near on the part of God to
man, and on the part of man to God ; God's being in
man, and man's being in God ; but of such a nature
that this fellowship depends upon God for its basis,

42

Nature of Religion — Its Content

progress and completion, that God has the first and last
word, however important man's response may also be.
The idea which has been last expressed we specially
emphasize at this point, in order that the objection dis-
cussed at the commencement, the demand for a truly
"theocentric theology," may not prevent a careful
estimate of such considerations as are set forth in what
follows, and are indispensable. We shall often have to
revert to this matter, and shall do so definitively when
dealing with the Origin of Religion.

This would of course be all wrong, if certain philo-
sophers were right, who quite recently, like Natorp and
Hoff'ding, have constructed a religion without God ;
having as its special source the feeling behind knowledge,
will and imagination and purely subjective. In so doing
they have received in some measure the approval of
many historians of religion. The "infinity of feeling,"
it is held, must not be confused with the " feeling for
the Infinite " : the former must stand, the latter must
cease. Only this theory applies not to what mankind
have hitherto called religion, but to what in the opinion
of such philosophers must take its place, seeing that at
the stage of civilization reached by almost all people, it
has reached its end. In reality, however, religion is
not a discussion which man holds with himself, but with
God ; it is the " longing for a reality on which we can
know that we are entirely dependent, as soon as we
become aware of it " (W. Herrmann). Wundt also has
expressly stated this in his own way, though he sub-
stantially shares the belief that religion has been trans-
formed into morality.

Now is the time to emphasize some specially im-
portant aspects of the above-named characteristics,
which while we are considering religion in general help
us to a better understanding of our own. In this con-

43

The Nature of the Christian Rehgion

nexion we must always emphasize the immense dififer-
ence between these characteristics in the different
religions, as also the sameness in spite of the difference,
which it is that justifies our speaking of them as funda-
mental characteristics.

First The Idea of God. We merely observe in
passing, how honour is paid here to many gods, either
an unlimited number, or a limited circle ; there to one
God, at times to one only to the strict exclusion of all
others, at other times to one, whose relation to the
many is undefined. It is more necessary to emphasize
the infinite variety of senses given to the expression
'* Supernatural Power " in different instances. The word
" supernatural " is always differently understood accord-
ing as the natural world is thought of, whether as small,
or great, or infinite ; and also according as it is viewed
as a world which is determined only in the natural
relations or in the moral as well. But in every religion,
the god of the worshipper is distinguished from his
world and thought of as exalted above it, however little
exalted this exaltation may appear to another, and how-
ever indefinite the distinction. This holds good equally
of the fetish-worshipper, and the modern man : the one
would not yet have religion, the other would have it no
longer, were his god not exalted above his world. The
most recent discussions especially show that there is
reason for insisting on the latter point. The dread lest
they should describe the delicate subject religion in too
precise terms, has induced many to use only the negative
expression "non- world," rather than the word God.
But then the way in which they speak of this testifies
plainly to the correctness of our statement : much
commotion of mind is often betrayed by their halting
speech.

Equally different are the conceptions entertained re-

44

Nature of Religion — Idea of God

garding the claim which God has upon the worshipper,
and God's interest in the worshipper. Between the
Heavenly Father who makes us His children in Christ,
and the demon whose evil eye it is well to avert, there
is a whole world containing all conceivable gradations,
and it need not be said that these two extreme ideas
appear to us as far apart as the poles ; but yet in both
cases it is presupposed that the god who is believed in,
at all events under certain circumstances, has an in-
terest in man. It is likewise difficult for us as Christians
to speak of our reverent awe and trust in the same
breath with the shivering terror of a Shaman ; still the
two have this in common that the Supernatural Power
lays claim to man, and expects of him a certain be-
haviour. This circumstance has an important conse-
quence for the form of the idea of God. Namely, God
is always regarded as personal — feeling, knowing, will-
ing ; otherwise surely it would be absurd for man to
make any appeal to Him (cf. 1 Kings xviii. 26 ff. ;
Psalm cxv. 1 flf.), " as if in Heaven there were an ear
to hear". A religion, in which God is thought of as
quite impersonal, is a self-contradiction, although under
a complicated civilization it may often be just upon
the personality of God that doubt is cast, and for
a time it may appear as if there might be a religious
relation to a god identical with the world. The question
whether in the plain sense of the term prayer can be
offered to such a god is the quickest way to destroy this
illusion. Such an idea of God has its home not in re-
ligion, but in philosophy. Properly, however, we should
speak not of God, but of the Infinite, the World-ground,
the World-unity and the like. It is an intellectually
based, often an esthetically embellished idea of God.
Only it conduces to perspicuity to recollect here how
little significance attaches to ambiguous names. Often,

45

The Nature of the Christian ReHgion

e.g. the word Pantheism is used, when one would
simply wish to maintain the living presence of God in the
world, His immanence ; or the word Theism is opposed,
when one wants to reject spiritless types of anthropo-
morphism. The Pantheism which we oppose here is
such an identification of God with the world as implies
that man is viewed as entirely passive, in presence of
the Divine nature which darkly strains forward in the
process of its evolution, so that nothing but submergence
in this Absolute is possible. And the Theism which we
assert is nothing else than the intellectual treatment of
religious experience, by which it is objectified in its full
significance as described above. " We cannot worship
what only attains to consciousness in us " (Otto). In
the Doctrine of God's Personality and Eternity, it will
have to be shown in how far this Theism cannot be
proved, but can be established, and why this " objecti-
fying " is not a mere subjective phantasmagoria of our
own, but is an interpretation of the fact of God's conde-
scending approach.

A self-evident but important inference from all this
is that every religious person has the greatest conceiv-
able interest in the truth of his idea of God. To be sure,
here again the greatest differences show themselves in
reference to the clearness, the consistency and indeed
also the measure of men's assurance. The clear con-
fidence of the Christian which fills and sustains the whole
life has little affinity with the confusion, haphazard and
uncertainty of the superstitious negro. But common to
both is the circumstance that if, and in so far as, they
have religion, they cannot forego the claim that the god
to whom they make appeal actually exists. Yes and No
is a poor theology, because religion lives by its assurance
of the existence of God, and endures no Yes and No :
this god is certainly no matter of indifference to us, but

d6

Nature of Religion — Idea of God

the supernatural Power that has an interest in us and
makes claims upon us. " Our weal and woe are at stake "
(J. Kaftan). This interest in the truth explains the holy
enthusiasm of all genuine believers — their glowing zeal to
win others for their own faith — as also the terrible fanati-
cism associated with religion, where this is not excluded
by the nature and content of the faith. This im-
portant truth, long misunderstood, has received more
general recognition through the modern Psychology of
Religion ; e.g. H. Maier expresses the matter which has
just been stated in the words of J. Kaftan, by saying
that our conceptions of value in Religion are shaped by
the "affective imagination," not by the "cognitive".
No doubt there is always the danger there, that this
modern Psychology should suppose that by its own re-
sources it can decide as to the truth of the conceptions
in which faith is embodied, and so, if we may use the
language just quoted, can put the " cognitive imagina-
tion " above the "affective". This matter must be
considered later, when we have to discuss the signi-
ficance of the Psychology of Religion as a whole ; and
the principle is examined when we are dealing with the
relation between faith and knowledge.

The allusion to the imagination leads us here to
specify another important peculiarity of the guiding
idea. This quite inalienable interest in the truth has
reference properly speaking only to the specific nature of
each religion, not to every possible expression which this
nature finds. The garb of religious truth is always
woven with the help of the imagination ; even what is
not of this world must be expressed in the language of
this world. This symbolical character of religious ideas,
in particular their anthropomorphic character, will often
occupy us again. Now it is quite a matter of indiffer-
ence if these expressions change and are being con-

47

The Nature of the Christian Rehgion

tinually recast, in harmony with the general spiritual
development ; so long always as the living roots of the
religion concerned are not injured. But when this
happens, its death-knell has rung. Many a lofty temple
has been closed, because the onward march of culture
destroyed not only the trappings, but the idol, and along
with the idol, the life of the god, no longer suffering
him to live as a reality in the faith of his worshippers.
Thus arises one of the most difficult problems in the
history of the race, as also in the life-history of each
individual human being, who has power to make himself
the object of his own thought. In this place we can
only raise the question, " Will the Christian Faith share
that same fate ? " It has survived the overthrow of the
Ptolemaic system of astronomy ; but will not its end be
brought about by the Copernican, when once it is uni-
versally understood in all its consequences, as is very
frequently maintained ? This Christian Faith has on
the whole shown enormous adaptability ; but will there
be no limit thereto ? " Father in Heaven " is certainly
a metaphorical expression like the others : will it prove
itself the reality which cannot be dissolved by any ad-
vance in the knowledge of the world, because in its true
and deepest sense it has its roots not in the knowledge
of the world, but in the self-revelation of the God in
question ? The Christian Faith is that every wound,
every shock in such a struggle for God, and every ap-
parent defeat only leads to new victories, new disclosures
of His unsearchable riches. Since we have had at last
to use the word " revelation," we are referred onwards
to this fundamental characteristic of all religion, the
significance of which was already mentioned at the out-
set, and has to be worked out in detail later on. Here
our purpose was simply to emphasize the importance
for the believer of the truth of his conception of God,

48

Nature of Religion — Vital Necessity

since he regards himself as possessing it through re-
velation.

Our next task, however, is to treat of the second
fundamental characteristic of the religious process, the
EXPERIENCING OF A VITAL NECESSITY. This is Variously
expressed, but the fact is always the same and unam-
biguous. There is a feeling of insufficiency, and a wish
to get quit of it, the feeling of a limitation and the desire
to overcome it ; the contradiction between the claim to
life present to self-consciousness and the life actually
present, and the longing to remove this contradiction ;
the want of what is good, and the longing for such good.
Here again, there is the gi'eatest diversity in the nature
of the good things missed and pursued. There may be
many such, material or ethical, both in the lowest and
in the highest degree ; there may be one only which
again may be either ethical or natural. With this there
is connected another distinction, without the two coin-
ciding : the supernatural power may be sought rather as
merely giver of the good pursued, or as good and giver
in one. This latter is by no means confined, as we are
apt to think, to the highest stages of religion. No even
Baal and Astarte grant participation in the life which,
in the opinion of their worshippers, they themselves
live. What a contrast to the Old Testament, " My joy
is to draw near to God " ; "If only I have Thee, I care
naught for heaven or earth " (Ps. lxxiii.) ! But a common
element is an impelling desire for joy, satisfaction, life,
and the appeasing of this hunger by, yea in, God.
Every religious act, be it ever so dark and confused,
has within itself something of this yearning to enter into
fellowship with the gods or God, and not to use them
simply as a means towards the acquisition of any sort of
good : we recall the first fundamental characteristic of
which we spoke, the groping after an exalted Power,

VOL. I. 49 4

The Nature of the Christian Religion

which interests itself in, and lays claim to, us ; and the
third which will be treated immediately. Note further
that there is a natural correspondence between this
variety in the good things pursued, and in the manner
of pursuit, and the various conceptions entertained
regarding God: as is the idea held of the good thing
or things, so is that of the God or gods. And here
again the most important distinction consists in the
more or less pronounced recognition of moral benefits
and of gods possessed of moral attributes. The further
characterization of the third fundamental characteristic
is also closely connected therewith. In passing to the
third, we want to make it specially plain that these
fundamental characteristics are inseparable from each
other. As regards that of homage, the truth in question is
expressed by the word God itself, if we assume that it
denotes "the Being who is supplicated," or ''the Being
to whom sacrifice is offered ".

Man's HOMAGE in the presence of the god, who takes
some sort of interest in him and lays some sort of claim
to him, realizes itself first in the emotional and volitional
impulses towards worship and trust, as well as towards
obedience based thereon, which correspond to that pre-
supposition ; and then shows itself in all sorts of actions
(Prayer and Sacrifice). The name " worship " is gener-
ally applied only to the latter, but their hidden roots
in the heart are quite as important for the understand-
ing of religion. The most obvious distinction between the
stages of this worship, which again are innumerable, has
reference to whether the homage offered God is thought
to dispose Him favourably towards man's desires, indeed
actually to change His attitude, as by an action neces-
sary for Himself, or is merely the condition, under which
God, in accordance with the nature of religious fellow-
ship, can grant the believer the blessings desired by

50

Nature of Religion — Worship

him. Thus in Evangelical Christianity, faith or trust
is the sole service of God (Apology, 3, 34) ; we do not
make God to be gracious to us ; and our faith is no
merit, but the word " demands merely believing hearts "
(Luther), the fellowship of God and man can become
an actuality only upon condition of trust on man's part.
In conformity with this fundamental distinction, all the
conceptions above mentioned mean something different
in every religion, and stand in a different relation to
each other : Keverence, Humility, Trust, Resignation,
Submission, Obedience. Something else is here in-
volved : the feeling of obligation to homage in the pres-
ence of the Godhead exhibits very varied degrees of
personal earnestness, but it is never wholly wanting ;
and it is one of the most important facts in reference
to religion that it cannot be created certainly, but it may
be repressed by want of inclination therefor. Without
some trace of the feeling of obligation as towards the
supernatural Power, and the recognition of the implied
duty, we can nowhere find real religion. In our religion
this feeling, which we have to acknowledge with the
full power of the will, is so surely the vital matter, that
in view of it, Luther as well as Calvin can with good
right make the idea of our blessedness in God fall com-
pletely into the background ; however true it is that
they cannot set aside that idea, and have no wish to do
so. Here we have the legitimate core of the opposition
to that conception of religion as signifying the further-
ance of life, which we mentioned at the outset. Of
course without effort made for the furtherance of life
there is no real religion. Even a Calvin speaks quite
frankly of the circumstance that " men could never de-
vote themselves to God entirely and with the heart,
unless they saw that their own supreme happiness was
firmly grounded in Him " ; for in what other way except

61

The Nature of the Christian Rehgion

in the form of purposes needing to be fulfilled, can we
conceive the spiritual life of man in its living reality ?
However, this effort to secure the furtherance of life has
a religious significance, only when it is subordinated to
the feeling of obligation as towards the supernatural
Power that gives life, towards God, however obscure
that feeling may be ; and when there is a recognition of
that obligation by the will. To the consciousness of the
man of faith, reverence before God is certainly in count-
less instances only a means in the first place for the
purpose of the furtherance of life ; but the sense of
obligation, however obscure it may be, is never really
wanting in any religious act. In the last resort, the
furtherance of life is the subject-matter dealt with, as
homage is shown in presence of God, being Divinely
intended means for the manifestation of homage ; but
contrariwise homage is not means for the furtherance
of life. In our religion we experience our true life when
we have perfect trust in God, for the reason that God
is love ; but this trust is entirely one with a fear of God
which is never so profound under other circumstances,
a reverential obedience which is unmatched ; in fact it
is just in this homage that we find blessedness for our
souls: to the "Father" we say, with a devotion which
is never attained in other circumstances, '' Thine is the
kingdom and the power and the glory for ever ".

In reference to the fourth fundamental character-
istic, belief in a Revelation, it is specially necessary to
remember that here again we are speaking not of the
truth of religion, and so neither of the legitimacy, nor
the reverse, of this belief, but simply of the fact, that
such a belief undeniably is of the essence of religion
precisely determined. It is the conviction that God has
shown His activity in some sort of way. Just that is
regarded as revelation which calls forth in man the

52

Nature of Religion — Revelation

impression that God manifests His activity for his
weal or woe. There is a natural correspondence
between the nature of this revelation, and the ideas
entertained of God, of the good bestowed or refused by
Him and the homage due to Him ; for the God who
manifests Himself as active, shows who He is, what He
gives and how He desires to be honoured. Only it
must be realized that this will be the case in proportion
as the revelation affirmed is clear and effectual ; the less
this is so, the more will the desire of the worshipper
mould God upon itself ; in conformity with this desire
the form of the homage will assume definite shape,
while the idea of the revelation will be shaped by them
all. But unless there is present in some form the con-
viction of God's manifestation of Himself as active, of a
revelation of Him on the basis of some sort of experi-
ence, then there is no real religion. In every religion,
therefore, the proper function of "revelation " is that it
proves the reality of the religion in question for the
consciousness of its adherents. We must not let our-
selves be blinded as to this simple state of matters by
traditions which in the sphere of a definite religion it is
almost impossible to eradicate ; as among ourselves, by
the after effects of the opinion of our old Protestant
theologians that revelation is essentially the imparta-
tion of supernatural knowledge, infallible doctrines con-
cerning God, though certainly in the perfectly spiritual
religion knowledge has high significance, and in it God
cannot interest Himself for our salvation without also
working in us a knowledge of the truth, as we may
realize by remembering the testimony of Jesus. But it
is also a displacement of the idea of revelation, though
of quite another kind, if revelation be taken to mean
essentially merely everything that is original and touched
with genius in the sphere of religion (Schleiermacher).

53

The Nature of the Christian ReHgion

The importance which the idea has in all religions is
thereby obscured, seeing that only the higher religions
are thought of ; while the specific character of revelation
is easily lost sight of : for certainly in the concept of
revelation in religion the stress is not on the circum-
stance that something is great and new in the life of
the human spirit as such, but that God makes Himself
known, manifests Himself as real. The believer has
quite a different sort of earnestness about the reality of
God from that of the artist, for example, or the hero
of science in their " revelations ".

Though every religion claims to rest upon revela-
tion, greatly as they vary in the stress laid upon this
claim, yet very different ideas are held as to the manner
of revelation, and this very fact affords a ground for
these variations in stress. The chief difference is
whether the manifestation of God is seen essentially in
external facts whether of nature or of history, which
(primarily the latter but under certain circumstances
also the former) continue their influence by means of
tradition, or on the other hand in inner experiences.
The latter is often called mystical, the former historical,
or mythical, revelation. But the inward by no means
excludes the outward. The assertion that because God
reveals Himself inwardly. He cannot reveal Himself in
history, gives evidence of a very superficial view of the
matter. The great question in general, and for Chris-
tianity in particular, is rather that of the relation of the
inward to the historical, whether the historical can lay
claim to abiding significance, or must retire in favour
of the inward ; in which latter case, revelation is in the
last resort nothing other than the deepest objective
ground of subjective religious experience.

From the foregoing, it is manifest how ambiguous
the conceptions "general and special," "immediate and

54

Nature of Religion — Revelation

mediate," "natural and supernatural " are, as applied to
revelation. The last distinction in any case, has refer-
ence much more to its truth than to its nature, for every
revelation in itself claims to be supernatural : what is
expressly so called claims therefore to embody a higher
degree of certainty. But the same confusion of the
question of nature and truth often enters into the other
terms as well. Indeed some of them are actually used
in quite opposite senses, since for example '^ immediate "
is applied by many to the inward, while it is to the
historical that others apply it.

In view of the questions which arise later in the
special department of Christian Dogmatics, we may here
in concluding at least refer to the fact that the desire
for religious certainty, which finds its clearest expression
in the belief in revelation, does not exclude but involves
difficulty in the attainment of this certainty. Mystery
and revelation are the two poles of every living religious
movement; without "the Hidden God" "He that re-
vealeth Himself" is not "God". Especially in our re-
ligion of divine sonship, it is only in conjunction with
the most reverential reserve that the most intimate
fellowship is real and sincere.

From this explanation of the most important aspects
of religion, in reference to its content, the inner relation
of which will occupy us more particularly when we
speak of its origin, we see clearly how far each of the
definitions rejected at the start is correct, without our
repeating them, and insisting at this time upon their
partial truth. The same holds good of all the countless
judgments of profound souls of all times and peoples,
regarding the nature of religion. They have in it always
seen " the Sunday of their lives " (Hegel). It is indeed
"the soul of a man's history and of the history of
humanity" (Carlyle). And this it is, because it "is the

55

The Nature of the Christian ReHgion

way and manner, whereby man feels himself related to
the unseen world, or non-world " ; in it " man is the
miracle of miracles, the great unfathomable mystery ".
" The Eternal comes into play : the temporal becomes a
means to an end : man belongs to the side of the Eternal."
And " Man's need is the sign of his greatness " (Pascal).
And " the pure region of our breast is haunted by an
aspiration to devote ourselves voluntarily with grateful
heart to a Higher Being, One who is pure, unfathomed ;
thus solving the mystery found in Him who is eternally
nameless. We say that this is to be pious " (Goethe).
As to anything in such utterances of the greatest minds
that immediately approves itself as true to every one of
lesser note, and as to any defect that may be found in
them, in particular whether religion is not valued too
much as a process in our consciousness merely, — on these
matters no further discussion is required at this point.
Looking back upon all the attempts to make so unfathom-
able an experience more intelligible to us, we simply
affirm once more that there is involved communion be-
tween God and man — from God to man and from man to
God — however imperfect may be the idea of this com-
munion. We shall have to remind ourselves of this when
we speak of our communion with God in Christ, which we
as Christians believe cannot be surpassed : " The Father
in me, I in the Father," and " We in them, they in us ".
Having now made clear to ourselves the content of
the religious process, we ask " In what activities of the
soul has it its home ? "

The Nature of Religion According to its Psychical

Form
This was given above as our second fundamental
question. As against the long-prevalent definition,
"Keligion is the knowledge and worship of God," the

56

Psychological Form of Religion

statement of Schleiermacher once acted as a revelation,
" Piety regarded purely in itself is a matter neither of
knowledge nor of action, but a distinct kind of feeling ".
Schleiermacher certainly proceeds at once to further
define this feeling, in a way convincing only for one who
shares his view of the nature of religion according to
its content (feeling of absolute dependence), as that
again is dependent on his philosophical convictions, and
B,s we saw does not completely express the reality. Our
treatment of the content has already shown us that
knowledge and will have far greater significance for the
religious process than Schleiermacher admits : in refer-
ence to knowledge we call to mind the idea of God, and
in reference to the will, what was said regarding homage ;
for not only in obedience but also in fear and trust, the
will is active and not at all simply feeling.

But all the same it would not be correct to rest
contented at this point with the indefinite statement that
religion has its seat in all the psychical activities.
Schleiermacher is right in the first instance, in saying
that the significance of feeling must be recognized in
its full scope. From the psychological point of view,
every truly religious process has its starting-point and
reaches its goal in feeling : the former in the feeling of
a want of some sort, the latter in blessedness, however
this may be more precisely defined. Moreover the idea
of God, however decisive its significance may be, is not
yet a constituent part of piety, unless its value be ex-
perienced in feeling. Nor lastly can homage be under-
stood, without a stirring of feeling, whether as trust or
a,s obeisance and obedience. But certainly it is false to
isolate feeling as Schleiermacher does. In all these
relations, not merely are feeling and will in general
interconnected in the closest manner — the two going
together in contrast with the objective consciousness,

57

The Nature of the Christian Rehgion

a fact emphasized by the newer psychology — but it is the
special characteristic of the religious process that those
feelings collectively require recognition — personal affir-
mation— by the will, although in very different degrees.
Even the most vivid sensation of a want, as well as of its
satisfaction by the higher Power, is no religious experi-
ence, unless by an act of will we seek to overcome it,
and by an act of will acknowledge the help of God as
such. This special characteristic of the religious process
was underestimated by Schleiermacher on account of his
under-estimation of the consciousness of freedom, that
is of moral responsibility. Should we wish now to ex-
press in one word this close interconnexion of will
and feeling, we might speak of the "heart" as the
home of religion, but for the fact that this word itself
would first need more precise definition. Others, with-
out using a definite word, are content to affirm that
religion falls essentially among the practical processes
of the spirit in distinction from the theoretical, and sa
has its place within the life of the soul in feeling and
willing. But even so, we have not yet got beyond
Schleiermacher, in the thorough-going manner which
exact investigation requires. Not only must the inner
relation of feeling and will be emphasized as has just
been done, but likewise that of feeling and will to know-
ledge. The practical life of the spirit cannot be separated
from the theoretical, as he supposes it can. The thought
of God substantially determines the religious act : we
have already had to demur to Schleiermacher's state-
ment that for the pious person, it is a matter of indiffer-
ence whether he thinks of God as personal or not.
This matter will have to be considered further in om*
discussion of faith and knowledge, and also at once
when we are dealing with the relation of religion to the
other leading aspects of man's mental life.

58

Religion and Forms of Higher Life

The favourite expression of Holy Scripture, when it
speaks of the inner process of faith, is the heart (Rom.
X. 10). This word is often used to insist that religion
is an affair of the whole man, of the inmost personal
life. This is certainly correct. In the biblical word
reference to cognition is also included, indeed it i&
strongly emphasized, if we recall the Hebrew usage.
But the necessary explanation brings us back again ta
what has been already said. And from this we see at
once in what sense the Psychology of Religion has good
warrant for its pronouncements. But at the same time
it is plain from our section relating to the content of
the religious process, what danger there is in expecting
from Psychology deliverances with reference to the
knowledge of religion which it is unable to supply, viz.
a knowledge of the special content of those processes.
There is more serious risk still, if one supposes further
that it is possible by means of Psychology to make out
anjrthing with regard to the truth of religion. (Cf. the
school that founds on " The History of Religion," where
the main tendencies of modern theology are treated.)

Now that the nature of religion has been determined,
both according to its content and its psychical forms, a
discussion which in some important aspects will be sup-
plemented by what we have to say of the origin, there
arises in immediate connexion with the questions already
answered, our third, that regarding the

Relation of Religion to the Other Main Aspects
OF the Life of the Human Spirit

We are, however, to consider this question only under
the points of view which are of value for our further
progress, in particular for the proof of the truth of our
religion. The religious activity of the spirit has to be

59

The Nature of the Christian ReHgion

compared with the scientific, the esthetic and the moral,
the three great branches on the tree of the higher
spiritual life.

Reference may be made in a word at least to
something which is almost obvious, and yet is not always
sufficiently attended to in its consequences. In the
oactivities of the spirit which we have named, it is always
>one of the fundamental psychical powers which is active
in the first instance, as surely as in the last resort we
have always to deal with processes in the soul taken as
a unity ; namely in science it is cognition, in the kingdom
of the beautiful it is feeling and imagination, in ethics
it is the will, in religion as we saw it is feeling com-
bined with volition in the manner indicated. In the
economy of our psychic life, however, feeling and volition
go together, and are distinguished from cognition, so that
they are often characterized as functions of the practical
psychic life in contrast with those of the theoretical.
For so far as our purpose requires us to make use of the
fact, it is clear that in the fundamental psychic experi-
ence of consciousness, the stress may be laid upon our
meeting with something in ourselves, or upon its being
in ourselves that we meet with something : in the former
case it is what is called theoretical, in the latter what is
called /?rac^zc«/ psychic life, that we have. Only in view
of misconceptions which never cease to be formed, we
may insist once more that it is presupposed in what we
have said that the two functions are inseparable ; in
particular, we are far from asserting that there can be
a religious process unless knowledge is largely involved ;
as appears from the whole analysis of the nature of
religion. Alongside of this preliminary remark we note
further that the votaries of science and art are far from
expecting every one to share their pursuits — on the con-
trary, such pursuits are often expressly lauded, as a

60

Religion Compared to Science

privilege belonging to intellectual distinction. It is quite
different in the moral and religious spheres. No moral
or religious person can admit that others are under no
obligation to be moral and religious, though in both re-
spects there are differences as regards degree and sig-
nificance.

We come now to the essentials. With science (cf.
"Ethics," 386 ff.) religion has in common an intense
interest in the truth in the simple sense of the word.
That was a fundamental point with us before when w&
spoke of the idea of God. But how they differ in their
anxiety for the truth ! The purer science is, the nearer
it attains to its ideal, the more entirely does it separate
what it seeks to know from the value that this has for
the knowing subject. It sinks itself so completely in
the object that it forgets the subject. This is not to
say that the human mind is capable of doing anything
valueless for itself ; but the value of knowledge depends
upon its comprehending the object to be known as com-
pletely, as exactly, and as little influenced by any out-
side consideration as is at all possible. The religious
man on the other hand, seeks to know the truth of God,
because his own life depends thereon ; he has the
greatest conceivable personal interest in the truth of
the world of his faith. He has as little intention of
deceiving himself as the scientific investigator — in this
respect, truth has precisely the same significance for
both — but he is anxious not to deceive himself regard-
ing the object because of the importance of the object
for the subject, while the man of science is anxious for
the sake of the object, is concerned about its nature,
apart altogether from its importance for the subject.
Points of resemblance and difference show most clearly
as the struggle of science after truth has also been
called a service of God. And rightly so, for it doubt-

61

The Nature of the Christian Rehgion

less involves an aspiration of the soul above the phe-
nomenal, the natural, the finite, a struggling after an
infinite, a subordination of self to an unconditioned. The
mind is inspired by the ideal of truth, and renders
homage to that ideal. If that knowledge leads it to
the thought of the Absolute, it stands in relation to that
thought as it does to any other, seizing it in its pure
objectivity without regard to its significance for the
mind itself. For the religious man, as we saw, there is
something different from this in his knowledge of God,
his aspiration towards God and his homage to Him.

Regarded from this point of view, life in the world
of the beautiful seems much more akin to the religious
life (cf. "Ethics," pp. 390 ff.). Here, certainly, we have
to do with a value that can be experienced in feeling ;
a value moreover that at first sight has the closest
affinity with religious satisfaction. How often is the
effect of Art extolled, as blessing and making free,
offering "redemption by sight," raising us above the
contradictions of actuality, and setting us in a kingdom
of undisturbed harmony, so that life for Art's sake can
actually be called a life in the eternal ? Is not religion
also life in the eternal ? Is it not the fact, moreover,
that the free play of the imagination is also the principal
means for the expression of religious ideas, not only in the
imperishable works of creative Art, Poetry and Music,
but as we saw in the simplest utterance of religious
truth ? Is not even our religion dependent upon parables,
and how can they be created or understood without im-
agination ? But mark now the striking contrast ! Art
lives by the beauty of its illusions ; for religion even the
most beautiful illusion means death. Art embodies the
content of some sensation, and the more perfectly it suc-
ceeds in setting this forth, the more perfect it is. But
whether there is a corresponding actuality, apart from

62

Religion, Art, and Morality

the esthetic feeling, is a question which has no signifi-
Kjance from the point of view of Art. Indeed, what we
do is to run away from the pressure of actuality into the
world of beautiful fancy ; and so Art becomes to mul-
titudes who are no longer able to find the actual living
God, a substitute for religion — according to the convic-
tion of the religious man who knows what actual re-
demption is, a substitute of inferior value, and yet
fraught with danger.

Different again is the relation of morality and religion
{cf. "Ethics," pp. 13 ff.). They are at one in the high
value they put upon the will, since both look lightly upon
the mere feeling for the beautiful as upon something
unsubstantial, and lacking in seriousness in the deepest
sense. They are at one also in their demand on others —
their universal demand — that all men ought to be moral
a,nd religious. All that was said above as to the im-
portance of the obligation as towards God would have
to be repeated and emphasized here. Without apprecia-
tion of the moral imperative, there is no entrance on the
course of Christian piety, and the latter never exists
without being proved in the moral life. There is further
a sort of connexion between the moral and the religious,
a,ccording to their content as well, at all the stages, in
a,ll the forms of religion, even what is for us religiously
most horrible, and morally most detestable, up to our
perfectly moral religion, in which piety and goodness
^re wholly inseparable, because our God is the alone
good and perfect One, and in which the whole life is re-
plete with piety and morality. But it is just here where
they are most at one, that the difference comes most
clearly to view. Morality is concerned with an uncon-
ditional law, a binding ideal, the realization of which by
us is our chief end, and so far at all events our highest
good ; religion with the reality of the supernatural power

63

The Nature of the Christian Rehgion

of which we spoke as interested in us, laying claim to our
trust and reverence, and blessing us, — which as gracious
is our highest good. And this distinction is not abolished
even in Christianity, where the highest good is com-
munion with the good God who makes us good. Moral
obligation does not in this way lose any of its exalted
solemnity, for the good of which we speak belongs to
those who are good, but it does lose the sting of its un-
attainableness, and the still more painful sting of guilt ;
" Only when we are made righteous, do we do what is
righteous" (Luther). Now there we have the further
distinction between religion and morality, that the for-
mer is experienced by the separate person in another
way still from the latter, viz. in respect of its individual
character ; and in saying this, we do not need to make
special reference here to the importance of the com-
munity for religion.

We see that all the higher spiritual life is concerned
with the infinite, the unconditioned, the eternal, but
science with the ideal of truth for the spirit purely as
knowing, art with the idea of the beautiful for the
emotional self as capable of enjoyment, and morality
with the subordination of the will to unconditional law^
for the realization of the chief end. In all these the
infinite remains confined within the spiritual life of man,
though differently in science, art, and morality, and in
the latter always on the point of transcending the
limits in question. Religion, on the contrary, conceives
of it unreservedly as the great reality independent of
our spiritual life, although becoming active there. The
philosopher, the artist, and the good man are alike
strangers in the purely natural world with its finite mag-
nitudes. The religious man rises superior to the whole
world and finds his home in God. This is the paradox
and miracle which has always marked religion in experi-

64

Value-Judgments in Religion

ence, even for those who were incapable of expressing
their experience in grand-sounding words. Whether
religion is right in this claim, whether it is true, is still
an open question (meanwhile). But what has just been
said is so decisive for our knowledge of the nature of
religion, that only in the light of it does all that we have
set forth in the preceding pages, regarding its content
and its psychical form, become perfectly plain. And it
is just this, apart altogether from any criticism of details,
that really and essentially constitutes the great scientific
discovery of Schleiermacher — the specialty of religion,
its character as a personal experience of God gifted to
souls that are true and on the watch, that, whether they
are rich or poor as regards all other experience, and
while they are free and fettered in themselves, desire to
become free and rich in perfect subjection to God. To
borrow the language of the Christian religion, they lay
hold of His gracious will.

We find now that this comparison of religion with
the other higher activities of the spirit helps to a settle-
ment of the much-discussed question of what religion
has to do with the value-judgments of which we hear
so much. The passion with which in the last decades
the view that religious judgments are value-judgments
was assailed, would have been justified if those who
used this expression had understood it in the sense which
many of their opponents seemed to attribute to them.
That is to say, if it had been left an open question
whether the objects which find expression in judgments
of value, God, eternal life, Christ, and the forgiveness of
sins, are real or not. In that case, judgments of value
would certainly deserve the epithet " vile," and no term
of abuse would be too strong for them. Only it has
always been inconceivable how such an opinion could
have been attributed to religious men, or to theologians

VOL. I. 65 5

The Nature of the Christian ReHgion"

setting forth the nature of religion. For the being or
non-being of religion depends on the reality of God, as
we have insisted again and again, in the foregoing. There
is no justification even for the milder form of the re-
proach of which we speak, that religion certainly does
not leave the reality of God and the whole world of faith
an open question, on the contrary affirms them with all
earnestness, but does so only on account of their value ;
this value is the only ground that can be adduced for
their alleged reality — in other words, they are assump-
tions or postulates. Or at least this is the contention
of those opponents of judgments of value who speak
with most warrant — such judgments are certainly, ac-
cording to the conviction of those who uphold them,
judgments about what really exists, but they are based
simply on subjective experience ; and that really means
in the last resort that they are baseless, when they fail
to acknowledge that the needs for which man obtains
satisfaction in experience are grounded on norms of our
mental life which are self-attested (Ludemann). On the
contrary we have again and again urged that religion
sees the proof of its reality in manifestations of the God-
head, which presents itself as active.

In order now to understand the proper sense of the
expression "religious judgments of value," as against
such misrepresentations, and to determine whether there
is any objection to this sense, we must start from the
fact that judgments of value are by no means peculiar
to the religious sphere, as the controversy in question
often seemed to imply, but that here, they certainly
receive a modification which makes their justification
necessary. Their peculiarity is due to the fundamental
distinction which was spoken of in all mental activity,
the theoretical and practical forms. There are judg-
ments of value then in all provinces. In that of the

66

Value-Judgments in Religion

natural impulses and inclinations : " This is pleasant,"
*' that is unpleasant ". In that of law and morals : for-
bidden and permitted. They are most important in the
field of those higher psychic activities, which we have
just discussed. Here they aspire to the character of
universal validity ; namely, the judgments : something
is true or false, beautiful or ugly, good or evil. The
trait of absoluteness applies to them all, but with the
differences which were there adduced.

What is peculiar to the religious value-judgment
is found, as we now see, in the fact that, as was shown
above, it is a pronouncement about a supreme reality
which is independent of our spiritual life, which is
transcendent in relation to it, a pronouncement about
God. This is the great objection to the religious value-
judgment. And yet it is just here that we have the
claim which religion cannot abate. How now can such
a judgment be defined with the proper qualifications so
as to prevent its becoming a mere postulate ? The fact
is this. The validity of the judgments of faith for the
believer depends on the living conviction that the
supreme reality in question maniefests itslf, but only
to one who consents to recognize its reality as of value
for him personally, not in the irresistible way in which
the laws of logic demand recognition. (The similarity
and the difference as we compare with esthetics and
ethics, are discovered from what was said above. Thus
the believer does not regard what is valuable as real,
because it is valuable for him, but because it meets him
as real. It meets him, however, not as a reality which
no one can deny — rather as one which only he can ac-
knowledge, who is willing to acknowledge its value per-
sonally. Or as has been said with special appropriateness
in reference to the highest stages of religion, " Religious
value-judgments are judgments of trust with reference

67

The Nature of the Christian ReHgion

to divine revelations ". In this sense there are and must
be religious value-judgments ; religion stands or falls
with them. But then it is manifest that this special kind
of certainty must have a foundation, must be justified
against obvious objections. In other words, we are here
face to face with the task of the proof of the truth,
which will meet us later, as what is really decisive for
Christianity. For the problem inevitably arises whether
such a way to certainty regarding the objects of faith
may not be impassable, unnecessary or impossible, on
account of the legitimate claims of conclusive know-
ledge. There lies the abiding interest of the contro-
versy regarding value- judgments, and not in the absurd
misrepresentations to which the expression has so often
been subjected.

There still remains the fourth and last point of
view, under which we proposed to consider religion.
We have dealt with its nature according to its content,
and its place in the psychic life, and then with its rela-
tion to the other higher spiritual activities. Those
sections fitly conclude with the question of the

Origin of Religion

We started from the principle that "nature" and
" origin " should be strictly distinguished. Overhasty
treatment of the origin is often fatal to accurate de-
termination of the nature, while such determination
naturally limits the field of inquiry into the origin in
various directions, and conduces to a correct statement
of the question. For there can certainly be no doubt
that the individual members of a religious communion
first become religious through the agency of education,
and that on the other hand the first beginnings of history
in this department as in all others are hid from us, so
that the question of the origin appears to fall to the

68

Origin of Religion

ground altogether. Only, in reference to the former
clause, however highly we may estimate the power of
religious education, and admit that many men, their
whole life long, scarcely move beyond what they have
grown up accustomed to, yet in our province just as
much as in that of the other main activities of the
human mind, which we have discussed, we cannot get
away from the question, " From what powers in the inner
life of man, working in conjunction with powers presup-
posed as external thereto, do such education and force
of habit become intelligible ? " — the pious person, of
course, reserving for himself the right to recognize with
reverence the action of God in the whole process. This
question is forced upon us directly by our investigation
of the nature, and is the relevant starting-point for the
investigation of the origin. And if in reference to the
second clause we were more favourably circumstanced
than we are, if our historical vision reached farther
back than is actually the case, the task just indicated
would still arise. To this task, therefore, we must at-
tend with all care ; it is the important one. But
further, by our knowledge of the nature of religion, we
have gained a norm for judging of many of the answers
to the question of its origin : every theory of the origin
is false which contradicts the observed facts, from which
we established its nature.

Thus, first of all, the explanation of religion as the
product of statecraft and priestly deception needs no
refutation. Not only because it must have ceased, after
these corrupt sources were exposed, but because they
altogether fail to account for the superstructure, the
explanation of which is in question. Nor are we helped
by calling in the aid of the theory of heredity — for
example, the favourite expression " social fictions,"
which are supposed to have established themselves by

69

The Nature of the Christian Rehgion

propagation through countless generations, and among
which religion is the most powerful (Max Nordau).
And the derivation of religion which was long current
from primitive views of the need of causality, a need
satisfied by what appeared in a garb formed by the arts
of poetic imagination, does not hit the peculiarity of the
process, as we have come to understand it. Even more
profound attempts manifestly suffer from a dispropor-
tion between the explanation proposed and the matter
to be explained. In the middle of last century there
was an inclination to explain the whole by man's
natural disposition to personify the world ; and then
to derive the whole from the worship of souls, religion
being described as ''Animism" (Lippert, Spencer).
Others combined the two methods, holding that from
the inclination of the human Psyche "to perceive
animated beings everywhere," from this "assumption
of two modes of life," there arose "the worship
of souls and the personification of nature ". Imagina-
tion has been largely applied to the experiences of
dream-life and those connected with death and with
processes in external nature, so as to make the desired
result appear probable. Many descriptions by poets of
this kind who don the mantle of science, are as plainly
detailed as if they had been present when the first
religious impulses of primitive man were formed. But
in such an attempt, the matter to be explained is far too
readily presupposed in one way or another. For why is
help sought from those souls and spirits, or from those
personified objects of nature, by rendering homage to
them ? It marks a great step in advance, when this
difficulty in explaining religion by " personification and
imagery " is felt at all, — a process which would really
be in strictness a case of creation out of nothing.
Hence the fact is deserving of attention that, of late,

70

Origin of Religion

the view is expressed with increasing frequency, that
we must not by any means claim that every species of
magic, associated with souls and spirits which are sup-
posed to exist, is religious ; but that only those souls
and spirits that somehow exercise permanent influence
are to be recognized as gods (Ed. Meyer). Whether it
is right or wrong, such a thesis testifies to a deeper
apprehension of the problem.

The question is raised in a pertinent manner only
when those fundamental characteristics which consti-
tute the essence of the religious process (pp. 36 fiP.) are
investigated with a view to whether they can be referred
back to one, and that one can be understood as the pre-
cise activity of the soul by which, in combination with
powers presupposed without the soul, the religious pro-
cess may be explained. Clearly we cannot for this pur-
pose start from the idea of God ; first the possibility at
all events remains open that this itself can be explained
as a product of that simplest element of which we speak ;
and the same is true still more manifestly of homage.
The processes again which are regarded as revelation
are that doubtless only in their effects upon a soul
susceptible thereof. There remains, therefore, as the
starting-point only the struggle for life, the impulse to
solve the contradiction between the claim to life and the
experience of life as an actuality. Out of this, accord-
ing to what is certainly the dominant opinion of our
day, in so far as it is not contented with these unsatis-
factory answers, arises the idea of the Supernatural
Power, or in other words the readiness to regard certain
processes within as well as in nature and history in the
light of a revelation of this Power ; out of it arises like-
wise the homage paid to this Power in reverent fear
and trust.

The opponents of this view have often made

71

The Nature of the Christian Rehgion

their refutation too easy by saying, " In the way
described arises not religion but civilization : the stress
of life educates man for the conflict therewith ; for the
discovery of all sorts of instruments ; for knowledge
and power of every kind, and only such as weaklings
fell upon the thought of seeking help from a higher
Power ". For this misunderstanding, inaccurate expres-
sions of many modern philosophers of religion were
certainly greatly to blame, since without qualification
they made the human spirit under all sorts of pressure,
" exercise its religious function," seeing in every need
the " flywheel " that sets religion in motion. The more
earnest, however, have always meant simply that the
feeling of limitation, which arises at the impassable out-
side limit of all our present knowledge and power, is the
starting-point for the seeking of help from a higher
Power. They thus rightly distinguished between the
impulse to civilization and that to religion ; and they
could easily show how each forward step in civilization
always leads to new limitations, felt perhaps with
doubled severity, while others, like sickness and death,
it never removes ; so that religion cannot by any means
be superseded by progress in civilization. But there
now emerges another point which is no less certain : if
the adherents of the theory set to work in an accurate
way, they must give it a more precise definition, which
shows that it is essentially less valuable than they often
assume. They must not lose sight of the ambiguity
in their statement, ''The religious process necessarily
follows from the feeling of the limitations of life ". This
statement may mean : necessarily in every being which
feels as its own a need that cannot be removed by any
effort of its own, or any combined action in conjunction
with other beings of a like nature. So understood, the
statement is unquestionably false. We can quite well

72

Origin of Religion

imagine a being which acquiesces in this feeling, and
rests satisfied with its experience of its own hmitations.
If on the other hand we assume in man the impulse not
to despair though he has reached the limits of his own
strength, but to realize that yearning for life, of which
we speak, the impulse in question must be recognized
as a strictly ultimate fact. In it, in this imperturbable
optimism, we can then certainly discern the motive
which sets to work under certain influences of nature
and of human life to construct the idea of God, to appeal
to God, to explain this or that experience as a mani-
festation of God. Others will be disposed to say at once
that we must also assume an original faculty for the per-
ception of the divine. But it is more correct, because
more certain to meet with universal assent, to stop short
in the first instance with that yearning for life which
refuses to despair, and without looking elsewhere to see
in this the capacity for religion.

In dealing with the question of the origin of religion,
we have now reached the point at which quite naturally,
by an inner necessity, this question passes into the ques-
tion of its truth. More exactly, this last point which we
have just established will be judged diff'erently by every
one according to his personal attitude to religion, and
his judgment regarding its truth. The man who person-
ally rejects religion will express his attitude in some
such way as this. It arose long ago in the manner de-
scribed, under primitive conditions, and still arises under
the influence of thousands of years of ancient tradition
and heredity. But because the advance of knowledge
proves God an illusion, the modern man must renounce
religion. He takes up the position that the human
spirit has as its own peculiar possession a forward im-
pulse which satisfies itself in other ways, within the
limits of this present world, without aspiring beyond

73

The Nature of the Christian Rehgion

the world, but of course always only imperfectly, per-
haps in the progress of the race — an unlimited "plus
ultra ". Here we would have that " infinity of feeling "
which we have already spoken of, and which many
people of the present day, without sufficient reason,
still call religion (p. 43). In this optimistic impulse to
go beyond every limitation of knowledge and will, the
religious man, on the other hand, will see not only the
basis of religion as a fact in human life, which the
others also admit it to be, but the basis designed by God
Himself, and always in evidence anew according to God's
will — the permanently valuable capacity for religion ;
and for him this capacity is itself a work of God which
is eternally present (see later, in the Doctrine of God
and the World). And he will likewise regard the external
influences which develop this capacity as actual revela-
tions— workings intended as revelations by God. In-
deed, he will assume what we have just set aside, an
original mental faculty for the perception of God, and
will see in this the ultimate ground for the yearning
for life of which we speak, not contrariwise the ground
for the idea of God in the yearning for life. For this
we can even appeal to our opponents, who believe that
they can satisfy the optimistic refusal to despair in other
ways ; so that in any case no proof is furnished by them
that under certain circumstances it must necessarily
satisfy itself in the form of real religion. And we have
already asked whether the yearning for life can be fully
understood as it reaches beyond the world of the person
concerned, unless there is a feeling after a supernatural
Power.

However that may be, in any case, the religious man
is not put out by the reproach that what is professedly
the highest moment of man's spiritual life, the religious,
is essentially conditioned by human needs. Strange to

74

Origin of Religion

say, even many who have believed in God have agreed
with this reproach that such an explanation of religion
is unworthy. To the religious man, on the contrary, it
seems worthy of God and man that God should accom-
plish His highest purpose by the most insignificant
means, making the deepest poverty the foundation of
the greatest riches. Thus, for example, Luther says on
Psalm cxviii. : " Let him learn here, who can learn, and
let every one also become a falcon that can soar aloft
into the heights in such need. It says, * I cried unto the
Lord '. Thou must learn to cry. Come now, thou lazy
rascal, fall down upon thy knee and set forth thy need
with tears before God." This quotation illustrates for
us one other point in the judgment of the religious man
with reference to the matter before us. He may lay
stress upon the circumstance that homage before God
appears to his consciousness as a claim on his respon-
sible will, in no way as a constraining necessity. Even
"what meets him as the most potent revelation seems to
him like a question on God's part, whether he is willing
to kneel down, and uplift himself to God. Further, in
all the higher religions the content of the manifestations
of God is of such a kind, that the religious man feels him-
self unaffected by the reproach of selfishness, though
certainly he can never force this judgment of his on the
man who despises religion. Thus in all respects there
is a vindication of the pious person's conviction that he
has not made his God to suit himself, that religion is
not a creation of man, but of God. Research in the
field of the psychology of religion, however, has enabled
us to obtain a deeper insight into the actual circum-
stances connected with this marvellous creative act,
and has furnished the pious person with ground for
more heart-felt adoration. Thus while we adopt a
course which we of the present day can follow, one

75

The Nature of the Christian Rehgion

which is marked out for us by the knowledge of the
present day, we reach the same point from which we
started when dealing with the question of the Nature
of Eeligion, and which was reached of old, in a way of
their own, by Calvin and the other Reformers. Now
when we are engaged in the exposition of the nature of
our religion, it will no longer be possible to have any
doubt whatever on the matter ; and the possibility will
always be less, in proportion as we approach the
culmination of that religion, viz. the assurance of salva-
tion through faith. Who could suppose it is based on
human desire, or deny that man's destiny is reahzed in
it ? Who could possess it except in deepest humility
acknowledged in honour of God, or without joy and
gratitude for the attainment of true life ? Who would
regard it otherwise than as a pure gift of grace from the
Creator, or without a sincere sense of responsibility?
Our whole existence, as our self-consciousness immedi-
ately attests, places us under obligation to God : we
did not make ourselves, and therefore do not exist for
ourselves. But just when we recognize this obligation,
we find our life, viz. in God. And God awakens the
recognition of the fact that we are under obligation,
when He grants us life as we share in His own. As
we have but imperfect conceptions for this last mystery
of our existence, of which we experience in religion a
gracious revelation, as well as abysmal depths which
are ever opened up anew, a reference may be permitted
to Michael Angelo's Creation of Adam. Here the
imagination of the artist gives an embodiment and vivid
perception of what was said in inadequate language re-
garding the communion between God and man, — visual-
izes the sovereign pronouncement of God in human
form, "Let there be " ; the will of the man formed in
God's likeness, characterized as it was by reverential

76

Origin of Religion

trust ; the Creation of the responsible being, and the
dependence of the latter, conjoined with a devotion
which was freely accorded.

Only now have we the right in one word more to
come to the question of the historical origin of religion,
if we can so call it, seeing it lies outside of our historical
knowledge. What we can say regarding it in the form
of a hypothesis, is, conformably to what was said at the
beginning, essentially the same as we adduced regarding
the origin in general. It springs from the religious
capacity in the sense defined above, and working in con-
junction therewith occurrences in nature, and in the
social life of man, or special inward experiences, which
produce the impression of a revelation of God, or it may
be of higher powers. In this connexion one may con-
sider the probability for the first beginnings of special
manifestations of God, to which many have applied the
name Fa7'astasis, a special drawing near on the part of
God in some sort of visible form. For Christian dogma-
tics, however, all consideration of the first beginnings is
of value only in connexion with the question of the stage
in human progress which they represent. On the basis
of conclusions drawn from the religious condition of the
lowest tribes still in existence, most historians of religion
believe that this should be placed as low as possible.
Fetishism or, as most now think, animism appears to
them the beginning of religion. The facts, which in
the nature of the case admit of many explanations, and
in the explanation of which people are more influenced
by their personal attitude than they commonly admit,
by no means necessitate this theory. Other facts, or the
same facts differently explained, for example the idea
of One God, which is also found in tribes of low stand-
ing, have led other investigators to the hypothesis of an
original Henotheism : *' Without the thought of God

11

The Nature of the Christian Rehgion

there are no gods ". In these last years this hypothesis
has once more gained support, and that too among those
who have an accurate knowledge of the facts, in part
newly discovered or newly appreciated (Ewe and Batac
religions, etc.). But if Dogmatics is to speak decisively
on this point, or without prejudicing her interests by
passing beyond her proper borders, she must defer con-
sideration of it to another place, namely the doctrine of
Sin.

THE CHEISTIAN EELIGION

When we were investigating the questions which are
indispensable in order to determine what religion is,
we had to insist upon the importance of the fact that
religion presents itself to us as a Pkimary form of
HUMAN FELLOWSHIP — wc must not infringe upon what is
called objective religion in the interests of subjective.
This is a truth which had to be enforced by frequent
repetition. We have now to make explicit use of it, if
we are to realize the distinctive character of the
Christian religion in the great whole of religion gener-
ally. Owing to the distinctive character of religious
experience, the need for fellowship — the fundamental
impulse of man's inner life of which we speak — is
particularly widespread, strong, and lasting in this
province. Not only is the religious man stirred in the
depths of his whole being, and thus powerfully impellep
to seek fellowship ; there is added to this the conviction
of the reality of his God, which we have often empha-
sized ; he knows himself, therefore, to be a servant of the
highest truth, and it is to him a religious duty to work
for it. We understand then that every religious experi-
ence works for the creation of fellowship according to
the measure of its strength. Moreover, the nature of the
working depends upon the experience. Now this ex-

78

The Religions

perience is always definite and specific, never religion in
general. Keference was also made to the fact that
there is no " natural " general religion ; there are only
concrete, definite, " positive " religions, even if, com-
pared with others, they are very indefinite. In order
to understand this individual character of the various
religions, we must consider the form assumed by the
four fundamental characteristics which we have dis-
cussed. For we find that the form of one influences
that of all the others ; thus in the diff'erent religions the
same words have quite different meanings, as for ex-
ample, the Unity of God in Islam and in Christianity.
The specific form of the idea of God, the chief good and
the worship, is often called the material principle of a
religion ; the specific form of the revelation assumed
and believed in, by means of which it finds a basis for
its truth, and according to which its content (the
material principle) is determined, is called the formal
or epistemological principle. Only here as elsewhere
the expressions are not always used in the same sense.
These points of view, then, guide our survey of the many
religions in their relation to Christianity.

They may be exhibited in many ways, and almost
every resulting Classification brings to the front an im-
portant aspect of the matter. For our purpose it is
sufficient to point out that as regards the material
principle, the classification according to the nature of
the blessings desired is the simplest arrangement of the
almost infinite fullness of the facts ; this confirms and
explains with the help of the newer history of religion
the fundamental division according to stages and classes,
into polytheistic and monotheistic, natural and ethical
religions, already suggested by Schleiermacher. It also
readily lends itself to the setting forth of the distinction
emphasized by other investigators — in so far as justified

79

The Nature of the Christian Rehgion

— ^between the religions of non-civilization (more ac-
curately of a poor civilization) and of civilization. Again,
there is the distinction between legal religions and
religions of redemption, which is significant especially
for Islam on the one hand, and for Brahmanism, Bud-
dhism and Christianity on the other, proving the latter to
be distinguished from each other by the ethical character
of the chief good and the definition of it in detail. Only
it must be remembered in reference to this terminology,
that the name " religion of redemption " is itself under-
stood in a definite narrower sense, for in the wider all
religions are religions of redemption. For the purpose
of a cursory glance, that primary classification of which
we speak is by far the most satisfactory ; and the fact
that the actual religious life of mankind everywhere
shows these forms passing into one another, only deepens
its worth for actual insight into this very intricate
subject.

But this classification based upon the material
principle has now to be combined with one drawn from
the formal principle. Here again, however, it is sufficient
to point to the fundamental forms which we have already
learned to distinguish, and which likewise as they meet
us in the actual world of religion pass over into one
another at many points. In the narrower sense then
those religions are called " religions of revelation," which
are based upon historical revelation and in consequence
on the work of a definite founder ; though as a matter
of fact, as we have seen, there is no religion without some
sort of revelation (or belief in revelation). Those
religions of revelation in the definite narrow sense of
the term, are, as regards their content, simply because
they claim to be based upon a special manifestation of
God, so independent of their native soil that they con-
sciously and purposely aim at universal recognition, that

80

Method of Inquiry

is, engage in a world-mission, having vigour enough to
be able to eliminate what is unessential and temporary,
to assimilate foreign matter of value, and to form a
theory of the universe and a moral ideal out of what is
their very own, amalgamated with this element which
has been adopted (Harnack). But for this purpose they
need a more reliable means of propagation than oral
tradition, namely sacred Scriptures, which enable them
to preserve their original individuality by continual
reference back to the beginnings.

Though it is quite easy in a general way to determine
the place of our Christian Religion in this tabular survey
of the religions, great difficulties present themselves,
whenever we attempt to characterize it more precisely
in advance, in a few sentences. There is no doubt that
with peculiar emphasis it claims to be the monotheistic
ethical religion, and consequently there is no doubt in
what sense it claims to be the religion of redemption.
There is no doubt that with fuller consciousness than any
of the others it traces its origin to historical revelation.
But as soon as we attempt to fill out this framework
ever so little, we cannot get away from the fact that,
especially in our day, the most varied answers are given
to the question of the nature of Christianity ; even theo-
logians closely akin to each other regard as essential only
that to which they give the name of " the nature," and
that in both the main relations, the definition of the con-
tent as well as of its ground in the revelation believed
in. What a strange sound has this latter thought
altogether to many of our contemporaries ! How evident
does it appear to them that Christianity may be separated
from its founder ! There is no less diversity of judgment
in reference to the content — the place occupied in the
whole range of Christian saving truth by the forgiveness

VOL. I. 81 6

The Nature of the Christian Rehgion

of sin, the hearing of prayer, and the eternal consumma-
tion. It has been found a profitable task to compare
the views on the subject held by different outstanding
men, whose images still live in the universal conscious-
ness ; in consequence not a few have gained the impres-
sion that the points of divergence outweigh the inner
unity. Is it diflFerent when we leave the present and take
a historical survey ? What is " legitimate development,"
and what is " essential deviation " ? What type of
Christianity is to be regarded as most truly Christian —
Eastern or Western, Roman or Evangelical, " Old "
Protestant or " Modern " Protestant ? Or does the
essence of Christianity realize itself in the totality of
these manifestations ? If it should be supposed to real-
ize itself in all in like manner, that would manifestly be
to forego all knowledge of the essence ; and what would
be worse, we should be compelled to see in the whole
process the necessary evolution of the "idea of Christi-
ianity " (perhaps as Hegel understood it), which would
deny responsibility and sin. If on the other hand we
evangelical Christians seek the norm for the history
in the testimonies of its first age, and if to justify such
a proceeding, we may appeal in general to the historical
consideration that the more definite a religion is in itself,
the more clearly does it show this definiteness in its
beginnings, does not the same difficulty as above arise in
new form ? Is not Holy Scripture, even if we take only
the New Testament, the book in which every one finds
what he looks for ? Has it everywhere in its pages the
same content ? Is it even clearly marked off from the
later history ?

Still this danger of subjective caprice is by no means
so insuperable as at first sight it appears to be. For
the New Testament by its very nature furnishes safe-
guards against it. That is to say, there are striking pas-

82

Method of Inquiry

sages where it bears clear testimony to the well-marked
distinctive character of the Gospel, calculated though it
be in certain circumstances to cause offence. For ex-
ample, 1 Corinthians i. 22 ff., in combination with
Matthew xi. 27 ff., gives expression in the most pointed
manner possible to its paradoxical character, and that,
too, in reference both to its content and its indissoluble
connexion with its Founder as being in visible form the
express image of God, who as Holy Love receives sinners
into fellowship with Himself. It is certainly possible for
human imperfection, and personal aversion to the dis-
tinctive character of our religion, " to the Jews a stumb-
ling block, and to the Greeks foolishness," to mislead
us here again into inaccurate apprehension of the pic-
ture of it which appears in its primary documents. But
mere caprice must always reveal itself as such ; what
are really the essentials will always shine through it.
This is the main conclusion to which we come as the re-
sult of the survey of the development of Christianity
which we have made, which may in the first instance
be misleading. For not only have all its changing forms
made some sort of appeal to the New Testament foun-
dations, but they have had enduring significance in
proportion as they succeeded in proving their own con-
sistency therewith. In this comparison of the developed
product with the origin, what belongs to the essence
always comes more clearly into view. The beginning
itself proves to be the germ of a fruitful development,
a germ of paramount significance, including in a pro-
ductive form elements which are seemingly opposed to
each other; the word development, which is so often
misused, having here good warrant, because it has its
clear and proper sense. The subjectivity which re-
mains after all this, the possibility of error and even of
misconstruction and perverted judgment, can be under-

83

The Nature of the Christian Rehgion

stood by the man of faith from the nature of religion :
we are meant to understand and reverence God and His
work, but we are not compelled to do so. Again, if we
seek to determine the nature of our religion in the
manner we have indicated, the proceeding is one to
which no objection can be taken ; for the reason that
we thus arrive at a determination of the nature, to prove
the truth of which according to the opinion of our op-
ponents is manifestly not easier but more difficult, than
if we were content with a quite colourless concept of
the essence of Christianity. A series of the most weighty
objections do not affect such a mere abstraction at all,
but they do affect the sharply defined view which we
get by following the path we have chosen. The doctrine
of Revelation and of Holy Scripture, to be treated later,
will elucidate all this by means of examples.

In order to determine the essence of Christianity,
first of all according to the three first fundamental char-
acteristics of religion of which we have spoken (the
Material Principle as it is called), we may start from
any of them ; for they correspond to each other, and the
higher the religion concerned, the more exact is this
correspondence. At the same time the idea of God or
the religious blessing supposed to be conferred, is natur-
ally better suited to be the starting-point, and the latter
again in preference to the former, that means for this pre-
liminary survey which is to be made the basis of oui'
proof of the Christian religion; whereas in Dogmatics
proper everything will be set forth with the idea of God
as the guiding principle, for our starting-point. If we
start from the accepted position that the Christian re-
ligion is the perfectly moral one, we must observe that
in the course of its history the emphasis has been placed
at times rather on the religious aspect, and at other times.

84

The Material Principle

on the moral. The former was the case, for example,
with the old Protestant Theology and Schleiermacher,
the latter with the Enlightenment and with Kant ; and
such difference of emphasis in dealing with what is one
and the same truth has not seldom found expression in
the preference for the concept " Kingdom of God " on
the one hand, or on the other, "redemption" or "recon-
ciliation," to denote the religious blessing of Christianity.
As a matter of fact both imply that Christianity claims
to be both the perfectly moral religion, and the perfect
moral religion ; and the only difference between them is
that the second expressly points to the content of the
first as designed for sinners who are to be redeemed
and reconciled. But the idea of the Kingdom of God
as more exactly defined with the help of the idea of re-
conciliation is better suited for a general expression for
the essence of Christianity, from the point of view of the
religious blessing offered, than other expressions which
have been proposed, such as life, love, sonship to God,
restored communion with God, the instituting of a
humanity for God, justification by faith. For reasons
similar to those which hold good in Christian Ethics,
the idea of the Kingdom of God, only regarded in
another point of view, deserves the preference. It is
true that " justification " has the merit of giving effect
to the Protestant watchword, even in the determina-
tion of the essence ; but for all that it is far too definite
for the start. On the other hand there is too little of
the distinctively Christian note about " Life " and " Re-
stored communion with God ". " Sonship to God " again
does not suggest the community as surely as " Kingdom
of God " does the individual ; and a " Humanity for God "
is modelled too much upon an isolated Biblical phrase.

To be sure, objections are urged against the use of
the term Kingdom of God also, and that too in the name

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The Nature of the Christian ReHgion

of the New Testament. These objections are not quite
the same as in Christian Ethics ; for it is easier for
Dogmatics than it is for Ethics to utilize the fact that
the phrase originally meant the rule of God. But we
are told that its signifying essentially the rule of God as
perfected is a barrier to its use in Dogmatics likewise.
Here again, however, we need only to point out that
Dogmatics manifestly uses the phrase, not as a single
constituent element of the original Christian message,
derived immediately from the New Testament, but as a
comprehensive general term for that message as a whole,
arrived at as the result of reflection ; and that there are
good grounds inherent in the nature of the case for
choosing Kingdom of God for this purpose, though that
can be proved only by our whole presentation of Chris-
tian truth. Attention may also be directed to the fact that
this phrase is found from time to time upon the lips of
the greatest in the history of our religion, as a watchword
used to express their conviction of the identity of their
new interpretation of Christianity with its original form ;
take for example, Augustine, Luther, Calvin, Spener and
Schleiermacher, even though they did not use it as a
regulative principle as here proposed. Luther's simple
exposition of the second petition reminds us at the same
time how even in the New Testament, in Paul and John,
faith and love serve to elucidate it-

Even in the Old Testament, " Kingdom of God," i.e.
rule of God, is a religious pronouncement full of spiritual
and moral impressiveness, although it is never com-
pletely divorced from the national and the political. It
next becomes in the Apocalyptic Literature of Judaism
a term embracing every miracle which transcends the
ordinary course of the world ; while in the Gospel the
national husk of which we spoke completely disappears,
and we have the consummation of the transcendent

The Material Principle

element without any sacrifice of actuality : in its purely
spiritual and moral nature it does in truth transcend the
world and is the Reality of all realities. The rule of
God is the actualization of His almighty will, which
alone is good. God receives men into the fellowship of
His love, that reality which is most precious. He thus
excites in them love to Himself and to each other, and
in both respects, in His love as experienced and recipro-
cated and in love to each other, causes them to ex-
perience His blessedness. The two are absolutely
inseparable ; for men cannot otherwise participate in
the blessedness of God who loves the world. It is in
this fellowship of love with God and with each other
that they are raised above the world, gaining the victory
over it — mastering it; all is subject to them just as
surely as it is subject to God, in subjection to whom
their blessedness consists. This fundamental idea fills
the whole New Testament, and is applied in the
most diverse ways. We have the parables of the
treasure, the pearl and the wedding feast, what is
said of unlimited forgiveness of our brother; and the
beatitudes addressed to those who are called sons of God,
who see God, and who are to be satisfied as being of a
pure heart, as hungering after righteousness, as being
peace-makers, and as sufi*ering persecution. The two
things are always indissolubly connected, communion
with God in love and love to each other. In both we
have at once independence of the world, and a well-
assured hold upon it, so that it is only reflection that
can distinguish the two aspects ; e.g. in the parable of
the wedding feast, sitting at table with God on the
one hand and with the perfected saints on the other.
Peace springs (Phil. iv. 1 ff.) from joy in the Lord,
sanctified freedom from anxiety, the certainty that the
Lord is near, as well as from the fact that Christians

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The Nature of the Christian Rehgion

think on whatsoever things are righteous and honour-
able and virtuous. Special emphasis is laid in 1 John
upon the children of God having their life in love of the
brethren (iii. 14 ff.), as well as in the experience of the
love of God who first loved us (iv. 7 ff.).

We have simply another side of the same truth
when prominence is given to the blessing of the Christian
religion, the Kingdom of God, as at once a gift and a
task. This follows from its inmost nature. The love
of God even cannot actualize itself in the hearts of men
by the exercise of omnipotence, as it can do in the realm
of nature : it makes its appeal to trust ; and on the other
hand even Christian love to God and our neighbour is
itself a gift of grace and a blessing, and not at all merely
a duty. The gift and the task cannot be separated ; no
one can participate in the gift who does not apply
himself to the task it involves, while again no one
can engage in the task without the power that
comes from the gift. This is what makes Christianity
the moral religion : its appeal is to a personal act of
will ; even in regard to the acceptance of the gift, such
acceptance becomes itself the task, and thereupon the
gift accepted imposes new tasks. Nor can it be other-
wise in view of the nature of the gift, seeing it is love.
But the gift of the love of God to us occupies the first
place, as surely as Christianity is the moral religion and
not a system of morality with a religious basis. This
clearly shows why and in what sense the idea of the
Kingdom of God can be supreme for Dogmatics and
Ethics ; it shows further that Ethics is based upon
Dogmatics (cf. "Ethics," pp. 127 ff.).

An accurate statement of the Christian religious
blessing would now have to further define this idea of
the Kingdom of God in all its aspects, by taking account
of the other view-point we mentioned, namely that of

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The Material Principle

redemption (or reconciliation). This does not, as used
often to be supposed, characterize Christianity solely in
its religious aspect, whereas the term Kingdom of God
indicates its moral nature ; but is an important further
determination of the fundamental concept Kingdom of
God, which is moral and religious in one. The Kingdom
of God is the supreme good of redeemed sinners —
sinners who have to be redeemed both from the guilt
and power of sin, and from all the evils which follow
from sin. This applies again to all the relations they
occupy — though we cannot discuss these in detail on
every occasion — to God, to their neighbours, to them-
selves, to the world. Jesus' preaching of the Kingdom
is combined with the call to repentance, and His purpose
of saving that which was lost (Luke xix. 10) is identical
with that of establishing the Kingdom of God. It is
the indispensable means for the realization of the end of
which we speak. Indeed it is the end itself regarded in
a particular point of view, as we see at once when we
consider here again what is the nature of the Kingdom,
namely that it is righteousness, the state of perfect
goodness, love. But in this connexion what is most
significant for our religion is the unique combination
of gentleness and severity, of absolute condemnation
of sin and of unlimited forgiveness. Other religions
appear to surpass Christianity in strictness ; they give
the name of sin to all conceivable sorts of things, and
yet have no knowledge of guilt ; in like manner they
seem to offer grace on easier terms, and yet they bring
no assurance of forgiveness. Looked at from this point
of view also, Christianity proves itself the moral religion.
We shall have to take this fundamental truth with us
through the whole of Dogmatics ; and last of all, in the
Doctrine of Justification, it will be plainly set before us
in all its unfathomable and incomparable value.

The Nature of the Christian ReUgion

Here we must emphasize further that this Kingdom
of God begins to be a reality in this present world, just
as truly as it will reach its consummation only in another
order of things. This also is a truth that does not de-
pend upon the exegesis of particular New Testament
passages, dealing with the Kingdom of God. Once
again the proof of it is to be found in the nature of the
Kingdom. The love of God would not be almighty if
it could not cause itself to be experienced in spite of
earthly conditions however opposed to it ; nor again if
it did not possess the power " to make all things new ".
Were it otherwise, the religious blessing would not be
one of a moral and spiritual nature, as we have seen
that it is, and the supreme value under consideration
would not be the ultimate reality (cf. " Ethics," pp. 130
fif.). But in emphasizing this, we have at the same
time reached the point where we can no longer speak
definitely of the content of our faith (the material
principle of Christianity), without mentioning that it is
inseparable from the fact which is the foundation of its
certainty, the revelation of God in Christ.

We have still to point out merely in passing that
for the reasons already given, there is definite corre-
spondence between the views held regarding the religious
blessing, and those regarding the nature of God and the
homage paid to Him. In Dogmatics proper it is really
the idea of God that is decisive, and that of the religious
blessing models itself upon it. But to begin with, it was
simpler to start from the religious blessing, and it is
sufficient to indicate, as we have done, that this is in line
with the idea of the God who alone is good, the perfect
Father in Heaven, who is love, and whose blessedness
has its source in His love ; whereas the blessedness of
the heathen gods, even those of a loftier species, is self-
enjoyment. With this agrees the Christian view of the

90

Revelation

world and of man ; in a history which unfolds itself in
time, throughout the whole period of their alienation
God is winning created spirits for fellowship with Him-
self. But the homage upon condition of which this
eternal Love of God actualizes itself cannot for its own
sake be a service of God, according Him something
other than the reverently grateful response to the crea-
tive word of His love. Trust is the only service of God
applicable to our religion.

All these statements, however, regarding the religious
blessing, the idea of God, and the personal relation to
God in Christianity, would be incomplete, were they not
related to the manner in which in our religion Revelation
(the Formal Principle) is viewed. Every religion,
we saw, claims to rest in some way upon revelation,
and bases thereupon both its special content and its
truth ; the fact that it thinks of God as it does, that
it expects from Him a definite religious blessing, and
does so upon certain definite conditions, and that at the
same time it believes that in this it is asserting no mere
empty dream, but really has solid giound under foot,
it traces to this that God has manifested Himself —
proved Himself real. We Christians see this revelation
perfected in Jesus ; He is the standard for the content
of our faith, and the ground of its certainty. The re-
cognition of Him as revelation has a deeper sense in our
religion than any such we find in those other religions we
have referred to, which also claim to rest upon historical
revelation. Our relation to Jesus is diff'erent from that
of the Israelites to Moses, or the Buddhists to Sakya-
Muni, or the Mohammedans to Mohammed. For the
Buddhist, in proportion as he himself becomes an Initiate,
the first great Initiate retires into the background.
Indeed, strictly speaking, it is against his own will that
the latter has been put in the place occupied in the

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The Nature of the Christian Rehgion

various religions by revelation, and that his doctrine of
self-redemption without God has in consequence been
turned into a religion. The whole effort of a Paul, on
the other hand, is to gain Christ, to be found in Him
(Phil III. ). Every forward step only makes Christ more
indispensable for him ; and our oldest authorities prove
that he does not misunderstand Jesus in assigning Him
this place, but that He Himself claimed — " Neither doth
any know the Father save the Son, and he to whomso-
ever the Son reveals Him " (Matt. xi. 27 ff). Islam sets
up from the very start an inseparable relation between
its adherents and Mohammed, the prophet, that is the
revealer, of Allah. But faith in Mohammed is submis-
sion to the law which governs faith and life by principles
alike inviolable. This law is true because Mohammed
as the prophet has proclaimed it. There is, however, no
essential connexion between it and his person. For us
Christians on the contrary Jesus is the norm and basis of
our faith, in the sense that, as regards its content and cer-
tainty, our faith is so inseparably connected with Him that
He is its object. " We beheve in God the Father Almighty
and in Jesus Christ our Lord." This is not meant simply
in the sense in which it is said of Moses that the people
believed in Jahveh and His servant Moses (Exod. xiv.
31). What God does by the hand of Moses associates
trust in Jahveh with trust in His instrument ; just as
in John xiv. 1 — Ye believe in God ; believe also in me.
But the similarity which we have here only brings the
difference into clearer relief. Since the revelation made
through Moses, however it excels other examples, is
after all only preparatory compared to that given in
Jesus, is not yet the complete personal revelation of the
purely Spiritual God of all goodness, Israel's trust in
Moses is in consequence not so inseparable from trust
in its God, as that which Christians repose in Jesus is

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Revelation

from trust in God the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ.
And this unique significance which belongs to Jesus as
the historical revelation only comes out in a clearer light,
when Christianity, so far from denying, lays quite special
emphasis upon, the inward attestation which may also be
spoken of as revelation, qualifications being reserved :
"Flesh and blood hath not revealed it unto thee, but my
Father which is in heaven " ; " When it pleased God to
reveal His Son in me" ; " God hath revealed it, unto us
by His Spirit" (Matt. xvi. 17; Gal. i. 15 f. ; 1 Cor. ii.
10). What does this refer to? The appropriation of
the revelation of God in Jesus, the personal realization
of the great historical reality.

In short, in our religion, the material principle and
the formal principle, the content (the religious blessing,
Godj and the homage offered Him) and the foundation
(the revelation accepted) are identical as they are in no
other. Eightly understood, Jesus in whom we Chris-
tians see the perfect revelation of God, is Himself the
religious blessing ; He belongs to the side of God, our
faith and our homage is faith in Christ and a bowing
of the knee before Him to the glory of God the Father
(Phil. II. 9 ff.). Or if at this point these statements
without qualification and proof may be open to attack,
the conclusion at all events is that the religion and the
Person under consideration cannot be separated ; Jesus
is somehow the " power of His gospel ". In this sense He
belongs to the gospel. He is the gospel. In this consists
the unity of the faith, in spite of all the diversity of
theological opinion. To examine the theological differ-
ences, and to find as accurate an expression as possible
for the faith in question, will be the task of our whole
detailed exposition of Dogmatics.

Many other questions which have often been raised
in connexion with the matter before us cannot be de-

93

The Nature of the Christian ReHgion

cided at this stage of our inquiries. There is the question,
for example, whether the idea of revelation jis adequate
for the unique significance of Jesus. Ought He not at
the very least to be described explicitly as the revelation
of salvation, as redeeming us and reconciling us to God ?
In view of all that has gone before, our answer to the
latter question is quite obvious ; from the very start we
have opposed the error of Intellectualism, which makes
revelation the impartation of supernatural truths. We
are unable to determine where the concept in question
is defective — how far it is inadequate to indicate the
reality of God in its supreme activity, which is manifestly
His activity as directed towards the realization of the
moral and spiritual blessing which is always His end,
the Kingdom of God for sinners in need of redemption.
But to give up the concept of revelation altogether must
be not merely unnecessary but ill-advised, because it
puts difficulties in the way of comparing our religion
with others, and brings its distinctive character forward
not in a more but in a less convincing form. However,
we expressly defer all consideration of details, desirable
as it may be in the interests of our subject. Thus, e.g.
there is the question which is certainly an important one
in its own place, whether Jesus in bringing us salvation
from God is at the same time possessed of value for God,
as in some sense He appears on our behalf before Him.
But to discuss this question in the preliminary section
of our work would readily lead to confusion. At this
point it is only the unique signiticance of Jesus of which
we have spoken that must be put in the forefront as be-
longing to the essence of our religion, and we must still
confine ourselves to a general statement.

To vindicate the legitimacy of the faith of which we
speak is one of the principal tasks of Apologetics — the
proof of the truth of Christianity. It is as a foundation

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Revelation

for this that we have begun with this discussion of its
nature, in order to learn what has to be proved, or if this
is impossible, what we are to do instead. Is it possible
to prove what we have asserted of the unique significance
of the Founder of our religion — to prove that it is both
intelligible and necessary in view of the general char-
acter of the religion under consideration, and in line with
Jesus' own intention ? Or is the " Christianity of Christ,"
which is separable from His person, the original and per-
fect Christianity ? Our discussion so far has done this
much at least for us : it has taught us to expect that
the explanation of the special place which our religion
assigns to Jesus will be found in the distinctive character
of its content, the particular form assumed in it by the
communion of which we spoke between God and man
which is the goal in every religion. The Kingdom of
God, of which we have spoken, in its unfathomable
compass and majesty, particularly as being a kingdom
for sinners, demands the personal self-revelation of the
God of holy love who alone is good, provided that living
personal trust in Him is to become a reality in the hearts
of men. This further imposes upon us the duty of at
least carefully examining our other question, the histori-
cal one.

At the close of this determination of the nature of
our religion as a foundation for the proof of its truth,
there is a further point which may be mentioned. For
a more detailed exposition it would be highly rewarding
to elaborate Schleiermacher's view of the heresies in
Christianity. He himself does this with reference to the
construction put upon Christ and human sin in their
reciprocal relations : if such stress is laid upon human
sin that there is a danger of its being denied that man
is capable of redemption, the tendency in the doctrine
of Christ will be so to overstate what is distinctive in

95

The Nature of the Christian Rehgion

Him as to endanger His likeness to us. If on the other
hand our views of sin were so low that there should
seem to be scarcely any reason why we should affirm our
need of redemption, we should think of Christ as not
differing in essence from ourselves. Schleiermacher was
thus the first, of set purpose, to mark off the foundation
for an exposition of our faith as a truly coherent whole,
showing the inner relation of every element in it to every
other. He did this by fixing upon what is the decisive
point for our religion, the doctrine of the Redeemer and
of the redemption wrought by Him. It would be easy
to show, however, that the mutually related errors we
have mentioned in the doctrine of sin and in Christology
by no means stand alone. Heresies in regard to the
doctrine of God, the world, conversion, the Consumma-
tion, could be adduced in the same way, and these also
act and react upon each other as well as along with
those mentioned by Schleiermacher, in the most inti-
mate fashion.

This whole determination of the nature of our religion
occupies the distinctive standpoint of the Protestant
Church. The Roman Catholic Church has an essenti-
ally different conception of Christianity. The religious
blessing, the view of God, man's religious relation to God
and the estimate put upon Jesus are all different. This
statement is to be accepted here upon the authority of
the science of Symbolics. All the differences between
the two churches which strike the eye may be traced
back to this fundamental difference of which we speak.
According to our Protestant view, the religious blessing
is the personal fellowship of trust with the personal God
of Holy Love in the Kingdom of God through Christ, as
we have described it. On this view the Church must
be to us simply the fellowship of believers, who, inspired
by the Gospel to the personal faith of which we speak,

96

The Protestant Church

communicate this faith-producing gospel to others. For
Roman Catholics, on the other hand, the Church, as
organized upon a legal basis, the hierarchy, is an object
of faith : being infallible she guarantees the truth, in the
sacraments she dispenses grace, in virtue of her divine
authority she governs the life of believers. The funda-
mental reason why the Church as an institution is thus
valued, is that a dififerent view is held regarding the re-
ligious blessing : it is not of a purely personal and ethical
character, but while it is indeed ethical, it is at the same
time supersensible, though working through the senses ;
grace is not the gracious will of God of which we have
spoken, which shows itself operative in Christ, but a
mysterious sanctifying power. It is not possible to be-
come assured of, and to participate in it, solely by per-
sonal trust, and in such trust itself to experience the
impulse to and the power of the new life ; by divine
appointment all this depends upon the legally constituted
Church. Or for our present purpose we may express the
same truth quite briefly as follows : because the material
principle is differently construed, there is a difference of
view as to the formal principle as well. We mean by it,
as we have seen, the revelation of God in Christ which
produces faith, whereas the Church of Kome means the
Church with her infallible hierarchy. She is the norm
and basis of the truth, guaranteeing the truth of the
salvation of which we have spoken, and in her sacraments
as well as by her direction of souls making it effective ;
and in this way she herself becomes the chief good.
This difference between our position and that of Roman
Catholic Christianity will often engage our attention as
we proceed ; hitherto we only needed to point to funda-
mentals.

It might further seem desirable at this point to take
up the thesis which is at present so warmly discussed,

VOL. I. 97 7

The Nature of the Christian Rehgion

that what we call Protestantism must be consciously
distinguished as Neo-Protestantism from that of the
Reformers, which is Old Protestantism (cf. Troeltsch).
But in this case too, it is only our exposition as a whole
that can give a satisfactory account of the matter.
Here the question may suffice — Is Old Protestantism
really only a transformation of mediaeval " ecclesiastical
principles, characterized as they were by supernaturalism
and dualism " essentially, when it is admitted that not
only was the Sacramental system destroyed, but also
the idea of grace became difiFerent as regards its con-
tent ? A Protestantism of a general type again, without
the living, personal God of grace, would no longer be a
form of Christianity (cf. Ethics, p. Ill ff.). At present,
the difiference of the Reformation age from our own is
not infrequently exaggerated in this respect among
others that, in the former, faith in God is viewed as an
inviolable presupposition. That is no doubt right, if
it is the public vogue that is considered. But if we
look to personal conviction in the depths of the heart,
there was a raging conflict for the individual, even in
that former period ; as we may see, e.g. from Luther's
treatise De serw arhitrio.

Lastly, in what sense the following exposition runs on
distinctively Lutheran lines within Protestantism, only
an examination of the separate statements as they
occur can determine. At the same time here again
we may call attention to the fundamental principle at
all events. It is this. The opposition to the modern
consciousness, so far as it is non-Christian, on the one
hand, and on the other, the gentle pervasive influence
of the New Testament sources of information which
are common to all Protestants, or should become a
common possession, have forced into the background
the old points of difiference between the Protestant Con-

98

The Protestant Church

fessions. This applies even to those who have no desire
for any external union, and know well how to value the
great heritage of their particular Church. The more
this unity, which is not of the letter, in regard to the
attitude of our hearts to the gospel grows among us,
the less possibility will there be of any flirtation with
the Church of Rome, as the Guardian of the "great
truths of the faith which all Christians hold in common,"
and on the other hand, the greater the possibility of a
genuine union in faith with the individual devout mem-
bers of the Church in question.

99

THE TEUTH OF THE CHEISTIAN KELIGION

It is a matter of secondary consequence whether we
speak of a "proof" of the truth or prefer the terms
"establishment," "vindication" or "justification".
Many think " proof " incorrect because they associate
with this word a quite definite sense, of which in the
nature of the case there can be no question here. But
it is still quite undetermined what the character of the
proof is. The same applies to the other words also.
On the other hand, the foregoing discussion of the
nature of our religion has made it still clearer than it
was when we began, how necessainj and how difficult
such a proof or vindication is. We have got fresh light
upon a series of the objections which are mentioned
there, in their source and intention, and also at the same
time in their seriousness. We found that religion, and
especially our own, is so much a thing by itself, that we
can readily understand how it looks to many men of our
day like a stranger in their world. But while knowledge
of its nature prevents our making light of the proof of
its truth, it gives us the right sort of courage thereto.
For one thing, we see that many objections to Chris-
tianity do not affect Christianity at all, as soon as we
direct our attention to what Christianity really is, and
not to some view of it as the creation of man's own fancy.
We often hear it said, for example, that if the gospel
had been right it must have long since conquered the
whole world. But this does not accord with the judg-

100

Connexion of Nature and Truth

ment of the gospel regarding the world ; from the very
start it combined with the feeling of the certainty of
victory the clearest possible understanding of the extent
of the opposition it had to encounter, indicating plainly
■enough the reasons for this opposition, among others
the fact that the enigmas in the life even of Christians
are challenges to their faith. Then again it is strange
that the opponents of Christianity should believe them-
selves able to prove it untrue, because they find the
amount of evil in the world incompatible with the love
of God. They demand that we should prove a love
which does not coincide with the Christian view of
God : it is not surprising if the proof is unsuccessful.
This brings us to the second advantage which results
from our knowing the nature of our religion before we
enter upon the establishment of its truth — not only
must the proof of the truth have reference to the nature
as precisely determined, but rightly understood the
nature as ascertained furnishes the basis for the proof
of the truth. Or putting the matter more accurately,
the end and method of a proof of the truth follow from
the knowledge of the nature. Not every proof cor-
responds to the Christian faith which has to be proved ;
it is equally true that the faith cannot dispense with all
proof. I give an illustration of what I am saying.
Present day opponents of our religion lighten their task
by dazzling and confusing its adherents by means of the
variety of their weapons, and the rapidity with which
they change them. *' What must first be proved is not
of much value." "Faith makes blessed, therefore it
lies." Such are two catchwords which are in great
favour (Nietzsche). Properly speaking they contradict
each other, but both are supposed to hold good against
Christianity. The first says, in its application to Christi-
anity, that it needs no proof whatever, provided it is

101

The Truth of the Christian Rehgion

of value ; in that case it rather contains the proof in
itself, from the simple fact that as it exists it is so
precious. The second says that, if it refers to its effects
in conferring blessedness, in order to prove its truth,
what it does prove is only that it is of no value, — because
it cannot get any other proof. A Christian will be
specially willing now to admit what is true in both of
them. As regards the former he will admit that he
knows something of an inward certainty which cannot
be forced by argument. " The Spirit beareth witness
with our spirit." As regards the latter, he will admit
that he must exercise very special caution in the matter of
finding a proof of the truth of his faith in anything that
men have already indicated by the word " blessedness ".
But for these very reasons, he refuses to be afraid of
one or other of these statements, or of a combination
of the two. On the contrary, he invites his opponents
to understand from the nature of faith, in what sense it
does not require a proof, and again in what sense it re-
quires one that cannot be charged with being a beautiful
illusion.

A vindication of Christianity at a particular time is
of value for the time in question, in proportion as it lays to
rest the special objections then current. But in order
to make it plain what our task is, we must glance at
the history of Apologetics.

THE HISTOEY OF APOLOGETICS

This history shows how the antagonism has assumed
the special form which confronts us now, and what
weapons, old and new, we of the present day have to
employ. The Apologetics of the past falls into two
divisions of very unequal length as regards time. Speak-
ing quite generally we have to do, as we showed at the
start, with the conflict between Faith and Knowledge,

102

History of Apologetics

Now though these two entities, Faith and Knowledge,
have always dominated Apologetics, to begin with their
nature was not investigated to the extent which the case
requires ; for who is to determine questions of right and
wrong between opponents imperfectly discriminated ?
Schleiermacher was the first to endeavour to show
scientifically what faith is ; and Kant was the first,
deliberately and of set purpose, to summon knowledge,
the critic of all things, before the bar of criticism. Ac-
cordingly we group together all Apologetics prior to
Kant and Schleiermacher, in spite of the important differ-
ences we discover, in one great period. If we look again
only at the main features, and survey the history with
a view to the understanding of our present task, it falls
in the next place into the two subdivisions, Domination
of Faith over knowledge and Domination of Knowledge
over Faith. But because Faith and Knowledge were
not yet known as they are distinguished from each other
in their inmost essence, we can easily understand how
Faith, not having been subjected to criticism, remained
too near akin to Knowledge, without this being observed,
and conceded to Knowledge far too extensive rights,
thus injuring itself ; while on the other hand. Know-
ledge, not having been subjected to criticism, was simply
unproved Faith, and in consequence prejudiced real
Knowledge.

The domination of faith, alongside of the great
half-concealed influence of Knowledge, is the easily
understood consequence of the victory of our religion
over the Ancient World in the Ancient World. It was
the victory of a Truth, which in its victory manifested
itself as supernatural both in its content and in the mode
of its attestation. The foolishness of God had overcome
the wisdom of men ; the proof of the Spirit and of power
was on its side. Greater miracles no other religion could

103

The Truth of the Christian ReHgion

claim, and the particular examples had all centred in the
Miracle of all miracles, in the Name above every name,
which was reverenced as that of Him who was the
unsurpassable Revelation of the eternal God. But the
victor expressed his victory to himself, supernatural as
it undoubtedly appeared to him, in terms of the natural
means of the vanquished ; the product of the ancient cul-
ture was assimilated, modified by Christian Truth and in
turn modifying it. Indeed it was in relation to the point
here before us, the proof of the truth of Christianity,
that the ancient culture of which we speak exerted its
influence in the wonderful combination of beauty, truth,
morality and religion, which constitutes the charm of
Antiquity, but fails to do justice to the seriousness of
religion as Christianity understands it. The boundary
lines between these highest interests of man's inner
life were not clearly defined. The beautiful was
good and true, the good was true and beautiful, and re-
ligion was one with Art, Ethics and Philosophy. In
Christianity there was a new experience now of divine
truth, men felt within them a new power for the truly
good ; but the time had not yet arrived for the search-
ing question, how this truth of God stands related
to everything else which receives the name of true
and good. Thus though enough could not be said in
praise of revelation as something unheard of and
unique, this point of view alternates only too rapidly
with another, and revelation is regarded as the perfec-
tion of ordinary human reason. It is well known what
combination of the Gospel with philosophy is presented
to us in Greek dogma. And likewise in the Roman
Churchy alongside of absolute subjection to authority,
a wide field is left to the natural intellect and will.
In the beginnings of Scholasticism, the universal domin-
ation of the Church manifests itself in the claim to

104

Before and at the Reformation

iurnish a proof of the necessity of the incarnation
•on a purely rational basis. In its best days reason
was regarded as able at least to bring men in virtue
of its own inherent power to the forecourts of Truth,
to provide proofs of the being of God and to con-
firm the law of conscience innate in man. Further,
the Vatican Decree pronounces its anathema on both
positions, that the one true God cannot be known by
the natural light of human reason, and that supernatural
revelation is unnecessary. Indeed even to this day, we
iind Romish Apologetics very fond of admitting, in
the first instance with a show of Liberalism, the force
of impartial science, in order thereafter all the more
surely to make it distrustful of itself, and thus bring it
to the altar of the Church. Its efi'orts are not without
astuteness, since our Protestantism, in making the
truth a matter of private judgment, is represented
as making it relative, and since faith is defined as
that conviction, firmly established by the Grace of God,
which is realized through the co-operation of reason
and will with grace. Certainly we can see in this
glorification of Saint Thomas compared to Kant, only
a narrowing of science and religion. The anxiety oc-
casioned by Modernism certainly seems now to have
as its first eff'ect a further curtailment still of this Catho-
lic science, a species which succeeded in its own way
in producing important results (pioneer work in Apolo-
getics).

The new understanding of the nature of the Gospel
which was granted to the Reformation, necessarily pro-
duced at the same time a new understanding of the
elements of a relevant proof of its truth which are in-
herent in it. The person who knows what the Gospel
is finds himself thereby delivered from many artificial-
ities of Apologetics, and directed to the way which leads

105

The Truth of the Christian Rehgion

to the goal of certainty. Luther had a lively sense of
where the roots of genuine Apologetics are to be found :
in a right estimate of the supreme value which the
Gospel offers us, and of the supreme reality which it
possesses in Christ — which together constitute an in-
dissoluble unity. Because he knew by experience what
faith is, what is meant by saying that we cannot "by
exercise of our own reason or strength believe in Jesus
Christ," and how God (Christ, the Word) and Faith
" go together," he spoke a new language with regard to
faith and knowledge also, telling us that the truth of
the Kingdom of God belongs to a sphere "without,
within, above and underneath all dialectical appre-
hension ". But this was prophecy and not science, and
accordingly we find it everywhere conjoined with the
fundamental conceptions of the past, which belong to
another order of thought. For example, even the
statement last quoted appears in a disputation (xi. i.
1539) defending the thesis of the twofold truth ; with
regard to which, however, it shows a much firmer grasp
than any of the mediaeval compromises between reason
and revelation. Further, searching investigation has
proved that the famous juxtaposition of "clear grounds
of Scripture or Reason," is genuinely mediaeval or Au-
gustinian.

The Dogmatic Theologians of the Churches of the
Reformation built rather upon this mediaeval heritage
than upon Luther's own ideas, rich as they were in
promise for the future. To be sure, their funda-
mental principle was the absolute supremacy of reve-
lation in the sharpest conceivable form. The only
source of knowledge is supernatural revelation, which
means for us Holy Scripture. Its Author, the Holy
Spirit, produces faith in it in the same supernatural
fashion in which He produced it, by His inward testi-

106

The Reformation

mony to it. In relation to this miracle supernaturalljr
attested, reason has no other function than a purely
formal one, to collect and arrange the truths contained
in Scripture. The intention of this doctrine is as clear
as it is unexceptionable, namely to safeguard the cer-
tainty of the saving truth upon which depend life and
blessedness. But it is equally clear and incontestable
that it fails of its purpose. The sum of the supernatural
facts and truths contained in Scripture which are super-
naturally attested by the Spirit, is something different
from the declaration of the grace of God in Christ which
produces faith ; such a displacement of the concept of
Faith and Eevelation held by the Reformers, and their
identification with something that the intellect can pro-
duce, even if it can be produced presumably only in a
supernatural manner, must in the long run have been as
intolerable for faith as it was for knowledge ; it must have
given rise both to Pietism and to Kationalism. But the
old Protestant Apologetics contained within itself yet
another element which was to help towards its dissolu-
tion. Alongside of the purely formal function of reason
in relation to supernatural revelation of which we have
spoken, our old divines recognized another ; besides
what they called the " organic," that is purely formal,
they spoke likewise of a " catasceuastic" i.e. preparatory
or pedagogic. By this word they meant that inasmuch
as reason has a natural, though it be only a dim "inborn
knowledge of God," but especially inasmuch as it recog-
nizes the Divine law in conscience, it points us towards
and brings us to the Gospel, preparing us to accept it.
This is certainly a profound thought ; as a matter of
fact there can be no understanding of the Gospel, unless
it is brought into relation with the law of conscience.
No genuinely Christian Apologetic can dispense with
this thought. But if its scope is not defined with the-

107

The Truth of the Christian ReUgion

greatest care, if as was increasingly the case with our
old Protestant Dogmatists, such natural knowledge,
owing chiefly to an inaccurate exegesis of Romans i.
19, II. 15, is appreciated at more than its real value, we
<}ome very near to the ancient Catholic view of the rela-
tion between faith and knowledge ; as is shown especially
by the distinction between " mixed articles of faith,"
established partly by natural reason (also called natural
revelation) and partly by supernatural revelation, and
*' pure " articles derived solely from the latter.

But this state of affairs makes it incumbent upon
reason to free itself from the authority of revelation.
The period of the domination of faith not thoroughly
critical of itself, when consequently knowledge has a
wider range assigned to it than it has proved its right to
and faith suffers, is followed by that of the domination
OF KNOWLEDGE, imperfectly critical, and consequently
with its exact rights undetermined as before, while it
does harm to itself as before. The preparation furnished
for this domination by the Renaissance, and its establish-
ment on first principles since the time of Descartes, may
here be taken for granted. It is sufficient for our pur-
pose to refer to the standpoint of the " Enlightenment "
and of Rationalism ; there is no need to mention all the
separate forms of this type of thought. Nor do we re-
quire to dwell on the question how far even religious
interests associated with a *' layman's faith " which the
common man himself could understand, were satisfied
by this Rationalism.

It is more important that we should realize that even
the complete revolution indicated by Kant's " Critique
of Pure Reason " could not in his own case, and still less
in that of many of his followers, supply a basis for a rele-
vant Apologetic, because the other condition for such
which is equally indispensable, the knowledge of the

108

Kant and Schleiermacher

nature of religion which we owe to Schleiermacher, was
lacking, or as in the case of the Speculative Philosophy
was again lost, or at all events not properly made use of.
When Hegel teaches that all religious knowledge remains
on the plane of pictorial representation, and has to be
raised to that of the Absolute Philosophy, we have the
domination of knowledge over faith, albeit in a form in-
finitely superior to and richer in content than that of the
" Enhghtenment," or of Pre-Kantian Rationalism. Not
only so, but knowledge with him in great measure fails
to reckon with the Kantian criticism of reason, without
having proved it invalid. In the modern consciousness
again, under the influence not only of Romanticism but
also of Kant himself, the sense for the depths of reality,,
for the mystery of our existence, has become exceedingly
delicate in a multitude of people, and indeed stimulating ;
only, a strict recognition of the limits of demonstrative
knowledge is by no means secured in this way, and the
old craving for domination, by which reason was charac-
terized before it was subjected to criticism, is by no
means eradicated. This matter was already referred to
at the outset, and it will have to be discussed at greater
length, when we are dealing with the modern Philosophy
of Religion, and in the systematic exposition of Apolo-
getics.

How far can it be said of Schleiermacher that he
explained the nature of faith in a manner that furnishes
a basis for a proof of its truth ? This question is not
answered when we point generally to his scientific
exhibition of the nature of religion, of which we have al-
ready spoken ; on the contrary we must set forth the con-
sequences of his work for the concept of religious truth.
Here two points have to be remembered. For one thing,
Schleiermacher was the first to explain scientifically
what sort of truth it is, putting the matter generally,

109

The Truth of the Christian Religion

that we seek to establish — the nature of the truth which
the Christian Church at large is interested in proving.
The Church at large is by no means concerned to prove
-all that Dogmatics has ever in any place established or
sought to establish. Even if we admit, e.g. that the
Chalcedonian formula regarding Christ is an inalienable
possession of the Church, for reasons afterwards to be
more particularly specified, let us say because it is indis-
pensable as a safeguard against errors, Schleiermacher
has made it impossible to assert any longer that it is a
truth of Christian faith in the strict sense. Such a truth
must have immediate value for Christian experience, the
personal religious life of the Christian. This is an in-
dubitable consequence of the nature of religion. But
the formula in question does not possess immediate value
for the Christian religious life, and that for two reasons.
Many have believed on Christ and do believe, without
knowing it, and it is foreign to the New Testament at
least as a formula. Indeed this has been admitted in
principle by every system of Dogmatics since Schleier-
macher, however much the admission may have been
retracted in regard to particulars, or glossed over. The
second principle is a consequence of this first one. It is
that a truth of faith (or a religious truth) can be proved
true, only upon condition that in some form there is
experience of its truth. This does not mean that what
is valuable must on that account be real, but without
appreciation of the value the reality cannot be under-
stood. To continue using the same type of example,
the redemption work of Jesus can be proved an actuality
only to the person who lets himself be redeemed. We
are concerned with a species of certainty which, in
■Schleiermacher's own words, "is other, but not less,
than that which is associated with the objective con-
sciousness ". This also follows from the nature of

110

Schleiermacher

religion ; and what was previously set forth with refer-
ence to the sense in which the ambiguous phrase Judgment
of Value may legitimately be used, appears now in a
specially clear light, and would have to be repeated.

But we must add forthwith ; Schleiermacher does
not make full use of the two principles we have men-
tioned, he only sets them agoing ; which is quite in line
with the fact that he personally only starts without
settling the discussion of the nature of religion, know-
ledge of which it is that yields the principles in question
as consequences for the proof of its truth. In the first
place Christian religious experience, statements of the
content of which, according to Schleiermacher, con-
stitute the doctrines of Christianity, required a fixed
standard measured by which such experience could
prove its Christian character. The doctrines of Chris-
tianity are far from being " simply statements in proposi-
tional form of the states of feeling characteristic of
Christian piety ". They are at least statements of states
of feeling produced in some fashion by the divine re-
velation in Christ ; they give expression to a quite de-
finite experience of salvation brought about by revelation.
If it should be said, not without reason, that Schleier-
macher, so far from denying this, took it for granted,
the answer is that in any case it should have been
stated with greater explicitness. Then again while
Schleiermacher is quite right in his assertion regarding
the establishment of such positions, that their truth
can be proved only to the person who possesses the
experience in question, this statement must be qualified
thus : it is not the subjective experience which furnishes
the adequate ground of the truth, but the divine revela-
tion as it proves its reality to human need. In a word,
all the defects we had to point out in Schleiermacher's
conception of religion leave their mark upon his proof

111

The Truth of the Christian ReHgion

of its truth. But at the same time it is Schleiermacher
himself who shows the way to the modifications re-
quired : in his definition of our religion he emphasizes
its ethical character, and its complete dependence upon
Christ as the revelation of God. The next task of
necessity is to arrange terms between faith and know-
ledge— between religious truth and everything else
bearing the name of truth, doing justice to the advance
marked by Kant. The latter subject will be treated
with more precision in the systematic exposition. But
even here this defect in Schleiermacher must be em-
phasized, because the most recent investigations of his
theory of principles have reference to it in particular.
It is undeniable that while, in the " Discourses " and
in his "Ethics," he considers religion as a process of
historical development, or prepares the way for this idea,
he has not clearly related his view to the same conception
of the experience of the Christian Church as an ultimate
certainty. This is shown most plainly by a comparison
of the first paragraphs of " The Christian Faith " with the
''Philosophical Theology" in the'* Short Exposition".
Starting with the Nature of Religion as Schleiermacher
began to apprehend it, we require to arrive at a new
determination, resting on first principles, of the relation
between faith and knowledge ; and then the appeal to
Christian experience no longer seems a mere assertion.
This, however, was not the course immediately followed
by Sghleiermacher's direct successors. All viewed
with admiration the advance he had made. Practically
none escaped his influence — not even those who claimed
to use him simply as a bridge across which to pass to
firmer ground ; while on the other hand, his most un-
qualified admirers could not altogether get away from
the demand we refer to, for a fixed standard and in
particular an impregnable stronghold of truth. But

112

The Mediating Theology

it was as if the innovation had been too daring for
his work to be fully understood to begin with, and
to be carried on quite in the spirit of the great start
that had been made. Instead of this, the Apolo-
getics of the nineteenth century sought at first to
come to the rescue with little expedients, attempting
to cover over the deficiencies in Schleiermacher by
borrowing from the main schools of thought prior to
his time. All had their own specific : a little more of
the Bible, a little more of the Church Confession, a
little more reason, became the watchwords. Taking
these watchwords, and looking only at what is most im-
portant for our purpose, and not at the separate details
of the history, we can readily distinguish three groups,
which had many notable representatives last century,
and are still active among ourselves. We have to add
a fourth, which has to be placed first, because more than
any of the others their deliberate intention is to follow
Schleiermacher's lead. All they seek to do is to make
his position unassailable by emphasizing more strongly
the aids we have mentioned.

This last group is the Mediating Theology, as it is
called. Its adherents are united by their intimate rela-
tion to Schleiermacher ; in order to make his doctrinal
statements more distinctively Christian, and their truth
more indisputable, they emphasize the one or the other
of the principles which occupied the first place in the
proof of the truth prior to Schleiermacher. For
example, with the elder Nitzsch it is Holy Scripture,
with Twesten it is the History of Dogma and the Con-
fession of the Church, with I. A. Corner and Martensen
it is speculative reason ; while A. Schweizer was most
anxious to be faithful to Schleiermacher, though with
all the modifications of which we speak, demanded as it
appeared by the circumstances of the time ; and M.

VOL. I. 113 8

The Truth of the Christian Religion

Landerer, less in evidence as an author but exerting an
influence upon grateful pupils, had a specially clear
sense of the defects of his own theological school, and
sought with special acuteness to get over these defects
by die use of the methods of the school itself. E. Kothe,
on the other hand, occupying a position near akin to
that of the theologians we have named, though at the
same time standing alone in bold independence, was
regarded by some, with his speculation on Christian
topics, as an echo of the past and by others as the
herald of a better future. The power of the whole
school lay in the earnestness combined with freedom,
with which they sought to reconcile both the Protestant
Churches around them with each other, and the uncur-
tailed Gospel with all the elements of humane culture,
and especially theology with philosophy— a reconciUa-
tion illustrated by many-sided harmonious personalities.
There is a tendency nowadays to undervalue not only
their work in regard to particular doctrines, but also
their Apologetic activity, often without knowing it.
But it is undeniable that from about the middle of the
sixties, the scepticism of the younger generation as to
the reliableness of this type of scientific confirmation
grew. It was apt to create the impression of being
artificial and complicated ; it seemed at once to go too
far and not far enough ; the points of support, related
to each other to a nicety, did not inspire full confidence
as to the adequacy of the foundation they furnished.
Connected with this was the fact that there was no
evidence of an influence quickening the thought of the
people as a whole, genuine and of a fine fibre as the
piety of the individual representatives of this theology
doubtless was.

As this feeling came to prevail among the younger
theologians, more determined leaders for them appeared

Liberal Theology

on the Right and on the Left. On the Left, we had
what is called the Liberal Theology. It often preferred
to speak of itself as Schleiermacher's Left, emphasizing
in its own way its connexion with him quite as much as
did his following on the Right of which we have spoken.
Their aim was to establish the experiential basis by
unreserved recognition of reason. Epistemologically
this group falls into those who in manifest dependence
upon Hegel make " speculative reason the autonomous
standard for religious experience " (Biedermann), and
others who, professedly at least, associating themselves
with Kant, seek with the help of reason so to work up
the material presented by experience as to efifect an
" adjustment between Christian truth and all the assured
results of present-day knowledge " (Lipsius) — a favourite
claim for a whole generation. As regards the content
of their teaching, the advocates of this theology were
distinguished according as they construed the idea of
God pantheistically or theistically — a distinction which
for the most part indeed followed the epistemological
one already referred to. But they were at one in
deliberately contrasting the " Christ of history and the
ideal Christ," with which went their agreement in the
estimate they formed of sin, according to the principle
as to the connexion between the two already enunciated
by Schleiermacher ; although at the same time, in har-
mony with their view of God, the one party were more
seriously concerned as to the recognition of the ideas of
guilt, responsibility and freedom. It is hard to tell
what was mainly responsible for the decline of the en-
thusiasm which stood so high for a generation ; whether
it was appreciation of the violence done to fundamental
positions of Christianity on such matters as petitionary
prayer and eternal life, at all events in the case of the
former type of thinkers, or suspicion as to the lack of a

115

The Truth of the Christian Rehgion

scientific foundation. The spirit of the age, which had
been identified with the view in question, took other
directions, and regarded the use of reason here recom-
mended as only a shade less irrational than the method
followed in the restored Orthodoxy.

This third school, the Theological Right or the Con-
fessional Theology as it is called, seeks to combine the
experiential basis in the recognition of which it shows
its connexion with Schleiermacher, sometimes laying
great stress thereupon, with emphatic recognition of
the Church's Confession. Here again the differences
are great. There was reproduction pure and simple
(Philippi), which owed to Schleiermacher scarcely any-
thing beyond the dialectical phraseology ; there was
finely conceived utilization of the History of Dogma
(Thomasius) ; in the most intimate dependence upon
Schleiermacher in regard to method, J. Chr. K. Hof-
mann develops his Christian experience, at the same time
as a Scriptural Theologian evolving from his experience
the content of Scripture ; while Frank in his System of
Christian Certainty proves, as he believes upon the basis
of universally valid principles, that the whole rich con-
tent of the Confession is the necessary presupposition of
the experience of regeneration. The roots of such Apolo-
getics reach back not only to the enthusiasm of the War
of Independence, and still farther to Pietism, but also to
the general attitude of Romanticism. The merit of the
whole movement in having directed attention to the
rich treasures of the past is clear. Equally obvious is
the danger of confusing what was once living with what
is still desirable, and then forcing it upon men's minds by
other than purely spiritual means. In time the power
of the Church Press came to dominate the situation.
People were readier to measure the faith of others by the
standard of the Confessions than they were to conform

116

Confessional Theology and Biblicism

to them in all particulars themselves. And those who
personally welcomed the return to the faith of their
fathers most heartily, could not always feel unmixed
satisfaction with the way in which this faith was made
the battle-cry in secular matters as well, and complained
that the spiritual movement and its influence upon the
world generally were not so living as in the days of
their youth.

Was there not then a much simpler way to secure
what was best in all these schools, and to avoid their
errors? What but Holy Scripture was the source of
their best elements ? It wrought in them what was
vital ; it continued to work when everything else in
them fell into decay, or sought to assert itself in
doubtful disputation. And was it not a defect of
Schleiermacher's emphasized by all, that he under-
valued Scripture ? It is necessary to have seen such
obvious views of the Bihlicist School embodied in a
forceful personality like J. T. Beck, in order to under-
stand their full weight : Be disciples of simplicity,
the wisdom from above ; leave the many fine-spun
theories of theology alone, they merely mislead farther
and farther from the goal ! The thing is to find in
Scripture the " organism of truth " which is immanent
in it, and it is found by the disciples of simplicity who
are prepared to do the will of God. In the simple
emphasizing of the primary truth, that the Gospel makes
the proof of its truth contingent upon moral conditions,
which found expression in the Old Protestant doctrine
of First Principles at its best, and which had come
to life, aside from the beaten track, in a Spener and
J. J. Moser, lay the most valuable contribution of
Biblicism to a relevant Apologetic. But it was possible
to accept this idea heartily in all its force without being
satisfied with the foundation laid by this theological

117

The Truth of the Christian Rehgion

group, because they made no strict and thorouo;hgoing
examination of the relations between faith and know-
ledge, and consequently often produced the impression
of referring the sceptic to conscience, for what ought
properly to have been dealt with at the bar of knowledge.
Again, lastly, the organism of Scriptural truth of which
they spoke, on closer examination proved to be not
immanent in Scripture, but superimposed upon it from
an alien source, namely, Theosophy. And a really his-
torical treatment of Scripture was not taken seriously.
We have something quite different when such Biblicism
does not offer itself as a special Apologetic standpoint,
and indeed as the only correct one, but merely gives ex-
pression to a living personal dependence upon Scripture.
Thus understood, it is as imperishable as Scripture itself,
and in its worthy representatives a welcome reminder to
all the different schools of theology, that they but state
the eternal gospel for their own day. But because one
sees this, to refuse to occupy any definite theological
standpoint presupposes quite special gifts and guidance.
In reviewing the century after Schleiermacher, per-
haps the quickest way of bringing home to our minds
the results and the task is by a slight modification of a
well-known metaphor. Schleiermacher's fundamental
Apologetic principle was a great simplification as com-
pared with the elaborate structures of the past ; but his
own structure (in regard that is to the Apologetic pro-
blem with which we are occupied) was little more than
outlined ; the building was scarcely formed. So it
seemed insecure, unfitted to weather the storms. His
successors kept strengthening it with buttresses trans-
ferred from the old building. Not only did these differ
in style from each other ; as they existed they were not
in keeping with the foundation laid by Schleiermacher.
This foundation itself, on the other hand, was more
' lis

Ritschl

secure than either friends or foes imagined. What had
to be done was to examine it more carefully, and to finish
the building that had been begun, and after that to erect
the superstructure above it — or rather to leave over
building in the old way altogether a proud structure
soaring aloft and exposed to the storm winds : the im-
pregnable forts, those best able to withstand the guns
of the enemy, are such as are underground.

It may be said that the inmost motive of the
Apologetical work of A. Kitschl points in this direction,
although he himself may not have recognized his rela-
tion to Schleiermacher as clearly as we of a subsequent
day are able to do, and especially although there is much
in his positions too which belongs to the past. His dis-
satisfaction with the schools we have described, as it
finds vigorous expression in his biography, may be under-
stood, to put the matter succinctly, as due to the feeling
that it was not the best in Schleiermacher which sub-
sequent theology had appropriated, nor had it emended
the less good in him in the light of his best. Or, to
refer expressly to what we have said regarding Schleier-
macher, Ritschl agrees with Schleiermacher in holding
that the content of the doctrines of Christianity cannot
be other than what is capable of being experienced
religiously ; he differs from him in holding that the
standwrd which determines whether a position is dis-
tinctively Christian, is not the experience of the in-
dividual or even of the Christian Church, but the
revelation of God in Christ, which produces saving faith
in those whose nature responds thereto. This means
those whose nature responds to the completely and
distinctively ethical religious blessing offered by this
revelation. Ritschl further agrees with Schleiermacher
in holding that the truth of a religious doctrine cannot
be proved, except to the man who has personal experi-

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The Truth of the Christian Rehgion

ence of the salvation to which it refers ; he differs from
Schleiermacher in holding that the objective ground for
the truth of such experience is the revelation of God in
Christ, as it and the recognition of our most profound
ethical needs work in conjunction with, and act upon,
each other.

It is easy for the opponents of Ritschl on the
right and on the left, the old mediating theologians
as well as the Biblicists, to raise the objection at the
outset, that Ritschl himself does not make any thorough-
going application of these fundamental principles of his.
This applies to the first, for there is a whole series of
important religious doctrines which we fail to find in him,
although on his own principles they called for recogni-
tion ; and hence there are all his extra demands regarding
the doctrine of reconciliation, mysticism, Christology,
and Eschatology. At this stage, it is a sufficient answer
simply to say that so far, we are not dealing with the
application of the fundamental principle, and that all the
questions of detail are not yet decided. We are further
told that the second fundamental principle is endangered
in Ritschl's case by his "pernicious judgments of value,"
which enabled him to evade the necessity of dealing in
a thoroughgoing fashion with the claims of knowledge,
by the use of ambiguous phraseology. Here again it
must be said in reply that we were dealing solely with
Ritschl's intention, not with his success in the execution
of it. The easiest way of determining in brief compass
whether this intention follows right lines, and whether it
is worth while to expend fresh labour upon it, will be to
close our survey of the history of the proving of Chris-
tianity with the ESSAYS in Apologetics which have

CLAIMED ATTENTION SINCE RiTSCHL, AND STAND IN DIRECT
OPPOSITION TO HIM.

Since we are dealing with present-day movements,

120

Post-Ritschlian Apologetics

for the understanding of which we have not yet got the
proper historical perspective, it is our duty to exercise
reserve. Without forgetting this duty, we are yet able,
speaking broadly, to distinguish four types of thought.
It is the emphatic contention of the first of these, above
all things, that Ritschl did not preserve the treasure of
the old faith in its fullness, and put the stamp of a new
age upon it. Manifestly therefore the theologians of
this way of thinking follow in the footsteps of the
" Theological Right," subsequent to Schleiermacher, of
which we spoke above. The second, on the other hand,
looks upon Ritschl as having been too conservative.
Its watchword is the psychology and history of religion.
But because no amount of ingenuity in the investigation
of the facts of religion can take the place of an answer
to the question of its truth, the ps^Cchology and history
in question of necessity once more become a philosophy
of religion. Accordingly the characteristic of the third
group is just their thus addressing themselves to the
problem of religious epistemology and metaphysics.
Though closely related to the second, they are yet not
identical with them. Allowance being made for the
altered circumstances of the time, these two together
take the place of " Schleiermacher's Left," as it is
called. As the third group, which clearly takes its
stand upon Post-Kantian speculation, notwithstanding
all its rich stores of new material is incapable of silenc-
ing the old objections, we can understand the existence
of a fourth, which promises to show us a completely
new way to the goal, never hitherto reached, of a
triumphant Christian Apologetic. Naturally, however,
and not without cause, the first three groups also claim
to be regarded as more than mere continuations of the
Pre-Ritschlian essays in Apologetics of which we have
spoken. There is a claim to be " modern," put forward

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The Truth of the Christian ReUgion

by no means only by the " Liberal " theologians, but by
those of the " Positive " school as well.

This is evident in the case of t\\Qji7'St group, the name
which is adopted by many of its representatives being
itself significant—" Modern Theology of the Old Faith "
(Theodore Kaftan) and "Modern Positive Theology"
(R. Seeberg and his school). " Old Faith " and '' Positive
Theology " denote their churchly type ; " Modern " their
avowed intention to proclaim the old faith and positive
theology with new tongues to the present generation,
with the conviction that the modern consciousness does
not simply confront the old faith with a hostile bearing,
but offers internal links of connexion with it, which, if
properly utilized, bring its riches into currency in greater
purity and with more clearness. According to Theodore
Kaftan, the characteristics of the modern spirit, which
are well warranted in themselves, are autonomy, indivi-
dualism, personality, and the feeling for reality ; and
these, when rightly understood, are very closely akin to
faith, if only it is the old ever-enduring faith, and not an
antiquated theology, that is proclaimed. This distinction
between old faith and old theology is possible, if the
basal conceptions which are of decisive significance in
Kant's Theory of Knowledge are called into requisition
for the purposes of modern theology. This principle
is visualized when it is applied to matters of decisive im-
port. " The man Jesus of Nazareth stood in a relation
to the living God which was absolutely unique ; in a
relation which cannot be attained by any other indivi-
dual, because for His personality it was of constitutive
. significance." On the other hand, statements about Pre-
existence and the Virgin-Birth, such as appear in the
old Dogmatics, logically defined and demanding belief of
necessity, are impossible ; although Theodore Kaftan
personally assents to both these doctrines. It is plain

122

Modern Positive Theology

that such a position approximates closely in principle
to that of Kitschl, and that it is well adapted to pro-
mote the ends of peace, amid the agitations caused by
the fusion of ecclesiastical politics with Dogmatics ;
and to do so, not by way of compromise, but with the
assent of fiaith itself. Only, others will ask whether the
principle is followed out without restriction ; especially
whether it is made quite clear in what way saving faith
in the Revelation of God arises ; in other words, whether
it does not appear as some form of subjection to an ex-
ternal law imposed on faith. In contradistinction to
this " modern theology of the old faith," the " modern
positive theology" (R. Seeberg, Gruetzmacher, Beth)
aims at setting aside the application of Kant's Criticism,
and supposes rather that it can incorporate the spirit
and the favourite ideas of the modern consciousness in
a direct fashion in a new systematic structure ; having
in view, as regards content, the craving especially for
redemption from the misery of the world, and as regards
form, the idea of development. In all this it reminds
us of the older Mediation Theology. Hitherto it has
made promises rather than fulfilled them. And when
it undertakes to carry out its engagements, as in eluci-
dations recently given in outline of the doctrine of the
Trinity, a doctrine presented as necessary for salvation,
it has not always avoided the danger of being chargeable
with some of the ancient heresies.

But the group we speak of, in connexion with Dog-
matics of a modern type, one which likes to describe it-
self as " positive," extends further than the schools dealt
with above, which adopt the watchwords that were
mentioned. According to the judgment of those who
have been noticed, and according to that of the men now
to be specified, it includes on the one hand names like
Ihmels, Stange, Dunkmann, and Hunzinger, and on the

123

The Truth of the Christian Rehgion

other hand, Kaehler, Schaeder, and Schlatter. While
the latter are obviously more closely allied to the earlier
Biblicism than the former, they are nevertheless marked
off from that Biblicism by a stricter conception of the
task of systematic theology ; and it is this which demands
that they should be mentioned in the present connexion.
Only, as we consider the whole of them, it is very speci-
ally necessary to remember that, while they are thus
classed together, we must not in any degree detract from
the independence of their work as individuals. But it
is impossible, in the brief space at our disposal, to char-
acterize that independence. For example, we have the
undertaking of Stange to apply a Theory of Knowledge
in the investigation of religion, and so to exhibit the
latter as the coefficient of all experience ; an attempt
which shows that he and others, in spite of all the differ-
ence that remains, are in close affinity with a party on
the " liberal " side, whom we shall soon refer to as the
representatives of a new metaphysic. The same line of
remark also applies, though the details are quite different,
to Schlatter's confidence in the knowledge which man
has of God from nature. For our present purpose, it is
more important to note that this whole group gives
proof of an earnestness, which was long depreciated by
the "liberal" and "Ritschlian" schools, in pressing
certain demands in common which claim universal re-
spect. Thus we have the demand that the complete
objectivity of religious experience should be established.
While this demand has reference to the theology which
lies at the foundation, there is another which relates to
the content of faith : it has to be set forth in its full
wealth. In particular, the aspect of reverence in view
of the Majesty of God must be included. In this sense
we heard from the very first the cry for a " Theocentric
theology". Others will have seriously to discuss the

124

The Religio-Historic Standpoint

question whether these demands are always adequately
fulfilled. However, the recognition of those demands,
which always becomes more pressing, may be welcomed
as a hopeful sign for the future, one which is more
trustworthy in proportion as the "readiness to learn
from all parties " is translated in the different quarters
into fact. For example, it might be hoped that the
thesis of Ihmels on the self-evidencing power of Holy
Scripture may lead to a fruitful understanding with those
who, while equally assured of the importance of the
historical Revelation, have scruples with regard to the
hasty identification of it with Holy Scripture, or with
Scripture as understood according to the Confession of
the Church, and want also to have a more exact state-
ment of the whole question how the precise fact of
historical Revelation can awaken a saving faith.

The second of the types of thought referred to is
the ^^ Religio-historic,'' which prefers to call itself the
" modern " type par excellence. It has to be explained
how far we can speak of such a school, when the refer-
ence is to Apologetics. The objections to Ritschl which
they allege are partly the same as those already men-
tioned, but they are amplified and set in a larger context,
where we come upon the watchword of '' the ' religio-
historic' method" by the way. And the objections in
question were for the most part first raised by men who
had been decidedly influenced by Ritschl. Naturally, in
what Ritschl offered, the really valuable was not always
formulated in unexceptionable form at the first attempt,
while there were other elements that were actually open
to attack, and opposition could not but become more pro-
nounced in proportion as it was repressed at the start by
the Master's strength of will. To what was open to at-
tack belonged doubtless — not to go into every particular
— many elements in his conception of revelation. This

125

The Truth of the Christian Religion

applies even to the isolating of the revelation of God in
Jesus, although this feature was originally one of the
main reasons for the extent of Ritschl's influence. The
question of how this revelation stands related not only
to that of the Old Testament, but also to the whole
history of religion, had to be faced before long. Then
again the inherent necessity of such unique revelation
was not explained at all points, as fully as such a
far-reaching assertion demanded. In especial, objec-
tion was taken to the proof of its historical reality, not
only on the ground that Ritschl's use of Scripture,
in spite of undeniable instances of marked penetra-
tion, was often forced, but also on the general ground
that the strictly historical method seemed ruled out
of court, so far as a definite circle of facts was con-
cerned. Lastly, the general question of the possibility
of such a revelation would have demanded a more de-
liberate adjustment with reason ; as this was not seen
to, the lack of it reacted upon the other points of view
of which we have spoken. For all these reasons there
came to be many whom Ritschl no longer satisfied in
what he provided. Further, he failed to provide much
that was desired. Though at first he was credited with
showing his strength in confining himself as he did, and
people were grateful to him because at last they again
had in him an out and out theologian, who was just a
theologian and nothing else, this limitation soon became
a subject of reproach to him. People now began to
miss the feeling for the breadth and fullness of life and
thought — the infinitude of the real and its problems —
which was a special oS'ence to a generation again pre-
disposed to the sentimental, indeed to Romanticism.
Ritschl's definiteness created the impression that he
claimed finality, and a final theology was felt to be in-
tolerably narrow. Moreover the younger generation had

126

The Religio-Historic Standpoint

grown up into his ideas as into a natural heritage. They
had not themselves lived through the stress of the genera-
tion before them ; under the pressure of new conditions,
they had a livelier realization of what Ritschl could not
do to cope directly with these, and aimed at an entirely
new solution, without troubling themselves to ask what
in him might perhaps have permanent value. Now
their great difficulty was the modern consciousness of
which we spoke, the distinctive character of which we
ventured to sum up in the domination of the idea of
evolution. Should there not be a possibility of turn-
ing to account and deepening this consciousness, in
such a way that Christianity might find in accord with
it a firm foothold in the inner life of our day — not
a dogmatically narrow Christianity to be sure, such as
was even that of E-itschl, but a Christianity quite
emancipated from all theological prejudice, and trusting
itself absolutely to the current of the new movement ?

It is not the modern consciousness in its application
to nature, but in that to history, which is first under
consideration here, though indeed it is one of the chief
concerns at least of the shrewdest of the investigators who
are occupied with the science of religion, to get away
from the specific distinction between natural and histori-
cal science. Our religion must be treated historically ;
the historical method must be applied to it without
reservation. And this historical treatment of religion
stands in indissoluble connexion with modern "exact "
Psychology, which is essentially based on natural science,
in its application to religion, — with the " Psychology of
Religion ". This Psychology of Religion, combined with
the History of Religion, has taught us to go down to the
depths, to lay bare the roots, and to see the essence of a
religion, not in the complex creations of dogma and
worship, but in the mysteries of inward experience —

127

The Truth of the Christian Rehgion

almost inexpressible movements of the soul — which how-
ever can be analysed by exact Psychology into their
elements, and apprehended in their connexions with
all other mental processes. The Psychology of Religion
teaches further that this religious life is self-attested,
requires no assumption of supernatural intervention,
rather excludes anything of the kind. Finally, this
History of Religion associated with the Psychology of
Religion shows how closely akin all religions are, when
we go down to the psychical foundation of which we
speak, how for this reason similar phenomena are found
everywhere, so that the artificial barriers between the
various religions fall away. For all these reasons to-
gether, we find a general Relativism, a profound aversion
to the innocent claim that there must be an absolute
religion, and that Christianity is the absolute one, in
particular to hasty judgments regarding religion as
true or false. Thus to put the matter briefly, we have
a religious instinct instead of a faith which can be
expressed in definite statements, immanence instead of
the presupposition of a supernatural power, endless de-
velopment instead of the idea of an absolute religion,
indifference to the declaration which religion makes of
its truth. Such are perhaps the fundamental thoughts
of the religio-historic standpoint, which indeed on the
testimony of its adherents immediately lose a good part
of their attractiveness, if an attempt is made to formu-
late them in anything so crude as the concepts of the
old way of thinking.

It is clear how much of the " theological " mode of
thought hitherto in vogue is thus disposed of : the value
assigned to our religion as possessed of a definite content
of assured dogmatic truth, its whole character as super-
natural in the midst of this world, its unique grandeur
as true, by contrast with what is false in religion. All

12S

The Religio-Historic Standpoint

this disappears, not only in the sense in which it is
understood by the old, or a new, orthodoxy, but even in
the sense in which the German Idealistic Philosophy of
Religion made use of the idea of the absolute religion
and applied it to Christianity. The whole idea of which
the past made so much — the absolute religion — belongs
to the past ; we are incapable of proving the truth. It
is only by paying this price that theology can continue
or again become scientific — only by accepting without
reserve the universally valid psychological and historical
method with the consequences we have indicated.

The significance of this modern psychology and
history of religion is too clear to require express recog-
nition. The new study has shed light upon so many
questions hitherto dark that even its most active oppon-
ents are beginning to use the light it offers. On the
other hand, its extravagances are manifest to all who
do not refuse to see them. In regard to the history of
religion, this applies especially to the uncritical use made
of analogy, which associates things quite dissimilar —
think of the Epic of Gilgamesh — and in regard to its
psychology, the recklessness with which untested statisti-
cal methods are applied. For example, the schedules of
a Starbuck regarding conversion (" Psychology of Re-
ligion," London, 1899, German Translation, 1909), were
certainly not answered by the most competent ; and
even if they had been, what could they have given us
but a number of general tables ? Certainly not what is
best and deepest in religion, the individual element.
Again, necessary as it is in itself to call attention to
the immediacy of religious experience, into what a mis-
leading underestimate of religious ideas is it always
betraying us. Further there is the ridiculous way in
which the significance of " primitive man " is exagger-
ated, and the obvious danger of looking with favour on

VOL. I. 129 9

The Truth of the Christian Religion

pathological elements, a danger from which even so
meritorious an investigator as James did not keep clear ;
although in another respect, modern Apologetics is in-
debted to him for a contribution so important as that
which we have when he emphasizes the "Will to
believe ". But here it is another matter which engages
our attention. Only too often it has been supposed, or
people have unwittingly acted as if it were the case, that
the psychology and history of religion could themselves
solve the supreme and ultimate questions which come
before us in our present connexion, when discussing the
grounds of religious certainty. I refer to the questions
which we mentioned above, when we described the
Eeligio-historic movement as well as the answer it gives
to them. But are the psychology and history of religion,
however ingeniously and comprehensively turned to ac-
count, able in their own right to find proofs for the truth
of religion, and standards for the classification of the
various religions ? How little the psychology of religion
is capable of doing so is very clearly shown by the latest
American efforts, which issue in bold naturalism. They
tell us that when the lower nerve centres are cut off by
the establishment of higher connexions, we have " Christ's
coming into the heart," or that the consciousness of sin
is the price we have to pay for the bulky and originally
awkward distension at the upper end of the spinal cord.
The incompetency of the history of religion in respect of
the goal in view, is as direct a consequence of the nature
of history, as that of the psychology of religion is of the
nature of psychology. There is scarcely any department
of thought where so much harm has been done as here,
by the confusion of the genetic function with the critical
— the question of the manner in which something occurs
with that of the grounds upon which something is ac-
cepted as valid.

130

The Religio-Historic Standpoint

Consequently the deeper spirits among the pioneers
in regard to the importance assigned to the psychology
and history of religion, have not been blind to the fact
that, without a criticism of religious knowledge and a
new religious metaphysic, these sciences can provide no
resting-place, and are of no value in relation to the
ultimate question. They share to the full in the anti-
supernatural tendency of which we have spoken, and in
the refusal to acknowledge any absolute magnitude.
But they seek to show that this is far from eradicating
all religious or even Christian conviction. To hold that
there can be no proof of the absolute religion is not,
they tell us, to relinquish our joy in the religion which
we actually have. We can see from the comparative
history of religion that it is the highest hitherto at-
tained, and we have reasons for holding that it is no
illusion. For as a result of the historical development
itself, the spirit of man is always arriving at a clearer
understanding of the standards by which it measures
the treasures of history in a way that is constantly be-
coming more perfect, though, to be sure, it never reaches
finality. In this progressive development, the spirit
realizes with ever-increasing clearness that the groping
after the infinite, which has its roots in man's inmost
being, is no illusion, and that the idea of God is no
hallucination, but the supreme reality, "the self -dis-
closure of the absolute Being ".

It is this more profound attitude to the psychology
and history of religion which we have characterized as
the third type of Post-Hitschlian Apologetics. The fact
that it is far from being confined to thinkers who find
themselves driven to the philosophy of religion, by such
dominating influence exerted by the study of its history
as we have described, compels us to assign it a place of
its own. Indeed, to put the matter quite generally, an

131

The Truth of the Christian ReHgion

enormous increase of courage in thought, and of trust
in the competence of thought to decide the highest
questions, is one of the most characteristic signs of the
immediate present. This courage and trust are found
in many different degrees. But there is a widespread
community of feeling which unites philosophers like
Eucken with systematic theologians like Luedemann,
Troeltsch, Wobbermin, H. H. Wendt, Titius ; but com-
pare too what was said above of the first group. Just
at present this feeling is peculiarly lively in the circle
which is eager to revive, or more correctly speaking to
make use of, the philosophy of Fries [Elzenhaus, Otto,
Bousset]. But everywhere along the Hne we hear the
watchword — "Not only back to Kant, but also for-
ward, with Kant as a starting-point, beyond Kant".
" There is actual knowledge of the supersensible " ; we
have to know the " religious a priori," " religion as an
original property of reason." There is enthusiasm here,
certainly, and a confidence which is very exhilarating by
contrast with a blase scepticism. But we must get such
professions more clearly defined. Those who support
Fries against Kant have never yet succeeded in proving
their Master the more lucid of the two ; in the end they
are always compelled to admit that after all, "know-
ledge " with them is something quite diff*erent from
assent-compelling scientific knowledge, and that faith
rests upon personal experiences. This type of thought
is of importance to us as a reminder that we must not
sacrifice the unity of the inner life, and that we must
beware of every appearance of "twofold truth". But
it has not been able to prove that the line of Apolo-
getics which leads from Schleiermacher to Ritschl can
be departed from without loss of clearness, though
certainly we of to-day must ourselves traverse the path
thus opened up for us, must win it anew, and extend it

132

The Religio-Historic Standpoint

for our own needs. As regards even the phrase " re-
ligious a priori " (E. Troeltsch), we have not hitherto
had any explanation of what it adds to the important
truth which we must never lose sight of, that religion is
our supreme vocation and the true completion of our
nature, and that consequently the capacity for religion
is the inmost and deepest endowment of the soul, as we
have already shown in detail, when dealing with the
question of its origin. So far at least, anything beyond
this which the phrase has been supposed to denote has
always been to religion what the wooden horse was to
the Trojans. For, if the " religious a priori " were to be
regarded as equivalent to the theoretical in Kant's sense,
it would be all over with the distinctive character of
religion : the latter has not the same universal validity
and necessity as theoretical knowledge. If, on the
other hand, a priori is to be understood in a wider
sense as pointing generally to certain laws which are
grounded in our nature as spiritual beings, the expres-
sion must first be qualified in the most careful manner.
All this will be shown in what follows, even if we do
not make use of the phrase " religious a priori ". In-
dependently of the form of presentation here adopted,
and upon a broader philosophical basis, the same stand-
point is advocated in Fr. Traub's " Theology and Philo-
sophy" (1910). The ruling idea of this book, which is
independent of the author's detailed findings on purely
epistemological points, may perhaps be summed up
briefly as follows. We do not take positive religion
merely as a starting-point, in order thereby to find the
proof of its true content and its impregnable certainty
in a " religious a priori," which presumes to correct the
positive content of real religion at decisive points, and
in particular reduces the significance of responsibility,
and makes historical revelation a mere figure of speech.

133

The Truth of the Christian ReHgion

On the contrary, what we do is to investigate the re-
ligious conviction of the Christian believer, comparing
it with the proofs which are inherent in its distinctive
character. In this way we do full justice to what is
correct in the idea of an a priori of which we have
spoken : we vindicate religious conviction against the
objections of overweening knowledge ; and at the same
time it is by such a course that we show the essential
oneness of our mental life. At this point we may
also refer to the historical fact, that something very
similar to this most modern phase of religious meta-
physics was a much-canvassed characteristic of Pre-
Kitschlian Apologetics, though never securely estab-
lished. Of course there were differences in regard to
form, for nothing in history ever simply repeats itself,
and these earlier efforts lacked the rich clothing pro-
vided by our modern science of religion. But alongside
of other reasons, it was just the impossibility of proving
such religious metaphysics, modest as its claims were,
which then made us ready to welcome, and grateful for,,
the fundamental principle of Ritschl's teaching. And
this of course holds good not merely with reference to
the Apologetic work of the " liberal " theologians, which
is here considered in the first instance, but also as re-
gards the adherents of the " Positive " school alluded to-
above, who are animated by a similar appreciation of
knowledge.

First of all, however, we have something to say about
OUT fourth type of thought. This is thoroughly and pro-
fessedly apologetic, and is moreover so daring and am-
bitious, that we must go back to the time of Hegel in
order to find anything similar. I do not mean that it
ought to be compared with Hegelianism m the matter
of its content. On the contrary it is, so to speak, the
extreme outcome of the view which assigns the primacy

134

The Most Recent Apologetics

to the will instead of the intelled, in so far reminding us
of Schopenhauer, but having quite a different funda-
mental tendency, and being far more radical. Its com-
plaint is that lack of conviction is the worst ailment
of our day, and the relativism of the " religio-historic "
method, from which we start, has only gone to spread
it and make it still more deeply seated, till it has be-
come a mortal disease. All the old remedies fail. On
the one hand, not only is the domination of authori-
tative faith over knowledge at an end, and on the
other hand, not only are the theistic proofs over and
done with, and with them every proof of the truth of
religion according to the method of universally valid
knowledge, even when it takes the cautious form which
was last described ; but likewise the Apologetic at-
tempted by Ritschl, who founded on Kant and Schleier-
macher, is dead. This applies to all its forms. It too
is only an untenable compromise, deserving of appreci-
ation because of the emphasis it puts on the character
of religion as involving will and feeling, but, because it
bon'ows from Kant, incapable of holding its ground
against the claims of knowledge. Only one way, it is
said, is still open. The attempt must be made to
show that religious thought is not an oddity which we
cannot locate, but an integral part of sound thought
generally — that all truth is in the last resort homogene-
ous with religious truth. In matters of detail this view
admits of being formulated in a variety of ways, and in
the immediate past it has been variously formulated.
One such is as follows. AU thought, says K. Heim, is
analysis of reality, the ultimate elements of which, how-
ever, are simply creative determinations of the will ; the
nature of religion is such a determination of reality Hke
others. The pathway to the realization of this must be
cleared by the final uprooting of the ego-myth, by refer-

135

The Truth of the Christian Rehgion

ring the distinction between Subject and Object to the
irreducible fundamental form of all reality, — to the " pe-
culiarity of everything real as signifying a relation ". In
this direction, it is held, the natural solvent of what was
formerly called philosophy points, viz. modern '' Empirio-
criticism," i.e. the tendency to isolate " pure experience,"
keeping it free from any interpretation derived from
metaphysical ideas, a treatment of it which has been
begun by Avenarius and Mach : the work we speak of
has to be utilized in the interest of religion. All know-
ing and willing leads back to an Archimedean point,
where discussion ceases and the ultimate categories
coincide in one. Here is the point where the distinction
between problem and solution must no longer be made ;
for from that which forms ''the Absolute," the ever-
enduring present, we are, so to say, quite unable to
emerge, so as to place it over against ourselves, and to
reflect on it. In it question and answer coincide : the
mere starting of a problem here means that we have
emerged from it. This emergence is sin. And what of
redemption from that sin ? From the despair to which
the insolubility of the problem of knowledge leads, a
situation which is felt as the greatest practical exigency,
deliverance is obtained by means of the one empirical
fact that is valid beyond the empirical sphere, viz.
Jesus Christ. To have faith in Him is, so to say, a
requirement of pure reason : here we have the Cate-
gorical Imperative, or to speak more precisely, the
synthesis of Pure Reason and Practical Reason which
was sought by Kant. This foolishness of the Cross is
the highest wisdom of the epistemology that has under-
stood itself, and is the power of eternal life. Another
way to the same goal is pursued by Fr. Walther. "All
thinking is valuing." Our pronouncements originate
thus : we define an idea whose value is immediately

136

The Most Recent Apologetics

clear to us, by means of another idea, regarding whose
value for the process of life in our case we have im-
mediate knowledge. When we have done this, we
erroneously suppose that we have reached the sub-
stantial reality ; whereas in truth we have only for-
mulated the value of the factor concerned, with the aid
of one or more other ideas or factors of life. We test
the correctness of that formulation by our life-experi-
ence, which shows us whether the idea in question
possesses the value in reality, which we ascribed to it
by making our pronouncements. Now if our thinking
as a whole is limited from the nature of it to such pro-
cedure, religious thinking must no longer be suspected
as being of slight value. On the contrary, in that case
the so-called objective view of the world is a phantom.
The question, Who thinks most acutely ? is decided in
favour of the religious man, the Christian.

The elation with which this new Apologetic enters
the field must justify itself, by its power to convince
others that its epistemological basis is tenable, that we
have the right to set aside the ego-myth, the distinc-
tion between subject and object, and that all thinking
is valuing. Its dependence upon ideas belonging to
Hindoo philosophy will scarcely induce us Occidentals
to change our modes of thought in the way demanded ;
and the affinity with American Pragmatism, however
true it is that the work of these German thinkers is
much more profound, will rather create misgiving.
For in that aspect of it which falls to be considered
here, this Pragmatism (James) is felt by us with ever-
increasing consciousness, to be a source of danger to
the whole conception of truth. Again, we can see how
objections may arise on the ground that such a victory
for religion endangers its distinctive nature, as Schleier-
macher taught us to realize it. This means that the

137

The Truth of the Christian ReHgion

expedient proposed strikes us, not as a solution, but as
a denial of the difficulties inherent in our present con-
stitution as spiritual beings, difficulties which are in-
telligible when we look to the nature of religion, as far
as is possible if we are not to deny that nature. Conse-
quently, this expedient is rather a prophecy of a higher
stage of immediate vision, than a light shed upon our
present stage of human knowledge. We prefer, there-
fore, to continue our investigation of what can be a-
chieved by following the unpretentious road, at the
starting-point of which we find the two names we have
once again placed side by side, those of Kant and
Schleiermacher.

Here agreement is facilitated if ambiguous words
are avoided as far as possible. The idea of religious
certainty itself, round which naturally enough every
species of proof for the truth of religion turns, is under-
stood in a great many ways, being as varied as that
proof itself. Thus it is advantageous to recollect in ad-
vance the saying of Schleiermacher that, in the sphere
we are concerned with, religious certainty is of a difiPerent
kind from that which is associated with the objective
consciousness, yet it is not less ; and that Christian faith
is simply the certainty that through the work of Christ,
the condition in which one finds he is in need of re-
demption is brought to an end. Like the idea of
certainty, that of universality, which is often used with-
out any proper definition, entails confusion. Univer-
sality of some sort is inseparable from every conception
of proof ; but when the universality which is claimed in
the sphere we have to do with is identified with the kind
which may be maintained in the sphere of demonstrative
knowledge, or only with the kind asserted in the moral
sphere, all hope of agreement is precluded. Or lastly,
the general terms, knowing, understanding, conviction,

138

Principles

should not be employed as self-evident in their sense,
without full explanation. For example Apologetics
cannot renounce the claim that it attains to real know-
ledge, without renouncing its raison d'etre ; but still it
is an entirely open question what sort of knowledge is
concerned, — whether it is purely intellectual, valid for
theoretical reason, a kind which involves constraint for
all who have the faculty of thought, or a species which is
dependent in a legitimate way on will and feeling. The
continued failure on the part of the numerous theologi-
cal groups to arrive at a common understanding, springs
mainly from the fact that this ambiguity in words which
are used without explanation, is not sufficiently attended
to. This applies with very special force to the statement
last made. How often does one speak of a proof for the
idea of God which is universally valid, and then all of a
sudden the remark is thrown out that of course it is
valid only for one who has a personal interest in the
matter.

THE PKINCIPLES OF THE PEOOF OF THE TEUTH
OF CHEISTIANITY.

It is quite impossible, for the reasons already speci-
fied, to go behind Schleiermacher and Kant. Every
proof of the truth of our religion which fails to do
justice to its nature and to the nature of knowledge,
is ruled out. The communion with God in the Kingdom
of God through Christ, which the Christian experiences,
by its whole character renders impossible such a proof
as that attempted on the one hand by the Pre-Kantian
philosophy, and on the other hand by the Apologetics
of Roman Catholicism, or in quite another direction,
though as regards the point which is here decisive
the two are akin, by early Protestantism — a proof, that
is to say, which aims at convincing people of the truth

139

The Truth of the Christian Rehgion

of the Christian faith in a manner which involves con-
straint, whether it be by grounds of reason, or by en-
forcing an exalted, miraculous authority which attests
the miracle of religion, and always offers it anew — the
infallible Church which dispenses salvation, or Holy
Scripture which is likewise infallible. Both attempts
mistake the real nature of faith as well as of knowledge,
whether by way primarily of giving faith the supremacy
over knowledge, or knowledge that over faith. How very
strange it seems therefore to us, in any of the schools of
present-day Apologetics, to come across the sentence
standing all by itself—" Faith is intellectual interest in a
knowledge of trustworthy witnesses to Christ's Person
and Work!" (E. Koenig). Such a sentence appears
doubly strange, just where emphasis is laid upon the
value of the history, as we seek to do in what follows.
But misplaced, and advanced with a false a.ccent, the
sentence denotes a complete misunderstanding of re-
ligion, and in relation to it we are right in saying that
''what must first be proved, is of no value". For at
bottom, a conviction valid in the strict sense for every
normal intelligence has never been regarded as the aim
of a proof for the Truth of Christianity, nor logical de-
monstration as the means thereto. Further the claim
that one should submit to the infallible authority of the
Church or of Scripture, has never been able or willing
to forego the aid of quite other means.

But the recollection of the nature of our religion
brings us to a point equally removed from logical de-
monstration, and the rejection of each and every proof.
Christian faith is certainly an immediate experience, but
it is yet not so characterless a thing that it must now
incur that other objection of which we spoke, that " Faith
makes us blessed, therefore it lies ". Individual enthu-
siasts, it is true, are always asserting that their faith is

140

The Task of the Present Day

something so wonderfully certain, proving itself in an
exuberance of bliss, that the very idea of a proof proves
lack of understanding. But often they very quickly
exchange this attitude for one of unstable doubt, and
then for quite a bad Apologetic. No, the Christian faith
has in its own peculiar nature both the yearning desire
for a sure foundation, and the means of satisfying this
desire. It has this desire for its own sake as well as in
reference to others. For its own sake — for on account
of its marvellous content. (we refer to the Kingdom of
God for sinners, the Kingdom in this world and another),
it is " now great and strong, now small and weak," and
therefore must be able to satisfy itself as to the sound-
ness of its basis ; it must know in whom it believes and
why it believes, and how it can stand fast in the presence
of opposition, and still gain the victory. This is doubly
necessary in our days when old doubts as to whether
the invisible may not be a beautiful dream, appear in se-
ductive dress. The idea of auto-suggestion, whose power
has been made plainer to us, comes to be a temptation
to very many. As against it, what suffices is not the
summons to believe, nor even the insinuation that the
idea in question is sinful, but only a refutation.
The Christian faith needs justification likewise in refer-
ence to others. For since it is a stimulus to, and power
of love, it must, in order to win others and to advance,
be '' ready to give an answer to everyone ". Under these
circumstances it looks very supercilious to seek to dis-
pense with Apologetics, on the plea that it cannot create
faith. In truth this disparaging estimate is evidence of
ignorance of the actual circumstances. More frequently
than is realized by a hasty judgment based upon a surface
view of the life of others, many of our contemporaries are
on the outlook for a relevant answer to their doubts. At
heart there is an inclination on the part of large numbers

141

The Truth of the Christian Rehgion

towards the Gospel, though they are still incapable of
breaking through the walls of prejudice erected in their
path by the general consciousness. As this inclination
is in many identical with moral earnestness of purpose,
it would be nothing less than a dereliction of duty, not
to come to their help in the struggle with those pre-
judices of which we speak (pp. 2 ff.).

But with the need for vindication, the method for the
satisfaction of this demand is likewise given. That is to
say, did the decisive grounds lie outside of itself in the
sense described above, being independent of it, and valid
for everyone however indifferent, we should be abandon-
ing the first principles of our knowledge of the nature of
religion. We should have nullified all that has just been
indicated 'as the product of the history till now, and as-
serted anew a compelling force, whetlier of reason or of
authority, with the result that the unlearned Christians
would be at the mercy of the learned, the laity of the
priesthood. Should we on the other hand confine our-
selves to subjective faith as such, content with the exper-
ience as such, then surely there could be no talk of a
vindication of it. All therefore that can be done is to
bring to consciousness the objective grounds of subjective
faith ; to search for and make clear the groundworks,
in fact the elemental active forces, which, as certainly
as they can be recognized only in religious experience,
are yet not created by such experience, but on the con-
trary, as something distinguishable therefrom, create,
sustain and uphold it. The more thoroughly self-con-
sciousness applies itself to this subject, the clearer will
two things become. For one thing the Christian is
always learning more fully that the most precious re-
alities are the blessings experienced in Christian faith,
the forgiveness of sins, power for what is good, hope of
perfection. He does not simply experience in his pos-

142

The Task of the Present Day

session of them an undefined feeling of well-being — on
the contrary there is often, to begin with, a strong aver-
sion— but the further he advances, the deeper becomes
his satisfaction, which cannot be understood except as
the realization of his nature, his destiny. All that is valu-
able to him in other regards, all that he looks upon as
the best possession of his inner life, and strives for,
above all the knowledge of what is good and submission
thereto, attains in his religious experience to greater
clearness, and more living reality ; and at the same time,
the whole of his outward life, which is as full of enigmas
as the inner, gains light and power. With respect
neither to the outer world nor the inner must he sur-
render the sense of reality by believing in God ; on the
contrary, it is only then that these two worlds are
harmonized and become to him personally the most
precious reality. Only this proof of the truth of our
faith, important and indispensable as it is, does not
give perfect satisfaction. The more precious to us the
experience which has been desciibed is, we ask with
the more insistence whether it is finally set free from
all suspicion of illusion. Certainly it is a reality, in
so far as it is our experience, and that too, as we
have just seen, not merely an accidental, subjective ex-
perience, but of a kind which is most precious, true,
and consistent with our destiny. But is it a reality, in
the pressing sense of the term in the distinctive sphere
of religion, which, as we were convinced, reaches out in
virtue of its nature even beyond the highest ideal reality
of the subjective experience in question ? Have we to
do with the ultimate reality in and above the whole
world, with the living God ? In order to be certain of
that, is it sufficient to interpret our experience as
a working of God in us, as a self-revelation of the
Divine Spirit in our spirit ? Or does everything that we

113

The Truth of the Christian Rehgion

may so interpret and understand, find its ultimate ground
in a reality which is distinguishable from our experience,
in a manifestation which God makes of Himself in
action, i.e. for us Christians in His reality in Jesus
Christ ? Christ advances the claim to be with unique
power and clearness God's presence in our world, full
as it is both of motives and of hindrances to faith. It
is only with this question that we complete the investi-
gation of the objective grounds which subjective faith
meets with, as it analyses its experience. We are con-
cerned with two distinguishable, yet closely related aspects
of that introspective examination of the grounds of faith
of which ive speak. But there is still another investi-
gation which belongs to a complete proof. It must
be shown how the residts we have named are related to
the claims of knowledge in other directions, more pre-
cisely of theoretical intellection. It must at least be
pointed out whether there is any opposition or not,
whether the two can exist side by side. It is better
still if we are able to show that we experience the unity
of our mental life, precisely in the fact that the two are
complementary to each other.

Manifestly these thoughts bring us again to the
point which we had reached in our discussion of the
stage in the history of Apologetics represented by
Schleierraacher, and of the questions which still re-
mained open, as well as of the answer to them found
in Kitschl. For the systematic development of these
thoughts, the way opens when we observe that in the
Apologetics of the immediate present there prevails on
one side far-reaching agreement, but that the differ-
ences of opinion, which by reason of the importance of
the matter, and not merely from theological disputa-
tiousness often become serious oppositions, consist
essentially in this that the sides of the proof as we have

144

The Order of Thought

Darned them are not always all expressly recognized, or
on the other hand are set in a different relation to each
other. For example, the theological Right and the Left
are agreed in assigning to theoretical intellection an
essentially higher value than is placed upon it by any
who in any way range themselves with Ritschl ; while
Ritschl himself undervalued the task, which in any case
presents itself at this point, of coming to a critical
understanding with the claims of knowledge. Thus in
the introspective examination of the immediate grounds
of faith of which we spoke, the representatives of
Orthodoxy and of Liberalism once more find them-
selves at one in this, that they do not expressly, in their
treatment of Apologetics, bring the values contained in
the Christian Faith — its excellence as it may be known
in experience — into relation with the revelation of God
in Christ. This holds good in spite of the circumstance
that in Dogmatics the '' Positive " theologians un-
questionably put a high value upon the " facts of salva-
tion," while the *' Liberal " relegate them very much to
the background. Under these circumstances it is ad-
visable, in order to secure clearness on all sides, to begin
with an explicit discussion of the significance of know-
ledge, and then to carry through that examination of
which we spoke, of the grounds of certainty that are in-
herent in faith itself. Should we begin with the latter,
we would be continually interrupted by the charge that
all that would be well and good, were it not that in the
end the ground is removed from beneath it all by the
" self-acting norm of reason "

But it must be urged besides, with regard to the
proof as a whole, that in the separate discussions especi-
ally with reference to knowledge, there is obviously pre-
supposed a higher stage of general culture ; while again
the fundamental Protestant principle of the universal

VOL. I. 145 10

The Truth of the Christian Rehgion

priesthood is not denied, because the immediate grounds
of certainty are available for every one. There is no de-
pendence upon science at the critical point ; that will be
proved step by step in what follows. But it has to
be admitted without more ado that our religion must
share the fate of ancient Paganism, if it is no longer
capable of coming to such an understanding as regards
principles with all the elements of contemporary culture.
That is the reason, as we showed at the very start, why
the Church cannot dispense with Systematic Theology,
nor Systematic Theology with Apologetics. And the
Church cannot deny the general possibility that such
a situation may arise, but by her labours she ought to
take good care that the possibility does not become an
actuality. The conviction of faith that this will never
be the case, may be expressed from the standpoint of
faith in these terms : Were that time to come, it
would be the end of the world^the Lord's return. This
would put an end to the strain upon faith which had
become intolerable. On the other hand, if the return did
not occur, faith would die from that terrible certainty.
However, living faith knows that it is under obligation
to prove from its own inmost nature that it is living,
among other ways by the labour of thought connected
with an Apologetic which changes anew with every new
age.

The Significance of Knowledge for the Proof of
THE Christian Faith

The so-called Theoretical Proof.

The usefulness of this section depends not so much
upon our going into every separate detail, as upon our
emphasizing with the greatest possible simplicity and
clearness the points of view, and presenting them in

116

Significance of Knowledge for Proof

systematic form as a unity. And here it is advisable to
give the assurance in advance that an opposition between
faith and knowledge in the last resort, and therefore
their irreconcilability in one and the same consciousness,
must on no account be asserted. "Twofold truth" in
this sense would be the death alike of faith and know-
ledge. That is obvious from all that has been said
above ; but there is an advantage in repeating the state-
ment here once more, obvious as the fact is, for the
reason namely, that the immediate purpose of the dis-
cussion in this section must be to refute claims of know-
ledge which are unfounded. For the short hints of our
historical survey showed over and over again that faith
has always come to grief, whenever knowledge has sought
to assert itself as the supreme court in the province of
faith ; it could not be otherwise, because that necessarily
means a denial of the proper nature of faith. But natur-
ally the realization of this in no way decides the right of
knowledge to have a say in matters of faith ; a danger-
ous enemy is never overcome by the recognition of his
dangerous character. The object of the present investi-
gation therefore must be to prove before the bar of
knowledge itself, from its own specific nature, its
inadequacy in the province of faith. Only thus can
faith be rescued from the clutches of knowledge, but
thus it certainly can be rescued, and we are in a position,
unperturbed, to realize the grounds of certainty in-
herent in faith itself. But something else must first be
made plain. Our decisive task is certainly to de-
termine the limits of knowledge ; only if we applied
ourselves immediately thereto, we would fail duly to
appreciate the fact that times innumerable in history,
knowledge has been appealed to by faith as a highly
desirable ally ; more than this, that such a relation to
knowledge appears to commend itself ever anew. Con-

147

The Truth of the Christian ReUgion

sequently we must begin by showing in what sense and
in what way knowledge has been, and still is, appealed
to for a proof of the truth of faith. We point to the cir-
cumstance that in this undertaking, as a matter both of
fact and of necessity, the goal reached is the opposite of
what was intended. Only then is the ground clear for
the thought which decides the question : knowledge is
essentially unequal to the task demanded of it. This
course moreover quite naturally secures the freedom
of faith from knowledge, but at the same time also
the way is open for showing positively that faith and
knowledge are not contradictory, and therefore that they
are essentially homogeneous.

There would be a proof of the truth of our re-
ligion THAT WOULD COMPEL ASSENT, WCrC it pOSSiblc tO

confirm its content as necessary thought. This idea of
rational necessity has, it is true, scarcely ever been
understood in the sense that faith can be evoked by
such proof alone, being thus demonstrable like a truth of
mathematics. Indeed to have such confidence in the
cogency of the proof would be frankly to deny the re-
ligious character of faith. It is for the most part silently
taken for granted that there must be other conditions
present, if there is to be faith. The opinion has always
been something like that expressed by one of the last
avowed supporters of this position, in the words — " Faith
is willingness to go the way that reason shows " (BoUiger).
The objects of faith are established as actual by cogent
grounds of thought : whether we have a personal in-
terest in them depends upon other circumstances than
the clearness with which we can follow this ratiocinative
process. There is a further qualification to which im-
portance attaches. This necessity of thought is not
generally affirmed of the tvliole content of faith. Most
of those who occupy this ground are content to prove

148

Faith Seeks no Demonstrative Proof

one specially important aspect of it. Almost always it
is proofs of the being of God that we get. When we
keep these qualifications in mind, the former referring
to the meaning of necessary thought in our connexion,
the latter to its compass, it is clear how many of the
attempts mentioned in our historical survey had this
ideal of a proof of faith by knowledge floating before
them, and on the other hand in how many forms and
with what varied emphasis it has found expression.
They are at one, however, in the intention to secure
necessity of thought as a strong ally, who must take
upon himself the main burden of the proof. This is a
perfectly intelligible intention when one thinks of the
power of conviction-compelling knowledge, which beats
down all opposition, and its triumphs in other provinces.
And yet, faith desires no such troof, because in
TRUTH HARM IS THEREBY DONE TO IT. Morc exactly, as a
matter of fact harm has always been done, and must
always be done. That this is so in fact is most con-
vincingly shown in principle by the most acute and
well-considered attempts. For example, Biedermann's
idea of God excludes petitionary prayer, guilt and per-
fection under other conditions of existence, the three
points which Strauss had already indicated as those
which it is specially difficult for one brought up as a
Christian to be compelled to give up. But there are
other respects as well, in which the God of that proof is
not the God of faith : He loses His personal activity
and living personality, which alone can draw our trust to
Him. In such attempts, there are, as regards points of
detail, great differences which merge into one another, as
to how far faith is already swallowed up by knowledge
— to use the figure so often employed of the wolf and
the lamb — but the ultimate outcome cannot be doubt-
ful. So too, as the content of faith is disturbed, there

149

The Truth of the Christian ReHgion

is harm done to the essential nature of it. What a differ-
ence there was in the period of Hegelianism, for example,
between the relation to his God of the man who had
knowledge, and that of the one who "had merely faith".
On the other hand, the estrangement of science from God
has in numberless cases facilitated religious estrangement
from Him — a proof certainly of how little personal such
religion was. But this whole state of matters is un-
aroidaUe. Knowledge must reconstruct the objects of
faith according to its own points of view, which are
foreign to those of faith. It looks in every event for
the relation of cause and effect ; its ideal is the world
conceived absolutely according to the law of causality,
not the God of religion. If the world be called God,
we have only another name for the world as known ;
the change in the nature of the connotation of the word
affects the idea of God. But not only must such a
proceeding do harm to the content of faith ; the grounds
which are decisive for faith are necessarily altered ; its
ininost nature is violated. The measure of intellectual
power must consequently become the measure of piety ;
religion, at first a matter of speculation in the most
exalted sense of the term, must become a matter of
speculation in the commonest sense of it. The pro-
spects of religion would rise and fall according to the
confidence with which science gives expression to uni-
versally valid judgments concerning God. For our
psychic powers are not so constituted that the necessity
of thinking God and His Kingdom could fail in some
way to influence our wills. Long ago it was said, in 2
Clem. XX. 4, that if God immediately granted the
reward to religious men, we would immediately transact
business, instead of cultivating religion. And the treat-
ment of the same idea in Kant's Critique of Practical
Reason is still unrefuted.

150

Faith in Relation to Knowledge

Here, however, we reach the point where, as was
shown in our survey, the actual capacity of knowledge
must be investigated. Though faith may assure us ever
so often that it desires no proof from knowledge, such
affirmation is worthless, unless knowledge itself is

COMPELLED TO ADMIT THAT IT CANNOT FURNISH ANY SUCH

PROOF, because it is not at all in a position to express
normative judgments regarding faith, either for or
against. Otherwise there remains the possibility that
knowledge has power and right to eradicate faith, being
not simply incapable of furnishing any proof for faith,
but being actually capable of furnishing a proof against
its right to exist. It is no infrequent occurrence in
other connexions, for love to pass away and turn to
hatred. At the dissolution of the alliance of a thousand
years' standing between faith and knowledge, faith must
be assured that knowledge cannot in its own interest
turn against it ; the proclamation of their old time
fellowship, without this guarantee for the future, would
be a dangerous undertaking.

In reference to that special task of which we spoke,
which for centuries stood in the forefront of work upon
our subject, the theistic proofs, knowledge itself has long
since proclaimed its own incompetence. Here it is
sufficient to call to mind a few statements which meet
with general acceptance. For one thing, even if we are
still quite undecided as to the validity of the proof
attempted, there can be no doubt that the so-called
theistic proofs, taken together, do not yield the distinc-
tively Christian concept of God. Suppose, for example,
that the cosmological proof legitimately reasons from
the fact of the world to a supernatural Cause, it is yet
the case that this First Cause need not necessarily be
thought of as personal. The history of philosophy
proves that this is so, even when the teleological proof

151

The Truth of the Christian ReUgion

is combined with the cosmological, and the First Cause
of the world is now designated its End, Again, even if
this bare concept is immediately exchanged for the
idea of an All-wise and Almighty Creator, assuming that
this may be done, where do we get the God who alone
is good? If further we believe ourselves justified by
the moral argument, by inference, that is, from the moral
law in us, in thinking of that creative will of which we
speak as the perfectly good, we have still no assurance
of His pardoning grace. But not only is the goal of the
proof not reached, the wai/ is impassable. For one
thing, the foundation in fact which is indispensable
is awanting. For the teleological argument, e.g. the
necessary presupposition would be a world of adapta-
tions without any break : who in our day would ven-
ture to prove this ? In the second place, not only is
it impossible to establish premises of such a kind, but
the validity of the conclusion itself, namely from facts of
experience to what transcends experience is, since Kant,
to say the least, no longer universally acknowledged.
Such an attitude to the theistic proofs does not de-
prive them of all value. Not only were they once of great
significance, under conditions of knowledge and opinion
that no longer hold good for us — a sort of universal
hegemony of Christian Faith in the province of know-
ledge. Even in our day, they will not fail to make an
impression in circles where the necessary self-criticism of
reason, the perception of the limits of its capacity, has
not yet been applied without reserve. On the whole,
however, this will be the case, if they claim to rank not
as demonstrative proofs, but as genuine indications of
God, the force of which can hardly be overestimated,
when they are combined with the recognition of certain
needs and obligations of the inner life. This will be
acknowledged in its own place in the most unqualified

152

The Inherent Limitations of Knowledge

fashion. In this sense we can rejoice at pronouncements
even of a forceful description, which, based as they are
on all departments of the real world, on our organiza-
tion, on nature, on the community, aim at exhibiting the
idea of God as the truly rational conclusion of all our re-
flection (Schlatter). But if we are to speak of proofs,
we should be in earnest in using the word in its
strict sense. It is not against, but on the contrary in
favour of the attitude just assumed towards the so-
called theistic proofs, when a well-known Psalm (xiv.
1) applies the name of fools to those who deny God;
what is here meant by folly is just the derangement of
the highest, the moral and religious faculty, which likes
to clothe itself with the pretence of intellectual clearness,
and blocks the paths which lead even our thought to
the spiritual heights.

It is more difficult to express in a way that ivill he
generally acceptable the proof of the incompetence oi neces-
sary knowledge in general than it is in the matter of the
theistic proofs. And yet this is the more important
task ; for in the present attitude of hostility to our
faith, the impossibility of theistic proofs is readily ad-
mitted, while only with reluctance do men acknowledge
in principle the incompetence of knowledge, because it
is felt that to do so does away with the chief objection
to faith. But just for that- very reason our present task
is of importance for faith. The matter is a quite simple
one for all those who definitely occupy the standpoint
of Kant, as to the fact that our knowledge, in the strict
sense of knowledge which compels assent, is confined to
the province of experience, and as to the reason why
this is the case. At the same time, in view of the present
situation, an overhasty appeal to Kant is not advisable.
For it is easy to understand that objection should be
taken to individual positions of his, which readily ob-

153

The Truth of the Christian Rehgion

scures the fact that the fundamental principle of the
Kantian thought meets with recognition far beyond the
circle of his conscious adherents ; and the same effect
is produced by the controversy as to the proper inter-
pretation of Kant's philosophy generally. This applies
to all who, along with their acceptance of and emphasis
upon the results of theoretical knowledge, especially in
the province of natural science, hold fast by some sort of
personal convictions, which have quite a different origin
and quite a different ground for the validity they claim,
namely in needs and experiences of the inner life, especi-
ally in the moral sphere. The truth that man harbours
within his mind the most pronounced contradictions finds
in our day a very noteworthy illustration at this very point.
It is frequently more creditable to the individual's heart
than to his head, and there goes along with it an eager
yearning for a time when it will be easier for all once
again to satisfy themselves regarding such fundamental
questions. (Cf., e.g. as an effective appeal of this sort,
Karl Koenig : ''Between Head and Soul ".) Turning
away from these self-contradictory phases, we can easily
see that those who consciously acknowledge the in-
herent limitations of the knowledge that compels as-
sent, give expression to this admission of theirs in very
varied form. Some like to emphasize such limitations
in the very sphere in which in other respects the un-
limited triumphs of such knowledge are constantly
being illustrated afresh. They draw attention to the
fact that the concepts which we take for granted,
power, matter, atom, motion, conceal within themselves
a multitude of insoluble problems ; and that the causal
explanation, even when it is most complete, and the laws
that govern it are clearest, and most fruitful for the in-
crease of our knowledge, always depends upon artificial
isolation of individual parts of events, and holds good only

151

The Inherent Limitations of Knowledge

upon condition of such abstraction. Others lay bare the
difficulties inherent in the concept of evolution, which is
generally employed so carelessly.

Those who lay stress upon the distinction between
natural science and historical, precisely in their ultimate
and most important presuppositions, go deeper in prin-
ciple than either. (Cf. among others Windelband and
Rickert.) But even when such investigations are con-
sciously combined into a philosophical theory of know-
ledge, the utmost diversity prevails, not only as to the
way in which terms are used, but also as to the subject-
matter ; and this often conceals the large measure of
agreement in the ground idea. Making allowance for the
many qualifications required, and also for the varying
degrees in which individual exponents seriously grapple
with the problem, this idea may perhaps be expressed as
follows: knowledge which compels assent, and the non-
recognition of which excludes one from the circle of
sound-thinking people, is the comprehension of the
perceptible object presented to human consciousness, by
the given Forms of this consciousness. With this in-
sight into the nature of the knowledge that compels
assent, there is inseparably conjoined insight into its
limits which cannot be got over, because they have their
grounds in its very nature : namely that the perceptible
object on the one hand and the Forms of consciousness
on the other, are the indispensable presupposition of
such knowledge. That insight is independent of a
definite Theory of Knowledge, and also of the ex-
pressions just used, — this distinction of perceptible
object and Forms of consciousness. It can be conjoined
with any Theory of Knowledge, if it is not rather a
species of Metaphysic, asserting, that is, ** the know-
ableness of what is transcendent in the material sense,"
and so of God and His relation to the world. But that

155

The Truth of the Christian Rehgion

this claim is unfounded can be shown in a manner that
is of force for all, without the acceptance of a definite
Theory of Knowledge, simply by working out our general
jiroposition ; except when, as has been attempted of
late, the whole presupposition would be denied that
there is knowledge that compels assent, in the sense
just described, and consequently the question could not
be asked how far that knowledge reaches. But that
presupposition is for ever established by the fact of
Mathematics, and in the long run no one will be inclined
in face of a basal point which is so clear, to commit
liimself to propositions so vague as the statement, e.g.
that "all knowledge is embedded in descriptions of
feeling and will ". For at all events such propositions,
from their vagueness, are as unfitted as possible to serve
as a starting-point for any kind of understanding on the
fundamental question with which we are occupied.

The conclusion which we draw from the foregoing
signifies nothing more nor less than the freedom of faith
as against knowledge. Thus it does away with a sus-
picion which makes every proof, even the best, in-
effectual ; the suspicion, namely, that such proof may
ultimately be shown by assent-compelling knowledge
to be untenable — nullified by irrefutable objections.
From this fear, which in our province works like a
paralysing fear of death, we are free. Our argument
that harm is done to faith by proofs that compel assent,
might still be contradicted by a long-established experi-
ence to the contrary. And the position we have reached,
that such a proof of faith is not to be expected on
account of the nature of knowledge itself, might after
all be at first looked upon as a loss : this explains the
regret felt by many at the disappearance at least of the
theistic proofs. But now the gain secured at the cost of
all such apparent losses is clear and unmistakable —

156

The Freedom of Faith

the actual freedom of faith. For there follows immedi-
ately, from what we have learned of the limits inherent
in the nature of the knowledge which compels assent,
together with the certainty that there is no proof of
faith based upon necessary grounds of knowledge, and
just as necessarily, the certainty that there can be no
such proof against faith. And that upon two grounds.
Knowledge has no right to assert that there is no
reality at all, apart from the reality accessible to her.
Nor has she any right to assert that the real which she
knows under the conditions we have indicated, is known
in all the aspects of its reality. Rather the full reserva-
tion is made that there may be another reality besides,
which is accessible in a different manner ; and that the
reality which is known under the conditions indicated,
may also be apprehended in other aspects of its actual
nature, not by theoretical intellection in the sense of
assent-compelling knowledge, but by the activity of the
willing and feeling mind in faith. Or if you will, it
would be, not by theoretical but by practical reason ;
but here the precise definition of these expressions must
be held entirely in reserve, if fresh misunderstandings
are not to arise. Both propositions mentioned above
are of the utmost importance for Christian faith. The
former has reference more to its content in general:
God and His love to us. The latter has reference more
to the separate relations of Christian faith to the real
world, which is the object of assent-compelling know-
ledge, e.g. in regard to the question of the hearing of
prayer or of guilt. But it is of set purpose that these
sentences are expressed in this particular form, instead
of its being merely asserted in some way that assent-
compelling knowledge leaves room for another handling
of the same subjects, namely under the point of view of
teleology, of value, or as one may put it. Though that

157

The Truth of the Christian Religion

is doubtless correct, it is yet the case that such a mode
of speech, unless it be safeguarded with the utniost
precision in a way that would be impossible at this
point, readily excites suspicion in the mind of the
religious person ; as if it were sought to satisfy him, a
man that lives upon reality and is driven to despair
without it, by means of some kind of beautiful illusion.
That is excluded from the outset, in the case of the
expressions we have chosen.

It is possible, certainly, to contest the positions we
have laid down. It is possible to disregard the limi-
tations of which we speak, and assert that our know-
ledge is absolute knowledge as regards its scope and
nature, that it includes all that is real, and that too in
the whole range of its reality. But this cannot be
asserted upon the basis of assent-compelling knowledge,
but only by disregarding its nature, by an act of will,
or rather of groundless caprice. The will claims that
knowledge should be absolute, because knowledge is
regarded as the highest good. In order to be able to
maintain that ideal of knowledge, which is honoured
without sufficient basis in knowledge itself, men prefer
to renounce a truth which cannot possibly be acknow-
ledged except by a decision of the will. It is not, as
they make believe, that the intellect stands in opposi-
tion to the will and feeling. On the contrary, intellect-
ual confusion goes hand in hand with a vague feeling
and an indefinite but strong decision of the will, that
there must be nothing but what can be known in the
manner affirmed.

But is not the only scientific attitude to our problem
at least one of Scepticiwi ? Though now it is often called
Agnosticism, a protest must be entered against this in
the interest of clearness as to the fact. Otherwise there
results the appearance that knowledge compelled us to

158

Scepticism

renounce every ultimate conviction ; whereas genuine
Agnosticism, as the name implies, only says that a theory
of the universe cannot be reached on grounds of assent-
compelling knowledge, but leaves it an open question
whether the possibility still remains of arriving at the
goal along another path. Thus real Agnosticism, where
knowledge and its opposite are understood in the strict
and clear sense, that of assent-compelling knowledge,
can be a true ally of faith ; as the striking confessions
e.g. of a Romanes may show. The natural meaning
of Scepticism, on the other hand, is just that of which
we speak, which is often wrongly given to Agnosticism,
and it is here that Scepticism is in the wrong. It
does not disclaim assurance on grounds which com-
pel assent, but upon the baseless assumption that
nothing can be real except what can be proved by
necessary thought. It has no right in the name of
knowledge to deny the possibility that there may be
truth, assurance of which is possible only by the way
of personal experience, personal testing. The view
with which we are here dealing finds its counterpart in
the figure of the traveller, whose only means of escape,
at the abyss where there is no possibility of turning
back, lies in a daring leap, but who first demands a proof
that the leap will be successful. He thus deprives him-
self of the means of escape. He demands more than
in the nature of the circumstances he has any right to
demand. He is not content to recognize that the leap
for escape is not one that necessarily fails, but that it
can be successful only for him who makes the venture
(cf. '' Ethics," p. 93 ff.).

The significance for the further progress of the proof
of the truth of our religion which belongs to what we
have learned of the limits inherent in assent-compelling
knowledge is self-evident. If this proof now concerns

159

The Truth of the Christian Rehgion

itself with reasons for faith, based not upon such know-
ledge, but upon experiences of value, it no longer labour?
under the reproach of having turned such a method of
proof to account in mere caprice, because another, alone
conclusive in questions of truth, is not available. On
the contrary, it is in a position of equality, or, as Chris-
tians are convinced, of superiority, as compared with
eveiy proof that can be ottered for ultimate conviction
in general, or a theory of the universe. For in no
case can a theory of the universe be established by
the method of assent-compelling knowledge ; it can
vindicate itself either not at all, or upon grounds which
have their roots in the volitional or emotional functions
of the human spirit. For the same reason the opposition
offered by those theories of the universe which are
antagonistic to Christian Faith loses its chief support.
It was always based, not so much upon their furnishing
something deeper and greater in content, as upon the
claim that they alone have as their foundation necessary
conclusions from unassailable premises, whereas Chris-
tianity, on the other hand, is mere faith, unfounded
opinion. Noiv however faith meets faith. Even material-
ism is a form of faith, and so is the more fashionable
monism, however often this necessary inference is re-
jected by those who admit the premises. This does not
at all mean that faith must be unfounded opinion,
but it is as far from being true of Christianity as of
any other faith. Now that we have shattered the il-
lusion that on the one side there is knowledge and
on the other only faith, the question may be discussed
in a relevant manner, by comparison of the one faith
with the other, which has the better foundation. But
it is as well to emphasize clearly that in setting belief
and knowledge alongside of each other, hitherto we
have been concerned with principles, the full bearings

160

Scepticism and Agnosticism

of which we cannot see till we come to apply them
to the individual difficult problems of Christian faith,
e.g. the Personality of God, the hearing of prayer,
the historicity of Jesus. And some concluding sentences
regarding faith and knowledge find their place more ap-
propriately after the exposition of the grounds for the
truth of faith which are inherent in itself. Here there
was nothing more than the simplest possible exposition
of the fundamental idea. In reference thereto it may
be said that, when once the comprehension of the
nature of assent-compelling knowledge, which no one
can dispute without putting himself outside of the
circle of sound-thinking beings, has permeated the
general consciousness, it will no longer pass for sound
thought to assert, that ultimate conviction of the ground
and purpose of reality, or a man's theory of the universe,
or religion, is determined by assent-compelling know-
ledge. Certainly a man is still far, at this point, from
having been won for the Christian view ; but a prejudice
has been overcome which still prevents many among us
from putting Christian truth to any serious test. In
this respect the philosophical work of E. Adickes, e.g.,
may prove to be effective.

The proof that there is no contradiction between
faith and knowledge will be more convincing, in pro-
portion as there is combined with it the positive proof
of their homogeneousness. And here it is more important
and more difficult to show that knowledge cannot exist
without faith, than to show that faith cannot exist
without knowledge. The latter point is proved by life
itself. It cannot occur to the religious man to deal
seriously with his faith in this world, while he renounces
all knowledge. The demand for life is stronger than
the strongest secret aversion of faith to knowledge ; at
all events this is the case in our ethical religion. But

VOL. I. 161 11

The Truth of the Christian Rehglon

the other point too is undeniable, that knowledge is
nothing without faith. Natural and historical sciences
rest in the last resort on presuppositions which are con-
ditioned by practice, being derived from the impulse
which leads man to seek life. But it is religious faith
that gives the right to form them. In this consists the
unity of faith and knowledge, or more precisely their
conformity. For on no account should faith and know-
ledge be identified now, in contradiction to all that has
been set forth in the preceding I pages, and to the de-
struction of both of them. But certainly their con-
formity is manifested by what has been said, a unity of
a teleological nature, in reference to their object, as
also to the subjective functions. " The whole world is
a means for the realization of the Divine purpose with
the world, and theoretical knowledge is a means for the
purposes of the Christian's personal life." However,
the more detailed treatment of this idea lies beyond the
point where Apologetics stops. (Cf. among others
Reischle and Fr. Traub at the passage quoted.) Here
we may close by pointing to the fact that the most
general presuppositions for a proof, in the sense indicated
and now to be explained more fully, are gaining recog-
nition in larger circles ; although the inferences are by
no means drawn from them in all cases, which we shall
enforce later. The more clearly the conception of science
is grasped, the less, in the long run, can people fail to
discover the limit to its domination, as supplied by itself,
or the presence of other mental powers of the strongest
kind ; and the less can the desire, ineradicable in the
human mind that is not distorted, for an ultimate con-
viction regarding the world as a unity, be suppressed.
But in this way " Christianity establishes itself in its
true home, like a conqueror that had been driven out " ;
and the question of " our relation to the ultimate

162

Proof from Grounds Inherent in Faith

mystery, which makes us at once so little and so gieat "
(Dilthey), can again be asserted to involve the most im-
portant of all our tasks.

Proof of the Faith from Grounds Inherent in

Itself

The so-called Practical Proof

This proof must first of all be safeguarded against
a twofold misunderstanding. On the one hand it claims
to be an actual vindication on an adequate basis. When
we said that there can be no logical proof, we did not
mean that every one may now believe whatever he
chooses, according to his own sweet will. On the con-
trary, in an open comparison of the various theories of
the universe, the Christian faith must prove its superior-
ity. Let each faith prove its right to exist, and the palm
be awarded to the best grounded ! In other words, we are
dealing with real knowledge (pp. 138 ff.) of the grounds
of faith which are good ; only they are different grounds
from those which have been rejected up to this point,
in the interest both of faith and knowledge. We are
dealing with an objective balancing of the one against
the other ; the end aimed at is a universal judgment.
But the words " objective " and " universal " are to be
understood here, as we realized in advance at the close
of the historical survey, in the definite sense which alone
they can bear when we move in the plane of the per-
sonal life. In this there can never be logical demonstra-
tion, in the sense of a proof as explained above ; because
it is possible to object to the whole method, though, as
we saw, certainly not on grounds of assent-compelling
knowledge. This misunderstanding is constantly check-
ing the progress of Apologetics. The attempt is made

163

The Truth of the Christian Reho-ion

o

to prove too little or too much, — in truth to prove the-
faith in a manner of which the case does not admit.

The two main points, however, with which we are
now concerned, have already been emphasized above
(pp. 105 f.). When subjective faith examines itself with
its objective grounds in view, it comes upon a two-sided
foundation, though it is always becoming more clear that
the two sides are essentially of a piece — its value as
capable of being experienced, and the ultimate basis in
reality of this experience, which is found in historical
revelation. We say that this foundation has two sides,
but that the two are of a piece, for the reasons already
given. They are of a piece because it would be absurd
to speak of the value of faith as something which is
merely the object of our thought, but not capable of
being experienced as actual ; and on the other hand, to
speak of a reality which was demonstrable, without
our being able and ready to experience it in the value
it possesses. But the foundation has two sides, be-
cause we have to inquire of set purpose, whether the
value which is capable of being experienced has reality
accruing to it, in the full sense which the man of faith
must insist on unless he is to renounce that faith itself.
Fuller particulars regarding the relation of these two
aspects of the matter will naturally be given, as the
latter are dealt with in detail.

Introspective Examination of the Value of our Faith
as it is Capable of being Experienced.

This is just as much a matter for every simple Chris-
tian who seeks assurance regarding his faith, as it is for
methodical scientific investigation. In both forms it is
possible and necessary, for the reasons which have often
been given. We Protestants are firmly persuaded that
in the inner sanctuary of his religious assurance, no one

164

The Experiential Value of Faith

must be dependent upon the learned ; every one must
be capable of personal assurance upon the final and de-
cisive grounds. But at the same time on account
of its spiritual character and universal claim, our religion
cannot refuse to come to an understanding on a scientific
basis with all the powers of our mental life. For both
forms of this introspective examination of personal ex-
perience of which we speak, there is required the capacity
to put ourselves into the place of another, for the pur-
pose of comparison with another's experience. Even
the Christian whose education is of the simplest, can and
must exercise this capacity, because he lives with others
who do not share his faith ; on the other hand, the
educated cannot and must not so practise it, as to
occupy a position of neutrality regarding the different
values ; for in our province that is impossible and wrong.
To remember this latter truth is often of direct practical
value, especially in the days of youth. In order to be
quite impartial, people forget that conviction is never
reached at all except through personal, active interest.
Consequently they are as sceptical with reference to the
rudiments of conviction already in existence in them-
selves, as they are just to excess with reference to the
opposing convictions of others, and thus deprive them-
selves of the real impartiality proper to the matter in
hand ; instead of rising to a personal conviction on the
basis of this impartiality, many sink into a weak inde-
cision.

It is difficult to summarize briefly the immediate
personal conviction of even the simplest Christian, re-
garding the value of his faith as capable of being ex-
perienced, because the life subjected to such observation
is so infinitely rich and varied. Every earnest pastor
knows in what a multiplicity of forms it appears, pro-
vided that he is guided by " the love that is willing to

165

The Truth of the Christian Rehgion

see ". Perhaps it appears in thoughts like these — " What
a treasure my faith is to me ! How happy I am in spite
of all anxieties ! This or that course would have been
unbearable for me, without the support of the Christian
hope ! What if there were no forgiveness ? What if
the power of God were not mighty in our weakness ? "
Generally speaking, such utterances are the more valu-
able, the less frequently and the more hesitatingly they
are in evidence. But they are all neither more nor less
than evidences of the experienced value of the Christian
faith. Further, it is easy to refer the separate traits
back to the nature of our religion as before discussed.
We spoke of personal communion with God, and on the
basis of this with our neighbour, in love, a communion
which now takes place in time, but will one day be per-
fected in glory. In such communion, and certainly in
all cases, in spite of there being no minimizing, but full
recognition, of sin, the Christian experiences for himself
as well as in reference to the whole community, a life
the most valuable that he can conceive, the realization
of all that in his inmost being he is compelled to regard
as his true life, his destiny. On all sides he has the op-
portunity of comparing this possession of his with that
of others : even to the remotest village the modern con-
sciousness penetrates, at least by means of the press.
And so too he can compare what he possesses as a
Christian, with any valuable experience, apart from that
which he may call his own ; or with what he formerly
experienced and sufifered, before the light of eternal
truth fell upon him as it now does. But all that pos-
session of others, like his own, seems to him but as
poverty, when he compares it with what he himself
possesses as a Christian, however unscientific may be
the form of such comparison. Frequently the compari-
son becomes a temptation to him ; but the temptation

166

The Experiential Value of Faith

leads to the strengthening of his position : he becomes
more assured and richer in his faith. Peculiar interest
attaches, for example, to the way in which even simple
folks settle for themselves the siren claims of Neo-
Buddhism. They instinctively understand the superi-
ority of the positive Christian ideal of love over such a
negative one, and the inseparable connexion between
Christian love to our neighbours, and the love of God
in Christ. Further, their experience of the Christian
faith convinces them in as immediate a fashion of its
universality, and inspires them to put this conviction
of theirs to the test among all with whom they are
brought into contact, however different they may be,
and indeed in a far wider circle to interest themselves
in the evangelization of the world.

In scientific Apologetics, this personal conviction of
the Christian regarding the value of his faith can and
must be developed in methodical fashion. So far as
it is here a matter chiefly of conscious comparison with
the other ultimate values of our life as spiritual beings,
we must have a standard for such an undertaking. In
order to secure such a standard and to establish it on all
sides, we should have to engage in a comprehensive
preliminary study, which would move in the sphere of
psychology, as well as of a general view of history. In
particular we would have to avoid in this undertaking the
improper course pursued by scholars of old, that of con-
sulting only scientific evidence. Our watchword would
have to be a very great amount of " lay theology " ; unin-
tentional confessions of notable personalities who are
placed in the full current of " worldly life," would have to
be copiously utilized. In that case all the cloudiness of
the doctrinaire, which suggests that we have to deal
with a very complicated subject, is most certain to dis-
appear ; power measures itself with power, and in real

167

The Truth of the Christian Rehgion

life it is manifest where the truth lies. For our purpose,
it is sufficient to attempt to state, with as little depend-
ence as possible upon any definite technical phraseology,
the result of this work. The deepest and at the same
time the most far-reaching struggle of our life as spirit-
ual beings is found to be the struggle for inward harmony
and freedom. (The two manifestly go together, but are
yet quite distinguishable.) However far a man may be
from this ideal in his own life, still the judgments he
instinctively passes upon others show that he acknow-
ledges it In a child, for example, we regard it as a
natural and lovable trait, that his interest should quickly
turn from one thing to a quite different, and that he
should let himself be engrossed by external impressions
in their profusion ; in a grown man we very soon set it
down as simply childish, if there is no comprehensive
life-plan subordinating every separate interest to itself,
and if the external world is not inwardly appropriated,
and by an act of will changed to his inner world, so that
it can be said of his feeling and willing, not to mention his
thinking and judging, — " That is he," " That is his own ".
Indeed even the joy of which we speak in the child's
many-sidedness and nervous alertness, is unalloyed, and
full of hope for the future, only when at the same time
we notice something of the deep collectedness and in-
dependence— the " simplicity " in the highest sense —
which is a prophecy and guarantee of a genuine man.
A more comprehensive exposition would naturally have
to bring before us not merely the individual man, but
also humanity. (Cf. J. Kaftan : "Truth of Religion ".)
In what way now are this inner harmony and free-
dom, in which we must recognize our true nature and
destiny, realized ? Manifestly in those spiritual activities
which we described when dealing with the distinctive
character of the religious process (pp. 59 ff.). A man who

168

The Experiential Value of Faith

lives merely the life given him by nature, knows nothing
of the harmony and freedom of which we speak ; he at-
tains to it in the scientific, the artistic and the moral
life, in the world of the true, the beautiful and the good :
he attains to it in its perfection, as we Christians are
convinced, in li¥ing faith in God, What we have got to
do is to justify this conviction, by comparing the extent
to which inner harmony and freedom are reached along
these various roads. How great a measure of the high-
est satisfaction is secured for example by a life devoted
to Science, may be realized from the self -consciousness of
a Kepler, as it finds expression in the preface to his
" Harmony of the World ". At the same time we have
evidence there that there is for him a still deeper satis-
faction for his inmost being, namely the religious ; since
he praises God for his scientific attainment. Knowledge
does not completely fill any human soul ; the purer
knowledge is, the less personal is it, because it is the
more objective. Accordingly the man of mere know-
ledge never creates in others at least, the impression that
the destiny of man is completely realized in him. This
glory maybe accorded rather to the artist ; but the great-
est is often the readiest to confess that ''brush and
chisel still not the heart " (Michael Angelo) ; and while
as an artist he lives in unbroken harmony, unaware of
any flaws in his art, as a complete man he often suddenly
realizes the distressful antagonism between the " good "
and the " beautiful," after having perhaps for a long time
identified them. To come to an understanding with re-
gard to the aesthetic ideal in life, is very specially neces-
sary in our time, in which so many extol in an extravagant
fashion the consolation and the strength which are
derived from the beautiful. In personal submission to
an unconditional imperative, there opens out a new path-
way to harmony and freedom. This way may be taken

169

The Truth of the Christian Rehgion

not merely by a few elect persons, as is the case with
science and art, but by all, even the ignorant and those
who are wearing themselves out in the struggle for daily
bread. Besides, it shows itself to be the surer and higher
way. For the inner harmony of which we speak must
be attained by personal achievement ; and what is so
personal as the act of the will which masters itself, and
in so doing frees itself from the power which restricts all
beings ? Only, the good will is limited. This is true
not only of its effects upon the world : the limitations
inherent in its own nature weigh more heavily upon it,
and would do so, were it only a matter of limitation,
were there no guilt which it cannot forgive itself, or make
good by any effort, because effort itself is hindered by
guilt. Thus harmony and freedom remain a dream,
unless God, the truly good, is forgiving and so regenerat-
ing love ; in other words, unless the moral life makes
itself one with religion, that is faith in the living God.
" The heart finds no rest until it rests in God," and
in such rest, it finds both the stimulus to and the
strength for eternal activity. The value of the religious
life surpasses that of the other higher interests of life,
and perfects them. This only becomes plainer, when
in recent investigations men of striking acumen (Cohen,
Natorp) set free morality from all inexact, overhasty
connexion with religion, and think they may dispense
with the latter.

In this line of thought, we have purposely refrained
from touching upon a series of thoughts which occur by
the way ; our intention was merely to give in brief out-
line a living impression of the value of faith. We now
refer to some at least of the particulars. A more com-
plete discussion of the value which the ethical, in dis-
tinction from the intellectual and the sesthetic, possesses
for the attainment of that inner harmony and freedom

170

The Experiential Value of Faith

of which we speak, would naturally have to compare
the various ethical ideals with each other, and to esti-
mate their value for our inner life, as shown by such
comparison. It would have to make clear how the
Christian ideal escapes the one-sidednesses of the others,
combines their merits, and in both respects surpasses
them, and helps forward the individual as well as the
race in the realization of their destiny (cf. " Ethics," pp.
67 flf.). In the second place, we should have to test
likewise the value of the different religions, in the rela-
tion with which we are dealing. But especially it
would be a rewarding subject of investigation to con-
sider in what relation the ethical ideal in general stands
to religious faith, or speaking generally to an ultimate
conviction in reference to the real, a theory of the
universe, that is ; and how the different ethical ideals
correspond to different ultimate convictions (cf. " Ethics,"
pp. 95 ff.). Thus there grows up in the mind of the
Christian Church, as she reflects upon the value of her
faith, a firm confidence against the suspicion of which
we spoke, that " faith makes us blessed, therefore it
lies " ; for the specially close connexion between the
ethical and the religious in Christianity protects against
the reproach of indolence, the inclination to hypnotise
oneself by means of devout dreams of blessedness :
whoever is disposed to such indulgence must certainly
look for another faith than the Christian, in the Pro-
testant interpretation of it.

As a result of all this, there can be no doubt that
the self-analysis of our faith finds in the value which it
has, and of which we can assure ourselves by clear re-
flection, a proof of its truth which we have every right
to call objective, in the sense in which we can rationally
speak of objective grounds in this department, where
logical demonstration is impossible. Indeed in the ab-

171

The Truth of the Christian Rehgion

^tract, there is no objection to be made, even if one
wants to call this objective ground, these transcendent
norms, universal as they are when rightly understood,
the religious a priori. Only the position would have to
be defined with the utmost precision. But is it the case
that by this expedient, or by our whole discussion up to
this point, the entire question as to the truth of our re-
ligion is settled, that the unique hunger which the pious
person feels for reality is allayed, and that his unique
anxiety lest he be deceiving himself is overcome ? Is
there not ambiguity in that word reality, precisely in
the sphere which we are concerned with ? Is subjective
experience, which doubtless is not merely subjective
reality, objective reality in the sense meant by religion ?
What does it mean more precisely, and what conclusion
have we to form regarding it ? In short, to state the
crucial matter in advance, and meanwhile without giving
particulars, we must now ask explicitly, whether all
this that we have ventured to assert regarding the value
of faith as capable of being experienced, must not be
referred to revelation, and that too the revelation of
God in history, in order to secure a reliable foundation
and a sure basis.

Introspective Examination of the Reality of our Faith
in God, a Reality open to Experience and Resting
on Divine Revelation.

The following statement deals throughout with
the most important religious and theological contro-
versies of the day, and its power to carry conviction de-
pends essentially upon the clearness with which the
fundamental ideas are set forth at the outset in their
proper order. In the first place, we must put the matter,
which is a complicated one, as simply as possible, i.e. we

172

Revelation Differently Estimated

must examine the various answers to the question which
DOW inevitably arises, namely : Is the preceding all that
can be attained, by way of a proof of the truth of our re-
ligion ? This question receives a great variety of
answers, but they all resolve themselves in the last
resort into a simple " yes " or " no ". In the second
place, if, as is here maintained, the question cannot be
answered in the affirmative, but must be answered in
the negative, we have to show the necessity for such an
answer, and consequently the religious significance of
revelation. In the third place, we are confronted by
the task of defining with greater precision the idea of
such a revelation, should it be proved indispensable.
In the fourth place, so many historical objections are
raised against this conception of which we speak, that
we cannot be satisfied by the most precise delineation
of it, any more than by the proof of its necessity, unless
we are able to establish the historical reality of the
revelation which we affirm. Finally, what we now say
regarding revelation, and what we said above regarding
the value qi faith as capable of being experienced, must
be combined, correlated, and exhibited as constituting
in their unity the basis of our certainty.

The first question, whether the proof of the.
TRUTH OF OUR RELIGION is definitively closed with the
preceding discussion, is at present answered by the one
party with an affirmative, as decided as the negative of
the other side. But very different reasons are given
for both answers, and both are given at one time in a
spirit of confidence and joy, at another hesitatingly and
under pressure of necessity ; while again on this point,
there is no simple line of d(3marcation between theo-
logical parties and schools which in other respects hang
together. Under these circumstances it is at all events
noteworthy, that the negative answer is without doubt

173

The Truth of the Christian Rehgion

the one that would have been given by the Christian
Church in the earliest days, as well as by all the classical
representatives of our religion hitherto ; and that even
the other religions hold a similar view regarding them-
selves. For to recall only the latter point, they all
claim to rest upon revelation ; finding the main proof of
their truth in the self-manifestation of the Deity, in
which He gives evidence of His power (pp. 52 ff.). But
Jesus with unique emphasis declared Himself to be the
Son of the Father, who alone knows the Father and
alone reveals Him to others (Matt. xi. 27 ff.). More-
over, He himself designated the recognition of this
special claim of His as revelation, and saw in it the
foundation of His Church (Matt. xvi. 17). That the
same holds good of Paul, John, and the other witnesses
of the earliest days, needs no proof. The great men of
a later date took this conviction over as an inheritance ;
indeed it was by means of it that they became great,
since they discovered it anew for their own time. Each
of them did so, in his own way, but they were all at one
in regard to the decisive point. The most convincing
proof that here we have to do with something that must
not be lost, is just the case of those who, in opposition
to the tendencies of their time and their own funda-
mental principles in other directions, saw the anchor
of their religious certainty in revelation — in Christ. In
this connexion, alongside of a Luther's constant appeal
to Jesus, in whom we see, hear and touch the Father,
— an appeal to the man Jesus, in whom we have " the
sensible God," — Schleiermacher is particularly instruc-
tive ; owing to the fact that he broke with the prejudice
of his day, with which we shall presently become ac-
quainted, though himself still under its influence, and
made faith dependent upon Christ. It was his going
back to that position which made him the restorer of a

174

Revelation Differently Estimated

definite faith, sure of itself. "We have already shown in
our historical survey, that the fault of his successors
was that this guiding principle of his was infringed
upon in many ways, or was not developed and applied
as the time and circumstances required ; and that its
emphatic reassertion is the foundation of Ritschl's great
influence, while at the same time it explains the aban-
donment of him which speedily followed. But ere we
examine this feeling, which has been widely prevalent
throughout history and has continued right down to our
own day, having indeed once again become well-nigh
all-powerful, we observe that it is not merely the
heroes of Christianity who have grounded their faith
upon Christ as a precious treasure. What is true of
them has been, and has continued to be, equally true of
innumerable unknown persons, who as '* The quiet in the
land,"^ in small groups or as active members of the
great church-communions, have made and are making
the certainty of their faith the object of conscious reflec-
tion, without ever knowing or applying the form of
scientific investigation. Often the most impressive in-
stances of this are met with in pastoral work, even in
the simplest congregation. " Looking to Christ " and
" relying on Him " occur in every key. What we have
to reckon with is always the simple, but inexhaustible
thought, that the proof of the reality of those religious
experiences which are valuable, is that religious faith
possesses a sure foundation in Jesus Christ, " the same
yesterday, to-day and for ever " ; and the hymns of
Christendom never cease to celebrate this power which
belongs to Him, though a Gerhardt and a Gellert may
differ greatly as to how they give expression to it (cf.
pp. 91 ff.).

[^ A name assumed by certain circles of German Pietists, cf. Ps.
XXXV. 20. — Translator's note.]

175

The Truth of the Christian ReHgion

But if we leave out of account the very earliest days
of Christian history, the contrary opinion has never been
without its advocates, since Greek thought allied itself
with the gospel. To the Greeks, indeed, as Paul already
testifies, not only was the content of the gospel foolish-
ness, but also the fact that it sought to pass for history
and not simply as eternal truth ; they rejected not only
the preaching of grace, but also the preaching of the
Crucified as the basis of faith in the grace of God. Still
it is only since the time of the Enlightenment that this
view has become a power to reckon with in the world of
Christian thought. In many quarters it still adopts as
its watchword Lessing's phrase, " Contingent truths of
history cannot prove eternal truths of reason ". Lessing
means that this is impossible, not only because there
can never be a logical demonstration of the facts of
history, but because the historical and the eternal do
not admit of comparison. German Idealistic Philo-
sophy had a deeper understanding than Lessing both of
the nature of religious experience, and of the value of
history for the comprehension of the highest truth.
But in spite of this, that statement of his became one
of its ruling principles, which it never tired of enlarging
upon ; in all its phases talking of it coolly, as of some-
thing obvious, as well as with restrained yearning ; and
making all sorts of applications of it, now with direct
reference to religion, at another time with reference
rather to ethics, and at another quite generally. The
philosophers vie with each other in their expressions
of high reverence for Christ. One (Kant) speaks of
Him as being the first to exhibit in His own person the
idea of a humanity well-pleasing to God, and at the same
time as doing this with a perfection attained by no one
else. Another (Hegel) tells us that He introduced the
religion of sonship to God and union with Him, by the

176

Revelation Differently Estimated

personal embodiment of it in Himself ; even that in His
consciousness, at once human and divine, the Absolute
attains to self-consciousness. But notwithstanding, the
last word is always to this effect : the idea of a humanity
well-pleasing to God, of man's sonship to God, and of
the incarnation of God, is in its truth independent of the
historical introduction, realization, embodiment, to which
reference has been made. Christ is the way, but when
He has brought us to the goal, we may and should for-
get the way : He Himself in His humility would ask us
to do so, were He still amongst us. Certainty belongs
in the last resort only to the personal experience of the
true relation to God, the divine sonship ; and this ex-
perience does not depend upon a permanently indis-
pensable working of Jesus upon us. "It is the
metaphysical and not the historical which confers
blessedness " (Fichte).

To be sure, this present generation, which is proud to
call itself *' historical," again possesses a more accurate
conception both of the nature of inner experience and
of the meaning of history for that experience, than those
philosophers of whom we speak had in comparison to
Lessing. It knows, as we have seen, neither eternal
truths nor contingent events of history, in the sense at
first attached to these words ; no truths of reason with
regard to God, virtue and immortality, in reference to
whose inherent and unassailable certainty, a historical
personality could have only the value of being the first
to make them known, and whose individual experiences
and actions would therefore stand in no necessary con-
nexion with his message. Even these highest truths, as
held by German Idealism with bold self-assurance, can
no longer be taken for granted by our present-day
consciousness. It has, moreover, in events within its
own experience, felt the power of personalities, as being

VOL. I. 177 22

The Truth of the Christian Rehglon

more than the accidental transmitters of ideas. There
is thus a widespread disposition to assign as high
a value to history as possible. But not only is this
weakened by tendencies of the modern consciousness
which are of quite a contrary nature : one thing at least
is regarded as a truism, that the relation to Christ which
makes Him actually the foundation of faith is possible
only at the unscientific stage, when the consciousness is
not yet clear as to itself. This is essentially due in part
to the objection to an absolute as well as to a super-
natural entity, which we emphasized as characteristic of
the modern theory of evolution (pp. 9 ff., 124 ff.). But
that depreciation of history is shared too by those re-
presentatives of thorough mental culture in our day,
who, as respects their private convictions, come closest
in their way to Christianity, and keep furthest aloof
from the vulgar self-consciousness of many who rank
as modern. For example, W. Dilthey shows with the
greatest acumen what circumstances '' gave rise to the
modern theories of religion, as held not merely by the
philosophers, but also by Protestant theology," circum-
stances *' which the Middle Ages, and indeed Luther
himself, had not understood ". He refers to the " new
scientific spirit ". " To be filled with it means to-day to
have life " ; whereas formerly it had seemed that " all
human science, compared to Divine Revelation, was
entirely uncertain, and flitting like shadows." Now
''historical study and dogma fall into the background,
behind the aim of finding the essential connexion of all
our interests with the life of feeling " : " Christianity
establishes itself in its true home, like a conqueror of
the world who had sustained a reverse ". That is the
position which we have all along adopted in the foregoing,
when we said that the nature of religion had to be de-
fined, and then the grounds of religion, when it was

178

Eternal Truths and Facts of History

properly understood, had to be established. And ac-
cordingly, we also have from Dilthey statements about
faith and knowledge, which approximate very closely to
those made above. But now the critical question is
whether this " falling into the background " alleged with
reference to "historical study," if it is assumed in the
degree and in the sense which he contemplates, is not
inferred from a process of observation which has not
been completed ; and whether the history of the Origin
of Christianity is not for all time one of the constituent
parts of " its true home " ; although certainly we do not
include in this all that was formerly regarded as belong-
ing to that history, nor do we subscribe to the terms in
which the history was formerly defined. For the revolu-
tion of modern study is indeed as enormous as it is
undeniable. In theology especially, in the sixties of
last century in particular, the watchword of the school
which denies the permanent and essential significance of
history for establishing the certainty of our faith, was the
differentiation of the Christian redemptive principle from
the person of the Redeemer, or the " Christ of faith " from
the ''Jesus of history ". At present its main advocates
are the E-eligio-historic School (p. 121 ff.), who at the same
time, as their essential characteristic absolutely requires,
aim at as comprehensive and profound an estimate as
possible of Jesus as a historical personality ; just as
they seek to investigate thoroughly the peculiar nature
of immediate religious experience. This often acts
prejudicially to clearness in the statement of the ques-
tion ; the more so because on this point the historians are
fond of assuming the role of systematic theologians,
without accurately defining the terms they make use of.
In such incursions into a foreign province, there is just as
much talk of the great value of history for faith, as there
is of the necessity for "a little more metaphysics,"

179

The Truth of the Christian ReHgion

along with the immediate certainty of experience, in
order to lay a sure foundation for faith. But when the
Systematic Theologian seeks to give a clear exposition
of, and to prove, the former affirmation, he meets with
opposition just as certainly as when he asks for a more
precise definition of the latter. These vital questions of
contemporary research in religion will occupy us in the
following section, where we deal with the essential
necessity of historical revelation.

Now it is a remarkable fact that the opponent of
this " Keligio-historic School," which loves to speak
of itself as " Positive," is in our question largely at one
with its habitual antagonist. The two are united
against those who consciously seek to turn the historical
revelation to account as the basis of religious certainty.
To be sure, on the part of the Theological Right, there
is no lack of emphasis on the " facts of salvation ". It
is in their attitude to these that they find their own
superiority, and the distinguishing mark of genuine re-
ligious faith. Only, these facts of salvation, the Incar-
nation, the Death on the cross, the Resurrection, the
Ascension, the descent of the Holy Spirit and the
Second Coming, are confined exclusively, in the case of
the theology in question, to the Dogmatic System it-
self : they are acts in the history of the God-man
which constitutes the content of faith ; but they find
no place in Apologetics ; they do not come into con-
sideration as a basis for faith. For example, Lu-
thardt and Cremer were at one in this with Lipsius
and Otto Pfleiderer against Ritschl. The question here
is not at all whether the so-called *' facts of salvation "
have the place and significance assigned to them. Sup-
pose that they have in every particular and in every
respect, the possibility still remains that they are of
importance likewise under the other point of view indi-

180

Importance of the Historical Revelation

cated, viz. in Apologetics. Our subject of inquiry, there-
fore, is whether indifference to the revelation of God in
Jesus Christ, in the course of the proof of the truth of
our religion, is well-founded — whether such proof can be
brought to a conclusive issue, without understanding and
emphasising this revelation as the basis of faith. That
is the SECOND point to which we directed attention as
demanding consideration ; and we believe ourselves able
to answer the question which we have just put in the
negative, and to prove the inner necessity of the
Revelation.

First of all, to speak quite generally, we have a very
simple line of argument, which applies to both sets of
those who are opposed to taking Revelation as a basis.
The hunger for reality, which is the very soul of religion,
and which came before us right at the commencement
of our attempt to understand its nature, is not satisfied
by the circumstance that religious experiences are of
value to us, however high the value we may put upon
them. Fichte's bold statement that worth is actuality,
value is reality, the valuable is real, is calculated to im-
press, stimulate and fascinate ; indeed in opposition to
a superficial view of reality, we may claim for it a large
measure of validity precisely on Christian grounds, but
all the same it is not the immovable ground of truth.
We must recall to mind the relation of religion to the
other main dejoartments of man's psychic life (pp. 59 ff.).
In their case we take our stand upon our own inward ex-
perience, and rightly so : we have no reason to go past
it. What does the artist care for reality, apart from
that of his own feeling — his powers of imagination ? In
the esthetic sphere, beauty and truth coincide. The
man who is making an effort in the ethical sphere,
knows himself under obligation to his ideal, whatever

181

The Truth of the Christian Rehgion

the reality may be. Even pure science, that which deals
with assent-compelling knowledge, does not transcend
the scientific consciousness, especially when it under-
stands its own nature. Religion, on the contrary, as we
have often had to point out, stands or falls with the
reality of God, as real not only in our consciousness.
But there are many who, under the influence of very
crass conceptions of reality, have grave doubts about
this Reality. Now there is no question that the experi-
ence of the value of our faith of which we spoke (pp.
164 ff.), is for Christian conviction an experience of God,
an effect of the Supreme Reality. This is true especi-
ally of that experience at its highest stage, where the
religious is inseparably one with the ethical. Con-
sequently it is a grand truth, corroborated by experi-
ence, to which a recent philosopher gives utterance
when he says, "In the categorical imperative we ex-
perience a categorical indicative, an instinctive assur-
ance that it will work, come what may, something
of an infinite power which holds its own in spite
of all the weakness of our moral effort, an inward
pledge which proves for us that the yearning for the
existence of God has a reality corresponding to it "
(Class).

Only the more such positions are in line with our
own wishes, the readier we are to see one side of the
truth affirmed by ourselves find expression in them, the
more does the obligation rest upon us of putting their
validity as a proof to the test. First of all let us consider
the application of these principles in the so-called
Liberal Theology. We are absolutely at one with what
is said by Class, so far as it gives clear expression to
the truth that the religious man cannot construe his
experience except as a presence of God in him, an effect
wrought by God, a revelation on the part of God. In

183

Importance of the Historical Revelation

emphasizing this truth, present-day thought, particularly
of the religio-historic type, unquestionably marks an
advance. It is right in consciously directing attention
to the immediacy of the religious life, and in so doing
it finds that the pious person views his experience as the
work of God in man. Indeed it sees here an advance
over the standpoint which we ourselves advocate, namely
that there is an essential relation between our religious
life and Christ as the basis of its certainty. It must be
against this position that the party cry is raised — " Back
to God ! Only the Almighty and Eternal can be my
Redeemer " (Sulze). This party cry, we are told, will
mark a new victory of faith in God in our generation.
Now we are ready to grant that faith in Christ can be
so preached as to obscure faith in God. This is a
danger which we wish to keep in mind. But our
present concern is with the clearness and consistency
of the position urged on the other side. We must con-
sider carefully what is meant by saying, " Faith is God's
work in me, something produced by Him". Here
manifestly only two methods of Divine revelation can
come into consideration, one within the human soul,
another, as we show more carefully afterwards, in
history. The opponents with whom we are here deal-
ing affirm the former to the exclusion of the latter.
More accurately, they regard the former as the decisive
one, although they are ready, as we immediately pro-
ceed to show in detail, to assign the latter a significance
as great as possible alongside of the former. We on
the other hand are far from denying the inward revela-
tion ; and this likewise w411 appear plainly, in the course
of our exposition. What meaning could faith or trust,
particularly in our religion, have, without immediate ex-
perience of the Divine inworking ? But however high
the estimate we put upon this, we affirm that without

183

The Truth of the Christian ReHgion

support in the historical revelation, there is lacking a
foundation indispensable for assurance.

A simple explanation will show why we make this
assertion. When the statement that faith is the work
of God, is understood as meaning that the experience of
the religious man is simply the form of the Divine in-
working, all the variations of our subjective experience
become variations of the Divine inworking ; whereas we
wish to be assured of this as something lying outside of
and transcending the variations of our subjective ex-
perience. Consequently we fail to secure the very thing
we are concerned to have at this point of our investiga-
tion. We are in quest of a sure basis for our experience,
and we receive the assurance that we have experience
of God in the variations of it. The following considera-
tion places this conclusion still further past dispute.
The position that faith is the work of God, as hitherto
understood, namely as meaning that God's self-manifes-
tation is the objective basis of our subjective experience,
and that the two are distinguished only in our thought
of them, is no accurate expression for the experience
of the religious man. Such a statement fails to give
due recognition to the personality either of God or
of man, reduces the relation of God and man to a
relation between the Infinite and the finite, and so in-
fringes upon the conclusion forced upon us when deal-
ing with the nature of religion. If we must abide
by this, and maintain that the relation between God
and man must be viewed as really personal, and
that the truth that faith is the work of God does not
exclude human responsibility, we cannot escape the
admission that the mystical inworking of God of which
we speak, cannot furnish an impregnable foundation for
certainty, but that on the contrary there is expected of
the human subject what that inworking cannot achieve

184

Importance of the Historical Revelation

for him. We should have to create by our trust some-
thing that is not present in such Divine inworking. In
any case such must be our finding, if we presuppose the
distinctively Christian view of God. To be sure, where
the Christian faith in God the Father is understood as
meaning that " in our sense of guilt we trace God's own
pardoning love, that we must work, and in doing so
must become guilty ; but this sense of guilt we experi-
ence as a supernatural gift of God's grace " (Weinel), or
where the essence of religion generally is transformed into
" an experiencing of man's true nature," "an uplifting to
personality" (Johannes Mtiller), the indefinite idea that
the Infinite in us eff'ects this uplifting, enabling us to
experience the supernatural gift of grace referred to,
may be sufficient. But this is not the well-marked
genuine Christian view of God, who "in grace and
truth deals with us, entering into personal fellowship
with the struggling soul, as the Living and Kighteous
God ". We cannot understand faith in this God as a
mystical presence of God in us, without being compelled
to forego the certainty we have of faith. This certainty
shines for us " in the face of Jesus Christ ". If the experi-
ence of Christian Faith is conceived and acknowledged
more precisely as in the quotations last given, the need for
a more thorough establishment of the truth of it only
becomes the clearer.

It is thought by the adherents of the so-called Positive
Theology that they are able to establish this certainty
ever so much more clearly, and that their basis is vastly
superior to any that we have described. They feel them-
selves grounded upon the firmest conceivable foundation :
the Holy Spirit of God gives them an assurance regard-
ing their faith, that is unassailable. Now there can be
no doubt that the Christian refers his religious certainty
to the working of the Holy Spirit. But in our present

185

The Truth of the Christian Rehgion

connexion the question is, how does this certainty arise,
and how can it be re-established amid all its fluctuations ;
that is to say, on what grounds are we able to recognize
the work of the Holy Spirit ? It is of very little value
here simply to point out how wonderfully mysterious
His work always is ; we have proof of this in the fact
that such is the line taken by the Vatican decree regard-
ing faith and revelation. But further, this course involves
consequences of which no Protestant can approve. If
the Holy Spirit is adduced at the wrong place, and
consequently in an illegitimate manner, as the ground of
religious certainty, there is danger both of intellectualism
and of fanaticism. For if we fail to show how saving
faith may be produced by the facts of salvation, or more
accurately, by the one great fact of Jesus Christ, work-
ing upon us as a revelation of God which we can experi-
ence, it is almost impossible to avoid the appearance
that we have to assume by a decision of the will, the
truth of those facts of salvation. Thereupon the claim
is made that supernatural certainty is inwrought in the
heart by the Holy Spirit. The latter position is just as
certainly fanaticism as the former is intellectualism.
In all schools of present-day theology, it would be agreed
that such a preaching of the gospel produces such effects.
Unanimity might be reached in this way, because preach-
ing in the different schools, in the measure in which it is
real preaching, rises superior to what may be false in
their theological presuppositions. But should there be
an inclination, as there is so apt to be, to see in all this
only artificial difficulties, and to confine one's self to the
position that, nevertheless, the work of the Holy Spirit
is demonstrable in its bliss-conferring and regenerating
effects, we should have to insist that we are not now
speaking about that at all ; we are long past that point.
What we would like to know is, how the truth of such

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Importance of the Historical Revelation

experiences can be proved, even if doubt should be
cast upon them. Nothing accordingly is gained for
our quite definite question by referring to the Holy
Spirit. We are no further forward than we were,
when we refused to be satisfied by the appeal to God's
mystical inworking in the human soul. At this point
the Orthodox Apologetics shows no essential superi-
ority to the Liberal. But we may find that the former
is superior, if the work of the Holy Spirit is rather
declared to be inseparable from the Word of God,
or to speak more precisely, to attest the Word of
God in Scripture to our hearts ; not of course in the
sense of the old doctrine of the witness of the Holy
Spirit to the inspired writing, but in the sense that the
content of Scripture is made sure (cf. Ihmels). In fact
this modification of the idea comes close to what we
assert in the sequel, when we make use of the history
contained in Revelation, so as to get a proof for the
truth of our religion. But only if we prosecute the aim
with clearness of purpose and without reserve, following
the course which is afterwards described, would it be
possible to make real progress, and to supply a refuta-
tion of the objections put forward above.

But we would be unfair to our opponents, if we
brought our account of their views to a close in this way,
without having directed attention emphatically to the
fact, that they themselves are at pains to cover the deficit
which showed itself on their summing up of inward
revelation, by a loan from the revelation in history. Our
own intention is to show the decisive importance of the
latter revelation. Our opponents to the Right and to the
Left refuse to assign such significance to it, in proving the
truth of religion, that is in establishing the certainty pos-
sessed by faith. But they are willing to let it rank as an
auxiliary, and to make as much use of it as possible. In

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The Truth of the Christian Rehgion

particular in the theological school of our day, where the
distinction between the Redemptive Principle and the
Person of the Eedeemer is still held as a fundamental, we
find the tendency, in spite of this separation, to emphasize
the latter as strongly as possible. The relation of Prin-
ciple to Person, we are told, is not an external and tempor-
ary one ; it is essential and permanent. We have to do
not with the communication of a doctrine, but with " the
first self-embodiment of the Principle in a Person of cos-
mical significance. The Person is the source, the arche-
type which guarantees the efficacy of the redemptive
Principle " (Biedermann). The last expression betrays
most clearly the instability and inconsistency of such
positions, and also the reason of this instability and in-
consistency. They are insecure and inconsistent, for
"guarantee " and " archetype " are two different things,
and it does not make them one to mention them together.
If Jesus be our Archetype, our task is to model ourselves
upon Him, roused and supported by Him certainly, but
essentially in virtue of the inherent majesty of the Arche-
type, which means of the principle ; and the principle is
in the last resort independent of the Person, though He is
an illustration of it. If on the other hand. He guarantees
our being formed in His image, assuring its success, His
work is of another order, deeper and more effectual than is
within the power of an Archetype. His work then is what
we have always maintained it to be, of such a nature that
in it we are able to experience the work of God ; that is,
He works as a Revelation of God. In that case, to be
sure, the relation of principle and Person is an essential
and permanent one, but consistency is sacrificed. For the
claim made for this standpoint, as compared with the ec-
clesiastical tradition, is that the Person of the Redeemer
is no longer encrusted with affirmations which it is be-
lieved are applicable to no one in history, as temporally

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Importance of the Historical Revelation

conditioned ; but have been attributed to Him, only
through a confusion between Person and principle, which
is intelligible in the sphere of naive thinking. And yet
here again an affirmation is made regarding the Person,
which in truth, must apply only to the principle. If on
the other hand it is clearly a case of hyperboles, and in-
consistent ones at that, the reason for such hyperboles is
unmistakable ; it is the ineradicable demand which faith
makes, that what it values most highly must be real,
the yearning to pass from the realm of what it wishes
into the world of what is.

Still more finely conceived in regard to matters of
detail, are the attempts made, under the influence of the
modern historical study of religion, to substantiate re-
ligious certainty, the basis of which is found in principle
in inward experience, by assigning to Jesus a supreme
value, without however transcending the limit of which
we have been speaking. Jesus is no longer spoken of as
an Archetype or Example. That seems too lowly a
role for Him, and too moralistic. There is too little of
the immediacy of religion about it. He is regarded as
the religious genius, virtuoso, and hero, and it is believed
that this enables us to assign to Him the power we de-
siderate. These watchwords, which are prinked out
with the utmost brilliance of colour, and made to glow
with the utmost warmth of feeling, tell on our generation,
disciplined as it is in the art of entering with lively ap-
preciation into the sentiments of others. The first of
these words emphasizes originality in matters religious
in its inmost nature, the second the manifestation of it in
all the events of the individual life, while the third and
most popular of the three gives direct expression to the
power of influencing others. The applications in detail are
variations of Carlyle's theme of "heartfelt, prostrate ad-
miration ; submission fervent, boundless, before a noblest

189

The Truth of the Christian ReHgion

godlike Form of Man ". In this sense Jesus is bailed as
" the Hero of the undertaking which He names the King-
dom of God, the Dayspring of real manhood " (Johannes
Mtlller). The idea of the Hero as thus employed, is a very
appropriate one, because on the one hand it gives clear
expression to the unquestionable significance of history
for our own religious life — there is a great advance here
upon Lessing's " contingent truths of history " — but on
the other hand it still leaves our own religious life in the
last resort independent of history. Indeed this high
estimate of Jesus is compatible with the acknowledg-
ment that " it does not matter who points us to the
way of deliverance so that we may become men'' (J.
Miiller). For such an estimate of Jesus, the term IIe?'o
fits like a glove. Heroes occupy the borderland be-
tween history and myth, and exercise an influence in
the dim light which reigns there, not as historical per-
sonalities, but as symbols embodying ideas. This whole
modern attitude to Jesus indicates an enrichment of out-
look, but inasmuch as it does not rise beyond the ground
idea that certainty rests upon inward experience of God,
it is open to the criticism which we had to pass upon that
idea. In spite of all asseverations, we cannot see how we
are to attain to assured confidence in the good and graci-
ous God. No skill or enthusiasm in presentation can
get us away from the alternative which we always see
confronting us. In the inward experience of God, His
revelation in Jesus is either a " constitutive moment " or
it is not. Consequently there is religious certainty or
there is not, according as Jesus belongs to the foundation
of our faith or not. With joy and gratitude we welcome
such voices as these, " We find God in Christ ; we have an
inalienable possession in faith in Him ". But it is not
from mere contentiousness, but on account of the great-
ness of the issues involved, that we are compelled

190

Revelation and the Certainty of Faith

to insist that such vital statements must be carried to
their logical conclusions, and that it does not do to say in
the same breath, " We are utterly tired of Christology " ;
-for such statements are a Christology, even if on fuller
examination it should prove to be very different from that
of Chalcedon. Similarly, it is not permissible, when the
conception of Hero, applied to Jesus, is criticized as
above, to reply that this word is not used in the
strict sense, though there had previously been a very
definite application of it. In view of such lack of cer-
tainty, we can readily understand how it is that large
numbers, belonging to very different ways of thinking in
regard to other theological matters, are driven to other
supports in order to reach it. We take it for granted that
the gravity of the problem is generally realized, and that
most people are too accurate in their thinking to see the
perfection of wisdom in the friendly counsel, " Only let a
man be bold in his faith, and he will presently become
assured of it " — a counsel of equal value with the proposal
that the drowning man should get out of the water. It
is easy to see what can still be seriously urged apart from
these feeble measures. There is nothing left but to
make another appeal to the method of proof, by means of
some sort of necessary knowledge, which we have al-
ready rejected. In other words, we must revert some-
how to the proofs for the being of God, though we may
apply them in a new way.

The one group of them, of course, the ontological, the
cosmological and the teleological, cannot seriously come
into view, at least in the old forms, for the reasons
given ; more significance apparently is thought to belong
to the uwral. Reference has already been made in our
own argument, to the inner connexion between recog-
nition of a moral ideal, and an ultimate conviction re-
garding the ground and purpose of the world. To be

191

The Truth of the Christian Rehgion

sure, in a complex civilization, we not infrequently find
heroes in the field of moral effort deliberately renounc-
ing every such conviction. A Christian must look upon
it as highly unchristian to make little of those men.
But just now we are not concerned with sach individual
cases, or even in the first instance with the general
question whether man is cajDable of moral effort without
faith in God. For this question, raised prematurely, is
destructive both of morality and of religion : the former
loses its full earnestness, the latter its full blessedness ;
an unmoral type of religion and an irreligious type of
morality arise only too readily. The question rather is
whether there is a necessary connexion of thought be-
tween the moral ideal and faith — conviction regarding
the Ultimate Reality, the ground and purpose of the
world. Unquestionably there is such a connexion. We
feel that there is an intolerable contradiction in submit-
ting ourselves to the absolute command of the good, and
at the same time abjuring the faith that the good is the
supreme purpose of the world ; in other words, that the
ground and purpose of the world is good, and not in-
different as regards what is good. Nor is this all.
There is an unmistakable connexion between the par-
ticular idea held concerning \yhat is good, and the con-
ception entertained regarding this ultimate Reality. The
all-gracious indulgent Father of the period of Illumin-
ism, corresponds with the content of the ethical ideal
then current, and the not overstrict construction put
upon the moral imperative. To the principle that what
gives pleasure is right, there is properly speaking no
corresponding ethical conception of God ; the esthetic
notion of a world-harmony, where the Infinite realizes
itself and the dark shades contribute to the beauty of
the whole, suffices. It is specially clear how the Chris-
tian commandment of love to God and our neighbour,

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Revelation and the Certainty of Faith

and the Christian idea of God as pardoning, holy love,
correspond to each other ; for otherwise the obstacles,
not only those which occur in the course of the world's
progress, but guilt, the greatest of evils, could not be
overcome. In such considerations is found the deepest
sense of the so-called moral theistic proof. It is no
proof, because the presupposition is not logically demon-
strable, namely the recognition of the moral law. But
it brings home to our consciousness in a living way, that
there is a rational connexion between the idea of God
who wills the good, and the act of our own will of which
we speak. This does not mean that happiness and
morality will be balanced, if not on earth then in a future
existence ; that would be the false and rash identifica-
tion of "Thou shalt" with "God wills it," of which we
have spoken. All that we affirm is that there is a rational
connexion between the one and the other. This is a
truth by no means to be despised. Under certain cir-
cumstances it can be of great value, amid the difficulties
attendant upon the growth of the personality. Living
personal faith in God, let us say, may have got lost in
the conflict with doubt, along with the other treasures
of childhood ; but the man who has lost his faith is kept
from cutting himself adrift from what is good, as well as
from religion, by the knowledge, or it may be the vague
feeling, that to do so would mean self-annihilation. In
such darkness of soul, many have found in that inter-
relation of ideas of which we spoke, a last slight bond
uniting their better self with God in His goodness.

But this consideration does not bring us the certainty
at which we are aiming in this present connexion. I
refer to the correspondence which we have found to ex-
ist, between the moral ideal and a judgment regarding
the ground and purpose of the world, and in particular
between the Christian moral law with its unconditional

VOL. I. 193 13

The Truth of the Christian ReHgion

^' Thou shalt," and its imposing content, on the one hand,
and the Christian idea of God as forgiving, holy love, on
the other. There is no certainty for us here, because,
although we can easily see the correspondence between
the two ideas, we have no means of proving the moral
right to affirm it. For in any case the moral imperative
of which we speak, taken by itself, only brings us to the
righteousness of God, and that very circumstance makes
it the despair of the conscientious person. If again, in
order to escape this, he thinks of the righteous God as
pardoning love (on his own initiative, without warrant
in an actual revelation of God) he does so at the cost
of surrendering the majesty of the moral law. He plays
fast and loose with goodness and with God. He lets
his imagination go as it pleases in an illegitimate way.
We received impressive warning of this twofold danger,
despair on the one hand and vain self -justification on
the other, from our Reformers, who saw that there is
only one way of escape, namely Christ ; that is, an actual
drawing near on the part of God. But let us suppose that
the hypothesis or postulate of God's existence is war-
ranted on ethical grounds. The religious man's need
would still be unsatisfied ; for his concern is not with what
he establishes as coherent thought, and on this basis postu-
lates as actual, bu-t with the Reality of God, as a reality
that proves itself active on his behalf. His whole desire
is, to get away from the forbidden ground of his own
inner experiences, as being merely personal experiences,
and to have the right on good grounds to understand
them as an actual communication of the living God to
him.

The school which for the while is enjoying extensive
popularity, does not always enter far enough into the
rationale of pious experience, as just described, — the
school referred to in our historical survey of Apologetics,

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Revelation and the Certainty of Faith

when we used the catch-words, "Religious a priori," or
the '' Reintroduction of Metaphysics into Theology " (pp.
131 ff.). An objection on the ground of principle was
there stated, and now it will be possible to clear up
some matters of detail in connection with our present
argument. The attractiveness of the essays alluded to
is unquestionably due in the first instance to their very
vagueness. Expressions like taking the theistic proofs
as the rational basis, appear to be far too rough-hewn ;
but all really comes at last to this, that the Absolute,
considered as the ground and purpose of the whole
process of the universe, gets to be viewed as having the
force of one of the truths of reason, and so establishes
the truth of faith in God as taught by Christianity. At
this point we shall not ask again whether we can speak
seriously in this case of rational necessity ; nor yet
whether, supposing we could do so, the real existence
of God, in the sense understood by religion, is certainly
one and the same thing with the necessity of the idea of
God for our thought. But meanwhile, this, we can say,
has always become plainer to us, that the pale abstrac-
tion which they adduce, when they speak of the ultimate
ground and goal of the whole process of the universe,
differs toto coelo from the Christian conception of God,
with its richness of content ; and it is just the elements
of the latter conception which are of chief importance
for Christian piety, that are wanting to it, — we refer
here only to prayer, responsibility, forgiveness of sin,
eternal life. Now if the ''New Metaphysic," as we
have it, say, in Troeltsch, develops into a Metaphysic of
Freedom, and frankly accepts "Dualism," convictions
of the kind, in proportion as they are of value to us,
and touch a deeply sympathetic chord, are hardly to be
called universal truths of reason ; and accordingly it
usually happens that an appeal is made with deep feeling,

195

The Truth of the Christian Rehgion

at some point or other, for faith, in the sense of this
metaphysic, faith reached by a personal decision. For
example, it is said that " there is no other pathway to
faith, except by submission to the Revelation which God
has made, exhibited through one's personal activity and
freedom ". If now we hear along with this statement,
that " there is a philosophical metaphysic which knows
from its own resources that there is religion and
morality," we shall be curious to know whether the two
pronouncements can be harmonized in a way that carries
conviction. While the "Religious a priori" is thus
insecure as a foundation for the truth of our faith, we
shall also require to be very cautious, if we think of
making use of the same idea, in the sense of a norm for
the content of the truths of faith. Certainly, when we
showed above (pp. 59 ff. and 164 ff.) that man's mental
life reaches its full height and depth in religion, that in
piety we have experience of our destiny as realized, —
an idea which the very simplest teaching from the
Catechism brings home with effect, where the doctrine
of the creation of man in God's image is treated — it
cannot be denied that in this experience of the attain-
ment of our destiny, there is to be found a standard for
judging the particular manifestations of religious life,
and so also, to take an example, for condemning a faith
resting on external miracles, like that which we have in
" Christian Science ". However, the norm for this
purpose is the rule, always more profoundly realized,
of our own definite religion ; not any disposition for
religion existing in mankind generally. And without
doubt, when we seek to prove the truth of our faith, it
is also important to show, as we ourselves have attempted
to do, that Christian piety brings the religious disposi-
tion to its full issue ; but to show this, we can as before
find no religious a priori, as a norm which is definite as

196

Revelation and the Certainty of Faith

it stands. Consequently the expression should be re-
placed once for all by words which are unambiguous.
We see then that so long as these attempts have left
revelation out of sight, in spite of their great variety,
they have failed to reach the sure ground of certainty.
We are thus driven to the conclusion that either no such
certainty is attainable by faith, or the revelation of Ood in
Christ has to be acknowledged ivith clear consciousness, as an
essential groimd of the proof. We reserve for further con-
sideration all questions of detail, especially the question
how this revelation relates itself to our value-judging
faculty, approving itself thereto as true. Every religion
claims to rest upon revelation, proving its reality in this
way, and defending itself against the charge of being an
illusion. We have now satisfied ourselves why Christian-
ity, and Christianity in particular, cannot forego such claim
without relinquishing its all. In closing, we may draw
attention to an argument, one which is at first sight of
a very different species, that seeks to show that the
historical Person of Jesus is indispensable. E. Troeltsch
views Him in the central position He occupies for the
Church's practical needs. He is "indispensable from
the point of view of Social psychology, for worship, to
make the faith effective, and to propagate it ". "The
law of social psychology " which applies to the formation
of associations, holds good for the religious life as else-
where : when associations are formed in connexion
with spiritual religions, it is the prophets, and the
personalities of the founders, who serve as prototypes,
authorities, sources of power, rallying centres ; and
therefore " all great spiritual religions are instances of
religious homage yielded to their founders and prophets.
So also with the Christian idea : it will have no effective
reality without association and worship ; and in Christi-
anity, the latter is just the gathering of the Church

197

The Truth of the Christian Rehgion

round its Head." In relation to our question, we wel-
come this emphasis laid on worship ; it corresponds
indeed to all that we have said from the first regarding
the nature of religion, in this aspect of the matter.
But when Troeltsch assigns to the worship of Christ
the significance, that it is " becoming immersed in the
Revelation of God contained in the image of Christ " ;
when he speaks of a ''real hunger for conviction and
certainty," and says that as God is for the Christian
"not an idea and possibility, but a holy Reality," and
so too that the " Symbol of God " which he acknow-
ledges, is for him "a real symbol, a real man," who
"lived, struggled, trusted, and conquered as Jesus did,"
— what we took to be the critical matter is there ad-
mitted. But in our opinion, it requires to be expressly
represented as such, and to be much more exactly de-
fined. For we are obliged to ask, why the fellowship
of Christian faith has its basis only in such worship :
surely the religion will not exist for the worship, but
rather the worship for the religion. The religion lives
on the certainty of the real Revelation which God has
made. But next, how far the faith of the Christian
Church in the Revelation of God in Jesus, is the work
of Jesus, and not merely the necessary work of the
Church in fulfilment of a law of social psychology, —
the question in this aspect of it has to be discussed
later ; though it is certain that the matter of our ex-
position up to this point is not independent of the decision
given to it. Our next task, accordingly, the third of
this division, is to say what is here understood by reve-
lation. We have attempted to understand its import-
ance : we have now to define its nature.

In the view of our old Dogmatic Theologians,
" special " or " supernatural " revelation (as distinguished

198

Concept of Revelation

from " general " or " natural," the light implanted in
reason and conscience, acted upon by contact with
God's works of creation and providence), was communi-
cation of the supernatural truths of salvation ; i.e. simply,
profitable instruction in these truths. This was the view
which Rationalism opposed, though it did not itself sub-
stitute a new conception of revelation. By comparison
with this position, involving the affirmation or denial of
such revelation, Schleiermacher's conception of revelation
as direct impartation of life is quite as much a discovery as
his conception of religion itself, to which it corresponds
exactly ; for if religion is essentially not a matter of
knowledge or conduct, no more can revelation be essen-
tially the communication of truths, which a man ought
to know, or according to which he ought to direct his
conduct. But neither in Schleiermacher's conception
of religion, nor in his corresponding conception of revela-
tion, is sufficient attention given to the religious man's
interest in truth. As against the old intellectualism,
the emphasis on life was certainly a notable advance,
but the life in question was not defined with sufficient
explicitness as spiritual and especially as moral. This
applies particularly to our religion, which claims from
the start to be the perfectly spiritual and moral one ;
and in which, conformably thereto, the idea of revelation
found expression at an early date in the statement, that
in Christ grace and truth have come to us. Besides,
Schleiermacher regarded revelation, or immediate com-
munication of life, as essentially an experience of the
religious man : the objective basis of this subjective
experience remained in the background. And yet it is
just this side of the truth which is of decisive importance
in our present connexion. Wherever mention is made
of revelation in religion, it is claimed that the limits of
the inner life are transcended, and the reality of God

199

The Truth of the Christian Rehgion

is experienced. To escape both defects in Schleier-
macher's view, while continuing to hold fast his unde-
niable advance upon the old divines, is Kothe's intention
in emphasizing manifestation and inspiration, as the
connected and yet distinguishable moments in every act
of revelation. The manifestation, i.e. the actual making
of Himself known on God's part, is the communication
of life, and is indeed thought of absolutely as an ob-
jective act of God. The inspiration is the significance of
the manifestation for our consciousness, the knowledge
of the truth wrought by God Himself, which is given
with the communication of life, explaining and perfect-
ing it. The deliverance of Israel at the Red Sea is
manifestation : " I am the Lord thy God, who have
brought thee out of Egypt," is inspiration. Jesus'
whole history, from the cradle to the empty grave, is
manifestation ; His witness and the words of His apostles
are inspiration. Obviously this view of Rothe's as to
revelation, in the relations stated, aims at combining
in a higher unity, what is correct in the orthodox
Protestant conception and in that of Schleiermacher,
without, however, certainly reaching this goal ; especially
inasmuch as manifestation and inspiration are often
found side by side, external to each other. The out-
come of theological work so far upon this conception,
on the exhibition of its essential characteristics, may be
summed up in a few formulae, which give expression
to the truth of the old position, as well as that of
Schleiermacher. It is true that ambiguity in the use of
the terms,^ e.g. the words " natural " and "supernatural,"
is a hindrance to a common understanding, as had to
be emphasized already in another connexion. In the
nature of the case we have to deal with three main
aspects, the content, the form, and the signijicance of re-
velation.

200

Concept of Revelation

Upon grounds often indicated, its content is life,
reality fully satisfied, not mere thought which we would
have to inspire with life ; but spiritual life, finding
self-utterance in clear thought ; and truth, because
personal life at its highest, not an indefinite sentimental
blessedness, but communion with God at once spiritual
and moral. Or, from the other side, regarded from the
point of view of the subjective reality of revelation :
the revelation of God in our religion is a revelation
which produces faith, i.e. trust. This is what the original
witnesses affirm, what the Reformers discovered afresh,
and what each one experiences, when he first seriously
enters the world of religion, while the most advanced
never gets beyond it. As the God who reveals Himself
is personal holy love, His revelation consists in a self-
attestation capable of producing personal trust. It is
trust which makes a reality of this communion, of the
life in God, which is for the same reason the highest
knowledge. Thus it is that in the New Testament faith
in God and knowledge of God, truth and eternal life, are
interchanged in a way that is at first often perplexing.
In the human relations of true love in all its forms, we
have the image of this relation between the self -reveal-
ing God, and the man who opens his heart to Him.
Simple as it is, the image always discloses fresh marvels.
In trust, we experience a communion which is itself the
highest knowledge of Him who is the object of our
trust.

With regard to the formal relations of the conception
of revelation, we may state in the forefront that this con-
tent of life and truth assigned to it is truly supernatural :
the mystery of God is revealed : what has entered
the heart of no man, God has prepared for those
who love Him, and in their love of Him know as also
they are known. But this supernatural truth given in

201

The Truth of the Christian ReHgion

life, does not remain for us a thing strange and apart ;
on the contrary it becomes our most intimate personal
possession : for it is the perfection of our nature. As
regards the method of its realization, revelation is some-
thing outside of us, but does not remain external to us, is
immediate but not independent of means. The proof of
God must lie outside of us (we have no other unambigu-
ous word). The very purpose of revelation is that we
may become inly conscious of God, as the realityindepend-
ent of our spiritual life. But what help is it to us, if it
remain outside of us, without approving itself to us as the
reality which exists for our sake, and awakens trust in
us ? For the same reason it is an immediate manifesta-
tion and yet it is not independent of means, either in
history or in its personal appropriation. In its history ;
for if it were simply an occurrence like any other,
how could we distinguish it as God's proof of His being ?
On the other hand, were it out of relation to all other
events, how could we recognize it as real ? In the
same way, its personal appropriation is God's immediate
act in us — this is the truth of the belief in the Holy
Spirit — and yet it is indissolubly connected with the
whole of our experience ; the grounds for both state-
ments being the same as before. Let it be noted at
least in passing, that these last named relations may be
connected by the use of those words of many mean-
ings, " natural " and " supernatural ". Such statements
as a whole raise new questions which cannot be answered
till later. At the same time it is certain that they
express the essence of our religion, and of the idea of
revelation which belongs to it.

Finally, the statements regarding content and form
are in exact correspondence with the statement regarding
the valite of revelation. It is a real authority, otherwise
it would be worthless. But its authority is not of a

202

Concept of Revelation

legal order. That may suit Islam, but it is contrary to
our religion. We know only a revelation which is real
for trust ; but trust does not stand alone and independ-
ent ; it has in revelation its basis and norm.

All this, however, serves only as a preliminary to some
points of view which we must not disregard, instructed
as we have been by the history of the Christian idea of
revelation. They first receive their full significance by
being related to the reality of the personality of Jesus, But
how are we to characterize this reality itself ? How far,
and in virtue of what characteristics, does it win our
confidence, that in it God shows Himself operative as
almighty righteous love, eternally offering sinners
personal communion ? Were we to say forthwith,
" He is for us, in His work addressed to us, the personal
self-revelation of the God of whom we speak, whereby
God secures our trust : He is this in His speech, con-
duct, and destiny, as these are all summed up in the
unity of the personal activity belonging to His vocation,
upon the basis of His distinctive self-consciousness as
Son," — we should doubtless give correct expression to
the faith of Christendom. It is instructive to emphasize
that the positions adduced with reference to the idea of
revelation, its content, its form and its significance, are
capable of being summed up in the thought of the
personal self-manifestation of God. But the meaning
of the affirmation which sums them up, namely
that Jesus is the personal self-revelation of God, comes
more clearly into view, when we consider in what other
ways this God of ours could reveal Himself, in order to
arouse religious trust in us. To be sure, in dealing with
this question, we are guided by the Revelation acknow-
ledged in Christendom, and we cannot suppose that we
could ever evolve the idea of it by means of our discussion
itself. Indeed we must explicitly reject the erroneous

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The Truth of the Christian Rehgion

opinion, that the exposition which follows amounts to a
syllogism — A perfect self-revelation of God can be ac-
knowledged, only if He manifests Himself in such and
such a way : it is in this particular way that He has
proved Himself active in Jesus : therefore we acknow-
ledge Jesus as the perfect self-revelation of God. By no
means. On the contrary, starting with Jesus as a
Reality, we derive by deliberate reflection thereupon
the separate moments of the revelation which claims to
be understood as a revelation of the God in question ; if
the nature of the God who reveals Himself, and the
manner of His revelation of Himself, must correspond
and actually do correspond in all religions (cf. pp. 52 fif.,
91 ff.). But, when, by an abstraction, we put the ques-
tion as if we had not yet the answer, the reality in all its
aspects stands out more clearly for us, and its signific-
ance becomes more intelligible ; what we have long been
accustomed to comes home to us with new meaning. At
the same time, the whole history of mankind before and
independently of Christ, with its imperfect yet not value-
less belief in revelations, becomes more fruitful to us ;
and we understand the yearning complaint which the
poet puts into the mouth of the sage, when he remembers
the many messengers of God who brought but half light.
" Wilt Thou never gather all together into one clear and
living word, Almighty One ? Will Thy loving thought,
full of pity for our sorrow, never condescend to the
limits of mortality, tremulous with yearning ? " (Geibel).
A discussion such as we propose has the following
stages. Fi7'st of all, it is clear wherein such revelation
cannot consist. That is to say, not in a nature miracle,
be it ever so unheard of ; or, as may be supposed, in a
theophany surrounded by any sort of halo of supernatural
glory. There would be no inner connexion between the
nature of God as conceived by the Christian revelation,

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Concept of Revelation

and the manifestation in question. Righteous Love
would not be revealed thereby, though its seal were made
to shine resplendent with the words written in fire, " Sins
are forgiven ". It is only the other side of this same fact,
when we add that there could never be any confidence
in such love ; the most that could come into play would
be a sort of compulsion to yield to it. This would be
the case, apart altogether from the unanswerable objec-
tion, that such miracles have a meaning only for the
person who himself experiences them : they can be ac-
cepted by those who come after, only on the testimony
of others — a sort of assent that no Protestant will feel
disposed to recognize as trust. Consequently we must
in any case turn from the merely natural province to
that of personal life or history • we think of God as
personal, and in harmony therewith, we must conceive
of man's relation to Him as one of personal trust.
Would it be sufficient then to have accurate communi-
cation of supernatural religwus truths, by a historical
person as the bearer of a revelation from God ? We
have passed beyond that position too in what we have al-
ready said. That might suffice for a legal religion like
Islam, although even it is not satisfied therewith. Further
in order to prove such communication of the truth, we
would be compelled almost of necessity to have recourse
again to external miracles.; in which case what was said
above would again apply. Rather, as our reflection,
resting on general grounds, leads us to conclude, the
drawing near on God's part in a historical personality
must prove itself real, through God's inmost being reveal-
ing itself in his whole work and life. God's will of love
towards sinners must confront us in the work of this
personality, in a manner so effectual, that his work can
be experienced as the work of God, and consequently
excite in us trust in the love of God. But such a unity

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The Truth of the Christian Rehgion

in the matter of work would be inconceivable for us, un-
less it sprang from an all-dominating consciousness, of
being here for the very purpose of makingsuch a revelation
— of having this vocation. " I am come to seek and to save
that which is lost." Again such a consciousness of voca-
tion is inconceivable, or at all events unethical (and in
that case, of what value would it be in our religion ?)
unless it rests upon a unique sel/-co?is-ciousnes-s, i.e. an
indubitable certainty regarding the God who purposes
so to reveal Himself. But in the sphere of our religion,
this certainty is conceivable only as the closest personal
communion with the life of the Father, only when the
inmost content of self-consciousness — within the limits
of human life — is the same disposition of love which
forms the content of the Divine nature ; when such a
person, loved by the Father as His Son, loves the Father,
and therefore loves men, who through Him are to be-
come children of God. "No one knows the Father
except the Son, and no one knows the Son except
the Father." But now for the other side. As we
have been led onwards from the thought of an ac-
tivity as God's, that is of the activity of a historical
person who excites the confidence that God is working
in him, to the consciousness of vocation on his part, and
from that point to the inmost depths of his self-con-
sciousness, so we are necessarily directed back again
from those depths to the clear light of his activity, as we
may know it. That innermost sanctuary of a conscious-
ness as to self which was unique, and the implied con-
sciousness of a vocation which was also unique, can
become certain to us as a reality of this world, only if
we find it in the form of a personal life which is truly
human, a form therefore which is characterized by trust
and prayer as well as by purposeful action. How could
we otherwise give credit to such an extraordinary claim,

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Concept of Revelation

unless it were verified by reference to a plain and demon-
strable impression made by the whole work of a life,
viewed as a unity ? Stupendous claims have been ad-
vanced by many in human history. They have been
forgotten as dreamers or condemned as deceivers, un-
less they made good their claims by the facts of their
life. They were not protected by their good intentions,
or even by their fidelity to what they regarded as their
vocation, from the reproach of having taken too much
upon them. Finally, if this one person is really to be
for all men, however separated in space and time, the
revelation of God, his figure in history must be suffici-
ently recognizable and definite, to be able to evoke even
in us — even at the remotest point in history — the assur-
ance that God was working in him.

The more carefully we traverse the separate steps of
this way, the clearer does it become, that these moments
of a revelation of the living God capable of evoking faith,
are synthesized in the thought, great in its simplicity,
which has already engaged our attention, while we in-
vestigated the nature of religion and of Christianity, and
which will demand more and more consideration in our
doctrines of God, of sin, of Christ, and of regeneration.
The question, that is to say, always resolves itself into
this : How is the communion of God with man and, on
the basis of this, of man with God, brought about ? It is
a case of " God's being in man and man's being in God ".
The answer is : To realize such communion is the pur-
pose of God's self-manifestation ; the latter is the proper
means for the supreme purpose in question. God
realizes this communion in One, that thereby it may
become real in all : He does this by the personal act of
this One, by His being in God, because God is in Him.
No other way would make perfect communion between
God and man, and man and God, a reality ; the means

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The Truth of the Christian Rehgion

corresponds exactly to the end. Now it is the unspeak-
able joy of Christendom, that it does not merely desire
such communion between God and man, or dream wist-
fully about the sort of manifestation of God that would
give assurance of God, if it were real, but on the con-
trary finds such a manifestation in Jesus. All the
traits adduced regarding the trustworthy, because trust-
inspiring, bearer of a revelation, are derived from the
portrait of Jesus. Only in order that we might rightly
appreciate the uniqueness of His portrait, they were
pictured as if we could evolve them, whereas in truth
they are derived from contemplation of Him. The well-
known phraseology of the New Testament would rise
spontaneously to our lips, if we were to enlarge upon
this subject as we might well do. We may now sum up
in simple fashion what we have got to say : All the
moments which we look for in a revelation capable of
exciting religious trust, in their necessary inner relation
to each other, the Christian Church finds harmoniously
realized in the historical personality of Jesus. In His
words, deeds, and suffering, and in the impression made
by His life as a whole. He works as God ; as the God by
whom He professes Himself sent, whom He designates
it as His calling to bring near to us, and assure us of,
knowledge of whom by Himself alone He urges as the
supreme proof of this calling. The content of the
divine life is effectively realized in the form of an
historical life under human conditions ; Jesus is the
personal self-revelation of God — of the God who, in His
Kingdom, unites sinners with Himself and with each
other in the eternal fellowship of His love, judging sin,
pardoning guilt, renewing the will, vanquishing death.
Jesus is the personal self-revelation of this God, since
He evokes such trust as the actively real presence of
the invisible God in the actual world, in which there is

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Concept of Revelation

otherwise no real assured confidence in this God. He is
the ground of faith, i.e. of trust. This is the truth to
which the faith of the New Testament testifies in
the most varied forms. What is most important, it
records the impression which Jesus Himself produced,
and which He always continues to produce, as the
ages pass. To show in detail in what sense Jesus, as
being in this way the foundation of faith, is also the
object of faith, is the work of the doctrine of Christ in
Dogmatics proper. But it follows from His significance
which we have just discussed, as the foundation of faith,
that He is also the object of faith, all further definition
being reserved. We may indicate here how valuable
this sequence of thought is. It frees us at the outset
from the fear that faith in Jesus is to be violently thrust
upon us, or that we have to work ourselves artificially
into it — a burden in both cases, and no blessedness.
Consideration of what is for ourselves the ground of
faith, has brought us to Him ; it has taught us to re-
cognize in Him the ground of our trust. We are bound
to Him by the strongest bonds there are, those of trust
rooted and grounded upon Him. As certainly as we
believe in God, we believe in Him ; we have the right
to believe ; in the proper sense of the word we ought to
believe ; but there is no compulsion about it. There is
no longer any possibility of that dread thought of com-
pulsion, the greatest enemy of all real faith. God asks
us whether we trust Him, for He thinks us worthy of
entering into personal fellowship with Him. He asks
us this question in Jesus — whether we bestow our trust
on Jesus : whether we bestow it on Him in Jesus, in
whom He works on us, exciting trust : whether we are
willing to let ourselves be laid hold of by His love re-
vealed in Jesus.

But the thought here turned to account in Apolo-

VOL. I. 209 14

The Truth of the Christian ReHgion

getics that, as the self-revelation of God in history, Jesus
is the ground of our faith, calls for a more 'precise defini-
tion. That is, we have briefly to define with greater pre-
cision the extent of the historical material, in which we
can see the self-revelation of God. Are we to include
everything that has come down to us regarding Jesus, or
only a part of this tradition ? Is the ground of our faith
an entity in which every item is of equal importance, and
equally capable of serving as a foundation for faith?
This question is earnestly debated, even among those
who agree in the main point ; that is, who with full con-
sciousness recognize in Jesus as the Revelation of God
the basis of faith. "The whole biblical Christ" is
this basis, according to the one party ; and they under-
stand thereby not only the whole series of the so-called
" facts of salvation," from the miraculous birth to the
bodily ascension, but also the collective testimony of
the first Church regarding Jesus, which is preserved for
us in the New Testament. The other side hold that
only THE portrait of Jesus, or His inner life, should be
regarded as revelation producing faith, and consequently
as the basis of faith ; this portrait or inner life being
manifested and tested in the whole course of His life,
and of the activity pertaining to His vocation, and
reaching its consummation on the Cross. A way is
being opened on both sides, towards a common under-
standing with reference to this contested point, often
more surely than the friendly opponents expressly recog-
nize. The latter (W. Herrmann) emphasize that in the
Crucified we feel the courage of victory, seeing Him al-
ways as conqueror ; and they here refer not merely to His
consciousness, or His claim, but also to the legitimacy
of this consciousness and claim of His, as a matter that
we require to prove. The former on the other hand
(Kahler) instinctively distinguish in that collective testi-

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Revelation in Christ Precisely Defined

mony of Scripture, between the essential and what is of
less importance ; not only to individual expressions in
Hebrews about Melchisedec, but even, among the facts
of salvation, to the miraculous birth, e.g., they do not
ascribe the same immediate significance as to the Resur-
rection ; even when with full conviction they assert them
in their Christology, they do not in Apologetics make
the same use of them as of other parts of the tradition.
Their reasons for so doing are quite plain. In reference
to facts of revelation, it must be shown in some way how
they can produce our confidence in them ; how we can
perceive the God who shows Himself operative, as opera-
tive in them. No one will assert that we can thus turn
to account, in the same sense and measure, the mystery
of the Birth and the portrait of the Redeemer. This is
so, quite apart from the fact, that a large portion of the
New Testament itself knows nothing of the account of
the birth of which we speak • Paul preaches the Cruci-
fied and Risen One ; it is there that he sees the founda-
tion of faith. So our investigation resolves itself essenti-
ally into the question, whether even the Resurrection
belongs in the strict sense to the basis of the faith. For
the present we leave out of account the special question
as to the manner in which it is conceived : all that is
meant is that the disciples, when they saw the Lord,
were not self-deceived, that He actually showed Himself
to them as the Living One.

In this point the difference above mentioned, among
those who in other respects are at one in their estimate
of the history, once more appears. Recognition of the
Resurrection, says the one party, is a consequence of
faith, the basis of which is the inner life of Jesus consum-
mated on the Cross, is a necessary thought for already
existent faith. It belongs itself to the basis of faith,
answer the others. Manifestly the former are afraid,

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The Truth of the Christian Rehgion

not without justification, that the Easter message may
be accepted with a submission which is merely external,
and consequently irreligious, indeed sinful because in-
jurious to truthfulness, instead of by an act of faith.
And who would deny that many Easter sermons are
calculated to act as a temptation to this sin ? A tempta-
tion certainly to which most of our contemporaries do
not expose themselves, whatever may be their motives,
whether conscientiousness or indifiference. On any theo-
logical platform, allowance might be made for this con-
sideration by the frank admission, that the resurrection,
as a basis for faith, can avail only for one who has
already been impressed in some way, by those other
features of the personality of Jesus, of which we have
spoken as making a first appeal. Indeed, according to
the faith of the Primitive Church itself, He did not
appear to all the people, but to witnesses chosen afore-
time (Acts X. 41). That He might have shown Himself
ahve to the Chief Priests and Scribes as well, is a thought
which plainly could not occur to the actual faith of the
Early Church, because standing in too obvious contra-
diction to the word of the Lord (Luke xvi. 31). Or in
other words : Faith cannot begin as it chooses, with the
impression of the public activity of Jesus, or with the
resurrection ; it cannot deal with these layers of its
foundation which have to be distinguished from each
other, as if they were perfectly homogeneous. Whoever
has not allowed himself to be in any way attracted,
humbled and exalted by Jesus' character, whoever has
not felt in His simple actions on earth the mark of the
invisible God, whoever has remained indifferent to His
love for sinners. His patience as a teacher in His inter-
course with the disciples. His earnestness in opposition
to the hypocrisy of pretended piety, whoever has not
found all this perfected and guaranteed upon the Cross,

212

The Revelation in Christ

is necessarily precluded from understanding the message,
'* the Crucified lives " ; and if he accepts it, it is only a
mere supposition, of the kind upon which no one can
base faith worthy of the name. But if there were no
doubt of this on the one side, the other for their part
might acknowledge that, as a matter of fact, the resur-
rection belongs to the foundation which is capable of
sustaining perfect religious faith. If we exclude it
therefrom, we have no full idea of the revelation of our
God, nor as a consequence of the foundation of our
Christian faith. If the life of Jesus end with the Cross,
in His love proved by His death we have, doubtless, a
revelation of the highest love that it would be possible
to find, which accordingly we shall gladly call " divine ".
But when we say that the love of God is revealed to us
in Jesus, we mean something different, namely that in
this Jesus, the love of God is revealed as the highest
reality, as the ground and goal of the universe. And
this is not the case unless it manifests itself as victorious
over death. The use of the popular word " divine," is
apt to conceal the fact that we use it in somewhat differ-
ent senses. Consequently also in the growth of faith in
each individual, a point will be reached where the indivi-
dual sees himself confronted by the question, whether
his trust in Jesus perfects itself in trust in His life from
the dead. Only when this is the case, will he himself
see in his trust the religious confidence of Christianity ;
though certainly he will not regard as valueless the be-
ginnings of such faith, when they show themselves.
But he knows that, without this goal, what was experi-
enced as valuable by the way, would be valueless in the
relation here in question. Jesus would remain for him
as example and guide, but as regards what went beyond
this in those initial experiences of which we spoke, the
impression of the active presence of God in Him, the

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The Truth of the Christian Rehgion

revelation of God, would slowly but surely disappear.
The more readily will these positions be admitted, the
less they are asserted with blatant insistence.

We have sought to define how far Jesus as the
revelation of God is the foundation of our faith. But
does not this confine the revelation of God to too narrow
a space in history ? Does not the following statement
speak of broader and firmer ground : "God is revealed
not in Jesus only, but also in all the matter that pre-
ceded Him, and that followed Him, without which, in
spite of all His uniqueness, He would be incompre-
hensible " ? Does not at least the expression, " But tor
Jesus I would be an Atheist " (Gottschick), merit this
reproach ? Its original intention was really just to bring
home to consciousness as vividly as possible, how indis-
pensable this supreme revelation of our God is, for the
certainty of living faith in this God ; and in this sense
it holds good, because here in the last resort there is
only the one alternative. Jesus himself said that He
alone shows us the Father, and we have explained the
grounds which induce us to admit His claim. But
certainly that statement of His is very apt to be mis-
understood. For it is just as obvious that an external
isolation of Jesus is nowise necessary, indeed that it
must not be sought for at all, where there is agreement
with that fundamental thought of which we spoke. On
the contrary. He claimed to stand in integral connexion
with the revelation of God in Israel, and we must con-
sider Him in connexion therewith in order to understand
Him at all. But the relation of this revelation to that
in Jesus is, again according to His own claim, that of
the preparatory to the completed. It is in all serious-
ness preparatory revelation, but just as certainly is it only
preparatory. In this sense it really belongs to the foun-
dation of the faith, but also only in this sense. (See

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Definition of the Concept of Revelation

further details in the Doctrine of Holy Scripture.) We
have nothing to do here with individual difficulties ; we
are concerned purely with the fundamental idea. This
secures a footing, slowly but surely, wherever there is
a truly Christian faith, as against all exaggerated claims
on behalf of the Old Testament as well as against all
underestimation of it ; whether the one or the other be
advanced in the name of faith or of unbelief.

Here also we find the right light in which to view
the History of the Church. For us it too is certainly a
revelation of God, and no dogmatic veto will keep the
Christian community from using it accordingly. To
call to remembrance just one thing : it is to History
that we are indebted for the knowledge that, according
to the counsel of God itself, the Gospel is to have a
chequered career in this world. At this point indeed,
in order to be quite clear, we must venture upon the
statement that, in one aspect, the history of Christendom
is more important for the faith of the Church, as a
revelation of the thoughts of her God, than that of the
people of Israel, just because it is definitely Christian.
But it is no contradiction to add : from another point of
view, that of Israel is more important, namely because
its authentic significance is given by Jesus Himself, and
it is so far complete ; while for the history of Christen-
dom, we ourselves must apply the supreme test of the
revelation of God in Christ, and can do so only tentatively
and imperfectly. In short, what is said in John xiv. to
XVI. regarding Jesus and the Spirit, furnishes the ideas
we speak of and have only to indicate here. The revela-
tion of God in Jesus remains the essential point.

The more clearly this is recognized, the more dis-
passionately will the individual Christian, as well as the
Church, recognize and value all else that may be under-
stood as a revelation of God. Here as in ordinary cases,

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The Truth of the Christian ReHgion

the way is from one's base into the open. Those who
make for the open, without having first settled their plan
on the ground which alone is secure, fail of attaining the
goal of certainty. When we start from the storm-proof
spot of the revelation in Jesus, the world becomes full of
the revelation of God. This is true of the History of the
World, with its wonderful development of all the higher
values, not merely the religious and ethical, but also the
esthetic and the scientific. It is true even of Nature it-
self, full of perplexities as it is for unstable faith. It is
high time that Christendom should make a new applica-
tion of the apostolic principle, " All things are yours,"
and claim Nature as its own. We rejoice in the pros-
pect of the philosophy of history and nature having a
future more securely than ever before based upon living
faith in God. Finally, it can scarcely be necessary to
direct special attention here again to the circumstance,
that there is an inexhaustible variety of ways, in which
all these effectual operations of God prove themselves
real, for the life experience of the individual.

At this point, however, another question, and an
urgent one, arises when we are speaking of the founda-
tion of the certainty of Christian faith. We found that
the revelation of God in history is indispensable for this
purpose. Is this history trustworthy history ? We
have had difficulty in delaying the consideration of this
question so long. Nor can we agree with those whose
final solution of it is the strangely inconsistent one, that
it does not matter much about the trustworthiness of
the history That is to make a virtue of necessity in
the worst sense ; to be generous to the point of self-
impoverishment. Either the history is of value for the
establishment of the faith, in which case it must be at
the same time reliable, or it is not, in which case cer-

216

The History of Revelation Trustworthy

tainly it is quite a matter of indifference how far it holds
good. Let us suppose that a future, however distant,
will prove that Jesus is only a creation of faith, and it
is all over with faith ; if it be in any way based upon
history as we have maintained that it is.

But certainly it must be carefully determined what
measure of historical trustworthiness is essential, if we
are to base our faith upon history, and what measure of
trustworthiness history in general can afford. In the
controversy regarding the trustworthiness of the history
of Jesus, both points are often neglected. The op-
ponents of Christianity make the wish father to the
thought, and speak as if faith must have a history every
detail of which is quite indisputable ; and make it appear
as if history of the kind were to be found in other de-
partments, only not in the particular one with which
we are concerned. It is child's play then to put faith
in the wrong ; for it is never difficult to refute an opinion
carried to the point of absurdity. Only no proof can be
given of either of these presuppositions of which we
speak. Faith neither requires historical trustworthiness
in the measure presupposed, nor is history in general
capable of affording it. We have the same two-fold
negation as before, when dealing with the question of
assent- compelling demonstration (p. 146 ff.). There we
had to face the general problem ; here we have the
particular application to the province of history. If the
trustworthiness of the tradition regarding Jesus could
be conclusively demonstrated, there would be an instance
of what we had on that former occasion to renounce in
the name of faith, for the sake of its essential character.
Intelligent persons would be compelled to believe, or
rather not to believe but to admit an indisputable fact.
On the contrary, however, there is no such compelling
demonstration in history, as soon as we pass beyond the

217

The Truth of the Christian Rehgion

verification of external events, and simple questions
regarding their interrelation. We see the proof of this
in the fact, that distinguished historical experts cannot
agree about distinguished historical personalities. The
more complicated the inner life, the higher the signifi-
cance for universal history, of the characters to be de-
lineated, the more undeniable is the personal equation
on the part of the investigator. Of this we have lately
had in reference to Buddha what might be called ocular
demonstration (Oldenberg and Pischel). It is certainly
unworthy as well as incorrect, to depreciate historical
knowledge in sceptical fashion, upon pretence of doing
honour to faith ; but the same is true of the overestimate
of such knowledge as knowledge, the confounding of
demonstrative certainty and the ideal of the highest
possible probability. According to all that has gone be-
fore, there can be no doubt what measure of trustworthi-
ness the history of Jesus must have, if it is to be capable
of being recognized as the revelation of God. Namely
high PROBABILITY for the religiously susceptible man,
strong enough for him to be able with a good conscience
to surrender himself to the impression of the Person in
question, and to His working as the present activity of
God, to apprehend on the ground that he is appre-
hended ; so that he now rises by this means to the
certainty which, but for that surrender, would be unat-
tainable. For the man who is not personally interested,
on the other hand, that history must be indisputable,
must be characterized by irrefutability, in the sense
that he is compelled to admit, in order to maintain a
good scientific conscience, that he is kept from giving
his assent, not by compelling grounds of a historical
character, but by a theory of the universe opposed to
the Christian. Nor do we forget here that this measure
of trustworthiness is important only for the history, as

218

The History of Revelation Trustworthy

we have already defined its compass. We are not con-
cerned with all the possibilities, or with all that one might
like to know, but only with what in it has the definite
value of being capable of being understood as the revel-
ation of God, and consequently as the foundation of
faith. Obviously a faith once assured of its foundation,
will sympathetically draw within the circle of its know-
ledge much that at first it left aside, and will learn to
regard as real many parts of the tradition which at first
it rejected. But if it understands itself, it will not efface
the distinction between the one thing needful for it,
and the many other things. To scoff at this as a " theo-
logy of the minimum," would be to underestimate the
actual needs of the religious life. Its foremost concern
(in this connexion), is a sure standing ground. Its right
and duty is to extend from this as a centre, to the whole
breadth and depth of which it is capable. To attempt
this prematurely and with too little care, often brings its
own punishment, in bitter troubles that one might have
spared oneself and others. But while confining oneself
in the first instance to the main point, one may at the
same time rejoice by anticipation at the incontestable
truth, that as regards the question of actuality, a his-
torical personality and the spiritual effects proceeding
from Him, have again an untold advantage over the
isolated events of external history.

Our present task then is to determine whether the
measure of trustworthiness indicated, can really be estab-
lished for the history within the limits we have defined.
In order to answer this question carefully, it is neces-
sary to make a particular application to the problem
before us, of a consideration which we had to bring for-
ward a little ago, when dealing with the question of the
limits of demonstrative proof in history. I refer to the
circumstance, that a series of ostensibly historical objec-

219

The Truth of the Christian Rehgion

tions to the reliability of the gospel tradition, have their
origin, not at all in grounds of historical method, but in
some definite theory of the universe. Due account
must be taken of this in each separate instance. It
applies with quite special force to the position, made use
of by many without any proof, that a historical character
cannot be qualitatively perfect in his special province,
and that Jesus accordingly cannot be in the sphere of
religion the perfect revelation of God, in the sense which
we have maintained : we merely refer once again to
His own claim, that no one knows the Father save the
Son. This objection is a very familiar one in our day ;
it is an axiom of the theory of evolution in its thorough-
going form (p. 9 ff., 125 ff.). As such then it ought to be
designated ; it should not, as often happens, be given
forth as the result of historical investigation. This
confusion of thought is doubly strange, when, as is
frequently the case, it does duty in the proof in the
form of the prettiest circle imaginable. This is some-
thing like the shape it takes. The theory of evolution
makes us suspicious of the idea of an absolute entity ;
nor does the history of Jesus, when accurately investi-
gated, demand any such idea ; consequently it is in its
own sphere a proof of the absolute validity of the theory
of evolution. Naturally if these positions are silently
assumed, and thereupon all instances to the contrary,
in the history of Jesus, of whatever kind, are put aside,
the result desired is easy to reach. It is precisely the
testimony of Jesus regarding Himself, of which we
speak, which is frequently either suspected as regards
its general historicity, simply on account of its content,
without any grounds in Criticism whether Lower or
Higher, or, on the other hand, is twisted about, till
there is left of its obvious sense only as much as is
thought to be possible, according to the analogy of other

220

The History of Revelation Trustworthy

expressions elsewhere ; and for this the supreme stand-
ard is the analogy of the religious self-consciousness,
what the investigator in question regards as possible
according to his own ultimate convictions. Those who
refuse to go that way, taking the words of Jesus some-
what more scientifically as they stand, but yet judge
them according to the standard above referred to,
certainly cannot help finding an element of fanaticism in
Jesus' highest testimonies to Himself. An inaccurate
use of the word "interpret" often leads in the same
direction. The attempt fully to understand Jesus' testi-
mony to Himself by analogies elsewhere known to us^
is the same thing in efifect as to deny them in the manner
indicated, or to change their significance, or to treat Him
as a fanatic. Now faith could relevantly defend itself
against all such objections, if they openly declared them-
selves for what they are. But when they profess to be
the necessary result of the historical method, the con-
fusion is of course almost inextricable. Their legiti-
macy, or the reverse, would have to be settled, by testing
the claims of the various theories of the universe. In
coming to a decision upon this point, the history of Jesus
is itself at least one of the most important factors. In
spite of this, or must we say on this account, in dealing
with His history there is often a marked lack of the
reserve and caution, observed in reference to other out-
standing phenomena ; the feeling, though it be an inde-
finite one, of how much is here at stake, is apt to interfere
with clearness of judgment. How sensitive is our age
to the mystery of personality in general, even when the
individual instance presents the greatest enigmas ! A
like reserve is not always observed in the presence of
what Jesus suggests to our hearts as His inmost being.
As we have a widely circulated romance regarding Jesus
(Frenssen's " Hilligenlei "), any one may easily prove this

221

The Truth of the Christian Rehgion

for himself. The treatment of Luke vii., e.g. is mani-
festly unhistorical : it is not possible to separate Jesus'
forgiving love to sinners from His righteous earnestness
against sin. By starting from so clear an instance, it
will be possible to arrive at a really historical judgment
as to other positions as well, which, though apparently
much better founded, have nevertheless their origin not
in the findings of history, but in preconceived ideas, be-
longing to a theory of the universe opposed to the Chris-
tian one. As a welcome instance to the contrary of
what we have in Frenssen, one drawn from the most
recent literature, mention may be made of H. Oeser,
whose teaching is — Jesus had the grace of God without
measure ; God was living in His will, therefore He was
holy, therefore He had such profound insight. Who
had ever such profound insight, — and you want to cor-
rect Him ? The mystery of Jesus is in the bosom of
God ; it is the mystery of grace ; He did not work by
suggestion.

It was necessary to refer with such emphasis to the
way in which the purely historical judgment can readily
be, and often actually is, distorted by considerations
derived from some theory of the universe ; because it is
only in this way that it can be fully shown, that there is
no sort of contradiction between a judgment based wpon
'purely historical considerations, and the actual needs of
faith. Faith has no reason either to veil any facts, or to
readjust them in any artificial way. The New Testa-
ment writings are without question a literat are by them-
selves, and a comparison with other testimonies not
composed from the standpoint of faith is, with some in-
significant exceptions, impossible. The authorship of
the Gosples in their present form by eye-witnesses will
always be contested. Further, they comprise only a por-
tion of the history of Jesus. Again, the tradition is a

222

Revelation as Historical

two-fold one. For all these reasons a biography of Jesus
is impossible. Nor is faith interested in such. The his-
torical materials indispensable for faith, when it under-
stands its own nature, are reliably attested, in the sense
above defined of being possessed of a high degree of
probability or irrefutability, in a historical point of
view. Here we may leave out of account the denials
that Jesus ever existed as a historical person. It is a
circumstance of some significance that a propaganda
like that of Arthur Drews has had practically no success,
in spite of the tendency of our time to historical sceptic-
ism (cf. A. Jtilicher and many others, 1910). Nor need
we take into consideration the pathological interpreta-
tion of Jesus, in the hands of a Rasmussen and De
Loosten. And the attempts to understand Jesus as
essentially a representative of the proletariat (Kautsky,
Maurenbrecher), have also been discounted by the his-
torians, on account of their arbitrariness in dealing with
the sources : Maurenbrecher's stronger side appears in
his emphasizing the transference of pre-Christian myths
to Jesus. What does immediately concern us is the
definite content of the historical portrait of Jesus, as it
is capable, according to Christian conviction, of creating
the impression of being the Revelation of God.

It has frequently been admitted, even by those who
are far from seeing the Revelation of God in the history
in question, how great improbability attaches to the as-
sumption that this portrait, in its fundamental character-
istics, is the creation of the religious imagination, that
especially the testimony of Jesus to Himself, in its com-
bination of the deepest humility with the highest self-
assertion, could not have been put into His mouth ;
and what a contrast inevitably forces itself upon our
notice, between the life-like distinctness of this por-
trait, and the poetical creations of faith, in which

223

The Truth of the Christian Rehgion

also the history of Christianity is certainly far from
poor (glorifications of Mary, legends of saints). The
idea, however, of a material touching up of the his-
torical portrait by the Church calls for more precise
consideration. Is not what is for faith precisely the
decisive point to be thus explained ? Is not the relation
of the Church to Jesus much more the act of its ex-
uberant faith than Jesus' own act, and on that account
not a recognition of His actual claim, or an understand-
ing of His intention ? This supremely serious question,
which, though it has altered greatly as regards form
since Lessing's watchword of "the Christianity of
Christ," has always remained the same in substance, is
nearer a definitive answer in our day than was the case
even a little ago. For the inadequacy of the answer
which for long first suggested itself, that Paul was the
real creator of faith in Christ, is increasingly coming to be
recognized. This is so, not merely because the placing
of the Pauline Epistles in the second century, suffers
shipwreck upon the unique fact of the relation of
Marcion to Paul, but because it is necessary to recognize
the circumstance that, in the matter of faith in Jesus,
Paul was conscious that he was at one with the earliest
Church, not that he had created such faith, and had
won the earliest Church thereto. For where is there
a single trace in his Epistles that differences of opinion
existed regarding this point, as regarding the law, cir-
cumcision and liberty ? Certainly this is still far from
solving the problem of " Jesus and Paul," and the points
of agreement and difference may be defined in very
diverse ways. But the fact that the Gospel possessed
by the Church was from the very start a Gospel occupied
with Jesus, and not simply preached by Him, and that
it was only through faith in Jesus that the Church came
into being, is independent of this. There are then only

224

Revelation as Historical

two possibilities. Either this fact has its adequate
basis in the consciousness and claim of Jesus Himself,
as the gospels assert, however great may be the un-
certainty in matters of detail, as we must once more
repeat at this point. Or on the other hand, the fact
must be explained by the creative power of the Church,
which means for us at any rate the contemporary
syncretistic movement, supposed to have dominated the
Church. The attempts to do this are worthy of the
highest appreciation, because they see the real problem
and do not conveniently ignore it, even though the
result may be far from satisfactory. Unsatisfactory we
must pronounce it, from the purely historical standpoint.
All the elements of that syncretism of which we speak,
all the parallels in religions and secret cults of that
period, fail to explain what they profess to explain —
the Jesus Christ of Christendom. Attempts like that
of Jenssen in his Epic of Gilgamesh, have not been
pushed aside unconsidered by ''theological criticism,"
as the author would like to make out ; and even a
presentation of the teachings and mysteries of the
" Saviour-God who dies and rises again," so little biassed
in favour of our religion as that of W. Bruckner (1909),
closes with the admission that the association of such
ideas with a historical personality, and their fundamental
ethical character, tell against the dissolution of the faith
in Christ in the general history of religion. However
highly, therefore, we may rate the influence of contem-
porary syncretism upon individual elements in the
primitive Christian faith, as regards the main point we
always come back to the decisive impression made by
the Person of Jesus. This, however, it is necessary to
define with greater precision, if we are to explain any-
thing at all. Even in a time of the utmost religious
ferment, a martyr's death, however impressive, does not

VOL. I. 226 15

The Truth of the Christian ReHgion

turn a teacher of religious wisdom, and a courageous
opponent of religious shams, into the Lord on whom the
earliest Church believed. If, on the other hand, starting
with the recognition of this, we see ourselves compelled
to admit that Jesus made some sort of claim to be the
Messiah, and at the same time we cannot understand
Messiahship in the Jewish national sense, the question
immediately arises, whether we are to find an element
of fanaticism here or not ; which, as we have seen, is a
question that cannot be answered by purely historical
methods. Then, again, it will also be admitted, whatever
side be taken, that there is a special argument in favour
of the reliability of the gospels, derived from such ex-
pressions and narratives as caused offence at a slightly
later date, the fabrication of which consequently is in
the highest conceivable degree improbable. We need
refer only to Mark x. 18, "No one is good " ; Mark xiii.
32, " Nor the Son," and the cry from the Cross in Mark
XV. 34. If we go further into the matter, we find that
a considerable number of such passages have recently
been brought together. And they seem to be more
conclusive, when the historian who collected them re-
jects faith in Jesus for his own part (Schmiedel). What
was said above as to the essential limits of a historical
proof becomes once more all the clearer.

After all this, we may conclude with a quotation
from E. Troeltsch. " The fireworks of sensational hypo-
theses will come to an end, and the Church's own view
of its origin will be substantially vindicated. Christi-
anity did not arise out of a misunderstanding, or an
amalgam of alien redemptive myths. It had its origin
in the life and personality of Jesus. The essential
features of His preaching can be known with sufficient
certainty, to make it a religious unity, for every one who
attributes fundamental religious significance to it. When

226

Experiential Value and Revelation

the cloud of dust subsides, the old aspect of things will
remain in essentials, to this extent at least, that Jesus will
continue to be the Source and Power of Christian Faith."
This is what concerns us at our present stage. The more
searchingly attention is directed to the question of the
significance of this historical personality for our faith,
the more clearly will the Church and the individual be-
liever discern the harmony which pervades the whole
content of His life. " Other great men have attempted
for their own sakes to set at rest a mystery, a doubt, a
need. Jesus loned in obedience to the Father ; He
lived for others. And in regard to this decisive point,
notwithstanding all the breaks in the tradition, we know
Him better than we know others, however many memoirs
we may possess of them. We know His life as the
perfect harmonious expression of His will to love " (A.
Schlatter). At the close of the Christology we shall
have to return to the great problem discussed in the
foregoing. Here it may further be pointed out that
there are naturally many expressions for the attitude
towards history which is here represented. For example,
there has quite recently been an endeavour to draw a
distinction between aspects of history (Wobbermin),
essentially in the sense of the foregoing expositions ;
but then it must be said that the opponents are apt to
waste their time over an ambiguous term.

The Recapitulation of the two Sides of the Practical

Proof

What we have said regarding the significance, the
mode and the trustworthiness of Revelation (pp. 172 ff.),
must now in conclusion be brought into explicit rela-
tion with what was said before, on the subject of the
VALUE of religious experience (pp. 163 ff.). When faith

227

The Truth of the Christian Rehgion

examines itself as to its reasons for accepting the truth it
holds, we come upon two solid foundations. On the one
hand, there is the satisfaction of our highest needs, i.e.
the realization of our true destiny ; and on the other,
there is the self-manifestation of God evincing itself in
action. We learned how much demonstrative force
there is, in the experience of the value of faith of which
we spoke, but yet at the same time, that faith cannot by
its own act rid itself of the last and most disquieting
suspicion, that it is self-deceived. It requires a founda-
tion of rock, which cannot be shaken by any breaking of
the waves of shifting human feeling. But in our inves-
tigation of this foundation, we had to emphasize again
and again, how it is only the man who feels and acknow-
ledges the needs of which we speak, that finds it to be
a foundation of rock. Things are thus apt to look as if
neither the value on the one hand, nor the revelation on
the other, were in a good way ; and the taunt lies ready
to hand, that it is a case of a worthless value, and a
revelation which properly speaking reveals nothing, or
more exactly, of a value without any active principle
behind it, and a reality without value. As a matter of
fact, this objection fails to recognize what faith is really
concerned in, and that it is only when the relation of
which we speak is maintained between the two entities,
that its real interests are safeguarded. This thought has
been often emphasized, but such is its decisive import-
ance that it is worth while to bring it to the forefront
once again.

A revelation that compels assent is contrary to the
nature of our faith. On this point, Kant's argument at
the close of his Critique of Practical Reason remains
irrefutable. If God and Eternity in their awful majesty
lay continually before our eyes, no good would be done
from duty ; there would be absolutely no moral value

228

Value and Reality

in our actions : the conduct of mankind would become a
purely mechanical affair, where as in a puppet show all
the gesticulations would be correct, but yet there would
be no life in the figures. What Kant here says, primarily
with reference to a demonstrative proof of God and its
significance for moral conduct, holds good also with
reference to a demonstrative revelation, and its relation
to faith, provided that the moral character of our religion
is to continue unaltered. Only, this does not exclude
revelation altogether as worthless or even hurtful, as
Kant thought. The life of all religion is the effective
reality, that is the revelation, of God : the deeper insight
into the nature of religion which we owe to Schleier-
macher, has taught us to understand the significance of
revelation, but just of such a revelation as we Christians
have. In Jesus, God shows Himself to us in action as
the Reality of greatest value : He arouses the yearning
for communion with Himself as the Supreme Value, and
at the same time satisfies it as the Supreme Reality.
But because it is a question of the reality of the supreme
value, He wills to arouse and satisfy the yearning of
which we speak, only in the person who wills to let it be
aroused and satisfied. The revelation of God bestows
on him what no wish nor longing, nor act of will, how-
ever honest, to experience God, can produce by its own
effort. It is something that can be created, only by a
drawing near on God's part, if this longing exists.
Hunger never satisfies, but only the hungry are satisfied.
No one ever secures a friend simply by wishing to have
him for a friend ; one must reveal oneself, and prove
that there is real value in the desire for friendship ; but
real friendship exists only when this proof meets with a
heart that responds to it. Jesus promises that those
who hunger after righteousness shall be satisfied ; nor
is this any empty word for them. He speaks it, and He

229

The Truth of the Christian ReHgion

works as the Father works, for the Father works in Him.
The reason for Luther's delight in the story of Zacchaeus
was, that it brings into view with special clearness this
relation of which we speak, between the sense of value
and the yearning on the one hand, and the gift of God
and the satisfaction of the longing on the other. Jesus
causes the receptive person, the person who feels his
need, to feel and acknowledge in Himself the supreme
value of life as a personal reality, and asks his trust.
Under the influence of this impression, therefore, the
man who is " called " (Synoptists), " drawn " (John),
"apprehended " (Paul), ventures to decide for faith ; the
impression of reality, in combination with the sense of
value, becomes for him the basis of trust, the personal
venture of which we speak ; and in the experience which
begins in the very act of trust, he attains to assurance
concerning what is at once the Reality possessed of
greatest value, and the Value possessed of most reality,
the PersonaHty of Jesus and God in Him. The feeling
of reality and that of value are found combined in all
sorts of ways, and in varying degrees of strength : the
major emphasis rests now upon the one, now upon the
other. But the two constitute an indissoluble unity.
Our age, as we saw, is sceptical regarding the significance
of historical revelation. Consequently so far as it is
concerned, special value attaches to those figures of the
past, who became and continued Christians for the very
reason that they experienced its significance, even in
opposition to the prevailing tendency of their day, or
their own past. In the history of the great in the King-
dom of God, as well as of the least, this experience re-
peats itself. For Justin Martyr, the reality of what
possesses supreme value is to such an extent the decisive
factor, that he could look upon the Gospel as scarcely
new in the matter of its essential content, by comparison

230

Value and Reality

with the most profound ideas of Greek Philosophy. A
Schleiermacher, influenced in the first instance, on the
other hand, by the specific value of the Gospel, declares
that " whoever robs it of faith in the historical Christ
as the objective element, as revelation, understands not
a word of it ". From the starry heaven of great ideas,
he turns to the sun of God's real existence in Jesus.
" Christ's ajDpearing as active, that is as affecting us in
a certain way, is the true revelation and the objective
element" (Letters 4, 335). To expound this thought in
view of the needs of our day, has been the purpose of our
whole discussion so far.

What we have said may stand in need of great
improvement in matters of detail, but the guiding
principle to which we refer is imposed upon us by our
very subject. Objections such as that the objectivity of
revelation is thereby infringed upon, or on the other
hand that the objective element is too much in evidence,
only prove in truth that the real nature of the problem
is not yet understood ; namely how the objective ele-
ment which is indispensable works upon the subject, and
becomes an inward personal possession, which is just
the matter that Schleiermacher describes. A revelation
which does not produce trust, is as valueless as a faith
which does not rest upon revelation. Hence also it is
an unwarranted objection, that the inward working of
God which we have spoken of, and the working of Christ,
are not related to each other in any way that can be ac-
curately defined. This objection always proceeds on the
ground that the other conception whose inexactness we
attempted to prove, is the correct one. It seems to be
clearer, but it fails to do justice to the actual facts of the
case. Again, we shall no more be troubled with the
reproach which we encountered at the beginning of this
section, that the interest of every living religion in the

231

The Truth of the Christian Rehgion

present, comes into conflict with the emphasizing of his-
torical revelation, that is revelation which in some way
belongs to the past. This reproach is justified with
reference to the attempts denoted by the phrase " Modern
Jesuanism," which are in evidence wherever mere inward
revelation is felt to be inadequate — in our opinion rightly
so — but the effort is made to supplement it by appeal
to the " historical effects produced by Jesus ". This
means appeared to us inadequate for the purpose aimed
at. The Personality of Jesus, on the other hand, as we
have realized its significance, is " strong and many-sided
enough to speak directly to every age, without being re-
cast " (Steinmann). In this way the legitimate desire
for immediacy of religious experience of which we spoke,
is not interfered with, but actually satisfied ; while,
detached from Jesus, it is straining after the impos-
sible. And the weak fluctuation of the thought of our
time between a slavish attachment to history and an un-
tenable independence (cf. Goethe's utterance — " Gladly
would I cast off tradition and be quite original, but the
undertaking is a serious one and leads to many woes "),
can only be overcome by recognizing the centre of the
Christian faith as we have represented it.

Lastly by keeping in mind the endless multifa7nousness
of life and history, we shall have an answer to the scruples
so often urged by many, against consciously turning to
account the history of Jesus as revelation, for the proof
of the truth of our religion. They are afraid that a very
complicated possibility, which becomes an actuality only
in exceptional cases, may be pronounced a position uni-
versally valid. It is, they say, only in the case of a very
small proportion of Christians, that the certainty of their
faith is consciously based upon Christ. Most derive their
life from the incalculable effects of the Christian spirit in
the Church, and so far as they are possessed of personal

232

Value and Reality

faith in the stricter sense at all, it is evoked by the in-
fluence of Christian personalities, and sustained by the
impression derived from them. To esteem such influence
lightly, is in a quite special degree contrary to the stand-
point here advocated. But the decisive question is pre-
cisely that of the impregnable basis of faith : the clearest
answer will be found, not by reference to the many, who
have no special battle to fight for their faith, so that they
are not compelled to examine the foundations carefully
for themselves, but by reference to those who have to
fight every inch of their way. It is in the leaders that
we must study the nature of the subject in which they
lead. We have often emphasized the fact that, in the
sphere of real religion, the leaders are not simply the
great names of history, but also many whose names are
unknown. All of them bear witness in the clearest
possible terms to Jesus as the foundation of their faith.
They are the more emphatic about this, the more grate-
ful they are for all other inspiring and strengthening
influences. It is only right, therefore, that Christian
preaching never tires of pointing to this as the way to
the deepest sure foundation. In the Christian Church
the normal outcome of the growth of faith, is to become
conscious of the indissoluble connexion of which we
spoke, between Christian faith and Christ as the indis-
pensable solid foundation of its certainty. It is just
when it is thus regarded and treated as the normal out-
come, that we have the surest preventive against all
mechanical reduction to the same dead level ; clearness
in method is the most reliable safeguard against slavish
dependence on method. The bond with Christ is so
strong and profound, but at the same time so delicate
and free from constraint, that it becomes a reality for
each one, according to his own individuality. But to
deny it is to deny the certainty of faith ; for the argu-

233

The Truth of the Christian Rehgion

ments which on a former occasion carried us beyond
purely subjective experience, teaching us to understand
and value revelation, are not disproved by being repeated
at this point, with the plea that injury is done to the rich-
ness of life. Conscious union with Christ does no injury
thereto, but the confidence of faith is certainly impaired,
where the connexion of which we speak is relaxed.
How far we are from seeking in any part of this dis-
cussion to favour a preconceived view, may be further
shown by our drawing attention expressly to a problem
of the Christian life, which is presented here, and n^t
infrequently meets us in pronouncements of the inier
life which are beyond suspicion. What if the faitl: in
God which rests on faith in Christ, is to become urcer-
tain, through the shattering of the faith in Christ '^ In
that case, it becomes plain from the pronouncements in
question that, even at this juncture, a noteworthy 'nter-
action occurs between one's realization of God in a
general way, and that faith in Him which l fully
conscious and certain of itself, — the faith wlich de-
pends on Christ. Even then, the general realization
points to Jesus, and Jesus always brings it anc' to per-
fection, at all stages of the development. 3n both
sides, the Christian is always growing, never .omplete.
So this apparent objection itself only serves ^o confirm
our fundamental conception.

It only remains that we should point out it the con-
clusion of this proof that, when all has ben said, and
when the proof is formulated as has beei done quite
in the spirit of John vii. 17, it must not of course be
understood as if insight into its form?- correctness
necessarily led to faith. This is a strage but by no
means uncommon error, due to the vduence of the
scholastic impulse in theology. " The ractical proof "
for the truth of the Christian faith mut itself certainly

234

Value and Reality

be treated as a matter of doctrine, if and in so far as
the question is one of logical consistency in the chain of
thought. But it is wholly unjustifiable, here as else-
where, if there is the slightest tendency to confuse the
recognition of this consistency with the personal posses-
sion of the truth (cf. on the other side, e.g. J. T. Beck,
in the Introduction to his '' Science of Christian Faith ").
If, on the other hand, hearty recognition of the actual
state of matters as we realized it, incurs the suspicion
of showing a lack of the scientific spirit, or of shelving
the question, and the favourite objection that, where
arguments are wanting, the decision is left to "con-
science," is raised, we may point to the fact that we
are not, by any poor subterfuge, setting aside the claims
of real knowledge in what we are saying. On the con-
trary, these claims have already been defined in prin-
ciple, and will forthwith be further elaborated.

Finally, it is not superfluous at the close of this
whole section, to indicate once more the point of view
from which alone we meant there to look at the matter.
We are dealing with the proof of the truth of the
Christian faith, with the question how we become cer-
tain of its truth, — and we find it is by the working of
God, which assures us in our hearts of His historical
working in Christ ; as this has to be set forth in the
Doctrine of Christ and of the Holy Spirit. God's work-
ing without this definite relation to His work in Christ,
is by no means denied or undervalued in what we
assert ; rather it is acknowledged without reserve, both
in the sphere of the non-Christian religions, and also
within the Christian Church ; or, looked at from the
other side, religious experiences of the kind are by no
means declared to be an illusion. Such Christocentric
teaching would be opposed by the whole of the New
Testament, and by the impartial observation of human

285

The Truth of the Christian Rehgion

life ; and it would impoverish the Christian idea of the
God who in His eternal goodness draws near to those
who seek Him, and " does according to His good pleas-
ore, beyond what we ask or conceive," even when men
feel after Him in the greatest darkness, and when their
power of will is the weakest. And according as God
draws near, religious confidence is built up. This we
have often insisted on above. But in view of the con-
stantly recurring misinterpretation of the serious esti-
mate which is formed of the highest revelation in
history, we had to give special prominence once more to
the matter in question.

On looking back upon this proof of the truth of our
religion, we find an answer in princij)le to another
question, the omission of which so far has perhaps sur-
prised the reader, that namely of The Absoluteness of
OUR Religion.

The whole problem as it is now understood, is still of
recent origin. The great victory of Christianity, gained
at the cost of severe struggle, for long centuries kept
the question from becoming a burning one. It was only
in the by-ways, let us say, of the " Enlightenment of the
Middle Ages " that there was a deeper appreciation of
it ; and then when the Renaissance put it with new in-
sistence, it was forced into the background once more
by the vigorous life of the Reformation. When it be-
came a burning question in the conflict with Deism and
Rationalism, the weapons derived from the traditional
Apologetic proved inadequate. Religions were too
long divided simply into true and false. The proof
from miracle, which had now more and more come
to be exclusively relied upon, fell short of the mark, in
view of the circumstance that the adherents of every
religion beheve their own religion full of miracle.

236

The Absoluteness of Christianity

German Idealism seemed to have adduced a far superior
proof of the absoluteness of Christianity, and one of
abiding validity. By sheer force of reason the idea of
religion was produced, and Christianity was declared to
be the realization of this idea. It is well known why
this illusion had to go. Nowadays the '' Keligio-historic
Theology" (p. 125 fF.) maintains before the Christian
Church, the impossibility of affording any proof at all of
the absoluteness of her religion ; but invites her to ac-
cept what is supposed to be the inevitable, by assuring
her that it is enough that Christianity has not been sur-
passed so far, that she need not attempt a proof that it
is the best of all possible religions.

Manifestly this imposes an impossible condition upon
the Church : she cannot surrender the conviction that
hers is the best of all possible religions. But just as
certainly she can surrender the claim that there is an
objective proof of this absolute superiority, in the sense
understood by the opponents ; and can yet accept what
they are exactly thinking of, when they believe they
cannot maintain the absoluteness. In other words,
the old way of putting the question is having pernicious
after-effects, shown in the case of the Religio-historic
School by its demanding such surrender ; while they
are apt to appear also in the case of the Church by
the refusal she makes. She can not merely waive the
claim to a proof in the old sense, but she ought to do
so, and she will do it, if she understands her faith aright.
An objective proof of the truth of Christianity that
would carry conviction even to the indifferent, is
neither possible nor desirable ; but the only possible
and relevant proof of its truth, includes the possible
and relevant proof of its absoluteness. The person
who has attained to assurance of faith along the way we
have indicated, will also have attained to the assured

237

The Truth of the Christian ReHgion

conviction, that the God who is revealed to him in Christ
will never deny Himself. The Father who permits His
children to know His inmost being, His holy love, by
giving them the experience of it in trust, will not ap-
pear different to them in His inmost nature, in an
earthly development which is undreamt of, or when
this earthly existence ceases. But in this assurance
there is directly involved the confidence that He will
■disclose Himself more fully and intimately in endless
developments, in a manner which we are still altogether
incapable of penetrating ; but what He will thus disclose
is just this nature of His, the heart of which He has
already manifested to them by His revelation of Himself
(cf . '' Eschatology "). In no other religion are possession
and hope so entirely one, as they are in ours, and no
other religion has such infinite possibilities in both re-
spects ; just because it rests upon the self-revelation of
the personal God of Holy Love of whom we speak.
With this sure basis to start from, it transcends the
boldest of evolutionary dreams. But how is this sure
basis to be won ? Such is the question we have sought
to answer, in the whole of the proof which we have
now brought to a close. It is only for the man who
seeks personally to be a Christian, that the question
whether his faith can be superseded, becomes vital ;
but for him that question has found its solution in this
faith of his.

233

THE SCIENCE OF THE CHKISTIAN FAITH

Now that we have discussed the two subjects of
the nature and the truth of our religion, the proper task
of Christian Apologetics is accomplished. What still
remains is that we should state the results of our
Apologetic inquiry for the concept and the method of
Dogmatics. It was only in very general terms that we
could speak upon these points at the start (pp. 29 ff.);
any more detailed definition depends upon our findings
regarding the nature and truth of Christianity. Only
now, upon the basis of these findings, can we explain
the nature of the Science of the Christian Faith, a
systematic exhibition of which Dogmatics seeks to be,
and show how it can be logically exhibited. Leaving
all side questions out of account, we are concerned then
in the first place, when treating of the concept of Dog-
matics, with the nature of Christian religious know-
ledge in general, and of theological, in the present
instance of Dogmatic, knowledge in particular, and with
a succinct statement of its relation to other knowledge.
Both points come before us in brief outline, because it
is only the application of the fundamental principles in
the Dogmatic System itself, that can make them fully
clear. In the second place, when dealing with the
method of Dogmatics, our essential subject is Holy
Scripture as the supreme source of knowledge, with
which the question of its relation to ecclesiastical
doctrine is necessarily connected. The question of the

The Science of the Christian Faith

principle of division next forms the transition to the
detailed presentation of the system. Those main tasks
of which we speak both find their solution, when we
draw the conclusions from our proof of the truth of
Christianity, that is from the idea of revelation developed
as the basis and norm of Christian religious truth.

THE NATUEE OF CHRISTIAN RELIGIOUS
KNOWLEDGE

The Fundamental Idea

Christian Eeligious Knowledge is wholly and
entirely knowledge of revelation. In this it has its source
and norm as well as its basis. Its content is derived
from revelation, and revelation is its standard. At the
same time, it is certain reliable knowledge, because it
rests upon revelation. The Christian Church is not so
poorly circumstanced that she cannot meet all know-
ledge in a sympathetic spirit : we shall take the oppor-
tunity of again emphasizing how absolutely open-minded
she is, and how her attitude to all knowledge is one of
queenly freedom. This attitude of openness and free-
dom she maintains, even in regard to all that presents
itself to her as religious knowledge. But what she
accepts as binding upon herself is what is derived
from, and measured by the standard of, revelation ;
namely the definite truth which we set forth provision-
ally when dealing with the essence of Christianity, and
which the whole of Dogmatics has now got to unfold in
detail. The Christian Church is assured of this truth,
because it is derived from revelation : revelation is its
basis as well as its source and standard. This does not
mean that Christians lightly esteem the gi'ounds upon
which other truth is accepted. On the contrary, even
for the confirmation of the saving truth of religion, they

240

Christian Religious Knowledge

turn to account diligently and gratefully, whatever in
the changeful course of history presents itself to their
open minds as a new statement of the problem, or an
answer that brings new light. But for the sake of the
truth itself, they are diligently on their guard lest there
be any confusion between what may be valuable by way
of shedding new light or of explanation, and as an
obvious consequence in advancing the knowledge of the
truth, on the one hand, and the solid foundation on the
other ; so that its impregnability might be endangered.
Both truths, that revelation is the source and norm as
well as that it is the foundation of Christian religious
truth, hold good everywhere and always. But it is
worth noticing how closely foundation and norm are
connected in our religion, in revelation itself. The
latter is the norm to the same extent as it is the founda-
tion ; the significance it has as norm reaches as far as
the significance it possesses as being the foundation.
This has great critical effect for our later exposition.
In the strict sense, religious knowledge includes only
what is derived from revelation, as matter which is
productive of faith. To be sure, this must not be ad-
vanced at all times, with one unvarying emphasis, in
reference to all the separate constituent elements : that
would be trifling, and certitude is opposed to all trifling ;
but the fundamental position holds good without ex-
ception in reference to the whole, and under all circum-
stances. Where it does not apply, it must be clearly
acknowledged that the limit of Christian religious con-
viction is reached ; and Dogmatics would simply gain
in confidence, if it marked off such points without re-
serve, and waived every appearance of omniscience, and
that means here thirst for domination in the spiritual
sphere. In truth, this dependence of religious know-
ledge upon revelation is a decided limitation and re-

VOL. I. 241 16

The Science of the Christian Faith

straint, but at the same time it brings freedom and
confidence. For it has its foundation in the very nature
of the case. Suffice it to refer to the object of all
religious, especially Christian, knowledge — God in His
working upon us. Having this incomparable object,
it aims at an incomparable certitude, for its inmost
life depends thereon. No intellectual audacity on our
part, nor any effort of our wills, reaches the goal with
certainty, or in a manner that admits of no gain-
saying. God's condescending self-manifestation. His
gracious revelation of Himself, freely bestows what is
altogether beyond our reach. Christian religious know-
ledge is interpretation of revelation.

But for the same reason, it is religious knowledge,
that is knowledge conditioned by religious faith. In
saying this, we are merely repeating in our present con-
text, what forced itself upon our notice when we had to
define the idea of revelation (p. 132 ff.), and what finally is
the necessary consequence of the nature of our religion.
It is only upon condition of trust, that the revelation of
our God, who as holy love wishes to enter into personal
communion with us, discloses itself. Such communion
is a reality only where there is trust ; and thus, only
where there is personal trust, is the knowledge of personal
love a reality (p. 198 ff.). The opponents of the Christian
faith are fond of setting it down as an expedient occa-
sioned by perplexity, when in this way religious know-
ledge is made dependent upon personal conditions. They
ought rather to admit that it cannot be otherwise, if we
are really dealing with knowledge of God — the God of
whom we speak, whom Christians are convinced that they
know from His revelation of Himself. Indeed this holds
good in reference to revelation, both in so far as it is the
source and norm, and also in so far as it is the ground, of
religious knowledge. What in it cannot be appropriated

242

Christian Religious Knowledge

in trust, and thus become personally conditioned know-
ledge, does not belong to Christian religious knowledge
as regards its compass and its nature, and has no part
in the certainty which it possesses. This principle may
occasion many a difficult decision in the elaboration of
the doctrinal system, but as a principle, it cannot be
disputed.

This personal character of Christian knowledge, as
knowledge conditioned by faith, also explains the fact
that in the New Testament, faith and knowledge are as-
sociated with each other in the closest possible manner,
often seem to be interchanged, and come before us now
in the one order, now in the other (e.g. John vi. 69, xvii.
8). That this is the case, especially in John, is explained
in a formal point of view by the influence of the Greek
conception of knowledge, according to which, more than
with us, knowledge is an affair of the whole personality,
including even the volitional and the emotional functions
of the spirit. But while in the case of the Greeks, it
was this that led to the well-known over-estimate of
knowledge, as if knowledge of what is good made good,
on the other hand, in Christianity the knowledge of God
is so entirely one with personal surrender in trust to the
revelation of God, that John vii. 17, to which we have
so often referred, may be regarded as a short compre-
hensive statement of Christian Apologetics, in the form
of a memorable apophthegm. And in substance John vii.
17, is the completion of the O. T. thought, " The fear of
the Lord is the beginning of wisdom".

Rightly understood, therefore, Schleiermacher had
good grounds for adopting as the motto of his Dogmatics
the words of Anselm, " I believe that I may know ".
This means that both concepts are to be understood in
their evangelical sense, faith of personal trust in the
self-revealing God, not of submission to the Church con-

213

The Science of the Christian Faith

stituted upon a legal basis as guaranteeing the truth,
and knowledge not of a mystical vision exalted above
faith, but of the comprehension which itself depends
upon trust. But for this it is requisite that our religious
knowledge must be understood strictly as knowledge
of revelation conditioned hy faith. That is to say, our
second statement must be conceived of as inseparably
one with our first. The propositions of Christian Dog-
matics are not, as Schleiermacher makes them, " the out-
come of the observation of Christian states of feeling,
verbally expressed ". On the contrary, they are the pro-
duct of states of feeling evoked by revelation, or more
accurately of revelation as understood in trustful sur-
render, or of the reality which revelation discloses to
faith, namely God and His Kingdom. Without this
qualification, there is no guarantee that Christian re-
ligious knowledge has the definiteness and certainty,
which alone make it valuable. In short, the advance
marked by Kitschl's conception of religion and revelation,
over that of Schleiermacher, must be maintained, and
defined for our present-day needs with ever-growing ac-
curacy (see pp. 109 ff"., 119 ff., 198 ff.).

This religious knowledge, however, which so far we
have been describing in its inmost essence, has different
FORMS AND DEGREES. Here the general laws of the mani-
festation of the spiritual life apply. Schleiermacher
finely distinguishes the religious affirmations of poetry,
of preaching, and of plain didactic statement. These
all, and not as is often thought simply the two first,
serve the immediate impulse of faith to confess one's
faith to the glory of God, to do good to one's neighbour,
and at the same time, in both of these acts, to benefit
one's self. There is a whole world of Christian experience
concentrated in these simple statements. We think of
the deep things of sacred song, of the power of pulj^it

244

Nature of Theological Knowledge

testimony, of convincing intellectual activity, and ask
ourselves what fruits the future may yet mature in each
one of these provinces ; for they are all full of new
tasks and unsettled anxieties for us. Here we have
to do with the religious affirmations of plain did-
actic statement. How different is the measure of
definiteness which is aimed at in them, according to
the several needs of the persons who give expression to
them, and the circles for which they are designed : at
home, in school in all its different grades, in public inter-
course, in Church fellowship ! And how varied are the
forms even for the same grades !

But the theological, in our connexion in particular
the dogmatic, presentation of Christian religious truth,
is that in which the greatest possible measure of definite-
ness in conception, and of strict consistency between all
the separate affirmations, is aimed at. What is the special
characteristic of the method of plain didactic statement
in general, is here systematically pursued with full con-
sciousness. It is well, however, now to make the re-
servation, that this definiteness of conception, aimed at
in Dogmatics, cannot get beyond certain limits inherent
in the nature of the case, lest a reproach should be made
against us later in our detailed exposition. In particular,
it is not possible to banish the whole of the figurative or
symbolical, especially the anthropomorphic, element from
the language of Dogmatics ; in other words, to encroach
upon the rights of the imagination. The attempts di-
rected to this end are frequently blind to the fact that
their pure concepts, supposed to be purged of every
trace of the material point of view, not only frequently
become indistinct, but still continue to carry in them-
selves, though concealed, such traces of the " unscien-
tific" method of treatment ; for example, the designation
of God as the being in, from, and for, Himself, which

245

The Science of the Christian Faith

is entirely dependent on the spatial point of view.
The demand for a mode of speech absolutely unfigura-
tive does not realize how, even in logic, human speech
can designate the immaterial only with the help of words,
whose roots have their home entirely in the material
point of view, and how it remains a surprising fact of
our spiritual life that we are capable of '' apperceiving "
the immaterial significance. In the other departments
of the higher spiritual life, the significance of the ima-
gination is altogether inexhaustible. This is true in a
quite special degree of the personal intercourse of human
fellowship, which is the best type of the fellowship be-
tween God and us. So then on the contrary it remains
the great task of Dogmatics, to bring to consciousness as
clearly as possible the figurative character, even of what
are precisely the most important fundamental concep-
tions of our religion, such as Father and Kingdom of God ;
and then to denote as accurately as possible what faith
means by them, what sort of supernatural reality it
comprehends on the basis of divine revelation, and seeks
to give expression to in such words (cf. p. 47 f.). In this
way it only becomes more and more clear that the
anthropomorphism of religion has its root, not in the
illusion of human desire, but in our trust in God's
gracious manifestation of Himself, Because God seeks
to reveal Himself in a real way to man. He gives Him-
self a human form which is intelligible to men ; but this
corresponds to His nature. God and man become really
one in religion. Such is the judgment of faith, and it
is certain that it has good reasons.

But of special importance, in reference to the nature
of theological and of dogmatic religious knowledge in
particular, is the understanding that in its inmost nature
it is not differently circumstanced from Christian religious
knowledge in general ; that is to say, that it also is

346

Dogmatic Religious Knowledge

religious knowledge of revelation. The emphasis more-
over now lies upon its being an understanding ofivhat is
given in faith. For that it is bound up with revelation
follows from all that has gone before ; it cannot attain to
another epistemological basis, and in virtue of it to a
higher truth of God and divine things, not accessible
to the " lower " knowledge possessed by faith. . . .
But the inference is not always drawn from this recogni-
tion of revelation of which we are speaking, that for this
very reason Christian religious knowledge, even at its
highest, when it is most perfect in conception and most
complete as regards systematization of form, is not
exalted into a knowledge that stands superior to faith,
that follows a course determined by other fundamental
conditions, but remains knowledge based upon faith .
This statement applies not only against Hegel's well-
known distinction between sense-form and pure thought,
but also against every preference in principle of know-
ledge to faith, which has appeared in the Church itself.
Such was the case with the ancient Alexandrians ; so
with Anselm, for whom theological knowledge is an in
termediate stage between faith and intuitive perception.
Such is the opinion which recurs in the case of many
dogmatic theologians even of the Evangelical Church,
that Dogmatics has essentially a deeper grasp of the ob-
jects of the faith, than the simple understanding of the
ordinary Christian ; and it is instructive that this opinion
is found independently of great differences of theological
point of view in other respects (cf . for example, Dorner
and Frank). This endangers the unity of the Christian
Church, since those who merely believe are put in an
inferior position by those who know, the Pistics by the
Gnostics ; so that the Evangelical Church in any case
ought to be suspicious of it. But what is more, such a
distinction alters fundamentally the recognition of reve-

247

The Science of the Christian Faith

lation, as the sole ground and the sole norm of Christian
truth, however strong the claim that one is recogniz-
ing it — indeed in the last resort it alters the nature of
our religion. The reason has already been given. Our
God of Holy Love wills personal communion ; this be-
comes real in trust ; only the man who has personal trust,
understands the person who yields himself to personal
communion ; a knowledge based upon grounds essenti-
ally other than such trust, would not be personal
knowledge of the God of whom we speak. In the
controversy regarding the " Theology of the unregener-
ate," the Pietists, therefore, were right, when they
emphasized personal religious trust as the indispensable
foundation of true knowledge of God. Without that faith,
even the person who is scientifically most capable, is fitted
for the exposition of religious truth, only so far as the
want can be compensated for with the help of the ima-
gination, by supposing himself transposed into a strange
world of faith. Where this also is lacking, the result is
those strange caricatures in which no Christian recog-
nizes his faith. On the other hand, the Pietists failed
to perceive the distinction which really exists, and is in
its way of great significance, between the immediate
knowledge possessed by faith, and the theological know-
ledge designated above, the aim of which is to secure
precision and consistency of thought, and which obvi-
ously cannot dispense with the talent and equipment
necessary for this purpose.

Looked at from this point of view, a statement which
in other respects readily gives offence will be intelligible.
The greater precision of thought possessed by scientific
religious knowledge, certainly makes it superior to
general religious knowledge in this definite respect ; but
in another point of view, namely as regards the degree
of certainty, the latter has the advantage of it. As

248

Dogmatic Religious Knowledge

knowledge of faith in the sense before defined, religious
knowledge is in itself certain absolute knowledge, if the
word absolute is to be used here ; but it is so merely as
being such knowledge of faith : in so far as it is science,
it just participates in the conditionality, the relativity,
of all knowing. And that is well, for this reason — it
guarantees the personal independence of the believer
who is not scientifically educated, as well as that of him
who is. This is a fact which every dogmatic theologian
should keep before him. Confidence in the eternal
validity of the religious knowledge set forth by him,
should go hand in hand with a modest estimate of his
own scientific religious knowledge : for his Dogmatic
system belongs in the next generation to the History of
Dogma (cf. p. 20 ff*.).

When emphasis is laid, as has been done above, on
the character of all theological knowledge as dependent
on faith, the opponents of Christianity are naturally
fond of making the charge, that it is a knowledge un-
deserving of the name. This reproach is of little signi-
ficance, if it can be shown to proceed from a conception
of knowledge, not only opposed to the Christian, but in
itself unprovable and indeed full of contradictions. This
is what we have sought to prove in our Apologetic. It
is more remarkable that our position as to the dependence
of all Christian knowledge upon faith, is often assailed
by friends of Christian truth. Not seldom on the gi'ound
that it underestimates the power and value of Christian
knowledge, that it is an evasion of thought, and points
to enervation on the part of faith itself. It is not in
vain, we are told, that in the New Testament, knowledge
is praised, recommended, prayed for. Undoubtedly
so ; but surely just such knowledge as corresponds to the
nature of faith, which means essentially such knowledge
as we have above indicated. A knowledge based upon

249

The Science of the Christian Faith

another foundation, like that of which we spoke, which
is said to " approximate immediate perception," has not
only as a matter of fact been of little use ; on the con-
trary, with advancing insight into the nature of know-
ledge and faith (cf. pp. 102 ff.) it has occasioned rather
than overcome doubt. We have also seen why it cannot
be otherwise, namely because it is only the knowledge
which is in accord with the nature of faith, that is im-
pregnable. But this knowledge is by no means narrow
in compass and unfruitful in itself, as it is often errone-
ously charged with being, confined so to speak to a poor
"minimum theology," a few statements incapable of
development, and to be received simply on the testimony
of tradition. On the contrary, it is as productive as faith
itself, and as inexhaustible as its object, the living God.
This is so, both in Apologetics and in Dogmatics. In
every generation it has to undertake new apologetic
tasks, since it has to bring its nature as knowledge con-
ditioned by faith into relation with the culture of every
generation ; and its dogmatic task is equally boundless,
namely the comprehension in all its aspects of the con-
tent of revelation, with ever-increasing clearness. The
charge, therefore, of which we spoke, has its justification
and its usefulness, not in our conception of religious
knowledge, but as an urgent appeal for a more thorough-
going application of our principles. In this sense every
lamentation over the intellectual indolence of the Chris-
tian Church, is worth laying to heart, for in truth every
underestimate of religious knowledge is a defect in faith.
This naturally applies not merely to Dogmatics but to
Apologetics, both in the fundamental part which lies
behind us, and in the application of it throughout the
whole Dogmatic System ; which, if carried out fully and
deliberately, would give us a complete Christian philo-
sophy of nature and history.

250

Dogmatic Religious Knowledge

Now with all this, the conception of the Science of Faith
is accurately defined, in relation to the general state-
ments made at the outset, in our preliminary remarks
(pp. 2 f., 29 f.). But any short definition, in which there is
no allusion to all these discussions, is liable to misinter-
pretation. And this too, even if it is said, without doubt
correctly, that Dogmatics is the scientific exposition of
Revelation as it is understood by Faith (cf. E-eischle) ;
or that it is the Science of Christian Truth, as that truth
is believed and confessed in the Church, on the ground
of Divine Revelation (cf. J. Kaftan), with or without
such an addition as '' at the present stage of the Church's
development ". For all the questions which have now
been dealt with, and were mentioned at the outset, those
implied by the idea of a Science of Faith, cannot pos-
sibly be considered in a short definition. This posi-
tion of matters is made specially plain, by the fact that
the summary definitions are very much alike, even in
the case of writers who would not identify themselves
with those associated with the theological standpoints
just mentioned. Take e.g. that of Ihmels : A scientific
presentation of Christian Truth which is undertaken from
the standpoint of Faith, and for the Church which
adheres to the Faith ; this truth being viewed as it is
derived by Faith from Revelation. This definition does
not prevent Ihmels, in the exposition given by him, from
furnishing a specific statement of the meaning of Revela-
tion, Scripture, Dogma, which Reischle or Kaftan re-
jects. On the other hand, Troeltsch's definition : *' An
Exhibition of the Ideas of Faith on the basis of Science,
of the Philosophy of Religion," does not in itself stand
in any necessary opposition to those just mentioned,
including that of Ihmels, though it is certain that the
difference is great. However, by reference to the posi-
tion which we hold, where every suspicion of external

251

The Science of the Christian Faith

reconciliation is precluded, these examples may demon-
strate not only the ambiguity, and therefore the insuffi-
ciency, of preliminary definitions, but what is better, the
far-reaching agreement which also exists ; and they
may bring the critical matter before us once more —
that all those who are of serious mind are concerned
with the understanding of Revelation which is open to
faith ; but of course on the supposition that the truth
of Revelation must be proved, or, to go back to our
commencement, that there can be no Dogmatics with-
out Apologetics.

Faith and Knowledge

Now that the nature of religious knowledge has been
defined, upon the basis of the nature and truth of our
religion, it is necessary and possible to sum up in a few
sentences the conclusions already given regarding the
relation of faith and knowledge. On the one hand, we
have now got beyond a series of definitions of this rela-
tion which in part have been of importance in history,
and in part are still current among ourselves. On
the other hand, the attitude accepted as correct can
be briefly indicated by reference to these negatives.
The opinions to be rejected may perhaps be
arranged in the following order. One type describes
faith and knowledge as irreconcilable opponents, and
rests with that irreconcilableness. Another affirms the
right of the one by denying that of the other. A third
wants to do justice to both, in such wise that it subor-
dinates the one to the other in principle, seeking either
to refer faith to a kind of knowledge, or knowledge to
a kind of faith. A fourth acknowledges that, on this
course, violence would always be done to the one or to
the other, and in the end really to both ; and seeks to
have both co-existing with their respective rights unpre-

252

Faith and Knowledge

judiced ; whether by proposing to separate the two
spheres, or by discovering an escape from the difficulty
in the watchword of two distinct methods of viewing the
same province.

It is practically only for the sake of completeness
that we refer to the Jirst group. It is to relinquish
all attempt at a solution, if one rests satisfied with the
position of a " double truth," that a thing may be true
in theology though false in philosophy. This position
testifies how deep may be the feeling of inward need,
which finds no way of escape from the conflict be-
tween knowledge and faith that assails the seat of life^
or again it can show in how frivolous a spirit men may
play with the question of Truth. Of both of these we
have examples in the closing days of Scholasticism. Or
again it may be a bold expression of the confidence of
faith, and an inkling of the peculiar nature of faith as
distinguished from knowledge. Thus in his celebrated
theses on this position, Luther says that the objects of
faith lie "beyond, within, on this side, and on that side
of," reason. At present the catchword has been for
some time a favourite weapon in party warfare, especially
against the Ritschlian Theology (cf. Value-judgments,
pp. 65 ff.), but is now beginning to disappear, in propor-
tion as the theological opponents have confidence in each
others' sincerity, though, taken seriously, it is absolutely
irreconcilable with sincerity, for us men of to-day.

But likewise the second of the possibilities mentioned
above cannot be maintained in the long run, the '* radical
solution" — the alternative of faith or knowledge. As
used in the interest of faith, this watchword has been
represented only by fanatics, who gave it the lie, however,
in the conduct of their lives, or paid the penalty by their
destruction : even for them, the world of knowledge is
altogether too real. On the other hand, there is no

253

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want of manifestoes against all faith, as blind faith which
is dying out, some of them being of a spirited type, like
Feuerbach's " lUusiveness of Religion," and some of a
coarse description like Haeckel's "Riddle of the Uni-
verse ". But the representatives of these views live after
all in some unprovable faith ; and, as we saw, their faith
decides in the last resort for an unprovable ideal of know-
ledge.

The third group we spoke of takes us higher. We
have found it was often brought home to us from history,
in how many ways, as we pass from the Alexandrians
to Hegel and Biedermann, faith was " exalted " to know-
ledge, presumably with a view to its protection and its
perfect security ; but really, in the last resort, since it
was subordinated to knowledge, it was restricted, pre-
judiced, denied. We also met with the opposite possi-
bility, though naturally much more rarely, — faith is a
remnant of the knowledge which alone is right ; and
this knowledge itself, when viewed in its true nature, is
believing, valuing, deciding with the will (pp. 134 ff.).
A possibility this, which does not grant to knowledge
what belongs to knowledge ; as the other withholds from
faith what belongs to faith.

The fourth of the standpoints mentioned above has
certainly the most supporters ; for it is distinguished by
the conscious purpose of succeeding in proving that faith
and knowledge are compatible with each other, while
both are understood in their real nature. To be sure,
one form of this attempt at a solution, one which was
favoured by many people not very long ago, will now be
approved only by few. It sees salvation in a division of
promnces between faith and knowledge. This was
Ritschl's view in the first edition of his work. Indi-
vidual occurrences in the world, they say, belong to
the domain of knowledge, the world as a whole to that

254

Faith and Knowledge

of faith. Only this satisfies neither faith nor knowledge.
Faith is not satisfied, because it cannot possibly re-
linquish the right to pass judgment upon individual
events in the world ; it is there that its temptations are
fought out, and its answers to prayer experienced. To
relinquish the world in individual particulars is for faith
to relinquish it altogether ; a general judgment regard-
ing the world, which must keep clear of the individual
items in it, is not the victory over the world of which it
is assured. But besides, faith is not content with the
world as a whole, if it is just simply the world. It
knows of a reality which is not the world, but higher
than the whole world ; it knows of the living God : in the
expression with which we are occupied, that is not recog-
nized at least without ambiguity. But not only does
faith find its claim curtailed : knowledge also must de-
cline the proposed partition of spheres ; at least for the
reason already adduced, that faith is certainly not in a
position to relinquish without reservation its claim upon
individual occurrences in the world. Knowledge would
therefore never be sure as to where, even in reference to
individual occurrences, faith claimed to fix a limit to its
investigation. And whether knowledge is incapable of
pronouncing any judgments regarding the world as a
whole, would have to be proved at all events with more
exactness than we find at this standpoint.

But the greatest popularity is attained by the thesis
— not separation of the provinces, but " a twofold way of
looking " at the same provinces. According to this con-
ception, the object for faith and knowledge is the same,
namely the whole of reality. But it comes before us
under opposite points of view, under that of the causal
explanation for knowledge, under that of the teleologi-
cal interpretation for faith. The veiy same reality for
which in the one case the efficient causes are determined,

265

The Science of the Christian Faith

appears in the other as an instrument for the divine
purpose of salvation. Against this it must again be ob-
jected first of all that the object of faith, the reality which
transcends this world, namely God and His Kingdom, is
not unreservedly acknowledged ; only the world which
admits of the causal explanation is at the same time set
in the light of teleology. But the main difficulty will
be whether, by this method of treatment, expression is
actually given to what faith supposes itself to experience
with reference to the world. Examples from the
doctrine of Providence show very clearly what is here at
stake. If the prayer, " Lead us not into temptation," or,
" Deliver us from evil," and at the same time the answer-
ing of it in any single instance of the Christian life, are
simply links in a causal chain, so that prayer and answer
have alike their basis in the necessary system comprising
the whole of reality, what then is the teleological way
of viewing things but a beautiful illusion, spread over the
hard rock of reality? In other words, the catchword
of which we speak of the twofold point of view, is not
for the most part accurately explained. Then it secures
in appearance the advantage of emphasizing in the
strongest manner possible, the absoluteness of the causal
point of view, and yet of leaving faith in possession of
its rights. But in reality knowledge thus gains every-
thing, while faith loses everything. For strictly re-
garded, what is affirmed is not a twofold point of view,
with both aspects equally legitimate, but upon this pre-
text, faith is subordinated to knowledge. The one point
of view is the objective, the other the purely subjective ;
that is, it is a beautiful illusion, and faith, which is vitally
interested in the truth in the simplest sense of the term
(cf. pp. 46 fF., 100 flf.), becomes subject to oscillation : not
only the changing pictorial form of its conceptions, but
its inmost kernel, is reduced to a figure of speech, which

256

Faith and Knowledge

must be its death ; while theology becomes a sort of
superior collection of phrases. But certainly this dis-
astrous way of understanding the "twofold point of
view" is not inevitable. Only, if the interpretation in
question is rejected, the rejection should be unmistak-
able, and it should be justified. This brings us to the
task of defining positively as well, the relation of
faith and knowledge, on the basis of the foregoing
Apologetic.

On the basis of determinations of the volitional and
emotional functions of the inner life, in combination
with God's revelation of Himself in history, faith is
assured of a reality which is not accessible to theoretical
knowledge, universally valid science. Faith, moreover,
sets the world of experience, which is really accessible
to universally valid science, teleologically in relation to
the reality of God, assurance of which is the peculiar
possession of faith itself, subordinating the former to the
latter as the means to the end. This activity of faith
is not a subjective proceeding, but one that fits in with
the real circumstances of the case, because faith can
show the reasons which justify it in adopting this pos-
ition. And what it is concerned about is real know-
ledge of the Reality that is most real of all, not by any
means an obscure feeling or a postulate made by the will.
All that was said above regarding religious knowledge
would have to be repeated. But within the limits im-
posed upon it by its own nature, knowledge is secure against
all pretensions on the part of faith, which do not cease as
long as, on the other hand, knowledge endangers faith.
And as in history, real knowledge first became possible
through the overthrow of Polytheism, "through the
victory of Jahve over Baal " (Ranke), but also in another
way among the Greeks, so, for reasons in its own nature,
living faith in God is the best support and truest friend

VOL. I. 257 17

The Science of the Christian Faith

of science, and the Christian is affected with the utmost
joy by every advance of it. But knowledge feels the
above-defined subordination to faith (not any subordina-
tion) not as an arbitrary restriction, but as the place
corresponding to its nature. For the confidence which
characterizes our knowledge of nature is itself, in the
last resort, a postulate of the emotional and volitional
faculties of the mind, rests on our impulse to seek life,
on our desire to master the world. The right to make
this postulate is referred by personal faith, which is con-
vinced on good grounds of its truth, to the living God
(cf. pp. 161 f.). From the nature of this faith itself,
however, we can understand what purpose is served by
thus defining the relation of faith and knowledge: it
promotes the interest of faith in God, which would not
otherwise be faith (pp. 146 ff.).

This is by no means to say that the Christian
Church does not feel even this relation of faith and
knowledge as a problem ; on the contrary, for the
Church as a whole, as well as for every individual
Christian, there is always, at every step in the develop-
ment, new occasion for a great and difficult conflict of
faith. The separate doctrines, especially those of God,
Providence and Christ, will give us frequent opportunities
of bringing up this point again. The formula must
prove itself true in the particular applications of it. But
its correctness in principle, as well as, in particular, the
explanation of why this tension is, under earthly condi-
tions, necessary for the sake of faith itself, and of how
far, under other conditions, faith can hold out the prospect
of a solution, follows directly from all that was said re-
garding the nature and the truth of our religion ; of
which these sentences profess to be merely a summary,
for the purpose in front of us.

With the express reservation that every analogy must

258

Faith and Knowledge

be imperfect in such matters, the one point in our dis-
cussion which is specially contested, the question namely
of how faith and knowledge can apply themselves with-
out antagonism to the same experiences of our life, may
perhaps be illustrated by the figure of the immemorial
dispute between great neighbouring nations as to the
borderland. To speak of "two-fold truth," would be
foolish. War to the death would correspond to our
second view of the relation of faith and knowledge,
when each denies the other's right to exist, an irrational
attitude and fundamentally impossible between such an-
tagonists. But again, the third expedient would only
be playing with words : that which makes the right of
the one come to signify the right of the other. For then
the dispute would begin to blaze out on the point, which
of the two was entitled to the first place ; because they
would soon see that in the last resort, it was really a
question for them of existence or non-existence, as re-
gards their most distinctive characteristics ; e.g. if the
language of the one was pressed on the other by force.
A separation in respect of their absolute authority might
now be suggested ; but what sort of division would it be,
that the one nation should have general control, and the
other control in the separate particulars ? Nor would it
be any less strange to affirm that both can rule, if only
they would consider the district in dispute in diff'erent
ways. For neither is much interested in the mere con-
sidering of it ; but as soon as the one takes its consider-
ing seriously, it is all over with the other. On the other
hand, when once the sovereignty of the one kingdom
over the land in dispute is well established, the other,
by submitting thereto, can exercise a profusion of the
activities which belong to it in virtue of its proper indi-
viduality, with full freedom — more freely than when
false and untenable claims crippled its strength. True,

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The Science of the Christian Faith

there will never be any lack of new discussions ; but
honourable struggle is the heart-beat of life.

Such a discussion relating to faith and knowledge
as has been comprised in the foregoing, is readily taken,
no doubt, to mean that it is intended in this way to
forbid any higher flight of knowledge, indeed that there
exists in the last resort an intolerable division in our
mental life. Once again then, it may be stated expli-
citly in conclusion, that this charge of an unfounded
limitation of knowledge would be due to a complete
misunderstanding. Christian thought must apply itself
with new ardour to the problems of the theory of
knowledge, the philosophy of history and that of nature.
This would bring to the front more and more clearly the
positive significance of knowledge, its immense value in
itself and for all the other activities of the inner life,
religion included. But on the other hand too, the same
might be said of the conviction, that knowledge itself
" rests on a postulate, the right of which can be affirmed
only by faith " (cf. pp. 257 f.). So then it is just on the
course here recommended that the unity of our mental
being is preserved.

From all that has been said, it will be possible to
understand why the tempting pronouncements which we
mentioned when giving the survey of the schools of
modern Apologetics, and in our systematic exposition
(pp. 131 ff., 146 ff.), can no more be yielded to by us at
this point, when we have now concluded our definition
of the relation between faith and knowledge, than at the
former stage referred to, — those pronouncements which
attribute more to the power of knowledge, in the direction
just described. We hear the message, it is true, but we do
not have faith in it. And we are influenced not only by a
regard for faith, but by a regard for knowledge. Not as if
the greatness of the promise did not attract us, or more

260

Faith and Knowledge

precisely, the motive from which it springs. It seems
so courageous when it is said, that the view which has
been expounded marks the point for retreat, no doubt ;
but the troops must likewise go out to the field, must go
where there is freedom, in order to give religion more
power in the world. It is held that we should cultivate
a new Metaphysic, the right kind which does not leave
nature and spirit meaningless, or bring down the history
of Jesus to a low level, and which also achieves other
results that are so deserving of admiration. It is said
that we need a positive reconciliation between the
scientific and the religious views of the world, and that
this can be attained. Or at least, connecting lines be-
tween the two are required. As if such had not really
been set forth in the most deliberate manner ! Or, the
alleged tension between faith and knowledge is con-
sidered to be tolerable, only if it is made clear that
knowledge is indispensable for faith, and faith for know-
ledge. Has not this too been done, so far as the position
can be described in plain statements (pp. 161 f., 257 fi".)?
But what forms our lasting objection to all those multi-
plied demands, and it is one too which is the more
forcible the more extensive they are, is just this, that
those who urge them do not succeed in showing that
faith is not prejudiced by their proposals ; and they are
equally unable to demonstrate that knowledge, which is
supposed to investigate the nature of faith with precision,
can clearly substantiate such claims. We may allow the
former consideration to rest now as it is (cf. pp. 148 &.).
But as regards the latter, the real position is just this :
the more exactness is applied by modern philosophy, in
dealing with the problem of knowledge, the more it ap-
proximates in principle the standpoint which is here repre-
sented ; although it may hold itself quite aloof from the
conclusions in favour of the Christian faith (cf. pp. 153 ff.).

261

The Science of the Christian Faith

At the transition from Apologetics to Dogmatics,
we have been occupied first with the idea of Dogmatics,
that is in the main the nature of religious knowledge,
concluding with some general formulae regarding the
relation of faith and knowledge. There follows now
what is most indispensable regarding the method of
Dogmatics. Its most important problem is

THE NOEM OF CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE

It is of course a summary proceeding to set every-
thing forthwith in this aspect. In so doing, our attention
simply is to bring to the front the point of main import-
ance, without signifying that the many separate questions
of method, which here present themselves for a more de-
tailed exposition, are in any way of small moment. But
all that has gone before has in view the point of which
we speak, as the main thing. If the revelation of God
in Christ is the source, norm and basis of all Christian
religious knowledge, and consequently of all correctly
formulated doctrine, we are immediately brought face
to face with the doctrine of Holy Scripture. For as that
revelation which is productive of faith is historical for
all who were not contemporary with it, it cannot be-
come effective except through the testimony of faith to
it in history ; but it is just this that Holy Scripture
means to be. Since then the facts of the case themselves
call upon us to expound first of all the significance of
Holy Scripture for Dogmatics, all the other questions,
so far as they are indispensable, naturally fall into their
place behind this fundamental one. This is true especi-
ally of the relation of Holy Scripture to the Confession
of the Church, because in the history of the Church,
Scripture has been understood and turned to account in
many different ways. But while such exposition is

262

Place Assigned to Doctrine of Scripture

making plain the fact that, the reason why, and the
sense in which, Evangelical Dogmatics claims to be
Scriptural, we are at the same time reminded what
moments of truth, if any, are present in the other types
of Dogmatics which history exhibits ; and further, the
most indispensable formal principles fall into their proper
place without difficulty. And at this point it will
appear quite naturally why we speak here in the first
instance of Scripture alone, and of it only as norm ;
though it is certain that a thorough-going exposition
would have to estimate afresh all possible sources of re-
ligious knowledge, and the emphasis which is variously
laid on them in history, and would have to determine
the relation of them to Scripture.

The place here assigned to the doctrine of Scrip-
ture, before the detailed exposition of the doctrinal
system, is that accorded it by the Old Protestant syste-
matic theologians. It should be acknowledged to be
the only appropriate place, by all who recognize in reve-
lation the ground and norm of Christian religious truth.
For it makes no difference for our question, whether
Holy Scripture is identified with revelation, as was the
case with our old divines, or is at once distinguished
from, and related to it, as the authoritative and faith-
producing testimony to revelation : in either case, it is
the source of our knowledge of our faith. The position
assigned by Schleiermacher to the doctrine of Holy
Scripture, namely within the Dogmatic System itself,
and there under the main head dealing with the Holy
Spirit and the Church, is a consequence not so much of
the reasons given by him in that immediate connexion,
as of his fundamental conception of Dogmatics as an
exposition of religious experience. His subtle statement
that a doctrine does not belong to Christianity because
it is contained in Scripture, but is found in Scripture

263

The Science of the Christian Faith

because it is Christian, is doubtless correct when it is
correctly explained : but it admits of several interpreta-
tions. It is correct, if the intention is to say, " Because
there is Christianity, on the ground of the revelation of
God in Christ, there is a Sacred Scripture, the content
of which testifies to that fact ; the former is the real
basis for the significance of Scripture ". But this Reve-
lation has to be defined with more exactness than is
shown by Schleiermacher, and thus, for reasons soon to
be explained, Holy Scripture belongs inseparably to it ;
and so far Scripture is not simply the source, speaking
quite generally, of the knowledge of revelation for us,
but the indispensable means of its continued activity,
and is therefore, in a very definite sense, the source of
that knowledge. In this sense, qualifying statements
being reserved, a thing is Christian for us, because it
is found in the Bible. Still more important is that
other statement of Schleiermacher's, that the authority
of Scripture cannot be the foundation of faith in Christ,
but that faith in Christ must be already presupposed,
in order to attribute a special authority to Scrip-
ture. As a matter of fact, the person who is laid
hold of by Christ acquires an inward religious attitude
to these writings ; but that is just because it is from
them, and through their means, that he receives his
authoritative religious impressions of Christ. And thus
far, certainly, the authority of Scripture is not the basis
of faith in Christ ; but at the same time, all qualifying
statements being again reserved. Scripture is the basis
of faith in Christ. Putting the two together, it may
therefore be said that the former statement defines the
relation of the Church to Scripture, the latter that of the
individual believer to it, in the way which alone is
evangelical, without which personal saving faith is en-
dangered ; otherwise we should be dependent upon a

264

Old Protestant Doctrine of Scripture

dead book instead of the living God. This, however, in
no way excludes Sacred Scripture from having a special
significance for faith. On the contrary, upon closer
examination it rather requires that it should have such
significance, as being the testimony to the revelation
which is the basis and norm of faith, and, on account of
the manner of the revelation, an indispensable part of it.
Because the relation of religious experience and revela-
tion was not at once made clear by Schleiermacher
(cf. pp. 109 ff., 118 flf., 172 ff.), he assigned the doctrine of
Scripture a different position from what it had with the
old divines, in the system instead of as a preliminary to it.
It is intelligible that he should be followed in this by
those of his successors who bring religious experience
to the front, keeping its objective basis in revelation in
the background. On the other hand, it is incompre-
hensible that the same procedure should be followed in
so-called ''positive" text-books, which seek to raise
their structure upon the foundation and according to
the standard of revelation.

As nowadays the legitimate intention of the Old
Protestant doctrine of Scripture cannot be achieved
without a complete transformation of it, while in the
strife of parties, want of clearness in regard to it
widely prevails, and often indeed, we might almost say,
is artificially fostered, whether in the name of faith or of
science, first of all this traditional doctrine has to be
stated and criticized.

The Old Protestant Doctrine of Sacred
Scripture

The understanding of this doctrine often suffers from
the circumstance that in the statement of it, the arrange-
ment customary with its representatives is followed in

265

The Science of the Christian Faith

too external a fashion. After briefly declaring that the
only source of knowledge for theology is Kevelation,
meaning thereby for us modern men Sacred Scripture,
they hurry away to the doctrine, carried out in its minutest
particulars, of the origin and inspiration of Scripture ;
and then they bring forward the doctrine of its " Affec-
tioties,'' that is peculiar characteristics. While it only
becomes quite plain under the last-named heading why
so enormous a claim is made on behalf of Scripture as
that it is inspired, namely because it is believed that
only in this way, there can be obtained an infallible
authority in matters of faith, and how this conviction
is originated, attention is involuntarily fixed upon the
detailed statements on inspiration already made, and
naturally after that directly upon the minor details of it
which are so strange. In order to be fair to the old doc-
trine, we must therefore, in expounding it, take as our
starting-point its motive and purpose, and understand the
statements regarding inspiration which stand in the fore-
ground, as a means for the end aimed at. But in the
criticism, the opposite course will commend itself : the
means may be perverse or unintelligible and the end
nevertheless legitimate. It is only when the end it-
self is admitted to be incorrect, that the reconstruction
of the doctrine of Sacred Scripture from the nature of
Revelation, can be discussed with perfect impartiality,
and it can be shown that it is by such reconstruction alone,
that the motive actuating the old divines, so far as it
had a sound basis, can be adhered to. In this connexion
many valuable individual pronouncements of historical
investigation must be left out of consideration, such as
these — that the principle, " The Scriptures alone," in-
deed even the demand for " the literal sense," are by no
means in and for themselves new discoveries of the
Churches of the Reformation, but were simply given a

266

Old Protestant Doctrine of Scripture

new application there. We are occupied only with tne
point which is of decisive importance for Dogmatics.

As above shown, the fundamental interest of the old
doctrine is the anxiety for an absolutely certain source
of knowledge for theology, which meant, in a way soundly
Protestant in principle, for saving faith itself. Faith
needs a firm foundation, a normative authority. That
is revelation. But this concept of revelation, which in
the doctrinal system itself, at least at its centre, men
had learned to understand in a new way, starting from
the concept of saving faith, continued to be understood
in the Prolegomena in the old way, as the supernatural
communication of saving truths. Or rather this imper-
fect thought was followed out, with an energy hither-
to unheard of ; the new power of faith gave new life to
the old concept of revelation, as religiously binding doc-
trinal authority. In Scripture there had been found
Christ, the gospel, the manifestation of God's gracious will
to save. The danger now was the Romish doctrine of
tradition on the one side, the fanatical doctrine of en-
lightenment on the other. Where was there safety from
both these errors ? Where was there incontestable
certainty for faith ? Only, it seemed, in the identification
of revelation and Holy Scripture. Holy Scripture is
" the only rule and standard " : it is the normative au-
thority. Further, before it can be this, it must be it in
the strictest sense, it must be absolutely infallible.
Otherwise one of the principles rejected, tradition or
enlightenment, immediately presses forward ; the war-
ranty of the Church or the individual spirit — both of
them in the last resort fanatical, as Luther finely said —
takes the place of the self-attesting revealed God, and
the sure ground of religious certainty is shattered. But
if normative authority belongs to Scripture in this sense,
in all that concerns salvation it must have the property

267

The Science of the Christian Faith

of sufficiency, of perfection ; otherwise it needs again for
its completion, tradition or subjective enlightenment, or
both combined in their inner oneness. In order, how-
ever, that it may be capable of being turned to account
as such perfect normative authority, Scripture must also
be plain and perspicuous in itself, it must explain itself,
without requiring the teaching authority of the Church
or special enlightenment. In short, in the three char-
acteristics of Sacred Scripture, connected with each
other as I they are in the manner indicated, our old divines
have given expression to the religious intention which
guided them in their doctrine of Scripture. The fourth
characteristic which they ascribed to Scripture, namely
efficacy, gives expression to the fact that it is a means
of grace, producing faith. In this expression, therefore,
the deepest religious impulse which led to the whole ela-
borate doctrine of Scripture, has been most directly pre-
served. And with this agrees in the last resort what was
further discussed under one of the headings already men-
tioned, namely that of the authority ; since alongside of
the normative authority of Scripture — its being the rule
and standard — mention was made of a causative authority.
That is, it testifies to its own truth, it proves its peculiar
authority ; or more accurately, the Holy Spirit bears
witness to His work, the Scriptures, in the heart. This
testimony of the Spirit works divine faith in Scripture ;
all other proofs excite merely human faith, both the in-
ternal testimonies, such as its simplicity and majesty, and
the external, such as the reliability of its authors, or the
history of its eflPects.

This " testimony of the Holy Spirit " now serves at
the same time and directly, as the one great proof for
the miraculous origin of Holy Scripture, for its insjnratiofi,
the unique means, as was set forth above, to the unique
end in view in the doctrine of Scripture, namely the ob-

268

Scripture : Protestant View Criticized

taming of an absolutely sure basis of knowledge for faith.
It is well known how the doctrine was carried out in its
minutest particulars. In order that the Scriptures may
be infallible, perfect, perspicuous, their real original
author must be the Holy Spirit Himself ; He must have
dictated the facts and words to the human scribes ; they
are simply His instruments, penmen, secretaries. Their
psychic condition during the reception of this dictated
message is simple passiveness, whereas the Ancient
Church thought rather of ecstasy ; the latter was dis-
credited owing to the fanatics, and it is significant that for
that passive state there was coined the word "suggestion,"
which is now used in so different a sense. The Scriptures
were proved to have had this origin by their own state-
ments ; at the same time it was not a case of reasoning in
a circle, inasmuch as the reservation was made, that inward
assurance of the inspiration of Scripture depends upon
that internal witness of the Holy Spirit to His work, of
which we have spoken ; so that, therefore, the proof from
the Scriptural passages already occupies the standpoint
of faith.

In CRITICISM, first of all on the doctrine of the origin^
it is best to distinguish the points which lay beyond the
horizon of the old divines, and those which cannot be
waived without surrender of their characteristic position.
Nowadays it will be conceded without further argument,
that the attestation of the doctrine of inspiration by the
testimony of the Holy Spirit, which was their final proof,
overlooks points of importance. Such could apply im-
mediately only to the content, not to the origin in all its
details. Further, this testimony must somehow be
proved by its effects upon the subject. Again, a purely
passive attitude on the part of the sacred penmen is
psychologically inconceivable. But these objections
partly did not exist as the matter was then regarded ;

269

The Science of the Christian Faith

partly they were repressed by the interest already re-
ferred to in the absolute objectivity of revelation. On
the other hand, even upon the old presuppositions, the
question why the "sacred penmen" did not themselves
refer to this circumstance, when once put, is not to be
lightly regarded. Now, although fully alive to being
really the bearers of a revelation, and able to distinguish
the message given them from their own thought, the
authors of the Old Testament give no indication that
they were in any special condition, when in the act of
writing, not even on those occasions, rare after all, when
they attribute their writing to God's command (e.g.
Exod. XXXIV. 27, Is. viii. 1). On the contrary they
themselves testify to individual activity on their own
part, by mentioning, for example, the older sources used
by them, such as the Book of Jashar. In the New
Testament, Revelation xix. 9 fF. is the only instance in
which mention is made of a Divine command to write ;
and here, what the author says of himself in the context,
of his falling down and speaking, certainly does not fit
in with the foregoing theory. Paul, with all his assur-
ance, not only of possessing the Spirit in general in a
pre-eminent degree, but also of making particular state-
ments directly in the name of the Lord (1 Cor. vii. 10),
lays claim to no special mode of authorship for the
moment of their being committed to writing. As a
direct argument against the strict doctrine of inspiration,
the express testimony (Luke i. Iff.) to serious literary
effort in the collecting and arranging of the material,
has always demanded special consideration. Such is
the evidence of the authors themselves. Moreover they
incontestably give us the impression of intellectual effort.
The construction of Hebrews, the difficulties of the
sequence of thought in every more considerable passage
of a Pauline epistle, may suffice in proof. The whole

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Scripture : Protestant View Criticized

work of exegesis is a continuous refutation of the old
theory of the origin of Holy Scripture, as the dictation
of the Holy Spirit. Nor, finally, is it possible, since the
circumstances are thus clear, to obtain by an appeal to
2 Timothy iii. 16 (writings inspired of God, originating
in the breath of God's Spirit) and 2 Peter i. 21, an
opposite conclusion by means of the inference : if so
special an origin is here affirmed of the Old Testament
writings, how much more must it hold good of the
New Testament. The very presupposition that the in-
spiration here asserted is conceived of quite as strictly
as by our old divines, is unprovable. The doctrine as
found in contemporary Jewish Scribism was certainly
very strict. But for all that, as regards the Old
Testament even, the facts as given above are more
authoritative than such a judgment regarding them ;
and the inference to the New Testament must be com-
pletely rejected, on account of the actual circumstances
of its composition. This follows too, as has been acutely
shown, from the fact that allegorical interpretation
almost necessarily goes along with the acceptance of
inspired writings. In our evangelical Church at least,
this is rejected as a matter of principle ; and in the New
Testament itself, in dealing with the Old, it is employed
to a much smaller extent than elsewhere in Jewish and
ecclesiastical literature — by Jesus Himself not at all.

But all such considerations, however convincing they
may be, have not yet eradicated the old Protestant
doctrine of Scripture. It is just in the case of a living
Protestant congregation that one has to realize for one-
self, by profound sympathy with their thoughts and needs
— the actual trials frequently of the best members — how
deeply the roots of that theory penetrate the sanctuary
of faith. It is certainly inexcusable that theologians
who might and should know the actual facts, should en-

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The Science of the Christian Faith

courage such church members in their perplexity, or
actually occasion them mistrust. But their own alarm,
which is not due to outside influence, is only too intelli-
gible, and it shows a lack of understanding quite as
much as of sympathy to belittle it. The method of our
investigation has been motived by such a feeling. In
the exposition the end in view stood in the forefront,
namely the infallibility of Scripture, and this was
followed by the means used to reach it, namely its origin
in inspiration, dictation by the Holy Spirit. In the
criticism we began with the latter section ; the position
was proved untenable, and that not at all by our ideas
regarding the matter, however strong their foundation,
but on the contrary by the actual facts of the sacred writ-
ings, the consciousness of their authors indeed. Only, as
long as the end in view, the absolute infallibility of Scriptui'e,
is regarded as legitimate, no objection to the means, the
miraculous origin, takes effect. Concessions are made
in regard to individual points, even at the cost of con-
sistency. Or if this fail, perhaps the idea is affirmed as
one that is necessary, although it cannot be fully fol-
lowed out, and refuge is taken in the unfathomable
mystery. The case is altogether different if the infalli-
bility of Scripture presupposed, proves to be an artificial
and erroneous presupposition. But this last is capable
of two senses : erroneous, because asserted without
foundation in the actual facts of Scripture, or without
foundation in the nature of our Christian faith itself.
The way is thus opened for our further progress.

The complete inerrancy of the Sacred Writings,
asserted by the old divines as they thought in the
interests of faith, is contrary to the facts. We may
put first what we have already said, because it makes
the most direct impression upon those who are alarmed
for reasons of faith : such inerrancy is not in harmony

272

Scripture : Protestant View Criticized

with the consciousness of the Biblical writers themselves.
For while they are fully assured that they are bearing
witness to divine saving truth, they make no claim to
infallibility in all particulars ; otherwise the statements
already referred to, such as Luke i. 1 ff., 1 Corinthians
VII. 10, would be meaningless, though for other reasons
and in another point of view than those which we dis-
cussed before. And if at an earlier date in devout
circles, Revelation xxii. 19 was frequently referred to
our whole Bible as it now stands, instead of to the book
of the Apocalypse, a misunderstanding so evident is
disappearing even from such circles ; and besides, im-
pression is made by the knowledge that the same external
emphasizing of authority, is characteristic of other Apo-
calypses not received into our Bible, while it is lacking
for the most important parts of our New Testament.
This again simply wins fresh assent to the opinion ex-
pressed long ago by Luther.

On the positive side, more importance attaches to the
slowly but surely growing recognition of the undeniable
individual errors, brought to light by the grammatico-
historical interpretation of Scripture, which was recog-
nized by the Reformation as alone legitimate in principle.
With such interpretation criticism is inseparably con-
nected. Even the most harmless results of textual
criticism are an assault upon the outworks of the doctrine
of inerrancy. It is no mere chance that conflict once
raged over the legitimacy of the Hebrew vowel points,
and that the most absolute recent advocate of the old
claims (Koelling) not long since demanded that a com-
mission of theologians, with expert training in textual
criticism, must be kept sitting till they had settled beyond
dispute disputed texts. We pass now from matters
insignificant, though not without significance for the
theory, to weightier points. The surest way to secure

VOL. I. 278 18

The Science of the Christian Faith

recognition for manifest inaccuracies in the history, is
here again to begin with what is obviously immaterial
to faith : perhaps with the example discussed by J. A.
Bengel, upon ground specially receptive of as well as
sensitive to such questions, that namely of the old Wir-
temberg religious fellowships. According to Mark i. 29,
Jesus enters Peter's house immediately after leaving
the synagogue, while according to Matthew viii. 14, the
narrative of the leper (and of the centurion) comes first,
which in Mark follows the healing in Peter's house. The
impossibility of subterfuge here is just as plain as the
religious insignificance of the difference in the narratives ;
while it is the apologetic harmonizing which has invented
explanations in part religiously questionable. Greater
importance naturally belongs to the diff'erences in the
account of the baptism, the cleansing of the temple and
the day of our Lord's death. In any case one cannot
get over the difficulty in them by such phrases as, " by
a deeper apprehension," " by reference to the purpose
which Scripture is designed to have," such difficulties
disappear (Luthardt). How much offence is thus given to
the feeling for truth in young people, is startlingly shown
from time to time in confidential talk ; and not all who
are thus caused to stumble succeed in renouncing artifices
of the kind referred to in Job xiii. 7 ff., and at the same
time achieving the full measure of the humility that goes
with a delicate sensitiveness as to truth. A still greater
difficulty for the religious sense than the diff'erences in
the historical narrative, are those in the religious testi-
mony itself, not so much the so-called variations in New
Testament theology as individual points, such as the ex-
pectation in the Apostolic writings of our Lord's speedy
return. Here at all events there lies a great problem
for the combining of pastoral truthfulness and wisdom.
The difficulty last mentioned forces itself unaided upon

274

Scripture : Protestant View Criticized

attentive readers of the Bible in the Church ; as when
they hear from the pulpit that " unbelief ascribes such
an opinion to the Apostles " ! — an instance derived from
actual experience. Thus reverent attempts to discuss the
actual character of Holy Scripture, let us say before a con-
gregation like that of the Basle Mission House (Kinzler),
have a decided significance for the history of the Church.
Even if at first they give ofifence, this must have its roots
not so much in the attitude of the congregation, which,
the more devout it is, learns with the greater ease to
distinguish between the kernel and the husk, as in the
influence exerted over them by clergymen who ought
to study more deeply, and understand their calling
better.

But certainly it is not sufficient to refer to the actual
character of Scripture. It would be conceivable indeed
that its inerrancy in the old sense must be definitely
surrendered, but to the injury of faith. This possibility
is excluded only by showing that the inerrancy asserted
by the old divines in all particulars, is not required for
real saving faith, or the gospel rightly understood, but is
excluded as unnecessary, and even dangerous. It would
perhaps suit a religion, the nature of which was com-
pletely expressed in individual definitely formulated
doctrines, whether in individual commandments ad-
dressed to our wills, or in individual truths addressed
to our understandings, — a legal religion in either point of
view : it is not suited for Christianity as we came to know
it, as personal communion with the God of Holy Love in
the Kingdom of God for sinners, realized by the self-
revelation of this God in Christ. Thus the idea of
revelation which belongs to, and alone harmonizes with,
the nature of our religion, is not securely established,
but on the contrary injured, by the traditional identifica-
tion of revelation and Scripture. The self-attestation

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The Science of the Christian Faith

of God which works saving trust in God's love, the life-
giving Word of the living God, cannot be the letter of
an infallible Book. Were we to admit that it is, we
should have to retract all that has been said with refer-
ence to revelation and faith. But the intention of our
old divines, to assure the truth of this revelation and
the certainty of the faith evoked thereby and directed
thereto, is safeguarded because it rests upon an impreg-
nable basis ; indeed even the erroneous attempt to carry
out this intention is completely intelligible only from
their earnestness. For the protection of their ex-
perienced assurance of salvation, under the temporal
conditions already mentioned, they erected a bulwark,
which necessarily became a source of danger : what
was meant to protect against the infallibility of the
Church, became a pope on paper ; what was meant
to protect against the subjectivity of the fanatics, could
not lead to certainty.

It is, then, admitted in principle, in almost all schools
of Protestant theology, that the strict theory is untenable,
both as contrary to the actual character of Scripture, and
as inconsistent with the fundamental principle of the Ke-
formation. Unfortunately, however, not only is the sur-
render in principle of the position frequently disguised in
theological polemics, and still more in the training of the
Christian Church, but worst of all, the doctrine which
takes its place does not generally speaking correspond in
precision with the actual facts of the case. People are
much too readily satisfied with the general concession
that the rigour of the old doctrine must be modified, or
with indefinite talk about the human and divine character
of Scripture ; though surely a matter dark enough in its
own department is not calculated to throw light upon
another. But if it is not possible to secure the recogni-
tion in the Protestant Church of a doctrine of Holy Scrip-

276

Relation and Scripture

tare, which in its own way is as clear as the old Protestant,
and advances the legitimate purpose of this old Protes-
tant doctrine better than itself, the most nicely balanced
individual statements regarding Scripture serve in the
last resort only to break down its authority, and thus
favour a subjectivity which threatens our evangelical
church, because it threatens the treasure of the Reforma-
tion, the assurance of salvation. But this is threatened
also, when others, in order to restrain this subjectivity,
set the norm of the Church's Confession above the auth-
ority of Scripture. The safety and the future of our
Church do not depend upon Romish objectivity or
fanatical subjectivity, or unstable oscillation between
the two, but upon what rises superior to both danger's, a
reinstated doctrine of Scripture, starting from the nature
of our religion, and in harmony with the motive principle
of the Reformation.

The Doctrine of Scripture which Results from
THE Nature of the Evangelical Conception of
Revelation

Of the two tasks, which occupied us in our exposition
and criticism of the old Protestant doctrine, the one
passes entirely into the background, namely the question
of the special origin of the Bible. Indeed it was only
by reason of the other, namely the inerrancy asserted
of Scripture, that it became of such importance as actually
to be the centre of interest. If, on the other hand, the
question which is in truth decisive is differently answered,
the question of the origin loses all direct significance
for faith, and can be briefly discussed by way of an
appendix. So much the more carefully must we keep
in view the proper problem in all its aspects. It is the
problem of special writings, excellent above others,

277

The Science of the Christian Faith

authoritative for faith and life — that is, just canonical ;
authoritative, obviously because it is they more than any
other Christian writings, which afford reliable testimony
to faith regarding the truth of the Christian Revelation,
any more precise definition of their content being re-
served. But even upon this quite general characteriza-
tion of our task, three fundamental questions force
themselves upon our attention. The first is, Why and
in what sense is it supposed that there are canonical
writings ? What religious interest is thus served ?
The second is. Are there such writings ? Is there
not simply a pious wish that there were such? Or
more accurately. Have the writings regarded in the
Church as canonical any right to be so regarded ? Thus
the question of the religious value of such writings, and
that of their reality, stand side by side. Finally, accord-
ing to what principles are these writings, provided their
value and their actual existence are established, to be
employed for the construction of doctrine ? Only when
these three points are discussed, can a final judgment be
passed on the significance of this doctrine of Scripture.

Our first question concerns the value and the

NATURE OF CANONICAL WRITINGS. We haVC jUSt Spokcn

of it as a twofold question, asking first " Why," and then
" How far (are there such writings) ? " In our criticism
of the old doctrine, no objection was taken to the fact
that value was assigned to the canonical writings, but
only to the way in which the value thus assigned was
further defined, the absolute inerrancy attributed to
them. Consequently it is upon this latter point that
the emphasis will fall for us. But the fact is also im-
portant, and the answer to the latter question follows
from it, rightly understood.

The point may be put in simple terms as follows :

278

Value and Nature of Canonical Writings

As the heading of the section implies, the fundamental
thought of the Apologetic here advocated is, that the
historical revelation of God in Christ is the basis and
norm of Christian Faith, though certainly the history-
has this significance only for faith (cf. e.g. pp. 181 ff.).
But in that case the conclusion is inevitable : for all
others than those contemporary with that historical
revelation which pi oduces faith, there must be historical
primary sources of information regarding it, — that is,
testimonies such as are themselves parts of the histori-
cal succession of events to which they relate ; for it is
only from historical primary sources that historical facts
can be reliably known, even such as have this high
significance only for faith (cf. e.g. pp. 216 ff.), and can
be fully understood only in this significance which they
have for faith. Should this conclusion be rejected, the
premiss must also be rejected, that our Christian faith
is dependent upon the revelation in Christ. The same
conclusion may be expressed in other words, as a judg-
ment of the Christian faith in Providence, as follows :
should God will to reveal Himself in history, He must
also will that there should be reliable information of
this historical revelation, primary sources of revelation
in the historical sense, in order that the generations, who
are separated in point of time from that historical
event, may have their own indispensable share in the
revelation.

But what will be the nature of such primary sources ?
Exactly as follows from the character of the revelation.
This is the point where our way parts from that of the
old divines, in common with whom we have maintained
the necessity of canonical writings for the sake of the
necessity of revelation. One cannot be too careful to
indicate as clearly as possible this point of departure,
alongside of the agreement in principle. Otherwise we

279

The Science of the Christian Faith

are at a disadvantage compared with the old doctrine.
For it seems to offer more, as long as the after-effect of
its idea of revelation as identical with Scripture, prevails
unnoticed. This is why it is so important to define
more precisely the nature of the primary source of
information regarding revelation, in accordance with the
better understanding of the nature of revelation. It
is obvious that Holy Scripture can be a ground and norm,
only in so far as it is concerned with saving faith. It is
more important that even in reference to the religious
content, it can hold that position, precisely as Revelation
itself holds it, and in no other way. As surely as Re-
velation does not compel one to have faith, but produces
it only in those who are receptive of its content, the same
is true of the primary source of information regarding
Revelation. But as surely as real Revelation alone,
the reality of God as shown in action, awakens con-
fident, saving faith in those who are receptive, and can-
not be replaced by anything else, the same is true
derivatively of Holy Scripture. Consequently, what
was set forth regarding the relation between the con-
tent of Revelation as possessing value, and the reality
accruing to it, when we were dealing with the concept
of Revelation as productive of faith, has to be applied
here to the relation between the religious content of
Scripture, and its historical credibility. It is clear there-
fore in advance, how far the inerrancy of Scripture, as
maintained by the old divines, is from corresponding to
the evangelical concept of the revelation of God in
history which produces faith ; and how important never-
theless— indeed, just for that reason — is the proof of
its historical trustworthiness, rightly understood. Im-
mediately, when dealing with our second question,
whether there actually are such sacred writings, we
shall have to make use of and discuss in detail all

280

Value and Nature of Canonical Writings

the following : that a certain measure of purely historical
probability is indispensable, and its place cannot be
taken by any amount of religious value ; but that it is
only in the combined operation of both factors that there
arises a Christian faith certain of itself, precisely as we
had to decide in the doctrine of revelation. But it is
not a matter of dogmatic consideration and requirement,
how the Sacred Writings in either point of view must
be circumstanced in detail. On the contrary it follows
from the general position, clear in itself, that the
Christian faith in Providence leaves this to the Divine
government of the world ; in other words, infers from the
actual nature of these writings, what measure of power
to work faith in their separate details, they are meant
to have according to the will of God (cf. pp. 163 ff., 172
ff., 199 ff., 216 ff., 227 fif.).

Should it be objected to these statements of the
significance and nature of religiously authoritative
writings, that they could never represent the revelation
of which they testify, never excite faith as it does itself,
because the immediate activity of the Spirit is want-
ing, while this was fully acknowledged by the old
divines by means of their view of the presence of the
Holy Spirit in Scripture, that would be to overlook that
the thought of the immediate divine activity of Spirit
upon spirit, cannot be settled at this point (any more
than formerly, when we dealt with the doctrine of revela-
tion), nor is it meant to be excluded. Only, in any case
and upon any standpoint, it is not, in our present con-
nexion, the decisive thing ; for in dealing seriously with
historical revelation, we are certainly not concerned with
the mystery of immediate divine activity, but with that
which is historically knowable regarding it, and intelli-
gible to us, as was before determined.

The decisive basal principle in the present connexion

281

The Science of the Christian Faith

may also be expressed thus : Holy Scripture is the rule
of knowledge, alike in regard to the truth of the Christian
salvation and the means of grace (v. infra) ; and for the
former, because it is the rule for the latter (Kirn). But
in the Doctrine of Scripture, this must be determined in
the precise manner which was shown in the foregoing ;
otherwise it appears again and again that what cannot
be gained for certain from the one point of view, has to
be gained from the other ; and this would be incorrect.
On the contrary, from the evangelical concept, strictly
defined, of the revelation of salvation for faith, there
follows the significance of Holy Scripture as we have
stated it.

Are there then such canonical writings ? Such
faith-producing authoritative testimonies to revelation ?
We sought to make their value plain, presupposing that
the Church has such a possession. She affirms that she
has. But with what right? Do the writings regarded
as canonical satisfy the tests, which we have established
in the foregoing ? The question is unavoidable and in-
sistent. From the fourth century (Athanasius, Augus-
tine) to the middle of the eighteenth (Semler), apart
from the opposition of the heretics, and the temporary
reappearance in the early years of the Lutheran Church,
of doubts as to matters of detail which had existed in
the Ancient Church, the "Canon" settled by the Old
Catholic Church, — that is the collection of primitive
Christian writings supposed to form the Canon, the
standard for faith and life, — held the field without opposi-
tion. In comparison with this large measure of agree-
ment in the main point, little importance attaches to
differences between the Churches of the Reformation ;
for example, as regards the lower or higher value as-
signed to the so-called Apocrypha, or the enumeration

282

Are there Canonical Writings ?

or non-enumeration of the individual books (the former
in each case refers to the Reformed Churches). But
historical criticism has called in question the legitimacy
of this whole tradition : both the demarcation of the
compass of these canonical writings and their character
as canonical, that is their special significance as based
upon their distinctive nature.

The first objection concerns the question : A7^e there
grounds for distinguishing the writings traditionally held
to he canonical, as such, from others? There is urged on
the other side the fact that the canon was established
very gradually, and was completed only after many ups
and downs, and that in a twofold point of view. Writ-
ings finally included were not generally acknowledged
till late, e.g. the Epistle to the Hebrews in the Western,
and the Revelation of John in the Eastern, Church, and
a group of the so-called Catholic Epistles, 2 and 3
John, 2 Peter, Jude and James — just those to which,
for the most part, Luther's free judgments in his pre-
faces apply. On the other hand many writings, which
received recognition for a long time, were yet finally
excluded, such as Barnabas and the Shepherd of Her-
mas, which in part still keep their position in the oldest
manuscripts. But altogether one misses — and this is
the ground of the facts just mentioned — a plainly re-
cognizable standard for the inclusion or rejection, in
view of the fact that the standard which prevailed at
the ultimate fixing, namely Apostolic origin, in very
many cases appears to us unfounded. The necessary
result of this attack upon the demarcation of the
compass of the authoritative writings of primitive
Christianity, is the obliteration of the boundary lines
between them and the non-canonical. The latter are
conjoined with the former in a history of primitive
Christian literature ; for example, the first Epistle

283

The Science of the Christian Faith

of Clement and that of Barnabas with the Epistle
to the Hebrews, James with the Shepherd of Her-
mas, and the fourth Gospel with the Gnostic move-
ment. In this obliteration of the boundaries, the Church
of Rome has less difficulty in coming to terms with
historical criticism, naturally from other motives as
well, but essentially in order to establish the authority
of tradition alongside of Scripture.

A still greater danger in the way of the acknow-
ledgment of writings as canonical, is the other attack
which deprives those traditionally so regarded of this
property, — the attack upon their composition by the
authors whose names they bear (their authenticity),
their unaltered transmission by tradition (their integrity),
and above all their trustworthiness (credibility), — by
reason of the wide scope given to the idea of writing in
support of a particular tendency.

Many attempt to neutralize both types of objection,
that the extent of the canonical writings is arbitrarily
determined, and that the writings thus arbitrarily se-
lected have no claim to such distinction, simply by re-
ferring to the excellence and the lasting efficacy of the
content of these writings. In other words, they see in
their power to produce faith (without any further ex-
planation of the expression), the sufficient proof of the
right of the Church to distinguish them in preference
to the others as authoritative. It is possible to be in
complete agreement with this thought in and for itself,
especially when uttered with religious warmth, and ad-
vocated, in dependence upon a well-known remark of
Luther's, in the form that what is occupied with Christ
proves itself canonical, and that in the measure in which
it is occupied with Christ ; and yet it must be rejected
as inadequate for the purpose in hand. For this pur-
pose, it proves at once too little and too much, but not

284

Are there Canonical Writings ?

what has to be proved. Too little ; for as revelation
works faith through its content, and through it only
in those susceptible thereto, who appreciate and ac-
knowledge its value, so also does Scripture, as the
primary source of information regarding such revela-
tion. But as revelation does this, not only through the
value of its content, but through the fact that this
value is realizable in experience, by the active presence
of God, so also does Scripture. Consequently, his-
torical credibility, or irrefutability, in the sense more
precisely defined when we dealt with revelation, is an
indispensable factor in the efficacy of Scripture ; and its
place cannot possibly be taken by any intensification of
the other factor, the great value of the content, nor
by any asseveration that this valuable experience has to
be referred to God's direct, mystical working in men's
hearts. The suspicion of being only a beautiful illusion
would be fatal, not only to revelation, but to the primary
source of information regarding it, if the question of its
historical credibility could no longer be openly put and
answered in the affirmative, but had to be silenced by a
reference, in itself perfectly legitimate, to its inherent
value ; even this value would no longer be the same, when
divorced from reality. But the thought of " being occu-
pied with Christ," also proves too much. Measured by
such a standard, without doubt individual portions of the
later literature, and these certainly not simply the earliest,
would have to be placed alongside of, and indeed pre-
ferred to, the canonical, that is to say to individual por-
tions of it. Clear evidence of this is furnished by the
use, in wide circles of the Christian Church, of many
books of hymns and prayers. Still who would base his
faith on these, or make them the supreme standard of
it? They themselves require a sure standard, and an
immovable basis. But if this basis and norm are-
ass

The Science of the Christian Faith

found in the historical revelation, and if we who come
after have part in it only through the testimonies re-
garding it, these can prove themselves authoritative,
canonical, only in the same way as the revelation itself.

A peculiar application of the thought, that the effi-
cacy of the writings distinguished by the Church as
canonical is a sufficient proof for the honour assigned
them, is the following : these writings prove themselves
canonical, because in the circumstances of the primitive
Church, they portray all the circumstances that can
conceivably affect the Church in later times, and furnish
it with the light necessary for the whole course of its
existence in time (J. Chr. K. Hofmann). The idea is
thus, so to speak, objectified ; instead of individual
experience, we have the experience of the Church con-
tinually verifying itself in history. This idea is not
only grandly comprehensive, but for faith indubitable,
though it is insufficient as a proof of the canonicity of
the writings traditionally regarded as canonical. At
all events, it would require qualification, as for example
all the circumstances conceivable are certainly not por-
trayed within the compass of the primitive church, seeing
that very many of those which have actually arisen in
history were not then in existence. But the main point
is that the position meant as a proof falls into an ob-
jectionable circle. For obviously it can be shown only
at the close of the Church's earthly course, whether
these writings have always done her the service men-
tioned : meanwhile the statement remains a hope of faith.

The pertinent answer to the question whether we
really have canonical writings, and whether they are
those selected by the Church, is for us a simple conse-
quence from what has been already adduced regarding
the nature of revelation, and the nature of the primitive
sources of information concerning revelation, which ex-

236

Are there Canonical Writings ?

actly corresponds thereto. We have to ask whether in
our so-called canonical writings, we have writings which
possess the two characteristics which we have repeatedly
mentioned, and which, inseparably united, constitute
the essence of primary sources of information regarding
revelation, because they constitute that of revelation,
and are capable of exciting saving faith.

The one point is to be confirmed by purely historical
investigation, and upon no seductive pretext must a
judgment founded upon faith intrude here. Only that
historical investigation must not forget its own proper
nature, nor the limits which we discovered, when con-
sidering the question of the historical reality of revelation
(pp. 216 ff.). In harmony with what was there adduced,
the following is the important matter. The writings com-
bined in our New Testament go back for the most part
to the infancy of the Church, before the appearance of
the great heresies and the origin of the Old Catholic
Church, which was conditioned thereby. Among them
are sources of the first rank, understanding the word in
the historical sense, or at least such recognizably lie at
the basis of these writings. The latter statement ap-
plies to the Logia in the Gospels, and the former to the
admittedly genuine Pauline Epistles. The uncertainties
of many kinds in matters of detail, however, and the
changing but growing insight into the facts of the case,
correspond exactly to the nature of history as well as of
faith, provided that the two entities understand their
own natures accurately (cf. pp. 216 fF.). But the purely
historical investigation of Holy Scripture permits of these
general positions being construed yet more precisely.
Not only those primary sources of the first class, but
even writings probably more recent, perhaps contempo-
rary with many rejected by the Church (e.g. Hebrews
compared with 1 Clement and Barnabas), have in com-

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mon, though again in very different degrees (as is always
the case when dealing with matters of actual history) a
peculiar characteristic which other Ancient Christian
literature is without, or does not exhibit so markedly ;
what has been called their particular relation of depend-
ence on the Old Testament. That is, they understand
the religion of Israel, especially its prophetic stage, as
actually preparatory, but also as merely preparatory,
revelation. Now on account of the early Judaizing
and Hellenizing of the Gospel, this individual peculi-
arity cannot be understood except as a testimony to
the original understanding of the revelation in Jesus,
consequently as His act, His understanding of the Old
Testament, derived from Himself. Thus the tact of
the Ancient Church in the settling of the canon is
justified on the lines of purely historical investiga-
tion ; and once more the many vacillations, transitional
positions, and exceptions, confirm the general impres-
sion. It will grow in the measure in which the influence
of the most important Old Testament writings, e.g. Deu-
tero-Isaiah and the Psalter, upon the most important
writings of the New Testament, is systematically in-
vestigated. And in connexion with such investigations,
the apposite dictum would certainly come to its own : An
attempt to preach as often upon the Apostolic Fathers
as upon the New Testament pericopes, would make us
alive to the special character of the latter (W. F. Gess).
So much concerning the point that the one character-
istic of canonical writings, historical credibility, may be
proved of those regarded as such by the Church, in the
measure and within the limits of which the circum-
stances admit. Nor would it be difficult now to discuss
how far they are possessed also of the second fundamental
characteristic. Essentially these writings, by the value
of their contents, approve themselves as the most effi-

Use of Scripture in Dogmatics

cacious religiously, as the writings most " occupied with
Christ," from which, in the personal hfe as well as in
the history of the Church, all the deepest revivals have
proceeded.

We come lastly to our third question : How have we
TO EMPLOY THESE Sacred WRITINGS in Dogmatics ? Old
Protestant Dogmatics found the answer to this question
also in its identification of Scripture and Revelation,
and its view of the inerrancy of both. Among things
dictated by the Holy Spirit, there cannot be in principle
any gradations of validity. There can only be varying
degrees of clearness, produced and intended by the Holy
Spirit Himself. Each separate doctrine thus has its
own " classical passages " ; each has its " seat " in Scrip-
ture ; a start is to be made from this, and the other
statements are to be understood according to it. But
this use of Scripture, which was meant to establish its
position as the only standard, led to precisely the opposite
result. For since the individual passages of revelation
were treated in isolation, and as in principle of equal
value, so that the only possible way of understanding a
complex entity in its essential unity — that namely of
harmonizing the many statements with the help of
straightforward verbal interpretation — was closed, a
start was made from the classical passages, on the plea
that they were most distinct ; but that meant in reality
from the passages which seemed to contain most clearly
the opinion prevalent in the Church. Thus quite different
principles were admitted into the Dogmatics constructed
in intention solely upon the basis, and according to the
standard, of Holy Scripture (cf . pp. 102 ff. ). For us on the
other hand, after all that has been said regarding the
value and nature, as well as the actual existence, of
canonical writings, it is obvious that their content pos-

VOL. I. 289 19

The Science of the Christian Faith

sesses many varying degrees of value ; and consequently
that it can be made use of in Dogmatics, only when that
is accurately taken into account. Here again it is only
this that corresponds both with the actual facts of
Scripture, and a genuinely Christian concept of revela-
tion. If, in the interests of faith, there cannot be any
revelation which compels assent upon grounds of logical
necessity, neither can there be any testimony to it so
homogeneous in itself and so uniformly authoritative,
that it would be superfluous for the believing community
to test what is authoritative in the first degree, what in
the second, and what in the third, what belongs to the
inmost essence, and what does not. And what thus
follows from the nature of the historical revelation as
designed for personal saving faith, follows likewise from
its historical character as such ; because history without
variety, gradation of light and shade, nuance, is not real
history. Thus in dealing with Christ as the self-reve-
lation of God, we have already reached the conclusion
that this significance does not belong to the whole of
His historical manifestation, in all its parts alike (cf.
pp. 210 ff.). This has now to be exhibited in greater de-
tail, with reference to the separate layers of the New
Testament tradition.

First of all, we have to deal with differences common
to them all, which may be mentioned here in advance,
to prevent the necessity of continual repetition. Firstly,
such a distinction holds among the affirmations of the
primary sources of revelation (by which we are always
to understand both the facts recorded and the judgments
relating to them), according to whether their content is
religious, or pertains to the wider circle of human
relations in general. Secondly, in matters religious
we have to distinguish between what is original,
strictly individual, and what is popular, belonging to the

290

Use of Scripture in Dogmatics

age. Thirdly, in the decisive religious testimonies them-
selves, the distinction forces itself upon our attention, as
to how far they are direct evidence, or merely serve in
some way to explain the direct evidence. Fourthly, here
again there are dififerences of expression, which may
present itself as a full correspondence between form and
content, or in such wise that there is disparity between
the idea and its dress. Finally, there are obviously
elements in common, elements of identity, and individual
peculiar elements, and that not only in the different
gi'oups, but also in the different writings. It is not
difficult to find instances of all these ; but first of all it
was advisable to mention the unassailable fundamental
positions as such, because controversy readily arises at
once regarding the particular instance. Besides, they
acquire full significance only in their application to the
questions which are properly decisive : how are the
writings which belong to the New Testament tradition
related to one another? How is the New Testament
related to the Old ?

What, then, is the relation between Jesus Himself
and His Church, His life and work in the light of His
own testimony, and the testimonies borne to Him by the
faith of His Church ? Is it possible to distinguish
the two at all, and yet to understand them in their
inner unity ? Are they not rather to be entirely separated
or entirely identified? Taking the latter first, it is
affirmed in opposite senses — to use the common party
cries for the sake of clearness, in the positive orthodox
and in the negative critical sense. On the orthodox side
a^ain in two forms : either in the sense of the Old Pro-
testant doctrine of Scripture, according to which every
apostolic word is alike infallible with every word of the
Lord, a thesis which, as we saw, never was and never
could have been seriously applied in the use of Scrip-

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The Science of the Christian Faith

tui'e for Dogmatics. Or with much greater refinement
of thought, it finds expression in the watchword of the
"whole Biblical Christ". It is only through the com-
munity of believers, it is said, that we know of Jesus,
and this is just as it should be : the person whom faith
understands is the really historical Christ. We have
already shown in another place (pp. 209 ff.), how much
truth there is in this position, upon grounds not only of
faith but also of history, and in what sense we admit it ;
but at the same time with what reservation. In our
present connexion this necessary reservation is perhaps
more intelligible to many, because the position granted
absolutely, can be, and quite frequently is, applied in the
opposite interest. That is to say, in order to prove that
by way of history we know nothing of Jesus, because
we have only the uncontrollable evidence of what His
Church believed regarding Him : that would be nothing
less than the death of faith, and on the other hand an
attitude by no means to be verified on historical grounds
(pp. 216 ff.). We thus naturally come to those others,
who on the other hand oppose the testimony of Jesus
and that of His Church to Him to one another. He
Himself, they think, aims only at being the first be-
lieving member of His Church, in no sense the object
of its faith ; whether this be held in the sense of Lessing's
Christianity of Christ, or in connexion with the theory
of evolution in its most modern form.

Rising superior to both extremes, the identification
of the two entities, Jesus and the Church, and the setting
of the one against the other, we must take our stand,
making good their diversity in unity and their unity in
diversity. This is in keeping both with the faith which
understands itself and with unprejudiced historical in-
vestigation. We must start from the unity ; for what
use would faith have for a revelation misapprehended

292

Testimony of Jesus and of the Church

as regards essentials ? Besides, on grounds purely his-
torical would not adequate cause be wanting for the
wondrous testimony of the Church ? But this unity
leaves room for diversities. What sort of revelation
would it be in which the bearer was not superior to the
recipients, and these too had not matter of their own,
as they appropriated the revelation by the free use of
their personal faculties ? And what sort of history, in
which there was nothing characteristic and new, spring-
ing from the creative source ? Without anticipating de-
tails, this unity between the two entities, which endures
or rather demands inner diversity, may be expressed in
a general statement. Inasmuch as for Christian faith
Jesus is the definitive self-revelation of God, and the
earliest Church, educated and guided by Him, is the in-
telligent recipient of this revelation, the testimony of both
is of equal value, if and in so far as that of the Church
does not lag behind that of Jesus ; or if it goes beyond
the latter, but can yet be regarded as an understanding of
Jesus' testimony intended by Himself. Whether a case
of lagging appears in Paul's judgment regarding marriage,
or the other relation can be asserted of the fundamental
characteristics of the apostolic Christology, are obvious
particular examples which, like all particulars, can be
decided only by special investigation. The problem as a
whole is notoriously a question of the hour, under the
title " Jesus and Paul," and is discussed from all the
points of view mentioned. Here it is more needful to
point out further, that it will not do to describe the
Gospel of Jesus as the highest standard for appeal, if
one understands by it essentially the verbal testimony
of Jesus merely, whereas we saw that the concept of
God's self-revelation is realized in His personal life as a
whole.

In every special investigation, both with regard to

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The Science of the Christian Faith

the testimony of Jesus and that of the earliest Church,
and their relation to one another, the general principles
above set forth next come into consideration. They
have taken longest to gain a footing in their application
to Jesus' own testimony, without however being seriously
opposed yet as principles : the controversy turns upon the
particular application. That what is simply transferred
from the general culture of the time, in reference to
nature and history, is not normative, will be universally
admitted. But it is difficult to define the boundary line
between such matters and the province of religion, for
example in reference to demonic possession, or to the
particular statements regarding the Parousia. In general
at this point we can only reach the position : Jesus'
testimony is normative, in the measure in which it is con-
nected with His self-consciousness and His consciousness
of His vocation, as central. A statement like Mark xiii.
3 If. shows at once limitation and freedom. In comparing
the testimonies borne by the faith of the earliest Church
with each other, special importance attaches, among the
principles already set forth, to that of the distinction be-
tween testimony and proof. A proof such as that in
Galatians iv. will not be regarded by any evangelical
theologian as normative : as regards expositions of de-
tails in Christology, there is lasting dispute. That under
certain circumstances even what is individual can have
lasting significance, is clear by reference to the Pauline
doctrine of Justification ; and how often elsewhere in
history, has the Church learned to understand anew what
has long been relegated to the background ?

We come now to the relation of the Old and the Netv
Testaments. A word on this subject is the more indis-
pensable, because in the interests of brevity attention
has hitherto centred almost solely on the New. Here
again the best introduction to the proper attitude which

294

Old and New Testaments in Dogmatics

results from the Christian idea of revelation, is to recall
the two extreme views. The extremes are the worth-
lessness in principle of the Old Testament for Christians,
on the one side, and its being regarded as of equal value
with the New, on the other. The former is found, for
example, in Marcion, and " the Marcion of the Newer
Theology," Schleiermacher ; in the latter, not from his
indisputable position that the Old Testament writings do
not share the normative dignity of the New, but on ac-
count of his underlying view of the history of religion,
according to which Christianity, as regards its historical
existence and its aims, occupies a like relation to Juda-
ism and Heathenism. The over-estimation of the Old
Testament, the regarding of it as of equal value with the
New, may take the form either of a Christianizing of
the Old Testament or a Judaizing of the New : the
latter applies more to the Church of Rome, the former
to Protestant orthodoxy and to religious lay circles.
The following principles are a necessary consequence of
our fundamental position. As certainly as we, being
Christians, see in Christ the perfect revelation of God,
for Christian Dogmatics only the New Testament primary
sources of this revelation are directly authoritative. No
Christian doctrine therefore can be derived from the Old
Testament alone, such as for example the restoration of
Israel as a nation from the Prophets ; and every state-
ment of the Old Testament made use of in Dogmatics
at all, must be understood in a Christian sense, with the
Christian faith as central, for example in the doctrine
of God and Sin. But just as certainly as the revelation
in Christ is the perfection of the Old Testament revela-
tion, the former cannot be correctly understood without
the latter ; every Christian doctrine must be traced back
to its Old Testament roots, and made intelligible from
them — think of such important New Testament ideas

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The Science of the Christian Faith

as "Son of God," "Kingdom of God," "Justification".
This attitude, consistent in both points of view, corre-
sponds to that of Jesus Himself. He is come not to
destroy but to fulfil : the God of the fathers is His Father,
but as Father to the Son Who alone knows the Father.
The Old Testament is His Home, but it is also the Son's
Home : His binding relation to it is closer than any
other finds for himself ; but for that very reason it is also
a relation of greater freedom. Because the Old Testa-
ment was to Him the Word of God, and as such His
Father's Word, it also experienced and endured His
spiritual criticism ; and as this Sacred Scripture was
appropriated by Him, so is it also by us. In regard to
matters of detail, serious questions naturally arise here
too. For example even those who have not felt them-
selves bound to accept the Davidic authorship of Psalm
ex., on account of its use in Matthew xxii., are not
always equally prepared to forego a judgment regard-
ing the history of the Patriarchs, by reference to
Matthew xxii. 32. But the fundamental idea is suflici-
ently firm and clear to surmount such questions of detail ;
and even in the practical sphere, in association with
religious Guilds, as well as in the manifold difficulties
of catechetical instruction, it is beginning to show itself
fruitful. In Christian Ethics, it has already been
followed out more generally than in Dogmatics ; in the
former too, the application of it in some measure can be
illustrated more easily by particular examples (cf.
"Ethics," pp. 117 f.).

It is almost simply for the sake of completeness, that
we mention that our whole doctrine of Holy Scripture
has so far concerned itself with only one of the problems
which our old Divines used to discuss under that head,
namely the authority of Holy Scripture. Indeed on
account of the altered conception of the authority, so

296

Question of Origin of Scripture

far as we are concerned, the other problem, that of the
ORIGIN, the inspiration, the latter term being understood
in the strict sense, has now retired completely into the
background : it is not a question of faith, it is merely
a subject for Christian study. As such it is not illumined
by indefinite forms of expression, as for example by
speaking here of the human and divine origin (as before
of the human and divine character), which is manifestly
not a solution, but only a naming, of the problem, and
little appropriate even for that purpose. It is more
profitable, in dependence on Schleiermacher's idea, to
speak of the inspiration, not of the writings, but of the
authors. The peculiarity of their writings is to be under-
stood, we are told, in a material point of view, as the
original impression made by the image and spirit of
Christ, and in a formal, by referring to the distinction
between what is given to them, and the products of
the authors' own reflection or study. In the second
place, we may think of them as filled in a specially
intense degree with the Spirit of God and Christ,
in the most important moments of their activity at
their vocation in general, but especially in those of
their writing, which, not for their own consciousness it
is true, but in God's intention, had the significance which
we have just explained for the Church in all ages. Only
we must never forget the limits to which we have fre-
quently referred, as pertaining to the essence of our
religion ; that is, in our present connexion si^ecifically, we
must not think of their psychic condition as a passive
one. This activity too was service, and service is the
highest form of personal activity, the more so, and not
the less, according as '' it is God who there works ".
Indubitable examples of how work and gift coincide just
in their highest manifestations, are furnished by the
testimonies of creative geniuses in other provinces as to

297

The Science of the Christian Faith

themselves. In some such way as this perhaps, Christian
reflection may seek to give appropriate expression to the
fact, that we naturally speak of those words of Holy
Scripture as inspired, which are most fruitful in their
effects ; and where others speak of sub- or supercon-
sciousness, it has good right to speak of the Spirit of
God. But when in this connexion striking expressions,
as, say, Kierkegaard's declaration that, when he was
moving on the loftiest heights of his literary activity, h©
"has thought that he was copying out of a book," are
made use of without examination as evidence for the
purposes of Dogmatics, neither is the doctrine of the
old divines justified by such means, nor is the actual
situation cleared up for us.

We must not, however, bring our doctrine of Scrip-
ture to a close with such reflections, belonging to the
outside limit of what faith is interested in, but with a
simple recapitulation, once more, of the fundamental
IDEA regarding its authority. The aim is to overcome
the uncertainty, which cannot be evaded either by hold-
ing fast the old doctrine or by giving it up, unless some-
thing definite takes its place. It cannot be evaded by
holding fast the doctrine. For as we saw, in the original
sense of the old divines this has become impossible,
both by reason of the actual character of Scripture, and
as a result of the consistent application of the idea of
Revelation and faith held by the Keformers. Scripture
is not a textbook of Dogmatics nor a " Catechism of
doctrine," as the orthodox renovators of the old theory
will have it. But no more is it an Introduction to the
History of Revelation, as with the Erlangen theology, at
least on one of its sides ; nor is it simply the " Foremost
Book of Devotion," (as with the Religious Guilds, often
associated lately with the renovation of orthodoxy just

298

Authority of Scripture

alluded to). All this neither corresponds to its actual
nature nor satisfies the actual needs of faith. Conse-
quently, it is not surprising if such views of Scripture,
which readily emphasize their opposition to all exalta-
tion of self above Scripture, their subjection to the
word, imperceptibly either fall into an arbitrarily sub-
jective use of it, or are compelled to set the Confession
of the Church above it, as a standard for it. On the
other side, the frank surrender of the authority of Scrip-
ture, the regarding of it as the important but not nor-
mative memorial of the initial stage, with the " Liberal
Theology," without doubt undermines the certainty and
definiteness of faith. It unwittingly gives religion a
fanatical or mystical, but in either case a subjective, char-
acter. Besides, whether for its own part it sees in this
an advance, or a loss that cannot be avoided, the result
is something different from the Christianity which has
proved itself a real power in history ; while uncertainty
is introduced into the practical sphere, especially in re-
gard to the problem of the relation of Chi^istianity to cul-
ture. Consequently it is not strange that occasionally,
such subjectivity is found to adopt an attitude of out
and out Conservativism in reference to the ecclesiastical
order. Yet this view of Scripture, which endangers the
security of faith, according to which Scripture is simply
a memorial of the initial stage of our religion, cannot
prove that it is demanded by historical reality ; on the
contrary it exhibits, sometimes with more sometimes
with less clearness, an admixture of historical and dog-
matic principles.

In opposition to both dangers, with our carefully
defined idea of revelation as our starting-point, our aim
is to understand Holy Scripture as the authoritative
original testimony of faith to revelation — a testimony
which necessarily goes therewith. If it be seriously

299

The Science of the Christian Faith

held that we as Christians are always dependent upon
the historical revelation, that our faith in God, in its
distinctively Christian form, has its basis and standard
in Jesus Christ — and it was shown why this must be
seriously held, if definite Christian faith is to be taken
seriously — then there must necessarily be a reliable
testimony to the Christian revelation : the one position
cannot be maintained, while the other is rejected.
But faith does not require some sort of testimony
contrived out of our own thoughts : it requires one
in correspondence with the nature of the revelation
we possess, working faith in it. And it is just such a
testimony, no vague kind, that history affords, and
which it alone can afford. Faith does not wish any-
thing and everything from history, but something simple,
yet definite ; and this definite something history fur-
nishes, or is capable of furnishing. But if it were to be
objected that we know the nature of revelation only
from Scripture, and consequently are moving in a circle,
we have to point to our previous discussions on the
nature of Christianity and on Revelation.

If now the same objections are raised against this
doctrine — derived by us from Holy Scripture — which it
seeks to avoid, if, that is to say, to some it appears
unstable in its subjectivity, while to others it appears
much too dogmatically objective, the latter objection
needs no further refutation here. It is in principle that
which we have assailed from the beginning, the objection
to faith in the perfect revelation of God in Christ, with
which our religion stands or falls. But the other objec-
tion needs further consideration, which serves to clarify
the fundamental idea. It does, as a matter of fact,
present the appearance of subjectivity, in the conscious-
ness of all who maintain the old doctrine, though they do
so at the cost of their consistency. But this appearance

300

Authority of Scripture

may be shown to be mere appearance. From the mani-
fold testimonies of Holy Scripture, which in very different
degrees (p. 277 ff.) are faith-producing testimonies of faith
to revelation, the Christian Church, in the course of its
progress through time, gains under its changing, mani-
fold, experiences and tasks, which however (according
to Christian faith) are all directed by the Providence
of God to one goal, an ever clearer and deeper, as well
as more complete, understanding of the nature of the
revelation bestowed upon it, testified to in Scripture and
efficacious. If we so choose, we may speak of the nature
of our religion^ as it thus progressively comes to our knoiv-
ledge, under the name of its principle, the consistent idea
of it. It is, however, not an idea which is a product of
reflection, a manufactured thing. On the contrary in
the actual history of our religion, the deeper under-
standing of the idea of it has always sprung from the
testimonies which faith has given regarding its actual
origin. It is just this which becomes aneiv the standard
whereby the separate statements of Scripture are measured,
according to the position reached by each age in the under-
standing of the idea. The old Protestant fundamental
principle that Scripture is the Interpreter of Scripture,
is consistently applied in a manner corresponding with
the nature of faith. It would be well worth while to
work out this thought in a general survey of the history
of the Bible, based however upon accurate knowledge
of the particulars. This would have to be done, not
only on the side upon which, with reason, attention is
first fixed, the enormous influence exerted by the Bible
upon the development of the race, but also with the other
aspect in view, the influence which the development of
the race has had upon the understanding of the Bible,
the way in which the history of the understanding of
the Bible presents itself as a great process of simplifi-

301

The Science of the Christian Faith

cation, but at the same time of deepening — an ever-
deepening comprehension of its inmost substance, that
is of the revelation to which it furnishes the testimony
of faith.

Such is the objectivity valuable to and indispensable
for faith in relation to Scripture ; such is the objectivity
possible without prejudice to truthfulness. What sub-
jectivity still remains need not be glossed over, or
apologized for : it is the subjectivism of life — of life at
its highest, the life of faith, or of personal communion
with the personal God.

To the passing glance, not to mention the hostile or
unintelligent one of opponents, what first obtrudes itself
in such evangelical attitude to Holy Scripture is certainly
always the singular, the accidental and the arbitrary ; a
deeper look into the history always proves this impres-
sion incorrect. The advances denoted by such names
as Augustine, Francis, Luther, Bengel, and Schleier-
macher, however different from each other, have never-
theless all been advances in the understanding of Holy
Scripture, which have led to a deeper conception of the
nature of our faith, and brought the particular into the
light of the new knowledge of fundamentals. How little
in keeping with faith, then, as well as how poor, appears
the demand that God must have given us a Holy
Scripture inerrant in every particular ! In personal
Christianity, in reference to Divine Providence, this must
ranks as unbelief. Nor is it otherwise with the Church.
It is often thought that the two cases can be made out
to be different, by drawing the distinction that our
personal life can endure the riddles of Providence, just
because it has the inerrant Word as the sure basis of its
faith. To be sure it has. But the actual character of
the Holy Scripture furnished by the Providence of God,
determines the nature of this inerrancy, how far it

302

Scripture and Confession

reaches, and how faith becomes assured of it. It is by
temptation, conflict, and resignation, that faith learns to
understand it in this its actual character as the entity
corresponding to itself ; while that type of Scripture
which is demanded and is said to be necessary, could not
for all time, amid all the mutations of history, in the
presence of all the new tasks, furnish faith with what
it requires.

Now that this fundamental position has been clearly
laid down, the doctrine of Scripture may close with a
thought which is calculated to reconcile even the hesi-
tating, without in any way endangering the attitude
hitherto taken. In every single case Dogmatics has to
consider as accurately as possible, whether it is exhaust-
ing the full riches of Scripture at that stage of general
knowledge regarding our faith which is accessible to it.
The more carefully it exercises such self-criticism, the
better adapted will it be for true progress in detail even
in non-creative periods, even in the days " of small
things," and at the same time, though only in the slightest
measure, for paving the way to a new stage in the
knowledge of the faith. By thus exercising itself, in-
structed by history, it will also learn, especially upon the
points which in their nature approach the limits of
mundane thought, to value just those testimonies of
Scripture which are little in favour with the current
frame of mind of the age. This work is imposed upon
us by the principles we maintain regarding Scripture,
as the faith-producing testimony of faith to revelation,
necessarily accompanying it.

Holy Scripture and the Confession of the Church

Our doctrine of Scripture also gives us the answer to
the question, whether the Confession of the Church can be

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The Science of the Christian Faith

the basis and norm of Protestant Dogmatics. The answer
is that in principle it cannot, but it is an answer, which, if
there be no doubt regarding its acceptance, not merely per-
mits us to do justice to the great relative significance of
the ecclesiastical authority, but actually postulates such
significance. It is by no means superfluous, even in the
Evangelical Church, to emphasize the fact that in principle
the answer is in the negative. In the latest of our Con-
fessions, which expressly goes into the Problem, in the
Preamble to the Formula of Concord, with reference to
the Dogmatic rule and norm, we find sentences side by
side which, taken strictly, nullify one another. Clearly
in the forefront stands the Scriptural principle : Scripture
is the sole norm and rule ; and plainly and without am-
biguity, it is immediately applied to the Confession in
question in the words, that it is the unanimous decision
according to Holy Scripture, of the men then alive, re-
garding the controversies which had arisen in the Evan-
gelical Churches. But then it goes on to say that this
decision is to hold good and endure for ever. In truth
there is here a dilemma which there is no escaping.
Either the decision is reached according to Scripture as
the supreme standard, in which case it manifestly holds
good, as long as its harmony with Scripture can be
clearly proved. Or it holds even without this condition ;
in which case it is undeniable that a decision of the
Church is set over Scripture. This dilemma is not
got rid of, even by the distinction so nicely drawn be-
tween the Norma normans (Scripture) and the Norma
normata (the Confession) : for if the harmony of the
Confession with Scripture can be proved, the distinction
is worthless : if it cannot, Scripture is dethroned from
its authoritative position. Obviously the authors of
this dogmatic formula as well as of those sentences of
our latest Confession, acted in the full assurance that

304

Scripture and Confession

such harmony could never be denied ; but nevertheless
the sentences remain contradictory in themselves, and
we know well how harmful they have been in practice.
For no one can stand by all the separate pronouncements
of the Confessions, e.g. the damnation of unbaptized
infants in the second article of the Augsburg Confession.
Again, the want of clearness in principle opens the door
for caprice ; for some deviation or other, every one may
be suspected of disloyalty to the Confession — say, for re-
jecting the unio mystica as defined in the Formula of
Concord. But if, in order to justify this state of matters,^
it be said that there is general agreement as to a certain
measure of agreement between the confessional and the
scriptural, a proof of this assertion may reasonably be
demanded, provided that the recognition of the Scriptural
principle is taken seriously.

Our view of the authority of Scripture not only thus
absolutely negatives every attempt to subordinate
Scripture to any interpretation of it found in his-
tory, but at the same time assigns high value notwith-
standing to the Co7ifession of the Church. It is a matter
of the application of what was said above regard-
ing the progressive understanding of Scripture in the
Church, a position based upon faith in the Revela-
tion of God as authoritative for all times. Now for us
the Reformation of the sixteenth century is the most
important stage, because, according to reasoned convic-
tion it is so far the highest, reached in this understand-
ing of Scripture, viewed in its main scope. The primary
documents of the Church of the Reformation as it came
into being, are consequently the indispensable guide to
the Reformers' view of Scripture, but not that we may
maintain that view as something final and definitive. On
the contrary, upon the basis of it and in connexion with
it, our knowledge of the inexhaustible riches of Scnpture,

VOL. I. 305 20

The Science of the Christian Faith

as the testimony of faith to revelation, is to be deepened,
and these riches are to be turned to account for us and our
present-day needs. It is only when we have constructed
the System of Dogmatics that the meaning of this
principle can be made plain. Still it is worth while to
remind ourselves even at this stage how careful we must
be in the precise determination of it. For example, to
take the bearings of the Reformation mainly from Paul's
conception of the Gospel, is certainly a proceeding which
cannot be abandoned ; but it is as true that we may
come to be fettered by it. The needs and the results
of research at the present day are ministered to, when
we deliberately make use of the Synoptics at the same
time.

It follows naturally, therefore, from what we have
stated what theology, and in especial what Dogmatics, is
of a " churchly " type, and what is not. The application
to the duty of teaching which falls on those who serve the
Church, has to be made in Ethics and Practical The-
ology. But without a clear Dogmatic basis, these
disciplines cannot permanently do justice to the practical
needs.

The strict supremacy of the principle of Revelation,
and of the Scriptural principle by way of derivation
therefrom, excludes from the decisive position in the de-
fining of the basis and norm of Christian faith, not only
the Confession of the Church, but also the other possi-
bilities spoken of in our Apologetics. At the same time,
however, it secures for them too their relative right, more
certainly and distinctly than the seemingly stricter em-
phasizing of Scripture in the old Protestant Dogmatics.
It has been shown how in the latter, reason and religious
experience, though unacknowledged, made themselves
felt all the more, and that in a dangerous way. What
they really mean for Evangelical Dogmatics follows

306

Results for the Method of Dogmatics

naturally from the survey there given. Only what then
came before us under the apologetic point of view, would
now have to be stated in detail under that of the method-
ology of Dogmatics. Leaving this, attention may further
be directed to some of

THE KESULTS FOE THE METHOD OF DOGMATICS

IN DETAIL

The Evangelical Church knows no other system of
Dogmatics than a Scriptural one, as certainly as Christian
religious knowledge is an understanding, conditioned by
faith, of the Revelation to which Holy Scripture is the
necessary accompaniment, as being the faith-producing
testimony of faith thereto (p. 240 ff.). But evangelical
Dogmatics, although in this sense it has in Holy Scripture
its supreme Norm, cannot be merely an ordered presen-
tation of the contents of Scripture : it cannot be identi-
cal with Biblical Theology, as certainly as this is its most
direct preliminary, and the two, as they advance, are
continually acting and reacting upon one another. It
may be said that a series of once highly esteemed Dog-
matic positions have become for ever impossible, through
the progress of New Testament Theology : the peaceful
labours of New Testament Theology secure, slowly but
surely, what is beyond all the mighty powers of the
Church as an organization. But yet Dogmatics is not
the best Biblical Theology of the day. In the first
place, because the latter is always a historical science
in the strict sense, whereas the former aims at setting
forth the religious knowledge which is valid for us, which
we can attain by the understanding of Revelation as a
whole, as such understanding is accessible to us at the
stage we have reached in our historical development —
a point already discussed at the close of our doctrine of

307-

The Science of the Christian Faith

Scripture. Further, because Dogmatics, as systematic
science, strives after the gi'eatest possible definiteness in
its ideas, as well as in the combining of them into an
ordered whole.

Next, reference must be made to the fact that a
place must be found within the Dogmatic system itself
for apologetic details^ namely at all the points, towards
which the opposition of other convictions is directed
with special emphasis, or according to the favourite way
of putting it, the opposition of " Science ". At all events,
to banish them entirely from Dogmatics and confine
them exclusively to Apologetics, is not in accordance with
practical requirements, inasmuch as the opposition of
our adversaries and the need to meet them are most
pressing at those particular points ; nor is it in accordance
with the requirements of science, because otherwise the
attack and the defence are apt to be left in the realm of
the unknown and general. Only it is obvious that in
such sections of the Dogmatic System, no grounds can
be introduced for the certainty of faith other than those
whose legitimacy was proved in the Apologetics. In
other words, the idea of religious knowledge, which
has been justified upon the basis of the nature of faith
and knowledge, must not be surrendered, but on the
contrary must be carried through with ever-increasing
clearness. Otherwise in the end faith itself would be
shaken, instead of strengthened, which as a matter
of fact is often the outcome of misjudged apologetic
efforts.

The old controverted point as to the relation of
Dogmatics and Ethics, the Christian faith and the
Christian life, certainly presents greater difficulty for
the beginnings of the latter than of the former. Per-
haps for that very reason, it will be less difficult to secure
the recognition of some principles, which must be kept

308

Dogmatics and Ethics

in view here at the commencement of the Dogmatic
system. If it be said that in both sciences the whole
subject-matter of Christian doctrine may be dealt with,
but under opposite points of view, namely that of rest
or dependence in Dogmatics and that of motion or per-
sonal activity, freedom, in Ethics, this position may be
harmless, nay fruitful, when handled by a master — think
of Rothe. It can, however, still more easily become a
cloak for obscurity, through the relation of dependence
and freedom, in the sense of our religion, not being clearly
defined either in Dogmatics or in Ethics. It goes into
the matter more deeply to note that, on the one hand (see
Apologetics), Christian faith cannot originate without
personal surrender, moral willing, as we may again remind
ourselves by reference to the often quoted words of John
VII. 17 ; and that on the other hand the Christian faith
in God cannot continue without moral willing, without
self-realization of the most personal kind, but on the con-
trary is the basis of and impulse to the good (see Ethics)
— both circumstances following from the fact that our
religion claims to be the absolutely ethical one. Cer-
tainly we have here carefully to distinguish between
moral willing in general and Christian moral willing :
there is Christian faith only where there is some sort of
moral will (however it may differ in nature and degree
in different cases) ; and there is Christian moral will only
where there is Christian faith. But in any case it follows
from this simple consideration that, as regards the main
point, the correct procedure is to conceive of the Chris-
tian faith and the Christian life as an inseparable whole,
and to adhere to the separation, which indeed was effected
at a comparatively late date (Calixtus, 1634), essentially
only on external grounds. Schleiermacher's two ques-
tions are inseparable : What must be, and what must
come to be, because there is Christian self-consciousness ?

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The Science of the Christian Faith

Or how is the affirmation " God loves me," possible ? and
what is meant by " I love God " on the basis of it ? (J.
Chr. Hofmann). Or to speak with Seeberg — God is for
us, therefore everything ministers to us ; we are God's,
therefore we are the servants of all. Or with Gottschick
— on what actions of God do I know my salvation to be
based ? What task is appointed for my personal activity,
because I am certain of salvation ? Only when the two
are taken together, is it fully explained what Christian-
ity is. Ethics without continual reference to Dogmatics
is not distinctively Christian ethics, and Dogmatics unless
it has ethics continually in view is wanting in clearness^
and poor in reference to significant content. Therefore
if we express the Christian salvation by the term " King-
dom of God," Dogmatics shows how this blessing becomes
an assured personal possession, through trust in the re-
velation of God in Christ ; Ethics, how such trust brings
us the impulse and the power to become fellow-workers
in the realization of it. For just as certainly as it is a
gift, so certainly does this gift become a task by reason
of its nature. But for this very reason, it is only the
two together which constitute the whole of Christianity.
When this is admitted without qualification, it is simply
a question of convenience, whether Dogmatics and Ethics
are to be taken together as constituting one system of
Christian Doctrine, as K. I. Nitzsch and H. H. Wendt
strongly insist. Hitherto, apart from external reasons,
connected especially with academical instruction, it is
chiefly the abundance of the '* Ethical " material that
has prevented this requirement from being fulfilled ; but
its intrinsic justice should not be disputed in principle,
especially if an exhaustive treatment of Apologetics is
put in the forefront of the whole system.

The Division of Dogmatics is of importance for the
separate doctrines, where frequently the very arrange-

310

Division of Dogmatics

ment shows whether the principles already laid down
with reference to the nature of religious knowledge, and
its method, are attended to. But in regard to the ques-
tion of the main division of the subject, there is almost
but one point of material significance. Namely there
must be a conscious abandonment of the ruling thought
of the most influential work in the history of Dogmatics.
Schleiermacher says : " We shall exhaust the subject,
if we consider the facts of the religious self-conscious-
ness, in the first place, as they are already pre-supposed
by the antithesis expressed in the concept of redemption
(sin and grace), and in the second place, as they are de-
termined by this antithesis." This distinction doubtless
widely influenced the presentation of Dogmatics before
Schleiermacher — think for example of the general doc-
trine of God, and the distinctively Christian doctrine of
the Trinity. But in fact it is Schleiermacher himself who
has shown, and that with special clearness, how, in the
different religions, matters which are seemingly most
closely akin are diff'erently defined according to their
fundamental idea, how no single expression like the unity
of God, providence, faith, redemption, blessedness, has
the same significance in two diff"erent religions. Why
then is the Dogmatic Theologian to rush into a tempta-
tion to which he must necessarily succumb ? Under the
name of general religious experiences (or doctrinal posi-
tions) presupposed in Christianity, he must either make
entirely colourless indefinite statements, or on the other
hand, as will always be the case in some respects at the
same time, statements which, in spite of their Christian
indefiniteness, are already too definite in another direc-
tion, being less than Christian, and so involuntarily
rendering complete Christian definiteness difficult, nay
impossible (take here for example Schleiermacher's
" general " statements regarding God in relation to the

311

The Science of the Christian Faith

natural order). But then should we not go still farther,
and not begin with the Doctrine of God and the world
at all, but with the Doctrine of Sin and Grace, with the
very core of all experience of Christian faith ? Has not
the censure been pronounced with good reason, that most
frequently the idea of faith is discussed only at a very
late stage ? That very view is carefully considered in
the exposition by Schleiermacher which has been alluded
to ; and the well known arrangement of the first brief
outlines by Melanchthon and by Calvin appears to make
its importance complete. Among those of recent date,
Lobstein has accordingly proposed a strictly Christocen-
tric structure for Dogmatics. But as the attempt is made
to carry out this proposal, it is scarcely possible to get
over the objection, that far too much of the Doctrine of
God and man must be presupposed. Hence the aim, so
far as it is a legitimate one, is without doubt more ade-
quately realized, if, as was done in the foregoing, saving
faith is set forth, even in Apologetics, in its inseparable
connexion with Christ. And in the sphere of practice,
the desired end is frequently reached by gaining an ac-
quaintance with Christian Ethics in the first instance,
and then turning from this to Dogmatics.

Next, as to details, there is less danger in merely
ranging the chief doctrines alongside of each other
(J. Kaftan), than in making too much of an artificial
connexion of them. But if some sort of articulation is
unavoidable after all in a systematic science, it is
advisable in the first instance, for the sake of historical
continuity (Origen, Calvin), i to follow the three Divisions
of the ancient Creed. The more these three parts are in-
tegrally related to each other, the love of God being shown
to be completely that revealed in Christ, Christ completely
the revelation of this love, and the Holy Spirit the Spirit
of this same God and this same Jesus Christ, as He works

312

Division of Dogmatics

in the Church and in the individual, the more will the divi-
sion into three parts approve itself as natural, while at the
same time room will be left for the utmost variety in the
understanding of details. Our faith is always occupied
with one single inexhaustible subject — God's love to us :
this means, however, God who reveals Himself in Christ
as love to us, Christ in whom God reveals Himself as
love to us, the Holy Spirit in whom this revelation of
the love of God to us through Christ is actualized in us.
Consequently in all the parts rightly understood the same
content is expressed, but under different points of view ;
for example even the eschatology, with which the third
part concludes, is necessarily prefigured in the first.
Under what unifying point of view these three parts are
next brought into relation, depends upon what idea has
the preference in the defining of the nature of our re-
ligion— sonship to God, justification, or the Kingdom of
God (cf. p. 84 f.). But this matter cannot be followed
out here, whereas it presents itself naturally at a later
stage. Only there is found another distinction, which
is not without material significance, in the fact that, in
Dogmatics, many emphasize the point of view of the
*' historical process of redemption " — and take credit to
themselves for so doing — speaking perhaps (with Frank)
of its principle, accomplishment, and goal ; and in dealing
with its accomplishment, of generation, degeneration, and
regeneration. Manifestly this is not in the interest of
Dogmatics as the scientific presentation of the Christian
faith. This faith, though it rests entirely upon historical
revelation, is yet not itself a history ; otherwise, as re-
gards content, its interests are apt to be encroached upon,
if it is made to assume the form of the " Divine Human
Drama," even if we manage to steer clear of the dangers
attending the popularization of this method, as that for
example almost as much is heard of Adam as of Christ.

313

THE CHKISTIAN FAITH AS A COHERENT
SYSTEM

315

FAITH IN GOD THE FATHER

The supreme principle as regards method which we
arrived at in our Apologetics, must regulate every de-
tailed exposition of Dogmatics, viz. — The revelation of
God in Christ is the ground and norm of all religious
knowledge. This was emphasized by Melanchthon in
his preface to the first system of Evangelical Dogmatics.
Not only is its truth clear, but it is specially necessary
that we should be fully alive to the principle, at the
commencement of our doctrine of God. Luther is never
weary of enforcing Matthew xi. 27 ff., John xiv. 6, and
XVII. 3. Because the whole Dogmatic system is in the
last resort a doctrine of God, every error here inevitably
avenges itself in every division. We saw that in the old
Protestant Dogmatics other elements were imposed
upon the foundation of faith in God, without accurate
examination of their adequacy, namely the theistic
proofs, and that these threatened the security of the
foundation which at first they were believed to strengthen.
We also required to point to the fact that, down to
the present, indeed especially in it, old dangers threaten
to arise under new names ; e.g. when the idea of a
religious a priori is not defined with precision. As re-
velation is the ground, so it is also the norm, of Christian
knowledge of God, as regards its content and compass,
as well as its nature. As regards its content : God is
what He reveals Himself to faith as being. Hence those
elements of the idea of God which win trust must never
be discarded, a thing that happens so often in the name

317

Faith in God the Father

of alleged science, e.g. in the doctrine of the hearing of
prayer. As revelation is the norm for the content of
the Doctrine of God, it is so also in regard to its com-
pass. The Doctrine of God has to set forth nothing
else except what God is, according to His Revelation of
Himself. Much that seems of importance beyond these
limits must stand aside ; perhaps it contains a problem
which we must elucidate, but it does not belong to the
sphere of religious faith. Likewise the nature of the
knowledge of God is defined by the circumstance that
it has its source in revelation ; it depends upon personal
conditions. This peculiarity of being determined by
Revelation applies even to the mode of speech we em-
ploy ; because content, compass and nature are domin-
ated by Revelation, because everything that has a right
to a place in Dogmatics serves "our salvation and the
glory of God," and "there is no knowledge of God,
where there is no piety" (Calvin), our very language
is determined by the gratefuL reverence with which we
are filled by the knowledge of the Reality of supreme
value. There is no room in a real system of Dogmatics
for the hurried play of desultory thought, for mere
superficial smartness which pleases for the moment, for
cheap condemnation of once valuable, even if imperfect,
forms given to the eternal content ; but there is just as
much profanity in an artificial sanctimoniousness which
seeks to atone for intellectual insipidity. In Augustine's
Confessions, the prof oundest thoughts about God appear
in the form of a devout colloquy with the Deity. How-
ever true it is that this mode of treating the subject
cannot be repeated, the inmost motive of it should prove
to be operative in any Doctrine of God.

There is general agreement regarding the subjects to
be dealt with in the Christian doctrine of God ; the
differences concern the method of treatment, and have

318

Division of the Doctrine of God

their roots in the fact of which we spoke, that revelation
is not always taken seriously as the starting-point.
What we are saying does not apply in essential particulars
to the question of the division of our subject ; a division
satisfactory in all points of view has not yet been dis-
covered. Manifestly our subject is God in His relation
to the world. For in religion this alone concerns us :
it was just for this reason that for us the ground and
norm of religious knowledge was the revelation of God,
His showing Himself active in the world. This holds
good even of the doctrine of the Trinity. The objection
that in this case we have to do " merely " with God's
relation to the world, without knowing His real being,
can be urged, only by one who does not take seriously
this recognition of Revelation in the Christian sense :
this revelation of His is a manifestation of His real self.
It is right and proper, therefore, that Dogmatics speaks
of God and the world, placing the emphasis at one time
upon God, and at another upon the world, for the very
reason that the revelation of God is a revelation of His
being directed to the world and in the world. But diffi-
culties are occasioned, and at all events the interests of
lucidity are endangered, when in the Christian doctrine
of God, the world comes into consideration as in actuality
smful ; while at the same time it cannot be exhibited as
being simply sinful, because that would be apparently
to prejudge the question of the origin of this contradic-
tion to the love of God. Then again there is another diffi-
culty. The usual distinction between the natural and the
moral worlds doubtless has its basis in the facts of the
case, but at the same time it involves the danger to which
we had to refer above, when dealing with the question
of the division of the Dogmatic system as a whole ; the
intrusion namely of general statements regarding the
relation of God to the world, which, later on, when we

319

Faith in God the Father

deal with the definitely Christian positions, make them-
selves felt as infra-Christian. Thus in discussing the
relation of God to the natural world, the continuity of
natural law is often spoken of in such terms, as will
make it difficult to give expression to the definitely
Christian view of the hearing of prayer ; an example
which was mentioned above in another connexion, be-
cause it is of special importance in all relations.
Finally, we must admit an impression which certainly
arises more often than expression is given to it. When
the doctrine of Providence takes its place alongside of
the doctrines of the creation and preservation of the
world, as coordinate with these, particularly when they
precede the doctrine of sin, the doctrine of Providence
does not have the significance which belongs to it
in religion itself; it appears simply as one doctrine,
occupying the same plane of value with those others of
which we speak. All these considerations may perhaps
come to their own, if in what follows we deal first with
God in His relation to the world ; then with the world
in its relation to God ; and then with the Divine Attri-
butes ; and finally with Providence. This last is the
comprehensive idea, in which all that is previously
treated has its immediate reality for faith. Here it
is shown what Christians mean by statements like these :
God is Love ; He loves the world ; such and such
are the modes of action of the Divine love in relation
to the world. Here it is determined with equal pre-
cision what the world means for Christians, because it
is the world of the God of whom we speak, who is love
and brings men into the eternal fellowship of His love.
For if we cannot experience this much in this world of
doubt and care, if it is not as a whole and in each one of
its separate happenings the world determined by the love
of God, it cannot be God's world, and there is no God

320

The Christian Idea of God

of love ; whatever high-sounding words we may make
use of thereanent in the doctrine of God, and also in the
so-called doctrine of the Attributes. Our fourth division
therefore explains our second, defining its meaning more
precisely, as in the first instance the third does the
first ; but in the fourth, we have the direct explanatior
of what all the others mean, not for speculation divorced
from the actual world, but for Christian faith as it
fights its battles and gains its victories in the actual
world. Consequently even the doctrine of sin, the
foundation of which naturally belongs to the second
division, finds its completion in the doctrine of Providence
(as embraced and vanquished by it). If one reflects on
the position of matters, as here stated, one will not allow
much weight to the objection which readily occurs, that
an exposition which follows this arrangement is ruled by
circumstances, and is not rigidly scientific as it ought to
be. For after all, the arrangement in every case must
depend on the subject which has to be set forth.

GOD (AND THE WORLD)

When dealing with the nature of religion, we showed
what general characteristics pertain to the idea of God
at all stages and in every type of religion, and how,
nevertheless, its distinctive content difiTers with every
religion. We also saw that this difiTerence in content
corresponds to the difference of view regarding the
religious blessing, which the deity concerned bestows
upon his worshippers. But the distinctive conception
of the nature of God, which corresponds to the nature
of the blessing He confers, always diff'ers according to
His special manifestation of Himself as active, i.e.
according to what is believed regarding His self-revela-
tion. Now we Christians believe in the God who reveals
Himself in Jesus, and, working in Him, brings us into

VOL. I. 321 21

Faith in God the Father

fellowship with Himself. We know, therefore, who our
God is, what constitutes His nature, from what He
bestows upon us in Jesus, from the religious blessing
which Jesus brings us ; abstractly, from the purpose
which He realizes. His purpose is that of the God who
works in Him. For all definite activity must present
itself to our minds as designed to serve some definite
purpose. But the activity of Jesus is summed up in the
realization of the Kingdom of God, that fellowship of
God with us, and of us with God and with each other,
in love, of which we have already spoken, and which
forms the subject of the whole both of Dogmatics and of
Ethics (cf. e.g. Eph. i. 4). God, therefore, is love
(1 John IV. 8), and to expound this truth in detail, is,
rightly understood, the whole task of the Christian
doctrine of God.

But this is the case, only if the matter is rightly
understood ; namely, if the general presuppositions of
this distinctively Christian idea of God are not neglected,
as we had to set them forth when dealing with the con-
cept of religion (pp. 43 ff.). God, as we then saw, is
always thought of as a power exalted above the world
of the religious persons concerned, and governing it, as
the goal of the world and a power superior to it. This
is so, however varied, indeed self-contradictory, may
be the precise content of this idea in all its constitu-
tional elements (World, exalted, governing), and how-
ever material even, to begin with and for the most part,
may be the opinions held regarding the supramundane
goal and power, of which we speak. Further, in all re-
ligions this power is thought of as being in some way
personal, otherwise there would be no religion, no interest
on the part of God in man, no turning to God on man's
part.

These general fundamental characteristics of the idea

322

The Christian Idea of God

of God are, of course, only presuppositions for the
Christian idea of God. They do not express the peculiar
content of it ; it is rather through that content that they
acquire their definitely Christian sense. We do not re-
tract in any measure what we said in the foregoing, —
namely, that the statement, "God is love," is the whole
Christian doctrine of God. As soon as we think of our-
selves as confined to the alternative : God must be
thought of either as Absolute Personality or as Love —
the question is immediately decided in favour of Love.
This is the relation also in which the Biblical statements,
" God is Spirit," '' God is Love," have always been placed,
as soon as the question has been clearly put. We believe
in the (supramundane, unconditioned) personal love, not
in the loving (supramundane, unconditioned) personality.
The opposite cannot be established by an objection which
is at first sight important, namely that it is the nature
of love to communicate itself in showing kindness and
expressing satisfaction : if then the nature of God is
love, He communicates Himself as love, and in order to
escape this circle, we must say that out of love He
imparts the life of His absolute personality (J. Kaftan).
Assuredly this statement is quite correct and important.
God does really impart His love. It is obvious that this
love of His is in all respects incomparably the highest
kind, infinitely excelling all human love ; and this truth
may be expressed by the statements that God is the
Absolute, and the Absolute Personality moreover. But
we state the most momentous fact in saying that God
loves, not that out of love He gives all. The same is
true even in the higher relations of man with man.
We reach the same result when we explain the state-
ment that the divine love imparts itself, by means of
the other : it seeks communion in order to realize the
common supreme end. This too, it might at first be ob-

323

Faith in God the Father

jected, is a circle : the common end is the Kingdom
of God, while the Kingdom of God again is the fellow-
ship of love. Only this also is but an apparent circle.
For in reality what God wills, what is His supreme end,
is that we may experience His love, and upon the basis
of this experience, may ourselves love God and our neigh-
bour ; it is manifest again that we are to do this in the
full richness of all the powers bestowed upon us ; but
this full richness ranks under the end of which we speak,
as a means for the realization of it.

So much for the explanation of our statement, that
the general conceptions of God's supramundane character
and His Personality are only presuppositions of the
Christian conception of the Deity — '* God is love ". But
now we have the other side of the truth. They are
necessary presuppositions. We do not believe in the
God who is love, if we do not believe that this love
is supramundane, "absolute," love, the purpose and
ground of the world, and love too in the form of person-
ality. On that matter, the pronouncements of the New
Testament leave no doubt. Jesus prays to the Father as
Lord of heaven and earth. Paul's thought is lost in the
unfathomable depths in God, of whom and through
whom and to whom are all things. Calvin's statements
on the grace of God never allow one to forget that, in
His eternal Majesty, He is the Lord of all lords.
Luther's "de servo arbitrio" sets off his jubilant feeling
in view of sonship to God. The modern consciousness,
as being struck dumb before the absolute mystery, often
fancies itself superior to faith, with its confidence based
on Revelation. As compared with the familiarity with
God which is deficient in reverence, it would be right. In
elucidating the Christian pronouncement, " God is love,"
we shall therefore have to attend expressly to this matter.

In the first instance, it is clear how these presupposi-

324

The Christian Idea of God

tions give occasion for sceptical questions which are the
most difficult of all, precisely in Christianity. We refer
particularly to the conception of the Absolute and that
of Personality, each by itself, but chiefly the two in com-
bination. As long as we are not at all strict in our view
of God's exaltation above the world and His governing of
it, especially if we conceive them somehow after the ana-
logy of the relative exaltation of the human spirit above
nature, and the relative dominion over nature exercised
by the human spirit, as these are known to us by ex-
perience, the idea causes us little difficulty. But in this
indefinite form, it is insufficient for the Christian idea of
God ; indeed it is altogether insufficient as soon as the
idea of the One God is reached. For it denotes that God
is not exalted above and master of some sort of world,
as it appears when viewed from some limited standpoint.
On the contrary He is exalted above the whole world,
without any qualification : He is the unconditioned goal
and ground of the world. This is just the original relig-
ious sense of the term, the Absolute. This conception of
the unconditioned, which has at the same time been
elaborated by philosophy, from a regard for its own in-
terests, has since occupied the most manifold relations
to the Christian view of God. Often it was looked upon
as the best, the most excellent expression of that view :
the belief was that its essential content could be derived
from, and most securely based upon, the idea of the Ab-
solute. And then it was readily regarded as a supreme
standard for determining what is tenable in the idea of
the love of God. After all that we have said, this is cer-
tainly out of the question. But at the same time the
love of God must be reconciled with the idea of the
Absolute, and also with that of the personality of God.
This idea also, when removed from the sphere of the in-
definite, as it must be in its application to the Christian

325

Faith in God the Father

conception of God, involves a whole series of problems.
To be sure, we quite understand that the higher the
standing of a personality, the more unity there is about
his purposes, so that the unity of the divine purpose is
matter for adoration on our part. But in our under-
standing of what we call personal life, we cannot get
away from the psychic processes in ourselves : are we to
find an analogy to these in God, and how are we to do
it ? Now it is just at this point that the former idea of
which we spoke, that of the absoluteness of God, His
unconditioned exaltation above and mastery over the
world, becomes the powerful ally of the doubts which
the very idea of personality in itself excites : "Is not
Absolute Personality the perfect self-contradiction ? "
(Strauss). Only a few have the courage to assert on
the other hand, with Frank, that the concept of the
Absolute involves that of personality. Nor is it by
any means only the scientific mode of thought that
inclines to the doubt of which we speak. There is
scarcely another point at which doubt comes into so
close touch with the general feeling ; it is found here,
just as it also is in regard to the belief in Providence,
with the first steps which reflection takes, often very
awkward ones. This is natural enough, seeing that the
intellectual difficulty concerns personal piety so directly,
and the difficulties are so plain and obvious. But for
this reason, this also is a point at which the nature of
religious knowledge must be made specially clear.
Further, because often all that may be said concerning
the Christian idea of God as love, is prejudiced by the
unspoken impression that the idea of absolute personality
is irretrievably lost, though it constitutes the pre-
supposition of the idea of love, we make an exception
here, placing the apologetic task before the dogmatic,
and dealing first with

826

Absolute Personality

The Absolute Personality

We shall first consider the objections to Absolute
Personality. In case they cannot be altogether refuted,
the question arises whether the idea which causes offence
may not be surrendered, without injury being done to
Christian piety. Should this also prove impossible, we
have to show in what sense and upon what ground it
may still be maintained.

In dealing with the objections, we distinguish be-
tween those that can be refuted, and the one that cannot.
Taken collectively, they resolve themselves into a dis-
quisition on the statement : All determination is nega-
tion {Omnis detsrminatio est negatio); to predicate
personality is to limit, but God is the Absolute, the
negation of every limitation. This is certainly a state-
ment that can be taken in many different ways. For
this very reason, considerations based upon it are of very
varied worth ; but the exposition of them sets the main
point in a clear light. In the first place, if we should
understand the statement in the strictest way, it would
by no means exclude only the affirmation that God is
personal, but every affirmation in relation to Him which,
ostensibly in view of the statement we speak of, it is
thought may be substituted for personality ; such as
that God is pure spirit (Biedermann), and the like. It
would be necessary to accept without any reservation
the Neo-Platonic idea that God is exalted above every
definite quality, and to refuse absolutely to make any
affirmation regarding Him. If we say that God is pure
being, this differs from saying that He is pure nothing-
ness, only because, without knowing it, we again supply
tacitly, at least some positive affirmations regarding Him.
In its most general use, therefore, as given above, the
principle which is supposed to render belief in the

327

Faith in God the Father

personality of God impossible, is harmless. The second
application of the principle runs as follows : Personality
is the unity which comprehends itself in itself, and ex-
cludes all else from itself ; and is therefore the opposite
of the Absolute as the all-inclusive, which excludes
nothing but just that comprehension of itself in itself of
which we speak. Only this is not by any means a
correct description of the concept of spiritual, to say
nothing of moral, personality. It is only the third ap-
plication of the principle which demands serious con-
sideration, namely : " The Ego is unthinkable without the
Non-ego ". There are three ways in which this state-
ment may be understood. It may be said quite gener-
ally that the non-ego is the ground of the ego, so that
God needs the contrast with the world as a condition
of His personality, and so cannot be the Absolute. But
this overlooks the fact that our ego, our self-conscious
personality, does not at all find its full explanation in the
contrast with the non-ego ; but that on the contrary a
feeling of separate existence must be already presup-
posed, if the contrast with the non-ego is to issue in
self-consciousness. We must, therefore, at least put the
matter more precisely thus : The growth of the finite
personality depends upon the existence of an external
world, i.e. upon the influence exerted by the non-ego ;
and consequently for us the idea of Absolute Person-
ality is a contradiction. Only the retort lies open : To
be sure, the concept of Absolute Personality involves a
world of ideas, feelings, and volitional activities, but this
world is not a godless one ; in God Himself there may
be found eternally the ground of the activity of which
we speak. For it is irrational to transfer the conditions
necessary for the development of finite personality to
the Infinite, especially as even the finite, in the course of
its development, becomes relatively independent of the

328

Absolute Personality

external world, and draws from its own inner world.
If again our opponents would still further ask, what it is
in God that corresponds to the first impulse which finite
personality receives from without, they forget that even
any contrasted idea of the Absolute, and indeed Material-
ism itself, have just simply to assume a first activity,
without in any way being able to comprehend it.

But faith, conscientiously testing the objections of its
opponents, must not, for the sake of its own certainty,
content itself with such refutation. It finds another
and deeper meaning in the proposition of which we
speak, and asks : How is personal life, which we cannot
imagine without change of relations in our self-conscious-
ness and in our self-determination, i.e. without inner
movement of the vital forces, compatible with the un-
changeableness of the inner life of the Godhead, as that
appears to be given us in the idea of absoluteness ? Now
there are certainly good grounds for saying, that even we
experience the unity and continuity of the inner personal
life ; indeed, that this constitutes the supreme content of
life for us, especially in the carrying through to the end
of a great purpose, by instrumentality of a long series of
means. When, however, we apply this to God, His un-
changeableness in a moral point of view is beyond all
question fully safeguarded ; and this is certainly the main
point, provided that we regard the confession of Him as
love, as the supreme thing for us. But we must express
ourselves unambiguously : we have not attained to a real
insight into the inner life of the Godhead as personal — the
formal presupposition, so to say, of the content of the
statement that God is love, which is what is here occupy-
ing us. We are confronted by a clear alternative and
it must be unreservedly recognized as such ; e.g. even
as against the speculation of a Lotze, whose clear-
sighted refutation of the usual objections we have

829

Faith in God the Father

adopted in the foregoing. Either we emphasize that
God in the unity of His personality comprehends in like
fashion the whole fullness of the inner relations of
which we spoke ; that He is, to speak in terms of
space and time, at all times equally near to them all.
In that case we do away with His inner activity, pro-
ductivity, or whatever we choose to call it : His know-
ledge is sight in eternal repose, His willing is eternal
bringing to pass, His life is unaffected by desire or the
absence of it. Or, on the other hand, we emphasize
the activity characteristic of the inner life of the
Godhead ; in which case we do away with His unchange-
ableness, by which we sought to distinguish His life as
absolute, from ours as finite. This alternative forces it-
self upon us all the more, as in Christianity we are com-
pelled to attribute to man as a moral being some sort of
independent reality ; an idea which will occupy us
finally in the doctrine of the eternity of God. Here
we may simply add a reference to philosophical con-
tributions to this problem, as by Lotze or Simmel.
They are the more worthy of gratitude, when their
skilfully established position that human personality
deserves to be called only a very imperfect form of
personality, that God is Personality in its entire truth,
is accompanied by the recognition of the fundamental
truth of religion, that in the nature of piety there is in-
volved the rejection of all pure Pantheism, because
there is involved the assertion of a real personal relation
between the personal God and us. But even they do
not get over the difficulty we have mentioned.

In view of these circumstances, it is natural that ever
and anon the attempt should be made to eliminate the
IDEA of the personality of God, as one that Christian faith
can dispense with. We have already travelled far, it
may be said, from the original anthropomorphic — all too

830

Absolute Personality

anthropomorphic — presentations of God, to the sublim-
ated conception of spiritual personality, as found in the
religious consciousness of the present day ; why should
we not, in consistency, take the last step and surrender
this conception too? This is advice that faith will
certainly be predisposed to regard with suspicion, be-
cause it knows how vitally interested all religion has
always been to conceive of God in the form of personal
life (see pp. 45 f.). The more carefully the assertion
that the idea can be dispensed with is looked into, the
clearer and stronger will this immediate feeling become.
This holds good especially of the most brilliant defence
of the position of Schleiermacher, that Christian piety is
compatible even with the Pantheistic idea of God, that
of Biedermann. He says first of all that the whole con-
flict is a matter of words. For every higher idea of God
seeks to safeguard alike the two essential moments, abso-
luteness and spirituality. Those now who speak of per-
sonality merely wish to emphasize that they are in earnest
in regard to the spirituality ; those who reject it, that they
are in earnest in regard to the absoluteness. But at the
same time it is necessary to forgo the use of the ex-
pression ''personality" : for the reason that personality
is the specific form of existence for the finite spirit, it
must be surrendered by every one who does not wish to
continue at the stage of the " sense-form," of which it
constitutes the characteristic shibboleth. Therefore, the
one of the essential characteristics of which we speak,
the absoluteness, is taken so seriously by Biedermann,
that the other, the spirituality, must no longer be
expressed in the form of which it had just been said, that
its intention is to show that we are in earnest about the
spirituality. Now this is certainly not a mere dispute
about words. For Biedermann asserts, in distinction
from Hegel, that the "senseform" remains the common

S31

Faith in God the Father

form of our faith — that it belongs essentially to religion.
But how then can the personality of God, which is the
shibboleth of a Theism conforming to " sense-forms," be
surrendered ? That this is impossible without injury to
faith, is shown by Biedermann's doctrine of prayer,
which leaves no room for real communion between God
and man. Indeed, such communion is inconceivable
apart from the idea of the personality of God. But
even the most recent laudations of the "Unconscious "
cannot fascinate the Christian Church. She does not
require to be told that communion with God is higher
than all reason ; whether in the sense that reason does
not humbly guard one's private experience as a mystery,
or in the sense that it presumes to analyze the inner
life of God. But she cannot renounce the relationship
expressed with reverence and trust by "Thou" and
** I," without giving up her all. This anthropomorphism
belongs to the essence of our religion.

Little more need be said to indicate the attitude
OF Christian faith to this problem : we have already
made the transition to that matter in the course of our
discussion. Christian faith asserts the personality of
God, not, however, simply because otherwise it would
be signing its own death-warrant, i.e. simply on account
of the value of the idea. On the contrary, it defines
the qualifications with which it asserts the personality
of God, and vindicates its standpoint, thus carefully de-
fined, upon good grounds both of knowledge and of
faith.

The qualijlcation is as follows. Because in the reve-
lation of God faith recognizes the nature of God, namely
as love, while on the other hand, love without the form
of personal life is for us something altogether unintelli-
gible, it asserts the personality of God ; and is assured that
ivhat it means by this, the necessary presupposition of

382

Absolute Personality

the communion between God and man in love, of which
we speak, is neither invalidated by any knowledge of
God supposed to be purer, nor is it regarded as a de-
lusion on the part of man in the judgment of God,
knowing Himself as He does. In this sense Christian
faith claims an adequate knowledge of God, not only in
reference to the position that God is love, but also in
regard to the position that God is personal spirit, so far as
the latter is inseparable from the former. On the other
hand, faith itself regards as inadequate its knowledge of
God with reference to the mode of this personal inner life
of the Godhead, the psychological conditions, so to speak,
of its course. Thus it does not assert, for example, that
the hearing of a petitionary prayer involves the same
moments in the divine feeling, thought and volition, as
it does in the case of a finite personal spirit. But it
certainly does assert that such hearing is a reality even
for the divine life. Nothing is farther from it than the
thought of God as One who is only an infinitely great
man ; as is presupposed in a specially crude fashion in
the "definition " given by Haeckel, one which does not
deserve to be made more widely known. And here
again we need to remind ourselves of the symbolical char-
acter of religious language (pp. 47 f., 245 f.), especially
of the fact that while its terms, which originated under
other circumstances as regards education, certainly serve
to express religious experiences, and summon men to
enter on such experience, they have also a kind of inde-
pendent existence, and by means of collateral ideas
which adhere to them, readily become a hindrance to re-
ligious experience ; unless they are constantly rejuven-
ated, in the consciousness of another generation, by
what springs from this living source, the antiquated
element in an idea being cast off, and what has eter-
nal life being supplied to it (Steinmann). An increasing

333

Faith in God the Father

apprehension of the nature of religious language, as
thus described, is far more full of promise than an
over-hasty coining of ambiguous terms, such as the
super-personality or super-consciousness of God. The
truth which they mean to express is recognized in the
foregoing ; for the rest, they readily contribute to build
up a phraseology which is fraught with danger.

The prooj^ that this is the attitude of genuine faith,
upon grounds both of faith and of knowledge, is found
in the conclusions of our Apologetic (pp. 141 ff., 252 ff.).
As regards knowledge, it is found in a critical inquiry
into the inherent limitations of assent-compelling know-
ledge. Those who make the inconceivableness of the
divine self-consciousness, the inadequacy of our know-
ledge with reference to the mode of which we spoke, a
reason for denying the love of God, when it meets them in
God's revelation of Himself, declare assent-compelling
knowledge the highest good, not because of necessary
grounds of theoretical knowledge, but because of a de-
cision of the will ; for they assert that nothing can be real
save what can be proved by such means. In this con-
nexion, as against all such objections, supposed to be
based upon necessary grounds of theoretical knowledge,
faith is well served especially by the proof, which its op-
ponents themselves are wont to furnish against their will
with such completeness, that other ideas regarding the
absolute are in themselves by no means more clear than
the Christian idea of God, which they attack ; for example
the famous definition of the absolute as "Pure being in
itself and by itself, and being in itself the ground of all
being outside of itself ". When once such considerations
have protected faith against the charge of speaking of
reasons peculiar to itself, because it cannot answer the
counter-arguments of knowledge, it can prove without
reserve from its own nature, that another state of matters

334

Absolute Personality

would be altogether inconsistent with its nature, and
fatal to its life. Complete knowledge of God in refer-
ence to the mode of the inner life of the Godhead, is not
at all compatible with the idea of the love of God, as it is
actually derived from revelation ; an idea which does not
abolish the distinction between creature and Creator,
and so makes Him the object of adoring reverent trust.
The ethical character of Christian Faith is at stake (p.
146 fF.). Faith by its very nature is precluded from rais-
ing the question how God can be God (Lotze). Thus
" not to know the things that man cannot know and is
not meant to know," is for it " wise ignorance ; to imagine
that one knows them is a sort of madness " (Calvin).

"While this last consideration will soon engage our
attention again, we may be justified by a regard for a
wide-spread feeling, in further explaining briefly the
other idea we spoke of, and finding that the substitute
offered by the opponents of the conception of Person-
ality, as applicable to God, when it too is looked at
dispassionately in the light of thought, has little in it to
lead us astray. Many are bold enough to assure us that
religion is possible, only if "man's spiritual self is
identified with the Godhead," and if the " deification or
the annihilation of the self," which is otherwise inevitable,
is by this means obviated (A. Drews). That will be an
incredible announcement for all who clearly realize what
actual religion is, and do not merely protest that such
religion is the object of their reflection, whereas in truth
they construct something which they call religion, but
in which religious men do not recognize anything of the
kind. However, apart altogether from that, we ask
whether the ideas of the Absolute, which are lauded as
a substitute, are in themselves clear and free from in-
consistency. Little hope of that is awakened by what
is said with the aim of explaining that identity of the

836

Faith in God the Father

spiritual self and the Godhead which was just referred
to. To begin with, there is the shiftiness of the explana-
tion, the change from the statement that the self and
God are identical, to the other statements, that the self
is one of the "joint functions of God," and that it has
" a root in God ". Still less reassuring is the assertion
that "self-consciousness and self "are to be distinguished,
and that " spirit in its true form is unconscious " ; especi-
ally as such assurances are always accompanied by attacks
on the mental obtuseness which does not understand a
solution of this superior type. But of course we have
pretty often had occasion to observe that sort of thing
before in the history of philosophy, when the ability to
furnish proof had failed. However, it is quite time that
real science should no longer allow itself to be blinded
by the seeming merits of Pantheism. For the latter, as
is said with different shades of thought, God is trans-
lucent like nature : He is not some inconceivable agency
that disturbs nature ; its laws exhibit the unchangeable-
ness of God in a way which we can understand ; the
world does not limit God and make Him finite, all
semblance of human capriciousness being excluded. As
if the concept of the world were an object of experience
which is clear in itself ; as if the idea of laws of nature
exhausted the essence of reality ; as if God, brought in
this sense into the life of the world, made the conflicting
realities of the world appear more intelligible, and the
enigma of our personality, especially of the moral
personality, more endurable (Kovalevski). It cannot
surprise us if that which often shows so little clearness
in the lofty realms of science, passes into mere resonant
oratory on the low tracts where ephemeral pamphleteer-
ing obtains ; take e.g. — From the "Divine Humanity in
the Universe of God," from the "primal abyss of the
consummation of things," through the "divinely settled,

336

God as Holy Love

divinely ramified, divinely blooming and divinely matured
Church of Humanity " (Pamphlets of the Young Ger-
mans ; and such like). But even conceptions of modern
thought which rise to a higher level, — e.g. the recogni-
tion of " a spiritual ground of the world, of a supreme
essence within nature, principally in the human mind,"
" to which we accord a devotion, in the worship of the
ideal, which the Gospel calls faith " (B. Wille) — are
unable, from their vagueness, to compete seriously with
the Christian conception of Absolute Personality. In
view of such tentative efforts, we can well understand
that the movement for a Christian Metaphysic, which
we previously discussed, finds no little sympathy at
present. It is in truth superior to those pronouncements
which are often given forth with such pompous airs, as
antitheses to Christian faith in God ; and it is right in
maintaining that " the inference pointing to a purposive
Will " set over the world, though " not necessary, is yet
more intelligible " than Pantheism. Only, while making
this acknowledgment, we cannot retract our objections,
made on the ground of principle, to the mode of establish-
ing a new Christian speculation of the kind.

This discussion on Absolute Personality should now
enable us, with a good conscience and with no more
trouble, to set forth the proper content of the Christian
conception of God.

God as Holy Love

The dogmatic exposition of this doctrine of religion
is rendered difficult by the very circumstance which
constitutes its merit, namely that it is as inexhaustible
as it is simple. Were it otherwise, it could not be
all in all for all men of all ages. This inexhaustible
simplicity of which we speak in the concept of God,
makes Christian Dogmatics a unity ; in all its parts

VOL. I. 337 22

Faith in God the Father

it is simply the unfolding of the concept before us.
But at the same time it makes it difficult in any single
section like the one before us, to say what is most es-
sential, without unnecessary repetition in other places.
What is most essential is to explain the Christian name
for God, namely Father, or the statement which has the
same meaning, that God is love.

As certainly as Jesus does not reveal a different God
from the one revealed in the history of His people, and
thus largely presupposes God as known. He is yet con-
scious of alone knowing this God perfectly, and on the
basis of this knowledge of revealing Him perfectly. In
accordance with this, the name Father, though it also
has its roots in the Old Testament, receives a new con-
tent (Matt. XI. 27 ff.), exactly corresponding to the new
meaning given to the other Old Testament expression.
Kingdom of God, the rule of the God of whom we speak.
Every element is eliminated which is merely national in
favour of what is universally human, together with
everything that is one-sidedly social in favour of what is
individual, everything that is legal in favour of what
makes for personal freedom, everything in these relations
that looks merely to this earth, and — what is the basis of
all — everything that is not yet fully spiritual or ethical.
Again full justice is done to what the name of Father
necessarily presupposes regarding that exaltation above,
and sovereignty over, the world, of which we spoke as
involved in the idea of the Absolute (p. 321 ff.), by in-
ference from the fact that Jesus designates the Father
as the Heavenly Father.

Jesus wishes His whole work in word, deed and
suffering to be understood as the Father's work in
Him — as the revelation of the Father (see pp. 199 ff. in
our Apologetics, and the doctrine of Christ in our Dog-
matics). But His work is love — the love which delivers

338

The Concept of Love

sinners and receives them into the Kingdom of God
(Luke XV. 1 fF., John xiii. 1 fF.). And He directs us
to regard His whole existence which makes such work
possible, as the Father's will and the supreme proof of
His love (Luke xix. 10, John iii. 16). Hence His church
shows that it has entered with full discernment into His
intention, by summing up the knowledge of God bestowed
upon it in Jesus in the statement, " God is love " (1 John
IV. 8). Accordingly the task arises of defining the idea
of love, as an essential characteristic of God, in its most
important features, and then of showing how all that
here comes under consideration finds expression in a
direct religious sense in the name of God as the Heavenly
Father.

The fear of having only worthless analogies drawn
from human life to offer, in applying the features in
question of the concept of love to God, need no longer
disturb us. Indeed it is just in relation to the highest
objects that we have realized the necessarily symbolical
character of all our means of expression ; and this being
the case, it is obvious that there are no higher symbols
than those derived from our spiritual life at its highest.
It also follows then that it is not in its essential features
that the limit of the applicability of the idea of love to
God is to be found, but in the formal psychological pre-
suppositions, which we dealt with under the heading of
the personality of God. As regards those characteristics,
on the other hand, which are normative for the content
of the concept of love, not only may Christian Dogma-
tics "apply" them to God, but they find indeed their
ultimate ground in the revelation of God. Men know
what love really is, since they know the reality of God.
"Herein is love, that God has loved us" (1 John iv.
10). Everything that elsewhere deserves the name is for
the Christian judgment a feeling after, yearning for, pre-

839

Faith in God the Father

monition or effect of, the love of God as it gradually
reveals itself; and now, after the sun has risen, we
have its clear warm radiance, and its divine victory
over all that is not love.

Now love is the desire for fellowship both in giving
and receiving, arising out of a wish for the well-being
of, and out of pleasure in, the other, for the realization
of common ends (see fuller statement in *' Ethics," p.
131 f.). Then it is clear, first of all with reference
to the former part of this definition, how this aspect of
God's nature, as manifested in Jesus, is brought to light
in Holy Scripture in many forms, and attested to us as
the object of reverent trust. It is just in order to give
expression to the inexhaustible many-sidedness, first of
all of its qualities of self-impartation, that all the rela-
tions of love between human beings are employed as a
figure of the divine love — bridegroom and bride, friend,
mother, father. The love of God surpasses them all,
e.g. a mother's love (Is. xlix. 15), a father's (Hebrews
XII. 5 ff.). At this point we must further refer to the
separate attributes, as they are called, of the divine
love — goodness, kindness, faithfulness, longsuffering,
patience, mercy, grace. The latter portion of these
urges us to adore the intensity and constancy of the
divine self-surrender, particularly in its struggle against
the opposition from human lovelessness, not simply in
its expectancy with regard to such as, being subject to
temporal development, are able only gradually to open
their hearts to the divine love. God's love is love to
His enemy (Luke xv.), and the triumph of this self-sacri-
fice on His part is the surrender of His well-beloved Son
(Mt. XXI. 37, Ro. VIII. 32). (See the doctrines of Sin and
Redemption.) In such self-sacrifice the blessedness of
God consists. The nature of true love is that it seeks not
its own, but the good of the other, and that it finds its life

340

The Concept of Love

in the very act of losing it (Mt. xvi. 25). This is true of
our love because, in the first instance, it is fully true of
the love of God. The gods imagined by man, though
at times beneficent and helpful in the face of human
need, yet in the last resort find their blessedness in
their selfishness, even if their self-satisfaction be of a
highly ethereal esthetic type ; the God who reveals
Himself to us finds His blessedness in self-surrender
(e.g. Luke xv. 1-7). Consequently those definitions
fall far short of the Christian standpoint, which tell us
that God's blessedness flows from His self-sufficient
fullness of life ; and it helps matters very little
when we have the addition — " and from His moral
perfection" (Luthardt). Indeed the reason why the
New Testament so seldom uses the word blessed of
God (1 Tim. i. 11), is perhaps just that the first Church
was far too apt to find in it a reminiscence of the
quite diff*erent blessedness attributed to the Gods of
Greece.

But it is only when brought into connexion with the
other characteristic of the concept of love, that the one
which we have hitherto emphasized, namely its desire
for the well-being of and pleasure in its object, comes
quite clearly to view in its import for the Christian con-
cept of God. I refer to its being a desire for fellowship
for the realization of common ends. If God's nature is
really love. He can set us no higher end than that
we may find blessedness in His love, and upon this
as a basis ourselves learn to love Him who has first
loved us, and in loving Him to love all others whom He
loves along with us. Were it otherwise. He would be
withholding something, giving less than Himself, conse-
quently would not be loving. This truth is comprehen-
sively stated in the conception of the Kingdom of God ;
the Kingdom of God is the common supreme pur-

311

Faith in God the Father

pose for the realization of which God draws us into
fellowship with Himself.

In such consideration of the nature of love as regards
its two fundamental features, there is involved a series
of important qualifications of a more specific kind. In
the first place, because love shares its own supreme end
with its object, God's love in the strict sense of the
term does not extend to all His creatures, but only to
those who are qualified to enter into loving fellowship
with Himself, those who are capable of personal life of
a spiritual and ethical kind. All else is related to them
as the means to the end ; and in all else they themselves
should not see their highest end. Further, the fellow-
ship of individuals of which we speak, which is to
form the Kingdom of God, cannot, like nature, be set
up by the fiat of His omnipotence, but must be trained
through a historical process for freedom and by means
of freedom, as they rise from the state in which they are
conditioned by nature. Because God is love and desires
love, He desires freedom : however many difficulties
this statement involves, we cannot get away from it ;
in fact it is a touchstone to show whether the idea of
God is conceived in the sense which is really Christian,
or whether influences derived from Neo-Platonism, with
its speculation on the Absolute, compromise the purity
of it. But because in history spiritual communities
always come into being round some personal centre
which determines their character, the immediate object
of the Divine Love is the Person in whom God's Kingdom
is realized, namely Christ (1 Cor. xv. 47 ; see Doctrine
of Christ, and what we have already said concerning
revelation). Specially important is the third truth, re-
sulting from this, that the love of God, though as regards
its intention absolutely without limit, must be conscious
of a possible limit just because it is love ; namely where

U2

Concept of Holy Love

it comes into contact with its direct opposite on the part
of its objects, their determined refusal to let themselves
be loved, even in spite of the highest conceivable revel-
ation of the divine love. A desire for fellowship of
such intensity that oneness of purpose is really at stake,
in reference not to some incidental ends, but to the
supreme end which constitutes the very being of the
person concerned, an absolute suiTender of so self-sacri-
ficing a nature as has been before us, conformable to
such a desire, would no longer be love at all ; it would
not be the act of a person, but natural necessity, without
this possible limit implied in the very idea of love. Love
does not seek to compel love, because it cannot do so
without ceasing to be itself.

For the last-mentioned negative pole of actual love,
the most apposite designation is the Scriptural one of
holy love. Only here again it must not be forgotten
that such expressions have a long history behind them,
and that every stage of this history is far from having
the same abiding significance for Dogmatics. Admittedly
in the word " Holy " in the Old Testament, the idea
of exclusiveness is, to begin with, the decisive one : the
things which are withdrawn from profane use are holy,
cut off, because God is the Power above the world,
however defective may be the idea of the world, and
consequently of what is above the world (cf. what we
said of the fundamental characteristics always found in
the idea of God). Jahveh is the Holy One, because He
is the Exalted One ; who can stand before Him (1 Sam.
VI. 20) ? In bringing His enemies to naught and in
delivering His people. He reveals Himself as the One,
beside whom there is no other. But in the measure in
which the God of Israel manifests Himself as willing
the good. His holiness becomes moral uniqueness (cf.
e.g. Is. VI. 8 with vi. 7). This is not to say that holiness

343

Faith in God the Father

shows itself only in maintaining law, or in any way
to approximate the old dogmatic idea of punitive
righteousness ; nor is it to say, on the other hand, that
the idea of holiness passes into that of love, as Menken
does, upon the basis of an incorrect exegesis of Hosea
XI. 8, 9 and Psalms cm. 1 ff. But it is as the two are
synthesized, that testimony can be borne to the unique-
ness of God in both respects ; just because He is more
and more recognized as the alone good, for the reason
that His unique exaltation is recognized as exaltation
of a moral nature. He makes His people holy, cuts
them off from the whole world, and appropriates them
to Himself in sovereign election ; He enters with them
into a real fellowship, and realizes in judgment and grace
the purpose He appointed for this people, one worthy of
God Himself. If now in Christ, God's nature fully dis-
closes itself as love, and it is in regard to His love that
He claims to be the One beside whom there is no other,
and the Incomparable, what the word holy describes is
the majesty and sovereignty of His love in general, but
in particular the fact that it is true to itself, as shown
by its reaction against sin. Of course this is not to say
that holiness takes its place alongside of love, and that an
adjustment must be brought about between these two
fundamental attributes of the divine nature, as they are
supposed to be. On the contrary, it is because it is per-
fect love that the love of God is Holy Love. Its reaction
against sin is itself love, because it is the means for over-
coming the opposition to love ; and should it punish any
persistent opposition to the supreme revelation of love, by
departing from its importunate appeals, this also has its
ground in the nature of love which cannot force itself. In
this way we understand the circumstance that, in the New
Testament as a matter of fact, the word holy is seldom
found ; but where it occurs, its main purpose is to give

344

God as Love

expression to the serious side of love, to which we have
pointed, and which is necessarily implied in its nature.
The name, Father, as applied to God is to be kept holy,
its uniqueness is to be acknowledged, it must not be
trifled with ; the reason for this is just that it gives ador-
ing expression to the inexhaustible depths of God's love,
and warns us of its majesty. This phrase of the Lord's
prayer (Mt. vi. 9) is in full accord with John xvii. 11 ;
1 Peter 1. 15, 17 ; Ephesians i. 4, and in their fundamental
significance, with the words, " Ye would not " (Mt. xxiii.
37), which in their simple seriousness are not surpassed
by the awful saying in Hebrews xii. 29. Love would not
be love, if it did not demand free recognition and return,
and fight against indifference and defiance, so that there
could be no mistake as to its recoil from them ; in one
and the same act attracting, with a free grace that is ever
new, the person who has not yet come to a decision or
steeled his heart, but also cutting off from itself the de-
liberate contemner. This is the truth which Dogmatics
states most briefly in the expression. Holy Love. The
" Holy " stands like an armed sentinel in front of the
throne of " love ". What keeps the communion between
God and man from being nothing but a pretentious empty
dream, nay more, an outrageous presumption, is ulti-
mately just that it is a communion based on love ; and
to show this to be fully true, it is our business to exhaust
the concept of love as holy love, down to its deepest depths.
We shall find this thought at work in the whole dogmatic
system, especially when we are dealing with the concept
of the atonement ; but it reaches right into the eschato-

At the close of this discussion of the statement that
God is love, we see more clearly than we could have
done when we started, the truth of the statement that
in our religion love is not an attribute of God ; it is

845

Faith in God the Father

indeed a designation fm^ His essence. When we say " God
is Love," subject and predicate are identified, and for
the Christian Church this identification is the inex-
haustible ground of its worship ; it is never for the
Church, so to speak, an analytical judgment ; it is always
a new feat of faith, but one that is possible only where
we have revelation as a basis. The only one who,
humanly speaking, could make Himself the end of His
existence refuses to do so : He is love ; and by the re-
velation of His love He evokes trust in such love, — the
Christian experiences the truth that the divineness of
God's own nature is found in loving. This is the fullest
glimpse we can get into the unfathomable mystery. The
identity of God and love, Luther gives expression to in
these words of adoration : " If one were to paint God
and get His likeness, he must paint such a picture as
would be pure love ; and again if one could paint and
make a likeness of love, he would have to make such a
picture as would be neither an inanimate work nor human,
indeed neither angelic nor heavenly, but God Himself ".
This identity of God with love is not narrowed, rather
its inexhaustibleness is only all the plainer, if we em-
phasize once again in closing, that what was said of the
concept of the Absolute, of its legitimacy and its indis-
pensableness even for the Christian view of God as love
(p. 321 fF.), still holds good. For we referred the legiti-
macy of the concept of the Absolute back to the funda-
mental idea of all religion, that in it there is involved
communion with the Power exalted above the world.
If therefore this were eliminated from the Christian idea
of God, it would not be an idea of religion at all. What
we have now done has simply been to emphasize as
strongly as possible, that the characteristic content of
the Christian faith in God finds full expression in the
statement that God is love ; not in any measure to

346

God as Love

weaken the conviction that He is absolutely exalted
above the world, and has dominion over it. Any sus-
picion that our God may be a good but impotent will,
a moral genius, without being master of the world,
destroys the roots of all religious power. In the con-
flict between our intellect and our religious faith, especi-
ally in view of the enigmas of the doctrine of Providence,
such an idea may perhaps be able to tempt us for an
instant (as in the thoughtful work, " The Gospel of a Poor
Soul");^ but unless this temptation is conquered, the
Christian religion is conquered. What Jesus knew was
that with God all things are possible, that He carries
His purpose of love through to victory, even if it be by
way of defeat, and that His own Cross itself is embraced
by the divine necessity ; and His Church, bowing in
adoration, testifies regarding the God who is love, that of
Him, through Him and unto Him are all things (Rom. xi.
36). There is still another reason which makes it indis-
pensable for our religious knowledge to remember that
the idea of the Absolute, as a presupposition of the dis-
tinctively Christian view of God, has incontestable right ;
and the one reason is inseparable from the other. It
preserves in safety the reverence which is indispensable
for the trustful joy over the truth that God is love.
Only when there is no doubt that the distinction between
Creator and creature is fully maintained, do the detailed
expositions of this truth leave uninfringed the funda-
mental religious feeling of dependence. This holds good
all the more, the more uncompromising the expositions
are. In Christianity the fellowship of love between God
and man, in its beginning, progress and completion, has its
basis in the sovereign initiative of God ; in particular
every pantheistic idea of a natural identification of God

1 [See Pfleiderer's " Philosophy of Religion," E. T., Vol. II, pp.
186-188 (Trans, note)].

Faith in God the Father

and man is excluded. To leave no doubt at all about
this point, is the purpose of the statement we have
made above : it renders false intimacy impossible ; and
this is necessary, because in Christianity the fellowship of
love is to be taken with absolute seriousness. As Jesus
calls to Himself whomsoever He will (Mk. iii. 13, John
XV. 16), so Paul, in a paradox of the utmost boldness,
gives God's free choice its right (Rom. ix., Phil. ii. 13) as
against every claim of man's imagining ; and it has been a
privilege of the E-eformed Church to safeguard the prin-
ciple, Soli Deo Gloria, against every abuse of the other,
that God is love. In this we have the complement
to the characteristic gift vouchsafed to the Lutheran
Church, consisting in a specially profound and tender
apprehension of the " beloved Father ".

There may be a difference of opinion as to how to
express this presupposition of the absoluteness of the
divine love. What was indicated above (p. 343 ff.) as to
the original sense of the word holy, might suggest that it
should always be used for this purpose. The O. T. pas-
sages which point in this direction are numerous, and the
imperfect ideas belonging to the merely preparatory reve-
lation, which attach to it in individual instances, might
be set aside. But as we use the word, the more definite
and directly ethical sense is the more natural one ; and
it would be hard to find another expression for this
characteristic of the divine love, which is so indispensable.
For these reasons it is better here to stick to the desig-
nation of the love as " world-transcending," exalted
above the world and having dominion over it ; or even,
especially in popular usage, to speak simply of Almighty
Love (cf. " Doctrine of the Attributes"). Only in that
case we must be quite explicit that in speaking of the
love of God as world-transcending, the expression is
not used now, as it often is, with the meaning simply of

348

God's Love as World-transcending

unconditionally valuable, but with that of absolutely real.
Regarding the former nothing more need be said, but
the reality of what possesses supreme value calls for the
strongest emphasis ; the hunger of all religion after
reality, which we have often had before us, claims to
be satisfied. Assuredly our religion has the strongest
conceivable interest in this world-transcending reality
of which we speak. Christians not merely know that
they are already in actual fellowship with it, but they
have in this possession the guarantee, that they will
be perfected under other conditions of existence than
the present. Such confidence is indeed a fundamental
thought of the New Testament. The members of the
Kingdom are accounted worthy to attain to " that world "
(Luke XX. 35) ; those who are already sons wait to be re-
ceived as sons (Rom. viii. 15, 23) ; their life is hid with
Christ in God, and they will be made manifest with
Him in glory (Col. iii. 3 f.) ; it doth not yet appear what
they shall be (1 John in. 2). But unless they bow in
profoundest reverence before the unutterable mystery
in God, this fundamental conviction would be a hollow
fancy.

It is impossible to state briefly in a formula, what
Christian piety possesses in the experience of this super-
natural holy love of God : what every other religion
only darkly gropes after, namely the union of the most
heartfelt trust and the most reverential submission. In
this experience, the word God is not a sublime but indis-
tinct, or a familiar but lightly used word ; on the contrary
it refers to the one incomparably exalted and adorable
reality. Faith in the Almighty God of love, communion
with Him through faith, is really the loftiest conception
that can " enter into the heart of man " ; but it would
not have entered any man's heart, unless God had '* pre-
pared it for them that love Him," being real communion

349

Faith in God the Father

with God for man His creature ; humanity being sunk in
Divinity, without the distinction between God and man
being blotted out. Only through this faith that God is
love, do we get once for all beyond a Titanic defiance (** If
there were a God, I would have liked to be God myself "
— Nietzsche), and beyond all mystic self-renunciation and
merging in the universe. Communion with the supra-
mundane God who is love, is always in truth the highest
end that men can regard and experience as their
destiny, without denying the known fact of their ex-
istence. This communion means that they are really
taken up into the life of God who is love ; and yet
it is no presumptuous dream, which must necessarily
veer round to self-renunciation, and end in their
merging in the universe, as being communion with the
eternal whence we have sprung. We bow before Him
who raises us to the sphere of His own life : we do not
merely tolerate the fact that He is incomprehensible ;
rather, we gladly pray to Him, because He loves us ;
our grateful assurance of His Revelation of Himself is
in harmony with the confession, " For Thee, Incompre-
hensibleness is meet " (Tersteegen). Hence too, through
this faith all the strange fancies, an admixture of religi-
osity and frivolity, disappear, which are otherwise called
forth precisely by the conception of a personal God ; a
conception in which this God, who is only a man magni-
fied to infinity, is at one time denied, and at another
time again, as the persons concerned venture to
think, becomes responsible for the incomprehensible
features of the world. Then, realizing the strange-
ness of this proceeding, they decidedly put the world
in God's place ; but as they demand more of the
world than it is capable of yielding, they come out of
their grand, fantastic dreams and sink into Pessimism.
(Of. many of the points brought out by Fr. Vischer —

350

God's Love as World-transcending

" Auch Einer" — but also well-known sayings of Luther
regarding the attitude of the natural man towards his
" God ".)

In closing, we may again call to mind in this con-
nexion how difficult living faith in this living God of
supramundane, holy love, becomes for the modern con-
sciousness. Indeed its noblest champions even fre-
quently see the significance of Christianity in the fact,
that it has educated the nations to independence, **to
be able henceforth to reconcile themselves, no longer
with God, but with their own hearts " ( Ja. Burckhardt).
However much personal piety may be combined with
this opinion, it cuts right through the vital cord of
our religion, the life of which consists in the dis-
tinction between God and man being taken seriously.
" God's nature is to look below. He cannot look above,
and He cannot look around, because He has nothing
above Himself and no one like Himself. So He looks
below Himself ; therefore the deeper any one is, the
more clearly do the eyes of God behold him " (Luther).
To be sure, the forms of our thought are changing away
from the transcendence of God, and are deepening in
the measure in which we realize His immanence, rightly
understood. But if the ultimate mystery is shifted to
the soul of man itself, if the " God in man's own heart "
is in man's heart alone, real religion ceases, and all sorts
of substitutes, chiefly esthetic, take its place (cf. pp. 7
ff.). Such is the experience even of the great repre-
sentatives of the modern sentiment to which we refer, as
the hunger of their soul for the living God betrays itself
in conflicting testimonies of another cast, often with no
attempt at a reconciliation. "When I think of the
appalling contrast between the hallowed glory of that
creed which once was mine, and the lonely mystery of
existence as now I find it, I shall ever feel it impossible

351

Faith in God the Father

to avoid the sharpest pang of which my nature is sus-
ceptible " (Romanes). When such testimonies uninten-
tionally become sighs of yearning which name the name
of Jesus, they confirm, so far as they go, the correctness
of the statement regarding the inseparableness of living
faith in God from Him. " Oh, if I had lived when Jesus of
Nazareth was journeying through the land of Galilee, I
should have followed Him, and let all pride and super-
ciliousness go in love to Him ! " (Ja. Burckhardt. Cf.
among other examples Goethe's " Mysteries ".) We
shall often have to remind ourselves of this unity of
reverence and trust in contemplating the supernatural
love of God, till we get to the Doctrine of Justification.

In the name Heavenly Father as applied to God,
all the moments of the Christian idea of God, as we
have set it forth in the foregoing, are comprehended in
a distinctively concrete form. To prove this in detail
would involve repetition ; the mention of it is sufficient.
The name Father, as used by Christians, then, does not
denote God generally as the Author of the Universe, or
at least of all the life in it, nor yet as the Author of all
human spirits, or at least of those who are outstanding in
their natural existence. This generalizing of the idea is
found in the popular residuum of the traditional Church
doctrine, particularly in the commentaries on the Cate-
chisms produced in the period of Rationalism, but also in
our own day. But Luther's celebrated exposition, on the
other hand, presupposes and bears emphatic testimony to
the distinctively Christian view ; and the more general
sense is contrary to the Biblical usage, as well as to the
fundamental idea of revelation. God the Father is
Creator, but it is not as Creator that He is Father. Nor
again must we connect the Fatherhood with the fact that,
at the higher stages of self-consciousness in religion and

352

The Heavenly Father

philosophy, the most devout and wisest are called "sons of
God" (e.g. Ecclesiasticus iv. 10 f. ; Wisdom ii. 13 ; Plato) ;
however much value there may be in this thought too,
which asserts itself indeed with a new foundation in
Christianity also. Rather is the Christian use of the term
Father based upon those passages of the O.T. which de-
signate God the Father of His people ; not because He
has bestowed upon them their natural existence, but be-
cause He has given them their distinctive part in history,
and in particular their unique religious standing, making
Israel His first-born son (cf . e.g. Exod. xix. 5 ff. with paral-
lels, and Is. XL. ff. ). But in Jesus He has revealed Himself
as the love which unites with Himself and with each
other, the spiritual beings created by Him for His
kingdom — the personal fellowship of love of which we
have spoken, — and it is only this which gives us the Chris-
tian sense of the term Father as applied to God. It
thus follows for the reason already given, that God is
immediately the Father of Jesus Christ, towards whom,
as the One who personally brings about this fellow-
ship and carries it through, His love is immediately
directed, and is our Father through Him, — is the
Father of this Son, and through Him of many sons. In
token of this dependence, the word "Abba" which
Jesus used in addressing His Father has been adopted
by all who have courage through Him to use it for
themselves (Rom. viii. 15). As such a Father, namely
as love. He is the God who alone is good (Mt. xix. 17),
— the perfect Father (Mt. v. 48). This excludes every
weakly sentimental abuse of the name Father ; for as the
love had to be defined as holy love, the truth is already
in the forefront, that the Father to whom Christians
appeal is the Holy One, whose name as Father must be
kept Holy. In elaborating the statement that God is
love, we had to emphasize the truth that this love is

VOL. 1. 868 23

Faith in God the Father

exalted above and is master over the world. These
aspects of the truth are safeguarded by the words in
Heaven, which we find upon the lips of Jesus Himself,
added to the name Father. Faith is thus assured that
He it is, of whom, through whom and unto whom are
all things ; and there are maintained towards Him that
reverence and humility, without which the name Father
applied to Him, would be not an empty word merely,
but an act of blasphemy. So far as this keynote of sub-
mission, which trills in every prayer to the Father, can be
expressed in words, we find it in hymns, like ''All-
Sufficient Being ". And this truth is of quite special sig-
nificance for our day. The message which the prophet
proclaims upon the heights of culture for his Supermen
that God is dead, is only too prevalent on lower levels,
causing a thoroughgoing insensibility to spiritual things.
But we often find that even those circles who speak readily
and loudly of God as love, are not thrilled through and
through, as we should expect, by the mystery of the
eternal.

But the Christian Doctrine of God would not be at
all adequately set forth, unless in every portion it brought
home to us, in a perfectly natural manner, and not at all
by way of an addition forming a " practical application,"
the importance of its conclusions for our earthly experi-
ence. Its downright earnestness, its call to truly per-
sonal, most reverential submission, with full trust in the
heart, is by no means due merely to that aspect of the
Christian conception of God which we brought forward
last, but as much to its most characteristic content, ex-
pressed in the statement that God is love. Now as it is
certain that only in Jesus the love of God is perfectly
revealed, and therefore that perfect faith is realized only
in the sphere of that Revelation, it is equally certain
that the Christian in particular, keeping in view the

354

Imperfect Conceptions of Faith in God

content of such Revelation, is forbidden in any degree
to overrate Revelation in its external features. Just
because God has been revealed as holy love, the Christian
has to acknowledge any honest faith in God though not
yet fully revealed, — has indeed to bow in presence of it,
— so that he himself may do honour to the greater gift.
by a trust which is more complete. A specially grand
expression for this telling reminder to Christians, is
found in the pronouncement of St. Paul in Romans ii.,
regarding those who, " by patient continuance in well-
doing seek for glory and honour and immortality " ,
though this is itself only an adumbration of the words of
Jesus in Matthew xxv., in the great parable of the Judg-
ment (cf. Eschatology).

If every truth becomes clearer when we compare it,
not only with its opposite, but often still more almost,
when we compare it with imperfect representations of
itself, it may not be unprofitable, at the close of this
exposition of the Christian view of God, to refer to
IMPERFECT INTERPRETATIONS of the idea of the love of
God, at least in the form of a short survey. We dis-
tinguish them according as we meet them in the Christian
philosophy of religion, or in Dogmatics proper. As
regards the first group, we have first of all to mention
the evaporation of the distinctively Christian idea of the
love of God, or sonship to God in His Kingdom, into
that of a universal spiritual kinship in essence and one-
ness of nature between God and man — an incarnation of
God in mankind, and that to the detriment of what is
ethical. We meet with this in innumerable shapes and
colours, from ancient Gnosticism to various forms as-
sumed by the modern consciousness : then, to come to
details, ''converse with nature in our own bosoms " may
be felt to be service of God, and the " God who stands in
immediate union with nature may be looked upon as the

355

Faith in God the Father

proper God " (Goethe) ; or the divine thought may attain
to self-consciousness in the thought of the human spirit
(Hegel), — all of which admit of infinite modifications and
combinations. To views of the latter description, the
flashy concept of Monism invites at present in a seduc-
tive fashion ; but of this we have to speak again immedi-
ately. Then again the unity of God and man may be
defined in an essentially ethical way, but so as to do harm
to the directly religious relation ; and this also may be
done with many differences in detail, and not only as it was
in Rationalism. And the claim of Theosophy rises, it
is supposed, above both these one-sided positions : above
thought and volition stands immediate vision, and the
supreme idea is that of life. God is essentially Person-
ality and Love ; and thus it is believed that all the great
enigmas, the Personality of God, the existence of the
world and sin, find their solution once for all. In truth
this is to endanger the distinctively Christian fundamental
idea, to say nothing of the fact that hitherto no one has
succeeded in stating fully and clearly the epistemological
foundation. Only at the same time it must be em-
phasized that not only is the intention, especially in Jacob
Boehme himself, to Christianize all thought, but that
even the imperfect execution possesses the value of a
prophecy of another stage in our knowledge, that, namely,
which in the New Testament is called " sight," but is
there expressly reserved for the other world (2 Cor. v.
7, 1 John III. 2). A combination of all these tendencies
is found in the most modern attitude, one that is so wide-
spread, of romantic mysticism ; which, when it requires
a name for the indefinite object of its homage, rejoices
in that of Monism. It will occupy our attention further
in the Doctrine of the World, because the chief consid-
eration that led to the rise of Monism was really the in-
terest of understanding the world, not in the first

366

Imperfect Conceptions of Faith in God

instance a consciously religious interest. Here, however,
we had to allude all the more emphatically to this reli-
gious application of it, because (cf. what we said near the
beginning, p. 9 ff.) often it is recommended, with good
intention but without clearness of thought, as a means
for modernizing Christianity. E.g. Campbell (1909)
alleges, as a characteristic of the " New Theology," that
it carries out fully and consistently the truth regarding
the Divine immanence. God and the world are held to
become intelligible, if taken in conjunction with each
other, when the world is understood as God's realization
of Himself : this is a ** Pantheism which finds the whole
fulness of our self-consciousness hidden in God " ; not
that dreary type of Pantheism which philosophy puts
before us, but a purely *' active " species, having as its
watchwords, "spiritualizing and moralizing, indeed
love," — a bold flight, in which one mounts up without
concern above the facts of experience ; though undoubt-
edly there are also elements of the actual Gospel enforced,
which for long received scant justice.

In the field of theology proper, on the other hand,
we refer especially to two aberrations from the com-
mon Christian idea of God, which have been and
still are of importance. One is the co-ordination of
the divine mercy and righteousness which was a test
question in the old Protestant Orthodoxy. It is in the
doctrine of the atonement that its most important con-
sequence appears, but even there it cannot be explained
unless we are able to refer to indispensable statements
derived from the doctrine of sin. The other is the
Scotist and Socinian concept of God, according to which
the divine will is thought of as caprice : God can deal
with man as He pleases, but from a sense of fairness be-
stows upon him certain rights. Luke xvii. 10 was often
groundlessly supposed to support this view. Both these

357

Faith in God the Father

diverging views find their ultimate support in the fact that
the concept of Holy Love — of the Heavenly Father — is
not accepted in the full distinctive sense of revelation,
but has mixed with it foreign ideas of the Absolute,
as these penetrated into the thought of the Church from
Greek philosophy. On the other hand, when we follow
out the fundamental idea of Christianity without re-
serve, the " Absolute " really comes to its own. And
the "modern" man, struck dumb in presence of the
"Inconceivable," never attains to such profound per-
sonal reverence as that which characterizes the senti-
ment in which Christianity is rooted.

As a last problem of the doctrine of God, we may
ask at this point whether the definition of God as love,
in our earlier expositions of it, the superiority of which
to the views last dealt with needs no proof, is complete
— whether there is not one element still lacking. In
other words, the question arises whether the love of God
exhausts itself as love to the world, the Kingdom of
created spirits destined for the Kingdom of God. That
this Kingdom is for God no incidental purpose, must be
admitted by every one who at all acknowledges the
standpoint of revelation. Its testimony indeed inces-
santly emphasizes the eternal counsel of Divine love
(Mt. XXV. 34, Eph. I. 4, and parallels). This is recognized
by our old divines themselves, and it is in opposition
to the idea of caprice in God of which we spoke, that
they do so. But they hurry away from this thought
to another, which is in their view still more profound :
God as the Triune One loves Himself eternally. Now
in any case the necessity of this last thought cannot be
proved by the consideration, that God would be rendered
finite by His love to the Kingdom of God which comes
into being in time. For this assertion is not Christian at
all, but Neo-Platonic as we have already seen. Christian

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The Christian Conception of the World

faith necessitates our positing some sort of relation of
God to history, as real for God Himself, as the doctrine
of the Eternity of God brings out more precisely. Con-
sequently we must put the question before us as
follows : Can the world be for the love of God the ob-
ject which fully satisfies that love ? Only from the
standpoint which is here advocated, this is a subject
upon which nothing can possibly be said upon the basis
of general considerations. For our problem such con-
siderations are particularly ineffective ; we can as little
prove that the other object of which we speak is neces-
sary for the love of God, as on the other hand we
can the assertion, that God's Trinitarian love would be
self-love, and so not love. With both assertions we quite
manifestly pass the bounds within which our knowledge
is competent. The question must rather be put in this
form : Does it arise when we take our stand upon re-
velation, and if so how can it be answered when we
make revelation our basis ? This is doubtless a question
which we cannot answer at this stage, till we have con-
sidered the revelation of God in Christ in all its aspects.
There is no foundation at all for any sort of Christian doc-
trine of the Trinity, unless we find such in Christology.

THE WOELD (AS GOD'S)

We have already pointed out how this division
stands related to the one before it, and also to those
that follow (pp. 317 ff.); also that in it we are to deal
first with the world considered apart from sin, and then
with the world as sinful.

The World Considered without Reference to Sin

Here we take first the world generally, and then
man in particular.

359

Faith in God the Father

THE WORLD
Statement of the Problem

Our guiding principles with regard to method, as they
relate to the ground and norm, and consequently to the
content and compass as well as the nature, of doctrinal
knowledge, which followed from our Apologetics, and
were recalled at the commencement of our doctrine of
God (pp. 317 ff.), hold good without any modification for
the doctrine of the world likewise. Here, seeing that we
can take our doctrine of God for granted, it is sufficient to
state quite briefly, that onlysuch statements regarding the
world and man as give expression to what the world is
for the world-transcending love of God, which wills the
Kingdom of God, have any right to a place in Christian
Dogmatics. Especially at this point, even more directly
than there, we see clearly how limited the compass of
Christian doctrinal statement is : all purely metaphysical
speculations regarding the relation of the infinite and the
finite are excluded, as well as all investigations which be-
long purely to natural science. But equally obvious is the
necessity of again making good the apologetic position,
that neither such speculations nor the results of natural
science, come into conflict with the doctrines of which
we speak. A proof of this can be successful, only if
Dogmatics confines itself to its limits in both directions in
the strictest possible way : the danger of overstepping
these limits is even more widespread in this section of
our subject, than in the doctrine of God. Remembering
this danger before we start, we lay down the funda-
mental Christian idea regarding the world as God's.

This is just what stands at the head of our section
— that this world is God's world, that it belongs to the
God whose nature we have learned to know as love.
This fundamental idea receives concrete expression in

360

The Christian Conception of the World

the attitude of Jesus to the world. Jesus conducts
Himself in it with the freedom and assurance befitting
the Son of the Father, to whom, in the fellowship of
love with the Father, belongs all that is the Father's.
The world can never occupy the first place. This is
reserved for the love of the Father, and the supreme
purpose which this love realizes, the Kingdom of love.
But again, on the other hand, as certainly as the world
is not the supreme thing, so certain is it that it is not
nothing ; for in the world and from the world, God
builds up His Kingdom.

But it is not easy to carry out this fundamental
principle clearly on all sides. With this in view, we
mention in order the many questions which from time
to time force themselves upon us in the doctrine of the
world — questions which, though they are apt to go
beyond the proper limits of Dogmatics, are yet all of
them at bottom far from being factitious. The best
known is the distinction of creation and preservation ;
it is equally well known what difficulties this distinction
involves, as soon as a real attempt is made to understand
the terms. At all events, it is apt to give the question
of the origin, as distinguished from the present condi-
tion, of the world a more independent significance than
follows immediately from Christian faith. All the more
so, if the idea of preservation, which rouses no religious
warmth, takes its place alongside of that of creation, as
having equal rights ; whereas in our old divines it was
a corollary along with the latter to the comprehensive
concept of Providence. Consequently it was much less
independent : rather it was merely a presupposition
of the government of the world, supplemented moreover
by the idea of co-operation, which was intended expressly
to emphasize the living nature of the divine relation to
the created world. Within this framework there next

861

Faith in God the Father

arose a series of separate puzzling questions : as to how
far the world owes its existence to the free-will of God,
which, however, does not mean to caprice on His part ;
how far, that is, to an inner necessity of the Divine
nature ; whether it was created for God's glory, or for
the blessedness of men ; what is the Christian stand-
point regarding God's transcendence over the world, and
His immanence in the world ; what is meant when we
say that the world was " created out of nothing " ;
especially also in what way, speaking generally and in
reference to all these points, we have to understand the
Biblical expressions to the effect that the world owes its
existence to the Word or Spirit of God. All these
questions may be arranged on further reflection in two
groups : on the one hand, how is the world constituted ?
on the other, wherefore and whereunto is the world?
Or we must deal with the nature of the world on
the one hand, and its ground and purpose on the other.
The latter group of questions is the more easily
answered. It is true that the question of the nature of
the world appears the easier, inasmuch as a sure answer
is given to it in our immediate experience. But as soon
as reflection is directed to the problem — What then in
its inmost nature is this existence in space and time, of
content so rich, as it is related to the Eternal God of
love ? — abysmal depths, impenetrable to our thought,
open up before us and become darker the more we peer
into them. The finite in its relation to the infinite,
which is the fundamental enigma of all human know-
ledge, for it is that of our existence, is for Christian faith
all the more mysterious, as what faith has to do with is
the relation of the living God who is love, to a world in
which the Kingdom of personal beings, beloved by Him
and loving Him and each other, is to actualize itself.
However, this mystery has always afforded scope for

362

The Purpose and Ground of the World

the reflection of minds of the prof ounder type ; and it
finds, e.g. in Aristotle's saying, that '* nature is not a god,
but a demigod," a clearer expression than in that hasty
identification of God and nature which is so often at-
tempted, but does no more than merely conceal the diffi-
culty. Amid this perplexity we realize at least this one
thing that, so far as the question of the nature of the
world in its relation to God admits of any answer at
all, the answer will be found in that to our second group
of questions, those relating to the ground and purpose
of the world. And as a matter of fact, more direct light
is cast by revelation upon the question of the purpose of
the world, than upon that of its ground : the ground
itself needs the purpose to elucidate it. Accordingly
we invert the order of the main questions we have
indicated, and deal first with the purpose and ground of
the world, and then ask. What is the world ? As we
treat of each of these points, the various great traditional
problems mentioned above will find their own natural
place, and the whole will issue in a discussion of the
Word and Spirit of God.

The answer to the question of the end or purpose
of the world, is directly implied in the Christian faith in
God as love. The world has its end in the love of God,
which directs itself to the realization of the Kingdom of
God. The world is the means to this end, nothing but
the means, but also as the means really necessary. The
direct means are the finite spirits who, ceasing to be con-
ditioned by nature, are destined to become members of
the Kingdom of God ; the indirect, the whole world as
the means for this advance of theirs. In saying this, we
are addmg nothing new to the Christian faith in God, as
on the other hand the statement itself has no meaning
apart from the presupposition of Christian faith ; but we
are contemplating it explicitly from a definite point of

363

Faith in God the Father

view. If God wills the supreme end of His love, His
Kingdom, He must necessarily will the world as the
means for His end, otherwise His end would be incapable
of realization ; and indeed He must will the quite definite
world that we know, otherwise He would not will the
best means for the best end. But He wills it only as the
means, otherwise His end would not be His end. This
fundamental formula which is a double-faced unity, is
for faith no empty formula. Its life is the assurance
that absolutely the whole world is the means for God's
purpose — that all things work for the best to them that
love God. The Lord's Prayer uniformly testifies to this
assurance ; even temptation and evil are embraced as
means by God's good will, which is to be done in earth
as it is in Heaven, and in the doing of which God's
Kingdom comes. But this other point is also of great
significance for faith : means is always means, and when
the end is reached, the means has done its work. That
applies to everything in particular in this present world,
and to the world as a whole. When once the structure
of the Kingdom of God in its earthly temporal form is
complete, the whole scaflfolding is removed ; new means
serve the eternal purpose : we wait for a new heaven
and a new earth. With sublime simplicity Paul sums
up all this in the phrase, " Unto Him are all things "
(Rom. XI. 36). But because the realization of the Divine
purpose depends, as we saw when dealing with the love
of God, upon His revelation in Christ, and He is its
original object, we can also say, " All things are created
unto Christ" (Col. i. 16).

When we state that the end of the world is the King-
dom of God, and that the world is the means for the King-
dom of God, the great problem of olden days, whether
the world exists for the glory 0/ God, or for the blessedness
of man, has found its solution. We have got beyond

364

The Purpose and Ground of the World

such a way of putting the question : it is not a case of
an alternative. If God is love, His end and ours coin-
cide. When we are dealing with the gods of the world,
the creation of man's own imagination, there may be
conflict between their glory and the well-being of their
subjects ; but for the true God, who is good, eternal
blessedness springs from the love that confers bliss.
And anything further that may be alleged, — say, as to
God's joy in creating, apart from the fulfilment of His
supreme purpose — so far as it is clear and well war-
ranted, may be taken up into our proposition. But the
assertion may also encourage useless dreaming. For
with the supreme purpose there must, humanly speaking,
be associated even the boldest play of such Divine fancy ;
although there is likewise an attendant freedom which
is not transparent to us at present.

The second question, " Why does the world exist ? '*
receives its answer from the one that we have al-
ready discussed, ''Whereunto does the world exist?'*
If the supreme purpose of the world is to be the means
for God's purpose, the Almighty love of God must be
its sole ground ; if it is " unto " Him it must be " from '*
Him, as the two are placed side by side in the Pauline
doxology. For if, speaking generally, every purpose is
real in the measure in which it is master of the means for
its own realization, the reality of the supreme purpose
is inseparably bound up with absolute power to provide
all the means for it. Indeed this is just what ordinary
language means by the word " create," the use of which,
accordingly, it confines to such human activity as re-
sembles the divine activity in the respect indicated, or
is supposed to resemble it. Of course this statement
regarding the ground of the world, in correspondence
with the previous one regarding its purpose, may likewise
be interpreted in two ways ; the world is only of God,,

365

Faith in God the Father

but it is of God. And when we find in the New Testa-
ment, together with the phrase " of Him," the other
expression "through Him," and when it is said besides
that everything that exists is full of God, these variants
serve the interest of faith, enabling us to realize vividly
the world's dependence on God in different relations,
which will naturally present themselves to us again in
what follows. Something similar applies to the use of
the preposition in ("in Him"), comprising as it does, in
a certain sense, " to, of, and through ". But because the
judgment regarding the origin of the world is based
entirely upon the judgment regarding its end, and its
end is inseparable from the revelation of God in Christ,
on this account, in the New Testament its origin also
is referred back derivatively to Christ, and we are told
that all things are created through Him (Col. i. 16) ;
a statement in regard to which the question whether,
and how far, this is to be construed as a personal relation
to the creation of the world, must be reserved for
Christology.

In saying that the sole ground of the world is the
love of God, and that the world is absolutely from God,
we have at the same time answered another of the stand-
ing questions of which we spoke, so far as it admits of
a rational answer ; namely, whether the world is necess-
ary for God, or has been brought into existence by a
free act on His part. We have passed beyond this state-
ment of the question also ; such an alternative does not
exist. Because God is Love, He necessarily wills the
world as the object of His love, but this necessity is not
compulsion : it is, on the contrary, the highest freedom
of the good will ; and for this same reason this freedom
is not caprice. In other words, the world is as little a
necessary effluence from God or development of God
(Emanation or Evolution), as it is the plaything of His

366

The Ground of the World

whim. This follows logically from the idea of the love
of God, as we have discussed it (pp. 339 ff.). Only the
answer we have given safeguards for faith its reverent
gratitude. It is true that to revel in the thought of the
caprice of God, appears to many to afiford a still more
sure foundation for humility on man's part ; but they
fail to note that Muder such circumstances we can no
longer have genuine trust, and consequently cannot have
real humility. On the other hand, Christian piety
knows no other necessity which God found for creating
the world except that of love. The idea which is so
much in vogue at present, that the history of the world
is God's redemption of Himself, contradicts the funda-
mental attitude of Christianity towards God : the idea
which is so important, in Ethics especially, that we are
fellow-workers with God, is moulded on a different
principle. No doubt in the truth of the Atonement as
set forth in Christianity, we shall come to see incom-
parable devotion to the world on God's part ; but even
this is devotion on the part of One who is distinguished
from the world and is the Ruler of it. If it is objected
that our answer to the question now discussed does not
satisfy knowledge, we may say that to wish to know
more leads in this instance, as in that other of which we
spoke, to the meaningless question how God can be God.
When one considers in their mutual relations the
two positions which we have laid down so far regarding
the end and ground of the world, as they are determined
by faith in God, it is clear that the first is a direct con-
sequence of the faith that God is Love, while the
second is an inference from the nature of that love,
presupposed in such faith, and defined with greater pre-
cision as "world-transcending" or "absolute" (to use the
word quite as on pp. 348 ff.), but that both are derived
from the one elemental thought that God is love. We

367

Faith in God the Father

have now to derive from both positions what we can say
regarding the nature of the world, which, though not much,
is yet sufficient. In accordance with the relation which
we have just mentioned between the two statements re-
garding the purpose and the ground of the world, we
have to deduce first of all from the former, a statement
regarding the nature of the world according to its content,
as it definitely presents itself to us ; and from the second,
a statement regarding the/orm of its existence, the con-
dition of its being, though the two form an inseparable
unity.

As regards the former, the world must have some
sort of affinity with God, some term of comparison with
Him, just as on the other hand it must be something
different from God. To deny either of these statements
would be to nullify the concept of the love of God, for
it demands an object distinct from God, which, however,
out of His desire for its well-being and pleasure in it,
can become one with Him in community of purpose
(pp. 339 ff.). The world must be planned with a view to
love and, as a presupposition of this, to spiritual life, and
consequently to transcending space and time ; but at
the same time, it must not as yet be love or spiritual life,
but only be in process of becoming such, and that too
subject to the limits of space and time. These are
necessary thoughts, but the elaboration of them in detail
is beyond the power of our earthly knowledge ; for even
these last statements of om^s contain nothing that is
essentially new, as compared with the guiding principle
with which we started, but are actually liable to be
misinterpreted : how often is the conclusion of the
necessity of sin drawn from the thought, that the world
is not yet spiritual life or love, but is only in process of
becoming such, — " not yet " being turned into a logical
contrary ! We experience, we may say now with still

368

The Nature of the World

greater clearness than before, what the world as related
to God is in its nature. But our concepts do not carry
us beyond the thought, that it is the means for th&
realization of the Divine purpose of love. It is not
granted to us to fathom the working of these means in
detail ; indeed, in the Doctrine of Providence, we shall
come upon enigmas in this regard, which are of alto-
gether exceptional difficulty. Only we understand
further, that this experience would be something differ-
ent, it would contradict its supreme purpose, if it lay
open to our knowledge with the power to compel assent
that belongs to a question in addition (pp. 149 f.). In
other words, we are standing once more at the portals
of the one great mystery, the significance of which will
gradually become clearer to us, as we proceed with our
presentation of Dogmatics, without its ever ceasing to
be a mystery. It occupies us when dealing with the
conception of the Personality and Eternity of God, of
Sin, in Christology, in the Doctrine of the Spirit, in that
of Regeneration, in Eschatology ; and already, in prin-
ciple, it formed the distinctive problem of Apologetics,
when we were determining the relation between faith
and knowledge.

Once more, the statement we have made — our first,
regarding the nature of the world — gives us the answer
to one of the stock problems of theological tradition,
naturally of course with the same limitations as before.
That is to say, the directly religious meaning of the
problem of the Immanence and the Transcendence of
God, is seen to be simply what we have just acquainted
ourselves with. The one emphasizes the likeness
between God and the world, which is necessary for the
sake of His love ; the other, the unlikeness which is
equally necessary. For living Christianity, the one is as
necessary as the other. But there is harm which it is

VOL. I. 369 24

Faith in God the Father

difficult to obviate, arising from the fact that the
friends of our religion allow themselves far too often to
be persuaded by its adversaries, that when we emphasize
the Immanence, without which in truth the most vital
interests of piety are compromised, the result is Pan-
theism. This opinion is based on a misty idealistic
conception of Pantheism, and on a conception of Theism
which is equally misty, being a caricature ; a matter
which we had to emphasize again and again, and will
yet have to emphasize in what follows. Here, however,
it should further be expressly remarked that the words
Transcendence and Immanence are used in a variety of
senses, especially to include the truth which we are to
discuss directly, that of the nature of the world accord-
ing to its form. In fact the two questions are insepar-
able.

The question, how is the world conditioned ? must
be answered in a formal point of view with a similar
necessary principle, which again we are incapable of
applying in detail . it is absolutely dependent upon God,
and it is relatively independent in relation to God ; both
of which statements are to be understood in the sense
which follows from the concept of the love of God
(considered in this case primarily as the ground, just as
before it was considered primarily as the end of the
world). Dependence in the sense of natural necessity,
makes love quite impossible ; independence, in the sense
of the doing away with the distinction between creature
and Creator, does away with the love of God. For this
reason, such dependence and freedom do not involve
any contradiction for the experience of faith, but
obviously they call for more precise definition. At our
present stage, there are many concepts still lacking,
before the problem can be so much as clearly put. In
especial, it would not yet be possible to explain what

370

The Nature of the World

enormous importance belongs to the relative independ-
ence of the world of which we speak, in its bearing upon
religious and moral personality as related to God's
government of the world. It is only when we reach the
sections dealing with Providence and Sin, that we shall
have more precise information upon this subject. Simi-
larly the general question of the relation of the divine
causality to finite causes, is reserved for the place where
it comes into consideration in view of the interests of
faith.

Here also one of the traditional questions finds its
answer, and in fact the one of them which most stands
in the forefront of human thought, that relating to the
twin-concepts of creation and preservation. Even irre-
spective of the fact that the word " preserve," which is
equivalent to "prevent detriment," is not appropriate
as applied to God in His relation to the world, simply
to understand the distinction between cfi^eation and
preservation as one between beginning and continu-
ance, establishing and being established, existence and
development, conveys a clear idea only to the person
who is not yet alive to the problem of time in relation
to God and the world — say, the general problem of the
Infinite and the finite — or aware that it is one that can-
not be solved. This seems to indicate that the one con-
cept should be resolved into the other. Only the reduc-
tion of preservation to creation, and the assumption in
consequence of a continuous creation, though it does give
living expression to the complete dependence of the world
upon God, and the living reality of His activity in every
moment of the development, not only fails to satisfy the
interest which we have asserted above in the relative
independence of the world, but endangers it in favour
of a purely natural absolute dependence. On the other
hand, the resolving of creation into preservation, as at-

371

Faith in God the Father

tempted by Schleiermacher, if the concept is really to
have a definite meaning, endangers God's sovereignty
over the world in the Christian sense, the divine freedom
of the love of God of which we spoke, as distinguished
from natural necessity. One should not be led to have
any doubt as to this result, one which is undeniable, by
the fact that the argumentation in Schleiermacher's ex-
position may in the first instance produce the opposite
impression, that it is just in this way alone that the
independence of the world, and its dependence on God,
are preserved. The reason for this appearance is found
in Schleiermacher's concept of God. These attempts
consequently show that to reduce the two concepts to
one of them, always injures one interest of faith, which
in one and the same experience does justice to both,
the complete dependence of the world upon God on the
one hand, and its relative independence on the other ; as
the statement we have made above asserts provisionally,
expressly reserving more detailed explanation. In the
sense of this statement, therefore, both concepts are to
be maintained, to give expression to the two needs of
faith, which are in reality one and the same need. We
may therefore be allowed to give lively expression once
more to the pure Christian conviction ; as we are con-
strained to do in connexion with each of the conceptions
just treated. Our reverential trust looks to the God
who wills such a world. And we know by faith why
we concede no other idea with regard to the world : it
would not lead us on to profounder trust and prof ounder
reverence, but would injure us in both respects.

In connexion with this topic, an idea finds its
proper place which deserves mention because of its his-
torical importance, if for no other reason, that namely
of the Creation of the world "out of nothing". Its
exegetical foundation is 2 Maccabees vii. 28, whereas

372

The Nature of the World

in Hebrews xi. 3 it is only implied. The words, " By-
faith we understand that the worlds have been framed
by the word of God, so that what is seen hath not been
made out of things which do appear," mean that in
Creation God had the intention of making us understand
that the visible is made out of the invisible, and that
only faith can comprehend this. We have the thought
expressed in the most purely religious sense in Komans
IV. 17. The epigrammatic phrase, " out of nothing," is
therefore the strongest conceivable way of denying that
matter has any sort of existence independently of God.
It was for this reason that the phrase became the watch-
word of early Christianity, in its conflict with the ancient
view of the world, as possessed of some sort of false in-
dependence in relation to God, and in its rejection of
every false identification of the world with God ; for the
one error leads necessarily to the other. Its victory here
was a victory over all infra-Christian dualism as well
as all Pantheistic monism (emanation or evolution). In
all our modern battles against any unchristian construc-
tion of the concepts in question (matter, space, and time,
view of the world, development), we may employ the old
phrase as a brief designation for the Christian funda-
mental idea regarding the world, or more accurately for
those aspects of it which emphasize the unconditional
dependence of the world upon God, and the fact that it
is different from God — truths which must be emphasized,
otherwise it is impossible to maintain those others, which
in their way are equally indispensable, namely the re-
lative independence of the world in relation to God, and
its likeness to Him.

We have still to deal with the fact that, and the
extent to which, all these statements regarding the goal
and the ground of the world, as well as its nature as de-
fined thereby, correspond to the Biblical assertions that

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Faith in God the Father

the world was created by the Word and Spirit of God.
In the Old Testament the world is referred to the Word
or Spirit of God, whether alone or in conjunction, as
Genesis i. and Psalm xxxiii. 6 with their parallels soon
show. This is so, both when the reference is to its ex-
istence generally, and when it is to its continuance, and
progress. In the New Testament in these connexions the
Word stands in the forefront. Inasmuch as the Word is
the utterance or revelation of the Will, and of course of a
Will that has a definite content, is rational and sets itself
an end, the expression that the world was called into
being by the Word of God, and is sustained by the Word
of His Power, emphasizes the fact that the world is
determined absolutely by — is absolutely dependent upon
— God, and its unlikeness to God ; for we cannot express
the absolute determination of a matter by our wills more
strongly, than by saying that the utterance of our wills
is the sole ground of its existence. In the whole com-
pass of the world, in inanimate nature (Gen. i. 4), in
animal life (Num. xvi. 22), in the religious as also the
moral life of the Church (Rom viii.), Holy Scripture
sees the working of the Spirit of God. The word is
therefore used in very many ways, as regards the extent
of the Spirit's working. The idea of the Spirit is a
difficult one too, because He appears at one time as an
active power of God outside of God (Ps. civ. 30 with
parallels), at another as the Divine Self-consciousness
(Is. XL. 13, 1 Cor. II. 1 ff.). The explanation of this is
that in all the activities of which we speak, God is
thought of actively, as the Person who realizes the
fullness of His manifold but self-consistent purposes,
which constitute the content of the Divine self-conscious-
ness. The expression that the world owes its existence
to the Spirit of God, consequently emphasizes its relative
likeness to God, and its relative independence. Though

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Creation by the Word and Spirit of God

in what we have said we have emphasized primarily
the distinction between the two ideas Word and Spirit,
it is nevertheless clear that the two go together. God's
will is in the highest degree rich in content, and in the
highest degree purposeful ; the purpose of God is not
an unreal one and only ideal, but is a purpose that
absolutely realizes itself. To use human terms, God is
rational will and volitional reason. We may say then,
in conclusion, that the religious significance of these
Biblical expressions is just the same that we gave ex-
pression to in our statements regarding the nature of
the world, upon the basis of our statements regarding
the end and ground of the world. There is no need
to work out the parallels in detail. They are before
us, including even those stock problems which we have
discussed each time by way of an appendix. Further,
it need only be mentioned here that if the world is
created for Christ as its end, and through Christ, it is
clear why the New Testament brings the creative Word
into connexion with Jesus Christ as the Mediator of
salvation, and the Spirit becomes the Holy Spirit of
God and Christ. But the only conclusion for our doc-
trine of God, which we can draw from this at our present
stage, is the one already established, namely that our
God as Love is a God who reveals and communicates
Himself. Whether we can infer from it that there are
distinctions in the inner life of the Godhead (Father,
Son = Word, Spirit), can be decided only after we have
dealt with the doctrines of Christ and of the Holy Spirit.
People may call these statements about God's world
dry theorems, if they are only correct. It will not be
difficult to follow them out and apply them ; only it
must not be forgotten that what is most graphic and
pleasing about them belongs to Christian Ethics. There
our theorems will have to be verified through the wealth

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Faith in God the Father

of concrete matter di-awn from civilized societies. But
no exposition, however attractive, can enable us to get
over the acknowledged truth that in the world, if it is
not to be put in the place of God, but is to remain His
world, our Christian knowledge is confronted by limits,
the significance of which we can understand, but which
we must not overstep. If this is steadily kept in view,
we shall be able to appreciate fully any descriptions
from the life of the Christian's attitude of freedom as
towards nature, as he masters it and enjoys it ; but the
inherent right of such attitude is proved by the principles
we have established, while they also prevent its abuse.

Such is the fundamental Christian principle regard-
ing the world as God's, as it can be inferred from the
Christian view of God. But like this, it stands in need
of

Apologetic Vindication

No successful defence is possible, as long as there
are in the name of Christian Faith unwarranted in-
vasions OF alien spheres. The quickest way of passing
these under review is to direct attention first of all to
those which appeal to Genesis, Chapter i. Some of them
are of a more speculative kind, others belong rather to
natural science.

Under the former heading we have, e.g., the theory
which inserts a fall of angels between verses 1 and 2
of that chapter ; this was what made the earth waste
and void, and the whole present creation is but an
intermediate stage between the proper creative act
of God, referred to in the words, "In the beginning"
(Gen. I. 1), and '' the new heaven and the new earth " of
Revelation, ch. xxi. This undoubtedly does violence
to the text, and that in a way which is far from un-
objectionable. For one thing, it is generally found in

376

The World and Genesis I

combination with the theosophical ideas which we re-
jected (p. 356 f.), regarding the evolving of the Personality
of God out of His nature, which is supposed to explain the
mystery of God on the one hand, and that of the world
and of sin on the other, but in truth, so far from ex-
plaining it, actually does injustice to its distinctively
Christian form. Again an emphasis which cannot be
justified, or at all events in any way proved at our
present stage, is laid upon the ruin of God's world by
powers opposed to God.

More importance attaches to the scientific inter-
pretations or, as they really are, misinterpretations,
of the first chapter of the Bible. Once upon a time,
in the Old Protestant Dogmatics, as at an earlier date
in the Scholastic, only with even greater strictness,
there was based upon the doctrine of inspiration the
view, that it was an infallible source of information
regarding even the external course of the creation, a
sort of supernatural text-book of natural science ; al-
though in many respects the original meaning was
modified, to bring it into harmony with the ancient
and especially the Aristotelian view of nature, which
was accepted on independent grounds. As there can
no longer be any question of this, there is a widespread
tendency in present-day Apologetics, which attempts as
much as possible to bring the results of modern natural
science into accord with the Old Testament Text. This
cannot be accomplished without strained Exegesis.
For example, to understand the days of Creation as
periods — in itself an idea to which no exception can be
taken — is contrary to the plain sense of the creation
narrative. But putting the matter generally, such at-
tempts fail to recognize the purpose of this chapter and
allied portions of the Old Testament. If it had been
their intention to give information free from error in

377

Faith in God the Father

every particular regarding the manner of creation, they
could not have shown such indifference in regard to the
agreement of the separate statements as is actually the
case, and as no one can fail to see, who so much as com-
pares the first and second chapters of Genesis, or both,
singly and together, with Psalm civ. It is true that
there is no contradiction between the fundamental
religious ideas which there find expression, but it is
equally true that there is no such harmony in the pre-
sentation and sequence of the separate events, as is
asserted by the Apologetics of which we speak. And
if the assertion is made nevertheless, it is not an
amateurish fancy of no importance, but a manifest
injury to faith. This is so, not merely because its
certainty necessarily suffers from the attempts at har-
monizing, which but soothe without convincing, but
because it is wronged in its inmost nature. The pur-
pose of the Divine revelation, namely salvation, is ob-
scured, and so is the nature of faith as personal trust
in the God who reveals Himself for our salvation.
Such self-imposed faith in a revelation asserted by man,
not bestowed by God, which being our own work passes
only too readily into importunate dogmatism, necessarily
destroys moreover the credit of genuine faith in wide
circles, whose knowledge is often practically confined
to the spurious. It is obvious that this judgment con-
cerning a use of such Old Testament passages which
apparently shows special faith, but in reality shows a
lack of faith, is not directed against the attitude of a
devout heart or of devout fellowship circles, in becoming
devotionally engrossed in such passages : for them the
promise given to sincerity certainly holds good here also.
But we have something quite different, when such an
attitude towards Scripture, one which we can respect in
view of the individuals who represent it, produces in

878

The World and Genesis I

the minds of imperfectly educated theologians some bad
theory, which is then imposed on believing lay circles as
a necessary demand of faith. In opposition to this, the
interests of faith itself impose upon real theology the
duty of making a correct application, in our present
section as well as elsewhere, of the principles as to the
use of Scripture which follow from its actual character,
as the testimony of faith to revelation. We have to
remember especially that no Christian doctrine can be
based solely upon the Old Testament. Thus for the
Christian doctrine of the world, the short New Testa-
ment statement that it is created for Christ, is more
important than all the details found in Genesis i. But
if we allow this chapter to convey to us in the first
instance the exact sense it bears in the Old Testament,
as testifying to the relation of God to the world applic-
able to the preparatory revelation, it becomes clear to
us then how much it has to say even to us Christians.
And the more strictly historical our attitude is, the less,
e.g. we deny or minimise the undoubted points of con-
tact between the contents of the chapter and the
traditions of other peoples, especially the Babylonians,
the more conspicuous will be the uniqueness of the
Spirit who has claimed this material as His own, trans-
formed its character, and made it an instrument to serve
His higher end ; the more is " Babel and Bible " not an
alternative between want of faith and what passes for
faith, but an aid to genuine faith, humbly meditating
upon the ways of God. With ever-increasing gratitude,
Christendom will then recognize how certain funda-
mental presuppositions of its own faith, such as the
absolute dependence of the world upon God of which
we spoke, alongside of its relative independence, its
unlikeness to God and its affinity with Him, its suita-
bility for the supreme end, the Kingdom of God, its

379

Faith in God the Father

significant gradations of being culminating in mankind,
called to fellowship with God, are expressed with un-
surpassed clearness in the words which are as simple as
they are impressive, " God spoke and it was done," " let
us make man," " it was all very good ". But such an
estimate is impossible without absolute truthfulness.
With gratitude and joy therefore, the publications of
the " Kepler Society " are to be welcomed, in proportion
as they give us to understand with increasing clearness
that the principles which we have set forth are ad-
mitted.

But even where there is no explicit relation to Genesis,
Dogmatics has not always kept within its appointed
bounds. Here, however, it is sufficient to mention
briefly one or two examples. Speculations about space
and time do not belong to Dogmatics, if it is meant
that the one opinion on this head as such is Christian,
and the other as such is unchristian ; the view that
the world is limited in space and time being Christian,
the one that it is unlimited being unchristian. The
question, which is not coincident with this one, whether
recognition of the impossibility of solving this problem
may perhaps be of service to Christian faith in an apolo-
getic direction, will come before us when dealing with
the eternity of God. As with regard to space and
time, the same applies to theories of the nature of
matter, and also to those questions which belong directly
to pure natural science, in particular the development
of the separate forms, inorganic and organic. But inas-
much as there is always the further possibility of con-
clusions being arrived at which are detrimental to the
fundamental Christian principle regarding the world,
we discuss these points, so far as it is necessary to dis-
cuss them at all, not from what has been our standpoint
hitherto — namely that Dogmatics must confine itself to

Materialism and Monism

its own proper subject — but from the other, that it
must be able to defend its own fundamental principle
against attacks. Only, there is one other point which
should not be passed over without some mention. I
refer to the attempt which is always cropping up in
some form or other, to maintain in its entirety, or to re-
store, " the Biblical view of the world," as against the
modern one. For example, it has recently been made
with special energy by Lepsius. However Christian the
intention may be, the result is harmful to our faith.
This Biblical view of the world, as it is called, is neither
Biblical, nor is it in itself clear. For nothing comes of
such attempts unless we give new meanings to the Bib-
lical words for " above " and " beneath," " Heaven,"
"Earth," and "the Under-world". But the manifest
indefiniteness of the views which have the new meanings
put upon them arouses the suspicion, that the case is no
better with the actual doctrines of religious faith. The
position is similar with regard to Biblical Psychology,
as it is called. The truly Scriptural course on the other
hand is to abandon resolutely merely temporary thought-
forms in Scripture, and to be permeated with the eternal
principles of revelation in our judgments regarding the
world of experience.

The VINDICATION OF THE ARTICLES OF CHRISTIAN DOC-
TRINE WITH REGARD TO THE WORLD, prCSUppOSCS all that

was said in our Apologetics concerning faith and know-
ledge ; here we are dealing with a definite application of
it, though this again throws light upon the fundamental
principles. A word first of all regarding the various
general theories of the universe which are directly op-
posed to the Christian one. Powerfully impressed by
the unchanging regularity of events in the material
world, but especially by the regular interconnexion of
the material and the spiritual, with which psychophysics

381

Faith in God the Father

and psychiatry have made us specially familiar, Material-
ism reduces the whole of reality to the material, and
sees in the so-called spiritual processes merely special
functions of matter. But while they are inseparably
combined for our experience, there is no parallelism be-
tween the two sorts of processes, and consequently the
one is not reducible to the other. The concept of
matter presupposed lands us in contradictions from
which there is no escape. Speaking generally, that of
which alone we have immediate experience — the spirit-
ual— is derived from what is first discovered through its
instrumentality — the material. All this has not only
been proved irrefutably by Philosophy, as Psychology,
Logic, and Epistemology, but is also admitted without
dispute by an increasing number of natural scientists,
who are capable of distinguishing between what is real
natural science and what is fancy. Under pressure
of this opposition, avowed Materialism now finds its
adherents for the most part only among the imperfectly
educated. All the more loudly is Monism extolled as
the genuinely modern theory of the universe : the real
is in its ultimate basis the spiritual and the material in-
separably united. This idea is unexceptionable as a
demand of our spirit in its struggle after oneness. It
is, however, anything but a solution of the riddle of the
universe. On the contrary it is an empty word, as long
as the spiritual and the material processes cannot be
really brought into line with each other ; which means,
by reason of the limitations inherent in our conscious-
ness, for all time. As a matter of fact, consequently, the
Monism of which we speak is often merely a grander
word for the old Materialism, since in the application
no serious attempt is made to do justice to the equal
rights of the spiritual and the material. That is all the
more dangerous from the fact that the indefiniteness of

Materialism and Monism

the word permits of the satisfaction, at least in appear-
ance, of other and quite different interests, especially
esthetic, though also to a certain extent religious. In
particular it commends itself to a countless number
of the more highly educated class, as a means of
combining pantheistic sentiment with exact investiga-
tion of nature, as the writings of Boelsche, and his
Prefatory observations in the new edition of "Ancient
Mystics " may prove. The incompatibility of such
speculations with the Christian view of the world as
God's, needs no further proof here : it consists — apart
from the identification of God and the world — especially
in the endangering of freedom, by an application of
the idea of causality which admits of no proof. Re-
garding the scientific basis of Monism, what was
brought out in our Apologetics holds good generally
speaking. Though Monism is known, not without
reason, as modern Spinozism, yet Spinoza's position that
the order of our thoughts represents the real order of
things, in its indifference to the particular questions
which press upon us, and undisturbed as yet by the
Criticism applied by Reason to its own powers, makes a
more imposing and clearer impression, as he presents it,
than we find in his modern disciples. In particular, it
is to be hoped that that obscurity on the score of prin-
ciple in the use made of the word Monism, which gains
for him numerous adherents, should be more and more
carefully examined ; namely the confusion between
unity in the theory of the world and the assumption of
a single Substance of homogeneous content. Who
would give up Monism in that first sense of the word ?
But who can prove that such a thing is simply possible,
if the word is understood in the second sense ? Indeed,
who can adopt this latter position without doing violence
to facts, and those too the principal facts of personal

333

Faith in God the Father

moral life, and therefore without paying a price which
real knowledge can never pay without renouncing itself ?

If this monism, regarded as a deliberate system, is an
opponent that must be taken seriously, the same cannot
be said of half-understood modes of speech which are
found at certain congresses, and in the superficial litera-
ture of popular propagandism, and which cover their
emptiness with the grand word " Monism ". Under
this head fall inter alia many assertions regarding the
nature of matter, the confidence of which stands in in-
verse ratio to their clearness, or regarding space and
time, or regarding the significance of the earth in the
universe as a whole, or regarding evolution, — in a word
all those concepts with reference to which Christian
Dogmatics was warned above against transgressing its
own proper boundaries. It is neither possible nor
necessary to mention now all the ways in which Natural
Science or Speculation upon such points may, in their
turn, overstep their proper limits, and to show where
they are in error. But it is well worth our while to
remind ourselves of the principle, that there are two
sides to the ideas with which we are dealing, inasmuch
as, regarded as a whole, they can either leave Christian
faith unaffected, or on the other hand oppose it.

Christian faith is not at all affected by the concept
of matter, so far as it appears simply as the presupposi-
tion of investigations in natural science ; as such indeed
it comes under consideration merely as a hypothesis for
the simplest possible explanation of certain processes.
But speculative philosophy can also form a concept of
matter, about which Christian faith is not concerned
one way or the other, that of empty space for example,
or of the possible. On the other hand, the idea of
"formless matter" ("the matter without form" of
Wisdom XI. 17), whether it be further defined as the

R84

View of the World : Christian Faith

Chaos of the ancients or the " Nature in God " of the
Theosophists, or the sum of the atoms or of energy, if
by this is meant the ultimate reahty in the metaphysical
sense, is not a Christian one ; and here it may be noted
with satisfaction, that this last-mentioned confusion be-
tween a fundamental presupposition of natural science
and a tenet of metaphysics happily seems to be now
getting less frequent again. Dogmatics cannot even
speak of a Divine world-idea as independent of the
Divine will to love, or of eternal truths as in any way
limiting that will, without danger — the danger namely
of doing injury to its own guiding idea of the purpose
and ground of the world. Before we are aware, such
matter or world-idea or eternal truths often become an
obstacle to the realization of the Divine purpose. In
particular, it affords ground for conceiving of evil as a
necessity or for limiting finite spirits to their present
type of existence, as the only one possible for them.
Speculations regarding space and time naturally go with
those regarding matter. We can think of some such
which in like manner endanger the Christian faith in
the unconditioned power of God over the world. No
doubt we must here admit once more that the inclina-
tion to indulge in dangerous flights of thought of the
kind, is not infrequently fostered by a claim to om-
niscience as regards the riddle of the universe, which
is made in the name of Christian faith.

At present another of these particular questions is
more in the forefront, that namely which concerns the
change in our view of the world brought about by Coper-
nicus, as compared with that held by the ancients.
Quite a favourite weapon in the conflict with Christian
faith is to ask whether our whole attitude of mind must
not be essentially altered, and turned into one contrary
to the Christian, if the earth is dislodged from being the

VOL. I. 385 25

Faith in God the Father

centre of the universe, and becomes simply a small body
in the infinity of space. The reproach of Celsus of old
ab<3at the conceit of pnny man, and what is supposed to
be a revelation of Grod in the comer of Galilee, comes
before us again in a new form, and with what looks an
incomparably better foundation, in the calm, di^mified
speech of science. This e.g. is an up-to-date method of
setting to work in " The Universe and Mankind " • The
universe and mankind, the eternal and the temporal,
what is of heavenly greatness alongside of what is of
earthly httleness — it has first to be stated what causes
us to unite in such bonds the universal sway of nature,
and the totality of living, thinking beings. The inference
is now drawn that hitherto we have confined ourselves
in too one-sided a fashion to the history of mankind,
without fixing our attention upon the universe as a
whole : we know now the significance of the general
forces of nature for the body and spirit of man, and the
evolution of human civilization : we also know man's
struggle with the forces of nature and the triumphal
march of human progress. Thus it becomes clear to us
that out of the timid beings who once fled before the
powers of nature, and who thought themselves and
their earth the centre of the world, in our day bold
combatants have arisen who, in spite of the knowledge
that man, and earth his ever-revolving habitation, are
merely like a grain of dust in the infinitude of the uni-
verse, have already reduced many a gigantic enemy to
slavery in the temple of civilization. Expositions of this
kind show clearly what is the basis of one form of opposi-
tion to the Christian conception of the world. It is not
in the facts, but in the explanation of them, or more
accurately in the attitude of mind which is only partly
explained by the facts, but for the most part springs
from quite different sources. Where there is a living

View of the World : Christian Faith

faith, the enlarging of our conception of the world will
increase our reverence, gratitude, and adoration ; faith
should and could be strengthened by the feeling of the
vastness of God's thoughts, so unexpectedly widened
and deepened. For example, the words of the Psalm,
"Even the darkness is not dark with Thee," receive
what is for us moderns a wonderfully impressive illus-
tration, in the discoveries in Optics. Indeed, even the
wonder which is felt as to whether perhaps God's pur-
pose of love extends beyond this earth and its inhabit-
ants, has long been familiar, in another form, to many a
simple Bible Christian, through the faith expressed in
the first period of the Church : To Christ principalities
and powers are subject, and through Him God has re-
conciled the universe (Col. i. 16 ff.). To be sure, such
words ought not to be modernized ; but the narrowness
of outlook with which faith is charged is not on its
side. It is only if the insinuation is that the revelation
of God in Christ in its inmost kernel, can be disproved
or superseded, that God is not love, and that the King-
dom of the Divine love is not the supreme purpose of the
world, that the Christian will feel that the widening of
the horizon of which we have spoken, is detrimental to
his faith. Certainly such insinuation is often implied,
even when it is not expressed, in those hymns to the
Universe and to mankind which, with strange incon-
sistency, in one breath destroy man's illusion as to his
own greatness, and magnify his greatness, regarded as
self-centred, till it becomes an illusion. God is reduced
to dust and dust becomes God. But this is not science,
and it is certainly not assent-compelling knowledge.

As this judgment regarding the geocentric view of the
world brings us back to the general fundamental ques-
tions, the same is true of the idea of evolution, which is in-
separably connected with it. That is to say, just as on the

387

Faith in God the Father

one hand the earth is to be deprived of its commanding
position, on the ground that it is found to be an acci-
dental product alongside of others, in the immeasurably
imposing evolution of the universe, instead of being a
realization of a Divine puipose, so on the other man is
to become conscious of his insignificance, through recog-
nizing that he is a product of the evolution of the earth.
But it cannot be denied that the products of evolution,
in all their abundance, may be brought under the prin-
ciples as to the end and ground of the world which, as
we saw, constitute the substance of Christian religious
knowledge ; they can be found to realize Divine purposes
in subordination to the supreme Divine purpose. In
that case, we cannot discover the shadow of a reason
why faith, in its own interests, should make any de-
mands as to the manner of their realization of it, instead
of leaving the answer to this question to science, which
investigates facts. It ought therefore to recognize all
the facts of evolution actually proved by science, and
indeed to welcome them, if God proves Himself by them
as well as in other ways a God of order (1 Cor. xiv. 33).
Whenever faith illegitimately passes beyond its proper
limits in this direction or in any other, it invariably does
itself harm ; whereas on the other hand its real interests
cannot be infringed upon by any encroachment on the
part of knowledge. But certainly one of the vital
interests which we have in mind is opposition on prin-
ciple to every deification of the idea of evolution.
Compare first what was said at the outset on the Modern
Consciousness, and then all the positions with reference
to Faith and Knowledge, and what is to be subjoined
immediately in the Doctrine of Man.

We saw before when treating the Doctrine of God,
and we may now remind ourselves here, in concluding
the Doctrine of the World, that it is only faith in God's

388

View of the World : Christian Faith

love, strengthened by active conflict, that acquires this
extraordinary power of making every change in the view
held regarding the world subservient to one's purpose.
From it alone springs the courage that enables one to
recognize the facts precisely as they stand. In the
present connexion, that means that we should not
hurriedly rush away from the facts that do not har-
monize with the old view of the world, — e.g. awful cases
of the struggle for existence or devastating catastrophes
in nature on the one hand, and slow development to
higher forms on the other, — and again dreamily fancy
as best we can, that we believe in that old view of the
world. By so acting, we not only do wrong to our sense
for truth, and so also of course to our faith, but we bar
the way against that deepening of our reverence and
trust which God affords us, precisely by such change of
the view of the world among other means. In that case,
the adversaries readily appear to be not only more de-
voted to the truth, but more upright and more rich ;
whereas faith, cleaving to the truth, should have known
in experience how rich it is, even in view of the greatest
riches they possess. The most instructive example for
us, we may say, is Goethe. His relation to what he
calls God as Nature, should not be confused with what
lesser minds repeat after him in opposition to the
Christian faith ; and it cannot be counteracted by what
believers of a narrow-minded type say in the name of
Christianity, in answer to him. For him, it was a new
and momentous experience, surpassed only by real faith,
to which he himself wistfully reached out, e.g. in the
" Mysteries ". But here it must suffice to point to the
important truth we speak of : for the further treatment
of it, all sorts of presuppositions are still wanting for us,
which are got from the Doctrine of Evil and of Provi-
dence. The truest conclusion is always reached by

389

Faith in God the Father

pointing to the great fundamental mystery of the world,
to which the greatest men have often pointed with
special insistence, — with paradoxical expressions indeed ;
like Luther, with that saying of his which could so
easily be ridiculed — " The world is an astonishing oddity ;
would God it soon came to an end ". The result must
just be, for reasons inherent in faith itself, that all our
Christian conceptions of the world acquire their pro-
portion, meaning and basis, simply and solely as corre-
lates of the distinctively Christian idea of God. But
here as elsewhere, faith should be cheered in its wrest-
ling, by the recognized fact that there are no less enigmas
connected with every ultimate conception that man has
framed with regard to the world and God.

Man

Exposition

In the doctrine of man an accurate statement of the
problem is particularly indispensable, if there is to be a
possibility of truly Christian conclusions. For faith, the
question of the nature of man can only mean : How must
the nature of man be defined, if he is to be the object of
the love of God in the Kingdom of God ? In other words,
the problem has reference to the religious nature of man,
and to this naturally in its distinctively Christian form.
Thus the doctrine of man is fitly called the doctrine of
THE Image of God in him. There are reasons for its
having this title in other religions as well as ours. In
all religions there is fellowship — communion between
God and man. This would be impossible without some
sort of resemblance between God and man, and that, too,
in reference both to the form and the content of life.
Now as the fellowship originates with God, the likeness on
man's part is a copy : God is the original. Consequently
in every religion the idea of the image of God in man

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The Destiny of Man

varies with the idea of God. There is a great difference
between the image of God in the heroes sprung from
Zeus in the religion of Greece, and the sons of the
Heavenly Father in Christianity. Further, because the
content of the idea of God in every religion is defined by
the revelation of God presupposed in it, so also is the
idea of the Divine image. Now since for us Christians
Jesus is the personal self-revelation of God, and God
really works in Him under the conditions of human
personality. He is the perfect image of God (2 Cor. iii.
18 ; IV. 4 and parallels) ; man considered apart from
Christ, is that image only in the wider sense — rudiment-
arily, as Paul expressly insists (1 Cor. xv. 45 ff.). Christ
is the true man ; we shall be changed into His likeness ;
we shall "put Him on " (Col. in. 10 ; Eom. xiii. 14).

Here, too, it is clear how sublimely simple and consis-
tent Christian faith is. All religion claims to be fellowship
of God and man, but ours is fellowship with the God who
is love. God's being in man and man's being in God, is
for us loving fellowship of the most personal kind. It
realizes itself immediately in Christ, in us through Him.
Christology and the doctrine of the appropriation of
salvation have to expound in detail all that is implicit in
this position ; but it is always the same simple inexhaust-
ible truth. In our connexion it means that we see in
Christ what is the pure Divine Image in man.

If we seek to make this nature of man, so far as Dog-
matics is concerned with it, that is just the image of God
in him, more intelligible, we must express it in the form
of an idea of purpose, which is to be realized. But as
this purpose is the realization of personal life, this means
that we must speak of the destiny which man is to
fulfil, and of the capaeAty which makes it possible for
him to fulfil it. For it lies in the nature of this image
of God in us, that it cannot be called into being ready

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Faith in God the Father

made, like something belonging to inanimate nature,
nor yet, as is the case with animate but impersonal
nature, that it needs a development certainly, but only
one traced beforehand with physical necessity. On
the contrary, love can only be understood and recipro-
cated in personal surrender. The capacity certainly must
be presupposed ; the destiny however is not fulfilled
by the mere unfolding of it, but by the free exercise of
it on both sides. Consequently the habit of our old
divines in speaking of the " nature " of man is a mistake.
When combined with inaccurate conceptions of God's
activity in Creation, it betrays us into the self-contradic-
tion that the capacity of which we speak might be actual-
ized immediately by a divine creative act, and the destiny
fulfilled without a personal decision ; in short, that the
Divine image might be implanted as a thing realized.
Moreover, they had in view the highest conceivable idea
of the Divine image, an idea determined by the standard
in Christ ; consequently, if that was supposed to be
implanted, they had in view perfect righteousness as
implanted, and indeed, for the thought of that period,
it next followed that they had in view perfection in
general as implanted, — even in the matter of know-
ledge. In the case of our old divines a second error was
naturally conjoined with this one. In dealing with the
nature of man, they thought immediately of the Ji?'st man
and his actual condition in his supposed original state.
That was the state of perfection, of " original implanted
righteousness ". As the result of the Fall, this state has
been replaced by that of corruption. But not only is
this idea entirely self-contradictory, as we have shown
above ; it is besides, as applied to the first man, quite
plainly opposed to all experience. So too it is destitute
of Biblical foundation. The Old Testament thinks of
the first man as being at least not in a state of intel-

392

The Image of God in Man

lectual perfection, but as requiring to be developed at
all events in this respect : he is set the task of tilling the
garden and keeping it (Gen. ii. 15). Finally Paul sees
in Christ not simply a restoration of what was im-
planted in the first man, but a realization of the Divine
image going far beyond that ; the first man was made
a living soul, the second a quickening spirit (1 Cor. xv.
45 fif. ). In accordance with this, the Reformers were satis-
fied with at least more moderate ideas of the first man.
Luther speaks of Adam's childlike innocence, Calvin
of his childlike relation to God ; and it was our early
Dogmatic theologians who first developed those mea-
sureless conceptions which we mentioned. In truth,
each stage of Divine Revelation finds a corresponding
stage, as regards the acceptance or the rejection of it
on man's part. Man is responsible in the degree in
which God approaches him at each period ; but for the
actual approach of God, he is actually responsible. The
further exposition of this question, however, regarding
the original condition of man in history, belongs to the
doctrine of sin. The two questions, that of the destiny
of man, together with the capacity necessary therefor,
and that of the actual condition of the first man, are
first clearly separated by Schleiermacher, who, by ori-
ginal perfection, understands simply the destiny of
which we speak, as one that can be attained on the
foundation of man's endowment. But when he not
only strictly separates from this question the other, of
the state of the first man, but immediately finds an
answer to it by negativing the original innocence alto-
gether, and declaring the necessity of the consciousness
of sin for development, we have what is by no means a
necessary consequence of his correct answer to the
former question.

The image of God in man is thus nothing but his

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Faith in God the Father

destiny to become a child of God in the Kingdom of
God, or the capacity necessary for the realization of this
destiny. Both expressions have the same content ; only
in the one case the subject is looked at from the stand-
point of the goal, in the other, from the beginning of
the way that leads to the goal. Both moreover are
indispensable, because the destiny cannot become an
actuality except by the way of a personal decision, on
the foundation of a definite capacity ; while on the other
hand the capacity secures its definiteness only in view
of the goal to be reached. In speaking here of destiny
to be a child of God in the Kingdom of God, we point, first
of all, in a few words to the important truth that it is
not Christian to speak of the individual man without
speaking of humanity, and tice versa. God's love has as
its object the Kingdom of God, the united fellowship of
all God's children, not the individual in isolation ; but
just as little a society where the individual goes to the
wall. Every individual has to imprint the image of God
upon his own special individuality, on the foundation of
his individual capacity ; and he can do this only in the
fellowship which includes all individuals. This fellow-
ship is naturally constituted on the principle of sex, rank,
nation, as well as of the fundamental relations affecting
the whole of the inner moral life, the family, social inter-
course, dominion over nature, art, science, law, and re-
ligion. As is shown by the very name, the image of
God in man, and the explanation of it by reference to
sonship to God in the Kingdom of God, the premier
place belongs to the religious relation in the strict sense,
the fellowship of love with God, who reveals His love
to us, so that in trustful responsive love we can assent
to it (the communion of God with us and our communion
with Him). But inseparably connected with this are
love to our neighbours and self-discipline, as well as

394

The Nature of Man

dominion over the world, matters which receive exact
treatment in Ethics. If the image of God in man is
thus designated from the point of view of the goal as
realized destiny, from the other side we sum it up in
the expression, religious and moral capacity (again in
all its aspects). If man's destiny is to admit of fulfil-
ment, we must think of him as so equipped that, while
longing for that supreme inward unity and freedom
(p. 61 ff., 167 ff.) which become real only in fellowship with
God, he is capable, through Divine lievelation of satis-
fying such longing by means of fellowship with God,
and letting the love of God become operative in him-
self (once more in all the relations mentioned above).
Or to use the words of the Augsburg Confession, the
Divine image, conceived of as realized, consists in the
knowledge, trust, fear, and love of God (Art. 2), with
which there goes the more detailed exposition of the
other passages in Article 27, under the heading of
Christian Perfection ; for it is this article which shows
in what the realized destiny of man consists. On the
other hand, looking at the matter from the point of view
of the capacity necessary in order to reach that goal, the
Apology says (2, 17) that it consists in the disposition
towards such perfection, and the power to reach it. (To
be sure these passages of the Confessions seek to answer
at the same time the historical question — one that lies
beyond the horizon of our thought at present — of man's
original condition (cf. above).) The fundamental truth
that the essential point in the image of God is the re-
ligious relation, was expressed by the old divines, not
quite clearly as regards form, but quite correctly in sub-
stance, by speaking of an image "in general," when
they referred to all the above-mentioned moments taken
together, which make man what he is, including there-
fore, besides the relation to God, his relations to

395

Faith in God the Father

other men and to his own nature and to that which
lies without ; and distinguishing from these the main
element as the most important "part,"^ — that element
being the relation to God. In particular, dominion
over the creatures and immortality were rightly re-
garded by them as a consequence of moral and religious
perfection (while the Socinians, on the other hand,
saw the essence of the Divine image in the lordship
over the creation). Another distinction not to be con-
fused with this one, and of even greater importance for
the understanding of the subject, was that between the
image in the wider, general and the narrower, particular,
special sense. By the former they meant the formal
presupposition of the Divine sonship, or of the religious
capacity, that is personality in general or the capacity
therefor. The image in the strict sense on the other
hand, according to them, consists, not " in the possession
of reason or understanding, but in the possession of such
a will or understanding as understands God, and wills
what God wills " (Luther).

This idea which attains to full clearness and depth
in Christianity, that the essential thing in man is his
moral and religious destiny, and that it is here that we
are to find his superiority to all the other inhabitants of
the world, even where it is not fully held in its dis-
tinctively Christian form, unites those who represent the
higher development of mankind, with each other and
with all who, even in the humblest fashion, actually rise
to the consciousness of their worth as men. They are
animated by faith in "the divinity of humanity". At
times this faith finds clear utterance in prophetic tones,
which assure a generation that at one time revels in
self-glorification, and at another despairs of itself, that
it is lost without it. "I have placed thee in the midst
of the world. ... I created thee with a nature that is

396

The Nature of Man

neither heavenly nor earthly, neither mortal nor im-
mortal alone, that thou mightest be the moulder and
conqueror of thyself " (J. Picus). '' Those are the
poverty-stricken periods, dark in spite of all the glitter
of civilization, which no longer want to know anything of
reverence. Thought without reverence is barren, indeed
poisonous. . . . The man who cannot always wonder
(and worship) ... is but a pair of spectacles behind
which there is no eye. . . . The Universe is an Oracle
and Temple as well as a Kitchen and a Cattel-stall. . . .
Retire into private places with thy foolish cackle, or
what were better give it up and weep, not that the reign
of wonder is done . . . but that thou hitherto art a
Dilettante and sand-blind Pedant " (Carlyle ; and cf .
Goethe on reverence and religion). Such reverence,
however, goes along with a deep sense of the mysteri-
ousness of human life, and should do so. This sense
also finds unique and perfect realization in Christianity.
In what we are saying we are simply bringing to the
forefront once again, in connexion with our present sub-
ject, a truth which has been before us from the com-
mencement of the doctrine of God onwards : in the
Gospel of Divine sonship least of all is there a place
for familiarity without reverence. But we have a parti-
cular impressive warning in this direction in the strict
limitation of our knowledge of the relation of Spirit and
Nature, which in the form especially of the question of
the relation of body and soul, becomes the perpetual and
ever-recurring riddle of our personal life. We are ac-
quainted with development to spiritual personality only
on the basis of material existence, and at the same time
with the multiplicity and the individual character of
finite spirits only in their distinctively material form ;
these incontestable positions are statements of a fact,
they are not properly speaking an explanation of the

397

Faith in God the Father

fact. If we should regard them as an explanation,
they are certainly not unobjectionable from the Chris-
tian point of view, as is shown, for example, by Bieder-
mann's position with reference to the question of the
future life. This he is compelled to negative, because
he affirms that it is possible to conceive of finite spirit
only in substantial union with a material body. In the
same way he is compelled to regard sin as a necessary
stage in the development of the spirit, as it grows out
of its material form of existence. The limitations of
our knowledge of which we spoke, and still more the
immediate experience of the mysterious connexion be-
tween our inner life, at its very highest indeed (think
of prayer, for example), and our natural existence, pro-
duce the feeling to which Paul has given impressive
expression (especially 2 Cor. iv., v.). Even in the
Pre-Christian world, and beyond the limits of Chris-
tianity, the deepest aspirations struggle into being, out
of this experience of the dualism of human nature,
man's two souls, the lower and the higher, the dark and
the light, the flesh and the spirit. The triumphant song,
"There is naught that is stronger than man," and the
dirge which speaks of the generations of men passing
hence, like the leaves of the forest, do not admit of being
reconciled in a convincing synthesis. The strong faith
in God which meets us in the Old Testament, unites
them by main force, in moments of adoration. " What is
man that Thou art mindful of him ? Thou hast made
him a little lower than God" (Ps. viii.). But most
acutely does the Christian feel the enigma, and he fights
his way through it to assured hope. He knows the
earthly body not simply as an instrument willed by God,
and a symbol of the spirit, but as destined for a temple
of the Holy Spirit (1 Cor. vi.) ; while at the same time
the recipient of the Holy Spirit, in a way quite dififerent

398

Protestant View of Man's Destiny

from a great spirit, both experiences it as a " body of
humiliation" (Phil. in. 21), an imperfect organ and
symbol, and finds in the midst of painful limitations (2
Cor. XII. 11) peace only in the assurance of God's love,
which is not confined within any earthly limits and one
day makes all things new (Rev. xxi. 5). With all this,
we only express anew, in connexion with the Doctrine
of Man, what was affirmed and proved in the Doctrine
of the World.

The view of the destiny of man, which we have thus
far developed, is the Protestant (in German, the Evan-
gelical). Religious and moral perfection, sonship to
God in the Kingdom of God, is really " natural " ; that is,
it is man's proper destiny, his true nature. If we exclude
this destiny from our conception of man, our idea of him
is no longer genuinely Christian, as we are compelled to
conceive of man, believing in revelation. The Romish
doctrine, on the other hand, sees the essence of man in
what is for us Protestants merely the necessary presup-
position, in his being possessed of personality, equipped
with reason and free will ; not in the religious and moral
constituent elements of personality, sonship to God,
What is for us natural destiny is for Catholics super-
natural exaltation, a special gift of grace superadded to
man's nature. A necessary consequence of this is a
somewhat difi'erent view of this higher supernatural ex-
altation, as it is supposed to be, which is added to man's
natural condition (so to say, the higher Divine image in
man in relation to the lower ; for, according to an ancient
piece of trifling with the Hebrew words in Genesis i. 26,
where two words for image occur together, people used
to speak of two images). This supernatural endowment
is defined as victory over and renunciation of nature, as
the closest possible approximation on the part of human
life on earth to the superhuman angelic life. Its most

399

Faith in God the Father

conspicuous characteristics are the renunciation of the
natural instincts of acquisition, sex, and independence —
poverty, chastity, and obedience. This applies to the
sphere of the will ; in that of the intellect we have
contemplation, the fullest possible anticipation of the
Heavenly Vision. It is obvious at once that such super-
natural life is completely attained only in individual
acts, and only by the repression by every individual
of his individuality. What a contrast to our Protes-
tant ideal, where personality is everything, and all
that is done emanates from the will of the child of God,
viewed as a unity ; where the more natural a thing is,
the better it is ; the earthly vocation is the sphere
where sonship to God is experienced and acquired ; it is
here we have the material for the experiencing of the
love of God ; here we have the high school of trust in
God and of prayer, of love to our neighbours, self-discip-
line and victory over the world. How the different ideas
of sin as what is contrary to our destiny correspond ex-
actly to the dififerent ways of regarding our destiny, will
be shown in the doctrine of sin, but is quite easily under-
stood even at this early stage of our discussion.

Apologetical

The doctrine of the nature of man, that is of his
destiny to be a child of God in the Kingdom of God,
ordinarily has combined with it a series of apologetical in-
vestigations which seek to establish it. They have, how-
ever, not infrequently the opposite effect, because they
do not always keep within the limits drawn by the actual
interests of faith. Our task is the same as it was in the
parallel investigations in the doctrine of the world gener-
ally. We have two things to show. The first is that
so far as the questions referred to are really of signi-
ficance for faith, they have been already decided in our

400

Apologetics and the Doctrine of Man

main thesis ; and with the proof of this, it is easy to
combine the proper Apologetic matter which is required
in the present section. So far as they go beyond that
thesis, they have no significance for faith, but damage
its certainty because they obtrude illegitimately into the
province of knowledge. Following our plan we have
to deal partly with questions which concern the nature
of man, partly with such as relate to the beginnings of
human history.

Under the former heading the first place belongs to
the question of the distinction between the brute crea-
tion and man. Its religious significance is as clear as
that it finds no answer which goes essentially beyond
our main thesis. The well-known judgment of child-
hood that the animals cannot pray, touches the decisive
point, and that is just what we have already spoken of,
man's destiny to be a child of God. This includes as a
presupposition his capacity for personality, the "bent
towards the unconditioned in all departments of the
mental life" (Lotze), the craving of the inner life lor
unity and freedom (pp. 61 ff., 167 ST.). The most fruitful
starting-point for the empirical investigation of this
superiority, is man's possession of speech. The contro-
versy on the other hand as to the presence or absence
of intelligence in the animal world, is often conducted
in an unintelligent way ; while that regarding reason
and intelligence first demands more precise demarcation
of the concepts in order to be at all clear, and is in any
case without significance for Dogmatics.

Faith is thoroughly indiff'erent to many mews regard-
ing the fiindfirnental elements of man's being, ami their re-
lation to each other, so far as they are not contrary to
the destiny affirmed of him, that he is called to be a
child of God. The popular twofold division into body
and soul prevails in the main in Scripture itself ; and

VOL. I. 401 26

Faith in God the Father

then in the Western Church and the Churches of the
Reformation. The threefold division into spirit, soul,
and body goes back to Plato, appears in individual
statements of the New Testament such as 1 Thessa-
lonians v. 23 (Rom. viii. 16 ?), and is the usual one in
the Eastern Church. Neither of them is Christian in
preference to the other : for example the former does
not at all endanger the Christian hope of a future life,
while the latter in no way strengthens it. If both pro-
positions are still asserted among us, it shows an in-
accurate understanding of psychology or of the Christian
faith, or generally speaking of both subjects. Like
these early traditional theories as to the fundamental
elements of human nature, the theories of ancient or
modern times regarding their relation to each other,
are in themselves neither Christian nor unchristian.
This applies to the theory of the interaction between
body and soul, or of psycho-physical parallelism ; un-
less the latter for example, understood as metaphysical
truth, is interpreted in a sense contrary to that degree
of independence on the part of the spiritual life, with-
out which communion with God cannot be consistently
regarded as personal in the strict sense, or as surviving
this earthly mode of existence. But our judgment
that there is no anthropology or psychology in itself
Christian, holds good likewise of what is called " Bib-
lical Psychology ". For the accurate understanding
of Scripture, accurate knowledge of its psychological
vocabulary is naturally indispensable. Religious affirm-
ations of the utmost importance remain a sealed book for
the man who is unaware that, among the Hebrews, the
"heart" is regarded as the central organ of the inner
life of thought, as well as of volition and feeling. Indeed
it is possible and necessary to go further. Here and
there, such Biblical Psychology directs attention to

402

The Origin of the Human Race

significant facts of the inner life, which that current
among us readily overlooks, for example the close con-
nexion of our thought with the will. How pertinent
e.g. is the statement, " With the heart man believeth "
(Rom. X. 9) ! To have emphasized this is the service
of many friends of Biblical Psychology (Roos, Beck,
Delitzsch). But it is impossible on this account to de-
clare Biblical Psychology authoritative in its individual
statements. For one thing, there is not as a matter of
fact any consistent psychological system in Scripture,
but such must first be artificially imposed upon it. For
another, many of its separate statements could not be
maintained alongside of our present knowledge, without
discarding our'better insight into such subjects.

As regards the special question of the origin of the
indimdual soul, the Ancient Church rejected the idea
that it existed before its union with the earthly body
(Pre-existence), for the reason that the theory seemed
to undervalue this union, failing to recognize it with
sufficient explicitness as God's good appointment.
But this objection is perhaps unnecessary, and in
order to explain the origin of sin, the idea has found
no mean supporters down to our day ; though mani-
festly they are moving in the region of philosophical
speculation, and no longer in that of Dogmatics proper.
With regard to the two other most widely diff'used
theories, no authoritative decision was pronounced.
Some preferred what is called Creationism, referring
the soul to an immediate creative act on the part of
God ; which is the general opinion of the Roman
Church and of Reformed Theologians. Others were
in favour of Traducianism • that is, they supposed body
and soul to spring togethei- from the parents, the rela-
tion being like that of the layer to the vine. Such —
with the doctrine of original sin in view — was the

403

Faith in God the Father

opinion of the Lutheran Dogmatists, along with Ter-
tullian. Consideration of the facts, the wonderful com-
bination of what is derived by heredity and what is
individual, points us beyond both theories, even if no
clear idea can be reached. In any case there is no de-
cision in the name of faith, except that our leading
principle of the destiny of man must not be obscured.
But in so far as the problem of the relation of the
Divine activity to the course of the universe always
stands in the background, alongside of the questions
which have hitherto occupied us, we are thus brought
at the same time to the other series of questions which
relate to the origins of mankind.

In this connexion, immediate significance for our
faith belongs least to the question in regard to which it
is most frequently assumed, namely whether man was
created out of material already organized, in dependence
on other highly developed organisms, or out of unorgan-
ized material. The question must be put in those terms :
for the Christian his '* creation " is axiomatic. This is
true not only in the sense, that man like everything else
owes his existence generally to God, but also in the
sense that a special Divine intention is creatively realized
in him, that namely which according to the Christian
faith is the highest of all : he is the object of the Divine
love, a nature called to be a child of God's, for which
(see above) the necessary presupposition is the capacity
for personality. Hence too the statement that there is
a dispute about the origin of man, is erroneous unless
fuller particulars are given. The alternative applies
solely and exclusively to the method of the Divine
creative activity,— not to the why and wherefore, the
ground and purpose. The fact itself is as little altered
by the one assumption as to the method, namely from
previously organized material, as is the joyful assurance,

404

The Origin of the Human Race

" I believe that God has created me," by reference to
father and mother. The distinction is not a funda-
mental one. In the one case we accept our life from
the hand of God, although its mediation to us by our
parents is beyond question, and is admitted up to a
certain point. In the other, we collect painstakingly
the facts of a dark past which are difficult to reach, we
seek to understand them by the help of analogous facts
often ambiguous, and by means of inferences to deter-
mine the greater or less degree of probability of the one
or the other hypothesis with regard to the method in
question. It might be expected accordingly that the
question of the origin of man, thus narrowly confined,
would be discussed with all impartiality. Indeed in
the case of generation, the experience of which we
ourselves share, it might appear more difficult for us to
reverence in faith the Divine activity, because an in-
grained habit tempts us to push the thought of God
further away from us, in the case of a process which,
looked at from one side, we understand somewhat
better, or think that we do. In truth the method of
the Divine creative activity (not only in reference to this
occurrence, but generally in reference to every occur-
rence), is always in the last resort a mystery alike
impenetrable, however we may regard our present al-
ternative. Why is there, notwithstanding all this, so
much impassioned controversy regarding the first man,
with reference to the manner of his appearance, even
where the mystery of our own origin which comes nearer
us is scarcely ever mentioned ? The explanation is to
be found partly in the appeal to the individual Biblical
statement in its isolation, which on this subject is made
even by those who are far from holding all the other
individual statements in Genesis ; partly in the unde-
niably frivolous joy with which many turn the thesis,

105

Faith in God the Father

in itself certainly not unchristian, that God called the
first man into being in dependence on what was already
highly organized animal life, into a strange dogma of
the descent of our race from the ape, and thus naturally
drive their opponents to an external reliance upon the
letter of the Bible. These Dogmatists, professing to be
scientific investigators, fail to recognize the all-important
distinction between the theory of evolution generally
and the naturalistic theory of evolution. Only the
latter, in its exclusion of our doctrine of the purpose
and ground of all that happens in the world, stands in
fundamental opposition to the Christian faith in God,
as we have already seen. Dogmatics is concerned ex-
clusively with this determinative idra. But it cannot
be settled by any natural science, but only by the con-
catenation of ultimate convictions, the grounds of which
have been discussed in Apologetics. Consequently it is
unnecessary for Dogmatics, and for that very reason
dangerous, to pass its judgment upon the conflicts of
natural science. However joyfully it may view the fact
that the idea of the theory of development as funda-
mentally opposed to design, and also the overestimate
of it generally, as if it were a solution of the mystery of
the universe, have broken down, it has no reason to
welcome an ill-defined intrusion of the idea of design
into the exact investigation of nature (as for example
in many forms of Neovitalism). Dogmatics both should
and can know its independence, alike of the individual
''discoveries," and the hasty interpretations of them.
It is more mindful of its task when, instead of haggling
about supposed gains or losses on its side, it helps to
make every new insight, really gained and not merely
asserted to be gained, into the development of the earth
and its inhabitants, become a new hymn of praise to the
eternal God. Faith hears as is from afar something of

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The Origin of the Human Race

these new tones of the never-ending hymn of the
depth and the riches of the all-powerful wisdom of God
(Rom. XI. 33 ff.). History will be our teacher here. The
Church once vehemently opposed Copernicus ; it is long
since she acknowledged him. Is she to behave in the
same way in reference to the theory of development,
and then to "come to terms" with it, according to the
taunts of her opponents ? It is always a mistake if the
Church " comes to terms " only upon compulsion, in-
stead of appropriating for her own use, in the freedom
of faith, all that is true, and understanding it in the light
of eternal truth. Certainly this attitude is often made
bitterly hard for her by the way in which a single truth
is deified by its adherents. But there is as little " of
faith " (Rom. xiv. 23), to which all things belong (1 Cor.
III. 22), in the appearance even of laziness in the province
of knowledge, as there is in any other.

There is but one thing that this faith of ours can
never surrender, namely the fundamental thought which
we have again and again emphasized, that all things are
of God and unto God, and that man is destined and
fitted to become a child of God. To be sure, in its appli-
cation to our particular question of the appearance of the
first man, this fundamental thought calls once again for
a special qualification. Why do so many refuse to be
content with it in its general form ? Why would they
decide the manner of man's appearance, in the name of
faith, if they could ? Manifestly because the more it
is a question of God's relation not to the world in general,
but in our section to man in particular, the more urgent
becomes the one side of the fundamental truth, namely
the relative independence, and homogeneousness of the
world in relation to God ; in other words, the problem of
living communion between God and man. Now the
doctrine of Providence is the proper place where an

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Faith in God the Father

accurate treatment of this problem becomes indispens-
able. But though unexpressed, it dominates the situa-
tion, as soon as there is any express reference to man
at all, and becomes specially acute, when our imagina-
tion involuntarily comes to be held fast at the thought
of the first man. Consequently it had to be mentioned
here.

What was last said applies still more in reference to
two special questions concerning the first man, the
'place in the scale of citilization occupied by mankind
071 their first appearance, and the common descent. In-
deed, on considering the matter more carefully, we
must give it as our opinion that they have more im-
mediately religious interest. But it is also plain that
they can be accurately set and answered only in connexion
with the doctrine of sin. For the position already
within our reach, apart from the doctrine of sin, that
the beginnings must be such that progress to the goal is
possible, is as indisputable as it is worthless, if nothing
further can be said regarding the nature of the way,
whether it can be a straight line. Apart from sin, it is
even less possible to make a more definite affirmation
upon the second point than the one which is again
obvious, that the unity of humanity as destined for salva-
tion consists just in its capacity to reach this goal ; which
leaves it altogether an open question whether the
empirical starting-point likewise, is one and the same
for the whole human race.

We have already repeatedly been invited to look
beyond the world of our mundane experience, as we
realized the position of our faith, that all things are for
God and of God who is Love, and that we are destined
for sonship in the Kingdom of this God. But hitherto
we have done it in the sense that, speaking quite

408

The Doctrine of Angels

generally, the Kingdom of God, as we men are called
thereunto, is not bounded by the conditions of our earthly
existence ; and as a consequence that as regards its
compass it must not be confined in any way to us men.
These ideas, especially the latter, receive a more definite
form in the traditional doctrine of the Angels, but
also, as thus elaborated, excite obvious objections which
do not apply to that latter idea itself. Quite apart from
such objections in the first instance, the doctrine is at
all events of great methodological importance. It shows in
a specially simple and clear way the stages traversed by
the history of the separate Christian doctrines generally.
This history is specially instructive in the case of the
doctrine of Angels, because according to the general
conviction of Christendom, the matter here in question
does not possess the same high personal significance for
our standing as Christians, which belongs to others, as
for instance Christology or the doctrine of the atonement.
Consequently many are more willing to recognize and
learn from the stages of the development in the one case,
than they may be in the other, the lesson of how indispens-
able is our supreme principle of Revelation, as the ground
and norm of all doctrines ; and how indispensable, in the
interests of the certainty and the clearness of the faith,
is its application without reserve. The main points
which we can always establish in the course of the
Dogmatic development are the following. In the first
place an infringing upon that supreme principle, and an
apparent transcending of it as regards the degree of
certainty and the content of religious knowledge, through
an alliance with the prevailing contemporary philosophy,
which in the orthodox period is regarded as purely in
the interests of the gospel. Then criticism of the
Dogma which had thus arisen, when the materials and
instruments employed in the construction of it were no

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Faith in God the Father

longer generally acknowledged, or as a result of their
being developed in their proper consequences, in this
instance in a sense unfavourable to the Dogma ; the
result being a change in the significance and the dis-
solution of the traditional belief. This takes place in
the age of Rationalism and of the modern consciousness.
Finally when the mere restoration of the old which is
at first attempted proves impossible, there is a fresh
appeal to revelation itself, with an exact use of the
primary sources, based upon an understanding of them
as a whole facilitated by history, and with a careful ap-
plication of the principles which we accept regarding
faith and knowledge.

With our old Dogmatic theologians, the doctrine of
the Angels used to be a favourite subject of theological
speculation. Their nature was precisely defined, they
are pure spirits. As regards their estate, there are some
that have continued good and others that are fallen,
evil : as regards their rank they are divided into a
Heavenly Hierarchy. Their office was to praise God
in Heaven and to serve Him on earth : this was spoken
of not only in Dogmatic Theology, but also in morning
and evening hymns. Their glory is detailed especially
in opposition to the Catholic worship of Angels. The
attack, which is at all events partly intelligible on the
ground that this Dogmatic system encroaches where
there is no basis in faith itself, is in essence fourfold.
There was a search for the actual or suj^posed contra-
dictions of the doctrine of the angels, which did without
doubt go beyond the finely traced limits of what faith
in the Revelation of salvation is capable of experiencing
and knowing ; when, for example, it spoke of their na-
ture, or perhaps of their relation to space or to material
corporeality, as if dealing with an instance of universally
valid knowledge concerning the things of this world. As

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The Doctrine of Angels

against such supposed knowledge, a moderate amount of
actual knowledge of the world was sufficient to turn it
into ridicule as self-contradictory. A still greater impres-
sion was made by referring to the historical connexions
of the belief as to angels with Persian or other oriental
ideas, or going still farther back, to the possible psycho-
logical roots. Might it not have arisen out of a naive
materialization of religious experiences, the realization
of the Divine help or of the mysterious conflict between
powers of light and darkness, of good and evil in our-
selves ? Or out of the disposition of our reason to
postulate that there is yet more spirit in the universe
than our mundane experience knows ? In short, it was
believed that it could be shown how the belief in angels
had arisen. Further the attempt was made to show
that the needs which give rise to it are satisfied better
and more consistently in other ways : the psychic work-
ings in us by a more accurate psychology, the demand
for more spirit in the universe by peopling the stars
with spiritual beings, though they are unknown to us.
Inconsistent, explicable on grounds of history and
psychology, worthless in a religious point of view — the
conclusion from such premises is plain : absolute re-
jection. For a change to some speculations foreign to
the faith, is for it the same thing as denial. This is
what takes place when Swedenborg makes the angels
human souls developing in the future life, or when with
Fechner they become natural powers, or even when they
are fitted by modern Spiritism into its " scientific "
experiments. But should there be the desire simply to
revive the doctrine of angels of our Divines, in spite of
these attacks, the same process of dissolution would at
once necessarily begin anew, because the elements of
dissolution are contained in itself. Nor do we gain any
sure resting ground even from the standpoint of religious

411

Faith in God the Father

experience. For the upholders of this view themselves
do not venture to assert that belief in angels is an object
of religious experience, in the same sense as sin and
grace ; otherwise they would have to regard appear-
ances of angels as necessary for Christians. We are
thus, as was maintained at the start, brought back to the
question whether and how far the Revelation of God in
Christ, as the source and norm of religious knowledge,
renders possible affirmations of faith regarding the
angelic world.

For the relation of the Old Testament statements to
those of the New Testament, and that of the latter to
each other, reference may be made to principles already
laid down (pp. 294 ff., 379). As regards the New Testa-
ment, it is obvious that less importance attaches to the
presence of angels in narratives about Jesus, than to His
own statements regarding the angels ; because in the
former, we have always to take into consideration the
possibility of legendary embellishment. Compared with
the Jewish angelology as with that of our old Dogmatic
Theology, these show great reserve as regards their na-
ture, estate, and ranks, and confine themselves to their
service. They worship God in the Heavenly realm where
His Glory is manifested, and stand in readiness for His
service on earth. But by far the most important point
is that Jesus brings the Old Testament idea of angels
surrounding the throne of Jahveh with hymns of praise
and in readiness for service, into relation with Himself
the Son, now, but especially on His return. They are
the angels of His Father ; He could ask the Father for
their help ; He appears with the angels of His might
(Mt. XVIII. 10, XXVI. 53, XIII. 49, xxv. 31, John i. 51).
And as they serve Him the Son, so do they His, the
sons, through Him (cf. Luke xvi. 22, Mt. xviii. 10). In
both relations, the Church includes itself in its state-

412

The Doctrine of Angels

ments regarding the angels. Its Lord is the Lord of the
angels, and they serve it as well as Him (Heb. i. 5,
1 Pet. III. 22, Parall. and Heb. i. 14, 1 Cor. xi. 10).

This state of matters does not permit us to regard
belief in angels as a part of the consciousness of Jesus
which is taken over in a merely external fashion. As
we saw. He makes a special application of it on the basis
of His belief in Himself as the Son. At the same time
it is impossible to show on the other hand that it is in-
separably connected with the inmost core of this self-
consciousness of His, that the latter would be essentially
altered, if we were to depart from the idea. We may
thus on the one hand affirm that belief in angels is not
a necessary constituent of the Christian doctrinal system ;
and accordingly we must not make any use of it for the
establishment of saving faith. That would be a positive
transgression of Jesus' rule (Luke xvi. 31), which in spirit
goes further than the obvious meaning of the words and
applies here too. On the other hand, seeing that the
belief in angels receives at least a particular application
at the hands of Jesus, the proper thing is not to ignore it
altogether in Dogmatics, but to say that our personal atti-
tude to it depends upon the limits within which we re-
cognize the religious authority of Jesus ; whether we do
this even in matters which are not inseparably connected
with the kernel of His gospel, which always is the inner
sanctuary of His personal relation to the Father and to us.
On this subject individual Christians have held very
different opinions in different ages, and it has often been
those who sincerely accepted the word of Jesus on the
point that have declared most plainly, how far they were
from wishing to make belief in angels the test of a
specially strong faith. The better they know what
faith is, the further from their minds is such a standard
of it according to the sum of its points, in a word the

413

Faith in God the Father

strange idea that one could believe ou angels instead of
in their existence. Further such adherents of the belief
in angels are well aware that individual opinions in this
province must be in a special degree inadequate.

With such reservations, however, they must be left
free to treasure their belief in angels as a living confir-
mation of truths which cannot be taken from them,
but are altogether independent of this confirmation.
There are two of them, a primary one and a derived.
God's creative activity does not exhaust itself within
the limits of the world of space and time knowable by
us, and even in those exercises of it which are still hidden
from us serves the supreme purpose of the Divine Love,
the Kingdom of God in Christ. This Kingdom is a reality
even apart from its earthly realization, though a reality
bound up with its earthly realization (1 Peter i. 12 ;
Eph. III. 10) ; and as perfected, it will transcend all our
present comprehension, and fulfil all the highest ideals,
not only of the good and true, but also of the beautiful.
As a protection against either an overestimate or an
underestimate of the world disclosed to our earthly
intelligence, this line of thought is so immediately re-
lated to the fundamental idea of our faith, as to be com-
pletely independent of the attitude of the individual to
belief in angels. But those who share that belief will
see in it a welcome expression therefor. Within this
fundamental idea of the Divine Glory — the word by
which Scripture sums up all those relations of which we
have spoken — the special idea of a demonstration of the
Divine Help by means still unknown to us, has its rela-
tive right, and may even be kept free from everything
that is fantastic. For example, the visionary character
of the appearances of angels, which applies both to many
of the Biblical statements and to the stories from the
lives of religious persons, worthy perhaps of serious con-

414

Doctrine of Sin : Method of Inquiry

sideration in other respects, is intelligible from the na-
ture of faith. More power to convince would again be
contrary to Luke xvi. 31.

God's World in Contradiction to the Divine Love

(Sin)

Faith in the Revelation of the love of God in Christ
assures the Christian Church that the world has its
purpose and source in God, that it is for God and from
God ; and in this knowledge which faith possesses, it
understands as much of the nature of the world as it
needs to know in the interests of faith. But the world
of which hitherto we have been speaking is not the
world in the whole of its reality, as given to Christian
faith. In order to get quite a clear idea of some indis-
pensable fundamental conceptions, we left out of con-
sideration, to being with, the fact that this world is a
sinful world — a world in opposition to the love of God.
The Christian knows it as such, but believes notwith-
standing, indeed just on that account, that it is God's
world. Christian Faith is essentially faith in the sin-
forgiving love of God — the Kingdom of God is a
Kingdom for redeemed sinners (pp. 84 ff.). There is no
exposition of the distinctively Christian faith, unless this
is clearly realized. But in this content of the Christian
faith, God's love to the world and the world's opposition
to the love of God, we have a fact so enigmatic that only
the full reality of the revelation of this love makes it
intelligible to us, inasmuch as this is the actual solu-
tion of the opposition in question to the love of God by
the love of God. Otherwise we naturally minimize the
seriousness of sin, or we do not conceive the love of
God as what it really is : sin and the love of God be-
come elements of natural necessity. We may certainly
develop the thought which results directly from our

415

Faith in God the Father

immediate context : if man's destiny cannot be rea-
lized along the pathway of necessary Omnipotence, the
twofold possibility confronts us — either a direct pathway
to the goal, or a crooked and winding one. But it is a
chilling thought, in presence of the enormous power of
sin and the all-subduing love of God. But for the fact
that sin is subdued by the love of God, its power re-
mains the obstacle that cannot be got over, in the way
of the faith, that the world is the world of our God — the
world of eternal love ; and without experience of the
power of sin, there is for us no full experience of the
love of God, — both statements being made in the sense
of the proposition just mentioned, that otherwise sin
and the love of God become elements of natural necessity.
The bearing of this conclusion may gradually become
clear to us, in the course of our exposition of the sub-
ject of sin, but it can be fully shown only when we deal
with the question of its origin.

It is for this reason that doctrinal statements regard-
ing sin call for special carefulness. Like all doctrinal
statements they are altogether dependent upon revela-
tion as producing faith ; but here again we must pay
particular attention to this supreme rule as to method.
Religious experience when separated ever so little from
revelation, its sure ground and unvarying norm, incurs
the gravest danger of error. The very fact of our per-
sonal interest in the judgment of sin causes us to vacil-
late all too readily between an overestimate and an
underestimate of it. Though the latter inclination is
much stronger, it punishes itself by passing to the other
extreme, and turning up in the guise of a seeming over-
estimate which is in reality only another form of under-
estimate. Moreover, if without knowing it, we lose
hold of the norm of revelation, subjective experience,
which is supposed to be so certain, is influenced by other

416

Doctrine of Sin : Method of Inquiry

objective standards of Non-Christian or Anti- Christian
theories of the universe, in our day especially by certain
unproved assumptions of the modern theory of the uni-
verse, which dominate ordinary opinion. This makes
the full and free acceptance of the Christian fundamental
ideas regarding sin exceedingly difficult. Suspicion is
cast upon the deeply solemn word sin, as if there were
simply imperfection, while in the next instant a change
takes place apparently to hopeless pessimism : respon-
sible freedom of the will is laughed at, and alongside of
this the power of the human will is exaggerated ad in-
finitum.

The Reformers were fully alive to this urgent
necessity of taking their stand upon revelation in their
doctrine of sin, and it was to this principle that they
owed their more profound flashes of insight into the
nature of sin. As the champions of the full recognition
of the grace that is in Christ, they were necessarily at
the same time the champions likewise of the full recog-
nition of sin. Such too is the meaning of their state-
ments regarding the Divine image (pp. 390 ff.). Man's
destiny, what is inconsistent with it, and the realization
of it through Christ in us, are all exactly of a piece. It
is because the Divine image, in the full and deep sense,
belongs to the nature of man, and is not in any way an
added gift of grace, that sin is " so deep and dark "
(Smalk. Art. Ill, 1); not a regrettable stain, which,
however, leaves the inmost being untouched, but a per-
version of our nature, a denial of our destiny. But it
can be so spoken of, only when like the Reformers we
recognize that sin is something personal, an afiair in-
volving the personality, and not a matter of separate
evil deeds. Luther is always inculcating by his favou-
rite quotation from Matthew vii. 16 ff., thatitis because
the tree is not good that the fruits are not good. That

VOL. I. 417 27

Faith in God the Father

again he can say, because he knows, also by the testi-
mony of revelation, what sin is as regards its content ;
namely want of faith, not fearing or loving or trusting
God. It is not primarily domination by the natural
impulses ; this is sin because of the lack of faith, the
right relation towards God.

But such new principles of the Reformation, which
were even there bound up with the old doctrine, fell
short of being developed in an effective way, in propor-
tion as they were set within the traditional framework
of the doctrine of sin, in the writings of our old Dog-
matic theologians. Indeed the new served in part to
make the old still more unsatisfactory and inconsistent.
A main error was that the confusion of which we spoke
between the question of God's image in man and that
of the condition of the first man, actually dominated
the doctrine of sin. After very general observations
regarding sin in its main scope, the exposition huriied
on to the Fall and its results, to original sin in the two
senses in which the term was then used, according to
which it is the first sin of the first man as the source
of the sin of the whole race, and the sinfulness of the
race in so far as there involved. This was followed, it
is true, by a more detailed section on actual sins, but
without any clear connexion with the foregoing, or with
the next and closing section on the servitude of the
will. Attention was thus immediately withdrawn from
what lies nearest all of us, the nature of our sin, to
what is most remote, the origin of sin in general, a fault
from which public instruction and even preaching still
largely suffer. I do not mean that the question of the
origin could and might be left alone. But in any case,
so far as it admits of an answer at all, it can be answered
only when we have exact knowledge of the nature of sin.
Otherwise we may possibly establish the origin of some-

418

Doctrine of Sin : Method of Inquiry

thing quite different from what is presupposed, some-
thing, therefore, in which we have no interest ; and
more than that, for we thereby in turn prejudice ac-
curate determination of what lies nearest us. This
was undoubtedly the case in our old Protestant Dog-
matic Theology. It was precisely the new light upon
the nature of sin brought by the Reformation, which
was obscured by the all-dominating doctrine of its
origin. That emphasizing of the personal character of
sin which accompanied the insight into its nature as
want of faith, could not come to its own, as long as
all sin was regarded essentially only from the point of
view of something inherited. When further this heri-
tage was explained without more ado as a heritage of
guilt, in order that it might be at the same time a
personal possession, we had an exaggeration against
which it was the Christian conscience itself that rose
in protest. Moreover, if all sin has its basis in the first
sin, no proper account is taken of the immeasurable
distinctions found among sinful men, while again the
question of personal sin can no longer arise. By both
exaggerations, however, though they were supposed to
show how diametrically opposed sin is to the nature of
man, it is in actual fact robbed of the seriousness which
belongs only to the truth in its fullness. Nor is this
mischief made good by the circumstance that the doc-
trine in question really gave a vivid representation of
the enormous power of solidarity possessed by sins and
sinners. For since this was brought about at the cost
of truth, even this most serious aspect of the doctrine
was involved in the danger of not being taken quite
seriously. In this connexion it is natural to pass judg-
ment incidentally upon the much canvassed position
that the Divine image was lost in consequence of the
fall of the first man. Perfectly right as regards its in-

119

Faith in God the Father

tention, a vivid expression for the strict judgment upon
sin, and intelligible as complementary to its presupposi-
tion of the natural perfection of the first man, it yet
necessarily involves a contradiction in thought. For if
the Divine Image denotes the destiny of man and the
capacity which he possesses therefor, there is certainly
opposition to this destiny in a perverted direction of the
will, and thus there is abuse of the capacity, but not
forfeiture of the destiny and the corresponding capa-
city. At least this is so as long as man is regarded as
being capable of redemption ; consequently the doctrine
we are now considering had to pay the penalty in con-
nexion with that of regeneration. Moreover, it is con-
trary to the express words of Scripture, where it is
presupposed in the New Testament as well as the Old
(Gen. IX. 6, James iii. 9, 1 Cor. xi. 7), as something
obvious that even sinful mankind is possessed of the
image of God.

Though these preliminary observations expressly
emphasize the fact that, and the reason why, our supreme
methodological principle that all doctrinal statements
have their basis in revelation is specially necessary in
the doctrine of sin, it appears worth while nevertheless
to direct attention explicitly to the truth which is there
implied, that the doctrinal statements having this basis
naturally hold good only in the sphere of such revela-
tion— only for faith in it. This is indeed, rightly un-
derstood, only the other side of the same truth. If
Christian faith is concerned solely with the positions
thus reached, then certainly it is only Christian faith
that is concerned with them. There is sin in every
religion. But in every religion it must be determined
what sin is according to the revelation there believed
in. Were we to disregard this point, we should of
necessity come to a wrong judgment with reference

420

The Nature of Sin

both to the evil and the good in other religions, which
would again in the long run lead to distorted judgments
in regard to our own religion. Then even from within
Christianity, the Christian ideas of sin readily appear
punctilious and overstrict, as well as frivolous and in-
definite, if their manifest connexion with their sure
basis and clear standard is not kept distinctly in view.
For example, the ever-recurring objection that Chris-
tianity has tolerated slavery, fails to observe that it is
only gradually that even the Christian principle can pre-
vail in every separate ramification. It is the same in the
sphere of the individual life. For example, the guilt
remitted in forgiveness cannot be truly appreciated in
its depths, where nothing is yet known of forgiveness.
In that case, on the contrary, the greatest thing in the
world, guilt and forgiveness, becomes something poor
and artificial. Only too frequently Christianity suffers
by such want of clearness on the part of its adherents.

We have still to recall in closing: what we said before
about the nature of religious knowledge — that it is a reve-
lation which faith has to interpret, and it is faith which
has to interpret the revelation. The doctrine of sin may
be set forth in a falsely " objective " fashion, unconnected
with religious experience, and in that way the doctrine
is broken up. We have thus then vindicated our ar-
rangefnient of the material belonging to the doctrine of
sin, the strict separation of our two sections on the
nature of sin and its origin, and the order in which we
take them. The former deals with the

Nature of Sin

Here we have first of all to put the separate ques-
tions as simply as possible. Common speech with in-
creasing precision confines the word sin to the religious
sphere. Where it is still otherwise used, a measure of

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Faith in God the Father

emphasis and solemnity clings to it, from the usage
which is alone properly speaking correct. What is evil,
regarded in the religious point of view, is sin. Now evil
is what is contrary to an unconditional law ; sin therefore
is what is contrary to the unconditional law of the Divine
Will (1 John III. 4), — to the unconditionally valuable,
which thought identifies with the unconditionally real.
By this in its most obvious meaning it is emphasized
that this opposition to the will of God separates from
God, alienates from Him (cf. Is. lix. 2). More pre-
cisely the opposition is not, in the first instance, to be
characterized as one that affects the direction of the
character and life, but rather as an opposition of the
will, of the particular expression and particular act of
the will, and of the direction of the will, and of the social
order resulting from human conduct. To begin with,
opposition of the will in general is sufiicient, the more
precise qualification being reserved. The Divine will,
however, with which the human will comes into op-
position, is for us Christians the will of God revealed
in Christ, with the content of which we have just ac-
quainted ourselves in the doctrine of the Divine Image,
of man's destiny upon the basis of the self-revelation of
the love of God. In this connexion, while we have
strictly to maintain the principle that ideas regarding
sin which belong to the stage of the preparatory revela-
tion, are not combined with the distinctively Christian
ideas without being tested, at the same time we may
emphatically affirm the incomparable importance which,
on this presupposition, belongs to the Old Testament
statements. Indeed the History of Israel is, in its
deepest foundations, a Divine education in the know-
ledge of sin by means of the Law (Gal. iii. 24). Conse-
quently no other religion is so rich in significant terms for
the finest distinctions and mutual relations in the King-

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The Nature of Sin

dom of sin, the enormous breadth and depth of which are
surpassed only by those of the Kingdom of God in Christ.
If sin is opposition of the will to the Will of God,
we have now only to emphasize separately the constitu-
ent elements of this preliminary definition, in order to
find a simple division for our discussion of the nature
of sin. When in speaking of the opposition of the will
to the Will of God, we place the emphasis upon the
Will of God, the content of the sinful volition comes
manifestly before us ; when we place it upon the opposi-
tion of the will we learn the form of the sinful voli-
tion in the most manifold relations. Under this head
the following are certainly the most important points.
The numerous gradations of opposition on the part of
the will, considered with reference to the strength of it,
bring us to the relation of sin and guilt. We next
remark that the opposition of the will has to be con-
sidered under the point of view of individual acts of
volition, as well as of the direction of the will. What is
the intensity of the opposition generally, without pre-
judice to the different degrees of which we have already
spoken ? But further it is by no means a question
simply of the individual sinful will ; on the contrary, all
that has been said regarding it becomes fully intelligible,
only when we consider the interaction of evil wills in
the kingdom of sin. Finally these observations natu-
rally conclude with a word upon the universality of sin.
But first of all, before sin can be considered according
to its content, as what is contrary to the commandment
of God, and before the separate questions mentioned
regarding its nature, as opposition on the part of the will,
can be answered, it is necessary to remind ourselves
how ambiguously individual concepts which come from
tradition are understood, and how in consequence they
cause confusion by their ambiguity.

423

Faith in God the Father

The word selfishness frequently means the opposite
of love of one's neighbours, sin, therefore, according to
the one aspect of its content (alongside of godlessness,
and want of self-discipline). But it also denotes quite
generally the essence of all sin in point of form, thinking
of oneself, self-love, self-seeking, self-will, without which
indeed we could not think of an opposition to the Will
of God at all. The word passion denotes frequently the
opposite of self-discipline, the mastery over our natural
impulses ; and this, corresponding to the meaning of
the word selfishness which was first mentioned above,
is again an aspect of sin according to its content, though
a different aspect from that above ; being want of disci-
pline as distinguished from godlessness and want of love.
However, it often refers to the whole of our natural im-
pulses, under the point of view of the weakness which
they indicate, which is again one side of the essence of sin
in a formal point of view, corresponding to the meaning
of the word selfishness which was mentioned above in
the second place. It will be manifest how the second
meaning of the words is always automatically running
into the question of the origin of sin, and is consequently
quite frequently employed for the answering of it. To
a certain extent the most varied meanings of the words
we have hitherto been considering, selfishness and pas-
sion, are combined in the biblical word Flesh, especially
in the Pauline and Johannine usage. Flesh there denotes
by no means selfishness only, or passion only, as is shown
by a short comparison of the passages, but both of them,
and alienation from God besides. Quite as varied is
the use of it with reference to the essence of sin in a
formal point of view. In this reference also, note must
be taken of almost all the points of view of which we
have spoken, in order to exhaust what is meant by the
Yfovdi flesh in each individual instance. The word does

424

Concept of Sin

not exclude but includes the sinfulness of our nature as
well as the expressions of it, the depth of the corruption
in the individual and the extension of it in the race, even
the idea of guilt. As sin is thus in all the aspects of its
content and its distinctive form denoted by the term
Jlesh^ which primarily means nothing more than animate
matter, it is easily intelligible that many should see in
this natural property of man the root also of his sinful-
ness. Whether this is legitimate we cannot discuss till
we are dealing with the origin of sin.

These observations upon the terminology contain an
answer, though in the first instance only a negative one,
to that first question of

The Essence of Sin According to its Content

They make it antecedently improbable that the defi-
nition is correct which finds the essence in selfishness or
passion, if the words, as was shown above, are meant to
express the essence according to its content, want of
love and want of self-discipline. Both words are too
narrow. Passion is too narrow for the very acme of sin.
What is called diabolical wickedness is much more de-
liberate want of love than it is want of self-discipline,
while on the other hand, all sin is not essentially want of
love. Should we simply combine the two and say that
in passion there is always at the same time selfishness,
while in selfishness there is always also a moment of
passion, the one specially manifest in the child, the other
in the reckless world-conqueror, the definition would
still be incomplete, for in any case a perverted relation
to God is also sin. That sin is love of the wm^ld is like-
wise inaccurate ; it infringes upon what was correct in
the definitions we have discussed. Only this definition
rightly calls attention to an aspect of the matter, which
they have not taken into consideration. In dealing with

425

Faith in God the Father

the destiny of man we had, as a matter of fact, to keep
in view his relation not only to God, to his neighbour,
and to his own nature, but also to the world.

The rejection of these definitions which are only
partly correct now leads naturally to the correct one.
The relations we have named, when synthesized, consti-
tute the essence of sin according to its content, and we
already know the synthesis of them, namely from the
doctrine of the divine image, man's destiny I to be a child
of God in the Kingdom of God. Of this, love to our
neighbours, self-discipline, and dominion over the world
were essential parts, but the point that unified them all
was the right relation to God. Now it is as certain as
that in every religion sin can be understood only as what
is contrary to the good acknowledged in it, to the Will
of God revealed in it, that for us Christians the inmost
essence of sin consists in its being the perversion of the
normal relation to God, want of religion, opposition to
the self-revealing love of God which excites and demands
trust, " want of faith ". All religion is fellowship, com-
munion between God and man : but nowhere is this
communion so profoundly personal and so profoundly
ethical as in our religion, where we have fellowship on
the part of the personal God of holy love with man who
rises to personality by trusting in this same God. God
is willing to enter into this communion, and His will of
love makes it a question of whether man is willing to do
so. The refusal to have such trust, to surrender oneself,
to acknowledge God, the course of self-seeking, of re-
solving to live and die for self, — this is sin. It should
be observed in these expressions how very closely the
material and the formal definitions of the essence of sin
are connected. *' To assert oneself, as if one belonged
to oneself," is sin in its profoundest quality. We did
not make ourselves, either as regards the natural or the

426

Essence of Sin According to its Content

moral and religious life ; we owe nothing to ourselves ;
but when we do not allow this truth to have effect, when
we lie to ourselves, saying " we stand by our own right,"
this is sin in us.

This Christian truth regarding sin is implicit, that is
as a self-evident counterpart, in all the N. T. testimonies
which tell us what is good, what is the will of God, in all
the words of Jesus regarding the Kingdom, especially
in all the beatitudes, as well as in the self-revelations of
a Paul, which are summed up in a disclosure of the
inmost convictions (Gal. ii. 20). But this refusal to
believe is also expressly represented as sin in its dis-
tinctive form. For example, Matthew xxiii. 37, "Ye
would not " (let yourselves be won by me for the dominion
of God), or John xvi. 9, " This is sin that they believe
not ". The characteristic sin of him who is the opposite
of Christ, in whom the essence of sin appears in em-
bodied form, the man of sin, is that he exalts himself
against God (2 Thess. ii. 3, 4). It was thus a rediscovery
of the gospel when the Reformers recognized the sin of
all sins in our being without the fear of God, without
love to God or trust in Him (Augs. Conf . 2), in our even
contemning, hating God in the inmost core of our hearts,
in our doubting His grace, or, to use the favourite ex-
pression of the time, in our transgressing the command-
ments " of the first table ". This does not mean that the
sin of want of love, want of self-discipline, or finding our
happiness in the world, was belittled. On the contrary ;
but none of these are understood in all their depths till
they are traced out to their primal source in the perverted
relation to God. How much talk had there been in the
Middle Ages of concupiscence, of evil lust, but upon the
view that the natural impulses, especially the sexual
impulse, and further the desire for gain and independ-
ence, were in themselves evil ! And how natural it had

427

Faith in God the Father

then been to ease the conflict with actual sin, by means
of these " painted sins ! " Now it came to be a question
of the heart, of pure love to God, and by a grand paradox
the name concupiscence was now given to the perverted
relation " even in the higher powers " (Apol. 1, 24), the
sin par excellence, the want of faith of which we have
spoken. For as faith (in its full evangelical sense of re-
ligious trust) gives the impulse and the power for love
of our neighbours, and for free command of our own
and external nature, so is want of faith (in the like deep
sense) the root of selfish lovelessness, undisciplined
gratification of the natural impulses, and surrender to
the world — apparent dominion over it, but in reality
being mastered by its seeming blessings. For the
material presented to our wills remains the same. But
the impression made by it is quite different according as
the will in all its relations is guided and shaped by trust
in God, or is made subject to the self that is alienated
from God, and this godless self is the master.

This important truth will force itself upon every one,
who is interested in a genuinely Christian view of the
essence of sin, the more convincingly, the more a twofold
misinterpretation of it is averted. I?i the first place it
is not asserted that in the consciousness of the sinful man,
irreligion must always stand in the foreground. That is
by no means the case. On the contrary, he is conscious
much rather of individual actions, or defects, telling of
want of love or of self-discipline. For the most part he
is not conscious of alienation from God, so long as it takes
the form of indifference. And even if in any way the
thought of God comes more clearly home to him, it often
for a long time occasions merely a feeling of discomfort.
Satisfaction with the world, and weariness of it, may
alternately dominate the heart, throughout a long life-
time, without its becoming clear that the absence of God

428

Essence of Sin According to its Content

is the cause of this hunger as well as of this apparent
satisfaction, to say nothing of the realization of the
enmity against God. Our statement therefore does not
claim to describe an unvarying succession in the course
of the conscious spiritual life, but to determine the
inner relation of the moments in the concept of sin, as
in its full clearness it becomes perfectly intelligible only
to the Christian, who is in principle redeemed from sin,
who, starting from his experience as a child of God, sees
light upon its opposite, and certainly no longer doubts
that this judgment of his corresponds to the objective
fact. For as a matter of fact, into the empty place which
should be filled by God, and from which as from a fixed
centre the whole rich universe within and around us
should be governed, there rush tumultuously and in con-
fusion all the powers and temptations of this world, and
under the guise of riches and freedom they establish
their enslaving despotism. In the second place we also
require here to estimate the observed fact, that the
relation of the separate fundamental aspects of sin with
each other is one of action and reaction. The person who
does not trust comes to be without anchorage in reference
to his own nature and the world, and without sympathy
towards his neighbour ; while on the other hand every con-
cession to the impulse of passion weakens the power of
love and trust in God. This tragic concatenation again
admits of endless variation in every single individual.

In conclusion, we must once again affirm the principle
before adduced, that the distinctively Christian content
of our definition naturally holds good only upon the
foundation of the Christian revelation. So far as the
understanding of it is subject to an historical develop-
ment, the further definition of sin varies with this in the
individual. But even under pre-Christian and extra-
Christian conditions, as well as imperfectly Christian

429

Faith in God the Father

ones within Christendom itself, the Christian judgment
regarding it possesses its relative truth, — in each case
according to the knowledge of God actually present,
though imperfect. Thus Paul sees the fundamental sin
of Heathendom in ingratitude, inasmuch as men did not
suffer their knowledge of God, imperfect as it was, to
assert its influence over their wills, and let a reverent
recognition of God mature within them (Rom. i. 21).
Further the psychology of religion justifies him in
maintaining that such lack of reverence and gratitude
is always, however little in evidence, the ultimate source
of all possible sins, wherever the powers of Christianity
are not operative in their fullness. Think how in Modern-
ism self-deification and self-depreciation are so often
strangely conjoined. But we may once more remind
ourselves at this point how indispensable, speaking
generally, for an effective introduction of our Christian
idea of the nature of sin into the mental life of the pre-
sent, is an exact and sympathetic acquaintance with that
mental life in its characteristic modern form. For
example, it is instructive to consider what was said about
the disturbance of the normal relation to God, to one's
neighbour, to one's own nature, to the world, from the
point of view which is adopted by large classes ; how it
is a question there of a relation to superiors, equals and
inferiors, and how in this regard, service and domination,
dependence and freedom, are connected with each other
in the most marked variety ; and in particular, perhaps,
to observe in what kindred yet different forms Goethe's
celebrated exposition of the three kinds of reverence — to-
wards what is above, around, and under us — is presented.

The Essence of Sin according to its Form

Such is in principle the definition of the essence of sin
according to its content. It is opposition of the will to

430

Essence of Sin According to its Form

the Will of God. Much more complicated is the ex-
position of the other side of our definition, according to
which sin is opposition of the will. There is here in-
volved, first of all quite generally, a limitation of the
assumption widely current that sin is essentially weak-
ness of will, suffering, passiveness, a restriction upon
life, not an exercise of life. Certainly it is restriction,
suffering ; but then above all it is regarded under a
quite different point of view from here, namely when we
are dealing not with its essence as here, but with its re-
sults. These are in fact summed up in the concept of
evil, that is of restriction upon life. Next, so far as sin
must be viewed as weakness, at our present stage, where
we are inquiring as to its essence, — and of course it must
— that view of it is entirely erroneous, unless the truth
which is decisive has previously come to its own. We
can express it in the first instance in the proposition,
imperfection and sin must not be confused. It is not being
conditioned by the natural impulses in itself that is sin,
but willing to let ourselves be conditioned by them. The
multiplicity of natural impulses is part of the equipment
bestowed upon us. It is likewise part of it that this
multiplicity of natural impulses is not arranged in an
harmonious whole. Moreover, in our development the
natural impulses spring up before the consciousness of
our destiny, and consequently when this consciousness
awakes, they cannot be made subject to it except by a
determination of the will. Nor can we imagine such
taking place without some kind of resistance, which
means some kind of conflict — the necessary qualifications
being reserved. But this equipment is understood by us
as capacity to attain to our destiny. It is not sin, but
a necessary means for our supreme end, our destiny,
that by the act of our wills we should become one with
the Will of God, children of God, For as we saw, when

431

Faith in God the Father

dealing with the idea of the love of God and our being
in the image of God, communion with God cannot
be brought about like a natural process by creative omni-
potence. Our equipment with the multiplicity of still
unharmonized natural impulses is thus the necessary
presupposition both for our becoming children of God
and on that account for possible sin. Actual sin arises
out of it when the will, instead of using them as a means
to that end, yields itself to them as if their mastery were
itself the end of our existence — when our will in opposi-
tion to the standard of the good, seeks itself ; which
necessarily means that it affirms that multiplicity of its
impulses of which we spoke, its merely and distinctively
natural form (on all its sides, see above). This truth
stands out with remarkable distinctness in Genesis in.,
and is summed up with striking brevity in James i. 14.
In the latter passage there is certainly the presupposition
of the human will as already perverted. And now if, in
the manner just described, sin is recognized as a contra-
diction by the will, the proposition which was set aside
above, because there it was erroneous and then actually
dangerous, becomes plain in its relative truth : sin is weak-
ness of will, both the particular sin, and the whole per-
verse disposition. As submission to the natural impulses,
it is of course powerlessness, weakness of will. But that
it is in all seriousness a process of will, had to be
brought out in advance as definitely and simply as pos-
sible. We sin with the will, said Augustine of old, one
who was a finely qualified investigator of these deep re-
cesses of our inward being ; our weakness of will is an
affair of the will, — so to say a false strength of will, — a
matter of self-will, self-seeking, self-love. Perhaps this
truth is still plainer, if it is expressly added that the
phrase contradiction by the will is by no means meant
only in the sense of conscious intention, of which we

432

Essence of Sin Formally Considered

have to speak immediately when we distinguish sin and
guilt. The expression actual opposition of the will or
actual contradiction in the will, likewise suffices here.
Indeed all that would be admitted by every one as a fact
of self-observation guided by the light of revelation, were
it not for the circumstance, to which we have pointed
from the beginning of the doctrine of sin onwards, that
the question of the origin of sin obtrudes itself here also
as a disturbing element. The question is at once raised
whether and how far this actual contradiction by the
will is an unavoidable reality. Thus in order to allow
of such an examination of the facts of the case which
are referred to as would not be prejudiced by this
question, it may be remarked here that an explanation
of them that might be found from one's own guilt, and
especially from that of others, is still kept entirely in re-
serve, and that the unavoidableness alluded to is by no
means already recognized as a necessity which is inde-
pendent of that guilt.

The outcome of this investigation, then, is the state-
ment with which we started : Sin and imperfection must
not be confused.

This statement leads directly to another which is
even more important, viz. : Sin and guilt must not be
confused. The word sin denotes opposition on the
part of the human will to the Divine, considered in
relation to the Divine will as its objective norm. The
word guilt, on the other hand, denotes opposition on the
part of the human will considered in relation to the
understanding of the objective norm which is subjectively
present, and to the power subjectively present of com-
plying with it. All qualifications are still reserved,
especially the fact that a sin may involve guilt, although
in the moment when it is committed there is perhaps
neither the knowledge nor the power of will to avoid it ;

VOL. I. 433 28

Faith in God the Father

but there might have been but for incapacity due to
previous guilt. This is what is meant when it is often
said off-hand that sin is an objective, guilt a subjective
concept. This distinction between sin and guilt would
likewise be generally admitted, were it not for the
premature intrusion here again of the problem of the
freedom of the human will, which falls to be answered
only when we are dealing with the question of the origin
of sin. Here on the contrary we are dealing with the
essence of sin as a fact capable of being experienced and
tested by the standard of revelation, where this distinc-
tion of sin and guilt forces itself directly upon our
notice ; and it will be impossible to identify the two, in
the sense that only that is called sin which was called
here guilty sin (H. H. Wendt), — if the whole wealth
of life is to be apprehended by means of clear concep-
tions.

In the traditional doctrine of the Church, the dis-
tinction between sin and guilt does not receive its full
rights, any more than the distinction which we first
treated between imperfection and sin. Indications of it
are certainly not awanting, as for example, when it is said
(2 Helvetic Confession, 8) that some sins are more griev-
ous than others, where the predicate " more grievous "
has reference not to the content of the norm violated,
which also recognizes different degrees, as between injury
to life and to property for example, but to differences in
the measure of moral knowledge and power. But on the
whole, for reasons which we shall understand with
growing precision, the tendency predominates as far as
possible to identify sin and guilt. A distinction is
indeed drawn between sins of knowledge and deliberate
purpose, or sins of malice on the one hand, and sins of
ignorance and unpremeditated sins or sins of weakness
on the other. But the distinction is nullified, because

43i

Essence of Sin Formally Considered

generally speaking the individual actual sins are under-
stood almost entirely as the outcome of sinfulness, which
is looked upon as inherited and yet as involving guilt.
When Rationalism did away with this presupposition of
Orthodoxy, its place was taken by another method
equally one-sided, namely the atomic treatment of in-
dividual sins, and the minimizing as far as possible of
their guilty character.

On the other hand, the distinction between sin and
guilt is everywhere presupposed by Jesus' treatment of
the soul, which goes thoroughly into each individual
case, and in a wonderful way combines strictness with
gentleness. All certainly stand in need of His salvation,
but not as if they were a uniform body ; there are
many degrees between the " poor in spirit," and those to
whom His words, " Ye would not," apply. Of special
importance for our question is the clear understanding
of " sin of ignorance " in the New Testament. The
term is far from comprehending simply what is so
designated in the literature of devotion ; it is used also
of what are called gross and heinous sins, like the
heathen vices (Eph. iv. 18), or the death of Jesus by the
leaders of the people or the people themselves (Acts xiii.
27, cf. Luke xxiii. 34), or the persecution of the Church
by Paul (1 Tim. i. 13). The last passage shows with
special clearness that guilt, even of a serious nature, is
in no way meant to be excluded by the expression.
But this is only to make the distinction between sin and
guilt, as well as between different degrees of guilt, so
much the clearer. Ignorance in such passages is the
opposite of deliberate opposition to the will of God,
more accurately to the love of God fully revealing itself.
In this Scriptural sense, sin of ignorance is possible till
the supreme revelation of the Love of God is complete
(till the coming of Christ ; cf. what was said above re-

435

Faith in God the Father

garding the heathen world), or, after it is complete, till
it comes home in the fullness of its glory to the persons
concerned. Here then sin of ignorance means the same
as sin which is not deliberate, of the sinfulness of which
we are not yet fully conscious, sin which, however much
guilt it may involve, does not exclude the Divine forgive-
ness. Its opposite, deliberate rejection of salvation fully
known, is called sin unto death (1 John v. 16) or wilful
sin (Hebr. vi. 4 ff., x. 26 ff.), only that we must under-
stand "wilful" here in its strictest sense as discussed
above. The sin against the Holy Ghost (Mt. xii. 31 ff.)
has the same meaning, when we go behind the immediate
context to the root idea (cf. ''Ethics").

There can be no doubt that this insistence of the
Xew Testament upon the distinction between sin and
guilt, and the many varying degrees of guilt, is fully
borne out in education and pastoral work, as well as in
one's criticism of one's self, while neglect of it brings its
own punishment ; but there are many subjects, especially
that of collective sin, which fall to be discussed before
we can speak of it definitely.

In the first place, it has to be noted that the opposi-
tion of the will, and that too in all the degrees of which
we have spoken, may be an opposition in individual
ACTS OF VOLITION, or in the dikection of the will. In-
deed this also is a distinction recognized by the tradi-
tional doctrine, but again without its being assigned its
full importance. Actual sin is distinguished from habit-
ual sin, and the actual sins are classified under all pos-
sible points of view, which naturally coincide in part with
our last discussed distinction of sin and guilt, such as
"intentional" and "unintentional," or "deadly" and
" venial ". Others again have reference to the content
of the sin, as " against God, or our neighbours, or our-
selves," or to some formal relation as " sins of the heart,

436

Individual Sins and Direction of Will

of the lips or of deed " ; while there are still others which
have no serious value, being based upon the external use
of individual Biblical passages, like " crying " sins and
" not crying " ones. But generally speaking, there is no
possibility of a clear recognition of individual sins,
because, as we had occasion to point out in the other
connexion with which we dealt, they are regarded
essentially simply as manifestations of a sinful direction
of the will, instances of sinfulness, that is, or of original
sin in the one sense of this term, according to which it
is meant to point not so much to the origin of sin, but
on the contrary to the sinful state in which, as a matter
of fact, we find ourselves in virtue of heredity. Now
there undoubtedly are a great many sins, which are to
be regarded simply as fruits of the corrupt tree (Mt. vii.
16 ff.); but if all actual sins whatsoever are construed
merely in this way, there is to say the least no adequate
explanation of how such a crop on the part of the tree
is intelligible to any great extent, so far as we can observe,
from the nature of the will, without immediately having
to resort to the idea of an evil nature, which in any case
itself calls for explanation : how is it, for example, that
every evil determination of the will makes the next
easy ? Moreover, such a course fails to do justice to the
idea of the determination of the will itself, in the light
of the im.portant fact of our inner life of which we spoke,
that all sins do not in the same degree involve guilt.

All such considerations lay far beyond the horizon
of our old divines, because from the first their interest
was directed to emphasizing as strongly as possible the
sinfulness of our natural will. They are always occupied
in the first instance with the intensity of the corruption,
its hopeless character, apart from Redemption. Hab-
itual sin is for them radical sinfulness ; that is the loss
of the divine image or of the original innate righteous-

437

Faith in God the Father

ness, together with evil inclination in the deepest
sense of the term, " inward impurity, evil desire in the
higher powers of our being " (cf. p. 427 f.) ; in short, a
condition thoroughly corrupt, a propensity to evil, so that
the indicator of the balance in every case inclines to the
wrong side, and sinful man has in himself no power to
turn it to the other. The Eoman Church prefers to
speak merely of weakness on the part of man's free
will. Indeed in the baptized it does not admit the
existence of sin in the strict sense, but only of the
" material " for sin ; and though for the attainment of the
supernatural goal it demands " the infusion of super-
natural grace," when this is once infused it holds that
it immediately co-operates with the natural will, and ac-
cordingly produces good works under the point of view of
merit. The Evangelical Church, on the other hand,
strictly maintained that the natural man has completely
lost the power of realizing by his own strength the divinely
good, which nevertheless is and continues to be his vocation
(p. 419 f.) ; his freedom extends only to civic righteous-
ness. That is, he has " in some measure freedom of will
to live an outwardly decent life, and to choose such things
as reason can reach unto . . . but not to fear God from
the heart, or to have faith " (Augs. Confess. Article 18).
Certainly, however, the last Lutheran Confession is
unfortunate in its formulation of this fundamental
principle of our Church, when it says (Formula of Con-
cord, 2nd Part, IL 19 ff.) that the heart of the natural
man is worse than a stone or a log, inasmuch as it is
rebellious against and averse to the will of God. Though
such expressions are quite intelligible in their Scriptural
context, when converted into dogmatic statements they
obscure the character of sin as an act of the will, which
is the aspect of it indeed that our evangelical doctrine
must be supremely interested in, They land us in con-

438

Radical Sinfulness

tradictions, inasmuch as the enmity in question is looked
upon as purely the act of man, while faith in the grace
of God is not in any point of view regarded as his
decision ; and above all they fail once more to re-
cognize the undeniably great individual differences in
the degree of opposition on the part of the will. At
the same time the proper intention of such statements,
as defined in what we have already said, is certainly to
be maintained without reservation. It is the general
impression made by all the testimonies of revelation,
not merely the Pauline and the Johannine (Romans vii.
7 ff. with parallel passages ; John iii. 8 with parallel
passages) but also that of the activity of Jesus, that the
sovereign power of God both demands and at the same
time alone produces a transformation of man's inmost
being (Mk. i. 15 with parallel passages, especially Mt.
V. 1 ff.). Jesus never in any external fashion glosses
over the differences between those with whom He comes
in contact, and never groups them together in any rough
and ready estimate as if they constituted one uniform
mass, but seeks and finds each one individually in his
individual isolation from God ; He speaks freely of the
righteous and sinners, of the whole and the sick (Luke
V. 31 1). But for that very reason, it is all the more
remarkable how He makes every one realize that He is
for each and all, and has something for every one, and
that the best, the one thing that all need and none have,
and that no one can receive except by a complete change,
a return home in the spirit of a child and in poverty of
spirit. The less obtrusive this is in His teaching, the more
He drives it home to us. And the truth He wishes us to
realize is just that from which we started, that there is
perversion of the will in its inmost core, and that this is
so because the will itself is involved ; we have to reckon
not with a weakness that can easily be got over, but

139

Faith in God the Father

with a deep-seated false strength, which it is not in our
power to overcome. We find ourselves confronted with
the decisive question : what is thine ultimate, inmost
desire, thy supreme goal ? Is it reverently to trust the love
of God, and in the power of such trust to love thy neigh-
bour, to dedicate thyself with all thy powers and inclina-
tions to the service of this love, and to use the world as
the inexhaustibly glorious means for the realization of a
task so inexhaustibly grand, or to deny it when it sets
itself in opposition ? The question assumes a different
form and a different emphasis in the case of every individ-
ual, and the sound and colour of the answer also vary in
every separate instance ; but at bottom we have always
to do with one and the same experience. It is the task
of Ethics to arrange as well as it can the fullness of the
experiences which belong to life. It does so with the
help of the much-misused, and therefore not without
reason much mistrusted, word Conversion, and shows
that the word is an indispensable one, when all is said,
for it gives expression to a reality of momentous im-
portance ("Ethics," 195 flP.). Ethics is furnished with a
specially instructive illustration by Pedagogics, the
picture-book of the hopes and disappointments which
circle round the question, whether man is good or evil,
and what measure of strength belongs to the evil
tendency in his will. But we can realize more clearly
what a living interest even our own age has in this
problem which is concerned with the deepest personal
interests of the individual, in spite of appearances to
the contrary, when once all that we have said so far
regarding the nature of sin as opposition on the part of
the will, has been supplemented by the consideration
advanced at the start, but always kept in the background
in the interests of clearness, that we have to do by no
means only with the sin of the individual, but with the

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Kingdom of Sin

interaction of evil wills upon each other, or a Kingdom
OF Sin.

In reality what we have always to reckon with is a
plurality of wills acting in opposition to their vocation,
and these not as a sum of isolated self-centred units,
but, in conformity with the general laws of our spirit-
ual being, as a communion of wills reacting upon
each other. To this potent actuality Holy Scrip-
ture gives the name of the world. In the traditional
Dogmatics of the Church, in place of this profound idea
" the world," we find that of the mass of corruption : by
the first sin all are entangled in the same sin and guilt,
as if the realm of nature were involved. The character of
the will is infringed upon, and its individuality is lost in
regard to the nature and measure of the opposition to
the good. But just as one-sided was the Pelagian
atomism of the Dogmatics of the rationalistic type, the
idea of a sum of separate but at bottom good wills,'
which, coming to be freely related to each other, have
of course to suffer from evil example. Emphasizing as
it did anew the idea of the Kingdom of God, Pietism
found a new meaning for its opposite, the idea of the
world, but the latter, like the former, was narrowed by
comparison with its fundamental New Testament signi-
ficance. This was restored to it by Schleiermacher under
the title Kirigdorn of Sin; and the richness of the life of
modern civilization gave it a content of the utmost
variety and an ever-changing application, without, how-
ever, passing beyond the root idea of the New Testa-
ment. For as the world is described as being a world
of offences (Mt. xviii. 7), and it is explained by simple
examples of all kinds what an offence is, the word ivorld
is as graphic and popular as it is definite. And as it not
only embraces those occurrences which spring directly
from the perversion of the will, but brings into relation

141

Faith in God the Father

with sin absolutely the whole compass of our experience,
it is still more comprehensive than Kingdom of Sin, or
it brings before us still more directly the all-embracing
all-pervading power of sin of which we speak. Desire
and care of this world, fear and love of the world,
hatred of the world and anxiety about it, to live for
the world and to be crucified to it — the expressions
denote actually an infinite world of Christian experi-
ence. Ethics has to show in detail how it is that
the world is full of ofiPences (cf. "Ethics," pp. 150 fi*.);
here it is sufficient to refer to the root idea; they
are the outcome of reciprocal action on the part of
sinful wills, with their motives, standards, and purposes,
including all the occurrences, relations, or circumstances
produced or altered by them. In this reciprocal action
all are bound up with each other to an extent that
human judgment cannot measure. This does not apply
to contemporaries merely ; each generation receives an
inheritance from the past and transmits one to the
future. Nor does the reciprocal action involve only
all individuals in their dealings with each other ; it affects
all sorts of common relationships, the family, education,
nationality, religion. In this acting and reacting of wills
upon each other, " each is the work of all and all are the
work of each ". This statement needs only to be made,
to understand what significance the idea of the world
or the kingdom of sin has for all the ideas regarding sin,
which we have discussed thus far, so that it is only now
that we are in a position to deal with them in definitive
fashion. Our success will depend upon the clearness with
which, at the same time, we realize that the Kingdom of
Sin is not externally separated from the Kingdom of
God, in this present stage of its development. The wills to
be found acting and reacting upon each other are of all
degrees of relative goodness as well as evil. Even those

442

Kingdom of Sin

who are in principle renewed (regenerated or converted)
still carry within them elements of the old, and con-
sequently have at work in them purposes, standards and
motives where good and evil are so intertwined, that
they cannot be disentangled by human judgment.

Looking backwards we understand now much more
clearly what had to be said of the content of sin : it is
because the individual will is entangled in such a King-
dom of Sin that the separate aspects of sin assume their
distinctive character, the lack of self-restraint or of love
of which we spoke, and what is the deepest root of
these, the lack of religion. But this applies quite as
much to the nature of sin according to its form as op-
position on the part of the will. The direction of the
will in relation to the individual volitional act, and still
more the radical perversion of the will, appear in a clearer
light after we realize how evil wills act and react upon
each other. But above all we must once again direct
attention to the distinction between sin and guilt, from
this higher point of view. For the statement, " every-
one the work of all," inevitably raises the question, "Is
everyone wholly and solely the work of all ? "

This question we have already answered in the
negative when, in spite of the radical incapacity of the
will for what is truly good, we had to lay down that
there are different degrees of opposition on the part of
the will, and saw that on this fact the distinction between
sin and guilt, as well as between manifold degrees of guilt
itself, is founded. Now upon the basis of our knowledge
of the Kingdom of Sin, we can say that with greater pre-
cision. Its power helps us in large measure to understand
the distinction in question. There is much sin in the world
which is not guilt on the part of individuals, because
they are led into sin by the offence of the world, before
they have the measure of insight and strength necessary

Faith in God the Father

to withstand temptation. Others may have the guilt,
but it is not their personal guilt, however great the
certainty that it is sin. It is true that this statement is
not always unreservedly admitted ; indeed it is denied
for reasons the intention of which is creditable. We
are responsible, it is said, not only for the fact that we
do not do our part to overcome the opposition to the
good, but also for the fact that the opposition exists in
such strength in ourselves. " Certainly," we reply, " in
numberless instances ; indeed it is a sure proof of moral
sensibility that in our self-condemnation we do not con-
fine our attention to the moment of our sinning, but ask
ourselves whether and how that moment was prepared
for by previous guilt. But we cannot admit that, as
soon as we recognize something in ourselves as morally
evil, we make ourselves responsible for it. Our conclu-
sion must be that sin is that which, when measured by an
objective standard, does not conform thereto ; but guilt is
sin for which we have knowingly and willingly decided, or
the cause of which we are compelled to seek in earlier de-
cisions knowingly and willingly come to. And even the
most conscientious self-examination does not make the
extent of our personal sin coincide with that of our
personal guilt." It is not easy to give expression to this
truth in a manner not liable to be misunderstood. It is
earnest Christian circles which incline to the contrary
opinion, and see in the one of which we have just ap-
proved at least the danger of making light of sin. Ap-
peal is also made to the testimony of the great in the
Kingdom of God in favour of the stricter view. In such
appeal to an Augustine or Luther, to say nothing of
those whose confessions do not so unquestionably breathe
the atmosphere of absolute truthfulness, one is apt to
forget how alien it is to such confessions to strike an
exact balance of thought, such thought as bears on

Hi

Kingdom of Sin

the question, how much of the oppressive sense of
sin is personal guilt in the strictest sense. "O my
guilt," becomes in all sincerity, " O the infinitude
of my guilt," without any quantitative identification of
sin and guilt. Or on the other hand, are we to hold
that the consciousness of guilt is absent from what Paul
says in Romans vii., because taking him literally he re-
fers only to the thraldom of sin ? In what we have
said we are far from denying, on the contrary we
emphatically assert, that the feeling of personal guilt
deepens and broadens with the progress of the Chris-
tian life. If the expression be allowed, material from
the general stores of the consciousness of personal
sin, is being drawn in ever-increasing quantity into the
hidden furnace of intimate personal responsibility, and
that furnace is felt to be always hotter. It is not mor-
bid self-torment which makes the individual judgment
more and more, as time goes on, lay bare the delicate
ramifications, and hidden roots of the inward corruption,
whereas at first it confined itself to single more or less
manifest errors and " gross " sins ; and makes the sense
of guilt deepen at the same time. In particular this is
the case in the measure in which the nature of sin ac-
cording to its content is more fully known, and seen to
be lack of religion. We no longer ask ourselves, in
however earnest and heart-searching a fashion, where
and how love and self-discipline should and could have
gained the victory. The question we now put is,
how often we have neglected God's still, tender wooing
of our souls, "have glorified Him not, neither given
thanks," and how we have thus obstructed our own
heavenward path, and deprived ourselves of the power of
really becoming good in all the other relations involved
as well. But it is when this truth is emphasized as
strongly as possible, that the interests of truthfulness

445

Faith in God the Father

impose upon us the duty of maintaining our position
regarding the distinction between sin and guilt, and
affirming that for the individual the two do not coin-
cide. The distinction is not to be obliterated by the
circumstance, that the admission we have made is used
to support the conclusion that, because an ever-increas-
ing amount of sin is recognized as guilt, in the end all
sin will be so recognized. Certainly external purely
self-righteous ways of measuring and computing our
sinfulness, will ever fall more and more into the back-
ground ; the judgment the sinner passes is compatible
with and demanded by the truth, that he has made his
own what was at first foreign to him, — but this does not
mean that he has made all of it his own in the sense of
strictly personal guilt. This is what is borne out ulti-
mately even by those confessions of the great in the King-
dom of God, of which we have spoken, when we take the
trouble of understanding them with precision ; above
all — and this is what settles the point — it is borne out
by the method of Jesus in dealing with souls, and the
manner in which this method is ever confirmed anew
in the souls which trust themselves to it. From the
many masters, who, though it is their earnest intention
to make sin duly sinful, often do not refrain from ex-
aggeration and undue pressure, the person who does
not wish to deceive himself or to let himself be deceived,
turns for safety, even in this anxiety which is above all
others a personal one, to the One Master, who speaks
the words, " Ye who are evil," or rather causes him to
experience them in his own heart, in such wise that
all excuses which are not of the truth are silenced, but
at the same time any apparent advance beyond the
simple truth is set aside as an exaggeration. And in
His school one learns how it is that even outside the
Christian community, at all stages and in all kinds of

ii6

Kingdom of Sin

religion, there may be found at least a presentiment in-
clining one to say — I did not give myself life, but I live
as if I lived by my own power and might live for
myself ; and in this consists my guilt.

Again we may say that the position we have laid
down would certainly be more generally accepted, if
matters were not complicated by the question of the
ultimate origin of sin, which we have reserved. We
have not yet come to the question whether all sin in-
volves personal guilt, although all the sin of an indimdual
does not involve personal guilt on his part. But we
have been able to see how inevitable the question is. It
is all the more inevitable, the more accurately we con-
strue the concept of the Kingdom of Sin. By thinking
out the idea of reciprocal action fully, we receive in fact
an important aid towards the solution of the problem of
the origin. In every case of such reciprocal action
every one is the object of the working of all, and the
subject of the working upon all. In so far as he is
object, the sin in him is largely inevitable, he is under
a necessity ; in so far as in the strictest sense of the
term, he is subject, sin is avoidable on his part, it is his
personal guilt. It is easy to undervalue the signific-
ance of this truth, which is one capable of directing our
judgment of ourselves to a much greater extent than
we are often inclined to admit. But in any case it does
not give us the last word ; for the answer in question
raises new problems, which resolve themselves into the
one indicated above. Still, the positions we have al-
ready established guard us against superficial answers
to this last great problem. It is said, e.g. "guilt is a
Jewish delusion, which has come down to us by inherit-
ance," or "there is not guilt at all except when the
shining form of Jesus confronts us ; but that is a con-
sciousness of guilt of a purely religious kind, and has

447

Faith in God the Father

nothing to do with freedom and responsibility". In
such statements everything is obscure ; above all, the
careless confusion of the questions of fact and of origin.
But thoroughly obscure too is that assertion that there
is guilt only when we are face to face with Jesus ; as if
the greatest guilt were not just what it is, but yet had
its very real preparatory forms at all stages of Christian
or non-Christian life.

Little further need be said upon the only one now
remaining of the concepts which we put in the forefront,
that namely of the Universality of Sin. From the stand-
point of the Christian faith in revelation, it is a presup-
position for the universality of redemption or a conclusion
drawn therefrom (Rom. iii. 20). But at the same time
it is accepted as a fact of experience not merely in the
preliminary revelation of the Old Testament, but by
the general consciousness of humanity in the measure of
the development of the moral sense. Further, it has
always been noticed that the universality of sin has been
held most absolutely by the relatively best of men, while
sceptics are found most frequently among those who
condemn not only the moral consciousness, but even the
requirements of law. All the more remarkable will the
single exception, Jesus' judgment of Himself, appear
to us even at this stage of our studies.

Is there any point of contact between these principles
of Christian religious knowledge regarding the nature
of sin, and the present-day consciousness ? It is as
impossible to answer this question in a concise epigram-
matic phrase, as it is to speak of the modern conscious-
ness generally as a homogeneous entity (pp. 2 ff.).
Certainly Benan's "What of sin? I believe I am
mastering it," will make small impression on the Ger-

448

Universality of Sin

man mind. But even in Goethe we find, alongside of
profound words regarding sin and guilt, and that too
not in the years of his exuberant strength alone, traces
of an optimism foreign to Christian faith. The moral
law and the law of nature come closer together than
Christian faith permits ; the moral fact itself becomes a
beautiful natural phenomenon ; the poet will let noth-
ing seduce him into being good and evil, like nature.
And though the well-known words upon original sin
apply to it in the first instance as an extreme refinement
of sheer dogmatism, they support nevertheless the view
of " the infinite goodness of the human will ". But to
the same observer we are indebted not merely for the
statement that the knowledge of sin is the doorway to
Christian faith, but for this other so striking in its sim-
plicity, which indeed belongs to an earlier date : " The
thing, the evil thing never yet explained, which separates
us from the Being to whom we owe life — the Being
from whom everything worthy to be called life must
derive its support — the thing that is called sin I knew
as yet not at all ". Subsequently this tendency to under-
estimate sin, and to confuse between the ethical and the
natural, grew, and spread among the masses beyond the
narrow circles of the initiated. This applies especially
to the opposition to the ecclesiastical doctrine of the
complete corruption of the natural man in things spirit-
ual (which was natural enough when this world of the
perfectly good God became for many a dissolving phan-
tom). But there were not wanting too those who
pointed earnestly to sin as the great enigma which is
not solved by being denied. In particular, many a
long-cherished illusion as to the goodness of the human
heart, was destroyed by searching examination of the
actual facts. Naturalism in laying bare the natural
roots of the moral life found them in many respects

VOL. I. 449 29

Faith in God the Father

so tainted, that long forgotten expressions of the ec-
clesiastical Dogmatics regarding the lack of freedom on
the part of the will, seemed scarcely strong enough; and
recognition of the reciprocal action of evil wills upon
each other, as well as of the way they are intertwined
with nature, secured for the idea of original sin new ad-
herents among its most decided contemners, though
responsibility was now denied more absolutely than ever
before, and the fearful " spectres " haunting the sphere of
sex relations were subjected to the iron law of necessity.
And yet often immediately alongside of such ideas, or
inseparably connected with them, we find not only deeper
knowledge of the will, but also unreserved admission of
its power and actually spirited encomiums upon its
functions, its world-renewing ideals ! Strange though it
sounds, Nietzsche's prophetic activity has reawakened in
many a belief in the will, which could become a belief
in the contemned divine message of the freeing of the
enslaved will.

Only whatever judgment we may form regarding the
relation of the modern consciousness to the Christian
doctrine of the nature of sin, in any case it is incum-
bent upon us to concentrate attention most closely upon
this doctrine itelf, when we inquire now regarding the
ideas of the Christian faith on the question of the origin
of sin.

The Origin of Sin

The fact that, and the reason why, the question of
the origin comes second have already been explained.
It is really not of equal importance with the question of
the nature. All the same we have to do with a problem
which necessarily arises. How much this is the case
may be illustrated by the fact that, in the beginning of
the nineteenth century. Daub's " Judas Iscariot " was

450

The Origin of Sin

still possible. That is to say, he ventured upon the
dualistic answer, in order to be able to give any sort of
answer at all. We have now become more discreet and
wary, but every one knows by experience that the old
question of the origin of evil grips him with a power all
its own, when he reflects upon the mystery of his own
being.

The knowledge of the nature of sin is at all events
the norm for the knowledge of its origin (pp. 415 ff.).
For we would like to understand the fact of sin, so far
as we are capable of so doing, without doing violence
to that fact. This fundamental principle gives us a
centre, round which the almost innumerable answers
to our question group themselves, so that we can give
a summary survey There are then three main answers ;
namely that sin is to be regarded as necessary, or that the
idea of freedom is to be asserted as the last thought con-
cerning its origin, or that the two are to be combined.
Now manifestly the last course is the most natural one
to attempt, if, in accordance with the norm to which we
have referred, we pass from the treatment of its actual
nature to that of its origin. For in dealing with the
former question, we came to two conclusions : sin is to be
regarded as opposition on the part of the will, but with
all conceivable gradations of personal guilt in the strict-
est sense of the term, up to complete absence of free-
dom on the part of the will ; while again the individual
sinful wills are merged in the Kingdom of Sin. In this
accurate construction of the facts there was involved to
some extent an answer to the question of the origin, and
we had always to be on our guard against unwittingly
encroaching upon the question of the ultimate origin.
Should we not therefore say now, when we deliberately
raise this question, that the facts point to a combination
of both answers ; there is truth in both ; the correct

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Faith in God the Father

answer has a place for both freedom and necessity ?
Only it is more in accordance with the impulse of the
human soul in favour of a single ultimate, to conceive of
even the apparently free as necessary, or the ap-
parently necessary as free. By reason of the con-
sciousness of guilt, unbiassed Christian instinct, in
its depths as awakened by the Christian view of God,
inclines towards the latter alternative ; philosophical
reflection inclines towards the former, for us moderns
especially in the form of the all-dominating theory of evo-
lution, though philosophy is often reinforced apparently
by a motive which is fundamental in the religious point
of view. In what follows, we start therefore from the
theories which, in accordance with the remark made
above, can be summarily referred to as theories of the
freedom of the will. Within this group we begin with
the most radical ones, which on that account are in the
most manifest contradiction to the facts of the case,
which showed us that sin in one aspect of it is inevit-
able ; and we conclude with the most imposing, which
at the same time takes into most careful consideration,
and seeks to understand, this aspect of the situation,
namely the ecclesiastical doctrine of original sin. The
discovery that notwithstanding, in its traditional form,
it fails to do justice to the full truth of sin as we have
established it, leads to the theories of necessity. Among
them, precisely as before, we deal first with those which,
on the other hand,are least successful in explaining what
had to be said of guilt which points to freedom ; then
come the attempts which deliberately seek to reckon
with this objection, without however acknowledging
freedom in principle. Should these also not be en-
tirely successful, the inclination is to try without pre-
judice the attempt to mediate between freedom and
necessity which recommended itself first as most

452

The Origin of Sin

obvious, but which, however, did little to meet the
demand for the unification of knowledge, and conse-
quently was put aside. Finally, if even this way does
not lead to the goal, the question may be raised whether
it may not be possible, by taking all these attempts into
consideration, to develop the ecclesiastical doctrine in
harmony with the fundamental ideas of revelation, and
to state it in unobjectionable form ; or whether we must
not refrain altogether from seeking a satisfactory solu-
tion of the problem, and why we must do so. In short,
there is a great variety of possibilities. Still we shall
not be confused by them, if we keep in mind the prin-
ciple of division we have adopted.

Theories of the Freedom of the Will

Among these, there is no need to spend time over
the theory of pure indeterminism, which regards every
single sin as proceeding from the unconditioned choice
of a completely undetermined will, because apart alto-
gether from all the inherent objections by which it is
weighed down, it completely ignores a series of the
most important facts which we established when in-
vestigating the nature of sin, especially the fact of the
evil tendency of the will, as well as of the reciprocal
action of evil wills upon each other in the Kingdom
of Sin. Again the charge of underestimating, to say
the least, the fact last mentioned must be brought
against those who, partly with discriminating emphasis
upon important moments, assert a fall on the part of each
individual in the dark beginnings of the personal life,
without thereby seeking to exclude subsequent freedom
of decision. The stress it lays upon the personal char-
acter of the guilt of sin, may always commend such a
theory to some ; and the objection that all of us must
have retained the recollection of so weighty a decision, is

453

Faith in God the Father

perhaps invalid, since so far as such recollection is lack-
ing, its place might have been taken by the conscious-
ness of guilt which is the consequence of the individual
fall. But this theory fails to distinguish with sufficient
precision between sin and guilt, and underestimates
the undeniable influence of the sinful society. In order
to be freed from this objection, it would have to be so
seriously modified, that it would pass over into theories
which we shall afterwards have to discuss.

A theory often rejected on purely superficial grounds
is the Predeterminist one of a pre-existent fall, hap-
pening anterior to time, or more accurately out of time,
yet conditioning temporal existence. The motive of this
theory at all events is quite intelligible. It starts from
the dilemma : If sin is inevitable, what place is there for
freedom, the presupposition of the sense of guilt ? If
man is free, why should sin be inevitable ? and sees the
only way of escape from this dilemma in the view before
us (Julius Mtiller). But again it cannot be concealed
that the theory, at least in its ordinary form, is not suffi-
ciently careful to take as its starting-point the actual
nature of sin as indicated above ; it isolates the indivi-
dual from the community, the Kingdom of Sin, and it
is far too ready to construe all sin as guilt. The reverse
side of the latter exaggeration very soon shows itself.
It becomes only too easy to look upon no sin as in the
strictest sense guilt. In fact even in Origen the idea of
a pre-existent Fall approximated toward the speculative
transformation, the view namely that the finite as such
is sinful. Hence there is little need in Dogmatics to
prove that for us at all events every idea of such a de-
cision is forbidden. But the theory has at least the
merit of impressing the seriousness of the problem
upon those who are hasty in judgment, when it is
taken in connexion, say, with Kant's and Schopen-

454

The Origin of Sin

hauer's advocacy of the idea of intelligible freedom.
Perhaps one or two ma}?^ take it up again at the end of
the long journey which still lies ahead of us, and occupy
themselves more seriously with it.

While naturally it is mostly only isolated thinkers
and smaller circles who are interested in the theory of a
fall anterior to time, the last theory in our group which
calls for discussion, namely the ecclesiastical doctrine
OF ORIGINAL SIN, is not Only widely prevalent still, but
can in the first instance give a good account of itself on
rational grounds. For as compared with all the attempts
so far mentioned, it commends itself by the clearness
with which it sets itself to maintain in the most unam-
biguous manner possible, that God is in no sense the
Author of sin (Augsburg Confession, 19), but the evil
will itself, while yet at the same time recognizing that
as a matter of fact evil is in great measure unavoidable ;
a position which it endeavours to reconcile with the
other by regarding such unavoidableness, or the evil
tendency of the will in the case of all men united as they
are in the Kingdom of Sin, as the result of the first sin,
where freedom was a reality.

We can form an accurate judgment as to how far
the ecclesiastical doctrine of original sin achieves its pur-
pose, only if we realize this purpose itself in all its wide-
ness of range. Such judgment naturally concerns itself
both with the idea of the Fall itself, and with that of its
consequences ; and the standard of judgment in the one
case is found in the conclusions arrived at in the matter
of the divine image, in the other, in those regarding the
nature of sin. Now we had to reject the theory of orig-
inal righteousness as self-contradictory, and at the same
time as not borne out by the statements of Holy Scrip-
ture. Here, however, we must add : from such a state
of perfection a fall is inconceivable, and that too not

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Faith in God the Father

only in the sense in which sin generally can be spoken
of as inconceivable, if the idea of freedom is to be al-
lowed full scope, but because of the greatness of original
righteousness which is presupposed. Christian faith
must protest against such a possibility; otherwise it
would lose the joyful confidence that when once we
reach the state of perfection, the disturbing possibility
of a change of will can no longer trouble us. In addi-
tion to this first error there is the second, involved,
doubtless, in the first, in the case of our old divines,
that they thought of the effect of the first sin upon Adam
himself as unlimited. By it alone he brought upon him-
self a perversion of the direction of his will, in the sense
indicated above (as regards extent and depth). We saw
that this too could be maintained only if there was no
proper regard for the nature of the will.

Still more serious are the objections to the doctrine
of the consequences of this fall. They apply to the view
held as to what it is that is transmitted to us, and how
it is transmitted — as to the matter of these consequences,
and the manner of their occurrence. In the first place,
the content of what we inherit from Adam is vaguely
defined. This is so not in the view of some Reason
which must first prove its legitimacy, but in that of the
Christian Reason — the religious knowledge which rests
upon revelation and is defined by it. The great truth
of the Kingdom of Sin is undervalued ; what can be com-
prehended as resulting from the reciprocal action of
evil wills upon each other, is construed by the traditional
doctrine without proof, as being the direct consequence
of the single first sin. In the second place, the per-
verted direction of the will is wrongly looked upon as
the direct and in the last instance the sole cause of the
separate sinful actions ; and in consequence the great
differences of degree, as regards the opposition of the

456

Doctrine of Original Sin

will to the divine commandment, are underrated. Be-
sides, by reason of the sin of the first man, all men
have become sinners, to the extent above indicated of
radical corruption of the will. If in the connexion
aforementioned, while fully accepting the fundamental
thought of our Church, we were yet compelled to find
a lack of precision in the expression given to the truth
in question, the same thing obviously applies here also.
In other words, the thesis regarding the origin of sin,
that " all the sin of all men is the direct consequence of
the first sin of the first man," is not in exact accord with
the nature of sin. But it is rendered still more self-con-
tradictory by the fact, that a guilty character is ascribed
to this sin, the consequence of the first sin. Zwingli stands
alone in his estimate of inherited sin as a ** Presten," i.e.
a sickness. Elsewhere it is uniformly regarded as actu-
ally guilty sin, involving even now the penalty of eter-
nal damnation ; and it is a proof of how seriously this
is meant, that the exception in favour of unbaptized
infants is rejected (Augs. Conf. Art. 2, Form, of Cone.
I, Art. 12). It is true that even here the intention of
the doctrine is unimpeachable, but its detailed applica-
tion does not fit in with the facts of the nature of sin,
in this case, the necessary distinction between sin and
guilt. This must be recognized, otherwise there is a
danger that if all sin is guilt, in the end no sin is re-
garded as being in the strict sense guilt. But here this
objection is reinforced by the other, that just as we
cannot attribute guilt to ourselves for anything which
we merely inherit, so we cannot reconcile it with the
love of God, that He should burden us with such guilt.
All these objections aff'ecting the consequences of the
first sin, which hitherto we have considered from the
point of view of its content (generally and its guilt in
particular), acquire much greater force still, when we

457

Faith In God the Father

come to consider what is asserted of the form of its work-
ing, turning from the question of what is transmitted to
that of how it is transmitted. By heredity, the answer
tells us, the first sin has become the sin of all ; it is
propagated by means of the act of generation. Once
again, and with increased emphasis, we must say
this explanation fails to realize clearly what it is that
has to be explained. If sin is essentially opposition on
the part of the will, its origin cannot be found in
heredity. To be sure, all possible dispositions to sin
may be inherited, but not sin itself, strictly regarded.
At this point the doctrine is penalized for its lack
of precision in defining the nature of sin ; it was not
clearly recognized that it is perversion of the will.
Under these circumstances it was not seen that there is
any contradiction in identifying the first man with the
general concept " man," so that when Adam sins all
sin. This objection aflfects at the same time the other
thought which our old Dogmatic theologians often
emphasize almost more strongly than they do that of
transmission by heirship, when they wish to explain
how it is that our sin is rooted in that of Adam. It is
only in the Lutheran Church indeed that special attention
has been given to the latter thought ; but even there it
is so to speak bound up with the idea of the righteous-
ness of the divine judgment upon the first sin. Only
no theory of Adam, whether as the physical head or as
the representative of mankind, is sufficient to silence
the question how in such case, the love of God who is
righteous and wise, is reconcilable with the awful con-
sequences of the first sin, regarded as the sole cause of
all sin — sin too which, in the statement that " because of
Adam's sin we are all guilty, and liable to the hatred
of God," is declared to be guilt.

It is true that in reference to almost all these points

458

Is Sin Necessary in a Finite Personality?

in the ecclesiastical doctrine of original sin, the question
arises whether it can hold its own, provided that the
positions manifestly untenable are surrendered unre-
servedly, and only the intention they have in view is
retained in other and unassailable form. The old divines
doubtless proved too much, and so failed to prove any-
thing. But their intention was to accept the fact that
sin is in large measure unavoidable, and at the same
time to explain all sin as being in the last resort the act
of human freedom. Accordingly the course which first
suggests itself is to reconstruct the traditional doctrine
along these lines, or if this also should prove inadequate,
to adopt the attempt to mediate between freedom and
necessity, of which we spoke at the start. Only it is
quite easy to understand why the deviations from the
ecclesiastical doctrine of original sin, do not in the first
instance follow either the one course or the other. In
both cases human freedom is earnestly affirmed, however
carefully safeguarded the statement of it may be. But
it is the idea of freedom which is the great stumbling-
block for the modern consciousness ; and to choose the
former alternative and develop the ecclesiastical doctrine
at the same time, implies a judgment regarding the origins
of our race, in regard to which the attitude of the modern
consciousness is, to say the least, sceptical. Thus the
tendency is rather to follow out to its strict logical con-
clusion the idea of necessity, and to bring it into line as
well as possible with the fact of sin. Obviously if we
follow this procedure, difficulty is caused by those as-
pects of the concept of sin which are quite simple upon
the libertarian theories, and vice versa.

The Necessitarian Theories

It is by no means all the attempts to conceive of evil
as necessary, which call for serious consideration in

459

Faith in God the Father

Dogmatics. At the very outset we can without discus-
sion dispose of those theories which regard finite and

SINFUL AS INTERCHANGEABLE TERMS, if this meaUS SOme

sort of dualistic view of the world : the Christian view
of God being presupposed, there can be no question of
any such. But we may also discard the theories which
content themselves with a quite general use of that idea,
to the effect that evil taken by itself appears as such
only to our limited intelligence, which looks at things in
isolation, but that it is good when considered in relation
to the whole cosmic system. What we have to see as
good and evil, God can see blending in one ray of light :
this idea is capable of making an impression at times,
especially when set forth in poetic guise ; but it is too
notoriously in contradiction to the frightful reality of
evil. And as Lotze asks, " Of what use is a consolation,
the force of which depends on the order of a sentence " ?
For what becomes of our statement when we invert it
and say, "Looking at the world in the mass we find
harmony, but when we look at the separate parts it is
full of misery and sin " ?

Much greater respect is due to the elaboration of the
idea that Sin is to be understood as arising out of the
NATURE OF FINITE PERSONALITY, which is by nature so
conditioned that it cannot develop itself except by means
of sin ; from which it follows on the other hand that sin
exists solely as a means for the realization of the good,
which alone is willed by God. This view, which is
favoured by many, has been elaborated with most sub-
tilty by Schleiermacher. We have the consciousness of
sin as often as the consciousness of God, which exists as
an element in an experience of the inner life, conditions
our self-consciousness as pain, and we understand sin
therefore as a positive opposition of the lower conscious-
ness to the higher, of the flesh to the spirit. Further

460

Original Sin: Schleiermacher's Doctrine

we are conscious of this conflict as due to the influence
exerted over us by a time, when the bent towards the
consciousness of God had not yet emerged. In other
words, the flesh has the start of the spirit, the evil of the
good. We understand this fact as due to the nature of
our moral development, namely because our intellectual
development and our will-power necessarily fail to keep
pace with each other. The good presents itself to us
(at all events in a moral community already existing),
as in some sense a homogeneous ideal, while manifestly
a single act of will can realize only one side of the ideal.
Take the case of the impression made by a noble mother
upon the mind of a child ; the child cannot possibly by
an act of will appropriate this ideal in its entirety, while
on the other hand the intelligence with the help of the
imagination sees it as a whole. Similarly in moments of
inspiration, the ideal presents itself to our consciousness
in living form, but it is only by long-continued work
that the will is able gradually to actualize it. Now in-
asmuch as this necessarily disproportionate development,
so far from doing away with the good is wholly and solely
due to the action of the good, Schleiermacher logically
concludes, we should have to rest satisfied with the posi-
tion that evil is simply the consciousness, produced in us
by individual acts and moods, of good which is not yet
ours ; i.e. the consciousness of sin would have to be
understood entirely as the indispensable means for the
realization of the good. But why does he say only, " We
should have," and " would have," and not, " we have," and
" has " ? Schleiermacher answers that such a statement
could scarcely be regarded as Christian, for with the
reality of sin the necessity of redemption disappears ; in
the Christian Church, the certainty with which in out-
standing moments we are conscious of the good, is a
certainty that all the moments in which we have the

461

Faith in God the Father

consciousness of sin are avoidable ; and we are fully
convinced that actual opposition is not inevitable, by the
certainty we have of a sinless development, namely that
of Christ, on account of which we have to construe sin
as a violation of nature.

The contradiction in which Schleiermacher here in-
volves himself is undeniable. He shows how sin can be
understood as unavoidably bound up with the natural
development, and yet asserts that the Christian Church
must look upon it as avoidable on general grounds, and
especially on account of the sinless development of
Christ. But in his Christology he says that the possi-
bility of such a development was shown in the doctrine
of sin, whereas on the contrary its impossibility was
there proved, and the possibility was asserted only in
the case of Christ. But this contradiction is as instruc-
tive as it is irremediable. How essentially repugnant
to the feeling of the Christian Church must be the view
that sin is inevitable, and how deep-seated must be the
conviction of the sinlessness of Jesus, when the repug-
nance and the conviction in question keep Schleiermacher
himself from being true to his theory, after elaborating
it with all the appliances of dialectical subtlety. But
we can also understand, how others did not let such
scruples prevent their maintaining the necessity of sin,
with thorough-going consistency, on Schleiermacher's
principles. Naturally in opposing their attitude, we
can get an advantage only by proving that these prin-
ciples themselves are invalid. As a matter of fact, how-
ever, it is possible to do this.

The positions in question regarding the lack of uni-
formity in the development of the intelligence and the
will, do not prove what they are supposed to prove, the
necessity of sin, the inevitableness of the consciousness
of sin. More precisely : the description which they give

462

Original Sin: Schleiermacher's Doctrine

of the progress of our inner life, is as incontestable as
regards one part of it, as the other part is false. It is
quite true that moral knowledge advances more rapidly
than the moral will ; all that Schleiermacher says on
this point is true to life. But that this advance of the
one beyond the other comes to our consciousness as sin,
is false. In numberless instances it is not the case even
in our present experience (with regard to which we
have not yet decided, whether it is not itself an experi-
ence determined by previous guilt on the part either
of others or of ourselves, so that it cannot be taken
as solely the outcome of our own natural develop-
ment). For we are far from feeling that the disparity
between our moral insight and our moral will-power, is
essentially personal opposition to the good. On the
contrary we regard it as pointing to a goal in front of
us, which we are under obligation to reach, experiencing
it as a stimulus to good. In this connexion we can
even admit without hesitation that there is a certain
conflict, namely among those unregulated impulses and
inclinations of which we spoke, which become tributary
to the moral end, only when controlled by the moral
law (pp. 431 f.). This conflict too and the feeling of pain
associated with it, is not the consciousness of sin. On
the contrary, we understand it exclusively as a prere-
quisite of actual temptation, without which there is no
moral development (cf. Christology). But that this
natural conflict and this natural pain must become
personal opposition to the good or sin, is an assertion
that takes for granted what has to be proved. Thus it
is only a confusion between imperfection and sin that
makes it possible to hold, that sin is something which
cannot be avoided in the progress to moral personality.
As we are circumstanced, the duty of distinguishing
from the very start between imperfection and sin, is

463

Faith in God the Father

perfectly clear : but on the other hand it is by insight
into this confusion of which we speak, that the capacity
to do so has grown. Lastly fresh light is now shed
upon our previous distinction between sin and guilt and
our contention in support of it. Guilt is opposition at
any stage of the development to good which is not only
acknowledged to be such, but is within the power of the
will in the moment of decision, or in the sequence after
previous decisions ; whereas sin is any opposition on the
part of the will to the good generally, whatever may be
felt about the possibility of submitting ourselves to it
(cf. pp. 433 ff., 443 ff.). The assertion which is often
assented to at present that not only past transgression,
but every advance in the moral life, is accompanied by
the sense of " Schuld" is nothing but an inexactitude
with the appearance of cleverness, a play upon the word
** Schuld " (which in German means both " guilt " and
"■ obligation "). For if we deal honestly with ourselves,
we are aware of a great difference between having failed
to yield to the attraction and the elevating influence of
a demand pointing us to a better way, and feeling with
our whole hearts that we have incurred the condemna-
tion from which there is no escape, of having had no
will, of not consenting to be afifected, to be submissive,
to be attracted, or to be elevated.

In short, it cannot be proved that sin is a necessary
consequence of the nature of man's moral development.
But perhaps without being able to understand it in the
manner claimed, we can rest contented with the fact that
it cannot be escaped. What restrains many from this
attitude, and rightly so, is i\iQ fact of the sense of guilt.
This is true, even when the very appearance of all pious
exaggeration is avoided, as we have sought to do. " I
am guilty," certainly means more than, " I ought to have
acted otherwise ". In addition to the recognition of the

464

Necessity of Sin

specific demerit of the evil action, there is the judgment
that it is a violation of the unconditional command-
ment, that which absolutely ought to be. But, "I am
guilty," means more than this. It means, " I am re-
sponsible for having so acted ". It is an acknowledg-
ment that the speaker is himself the cause of the deed
in question, and has acted as he had no right to do. A
great deal of ingenuity has been employed to explain
away this fact of the consciousness of guilt, and to re-
solve the second moment into the first. The twofold
meaning of the German phrase "schuldig sein," i.e. "to
be guilty " and " to be indebted," has been partly respon-
sible for this. It is true that nowadays verbal subtleties
are less in favour than they used to be. An instance is
the well-known statement which used to be so popular,
that one should not say, " I could not have acted other-
wise," or, " I could have acted otherwise," but only, " I
am not as I should be ". But in the last resort, all the
latest explanations, which resolve the sense of guilt
simply into a stimulus to moral progress, do not get
beyond denying the actual facts of the case, or doing
injustice to one of the moments in our consciousness
of guilt of which we spoke. Certainly every one who
is not content merely to acquiesce in the statement that
he is not as he should be, but endeavours to understand
the sense of freedom as a guarantee of future sub-
mission on his part to the unconditional moral law, de-
serves credit for his moral earnestness. But it is only
by the person who is already convinced, i.e. who has de-
cided to surrender the idea of freedom, by reason of the
metaphysical difficulties connected with it, that this view
will be regarded as affording any material aid towards
our understanding of the fact of the inner life involved.
Naturally all such attempts to give a new turn to the
sense of guilt, must come to terms in Dogmatics with

VOL. I. 466 30

Faith in God the Father

the Christian view of God, and the two lines of thought
are essentially connected with each other. In this also
they follow the lead of Schleiermacher. That is they
emphasize as strongly as possible the idea that sin is
ordered by God solely with a view to redemption. Only
the revelation of God in Christ is so completely a revela-
tion of Holy Love and a very thorough condemnation of
sin, that this teleological way of looking at the matter is
insufficient ; it looks like the most subtle, but at the same
time the most hurtful, application of the principle that the
end justifies the means : God brings about an illusory
sense of guilt with a view to the realization of the good.
Can the good and the true be so opposed to each other ?
The words of Augustine, " O Blessed Guilt," are strictly
Christian, only when in them the faith that God makes
even the guilt of man serve the glorious realization of
His loving purpose — without doing away with its guilty
character, — bursts forth into rapt strains of adoration.
Only in this sense is it true that one " must thank God
even for one's sins ". Otherwise this " teleological "
method of dealing with evil falls under the condemnation
of the apostle of grace (Rom. ih. 7 f . ). This fundamental
objection to all the necessitarian theories, even the most
cautious of them, is somewhat softened where the prin-
ciple, that under other conditions than those of the
earthly existence, sin will be perfectly conquered, finds
unqualified acceptance. Then the governing and the
creative will of God cannot be opposed to each other, at
least eternally. Accordingly many Dogmatic theologians
emphasize Eschatology at this stage, when giving us
their doctrine of sin.

Attempts to Mediate

But the more earnestly such cautions are meant, the
more evidently have we, without being aware of it, ap-

466

Necessity of Sin

proximated to the attempt which seeks to employ, for the
solution of the problem, fkeedom and necessity acting
in some sort of conjunction, and manifestly occupying
a definite relation to each other. This was the pro-
cedure which the state of the facts seemed to point to
in the first instance (cf. pp. 451 f.). The natural course,
indeed, is with all emphasis to give freedom what be-
longs to freedom (according to the facts of the case), and
to give necessity what, for the same reason, belongs or
seems to belong to necessity. Thus arose the theory
that in the beginnings of the race as well as of the in-
dividual life, permeation by sin is an ordinance of God
from which there is no escape, for finite personalities using
material existence as the instrument of their self-de-
velopment, but only as a presupposition for trulj/ free
decisions in favour of the good in the later development.
With the growth of the moral life of the race, as well as
of the individual, sin according to the theory, becomes
progressively avoidable, and in Christ the originator and
head of the new humanity, it is in principle overcome,
and in the fellowship instituted by Him, it is to be
progressively overcome by the faithful. With great
speculative power this idea has been expounded by R.
Rothe, and recently by Troeltsch among others, the
modern idea of development being called into requisi-
tion ; and for reasons which are easily understood, it is
taken in connexion with the idea of Predestination,
while there is a resolute outlook towards Eschatology.
Perhaps still more attractiveness might be given to
attempts of the kind, by expressly limiting the con-
ception of guilt in the strictest sense to the thoroughly
conscious and deliberate rejection of grace, after it had
become fully operative for the individual. By travers-
ing the course of sin, one which is essentially character-
ized by numerous gradations, we would be gradually

467

Faith in God the Father

prepared for the possibility of a real act, — in the strict
sense the one unique act — of freedom, namely the accept-
ance or rejection of that grace of God which puts to one
the personal question bearing on eternal salvation.

The attractiveness of such a theory lies above all in
the fact, that it makes no affirmation regarding the origins
of our race, which by any possibility can come into con-
flict with any discoveries or opinions of the modern
history of civiHzation ; and at the same time that the
sense of guilt does not need to be described as illusory,
while the sinfulness of all individuals again seems to be
intelligible. Only inasmuch as in one definite relation
at least, freedom, to which the modern consciousness
has such a deadly hostility, is unreservedly admitted,
the modern consciousness will not find very much satis-
faction in this attempt to meet it ; nor on the other
hand will Christian judgment lightly surrender its ob-
jection on principle to even so limited an acceptance of
necessity.

The Remodelling of the Doctrine of the Church

Failing to get any unqualified satisfaction even out of
such a variety of possibilities, many next turn again to the
MOTIVE OF THE Church DOCTRINE, and ask whether the
end it has in view can be accomplished by some modifi-
cation of its form, free from the manifest defects which
we pointed out above. We found its ruling motive in
the desire to prevent God's being regarded as in any
sense the Author of sin, while at the same time recog-
nizing the unavoidableness of sin, so far as experience
unquestionably certifies thereto. This double end it
seeks to attain by referring the unavoidableness itself
to an act of man's free will, the first sin of the first man
(pp. 454 ff.). The objections applied both to the defini-

468

Origin of Sin : Remodelled Doctrine

tion of the first sin and to that of its consequences.
On the other hand, our criticism itself pointed directly
to the improvements which are necessary in this respect,
but are perhaps also possible.

We must not conceive of man's original condition as a
state of implanted moral and religious perfection, but in
harmony with the hints of Holy Scripture as well as of
the Reformers, as a state of " childlike innocence " ; or
more accurately, we must presuppose such capacity for
moral and religious personality, as makes the temptation
indispensable for its realization possible, but does not
necessitate our yielding to it, — in harmony with what
was said regarding the natural impulses (pp. 431 f., 443
f.). In doing so, in order not to come into conflict
with the facts of ethnology, we must distinguish between
the degree of civilization, and that of moral and religious
condition : even in our own experience, the two things
by no means coincide, in spite of the close connexion
between them. Again, Dogmatics must be on its guard
against overestimating the significance of individual
facts, like the tendency towards monotheism which is
seen by many who are occupied in the Mission Field, in
religions which in other respects occupy a very low plane ;
just as in general these facts are sedulously underesti-
mated or denied on the other side. For in the nature
of the case, there can be no historical knowledge in the
strict sense on the one side or on the other. Coming
to particulars, we may leave it an open question whether
the first actual sin is to be placed very early, or after
mankind had experienced a somewhat lengthy develop-
ment ; the latter view would perhaps bring the con-
ception which is here in question, nearer to our other
ideas regarding the beginnings of our race, and no
obvious interest of faith is dependent on the opposite
assumption. This seems rather to be the case in refer-

469

Faith in God the Father

ence to the view that all have one common descent, in-
asmuch as the hypothesis of a first sin occurring at
different points seems to render less probable its ex-
planation in freedom ; only if we take the idea of freedom
seriously, even this objection, we may hold, is not in-
superable. If man's original condition is defined in this
way, an actual Fall, a first actual sin, is not so inconceiv-
able as it was on the view of his first state held by our
old divines. It can be regarded as inconceivable only by
those who deny freedom at every later stage of the
development. In principle every decision truly free is
always equally conceivable or inconceivable ; if only the
presupposition for it which is undoubtedly necessary,
namely actual temptation, is admitted in all respects, as
was done by us to the full in the foregoing.

As regards the consequences of the first sin, if we
distinguish again, as we did when criticizing the tra-
ditional doctrine of the church, between what it is that
is transmitted to us, and how it is transmitted, we have
to insist, in reference to the former question, that it is
by no means the case that all sin is the direct conse-
quence of the first one, so that properly speaking there
is no other. On the contrary, the first sin is the ground
of those sins, which when we had the facts of the case
before us, we were unable to explain as due to the
freedom of all individuals, and which therefore, if they
are not the result of the first sin as an act of man's free
choice, must be attributed to God. But it is equally
certain that the first sin, being first, is not of practically
the same consequence as the others, but as we shall see
more clearly when dealing with our second point, it is
in a class by itself, far more serious in its results and
harmful than any other can possibly be. Or more
precisely, sinfulness, as we had to admit it in our-
selves, considered apart from redemption, is the out-

470

Origin of Sin: Remodelled Doctrine

come of a course of sinning into which, after it started
with the first sin, every individual and every genera-
tion enter, adding their own quota of personal sin,
avoidable and unavoidable, to the common store, but
in which on the other side no good working in an op-
posite direction is lost ; so that the course is not merely
one of sin, but also of redemption, not merely one of
inherited sin, if we may use this expression, but of in-
herited blessing as well. Neither the first sin (whether
directly or indirectly), nor sinfulness, so far as it has its
roots in this course of sinning, is reckoned as personal
guilt to every one wh© is involved in this course of sin
on the part of the human race, but our personal assent
to and augmentation of the common store, rooted in the
free decisions of our own wills, and differing as they
do greatly in extent. This naturally includes all the
consequences of such decisions, — an important principle
which keeps the concept of guilt, purged of exaggera-
tion, from appearing to be externalized or falsely
lightened. But now the portion included in this
measureless kingdom of sin (cf. p. 441 ff.) which cannot
be conceived either as unavoidable sin, on the ground
of its being acts resulting from the free-will of all, or as
a freshly added act of the free-will of individuals, the
portion consequently which, were there no assumption
of a Fall, would have to be referred to God, — this, as
we stated at the outset, would have to be conceived as
the result of the first free decision against the good, of
a Fall in the beginning of history.

We turn now to the way in which the effect of this
first sin is transmitted. It affects in the first instance
the first sinner himself, making him weaker in the
presence of subsequent temptation, doubly so in view of
the far greater plasticity of primordial nature. The
first sin, and all the sins of the first sinners which follow

471

Faith in God the Father

upon it, influence those living at the time and those who
come after in their collective capacity, first of all and
principally in the form of an offence or stumbling-block
(pp. 441 ff). This applies also to all the stages of the
subsequent development. Besides there is actual trans-
mission certainly not of sin nor yet of guilt as such, but
of a character, of physical and mental tendencies on the
part both of the race and of the individual, which inevit-
ably lead to sin, and which powerfully foster temptation
until it issues in sin involving guilt. When we define
the effects of the first sin in this accurate fashion, we
see a real meaning in the idea of a divine judgment
upon it baldly expressed by our old theologians. For
although there may seem to be little wisdom or justice
in attributing, by reason of the sin of the founder of the
race, direct personal guilt to all his descendants, on the
other hand the Christian view of God makes it quite
easy for us to understand that the divine love as holy
would leave sin free to develop all its consequences, and
would not wish to conquer it except in a manner truly
moral, by way of freedom. This also gives its proper
place to the truth that sin belongs to the divine order
solely in relation to redemption.

Some such development of the doctrine of the Church,
it may be added, would best harmonize with all the state-
ments regarding the origin of sin contained in the New
Testament, and especially with the detailed Pauline ex-
position in Romans v. 12 ff. ; which speaks indeed neither
of a direct imputation of the first sin to all the descendants
of the first man, nor of its mere first appearance, it be-
ing necessarily rooted in man's fleshly nature ; and which
must be reconciled with the emphatic testimony of the
apostle to the great extent to which sin is unavoidable
in the kingdom of sin, as well as to the depth of the
sense of guilt. We see the necessity of this all the

472

Origin of Sin : Remodelled Doctrine

more when we feel ourselves completely free from the
opinion, that a dialectical harmonization of the separate
statements has been effected. It may be affirmed with-
out further comparison in detail that such a reconstruc-
tion of the doctrine of the Church, in dependence upon
the fundamental thoughts of the New Testament, does
much fuller justice than any of the other theories to the
actual facts of sin as previously expounded. We have
arranged all these theories, according to a well-deter-
mined principle, in the conviction that the accurate
definition of the nature of sin gives the norm for the
theories of its origin. And now the main point in the
view which was developed last is the unity of the two
leading interests which in the other cases appear as anta-
gonistic. On the one hand, we deal seriously with the
truth that ours is the guilt, and God's the glory : God is
in no way the Author of sin ; and on the other hand, we
deal similarly with the fact that sin is in great measure
unavoidable.

And we cannot see how the objection could apply
to this theory that it favours man's convenience, and that
the seriousness of the conflict with sin is diminished.
It is much more to the point that here in conclusion
reference should be made to one other respect in which
the superiority of the theory is very marked. The ex-
aggeration of the old divines regarding the consequences
of the first sin concentrated attention in a one-sided way
upon the past. This used to be done with a profound
sense of guilt, and men were kept from despair only by
looking to the " second Adam ". But after this feeling
came to lose its reality, such retrospection was given up
altogether as valueless. It was said now that good is
done only by looking forward : to do this brings stimulus
and power. We are co-workers in God's great conflict
with sin ; let us forget the dim and distant beginnings,

473

Faith in God the Father

rejoice in what we have already achieved, and press on
towards the goal in front of us. This is certainly a noble
and genuinely Christian thought ; at the same time it is
only through faith in the living God that faith in an
ultimate goal to be surely reached, has become a power
in the world and in the individual soul. But is not one
root of its power to be found in the assurance which we
are capable of experiencing, that there is actual guilt in
sloth and in too slow an advance along this path to the
goal? If this is true of our struggle after what lies
ahead of us, why is it not true of every stage of the
struggle which lies behind us ? Unless we are fully in
earnest in regard to the sense of guilt in our develop-
ment, we shall have a false contentment with ourselves,
thinking that we could not have done more than we have
done ; if we are fully in earnest, we do honour to those
before us by thinking the same of them. In this way
the idea that their progress like ours was accompanied
right through by the sense of guilt, not of necessity but
as a matter of fact, brings us into close, essential con-
nexion with the past back to the earliest obscure begin-
nings of history. To look behind us in a right and
intelligent spirit enlarges and deepens our outlook upon
life, and helps us to realize its full seriousness, shatter-
ing all complacency, but, because of the certainty of
redemption, not producing despair.

An Ultimate Enigma

After all, this development of the Church doctrine is
not regarded as a perfectly satisfactory solution even by
all who accept it. There are others who will prefer on
the whole the view of Rothe, of which we have spoken
(cf. p. 466 f.), though likewise with a feeling of its inade-
quacy upon other grounds. All of them will have to

474

Origin of Sin : Ultimate Questions

admit that, in spite of both these theories of the origin
of sin, there still remains a question which we have not
yet considered. An ultimate enigma presents itself,
though there is often no distinct realization of it as
such. Our explicit distinction between sin and guilt
(pp. 433 ff., 443 ff.), forced upon us by the facts of the case,
has taught us how far there is inevitable sin, which all
the same in the last resort is not due to the will of
God, but is capable of being understood as the conse-
quence of human guilt, not ours but that of those before
us and round about us. Only this raises the further
question, which we have just described as the ultimate
problem — Why have all involved themselves in personal
guilt (for we have stated it as the conviction of the
Christian Church upon the basis of revelation that all
have done so) ? Why has no one (apart from the Re-
deemer) so opposed hereditary sin, when he recognized
it, that he remained without personal guilt ? Naturally
we must not seek to " explain " this fact ; that would
be to do away with our concept of guilt, and the power
of truly free decision involved in it. But the fact that
no single person has used the freedom asserted, so to
resist sin as to continue without personal guilt, though
not without sin, constitutes for us, none the less, quite
a specially perplexing enigma. The pleas which prompt
us to throw suspicion on freedom itself automatically
rise to our lips once more.

Indeed at this stage of our discussion, they force
themselves upon our consideration with increasing
urgency, wearied as we are with so many attempts.
They assume the form of the tempting question whether
we seriously think that the love of God could reveal
itself in all its depths, or that we could trust in it as
love at its highest, unless it were love for sinners.
The old saying, "O blessed guilt," has again a fresh at-

476

Faith in God the Father

tractiveness, while it is understood in a different way.
Ought we not boldly " to thank God even for sin," more
heartily and unreservedly than for anything else, look-
ing upon it as occasioning the supreme triumph of His
eternal love and wisdom ? The effect of this challenge
upon a generation fascinated by the idea of necessity can
scarcely be overestimated. Its essential falsity, how-
ever, is proved by a simple consideration. We must
take out of the statement made above only what it
really says, not what it seems to say because of a bias
on our part. That is, it is only in relation to sin as
actually guilty that the Divine love reveals itself in its
incomparable glory, and the quality of our gratitude is
due to the fact that it forgives our actual guilt and sin.
Could there be any gratitude, if God as the Author of
sin produced in us feelings of guilt, not true to the
actual facts, however surprising His skill in so doing ?
(If we referred to man we should use another word than
skill.) On the other hand, if the statement is taken to
mean that for the perfect revelation of His love God
requires actual and not merely apparent guilt and sin
on our part, we are at the limit of our human dialectic,
where Paul himself would no longer draw conclusions,
but protested against doing so (Rom. in. 8). The view
that we ought to think of guilt as blessed and boldly
to give thanks even for sin, commends itself to our
Christian consciousness as true and Christian, only if
held along with a real sense of personal guilt — great
guilt. The depth of the love of God as it reveals itself
in the forgiveness of guilt, does not do away with the
depth of the guilt which is really ours, but first shows
it in its depth.

It is a mistake therefore to yield to the siren strains
of the doctrine of necessity. This is so even when they
assume their most alluring form. If Dogmatics is to be

476

Origin of Sin : Ultimate Questions

scientific, it must firmly maintain the principle that im-
perfect understanding of the ultimate grounds of facts
does not warrant our modifying the facts. The deter-
mined reduction of freedom to necessity is impossible
without doing violence to a fact of the inner life. And
to what fact ? Not to some fact of little moment, but
to one which we cannot deny without an evil con-
science, the fact of the evil conscience itself, that is of
guilt. We must therefore definitively reject all such
" explanations " of the sin that involves guilt as take
us beyond the idea that God, inasmuch as He wills per-
sonal fellowship in love, wills freedom, and the real
possibility too of closing up one's heart against that
love, because that means the real possibility of having
personal trust in it ; for otherwise He would not have
willed personal fellowship in love. This matter was
considered when we dealt with the question of the
image of God in man, and with the idea of the love of
God and of human sin ; where it is also pointed out
that in all the stages of God's condescending approach,
we must conceive of a corresponding assent or refusal
on man's part, which culminates only when God's Re-
velation of Himself has been perfected.

We retract nothing of what we have said as to the
guiltiness that cleaves to men in general being inexplic-
able ; but simply for the sake of completeness we add
that at this closing point of our discussion on the origin
of sin, two theories, which we must reject as theories
because they furnish no really satisfactory solution, are
only now fully intelligible. One has already been
mentioned, the theory of a Fall of Spirits anterior to time.
While there is an express rejection of any mythological
treatment of the idea, it may, strange as this seems,
actually commend itself anew to modern thought ;
namely in order to render more intelligible that en-

477

Faith in God the Father

tanglement of all which was spoken of, not only in a
kingdom of sin but of guilt. We men on earth as a
whole would be a kingdom of fallen spirits, " the lost
son " in the world of spirits. But only that speculative
reason which has not been subjected to criticism, will
imagine that it is capable of attaining real knowledge
as to this. The same must be our conclusion, if, as was
mentioned above, the idea of a Fall anterior to time re-
solves itself strictly into that of an act of intelligible
freedom.

For the purposes of Dogmatics, it is further advis-
able to recall a matter which belongs to the history of
dogma ; and that is the second addition we have to make
in our closing observations on the ultimate enigma.
Our attitude may be regarded as a return to the ori-
ginal position of our Keformers (as distinguished from
that of the Old Protestant Dogmatics), allowance be-
ing made for the different epistemology of our day. I
do not mean that it is a return to their position in all
the details once associated with it ; for as we have often
pointed out, these details partly do not at all correspond
with the nature of sin as we have accurately determined
it (reciprocal action in the Kingdom of Sin, dififerences of
degree in regard to sin and guilt). Nor again is it in
any way a return to the form which the last idea regard-
ing the origin of sin assumed in the hands of the Re-
formers, but to their ruling motive, which the form of
their thought often concealed rather than explained.
Calvin, for example, tells us that *' God had the best
and most righteous purpose in ordering the fall of man,
and the thought of sin is altogether foreign to the divine
order ". Such too is the teaching of Zwingli and Luther,
and in fact even of the German text of the Augsburg
Confession, when it says that the godless turn from God
to evil as soon as God withdraws His hand from them.

478

Origin of Sin : Ultimate Questions

This view, known as Supralapsarianism, because the will
of God includes the fall of the first man, if construed as a
theory of the origin of sin, quite obviously belongs in one
point of view to the necessitarian theories ; on the other
hand, however, seeing that the intention is in no way to
refer sin to God, but on the contrary, Adam falls " ac-
cording to the Divine appointment, but by reason of his
own guilt," the doctrine of necessity is emphatically re-
jected as impious. How it is possible to afiirm both
these statements at the same time is not shown ; on the
contrary their incomprehensibility is openly admitted.
" If a person says, ' That is beyond my comprehension,'
I reply, ' It is beyond mine also ' " (Luther). But it is
just here that this view differs from the theories which
believe it possible to prove the inevitableness of sin, or
at least to understand its congruity with the Christian
idea of God. For this same reason we must not identify
the standpoint of the Reformers with modern Deter-
minism. The specific characteristic of their standpoint
is the admission that we have no logically consistent
knowledge upon the subject ; they are perfectly serious
in attributing the guilt to the human will ; and their re-
garding it as embraced by the Divine will is simply an
equally earnest emphasizing of religious dependence
upon God.

There must always, and especially in our own day, be
many who, after traversing the mazy paths of attempted
solutions with all the profundity of thought they dis-
play, without finding satisfaction, are ready to welcome
such an admission, if genuine and not merely formal,
not one which always really claims to comprehend the
incomprehensible, and so is only an embellishment of
the admission that sin is necessary, and consequently is
an empty play with words. These will make the con-
fession— "we do not understand the solution in which

179

Faith in God the Father

we believe " (Lotze). Here again we are face to face
with the one limit to our knowledge which we cannot
get over, the problem namely of how the finite is re-
lated to the infinite, or of time and eternity, upon which
we have already touched repeatedly, and which will
come before us on various subsequent occasions. Only
in the present instance it is still clearer than in other
cases that the question here at stake is that of our
moral and religious existence itself. It is not a meta-
physical problem to which we may be indifferent ; it
involves our inmost personal religious life, this life indeed
in its ultimate depths. In such a frame of mind we re-
peat perhaps the words of the same philosopher : " The
roots of metaphysics lie in Ethics ". This does not mark
any addition to our knowledge, but it is an admission that
there is a limit to all our assent-compelling knowledge.
Only it is not with the resignation of despair that we
make this admission, but in gratitude for the knowledge
actually bestowed upon us in faith. This knowledge is
sufficiently extensive and certain to make us feel that,
in the limit of which we have spoken, we have not a
danger to faith, but an incentive to turn it to account in
fighting the battle of life. Such a faith goes beyond
the well-weighed words of the poet, "It is to leave
Freedom's entrancing form undisturbed that God suffers
the hideous host of evils to rage in His world " (Goethe).
For what we have to do with is not a form that entrances
the esthetic sense, but the supreme reality of the ethical
world, the significance of which we may express in the
faith that love wills freedom. In this faith we under-
stand the very limit of our knowledge, at this point as
at all others, and at this point in a new and special way,
as a limit which is necessary in the interest of faith.
And shining through all our uncertainty as to ultimate
problems, faith has a certainty which cannot be shaken,

4.S0

The Belief in the Devil

that the love of God reveals its Divine riches to every
one, denying itself eternally to no one who opens his
heart to it ; and that at the last there is accordingly
only one form of guilt, namely deliberate opposition to
God's love. This certainty is of more value for the re-
ligious knowledge of the Christian than the theories we
have had before us, elaborated though they are in de-
tail : they all really failed to give entire satisfaction.
(Cf. "Doctrine of Predestination and Eschatology ".
On the problem of Freedom itself see Ethics (pp. 76 ff.).)
We insist once again upon the necessity of recog-
nizing the question of the nature of evil, as the decisive
one by comparison with that of its origin,2ind of giving due
heed to the consequences which follow directly from its
nature according to our careful determination of it, par-
ticularly with reference to the Kingdom of Evil. This
much at least we have as the result of our long search.

For Dogmatics, no further light is shed upon the
aspect of the great problem which has brought us to the
conclusion last discussed, by the Biblical idea of the
EVIL ONE, as the Prince of this world, i.e. of the
Kingdom of Sin. For unless we transform the super-
human Adversary of God and Tempter of man into a
second God, which would be Dualism and consequently
Infra-Christian, the difficulty is merely transferred to
another point. So far as the idea deserves a place in
Dogmatics at all, exactly the same is true with
reference to method as was said at the beginning
of our section on angels. Taking this for granted, we
may confine ourselves to the common objectiorcs, to the
attitude of Jesus and to the fundamental yrinciyle result-
ing from this. We shall consider even those points
briefly. The idea would certainly gain in interest by a
reference to " The History of the Devil ". This is a
widely diffused and deep current of superstition in which

VOL. I. 4 PI 31

Faith in God the Father

the purer sources whence it springs are almost entirely
lost. Our interest, apart from these, mostly centres
round the new tributary current which has its origin in
the German sense of sin, and issues in a deepening of the
ancient tradition. Of this the last and the classical ex-
ample is Luther. To be sure it is now that the most
horrible features also appear (trials for witchcraft).
Then there comes the characteristic reconsideration
which the idea received in our classical poetry, above all
in Goethe's Faust, after Rationalism had, as was sup-
posed, perfectly cleared the air for all time. And lastly
there is the external revival of the old doctrine, which
provoked the equally external antithesis, " If there is no
devil, there is no redemption*' (Strauss in reply to Vilmar).
Omitting all this, we must first of all establish the
position that the arguments against taking the idea
seriously, which are regarded by many as unanswerable,
and yet have scarcely ever been formulated with preci-
sion, when taken collectively are certainly worthy of the
most earnest consideration, but they are not irrefutable.
In the jirst place, it is said that such a combination of
intelligence and wickedness as is attributed to the devil
is absurd, and that the very idea of an embodiment of
evil is self-contradictory. But in the sphere of human
wickedness experience testifies clearly enough to both
realities. When sin has attained to a certain measure
of self-consciousness, it actually shows a wonderful
mastery of the art of embodying itself in visible form ;
and without the combination of intelligence and wicked-
ness we could have none of those manifestations of
evil, to which significantly enough we give the name of
diabolical. In the second place, in our question as in
others a great part is played by the circumstance that
the idea of the devil admits of explanation, and that too
both on historical and on psychological grounds, as an
intrusion from other religions and as due to the enigmatic

432

Concept of the Devil

character of sin. Sin is experienced by us, we are told,
as a contradiction to our vocation, indeed putting the
matter generally as a self-contradiction. Thus it ap-
pears, especially on account of the rapid and inexplicable
way in which our moods change, as a power which we
cannot understand ; how natural it is then to find the
origin of it outside of ourselves. Doubtless the person
who rejects the idea of a devil will thus explain it. But
no proof is adduced, and none can be adduced, that it
must be explained in this way and in this way only.
Further it is said that belief in a devil is dangerous in a
religious point of view ; it furnishes an excuse for indo-
lent self-justification, and it occasions harrowing self-
torture. Without doubt, it does both in many cases,
as every one knows who has much experience of pas-
toral work. But do these objections attach to belief
in a devil, as we meet with it in Ephesians vi. 11 ? In
what is there said of the Christian armour for the con-
flict with the unseen foe, does it minister to self-com-
placency or to self-torture ? Or in what Jesus says of
evil ? Again lastly it is said that at all events the belief
is useless and of no religious significance, for it makes
no difference to any aspect of the Christian judgment
of sin. Those who assert this most vehemently often do
least to prove it by a careful doctrine of sin. But it
brings us to our second point, the attitude of Jesus.

We must make the words of Jesus our starting-
point ; for our decision in the matter of the narratives of
the demoniacs is naturally determined by our decision
regarding the devil and his Kingdom, and not vice versa ;
especially as in our day even those who are convinced
of his existence look upon the " possessed " as suffering
from some disease. With reference then to the words
of Jesus, the question must^r^^ be asked : Is it possible
to understand them figuratively ? So far as the mere
words go, in some cases it certainly is, — perhaps Matthew

483

Faith in God the Father

xm. 19. 39. e.g. But in other cases it is impossible,
namelv where He speaks of His own work as a con-
flict with and victory over the Evil One (Mt, xii. 25 ff..
Lake x. IS. with parallels). This raises the further
question: Is conscious accommodation on the part of
Jesus to contemporarv ideas of the devil conceivable ?
Certainly not : at this point it would be incompatible
with. His truthfulness as well as with His wisdom as a
teacher. So we come to th^ dedsir^ question : May we
asstmie that His knowledge was limited ? Doubtless
mxMcik greater caution is called for here than when we
suggest such limitations in other directions. In ordinary
secular matters no one will for reasons of faith attribute
to Jesus perfect knowledge, but will take it for granted
that He shared the ideas of His people and His rime
as regards the son and the earth for example. Many
win reserve judgment for a time as to whether Jesus
intended to bind us by what He said upon a historical
fact, the authorship of a Psalm, let us say (Mt, xxn.
43 ffi) : still more so. as to whether He expected to come
again in the course of the generation then alive. Yet
er&i in this last instance, should it be settled that His
words regarding Bis retnm do not admit of any other
interpretatioii, Jesos' own disclaimer (^Mk. tttt $2), will
act as a relief to ^th. But can we conceive of the
Re»ieemer from evil as speaking of the Evil One. in
pssentiil dqiraidence i^cm the consciousness of His
daj. and not oat of Uie depU^ of His own personality ?
In view of the simple fact which we have already
had before us, that in the consciousness of Jesus we
disdngnish different circles nearer to and further
tibe ocBtre, it is at least our doty not to rule this
qoestioii oat of ooort as raised by nnb^ief, but to
consider it carefully in its distinctive nattira Further
we haTo learned in our Apologetics why such ex-
amiDatioQ fe incombent up-^n us : because revelation

i6*

Concept of the Devil

has throughout but one single purpose, to bring God
near to us, and because on that account it is throughout
personal. Now no evangelical Christian can deny
that the question before us has received diflferent answers
from those who recognize each other as being at one in
their faith in Christ. The reason is that which we have
just indicated, that the affirmations of Jesus regarding
the Evil One cannot be the object of direct personal
religious experience, like those regarding His relation to
the Father, our sin, His love which saves sinners. If
therefore Dogmatics cannot show that this idea is an integ-
ral part of saving faith, it must content itself with stating
carefully under what conditions the affirmative and the
negative answers to the question of the idea of a devil are
to be accepted as Christian within the Christian Church.
Such conditions apply on both sides. The person
who thinks that he can dispense with this belief, not in
a spirit of levity, but as the result of well-considered
religious conviction (in the spirit of Rom. xiv. 5, 23), is
manifestly under obligation to prove that his judgment
upon sin is essentially unaffected — that there is no min-
imizing of its power and danger, especially in the Kingdom
of sin and of the offence which it occasions. For it is
only if this is so that he can have the confidence which
he cannot do without, that the idea in question does not
belong to the inmost kernel of Jesus' consciousness as
the Redeemer from sin ; otherwise, not being at one with
Him in His estimate of sin, he could not be assured of
His redemption either. Along with this there is another
point that he must satisfy himself upon : while accepting
without quaUfication the position that revelation is given
to us in history and is thus historically conditioned, he
must see to it that his refusal to believe in a devil, so
far from infringing upon the absoluteness of revelation,
on the contrary makes it all the more indubitable and
trustworthy. Consequently it is specially important

466

Faith in God the Father

that he should note how clearly the words of Jesus upon
this subject as upon others ring out in their purity
through the musty sultry atmosphere of contemporary
superstition. So much with regard to the person who
rejects the belief. Others will hold themselves bound
to submit to the authority of Jesus in this as in other
matters. Their duty is twofold : to be clear about the
exact grounds of their submission, and to keep the con-
tent of the idea strictly within the limits of the New
Testament evidence. They will not count it a part of
saving faith in the strictest sense, nor will they hold that
it is as directly involved therein as is the sinlessness of
Jesus for example. But on the basis of their saving
faith in Him, they believe Him in this matter too as the
trustworthy witness regarding a mystery of the unseen
world, belonging to the outer limit of the revelation
which faith makes available for our experience. Accord-
ingly they refuse to go a step beyond the explicit state-
ments of Jesus, or the testimony of the original church
which keeps within these limits. Rejecting all imaginary
pictorial details, they will sum up this testimony in
something like this fashion. The Kingdom of human
sin is integrally connected with evil found outside of
man, which comes to a climax in a personal evil will.
As regards his nature, he is the perfect embodiment
of what is the inmost nature of sin generally — lack
of religion, enmity to God, because ** wishing to be
God " of the creation : " If there were a God I myself
would desire to be such, and therefore I hate God"
(Nietzsche). Compare the way in which the incarnation
of the spirit opposed to Christ in a person is described
in 2 Thessalonians ii., while in 1 John denial of the
unique relation of the Son to the Father constitutes the
character of the Antichrist or Antichrists. In ordinary
speech we naturally give the name of devilish to deliber-
ate opposition to the good and consummate pleasure in

486

Concept of the Devil

what is evil, in all its principal manifestations of which
we have often spoken, the most thoroughgoing of which,
however, is just such opposition to Grod. The work of
this evil being consists in temptation, that is in deliberate
and intentional giving of offence. Inasmuch as tempta-
tion always consists in offering counterfeit good, while
moreover evil itself in the last resort as compared with
good is mere pretence and falsehood, the evil one is
called the Liar ; and because the counterfeit, or lie as
such, is the opposite of life, is fatal to life and is death,
he is called the murderer of men. Both of these he has
been from the beginning, for the reason that he has made
the human race feel his power in this his nature from
the beginning of their history onwards (John viii. 44).
As the spirit of the world changes with the changing
years, his work of fatal deceit also assumes various forms
and colours. It may thus be pre-eminently effective in
generally making light of, and throwing ridicule upon,
the whole idea. If there is an evil one, his masterstroke
is the skill with which he destroys belief in his own
reality. Every generation may see his opposition in the
special difficulties they have in getting to the invisible
God. This applies both to epidemic indifference towards
God, and to the caricatures found in low types of religion.
Then on this presupposition, if the devil was spoken of
as silly, it was simply a humorous expedient especially
of the German popular spirit, in self-defence against the
oppressive burden of an idea which was anything but a
joke. It was thus in principle a judgment of faith in the
victory of the Kingdom of God. (With reference to what
are called "temptations of the devil," see "Ethics".)

Thus we may express the arguments for and against.
We see clearly that the two sides approach each other
far more closely than they seem to do at first sight.
But every one must decide the question for himself
upon the basis of the principles above enunciated.

487

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