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CliaRCH-STATE RELATIONS IN
EDUCATION IN ARGENTINA SINCE 1943

Virginia V7augh Leonard

A DISSERTATION PRESENTED TO THE GRADUATE
COUNCIL OF THE UNIVERSITY' OF FLORIDA IN PARTIAL
FULFILIJviENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR TIIE DEGREE OF

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA
1975

ImB'.!!?/ FLORIDA

iiiafiii

1975

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

To prepare this study I received assistance from
institutions and persons to whom I am grateful. I would
like to thank the University of Florida for allowing me
the use of its library and for arranging my study schedule
so that I could pursue this work. I am also indebted to
the Organization of American States for awarding me a fel-
lowship for field research in Argentina. I acknowledge
the wonderful resources of the U.S. Library of Congress
and the Argentine Biblioteca del Congreso. I am especially
grateful to Miguel Petty, S.J., and the Centro de Investi-
qaciones ^ Accion Social for providing me with statistics
on Roman Catholic schools found nowhere else. I am also
grateful to Hermano Septimio, head of the Consejo Superior
de Educaci5n Catolica, for orienting me on Roman Catholic
education. I am most grateful to Dr. David Bushnell of the
University of Florida for his counsel, criticism, and aid,
at all stages of the writing and research of this manuscript.
The author of this study takes full responsibility for the
errors and deficiencies of the text in its final form.

10.1

PREFACE

Argentina is known as a Catholic country. Its Con-
stitution and laws favor the Catholic church. For example,
the President and Vice-President are required to be Roman
Catholics. The church also receives state subsidies for
its buildings, missionary work, and schools. A divorced
person is forbidden to remarry, a law which conforms to
Catholic doctrine. The church has always enjoyed a privi-
leged position in Argentina where over nine-tenths of the
people are Roman Catholic.

But Argentina also has a secular, anti-clerical, and
lay tradition which reached its zenith in the 1880 ' s when
religious education was excised (though reinstated from
1943-1955) from the national schools. Protestants, Jews,
and lay groups may receive state subsidies for their pri-
vate schools. Presidents such as Frondizi have been nomi-
nally Catholic. The principal democratic parties and stu-
dent groups have fostered the national universities, sup-
ported the university "Reforma," and opposed Catholic xini-
versities.

Interest groups and political parties have opposed
the church on certain issues in the field of education.
Two issues in particular have engendered the largest and

longest disputes: catechism in the public schools and
state recognition of the titles and degrees of private
universities. On the first issue the church has lost out
to lay and secular education on the national level. But
this loss has not been uniform: religious education is
given in the majority of public provincial schools. On
the issue of Catholic or private universities, the church
won a stupendous victory in the post-Peronist era — the
state agreed to recognize the titles and degrees of pri-
vate universities under certain conditions. Yet this vic-
tory was not total: the state refused to provide finan-
cial aid to private universities.

Church-state relations on education were examined
because the church regards teaching its doctrine as a cen-
tral part of its mission and therefore enters the political
arena to fight for its way in education. To achieve its
educational goals the church must vie for social and po-
litical power with other groups and institutions. The two
issues selected for study were chosen because they were
major issues in Argentina. Economic support of Roman Cath-
olic schools was never much of an issue in Argentina, un-
like in the United States. On the other hand, private uni-
versities were disputed in Argentina but not in the United

states . The Argentine context itself thus established the
focus of this study. Peripheral contests over religious
freedom and economic support for Roman Catholic education
were examined insofar as they related to the above two

issues.

One conclusion that emerges from this study is that
the fate of private education is inextricably wound up with
the fate of Catholic education. The church and its pro-
ponents promote private schools and universities in order
to promote Catholic schools and universities. Another con-
clusion is paradoxical: private or Roman Catholic educa-
tion seems to thrive when Argentine governments are lay
and secularist. When the church was in an open alliance
with the government (1943-55) , public — not Catholic — edu-
cation enjoyed its greatest promotion and expansion. The
recent progress of church education leads to a third con-
clusion: other groups, especially those that support lay
and secular education, are not able to compete with the
church on an equal political and socio-economic footing.
In Catholic and developing Argentina, the weakness of
countervailing groups and institutions makes for little
competition. The scholastic policy of the church results
in the education of the elite in its schools, and it is

this group that wields socio-economic and political weight
in Argentina: if the elite is not in the key government
posts, it is not far from those in them. Thus, provincial
and national Ministries of Education become the main pro-
moters of private education. This conclusion is warranted
in spite of church protests that government bureaucracy
restricts its schools and universities.

Church-state relations are not easily quantifiable.
They arouse passions and action behind the scenes. It is
difficult to predict when an Argentine Catholic will rally
around his church as he did during the overthrow of Peron
in 1955. Even statistics on the number of Catholic schools,
pupils, and teachers are difficult to obtain. This is due
to two factors: in statistical records church education
is lumped together with other private schools, pupils, and
teachers in the general category of private education.
Secondly, the church is reticent to divulge any information
about itself.

The sources of church "influence" on politicians
are even more elusive. It can only be taken for granted,
and not proven, that elected legislatures reflect the opin-
ion of Argentines on church-state issues. During times of
dictatorship, it is even more difficult to ascertain the

vii

feelings of Argentines about church-state relations, and
to conclude that the officials in command reflect the Cath-
olicity of the people. It is more likely that Argentine
governments reflect the religious opinion of the elite..
And the religious opinions of the elite may be linked to
the social and political power of the Argentine Catholic
church as an institution. Roll-call votes in Congress and
provincial parliaments can be tabulated; but the decision-
making process cannot always be ascertained from a mere
tabulation of yeas and nays. It is not easy to calculate
if a person acts in a certain manner because he is Roman
Catholic, or because he seeks church support behind his
career, or whether he fears the church's power to defeat
him rather than acting out of love for the 'church. All
these factors may influence his decisions and the fact
that he was affected by them illustrates the "influence"
of the church. Oftentimes a practicing Catholic might not
side with the church on education issues whereas a nominal
Catholic promotes, say, church universities. Then, the
reasons for political decisions lie in the realm of pol-
itics or economics and will involve speculation and hypoth-
esizing, countervailing power, and compromise.

To understand church-state relations on education

Vlll

in Argentina, therefore, it has been necessary for the
author of this study to supplement quantifiable data with
written reports and personal interviews. Interviews had
to be balanced between statists and clerics, between pol-
iticians of a pro-Catholic stance and those of a secular
bent. Among statists and clerics there were divisions.
Some interviewees had a clearer or less prejudiced opinion
of the issues than others; some simply lied. Few people"
are neutral on the subject of church-state relations.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS iii

PREFACE i^

KEY TO ABBREVIATIONS xiv

ABSTRACT XV

CHAPTER

One THE EMBRY.DNIC SCHOOL SYSTEM 1

Introduction
Colonial Era
Independence to 1884

Independence

Rivadavia

Rosas, 1835-52

Buenos Aires and the Confederation,
1852-61

National Organization, 1862-1884

Two LAIC VICTORIES OF THE GENERATION OF 1880 . . 22

Proponents of Secularism

The Educational Uproar of 1884: Law 1420

Precedents

Roman Catholic Resistance

Law 1420

Implementation
The Argentine Counter Reformation: 1884-1943

The Press

Acci6n Catolica Argentina

Religious Education in Provincial Schools

Church Built Its Own School System
The Universities: 1884-1943

La Reforma

Catholic Universities Blocked

CHAPTER
Three

THE 1943 COUP AND ENSENANZA RELIGIOSA

Four

The Military Government

The Decree of Ensenanza Religiosa, December
31, 1943

Promulgation

Bishops Denied Collaboration
Administration of the Decree
Critiques of the Administration of
EnsePlanza Religiosa

THE ALLIANCE BETWEEN PERON AND THE CHURCH:
1943-1954: PART I

Government Religious Policy
Religious Education Becomes Law
Presidential Election of 1946
Opposition to Religious Education in

the Public Schools
The Deputies Debate, March 1947

Five THE ALLIANCE BETWEEN PERON AND THE CHURCH;
1943-1954: PART II

115

Gratitude of the Church
Reaction of the Radicals
Educational Militancy of the Church

Accion Catolica Argentina

Estatuto del Docente, 1947

Other Educational Demands of the Church
Slow Growth of Private Schools
The Universities: 1945-1955

Six

CHURCH-STATE STRIFE: PART I 148

Incipient Church-State Conflict
The Conflict Looms

Seven

CHURCH-STATE STRIFE: PART II . . 187

Government Offensive
Ecclesiastic Offensive
Pe r c5n • s O ve r thr ow

CHAPTER
Eight EDUCATIONAL POLICY OF THE PROVISIONAL

GOVERNMENT: 1955-1956 220

No Religious Education in the Public Schools
Expansion of the Catholic School System
The Universities: Moves to Change the Law

Decree 6403

Catholics and the Decree
Reaction to Article 28

National University Rectors, Professors
and Students

Laicists

The Supreme Court

The Junta Consultiva

Student Demonstrations

Nine PRIVATE UNIVERSITIES FOUNDED AND DEFENDED . , 252

Catholic Universities Formed
Development of Catholic Campaign

Catholic Rectors and Professors

Catholic Students

Gathering of Outside Support

Ten PRIVATE UNIVERSITIES LEGALIZED 270

Preliminaries of Debate *-

Special Committee Report

National University Protest

Catholic Counter Protests
Congress

The Bill

Heated Debate in Chamber
Repercussions

More Riots

Question of Implementation

Implementation

XIX

CHAPTER

Eleven RELIGION IN THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS SINCE 1958 . . 300

Political Background

Frondizi-Guido

Illia

Ongania
Religion and Public Schools Since 1958

1958 Estatuto del Docente

Ensenanza Religiosa in Public Schools

Provincial Level

National Level

Religious Objects in Classrooms

Religion in Public School Textbooks
Spread of Catholic Schools Since 1958
Increase in Nximber of Catholic Schools

Twelve UNIVERSITY EDUCATION SINCE 1958 346

Political Background: Frondizi to Ongania
Provincial Universities
Catholic Universities
National Universities

EPILOGUE ■ 369

BIBLIOGRAPHY 381

BIOGRAPHICAL. SKETCH:...- /^01

Xlll

KEY TO ABBREVIATIONS

DSCD Argentina. Congreso. Camara de Diputados. Diario
de Sesiones de la Camara de Diputados. The year
given in citations is that of the sessions, not
year of publication. Certain of the debates of the
1946 session actually took place early in 1947, but
they were printed as part of the 1946 series and
will be so cited.

DSCS Argentina. Congreso. Senado. Diario de Sesiones
de la Camara de Senadores. The year given in cita-
tions is that of the sessions, not year of publica-
tion.

ALA Argentina. Anales de Leqislacion Argentina. The
year given in citations is that which is found on
the bound volume and is not necessarily the year
of the decree, resolution, or law.

xiv

Abstract of Dissertation Presented to the Graduate
Council of the University of Florida in Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy

CHURCH-STATE RELATIONS IN
EDUCATION IN ARGENTINA SINCE 1943

Virginia Waugh Leonard

August, 1975

Chairman: Dr. David Bushnell
Major Department: History

Argentina is known as a Catholic country, but inter-
est groups and political parties have opposed the church on
certain issues in the field of education. Two issues in
particular have engendered the largest and longest disputes:
catechism in the public schools and state recognition of
the titles and degrees of private universities. In 1884,
Congress passed a law that established public education as
basically laic during school hours. The church never ac-
cepted this decision and openly collaborated with the Cath-
olic nationalists who implanted religion in the nation's
public schools in 1943. However, this alliance ended when

church and state became rivals in the field of education
and Juan Peron abrogated many privileges of the church,
including religious teaching in the public schools. Though
the nation's schools have remained laic since that time,
Catholicism has continued in or has been introduced into
the provincial schools of the most poulous provinces, and
the church's own school system has expanded rapidly, bene-
fiting from increasing state subsidization.

On the issue of Catholic or private universities,
the church won a stupendous victory in the post-Peronist
era when the state agreed to recognize the titles and de-
grees of private universities under certain conditions.
Yet this victory was not total : the state refused to pro-
vide significant financial aid to private universities.
This dispute, like the former, symbolized the inability of
a fragmented Argentina to attain either a true national
consensus on policy or even a coherent policy imposed by
one faction upon another. Church-state quarrels of the
19th century continued to absorb time, money, and energy
that could have been applied to pressing economic and
social problems, problems that did not receive adequate
attention from Argentina's private or public educational
system.

XVI

CHAPTER ONE

THE EMBRYONIC SCHOOL SYSTEM

Introduction
This study undertakes to examine the church in Argen-
tina as a political institution. Its canon law, dogma,
doctrines, and official positions treat the field of educa-
tion: in fact, it regards its mission to teach its dogmas
and laws as its most important task. The Spanish crown
recognized this "right" of the church and helped finance
the educational aspect of the church's mission. But as
modernization and growth took place in Argentina after In-
dependence, the state began to view schooling as essential
to its aim to create an "educated" and "Argentine" citizen-
ry. This outlook which, at first, led to cooperation be-
tween church and state in educating the young, later led
to competition between these two socio-political institu-
tions toward the end of the nineteenth century.

Colonial Era
Spanish monarchs willingly gave the church a free
hand in the education of Spaniards and the civilization of
Indians in the centuries preceding Independence. In the

colonial era there were three types of primary schools:
state schools established by the cabildo (also known as the
king's schools), religious schools, ani private schools.
Religious orders taught the Indians Spanish and catechism
in mission schools. Because there was little tradition
for the state school and because Argentina was sparsely
settled by Spaniards, a school was a luxury and usually re-
ligious, run by Roman Catholic clerics.

Secondary schools grew out of the need of regular
and secular clerics to further educate their prospective
members. They were also attended by laymen, almost always
the well-heeled sons of ranchers and merchants. If a- stu-
dent wished to continue on to university studies, he had

three choices: he could study theology for a doctoral

degree at the University of CSrdoba, which was founded by
the Jesuits in 1622; he could study for a doctorate of med-
icine at the University of Chuquisaca (La Plata) , founded
in 1623 in what is now Bolivia; and he could study for a
doctorate of law at the University of San Felipe which was

founded in 1757 in Chile, pr at the University of Cordoba
as of 1795, or at the University of Chuquisaca.

Juan Carlos Zuretti, Historia eclesiSstica arqen-
tina (Buenos Aires: Editorial Huarpes, 1945), pp. 113, 115,
121-22.

In primary school a student learned the 3 R's and
catechism. He then entered a secondary school to study
grammar or Latin and Latin literature for two years; he
next graduated to courses of art or philosophy which last-
ed two to three years. Philosophy was a study of logic,
metaphysics, and physics, usually taught by a cleric who
gave an overall examination. The student who successfully

graduated was considered magister-artium and ready to

attend university to study law, theology, or medicine.

Those laymen who were teachers usually had failed in
other endeavors and took the job for the small recompense.
It was common for cabildos not to pay the teachers hired
by them, so teachers relied on the parents of their stu-
dents to pay them money or kind. By contrast, the reli-
gious schoolteachers did not charge tuition, since the re-
ligious orders supported them. The Jesuits, who ran the
best primary and secondary schools and Argentina's only

university, lived off the profits of their estancias; the

Franciscans lived off alms.

^Ibid. , p. 113.

For a good discussion of colonial education see

Juan Carlos Zuretti, "La evolucion de las ideas pedagogicas

The Spanish Crown controlled all activities of the
church in the new world; similarly, the cabildos oversaw
religious as well as lay education. The Real Provisi6n de_
1771 set standards for the hiring of teachers which includ-
ed an examination of their writing, reading, arithmetic,
and Christian doctrine, information of good conduct, and
limpieza de sangre. Cabildos had to approve the estab-
lishment of any schools within their jurisdiction as well
as the teachers, the tuition charged if it was a state
school, the salary of teachers (often paid to support re-
ligious teachers also) and the texts and equipment. And
state subventions supported many religious schools if the.
cabildo was willing and able to grant them.

Despite some state funding, education had a privi-
leged and aristocratic character and was mainly for boys.
Some poor students were able to attend state schools with-
out paying when they were supported by funds from the
cabildo and the tuition of other students. Girls attended

en la Argentina: II — La escuela colonial," Criterio, XIX
(November 28, 1946), 517-18.

'^Antonio Salvadores , La Instruccion primaria desde
1810 hasta la sancion de la lev 1420 (Buenos Aires: Consejo
Nacional de Educacion, 1941), p. 19.

the few schools for them established by rioh l.aies and
nuns. Often acting jointly, m general, not very r^ny
school-agea children attended school because they could
not afford them, schools were scarce, and poor teaching
methods were used: rote memorization and drills, as well
as corporal punishment. ^

Lay teachers were expected to teach the Roman Cath-
olic religion to their pupils: religion was not excluded
from Argentine state schools until the latter half of the
nineteenth century. However. Argentine state schools began
to exclude clerics as teachers and administrators. 6 For
example, Manuel Belgrano, honored as the father of Argen-
tine primary schools, left money to establish schools run
by laymen, but Christianity was to be taught in these
schools along with other subjects.'

Laicism in the sense of lay or state administration
Of education was promoted by the rapid economic development
Of Buenos Aires, which was partly stimulated by the Bourbon

Rosalba Aliaga Sarmiento, LainstrucciSn Drimarfa
durante la dnn,1,naci6n esn.nnl. (Buenos Aires: gsgS—
Nacional de Educacion. 1940). pp. 84-86. 10?. ''""^^^o ,

Salvadores, pp. 19-20.

Alxaga Sarmiento, pp. 201-3.

reforms of Carlos III. More money was directed toward pub-
lic education and a system of municipal schools. In 1805

Buenos Aires even made public education free, the first

cabildo in Argentina to do so. But the English invasions

and the independence movement retarded this development.

Independence to 1884
Independence

The upheaval that ensued with the revolution for in-
dependence caused education to retrogress because the
cabildos could not spare money for state schools and be-
cause authorities were occupied with other matters. Schools
disappeared altogether after the struggle for independence
began in 1810 in the provinces of San Juan, San Luis, and
La Rioja. In cSrdoba, the rural schools set up by Bishop
San Alberto and, later. Viceroy Sobremonte, disappeared.
Salta, once a leading center of education, was hard hit.
Though Belgrano donated 40,000 pesos to found four schools
in the provinces, only one was ever completed — in Jujuy in

These municipal schools were begun in 1720, and
were managed by the University of Buenos Aires from 1821-
1828 when they were dependent on the provincial government,
Later, they became national schools.

^Salvadores, p. 17.

Ibid., pp. 110-11; 198-99.

1825. In this period, school systems survived only in
those provinces with the means and traditions of public
support for education — Buenos Aires, Cordoba, and Mendoza.^^

The church was no longer in a position to step into
the educational vacuum left by the state. Its organization
was disrupted by the impact of the independence struggle
and the interruption of normal ties with Rome, which under
the patronato had passed through the Spanish court; all
existing bishoprics were vacant after 1819. The number of
clerics and, therefore, cleric teachers dwindled, and the
two seminaries in C&rdoba and Buenos Aires were deficient
in graduating priests to replace those who left Argentina;

Without supervision many of the secular and regular clergy

fell into corrupt ways.

State officials realized that education was deplor-

^^Ibid., p. 230.

Salvadores, pp. 64-66.

The Pope finally appointed titular bishops to these

vacant sees in 1832. (J. Lloyd Mecham, Church and State in
Latin America /Shapel Hill: University of North Carolina
Press, 19347, pp. 57, 84-86, 226.) For a synopsis of the
sorry position of the church after independence consult
Guillermo Furlong, S.J., "El catolicismo argentino entre
1860 y 1930," Historia argentina contemporSnea, 1862-1930,
Academia Nacional de la Historia (4 vols., Buenos Aires:
El Ateneo, 1963-67), II, 251-52".

able in both the public and private sectors and interested
themselves in remedying it. In 1810 the cabildo of Buenos
Aires commissioned two regidores to study educational re-
form: they visited every school in Buenos Aires. Church
and state were educationally allied: the priest Dean Funes
approved the recommendations of the two regidores for im-
proving instruction in church schools, and courses on

Christianity were favored for public schools. Reforms that

the cabildo and Junta tried to institute came to naught.

Rivadavia

As a minister in the government of Buenos Aires in
the early 1820 "s, Rivadavia carried out a reform of the
church with the support of the provincial legislature and
some liberal ecclesiastics who were opposed by other cler-
ics who even dabbled in plotting the overthrow of the gov-

15
ernment. In 1822 txthes and the ecclesiastical fuero

were abolished, and the smaller houses of the regular cler-
gy were disestablished. Some church properties were con-
fiscated and, in turn, the province agreed to give the

■•■^Aliaga Sarmiento, p. 194,

Ricardo Levene, A History of Argentina (Chapel
Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1937),
pp. 364-65,

church an annual subsidy and to construct church buildings;

but the net effect of Rivadavia's measures was to weaken

16
the church.

In 1821 Rivadavia authorized the setting up of the
University of Buenos Aires under the direction of Dr. Al-
berto SSenz, an ordained priest. The cabildo eclesiastico

provided funds from its treasury for the chairs of philo-

17
sophy and Latin.

Rivadavia also concerned himself with the schooling
of girls. In 1823 he set up a separate school system for
girls under the Ministry of Government; money for these
schools was to be raised by rich ladies in the Sociedad de
Benef xcencia .

In 1825 a commercial treaty between England and Ar-
gentina gave the English the right to found schools and to

Guillermo Gallardo, La politica religiosa de Riva-
davia (Buenos Aires: Ediciones Theoria, 1962), pp. 71-72,

•I'The University was inaugurated in 1821 and includ-
ed a department of primary schools which controlled all
primary schools except those for girls, which were organized
under the Sociedad de Benef icencia in 1823 . Since the Uni-
versity contained all grade levels it was a microcosm of an
educational system for all Argentina. (Levene, pp. 365-67.)

l^salvadores, p. 106.

practice their religion publicly or privately (article 12).
In 1827 the first English academies opened: the curricu-
liim was humanistic and commercial, and religion was not
mentioned. The best families sent their children to these

English private schools, downgrading the public schools and

universxty,

Rosas, 183 5-52

As governor of the province of Buenos Aires, Rosas
allied himself with the church and tried to diminish the
influence of the English schools since they were run by
Protestants, but neither they nor their teachers disappear-
ed despite two decrees of 1831 and 1844 requiring teachers'
to profess the Roman Catholic faith. ^"^ Rosas continued
the policy of preceding governments of granting state sub-
sidies to religious schools and backing religious educa-
tion in the public schools. The Jesuits, expelled from
Argentina since 1767, were invited to return by Rosas, who
restored the convent and school of San Ignacio .to them.
But the Jesuits did not adequately extol the virtues of

Zuretti, "La evolucion de las ideas pedagogicos

en la Argentina: IV — Las escuelas publicas y privadas de
1813 a 1829," Criterio, XX (January 2, 1947), 15.

Salvadores, p. 195,

his government to their young pupils, so they were again

expelled in 1843; half of the total of 39 Jesuits had al-

ready emigrated since 1841. Rosas also purged the Uni-
versity of Buenos Aires of Unitarian professors and insti-
tuted religion courses in the curriculum. Government
financial stringency meant that subsidies were smaller,
and the University stagnated.

The government's ability to subsidize education was
diminished by a French blockade of its port, and in 1838 the
Sociedad de Beneficencia was notified that state funds were
unavailable and that it would have to charge tuition in its
schools. Private and public primary schools folded from
1830 to 1850; in 1830 there were 39 public primary schools
with 50 teachers serving 2,500 pupils and 75 private schools
with 80 teachers and 2,500 students; whereas, in 1840,
Buenos Aires province had only 5 public primary schools with
10 teachers and 700 pupils and 30 private primary schools

with 40 teachers and 1,500 students — a situation that did

not change materially for the remainder of the -decade.

Provincial schools were turned over to the police

Enrique Arana (h.), Juan Manuel de Rosas en la

historia argentina. Institute Panamericano de Cultura (3
vols., Buenos Aires: Companla General Fabril Financiera
S.A., 1954), I, 625-26.

^^Ibid. , pp. 554, 558, 560.

department to administer in 1842."^ The poor remained
largely outside the educational system of Buenos Aires —
except in the girls' schools of the Sociedad — until the
advent of Sarmiento.

Provinces. — The state of education depended in large
measure on the governor or caudillo of a given province, a
strong man leaving his imprint upon the school system. tJsu-
ally the municipalities attended to the schools in their
locale. Entre Rios stands out for the efforts of its gov-
ernors Pascual Echague and Justo Jose de Urquiza to extend
public education. Religious education was omnipresent,
teachers had to be Roman Catholic, and many provinces re-
fused to recognize the religious toleration of the 182 5 Eng-
lish commercial treaty, e.g., San Luis, Tucuman, Corrientes,

- 24

Santa Fe, and Cordoba. The governors of Mendoza, Entre

Rios, Salta, and Cordoba emulated Rosas in inviting the
Jesuits, although they did not necessarily act upon the in-
vitation/to set up schools (especially secondary) in their

25
provinces.'*-'

^^Ibid., p. 559.

^^Guillermo Furlong, S.J., La tradicion religiosa en
la escuela argentina (Buenos Aires: Ediciones Theoria; . 1957),
pp. 48-50.

Arana, I, p. 624.

In spite of economic blockage and internal civil
strife, provincial private — and especially public — educa-
tion gradually improved. Although the figures can be re-
garded as approximations at best, one source suggests that
by 1840 there were 76 public primary schools with 78 teach-
ers and 3,830 pupils and 36 private primary schools with
38 teachers and 1,740 pupils; whereas, in 1830, there had
been 45 public primary schools with 48 teachers and 3,010
students and 41 private primary schools with 45 teachers
and 2,010 pupils. And by 1850 there were 125 public pri-
mary schools with 139 teachers and 7,700 pupils and 45 pri-

26
vate schools with 52 teachers and 2,003 students.

Buenos Aires and the Confederation, 1852-61

Buenos Aires . — After the fall of Rosas, Buenos Aires
functioned for a time as a separate state enjoying de_ facto
independence from the rest of Argentina. During this peri-
od, educational development was hurt by political infight-
ing, lack of economic resources, and administrative con-
fusion. There was a proliferation of educational agencies —
Sociedad de Benef icencia, the University, the itfunicipalities.

26ibid, , I, pp. 554, 558, 560.

the province — as well as frequent changes in the adminis-
trative mechanisms charged with overall supervision of ed-
ucational problems. ' This state of affairs changed for
the better when Domingo Sarmiento became Chief of the De-
partment of Schools in Buenos Aires from 1856 to 1861.
Sarmiento worked to expand the public school system of the
province, but allowed the teaching of religion in the pub-
lic schools by Roman Catholic priests outside of class

hours .

The Confederation. — The other provinces joined to-
gether in a Confederation under the Constitution of 1853.
The Constitution made Roman Catholicism a state religion, •
with the patronato to be exercised by the President and
Senate. Both the President and Vice-President of Argentina
had to be Roman Catholic, and the state was obligated to

sustain the church. Among other things. Congress was to

further the conversion of Indians to Roman Catholicism.

Juan Manuel Chavarria, La escuela normal y la

cultura arqentina (Buenos Aires: El Ateneo, 1947), p. 292.

^^Speech by Deputy Absalon Rojas, DSCD 1946. X, p. 573,

Juan Casiello, Iqlesia y estado en la Arqentina

(Buenos Aires: Editorial Poblet, 1948), p. 334.

Education, however, was left up to the provinces, as had
been the practice since 1821; article five made public ed-
ucation gratuitous but said nothing about it being obliga-
tory.

The Confederation Congress voted the church a reg-
ular subsidy that was to compensate it for its loss of in-
come from the tithes, which had now been abolished in all

30
provxnces. Such funds were technically available for use

in founding church schools. But education advanced very
little except for the organization of its administration
on the provincial level. Governors regarded themselves as
vice-patrons in exercise of the national patronato and
thus converted convents into schools, contracted clerical
teachers ,and invited orders to their provinces to found
schools. Some provinces such as San Juan and Corrientes
made education theoretically obligatory in their constitu-
tions, but most let the municipalities take care of it,
and they lacked the resources to reach more than a small
minority of the school-age population. The University of
Cordoba was nationalized b^? the Confederation in 1854.
Urquiza also extended national secondary education, but

^"^Furlong, "El catolicismo, " p. 256.

post-elementary education was rare in the Confederation.

President Urquiza ordered in 1855 the publication
and use in the public schools of a catechism Instrucciones
cristianas by Escolastic Zegrada. His successor Santiago
Derqui also arranged with Pope Pius IX for the return of
the Jesuits to reopen the schools of Cordoba and Santa Fe.
National Organization, 1862-1884

In 1862, with Bartolome Mitre as president, Argen-
tina began its modern history as a unified nation. Educa-
tion could now be constructed on a national level: a Min-
istry of Religion, Justice and Public Instruction was set
up. An 1865 accord was signed with eight provinces to give
their schools financial aid from the national treasury.
Mitre became known as the "Founder of Secondary Education
in Argentina" when he set up in 1863 the Colegio Nacional
de Buenos Aires as a model for national secondary schools.
Its first rector, a cleric, was succeeded by a Frenchman
who drew up a six-year plan of studies for the bachillerato
degree with religion and sacred history included in the

•^^Leoncio Gianello, "La ensenanza primaria y secund-
aria (1862-1930), Historia arqentina contemporanea, II,
p. 120.

Furlong, La tradicion, pp. 71-72.

curriculiun.

Sarmiento became president in 1868 and planned with
his education minister Nicolas Avellaneda to educate all
social classes everywhere in Argentina. Ley 463 of 1871
provided for the subsidizing by the national treasury of

school buildings, furniture, books, supplies, and salaries

34
of teachers and inspectors. Avellaneda as president

(1874-80) continued to promote education. Plans of study
were made uniform for national primary, secondary, and
normal schools. But since provinces for the most part
controlled education within their boundaries, no uniform
law of education was drawn up.

In 1875 the Province of Buenos Aires drew up a Ley
de Educaci<5n Comun de la Provincia. A Consejo General was
created to approve the establishment of public and private
schools; every district would elect its own Consejo. Teach-
ers were no longer required to be Roman Catholic but only
to have good mental and physical health, good conduct, and
professional qualifications. Private schools were no long-

Chavama, p. 76.

^'^Anales de legislacion arqentina ; complemento.' "anos
1852-1880 (Buenos Aires: Editorial La Ley, 1954), p. 934.

er subsidized, Roman Catholicism was still taught, but the
religious beliefs of others were to be respected.

In the same year Congress passed a law. No. 758, to
establish normal schools for teachers of primary pupils in
the capital of every province, A previous law had already
established two in Parana and Corrientes, The four-year
plan of studies did not include the Roman Catholic religion,
only courses of morality. Sarmiento began to recruit teach-
ers from abroad to set up normal schools and to teach in
the universities. Sixty-five teachers from the United States
came between 1869 and 1898 to found or rehabilitate eighteen

normal schools, each with its model grade school and kinder-

gar ten.

By 1880 the civil strife between the Province of
Buenos Aires and the other provinces had receded enough to
allow the organization of the government on a definitive
basis. The city of Buenos Aires was federalized as the
capital of a united Argentina. At the beginning of 1881,

In accordance with this law, the Sociedad de Bene-

ficencia handed over its schools to the Consejo General
and Sarmiento was named the Director General of this Consejo,
(Salvadores, pp. 227-36, 336-48.)

■^^Alice Houston Luiggi, 65 Valiants (Gainesville:
University of Florida Press, 1965).

the municipality of Buenos Aires ceded its schools to the
Nation, and it was decreed that the provincial school laws
of Buenos Aires would still apply to these schools. Thus,
primary education was free and compulsory since these schools
were under the 1875 Ley de Educacion Comun de la Pr ovine ia.
At the same time, a decree created a Consejo Nacional de
Educacion to govern these national schools. Sarmiento left
the Consejo General de Educacion of the Province of Buenos
Aires to become the Superintendent of the Consejo Nacional
de Educacion (CNE) ; eight inspectors made up this entity
along with the Superintendent. Besides arranging for the
Congresso Pedagogico of 1882, the CNE also carried out a
school census in 1883, which showed that only 29.3% of the

school -age population (five to fourteen years old) was at-

37
tending school. Both the Congress and Census of 1883

spurred on efforts to draw up a national education law
that would encompass the former decrees and promote lit-
eracy. Congress began to work on such legislation during

the administration of Roca (1880-86), a procedure which

embroiled laicists in a bat^tle with the church.

■^^Salvadores, p. 360,
38ibid. , pp. 355-62.

The Church. — The Argentine church was plagued through-
out the nineteenth century by a lack of clerics, regular and
secular. Its hierarchy and leaders tended to reflect a tradi-
tionalist conservative mentality and did not favor progres-
sive Catholic organizations when they did appear. Rather
than come up with constructive ideas of their own, the
church's leaders tended to resist and to lash out at the in-
creasingly secular and liberal cultural and intellectual cli-
mate of Argentina. Argentine Catholicism was isolated from
Europe and did not meet the challenges from Masonry and anti-
clericalism which were gaining ground among professionals,

teachers, and politicians.

It was not until the 1860 's that the church became
organized on a strictly national basis; until 1865 the
dioceses of Argentina were under the control of a foreign
metropolitan, the Archbishop of Charcas, but in that year
two archdioceses were established in Argentina, those of
Buenos Aires and Parana. The church sought to restore its
influence by building up the number of clerics and teach-
ing catechism in both the public and private schools. The

Nestor T, Auza, Los catolicos argentinos; su
experiencia politica v social (Buenos Aires: Ediciones
Diagrama, 1962), pp. 12. 72, 76, 125.

government agreed to subsidize seminaries to graduate more
priests, and Ireland and various European orders sent
clerics to help. The Jesuits, who had been invited back
to Argentina in 1860, opened schools in Santa Fe and Buenos
Aires (Colegio del Salvador) that became universities a

century later. Evangelization of the Indians in the North

and South was carried out after 1875 with federal aid.

The church also received state subventions for its own
schools.

The conservatism of the church led it to hamper ef-
forts to create a public and secular school system. It con-
sidered the schoolteachers imported from abroad as enemies
of the faith and protested the "dechristianization" of ed-
ucation. Thus, in Parana, for example, clerical protests
succeeded in putting a course in religion, morality, and
civics into the curriculum of the local normal school. But
the national government insisted that it be taught by a
priest before or after regular class hours and. that it not
be required.^

^^Furlong, "El catolicismo, " pp. 256-59, 262-63.

41 # . * .

Maria Elina R. B. Demaria, La mstruccion primar-

ia en la Argentina, 1884-1936 (Buenos Aires: El Ateneo,
1936), p. 61.

Chavarria, pp. 66-73, 76.

CHAPTER TWO
LAIC VICTORIES OF THE GENERATION OF 1880

Proponents of Secularism
Argentina's economically dominant classes of the
1880' s sought to modernize the country and themselves by
adopting the ideas and institutions of the more developed
countries of England, France, and the United States. The
generation of 1880 turned to Masonry, liberalism, mater-
ialism, positivism, and laicism. Both the upper and middle
classes wanted to diminish the influence of revealed reli-
gion and provide an opportunity to the young through educa-
tion, itself an instrument for the modernization of Argen-

1
tina and a tool for its unification.

The groundwork laid by secularists in the post-inde-
pendence period flowered into a series of laic reforms in
the 1880' s. These reforms consisted of civil marriage,
abolition of parochial registration of births, marriages,
and deaths, the secularization of cemeteries, and Law 1420 »

Torcuato S, Di Telia, "Raices de la controversia
educacional argentina," in Los fragmentos del poder, de la
oliqarcTuia a la poliarquxa arqentina (Buenos Aires: Edi-
torial Jorge Alvarez, S.A., 1969), p. 312.

23*

which excluded religious education from the public schools
during school hours.

Lay and secular ideologies became entrenched among
the professionals, teachers, and politicians of the Argen-
tine upper and middle classes. Masonic lodges promoted
laicism, and President Roca's Minister of Justice and Pub-
lic Instruction Eduardo Wilde, was a Mason, as was "Grand

Master" Sarmiento and other prominent politicians who had

2
the seats of power. French positxvist thought permeated

the normal schools and the Faculty of Law of the University
of Buenos Aires and looked upon revealed religion as unsci-
entific. Normal school graduates became teachers in pro-

3
vincial schools and spread positivist philosophy. The

American instructors in these normal schools were mainly

Protestant and opposed to catechism in public schools.

Little wonder, then, that the growing professionalization

of Argentine teachers pitted them against clerics who had

long dominated Argentina's educational system because of

their superior formal education. French liberalism was

Furlong, La tradicion, pp. 67, 100.

3
Chavarria, p. 76.

John J, Kennedy, Catholicism, Nationalism and Dem-
ocracy in Argentina (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of
Notre Dame Press, 1958), p. 190.

imitated by prominent Argentines, who also emulated its
anticlericalism and secular thinking which saw society as
made up of all creeds and the school as a neutral terrain

for all inhabitants, a source of solidarity and social uni-

5
ty. "Arqentinidad" would be promoted by the secular,

public school. And lastly, the material development of the

nation was to be patterned after that of the United States

which drew its immigrants from northern Europe. Argentina

could better attract these mainly Protestant immigrants if

its Roman Catholicism was downplayed and a free and lay ed-

6
ucation offered to their children.

The Educational Uproar of 1884; Law 1420
The culmination of lay and liberal influence in Ar-
gentina was Law 1420 which provided a national administra-
tive structure for primary education and established that
national primary schools would be tuition-free, based on
promotion between grades, and laic. It was this latter

5
Speech by Juan B. ,Teran in 1933, quoted in Bishop

Antonio Caggiano and Archbishop Nicolas Fasolino, "Pastoral

a los Catolicos de la Provincia de Santa Fe, " April 22,

1945, in Criterio, XVIII (April 26, 1945), 367-69.

^Ibid.

principle that raised a furor in the 1880' s and is still

being disputed even today.

Precedents

As early as 1877 Congress adopted Law 934 which gave
the state the exclusive right to grant titles to the grad-
uates of secondary schools. Graduates of private second-
ary schools had to pass examinations given by a committee
of five persons, three of whom represented the national co-
leqios. Only then would their certificates be recognized
by the national colegios and universities. Another article
in this legislation of 1878 provided that students from pri-
vate or provincial institutes of higher education could en-
ter national university faculties only after passing exam-
inations given by the national universities on the subjects
studied in those institutes. This law thereby affirmed the
power of the state by which it could force private schools

on the secondary and higher levels to meet national stand-

ards. However, no uniform system of national secondary

schools was set up. Instead, laicists and liberals turned
their attentions to the primary level.

7
Ley 934, September 18 78, is discussed in detail in

Americo Ghioldi, Libertad de ensenanza (Buenos Aires:

Universidad de Buenos Aires, 1961), pp. 48-77.

The question of establishing an administrative
structure for national primary schools funded by public
taxes also involved the question of religious education in
these schools. Two congresses that met in 1882 wrestled
with the issue of Catholic teachings in the national pri-
mary schools. One was a Congress of Workers presided over
by Pietro Geriomet in the Teatro Verdi in the Boca. Al-
though this congress was more concerned with working class
morals and salaries, it also addressed itself to the issue
of religion in the schools where workers sent their children,
The congress declared itself in favor of public schools

without dogmas. This secular position of the workers may
be explained by the fact that they were foreigners of di-
verse nationalities and creeds (or of no religious creed
whatsoever). Also, clerical influence upon the working
class was not strong. Since workers in Argentina had little
political power at the time, this congress influenced the
national Congressmen far less than the Pedagogical Congress
of 1882.

The Pedagogical Congress of 1882 was presided over

Speech by Silvano Santander, PS CD 1946 , X, p. 591.

by Onesimo Leguisamon and influenced by Sarmiento' s news-
paper articles in El^ Nacional ; it was held under the aus-
pices of the Ministry of Justice and Public Instruction
headed by Eduardo Wilde. Its ostensible purpose was to
bring together the teachers who could help in improving
public instruction through a coordination of methods and
standards. Since participation was limited to secular
teachers, to the exclusion of clergy and religious teach-
ers. Catholic writers such as Furlong claim that it was

9
rigged against the church. One of the conclusions of this

Congress was : "Las escuelas del Estado deben ser esencial-

mente laicas : las creencias reliqiosas son del dominio

10
privado."

The struggle between opponents and supporters (who

included President Julio A. Roca ) of Law 1420 had one of

its principal battlegrounds in the press. Sarmiento, who

opposed catechism in the public schools during class time,

headed the journalistic battle. His nephew Belin obtained

9 *

Furlong, La tradicion, p. 89.

^Olbid.

Much credit for this law must go to Roca who want-
ed Congress to formulate a law for primary schools and back-
ed its laicism from 1881-84. (Jose Arce, "Genesis y tram-
itacion de la ley 1420," Publicaciones del Museo Roca, XII
^uenos Aires: Tecnica Impresora S.A.C.I., 1966/, 149-83.)

the support of Mitre and other newspaper publishers, in-
cluding those of foreign language newspapers. Liberals,
as they came to be called, such as Sarmiento, Mitre,
Groussac, Gallo, Saenz Pena, shaped newspapers such as La
Nacion, El Nacional, and Sudamerica as bastions of the
principles of laicism. The ideas diffused by this press

helped to prepare the educational as well as the political

and economic thought of the national Congressmen.

Roman Catholic Resistance

Astounded by the headway that laic ideas were making
in Catholic Argentina, Argentine Catholics fought back. Of
all the lay reforms, none gave rise to such a fierce battle
as the issue of secular versus religious education in the
public school. The hierarchy of the church insisted on cat-
echism in the public schools as a necessary means to main-
tain the faith. Canon law and the Syllabus of Pius IX con-
demned the separation of education from Roman Catholicism.

In the first half of 1882, Argentine Catholics orga-n-
ized themselves to fight laicism. Catholic laymen head-
ed by Jose Manuel Estrada founded a newspaper La Union in
Buenos Aires to counterattack the liberal press; the Jes-

12 * -

Maria Elina R. B. de Demaria, La mstruccion

primaria en la Argentina, 1884-1936 (Buenos Aires: El
Ateneo, 1936), p. 10.

uits of the Colegio del Salvador aided La Union. IWo weeks

later the archdiocese began its own newspaper La_ Voz de la

Iqlesia, headed by an ecclesiastic. Other pro-Catholic

newspapers were founded in the provinces by laymen and

13
clerics. But it was realized that a religious press was

not enough to combat liberalism and laicism since the more

prominent newspapers, political parties, and the government

were in the hands of the liberals: political organization

would be necessary.

The Asociacion Catolica de Buenos Aires was formed

in 1883 by Jos^ Manuel Estrada as an offshoot of the Club

Catolico, founded in 1876-77 by the priest Felix Prias.

Aided by a monsignor, this Asociaci6n organized the Primer

Congreso Nacional de los Catolicos Argentines in 1884.

Made up of lay and clerical leaders from all over Argentina,

the congress sought the entrance of Catholics into politics

to counter liberals and their programs, especially Law 1420.

A Catholic political party UniSn Catolica emerged from this

14
congress.

Both Furlong, "El catolicismo argentine entre 1860

y 1930, " Historia arqentina contemporanea, 1862-1930 (Buenos
Aires: El Ateneo, 1964), II, 270; and Auza, Los catolicos
arqentinos, pp. 27-29, contain a nice synopsis of the Cath-
olic press in Argentina but go into little detail.

^^Auza, pp. 33-38 ; and Furlong, ibid., 270-73, 280.

Law 1420

But Roman Catholic resistance to Law 1420 was too

little and too late. The national Congress had debated it

from July 4 to 14, 1883, and had passed it on June 23, 1884,

Law 1420 dealt principally, though not exclusively, with the
national primary schools, which in 1884 were found only in
the Federal District, national territories, and certain un-
important agricultural colonies. It reaffirmed the author-
ity of the Consejo Nacional de Educacion (CNE) , which had
been established by decree a few years before, over these
schools, and it earmarked certain specific sources of rev-
enue for their support. It also provided that the CNE
should direct the national normal schools, whose curriculum
was to be established by Congress and the Ministry of Jus-
tice and Public Instruction. And it further set minimum
standards, for private as well as public primary schools.
A Consejo Escolar de Distrito was to oversee both private
and national schools in each school district. These public
bodies could approve or disapprove a private school's site.

For a blow-by-blow account of the passage of this
law, consult Gregorio Weinberg (ed,). Debate parlamentario
sobre la Ley 1420, 1883-1884 (Buenos Aires : Editorial
Raigal, 1956).

building conditions, classroom conditions, and capacity of
a teacher to teach. They could inspect to assure that re-
quired subjects, plus hygiene and morality, were being
taught. If standards were not met, the Consejo Escolar
could close down a private school in its districts .

The main debate on Ley 1420 was over its article
eight which stated the following:

La enseKanza religiosa s6la podr5 ser dada en las
escuelas ptablicas por los ministros autorizados
de los differentes cultos, a los ninos de su
respectiva comunion, y antes o despues de la
horas de clase.

Catholic anxieties were fed by the fear that all public
schools might soon be secularized, even though this article
eight only pertained to the national primary schools. The
latter were not very niomerous until the passage of the Ley
Lainez in 1905, which provided for the establishment of
national schools in the provinces . The more numerous pub-
lic schools belonging to the provinces were left out of
this legislation. Neither did it refer to secondary schools,
And proponents of the law further pointed out that it did
not ban religious education from the national schools: it
only restricted the hours in which it could be given. The

1 C

A partial text of this law may be found ibid. ;
article eight is quoted on p. xxvii.

required curriculum itself was not irreligious: it includ-
ed a course on morality that discussed God and His laws.

Catholic opposition to Law 1420 was not directed at
the state's prerogative to oversee and set standards for
private schools. Rather, it was against the restriction
of the teaching of catechism in the national schools . Cat-
echist classes in the more numerous provincial and private
schools were untouched by this law. Initial Catholic opposi-
tion, it must be concluded, was not just to the immediate
consequences but also to the presumed long-range intent of

this law: it was an effort to hamper the creation of a pub-

lie school system free from Catholic influence of control.

Implementation

l^ie Argentine church maintained its opposition to
laicism, while the government demonstrated its intention
to expand public and lay education on the primary level.
Right after the passage of Law 1420 the government found it-
self embroiled in a dispute with the church: the Capitular
Vicar of Cordoba issued a pastoral to the laity forbidding
them to send their children to a normal school directed by

Luiggi writes that the church was "jealous of its

lost opportunities . . . was continually hampering the ef-
forts ... of Sarmiento and the government ... to create
a school system free to every dweller in Argentina.^ ,. . . "
(65 Valiants, p. 27.)

Protestant women. He was supported by the Bishop of Salta,
who issued a similar pastoral to his own laity, and by two
other vicars. When the government tried to force the Ca-
pitular Vicar of Cordoba to back down, the Cathedral chap-
ter protested and supported him, as did Catholic professors
at C6rdoba and Buenos Aires national universities. The
government retaliated by suspending all of the vicars and
the Bishop of Salta, and by dismissing the professors. The
government also ejected the Apostolic Delegate from the
country when he met privately with the Protestant director
of the Cordoba normal school in hopes of getting her to
permit the teaching of catechism in the school in exchange

for the church's lifting of its pastoral ban against the

18
school. The government had made its point that the church

should not interfere in the public schools.

In 1884, the Primer Congreso Nacional de los Cato-
licos Argentinos resolved to combat Law 1420. The govern-
ment replied with harsher rulings. An 1885 directive stat-
ed that ministers of different faiths must receive permis-
sion from the district school councils and have at least
fifteen pupils in order to hold religious classes in the

See Furlong, "El cat^licismo, " pp. 268-69; and

Mecham, Church and State in Latin America, pp. 239-41.

schools. Moreover, in 1904, the CNE ruled that religious

education was to be given only to those students whose par-
ents previously requested it. A later ruling said that

religion classes had to end one-half hour before school

20
began, or begin one-half hour after school classes ended.

The Argentine Counter Reformation; 1884-1943
The church failed in the 1880 's to convince Argen-
tines who held the reins of power and teaching posts and
guided political parties that a Roman Catholic education
was better for Argentines than a liberal and secular one.
Not only did the church not overturn Law 1420, but, as will
be seen, its one university folded after a decade (1910-
20) . The greatest setback for the church after the laic
legislation of the 1880 's was the Re forma of the national
universities, which further secularized them. In general,
Argentine Catholicism was not fecund in ideas and works
responding to new situations from 1870 to 1920: progres-
sive Catholic organizations were not supported by the hier-

21
archy and even stymied by it.

Casiello, Iglesia y estado en la Argentina, p. 332.

Furlong, La tradicion, p. 101.

Auza, Los catolicos arqentinos, pp. 23, 72, 76, 125,

On the national level, Argentines were not pursuing
"Catholic" goals and did not see religion as relevant to
the socio-economic issues of Argentina. They saw the legal
and constitutional traditions of Argentina as adequately
protecting Roman Catholic interests; after all, the church
was subsidized by the state and the president of Argentina
had to be Roman Catholic. Because of the prevalence of

such attitudes on the part of the laity, a Roman Catholic

political party hardly got off the ground.

After 1920 Catholic groups with explicitly Catholic
goals began to attract more adherents. The church con-
vinced laymen to work for its ends especially through the
Union Popular Catolica or Accion Catolica Argentina. More
conservative governments rescinded many of the gains of
the university Re forma and replaced liberal administrators
and professors with ultra -nationalist and Catholic ones.
But the greatest triumph of the church's "counter reforma-
tion" came in 1943, when a military junta suspended Law

1420 and established catechism in the public schools.

Ibid . , p. 23.

23 ...

Richard J. Walter, Student Politics xn Argentina:

The University Reform and Its Effects. 1918-1964 (New York;
Basic Books, 1968), pp. 80-83, 90-115.

The Press

The Catholic press continued to fight liberalism and
laicism. The Third Catholic Congress held in Cordoba in
1907 urged the diffusion of Roman Catholic ideas through
the press. At the same time, the Catholic press began to
expand, as a result of journalistic activities of clerics
and laymen. In 1911, the magazine Estudios was started by

Jesuits; it became rightist after the death of one of its

co-founders in 1925. Accion Cat6lica Argentina controlled

directly or indirectly 700 publications, plus publishing

, 25
houses such as Editorial Difusion. Its official daily

newspaper. El Pueblo, was anti-democratic, and during

World War II was nearly black-listed. A strongly Catholic

layman Manuel Fresco, who as governor of the Province of
Buenos Aires had implanted religious education in the pro-
vincial schools in 1936, was editor of the pro-fascist

Furlong, "Breve historia de la revista 'Estudios,'"
Estudios, XLVII, no. 500 (December, 1958), 759, 761-62.

Overseas News Agency, "Memorandum on Argentina, "

Buenos Aires, February 24, 1944, p. 3. National Archives
file no. 835.404/42.

Accion Catolica Argentina forbade its members to

read a pro-democratic magazine, Orden Cristiano. (Ibid. ,

p. 2.)

27
Catholic daxly newspaper Cabildo. Another Catholic lay-
man, Atilio Dell'Oro Maini, founded the magazine Criterio
in 1928; in 1932 the hierarchy named Monsignor Gustavo J,
Franceschi as its editor. This magazine best reflected
the thoughts of the Argentine hierarchy, becoming, after

Franceschi took it over, more ultra -nationalist and anti-

28
liberal, for the authoritarian views of many clerics and

Catholic laymen were being reinforced by the fascist ide-

ologies of Europe of the 1930' s.

AcciSn Cat61ica Argentina

Catholic laymen and progressive priests had organ-
ized leagues and associations after the 1880 's like the
Clrculos de Obreros, Uni6n Democrata Cristiana, and the
Liga Social Argentina, All were impeded by a narrow and
conservative hierarchy that either disbanded these organ-

27 .
Ibid.

James M. Byrne, "Catholic Influence on New Regime

in Argentina," Summary of despatch no. 13193. Buenos Aires,
December 14, 1943, p. 2. National Archives file no.
835.00/2228.

29 I

Marysa Gerassi, "Argentine Nationalism of the Right:

1930-1946," Studies in Comparative International Develop-
ment, Social Science Institute, no. 13 (St. Louis, Mo.:
Washington University, 1965), 181-94.

30
izations or absorbed them.

In 1919 the Argentine hierarchy approved the statutes

of its main apostolic organization, Uni6n Popular Catolica

Argentina, later to be called Accion Catolica Argentina

(ACA) . It was modeled after an Italian organization which

was conceived of as the clergy's secular arm. ACA came

to be divided into four branches: the Asociaci6n de Hombres
de Accion Catolica (AHAC) , the Asociaci6n de Mujeres de
Accion Catolica (AMAC) , the Asociacion de los Jovenes de
Accion Catolica (AJAC) , and the Asociacion de las Jovenes
de Accion Catolica (AJAC) . A fifth branch was added in
1952 — the Asociacion de Profesionales de Accion Catolica.

ACA was organized on the archdiocesan, diocesan, and
parochial levels. On the archdiocesan level was formed a
Junta Central in the capital, which was the seat of Se-
cretariados Centrales: Economic-Social (founded 1934),
Moralidad (founded 1935), Publicidad y Propaganda (founded
1937), Educacion (founded 1947 and dissolved in 1963), and

Auza, pp. 60-120.

Ibid., pp. 117-18; cf. Gianfranco Poggi, Catholic

Action in Italy: The Sociology of a Sponsored Organization
(Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1967), pp.50,
54, 217-19.

Defensa de la Fe (foiinded 1947) .

Institutions such as Scouts Cat61icos Argentines,
Congregaciones Marianas, and the Confederacion Argentina
de Maestros y Profesores Catolicos (founded 1936) adhered
to ACA as affiliates and were assigned asesores or advi-
sors who were clerics with the final word on any decision.
Catholic students attending public schools were organized
into federations which were either in the boys' or girls'
branch (AJAC) , Catholic students at Catholic schools were
organized into Centros Internes and also belonged to the
branch of their sex in AJAC. Catholic university students
could join the Federacion de los Centros Universitarios of

ACA; these federations and centros were headed by ecclesi-

33
astical advisors.

A United States Embassy despatch from Buenos Aires

considered ACA to be the most important Catholic group

wielding political influence in Argentina in 1943. In-
deed, ACA did attract numbers. AHAC with 4,048 members in

Interviews with civilian administrators of ACA,

R. Diaz and J. Iglesias, Buenos Aires, August 18 and 21,
1972.

Ibid.

Byrne, "Catholic Influence," p. 3.

1933 had an index of growth of 201 to total 8,161 members
by 1943; AMAC had 5,177 members in 1933 and 15,061 by 1943,
a growth index of 290; AJAC (girls) had 7,150 members in
1933 and 22,871 by 1943, a growth index of 319; and AJAC
(boys) had 3,831 members in 1933 and 12,407 by 1943, a
growth index of 323. There were also preparatory sections
founded in 1935 for little girls and boys, numbering over

7,000 and 6,000 members respectively, plus sections of

future members numbering 10,000 men and 13,000 women.

From the very beginning, ACA pressured for religious

education in the public schools. AHAC chose religious ed-

36
ucation as its campaign topic for 1933. The Junta Central

of ACA heard a paper in 1934 that described the laic school
as "atheistic" and "contrary to the national Constitution."
The Junta voted in favor of "reclaiming as a right the es-
tablishment of religious education for all orders of offi-

37
cial teaching." In 1938 the ACA organized its members to

■^^Faustino Aranguren, "Datos estadisticos, " Boletin
de la AcciSn Cat61ica Argentina, XXI (April, 1951), 169-70.

^^"Respuesta de la Accion Catolica Argentina al cues-
tionario de la Oficina Pontifica, 'Actio Catholica,'"
Boletin de la ACA, XVII (November, 1947), 307.

"^^Campobassi, Ataaue y defensa del laicismo escolar
en la Argentina, 1884*1963 (Buenos Aires: Ediciones Cure,
1964) , p. 27.

lobby in Congress against the Coll bill, which would have
maintained and extended the neutrality of the public schools
in religious matters. ACA won this battle and went on to
organize in 1939 a Segunda Semana Nacional de Estudios Soci-
ales, held in Buenos Aires as the opening phase of another

campaign to install religious education in public schools,

38
and to make private schools independent of state control.

ACA's theme for 1939 for its congresses and assemblies was

"La Educacion Cristiana, " based on the papal bull "Divini

39
Illius Magistri." In 1942 the ACA again took as its

campaign topic the theme of religious education in the

state schools.

The ACA, it must be recalled, was reflecting the opin-
ion of the Argentine hierarchy. In turn, the episcopacy was
acting generally in accord with the policies and objectives
favored by the papacy itself. ACA's activities were to
bear fruit in 1943 when an ACA member, Martinez Zuviria,
became the national Minister of Education and decreed the

Mercedes Terr^n, "La ACA en la educacion argentine, "

in 30 anos de Accion Catolica, 1931-1961^ ed* Manuel N. J.
Bello (Buenos Aires: Talleres Graficos de Don Rudecindo
Sellares, 1961), pp. 190-91.

^^"Respuesta de la ACA," Boletln de la ACA, p. 306.

Overseas News Agency, "Memorandum on Argentina,"

p. 3.

reintroduction of religious education into the regular '
class hours of the national schools.
Religious Education in Provincial Schools

Before moving on to the topic of religious educa-
tion in provincial schools, a few words must be said in re-
gard to the state of provincial education. Education had
been left to the provinces by the Constitution of 1853, but
they lacked the funds to establish an outstanding system of
primary schools. The provinces needed to receive national
subventions for their schools, a procedure begun in 1871,
but "the logical tendency of national authorities to place
funds, teachers, and efforts in areas where obstacles seemed

less staggering, robbed the interior of any fair share in

41
Argentina's educational campaign." In provinces such as

Salta, Santiago del Estero, and Jujuy, less than 50% of
school-age children attended any school in 1914, in con-
trast to the more than 60% who attended schools in the Prov-

42
mce and City of Buenos Aires. Though great strides were

made toward wiping out illiteracy from 1868-1890, efforts

James R. Scobie, Argentina: A City and a Nation
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1964), p. 154.

42ibid.

43
slackened from 1890-1930. According to the 1940 census,

44
30% of school-age children did not attend primary schools.

The Socialist Americo Ghioldi pointed out in 1942

that the provinces received only 4,530,000 pesos in 1918

(the budget of 1917 gave them about this amount out of a

45
total of 26,531,228 pesos for all primary education ) from

the national government, and, as of 1942, they were still
receiving a small amount. Ghioldi proposed that the nation-
al subvention of provincial schools be increased in order

to guarantee provincial teachers 75% of the salary of

46
national schoolteachers.

Although the provinces received national subventions
for their schools, many of them implanted religious educa-
tion through provincial laws, decrees, and reglamentos.
Salta, for example, passed a law in 1886 which made the

Gianello, "La ensenanza primaria y secundaria,"

Historia arqentina contemporanea, II, p. 155.

^^speech by Americo Ghioldi, DSCD 1941, 'll, p. 638.

Argentina, Ley del presupuesto general, 1917

(Buenos Aires: Talleres Graficos del Ministerio de Agri-
cultura, 1917), pp. 486, 528.

"^^DSCD 1942, I, pp. 700, 702.

teaching of the Roman Catholic religion obligatory. Cfirdoba

followed suit in 1896, calling for the teaching of morality

47
and religion. A subsequent law in 1908 said that reli-
gious education should be given in schools to children

whose parents or guardians did not object. In Catamarca,

an education law of 1900 allowed the province's Consejo de

Educaci6n to dictate a curriculxim that would include the

49 s
Catholic religion. Santa Ffe's legislature passed an ed-
ucational law declaring the religious formation of children
to be necessary. Schoolchildren would be taught morality
and Catholic doctrine by a teacher if no cleric could do

it.=°

When the legislature of Santiago del Estero passed
a law implanting religious education in its schools, the
CNE threatened to cut off national subventions to its
schools, and the governor vetoed the law. However, the
national Congress did not impose on the right of provinces
to make laws for their schools. A bill of December 1914

Furlong, La tradici6n, p. 120.

^^Speech of Deputy Alfredo Palacios, DSCD 1914/15,
VI, p. 684.

As of 1914, this law was not applied but neither

was it repealed. (Ibid. , p. 683.)
SOlbid.

to cut off national subventions to provinces with laws
permitting religious education in their public schools was
defeated. It was pointed out by its sponsor that educa-
tion was lay only in the provinces of Buenos Aires, Corri-

51
entes, Entre Rios, Jujuy, San Luis, Mendoza, and La Rioja.

In the 1930 's the governing elites and military be-
gan to turn against the liberalism of the 1880 's in reac-
tion to the socio-economic crisis of the great depression
and the challenge posed by new urban middle- and working-
class groups. Their self-confidence shaken, despite their

return to power, the Conservatives on the provincial and

national levels turned increasingly to a romantic tradition-
alism, one of whose features was support of historic Ca-
tholicism.

In response to this new climate Buenos Aires implant-
ed religion in its schools by a reglamento of its Consejo
General de Educacion (1936) . A national interventor de-

^•^Ibid., pp. 685, 691.

Conservative parties operated mainly on the pro-
vincial level and went by different names; only in the Pro-v-
'ince of Buenos Aires was there at one time a major party
by that name. Here the term is a generic designation for
the "oligarchy,"

^■^Henry Stanley Fertis, Argentina (London: Ernest
Bonn Limited, 1969), p. 160.

creed religious education in the provincial schools of Cata-

marca (1937) , and a governor of Mendoza made it an optional

54
course in the provincial schools (1937) . In one way or

another, between 1936-37 religious education was also im-
planted in the provinces of Corrientes, San Luis, La Rioja,

55
and Jujuy. It was also inserted in this period m prov-
inces where it had previously existed but had later been

56
eliminated: Santa Fe, Cordoba, and Salta. Hence, the most

populous provinces in Argentina had religion being taught
as part of the regular curriculum in the provincial schools.

Small wonder, then, that a 1940 pastoral of the Ar-
gentine bishops applauded those who had worked to conserve
a "Christian education" in the provincial schools, besides

reminding Argentine Catholics that religious education was

57
still a goal of the church. The church's influence on the

elite was helping it achieve a Catholic curriculum in

Furlong, La tradici6n, pp. 121-22.

Campobassi, Ataque y defensa del laicismo, p. 36,

Ibid. , p. 36.

"Pastoral del Episcopado Argentine Sobre la Educa-

cion Cristiana," June 29, 1940, quoted in Revista Eclesiastica
del Arzobispado de Buenos Aires y del Obispado Sufraganeo de
Azul, XL (July, 1940), 385-98. (Hereafter cited as the Re-
vista Eclesiastica de Buenos Aires. )

public schools.

Church Built Its Own School System

The Generation of 1880 was active in the field of
primary education, and national schools proliferated. In

1885, one-fourth of all primary students were attending

private schools; it may be assumed that three-fourths of

them were Catholic. By 1937, only 7,5% of Argentine pri-
mary students were in private schools; the overwhelming ma-
jority were evenly divided between provincial (46.2%) and

59
national (46.6%) primary schools. In fact, from 1908 to

1938 the number of primary schools had doubled, the number

of students had tripled, and the number of teachers had

quadrupled. This expansion was the result of Congres-
sional and Executive action: Ley LSinez and financial
support for national schools and teachers.

But by no means had the church given up on spread-
ing its own school system in the face of state activity.
At the same time that it began to organize lay groups such

^°Demaria, p. 28, ,

^^Alejandro E. Bunge, "Reflexiones acerca del regimen
educacional — constataciones num^ricas," La enseflanza nacional
(Buenos Aires: Espasa Calpe Argentina, 1940), p. 149.

^°Ibid., p. 152.

as Accion Cat6lica, and at the same time that clerics and
laymen founded a Catholic press, the bishops founded the
Consejo Superior de Educaci6n Cat6lica (CONSUDEC) . All
church-administered schools, parochial or religious, were
made dependent on CONSUDEC in 1922, their statutes being
dictated by the Argentine episcopacy. The goals of CONSUDEC

were to orient, coordinate, inform, and, if necessary, to

61
defend all Catholic schools.

The church decided to concentrate on the establish-
ment of secondary and normal schools, and to leave the pri-
mary schools chiefly to the public sector. In 1918, one out
of five secondary students was enrolled in private schools;

in 1943, more than two out of five secondary students were

62 ,

studying in private schools. (It is assumed that three-
fourths of these private schools were Catholic) In 1918,
13% of Argentina's normal school students were enrolled in

private normal schools; in 1943, this percentage had in-

63
creased to 66%. Almost all of the private normal schools

Information in a letter to the author from Hermano

Septimio, the head of CONSUDEC, Buenos Aires, March 19, 1974,

Di Telia, "Raices de la controversia educacional

argentina," Los fragmentos del poder, p. 314.
Ibid.

were Catholic. The church was assured of reaching the
children of the middle and upper classes by concentrating
on secondary school students. And the church was molding
the teachers of primary schoolchildren by operating more
normal schools, thereby reaching more primary school pupils
indirectly.

Ley 934 of 1877 only mentioned secondary schools,
stipulating that private secondary school students would
have to submit to state examinations given by the national

coleqiosr left outside of this law were private normal

64
schools. Thus the graduates of Catholic normal schools

did not have to submit to state administered examinations
in order to receive state recognition of their diplomas or
certificates. Catholic normal schools faced no legal ob-
stacles, therefore, and increased in number faster than the
national ones. By the early 20th century Argentina had a
surplus of primary school teachers; while the state and
provinces moved to slow down the growth of their own normal
schools, the church kept on increasing its niimber of normal

^'^Ghioldi, Libertad de ensel^anza, p. 89.

^^The CNE in 1920 projected a surplus of 25,000
primary schoolteachers by 1930 if present growth rate were
maintained. (Deputy Juan F. Cafferata, DSCD 1927, II,
p. 294.)

schools.

The church's school system was also aided by the
state. The national government and some provinces gave
subventions to private schools. In 1938 the federal gov-
ernment spent thirty million pesos on private schools out
of a total education budget of 310 million pesos; 211 mil-
lion went to the national schools, and sixty-nine million
went to the provincial schools. In 1928, President Hipol-
ito Yrigoyen and his Minister of Education permitted pri-
vate secondary schools to waive the final national examina-
tions required by Ley 934 for those pupils who achieved a
high grade-point average, thereby lifting state control
over private secondary school certificates. The result was

an immediate upsurge in the number of private secondary

schools operating more like businesses than academic centers.

The church's growing number of schools was abetted
by the state's lack of action on the secondary (and normal)
school level. No state bureaucratic interest group devel-
oped to promote secondary education as one did on the pri-
mary level because Congress failed to pass a law creating a

Bunge , p . 148 ,

^"^Ghioldi, pp. 97-98.

Consejo Nacional de Enseffelnza Secundaria.

There were few national secondary schools in the
provinces; in 1900 there were only sixteen. In this same
year, there were 3,609 secondary students in the national

coleqios and 3,272 secondary students in private schools

69
m all of Argentina. The national government was leav-
ing secondary education up to the provinces, but they did

not have the money, and, in fact, were closing down some

normal schools in 1900 because of lack of funds. What

the national government did do, however, was to commit re-
sources for non-bachillerato secondary schools, beginning
commercial schools (1890), industrial schools (1897), and
special schools for the deaf, dumb, and blind. In 1903
Congress approved a law creating an Institute Nacional del

Profesorado which graduated teachers especially for the

secondary schools.

°°There were many attempts throughout the 19th and
20th centuries; for one example, see DSCD 1894, pp. 528,
1205.

^^Deputy Alejandro Carbo, DSCD 1900, pp. 1180, 1269.

"^°Ibid. , p. 1180.

"^^Gianello, pp. 120-23, 126-30, 140-44.

The Universities: 1884-1943
Presidents Mitre through Roca promoted education be-
cause they deemed it important for Argentina's social, eco-
nomic, and political development, and they saw the univer-
sity as the pinnacle of Argentine education. During the
period of lay reforms of public education. President Roca's
government (1880-86) defined the relationship of Argentina's
national universities to the federal government by sponsor-
ing the Ley Avellaneda (Law 1597) . The law governed the
universities from 1885 to 1967 except for an interruption
during the Peron era, 1947-55. As originally passed, it
gave the university a juridical status known as "limited
autarchy": the university could decide its own regulations
and basic norms and administer its internal finances. Un-
der this law the national universities had the exclusive
right to grant professional titles. Their autonomy was
limited, however, in that the President of Argentina ap-
pointed professors on the basis of nominations of the
superior council of the university; the national executive
could also remove professors from their posts; and the leg-
islative and executive branches annually approved the uni-
versity budgets. Changes in university statutes had to be

approved by the President of Argentina.

At the time the Ley Avellaneda was passed, the only
national universities were those of Buenos Aires and Cordoba,
which had come under federal control during the period of
national reorganization. Subsequently, other institutions
were added to the national system. La Plata was originally
planned as a provincial university, but in 1905 was turned

over to the Nation and soon functioned as a national uni-

73
versity. Santa Fe originally had a Jesuit colegio with

a law faculty that awarded degrees recognized by the two
national universities, 1875-1884. In 1890 this colegio be-
came part of the provincial university of Santa F5, and in
1919 it was nationalized by Yrigoyen as the University of
the Literal and included former institutes in Rosario, Par-
ana, Corrientes, and Entre Rios. Tucumanwas also a forme'r
provincial university which was nationalized (1921) after

Reform statutes had been approved for it by President

74
Yrigoyen in 1920. Cuyo was made the sixth national uni-

Maria Terren de Ferro, "EducaciSn: la universidad

actual y su autonomia," Estudios, no. 496, XLVII (August,
1958), 460-61.

Gran enciclopedia argentina, ed,, Diego A. de

Santillan, (8 vols., 1953-66, Buenos Aires: Ediar Sociedad
Anonima Editores, 1963), VIII, p. 250.

Jose Torre Revello, "Historia de las universidades

versity in 1939, growing out of various institutes in Men-
doza.

La Reforma

All the national universities, in existence or that
came into being from 1918-21, had their statutes written
and approved by the national executive to incorporate the
ideas of the "Reforma." This reform movement began at the
national University of Cordoba in 1918 and was carried out
by alumni, students, and professors. They wished to change
the rigid university structure that allowed certain tradi-
tional families from Cordoba to monopolize professorships.
As these families were generally conservative and Catholic',

the struggle was also against the church and religious in-

fluences at the University of Cordoba. The reform even-
tually spread to all Argentine universities and other Latin
American countries, bringing a tripartite system of univer-
sity government: alumni, students, and professors would
govern the university under conditions of university auto-
nomy the state would not interfere in university life.

y de la cultura superior, " Historia argentina contempor&nea.
1862-1930 (Buenos Aires; El Ateneo, 1964), II, 188-90.

7 Sri chard J. Walter, Student Politics in Argentina;
The University Reform and Its Effects. 1918-1964. pp. 39-77.

Other changes were that class attendance was no longer ob-
ligatory, examinations could be taken by students who did

not attend classes, and professors' chairs were opened to

Other than the elite families' members.

The Reform reflected student attitudes and ways of
thinking that would become characteristic: nationalism,
idealism, rhetorical solidarity with the working class,
support for social justice, and solidarity with youth in
other Latin American countries. Moreover, a by-product of
it was the creation of a national organization, the Fed-
eracion de Universitarios Argentines (FUA) , to coordinate
all of Argentina's student groups through pamphleteering,
meetings, etc., and to make the students' weight felt in

national politics — through meetings with the President and

violence if necessary.

The Reforma, like lay education, was soon subject
to a counter reformation. The government of Alvear inter-
vened the universities of the Literal and Cordoba and rolled

78
back several of the Reformista renovations. Reforms-

Maria Mercedes Bergada, Argentine Survey S.J.;

II — Situacion educacional (Buenos Aires: Centro de Investi-
gaciones y Accion Social, 1968), Part 2, pp. 249-50.

^\alter, pp. 55-60, 77.

Ibid. , pp. 80-83,

ists again suffered setbacks after 1930. Ironically, they
had worked to bring about the overthrow of Yrigoyen by mil-
itary coup in 1930, even though he had restored many of the
reforms to the universities; but they soon came to regret
their contribution to his overthrow. Under the military
dictatorship set up in 1930 and the fraudulently elected
Conservative coalition to which it gave way in 1932 (the
"Concordancia") , most of the universities were intervened,

and the administrators and professors opposed to the Re-

79
formista program replaced those of more liberal tendencies.

Governmental repression of students led to their increasing
politicization. Marxist groups grew in strength, as did
certain extremist groups of the right. But the main body
of university students identified with the democratic par-
ties (and with the Allies at the outbreak of World War II).
The principles of the Reform remained only as ideals dur-
ing the years 1930-43: and their university centers and

federations became foci of opposition to the national gov-

ernment.

^^The Second National Student Congress that met in
Buenos Aires in 1932 voiced opposition to the Concordancia
and demanded that the church not interfere in political af-
fairs. (Gabriel del Mazo, ed.. La reforma universitaria
/Ta Plata: Edicion del Centre de Estudiantes de Ingenieria,
19417, II, 370-90.)

^°Walter, pp. 90-115.

Catholic Universities Blocked

The anti-conservative and anti -clerical bias of the
Reform made Catholics more conscious of their own failure
to found a Catholic university. Various attempts had been
made before: in 1871 a bill submitted to the Buenos Aires
provincial legislature by Estrada was defeated; it would
have allowed private universities to grant scientific de-
grees, but not habilitating titles to practice a profession

81
unless the state approved. A Jesuit colegio m Santa Fe,

as noted above, had obtained approval of its law school

graduates' degrees from the two national universities,

1875-84. But it was not until 1910 that the church hier- •

archy along with Catholic laymen founded the Universidad

Catolica de Buenos Aires. The state refused to recognize

the degrees of the university's graduates, and it ceased

to function around 1920-22.

Meanwhile, however. Catholic activists as early as
1910 had formed Centres de Estudiantes Catolicos in the na-

Horacio 0. Domingorena, Articulo 28; universidades

privadas en la Argentina; sus antecedentes (Buenos Aires:
Editorial Americana, 1959), pp. 19-20.

^^This Catholic University had faculties of law and
social science; Mons. Luis Duprat was rector. (Auza, Los
catSlicos argentinos, pp. 73-74.)

tional universities; they included secondary as well as
university students and alumni. Each Centre had an eccle-
siastical advisor, and Tribuna Universitaria was published

83
to propagandize their ideas and orient the movement. At

the same time. Catholic laymen organized the Cursos de
Cultura Cat61ica, in which Catholic professors met with
students in informal seminars to teach them about Catholic
culture and philosophy. The future Universidad Catolica
de Argentina grew out of these Cursos, as did the Ateneo
de la Juventud, founded in 1934. Many of the participants
such as Dell'Oro Maini, Tomas D. Casares, and Rafael Ayerza
became active in Argentine intellectual life and were to
use their influence to help the church achieve its educa-
tional aims.

The Tribuna Universitaria was edited by Dell'Oro

Maini, in 1917. See Tribuna Universitaria, October, 1917,

p. 103.

CHAPTER THREE
THE 1943 COUP AND ENSENANZA RELIGIOSA

The Military Government
On June 4, 1943, the government of Argentina was
forcibly replaced by a new group of military leaders. This
group identified itself with nationalist and Roman Catholic
forces. Its revolutionary proclamation stated that one
goal of the revolution would be "acercar a_ los ninos a la

doctrina de Jesuscristo" and "educar a_ la^ j uventud en el

1
respeto a_ Dios."

Nationalist Catholics applauded this coup, and moved

into governmental posts. Six days after the new government

took office. Father Gustavo Franceschi wrote an editorial

for Criterio which praised the actions of the armed forces

and called the revolution "una racha purificadora del ambi-

ente social." The "duty" of Argentines was to support this

government. In the next issue of Criterio appeared a let-
ter from General Pedro Ramirez, who had become President,

Campobassi, Ataque y defensa del laicismo escolar.

p. 40.

10, 1943), 128.

"Comentarios : la revoluci6n, " Criterio, XVI (June

openly thanking Franceschi and Criterio for their support.
Franceschi replied by complimenting Ramirez for his "inte-
gral Catholic Christianity" and his proposal to seek social
justice in the manner laid out in the papal encyclicals.^
General Ramirez also called on Cardinal Copello and told

him that his government intended to lean heavily on the

4
church for assistance. Ramirez had a cleric as his per-
sonal advisor. Father Roberto A. Wilkinson Dirube, who

5
also was credited as being his speech writer.

The Catholic militancy of the new government showed
up in the field of education. The Minister of the Inter-
ior Hector Bernardo, who headed a nationalist group pro-
fessing to be followers of St. Augustine, issued an order
for the intervention of the province of Tuciiman. While the
province was intervened, the provincial Minister of Educa-
tion sent out a nationalist circular to all schools that
called for the extirpation of liberal democracy. This was
followed by the installation of ensenanza religiosa in the

3t.
Franceschi, "Nuevas consideraciones sobre la re-

volucion," Criterio. XVI (July 1, 1943), 200.

4
Despatch no. 11024 from Ambassador Norman Armour

to the Secretary of State. Buenos Aires, July 17, 1943,

p. 7. National Archives file no. 835/1671.

^Ibid.

provincial public schools. The action of the Catholic na-
tionalists in the public education system of Tucuman was a

g
preview of what they would do in the national schools.

The new Minister of Justice and Public Instruction,
Gustavo Martinez Zuviria, was a member of ACA and an ex-
treme Catholic militant who had written nationalist and
anti-semitic novels under the pen name of Hugo Wast. In
December 1943, he issued the decree by which religious ed-
ucation was implanted in the national primary and second-
ary schools; by religious education was meant the teaching
of the Roman Catholic religion. The provincial governments
followed suit and established religious education in their
provincial public primary and secondary schools by local
ordinance.

Martinez Zuviria named another Catholic militant,
Jose Ignacio Olmedo, as President of the Consejo Nacional
de Educacion; he announced pro-clerical and nationalist
principles upon assvuning office on March 25, 1944. Two
days later, Olmedo issued a decree suspending all primary
schoolteachers, specialists, and administrators, pending

Byrne, "Catholic Influence on New Regime in Argen-
tina, " Summary of despatch no. 13193, Buenos Aires, Decem-
ber 14, 1943, p. 1.

a review of their fitness. All continued in their posts
until each individual case was decided, but the net effect

was to put primary education safely in the hands of the

7
clerics and nationalists.

Martinez Zuvirfa directed the intervention of all
the universities, except the University of La Plata, and
ended student participation in university administration.
He declared FUA and all its centers to be illegal and dis-
solved; FUA, however, continued to operate clandestinely.^
Pro-democratic professors and administrators were removed
from office or resigned in protest. Ultra-nationalists
and reactionary Catholics replaced them.^ The main uni-
versity with over 90% of all Argentine university students
was the University of Buenos Aires, whose interventor was
Tomas D. Casares, a member of the Cursos de Cultura Cato-
lica, ACA, the organizing committee of the First Congress
of Ibero-American Culture, the Club del Plata, and Con-

Telegram from Ambassador Norman Armour to the Sec-
retary of State. Buenos Aires, March 28, 1944. National
Archives file no. 835.42/185.

Despite government repression, university students
managed to force the resignation of some reactionary profes-
sors and administrators. (Walter, Student Politics in Ar-
gentina, p. 123.) ~

Walter, Student Politics in Argentina, pp. 121-22.

vivium. Other Catholics who belonged to some of these
same organizations played a role in the University's inter-
vention: Atilio Dell'Oro Maini, Interven tor-Dean of the
Law School of the University of Buenos Aires; and Rafael
Ayerza, Interventor-Dean of the School of Science.

On May 4, 1944, Dr. Alfredo Baldrich succeeded Mar-
tinez Zuviria as Minister of Justice and Public Instruction.
He, too, was a Catholic nationalist and appointed another'
Catholic nationalist as his subsecretary, Silenzi de Stagni,
So was JordSn Bruno Genta, the former inter ventor of the
University of the Literal, who on June 6 became rector of

the Institute del Profesorado, the leading secondary school-

teacher training center. A course in religious educa-
tion and morality had been added to its curriculum since
the decree for religious education also applied to second-
ary schools. By such means, secondary education was brought

Casares was named to the Supreme Court in 1944 and
rose to be its president under Peron in 1946. He typifies
these Catholic nationalists in that he sided with the church
during its showdown with the government in 1955. (Inter-
view with Casares, Buenos Aires, September 11, 1972.)

Byrne, pp. 4-5.

Letter from Cultural Attache Hayward Keniston to

the Secretary of State, Buenos Aires, June 9, 1944, p. 6.
National Archives file no. 842.6/15018.

increasingly under the control of Nationalist Catholics.
Catholic nationalists had carried out the educa-
tional policies of the new government and vice versa. Gen-
eral Edelmiro Farrell, who replaced Ramirez as President
in February, 1944, summed up the government's educational
activities on June 4, 1944: dangerous elements had been
eliminated from the universities and the teaching profes-
sion generally; students would have no share in the govern-
ment of the university, nor should they devote themselves
to political problems. He explained the implantation of
ensefianza reliqiosa as the "restoration of the rule of

the National Constitution in the proper interpretation of.

1 3

its text and spirit."

The government had sought the support of Catholic
nationalists because it genuinely shared the church's
values; there was a close identification between the mil-
itary men and the church on the critical importance of or-
der, hierarchy, authority, and tradition. When interview-
ed many years later. Colonel Enrique P. Gonzalez, President

^^Ibid.

Interview with Jose Luis Imaz, sociologist, Buenos

Aires, December 2, 1971.

Ramirez' secretary and a key advisor in the government dur-
ing its first phase, stated that the government had wanted
to use the Catholic religion to fight leftist ideologies:
communists and anarchists were seen as formidable foes who
wished to destroy the family and take Argentina into an era
of terrorism in order to establish a despotic regime. The
communists especially wished to infiltrate youth, attack-
ing the home and religion with their "ideas disolventes,"

which only could be combated with religious instruction of

15
the young in the schools. The Jesuit historian Guillermo

Furlong likewise claimed that ensenanza reliqiosa served

to combat totalitarianism, especially of the Soviet brand.

The military government already had support and did

not need to woo the Argentine church, but it wanted the

17
church's backing. And the church wanted the natxonal

government to implant religious education in the schools
so that the young would know its teachings. The church al-
so managed to eject other religions from the public schools.

Interview, Buenos Aires, April 10, 1972.

1 c

La tradicion, pp. 12 5-26.

Telephone interview with Robert A. Potash, Buenos

Aires, July 14, 1972

Law 1420 had allowed the ministers of other religions to

teach their respective coinmunicants , The 1943 decree was

exclusionary — only the Catholic religion could be taught.

The Roman Catholic Church of Argentina now enjoyed:

... el control mSs o menos absolute de las
tres ramas educativas de la NaciSn por ele-
mentos cat5licos y clericales ... el triunfo
politico mSs amplio de la Iglesia — la jerar-
guia — en el periodo.

The Decree of Enseflanza Religiosa, December 31, 1943

Promulgation

On December 31st the Minister of Public Instruction

Dr. Gustavo Martinez Zuvirla promulgated decree no. 18.411,

which said:

Articulo Primero. — En todas las escuelas pflbli-
cas de enseRanza primaria, postprimaria, secun-
daria y especial, la ensePianza de la Religion
Catolica sera impartida como materia ordinaria
de los respectivos planes de estudio.

Quedan excluidos de esta enseFIanza aquellos
educandos cuyos padres manifiesten expresa opo-
sicion por pertenecer a otra religion, respe-
tandose asl la libertad de conciencia. A esos
alumnos se les dara instruccion moral.

Art. 2 . — Los docentes que tengan a su cargo la
enseRanza da la Religion Cat(51ica seran'desig-
nados por el Gobierno debiendo recaer las nom-
bramientos en personas autorizadas por la Au-
toridad EclesiSstica,

Alberto Ciria, Partidos y poder en la Argentina

moderna, (1930-46) (Buenos Aires: Editorial Jorge Alvarez,

1968), p. 220.

Art, 3 . — Los programas y textos destinados a
la ensefTanza religiosa seran aprobados por el
Gobierno, de acuerdo con la Autoridad EclesiSstica.

Art, 4 . — En los-. establecimientos de ensenanza
media y especial dependientes de las Universi-
dades Nacionales, asi como en las escuelas co-
munes dependientes del Consejo Nacional de Edu-
cacion regiran las disposiciones del presente
Decreto.

Art. 5°. — Crease la Direccion General de Instruc-
cion Religiosa a los efectos de organizar y
dirigir esta rama de la Enseflanza en las escuelas
dependientes del Ministerio de Justicia e Instruc-
ci6n Publica y del Consejo Nacional de Educaci6n,
y la Inspeccion General de Instrucci6n Religiosa,
cuyas funciones respectivas serSn oportunamente
reglamentadas por el Ministerio en cada juris-
diccion, con el acuerdo o la consulta que, segun
los casos, corresponda hacer a la Autoridad
EclesiSstica.

Art. 6°. — Los gastos que demande el cumplimiento
del presente Decreto serSn incluldos come item
especial en el Presupuesto General de la Nacion.

Art, 7°. — Communiquese, publfquese, anotese, dese
al Registro Nacional y archivese.

RAMIREZ (signed)
Gustavo Martinez Zuviria, Luis C. Perlinger,
Cesar Ameghino, Benito Sueyro, Diego I. Mason, .q
Alberto Gilbert, Edelmiro J. Farrell, Juan Pistarini.

The decree was signed by all the ministers, giving
it the force of law, A long preamble to it gave the gov-
ernment's reasoning for instituting ensenanza religiosa in

1 q

Casiello, Iglesia y estado en la Argentina,

pp. 336-37.

the public schools: a school system without religion had
helped contribute to administrative corruption and "_la de-
formacion del alma del pueblo" because it had stripped Ar-
gentina of "el unico fundamento valido de toda moral pri-
vada Y. publica _^, para nosotros los argentinos. la destruc-

cion de uno de los mas fuertes vinculos de la unidad nacio -

, 20
nal . " It was also pointed out that a future Argentine

President, since he was required by the Constitution to be
Roman Catholic, should know the catechism.
Bishops Denied Collaboration

The episcopacy never admitted that it helped draw
up this decree. Instead, it took the official position
that the decree was unilaterally issued by the military;
that the church had no hand in drawing it up; and that the
bishops were even surprised by it.^''' This does not mean
that Catholics did not favor the decree. The bishops laud-
ed it in a letter to President Ramirez, and in a pastoral
letter: ACA praised it; Criterio enthusiastically greet-
ed it; clergy, bishops and Cardinal Copello publicly and

IM^., p. 335.

See Franceschi, "La posici6n catolica en la Argen-
tina, " Criterio. XVII (February 8, 1945), 133-40; Boletfn
de la Accion Catolica Argentina, XXV (1955), pp. 55-62,
quoted in Casiello, p. 338; and DSCD 1946. X, p. 690.

repeatedly praised the government because of its restora-
tion of ensenanza religiosa.

It was reported that the church was well aware of
this decree before it was issued and, in fact, had with-
held its endorsement of the decree for several months out
of fear of a negative fiublic reaction to it. Minister of
Public Instruction Martinez Zuviria purportedly overcame

Cardinal Copello's qualms, and the decree was issued the

22
end of December. Further verification that the church

did know of this decree was supplied by President Ramirez'

former secretary and chief advisor Colonel Gonzalez, who

stated that Martinez Zuviria periodically consulted the

episcopacy while drawing up the decree for enseRanza re-

, . . 23
ligiosa.

After the promulgation of the decree, an article in

Criterio reassured Catholics that the church would have a

major part in administering the decree. The government

could not impose its political will on the church because

the teachers and texts had to be authorized by the eccle-

^Letter from Counselor Edward L. Reed to the Secre-
tary of State, Buenos Aires, January 8, 1944, p. 2. Nation-
al Archives file no. 835.42/179.

23 ,, ,.

Interview with Col. Enrique Gonzalez, Buenos Aires,

April 10, 1972.

siastical authorities. A Director General had to be con-
sulted on the organization and administration of enseflanza
reliqiosa. and a distinguished priest with firm character
would be appointed with the concurrence of the hierarchy

to this post to ward off chances that the government would

dictate to the church.

The church was defensive in face of the charge that
it had meddled in politics to get by force what it could
not get by persuasion. The decree had been announced on
the same day that political parties were ordered dissolved,
thereby linking religious education with military dictator-
ship. The hierarchy maintained that they were not the on-
ly ones who favored religious education. They argued that
it had been a demand of the people, a right of the church,
and part of Argentine tradition; it was something the gov-
ernment was duty-bound to do by virtue of divine law.

El establecimento de la ensenanza religiosa cato-
lica en las escuelas de un pais no constituye un
libre obsequio del gobierno a la Iglesia, sino
el reconocimiento del derecho de Cristo a llevar,
por medio de dicha Iglesia, su Verdad al alma
de los niKos.

24„

Franceschi, "Un 'grave problema argentine'

imaginario, " Criterio, XVII (January 27, 1944), 83.

"Pastoral Colectiva del Episcopado Argentine

Acerca de los Deberes de los Catolicos en el Momento Actual,"

November 5, 1945, quoted in Criterio. XVIII (November 22,

1945), 497.

Administration of the Decree

That the bishops, or at least those familiar with
their viewpoint, were almost certainly in on the drawing
up of the decree is apparent in the text of the decree it-
self, whereby the Argentine episcopacy must decide on the
texts and curricula and nominate the teachers for religious
education. The episcopacy was also to be consulted by the
government on the functions of the General Directorate of
Religious Instruction (DireccicSn General de Instruccion
Religiosa) and the General Inspection of Religious Instruc-
tion (Inspeccion General de Instrucci6n Religiosa) .

The Director General was responsible for religion
and morality in the schools. Underneath him were two head
inspectors — one for the primary schools and the other for
the secondary schools. The Director General's activities
were regulated by the Minister of Justice and Public In-
struction and were to be conducted in close cohsultation
with the Church hierarchy. The chief inspectors, in turn,
headed a staff of inspectors situated all over Argentina.
These inspectors would visit the schools every week through-
out Argentina, and mainly were to orient the teachers of
ensenanza religiosa and morality. However, the Director

also tried to have a priest appointed for every school to

serve as an advisor for the teachers of religion and moral-

.. 26

ity.

MINISTER OF PUBLIC INSTRUCTION

DIRECTOR
GENERAL

INSPECTOR
primary schools

INSPECTORS

-1 — I — r

I 1

I I

INSPECTORS

I ^ I r
III!

The General Directorate was officially established
by decree on May 20, 1944, although the first Director Gen-
eral was appointed in March to set up the office. It was
composed of four members plus the Director General, all of
whom were nominated by the government, and a sixth member
appointed directly by the episcopacy. It thus epitomized

Interview with Pbro. Dr. Jesus E. Lopez Moure,
Second Director General, 1944-47, Buenos Aires, August
9, 1972.

collaboration between church and state on public education.

All of the Directors were clerics. The first, Juan
R. Sepich, lasted two months, March-April, 1944. He was
succeeded by Father L6pez Moure, who directed the program
of religion and morality in the schools from April 1944 to
April 1947. The hierarchy approved books for use in the
teaching of morality and religion before they were finally
screened by the Directorate. They were checked by the bish
ops for doctrinal errors; the Directorate checked them for
their suitability in the classroom. The hierarchy approved
the teachers of religion and morality if their diplomas and
titles showed them to have had formal training in Roman
Catholic dogma. The Director reviewed the list and passed
it on to the Minister of Public Instruction (for secondary
and normal schools) or to the CNE (for primary schools),
who then appointed them to teaching positions within the
schools . The CNE was appointed by the Minister of Public
Instruction, who in turn was appointed by the Chief Execu-
tive .

When the program began, there were few teachers pre-
pared to teach religion and morality, and the Directors,

73
27

^"^L. Edward Shuck, Jr., "Church and State in Argen-
tina," Western Political Quarterly, II (December, 1949), 438.

therefore, used graduates—mainly clerics—of the Institute
de Cultura Religiosa Superior and an institute run by the
Benedictines in Belgrano. Meanwhile Directors Sepich, and
later Moure, pressured the bishops to begin training courses
in the dioceses for future lay and clerical religion and
morality teachers. Teachers were certified to teach these
classes in secondary schools only if they passed an examina-
tion, written and oral, made up and administered by the

individual bishop of the diocese. The training courses

consisted of three years of dogma, morality, sacred liter-
ature, church history, ascetic theology and mysticism, lit-
urgy, philosophy, and sociology. At the end of three years,

a teacher of morality or religion would be awarded a cer-

txficate recognized by a diocesan bishop.

On the primary level, the training and selecting of
teachers was handled in a different way. There, volunteers
were sought among the regular elementary teachers to teach
morality and religion. This was because the religion con-

Interview with Lopez Moure, Buenos Aires, August 9
1972.

Around 1949 a Corporacion de Profesores de Religion
y Moral was founded with an ecclesiastical advisor appointed
by the bishops. (Luis R. Capriotti, "Documentos : los cat6-
licos, el profesorado de religion y de moral y la ley 12.978,"
Criterio. XXII /June 9, 1949.7, 310.)

tent of the courses was simple enough to be handled by a
volunteer, and there were already so many teachers in the

primary schools that additional ones to teach religion and

30
morality would have added excessively to the numbers.

However, the church did act to ensure that its religious
doctrines were taught by lay teachers. Priests or inspec-
tors who were priests were sent to the schools twice a week

31
to give one-half hour training courses to the volunteers.

Texts and curricula . — In 1944 the only books avail-
able as textbooks for enseRanza religiosa were catechisms.
Pages were mimeographed from these catechisms and distribut-
ed along with religious pamphlets to the classes. By 1948,

however, there was a published series of books for indivi-

dual grades that followed the church-approved curricula.

A decree of November 28, 1944, issued by the Con-

sejo Superior de Ministros with the collaboration of the
Directorate General of Religious Education stated: "EnsenarSn
Religion los mismos maestros en sus respectivos grados ; si
algun maestro no se creyere capacitado hacerlo . . , sera
reemplazado en esta signatura por la Direcci6n General de
acuerdo con las Autoridades del Consejo Nacional de Edu-
cacion." (Quoted in Gustavo J. Franceschi, "El problema
de la ensenanza religiosa," Criterio, XVIII _(^uly 26, 19457*
81.)

Interview with L6pez Moure, Buenos Aires, August

9, 1972.

Ense?^anza religiosa; programas aprobados por el

poder ejecutivo de la Naci6n (Rosario: Editorial "Apis,"
1948), p. 2.

Under the first Director General experienced teach-
ers of catechism drew up the curriculum for the first two
years of primary school and secondary school. The lack of
money and teachers of religion initially impeded religion
from being offered in the other grades. Tvv^o years of moral-
ity or religion had to be passed by secondary students in
order to graduate. Later on, the curriculum for religion

and morality was drawn up for all grades. These curricula,

33
too, were submitted to the episcopacy for their approval.

For the primary grades, ensenanza religiosa consist-
ed of Doctrine (faith and law) and Sacred History (Old and
New Testament) . On the secondary level — national colegios,
liceos, escuelas normales, comerciales, ^ industriales —
ensenanza religiosa was more specialized. In general.
Faith was offered the first year of secondary school. Law
the second year. Sources of Grace the third. History of
the Old and New Testament the fourth, and Social Doctrine
of the Church the fifth year. But these course varied
somewhat according to the type of school: normal schools
offered a course on the Teaching Profession of the Church
in the fifth year; professional and technical schools taught

Interview with Lopez Moure, Buenos Aires, August
9, 1972.

History of the Old and New Testaments in the third and fourth

years in lieu of Sources of Grace and Social Doctrine of the

, 34
Church.

The texts and programs used to teach religious ed-
ucation were similar to the ones used for religion classes
in the church schools. Dr. Lopez Moure explained the small
difference between religion texts used in the public and
private Catholic schools in a 1945 circular:

Que la unica diferencia que poseen con -los pro-
gramas oficiales es que los mismos temas se tra-
tan con mayor amplitud, consecuencia logica <3e --
ser institutes de formaci6n integral religiosa.

If parents asked that their children be excused from
classes of ensenanza religiosa. their children would be en-
rolled in the alternative course of morality. But a con-
tent analysis of the texts used for morality reveals that
they hardly differed from those used for enseflanza religi-
osa . The morality texts taught the Roman Catholic view-
point of man, God, society, family, and civil authority.
They taught that the only true, legitimate, and valid mar-
riage between Christians was between baptized persons

Ensenanza religiosa, pp. 5-6, 22-48.

"Circular No. 32," Buenos Aires, November 7, 1945,

quoted in Criterio, XVIII (November 22, 1945), 501.

married with the sacraments of the church. Adultery, free

love, and prostitution were denounced. Hobbes* and Rous-
seau's theories of civil society were denigrated as false;

St. Thomas of Aquinas' views were presented as good. Lib-

37
eralism was denounced as an erroneous doctrine. Humility

was a virtue achieved by submitting to the will of God.

Remedies for pride were the recognition of God as the Sumo

Bien and Suma Bondad, and the recognition of reality as

38
God, neighbor, and society.

These morality textbooks would also have had to con-
tain nothing contrary to Catholic teaching because they
were subject to the approval of the Argentine episcopacy, •
just as were the texts of religion.
Critiques of the Administration of EnsefTanza Religiosa

The hierarchy's role in making up curriculum and ap-
proving teachers and textbooks meant that any shortcomings
or violations of the decree of religious education could

Miguel Angel Etcheverrigaray and Alberto Franco,

Moral, libro IV para 4° ano de la ensenanza media (Buenos

Aires: Ediciones Itinerarium, 1951), pp. 129-34.

•^"^Ibid., pp. 170-78, 205.

Etcheverrigaray and Franco, Moral, libro II para

2 ano de la enseT^anza secundaria (1949), pp. 143-44.

be attributed to the church as well as to the government.
When criticism was leveled at the disruption of regular
classes by the addition of religion and morality courses,
the church was not directly criticized. But, however o-
blique the criticism, church spokesmen and groups took it

upon themselves to answer the charges, since the church was

39
responsible for these classes. The government itself al-
so disciplined those who were critics or potential critics
of religious education courses in the public schools. Dr.
Manuel Villada Achaval suspended the rector E. F. Rondanina

of the Colegio Nacional de Buenos Aires for writing an arti-

.. 40

cle that criticized ensenanza religiosa. The church was

purportedly in on the arbitrary dismissal of public school

41
rectors and teachers, including a large number of Jews.

Father Franceschi did not wholly deny this charge but

claimed that members of the clergy intervened to save many

in 1944-45.'*^

"Comentarios : diligencia por una parte y caballer-

osidad for otra, " Criterio, XXIII (February 25, 1950), 113.

Osvaldo Francella, "Comentarios: el Profesor Ron-
danina," Criterio, XVII (April 27, 1944), 393.

'^^George P. Doherty, "The Cross and the Sword: A
Catholic View of Argentine Nationalism," Harper ' s Magazine ,
CXC (June, 1945), 110.

Gustavo J. Franceschi, "La posicion catolica en la
Argentina," p. 138.

Clerical teachers of religion were found ill-pre-
pared and inept by their critics. Priests in the second-
ary schools teaching religion, a Protestant American liv-
ing in Buenos Aires charged, were improvising as teachers,

unable to handle increasingly dissatisfied students with

43
inconvenient questions. A Peronist priest claimed post-
1954 that the hierarchy violated the intent of the decree

by nominating priests instead of laymen for secondary teach-

44
ers of religion.

The religious education program was also scored by
the United States Cultural Attache in a private letter for
teaching ideas of an authoritarian nature. Religion and
morality classes taught that civil authority came from di-
vine authority and thus, implicitly, that political obedi-

45
ence was required by God. Along this same line, the

General Directorate of Religious Instruction asked that in

classes of ensenanza reliqiosa the teachers explain to the

George P. Howard, "Clericalism in Argentina's Cri-
sis," The Christian Century, LXII (October 17, 1945), 1184-85,

44 ' *

Pedro Badanelli, Peron, la iglesia y un cura

(Buenos Aires: Editorial Tartessos, 1960), p. 77.

Letter from Cultural Relations Attache Keniston

to the Secretary of State, Buenos Aires, June 9, 1944.

National Archives file no. 842.6/15018.

students that:

el fundamento solidlsimo de la autoridad de
los propios padres, es la representacion de la
autoridad divina, representacion que se exti-
ende, tambien, al maestro, y se agranda en la
autoridad civil, necesaria para el ordenamiento
de la vida de relacion sobre la tierra, y que
culmina en la autoridad eclesiastica, como
orientadora de la vida del hombre hacia su
destine supremo y definitive .

Thus, church and state were acting in concert to instill
concepts about the sacredness of the church-state relation
and their institutional infallibility.

Critics charged that the church wanted all classroom
textbooks, instruction, and teachers to conform to its reli-
gious teachings. This accusation could not be denied by

47
the church since this is what it indeed wanted. Critics

pointed to a 1945 circular signed by Father Alberto Escobar,

Inspector General de Ensenanza Religiosa, as proof for their

charges. In this circular, he told schools to apply Roman

Catholicism to the teaching of all subjects: for example,

history should consider Christ as the center of world his-

"Circular," June 3, 1944, Boletln del Ministerio

de Justicia e Instruccion Publica, VII, no. 52 (June, 1944),

853.

Octavio Nicolas Derisi, "El fin ultimo y los fines

inmediatos de la educacion catolica," Criterio, XIX (Decem-
ber 19, 1946) , 583.

tory; in writing class, students should copy "yo_ amo a_
Dies" or "cruiero ser buen cristiano." A "unified" school
was the goal: "En la_ escuela unitaria, el maestro puede
ensenar reliqi6n nuntamente con las demSs materias."

This circular went on to recommend that religion
classes begin with prayer and the sign of the cross and

that trips be taken to temples and sanctuaries to explain

49
Roman Catholic dogma and symbols, gxvmg rise to more

charges that the intent of the decree of 1943 was being vi-
olated. The point is perhaps arguable, but Colonel Enrique
Gonzalez later agreed that religion classes were not meant
to be religious services but theoretical and historical in
their treatment of religion.

Detractors pointed out the intolerance built into
the religion and morality classes. First of all, the text-
books were biased against other religions and civil laws.
One such text. La reliqi6n explicada by Ardizzone, scorned
Protestantism as sustaining "principos que conducen a_ la_

Critics of this circular were Deputy Alberto Candi-

oti, DSCD 1946, X, p. 693; 'and Campobassi, Atacrae y defensa

del laicismo escolar, pp. 48-49.

"^^DSCD 1946, X, p. -693.

Interview with Col. Enrique Gonzalez, Buenos Aires,
April 10, 1972.

xmmoralidad ^ al crimen. " The Manual de instrucci6n re-

liqiosa, a text provided by the CNE, attacked civil mar-
riage and the lay school, although both had been sanctioned

52
by national laws. Secondly, pressure was put on students

not to opt for the morality classes, even though they hard-
ly differed from the religion classes. Students who left
the classroom to attend them were often jeered by their
classmates and called "Jews";^ parents had to take the ini-
tiative in requesting that their children not be enrolled
in religion but in morality classes and often would not

bother or be too intimidated to go to the school authorities

54
with this request? and students graduating from secondary

school faced difficulties, it was charged, if they had

55
taken morality instead of religion.

Church spokesmen countered almost all of the above

charges by insisting that morality was an accepted alterna-

DSCD 1946, X, pp. 696-97.

Deputy Cipriano Reyes, DSCD 1946, X, p. 776,

Interviews with former students of morality.

Buenos Aires, 1972.
54

Deputy Absalon Rojas, DSCD 1946, X, p. 705.

Ibid.

tive to religion; therefore, the program was tolerant and
optional. The church denied that its priests were inept
and constantly maintained that it had the divine mission
to teach its doctrine in the public schools. But the ad-
ministrators of the ensenanza religiosa program did lessen
the obstacles to parents who wished to withdraw their chil-
dren from religion classes. A ruling in 1944 allowed par-
ents of elementary schoolchildren to excuse them from reli-
gion if they appeared in person before the district school
council and signed a special register to that effect; in
1945 parents had only to send a letter. By 1945, secondary

students could excuse themselves from religion on their

.... 56

own initiative.

In general, the church sought to answer its critics
by pointing to the enrollment figures for religion classes.
From 1943 to 1955, 91.1% of registered students studied re-
ligion instead of morality, meaning that a little less than

57
9% opted for morality. To church spokesmen this was

proof that Argentines wanted their children to study re-
ligion and that Ley 1420 had not reflected the wishes of

Franceschi, "La posicion cat6lica en la Argen-
tina," p. 137.

Furlong, La tradicion religiosa en la escuela
argentina, p. 126.

58
the people. (To many critics, this was proof that the

church was part of the coercive apparatus of the dictato-
rial state.)

The Catholic nationalists who seized power in June
of 1943 had indeed carried out their promises to purify the
teaching profession and bring Catholic values into the
schools. The church had worked closely with them to assure
that it doctrines would be properly taught on all school
levels and that morality would not deviate too much from
the Catholic catechism. Thus, every Argentine school pupil
was now exposed to Catholic religious teaching, unless en-
rolled in a Protestant or Jewish school.

Ibid. 7 and Casiello, La iglesia y el estado en

Argentina, p. 340.

CHAPTER FOUR

THE ALLIANCE BETWEEN PERON AND THE CHURCH:
1943-54: PART I

Government Religious Policy
The government that came to power in 1943 sincerely
desired to revamp and strengthen the state's bureaucratic
structure, cope with difficulties caused by World War II,
and promote the diversification of the national product.
But the most lasting work of this military government was
in the social order, due to Juan Peron, who became head of
the Secretarla de Trabajo y Prevision Social in 1943. Colo-
nel Peron secured the future of two million workers by giv-
ing them retirement benefits from the state; he also set up
special courts for workers' disputes which revolutionized
labor-management relations; and he obtained a decree on

professional associations which institutionalized the labor

union movement m Argentina.

Besides using the carrot to carry out its goals the
government also used the stick. Labor union leaders who

Felix Luna, El 45 (Buenos Aires: Editorial Sud-
americana, 1973), pp. 31-32.

did not cooperate with Peron, especially the Communist ones,

2
were removed from their posts and imprisoned. University

professors who signed a democratic manifesto in October of
1943 were removed from their jobs; over 300 teachers were
dropped from the schools; the public administration was
purged; radio waves were systematically used for govern-
mental propaganda for the first time in Argentine history;
political parties were suppressed and many of their lead-
ers went into exile; the press was censored; and the gov-
ernment supported the Axis powers until the United States

threatened economic sanctions and Allied victory appeared

^ . 3
certain.

This government also garnered the support of the

Catholic church. Besides decreeing ensenanza reliqiosa

and appointing militant Catholic^ to education posts, the

government took other steps to promote the church, mainly

by obstructing its supposed competitors, the Protestants

or Evangel icos. In 1945 the government softened the harsh-

Robert J. Alexander, "Argentine Labor Before Peron

and Under Peron, " in Why Peron Came to Power, ed. Joseph
R. Barager (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1968), p. 189.

^Luna, El 45, pp. 37-38.

ness of some of its measures in religious as well as educa-
tional and political aspects of Argentine life, only to re-
impose them with greater severity after Peron was elected
President in 1946.

Protestants, Jews, Spiritists, and other non-Cath-
olics comprised a population of more than one million ac-
cording to the 1947 census: 310,633 were Protestants, ^
249,326 were Jews, 239,949 were "without religion," 114,589
had no declared religion, 66,217 were Greek, Russian, Syr-
ian and Armenian Orthodox, 18,764 were Muslim, and 2,129

4
were of other Christian faiths. The governmental restrict

tions applied to them after the June 1943 revolution were

the result of church propaganda and politicking against

the non-Catholics, of whom the Protestants were the chief

target. They were applied because the government agreed

with the church's pretensions and/or for political reasons;

5
and behind this pro-clerical military government was Peron.

As was discussed in Chapter Three, discrimination

against non-Catholics began when ensenanza reliqiosa was

imposed on the national schools. It was soon extended to

Santiago Canclini, Los evanqelicos en el tiempo de

Peron (Buenos Aires: Editorial Mundo Hispano, 1972), p. 182
Ibid., p. 68,

the provincial schools, and even to private schools by means

of circulars from the Directorate General of Religion and

Morality. The Jesuit Sepich, as head of the Directorate,

sent "Circular No. 8" on March 18, 1944 to the Institute

Evang^lico Americano instructing the school that:

... en principle debe anotarse en la clase
de religi5n a todos los alumnos de su estable-
cimiento.

Thus, Catholic heads of governmental agencies even tried
to spread Catholic catechism to Protestant schools. This
circular was successfully resisted by the Protestant schools,
and the new Director General L5pez Moure eased up on them.
This collaboration of state and church was evident
in further restrictions on non-Catholics attempting to lim-
it their proselytizing, which was largely a Protestant en-
deavor, A pastoral of the bishops warned in January 1944
that:

El derecho que tienen los protestantes y disi-
dentes a que se les respete en el ejercicio de
su culto y a que no se les persiga, no les da
derecho a hacer proselitismo entre los cat6licos.

In February 1944 a bishop from C5rdoba blasted Protestant

^Ibid. , p. 283.

7
"Carta Pastoral del Episcopado Argentine," January

25, 1945, quoted in Canclini, p. 37.

influence in Argentina, especially among the poor, and

g
called upon the government to stop it. Soon thereafter,

the police forbade certain meetings of Protestant groups

in towns in Cordoba, only to have these decisions reversed

by the federal interventor when the national press decried

this abridgement of religious liberty.

Other restrictions soon followed: as of February 18,
1945, all Protestant radio broadcasts were suspended. They
were allowed before the presidential election of 1946, only
to be suspended again from May 1949 to Peron's fall in 1955.
In 1944 the military government set up military Zonas de
Seguridad in Formosa, Chaco, Misiones, Entre Rios, Corri-
entes, Patagonia, C6rdoba, and Buenos Aires provinces in
the parts where Indians resided. As early as 1946 the gov-
ernment made it difficult for Protestant missions to acquire
land in the Chaco, and by 1951 it became clear that the Prot-
estant churches and missions would be forbidden to acquire

property, move, or build in these zones. Decree 15.498

8
Mons. Buteler, "Los pastores protestantes f rente a

la Constitucion Nacional, "' El Pueblo, February 11, 1945,

quoted in Canclini, pp. 42-43.

9
Canclini, pp. 44-45.

Canclini, pp. 85, 314-15.

^llbid. , pp. 138-45.

of August 1953, forbade any religion except Catholicism to
convert the Indians in these zones, and a Comision Inter-
ministerial was set up to administer it. Protestant pro-
tests, plus the ensuing falling out between Peron and the

church, vitiated the enforcement of this decree, yet it was

12
not abrogated until June 1957. Another decree that proved

baneful . . to non-Catholics was one of 1946 that created a
Register of non-Catholic sects and demanded they submit in-
formation as to the date their organizations appeared in
Argentina, the creed professed, the names of their author-
ities, plus their nationality, their extraconfessional activ-
ities, the location of their temples, the nvimber of their
members, and the zones where they met. This decree was
protested by every non-Catholic group in Argentina, and the
Senate refused to approve^ it, but after two years of res-
pite, it was revived in October 1948, substituting the term
"Fichero" for "Registro" ; this was done while the Congress
was in recess so that non-Catholics could not appeal to
Congressmen to vote down the decree. Several Protestant
Slavic churches were closed down under the pretext that
they had not filed this data, and other churches were fined
for holding meetings on the ground that all religious meet-

■^^Canclini, pp. 169-70,

ings had to be registered with the local police. It was

13
not until 1958 that this decree was modified.

While non-Catholics were facing harassment from
Peronist government officials, the Catholic church was re-
ceiving increasing support as the official religion sus-
tained by the state. Before Peron came to power, the bish-
ops each received 500 pesos yearly from the state; Perfin
upped this support to 5,000 pesos per year. The church
also received state aid for its social work. A 1947 stat-
ute, that will be discussed in Chapter Five, subsidized
salaries of the teachers in private schools. Peron' s gov-
ernment also built seminaries for the church, lowered the.

cost of electricity for its secondary schools, and helped

15
the church financially m many other ways.

Religious Education Becomes Law
Presidential Election of 1946

The government's support of catechism in the public
schools was of crucial concern to the bishops. On January

^■^Canclini, pp. 183-206, 208-13, 241-42, 246, 251.

Esteben Peicovich, Hola, Peron (Buenos Aires:
Jorge Alvarez, 1965), pp. 38-39,

Pedro Badanelli, p. 31.

10, 1944, the Junta Central de la Acci5n Catolica, official-
ly representing all Roman Catholicism as the apostolic arm
of the bishops, sent a note to the President of Argentina:

V. E. y su gobierno merecen bien de la Patria
por la clarividencia y decision con que han
sabido restituir a la ninez argentina su
autentico patrimonio, devolviendo a Cristo -.^
a nuestra escuela y nuestra escuela a Cristo.

The then-power behind the throne, Juan Peron, soon

emerged as a candidate for the presidency in the elections

of 1946. Peron and his coalition of political parties were

actively supported by individual priests on the grass roots

17
level. And in the midst of the 1945-46 election campaign

the cardinal and bishops issued a pastoral stating that no

Roman Catholic could affiliate with parties or vote for

candidates supporting the following programs:

1) the separation of church and state;

2) the abolition of legal dispositions between
church and state recognizing specifically
the rights of religion and particularly
the religious oath as provided for office-
holders;

3) "el^ laicismo escolar" (meaning a repeal of
the existent decree providing for compulsory
religious education in the schools) ; and

1 6

Boletin de la ACA, XIV, no. 261 (1944), quoted

in Casiello, p. 337.
17

Shuck, "Church and State in Argentina," p. 539.

18
4) the legalization of divorce.

The pastoral further demanded from Catholics a support of

"unity" and "social justice," favorite phrases of the

19
Peronists. An Argentine Catholic who heeded the above

pastoral could not vote for the Democratic Union, Radical

Party, Socialist Party nor Communist Party because all had

platforms in favor of one or more of the above programs.

Peron himself recognized the church's support when

he wrote in exile:

Mi movimiento a diferencia de otros era ideol5-
gicamente cristiano, tanto lo era que por diez
anos consecutivos el clero argentine desde su
mas alta jerarquia al mas humilde cura de
campana, apoyo al peronismo, tanto en sus
campanas electorales como en su gestion parti-
dista normal en el gobierno.

But this support was given after some hesitation.
The bishops were mainly from the upper class or tied to the
upper class, and the upper class was mainly against Peron
and had attracted Monsignor Miguel de Andrea to head Cath-
olic opposition to Peron and support the Democratic Union.
Until 1945 Cardinal Copello resented Peron and had a per-

"Pastoral Colectiva del Episcopado Argentine Acerca

de los Deberes de los Catolicos en el Momento Actual," p. 497,

Shuck, p. 539.

Juan D. Peron, Del poder al exilio (Panama, 1958),

quoted in Canclini, p. 66.

sonality conflict with him because he thought Peron ex-
pressed a Nietzschean morality in a 1925 pamphlet Moral
militar written for the Manual del aspirante. Copello for-
got these differences when he and some bishops informally
visited Per6n the beginning of November, right before they

wrote the pastoral on the election, according to Dr. Arturo

Enrique Sampay, who made the negotiations for this visit.

These differences were forgotten when Per6n presented him-
self as a candidate who had kept the masses from becoming
Communists, had taken part in the government which had es-
tablished religious education in the schools, and repeat-
edly had declared himself a fervent believer — Peron public-
ly made acts of faith in different Catholic sanctuaries

and declared Nuestra Senora de la Mercedes the patron of

the Army.

There were two bishops in particular who advocated
that the church should collaborate with PercSn, Monsignor
Nicolas de Carlo of Reistencia in the Chaco and Monsignor
Antonio Caggiano of Rosario in the Province of Santa Fe,
later made a cardinal in 1945, They were soon joined by

Luna, El 45, pp. 48, 64.

^^Ibid., pp. 48, 409, 453.

the Archbishop of Salta, Monsignor Roberto Tavalla. Mon-
signor Caggiano viewed Per6n as an opportunity for the church
to achieve what it wanted and is purported to have said
"esta es nuestra oportunidad, no debemos perder el tren."

There is a widespread belief that Peron promised the
hierarchy that he would support the decree for enseT^anza

reliqiosa if he were elected president in exchange for the

25
church's support of him in the elections. Such an agree-
ment between the church and Peron would have been oral, but
Peron did commit himself in writing to two Catholic nation-
alists who seem to have sought his promise on their own in-
itiative. The Jesuit Leonardo Castellani and the editor of
the nationalist Catholic newspaper Tribuna went to see Per6n
on February 18, 1946, to solicit a promise from him on the
decree; he promised in a five paragraph statement that he
would ratify the decree if elected, and even expand ense-
nanza reliqiosa ("acrecentarla" ) , which hinted at making

Statement of the ex-Jesuit Leonardo Castellani to

Gambini, cited in Hugo Cambini, El peronismo y la iglesia
(Buenos Aires: Centre Editor de America Latina, 1971), p. 15,
Castellani was a Jesuit and member of the rightist group,
Alianza Libertadora Nacionalista (ALN) , known as the alian-
cistas, which used strongarm tactics in the street and dis-
rupted Protestant and anti-Peronist meetings while shout-
ing "Cristo Rey." (Canclini, p. 278.)

Gambini, p. 15.

See,, e.g., Canclini, p. 265.

the decree a law since all decrees would be subjected to

congressional purview.

But the strongest disagreement with the argument of
benevolent neutrality on the part of the church toward Peron
is found in the opposition's reactions to the pastoral and
their contention that the church did favor Peron,
Opposition to Religious Education in the Public Schools

The decree of ensenanza religiosa had been seen from
the outset as a cruel blow by the Protestants, and especial-
ly the Baptists and Methodists who strongly advocated the
separation of church and state. The Baptist leader Santiago
Canclini and the Methodist pastor Julio M. Sabenes became
leaders in the fight to abrogate the decree for religious
education. In a speech delivered on May 25, 1944, Canclini

Castellani and Duranona published Peron' s vow the

next day on the first page of the Tribuna, and Castellani

was fired shortly thereafter from his job as teacher of

catechism in the Normal School of Salta by the Archbishop

of Salta. Evidently, the bishops wanted to keep quiet their

compromise with Per5n and/or to appear neutral. (Gambini,

p. 15.)

This declaration of Per6n was circulated extensively
right before the elections, probably by his opponents as
well as his proponents. The key paragraph stated: "He jur-
ado escuchar y satisfacer los anhelos del pueblo argentine
que por mayoria abrumadora quiere para sus hijos la ense-
flanza religiosa, he de mantenerla y acrecentarla con el mayor
empeno ya que responde a una intensa conviccion de mi espi-
ritu." (Tribuna, Rosario, February 19, 1946, p. 1, quoted
in full in Canclini, p. 281.)

averred that the lay school as provided by Ley 1420 assured
freedom of conscience and free inquiry, warded off atheist

and religious fanaticism, and was in accord with the spirit

of the Constitution. The Baptist newspaper El Expositor

Bautista published detailed instructions to parents on how
to withdraw their children from classes of ensenanza religd-
6sa-.-. They were to show a Christian attitude, but write

courteous letters to school officials asking their children

^ ^ 28

to be excused.

The Protestants — Baptists, Methodists, "Free Brothers,"
Union Evangelica, Christian and Missionary Alliance, Luther-
ans, Waldensians, Mennonites — were joined by the Jews in a

petition calling for an end to religious education. The

Delegacion de Asociaciones Israelitas Argentinas (DAIA)

was the chief authoritative body for Jewish organizations.

Speech given on May 25, 1944 in -the Baptist Church

of the Center of Buenos Aires. Printed and issued in pamph-
let form as Por que los cristianos evang^licos defendemos
la escuela laica/Canclini . p. 282.)

El Expositor Bautista. XXXVTI, no. 8., August, 1944,

pp. 267-69, quoted in Justice C. Anderson, Church-State Prob-
lems Among Baptists in Argentina in the Light of the Historic
Baptist Perspective (dissertation presented to the South-
western Baptist Theological Seminary, Fort Worth, Texas, 1965,
PP-. 57-58.)

DAIA. must be distinguished from the Organizacion
de Asociaciones Israelitas (OIA) which was practically a po-

institutions, and congregations, and conducted Jewish ne-
gotiations with the state; it always supported the Protes-

tants on xssues of religious liberty.

Lay groups that supported the lay school were main-
ly teachers* associations and a group founded by Socialists,
Asociaci6n Pro Defensa de la Escuela Laica. -A group of
distinguished educators founded the Asociacion CampaKa Pro
Defensa de la Ley 1420 in 1945. The Federacion de Maestros
de la Provincia de Buenos Aires and the Asociacion de Maes-
tros de Santa Fe, in Argentina's two most populous provinces,

went on record as opposed to religious education and in

favor of the lay school.

Religious education was also opposed by the news-
paper La_ Prensa, the leading spokesman for the liberal wing

of traditional upper class Argentina. La Vanguardia,

the newspaper of the Socialist Party, deplored the decree
for religious education. Socialists were joined by Radicals

litical branch of the Peronist Party and was created and in-
augurated by Peron in 1948. It did not represent the Argen-
tine Jewish community as it claimed. (Canclini, Los evangel-
icos en el tiempo de Peron, p. 302.)

Canclini, p. 111.

^•'•Ibid., pp. 264, 266, 276, 279.

Ibid., p. 267.

100

and Progressive Democrats and Communists in support of the

33
lay school.

On February 24, 1946, Peron was elected president

of Argentina by 55% of the males who voted: the Democratic

Union received 45% of the more than three and one-half

mxllion votes cast. Peron immediately submitted all the

decrees promulgated by the military government since 1943
to the newly elected Congress for ratification as laws.
The Senate approved them all, but the Chamber of Deputies
separated out from this lump package three decrees, one of
them the decree for enseRanza religiosa, to be considered
separately. Peron kept his promise to the Catholic church
and gave it his full backing, meaning that the Peronists
who controlled Congress because of their majority would

back it, but it was not taken up by the Chamber of Deputies

35
until March 1947.

The opponents of religious education saw hope in

Nobody expected the Communists, Socialists, and

Progressive Democrats to give up being in favor of divorce

and lay education because of the 1945 pastoral. (Luna, El_

45, p. 409.)

Ibid., pp. 459-69.

Canclini, p. 281.

101

this delay for re-establishing the lay school in accord
with Ley 1420. In August 1946, Canclini wrote and publish-
ed a book entitled Sarmiento: defensor de la escuela laica
(Buenos Aires: Junta Bautista de Publicaciones, 1946) and
sold it on the streets. Several vendors were beaten up by

aliancistas of the ALN. Copies of this book were sent to

members of Congress and to government officials. On Sep-
tember 24, 1946, a rally was held, featuring speakers from
several evangelical denominations: out of this rally came
a petition which solicited the derogation of the decree
for ensenanza religiosa. It was sent to the President of

the Committee on Public Instruction of the Chamber of Dep-

37 . ., -

uties. In December 1946, the Asociacion Campana Pro

Defensa de la Ley 1420 held a Congress of Lay Education

which was attended by educators and others opposed to re-

38
ligious education.

While the opposition to religious education in the

public schools was building up support for its point of

view, the Chamber of Deputies was preparing to debate the

Anderson, p. 150.

^^Canclini, pp. 276, 281-82.

Ibid., pp. 279-80.

102

issue, The Protestants had sent their September petition
to the committee preparing to report on the bill, and
had also sent to each deputy a copy of Canclini's pamphlet

Por cue los cristianos evangelicos defendemos la escuela

39
laica.

Catholic Action. — Simultaneously Accifin Catolica Ar-
gentina mounted a campaign to assure the ratification of
the decree. Along with denunciations of Sarmiento and Ley
1420, it denounced the Juntas pro Ensenanza Laica for attack-
ing the religion of the majority. It argued that all other
subjects were taught in schools, so religion should be in-
cluded. On March 5, 1947, ACA and other Catholic groups
organized a march up the Avenida de Mayo from the Cathedral
on the Plaza de Mayo to the national Congress building.
They went inside and met with the deputies to advocate the
passage of the bill for ensenanza religiosa and to pre-
sent the following plea to the Chamber:

Este decreto exige que las escuelas a las cuales
acuden los catolicos sean catolicas, no solo
porque la ensenanza religiosa tenga su sitial
decoroso entre las asignaturas de estudio, sino
tambien porque el conjunto de estas, asi como
los maestros, reglamentos y textos, estSn im-

Ibid., p. 282,

Campobassi, Ataque y defensa, p, 57,

103

pregnados de espiritu religiosa.

The Deputies Debate, March 1947

42
One hundred and two Peronist deputies confronted

forty-four Radicals in the Chamber of Deputies during the

debate on the decree-law; there were also two deputies each

from the Independent Laborite, National Democrat, and Labor-

43
ite parties, and one Progressive Democrat.

The Peronist deputies argued that Argentina had a
Roman Catholic tradition. Deputy Alvarez Vocos of Cordoba
stated that the Argentine people must return to their Chris-
tian traditions and oppose foreign ideas, and let spiritual

44
values shape Argentine youth as they did before. Deputy

Cesar Joaquin Guillot of the Federal Capital reminded all

that enaefianza religiosa had always existed in Argentina

in provincial schools and that other advanced countries

such as France permitted religious education to be taught

Speech by Deputy Santander, DSCD 1946, X, p. 867.

There was no Peronist Party until after the 1946

election, formed from the Laborites, Intransigent Radicals,
and Independent Laborites. (Luna, El 45, p. 509.)

Peter G. Snow, Argentine Radicalism: The History
and Decline of the Radical Civic Union (Iowa City: Uni-
versity of Iowa Press, 1965), p. 112.

^"^DSCD 1946, X, p. 826.

104

during school hours. Deputy Montiel of the Province of

Buenos Aires said the constitutional requirement to convert
the Indians to Roman Catholicism meant that enseflanza re-
liqiosa was obligatory, and, furthermore, the president
and vice-president were required by the constitution to be

Catholics. Thus, the citizenry must be educated to fill

46
the highest offices of the land. Deputy Colam of the

Federal Capital stated that "we" (Peronists) are going to

establish enseFianza religiosa so that it is not taught in

47
early morning hours when the pupils are still sleepy.

The Peronists also counterattacked the opposition's
arguments by claiming that the decree had worked out well.
The Minister of Justice and Public Instruction Dr. Belisario
Cache Piran spoke on behalf of the decree. He refuted
the Radical charge that religious education was "anti -ped-
agogical" by observing that graduates of religious schools
do well in Argentine life, that religious schools are re-
spected and that few countries prohibit them. He repeated
the old adage that ensenanza religiosa would not be oblig-

^Ibid. , pp. 849-50.

Ibid., p. 602.

^^Ibid. , p. 718.

105

atory for non-Catholic children. He denied abuses: students
studying morality were not excluded from examinations given
in Normal School no. 4, all textbooks would not be revised
to reflect the Roman Catholic viewpoint, and the decree had
been applied with tolerance since Russian Orthodox priests
had been granted permission to teach their religion in school

no. 19 in Misiones and in school no, 179 in the Chaco as of

November 1945. Deputy Valdez of TucumSn cited statistics

to show that teachers were happy to teach ensenanza reliqiosa.

Only 1.85% of the teachers in the federal capital and .99%

49
m the provinces had asked to be exempted.

The Opponents. — The Radicals accused the majority

bloc of Peronist deputies of being indecisive about this

decree and of only going along with it because Peron had

made a political commitment to the church. Deputy MacKay

warned that the Catholicization of the masses by official
force and not by apostolic force might create a religious

fight that was non-existent and could explode as in Mexico

c . • 51
or Spain.

Ibid,, pp. 860, 865-66.

^^Ibid. , p, 791.

5Qlbid., p. 810.

Ibid . , pp. 760-61.

106

Deputy Sobral stressed that clericalism was neither
the Roman Catholic church nor the Roman Catholic religion.
Clericalism was militant politics seeking temporal power,
a converse religion taking advantage of the totalitarian
state in order to impose itself upon Argentina. He went
on to lament that the 1943 decree surrendered an essential
part of state education to a private entity — the church:

the church could intervene in the selection of teachers of

52
religion. Deputy Emilio Ravignani insisted, on the other

hand, that the state was using the church rather than the
other way around, in order to establish a totalitarian state
on the Spanish pattern. He warned that the church would
lose its independence as well as the respect of many Argen-
tines and should not convert itself into a political instru-
ment to prop up strongman regimes. He argued that, when

both church and state seek absolute power, they will con-

53
front each other and that the church always loses.

A further argument reflected on the merits of Ley

1420, which had proven a good law and was part of Argentine

tradition. The Radical minority on the committee to report

Ibid., pp. 607, 611-12.

^ Ibid . , pp. 628, 637-38, 645.

107

out the bill had voted to table it because they upheld la-
icism. The Union Clvica Radical (UCR) looked upon the Ar-
gentine people as forming a lay political community and it,
therefore, favored laicism in education. The Radicals were
not against any religion but thought that a religious con-
science developed best in a spiritual climate of laicism.
From the vantage point of philosophy and pedagogy laicism
was wise: a democratic state saw education as preparation
for individual responsibility; therefore, education should
be independent of spiritual authorities who seek intellec-
tual domination. Laicism permitted the development of a

54
common conscience, and the democratic school was tolerant.

Deputy Candioti concluded that the Argentine tradition was

55
being perverted by this decree-law.

Several speakers chided the clergy for never having
really taken advantage of opportunities for religious ed-
ucation provided by previous law. One sarcastically asked
if the hours of the former law were inadequate for the child
or priest, and if the priests had stopped giving lessons .
under Ley 1420 because they were gratuitous or because they

^"^Ibid., pp. 604-06, 608.
^^Ibid., p. 691.

108

wanted to create a climate adverse to the law?" Dellepiane
thought that the priests had stopped teaching religious ed-
ucation because they wanted to be able to say that the lay

^ , , . . 57
school was atheistic. Deputy N. Rojas speculated that

the church was worried that increased immigration of non-
Catholics would result in their taking advantage of Law 1420
and teaching their religion in the public schools. He con-
cluded that the church must have another motive: it wanted

not only primacy but exclusivity in religious education.

Like the deputies above, Santander could not understand why
the church wanted to destroy Ley 1420; it did not interfere
with the annual subsidy given to the church by the state —

three hundred million pesos — nor did it keep the church

59
from founding more normal schools than the state.

The destruction of Ley 1420 meant to the Radicals
the violation of principles of freedom of religion and con-
science. Since June 4, 1943, Argentine Catholicism has been
in league with a military dictatorship. Deputy Candioti

56 . .

Speech by Deputy Candioti, ibid. , p. 638.

57__- .

D5CD'1946. X, .p. 638.

^^Ibid., p. 810
^^Ibid., pp. 590-92.

109

sarcastically observed that the church hierarchy was doing
nothing to stop the street demonstrations attended by priests
to agitate for ensefianza religiosa, and asked why they did

not stop them if, as had been suggested, the church had had

fin
nothing to do with the issuance of the decree? Deputies

A. Rojas, Sobral, MacKay, and Candioti gave examples of
the dictatorial application of the decree and its viola-
tions of conscience, ostracism of students studying moral-

61
ity. Catholic textbooks which upbraided civil laws, etc.

Deputy N, Rojas argued that Roman Catholicism was just one

ingredient in contemporary civilization, and that education

should be oriented to convey to students the whole thing, •

not just this one part. Spirituality is not Catholicism,

and religiosity existed before Catholicism,

The Socialists were not represented in the Chamber
of Deputies but made known their point of view through pub-
lic statements and their newspaper La Vanguardia. On the
eve of the Chamber's vote on the decree, the Executive
Committee of the Socialist Party held a rally in Plaza Once

fin

Candioti also observed that the clergy had entered

the schools accompanied by the sound of military boots.

(DSCD 1946, X, pp. 689-90.)

^■"■Ibid. , pp. 620, 695, 705, 866,
^^ibid. , pp. 807-08.

110

to speak against it and in favor of lay education and Ley

1420. The Party's head warned that the church was linking

itself to a corrupt dictatorship:

Tendremos catecismo en la escuela al mismo
tiempo que el maquiavelismo corrupter hace
su curso en el gobierno, en el Congreso, en
las legislaturas, en la administraci6n, en-
la polltica, en los sindicatos dirigidos.

Also, the Accion Laica Argentina organized a popular
demonstration in Plaza Once on March 5, 1947, to propagan-
dize for lay education. This group had been organized by

64
prominent Socialists in 1936 to defend Ley 1420.

Deputy Mario Mosset Iturraspe was the only represen-
tative of the Progressive Democratic Party in the Chamber of
Deputies. This Party had been ably led by Lisandro de la
Torre and was agrarian and reformist, with its strength
based in the Province of Santa F^, Deputy Mosset agreed
with the Radicals that all this hullabaloo was the result
of a corrupt, fraudulent and reactionary regime influenced
by reactionary European circles. He further agreed with
the Radicals that Ley 1420 had served Argentina well for
sixty-two years, and that the schools had been organized

Americo Ghioldi, "Acto del Partido Socialista en

favor de la enseiTanza laica, " La Prensa, March 15, 1947, p. 9.

Campobassi, Ataque y defensa, p. 57.

Ill

under it to be humane, pacific, tolerant, free, equal, and
without privileges and dogma. The state should be neutral
in religious matters, and the constitutional requirement
that the president be Roman Catholic did not mean that
fburteen million Argentines should be taught Roman Catholic
dogma,

Cipriano Reyes spoke for the Laborite Party; not on-
ly was he a national deputy, but he also headed the Meat
Packers Union and had been first. Vice-President of the
Laborite Party's Executive Committee during the election
when the Party supported Peron for president. He had been
crucial in rallying the workers to demonstrate for Peron' s
return in October 1945, when Per6n had been arrested and
jailed on the island of Martin Garcia. Thus, for Reyes

to speak out against a Peronist measure was a sign of in-

dependence from Peron within the labor movement. Deputy

DSCD 1946. X, pp. 685-86.

^^Luna, El 45, pp. 66, 334, 396, 451.

Reyes resisted the merger of the Laborite Party
with the Intransigent Radical Party and the Independent
Laborites to form the Partido Unico de la Revolucion Na-
cional, and later renamed Partido Peronista. He fought
Peron for two years, and was jailed in 1948 when his term
in Congress expired, only to be released when Peron was over-
thrown in 1955. (Robert J. Alexander, "Argentine Labor Be-
fore Peron and Under Peron," Why Peron Came to Power, pp.
191, 197.)

112

Candioti had already noted that no worker had taken part
in the noisy demonstration on behalf of the decree-law.^®

Reyes noted that Argentine organized labor had gen-
erally supported the lay school and respected all religions

. ^ . 69

m thexr public declarations. He pointed out that on

March 1, 1947, the official magazine of the Confederacion
General del Trabajo (CGT) , by then the privileged labor or-
ganization of Argentina, published an article on religious
education for its more than one million members, who were
mostly Peronists. The article maintained that workers op-
posed ensenanza religiosa as undemocratic because all re-
ligions had their rights. Labor unions had always fought
for freedom of conscience and lay schools. It concluded

that "Los trabajadores est5n en la_ obliqaci6n necesaria de

defender a_ sus ninos de una enseHanza dogmStica. "

Furthermore, Reyes continued, at the height of the

debates on religious education, the Union Sindical Argen-

^. 71

txna sent a note to him "in the name of 110 affiliated

^^DSCD 1946. X, p. 690.

"""ibid., pp. 770-76.

Ibid., p. 775.

Its most important affiliates were the Telephone

Workers' Federation and the Maritime Workers' Union. At

the time of the 1943 Revolution it was one of four central

113

syndicates." The Union Sindical Argentina opposed the im-
plantation of enseflanza reliqiosa in the schools: Ley
1420 was sound morally and pedagogically; the spiritual
formation of men in non-Roman Catholic nations was of a •
high quality; the teaching of religious education reflect-
ed a retarded concept of the social question which might

result in a bad influence on the next generation of Argen-

tine workers.

Reyes declared that the working class had always
viewed the Catholic Church as its enemy, and that laws to
better the material and moral well-being of all working-
men, i.e., social security and social justice for agricul-
tural workers, were more important than a law for religious

education. Even though he was a Peronist he would vote

against this bill for religious education in public schools.

The debate was declared over on March 14, and a vote

was taken on the decree for religious education: it was

74
approved by 86 votes in favor to 40 against. The Cham-

labor organizations, along with FORA and two rival CCT organ-
izations, one Socialist and one Communist-influenced. (Al-
exander, "Argentine Labor Before Peron and Under Peron, " p.
184.)

"^^DSCD 1946, X, pp. 775-76.

^■^Ibid. , pp. 770, 773.

'^'*Ibid. , p. 887.

114

ber then notified the Senate of its approval, and the Sen-
ate, which had previously approved it with little debate,
sent it to the Coitunittee on Constitutional Provisions which
reported it out favorably on April 17, 1947. It was ap-
proved again by the Senate on that very day. The Execu-
tive Power promulgated it by decree on April 29 as Law

75
12.978.

With the passage of the law for ensenanza reliqiosa
in 1947, Peron's government openly sealed its alliance with
the church. Thus was a bond created which made Cardinal
Copello hesitate to oppose Per6n. An historical analysis
of Peron's administration found religious education to ba-
the most important factor in church-state collaboration
during that time: - .. .

... la ensei^anza religiosa segula siendo ■ - :
el nudo donde se hablan cruzado los lazos ^^
de amis tad entre la Iglesia y el Gobierno. ...

^^Campobassi, p. 77. -_ - --

"Historia del peronismo: clero y gobierno,"
Primera Plana, V (November 1-7, 1966), 35.

CHAPTER FIVE

THE ALLIANCE BETWEEN PERON AND THE CHURCH:
1943-54: PART II

Gratitude of the Church

The archbishops and cardinals Copello and Caggiano

formally called on Peron to express their thanks one day

after the Senate approved the decree. Cardinal Copello

said:

Antes de la ultimas elecciones habiais prometido
a los electores esta ley, y una vez proclamado
primer magistrado de nuestra Patria, con una
constancia y dedicacion ejemplares, propici-
Ssteis esta ley hasta verla felizamenta sanciona-
da . por las Camaras.

Per&n answered Cardinal Copello 's words with an exposition
on the humanist and spiritual sense of his government, stat-
ing that it acted upon Christian social doctrine and af-

firmed justice, individual liberty, and Christian charity.

It is interesting to note that the church hierarchy thanked
Peron and not the senators and deputies for making the
decree a law.

"El episcopado y la ensenanza religiosa," Re vista
Eclesiastica de Buenos Aires, XLVII (May, 1947), 258.

^Ibid.

115

116

Even the Pope was grateful to Peron. Peron sent a
letter to the Pope in April 1947, which discussed his po-
litical, social, and economic reorganization of Argentina.
The Pope told Peron 's personal representative after read-
ing the letter how grateful he was to Peron for having end-
ed atheism and laicism in the schools. In 1947 Peron' s

wife Eva Duarte was personally invited to Rome by the Vat-

4
lean, and the Pope gave her a golden rosary.

In Argentina, Cardinal Copello went out of his way
on various occasions to appease Peron. After Agustin Luchia
Puig of the Assumptionist order had sermonized against Peron
and made criticisms of the government over Radio El Mundo,
Copello pressured his order to send him out of the country
in 1946. Puig had also been associated with the Catholic
weekly Estrada along with other dissident Catholics — his
brothers Felix and Luis Luchia Puig, Manuel Ordonez, Moises
Alvarez Lijo, Eduardo Saubidet Bilbao, Hector Gato, and
Manuel Rio. Copello sought to suppress this liberal week-
ly by prohibiting Catholics to read it "bajo pena de pecado
grave, " and by publishing in the bulletin of the Archbishop-

3
Ludovico Garcia de Loydi, La iqlesia frente al peron-

ismo (Buenos Aires: C.I.C., 1956), pp. 55-56.

4
Ibid.

117

ric the warning that "Ese semanario no cuenta con la dis-
pensa eclesiastica. " Copello also called upon the priest
of Liniers, Father Dumphy, in 1948, to convince him to
leave his parish and take a trip abroad. Copello took this
action after Peron had upbraided Copello and the bishops
for not keeping an eye on the clergy, ending with the threat,
"Tiene dos meses de plazo para eliminar al cura de Liniers,
que sique moles tando. * This conversation followed on the

heels of the alleged plot to assassinate the Perons for

whxch three chaplains had been among those arrested.

Father Jose Maria Dumphy refused to give up his post from

which he had criticized Peron and Copello had him ejected

8
from it in 1949 and defrocked.

At the same time, Copello looked favorably on those

priests who actively supported the Per6ns and presumably

gave his tacit approval to their activities. Father HernSn

Benitez became Peron 's personal ambassador to the Pope,

while Evita was angling for her Papal medal, and later he

5
Gambini, El peronismo y la iglesia, pp. 35-36,

Ibid., p. 38,

See below, chapter 6, pp. 150-51, 160.

Gambini, pp. 37-40.

118

was made chaplain of the Eva Peron Foundation and Evita's
personal confessor. (His brother, Leonardo Enrique Benitez
de Aldama, was designated Subsecretary of Religion in the

Ministry of Foreign Relations and Cult, while also acting

9
as the General Director of Religious Education.) Father

Virgilio Filippo was named the Adjunto Eclesiastico de la
Casa de Gobierno, with rank equivalent to ambassador, in
Per6n's first administration, Copello gave permission to
Filippo to stand for election in 1948 as a Peronist; he
was elected to the Chamber of Deputies where he loyally
served Peron, even when Peron fought with the church.

There was only one exception to the generalization
that the hierarchy supported Peron, and that was Bishop
Miguel de Andrea, De Andrea was the founder and spiritual
advisor of the Federation of Catholic Workers' Associa-
tions, a women's trade union in the Federal Capital. Po-
litically, he was a democrat who outspokenly advocated
freedom of speech and, press. From the very beginning he
opposed Peron' s encroachments on union autonomy and free-
dom of expression. But de Andrea was trounced by Copello

9
Ibid, , p , 32.

Ibid., pp. 41-42.

119

in church circles, and the bishops decided to support Per6n.
However, de Andrea's titular see was in the Near East, so

that he could avoid signing the pastoral letters that favored

the election of Peron and his supporters.

During the Congressional election campaign of 1947-48
the Catholic hierarchy again issued a pastoral which was
interpreted as supporting the Peronist candidates:

1) All persons are morally obligated to vote.

2) All voters must vote for candidates who
appear "to be likely to secure the greater
benefit for religion and the fatherland,
even though they do not belong to your
particular party, because public good is
above party interest."

3) No Catholic may affiliate himself with a
party or vote for a candidate whose program
contains the principles enunciated ^Hy a
pastoralT" in the 1945-45 campaign.

Since Radicals, Socialists, Progressive Democrats* and Com-
munists advocated the separation of church and state, plus
laicism in the public schools, this pastoral letter, in ef-

Felix J. Weil, Argentine Riddle (New York: The
John Day Company, 1944), pp. 8-9.

Robert J, Alexander, The Peron Era (New York:

Columbia University Press, 1951), p. 129.

"Sobre las proximas elecciones emitio una pastoral

el episcopado," La Prensa, December 31, 1947, p. 8.

120

feet, supported Peronist candidates.

Again, on August 1, 1951, when Peron was a candidate
for the presidency, a letter from the Argentine hierarchy
favored him and his party, repeating that Catholics could
not support a political party's candidates if that party
subscribed to laicism, separation of church and state, legal
divorce, and the suppression of legal dispositions which
recognized the rights of "Religion."

Reaction of the Radicals

On August 24, 1951, the Union Civica Radical thought

it necessary to state publicly its position on issues of

concern to the church as a result of the church's pastoral

letters. It also indirectly attacked clerical meddling in

politics and concluded that Roman Catholics could be members

of UCR. The Radicals' public declaration stated:

La UCR, a raiz de versiones circulantes puestas
al servicio de la confusion, cree llegado el
momento de dirigirse a los catolicos argentinos
y explicar, con toda claridad, su posicion con
respecto al catolicismo, para asi evitar
equivocos que desvirtuan su historica trayectoria
politica.

La UCR se cuido, con saludable tolerancia, para

"Pastoral Colectiva Acerca de los Deberes Civicos

de los Catolicos," August 1, 1951, quoted in Boletin de la

ACA. XXI (July-August, 1951), 119.

121

que los deberes de su disciplina interna no
afectasen, en momento alguno, las preferencias
confesionales de sus afiliados. Es por eso
que pudo acoger en sus filas y concertar al-
rededor de su esperanza a personas que tienen
opiniones no coincidentales en materia religiosa.

Es notorio que en la Nacion predomina una in-
mensa mayorxa cristiana y catolica. El radical-
ismo, en que se refleja la misma, nunca tuvo, en
la oposici(5n o en el gobierno, dificultades
f rente a la iglesia sostenida por el Estado.

Es publico, asimismo, que su prograitia partidario
no incluyo, entonces ni ahora, disposicion alguna
dirigida a provocar la separacion de la Iglesia
y el Estado o a instituir la disolucion del
matrimonio por la via del divorcio. Y en cuanto
al problema de la religion en la escuela, el
radicalismo se jacta de haber proclamado la
libertad de ensenanza con todos sus posibilidades
utiles, de acuerdo con su historica preitiisa de
respeto por el hombre.

La UCR comprende que la Iglesia tiene que estar
al margen y por encima de toda tendencia partidista
que niegue los valores humanos, pero no entiende
que la religion pueda profesarse con plenitud,
prescindiendo del patriotismo. Por eso advierte
que los gobiernos de tipo totalitario, al negar
las esencias del hombre, malogran los sentimientos
cristianos, y afirma que los catolicos deban
arrodillarse ante Dios, pero jamas ante tiranos.

La UCR ha creido oportuno dirigir estas palabras
de informacion a todos los catolicos que simpatizan
con su causa, que es la del pueblo y la de todo
ciudadano que quiera vivir en libertad y dignidad.
Recibanlas sus destinarios como un cordial mensaje
de solidaridad en la obscura noche por que
atraviesa la Republica.

Buenos Aires, Agosto 24, de 1951.

Santiago del Castillo, presidente.

122

Luis R. MacKay y Ernesto Dalla Lasta, secretarios
Alfredo Grassi, Domingo Cialzeta y Angel M. Lago-
marsino.

Educational Militancy of the Church
Accion Catolica Argentina

In 1936, ACA had established the Confederacion de
Maestros y Profesores Cat6licos under the tutelage of Father
Luis Correa Llanos. This union promoted religious educa-
tion in the public schools and supported Peron because under

his auspices religious education was officially offered in

16
the public schools.

The year that religious education became law, ACA

set up two new Secretariados on the national junta level —

the Secretariado Central de Educacion and the Secretariado

17
Central para la Defensa de la Fe. Through the offices of

the Secretariado Central de Educacion, ACA hoped to main-
tain the gains of the Argentine Roman Catholic Church in the

15 , , •

"La Union Civica Radical y el catolicismo; declarar

ci5n de la mesa directiva del comite nacional," DSCD 1958,

VI, Appendix: Insertion No. 2, p. 4452,

1 6

Interview with Isabel Ruiz, Secretary-General of

Federacion de Agrupaciones Gremiales de Educadores (FAGE) ,
and member of the Federacion Catolica de Maestros y Pro-
fesores, Buenos Aires, September 12, 1972.

"Repuesta de la Accion Catolica Argentina al cues-
tionario de la Oficina Pontifica 'Actio Catholica, ' "
Boletin de la ACA, XVII (November, 1947), 289, 191

123

field of education. It would also act as an organizational
base for extending Roman Catholic doctrines in the schools.
This Secretariado is to be distinguished from CONSUDEC, or
the Consejo Superior de Educacion Catolica, which was es-
tablished by the Episcopacy in 1922 to coordinate, orient,

and defend all the Catholic schools, which were made depend -

18
ent on it. The Secretariado served more broadly defined

ends, as provided by Article 3 of the Secretariado *s stat-
19

utes;

Art, 3° — a) Organizar y coordinar las actividades
educativas catolicas;

b) Promover y fomentar en la sociedad el conocimi-
ento, necesidad y sentido de la educacion catoli-
ca (Enciclia "Divini Illius Magistri");

c) Estudiar la legislaci5n educacional, nacional
y mundial;

d) Seguir el movimiento educative en materia de
metodos y organizar encuestas y estudios;

e) Vigilar las maniobras contrarias a los derechos
divinos de la Iglesia en esta materias (organ-
izaciones, doctrinas, nombramientos, proyectos,
etc) ;

f) Hacer un estudio complete y mantenerlo • al dia

(archives, ficheros) de la obra educativa

Letter from Hermano Septimio of CONSUDEC to author,

Buenos Aires, March 19, 1972,

19 •

Mercedes Terren, p. 191.

124

eatolica nacional; su organizacion, sus
actividades, su personal, su evoluci6n,
sus recursos, etc.;

i) Clasificar los textos escolares (lectura,
literatura, historia, ciencias, filosofia,
etc.) de acuerdo a la doctrina eatolica y
procurar la difusion de los autores orto-
doxos ;

1) Preparer y formar dirigentes en la materia,
sobre todo, con vista al future,

JAC, or Jovenes de Accion Catolica, carried out cam-
paigns under episcopal direction to teach secondary and
university students the Catholic religion and to enlist
their support for apostolic activities. Centros internes
were set up in Catholic schools for this purpose and centros
secundarios were formed in public schools, as were centros
universitarios created in universities. But enrollment in
these centers began to slack by 1950. Many disassociated
themselves from these student groups in order to join Peron-

ist youth groups or just lost interest in non-secular activ-

20
ities.

In 1951, AHAC, or the men's branch of ACA, helped

form the Liga de Padres de Familia (LPF) , and the AMAC branch.

Tiburcio Casal, "La A. C. y los colegios religiosos, " ii

30 anos de Accion Catolica, 1931-1961^ ed . Manuel N. J. Bello

(Buenos Aires: Talleres Graficos de Don Rudecindo Sellares,

1961), p. 162.

125

or the women's section, similarly created the Liga de Madres
de Familia (LMF) , By 1954 the bishops recognized a Confed-
eraci6n de Uniones de Padres de Familia de Colegios de la
Republica Argentina (CUPFRA.) , set up to defend the funda-
mental rights and principles of the family. The LMF could
claim 20,000 members by 1953, and helped to organize reli-
gious education courses which were later taken over by the
Institute de Cultura Religiosa Superior. Both the LPF and

the LMF would be active in the campaign to overthrow Peron

21
in 1955.

In 1952 the bishops formed what was to become the
mose important branch of ACA — the Agrupacidn de los Profesio-
nales de la Accion Catolica (APAC) , which included profes-
sionals and university students. They had more influence

on public decision-making than JAC or Catholic youth.

0 1

Consult Anuario eclesiastico de la Republica Argen-
tina, 1961 (Buenos Aires: Institute Bibliotecologico del
Arzobispado de Buenos Aires, 1961), p. 125; "La Liga de Padres
de Familia," Boletin de la ACA, XXI (September-October, 1951),
p. 103; and Consejo Superior de la A.M.A.C., "30 anos de vida
en la Associacion de Mujeres de la.A.C," 30 anos de Accion
Catolica, p. 223.

Juan Carlos Remon, "Treinta anos al servicio de la
juventud," 30 anos de Accion Catolica, pp. 236, 238.

126

And it was from APAC that Dell'Oro Maini organized a lobby
group to support the legalization of private universities
when he became Minister of Education in 1955.
Estatuto del Docente, 1947

The church attained a financial boost for its schools
when Congress passed a statute providing for state support
of personnel salaries. This Estatuto del Docente de Estable-
cimientos Particulares was passed by Congress in 1947 and
known as Ley 13.047. By it the state agreed to subsidize
the salaries of private schoolteachers and staff according
to a sliding scale based on tuition paid by pupils. A pri-
vate schoolteacher in a tuition-free school could have up

to 80% of his salary subsidized by the state.

The law also set up a Consejo Gremial de Ensenanza
Privada to administer the apportioning of state moneys to

the private schools, and the resolution of questions of ten-

24
ure, salary, and working conditions. Twelve persons and

a president were to sit on the Consejo; four represented the

Ministry of Justice and Public Instruction; two represented

23Article 24 of the Statute, DSCD 1947, IV, p. 754.

Article 31 of the Statute, ibid. , p. 755.

127

the Secretariat of Labor; and six represented private
schools. The President of Argentina would choose the Con-
se^o's president. The Consejo would also award fellow-
ships paying all or part of the tuition of no less than ten
percent of the pupils of private schools that had been as-
similated previously into the public educational system and

had been receiving state support on that basis.

The Radicals supported the Estatuto del Docente on
the grounds that it extended social justice to private
schoolteachers, including retirement pay, tenure, and great-
er contact with public schoolteachers and officials. They
considered the Statute to be in the Argentine tradition,
stemming from 19th century state subsidies to provincial
and private schools, e.g., the 1871 law of subventions.

Article 27 of the Statute, ibid.., pp. 745-55.

The 1947 Statute covered private normals schools as
well as other types of private secondary schools. There
were three categories of private schools in the Statute:
"a) adscritos a la ensenanza oficial — establecimientos pri-
vados de ensenanza primaria, fiscalizados por el Consejo
Nacional de Educacion, y de ensenanza secundaria, normal o
especial, incorporados a la ensenanza oficial dependiente
del Ministerio de Justicia 'e Instrucci5n Publica; b) libres—
establecimientos privados de ensenanza secundaria, normal
o especial que, siguiendo los planes y programas oficiales,
no esten comprendidos en al apartado anterior; y c) estable-
cimientos privados, de ensenanza, directa o por corres-
pondencia, no incluidos en los incisos a) y b) . " (Article
2 of the Statute, ibid.., p. 750.)

128

otherwise known as Ley 463. However, the Radicals pointed
to several cases of private schools that would not be cov-
ered but that should be, in their judgment. Their main
reservation was that the state might abuse its control of

private education under the terms of the Statute and dis-

miss teachers under the guise of enforcing the Statute.

One of the ways in which this might happen was to take

political advantage of article 9, which provided:

El personal serS designado por los respectivos
establecimientos de ensenanza y, en el caso par-
ticular de los establecimientos "adcritos a la
ensenanza oficial," con aprobacion de los orga-
nismos oficiales que corresponda, la que sera
indispensable para perfeccionar la designacion.

The Statute was amended to meet some of the dissent-
ing arguments of the Radicals, and a modified version was
passed in the Chamber, But the Senate rejected the Cham-
ber's version and returned the original bill. The Radicals

decided that the original bill was better than no bill and

joined with the Peronists to approve the Statute, Thxs

See speeches by Deputies Oscar Lopez Serrot, Jabel

Arevalo Cabeza, Antonio Sobral, and Emilio Ravignani, ibid. ,

pp. 770-71, 774; and in DSCD 1947, VI, p. 75.

^^Article 9 of the Statute, DSCD 1947, IV, p, 751.

^^DSCD 1947, VI, p. 77.

129

Statute provided state funds to private schoolteachers un-
til PerCn came into conflict with the church and withdrew
state funds from private secondary schools in February 1955.

Peron later complained that clerics had become the main

31
beneficiaries of this law.

Other Educational Demands of the Church

Catholics wanted subsidies from the state for their

schools while, at the same time, the authority of the state

over their schools would diminish. ACA leaders called for

the autonomy of Catholic schools, which meant that they

could grant diplomas, give examinations, set up curricula,

and choose methods of teaching without outside control.

Catholics did not challenge the state's establishment of

norms for the amount of capital invested in a school, the

momber of teachers, or the type of examinations given.

Emilio F. Mignone, Politica educativa (Buenos
Aires: Editorial Pallas, 1955), p. 114.

". . .la partida de pago de estos sueldos que era

de 13,000,000 en 1947 lleg6 a 100,000,000 en 1954. Por otra

parte, en 1947 el 80% de los profesores de estas escuelas

religiosas eran particulares, en tanto s61o el 20% eran

sacerdotes. En 1954, en cambio, el 80% eran profesores

sacerdotes y el 20% particulares." (Perfin, La fuerza es

el derecho de las bestias _^;^vana, Cuba: Santiago Tou-

rino, 19567, p. 71.)

-^^Oscar R. Puiggros, "La educaci6n catfilica," Criterio,
XVII (August 10, 1944), 142; and Criterio, XVII (August 17,
1944), 166.

130

Ley 934 of 1878 was one of the laws that Catholics
whittled away during the Peronist era. It provided that
graduates of private secondary schools submit to state ex-
aminations given by national secondary schools before their
titles were "habilitating" or equipped them to practice a
profession. But in 1950 a government decree gave CONSUDEC
(Consejo Superior de Educacion Catolica) the right to issue
certificates to secondary graduates of their Institute Ad-
scrito del Profesorado. Thus, nuns and clerics could be
certified as secondary schoolteachers by the above Institute
without having to satisfy state requirements of the normal
schools, teachers' institutes, and faculties of philosophy
and letters. An editorial in La Nacion condemned this de-
cree as another instance of favoritism toward private re-

33
ligious schools. In February 1952, the private Institute

de Humanides de Salta was allowed to grant habilitating

bachiller high school degrees autonomously.'^^

When Peron clashed with the church, however, these

decrees were abrogated. On September 30, 1954, Ley 14.389

"Adscripcifin de institutes del profesorado," La
Nacion. April 17, 1950, p. 4.

■^'^Mignone, p. 114.

131

returned to the Ministry of Public Instruction the exclusive

. ^ 35

right to grant secondary schoolteachers' certificates.

The church was purportedly behind two bills submitted

to the legislature of the Province of Buenos Aires and to

the Congress to confine all primary and secondary textbooks

to those prepared by the respective governments of the Prov-

36
mce and Nation. These bills were opposed by educators,

37
publishers, and such liberal organs as La_ Prensa. The

provincial bill was milder because it did not insist upon

38
a single book for each course. The national bill, as

finally passed, provided that the government would approve

39
and print the selected book, the " texto unico y. oficial, "

for the national schools. Opponents of this law pointed out

its implicit authoritarianism. When a " texto iSnico" was

introduced into the first grade in 1950, an editorial in

^In February 1955 the Chief Executive withdrew re-
cognition of the bachiller degree awarded by and the state
subsidies of the Institute de Humanidades. (Ibid. , pp. 113-14.)

Letter from Ambassador George S. Messersmith to the

Assistant Secretary of State Spruille Braden, Buenos Aires,

October 4, 1946, pp. 1-2. National Archives file no. 835. 42/10. 34

"Textos escolares unicos y oficiales," La Prensa,

September 21, 1946, p. 4.

Letter from Messersmith, p. 1.

George I. Blanks ten, Peron's Argentina (Chicago:

University of Chicago Press, 1953), p. 187.

132

La Nacion complained that this meant a state monopoly of
ideology and warned that "Los textos escolares no puedan
ser concebidos ni utilizados como ins trumentos de adoc-

trinamiento politico o_ de sometimiento a_ un_ rigido orden

social-espiritual . "

One aspiration of the church that did not receive
fulfillment was a Concordat between church and state. The
church wanted to maintain its union with the state but re-
move the tutelage implied in the patronato, as well as to
consolidate the educational gains made since 1947 — ensenanza
religiosa and the Estatuto del Docente — by giving them the

sanction of a formal agreement with the Vatican. However,

41
no Concordat was arrived at during 1943-55.

Slow Growth of Private Schools
Because the Estatuto del Docente Privado provided
funds for student scholarships and staff salaries for pri-
vate schools, an increase in the number of private schools

"El regimen del texto unico," La Nacion, April 2,
1950, p. 4.

The longing for a concordato can be found in books
by writers who reflect the hierarchy's point of view, such
as Casiello, p. 3 51; and Cayetano Bruno, Bases para un con-
cordato entre la Santa Sede y la Argentina (Buenos Aires,
1947), quoted in Furlong, La tradicion religiosa, p. 122.

133

would be expected. What is surprising is that this in-
crease was so overshadowed by the increase of the state
schools in the period 1943-55.

In 1943, there were 82 national secondary schools with
37,280 pupils and 8,604 teachers, and 237 private secondary
schools with 18,564 students and 3,097 teachers. In 1948,
the number of national secondary schools had increased to
131, the niomber of pupils to 47,590, and the nTomber of teach-
ers to 7,859, whereas there was only a slight increase in
the number of private secondary schools — 252 with 21,091
students and 7,859 teachers. By 1955, the last year of
the Peron era, there were 179 national secondary schools
with 77,332 pupils and 10,927 teachers; the number of pri-
vate secondary schools had risen to 279; the number of

pupils had not quite doubled since 1943, since there were

42
33,423 in 1955, and they were taught by 4,950 teachers.

In 1943, forty-four percent of all secondary bacca-
laureate students were in private schools, and this figure
remained constant up to 1948. By 1955, only forty-one per-

Argentina, Ministerio de Educacion y Justicia,
Ensenanza media: anos 1914-1963 (2 vols., Buenos Aires:
Estadistica Educativa, 1964 /~?_7) , I, cuadro nos. 53, 59,
pp. 58, 75.

134

cent of secondary baccalaureate students were matriculated
in private schools. The enrollment figures for normal
schools are even more demonstrative of state activity: in
1943, sixty-six percent of all normal school students were
matriculated in private normal schools; in 1948, the per-
cent had dropped to sixty, and, in 1955, it had been reduced

43
to forty-five percent.

The state likewise retained the overwhelming presence
in primary education it had developed since the era of Sar-
miento. In 1954, 91.6% of elementary school students were
enrolled in public primary schools.

Di Telia offers two explanations for the slowing up
of expansion of the private sector in education, which was
practically synonymous with the Catholic sector. First,
the church felt it had sufficient influence in the state
educational apparatus and did not feel the need to consol-
idate and expand its own educational system. After all,
ensefianza religiosa was being offered in the public schools.

43 . ,

Di Telia, "Raices de la controversia educacional

argentina," in Los fragmentos del poder, de la oligarquia

a la poliarquia arqentina. p. 314.

Federico Eduardo Alvarez Rojas, La escuela popular

arqentina (Buenos Aires: El Ateneo, 1964), cuadro no. 3.1.13,
p. 40.

135

and ardent Roman Catholics were in leadership positions

in the Ministry of Education, This thesis is plausible

when one considers that the permanent delegate from Argen-
tina to the International Bureau of Education of the United
Nations Economic and Social Council (UNESCO) explained the
government's educational program as being "inspired by the
highest ideals, and by an ethical principle which does not
put science and technology before moral values, but which,

on the contrary, respects personality and seeks the spiri-

46
tual m hxoman nature." And the church could further re-
lax when the state normal schools made the study of Latin

47
a prerequisite along with two hours per week of Ethics

48
and the Catholic Religxon. The church enjoyed the priv-
ileges and moneys for its religious schools and settled
back contentedly in the schools that already existed.

Di Telia, p. 316.

^^UNESCO, International Yearbook of Education 1949
(Geneva: International Bureau of Education, 1949), p. 50.

UNESCO, International Yearbook of Education 1948

(Geneva: International Bureau of Education, 1948), p. 41.

48 "

UNESCO, Primary Teacher Training, Publication No.

117 (Geneva: International Bureau of Education, 1949),
p. 33.

136

The thesis that the church was satisfied with its
influence on the primary and secondary schools seems to hold
true for university education as well, since none of the
attempts to found private universities during the Peron
era came from the church. During Per5n's administration
six Radical deputies submitted a bill to the Chamber of
Deputies to permit universidades libres, or private uni-
versitiesr this attempt failed. There were two other
attempts in 1947 by professors expelled from their jobs.
In October, these professors held a convention in Rosario

to set up a "democratic" and "autonomous" university that

50
would grant diplomas on its own authority. In December,

their counterparts in Buenos Aires held an assembly to
found a private university, calling themselves the Agrupaci-
ones para la Defensa y Progreso de la Universidad Demo-
cratica y Aut6noma de Buenos Aires y La Plata. The state-
ment of proposals of the assembled forty professors and ad-
minstrators did not mention titles or diplomas or funds,
but academic freedom and the need to avoid the dispersal

^^Domingorena, Artlculo 28; universidades privadas
en la Argentina; sus antecedentes , p. 21.

^"^Deputy Perette cites the text of the "Convenci6n
pro universidad democratica y autSnoma," DSCD 1958, VI,
p. 4361.

137

of Argentine intellectuals forced from their posts.

These universities hardly functioned, enfeebled by a lack
of funds and legality.

Another explanation for the failure of the church to
expand its school system was that the forces which might be
described as "the church of the CGT" — consciously identified
with lower-class interests rather than with the traditional
upper class — had gained predominance within the church it-
self. These forces were just not much interested in pri-
vate education, viewing it as a preserve of the upper classes.
Similarly, the government was dominated by groups that ident-
ified with the popular classes and the trade unions. Thus,
neither church nor state took full advantage of the oppor-
tunities that were available to promote the growth of

Catholxc schools.

It is hard to accept the latter thesis in its entire-
ty. Its author, Di Telia, does not say where the bishops
and the cardinal belonged, and they cannot be described
categorically as "the church of the CGT." Neither is the
above thesis easy to reconcile with the ensuing clash be-
tween the church and Peron. The one undeniable concept is

"En una asamblea fue fundada la Universidad de
Buenos Aires," La Prensa, December 25, 1947, p. 6.

^^Di Telia, p. 316.

138

that the government was strong and popular, and, by exten-
sion, did become active on behalf of the popular classes
and the CGT.

Peron's government certainly was active in the field

of public education. He claimed that 5,000 schools were

53
erected during the first Five-Year Plan, 1947-1951. He

also said in 1951 that:

I can declare with legitimate pride that my
government has constructed more schools in
five years than the total erected in the one
hundred precedxng years.

While these claims are exaggerated, they are near enough to
the truth to say that the two Perons' activity in the educa-
tional field did put previous governments to shame — in 1951

55
alone, 401 new primary schools were opened. Under the

Perdns, the Ministry of Public Works intensified its school-
building program, and gave priority to rural and primary
schools. The national government also stimulated the pro-
vincial governments to build more schools.

^^Esteben Peicovich, Ho la, Peron, p. 32.

54 -

La Razon, April 2, 1951, quoted in Blanksten, p. 198.

Blanksten, p. 198.

^^UNESCO, International Yearbook of Education 1949,
p. 52.

139

The Ministry of Education was created by the Pertfns
to show the importance that their popular-based government
was giving to education. Heretofore, the administration of
education had been under the Ministry of Public Instruction
and Justice. The new Ministry of Education was created in
June 1949, and consisted of a minister, an under-secretary

for culture, a secretary-general, and an under-secretary

57
for the universities.

The educational reforms of the Perdns were influenced

by their efforts to reach the popular classes and by their

concern to stay in power. Technical education was advanced

and adult education was pushed by their government; the

private sector had little to do with either. By 1954, 91%

of all technical students and 100% of those taking adult

tr p

education were enrolled in public schools. The Perons

aimed to wipe out illiteracy and concentrated on the rural

areas where it was 234% higher than in the urban areas.

Although Peron was mistaken when he said that "The Argen-
tine republic at the present time has no illiterate children"

^"^Ibid.

Alvarez Rojas, La es_cuela popular argentina, p. 40.

^^Ibid., p. 41.

140

and "Among the adults there exists illiteracy of only 8 to

fin
12 percent, " he was still right in pointing out that the

government had tried to eradicate illiteracy.

The Perons were attempting to instill nationalism in
the Argentine child and represent themselves as embodying
that nationalism. The Ministry of Education established
a "school journeys" department responsible for the trans-
port and accommodation of pupils at all three levels — pri-
mary, secondary, and university--and of visiting foreign
students and teachers. Students traveled to all parts of
the country under the slogan "Argentinians Re-discover Ar-
gentina." An Argentine patriot was loyal to the Perons:
teachers as well as students were expected to praise the
virtues of the Perons. The new curriculum and out-of-
school activities were Peronist-inspired. The welfare

foundation "Maria Eva Duarte de Peron" contributed gifts

6 "?
and material help to school clubs.

Thus, the Perons paid a great deal of attention and

As quoted in Blanksten, p. 198.

UNESCO, International Yearbook of Education 1949.

p. 53; and UNESCO, International Yearbook of Education 1948.
p. 42. ■ '

Blanksten, p. 197,

UNESCO, International Yearbook of Education 1948,
p. 42. — — __

141

money to Argentine public education as well as helping to
finance the private schools. The church was well satisfied
with the installation of ensenanza religiosa and morality
into the curriculiam of the public schools and did not de-
cry their proliferation. What the church did come to mind,
however, was the attempt of the Perons to disseminate their
doctrines in seeming competition with the church's.

The Universities: 1945-1955
Peronist control of university education favored the
popular classes. Technical education was promoted, and
Congress approved a National Technological University in
1948; it opened in 1953 with campuses in Buenos Aires,

Bahxa Blanca, Cordoba, Mendoza, Santa Fe, Rosario, and

Tucuman. A building program paralleling that found in

primary and secondary education was carried out; many new
academic buildings were constructed, and work on "univer-
sity cities" was begun. Not only were examination fees

65
abolished, but tuition was ended by decree in July of 1949;

this policy is still continued, enabling poor students to

Domingorena, Articulo 28, pp. 16-17.

UNESCO, International Yearbook of Education 1949,

p. 51.

142

attend the national universities. The results of these re-
forms showed up in the enrollment figures: the number of

university students rose from 68,460 in 1945 to 142,435 in

66
1955.

Government control of the universities became increas-
ingly dictatorial except for a brief interlude in 1945-46.
This interval saw the restoration of university autonomy
as part of a general liberalization inside Argentina prompt-
ed by Allied victories in World War II. In February 1945,
university professors who had been fired were allowed to re-
turn to their teaching posts. University elections returned
to power rectors and professors who had opposed the govern-
ment. The previously banned student organization, FUA, was

67
again permitted to exist by decree in August 1945. FUA

supported Peron's electoral opponents in the Democratic
Union. During the "October days" of 1945 students rose in
opposition to the Farrell-Peron regime. After initial ar-
rests of students and professors, the military again restored

the universities to the control of their elected officials

68
and removed Peron from office.

Walter, Student Politics in Argentina, p. 149,

^^Ibid., p. 124.
68.

^Ibid. , pp. 129-31

143

Having been released from imprisonment by the workers'
movement of October 17, 1945, Peron stood for election as
president of Argentina and won in February 1946. He imme-
diately moved against the universities so that the "October
days" would not be repeated. In the months that followed
he intervened all six national universities: more than 70%
of their faculty were removed or resigned in protest, so
that by the end of 1946 more than 1,000 professors had lost
their jobs. Their places were taken by men of inferior

ability and accomplishment, many of them coming from ultra-

nationalist and Catholic circles.

The Peronist Congress approved a new "University Law"
that went into effect on October 4, 1947. This law — Ley
13.031 — replaced Ley Avellaneda and ended university auton-
omy. The Chief Executive had the power to appoint the uni-
versity rectors, who, in turn, appointed academic and ad-
ministrative personnel. Students and professors no longer
participated in the running of the universities. A sub-
secretary in the Ministry of Education was made responsible
for the universities. ^° In 1954 this law was replaced by
Ley 14.297 which continued the trend of presidential con-

^^Ibid., pp. 136-37.

Blanksten, pp. 196-97.

144

trol of university affairs; a course on national doctrine

was made part of the curriculum.

Since 1947 professors had been encouraged to teach
Peronism, and classes in Peronist political philosophy
were made compulsory. Texts were rewritten to glorify the
activities of Juan and Evita Per6n, which were compared to
those of General San Martin.

FUA was suppressed again, and student leaders were
arrested and tortured and imprisoned; many went underground
or to Uruguay. Those students who engaged in anti-govern-
ment activity were subject to suspension or loss of credit

72
for examinations previously passed. Peron created a stu-
dent organization to replace FUA, one that would support
him. The Confederacion General Universitaria (CGU) was
not only financed by him, but given attractive athletic
facilities. In 1952 the Communist university students with-
drew their support from FUA and backed Peron for tactical
reasons. When the national Communist Party returned to a

more neutral position in 1953, the student party remained

73
separate from FUA. But in spite of Communist defections.

Domingorena, pp. 37-38.

Walter, pp. 138-39.

Ibid., pp. 141-42.

145

political suppression, and a well financed rival student
organization, the FUA remained the main student organiza-
tion in the six national universities, operating clandes-
tinely.

And FUA also picked up support from two sources. It
gained the backing of the secondary-school students, or
coleqianos, who had supported FUA sporadically since the
1918 Reforma. This group, along with the universitarios,
supported the Democratic Union in 1946, and, in 1951, they

participated in the strike to free the arrested student

74
leader Ernesto Mario Bravo. The secondary students par-
ticipating in these activities formed the Federacion de
Estudiantes Secundarios (FES) in December 1952. FES was set
up with the help of university students on the same basis
as FUA, and with a program calling for political liberty,

a more equal distribution of national income, and student

75
participation in secondary school administration. From

1952 to 1955 the FES aided the university federations in

the struggle against the Per6n dictatorship.

^^Ibid. , p. 142.

Federacion de Estudiantes Secundarios, Guia del
estudiante, quoted in Walter, p. 142,

"^^Walter, p. 142.

146

FUA also gained the support of liberal Catholic uni-
versity students. In 1951 a group of Catholic university
students formed the Liga de Estudiantes Humanistas, which

declared its support of a pluralistic society and opposi-

tion to totalitarian government. In October-November of

1951, a group of students meeting to plot Peron's overthrow
were detained and questioned by a Peronist police official
of the special section that combated Communism. Some_ of.
the students in attendance declared themselves to be Human-
ists; it was the first time that the students of other po-
litical parties realized that there were Roman Catholics--

78
against Peron. The attitude of the church hierarchy -

toward the Humanists was one of hostility, for at this time
the hierarchy was still supporting Per6n; another motive
for their dislike of the Humanists was that the group em-
phasized its own independence of official church positions.
However, the Humanists managed to stave off formal condem-

77
— . ' 'Liga de Estudiantes Humanistas, Humanismo y uni-

versidad (unpaginated monograph, Buenos Aires, July, 1953)

Interview with Gregorio Selser, Buenos Aires,
September 10, 1972. Selser was a member of FUA at this
time and present at the meeting and police station.

147

nation and exconmunication and to aid FUA in opposing

* 79
Peron. In a few years' time, the church hierarchy it-
self would join the opposition.

"Por presion de los elementos integristas que

asesoraban movimientos estudiantiles , la Curia de Buenos

Aires dio a conocer una advertencia censurando y casi

condenando al Humanisrao." (BergadS, Argentine Survey S.J.

II — situacion educacional. Part 2, p. 2 58.)

CHAPTER SIX

CHURCH-STATE STRIFE: PART I

The growing conflict between church and state in Ar-
gentina is linked to the nation's economic difficulties.
This economic crisis, which featured price inflation along
with production shortages and — for some — a fall in real in-
come, began to appear as early as 1949, and it meant that
economic aspirations of the masses could no longer be met
as before. Instead of dealing with these problems solely
through economic measures, Peron chose to handle them by
extending his political control of the nation, thereby re-:
pressing political nonconformity. As he reverted to more
totalitarian political mechanisms he eventually came to
loggerheads with an institution which also had totalitarian
aspirations and insisted on maintaining its political inde-
pendence— the church.

Paradoxically, Peron' s extension of political control
aggravated his economic problems because it involved new
expenditures. A growing state bureaucracy running expand-
ing state programs employed a personal loyal following that

Ferns, Argentina, pp. 194-95,

148

149

demanded more money. In 1954/ those in public administra-
tion, excluding defense, education, and public health,

amounted to 7%, or 520,000, of a work force of 7,600,000.

The Army purportedly grew from 40,000 in 1943 to 105,000
in 1945 and was cut back to 70,000 in 1949. Military con-
struction, barracks, and factories received huge outlays.
Officers were also kept happy with large salary increases .

that made them higher paid than those in the United States

3
by 1950. And by that year, the military budget accounted

for one-quarter of all national expenditures. Added to

this were the moneys demanded by the Eva PerSn Foundation

and social welfare measures for urban workers, an enlarged

police force and internal security apparatus, the CGT, and

subsidies for the church. State funds were further drained

by public fiestas, parades, Peronist youth sports events,

tourism, and parties. The nationalized railroads, tele- .

phone companies, gas and electrical companies, were bought

at tremendous cost and run in an expensive but slipshod

4
manner. State income was depleted by corruption, which

2 ...

John J. Johnson, Political Change m Latin America

(Palo Alto, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1958), p. 118.

^Alexander, The Per6n Era, pp. 118-20.

Daniel Friedenberg, "Peronl Peronl Peronl" New

Republic, CXXXIII (September 26, 1955), 14.

150

increased in the second presidency of Peron and was the
subject of scandalous rumors that daily circulated, seem-
ingly confirmed in 1953 by the suicide of Evita's brother

5
Juan Duarte.

Peron' s move toward more political control simply
reinforced trends that dated from even before 1949. After
becoming President in 1946, Peron had ousted the judges on
the Supreme Court and replaced them with his sympathizers,
Per5n also set out to form a personal political party, which
meant the dissolution of the Laborite Party. When one of
its leaders, Cipriano Reyes, refused to disband the party,
Peron wooed away the other members to isolate Reyes. Be-
sides being the victim of assassination attempts, he was
accused in 1948 of plotting to assassinate the Perons and

jailed. He and some of the others imprisoned for alleged

complicity in this same plot were subsequently tortured.

Those arrested included representatives of the armed forces,
business, landed interests, and the church; the church and
armed forces were lumped together since the conspirators

Frank Owen, Peron; His Rise and Fall (London: The
Cresset Press, 1957), pp. 92-93.

Alexander, The Peron Era, p. 62,

Ibid., pp. 54-59.

151

arrested from these two groups were naval chaplains, a
"clever economy of effort,"

The growing harshness toward all opponents was ap-
parent in Congress, where the Radical "bloque de los 44"
who served in the Chamber of Deputies from 1946-48 were
harassed by Peron for their implacable criticism of his eco-
4iomic- and political machinations. In 1948 a Radical
deputy was even expelled from the Chamber ostensibly for
making offensive remarks against the Argentine people.

Equally ominous was an August 1948 statute granting the

12
Presxdent dictatorxal powers in a "national emergency."

Restrictions of freedom of the press were lifted for

the 1946 election, but in 1947 the government again moved

to gag the press. This time opposition newspapers were

closed down for not meeting health standards or silenced

°Naval chaplains Carlos Grandi and Fedel H, Moreno
were released for lack of proof, but Victor Jorba Farias
remained detained. (Gambini, El peronismo y la iglesia,
p. 38,)

^Ferns, p. 194.

In the Senate all were pro-Peron since the two non-
Peronistas were not seated after they had won election in
1946. (Felix Luna, Argentina de Peron a Lanusse, 1943-1973
j/BUenos Aires: Editorial Planeta Argentina, 1973_7", p. 51,)

■"■■"■Ibid.

12 •

Alexander, The Peron Era, pp. 68-70,

152

by intimidation and bribery. Evita and other Peronistas
bought out many of the newspapers and magazines of their
opponents. And the government began to restrict the supply

of newsprint to opposition papers such as La Nacion and La

Prensa. Also, throughout 1948, the government acquired

private radio stations and effectively muzzled others.

This meant that anti-Peronists had no access to the radio

14
waves until July 1955. Movies also faced government cen-
sorship, and some simply were refused showings. Thus, the
opposition was denied access to the mass media and only a
few newspapers maintained any semblance of independence.

The Peronist Party revised the 1853 Constitution in
1949 to make Peron eligible to succeed himself as President.
Two new laws in that same year made it a criminal act to
show disrespect or "desacato" for any government official,
and made it necessary for political parties to register
three years in advance of an election in which they sought
to participate so that federal courts could pass on their
eligibility, one of the requirements being that they have
recognized provincial committees in all fourteen provinces.

■'■ Ibid., pp. 62-65.

Luna, Argentina de Peron a Lanusse, p. 52.

153

The latter law on political parties also forbade them to
form coalitions. These two laws were used to restrict
opposition: two deputies were expelled from Congress for
"disrespect" in 1949; in 1950 the Radical candidates for
the governorships of Tucuman and Buenos Aires (the latter
being Ricardo Balbin) were jailed for the same offense.
And when Balbin was released from jail to run for President

in 1951, none of the other parties could help him and his -

17
Radical Party because coalitions were banned.

This political repression was increasing as Argen-
tina's economic condition worsened. In 1949, for the first
time since 1890, Argentina could not pay its external debt,
and it sought a loan from the United States in 1950. This
was because agricultural production was not keeping pace
with internal demand, resulting in less meat and grains for
export, which had brought in much needed foreign currency.
Peronist agricultural policy — artificially holding down

farm prices — as well as bad weather aggravated the situ^. r

18
ation. In 1952, Argentina had to import wheat. - ^

Alexander, The Peron Era, pp. 68-69.
^^Ibid.

^^Owen, pp. 209-10.

Arthur P. Whitaker, Argentina (Englewood Cliffs,

N.J.: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1964), p. 125.

154

While Argentine agricultural productivity was con-
tracting, Argentine industry was not faring well either.
Only those industries manufacturing consumer goods showed
a sufficient rate of capital formation between 1940-44 and

1955. In spite of technological improvements between 1945-

1955 there was a decline m worker productivity.

Peronist industrial policy also exacerbated the pre-
dicament. The nationalization of foreign investments de-
pleted Argentina's reserves. Clearly she should have used
these reserves to invest in transportation, power, and cap-
ital goods industries where capital formation was inadequate,
As much as 73.9% of the capital acc\imulated during the -_-
Peronist administration was diverted to non-productive sec-
tors of the economy, such as housing, services, and govern-
ment bureaucracy. -

All groups began to feel the consequences of Argen-
tina's economic decline. After 1949/ the gross national
product declined sharply (in terms of 1950 pesos) to 49 ..3
billion pesos in 1952 from a high of 62,3 billion in 1948.

Leopold Portnoy, Analisis critico de la economfa
arqentina (Mexico City: Fondo de Cultura Economica, 1961),
p. 86.

Ibid., pp. 52-53.

155

This meant an even sharper decline in per capita wealth

since the population grew between 1948 and 1952 from 15.4

million to 18 million. Indeed, disagreement with Peron's

policies was no longer confined to the upper and middle sec-
tors of the population as workers faced a drop in their

real incomes after 1948. Disaffection with Peron now ap-
peared in groups that propped up his regime — labor, the -
armed forces, and the church.

From the beginning, the upper classes were hostile
to Peron's regime, and he in turn had attacked them as an
"oligarchy." He had hurt the landed interests in partic-
ular by setting up a state agency, lAPI, to sell and buy .
agricultural produce at fixed government prices. The upper
classes as a whole maintained close social and blood ties
with high officials in the church and armed forces. Sectors
of the middle classes, such as some small businessmen, medi-
um-sized farmers, professionals, and students, continued to

Whitaker, pp. 124, 137.

Workers experienced an increase of about 50% in

purchasing power between 193 7 and 1948, and wage levels of
industrial (urban) workers increased more than consumer
price levels from 1943 to 1948. (Tomas Roberto Fillol,
Social Factors in Economic Development: The Argentine Case
(Cambridge: TheM.I.T. Press, 1961), pp. 62, 67, 82.

156

support the Radicals. Some were anti-Peronist because of
a class bias against the working classes (or cabecitas neg-

ras) who supported Peron. Others opposed Peron because of

his despotism and corruption.

Beginning in November 1950, the railway men went
on strike seeking higher wages and were granted them quick-
ly because Peron feared that his enemies in the armed forces
would see weaknesses in his labor support. But these wage
increases remained on paper, and the railway men went on
strike again in December, seeking the heads of their union
bosses who were "company men"; they departed, and the union
was simply taken over by the CGT. Their wage claims unmet,
the workers struck again in late January 1951; Evita vis-
ited the railroad stations, sobbed, screamed, and exhorted
the men to return to work, but to no avail. Then the gov-
ernment broke the strike by violent means ; only La Prensa
reported it, Peron hoped to suppress all news of the

strikes so that other unions would not grow restive, but

they did. In August the railway men again went on strike

Luna, Argentina de Peron a Lanusse, pp. 73, 79-80,

87-88.

Owen, p. 155.
^^Ibid. , pp. 155-57.

157

with the expectation that other dissatisfied workers would

join them while the armed forces carried out a planned rev-

, 26

olution to topple Peron.

But other unions did not join them when they saw
that the troops stationed at the Campo de Mayo did not march
on Buenos Aires. For junior officers had remained loyal to
Peron along with the majority of the army and labor. The

uprising had received the support of one wing of the Rad-

27
ical Party besides some workers. The leaders of the revolt

were officers in the cavalry — including Alejandro Lanusse,
future President of Argentina — headed by General Benjamin
Menendez, They had been joined by naval and air force of-
ficers. These officers had become disillusioned with Peron
for several reasons. First, many of them had an upper-class
bias against Peron but had refrained from disposing of him —
though some had tried in 1945 — because of his support from
labor; when rifts appeared in labor, they had decided to
go against Peron openly. Second, the armed forces "had it
forcibly brought home to them that Peron and his wife were
not only impoverishing Argentina but changing its social

^^Ibid., pp. 202-03:

Luna, Argentina de Peron a Lanusse, pp. 72, 74.

158

character" when Evita was nominated for the vice-presi-
dency by the Peronist Party. The idea that a woman could
become President of Argentina and, therefore, commander-in-
chief of the armed forces was still unacceptable. Military
protests, a poor turnout at a rally for her candidacy, and

her failing health had forced her to withdraw her nomina-

tion. Third, the uprising was in reaction to the increas-
ing authoritarianism of the Peron regime. However, in prac-
tice it only led to more suppression: Peron had Congress
pass a law sanctioning an "estado de guerra interne "
which, among other dictatorial powers, allowed his govern-
ment to imprison a citizen without trial. Peron also purged
the Army of three retired generals, nine active generals,
and fifty-six colonels in an effort to break the power of

those officers who opposed him; many of them had opposed

31
Evita's nomination for Vice-President.

When presidential elections were held, in November

1951, the results showed that Peron had not lost the sup-

Ferns, p. 195.

^^Owen, pp. 195, 198-99.

Luna, Argentina de Peron a Lanusse, p. 72.

Owen, pp. 206-7.

159

•

port of the popular masses. In all fairness to his Radical
opponent, it must be said that Ricardo Balbin campaigned
after his release from jail without access to the radios
and newspapers. Even a Radical meeting was broken up by
the armed forces? the Radicals faced the constant threat of

physical repression. Not surprisingly, therefore, Peron

32
received around 62% of the popular vote. Per6n's win

over Balbin was about a 10% gain on the 1945 election re-
turns. The Peronists swept the Congressional seats, winning

all except twelve in the Chamber of Deputies.

It seemed by the end of 1951 that Per6n had complete
control over all groups in Argentina in spite of an economic
downturn that already had caused cracks in his support among
labor and the armed services. The CGT was an important prop
of the government and kept labor in line; officially spon-
sored confederations of professionals, students, and business-
men tried to do the same with their respective groups. Jew-
ish and Protestant congregations had to register and report
their activities annually to the state. Landowners had to
deal with state agencies si^ich as lAPI in order to selL their

Snow, Argentine Radicalism, p. 69,

^^Ibid.

160

produce. The armed forces were run by men loyal to Per6n
or legalistic enough to refrain from a coup d' §tat. The
police were oimiipresent and empowered by law to detain any
suspect without a trial. Education at all levels was con-
trolled by the state. Radio, and television (new since
October 1951) , were censored and used as vehicles for state
propaganda along with cultural and sports events. The press
was gagged and also used to promote the Peronists,

Incipient Church-State Conflict
The one institution not controlled by Per6n was the
Roman Catholic Church, but, even though somewhat independ-
ent, it acted on the whole as a prop to his government. In
1943 the church voluntarily adhered to the military govern-
ment. During the election campaign of 1945-46 it issued a
pastoral letter that aided Per5n. In 1948, when the gov-
ernment announced the discovery of a plot to assassinate
the Perons and even arrested three naval chaplains for com-
plicity, the bishops ordered prayers of thanksgiving that
Peron and Eva had escaped harm to be intoned in all churches.
Again in 1951, the church issued a pastoral letter that sup-
ported the Peronist Party. From the very beginning the

Alexander, The Peron Era, p. 128.

161

Peronist Party welcomed priests as members; most notable
of them were Fathers Virgilio Filippo and Arturo Melo,

Priests were invited to give their blessings, and anti-

35
Peronxst priests were disciplined by the hierarchy.

Although the church was not directly controlled by
Peron, it still was dependent upon him for state subsidies.
Both federal and provincial governments constructed churches
and seminaries, and sustained many church activities. Car-
dinal Copallo ordered churches designed on one architectur-
al model and relied upon the state to have them erected in

different sections of Buenos Aires. Beginning in 1943,

the church received legal privileges from the state such as
ensenanza religiosa that it did not want to lose. Early
conflicts were smoothed over because the ecclesiastics "were
just as much taken in by him /Peron/ as anyone else, and
they only turned away from him when he began to gore their
ox."3'7

As the two Perons moved to change the social and po-
litical structure of Argentina it was natural that they
would find themselves in conflict with the church, an in-

35ibid., pp. 128-29.

Gambini, El peronismo y la iglesia, p. 48.
^^Ferns, p. 196.

162

stitution that had its roots in the established way of do-
ing things. As director of the Secretariat of Labor and
Social Welfare in 1943, Peron began to force employers to
include welfare benefits in union contracts. Under his aus-
pices the state enacted decrees that would benefit Argentine
laborers materially. Eva Peron set up an all-embracing wel-
fare organization, the Eva Per6n Foundation, which distrib-
uted most charitable contributions in Argentina. In this
way, the church's own activities in this field were increas-
ingly overshadowed, to the chagrin of the clergy.

In the same year that Eva was setting up her founda-
tion, she also was instrumental in obtaining the enfranchise-
ment of women. The woman's vote as well as the eligibility
of women to hold office were included in the 1949 Constitu-
tion. In line with traditional attitudes on the proper role
of women, the church opposed woman's suffrage, but it did
not make an issue of it when presented with its enactment.
The church, of course, was shortsighted to oppose it, for,
as Ferns writes, "women in Argentina, as elsewhere, tend to

be more pious than men, and potentially a favorable factor

for the Church in the equations of politics. But the

Church did not see the matter this way at this time."

■^^Ferns, pp. 197-98.

163

Another vmalleviated source of tension in church- _
state relations was Evita's seeking of high papal medals.
Three months after enseRanza religiosa was legalized by
Congress, she visited the Pope in Rome, hoping to receive
the Supreme Order of Christ medal. Instead, she received

the inferior Grand Cross of the Order of Pius XII medal-

39
lion. Agaxn xn 1949 and 1951 Eva sought the higher medal

40
from the Pope, only to be rebuffed.

The two Perons sought to make certain red light dis-
tricts legal in Argentina and here, too, ran up against the
church. The hierarchy and Catholic organizations fought -

the legalization of whore houses, and Cardinal Copello

41
publicly denounced the scheme. During a heated discus-
sion of Cardinals Copello and Caggiano with Peron over
prostitution, Copello asked that the government' s ecclesi-
astical advisor (a post created by Peron) not be allowed
to speak, since this was a matter for the episcopacy and

^Peron used diplomatic channels to support her- am-
bition and claimed that "Dodero me habia asegurado que eso
se arreglaba con ciento cincuenta mil pesos..... . '.' Father

Filippo reported this remark to Cardinal Copello, who pro-
tested: "Nada tengo que hacer yo en este asunto. Ha er-
rado el camino." (Quoted in Ludovico Garcia de Loydi, La
jqlesia frente al peronismo, p , 5 5 . )

40(

Alexander, The Peron Era, p. 131,

^Owen, pp. 108, 138,
41,

164

the advisor did not represent it. Per6n interrupted Co-
pello: "Me falta al respeto" ; he then chewed out the Cardi-
nal. However, Per6n did back down on legalizing bordellos

and, for the present, prostitution remained illegal.

There was one other clash with the church at the end
of Peron's first presidency — one that reflected cooling re-
lations between church and state. Peron gave permission
for a Spiritualist assembly to be held in Luna Park in
October 1950; it was interrupted and broken up by groups of
Catholics. These Catholics ran through the streets and be-
gan to pray as the police detained 200 of them, 80 for bear-

43
ing arms. Peron was so piqued that Catholics had gone ■

against a meeting authorized by him that he did not official-
ly greet the PapaL Legate Cardinal Ruffini, who arrived in
Buenos Aires a week later to attend the Fifth Eucharistic
Congress scheduled to be held at Rosario. Ruffini point-
ed out this slight to the Vice-President when he presented

his credentials. The clergy and hierarchy closed ranks

and went to Rosario for the Congress — no official escort

Garcia de Loydi, pp. 57-59.

^•^"Historia del peronismo: desobedientes y conform-
istas," Primera Plana, V (November 8-14, 1966), 38, 40.

^^"Argentina — 1951," Hemispherica, I (February, 1951),

165

was provided Ruffini for this trip — and the Vice-President

went, too. On the last day of the Congress, Peron and Eva

arrived, knelt, and kissed the ring of the Legate. Peron

delivered

... .a highly emotional discourse about brother-
ly love. The effect of this was completely ob-
lierated a half hour later when, at a banquet
tendered him by the chief of Rosario's police,
he gave one of his most violent pronouncements
against his political opponents, which certain-
ly was intended to reach the ears of the gathered
churchmen ... . . . „ °

Peron also had government representatives see Ruffini off

in order to make sure his opponents did not link up with

the Catholics milling around the Legate.

The episcopacy and Peron resumed cordial relations

after the Ruffini affair, and the bishops felt they had

48
taught him a lesson. They again issued a pastoral letter

for the 1951 elections that warned Catholics not to support

candidates of parties that supported divorce, lay education,

49
etc.. I.e., the Radicals. The hierarchy was also consoled

Gambmi, p. 46,

AC.

"Argentina — 1951," Hemispherica, I (February, 1951), 4,
^^Gambini, p. 46.

^Qibid.

See above, chapter 5, pp. 119-22.

166

when Peron, in 1951, became the first Argentine president ~

to ask the Pope for the declaration of the dogma of the

Assumption of Mary. Perhaps Benitez de Aldama, Eva's

confessor, best summed up the church's attitude toward

Peron:

Seamos sensatos y justos: la Iglesia, el Epis-
copado y los catolicos vibraban al unisono con
los hechos. No significaba esto que aprobaron
algunas medidas totalitarias y cierta falta de
libertad. La Iglesia y los catolicos, no ob-
stante estos desaciertos, continuaron inclinan-
<3ose _ a lo que pesaba mSs, a lo bueno, y
disimulaban y aun toleraban lo que parecia pesar
menos.^^

The Conflict Looms
The first indication of serious trouble with the
church occurred within the context of the worsening econom-
ic situation. By 1952 Peron again was forced to seek a
loan (the first was obtained from the Export-Import Bank
in 1950) from the oft-reviled United States. Many in the
Army and the CGT, besides the Radicals, Socialists, and -
others saw this "deviation" from previous Peronist principles
as a sellout to foreign capitalists. Again in 1953, nation-
alists became dismayed as Peron dropped his anti-imperial- -

"Historia del peronismo: desobedientes, " p. 43.
^^Ibid.

167

ist and anti-Yankee lectures to seek aid from the United

52
States and Britain. Argentina needed funds to rehabil-
itate railroads and electric power production, and to ex-
tract oil. Oil shortages led him in August 1953 to nego-
tiate a secret contract with the Standard Oil Company of

California, and he obtained from Congress a law guarantee-

53
mg foreign investments. European and United States in-
dustrial firms now felt conditions were propitious and be-
gan to take over major sectors of Argentine industry.
Peron offered tariff protection to Italian, German, and
United States firms which made new jobs available to the
working class and university graduates. Peron was now sup-
ported by foreign industrialists, government office-holders

54
and Peronist sycophants, plus his old allies, the workers.

At the same time Peron lost an invaluable ally — his

wife. His circle of friends began to change after Evita's

death from cancer of the uterus. She was no longer around

^^united States aid is credited with having propped
up Peron 's regime. ( "Peron' s Hardest Battle," The Econom-
ist, CLXXV (April 23, 1955), 298.

53 »

See Luna, Argentina de Peron a Lanusse, pp. 80-81;

and Whi taker, Argentina, p. 146.

-^^Ferns, Argentina, pp. 198-99,

168

to censor whom he spent his leisure time with, and dis-
honest speculators and "oscuros interlocutores " replaced
the old companions of the first presidency. Without Evita
after August 1952," . . . Peron began to lose his vital
grip, both upon the descamisados and the CGT," In her
own right she had commanded the loyalty of millions of Ar-
gentines, especially among the cabecitas negras .

Evita' s death affected Peron' s relation with the
church in several ways. First, Peron began to have sexual

relations with teenage girls. R\imors, and even pictures,

57
began to circulate of his relations with minors. This be-
havior was condemned as immoral, and not only by the Cath-
olic church. Second, Evita had paraded herself as a good
Catholic and had astutely buttered up the church. It is
doubtful that she would have risked an open fight with the
church; but without her the possibility could not be ignored,

^^Luna, Argentina de Peron a Lanusse, p. 81.

^^Owen, p. 216.

Pierre Lux-Wurm, Le peronisme (Paris : Librairie

Generale de Droit et de Jurisprudence, 1965), pp. 153-54.

Canclini, Los evanqelicos en el tiempo de Peron,

p. 294.

169

Thirdly, Peron now began a drive for canonization of Evita
which frightened and angered the church. Millions of Ar-
gentines paid their last respects to her cadaver while the
Peronist press and meetings eulogized her. The episcopacy
looked askance at the efforts to elevate Evita prematurely
to sainthood and were jealous of the cult of Evita that
developed outside of the church beyond their control. It

appeared that Per6n "was going to take over the ritual and

59
merit systems of the Church as a political weapon."

The church feared even more that Peronist doctrine
was in competition with the "true faith" for the hearts
and minds of the young. Economic woes resulted in an in-,
crease of Peronist manipulation of the young. In the late
1940' s children's clubs, or C lubes "Evita," had been organ-
ized by the government to take elementary students on sports
outings on Sundays, the very day the church insisted that
they worship. As long as the church felt it was reaching
Argentine youth through classes of ensenanza religiosa it
appeared to be more than compensated. Then, these classes
began to face competition in the schools as the Per6ns in-
troduced classes on National Doctrine. The latter system-

Ferns, p. 197.

170

atically implanted the requirement that teachers discuss
the "life and teaching of Peron and their 'significance'
for the country." In March 1951, the two Perons attend-
ed the opening of the Escuela Superior Peronista which was
to prepare men and women teachers to teach the National
Doctrine in schools throughout Argentina. At this time
Peron declared that the purposes of the school were twofold:
"The first is the formation of justicialists and the second

the exaltation of Peronista values to serve the justicial-

61
ist doctrine in the best way." In 1953, the first class

was graduated.

Gradually the hierarchy began to draw away from Peron,
as he attempted to make Peronism an article of faith for all
Argentines. But instead of making a frontal attack upon
Peron, the episcopacy gave more leeway to the lower clergy
to act. Dissident priests and Catholic laymen were no
longer disciplined, except for those Catholic university
students who organized the Hiimanistas completely independ-

Alexander, The Peron Era, p. 132.

Blanksten, Peron ' s Argentina , p. 342.

"Escuela Superior Peronista," Mundo Peronista, IV

(March 15, 1955), 19-21.

171

ent of hierarchic control.

As early as 1951 teachers of religion had joined

other teachers in protest against having to support Peron's

64
reelectxon. It was also in religious education courses,

according to an ex-Director of Religious Education, that
Peron was first criticized within the schools. Dealing
with topics such as inan's conscience and freedom, and com-
monly enjoying job security as clerics, religion teachers

65
were less inclined to stifle student criticism of Per6n.

The economy meanwhile continued to worsen, and
political repression to increase. In 1953, Peron denounced
the "psychology of rumor" and ominously stated that the Ex-
ecutive Power was ready "to take indispensable measures to

66
assure public safety." After Evita's brother Juan was

involved in corruption and committed suicide, Peron expressed

what many already felt: "Estoy rodeado de ladrones 3/ alca-

huetes."^^

See above, chapter 5, pp. 146-47.

° Interview with Lopez Moure, Buenos Aires, August

9, 1972,

^^Ibid.
66

Lux-Wurm, p. 151.

Luna, Argentina de Peron a Lanusse, p. 79,

172

The opposition also became more violent: on April
15, 1953, a bomb(s) exploded while Peron was speaking to a
crowd of his CGT supporters in front of the Casa Rosada,
Peron promised revenge, and on April 15 and 16 unidentified
persons connected with the CGT put fire to the Jockey Club
and to the party headquarters of the Radical, Socialist,
and National Democratic (Conservative) Parties, plus a bar
frequented by the opposition. This began a vicious circle

of direct physical violence on opponents, further poison-

, . . 68
mg Argentine politics.

Peron also turned his attention to increasing his
political control of Argentine youth. The creation of a
Confederacion General Universitaria to draw away members
from the banned FUA and the regimentation of university ad-
ministration and curricula have been noted in the previous

chapter. At the secondary level, the Minister of Educa-
tion Armando Mendez San Martin in 1953 formed the Union de

70
Estudiantes Secundarios (UES). Secondary students through-

^8 Ibid.

See above, chapter 5, pp. 143-45.

"U.E.S.: escuela de solidaridad, " Mundo Peronista,

IV (June 1, 1955), 30-31.

173

out Argentina could join the UES and participate in sports,
tours, broadcasting and other activities. Peron delighted
in the UES, and funds flowed to it: already in November

1953, the male branch of the UES could move into new and

71
permanent headquarters on the Avenida Las Heras. An

elegant sports and country club for the UES was built on

land adjoining the President's home in Olivos; the female

quarters of this club were connected by a tunnel known as

the " pochoduc " to the presidential home. For Per6n had

taken the nickname of " Pocho " and enjoyed cavorting with

female UES motor scooter formations, also known as "pocho-

72
netas." It seemed that Peron was spending most of his .

time with the UES. There was hardly an issue of Mundo

Peronista that did not carry an article and pictures of

Peron viewing and promoting its activities.

The church disliked this steady increase in political

encroachment upon a domain in which it, too, was very much

interested — doctrine and activities for the nation's youth.

An American author prophetically wrote in 1951 that "if

the trend toward a totalitarian form of Peronismo continues.

"^■•■Ibid.

Lux-Wurm, p. 154; and "Motonetas: otra industria
nacional," Mundo Peronista, IV (November 1, 1954), 13-15.

174

the teaching of that 'one true faith of all Argentines' is

likely to come into conflict with the teaching of the Faith

73
of the Church." Neither was the church iitimune to the

growing disaffection with Peron brought about by Argentina's

economic slide. As other groups stepped up their opposition

to Peron, it was only natural that opposition would grow

within the church.

As noted above, the church hierarchy did not rein in

Catholics who went against Peron after 1951. By 1954 it

became apparent that the church, the one truly national

institution that had not been purged or dominated by Peron,

was moving toward even greater independence. Likewise,

Catholic laymen began to form groups to study and plan the

organization of a political party, the Christian Democratic

Party, that would have at least informal ties with the church.

Among these were Manuel V. Ordonez who headed the Fraternidad

circles, the Fray Mamerto Esquiu group whose headquarters

were in the house of Pedro Balinas, Alberto Velez Funes

and Marcos Agrelo who headed the Union Cristiana Democratica

in C<5rdoba, and a democratic Catholic sector of Rosario

74
which was directed by Juan T, Lewis. Catholics who had

^Alexander, The Peron Era, p. 132,

Gambini, El peronismo y la iglesia, p. 48,

175

opposed Peron from the beginning had been held back by the
hierarchy when liberal magazines such as Estrada were cen-
sured by the hierarchy. Now they received the support of

the episcopacy, and the Christian Democratic Party was

75
formed in July 1954.

The episcopacy also showed interest in promoting

church-oriented labor unions, vindicating Bishop de Andrea's

thinking. In mid-1953. Cardinal Caggiano had disclaimed

any interest of the church to form unions during a speech

at the Eighth Diocesan Assembly of Catholic Action:

No pretende la AC — porque no pretende la
Iglesia — dirigir los sindicatos ni dirigir
los partidos politicos.

In 1954, however. Catholic Youth workers started to prosely-

77
tize in factories, and in November Peron was to accuse

the church of infiltrating labor unions as well as polit-
ical parties.

The church also stepped up its organizing activities
among secondary students to counter the UES . The church al-

^^Ibid., pp. 48, 74^.

Antonio Caggiano, "La Accion Catolica, sus derechos
y sus deberes ante la iglesia y la sociedad civil," Boletin
Oficial de la ACA. XXIII (July, 1953), 138.

Friedenberg, "Peronl Peronl Peronl" New Republic,

p. 15.

176

ready had student members of Catholic Action groups to act

78
as a Union of Catholic Students. Priests. further respond-
ed to PerSn's immoral carrying-on with the teenage girls of

the UES by recommending from the pulpit that mothers not al-

79
low their daughters to attend UES functions. The clergy's

criticisms of the UES came on top of the founding of the

Christian Democratic Party and the church's union activity,

aggravating tensions even more.

Peron still appeared secure in his political control

of Argentina. Elections for a new Vice-President had been

held on April 25, 1954, in which the Peronist candidate had

received 4,994,106 votes to 2,493,422 for the opposing Rad-

80
ical candidate. What did preoccupy Peron and his Minister

of Education M^ndez San Martin, however, was the church's
competition with the Peronists for the allegiance of the
young. The government began to attack the independence of
the Catholic schools, as when, in September 1954, by author-
ity of the 1947 Estatuto del Docente, it imposed the manda-

Ibid.

Statements of Manuel V. Ordonez, the main founder
of the Christian Democratic Party in Rosario, quoted in
Gambini, pp. 81-82.

Lux-Wurm, p. 151.

177

tory teaching of the National Doctrine in private schools.
This decree was issued while scandalous riimors about Peron's
activities with the feminine branch of the UES were circu-
lating. In the same month. Congress passed a law granting
illegitimate children the same rights as those born to

married parents; this antagonized the church and convinced

81
many clerics that they should no longer support Peron,

In the light of such developments. Catholics were all the

more inclined to censure Per6n's totalitarian pretensions

to dominate the spiritual content of national education.

The latent conflict between the two "true faiths" of..
Peronism and Catholicism over Argentine youth came perma-
nently out into the open when Per6n's special love, the UES,
was rebuked by Catholic Action: in Buenos Aires the direc-
tors of Catholic Action criticized a huge fiesta given by
Peron at his presidential residence for UES athletes on
September 21, 1954, and at the same time criticized Mendez
San Martin. There followed a vitriolic campaign on the part

of Catholic Action against both the UES and the Minister of

83
Education. In Cordoba, Catholic Action threw a huge par-

^^Owen, p., 221.
^^Lux-Wurm, p. 247.
^•^Gambini, p. 75.

178

ty at the same time that one was going on for the UES; the

84
former had a larger turnout than the latter. These cler-
ical or clerically-inspired moves against the UES so affect-
ed Peron that he became furious with the church and with

85
the clergy generally. Pressure was brought to bear on

Catholic Action in Cordoba that resulted in the dismissal
of some of its functionaries. The Peronist press geared up
for a campaign against the clergy — denouncing their "infil-
trations" into national institutions and the "imperialism
of the cassock."

The Ministry of Education became one of the main cen-
ters of the controversy, for Minister of Education Mendez .

San Martin was adamant that Peron take a stand against the

87
church. He was convinced that the teachers of ensenanza

reliqiosa were anti -Peronist and concluded from this that

the church was too. As the founder of the UES, he person-

°^Lux-Wurm, p. 247.

o c

Garcia de Loydi, La iglesia frente al peronismo,
p. 49.

Lux-Wurm, p. 247.

°' Pablo Marsal, Peron y la iglesia (Buenos Aires:
Ediciones Rex, 1955), pp. 10, 22, 37,

Interview with L6pez Moure, Buenos Aires, August

9, 1972.

179

ally was subject to intense Catholic Action criticism. Cath-
olics accused him of being a puppet of the Masonic lodges,

and blamed him for having the "machiavelian" goal of pitting

89
Peron against the church. Catholics also accused him of

forging some of the pamphlets that were circulating on

Peron 's private life to appear as the work of Catholic Ac-

90
tion.

Another center of opposition to the church was the
labor movement. Traditionally, the workers had been anti-
clerical; older trade unionists had told an American schol-
ar in 1950 "that they did not particularly like the close
link between Per6n and the Church, but that it was not a

sufficiently grave issue to get upset about, in view of the

« . 91

good thxngs which Peron was doing." The unionists m the

CGT were inclined to blame the clergy for growing popular
disaffection toward Peron 's government, and their anti-
clericalism was soon to become virtually an antireligious

policy.

Peron himself later blamed his breach with the church

Garcia de Loydi, p. 49.

^•^Marsal, p. 13.

Alexander, The Peron Era, p. 130.

Luna, Argentina de Peron a Lanusse, pp. 83-84.

180

on the latter 's attempt to compete with the state and its
associations:

Junto con la aparicion del partido Democrata

Cristiano en la Argentina, comenzaron a

aparecer Asociaciones de medicos, maestros,

abogados, industriales, ganaderos, obreros cato-

licos, etc. Esto promovio un sentimiento de

inquietud entre los dirigentes de las mas

diversas organizaciones gremiales, hasta que un

dia se presentaron a mi despacho los Secretaries

Generales de la Confederacion General del

Trabajo, Economica, de Profesionales, de Sstudl-

antes, etc. En esa reunion me hicieron

presente su inquietud por la intervencion de

la Iglesia en sus actividades gremiales. Ellos

entendian que la Iglesia podia asociar a los

catolicos, pero no a los obreros, profesionales,

estudiantes, etc., como entes gremiales y, en

consecuencia, pedian una solucion al conflict©

. 93
por parte del gobierno.

On September 27, 1954, in a move principally directed against

Catholic professional organizations, the Congress passed a

law withdrawing "juridic personality" from associations

based on a religion, belief, nationality, race, or sex.

This meant that Catholic associations of professionals would
no longer enjoy legal status.

Peron next addressed himself to the threat of com-
petition of Catholic unions to the CGT. In a speech to

p. 72.

Peron, La fuerza es el derecho de las bestias.

^^Lux-Wurm/ ■ p. 248.

181

the CGT on September 29, Peron assailed Catholic unions:

I recall that when I came to power, religious
syndicates already existed. What is religion
doing in that area? The workers do not want
to be encumbered by religion, and religion
must not enter into the unions. They that
want religion may practice it in their pri-
vate lives, but not in the union s where we

95
are all the same.

This tirade against Catholic syndicates was not taken seri-
ously by the hierarchy, who considered the speech of "minor"

96
importance.

In the month of October, Peron began in earnest his

campaign against the church, "la unica institucion todavia

independiente . " On October 17, he made an indirect refer-
ence to the clergy while discussing the enemies of Peronism,
and called on Argentines to choose sides, since neutrality
was unpatriotic .

En este momento, si miramos el panorama de la
RepubULca en el orden politico, veremos tres
clases de adversarios: los politicos, los co-
munis tas y los embozados . . . Estan tambien
los apoliticos, que son algo asi como la bosta
de paloma; y son asl porque no tienen ni buen
ni mal olor. Y los enemigos disfrazados de
peronistas, que tambiSn los hay. A estos los

^^Ibid. , p. 247.

^^At least so said Manuel Tato, the auxiliary bishop
of Buenos Aires who was exiled by Peron in June 1955. (Man-
uel Tato, "Exile's Story," The Sentinel of the Blessed Sac-
rament. LVIII November, 1955/, 522.)

97 *

Luna , Argentina de Peron a Lanusse, p . 83 .

182

vamos conociendo poco a poco, y eliminando de
toda posibilidad . . . Cuando la suerte de la
Republic se juega en su destino, hay un solo
delito infamante para el ciudadano: no estar gg
en ninguno de los dos bandos o estar en los dos.

The government stepped up its pressure on the church:
the Minister of the Interior, having taken over jurisdiction
in the mxinicipality of Buenos Aires, prohibited a series of
conferences organized by the Catholic Action Center of Pro-
fessionals of Economics. He also prohibited Family Week

which had been organized by the Corporation of Catholic

99
Lawyers .

On October 22, Peron held a meeting at the Casa
Rosada with sixteen members of the church hierarchy, includ-
ing Cardinals Copello and Caggiano and the papal nuncio
Zanin. As to what transpired during this meeting, there
are two principal versions, both emanating from Peron. When
Peron first spoke of what happened in an address at Luna
Park, he said that the episcopacy was in agreement with the

Gambini, pp. 75-76; and Mundo Peronista, IV (Novem-
ber 1, 1954), 23-24.

5^Cesar H. Belaunde, "La persecuci6n religiosa de
1945-55," 30 anos de Accion Catolica, p. 53.

■'■^^The date of this meeting is mentioned in only
one source. (Gambini, p. 76.)

183

Peronists' charges that certain clerics were infiltrating
their organizations and hurting their movements. Peron had
called representatives of the " Or ganizaciones del Pueblo" —
Confederacion General del Trabajo, Confederacion General
del Profesionales, Confederacion General Economica, Confede-
racion General Universitaria, Asociacion Estudiantil, "^
otras entidades de distinto carScter" — to come meet with
the episcopacy at that very gathering. The calling of these
Peronist representatives had been on short notice, according
to Peron 's original version, for they were "sorprendidos
con mi llamado ^ no_ tenxan los documentos ni los casos con-
cretes que podrian citarse en una reunion como esta. "
Yet the clerics seemed to have been willing to believe the
Peronist charges :

Me dijeron ese mismo dia los prelados, que eran

los primeros que condenaban esa accion al margen

de la obligacion de los clerigos y que, como en

todas las organizaciones humanas, habia hombres

102
que cumplian y hombres que no cumplian.

In a later recounting of these events, Per6n still

saw himself as an independent referee, but the tone had be-

•'■^■'■"Una situacion clara," Mundo Peronista, IV (Decem-
ber 1, 1954), 24.

^°^Ibid. , p. 23.

184

come more anti-episcopacy. Per6n called the representatives
of the Orqanizaciones del Pueblo so that they could "better
inform" the episcopacy of the "demand as de las orqanizaciones
sindicales." The hierarchy was more antagonistic and defend-
ed their associations on the grounds that they were reli-
gious, an inkling that more than just "clerical infiltra-
tions" of organizations was involved, as Peron had before
simply described the encounter. Peron went on to state
that the explanations of the ecclesiastics were not accepted
by the labor representatives and that he decided to appoint
a commission to settle the dispute and render" ' ajL C^sar lo
que era del Cesar y a Dios lo que era de Dios.'" Peron
lamented that this commission was never named and that a

crisis developed because of popular demonstrations against

104

the aforementioned clerical activities.

One thing certain is that the principal non-church
parties present at the conference were PerSn and Minister
of Education Mendez San Martin, for it was rivalry in ed-
ucation that instigated the confrontation between church
and state. In fact, criticism of the UES had piqued Peron

^•^Peron, La fuerza es el derecho de las bestias.

p. 73.

104

Ibid.

185

and Mendez San Martin to the point where they decided to
bring private education fully under their control, ending
the privileges, and thereby the independence, of Catholic
schools and Catholic youth groups and associations. Be-
cause the church viewed part of its historic mission as
the education of the young, it could hardly give in to Pe-
ron's intervention in this area. Already the government
had decreed that private schools must teach the National
Doctrine. The church was to face more government interfer-
ence in the schools in the months ahead, resulting in the
resolve of the church to make a stand against Peron. Lux-
Wurm concluded, "Ce fut sans doute ^ cause des interventions

reiterees de L' Etat: dans 1 ' enseignement prive que le clerq^

105

commenca a^ manifester de la mauvaise humeur . "

The church hierarchy still did not openly attack Per&n,
but neither was it failing to notice that others were. Since
the beginning of October, university students were carrying
out a nationally organized strike against the Peron govern-
ment in protest against police acts in breaking up a student
assembly of engineering students at the University of Buenos
Aires. The outlawed student federations of FUA had called
this strike, revealing the inability of the Peronists to co-

105

Lux-Wurra, p. 247.

186

106
erce, indoctrinate, and entice youth. Moreover, on No-
vember 1, 1954, the hierarchy did make an indirect attack
on Peron, showing that it still was an independent force
that had to be reckoned with. It published a pastoral let-
ter condemning "the aberrations of spiritism, "^*^^ a veiled
criticism of Per5n, who had permitted spiritualists to as-
semble in Argentina and who had met with them. The bishops
had only ten days to wait before they received Peron' s re-
sponse .

1 06

Walter, Student Politics in Argentina, pp. 143-46,

1 07

•^^'Gambmi, p. 76.

CHAPTER SEVEN

CHURCH-STATE STRIFE: PART II

Government Offensive
Peron retaliated on November 10, 1954, with a speech
that was a bombshell, surprising the public and commencing
a virulent and violent campaign against the Argentine Roman
Catholic Church. In this address to the provincial gover-
nors, territorial delegates, and "representatives of the
popular forces," he denounced Catholic Action as "una
asociacion internacional que en su seno, contar^, sin dud a,
con anti-peronistas . " He accused Catholics of causing prob-
lems for the trade unions, the Confederacion General Eco-

n&mica, the ConfederaciOn de Profesionales, the ConfederaciSn

1
General Universitaria, and the other student organizations.

Peron continued by insisting that he had no problem
with the church, only with a few priests and Catholic lay-
men "que estan perturbando . " He called on "los responsables
de la Iqlesia argentina" to condemn them and take sanctions
against them as they had promised I He then denounced three

Hechos e Ideas, XXVII, nos. 126-127 (October -Novem-

ber, 1954), 385-97.

187

188

bishops as "enemigos del gobierno" : Bishops Laff ite,
Fasolino, and Ferreyra of Cordoba, Santa Fe, and La Rioja
respectively. He went on to identify individual priests
from the provinces of Corrientes, Catamarca, Santiago del
Estero, San Luis, and Rio Negro as enemies. The most
troublesome priests were in the province of C&rdoba: a
Father Bordagaray who was an advisor to the Catholic union
of university students, the Ateneo Universitario de C6rdoba,

had gone so far as to state that one must choose between

Christ and Peron. This speech, formulated after discus-
sions between Peron and leaders of the Peronist Party and

3
CGT, was broadcast twice over the national radio network,

4
giving it wide publicity and a greater impact.

Peron broadened his attack to include "clerical in-
filtration" of unions and organizations rather than merely
clerical influence on the young, clerical competition in
education, and clerical criticism of the UES. This is
because Peron needed shock troops which were to be found
in the CGT and Peronist Party. Supporters from these groups

^Ibid.

3
Owen, p. 222.

"^Tato, "Exile's Story," p. 522.

189

were more likely to be enthused to do battle with the
church if they saw a clear and present danger to them.
Since the Peronist state had helped the church in the field
of education through subsidies, a law for enseflanza reli-
giosa, and the 1947 Estatuto del Docente which provided
moneys for private schools, it would be difficult for Peron
to denounce Catholic infiltration of education. It was
even harder for Per6n to allude directly to clerical con-
demnation of his immoral relations with the UES since most
Argentines condemned them. Thus Per6n consulted with his
allies in the CGT and Peronist Party to find issues which
would convince their members to move against the church,

Peron handed over his list of clerics who had pro-
voked him to the Minister of Foreign Relations and Cult
who immediately began to arrest and detain them, in spite

of a visit on November 11 from the Papal Legate Zanln to

5
the Minister. The government's propaganda machine began

to roll: Democracia spoke of evil pastors, and the Peron-
ist press insulted the clergy and pope. La Prensa, under
Peronist control since 1951, charged that "what these priests
are trying to do is sit at a table that has already been

^Gambini, El peronismo y la iglesia, p. 81.

190

laid, take over, and gain credit for what they did not

create. ..." Plainclothesmen began taking notes on what

7
priests said from pulpits, A CordobSs priest was arrest-
ed for supposedly preaching a sermon in which he compared

Hitler's persecution of Catholics to Per6n's, Municipal

orders were issued to remove posters announcing the MisicSn
Bonaerense and to dismantle church loudspeakers . Religious
acts were cancelled, more priests detained, and Catholic
radio programs were taken off the air.

On November 25, 1954, the very Sunday the church
was protesting its persecution in a pastoral letter to the
laity, Peron addressed a mass meeting at Luna Park organ-
ized by the Peronist Party and the CGT to protest "clerical
infiltration." Per6n averred that "no force in the world

can control our Government and place it in opposition to

9
the people," and claimed that he had run out of patience

because the bishops had not taken any action to rectify

the wrongs he had cited in his November 10th speech to the

^Tato, p. 522.
"^Ibid.

^Owen, pp. 222-23

9
Owen, p. 223.

191

governors. Peronists marched to this assembly carrying
banners and standards bearing such slogans as "Per6n, Yesl-

Priests, Nol", "No more Religious Teaching: ", and "We Want

10
Divorce." A dummy priest was hung from the gallows, and

the presidents of the male and female branches of the CGT

11
made violent speeches: "Our people know that it is not

necessary to respect empty idols and that the habit does

not make the monk"; "The oligarchy hides behind cassocks";

"War is a man's affair; they should not complain like women";

"To the rear, merchants of religion, to the back, enemies

of the people and enemies of God."

University students in Santa FS and C(5rdoba were ar-
rested during police raids in November. Forty-five profes-
sors, including five priests, were dismissed from the Uni-
versity of C6rdoba by special order of Perc5n on December
28. The entire provincial judiciary was suspended in C6r-

doba. The city of GSrdoba, Argentina's most Catholic major

13
city, was being singled out for repression of dissent.

^°Ibid. , p. 224.

Belaunde, "La persecucion religiosa, " pp. 53-54.

Lux-Wiarm, Le p^ronisme, p. 248.

Owen, pp. 222-23, 225.

192

General harassment of the church throughout Argen-
tina continued. A law banned open mass meetings and public
processions without official permission, and under this law
religious processions were prohibited by the Subsecretary

of Religion of the Ministry of Foreign Relations and Cult

14
Father Leonardo Benitez de Aldama, the brother of Evita's

confessor. In defiance of one of these orders, the church

celebrated the Marian year with a procession in the federal

capital while the government staged a counter demonstration

15
welcoming back a boxing champion. The demonstrators at

the Catholic ceremony gathered outside the Cathedral and

Cardinal Copello's residence to protest the government's

anti-clerical policy: they chanted "Argentina is Catholicl"

16
and "Long live the Pope! " A secret order to create dis-
turbances in the churches was circulated among the females

17
of the Peronist Party. Religious symbols were removed

from public offices and unions, and secular Christmas dec-
orations were substituted for religious ones in the federal

Belaionde, p. 54.

^^Tato, p. 523,

Owen, p. 224.

Belaunde, p. 54.

193

capital, ■ r-^--

Christmas was celebrated laically by the state, with
the Secretary-General of the CGT addressing the people on
radio and asking them to drink to the health of Per6n and
Evita, and to the country. On the Epiphany, Per6n broad-
cast a message recalling that "men and their children are

the sole and unique Magi Kings who, in the future, will as-

sure the country's destiny and bestow it with gifts."- --i-

The cult of Evita was extended, and pictures of her in -----

20
saintly clothes and postures appeared. .rz-.z

Several measures were adopted in December 1954 that

were meant to hurt or at least annoy the church. Divorce

was legalized on December 14; it was learned on December 21

that public reunions could be intervened by the police if

they menaced public tranquility or if the celebration were

against the interests of the people; and houses of pros-
titution, legally closed down since 1936, were authorized
by a decree of December 30, signed by President Perfin-and'--

^^Ibid.

Lux-Wurm, p. 249,

^^Mundo Peronista. IV (January 15, 1955), p. 23

^ -^Lux-Wurm, p. 249.

194

all his Cabinet ministers.

The government hit hard at Catholic education, the
church's most sensitive area since education was central
to its divine mission to teach the faith. Catholic uni-
versity associations such as the Ateneos at the univer-

sities of Santa Fe and Cordoba were dissolved. The

Jesuit Colegio del Salvador lost its autonomy for the pri-
mary grades enjoyed since November 1943, when a decree of

December 10, 1954, abolished this privilege. Similarly,

the Jesuit Institute de Humanidades de Salta lost state rec-
ognition of its degrees of bachillerato, granted since Feb-

25
ruary 1952, by a decree issued on January 12, 1955.

Decree No. 20.564 of December 2, 1954, put the church

on notice that the government threatened its catechism

classes in the national schools. In the "consideraciones"

to this decree, the government argued that particularly in

the light of legislation establishing National Doctrine as

a required element of the curriculum the Ministry of Educa--

tion could not abdicate its supreme responsibility in the

Owen, p. 225.
^^Belaunde, p. 54.
^"^ALA 1954, XIV-B, p. 1334.
^^ALA 1955, XV-A, p. 50.

195

field of education. This in turn precluded an outside
authority such as the Autoridad EclesiSstica interfering
in the selection of teachers, texts, and curriculiam even
for religion and morality classes. Therefore, article two
of this decree ended the offices of Direction and Inspection

of Religious Education and Morality within the Ministry of

Education.

This decree did not terminate enseHanza religiosa
in the national schools, but it was a harbringer of the

government's intentions. A decree of December 8 authorized

the firing of religion teachers in the national schools,

and by the beginning of 1955, 102 clerics had been dismissed;
but classes of ensenanza religiosa existed until they were
ended by ministerial resolution in April, and by Congression-
al law in May.

On December 28, 1954, the government ended its fi-
nancial support of Catholic schools by abrogating article 24

This decree had the goal of ending religious educa-
tion in the public schools. ("Nuestra Contribuci&n a la Paz
de la Paz de la Patria: DeclaraciSn Episcopal Denunciando
la Persecucion Religiosa en la Argentina," June 7, 1955,
quoted in Criterio, XXVIII /July 28, 1955,/, 523-29.)

^^Lux-Wurm, p. 249.

196

of the 1947 Estatuto which provided for state funding of

29
the personnel of es tablec imientos adscriptos. Private

schools were being closed on various pretexts, and, by

the beginning of 1955, eighty private schools had been

closed.

Ecclesiastic Offensive
The church hierarchy reacted to the government's
moves by publishing a series of pastorals, by exhorting
the faithful, and by holding demonstrations; all the while,
it hoped to renew negotiations with Per5n, in order to re-
gain its former privileges and autonomy. In this vein it
sent letters to Per&n: a letter of November 19, 1954,
from the cardinals and bishops, reminded Per6n that the
church did its spiritual work within a peaceful atmosphere,
that it had been helped by Peron who had sponsored the law
for ensenanza religiosa. Now the episcopacy was left with
the impression of "asombro" and "estupor" in light of the
public charges made by Peron along with his denunciation

"Cartas del Episcopado Argentmo al Excmo. Sr.

Presidente de la Nacion Argentina y al Excmo. Sr. Ministro
de Educacion de la Nacion," March 16, 1955, quoted in Revista
Eclesiastica de Buenos Aires, LV (April, 1955), 117-18.

Lux-Wurm, p. 249.

197

of a small n\amber of priests accused of interfering in

unions and student organizations. The letter affirmed the

apolitical character of the church's institutions, ACA,

clergy, and bishops. Per6n was reminded of his words at

the close of the 1953 First Congress of Ensefianza Religiosa;

Yo como catolico, siento una inmensa satisfacci-
on por el trabajo realizado por Vds, como asl
tambien, como servidor de la doctrina cristiana
siento la inmensa satisfacci^n. ,, . . .

Another letter was sent to Per6n from the Argentine episco-
pacy a day later, asking him for a list of specific charges

against the church.

The episcopacy then turned to the faithful, issuing
a pastoral on November 22 to be read in all churches on
Sunday, November 25 and December 5. It stated that in face
of the denunciations made against certain priests and Roman
Catholic associations the bishops would adopt the appropri-
ate measures. The bishops went on to recall the respective
rights of church and state. The priest was not to remain
indifferent but was expected to defend eternal Values when
confronted with the lay school, divorce, or Communism. The

"Carta al Excmo. Sr, Presidente de la Naci6n, "

November 19, 1944, quoted in Criterio, XXVII (November 25,

1954), 843-44.

Tato, p. 524.

198

church's mission could not be confined to the temples be-
cause she must preach the Gospel everywhere. Yet the priest

and Catholic Action were to remain outside and above polit-

• •. ^- 33
ical parties.

After this pastoral was read. Cardinal Copello and
Nuncio Zanxn went to see the Minister of Foreign Relations
and Cult to negotiate the disputes. But this came to naught:
Peron had deduced from the pastoral that the church had be-
gun a war with the state, and he had decided to answer it
by the Decree of December 2, 1954, which began the govern-
ment's attack on ensenanza religiosa.

The church had to contend with Peronist ideas of
Christmas in the month of December besides defending its
school system and religion classes in the public schools.
The church tried to warn the faithful away from lay celebra-
tions of Christmas that fed the cult of Evita. A circular
of December 2 forbade Catholics "to attend acts that pre-
tend to have a religious character without having been ap-
proved in advance by the hierarchy. "-^^ The church ended

"Carta Pastoral a los Cabildos EclesiSsticos, al
Clero Diocesano y Regular y a Todos los Fieles," November 22,
1954, quoted in Criterio, XXVII (November 25, 1954), 844-45.

Gambmi, p. 83.

-^Lux-Wurm, p. 249.

199

December condemning the legalization of divorce and pros-
titution, and warning against the separation of church and
state.

January was a quieter month, but there were ominous

signs for the church. Chaplains were expelled from seven-

37
teen prisons on the 14th. The municipality of Buenos

38
Aires permitted a strip-tease place to open. The Bishop

of Santa Fe published a pastoral calling on all to "traba-

jar incansablemente por mejorar el ambiente espiritual ^

39
moral que nos rodea. " The church also forged weapons to

fight the state: there were demonstrations of the church
faithful; a clandestine press sprand up to combat the of-
ficial press, Verdad being the most renowned example. The
letter sought to refute charges against the church and its

activities and to encourage solidarity in face of govern-

40
ment persecution.

The fact that schools were closed for summer vaca-

"Pastoral of December 23, 1954," quoted in Gambini,

p. 83.

Tato, p. 523.

Gambmx, p. 84.

Ibid.

Belaunde, "La persecucion religiosa," pp. 556-59.

200

tion until mid-March somewhat lessened the tension on the
education front, and in particular reduced the involvement
of students in the church-state dispute. Moreover, during
this lull Cardinal Copello and Per6n tried to reach an ac-
comodation; there were meetings between ':them_on_ February _22

41 42

and 24. Copello also met with the Minister of Education.

Nevertheless, decrees continued to be issued that under-
mined the position of Catholic schools, and when schools

reopened in March the government stepped up its policy to

end Catholic competition with it m the field of education.

On March 1, 1955, Decree No. 2917 ended the autonomy
of the Institute Adscripto del Profesorado del Consejo Su-
perior de Educacion Catolica, granted it by previous decree
in March 1950. This meant that the titles issed to its
graduates for teaching in secondary education were no longer
recognized by the state. Students already enrolled could
transfer to the Institute Nacional del Profesorado Secun-
dario of the federal capital. Also on March 1, two schools

Gambini, p. 84,

Tato, p. 524.

See above, pp. 194-95.

^^ALA 1955, XV-A, p. 90.

201

operated by the Assumptionist order were closed in the fed-
eral capital. Soon after, the Institute de Humanidades in

45
Salta was intervened.

The hierarchy responded with several letters in mid-
March. In a message to the Minister of Education the epis-
copacy lamented the present organization of religious educa-
tion in the public schools. Without their approval of texts,

curriculum, and teachers the orthodoxy of these courses was

46
imperiled. In a letter to Per6n written on the same day,

the hierarchy complained that the constitutional rights of
its private schools had been violated. They deplored "la
actual condicion a_ que han side reducidos los coleqios
catolicos. " They specifically asked PerSn to suspend the
decrees and resolutions which ended state funding of pri-
vate schools, ended the autonomy of the Institute del Pro-
fesorado of CONSUDEC, and gave the Ministry of Education

the authority to release from employment and transfer the

47
personnel of religious schools.

Belaunde, p. 56.

Letter of March 16, 1955, "Cartas del Episcopado

Argentine," pp. 121-23.

This letter was also dated March 16, 1955, ibid. ,

pp. 117-18.

202

The hierarchy also made it clear to the faithful in

a Lenten Pastoral of March 19, 1955, that was read on March

27, that it considered religious education in the public

schools to be of prime necessity to the church:

Con el restablecimiento de la enseHanza re-
ligiosa, asi ha acontecido en la escuela ar-
gentina; y es de esperar que la comprensi6n
y buena voluntad de los gobernantes mantengan
esta conquista, reconocida como necesidad
hasta en naciones alejadas de la Iglesia
catolica.

The bishops maintained that it was the right and mission
of the church to teach. They wanted access to the mass
media to carry out this mission (Peron had discontinued
Catholic broadcasts, and the Peronist press no longer pro-
moted the church) . This letter went on to warn that if a
Roman Catholic adopted a position contrary to the church's,
he put himself in the camp of the apostates (a threat of
excommunication) . Citing Re rum Nova rum, the episcopacy
denied it had neglected social works. It also denied that
it wanted political or temporal domination: it only tried
to save souls. Recent events it could not be silent about
were the prohibition of religious processions and Catholic

"Pastoral Colectiva del Episcopado Argentine Sobre

los Derechos de la Iglesia," March 19, 1955, quoted in

Criterio, XXVIII (April 7, 1955), 261-62.

203

public assemblies, the authorization of propagandists of
other religions, the use of radio by other religions when
Catholic programs were prohibited, and the removal of pub-
lic functionaries from their posts for religious reasons.
The pastoral ended by giving "our voice of encouragement

and comfort" to those who had been imprisoned for the same

49
motives .

The government acted to remove religious festivals
as public holidays from the calendar in a decree signed by
Peron and all the cabinet ministers. No change was made
as regards Christmas and Good Friday, but other religious
holidays were given no recognition at all, becoming regular
work days. National holidays were to include Eva's death
and October 17 (Peron 's return from detention in 1945).

The month of April saw the continuation of a flurry
of activity in the Ministry of Education that was directed
against the church's educational sphere. An April 14
ministerial resolution called for the suspension "momen-
tarily" of religion classes in the national schools under
the pretext of arranging to restore them on some different

Ibid.

^^Decreto No.3991, March 21, 1955, ALA 1955, XV-A,

pp. 98-99,

204

basis. The episcopacy relied that very day by deplor-
ing moves tending to bring about the separation of church
and state. It quoted the pastoral of October 3, 1931:

No contentos los propulsores del laicismo
con haber expulsado a Dios de las escuelas
de la familia, pretenden borrar de las leyes
y aun del mismo Codigo fundamental cuantos
vestigios encue^Jran de la piedad de nuestros^
mayores ....

The Peronist priest Father Virgilio Filippo decried
on the floor of the Chamber of Deputies the governmental

measures taken to end religious education in the public

53
schools. But this had little effect on the deputies who,

only the day before, had eliminated the religious oath

taken by their prospective members during the swearing in

54
to that Chamber. All through this month of April, Cath-
olic laymen and priests were detained along with other op-
ponents to the Peron regime.

On Labor Day, May 1, the CGT and Peronist Party dem-

Belaunde, p. 57.

"Declaraci5n de la Comisi6n Permanente del Epis-

copado Argentine," April 14, 1955, quoted in Criterio,

XXVIII (April 28, 1955), 2'97.

Garcia de Loydi, La iglesia f rente al peronismo,

pp. 41-42.

This was on April 26, 1955. (Tato, p. 523.)

205

onstrated against the church, calling for its separation

from the state and for the definitive suppression of ense-

« 55

nanza reliqiosa by congressional legislation. Per6n

gave a speech the same day in which he rejected clerical
pretensions that only the church had the right to care for
souls, averring that the state also had such a right be-
cause, united, the souls of individual Argentines made up
"el alma comun de nuestro pueblo. "

The church chose to answer Peron this time in a dif-
ferent form: the prosecretary of the Curia replied to the
above assertions in a sermon given five days later in the
Cathedral. And on May 6th, an anti-Peronist street demon-
stration organized by ACA took place during rush hour; it
was witnessed by thousands of office workers who received

anti-Peronist handbills printed on the sub rosa Catholic

57
press. Unlike previous Catholic demonstrations held to

support the church, this one was both militant and specif-
ically anti -Peron — the first of this kind since Per6n's
election.

Campobassi, Ataque y defensa del laicismo escolar

en la Argentina, p. 83.

Gambini, p. 84.

^"^Ibid.

206

The police arrested many demonstrators and suffered
two wounded along with two crippled buses when the Cath-
olics resisted their interfering. In reprisal, the govern-
ment arrested twenty members of the Junta Central of ACA

and closed down ACA's offices. Those detained ACA members

58
were gradually released during May 11-17.

Congress acted in May to remove past privileges of
the church. Legislation was introduced to suppress ense-
Ttanza religiosa in the national schools. In the Senate,
six Peronist senators, all connected with the CGT, presented
legislation to this effect. What followed was less of a de-
bate than an explanation on the part of the Peronists as to
why they now opposed catechism in the public schools. The
bill passed in the Senate on May 11 and was taken up by
the Chamber. Peronist deputies accused the church of in-
citing rebellion against the authorities, encouraging the

people "to give to God what is God's and to take from Caesar

what is Caesar's." They accused the clerical teachers

of using their posts to criticize Peron and his revolution
in a conflict brought about by a bad group of priests rath-

Tato, p. 523.

Deputy Etelvina C. Barreto, DSCD 1955, I, p. 214.

207

er than the church itself. The church was charged with

using the Ministry of Education for its own selfish ends,
and with organizing social organisms — workers and profes-
sionals— on confessional' lines which clashed with secular

61
Peronist ones.

The Radical deputies in the Chamber, long opposed
to religious education in the public schools, did not pro-
test its abolition. They could hardly help but taunt the
Peronists for this reversal on their part, save for a few
labor elements who always had opposed clerical influence.
One Radical deputy wondered why Peronism was now suppress-
ing enseHanza religiosa — had electoral opportunism and
fraud been so perfected that priests were no longer needed

to captivate the masses? On May 13 this bill was passed

by the Chamber, and it became law ten days later.

Congress then enacted a bill on May 20 that struck
at the church's economic privileges. By it, the church and
its institutions no longer enjoyed a tax exempt status.

Deputy Beato Miguel Tejada, ibid., pp. 220-21.

^^Deputy Raul C. Bustos Fierro, ibid., pp. 240-41.

^^Deputy Raul Jorge Zarriello, ibid,, p. 217,

^^ALA 1955, XV-A, p, 1.

208

Taxes were imposed on "las instituciones religiosas, a sus
templos, conventos , colegios y. demas dependencias , a_ los
bienes que posean o a_ los actos que realicen. " This measure

was retroactive to January 1, 1955, and affected all reli-

64
gions.

Three days later. Congress passed Ley 14.404, a law
that declared the separation of church and state to be
necessary and accordingly called for a reform of the Con-
stitution to excise article two and certain other provisions

from it so that the state would no longer have to sustain

. . 65
the Roman Catholic religion.

Throughout May, police raids continued against sus-
pected opponents of the regime: anti-Peronist pamphlets

66 . . ^

were confiscated from churches, and forty-nine priests

67
were detained. Commemorative masses traditionally held

with government officials to celebrate Argentina's Inde-

pendence on May 25 were cancelled by the government.

64 .

Ibid . , p. 3.

Ibid. , pp. 1-3.

Gambini, p. 87.

^"^Tato, p. 523.

Belaunde, p. 57.

209

And the Communist and Peronist press persisted in attack-

ing the Roman Catholic press.

In June matters came to a head in the aftermath of
an abortive military coup against Per6n. The first week
of that month, the Argentine episcopacy held a plenary as-
sembly that resulted in a declaration that documented and
denounced religious persecution in Argentina. (Publica-
tion of this declaration was delayed until July 13.) The
suppression of ensenanza reliqiosa was most lamented, and
the church reminded Peron that this had been the "promesa
^ bandera del programa con que el Partido Peronista soli-
cito los votos del electorado" ; that the episcopacy had
not asked for it; and that it was an inalienable right of

families and the church to give their children a Christian

70
education.

On June 11 a Corpus Christi celebration was held in

the Buenos Aires Cathedral in spite of a government ban

against it. An overflow crowd attended and marched through

the streets afterward, bearing a Papal flag as well as the

Ibid.

^'^"Nuestra ContribuciSn a la Paz de la Patria: De-
claracion Episcopal Denunciando la Persecucion Religiosa
en la Argentina," pp. 523-29.

210

national one. The next day the government accused the Cath-
olic demonstrators of having burned the national flag, and
the episcopacy called for an investigation. Peronist mobs
surrounded the Cathedral after they learned of the flag
burning, while Catholics went inside to worship and defend

the Cathedral: the police intervened by arresting 250 male

71
worshippers. The two bishops responsible for the Corpus

Christi service. Bishop Manuel Tato, auxiliary bishop for

Buenos Aires, and Pablo Novoa, dean of the Cathedral, were

arrested a few days later. On June 15 they were expelled

from Argentina, an action that determined Per5n's excommuni-

72
cation. Meanwhile, a military investigation revealed

73
that Peronist government officials had burned the flag.

Peron's Overthrow
On June 16, news of the Vatican's excommunication of

Peron and all those responsible for the "crimes" and violence

against the church reached Argentina. Within hours Navy

Tato, p. 523.

72 '

Luna, Argentina de Per6n a Lanusse, p. 85.

Evidence of this farce about the flag speeded up

the plans for a coup d'etat that Navy officers had been
making for several weeks . (Ibid. )

'Owen, Peron, pp. 226-27.

211

bomber planes took to the air to bomb the Casa de Gobiemo - -
with Peron inside. Peron escaped, having been forewarned
by the United States Ambassador, ^^ but several hundred
people in the vicinity of the Casa de Gobierno were killed
by bombs. Navy troops accompanied by some civilians went
to the building to find Peron, but he was not there. Troops
loyal to the administration moved in to occupy the Navy
Ministry, but before the day was over a new wave of bombings
had killed more onlookers. Rebel warships were delayed by
fog, and certain rebel Army units held their fire. Loyal

troops also captured the airfields, and the uprising was _

76
over. . ^-:=ia«a- .

Peronists blamed the church for instigating the Navy
to rebel. That night angry Peronist mobs sacked and burned

the Curia, with its colonial archives, and the churches of

77
San Ignacio, Santo Domingo, San Francisco, etc. Regular

and secular clerics were rounded up by the police, although

78
they were released on June 18.

Luna, Argentina de Per6n a Lanusse, p. 86.

^ Ibid., pp. 85-86.

^^Ibid. , p. 86.

Belaunde, p. 60.

212

Peron now felt that both sides had gone too far and
held out the olive branch. He himself did not accuse the
church of participating in the revolt. A staunch Catholic,
General Franklin Lucero, was put in charge of restoring
order. A ban on public meetings was lifted for church serv-
ices, and police were assigned to guard churches. Peron
also purged his cabinet, sacrificing the Minister of Educa-
tion among others. Catholic laymen, priests (some of whom
had been imprisoned since 1953), and Radicals were released

from jail. And a bill was passed in Congress to give

79
200,000,000 pesos for the repair of the burned churches.

The hierarchy, however, did not allow the Peronists

to repair the desecrated churches, indicating its intention

not to make up with Peron. The sight of the ravaged churches

was mute testimony to the barbarity and immorality of the

Peron regime. Peron remained excommunicated. A Roman

Catholic march from the Cathedral to the burned out church

of San NicolSs, on July 2, likewise indicated that the

80
church could not forget its persecution. On July 13, a

pastoral was read which recalled the persecutions suffered

^^Owen, pp. 229-32.

^'^Jbse Flores, Operacion "Rosa Negra" (Buenos Aires:
Editorial Errele, 1956), p. 206.

213

by the church, and especially dwelt on Peron's attempt to

replace the church with what he called an "authentic Chris-

81
tianity. " Three other pastorals which had appeared be-
tween June 22 and July 6 also recalled the more recent of-
fenses against the church, although the third of these in-

eluded a call for union and pacification, emulating Peron.

The latter plea may well have reflected the personal views
of Cardinal Copello, who still wanted to reconcile with
Peron.

The public was also confused as to the attitude of
the episcopacy toward Peron when they disclaimed any con-
nection with the Christian Democratic Party, which took ad-
vantage of the political freedom now allowed by the govern-
ment to announce its formation, although it had actually
been founded a year before. The church declared that:

The Argentine Episcopacy has not accepted, nor
can it ever accept, any understanding with any

See above, pp. 192-93. This pastoral had been writ-
ten on June 7, 1955, but was not made public until July 13.
(Gambini, pp. 103-04.)

"Documentos: cartas pastorales del Arzobispo de

Buenos Aires con motive de los ultimos sucesos," Criterio,
XXVIII (July 14, 1955), 498-99.

Copello wanted reconciliation and Cardinal Caggiano

was neutral, while the rest of the hierarchy wanted Peron

ousted. (Interview with Hermano Septimio, Buenos Aires,

September 7, 1972.)

214

political party to defend the rights and
liberties of the Church against the legitimate
Government of the nation in any case, even if
oppression and persecution continued.

This same cautious attitude was never noted when it came to
education. The episcopacy always claimed that it was a
right of the church to teach religion in the public schools
and to have autonomy for its own religious schools. And
furthermore, the church had supported the Peronist Party
with pre-election pastorals. Perhaps the bishops were also
implicitly recanting their past connection with the Peronist
Party, for in reality Catholic laymen and clerics were ac-
tively working behind the scenes to link up with other op-
ponents of Peron in order to overthrow him. The burning

of the churches had made every Catholic a militant adver-

85
sary of the government, and the church now gave the op-
position moral force and issues around which long-time op-
ponents of the regime could coalesce.

Peron himself for a time continued his conciliatory
stance. On July 6 he had called for national pacification;
on July 15 he resigned as head of the Peronist Party; and
on July 27 he allowed the Radical leader of this opposing
Party, Dr. Arturo Frondizi, to speak on the radio. Frond izi's

Owen, p. 233.

TLuna, Argentina de Peron a Lanusse, p. 87,

215

speech was neither conciliatory toward Peron nor anti-
Peronist. He attacked the Conservatives (National Dismo-
crats) and did not mention the persecution of the church.
Foreign correspondents concluded that Peron had wisely al-
lowed his opponents to speak publicly so that they would

86
quarrel among themselves. But Frondizi's speech had also

outlined a program for political reconstruction of Argen-
tina, calling for a renewal of civil liberties and annul-
ment of the petroleum contracts with Standard Oil. Broad-
casts of the leaders of other political parties followed in
a similar vein, and it became apparent that the differences

with Peron were more irreconcilable than the differences •

87
among the opposition parties themselves.

With the loss of church support, Per6n could fall
back only on labor and the military, and the latter were
not truly reliable any more. The more aristocratically-
inclined Navy needed little convincing to go against a pop-
ulist regime as they had demonstrated on June 16. The lesser
rank Navy officers who had conspired against Peron on that
date had not been purged because the Army had had no stom-

Owen, p. 234.

Luna, Argentina de Peron a Lanusse, pp. 88-89.

216

ach for it. The Army began to realize that it was up-
holding an increasingly unpopular government that was ex-
communicated, tarnished by foreign oil and investment con-
cessions, and unable to handle Argentina's economic prob-
lems. The upper class further brought renewed social pres-
sure to bear on the officers of the military to cast off

89
Peron, while the church's disavowal of Per6n let loose

"the natural opposition of the upper and middle classes,

90
particularly among the women."

On the 31st of August, Peron used a ruse to enlist
labor and his remaining military support in a new campaign
to crush his opponents. That morning he tendered his res-
ignation as President to the Peronist Party and CGT but
not to the only body — Congress — constitutionally authorized
to accept or reject such an offer. The Peronist Party and
CGT, which called an immediate general strike, demanded
that Peron remain in office. That evening Peron bowed to
the will of the people and withdrew his resignation. He
vitriolically denounced his opponents and authorized the

Sidney Lens, "But What About Peronism?" Christian

Century, LXXII (November 2, 1955), 1267,

Luna, Argentina de Peron a Lanusse, pp. 87-88,

^Friedenberg, "Peronl PeronI Peronl" New Republic,

p, 14,

217

use of violence to suppress "the enemies of the regime."

Peron plainly counted on the Army to help him squash his
enemies, and the Army's role was reinforced by Congress'
declaring a "state of siege"in Buenos Aires on September 2.
The Army general placed in charge of public safety listed
offenses such as the unauthorized possession of arms, am-
munition and explosives, the spreading of rumors either
orally or in writing, the distribution of subversive pamph-
lets or other publications, and unauthorized meetings and

demonstrations — ^which would be "repressed with the utmost

severity." On that same day, in a separate speech to

the Peronist Party, Peron charged that the oligarchy had

rejected his offer of political pacification, and he threat-

93
ened a "war to the death" against his enemies.

Peron' s violent words spread a wave of terror among

his opponents and made them work harder for his downfall.

The Army did not look forward to being a repressive force
for a government that had lost its moral fiber and was be-

Owen, pp. 234-35.

Ibid., p. 235.

^^Ibid. , p. 236.

Luna, Argentina de Per6n a Lanusse, p. 90.

218

coming paralyzed by its corruption and inefficiency. This
was recognized by the CGT, which was clearly calling for
the arming of its six million members as a civilian militia.
This menace to the monopoly of force enjoyed by the mili-
tary further egged on the conspirators in the armed ser-

95
vices. The clandestine Catholic press on its part at-
tacked the proposal to arm the workers, and urged the mil-

, 96
itary to overthrow Peron.

On September 16, General Eduardo Lonardi, a devout
Catholic who had recently attended a meeting between mil-
itary conspirators and Roman Catholic priests, headed an

uprising in CSrdoba. It was aided by Roman Catholic groups

who manned radio broadcasts under the code name "rosa negra" :

these insurgent-controlled broadcasts were important because
they could discount government propaganda that the rebels
were being defeated. Garrisons in Entre Rios and Corrientes
joined those in C6rdoba in concerted actions, and the South
of Argentina soon came under rebel control when troops in
that section of the country joined Lonardi' s Provisional

Carleton Beals, "Who Won m Argentina?" Nation,

CLXXXI (October, 1955), 275.

Flores, p. 255.

^^Ibid. , p. 279.

219

Government. The Navy joined in its entirety, and so did
the military stationed in Rosario. Only those troops locat-
ed in Buenos Aires remained loyal to Peron, but their gen-
erals advised him to yield. On September 19, Peron sought

and received asyliom from Paraguay, and the battle was over.
The head of the triumphant Provisional Government came to

the federal capital and addressed a huge crowd in the Plaza

99
de Mayo on September 23. In this discourse. General Lo.*-

nardi underscored his own regard for the church:

Sera mi preocupacion constante mantener inal-

terables el respeto y la garantia de los de-

rechos de la Iglesia y la conciencia religi-

100
osa de todos, sea cual fuera su credo.

^^Owen, pp. 237-43.

Among those who greeted Lonardi were Cardinal

Copello and leading church dignitaries. (Ibid. , p. 241.)

100

Flores, p. 303.

CHAPTER EIGHT

EDUCATIONAL POLICY OF THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT:

1955-1956

Lonardi, who lasted fifty days as Provisional Presi-
dent, had promised he would respect the religious conscience
of all; he also promised that there would be neither vic-
tors nor vanquished ("ni^ vencedores ni vencidos" ) : and he

promised to restore democratic political process to Argen-

tma. These promises would be hard to keep because there

were many who clamored for revenge. "The two major inter-
est groups which had overthrown Peron were the army and
the church, and neither of these was liberal in principle
nor were the numbers among its leaders large who were con-
vinced of the advantages of a liberal political order as

3
distxnct from a Ixberal society."

Lonardi was identified as a deeply religious Catholic,

who was sure that Divide Providence guided him when he led

This was the motto of Lonardi' s administration,
(Luis Ernesto Lonardi, Dios es jus to /Buenos Aires: Fran-
cisco A. Colombo, 1958/, PP. 366, 374-76.)

Luna, Argentina de PerSn a Lanusse, p. 97.

3
Ferns, Argentina, p. 206.

220

221

the revolution against Peron. Lonardi had married into

a prominent and very Catholic family from Cordoba, Villada

5
Achaval, His intimate circle was made up of militant Cath-
olics such as presidential advisor and relative Clemen te
Villada AchSval and Minister of Education Atilio Dell'Oro

Maini, and he was linked with nationalist Catholic sectors

6
of C6rdoba, At his swearing-xn ceremony as Provisional

President of Argentina on September 23, 1955, he stated

that he was anxious to stabilize church-state relations

with a Concordat:

En lo que concierne a la Iglesia Cat61ica, me
sentire muy feliz si la Providencia me depara-
se la oportunidad de poner fin a todos los
malentendidos mediante la concertacion de un
Concordato. No tenemos por que cargar indefi-
nitivamente con la consecuencia de viejos
errores, def initivamente superados por los
hechos y las ideas del presente.'

Lonardi' s administration was short-lived, and he
did not get around to a Concordat with the church. How-
ever, he did issue decrees that abrogated Peron 's anti-

^Lonardi, p. 205.
Interview with Jos5 Luis Romero, Adrogue, July 20,

1972.

Luna, Argentina de Peron a Lanusse, p. 99; and
interview with Romero, Adrogue, July 20, 1972.

^Lonardi, p. 220.

222

church legislation and returned former privileges to the
church. On October 8, for example, Lonardi restored cer-

tain religious holidays to the calendar. Four days earlier
he had annulled the Peronist law that forced religious in-
stitutions to pay property and income taxes; again, churches

of all faiths were to enjoy tax exemptions. On October 24

he restored to the Catholic schools Colegio del Salvador
in Buenos Aires and Colegio de la Inmaculada Concepci6n in

Santa Fe the autonomy that the former had received from the

military dictatorship in 1943 and lost on December 10, 1954.

This last decree was anti-laic and showed a partial-
ity toward the church that threatened to be manifested in.
more decrees. Laicists and liberals were maddened by some
of Lonardi 's Catholic advisors who were considered "cleri-
cales neo-f ascistas . " Military officers wanted Argen-
tina de-Peronized and called for government intervention of
the CGT, as did the political parties sitting on the Junta

®D. Ley 554, October 8, 1955, ALA 1955, XV-A, p. 529.

D. Ley 317, October 4, 1955, ibid., p. 518.

^°D. 1757, October 24, 1955, ibid., pp. 556-57.

E. F, Sanchez Zinny, El culto de la infamia
(Buenos Aires: Artes Graficas Bartolome U. Chesino, 1958),
pp. 631-32.

223

Consultiva. This body had been created by Lonardi, who

appointed leaders of the political parties opposed to Per6n
to it in order to provide an element of popular representa-
tion and mollify the appearance of a larger military dic-
tatorship. On the evening of November 12, a delegation of
officers of the armed forces interrupted Lonardi's supper
and demanded that he eject from his government knovm Cath-
olic nationalists such as his advisors Major Juan Francis-
co Guevara and Villada AchSval, Minister of Transportation
General Urange, and the Minister of the Interior Dr. Luis
Maria de Pablo Pardo. The visiting officers asked him to
change his intimate circle of advisors and ministers, citing
Lonardi's speech of November 12, v^ich was viewed as too
lenient towards the Peronist Party, and the right-wing na-
tionalist character of his government. They claimed that

the civilians on the Junta Consultiva had resigned, and

that the Supreme Court was ready to do the same.

The next day Lonardi's resignation was announced,
and General Pedro Eugenio Aramburu took his place as Pro-
visional President. But E)olicy toward the church seemed

Lonardi, pp. 236-43,

Luna, Argentina de Per6n a Lanusse, pp. 98-101.
13,

224

to keep the same course, and the ultra-Catholic Dell'Oro
Maini remained as Minister of Education. On November 24,
1955, the Aramburu government exempted religious institu-
tions from paying municipal taxes in Buenos Aires; this was
made retroactive to January 1. Another decree on Novem-
ber 30 abrogated Perdn's 1954 Estatuto del Docente and

promised that the Ministry of Education would draw up a new

15
Statute. In a list of government intentions, "Directivas

Basicas del 2 de diciembre de 1955, " Aramburu and his cabinet

touched upon the church:

h) Mantener inalterable el respeto a la con-
ciencia religiosa de todos, garantizando la
libertad de cultos. Asegurar los derechos
de la Iglesia cat6lica contemplando la posi-
bilidad de la concertaci6n de un concordato
sobre relaciones con el Estado;

Aramburu was even continuing Lonardi's goal of arriving at
a Concordat with the Vatican.

No Religious Education in the Public Schools
The church's spokesmen had been calling for a Con-
cordat to stabilize church-state relations since Peron's

••■^D. 3665, November 24, 1955, ALA 1955. XV-A, p. 592,

^D. 4227, November 30, 1955, ibid., pp. 606-07.
^^ALA 1956, XVI -A, p. 3.

225

first administration. A Concordat was seen as an in-
strument to clarify the church's educational role, guar-
anteeing the right of the church not only to have its own
schools, but to have the degrees granted by them recog-
nized by the state, and, secondly, formalizing the estab-

17
lishment of religious education in the public schools.

Aramburu did appoint an ambassador to the Vatican, heighten-

18
ing speculation that a Concordat would be forthcoming.

In the end, none was negotiated, but the question of reli-
gious education in the schools nevertheless became a center
of public controversy once again.

Within a month of Perfin's ejection, the Argentine
episcopacy had issued a pastoral letter calling on the
faithful to conduct their apostolic activities through Ac-

ci6n Cat6lica or in collaboration with the bishops and

19
priests of the church. Acci6n Cat6lica Argentina and re-
lated groups such as the Liga de Padres and Liga de Madres
began an intense radio campaign supplemented by magazine

Casiello, Iglesia y estado en la arqentina, pp. 351-
53.

"Estrechan lazos la Argentina y la Santa Sede,"

La Naci6n, February 12, 1956, p. 1.

"El episcopado argentine dio una pastoral," La

Nacion, October 22, 1955, p. 1

226

and poster publicity to mobilize public opinion in support

of ensenanza religiosa. There can be no doubt that ._ -

Lonardi personally also favored it. However, in an address
of November 12, he spoke of the government's ass\iming an
"actitud mesurada " toward the church, and as being respon-
sible and not hurrying decisions that "incitan a la pol§-

■ ^ 21

mica apasionada o que puedan producir grietas .--, . -

General Aramburu, Lonardi 's successor in November
1955, was even less in clined to reinstate religious educa-
tion. Personally he was opposed to religion classes in the

schools, being a free-thinker and heading the Liberal fac-

tion in the armed forces. Moreover, he wanted the sup-
port of the political parties. The parties that represent-
ed so many Argentines, the Radicals and Socialists, were, -
just as opposed as ever to ensenanza religiosa in the public
schools in 1955-58 as they had been in 1943-54. The party-
of many other Argentines, the Peronist, excluded from par-
ticipating in this government, was still In opposition -to

2°"Aclaraci6n, " La Vanguardia, February 23^ 1956,, p.. -1.
^■•■Lonardi. pp. 207, 213, 232-33.

22interview with Americo Ghioldi, Buenos Aires,
August 15, 1972.

227

the church. Only the smaller National Democratic (Conserva-
tive) and Christian Democratic Parties were supporters of
religious education in the schools. On March 6, 1956,

therefore, the Provisional Government reinstated Ley 1420,

reaffirming the lay school.

Provinces . — Peronist measures had suppressed ense-

nanza religiosa in the provincial schools in emulation of

24
the measures of the national government. When Aramburu

reinstated the provincial constitutions that existed before
Peron's regime, most provinces proceeded with plans to draw
up new constitutions by calling conventions for that pur-
pose. The church worked on the provincial level to influ-
ence these new constitutions and to convince law-makers to
implant religious education in the provincial schools. The
church met with qualified success in Santa Cruz in keeping
laicism out of a provincial constitution: its new consti-
tution only said that "la_ ensenanza sera gratuita ^ obli-

gatoria."

The church also had success when many provinces re-

Campobassi, Ataque y defensa del laicismo escolar
en la Argentina, p. 91.

Ibid . , p. 95.

^^Ibid.. p. 94.

228

adopted the education laws in force before Peron's con-
flict with the church, which implanted ensenanza religiosa
in the public schools. However, the Provisional Govern-
ment did block the federal interventor of C6rdoba from re-
implanting religious education in that province's schools.
The Province of Buenos Aires kept the Peronist measures
that abolished it, and the Province of Salta returned to a
previous law calling for the obligatory teaching of reli-
gion in the schools only to decree its abolition in April

26
1956.

Democratic Education. — The Provisional Government
was more interested in wiping out the effects of Peronist
education than in giving religious education. On the an-
niversary of Peron's 1945 return from detention. Decree
1023 of October 17, 1955 suppressed the teaching of Nation-
al Doctrine; it was soon reinforced by another decree of
November 29, 1955. In its place was put "Educaci(5n Demo-

cr^tica" — a kind of civic education that was to inculcate

democratic values. While the curriculum for these courses

was being drawn up for every grade, a proclamation of April

Campobassi, p. 95,

^"^D. 7625, December 30, 1955, ALA 1956, XVI-A,

pp. 59-61.

229

27, 1956, reinstated the national Constitution of 1853 and

the provincial constitutions that existed prior to Per6n's

28
presidency. In mid-1956 the curriculum for Democratic

Education was formulated for the primary grades, junior

high grades (ciclo basico) , and secondary, special, and

normal schools. For the higher grades it included a study

of the national Constitution along with studies of demagogy,

anti-democratic forms, electoral and parliamentary procedures,

29
civic virtues, federalism, and the United Nations.

Expansion of the Roman Catholic School System
Uncertain about the future of religious education
after 1955, the church turned its attention to building up
its own school system. The conformist church linked to the
upper classes was once again in the ascendancy, and the
"church of the CGT" which in the thesis of Di Telia had
come to the fore in the Per6n years was now out of favor.

Traditionally, it was the former that was most disposed to

30
support private education, especially at the secondary level.

"Proclama del 27 de abril de 1956," ibid., pp. 1-2.

^^D. 9086, May 22, 1956, and D. 10.632, June 15,
1956, ibid., pp. 470-75, 500-01.

"%i Telia, "Raices de la controversia educacional
argentina," Los fragmentos del poder, pp. 316-17.

230

The subsidies for private schools which had been
cancelled by the Per6n government were restored. Citing
the "aporte estatal" promised to private schools by Ley
13.047, the Estatuto del Docente of 1947, over $10.5 mil-
lion pesos were distributed to private, mainly religious,
schools that were due for the years 1953 and 1954. In

addition, over 52 million pesos were pledged to the pri-

31
vate schools for 1955. Thus the state was reassuming its

financial commitment to the private school sector.

Thanks to this aid as well as its own efforts, the

private sector expanded its school system after 1955. This

boom especially took place on the secondary level. From

1956 to April 1958, more than 100 new Catholic secondary

32
schools were founded, as CONSUDEC (Consejo Superior de

Educacion Catolica) pushed to bring adolescents into reli-
gious schools. In 1955, 41% of the students enrolled in
secondary schools that led to the bachillerato were in pri-
vate schools, and by 1958 this percentage had increased to

33
52%. The figures for the proliferation of private normal

■^■'■D. Ley 7237, December 28, 1955, ALA 1956, XVI-A,
pp. 40-41.

"Educacion," Revista Eclesiastica Argentina, I
(March-April, 1958), 86.

^^Di Telia, p. 314.

231

schools are even more striking: in 1955, 45% of normal

school students were enrolled in private schools; by 1958,

34
this figure had risen to 69%. The expansion of the private

sector on the primary level was slower because the church

did not concentrate its efforts at this level. As for the

public sector, enrollments at all levels increased slowly

35
in comparison to the Peronist years .

The proliferation of Catholic normal schools was :i
further abetted by a decree issued on April 28, 1958, two
days before the end of the Provisional Government, -_ This ^
decree, signed by Aramburu and the acting Minister of Ed-^^-
ucation Alberto Mercier, contravened article 305 of Presi-
dent Alvear's 1927 ruling on the Law of Secondary Educa-
tion (Ley 934) by allowing Catholic normal schools _ to in-
corporate with public normal schools, which gave them the

autonomy to grant their degrees without their students sub-

mitting to state examinations. . _ . , .. ..-

•^^Ibid.

3 'i

Argentina, Ministerio de Cultura y Educacion,
"Alumnos matriculados : anos 1900-1971" (mimeographed page,
Buenos Aires: Departamento de Estadxstica Educativa, 1972) ,

Ghioldi, Libertad de ensenanza, pp. 91-97.

232

The Universities: Moves to Change the Law
The university students could well expect some reward,
having been among the most consistent opponents of the Per6n
regime. When Peron was toppled, the leadership of the Fede-
racion Universitaria de Buenos Aires (FUBA) resolved to oc-
cupy the University of Buenos Aires on September 21, The
student federations at the other five national universities
copied FUBA, occupying and administering the buildings and
faculties of their universities. After occupying the build-
ings, the students made it clear that they expected the Pro-
visional Government to accede to their demands, as a reward

37
for their opposition to Peron.

The students demanded that they participate in the
elections of university authorities. FUBA called for the
full restoration of individual rights and constitutional
guarantees, the repeal of repressive legislation, the de-
struction of Peron' s espionage and police system, and the
reopening of student centers. Students especially wanted
an end to the arbitrary hiring and firing of professors
("Professors Yes, Stooges No"), and an end to governmental
interventions . of universities. FUA (Federaci6n Universi-
taria Argentina) , the ximbrella organization of all student

■^"^Walter, Student Politics in Argentina, pp. 157-58.

233

federations, called for university autonomy, free and

38
secular education, and academic freedom.

At first, the Provisional Government met student de-
mands. On September 29, Lonardi appointed Dr. Jo^ Luis

Romero as interventor in the University of Buenos Aires,

and he promised to restore university autonomy. On Octo-
ber 7, Decree 477 of the Lonardi administration reestablished

the Ley Avellandeda. On that same day. Decree 478 announced

that eventually all university posts would be filled through
open competition, although in the interim federal interven-

tors would appoint personnel. On November 4, Decree-Law

42
2538 authorized interventors to reassign professors to

their original positions if they had been expelled or had

resigned for political reasons during 1943-46, as well as

those professors who had more recently been expelled or had

resigned; this was meant to include professors who had been

staunch Catholics and, therefore, separated from the uni-

Ibid.., p. 158.

•^^Ibid. , p. 159.

^^ALA 1955. XV-A, p. 521.

'^■'-Ibid. , pp. 521-22.

^^Ibid. , p. 576.

234

43
versities in the last year of Peron's regime.

The maneuvers of the Provisional Government made
autonomy less than complete. After all, Aramburu had
come to power backed by civilians and militarists who want-
ed to remove all Peronists from positions of power. With
interventors of Socialist and liberal sympathies often
placed in charge of the faculties by the Catholic Minister
of Education Dell'Oro Maini, a purge of Peronist professors
iegan. These purges were abetted by a ministerial resolu-
tion of November 4 which called upon interventors to sub-
mit nominations for professorial posts to the Chief Execu-
tive, thus chipping away at autonomy. Furthermore, Decree

4361 of November 30, 1955, allowed interventors to remove

44
professors for reasons of university restructuring. Com-
plaints of government interference in university affairs
led to Decree-Law 5150 which stipulated that interventors
were authorized only to fill positions which were vacant

" como excepciSn y_ cuando asl lo requiera el cumplimiento

de funciones indispensables de cada universidad. "

Terr5n de Ferro, "Educaci6n: la universidad actual
y su autonomla," p. 461.

Ibid.

^D. Ley 5150, December 9, 1955* ALA 1955, XV-A, p.
624.

235

Those now in control of the university system were
predisposed to identify militant Catholics with those who
had subjugated the universities in 1943 and had replaced
professors ejected in 1946. Thus, many Catholics were
purged from the universities along with Peronists. Many
were eliminated under the criterion that they had "ethical-
civic" flaws, such as adherence to the 1949 Peronist Con-
stitution, support of Per6n's re-election, and the wooing
of an honorary doctorate. But comparable considerations
were not taken into account when dealing with persons of a
liberal or Socialist background, who received posts espei^

cially in the faculties of Exact Sciences and Philosophy •

46
and Letters (primarily in Sociology and Psychology) .

Decree 6403

Under these circiimstances Decree 5403, signed by

Aramburu and his whole Cabinet, was issued on December 23,

47
1955, reorganizing the universities. By it, the method

of selecting professors was not changed for the present,

but it was provided that intervention would end. The de-

BergadS, Argentine Survey S.J.: II — 'S^ituaciSn edu-

cacional. Part 2, pp. 250-61.

"^"^D. 5403, December 23, 1955, ALA 1956, XVI -A, pp.
17-21.

236

cree foresaw reimplantation — once autonomy was restored —
of the method of choosing professors by concurso, and with
"ethical-civic" considerations to be taken into account
even then. Autonomy would be recognized after elections

were held according to a tripartite system by which pro-

48
fessors, students, and alumni shared power. Accordingly,

a University Assembly was elected in late 1957, and drew
up its own statutes in 1958, restoring autonomy to the
University of Buenos Aires; simxlar elections took place
in all national universities. However, student groups
were dissatisfied because they had not been consulted in
the drafting of the decree, and because article 28 would •
allow the establishment of private Catholic universities,
not directly controlled by the state, and capable of grant-
ing professional licenses. Article 28, which so irritated
the students, read as follows:

Private initiative can create free universities
which will be qualified to issue diplomas and
titles which will always be subject to conditions
expressed by a regulation that will be dictated
opportunely.

48Terr§n de Ferro, p. 464.

Tulio Halperin Donghi, Historia de la Universidad

de Buenos Aires (Buenos Aires: EUDEBA, 1962), pp. 205-07.
^°Walter, p. 159.

237

This decree was issued while the students were on
their summer vacation, giving them little chance to op-
pose it until they returned to classes. Their reaction
will be discussed later in this chapter.
Catholics and the Decree

Previous attempts to found private universities had
been made by Catholics in the time of Estrada and during
the first two decades of the twentieth century in the city
of Buenos Aires. The last attempt failed because degrees
were not legally recognized for the practice of professional
careers. For this same reason, the universities founded by

the Socialists and Radicals did not outlast the Peron era,

51
and were only established for purposes of academic freedom.

Article 28 was once again the work of Catholics, and sectors
of Catholic opinion, including the Humanists, were united
in its behalf. The new campaign for private universities
had in fact begun before the Provisional Government was a
month old, spurred by the Vatican. The papacy was promot-
ing Catholic universities all over the world, and the Ar-

gentine hierarchy sought tp comply. In the first month-

See above, chapter 2, p. 57, and chapter 5, pp.

136-37.

Interview with Dr. Jorge Mejia, Buenos Aires,

August 22, 1972.

238

ly meeting of university rectors-interventors held after
the revolution in September 1955, with the presence of

Minister of Education Dell'Oro Maini, the need for private

53
universities was forcefully presented by Dr. Augustin Caeiro,

a militant Catholic from Cordoba and admirer of the United

States system of higher education, who had been appointed

by Lonardi as head of the national University of C6rdoba in

the first days of the revolution, while Lonardi was still

* 54

in Cordoba,

Similar views were expressed by Dell'Oro Maini him-
self in a speech given in the Department of Philosophy and
Letters of the University of Buenos Aires on October 1,
1955:

El Estado no tiene el monopolio de la verdad,
de la ciencia y de la educaci5n. ...

He went on to say that it was necessary to give the private

sector a clear path in higher education without diminish-
es
ing the "garantias" for professional titles. This speech

Interview with Romero, Adrogue, July 20, 1972.

Interview with Mejxa, Buenos Aires, August 22, 1972.

^^"Educacion y libertad, " Criterio, XXXI (September
25, 1958), 683.

S^Ibid.

239

was in keeping with the philosophy of Dell'Oro Maini, a

staunch Catholic who had co-founded the Cursos Catolicos,

- 57
predecessors of the Universidad Catolica.

In November 1955, the Federation of Catholic Students
of the University of Tucuman sponsored a conference on
free, or private, universities. Leaders from professorial,
alumni, and student groups were invited because the Cath-
olics hoped to make this conference representative of the
whole university. Since it was seen as an attempt on the
part of Catholics to promote the establishment of private

institutions of higher education, many invitees refused to

58
attend. Not unexpectedly, this Catholic-sponsored meet-
ing agreed with Dell'Oro Maini that there should be pri-
vate universities. These "Jornadas de Tucuman" also
tackled the problem of "titulos habilitantes, " or titles
that allowed one to practice a profession, as well as the
problem of public financing of private universities. The
conferees sought to allay the fears of partisans of the

57 ...

Dell'Oro Maini also founded Criterio, a magazine

which reflected the church's position and was taken over

by the hierarchy, and was past president of the Liga de

la Juventud Catolica.

Interview with Romero, Adrogue, July 20, 1972.

240

national universities with the following conclusions:

Las Universidades Privadas otorgaran diplomas
o grados academicos, pero no podran expedir ti-
tulos habilitantes para el ejercicio de las pro-
fesiones liberales, cuya regimentacion es ex-
clusiva del Estado, ni tampoco recibir subsidies
del mismo.

Opponents assumed that private universities, even

without habilitating titles, would be an opening wedge,

and that the training they offered would be inferior to

that in the national universities. The Liga Humanista did

not share this fear of private universities and approved

Dell'Oro Maini's article 28. When FUBA tried to force

Dell'Oro Maini's resignation in December 1955, the Huma-

nistas publicized that they "energetically oppose said re-

.60
quest for resignatxon." The Humanistas not only opposed

the boycotts and demonstrations organized by FUA but in
due course forced the resignation of Romero as rector of
the University of Buenos Aires in revenge for FUA's achiev-
ing Dell'Oro Maini's resignation as Minister of Education

61
m May 1956.

59 . *

Domingorena , Articulo 28: universidades privades

en la Argentina: sus antecedentes, pp. 157-58.

Walter, p. 161.

Interview with Romero, Adrogue, July 20, 1972.

241

Meanwhile ACA (Accion Catolica Argentina) was also
campaigning for private universities under the slogan of
"libertad de ensenanza. " APAC (Agrupacion de los Prof es-
sionales y Estudiantes de Accion Cat6lica), the fifth
branch of ACA, formed in 1952 of secondary and university
students and professionals, took the lead in mobilizing

Catholics for this battle, working closely with the Min-

ister of Education Dell'Oro Maini.

Simultaneously, Catholic laymen were organized into
an Asociacion por la Libertad de Ensenanza (Association for
Educational Freedom) on October 27, 1955, in Buenos Aires.
This lay group had affiliates in Argentina's interior and

was also associated with the International Union for Edu-

63
cational Freedom which supported Vatican policy. This

local organization busily published pamphlets in support
of private education in Argentina, oftentimes using re-
prints of articles in Criterio opposing Law 1420 and the
"state monopoly of education," or promoting "libertad de

Interview with Jose Iglesias, Secretary General

of the Junta Central of ACA, Buenos Aires, August 18, 1972,

Interview with Carlos Caballero, Secretary of the

Asociacion por la Libertad de Ensenanza, Buenos Aires,
July 4, 1972.

242

ensenanza. " As a lobby, the Asociacion sought interviews
with each Minister of Education, informing him of the prin-
ciples of "educational freedom," convened assemblies, and

maintained contacts with parents, teachers, and political

' . . 64

authoritxes toward the same end. In September 1956, for

example, the Asociaci6n sponsored a course for teachers and

principals in which Professor Carlos Olivera Lahore lectured

on subjects such as "Problemas inmediatos de la campana por

la_ libertad de ensenanza" and "La_ liber tad de ensenanza

• ^ -, , . 65

como exiqencia de la democracia arqentina."

Reaction to Article 28
National University Rectors. Professors, and Students

The rector of Argentina's largest national univer-
sity, Jose Luis Romero of the University of Buenos Aires,

protested in a note of December 28, 1955, against the new

66
university decree, including article 28. He also pro-

54 -

Asociacion por la Libertad de Ensenanza, Declaracion

de principios (monograph, Buenos Aires, October 27, 1955),

pp. 1-4.

6 ^

"Informaci6n: vida cultural: cursillo sobre la

libertad de ensenanza," Criterio. XXIX (October 11, 1956),
755.

Deputy Americo Ghioldi, DSCD 1958, VI, p. 4451.

243

tested against article 28 in a letter to La_ Nacion. reason-
ing that it distracted from the need to rehabilitate higher
education in Argentina, that there were not enough resources
and materials to renew the existing universities which were
for everybody, and that there would be time later for dis-
sidents to group themselves into private universities. He
also saw a connection between enseflanza religiosa and the
private universities:

El problema de lo que &hDXA se llama ensenanza
libre es exactamente igual a lo que en otros ti-
empos fue conocido como problema de la ensenanza
religiosa; y a nadie se le oculta a que extremes
de beligerancia puede conducir el plantearlo.

In other words, private universities would be Catholic,

dedicated to indoctrinating students in the teachings of

the church.

Mysteriously, Romero lapsed into silence on the

issue after publication of this letter, a silence which

68
lasted until 1958. The other national university rectors

Romero, "Defensa de la universidad, " La Nacion,

February 12, 1956, p. 4.

68 '

Americo Ghioldi surmised that Romero made a deal

with Dell'Oro Maini when Dell'Oro Maini visited him at his
home in Adrogue, and that is why Romero kept quiet. (Inter-
view with Ghioldi, Buenos Aires, August 15, 1972.) Dell'Oro
Maini claimed that Romero knew about article 28 before it
was decreed, but did not protest it then. (Interview with
Dell'Oro Maini, Buenos Aires, August 21, 1972.)

244

remained silent for the most part too. In all probability,
they saw no need to fuss because it appeared that article
28 would never be implemented. When the possibility of
its implementation did become imminent in 1958, the rectors
did protest.

Some individual rectors, professors, and student
groups did object to article 28, however, in the 1956-58
period, besides the one and only protest of Romero. A pro-
fessor at the University of Buenos Aires, Jose Maria Monner
Sans, gave a speech in Mar del Plata in mid -February 1956,
exhorting students to strike at the beginning of classes

if the Minister of Education insisted on private univer-

sities and made ensenanza religiosa optional in the schools.

In turn, Mons. Franceschi warned in the pages of Criterio

that while Roman Catholicism did not begin this conflict,

70
they would fight if pressed. Professors at the national

universities generally opposed article 28, with the excep-
tion of those professors who were active Catholics and
planned to work in the private universities. They joined

"^Franceschi, "Universidades libres," Criterio,

XXIX (February 23, 1956), 124.

245

with the students who were seeking the resignation of
Dell'Oro as Minister of Education.

Although students were on sxinimer vacation from Decem-
ber to March 1956, the FUBA managed to go on record as op-
posed to article 28 by asking the Provisional Government
not to implement it. Its declaration explained:

No corresponde al Gobierno Provisional surgido
de la Revolucion decidir cuestiones que no hagan
a la esencia misma de los objectives revoluci-
onarios. El problema de la educacion debe dejarse
para que la solventen las Camaras de un Gobierno
legftimamente constituido,

Laicists

Also in January 1956, the Junta Pro-Democratizaci&n
de la Enseiianza made public a document that opposed arti-
cle 28. This Junta consisted of the Agrupacion Reformista
de Egresados Democraticos de la Facultad de Filosofla y
Letras, the Colegios de Graduados de la Facultad de Filo-
sofla y Letras, the Federacion de Estudiantes Secundarios,
the Accion Laica Argentina, the Liga de Cultura Laica, the
important teachers' union Confederacion de Maestros, the
Comision de Padres Pro-Ensenanza Laica, the Centre de

71 »

Terren de Ferro, p. 461.

La Vanquardia, January 23, 1956, as quoted xn

Alberto Kaufmann, "Comentarios : la 'F.U.B.A.' en contra-
diccion, " Estudios, XLVII, no. 498 (October, 1958), 638.

246

Profesores Diplomados de EnseTianza Secundaria, the Comite
Pro-Defensa del Laicismo y la Libertad, and the Ateneo
Liberal Argentina. Other groups later affiliated them-
selves to this Jxinta. The Junta released a document on
January 23 and 24 rebuking article 28 on the following
grounds :

1) the decree to re-organize university educa-
tion was issued by surprise and hot debated;

2) a congress should democratically decide
the educational problem;

3) a democratic state should assure unrestrict-
ed knowledge and discussion to its youth; and

4) the state had the right to form free citizens
and to control titles ^^at habilitate one to
practice a profession/* ^

The Supreme Court

Mario Brandi asked for a ruling on article 28 in

Argentina's highest court. In similar cases in 1928 and

1929, the Supreme Court of Argentina had ruled that a pri-
vate university title did not merit state habilitation,
i.e., the right to practice the profession for "which the

"Ensenanza laica, " La Vanguardia. January 26, 1956,

p. 1.

Florentine V. Sanguine tti, "Las universidades pri-

vadas," in La reforma universitaria 1918-1958 (Buenos Aires:

Federaci5n Universitaria de Buenos Aires, 1959), p. 220.

247

title was granted, since the existing Ley Avellaneda en-
sured that only the state or national universities could
grant titles that allowed one to work in that profession.
Now, in the Brandi case, the Court ruled similarly on Feb-
ruary 3, 1956, that article 28 of decree 6402 was in con-
flict with article 1 of the law which gave only the nation-

al universities the right to grant habilitating titles.

The Junta Consultiva

The ruling of the Supreme Court indicated that the
national Constitution was not standing in the way of pri-
vate universities, but only laws and decrees subsequently

enacted. Dell'Oro Maini's next step was to get the ad- •

76
herence of the Junta Consultiva to the new decree before

he and the Provisional Government implemented it. Created

by Lonardi, this political body was given a larger voice

by Aramburu. It included National Democrats, Radicals,

Progressive Democrats, Socialists, and Christian Democrats.

The Commionists had no representative named to the Junta,

and concentrated on building up their strength in the

77
unions.

Ghioldi, Libertad de enseflanza, pp. 132-37, 162-63,

See above, pp. 222-23,

Luna, Argentina de Peron a Lanusse, pp. 103-04.

248

On February 29, 1956, the Junta Consultiva considered

78
article 28 in its eighth extraordinary session, inviting

Minister of Education Dell'Oro Maini to outline his univer-
sity policy. Dell'Oro Maini 's explanation was critical to
the approval of the decree by the politicians on the Junta
Consultiva. He emphasized that the state would not give
any money to the private universities and that the state's
competent organs would validate and control the professional
titles of graduates of private universities, two qualifica-
tions not yet written into the decree's article 28. Dell'Oro
Maini played down the public agitation over the problem, and

said that he had been moved by the spirit of the university

and not by a political or confessional spirit.

Dell'Oro Maini 's flat reassurances seem to have sat-
isfied the members of the Junta Consultiva, and Socialist

Party representative Ghioldi in the interest of national

peace no longer sought his resignation. Yet, the Socxal-

ists and Radicals deplored the public unrest over article
28 and divisions created among Argentines, and they criti-

DSCD 1958, VI, pp. 4422-52.

"^^Ibid. , pp. 4447-50.

^°Ibid., p. 4450.

249

cized the "surprise" announcement of the decree since the

Directivas Basicas of Aramburu had contained no inkling of

81
this article. But at the end of the extraordinary session

they implicitly approved Decree 6402 including article 28,
on the understanding that the state would control profes-
sional titles and would not finance in any way these private

universities.

Student Demonstrations

The national university students returned from vaca-
tion in March 1956, unhappy about article 28. Dell'Oro
Maini had already appointed a Special Committee on February

25, 1956, to analyze ways in which article 28 could be im-

83
plemented. In April and May, students began to demonstrate

against the new university law and its article 28, protest-
ing in front of government buildings and boycotting classes.
Secondary students joined university students in their pro-
tests: they demanded that the University Decree of Decem-

Directive "j" promised to live up to the Ley Ave-

llaneda by giving "vigencia a la autonomia universitaria, "

Directivas Basicas del 7 de diciembre de 1955, as quoted

in Anales de legislacion arqentina 1956, XTI-A, .p. "3,

^^DSCD 1958. VI, pp. 4424-52.

Speech by Deputy Rt±)en Victor Manuel Blanco, ibid . ,
p. 4209.

250

ber 1955 be revised and its implementation postponed until

a constitutional government replaced the provisional one;

84
and, article 28 was to be annulled.

Counter-demonstrations were waged by students of
the Catholic schools of El Salvador, Lasalle, and Champanant,
Accion Catolica Argentina, Ligas de Padres de Familia, uni-
versity student groups of Catholics such as the Ateneos
and Humanistas, marched in opposition to the groups who
wished to repeal article 28, They were supported by the
Christian Democrats and National Democrat parties which

charged that the laicos were led by Marxist and Trotsky-

85
ite elements.

Violence and truancy from school mounted. FUA met

with Provisional President Aramburu and asked for Dell'Oro

Maini's resignation. They chanted "Dell'Oro al Vaticano"

during demonstrations while the libres (pro private, or

"free," universities) chanted "Romero a Moscu." On May

12, the government announced the resignation of Dell'Oro

°^"La juventud estudiantil se movio por moviles
propios," La Vanguardia, May 17, 1956, p, 1,.

^^"El sismo nacionalista de noviembre y la rSplica
de mayo," La Vanguardia, May 17, 1956, p. 1.

251

Maini. In turn, Romero had to resign as rector of the

University of Buenos Aires, giving rise to the accusation

that the government was using the tactic of tit for tat,

87
I.e., Romero's resignation for Dell'Oro Maini' s. But,

more significant for the demonstrating students, the gov-
ernment had decided that the issue of private universities
was so divisive that it could not be settled by a decree,

and that implementation of article 28 would have to wait

until an elected Congress took office.

Dell'Oro Maini was in Lima, Peru, for meetings
when he resigned. He later claimed that he did not want
to be a cause for division among Argentine youth. (In-
terview with Dell'Oro Maini, Buenos Aires, August 21, 1972.)

"El sacrificio de Jose Luis Romero," La Vanguardia,

May 24, 1956, p. 3, This article also charged that the
tactic of tit for tat had been used when Ley 1420 was re-
instated coincidentally with the abolition of the divorce
law,

Interview with Americo Ghioldi, Buenos Aires,

August 15, 1972.

CHAPTER NINE

PRIVATE UNIVERSITIES FOUNDED AND DEFENDED

Catholic Universities Formed
A sign that private universities would be recog-
nized by the state was that the Provisional Government
did not dissuade the Catholic Church of Argentina from es-
tablishing universities. In fact, the Provisional Govern-
ment had encouraged the church by issuing Decree No. 6403.
In response to this decree, the Argentine Episcopacy in
the Plenary Assembly of February 1956 considered the times
favorable for establishing the Universidad Catolica Argen-
tina, and approved plans to organize it. UCA, or the Uni-
versidad Catolica Argentina Santa Maria of Buenos Aires,
was officially founded by the bishops in the Plenary As-
sembly of October 1957, having been preceded by the Cursos
de Cultura CatSlica. It was composed of three faculties —
Philosophy, Law and Political Science, Social Science and
Economics — and an Institute of Sciences and Letters and Arts.'

"Docximentos: fundacion de la Universidad Cat6lica
Argentina," Criterio, XXXI (March 27, 1958), 224, 226.

"Commentarios : Universidad Cat6lica Argentina,"

Criterio, XXXI (March 13, 1958), 174.

252

253

The Jesuits also decided to found a university built upon
one faculty — the Faculty of Philosophy — which was the out-
growth of courses in higher education established at the
Colegio del Salvador by Padre Enrique Pita, S.J., in 1943.
Along with UCA, Salvador was considered an "institute" un-
til it received official university status in December 1959,

4
UCA having become a university earlier, in October 1959,

Another "institute" founded by the Jesuits in 1956 in .— _
Cordoba was the forerunner of the Universidad Catolica, de ,

Cordoba (1958).^ ^::.- - - . -

The Jesuit instituto-universidad founded in C6rdoba
illustrates the Catholic campaign to obtain the legaliza--
tion of private universities. It was established as an in-
stitute by the Jesuits with the approval of the Archbishop
of Cordoba. The aim of the Jesuits was to establish a \ini-
versity on a par with the national university located in

3
Interview with Daniel Obreg6n, S,J., first rector-

of the University of Salvador, Buenos Aires, July 17, 1972,

"Comentarios: perspectivas de la universidad, "
Criterio, XXXI (Devember 2|4, 1958), 946.

^"Informacion: diose a conocer el estatuto que - -
regira el Instituto Pro-Universidad Catolica de C6rdoba,"
Criterio, XXIX (July 26, 1956), 554,

254

Cordoba, and this was spelt out in the institute's statutes

of 1956: -- - ^ -

Fines : Las actividades del Institute Universi-
tario tenderan a dar una formacion humanista,
cientxfica y profesional mediante la docencia
y la investigacion en sus formas superiores y
el cultivo de las bellas artes . El Institute
Universitario es el germen de la futura Universi-
dad Catolica: sus fines por lo tanto no pueden
ser sino los de la misma Universidad Catolica,
segun consta en los estatutos de la misma.

This institute-university enrolled 150 students in

1956, and by the end of -the. first academic year, the rector

Padre Camargo, S.J., found himself addressing 268 students.

In 1958, this institute-university^ became the first legal
private university in Argentina after Congress approved a
law which essentially recognized private universities. By
the end of 1959, Camargo could brag that the University
had grown from 150 to 400 students in just three years,
from 30 to 100 professors, from a library of 1,000 books

to 15,000 books, but that expenses had increased from 132,000

p
pesos to 1,200,000 pesos. rr^- ..-=i -.-^z-:.-

^Ibid., p, 554.

"Cronica: educacion," Revista Eclesiastica Argen-
tina, I (January-February, 1958) , 96,

"Universidades catolicas," Revista EclesiSstica Ar-
gentina, II (January-February, 1959), 91; see also below,
chapter 12, pp. 357-58,

255

Development of Catholic Campaign
The opposition to private universities had kept
article 28 from being implemented by the Provisional Gov-
ernment, and it seemed to have been motivated more by dis-
trust of the church than by a lack of confidence in private
education as such. The Catholic press admitted it was dif-
ficult to distinguish between those against all freedom of

education and those who merely opposed the Roman Catholic

9
church. The church, therefore, was faced with a complex

task of moulding public opinion. It could not simply brand
its opponents as anti-clerics. Thus, the Catholic press
pictured opponents of article 28 as totalitarians who op-
posed freedom of education. Article 28 symbolized pri-
vate enterprise, freedom, democracy, and personal rights,

12 13

besxdes educational diversity and decentralization.

9
E.J.B,, "Cronica: comentario: la dificil libertad;

apuntes para una cr6nica," Estudios, XLVII, no. 498 (October,

1958), 648.

^ See above, chapter 8, p. 242.

Luis Maria BaliTia, "Las universidades libres, aspira-
cion secular argentina," Ciriterio, XXIX (February , 23, 1956), 132,

Franceschi, "Universidades libres," p. 125.

"Comentarios: llamado a la coherencia," Criterio,

XXIX (February 9, 1956), 97.

256

Since so many opponents of article 28 were connected

with the national universities, the Catholic press attacked

14
these universities as being of poor quality, their deca-
dence being rooted in the state monopoly of higher educa-

tion. Moreover, their students were portrayed as violent

and lax about their studies. The opposition's argxament
that private universities were too new to grant habilitat-
ing titles was countered by pointing out that there were

16
new national universities of the Sur and Nordeste.

Catholic Rectors and Professors

In pursuit of this goal, the rectors of the univer-
sity-institutes banded together in a Committee of Relations
for Private Institutes-Universities of the Argentine Re-
public: it was made up of the Instituto Pro Universidad
Catolica de Cordoba and sister institutes of Santa F§ and
La Plata, Universidad Libre de Santiago del Estero, Insti-

"Educaci6n y libertad," p. 685.

See "Comentarios : limites del gobierno universi-
tario," Criterio, XXIX (September 13, 1956), 658; "Comen-
tarios: tumultos universitarios, " Criterio, XXVIII (October
27, 1955), 775; and "Comentarios: revoluci6n y democracia,"
Criterio, XXIX (January 12, 1956), 16.

"Educacion y libertad," p. 685.

257

tuto de Humanidades San Buenaventura de San Juan, Institute

Universitario de Mendoza, and the Institute Libre de Humani-

17
dades- de Santa F5. This committee publicized the fact

that private institutes-universities already existed, need-
ing only the implementation of article 28 in order to realize
their potential. On September 20, 1957, for example, this

committee sent a note to Provisional President Aramburu,

reminding him of Decree 6403,

Professors at the Catholic institutes-universities
also lobbied for article 28' s implementation. On November
28, 1957, a delegation of professors from the institute of

the Colegio del Salvador met with President Aramburu to

19
"interest" him in implementing article 28, Catholic pro-
fessors also spoke at public meetings in favor of enseKanza
libre. At one such meeting in the Teatro Buenos Aires of
the federal capital, they related freedom of education to
private universities, and alleged that the failings of Ar-
gentina's educational system were due mainly to an anach-

"Documentos: articulo veintiocho," Estudios,

XLVII, no. 490 (January-February, 1958), 51,

Ibid,,, p. 51,

^^Ibid.

258

ronistic system of state monopoly.

Catholic Students

It was noted, in the last chapter, that the Human-
ists disagreed with the rest of FUA (Federaci6n Universi-
taria Argentina) over its protests against article 28 and
Dell'Oro Maini, the Minister of Education deposed in May
1956. At the National Convention of Students held in Buenos
Aires on September 1, 1956, the Humanists continued to ob-
ject to a state monopoly of education. However, they agreed
with FUA on other issues such as improvements for the work-
ing class and the goal of creating a democratic and pro-
gressive Argentina; thus, they remained affiliated with

21
FUA. But when FUA went all out to convince Congress not

to allow private universities in September 1958, the Human-
ists decided they could no longer remain within FUA, and

they withdrew, beginning the first of many splits in the

student movement since 1958.

"Comentarios: compromise formal," Criterio,

XXXI (June 26, 1958), 452.

"^■^Walter, Student Politics in Argentina, pp. 166-68.

22"Separanse de la FUBA las agrupaciones Humanistas,"
La Prensa. October 2, 1958, p. 6. The Humanists also ob-
jected to the increasing Communist line of FUA. (Walter,
pp. 168, 176.)

259

Catholic secondary students already active in APAC
were involved in the Catholic campaign for private uni-
versities. However, their numbers swelled when priests re-
cruited primary and secondary students in Catholic schools
to join in the demonstrations for private universities,
thereby hoping to convince Congress to give them legal sta-
tus. Right-wing priests also formed a well-lcnown national-
ist group, Tacuara, largely recruited from Catholic school
students in the mid-50' s. Among their purposes was to go

out into the streets to fight the partisans of lay and

state education.

Gathering of Outside Support

The Catholic campaign for article 28 was mounted by
the hierarchy, priests, and the lay apostolate. But this
would only be fully successful if Congress enacted legis-
lation that legalized the professional titles of private
university graduates. The church, therefore, turned its

After article 28 was incorporated xnto congressxon-

al legislation, the priests called upon Tacuara to disband,
and it lost two-thirds of its members. Into it streamed
lower middle class Peronist youth who gave it a leftward
drift. Many of the surviving original members left and
formed the Guardia Restauradora Nacionalista^. (Rogelio
Garcia Lupo, La rebelion de los qenerales /Buenos Aires:
Proceso Ediciones, 1962// PP- 72-74.)

260

attention to politicking for the support of political parties.

One party that could be counted on to promote private

universities was the Christian Democrat Party, made up of

men and women who considered themselves to be practicing

Catholics applying the spiritual mission of the church to

political life. During the 1958 election campaign, the

presidential candidate of the Christian Democrats made

clear their support of private universities :

Deseamos pues reorganizar la ensenanza en todos
los ordenes:, sobre la base de los principios de
libertad, autonomia, descentralizacion, diversi-
ficacion regional que deben ser las cuatro carac-
teristicas que la orienten ....

Eso naturalmente supone romper con el monopolio
estatal por una parte, y no solamente en el
entido provincial o nacional, sino este monopolio
nacional que tenemos, que no respeta las auto-
nomias provinciales . En lo que se refiere al
otro aspecto, senalarla que nosotros tenemos que
tender a promover un regimen de competencia
educative, para que por via de competencia se
superen los planes y se mejoren los mStodos.
Por eso somos tan partidarios de un regimen de
libertad, que va a permitir la competencia.

Similarly, the Independent Civic Party, organized by

Alvaro Alsogaray at the beginning of 1956 to promote a "pop-

25 '
ular capitalism," put up a presidential candidate. Dr.

"Los candidates presidenciales nos hablan: el Dr.

Lucas Ayarragaray expone los principios que sostiene el
Partido Democrata Cristiano," La Naci6n, January 11,1958, p. 3.

Luna, Argentina de Per6n a Lanusse, p. 103,

261

Juan B. PeRa, who also supported private universities. He

stated the position of his party on this subject in a La

Nacion interview published on February 1, 1958:

El Partido Civico Independiente se ha expedido
ampliamente sobre este topico: propicia la li-
bertad de ensenanza en su m&s amplia acepci6n.
Lo que involucra el derecho de personas y enti-
dades, congregaciones religiosas, colectivi-
dades, asociaciones civiles, etc., a impartir
toda clase de ensenanza, con los sistemas que
encuentren mas adelantados y con la sola limita-
ci6n de un minimo que las leyes determinaran,
los conceptos bSsicos de la democracia y los
fundamentos de nuestra nacionalidad.

The above political party, made up of successful

and conservative businessmen, had the same attitude toward

the church and private universities as did the landowners

and lawyers who dominated the Popular Conservative Party,

another recent creation. In an interview with La_ Nacion

the Popular Conservative presidential candidate Dr. Vicente

Solano Lima spoke in favor of not only private education

but also its subsidizing by the state:

Soy contrario al monopolio estatal de la en-
senanza y creo que debe formentarse la ensenanza
privada; mas aun, creo en el regimen de sub-
sidies que debe establecerse para fomentar la
educacion privada.

•^"Interview with La Nacion, quoted in Domingorena,
pp. 101-02.

^^Ibid., p. 102.

262

Thus the church could count on the Christian Democrats,
the Independent Civic Party, and the Popular Conservative
Party for support of "libertad de enseflanza . "

But these parties were minor and would not have a
majority vote in Congress even if they voted together.
The political party of at least one-third of the Argentines,
the Peronist, was forbidden to put up candidates. This
left the Radical Party as the key party to any political
decisions made by a representative government. The Radicals,
however, had split into two factions by 1956 — the UCRI or
Union Civica Radical Intransigente, headed by Arturo Fron-
dizi, and the UCRP or Union Clvica Radical del Pueblo,
headed by Ricardo Balbln. They had split primarily over
whether they should woo the Peronists as Frondizi insist-
ed, or have nothing at all to do with them, which was in-

itially the point of view of Balbin; UCRP, therefore,

would not support the candidacy of Frondizi for president

of Argentxna,

Alexander, An Introduction to Argentina (New York:

Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1969), p. 99,

Snow, Argentine Radicalism, p. 75.

263

In July 1957, the UCRP faction of the old Radical
Party beat the Ucristas by a plurality of 260,000 votes in
elections for delegates to the Constitutional Convention.
If the UCRP commanded the same nvunber and distribution of
votes in the coming February 1958 elections, they would
win the presidency and about 100 of the 187 seats in Con-
gress, But the UCRP victory had been made possible be-
cause the Peronists had cast blank ballots. Prondizi,
who had been seeking Peronist support since 1956, stepped
up his wooing of their party and leader in exile, Juan
Peron, for he needed Peronist votes in order to win over
'the UCRP, He attained this support when a clandestine
letter from Peron was circulated on the eve of the elec-
tions in February 1958, urging Peronists to vote for UCRI

31
and its candidates .

Frondizi also sought the support of Catholics and

nationalists to assuage the armed forces who were nervous

about his Peronist backing. His anti-divorce stand and

support of article 28, a reversal of Radical principles

which he had always endorsed, were taken to appeal to these

^°Ibid., pp. 76-82.

■^■^Luna, Argentina de Per6n a Lanusse, p. 116.

264

two groups. Article 28, it should be recalled, had been

very vague about state supervision of private universities,

and Frondizi had opposed this article in February 1956 as
head of the Radical national committee's Oficina Universi-
taria. At that time the Oficina Universitaria had urged
the Provisional Government to postpone the implementation
of article 28 so that an elected government could "intro-

ducii* reformas de fondo en la_ estructura educacional ar-

qentina." But at the beginning of 1958, Frondizi was

supporting the church's campaign for "libertad de ense-
fTanza , " a phrase that stood for article 28 or private uni-
versities ' receiving state recognition — under ill-defined
conditions — for professional titles.

The positions taken by Arturo Frondizi and his vice-
presidential candidate Alejandro G6mez in effect constitut-
ed the program of the Ucrista Party since no platform had
been drawn up in a national convention. In a talk on Radio
El Mundo on January 14, 1958, Frondizi came out clearly
as a proponent of private education:

El derecho constitiicional de aprender y la li-
bertad de ensenar seran celosamente preservados;
y todo argentine tendra asegurado el acceso a

See above, chapter 8, p. 2Jb.

This statement of the Oficina Universitaria was

265

la educacion y el derecho a elegir el tipo
de ensenanza que prefiera para si o como
padres para sus hijos. La salvaguardia de
estos derechos es esencial, porque la
imposicifin obligatoria de un espiritu de-
terminado en la ensenanza constituye un
avance peligroso en el ambito de las concri-
encias .

The same theme was repeated in an interview with La Naci6n

Tambien he decidido antes de ahora mi posicifin
sobre este asunto. Considero que el Estado
debe prestar recursos para que la educaci5n
primaria, la secundaria y la universitaria
dispongan de todos los elementos financieros
indispensables para que el pais tenga un alto
nivel cientlfico, un alto nivel tecnico.
Estamos absolutamente atrasados en relaci6n a
otros paises . Creo que debe mantenerse el
principio de libertad de ensenanza, es decir,
que ademSs de la actividad del Estado en todo
lo que se vincula con el proceso educative,
los distintos sectores de la vida nacional
pueden tambiSn ejercer el principio de la
libertad de ensei^anza.

Another way that Frondizi indicated his support of
private universities besides mentioning "libertad de ense-
nanza, " was to denoxince the state monopoly of education:

introduced into the record by Deputy Carlos H, "Perette,
DSCD 1958, VI, p. 4360.

"Mensaje a 20 millones de argentinos," quoted in

the Appendix, DSCD 1958, VI, p. 4454.

"Los candidates presidenciales nos hablan: el Dr.

Arturo Frondizi de la U.C.R, Intransigente, se refiere a
diversos problemas del momento argentine," La Naci6n, Jan-
uary 16, 1958, pp. 3-4.

266

. . . creemos que en el otorgamiento de
titulos se debe partir de la base de que la
Nacion no renuncia a su legitime derecho de
orientacion, vigilancia y decision sobre
todo lo que tenga relacion con los aspectos
fundamentales de la ensenanza. No soy
partidario del monopolio estatal.

Frondizi was promising to keep tight control over private

university titles while permitting them to be granted.

The historical tradition of the Radicals had been

laicist and favorable to the national universities and

their Ref orma . The Left was already in Frondizi 's camp be-

37
cause of his past progressive record. At the end of

January 1958, the head of the Communist Party, Rodolfo

38
Ghioldi, threw his and his party's support to Frondizi.

A new Roman Catholic-oriented party of the extreme right,

the Union Federal, also was asked to vote for Frondizi by

its head, Mario Amadeo, who was pleased with Frondizi 's

support of no-divorce and private universities, along with

36 . .

Ibid.

Luna, Arqentxna de Peron a Lanusse, pp. 116-17.

^^Snow, p. 82.

Alexander, An Introduction to Argentina, p. 104.

Snow, p. 82.

267

other Catholics and nationalists. Frondizi's pre-election

compromise with the hierarchy to favor private universities

41
was an open secret m Argentina, and won him the support

of the church and Catholics, a nice counter-balance to his

Leftist and Peronist support.

Shortly after he was elected President of Argentina,

Frondizi gave a speech from the Casa del Partido of Buenos

Aires in which he once again pledged to provide libertad

de enseflanza while in the same breath affirming that his

government would not shirk lay and public education:

Sera salvaguardado el derecho de los padres a
elegir la class de ensenanza que quieran para
sus hijos; es decir, que no se impondrS ningiSn
determinado tipo de ensefianza moral, sino la
que el padre quiere. El Estado cumplirS su
obligacion dando todo el apoyo necesario a las
instituciones oficiales invirtiendo grandes
recursos en sus programas de educaci6n y cul-
tura popular .

How Frondizi would deal with education was still
anyone's guess after the election, and this ambiguity re-
mained after another interview with La Naci6n. When asked

An editorial in Criterio, the magazine that reflects

the hierarchy's point of view, claimed that there was no

secret agreement but an open pre-election commitment,

("Educaci6n y libertad," p. 687.)

4.0 . ,

Speech of February 21, 1958, cxted by Lopez Serrot,

DSCD 1958. VI, p. 4398.

268

if he would maintain Ley 1420 or bring about "enseTlanza

libre , " he answered that "La Ley 1420 establece la ense-

nanza libra . " The reporter went on to ask: "; Pero con

titulos habilitantes otorgados por el Estado?" Frondizi

responded.

No se5^or; porque hay muchos casos en que el
Poder Ejecutivo autorizo el otorgamiento de
titulos. Yrigoyen autorizo a expedir titulos
dentro del regimen de la ley 1420. Tal el
caso de Entre Rios . En estos temas, conviene
que haya precisi5n para que no nos equivoquemos .
En cuanto a las ideas de gobierno, mientras
no las modifique — cosa que no pienso hacer —
son las que he fijado oportunamente. ^

Frondizi was reminding the reporter of the time when Presi-
dent Yrigoyen and his Minister of Education decreed that
private secondary schools could award "certif icados de ense-
nanza" to students with an annual average of seven points
without their having to pass a final state examination.
This decision had been favorable to the church, and caused
the church to petition the state, unsuccessfully, to extend

this privilege to institutes of higher education, namely

44
to Catholic universities. By mentioning this legal

"Relaciones con la iglesia y enseftanza," La Naci6n,
February 28, 1958, quoted in "Cronica politica," Re vista
Eclesiastica Argentina, I (March-April, 1958), 93.

"^^Ghioldi, Libertad de ensenanza, pp. 97-98, 128-34.

269

change which had benefited the church, was Prondizi giving

a warning of his intentions?, __ , _. . ^- . : -,:---

While many may view Frondizi's adherence to the
episcopacy's university cause as purely for political reasons,
i.e., in order to convince Catholic and nationalist elements
in the armed forces to allow him to take office even if
Per5n, whom they hated and feared, had supported him, it
may also be seen as a product of new political configura-
tions in post-Per5n Argentina. The liberals who had con-
sistently opposed Peron had been helped in the final hour
by the church. Some of these liberals began to view ther-__
church as playing a positive role, that of maintaining so-?
cial discipline and control in face of such_ threats as .
fascism, Peronism, or communism. Thus the aspirations of
the episcopacy found an audience at least within an import-
ant minority of the liberal camp — notably including Frondizi
and some of his fellow Ucristas. Some liberals also assumed
that Argentine education should be entrusted to the church

and public education more vigorously supervised in order

45
the above ideological heresies.

Halperin Donghi, Historia de la Universidad de
Buenos Aires, pp. 200-01, 204.

CHAPTER TEN

PRIVATE UNIVERSITIES LEGALIZED

As already noted, it was not at all clear what Fron-
dizi as president would do about private universities, es-
pecially since his Party was divided over the issue, and
it was not really imperative that Frondizi keep any elec-
tion promise to the church once he took office. An American
political scientist perplexedly noted, "After his inaugura-
tion Frondizi acted in a manner almost diametrically opposed
to his former writings and speeches." Yet on March 13,
1958, president-elect Frondizi announced that he was study-
ing the legal means by which the principle of "liber tad de

- 2

ensenanza" could be put into effect. By these words Fron-
dizi showed his determination to complete the break with .
the "izquierda laica. " The Marxist historian Jorge Abelardo
Ramos cynically observed that "ante la proximidad del poder
la_ burquesia expresa en sus jefes sus tendencias ideolSqicas
roSs conservadoras. " The National Committee of UCRP accused

Snow, Argentine Radicalism, p. 84.

E.J.B., "Cronica," p. 645.

Jorge Abelardo Ramos, Revolucidn y contrarrevoluci''6n
en la Argentina (2 vols., Buenos Aires: Plus Ultra, 1964-
65), II, 678.

27J

Frondizi of backing private universities in order to win

4
Catholic support for unpopular solutions m other areas.

Others have subsequently suggested that Frondizi wanted
to create a smokescreen to divert the public's attention
from a series of controversies surrounding the early stages
of his administration,

A kinder analysis of Frondizi 's favoring of church-
related universities is that he wished to modify the doc-
trinaire stances that kept Argentina fragmented and at the
same time served as obstacles to the course of rapid modern-
ization that Frondizi, as a committed desarrollista, was
seeking to promote. He displayed a similar pragmatism in
the area of petroleum policy, where he retained the state's
ownership of Yacimientos Petrollferos Fiscales (YPF) yet
also arrived at contracts with foreign oil companies to
develop Argentine oil reserves. By his ley de amnistia
and related moves, he set out to reincorporate the Peronists
into Argentine political life. And by his acceptance of
private universities, he both held out conciliation to
Catholics and struck a blow for greater flexibility in the

This accusation is contained in a resolution read
into the record by Deputy Ruben Victor M. Blanco, DSCD 1958,
VI, pp. 4207-08.

272

regime of higher education — a flexibility that was in
principle all to the good, whether or not the private uni-
versities that resulted have provided just the kind and
amount of innovation that Argentina needed.

Whatever the reasons, the fact is that Frondizi's
support of private universities represented a shift from
positions formerly taken by him and other members of the
UCRT as exponents of longstanding Radical traditions and
attitudes. There was an implicit elitism in the case for
private universities that contrasted with the equalitarian
dogmas, though not necessarily the real attitudes, of tra-
ditional Radicalism. More important, or at least more im-
mediately controversial, was the abandonment of the laic
tradition of Radicalism. This change clearly reflected
a new attitude toward the church, one that considered the
church an ally for the development of Argentine society
along the lines desired by Frondizi and many members of his
Party. ^

5
Lvma, Argentina de Peron a Lanusse, pp. 122-25.

^See above, chapter 9, p. 269.

273

Preliminaries of Debate
Special Committee Report

A few days before the Provisional Government was to
recede in favor of Frondizi, the incoming president, the
Special Committee appointed by Minister of Education Dell'Oro
Maini in February 1956 issued its report, on the prospects of
implementing article 28. This report of April 18, 1958,
was signed by committee members Drs. Bernardo A. Houssay,
Eduardo Braun Menendez, SebastiSn Soler, Venancio Deulofeu,
Juan T. Lewis, Luis F. Leloir, Jaime Perriaux, Eduardo
Huergo, and Alfredo Carlos Casares, who concluded that ar-
ticle 28 was "inconvenient." The Committee faulted the
text of the article for employing the wrong term "libre"
for private universities; for according the right to found
educational institutes when the Constitution had already
accorded it; for giving the institutes the faculty to grant
diplomas and habilitating titles directly; and for not fore-
seeing the need that these institutes subsist from state

funds. The Committee then averred that Congress and not

the Executive should draw ,up a university law.

^Deputy Misael J. Parodi Grimaux, DSCD 1958, VI,
p. 4156; and Ghioldi, Libertad de ensenanza, pp. 155-56.

274

The Committee then went on to lay down some basic
principles that would guide any future university law, pre-
sumably reflecting the Catholics' revised assessment of
what they could attain, since this Committee had been stacked
by Dell'Oro Maini with men who were favorable toward the
church and its positions. Private institutes, the Commit-
tee proposed, could become universities that were self-sup-
porting; they could not exercise the state function of grant-
ing habilitating titles. But,

Los certificados parciales de estudios o los
diplomas podran ser acreditados para autorizar
a su tenedor a rendir el examen de estado de
habilitacion profesional, siempre que los
estudios cursados en la instituci6n otorgante
de aqu^llos, reunen las condiciones estable-
cidas por la ley.^

This proposition was illustrative of a change in Catholic

demands, from clamoring for private universities which

could grant diplomas and habilitating titles to the demand

for an "examen de estado, " which implicitly all university

students (national and private) would take before commit-

" . 9

^tees appointed by the state. Throughout the ensuing de-

». ■

■bate, however, there was much room for imprecision in dis-

Ghioldi, Libertad de ensenanza, pp. 156-58.
^Ibid . . p. 158.

275

cussing the question of professional certification. While
private university advocates normally accepted that only
the state should grant such certification, they were often
unclear — perhaps deliberately — as to whether they expected
the state to issue habilitating titles only after holding
special examinations or simply to rubberstamp the titles
issued by approved private universities.
National University Protest

The national university community — faculty, admin-
istration, and students — went into an uproar over the in-
creasing likelihood of a law that recognized private uni-
versities. They realized along with everyone else that the
church was the only interest group capable of establishing
private universities and the only major interest group
which wanted them as of 1958. The confessional nature of
such private universities was deplored as a break with
traditional Argentine cultural diversity exemplified by
the national universities . The recent experience under
Peron had taught the partisans of the national universities
the importance of ideological pluralism, and the private
universities, it was argued, would be possible centers of
fascism and totalitarianism. The national universities
needed time and money to recover from Peronism and to

276

"reconstruct" themselves; Catholic universities would com-
pete for already scarce state resources, such as money, to
the detriment of the national universities.

The leader of the national university community pro-
test was the rector of the University of Buenos Aires,
Risieri Frondizi. When his brother, the president-elect
Arturo Frondizi, persisted in going ahead with plans to
implement article 28, he and the other university rectors
hastened to issue a declaration of their own:. _

No debe confundirse a la opinion publica mez-
clando grandes principios con intereses mez-
quinos, circunstanciales o sectarios . La gran
mayoria de los universitarios argentinos, somos
decididos partidarios de la libertad de enseRar
y aprender y estamos dispuestos a luchar por
ella.

Una cosa sin embargo es la libertad de ensenar _y
otra muy distinta el afan y la urgencia por conse-
guir a toda costa la patente para otorgar titulos _
habilitantes .

Llama la atencion el contraste entre la premura
por conferir ese derecho a instituciones que no
tienen un ano de vida y la parsimonia por asegurar
una estabilidad jurldica a las Universidades Naci-
onales que han tenido la responsabilidad de la
ensenanza superior y la formacion de profesionales ^;
desde la iniciacion misma de la Naci6n.

La Ley Avellaneda que rigio la vida de lasiUni-

•'-^Halperin Donghi, Historia de la Universidad de
Buenos Aires, pp. 201-05. --

277

versidades Argentinas desde 1885 hasta 1947
y que esta nuevamente en vigencia segiSn lo
dispone el Decreto-Ley 447 establece en el
articulo 1° 'la Universidad expedira los
diplomas de las respectivas profesiones ci-
entf f icas . ' i Puede alguien pensar que esta
vieja y sabia ley contrarla el principio
constitucional establecido en el Articulo 14?

The national university rectors also submitted their own
university reform bill to Congress in June 1958. By it,
the national universities would enjoy full autonomy in
drawing up their own statutes, determining their own sys-
tem of government, electing their own authorities, and ap-
pointing and removing personnel for research, technical,
administrative, and teaching functions without intervention

of the Chief Executive. Only the national universities

could grant habilitating titles. On August 21, the rec-
tors met with President Frondizi and presented him with a
petition that asked him not to implant article 28 of De-
cree 6403.

Six days later Frondizi gave his answer in a press

J: _ :i 3

^^E.J.B., "Cronica," pp. 645-46.

12 - - -

Consult Terren de Ferro, "Educaci6n: la univer-
sidad actual y su autonomia," p. 464.

Domingorena, pp. 59-60. -

278

release containing nine points in favor of article 28.
The last point reaffirmed his promotion of private uni-
versities:

El Poder Ejecutivo hace saber al pafs que
estS estudiando los medios juridicos para
hacer efectivo el principio de la libertad
de ense!ianza dentro de los conceptos arri-
ba enunciados.

National university students also protested against

article 28 and private universities in late August, when

the Federacion Universitaria Argentina organized parades

in front of the National Congress building. They carried

placards whose slogans backed up the petition of their

rectors: "State, Yes; Private, No," "Secular, Yes; Free,

No," and "Priests, No; Books, Yes."''"^ On September 1,

Frondizi made a formal reply to the rectors' petition; he

16
fully supported "libertad de enseRanza."

When it appeared likely that Congress would approve

legislation authorizing private universities that could

grant habilitating titles to students who passed a state

■•■^E. J. B., "Cronica," p. 645.

Walter, Student Politics in Argentina, pp. 163-64,

■'•^Domingorena, pp. 62-63.

279

examinationk the rector and students of the University of
Buenos Aires became more politically active. On September
4, Risieri Frondizi addressed the Federacion Universitaria
de Buenos Aires (FUBA) and then led the students in a march
on Congress, where he requested that article 28 be defeated.

The throng chanted, "The school is Sarmiento's, " and "Priests

18
to the monastery." On September 9, Risieri Frondizi

spoke to the Federation of Engineering Students, inspiring

them to fight for the national universities because: '"

Durante ocho meses, hemos mantenido la Universal- "
dad de Buenos Aires al margen de toda cuesti6n
politica; . . . Fuerzas oscuras se movian sigilosa-
mente, mientras nosotros trabajabamos tranquila
y serenamente. EstSbamos desprevenidos, pero '"
no necesitamos mucho tiempo para reaccionar ...
y ahora salimos a luchar.

He continued his speech by pointing out how the private
institutes-universities were of poor quality, had few stu-
dents, and had copied the worst aspect of the national uni-
versities— "el_ profesionalismo. " He wondered why the ur-

The students were to receive the title only after
passing the state examination.

18 '

E.J.B., "Cronica," pp. 648-49.

■""^Risieri Frondizi, "La enseflanza libre y la libertad
de la cultura," in La reforma universitaria 1918-1958, ed.
Federacion Universitaria Argentina (Buenos Aires: Federacion
Universitaria de Buenos Aires, 1959), pp. 257-58.

280

gency on their part for article 28, and then answered his
own question: the private universities "pref ieren lanzarse
inmediatamente al mercado de la venta de titulos." He
finished this talk by calling upon Congress to quash arti-
cle 28 and sanction a university law that permitted nation-
al universities to work in peace and for the good of the
country, and he beseeched the Chief Executive to quit play-
ing politics with education and stop tampering with the

20
cultural conquests of the Argentine people.

In September, the FUA, in imitation of the national
viniversity rectors, also submitted a bill to Congress that
contained their thoughts on a new national university law.
No private universities were allowed since all were nation-
al. The universities were communities of professors, stu-
dents, and alumni, all of whom had equal duties and rights.
The universities were autonomous, running their own affairs.
This student bill called for the cancellation of all previous

university laws, including Ley Avellaneda, and decrees, in-

21
eluding Decree 6403.

20lbid. , pp. 262-65.

21 ...

FUA, "Anteproyecto de ley universitarxa, " La re-

forma universitaria 1918-1958, pp. 266-70.

281

High school students, mainly from the public second-
ary schools, joined university students in their protests
against private universities. In July 1958, two hundred
delegates from thirty colegios met in Buenos Aires to co-
ordinate their demonstrations with the university students
"Ante la primer a noticia de la reglamentacion del articulo
28 que ponia en peliqro nuestra Universidad Nacional. .,„,„. 'i
This organization of secondary students was known as FES
(Federacion de Estudiantes Secundarios) , of which the most

active branch was FEMES (Federacion Metropolitana de Estudi-

antes Secundarios) of greater Buenos Aires.

Students — mainly university — held demonstrations

against article 28 in Cordoba and La Plata during the first

24
half of September. On September 19, an estimated 160,000

persons, mainly male university students, converged on the

Jorge M, Rensin, "iPuede el gobierno ignorar la

agremiacion secundaria?" La reforma universitaria 1918-1958,
p. 276.

Ibid., pp. 275-77.

^ The Cordobes students opposed to private univer-
sities had thrown tar bombs, and the C5rdoba governor had
had to call out troops to replace the police in maintaining
order in the University of Cordoba. In La Plata a dummy of
President Frondizi dressed as a cardinal had been ceremonious-
ly burned. ("Aniversarios : setiembre 1958: laicos v.
libres," Primera Plana, VI September 24, 1968// 84.)

282

Plaza del Congreso. Speakers called for the defense of
"the popular culture," and for ensef^anza laica.^^ After
the demonstration FUA resolved to "occupy" and "take" the
nation al universities if article 28 were not abrogated. ^^

Demonstrations became increasingly violent: the
Plaza del Congreso was the scene of daily pitched battles
between the Reformistas of FUA and the police. Secondary
students of PES joined the university students in boycott-
ing classes.

Catholic Counter Protests

The hierarchy was prepared to accept that the state

should set standards for admittance into the professions.

But the church did not want the national universities to

decide who could practice a profession, feeling that the

national universities would discriminate against graduates

of Catholic universities. In a speech published during

September 1958, Cardinal Caggiano stated that:

. . . un control del Estado, que permita la liber-
tad para que las universidades privadas, como las

Ibid.

The speakers represented alumni, university stu-
dents, secondary students, political parties, and labor
groups, and urged the rejection of article 28. (La Prensa.
September 20, 1953, p. 1, as quoted in Walter, p. 165.)

283

esta tales, den titulos acadeinicos, peroque no
impliquen de inmediato el ejercicio de las
profesiones se vincula con el bien pftblico,
por lo cual el Estado es el que debe regular
el ejercicio de las mismas. El Estado debe
determinar la forma de tomar el examen de
competencia profesional, hasta establecer
cualquier otro medio de control. No es ne-
cesario inventar ninguno, porque en las na-
ciones de America y de Europa funcionan los
mas diversos procedimientos por los cuales el
Estado controla el acceso al ejercicio de las
profesiones.

The Permanent Commission of the Argentine Episcopacy

reiterated on September 15 that ensenanza libre was not

ensenanza religiosa, and that the church was asking for

nothing for itself but rather the freedom to learn for all

28
with legitimate state supervision. The bishops' univer-
sity, the Universidad Catolica in Buenos Aires, also de-
clared what it wanted in a university law. Point no. 5

asked that only the state recognize professional degrees or

titles, since it was important to the bishops that the

national universities were not delegated the authority to

Democracia, September 10, 1958, quoted in a speech
by Deputy Oscar Lopez Serrot, DSCD 1958, VI, p. 4400.

"Educacion y libertad," p. 687.

"Docximentos : declaracion de principios de la

Universidad Cat6lica de Buenos Aires y de Cordoba," Estu-
dios, XLVII, no. 497 (September, 1958), 571-72.

284

represent the state in recognizing the titles and degrees

of Catholic universities because they could be expected to

30
oppose them. Point no. 8 of the same declaration illus-
trated another facet of the church's position by arguing
that the money spent on education came from the whole pop-
ulace and should be proportionately spent on both state

and private universities as well as on primary and second-

31
ary schools. However, the demand for public funding,

which on the whole had been kept discreetly in the back-
ground, was strongly rejected by the opponents of private
universities, and such a provision was not included in the
final version of the law for private universities.

The September 4 street demonstrations led by Risieri

Frondizi were denounced by the Humanists, who began to plan

counter demonstrations. Catholxcs in the University of

Buenos Aires Assembly criticized Frondizi 's actions and un-

33
successfully tried to get a vote of censure against him.

^°See below, p. 295.

"Documentos: declaraci6n de principles, " p. 571.

La Prensa, September 13, 1958, p. 5, quoted in

Walter, p. 16.
33

E.J.B., "Cr6nica," p. 649.

285

Catholic professors and rectors of the private insti-
tutes-universities drew up a university bill to counter
that of the national university rectors and that of FUA.
They wanted an organism of the state to recognize habili-
tating titles of the new private universities, and they no
longer spoke of state funding of the private universities.

Artlculo 5° — Las Universidades Privadas podrSn
establecer sus propios planes de enseftanza,
otorgar certificados de estudios y expedir di-
plomas que solo tendrSn valor academico.

Articulo 6° — Los titulares de diplomas academi-
coe, expedidos por las Universidades Pri-
vades, tendrSn el derecho a presentarse al
Minis terio de Educacion para obtener el re-
conocimiento de su validez profesional, el
cual sera otorgado por intermedio del organism©
a que alude el Articulo 7 , previa comprobacion
de que las Universidades Privadas que los ex-
pidieron cumplan todos los requisitos exigidos
por la presente ley y reglamentacion.

Article 4 did not mention state aid for the private univer-
sities, but neither did it exclude the possibility: it

only stated that the universities could "fijar aranceles

^ --u • 34

Y recibir contribuciones ^ . - . .

Catholics also mounted a massive street demonstration
on the 15th of September td counter the ones of opposing

"Documentos: anteproyecto de ley para las univer-
sidades pirvadas : fundamentos, articulado y reglamentacion
de la ley," Estudios, XLVII, no. 498 (October, 1958), 655.

286

students held in Cordoba and La Plata. Composed mainly of
Catholic elementary, secondary, and university students,
plus adult men and women, the crowd numbered from 100,000
to 150,000 persons, stretching for ten blocks along the
Avenida de Mayo. They converged on the Plaza del Congreso
where Congress was considering article 28, and as they
passed the Casa Rodada they shouted, "Risieri-Nikita, qufe
linda pareiita. " and "Arturo, coraje, a_ Risieri dale el

raje" ; President Frondizi came out on the balcony and salut-

ed them.

Catholics also decried the demonstrations organized
by FUA, and tried to play down the far greater numbers they
attracted. Criterio charged that the September 19 protest
drew so many persons because some government officials had
been accomplices and let employees out early to join the

protest, and because some public transports had not charged

the demonstrators fare to the Plaza del Congreso.

Congress

The Bill

Article 28 had stated that private initiative could

E.J.B., "Cr6nica,- p. 649.

^^Ibid. , p. 650.

287

create private universities which could officially issue _
diplomas and professional titles, though under some sort
of state regulation. This proposition was rejected by too
many congressmen and senators to be made law. The promoters
of private universities realized that only a law which re-
served to the state the right to emit habilitating titles
and forebade state funding of private universities would
be considered. And even with these two disclaimers in-
cluded, the outcome was not certain. = ;__;:./ ;,.-.:. :::._^t-

Subsequently, both the Chamber of Deputies and the

37
Senate voted to abrogate article 28 of Decree 6403. The

Senate, xonder the leadership of Senator Horacio Domingoreaa
of the Ucrista Party, approved a new article which formed-
part of what became known as the Domingorena bill. The~_--
revised bill authorized private universities to grant titles
and/or academic diplomas. Graduates of these universities
who wished to practice certain professions would have to
submit to state examinations given by a state body created
for Such a purpose. Public~£unas ("recursos estatales")
could not be given to thes,e universities, and private uni-
versities were to submit their statutes and plans of study

Ghioldi, Libertad de ensenanza, pp. 160-61.

288

to a state administrative authority for prior approval.

In the Senate this version was passed by the majority

Ucristas, who voted along party lines, and was returned

to the Chamber of Deputies for their approval.

Heated Debate in Chamber

This bill passed to the Chamber of Deputies where

many Ucristas bolted from their Party to oppose it; in fact,
the UCRI Party released its members from voting according
to the party line so that they could vote according to
their conscience. On September 23, sixty-three Ucrista
deputies signed a manifesto that stated:

1) Negamos expresamente que en los actuales
momentos est§ en juego el principio de la
libertad de ensenanza 0 - de la enseflanza libre,
como quiera llamarsela, que todos defendemos.

2) Pero entendemos, en ejercicio del derecho
de policia del Estado, que los titulos habili-
tantes para el ejercicio de las diversa pro-
fesiones cientificas s61o pueden^^er otorgados
por las universidades estatales.

The sixty-three Ucristas who signed the above manifesto

joined with UCRP and the Socialists in voting down the

Domingorena bill.

^^This revision was taken up by the Chamber. (DSCD
1958. VII, p. 5343.)

DSCD 1958. VI, p. 4359.

289

The UCRP had already published its reasons for re-
jecting the Domingorena bill on September 18. It accepted
the right of all inhabitants of the country to found pri-
vate institutions, but stated that "el_ Estado no puede ni
debe compartir con los particulares, ni con instituciones
privadas. ni deleqar en ellos su obliaaci6n de eiercer el
poder de policia sobre el otorgamiento de titulos habili -
tantes para el ejercicio de las profesiones." Moreover,
like the Ucrista dissidents, it affirmed that only the na-
tional universities could represent the state in the above
functions . It concluded that "las universidades privadas
no pueden encontrar inconvenientes en la adopci6n de los
planes de estudio , r^gimenes de promocion y_ de_ otorgamiento
de titulos habili tantes para el ejercicio de las profesiones,

prescritos por las leyes y reglamentos de la materia ya que

estan sometidas las propias universidades nacionales. "

UCRP, in effect, took the stand that the national univer-
sities should be supreme and the private ones subjected to
their standards — with the national universities administer-
ing those standards to them.

The deputies continued to opposed the revised bill

^^DSCD 1958, VI, p. 4208,

290

for reasons that were not fully stated and which were af-
fected by anti -clericalism. They sympathized with the ad-
ministration and faculty of the national universities who
wanted to maintain their monopoly of university education.
Proponents of private universities tried to reassure the
national universities and their congressional allies that
they need not fear competition since they had federal back-
ing and strong organization. It was also expected that
private universities would attract liberal arts students
and would permit the national university to invest state
resources into preparing the costlier programs for the
training of technicians. The private sector on the pri-
mary and secondary levels saved the state money for public

41
education, and so would the private university. But the

deputies continued to fear that once Catholic universities

got a foot in the door they would press for the privileges

of granting habilitating titles and receiving state funds,

thereby competing with the national university for already

scarce funds, good faculty, and students. The private iini-

versity would also be more likely to acquiesce in state

interventions than the united national universities who

Domingorena, Articulo 28, pp. 133-40.

291

fought dictatorships in the past. Proponents of national
universities assiimed that examinations for habilitating
titles would be given by political appointees and simply
nominal. Moreover, a future President or Congress could
change the law or implement it in a way even more favor-
able to the private universities, taking away from the mon-

opoly of higher education of the national universities.

But the Senate stuck to its revision of article 28
which stated that the state could award habilitating
titles, a compromise between the position of those who want-
ed the private universities to award habilitating titles
and the position of the national universities which was
that only they could award such titles. Thus the bill again
returned to the Chamber on September 30; it was necessary
for the deputies to defeat it by a two-thirds majority in
order to block its passage, since it had twice been approved
by the Senate. In the end, sixty-nine deputies voted
against killing the bill, and though its opponents mustered

42 ...

Based on interview with Risieri Frondizi, Buenos

Aires, August 12, 1972; and interview with Americo Ghioldi,
Buenos Aires, August 15, 1972.

Article 68 of Chapter V of the Constitution pro-
vides that if a bill is approved by a two-thirds majority
for a second time by the originating house, the other house
must defeat it by a two-thirds majority vote.

102 votes, they fell short of the necessary two-thirds.

The final bill was promulgated as Ley 14.557; its

text read as follows :

Artlculo 1°: Derogase el articulo 28 del
Decreto-Ley 6.403/55 y apruebase en su re-
emplazo el siguiente :

La iniciativa privada podrS crear Universi-
dades con capacidad para expedir tltulos y/o
diplomas academicos.

La habilitacion para el ejercicio profesional,
sera otorgada por el Estado Nacional.

Los examenes que habiliten para el ejercicio
de las profesiones seran publicos y estaran a
cargo de los organismos que designe el Estado
Nacional,

Dichas Universidades no podran recibir recursos
estatales y deberan someter sus estatutos,
programas y planes de estudio a la aprobacion
previa de la autoridad administrativa, la que
reglamentara las demas condiciones para su
f uncionamiento .

El Poder Ejecutivo no otorgara autorizacion, o
la retirar^ si la hubiese concedido, a las
Universidades Privadas, cuya orientaci&n y
planes de estudio no aseguren una capacitacion
tecnica, cientifica y cultural de los gradu-
ados, por lo menos equivalente a la que im-
parten las Universidades Estatales y/o que no
propicien la formacion democratica de los estu-
diantes dentro de los principios que informan
a la Constitucion Nacional,

292

44dsCD_1958, VII, p. 5344,
Domingorena, pp. 85-86.

293

Repercussions
More Riots

The passage of the Domingorena bill on September 30
resulted in opposing students trying to storm Congress and
set the building on fire. A student protest on October 1
was held in the Plaza del Congreso, and traffic was blocked

with park benches . Four hundred students marched on the

46
Casa Rosada, but were turned back by the police. On the

same day the Catholic Hxomanists withdrew from FUBA (Federa-

ci&n Universitaria de Buenos Aires) because they did not

share FUA's opposition to private universities and article

28. This withdrawal was followed by student boycotts of

classes and a riot between the Humanists and Reformists at

the University of Buenos Aires, leading police to intervene

and the Reformists to erect barricades against the police.

In Tucuman, a gun battle was waged with the police, caus-
ing Minister of Education Luis MacKay to intervene with a
call to students to calm themselves down and an order clos-

"Hubo desordenes estudiantiles en Plaza del Con-
greso," La Prensa, October 2, 1958, p. 6.

'^^See "Separanse de la FUBA las agrupaciones Huma-
nistas," La Prensa, October 2, 1958, p. 6; and "Intervini-
eron en nuevos y m&s graves sucesos los estudiantes, " La
Prensa, October 4, 1958, p. 4.

294

ing secondary schools where there were disturbances.^®
Since most police action was directed against the Reform-
ists of FUA when they clashed with the Humanists, there
were protests lodged against the police by the Socialist
Party, the Centre de Estudiantes de Ciencias Econ&micas,
and the Federacion Metropolitana de Estudiantes Secundarios ."^^
The police, on the other hand, blamed the disorders of

September 30 on "la extrema izquierda" who, they claimed,

50
were trying to make a civil issue into a religious one.

Question of Implementation

Before the new law for private universities went in-
to effect, the President of Argentina would have to imple-
ment it. On October 4 the rector (R. Frondizi) and deans
of the University of Buenos Aires met with the Minister of
the Interior and asked that the government not implement

it, so that the whole matter could be taken up by Congress

51
m 1959 and peace could come to the campuses again.

^°"Comentarios: desorden en la enseTianza," Criterio.

XXXI (October 9, 1958), 735.

"Repercusion publica por el conflicto estudiantil, "
La Prensa. October 4, 1958, p. 6.

See "Comentarios: religion y anticlericalismo, "

Criterio. XXXI (October 9, 1958), 733-34; and "Comentarios:

peripecias de la libertad, " Criterio, XXXI (September 25,

1958), 698.

Domingorena, p. 87.

295

Leaders of all national universities also met with Presi-
dent Frondizi and asked him to veto the law; they sent him
a note on October 16, reminding him that passions were

still stirred up, and that the moment was "inopportune"

52
for private universities. The note also contained a

threat of more demonstrations if Frondizi implemented the

law:

Los ocho Rectores Universitarios nos apresura-
mos a hacer llegar al senor Presidente, nuestra
inquietud y preocupacion ante esa noticia y
creimos nuestro deber advertirle las posibles
perturbaciones a la vida uniyersitaria que tal
reglamentacion ocasiona2U.a.„

The Catholics, too, put pressure on President Fron-
dizi, but in their case it was for the implementation of
the law in a form that would be advantageous to them. They
wanted a Consejo Nacional de Universidades Privadas to be
created which would, among other duties, issue habilitat-
ing titles for the exercise of professions when academic
titles were submitted by the private universities; nothing
was said about state examinations being given to their grad-

Speech of Jorge Camargo, Rector of the Universi-
dad Catolica de Cordoba, Cordoba, October 18, 1958, quoted
in "Comentarios: algo que no puede ser 'sorpresivo, • "
Estudios, XLVII, no. 499 (November, 1958), 721.

^^Domingorena, p. 88.

296

uates for these titles. Neither was the possibility ruled

54
out that these universities might receive public funds.

Similarly, Catholics harped on the inequities between

private and public universities that were written into the

law. The law called for state examinations to be given to

the graduates of private universities for habilitating ti-r

ties: their suggested remedy was for these examinations

to be cancelled once private universities demonstrated that

they had high standards, or for these examinations to be

given to the graduates of the state universities, too.

Second, it was unjust that private universities could not

receive state moneys, since federal taxes were paid by all.

And third, the phrasing of the law was patronizing when it

said that private universities must have a curriculum that

assures a technical, scientific, and cultural level on a

55
par with that of the national universities. Above all.

Catholics wanted the law for private universities to be

implemented as soon as possible so that the existence of

these universities would not be jeopardized. They pointed

out that these private institutes-universities already ex-

"Documentos: anteproyecto, " p. 656.

Ismael Quiles, "Reglamentaci6n de la ley de uni-

versidades privadas," Estudios, XLVII, no. 499 (November,

1958), 695.

297

isted, so why not implement the lawl
Implementation

President Frondizi promulgated Ley 14.557 in mid-
57
October 1958, and implemented it by Decree no. 1404 on

February 11, 1959. By issuing the decree in February, a
summer month in Argentina, the government avoided student
demonstrations against the decree since the students were
on vacation. The state body created to supervise the pri-
vate universities was the InspecciSn General de Enseftanza
Universitaria Privada, located in the Ministry of Educa-
tion and Justice. Private universities that complied with
Ley 14.557 could grant titles and academic diplomas. The
Executive Power would designate " tribunales de profesionales
Y. profesores de la especialidad de que se trata " to examine
those graduates who were to receive habilitating titles.
The decree was rather vague, however, about the number of
examiners, the length of the examination, what professions
would be examined, how often the examinations would be
given, and what type of questions would be asked — in short,
the examinations would depend upon the persons appointed by

Jorge A. Camargo, "La ley y la realidad universi-
taria actual, " Estudios, XL VIII, no. 501 (January-February,
1959), 40.

^"^ALA 1958. XVIII-A, p. 213.

298

the Chief Executive from professional associations, high

58
schools, state and private university faculties.

Clearly the above decree needed to be clarified by
another, but it was not until January 22, 1962, that Mini-
ster of Education Luis MacKay and President Frondizi issued
a supplementary decree on the subject of habilitating exam-
inations. Decree no. 631 of the above date established
that habilitating examinations would be given for the car-
reers of law, architecture, economics, pharmacy, biochemr-
istry, engineering, medicine, notary public, agronomy, and
veterinary science. The examinations would be given by.t.-
three examiners representing the state, the private uni»

versity, and the professional association of that career^^

The tribunals of exaininers would be appointed by the _:- i
Ministry of Education and Justice, and they would take

their questions from the curriculum of that major field

59
as established by the private university. . ^ . -£

The 1962 decree was still too vague to satisfy^ the

rector of the University of Buenos Aires, since it contained

no binding provisions as to the type or length of the exam-

^^ALA 1959, XIX-A, Part 2, pp. 73-74.
^^AIA 1962, XXII -A, pp. 222-24.

299

60
mation. He also complained that the examining board

was reduced to only three examiners, and that there was no
provision for the professional fields of odontology, chem-
ical engineering, meteorology, geology, and secondary school

61
teaching .

Frondizi thus kept his promise to the Catholics made

before the election — he backed a bill in Congress that

recognized the diplomas of private universities, and he

implemented it when it became law. But in the process he

alienated those liberals who were anti-clerical or who felt

a close identification with the national universities, both

in and out of his UCRI Party. Because of his support of

the private university law, the leftist and liberal in-

. 62

tellectual circles would never trust him again.

"Acerca del examen para la habilitacion de pro-
fesionales," La Prensa, February 5, 1962, p. 6.

^^Ibid.

Luna, Argentina de Peron a Lanusse, pp. 129-30.

CHAPTER ELEVEN

RELIGION IN THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS SINCE 1958

Political Background
Frondizi-Guido

Frondizi's administration had more to do with educa-
tion than just the private university question already
dealt with; it also had certain policies to promote in pri-
mary-secondary education, and gave strong financial support
to education in general. His policies were viewed as pro-
Catholic, illiberal, and anti-laic by those in the laicist

camp, and public education lost ground vis-^-vis the pri-

1
vate sector. Yet from 1961 to 1962 the budget for educa-
tion increased 22.6%. The proportion of the budget set

aside for education in 1960 was 12.3%; in 1961, it was 13%;

2
and, in 1962, it was 17.6%.

"En 1958 lleg6 Frondizi al poder, con una rama de
los radicales, y su accion, no obstante tener fama anterior
de liberal, fue netamente antiliberal, antilaica_y procat6-
lica. Frondizi hizo un da?io tremendo al liberalismo y al
laicismo, pues entrego la ensenanza publica al arbitrio de
los catolicos." (Information in a letter to the author from
Jose S. Campobassi, Buenos Aires, December 27, 1974.)

2 -

"El presupuesto de educaci6n para el ano 1963," La

Prensa, November 16, 1963, p. 6.

300

301

General elections for national congressmen and pro-
vincial legislators and governors were slated for March
1962, and, for the first time since the overthrow of Peron,
Peronist candidates were allowed on the ballot, albeit un-
der non-Peronist headings. These neo-Peronists captured

31.9% of the vote and triumphed in four provinces — five

if Jujuy is counted, where they helped a Christian Democrat

4
to win. The Ucristas won 24.5% of the vote, the UCRP 19.9%,

the Popular Conservatives 6%, the Socialists 4.5%, and the
Christian Democrats 2.3%. The anti-Peronist armed forces
decried the Peronist victories and demanded that Frondizi
intervene provinces where they had won. Even though he
complied, the military overthrew him on March 28. On March
30, they decided to let the constitutional successor to the
presidency, Ucrista head of the Senate Jose Maria Guido,
become President if he would annul the elections and inter-
vene all provinces. Guido also closed down Congress so that
no Peronist could take his seat there.

Snow, Argentine Radicalism, p. 94,

Luna, Argentina de Peron a Lanusse, p. 139.

Snow, p. 113.

Luna, pp. 147-48.

302

Guido continued the policies of Frondizi in the educa-
tional field until he was succeeded by Arturo I Ilia as Presi-
dent of Argentina in July 1963. Guide's government propor-
tioned the same amounts of money to education, and favored
the growth of the private sector. According to a La_ Prensa
editorial the 32,000 million pesos spent annually on public
education was still inadequate. For example, out of a pos-
sible graduating population of 400,000 in 1961, only 18%

or 70,000 students graduated from high schools, and only

7
13,211 of them graduated with a degree of bachillerato.

Illia

The election of Illia brought the UCRP Party to power.
He received 25% of the vote, nearly one million more than
UCRI. However, the law of elections drawn up by the Ucrista
Guido established the d'Hondt system of proportional repre-
sentation, under which UCRP won only 71 of the 192 seats in
Congress; without a clear majority, Illia and his Party
would need to strike bargains with the other parties. Illia
did nothing to halt the erosion of laicism in Argentine ed-

ucation, but followed the, trends of the Ucristas to spend

"Educacion pdblica insuf iciente, " La Prensa, August
31, 1963, p. 6.

^Letter from Campobassi to author, Buenos Aires,
December 27, 1974.

303

more on education. In 1960, 2% of the Gross National Prod-
uct of Argentina went to education; in 1965, 3.3% did; in

1967, one year after the military coup against Illia, the

percent of the GNP spent on education had reverted to 2%.

Throughout the period from 1963 to 1966, the predom-
inant attitude of the Argentine political elite toward the
church was favorable, to judge from survey results. Thus
the members of Illia 's UCRP, a political party whose public
positions were less favorable to the church than those of
UCRI (Frondizi) , showed itself well disposed to the church.
Interviews with 68 members of the Illia administration dis-
closed that 42.6% thought that the Catholic church should
play an important role in the political life of Argentina,
while 16.1% said that this should only be in an emergency,
and 38.2% stated that the church should never play an im-
portant role in the political life of Argentina. The at-
titudes of the future members of the political elite — uni-
versity students — ^were at that point also found to be fav-
orably disposed toward the church: 45% stated that the
Catholic church should always play an important role in

UNESCO, "Public Expenditure on Education," UN

Statistical Yearbook, 1971 (Louvain, Belgium: Imprimerie
Ceuterick, 1972), p. 515.

304

the polity.
Onqanla

When the UCRP administration of Illia was tossed
out by military action in June 1966, the military dictator
who took over was Juan Carlos Onganla, an Army general and
a staunch Catholic. Under him there were no elections, and
military governments ruled in the provinces by decree. Ed-
ucation budgets for public schools were decreased, and re-
forms were planned to weaken the public education system
by transfering national primary schools to the provinces.
The university law was changed to allow private universities
to receive state aid. Military governments which succeeded
Onganla* s after 1970 continued his educational polices, and
by 1972, there were five provinces which had religious ed-
ucation in the provincial public schools during school hours,
given by priests or other persons authorized by the provin-

A study of the political elite (398 activists in

the 1958-62 Frondizi administration, and 384 activists of
the 1963-66 Illia administration) , which was defined to in-
clude Congressmen, governors, upper-level administrators,
and government heads, consisted of two different surveys
and only questioned the Illia elite on their attitudes
toward the Roman Catholic church. (Julio A. Fernandez, The
Political Elite in Argentina ^ew York: New York University
Press, 1970/, pp. 62, 86, 94-95.)

See below, pp. 328-33.

305

cial hierarchy. These five provinces — Buenos Aires, Cor-

12
doba, Santa Fe, Catamarca, and Salta — had enrollments of

more than half of the total Argentine school population.

Religion and Public Schools Since 1958
1958 Estatuto del Docente

The Provisional Government's 1956 interim Estatuto
del Docente was replaced by a new statute approved by Con-
gress on September 12, 1958; it was published as Law 14.473.
It lumped together public school personnel with that of pri-
vate schools "adscriptos a_ la_ ensefianza oficial" ; either
they were primary, financed by the CNE, or they were second-
ary, normal, or special, "incorporados a la_ enseRanza ofici-

14
al. " The teachers and administrators of these private

schools would enjoy the same monthly salary as their peers

in public schools (municipal, provincial, and national) .

This federal remuneration also contained an escalator clause

that tied salaries to the cost of living. Retirement pay

Interview with Hermano Septimio, head of CONSUDEC,

Buenos Aires, September 16, 1972,

^^ALA 1958. XVIII-A, pp. 98-127.

■'■'^Article 174, ibid . , p. 126, uses the definition of
this category of private schools found in paragraph a) of
article 2 of Law 13.047, ALA 1947. VII, pp. 392-93. Also
see above, chapter 5, p. 127.

306

was subsidized by the federal government for private as well
as public schoolteachers and administrators; if they had
worked for 25 or 30 years, depending on whether they taught
or not, they were assured of a pension of at least 82% of
the salary of an active teacher or administrator; early re-
tirement was compensated at 75% of the last salary earned.
This statute also introduced a new policy: for every ten
years worked, a teacher or administrator could take a year
off with pay in order to study.

This law was mainly the work of the Ucristas who
dominated the Senate, since it was their version passed by
a two-thirds majority the second time around. The Chamber
of Deputies had passed by a two-thirds majority a very
similar bill that differed in the following ways: it want-
ed to protect the tenure of personnel in private schools;
and, to pay the full salary of personnel in private schools
only if they were tuition free, otherwise salaries would

only be subsidized up to 80% of the full amount as in the

16
1947 Statute. The Frondizi government further implement-

See the "Consideraciones, " ALA 1958, XVIII-A, p. 99,

1 C.

•^Proposed articles 174, 176, ibid., pp. 101-02;
and "Diose sancion definitiva al Estatuto del Docente, " La
Prensa. September 13, 1958, pp. 1, 4.

307

merited the 1958 Statute by creating the Servicio de Ense-" —
nanza Privada (SNEP) to concentrate in one body all the

supervisory and service fiinctions of the national govern-

ment vis-i-vis private schools.

The Senate's bill was advantageous to private school
personnel since they were subsidized on a par with the pub-
lic school personnel, and it especially favored the church
since it was the sponsor of almost half the private schools
in Argentina. CONSUDEC (Consejo Superior de Educacion
Catolica) had lobbied for an increase of state support for
private school salaries along with the Institutes Adscriptos
a la Ensenanza Oficial, the Asociacion de Institutes Libres
de Ensenanza Privada, the S indicate de Docentes Particulares,

the Sindicato de Empleados y Obreros de la Ensenanza Privada,

18
and the Centre Argentine de Docentes Adscriptos.

Private school groups argued that equal pay for them

and public school personnel would cost very little, and

that the private sector in education saved the state mon^y:

■•■^SNEP was created ,by Decree 9247 of August 9, 1960.
(ALA 1960, XX-A, pp. 620-21.) See below, p. 310.

^^See "La equparacion de sueldos de docentes ad-
scriptos," La Prensa, July 1, 1958, p. 18; and "Centre Ar-
gentine de Docentes Adscriptos," La Prensa, July 9, 1958,-
p. 16.

308

... la ensenanza adscripta subvene ionada
configura una tercera parta de la que se de-
sarolla en el pais, con sujecion a programas
y direct! vas oficiales, y ... la suma re-
querida a la Nacion para pagar los sueldos
equiparados significa solamente una decima
parte de la que debera votarse para hacer frente
a los aumentos de los docentes oficiales . . .
la ensenanza adscripta subvencionada ahorra al
Estado por impartirse en lugares apartados de
la Republica — sumas superiores a los 2,000
millones de pesos anuales.^

As in 1947 and 1956, there was little opposition to
the including of private school personnel and teachers in
the Estatuto del Docente. Public schoolteachers and per-
sonnel seem to have concentrated on obtaining higher wages

for themselves along with their comrades in the private

20
schools. The main problem for public school personnel

was to get the government to adjust their pay scale to the

cost of living which was rapidly increasing. Beginning in

1957 teachers had called upon the Provisional Government

to implement the Estatuto del Docente of 1956 in order to

receive adequate state remunerations and retirement pay.

1 Q

"Aporte del estado a la docencia privada," La

Prensa, August 3, 1958, p. 7.

"Nuevas gestiones para mejorar los sueldos de do-
centes, " La Prensa, June 30, 1958, p. 22.

O "I

"Reglamentacion del Estatuto del Docente," La Prensa,
November 18, 1957, p. 6; "En una asamblea publica pidiose
ayer la vigencia plena del Estatuto del Docente," La Prensa,

309

which were not yet fixed but were to be studied by a com-

mission. This "inter-ministerial" commission recommend-
ed reforms and salary schedules which were included in the
1958 Statute. But the government was slow to adjust wages
to the rising cost of living as provided in the escalator
clause (article 134) of the Statute, and teachers had to

threaten or call strikes during every administration there-

23
after in order to receive just wages. The Illia govern-
ment established a scale for subsidies of 40%, 60%, and
80% to private schools, depending on how much tuition the
schools charged; tuition-free schools received a state sub-
sidy of 100%. Private schools that received tuition had •

to set aside at least half of these funds for staff salaries.

24
Class size was set at a certain minimum. This sliding-

November 24, 1957, p. 8; "Reflexiones sobre el curso escolar, "
La Prensa, December 7, 1957, p. 6; and "Reglamentaci6n en
parte el Estatuto del Docente," La Prensa, December 31, 1957,
p. 1.

^^Article 2, Ley 16.767, September 11, 1956, ALA 1956,
XVI -A, p. 988.

"De los docentes se ocupa el Congreso, " La Prensa,
August 3, 1960, pp. 1, 4; "El descuento en los haberes de
los docentes," La Prensa, February 14, 1962, pp. 1, 22; and
"Comenzaran hoy otra huelga los docentes," La Prensa, August
19, 1963, pp. 1, 3.

D. 15,. January 2, 1964, ALA 1964, XXIV-A, pp. 200-05.

310

scale system was in line with the Deputies' opposition to
full subsidization when the law was originally adopted.

Frondizi also implemented the 1958 Statute by founding

SNEP.

Ensenanza Reliqiosa in Public Schools

With the advent of the Frondizi government the church
had an ally which would help the private sector in the field
of education. The church renewed its push for religious

education in the public schools, or as Campobassi put it,

26
"its offensive against lay education." Ucristas, Chris-

27
tian Democrats, Popular Conservatives, and Peronists aid-

SNEP replaced the Direccion General de EnseHanza

Privada only to be replaced itself by a Consejo de Ense-
nanza Privada in early 1962. The Illia administration again
reverted to SNEP, and the Ongania government retained this
acronym but renamed its private education agency the Superin-
tendencia Nacional de Ensenanza Privada and transferred to
it the Inspeccion Tecnica General de Escuelas Particulares
of the Consejo Nacional de Educacion. (D. 895, January 25,
1962, ALA 1962, XXII-A, pp. 227-28; and D. 5923, September
25, 1968, ALA 1968. XXVIII-C, p. 3624.) See above, p. 307.

2 6

Campobassi, Atague y defensa del laicismo escolar

en la Argentina, p . 97.

Peronist co-operation with the church did not go

unnoticed or unrewarded. The Vatican lifted Peron's excom-
munication of February 13, 1963, eight years after his ex-
communication. Notice of Peron's absolution was kept secret
until September 7, 1971, because of "el delicado momento
politico por el que atravesaba entonces la Argentina . "
(Gambini, El peronismo y la iglesia, pp. 107-12.)

311

ed the church on the national and provincial levels. This
effort continued during the Illia administration, and re-
mained unabated during the dictatorship of Organia. Since
the provinces theoretically had autonomy in drawing up
their own educational systems. Ley 1420 did not apply to the
provincial schools, and, therefore, the church had more
chance for success at this level.
Provincial Level

Buenos Aires . — In the province of Buenos Aires, ense-
nanza religiosa had been implanted by the Fresco government
in 1936 and had remained part of the primary school cur-
riculum until a Peronist-controlled legislature removed it
in 1955. In 1958, the Ucristas captured control of the pro-
vincial government as well as the national government. The
new Minister of Education of the Province of Buenos Aires
announced that he was preparing a bill for a " texto unico

X of icial" while the provincial legislature was consider-

28
xng a similar bill. This old saw smacked of censorship

as well as Catholicism as it had in the time of PerSn. As

in the time of Peron, ther^ was enough opposition to defeat

^ " Libro escolar unico y of icial?" La Prensa , July
28, 1958, p. 8.

312

it.

The Minister of Education of the province also
sought to rewrite the curricula for classes of morality in
1958, according to the teachings of the Roman Catholic
church. This plan was at first opposed successfully by the

teachers' unions, Federacion Universitaria Argentina (FUA) ,

30
UCRP, Socialists, and certain other lobbying groups. Un-
daunted, the Minister tried to obtain approval for a reli-
gious education program in all schools from a congress of

educators representing both public and private schools;

31
again he was unsuccessful. So, he tried again, this time:

convoking a meeting of three teachers' unions — the Asoci-

acion de Maestros de la Provincia de Buenos Aires, the Aso-

ciacion de Maestros "Domingo Faustino Sarmiento," and the

Corporacion de Maestros — to get their approval of religious

education in the provincial schools; it was resoxindingly

voted down. But then, on July 6, 1951, the Minister of Ed-

See above, chapter 5, pp. 131-32^

^Consult the magazine published by the Federacion
Universitaria Argentina, Revista del Mar Dulce, IV, suple-
mento 4 (September, 1958), pp. 1-43; and Campobassi, p.
129, et passim.

Campobassi, p. 124.

313

ucation arbitrarily replaced the existing morality curric-
ulum with one that was catechistic. This amounted to the
implantation of ense!^anza religiosa into the provincial

schools of Buenos Aires. A Socialist attempt to beat back

this curriculum was defeated an the provincial legislature.

In 1967, a decree of the federal ' interventor reaffirmed

"educacion moral" as part of the curriculum of the provin-

cial primary schools.

Corrientes. — In August 1960, an assembly was held to
reform the province's constitution during which the Christian
Democrats tried to add a clause favoring religious education.
But a majority consisting of Liberals, Intransigent Radicals,
and Autonomists instead supported the Committee on Educa-
tion's recommendation which said merely that primary educa-
tion will be compulsory and free and will develop all the
human faculties needed to form the Argentine man by the
" f omento del amor a_ la_ patria, y. S. iB. ^nion espiritual del
pueblo en el culto a_ la_ libertad y_ la_ democracia como sistema
de vida." Of the four who voted in favor of religious ed-
ucation, three were members of the Christian Democratic

32 .

Ibid., p. 125.

^\rticle 111 of D. 9813, September 25, 1967, ALA 1967,

XXVII-C, p. 3368.

314

Party and one was a Ucrista.

Santa Cruz. — In November 1961, the Chamber of Dep-
uties ratified a law on religious education which made it
legal for the province's elementary schools to offer an
elective course in religious education during school hours.
The parties favoring religious education were the UCRI,
Conservador Popular, Democrata Cristiano, and Movimiento
de Recuperacion Radical; in opposition were the members of
the UCRP. The law allowed religious education to be given
as an elective twice a week during the last hour of classes.
The authorities of the religions chosen by the parents of
the pupils would choose the teachers and texts for the
classes. This education bill also provided financial aid
to private schools in the form of scholarships and sub-
sidies to the families who otherwise would not have the

35
economic means to send their children to private schools.

Chubut. — The Ucristas controlling the province's

legislature sanctioned a law in 1958 which established free.

Campobassi, pp. 132-33; and "Las deliberaciones de
la convencion de Corriente's, " La Prensa, August 7, 1960,
p. 6.

35 . >

Campobassi, pp. 140-41; and "La ley de educacion

fue aprobada en Santa Cruz," La Prensa, November 13, 1961,

p. 10.

315

obligatory, and lay education.

San Luis. — A constitutional reform convention which
met in April 1962 debated whether religious education should
be after school hours in the manner of Ley 1420. This was
affirmed by a vote of 29 to 20 when Liberal Democrats were

joined by some Ucristas to defeat a Ucrista proposal that

37
religious education be given during school hours.

Santa Fe. — In early 1962, a convention was held to
reform the Constitution of Santa Fe. The archbishop and
bishops of the province sent a note to the convention's
president advocating retention of article 15 of the exist-
ing constitution which stated that the religion of the prov-
ince was "cat6lica, apost6lica ^ romana" ; and the retention
of articles 70 and 77 which required that the governor and
vice-governor of the province be of the Roman Catholic
faith. The laic school was denounced as contrary to free-
dom of choice and to the conscience of believers, and the
bishops called upon the convention to recognize the right
of parents to choose the type of education they wanted for

Campobassi, p. 140.

^'^Ibid., pp. 136-37.

316

38
their children.

The dominant party in the convention was the UCRI .
Delegates from the Federaci6n Provincial del Magistrado
met with Ucrista representatives to lobby for educational
reforms. While they agreed with the church's position that
parents should have a choice of the kind of education they
wanted for their children, they also lobbied for lay educa-
tion in the public schools. They wanted private schools

to be controlled by provincial authorities, and they wanted

39
30% of the provincial budget to be spent on education.

The UCRI Party joined the Christian Democrats in
voting to maintain the wording of the previous constitution
which offered the province's protection to the Roman Cath-
olic religion while guaranteeing freedom of religion. The
articles on education did not establish religious educa-
tion in the public schools, but guaranteed the right of

choice of school to parents, and promised to stimulate the

founding of private schools. The political parties that

"La reforma en Santa Fe de la Constitucion: en una

nota expone la iglesia su pensamiento al respecto," La Prensa,
February 16, 1962, p. 6,

"Sobre la reforma constitucional en materia educa-

tiva," La Prensa, February 18, 1962, p. 4.

"La convencion trata en Santa Fe los despachos,"
La Prensa, April 11, 1962, p. 6; and "Se sanciono la nueva

317

voted against making the Catholic religion the official one
and defended the lay school were the Progressive Democrats,

UCRP, and Trabajo y el Progreso: they lost on the first

41
poxnt but won on the second. The Catholics were dis-
satisfied, and in 1963 the Asociacion del Magisterio Catolico

asked the federal interventor to implant religious educa-

42
tion m the provincial schools; he refused.

Cordoba. — In C5rdoba religious education during school

hours (one-half hour each week) was santioned by a 1937 law,

but the rules regulating it held that schoolteachers could

not teach it, making it almost ineffective. On March 10,

1959, the Archbishop of Cordoba, accompanied by two of his

bishops, asked the governor of Cfirdoba to annul the article

prohibiting the teachers as state agents to teach the

Roman Catholic religion in the province's elementary schools.

The governor promised the prelates that the matter would

be studied and referred the problem to C6rdoba*s Consejo

General de Educacion, the provincial counterpart to

Constitucion de Santa Fe, " La Prensa, April 15, 1962, p. 6.

"La reforma de la Constitucion de Santa Fe se trata

en particular," La Prensa, April 13, 1962, p. 8; and "Apro-
bose en general el proyecto de la Constitucion de Santa Fe,"
La Prensa. April 12, 1962, p. 12.

Campobassi, p. 132.

318

the national CNE. It refused to change the law on the

ground that the teacher would then be put in a_ partisan 3, -^
position. The CSrdoba epsicopacy appealed the decision
and pressured the governor to remedy the situation. The
Catholic newspaper Los Principios supported the episcopa-
cy' s case, but not so its colleague La Voz del Interior
and the Asociacion de Maestros de la Provincia de Cordoba,
who wanted to preserve the status quo. The 1937 law which

allowed for religious education in the primary provincial ..

44
schools was maintained as it was. In August 1963> a

federal interventor inserted in the secondary schools com-
pulsory classes in religion or morality for a minimum of . .

45
two hours a week during school hours .

Tucuman . — The Ucrista governor of Tucuman drew up
a bill for the reimplantation of religious education in
the province's primary schools. This proposal was applaud-
ed by the Liga Humanista and the Organizacidn pro Defensa
de la Libertad de Ensenanza in October 1960. -Groups that

"Cronica; educapion, " Revista Eclesiastica Ar-
gentina, II (May-June, 1959), p. 316.

44 ".--:_

Campobassi, pp. 134-36, -.---

The curricul\am and clerical or lay teachers for re-
ligion had to be "aceptados por la autoridad eclesiastica* , .
(D. ley 846, August 5, 1963, ALA 1963, XXIII-B, p. 1228.)

319

opposed the teaching of religion and morality in public
schools during school hours were the usual type of pressure
groups. The provincial Senate passed the measure; in the
Chamber of Deputies the Ucrista and Blanco (Peronist) Parties
supported it, although four Ucristas joined the UCRP and two
minor party deputies in voting against it, but again it
passed. The governor of Tucuman implemented the law by adopt-
ing the curriculum for religious education in schools ap-
proved by the Plenary Assembly of the Argentine Episcopacy

46
in 1957.

In 1967 the above 1960 law was modified, and the
dispositions dealing with religious education in the pro-
vincial schools were reedited. The new article read as
follows:

La formacion espiritual del educando se pro-
curara mediante le ensenanza de la religion
por la que optaren los padres. En caso de
negativa o de falta de opcion se ensenara mo-
ral. En uno u otro caso las clases se daran
durante los horarios que correspondan y como
parte integrante de los respectivos planes
de estudios.

The Ongania military government's interventor thereby kept

religious education in Tucuman' s schools.

Campobassi, pp. 137-39.

'^'^Article 14, Ley 3472, ALA 1967, XXVII-B, p. 2629.

320

La Pampa. — On June 10, 1960, the Ucrista majority

approved religious education in the provincial primary ,^

schools, though outside regular class hours, by adopting

article 20 of a new provincial Constitution which stated:

La instruccion primaria sera obligatoria,

gratuita, gradual, integral y regional.

Podra impartirse ensenanza religiosa en las . . .

escuelas publicas a los alumnos que opten

por el la, exclusivamente por los ministros

autorizados de los diferentes cultos, y con

posterioridad a las horas de clases ofici- --

, 48
ales.

UCRP had opposed this provision, arguing that the Consti-
tution should remain laic and not bring up the subject of
religion,

Salta, Catamarca, and Jujuy. — Federal interventors
implanted religious education in the provincial schools of

three more provinces in 1962 under the Ucrista administra-

50
tions of Frondizi and Guxdo. In Salta the mterventor

issued a decree-law which said that religion would be given

48 - .

Campobassi, p. 141.

v-^^Ibid.--..- -.. ...., ...

General elections were held from December 1961, to

March 1962, and provinces were intervened before March 1962,

by Frondizi, succumbing to military pressure; subsequently

Guido intervened all provinces. (Luna, Argentina de Peron

a Lanusse, p. 139; and Snow, Argentine Radicalism, pp.

92-96.)

321

during regular class hours to students in the provincial
schools; if the parents objected, a student would study

morality. The curriculum for religion would be officially

51
approved by. the Argentine episcopacy. The re-implanta-
tion of religious education in the provincial schools in
Salta received a te_ deum of thanks offered in the cathedral
by the Archbishop of Salta; the Bishop of Oran and other

Catholic spokesmen sent notes and telegrams to the federal

interventor, thanking him for the measure.

In June 1962, the primary, schools of Catamarca had
religious education made part of their curriculum by the
province's federal interventor. The orientation of this ■

education was to be administered by a priest and a corps

53
of inspectors chosen by the ecclesiastical authorities.

The number of schools affected by this decree was large
since the national primary schools had already been trans-
ferred to provincial jurisdiction by the CNE on March 14,
54

^^D. Ley 18, January 26, 1962, ALA 1962, XXII-B, p. 1736.

^"Refierse el arzobispo a la reimplantacion de la
ensenanza religiosa," La Prensa, February 2, 1962, p. 7.

Campobassi, p. 139.

^^See below, p. 328.

322

In October 1962, the federal interventor of Jujuy
reimplanted religious education in the provincial primary
schools by decree. Article 2 of the decree modified arti-
cle 15 of the education law of the province to read:

La ensenanza religiosa serS dada en las es-
cuelas por personal designado a propuesta
de las autoridades eclesiasticas del culto
Catolico Apostolico Romano de la provincia,
sin remuneracion por parte del Estado.

Esta ensenanza se impartira dentro de los
horarios normales, a los ninos cuyos padres,
tutores o encargados, no manifesten su vo-
I an tad en contrario y no constituira mate-
ria de promocion. -^

National Level

Less progress was made by advocates of religious ed-
ucation at the national level despite the favorable dispo-
sition of the Ministry of Education due to the political
alliance forged by the Ucristas with the church. After the
UCRI had won the battle for private universities, its lead-
ers turned their energies toward advancing church teachings
in the public schools, but some members often balked, re-
maining faithful to the laicism inculcated by their Radical
Party heritage. »

Between 1959 and 1960 the Ministry of Education orga-

^^D. Ley 5, October 31, 1962, ALA 1962, XXII-B, p.

1539.

323

nized seminars for all Argentine primary and secondary
teachers in order to discuss educational reforms. Local
seminars chose delegates to regional seminars who, in turn,
chose delegates to the First National Seminar on Education,
held in c5rdoba during March 1960. In attendance were the
Minister of Education and Justice, Dr. Luis R. MacKay, his
sub-secretary, Antonio Salonia, the Minister of Public Ed-
ucation of Cordoba, Dr. Edgar Vidal, national legislators,

provincial legislators, and representatives of civic insti-

4-4-- 56
tutxons .

According to Campobassi, these seminars had been
stacked in favor of the religious schools. Primary school-
teachers and university professors were excluded or with-
drew from participating; both groups were strongly lay.
Instead, the seminars wound up being assemblies of second-
ary schoolteachers, a level with more private schools and
teachers than any other. And because each school was al-
loted an equal number of delegates, the more populous pub-
lic schools were put on a par with the smaller private

57
schools.

"Un seminario de educacion se inici6 en Embalse,"

La Prensa, March 5, 1960, p. 4.

The Liga del Profesorado Secundario declared m

November 1959 that the national' seminars would be dominated

324

Not unexpectedly, a majority of the 174 delegates
at the national seminar resolved that the Roman Catholic
religious should be taught in all schools to all grades,
with an alternative course in ethics for children whose
parents wanted them exempted from religion. ^^ Since the

majority of delegates were priests and nuns or lay teach-

ers in the religious schools, it appears that the church

still hoped to obtain the reimplantation of religious ed-
ucation in the public schools.

But these seminars came to naught because the pro-
ponents of lay education were too strong in the education-
al bureaucracy and teachers' unions. Protests by UCRP
deputies, teachers' and students' groups focused on the
defense of Ley 1420:

... el pedido de implantaci<5n de la ense-
nanza religiosa hecho por los referidos
seminarios, no es otra cosa que la culmi-
nacion de un ataque a la ley 1420, garan-
tia de acceso a los establecimientos edu-
cacionales de las clases populares y freno

by those who wished to deprecate public education. This
opinion was also shared by numerous other teacher groups.
(Carapobassi, pp. 110-11.)

Campobassi, pp. 110-13.

"Continuaran hoy en Cordoba los seminarios de
educacion," La Prensa. March 9, 1960, p. 17.

325

de todos los mtentos de dogmatizer la

« 60

ensenanza.

In order to co-ordinate the educational curriculum
of the national and provincial primary schools, the Fron-
dizi government had begun annual assemblies of educators
from both levels. In July 1960, the Third Assembly of the
Permanent National Commission on Academic Coordination met
in Tucuman with provisional and national authorities present.
The delegates represented their provinces and were to select
curricula for the national and provincial primary schools.
The delegation from the CNE proposed that the curricul\im
for morality include the idea of God as the Creator and the
duties owed to Him. Laicists feared that the introduction
of God into the curriculum would be used as a pretext to
slip in Roman Catholic indoctrination not actually provided

for in the bare words of the CNE curriculxom reform, and it

61
was voted down by eleven votes to seven.

The reaction of the church to this vote was public

and furious. The Archbishop of Tucuman condemned the de-

This is a quotation from a student group at the Uni-
versity of the Litoral. ( "Repudia la Federaci5n Universi-
taria del Litoral los seminaries," La Prensa, March 13,
1960, p. 6.) For protests of the UCRP, etc., see Campo-
bassi, pp. 109-10.

Campobassi, p. 118.

326

cision. Catholic Action of Santiago del Estero condemned
that province's delegates for not supporting the CNE pro-
posal. Similarly, the Archbishop of Cordoba protested to
the federal interventor of Cordoba against the negative
vote of the delegate representing Cordoba. ^^ The inter-
ventor* s reply seemingly took the side of the delegates,
but actually pointed out to the church that it was free to
influence local governments in order to change education
laws:

La resolucion de Tucviman, al dejar librada a
los gobiernos locales la decision sobre tan
delicado asunto, no solo no se opone al cumpli-
miento de la Constitucion y de las leyes de
esta provincia, y por ende a la ensenanza de
la religion en las escuelas, sino que, muy
por el contrario, respeta y ratifica el
derecho de los gobiernos locales a seguir
los lineamientos que le marca su propia or-
ganizacion constitucional.^

This reply could not hide the fact that an attempt
by national authorities in the CNE to implant religious
ideas in the curriculum had not only been made, but had
also failed, as had similar efforts made in the national
seminars discussed above. Undaunted, the Minister of Ed-
ucation MacKay and his appointed following in the CNE took

^^Ibid. , pp. 119-20,
^-^Ibid.. p. 121.

327

another option open to them — the CNE instituted curricul\irti
changes without approval by any representative body.

Hardly had the Commission which met at Tucuman voted
down the CNE's proposals, than the CNE announced its revi-
sions of the curricul\im for primary schools. It was to in-

64
elude a notion of God and the duties owed Him, the very

program defeated in Tucuman I Laic groups denounced this

curriculum change to no avail. The Liga Argentina de Cul-

tura Laica saw it as "una tentativa para incorporar la ense-

65
nanza religiosa en las escuelas." The Confederacion de

Maestros concurred that the introduction of the idea of God

was equivalent to implanting religious education in the

66
schools, something that Law 1420 had aptly restricted. Ac-
cording to the Circulo de Profesores de Educaci5n DemocrStica
and other lay groups, this curriculum reform arbitrarily
made by the CNE (a body dependent on the Minister of Educa-
tion) was a victory for the Catholic church in that it rep-
resented the imposition of ". . .la. ensei^anza de una re-
liqion determinada, en manifiesta violaci(5n de la^ Consti-

^"^Ibid., p. 122.

65ibid.

^^Ibid., pp. 122-23,

328

^^^^°"- nacional x de la sabia ley federal 1420, que establece
sue la ensefianza debe ser laica, gratuita y. obligatoria. "^^
Transfer of National Schools to ProvinceR

Frondizi and Minister of Education MacKay also drew
up plans to turn the primary schools created by Ley Lainez
over to the provinces. To this end, pacts were signed with
the provinces of Santa Fe, Buenos Aires, Catamarca, Santi-
ago del Estero, San Luis, Neuquen, and Formosa, beginning
in early 1961. Decrees by the CNE and the educational author-
ities of the provinces ratifying these pacts ( " convenios " )

soon followed. A general decree outlining the intent

of the national government was announced on January 17,

1962; article 1 declared:

Desde el comienzo del curso lectivo del ano
1962 todos los establecimientos de educaci6n
primaria dependientes del Consejo Nacional
de Educaci6n ubicados en jurisdicci6n pro-
vincial cuya trans ferencia no se haya con-
cretado hasta entonces pasaran a las respec-
tivas provincias donde se encuentren.

Since the provinces could not afford to run them plans were

^"^Ibid. , p. 123.

^QalA 1962., XXII-A, pp. 167-69, 173-77, 276-77, 298,
326-28.

D. 495, January 17, 1962, ibid., pp. 205-06.

329

made to have the national government pass on to the prov-
inces the necessary moneys to maintain them, construct new
schools, and pay the salaries of their personnel:

Art. 8° — El Poder Ejecutivo nacional trans-
ferira a las respectivas provincias una sxima
anual igual a la que tiene asignada en el
presupuesto vigente para el sostenimiento de
los servicios incluidos en el presente
decreto .,-.'..

As these schools ceased to be national, they would come
under the control of the provinces and subject to pro-
vincial laws. Therefore, provincial courses of religious
education would be injected into their curriculiom if the
provincial laws so allowed. The transfer of national pri-
mary schools would clearly benefit the church and propo-
nents of enseRanza religiosa.

Besides fearing that clerical interests benefited
from the transference of schools to the provinces, teach-
ers' unions and bureaucrats also feared that the provinces
would not be able to financially maintain the schools as
well as the national government. The decree of the Fron-
dizi administration establishing the transference of schools
foresaw the resistence of teachers and threatened resistors
with dismissal:

"^°Ibid., p. 206.

330

Art. 5° — El personal que no acepte el cambio
de jurisdicci6n sera dado de baja » , . . ^

But bureaucratic intransigence and a strong defense of Law

1420 and the national primary schools by teachers' unions

delayed the implementation of this decree in spite of the

72
threats made.

Curiously, the federal interventor of San Luis de-
nounced the "convenio sobre transferencia de escuelas naci-
onales a la_ provincia, " which had been approved by the pro-
vincial legislature after the convention had been drawn up
by the CNE in agreement with the Consejo of San Luis in
December 1961, In the "consideraciones " of this decree,
provincial authorities claimed that the national decree was
ill-founded, undemocratic, and costly to the province. This
denunciation anticipated the repeal of Decree 495:

Que la transferencia sobre escuelas nacio-
nales situadas en provincias, ha sido re-
alizada sin debate previo, ni estudio alguno,
por cuyo motivo los intereses de lo nacional
primero, como asi los de los maestros y
personal y los de las mismas provincias,
luego, tal el caso de las de San Luis no han
sido tenidos en cuenta, todo lo cual confi-
gura un procedimiento que no condice con la

71 Ibid.

"^^Inter
Education 1966-70, Buenos Aires, March 10, 1972.

Interview wxth Emilio Mignone, Subsecretary of

Que la transferencia f-»7 '„„ '
procedimiento, no se luL ^^ ^*^""° ^1

funaidaa el t;em:„a: proble^r^f "^ ^" P"'
vmo a crear a nuesf^; ° eoonomico y
que no estS de nin^" P=^°vxnoia erogaciones,
de afrontar y aSiSS"!"!""^ ^" «nai«ones
aria a la provinSa fa '^"*J"«'^=^. acarre-

Presupuesto deberS aumenter^r^'^'^' ^" '"^ ^"
-n todas las conseouer.^r^^ -^^^s"" *°^°' -
finally the government o. Cuido responded to the

7814, declaring that schools would not ^ transferred to
the provinces i. the provincial legislatures had not rat-
"ied the .■,,,^,, ,_^_ ^^^^^ ^^^^^ ^^ ^^^^^ ^^^

Heu^.n. and San .uis^ had ratified agreements already
-<^e, the national primary schools would he considered

transferred to these i-y,-^^^ . 75

tnese three provinces.

^e transfer of national schools to the provinces
was revived a.ain durin. the On.ania administration, .aw
l7.B.e of septe^er 5, ,ses, authorised the Executive Power

74,

D. Ley 18, July 26, 1962, ALA 1962 XXir n
,4 i2ii£l.J^^b£, XXII-B, p. 1862,

Of San Lux'^'had'denounced the'"' ''''• ""^^ ^^^ interventor
1961. (Ibid.) "°^^^^d the "convenio" of December 28,

D. 7814, ALA 1962 JOTtt a

iZ2£/ AXII-A, pp. 608-09.

332

to transfer national schools in the provinces and terri-
tories to their jurisdiction. The law was almost a replica
of the decree of 1962. Article 7 stipulated that:

Queda facultado el Poder Ejecutivo para trans-
ferir a las provincias con las que se suscriban
convenios, los fondos necesarios para atender las
erogaciones de los establecimientos y servicios
que se transfieren. El monto de dichos fondos
no podra superar el asignado en el Presupuesto
Nacional para tal fin y los mismos continuaran
figurando en el anexo pertinente de la Secretaria
de Estado de Cultura y Educacion, pudiento ser
incrementados en razon de los aumentos automS-
ticos o que disponga la Nacion por ajuste de in-
dice docente. La contribuci6n financiera podra
comprender tambien los fondos necesarios para
terminar obras en ejecucion y su habilitacion y
los valores totales resultantes tendran el ca-
racter de contribucion especial.

Again "convenios" were signed with various provinces

for the transfer of national schools to them: Rio Negro,

La Rioja, and Buenos Aires, These pacts were then ratified

77
by the national government m early 1969. These trans-
fers were again impeded by protests of educators and bureau-

78
crats who saw them as weakening Law 1420, the national

school system, and laicism. They saw these transfers as

"^^ALA 1968. XXVIII-C, p. 3291.

^^ALA_1969, XXIX-C, pp. 4131-32.

Interview with Emilio Mignone, Buenos Aires,
March 10, 1972.

333

hurting the schools because the provinces would be respon-
sible in the long run for their administration and funding.
This weakening of the public schools would abet the private
schools, including those of the church, because they would
face less competition.

On February 6, 1970, the Onganla government published
a decree that encompassed Law 17.878 and other laws that

transferred national "organismos ^ funciones" to the prov-

79
xnces . This new law amounted to an authorization to

carry out these transfers, but it was never put into prac-
tice .
Religious Objects in Classroom

Religion often penetrated the public provincial and
national schools in the form of religious objects — cruci-
fixes, saints, pictures of clerics — that were placed in the
halls and classrooms. From time to time, a principal or
teachers would challenge the placing of religious objects
in the public schools. In cases involving the national
schools, the CNE was the final arbiter; the CNE's decisions
reflected those of the Minister of Education and Justice

"^^Ley 18.568, February 6, 1970, AIA 1970, XXX-A,

pp. 148-50,

334

who in turn reflected the attitude of the administration
then presiding over Argentina.

Before the advent of the Frondizi government, a prin-
cipal had removed classroom crucifixes from a school in the
province of Corrientes. The Inspecci6n de Escuelas of that
province refused to have the objects replaced, and the
church futilely protested this decision. In another in-
cident, a crucifix was removed from the auditorium of the
Colegio Nacional of Buenos Aires before it was to be used
for graduation ceremonies. The principal refused to re-
ceive a group of Roman Catholics protesting this action. ®°

With the Ucristas in power after May 1958, religious
objects in the classroom became an issue. During this per-
iod the CNE tended to back up the church and allow religious
objects to be in the national schools' classrooms. At the
beginning of 1959 the Bishop of Posadas sent a note to
the clergy of his jurisdiction warning them of an attempt
on the part of -enemies of the faith" to take crucifixes
and images of the Virgin or saints from school establish-
ments. He reminded them that a CNE resolution was in force
permitting the image of the Virgin of LujSn in public

"Cronica: educaci6n, " Revista Eclesiastica Argen-
tina, I (January-February, 1958), 95-96. ~~

335

81
schools. In another case, religious objects were removed

from a school in TuciimSn, resulting in Catholic protests
that received the backing of the province's Inspeccion de
Escuelas . The CNE intervened and forced the principal to
replace the sacred images .

In September 1950, crucifixes were removed from the
Faculty of Law at the National University of La Plata and
from the office of the Justice of Peace of Moron. The Ar-
gentine government intervened to have the crucifixes re-
placed and those responsible for their removal were fired.
A declaration of the Executive clarified the Frondizi gov-
ernment's policy:

La presencia de simbolos religiosos como el

crucifijo en locales publicos de ensenanza,

de administracion de justicia, de gobierno,

. . . puede entenderse como signo de . . .

la mas elevada garantia de respeto . . . /E71

Gobierno Nacional senala aqui su posici&n,

que considera logica e historicamente acertada,

y su decision de mantenerla y hacerla mantener

83
en cuanto de el dependa.

"Cronica: educaci5n," Revista EclesiSstica Argen-
tina, II (January-February, 1959), 92.

"Cronica: educaci6n," Revista EclesiSstica Argen-
tina. II (September-October, 1959), 537.

^•^Angel Miguel Centeno, Cuatro anos de una polltica
religiosa (Buenos Aires: Editorial Desarrollo, 1964),
pp. 64-65, 105-06.

336

Religion in Public School Textbooks

Laicists could not stop the Catholic inroads made

into the textbooks used by the national schools as long as

84
the Ucristas controlled the Ministry of Education. With

the election of Arturo Illia, lay forces became heartened

that UCRP control of the Ministry would mean the redress of

their grievances against Roman Catholic indoctrination in

textbooks used to teach Argentine history and democratic

education.

The Liga Argentina de Cultura Laica sent documents

to the Ministry of Education between December 1963 and

March 1964, denouncing the content of some textbooks used.

in the teaching of democratic education and Argentine his-

85
tory. The Democratic Socialists were the mainstay of this

Liga ever since some of their members had founded it in

1932." The Liga was also joined in its protests by the

Communist writer on education and politics Atilio Torrassa.

He denounced these texts in a letter to the leading Cordobes

®'*An editorial denounced these efforts as totalitar-
ian. (^'iLibro.escolar iShico y oficial?" La Prensa, July
28, 1958, p. 8.)

85 • •»

"Nuevas criticas sobre textos de ensenanza," La

Prensa, March 16, 1964, p. 8.

337

newspaper. La Vox del Interior. The liberal magazine

Primera Plana agreed with these criticisms in an article

87
of December 1963,

Laicists condemned passages in various texts as un-
democratic, anti-liberal, pro-Catholic, etc. In them canon
law was held to be predominant over civil law, and the better-
ment of conditions for workers, blacks, and women was at-
tributed to Catholicism. Ideas on government did not
counter those of right-wing nationalists and clerics: gov-
ernment by the people was Utopian; representative govern-
ment was impossible to realize in practice; the French Rev-
olution was a catastrophe; and the presidency of Roca and

the Revolution of 1890 were condemned since they unleashed

.88

religious persecution.

The use of officially santioned texts that contained
Catholic and nationalist teachings had been going on since
the first presidency of Peron. What is surprising is that

Atilio Torrassa, "Los clericales y la ensenanza,"
La Vanguardia, March 18, 1964, pp. 3-4.

"iQuien controla los textos escolares?" Primera

Plana, II (December 24, 1963), 34.

Liga Argentina de Cultura Laica, Escuela sectaria

V textos de educacion democratica (unpaginated monograph,

Buenos Aires, 1964).

338

they were updated and continued in use even during the
elected Radical administrations of Frondizi and Illia. Some

of these books continue in classroom use in spite of pro-

tests against them from laicist groups.

Spread of Catholic Schools Since 1958
Laws Favorable to Private Schools

The school system of the church was able to spread
rapidly after 1958 due to the cooperation of the national
and provincial administrations. With their help, it secured
the passage of laws or the issuance of decree-laws that aid-
ed its "mission" to educate. It also demanded and often
received more state financing of its schools.

The Estatuto del Docente assured private schools of
state financing of their staffs after 1958. With this foot
in the door, the private sector concentrated on widening
the application of the Estatuto to their school system, and
on getting more of their schools incorporated into the na-
tional system so that they would be eligible for funds un-
der the terms of the Estatuto. Decree 12.546 of October
11, 1960 granted state retirement benefits to teachers in

Letter from Campobassi to author, Buenos Aires,

December 27, 1974.

339

private primary and secondary schools that were incorporated
m offxcxal plans.

The subsequent movement on the part of private second-
ary schools to become incorporated or begin new classes and
hire more teachers must have been costly for the state, be-
cause on August 22, 1962, Decree 8534 warned that incorpora-
tion and authorization for more classes "no lleva implicito
el derecho a_ percibir contribucign del Estado en los tgr mi-
nes de la ley 13 .047 /T^Al Estatuto del Docente/ y. dispo-

.91

sxciones concordantes y_ reglamentarias . "

The Onganla government extended state aid to cover
more private schools and their activities. In August 1968,
private secondary schools that were technical were granted
a wide range of tax exemptions . In a note accompanying
the decree, it was argued that costs for technical schools
had skyrocketed, especially for laboratory equipment, and
that it was the "deber del Estado favorecer no s(51o la
permanencia de las escuelas e_ institutes privates de ense -
nanza tecnica existentes sino tambien su increm.ento^ . , - , ^"^^

^°ALA__1960, XX-A, p. 831.

^^ALA 1962, XXII-A, p. 655.

92Ley 17.827, August 5, 1968, ALA 1968, XXVIII-B,
p. 2007.

340

Increase in Number of Catholic Schools
Private Sector

The favorable laws that aided private schools helped
the private sector to expand in the educational field after
1958, especially on the secondary and university levels.

From 1961 to 1971 there was a 68.4% increase in the number

of private schools.

As of 1971, 17% of all Argentine schools were private,

educating 20% of the school population. In other words,

one out of five Argentine students attended a private school.

The proportion of students attending private secondary
schools was double that of those attending private primary
schools: one-sixth or 560,230 out of 3,671,451 students
were enrolled in private primary schools, whereas one-third
or 331,307 out of 1,007,537 students were registered in pri-
vate secondary schools, for percentages of 15.3% enrolled
in private primary schools and 32.4% in private secondary

Argentina, Secretaria de Estado de Cultura y Edu-

cacion. La educaci6n en cifras. 1958-1967 (Buenos Aires:
Departamento de Estadistica Educativa, 1968 /?7) . p. 127.

Argentina, Ministerio de Cultura y EducaciSn,
Estadistica educativa. 1971 (Buenos Aires: Departamento de
Estadistica Educativa, 1971), pp. 26, 31.

341

schools.

Figures for 1971 do not show the phenomenal growth

of private normal schools since they were phased out during

96
1969-70. In 1958 there were 290 private normal schools

with 49,2 55 students enrolled; by 1967 there were 565 schools
with 108,569 students. This contrasts with the slower in-
crease of public normal schools: in 1958 there were 144
public normal schools with about 72,700 students, whereas
in 1967, although there were 315 normal schools, they en-
rolled 95,000 students, an increase of only 20,000 pupils

over the nine-year period, compared to the private schools'

doubling of their student body.

Catholic Schools

The figures for Catholic schools separated out from
the over-all figures for private schools show that Catholic
schools, too, were found predominantly in the richer areas

of Argentina. In the federal capital, 24.8% of the primary

schools were Catholic, and 43.8% of the secondary schools.

-^Argentina, Minis terio de Cultura y Educacidn,

"Alumnos matriculados; 1900-1971.'" (mimeographed page).

9fi

See below, p. 343; and epilogue, pp. 371-72.

Argentina, Secretaria de Estado de Cultura y Educa-

cion. La educacion en cifras, 1958-1967, pp. 56, 58.

Miguel Petty, "Dimensiones de la escuela catdlica

342

The federal capital and the richer provinces of Buenos
Aires, Cordoba, and Santa Fe contained 72% of the Catholic
primary and secondary schools in all of Argentina. ^^

Catholic schools accounted for the major part of the
private sector in 1971. Of the 3,991 private secondary
and primary schools in Argentina, 2,401 or sixty percent
were Catholic. There were almost the same number of Cath-
olic schools on the primary as on the secondary levels;
1,188 primary to 1,213 secondary Catholic schools respec-
tively. Since there were fewer private schools on the
secondary level (1,890) than on the primary level (2,101),
the Catholic predominance in private secondary education
was even greater —64. 2% of private secondary schools were
Catholic. And most of these Catholic secondary schools
were baccalaureate (60.9%) rather than commercial (32.3%)
or technical-industrial schools (6.8%)."'"°°

The enrollments in normal schools grew to such an

en la Argentina," Revista del Centre de Investigaciones v
Accion Social. XXI (May, 1972), 20, 24.

^^Ibid.

Petty arrived at these figures by using a combina-
tion of sources since no official statistics separated out
Catholic schools and students from the general category of
private schools and students. (Petty, p. 22.)

343

extent that there was a surplus of teachers who could not
find employment. The Ongania government decided to reclas-
sify normal schools and transfer them to the baccalaureate
program, making it harder for teachers to prepare and grad-
uate since the baccalaureate curriculum was more rigorous.

102
By 1971, there were no students registered in normal schools.

The Catholic strength relative to the public sector
was more apparent on the secondary level because there were
fewer public secondary schools. Overall, 10% of Argen-
tina's schools were Catholic in 1971. But on the primary
level only 5.9% of them were Catholic, whereas on the second-
ary level 31.3% were. Moreover, Catholic primary schools

104
enrolled 8% of Argentina's elementary schoolchildren,

but Catholic secondary schools enrolled 21% of the nation's

secondary students.

See below, epilogue, pp. 374-75.

102

Argentina, Minis terio de Cultura y Educaci6n,

"Alumnos matriculados : 1900-1971" (mimeographed page).
^°^Petty, p. 21.

lO^ibid.

105

Since there were no exact figures available on

the number of students in Catholic secondary schools, the

statistic of 21% was arrived at by the author of this thesis

by assuming that Catholic schools enrolled the same average

niimber of pupils as did all private schools. Thus, the num-

344

That 31% of Argentina's secondary schools enrolled
21% of the students was explained by the statistics for
class size. There was a smaller teacher-student ratio in
the private secondary schools which enrolled on an average

half the nvimber of pupils that public schools did, 171.6

106
to 321.8 respectively. Even though there were more

teachers per pupil in the private schools, the private

schools were less costly to the state than the public ones,

since the private schools were also collecting tuition from

^ 107
parents .

Upper and middle class parents, it seemed, pursued

a private education for their children and were the only

108

parents who could afford it. In the poorer provinces

ber of Catholic baccalureate schools was multiplied by the
number of pupils per school (738.7 x 184.25) and added to
the number of pupils calculated in a like manner for the com-
mercial (391.8 X 155.51) and industrial (82.5 x 155.41) Cath-
olic schools, resulting in a figure of 209,856 Catholic sec-
ondary students in a secondary school population of 1,007,537.

■•-^^Petty calculated that in the private sector, 22.9%
of the nation's schools enrolled 23.4% of its primary pupils,
and 47.4% of its secondary schools enrolled 32.9% of its stu-
dents. Thus there is little difference -in the teacher-stu-
dent ratios between public and private schools on the pri-
mary level, but a large difference on the secondary. (Petty,
pp. 17-19.)

■^°'^Ibid. , p. 19.

108

Ibid.., pp. 20, 24.

345

there were few private schools, and the private schools
that existed were mainly Catholic. In the provinces of La
Rioja, Corrientes, Jujuy, Santiago, and Catamarca only 25%
of the secondary schools were private. In the richer fed-
eral capital of Buenos Aires, 37.8% of the primary schools

were private, and 71.5% of the secondary schools were pri-

109
vate.

Thus the private, and in particular the Catholic,

sector of education increased its schools and enrollments

after the fall of Peron and with the Estatuto del Docente

of 1958. Public school teachers and statists had not built

their own constituency to effectively counter private school

advocates. Those running the state identified with the

private education and, oftentimes, with Catholic values

and education.

lO^ibid.

CHAPTER TWELVE
UNIVERSITY EDUCATION SINCE 1958

Political Background; Frondizi to Ongania
Frondizi's government secured the passage of a law
which recognized the academic titles of private universi-
ties and provided for state recognition of their profes-
sional titles. (See chapter ten.) His government also
respected the autonomy of the national universities, and
they were never intervened. The moneys budgeted for the
national universities were increased during the Frondizi
administration. A salary scale was instituted for uni- ■

versity faculty and administration in order to "implantar

la dedicacion exclusiva en la docencia . " In short, Fron-
dizi established a system of private universities while
amply compensating the national university system with

funds and respect for their internal freedom to administer

themselves.

Argentina, Minis terio de Hacienda, Presupuesto gene-
ral de la administracion nacional para el ano 1960, (2 vols.,
Buenos Aires: Ministerio de Hacienda, 1960 /?7) , II, 530-1012,

^D. 13.501, October 31, 1960, ALA 1960, XX-A, p. 840.

Luna, Argentina de Peron a Lanusse, p. 130.

346

347

The interim government of Guido continued the uni-
versity policy of Frondizi. However, the Inspeccion Gene-
ral de la Ense!\anza Universitaria Privada, established by
Decree 1404 — the same decree which implemented the Law for

Private Universities (Law 14.557) — was put directly under

the Minister of Education and Justice. This meant that

private universities would only have to deal with the Chief
Executive and his appointed minister instead of with an ed-
ucational bureaucracy that could well be predisposed to
favor the national university system.

In 1963 the Popular Radicals, or UCRP, won the presi-
dency of Argentina, but not a clear majority in Congress.
UCRP did not disband the private universities, as one might
have expected because of their previous opposition to them,
for two reasons. First, without a majority in Congress
UCRP could not have succeeded in passing legislation to
abolish the right of private universities to seek state

recognition of their professional titles; and secondly,

5
public opinion now accepted private universities.

^D. 6814, July 16, 1962, ALA 1962, XXII-A, p. 578.
^Luna, Argentina de Per6n a Lanusse, pp. 172-73.

348

The UCRP administration of President Illia continued to
support the national universities with funds and a respect
for their autonomy as had Frondizi,

One innovation on its part was to pave the way for
the establishment of provincial universities. On October
29, 1965, national validity was legislated by Congress for
titles awarded by provincial universities. The only pro-
viso was that the curriculiom of the universities directed
by the provinces assure "una formaci6n cultural ^ un
nivel cienttfico y_ profesional equivalente al seflalado en
el pSrrafo anterior." The paragraph referred to was that
of article 1 of the law for private universities (Law 14.557)
Unlike the law for private universities, graduates of pro-
vincial universities would not have to pass state examina-
tions in order to receive habilitating titles. Although
Illia. promulgated the law at the end of 1965, there were
no provincial universities established until Onganfa's era.

Onganla's coup soon led to violations of the autonomy
of the national universities, observed by all governments
since 1957. Obsessed by the notion that these universities
were hotbeds of communism, Onganla decided to reorganize

^Ley 16.777, October 29, 1965, ALA 1965, XXV-C,

pp. 2139-40.

349

them. This view was reconfirmed when the rector of the
University of Buenos Aires, Hilario Fernandez Long, a Hu-

manistr, - convoked the Superior Council of the UBA and con-

7
demned the military's coup of June 26, 1966 two days later.

On July 29, Ongania responded in two ways: he and the

Junta de Comandantes en Jefe, which acted as a legislative

body, ordered the police to physically occupy the UBA's

8
Faculties of Exact Sciences and Archxtecture; on the same

day, a new university law was promulgated, amounting to

an intervention of all faculties and the dissolution of

most student organizations:

Art. 3° — Los rectores o presidentes de las
universidades nacionales y los decanos de
sus respectivas Facultades ejerceran funci-
ones administrativas, siendo sus actos pro-
visionales, correspondiendo al Minis terio de
Educacion el ejercicio de las atribuciones
reservadas por sus estatutos a los consejos
superiores o directives.

Art. 8° — Los centres o agrupaciones estudi-
antiles, deberan abstenerse de realizar acti-
vidades politicas. La violacion de esta pro-

Joseph F. Bunnett et_ al., A Report to the American

Academic Community on the Present Argentine Situation
(monograph, Austin, Texas: Latin American Studies Associ-
a.tion^: ,1967.) , pp.: J.7-27.

350

hibici6n autorizara al Ministerio de Educa-
cion para disolver el centro responsable
de ello.

In protest of this new law and the physical occupa-
tion of their universities, professors and student leaders
resigned in mass protest from their posts at the national

universities of Buenos Aires, Cordoba, La Plata, and the

10
Literal. At the national universities of the Sur, Cuyo,

and Nordeste there were no protests of the new law, and

their rectors and professors remained in their positions.

An American investigator of this intervention in

1966, suggested that the Roman Catholic "right" sought

Onganla's repressive reorganization of the national uni- ■

versities in order to:

. . . mark out the moderate, post-Conciliar
and ideologically oriented sections of the
more liberal active Catholic groups for at-
tack along with the Communists, Trotskyites,
and other sympathizers of movements for
radical social change.

To be sure, liberal Catholics such as the Hiomanists had

^Ley 16.912, July 29, 1966, ALA 1966. XXVI-B,

p. 782.

Bergada, p. 270.
^^Ibid.. p. 271.
Bunnett,, p. 24.

351

protested along with the Reformists of FUA the military
overthrow of President Illia, Rightist Catholics such as

the "Integralistas" had used physical violence to oppose

the Reformists xn Cordoba after the coup. Another Cath-
olic rightist group, the Ateneo, founded in Santa FS in

1955, took advantage of the coup to gain posts at the Uni-

14
versity of the Literal.

Onganxa's government turned to APAC (Asociacidn de

los Profesionales y Estudiantes) , the fifth branch of Ac-

cion Catolica Argentina, for assistance in weeding out the

leftists in the national universities and in governing them

after the Reformists and Humanists had been suppressed,

APAC set up alumni associations that served to guide the

.... 15

unxversxtxes xn dxsassocxatxng from Marxist politics,

APAC particularly thought itself successful in depoliticiz-
ing the universities of Cordoba and Buenos Aires. By 1968,
a Jesuit -published survey on education in Argentina could
report that a few Marxist professors were to be found only

•'■^BergadS, pp. 270-72.

Ibid,., p. 272.

"Agrupacion de Profesionales de la A.C.A.," 30
anos de Accion Catolica, 1931-1961, p. 227.

352

in the Faculty of Philosophy and Letters at UBA, and that
"el problema del marxismo" was at the "nivel del estudi-" '
antado."

The Onganla government also changed the 1958 univer-
sity law which prohibited private universities from receiv-
ing public moneys. At the end of 1967, a law was decreed'
for the private universities whose article 16 said the
following:

. . . se faculta al Poder Ejecutivo para ' ~
acordar a los establecimientos autorizados
que lo soliciten la contribucion econ6mica ' '
del Estado, cuando aquel considere que ello
conviene al interes nacional.

This was a dramatic break with the original law for private
universities, one which its opponents had foreseen. How-
ever, private universities still could only issue academic
titles; the system of state examinations for habilitating
titles was kept, probably because it was only a formality.

The decree that implemented the above law spelled out
what kinds of aid would be given to private universities,"
limiting it to scientific research projects that had won
the approval of the Consejo de Rectores de las Universi-

Bergada, p. 273. —

"^Ley 17.604, December 29, 1967, ALA 1968, XXVIII-A,
p. 156.

353

• ^ A last proviso was that the projects had
dades Privadas. A last provx^

to coincide with "the national interest." «>ese spec-
.ications .neant that the national ,ove.n.ent would not he
funding private universities on a par with the national
ones. But the wording of article 16 of Law 17.604 did

open the door for future state financing.

The onganla government abetted the support of pri-
vate universities in other ways. In 1968. the Municipal-
ity of -enos Mres gave forty hectares of land to Salvador,
the aesuit university of Buenos Aires." something that
oould not have heen done without the approval of the nation-

»n^ in 1969-70, the national government gave
al government, m i.^o^ »

•4-, r^■F Pataaonia "San Juan Bosco, " a
land to the University of Patagonx

■^ nr, -t-l^e tovm of Comodoro Rivadavia,
catholic university in the tovm o

.long with 300 million ^sos for the construction of huild-
,„,s ^° -other icind of support came from the Kinisterio
ae Bienestar Social which gave money to private as well as

' -.. lacQ ATA 1970, XXX-A, p. 341,

18d. 8472, December 31, 1969, ALA i^/u,

i.^e .esuits --rn^fm^:s"h::iirngs!" (Xnt'^vP
rthTigrile'tt^y! r.!!%ienrs Lres. August .3. 197..,

20„terview with Jos€ ^'^l^^'^j;,'; ' sllt^.^T.
BirecciSn de Altos Estudios, Buenos A.res,

1972.)

354

state universities in the form of student scholarships.
And the Province of Salta (which was under federal inter-
vention like all other provinces likewise gave money in

the form of scholarships to the Universidad Cat6lica de

Salta. Lastly, the government created a Consejo Nacional

de Ciencia y Tecnica (CONACYT) to support technical and
scientific research to promote the national goals of devel-
opment and security. Both public and private institutions

were eligible to receive state funds ' toward this end.

Provincial Universities
The potential of the provinces to become involved
in higher education was illustrated by Salta 's support of
a Catholic university discussed in the previous paragraph.
As also noted above. Congress passed a law in 1965, dur-
ing the time of Illia, that recognized the validity of
provincial university titles; in 1968, this law was revised
by Ongania. Law 17.778 provided in article 1 that pro-
vincial degrees and titles were to be recognized by the
state if the universities awarding them had achieved nation-

^^Ibid.

^^Ley 18.020, December 24, 1968, ALA 1969, XXIX-A,
pp. 21-23. '

355

al government recognition. Provincial universities were to
enjoy academic autonomy and financial autarky, but lest the
Onganla dictatorship lose control of these universities it
was established that "autonomia ^ autarcruia no podran obsta-
culizar el ejercicio de las atribuciones y. deberes que competen
a_ otras autoridades nacionales o_ locales respecto al manteni-

mlento del orden publico ^ el_ imperio de la legislacion comun

en el 5mbi to universitario . " Persons connected with the

provincial universities were reminded that "actividad politi-

ca, " proselitismo, " and "propaganda polltica" were prohibit-

ed. This law was implemented by Decree 1617 on Aprxl 2,

25
1969. "^

Provincial universities were founded after the 1965
law was passed, and by 1967 there were four of them — the
Universidad Provincial de Mar del Plata, the Universidad
de La Pampa, the Universidad de Neuquen, and the Universi-
dad de San Juan — containing only 1,838 matriculated stu-
dents. It was not until 1971 that two more provinces estab-
lished universities — the Institute Superior de Ciencias
Economicas de Jujuy, and the Facultad de Ciencias Aplicadas

^^Article 7, Ley 17.778, June 12, 1968, ALA 1968,

XXVIII-B, p. 1888,

^'^Article 13, ibid,, p. 1889.
^^ALA 1969, XXIX-A, p. 409.

356

a la Industria de San Rafael, of Mendoza. The total num-

ber of matriculated students had doubled to 4,136 in 1971,

Catholic Universities
Proliferation

The rapid increase of private universities, most of
which were Catholic, was striking. Factors that accounted
for this development were the increasing demand for higher
education, the efforts of the Argentine hierarchy to satis-

fy the demand, the ease with which students could enter
the private universities, and conservative families' wish-
ing their children to avoid the turbulent politics of the
national universities.

Demand for university education increased with the
niimber of graduates from secondary schools, which tripled
from 1950 to 1971; moreover, an increasing proportion of
them wanted to continue on to the university. In 1950

there were 323,584 secondary students, and by 1971 there

27 - ""^

were 1,007,537. In response, university enrollment quad-

26 '

Argentina, Ministerio de Cultura y Educaci6n, Esta-

distica educativa, sintesis 1967-71 (Buenos Aires: Departa-
mento de Estadistica Educativa, 1971), pp. 111-12, 122.

Argentina, Ministerio de Cultura y Educaci6n, "Alum-
nos matriculados, 1900-1971" (mimeographed page) .

357

rupled from 1950 to 1971, from 80,292 students to 269,912,
the biggest increases being registered in the 1960's. And
it was the private universities which were expanding most
rapidly to respond to this demand. In 1965, almost 93% of
Argentina's university students were enrolled in the nation-
al universities, 6.5% in private universities, and .5% in
the provincial universities. By 1971, however, the pri-
vate universities enrolled 15% of all university students,
the national universites 83,5%, and the provincial iiniver-
sities 1.5%.^^

Another reason for the expansion of private Catholic
universities was that the Argentine hierarchy was zealous-*
ly establishing as many as it could. The papacy itself
was pressuring the Argentine bishops to found Catholic uni-
versities as part of its campaign to establish Catholic

universities all over the world, Dell'Oro Maini, the

Minister of Education who wrote the decree committing the
executive branch to recognize the habilitating .titles of
private universities, was amazed at the eagerness of the
Argentine bishops to found universities as early as 1955,

Ibid.

^^Interview with Dr. Jorge Mejia, editor of Criterio,
Buenos Aires, August 22, 1972.

358

when the decree was made public. By 1962 there were

31
seven Catholic universities. A report of the Centro de

Investigacic5n y Accion Social of the Jesuits concluded

that the Argentine hierarchy authorized the creation of

too many Catholic universities in 1955 and subsequently,

thereby watering down standards.

For the standards of admittance were lower than those
for the national universities. Many of the private univer-
sity professors were also not as qualified as their counter-
parts in the national universities. Their salary was less

than that of the faculty of the national universities, and

sometimes they were not paid at all. The physical plant

of these universities was also inferior to that of the
national viniversities: the majority of them were located
in secondary school buildings of the church that could only

When Dell'Oro Maini showed his skepticism over the
possibility that so many universities could be established and
properly sustained, some of the bishops became angry, think-
ing that he opposed them. (Interview with Atilio Dell'Oro
Maini, Buenos Aires, August 21, 1972.)

Argentina, Secretaria de Estado de Cultura y Edu-

cacion. La educaci(5n en cifras, 1958-1967, p. 87.
^^Bergada, p. 263.
^^Ibid.. pp. 262-65.

359

be used after school hours, thereby limiting the campus
life of the university students- Equipment was lacking,
and Ixbraries were puny.

The administration of these new private universities,
many of whom were clerics, also lacked experience in setting
up and managing universities . They chose the path of least
resistance and set up institutions that offered courses in

the humanities and social sciences, programs less costly

35
to run than those m physical sciences. With time, a

few innovations were introduced, such as a doctorate of

enology being offered at the University of Mendoza; de-
partments being made the key administrative sub-divisions,
as in universities in the United States, at the Jesuit-con-
trolled University of Salta; and an exchange of professors
and students being worked out for research in physics and

34,, .,
Ibid.

3 5

Ana Maria Jalon, Argentine Survey S.J.: II — situ-

acion educacional (Buenos Aires : Centro de Investigaciones

y Accion Social, 1968), Part 1, pp. 218-23.

Dr. Fernando Storni, S.J., presented this informa-
tion at a seminar on "The Argentine University, " held at
the University of Salvador in Buenos Aires, September 16,
1969. ("Amplio debate sobre la integraci6n del sistema
universitario argentine: el destino de las universidades
esta tales, privadas y provinciales, " Estudios, LVIII, no.
606 October, 1969/, 34-38.)

360

electricity between Bucknell University in the United States

and the Catholic University of Cordoba, financed by A.I.D,

37
with $300,000. Catholic universities also began by the

late 1960 's to offer courses of a more technical nature,

such as business adininistratxon and engineering.

The political quietism of the Catholic universities
attracted students, especially the daughters of families
who did not wish them to be "contaminated" by leftist ideas
prevalent in the national universities. The first rector

of the University of Salvador had to set up quotas for fe-

39
males to keep the University from being swamped by them.

But the female demand for places in the University of Sal-
vador persisted, and by 1968 there were more females than
males, the quota system having been waived. The faculties
of philosophy and hiomanities of Catholic universities, in

40 m,

general, are inundated with females. The high number of
women in the Catholic universities not only resulted from

^^Storni, p. 35. ' -^- .

39 ^ --:-- -

Interview with Daniel Obregon, S.J., first rector

of the University of Salvador, Buenos Aires, July 17, 1972.

40 *

Bergada, p. 364. - — = — - - —

361

the lack of political upheaval, but also may have con tfi-^~^ =
buted to this lack. • , - .

Not only female, but male, students in the Catholic
universities were politically inactive and relatively con-
servative compared to their peers in the national univer-
sities. They did not occupy their universities or bring
classes to a halt through boycotts or strikes. A 1967 re-
port issued by student members of the Federacidn de Estudi-
antes de la Universidad del Salvador (FEUS) averred that Sal-
vador had a student body drawn mainly from the upper social

strata of Argentina since poorer students could not afford

41
the tuition. This difference in social background may-^'

have had some effect in dampening student unrest, and the
payment of tuition could also have made the students (or -
at least their parents) more concerned with keeping the uni-
versities open, with the result that they were less inclined
to occupy their universities or call boycotts of them.

University administrators helped maintain Sh .apolitic-
al atmosphere by an occasional use of dis-ciplinary measured

Primera Comision de Estudios del Centre de Estudi-
antes de Letras de la Universidad del Salvador, En pos de '
una nueva universidad, ed. Jorge Cavodeasse (Buenos Aires:-
Federaci6n de Estudiantes de la Universidad del Salvador,
1967), p. 20.

362

and even dismissal against Catholic university students
engaged in political activity. Universidad Catolica Argen-
tina students were temporarily suspended by the administra-
tion for yelling out for freedom for imprisoned students
and for university autonomy during the inauguration cere-
mony of a new faculty of social sciences and economics at-

42
tended by Onganla's Minister of the Interior. One of

these students, Eduardo Saguier, was permanently suspend-
ed, and he sued in court to regain admittance; he lost the
suit and appealed to the Argentine Supreme Court. The
Court backed up the lower court's ruling that UCA's statutes
permitted the administration to expel a student: the argu-
ment was that the student had accepted the university's
restrictions when he enrolled. Meanwhile, Saguier had en-
rolled in the University of Salvador; again he was expelled,
this time for writing adversely of the Argentine episcopacy.

The courts again refused to reinstate him on the same

43 . .

grounds as in the previous suit. Thus the administra-
tions of private and Catholic universities could enforce a
political quietism.

Interview with Eduardo Saguier, Buenos Aires,

September 9, 1972.

These court decisions appear in newspaper accounts
of September 14, 1968, and April 8, 1969.

363

National Universities
The Peron government had not increased the number of
national universities. Instead it had made tuition free
and had financially supported the existing six national
universities. The provisional government of Aramburu, on
the other hand, acted to meet the increasing demand for uni-
versity education both by issuing the decree-law for pri-
vate universities and keeping it on the books, and by cre-
ating two new national universities in the Northeast and
in the South in 1956 — Universidad del Nordeste and Univer-
sidad del Sur. The administration of Frondizi, while sup-
porting the bill for private universities, also acted to
create another national viniversity in October 1959 — Uni-
versidad Tecnologica Nacional. This university was the
successor to the Universidad Obrera of Ley 13.229/1948,
founded by the Peronists as a non-university secondary
school which took in primary school graduates and taught
them a trade. The Universidad Tecnologica Nacional would
now function as a university to prepare "profesionales en
el Smbito de la tecnologia para satisfacer las necesidades

correspondientes de la industria, sin descuidar la_ forma-

- 44
cion cultural y. humanlstica> . ;• ." - The dictatorship.Tof

^Article 2, Ley 14.855, ALA 1959. XIX-A, p. 112

364

Onganxa added a tenth national university — Universidad
Nacional de Rosario — which began operation in 1969. .

In spite of these additions to the national univer-
sity system, enrollment in national universities increased
very slightly and came almost to a standstill during On-
ganxa 's administration. In 1967, there were 221,522 matric-
ulated students in the national universities; in 1971,

45
there were 225,671. In contrast, the private universities

in 1967 had 17,092 matriculated students, and in 1971,

46
40,105, a threefold increase 1

Student Politics

An American authority on Argentine university stu-
dents has noted that their politics in the post-Peron era
have been characterized by "negativism." He attributed
this to the authoritarian control exercised over the stu-
dents for a twenty-five year period, 1930-55. Subsequent-
ly, national university students have "generally opposed
the economic and political policies of the national gov-
ernment, " offering few "practical alternatives for the
solution of national problems." The 1958 campaign against

Argentina, Minis terio de Cultura y Educaci6n,

Estadistica educativa, sintesis 1967-71, p. 111.
Ibid.

365

article 28 illustrated the negativism of the students:
this campaign only served to weaken the overall student
movement and distracted students from the priorities of
educational reform and betterment. The Humanists broke

with the Reformists^ at this time, beginning the withdraw-

al and splintering of groups from and within FUA.

The Humanists attracted many adherents and votes be-
tween 1955-64 due to the prestige of their anti-Peron stand,
their seeking to grapple with social and economic problems,

and the vogue of Christian Democrat ideas generally in Latin

48
America. Humanist strength was greatest m the University

of Buenos Aires, where they won elections in 1961, beginning
with the alumni. By November 1962, the Humanists had swept
all three sectors of the tripartite Assembly, alumni, stu-
dents, and faculty, enabling them to elect a Humanist rec-
tor (Julio Hip61ito Guillermo Olivera) and vice-rector
(Hilario FernSndez Long) . But divisions soon appeared among
the Hiomanists between the more liberal and conservative
members; members became apathetic and did not turn out for
elections. In 1965, Olivera resigned as rector and was re-

Walter, Student Politics in Argentina, pp. 167-68,

192-93.

Ibid,., p. 168,

366

placed by Fernandez Long, a Humanist who had voted along
with the Reformists. By 1966, both Humanism and Reformism
had veered toward the left and were reconciling political-
ly. Both groups joined in denouncing Onganla's coup and

. . 49
intervention of the national universities .

Both the Humanists and the Reformists were challenged
politically by the increasing influence of the Communists,
who by 1964 dominated the leadership of FUA and most af-
filiated local federations. This also caused many student
groups to disaffiliate from FUA, and after 1964 the Commun-
ist leadership itself began to lose its following. Splits
occurred among the Communist students, and splinter groups

variously known as Trotskyites, Maoists, Stalinists, and

50
Castroites became active.

The fourth general category of university students
in the post-Peron period had been categorized by Walter as
the "Conservative" faction. Although he is vague about
what students would fit into this category, it seems that
he included essentially all who did not support the Human-
ist, Reformist, or Communist factions. Walter pointed out

'^^Bergada, pp. 267-69.

Walter, pp. 172-74.

367

that the leftist reputation of the Faculty of Philosophy
and Letters of the University of Buenos Aires did not
correspond to the results of a poll made in 1955-55, which
showed that the political choices of university students

were basically the same as those of Argentina's middle

class. He also cited a 1958 census of the University

of Buenos Aires student body that revealed that more than

90% of the students were from the middle classes. Thus,

the leftist activism of Argentina's university students was
overrated by Ongania and public opinion: the bulk of middle
class students tend to reflect the political beliefs of the
Argentine middle classes, which are not truly revolutionary.

Nevertheless, the fact remains that since the 1918
Reform, Argentine university students had been genuinely

concerned with the solution of national social, economic,

53
and political problems. And, though initial student pro-
tests against the Onganxa regime gave way for a time to
passive acceptance, under conditions of increasing repres-

A. M. Eichebaum de Babini, Alqunas caracterf sticas
de los estudiantes de la Universidad de Buenos Aires (Buenos
Aires, 1958), p. 36, as quoted in Walter, p. 201.

^^Walter, p. 187.

^^Ibid. , pp. 172, 187.

368

sion opposition was bound to break out again. In May 1969,
a minor cafeteria incident at the University of the North-
east in Corrientes sparked rioting in several cities. La-
bor union support for the university students in Cordoba
highlighted the failure of Onganfa's economic program among
the highest paid workers in Argentina and among the here-
tofore pacific middle classes, plus the fact that Onganfa's
dictatorship could not guarantee order. State security
services, university authorities, all appeared inept.
Thus, university students set in motion an alliance of la-
bor, intellectuals, and middle sectors that successfully
ended the Onganfa regime in June 1970. Argentina's uni- .
versity students began the 70' s still viewing their uni-
versities as political as well as educational institutions,
a process unleashed with the 1918 Reform.

Luna, Argentina de Peron a Lanusse, pp. 202-04.

EPILOGUE - - _ , ; . -

After 1955, most of the divisions among Argentines
coalesced around the issue of Peron and his Party and
whether they should be allowed again to govern Argentina.
Neither students, teachers, military groups, churchmen,
political parties, nor economic classes were unified on
the issue. Argentina remained fragmented politically and
socially, and failed to develop a coherent policy on sig-
nificant national issues, including education.

In the field of education repeated quarrels illus-
trate that political parties and institutions were not
able to confront contemporary realities, but were still
bogged down by old problems, personalities, and divisions.
Church-state controversies of the 19th century over educa-
tion were still being fought out in the last half of the
20th century, absorbing time, money, and energy that could
have been applied to pressing economic and social problems.

Educational policies should have dealt with prob-
lems such as the high drop-out rate in early school years.
Over half of the children enrolled in the first grade did
not reach the sixth and last grade of primary school. Yet,
in 1970, only 41 percent of the public (national, provin-

369

370

cial, and municipal) expenditures for education were direct-
ed to the primary level. This was because Argentina's
educational system was top-heavy, with high enrollments in

secondary and post-secondary schools that absorbed respec-

tively 34.2 percent and 24.8 percent of the public funds.

Since most educators agreed that a minimum of three years
of schooling was needed for a person to be literate, Argen-
tina was not supplying enough funds to develop basic lit-
eracy and skills needed for further learning by a very large
segment of its youth. And Argentina was favoring the urban
and upper and middle sectors of its population by piamping
money into post-primary schools, most of which were located
in the federal capital and other big cities.

This upward bias in the allocation of funds aggravat-
ed the regional differences in Argentina's educational sys-
tem. At all grade levels more students in relation to the
school-age population were matriculating or graduating in
the federal capital than in the provinces. In 1962, less
than half of those entering the primary schools in 15 prov-

Thomas E. Weil _et _al . , Area Handbook for Argentina
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1974).

^Ibid . - .

371

inces completed the sixth grade, whereas the figure in the
federal capital was 87 percent. In that same year, only

the federal capital had as much as one-third of its second-

ary school aged population graduating from secondary school.

In 1971, almost half of the matriculated primary students
were in schools in Buenos Aires and the federal capital,
more than half of the secondary school students were in
schools in Buenos Aires and the federal capital ^ and more
than half of Argentina's university students were matricu-
lated in universities in Buenos Aires and the federal capi-

4
tal. Thus the allocation of educational resources bene-
fitted the federal capital and the middle and upper sectors
in Greater Buenos Aires at the expense of the rest of the
country and its rural poor.

The number of secondary school students as a percent-
age of the school age population (based on the median sec-
ondary school attendance age of sixteen years) was 35% in
1957, and rising about one percentage point per year. Un-

Unfortunately, Hannon did not include figures for the

province of Buenos Aires in his data. (Donald Paul Hannon,
"The Argentine Educational System: A Quantitative Analysis,"
_^/Master's thesis, Austin, University of Texas, 19687# PP.
26-29.

Argentina, Minis terio de Cultura y EducaciSn,
Estadistica educativa, 1971, p. 32.

372

til the Ongania government changed their classification,

the expansion of the secondary level was most pronounced

5
in the normal schools. After 1969, these students were

transferred to baccalaureate programs, dramatically in-
creasing the number of graduates from bachillerato second-

g
ary schools from 167,000 in 1969 to 403,282 in 1970.

Drop-outs at this level were frequent, amounting in 1971
to 47% of the matriculants in the baccalaureate program,
59% of those in the industrial-technical, and 78% of stu-
dents in the agricultural secondary schools. Drop-outs from
these secondary schools, moreover, had few skills to equip
them to contribute to Argentina's economic development

since the courses in most of these schools were liberal

7
arts rather than industrial, technical, or agricultural.

The problem of the universities was not so much the

high drop-out rate, but too few places to offer to those

applying for entrance. In the 1960's, for example, the

University of Buenos Aires had to turn away 60% of the ap-

^Argentina, Ministerio de Cultura y Educaci<5n,
"Alumnos matriculados : anbs 1900-1971" (mimeographed
page) .

Ibid.

^Weil, Area Handbook, pp. 108-09.

373

plicants for the entering class. The national universities

had to turn away 25,929 applicants or 32% of 80,097 aspir-

9
ants in 1970. Since only about 7% of the university age

10
populatxon went on to a higher education as of 1965,

they constituted a potential elite. However, university
enrollments grew fast in Argentina, jumping from 117,000
in 1961 to 270,000 in 1971 and to almost 300,000 in 1973.
This increase was due chiefly to the expanding private uni-
versity system. But the national university continued to
dominate in numbers, and during 1971-1973 President Ale-
jandro Lanusse was reported to have created fifteen new
national universities, mainly formed from existing units,
industrial and commercial secondary schools and higher insti-
tutes. The enrollments were small — 1,000 students being the

11
largest — but they had the potential for future growth.

8 . . . - ,

Jalon, Argentine Survey S.J.: II — situacion edu-

cacional. Part 1, p. 218.

Argentina, Consejo de Rec tores de Universidades Na-
cionales, "Ingresos a las universidades nacionales 1970,"
Universidades Nacionales, informativo 2 (Buenos Aires: De-
partamento Estadlstica, 1970), pp. 1-2.

Argentina, Secretaria de Estado de Cultura y Edu-
cacion. La educacion en cifras, 1958-1967, p. 9,

^^Weil, p. 112.

374

Similar to the secondary education of Argentina, --^s
the university education the students received did not _ -
respond to the country's needs. The careers pursued in
the university were not those that aided economic and tech-
nical development. Argentina had a maldistribution of

physicians, with a superabundance in the cities and an a-

12
cute shortage in outlying areas, brought about m part

by the highly specialized education they received in the-

universities for which facilities were generally lacking

in small towns. The country had an over supply of lawyers

but needed more economists, agronomists, veterinarians,

and engineers. The periodic interventions of the natxo?i-

al universities had also hindered the development of strong
programs in the physical sciences: in 1966, the Ongania
intervention caused many full-time professors in the -
faculties of physical sciences to leave, further impeding

Argentina's preparation of _well-trained technicians^^

Argentine governments have recently begun to empha-
size technical training. On the secondary level, the On-
gania administration transferred the education of elemen-

■'"^ Jonathan Kandell, "Bar to Medical Students is De-
bated in Argentina," New York Times, February 3, 1973, p. 10,

^^Weil, pp. 116-20.

375

tary teachers to post-secondary or extra-university insti-
tutes whose enrollments jumped from 27,000 in 1969 to
38,000 in 1970 to almost 52,000 in 1971. Thus prospective
teachers would finish their secondary education in the ex-
panding technical-industrial and commercial school system,
or in the baccalaureate schools, before they would go on
to the two-year extra -university institutes for primary
schoolteachers or the four-year extra-university programs
for secondary schoolteachers. On the university level,
economic faculties began to be created (as of 1959) , and
the number of engineering faculties was increased, espe-
cially when the National Technical University was created,

enrolling 40% of those studying engineering in all of Ar-

14
gentma by 1971.

But the future technical demands of Argentina could
not be met as long as the universities were so inadequately
financed — another educational problem of Argentina which
the national government did not resolve. Although the na-
tional universities received a high percentage of the edu-
cation budget, it was not enough to provide the teachers,
and especially expensive technical equipment, for the soar-

Ibid., pp. 116-18, 123-24.

376

ing nvunber of students.

The national government was not conmiitting enough
resources to education as a whole. In 1971, educational
investment accounted for only 2.1% of Argentina's Gross

Domestic Product (GDP) compared with 3.8% in Panama and

16
Costa Rica, and the 4% invested by advanced countries.

Teachers in Argentina were paid less than teachers in ten

major world cities (after adjustments for the cost of liv-

17
ing) according to a 1972 study of teacher income. Uni-
versity professors received low salaries, and poorly paid
part-time faculty were increasingly employed. While schools
and equipment remained run-down, the 1973 budget reduced
the proportions doled out to education in previous years.
From 1968-1972 education absorbed 14.6% of the national
budget but the 1973 budget earmarked only 12.4% of the total

for education. Economists maintain that the desirable por-

18
tion for developing coiintries is between 15 and 20 percent.

•"■^Ibid. , pp. 119-20.

N. Eriksson, "Expenditure on Education, " Review of
the River Plate, CLIV (August 31, 1973), p. 315.

■'■'^Weil, p. 129.
•^"Eriksson, p. 315.

377

Although these federal budgets included funds for
private education, the proponents of Catholic schools ar-
gued that the state saved money by financing private edu-
cation. Using 1971 statistics, Miguel Petty, S.J., found
that

... el costo para el gobierno, por alumno
en el sector privado, es aproximadamente la
mitad del costo para el gobierno por alumno
en el sector oficial.

If this were so, the savings for the national government

were tremendous, since out of 5,600,000 pupils receiving

education in Argentina in 1973, 1,300,000 or 23% were in

private institutes.

Yet private education was becoming more dependent
on state subsidies. In 1969, private teaching institutions
were subsidized by the state to the extent of approximately
9 percent of their expenditures, which mainly went to staff
salaries. In 1972, the proportion had increased to 19 per-
cent. But the future of these state subsidies was not cer-
tain in 1973. Reports circulated that "certain groups with
a strong bias toward State control" wanted to end state

Petty, "Dimensiones de la escuela cat61ica en la

Argentina, " Revista del Centro de Investigaciones v AccicSn
Social, p. 19.

Eriksson, p. 316.

378

subsidies for private institutions imparting a sectarian

or confessional education. And one of the planks of the

Radical Party in the March 1973 presidential campaign called

for the elimination of subsidies to private primary schools.

Instead of the private sector collaborating with the
state to improve the quality of education in Argentina,
the opposite was happening. Catholics claimed that their
schools were hamstrung by the bureaucracy, stultifying edu-
cation with legal red tape for equivalency examinations

23
and curriculum changes. A study reported that the qual-
ity of education offered in the Catholic universities was

not "rigorous" since they lacked money and had proliferated

24
too fast. Catholic schools on the secondary level were

offering little in the way of technical education. In the

early 1960's public secondary schools sent 23.4% of their

graduates into industry while private schools sent only

3.6%; the private schools sent 50% of their graduates into

Ibid.
^^Weil, p. 100,

Petty, "Dimensiones de la escuela catolica en la
Argentina, " pp. 25-26.

^'^Bergada, Argentine Survey S.J.: II — situacign edu-
cacional. Part 2, pp. 275-76,

379

2 '^
teaching while public schools sent only 23.4%. Private

schools, which were mainly Catholic, were motivated by a

desire for profits, and expensive laboratories, machinery,

workshops, etc., did not give the private investor much of

cL- return on his investment. On the other hand, investors

did receive an adequate return from secondary schools which

were baccalaureate or chiefly offered courses that only re-

quired a blackboard and desks. Catholic schools also con-
tinued to be criticized for catering to the elite rather
than to the children of the poor.

In short, Argentine society was divided socio-eco-
nomically and regionally: between a city population high-
ly educated, often by Catholic secondary schools, with a
surplus of lawyers and physicians, and a rural sector suf-
fering from inadequate education, many of them drop-outs
from primary school, and from a shortage of trained pro-
fessionals, most of whom had gravitated to the cities, Ar-
gentine education reflected this socio-cultural division
and, in addition, the fragmentation of the political sys-

Hannon, "The Argentine Educational System: A

Quantitative Analysis," p. 63.

Eriksson, pp. 315-16.

27pgtty, pp. 17, 26.

380

tem, where 19th century issues between church and state on
education remained bones of contention. In 1943 a military
regime reversed a ban established in 1884 against religious
education in the nation's public schools; in 1955, religion
was again taken out of the public schools during regular
class hours. In 1955 private universities, which it was
generally understood would be Catholic, were promoted by a
state decree that promised to recognize their professional
degrees . After prolonged wrangling, this decree in 1958
attained the status of permanent legislation.

Underlying these issues is a question of patronage:
should the state subsidize private — mainly Catholic — educa-
tion, and by how much? A larger question involves whom
the state should educate and for what purpose. When Argen-
tina promotes private education it is promoting elitism and
favoring urban groups of a high socio-economic status who
will enter the traditional professions but not technical or
administrative careers essential to economic development.
The educational disarray symbolizes the inability of a frag-
mented Argentina to attain either a true national consensus
on policy or even a coherent policy imposed by one faction
upon another.

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401

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Virginia Waugh Leonard comes from an academic fam-
ily, both her parents being college professors. A younger
brother is a lawyer. She did her undergraduate work at
Oberlin College in Ohio, and at the University of Cali-
fornia in Berkeley, where she majored in International
Relations. She then attended Hofstra University on Long
Island where she received her Master's degree in Social
Sciences, and also became certified to teach social studies
on the high school level. She then entered the University
of Florida in order to pursue an interest in Latin Ameri-
can studies. She is now residing and teaching college in
New York City.

I certify that I have read this study and that in my
opinion it conforms to acceptable standards of scholarly
presentation and is fully adequate, in scope and quality,
as a dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

^ ~ - — ^ — ■

Arthur L. Funk, Chairman
Professor of History

David Bushnell
Professor of History

Neill Macaulay /;;
Professor of History

G. Seldon Henry )i
Assistant Professor of History

^£^

Clemens L. Hallman

Associate Professor of Education

This dissertation was submitted to the Department of History
in the College of Arts and Sciences and to the Graduate
Council, and was accepted as partial fulfillment of the re-
quirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy,

Dean, Graduate School

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Full text of "Church-state relations in education in Argentina since 1943"

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