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■■■'■ h
h*A
i
/
MODERN WAR
^u
M(
M0S1
WA
PRU
\
MODERN WAR
ContainiDg Opinions and remarks
OF THE
MOST DISTINGUISHED SOLDIERS
ON THE LAST
WARS INCLUDING THAT OF EGYPT
COMPILED BY
MAJOR de &< HUBERT d'ENTRAQUES
H.M. Reserve Forces.
THIRD EDITION
MONTREUX
PRINTED BY PEYROLLAZ & BORGEAUD
1883
All righU reserved.
\ »»
h
i.
Jnstead of centralizing military administration, Prussia has
worked out the principle of decentralization and definite
responsibility of individuals; and instead of leaving all to
be done at the last 'moment, in a hurried and perfunctory
manner, there is not a single step in the mobilization of her
forces which has not been arranged beforehand. There is
nothing new or startling in the Prussian idea. It is but the
principle of division of labour carried out in the organization
of an army as Adam Smith described it to be in a pin manu-
factory. Each official has a definite duty to perform and
definite instructions how to perform it, so that no meddling
is required from Berlin, and no uncertainty exists in the
various districts. The War Office knows to an hour when
each corps d'armie will be ready, and where each Division
and Brigade will be with its General who knows his officers
and soldiers, and who is served by a Staff equally well
informed.
Recruits in Prussia have to serve three years in the active
Army, though, for economical reasons, they are generally
sent home some months before the expiration of their term;
then four years in the Reserve, after which they fall for
five years into the Landwehr, and need no longer expect to
be put into the first line in war except under extraordinary
circumstances. The Landwehr, together with young untrained
1
4 —
men, have generally enough to do on the lines of communi-
cations, where they are being taught all things necessary to
enable them to take their place in the front line should their
help become necessary. The great fact is that the active
regiments are always associated with their Landwehr battalions,
their reserves, their depots of troops, arms, clothing, trans-
port, and supplies of all kinds. Not an article of equipment
has to be sent from Berlin or elsewhere. Everything they
need is to be found close at hand in their own districts.
There is no choking of railways with men hurrying to and
fro before they can be equipped. Every commander of a
district Landwehr battalion knows who are the men to be
called up instantly from the Reserve to complete the active
regiments, and if any of them are not close at hand there
are letters already written to recall them, enclosing railway
orders for their use. Their clothes and arms are ready for
them when they join, and they are then within a short
distance of their regiments. All the transport of each Corps
is present in its district. There is a definite plan to supply
the extra horses required. In a given number of days, known
beforehand, each Corps is certain to be perfectly ready for
active service and in possession of every requisite for a
campaign ; while arrangements have been made for the supply
from its districts of all things likely to be expended during
a war, whether it be short or long. The district feeds the
children of its soil with whatever they cannot obtain in the
enemy's country, and assumes at once the charge of the
wives and families left behind. In the district, after the
troops march, the remaining reserves and recruits are being
taught their duties as steadily as in a time of profound
peace, and a regiment calls these to its standard as soon as
it has lost by wounds or sickness one-tenth of the men who
marched with it. In a very few days after the War Office
has telegraphed the order to mobilize, the country produces
— 5 —
a number of small armies, each perfectly prepared to act
instantly as an independent body or to join the others at a
place ordered. Moreover, the plans for every conceivable
campaign have been drawn up during the leisure of peace ;
the railway arrangements have all been made, and only need
one word from the Chief of the State to confirm the projects
of the General Staff. In fact, the various departments have
done their work so well in peace that the order for war puts
upon them no stress whatever.
The tactical system of the Germans disclose a large ex-
perience of the past, an intelligent appreciation of recent
changes, and the results of continual efforts to make the
army a perfect instrument. Thus the value of one of Napo-
leon's inventions — the separation of a national force into a
number of independent units, each capable of acting by
itself — was fully understood and carefully maintained ; but
instead of being formed into one army, obeying a single
Commander-in-Chief, a certain number of corps d'armee were
aggregated into distinct armies, each under a responsible
leader, the immense masses of modem times making this
arrangement obviously expedient. Thus, too, the principle of
giving subordinates in high command great freedom of action
while carrying out a general scheme, observed by Napoleon
towards his Marshals, was faithfully followed by Von Moltke ;
but even more ample liberty was allowed, in consequence of
the vast proportions attained by war in the present day.
Celerity, absence of complications, and self-reliance were thus
promoted ; and though too much is not to be made of a mere
matter of organization, the consequences were of undoubted
value. Coming to tactics in a more technical sense, while the
leading rule was steadily adhered to that the three arms
should assist each other, and perform their proper functions
in the field, the greatest care was taken to adapt them to
the exigencies and uses of modern war, and to accommodate
— 6 —
their action so as to fall in with the changes wrought by
modem inventions.
Strategy is a science which is constantly in progress, and
which always takes into the reckoning the changes in the
laws of arms in more recent times, as well as the utilization
of the new improvements in the means of communication —
such as railroads and telegraphs.
The distinct formal movements by which an army is made
to assume throughout a similar or con'esponding formation
are no longer possible in presence of modem weapons. It is
absolutely essential in order to diminish the disastrous effect
of the present arms that each small section of an army
should be moved in such a manner as the local circumstances
impose. An attack in column is no longer possible, and an
attack in rigid line — except for short distances — never
was possible against properly posted enemies ; and now, except
under the very rarest circumstances, attacks cannot ever be
restricted to short distances. If an army, then, is to attack
at all, it must do so in skirmishing order, with a proper
system of supports and reserves. This mode of battle implies
an increase in the space occupied by a given number of
men. In pjroportion as the space occupied by a company is
increased, the difficulty of having men under control is
augmented. Hence drill discipline is more necessary, and the
combination of the most entire obedience with the greatest
intelligence more desirable, than ever. It is obvious that it is
now impossible for an officer to bring the same number of
men under his eye as he could when they were more com-
pact, and yet rapidity of movement and quickness in conveying
and obeying orders are of greater consequence than before.
The consequences of outflanking or of breaking the line are
more serious than they were.
Now, as heretofore, and perhaps more than ever, the fate
of battles depends on infantry ; but the action of the other
— 7 —
arms must not be forgotten. The French generally threw
away their cavalry in clashing bnt utterly hopeless charges;
and did not employ it enough in reconnoitring; the Germans
followed exactly contrary rules.
The cavalry divisions covered their army and its marches
as with a veil. Even before crossing the frontier the cavalry
divisions in the centre of the army were pushed to the front.
At the first entry into France they came upon the enemy at
Spicheren, at Weissenburg, and at Woerth. Immediately
after these actions the cavalry division again led the way.
The enemy's cavalry was, on the contrary, very inactive.
The French generals did not appear to understand the employment
of cavalry after the German fashion.
This double use of horsemen acting as widely-spread iclai-
reurs, and concentrating into immense masses when needed,
is best obtained by the Prussian corps d'armee organization,
with its divisions of Batteries and its Cavalry detachments
each attached to a specific Division, so that the little army
is complete in itself witli some 30,000 men and 90 guns.
It must be laid down as a rule that on tlie cavalry lies
the obligation under all circumstances to watch and gain
information concerning the enemy at great distances. But it
is the business of the leader to carry this out with a requisite
economy of the powers of this arm ; for he who considerably
weakens his cavalry before the first engagement cannot expect
anything from it either in or after it.
The stronger, however, tlie body of troops destined as
eoverers, the further it can be pushed forward, and the greater
will be its sphere both for gaining information and covering.
Tne cavalry should always form the head of the column
eveji in the mountains ; but in this case their strength should
be limited. Their business should be only to secure and give
intelligence ; thus patrols would be the extent of their
employment on such a ground. Some dragoons should always
— 8 —
be at hand to obtain qnickly information of anything which
may be observed on the flanks, which is often necessary on
the march. Good riders on stout horses, with the confidence
which these conditions afford, can do much.
The greater the distance that the view is unbroken over
the ground, the more num^^rous will be the patrols which will
be required to be sent forward ; and in this case they will
require a support of their own arm.
The Artillery should be accustomed to act in masses, or
to take up extended positions according to the ground, and
nothing can be less effective, pretty as it is, than a line of
Infantry with its Batteries all ticked off, gun by gun in line
firing right in front. The real power of this mighty arm is
most seen in concentration of fire, and in the combination of
numerous batteries on a decisive point or two in the field.
If it was wished to open the battle in earnest, no time
was lost by the Germans in deploying a strong force of
Artillery, which generally took part in a connected line at the
distance of from 2,000 to 3,000 paces, endeavouring by its
fire to cover the further deployment of the main body and
to shake the enemy. The division Artillery, and the greatest
part of the corps Artillery, of the army corps engaged, were
usually employed for this purpose. The Artillery secret had
again been discovered, and the arm had become conscious of
its strength. The German Artillery was employed on the
largest scale in this manner at Gravelotte and Sedan. Long
lines of guns kept up a fearful fire upon the French positions,
shattered their formations, and silenced their batteries. We
see the French Artillery, utterly unmindful of old Napoleonic
traditions in general, not bringing forward sufficient force to
meet the massive array of German cannon. We observe no
particular cohesion in its formations and manoetnrea. They
worked generally by single batteries; rarely were they able
to form a line of guns equal to tlu^ German in extent.
■%
— 9 -
The Artillery being the arm which can damage an op-
ponent at the greatest distance, its mass must therefore come
into operation before the weight of the Infantry is pushed
into the fight. The Artillery should never be placed too far
back in the column of march, it belongs rather to the front.
In the situations in war on a large scale, individual batteries
cannot manoeuvre of their own accord, as frequently happens
in small detachment exercises. Where 12,000 Infantry are
striving to attain one object, the Artillery distributed to them
should not seek to act on its own account, but on the contrary
it should contribute to the attainment of that object with its
united power, which is possible only, when the batteries do
not act independently, but obey one will.
In war on a large scale, employing tlie batteries in a
mass is the rule; their isolated employment is the exception.
This principle must be rather the more maintained, inas-
much as the actuality frequently renders the exception
necessary.
In all cases the Artillery of the advanced guard comes
first into action and has to keep up its fire for the greatest
length of time ; and therefore every officer in command would,
without doubt, prefer to employ the battery which carried
the greatest number of rounds, and that is the 4 -pounder
battery.
To give a special eseort to the Artillery on the line of
march is wholly superfluous, since it is in direct communication
with the other arms, divisions marching directly in ftvnt and
in rear of it.
Infantry siiould not think the protection they get from
guns is to be measured by their proximity, and should not
feel tlu^y were abandoned when the guns move oft* to better
positions.
Detaching gunn from a l)attery must be considered as
altogether exceptional, the rule being to keep the wliole
— 10 —
together; in open level ground the battery of the advanced
guard should always march united.
The Gerinan Infantry knows how to adapt itself quickly
and safely to all possible positions, because it not only
manceuvres on sound principles, but because it is accustomed
to act according to the circumstances and situation of the
moment.
To obtain the results of arms of precision, the old order
of the German battle was modified in an extreme degree —
battalions were formed mto smaller units, stiff lines and
columns were almost given up, and Infantry were trained to
break into dense swarms of skirmishers as much as possible,
to take any advantage of cover, and to manoeuvre rapidly
upon the field; while attention was paid to improve their
fire, and to make them steady and self-reliant. Most properly,
too, though modern small arms, were known greatly to favour
the defence, the vicious principle was carefully eschewed of
trusting to a passive defensive ; and it was sought to overcome
the difficulties of attack by quickness of movement, by sureness
of aim, by making use of local accidents of the ground, and
by combining in all instances, an advance on the flank with
advance in front, so as to harass and perplex the enemy.
The German line, as it advanced to attack, presented
formations of eager skirmishers who made use of every accident
of the ground to conceal themselves and close with the foe,
and maintained a deadly and continuous fire, tliongh in loose
order at a near range ; and it always overlapped and outflanked
the French, twisting round them in a destructive coil as they
vainly endeavoured to stop its approach.
The loose order of wide-spread skirmishing which charac-
terizes the Infantry tactics of this day has been compared
to "the battles of savages," and it has been supposed
that the effects of discipline and of acting in concert would
be less important at the present day than in past times.
— 11 —
m^
The contrary, however, is the case ; experience has shown
that long training is required to make use of modem small
arms; that the advantage of union and combined practice is
just as marked whether men fight in thin formations or in
dense masses ; and that the difference between raw and
disciplined armies is at least as great as it was of old.
The German line of skirmishers approached the enemy
by a succession of rushes. This was either done by taking
advantage of cover, or else they would advance about 100
paces at a run. throw themselves down, and then run on again.
Much address was displayed in this manoeuvre. Although the
Germans were frequently obliged to make front attacks, the
principle of the turning movement always asserted itself. So
fearful are now the effects of fire that direct attacks present
many difficulties, and therefore demand so much time as to
give the adversary leisure to reinforce the threatened part
of his line. Thus turning tactics are fully justified.
The German front attack was usually combined with an
attack in Hank, made by a turning movement. It has yet to
be seen whether such tactics, any more than strategy of the
same kind, will succeed against a well-trained enemy who
makes a vigorous counter attack : but they were very successful
when encountered only by troops standing passively on the
tlefensive. The turning movement for tlie flank attack makes
the attacking line exceedingly weak, and gives the enemy a
favourable chance to break it ; in fact, a groat superiority of
force, which on most occasions the Germans liad, is the true
justification of this system.
It is self-evident that when one army so completely sur-
rounds anotlier the attacking line must be very thin in many
places. According to old rules the best way of meeting such
a move would be by a vigourous attack with a concentrated
mass upon some point of the necessarily thin and extended
line of the enemy.
— 12 —
The French Infantry generally received the (jrerman attack
behind field intrenchments ; and though they destroyed the
enemy in thousands, they frequently allowed themselves to
be turned, made no resolute counter-attacks, and ended by
abandoning the ground.
In spite of the drawbacks (caused by the fire of modern
small arms) the French might have tried the effect of an
attack upon a point of the line which was surrounding them.
But their tactics were entirely deficient in the offensive element
on a large scale, by which, with inferior numbers even, you
may gain great advantages if you are in a position to make
rapid concentrations and advances on decisive points. Partial
counter-attacks on isolated points of a battle field, such as
the French made frequently, and with great bravery at Sedan,
can only have a momentary effect.
The German Infantry, when on the defensive, did not open
fire till the enemy was within 300 or, at the outside, 400
paces.
An attem^i; to break through investing lines with anything
like a large army is a matter of extraordinary difficulty ; the
case is quite different from that of a garrison escaping from
a fortress ; and the proverb " ville investie est ville perdue "
is more than ever applicable in modern war.
It is a very diiucylt matter to sally forth from a fortress
even against unfortified positions, for the investing force has
this great advantage, that the besieged can never take it in
flank, being themselves surrounded by the position of the
besiegers. They must, therefore, attack the latter in front,
to which the breechloader opposes great difficulties. Besides
which, to deploy considerable masses of troops among t'.ie
works of a place, and to make them debouch from its gates
requires much time and a great power of manoeuvring.
A plan which is destined to envelop and overthrow the
enemv both in front and on both flanks can only be undertaken
— 13 —
with a numerically superior force, and even then, can only
be carried out by leaders who can rely upon the punctual
execution by all parties of their share in the complicated
dispositions.
Plans of this sort have frequently been proposed in former
wars, but have never been executed as they were in the late
campaign; they never can suoi. dd except with perfectly
formed and disciplined troops under efficient and distinguished
leaders, a fact which has been clearly proved by history.
The frequent failures of concentric attacks formerly led to
the opinion that such operations were altogether unadvisable.
The danger to the aggressor is certainly very great, even,
if only one part of the army machine should fail to perform
its share in the general plan. The lines on which the several
divisions of the force march are all converging, and only
intersect each other on a point the possession of which they
must strive for; the danger lies in the possibility of the
separate parts of tb'^ tacking force being fallen upon and
defeated in detai'
It is then very apparent when the march takes place
against an enemy, the several divisions of the column cannot
move in immediate sequence one close behind the other, as
in that case any mishap to the head of the column would
throw the whole into disorder. An advanced guard then
should be selected, which in the larger divisions should
consist of different arms, and possess suflUcient intrinsic solidity
and independence to hold its own if attacked by the enemy,
until time is afforded for the rest of tlie column to draw up.
In order that the whole body should not have to form up
on account of every small body of the enemy, but should be
permitted to pursue its march undisturbed, it is so arranged
that the main body shall follow the advanced guard at a
certain distance. A wide distance therefore, between the
— 14
advaieed g«ard and the ntt of the troops, should always be
paiBtained.
The qnestion now is, whether there should be any considerable
distance between other portions of the troops — such as between
the main body and the reserve, which once was the rule.
That a leader in battle requires a reserve up to the moment
when he will be obliged to employ it, is self-evident ; all
troops engaged, are at the best only conditionally in the hands
of the superior command, and generally not at all, and a
leader has only so far a pervading influence, as he has
closely formed bodies of troops at his dispositon, or understands
how to form such bodies to meet the several crises of the
fight. No action should be entered into, without a reserve.
But why a reserve should be detached on a line of march
is not easily to be seen. A march reserve is not requisite,
and a battle reserve only when the fight commences.
Military nomenclature has here gone a step too far. Let
us only for a moment consider what the idea of a reserve
comprehends. All troops, so long as they are not engaged in
the fightf are the reserves of the Chief Command.
Up to this time it has been the custom to lay down as a
rule, for a line of march, one-quarter of the force, advanced
guard; one half, main body; one quarter, reserve. When a
battle commences, no one possibly can know whether the
advanced guard will suffice to carry it through, or whether
the last man will be required.
The advanced Guard opens the fight, the rest of troops
are its reserve, from which as many men are supplied as are
required. Why then should there be any other distribution?
Or, is a considerable separation with greater distances
necessary within the masses of troops themselves? It would
.certainly not be advantageous la action if a part of the whole
were to arrive half an hour later than is necessary.
15 —
«n
Ices
luld
Lole
This condition is shown when, for example, on a line of
march of a corps (tarmSe the reserve is separated and is
permitted to follow the tail of the column at a mile distant.
For the line of march, of course, intervals must exist, in
order that the whole may not be affected by temporary
impediments, but never of such extent as 1,000 or 2,600
paces; it is quite sufficient to fix as a rule, short distances
between the several bodies of troops in close order. Un-
doubtedly we must picture to ourselves that these distances
are there, in order to be lost under circumstances, and when
these occur, it requires time to take them up again correctly.
Thus, separating a reserve from the main body on the
march appears to be wholly useless; that which is useless is
also dangerous, and such a danger undeniably lies in the
distribution formerly in use.
Every effort should be used to mamtain the original homo-
geneity of the troops, as formed during peace, that is, their
order of battle as long as it is practicable. The order of
march commonly practised, operates however, most decidedly
towards destroying this most necessary principle.
Add to this, that the value of a strong reserve is greatly
increased by the comparatively heavy loss within a short
time, in an action of breech-loader against breech-loader.
Now, by the distribution of the force into an advanced guard,
main body, and reserve, and following the principle of bringing
into action these divisions as united as possible, a leader
might be seduced into allowing his main body to be engaged
too soon, and in that case he would have only about one-
fourth of his force — the strength of his reserve — left at
his disposition.
It appears advisable to prevent any artificial separation of
the unity of a brigade, especially at the moment of the fight.
This may be done if the rule is laid down, that the Regiment
which brigades with the advanced guard shall always be
m
— 16 —
t\-
iriaeed at the head of the main body. (An analogous formatioB
may alBo be employed either with small or large divisions of
troops.)
We have then this advantage, that the first support of the
engaged advanced guard is afforded by the nearest organized
division belonging to the same, and the Brigadier is enabled
to dispose of his whole united brigade in the battle, and the
General of Division has a so much stronger body in close
order as a reserve.
Further, a formation of this kind has this advantage —
that if called on suddenly to form a new advanced guard
for example, or if obliged to hurriedly change directiou, the
second brigade is not broken up.
The verbal command of a superior officer, given direct to
the person concerned, is the surest method of imparting
orders.
Also the verbal transmission of orders through Adjutants,
orderly officers, &c., is sometimes advisable, but only when
the order is short and positive, e. g, " the Brigade will take
up its march through X to Y ;" if anything further is to be ex-
plained with regard to general purposes, or other columns, &c.,
a written order is always preferable.
(The subordinate leader should be made perfectly well
acquainted with all that the officer in command knows
concerning the enemy so far as it relates to the object
in view.)
The purport of a order, i. e. what the object of it is,
should also be explained, but care should be taken not to
go too far. Certainly it is very interesting for the troops to
know how their better informed leader looks on the whole
state of affairs, but this leader has to digest and ponder
over all possible eventualities; and were such detailed views
laid before the subordinates they would only become confused.
— 17 —
it is,
ot to
}B to
irhole
|>nder
riews
ised,
because they are not able to judge which of these eventual-
ities would suit the case in point.
Nothing should ever be said in a written order concerning
a possible retreat. Such orders fall into too many hands, and
at the moment when all should endeavour only to gain the
victory, the troops ought not to imagine that their leader is
occupied with thoughts of retreat. Such orders, when neces-
sary, should be given verbally in an order, every word not
absolutely necessary is an evil. Orders covering a sheet of
foolscap take up too much time to read, and still more time
to understand ; the criterion of a good order is simplicity and
clearness; let one word only be struck out, and it ought to
be unintelligible. Should this not be the case, then the word
struck out is one too many, hence useless and pernicious.
Every leader must consider well what information he has
to impart to his divisions, and what to withhold. Orders in
circular form, which are advantageously used in peace time,
should be avoided in the field. If certain and rapid receipt
is to be desired, as many copies of the order as there are
commands to which it should be delivered, should be prepared.
The bad selection of a staff quarter has been proved to
cause very unnecessary delays in war, and often lamentable
results.
Either the General commanding the Division, or his general
staff officer should always be present in the staff quarters;
both being absent at the same time is highly improper. Should
any important orders, reports, or questions be necessary during
their absence the Adjutant of the Division would not be in
a position to issue the necessary instructions, since, as a rule,
he would not be aware of the general state of affairs, or of
the intentions of his Commander.
In general the place of each Commander is with the main
body of his troops.
2
— 18 —
J i;
IV
Afl a rale the Commander-in-Chief can only igeiie his orden
after he has received the reportB of the occurrences of tke
day from the several corps.
It must always be made known where the Gkineral of
Division is to be found, bo that reports may be able to
reach him.
With regard to the train of a Di^'i8ion, the led horses
belonging to it will follow immediately in rear, and it should
be strictly enjoined that they should not be turned into
packhorses, so that in case of need they may be mounted
immediately.
As a rule the munition wagons remain with the train of the
Division.
The ammunition wagons, when they are not attached to
the divisional train, belong to the regiment. Partitioning off
the same to the Artillery Division, separately or united, is
unadvisable.
The packhorses, baggage wagons, field forges, regimental
staff wagons, and the carts of the chief staff follow the rear
of the division.
The Pioneers at hand should never be allowed to be too
far distant from the head of the column of march. A single
road-bridge broken down would bring the whole Division to
a stand. The repair of a bridge cannot be too quickly taken
in hand with all the exertion at command.
The detail of a Van Guard is, —
1 Battalion
1 Squadron
2 Guns
1 Company of Pioneers.
In a open country such a guard, formed of all arms of the
service, is generally unnecessary when there is a strong body
of Cavalry in front.
it
is
— 19
of the
body
The troops in the main body of the advanced guard are
80 arranged that those are in front who would be the first
employed were the enemy to he met with. Should the Van
Guard experience an obstinate resistance, so that the main
body is obliged to interpose, in such a case also the Artillery
should endeavour as much as possible to prepare the attack.
The Artillery however cannot lead the head of a new division ;
it therefore follows in roar of the leading battalion.
When a mountain chain is between two marching columns^
it can never be certainly reckoned upon that a fight which
is going on in one valley will be heard in the other.
But if a communication exists, the detachment sent over the
mountains by the column which is not engaged can essentially
aid the other, especially if it should come up in the rear of
the enemy.
Flanking parties of Infantry could not follow the march of
the columns over the mountains. They would soon be left
behind, even if they set off at the same time as the advanced
guard, on account of being obliged to go up and down hill,
and there being no path. Flank-covering in this manner,
when the borders of the valleys are not very favourable, can
only be carried out by means of brauch columns when parallel
valleys arc to be found. If this be not the case, and if
cross valleys open out from which the enemy can approach
the line of march, detachments must be sent up as covering
parties, which eventually will Join the tail of the column.
It is most strongly to be recommended that bodies of troops,
not of the same party, who are in a position parallel to, or
behind one another, shall, above all things, keep up an
uninterrupted communication.
All forming up of troops is to be avoided, nnltss the nature
of the case absolutely requires it.
In order to rest the men, a simultaneous halt of the column
of march is all that is necessary ; each successive drawing
i?l
i':
I
— 20 —
np is a preparation. But this should not b« done on the
mere possibility of an engage^nent, but only when such is
inevitable, and then not till the advanced guard has been
arrested on its forward march. Where it is advisable to
form up depends chiefly upon the enemy, and on this account
it cannot previously be determined on; it is also dependent
on the nature of the ground and peculiar circumstances; but
the ground must be of such a nature as to render it possible,
and it forms the line of demarcation, in rear of which it is
the intention to fight, or the battlefield on which the attack
is to be made.
In the last case the forming up should not take place so
soon, because the advance in deployed order takes up considerable
time and fatigues the troops. If the advanced guard shall
have taken up a position which is at all tenable, then it will
be more advantageous to preserve the column of march up to
that point. If, however, the object of the march is to be
attained without fighting, the troops should only be drawn
up when they ai*e compelled to do so.
Every superior officer on a march sliould see his troops
defile before him at least once a day, in order to control
their march discipline, and especially to observe their general
appearance.
If the enemy is not in the vicinity, so that it is not
necessary for the leader to be with the body of the troops
constantly, an inspection of this kind may be extended to
to the baggage and trains, otherwise every kind of irregularity
will go on.
Special attention should be given to the times at which
the march is to take place. He who rouses up the men
unnecessarily as a rule, overlooks the fact that a large body
of men like a Division, when its several bodies are separated
by long distances, cannot all be set in motion at the same
time, and thus the troops are tired out by assembling too
— 21
\ troops
control
eneral
is not
troops
ided to
jularity
which
e men
e body
)arated
same
g too
early. Whether the troops may hare a hard day's work
impending, cannot be known beforehand ; therefore we should
be more scrupulous in avoiding all that is unnecessarily
fatiguing.
The art of command does not commence with bodies of
troops which come especially into relations with the General
Staff — such as the Division or Army-Corps, — it should be
exercised with skill acquired by practice by every leader,
even the lowest.
And this is a matter of such intense diflSculty, that too
much pains cannot be taken to acquire it, and in constantly
practising that which has been learnt; therefore the study of
Its rules should be commenced at the moment that the young
officer first begins his education in the mode of leading
troops.
If we examine the old treatises on war, we find a number
of plans given for arranging troops in order of battle. Two
opposing armies used to proceed leisurely, and neither attacked
till the other had made its dispositions. They were like two
chess players arranging their pieces in the regular order
before the commencement of a game. And no wonder, for in
those days war was constant; men of rank made it the
business of their lives, looked to it for their name, their
fame, and often even for their wealth, while the soldiers
were either feudal servants or mere mercenaries who sold
their services for pay and plunder sometimes to one nation,
sometimes to another. The fiery attacks of the French in
their wars of the Revolution gave the death-stroke to the old
system, and Napoleon's genius found in the use of requisitions
combined with contracts means of moving his troops so rapidly
as to out-manoeuvre and demoralize all armies led by Generals
who had been trained on the old system. What happens in-
variably in such cases occurred now. Napoleon's ideas were
22 —
I". I
adopted and his methods copied to a great extent by other
Powers.
In every age one country or another is recognized as the
leading school in war, because their exceptional study of the
military art has led to exceptional results. It does not follow
that the methods adopted for organizing the iorces of that
country, or even its system of tactics, are to be copied. It
is only of vital importance that the principles on which
success was based should be thoroughly understood. There
is, indeed, the greatest possible danger lest in studying the
methods of action the form should be taken for the substance,
and a mere wretched, lifeless copy be the result. Wherever
the sympathies of soldiers may now be directed, it is quite
certain that Germany is the great school of European war,
and thither are turned the eyes of all students. The Germans
taught us to use breechloaders ; they have shown to the world
an almost perfect system of supply ; they have re-affirmed the
law, which began to be doubted, that a vigorous offensive
strategy carries with it great advantage.
But it seems we have hardly yet appreciated the idea
which they declare to be at the foundation of all their success,
without which, indeed, a copy of their whole system would
be not only useless, but disastrous. It is, that every officer,
from highest to lowest, should be made an adept at the art
of leadership in war. All progressive officers should insist
upon this great principle. By the study and practice of leading
troops, juniiors will steadily mount the ladder of knowledge,
and seniors will find that indefinite grumbling disappear which
springs from Ignorance of the difficulties Inseparable from
leadership in all its branches.
If officers of low rank are not trained and accustomed to
take charge of an operation and conduct it with intelligence
the best plans of Generals may fail signally.
Ill:
— 23 —
If a man cannot attack or defend a small post with skill,
he is not in the way to command a brigade well; and if he
cannot place fifty men in good positions on ontpost duty, he
certainly cannot place five hundred. The Germans put faith
in a training of development, from small things to great, in
a general knowledge of tactics, individual responsibility, and
a system of inspection which testa all these most thoroughly.
Though mechanical and social changes have affected sub-
ordinate rules of strategy, and have greatly altered the system
of tactics, they have not made a radical revolution in the
art of war in any proper sense. Rightly interpreted, the
grand precedents of Napoleon require to be still studied ; and
now as heretofore, a distinct perception of the end to attain
and of the means to gain it, a fitting distribution of force on
the theatre, rapidity, skill, and good organization, ;ire the
essential conditions of military success.
The rapid and decisive success of Prussia must be wholly
ascribed to ability in command and to superiority of efiiciency
in the field, prevailing over divided counsels, imperfect general-
ship, and a bad military system.
Thi- less we imagine we can dispense with any of the
lessons of the past the sounder our conclusions will be. The
principles of war are immutable, but it was in direct violation
of a tactical principh^ that the German armes won their most
signal triumphs. It was not astonishing that an ill-directed
an<l ill-handled army whose organization was rotten should
have been beaten by one whose organization was sound, and
which, superior in numbers and in material, was led by the
best Generals in the world, nor were soldiers surprised to
have it proved that armed mobs arc not armies; but what
is astonishing and surprising is the tact that thv (rermans
succeeded on tiiree capital occasions '\n surrounding tho
French without sustaining disaster, if not destruction. No one
of the armies by wliioli, almost to the last man, the last
— 24
ill in
II
horse, and the last gun, the French were led into captivity,
had such an advantage in numbers over the forces which
surrendered to it as would, according to all previous calcula-
tion, have justified its extension over the enormous expanse
of ground which it occupied at the moment of victory, especially
in face of an enemy from traditions and training most likely
to take advantage of it. From the very circumstance of a
Greneral like Count Moltke adopting what a short time ago
would have appeared to all military students the ridiculous
method of literally surrounding an enemy, it is evident that
a vast change has been made in the mode of carrying on
the operations of war. Metz, Sedan, Paris — three startling
professional paradoxes ! And yet the movement on KoniggriitK
in 1866 was anomalous also. There two armies were placed
so far apart, each in the presence of an enemy of superior
numbers, that one was severely engaged and might have been
worsted before the other could come up to its assistance. So
vast is the change, indeed, in the Application of principles
that we are exposed in contemplating it to be led into errors
of a very opposite character. There are those who rigidly
adhere to maxims and traditions long after they have ceased
to be applicable, and condemn tactical innovations of all
kinds— fogies, young and old, who swear by the thin red
line as a perfect formation for every movement, and adore
solemn and deadly slow deployments with passionate tender-
ness. There are those whodeclare that ail the lessons of the
past must be forgotten, and that w(^ should begin afnisli to
construct a new system from the muzzle of the breechloader.
No sensible man could adhere to either side when the views
of its champions are thus nakedly put, but under ditterent
forms and guises such views are entertained where one would
least expect to find them.
To what, then, has the immense facility of manaMivring
which the Prussians have shown been dueV First, doubtless*
■a
— 25 —
eased
all
red
idore
nder-
the
bIi to
ader.
lews
erent
ould
■ rin«
I ess I
to the perfection of the actual training for war which has
been acquired severally by each man throughout the army.
A system of working at once so free and harmonious would
have been impossible if all had not been trained to appreciate
the value of the same principles, and to understand the larger
theory of the great art in the details of which they had to
co-operate. At every point the training of the average Prussian
officer shows itself to have been as high as it is probably
possible that, for the ordinary run of an army, it ever should
become, whether in the practice or in the theory of their
profession. But was that all? Not one who has considered
the history of the camp of Boulogne, and the effect which it
had upon the succeeding wars of the Empire, and who studies
the features of the present war, remembering always what is
the nature of the German organization in peace time, will
doubt how important an clement that permanent local organiza-
tion of the corps d'armee has contributed to the marvellous
harmony of their tactical working.
It is necessary to develope by practice the good qualities
of officei*8 and men, and to secure the military excellence or
elasticity as opposed to looseness, to enlarge the functions
and responsibilities of otticers, to constantly work bodies of
troops together at home so >«8 to I nsure freedom of maniBUvring
without degenerating into eccentric independence.
It by no means follows that the greater portion of drill
should consist in such large mancuuvres. Rigid formations
will still be a most essential means of early training, and be
also best adapted to most marches out of the immediate reach
of the (uiemy. It is important that any details that can be
suppressed should be done away with, in order that troops
may be able to devote as inueh time as possible to perfectly
mastering those which continue to be i)raetical, and to acquir-
ing field aptitude. But always enough will remain to demand
much time. No one who has watched the effect of niuob
Sii
il
— 26 —
loose work upon ill-trained troops will doubt that as a means
of discipline parade drill will be more, not less, essential than
ever, little as it continues to be applicable to the purpose
for which it was first designed.
As the mechanism of armies becomes more delicate and
complex, the value of mature organization increases.
Highly as the truly creative activity of the French September
Government and its astonishing results must be acknowledged,
still the quality of the newly-levied armies of the Republic
did not equal that of the former Imperial army. They had,
it is true, a sufficient force of artillery, some of which was
even superior to that of the latter ; but tliey had but little
cavalry, and the greater bulk of their numerous and well-
armed infantry was deficient both in organization and drill.
It fought well in defensive positions, but failed in that intrinsic
firmness which is so necessary during lasting and energetic
offensive operations. When attacking it seldom went beyond
the preparatoi*y advance of a dense swarm of skirmishers;
the attack itself often failed as soon as it was met by artillery
fire. Added to this, the organization of the ammunition and
provision trains for so large a mass of troops was faulty,
while the consumption was irregular and enormous. These
circumstances crippled the free action of the newly-formed
armies, and compelled them to cling to their lines of railway.
Modern war, from its rapidity, assumed that an adequate
reserve should be immediately forthcoming, for troops without
discipline there is no place in modern open war, something
more is needed to form an army than putting arms in the
hands of a great many men.
An army is never tried except in war. If the officials
charged with its organization and administration are not
students of war, if the army is regarded as a peace weapon
or a political plaything, it will never be fully prepared for
that supreme moment when only it is i>f any real use.
27
SucceBB must attend the banners of a nation which does
not forget in peace that war is sometimes a necessity, and
spares no labour or forethought to prepare for it.
The deeper the study of the events of 1870-71 is carried
the more confirmed will be the opinion that brave men when
masters of the art of war both in principles and details will
be far more than a match for brave men without profesaional
education ; that first defeats are almost irretrievable ; and that
thorough knowledge of war is a greater power than superiority
of weapons or of numbers.
The one decisive lesson of the war from beginning to end
is that no bravery will avail in modern war against superior
knowledge, with the moral force attendant upon the first
proofs of such superiority in knowledge. Great military
geniuses are as rare as great geniuses in other departments
of labour. A high standard of professional knowledge ought
to be demanded from all.
There is great simplicity about Prussian plans as well as
about Prussian organization. Whether the force to be manoeuvred
against an enemy be a group of great Armies, an Army Corps,
a Battalion, or a Company, the general plan is always the
same — namely, to hold the foe fast in front with even an
inferior force, trusting to the defensive power of modern arms,
and to attack him in flank with great vigour; above all, to
take the initiative whenever it is at all possible. Thus it
was to have been in 1870, whetlier the French invaded or
not. In the former case, the fiekl of decisive battle would
have been in Germany, instead of France; but the method
of proposed action was the same in both cases. Everything
depended upon information, and tlie best intelligence was
brought in by the Cavalry, which made raids into the enemy's
territory, not generally in large masses such as would attract
observation, but in dashes of a few men at a time riding
recklessly through the country, and taking their chance of
I'll!
I'
- 2h —
getting back again. Sometimes they came across hostile
detachments, which almost invariably fled at their approach,
probably believing that the daring horsemen were but the
vanguard of a stronger force. Sometimes they penetrated
quietly beyond the French lines, and, from some hill or church
steeple, watched the breaking up of camps and the march of
troops, whom they could count by battalions, squadrons, or
batteries. One such report as a Cavalry detachment could
bring in might appear of little value, but a number of them
brought together and examined by keen intellects well versed
in the theory and practice of war told nothing less than the
movements of the whole French Army on any given day.
Concerning cavalry, there is a tendency to overwork them
at first, forgetting that, while a tired man may be recalled
to energetic action by moral means, a tired horse cannot be
restored otherwise than by food and rest.
Often a couple of bold riders, if intelligent, can ascertain
more than a whole cavalry division, for they can remain
concealed where the division, could be perceived. When it is
necessary to send forward a strong detachment of cavalry
its commander should be placed in possession of all possible
information, especially about the position occupied by any
other bodies of friendly cavalry, the position of friendly troops
generally, and that of the enemy so far as it is known. In
the case of an unsuccessful action, support to routed cavalry
is always more necessary than to infantry. Therefore,
as a rule, infantry should bo told off to support cavalry,
even if they have to remain far l)ehind. Nothing annoyed
the Austrian cavalry in 1866 more than the h^bit which the
then inferior Prussian horsemen had of falling back steadily
and drawing their pursuers into the fire of infantry.
Mounted riflemen will be valuable.
As a rule in action the whole of the batteries should be
'<>:ll up, and working with the front line under the commander
— 29
yed
the
liUlv
be
der
of the artillery. The General should work the whole, as far
as possible, as a compact body of troops, and understand how
to treat it in that sense. He should not leave battery com-
manders to their own devices, but include the artillery in his
plan of operations just as much as the other troops. But he
should not interfere with details which are the business of
the artillery commander, who should generally rid'' vith the
chief of the division, taking command of the guns when
massed for work exactly for the same reason, on the same
principles, and with the same responsibility as commanders of
brigades, either infantry or cavalry. The artillery, being
always liable to a sudden call forward to prepare an attack
for infantry, should be near the front always. Its fire would
probably have to be given for an hour or two before the
infantry attack, even if the battalions were in fighting order.
But, generally speaking, a long column has to get into fighting
order, and the guns cannot be too ready to come into action
and cover the deployment, so as to commence as early as possible
the preparation for the infantry attack. As soon as the enemy
draws off the artillery should rejoin the troops to which it
belongs — that is, if attached temporarily to a brigade it should
rejoin that brigade — and horse artillery go to its cavalry.
Although an artillery combat must generally be carried out
at distances under 2,000 paces, the introductory fire will,
nevertheless, be opened at greater distances.
Though a brigade takes less than 40 minutes to pass over
a distiince of 4,000 paces, the necessary time increases in
proportion to the difficulties of the ground and strength of the
force extended. Moreover, it is necessary to leave much to
commanders of small bodies, such as battalions , only requiring
them at last to be drawn up In the order an. I at the place
marked out by the General. Tliough the superiority of the
breech-loader to the rifle of the Austrians in 1866, and that
of the German soldiers to the French levies in the latter
vM
m
\'f
m
— 30 —
'I'
Ij/,
Wll'
part of the Franco-German War, enabled the troops to be
nsed successfully in extended order and almost without reserves,
such a mode of action would be dangerous in the presence
of a steady and well-armed enemy, and its past success must
not be quoted as a precedent.
Independent fire well directed is calculated to scatter any
column. Should it be composed of stout material, and the
loss not too enormous, the men will join the advancing support
in partially loose order; if not possessed of the requisite
intrinsic power they will fall altogether out of the first line.
A front attack on lines of infantry in good position, even
made by very superior forces, has little chance of success
unless well prepared and supported by artillery. Whenever
it is possible, the enemy's flank must be threatened in com-
bination with the front attack, and the dispersion of attacking
troops menaced by great losses can only be prevented by
depth of formation. On the other hand, the defensive power
of the breech-loader allows the defending troops to be much
extended with comparatively small reserves, but then the
flanks are very weak, and the whole line probably retire if
one flank is in jeopardy.
In these days more than ever depends upon manoeuvring,
and as front attacks must sometimes be made, the formation
for the purpose must be deep. A division, therefore taking
the offensive should, as a rule, irrespective of flank attack,
move with a front of not more than 2,000 paces, and this
supposes that its artillery has passed to the front to prepare
the attack. Troops on tlic defensive may extend much more
than this, so long as they take care to have reserves behind
unprotected flanks. For purposes of manojuvrc the whole
force should be separated into organized, connected sub-divisions.
The subordinate leaders receive their special tasks independently,
and the Commander-in-Chief takes care that the working
together of the several parts la kept to the general aim.
i!
"iiii
— 31 —
ole
The temptation to interfere in the action of subordinates is
immense. It is always present to weak leaders and sometimes
even to strong ones. A General should keep his mind fixed
on his own busines, which is as much as a clever man aad
more than average man can do thoroughly. Interference in
details may appear very energetic, but it is always at the
expense of higher duties, and has a direct tendency against
training good subordinate leaders. Clear orders, a general
supervision, occasional information or direction towards a new
task, and the selection of a position whence he can see all,
or, at least, his first line, and where messengers will find him
easily — such are, in addition to an intelligent control over
the use of reserves, the first duties of a commander.
An excellent rule, and one worth impressing on the infantry,
is that since, without doubt, the greatest losses are incurred
by those who are running away, the best way to act when
in inferior force before an enemy is to hold your ground, or
even to attack boldly, trusting to be reinforced. But for success
in such bold tactics it is necessary that all officers should
have more responsibility, more right to take the initiative.
Every column should support every other column without
waiting to get leave from a General, and, furthermore, the
bodies permitted to act with some independence must be
smaller.
Modern improvements in guns and rifles render flank attacks
almost imperative.
The Great Napoleon, as a rule, broke through the centre
of the enemy's line. Napoleon and Wellington carried the
principles respectively of attack and defence to their highest
development— highest, that is, so long as men fought with
the old weapons. The Napoleon and Wellington of to-day
would change their systems, not because they used to be
wrong, but because the two great Commanders would know
how to adapt their tactics to the new circumstances.
ijltl'l
iii!!!
— 32 —
The campaign of 1866 in Germany is, in some respects,
even more interesting and valuable, from a military point of
view, than the great struggle with France. Apart from its
political results, it was the first contest since the days of
Napoleon — at least, on the European Continent— which showed
what strategic science and skill could accomplish in war on
a great scale ; and it was the first also which clearly indicated
the changes in the formations of troops, and, in some degree,
in the direction of armies, which the mechanical inventions
and progress of our age have rendered necessary or expedient.
Preparations were being made in Austria as early as March,
even by that time the heads of her armies were visible along the
Moravian frontier, and South Germany was getting ready; whereas
Prussia did not "mobilize" her forces until the first week of May.
The plan of campaign on the part of Prussia had been
evidently designed with careful forethought ; and, like the
projects which so often gave Napoleon victory over a coalition,
was a fine specimen of calculation and daring. This plan
rested upon the assurance that Hanover, Cassel, and Southern
Germany would not be ready to begin hostilities, and that
the numerous and martial legions of Austria formed the real
and main strength of the Allies; and, accordingly, it was
proposed to leave a small force only in the North and West
to paralyze the enemy on the Weser and the Maine, while
the principal power of the Prussian Monarchy should be
directed against the great State which alone was felt to be
truly formidable. For this purpose 50,000 men only were to
confront the Allies from the Elbe to the Rhine, though their
foes would be twice their number on paper ; but three armies,
forming, when joined, a mass of 378,000 soldiers, were to be
marshalled against the hosts of Austria, which, it was expected,
would be less numerous even if united to the Saxon contingent.
This scheme, framed with such true insight, was executed
with celerity and skill, and by the middle of June the weak
— 33 —
divisions of Manteuffel, Falkenstein, and Beyer were collected'
at Harburg, Minden and Wetzlar, ready for an immediate
advance into Hanover, while the Army of the Elbe, under
the veteran Herwarth, that of Lusatia, under Prince Frederic
Charles, and that of Silesia, under the Crown Prince of
Prussia, drawn together from a variety of points, had taken
their positions along a broad front extending from near
Dresden to beyond Neisse, and already approached the Saxon
and Bohemian frontier. At this time the Allies, it would
seem, had not formed any definite plan; and while their
enemy was about to make a well-concerted and sustained
attack they were discussing, with the usual hesitations and
jealousies of a»loo8e coalition, projects of an advance by Hof
on Berlin, of a raid into Lower Silesia, and of a march on
the Elbe through the Saxon passes. Nor were their forces
even nearly prepared, nor had they anywhere taken positions
which would have given them a fair chance of success. The
Hanoverian, Bavarian, and other Southern contingents were
not yet even equipped for the field, and were scattered in dis-
united fragments along the Main, the Woser, and the Rhine;
the Saxons were isolated in their own country; and though
a large and formidable Austrian army was being directed
towards Bohemia, its preparations were still incomplete, and
one only of its seven corps d'armie had passed beyond the
Moravian frontier. Sucli are the advantages which clear per-
ception, a fixed purpose, and a good military system give in
war over divided counsels, unsettled resolves, and faulty
organization; and it is a simple fact tliat, before an action
was fought, the promise of victory was all on the side of
Prussia.
Hostilities having been proclaimed on the 15th of .Tunc;,
the Prussian commanders set tlieir troops in motion at all
points for an offensive campaign.
3
I m
M -
m
On the 16tli of June the Army of the Elbe, abont 45,000
or 46,000 strong, took possession of tlie capital of Saxony,
driving before it the Saxon corps (Varmcc, compelled to retreat
at once into Bohemia; and by tlio 19th it firmly occupied
the region along the right bank of the Elbe, covering its
right Hank by the course of the river, and extending its left
towards Hinchfield and Rumburg. Meanwhile, the Lusatian,
or Ist army, composed of the 2d, 3d, and 4th coq)s, and of
one corps of cavalry, and numbering al)out 95,000 soldiers,
had been led by Prince Frederic Charles to the neighbour-
hood of Zittau and Marklissa ; and by the 21st it had come
into communication with the Army of the Elbe on the very
edge of the Bohemian frontier. A corresponding converging
movement had been made by the Crown Prince of Prussia,
and by the 22d, the Silesian, or 2d army, about 115,000
strong, and made up of the Guards, the 1st, the 5th, and
the 6th corps, with a single corps of cavalry also, had
advanced to the tract between Landshut and Glatz, its rear-
ward divisions, however, still stretching back to a short dis-
tance from Neisse, in order, probably, to deceive the enemy,
and to threaten Austrian Silesia till the last moment. Thus,
on the 22d of June, the three Prussian annies, approaching
each other on a narrowing front, had overrun Saxony and
reached the verge of the mountains that bound the north of
Bohemia; and a march or two would lead them through the
passes in the hills into the territory of the Austrian Empire.
They still, however, spread along an arc of 130 or 140 miles,
and held perfectly distinct lines. A large gap still existed
between the positions of the 1st and 2d Armies. Could they
venture in this situation to penetrate the mountain barrier
before them and to risk an encounter with a foe who, if
concentrated, would be able to fall upon their separate columns,
to meet and overwhelm them in detail, and to renew the
exploits of the youthful Bonaparte at Castiglione, Arcole, and
■ '
35 —
15,000
axony,
retreat
icupled
ing its
its left
isatian,
and of
loldiers,
"libouv-
itl come
he very
ivergins
Prussia,
115,000
ith, and
Iso, had
its vear-
hort dis-
enemy.
Thus,
ivoacliiug
tony and
north of
ough the
Empire.
40 miles,
I existed
nld they
|\ barrier
who, if
columns,
new the
ole, and
»g
Rivoli? Von Moltke, however, did not hesitate, and unitin;
the Army of the Elbe with the Ist, and directing the second
to close up on the right, he caused the two masses to enter
the defiles, and gave orders that they should gather towards
each other, from east and west, and concentrate within the
Bohemian frontier, if possible in the vicinity of Gitschin. The
Prussian armies, though widely separated, were directed to
combine in Bohemia, after a march through the hills at far
distances ; in the main because it had been nearly ascertained
that the Austrian army could not be collected upon an interior
line sufficiently soon to reach them when apart; and tliuugh
the invention of the field telegraph, which lessens the danger
of operations of this kind, and the great strength of the
Prussian armies which made it difficult to defeat either quickly,
may have had some influence on Von Moltke's judgment, the
true reason that he acted as he did was that he had grounds
to believe that his enemy's forces would not be able to unite
against him. His advance, therefore, which gave the Prussians
the great advantage of a speedy movement conducted upon
a variety of lines may be vindicated by well-known examples,
and was not a new and unheard-of operation; and we may
be quite sure he would not have tried it had the Austrian
army been drawn together and ready to strike in the north
of Bohemia. Nor was the Prussian march, however favourable
the conditions were under which it was made, exempt from the
serious dangers which must inevitably threaten an army that
endeavours, starting from distant points, to effect its junction
by separate lines, if at any time within reach of its enemy.
On the 23d, 24th, and 25th of June the Prussian armies
were in full march, the Elbe and 1st Armies making their
way through the passes in the Bohemian range to the Iser,
the 2d Army gathering towards the first, on a front between
the points of Liebau and Pastchkau. What, in the meantime,
had been the operations of their foe, as they were hazarding
1 ,.
1 ■'
i ]
I
I'-
fi::
w^
— Se-
this convergiug movement, which, had he been able to seize
the occasion, might have been made disastrous and even fatal ?
Austria had been arranging her Army of the North, as she
called it, since the beginning of April, if not three or four
weeks before ; but when the ill-fated but high-souled Benedek
assumed the command, on the 10th of June, its arrangements
were not nearly complete, and seven or eight days, at least,
were required to supply it with material absolutely needful,
and, in a word, to put it in marching order. Here we see
once more the superiority of the Prussian organization over
that of Austria; the Austrian army was not ready for the
field as soon as the Prussian by more than a week, though
the work of preparation had begun much earlier ; and to this
circumstance we must largely ascribe the discomfiture of the
Austrian projects, and the calamitous reverse which befell the
Empire. On the 15th of June, when war was declared, the
Army of the North, perhaps, numbered 240,000 men, including
noble reserves of cavalry, and an artillery force of high
renown ; but of the seven corps of which it was composed,
one only, the Ist, as we have seen, was stationed beyond the
Moravian frontier, while the remaining six, comprising the
10th corps, the 4tli, the 6th, the 3d, the 8th, and the 2d,
with almost all the divisions of horse, were cantoned far to
the south, in Moravia, between Zittau, OlmUtz, Wischau, and
Aiistcrlitz. The mass of Benedek's forces, therefore, was still
far away from the Bohemian range, the decisive scene on the
theatre of operations ; and even at this moment two or three
days were needed to complete its preparations, and to enable
it to proceed northwards. On the 17th and 18th of June the
Army of the North was at last set in motion ; and the ge-
neral scheme of Benedek's operations was in conformity with
the true rules of war, though even at this time it was hardly
feasible. The Austrian commander plainly foresaw the double
converging movement of the Prussians, and he resolved to
0 seize
i fatal?
as she
)r four
ienedek
;ement8
,t least,
needful,
we see
)n over
for the
though
1 to this
3 of the
(efell the
red, the
ncluding
of high
)mpo8ed,
yond the
sing the
the 2d,
far to
an, and
Iwas still
le on the
r three
I) enable
une the
the gc-
|ty with
hardly
double
ved to
, — 37 —
meet it in the manner in which it obviously should be met
in theory, to retard the separated enemy's advance, and then
to take a central position, to strike the Prussian columns as
they emerged from the hills, and to defeat them before they
could effect their junction. With this object in view, he di-
rected Clam Gallas, the chief of the 1st Austrian corps, which
was the most northward, to march and join the Saxon con-
tingent, already retreating upon Bohemia, and with this force,
about 45,000 strong, to hold steadily the line of the Iser,
while he prepared in person to move his six corps, and to
occupy positions behind the Elbe, between Josephstadt and
Koniginhof, with not less than 200,000 men. In this situa-
tion he would have placed his whole army just behind the
frontier, with perfect facilities of communication, and inter-
posing between the Prussians as they debouched into the
Bohemian plains. In principle, the project was worthy of a
great captain. But in war the execution of a plan is every-
thing, and at this moment it was scarcely possible, at least,
without extraordinary efforts, to carry out successfully Be-
nedek's design, for the bulk of his forces on the 18th of
June was further from the interior line in Bohemia, which
was his great object, than the Prussians were from the
point at which they might expect to unite their armies.
Thus it was not to be supposed that the Austrian commander
would be in time to break in between the Prussian masses
as they advanced; and it was the knowledge of this that
is the true justification of the Prussian leader's movement.
On the 18th of June and the following days the army of
Benedek was on its way from Moravia to the Bohemian
frontier. The General of 1796 and the enthusiastic warriors
he led might possibly have reached the space between the
Iser and the Elbe in sufficient time, but the Austrian move-
ments were far from rapid, owing, doubtless, as much to a
bad system as to any errors of the Oeneral-in-Chief. Mean-
):i
38
m.'
§m
i '''1
I!
t'/'in
■ h
while the 8axon8 had joined Clam Gallas, that commander
holding the line of the Iser from Jung Bunglau to Munchen-
gratz and Turnau, according to the orders of his chief, it
being expected that the main army would be close to the frontier
to support this wing before the enemy could seriously assail
it. By the evening of the 25th of June, however, one only
of Benedek's corps, the 10th, liad reached the Elbe at
Josephstadt, still a good way from the central position which
the Austrian commander hoped the occupy ; and liis remaining
five corps were far to the rear, filling the region between
Pardubitz and Policka, and unable lor several days to con-
centrate. By this time the Prussian Army of the Elbe, and the
Ist under Prince Frederic Charles, were not more than a march
from the Iscr, while that of the Crown Prince of Prussia, though
still five or six marches distant, was preparin^j; lor an advance to
the Elbe ; and thus, at this crisis, the Prussian lorces were better
united than those of Benedek ; he had scarcely a chance of reach-
ing the line, which was the mark and end of his efforts ; and
while the detachment of Clara Gallas was isolated, and almost
within the grasp of an enemy more than double in numbers,
the main Austrian army was in no condition to strike or to
put forth its strength against the Crown Prince of Prussia.
Such is the manner in which a good project may be marred
by miscalculation and slowness ; and thus, too, may military
movements wliich seem on the surface wild iind hazardous
be proved to be well-designed and correct.
On the 26th of June the Army of the Elbe came for the first
time in contact with the troops of Clam Gallas, and after a
few affairs of outposts, the Austria ns fell back behind the
Iser. Prince Frederic Charles being now fully in line, the
two Prussian armies, in great strength, assailed at once the
retiring enemy ; and having routed him with great loss at
Podal, Munchengratz, and Turnau made good their way to
Gitsehin on the 29th, the Austrians and Saxons, utterly beaten,
Ilia:!
39 —
hurrying in precipitate flight to the Elbe. Meanwhile the
array of the Crown Prince of Prussia had been advancing
towards the point of junction, and had also gained important
successes, though not wholly uncheckered by defeat. On the
27th of June part of his first corps became engaged with
the 10th of Benedek, which, as we have seen, was the most
forward, and it was driven back with some loss at Trautenau,
a failure which for a time made the position of the 2d Army
critical, and shows the danger of this kind of movement. On
the same day, however, the r>th Austrian corps was defeated at
Nachod by the Prussian 5th ; and as Benedek's lOtli, which
had advanced too far, was turned and afterwards routed by
the Prussian Guards, the Crown Prince was able to pursue
his movement, though in a somewhat disjointed manner.
Benedek, thus assailed by the enemy on his right, whose
advance he had hoped to frustrate, now endeavoured to draw
his forces together ; but his rearward divisions could not be
up in time, and he was only able to aid his defeated van-
guard with oiu! additional corps, the Hth. On the 28th this
fresh reinforcement was, with part of the Gth Austrian corps,
overthrown with ruinous loss at Skalitz, and driven headlong
across the Elbe ; and the 2d Pnissiai Army, low i'lvv. from
its foe, converged rapidly towards its supports, though evc^n
yet it was a lo ig way from (litschln. Meanwhile, tint luckless
Austrian commander, whose first line had been half destroyed,
called up his 4th, 2d, and '.U\ corps, the only ones which
remained intact; and rallying his defeatfid wings, tried to
form his army into onc! great mass, .-nnl still to make head
Mgainst his enemy.
In these operations we see the results of tin' tardiness of
the Austrian advance, of tlu^ (lislociiti(»n of Benedek's army,
and of the celerity of the Prussian luovenients. Clam Gallas
iiad been sent to the fro itier licc.iuse Benedek felt assured
that he would be in time to support his lieutenant, Imt the
— 40 -
II
Austrian commander was too late, and his detached witig had
been routed in detail. Again Benedek on the 25th of June,
had not reached his central position, and had not any two
of his corps near each other; a»id the consequence was that
he was not able to approach the line which he desired to
occupy, and when attacked by his active er.emy he was not
strong enough to resist his onset. He failed, in a word, to
meet the converging movement of tlie Prussians by concentra-
tion in time, and saw his divisions beaten in detail; and his
fine army was cruelly stricken before it could develope its
power.
On the :JOth of Juno, the Elbe and the 1st Army held
Gitschin in considerable force; but though connected with its
supports by cavalry, the 2d Army was fully 25 miles distant;
and as Benedek luiu by this time concentrated the greater
part of his forces; it is just possible that a chief like Napoleon
would have had a cliaMce of striking with success one of the
two masses opposed to him, so essentially critical, under any
conditions, were the separate movements of the Prussian
leaders. Benedek did not, however, make tiie attempt; in
fact, probably, his disheartened soldiers were not equal to an
effort of the kind ; and in the actual state of hie att'airs, his
most prudent course would, perhaps have been to have re-
treated behind the Elbe and gained some rest for his shaken
army, lie adopted, however, one of those half measures, so
characteristic of second-rate eommanders, which though it
gave him ujore nearly victory Ihan superficial persois suppose,
was, nevertheless, we believe, a mistake since he had defini-
tively renounced the offensive. The ranges of eminences
beyond the Elbe, between Jose])listadt and Kimiggrafz, |)resent
a series of strong i)osltlons, extending from Nt'clianitz on the
far left to Sadowa and Uacitz on the extreme right, and
covered by the streams of the Histritz and the Trotinka, and
Benedek resolved to make a stand here, aiul to risk the
11 I! I>
— 41
chances of a decisive encounter. He fell back to this grouud
OD the Ist of July, and gave ordei*s on the following day,
that his army should prepare for a general action. His left,
the Saxons, and .3d corps, with the 8tli as an immediate re-
serve, was posted from Nechanitz to Sadowa, holding Problus
and Neue Prim in great strength, and with the Bistritz along
its front; and his centre and right, the 4th and 2d corps,
with the 10th a little distance in the rear, were directed to
occupy the space between Sadowa by Lipa and Chlum to the
Elbe, the Trotinka protecting the extreme flank. The 6th
corps, with great masses of cavalry and artillery, formed the
general reserve and held a central position behind the line of
battle, ready, when necessary, to come to its aid. The whole
army, with the Saxon conti-igent, nothwithstanding the losses of
the preceding days, still numbered about 208,000 men.
While Benedck had been making these dispositions, the
Prussian armies had been advancing and finishing their converg-
ing movement. They had not, however, nearly effected their
junction l)y the 2d of July; and on that day they were spread
along an are al)out 30 miles in width, from the extreme right
at Smidar, to the far left at Gradlitz. The Prussian com-
manders were, in fact, unaware of lienedek's resolution to
stand and fight; and as they calculated that he would not
venture to risk a battle till he was behind the Kibe, they
were moving forward as quickly as possible, without con-
centrating their still parted forces. On the evening of the 2d,
however, Prince Frederic Charles became assured iliat a part,
;it least, of the Austrian army was between him and the Elbe,
and he resolved to attack it without delay, with the Army
of the Elbe and the 1st Army, stMuling at the same timci to
the Crown Prince of Prussia to reijuest the co-operation of
one of his corps. Had this project been carried out, about
130,000 men would have been engaged with 20H,0(»0 in a
4lefensive position of great strength; and most prol)ably the
_ 42 —
IP'
•i'
Crown Prince's detachment would not have sufficed to redress
the balance, especially as, being distant from the field, it
could not arrive until late in the day. This obviously faulty
design, however, was corrected by the remarkable man to
whom the arms of Prussia owe so much. Acting on true
principles, "^on Moltke gave orders that the Crown Prince
should aavance at once, not with one corps but with his
whole arm.y, to give aid to Prince Frederic Charles; and he
ckVu';. i that, by a vigorous effort, tlie Crown Prince would
strike the Austrian right in sufficient time to insure victory.
This was the best move tliat could possibly be made; yet as
the army of the Crown Prince was fully 15 miles from Sa-
dowa, witli I difficult and intricate country between, and as
the order cuiilu not rrach him until the early morning of the
.3d, the iper ti)a was far from certain; and Von Moltke
would hardly iia.n "isked so much, had any other course
be*"u miw opt' to h':>. It deserves also especial notice that
the momentous smuuioH' f. tlie Crown Prince was intrusted
to a single aide-de-camp only, a mistake which has often cost
armies dear, and which proves that even the Prussian Staff
is not incapable of serious oversights.
Prince Frederic Cliarh's attacked Benedek with part of the
Elbe and Ist Army in the early forenoon of the 3d of July;
but though the Bistritz was at last forced and the woods
around Sadowa were won, the main Austrian line resisted
with success, and after noon the engagement began to wear
an ominous look for the Prussians. The powerful Austrian
artillery proved more than a match for the Prussian batteries,
which were not served as in 1870; the power of the needle-
gun was comparatively unfelt in the thick cover which lined
the positicm; and, notwithstanding its heroic efforts, the as-
sailants' left wing might have been crushed, had Henedek
boldly assumed the offensive with the great superiority of
force at his command. The favourable moment was, however,
— 43 —
lost; and before long an apparition on the Austrian right
decisively turned the scale of fortune. The Crown Prince of
Prussia had set his army in motion with remarkable energy;
and his troops, straining every nerve to advance, reached the
neighbourhood of the field about 3 o'clock, and drew off the
weight that oppressed their hard tried comrades. A gap existed
now in Benedek's line, for the 4th and 2d Austrian Corps
had taken a position in front of that assigned to them, and
had besides inclined to their left, in order to press Prince
Frederic Charles; and Chlum, the key of the Austrian right
was brilliantly seized by the Prussian Guards, while their
supports moved forward on all sides to their aid. The Austrian
commander, completely surprised, in vain called upon his
numerous reserves to dislodge their rapidly increasing foes;
and as the pressure on his right became overwhelming, the
whole Austrian line by degrees gave way, and, abandoning
from Nechanitz to the Elbe the positions they had held in
the morning, rolled beaten away from the blood-stained field.
The cavalry and artillery, however, covered the retreat with
lieroic devotion ; and though a number of guns were captured,
iind its losses in men and material were great, the Austrian
army crossed the Elbe safely, nor was the pursuit of its foe
vigorous.
The victory of Sadowa was the result of the arrival on
the field of the Crown Prince of Prussia, an event which,
like Bluchcr's march on Waterloo, threw an overwhelming
force on the enemy's Hank, and before long decided the fate
of the day. The junction of the Prussian armies, however, in
sufficient time was by no means assured; in fact, Benedek
might have destroyed the left wing of Prince Frederic Charles
before the 2d Army came up ; and had this occurred the
ultimate issue would have been different on the page of
history. This proves how hazardous at last became the
operations of the Prussian leaders; their dividend armies never
m
I
l-i,;.4,
:««
i:1;f:.:
(III'
mrtf
— 44 —
united until actually upon the field ; and though their general
movements were fine, the unexpected stand of the Atistrian
commander exposed their armies to no little peril. The plan
of Prince Frederic Charles, evidently founded on an in-
accurate notion of Benedek's strength, was, it is hardly
necessary to point out, a mistake; and had it been adopted,
it is difficult to see how the Prussians could have escaped
defeat.
Viewed as a whole, the battle bears a marked resemblance
to the now half-forgotten struggle at Bautzen ; but, owing to
what was almost a surprise, the Prussian operations do not
disclose the precision and depth of Napoleon's manoeuvres;
and, strategically, the advance of Ney was more thoroughly
and surely planned than the march on Chlum.
Benedek probably, ought not to have fought at Sadowa at
all after the severe defeats of the preceding days ; he would
have found better positions of defence had he retreated behind
the Elbe and its fortresses, and though the stand he made
at Sadowa assuredly gave him a chance of victory, this is no
proof his decision was correct. His dispositions for the battle
itself contemplated only a passive defence, a system always
to be condemned ; and, in consequence, he certainly lost, as in
the case of Bazaine at Gravelotte, an opportunity of crushing
the Prussian left wing.
The Austrian chief, subduing ill-fortune, effected his retreat
with vigour and skill.
In 1866, as on other occasions, the Austrian commanders
gave signal proof of qualities for which they have been often
famous, tenacity and perseverance in the hour of disaster.
It is almost useless to refer to the secondary operations in
the Western theatre, for they had little influence on the final
result ; and yet they are not without much interest, for they
strikingly illustrate the superiority which a small force boldly
— 45 —
and ably directed may acquire over the far more numerous,
but ill-organized and ill-commanded levies of a faint-hearted
and weak coalition.
The issue was due to careful preparation, to an organiza-
tion for war which, under favourable conditions, sent masses
of warriors into the field with a celerity never before witnessed,
and to scientific and well-ordered strategy, improved tactics,
and superior weapons. In the plan of campaign of the
Prussian chiefs and in the general distribution of their forces
we see deep calculation and insight ; the march of their
armies into Bohemia, though hazardous, was justified by the
rules of their art ; and the rapidity and ease of the Prussian
movements and the power of the fire of the Prussian infantry
were important elements in deciding the contest. The campaign
also showed that operations on distinct lines may be less
liable to objection than they formerly were, the field telegraph
having in some degree united even widely-divided corps, and
armies now being so large that it is difticult to treat them
quickly in detail; and it showed also that modes of tactics
in use in the days of Napoleon and Wellington must be
abandoned, and a complete change effected. It is, however,
a mistake, to imagine that this campaign or that of 1870
has wrought a revolution in military science, or in the leading
principles of the terrible art v/hich founds and destroys Em-
pires. It is sheer ignorance to say, as some have said, that
the Prussian array is not essentially a standing army in the
true sense of the word ; and it is as ludicrous to argue that
the Prussian commanders have " invented a novel method
of strategy" as it was to insist tiiat tlic results of Rosbach
and Leuthen were caused by " the obliquo order " of Frederick
the Great, or that of Austerlitz by " the central attack " of
Napoleon. Not less idle is the supposition that tlie possession
(»f interior lines of operation has been found to be of no ad-
vantage, .and that one of the great objects of strategic man-
46 —
I'lri
It.!;. ,;■
III
CBUvres need no longer be sought in modern warfare. Un-
doubtedly the value of interior lines has diminished as armies
have so greatly increased ; it would be almost impossible to
play the magnificent game of 1796 with 200,000 men against
400,000, instead of 40,000 against 80,000; but this was
pointed out long ago by Jomini, and was illustrated in the
campaign of Leipsic. The war of 1866, however, itself shows
that this position is still of capital importance ; it was because
Benedek would almost certainly be unable to gain an interior
line that the Prussians advanced in the way they did ; in the
operations before Sadowa we see how perilous it may be to
attack a commander who holds an interior line, even when
its advantage lias been almost lost; and Falkenstein's move-
ments against the Southern Germans, like those of Lee in
1862-3, prove what a good General on interior lines can
eflfect against incapable foes.
Werder's dash at Bourbaki at Villersexel and march from
Vesoul to the Lisaine are fine specimens of daring generalship,
though not to be cited as military precedents ; but there is
no doubt that he was for some days in danger, wretched as
Bourbaki's enterprise was as a general strategic conception.
Manteuffel, with the 7th and 2d Corps, bore down rapidly
on Bourbaki's fiank, and wlien informed of Werder's success
resolved to close on the Frenchman's rear, and cut him oft'
from his retreat southwards, and finally, the German chiefs
enclosed in their net their luckless victims, and the French
Army was left no choice but to surrender or cross the Swiss
frontier. These decisive operations strikingly illustrate the
great advantage of the telegraph in modern war, for Maunteff'el
and Werder, though widely separated and operating on distinct
lines, were always in communication with each other; and
in this way, certainly, one of the chief objections made
formerly to manoeuvres of this kind is, to a great extent,
ii:l:
ill
'I
it' if:
— 47 —
removed or diminished. Still it is impossible to deny that
such attacks are full of danger, and likely to fail against a
resolute foe in a central position; it remains to be seen
whether a mechanical change will wholly efface the lessons
of the past; and attempts to surround a large army are
only likely to succeed when it has lost confidence in itself
and its chiefs. As it was, poor as was the composition of
Bourbaki's improvised force, and pitiable as its condition
was when it took refuge under the guns of Besangon, it
might not improbably have effected its escape, had it marched
directly by Auxonne on Dijon.
All reasoning from facts, all experience of the late war,
tends to prove that a trained army, properly covered, either
naturally or artificially, properly armed and supplied with
ammunition, is unassailable in front with any hope of success.
So long as the French regular anny existed it never once
failed to meet and hold back a front attack until its flank
was turned. The author of the Tactical Retrospect of 1866
tells how the fire of a defending force causes the attacking
force to stream naturally towai'ds the flanks. With later
experience before us we may say that what the troops did
by instinct was the right thing to do, and must in future
be done systematically and by order of the Generals. Von
Moltke, in an article publishea by the MilWlr Wochen-Blatt,
in July, 1865, says that a line of troops with open ground
in front of them can defend themselves against any front
attack and be pretty sure of success. On the other hand,
"As the chance of a front attack being successful becomes
smaller so much the more certain is it that the enemy will
direct his attention to the flanks, and so much the more
important does it become that these should be well protected."
His words have been verified in every battle between armies
provided with breechloaders, and it seems impossible to
avoid the conclusion that flank attacks supersede all others
■ ":-,'S ?'
I*
i:
— 48 —
for the real decision of battles. Front attacks must be made^
of course, to hold the enemy fast, and we now come to a
very important conclusion based upon the rapidity of fire
from breechloaders. If an enemy attacks us boldly in front
and we reply by a simple defence, it is almost impossible to
know his strength, or to be sure that he is not very loeak in
front and massing his troops on our flanks. For, if an equal
force can hold its ground with ease against front atts in
inferior one can make the saqie impression for a certai.. ^.ime
and produce an effect more than double its apparent numbers
by acting aggressively. Such work was actually done frequently
in 1870. Take, for example, the battle of Mars-la-Tour. The
object of the Prussians was to hold Baxaine fast and prevent
him from making his escape from Metz. The third Corps
was the first to arrive in contact with the French Army.
There was no hesitation or doubt about its conduct, though
the French were immensely superior in strength. It laid hold
of Bazaine's army like a bull dog, and never ceased its
apparently reckless attacks, though perfectly certain ' "^ to
succeed in driving the enemy back. It held him fa id
though it lost nearly 7,00(^ men, maintained its position and
its hold upon the enemy until supported by the successive
arrivals of other corps. It is now a golden rule with the
Prussians never to yield an inch of ground, because once
yielded it is so hard to regain it. It is recognized that an
inferior force in position can hold its own for a long time
against front attack — and for this reason, they are not afraid
of weakening their front in presence of the enemy, so only
that they can use the troops taken away for tlie purpose of
a flank attack.
Closely allied with the question of front or flank attack is
that of a system of offensive or defensive tactics. There can
be no doubt that almost all the German writers support the
fell
— 49
lick is
can
It the
principle of active aggression in war. Yet we find an excellent
example of their defensive fighting when Bourbaki attempted
to raise the siege of Belfort and make a diversion in the
East to assist Chanzy in his march upon Paris. Of course,
the whole strategic plan of this movement was ridiculous,
but that has nothing to do with the fact that the Germans,
very inferior in force, intrenched and defended themselves for
three days against all the efforts of Bourbaki's superior
army — superior, that is, in numbers, not in fighting quality.
But on this occasion the Germans were only doing on a
large scale what can be done on a small one. They were
only holding their own to give time for the flank and rear
attack of reinforcements hurried down to their support from
the North.
No army can limit itself to the defensive. Even on the
detensive, all that now remains in the power of the com-
mander is to determine the moment at which he shall abandon
his absolute inaction, and trust, as he launches his troops
into counter attack, to their readiness to conform, and their
capacity for conforming, to the essence of his instructions.
The answer to the tactical question of oflTence or defence is
perfectly simple, though its practical application in war is more
complicated than ever. If two thoroughly good Generals were
placed opposite to each other in command of troops, equal in
all respects as to marching and fighting powers, we believe that
both of them would act partly defensively, and partly aggres-
sively. Everything else being equal, superior information as to
the movements of the adversary would carry the day. Let us
suppose, then, that both armies are being extended eastwards,
in the endeavour to turn, one the right flank the other the
left of the opposing force. We will suppose that A discovers
the design of his opponent B. He will neither continue his
own movement towards that flank, because it would be useless,
4
warn
- 50 —
:r,i.
nor will he make a decisive centre attack, because it would
be both vain and costly; but he will avail himself of the
defensive power of modem weapons by placing a detachment,
inferior, perhaps, to the force with which the enemy is
attempting to outflank him, in a position where it can defend
itself vigorously and for a long time against the flanking force
of the enemy. At the same time, he will himself attack the
other flank of B's army, not hesitatiug to weaken his centre
for the purpose. His attack may, perhaps, be answered in a
similar manner by the enemy, if the latter obtains proper
information. Indeed, we have as yet no experience of what
will happen when two armies, equally trained, armed, and
commanded, meet on the field of battle. If tho troops be
animated with the same antagonistic spirit of race which
possessed the French and Germans during the late war, we
can well conceive that the result may be bloodier than that
of any action yet known to history. There may, evidently,
be special occasions when a distinct offensive or defensive
part must be played, as with Alvensleben's corps at Mars-la-
Tour or the Germans near Belfort when attacked by Bour-
baki ; but, as a rule, when the forces are anything like equal,
we believe there must be both attack and defence on either
side. Two great powers — one moral, the other intellectual —
are always on the side of the assailant. The spirits of men
rise with the sensation of attacking. An enemy on the defen-
sive seems by that very defensive action to be hiding, and
therefore inferior in numbers or courage, and the assailants
feel that they are making the battle, or at least giving its
tone. The other power is that of actually carrying out your
own plans while checking the development of those of the
enemy. Both of these are very strong in favour of the tittack,
and we may add a third, which springs out of them If
attacked, you know not what is behind tlie enemy's first
arriving troops; if you attack, you soon find out the weak
— 51
points of his harness. Defence, to be of any value, must at
some period or another be changed into counter attack.
No greater proofs of the difficulty of front attack could be
cited than the blockades of Metz and Paris, and the battle
of Sedan. In these three cases the action of the Germans was
eminently aggressive to begin with. All their marching powers,
all their courage and aggressive faculty were used at first,
and only by means of their aggressive action vigorously
carried out for days together did they succeed in placing
themselves in that strategically offensive, but tactically defen-
sive, position where the enemy must attack them in frontj
for there was no flank to attack.
The vital necessity is that, above all things, rxn army
should be fed well and able to move fast. It seems quite out
of the question to supply a large army entirely from its base.
The Prussians hold that such a system would be utterly im-
possible. The French are of the same opinion, and other
nations must imitate them or be left behind in a campaign.
The three most necessary articles are food, including to-
bacco, ammunition and boots. The experienced soldier will
carry any additional weight rather than go hungry.
The Prussian Etappen Department, acting upon regulations
made in 1867, after the experience of the Bohemian campaign,
includes among its duties much more than accumulating stores
and supplying them to the fighting forces. It is responsible
for the condition and the safety of all the means of communi-
cation between the armies in the field and the country whence
they originally marched.
At the head stands an "Inspector-General," holding the
rank of General of Division. He is always in direct communi-
cation both with the Commander of the Army and the
Minister of War, who remains behind. He has nothing what-
ever to do with the strategical march of the various corps
■11
•ss^
■HH
H— HHB^BB
mi
;i: .111:
)'■: ^'ii
il''''i!l;i
M' iiill'i
- 52 -
until they unite under one command. All that is the business
of the Corps Etappen Departments and of the wonderful
district organization; but the Inspector-General takes them
up at the point of concentration, and begins even before they
arrive to form his magazines and depots, which are to extend
in a chain from the base of operations to the army in the
field, no matter how far it may march. As the army advances
he follows it, always one or two days' marches in rear, but
in constant communication with its Commander, under whose
orders he acts, being kept acquainted with his councils. He
fixes each day the head of his chief Etappen line, taking
care that it is within reach of the transport belonging to
each corps, and they shall find there whatever they may
need; that the postal and telegraphic communication is kept
up regularly, and that he has troops enough with him —
generally Landwehr — to assure the safety of the roads with-
out the assistance of a single man from the fighting corps.
He has little to do with details of execution, only watching
carefully that all the duties of his subordinate officers are
performed with energy and intelligence. He has under him : —
1. A Chief of the Staff, whose title indicates his duties.
2. Three Adjutants; the first responsible for the military
organization, the guards of the roads, the correspondence
with the commander of the army, and all questions relating
to the personnel of the department. The second watches the
position of the various corps and detachments, takes cliarge
of their field-states and reports, attends to transports, convoys,
prisoners, and horses. The third performs the duties of a
superior aide-de-camp. All these attend to the oflUce work,
keep the journal, &c.
3. An Offlcer of Gendarmes directing the provost duties.
4. An Auditor responsible for all affairs of justice.
53
usiness
nderful
i them
re they
extend
in the
ivanceft
ar, but
f whose
Lis. He
taking
iging to
ey may
is kept
I him —
ds with-
g corps.
Aratching
icers are
him : —
uties.
military
londence
relating
Iches the
charge
onvoys,
es of a
e work,
luties.
5. An Officer of Artillery. His business is with everything
relating to arms. He is in charge of the parks and ammunition
columns, establishes workshops, collects arms, &c., from battle-
fields, and is generally responsible for the supply of military
material and all repairs too heavy to be executed by the
artificers of regiments and batteries. He has a considerable
staff of soldiers and workmen under him, and full power to
make requisitions for whatever he wants.
6. An Officer of Engineers, who directs and carries out all
duties relating to construction or demolition of field works,
roads, railways, bridges, barracks, huts, telegraphs, provisional
hospitals, and other works of the same kind.
7. A Director of Railways, who must be fully competent to
act as manager of a line with all its branches, as well as to
superintend and direct the engineering part of the work. He
has a large staff under him, and is responsible that linos
destroyed by the enemy arc in working order as soon as
possible. If he wants help, he makes requisitions through the
medium of the Inspector-General for men, civil or military,
or for material. The cost of repairing a line in the, enemy's
territory is, with the usual Prussian economy, paid out of
requisitions made upon the people. When the lines are restored,
the Director of Railways works them through commissions
appointed under his direction. As far as can be, the old
servants of the line arc made to work it under strict super-
vision. A regular railway guide, a sort of comprehensible
Bradshaw on a small scale, is printed, but room is left for
special trains conveying stores and reinforcements to the
array, damaged material, and sick and wounded. There is a
system of regulations imposing punishments touching purse
or person on the inhabitants of the district in case of damage
to the line.
H. A Director of Telegraphs, lie performs with regard t(»
the telegraphs the same functions as wo have just described
P
tas^
mm
— 54 —
in relation to railways. Whenever the army rests for a while,
each corps is placed in telegraphic communication with the
getieral head-quarters, and through them with the Fatherland
and the world. In this case the personnel of the field tele-
graphs falls temporally into the hands of the general Director.
9. A Director of Posts, who takes up the postal work
between the nearest railway station and the army or within
a day's march of it, according to circumstances. The duty
of sending letters and parcels from Germany, as far as the
railways can carry them, belongs to a central administration
common to all the armies in the field. The Director of Posts
for the army establishes relays on ail the roads, requisitioning
horses for the purpose. The one day's journey between the
corps .and the Etappen Post Director is managed by the field
posts.
10. An Etappen Intendant. The work of this officer is one
of very great difficulty. He has not only to secure the pro-
visioning of all the Etappen employes, but to be always
ready to supply to the army any provisions or clothing of
which it may stand in need for the moment. For this purpose
he has to establish magazines at the most important places,
and to sweep the whole country round for contributions. The
system of requisition is well known to be the backbone of
Prussian supply.
It would be a great mistake to suppose that the railways
in an enemy's country can be entirely trusted to as in peace
manoBUvros for the supply of an army.
In an enemy's country the railways arc always in danger
of being cut. The trains must therefore move slowly. Further-
more, besides empty carriages returning, there are frequent
and sudden calls made upon the railway for conveyance of
wounded. The result is that not the railways but the roads
are still regarded as the main arteries through which must
flow the life-giving requisites of the array.
— 55 —
With regard to the great staff of life — hread, the Prussian
instructions of 1870 foresee that when the army is making
rapid marches it cannot well employ its field ovens. In such
a case the Etappen Intendant has to pursue it with three
sections of bakeries, one of which only is at any given
moment actually supplying bread to the troops. It is supposed
that to establish bakeries sufficient for a large army and to
set them fairly going requires three days. For another three
days the section bakes as much bread as possible and sends
it on to the army, it then breaks up and spends three days
in catching its army again. We have thus three periods of
time during each of which one section is installing itself
close behind the army. Another further back is baking bread,
as fast as it can, while the third is on its road to rejoin the
anny.
The Etappen Intendant supplies hospitals as well as marching
troops with food and clothing, and takes care of all the love
gifts for the sick sent from the far off German home.
11. An Etappen Surgeon-General. His duty is to establish
all the necessary hospitals in rear of the army, to arrange
with the commissions all the transport and evacuation of the
wounded. He directs the reserve of ambulances and supplies
assistance, voluntary or otherwise, to the army when required.
He has to see to the comfort and repose of the wounded sent
from the front, and establishes resting places as well as con-
valescent hospitals where lightly wounded or over-fatigued
men are received, carefully tended, and when sound again
sent back to their corps.
12. A veterinary surgeon, who lias to care for the horses
just as the Surgeon-General has for the men. The only point
worth special notice is that there are no such curious animals
as dismounted cavalry with the Prussian army in the field.
If there are spare men after battles or from any other cause,
they are supplied with horses from the Etappen Department,
m
"H
I
— 56 —
wte
11
4
i:
11
which, on the other hand, takes charge of any horses becom-
ing useless to the army by reason of deficiency of men.
So far we have spoken only of the General Etappen De-
partment of the army, but all the organization of this De-
partment would fail in two essential particulars were it not
supplemented by another organization carrying out the prin-
ciple of decentralization, furnishing the blood which, as we
have said, flows along the main artery, and then distributing
it to the various members — the corps d'armee. This second or-
ganization is so complete in itself that it can at any time be
detached from the Etappen Department of the army and work
the communications and supply of each corps separately. We
must never lose sight of the fact that the whole force of the
German organization lies in the district corps system. From
the districts come the various articles required by their own
corps and not to be found in the enemy'" ountry. For the
collection and final distribution of these stores every corps
has an Etappen system exactly analogous to that of the Army
Etappen Department, only the employh are each one step
lower in rank than the corresponding functionaries of the army.
For instance, the Corps Etappen Inspector has the rank of a
commander of a regiment and has two adjutants. When the
dift'erent corps are acting together he remains with the Army
Inspector and takes orders from him, but if the corps is se-
parated from the others, he acts independently, and falls at
once under the orders of the corps commander — under his
orders most distinctly. The only body he " controls " is his
own department ; and there is no such thing as the commander
of an army or corps asking his Etappen Inspectors, "Can
you provide the means to enable me to perform the operation
I have in view V " He simply says, " I am going to march or
fight a battle, you must be prepared for certain probable con-
tingencies and for others not so probable. You must anticipate
the requirements of the army according to your knowledge
— 57
[)ecom-
n.
en De-
lia De-
it not
B prin-
as we
[•ibuting
lond or-
time be
ftd work
ely. We
B of the
. From
leir own
For the
ry corps
he Army
one step
he army,
ank of a
^hen the
le Army
ps is se-
falls at
nder his
is his
mmandcr
•s, "Can
operation
march or
able con-
mticipate
nowledge
and past experience. If I want anything take care that it
can be supplied. » Beyond watchfulness not to be cut oflf
from his communications the General has no further anxiety
or trouble about them. That care falls upon the Etappen
Inspector, who has even the troops necessary to guard his
roads and railways against the attacks of any small bodies
of the enemy. He has force enough to overawe the occupied
territory, to perform the duties of police throughout it, and
to establish garrisons, small, perhaps, but enough conside-
ring that his own friends are in front of him. Thus the fur-
ther the armies penetrate into an enemy's counti^ the larger
becomes his command, which, confined at first to the few
men necessary to perform duties at head-quarters, grows
by being fed from home till whole provinces are covered
with his soldiers and agents, while the commander of the
army need never so much as look over his shoulder to see
that all is right in rear.
It is by no means clear that the Prussian system of « mo-
bilization » in certain conditions would not prove faulty and
even dangerous.
MacMahon had placed the French right wing in position
at Woerth, and trusting to the support of De Failly, about a
march distant with the 5^'' French Corps, awaited the attack
with perfect confidence. The position of the Marshal was
very strong, but it admitted of a passive defence only, Mac-
Mahon like all the Imperial chiefs having adopted a system
in all respects opposed to the traditions of the French Army.
From a tactical point of view, the French army occupied
the ideal of a defensive position ; but it had the disadvan-
tages common to so-called unassailable positions.... First,
the position was deficient in issues to the front ; an attack
upon it might in the worst case be repulsed, but a counter
/
^
i!
!i'i
III;
I "rill I
■ ' (fi!'"
~ 58 —
attack to the front was scarcely to be feared.... Secondly, the
flanks were not supported. His right flank was more or less
in the air ; his left rested on that most doubtful of all points
of support to wings — a wood.
The French Army has seldom shown more heroism than
on the day of Woerth. MacMahon, unaided by De Failly, had
not five whole Divisions on the field, not more than 48,000
men ; yet with this comparatively small force he successfully
baffled for many hours the attacks of nearly three German
Corps, not less certainly than 90,000 strong, and even had a
marked advantage for a time. The defects, however, of a
system of passive defence revealed themselves as the day
wore on ; and when the German reserves came up, not far
from two additional Corps, it became possible to turn both
his flanks and to overwhelm him with irresistible numbers.
If MacMahon had safely crossed the Meuse, he would have
been intercepted by the Grown Prince of Saxony, and in that
event the whole Third Army would have assuredly closed
on his rear, and the catastrophe of Sedan would have hap-
pened a few leagues to the east or south of Montmedy. In
fact, under existing circumstances, MacMahon's march was
a ruinous error, contrary to the simplest principles of the
art of war ; and no one knew this better than the Marshal
himself, who, as early as the morning of the 27"> of August,
desired to abandon his fatal course, and to fall back by the
Oise on Paris.
A glance at the map will show how insane was the con-
ception of making an army describe a vast semicircle of
which the Crown Prince of Prussia held the centre with
180,000 men, and at the end to encounter in succession the
Crown Prince of Saxony, with an army of 70,000 men, and
the two armies of Prince Frederick Charles, 200,000 strong,
at Metz.
The head of the German armies, when apprised of the
!■:
— 50 —
lof the
results of the battle of the 14"» of August, addressed himself,
without hesitation or delay, to the means of turning them to
the best advantage. Though not aware of the exact facts, he
felt assured that the Army of the Rhine would now endea-
vour to escape from Metz ; and he thought it probable that
he should be able to baffle its leader's assumed projects. He
did not yet entertain a hope of hemming Bazaine in on the
Lorraine fortress, but he believed that it was now in his
power to separate him finally from MacMahon ; and, adhe-
ring steadily to his original design, he prepared to cut him
off from Chalons and Paris, and, if possible, crush him on
his line of retreat.
According, therefore, to this project, the 3<* Army conti-
nued its march, and it attained the line of Toul and Nancy
by the 16"* of August, stretching thence backward beyond
Luneville. Meanwhile the movement upon the Moselle was
accelerated in every possible way ; and while the rearward
corps of the 1*' and 2** Armies were still held on the eastern
bank, the vanguard was hastened across the river, with ge-
neral directions to the commanders to push towards the
roads from Metz to Verdun, and to operate at their own dis-
cretion, but with the greatest possible speed. These orders
were executed with energetic zeal, and by the evening of
the 45**» of August the 3«* and lO'^ Corps of the 2^ Army had
made their way over the river in force, preceded by two di-
visions of Cavalry, while the 9^^ Corps and part of the S^'' of
the 1*' Army were near the stream in the space between the
Moselle and the Seille. By these dispositions a German
force was placed on the westward bank of the Moselle,
within reach of the roads from Metz to Verdun; and it
might be expected to prove sufficient to intercept stray
columns on this line, and to form the head of a great pur-
suit northwards. The mass, however, of the 1*' andS** Armies
was still far away on the eastern bank ; the 7'*» and !«' Corps
I
— 60 —
if: I
to the south-east of Metz ; the Guards, the 4"', the IS'*", and
the 2"* Corps extending from Dieulouard to Herny, and the-
refore at a very great distance ; and accordingly the divisions
on the western bank could not expect support if at once as-
sailed, and were to a considerable extent isolated. A glance
at the map, indeed, shows that these bodies were very far
apart, to resist the efforts of a powerful army that should
endeavour to march from Metz on Verdun. The cavalry only
had approached the Verdun roads ; the lO^h Corps was many
miles away ; and so, also, were the 9'h and S"" ; and the 3<*
alone was in real proximity. It is evident, therefore, that the
German chiefs, according to ordinary military rules, had
not barred the retreat of the Army of the Rhine on the line
leading from Metz to Verdun, much less on any of the routes
northward ; in fact, their objects had been different ; and,
should Bazaine attack in force on the 16»i', he would have
many chances in his favour.
Such were the dispositions of the Germans, carried out
with conspicuous vigour and rapidity, yet not perfectly in
accord with the facts, and not without danger, had the French
had a real leader. The whole of these movements had in
view the pursuit of Bazaine north of Verdun, and did not
contemplate his army being in force on the roads between
Metz and that place ; for, in that event, the Marshal would
have a great preponderance of strength on his side. The fact
affords a new illustration of the important truth that Gene-
rals, often obliged to act on incorrect data, f"" into what,
judged by the event, are errors, however excellent their
plans in the main may be. While the German hosts had thus
been advancing across the Moselle by a wide sweep round
Metz, Bazaine had been endeavouring to get his Army free
from the great fortress, and thence to effect his retreat west-
ward. Having lost the precious day of the 13"> of August in
halting between opposing schemes, he had fought a battle
|I:V: ,
— 61 —
on the 14"", which had led only to disastrous delay ; and the
probability that he would make his escape without molesta-
tion on the part of his foe was growing fainter from hour to
hour. Yet it is now certain, as these papers prove, that he
had still the means of making his retreat ; nay, fortune was
about to give him a chance which a great soldier would,
perhaps, have made productive of very fruitful results. On
the afternoon of the 14'*', and throughout the 15'*", the retro-
grade movement of the French went on, and by the evening
of the last-named day the 1^ and &^ Corps and the Imperial
Guard were concentrated beyond Gravelotte, on the uplands
which spread around the villages of Vionville, Rezonville,
and Mars-la-Tour. The 3"^ and 4''' Corps had, meanwhile, de-
filed through Metz and crossed the Moselle ; but these divi-
sions of the Army of the Rhine, having been those chiefly
engaged at Borny, were fully twelve hours behind their
comrades, and it was not until the morning of the 16'*> that
they had taken their positions north of Gravelotte, near
Villers-les-Bois, Marcel, and Doncourt. There can be little
doubt that, viewed in the abstract, this movement had not
been well conducted ; and , as to retreat and avoid the Ger-
mans should have been the principal aim of the Marshal, he
ought to have divided his columns, and have sent one de-
tachment by the road to Briey, and so have made his march
more easy and rapid. But, in the actual position of affairs,
the Army of the Rhine was very well placed ; nay, its chief
had a real opportunity which he might have turned to great
account. Five French corps, fully 110,000 men, were now
gathered within a small space and perfectly in communica-
tion with each other along the direct roads from Metz to
Verdun ; and they still formed a magnificent force, equal, if
well directed, to the most gallant efforts. This great Army,
therefore, was on a line on which Von Moltke did not expect
it in anything like imposing numbers, and which he had
— 62 —
not even nearly barred ; and was it to be arrested in a deci-
sive movement by the comparatively feeble and divided foes
who alone could throw themselves across its path ? Were a
few thousand horsemen and the 3^ German Corps, resting
on supports at a great distance, to paralyze Bazaine and his
dense masses ? Nay, had he not the means of making his
enemy suffer heavily in his advanced position, of attacking
him with largely superior forces, and of opening triumphantly
his way to the Meuse after a struggle which ought to have
given him victory '? No candid student of war will deny that
the French Marshal had, on the morning of the IG"*, a gol-
den occasion which a true leader would not have allowed
to pass unimproved away.
These operations on both sides led to the great battle of
Mars-la-Tour, the most remarkable in the whole campaign.
In the early morning of the i&^ of August the advanced
guard of the German cavalry, which had reached the great
road from Metz to Verdun, about Tronville and Mars-la-
Tour, surprised and drove in the French outposts, and ere
long had spread in a wide circle to reconnoitre the French
position. In a short time the two Divisions of the 3«* Corps
appeared on the field, and falling on the corps of Frossard,
defeated at Forbach, they forced the enemy back a long dis-
tance, and captured the two villages of Vionville and Flavi-
^ny, which gave them important points of vantage. The 6**'
French Corps now came into line, and had it put forth its
whole strength and been sustained, as it might have been,
by the 2^ and the Imperial Guard, the united mass must
have broken through and through the Germans, and crushed
them. But Bazaine obstinately clung to the belief that he
would be assailed in flank and rear by enemies advnnr.inp-
from across the Moselle through the woods n
that covered his left, and conceived th-^* f«'' ..«
object should be to keep up his commum jus .. Me ,
II! ii'i !"■■,. . ■:'
Ill il,
— 63 —
• »
^nd, accordingly, he permitted a part only of the B"* Corps
to take part in the fight, and, withdrawing the 2<* Corps
from the field, massed it w'*h the Guard and the rest of the
4'*' in strong positions around Gravelotte, thus removing
from the struggle the very forces which, if properly used,
ought to have given him victory, in order to meet a fancied
danger ! The 6'*' French Corps gained some slight success.
By this time it was 3 o'clock, the struggle which the French
Marshal ought to have made a victory being quite undecided.
At the news that its comrades were engaged, the 10'*» Ger-
man Corps was pushed to the field by Prince Frederick
€harles.
Meanwhile, however, the 3** and 4**> French Corps had
been summoned by Bazaine to the fray ; and these detach-
ments, which, being near at hand, ought to have been in
line in the forenoon, and to have literally annihilated the
3** Corps, were in time to confront the newly-arrived enemy.
The battle now spread far away eastward, and the villages
of Mars-la-Tour, of Tronville, and Bruville were the theatre
of a stern encounter, in which, however, the prepondera-
ting force of ihe French gave them a marked advantage.
But here, again, the General-in-Chief interposed in the most
disastrous manner ; the leaders of the 3^ and 4"' Corps re-
ceived positive orders to hold their ground only. Prince
Frederick Charles, who had arrived on the field, employed
his reserves to the last man. Meanwhile the attack which
Bazaine had dreaded many hours before it could have oc-
curred, had been developed to a certain extent, and parts
of the 8"» and O'^ German Corps, marched to the scene of
action with great rapidity, began to menace his left flank
from Gorze and the adjoining district. Tiiis caused the Mar-
shal to draw in his line, and night ended a desperate battle.
The !»', the 3'', and the 4"' French Corps showed themselves
worthy of their old renown ; and the French cavalry, though
11^
i
m
''M I
■M
I!)
/:•
64
i<; ■■.'■'; J I
thrown away, as at WcBrth, against unbroken infantry, dis-
played splendid though fruitless valour.
Twice on the IG"*, Bazaine let victory elude his grasp; and,
had he moved his reserves against the weak 3* Corps, as it
stood isolated in the midst of foes — nay, had he afterwards bol-
dly engaged his 3^ and 4"» Corps against the 10"", his antago-
nists could hardly have escaped defeat. Instead of this, he
withdrew the Imperial Guard and the 2<* Corps to cover his
left, when not an enemy was even near ; he opposed a weak
screen to the S** German Corps, and gave time to its supports
to come up ; and, after having throughout the day stood on
a feeble and timid defensive, he paralyzed his 3<' and 4t'»
Corps, and held them back at a decisive moment. In other
words, he made no use of more than half his army on the
field of tattle ; he so placed it that it was not in force at any
time at the important points ; and throughout the day he
evidently had no idea of the inferior strength of the enemy,
no conception of what he might have accomplished, no
thought but of fighting when brought to bay, and making
sure of his hold on Metz, to which he clung as to a plank in
a shipwreck. This was the paramount cause of the defeat of
the French.
A great commander might even yet have, perhaps, opened
his way to Verdun by a desperate effort on the morning of the
17tii ; The Germans were happy in having such an antagonist.
Von Moltke had good reason to thank Fortune at Mars-la-Tour .
It is a mistake to suppose that the operations which ended
in the surrender of Metz were the result of a preconceived
design ; and in this respect they are not equal to the stra-
tegy which encircled Mack in Ulm.. The German comman-
ders were not omniscient, and their antagonists had more
than one chance. The German chiefs underrated the resis-
tance of France.
The battle of Coulmiers was nearly being a serious re-
Iml
n
— 65 —
lus re-
verse, and spread anxiety through the German camp ; after
that event, the fall of Metz probably alone prevented a re-
markable change in the scene. The Germans strengthened
their hold on Paris, and looked out anxiously for the fall of
Metz, which would set 200,000 men free to support their
feeble investing line, and to overpower the new French le-
vies. Meanwhile France made astonishing efforts, to repel the
invaders ; and in the South especially the Army of the Loire
became a large force. Even after the calamitous surrender
of Metz, the Germans felt that they were insecure, and the
First Corps was left around Orleans completely isolated, as
no troops could be detached to its aid from Paris.
The German authorities were not able to make a definite
dipposition of the inconsiderable forces that remained at
their disposal after deducting the Army of Prince Frederick
Charles, which was on the march. It was, indeed, a critical
period, and any prolongation of it was viewed with impatience
at Versailles.
In this state of affairs the Army of the Loire, now composed
of the IS'** and 16"' Corps, crossed the river in the last days
of October, the mass of the army by Blois and Mer, and one
detachment advancing on Glen, the object of D'Aurelle being
to cut off and overwhelm the First Corps by a concentric
movement against Orleans. General Von der Tanti advanced
to Coulmiers and Baccon, and this movement led to a colli-
sion between the First Corps and the new French army.
Between 3 and 4 p. m. General Von der Taim became con-
vinced of the necessity of adopting one of two alternatives ^
either to hold his position till nightfall, even if it cost him
his last man and his last cartridge, or to retire... He issued
orders for a retreat towards St. Peray and Artenay.
The .success of Coulmiers not only sent a thrill of rapture
through France, but caused profound anxiety at Versailles,
where the dangerous position of the investing army around
'^. If
" m\
66 —
11
1i!:H
Paris was fully apparent. Preparations were made to raise
the siege ; the Grand Duke of Mecklenburg was despatched
■with two divisions to the aid of the First Corps ; and though
Prince Frederick Charles was approaching the Yonne, it was
feared that the victorious Army of the Loire would move to
the relief of the capital by the circuitous route of Dreux and
Chartres.
Whether the Army of the Loire could have made this
march, and what, if it had, would have been the result, can
now be only matter of surmise ; but the German Chiefs were
not a little uneasy, and the fact shows how unexpected had
been the revival of the military power of France. One thing
is certain, that at this juncture nothing but apprehension of
Prince Frederick Charles prevented even the cautious D'Au-
relle from making the attempt to advance on Paris ; and, if
so, who shall pretend to say what effect the capitulation of
Metz — that dark episode of treachery and shame — may have
had on the final issue of the war ? For some weeks after the
battle of Coulmiers the operations of the Germans were far
from coherent, and the consequences showed themselves in
their strategy. Though the Army of the Loire had retired on
Orleans, the Staff at Versailles continued to fear that it yet
might push forward by Dreux or Chartres, and the result
was that the Grand Duke and Von dor Tann were despat-
ched far away to the Sarthe and the Eure to guard against
this supposed movement. This diversion, which opened a
wide interval between their forces and those of Prince Fre-
derick Charles, might have given a great chance to a more
daring chief than D'Aurelle — a chance perceived by the ca-
pable Chanzy. Few passages in the war are more worthy of
notice than the rallying under Chanzy of the left of the Army
of the Loire, and how, aided by an additional corps which
had risen suddenly, as it were, from the earth, he baffled
the Grand Duke and Van der Tann.
67 —
During the following week Chanzy, in position in the space
between the Loire and the Forest of Marchenoir, resisted
all the attacks of the enemy, and more than once gained a
marked advantage.
The tenacity and endurance with which the troops made
their stand for four days is a proof of the conspicuous energy
and inspiring activity of their leader, General Chanzy... Mo-
dern histoid offers no instance of battles so completely
fought out as those on the plains of La Beauce.
It is by no means now so certain that on future battle-
fields Cavalry cannot be turned to account. The natural ten-
dency of the breechloader is to cause great dispersion among
Infantry and immense waste of ammunition. Moments are
certain to arrive in every great battle of the present day
when troops find themselves dispersed and scattered, very
likely distant and separate from their reserves, and not at
all improbably with their ammunition expended. In these
circumstances the sudden appearance of a large force of
Cavalry at a critical moment may turn the fortunes of the
day, more especially when Infantry is demoralized, fatigued,
or surprised. At the battle of Custozza a squadron and a half
of Austrian Lancers came across an Italian brigade of five
battalions, and completely routed four out of the five. But
more especially when Cavalry is opposed to Cavalry do heavy
men protected with cuirasses and mounted on heavy horses
become useful. Light and medium men, not so protected,
cannot face them. In fact, the Heavy Cavalry of an army is
required to protect its light horsemen from the Heavy Ca-
valry of the enemy. It may, therefore, seem worthy of con-
sideration whether all Heavy Cavalry should not be armed
ivith cuirasses.
The fire of a Battery at the present day (and we hope soon
to outdo this) begins to be effective at 4,000 yards, is very
powerful at 2,000, and annihilating to tioops in any forma-
— 68 —
tion at 1,000 yards and under. The ground must, of course,
be supposed to be moderately open.
A gun in action under favourable circumstances covers
with its fire about seven square miles of country, and can
change its object from one point to another more than four
miles distant from the first by a simple movement of its trail.
A column on the right flank may be hit, and within a minute
another column four miles to the left of the first. 100 guns
would occupy a mile, and a mile was once a long range, but
now a line two miles long might fire at the same object, and
the guns at one end could protect those at the other by
flanking fire. Therefore every increase of range lent a new
argument for the tactics of massing.
A General should endeavour to obtain a superiority of
Artillery as early as possible. His whole, or nearly his whole,
force of guns should be pushed well forward and massed at
the beginning, so that it may crush the enemy's Artillery in
detail as the latter comes into position.
Whether acting ofl'ensively or defensively, artillery can
protect its own front in ordinary open country, and should
not retire before Infantry unless the whole force is retreating.
But Artillery can be sorely annoyed, or even caused to
retire, by the fire of Infantry skirmishers, well concealed in
folds of ground or behind walls and trees. Therefore Infantry
should not attack in any formation, but, so to say, stalk the
guns. And this being granted, Infantry should always attack
guns ; who knows but that they may be unsupported?
The only reply to such hidden attacks, early in the battle
before the friendly Infantry has come up, is by the use of
dismounted Cavalry, or, better still, by mounted men trained
to work on foot either as riflemen or gunners, and perma-
nently attached to the batteries.
Since Artillery can ta;- care of itself, provided its flanks
are protected, a line of guns may be deployed, and behind
,K -Ik
can
battle
jse of
ained
erma-
(lanks
lehind
it the Infantry may effect turning movements to act on the
enemy's flank. "When such a flank attr ck is ready to be de-
livered, the mass of guns should concentrate their fire on
that part of the enemy's line about to be assailed till it is
shaken.
A system of signals should be used to enable a large num-
ber of guns to act simultaneously against the same point.
"When the Infantry combat has commenced, as many guns
as possible should be pushed close up to the enemy.
"When Artillery advances to close combat, a considerable
number of men and horses should follow the batteries as
near as they can consistently with keeping under cover. If
this be done, there is no fear of leaving the guns in the
hands of the enemy. At such moments cover becomes a se-
condary consideration. Artillery, like Infantry or Cavalry, in
close combat must count on heavy losses in men and horses,
but they must determine to crush the enemy in that part of
the field, remembering that « omelettes are not made without
breaking of eggs. »
Since a frontal attack can be beaten off at any range, ar-
tillery, if it has a clear space of 1,000 yards i" front of it
and scouts on flanks, should not allow itself to be turned
from its immediate purpose by the reported approach of
large bodies of infantry. Such attacks may be neglected till
the enemy comes within 1,000 yards.
Range-finders, telescopes, and scouts are indispensable
to the development of the full power of artillery ; the same
may be said of spare men, horses, and ammunition. The
front line of the battery should have as few men and horses
as possible, and should bf) fed from the rear, two or three
times over if necessary. But the great principle of all is that
artillery has issued from its childhood, and is as well able to
shift for itself as any other arm. This does not mean that it
is independent of the others, but that it is only dependent
1 1
— To-
on them in the same sense that they are dependent on it.
The mainstay of an army is Infantry. Command should
extend over depth rather than breadth, and each company
should provide its own immediate support. This is effected
by directing each Captain to extend, in the first place, only
half his company, the other half being placed in the front
line whenever the Captain may see fit. Thus the mixing
up of companies at an early period of the action is avoided.
Tactical and administrative command should coincide.
The attack formation is to be assumed as soon as a batta-
lion becomes exposed to artillery fire. The distance neces-
sarily depends on the nature of the ground. In some cir-
cumstances it may rot be more than a few hundred yards.
In open ground the limits are estimated as being 3,000 and
4,000 yards, so great is the range and accuracy of the mo-
dern field-piece. The battalion is supposed to be in quarter-
column, and before it reaches the zone of effective artillery
fire it is deployed into line of half-battalion columns, and on
account of the range of shells the front taken up is much
wider than that hitherto considered sufficient. Space is allo-
wed as for a battalion in line on the following data : — Each
file is supposed to occupy 30 inches. The companies are to
be separated from each other by an interval of three paces,
and half-battalions by one of six paces. Thus not only will
half battalions and companies be kept as distinct as squa-
drons, but each man will have plenty of room for the full use
of his arms. As soon as the half-battalion columns have as-
sumed their positions, the two front companies of each will
be sent forward to act as the attacking line. Only half of
each company will at first be extended, the other half com-
panies being retained at a distance of from 150 to 200 yards
in rear, to constitute company supports. The leading half
companies will form on the march single rsnk, the intervals
between men being such as to insure the whole front of the
'. I
,^l
— 71 —
battalion being covered. The rear half companies will move
in two ranks, with two paces interval between files. The front
and rear half companies will together be styled « the at-
tacking line. » The captain is to take post in rear of his lea-
ding half company. The remainder of the half battalions
— two companies in an eight company battalion — will
follow in rear of the supports of the extended companies
at a distance from them of from 200 to 300 yards, and in
such formation as may be deemed advisable. These compa-
nies will be styled « the supporting line. » An excellent in-
novation is the sending in advance of all, at about 100 or
150 yards of the extended line, four or five picked men per
half battalion. These, under the direction of an officer, will
act as scouts, and will retain their relative position until
they approach to within 500 yards of the enemy, when they
will halt and lie down till the arrival of the attacking line
and then advance with it.
The principle is to evade as far as possible the destructive
effect of artillery fire by giving it no masses or bodies of men
shoulder to shoulder as targets. The front of a battalion of
800 rank and file, exclusive of scouts, would be 374 paces.
Consequently, at first each man in the extended line would
occupy a space of nearly two paces, or nearly five feet. Even
if a shell burst pi'ecisely at the right moment, it would cause
comparatively little loss on such aline. The effect of artillery
fire would also be very slight on the supporting bodies spread
over a considerable depth of ground and, equally with the
skirmishers, taking advantages of all cover and being cons-
tantly on the move. We may, therefore, conclude that du-
ring the earlier part of the advance the enemy's gunners
would fire but little. The extended line is to advance quietly,
steadily, and without unnecessary words of command or
bugle calls, and as far as can be gathered in a general line.
On reaching the zone of effective infantry fire the supporting
m
9?it . 1 If
— 72 —
■ 'Mi
;< •■■ffll
'' "!'• !''■
half companies will reinforce their leading half companies.
The precise moment at which this operation may be neces-
sary will depend upon the ground and the amount of resis-
tance encountered, about 800 yards from the enemy's posi-
tion. No fixed rule can be laid down. Officers commanding
the advanced companies should endeavour to approach as
near as possible to the point to be attacked before ordering
up their rear half companies. The true principle is to keep
as large a number of men as possible in comparative safety
till the decisive moment, and always to have something in
hand. Still, it must be borne in mind that the enemy's fire
must never be allowed to gain the ascendency and snuff-out
the assailants in detail. When the whole of the attacking
line has been thrown into the fight the supporting line is to
be moved up to within 300 yards of the men engaged. At this
point of the action a further advance must evidently become
difficult. The question then is, how is it to be accomplished
with the least possible loss ? That many casualties will occur
in the process is certain. The object to which attention must
be directed is the minimizing of loss. Advance is to be con-
tinued by alternate companies. This is so far sound, for if
the advance were by smaller bodies, they would be apt to
get in front of each other and obstruct the firing line ; whe-
reas, if the advance were by larger bodies, it would be diffi-
cult to give a simultaneous impulse to them. The rush is
only permissive, not obligatory. Thus, captains are practi-
cally allowed to advance in their own way. The experience
of many officers is that the best method of advancing is for
the two men of a file to work together, one running or cree-
ping forward a short distance, while his comrade covers the
movement with his fire. By this means the whole line gra-
dually gains ground like an incoming tide. When the attac-
king line is about 300 yards distant from the enemy's posi-
tion, it is to be reinforced by the rest of the battalion.
— 73 —
ipanies.
3 neces-
of resis-
^'s posi-
nanding
coach as
)rdering
to keep
^e safety
ithing in
ny's fire
muff-out
ittacking
ine is to
i. At this
' become
npUshed
rill occur
ion must
p be con-
id, for if
)e apt to
le; whe-
be diffi-
3 rush is
3 practi-
perience
ng is for
or cree-
vers the
ine gra-
le attac-
y's posi-
n.
In many cases, if a battalion succeeded in establishing itself
on a line about 150 yards from the enemy the affair would
soon virtually come to an end without a further advance.
Either the assailants or the defenders would be crushed by
the volume of fire poured in at such a close range. Assu-
ming, however, that the loss was not so great as to induce
the assailants either to remain halted or to retreat, or to
compel the defenders to quit their position, it is evident
that a very critical and dangerous piece of work devolves on
the attacking party. How is the deadly zone of 100 or 150
yards to be passed over ? The ranks of the enemy may be
much thinned and their courage greatly shaken. In that case
the assailants may, without danger, make a rush over the
intervening space. What, however, if the enemy, partially
covered by, say, the brow of a hill, should not have suffered
heavy loss and be evidently determined to stand their
ground? In that case a rush over 150 or even 100 yards
would bring the assailants up breathless, in disorder and
thinned by the last few shots, to cross bayonets with a hal-
ted, regularly formed, perfectly fresh line. It seems, there-
fore, that the former method of gaining ground by degrees
should be prolonged till the attacking line is within 50 or 60
yards. As a matter of fact, however, a front attack on a fairly
good position, occupied by resolute troops, would have few
chances of success unless the foe were previously shaken by
a fire of artillery, or simultaneously threatened on the flank.
The advance of Infantry should always be preceded by a con-
centrated fire of Artillery on the point selected for attack.
In order to minimize the loss inseparable from a front
attack, even when the latter has been fully prepared by Ar-
tillery, the assailants must have recourse to three expe-
dients— i.e, the nature of formation, quickness of movement,
and the taking advantage of cover.
The flank formation is the same as the front formation,
■ & I
— 74 —
\^'W
except that only one half battalion is broken up for attack,
the other half battalion remaining in rear as a battalion
reserve.
The attack formation for a brigade is merely an applica-
tion on an extended form of the principles laid down for a
battalion.
Retirement should be carefully practised. For nothing
tests the discipline and general training of men more than
a retreat under fire. Indeed, many military authorities are
of opinion that if an attack fails it will be almost impossible
to fall back without crushing loss and terrible disorder. Is
not the method adopted during the advance equally appli-
cable during the retreat ?
liEii
yvi(
ODERN W AR
CONTAINING REIARKS AND OPINIONS OF THE lOST DISTIN6UISIED SOLDIERS
7'
In the middle of the year 1877, General Gourko commen-
ced his daring raid.
When Reouf Pasha was engaged with the enemy, Sulei-
man would not send to assist him, although he was himself
amply provided with troops.
What he actually did was to seize Eski Zara, the garrison
of which had been weakened, and to keep all his forces about
him so long as there was a chance of his requiring them; in
fact, to render his own triumph secure at all costs. Suleiman
Pasha had superseded Reouf on reaching the Balkans, and it
was more than probable that, according to the usual system,
Reouf would be reinstated in the chief command should he
win his share of the battle while Suleiman lost his. The latter
appeared to have determined that this should not occur.
The defeat of Reouf followed in consequence of the non-
co-operation of Suleunan. Suleiman next wasted valuable
days in Eski Zara, and completely lost the touch of a Russian
force which had appeared in his front and reconnoitred him on
the 30th of July and the following day. Another delay of seve-
ral days was suffered at Yeni Zara. When at length the Gene-
ral marched straight on Shipka, two days were lost at the
Ferdich PaSs. The whole army halted while some slight field
works for the defence of the pass were constructed. They
might as easily have been made by a small garrison left be-
Compiled by M^jor d'Eulragues, H. M. Reserve Forces,
76
MoDBR5 War.
m4
hind while the army moved on. At Hain Bogaz another delay
was made for the purpose of fortification. Had it not been for
Reouf s defeat, or even had Suleiman followed up and obser-
ved with his cavaliy the march of Gourko's column on the
Hain Bogaz, the Turks might have advanced from Eski Zara
direct on Shipka, which was but one day's march distant.
The delay in marching on Shipka after the defeat of Eski
Zara had enabled the Russo Bulgarians to regain confidence
and to construct elaborate fieldworks for the defence of the
pass. It had also enabled the Russians north of the Balkans
to recover to a great extent from the shattering effects of the
great defeat at Plevna on the 30th of July and had given time
for reinforcements to be hurried up. Thus the Turks had
thrown away a great opportunity of hurling back the inva-
ding armies. Though everything depended upon rapid move-
ment, Suleiman Pasha had taken three weeks to do the work
of a single day.
The Later history of Suleiman's army, how thousands of
gallant men were squandered by iiurling them against posi-
tions which turned out to be impregnable, need not be follo-
wed. It is deeply fixed in the memory of the public. More
useful will it be to refer to the general deductions.
Briefly stated in technical language the principal conclusion
is that the local defensive has gained in power ; but that, in
spite of this, the tactical offensive continues to be advanta-
geous provided that a position is open to turning movements
and flank attacks. A force surrounding another in an intren-
ched camp should blockade, but not assault. It appears to be
only occasionally and by accident that long-range firing had
any considerable effect. For instance, the converging fire into
the Russian positions at Shipka was principally aimed at the
front line, and, passing over it, inflicted injury upon the re-
serves. This remark must not, however, be read as excluding
value from the well-directed aim of a few marksmen.
r delay
een for
obser-
on the
ki Zara
mt.
)f Eski
ifidence
e of the
Balkans
s of the
en time
iks had
le inva-
d move-
he work
sands of
ast posi-
be foUo-
Ic. More
nclusion
that, in
advanta-
vements
intren-
irs to be
ring had
fire into
3d at the
the re-
ixcluding
GoiTTAIirmO REHARKS A.XD OPINIOIfS OF TBE MOST DISTINGUISHSO SOLDIERS 77
One speedily perceived the great superiority in a country
like that in which the campaigns were fought of the use of
pack-animals instead of wheeled conveyances to carry ammu-
nition and all supplies. Had the supply of ammunition been
carried out by carts, the Turks must often have run short du-
ring the fighting on the Balkans. From ten to 20 mules accom-
panied a battalion, each carrying two wooden cases lined with
tin slung on either side of the pack-saddle. A case contained
1,000 rounds of ritle ammunition. Mules flso carried the in-
trenching tools of each brigade. The val le of the field tele-
graph and signalUng arrangements wis also remarkably
shown. On the 23d of August the Turl s had just carried a
wooded hill in the Shipka Pass, towards the west of Mount.
St. Nicholas, after a sharp fight with the Russian infantry.
The remains of the Russian garrison, exhausted by a three
day's fight against superior forces, and their ammunition ha-
ving failed, could be seen abandoning the main position in the
centre, where one battery after another ceased firing.
At length the Russian positions were nearly empty, and
only an occasional fugitive turned to fire a parting shot at the
attacking troops. The fines were completely at the mercy of
the Turks in the centre, who yet did not enter them. Being
on the steep slope of the hill, they could not see that the
whole position above them had been abandoned. Two Pashas,
in command respectively on elevated ground at the flanks,
tried to induce the centre to move on. One ordered « Advance »
to be sounded ; the other sent word to the attacking troops in
the centre that the position was deserted. But no movement
was made by the force, although the position was 200 yards
off. Ouick and explicit communication by telegraph, or by
flags or mirrors might perhaps have had another result. As it
was, 20 minutes of inactivity passed. Then the head of a Rus-
sian column came in sight making its way up the winding
Gabrova road. It re-occupied the works, and immediately be-
■t.
/
tf%
78
Modern WiH.
gan firing volleys with great precision. It was evidently com-
posd of fresh troops. Word arrived that the Turkish advance
line was being attacked in flank in the wood ; the attacking
troops in the centre fell back before the fire of the fresh co-
lumn. Night closed in, and an opportunity was lost which
would probably have decided the fate not only of the Shipka,
but of the whole compaign. On the 17lh of September, when
Suleiman temporarily captured the Si. Nicholas Rock, the te-
legraph had been laid between the three advanced sections
and the camp ; but the commander appears not to have posted
himself where he could fully use its services for insuring co-
operation by flank attacks and the timely aid of the reserve.
With regard to the later period of the war which resulted in
the treaty of San Stefano, the Russians had crossed the Bal-
kans between Sofla and the lilack Sea with a real force of
only 70,000 men, sul)sequently increased to a maximum of
130,000, encumbered with sick, dcflcienlly provided with
transport, and in a condition to be easily deprived of sup-
pUes of food after they had exhausted those which the Turkish
Generals had considerately left behind. Against them were
arrayed 100,000 Turks, and afterwards a greater number, in
the strong lines around Constantinople. A body of 50,000 Bri-
tish troops, assisted by the Rhodope insurrection and by fresh
levies of Turks which could have been formed to the number
of 200^000 to serve under British ollicers, could easily have
repulsed the invasion.
Are her conquests and extension soutii a source of strength
to Russia ?
If she took Gonst4intinoplc could Germany and Austria
permit.Russia to keep it ?
Or, considering their great interests, would these tv/o
powerful empires unite their magnilicent forces, attack Rus-
Containing hkmahks and opinions of the most distinguished soldiers 79
sia along her whole western line, push her back on Siberia
with irresistible force, and retain vasts provinces of her ter-
ritory to be developed by the rapidly increasing, industrious
and persevering Germans ?
mgth
tv/o
I H US-
There is no man who has better encountered and adopted
all those rational and well-considered reforms which the lapse
of years and altered circumstances have necessitated, than liis
Royal Highness the Duke of Cambridge, and no man with a
quicker appreciation of the exigencies of the times within
which he lives. In dilficult positions he has shown great
ability.
In General Robert's olficial account of the fight before Ga-
bul he tells us that he « received the greatest assistance
» throughout the day from army signaUing, under the direc-
» tion of Captain Straton, 'i'ind Regiment. » The army si-
gnaUing seems to have been conducted in sunshine by means
ofthe mirror or heliograph, and at other times with signal flags.
Their usual appliances are a pair of flags for day signalling,
and a buUseye lantern for use at night. The flags measure
four feet square, so as to be visible at some distance, an/ >hey
are of dark blue and white, with a bhie stripe, colours that
are very perceptible upon a mountain ridgf or distant mound.
By posting a chain of these signallers, communication may be
established between a general and his outposts without ditll-
culty, and evidently General Hoborts was enabled by the ef-
licient working of this sysli'in at Charasiab to obtain ready
reports of all that was passing around bini. In visnal signal-
ling the Morse code is that usually resorted to, but neyond
this the army have certain signs of their own to be adopted
in cases of m'gency and danger. Signalling is nMiurally a ser-
vice of some danger, and in this, as also in the last, Afghan
«i»
fiili
if* :. ■ ■■
'III'
80
Modern War.
campaign several isolated parties have been cut off and killed
by the hillmen and warlike tribes that hang about the flanks
of our army. Signs made by flag or lantern cannot very well be
seen for more than a mile or so, even when a telescope or bin-
ocular is used, but with the heliograph, which reflects a beam
of sunshine by way of signal, a distance of fifty miles may
intervene between the stations. In this case, all that is ne-
cessary is to have the stations sufficiently high above the plain
to prevent the interposition of objects in the path of the ray,
and to sec that the flashes go straight in the direction you
wish. It is interesting to find our system of army signalUng
so perfect as to call for the warm praises of a general upon
the field of battle, and it is not less welcome news that Sir
Frederick Roberts, wlio, as quartermaster-general in India,
was the first soldier to recogiuze the utility of the heliograph,
should have personally derived so much benefit from its use.
How useful the lieliograph has proved every one who has
followed the recent campaigns in the East knows.
General Roberts, during his march southward, was enabled
to communicate by its means with the for(!es he was about to
relieve.
At all times the service is one of extreme danger in an
enemy's country. To signal to a distance it is necessary that
the nunor should be placed as higli up as possible, and moun-
tains or hills afar oil' lioni the main body aie frequently cho-
sen for stations.
General Rol)erts's march and speedy and thorough victory
class him as one of the great generals of modern times. Assu-
ming the intention to evacuate Afghanistan, the campaign
could not have had a mor(> happy ternunation. British honoiu'
and prestige are safe after General Uoberts^s revenge.
The brilliant advance upon Gabul by General Hoberts's
small army in October and of the attack on the Char-Asiah
GoRTAinmo reharkc? ahd opinion*) of the most distinguished soldiers 81
in an
that
moiin-
cho-
heights the moment they were discovered to be in possession
of the^Afghans, will always excite admiration.
Any delay or hesitation at Ghar-Asiab would have added
enormous numbers to the defence and brought thousands
round the flanks of our army.
The cavalry charge to save the guns on the 11th of De-
cember, and the carrying of the Asmai heights on the 14th
of December were fine specimens of daring.
But what, next to the briUiancy and daring of the march on
Gabul, strikes one most is the quiet and able manner in which
all the troops were suddenly concentrated in Sherpur on the
afternoon of the 14th of December. Evidently if this had not
been done our army would have had a bad time of it, consi-
dering the enormous combination against us.
Fortunately, no army was ever richer in daring, able, and
resolute ollicers than our troops in Afghanistan, and recruits,
luider such circumstances as those in which Roberts's force
were placed, rapidly become veterans.
Sir Donald Stewart exhibits a commendable brevity, can-
dour, and honest statement of facts in his despatch relative
to the battle of Ahme.l-Khel, Afghanistan. It is evident that
this battle, in which our forces were outnumbered by the
enemy, was the most desperate and critical of tlie war.
It only lasted one hour in its intensity, from 9 to 10 a. m.,
but in that time the Afghans exhibited unprecedented pluck,
rushing up to the guns, to be mowed down in hundreds.
The enemy's attack having been cfl'e<-tually defeated, their
entire body spread broadcast over the country.
The casualties during tlie engagement amounted to killed,
17 ; wounded, 1'24, of whom nine were ollicers. More than a
thousand dead bodies of tbe enemy were counted <in tiie field,
and their loss is estimated at from '2,()(M) to ;i,0«M».
Taking into consideration the character of the attack, led
as it was by swarms of fanatics determined to sacrifice tlieir
/■
82
Modern War.
.11
Hi- i
' :!
'Xk
own lives, the conduct of the troops engaged was beyond
praise.
The action, though short, must have been a sharp one, affor-
ding some scope for the display of General Stewart's tactical
skill. Sir Donald showed sound judgment and true generalship.
It is a cardinal rule that at sieges the besieged should lose
no opportunity of making sorties in order to delay the preli-
minary operations, force the enemy to begin his approaches
at a distance, and ascertain the real point of attack.
At Jellalabad Sale, though his garrison did not, exceed
1,800 men, and the besiegers numbered between 5,000 and
6,000, repeatedly sallied out and beat tliem.
During the Mutiny it was a common thing for a force half
of which consisted of recently raised native levies, to attack
four or five times their ibrre of Sepoys, and to beat them in
half an hour. Orientals are better at defending than attacking
intrencliments, and we feel sure that General Burrow's small
force, if behind fortifications, could have kept any number of
Afghans at bay, so deadly is the l)reecli-loader in the hands
of steady men under cover, and with clrar ground in front
of them.
Clive and Napier won great victories in the face of equal
odds and with no less superiority in arms than we now pos-
sess.
Now the extended order, whicii answers so well against a
European foe, with weapons neaiiy as good as our own, is not
invariably the only method which should be adopted in dealing
with an uncivilised, indifferently armed, but numerically
superior force. In such a case, when pressed on all sides by
swarms of daring swordsmen, our men ought to be kept to-
gether, for mutual support and encouragement.
There is no real remedy short of annexation for effectually
and linally settling this constantly disturbing Afghan difliculty.
Annexation would not only cost us no great effort, but it
(J!: i
Containing remarks and opinions of the most distingcished soldiers 8S
equal
pos-
[inst a
is not
lealing
ically
[es l>y
pt to-
Itually
|('ulty.
hut it
would be acceptable from the first to many classes of the in-
habitants, and would before long be contentedly acquiesced
in by the great majority of the nation. The population of the
country is not all fanatic, and peace and security for property
is, after all, what the mass of the people desire. The revenue
of the counti-y was about one million and a quarter under
Shere All's rule, and if his reign had been prolonged he saw
his way to raising it to one million and a half. Good govern-
ment would, as always, increase this revenue in proportion
as trade prospered iind waste lands were brought under cul-
tivation. Admitting that our present Indian native army could
not bear the strain ol military occupation, it is worth consi-
deration if a local force of European (not necessarily British)
troops could not be raised, the figure of which could be placed
at 20,000 men.
A local service in the excellent climate of Afghanistan
would probably not be unpopular or difiicult to raise and re-
cruit. It could be supplemented to the extent required either
from the non-Afghan races of Afghanistan — the Hazaras
Kazilbashis, etc. — or from natives of India selected for
this special service, as in the first Afghan war, the true ele-
ment being gradually introduced. Five years hence, or even
less, a scheme such as this, preposterous and wild as it may
now seem, will not, perliaps, be deemed unworthv of attentio^^.
If order, again, were once estabUshed, the revenue of the
country would continuously improve, and it would in an
increasing degree pay the expenses of its occupation and go-
vernment. As to the animosity of the population, there is
much to be said in behalf of a belief that this animosity is
mainly confined to the possessors of wenlth and power. Those
classes know that a rule of strict justice would deprive them
of their present arbitrary authority over the poorer inhabi-
tants ; but the latter clnss would welcome the establishment of
our rule as insuring their deliverance from the constant op-
■■«'■■♦■ : -l,-,., . ■■"
84
HoDBBN War.
li
■ "ill
pression which is the curse of the poor in all Eastern coun-
tries.
The Sikhs were the most dangerous enemies we ever en-
countered in India ; but with annexation they became the
most valuable soldiers in the Indian army. It is conceivable
that we might similarly enlist the Afghans themselves, and
members of their race have certainly done good service in our
frontier regiments.
Ayoob Khan undoubtedly owed much of his success at
Kushk-i-Nakhud to the superiority of his cavalry, and this
proof of the excellence of the Afghan horseman is by no m*^ans
the first that has been afforded in the course of our campaigns in
the country. The superiority of the Afghans was made evident
in a marked manner on several occasions during the old war,
and there have not been wanting occasions during the present
when some tokens were given that the same truth still held
good. Both at Purwandurrah, where Dost Mahomed drove our
light cavalry from the field and where the English officers
alone held their ground to be either slain or wounded, and also
at Baba-Vali, where Nott's cavalry, despite the valour of Ne-
ville Chamberlain, was routed by the Duranis, it was shown
that the Indian sow^ar is not a match in single combat for the
Afghan horseman.
It was the irresistible charges of his cavalry that turned
the day in favour of Ahmed Khan at Paniput quite as much
as a similar movement decided the Battle of Blenheim.
Undoubtedly, it would be necessary to occupy Mymeneh,
Bfdkh, or Takhtapul, and even Fyzabad, in the event of the
Hindoo Koosh being constituted the boundary of our Eastern
Empire.
In point of f^ict, advisable though the occupation of Mymeneh
would be as an outpost, as a link between Herat and Balkh,
it can in no sense be termed the key of the Herat valley. On
the other hand, the occupation of that valley by England is
Go.VTAINrNO REMARKS AND OPINIONS OF TH£ MOST DI6TIN6UISHK0 SOLOIXRS 85
Imeneh
JBalkh,
^y. On
liiiid is
absolutely essential to the safety of our Indian Empire. The
valley of the Herirud possesses the quaUties attributed by the
First Napoleon to Cherbourg when he called that place « an
eye to see and an arm to stiike ». Herat is necessary to En-
gland, because England could not allow that valley to be oc-
cupied by any other power. The richest valley in the world,
producing in abundance the iron, the charcoal, the horses, the
lead, the corn necessary to equip an army, Herat, in the hands
an enemy, would soon Ijeceme a most formidable basis whence
to wage war on India. Pro))ably the present century has not
produced a Foreign Minister possessing keener insight into
matters affecting the safety of the country than Lord Pal-
merston. Yet Lord Palmerston waged two wars — the Afghan
War in 1838, and the Persian War of 1856 — with the sole
viewof preventing Herat from falling into the hands of Persia.
That able statesman knew well what a splendid base of
operations against India Herat would become in the hands of
Persia, or of a powerful ally of Persia. The value of Herat to
India was most strikingly exemplified during the reigns in
Hindostan of the later successors of Baber. Baber was the
only conqueror of India who did not enter India by, and who
did not secure, the gate of Herat. Bal)er entered by Candahar.
The result showed the insufficiency of the Candahar gate.
That gate was wrested from the successors of Baber by the
power which held Herat, and India in consequence suffered
the two invasions which more than anything else brought the
Mogul dynasty to the dust.
Under present circumstances the possession of Herat by
England is more than ever necessary to the safety of India.
The late sucessful march of Ayot^b Khan has demonstrated
the foresight of those who declared that Herat was the gate of
India. Ayoob Khan's invasion was only possible because he
marched along a route with his flanks covered by sandy de-
serts on the one side, by mountains on the other.
86
Modern War.
.'■'I
4 %
i 4
w
When we conquered the Punjab in 1849 we at once enlis-
ted in our service the brave men who had fought so stre-
nuously against us. The result has been most happy. The Sikh
element is the most important fighting element in our army,
the Goorkhas alone excepted. Had we boldly declared our in-
tention to annex Afghanistan and the northern slopes of the
Hindu Kush to the Oxus, and had we then, imitating our
Punjab policy, at once raised regiments from the inhabitants
of the country, we should by this time have had ready to our
hand a fighting power the value of which it would be difficult
to over estimate.
The colonists of the Transvaal, no less than Sir Garnet
Wolseley, are to be congratulated on the successful result of
the operations against Secocoeni. There were not wanting
those who predicted that we should find the Basuto chieftain
as formidable a foe as the Zulu monarch, and that the capture
of his stronghold was a feat not to be attempted by the force
at the disposal of the British commander. Many will speak of
the proverbial good luck of our youngest general and ascribe
all to its powerful influence ; but it is self-evident that good
management was the real secret of success. In the public es-
teen Sir Garnet Wolseley sUinds out from his fellows as a
man of especial capacity, energy, boldness, and professional
skill.
He has the faculty of husbanding and organizing his re-
sources, and using them effectively and at the right moment.
He has an aptitude for collecting around him on his Staff a
number of men of bright energy like his own, who are keen
to justify his selection, anil who work together eagerly for the
public advantage.
Although it was well known that Secocoeni was in close
communication with Cety wayo, fortunately the thin wedge of
GONTAININO RRMARKS AND OPINIONS OF TRB MOST DISTINOUISIfBD SOI-DIRRS 87
)lic es-
'S as a
Issional
|i close
^dge of
British troops at Luneburg and Derby and Wood's intrenched
camp at Kambula prevented the northern chieftain from thro-
wing in his lot more actively against us. Raids have been of
constant occurrence, and horses and cattle were often carried
off from our frontier forts ; but Carrington, who seems, like
Redvers BuUer, a born leader of irregular horse, has generally
found means for prompt retaliation. A close reconnoissance
of Secocoeni's position was made by Colonel Harrison, R.E.,
and Sir Garnet Wolseley, on the receipt of his report, deter-
mined to resume the offensive.
The attacking force was divided into two columns, the
stronger of which was directed to assemble at Fort Albert
Edward, a work recently thrown up on Olifant's River, 15
miles to the west of Secocoeni's kraal. II consisted of two 7-
pounder guns manned by volunteers from the 80th Foot, two
Krupp breechloaders manned by Colonial Volunteers, under
the leadership of Captain Knox, R.A,, six companies of the
21 St Royal Scots Fusiliers, six companies of the 94 th Foot,
371 Volunteer Cavalry and Mounted Infantry under Lieute-
nant-Colonel Carrington, of the 24th, the Rustenburg Native
Contingent, 7CK) strong, and about 3,000 friendly natives. This
was styled the Western Column, was under the personal
command of Colonel Baker Russell, and was accompanied
by Sir Garnet in person. The Eastern Column was directed
to assemble at Fort Burgers, and was under the command of
Major Creagh, of the 80 th Foot. It comprised two companies
of the 80 th, two of the 94 th Foot, 100 Colonial Mounted Rifles,
400 of the Eckersley Native contingent, and 6,000 Swazis, the
total force employed being 1,500 Regular Infantry, 470 Colo-
nial Horse, two Native Contingents 1,100 strong, 3,(HM1 natives
from the surrounding country, and 0,(HK» Swa/.is, or a grand
total of about 12,000 men with four guns. Secocoeni, it was
assumed, had about 5,000 men, all fairly armed and occupying
a country eminently suitable for defence.
M
88
Modern War.
r
■it I,'
The plan of operations was for the cavalry under Lieute-
nant-Colonel Garrington to push forward on the night of the
23d and seize a small Hill commanding Secocoeni's water
supply, about 2 '/« miles from the town. This position once
carried was to be strongly intrenched, and for the purpose
150 infantry, with intrenching tools, were to accompany Gar-
rington. Two days later the main body of infantry from Fort
Albert Edward were to advance to support the force holding
the water coppie. The Eastern Golumn was directed to ad-
vance simultaneously along the south-eastern base of the Lulu
Mountains, halting about two miles from the mountain spur,
at the rear of Secocoeni's town. On the night of the 27th the
two columns had taken up theii' assigned positions within
four miles of each other, and at daybreak on the following
morning the attack was delivered in three columns. The right
attack was led by Ferreira, a gallant Colonial Volunteer, who
has done excellent service on many occasions. The central
column was commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Murray, of
the 94th Foot, and the left by Lieutenant-Colonel Garrington.
Capturing the lower town, this column swept round the hills
to Secocoeni's own kraal, just as the Swazis under Captain
M'Leod, late of the 74th Highlanders, appeared over the crest
of the hill. By 10 a. m. the town and numerous caves around
it were cleared of the enemy, and then all three columns con-
verged on the Fighting Koppie, a conical hill with precipitous
sides, about 150 yards in diameter, and towering above the
surrounding country. It is described as a mass of gigantic
boulders, deep crevices, and hidden tortuous caves. The figh-
ting at this spot was sharp, but our troops were not to be de-
nied. Ably seconded by their native alUes, they drove Soco-
coeni's braves from one point to another until at 3 p. m. Sir
Garnet was able to telegraph that the far-famed kraal was in
our hands. The operations were crowned with the most com-
plete success, and were attended with comparatively slight
loss, two officers being killed and four wounded.
GONTAINIMQ REMARKS AMD OPINIONS OF THE MOST DISTINGUISHED SOLDIERS 89
Of
pi tons
ve the
Lgantic
le figh-
Ibede-
Soco-
Im. Sir
Lvas in
It corn-
slight
It is to free the Egyptians, and not to enslave them, that
England has taken up arms; to restore the country to the
•path of progress, and to give it the prospect of peaceful and
orderly development.
It is necessary to rescue an unhappy country from anar-
chy, oppression and despotism.
But for military reasons Egypt is absolutely necessary to
England, and we must keep it and have our own free roads
and canals to India at all hazards.
When Sir Garnet moved off in the morning he only inten-
ded to occupy a position on the side of the canal opposite to
the little village shown on the Intelligence Department map
as El Magfar, which lies to the south of the canal about five
miles beyond Nefiche junction. He only pushed on with the
Household Cavalry under General Drury-Lowe, his personal
Staff— that is. Major Swaine, the Military Secretary, Captain
Fitz-George, an officer of merit, the private Secretary, and his
four aides-de-camp— and two officers of the Army Head-Quar-
ter Staff, Colonel Butler and Major Maurice. Colonel Harris-
son was also present to look after the line of communications,
while General Willis, who commands the division, had com-
mand of the force as it arrived. The Marines, 350 strong, and
the York and Lancaster Regiment, 560, followed in support,
and a division of two guns of N Battery, Royal Horse Artil-
lery, under Lieutenant Hickman, with an escort, brought up
the rear, having been pushed on from Ismailia as soon as
they could move after being disembarked. On arriving oppo-
site El Magfar a few prisoners were taken and it was found
that the enemy had made a dam a couple of miles further up
the canal.
The information obtained showed that the enemy were
holding in force a position rather more than a mile off, of
which the central and strongest part was at Tel-ei-Manuta
on the railway, while a circular range of hills, forming an am-
phitheatre of gentle slope and circling completely round Sir
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MooBRH War.
Grarnet's point near the dam to his right at about the same
distance all round from him, gave them admirable cover and
a well chosen position. They had ten guns in position, about
13- pounders in calibre, and between 4,000 and 5,000 men, the
successive trains bringing up reinforcements. Sir Garnet at
8 30 a. m. sent back his aide-de-camp, Mr. Adye, to order up
the Duke of Cornwall's Light Infantry from Neflche, and the
Brigade of Guards with the remainder of the Horse Artillery
Battery and A-1 Field Battery as soon as they could be pus-
hed forward from Ismailia. Colonel Harrison went back to
organize the supply arrangements. The enemy showed a dis-
position to advance from their position, first coming forward
. about 7 30 a. m. in a prettily-thrown out line of skirmishers
whih a cavalry force moved down along both sides of the
canal.
About 12 40 the Duke of Corwall's Light Infantry anived.
And an eflfective advance of some Mounted Infantry drove back
some skirmishers who were showing over the enemy's crest
on our extreme right. By 5 the Guards were beginning to
show, and the promised Artillery was pushing its way for-
ward. The position was now secure.
During the night the enemy, pushing forward over the
crest with his Infantry, withdrew his guns. In the morning,
on the lirst advance of our men. he abandoned the whole po-
sition and made a precipitate retreat. The Cavalry cut com-
pletely in upon the enemy's line of retreat, and, supported by
N Battery, A Brigade, Horse Artillery and two field-guns
from N Battery, 2d Brigade, turned the panic-stricken enemy
out of their position at Magsameh, and seized seven Krupp
guns, 75 wagons of provisions, and 120 tents.
With regard to the expedition, it was not exclusively a mi-
litary expedition, but essentially at every point of it up to
the present a conjoint expedition of navy and army, and no-
thing more tended to its rapid progress and to the successful
Compiled by llj^jor d'Enlraguet, U. M. Rwerve Forcei.
GORTAININO RSMARKS AlfD OPINIOIfS OF THR MOST DISTIRaVISHRD SOLDIRRS 01
le same
rer and
1, about
aen, the
arnet at
►rder up
and the
Artillery
. be pus-
back to
5d a dis-
forward
rmishers
es of the
arrived,
rove back
ly's crest
Inning to
way for-
ever the
morning,
hole po-
Icut com-
lorted by
tcld-guns
n enemy
in Krupp
(ely a mi-
it up to
and no-
luccesaful
surmounting of the difticulties which attended it than the
hearty co-operation of the two services, and the cordial man-
ner in which the naval ollicers, with the heartiest goodwill,
and in the cheeriest way, strained every nerve to co-operate
with the army. No doubt the cordial goodwill which exists
between Sir Beauchamp Seymour and Sir Garnet Wolseley,
dating from an acquaintance as early as the Burmese War
(prior to the Crimea), had much to do with this happy state
of things, and the larger operations of the war, such as the
sudden transfer of our forces from Alexandria to Ismailia,
would have been impossible but for the skill with which the
arrangements for meeting the risks and dangers of passing
down the Suez Canal were devised and organized by Sir
Beauchamp. On the other side, too, Sir (Jarnet's old personal
friendship for Sir W. Hewitt substituted the (i\cilities of
personal relationship for olficial correspondence in all naval
questions connected with Suez and the Indian expedition. But
the same feeling was observable everywhere. Every day and
all day long after we seized Ismailia, Lake Timsah was lite-
rally crowded with ships, all full of stores, landed day by day
by the combined hard work of soldiers and sailors, the sailors
being under the orders of Captain Rawson,IH. N., the soldiers
under those of Sir Owen Lanyon, in his capacity of comman-
dant of the base of operations. Captain Bracicenbury was the
naval oflicer chietly employed in the hard and all important
work of lauding the stores from the ships and handing them
over to Sir Owen's statf officers. Major Sartorius and Major
M'Gregor, to receive, distribute, and forward on from Ismailia.
The general situation after the action at Mahsameh on the
25th of August and the occupation of Kassassin Lock next day
was somewhat unusual. General (iraham, with the Duke of
Cornwall's and the York and Lancaster, about 400 Hoyal Ma-
rine Artillery, small detachments of the 4th and 7lh Dragoon
Guards, amounting togeher to Httle over 5U sabres, 70 Moun-
mm
14
i']^im-
mir^m^l^f^^^^^^^^mim
92
Modern War.
■M
ted Infantry, and two guns of the Royal Horse Artillery, held
an advanced position at Kassassin Lock. General Drury-Lowe,
with the Household Cavalry, the 7th Dragoon Guards, and
the remaining four guns of the N Battery, A Brigade, Royal
Horse Artillery, remained behind at Mahsameh, where also
was a battalion of the Royal Marines. The Brigade of Guards,
nnder the Duke of Gonnaught, was still further back at Tel-
el-Mahuta, and part of it, perhaps even further to the rear.
Throughout all these early days of the advance the Guards
worked splendidly and were ably commanded throughout the
war by their brave and illustrious Chief the Duke of Con-
naught. It was impossible for them to be present at the ac-
tion of the 24th, but they showed the stuff of which they
were made by pressing forward through the heat of that
day, arriving on the ground in the evening. On the 25th they
were eager for fight, but the enemy refused the combat, and
after that their spirit and good temper were shown by the
hearty zeal with which they carried out the heavy duties of
fatigue work, aiding by their strenuous hibours the prepara-
tions for advance. It is not ditlicult to understand that the re-
markable position of the troops, with, in front, a small advan-
ced guard amounting to less than 1,900 men all told, and two
guns, the cavalry, except a few men for outpost work and or-
derlies, some three or four miles behind, and the rest of the
force still further back, was due to the difficulty of conveying
provisions and ammunition to the front.
But Sir Garnet Wolseley believed in the courage and vigour
of the army under his command, and the ability of the officers
whom he had chosen as leaders of divisions and brigades. The
result justified his confidence.
There is always great disinclination on the part of the go-
vernors of a nation to destroy great public works. Arab! Pasha
was urged by military advisers to blow up the Suez Canal,
and if he had done so when that advice was given to him
GOITTATNIKO REKARKS AITD OPIiriORB Or THE MOST OISTlRODISnBD 80LDIIR8 93
ry,held
-Lowe,
Is, and
, Royal
jre also
juards,
at Tel-
he rear.
Guards
lout the
of Con-
the ac-
ch they
of that
)th they
lat, and
by the
uties of
)repara-
the re-
advan-
lind two
and or-
of the
veyiug
vigour
lofticers
les.The
the go-
li Pasha
Canal,
I to hini
the war might have contimed longer. He hesitated, however,
until the day before the landing of our troops at Ismailia, and
then it was too late.
About haltpast 9 on the morning of the 28th the enemy
commenced his first attempt to drive back the head of the
British column by direct attack. The position of General Gra-
ham was not favourable for defence. His troops were astride
of the ciinal, and although a bridge existed, the separation of
right and left wing was partial in any case, and complete if
the force had either to advance or retire. Moreover, on the
right of the position the desert rose to a ridge some 150ft.
high, which might easily conceal the movements of an out-
flanking force. On the appearence of the enemy's cavalry
General Graham posted his troops under cover, with front to
the north and west, throwing out the cavalry and M'^unted
Infantry on the flanks. At the same time he warned General
Drury-Lowe at Mahsameh by heliograph. About 11 his scouts
reported that the turning movement which was to be expected
was taking place. A strong Egyptian force of all arms was
moving round behind the ridge to turn the right flank of the
English. At 12 o'clock, the enemy, who was gradually lear-
ning from us the points in the game of war, opened fire with
two heavy guns which he appears to have advanced along
the railway upon trucks, but the range was long, about 4,000
yards, and the elevation given to the pieces was insufficient.
The shot fell short, and, as was usual with the Egyptian artil-
lery, plunged sullenly in the sand. The attack was not pres-
sed, and about 3 p. m. Captain Pigott, commanding the Moun-
ted Infantry, reported that the Egyptians appeared to be re-
tiring. General Graham, therefore, withdrew his men from
their exposure to the snn, and General Drury-Lowe ,who had
brought his cavalry within two or three miles of the campi
returnee' to Mahsameh, having previously been requested by
General Graham not to engage unnecessarily. At half-past 4
ii ■Al
li
»' ?!
i
m
■ I «;."»'
■ T,"j^:»v|!irr
94
MoDMM War.
the enemy made a determined advance with a front of skir-
mishers extending for at least a mile, and endeavouring to
overlap the left front of the English. His 12 guns supported
the attack, and thoroughly searched our camp, wounding an
ollicer in the house which had been General Graham's head-
quarters but had been subsequently given up to the sick and
wounded. Remembering that the attack of the enemy was
being made on the north side of the canal it is easy to under-
stand General Graham's dispositions. He placed the Marine
Artillery on the south bank of the canal, where they could
not be turned themselves, but could bring a flanking fire to
bear on the enemy's advance. This manoeuvre might, howe-
ver, have turned out disadvantageously if the Egyptian force
had succeeded in enveloping the English right for, in that
case, the Marine Artillery would have had the rest of the ad-
vanced guard between it and the enemy with the canal bet-
ween them. In the centre the Duke of Cornwall's, 611 strong,
were posted to the north of the canal and about 800 yards
back from the Marine Artillery. This infantry regiment ex-
tended three companies in fighting formation, with supports
and reserves under cover of the railway embankment. The
fighting line faced west by north and was continued on 'he
right by the Duke of Cornwall's Light Infantry, with two-
and-a-half companies, the remainder being in support and re-
serve. Thus the disposition of the force was such as to face an
attack from the north and west, while its left, on the other
side of the canal, was placed in engineer fashion like the flank
to the curtain of a bastion. The 800 yards interval between
the Duke of Cornwall's and the Marine Artillery was partially
occupied by the Mounted Infantry and the small force of the
4th Dragoon Guards dismounted. On the right of all were the
troop of the 7th Dragoon Guards and the two 13-pounders,
with an additional two which had been sent forward from the
rear. About this time, General Graham sent back a message
f skir-
ing to
ported
ing an
J head-
;k and
ly was
under-
Marine
J could
fire to
, howe-
n force
in that
the ad-
lal bet-
strong,
0 yards
lent ex-
pports
Inl. The
on 'he
,h two-
nd re-
face an
other
le flank
tween
rtially
of the
re the
nders,
lorn the
lessage
GOHTAINIMO RKMAHK8 AMD OPIMIONfl OF THB MOST OI8T1NOUI8HBD SOLDIERS 98
to General Drury-Lowe saying that he could do no more than
hold his own, and directed the cavalry to come up and attack
the left of the enemy's skirmishers. At 5 o'clock reinforce-
ments were perceived coming up to the Egyptians by train*
and, at the same time, their cavalry appeared to be advancing
on the right. The reserve company of the York and Lancas
ter was, therefore, deployed to meet the attack. For some time
the 13-pounders were worked with great effect upon the
enemy; but, unfortunately, the ammunition gave out and the
guns had to cease firing. No wagons had been brought up by
the guns which had joined during the fight, probably on ac-
count of the heavy nature of the soil, and the actions of the
24th and 25th had, no doubt, exhausted that which was origi-
nally with Lieutenant Hickman's guns. We seem to see here
another danger created by want of sulhcient transport. If the
men could not be supplied with food it is not likely that the
heavier ammunition was forwarded to them. Luckily, a Krupp
gun, with its ammunition, had been taken at Mahsameh, und
was now worked by a gun detachment of the Royal Marine
Artillery with marked effect, 93 rounds being expended du-
ring the day. This detachment seemed to bear a charmed Ufe.
In front of it, beside it, and behind it fell shrapnel bullets and
ragged morsels of shell fired in salvos by the Egyptian guns.
But not a single man was hit during the engagement. The
enemy continued to press the attack, especially striving to
break through the gap between the Marine Artillery and the
Infantry; but the Mounted Infantry and dismounted Dra-
goons vied with each other in steady resistance^and good fi-
ring. The Egyptians were very determined, and even pushed
detachments across the canal, which was here 5ft. or 6ft. deep;
but they were always driven back by the Marine Artillery. At
a quarter to 7 the enemy had been held back so long and so
vigorously repulsed that General Graham judged that the mo-
ment had come for a counter attack. He believed, also, that by
I /-A
IS
M
m
96
Modern War.
vm
h'
that time the cavalry charge must be tiiking place, though he
knew nothing of what was actually occurring. Just after the
order for advance had beed given, the Royal Marine Light In-
fantry came up on the right from Mahsameh and was direc-
ted to advance, together with the Duke of Cornwalls, which
were on the left, the York and Lancaster being held in re-
serve. The enemy made little resistance, and the EngUsh foot
soldiers advanced two or three miles, the enemy only stan-
ding once, when their resistance was overborne by a single
volley of the Royal Marines. Not till 8 15 p. m. did General
Graham hear of the magnificent and successful cavalry attack.
Gliding along through the night, the Household Cavalry,
7th Dragoon Guards, and Horse Artillery, kept the ridge bet-
ween them and the enemy until it was time to charge. As they
crossed the ridge they were perceived, and a heavy fire was
opened upon them, but always too high. The front line clea-
red out of the way of the guns, which came into action wi-
thin 400 yards and enfiladed the Efjyptian lines. Sir Baker
Russell, who commanded the brigade, then gave the order to
charge, and took care not to remain behind till his horse was
killed under him. Cuirassiers duf* Dragoons rushed on at full
speed, swept through the Egyptian guns, and made great
slaughter among the infantry.
How this memorable attack was made and with what suc-
cess is now matter of history. The suddenness and silence of
the approach of the Household Troops, guided through the
haze by the flash of guns and rifles; the gallant charge, the
instantaneous rout of the enemy's line, the pursuit and the
complete defeat of the attacking force; these things have al-
ready taken their place in our military annals, and will be
pointed to in the future among the striking and even pictu-
resque incidents in the history of the British army. There vas
a grave fault in the operations of the day, that shortness of
ammunition to which we have referred ; and doubtless the
COHTAinillO RVMARKS AND OPIHIOHS OF TBC MOST DISTlNOmmiKD SOLDIERS 97
iigh he
ter the
ghl In-
; direc-
, which
. in re-
ish foot
y stan-
a single
jreneral
attack,
kvaky,
ige bet-
As they
ire was
ne clea-
ion wi-
r Baker
)rder to
rse was
1 at full
e great
jiat suc-
ience of
igh the
rge, the
ind the
lave al-
1 will be
pictu-
lere vas
less of
3ss the
responsibility for this will be brought home to the proper
quarter. But, as it happened, the fault was not fatal ; and the
day ended in a brilliant success.
During the next few days little of interest occuiTed at the
front. General Graham was reinforced, and on the 30th, Sir
Edward Hamley embarked at Alexandria with the 3d Bri-
gade, and sailed next day, the 31st, The brigade was, how-
ever, retained on board ship off IsmaiUa, merely landing por-
tions of the troops day by day to assist in the work which
was going on at the base. The Indian contingent continued
to arrive in the Canal, and the whole of the English staff were
engaged with whatever troops and workmen they could put
their hands upon in laying down a small branch railway from
the station to the pier at Ismailia, and in landing engines,
while the Naval Brigade placed launches on the Freshwater
Canal and cai»*ied provisions, ammunition, and stores up to
Kassassin Lock. The situation was clearing itself rapidly, and
while a portion of public opinion, both at home and on the
Continent, believed that the English force was checked, its
commander was developing his plans for the attack of Tel-
el-Kebir, the very spot on which before leaving England
he had laid his finger as the scene of the critical battle of the
war. By the 3d the whole of the Indian contingent had arri-
ved in the Canal, including the 1st Manchester, except the 6th
Bengal Cavalry, which continued to arrive in detachments up
to the 14th of September, one of its detachments having arri-
ved as early as the 21st of August. On the 5th the Sultan's
Proclanvition declaring Arabi a rebel was issued at Constan-
tinople, and the Convention was initialled on the t>th, when or-
ders were sent to prepare for the despatch of Turkish troops
from Suda Bay. Slight reconnoissances were made once or
twice by the enemy, and on the 9th Arabi made a reconnois-
sance in force, with which he was himself present. It was the
anniversary of the original revolt, and we cannot but believe
m
m
p
r
M
m
■4^' -I
■■'T'^^r^:
^
98
VODIBN WaB.
that something more than a reconnoissance was intended by
the attack, which was made both by about 8,000 men and 24
guns from the main body and a portion of the detachment
which, with feeble strategy, Arabi had pushed out to the ter-
minus at Salahieh. By this time the English were much too
strong to be placed in the sligthest jeopardy. In the artillery
fire the two English batteries and the 40-pounders on its
truck obtained a considerable advantage, and on this day
especially was proved the great power of shrapnel as a man-
killing projectile. Our loss only amounted to 60 killed and
wounded, while the enemy suffered heavely. Four or five of
his guns were captured, and the hotter spirits among the En-
ghsh were inclined to attribute want of vigour to Sir Garnet
Wolseley because he refused to carry, on that day, the lines
of Tel-el-Kebir. The same accusation was often pressed against
Wellington in the Peninsular War. If Sir Garnet Wolseley
had allowed himself to have been carried away by the heat
ot the moment, he might, indeed, have entered the works, but
the Egyptian army would have remained a solid force still
ready to dispute the way to Zagazig and Cairo. Not only was
he strategically right to bide his time, but the delay probably
saved the famous Egyptian city, with its monuments of anti-
quity which could never be replaced. At the time the action
was fought, the Guards were still at Mahuta, and the Highl£»d
Brigade, the Royal Irish Fusiliers, at least one battery of Ar-
tillery, with two squadrons of the 19th Hussars and part of
the Indian contingent were still at Ismailia. Nor were all the
requisite provisions, ammunition, and stores at the frpnt.
On Saturday the anniversary of the revolt, a sharp attack
on the head of the English advancing forces was made by the
Egyptian troops of Tel-el-Kebir. The design of the manoeuvre
was ambitious, no less than to assault the British force in front
and both flanks at the same time. This tactical plan had
exactly the same elements of failure as the strategical arran-
Compiled by M^Jor d'Eutraguei, U. M. Reterve ForcM.
led by
and 24
;hinent
he ter-
iich too
rtillery
I on its
lis day
a man-
led and
five of
the En-
Garnet
lie lines
. against
/^olseley
the heat
rks, but
ce still
nly was
robably
of anti-
action
ighland
of Ar-
part of
all the
)nt.
attack
by the
noeuvre
in front
an had
arran-
GO!<TAflTINO RKVARKS AND OPIinOirS OP THR MOST DISTiNODISHRD SOLDIIRS 99
gement by which the force at Tel-el-Kebir was weakened in
order to send troops to Salahieh. It may be taken for granted
that the first line advancing against unshaken infantry not
inferior in quality will always fail to penetrate I he position, and
that the only successful method is to send on wave after wave
even at one point so as to submerge it under a tide of men,
and open a way through the living barrier. Weak attacks
even in flank are sure to be repulsed. Thus it was on Saturday.
From the west where lies the main Egyptian position, from
the north-west where a range ef hills serves to conceal the
movements of an enemy advancing from the direction of El-
Kalraim and from the north where the same range lies bet-
ween Kassassin and Salahieh, moved heavy lines of whit-
coated soldiery bent upon driving in the front aud right flank
of the English. The advance began at 7 o'clock in the morning,
and about the same time a column moved towards our left
flank on the south side of the canal. Without hesitation,
General Willis moved out to meet the attack, with so much
of his division as was at the front and the marines, who are
now under his command. The Guards Brigade moved up
from the rear during the day.
^ According to the reports, the Egyptian General had under
his orders and available for the action eight regiments of in-
fantry, 2,000 regular cavalry, and 62 guns, but that force was
not brought into the field, neither was the whole of the Salahieh
gaiTison advanced against us. It was said to consist of 7,500
infantry, one regiment of cavalry, and 24 guns, and Toulba
Pasha had himself gone to Salahieh in order to make sure of
a successful combination. Only 1,500 men were, however,
brought up to assist in the attack. The first shot was fired by
the 40-pounder on the ironclad truck, and it fell near the
trains which were bringing up reinforcements for Arabi. The
enemy replied with artillery fire, and thus began a duel on
the fine of railway. Further to the right, six battalions of En-
. iLiiiil
> ''J
1.1 . :< !
m
Ti'm
■9J!.f *'!S'!i»i"!i'"«w..rj !
jJWiJulf . ,v^ji.
100
MooiRN War.
glish infantry were drawn up on rising ground, whence two
batteries of the Royal Artillery soon opened fire on the enemy.
The Bengal Lancers watched the right of the whole line, the
line of horsemen being afterwards strengthened by the Hou-
sehold Cavalry guarding the force rgainst attack from Sala-
hieh. On the left the Marines and King's Rifles met the attack
from the side of the railway and canal, and supported the 40-
pounder on its truck.
The Egyptian commander had choice of his own country-
men for the assault, the black regiments from the Soudan,
and seems to have used the latter for the hottest work. These
men have the reputation of being the best infantry in the
army, and pressed on with some vigour, exchanging a rolling
fire with the Rifles and Marines.
The enemy, shrank back from storms of bullets, carrying
with them a reserve which had advanced on the south side
of the canal. On the centre and right, the EngUsh shells tore
through the threefold ranks of the Egyptians and forced them
to recede, though [our guns were always under tire from the
enemy's artillery. Slowly and sullenly the whitecoated troops
drew back, but not without loss of honour. A small party of
Marines dashed out on the troops retiring from our front and
captured two guns which had advanced too near the position.
In spite of their losses and a heavy list of killed and wounded,
the Egyptians from Tel-el-Kebir fell back steadily within
their lines, whence shells were afterwards thrown dming the
day at a range of 5,000 yards.
The detachment from Salahieh showed more audacity and
fared worse. It held its ground after the retreat of the main
body, and thus enabled General Willis to pay more attention
to it. From the accounts given of this part of the affair, it
would seem that the Salahieh contingent was met by infantry
and artillery fire, and afterwards charged when retiring by
the Household Cavalry, who captured one or two guns. Thus
nee two
i enemy,
line, the
he Hou-
)m Sala-
he attack
ithe 40-
country-
Soudan,
rk. These
:y in the
a rolling
carrying
}uth side
lells tore
ced them
from the
ed troops
party of
front and
position.
grounded,
y within
iring the
icity and
he main
attention
affair, it
infantry
iring by
ns. Thus
COMTAUflKO RIXARK8 JL..0 OFOnOirfl OF THI MOST DISTIirOUISniD SOLOllRfl 101
the force which stood longest suffered most and was most
thoroughly beaten at last.
It is no doubt a fault to despise one's enemy, but it is a
greater evil to over-estimate his power.
Sir Garnet Wolseley in his report speaks of it as a recon-
noissance which only became a fight when General Willis
advanced. But the number and dispositions of the enemy
would seem to indicate an intention of attacking, and it is dif-
ficult to reconcile the movement from Salahieh on any other
supposition. The engagement probably resulted from one
of those halfhearted movements which are intended to strike,
but hang suspended in the air so long that the adversary has
time to anticipate the blow and strike vigorously under the
uplifted arm. If Arabi had attacked General Graham with his
whole power on the 28th at once instead of hovering round
him for hours, he might possibly have caused some retirement
of the advanced guard, however slight. And on Saturday his
best chance was to have concentrated for a heavy blow against
one flank of the English while only threatening the rest. The
small extent of our losses is to be accounted for, as usual, by
the indifferent fire of the enemy, who, as we have formerly
explained, always fires high, because the men are nervous.
It will be observed that the Egyptian artillery practice is bet-
ter than that of the infantry, because a field gun does not
shake, nor can its muzzle be raised or lowered by every tre-
mor of the man who lays it. The best proof of the steadiness
of an army is the fire of the infantry, and if a strong force goes
through an engagement for some hours inflicting little loss
upon the enemy, we may say with some certainty that its
quality is very inferior. The reasons may be many. Indifferent
training, want of good officers, and above all, carelessness for
the object of dispute.
Arabics attack upon our position was a determined one, and
was planned with some skill. The idea seems to have been to
m
a:1
m%
102
Modern Wab.
14
11
■tm
m
''Ml
Ml
take advantage of his preponderance in numbers by making
an attack on the north of our position while directing a mass
of troops along the line of the railway and canal.
With commendable promptitude, and, in the outset, no lit-
tle pluck, he resolved to forestall us in the offensive, striking
at our most advanced line before the concentration was com-
pleted.
According to prisoners, some of Arabi's crack regiments
were engaged, a statement borne out by the white uniforms
which only the regulars weai'. Arabi was also present in per-
son, and directed the movements. The attacking column out-
numbered us at every point, yet a disastrous and humihating
defeat was inflicted, in which the enemy suffered serious los-
ses, while ours were, as usual small.
The Egyptian troops shoot with tolerable precision, and
they stand lire very well at a distance. But when it comes to
close quarters, whether their assailants be the Household
Troops or the Marines, the Egyptians have no chance at all.
But now all was ready for the advance. On the 9th, the day
of the action, the head-quarters were established at the front-
The Highland Brigade commenced its march. The Guards were
brought up, and the whole force with which it was intended
to strike was concentraded on the spot by the 11th. The men
were allowed to rest for one day.
On the nth and 12th Sir Garnet Wolseley reconnoitred the
two sides of the enemy's position. He saw before him a Une
of intrenchmeuts some fom* miles long, soft earthworks with
hurdle revetments. At intervals along the line redoubts
mounted with guns were placed to deliver both front and
flanking fire and connected by trenches. In support of the
front hne were redoubts which were especially strong towards
the right centre of the position, both because they crowned
natural elevations and because they had been strengthened
by art. The flanks were protected by similar works, an in-
GONTAINIMO REMARKS AND OPIMONS OF TBE MOST DISTINGUISHED S0LD1KR8 108
laking
I mass
no lit-
triking
s com-
[iments
liforras
in per-
nn out-
iliating
3US los-
on, and
omes to
usehold
p at all.
he day
e front,
is were
itended
le men
red the
a Une
LS with
[doubts
|nt and
of the
)wards
lowned
Lhened
Ian in-
trenched front line and redoubts. They were probably unas-
sailable by cavalry.
The fighting force at the front with which Sir Garnet Wol-
seley had to strike his blow consisted of the Duke of Con-
naught's brigade, including the 2d Battalion Grenadier Guards,
the 2d Battalion Coldstream Guards, and the 1st Battalion
Scots Guards, all worthy representatives of Her Majesty's
picked troops; secondly, General Graham's brigade, including
2d BattaUon Royal Irish, which already carries the decoration
of the Sphinx, and whose long chain of victories extends from
Blenheim to the last war in Afghanistan; the IstBatalion West
Kent, a regiment which, now composed of the old 50th and
97th, shares their honours in common, and carries upon its
colours 19 names won in honourable fight; the 2d Battalion
York and Lancaster, composed of the old b5th and 84th, which
have fought in India, Arabia, Nive, Peninsular, Lucknow,and
New Zealand; and the 1st Battalion Royal Irish Fusiliers,
which amalgamates the honours of the old 87th and the 89th,
carries five distinctive marks, among which is the Sphinx,
and 14 names ranging from Egypt in old campaigns down to
Sebastopol; thirdly, the Highland Brigade under General Ali-
son, which contains the 1st Battalion Royal Highlanders—
that is, the old Black Watch ot high renown ; the 2d Battalion
Highland Light Infantry— a regiment which weds together
the old 71st and 74th, carries the distinction of the Elephant
and no less than 23 honourable names; the 1st BattaUon Gor-
don Highlanders, composed of the old 45th and 92d, bearing
as distinctions the Royal Tiger and the Sphinx and a list of
20 battles or campaigns ; and the 1st Battalion Cameron High-
landers, the old 79th, which also was formerly in Egypt, and
flaunts on its banners 13 histoi ical names.
A fourth brigade was formed of the two divisional batta-
lions—namely, the 2d Battalion Duke of Cornwall's Light lu-
fantiy, in which the old 32d an 4t)th mingle their honours,
404
MoDEii5 War.
1(1 ;.'i|
f
m
Jim
so that it carries 16 names, and the 3d Battalion of the King's
Royal Rifle Corps, formerly and still the 60th, a regiment
which, with its 29 names, might almost bear the motto of the
Royal Artillery « Ubique. » Of the Royal Marines and Moun-
ted Infantry we only know that they were present.
The whole of the divisional cavalry appears to have been
present, and would include under the command of General
Drury-Lowe. the Heavy Brigade, led by Sir Baker Russel,
which is composed of the Household Cavalry, the 4th and 7th
Regiments of Dragoon Guards; the Light Brigade, under Ge-
neral Wilkinson, composed of the 2d Beloochee's, the 6th Ben-
gal Cavah-y, and the 13th Bengal Lancers. Besides these, the
19th Hussars, which hitherto has been broken up and atta-
ched to the infantry divisions, was, to its great contentment,
permited to accompany the fighting force instead of being left
at Ismailia or broken up into small detachments on the line
of communications. Part of it was, however, left at Kassassin.
Of the ubiquitous Royal Artillery there were seven batte-
ries massed under the command of Colonel Goodenough, and
two batteries of Horse Artillery, which formed part of the ca-
valry division. The Field batteries were A-1, D-1, 1-2, N-2, C-
3, J-3, and the 9-pounder battery from India; the Horse Ar-
tillery Batteries were the G-B and N-A ; and the screw guns
worked by the 7-1 Garrison Mountain Battery were on the
field.
Besides this force there was the Indian Infantry Brigade,
consisting of 1st BattaUon Seaforth Highlanders, which are
composed of the old 72d and 78th, and bear the distinctive
badge of the Elephant, together with a list of 15 campaigns
and battles. The Indian regiments were the 7th, 20th, and th*^-
29th Bengal Native Infantry, but they were only represented
in small nuuibers, having each left two companies behind to
garrison Ismailia, and besides dropped half a company each
at Neftche and at MahuU\. The 1st Battalion of the Manchester
>*
^-1
King's
tgiment
0 of the
Moun-
^e been
General
Russel,
and 7th
ier Ge-
)th Ben-
lese, the
ftd atta-
ntment,
eing left
the line
issassin.
n batte-
igh, and
f the ca-
N-2, C-
)rse Ar-
iw guns
on the
brigade,
lich are
tinctive
npaigns
and th*^-
esented
hind to
ny each
Chester
CoifTAIHIKO REMARKS AND 0PIN10K8 OF Tm MOST DTSTmGDISHID SOLMIRB iOB
Regiment, which came from India, had the grievous disap-
pointment of being left to garrison Ismailia. Of all the painful
duties which can be assigned to a regiment, that of remaining
behind when their comrades are advancing upon the enemy
is the hardest; but it is a duty which must be done by some
one, and as the Indian brigade was to be more or less broken
up, the task of defending Ismailia against an attack which
might still come had evidently to be commited to one of the re-
giments of that Brigade. The Manchester regiment has the less
reason to complain as it already carries the honourable dis-
tinction of the Sphinx for old service in Egypt, and gained
fresh honours lately during the last compaign in Afghan-
istan.
The Fleet, the co-operation of which has so added to the
favourable chances of the campaign, was represented by 250
bluejackets with six Gatlings, and the 40-pounder railway
gun, together with the Krupp taken from the enemy.
The whole force taken together comprised about 11,000
bayonet:?, 2,000 sabres, and 60 guns, in addition to the 40-
pounder.
Sir Garnet Wolseley estimates the force of the enemy at
17,500 regular Infantry, 2,500 Cavalry, 70 guns, and 6,000 ir-
regulars, Bedouin or otherwise.
The position of the enemy, though nominally at Tel-el-Ke-
bir, that is, south of the Canal, actually extended, so far as is
known, to El Karaim, and even pushed out a strong detachment
to Salahieh. Thus, instead of concentrating his forces as much
as possible, Arabi distributed them over too large a space. In
the anxiety to guard everything, he failed to be strong at the
uecisive point.
Behind these works lay an Egyptian force the strength of
which can only be estimated by the tact that 18,000 rations
wereissued the day before for the regular troops, and 7,000 for
irregulars. But the strength of his enemy was only known va-
106
IfODKRif War.
guely to Sir Garnet Wolseley. The practical facts before him
were— the works, the knowledge that they were fully occu-
pied, the knowledge also of a detachment at Salahieh, and the
certainty that the enemy would be informed of all his move-
ments by spies. The experience of an Egytian sun on the de-
sert sands had shown that though English troops could fight
and conquer in the heat of the day, the hard task before them
had better be performed in the cool hours of the morning. To
save his troops, to deceive the prying eyes of the enemy, and
to seize the best moment for an assault, Sir Garnet decided to
move under cover of the night and commence his attack be-
fore daylight. Accordingly, at nightfall on the 12th, the camp
was broken up, tents struck, packed, and placed in order, and,
availing itself of the absence of moonlight, the force moved
silently forward in the order chosen for attack. After procee-
ding a short distance, the men bivouacked, no light nor fire
being allowed. At half-past one the men rose from their sandy
coaches and advanced with less difficulty than is to be ex-
pected in night marches. Tnere was some wandering astray,
but, on the whole, the movement was steady. The total
strength present was 11,000 bayonets, 2,000 sabres, and 60
guns, about half that of the enemy, excluding the Salahieh de-
tachment. On the right marched the bulk of the Cavalry Bri-
gade, and two Horse Artillery batteries, with orders to sweep
round to the rear of the enemy's line at daylight. Next to them
on the left., and forming the right of the Infantry, was Gene-
ral Graham's Brigade, supported by the Duke of Cnonaught
with the Guards. Nearer to the railway and canal moved 42
guns under Colonel Goodenough, supported by a fourth bri-
gade made up the day before from the King's Uoyal Rifles and
the Duke of Cornwall's, and with them apparently were the
Marine Light Infantry. On the same side of the railway and
the canal was the bulk of the Highland Brigade, under Sir
Areb'^^-^ld Alison, and on the south of the canal such of the
Compiled by Major d'Entragues, H. M. Reservo Forcat.
)i'e him
f occu-
and the
; move-
the de-
Id fight
i-e them
ling. To
ny, and
cided to
tack be-
ic camp
ler, and,
moved
procee-
nor fire
ir sandy
) be ex-
astray,
total
and 60
lieh de-
ry Bri-
sweep
to them
s Gene-
jnaught
oved 42
th Dri-
rtes and
ere the
ay and
der Sir
of the
he
CORTAININO RGHAnKS AND OPINIONS OP THE MOST DIST1N0UT8HED SOLDIRRS 407
Indian Contingent as were upon the ground, the 1st Manches-
ter having been left at Ismailia and detachments of other re-
giments dropped on the line of communications. With them
also must have been a portion of the Indian cavalry. The iron-
clad train occupied the railway, supnorted and manned by
the 250 blue-jackets who had been dra ./n from the ships and
sent to the front to share in the last great duty and the final
satisfaction.
The Highland Brigade on our left and Graham's Brigade
cm cfnr right stole forward through the darkness to the assault
of the enemy's position. Knowing the effect produced by the
sudden apparition of a brave enemy determined to charge, Sir
Garnet decided to have no preliminary fire, but to trust only
to the shadows of the night to veil his advance. It is said that
the men were ordered not even to load if it could possibly be
avoided, and, in any case, to close with the foe and, breast to
breast, decide the strugj^i' :ith the bayonet. On both flanks
the British atUicking fr . came within short distance of the
enemy before they were perceived. Dawn was faintly creeping
up the eastern sky when the crest of a ridge some 500 ysirds
in front of the Egyptian left became covered with moving ob-
jects telling Idack against the pale light. It was Graham's bri-
gade advancing. Then a single shot from the Egyptian lines
rang out in the stillness of the morning, and immediately the
whole front of the position was broken by jets of red flame
from rifle and cannon. It would seem that at this moment the
rest of the troops down in the shadows of the plain had not
been perceived, and that the fire was of that involunUiry sort
which tells of want of steady discipline. For a moment the
Brigade on the hill gazed upon the enemy at its feet, upon the
dark lines of their earthworks witli their fringe of flame. Then,
with a grand clieer, the tide of British lads was let loose, and
the blood of the men bounded no less strongly in their veins
because their service in the Army was to be six years instead
3
108
HoDERR War.
! fr
!
k
of twelve. But, as in this part of the field the English soldiers
had been seen by the enemy, they were subjected to a hail of
bullets. The Egyptian infantry clustered thickly on the para-
pets of the redoubts and poured down the slopes into the
trenches. Hundreds of them, lying down, pUed the head of
the advancing brigade with fire. The young soldiers deployed
with perfect steadiness and advanced by sections, alternately
lying down to fire and making short rushes towards the ene-
my's position, always under full control of their officers. As
they came near the trenches they gathered themselves together
and, without an instant's hesitation, leaped into the midst of
the enemy. Bayonet and butt were plied with deadly effect,
and the second line, rushing down to join their comrades,
found the trenches full of dead and wounded Arabs. The first
fine of the Egyptian defences was captured, with its redoubts,
A stronger fort lay behind, still occupied heavily by the enemy
and armed with 12 guns. Line after line of shelter trenches
stood further on. To have stopped at this time would have been
to re-enact the mistake of the Redan in the Crimea. The
men cheered again, climbed the mount and the parapet of the
fort, and bayoneted the gunners at their guns. A quarter of
an hour or 20 minutes from the first great rush after the firing
advance sufficed to place the intrenchments, with their sup-
porting redoubts, in the hands of the English troops. Those
of the enemy who were able fled, followed by the fire of the
troops in the captured positions, and though other redoubts
as yet uuattacked fired for a while, the threat of the EngUsh
cavalry coming behind caused them to be suddenly evacuated.
Towards the left of the British fine the Highlanders advan-
ced with a steadiness not to be surpassed. Not a shot was
fired until they were within 300 yards of the enemy's posi-
tion, and then came that burst of flame which had broken out
at once along the whole Egyptian fine. But at this point the
enemy fired wildly. The Highlanders cheered and dashed for-
CoHTAnnire remarks axd opmioire or the most DisTiNoriSHio f oldibrs 109
soldiers
I hail of
e para-
nto the
head of
eployed
srnately
the ene-
cers. As
iogither
midst of
y effect,
mrades,
[he first
Bdoubts.
e enemy
trenches
ve been
ea. The
et of the
larter of
le firing
eir sup-
Those
e of the
edoubts
Inglish
icuated.
advan-
lot was
s posi-
ken out
)int the
led for-
ward to the shrill music of their pipes. The first line of in-
trenchments was carried with a rush, and the men found
themselves in presence of a second line, which had to be car-
ried. Like their comrades on the right during the first ad-
vance, the Highlanders pushed on for a time slowly and firing
steadily, then cheered again, and rushed into the inner re-
doubt. The resistance of the Egyptians failed from that mo-
ment, and the battle was virtually over— the battle, but not
the pursuit. The Egyptian regiments, mingled together in one
wild and disastrous retreat, had no rest given to them, no
chance of rallying for a moment, for now it was the turn of
the cavalry, which, sweeping round from the north, cut to
pieces the tide of fugitives. The same gallant spirit and events
of the same character were seen in other parts of the field.
The 4th Brigade attacked boldly and suffered heavy losses,
and the artillery did its part with its usual devotion. But the
battle was won in an old-fashioned way, suitable to the re-
quirements of the case. If new occasions demand new means,
old occasions demand the old means of the bayonet and the
sabre. In former actions the artillery and cavalry had been
chiefly conspicuous. The battle of Tel-el-Kebir was won by
the infantry.
Nor was any chance of rallying allowed to the beaten
enemy. The guns in the redoubts were turned against their
former masters, and with astonishing swiftness portions of
the British Artillery bounded over intervening ditches and
parapets into the heart of the position and crushed the terri-
fied masses by shrapnel fire, causing the accumulations of
men to burst asunder and fly in all directions.
. Not a moment was lost. Straight over the battlefield the In-
dian contingent pressed the flying foe and moved swiftly
upon Zagazig. It was joined by a battalion of Highlanders at
or near Abou Essen, and together they occupied Zagazig that
afternoon. The bulk of the Cavalry division and the Mounted
Ir
i
I'
r'i.
110
Modern War.
:m(?
Infantry, having cut through ihe flying masses, moved south-
west by the desert road upon Belbeis, which it occupied, after
a shght skirmish, that evening, the guns however, and the
heavy cavalry being somewhat delayed by obstacles on the
route. This force occupied Cairo next evening, the 14th, after
a splendid march of 39 miles under the blazing Egyptian sun,
saving the town from destruction, which had been threate-
ned, and capturing Arabi himself, who remained a prisoner
in our hands. On the 14th, also. Sir Garnet Wolseley, the
Head-quarters Staff and a company of Scots Guards, with
the Duke of Connaught, moved on to Zagazig by train; thence
next day, the 15th, to Benha and Cairo, entering the capital
amid the acclamations of the people, accompanied by detach-
ments of Guards, Highlanders, and Marines.
The English force, after toilsome exertions to secure a
base at Ismailia and a proper line of communications— exer
tions which lasted three weeks— found itself almost half
a day's march from the enemy, who had been repulsed again
and again by the advanced guard, and had at last tiiken refuge
within his fortifications.
The night advance had been successful in this, that the
whole march was unopposed till the troops were in position.
Before long their artillery opened lire, and though it is unli-
kely that the enemy suffered heavy loss so long as he remai-
ned undisturbed behind his intrenchments, suflicient was
done to establish the superiority of our fire and prepare the
Arabs for retreat. Yet as the dawn mounted in the sky, and
objects became more distinct, the Egyptian fire improved, and
our men began to fall more freely. They were, however, clo-
ser by that time, and never wavered in their advance as they
pressed on firing steadily. This preparatory action seems to
have lasted for some hours, probably about three, and the fire
was general all along the line, the cavalry always creeping
round insidionsly to turn the flanks of the enemy, and change
GoifTAlMIMG REMAHKS AND OPIIflOIVS Or THE MOST DISTIHOVISHBD SOLDIERS 111
south-
id, after
ind the
on the
h, after
an sun,
.hreate-
>risoner
ley, the
is, with
; thence
1 capital
detach-
secure a
IS— exer
ost half
3d again
n refuge
that the
losition.
is unli-
remai-
nt was
lare the
;ky, and
ed, and
er, clo-
as iliey
lems to
the Hre
[reeping
change
retreat into rout. All such advances of infantry are made by
degress, one portion lying down and firing to control the oppo-
sing fire and support the forward movement of the others,
who, in then* turn, take up the duty of firing from a resting
position and help the rest to advance. We may therefore ima-
gine the Egyptians watching a line of flre which seems to
waver but never fails to approach, which disappears in parts
only to appear again with reneved vigour. Meanwhile the ter-
rible shrapnel flre covers the parapets with showers of balls,
and causes a growing tendency to keep well down below the
crest. But the soldiers so cowering cannot aim at the English,
and the bullets generally fly too high.
At last the gradual process of advance in flghting formation
was over. Steady Scotch and English, wild and laughing Irish
arrived within 200 yards of the opposing works, and with
mighty cheers the gallant lads leapt all intervening obstacles,
and found themselves breast to breast with their adversaries.
The army had to be dashed to pieces, not made to retreat,
and as the remnants of the first line recoiled from the bayo-
net, leaving their guns a prey to the victors, they found them-
selves under the flashing sabres and iron hoofs of the cavalry.
Discomfited, broken, put to flight by the intantry, they were
annihilated as an army by the cavalry.
The victory of Tel-el-Kebir is an achievement as brilliant,
complete, and cheaply purchased as any that has ever graced
the EngUsh arms. A position which the General describes as
« very extensive and very strongly fortified » has been at-
tacked and carried with one rush, and with a loss which,
though it includes many valuable lives, is yet far smaller
than the most reasonable expectation could have foreseen.
Sir Garnet Wolseley has known his business much better
than his critics. Without hurry, but without any unnecessary
delay, he has gone straight forward to his task; and his own
skill, the ability of his ollicers, and the admirable fighting
m
m-
il9
MODERlf Wab.
m
ii'.'m
fM
k
'i
i
f
I v'
5 If
■ ^.ll
qualities of his young soldiers have enabled him to win
a great victory.
It is impossible to conceive an operation more successful
and executed in a more masterly manner. The intrenchments
in which Arabi put his trust, and which were in truth formi-
dable enough to justify some confidence, were carried with
briUiant courage by the British troops. The proudly laconic
message of the Roman general may be used by Sir Garnet
Wolseley with full and unquestionable right. From the time
our soldiers left their bivouac until the Egyptians were in
panic-stricken flight, there was not a moment's pause in the
onward movement. In the end the battle was won in the good
old-fashioned EngUsh style, at the point of the bayonet. Sir
Garnet Wolseley adapted his tactics to the enemy he had to
contend with. The Egyptians have no particular objection to
rifle or even to artillery fire at long ranges. Af fifteen hun-
dred yards they show sufficient courage, and with a breast-
work in front of them they are almost as good soldiers as one
need wish. They have never been able to stand the onset of
British troops, whether mounted or on foot. The whole pro-
blem, therefore, was to get our men to close quarters with the
smallest possible loss, and the way to do this was to start be-
fore dawn. Our troops had to run the gauntlet of the enemy's
fire for about a mile ; though it appears to have done no mis
chief until the greater part of that distance was passed. By
the time the foe had sufficiently recovered from their confu-
sion and surprise to use their weapons with anything like
precision our men were too close to be stopped by anything
they could do. When they saw our soldiers on their parapets
notwithstanding the hail of bullets they had been discharging,
they gave up the struggle and defeat instantly became total
rout.
The whole plan of the campaign, as hitherto carried out,
was settled by Sir Garnet Wolseley with the concurrence of
to win
!cessful
hments
formi-
d with
laconic
Garnet
ae time
vere in
in the
he good
net. Sir
3 had to
jction to
3n hun-
breast-
s as one
onset of
>le pro-
ith the
itart be-
nemy's
no mis
sed. By
confu-
ng like
lything
larapets
larging,
e total
led out,
pence of
GONTAiinHG REMARKS ARIi OPIRIONB OF THE MOST DISTlNGDISIiKD SOLDIERS IIS
his superiors and the hearty acquiescence of his chief advisers
before he left England. There never was any question at all
about the Canal being the basis of operations. Not only did he
lay down the general plan of the campaign, but the time to be
occupied in the different stages of the undertaking was cal-
culated with a minute accuracy which events have fully veri-
fied. Before leaving this country he put his finger upon Tel-
el-Kebir, saying that there Arabi would make his stand, and
that we should attack him on the 15th of September. It looks
a remarkably good guess, but it was really the result of accu-
rate knowledge and careful calculation. We mention the cir-
cumstance to show that a great deal which to the outside ob-
server seems chance is really foreseen, planned, and allowed
for. Of course no man's calculations are of the sUghtest use
unless he can rely upon his data. Sir Garnet Wolseley assu-
med a very high degree of efficiency in the marine transport
both from this country and from India, and his confidence
was fully justified. He assumed a certain high standard of
endurance for the troops under his command, and again
events have verified his calculations. Our immense naval and
maritime resources have enabled us to carry out co-ordinated
transport movements from the extremities of our vast em-
pire with a regularity and precision to which no other nation
could attain; and our young soldiers have proved themselves,
as their commander expected, fully equal to the maintenance
of the reputation achieved by their predecessors. Another point
is worth mentioning, as it covers a great deal of hasty though
superficially plausible criticism. On the day he left Alexandria
for Aboukir Sir Garnet Wolseley wrote, I shall make for Kas-
* sassin Lock at once to get water. » In view of this precon-
ceived design to push ahead, his statement that he outran his
transport becomes the literal expression of fact instead of the
euphemistic phrase some were inclined to think it. The thing
had to be done rapidly, and he made up his mind to do it ra-
/
114
MODIBM WaB.
I ■■I
in''
111
■if
Mi
' 'I'l
n.
ill
pidly, with full knowledge of what the deteiinination invol-
ved. The Canal had to be seized at once ; and the Canal once
seized Kassassin had to be reached with all possible celerity
in order to save the water supply. Critics sitting at ease in
their arm chairs propounded the theoretically admirable prin-
ciple that you should never begin a thing until you are in a
position to carry it right through in a complete and orderly
manner. Sir Garnet Wolseley more wisely decided that to
carry the thing through is the great point; he saw that it had
to be done rapidly or not at all ; calculated that the stuff at
his disposal was strong enough to stand the strain ; and then
quite deliberately went fihead of his transport. He has achie-
ved a success which renders all apology for his methods su-
perfluous and classes him as one of the greatest commanders.
None would be more eager than himself to remind the coun-
try that whatever merit he may claim as head of the expedi-
tion, that success is largely due to the exceedingly able and
zealous manner in which he has been assisted by his staff. To
Sir John Adye, in particular, belongs a high meed of praise
for the indefatigable energy he has displayed.
It is always expected that English troops should be ready
to face in battle numbers exceeding theirs, and the long roll
of victories, especially over Oriental troops, has always been
marked by a disproportion in numbers. But it has not often
been given to an English General to attack a force of double
his own strength, armed with some of the best weapons of
the day, and defending themselves behind works designed by
competent engineers and built by men especially versed in
that part, at least, of the soldier's craft. An English army in the
field is now exactly what it ever has been. There is in the
English army one tradition and one force of unsurpassable
strength. It is the idea of duty and the feeling that every man
is working, not tor himself, but for the general cause of his
country. The efiect of this and of the natural instinct for figh-
Compiled by Major d'EDlraguea, U. If. fteserve Forcet.
GO.ITAINmO RRHARKS AMD OPmiOKS OF THE MOST OI&TlKGDISnED SOLDIIRB tlB
#1
invol-
1 once
Blerity
ase in
; prin-
re in a
>rderly
that to
, it had
itutT at
id then
achie-
)ds su-
anders.
e coun-
expedi-
ble and
ftaff.To
praise
ready
ng roll
|ys been
it often
double
>ons of
nedby
irsed in
ly in the
Is in the
lassable
iry man
of his
for figh-
ting which underlies the civilization of these islands has now
been, that Sir Garnet Wolseley with his small but steadfast
British army attacked and took in a marvellously short space
of time the Egyptian Plevna, completely routed an army of
double his own strength, captured many guns, several rail v, ay
trains, immense quantities of supplies, stores, and prisoners.
The great victory of Wednesday was followed up with the
same vigour and thoroughness that have marked the whole
ronduct of the campaign.
To know how to follow up a beaten foe is almost as neces-
sary as to know how to beat him.
Immediately after the battle, the pursuit was commenced on
two lines. The Indian contingent, pressed on at once by for-
ced marches to Zagazig, followed in the evening by the High-
land Brigade, which was pushed yet further to Benha, on the
line of railway there to seize the passage of the Nile. The bulk
of the cavalry soon covered that portion of the desert which
intervenes between Tel-el-Kebir and Belbeis, which they oc-
cupied the same night.
The cavalry and the Guards pushed on towards Cairo, and
the Duke of Gonnaught, who has done his work like a good
soldier, lead the advanced guard of England into the capital
of the Khedive.
Nothing could be more complete and signal than the suc-
cess of Sir Garnet Wolseley's brief but brilliant campaign.
He has been ably seconded throughout by subordinates
whose zeal and activity secured the prompt execution of all
his designs, and his troops have approved themselves worthy
to uphold the glorious traditions of the British army. They
have borne with patience and goodwill such trials as befel
them, and there probably never was an army which exhibited
less of murmuring or malingering in the field. It is easy to
think because the issue of the campaign has been so sudden
and so decisive that its difficulties and risks were insignifl-
/
Il«
MoDBRK War.
cant. They were not insignificant in themselves, but they were
reduced to insignificance by skill, forethought, and organiza-
tion on the part of the commanders, and by steadiness, bra-
very, and endurance on the part of the troops employed. The
capture of Tel-el-Kebir itself was, by the common consent of
public opinion throughout Europe, a brilliant feat J arms.
But the way in which the victory was followed up by the
prompt capture of Zagazig and Belbeis and by forced marches
on Cairo was a no less conspicuous example of military enter-
prise and endurance. « Our cavalry, * says Sir Garnet Wol-
seley, « did extremely well in taking possession of Utiro by
» a very long forced march yesterday afternoon; » and he
adds, in generous and deserved recognition of the spirit dis-
played by his troops, « all ranks have worked hard and done
» their duty well. i> The praise is abundantly earned, and the
country will freely indorse it. It is not the least satisfactory
feature of the campaign that the Indian troops have stood
shoulder to shoulder with their European comrades, and have
zealously fulfilled the duties of honour and difficulty with
which they were charged.
The details show that for a few minutes the fighting at
Tel-el-Kebir was more serious than was infened from the
first accounts of the action, and that our loss is some what more
severe than was at first reported. There was keen rivalry
between the different regiments for the honours of the day,
and all behaved with a gallantry beyond praise. Upon the
Highlanders fell the brunt of the conflict, but if others suffered
less it was certainly from no want of dash on their own part.
It is pleasant to acknowledge the admirable behaviour of the
Indian troops, who are stimulated by the desire to prove
themselves fully worthy of the honour of being placed in line
With British soldiers. Four years ago the excitement among
them at the prospect of fighting the battles of England was
intense, and their disappointment at being sent back without
GOHTAJiriNG REMAJIKS AND OPINIONS OF THE MOST DIBTIRGUISHID S0LDIU8 117
firing a shot was correspondingly keen. It was well under-
stood, however, that had there been any fighting, they would
have borne their share, and the knowledge of that fact had a
most salutary effect in India. Now they have actually fought
side by side with our troops, and have displayed qualities
which fit them to take an honoured place in any army that
the Empire may turn out to defend its interests. It is impos-
sible to exaggerate the good effect of this comradeship in dan-
ger. Our Indian soldiers are proud of the trust reposed in
them, and eager to justify it while nothing can inspire En-
glishmen with more legitimate and honourable pride than the
thought that they have so managed their great dependency as
to command its hearty loyalty.
The English General had to spend longer in securing his
base than would be the case if we were better organized for
sudden wars, but nothing better could have happened in the
present case. The delay enabled the enemy to concentrate at
Tel-el-Kebir and place his eggs in one basket, which the bril-
liant little English army had no difficulty in upsetting. It is
now seen and known that the plan was conceived before lea-
ving England and carried out as intended from day to day,
and is at last brought to a satisfactory conclusion. The Gene-
ral commanding has designed, his Staff have worked out the
details, and his regimental officers and men have struck the
needful blows. The whole campaign has been carried out in *
businesslike manner, with steadiness, quiet work, and confi-
dence that when the time came for engagements, great or
small, the men would carry it through with spirit and deter-
mination. So far as can be seen, not a hitch has occurred,
though some difficulty and delay was caused by want of trans-
port. The Government have been unsparing in sending all
that was needful for the troops, and have supported the hands
of the General. Taken all in all, the campaign has shown that
the army is more professional, and therefore more useful,
m
41
118
Modern War.
than at any time during this generation ; and the knowledge
cannot but be satisfactor j^ to the country.
It is said, and we beheve with truth, that Sir Garnet Wol-
seley, before the attack of Tel-el-Kebir, directed his men to
reserve their fire until the last moment and to trust to the
bayonet. There will probably be some criticisms on this order
and inquiries whether it was in consonance with modern sys-
tems of tactics. We may say at once that it was entirely con-
sistent with the modern idea. For the modern idea consists in
this, that while a certain model of attack may be laid down for
drill purposes, which supposes nearly level ground and eve-
rything in an average condition, any commander worthy of
the name will adapt his means and his practice to the end re-
quired. Under ordinary conditions and supposing the enemy
to have equally good troops with one's own, an attack conduc-
ted like the one at Tel-el-Kebir would surely fail. But, as it hap-
pened, the troops were not equal, and the attack was at least
commenced before daylight. The Egyptians had evidently no
regular system of outposts, or we must have heard of sharp
struggles before the English force arrived within range of the
works. Again, it was possible to count upon a very ill aimed
musketry fire on the part of the enemy, so that it was not ne-
cessary to spend a long time in subduing that fire before the
troops charged. To have hung about the outskirts of the tren-
ches for a long time would have given the Egyptian troops
time to recover from their surprise and to gain confidence.
Moreover, it was well understood that there was no question
of the success of our men at close quarters. Thus a number
of considerations all pointed in the same direction, and the
means were so contrived as to attain the end. It is this, and
not any particular system of formation for attack which may
be called the modern tactical idea. It means, in short, that sol-
diers should be masters of their profession and able to devise
at any moment a system of attack best suited to the necessity
GONTAININQ REMARKS AND OPIiaONA OF THI MOST DIBTINOUISHED 80LD1RR8 119
lowledge
oet Wol-
5 men to
ist to the
his order
lern sys-
-ely con-
msists in
down for
and eve-
worthy of
e end re-
lie enemy
a conduc-
as it hap-
is at least
liently no
of sharp
ge of the
ill aimed
Is not ne-
fore the
he tren-
troops
fidence.
[question
number
and the
his, and
ich may
,hat sol-
devise
icessity
of the case. For instance, while it would now be madness to
meet a portion of the German army in any stiff formation
whatever, solidity and stiffness are just the qualities required
to meet the attack of such enemies as the Zulus. What is right
in one case is wrong in another, and the test of a good com-
mander, whether general, colonel, captain, or lieutenant, is,
that he is able to devise at a given moment exactly the right
combination to suit his purpose. That ivhich was suitable for
darkess and an inferior enemy would not be so in other ins-
tances, and it is to be hoped that critics will remember this
before declaring Sir Garnet Wolseley heterodox, and teachers
of tactics will not use the present instance as a model for imi-
tation under different circumstances.
Indifferent troops, men whose hearts are already in their
homes, and who are in spirit looking over their shoulders, are
always timid in the dark. Even good troops are so when they
have to withstand, not to make, an attack. The darkness is all
to the disadvantage of defenders in the moral impression
which it creates. Again, the shadows of night conceal the at-
tacking force and render the enemy ignorant of the position
and strength of the columns. Weak feints can be made which
would be quickly understood by day, but are as terrible as
the main attack by night. And, above all, the night neutrali-
zes the advantages possessed by the defenders, firing as they
are from behind shelter and with rests for their rifles. The ad-
vantage disappears when they know not where to fire or on
what point the attackeis are advancing. A still stronger rea-
son for a night attack is the coolness of the air, which would
double the vigour of the English soldiers. To thp Egyptians,
accustomed to their own climate, and to work under a blazing
sun, the noontide rays may inatter little. To our troops they
mean a list of killed and wounded which may vie with that
produced by the fire of the enemy. There is a growing im-
pression among soldiers of mirk that in the future night at-
120
MODSRK War.
I^i
I I
tacks will be common, and will furnish the best answer to the
fire of modern breechloaders.
Against it there are the arguments that it is difflcult to
keep a force in hand at night, and especially difflcult to gather
it together for pursuit. The point of attack cannot be so well
prepared by a previous artillery fire to demoraUze the defen-
ders, though this is the less necessary, as they would not
know the direction in which the main attack was to be deli-
vered.
The difference between day and night attacks was shown
in the last war by the contrast between the assaults on Plevna
and on Kars; the one a gigantic and repeated failure, the other
a great success. But when all the ai jjuments which we can
marshal at home are exhausted, there remain many details,
the value of which can only be estimated on the spot.
It is interesting to note the great part played in our modern
political life by the discoveries of science and the achieve-
ments of our practical genius for machinery. Fifty years ago
such an operation as we have just carried out in Egypt would
have been absolutely impossible, and even twenty-five years
ago it would have been justly reckoned marvellous had it dis-
tantly approached the perfection attained to-day. Only the re-
cent developments of electrical and engineering science have
rendered possible that extreme nicety of calculation to which
the striking effect of Lord Wolseley's combinations is due.
The telegraph has annihilated time throughout our vast em-
pire Spjice remains to tyrannize over us, but even its ancient
power is curtailed. We can bridge it with hitherto unknown
celerity, and, what is even more importimt, with nearly abso-
lute certainty. In the old days an admiral went forth to seek
his enemy, but when, where, and how he might find him
were matters within the domain of accident. Contrary winds
might detain him for weeks in port, or might detain his ad-
versary, or might in a score of ways disappoint the most sim-
GOHTAIHIMO RBMARKS AHD 0PINI0K8 OF THE MOST DISTINGUISHED 80LDISRB 111
r to the
Icult to
gather
so well
defen-
uld not
be deli-
shown
1 Plevna
lie other
we can
details,
modern
achieve-
jars ago
►t would
e years
d it dis-
the re-
Ice have
[o which
is due.
fast em-
ancient
known
y abso-
to seek
nd him
winds
his ad-
ist sim-
ple calculation. To have started either from London or Bom-
bay with the fixed persuasion that a given point in Egypt
would be reached on a given day would have indicated ex-
traordinary inexperience; while to have depended on the
double event and calculated upon the exact coincidence of the
arrivals from these distant ports would have argued lunacy.
There is something exhilarating in the mere contemplation of
the marshalled forces that now obey our will. Custom dulls
our perception of the daily muacles wrought on our behalf,
just as it does our apprehension of the yet older and more
marvellous wonders of nature. Yet, as the sight of the sea in
its strength or of the mountains in their calm may sometimes
roll back the veil and restore the freshness of our perception,
so is there in some of the manifestations of human control
over nature a perennial, though sometimes suspended, power
to impress the imagination. To many of us an express train
shooting across the quiet fields or plunging into the yawning
tunnel is a phenomenon that never loses its interest. If we
think for a moment of the great ships pressing on through
daylight and dark, through tempest and calm, to perform
With ordered and foreseen punctuality an errand dictated
many thousand miles away, we get something of the feeling
with which our children watch a locomotive.
Lord Wolseley said in the recent campaign English sol-
diers, for the first time since the Crimean War, had encoun-
tered a regular army. They had since the war with Russia en-
countered Zulus, A-shantees, Maoris, men who brought against
them bows and arrows, assegais, and shields, who in many
cases had no artillery at all, and when they had field guns did
not know how to use them. But in the late war they met with
a regular army.
The victory was a victory of sui'^rise; one of those bold
strokes in which consummate audacity is the highest caution.
There is something that must captivate the most torpid ima-
/
122
MoDmn War.
wm
13
gination in the spectacle of the ease and rapidity with which
an Army has been conveyed from these shores to Egypt, has
fought a brilliant and successful campaign, and is being
brought back to England. We should search in vain for a
precedent to so rapidly-despatched a piece of business; and
it is impossible for any English man not to experience a mo-
mentary feeling of exultation over the sight of such marvel-
lous celerity, accompanied by such excellent results. It is
thought a great feat for the peaceful tourist, unencumbered
with baggage, and assisted on his road by an organisation for
speeding the coming guest, if he makes the circuit of the
world in three months. Yet in little more than that time an
Army, with all its endless appurtenances and impedimenta,
has gone from the North of Europe to the East of Africa, has
carried its victorious flag through a trackless and difficult
country, and has set its face homewards, that it may receive
the reward of skill, patience, and valour. It is no ungrud-
ging welcome the English people accord to the gallant sol-
diers that return from the dust and sand and sweltering
heat— the thirst, hunger, and privations of the Egyptian
Campaign.
LORD WOLSELEY'S DESPATCH
M
Cairo, Sept. 16.
Sir, — I have already had the honour of reporting by tele-
graph to you that I attacked the entrenched position of Tel-
el-Kebir a little before sunrise on the morning of the 13th in-
stant, completely defeating the enemy with very great loss,
and capturing 59 field guns, vast quantities of ammunition,
?aiiiiary stores, and supplies of all sorts.
'I he enemy were pursued to Zagazig, 25 miles from our
vvu, ;ltd by Major d'Eotraguei. H. M. Resarve Forest. *
GOIITATNmO REMARKS AND OPINIONS OF THE MOST mSTlNOtlSHSD SOLDIIRS 19S
I which
fpt, has
5 being
n for a
;ss; and
e a mo-
marvel-
ts. It is
imbered
ttion for
t of the
time an
dimenta,
frica, has
dimcult
y receive
ungrud-
illant sol-
weltering
Egyptian
lept. 16.
by tele-
\ of Tel-
\ 13th in-
|eat loss,
mnition,
Irom our
camp at Kassassin, by the Indian Contingent, the leading de-
tachment of which reached that place under Major General
Sir H. Macpherson, V.C., a little after four p.m., and by the
Cavalry Division, under General Lowe, to Belbeis, which was
occupied in the evening. Major General Lowe was ordered to
push on with all possible speed to Cairo, as I was moM an-
xious to save that city from the fate which befel Alexandria
in July last.
These orders were ably carried out. General Lowe reach-
ing the great barracks of Abassieh, just outside of Cairo, at
4.45 p.m. on the 14th instant. The cavalry marched 65 miles
in these two days. The garrison of about 10,000 men, sum-
moned by Lieut. Colonel H. Stewart, A.A.G. to the Cavalry
Division, to surrender, laid down their arms, and our troops
took possession of the citadel. A message was sent to Arabi
Pasha through the Prefect of the city, calling upon him to sur-
render fortwith, which he did unconditionally; he was accom-
panied by Toulba Pacha, who was also one of the leading re-
bels in arms against the Khedive.
The Guards, under his Royal Highness the Duke of Con-
naught, reached Cairo early on the 15th inst.
The result of the battle of Tel-el-Kebir has been the entire
collapse of the rebellion. The only place that has not as
yet surrendered is Damietta, and its capture or surrender can
be easily effected at our leisure.
The men of the rebel army having laid down or thrown
away their arms in their flight, have now dispersed to their
homes, and the country is so rapidly returning to its ordinary
condition of peace that I am al)le to report the war to be at an
end, and that the object for whicli this portion of her Majes-
ty's army was sent to Egypt has been fully accomplished.
Such is a brief summary of tiie events of the last three days.
I shall now endeavour to describe them somewhat in detail.
From the daily reconnaissance of the position at Tel-el-
/
M
Modern War.
Kebir, made from our camp at Kassassin, especially from the
good view I obtained of the enemy's works on the 9th instant,
when our troops drove back within their entrechments the
force of 13 battalions, 5 squadrons, and 18 guns, that had at-
tacked our camp in the morning, it was evident their works
were of great extent, and of a formidable character. All the
intormation obtained from spies and prisoners led me to be-
lieve that the enemy's force at Tel-el-Kebir consisted of from
60 to 70 horsed guns, which were mostly distributed along
their line of works, of two Infantiy divisions (24 battaUons)
of about 20,000 men, and three regiments of cavalry, together
with about 6,000 Bedouins and Irregulars, besides a force of
about 5,000 men, with 24 guns, at Salhalieh, all under the im-
mediate command of Arabi Pacha. I have since been able to
verify these numbers, which are certainly not overstated, ex-
cept as regards the number of guns at Tel-el-Kebir, which I
believe to have been 59, the number we took in the works
and during the pursuit.
Owing to the numerous detachments I was obliged to make
for the defence of my long line of communications from Suez
to Ismailia, and thence on to Kassassin, and owing to the los-
ses incurred in previous actions, I could only place in line
about 11,000 bayonets, 2,000 sabres, and 60 field guns.
The enemy's position was a strong one; there was no co-
ver of any kind in the desert lying between my camp at Kas-
sassin and the enemy's works north of the Canal. These works
extended from a point on the Canal V/t miles east of the rail-
way station of Tel-el-Kebir for a distance, almost due north,
of about 3V« miles.
The general character of the ground which forms the
northern boundary of the valley through which the IsmaiUa
Canal and railway run is that of gently undulating and roun-
ded slopes, which rise gradually to a fine open plateau from
90 to 100 feet above the valley.
GONTAUriNO BEUAUK8 AMD OPUTIONS OF THE MOST 0ISTU(GU18U£D SOLDURS 125
1 no co-
Lt Kas-
Iworks
le rail-
I north,
IS the
ImaiUa
roun-
from
The southern extremity of this plateau is about a mile from
the railway, and is nearly parallel to it. To have marched
over this plateau upon the enemy's position by daylight, our
troops would have had to advance over a glacis-like slope in
full view of the enemy, and under the lire of his well-ser ired
artillery for about five miles. Such an operation would have
entailed enormous losses from an enemy with men and guns
well protected by entrenchments from any artillery fire we
could have brought to bear upon them. To have turned the
enemy's position either by the right or left was an operation
that would have entailed a very wide turning movement, and
therefore a long, difficult, and fatiguing march, and what is of
more importance, it would not have accomplished the object
I had in view, namely, to grapple with the enemy at such close
quarters that he should not be able to shake himself free from
our clutches except by a general fight of all his army.
I wished to make the battle a final one; whereas a wide
turning movement would probably have only forced him to
retreat, and would have left him free to have moved his
troops in good order to some other position further back.
My desire was to fight him decisively where he was, in the
open desert, before he could retire to take up fresh positions
more difiicult of access in the cultivated country in his rear.
That cultivated country is practically impassable to a regular
army, being irrigated and cut up in every direction by deep
canals.
I had ascertained, by frequent reconnaissances, that the
enemy did not push his outposts far beyond his works at night,
and I had good reason for believing that he then kept a very
bad look out. These circumstances, and the very great re-
liance I had in the steadiness of our splendid infantry, deter-
mined me to resort to the extremely difficult operation of a
night march, to be followed by an attack, before daylight, on
the enemy's position ; the result was all I could have wi-
shed for.
116
Modern War.
At dawn on the morning of the 12th instant, accompanied
by all the Generals and Brigadiers, I inspected the enemy's
works, and explained to them my intended plan of attack,
and gave to each a sketch, showing the formation in which it
was to be effected. (Copy enclosed, marked B.)
As soon as it was dark on the evening of the 12th instant,
I struck my camp at Kassassin, and the troops moved into
position, the left near the point marked « Ninth Hill » on
sketch A, where they bivouacked.
No fires were allowed, and even smoking was prohibited,
and all were ordered to maintain the utmost silence through-
out the night's operation. At 1.30 a.m., on the morning of the
13th instant, I gave the order for the advance of the 1st and
2d Divisions simultaneously. The night was very dark, and
it was difficult to maintain the desired formation, but, by
means of connecting files between the battalions and briga-
des, and between the first and second fines, and through the
untiring exertions of the Generals and the Officers of the Staft
generally, this difficulty was effectually overcome.
The Indian Contingent* under Major General Sir H. Mac-
pherson, and the Naval Brigade under Captain P^itzroy, R.N.,
did not move until 2.30 a.m. To have moved them earlier
would have given the alarm to the enemy, owing to the num-
ber of viUages in the cultivated land south of ^he Canal.
Telegraphic communications by means of an insulated cable
was kept up through Kassassin all through the night between
the Indian Contingent on the south of the Canal, and the
Royal Marine Artillery, with which I moved in rear of the 2d
Division.
In moving over the desert at night, there are no land marks
* 7 I 1 Royal Artillery (Bfountain Battery), let Battalion Seafortti
Highlanders, Sd Battalion Native Infantry, made np of detachments of
7th Bengal Native Infantry, 20th Paiijaub Infantry, and29lh Beloochees.
GONTAININO REMARKS AND OPINIONS OF THE MOST OISTINGUISIIRD SOLDIERS 117
cable
Itween
Id the
ie2d
to guide one's movements ; we had, consequently, to direct
our course by the stars. This was well and correctly effected,
and the leading Brigades of each Division both reached the
enemy's works within a couple of minutes of one another.
The enemy were completely surprised, and it was not until
one or two of their advanced sentries tired their rifles, that
th^y realised our close proximity to their works.
These were, however, very quickly lined with their infan-
try, who opened a deafening musketry fire, and their guns
came into action immediately. Our troops advanced steadily
without firing a shot, in obedience to the orders they had re-
ceived, and when close to the works went straight for them,
charging with a ringing cheer.
Major General Graham reports « The steadiness of the ad-
vance of the 2d Brigade * under what appeared to be an ut-
terly overwhelming fire of musketry and artillery will remain
a proud remembrance. »
The 2d Brigade was well supported by the Brigade of
Guards, under H.R.H. the Duke of Gonnaught.
On the left the Highland Brigade **, under Major General
Sir A. Alison, had reached the works a few minutes before
the 2d Brigade had done so, and in a dashing manner stormed
them at the point of the bayonet, without tiring a shot until
within the enemy's lines. They were well supported by the
Duke of Cornwall's Light Infantry and the 3d Royal Rifles,
both under the command of Colonel Ashburnham of the last-
named corps.
In the centre, between these two attacks, marched seven
larks
iforth
Ints of
shees.
* 2d Battalion Royal Irish Regiment, Royal Marine Light Infantry,
2d Battalion York and Lancaster Regiment, tst Battalion Royal Irish
Fusiliers.
"1st Battalion Royal Highlanders, 1st Battalion Gordon Highlanders,
Ist Battalion Cameron Highlanders, 2d Battalion Highland Light In-
fantry.
m
M0DBR5 War.
1: l<i
mm
batteries of Artillery, deployed into one line, under the com-
mand of Brigadier General Goodenough, and, after the cap-
ture of the enemy's woks, several of these batteries did good
service, and inflicted considerable loss upon the enemy, in
some instances firing canister at short ranges.
On the extreme left the Indian Contingent and the Naval
Brigade, under the command of Major General Sir H. Mac-
pljerson, V.G., advanced steadily and in silence, the Seaforth
Highlanders leading, until an avanced battery of the enemy
was reached (it is not shown in sketch A), when it was most
gallantly stormed by the Highlanders, supported by the Na-
tive Infantry Battalions.
The squadron of the 6th Bengal Cavalry, attached tempo-
rarily to General Macpherson, did good service in pursuing
the enemy through the village of Tel-el-Kebir.
The Indian Contingent scarcely lost a man, a happy cir-
cumstance, which I attribute to the excellent arrangements
made by Major General Macpherson, and to the fact that,
starting one hour later than the 1st and 2d Divisions, the re-
sistance of the enemy was so shaken by the earlier attacks
north of the Canal, that he soon gave way before the impe-
tuous onslaught of the Seaforth Highlanders.
The Cavalry Division, on the extreme right of the line,
swept round the northern extremity of the enemy's works,
charging the enemy's troops as they endeavoured to escape ;
most of the enemy, however, threw away their arms, and, beg-
ging for mercy, were unmolested by our men. To have made
them prisoners would have taken up too much time, the Ca-
valry being required for the more important work of pushing
on to Cairo.
Such is the general outline of the battle of Tel-el-Kebir.
All the previous actions of this short campaign were chiefly
Cavalry and Artillery affairs, but that of the 13th instant Was
essentially an Infantry battle, and was one that, from the
! com-
e cap-
i good
my, in
Naval
I. Mac-
eaforth
enemy
IS most
he Na-
tempo-
iir suing
ipy cir-
;ements
ct that,
the re-
attacks
impe-
le line,
I works,
jscape ;
^d,beg-
made
Ihe Ga-
jushing
l-Kebir.
[chiefly
it Was
the
GoNT Annuo RtvARRS i?n) opiNioirs OF Tire MOSTDisTmomsniiD soi.Dimis IS9
time we started at 1.30 a.m. until nearly 6 a.m., when it was
practically over, was peculiarly calculated to test, in the most
crucial manner, the quality and the fighting discipUne of our
Infantry.
I do not believe that at any previous period of our military
history has the British Infantry distinguished itself more than
upon this occasion.
I have heard it said of our present Infantry Regiments that
the men are too young, and their training for manceuviing
and for fighting, and their powers of endurance, are not suf-
ficient for the requirements of modern war. After a trial of an
exceptionally severe kind, both in movement and in attack, I
can say emphatically, that I never wish to have under my
orders better Infantry Battalions than those whom I am proud
to have commanded at Tel-el-Kebir.
Our casualties have been numerous, but not so many as I
had anticipated. Her Majesty has to deplore the loss of many
gallant men, who died as became the soldiers of an army that
is proud of the glorious traditions it has inherited.
It would be impossible in this despatch to bring to your
notice the services of those officers whom I consider especially
worthy of mention. I shall do so in a subsequent despatch ; but
I cannot close this without placing on record how much I am
indebted to the following officers who took part in the battle
of Tel-el-Kebir, and who, by their zeal and ability, jontribu-
ted so largely to its success -. — General Sir John Adye,K.G.B.,
Chief of the Staff; Lieut. Generals WilUs and Sir E. Hamley;
Major-Generals Sir A. Alison, H.R.H. the Duke of Connaught,
Drury-Lowe, Sir H. Macpherson, and Graham; Brigadier Ge-
nerals Goodenough, R.A. Sir Baker Russell, the Honourable
J. Dormer ; Deputy Adjudant General Tanner and Colonel
Ashburnham, who temporarily commanded a brigade during
the action ; and to Captain Fitzroy, who commanded the Naval
Brigade.
iSO
Hoonii War.
Brigadier General Nugent, R.E., remained during the action
in command of the left at Kassassin, to cover the rear of the
army operating in his immediate front, and to protect that
position, with all its stores and depots, from any possible at-
tack from the enemy's force at Salhalieh. He rejoined me in
the evening at Tel-el-Kebir, having carried out the orders he
had received.
The medical arrangements were all they should have been,
and reflect the highest credit upon Surgeon General Han-
bury.
In the removal of the wounded on the 13th and 14th instant
to Ismailia the Canal boat service, worked by the Royal Navy,
under Commander Moore, R.N., did most excellent work, and
the army is deeply indebted to that officer and to those under
his command for the aid he afforded the wounded, and for
the satisfactory manner in which he moved a large number of
them by water to Ismailia.
No exertion has been spared on the part of Major General
Earl, commanding the line of communications, and of Com-
missary General Morris, to supply all the wants of this army
during its advance from Ismailia.
To the Head Quarter Staff, and to olficers composing the
Staff of each Division, my best thanks are due for the able
manner in which they performed their duty.
In conclusion, I wish to express my deep sense of the high
military spirit displayed throughout the battle of Tel-el-Ke-
bir, and during all our previous engagements, by comman-
ding officers, by all regimental officers, and by every non-
commissioned officer and private now serving in Egypt.
I have also the honour to enclose a roll of the casualties
which occurred at the battle of Tel-el-Kebir.
Major George FitzGeorge, 20th Hussars, the senior mem-
ber of my personal Staff, is the bearer of this despatch, and
Compiled by M^or d'Eutragues, H. 11, ReterTo Foroui.
GONTAINraO REMARKS AHD OPINlOlfS OF THE HOST DISTIHOUISIIKD SOLDIUS 181
I have the honour to recommend him to your favourable con-
sideration.—I have, &c.
G. J. WOLSELEY, General,
• Commander-in-Chief H.M. Forces in Egypt.
DESPATCH FROM LORD WOLSELEY
Cairo, September 24th, 1881
mem-
h, and
Sir,— In my despatch of the 16th instant, I promised to
forward for your information at a future date the names of
those who, in my opinion, should be specially brought to your
favourable notice for the good work they have done during
the campaign.
It is usual to make a report of this nature at the termina-
tion of a war, and to do this justly and fairly is one of the
most difficult tasks that devolves upon a General commanding
in the field, especially when, as in the present instance, al-
most all those employed in any other than regimental posi-
tions have been carefully selected, either on account of the
ability they have displayed in former wars, or because they
have passed the prescribed course of study at the Stafif Col-
lege.
In my previous Despatch I referred to the good services
performed by the General Officers Commanding Divisions
and brigades, or holding superior positions on the Staff of the
army. It is therefore unnecessary for me to repeat their na-
mes, but before passing on to those who have rendered good
service in less prominent positions, I would wish to avail
myself of this opportunity of expressing how deeply I have
been indebted, from the beginning until the termination of
this war, to General Sir John Adye, my Chief of the Staff", for
the cordial, loyal, and efficient assistance I have at all times
Wm
■mmiii*
m
Modern War.
received from him. His ability as an administrator is well
known to you, and the highest praise I can give him is to say
that his soldierlike qualities are fully on a par with his admi-
nistrative capacity.
Sir John Adye brings to my notice the able manner in
which Major the Honourable N. G. Lyttelton, Rifle Brigade,
who acted as his secretary, has done his work, a fact to which
I have great pleasure in bearing testimony.
His Aide-de-Gamp was Lieutenant the Honourable F. W.
Stopford, Grenadier Guards.
Lieutenant Generals G. H. S. Willis, G.B., and Sir E. B.
Hamley, K.G.M.G., G.B., led their divisions in a very gallant
manner at the battle of Tel-elTKebir. General Willis comman-
ded at Kassassin, when it was attacked by the enemy on the
9th instant, and with a very small loss drove him back within
his entrenchments.
The services rendered at Alexandria by Major General Sir
A. Alison, Bart., K.C.B., previous to my arrival, are already
well known to you. No one could have led his brigade more
gallantly, or with greater skill, than he did on the 13th instant,
when he showed it the way into the enemy's entrenchments.
He is both zealous and capable.
Major General his Royal Highness the Duke of Gonnaught,
K.G., Gommanding 1st Brigade, has evinced upon all occa-
sions throughout this war the utmost zeal for his profession.
No one could have taken greater care of his men than he has
done, providing for their wants and comfort, and setting them
an example of cool courage under the very heavy musketry
fire by which they were assailed on the 13th instant. He
brings to my notice the valuable assistance he invariably re-
ceived from Golonel Sir John M'Neill, V.G., K.C.M.G., and
Major Lane, Rifle Brigade, the former, in my opinion, one of
the best officers in the army.
I regret very much to say that the necessity of keeping a
Imga
GOMTIININO REMARKS AND OPINIONS OF THB MOST OISTINGUISUED S0LDUR8 1S8
large garrison at Alexandria deprived me of the active servi-
ces in the field of Major General Sir E. Wood, G.G.M.G., Com-
manding the 4th Brigade. He had, however, responsible duties
to perform at that station, especially when, on the capture of
Cairo, the enemy laid down their arms at Kafir Dowar. He
was also employed in obtaining the surrender at Damietta,
all of which duties he performed to my entire satisfaction.
The brunt of the fighting throughout the campaign fell to
the lot of major General G. Graham, V.C., C.B., Commanding
2d Brigade, and it could not have been in better hands. To
that coolness and gallantry in action for which he has always
been well known he adds the power of leading and comman-
ding others.
Major General Sir H. T. Macpherson, V.C., K.C.B., Com-
manding the Indian Contingent, is a pillar of strength in any
army with which he serves. His varied experience of war, and
the confidence he inspires in all under his command, mark
him out as a divisional leader to whom the honour of our
arms and the lives of her Majesty's soldiers can at all times
be safely entrusted.
He speaks in high terms of his Stafl" whose names are given
below :—
Lieutenant F. G. E. Ghilders, Royal Artillery, Aide-de-
Camp.
Major A. B. Morgan, Norfolk Regiment, Assistant Adjutant
General.
Captain H. Melliss, Bombay Staff Corps, Assistant Quarter-
master General.
Major A. C. Toker, Bengal Staff Corps, Deputy Assistant
Adjutant General.
Captain E. R. Elles, Royal Artillery, Deputy Assistant
Quartermaster General.
Lieutenant J. M. Grierson, Royal Artillery, Deputy Assis-
tant Quartermaster General.
re
m
11. iv'
184
Modern War.
Colonel C. Ashburnham, C.B., King's Royal Rifles, Aide-
de-Gamp, who acted as a Brigadier at Tel-el-Kebir, led his
Brigade upon that occasion to my entire satisfaction.
Colonel H. S. Jones, as Colonel on the Staff, commanded
the Battalion of Royal Marine Light Infantry, and also the
Battalion of Royal Marine Artillery. He did his duty at all ti-
mes with zeal and ability; the executive command of the Bat-
talion of Royal Marine Light Infantry devolving upon Lieut.
Colonel S. J. Graham.
Lieut. Colonel H. B. Tuson, of the Royal Marine Artillery,
is a very good officer. Both these battalions have done excel-
lent service; their discipline in camp and steadiness in action
leave nothing to be desired.
Brigadier General O. V. Trnner, C.B., Commanding Infan-
try Brigade of the Indian Contingent, has been specially
brought to my notice by Major General Sir H. Macpherson for
the able manner in which he led his brigade.
Major General D. C. Drury-Lowe, C.B., has commanded
the Cavalry Division with great skill and success throughout
the campaign, and I have great pleasure in strongly recom-
mending him to your most favourable consideration. His pur-
suit of the enemy and occupation of Cairo the day after the
battle of Tel-el-Kebir is worthy of every praise. I believe the
preservation of the city is owing to the splendid forced march
made by the cavalry on that occasion. The Staff of the Cavalry
Division was as follows : —
Captain C. E. Swaine, 11th Hussars, Aide-de-Camp.
Captain Viscount St. Vincent, 16th. Iiancers, Aide-de-Camp.
Lieut. Colonel H. Stewart, 3d Dragoon Guards, Assistant
Adjutant and Quartermaster General.
Lieut. Colonel M. G. Gerard, Bengal Staff Corps, Deputy
Assistant Adjutant and Quartermaster General.
Lieut. Colonel H. McCalmont, 7th Hussars, Brigade Major,
1st Cavalry Brigade.
GONTAOIING REMARKS AND OPINIONS OF THE MOST DISTINGDISHED SOLDIERS 188
|Camp.
distant
^epuly
lajor,
Major S. D. Barrow, Bengal Staff Corps, Brigade Major, 2d
Cavalry Brigade.
The soldier-like qualities of Brigadier General Sir Baker
Russell, K.C.M.G., C,B-, are so well known that it is unneces-
sary for me to enlarge upon them. He is a born cavalry leader.
Brigadier General Wilkinson, who commanded the 2d Bri-
gade of Cavalry (Native Cavalry), is a very zealous ofTicer,
and his frequent reconnaissances of the enemy's position at
Tel-el-Kebir were very well carried out.
Before passing from the Cavalry Division I must bring pro-
minently to your notice the name of Lieut. Colonel H. Ste-
wart, 3d Dragoon Guards, Assistant Adjutant General to the
Cavalry Division, one of the best Staff Officers I have ever
known, and one whom I feel it will be in the interest of the
Army to promote. General Drury-Lowe has written to me
about him in the highest terms, especially remarking upon
the tact with which he conducted the surrender of Cauro, and
of the garrison of that city.
I would also venture to mention the names of Lieut. Colo-
nel M. G. Gerard, of the Bengal Staff Corps, who was Deputy
Assistant Adjutant General to the Cavalry Division, and of
Lieut. Colonel H. McCalmont, 7th Hussars, and of Major S. D.
Barrow, Bengal Staff Corps, the Brigade Majors of the two Ca-
valry Brigades, all of whom are good soldiers.
General Drury-Lowe also speaks in the highest praise of
Lieut. Colonel G. B. Borradaile, Royal Horse Artillery, who
ably commanded the battery permanently attached to his di-
vision.
The Royal Artillery and Royal Engineer Staff, composed
as follows, have done their work to my satisfaction :—
Royal Artillery.
Brigadier General W. H. Goodenough.
Captain G. B. N. Martin, Aide-de-Camp,
'IM
-I
^^
186
MoosRN War.
Major A. G. Yeatman-Biggs, Brigade Major.
Captain H. S. Dalbiac, Acting Aide-de-Camp during absence
of Major Yeatman-Biggs.
At the battle of Tel-el-Kebir Brigadier General Goodenough
commanded and directed with much skill the movements of
42 guns, which formed the centre of our second line. He is
an excellent officer. He speaks in very high terms of the va-
luable services rendered to him by his Brigade Major, Major
Yeatman-Figi-i, cd by his Aide-de-Camp, Captain G. B. Mar-
tin, who acted as Brigade Major to the Artillery when Major
Yeatman-Biggs was incapacitated by illness.
Royal Engineers.
Brigadier Gcaerr/J. (i B. P. N. H. Nugent, C.B.
Captain S. Walls r, i- a?;-de-Camp.
Major T. Fraser, C.M.G., P'igade Major.
The Staff of the . w^o '^nfi^n'. ' Divisions, including the Bri-
gade Majors and Aides-de-Cuin^;; i^ the Brigadiers, consis-
ted of:—
1st Division.
Lieut. General G. H. S. WilUs, C. B.
Captain W. C. James, 2d Dragoons, Aide-de-Camp.
Lieutenant A. E. Codrington, Coldstream Guards, Aide-de-
Camp.
Colonel R. R. Gillespie, Assistant Adjutant and Quarter-
master General.
Major H. J. T. Hildyard, Highland Light Infantry, Deputy
Assistant Adjutant and Quartermaster General.
Mayor W. C. F. Molyneux, Cheshiie Regiment, Deputy As-
sistant Adjutant and Quartermaster General.
Captain J. J. C. Herbert, Grenadier Guards, Brigade Major,
1st Brigade.
Captain H. C. Hare, Cheshire Regiment, Brigade Major,
2d Brigade.
CONTAIHIRO RIHARRS AMD OITNIONS OF THC MOST mSTINOmSHCD SOtDIIERS iS7
Captain W. H. Holbech, King's Royal Rifles, Brigade Major,
2d Brigade.
Major R. B. Lane, Rifle Brigade, Aide-de-Gamp to Briga-
dier General, 1st Brigade.
Major R. G. Hart, V.G., R.E., Aide-de-Gamp to Brigadier
General, 2d Brigade.
Of the above excellent olRcers I would especially bring to
your notice the name of Golonel R. R. Gillespie, who is aflrst-
rate Staff officer, and well deserving of your favourable con-
sideration.
2d Division.
Lieut. General Sir E. B. Hamley, K.G.M.G., G.B.
Captain Honourable H. G. Gough, 14th Hussars, Aide-de-
Gamp.
Lieutenant J. Hanbury Williams, Oxfordshire Light Infan-
try, Aide-de-Gamp.
Colonel P. A. A. Twynam, Assistant Adjutant and Quar-
termaster General.
Major K. D. Murray, Royal Irish Fusiliers, Deputy Assis-
tant Adjutant and Quartermaster General.
Major E. J. Lugard, Royal Lancashire Regiment, Deputy
Assistant Adjutant and Quartermaster General.
Major R. W. T. Gordon, Argyle and Sutherland Highlan-
ders, Brigade Major, 3d Brigade.
Captain E. T. H. Hutton, King's Royal Rifles, Aide-de-Gamp
to Brigadier General of 3d Brigade.
Colonel P. A. A. Twynam is an excellent otflcer, thoroughly
acquainted with the working of all the Military Departments ;
I beg to recommend him to your special notice.
The following are the names of the Officers who comman-
ded Regiments, Battalions, Batteries, and Companies of Royal
Engineers in the field throughout this war, to whom, and to
the officers under their command, the country owes much.
i88
Modern War.
Cavalry.
Colonel H. P. Ewart, 2d Life Guards.
Major G. R. A. Denne, 4th Dragoon Guards.
Lieut. Colonel G. Campbell, 7th Dragoon Guards.
Lieut. Colonel K. J. W. Coghill, 19th Hussars.
Major F. Knowles, 2d Bengal Cavalry.
Lieut. Colonel J. Upperton, 6th Bengal Cavalry,
Lieut. Colonel W. H. Macnaghten, 13tb Bengal Lancers.
Artillery.
Lieut. Colonel B. F. Schreiber, Commanding Royal Artil-
lery, 1st Division.
Lieut. Colonel F. C. Elton, Commanding Royal Artillery,
2d Division.
Lieut. Colonel C. E. Nairne, Commanding Corps Artillery.
Lieut. Colonel Minto Elliot, Commanding Siege Train.
Commanders of Batteries.
Lieut. Colonel G. W. Borradaile, N Battery, A Brigade.
Lieut. Colonel W. Brancker, N Battery, 2d Brigade.
Major P. T. H. Taylor, A Battery, 1st Brigade.
Major W. Ward, I Battery, 2d Brigade.
Major E. J. Jones, D Battery, 1st Brigade.
Major E. R. Cottinghara, C. Battery, 3d Brigade.
Major L. F. Perry, J. Battery, 3d Brigade.
Major C. Crossthwaite, H Battery, 1st Brigade.
Major W. S. Hebbert, F Battery, 1st Brigade.
Lieut. Colonel W. M. B. Walton, G. Battery, B. Brigade.
Major J. F. Free, 7 Battery, 1st Brigade.
Major G. B. Macdonnel, 5 Battery, Scottish Division.
Royal Engineers.
Commanders of Troops and Companies.
Major R. J. Bond, A Troop.
Major Sir A. Mackworth, Bart,, C Troop.
Compiled by Mi^jor d'Entragues, H. M. Reserve Force*.
GORTATHINO RBVARKS AITD OPINIONS OF THE MOST DISTINGUISHED SOLDIKRS 189
Qcers.
ral Artil-
Artillery,
Artillery,
fain.
igade.
de.
igade.
Captain C. A. Rochfort-Boyd, Field Park.
Captain S. Smith, 8th Company.
Captain E. Wood, 17th Company.
Major W. Salmond, 18th Company.
Captain A. R. Puzey, 21st Company.
Captain C. de B. Carey, 24th Company.
Major B. Blood, 26th Company.
Infantry.
Colonel P. Smith, Grenadier Guards.
Colonel G. Wigram, Coldstream Guards.
Colonel G. Knox, Scots Guards.
Colonel G. F. Gregorie, Royal Irish Regiment.
Lieut. Colonel A. Fyler, Royal West Kent.
Colonel H. S. Jones, Royal Marine Light Infantry.
Lieut. Colonel H. B. Tuson, Royal Marine Artillery.
Lieut. Colonel F. E. E. Wilson, York and Lancaster.
Colonel J. N. Beasley, Royal Irish Fusiliers (since dead).
Colonel D. Macpherson, C.B. Royal Highlanders.
Lieut. Colonel D. Hammill, Gordon Highlanders.
Lieut. Colonel J. M. Leith, Cameron Highlanders.
Lieut. Colonel A. Straghan, Highland Light Infantry.
Lieut. Colonel W. S. Richardson, Duke of Cornwall's Light
Infantry.
Colonel C. Ashburnham, C.B., Royal Rifles.
Indian Contingent.
Lieut. Colonel C. M. Stockwell, C.B., Seaforth Highlanders.
Colonel H. R. B. Worsley, 7th Native Infantry.
Colonel R. G. Rogers, C.B., 20th Punjaub Infantry.
Lieut. Colonel J. Galloway, 29lh Beloochees.
The following Regimental Officers have been recommended
to me by the Officers Commanding Corps as specially deser-
ving. They have not been selected because they were the se-
5
ill I
140
Modern War.
niois of their rank, but because they have been deemed by
their commanding officors to be most worthy of consideration,
and where all did well to have distinguished themselves
most :—
Grenadier Guards.— Lieut. Colonel E. S. Bridges.
Royal Irish.— Major G. W. N. Rogers.
Royal Irish.— Captain H. J. Daubeny.
Duke of Cornwall's Light Infantry.— Lieutenant J. A. W.
Falls.
Duke of Cornwall's Light Infantry.— Lieutenant G. G. Cun-
ningham.
Royal Highlanders.— Lieut. Colonel W. Green.
Royal Highlanders.— Captain R. C. Coveny.
Gordon Highlanders.— Major J. Boyes.
Gordon Highlanders,— Captain A. E. A. Cross.
Cameron Highlanders.— Major W. H. M'Causland.
Cameron Highlanders. — Captain J. M. Hunt.
Highland Light Infantry.— Major R. Leigh.
Highland Light Infantry.— Captain C. M. M'Donald.
King's Royal Rifles.— Major C. P. Cramer.
King's Royal Rifles.— Captain C. H. Smith.
Royal Marine Light Infantry.— Lieut. Colonel S. J. Graham.
Royal Marine Light Infantry.— Captain R. P. Cottin.
Royal Marine Artillery.— Captain W. G. Tucker (who did
did most excellent service in the action of the 28th August).
1st Life Guards.— Lieut. Colonel the Hon. R. A. J. Talbot.
Royal Horse Guards.— Captain G. L. Wickham,
4th Dragoon Guards.— Major G, R. A, Denne.
4th Dragoon Guards.— Captain J. H. Hussey.
7th Dragoon Guards.— Captain M. C. Day.
19th Hussars.— Lieut. Colonel A. G. Webster.
19th Hussars. —Captain J. C. Hanford-Flood.
Royal Horse Artillery.— Lieut. Colonel C. E. Nairne.
GOKTAINIMO REMARKS AND OPIKIOnS OP THE MOST DISTlNOmSllED SOLDIERS 141
ned by
eration,
nselves
f. A. W.
G. Gun-
rrahara.
vho did
August).
Talbot.
Royal Horse Artillery.— Major and Brevet Lieut. Colonel
G. W. Borradaile.
Royal Horse Artillery.— Captain E. O. Hay.
Royal Horse Artillery.— Lieutenant S. C. Hickman.
Royal Horse Artillery.— Lieutenant C. S. B. Parsons.
Royal Artillery.— Lieut. Colonel W. G. Brancker.
Royal Artillery.— Major P. T. H. Taylor.
Royal Artillery.— Major T. J. Jones.
Royal Artillery.— Lieutenant Apsley Smith.
Royal Artillery.— Lieutenant H. V. Cowan.
Royal Artillery.— Captain F. N. Innes.
Royal Engineers.— Lieut. ColonelJ. M. H. Maitland.
Royal Engineers.— Major B. Blood.
Royal Engineers.— Captain G. Barker.
Royal Engineers. — Captain E. Wood.
Indian Contingent.
2d Bengal Cavalry. — Major H. C. Kemble.
2d Bengal Cavalry.— Captain M. K. Martin.
6th Bengal Cavalry.— Major R. M. Jennings.
6th Bengal Cavalry.— Captain T. C. F. Gordon.
13th Bengal Lancers.— Major R. E. Ry ves.
13th Bengal Lancers.— Captain G. W. Deane.
Seaforth Highlanders.— Lieut. Colonel C. W. N. Guinness.
Seaforth Highlanders.— Major W. F. Kelsey.
29th Beloochees.— Captain W. G. Macbay.
Of those who have taken a prominent part in this campaign,
none have had harder work, and none have done better work
than all ranks in the Mounted Infantry. Captain Hallam Parr,
C.M.G., Somersetshire Light Infantry, commanded the Corps
until badly wounded on the 24th August, when the command
devolved upon Lieutenant C. B. Pigott, King's Royal Rifles,
until he, in his turn, was badly wounded four days later. Af-
ter that date it was under the command of Captain R. C. La-
14S
Modern War.
wrence, 5th Dragoon Guards, until he was invalided a few
days ago, when the command devolved on Captain Lord Mel-
gund, Army Reserve, who, having been wounded on the 24lh
August, lately returned to duty.
The services rendered by the Mounted Infantry have been
invaluable, showing what a corps cm do whose officers are
most carefully selected, and whose non-commissioned officers
and men are similarly chosen from those who volunteer for
special service of this nature. The officer conunanding the
Mounted Infantry recommends for special mention : —
Quartermaster Serjeant Saddler, Royal West Kent Regi-
ment.
Serjeant Riordan, Duke of Cornwall's Light Infantry.
Private Corbett, King's Royal Rifles.
Private Bond, South Staffordshire Regiment.
The Chaplains of the different denominations were zealous
and attentive to their duties, and carried on their work with
a commendable earnestness.
The Staff of the Lines of Communications has been compo-
sed of very carefully-selected officers, selected for their know-
ledge of the army and their experience gained in various po-
sitions on the Staff. Without their assistance the campaign
could not have been brought to so speedy a conclusion, and
I feel especially indebted for the zeal, energy, and ability they
brought to bear on their onerous duties. I consider them all
to be deserving of reward :—
Major General W. Earle, G.S.I., the General in Command
of the Line of Communications.
Colonel Sir W. 0. Lanyon, K.C.M.G., C.B., Commandant of
the Base of operations.
Colonel R. Harrison, C.B., Royal Engineers, Assistant to
Major General Earle.
Lieut. Colonel C. E. Webber, Royal Engineers, in charge
of the Telegraph Lines.
Containing remarks and opinions of the most distinguished soldibrb 148
imand
iant of
int to
[harge
^
Major B. M. Dawes, Leinster Regiment, the olficer in charge
of the Base at Alexandria.
Major W. A. J. Wallace, Royal Engineers, in sole charge of
the Railway Arrangements, in which duties he was zealously
assisted by Captain Scott, Royal Engineers.
Major H. M'Gregor, half-pay, Deputy Assistant Adjutant
and Quartermaster General.
Major J. Alley ne. Royal Artillery, Deputy Assistant Adju-
tant and Quartermaster General.
Major G. W. Murray, Gloucestershire Regiment, Deputy
Assistant Adjutant and Quartermaster General.
Major J. C. Ardagh, C.B., Royal Engineers.
This officer belonged to the Intelligence Department, but
was lent for railway duties to the Line of Communications,
where the railway work was especially severe. Captain J. H.
Sand with. Royal Marine Light Infantry, in chi.ige of the ad-
vanced Depot.
Commissary General Morris, C.B., an officer of considerable
abihty, carried on his arduous duties to iny entire satisfaction.
He and the Conmiissariat and Transpo t Officers under his
command have worked zealously. I have great pleasure in re-
commending Deputy Commissary General Robinson and As-
sistant Commissary Generals Randall and Reeves, C.B., to
your favourable consideration.
The Medical Department, under Surgeon General Hanbury,
C.B., have done everything that could possibly be done for
the care and comfort of the sick and wounded. The manner
in which the wounded were removed from the fighting line
by the Bearer Company was most satisfactory. The following
officers are brought specially to my notice :—
Deputy Surgeon General J. Ekin.
Deputy Surgeon General W. G. N. Manley, V.C.
Deputy Surgeon General J. A. Marston.
Brigade Surgeon 0. Barnett, CLE.
144
MoDERA War.
Surgeon Major G. S. Davie.
Surgeon Major T. F. Dwyer.
Commissary General H. A. Russell has fulfilled the duties
of his difficult position in a very satisfactory manner. He and
the Officers of his Department named below have kept the
Army well suppUed with ammunition and stores :—
Assistant Commissary General H. Morgan.
Assistant Commissary General H. J. Mills.
Deputy Assistant Commissary General C. G. L. Campbell-
Deputy Assistant Commissary General J. Steevens.
Deputy Assistant Commissary General E. G. Skinner.
Quartermaster G. Harris.
Conductor R. Weir.
Conductor J. B. Somerset.
The Officers of the Pay Depai'tment, under Colonel Olivey,
have done their duty to my satisfaction.
The veterinary Department has been well administered
under the direction of the Principal Veterinary Surgeon Mey-
rick.
The Corps of Signallers has been under the command of
Lieut. Colonel F. C. Keyser, Royal Fusiliers, and has done
good work during the war.
The formation of a purely Military Postal Department has
been tried for the first time in this war. It has been very suc-
cessfully directed by Major G. C. Sturgeon, 24th Middlesex
Rifle Volunteers.
The duties of the Intelligence Department were well car-
ried out by the Officers named below :—
Colonel R. H. Buller, V.C, C,B., C.M.G.
Lieut. Colonel A. B. Tulloch. the Welsh Regiment.
Major J. C. Ardagh, C.B., Royal Engineers.
Major A. F. Hart, East Surrey Regiment.
Lieut. Colonel Tulloch had charge of the Intelligence De-
partment at first, and I can confidently say that no man could
GORTAfNlNO REMARKS A^P OPINIOITS OF THE MOST DISTINGVISHED SOLDIERS 146
it has
suc-
ilesex
car-
De-
;ould
evince more untiring zeal for the public service than he has
done since his arrival in Egypt some months ago.
Colonel R.BuUer reached the Army on the 1st instant, and
took over charge of the Intelligence work. His former servi-
ces are well-known to you, and in this campaign he has dis-
played his usual and thorough-going soldierlike qualities.
Major Ardagh did excellent service as an Engineer officer
at Alexandria previous to my arrival. In addition to his re-
gular duties he rendered valuable assistance in the organisa-
tion of our railway system from Ismailia to Kassassin. Always
willing to undertake any service, no matter how difficult or
trying, he has proved himself to be a most excellent officer in
the field, and I have the utmost pleasure in recommending
him for promotion.
In former Despatches I have referred to the assistance ren-
dered to me at all times, and in the most wiUing manner, by
Admiral Sir B. Seymour, G.C.B., and the fleet under his com-
mand. I would now bring to your notice the valuable servi-
ces rendered to this Army by Admiral Sir W. Hewett, the
Naval Commander in Chief on the Indian Station, not only by
the excellent arrangements for the disembarkation of the In-
« . ^'^"♦•"iTcnt at Suez, but for the assistance in placing the
locomotives sent from England on the railway on that place
To bim, and to all ranks serving under him, this Army owes
a deep debt of gratitude.
Admiral Hoskins has worked untiringly for this Army at
Ismailia, and I would venture to recommend his name, and
that of Captain Rawson, Principal Naval Transport Officer, to
your favourable consideration.
My personal StafU' was composed as noted below : —
Major L. V. Swaine, Rifle Brigade, Military Secretary.
Lieutenant W. Rawson, R.N., Naval Aide de Camp.
Captain F.M. Wardrop,3d Dragoon Guards, Aide deCamp.
Lieutenant E. S. E. Childers, Royal Engineers, Aide de Camp.
U6
IfoDRRiT War.
Lieutenant A. G. Creagh, Royal Horse Artillery, Aide de
Gamp.
Lieutenant J. Adye, Royal Horse Artillery, Aide de Gamp.
Brigade Surgeon R. W. Jackson, G. B., Medical Officer.
I cannot speak too highly of Major Swaine, my Military Se-
cretary. His tact and discretion in dealing with foreign autho-
rities enabled him to render me most valuable services. He
is an officer that would do credit to any military position for
which he might be selected.
Of my Aides de Gamp I have to regret the loss of Lieute-
nant Rawson, of the Royal Navy, who was mortally wounded
at Tel-el-Kebir. During the Many journeys I made by night I
found him of great use in directing our line of march correc-
tly, through his knowledge of the stars. On the 13th instant I
consequently selected him to conduct the Highland Brigade
during the night to the portion of the enemy's works where
I explained to him I wis, ed them to storm. This duty he per-
formed with the utmost coolness and success, but lost his life
in its execution. No man more gallant fell on that occasion.
His Serene Highness the Duke of Teck, Honorary Golonel
of the 24th Middlesex Rifle Vohinteer Corps, joined this army
as a volunteer, and has served on my personal Staff. He has
been present with me at all the actions during the campaign.
Brigade Surgeon Jackson, G.B., who has seen service in all
parts of the world, has, through the many wars he has taken
part in, distinguished himself throughout by his coolness un-
der fire and in zeal as a medical officer. I would venture to
recommend him for special promotion.
The Head-quarter Staff remain now alone 'm be noted;
and here again I feel great difficulty in referring to the services
of any individual where all are first-rate Staff officers, and
had been carefully selected for the work each had to perform.
By them the machinery of this Army has been kept in effi-
cient working order, and I cannot but feel that the country is
GONTAIMNO REMARKS AMD OPINIONS OF THE MOST DISTINGUISHED 80LDIKRS 147
loted ;
Irvices
|s, and
rform.
effi-
Itry is
largely indebted to them for the successful and early termi-
nation of the war.
I have already referred to the Chief of the Staff; and I can-
not close this subject without referring pointedly to another,
Brigadier General the Hon. J. G. Dormer, G.B., the officer se-
cond in rank belonging to the Head-quarter Staff. He has had
long and varied experience on the Staff. He thoroughly un-
derstands our Army system in all its various phases, and
adds great tact and judgment to his other many high military
qualities.
I give below the names of the other officers who were
members of the Head-quarter Staff, and I earnestly hope that
the services of each and all of them may be taken into your
favourable consideration.
Colonel the Hon. P. Methuen, the Commandant at Head-
quarters Camp, in addition to the fatiguing duties of his office,
was the Staff Officer selected to supervise all the press mat-
ters in connection with newspaper correspondents. This most
delicate duty he carried out with great tact and judgment, and
to my entire satisfaction.
Lieut. Colonel F. W. Grenfell, King's Royal Rifles, Assis-
tant Adjutant General, is a most excellent Staff Othcer, knows
his work thoroughly, and does it well.
Lieut. Colonel W. F. Butler, C.B., Assistant Adjutant Ge-
neral, is a very able olticer of high attainments and of great
resource.
Lieut. Colonel G. B. Wolseley, York and Lancaster Regi-
ment, Assistant Adjutant General, whose services were pla-
ced at my disposal by the Commander in Chief in India, has
done his work well.
Major J. F. Maurice, Boyal Artillery, Deputy Assistant Ad-
jutant General, an officer of untiring zeal and great ability,
and mc:3t deserving of reward.
Major C. Grove, East Yorkshire Regiment, Deputy Assis-
m
M0DBR5 War.
tant Adjutant General. This has been his first campaign. He
is very able, and is a very rising Staff Officer.
Brigadier General J. H. Rocke, Deputy Judge Advocate
General. I am proud to say that, owing to the excellent con-
duct of the men, he has had but little to do, but what he has
done he did well.
Colonel H. G. Moore, V.G., Argyle and Sutherland Highlan-
ders, performed the duties of Provost Marshal to my entire
satisfaction ; and Captain C. E. Beckett, 3d Hussars, and Ma-
jor G. Barton, Royal Fusiliers, commanding respectively the
Mounted and Foot Police, did their work most efficiently.
In conclusion, it only remains for me to add how much I
feel indebted to the non-commissioned officers and rank and
file, who have borne the trying hardships of this desert cam-
paign without a murmur, and in the most uncomplaining
spirit.
Their valour in action and discipline in quarters have shown
them to be worthy successors of those gallant soldiers who,
in former days, raised the reputation of England to a very
high position among nations.
I would specially bring to your notice the names of the fol-
lowing Non-commissioned Officers and Privates who have
been recommended to me by their Commanding Officers as
most deserving soldiers :—
Grenadier Guards.— Pioneer T. Winnett.
Royal Irish Regiment.— Serjeant E. O'Donnell.
Duke of Cornwall's Light Infantry.— Serjeant Major G.
Carr.
York and Landc aster Regiment.— Colour Serjeant Wal-
kley, Private W. Kavanagh, Private J. Kendall, Private Bas-
kerville, Private J. Marsh.
Royal Irish Fusiliers.— Private J. Kelly.
Royal Highlanders.— Colour Serjeant Young, Colour Ser-
jeant Watt, Private Donald.
orG.
Wal-
Bas-
GONTAlMUtO REMARKS AND OPINIONS OF THE HOST DISTINGUISHED SOLDIERS 149
Gordon Highlanders.— Serjeant Major Green.
Cameron Highlanders.— Serjeant Major J. Campbell, Co-
lour Serjeant W. Young, Colour Serjeant J. Newell, Colour
Serjeant W. Gunn, Colour Serjeant J. M'Laren, Colour Ser-
jeant J. M'Neil, Serjeant T. Salter, Serjeant D. Gunn, Serjeant
Piper J. Grant, Serjeant Drummer J. Sanders; Corporal S.
Syme, Private D. Taylor, and Private T. Chalmers (captured
a gun); Private J. Sheehan.
Highland Light Infantry.— Corporal W. Buchan ; Serjeant
S. Davis, Private A. Sutherland, Private G. Sutherland, Pri-
vate J. Robb, Drummer J. Fitch.
Royal Marine Light Infantry.— Corporal H. Henry, Bu-
gler F. F. M'Daniel.
Royal Marine Artillery.— Colour Serjeant White, Gun-
ner F. Hamilton, 6th Company Gunner J. Judge.
Royal Horse Artillery.— Serjeant Lockyer, 2210 Ser-
jeant J. Beardsly, 2301 Corporal Lemmon, 3699 Serjeant R.
M. Laird ; I Battery 3d Brigade Royal Artillery, Battery Ser-
jeant-major Samuel Firth ; C Battery 3d Brigade Royal Artil-
lery, 5312 Bombardier M. Kelly; F Battery 1st Brigade Royal
Artillery, Battery Serjeant Major Bowman; H Battery 1st
Brigade Royal Artillery, 5324 Serjeant J. M'Knight.
7th Battery 1st Brigade, Northern Division, Royal Artil-
lery.— 17931 Acting Bombaidier E. G. Needs, Havildar Major
Hyder.
I have, &c.,
G. J. WOLSELEY, General,
Commander in Chief of her Majesty's Forces in Egypt.
Ser-
Throughout the whole campaign the action of the cavalry
was magnificent.
Their heroic valour, desperate bravery, and valuable ser-
IKO
Modern War.
vices show the immense value of this arm. There ought to be
10 more regiments of English cavalry.
It was delightful to see that in Egypt the guns were used
with decision and boldness.
Field Artillery has grown to its present state of elliciency
from a condition in which it could hardly be called an arm of
the service at all. The change has been comparatively rapid.
Go back as far as we may in the history of war, there has al-
ways been infantry, and perhaps cavalry. Field artillery, on
the contrary, is a young service which may be said to have
attained the greater part of its development since the Seven
Years' War. Mioreover, it began by being a plebeian organi-
zation in the midst of a military aristocracy, and the prejudice
so engendered hangs about it now, more particularly in En-
gland. The same prejudice has existed in other arm! and
only given way to the facts of the battlefield. The English
army had seen no considerable battlefield for many years,
and had, therefore, been slower in arriving at an understand-
ing of the actual value and best methods of using field artil-
lery. Step by step, however, the knowledge is growing, and
it is now rare to hear the stereotyped old assertion that artil-
lery frightens more than it kills. Even if tliis saying were
true, it would be little to the point, because the most impor-
tant of all maxims in war is that it is not so much the number
of killed which wins the battle as the effect produced on the
survivors. But a good held artillei'y as now organized has
very deadly effect upon all troops in the open. We are never
likely to sec so long a talc of killed and wounded by shells as
by infantry lire, for the simple reason that the action of artil-
lery will be chicUy at long ranges above 1,000 ynrds, and
more often than not against troops under cover. Under such
circumstances, infantry lire would be of no use at all, or, at
least, of so Uttle use as not to be worth the expenditure of
ammunition. But there is no reason why artillery lire should
Containing remabks and opinions of the most distinguished soldiers ISl
artil-
, and
artil-
were
npor-
mber
n the
has
ever
ills as
util-
and
luch
r, at
e of
ould
be confined to these long ranges. It will always act When in-
fantry does not; but the difference between good and bad ar-
tillery tactics will be that the good tactician will use his guns
on occasions which will entirely escape the bad one. The
power of the German guns in 1870, considered as weapons,
was many times less than that of any field artillery to-day.
Yet, in spite of the excellence of the infantry, it is not denied
that the French were chiefly overawed by the artillery. Let
us take one case as a type of many. It will serve to illustrate
both the bold use of the arm and the manner in which it pro-
duces great effects even without creating much slaughter.
No serious student of war will deny that the battle of Se-
dan was a great crisis in the history of the Franco-German
War. Of course the Great Napoleon, Henri IV, Turenne, the
Great Gonde, Luxembourg, Villars, Vendome, Davoust, Mas-
sena, Soult, Bernadotte, Ney, St-Cyr and other great soldiers
would not have placed the brave French Army in such a po-
sition. If the Army of MacMahon had escaped to Paris, the
capture of the city would have been practically impossible. Af-
ter this and the other great battles, it was found that the ac-
tual losses of ^he enemy by artillery lire were comparatively
small, because the Prussians had no shrapnel ; but the oiTicial
account of the war written by the Prussian Headquarter Statf,
under the superintendence of Von Moltke, tells us that « not
only their (French) batteries and foremost lines of infantry,
but also their reserves moving backwards and forwards, and
the masses of cavaliy vainly seeking cover, were overwhel-
med with such an iron hail that they fell more and more into
disorder, and found their power of resistance welhiigh bro-
ken before I hey were even able to eiigage in the struggle. The
fate of the battle was already, to a certain extent, decided by
this employment eti masse of the German iirtillery, even with-
out the further advance of the intantry. » « So annihilating
was the lire of the artillery that the French were scarcely ca-
m
Modern War.
pable of any organized resistance when the German infantry,
towards 3 p.m., moved forwards from all sides against the
wood. J) The great stroke of the day, which prevented the
escape of the French, even into Belgium, was delivered by
the artillery of the 11th and 5th Army Corps, « which deployed,
trusting mainly to their own strength, in one long line, though
opposed to the hostile masses of horse threatening them and>
with their backs to the Belgian frontier. » The reason why
artillery was used for this purpose was that it was able to
move rapidly in advance of the infantry columns, which were
still marching round the west of the French army when the
artillery was already in action on the north. Now if this were
the only great battle of modern times in which artillery was
properly used and produced a great and decisive effect, it
would be sutflciejit to establish a precedent for future imita-
tion. But nearly the same effects on a greater or less scale
were produced by the German artillery throughout the whole
war, and if Sedan is worthy of special remark, it is because
the Germans had gained confidence in the use of field artil-
lery, as battle after battle showed its value, and on this crown-
ing occasion brought to bear the experience gained in all the
previous engagements.
To arrive at general principles for the employment of field
artillery it is useless to go back to the time of Frederick the
Great, whose artillery was not famous, or to that of the great
artilleryman Napoleon I., because in their days the fire of
both guns and rifles was far less powerful than at present at
the same ranges. Their battles were fought at short distances,
and therefore under totally different conditions. Germans and
French combined declare that the handling of the German
artillery in 1870-71 was the great tactical feature of the war,
and we have, therefore, to search that campaign for the prin-
ciples which we seek. They have been laid down with great
clearness by the general staft", and all German criticisms of
GOIfTAiniNG REMARKS AND OPINIONS OF THE MOST DISTINGUISHED SOLDIERS 15S
prin-
great
ms of
other wars have been based upon the fulfilment or non-ful-
filment of those principles, which are in brief :—
First.— To regard the artillery as a great offensive arm, ca-
pable of moving more quickly than the infantry, and there-
fore of arriving within striking distance of the enemy before
the battalions.
Second. — To use this power of mobility by pushing on the
batteries generally in front of the infantry and by that means
confusing the plans of the enemy.
Third. — To mass the guns in great bodies, which can be
directed by a single impulse, so that their fire can be turned
to effect in producing the greatest possible result on a compa-
ratively small space in a given time.
Fourth.— To bring these artillery masses as soon as possi-
ble within decisive distance of the enemy— that is to say, at
ranges of some 1,200 to 1,500 yards.
All the details of advice which are now given in good tacti-
cal books are but amplifications of the above rules; and we
find that wherever the rules have been followed they have
led to the succcess of artillery, while their non-fulfilment has
brought nothing but weakness and poverty of result. The
French, for instance, in the same war used their artillery ti-
midly at longer ranges and in a more scattered formation.
Their guns were, it is true, indifferent, but the chief failure
was owing to tactical errors. Both Russians and Turks pur-
sued what may be called the theoretical tactics of artillery.
Hesitating to expose the gun detachments to infantry fire, and
anxious to develop the questionable advantage of long range,
they opened fire at long distances and never pushed great
masses of artillery into the thick of the fight. They forgot in
short, that though modern field artillery can fire at great range,
the effect of the guns increases in a high ratio as the range
diminishes. Speaking figuratively to a certain extent, the dif-
ference between the two systems is that the German artillery
iU
MoDERK War.
concentrated and closed with its antagonists, while that of the
other armies remained skirmishing from a distance. It is only
rarely that artillery can actually close with its enemy and use
case, but the great principle ot doing so must always be in the
minds of those officers who wish to handle artillery so as to
produce the greatest possible result with it. The maxims of
war are based upon the strength and the weakness of human
nature, and we may search in vain through the pages of his-
tory for the name of a great general who was timid in the
matter of closing with his enemy at the decisive moment. On
land and sea it was always the same. The successful comman-
der throws his whole power into the light at the moment
which he judges propitious. The timid general, on the con-
trary, is careful to avoid losses, and, shrinking from the de-
cision of the combat, lets his opportunity slip by. What is
true of an army, or of any military force, is equally true of
artillery, and it will inevitably be found that the guns which
are kept hovering in the distance undirected by a single firm
command will waste their time, produce little effect during
the whole battle, and leave the force without their active co-
operation at the moment when everything may depend upon
the exertion of the greatest available energy.
It will be granted by every student of modern tactics that
battles are in these days chiefly decided by the use of firearms.
Advances of the nature of charges take place, but one side or
another has had enough of it and gives way before the shock
of collision. The fire of artillery, provided as it now is with
shrapnel, is terrible against all troops which oppose it in the
open field, and it has this advantage, that it can be disengaged
with ease fi-om the midst of a struggle in one part of the field
and transported with great rapidity to another. This quality
is of extreme importance. We are hearing every day the ad-
vocacy of mounted infantry, and for what purpose? Simply
that it may have the faculty of mobility, which is already pos-
sessed by artillery.
Compiled by Major the Marquis d'Enlragucs, M.M. tttscrre Forces.
-.-«».«,*-»«"»"'
that
barms,
[de or
Ishock
with
in the
raged
field
lality
^e ad-
Imply
pos-
CONTAININO RCUAnXS AHD OPINIONS OF Tnf: MOST DTSTINOVISHED SOLDIERS IBK
Young Skobeleflf, no mean master of war, insisted on ha-
ving a numerous artillery in his expeditions against the Tur-
comans. It is sometimes said that artillery may hamper the
march of an army. It might do so under certain conditions ;
but, if so, cavalry would be the first to suffer by the immobi-
lity of the gnns. Yet what do we see as the principal feature
of improvement in cavalry tactics ? Nothing more nor less
than manoeuvres intended to give opportunities for the exer-
tion of the full power ot horse artillery before, during, and
after a great cavalry charge. The great cavalry monoeuvres
conducted in Central Europe, both last year and the year be-
fore, were chiefly devoted to this one end— the development
of the whole power of artillery acting with cavalry.
We saw in the earlv actions on the Freshwater Canal the
English guns assuming a chief part in the fighting, even when
there were only two pieces present. At Tel-el-Mahuta Lieu-
tenant Hickman's small command, according to the official
accounts, repelled attacks made both from the front and flanks,
In every other action, the guns, even when on the defensive,
showed not only power, but brilliancy of effect. At Kassassin
the cavalry charge was preceded by the fire of horse artillery,
which unlimbered within some 400 yards of the Egyptian
infantry. The great fight of the war, the storming of Tel-el-
Kebir, was principally an inftintry battle, because the advance
was made at night, and the intrenchments were stormed with
a rush in the dusk of the morning. Yet even here we find the
guns displacing both mobility and tactical boldness. The bat-
teries, or some of the batteries, struggled over the ditch and
parapet and came into action against the flying Egyptians,
and one of them actually moved down in rear of the trenches,
driving out the defenders step by step with a flanking fire at
close range.
Unquestionably, that arm has not yet reached the develop-
ment which may be expected from it within a short time. Even
6
1B6
Modern War.
fair tacticians persist in arguing always from the past with
regard to an arm which is now vastly superior to what it was
in the Franco-German campaign. Much yet remains to be
done with it, and some steps may be taken almost immedia-
tely. One of them is the perfecting, or, at least, greatly impro-
ving, the fuses, which are to be used with shrapnel. It is now
generaUy acknowledged that there are circumstances under
which a shrapnel shell acts better with a time fuse and other
circumstances when its power is better developed by a per-
cussion fuse. Now, it is well known that compound fuses ca-
pable of acting both as time and percussion can be made. In
fact, such fuses were at one time in the English service, and
the experience of manufacturers is now very much greater than
it was then. Nor are the old pattern sights at all satisfactory.
All practical men know that they are diificult to aim with
and that the calculations requisite when allowing for wind,
inclination of wheels, and the rest, are so elaborate that they
will almost certainly be neglected in the heat of action. A ra-
dical change is wanted in this matter, and here again we know
that such sights are already available and have been for some
time in use on the practice grounds of other nations, though
designed in England. Rangefmders also, though adopted in
the service, have not yet been made thoroughly workable.
They are still often regarded as toys, and the organization for
their use leaves much to be desired. Yet the knowledge of
the correct range is one of the most vital points in the work-
ing of field artillery. It is easy to say that such improvements
as these are new, experimental, and therefore to be depreca-
ted. But it is exactly the novelties in weapons and in ta 'tir
which tell so greatly upon the field of battle. From i
ramrods of Frederick the Great to the needle-gun in 1. and
the improved artillery and tactics of the Germans in IbiU we
may see the action in war of novelties prepared in peace by
those who are wise enough to look a little in advance of the
GONTAINUia HEMARK8 AND OPINIOKS OF TUK M OST DlSTLNGCISillCD S0LDIKR8 ^6^
and
0 we
;e by
f the
latest campaign. The Egyptian army was well-found in all
the appliances of warfare that were essential to success. It had
a fine artillery— indeed, the guns were the same as had been
used by the Germans in the Franco-German wai-. The great
superiority we had from first to last over the Egyptian artil-
lery was this, that our guns when in action were enabled to
overpower twice their number. The Egyptian gunners were
excellent shots, but the reason we defeated them was that
while the Egyptians used the old-ftishioned common shell
which they had obtjiined from Messrs. Krupp, we adopted the
shrapnel shell. The Egyptian shells sank deeply into the
earth before they exploded. That alone furnished a lesson
which we ought to take to heart— namely, that no nation
could aflbrd to fall behind other nations in the inventions of
the day and the nation which did had nothing before it but
disaster staring it in the face.
Their infantry, were excellently drilled, disciplined, and ar-
med ; but their officers were badly educated and instructed
and were drawn from the same class as the men themselves.
But the Egyptians were pitted against an infantry the best in
the world, and commanded by officers the best in the world.
We had splendid soldiers commanded by splendid regimental
officers.
The Germans divided the space between two opposing bo-
dies of infantry into three zones, which they know respecti-
vely as the short, middle, and long distances. The first extends
to 400 metres from the firing line, the second to 700, and the
third to 1,200 metres. After the long distance, they consider
that, for all practical purposes, fire action must be resigned
into the hands of artillery. For, though the rifles will carry
much further, distances cannot be judged, and the fire is so
uncertain as not to be worth the expenditure of cartridges.
The hort zone is supposed, as a rule, to be handed over to
the e tire of the troops, which, be it understood, are still
m
Modern War.
dispersed — that is to say, each man chooses his own mark. The
middle zone is covered by what is called Abtheitungsfeuer, which
is ^still the fire of dispersed men, but carefully concentrated
upon particular objects under the orders of the officers, i^fter
700 metres it is not considered worth while to fire at any
object which does not present a very considerable extent of
surface, both in breadth and depth, such as a column of in-
fantry or cavalry or a battery of artillery. It is also understood
that the distances are partly judged by eye and partly by ob-
servation of the striking points of bullets fired with the known
elevation of the sights. This is all very well so far as the theory
goes, and certain rules are laid down for the accurate obser-
vation of the distance ; but it would l)e very interesting to
know how the regulations are actually carried out on thQ
field of manoeuvres. Is it possible during the din and in the
smoke caused by the engagement of large bodies of troops to
determine these points with anything like accuracy t In some
cases a sort of combined fire is used— that is, some of the troops
have one elevation for their rifles, others have another. It
would be interesting to know in what proportions these dif-
ferent kinds of fire are used. Again, the general principle
which guides German infantry fire is that it should be sudden
and unexpected, rather than slow and sustained, in order that
a sort of offensive character may be given to it, and the ner-
ves of the enemy correspondingly impressed. But we still
want to know exactly how this is done, and how far the prin-
ciple is found to be capable of application on the battle-field.
Another disputed question has been that of volleyfiring, which
is principally effected by groups of men coagulated together
among a swarm of skirmishers. Volleys by men drawn up in
line are understood to be reserved for special occasions, such
as when a position is just taken, and the flying enemy are to
be pursued by fire, while the successful attiicking forc3 is get-
ting itself into order, or when the enemy's cavalry sweeps
round to the rear and attacks troops wljich sue not in fighting
GOiNTAIMNG REMARKS AND OPINIONS OF THE MOST DISTINGUISHED SOLDIERS 159
formation. The French regulations are rather different from
these.
The bulk of an army must always be composed of infantry^
which is the cheapest and the most universally valuable arm.
Repeating Rifles will probably soon be used.
Infantry are now supplied with range-tinders, and the main
dilliculty is to persuade the men to lire low enough. Doubt-
less, until lately sufficient care has not been devoted to the
practical shooting of infantry in the field, and the present war
comes before the new regulations have had time to be of ser-
vice. But there has always been encouragement to the men
to perfect themselves. Prizes have been given, and first-rate
shooting has brought with it some small advantages. If the
lessons of the present war are laid to heart, there will be no
grudging of money or trouble to tmn out an infantry which
will be the best in Europe, so far as the use of the rifle is con-
cerned.
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