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K4>P 3t AHt 



PHILLIPS LIBRARY 




or 



HABVABD OOLLEOE OBBEBVATOBT 




CIVILIZATION AND CLIMATE 



CIVILIZATION AND CLIMATE 



By 
ELLSWORTH HUNTINGTON 

Author cf **Thb Puub or Asia," **PAL»TncE avd Itc Tbamifobmatioii, 

*TiB Climatic Factob,** etc. 




New Hatevs Yale UirivEBnTr Peem 

LOKDONS HUMPHBET MiLFOED 

OzFOED UirivEEBmr Peem 
MDCCCCXV 



1/^ 



COPTHZOHT, 1915 

By YAI.B Univbksitt Prbss 



First printed October, 1915, 1000 copies 



PREFACE 

This volume is a product of the new science of geography. 
The old geography strove primarily to produce exact maps of 
the physical features of the earth's surface. The new goes 
farther. It adds to the physical maps an almost inmmierable 
series showing the distribution of plants, animals, and man, and 
of every phase of the life of these organisms. It does this, not 
as an end in itself, but for the purpose of comparing the physi- 
cal and organic maps and thus determining how far vital phe- 
nomena depend upon geographic environment. Among the 
things to be mapped, human character as expressed in civiliza- 
tion is one of the most interesting and one whose distribution 
most needs explanation. The only way to explain it is to 
ascertain the effect of each of many cooperating factors. Such 
matters as race, religion, institutions, and the influence of men 
of genius must be considered on the one hand, and geographi- 
cal location, topography, soil, climate, and similar physical 
conditions on the other. This book sets aside the other 
factors, except incidentally, and confines itself to climate. In 
that lie both its strength and weakness. When the volume 
was first planned, I contemplated a discussion of all the factors 
and an attempt to assign to each its proper weight. The first 
friend whom I consulted advised a directly opposite course, 
whereby the emphasis should be centered upon the new climatic 
facts which seem to afford ground for a revision of some of our 
old estimates of the relation between man and his environment. 
In writing the book I have growingly felt the wisdom of that 
advice, and have been impressed with the importance of con- 
centration upon a single point, even at the expense of seeming 



vi PREFACE 

to take a one-sided view. If the reader feels that due weight 
is not given to one factor or another, he must remember 
that many unmentioned phases of the subject have been 
deliberately omitted to permit fuller emphasis upon the appar- 
ent connection between a stimulating climate and high civiliza- 
tion. 

The materials for this voliune have been derived from a great 
variety of sources. Although personal observation and investi- 
gation are the basis of much that is here stated, still more has 
been derived from the world's general store of knowledge. 
Except in a few special cases I have not attempted to give 
references. To the general reader footnotes are not only use- 
less, but often a distraction and nuisance. The careful stu- 
dent, on the other hand, cannot form a fair estimate of the 
hypothesis here presented without reading previous publica- 
tions in which I have set forth the reasons for many conclu- 
sions which are not fully discussed here for lack of space. 
These publications contain numerous references. Accordingly, 
the needs of the student will be met by giving a brief list of 
books and articles which have served as preliminary steps to 
the present volume. These publications form a logical series 
with only such repetition as is necessary to make each a com- 
plete unit. It is scarcely necessary to add that the rapid 
growth of the subject during the past ten years has led to 
important modifications in some of the earlier conclusions. 

(A) Books and longer articles on changes of climate and 
their effect on man : 

(1) Explorations in Turkestan. Publication 26 of the 
Carnegie Institution of Washington, 1906, pp. 167-817. 

(2) The Pulse of Asia. Boston, Houghton Mifflin Com- 
pany, 1907, 415 pp. 

(8) Palestine and its Transformation. Boston, Houghton 
Mifflin Company, 1911, 488 pp. 



PREFACE vii 

(4) The Climatic Factor as illustrated in arid America. 
Publication 192 of the Carnegie Institution of Washington, 
1914, 841 pp. 

(5) The Solar Hypothesis of Climatic Changes. Bulletin 
of the Geological Society of America, vol. 26, 1914, pp. 477- 
590. 

(B) Shorter articles dealing with phases of the problem of 
climatic changes not treated under (A) : 

(6) The Burial of Olympia. Greographical Journal, Lon- 
don, 1910, pp. 657-686. 

(7) The Oasis of Eharga. Bulletin of the American Geo- 
graphical Society, New York, vol. 42, 1910, pp. 641-661. 

(C) Articles dealing with the relation of climate to civiliza- 
tion: 

(8) Physical Environment as a Factor in the present con- 
dition of Turkey. Journal of Race Development, Worcester, 
Mass., vol. 1, 1911, pp. 460-481. 

(9) Greographical Environment and Japanese Character. 
Journal of Race Development, Worcester, Mass., vol. 2, 1912, 
pp. 256-281. (Reprinted in a volume entitled ^^ Japan and 
Japanese American Relations," edited by G. H. Blakeslee, 
N. Y., 1912, pp. 42-67.) 

(10) Changes of Climate and History. American His- 
torical Review, vol. 18, 1918, pp. 218-282. 

(11) The Adaptability of the White Man to Tropical 
America. In ^^Latin America." Clark University Addresses, 
1918, edited by G. H. Blakeslee, pp. 860-886. 

In addition to the works listed above a number of articles 
have appeared in Harper*s Magctzine. I am especially glad to 
mention these, because the liberal policy of the editors of that 
magazine has been an important factor in making it possible 
to carry on some of the investigations described in this book. 



viii PREFACE 

The facts set forth in this volume have by no means been 
derived wholly from observation and reading. Not far from 
a hundred people have given direct personal assistance. They 
are so numerous that it is impossible to mention them all by 
name. Therefore it seems best not to single out any for 
special thanks. Many of my colleagues among the Yale 
faculty and among the geographers of America have gone out 
of their way to offer suggestions, or friendly criticisms, or to 
bring to my attention publications and facts that might have 
escaped my notice. Others connected with such organizations 
as the Carnegie Institution of Washington and the United 
States Weather Bureau have placed me under obligation by 
the kind way in which they have taken a personal rather than 
official interest in answering queries and providing data. 
Equally great courtesy has been shown by officers and other 
members of the teaching force at West Point and Annapolis, 
and by officials connected with various factories, including some 
whose figures it has not yet been possible to tabulate. Another 
large group comprises contributors to the map of civilization, 
many of whom devoted to this work time which they could ill 
afford. Lastly, I owe much to personal friends who fall in 
none of the groups already specified. I suppose that the total 
time given to this book by all these scores of people makes 
their contribution larger than mine. My chief hope is that 
they may feel that their kindness has not been wasted. To 
each and all I can only express my deep sense of gratitude, 
and most of all to the one whose advice from the beginning has 
done more than anything else to keep this book true to a single 
aim. 

E. H. 

Yale University, 
New Haven, Conn., 
July, 1916. 



TABLE OF CONTENTS 

Chapter I. Civilization and Climate 1 

Chapter 11. Race or Place 11 

Chapter III. The White Man in the Tropics ... 86 
Chapter IV. The Effect of the Seasons .... 49 
Chapter V. The Effect of Humidity and Tempera- 
ture 88 

Chapter VI. Work and Weather Ill 

Chapter VII. The Ideal Climate 129 

Chapter VIII. The Distribution of Civilization . 148 
Chapter IX. Vitality and Education in the United 

States 188 

Chapter X. The Conditions of Civilization . 199 

Chapter XI. The Shifting of Climatic Zones . . . 220 

Chapter XII. The Shifting Centers of Civilization . 261 

Chapter XIII. The Climatic Hypothesis of Civilization 271 

Appendix 297 

Index 817 



CIVILIZATION AND CLIMATE 

List of Illustrations 

Figure 1. The Effect of the Seasons on Factory 

Operatives in Connecticut and at Pittsburgh 69 

Figure 2a. Human Activity and the Seasons ... 66 

Figure 2b. Human Activity and the Seasons ... 67 
Figure 8. Seasonal Variations of Mental Compared 

with Physical Activity 80 

Figure 4. Relative Humidity and Work in Connecticut 86 
Figure 6. Average Weekly Temperature during the 

Summers of 1910-1918 in Connecticut . 91 
Figure 6. Effect of the Days of the Week on Piece- 
Workers 96 

Figure 7. Variations in Daily Wages 96 

Figure 8. Human Activity and Mean Temperature . 99 

Figure 9. Growth of Wheat at Various Temperatures 108 
Figure 10. Mean Temperature and Vital Processes in 

Plants, Animals and Man 106 

Figure 11. Human Activity and Changes of Mean Tem- 
perature from Day to Day 116 

Figure 12. The Stimulus of Storms 122 

Figure 18. Distribution of Human Energy on the Basis 

of Climate 142 

Figure 14. Distribution of Civilization in Europe . 166 
Figure 16. Distribution of Civilization in Asia . 168 
Figure 16. Distribution of Civilization in Australia 169 
Figure 17. Distribution of Civilization in Africa . 170 
Figure 18. Distribution of Civilization in South Amer- 
ica 171 

Figure 19. Civilization in North America, According to 

All Contributors 178 



xii LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS 

Figure 20. Ciyilization in North America, According to 

Twenty-five Americans 174 

Figure 21. Civilization in North America, According to 

Seven British Contributors 176 

Figure 22. Civilization in North America, According to 

Six Grermanic Europeans 178 

Figure 28. Civilization in North America, According to 

Six Latin Europeans and one Russian . 179 

Figure 24. CiviUzation in North America, According to 

Five Asiatics 181 

Figure 26. Climatic Energy in the United States . 184 

Figure 26. Mortality in the United States .... 184 

Figure 27. Education of Native White Children in the 

United States 186 

Figure 28. Civilization in the United States 186 

Figure 29. Illiteracy among Persons of Native White 

Parentage in the United States .... 190 

Figure 80. Distribution of Human Energy on the Basis 

of Climate (Repeated) 200 

Figure 81. Distribution of Civilization (World Map) . 200 

Figure 82. Birthplaces of Persons of Unusual Ability 

in the United States 212 

Figure 88. Changes of Climate in Western Asia and 

Growth of Trees in California .... 228 

Figure 84. Changes of Climate in California for 2000 

Years 280 

Figure 86. Comparative Storminess at Times of Maxi- 
mum and Minimum Sunspots in the United 
States 246 

Figure 86. Comparative Rainfall at Times of Maxi- 
mum and Minimum Sunspots in Europe 246 

Figure 87. Major and Minor Sunspot Cycles . 248 

Figure 88. The Shifting of the Storm Belt .... 264 



CIVILIZATION AND CLIMATE 



CHAPTER I 

ClYIUZATION AND ClIMATE 

The races of the earth are like trees. Each according to its 
kind brings forth the fruit known as civilization. As russet 
apples and pippins may grow from the same trunk, and as 
peaches may even be grafted on a plum tree, so the culture of 
allied races may be transferred from one to another. Yet no 
one expects pears on cherry branches, and it is useless to look 
for Slavic civilization among the Chinese. Each may borrow 
from its neighbors, but will put its own stamp upon what it 
obtains. The nature of a people's culture, like the flavor of a 
fruit, depends primarily upon racial inheritance which can be 
changed only by the slow processes of biological variation and 
selection. 

Yet inheritance is only one of the great factors in the devel- 
opment of civilization. Religion, education, government, and 
the many human institutions and customs which surround us 
form a second great group of influences whose power seems 
almost immeasurable. They do for man what cultivation does 
for an orchard. One tree may bear a few wormy, knotty little 
apples scarcely fit for the pigs, while another of the same 
variety is loaded with great red-cheeked fruit of the most 
toothsome description. The reason for the difference is obvious. 
One tree grows in a tangle of bushes in thin, unfertilized soil, 
and the other in the midst of a carefully tilled garden. One 
is burdened with dead wood and suckers, and infested with 
insects, while the other is carefully pruned, scraped and 
sprayed. 



2 CIVILIZATION AND CLIMATE 

In spite of the most careful cultivation, however, a tree of 
the very finest variety may fail to produce good fruit. Too 
much rain or too little ; prolonged heat or constant cloudiness ; 
frost when the blossoms are opening, or violent wind and hail 
may all be disastrous. The choicest tree without water is 
worth less than the poorest where the temperature and rain- 
fall are propitious. 

For the production of good fruit the three factors of good 
stock, proper cultivation, and favorable climatic conditions are 
absolutely necessary. Are they equally essential to the fruit 
known as civilization? We all admit that race and the thing 
which for lack of a better name we call cultivation or training 
are of vital importance, but is it also true that man cannot rise 
to a high level except where the climate is propitious? From 
the days of Aristotle to those of Montesquieu and Buckle, there 
have been men who have believed that climate is the most impor- 
tant factor in determining the status of civilization. Others 
have held that wherever food is available for a moderately 
dense population and man can avoid diseases like tropical 
malaria, human culture can rise to the highest levels. The 
location of the world's great nations seems to them largely a 
matter of accident. 

The majority of people reject both of these extreme views. 
Few doubt that climate has an important relation to civiliza- 
tion, but equally few consider it so important as racial inherit- 
ance, or as good institutions in the form of church, state, and 
home. We realize that a dense and progressive population 
cannot live in the far North or in deserts simply because the 
difficulty of getting a living grinds men down and keeps them 
isolated. We know that the denizens of the torrid zone are 
slow and backward, and we almost universally agree that this 
is connected with the damp, steady heat. We continually give 
concrete expression to our faith in climate. Not only do we 
talk about the weather more than about any other one topic, 



CIVILIZATION AND CLIMATE 8 

but we visit the seashore or the mountains for a change of air. 
We go South in winter, and to cool places in summer. We are 
depressed by a series of cloudy days, and feel exuberant on a 
clear, bracing morning after a storm. Yet, in spite of this 
universal recognition of the importance of climate, we rarely 
assign to it a foremost place as a condition of civilization. We 
point out that great nations have developed in such widely 
diverse climates as the hot plains of Mesopotamia and Yucatan 
and the cool hill country of Norway and Switzerland. More- 
over, although Illinois and southern Mongolia lie in the same 
latitude and have the same mean temperature, they differ 
enormously in civilization. To put the matter in another way, 
we recognize two great sets of facts which are apparently con- 
tradictory. We are conscious of being stimulated or depressed 
by climatic conditions, and we know that as one goes north- 
ward or southward, the distribution of civilization is closely 
in harmony with what we should expect on the basis of our 
own climatic experiences. Nevertheless, even in our own day, 
regions which lie in the same latitude and apparently have 
equally stimulating climates differ greatly in their degree of 
civilization. When we compare the past with the present, we 
find the same contradiction still more distinctly marked. Hence 
our confusion. From personal experience we know that climate 
is of tremendous importance. Yet many facts seem to indicate 
that its importance is less than our observation would lead us 
to anticipate. 

The reason for this doubtful attitude can easily be dis- 
covered. The things that we call facts are often not well estab- 
lished. Although we believe in the influence of climate, we 
know little of the particular climatic elements which are most 
stimulating or depressing. How much do we know of the 
relative importance of barometric pressure, wind, temperature, 
or humidity? What about the comparative effects of the 
climates of England and southeastern Russia? In addition to 



4 CIVILIZATION AND CLIMATE 

this, we are far from knowing what type of climate prevailed in 
Egypt, Greece, or Mesopotamia when they rose to eminence. 
Many good authorities assert that the climate of those regions 
was the same two or three thousand years ago as now. This 
view is rapidly losing ground, but those who believe in a change 
are not certain of its nature. They are completely in the dark 
as to whether it has produced an important influence upon 
the particular climatic elements which are most stimulating to 
the human system. 

This book is written because recent investigations may 
enable us to explain the contradictions which have hitherto 
proved so puzzling. On the one hand, a study of the daily 
work of several thousand factory operatives and students at all 
seasons has given an approximate measure of the exact climatic 
elements which most influence efficiency. On the other hand, a 
prolonged study of past and present climatic variations sug- 
gests that the location of some of the most stimulating condi- 
tions varies from century to century, and that when the great 
countries of antiquity rose to eminence they enjoyed a climatic 
stimulus comparable with that existing today where the leading 
nations now dwell. In other words, wherever civilization has 
risen to a high level, the climate appears to have possessed the 
qualities which today are most stimulating. 

The steps which have led to this conclusion may be briefly 
sketched. In 1908, under the inspiration of the broad 
vision of Raphael Pumpelly and the careful scientific methods 
of William Morris Davis, I began to study the climate of the 
past. Two years' work with the Pumpelly Expedition sent to 
Turkestan by the Carnegie Institution of Washington led to 
the conviction that Reclus, Kropotkin, and others are correct 
in believing that two or three thousand years ago the climate 
of Central Asia was moister than now. Later, during the 
Barrett Expedition to Chinese Turkestan, it became evident 
that the scientists who hold that the ancient climate was like 



CIVILIZATION AND CLIMATE 5 

that of today have much strong evidence to support their view. 
It soon appeared, however, that evidences of moist and dry 
conditions, respectively, are grouped into distinct periods, 
the beginning of the Christian era being moist, for example, 
and the seventh century dry. This led to what I have called 
the ^^ulsatory hypothesis'' which holds that although in gen- 
eral the past was moister than the present, the changes have 
taken place irregularly in great waves. Certain centuries were 
apparently drier than today, while others were moist. In 1909 
this view was confirmed during the Yale Expedition to Pales- 
tine. Then a series of journeys in the drier parts of the United 
States and in Mexico and Central America in cooperation with 
D. T. MacDougal of the Desert Botanical Laboratory of the 
Carnegie Institution showed that the main features of pre- 
vious conclusions apparently apply to the New World as well 
as the Old. It also became evident that the climate of different 
parts of the world has probably changed in different ways. For 
example, Yucatan appears to have become moist when Califor- 
nia became dry. 

Having reached this conclusion, the next step was to study 
the mechanism and cause of the supposed changes. In Pales- 
tine variations in storminess and rainfall, rather than in tem- 
pei'ature, appear to have been the primary factor. In America 
the Maya ruins of Yucatan and Gxiatemala, and a series of 
measurements of the growth of the big trees of California make 
this conclusion appear the only feasible one. They also indi- 
cate that climatic pulsations probably consist of a shifting of 
the earth's climatic zones alternately toward and away from 
the equator, a view recently advocated by the German geologist, 
Penck. Thus the temperate zone of storms is shifted back and 
forth. When it was farther south than at present, the sub- 
tropical countries which now are subarid must have been rela- 
tively moist. Still farther south the arid belt was shifted 



6 CIVILIZATION AND CLIMATE 

toward the equator so that lands which now are wet were then 
apparently dry. 

If climatic changes have occurred during historic times, they 
must have had an effect on man. To all students of the sub- 
ject, one of the most interesting features has always been the 
apparent connection between climate and history. Kropotkin, 
for instance, has vividly portrayed the way in which a gradual 
dessication of Asia would drive into Europe the hordes of 
barbarians whose invasions were so important a feature of the 
Dark Ages. If the pulsatory hypothesis is true, the relation- 
ship between historic events and climatic vicissitudes is even 
greater than has been supposed. Many of the great nations 
of antiquity appear to have risen or fallen in harmony with 
favorable or unfavorable conditions of climate. Such changes 
may produce their effect in various ways. Not only are 
the people of dry regions, especially the nomads, forced to 
migrate in periods of drought, but increasing aridity, even 
in more favored places such as Greece, must cause economic 
distress, and thus engender famine, misery, and general dis- 
content and lawlessness. Certain climatic conditions also have 
a great influence upon diseases like malaria, which diminish 
the vitality of a nation. 

It is noteworthy that at times of favorable climate in coun- 
tries such as Egypt and Greece the people were apparently 
filled with a virile energy which they do not now possess. 
Many authorities attribute the loss of this to an inevitable 
decay which must overtake a nation, as old age overtakes an 
individual. Others ascribe it to the lack of adaptability in 
various institutions, to increasing luxury, to contact with 
inferior civilizations, or to various other factors, all of which 
are doubtless of much importance. Previous to 1911 I had 
often wondered whether O. Fraas and others might be right in 
connecting this with climate, but they gave so few reasons and 
the whole matter seemed so doubtful that I had little faith in 



CIVILIZATION AND CLIMATE 7 

their suggestions. At that time, Charles J. KuUmer sent me 
a manuscript in which he called attention to the remarkable 
similarity between the distribution of cyclonic storms and of 
civilization. His article was never published, but was pre- 
sented at a meeting of the Association of American Greogra- 
phers. He advanced the idea that the barometric changes which 
are the primary cause of storms, or perhaps some electrical 
phenomena which accompany them, may produce a stimulus 
which has much to do with the advancement of civilization. 
Although he presented no defibiite proof, his suggestion seemed 
so important that I determined to carry out a plan which had 
long been in mind. This was to ascertain the exact effect of 
different types of climate by means of precise measurements. 
Dexter, in his book on *^eather Influences," had made a begin- 
ning. Lehmann and Pedersen had made a small series of meas- 
urements whose highly suggestive results have been published 
under the title "Das Wetter und unsere Arbeit." A few physi- 
cians and students of child psychology were also at work, and 
their results have been summed up in such publications as Hell- 
pach's "Greopsychische Erscheinungen" and Berliner's "Ein- 
fluss von Klima, Wetter und Jahreszeit auf das Nerven- und 
Seelen-leben." Nevertheless, there existed no large series of 
measurements of the actual efficiency of ordinary people under 
different conditions of climate. 

The ideal way to determine the effect of climate would be to 
take a given group of people and measure their activity daily 
for a long period, first in one climate, and then in another. 
This, however, would not be practicable because of the great 
expense, and still more because the results would be open to 
question. If people were thus moved from place to place, it 
would be almost impossible to be sure that all conditions except 
climate remained uniform. If the climate differed markedly in 
the two places, the houses, food, and clothing would also have 
to be different. Social conditions would change. New inter- 



8 CIVILIZATION AND CLIMATE 

ests would stimulate some people and depress others. Hence, 
no such experiment now seems practicable. The most avail- 
able method is apparently to take a group of people who live 
in a variable climate, and test them at all seasons. The best 
test is a man's daily work, the thing to which he devotes most of 
his time and energy. Accordingly, I have taken the records 
of over five hundred factory operatives in the cities of New 
Haven, New Britain, and Bridgeport, in Connecticut, three or 
four thousand operatives in southern cities from Virginia to 
Florida, and over seventeen hundred students at the United 
States Naval Academy at Annapolis, and the Military Acad- 
emy at West Point. In most cases each person's record covers 
an entire year, or at least the academic year. All the records 
have been compared with the various conditions of the weather. 
The results are surprising. Changes in the barometer seem to 
have little effect. Humidity possesses a considerable degree of 
importance, but the most important element is clearly tempera- 
ture. The people here considered are physically most active 
when the average temperature is from 60 to 66 degrees, that 
is, when the noon temperature rises to 70 degrees or even more. 
This is higher than many of us would expect. Mental activity 
reaches a maximum when the outside temperature averages 
about 88 degrees, that is, when there are mild frosts at night. 
Another highly important climatic condition is the change of 
temperature from one day to the next. People do not work well 
when the temperature remains constant. Great changes are 
also unfavorable. The ideal conditions are moderate changes^ 
especially a cooling of the air at frequent intervals. 

The facts just stated are of great significance. From the 
data described in this book I shall construct a map showing 
how hmnan energy would be distributed throughout the world 
if all the earth's inhabitants were influenced as are the people 
of the eastern United States. We shall find that this agrees to 
a remarkable extent with a map of civilization based on the 



CIVILIZATION AND CLIMATE 9 

opinions of about fifty geographers and other widely informed 
men in a dozen countries of America, Europe, and Asia. More- 
over, by reconstructing the climate of the past, it will appear 
that when the various nations of antiquity were in their prime, 
they were probably blessed with climates which shared the 
stimulating qualities which now prevail where civilization is 
highest. 

In concluding this first chapter I cannot refrain from 
expressing astonishment at the way in which the various lines 
of investigation fit into one another. When the work was begun 
I had no idea what the outcome would be. One thing led to 
another, and now the final results seem explicable only on an 
hypothesis so sweeping in character that I advance it with 
genuine hesitation. The hypothesis, briefly stated, is this: 
Today a certain peculiar type of climate prevails wherever 
civilization is high. In the past the same type seems to have 
prevailed wherever a great civilization arose. Therefore, such 
a climate seems to be a necessary condition of great progress. 
It is not the cause of civilization, for that lies infinitely deeper. 
Nor is it the only, or the most important condition. It is merely 
one of several, just as an abundant supply of pure water is 
one of the primary conditions of health. Gk)od water will not 
make people healthy, nor will a favorable climate cause a stupid 
and degenerate race to rise to a high level. Nevertheless, if the 
water is bad, people cannot retain their health and strength, 
and similarly when the climate becomes unfit, no race can 
apparently retain its energy and progressiveness. This does 
not mean that we are hopelessly at the mercy of the changes of 
climate which any century may bring forth. On the contrary, 
if our diagnosis is correct, we may at last hope to be free from 
the withering blight which has overtaken every race from 
which the stimulus of a good climate has been removed. Here, 
again, the case is like that of a water supply. Suppose that a 
community had for generations been subject to repeated visita- 



10 CIVILIZATION AND CLIMATE 

sions of a dread disease which decimated the population. Sup- 
pose that it should be discovered that the disease arose from 
the drinking water. Finally, let the conmiunity learn that the 
water is infested with the bacteria which cause typhoid fever. If 
no other water supply were available, would there be reason for 
despair? The disease would be no worse than before, and there 
would be hope of finding some way of protecting the water 
from contamination. So it is with climate. For ages the world 
appears to have been suffering because one of the many con- 
ditions of progress has changed repeatedly from century to 
century. The disease has been clear enough, and we have 

m 

devised many helpful ways of treating the patients, although 
none has as yet proved highly satisfactory. This does not 
mean that the treatment has been wrong, or that we cannot 
ultimately succeed. It merely means that the neglect of one 
particular phase of the matter has prevented the other helpful 
measures from producing their full effect. If nature does not 
provide the stimulus which seems so effective elsewhere, man 
must himself provide it. 



CHAPTER II 
Race ok Place 

The problem which confronts us is primarily to separate the 
effects of race from those of place, heredity from environment. 
It may be made concrete by comparing two of the world's most 
sharply contrasted races. Teutons and negroes. Suppose that 
there were two uninhabited Egypts, exactly alike, and that one 
could be filled with negroes and the other with Teutons. Sup- 
pose that these settlers were average members of their races, 
and were equipped with the same religion, education, govern- 
ment, social institutions, and inventions. This might easily 
happen if the negroes came from the United States. Suppose, 
further, that neither race received new settlers from without. 
Which would succeed best? **The Teutons, of course," is the 
answer. ^^What a foolish question." But is it so foolish? 
You are thinking of the first few generations. I am thinking 
of the twentieth or thirtieth or later. Does anyone know 
what five hundred or a thousand years of life in Egypt would 
do for either Teutons or negroes if no new blood were intro- 
duced? 

At the end of that time the two sets of people would assur- 
edly be different, for the effect of a diverse inheritance would 
last indefinitely. The advantage in this respect would pre- 
sumably be on the side of the Teutons. I wish to emphasize this 
matter, for I shall have much to say about the effect of climate, 
and I want to take this opportunity to show that I do not 
underrate the importance of race. Although the matter is by 
no means settled, many authorities think that the brain of the 



12 CIVILIZATION AND CLIMATE 

white man is more complex than that of his black brother. 
Strong, in the Pedagogical Seminary for 1918, and Morse, 
in the Popular Science Monthly for 1914, have shown that 
in Columbia, S. C, the white children are mentally more ad- 
vanced than the colored. By applying the Binet tests to 225 
children in two white schools and to 125 children in a colored 
school, they obtained the following table, showing the amount 
by which the two races exceeded or fell short of what would be 
expected. 

COLORED WHITE 

More than one year backward, 29.4% 10.2% 

Satisfactory, 69.8% 84.4% 

More than one year advanced, 0.8% 5.8% 

Among the white children those from the middle classes made 
a better showing than those of factory operatives, but both 
were ahead of the colored. So far as home environment is con- 
cerned, the factory children have almost no advantage over 
the colored children. A slight advantage may possibly arise 
from the fact that when the Binet tests were originally devised, 
they were designed to measure the capacities of white children. 
The negro race may have capacities which the white does not 
possess and which do not play a part in the tests. In appre- 
ciation of humor, for example, and in equability of tempera- 
ment there can be little question that the black man surpasses 
the white. These things, however, can scarcely account for the 
fact that 29.4 per cent of the colored children showed a mental 
development more than a year behind that which would be 
expected from their age, while only 10.2 per cent of the white 
children were equally backward. 

So far as I am aware, every exact test which has been made 
on a large scale indicates mental superiority on the part of the 
white race, even when the two races have equal opportunities. 
For example, in Washington the colored children remain in 



RACE OR PLACE 18 

school quite as long as the white, but they do not accomplish 
so much in the way of study and do not reach so high a grade. 
In the cities of the South, Mayo and Loram find that where the 
races are given essentially the same instruction, the proportion 
of whites who are promoted is greater than that of negroes. 
Moreover, the difference seems to increase with years, which 
suggests that the average colored child not only stands below 
the average white child in mental development at all ages, but 
ceases to develop at an earlier age. In the high schools of New 
York, the superiority of the white race is shown by Mayo's 
examination of the average marks. By the time the children 
reach the high school, the processes of promotion have weeded 
out a much larger proportion of colored children than of white. 
Hence, the negroes form a specially selected group whose supe- 
riority to the average of their race is more marked than the 
superiority of the white high school children when compared 
with the rest of the white race. Nevertheless, the average 
marks of the white children are distinctly higher than those 
of the colored. 

In order to test the capacity of the two races in a wholly 
different way, I have made a comparison of white and colored 
workmen employed under precisely similar conditions. The 
first case was a cigar factory at Jacksonville, Florida. The 
employees were practically all Cubans. Both the whites and 
the blacks have very little education, and their home environ- 
ment in Cuba differs to only the smallest extent. They earn 
good wages, but are often out of work, and are generally 
shiftless and unreliable. There is, of course, no color line in 
Cuba, and the same is true in the cigar factories. Black men 
and white work side by side at the same tables. In such a 
factory, if the black man is as capable as the white he has 
exactly as good a chance, for he is paid by the piece, and his 
earnings depend entirely on himself. What, then, do we find? 
Taking all the operatives, we have 89 white and 66 negroes. 



14 CIVILIZATION AND CLIMATE 

Their average earnings, as measured by the wages of two 
weeks, are in the ratio of 100 for the whites to only 51 for the 
negroes. To make the comparison more favorable to the 
negroes, let us eliminate those who roU low-grade cigars where 
little skill is required and the pay is low. We then have 89 
white men and 44 negroes. They are doing exactly the same 
work under exactly the same conditions, but the whites earn 
a dollar where the negroes earn 75 cents. At a similar factory 
at Tampa, Florida, 17 colored men were at work and 808 white. 
In this case practically all of the few negroes happened to be 
men of long experience, while many of the whites were com- 
paratively new. Nevertheless, the whites are still on a par with 
the colored men, the ratio being 100 to 99.8. 

One of the best places for comparing the two races is the 
Bahama Islands. For reasons which I shall present later, the 
process of making ^^poor whites" has probably gone farther 
in the Bahamas than in almost any other Anglo-Saxon com- 
munity. Fart of the white people are like their race in other 
regions, but a large portion have unmistakably degenerated. 
Witness their intense and bigoted speech, their sunken cheeks 
and eyes, their sallow complexion, and their inert way of work- 
ing. In spite of racial prejudice, there is no real color line in 
the Bahamas. Fersons with more or less negro blood are 
worthy occupants of the highest positions, and are universally 
accepted in the most exclusive social circles. The British gov- 
ernment gives the negro every possible opportunity. The state 
of affairs may be judged from the remarks of a '*poor white" 
sailor, who said to me : "You want to know why I likes the south- 
em states better than the North. It's because they hates a nig- 
ger and I hates him, too. What kind of a place is this where 
they do everything for the nigger and nothing for the white 
man? It's bad enough to have to go to jail, but it's pretty hard 
for a white man to be taken there by a nigger constable." In 
one Bahaman village I saw negro girls teaching white children 



RACE OR PLACE 16 

in the public schools. In that same village a number of the 
leading white men cannot read or write. When they were 
children their parents would not send them to school with 
negroes. The despised negroes learned to read and write, but 
have now largely forgotten those accomplishments. The 
proud whites grew up in abject ignorance. Today the same 
thing is going on. I visited two villages where the white chil- 
dren are staying away from school because they will not go 
to negro teachers. The homes of such whites are scarcely 
better than those of their colored neighbors, and their fathers 
are called "Jim" and "Jack" by the black men with whom they 
work. Racial prejudice apparently works more harm to the 
whites than the blacks. So far as occupations go there is no 
difference, for all alike till the soil, sail boats, and gather 
sponges. 

When the lumber industry was introduced into the islands, 
whites and blacks were equally ignorant of the various kinds 
of work involved in cutting trees and converting them into 
lumber. The managers did not care who did the work so long 
as it was done. They wanted three things, strength, docility 
or faithfulness, and brains. They soon found that in the first 
two the negroes were superior. Time and again persons in 
authority, chiefly Americans, but also some of the more capable 
native whites, told me that if they wanted a crew of men to load 
a boat or some such thing, they would prefer negroes every 
time. The poor white shirks more than the colored man, he is 
not so strong, and he is proud and touchy. Other things being 
equal, the negro receives the preference. But other things 
are not equal. The very men who praised the negroes gen- 
erally added : **But you can't use a negro for everything. They 
can't seem to learn some things, and they don't know how to 
boss a job." The payroll reflects this. Even though the 
negroes receive the preference, the 400 who are employed earn 
on an average only about 60 per cent as much as the 67 white 



16 CIVILIZATION AND CLIMATE 

men. If we take only the 67 most competent negroes, their 
average daily wages are still only 88 per cent as great as those 
of the native whites. The difference is purely a matter of 
brains. Although the white man may be ignorant and ineffi- 
cient, with no more training than the negro, and although his 
father and grandfather were scarcely better, he possesses an 
inheritance of mental quickness and initiative which comes into 
evidence at the first opportunity. 

All these considerations seem to point to an ineradicable 
racial difference in mentality. As the plum differs from the 
apple not only in outward form and color, but in inward flavor, 
so the negro seems to differ from the white man not only in 
feature and complexion, but in the workings of the mind. No 
amount of training can eradicate the difference. Cultivation 
may give us superb plums, but they will never take the place of 
apples. We have tried to convert the black man into an infe- 
rior white man, but it cannot be done. Initiative, inventiveness, 
versatility, and the power of leadership are the qualities which 
give flavor to the Teutonic race. Good humor, patience, loy- 
alty, and the power of self-sacrifice give flavor to the negro. 
With proper training he can accomplish wonders. No one can 
go to a place like Hampton Institute without feeling that there 
is almost no limit to what may be achieved by cultivation. In 
an orderly, quiet way, those negro boys and girls go about their 
daily tasks and give one the feeling that they are making a 
real contribution to the world's welfare. To be sure, they work 
slowly, they are not briUiant in their classes, they rarely have 
new ideas in their manual work, but yet they are faithful. The 
willing, happy spirit of their work is something that we ner- 
vous, worried white people need sorely to learn. Once in a 
long time there comes a leader, a man to whom both white and 
black look up, but such leadership is scarcely the genius of the 
race. Yet leadership is what the black man must have. At 
such places as Hampton he gets it, and one realizes that the 



RACE OR PLACE 17 

white man's initiatiye joined to the Christian spirit which is 
there so dominant can give a training which overcomes much 
of the handicap of race. 

Having turned aside to pay tribute to the potency of race, 
education and religion, in determining the status of civilization, 
let us come back to physical environment. What part does this 
play? Is it so important that a strong race in an unfavor- 
able climate is likely to make no better showing than a weak 
race in a favorable climate? How far can a bad climate undo 
the effect of a good training? 

In answer to these questions, we may well compare the Teu- 
tonic and negro races when each is removed from the climate in 
which it originally developed. Before proceeding to this a 
word should be added to forestall any possible misunderstanding 
of my attitude toward the southern parts of the United States 
and toward other progressive regions which, nevertheless, suffer 
somewhat from climatic handicaps. In searching for the truth 
I shall be forced to say some things which may not be wholly 
pleasing to residents of such regions. It must be clearly under- 
stood, however, that these are not stated on my own authority. 
All are based either on the consensus of opinion among a large 
number of persons including many southerners, or upon the 
exact figures of the United States census or other equally 
reliable sources. My part has been simply to interpret them. 
Believing that in all essential matters of inheritance and of 
ability the people of the South average as high as those of the 
North, I have tried to find out why the southern part of the 
United States had prospered less than the northern. This does 
not mean that I reject the old ideas as to the cause, but 
simply that I emphasize another which has not received suffi- 
cient consideration. It does not discredit the South nor its 
people. It does not alter the fact that southerners possess a 
courtesy and thoughtfulness which we of the worried and 
hurried North need greatly to imitate. Nor does it mean that 



18 CIVILIZATION AND CLIMATE 

men of genius are not as likely to be bom in one section as 
another. Instead of this, it merely indicates that in addition to 
the many efforts now being made to foster progress in the 
South by other means, we should add a most vigorous attempt 
to discover ways of overcoming the handicap of climate. This 
book is written with the profound hope that the truth which 
it endeavors to discover may especially help those parts of the 
world whose climate, although favorable, does not afford the 
high degree of stimulation which in certain other restricted 
areas is so helpful. 

Let us first undertake a study of what the census shows 
as to negroes and whites in different parts of the United 
States. The only people whom we can compare with accuracy 
are the farmers, for they are the only ones for whom exact 
statistics are available. Fortunately they are the part of the 
conmiunity where social prejudices and other hampering con* 
ditions have the smallest influence. The prosperity of the 
farmer, more than that of almost any other class of society, 
depends upon his own individual effort. If he is industrious, 
he need never fear that he and his family will not have a roof 
over their heads and something to eat. Even when the crops 
are bad, he rarely is in danger of suffering as factory opera- 
tives often suffer, at least not in the eastern United States with 
which alone we are now concerned. Moreover, the prejudice 
against colored people has little effect upon farmers. No one 
hesitates to buy vegetables peddled by a darkey farmer. 
Finally, farming is the occupation in which the South has been 
least hampered as compared with the North. For nearly half a 
century the negro has been able to buy land freely in any part 
of the country. The southerners, whether white or black, have 
suffered economically because of slavery and the consequent 
war, but they have a soil and climate far better for agriculture 
than those of the North, and they have peculiarly good oppor- 
tunities to raise tobacco and cotton, two of the most money- 



RACE OR PLACE 19 

making crops in the world. Taken all in all, the farmers of 
the country ought to show the relative capacities of different 
races and of the same race under different conditions better 
than almost any other class of people. 

In 1904 the United States Census Bureau published a bulle- 
tin on the negro. From that I have prepared the following 
table showing the relative conditions in four groups of states 
in 1900. The first row of numbers (line 1) shows the total 
number of white and colored farmers. The second row shows 
that the farms of the northern white men average about 100 
acres in size, while those of the southern white men are larger. 
The colored farms, on the other hand, have an average size 
of about 50 acres. In the next row of figures, line 8, we notice 
that the northerners forge ahead. Even in the relatively hilly 
states of New York and Pennsylvania, the white farmers have 
improved 68.6 acres per farm, or 69 per cent of the whole, 
leaving only 81 per cent in the rough state of bushes or woods. 
The northern negroes do exactly as well in proportion to their 
holdings, for they have cleared 88.0 acres, which is also 69 
per cent of the average farm. In the Carolinas, Greorgia, and 
Florida, on the contrary, the white men have improved only 84 
per cent of their land, and the colored men 58 per cent. For 
the states farther west (comparison B), approximately similar 
conditions prevail. The negroes are obliged to clear a larger 
percentage than the whites because their small holdings would 
not otherwise furnish a living. The significance of the figures 
lies in the fact that the northerners, whether white or black, 
show more energy in improving their land than do the 
southerners of the same kind. 



II 

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RACE OR PLACE 



21 



Since this table was in print the corresponding bulletin 
(No. 129) for the census of 1910 has appeared. Unfor- 
tunately it is less full than its predecessor and does not give 
the value of products, line 9. For line 4 the figures are as 
follows : 



COMPAMISOV A 



COMPAKISOK B 



N.W. 


N.N. 


S.W. 


S.N. 


N.W. 


N.N. 


S.W. 


S.N. 


1009> 


$4,237 


$2,151 

419> 


$1,«41 


$7,917 
1009b 


$3,799 


$1,926 

259b 


$1,099 

149b 



In comparison A, the gain of the other divisions in relation 
to the northern white farmers is noticeable. In B, the per- 
centages are almost unchanged. 

In both comparisons the figures in lines 4 and 9 are the most 
significant. They show the value of the farms and the value of 
the annual products. In each line the values are stated in dol- 
lars as given in the census report, while underneath I have added 
percentages. In computing the percentages the highest value 
is reckoned as 100 per cent and the rest are figured accordingly. 
In each item of both comparisons the northern whites stand at 
the top. In general the northern white man's farm is worth 
twice as much as that of his colored neighbor, and he gets twice 
as much from it. The southern white man has a farm worth 
less than that of the northern negro, but he gets from it 
approximately the same amount of products. The southern 
negro's farm is worth about half as much as the southern 
white man's, and he gets from it about two thirds as much. 
Taking all the farmers from our four groups of states and 
reckoning them according to the value of what they actually 
produce, the census ranks them as shown in Table 2: 



22 CIVILIZATION AND CLIMATE 

Table 2. The Reuitive Efficiency of White and 
Neg&o Faemees in the Noeth and South 

Northern whites, 100 per cent 

Southern whites, 51 per cent 

Northern negroes, 49 per cent 

Southern negroes, 84 per cent 

This little table possesses profound significance. It shows 
unmistakably two types of contrast. First, there is the racial 
contrast, the result of long inheritance. That, apparently, is 
what makes the negroes fall below the whites in both the North 
and the South. There is also a climatic contrast. That, appar- 
ently, is why the negroes who come to the North rise above 
the usual level of their race, while the whites of the South fall 
below the level of theirs. I realize that the contrast between 
the two sections is explained in a hundred ways by as many 
different people. One ascribes it to the fact that slavery was 
a poor system economically. Another says that the South is 
cursed for having consented to the sin of slavery. Again, we 
are told that the predicament of the South lb due to the War of 
Secession, the failure to develop manufactures, the absence of 
roads and railroads, bad methods of farming, the presence of 
the negro making the white man despise labor, and many other 
equally important causes which cannot here be named. Still 
other authorities ascribe the condition of the South to its sup- 
posed settlement by adventurers, whereas the North had its 
Pilgrims. 

I would not minimize the importance of these factors. All 
are of real significance, and if any had been different, the 
South would not be quite what it is. All depend upon the two 
fundamental conditions of race or inheritance, and place or 
climate. Yet in the contrast between the North and South, the 
climatic effects seem to be the more potent. Slavery failed to 



RACE OR PLACE 28 

flourish in the North not because of any moral objection to it, 
for the most godly Puritans held slaves, but because the climate 
made it unprofitable. In a climate where the white man was 
tremendously energetic and where a living could be procured 
only by hard and unremitting work, it did not pay to keep 
slaves, for the labor of such incompetent people scarcely suiBced 
to provide even themselves with a living, and left little profit 
for their masters. In the South slavery was profitable because 
even the work of an inefficient negro more than sufficed to 
produce enough to support him. Moreover, the white man was 
not energetic, and his manual work was not of much more 
value than that of a negro. Hence, it was easy to fall into the 
habit of using his superior brain, and letting the black man 
perform the physical labor. If the Puritans had settled in 
Georgia, it is probable that they would have become proud 
slave-holders, despising manual work. 

So far as inheritance is concerned, the white southerners, 
according to the generally accepted principles of biology, must 
be essentially as well off as the white men of the North. New 
England has probably had a certain advantage from the strong 
fiber of her early settlers, but that section is excluded from our 
comparison because it has so few colored farmers. In New 
York, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and the states farther west, 
the white farmers in 1900 were of highly mixed origin, and there 
is little reason to think that they inherit any greater capacity 
than do the white men of the South. Hence, we infer that the 
difference shown by the census is largely a matter of climate. 
It has arisen partly by indirect means such as slavery and 
disease, partly by direct means such as the disinclination to 
physical exertion. This demands emphasis, for we are told 
that the South needs nothing but a fair opportunity, plenty of 
capital, and abundant roads, railroads, and factories, or else 
it needs only education, a new respect of one race for the other, 
cooperation between the two for the sake of the common good. 



24 CIVILIZATION AND CLIMATE 

and a deeper application of the principles of Christ. All these 
things are sadly needed, but it is doubtful whether they can 
work their full effect unless supplemented by a new knowledge 
of how to neutralize the climatic influences which seem to under- 
lie so many southern problems. In the climate of the South 
a part of the white population becomes a prey to malaria, the 
hookworm, and other debilitating ailments. People cease to be 
careful about food and sanitation. Even those who are in good 
health do not feel the eager zest for work which is so notable in 
the parts of the world where the climatic stimulus is at a 
maximum. Thus one thing joins with another to cause a part 
of the people to fall far below the level of their race, and to 
become "Poor Whites," or "Crackers.** These increase in 
number as one passes from a more to a less favorable climate. 
It is their run-down, unkempt farms which bring the average 
of the southern wliites so dangerously near the level of the 
negroes. The best farms of the South vie with those of the 
North. They show what could be done if all the inhabitants 
could be instilled with the energy and wisdom of the best. 

Aside from North America the only large area where Teutons 
and negroes come into direct contact as permanent inhabitants 
is South Africa. There they meet on practically equal terms. 
The English and the Boers began to settle in South Africa in 
large numbers only in the first half of the nineteenth century. 
In 1911 the South African Republic contained about 1,800,000 
Europeans, 4,000,000 natives, and 600,000 from other regions. 
A large proportion of the white men were not bom there, and 
hence the new conditions have not had time to produce their 
full effect. The natives consist largely of the Bantu stock of 
negroes. The majority are Zulus, but the most capable appear 
to be the Basutos, an allied race who have preserved a large 
measure of independence in the safe refuge of the Drakenberg 
mountains. Both the Zulus and the Basutos came from the 
North a few generations ago. Some preceded the white man and 



RACE OR PLACE 26 

some have come since his arriyal. In any case they are com- 
paratively newcomers. Their arrival, and still more that of 
the Europeans, has practically exterminated the former inhabi- 
tants, Hottentots and Bushmen. 

The colored people are most numerous in the north and east 
of the Republic, that is, in Rhodesia and Natal. The white 
men are most abundant in the south and in the central plateau, 
that is, in Cape Colony, Orange River Colony, and Transvaal. 
With ever increasing force, however, the blacks are pushing 
into the white man's country. They are brought as laborers for 
the mines ; they are wanted for the farms ; they are in demand 
as servants ; and they are themselves taking up farms and suc- 
cessfully cultivating them. They are doing more than this, 
however, for they are actually ousting the Europeans. In 1902 
the English and the Boers finished a bitter war. Ten years 
later their enmity had almost vanished in the common fear of 
the negro. Aside from the disturbances due to the European 
War of 1914, the great political question of the day is the 
black man. One party advocates segregation, with a white 
man's South Africa in the highlands from Transvaal south- 
ward, and a black man's South Africa in Natal and Rhodesia. 
No black man, they say, should be allowed to live permanently 
outside his own country, although he might go elsewhere to 
work temporarily. The other party holds that such measures 
are too radical, but it also recognizes the gravity of the 
situation. 

The problem presents itself under an economic guise. The 
colored men have a lower standard of living than the whites. 
Hence they work more cheaply. They furnish so abundant a 
supply of labor that white laborers have no chance. Thus a 
large number of the Europeans— even a tenth according to 
ardent believers in the future of South Africa — are "poor 
whites." They are a shiftless set, living from hand to mouth, 
proud of their race, yet less efficient than the blacks. The 



26 CIVILIZATION AND CLIMATE 

problem of preventing them from becoming an immediate charge 
upon the community is serious. They lack the push and energy 
which characterize the rest of the white population. According 
to Stevens, in his book ^^White and Black," 6 per cent of the 
white population in certain regions have fallen so low that 
they would rather resort to crime than work in competition with 
the black man. The most sinister fact is that these *^poor 
whites" appear to have been largely bom in the country. The 
newcomers are on the whole more energetic. They find employ- 
ment, and if they have difficulty in one place, move on to 
another. The poor whites lack the initiative to do this. If 
they fall into difficulties, they tend to lie down and give up. 
They need higher wages than the blacks in order to maintain 
their traditional standard of living. They are not efficient 
enough to get higher wages. If they had the restless energy 
which characterizes the children and grandchildren of emigrants 
from Europe in Canada, for example, they would scarcely fall 
into such straits. 

Since the problem is economic, the South Africans are 
striving to apply economic remedies. This is wise, but success 
is doubtful unless other factors are also considered. Back of 
the economic facts, and in many ways conditioning them, lies 
the climate. South Africa is supposed to have a climate 
admirably adapted to Europeans. I shared the common opinion 
until I began to gather statistics of the effect of climate upon 
efficiency. These, as will be shown later, indicate that although 
the South African climate is pleasant, it lacks the stimulating 
qualities which are so important in Europe and North America. 
This lack of stimulus increases rapidly as one goes from south 
to north. Here, then, is the situation that confronts us: In 
South Africa the white men settled first in the regions most 
favorable from a climatic point of view and then pushed north- 
ward into worse conditions. Even the best parts of South 
Africa cannot approach England and Holland in the excellence 



RACE OR PLACE 27 

of their climate. Hence, the white settlers are everywhere at a 
disadvantage. On the other hand, the Bantu negroes have come 
into South Africa from the north, where the climate is far less 
favorable than in their new homes. Thus the two races face 
each other under conditions which lessen the white man's energy, 
while they stimulate the black man. The whites are still far 
ahead, and will doubtless continue to be so indefinitely. Never^ 
theless, the weaker ones are being weeded out and prepared for 
destruction. What the final result will be, no man can say. It 
depends upon whether we can discover a means of preventing 
the deterioration which now seems to attack a portion of the 
population when people move from a good climate to a worse. 
A more striking case than that of South Africa is found in 
the Bahama Islands. At the time of the American Revolution 
a considerable number of Loyalists were so faithful to England 
that they sacrificed their all in order to escape from the new 
flag with its stars and stripes. Leaving their homes in Greorgia 
and other southern states they sought the British territory of 
the Bahamas. Other colonists came from Great Britain. Now, 
after from three to five generations, the new environment has 
had more opportunity than in South Africa to produce its full 
effect. Nowhere else, indeed, in all the world have people of 
the English race lived as genuine colonists for several genera- 
tions in so tropical a climate. What has been the result? There 
can be but one answer. It has been disastrous. Compare the 
Bahamas with Canada. The same sort of people went to both 
places. Today the descendants of the Loyalists in Canada are 
one of the strongest elements in causing that country to be 
conspicuously well governed and law-abiding, and the descend- 
ants of other colonists, both British and French, vie with them 
in this matter. In the Bahamas the descendants of the same 
type of people show today a larger proportion of poor whites 
than can probably be found in any other Anglo-Saxon com- 
munity. Although no figures are available, my own observa- 



28 CIVILIZATION AND CLIMATE 

tions lead to the conclusion that the average white fanner is 
scarcely ahead of the average negro. 

Whatever the exact figures may be, there can be no question 
that in the Bahamas the two races tend to approach the same 
level. This seems to indicate a marked retrogression of the 
white race in regions which are climatically unsuitable. Let 
me hasten to say that many of the more intelligent Bahamans 
do not differ from the corresponding portions of the Anglo- 
Saxon race elsewhere. At home they feel themselves handi- 
capped, but when the young people go away to the northern 
United States or England, they frequently show marked ability. 
Their inheritance is still good. As to the poor whites, who 
were described in connection with the lumber industry, it is not 
so certain that their inheritance remains unimpaired, for in 
some villages genuine abnormalities both of body and mind are 
seen. This, however, may be due to the intermarriage of 
cousins which has been common in certain communities. 

The inefficiency of many of the white Bahamans, however, 
is not due to intermarriage, as is sometimes implied, for 
villages where this prevails are scarcely worse than those where 
it is no more common than in America. Nor is the inefficiency 
due to disease. The hookworm is practically unknown. 
According to a report of Dr. McHattie, Chief Medical Officer 
of the Islands, only two cases had been reported up to October, 
1918. In this report, for which I am indebted to the courtesy 
of Dr. J. A. Ferrell of the Rockefeller International Health 
Commission, the author points out that ^Hhe remarkably rapid 
manner in which the soil . . . dries after even the heaviest 
rain" prevents the development of the infective larvae. For 
similar reasons malaria is no more prevalent than in Dela- 
ware, for instance, and in general the islands are decidedly 
healthful. A monotonous diet may be another detrimental 
factor, but it is scarcely the root of the matter. Many of the 
people are well fed, and all could be so if they displayed any 



RACE OR PLACE 29 

energy. Indeed, many people say that life is altogether too 
easy in the Bahamas. The soil is wonderfully fertile, crops 
of some kind will ripen at all seasons, and a man can work 
less than half his time and still readily procure an abundance 
to eat and wear for himself and his family. On the other 
hand, we are often told that the difficulties of life have broken 
the spirit of the inhabitants. The soil, in spite of its richness, 
is thin, and rocks are so abundant that the plough is almost 
unknown. Hand agriculture in little patches in the midst of 
naked limestone is the rule. It cannot be denied that there are 
difficulties in comparison with many other tropical countries. 
For instance, I was talking with a negro whose parents were in 
a slave ship bound from Africa to Cuba when a British war- 
ship captured it. The slaves were taken to the Bahamas and 
liberated. In answer to a question as to how his parents liked 
the islands compared with Africa, the son said: ^^They didn't 
like it. They used to say, ^In Africa one could lie around 
all day and do nothing and always find something to eat. 
Here one has to work or else starve.' " The truth seems to 
be that compared with North Prussia or Maine the Bahamas 
are a very easy place in which to make a living, but that much 
more work is needed than in some other tropical regions. They 
are at the happy mean. Other difficulties such as the tropical 
hurricanes which sweep over the country once in every few 
years ; insect pests, which are neither more nor less harmful than 
in other countries; the American tariff; competition with Cuba, 
and above all the isolated position of the islands are frequently 
cited as causes of the constant Bahaman failures. The islands 
are always suffering from bad luck, and something must be to 
blame. 

All these various factors doubtless play a part in retarding 
the development of the Bahamas. Back of them, however, lies 
a factor of even greater import, namely, an inertia due to the 
climate. It does not cause the difficulties mentioned above, but 



80 CIVILIZATION AND CLIMATE 

it aggravates them and makes it almost impossible to overcome 
them. I talked about this with perhaps fifty of the more intelli- 
gent people, including both natives and foreigners who have 
been there a number of years. Almost without exception they 
said the same thing. ^^This climate is one of the best in the 
world. You can see that for yourself. It is very healthful, and 
we have very few sicknesses. The only trouble is that it does 
not make one feel like work. In winter it is all right, although 
even then we cannot fly around the way you Americans do. We 
always feel lazy, and in summer we want to sit around all the 
time." As an American picturesquely put it : ^^Until I came to 
the Bahamas I never appreciated posts. Now I want to lean 
against every one that I see." Many of the men and almost 
all the women complain of feeling tired. Even the children 
are listless. One young man stated the case very strongly, ^^We 
go to bed tired in summer and we get up more tired, and the 
summer lasts from April to October." Again and again people 
said: "Oh, it's all very well for you to think we're lazy, but try 
living here six months or a year and you'll be as lazy as we are. 
It's something in the air. Just look at these young ministers 
who come out from England. At first they are, full of energy, 
but after a year or two it oozes out, though their spirit is still 
as zealous as ever." Two of the ministers spoke of the fact 
that when they came out they thought nothing of walking 
twenty miles, but now they dread the thought of two. Several 
of the most thoughtful and intelligent islanders, men who have 
succeeded in business and whose judgment would be respected 
anywhere, said: "We know that we are physically unable to do 
what English and Americans can do. We are weaker than our 
fathers, and they were weaker than theirs. It is a grief to 
send our children away, but in our hearts we know that this is 
not a white man's country." All this, it must be remembered, 
is not due to any specific disease, so far as we are aware. 
Indeed, I met several people who said that a stay of a few years 



RACE OR PLACE 81 

in the Bahamas had improved their health, but at the same 
time had made them feel inefficient. 

Aside from extremely ignorant persons whose opinion is of 
little value, the only men who spoke of the climate more hope- 
fully were five or six highly trained officials and others occupy- 
ing positions of authority. These men, without exception, can 
control their own time. In most cases their office hours are 
from 9 or 10 a.m. to 2 p.m., or less. They are men of naturally 
strong physique; they have the opportunity and the will to 
take regular exercise; and, most important of all, they make 
long and frequent visits to the United States or England. 

The benefit to be derived from a visit to a more bracing 
climate is astonishing. The contrast between the dull, sallow 
complexions and thin cheeks of the women and girls who have 
always lived on the islands and the round, rosy cheeks of those 
who have recently come back from a long stay at the North is 
most striking. According to a local saying you cannot tell 
whether a Bahaman woman is pretty until she goes away, and 
has a chance to fill out her cheeks and get some color. It is by 
no means strange that the stronger, more energetic young 
white people are fast leaving the islands. I asked a Bahaman 
girl, who had been studying nursing in New York, whether she 
enjoyed life more in the United States than in the Bahamas. 
"How can one help enjoying it more there?" she answered. 
"There one feels like doing things. Here one never feels like 
anything." Like almost everyone else she was sure that it was 
the climate even more than the new social environment which 
made the difference. 

One thing that surprised me was to hear the Bahamans speak 
of the stimulus of living in Florida. A native merchant re- 
marked: "If I hire a new man I don't have to ask whether he 
has been to Florida. I know it by the way he works, but it 
does not last long." Here again the social environment is an 
important factor, but various people told me that the air 



82 CIVILIZATION AND CLIMATE 

somehow makes them feel more capable of work in Florida than 
at home. The women of Florida — ^I heard them say it them- 
selves — are pale and wan compared with their northern sisters. 
One of them, whose color still shows her northern origin, re- 
marked: "When I come home after a summer in the North, I am 
full of energy and see all sorts of things that I want to change 
about the house. But after a month or two I don't care 
whether things are fixed or not." One hears the same sort of 
thing everywhere. A factory superintendent from Atlanta, 
Greorgia, told me that the Florida workmen, even the most skill- 
ful mechanics, drive him frantic because they are so shiftless 
and so ready to take a day off whenever they feel like it — far 
more so than at Atlanta, even though Atlanta seems slow to 
northerners. Yet, in spite of all these things, Florida is a more 
stimulating place than the Bahamas. Its summers are not 
much better, but its winters are sometimes frosty, while in the 
Bahamas the thermometer practically never goes below 50° F. 
Perhaps of greater importance, as we shall see later, is the fact 
that in Florida the temperature from day to day varies much 
more rapidly than in the Bahamas, even though both places are 
in the same latitude. Hence, the mainland is blessed with a 
genuine climatic stimulus compared with the uniform islands. 

The last thing to be said about the Bahamas concerns the 
effect of the climate on mental activity. Practically all the 
islanders with whom I talked thought that the effect of the 
climate on mental activity is at least as great as on physical. 
Several of the more thoughtful, without any suggestion on my 
part, put the matter in this way : "The worst thing about this 
climate is the effect on the mind. Not that people do not have 
as good minds as elsewhere, but one soon gets weary of hard 
mental effort. It is extremely difficult to concentrate one's 
thoughts. At night one cannot seem to make himself read 
anything serious — nothing but the lightest kind of stories." In 
our own southern states one hears the same complaint. Even 



RACE OR PLACE 88 

in Virginia the booksellers say that during the long summer 
almost no one touches a serious book. One feels it everywhere, 
for on the trains, at the railroad stations, and at the news- 
dealers it is generally difficult to find the higher grade of 
magazines. Time and again during a recent journey of three 
months in the southern states I tried to get such papers as the 
Outlook, Independent, Harper* 8, Atlantic, the Review of Re- 
views. The Century, and so forth — but all that I could find was 
trashy story magazines. The dealers rarely keep the better 
magazines because people will not read them. Lack of training 
surely has something to do with the matter, but mental inertia 
due to lack of climatic stimulus seems to be at least equally 
important. 

Let us return now to our question as to a Teutonic and a 
negro Egypt. The farmers of the northern and southern states, 
the race problem of South Africa, and the backwardness of the 
Bahamas, all seem to point to the same conclusion. When the 
white man migrates to climates less stimulating than those of 
his original home, he appears to lose in both physical and 
mental energy. This leads to carelessness in matters of sani- 
tation and food, and thus gives greater scope to the diseases 
which under any circumstances would find an easy prey in the 
weakened bodies. The combination of mental inertia and physi- 
cal weakness makes it difficult to overcome the difficulties aris- 
ing from isolation, from natural disasters, or from the presence 
of an inferior race, and this in turn leads to ignorance, preju- 
dice, and idleness. Thus there arises a vicious circle which keeps 
on incessantly. From its revolving edge a part of the com- 
munity is thrown off as poor whites, whose number increases in 
proportion to the enervating effect of the climate and the 
consequent speed with which the circle revolves. That climate 
is the original force which sets the wheel in motion seems to me 
evident, because it is only in adverse climates that we find the 
cracker'' type of "poor white trash*' developing in appreciable 



(( 



84 CIVILIZATION AND CLIMATE 

numbers. If white men lived a thousand years in Egypt it 
seems probable that a large proportion of them would degener- 
ate to this type. Whether they would still retain an inheri- 
tance of mentality sufficient to keep them ahead of a similar 
body of negroes can scarcely be determined. 



I 
5 



CHAPTER in 

The White Man in the Tropics 

Thus far we have dealt with the temperate zone. Even the 
Bahamas lie north of the Tropic of Cancer. Let us now turn to 
the torrid zone, which contains the world's richest and most 
inviting fields of future development. Let us inquire into the 
eiFect of that region upon Europeans who attempt to live there 
permanently. The isolation of the tropical regions, their lack 
of facilities for transportation, and the great difficulties of 
agriculture will doubtless be overcome, but that will by no means 
solve the problem. Two great obstacles will still remain — ^the 
native inhabitants and the white man's own mind and body. 

Whatever may be the cause, it is generally agreed that the 
native races within the tropics are dull in thought and slow in 
action. This is true not only of the African negroes, the South 
American Indians, and the people of the East Indies, but of the 
inhabitants of southern India and the Malay peninsula. Per- 
haps they will change, but the fact that the Indians both of Asia 
and South America have been influenced so little by from one to 
four hundred years of contact with the white man affords little 
ground for hope. Judging from the past, there is scant reason 
to think that their character is likely to change for many 
generations. Until that time comes they will be one of the 
white man's greatest obstacles. Experience shows that the 
presence of an inferior race in large numbers tends constantly 
to lower the standards of the dominant race. Here in America, 
although the negro forms only a ninth part of the population, 
he is one of our gravest problems. Yet he is not so great a 



86 CIVILIZATION AND CLIMATE 

handicap as are the native races of the tropics. Whatever the 
negro may have been when he was first brought to America, he 
is now less stolid and indifferent, more subject to stimulating 
influences than he was when he came, or than the Indians of 
tropical America. It is literally true in South America, for 
instance, that the more an Indian is paid the less he will work. 
If one day's pay will buy two days' food, he will work half the 
time ; if the pay is increased so that one day's pay will buy food 
for three days, he will work one third of the time. The experi- 
ment has been tried again and again. The most considerate 
employers of tropical labor agree with the most inconsiderate 
that in general it is useless to attempt to spur the Indians by 
any motive beyond the actual demands of food and shelter. 
Kindness and consideration on the part of the employer 
undoubtedly promote faithfulness, but they seem rarely to 
arouse ambition or energy. With the negro in Africa, as every- 
one knows, much the same condition prevails, but where he has 
been brought to the United States this is by no means so true. 
For example, in Central America it is generally thought that a 
negro from Jamaica is more efficient than an Indian, while a 
negro from the United States is much more efficient. The 
negro in the United States is generally considered more efficient 
than he was in Africa, whereas his stay-at-home brother and the 
Indian of tropical America, remaining in their old environment, 
do not seem to have changed. 

Doubtless the change in the negro is due to a new social 
environment quite as much as to a new physical environment, 
and many authorities believe that the social change is the more 
important. This, however, does not materially alter the case. 
As conditions are now, it is extremely difficult to change the 
physical environment of tropical races so long as they remain 
in their present habitat, and it seems to be equally difficult to 
change their social environment. Those who dwell permanently 
in the white man's cities are influenced somewhat, but the results 



THE WHITE MAN IN THE TROPICS 87 

are often disastrous. Here, as in other cases, the general 
tendency seems to be to revert to the original condition as soon 
as immediate contact with the white man is removed. This 
seems to have been the case almost everywhere within twenty 
degrees of the equator. 

I would not be understood as saying that contact with a 
higher civilization will never produce any good effects upon the 
people of the tropics, but merely that the process is bound to 
be slow. The aborigines of tropical America, for example, 
show no sign of disappearing, or of being swallowed up by a 
multitude of immigrants, as has been the case in temperate 
latitudes. On the contrary, in the equatorial countries of Latin 
America, the only tropical region where the white man has 
settled in any large numbers, the proportion of Indian blood is 
apparently increasing at the expense of the white. This is 
because the white man, except in a few favored places, suffers 
from tropical diseases more than does the native, and unless 
he is wise enough to adopt the latest discoveries of medical 
science his children die or grow up weak. It is notoriously 
true that in India there is almost no such thing as a fourth 
generation of Indian-bom British. The original stock is so 
weakened by tropical conditions that the children must either 
be sent back to Europe to recover their health, or else they 
become enfeebled and their descendants soon die out. Even with 
the help of modem medical science, it is not yet certain that 
the number of permanent white inhabitants can increase greatly, 
although sojourners are sure to become numerous. Moreover, 
there is reason to think that that same medical science may 
prevent the death of children among the natives, and thus 
gradually increase their numbers. The white man has already 
caused such an increase of the natives in India, not so much by 
conquering diseases as by the prevention of famine. 

If the conclusion just reached is correct, it seems probable 
that for a long time to come tropical countries will contain a 



88 CIVILIZATION AND CLIMATE 

dull, unprogressive population. Contact with such a popula- 
tion constantly exposes the white man to a most deteriorating 
influence. For example, the inferior mental ability of the lower 
race, and its incapacity for eiFective organization lead to the 
abuse of its labor and to its exploitation in some form of peon- 
age, even though the fact may be disguised by legal phraseol- 
ogy. Again, the presence of a despised race is almost certain 
to lead to low sexual morality. In the same way, political 
equality becomes a mere form of speech, for the dominant race 
will not permit the other to gain rights at its expense. Manual 
labor, too, is despised, for it is associated with the idea of an 
inferior race. All these things may be looked upon as dis- 
advantages of the lower race, but I believe that the higher reaps 
by far the greater injury. The conditions just mentioned 
appear to be among the most potent factors in rendering it 
difficult for the white man to attain as much success in tropical 
regions as in those farther to the north or south. Their evil 
effect is roughly proportional to the difference between the two 
races. That difference is at a maximum where a low tropical 
race remains in its original, unstimulating environment, and is 
brought into contact with immigrants of a highly developed 
race who completely change their environment. The new- 
comers are released from old restraints at a time when they 
stand in pecidiar need of them. Instead of being stimulated to 
greater love of political freedom and equality, sterner morality, 
and more intense industry, as was the case among the settlers 
in New England, the immigrants are in danger of being weak- 
ened in all of these respects. The effect on the original immi- 
grants is bad enough, but on their children it is far worse. 
The settler, or European colonist, who is possessed of wealth 
and power, can to a slight degree shield his family, but even in 
such cases the children are in constant contact with servants. 
They grow up with a supreme contempt for the natives, and at 
the same time with the feeling that they can treat them as they 



THE WHITE MAN IN THE TROPICS 89 

choose. If poorer people, that is, colonists in the ordinary sense 
of the word, attempt to live in the tropics, especially if they 
are people who work with their hands, their children are exposed 
still more to all the contaminating influences of contact with the 
natives. Hence, the second and third generations, and the 
fourth and fifth, if there are any, suiFer more than their 
ancestors. 

The degree to which the indirect or external handicaps of 
tropical countries are eiFective in lowering the standards of 
civilization depends largely upon the amount of energy and 
will power possessed by the inhabitants. This, in turn, depends 
upon physiological conditions. Obviously, diseases have much 
to do with the matter. This subject has been so much dis- 
cussed that I shall here refer to it only briefly. There can be 
little doubt that malaria, and the many other diseases which 
are characteristic of tropical countries, play an important 
part in causing a low state of civilization. The old idea that 
the people who live in tropical regions are immune to local 
diseases is no longer accepted by students of tropical medicine. 
Adults, to be sure, are often immune, but apparently this is 
not true of the race as a whole. Vast numbers of children die 
in infancy and early childhood from the diseases which prevent 
the white man from permanently living within the tropics. 
Others suffer, but recover. They bear the results with them to 
the grave, however, in the form of enlarged spleens, or other 
injuries to the internal organs of the body. The world has of 
late been astonished at the ravages of pellagra and of other 
diseases due to such organisms as the hookworm. People who 
are subject to them cannot be highly competent. Their mental 
processes, as well as their physical activity, are dulled* So 
long as a community is constantly afflicted with such disorders, 
it can scarcely rise high in the scale of civilization. Nothing is 
more hopeful for the tropics than the rapid progress in the 
control of these diseases. If they could be eliminated, not only 



40 CIVILIZATION AND CLIMATE 

would the white man be able to live permanently where now he 
can be only a sojourner, but the native races would probably 
be greatly benefited. How great this benefit would be we cannot 
yet telly but the elimination of the diseases which especially 
aiFect children would probably do much to increase vitality, 
energy, and initiative. This in itself would be an immeasurable 
boon not only to the natives, but to the white man, who would 
thereby be freed in part from some of his worst social dangers. 

This highly desirable result cannot be obtained quickly. The 
achievements of the United States in Panama are sometimes said 
to prove that diseases can be eliminated anywhere in tropical 
countries. This is true, but it must be remembered that Panama 
is a highly specialized case. During the building of the Canal 
a great number of people were collected in a small area, and 
enormous sums of money were freely expended. Everyone was 
subject to strict, semi-military rule, and similar conditions con- 
tinue under civil rule. Such methods cannot be applied to 
millions of square miles. The expense would be prohibitive. 
The ordinary farmer in tropical regions cannot expect to be 
protected by his government. He must protect himself. In the 
long run even tropical races may learn this lesson, but it will 
be a difficult and expensive task, and will require a radical 
change in the people themselves. Such a change will doubtless 
come, but not for generations, and not imtil a long selective 
process has gone on whereby those who do not adopt modem 
medical methods will gradually be eliminated, while those who 
adopt them will persist. 

At this point we come to the parting of the ways. Suppose 
that the white man should succeed in cultivating the forests, 
traversing the waste places, and conquering the diseases. Sup- 
pose also that he should eliminate the deteriorating influences 
of low social and moral standards among the natives. If all 
this were suddenly done, and he were set down in a tropical 
garden of Eden, would he be able to hold his own among the 



THE WHITE MAN IN THE TROPICS 41 

peoples of the world? Would Teutons or Latins under such 
circumstances be able permanently to maintain as high a stan- 
dard of civilization as is maintained by their brothers in 
Europe? Or would there be a change in some of the traits 
which we are wont to call racial? Clearly we are back at the 
point where we started, and are confronted by the question of 
race versus place. We must determine how much of our 
European and American energy, initiative, persistence, and 
other qualities upon which we so much pride ourselves is due 
to racial inheritance, and how much to long residence under 
highly stimulating conditions of climate. 

One of the lines along which we may seek for an answer is by 
a comparison of the character of Europeans in tropical coun- 
tries with their character in the temperate zone. Whatever 
differences we may find are presumably due largely to physi- 
ological causes, but they manifest themselves chiefly through 
the will. In tropical countries weakness of will is unfortunately 
a quality displayed not only by the natives, but by a large pro- 
portion of the northerner sojourners. It manifests itself in 
many ways. Four of these, namely, lack of industry, an iras- 
cible temper, drunkenness, and sexual indulgence are particu- 
larly prominent, and may be taken as typical. Others, such 
as proneness to gambling and disregard to the truth, might 
equally well be considered if space allowed. 

In the quality of industry the difference between people in 
tropical and other countries is well known. We have already 
touched on it in the Bahamas, but let us amplify it further. 
Practically every northerner who goes to the torrid zone says 
at first that he works as well as at home, and that he finds the 
climate delightful. He may even be stimulated to unusual 
exertion. Little by little, however, even though he retains 
perfect health, he slows down. He does not work so hard as 
before, nor does the spirit of ambition prick him so keenly. On 
the low, damp seacoast, and still more in the lowland forests. 



42 CIVILIZATION AND CLIMATE 

the process of deterioration is relatively rapid, although its 
duration may vary enormously in different individuals. In the 
dry interior the process is slower, and on the high plateaus it 
may take many years. Both in books and in conversation with 
inhabitants of tropical regions one finds practical imanimity 
as to this tropical inertia, and it applies both to body and 
mind. After long sojourn in the tropics it is hard to spur one's 
self to the physical effort of a mountain climb, and equally hard 
to think out the steps in a long chain of reasoning. The mind, 
like the body, wants rest. Both can be spurred to activity, but 
this exhausts vitality. The common explanations of tropical 
inertia are diverse. One man says that within the tropics hard 
work is unnecessary, because salaries are high ; another asserts 
that it is because servants are cheap; still another claims that 
hard work is dangerous to the health; and almost all agree 
that "anyhow, one doesn't feel like working down here." Prob- 
ably all four of these factors cooperate, and each, doubtless, 
produces pronounced results, but the last two, health and "feel- 
ing," seem the most important when many generations are con- 
sidered. 

In spite of individual exceptions, white men who spur 
themselves to work within the tropics as hard as at home are 
in great danger of breaking down in health. They become 
nervous and enfeebled, and readily succumb to tropical diseases. 
This is one of the most powerful deterrents to the development 
of an efficient white population in equatorial regions. If the 
more energetic members of the community ruin their health, they 
are almost sure to die before their time, or else to go back to the 
North. In either case they are not likely to leave many children 
to perpetuate their characteristics. Thus if white colonization 
takes place on a large scale within the tropics, there is grave 
danger that the less energetic elements will be the ones to per- 
sist and to become the ancestors of the future population. In 
the past this factor must have operated to weed out the more 



THE WHITE MAN IN THE TROPICS 48 

energetic members of each of the many races that have migrated 
toward the equator. The feeling of inertia which prevents the 
less competent members of a tropical community from working 
may perhaps be interpreted by teleologists as a merciful pro- 
vision of Providence to warn man that he must not work too 
hard in the torrid zone, but that will scarcely help to advance 
civilization. Few people will question the reality of the tropical 
inertia. It is the same lassitude which everyone feels on a hot 
summer day — ^the inclination to sit down and dream, the ten- 
dency to hesitate before beginning a piece of work, and to 
refrain from plunging into the midst of it in the energetic way 
which seems natural under more stimulating conditions. 

Lack of will power is shown by northerners in tropical 
regions not only in loss of energy and ambition, but in fits of 
anger. The English official who returns from India is com- 
monly described as "choleric.'* Every traveler in tropical 
countries knows that he sometimes bursts into anger in a way 
that makes him utterly ashamed, and which he would scarcely 
believe possible at home. Almost any American or European 
who has travelled or resided within the tropics will confess that 
he has occasionally flown into a passion, and perhaps used 
physical violence, under circumstances which at home would 
merely have made him vexed. This is due apparently to four 
chief causes. One is the ordinary tropical diseases, for when a 
man has a touch of fever, his temper is apt to get the better of 
him. In the second place, the slowness of tropical people is 
terribly exasperating. The impatient northerner uses every 
possible means to make the natives hurry, or to compel them 
to keep their word. His energy is usually wasted — ^the native 
remains unmoved, and the only visible result is an angry and 
ridiculous foreigner. Yet a show of anger and violence often 
seems to be the only way of getting things done, and this is 
frequently used as an excuse for lack of seli-control. In the 
third place, the consequences of becoming a^gry are less dan- 



44 CIVILIZATION AND CLIMATE 

gerous than elsewhere. The inert people of tropical countries 
often submit to indignities which an ordinary white man would 
bitterly resent. Of course they object to ill treatment, and will 
retaliate if possible, but they generally do not have sufficient 
energy or cunning to make their vengeance effective against 
the powerful white man. Finally, those who have lived in the 
tropics generally find that, even when things go smoothly, and 
they are in contact with people of their own kind and are in 
comparatively good health, they are more irritable than at 
home. In other words, their power of self-control is enfeebled. 
Of course there are many exceptions, but that does not affect 
the general principle. 

Drunkenness, our third evidence of lack of self-control, needs 
scarcely be discussed. Within the tropics, the white man's 
alcohol in the form of rum is scarcely more injurious to the 
natives of Africa than it is in other forms to himself. In 
places such as Guatemala and parts of Mexico, drunken men 
and women may be seen upon the streets at almost any time 
of day. Nowhere else, during extensive travels in America, 
Europe, and Asia, have I seen so much drunkenness as in 
Guatemala. Among white men a large number drink as badly 
as the natives. Here is an example, a railway conductor who 
was telling me about drinks in Guatemala: 

"They've got something here called *white-eye,' " he re- 
marked. *^ou know that Mexican Mescal,' and how strong it 
is? Well, white-eye's got mescal chained to a telegraph pole. 
Yes, I drink it. A man's got to drink something. The first 
time I tried it, I got crazy drunk and smashed things up the 
way they all do. I was arrested and fined fifty dollars. [This 
is really only two and a half, for Guatemalan currency con- 
sists of paper which is not redeemable, and hence is worth only 
five cents on a dollar — ^a characteristic evidence of tropical 
incapacity.] I ^t fined several times that way and didn't 



THE WHITE MAN IN THE TROPICS 46 

like it. Then one day when I was going to get drunk, I said 
to myself, *I'll go and pay my fine now and then they won't 
bother me.' I did that several times, and the ^jefe politico' 
liked it [presumably because it was an easy way of pocketing 
the money]. Then he said to the police: ^Don't bother this 
man. Just let him get drunk all he likes, and he'll pay his 
fines at the proper time.' I tell you, white-eye is bad stuff. 
The only proper way to drink it is to take a quart bottle in 
the morning. Find a place that will stay shady all day. 
Drink the whole thing right down and get so dead drunk that 
you will sleep till night." 

I do not cite this man as typical of all the white men in the 
tropics. Far from it. Many conduct themselves with sobriety 
and industry, but such men almost invariably make frequent 
and protracted visits to the better climate of the North. If 
a white man stays steadily for long periods in the tropics, 
however, and if his character has any weak spots, they are 
almost sure to be exaggerated. The drunkenness of the tropi- 
cal white man arises in part from the constant heat which 
makes people want something to drink at all times, partly 
from the monotony of life, and still more from the absence of 
the social restraints which exercise so powerful an inhibitory 
influence at home. Back of all these things, however, among 
both the white men and natives, there seem to lie two conditions 
which are directly connected with the climate. One is the same 
enfeeblement of the will which makes a man burst into anger. 
The other is a constant feeling of inefficiency which makes a 
man crave something to brace him up. 

The last of the ways in which weakness of will is evident in 
tropical countries is the relation of the sexes. Its importance 
can scarcely be overestimated. It leads to the ruin of thou- 
sands of northerners, even though they do not yield to drink, 
to anger, or to laziness. When once they have fallen into pro- 
nounced immorality the other weaknesses soon follow. The 



46 CIVILIZATION AND CLIMATE 

condition of the native races is still worse. Everjrwhere within 
the tropics missionaries say that their converts can be taught 
honesty, industry, and many other virtues, but that even the 
strongest find it almost impossible to resist the temptations of 
sex. Many Europeans condone this. They say that it is 
natural, and that the natives had better be left to their own 
conventional ways of restricting but not preventing sexual 
intercourse. Perhaps they are right, although I do not believe 
so. That is not the point, however. We are at present con- 
cerned with the effect which free indulgence has upon civiliza- 
tion and upon the capacity for progress. This may be illus- 
trated by what Gouldsbury and Sheane, for example, say of 
the Zulus in northern Rhodesia. They hold that one of the 
greatest reasons why these people remain so backward is that 
their thought and energy are largely swallowed up in matters 
of sex. During the years when the young men ought to be 
getting new ideas and thinking out the many little projects and 
the few great ones which combine to cause progress, the vast 
majority are thinking of women, and planning to gain posses- 
sion of some new woman or girl. Under such circiunstances no 
race can rise to any high position. 

The causes of these conditions are various. Many writers 
dismiss the matter by saying that the social standards of tropi- 
cal people are low and tend to cause northerners to conform to 
them. This is true, but it explains nothing. A real, though 
minor reason for the lowness of the standards is found in the 
free, open life which is almost universal within the tropics. 
People are out of doors so much and it is so easy to meet in 
secret that temptation arises very frequently. Much more 
important is the scanty dress of the women, and its character 
which calls attention to their sex. Livingstone speaks with dis- 
gust of the way in which his carriers, hour after hour, discussed 
the breasts of the half-naked women whom they met. Even 
in the North women seem to be strangely indifferent to the 



THE WHITE MAN IN THE TROPICS 47 

effect of their mode of dress upon men. They do not seem to 
think that they are responsible if their low-necked gowns and 
the making of their clothing in such a way that each little move- 
ment of their bodies can be detected, stir men's passions. They 
appear oblivious to the fact that the display of their beauty 
often means that some other woman must pay the penalty. 
Within the tropics these conditions are exaggerated. I believe 
I am speaking within bounds when I say that any young man of 
European race with red blood in his veins is in more danger of 
deteriorating in character and efficiency because of the women 
of the tropics than from any other single cause. 

The strength of this deteriorating force is not merely exter- 
nal. Either the actual temptation to sexual excess is greater 
in the tropics than elsewhere, or else the inhibitory forces are 
weakened by the same processes which cause people to drink 
to excess, to become unduly angry, and to work slowly. Hell- 
pach states that it is said that in southern Italy sexual irregu- 
larities increase greatly at times when the hot, damp wind 
known as sirocco blows across the Mediterranean from the 
deserts of northern Africa. This is so well recognized among 
the people themselves that offenses committed under such cir- 
cumstances are in a measure condoned. Violence, too, is more 
common at such times, for self-control of every kind is weak- 
ened. In eastern Turkey the hot desert winds cause the whole 
community to become cross and irritable. I have there seen a 
missionary, a man of unusual strength of character, shut 
himself up in his study all day, because he knew that he was 
in danger of saying something disagreeable. I cite this case 
because among the people whom I have known missionaries are, 
oiTliie whole, most completely masters of themselves and the 
least likely to let minor circumstances turn them from the 
Christlike lives which they are striving to live day by day before 
the native communities. For this same reason, to return to our 
immediate subject, I quote the remark of a missionary in Cen- 



48 CIVILIZATION AND CLIMATE 

tral America when we were discussing the morality of the coun- 
try. He was a most austere man, a mt^mber of a small and 
extremely devout sect, and his whole being was devoted to 
preaching the gospel. Speaking of his own experiences, he 
said: 

^^When I am in this country, evil spirits seem to attack me. 
I suppose you would call them something else, but that is what 
I think they are. When I am at home in the United States I 
feel pure and true, but when I come here, it seems as if lust 
were written in the very faces of the people.*' 

In all the evils which have just been mentioned — ^laziness, 
anger, drunkenness, and immorality — social causes undoubtedly 
play an important part. A strong public opinion would save 
many a young northerner from drink and immorality, and 
would keep him faithful to his work. A clear religious faith 
or a high ideal of duty would do the same thing. Good homes, 
proper dress, and many other material changes would help 
greatly. So, too, would a study of how it has come to pass 
that certain tropical races, in spite of their environment, have 
developed comparatively high moral codes to which they strictly 
adhere, while a few have actually learned the lesson of industry. 
Along with the social aspect of the question, however, and 
neither more nor less important, goes the physical. We must 
discover to exactly what extent physical conditions help or 
hinder the development of strong character. That is the pur- 
pose of the chapters that follow. 



CHAPTER IV 
The Effect of the Seasons 

In comparing Teutons with negroes, or tropical people with 
those of the temperate zone, we have been following a method 
as old as the days of Aristotle. Such comparisons have led 
to most interesting generalizations not only at the hands of 
Aristotle himself, but of many other men such as Montesquieu, 
Humboldt, and Ratzel. Yet the importance of climate as a 
factor in civilization is still in doubt. For instance, no one 
denies that South Africa is confronted by a grave race prob- 
lem, but many say that it is purely economic, and has nothing 
to do with climate. They support this view by strong argu- 
ments. Thus we are left in uncertainty. The only way to 
remove this is to devise some method whereby to separate the 
effects of climate from those due to all other causes, whether 
economic, historic, social, religious, or of some other sort. 
Accordingly, the rest of this volume will be devoted to an inves- 
tigation of the exact effect of various climatic factors upon 
selected groups of people, and to an attempt to discover how 
human energy and other qualities would be distributed if all the 
earth's inhabitants were influenced like these particular groups. 

In the study of climate one of the most puzzling features is 
the diversity of opinion among persons of good judgment. For 
instance, at what season do people work fastest in the northern 
United States? Some will say the winter, some the spring, a 
considerable number the fall, and a few the siunmer. Most will 
say that they are least efficient in summer, but others believe 
that they are at their worst in the early spring or late winter. 



60 CIVILIZATION AND CLIMATE 

Again, ask a dozen friends whether they work best on clear days 
or cloudy. The majority will probably answer that the first 
clear day after a storm is by all means the best. A small num- 
ber will perhaps think the matter over more carefully, and then 
say that after a storm the clearness of the air and the bright- 
ness of the sun are certainly inspiring, but one really accom- 
plishes more when it rains. 

This divergence of opinion is due largely to the fact that 
climatic effects are of two kinds, psychological and physiologi- 
cal. We are always conscious of the first, but often uncon- 
scious of the second. The two are admirably distinguished in 
Hellpach's book on "Greopsychische Erscheinungen." An exam- 
ple will make the matter clear. It is well known that at high 
altitudes the number of red corpuscles in the blood increases 
enormously, and the capacity to absorb oxygen and to give out 
carbon dioxide is correspondingly modified. Yet many people 
can go to altitudes of 5000 feet or more without realizing that 
their physiological functions have been altered. To cite my 
own case, up to the age of twenty-one I had never been a thou- 
sand feet above the sea. Then I went to live at an altitude of 
4500 feet. The only physiological effect of which I was con- 
scious was unusual sleepiness for the first few months, but 
whether this was due to the altitude or to the dryness of the air, 
I do not know. For two or three years I never thought of the 
physiological effect of the altitude until one day, happening to 
have climbed to a height of 7000 feet, I began to run up hill. 
I lost my breath and became tired so quickly that I was alarmed 
and thought I must be sick. I was much relieved when it 
occurred to me that the altitude was not favorable for running 
up hill. Manifestly my physiological functions were different 
from what they were at sea level, although I was unconscious 
of it. On the other hand, psychologically I was daily con- 
scious of living in a place where the air was extraordinarily 
clear, and where the mountains were always in sight across a 



THE EFFECT OF THE SEASONS 61 

splendid plain twelve hundred feet below us. Presumably both 
the physiological and psychological conditions had an appre- 
ciable effect upon the work of every day, but which was the 
greater it is impossible to tell. 

In this connection Lehmann and Federsen state an interest- 
ing fact. In Denmark and Norway they made a series of daily 
tests of the strength of three individuals by means of a dyna- 
mometer. They found that the change of atmospheric pressure 
due to an ascent of two or three thousand feet makes no appre- 
ciable difference. A similar descent, however, is accompanied 
by a marked increase of strength which disappears within three 
or four days. They suggest that this may be due to the per- 
sistence of abundant red corpuscles when people come down 
from high places. The red corpuscles multiply very rapidly 
under the influence of low pressure, but are slower in disappear- 
ing when the pressure once more increases. Thus, for the first 
day or two after a person has come down from the mountains, 
more than the normal amount of oxygen is absorbed, and mus- 
cular strength is correspondingly increased. Perhaps this is 
why mountaineers are generally so irresistible when they de- 
scend upon the plains in sudden raids. My colleague. Profes- 
sor H. E. Gregory, suggests that this may account for the fact 
that in the horse-races of the pioneer days of the southwestern 
United States, the poor, scrawny animals brought down from 
the mountains by the Indians usually belied their appearance 
and outran the better looking animals of the white men. They 
may have had an excess of red corpuscles. Professor Gregory 
adds that in some of the highland regions of South America 
there is a strict rule that before a race the competing horses 
must spend a certain number of days at the race course. This 
may have arisen because the animals which race directly after 
coming from the mountains are apt to win. The whole matter 
illustrates the fact that the various climatic elements produce 
numerous effects of which we are almost unconscious. 



62 CIVILIZATION AND CLIMATE 

In our opinions as to the effect of the seasons or of daily 
changes of weather the relation between psychological and 
physiological influences is probably the same as in the case of 
altitude. The external conditions which we see and feel make 
a greater impression than those which prevail within our bodies. 
For example, most of us think that in the northern United 
States we work fast in winter. As a matter of fact, the statis- 
tics of ten thousand people show that we work slowly. The 
ordinary impression is apparently psychological. In order to 
keep warm out of doors in winter we walk fast and this leads 
us to think that we do everything rapidly. 

Again, the blue sky, clear air, bright sunshine, and fresh 
colors of the first day after a storm are unquestionably inspir- 
ing, but does that inspiration make us work any better? May 
it not lead to a nervous excitement which actually hinders our 
work, by causing us to look out at the beauties of nature or to 
be less concentrated in other ways? The actual figures show 
that, taking the year as a whole, on dull days, especially the 
second such day when a storm begins to clear, we accomplish 
more than on bright days, even though we grumble about the 
clouds and the dampness. A bright day certainly makes us 
cheerful, but its chief helpfulness, so far as our work is con- 
cerned, is felt when it is a change from the monotony of a series 
of dull days. Clouds and rain produce exactly as much rejoic- 
ing when they succeed prolonged clear weather of the kind 
that we praise so highly. In America I have never seen so 
much rejoicing over a bright day as I have seen in Turkey 
when the first rain fell after the long subtropical summer with 
its truly superb weather. The rejoicing was in part due to 
the fact that the coming of the rains means good crops, but I 
have again and again seen exuberant joy among people to 
whom the crops made no difference whatever. I have seen 
Americans shout for joy because the clouds had come, and run 
out into the rain to let the cool drops refresh their faces. 



THE EFFECT OF THE SEASONS 68 

The questions which have just been asked and the possibili- 
ties that have been suggested show how indefinite are our ideas 
of the effect of climate. We understand its psychologiced 
effects fairly well. We know little of its physiological effects, 
however, except when they are extreme or unusual, or when 
people are sick or are in some other pathological condition. 
We need to determine how ordinary people are influenced by 
ordinary conditions of weather. That is the purpose of our 
present discussion. The most feasible way to do this, as has 
already been said, is to take groups of people who live in a 
variable climate, and measure their efficiency under different 
conditions of weather. The best and fullest test of efficiency is 
a person's daily work. If the subject does not know that he is 
being tested, so much the better. Piece-workers in factories 
are doing exactly what is required for our purpose. Accord- 
ingly, to begin with New England, I have taken the daily records 
of about 800 men and 250 girls, — ^most of them for a complete 
year. The records are distributed over the four years from 
1910 to 1918. The 550 people were employed in three factories 
in the cities of Bridgeport, New Britain, and New Haven, in 
the southwestern part of Connecticut. In all cases the officials 
in charge of the factories were most courteous and helpful in 
assisting me to obtain the necessary data, and I wish most 
warmly to express my gratitude to all concerned. 

In the selection of operatives for such a purpose, various con- 
ditions must be fulfilled. In the first place, they must be piece- 
workers who are paid according to their work and not at a 
fixed rate per day. In the second place, they must be employed 
in factories where their output is not limited by restrictions 
imposed by unions, or by the fear that if they earn too much, 
wages will be reduced. They must be doing work that is of 
essentially the same kind every day, so that their wages will 
not vary much because they are sometimes engaged upon new 
and unfamiliar tasks, or upon easy tasks at some times and 



64 CIVILIZATION AND CLIMATE 

hard ones at others. Furthermore, the same people must work 
steadily for month after month, throughout the year, if pos- 
sible, and without taking much time off, as is such a common 
practice among factory hands. Finally, they must be working 
where there is abundant incentive to steady, faithful work, 
where the conditions of air and light are reasonably good, and 
where accurate daily records are so kept that the wages of each 
individual can be determined not only per day, but per hour. 
The number of factories where all these conditions are ful- 
filled is small, for they demand special types of occupation and 
a high standard of management. The three factories from 
which data have been obtained all meet the requirements. I 
explained what I wanted to the superintendent or to some other 
responsible official in each case. He then selected the group 
or groups of operatives whom he thought proper, and placed 
the figures in my hands. There was no selection on my part, 
and in each case I have used all the figures, omitting only a 
few obvious errors amounting to perhaps a quarter of one per 
cent. 

An investigation such as is here set forth may follow two 
modes of procedure. One is to take a few persons and inves- 
tigate each minutely in order to eliminate all accidental varia- 
tions. The other is to take many people and get rid of the 
personal variations by averages. The wages of a workman de- 
pend upon many factors aside from the weather. One man has 
been scolded by his wife because he did not earn enough last 
week, another wants to buy some clothes for his little boy, 
and a third was drunk last night. A sore toe may have far 
more influence than any possible climatic variation. To ferret 
out all these accidental circimistances is out of the question. 
Fortunately, they do not occur every day, and most people 
work weeks at a time without being much influenced by them. 
Moreover, when large numbers of people work in different 
cities and during different years, the individual circumstances 



THE EFFECT OF THE SEASONS 66 

neutralize one another. The day that John Jenkins is dis- 
turbed because his boy has run away, Tony Albano is working 
hard because he is going to be married. Hence, by taking five 
hundred people we are able to eliminate accidental and indi- 
vidual circumstances and thus to reach a reliable result. 

All three of the factories whence our data are obtained make 
hardware, but the work varies greatly. In one factory where 
Italians are the predominant nationality, brass sockets for 
electric lights, and other little brass fittings are made. One 
group of people was here engaged in tending machines. Some 
were turning out screws, others were putting pieces of sheet 
brass into automatic machines which turn out perforated 
plates. The work requires little skill, but much quickness and 
concentration. Another group, composed largely of Italians, 
was engaged in rolling and drawing hot brass, a heavy and 
somewhat difficult kind of work, requiring considerable strength. 
It is difficult because the brass must be used hot, and hence the 
men must work in abnormally high temperatures. At another 
factory, the one from which the largest number of records was 
obtained during three successive years, there were two main 
groups of men and two of women. The girls, from sixteen 
to twenty years of age, were Americans by birth, but of 
varied descent, being chiefly Irish, Grermans, Scandinavians, 
English, and other north Europeans. Their work was the 
packing of hinges and screws, which are first wrapped in 
tissue paper and then placed in pasteboard boxes. This is 
a light, easy task in which dexterity and accuracy in 
picking up the right number of pieces are particularly 
important. For the first week or two when screws are 
packed, the tips of the fingers become sore, which makes 
the work proceed slowly. If a girl is changed from packing 
hinges to packing screws, her wages fall off for a time, but 
such changes are not frequent, and do not appreciably influ- 
ence our figures. The men at this factory were of all ages, and 



66 CIVILIZATION AND CLIMATE 

were of the same races as the girls. They were engaged in 
grinding and buflSng the hinges. The first operation is hard, 
heavy work. The hinges are held upon rapidly revolving emery 
wheels in order to grind them to a smooth surface. The other 
operation, buflSng, is similar except that it is easier, for the 
hinges after being ground are polished upon rapidly revolving 
cloth buffs covered with emery dust. In the third factory, the 
operatives were of north European descent, almost all being 
native-bom. Practically all, both girls and boys, were young, 
only a few being much over twenty years of age. The older 
girls leave to be married, and the boys, who are comparatively 
few in number, go elsewhere to find harder and hence better 
paid work. The work consists of the preparation of armatures 
and other wire coils for electrical purposes. Some operatives 
wind the wire upon rapidly revolving spools. Others put 
together the various parts of an armature. The work is light 
and not tiresome. It requires much dexterity and accuracy. 
Strings have to be tied at particular spots, pieces of paper 
must be inserted, the machines must be stopped when the right 
point has been reached, and little ends have to be grasped and 
inserted in their proper places. Taking our three factories 
together, the work ranges from the hardest to the lightest. It 
is of many kinds, requiring different degrees of strength and 
skill. The wages depend not only upon the amount of work 
completed, but upon the number of pieces rejected. In other 
words, the wages represent not only speed, but accuracy. 

Let us now turn to the actual performance of the operatives. 
This is summed up in Figure 1. The four upper solid lines 
represent the work done week after week, each year from 
1910 to 1918. In Figure 1 the work of only about 410 people 
has been used. The rest have been omitted because the figures 
are not complete for a whole year. In only one case has there 
been a deliberate omission of figures which cover an entire year. 
That was the Italians who draw hot brass and hence are sub- 



THE EFFECT OF THE SEASONS 57 

ject to abnormal conditions of temperature. The method of 
procedure has been to find for each working day the average 
hourly wages for each group of operatives. Hourly wages have 
been used instead of daily, so as to make it possible to com- 
pare half-days with whole. If part of the operatives were 
absent on any particular day, they were simply omitted, and 
the average for the rest was taken. When the daily averages 
had been found, they were averaged together by weeks. In 
doing this, a half day, such as the Saturdays in summer, was 
given only half as much weight as a whole day, and days when 
part of the operatives were absent or when the machinery was 
shut down for a while, were given a correspondingly smaller 
weight. Thus allowance is everywhere made for irregularities 
in the number of employees and the length of time that they 
work. The final process consisted of combining the diifferent 
groups. In order that each individual may have an equal 
importance, all the figures have been reduced to percentages. 
In this way if a girl earns a maximum wage of twelve cents an 
hour, it is called 100 per cent, while if a man's maximum wages 
are thirty cents, this sum also is called 100 per cent. Thus the 
variations in the wages of the giii and the man have the same 
weight in our final computations. Because of the enormous 
amount of work which would have been entailed, it was not 
possible to reduce the wages of each individual to percentages, 
but only those of each group. Had it been possible to work out 
each individual's wages separately, the results shown in our 
curves would probably have been more striking than is now the 
case. 

In Figure 1 the height of the curves indicates the efficiency 
of the operatives at various seasons for four successive years. 
The fifth curve, heavier than the others, is the average of the 
preceding four. Turning to the upper line, we see that in early 
January, 1910, the efficiency of about 60 factory operatives in 
Bridgeport was 88 per cent as much as during the week of 



68 CIVILIZATION AND CLIMATE 

maximum efficiency that year. By the middle of the month it 
had fallen to 86 per cent. Later it rose fairly steadily to 96 
per cent at the end of April. Then it dropped a little, rose 
still higher in June, and fell off distinctly during the summer, 
but not so low as in winter. During the fall it rose steadily 
until early November when it reached the highest point of the 
year, after which it fell rapidly. In the same way each curve 
may be traced week by week. I shall return to them shortly. 
Meanwhile, it would be advantageous for the reader to look 
them over and draw his own conclusions, picking out the fea- 
tures which are common to all, and noting those which show 
different degrees of intensity from year to year. 

In Figure 1 it will be noticed that the solid lines never reach 
100 per cent. This is partly because they have been smoothed, 
and partly because they have been corrected to compensate 
for the increased efficiency due to practice. The process of 
smoothing, as everyone knows, is used by mathematicians to 
eliminate minor variations and thus permit the main trend of a 
curve to be more apparent. It merely takes off the high points 
and the low. The figures for three weeks are averaged, and the 
average is used instead of the original figure for the middle 
week. In the present case, and in practically all the curves in 
this book, the process of smoothing has been performed twice on 
each curve. If the letters a to e represent the average wages 
for five successive weeks, the figure actually used for the middle 
week, Cy is obtained from the following equation: 

a + 2b + 8c + 2d + e 
^ = 9 

This process of smoothing can add nothing to a curve; it 
simply takes away the less important details. If carried far 
enough it would produce straight lines. 

In addition to smoothing the curves I have corrected them 



^im R6 Mch Apr May Junt JUyAo^&fitOet Na^rJhc. 




^bniptttttti 



Figure 1. The Eflfect of the Seasons on Factory Operatives in 
Connecticut (solid lines) and at Pittsburgh (dotted lines) 



60 CIVILIZATION AND CLIMATE 

for the effects of practice. The curves for 1911, 1912, and 
1918 are all based on the same factory at New Britain. When 
the wages for each year are averaged, we find that those for 
1912 were 1.5 per cent higher than for 1911, and those for 
1918 were 1.5 per cent higher than for 1912. This means that 
constant practice caused the average employee, including both 
old hands and new, to be 1.5 per cent more skillful at the end of 
the year than at the beginning. Hence, from January onward, 
the curve rises a little until in December it is 1.5 per cent higher 
than it would be if the operatives had not grown more skillful. 
To eliminate this we simply tip the entire curve, raising the 
January end by three quarters of one per cent and depressing 
the December end by the same amount. The fluctuations, of 
course, remain unchanged. 

In Figure 1, if there had been no correction, the highest and 
lowest points of the upper curve would lie at the points indi- 
cated by the crosses, and the other curves would be changed in 
corresponding ratios, there being no change at the end of June. 

Turning to less technical matters, let us consider the degree 
of resemblance in the four upper solid lines of Figure 1. 
All are unmistakably low in January. Then from February 
to June we note a general rise, varied by minor fluctuations 
which differ from year to year. At the middle or end of June 
all reach a distinct maximum, although in 1912 and 1918 it is 
of slight proportions. Next we have a drop during the summer, 
pronounced in 1910 and 1911, but not at all prominent in 1912, 
and scarcely noticeable in 1918. Following this there comes 
a series of irregular fluctuations, differing from curve to 
curve, but in each case culminating in a strong maximum at 
the end of October or the beginning of November. Six weeks 
later, in the middle of December, another slight maximum is 
suggested, and then all the curves drop suddenly. In the aver- 
age curve the minor fluctuations tend to disappear. They are 
more or less accidental, and represent peculiar conditions which 



THE EFFECT OF THE SEASONS 61 

pertain to one year but not to others. The features that have 
been named, however, show no sign of disappearing. They are 
five in number, namely, an extremely low place in midwinter, 
and a less pronounced low place in midsimimer; a high point 
in June, a still higher point at the end of October, and a hump 
in mid-December. Much the most variable feature is the low 
place in summer. This is highly significant, as we shall shortly 
see. 

Before we discuss the causes of the variability of the sum- 
mers let us consider the meaning of the curves as a whole. In 
the first place, it is evident that, although details may vary 
from year to year, the general course of events is uniformly 
from low in the winter to high in the fall with a drop of more or 
less magnitude in summer. To what can this be due? Did the 
factories shut down in January, or run on part time, or decrease 
work because of lack of orders, or to overhaul the machinery and 
so forth? Do the high wages in October and November indi- 
cate a special rush of orders at that time? Of course, any 
variations in the way in which the factory is running must be 
reflected in the wages of the operatives, but in the present case 
this does not apply to the main variations, although it may 
apply to minor details. In neither of the two factories here 
considered were the responsible heads able to oSer any expla- 
nation of the peculiarities of the curves on the basis of factory 
management or the exigencies of business. Both are engaged 
in making staple articles, the chief demand for which comes 
in the spring when building operations begin. There is no 
Christmas rush on hinges and electric light sockets. After 
Christmas the factories shut down for a few days at the begin- 
ning of the year, but that ought to increase rather than dimin- 
ish the hourly earnings. When operatives are working only 
part time they feel the need of earning as much as possible each 
hour. If part of the hands are laid off, that would also increase 
the average hourly wages, for the weaker ones would be 



62 CIVILIZATION AND CLIMATE 

dropped, and the average ability of those who remain would be 
high. 

In this connection, it is important to understand that in 
these factories a man is free to work as hard as he wishes at 
any time of the year. The managers have deliberately adopted 
the policy of getting as much work as possible out of each 
operative. Overhead charges for interest, superintendence, 
bookkeeping, salesmen, and other outside expenses, and also 
the charges for unproductive labor such as engineers, janitors, 
and the like are no greater no matter how hard the productive 
employees work. If the producing operatives should double 
their output, most of the other expenses would scarcely increase 
at aU. Hence, it would not only be possible to pay double wages 
for double work, but it would be profitable to the factory even 
if it paid perhaps $2.60 where now it pays $1.00. In view of 
these conditions, both factories have adopted systems whose 
special object is to encourage extra exertion. In one case part 
of the men work upon what is known as the ^'premium" plan. 
The management and the men have agreed that the various 
tasks shaU be rated according to the number of hours which 
they may fairly be supposed to require. If a man performs an 
eight-hour task, he is to be paid for eight hours' work, no 
matter whether he does it in six hours or ten. If, however, he 
finishes the work in less than the stipulated time, he goes to 
work at another task for the rest of the period. For half of 
this time he is to be paid, while the factory gets the benefit of 
the other half. For example, if an eight-hour task is finished 
in six, the operative works two more hours. He is then paid for 
nine hours although he has only worked eight, while the factory 
gets ten hours' work and pays for nine. Thus both are the 
gainers. In one case the managers made a mistake in deciding 
upon the number of hours needed for a certain task. It had 
never been done quickly, and no one knew how rapidly it might 
be done. The man who does it now earns ten or twelve dollars 



THE EFFECT OF THE SEASONS 68 

a day, where he formerly earned perhaps two and a half or 
three. Inasmuch as the management had agreed not to change 
the rates, they stick to their bargain. The task only occupies 
one day each month, and the matter is not serious. Moreover, 
even though the operative earns such high wages, the work 
actually costs the factory less than when he was earning two 
doUars and a half. 

In the other factory the girls are stimulated by bonuses. 
That is, they are not only paid for their work, but if they do 
more than is expected, they are paid a bonus. For example, if 
a girl's wages average about a dollar a day, and she does work 
worth $1.20, she does not receive $1.20, but $1.26 or even 
$1.40. The factory finds this worth while because so much 
more can be produced without any increase in charges for 
interest, office-work and other overhead expenses. When this 
bonus system was first introduced, it produced only a slight 
effect. The girls did not seem to care about the bonuses and 
made little effort to get them. Then the management realized 
that the parents were getting the extra money, and so it made 
no difference to the girls, most of whom gave their pay envel- 
opes unopened to their fathers or mothers. Thereafter the 
bonus was not put in the pay envelopes, but was handed out in 
loose change. The girls kept it and began to work hard. In 
the third factory, whose figures are not extensive enough to be 
used in Figure 1, but which enter into other computations, a 
similar system is employed. A limit is set for each task. If the 
work is performed within that time a bonus is paid. Otherwise 
the operatives receive only the regular pay, no matter how 
much time they spend. The introduction of this system has 
increased the output of the factory enormously. Inasmuch as 
the various systems of bonuses and premiums are equally 
applicable at aU times of the year, it seems impossible to find 
in the factories themselves any reason why earnings should be 



64 CIVILIZATION AND CLIMATE 

very low in January, moderately low in July, high in June, and 
very high in November. 

We seem forced to search outside of the factories for the 
reasons for our seasonal fluctuations of wages. Such things 
as panics, hard times, or strikes would certainly cause a gen- 
eral change in the conditions of work, but nothing of the kind 
occurred during the period under consideration. Moreover, 
such events do not recur at the same time each year. Aside 
from the seasons, the only event which recurs regularly year 
after year at the same time and which is important enough to 
cause variations in wages is Christmas. Its effect can be seen 
unmistakably in each of the solid year-curves. In that for 
1910 it appears in the little hump which culminates during the 
next to the last week in December. In the other three it comes 
a week earlier because this factory does not pay the week's 
wages on the Saturday of the week in question, but a week later, 
after there has been time to check up the work and make allow- 
ances for that which is poorly done. Hence, money for Christ- 
mas must be earned before the middle of December. If there 
were no such thing as Christmas, the wages would probably 
drop off in the way shown by the dash line in the average 
curve of Figure 1. After Christmas the wages probably drop 
somewhat lower than would otherwise be the case, for there 
must be a reaction from the previous effort, but it is noticeable 
that the wages do not reach their lowest ebb directly after 
Christmas, but keep on falling for nearly a month. Something 
else keeps them low. The Christmas hump is significant 
chiefly because it shows unmistakably that an outside stimu- 
lus which applies to all the operatives produces a dis- 
tinct result. We may properly infer that the other permanent 
features of our curves are also due to some outside force which 
influences all the operatives. That force must be connected 
with the seasons, and it must be far more powerful than Christ- 
mas, for its effects are far greater. There seems to be no 



THE EFFECT OF THE SEASONS 66 

recourse except to ascribe the fluctuations of the curves to 
climate. 

The verity of the conclusion just reached is strongly con- 
firmed by comparison with other regions and other types of 
human activity. Figure 2, which, for convenience, is here 
divided into two overlapping portions, presents a series of 
curves arranged according to climate, those from regions with 
cold winters and cool summers being at the top, and cool winters 
and hot summers at the bottom. The curves range from the 
Adirondacks in northern New York to Tampa in southern 
Florida, and include one from Denmark. With them I have 
repeated some of the curves of Figure 1 for the sake of com- 
parison. The most remarkable feature of this series is that 
although there is great diversity of place and of activity, all 
the curves harmonize with what would be expected on the basis 
of Figure 1. 

The first curve, A, is based on the work of Lawrason Brown, 
a physician who has published records of the weight gained by 
patients suffering from pulmonary tuberculosis at a sanatorium 
at Saranac Lake in the Adirondacks. A gain in weight in 
this disease is a favorable symptom, for one of the most marked 
effects of tuberculosis is to cause a wasting away of the flesh. 
In the present tabulation the patients who lost weight are not 
included, and a drop in the curve does not indicate loss of 
weight but merely a decreased rate of gain. If the patients who 
lost weight were also included, however, the form of the curve 
would still be the same, according to Brown. The Adirondacks, 
as everyone knows, have long cold winters, while the summers 
are delightfully bracing, being warm enough to be pleasant, 
but never hot enough to be debilitating. Hence, from about the 
first of April to the end of September the sick people make a 
marked gain. During the other six months, although they 
OA&y g&in more than would be the case in their own homes, 



Figure 9a. Human 
Actiyity and the 
Seasons 



Gain in Weight of 
ItOO Tubercular 
PatienU at Sara- 
nac Lake, N. Y.. 
18M-1M8. 



C. 



D. 



B. 



F. 



Work of 160 FSc- 
tory OperatiTes in 
Connecticut, 1918. 
Repeated from 
Pivurel. 



Work of M Fac- 
tory OperatiTes in 
Connecticut, 1911. 
Repeated from 
Fifure 9. 

Deaths in the 
State of New York, 
1801-1006. In- 
verted. In the 
scale of this cmre, 
160 represents the 
ayeraffe death 
rate. 



Strength of 00 
School Children in 
Denmark, 10044. 



Work of 410 Fac- 
tory Operatiyes in 
Connecticut, 1010- 
1018. Repeated 
ftnmFiflrurel. 



O. WorkofOOOirlsat 
Winston-Salem, N. 
a, 1014. 




i i ^ i ^ 
4 £ ^ < s 



« 

►5 h; •< do 



^ ^ o5 O Jz; Q 




Figure 2b. Human 
Activity and the 
Seasons 



F. 



O. 



I. 



J. 



K. 



L. 



Work of 410 Fac- 
tory Opemtiyes In 
Connecticut, 1010- 
1019. Repeated 
from Fiffure 1. 



WorkofMQiriaat 
Winaton-Salem, N. 
C. 1014. 



H. 



Work of 110 Opera- 
tiyes in Cotton Fac- 
tories at Columbia, 
S. a, 1019-14. 



Work of 190 Opera- 
tiyes in Cotton Fac- 
toriea near Au- 
gusta, Oa., 1019-14. 



Work of 07 Carpen- 
ters at Jackson- 
▼ille, Fla., 1011-14. 



Work of 400 Cigar- 
makers at JackBon- 
▼iUe, Fla., 1011 
1018. 1014. 



Work of 9900 Cigar- 
makers at Tampai 
Fla., 1019-14. 



Nora. In Figures 9a and 9b the unit is a year's work of an individual. Thus "190 Opera- 
tives, 1019-14," means an average of 40 per year for three years. 



68 CIVILIZATION AND CLIMATE 

they do not find the climate nearly so advantageous as in 
summer, and the disadvantage increases until the snow dis- 
appears. The next curve, B, is a repetition of the Connecticut 
curve for 1918. That year the winter was by no means so 
severe as is ordinarily the case in the Adirondacks. Hence, the 
curve does not remain low quite so long as does A, and does 
not begin to fall so soon. The summer, however, was almost as 
cool as among the Adirondacks, and hence there is no drop 
during July. 

The next pair of curves represent a year with a hot siunmer 
in Connecticut, C, and the death rate for fifteen years in the 
state of New York, D. The curve for deaths has been turned 
upside down, so that high places represent few deaths, that is, 
high vitality corresponding to high energy in the factory 
operatives. In New York State as a whole the effect of the 
summers is very different from what it is in the Adirondacks. 
The cities swelter for a few weeks in July, and that sends the 
death rate up enormously, especially among children, who are 
quickly taken sick, and who either die after a few days' illness, 
or recover. That is why the curve drops so sharply in mid- 
summer. In the winter, on the contrary, although it drops 
almost equally low, the maximum number of deaths per day 
does not come till March, although by that time the average 
energy of operatives has risen considerably. This is because 
people become sick in January and February, especially those 
who are elderly, and finally die after lingering illnesses quite 
unlike those of children. 

The death rate of other places mi^t be used quite as well 
as that of New York. The Japanese rate, for instance, is as 
follows, the figures being those for the ten years beginning 
with 1899. The figures represent percentages of the normal. 
Those for the state of New York, computed on the same basis 
are added in parentheses : 



January, 


104 (105) 


May, 


85 (100) 


February, 


108 (108) 


Jane, 


84 (90) 


March, 


lOS (109) 


July. 


97 (110) 


April, 


90 (106) 


Auguflt, 


116 (104) 



THE EFFECT OF THE SEASONS 69 

September, 118 (97) 

October, 109 (89) 

November, 96 (86) 

December, 98 (93) 

Here the course of events is almost the same as in New York, 
but with significant differences which harmonize with the cli- 
mates of the two places. Winter in Japan is less severe than 
in New York, and its effects do not last so long, for the 
highest mortality is in February instead of March. The 
Japanese summers, on the contrary, are characterized by pro- 
longed heat, and also by great humidity, especially during the 
rainy season from July to September. At the end of this 
period the mortality is at a maximum. The debilitating effect 
of the summer lasts so long that November and December have 
a higher death rate than May and June. The late spring is 
especially favorable not only because of its own excellent char- 
acter, but because it follows a winter which is not severe 
enough to be highly disadvantageous. 

Curves E and F represent the strength of ninety school chil- 
dren in Copenhagen as measured by Lehmann and Pedersen, 
and the average energy of factory operatives for four years 
in Connecticut. The Danish measurements were carried on 
during the school years of 1904-06 when sixty children were 
tested weekly, and 1905-06 when ten were tested daily. By 
combining the two years into one and making allowance for the 
fact that children grow stronger from month to month just as 
factory operatives grow more skillful, we obtain curve E in 
Figure 2. Since neither summer nor winter is especially severe 
in Denmark the dip at the two seasons is the same. The maxima 
in June and November are almost synchronous with those in 
Connecticut. The minima are both delayed six or seven weeks, 
but the winter minimum in March agrees with the maximum 
death rate in New York. The summer minimum ought pos- 
sibly to come in July or August, but the figures for those 



70 CIVILIZATION AND CLIMATE 

months are not obtainable, for during that time the schools in 
Copenhagen have vacation. In addition to this we should 
expect the Danish curve to lag a little behind that of Con- 
necticut because of the maritime climate. Inasmuch as Den- 
mark is constantly swept by west winds from the ocean it does 
not so quickly grow cool in winter nor warm in summer as does 
Connecticut where the prevailing winds are from the con- 
tinental interior, which of course becomes rapidly warm in 
summer and cool in winter. Thus it appears that the strength 
of Danish children and the energy of factory operatives in 
Connecticut have an almost identical relation to seasonal 
variations of , climate. 

Judging by curves C to F in Figure 2 one might hazard the 
hypothesis that man is subject to a seasonal rhythm which 
repeats itself wherever he goes without regard to the climate. 
On this basis one would expect maxima of efficiency in June and 
November in all parts of the world. In curves A and B, how- 
ever, we have already seen that where the summers are partic- 
ularly favorable and the winters unfavorable this rhythm 
breaks down, and the June maximum and summer minimum dis- 
appear. If we go farther south to places where the winters 
are favorable and the simuners very hot, we find a change in the 
opposite direction, for the winter minimum tends to disappear, 
and the summer minimum greatly increases and shoves the two 
maxima more and more into the winter until the two coalesce. 
This is evident in curves 6 to L. These represent variations 
in the wages of piece-workers in southern factories, compiled 
according to the method used in Connecticut. Curve 6 shows 
the work of sixty-five Anglo-Saxon girls in a tobacco factory 
in Winston-Salem, N. C. They were pasting labels on cans. 
Notice how their winter minimum does not fall so low as that 
of summer, while the spring minimum comes in early May 
instead of June. In September the curve drops suddenly. This 
is because at that time the effect of the war began to be felt, the 



THE EFFECT OF THE SEASONS 71 

price of cotton fell so low that the South was in great distress, 
and the sale of the goods made by this factory began to be 
curtailed. Therefore the girls were not given as much work 
as they could do. 

Curves H and I are from cotton mills in South Carolina and 
Greorgia, and each represents two mills. In South Carolina the 
two miUs are dose together at Columbia, while in the other 
case they are fifteen or twenty miles apart, one being in Georgia 
near Augusta, and the other across the Savannah River in 
South Carolina. The operatives in all cases are of pure Anglo- 
Saxon stock, chiefly of the ^^poor white" class. Men and women 
are included in nearly equal numbers. Part are weavers, while 
others, engaged in the occupations known as slubbing, spooling, 
and speeding, tend machines which spin the thread and wind it 
on bobbins ready for the weavers. In all cotton factories the 
air in the weaving room, and to a less extent in the others, is 
kept at a high temperature and a high humidity. This is neces- 
sary because when the air becomes cool, or especially when it 
becomes dry, the thread is apt to break and cause blemishes in 
the cloth. Hence, in factories where high-grade goods are 
manufactured the inside temperature is so abnormal and the 
amount of goods produced depends so largely on the breakage 
that it is almost impossible to obtain satisfactory figures. In 
the factories here considered, however, nothing but coarse 
cloth is manufactured. The breaking of the thread does little 
harm, and relatively slight attention is paid to the temperature 
and humidity of the weaving rooms. Moreover, for slubbing, 
speeding, and spooling, the temperature and humidity make far 
less difference than for weaving. Hence, the variations in the 
amount of goods produced per person depend largely on the 
energy of the operatives in watching their machines and pre- 
venting them from standing idle because of broken threads, 
empty bobbins, or other accidents. The exigencies of business, 
that is, the demands for goods, make no difference to the opera- 



72 CIVILIZATION AND CLIMATE 

tives so far as their production per hour is concerned, for the 
machines run at a uniform speed whether the factory runs one 
day a week or six. The cotton mill curves are essentially the 
same as that of the tobacco factory. In H there is a double 
spring maximum, due to accidental circumstances, but the true 
maximum would probably come about the end of April. In I 
the spring maximum comes still earlier, that is in mid- April, as 
is appropriate to a place so far south. The autumn maxima, 
on the other hand, ccmie later than in Connecticut, one being 
in early December and the other toward the end of November. 
The work of carpenters in Jacksonville, as shown in curve 
J, is different from anything else that is here considered because 
it is performed out of doors. The fifteen men per year whose 
records are here used were engaged in making the same kind of 
repairs time after time. A careful record of the hours that 
they spend is kept, but the number varies greatly on account of 
the weather. If it rains they cannot work. Summer is the 
rainiest period, but that does not tend to diminish the amount 
of work done per hour. In fact it increases it. The rain comes 
in hard showers, and while it is falling the men rarely try to 
work, and the time is not reckoned. When the rain is over they 
work better than before because the air is cooler, although still 
far from being cool. In winter, on the contrary, from Decem- 
ber to March, the rain is a pronounced hindrance. It often 
comes in the form of a drizzle, and the carpenters try to keep 
on working while it is falling. Moreover, after the rain the 
wood is wet, there is apt to be a chilly wind, the hands feel 
numb, and everything is opposed to great efficiency. Yet in 
spite of this, more work per hour is done in February, the 
worst winter month, than in May, June, July, or August. If 
these men were at work in well-protected sheds which were 
heated on the occasional cool days, there is little doubt that 
in December their curve would reach a maximum higher than 
that now reached in November, while even if the following 



THE EFFECT OF THE SEASONS 78 

months were not still higher, they would at least show no 
pronounced drop. 

The lower two curves, K and L, represent the work of cigar- 
makers at Jacksonville in northern Florida and Tampa in the 
southern part of the state. Those in Jacksonville were mostly 
Cubans, nearly two thirds being negroes, and the rest of Span- 
ish descent. At Tampa only a handful of negroes is included, 
but a large sprinkling of real Spaniards is found among the 
Spanish Cubans. The curves for the cigar factories are com- 
piled on a different basis from the others. The reason is that 
there are no definite hours. The factories are open twelve 
hours a day, usually from 6 a.m. to 6 p.m. The operatives 
saunter in as they please, provided they do not come later than 
8 a.m., and leave when they choose, although an attempt is 
made to let no one depart before 4 p.m. While at work they 
sit close together at tables, and talk volubly except when a 
hired reader is vociferating the news from a Spanish newspaper. 
At some time in the morning they go out for a lunch, but are 
rarely gone as much as half an hour. Otherwise they stay at 
their work till it is finished. 

Since there are no fixed hours, we cannot measure the exact 
earnings per hour, as we have done in other cases, but only the 
earnings in proportion to the time that a man might have 
worked if he had chosen to do so. In other words, we measure 
partly the actual capacity for work, and partly the inclination 
to work. In general the two seem to vary together, but the 
work of the New York State Commission on School Ventilation 
has shown that during short periods of high temperature the 
capacity may remain unimpaired, while the inclination declines. 
In the practical work of life a lack of inclination is almost 
worse than a lack of capacity. 

During the warmer half of the year the possible working time 
in the Florida cigar factories may be properly reckoned as 
eleven and a half hours. In winter, however, the light at mom- 



74. CIVILIZATION AND CLIMATE 

ing and evening is not adequate for the somewhat exacting 
work of cigar-making. Therefore the men are not allowed to 
begin so early as in summer, nor to work so late. The exact 
time depends on the degree of cloudiness as well as the height 
of the sun. The factory managers say that in December the 
working time is curtailed an hour and a quarter or more for the 
month as a whole. In order not to make the winter production 
appear unduly large, I have reckoned that during the shortest 
week — ^not month — ^the working time is an hour and nine 
minutes, that is, 10 per cent less than in summer. Before and 
after that date it steadily increases to the solstices, when it 
reaches the normal. Thus we get the lower curve for Tampa. 
It drops low in summer and rises to a single maximum in winter. 
At Jacksonville the variations in the length of the working day 
on account of light are less than at Tampa because a lower 
grade of cigars is made, and hence the men are allowed to work 
under less favorable conditions of light. Inasmuch as the exact 
effort of dark mornings and evenings cannot be determined, I 
have drawn two lines at each end of the curve. The lower shows 
the wages if no allowance is made for light, and the upper if the 
full Tampa allowance is mcule. The actual truth lies between 
the two. For our present purpose this uncertainty makes no 
difference, since in either case we have the summer minimum and 
winter maximum which all our other studies would lead us to 
expect in this latitude. 

The exigencies of business have more effect on the work of 
the operatives in cigar factories than in the others employed in 
Figure 2, but they do not determine the main fluctuations of the 
curves here used. In some cigar factories, to be sure, if busi- 
ness is slack the employees are often not allowed to make more 
than half or two thirds the usual number of cigars. For this 
reason I have omitted two factories whose figures I worked up, 
but whose curves I finally found to be almost wholly controlled 
by the supply and demand of the businessl In the three 



THE EFFECT OF THE SEASONS 76 

factories which were finally used, however, that is, one at Jack- 
sonville and two at Tampa, the operatives are only rarely placed 
on a limit. It is too expensive, especially where high-priced 
cigars are made, for four cigars a day have to be allowed to 
each man for ^^smokes." Each man smokes his full number, if 
not more, no matter whether he makes one hundred cigars or 
two hundred. The rush season for cigars begins in June or 
July and becomes increasingly intense until about the middle 
of November, by which time most of the Christmas orders have 
been received. Business is dullest in January and February. 
The operatives, however, know nothing about this, except as 
they see that men are taken on or discharged. The frequency 
of changes in the number of employees makes the cigar-maker's 
life hard, and accounts for much of his proverbial shiftlessness. 

Another thing which affects the wages of cigar-makers is the 
dampness of the air. During the warm, damp days so char- 
acteristic of the Florida summer, the tobacco is very pliable and 
easily worked, while on dry, winter days its brittleness causes it 
to break so that the work is hampered. If it were not for 
this the difference between summer and winter would be inten- 
sified. 

The most striking proof of the effect of the seasons is yet to 
be recorded. After this volume was in type I obtained a 
series of data corresponding to those of the Connecticut fac- 
tories and computed in the same way, but based on the work 
of operatives in a large factory engaged in making electrical 
apparatus at Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. The employees whose 
wages were investigated were employed in winding wire coils, 
assembling the parts of motors, and other similar operations 
which demand accuracy and speed. The admirable way in 
which the records of this company are kept renders the figures 
of great value, but lack of time and funds has made it neces- 
sary to limit the present investigation to monthly, or, in 1912, 
bi-weekly averages of hourly earnings. For this reason the 



76 CIVILIZATION AND CLIMATE 

resulting curves, which have been inserted as fine dotted lines in 
Figure 1 (page 59), are smoother than those of Connecticut 
where the daily earnings have been utilized. The number of 
piece-workers on which these Pittsburgh curves are based is 
shown in the following table : 

1910. Approximately 950 men and girls in winding section. 

1911. Approximately 750 men and girls in winding section. 

1912. Twenty-seven girls, winders ; 42 men, tinners, black- 
smiths, painters. In this case all the operatives were especially 
steady hands who worked throughout the year. In the few cases 
where they were absent, interpolation has been resorted to. 
Hence this year's curve is more reliable than the others which 
are based on all the operatives in a given section or in the whole 
factory without regard to whether they worked steadily. 

1918. Approximately 7000 men and girls in the entire 
factory. 

The general form of the curves for Pittsburgh and Con- 
necticut is obviously the same. In 1910 notice the deep dip 
in January, and the moderate drop in summer. The next year, 
1911, presents quite a different aspect. Because of the hot 
summer, the depressions in January and July are almost 
equally deep, the difference between the highest and lowest 
points is less than in most years, and the autumn maximum does 
not rise high above that of May or June, as is usually the case. 
The curves for 1912 both show a deep depression in winter 
which lasts unusually long. During the summer, on the con- 
trary, there is not so great a decrease in efficiency as during 
the previous two years. Finally, in 1918, both curves rise 
almost steadily from midwinter to late fall, with only a sli^t 
drop in summer. 

The agreement between the curves for Connecticut and 
Pennsylvania is far too close to be accidental. At Pittsburgh, 
just as at the other factories, variations in the total number of 



THE EFFECT OF THE SEASONS 77 

employees form an accurate measure of the demand for work, 
but these by no means vary in harmony with the actual produc- 
tion per operative. Often the average amount of work done 
by a given group of individuals, or by all the piece-workers, 
declines when the number of operatives increases, but quite as 
often the reverse is true. Hence the conditions under which the 
factories are run do not explain the variations in wages. More- 
over, it stands to reason that the same irregular variations 
would not occur season after season in an electric factory in 
Pittsburgh and in brass and hinge factories in Connecticut 4iOO 
miles away unless all were under the same control. The only 
common controlling factor which varies in harmony with the 
curves of Figure 1 is the general character of the seasons. 
This is essentially the same in both places. 

We have now seen that from New England to Florida physi- 
cal strength and health vary in accordance with the seasons. 
Extremes seem to produce the same effect everywhere. The 
next question is whether mental activity varies in the same way. 
Lehmann and Pedersen made a series of tests of the ability of 
school children in addition. Their general conclusion is that 
mental work varies in the same way as physical, but reaches 
its highest efficiency at a lower temperature. This agrees with 
the investigations of a few other scientists, and with the general 
conclusions of the world as summed up in the old adage, ^^No 
one is worth a tinker's damn on whom the snow does not fall." 
Before we can accept this, however, tests are needed on a large 
scale. The most feasible method at present seems to be by 
means of the marks of students in such schools as West Point 
and Annapolis. There the young men live an extremely regular 
life with a minimimi of outside distractions. Their recitations 
are graded with great severity and regularity, and a given 
subject is often taught six days in the week. The marks are 
handed to the heads of departments at frequent intervals and 
are posted where the students can see them. No class is taught 



78 CIVILIZATION AND CLIMATE 

in divisions of more than ten or twelve, so that every student 
has a full opportunity to show how well he is prepared. In 
order to avoid all chance of favoritism the instructors do not 
keep the same divisions month after month, but change every 
few weeks. Altogether it would be hard to devise a system 
which more thoroughly eliminates the human and accidental 
factors. As an instructor at West Point put it : ^^We are not 
really teachers. We are just put here as officers to see whether 
the cadets have studied their books, and to decide how many 
marks to take off." This is preeminently true in mathematics 
where the solution of a problem is either right or wrong and 
can be marked accordingly. 

When I broached my plan to the superintendents at the two 
academies, it was received with much interest, and every facility 
was placed at my disposal. I take this opportunity to express 
my warm appreciation of their courtesy. Some of the in- 
structors were commissioned to see that the proper records 
were available. The marks of individuals were, of course, not 
necessary. The various marks for each day or week were 
merely added, and averaged. The data here employed embrace 
the following: (1) The weekly averages in mathematics for the 
first-year, or entering class at Annapolis for the six academic 
years beginning with 1907-08 and ending with 1912-18. These 
classes recite six times a week. (2) The daily marks for the 
first-year class in English at Annapolis for the year 1912-18. 
This class recites four times a week. (8) The daily marks in 
mathematics for a year and a half for the classes entering West 
Point in 1909 and 1910. Recitations are held six days a week. 
The classes at Annapolis average about 220 in niunber and 
those at West Point about 120. The entire number of students 
whose marks have been used is between seventeen and eighteen 
hundred, but as some of the marks cover a period of a year and 
a half, the total is equivalent to about 1900 students for a 
single year. 



THE EFFECT OF THE SEASONS 79 

All these marks have been combined into the three lower 
curves of Figure 8. Before discussing them a few words should 
be said as to the method of preparation. The systems of mark- 
ing at the two academies are quite different. At Annapolis the 
department of mathematics tries to keep the average ad nearly 
uniform as possible. If the instructors discover that the 
average is rising or falling they mark more severely or leniently 
to counteract it. At West Point, on the other hand, the marks 
regularly begin high at the opening of the term and fall steadily 
toward the end. There is no attempt to keep them at a uniform 
level, but the instructors merely mark harder and harder or 
give more and more work as time goes on. Both systems tend 
to mask the effect of the seasons. The influence of the deliberate 
attempt to keep the marks at a uniform level at Annapolis is 
largely overcome by using a series of six years. The irregu- 
larities of one year counteract those of another except where 
special circumstances such as vacations interpose a disturbing 
element at the same time each year. In the English department 
at Annapolis there is less stringency about keeping the marks 
at a uniform level, and those of a single year show dearly the 
normal seasonal trend. At the end of the year, however, I 
have omitted the two weeks before examinations because there 
was then a sudden spurt accompanied by abnormally high 
marks. Otherwise all the Annapolis marks without exception 
have been employed in computing the curves of Figure 8. 

At West Point it has been necessary to eliminate the effect of 
the steady fall. The method is the same as in the correction 
for increasing practice. In order to eliminate the effect of 
such things as football games, holidays, examinations, repri- 
mands, or other circumstances which clearly have nothing to 
do with climate, I have omitted all the days whose marks fall 
more than 10 per cent above or below what would be expected 
at that particular date. Omissions of this sort are such a 
common procedure in astronomical and physical measurements 



80 



CIVILIZATION AND CLIMATE 



that the mathematician requires nothing more than a mere 
mention of what has been done. To the layman it may seem 
that they are of great importance. In reality they rarely alter 
the general form of the final curves, for exceptionally high 
figures 'balance excepti(Hially low. In the second curve of 
Figure 8 the effect is slight except upon the first weeks in 
January. There the minor maximum which occurs just after 
the Christmas recess is only about half as large as it would be 
if no data were omitted. At Annapolis it is not necessary to 
omit the days of special events because the marks are not sub- 



Ctf Nb¥. Dtc, JmMifhr /Ipr Mt^ Jbrm 




470 Cj^rttNv^ 



ZiO Shidmism 
/tatAematies ai 
\^i Rini 
1909491:1 



Z20ShuUn44m 
English ai 

Studeniam 
/{afh€m€iiw9 at 
mapcJU 
190^2916 



Figure 3. Seasonal Variations of Mental Compared with 

Physical Activity 



THE EFFECT OF THE SEASONS 81 

ject to such wide fluctuations. It is interesting to notice that 
the classes in mathematics there are influenced by the vacation, 
which comes at the end of January, just as at West Point. 
The English marks, on the contrary, are uninfluenced, probably 
because English is an easier subject than mathematics. More- 
over, as it is taught fewer days per week, and hence has less 
weight in determining the final marks for the work of the whole 
year, the students do not devote so much energy to it. 

By this time the reader has doubtless interpreted Figure 8 
for himself. The upper line is the standard average curve for 
factory operatives in Connecticut. It is the same as the aver- 
age curve of Figure 1, except that it begins in September 
instead of January. It is placed here to permit a comparison 
of the physical work with mental. The curves of mental 
activity all resemble it in having two main maxima, in fall and 
spring. At West Point, where the climate is essentially the 
same as in Connecticut, the mental maximum in the fall comes 
about ten days later than the factory maximum, while the 
spring maximum comes two and a half months earlier. Both 
occur when the mean temperature is a little above 40^ F. 
At Annapolis the maxima are, as it were, pressed toward 
the winter. The fall maximum in English, to be sure, begins 
early in November, but lasts till the middle of December. 
Since it represents the work of only a single year, it is less 
important than the curve of mathematics, whose fall maximum 
does not come till the first half of December. The spring 
maxima of both curves come in the middle of March. At 
Annapolis, just as at West Point, the time of best work is when 
the mean temperature is not far from forty degrees. 

Summing up the matter, we find that the results of investiga- 
tions in Denmark, Japan, Connecticut, Pennsylvania, New 
York, Maryland, the Carolinas, Georgia, and Florida are in 
harmony. They all show that except in Florida neither the 
winter nor the summer is the most favorable season. Both physi- 



82 CIVILIZATION AND CLIMATE 

cal and mental activity reach pronounced maxima in the spring 
and fall, with minima in midwinter and midsmnmer. The con- 
sistency of our results is of great importance. It leads to the 
belief that in all parts of the world the climate is exercising an 
influence which can readily be measured, and can be subjected to 
statistical analysis. It justifies us in going on with confidence 
to ascertain exactly what effect is produced by each of the 
climatic elements, such as temperature, humidity, and pressure. 



CHAPTER V 
The Effect of HuMiDnT and Tempeeatuee 

Having seen that both physical and mental energy vary from 
season to season according to well-defined laws, let us now 
investigate the special features of seasonal change which are 
most effective. Temperature is far the most important, but 
before considering it, let us discuss those of minor importance. 
One of these is light. Many students have ascribed great influ- 
ence to sunlight, and to its variations from season to season, 
or from one part of the world to another. For example C. W. 
Woodruff, an army surgeon, has written an interesting book 
on "The Effect of Tropical Light on White Men." Its main 
thesis is that the backwardness of tropical countries is due to 
excessive sunlight. The actinic rays at the blue end of the 
spectrum, especially those beyond the limits of vision, possess 
great chemical power, as is evident from the fact that by their 
aid photographs can be taken even when no light is visible to 
the naked eye. Such rays, when they fall upon the human body, 
are thought to stimulate the cells to greater activity. At first 
this is beneficial : if it goes to excess the cells apparently break 
down. The process is analogous to the ripening of fruit. A 
moderate change in the green tissues produces the highly 
favorable condition of ripeness: more brings on decay. Thus 
while the return of the light after the winter of the temperate 
zone may be beneficial, excessive light may be highly injurious. 

So far as our factory operatives are concerned, no effect of 
light is to be discerned in the South, while in Connecticut it is 
at best only slight. The heavy line next to the bottom in Figure 



84 CIVILIZATION AND CLIMATE 

1 (page 00) shows that from mid-September to the middle of 
November the amount of work increases, although the days are 
growing shorter. This is exactly opposite to what would be 
expected if the shortness of the days were of primary impor- 
tance. Moreover, in June when the days are longest we find a 
sudden drop. If the length of the days had much to do with the 
matter, there is no reason why more work should be done in 
November than in June. Nor should we find that a shortening 
of the days during September is accompanied by the same kind 
of increase in efficiency which is seen in March when the days, 
although of the same length as in September, are growing 
longer instead of shorter. For all these reasons we assign only 
slight importance to variations in the amount of light. Never- 
theless some effect can apparently be detected. Compare the 
two lower curves of Figure 1. In spite of the low efficiency 
occasioned by the winter's cold, the curve of work begins to 
rise sooner than does the curve of temperature which is placed 
below it. The first appreciable lengthening of the days in 
January may cause this by its cheering and stimulating 
influence. 

The line of reasoning applied to light applies also to the 
possibility that the variations of the curve of work depend on 
the extent to which people are shut up in the house. Obviously, 
this has nothing to do with the two maxima in November and 
May, nor with the minimum in July. In November people's 
houses have been shut up for a month more or less, while in May 
and July they are wide open, or at least as wide open as they 
ever are. The extremely low minimum in January, however, is 
probably due at least in part to the necessity of shutting up 
the house in winter. In October the weather becomes so cold 
that people begin to shut up their houses ; they live in stuffy, 
unventilated quarters, and fail to take exercise in the open air. 
By the middle of November this has had time to produce an 
effect which naturally becomes more and more marked as the 



* 

4 



HUMIDITY AND TEMPERATURE 86 

weeks go on. This would harmonize with the decline of energy 
from November to the middle of January. In January, how- 
ever, the decline ought not to cease if it is due chiefly to con- 
finement within the house. It ought to continue until about the 
middle of March, for not till that time do people in Connecticut 
begin to let in the outside air, and not even then to any great 
degree. As the curve of work has risen distinctly by that time, 
some other factor must intervene, presumably the increase of 
light to a slight extent, and the rise of the temperature to a 
larger extent. 

A third factor to be considered at this point is the relative 
humidity of the atmosphere. A sharp distinction must be 
drawn between the humidity of the outside air and that which 
prevails within doors. Physicians, students of factory manage- 
ment, school superintendents, and many other people have long 
appreciated the harmful effects of the dry air in our buildings 
during the winter. On the other hand, we are well aware that 
great humidity during hot weather is also harmful. We are 
more conscious of its effects than of those arising from exces- 
sive dryness. This does not necessarily mean that the total 
effect is worse than that of dryness, however, for hot, humid 
days are much rarer than the winter days when the air in our 
houses is drier than that of the majority of deserts. 

So far as our curves of work are concerned, humidity does not 
seem to be responsible for the fluctuations except as it is influ- 
enced by temperature. In other words, the average humidity 
of the outside air from season to season does not vary in such 
a way as to cause maxima in May and November, and minima 
in January and July. The average humidity of the outside air 
in November and in January is not greatly different. Never- 
theless, the inside humidity is probably an important factor in 
causing the low efficiency of midwinter. 

The relation of work and humidity among the factory opera- 
tives of Connecticut is illustrated in Figure 4. There the year 



86 



CIVILIZATION AND CLIMATE 



has been divided in three parts: (1) winter, (2) spring and 
autumn, and (8) summer. In each part all the days having 
a given humidity have been averaged together, and the smoothed 
results have been plotted. The heavy, solid lines represent what 
I believe to be the true conditions when other disturbing ele- 
ments are removed; while the dotted lines show the actual 
figures. In winter the dampest days are unmistakably the times 
of greatest efficiency. We may shiver when the air is raw, but 



50 



100^ 



99 



98 ■ 



97 - 



100 - 



99 




95 100% Rei. Hum. 



100% 



99 



• 98 



97 



Figaro 4. Relative Humidity and Work in Connecticut 
a. Winter, b. Spring and Fall. c. Summer 



we work well. The reason is twofold. In general the tempera- 
ture rises at times of excessive humidity, and this in itself is 
favorable. Moreover, the air, when taken into the house, does 
not need to be warmed so much as under other conditions, and 
thus it remains comparatively moist. 

In the spring and fall, when the temperature ranges from 
freezing to 70° with an average of about 50° F., the best work 
is performed with a relative humidity of about 75 per cent. 



HUMIDITY AND TEMPERATURE 87 

In other words, neither the dry nor the wet days are the best. 
The summer curve is the most complex of the three. It rises 
first to a maximum at 60 or 65 per cent, then falls, and once 
more rises to a higher maximum. The first maximum seems to 
be due to humidity, the second to temperature. A hot, damp 
day is unquestionably debilitating. The majority of the 
dampest days in summer, however, are comparatively cool, for 
they accompany storms. The coolness counterbalances the 
humidity, and people's efficiency increases. Hence, we dis- 
regard the right-hand maximum and conclude that with an 
average temperature of 65^ to 70^ a relative humidity of about 
60 per cent is desirable. 

The most unmistakable feature of the curves as a whole is 
that they show a diminution of work in very dry weather. This 
evidently has a bearing on the low level of the curve of energy 
in winter. At that season the air in our houses ought to have 
a humidity of 60 or 65 per cent, but most of the time the figure 
is only 20 or 80. On very cold days the percentage is still 
lower. For instance, if the outside air has a temperature of 
14^ F. ( — 10^ C.) and contains all the moisture it can hold, 
which is usually not the case, its relative humidity when it is 
warmed to 70^ F. will be only 12 per cent. Even on days when 
the outside humidity rises to 100 per cent and the temperature 
is 40^, the air in an ordinary steam-heated house has a relative 
humidity of only 85 per cent, which is far below the optimum. 
Apparently, this extreme aridity has a markedly debilitating 
effect. It also probably dries up the mucous membranes in such 
a way as to greatly increase our susceptibility to colds. In 
this way it is probably one of the most important factors in 
causing February and March to have the highest death rate 
of the year. The agreement of our conclusions as to humidity 
with those obtained by other students of the problem gives 
good ground for believing that the method here employed is 
sound. 



88 CIVILIZATION AND CLIMATE 

While the effects of light, of closed houses, and of excessive 
dryness explain part of the fluctuations of the curve of work, 
they have little bearing on any season except the winter. 
Another matter which may be suggested in this connection is 
vacations. These, like many other conditions of human life, 
are largely seasonal. Do people work fast in the fall because 
they have been rested by vacations? In professional occupa- 
tions and in business this certainly seems to be the case, but not 
among factory operatives. As a rule such people do not take 
summer vacations. They usually stop work at irregular inter- 
vals, or else after Christmas when many factories shut down or 
work on part time for a few days to prepare for the new year. 
The form of our main curve, however, shows that neither at this 
time nor in summer do vacations produce any appreciable 
stimulating results. If they were the cause of fast work, the 
curve ought to be highest within a few weeks after the people 
return to work, but this is not the case. During the vacation 
period of July and August the amount of work is moderately 
low, and in early January, after the Christmas break, very 
low. At the end of August it begins to increase, and increases 
steadily for two and a half months. The maximum in Novem- 
ber is so long after the vacation period that it can hardly have 
anything to do with it. 

What has just been said has an important practical appli- 
cation. There is a common idea that people need vacations in 
summer. Of course there are strong arguments for this, since 
pleasant recreation is then possible out of doors. Nevertheless, 
the need is apparently greater in winter than in summer. To 
meet this it is probably wise that work should be light during 
the winter. Already, as everyone knows, many factories run on 
part time during the first few weeks of the year, and now we 
see that there are strong physical reasons for this. Another 
important suggestion afforded by our curves is this: If the 
operatives of a factory, or people engaged in any other kind 



HUMIDITY AND TEMPERATURE 89 

of work, are to be speeded up, the time to do it is when nature 
lends her aid. To speed up at the end of January is analogous 
to taking a tired horse and expecting him to win a race. Later 
in the year, however, during the spring, especially in May, 
people may apparently be pushed to the limit, and will not 
suffer, because their energies are naturally increasing. This is 
still more the case in October and early November. After the 
middle of November pressure may produce important results, 
as we see at Christmas. Nevertheless, the chances are that if 
continued it will produce undue exhaustion, followed by a seri- 
ous reaction. Possibly the nervousness of Americans is due 
partly to the fact that although we relax somewhat in summer, 
we keep ourselves at high pressure through the winter when the 
need of relaxation is greatest. 

Turning now to temperature, we see that in Figure 1 (page 
59) the lower curve, showing the march of temperature through 
the year, and the Connecticut curve just above it are similar in 
many ways. Both are low in midwinter. From February onward 
they rise together until about the middle of June. Then the 
efficiency curve falls while the other goes on rising, a condition 
which fully accords with ordinary experience. The fall of the 
efficiency curve begins when the average temperature has risen 
to about 68**. When the temperature stops rising, the work 
stops falling, and then remains nearly steady through July. 
At the end of July the mean temperature has fallen to about 
71**. During the succeeding period of favorable temperature 
the two curves disagree, for the amount of work goes up while 
the temperature falls. When the average temperature falls 
below 48**, however, and begins apparently to be unfavorable to 
physical exertion, the curve of work turns downward. There- 
after, if we omit the Christmas hump and use the dotted line, the 
temperature and the amount of work decline together until they 
reach the lowest point in January. It is worth while once more 
to call attention to the somewhat surprising fact that in south- 



90 CIVILIZATION AND CLIMATE 

em New England, contrary to our ordinary opinion, low tem- 
perature seems to be much more injurious than high. 

This by no means indicates that high temperature is favor- 
able. Let us consider the effect of the high temperatures of the 
four successive summers shown in Figure 1 (page 59). Com- 
pare the summer dip in the Connecticut curve, that is, the 
area below the horizontal lines, with the heavily shaded areas of 
Figure 5, which shows the average temperature each week 
during the four summers from 1910 to 1918. The black por- 
tions indicate weeks having an average temperature night and 
day of over 78^. The size and distribution of these periods of 
extreme heat are in close correspondence with the amounts by 
which the curves of Figure 1 drop below the horizontal lines 
during the summers. This is illustrated in the following little 
table. The line marked ^^deficiency in work" indicates the 
amount by which the efficiency of the operatives diminished 
because of the hot weather, that is, the area below the hori- 
zontal lines of Figure 1. The year when the diminution was 
greatest is reckoned as 100 and the others in corresponding 
ratios. The other numbers show the area of the heavy black 
shading in Figure 5 and represent the intensity and duration 
of the hot weather. Here, too, the year of maximum heat is 
represented by 100, and the others by proportional values. 



Yeak. 


1910 


1911 


1912 


1918 


Deficiency in work, 


58 


100 


8 


2 


Severity of heat. 


52 


100 


50 


84 



In each case 1911 stands highest, 1910 next, and then 1912 
and 1918. In 1911 the heat was not only more extreme than 
during any year for about a century, but it lasted long, three 
weeks at one time and two at another. The death rate for 
July, 1911, in Massachusetts was 50 per cent greater than in 
the preceding June. In 1910 the hot weather was not so severe. 



Qy^ 'fcWigeu^y AvqusiStpt 




1^10 



\i9it 



I9IZ 



1913 



Fij^nre d. Average Weekly Temperature During the 
Summers of 1910-13 in Connecticut 



92 CIVILIZATION AND CLIMATE 

it lasted four weeks instead of five, and was divided into three 
parts instead of two. In 1912 the number of hot weeks was 
the same as in 1910. One was extremely hot, but the rest were 
not bad. Moreover, they did not come together, and the last 
was separated from the others by three cool weeks during 
which people had time to recover, which was not the case in 
1910. Finally, 1918 was a very mild year with only two 
extreme weeks which were separated by three moderate weeks. 
The year 1914 was even milder than 1918, and when its figures 
are compiled, they will probably show no fall whatever in the 
rate of work. 

An examination of Figure 5 makes it clear that only the 
extreme weeks are harmful. Thus 1911 was a truly terrible 
summer and 1918 a delightful one. Yet during 1911 the 
temperature remained above 69^ for only eight weeks while in 
1918 it remained above that figure for twelve weeks. Thus it 
appears that if the average temperature does not rise above 
about 70^, and if the noon temperature rarely exceeds 80^, 
the physical capacity of European races in the United States 
does not suffer any serious diminution. A slight further rise 
however — only four or five degrees — ^produces disastrous con- 
sequences. A single week of such weather does no great harm, 
but when several weeks come together people rapidly become 
weakened. The weakening is greater than appears in our 
diagrams, for during hot spells many of the operatives, par- 
ticularly the girls, stop work entirely or stay at home in the 
afternoon. Those who remain are the stronger ones, and 
naturally their wages are higher than the general average. 
Moreover, in 1911 the heat was so intense that the factory shut 
down for two or three days. Thus, if allowance is made for 
these facts, the difference which a few degrees make between two 
summers such as 1911 and 1918 becomes even more pronounced. 
The full effect of a hot summer, especially when it is very damp, 
may be gauged by the death rate in Japan (page 69). Sep- 



HUMIDITY AND TEMPERATURE 98 

tember is there 18 per cent worse than the average, instead of 
8 per cent better as in New York. 

The relation between the temperature and the amount of 
work in winter during the four years under discussion is not 
so pronounced as in summer, but can easily be detected. The 
hot summer of 1911 was followed, as frequently happens, by an 
uncommonly cold winter. The reason for both is the same. 
Unusually hot weather in New England is commonly due to 
the movement of heated air from the interior toward the coast, 
particularly from the southwest to the northeast. Cold winters 
are due to a similar transportation of air from the interior, 
this time from the northwest. The interior of a continent, as is 
well known, cools off very rapidly in winter and becomes hot 
rapidly in summer. When these conditions are carried from the 
interior to the coasts, they bring to New England what clima- 
tologists call a continental climate instead of the more maritime 
climate which usually prevails. 

The effect of the cold winter of 1911-12 can easily be seen in 
the curve for 1912 in Figure 1 (page 69). That year the 
average temperature where the factories are located was 19.0** 
for the first five weeks compared with an average of 82.7** for 
the three other years whose curves are given. For the next 
five weeks the temperature was 24.4** compared with 85.8^. The 
effect of this is seen in the low position of the 1912 curve of 
work far into the spring. The fact that the energy of the 
operatives remained low after the temperature began to rise 
suggests that the effect of extreme conditions may last long 
after more normal conditions begin to prevail. The same thing 
is suggested by the fact that after the summer of 1911 the 
curve of work does not rise so high in November as in the 
preceding May. During each of the other three years the 
November maximum is higher than its predecessor. Although 
a single winter and a single summer are not enough to prove 
that the effect of extreme conditions does thus persist for many 



94 CIVILIZATION AND CLIMATE 

months, they suggest that a long stay in an adverse climate 
may produce results which last for years. In spite of a previous 
statement, it appears that our plan of escaping from possible 
extreme heat by taking summer vacations in the mountains or 
at the seaside is wise. Equally wise is the growing habit of 
getting away from the severe cold for a while in winter. The 
only trouble is that those who most need such a change are 
rarely the ones who get it. If people could spend the summer 
on the Maine coast, the winter in Greorgia, and the rest of the 
year in New York, they ought to be able to do the best kind 
of work at all seasons almost without the necessity of a 
vacation. 

The effect of temperature may be shown in more ways than 
have yet been presented. Let us determine how fast people work 
on days having various temperatures, no matter in what month 
they occur. The very cold days, of course, all come in winter, 
but may be in December, January, or February. The very 
hot days come anywhere from May to September, while days 
with a temperature of about 50^ occur in almost every month 
of the year. 

The method can be illustrated by taking all the Mondays, 
all the Tuesdays, the Wednesdays, and so forth, and averaging 
the work of each day of the week. This has been done for 280 
people. The results are shown in Figure 6, which is inserted to 
show exactly how our results are obtained, and how necessary 
it is to have a large number of people. We are striving to 
separate the effects of one single condition from those of a vast 
number. We start with the wages of individuals which vary 
from day to day for hundreds of reasons wholly unconnected 
with the day of the week or the weather. The variations are 
so great that even if a man is influenced by the approach of 
pay-day, for example, we should probably not be able to detect 
it if we merely looked at his wages for a month or two. There- 
fore we average all the people of a department together, and 



Man. 74/0. Mtd Thyr Fri, Sat. 




Figure 6. Effect of the Days of the Week on Piece- Workers 

1. 00 Men, April-July, 191fl. 

9. 00 Men, AuflTust-Noyember, 1011. 

8. 40 Girls, 1019. 

4. 81 Men, 1019. 

5. 14 Girls, 1019. 
0. 94 Men, 1019. 

7. 00 Men, January-March, 1010. 

8. Weighted ATenge of Nos. 1-7, or M>proximately 980 People for One Year. 



96 



CIVILIZATION AND CLIMATE 



obtain results such as appear in Figure 7. This shows the 
actual wages — ^in percentages of the maximum — ^which were 
earned by 170 people divided into five departments during five 
weeks in January and February, 1918. There is little uni- 
formity in the different lines. Where one goes up the other 



too 



Janvaty 190 

fionday Monday Monday 



Fetrvary 

Monday Monday 




Fij^nre 7. Variations in Daily Wages. Five Departments 
(170 people) at New Britain, Conn. 



HUMIDITY AND TEMPERATURE 97 

goes down. Yet closer examination shows that in at least four 
out of the five departments the wages during the last two weeks 
were a little larger than during the earlier weeks. The varia- 
tions of the different curves are in part due to the persistence 
of individual vagaries which have not yet been averaged out, 
and in part to conditions affecting whole departments. For 
example, a foreman is cross one day and good-natured the 
next ; a belt breaks and delays work ; or some of the operatives 
converse so much that their work suffers appreciably. If a 
number of departments are averaged together these accidents, 
as well as those which pertain to individuals, disappear, but 
not until a great many people are considered. 

To find the effect of the days of the week, we take data such 
as are illustrated in Figure 7, select all the Mondays, Tuesdays, 
and so forth, and average each day. This gives the curves of 
Figure 6. Here we begin to detect a certain degree of uni- 
formity, although the accidents and peculiarities of each depart- 
ment are still in evidence. On the whole, however, the curves 
are higher at the end of the week than at the beginning. All, 
to be sure, are irregular, and the two lower — ^not counting the 
heavy line — slope in the opposite direction to the rest. The 
fact that the remaining five slope in the same direction shows, 
however, that these different people in different factories and 
during different years were subject to a common influence. 
Finally, we average all the departmental curves, giving each a 
weight proportional to the number of operatives. Thus we 
obtain the heavy lower line of Figure 6. This is still irregular, 
for although 280 people are included, all influences other than 
that of the days of the week are not yet eliminated. Neverthe- 
less, the wages clearly increase toward the end of the week. If 
the operatives were paid by the day instead of by the piece, this 
would probably not be the case. They would work slowly at the 
end of the week by reason of being tired. With the piece- 
workers, on the contrary, other considerations are dcmiinant. 



98 CIVILIZATION AND CLIMATE 

If they work a trifle slowly on Monday, they can make it up 
tomorrow. On Tuesday they can be slow and make it up on 
Wednesday, but a few who fell behind on Monday are begin- 
ning to work harder. So it goes from day to day until on 
Friday and especially Saturday many feel that their earnings 
for the week are insufficient, and hence make an extra effort. 
In some cases this may not be true, as in the curve next above 
the average curve. Yet it remains a general truth, and the 
lower curve of Figure 6 is a concrete expression of the fact that 
in the factory under discussion there is a difference of at least 
2 per cent between Monday and Saturday. Possibly the real 
difference is greater, and is obscured by other circumstances. 
In the cigar factories of Florida it rises to a far greater value, 
for the Cubans are much disinclined to work after a holiday. 
Not only are about 10 per cent of the operatives absent on 
Mondays, but those who are present come so late or are so 
indisposed to work that they accomplish only about 80 per 
cent as much work as on other days. This is so important a 
matter that allowance for it has been made in computations 
where individual days rather than weeks are concerned. The 
figures for each day of the week for 780 men at Tampa are as 
follows: Monday, 81.9 per cent; Tuesday, 98.7 per cent; 
Wednesday, 99.8 per cent; Thursday, 100 per cent; Friday, 
98.8 per cent; and Saturday, 97.9 per cent. The other days 
are reckoned as of equal weight, but the figures for Monday 
have been increased in the ratio of 82 to 100. 

By the employment of a method similar to that used with the 
days of the week we obtain the curves shown in Figure 8. These 
are based on varying numbers of people, from one to over 700. 
Yet all show the same general character. With the exception 
of the last two, which are distinctly the least reliable, the 
physical group all reach maxima at a temperature between 59^ 
and 65^. Even the two less reliable curves reach their maxima 
within the next four degrees. All the curves decline at low 



15® 2tf» 25° 30*» 35® 40° 45® 50*» 55° 60^ 65*^ 70° 75® 80° 



100% 

96 
94 
92 
90 




100% 
95% 
90% 
85% 



+ 2 
+ 1 



-1 
-2 



Figure 8. Human Activity and Mean Temperature 

A. wo Men in Two Connecticut F&ctorieg, 1910-18. 

B. 100 Girls in One Connecticut Factory, 1011-18. 

C. One Man (P) in Denmark, June-December, 1000. 

D. One Man (L) in Denmark, June-December, 1000. 
B. 880 Cigar-makers in Factory B at Tampa, Fla., 1018. 
F. 400 Cigar-makers in Factory A at Tampa, Fla., 1018. 

0. 8 Children Typewriting in New York, lOOS-0. 

H. 880 Cigar-makers in Factory B at Tampa, Fla., 1019. 

1. 1600 Students in Mathematics and English at West Point and Annapolis, 1900-1018. 



NoTs. All the curves except O and 
every case is reckoned as 100. 



I are drawn on the same scale. The maximum in 



100 CIVILIZATION AND CLIMATE 

temperatures, that is on the left, and also at high. The irreg- 
ularities at the extreme limits are largely due to the fact 
that there the number of days is so small that exact results 
cannot be hoped for. 

Figure 8, with the brief statements which accompany the 
respective curves, tells the whole story so plainly that it 
scarcely seems worth while to amplify it. Several points, how- 
ever, may well be emphasized. For instance, below a certain 
temperature, which varies from curve to curve, a further re- 
duction does not seem to produce much effect. People appar- 
ently become somewhat hardened, or else the conditions within 
tiie warmed houses do not change much in spite of a change in 
the outside air. Another noticeable thing is that the curve for 
girls has greater amplitude than that for men in the same 
region. Part of this is due to the inclusion of the group of 
Italians, already referred to, who are engaged in drawing hot 
brass and hence are benefited by the coldest kind of weather. 
Even if they were omitted, however, the girls' curve would still 
vary more than that of the men. This seems to indicate that 
either because of their sex or because of their age, girls are 
more sensitive than men. 

Another point brought out by the curves is that as we go to 
more southerly climes the optimum temperature of the human 
race becomes higher. It is important to note, however, that 
the variation in the optimum is slight compared with the varia- 
tion in the mean temperature of the places in question. For 
instance, in Connecticut the optimum seems to be about 60^ 
for people of north European stock. This is about ten degrees 
higher than the mean temperature for the year as a whole. In 
Florida, on the other hand, the optimum for Cubans is about 
65^, which is five degrees lower than the mean temperature for 
the year at Tampa. In other words, with a difference of twenty 
degrees in the mean annual temperature, and with a distinctly 
northern race compared with a southern, we find that the 



HUMIDITY AND TEMPERATURE 101 

optimum differs only about 6^ F. This seems to mean that for 
the entire human race the optimum temperature probably does 
not vary more than ten or fifteen de^ees. 

We have not yet pointed out all the important matters sug- 
gested by the curves of Figure 8. Above the optimum the 
curves in general begin to decline quite rapidly, but then cease 
to do so, and at high temperatures are not so low as would be 
expected. This is largely because in hot weather many opera- 
tives, especially the girls and the Cubans, do not feel like work, 
and so stay away from the factories. Those who come in spite 
of the heat are the strongest and most efficient. Naturally, their 
average wages are higher than those of the ones who stay away, 
and hence the general level of our curves is too high in the 
portions based on the hottest weather. The mental curve, how- 
ever, falls off very rapidly at high temperatures. This is 
because the students are obliged to be present on hot days just 
as on others. They must recite whether they wish or not. 
Hence, their curve is more reliable than the others. In this con- 
nection some experiments carried on by the New York State 
Commission on Ventilation are of interest. In an attempt to 
determine the most favorable conditions of ventilation the Com- 
mission placed a large number of persons in rooms where the 
temperature and humidity were under exact control, and 
measured their strength, mental activity, food consumption, and 
other conditions. The experiments lasted six or eight hours a 
day, and each set of subjects was tested for several weeks. 
Three temperatures were used, namely, 68°, 76°, and 86**. No 
appreciable effect upon strength could be detected, nor upon 
mental activity, and various other functions. This is probably 
because the experiments were not sufficiently prolonged. That 
is, the subjects were in the experimental rooms only a third or 
a quarter of each day, and hence their condition did not have 
time to change appreciably. Although the subjects did not 



102 CIVILIZATION AND CLIMATE 

lose in actual strength however, their inclination to work de- 
clined at high temperatures even within six or eight hours. 

Thus far we have been dealing with large bodies of people. 
It is peculiarly important to find that no matter how small the 
number, the same relation to temperature is discernible. One 
of the curves in Figure 8 shows the speed and accuracy of three 
children who wrote upon the typewriter a few stanzas from the 
^'Faerie Queen" or a page from Greorge Eliot daily for a year, 
and weekly for another year. Their records were kindly placed 
at my disposal by Professor J. McK. Cattell. I have corrected 
them for the effects of practice, and have combined speed and 
accuracy in such a way that each has the same weight. At one 
period, for some unknown cause, the efficiency of the children 
declined greatly for two months or more. If this were elimi- 
nated their maximum would come at a lower temperature than 
now appears, probably not much above 60^. In the curves of 
individuals, we are fortunate in having careful tests made by 
two psychologists, Lehmann and Pedersen, at Copenhagen. 
They tested their own strength daily with the dynamometer, 
and their curves, copied directly from their monograph, are 
before us. One is uncommonly regular with a maximum at 64^. 
The other, less regular, has its maximum at 69^. The agree- 
ment of Danish curves based on single individuals with New 
England curves based on hundreds is highly important. 

The last thing to be considered in Figure 8 is the mental 
curve at the bottom. It is based on so large a number of 
people, and is so regular, that its general reliability seems great, 
although I think that future studies may show the optimum to 
be a few degrees higher than is here indicated. It agrees with 
the results of Lehmann and Pedersen. Furthermore, from gen- 
eral observation we are most of us aware that we are mentally 
more active in comparatively cool weather. Perhaps ^^spring 
fever" is a mental state far more than a physical. Apparently 
people do the best mental work on days when the thermometer 



HUMIDITY AND TEMPERATURE 



108 



ranges from freezing to about 60^ — that is, when the mean 
temperature is not far from 40^. Inasmuch as himian progress 
depends upon a coordination of mental and physical activity, we 
seem to be justified in the conclusion that the greatest total 
efficiency occurs halfway between the mental and physical 
optima, that is, with a mean temperature of about 60^. 

Curves such as those of Figure 8 are not peculiar to man 
alone. They are apparently characteristic of all types of 
living creatures. To begin with plants, many experiments have 
determined the rate of growth of seedlings at various tempera- 
tures. The commonest method has been to grow different sets 
of seedlings in large numbers under conditions which are iden- 
tical except in temperature, and then to measure the average 
length of the shoots. In all cases growth is slow at low tempera- 
tures, increases gradually with higher temperatures, reaches a 
maximum like that of man, and then falls off quickly. The 
course of events, however, is not always so regular as here indi- 
cated. The curve of wheat, for example, as worked out by 
MacDougal is given in Figure 9. The peculiar double maximum 




Figure 9. Growth of Wheat at Various Temperatures 

After MacDougal 

The flfurei on the left indicate growth in mm. dnrins 48 hours 



104 CIVILIZATION AND CLIMATE 

there seen appears in each case where careful tests are made. 
It seems to be due to some inherent quality of the plant, and is 
of especial interest in our present study because we shall soon 
come upon an analogous case in man. When many species are 
averaged, such irregularities disappear, and we obtain the 
curve at the bottom of Figure 10, which has been prepared by 
MacDougal on the basis of his own measurements and others 
given in such works as Pfeffer's **Physiology of Plants/' Many 
of the lower plants, such as marine algs, have their optima at 
lower temperatures than those here indicated, and the same is 
probably true of Arctic species. On the other hand, certain low 
algae which grow in hot springs must have their optimum at a 
temperature above that of ordinary plants. These differences 
are immaterial. We are now concerned only with the fact that 
so far as plants have been measured, their response to tempera- 
ture resembles that of man. 

Apparently, we have to do with a quality which pertains to 
all kinds of living beings, and is presumably an inherent char- 
acteristic of protoplasm. The nearest approach to pure proto- 
plasm is found in unicellular organisms whose bodies show only 
the beginnings of differentiation into parts having separate 
functions. The infusoria furnish a good example. One of these, 
paramoecium, has been carefully studied by L. L. Woodruff. 
His original purpose was to determine whether it was possible 
for this organism to keep on reproducing itself without con- 
jugation for any great length of time. Under the conditions 
of nature the small motile cells often spontaneously develop a 
median cell wall and ultimately divide into two new individuals, 
thus reproducing the species. This process, however, does not 
go on indefinitely, for when two cells come in contact they fuse 
with one another, and then begin a process of fission which, like 
the other process, ends in two individuals. Thus we have two 
types of reproduction, asexual and sexual, which apparently 
give rise to the same kind of paramcecia. Woodruff's purpose 



HUMIDITY AND TEMPERATURE 



106 



was to determine whether the asexual method of reproduction 
can persist indefinitely, or whether, as is often asserted and as 
previous experiments seemed to indicate, it leads in time to 
extinction. He has shown that if the media of nutrition con* 





























































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Figare 10. Mean Temperature and Vital Processes in Plants, 

Animals and Man 



tain a sufficient number of elements, paramoscium can reproduce 
itself indefinitely by the asexual method. Between May 1, 
1907, and May 14, 1914, he had carried his cultures through 
4417 generations without conjugation. In the course of this 



106 CIVILIZATION AND CLIMATE 

work he has found that the rate of cell-division is an accurate 
test of the conditions under which protoplasm exists. For 
example, when extracts from nephritic kidneys or certain other 
diseased organs are added to the nutrient solution, even though 
they are present in such smcdl quantities that they cannot be 
detected by chemical analysis, they make their presence evident 
by a falling off in the rate of fission. 

One of Woodruff's most important lines of work has been to 
test the relation of his infusoria to temperature. From many 
experiments he finds that their activity corresponds closely to 
van't Hoff's law of chemical activity. According to this well- 
established law, chemical reactions of most kinds at ordinary 
temperatures become nearly three times as active with every 
rise of 10^ C. Even in inorganic chemical reactions, however, 
and far more in those of the living cell, there is a distinct limit 
where this rule breaks down. This limit forms the optimum of 
the species. At higher temperatures the degree of activity 
declines, and finally death ensues. On the basis of these con- 
clusions, Woodruff's data permit us to draw the second curve 
from the bottom in Figure 10. 

The next higher curve shows the amount of oxygen absorbed 
by the common crayfish at various temperatures. The most 
extensive work on this subject appears to have been done by 
Brunnow. The facts here given are taken from the summary 
by Putter in his "Vergleichende Physiologie." The amount of 
oxygen absorbed by an animal is an excellent measure of its 
physical activity. When supplemented by measurements of 
the amount of carbon dioxide given off, and of the speed with 
which certain other metabolic or katabolic processes take place, 
it gives a true picture of the animal's general condition. Ap- 
parently, these various processes follow van't Hoff's law just 
as do the growth of plants and the cell-division of the infusoria. 
The optimum in the three cases does not vary greatly, that for 



HUMIDITY AND TEMPERATURE 107 

plants being about 86^, for paramoecium 88^, and for the 
crayfish 74** F. 

Physiologists are not yet fully agreed as to the cause of the 
phenomena shown in these curves, although there is little doubt 
as to the general facts that they imply. One hypothesis may be 
briefly stated. According to Putter's summary, the most prob- 
able explanation is that activity goes on increasing according 
to the ordinary chemical law until it becomes so great that the 
organism is not capable of absorbing the necessary oxygen. 
That is, at a low temperature the creature easily gets what 
oxygen it needs, and gives it out again in the form of carbon 
dioxide or of other oxidized products which remove the waste 
substances from the body. As the temperature rises, the normal 
increase in chemical activity takes place, the animal is still 
able to get rid of all its waste products, and thus its life pro- 
cesses are strengthened. With a further rise of temperature 
a change sets in. The chemical processes which break down 
the tissues of the body become still more active, but the supply 
of waste products to be eliminated by oxidation becomes so 
great that they cannot all be removed. This is because in 
every organism there is a distinct limit to the amount of oxygen 
which the creature can mechanically convey to different por- 
tions within a specified time. If the supply of oxygen is not 
sufficient to oxidize all the waste products, some of these wiU 
remain in the system. They act as poisons. Their first effect 
is to diminish the organism's activity. If they accumulate to 
too great an extent death ensues. 

The discussion of this hypothesis must be left to the physiol- 
ogists. They must decide whether the hypothesis which ex- 
plains the curves of cold-blooded animals and plants is also 
applicable to warm-blooded animals. There can be little doubt, 
however, that variations in the rate at which metabolism takes 
place in the human body are at the root of the variations in 



108 CIVILIZATION AND CLIMATE 

efficiency which we are here studying. The researches of 
Thomson illustrate the way in which we are beginning to dis- 
cover the truth. In Manchester, England, from April to July, 
1910, and again in March, 1918, he measured the percentage 
of CO2 given off in the breath of four individuals under differ- 
ent conditions of temperature, humidity, and pressure. From 
his figures, given in the ^^Manchester Memoirs," I have compiled 
the following tables : 

I. Percentage of CO2 Exhaled bt Foue Peesons Undee 

Different Conditions of Tempeeatuee 

Temperature, 60n51*» 62-63** 54^56"* aesT" 69-69° 60-61** 68-63'' 6*-66** 98** ^Jg 
^^^^^^^^ 4.77 4.78 4.66 4.71 4.61 4.41 4.38 4.62 4.80+? 

II. Peecentaoe of CO2 Exhaled bt Foue Peesons Undee 

Different Conditions of Humidity 

Relative Humidity, 70-769b 76-809b 81-85^ 86-909b 
Percentage of COs, 4.75 4.60 4.60 4.46 

The interpretation of these tables is difficult, and I can merely 
oiFer a suggestion. An increase in the proportion of CO2 ex- 
haled from the lungs obviously indicates an acceleration of the 
metabolic processes which break down and consume the bodily 
tissues. This liberates energy which may manifest itself in at 
least three ways and possibly more. It may give rise to heat 
which is used to maintain the body at the normal temperature ; 
it may be used to accomplish physical or mental work; and it 
may cause an excess of heat which gives rise to further metab- 
olism of a harmful nature. In the first part of the table the per- 
centage of CO2 is comparatively high at the lowest temperature 
recorded by Thomson, and decreases with only slight irregu- 
larity till the thermometer reaches 62^ F. This is close to the 



HUMIDITY AND TEMPERATURE 109 

temperature which we have found to be the optimum. Below 
that point the increased metabolism is probably needed to keep 
the body warm. At higher temperatures increased production 
of CO2 is again apparent. This perhaps means that too much 
chemical activity is taking place, and that toxic substances are 
accumulating in the way suggested by Putter. At the optimum, 
according to this interpretation, the body does not have to 
use an undue portion of its strength in keeping warm, nor is it 
injured by too great stimulation. Thus it is in the best con- 
dition for work. 

The second part of the table shows that in the driest weather 
which England enjoys, metabolism is more active than in wet 
weather. Perhaps part of this is due to the fact that in dry 
air the body loses water and is cooled by evaporation, and hence 
requires more heat than in wet air of similar temperature. 
There is more to the matter than this, however, but further 
measurements are needed before an adequate explanation can 
be offered. All that can be done here is to point out the 
fact that in man, as in the lower organisms, activity varies 
according to temperature. This is evident in Figure 10, 
where the dotted upper line is the curve of mental activity, 
while the accompanying solid line shows the conditions if 
all accidental irregularities could be removed. The third 
line in the same way represents the physical activity of both 
men and women in Connecticut. I have not used the figures 
from the South because they are not quite so reliable as 
those from Connecticut. Finally, the second line from the top 
shows physical and mental activity combined, each being given 
the same weight. It may be taken as representing man's actual 
productive activity in the things that make for a high civiliza- 
tion. The resemblance of the human curves to those of the 
lower organisms is obvious. In general, the lower types of 
life, or the lower forms of activity, seem to reach their optima 
at higher temperatures than do the more advanced types and 



110 CIVILIZATION AND CLIMATE 

the more lofty functions such as mentality. The whole trend 
of biological thought is toward the conclusion that the same 
laws apply to all forms of life. They differ in application, but 
not in principle. The law of optimum temperature apparently 
controls the phenomena of life from the lowest activities of 
protoplasm to the highest activities of the human intellect. 



CHAPTER VI 

Work and Weatheh 

The effect of a given climate depends on two primary fac- 
tors. One is the character of the seasons as expressed in aver- 
ages such as are furnished by our weather bureaus. The other 
is the changes from day to day, that is, the weather. The boy 
quoted by Mark Twain was nearly right when he defined the 
difference between weather and climate as being that ^^Climate 
lasts all the time and weather only a few days." Two climates 
may be almost identical in their seasonal averages, and yet 
differ enormously in their effect on life, because in one the 
change from day to day is scarcely noticeable, while in the 
other there are all sorts of rapid variations. The old Irish- 
woman who was driving her pigs to market in a pouring rain 
did not realize it, but she gave expression to a truth of the 
greatest importance, when a friend pitied her for being out in 
such weather, and she replied, ^^Indade it's bad, but sure it's 
thankful I am to have any kind of weather." 

The changes from one day to another depend largely upon 
our ordinary cyclonic storms. In such storms the barometer 
goes down and then up; the wind changes in direction and 
velocity; the air becomes humid, clouds gather, rain usually 
falls, and then clear skies and dry air prevail ; the temperature 
also changes, often rising before a storm and falling after- 
ward, although the exact sequence depends on the location of 
a region in respect to the ocean and to the center of the storm ; 
the daily range of temperature also varies, for in damp or 
cloudy weather the nights do not become so cool nor the days 



112. CIVILIZATION AND CLIMATE 

so warm as when the air is clear. To understand the influence 
of the weather all these conditions must be investigated. Most 
of them, however, appear to be of relatively slight importance 
when considered by themselves. For instance, Lehmann and 
Pedersen could find no appreciable effect of the pressure of 
the atmosphere except where low pressure prevails a long time. 
The decrease in efficiency at such times, however, is probably 
due more to prolonged cloudiness and its attendant circum- 
stances than to the barometric conditions. My own work leads 
to the same result. The curves of efficiency compared with 
pressure are so contradictory that it does not seem worth while 
to publish them. The same is true of the range of temperature 
from day to night, and of the direction and force of the winds. 
I have no doubt that all these matters are important, and that 
some day their effect will be worked out. In general, however, 
their influence is exerted indirectly through changes in tempera- 
ture and humidity. In hot weather a great range from day to 
night is unquestionably highly favorable, but at ordinary 
temperatures it seems to make no special difference, except 
through its effect upon the mean temperature. 

As to the winds. Dexter, in his book on "Weather Influences," 
shows that they produce a marked effect upon the nerves, as 
is indicated by the unruliness of school children in Denver 
when high south winds prevail. Part of this is doubtless due 
directly to the wind, but the unseasonably high temperature 
and extreme dryness which accompany it are probably more 
important. Yet we are cdl conscious of the effect of a steady 
high wind. Some people are stimulated. I have seen a small 
boy, who was usually very quiet, climb to the top of a tall 
tree when a violent wind came up, and swing in the branches, 
singing at the top of his voice. For a while such stimulation is 
probably beneficial, but if continued day after day it makes 
people excitable and cross. A striking example of the effect 
of a prolonged wind is seen in eastern Persia in the basin of 



WORK AND WEATHER 118 

Seistan. During the summer, from June to September, the so- 
called "Wind of One Hundred and Twenty Days" blows so 
violently from the north that in the oases trees cannot grow 
except under the lee of high walls. The acrid wild melon, which 
ripens its beautiful little green and yellow fruit in the desert, 
does not spread its slender branches in all directions after the 
common fashion of plants. The gales crowd the branches into 
a sheaf which points so uniformly in one direction, a little to 
the west of north, that it can safely be used as a compass. 
When Europeans have to endure this wind they say that it is 
one of the most trying experiences imaginable. Not only does 
it render them irritable, but it deadens their initiative and 
makes them want to stay idly in the shelter of the house. The 
natives, although possessed of many good qualities, are inert 
and inefficient even in comparison with their fellow Persians 
who live farther to the north and west. On the whole, we may 
probably conclude that occasional short-lived gales and fre- 
quent light or moderate winds are beneficial, while long periods 
either of steady calms or of gales are depressing. 

Aside from the conditions of weather already mentioned, 
there are two whose effect appears plainly when curves are 
constructed according to the method described above. One is 
the change of temperature from one day to another, and the 
other is the character of the day as to clouds and sunshine. 
In considering changes of temperature from one day to the 
next, we deal with the mean temperature for each day and 
not with the extremes. A change of as much as 15^ is rare. 
Suppose that the thermometer stands at 60^ at sunrise, rises 
to 80^ by two o'clock in the afternoon, then falls rapidly to 
50^ at sunset and to 40^ by midnight. Suppose also that the 
next day the temperature is 40^ at sunrise, rises a little above 
56° during the day, and falls again to 45^ at night. The two 
days would be very different, and we should speak of them as 
being marked by a very great change of temperature, a dif- 



114 CIVILIZATION AND CLIMATE 

ference of 40^ within ten hours. Yet the average of the first 
day would be about 64^ and of the second 49^, a difference of 
only 15^ in the mean temperature. 

On the basis of this supposition the reader can estimate the 
importance of the various degrees of change indicated in Figure 
11. At the left the curves show the average efficiency on days 
when the temperature has fallen; in the middle are the days 
with no change; and at the right are the days characterized 
by a rise. Taking only the two upper curves, those for men 
and girls in Connecticut factories, the resemblance is striking. 
When we consider the heterogeneous character of the original 
materials the resemblance is still more important. The men's 
curve is based on 120 men at Bridgeport in 1910 and 1911, 
and on 180 men at New Britain in 1911, 1912, and 1918. The 
girls' curve is based on 196 girls at New Britain in 1911, 1912, 
and 1918, and on 60 girls at New Haven in 1918 and 1914. 
Even where the girls and men were working in the same factory, 
there is no reason, aside from the weather, why their wages 
should be high on the same day. The chief difference between 
the two curves is that the one for the girls varies more than 
that for the men, and reaches its maximum slightly farther to 
the right. Apparently, here, just as in the case of mean 
temperature, the girls because of their age or sex are more 
subject to the influence of the weather than are the men, and 
hence their curve dips deeper. 

Let us now interpret the upper curves, beginning at the 
middle. There they fall to their lowest level. This means that 
when the temperature of today is the same as that of yesterday, 
people work more slowly than after a change, no matter whether 
the change is upward or downward. A variable climate is 
therefore highly desirable if people are to be efficient. Perhaps 
the most surprising feature is that the lowest point of the 
physical curve, and a depression of the mental curve, C, come 
not at 0*, but at — 1*. The zero point is low, lower than any 



Pall of Temperatttre 
-14^ -12** -10** -8** -tf* 



-40 .2** 0** 



Rise of Tamperature 
+20 440 4^ 4.30 +100 4.12OP 



100% 



99 



96 



100 
99 
96 
97 

100 
99 
96 




A 
B 



- +1 




-1 



-; 100 



C 
D 



99 



96 



97 



B 
P 



100 



99 
96 



97 



H 



96 



Figure 11. 



Human Activity and Changes of Mean Temperature 
from Day to Day 



A. 
B. 
C. 
D. 
B. 
P. 
O. 
H. 



WO Men in Two Connecticut Pactories, 1910-18. 

956 OirlB in Two Connecticut Pactories, Iftil-is. 

460 Students in Blathematics and English at West Point and Annapolis, 1900-1918. 

760 Cigar-makers at Tampa, Pla., in Winter (October-March), 1018 and 1918. Pactory A. 

400 Cigar-makers at Tampa in Winter, 1918. Pactory B. 

400 Cigar-makers at Tampa in Summer (April-September), 1018. Pactory B. 

880 Cigar-makers at Tampa in Summer, 1019. Pactory A. 

880 Cigar-makers at Tampa in Summer, 1018. Pactory A. 



116 CIVILIZATION AND CLIMATE 

point of the physical curves except — 1**. Hence, our conclu- 
sion as to the injurious effect of uniform temperature is justi- 
fied, but that does not explain the curious dip at — 1**. 
The repetition of the same phenomenon in each of the three 
upper curves, and a similar occurrence at — 2^ and — 8** 
respectively in the two curves for the winter in Florida strongly 
suggest that we are confronted by a peculiarity which pertains 
to man as a species, in the same way that a double optimum 
of mean temperature pertains to wheat as shown in Figure 9. 
Possibly, a slight fall in temperature causes people to shiver, 
as it were, and only when the fall is slightly larger is the circu- 
lation of the blood so stimulated as to increase the activity of 
the various organs. In the South it may be that people's blood 
is more sluggish than in the North, so that the reaction 
due to cooler weather does not follow quite so soon, and hence 
the period of shivering is not over until the fall in mean tem- 
perature amounts to more than about 8^. I do not assert that 
this is so, but it is the only explanation that comes to mind. 
To go on with our interpretation of the physical curves, a 
slight rise of temperature seems to be favorable, but beyond 
that the favorable effects of increased heat, which are strong 
in cold weather, are neutralized by the unfavorable effects in 
warm weather. In fact, our personal experience tells us that 
even when the heat is not extreme, a sudden rise may make us 
uncomfortable and lazy, as often occurs in the spring. In spite 
of this, however, a rise is in general better than uniformity. 
When the temperature falls, on the other hand, a distinct 
stimulus is received, provided the fall amounts to as much as 
4®. The best effects are seen with a fall of from 6° to 9** with 
girls and of 7° to 11° with men. Here again the implication is 
that men are on the whole less sensitive than girls. An extreme 
drop is not so favorable as one of more moderate dimensions, 
especially for the girls. Taking the physical curves as a whole, 
the greatest amount of energy would be expected in climates 



WORK AND WEATHER 117 

where the mean temperature first rises 2^ or 8^ a day for a few 
days and then drops 4^ to 8^ a day. If the changes are greater 
than this, the effect is still stimulating, but not so beneficial as 
under the more moderate conditions. If there is practically 
no change, on the contrary, the efficiency falls within the low 
central depressions of our curves, and is less than under either 
of the other conditions. 

Mental work resembles physical, but with interesting differ- 
ences. When the temperature falls greatly, mental work seems 
to suffer more than physical, and declines as much as when 
there is no change. It receives a little stimulus from a slight 
warming of the air, but appears to be adversely affected when 
the air becomes warm rapidly. This last statement, however, 
must be qualified. The physical curves are based on the com- 
plete year, and the conditions of siunmer have an opportunity 
to balance those of winter. The results show the net effect for 
all seasons combined. The mental curves, on the other hand, 
do not include the summer vacation, which lasts from the 
middle of June to the first of September at West Point, and 
from the middle of May to the first of October at Annapolis. 
If this were included, the effect of a pronounced lowering of 
the temperature would be more noticeable than at present, for 
such a lowering is naturally more stimulating in July than in 
January. In another respect, also, the curve of mental effi- 
ciency needs modification. It is based on figures from two 
climatic provinces, namely, southern New York and Maryland. 
The great decline at times when the temperature rises rapidly 
is due largely to conditions in Maryland, where the hot days 
of the spring are much more debilitating than in New York. 
The students belong to a race which has never learned to 
endure sudden heat. Hence they feel it strongly. If allow- 
ance is made for the two conditions just mentioned, the mental 
curve will approach much more closely to the physical. A drop 
of temperature amounting to 8^ or more will appear more 



118 CIVILIZATION AND CLIMATE 

stimulating than now seems to be the case, and a rapid rise 
will not seem so harmful. Hence, the general conclusion for 
both physical and mental activity will be essentially the same. 
It may be summed up thus: Taking the year as a whole, uni- 
formity of temperature causes low energy; a slight rise is 
beneficial, but a further rise is of no particular value; the 
beginning of a fall of temperature is harmful, but when the 
fall becomes a little larger it is much more stimulating than a 
rise; when it becomes extreme, however, its beneficied qualities 
begin to decline. This conclusion must, of course, be appro- 
priately modified according to the season. A cold wave in 
January is very different from one in July. In our curves we 
have given January and July an opportunity to neutralize 
one another. They have not done so. This means that after 
all allowances have been made for the seasons, the total effect 
of cold waves is decidedly beneficial, and of warm waves slightly 
so. Frequent changes, therefore, are highly desirable. 

Let us pass on now to the Florida curves. Here we find a 
curious difference between summer and winter which is not easy 
to understand. Let us leave that for the moment, however, and 
consider only the two winter curves. Their general resem- 
blance is marked. The differences at the extremities are not 
important because the number of days there concerned is very 
small. It must be remembered that the two curves are from 
independent and rival factories. The position of any particu- 
lar point in either curve depends upon a number of days scat- 
tered irregularly through the months from October to March. 
Aside from a genuine effect of climate, there seems to be no 
possible way in which 400 men in one factory in 1918 could be 
made to work so that their curve would be the same as that of 
880 men in another factory in the two years 1912 and 1918. 
Here, as in Connecticut, West Point, and Annapolis, we are 
apparently dealing with a peculiar quality which is inherent 
in the human species. 



WORK AND WEATHER 119 

One of the Florida curves, E, is low at 0°, while the other is 
medium. This means that days when there is no change of 
temperature are not particularly favorable. At plus 2° to 
plus 4*^, however, both are fairly high, which indicates that a 
moderate rise of temperature is favorable. A further rise 
seems to be harmful. The effect of a slight fall of the ther- 
mometer has already been discussed. A further fall is bene- 
ficial. The most notable thing about curves D and E is the 
maximum from —4** to — 7**. It comes at about the same 
place as the mental maximum, and is similar to the Connecticut 
maximum except that the people in the far South do not seem 
to be able to stand such extreme changes as do those in the 
North. In fact, it seems most significant that the Connecticut 
men, who are the strongest of our various groups, are most 
stimulated by a strong change of temperature. The Connecti- 
cut girls come next, but being less sturdy, they do not enjoy 
quite such rigorous conditions. The mental curve is largely 
determined by Annapolis, and as the climate there is less severe 
than in Connecticut, the students seem to feel more keenly 
the effects of extreme changes, although they are stimulated 
by those of moderate dimensions. The same is still more true 
of the people of Florida in winter. Finally, during the summer 
the Floridans are stimulated by a slight drop of temperature, 
not enough to make them feel chilly, but enough to start their 
blood in motion. A greater drop makes them feel cold, while 
even the slightest rise of temperature in their long monotonous 
summer is unfavorable. 

We are ready now to sum up our results. The outstanding 
point is that changes of temperature, provided they are not 
too great, are more stimulating than uniformity, while a fall is 
more stimulating than a rise in the latitudes now under con- 
sideration. The effect of changes depends largely upon the 
degree to which people are inured to them. When they are 
weakened by a long hot period like that of the Florida summer, 



120 CIVILIZATION AND CLIMATE 

even a slight cooling of the air brings relief and activity^ pro- 
vided it does not go so far as to make people feel chilly. When 
the same Floridans become wonted to the somewhat sterner, 
albeit mild air of their winter, the first effect of a lowering of 
the temperature may be to make them shiver, but soon they 
become stimulated, and work fast. They are not so tough, 
however, as to be able to get benefit from the occasional days 
when really strong cold waves sweep down upon them. On the 
other hand, a rise of temperature stimulates them, unless it is 
of considerable severity. Farther north the same applies ex- 
cept that being tougher the people are more benefited by strong 
changes. Judging by the difference between summer and winter 
in Florida, it looks as if a little hardening would cause even 
the Cubans to respond favorably to changes at least as severe 
as those in Maryland, thus making the left-hand part of their 
curve like C in Figure 8. Taking it all in all, the one thing 
that stands out preeminently is that a fall of from 4*^ to 7^ is 
everywhere stimulating, provided people are accustomed to it. 

Man is not the only organism that is benefited by changes of 
temperature. Numerous experiments have shown that plants 
are subject to a similar influence. If a plant is subjected to 
unduly low or high temperature, its growth is retarded. As 
the temperature approaches the optimum, the rate of growth 
increases. When the optimum is maintained steadily, however, 
not only does the increase cease, but retrogression sets in, and 
the rate of growth declines. A moderate change of tempera- 
ture away from the optimum and then back again after a few 
hours checks this decline, and keeps the plant at a maximum 
degree of activity. Thus conditions where the thermcnneter 
swings back and forth on either side of the optimum are dis- 
tinctly better than where the optimum is maintained steadily. 
Thus it seems to be a law of organic life that variable tempera- 
ture is better than uniformity. 

The physiological process by which frequent changes of 



WORK AND WEATHER 121 

temperature affect the body is not yet known. The best sug- 
gestion seems to be that of Dr. W. B. James. It is universally 
recognized that one of the most important of the bodily func- 
tions is the circulation of the blood. The more active and 
unrestricted it is, the more thoroughly is the whole system 
nourished and purified. Provided it does not impose an undue 
strain on the heart or arteries, anything that stimulates the 
circulation appears to be helpful. Changes of temperature are 
a powerful agent to this end. Witness the effect of a bath, 
either cold or very hot. Few things are more stimulating than 
a Swedish bath. An attendant holds two hoses, one with cold 
water and the other with hot, and plays them alternately upon 
the patient. A man goes into such a bath with hanging head 
and dragging feet. He comes out with head erect and a new 
spring in his walk. Apparently, frequent changes of the tem- 
perature of the air produce much the same effect. No one 
change produces so pronounced an effect as a Swedish bath, 
but the succession of stimuli due to repeated changes through- 
out the year must be of great importance. 

Before leaving this subject, let us test the effect of changes 
in still another way. Let us see what happens during an 
average series of days such as make up our common succession 
of weather in New England. The ordinary course of events 
is first a day or two of clear weather, then a day or two of 
partly cloudy weather, next a cloudy day with or without rain, 
and finally another cloudy day during which rain falls. Then 
the sky clears in preparation for another similar series. On 
this basis I have formed the six groups indicated at the top of 
Figure 12. At the left, the efficiency on all clear days which 
follow cloudy or partly cloudy days has been plotted, just as 
in another diagram we plotted the efficiency on Mondays. Next 
come the clear days which follow another clear day. If sev- 
eral of these foUow in unbroken succession, they are all 
included, but a third or fourth clear day is rare. In the 



122 



CIVILIZATION AND CLIMATE 



next group come the partly cloudy days which follow 
either a clear or a cloudy day. The great majority follow 
clear days. A second partly cloudy day is much rarer than a 
second clear day, and a third is still rarer. The first cloudy 
day, the fifth column, includes cloudy days which follow either 
clear or partly cloudy days. Finally, the sixth column includes 
not only the second cloudy day, but the third and fourth if 
such are recorded. In general, this column represents days 



i 

I 



Q 



I 



a 

Si 



i 

•a 
I 
O 



^ 



i 

a 






a 

a 



Q 



Q 
I 



i 



i I 



i 




Q 




^ 


i 


>t 


1 




i 


s 


s 



i 



•a 
g 
6 

•a 

CM 



it 

a 

a 



a 
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(1) 



(2) 



(3) 



(4) 



Figure IS. The Stimulus of Storms 



(1) 00 Men at Bridgeport, 1910. 

(S) 00 Men at Bridgeport, August, lOll-July, 1019. 

(a) 170 Men and OirU at New Britain, 1018. 

(4) Weighted Average of (l), (S), and (8), Bqual to fOO People for One Year. 



WORK AND WEATHER 128 

when a storm comes to an end, while the one to the left of it 
represents the time when a storm first becomes well established. 
The rest of the diagram, to the right of the sixth column, is 
merely a repetition of the part already described. It is inserted 
to show how an ideal series of storms would repeat itself. 

Figure 12 discloses some surprising facts. For instance, the 
first clear day is characterized by the slowest work in the two 
upper curves and by almost the slowest in the third. Our im- 
pression of the stimulus of the bright, clear air after a storm 
receives a flat contradiction. It is apparently psychological, 
not physical. The second clear day makes a better showing 
than the first. It stands high in two curves, and low in only 
one. The first partly cloudy day is high in one curve, and 
medium in two. The second partly cloudy day is medium in 
all three. The same is true of the first cloudy day. The last 
cloudy day is as surprising as the first clear day. In each of 
the three curves it stands highest. People work fastest at the 
end of a storm. In the lower curve of Figure 12, the whole 
matter is summed up in a single line. Here we see that during 
an average ''spell of weather'' people are least efficient on the 
clear days ; moderately efficient on the partly cloudy days, and 
on the first cloudy day ; and most efficient at the end of a storm. 
We may tell ourselves that this is unreasonable, but when we 
think it over, we are likely to be aware of its truth. Before a 
storm we may feel depressed, but at the end, when the rain or 
snow is almost over and the air begins to have that excellent 
quality which makes us forget all about it, we bend to our 
work with a steadiness and concentration which are much less 
common at other times. Hellpach emphasizes this in his book 
on the psychological effect of geographical conditions. We 
fail to appreciate it largely because the esthetic impressions 
of a beautiful, clear day are felt much more consciously than 
are the physiological conditions which throw us vigorously into 
our work. Each storm, with its changing skies, varying 



124 CIVILIZATION AND CLIMATE 

humidity^ and slow rise and rapid fall of temperature, is a 
stimulant. Each raises our efficiency. 

We have now completed our survey of the effect of climate in 
the eastern United States. We have considered the influence 
of the seasons, of mean temperature, of humidity, of winds, of 
changes of temperature from day to day, and of the character 
of each day and its relation to storms. We have also seen that 
although different races, or people under decidedly diverse 
climatic environments, are at their best at slightly different 
temperatures, the differences are inconsiderable, and changes 
of temperature are as valuable to one as to the other. The 
question now arises whether the climatic effects are really of 
great importance. In Figure 12, the stimulus of the succession 
of clear and cloudy days amounts to only 1 per cent. In 
Figure 11 changes of temperature from day to day produce 
a variation of only a little over 2 per cent, if we omit the 
irregular and unreliable extremities of the curves. In Figure 4, 
the maximum effect of humidity appears to be only 8 per 
cent. In Figure 8, however, the differences are greater, for the 
effect of mean temperature upon the girls in Connecticut is 
7 per cent. Finally, in Figure 1, the effect of the seasons 
reaches nearly 9 per cent when four years are averaged, and 
nearly 15 per cent for individual years. 

These figures are far from representing the full importance 
of the various factors. This will readily appear from a little 
consideration. In the preceding paragraph, the percentages 
increase in proportion to two conditions, first, the degree to 
which the influence of a single factor is separated from the 
influence of all other factors, and second, the length of time 
during which each factor is able to exert its influence. The 
smallest figure, 1 per cent in Figure 12, does not represent 
any individual factor, unless it be cloudiness. It does not 
even represent the fluctuations which attend an individual 
storm, for the days were selected without regard to their posi- 



WORK AND WEATHER 126 

tion in a cyclonic disturbance, but simply according to their 
cloudiness. The variations shown in the curve are due to many 
factors, including mean temperature, changes of temperature, 
relative humidity, and others of minor importance. As no two 
of these are necessarily at their maximum at the same time, 
they neutralize one another. Moreover, a given condition lasts 
only a day in most cases, and so has no opportunity to produce 
any great effect. In the curve of changes of temperature from 
day to day, which shows the next larger effect, a single factor 
is singled out. Its full force can by no means be seen, however, 
for the humidity often varies in such a way as to neutralize it. 
Moreover, the effects of especially low or high temperatures 
may often completely overshadow any stimulus arising from 
the mere fact of a change. Furthermore, the effect of changes 
of temperature rarely continues more than two days. For 
example, if the thermometer averages six degrees lower on one 
day than on the preceding, it may happen that there will be a 
further drop before the next day, but there is far more chance 
that the temperature will rise a little or remain stationary, or 
fall so little that it will not be stimulating. Hence, the effect 
is rarely cumulative, and the influence of each single day must 
usually stand by itself. Much the same is true of relative 
humidity, except that by heating our houses we artificially 
induce long periods of great aridity. The effects of mean tem- 
perature, on the other hand, have greater opportunity to show 
their full importance, though they, too, are hampered. Rela- 
tively low or high temperatures last many weeks, which makes 
it possible for the effect of day after day to accumulate. Yet 
our curves by no means show the full effect, for a cold day with 
a mean temperature of 80^ may come in November at a time 
when efficiency is still at its highest. It produces its normal 
effect, but a single unpropitious day, or even a week, does not 
suffice to depress people's vitality to a degree at all approach- 
ing the low limit reached after two months of cold weather. 



126 CIVILIZATION AND CLIMATE 

Likewise, a day with the most favorable temperature, not far 
from 60**, may be sandwiched between very hot days in July, 
or between two cold days in March. Hence, people will dis- 
play little energy on those particular days, and the average 
efficiency at the optimum temperature will appear correspond- 
ingly lower than it ought. Finally, the seasons have more 
opportunity than the individual climatic elements to produce 
their full effect. Even here, however, the variability of our 
climate does not allow any special combination of circum- 
stances to work long unimpeded. Warm waves break the cold 
periods of winter, and cool waves come in summer. Storms are 
more active in winter than in summer, and hence their stimulus 
works towards overcoming the effect of prolonged cold. More- 
over, no single season is of great duration, and extreme con- 
ditions do not last long enough to produce their full effect. 
From all this we may conclude that the total influence of climate 
upon energy is much greater than appears in any one of our 
curves. 

The difficulty of determining the exact proportions of any 
individual influence may be made clear by an example. We 
know that man's power to work depends upon food, drink, 
sleep, and clothing. Suppose that while he was still supplied 
with these in normal quantities we were to try to measure the 
effect of each. We should test his strength at stated intervals 
after he had eaten his meals, or after he had had a drink. We 
should find out how many hours he slept each night and com- 
pare that with his work. We should measure his achievements 
before and after he put on his spring underwear or fall over- 
coat. We might get results, but it is highly doubtful whether 
they would be as distinct as those here discussed. We have no 
difficulty in measuring the effect of food, drink, sleep, and 
clothing, for we can easily vary them to suit the needs of our 
experiment. With climate the case is different. We must 
take it as we find it, and must experiment on people who are 



WORK AND WEATHER 127 

constantly subject to its influence. Some day we shall test 
people first in one climate and then in another, but that will 
be difficult because it takes a considerable time for climate to 
produce its full effect. Being obliged to search for the effects 
of climate without being able to change them in accordance with 
the needs of our experiment, we are in almost as difficult a case 
as the experimenter who should desire to determine the effect 
of the amount and kind of food consumed by a group of indi- 
viduals, but who had no control over how much they ate. They 
might allow him to measure what was set before them at each 
meal and what remained when it was over, but they would eat 
as much as they liked and when they liked. He would get 
results, if he did his work carefully, but they would by no 
means represent the full effect of food. 

The influence of climate upon men may be likened to that 
of a driver upon his horse. Some drivers let their horses go 
as they please. Now and then a horse may run away, but the 
average pace is slow. Such drivers are like an unstimulating 
climate. Others whip their horses and urge them to the limit 
all the time. They make rapid progress for a while, but in the 
end they exhaust their animals. They resemble climates which 
are always stimulating. In such climates nervous exhaustion 
is likely to prevail and insanity becomes common. A third type 
of drivers first whip their horse to a great speed for a mile or 
two, and then let them walk slowly for another mile or two. 
They often think that they are accomplishing great things, 
and they are better off than the two types already mentioned, 
but they still have much to learn. They are like a climate 
which has a strong contrast of seasons, one being favorable 
and the other unfavorable. Still a fourth kind of driver may 
whip his horse sometimes and sometimes let him walk, but what 
he does chiefly is to urge the animed gently with the voice, then 
check him a little with the rein. By alternate urging and 
checking he conserves the animal's strength, and in the long 



128 CIVILIZATION AND CLIMATE 

run can cover more distance and do it more rapidly than any of 
the others. Such a driver resembles a climate which has enough 
contrast of seasons to be stimulating but not to create nervous 
tension, and which also possesses frequent storms whose func- 
tion is to furnish the slight urging and checking which are so 
valuable in the total effect, although each individued impulse is 
almost unnoticeable. 



CHAPTER VII 
The Ideal Cumate 

We are frequently told that the Riviera or southern Cali- 
fornia has an ideal climate. Florida lays claim to it in winter, 
the Alps in summer. Two of the few regions which rarely assert 
their preeminence in this respect are Boston with its east winds 
and London with its fogs. Yet in many ways they have a 
strong claim to high rank. It all depends upon what we mean 
by ^Hdeal." For rest and recreation a warm, equable climate 
is doubtless most delightful ; for a fishing or climbing trip some- 
thing quite different is desirable. For most people the really 
essential thing in life is the ordinary work of every day. Hence, 
the climate which is best for work may in the long run claim to 
be the most nearly ideal. At least, it is the one which people 
will ultimately choose in the largest numbers. The few dis- 
agreeable features at certain seasons, provided they are not 
seriously injurious to health, are no worse than the shiver at 
the beginning of a cold plunge. 

On the basis of our factory operatives and students, the 
best climate would apparently be one in which the mean tem- 
perature never falls below the mental optimum of 88^, or rises 
above the physical optimum of 60 ^^ or possibly 66**. From 
this point of view the most ideal conditions would seem at first 
thought to be found where the temperature at all seasons 
averages not far from 50^, but this conclusion needs modifica- 
tion as will shortly appear. In four chief portions of the globe, 
the winter temperature averages not far from 88**, and that of 
summer not far from 60*^. The first of these is England. At 



180 CIVILIZATION AND CLIMATE 



London the thermometer averages 88 in January and 68 in 
July, while at Liverpool the figures are 89^ and 60^. If an 
average of 50*^ at all seasons were ideal, southwestern Ireland 
with a range from 45*^ to 69° and the Hebrides from 42^ to 
55^ would be more ideal than London. On the continent, where 
the seasonal variation is greater than in Britcdn, the length of 
the relatively unfavorable periods with temperatures above 60° 
and below 88^ also increases. 

A second region where the temperature conditions approach 
the ideal is the Pacific coast of the northern United States and 
southern British Columbia. Seattle, averaging 89° in Jan- 
uary and 64° in July has practically the same temperature as 
London. Southward the seasonal range decreases. San 
Francisco, averaging 49*^ in January and 59° in September 
after the cool summer fogs have passed away, may claim in 
many ways to be ideal. Still farther south the temperatures of 
Los Angeles and San Diego, 58° or 54° in January and 69° in 
August, fluctuate about the physical optimum and would be 
ideal for physical activity if mean temperature were the only 
criterion. The mental optimum, however, is lower than the 
temperature of all except the unusually cold days, and varia- 
tions from day to day are rare. A short distance inland the 
Califomian climate becomes less favorable than on the coast, 
for the average in summer at Fresno, for example, is 82°. 
Even though the heat is mitigated by low humidity, the con- 
tinuance of such high temperature causes people to feel indis- 
posed to activity. 

England and the Pacific coast owe their climatic excellence 
largely to the fact that ocean winds from the west blow freely 
over them. Two regions in the southern hemisphere enjoy the 
same advantage, namely. New Zealand and part of South Amer- 
ica, including southern Chili and portions of Patagonia. We 
are apt to think of these South American regions as sparsely 
settled places of little importance. This is true, for the pres- 



THE IDEAL CLIMATE 181 

ent, but it is not because the climate prevents activity. The 
climate, to be sure, is a drawback, but the harmful feature is 
not the temperature, but the rainfciQ. Plants, not man, are the 
chief sufferers. Unlike our other three regions, this part of the 
world has a deficient rainf €lQ except in the west, and there high 
mountains hinder settlement. In spite of this, the few small 
portions of Patagonia that permit profitable agriculture are 
making progress and would doubtless do so rapidly if not 
hampered by remoteness and the absence of railroads. 

It must not be inferred that the climates of Patagonia, New 
Zealand, England, and the Pacific coast of the United States 
are necessarily ideal. Mean temperature is not the only impor- 
tant factor. Among other things the relative humidity must 
be considered. The deficiency of moisture in Patagonia not 
only is disastrous economically, but, to judge from our factory 
operatives, it lessens man's energy. A similar effect is pro- 
duced by excess of moisture, and thus harm is done in Ireland 
and western Scotland, which would otherwise be almost as for- 
tunate as England. New Zealand, the central Pacific coast of 
North America, and England itself are sometimes unduly damp 
for long periods, but nevertheless enjoy a relative humidity of 
not far from 70 per cent much of the time. Other regions, 
however, such as the eastern United States and central Europe, 
seem to be more favored in this respect. 

The change of temperature from day to day, as we have 
seen, seems to be more important than relative humidity, and 
must accordingly be considered more fully. Its effect on human 
activity seems to be second only to that of the mean tempera- 
ture of the seasons. The intensity and number of daily changes 
depend upon two chief factors, first, the range of temperature 
from the warmest to the coldest part of the year, and second, 
the number of cyclonic storms. Where the winters are cold 
and the summers hot, the changes from day to day are also 
extreme. For instance in the Dakotas where the mean tempera- 



182 CIVILIZATION AND CLIMATE 

tures of January and July differ by 60^ F., a change of equal 
magnitude may take place in twenty-four hours. On the other 
hand, in a place like the Congo, where the difference between 
the coldest and warmest months is only three or four degrees, 
the days are correspondingly uniform. The whole matter is 
illustrated by maps in many physical geographies and in such 
publications as Bartholomew's Meteorological Atlas. The parts 
of the world where the change of seasons favors a highly advan- 
tageous degree of change from one day to the next include 
most of North America, but omit Florida, the Pacific coast of 
the United States, and the regions from the Mexican border 
southward. All of central and eastern Europe is also included 
except parts of Italy and Greece. A large area in North 
Africa and a small area in the south of that continent also 
rank high, as do central Australia and the part of South 
America which includes central Argentina. Finally, all except 
the southern parts of Asia lie within the high area. Thus this 
particular favorable condition occurs not only in many regions 
whose climate is also good from other standpoints, but in a 
much larger number whose general climatic conditions are 
decidedly unfavorable. This is not surprising, for the beneficial 
effect of pronounced changes of temperature from day to day 
is often nullified by great heat in summer or extreme cold in 
winter. Moreover, the seasonal range of temperature forms 
only one of the two factors which determine the amount of 
stimulation derived from changes of temperature from day to 
day. 

The other factor is the number of cyclonic storms. By this, 
as has already been explained, we mean the ordinary storms 
which produce our changes of weather from day to day in the 
United States and Europe. Possibly the storms are more 
important than the range of temperature from season to season, 
but until further data are available it seems wise to reckon the 
two as of equal value. The stormiest land of the world is the 



THE IDEAL CLIMATE 188 

Great Lakes region of the northern United States and south- 
em Canada. Around this center there is an area of great 
storminess extending southward approximately to Maryland 
and Kansas, and northwestward through the Dakotas to 
Alberta. Eastward it includes New England and the Mari- 
time Provinces, while northward it quickly disappears. To the 
south the storminess diminishes gradually, so that Florida has 
a moderate degree of variability in winter but not in summer. 
Southern California is the least stormy part of the United 
States. In Europe the very stormy regions include Britain, 
most of France, Germany, parts of Scandinavia and the north- 
em part of Italy, together with western Austria and the Baltic 
region. In Asia, Japan is the only place where cyclonic storms 
are at all in abundance. The lands of the southern hemisphere 
generally have few storms. New Zealand is the chief exception, 
although there they do not cause such great changes of tem- 
perature as in America and Europe. The extreme southern tip 
of South America is likewise stormy, but its storms do not cause 
much variability. On the contrary, they give rise to a monot- 
ony of wind and clouds which is extremely deadening, according 
to the testimony of those who have lived in such places as Tierra 
del Fuego or the Falkland Islands. Farther north, in central 
Argentina, there is a moderate number of storms, comparable 
to those in the southern United States, and their effect is 
distinctly favorable. 

We are now prepared to estimate the relative stimulating 
power of the various climates of the world. In England, for 
example, the mean temperature of the seasons and the degree 
of storminess are both highly favorable, while the seasonal 
changes are only moderate. Grermany is above medium in tem- 
perature, and high in seasonal changes and storminess. In this 
respect, it resembles the northeastern United States and south- 
em Canada. Japan is similar except that it is somewhat too 
warm and damp. The coast of British Columbia and the neigh- 



184 CIVILIZATION AND CLIMATE 

boring states is highly favorable in mean temperature, and 
medium in storminess and seasonal changes. Around San 
Francisco, the mean temperature is still better, but both sea- 
sonal changes and storms are mild. In compensation for this, 
however, there are frequent changes of temperature because 
fogs blow in from the ocean, and are quickly succeeded by 
the warm, bright weather which generally characterizes the 
interior. Farther south where the fogs cease, the conditions 
become less favorable from the point of view of the changes 
from one day to another, although the mean temperature of 
the seasons still remains advantageous. 

The chief defect of the climate of the California coast is that 
it is too uniformly stimulating. Perhaps the constant activity 
which it incites may be a factor in causing nervous disorders. 
When allowance is made for the fact that California's urban 
population is relatively smaller than that of states like Massa- 
chusetts and New York, insanity appears to be even more 
prevalent than in those states. Moreover, the cities of the Cali- 
fornia coast have the highest rate of suicide. In proportion 
to the population the number of suicides is greatest in San 
Francisco; then come San Diego and Sacramento; while 
Los Angeles and Oakland are exceeded only by Hoboken and 
Saint Louis. Possibly these facts may be connected with the 
constant stimulation of the favorable temperature and the lack 
of relaxation through variations from season to season and day 
to day, €dthough other factors may also play a part. The 
people of Cfidifomia may perhaps be likened to horses which 
are urged to the limit so that some of them become unduly 
tired and break down. 

In the same way the people of the eastern and central United 
States are more nervous and active than those of Europe — ^but 
not necessarily more efficient — ^because of still different climatic 
handicaps. They are alternately stimulated and relaxed by 
frequent changes from day to day, and in this are like horses 



THE IDEAL CLIMATE 186 

that are well driyen. In the spring and autumn, howeyer, the 
combined effect of ideal temperature and highly inyigorating 
daily changes spurs them to an astonishing degree of effort. 
Then comes the hot siunmer or the cold winter, either of which 
is debilitating. People do not diminish their activity at once, 
especially in the winter. They draw on their nervous energy, 
and thus exhaust themselves. They are like horses which pull 
on the bit, and when urged a little break into a run, straining 
themselves by their extreme speed. Then they are pulled up 
so suddenly that they are thrown back on their haunches and 
injured. In Grermany somewhat the same conditions prevail, 
although not to so great an extent. England apparently comes 
nearer to the ideal than almost any other place. The climate 
is stimulating at all times, both by reason of abundant storms 
and because of a moderate seasonal range. It never, however, 
reaches such extremes as to induce the nervous tension which 
prevails so largely in the United States. 

In strong contrast to these highly favored regions are such 
places as the center of Asia where the winters are depressingly 
cold and the summers unduly hot. The range from season to 
season is apparently helpful, but its good effects are largely 
nullified by the infrequency of storms. Day succeeds day with 
no apparent change. In the desert of Takla-Makan in Chinese 
Turkestan in the fall of 1905, I found that one of the most 
surprising features was the way in which winter came upon us 
unawares. Each morning the thermometer stood a trifle lower 
than the preceding morning, but there was never any change 
such as that which we so often experience in America when the 
first severe frost suddenly comes after a series of days as warm 
as summer. Frost at last began to prevail at night, but not 
until we found the water frozen hard in the morning did we 
realize that winter was upon us. So it goes, month after 
month, with deadening monotony. Yet when a storm does 
come the change is often much more extreme than in more 



186 CIVILIZATION AND CLIMATE 

oceanic regions. It is frequently so great that its value as a 
stimulus is much diminished. 

Tropical regions suffer even greater disadvantages than do 
places like the center of Asia. Not only is the temperature 
unfavorably high, but there are practically no cyclonic storms 
except in portions where a few hurricanes occur each year. 
Thunder storms, to be sure, are abundant, but they rarely 
bring any important change of temperature. Moreover, the 
seasonal range from the warmest to the coldest month is gen- 
erally less than the difference between day and night. Day 
after day displays no appreciable variation from its prede^ 
cessor. The uniformity of the climate seems to be more deadly 
than its heat. Such uniformity, even more than the high tem- 
perature and high humidity, is probably one of the most potent 
causes of the physical debility which affects so many white men 
within the tropics, and which manifests itself in weaknesses 
such as drunkenness, immorality, anger, and laziness. Even 
in tropical highlands the same deadening monotony prevails, 
although to a less degree than in the lowlands. Such monotony 
is perhaps the condition which will do most to prevent the white 
man from living there permanently for generation after gen- 
eration. His general health may not seem to suffer, but if he 
works hard he is in great danger of breaking down nervously. 
The temperature of the highlands may be highly stimulating. 
There are many places where the mean temperature during 
every month in the year is within a few degrees of the combined 
physical and mental optimum. At Quito in Ecuador, for exam- 
ple, the coldest month, November, averages 54.8** F., and the 
warmest months, February and September, 55**. If we are 
justified in associating a high rate of insanity on both the 
Atlantic and Pacific coasts of the United States with the pecu- 
liar climatic conditions, we should expect that white men in 
tropical regions at high altitudes would suffer still more in the 



THE IDEAL CLIMATE 187 

same way, or else would become inert, but no figures seem to be 
available to determine this point. 

We might proceed to discuss scores of ways in which a knowl- 
edge of the exact effects of climate may assist in the under- 
standing of historic events or help in guiding future develop- 
ment. Such discussions, however, are bound to be inconclusive 
until the world comes to a more definite agreement as to the 
exact physiological effect of climate upon normal human beings 
who are not under the influence of any specific disease or of 
any unusual circumstances except those which come in the 
ordinary course of everyday life. As a help in this direction 
let us construct a map of the world showing the degree of 
energy which we should expect among normal Europeans in 
various regions on the basis of climate. We have seen that 
the most important climatic factors are ( 1 ) the mean tempera- 
ture month by month, (2) the amount of change from one day 
to another, and (8) the relative humidity. The conditions 
which prevail at various seasons in the eastern United States 
duplicate those of almost every portion of the globe. There 
are hot, dry days like those of the Sahara ; hot, damp days like 
those in the Amazon forests ; cold days like those on the great 
ice-sheet of Greenland, and days of almost every other descrip- 
tion. At this point we must make an assumption which cannot 
be tested until vastly more data have been collected. Let us 
assume that the continuance of a given condition produces the 
same effect as its temporary occurrence. For example, in Con- 
necticut our measurements of the effect of days having a mean 
temperature of 75° are based on occasional days scattered 
through the summers of several years. Only in rare cases do 
four or five days of such extreme temperature follow in suc- 
cession without interruption by more moderate weather. The 
actual figures show that the first hot day does not greatly 
diminish people's energy, for the human body is able to resist 
for a while and to carry the impetus of previous good conditions 



188 CIVILIZATION AND CLIMATE 

into the first part of a bad period. After two or three days, 
however, the heat takes hold on people and makes them ineffi- 
cient, or even causes some to collapse. If such weather con- 
tinued for months we should become somewhat accustomed to it, 
and the period of collapse would be past. Just what the rate 
of work would then be we cannot yet determine. It would 
almost certainly be slower than on the first hot day, but it 
would probably be faster than on the third or fourth. Because 
of this uncertainty we are obliged for the present to assume 
that it would be equal to the average of a number of first days 
and a much smaller number of second, third, fourth, and so on. 
Having made this assumption, but recognizing that it needs 
testing, we may go on to construct our map. We must remem- 
ber that it is not supposed to be a map of the actual energy 
displayed by the people of various places, but of the energy 
that we should expect among Europeans if they lived in these 
places and were influenced as are the people of the eastern 
United States. 

In making such a map it is fortunate that the most impor- 
tant factor is also the one most carefully tabulated by climatolo- 
gists, and for which our investigations of energy give the most 
unequivocal results. The mean temperature for every month 
in the year is given for about 1100 stations in all parts of the 
world in Hann's "Klimatologie.** The second curve from the 
top in Figure 10, it will be remembered, shows the average 
efficiency of mind and body which would be expected at any 
given temperature on the basis of the work of operatives and 
students in Connecticut, New York, and Maryland. A table 
inserted as an appendix to this book shows the value for each 
degree of temperature according to the centigrade scale, the 
maximum being reckoned as 100. To determine the efFect of 
mean temperature upon human activity we simply take from 
Hann the mean temperature of each month, and then from the 
table in the Appendix, or from the curve in Figure 10, find the 



THE IDEAL CLIMATE 189 

corresponding relative efficiency. Then we add the values for 
all the months. If every month had an average temperature of 
50^» with a corresponding relative efficiency of 100, the efficiency 
for the place in question would be 1200. As a matter of fact 
this is never reached, but London stands at 1196.6, San Fran- 
cisco at 1198.6, and Quito in Ecuador at 1198.9. The worst 
place is Massaua near the southern end of the Red Sea, where 
the figure is 1070. 

The next process in constructing a map of climatic energy is 
to determine the effect of changes of temperature from day to 
day. Unfortunately exact statistics are not available in most 
regions, and we are obliged to employ an approximation. Since 
changes from day to day depend chiefly upon the seasonal range 
of temperature and the number of storms, I have combined the 
two, giving equ€d weight to each, and giving the two together 
approximately one half the weight assigned to seasonal tempera- 
ture. That is, the difference between Quito and Massaua, as 
stated in the last paragraph, is 128.9. This represents the 
maximum effect of the seasons, so far as the average tempera- 
ture is concerned. The maximum effect of the seasons as far as 
changes from day to day are concerned is reckoned as 80, and 
the maximum effect of storminess on the same basis is also 
reckoned as 80. Since highly extreme conditions are not favor- 
able, I have assumed that no seasonal change beyond 80^ C, 
or 64** F., is of value, and also that changes below — 7** C. 
(19.4** F.) or above 28*" C. (78.4** F.) are of no value. 
In other words, if the range from the mean temperature 
of the coldest to the warmest month is from below — 7** C. 
to above 28** C, it is reckoned as having a value of 80, 
just as it would be if — 7** were the lowest point and 28° 
the highest. If the range should be from 4** C. to 16° C, 
it would be reckoned as having a value of 12, while if it were 
from 20** C. to 28** C, the value would be only 8, because the 
extremely hot weather above 28° would scarcely be stimulating 



140 CIVILIZATION AND CLIMATE 

even if there were slight changes from day to day. In the 
same way extreme storminess does not produce an effect in 
proportion to the number of storms. One storm may succeed 
another so rapidly that the weather ceases to have sufficient 
variety, and becomes dull and lowering all the time. This is 
the case at Cape Horn, and also in certain parts of the North 
American Great Lakes region in winter. Accordingly a stormi- 
ness of 20 centers per year according to Kullmer's scale — 
which means far more than 20 itornu — ^is reckoned as the 
optimum. Greater storminess is held to have the same stimu- 
lating value as 20 centers, while everything lower is counted 
proportionally. The whole matter is so technical that it 
cannot be understood without reference to other publications 
which are mentioned in the Preface, and to a report which I 
hope to publish when fuller data are available. 

Humidity has not been considered, because the necessary 
figures are not available. In most of the cooler parts of the 
world it would make little difference, although a few unduly 
damp places like Ireland, or excessively dry regions like 
Chinese Turkestan would be lower than now appears. The chief 
difference would be in the warm portions of the world. Agra 
in northern India, for instance, now has a lower rank than 
Bombay and Calcutta, but if allowance were made for humidity 
this would probably be reversed, for Agra is pleasantly dry 
much of the year. The same reversal would probably occur 
between dry Khartum and wet Equatorville on the Congo. 
Arizona and other desert portions of the United States would 
also make a better appearance than on the present map. It 
must not be forgotten, however, that our data for New Eng- 
land show that extreme dryness does more harm than extreme 
humidity. This, however, does not apply to high temperatures. 
Under such conditions great humidity is undoubtedly most 
debilitating. Yet even when the air is hot, it may be too dry. 
In such a place as Death Valley in summer with the thermom- 



THE roEAL CLIMATE 141 



eter at 100 to 185 in the shade, it is ahnost impossible to 
drink enough water. to preserve normal physiological condi- 
tions. Even a brief period of physical activity gives rise to 
much discomfort, and people who stay through the summer 
are in danger of suffering permanent injury to health. 

Our knowledge of the effect of both extreme humidity and 
extreme dryness is unfortunately still qualitative rather than 
quantitative. Some day, however, exact figures for all the 
various climatic elements will be obtainable, and we shall con- 
struct a map showing the actual efficiency to be expected in 
every part of the world. It will be so accurate that the manu- 
facturer, for example, who contemplates establishing a factory, 
will be able to determine the precise efficiency of labor in the 
different places which he has in mind, and can put the matter 
into dollars and cents for comparison with the cost of trans- 
portation, raw materials, and other factors. 

Meanwhile, our map makes no claim to be more than a first 
approximation to the truth. Therefore no maps of individual 
continents are now presented, but merely a map of the world. 
Figure 18, and of the United States, Figure 20. In preparing 
these the figures for Hann's stations have been placed on the 
maps. Then a line has been drawn to include all places falling 
not more than 25 points below the possible maximum. These 
are ranked as ^Very high" and are shaded black. A second 
line includes places falling from 25 to 50 below the maximum, 
and the area thus delimited is ranked as ^^high," and shaded 
with heavy black lines. The next division, indicated by light 
lines, is ranked as ^^medium," and the values range from 50 to 
75 below the maximum. The area shaded with thickly scattered 
spots includes places ranging from 75 to 115 below maximum, 
and is coimted as low. The fifth division, shaded with widely 
scattered spots, is ^^very low," and ranges from 115 to 155. 
Finally, the hot desert areas which fall below 155 are left im- 
shaded, but if humidity were considered they would probably 



142 



CIVILIZATION AND CLIMATE 



rank as high as the wet parts of the tropics. Aside from the 
uiuhaded areas the general features of the map will probably 
remain unchanged even when the most accurate data are finally 
available. Undoubtedly, there will be variations in details, but 
a general map on a small scale, such as Figure 18, will not show 




Figure IS. The Distiibntlao of Human Eoergy »■> the BmIs of Climate 



differences which will materially influence our conclusions. In 
fact, whatever differences there will be, as far as they can be 
foreshadowed, will be in the direction of confirming our con- 
clusions, for Ireland will fall below En^and, southern India 
below northern, and the Congo re^on below the Egyptian 
Sudan. 

The roost noticeable feature of the map is two large black 
areas of "very high" energy in the United States and southern 



THE IDEAL CLIMATE 148 

Canada on the one hand, and in western Europe on the other. 
Each is surrounded by a heavily shaded ^^high^ area of large 
extent. The remaining high areas, four in number, are sur- 
prisingly limited. One lies chiefly in Japan. It is shown as 
extending into Korea, but the correctness of this is doubtful, 
for the records of storms in that region are imperfect. The 
second lies chiefly in New Zealand, but extends into Australia. 
The records of storms in this region have been published less 
fully than in Europe and America, but the general appearance 
of the map seems to be approximately correct. The third of the 
minor high areas is located in the southern part of South 
America. The records here are very imperfect, and the 
extent of the high area is doubtful. The reason for this imcer- 
tainty is not only that reliable records of storms are not 
abundant, but that the available data do not enable us to 
determine how much change from day to day is caused by the 
average storm. The amount of change must be slight com- 
pared with that experienced under similar circumstances in 
North America and Eurasia, because no part of the southern 
end of South America is far from the ocean. The fourth of 
the minor high areas lies along the Pacific coast of North 
America. As already stated, its southern portion owes its char- 
acter not to storms or seasonal changes, but to frequent breezes 
blowing in from the ocean. It extends only a short distance 
inland, and is too narrow to be prominent on the small-scale 
maps of this volume. 

In the far North human energy appears to decline more 
than would be expected. We know that population is scanty, 
and civilization low, but we commonly ascribe this to the diffi- 
culties of agriculture. Little can be demanded of people who 
must get a living by hunting and fishing. From the map, 
however, it appears that even if other circumstances were 
favorable we should not look for any great achievements. This 
accords with the slow, inefficient character of the Eskimos, and 



144 CIVILIZATION AND CLIMATE 

of the Ostiaks and other inhabitants of northern Siberia. 
Grenfell in his book on Labrador says that the Eskimo ^^cannot 
compare with the Newfoundland white fishermen for per- 
severance and ^snap.' An Eskimo does not get one fish for the 
other's ten." This happens even when the Eskimo is in his 
native habitat, and is doing work to which he has been trained 
from childhood. Racial inheritance may have much to do with 
this, but the testimony of white men is that after a long stay 
in the Arctic they themselves lose ambition and energy. 

At the other extreme of climate the regions within thirty 
degrees of the equator seem to be characterized by essentially 
the conditions that we should expect. The status of the 
highlands is striking. A high degree of energy among white 
men would not be expected permanently in any of them. We 
are often told that the climate of tropical highlands is as fine 
as any in the world. Not infrequently people are urged to 
colonize such regions. In book after book we read that there 
is not the slightest reason why the white man should not live 
there as well as at home. I do not assert that this may not be 
possible. In fact, I strongly hope that some day it will come 
to pass. Nevertheless, our map seems to indicate that previous 
to any such desirable consummation we must greatly increase 
our knowledge of how to adapt ourselves to nature, or rather 
of how to adapt nature to man. At present, while the white 
man may learn to preserve his health in tropical regions, he can 
scarcely expect to retain the vigor which he displays in the more 
favored parts of Europe. 

The most unexpected feature of the map is the diminution of 
energy as one proceeds eastward from western Europe to 
central Asia. In the deserts of Turkestan and Mongolia, and 
especially in the Tibetan highland, the map should probably 
show lower conditions than are actually depicted, but as records 
are not available, the medium shading has been extended across 
the whole of the unknown area. Before making the studies 



THE IDEAL CLIMATE 146 

here described I should have said that a man in Siberia could 
be as efficient as in far western Russia in the same latitude. 
Yet the Baltic Provinces are very high in climatic energy, while 
eastward there is a steady decline until only medium conditions 
are reached. The reason is readily apparent. In the first 
place, the Siberian winter is colder and longer than that of the 
region near the Baltic Sea. More important than this, however, 
is the decline in storminess as one passes eastward across Russia 
into Siberia. The cyclonic centers of low pressure, which con- 
stitute storms, are either broken up when they approach Asia 
in winter, or else swing out toward the sea to avoid the great 
area of high barometric pressure which lies over the continent 
during the cold season. Hence, during midwinter the far 
interior is characterized by clear and extremely cold weather, 
not hard to bear, but steadily benumbing. In the spring and 
autumn, on the other hand, storms are fairly frequent, and are 
often of most terrific intensity. The burans, as they are called, 
are even worse than our western blizzards, which are the same 
thing imder another name. They destroy cattle and horses by 
the thousand, and human beings often perish within a hundred 
yards of their houses. Only when the burans are at an end 
and the milder storms of the late spring and summer prevail 
does Siberia enjoy a highly stimulating climate. 

The conditions just described afFord an interesting commen- 
tary on the common idea that the plains of Siberia are to be the 
scene of a wonderful development of European civilization 
during the next few centuries. I formerly shared this opinion, 
but have now been obliged to modify it. While this chapter was 
being written I spoke of this change of opinion to a Russian 
friend who has come to America for the sake of greater freedom. 
"Yes," he said, "that is just what the exiles say. I have many 
friends who are exiles. When they are sent to Siberia they take 
books with them and expect to do much work in writing and 
along other lines. Some plan to carry on linguistic studies. 



146 CIVILIZATION AND CLIMATE 

and some to make various other kinds of scientific investigations, 
but they ahnost never do it. They say that at first they begin 
to work with great vigor, but after a year or two their energy 
declines. They have the desire to work, but do not seem able 
to do BO. They attribute this to being so far from home, and 
to the lack of stimulating contact with civilization. I think 
there may be more to it than that, for they seem to lose their 
energy.** 

Nansen, in his recent book ^^Through Siberia: The Land of 
the Future," emphasizes this point. He frequently speaks of the 
slowness and inertia which he encountered. Here per acre the 
Siberians raise far smaller crops than the Norwegians, and 
the main reason assigned by Nansen is lack of care, fore- 
thought, and energy in cultivating and fertilizing the soil. 
**There is no hurry here," he says, "Siberia is still a country 
that has a superabundance of time, as of everything else ; they 
may think themselves lucky for having so far escaped the 
nervous stress that we know too well in Europe." He also 
quotes Rodishev, one of the most enlightened members of the 
Duma, who sums up his impressions of a journey in Siberia with 
the statement that the Siberians are "a people without enter- 
prise or initiative." 

This suggests that the Russian autocracy has accomplished 
its purpose more fully than it realizes. It has not only exiled 
many of its most thoughtful and active people, but has sent 
them to a place where not only do the isolation and hardships 
diminish their power, but where nature insidiously accomplishes 
exactly the kind of repression that the authorities desire. From 
the standpoint of climate, without respect to the many other 
factors which may cause quite other results, the relative posi- 
tions of Russia and Siberia do not seem likely to change. Both, 
we may rightly hope, are destined to advance far beyond their 
present position, but while there is reason to think that western 
Russia may approach the standard of western Europe, Siberia 



THE IDEAL CLIMATE 147 

suffers from a handicap which may never let her overtake the 
Baltic portions of the great northern empire. 

Turning to China, we find that the summers are often debili- 
tatingly hot, with a steady, damp heat that is apt to be 
trying. The winters, on the other hand, are by no means so 
long as in Siberia, nor so severe. Yet they are far worse than 
in western Europe, and as bad as in any part of the United 
States. Cold waves often sweep down from the north, and are 
so severe that instead of being stimulants, they are depressing 
in regions like Peking. In the south, however, they are bene- 
ficial. Everywhere cyclonic storms are rare, so that there is 
no stimulus of great importance from that source. This is one 
of the chief reasons why China does not stand high on the 
energy map. The northern parts of the country are more 
favored than those in the south or in the far interior, but the 
difference is not great. Indeed, the uniformity of all parts is 
surprising. The disadvantages of high temperature in the 
south are balanced by those of low in the north. If China were 
part of a smaller continent her nearness to the moderating 
influence of the sea would help her much more than is now the 
case. All through the winter she is under the benumbing con- 
trol of the vast continent to the west, which not only sends out 
severe cold waves, but prevents the passage of storms. Japan, 
on the contrary, does not suffer so much in this way. Extremes 
of temperature are less than in China, and stimulating storms 
are frequent. Her greatest drawback is the long period of hot, 
damp weather in summer. Nevertheless she stands high. Here 
we must bring our review of the map of climatic energy to a 
close. We shall come back to it again when we have studied the 
distribution of civilization. 



CHAPTER Vin 
The Dibtubution of Civiijzation 

Doubtless the reader has already noticed the striking resem- 
blance between the distribution of climatic energy and of civili- 
zation. Look again at Figure 18 and see how the black areas 
agree with the places of highest culture. In view of this it 
seems advisable to construct a map of civilization to serve as a 
standard of reference. Only two methods appear feasible. One 
is by statistics ; the other on the basis of opinion. Both present 
grave difficulties. The statistical method will ultimately prove 
far the better, but it may not be practicable for centuries. For 
a fair estimate of the position of a country we need accurate 
statistics of education, morality, industry, inventions, scientific 
and artistic skill, wealth, pauperism, charity, crime, and many 
other aspects of human life which will readily suggest them- 
selves. No reliable figures for many of these things have ever 
been gathered in any part of the world ; no statistics for any of 
them have ever been gathered in many countries. Statistically 
it is almost impossible to c(»npare Afghanistan, for example, 
with Kamchatka. Even where accurate statistics are available, 
the methods of compiling them are often so diverse as to make 
comparisons misleading. We may know exactly how many 
people are arrested and convicted for theft in half a dozen 
countries, but in one country the police may be so inefficient 
that few criminals are apprehended, while in another practi- 
cally every thief may be caught. Thus the better may easily 
appear the worse. The only way to use statistics at present 
seems to be as a check upon the other method. We can select 



THE DISTRIBUTION OF CIVILIZATION 149 

some country so extensive that its various parts differ decidedly, 
but sufficiently homogeneous so that the figures for all portions 
are comparable. Since the United States meets these conditions 
better than any other country we shall examine its statistics 
in several cases, and shall use them as a test of a map prepared 
on the basis of opinion. 

For a map of the civilization of the entire world we must rely 
on the opinion of well-informed persons, but we shall find that 
this agrees closely with the indications of statistics. The value 
of a map based on personal opinion depends partly on our defi- 
nition of civilization and partly on our confidence in the judg- 
ment of the persons in question. Even the best and broadest 
experience does not eliminate personal or racial bias. There- 
fore, the only safe course is to obtain the opinions of many 
people belonging to different races and ruled by different ideals. 
Accordingly, in the autumn of 1918 I asked over two hundred 
people in twenty-seven countries to help in preparing a map. 
Most fortunately this was before the great war broke out. 
Good feeling prevailed everywhere, and among men of sound 
judgment there was perhaps as little racial prejudice as at 
any time during the course of history. This is especially im- 
portant because similar conditions may not prevail again for 
years. 

The persons whose assistance was asked were selected for 
various reasons. The larger number were geographers whose 
first duty is to know all parts of the world. Ethnologists in 
considerable numbers were included for the same reason, but 
they responded less freely than the geographers. Historians, 
diplomats, colonial officials, travelers, missionaries, editors, 
educators, and business men were all included. The only cri- 
terion was that each person should possess an extensive knowl- 
edge of the world through personal knowledge, or, in a few 
cases, through reading. Some were selected because of knowl- 
edge of special regions not well known to most people and only 



160 CIVILIZATION AND CLIMATE 

reached by extensive travel. To all these many kinds of people, 
numbering 218 in all, I sent the following letter: 

**May I ask your cooperation in the preparation of a map 
showing the distribution of the higher elements of civilization 
throughout the world? My purpose is to prepare a map 
which shall show the distribution of those characteristics which 
are generally recognized as of the highest value. I mean by 
this the power of initiative, the capacity for formulating new 
ideas and for carrying them into effect, the power of self- 
control, high standards of honesty and morality, the power to 
lead and to control other races, the capacity for disseminating 
ideas, and other similar qualities which will readily suggest 
themselves. These qualities find expression in high ideals, 
respect for law, inventiveness, ability to develop philosophical 
systems, stability and honesty of government, a highly devel- 
oped system of education, the capacity to dominate the less 
civilized parts of the world, and the ability to carry out far- 
reaching enterprises covering long periods of time and great 
areas of the earth's surface. 

^*In preparing such a map it is evident that statistics may 
afford much assistance, but they need to be supplemented. They 
touch only upon material things in most cases, and none are 
available for a large part of the world. Therefore, our best 
resource is the personal opinion of competent judges. Accord- 
ingly, I am asking a hundred geographers, anthropologists, 
and other persons of wide knowledge, whether they are willing 
to take the time to divide the regions indicated in the accom- 
panying list into ten groups according to the criteria mentioned 
above. Group 10 will include regions of the very highest char- 
acter, that is, those where the greatest number of valuable qual- 
ities are found in high degree. Group 1 will include those 
which are lowest in these respects. On the basis of this group* 



THE DISTRIBUTION OF CIVILIZATION 161 

ing I shall determine the average position of each region and 
shall prepare a map accordingly. 

^*The purpose of such a map is threefold. In the first place, 
it will prove intrinsically interesting to a large number of 
people, and is likely to arouse considerable discussion. In the 
second place, in all geographical, historical, sociological, and 
economic discussions it seems to me that we need a clearer, 
stronger emphasis upon hmnan character, that is, upon the 
mental and moral qualities which dominate the civilization of 
the various nations. If this is so, it is highly important, in the 
third place, that we should determine much more fully than has 
yet been the case how far various moral and mental qualities 
are influenced by physical environment, race, historical develop- 
ment, biological variations, and other causes. In order to 
determine these things we need a map which shall serve at least 
approximately as a standard of reference. In discussing the 
influence of such things as racial character, differences of reli- 
gion, social institutions, modem means of communication, the 
form of the land, the relation of land and sea, variations of 
climate and the like, we shall be able to gain much light by 
comparing their distribution with that of human character as 
it now exists according to a consensus of expert opinion. 

*^The matter can best be illustrated by outlining a specific 
purpose to which I mean at once to apply the proposed map. 
[Here follows a brief description of the map of human energy 
on the basis of factory work.] 

^^I recognize that those to whom this letter is sent will say 
at once that they are not sufficiently familiar with all parts of 
the world, and that they have no means of distinguishing be- 
tween different parts of China, for example, or between the 
different portions of equatorial Africa. This is certainly true, 
but it must be remembered that the classification is very rough. 
It is only desired that the one hundred and eighty-five names on 
the enclosed list be divided into ten groups, no group to contain 



152 CIVILIZATION AND CLIMATE 

less than fifteen names or more than twenty-one, and each 
preferably to contain eighteen or nineteen. It may not be easy 
to determine whether all of the divisions of France, for example, 
fall in the first group, but it is perfectly evident that none of 
them will fall in the fifth or lower. The chief thing is to place 
them as nearly as possible in their proper group according to 
one's own personal opinion. A given region may properly fall 
in the fifth group, but the purpose of this classification will not 
be defeated if it is placed in either the fourth, fifth, or sixth, 
for when the opinions of one hundred persons are averaged, 
individual idiosyncrasies will disappear. In view of the varying 
degrees to which each individual is familiar with the different 
regions of the world, I should be glad if each contributor would 
underline the names of regions with which he is well acquainted 
either by travel or reading, and would place question marks 
after the names of regions as to which his knowledge is espe- 
cially deficient. Names not underlined or questioned will be 
considered as intermediate. The three grades of familiarity 
thus indicated will be weighted in the ratios of 8, 2, 1. [This 
has not been done, partly because only about half of the con- 
tributors made the division into three grades, and partly be- 
cause the final results are not appreciably changed by using the 
unweighted values.] The grade of the various regions should 
be indicated by underlining or questioning the names upon the 
small slips mentioned below, but may be done upon the accom- 
panying list if that is more convenient, but in that case please 
be sure to return the list. For convenience of classification I 
enclose slips containing the names of the different divisions. 
These may be spread out upon a table and arranged in ten 
columns and shifted from column to column until an approxi- 
mately satisfactory arrangement is reached. When thus 
arranged those of each colmnn should be placed in the corre- 
sponding envelope of the ten here enclosed, and all may be 



THE DISTRIBUTION OF CIVILIZATION 168 

mailed in the large addressed envelope. Envelope ten is for 
the highest group, and one for the lowest. 

*^In making the classification, one or two points need to be 
borne in mind. In the first place, the past should not be con- 
sidered: Greece, for example, should be placed in the group 
where its condition during the past one hundred years would 
place it without reference to its ancient greatness. In the 
second place, if two races inhabit a given region, both must be 
considered, and the rank of the region must depend upon the 
average of the two, giving each one a weight proportional to 
the number of people. For instance, in a state such as Greorgia 
where nearly half the people are negroes, they must receive 
half the weight. Still another point is that the rank of a 
country can often be determined by considering the position 
which its people take when they migrate elsewhere. For 
instance, the position of Syrians as compared with Grermans 
when they migrate to England or the United States is a fair 
criterion as to the relative merits of the two races. After the 
first generation, however, this should not be applied, for the 
younger generation owes much of what it is to the new country. 
A final point concerns countries which are poor in natural 
resources, or which are not located in the main centers of the 
world's activity, but which are nevertheless of high character. 
For example, so far as importance in the affairs of the world 
is concerned, England vastly outranks Scotland. Nevertheless, 
our estimate of the greatness of England owes much to the 
large number of Scotchmen who have gone out to build up the 
British Empire. Therefore, in estimating the relative merits of 
Scotland and England, the matter of size or even of commercial 
importance should receive relatively little consideration, whereas 
the character and ability of the people as rulers, merchants, 
scientists, writers, and men of all sorts should have a predomi- 
nating weight. 

^^In publishing the final results I should be glad if I might 



164 CIVILIZATION AND CLIMATE 

print the names of those who have contributed, but of course this 
must be as each individual may choose. The individual lists will 
not be published, and will be treated as confidentiaL I judge 
that other contributors will feel, as I do, that their classifica* 
tions are of necessity so imperfect that they do not care to dis- 
tribute them to the world at large. Hence, while the list of con- 
tributors will be published unless the contributors prefer other- 
wise, their individual opinions will be withheld. I hope, how- 
ever, to publish a list showing the average rank of each country 
and the range of opinion between those who put it highest and 
those who put it lowest. Inasmuch as the plan here outlined 
depends upon the cooperation of many contributors, no single 
individual can in any respect be held responsible for features of 
the final map which do not meet his approval. 

*^^In addition to the general list of divisions, I enclose a set 
of cards bearing the names of the states of the United States, 
and of the provinces of Canada. Would you be willing to 
arrange these in groups and place them in the proper envelopes, 
employing the same method as for the larger divisions ? Group 
1 will be the states or provinces which are least progressive, 
or least influential, so far as the general character of their 
citizens is concerned, and Group 6 the highest. Each group 
should contain about ten names. The object of this you see 
is to make a map of the United States and southern Canada on 
the same basis as that of the world, but on a more minute scale. 

**The rough grouping here suggested ought not to take more 
than a few hours' time. Many days, to be sure, might be devoted 
to it, but the added accuracy thus gained would not be sufiicient 
to make it worth while. If you can give the necessary time at 
your earliest convenience I shall be most grateful. If you 
cannot, would you be willing to return the list, the slips, and the 
envelopes in order that I may ask someone else to do it in your 

* This paragraph was included only in the letters sent to Americans and 
to one or two Europeans especially familiar with America. 



THE DISTRIBUTION OF CIVILIZATION 166 

place? Whether you contribute or not, I shall take pleasure in 
sending you copies of the final results. Trusting that I may 
hear from you soon, I am 

"Very truly yours, 

"Ellswoeth Huntington/' 

Replies were received from 187 persons, while others sent 
copies of their publications, so that an answer of some sort came 
from about three fourths of those addressed. The majority 
of the remaining fourth were foreigners to whom a six-page 
letter in English might appear formidable. About 90 per cent 
of the English and Americans sent replies, which is a very large 
proportion as such things go. I am convinced that the rest 
failed to answer chiefly because the classification required more 
time and was more difficult than I at first realized. The fact 
that classifications continued to be received for an entire year 
indicates that many meant to answer, but put my letter aside 
for a more convenient season which never arrived. A third of 
those who replied, fifty-four to be exact, actually made classi- 
fications, and all but two or three conformed so closely to the 
general plan that it has been possible to use them. The names 
of the contributors are given in the Appendix. I take this 
opportunity to express the warmest appreciation of their kind- 
ness in cooperating so cordially. Not only their classifications, 
but their letters were of the highest value and in many cases 
contained suggestions which have been of great assistance in 
preparing this volmne. The same is true of many letters from 
persons who did not contribute, but who took pains to explain 
their reasons and to suggest ways in which my plan might be 
improved. Except where direct quotations are employed I 
have not attempted to acknowledge my indebtedness for various 
ideas which distinctly modify the tenor of these pages. This 
is partly because the same thought was often expressed by 



166 CIVILIZATION AND CLIMATE 

several persons, and partly because in many cases I cannot tell 
from which of several letters an idea was derived. Except in a 
single instance I have also refrained from mentioning names, 
because where so many have contributed materials of great 
value, it might seem invidious to mention some and not others. 
Therefore, I can merely express my gratitude to all concerned. 
The net result of this attempt at scientific cooperation among 
men of many races and tongues leaves a strong impression of 
the spirit of fellowship and friendly helpfulness among men of 
many interests in all portions of the world. 

The countries represented in the final classification and the 
number of contributors are as follows : Australia 1, Canada 1, 
Norway 1, Sweden 1, Switzerland 1, Russia 1, Spain 1, Portu- 
gal 1, France 2, Italy 2, Japan 8, China 8, Grermany 5, Great 
Britain 7, and the United States 24. The number of Chinese 
and Japanese is particularly gratifying. The ratio between 
the number of contributors and the number to whom letters 
were sent is higher among them than among any other main 
group except the Americans, as may be seen in the Appendix. 
It is to be regretted that no one from India or South America 
cooperated, and only one, a Russian, from the European coun- 
tries east of Grermany. 

The difficulty of making the classification is considerable. 
Several contributors spoke of spending an entire day upon it, 
or of taking out the slips time after time to arrange them more 
satisfactorily. Some said that they spent two entire days upon 
it. All seemed impressed by the way in which a systematic 
classification of this kind brings out the weak spots in a man's 
knowledge. For instance, here is the way in which one con- 
tributor expressed himself: 

^^One appreciates what a big world this is and how little one 
knows about it when he attempts such a task as you have set. 
It is a most excellent means of taking the conceit out of one." 



THE DISTRIBUTION OF CIVILIZATION 167 

Another puts it in this way : 

'*! must confess that it is the most difficult and one of the 
most humiliating games I have ever tried to play! I always 
knew I was a fraud as a President of a Geographical Society, 
but I never knew before how great was my deception! The 
greatest difficulty I found lay through my ignorance of the 
proportion of the different races inhabiting a district." 

An interesting feature of the letters was the diversity of 
opinion as to the advisability of any such classification of coun- 
tries. To take the adverse opinions first, one of my best friends, 
an American geographer, put the matter very strongly : 

**I am complying with your request for a sorting of the slips 
you sent me. It is a very bad plan, and not, I think, of value. 
Indeed I am not sure that I would have done it for anyone else 
than you.^ 



99 



I am glad to say that later he expressed a much less severe 
opinion. Another geographer, a Teutonic European, speaks 
most cordially in part of his letter, but comes out bluntly in 
opposition to this particular plan : 

^^I am wholly unable to take part in this work. I take your 
scheme as a failure ... I guess you are here, like some other 
Americans, imder the influence of a too systematizing spirit. 
It seems to me impossible to classify mankind by this simple 
method." 

Still a third, an American anthropologist, is equally uncom- 
promising: 

^^Speaking frankly I do not conceive that the method you 
suggest is possible of scientific results. One must choose 
between statistics which are definite and mere judgments which 
are general. To apply the geographic method to a compound 
of statistics and loose generalization may be productive of 
grave error." 



168 CIVILIZATION AND CLIMATE 

And a fourth, also an American anthropologist, expresses 
himself as follows : 

^*It has been my endeavor, in my anthropological studies, to 
follow the same principles that are laid down for natural 
sciences ; and the first condition of progress is therefore to elim- 
inate the element of subjective value; not that I wish to deny 
that there are values, but it seems to me necessary to eliminate 
the peculiar combination of the development of cultural forms 
and the intrusion of the idea of our estimate of their value, 
which has nothing to do with these forms. It seems to my mind 
that in doing so these obtain subjective values, which in them- 
selves may be the subject of interesting studies, but which do 
not give any answer to the question that you are trying to 
solve," 

Another anthropologist, this time a European, at the end of 
a particularly long and suggestive letter, expresses himself 
thus: 

^^Taking all that I have written here into consideration, I 
think that if we were going to grind all the diiFerent regions of 
your long list in the same statistical mill, and to try to compute 
an average, a highly improbable and fantastic result would be 
obtained. For my own edification I put some of your criteria 
to the test, though in a different way. I drew up a list of twelve 
characteristics of the ^highest value,' in which I included sense 
for beauty in literature {beUea lettrea) and a few others, and 
then distributed them to eleven different regions of the globe. 
My familiarity with those regions by a long sojourn or travel 
and reading, covers a lifetime. To each characteristic for each 
region I assigned a number, from 1 to 10. I then added the 
different values or points to try to find a ratio, which might be 
called 4ndex of civilization.' I give it vdeat quantwm valere 
potest.** 



THE DISTRIBUTION OF CIVILIZATION 159 

The table possesses so many points of interest that it is 
inserted below. At the end I have added a column showing the 
rank of the various regions according to all the contributors, 
as computed according to the system presently to be outlined. 
If the plan embodied in this table could be carried out on a 
large scale, it would undoubtedly be better than mine. The 
difficulty is that it requires a vast amount of work and a 
degree of familiarity with the various peoples of the earth which 
is found only among a few exceptional students who can almost 
be counted on the fingers. In course of time we may perhaps 
hope for a map based on some such minute study of hmnan 
nature. Yet when it is before us, there is every reason to think 
that its general features, with which alone we are concerned in 
this book, will be almost identical with those of the map which 
we shall shortly consider. The reasons for this will be given 
later. 

One important point stands out in this table. I have given 
too little weight to the esthetic side of human nature. In fram- 
ing a definition of civilization I consciously thought of art in 
all its forms, but it seemed as if this were included in ^Hhe 
capacity for formulating new ideas and for carrying them into 
effect," just as science is meant to be included. Moreover, the 
course of history seems to show that every nation which rises 
high in other respects sooner or later experiences a period of 
high development in art, architecture, literature, and science. 
Nevertheless, these things should have received more specific 
recognition in my definition. 

To turn now to the other side of the question, those who 
believe in the utility of the plan presented in my letter naturally 
do not feel the necessity of stating their reasons. Nevertheless, 
a considerable number take pains to express approval. For 
instance, a widely traveled Englishman thinks that ^Hhere are 
tremendous possibilities in all such attempts." An American, 
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THE DISTRIBUTION OF CIVILIZATION 161 

^Termit me to say how heartily I thank you for engaging in 
this enterprise. Despite any and all sympathetic or hostile 
criticism of such a work, or the cheap and hasty or really valu- 
able appraisal likely to be made, such a scheme will be invalu- 
able to all students of human progress." 

Another American, who has spent a large part of his life in 
the Orient, is of the opinion that : ^^It is a fascinating and very 
significant set of standards by which you have asked us to group 
the regions. From the time I started after lunch until now, 
late in the evening, I have done nothing else. But there is more 
than fascination. There is a very deep issue involved, and I am 
glad to share in the construction of the map and the charts you 
are aiming to devise." 

One of the fairest estimates of both the advantages and dis- 
advantages of the plan is contained in a letter from ^^Ambassa- 
dor" Bryce, as we Americans still like to call him. With his 
permission I quote it in full. 

^^Your idea is ingenious and interesting, and I should much 
like to see how it works out, though it seems to me, on first 
impressions, that the various factors involved are so many and 
so complex that the visual presentation you contemplate would 
need an amount of comment and explanation which would 
require something like a treatise to accompany the map. You 
give one instance in the case of the state of Georgia. Another 
might be found in the other Greorgia, south of the Caucasus, 
where besides the native Georgians (Karthli) there are Arme- 
nians, Tartars, and Russians, not to speak of minor races. Or 
take Japan. If one were to think of the educated and ruling 
Japanese and the sort of civilization they have created one 
would make a rating quite inapplicable to the ordinary Japan- 
ese. Without therefore doubting that by means of a map pre- 
sentation very interesting results may be obtained, I should 



162 CIVILIZATION AND CLIMATE 

think that some modifications would be needed. ^Efficiency' is 
a very complex conception. 

'^If I had time I should like to try to think further about the 
scheme, and lend what aid I could to it ; but unfortunately I am 
so fuUy occupied by trying to finish a book for the sake of 
which I retired from the Embassy at Washington that I am, 
to my regret, unable to cooperate with you. I shall be grateful 
for any information as to the results you can send me if you 
have leisure." 

P. S. [dated two weeks after the letter]. 

^^I have kept the papers some weeks in order to see if I could 
help you. I have dealt with the states and provinces of the 
United States and Canada, though roughly. But I have found 
the difficulty of any adequate arrangement of the extra-Euro- 
pean world in point of efficiency impossible in respect of the 
extraordinary mixture of races. Turkey and India are nuts 
too hard to crack ; ... In South America it would be easier, 
because the races are really so mixed that a new race results. 
But in India they live side by side and are quite difFerent. 
[Here follows a classification of South America.] It is quite 
interesting and makes one think. But after all it is the natural 
race divisions rather than territorial divisions that count every- 
where outside western Europe. Even in Russia and the 
Balkans, race doesn't correspond to territory." 

These various letters give a good idea of the general opinion 
of the attempted classification. As an illustration of the diffi- 
culties to be overcome, let me quote from an Italian contributor, 
an anthropologist: ^'What is the standard of these various 
civilizations? Yours, as it seems to me, is an European one, 
and this, I think, is a very limited one and cannot solve the 
problems." A similar objection is expressed in a letter from an 
English anthropologist. Quoting from my letter, he says: 



THE DISTRIBUTION OF CIVILIZATION 168 

** ^The power of self-control, high standards of honesty and 
morality, . . . high ideals, respect for law' are eminently char- 
acteristic of many savage and barbarian peoples, notably the 
North American Indians, and in my opinion these latter stand 
very much higher than the average American citizen, but the 
latter lead in ^the power to lead and control other races, and 
capacity for disseminating ideas . . . inventiveness, highly 
developed systems, etc.' 



»9 



I recognize the force of these comments. Races certainly 
differ greatly, even though they happen to dwell in the same 
physical environment. Moreover, people of a given race who 
live under the same environment may differ widely because of 
diversity in religion, government, or institutions. Furthermore, 
the definition of civilization here presented does not pretend to 
be perfect. It is a European definition. Yet it is also a world- 
wide definition. The contemplative Hindu may perhaps be a 
higher type than the aggressive citizen of western Europe, but 
the contemplative type has made relatively little impression 
upon the world as a whole. If we turn to antiquity, the people 
who have left their impress are those who had this so-called 
European activity. The Greeks and Romans had it to a 
marked degree. The people of India had something of it when 
they wrote the ^^Vedas." Gautama had it when he founded the 
Buddhist religion. He was contemplative, but yet he had the 
qualities expressed in our definition. He was preeminently 
possessed of ^^high ideals, respect for law, inventiveness [in the 
broad, non-technical sense], ability to develop philosophical 
systems, and the capacity to dominate the less civilized parts of 
the world." He dominated through ideas, not force. The Jews 
had this same power. Such men as Saint Paul, although not 
aggressive in the ruder European sense, were unsurpassed in 
^Hhe power of initiative, the capacity for formulating new 
ideas and for carrying them into effect, the power of self- 



164 CIVILIZATION AND CLIMATE 

control, high standards of honesty and morality, the power to 
lead and control" and ^Hhe capacity for disseminating ideas." 
The reason for regarding the standard here set forth as Euro- 
pean is that Europe is today its great exponent. In the past, 
however, not only did Rome, Greece, Palestine, and even north- 
ern India possess it, but Egypt, Mesopotamia, and Carthage all 
displayed it. China, too, in her days of early greatness, and 
the wonderful Maya people of Yucatan, the only ones to 
develop the art of writing in America, were animated by the 
same active, stirring, "European" qualities. That is why we 
remember them, but have forgotten most of their contempo- 
raries. 

Granting that our definition of civilization is imperfect, but 
admitting that it includes the qualities which are of greatest 
importance in causing a nation to impress itself upon the world, 
let us now proceed to ascertain how these qualities seem to be 
distributed. The fifty contributors whose classifications could 
be used have been divided into five divisions as follows: (1) 25 
Americans, 1 of whom is a Canadian; (2) 7 British, 1 of whom 
is an Australian; (8) 6 Germanic Europeans, 4 of whom are 
Germans, 1 a Swede, and 1 a Norwegian; (4) 6 Latin Euro- 
peans, namely, 2 Frenchmen, 2 Italians, 1 Spaniard, and 1 Por^ 
tuguese, with whom has been included 1 Russian because there is 
no other group in which he fits more appropriately, and (5) 
5 Asiatics, 2 of whom are Chinese and 8 Japanese. A third 
Chinese contribution was most unfortunately lost in the mail. 
The average opinion of each of these five groups is given in the 
tables in the Appendix. To obtain the final rank of each coun- 
try the averages for the five groups have again been averaged. 
Thus each race, or at least each of our five divisions, has equal 
weight in determining the figures on which will be based the 
map used in later discussions. The opinion of twenty-five 
Americans, for example, has no more weight than that of five 
Asiatics. This may seem unfair, but on the whole it seems to 



THE DISTRIBUTION OF CIVILIZATION 165 

be the method best calculated to give a reliable result. All of 
us are inevitably prejudiced. The Americans put America, 
especially its more backward parts, higher than is correct. The 
Asiatics put their own countries too high. By giving America 
and Asia equal weight and by dividing Europeans into three 
groups animated by different ideals and different sympathies, 
we are able largely to eliminate the effect of racial prejudice. 
The final results are summed up in Figures li to 19, but I shall 
defer comment upon these for the present. 

In the tables in the Appendix the countries of Europe, North 
America, and Asia have been divided into groups corresponding 
as nearly as possible to race, while those of Australia, Africa, 
and South America have each been put in a single group 
because the racial differences are either not strongly marked. 



Figure U. The DiabribntloD of ClTiliutioii in Europe 



166 CIVILIZATION AND CLIMATE 

as in Australia and South America, or are highly complicated 
as in Africa. Under each group the country whose final rank 
is highest has been placed first and the rest in consecutive 
order. To begin with Europe, England heads the list. It is 
the only region placed in the first rank by every contributor. 
Northwestern Germany, which includes Berlin, comes next. The 
Grermanic Europeans and the Asiatics all place it in the first 
rank. The British almost invariably do so, and their opinion, 
9.9, averages the same as that of all divisions. Among the 
Americans and Latins several place this part of Grermany in 
the ninth class instead of the tenth. Hence, its average position 
according to them is about 9.8. Such slight differences have 
little significance, for 98 per cent is almost as good as 100 per 
cent. Yet they suggest that in 1918 people who live in other 
parts of the world were on the whole not quite so sure of the 
Germans as of the English. 

Following northwestern Germany we find central Grermany, 
then Scotland, Denmark, Holland, and so on to northeastern 
Grermany. Here for the first time we ccnne to a region which 
is placed by one group, the Latins, in a rank lower than 9.0. 
Yet even here the Latins do not assign a rank lower than 8.6 — 
and everything above this ranks as "very high.'* Nowhere in 
these first fourteen regions does the greatest diversity amount 
to more than one degree on our scale of ten, or 10 per cent on 
the scale of 100. This is comparatively insignificant, for it 
means that while the difference between the highest and the 
lowest may be 10 per cent, each of them usually differs from 
the average by only about 5 per cent. Thus so far as numbers 
1 to 14 are concerned the difference of opinion among Ameri- 
cans, British, Grermans, Latins, and Asiatics is almost negli- 
gible. All alike rank these regions very high. 

Coming to Ireland, a country which, for lack of any other 
suitable group, is placed with the Teutonic regions, we. find 
mudi more diversity of opinion. The English, presumably 



THE DISTRIBUTION OF CIVILIZATION 167 

because it is part of their own country, and the Asiatics, perhaps 
because it seems to them like a part of England, place it very 
high, with a rank close to 9.0. The Germans, on the other 
hand, place it at 7.0, scarcely above the medium grade, while 
the Americans and Latins place it near 8.0, which means that 
compared with the world as a whole they think that Ireland 
stands high, but not very high. The fact that all the Teutonic 
regions except Ireland and the Austrian Alps rank above 9.0, 
and that these two, which are partly Teutonic, stand in the 
high group near 8.0, suggests that race is a dominant factor 
in determining the status of civilization. The same suggestion 
IB enforced when we note that among the Romance nations the 
most Teutonized portions stand highest. Yet if one looks at 
Newfoundland, Iceland, and Greenland, or some of the other 
comparatively low Teutonic regions, or at some parts of Aus- 
tralia, it becomes evident that geographical conditions also 
play a highly important part. 

The Romance nations of Europe seem to possess much more 
diversity of civilization than do the Teutons. Even if Albania 
and Montenegro be omitted as not being truly Romance, the 
range is from medium in Corsica and Sardinia to high in many 
regions, and very high in parts of France and northern Italy. 
Some places, such as southeastern Spain and southern Italy, 
are rated exceptionally high by the Asiatics, although the other 
contributors agree quite closely. 

Among the Slavic nations central Russia stands at only 6.2 
in American opinion, possibly because Jewish atrocities were 
freshly in mind when the classification was made. In general 
there can be no question that the Baltic Provinces and Bohemia 
stand at the top, while southeastern and northeastern Russia 
are at the bottom. The European region whose rank is most 
doubtful is southern Finland. The Asiatics reduce it to about 
6.6, while the Grermans rate it at 9.4. Even in so extreme a 
case the average opinion is not open to much criticism. The 



168 CIVILIZATION AND CLIMATE 

final rank is about 8.0, which puts Finland at nearlj the same 
level as Bohemia, the Baltic Provinces of Russia, Ireland, and 
the Austrian Alps. 

It would be interesting to go through all the tables and point 
out their special features, but this must be left for the reader 
to do by himself. Only one or two additional pdnts can be 



Figure 15. The Distribution of CiviUtatioD id Aaia 

indicated. In Asia the first thing that strikes one is the great 
diversity of opinion as to Japan and China. This is due to 
the fact that the Japanese and Chinese place their own coun- 
tries much higher than do the people of other races. This is 
natural. The surprising thing is rather that these people, with 
their justifiable pride in a great past, do not place their own 
countries at the very top. They recognize that Europe and 



THE DISTRIBUTION OF CIVILIZATION 169 

• 

North America have in certain ways surpassed them. Aside 
from Japan and China the agpreement of the different groups 
as to the position of Asiatic countries is on the whole surprising. 
Only in rare cases does the opinion of any one group depart 
from the average opinion by more than a single degree on the 
scale of ten. Two of the few exceptions are Rajputana and 
the Syrian Desert^ both of which are placed exceptionally low 
by the Asiatics. 

In Australia and North America the diversity of opinion is 
much greater than in the older continents. It reaches a maxi- 
mimi in Canada, especially in Alberta, and in southern Green- 
land, and Iceland. In such places opinion ceases to be of any 
special value. People simply do not know what sort of condi- 
tions actually prevail. In Australia, likewise, the comparative 




Figure 16. The Distribution of Civilization in Australia 



170 CIVILIZATION AND CLIMATE 

newness of the country causes some people to overrate it and 
others to depreciate it. It has not yet reached the stable equi- 
librium vhich gives the world as a whole a well-defined opinion. 



Figure IT. The DiatribntioD of Civiliaatioa in Africa 

In the United States there is no more diversity of opinion than 
in Europe, for that country has taken its true place among the 
nations. In Australia and Canada, on the other hand, out- 






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Figpire 18. The Distribation of Ciyilisation in Soath America 



172 CIVILIZATION AND CLIMATE 

aiders who live far away and who are not racially connected 
with the inhabitants are still sceptical as to whether those 
countries are actually destined to rise as high as their people 
claim. 

Thus far we have drawn attention to differences of opinion 
more than to agreements. Let us now examine the matter in 
another way which brings out the essential agreements. We 
will take North America because this is the continent as to 
which there is the greatest diversity of opinion. Figures 19 to 
24 present a series of maps based on the average opinion of all 
divisions of contributors and on the individual opinion of each 
division respectively. Here, as in Figures 14 to 18, the rank of 
each region has been written in its proper place on the map. 
Then lines have been drawn in such a way as to separate the 
areas above and below 9, above and below 8, and so forth. The 
areas ranking above 9.0 have been heavily shaded, those from 
8.0 to 9.0 less heavily, and so on until places below 2.0 are 
left unshaded. This gives a map of civilization whose main 
features can readily be grasped. In Figure 19, which repre- 
sents the average opinion of all groups of contributors, certain 
main features stand out prominently. They are (1) an area 
where civilization declines rapidly northward in British Amer- 
ica; (2) a high area extending from east to west across the 
northern half of the United States and a narrow southern band 
of Canada; (8) an exceptionally high area in the northeastern 
United States from the Mississippi to the Atlantic Ocean; (4) 
a similar small, high area on the Pacific co€ist; (5) a bight of 
lower, but not of low, territory extending up into Nevada; (6) 
a rather rapid decline south of the United States, which is inter- 
rupted by (7) an area of slight improvement in central Mexico. 

Let us now turn to Figure 20 and see how the opinion of 
Americans differs from that of the world as a whole. The 
general aspect of the two maps is the same, for every one of 
the seven features just mentioned can be detected. The older 



Figura 19. CivUliatioii In North AnMrica, Accordiog: to aU Cootributon 



Figure SO. CiTiliaktlOD Id North Americ*. According to Tweoty-flve Ameri^JU 



THE DISTRIBUTION OF CIVILIZATION 176 

states along the Atlantic from New England to the northern 
Gulf States have almost identically the same rank in both 
maps. The chief difference lies in this: the Americans have a 
higher idea of the new parts of their country and of the new 
parts of Canada than have the people of other places. They 
have a correspondingly low idea of the countries immediately 
to the south of them. In Central America their opinion does 
not differ greatly from that of the rest of the world, but they 
place the West Indies and Mexico relatively low. In the West 
Indies this is probably due in large measure to the fact that in 
order to prevent internal convulsion the United States has had 
to intervene in Cuba twice during the brief period of self- 
government enjoyed by that country. The low estimate of 
Mexico probably arises from recent revolutions which at the 
time when the classification was made were producing a most 
unpleasant impression in the United States. In Europe and 
Asia the disorders of Cuba and Mexico attract relatively little 
attention, and the contributors to our classification probably 
thought of these countries as they were during their periods of 
long peace. 

Now let us study British opinion as expressed in Figure 21. 
One of the most noticeable things is the English opinion of the 
southern United States and especially of the southwestern 
deserts. No patriotic feelings, either conscious or unconscious, 
lead them to believe that high conditions extend to the Mexican 
boundary beyond which Americans believe that there is a great 
and sudden change. Their opinion of the Atlantic portions of 
the United States is almost identical with that of the Americans 
and of the rest of the world, and they agree with other races in 
their opinion of the regions south of the United States. They 
believe, as does almost everyone, that the Pacific coast of the 
United States stands higher than the western part of the 
interior, but they do not think quite so well of it as do the 
Americans, although the difference is slight. The places where 



Figure SI. DlBtrlbntlou of CWUiutioo in North AmeHca, According tc 
Seven British Contributora 



THE DISTRIBUTION OF CIVILIZATION 177 

their national pride comes into prominence are in Newfound- 
land and the Canadian Northwest. It is interesting to notice 
that while they place Newfoundland and British Columbia 
higher than do the Americans, they do not have so high an opin- 
ion of the Maritime Provinces nor of Alberta, Saskatchewan, 
and Winnipeg. In the latter regions this is easily explicable. 
A great number of Americans have gone to Winnipeg, Alberta, 
and Saskatchewan during recent years, and their glowing 
reports have made upon Americans a great impression which 
has not yet reached England so strongly, and has scarcely 
touched the rest of the world. Americans perhaps think more 
highly of the Maritime Provinces than do the English be- 
cause many of the most energetic Nova Scotians and other 
provincials come to the States and display marked ability. 
To cite a case which has come under my own observation, the 
students from Acadia College in Nova Scotia, who carry on 
work in the Graduate School of Yale University, have for some 
years maintained a higher average grade in their studies than 
have those from any other institution. 

In the Grerman map, Figure 22, the seven general features 
already enumerated can readily be detected, just as in the 
American and English maps. The differences are largely 
matters of detail. Such a feature as the assignment of a rank 
of 9.0 to the northern Rocky Mountain states of Idaho, Wyo- 
ming, and Montana, and of only 8.0 to the Dakotas, Minnesota, 
Nebraska, and Iowa is probably due to lack of familiarity with 
the interior of the continent. Why Newfoundland should stand 
so high is not evident, unless it be because the name has long 
been known and is very familiar. In the high position of Iceland 
racial pride is again evident, for the Icelanders are close akin 
to the Germans. 

The Romance peoples present a map (Figure 28) which 
again shows all the main features. They know, however, even 
less of the recent development of the western United States and 



Figure 9i. CiTllUatioa ia North America, According to Six G«niiaDic Eoropeana 



180 CIVILIZATION AND CLIMATE 

of the Canadian Northwest than do the Grermans. To them 
Alberta and Saskatchewan are apparently undeveloped tracts 
where trappers and Indians still roam, for otherwise they surely 
would not assign so low a rank as 4.4. Newfoundland for some 
reason is also placed low, only 5.2, and Iceland still lower, 8.4. 
On the other hand, just as the presence of Grermanic people in 
Iceland and Greenland draws the high lines far to the northeast 
in the Grermanic map, and as pride of country bulges the high 
lines to include the whole of the United States in the American 
map, so a similar racial pride causes Cuba and the Creole region 
of Louisiana to be much higher on the Latin map than on any 
other. 

Last come the Asiatics with a map, figure 24, which is sur- 
prisingly like the other maps. They do not yet realize what has 
happened in the Canadian Northwest, but their opinion of 
eastern Canada and Newfoundland is close to the average. The 
place where they differ chiefly from others is in their relative 
ideas of the northern Rocky Mountain states to which they 
assign a rank of only 7.6, and of the southern states which 
they place all the way from 8.2 to 9.4. Apparently the eastern 
United States seems to them highly progressive in all parts, and 
they do not attach much importance to the presence of the 
negroes, a disadvantage which Americans themselves feel 
strongly. 

Taking these maps as a whole we see that they all give the 
same general impression. Where one group goes to a great 
extreme, as in Newfoundland or Greenland, some other is likely 
to go to the opposite extreme. Thus the eccentricities of judg- 
ment displayed by one race are largely counteracted by those 
of another. When all are averaged, the number of incon- 
sistencies is greatly diminished. To Americans and English it 
may seem that Alberta and Saskatchewan, for example, should 
have a rank higher than is here given them, but we are forced 
to admit that final judgment is not possible until these regions 



Figure i*. QTilintion in North America, Acconling to Five Asiatic* 



182 CIVILIZATION AND CLIMATE 

have been well populated for a generation or two. Taken as a 
whole Figure 19 seems to contain no important inccmsistencies, 
even, though one might wish to change the rank of certain 
places in which he is particularly interested. The map repre- 
sents the judgment of thoughtful people in many countries. If 
fifty other equally well-informed people representing an equally 
large number of countries in three separate continents were 
chosen to make another classification, it is highly improbaUe 
that their map would differ from Figure 19 so much as this 
map differs from the others. The chances are that the two 
would be so nearly alike as to be indistinguishable. Inasmuch 
as there is more diversity of opinion in regard to North America 
than to any other continent, the maps of the others approach 
still more closely to a true representation of the opinion of 
thoughtful people all over the world. The maps are by no 
means perfect, for human judgment is fallible. Yet they at 
least present so close an approximation to the truth that we 
may use their general features without danger of error. 



CHAPTER IX 

Vitality and Education in the United States 

We now have before us maps of the world depicting the dis- 
tribution of climatic energy and of civilization. Our ultimate 
object is to compare them, and see whether they are causally 
related. It will add to the certainty of our results, however, 
if we first apply an independent, statistical test to each of our 
two maps. Since the methods of compiling statistics vary 
greatly, we can be sure of reliable results only if we confine 
ourselves to a single country. The United States is easily the 
best for this purpose. It possesses a large and highly varied 
area which tends to produce diversity. Its census and such 
organizations as life insurance companies furnish data com- 
piled according to the same method in all parts. It is homo- 
geneous in government and institutions; equal opportunitieiB 
are open to all ; and the same ideals and methods prevail almost 
everywhere. Moreover, no part has sufi^ered from war or any 
other great disturbance for nearly two generations ; the people 
have moved freely from place to place; and there has been a 
constant tendency to foster a single type of culture. From 
all these points of view no other equal area is so nearly uniform. 
Racially the country is of course complex, but untH the last few 
decades the great majority of the people have been Teutons 
from northwestern Europe. The various types have mixed to 
such a degree and have become so strongly Americanized that 
the native white population is everywhere similar. The only 
large elements which tend strongly toward diversity are the 
negroes and the recent immigrants from non-Teutonic coun- 



Figure 96. Climatic Kaetgj in the Uoited Statea 



Flgur« M. Mortality in the Uait«d SUt«a 



Fl^re ST. BducatioD of Native White Childrea Id the Uaited States 



Figure 98. ClvillMtloo in the United States. The Numben Indicate the Relative 
RaDk 00 a Scale of «.0 Accordiog to 93 Contributors. The Highest Possible Rank 
U 0.0 and the Lowest 1.0. This Scale is Entirely Independent of the One Used for 
the WoM u a Whole 



186 CIVILIZATION AND CLIMATE 

tries. If these are eliminated, as they are to a large degree in 
the maps that we shall consider, essentially the same degree of 
energy and civilization ought to prevail throughout the coimtry 
except where geographic surroundings, the presence of some 
special institution, or some other disturbing factor makes itself 
felt. 

One of the best tests of energy is vitality. We have already 
seen that the death rate varies from month to month in close 
harmony with variations in the strength of factory operatives. 
Let us now see whether there is similar geographic harmony. 
Figure 25 shows the distribution of climatic energy in the 
United States. It is the same as Figure 18, but on a larger 
scale. Strong, vigorous people usually live longer than those 
who are weak. Hence, we should expect that where Figure 25 is 
heavily shaded people would have a better chance of life than in 
the lightly shaded portions. We might test this by the mortal- 
ity figures of the United States census, but the statistics of life 
insurance companies afford a still better method. As is well 
known, standard mortality tables show exactly how many peo- 
ple would be expected to die each year at a given age. A com- 
parison of the deaths which actually take place with the num- 
ber that would be expected on the basis of the table shows the 
degree of vitality possessed by a community. Figure 26 shows 
such a comparison. It is based on the combined experience of 
three prominent life insurance companies whose officials have 
kindly placed in my hands the figures for hundreds of thousands 
of people arranged by states. On the map the figures indicate 
the actual number of deaths compared with the average for the 
whole country which is taken as 100. The country has been 
divided into four grades corresponding to those of the energy 
map. The most heavily shaded includes regions where the 
mortality is distinctly less than would be expected from the 
actuarial tables. The second degree of shading indicates con- 
ditions a little better than the average ; the third, high mortal- 



VITALITY AND EDUCATION 187 

ity ; and the lightest, very high. The individual maps for eadi 
of the three companies are closely similar, which indicates that 
the general features are not due to any special policy of one 
company. Indeed, so far as the policy of the companies is con- 
cerned, the southern states ought to present a better record 
than the northern, for the restrictions upon the issuance of 
policies are there more rigid. For instance, one company 
entirely refuses to issue any policies in certain unhealthful 
sections of the South. Elsewhere only people engaged in special 
kinds of healthful occupations are accepted. Moreover, in the 
places where risks are accepted upon the same terms as in the 
North, the medical examination is often more strict, especially 
in respect to preventable diseases such as tuberculosis. Various 
other considerations cause one region to differ from another. 
For instance, in cities, especially in manufacturing cities, the 
death rate is higher than in country districts, and this causes 
New York State to be unduly high. Miners are an especially 
precarious class from the standpoint of the insurance companies, 
and, therefore, are excluded by at least one of our three com- 
panies in some of the more remote western states, and are 
accepted only in small numbers by the others. They may 
account for the poor position of Montana, but the neighboring 
mining state of Idaho ought in that case to be equally bad. In 
all the more important respects the tendency would be to cause 
the death rate in the South to be lower than in the North, were it 
not for the disturbing element of physical weakness due to 
climate. In tropical countries the figures are far worse than 
in the southern states, which is what would naturally be ex- 
pected. The fact that sick people often go west for their 
health does not enter into the problem. Such people cannot 
obtain insurance. If they have been insured before they become 
sick, they are reckoned as belonging to the place where they 
lived when the policies were issued, and not to the place where 
they die. 



188 CIVILIZATION AND CLIMATE 

It would be interesting to enter into further details, but space 
does not permit. The outstanding feature of the vitality map is 
its agreement with the map of climatic energy. As people die 
in greatest numbers during months when their energy is low, 
so they die in parts of the country where their energy would be 
expected to be diminished on account of the climate. In both 
Figures 25 and 26 conditions are best in the North from New 
England to Kansas. Westward and southward they become 
less favorable. This is probably due in part to the direct 
effects of climate, and in part to its indirect effects upon sani- 
tation and other methods for the promotion of health. The 
two conditions almost inevitably go together, for where people's 
energy is great, they are quick to adopt new means for the 
prevention of disease and the improvement of health. More- 
over, in dry, and still more in warm, regions it is easy to toler- 
ate unsanitary methods of disposing of sewage which thus 
pollutes the water supply. Yet all these things would appar^ 
ently lose part of their importance were it not for the weaken- 
ing effect which certain climatic conditions unquestionably 
produce, as is so well proved by the variation of the death rate 
from month to month even in places where the conditions of 
health are most carefully looked after. Here we must leave 
the matter. The general agreement of the vitality map with 
the map of climatic energy affords strong evidence that the 
climatic map is correct. 

We are now ready to test our map of civilization in the same 
way that we have tested the map of climatic energy, that is, by 
comparing it with a map based on statistics. Strength and 
energy of character cannot easily be reduced to statistics, for 
most of the conditions and activities for which we possess exact 
data depend too much upon outside circumstances and not suf- 
ficiently upon the actual qualities of the people. Professor Mark 
Jefferson has studied the matter carefully, and I have borrowed 
freely both from his published and unpublished work. It might 



VITALITY AND EDUCATION 189 

seem as if such things as railroads, the number of letters, the 
amount of manufactures, or other similar matters might furnish 
a good clue to the intellectual capacity and cultural develop- 
ment of a people, but unfortunately this is not so. Take the 
case of railroads. Nevada has more miles of railroad in pro- 
portion both to the number of inhabitants and the inhabited 
area than any other state in the Union. In 1912 it had 260 
miles for every 10,000 inhabitants, while Rhode Island had only 
8.6, and Massachusetts 6.1. This does not mean that Nevada 
is more progressive than New England. The case is like that 
of a desert through which a cowboy was riding when he met a 
friend. 

**What you doing here.?" asked the friend. 

"Nothing," was the answer. "I'm just crossing this here 
desert because it's here." 

In the same way the railroads cross Nevada because it 
happens to lie between the East and the West. If it were unin- 
habited, or peopled by savages, it would still have many rail- 
roads. 

The letters sent out by a community furnish a criterion of its 
state of civilization, but even this must be used with much cau- 
tion. A hundred letters sent by a Chicago mail-order house in 
response to orders averaging two dollars apiece are no more sig- 
nificant than a single letter from Detroit in answer to an order 
for an automobile. In this case, as in many others, a concen- 
tration of activity in certain regions may occur without any 
correspondingly high ability or culture. The same is true of 
manufactures. Doubtless, manufactures generally develop 
wherever a community rises to a high state of civilization, and 
the manufacturing processes and all that goes with them are in 
turn a help in the development of a still higher civilization. 
Nevertheless, the accidents of position, or the presence of nat- 
ural resources may cause two equally progressive and competent 



190 CIVILIZATION AND CLIMATE 

communities to differ enormouBly in the number of factories and 
other industrial plants. 

We are forced, therefore, to turn to something more personal. 
lUiteracj is a fairly good test, for it depends largely on the 
immediate surroundings of each indlTiduol. It would answer 
the purpose excellently were it not that people hare moved 
about so much in recent years, and that education has now be- 
come so well-nigh universal. The amount of illiteracy in the 
United States often depends less upon the particular place in 
question than upon the original home of the settlers. Taking 
cmly the native white population over ten years of age, the 
states of North Dakota, South Dakota, Montana, Wytxning, 
and Washington stand hi^j^est with only three illiterates for 
every 1000 people, as may be seen in Figure 29. Th^r good 



ngnra 99. IIliteiMy In the United States Among Penoas of NatiTe White Pttrentage 
Bod Over 10 Years of Age. The Figures Indicate Illiteratea per 1000 



VITALITY AND EDUCATION 191 

record, however, is due partly to New England and the other 
eastern states whence much of the adult population was derived. 
The people who came West were not the poor illiterates, but the 
wideawake, energetic members of the community. In view of 
this and of the great number of foreigners whose children are 
reckoned among the native whites of the East, it is remarkable 
that Massachusetts, where there are four illiterates for every 
1000 people, and Connecticut, where there are five, should be 
in practically the same class with the new western states. The 
only other states which rival them are Oregon, Idaho, Nevada, 
Utah, and Minnesota with four illiterates per thousand, and 
California which has five. In the South, on the other hand, even 
when the negroes are omitted, very different conditions prevail. 
The figures for the worst states are Alabama 101, South Caro- 
lina 106, Kentucky 107, Louisiana 150, and New Mexico 166. 
This last state is particularly bad when we consider the 
large inunigration from the North during recent years. Its 
low condition is due to the fact that a third of its so-called 
native white population consists of Mexicans, who furnish a 
good example of the effect of race as contrasted with place. 
The figures for other states show how recent movements of 
population affect the amount of illiteracy. For instance, Florida 
with 62 illiterates per thousand makes a better showing than 
the neighboring states, for Greorgia has 80 and Alabama 101. 
This is because many northerners have recently gone to Flor- 
ida to raise oranges and enjoy the mild climate. Mississippi, 
with 68 illiterates, ranks almost as high as Florida, and appears 
60 per cent better than Virginia (82). The relatively good 
showing of some other southern states such as Texas 88, 
Oklahoma 86, and Arizona 28, is clearly due to the recent 
influx of settlers from other regions. All things considered, 
illiteracy as a test of culture seems to be of more value than 
purely material things such as railroads and manufactures. 



192 CIVILIZATION AND CLIMATE 

but so long as new territory is being settled, it is misleading 
in certain respects. 

The difficulty of finding a suitable test of the distribution of 
culture indicates that Jefferson is right in ascribing first place 
to education. In a country like the United States this is 
particularly true. Each state, and often each county or 
town, decides for itself how much it wiU spend for schools, 
how long they shall be open, and how stringently attendance 
shall be enforced. Hence, the schools form an unusually deli- 
cate test of the real character of a community. It is impossible, 
to be sure, to test the quality of education by ordinary statis- 
tics, but if the schools are open for a long period each year, 
and if the children are not permitted to be absent except for 
unavoidable causes, the quality of the instruction is generally 
high. Under such conditions better teachers can be secured, 
and the pupils are not continually hampered by having to make 
up for absences. 

In estimating the value of an educational system on the basis 
of school attendance, it is necessary to consider not only the 
percentage of the children of school age who are enrolled in the 
schools but also the length of time that the schools are open and 
the proportion of possible school days during which the average 
child is present. The figures published in the Report of the 
United States Commissioner of Education give the necessary 
data : The percentage of the children between 6 and 20 years of 
age who are in school ranges from 70.2 in Utah to 48.1 in 
Louisiana. The low figure for Louisiana is partly due to 
negroes, but even if we omit these, the figures do not greatly 
change. If we omit not only the negroes, but also all white 
children who were not bom in this country, the figures become 
74.6 for Utah and 55.8 for Louisiana. Still greater differences 
are found in the amount of schooling. In Utah and Massa- 
chusetts, for example, the average child is in school 280 days 
per year. In Louisiana and Alabama, on the other hand, the 



VITALITY AND EDUCATION 198 

number is only about lOO, whfle in South Carolina it falls to 
92. For a true comparison we must multiply the number of 
days of schooling by the percentage of children who attend. 
On this basis, if Utah, which stands highest, be given an index 
number of 100, the index for Massachusetts, which stands 
next, is 96.5, while that of South Carolina is 81.7, and Louisiana 
81.6. 

The whole matter is summed up in Figure 27. Among native 
white children education is best cared for in (1) the northeast, 
(2) the lake states, (8) the middle tier of prairie and Rocky 
Mountain states as far west as Utah, and (4) on the Pacific 
coast. In the South it is neglected, and for some reason it falls 
low in the Dakotas, and to a less extent in the northern Rocky 
Mountain states. The comparatively recent settlement of some 
of the states where conditions are relatively low explains the 
situation in part, but Washington is almost as new as the Dako- 
tas or New Mexico and yet stands in the first rank. The spar- 
sity of population is also another factor. Utah, however, which 
ranks at the very top, has a population decidedly more sparse 
than that of the Dakotas, but ranks 100 where they rank 66 and 
69. Its density of population is scarcely greater than that of 
New Mexico, whose rank is only 85. The relatively poor condi- 
tions in the Dakotas find a partial explanation in the fact that 
the population is more completely agricultural than in almost 
any other part of the United States. There are no large cities, 
and even villages are comparatively scarce or small. The great 
majority of the people live scattered over the vast plain, each 
family on its own quarter-section. Hence, the children are 
obliged to go long distances to school. Muddy roads often 
make this difficult in the spring, while the severe storms of 
winter are an even greater obstacle. In spite of this, the 
Dakotas stand at the top in the literacy of their people, so that 
the school system must be fairly efficient. In New Mexico 
quite the contrary conditions prevail. A part of the people, to 



194 CIVILIZATION AND CLIMATE 

be sure^ live on widely scattered ranches where the children 
cannot go to school. By far the larger number, however, live 
in compact settlements where the houses are grouped in a com- 
paratively small area because of the necessity for using a 
common water supply for irrigation, or else because of mining 
industries. Under such conditions, schools can be maintained 
more easily than on huge, townless plains like those of the 
Dakotas. The same conditions prevail in Utah and Nevada, 
and to a less extent in Idaho, Wyoming, and Montana. 
Nevada's rank of 65 is in reality decidedly less creditable than 
South Dakota's of 66. Yet the fact remains that the Dakotas 
are lower than would be expected, while Utah is surprisingly 
high. 

The proud position of Utah is presumably the result of 
Mormonism. The leaders of that faith have had the wisdom to 
insist on a thorough system of schools, and have obliged the 
children to attend them. The ^^Gkntiles" have in self-defense 
been forced to do equally well, and the result has been admir- 
able. Whatever one may think of Mormonism as a religious 
belief, it must be credited with having accomplished a remark- 
able work in spreading a moderate degree of education almost 
universally among the people of Utah. Without its influence, 
the rank of Utah would probably be about 76, that is, between 
Colorado (82), on one side, and Nevada (65), on the other. I 
emphasize this because it shows how clearly our maps reflect 
the influence of any peculiar condition. Manifestly, the dis- 
tribution of education throughout most of the United States 
does not depend upon the influence of any particular insti- 
tution, for essentially the same institutions prevail every- 
where. In the same way the map of illiteracy, being based 
wholly on native whites, does not in most places reflect the 
influence of any particular race. Yet in the map of educa- 
tion, Utah is conspicuous because it is strongly influenced by 
the only American institution which is capable of producing 



VITALITY AND EDUCATION 196 

such an effect and which is at the same time limited to one 
small area. In the map of illiteracy, the presence of a per- 
manently alien and essentially non-European race in the only 
state where such a race forms a large proportion of the ^^native 
whites" causes New Mexico to be unusually low. 

Another factor which would be expected to bear an impor- 
tant part in determining the distribution of education is the 
presence of the negro. Doubtless this has a pronounced effect, 
for an inferior race inevitably retards a higher. Yet the map 
indicates that other factors are equally important. Not only 
is education at a low ebb in New Mexico which has few negroes, 
but also in Arizona which is comparatively free from both 
negroes and Mexicans, and which has its people largely 
grouped into compact villages where schools can easily be 
maintained. Moreover, Texas, where the colored people form 
only a fifth of the population, stands lower than Greorgia and 
Mississippi, where half the people are colored. Another signifi- 
cant fact is that the education of negroes varies from state 
to state almost as does that of whites. Although a smaller 
proportion of negroes than of whites go to school, the two 
races are well or poorly educated in the same places. 

In Massachusetts the proportion of the negro children, six 
to twenty years of age, who go to school is 66.5 per cent 
against 78.7 per cent for white children. In South Carolina, 
on the other hand, the percentage of negro school children is 
only 45.8, in Georgia 42.1, and Alabama 40.7. In Louisicuia 
it sinks to 28.9 per cent. This state stands lowest in the edu- 
cation both of whites and negroes, its index numbers for the 
percentage of children in school and the number of days of 
schooling combined being 81.6 for whites and 16.7 for negroes. 
Yet its percentage of colored population is only 48 ; while that 
of South Carolina is 55, although its educational indices are 
82 for white children and 25 for colored. In the same way 
Mississippi with 56 per cent of negroes stands still higher, with 



196 CIVILIZATION AND CLIMATE 

indices of 48 and 87. Thus it appears that the degree of edu- 
cation is not proportional to the number of colored people* 
The southern states differ among themselves because of special 
circumstances such as good or bad laws, but all stand low be- 
cause of more general factors. These factors form our chief 
subject of inquiry. In order to examine them fairly, we must 
overlook such minor matters as special laws in Mississippi, a 
backward race in New Mexico, Mormonism in Utah, and the 
scarcity of centers of population in the Dakotas. When allow- 
ances of this kind are made, the map of white education, Fig^ 
ure 27, seems to be as good an epitome of the general distri- 
bution of culture in the United States as we are yet able to 
obtain on the basis of the statistics of a single activity. 

Let us now compare our educational map with Figure 28, 
which represents the distribution of civilization in the United 
States according to the opinion of 28 people. All of these 
except Ambassador Bryce were Americans. They grouped the 
states and provinces of the United States and Canada into six 
classes, number 6 being the highest. Massachusetts is the only 
state invariably placed in the highest class. New Mexico and 
Arizona, which stand lowest, have an average rank of 1.6. In 
order to judge how much reliance to place on the classifica- 
tions, I took the first ten that were received and averaged 
them, and when ten more had come to hand averaged them 
also. Somewhat to my surprise, and much to my pleasure, the 
two sets of averages were practically identical. How much 
they differed may be seen in the Appendix. The average differ- 
ence is only 0.2, and the maximum 0.6. The agreement of the 
two sets probably indicates that any other group of equally 
well-informed persons would have made essentially the same 
classification. To be sure, in spite of several attempts, I was 
unable to obtain any contributor in the states west of Minne- 
sota or south of the Ohio River. Local prejudices, however, 
have probably not exerted much effect on the final results, for 



VITALITY AND EDUCATION 197 

California stands in the highest class with practically the same 
grade as Minnesota and Iowa. 

A comparison of the maps of education and of culture in 
Figures 27 and 28 is interesting. In general aspect the two 
are similar. Both have two high areas, one in the northeast 
and center, and the other on the Pacific coast. In both there 
is a decline from north to south. Two other common features 
are a tongue of high conditions jutting out toward Kansas, 
and a low tongue ending in Nevada. If the effects of Mor- 
monism and of the scattered condition of the Dakota farmers 
are eliminated from the map of education, its eastern high area 
becomes almost identical with that of the map of civilization. 
The contributors apparently took little account of either of 
these factors, and were perhaps right in doing so. In the 
Dakotas the lack of schooling is presumably balanced by other 
high qualities such as the scarcity of illiterates. In Utah the 
good school system is more than overbalanced by the Mormon 
defense of polygamy. Still other features of both maps appear 
to be due to special circumstances. For example, the recent 
growth of Texas, the establishment there of progressive insti- 
tutions for higher education, and the maintenance of efficient 
types of city government have raised that state well above its 
neighbors on the east and west, as appears plainly in both 
maps. Tennessee also rises above Arkansas on the map based 
on opinion, and is higher than any surrounding state on the 
other map. In the Rocky Mountain region the sparsity of 
population and the newness of the country are usually assigned 
as reasons why these states are less advanced than those east 
and west of them. The educational map shows that there 
is concrete ground for this opinion. 

Inasmuch as the educational map is based on only one of 
many phases of human culture, and is manifestly influenced by 
special circumstances, its agreement with the map based on 
opinion is surprisingly close. This seems to afford good ground 



198 CIVILIZATION AND CX.IMATE 

for confidence in the world-map of ciyilization* If a map of 
ciyilization could be based on the opinions of a large number 
of people, say twenty-five from each of twenty countries, and 
if a statistical map could be based on numerous activities 
among which education is only one, it seems almost certctin 
that the main outlines of the two would be nearly identical. 
Our present map of civilization on the basis of the opinions 
of 50 people in more than a dozen countries is by no means 
perfect, yet it stands the test to which we have here applied 
the part of it embraced within the United States. Our maps, 
both of civilization and of climatic energy, seem more worthy 
of reliance now that we have compared them with similar maps 
based on wholly different criteria. 



CHAPTER X 
The Conditions of Civilization 

We have now reached the most important pomt in our inves- 
tigations. We must compare the distribution of civilization 
and of climatic energy. Already the reader has noticed the 
unmistakable similarity of the two chief maps of the United 
States, Figures 25 and 28. Here the distribution of civilization 
and of energy are more alike than are the distribution of civili- 
zation and education. Slight differences, to be sure, appear in 
many places such as Texas. The greatest difference is in Cali- 
fornia, where culture rises higher than energy. This dis- 
crepancy is not surprising, for as already explained we do not 
yet know whether sufficient allowance has been made for Cali- 
. fomia's stimulating sea breezes. The disagreement of the maps 
in this region, if further research shall prove it well founded, 
may be highly significant. Yet it must not be exaggerated. The 
coast is either high or very high in both cases. That is the 
important region. If San Francisco, Los Angeles, and the 
other coast cities were removed, the influence of the state upon 
the rest of the world would be comparatively slight. Leaving 
these doubtful details, however, look once more at Figures 25 
and 28 before they are forgotten, and note how closely the main 
features of one are duplicated in the other. 

Let us next turn to the two maps of the world in Figures 
80 and 81. Figure 80, showing the distribution of climatic 
energy, is the same as Figure 18, and is repeated here for con- 
venience. Figure 81, showing the distribution of civilization, 
sums up the data shown in Figures 14 to 19. All regions to 




Pignre 31. The DUtribntion of ClvUintioD 



THE CONDITIONS OF CIVILIZATION 201 

which our fifty contributors assign a rank of 8.5 or higher are 
rated as ^^ery high/' and are shaded in solid black. Those 
from 7 to 8.5 are rated as **high," and are shaded in heavy 
lines; those from 5 to 7 are ^^ediiun," and are indicated by 
light lines ; 8 to 5, ^%w/' shaded with abundant dots ; and under 
8, "very low," and dotted only lightly. 

The first thing that attracts attention is the general resem- 
blance between the maps of energy and of civilization. Both, 
for example, show a high area in northwestern Europe. A 
tongue extends into Italy, another toward Roumania, and a 
third to the Baltic. Another projection runs out into western 
Siberia. Here the high area of the map of civilization extends 
about as far as the mediiun area of the map of energy. This is 
not surprising, for even if the people of Siberia have the energy 
indicated in Figure 80, they are hampered by the remoteness 
and newness of their country, not to mention other conditions. 
In central and northern Siberia, the difference between the two 
maps is slight. The significant thing is that in both there is 
the same falling off toward the center of Asia. Still farther 
east in China and Japan conditions are once more alike, China 
being medium and Japan high. 

In Indo-China and especially in India, the maps differ. 
Apparently, this arises largely from European domination, 
and is due to the constant addition of strength from that con- 
tinent. This does not apply to Siam, however, which has 
worked out its own salvation. It ranks as very low on the 
energy map, and only as low on the other. This may have no 
significance, for our maps are still in their early stages. Fur- 
ther knowledge may change such slight disagreements into 
agreements. On the other hand, it may increase the disagree- 
ment. In that case we may discover that by long residence 
within the tropics, the races of Indo-China and India have 
become differentiated from Europeans and are less susceptible 
to the infiuence of steady heat. Again, race differs from race 



202 CIVILIZATION AND CLIMATE 

in its inheritance, and the Siamese may inherit stronger traits 
than are possessed by their neighbors. Finally, the level of 
Siamese civilization may have been raised by contact with other 
races, by the adoption of particular institutions of govern- 
ment, forms of religion, or social organization, or by the inspira- 
tion and energy of a few men of unusual gifts. I mention these 
possibilities not because they are of special importance in 
Siam, but because they illustrate the many and varied influ- 
ences which cooperate to determine the position of a country 
in the scale of civilization. 

In comparing the maps of energy and civilization, one of the 
clearest features is the effect of a strong race upon regions 
which it rules or colonizes. Again and again the presence of 
such a race causes a region to be higher in civilization than 
would be expected on the basis of climatic energy. Java, the 
Philippines, and India are examples. It is especially notice- 
able in regions controlled by Great Britain. In Australia, for 
instance, the general decrease in both civilization and energy 
from southeast to northwest is the same in both maps, but the 
presence of the English raises the places of 'Very low" energy 
to ''low" in civilization, and so on, each grade being raised 
one degree, so to speak, until the map of civilization shows a 
large high area in the southeast. In South Africa and Egypt, 
British influence is displayed in the same way. In the Canadian 
Northwest, on the other hand, it is not apparent. The northern 
parts of Alberta and Saskatchewan appear higher in energy 
than in civilization. We have already seen that according to 
American and, to a less extent, British opinion, this is not the 
case, for recent settlement has raised these regions to a com- 
paratively high degree of culture. 

In the United States the energy map shows a strip of medium 
conditions along the southern frontier, but this is rated as 
high on the other map. Such a condition illustrates how a high 
type of government causes efficient people to settle in unfavor- 



THE CONDITIONS OF CIVILIZATION 208 

able regions, and how it also adds to the effectiveness of less 
efficient people such as Mexicans and negroes, thus in part over- 
coming the handicap of climate. In the central states, on the 
other hand, civilization is not rated so high as one would expect 
on the climatic basis. Probably this is because the country is 
so new that our Chinese, Russian, Spanish, and other foreign 
contributors, though they have travelled and studied exten- 
sively, do not realize how great is the progress of recent times. 
California, like the southern states, is higher on the map of 
civilization than on the other. As already explained, this may 
in part be due to the impossibility of making a wholly accurate 
map of climatic energy. It may also arise from the location of 
CaUfomia on the seaboard, and from its early development 
as contrasted with the newer states of the interior. A com- 
parison of the United States as it appears on the world-maps 
and as it appears on the maps of that country alone is impor- 
tant. Where the country stands by itself, and its parts are 
classified by people who live in it and are thoroughly familiar 
with it, the resemblance between climatic energy and civiliza- 
tion is greater than where the classification is on a rougher 
scale and is made by people less familiar with it. Another 
reason for the difference is that a classification of places where 
a uniform standard of culture prevails and where the same 
race is everywhere dominant is much easier than where many 
types of culture and highly diverse races are considered. The 
maps of the United States represent the kind which must be 
made for each country. The difference between the features of 
the United States on the world-map and on the other repre- 
sents the extent to which our general map of civilization is in 
error. In spite of this, however, the general features of the 
country are unmistakably the same on both maps. So far as 
the conclusions of this volume are concerned, it makes no 
difference which we use. In this lies the importance of our 
various tests of the United States. They show that although 



204 CIVILIZATION AND CLIMATE 

much remains to be done before we can construct a map which 
is approximately perfect, the most important features are 
reasonably distinct and unmistakable. 

Turning to Latin America, we find about what would be 
expected in Mexico and Central America. The highlands are 
medium and the lowlands low. South America, on the con- 
trary, presents some unexpected features. The Andean high- 
lands, including Venezuela, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Bo- 
livia, are all ranked as low in civilization, whereas the climatic 
map would indicate medium energy. In the belt of highlands 
on the east side of Africa the same phenomenon is observable. 
Perhaps an equatorial climate is more debilitating than would 
be expected from the work of factory operatives in summer. 
In South America the presence of an ancient race whose vigor 
was already waning at the time of the discovery of the New 
World has doubtless hindered Spanish immigrants in accom- 
plishing what might otherwise have been looked for. This, 
however, does not alter the case, for the original inhabitants in 
the Andean countries, just as in the African highlands, stand 
lower than would be expected. Argentina, on the contrary, 
goes to the opposite extreme, and is higher on the map of civili- 
zation than on that of energy. The importance of this must not 
be overrated, for the climatic data are somewhat doubtful 
because of the paucity of statistics as to changes of tempera- 
ture from day to day. As the maps now stand, however, they 
are encouraging, for they suggest that even with a moderately 
favorable climate, the Latin race in America is competent to 
rise to a high level. 

Let us turn now from these details, and look once more at 
the general aspect of the two maps. In spite of minor disagree- 
ments, the main features are essentially alike. There are, in 
each case, the same two great high areas in western Europe and 
the United States. The decline from western Russia eastward 
to the center of Asia, and the rise to high conditions on the 



THE CONDITIONS OF CIVILIZATION 206 

eastern edge of Asia in Japan are equally apparent. Like- 
wise, the maps are strikingly alike in the shape of the very low 
areas in Africa and South America. South of latitude 80^ S. 
each of the southern continents begins to rise in energy and in 
civilization, and the rise is more pronounced on the eastern 
side than on the western. Even where the maps disagree, the 
explanation of the disagreement is usually obvious from a con- 
sideration of the recent movements of European peoples. The 
few remaining discrepancies are almost all explicable on well- 
known grounds, such as the impossibility of agriculture, which 
hinders civilization in the far northern parts of America and 
Asia. 

When allowance is made for obvious facts like these, the 
resemblance between the two maps becomes more striking. Call 
to mind the method of their construction. Neither represents 
the personal opinion or bias of any one man. Any other per- 
son with the same data before him would have obtained similar 
results. The maps simply give expression to two distinct sets 
of facts. The first is that the opinion of men of many races 
agrees as to the general distribution of civilization. The sec- 
ond is that if the various conditions of climate produced the 
same effect upon all the people of the world as upon students 
and factory operatives in the eastern United States, the amount 
of work accomplished in different countries would be closely 
proportional to the status of civilization. 

Aside from the map of climatic energy, it is hard to think 
of any other which would so closely reproduce the features of 
the map of civilization. Suppose that race were made the 
criterion, and that a map were shaded in proportion to the 
number of Teutons. We should find that in Europe such a map 
would closely resemble the map of civilization except that places 
like Finland, southern France, central Italy, Hungary, Bohe- 
mia, Servia, and others are relatively high in civilization even 



206 CIVILIZATION AND CLIMATE 

though none are more than half Teutonic, and some only 
very slightly, or almost unappreciably so. In Asia, on the 
other hand, there is much more Teutonic blood in Syria and 
Asia Minor than in Japan, yet Japan ranks far higher. The 
Japanese might claim racial superiority almost as fairly as 
the Teutons, and both the Latins and Slavs may justly point 
to the fact that they predominate in some of the most advanced 
portions of the globe. When we look at the low places, we find 
that Teutonic areas, such as the Transvaal, Alaska, southern 
Greenland, Iceland, and parts of Australia make a poor show- 
ing; the Latins in parts of Latin America are even worse; 
the Slavs at their worst fall no lower than the Teutons ; while 
the Japanese nowhere fall so low. 

Suppose that we make a map of religion. It will not look 
much like the map of civilization, no matter which of the 
world's great religions we employ. Protestant Christianity, 
to be sure, prevails for the most part in regions which are either 
high or very high, although Iceland may possibly be counted 
as an exception. Roman Catholic Christianity, on the other 
hand, prevails in locations which range from very high to very 
low; and Greek Christianity from high to low. Buddhism, 
likewise, ranges from high in Japan to low in Tibet, while 
Mohammedanism never rises above medium, and in some places 
falls very low. That religion raises or lowers the tone of a 
country I do not for a moment question, but if a people are 
physically weak and are lacking in self-control because of some- 
thing in their surroundings, the history of the world as exem- 
plified by the Abyssinians, Armenians, Latin Americans, and 
others seems to show that they will drag even the finest reli- 
gion at least part way to their own level. The higher the form 
of religion and the more self-sacrifice and devotion it requires, 
the more difiicult it becomes to keep any but the most energetic 
and determined races even approximately true to it. The only 



THE CONDITIONS OF CIVILIZATION 207 

cases where people of low efficiency seem to retain a high reli- 
gion are where they are continually stimulated by the presence 
of a stronger race. 

As a third criterion, suppose that we take form of govern- 
ment, and inquire whether a map of governments would resem- 
ble one of civilization. Of course, the excellence of the govern- 
ment is closely related to the degree of civilization, but not so 
with the form. Republics range from very high in Switzer- 
land and France to very low in Venezuela. Limited, but auto- 
cratic monarchies exist in high countries like Germany, or did, 
at least, before the great war, and also in low countries like 
Turkey and Persia. Thus we might go on to consider one 
after another of the great factors which cooperate in giving 
form to modern civilization. The nature of a nation's reli- 
gious faith, its form of government, its social organization, its 
ease of intercourse with other nations, and various other con- 
ditions play a fundamental part in the distribution of civiliza- 
tion. Yet each is conditioned by the degree of energy possessed 
by a people, for if a race lacks energy, no amount of excellence 
along other lines will place it in the first rank. Energy, in 
turn, seems to depend upon climate, and thus climate becomes 
an essential element in determining the status of civilization. 
We may well reverse our statement, however, and say that no 
amount of energy will make a nation great if none of its people 
are gifted with genius, or if it never evolves an orderly form of 
government or a moral code which allows a man to enjoy life, 
property, and home without constant fear of outsiders. Thus, 
the material and immaterial elements of civilization play into 
each other in such a way that either seems the more important 
according to the angle from which we view it. 

The interplay of diverse factors is so important that it is 
worth while to examine it in a concrete case. Dr. Scott Nearing 
in the Popular Science Monthly for 1914 published an article 
entitled, *^The Greographical Distribution of American Grenius." 



208 CIVILIZATION AND CLIMATE 

While it is impossible to measure genius, it is possible to ascer- 
tain how many people of unusual ability are bom in a given 
region. That useful publication, "Who's Who in America," 
though not infallible, forms a good summary of about twenty 
thousand people who have either achieved "special prcnninence 
in creditable lines of effort, making them the subjects of exten- 
sive interest, inquiry or discussion in this country," or who 
occupy positions which could scarcely be attained except by 
persons of unusual ability. Taking **Who's Who" for 1912-18 
as a basis, Nearing has tabulated the birthplaces of the first 
10,000 names according to states. He took only 10,000 be- 
cause that number seemed enough to give reliable results. His 
tabulation strikingly reenforces the common opinion that New 
England, especially Massachusetts, has produced far more 
than its proportionate share of persons of unusual ability. The 
utility of his investigation seems so great and the method so 
reliable that I have asked Dr. Nearing for permission to make 
use of fuller data than were contained in his article, and he has 
kindly supplied me with the figures for each state. In order 
to determine the relative status of the various parts of the 
country it is not fair to compare the number of eminent persons 
who were bom in a given area with the present population. At 
the time when the men who are now prominent were born many 
of the western states contained only a handful of settlers. It 
is equally unfair to compare the number of such persons who 
live in a given region with the present population, for many 
persons who have achieved prominence owe it to the place where 
they grew up and not to that where they now live. The only 
fair way seems to be to ascertain the relation between the num- 
ber of eminent persons born in a given region and the popula- 
tion of the region at the time of their birth. Accordingly, the 
first thing to do is to find when the people in "Who's Who" 
were bom. Nearing gives the following table : 



THE CONDITIONS OF CIVILIZATION 209 

NuMBEK OF Eminent Pebsons in the United States Who 

Webe Bobn at Cebtain Times 

TIMX OP BIMTH VUICBBK 

Before 1850 2,818 

1860-1869 2,716 

1860-1869 2,717 

1870-1879 1,804 

1880-1889 96 

1890-1899 2 

Unknown 849 

Total 10,000 



The number who were bom before 1840 is not £^yen, but it 
must be considerable, for the people who attain eminence are 
among the most long-lived portions of the community. On the 
other hand, the number who were bom after 1880 is too small to 
be considered. People rarely become eminent before they are at 
least thirty-five years of age. The forty years from 1886 to 
1876 cover the births of practically all who had attained suffi- 
cient distinction to be included in "Who's Who'' for 1912. 
Accordingly, we must find the average population of each state 
according to the censuses from 1840 to 1870, but inasmuch as 
the number who were bom previous to 1840 is less than in later 
decades, we shall come nearer to the truth if we give that census 
only half as much weight as the others. In all cases we employ 
the figures for the entire white population, whether native or 
immigrant, but omit the negroes, Chinese, and Indians. The 
way in which the matter works out is illustrated in the follow- 
ing table, where the population is given in thousands : 



210 



CIVILIZATION AND CLIMATE 





White population in thonaands 


Rminent 
peraons 


Rminent 
persons 




1840 


1850 


1800 


1870 


Averace 
1840-70 


per 
100,000 


Massachusetts . . . 
South Carolina . . . 

Nebraska 

New Mexico .... 


729 
259 


985 

275 

62 


1221 

291 

29 

83 


1443 

290 

122 

90 


1147 

282 

43 

67 


1123 
111 

24 
1 


98.0 

39.4 

55.8 

1.5 



The figures in the last column show the relative rank of 
these states in the production of persons of unusual ability 
from 1885 to 1875. Similar figures for each state are given in 
Figure 82. Since Nearing used only the first 10,000 names of 
American-bom persons in **Who's Who,*' or only about 60 per 
cent of the total, the index figures really mean the number of 
eminent persons for every 60,000 people instead of 100,000. 
In a few cases where the average population previous to 1875 
was less than 10,000, two or more adjacent states have been 
combined so as to give a total large enough to be significant. 
The numbers thus obtained have been enclosed in parentheses. 
On the map the United States has been divided into four grades, 
as was done in Figures 25 to 29. Thus all these maps are com- 
parable. The only essential difference is that Figure 82 
belongs to a period averaging more than half a century earlier 
than the others. It presents the most accurate picture now 
available of the distribution of ability at that time. New 
states are at no disadvantage compared with the old, for if a 
region had no population previous to 1860, for example, and 
only a few thousand in 1870, full allowance is made for this. 
Many of our 10,000 eminent people have moved away from 
their early homes, but the great majority did not go until they 
had at least reached an age approaching twenty and the main 
elements of their character were already formed. Thus the 
peculiarities of the map depend not only on whether the popu- 
lation was of such a caliber that children of high ability were 



THE CONDITIONS OF CIVILIZATION 211 

produced, but also on the conditions which molded the early 
life of such children. 

Aside from accidents three chief conditions determine the 
number of eminent persons in a community. The first is 
inherited ability. Unless a man is born with more than the 
average mental capacity, the chances of his inclusion in ^^Who's 
Who" are slight. The second condition is opportunity in the 
broadest sense of the word. A bright child born on a remote 
farm in Maine, on a ranch in Arizona, or in a clearing among 
the Tennessee mountains may be so hampered by lack of edu- 
cation and of the stimulus derived from contact with people 
outside his own little circle that he never accomplishes anything 
that attracts attention. The third condition is energy. Many 
a man of high ability, who is also blessed with the best education 
and with all sorts of opportunities to develop his talents, fails 
to make any impression on the world because he is indolent. 
Frequently, a man of less ability but endowed with energy 
achieves much more. Energy depends partly on inheritance, 
but also on climate. So far as it depends on inheritance it 
should be included under the first of our three conditions. Thus 
the three may be briefly defined as (1) inherited qualities of all 
kinds, (2) opportunities, which include education, the degree 
of culture in a community, and the freedom with which a person 
can find scope for his particular talents, and (8) energy so 
far as this depends upon physical circumstances not connected 
with either heredity or opportunity. 

Let us now inspect Figure 82 to see how far our three con- 
ditions make themselves evident. Each gives rise to certain 
features which stand out unmistakably. To begin with inherit- 
ance, Massachusetts gave birth to 98 eminent persons for every 
60,000 of its white population during the specified period. That 
is, 1 white child out of every 600 bom at that time has dis- 
tinguished himself. The figures for the surrounding New 
England States and New York range from 50 to 78. Such a 



212 CIVILIZATION AND CLIMATE 

Btriking difference ia certainly not due to climate. It is equally 
certain that it is not due to opportunity. The average child 
in New York has as good a chance to go to school and enter 
any sort of occupation as has the child in Massachusetts. Yet 
the rank ot New York is only half as high as that of Massa- 
chusetts. In Maine, Vermont, and New Hampshire the oppor- 
tunities are distinctly less than in New York. There is much 
less wealth, the people are more isolated, the number of cities 
is proportionately smaller, the common school system is no 
better developed, and the focilitieB for sending children to 
college are not so great. Yet even Maine outranks New York, 
for she produced 64 eminent persons per 60,000 while New 
York produced only 60. Yet New York itself stands very high. 



Figure S9. Birthplaces of Penona of UdusimI Ability In the Uoited States. The Nu- 
merals Indicate the Namber of EmiDeat PenoQS Bora In Each State per 60,000 of 
tbe Avetage White Population from 1S3fi to ISTfi 



THE CONDITIONS OF CIVILIZATION 218 

Aside from the New England States only Nebraska exceeds it, 
while Oregon and Delaware rival it. South Carolina is another 
state which stands far higher than its neighbors, for although 
89 is low compared with the 78 of Connecticut, for example, it 
is high compared with the 24 of North Carolina and the 25 of 
Greorgia. Probably, heredity plays an important part here, as 
in other cases ; although, as we shall shortly see, the matter is 
complicated by other conditions. Oregon and especially 
Nebraska, however, are unmistakable. Proportionately, they 
stand as high above their neighbors as Massachusetts, Connec- 
ticut, Rhode Island, and Vermont above theirs. The case of 
these two states is most suggestive. So far as energy is con- 
cerned, there is nothing in the climate of either Oregon or 
Nebraska to give them a special advantage. Previous to 1890, 
by which time the education of four fifths of the people in 
"VHio's Who" was completed, these two states did not oflfer their 
children especially great opportunities. In fact, the opportuni- 
ties were much less than in Oregon's next neighbor, California, 
or in Iowa, Illinois, Indiana, Ohio, and Pennsylvania, the states 
directly east of Nebraska. Yet Oregon ranks 80 per cent 
higher than California, and Nebraska exceeds Illinois by 60 
per cent, and Indiana by over 90 per cent. In striking contrast 
to Nebraska we find New Mexico with a rank of only 1.5, which 
appears as 2 on the map because we have avoided the use of 
fractions. Here again neither climate nor opportunities 
explain why this state falls so far behind its neighbors. The 
only reasonable explanation is that until 1870 or later its 
^Vhite" population consisted almost wholly of Mexicans. 

In reading the preceding pages it may have occurred to the 
reader that the preeminence of New England is only appar- 
ent, not real. It may be due largely to the local prejudices or 
limited viewpoint of the compilers of ''Who's Who." This is 
not the case, however. The book is edited and published in 



214 CIVILIZATION AND CLIMATE 

Chicago. Yet Illiiiois and the neighboring states all receive 
a relatively low rank. 

The facts just stated are of profound significance. Massachu- 
setts, because she was settled by the strong-willed Pilgrim 
Fathers and by other Puritans who fled to the wilderness to 
maintain their high ideals, has produced vastly more than her 
proportion of the men who have made America what it is. 
Connecticut and Rhode Island for siaiilar reasons have followed 
closely on her heels, while the northern New England States 
have much more than held their own ccnnpared with the rest of 
the country. It has been a fad to decry puritanism, but people 
of puritan descent have taken the foremost place. They have 
done so because they inherit the strength of mind which made 
it possible for the Puritan Fathers to develop their stem con- 
scientious system and carry out their noble purposes in the face 
of temptation and opposition. When that old stock has been 
transported to places such as Nebraska and Oregon, where for 
a while it was dominant before the great tide of later immigra- 
tion, it raised the average ability to a level reached nowhere else 
except in New England. In New Mexico, on the contrary, we 
harbor a group of people, fortunately small, who are even more 
conspicuous by their lack of ability than the New Englanders 
are in the opposite way. We may excuse the Mexicans by say- 
ing that they do not learn our language and do not merge 
themselves in our civilization. The competent Mexicans, how- 
ever, usually those who possess the greatest proportion of 
Spanish blood, do learn English and make themselves felt 
among us. The others, perhaps because they inherit an inert 
disposition from their Indian ancestors, are content to remain 
backward. 

This brings up the great question of immigration and racial 
character. In the earliest days of colonization we received only 
the stronger elements of the various European populations. 
The North had its Pilgrims, Puritans, Quakers, and others, 



THE CONDITIONS OF CIVILIZATION 216 

while in the southern states a part of the settlers were people 
who as Huguenots or other religious refugees were notable for 
tenacity of purpose and high ideals. The rest of the settlers 
were in large measure people of unusual courage and initiative, 
for others were not brave enough to come. For this reason, 
apparently, the states of the Atlantic coast from Georgia 
northward stand higher than those west of them. After 
America had been settled so long that migration thither was 
easy, we began to get immigrants of medium grade, not the 
best nor the worst, but from advanced countries and from the 
substantial middle classes. These are what predominate from 
Pennsylvania to Iowa. They are good material, but not so 
good as the old. Otherwise why should so fine a state as Wis- 
consin have produced only half as many eminent men per 
100,000 as has Connecticut, and no more than South Carolina 
which labors under far greater disadvantages? In these last 
decades we are taking into our midst many people scarcely 
better than the Mexicans. We may say what we choose about 
absorbing them and making them good Americans. It is our 
duty to do so as far as we can, but why blind ourselves to the 
facts of biology? Plough horses cannot race like thorough- 
breds. Do men gather grapes of thorns or figs of thistles? 

Today Massachusetts and New England seem to be losing 
their supremacy in the production of men of special ability. 
Nearing's figures show that it is by no means lost, but not so 
marked as formerly. So far as this means that the strong old 
New England families have sent their sons out over the wide 
expanse of our land, the loss to the mother states is more than 
compensated by the gain to the rest of the country. Unfortu- 
nately, it means more than that. It means, in the first place, 
that we are steadily diluting our strength. We are acting as 
would a dairyman who thought that by adding a dozen low- 
grade animals to his herd of a hundred prize-winners and letting 
them breed together he was going to increase the value of his 



216 CIVILIZATION AND CLIMATE 

stock. In addition to this we are losing in another and more dan- 
gerous way. It is as if the dairyman should not only add poor 
animals, but should also prevent his best animals from bearing 
young. No amount of care would make the low-grade animals 
give as much milk or be of as much value as the prize-winners. 
Man is subject to the same biological laws as animals. High 
mental ability and strength of purpose are his most valuable 
qualities. Yet we act as if we thought that though these are 
not reproduced, our country can continue to advance. Our 
unwillingness to live simply either prevents a large proportion 
of our most competent men and women from marrying, or 
causes many of those who marry to have few children. All 
men are not created equal biologically, and it is the best who 
are dying out. We must recognize that fact, and act upon it 
before we have worked irreparable injury. All this has been 
said many times by eugenists, but it must be repeated again 
and again until it is not only believed but acted upon. Biology 
teaches it; common sense insists upon it; and now our purely 
geographical studies enforce the same conclusion. 

The second condition which controls the distribution of 
people who attain eminence is opportunity. This appears un- 
mistakably in only one portion of Figure 82, but there it stands 
out sharply. Notice how West Virginia with 19 eminent 
persons per 100,000, Tennessee with 18, and Arkansas with 11 
fall below the surrounding states. This is apparently because 
these are the portions of the South where mountains and other 
physiographic disadvantages cause the people to degenerate 
into "poor whites" and "crackers'* in spite of a good inherit- 
ance. What these backward communities need is a "chance." 
They need the opportunities that are brought by schools, rail- 
roads, factories, and the other appurtenances of civilization. 
They need also the opportunity brought by freedom from such 
bodily afflictions as the hookworm disease. Kentucky, which 
now has a rank of 28, would probably stand much higher were 



THE CONDITIONS OF CIVILIZATION 217 

not a large part of the state peopled by mountain whites. The 
same is true of North Carolina. Perhaps this state would not 
equal South Carolina, which had a large number of old families 
of unusual ability, but the two would be much nearer than now. 
A large fraction of North Carolina consists either of mountains 
or of swampy, unhealthy tracts along the coast, while South 
Carolina is almost free from such disadvantages. In another 
portion of the country it may be that Maine lags behind New 
Hampshire and Vermont in part because of her relative remote- 
ness and lack of opportunity. Doubtless other places show the 
same conditions, but the matter is not certain. For example, 
Nevada's low position with a rank of only 15 is probably due 
in part to this cause, but it is doubtful whether she has been 
much worse off than Utah, which has the respectable rank 
of 86. Idaho, Wyoming, Montana, and the Dakotas certainly 
had no more opportunities than Nevada previous to 1890, for 
they were supplied with fewer railroads, and were much less 
easily in touch with the rest of the world. Yet their rank is 88, 
or more than twice that of Nevada. Taking the map as a 
whole it seems that although opportunity is highly important, 
it is less important than heredity. 

Turning now to our last factor, that is, energy as determined 
by climate, we see that in general the outlines of Figure 82 are 
like those of the climatic map in Figure 26. To be sure there 
are important differences. For instance, the very high area 
which covers all the northeast and center of the country in the 
energy map is split into a New England and a Nebraska por- 
tion in the map of ability. Yet the Nebraska area of many 
eminent people displays an interesting resemblance to the 
tongue which projects out in the same direction on the energy 
map. The Pacific coast is likewise high on both maps, although 
there are differences of detail. Nevada, too, is at the head of 
a tongue of low conditions in both cases. On the Atlantic coast 
both maps rise from Maine to Massachusetts, and decline from 



218 CIVILIZATION AND CLIMATE 

New York to Florida. In the map of ability, however, high con- 
ditions go somewhat farther south than in the other map, and 
South Carolina, presumably because of heredity, rises unex- 
pectedly. The other southern states from Georgia to Louisiana 
are also a little higher on the ability map than on its com- 
panion, probably because of the wealth and opportunities which 
prevailed in them previous to the Civil War, or else because of 
the abundance of old families with high ideals and strong minds. 
Yet even these states are lower than the tier of northern 
states from Pennsylvania to Iowa, where the average inherit- 
ance is probably no higher, if as high, but where the climate 
gives energy. 

Taken as a whole the map of ability is an admirable example 
of the way in which a variety of factors cooperate in determin- 
ing the status of civilization. Climate, as it were, paints a 
broad background shading gradually from very high in certain 
areas to lower in others. Then the other factors come into play. 
They paint fresh colors which may or may not resemble those 
of climate. In some cases, such as Massachusetts, the same 
color is laid on by climate, heredity, and opportunity, not to 
mention proximity to the sea and to Europe, facilities for manu- 
facturing, and various other factors which perhaps may be 
considered as opportunities. Where that happens, high civili- 
zation is sure to prevail. In other cases, such as South Caro- 
lina, the climate paints only a moderately high color, inherit- 
ance paints a higher one, education a low, the presence of the 
negroes a still lower, and so on indefinitely. 

Such, then, is the meaning of our maps. They do not indi- 
cate that climate is the only factor in determining the condition 
of civilization, or even the main one. Far from it. Yet they 
indicate that it is as essential as any other. Today civiliza- 
tion seems to make great progress only where a stimulating 
climate exists. A high civilization may be carried from such 
places to others, but it makes a vigorous growth and is fruitful 



THE CONDITIONS OF CIVILIZATION 219 

in new ideas only where the climate gives men energy. Else- 
where it lags, or is kept at a high pitch only by constant reen- 
forcements from more favored regions. In the past men have 
perceived that climate is apparently one of the most important 
conditions which favor or retard the growth of civilization. 
They have been greatly impressed not only by its effects upon 
their own bodies and minds, but by the fact that in warm coun- 
tries the amount of progress is closely in harmony with what 
would be expected on the basis of one's own feelings. At the 
same time they have realized that among countries located in 
the same latitude there are differences of culture almost as great 
as between temperate and tropical countries. This has seemed 
to indicate that climate is not so important as the tropical 
regions would suggest. Now, however, we see that when 
people's actual achievements under various climatic conditions 
are measured, we must revise our opinion. Variations of tem- 
perature from day to day are much more important than has 
been realized. Therefore, in the same latitude the stimulating 
effect of the climate may differ greatly. The civilization of 
the world varies almost precisely as we should expect if human 
energy were one of the essential conditions, and if energy were 
in large measure dependent upon climate. 



CHAPTER XI 
The Shifting of Cumatic Zones 

In our study of man and climate two distinct methods have 
thus far been employed. We must now resort to a third. The 
three lead to conclusions whose degree of probability varies 
greatly. I cannot too strongly insist that the results obtained 
by the different methods be sharply distinguished. The first 
may be defined as the qualitative study of facts which can now 
be observed or which are so well known that they are not reason- 
ably open to question. This is exemplified in the early chapters 
where we considered the effect of tropical and temperate cli- 
mates upon white men and negroes. In the past, from Herodo- 
tus to Ratzel, the vast body of geographical reasoning has of 
necessity been of this type. It consists of picking out typical 
instances of a given phenomenon in as many regions as pos- 
sible, and then determining the general law by which they seem 
to be governed. For example, we compared the white man and 
negro in the United States, South Africa, and the Bahamas, 
and found that in each case the race which has gone from a 
more bracing to a less bracing climate is apparently weakened, 
while the race which has gone to a more stimulating climate is 
strengthened. General laws based on reasoning of this sort 
are extremely valuable, but lack the highest degree of cer- 
tainty, for they depend largely upon individual judgment. 
Hence, for two thousand years people have remained undecided 
whether climate is or is not of primary importance in deter- 
mining the distribution of civilization. 

The second method may be defined as the qtMntitative meas- 



THE SHIFTING OF CLIMATIC ZONES 221 

urement of facts which are within the range of observation and 
which can be tested again and again. It is exemplified in our 
study of factory workers, students, life insurance, and educa- 
tion. It eliminates personal judgment, and thus gives certainty 
to the primary facts upon which future reasoning is based. A 
hundred men might examine our factory statistics, and they 
would all come to the same conclusion. The operatives worked 
at a certain rate in winter or summer; they accomplished the 
most when the temperature was about 60^; and they worked 
relatively fast after a moderate drop of temperature. These 
are facts, not inferences. Of course they need to be tested, but 
that can soon be done. The only requisite is that tests be made 
by enough investigators to insure against accidental mistakes, 
and to show that the same conditions recur repeatedly. The 
final results can be expressed numerically. When once obtained 
they furnish an unshakable foundation. Therefore, the main 
portion of this book is far more important than the earlier or 
later chapters. This does not mean that I delude myself with 
the idea that the problem of the relation of climate to civiliza- 
tion is solved. Far from it. I mean only that when the sta- 
tistical method here employed is tested and its imperfections 
are eliminated, its ultimate results will be a body of facts which 
cannot be gainsaid. So far as the facts are yet available, they 
show, for instance, that if all the people of the world were like 
those of the eastern United States, we should not expect as 
much energy in central Asia as in western Europe. That is as 
far as we can go with unassailable facts. We may draw the 
inference that the condition of civilization is closely related to 
the degree of energy, but that remains to be tested. The mere 
fact, however, that diminished energy would be expected not only 
northward and southward from the main centers of civilization, 
but also as one penetrates farther into the interior of a great 
continent, removes one of the two great objections which have 



222 CIVILIZATION AND CLIMATE 

prevented people from believing that climate and civilization 
are intimately connected. 

The other objection to such a relationship is the supposed 
fact that many ancient nations grew great in places whose 
climate was not stimulating. The truth of this cannot easily 
be tested, for neither of the methods already discussed can be 
employed. We must resort to a third, less reliable than either 
of the others. Instead of a qualitative or quantitative study 
of facts which can actually be observed, we must first recon- 
struct our facts, and then apply one or both of the other 
methods. The facts as to the general distribution of the more 
advanced civilizations two or three thousand years ago can 
easily be reconstructed from historical and archaeological 
records. The facts as to the ancient climates, on the contrary, 
can be reconstructed only with great difficulty and uncertainty. 
No general agreement has yet been reached, and the hypothesis 
favored in this book is avowedly only one of several. Let me 
emphasize the fact that it was not in any sense framed to fit 
the conclusions set forth in earlier chapters, for it had reached 
practically the present form before the results of the work of 
operatives and students were known. The fact that it fits into 
those results so perfectly in spite of its independent origin is 
one of its strongest claims to recognition. Nevertheless, it 
stands in a more uncertain position than do conclusions based 
directly on facts of observation, or, still more, upon exact 
measurements. Hence, the remainder of this book makes no 
claim to stand on the same basis as the earlier portions, and 
should be judged with corresponding leniency. In order to 
complete our subject it is necessary to investigate the climate 
of the past, but this forces us to rely not on observed climatic 
facts, but upon observed facts of quite a different kind which 
we endeavor to interpret in terms of climate. 

The subject of climatic changes during historic times has 
been warmly debated for many years. It seems to be going 



THE SHIFTING OF CLIMATIC ZONES 228 

through stages like those through which the great controversy 
as to geological changes of climate has passed. A few genera- 
tions ago scientists believed that the climate of the world had 
been uniform since the completion of a definite creative act. 
Then, as geology began to become a real science, the opinion 
arose that the earth had cooled from a gaseous to a liquid condi- 
tion, and finally had become solid. As a necessary corollary 
it followed that since the crust took shape there must have been 
a progressive cooling accompanied by a freeing of the atmos- 
phere from moisture and by a drying of the lands. This was 
embodied in the nebular hypothesis which until recently domi- 
nated our ideas of the earth's evolution. It seemed to be 
strongly supported by the presence of fossil corals and other 
equatorial animals or plants in high latitudes where the tem- 
perature is now far too low to permit their existence. 

While the nebular hypothesis was entrenching itself, another 
line of studies was preparing to revolutionize our ideas of 
geological climates. It was discovered that glaciation once 
took place upon a large scale in many regions now free from 
permanent snow. At first this was supposed to have occurred 
at only one epoch. Gradually, however, geologists perceived 
that the glacial period consisted of at least four epochs sepa- 
rated by interglacial epochs during which the climate became 
as mild as at present, or even milder. Then they discovered that 
in the middle of geological time another glacial period occurred 
in the Permian era. This, too, appears to have been divided 
into epochs. Next still other glacial periods were discovered 
far back near the beginning of the record preserved in the 
rocks. At last geologists have almost universally concluded 
that throughout the hundreds of millions of years which form 
geological time the earth's climate has pulsated back and forth. 
At some times a vast mantle of ice has spread over regions 
within thirty degrees of the equator, while at others the ice has 
melted, and almost tropical conditions have prevailed as far 



224 CIVILIZATION AND CLIMATE 

north as Greenland. Neither has stability prevailed for any 
great length of geological time, nor has there been a change 
which has progressed steadily in one direction in response to 
the gradual clearing of the air demanded by the nebular hypoth- 
esis. The idea of climatic instability is now so thoroughly 
grounded that most geologists have rejected the nebular 
hypothesis. They are inclined to accept some substitute such 
as Chamberlin's planetesimal hypothesis which supposes that 
the earth was formed by the gradual accretion of small plane- 
tesimals or meteoric bodies which are thought to have abounded 
in the space now occupied by the solar system. 

In addition to this, another change has come over geological 
opinion. As the moraines and other remains of the last ice-age 
were studied more carefully, it became evident that the latest 
melting of the ice sheet did not take place steadily. At least 
three times the climate ceased to become milder and either 
remained nearly uniform for a while, or else reverted somewhat 
toward the conditions which induce glaciation. These post- 
glacial ^^stages" are constantly becoming more and more clearly 
defined. They show that after the main pulsations of the 
glacial epoch had passed away, there was a series of minor 
pulsations of the same kind, but less severe. This does not 
finish the matter, however, for glaciers are by no means the 
most delicate test of climatic changes. The salt lakes of arid 
regions where there is not enough rain to enable the water to 
rise to an outlet are perhaps the best of all rain gauges. In 
places like the Dead Sea valley in Palestine or the Searles 
basin in California there are great numbers of old strands, 
fifteen or twenty in some cases. These lie above the present 
level of the water, and indicate that an ancient lake fell irreg- 
ularly. Sometimes it declined rapidly, and again it stood 
stationary for a while, or else rose toward its former level, 
although the evidence of this latter change is usually concealed. 
These many movements up and down indicate climatic changes 



THE SHIFTING OF CLIMATIC ZONES 226 

like those of the glacial period except that they are much 
smaller. They show that during the past twenty or thirty 
thousand years the climate of the earth has been subject to a 
great number of small changes, just as during the inmiense 
lapse of geological times it has been subject to a large number 
of great changes, each of which in turn seems to have been 
diversified by many minor variations. The last of the lake 
strands are evidently recent, probably only a few hundred years 
old, and certainly not more than a few thousand. Thus from 
the earliest geological times down almost to the present day, 
change rather than uniformity has been the rule. The more 
the matter is studied, the more numerous do the changes 
appear, and the more universally are they accepted by geolo- 
gists. 

Coming to historical times we find that the course of thought 
has been much the same as for the vast periods of geology. The 
matter has not yet gone so far, however, and there is still an 
important difference of opinion among people whose judgment 
is worthy of respect. In many parts of Asia, Africa, and 
America ruins of towns and cities are located where now the 
supply of water seems utterly inadequate. Old roads traverse 
deserts where caravans cannot now travel ; traces of dry springs 
are seen ; bridges span channels which carry no water for years 
at a time ; old fields are carefully walled in places where now the 
rainfall is too scanty to permit agriculture and where no water 
can be brought for irrigation. These things and many others, 
which almost every traveler in semiarid or desert countries has 
seen for himself, seem to be almost irrefutable evidence that 
at some time the climate was moister than now. 

This has given rise to two hypotheses, which are now almost 
abandoned, those of deforestation and of progressive desicca- 
tion. According to supporters of the first hypothesis, the 
reckless cutting of forests has not only allowed the rains to 
denude the mountain sides of soil, but has caused an actual 



226 CIVILIZATION AND CLIMATE 

diminution in rainfall. This view once had a considerable popu- 
lar vogue, but for various reasons it has now practically ceased 
to be considered among scientists. In the first place modem 
measurements of rainfall before and after the deforestation of 
large tracts are contradictory. At best they show only slight 
differences, too small to have any appreciable effect, and in 
practically every case so doubtful that they may be due merely 
to the accident of an especially dry or rainy period of a few 
years coming not long before or after the forest was cut. 
Moreover, many of the strongest evidences of desiccation are 
found in places such as southeastern Syria where there is no 
reason to think that the country has ever been forested since it 
was first occupied by civilized man. Finally, there are thousands 
of square miles in Chinese Turkestan where the forests them- 
selves have died because of lack of water, and are still standing 
as gaunt skeletons preserved for a thousand years or more 
because of the extreme dryness of the air. 

The hypothesis of progressive desiccation assumes that dur- 
ing historic times the earth has steadily been growing drier. 
This view has been widely held, and many careful students still 
uphold it. The majority of its supporters, however, appar- 
ently think that it needs modification along lines which will 
shortly appear. 

While evidence of more water in the past than at present is 
prominent in many places, there is also much of the contrary 
nature, less noticeable, but no less convincing. For example, 
ruins are located on the floor of lakes which must have been 
partially dry when the structures were erected. Elsewhere one 
finds irrigation canals in places now so damp that their con- 
struction would seem to be a waste of energy. In north Africa 
and Syria huge irrigation works are located in regions of 
another kind, which not only are dry now, but must have been 
dry in the past. Otherwise the Romans would not have ex- 
pended such enormous labor to get water. These things and 



THE SHIFTING OF CLIMATIC ZONES 227 

others furnish ahnost irrefutable evidence that at certain 
periods the water supply of many semiarid regions was no 
greater than at present. Because such evidence is less abun- 
dant and noticeable than the other kind, the believers in progres- 
sive desiccation have overlooked it. On the other hand, other 
students have been so impressed by it that they have held that 
there have been no changes of climate during historic times, 
and that the fluctuations which f oUowed the last glacial epoch 
came to an end before the beginning of history. 

There seems only one way to reconcile these two opposing 
views, each of which is based on unassailable evidence. That 
way is to group all the evidence according to its date, and see 
whether the indications of moisture come at one time and of 
aridity at another. Such seems to be the case. For example, at 
the time of Herodotus, between 400 and 500 B.C., all the 
evidence points to moist conditions in western Asia and northern 
Africa; about 200 B.C. a somewhat drier climate apparently 
prevailed, although not so dry as now; then at the time of 
Christ conditions were once more favorable. After about six 
centuries of gradually increasing aridity, the worst conditions 
during historic times were reached about 650 A.D. An im- 
provement followed which culminated about 1000 A.D., then 
came another bad time, reaching its worst in the thirteenth 
century. It was followed by a rapid recovery, which did not 
last long enough to be of great value. Since the fourteenth 
century the tendency apparently has been toward aridity. The 
whole matter is summed up in the dotted line of Figure 88. 
There the high parts of the curve represent moist conditions 
and the low dry. The curve is only approximate, and does not 
represent all the data now available, but it seems wise to repro- 
duce it unchanged from ^^Palestine and its Transformation" 
and "The Climatic Factor." 

From what has been said, it appears that during historic 
times climatic pulsations have taken place. They seem to be of 



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THE SHIFTING OF CLIMATIC ZONES 229 

essentially the same nature as glacial epochs and post-glacial 
stages, the difference being only in degree. Apparently, the 
conditions of the geological past merge without break into 
those of the present. While this "pulsatory" hypothesis meets 
with much opposition, its critics are almost unanimous in ad- 
mitting that the Caspian Sea, for example, stood lower in the 
seventh century or thereabout than at present, and higher than 
now in the tenth. They also admit that the climatic pulsa- 
tions thus indicated were more important than any that have 
been observed since records began to be kept. They do not ad- 
mit, however, that the pulsations were large enough to possess 
appreciable historic importance. They also deny that between 
the end of the last post-glacial stage, say 2000 B.C., and the 
dry period in 600-700 A.D., there is any proof that the climate 
as a whole was moister than at present. The reader who 
would know more about the matter should consult the works 
listed in the Preface. 

In order to test the pulsatory hypothesis, some means of 
actually measuring the climate of the past seems necessary. In 
the southwestern United States there appear to have been 
changes like those in western Asia. In that region. Professor 
A. E. Douglass has found that the thickness of the annual 
rings of trees furnishes a reliable indication of variations in 
the water supply from year to year. Corrections must be 
made to eliminate the effects of age, but this can be done by 
mathematical methods of considerable accuracy. It is diffi- 
cult to determine whether the climate at the beginning and 
end of a tree's life was the same, but it is easy to determine 
whether there have been pulsations while the tree was making 
its growth. If the trees from various parts of a given dis- 
trict form thick rings for a century, then thin ones for another 
hundred years, and again thick ones, we may be almost sure 
that they have lived through a long period of unfavorable 
climate. 



280 



CIVILIZATION AND CLIMATE 



During the years 1911 and 1912, under the auspices of the 
Carnegie Institution of Washington, I measured the thickness 
of the rings of growth on the stumps of about 450 Sequoia 
trees which had been cut for fence posts, shingles, and pencil 
wood in California. The trees varied from 250 to nearly 
8260 years of age. The great majority were over 1000 years 
old, 79 over 2000, and 8 over 8000. Even where only a few 
trees are available, the record is surprisingly accurate except 
for occasional accidents. Where the number approximates 100, 
accidental variations are largely eliminated. Accordingly, in 
California we have a climatic record which is fairly accurate 
for 2000 years and approximate for 1000 years more. This 
is expressed graphically in the solid line of Figure 88. In 
order to bring out the details the more reliable portion from 
100 B.C. to the present time has been reproduced in Figure 
84. This is identical with the corresponding part of Figure 
88, except that the vertical scale is three times as great. 




TcTttii M m m mim m m m 



mm m mm 



Figrnre 34. Changes of Qimate in California for SOOO Years. At the Right 
Hand End the Dotted Line is Probably Correct 



In general, the tree curve resembles that of changes of 
climate in Asia, although there are differences in detail. Be- 
ginning with 1000 B.C., both curves have a maximum. They 
dip down about 800 B.C., and rise high not far from 700. 
About 400 B.C. they disagree, but this is probably due largely 
to the absence of reliable data for the Asiatic curve. In the 
second century before Christ both are low, but not so low as at 
present; at the time of Christ they rise high, and continue to 



THE SHIFTING OF CLIMATIC ZONES 281 

fluctuate together till 800 A.D. At that time they show a 
difference which may have arisen because I was unduly im- 
pressed by the abandonment of many ruins in Chinese Turke- 
stan at the end of the third century. The dash line is probably 
more accurate than the dotted and should be used. In the 
seventh century both curves reach their lowest point. Then, 
from 660 A.D. onward, their general course is closely similar, 
especially about 1000 A.D. 

The general agreement between the two curves seems to 
indicate that the main climatic variations of western Asia and 
of the similar region in the United States are approximately 
the same. This means that we are dealing with a phenomenon 
which is presumably world-wide, although its precise form 
may differ from place to place. It also means that in the only 
case where exact figures are available year after year, the 
inferences drawn from isolated facts in another continent are 
confirmed. The case is like that of the measurements of factory 
work. After employing the qualitative method and determin- 
ing what kind of events have apparently taken place, we have 
turned to the quantitative method and have tested our con- 
clusions by actual measurements. The results confirm the pul- 
satory hypothesis. They indicate not only that climatic pul- 
sations have taken place, but that as we go back toward the 
dawn of history, they become more pronounced. 

The only serious objection raised by opponents of this view 
is that various types of vegetation, such as the palm tree, 
grew in places like Palestine in the past and grow there today. 
This, they say, precludes a change of climate, for if Palestine 
were colder two thousand years ago than now, the palm coidd 
not have flourished. The truth of this statement is undeniable 
if we are talking about pronounced changes in the mean tem- 
perature. As a matter of fact, however, the evidence points 
toward changes of precipitation much more than of tempera- 
ture. The best students of glaciation agree that during the 



282 CIVILIZATION AND CLIMATE 

glacial period the mean temperature of the earth as a whole 
was probably not more than 10° or 16^ F. cooler than at pres- 
ent. If the climate at the time of Christ differed from that of 
the present time by one tenth of the difference between our 
modem climate and that of the glacial period, the temperature 
of Palestine would only have to be about 1° F. cooler than 
now. That would scarcely produce any appreciable effect 
upon vegetation. The actual figures show that Palestine might 
be at least 2° or 8^ F. colder than now without preventing 
the growth of the palm tree. Moreover, the extremes may have 
been greater than at present without much change in the 
average temperature. If the winter storms were colder than 
now by a few degrees, that would not hurt the palm tree. In 
Persia I have camped in six or eight inches of snow almost under 
the shade of a pahn grove whose dates, packed in a sheepskin, 
were the most delicious that I have ever eaten. The ther- 
mometer fell below 20° F., and a strong north wind blew over 
the tent, but the palm trees did not suffer, for in two or three 
days the air was again as balmy as spring. So far as has yet 
been shown, the conditions of vegetation nowhere seem to be out 
of harmony with our hypothesis. 

The general attitude of geographers towards the problem 
of changes of climate seems to be that expressed by Professor 
D. W. Johnson of Columbia University in a recent review of 
"The Climatic Factor." 

The volume, he says, "does not solve all the problems pre- 
sented by a theory of climatic pulsations. It does not pretend 
to do so. It does aim to show that the evidence thus far avail- 
able strongly supports the belief that there have been within 
historic time climatic changes of a pulsatory nature. In this 
the author has, in the opinion of the reviewer, been successful.*' 

One of the strongest reasons for believing that the climate 
of the historic past was distinctly different from that of the 
present has come into notice so recently that it is not yet 



THE SHIFTING OF CLIMATIC ZONES 288 

generally known, even to geographers. It is peculiarly impor- 
tant because it employs a method absolutely different from 
those already mentioned, but reaches the same conclusion. 
Every river holds in solution a certain amount of sodium, 
chlorine, calcium, carbon dioxide, and various other materials. 
Under ordinary circumstances this cannot be detected except 
by chemical analysis. If the river flows into a lake which has 
no outlet, however, the water is evaporated, but the dissolved 
constituents remain, and gradually increase until a brine is 
formed. Certain materials, such as the calcite, which forms 
tufa or other kinds of limestone, are removed by alg« or 
bacteria, and certain others, such as potassium, seem to be 
absorbed by the clays of the lake bottoms. Sodium, and espe- 
cially chlorine, however, do not appear to be removed until 
the brine becomes completely saturated so that crystals of 
common salt are formed. Hence, if we know the amount of 
sodium and chlorine brought in by the rivers each year and 
the amount dissolved in an unsaturated lake, we can easily 
calculate the time that has elapsed either since the lake was 
first formed, or since it last overflowed. A body of water that 
overflows, as everyone knows, soon becomes essentially as fresh 
as the rivers that supply it. 

On the eastern side of the Sierra Nevada mountains the 
bodies of brackish water known as Owens Lake, lying in south- 
em California, and Pyramid and Winnemucca lakes near 
Reno, Nevada, are peculiarly well adapted to our present pur- 
pose. Owens Lake receives most of its water from the river 
of the same name. Both have been measured and analyzed with 
unusual thoroughness because part of the river is carried to 
Los Angeles in a remarkable aqueduct nearly 260 miles long. 
H, S. Gale of the United States Greological Survey has care- 
fully gathered all the available data. He concludes that, 
according to the figures of the aqueduct engineers, the accumu- 
lation of the chlorine of Owens Lake would require 4200 years, 



284 CIVILIZATION AND CLIMATE 

and the sodium 8500, the average being 8850. A series of 
fresh strands and an old outlet channel show clearly that the 
lake overflowed not long ago. Hence, Gale concludes that 
^^4000 years or considerably less" is the length of time since 
the lake stood at the outlet level, 180 or 190 feet higher than 
at present. These figures, however, require modification. The 
reason why Gale gives the period as ^*4000 years or considerably 
leu" is that the figures of the engineers omit the lower third 
of the drainage area of Owens Lake, and this is the part 
where the waters flow most slowly and where the clays and other 
deposits which surround them are most saline. Hence, more salt 
proportionately should be accumulated here than higher up. 
Moreover, as he carefully points out, no allowance is made for 
the well-ascertained fact that when the rivers are more abun> 
dantly supplied with water, as must have been the case when the 
lake was full, the amount of dissolved salt is also greater 
although not in direct ratio to the water supply. When due 
allowance is made for these conditions and for others of minor 
importance, the time since the last overflow is reduced to about 
2000 years. In other words, 2000 years ago, more or less, 
the climate of the Owens Lake region was so moist that the 
lake expanded to two and one half times its present size and 
sent a stream down the outlet channel. 

At Pyramid and Winnemucca lakes the conditions are essen- 
tially the same as at Owens. The measurements, especially 
those of the lakes, however, are much less exact than at the 
California lake because no great aqueduct has demanded pre- 
cise figures as to the volume and constitution of the water. 
Hence we do not find so close an agreement between the sodium 
and chlorine. Pyramid and Winnemucca lie almost adjacent. 
Both are supplied mainly by the Truckee River, which some- 
times fiows to one and sometimes to the other. According to 
J. Claude Jones of the University of Nevada, the Truckee 
River would require 2400 years to supply the sodium in the two 



THE SHIFTING OF CLIMATIC ZONES 285 

lakes, and 4400 for the chlorine, the average being 8400. Here, 
as in the other case, a considerable allowance must be made for 
salts washed in from the surrounding saline lake deposits by 
small streams not tributary to the Truckee, and for the much 
larger amount of dissolved material which the Truckee itself 
must have contained when its volume was larger than now. Thus 
we are led to conclude that not much more than 2000 years ago, 
and possibly less, the climate of this region was such that 
Pyramid and Winnemucca lakes united and formed a large lake 
which overflowed to the north at a level about 70 feet above 
that of Pyramid at present. The outlet channel can plainly 
be seen winding away to the Smoke Creek Desert. The agree- 
ment of this region with Owens Lake is striking. It indicates 
that about 2000 years ago the dry, western parts of the United 
States were still under the influence of a pronounced moist 
period. 

The lakes do more than indicate a change of climate within 
two or three thousand years. They also show that the change 
has been highly irregular. This is proved by a large number 
of strands lying below the level of the outlets, and by the way 
in which these vary in character and in the extent to which they 
have been covered by fresh detritus washed down from the 
mountains. At Owens Lake there are four series of strands. 
These apparently correspond to the four chief periods when 
the climate has grown moist as shown by the growth of the 
big trees in Figure 84. Fortunately, Owens Lake lies only 
fifty miles east of the region where the trees were measured. 
The general climatic fluctuations of both districts are the 
same. The uppermost strand, the huge gravel beach at the 
level of the outlet, must date from about the time of Christ, 
for both the chemical evidence and the trees point to this con- 
clusion. A series of similar, but much smaUer beaches at 
lower levels record the approach of a dry period during which 
the lake fell to a low level whose exact position cannot be de- 



286 CIVILIZATION AND CLIMATE 

termined. Judging by the trees this must have cuhninated 
about 650 A.D. During this period gravels were washed in 
by mountain streams and deposited what are known as fans, 
or low, flattened cones, which may be several miles long. These 
covered the old strands in many places, and extended far 
below their level to the diminished lake. 

Next the waters rose again, but not halfway to their former 
level. They formed two small strands, not gravelly like their 
predecessors, but faint and sandy as if the winds were weak. 
They must date from about 1000 A.D., when the trees indicate 
a wet period, for they are younger than the gravel fans of the 
preceding dry time. The next phase of the lake was a dry 
period, which was most extreme about 1260 A.D. More 
gravels were then deposited, and the fact that they cover the 
preceding strands and extend to a much lower level shows that 
the lake then stood low, as would be expected from the trees. 

The next high period of the lake, about 1860 A.D. according 
to the trees, is unusually interesting. The water did not 
reach so high a level as formerly, because the rainy period 
was short, but it formed a large, high beach of gravel 
quite different from the preceding beaches. This seems 
to indicate great storminess, a condition which is also 
suggested by the fact that the growth of the trees at this 
time increased more rapidly than at any other period for 
nearly 8000 years. In Europe during the same century, un- 
precedented storms caused great floods in France, while the 
severity of the waves was so intense as to break through beaches 
and sand dunes, and convert large marshy areas into portions 
of the sea along the coasts of Holland and Lincolnshire. Dur- 
ing the winters the rivers froze to an unheard-of degree, and 
three or four times men and animals passed from Grermany to 
Sweden on the solid ice of the Baltic Sea, an occurrence 
unknown in our day. In England the summers were so rainy 
that the average yield of grain diminished disastrously. In 



THE SHIFTING OF CLIMATIC ZONES 287 

self-defense many landowners gave up grain-raising, and turned 
their attention to sheep and cattle. Distress and discontent 
were the inevitable result among the peasants. Far away in 
central Asia the Caspian Sea and the lake of Lop Nor both 
rose with great rapidity between 1800 and 1850 A.D. Thus 
from California to China evidence of various kinds unites to 
indicate that during the fourteenth century there occurred a 
short period of unusual storminess. Such conditions, if inten- 
sified and prolonged, would probably cause the accumulation 
of enormous glaciers. 

To return to Owens Lake, the lowest series of strands is 
sandy and small compared with the large gravel bar of 1860, 
and was evidently formed under different conditions. Presum- 
ably the lake fell to a low level about 1600 A.D., and rose 
during the next century or more to form the highest strand of 
the latest series. The evidence of Owens Lake is much strength- 
ened by that of its neighbors. At Mono Lake farther north 
in California, the character and relations of the numerous 
strands, as I hope to show in detail in a later publication, are 
almost identical with those at Owens, although there are also 
some older ones at higher levels. At Pyramid Lake the same is 
true. Thus on all sides there is the strongest evidence not only 
that the climate of the past differed from that of the present, 
but that many minor pulsations have taken place, and that 
these have grown less intense during the historic period. 

It must not be supposed that the same kind of climatic 
changes have taken place in all parts of the world. Penck, 
who stands at the forefront among German students of the 
glacial period, has come to the conclusion that this is by no 
means the case. He shows that on the northern side of arid 
or desert areas we find densely saline lakes, like Great Salt Lake 
in Utah, surrounded by old strands. These indicate that the 
lakes have long been contracting, so that they have abandoned 
first one strand and then another, while at the same time their 



288 CIVILIZATION AND CLIMATE 

water has become more and more highly concentrated. On the 
equatorial side of the desert belt, on the contrary, we have such 
lakes as Chad in Africa, a shallow sheet of water, only slightly 
salty and not surrounded by any great series of strands. It 
has the appearance of being a new lake formed by a recent 
increase in rainfall. Penck points out a similar contrast 
between the sand dunes on the poleward and equatorward sides 
of the desert belt in both hemispheres. On the poleward side, 
the dunes consist of loose, moving sand appropriate to places 
that are growing drier. On the other side there are plenty of 
dunes, but they are covered with a sparse vegetation which is 
sufficient to keep them from moving and to prevent the forma- 
tion of new dunes. Since their formation, the rainfall has evi- 
dently increased. From the dunes and lakes, as well as from 
other evidence such as the snowline, Penck concludes that 
changes of climate consist of an alternate shifting of the 
climatic zones. During a glacial period he holds that the 
northern storm belt is shifted southward so that the storminess 
of Germany and the northern United States is pushed into 
Italy or the southern United States. In the same way the 
desert belt is displaced toward the equator. Thus the polar 
side of the desert has more storminess and moisture than 
formerly, while on the equatorial side the desert is shoved into 
an area where equatorial rains formerly supported abundant 
vegetation. During a time such as the present, on the contrary, 
the desert expands on its northern border. Its lakes diminish, 
leaving strands behind them and becoming very saline; vege- 
tation dies; and the wind is free to pile up sand dunes. On 
the other, or equatorial side of the desert, the amount of rain 
is greater than before. Hence, basins which formerly con- 
tained no water are now filled with shallow lakes, such as Chad, 
which have not yet had time to become highly saline. Vegeta- 
tion also spreads into the desert and sand dunes become cov- 
ered with it and cease to be moved by the wind. Few people 



THE SHIFTING OF CLIMATIC ZONES 289 

have studied glacial problems more carefully than Penck. One 
result of the minuteness and care of his studies is that he is 
one of the foremost advocates of great climatic complexity. 
He distinguishes several post-glacial stages, and in addition 
brings his conclusions so far toward our own time that he 
states that a peculiarly dry period prevailed in central Asia 
as late as the early part of our era. 

While Penck was formulating his hypothesis of a shifting 
of climatic zones as an explanation of the glacial period, I was 
working out the same hypothesis in respect to historic times. 
Our work was wholly independent, being based on different 
lines of evidence, and, so far as I am aware, neither knew what 
the other was doing. The shifting of climatic zones is by no 
means a new idea, for it has been vaguely suggested many 
times. The new thing is to find direct evidence of it, such as 
Penck presents in his discussion of lakes and dunes. As to 
historic times, the ruins of Guatemala and Yucatan furnish 
perhaps the best available test, for those regions are the most 
notable example of a civilization which developed within the 
torrid zone. The ruins of that civilization are the most remark- 
able archaeological remains in the western hemisphere. Part 
lie near the northern coast of Yucatan in a relatively dry 
region inhabited today by a fairly prosperous agricultural 
population. Many of the finest ruins, however, and most of the 
more ancient ones, lie back from the coast in a wilderness of 
dense forest and jungle. There agriculture is almost impos- 
sible. The difficulty of clearing the rank vegetation and getting 
it dry enough to burn before a new crop of lusty bushes grows 
up is enormous. Fevers, too, prevail most of the year. They 
are the worst types of tropical malaria, not to mention many 
other kinds. Foreigners are quickly attacked, and it would be 
almost suicidal for a white man to attempt to live there per- 
manently, even with all the appliances of modem medical 
science. The natives also suffer terribly. Many of the chil- 



240 CIVILIZATION AND CLIMATE 

dren are apparently killed by malaria and other tropical dis- 
eases in infancy. Those who grow up carry the effects with 
them through life. Seventy-fiye per cent of the people who 
worked at the Panama Canal are thought to have had malaria 
germs in their systems, even though they did not show outward 
signs of the disease, and the case is probably even worse among 
the natives of the lowland forests of Quintana Roo, Campeche, 
and Peten, where most of the early Maya ruins are located. 
One has only to look at their swollen paunches to see that some- 
thing is the matter, and their dull, apathetic manner, both in 
work and play, is another sign of scnne deep-seated physical 
ailment. 

Here, where today the Indians are so diseased and agriculture 
so difficult, there dwelt an ancient race characterized by the 
qualities which we have defined as most essential to a high 
civilization. The Mayas of Yucatan and Guatemala, alone 
among the aborigines of America, carried to high perfection 
the arts of sculpture and architecture. The Incas of Peru, 
to be sure, made striking buildings, but they had no idea how 
to adorn their simple structures with columns, rosettes, arches, 
gargoyles, pediments, and many other architectural devices 
which were universal among the Mayas. These clever people 
were also adepts in astronomy, for they framed the most exact 
calendar ever known except our own. Theirs was better than 
that which Russia and the nations of eastern Europe still use. 
Most remarkable of all, the Mayas developed the art of writing 
and carried it to a pitch higher than that reached by the 
Chinese, for they apparently began to use signs to denote 
sounds instead of having a sign for each individual word. Their 
temples are great structures which sometimes rise three stories 
in height and have a length of three or four hundred feet. A 
single city often contained a score of noble buildings and 
extended over many square miles of territory. The Mayas 
need not shrink from comparison with any people who had no 



THE SHIFTING OF CLIMATIC ZONES 241 

greater opportunities. They were terribly hampered in many 
ways. They were not blessed with progressive neighbors to 
spur them on and teach them new ways. They had no beasts 
of burden. They could not plough the fields, nor transport 
loads except by their own labor. Every one of the great stones 
which form their temples and palaces must have been brought 
by human effort, a task which none but a most energetic race 
would undertake. Another disadvantage was the absence of 
metal tools. The Mayas perhaps had a little copper, but not 
a trace has been found of any metal tool that would be of 
service in carving their intricate f a9ades and delicately wrought 
statues. Flint or obsidian was all that they had, and yet with 
such poor tools they created works of art which command 
sincere admiration. To do all this with such small opportuni- 
ties was surely one of the greatest feats ever achieved by any 
race. 

The most surprising thing about the Mayas is that they 
developed their high civilization in what are now the hot, damp, 
malarial lowlands where agriculture is practically impossible. 
A hundred miles away on the coasts of Yucatan or in the 
Guatemalan highlands far more favorable conditions now pre- 
vail. There agriculture is comparatively easy, the climate, 
while not bracing, is at least good for the torrid zone, and 
malarial fevers are rare. Today the cities are all in these 
more favorable regions; the energetic part of the population 
is there, and the interior lowlands are hated and shunned by 
all except a degraded handful. In the past the more favorable 
localities were occupied by people close akin to the Mayas, yet 
civilization never rose to any great height. Ruins are found 
there, but they are as far behind those of the lowlands as the 
cities of Yucatan are today behind those of the United States. 

In explanation of these peculiar conditions only three possi- 
bilities suggest themselves. First, we may suppose that the 
Mayas were the most remarkable people who ever lived. They 



242 CIVILIZATION AND CLIMATE 

were able to carry on agriculture under conditions with which 
no modem people, not even those of European race, have ever 
succeeded in coping. They chose the worst place they could 
find, almost the worst in any part of America, even though far 
better places lay close at hand and were occupied by an allied 
people relatively few in numbers and backward in civilization. 
They were able to preserve their energy for a thousand years 
or more under the most debilitating climatic conditions; and, 
lastly, they were immune to the many fevers which today weaken 
the dwellers in their old habitat. To suppose that they were 
so extraordinary seems unreasonable. It is possible, but in 
the highest degree improbable. The second possibility is that 
in the time of the Mayas tropical diseases were less harmful 
than at present. We have no shred of evidence one way or the 
other. Such a thing is possible, but in view of the fact that 
there are several kinds of malaria, not to mention other dis- 
eases, any one of which greatly weakens a race, there is little 
chance that the Mayas were free from disease unless some- 
thing else was also different. Even if diseases were not so 
prevalent as now, this does not explain the other apparent 
anomalies of the Maya situation. The only thing that seems 
to explain them is the third possibility, namely, a climatic 
change such that the dry conditions which prevail a little far- 
ther north prevailed in the Maya region when these people 
attained eminence. Such a shifting of zones would increase 
the length of the dry season which now comes in February and 
March. This would diminish the amount of vegetation and 
cause scrub to take the place of dense forest. Under such con- 
ditions agriculture would become comparatively easy. Fevers 
would also greatly diminish, for in the drier parts of Yucatan 
they are today relatively mild, and the lowland plain would be 
the natural site of the chief development of civilization just 
as is the case in other countries. 

When the dates of Maya history are compared with the curve 



THE SHIFTING OF CLIMATIC ZONES 248 

of tree growth in California, they seem to agree with the 
hypothesis of a shifting of climatic zones. The early chronol- 
ogy is so doubtful that we may pass it by. The seventh cen- 
tury, however, is known to have been a time when Maya civili- 
zation sank to a very low ebb, for scarcely a building dates 
from that time, and the traditions become most vague. This 
would be what we should expect, for when the California trees 
grew slowly, the desert zone would lie far to the north. At 
the same time the equatorial zone of rains would expand north- 
ward over Guatemala and Yucatan; the rainfall would be 
abundant and the dry season short; the forests would become 
rank, agriculture would be difficult; disease would be rife; and 
the vitality of the Mayas would be sapped. From about 900 
A.D. to 1100 A.D., on the other hand, the California trees 
grew rapidly. At such a time the desert belt would be pushed 
south, and favorable conditions would prevail in the home of 
the Mayas. At that time occurred the last great revival of 
architecture and the construction of the great buildings whose 
ruins now adorn Yucatan. Whatever the cause, there is no 
doubt that there was a marked outburst of energy. The later 
history of the Mayas has no great abundance of architectural 
monuments to serve as landmarks, and hence cannot be corre- 
lated with the fluctuations of the California curve. Yet, so far 
as the indications enable us to judge, the two sets of phenomena 
are in harmony. 

In addition to the Maya ruins, the conditions of Palestine 
and the growth of the California trees furnish independent evi- 
dence that the zone of cyclonic storms has at certain periods 
suffered a shift equatorward. In Palestine, the rainy zone 
apparently once extended at least fifty miles south of its pres- 
ent limit, in spite of the fact that the mountains there die out 
and thus render the conditions doubly unfavorable to rainfall. 
Today Hebron is the last large town and Beersheba the last 
village. In the old days, Aujeh, far to the south, was com- 



244 CIVILIZATION AND CLIMATE 

parable to Hebron, and other ruins indicate that settlements 
were located still farther southward. The California trees 
indicate a shifting of zones, because they grow most rapidly 
during years when storms continue late into the spring. At 
such times the winter zone of storms is pushed equatorward and 
continues to give moisture late in the spring. 

Thus far I have spoken as if the shifting of zones were a 
comparatively simple matter. Recent studies, however, seem 
to show that it is complex. In a paper entitled, ^^The Solar 
Hypothesis of Climatic Changes," I have discussed the matter 
fully. Here it is possible only to summarize the results. In 
reading what follows it must be remembered that the truth or 
falsity of this attempted explanation of the cause of changes 
of climate has no bearing on the verity of preceding conclu- 
sions. It may prove entirely wrong, but this will not alter any 
of the evidence which leads to a belief in a pulsatory shifting 
of zones. Let us now consider certain well-established princi- 
ples, together with some newly discovered facts which seem 
to necessitate a revision of old ideas as to the cause of climatic 
variations. It is a universal scientific principle that the present 
is the key to the past, the near to the far. The sun is unmistak- 
ably the cause of the vast majority of climatic phenomena. 
Hence, men have long wondered whether its changes, as mani- 
fested in sunspots, may not be responsible not only for the 
differences between one year and another in temperature, rain- 
fall, storminess, and the like, but also for the greater changes 
of the past. The matter has been carefully studied, but there 
have seemed to be so many contradictions that until recently 
the general opinion has been that a direct relationship has not 
been established. Now, however, an important change of 
opinion seems to be in progress. The undisputed facts are 
these: When sunspots are numerous the sun sends out more 
heat than at other times. Yet, strange as it may seem, the 
earth's surface is unusually cool at such times. This is most 



THE SHIFTING OF CLIMATIC ZONES 246 

marked at the equator and diminishes toward the poles. The 
total difference of temperature between times of many and few 
spots is less than a degree Fahrenheit, but from the point of 
yiew of the climatologist this is highly significant. The next 
important fact is that, as Arctowski has shown, all parts of the 
world are characterized by little changes of temperature which 
occur with such uniformity that they must be due to some out- 
side cause which influences the whole world at the same time. 
Only the sun can do this. Even in these changes, however, con- 
tradictions would seem to be the rule if it had not been dis- 
covered that waves of heat are propagated over the earth's 
surface from places which happen to have been especially 
exposed to the heating power of the sun. These waves account 
for many apparent contradictions whereby one place grows 
warm and another cool without apparent regard to what is 
happening in the sun. Still another important fact is the dis- 
covery by Pocy, Kullmer, and others that during the part of 
the 11-year solar cycle when sunspots are numerous, cyclonic 
storms, including both tropical hurricanes and the ordinary 
storms of temperate latitudes, are more frequent than when 
spots are few. This seems to explain why the earth's surface 
becomes cool when the sun sends out more heat. Warm air 
rises in the center of every storm. If storms are more numer- 
ous, a greater amount of warm air is carried aloft. Thus, the 
upper layers of the atmosphere may be unusually warm when 
the sun radiates most heat, but the lower layers are cooled. 

The last important fact to claim our attention in this con- 
nection is the discovery of Bigelow, Hellman, and especially 
Kullmer, that the location of storms shifts in harmony with 
variations in the activity of the sun. Both in Europe and 
America the same general law applies. When simspots are 
numerous, storms diminish in nimibers along a central belt, 
while they become more frequent both to the north and south. 
This is illustrated in Figures 86 and 86. The heavily shaded 



ngme Sfi. Compantlve Stonnineu of the United States at Timea of Haximitm and 
MiDimnm Sunspota 

HcaTleft SbadlDB Indicatea More Than M4 Bices* of StormiDesi at Timet of Snoipot Uailmum. 

ReaiBlnder or HcaTV Sbadlnc Indicatea Lea* Tltui M9> KiceM at Uaiimuni. 

Ligbt Shadliw [Ddicate* Leas StormlneM at TIdmi or Uanr Spoti Thaa at Timea of Few. In the Heat 

Liabtlr Shaded Anai the DeflcleiicT !■ Hon Than IH. 
Tha Dlwnuii I* Baaed on the Report* of the United States Weather Bureau Since in*. 



Fi^re 36. Comparative Rainfall of Europe at Times of Maximum and MlDimum 

Sanspots 

HeaTT Shadina Indicates More Rain at Times of Uonr Sunspota Than al 

the Reverae. Numenli Indicate Fercentagu or Einu or Deflcienc: 

The Ditfram Is Based Chleflj' on Hellman's Data. IBSO-IMO, and on Ruul 



THE SHIFTING OF CLIMATIC ZONES 247 

areas are places where storms are more numerous at times of 
many sunspots than at times of few, while the lightly shaded 
portions suffer a diminution of storminess with an increase of 
sunspots. These diagrams, it must be remembered, are not 
based on inferences, but represent what has actually occurred 
during the past forty or fifty years since meteorological rec- 
ords have been available. The changes which they represent, 
together with those of temperature from one part of the sun- 
spot cycle to another, seem to account for the climatic differ- 
ences which everyone observes from one year to another. In 
other words, recent investigations by a large number of persons 
seem to show that the climatic variations now in progress within 
the range of ordinary observation are intimately connected 
with changes in the activity of the sun's surface. 

Let us apply this conclusion to our problem of the climate 
of the past. The first and most important fact is that the 
changes of the 11-year cycle seem to be of the same nature as 
those during the larger cycles, both in historical times and in 
the geological past. To go back to the glacial period, the 
northerly areas of increased storminess at times of many sun- 
spots correspond with the places where the main ice-sheets 
were formed. The areas of diminished storminess coincide with 
the places where the yellow eolian deposits known as loess were 
deposited during the glacial period. As loess is formed today 
only in deserts, this indicates that great dryness must once 
have prevailed in the places where today a moderate degree 
of dryness characterizes the years of many sunspots. In the 
southwest of the United States the black area of great increase 
of storminess at times of many spots is the place where scores 
of old lake strands indicate that the rainfall was once so abun- 
dant that dry basins were filled with water. On the other map 
the same is true of the heavily shaded areas of North Africa 
and Syria, where the Dead Sea is one pf the best examples of a 
body of water whose level has fallen greatly since the glacial 



248 CIVILIZATION AND CLIMATE 

period. Turning back to Fenck's hypothesis of a shifting of 
climatic zones we see that the maps show such a shifting. It 
is double, however, for the storms shift both poleward and 
equatorward at the same time, leaving an intermediate dr; 
strip. 

Coming down to historic times we see that Figures 86 and 
86 agree precisely with the inferences drawn from archeology 
and other sciences. In the southwestern part of the United 
States abundant ruins in places where it now seems impossible 
for people to get a living are located in exactly the area where 
storms increase at times of many sunspots. In Greece, and 
especially in the parts of Africa and Asia included in Figure 
86, evidences of desiccation during historic times are located in 
the places where rainfall increases at times of many spots. 
From whatever point of view one approaches the matter, the 
present small climatic variations of the 11-year solar cycle 
seem to be the counterparts of the far larger pulsations of the 
remote past. 

This conclusion clearly leads to the hypothesis that the 
changes of the past were due to a greater activity of the sun 
at that time than at present. Of course we have no way of 
subjecting the matter to the test of exact measurementa, for 
the spots of the sun have been observed with accuracy only since 
about 1749. All that we can say is this: Solar activity varies 
not only in small cycles of 11 years and less, but also in larger 
cycles. This may readily be seen in Figure 87. There the 



Figare ST. M^jor and Minor Sanspot Cycles 



THE SHIFTING OF CLIMATIC ZONES 249 

zigzag solid line represents the sunspot numbers. Dotted lines 
have been drawn to connect the maxima and minima re- 
spectively. They show unmistakably that the sun's spottedness 
varies in cycles having a length of a century more or less. In 
view of this it seems highly probable that there are also solar 
cycles of still greater length and intensity, and that these are 
related to the climatic pulsations which appear to have pre- 
vailed both in geological and historical times. This hypothesis 
is so new that there has not yet been time for it to be fully dis- 
cussed and tested by large niunbers of workers. Therefore, 
the reader must be cautious in accepting it. Its chief claim to 
consideration lies in the fact that it makes no assumption what- 
ever except that* what happens now also happened in the past, 
but upon a larger scale. If the conditions which now prevail 
at times of many sunspots were sufficiently magnified, the 
earth's climate would be like that which seems to have pre- 
vailed at the time of Christ and earlier. A stormy belt would 
cover the southwestern United States and the Gulf of Mexico, 
and the same would be true in the Mediterranean region. To- 
day the storms which prevail from Malta to Syria have been 
shown by the Indian Meteorological Service to continue east- 
ward to northern India. Therefore, if the storminess of the 
Mediterranean region were once greater, the same conditions 
must have prevailed in Mesopotamia, Persia, and the Indo- 
Gangetic plain. In like manner, the storminess of Japan would 
apparently be shifted southward at times of many sunspots and 
the storm belt in its new position would probably expand west- 
ward into China as if to join the stormy belt of North India. 
This has not yet been tested, but a similar phenomenon occurs 
in North America when the sun is active. Here we must leave 
the matter. The lines of study briefly outlined in this chapter 
have been pursued quite independently of those discussed in the 
rest of this book. Yet both lead in the same direction. The 



260 CIVILIZATION AND CLIMATE 

inTestigation of the relation of work and weather shows that 
cyclonic storms are of unexpected importance. The inyesti- 
gation of the climate of the pa^t gives rise to the idea that 
important changes in the location of the most stormy areas have 
taken place within historic times. 



CHAPTER XII 
The Shifting Centers of Civiuzation 

The final stage of our investigation is now before us. We 
have compared the present distribution of civilization and of 
climatic energy, and have seen their remarkable similarity. We 
have examined the climate of the past, and have found that, 
although the matter is not yet settled, a pulsatory shifting of 
zones appears to have taken place. Let us now examine the 
shiftings of civilization, and determine how far the distribution 
of ancient civilization was in harmony with the distribution of 
climatic energy at the same time. 

Areas of high civilization are primarily centers from which 
influences radiate outward. Chief among them today stands 
western and central Europe. Look at the portion of Europe 
shaded black in Figyres 80 and 81. In Figure 80, the map of 
energy, it includes Britain, France, Germany, Austria, the 
Baltic portion of Russia, northern Italy as far as Rome, Swit- 
zerland, the Netherlands, Denmark, the southern parts of Nor- 
way and Sweden, much of Servia, and a fringe of Roumania. 
As I write this list at the end of October, 1914, it is almost 
startling to see how the places of highest energy are the ones 
engaged in war. In Figure 81, Roumania, Servia, Russia, and 
all except the Grerman parts of Austria-Hungary are excluded 
from the very highest grade of civilization, but they closely 
approach it. 

The black area of the map of energy. Figure 80, embraces 
about 1,100,000 square miles, or two per cent of the total land 
surface of the earth. Its population is about 260,000,000, or 



262 CIVILIZATION AND CLIMATE 

17 per cent of the world's total. Consider what would have 
happened if all except this small two per cent of the lands had 
ceased to exist seventeen or eighteen centuries ago. Civiliza- 
tion would probably have differed only slightly fi'om what it is 
today, although history would have been very different. Con- 
sider how few important ideas have come from any other region 
since a century or two after Christ. If the rest of Europe had 
ceased to exist, Byzantine art, the works of some of the early 
Christian Fathers, Moorish architecture and irrigation, and the 
explorations, conquests, and colonization of the Spaniards 
would be lacking. Yet this would not seriously change the con- 
ditions under which we now live. The European countries 
within the area of very high civilization have themselves evolved 
almost every idea which any other country has developed. The 
chief exception is in the domain of art and architecture, but 
these things do not greatly influence the ordinary life of the 
people. Spain figures largely in the history of America, but it 
was an Italian who discovered the western hemisphere. If 
there had been no Spaniards, the other European countries 
would have been fully competent to explore the New World. 

Suppose that not only the more backward European coun- 
tries, but all the rest of the world except the very high Euro- 
pean area had been blotted out in 200 A.D. The influence 
of Greece and Rome would have persisted in Italy. The Roman 
Church, the Renaissance, and the Reformation would all have 
played their part. The absence of new lands for discovery in 
the Middle Ages would doubtless have retarded the develop- 
ment of certain ideas. Otherwise the status of civilization 
would have been changed only a little. The United States is 
the only non-European country which has succeeded in touch- 
ing the daily life of the world as a whole. American inventions 
have gone everywhere. The denizen of Turkestcm who dis- 
cusses news received by telegraph and whose wife makes his 
clothes with an American sewing machine is being genuinely 



SHIFTING CENTERS OF CIVILIZATION 268 

touched by the New World. Yet America must not boast too 
loudly, for without her aid, Britain, France, Germany, and 
Italy would have made most of the world's great inventions. 
To an even greater degree they would have been able to develop 
the arts and sciences. 

The energetic area of western and central Europe has been 
the great center of civilization for a thousand years. From it 
have gone forth more new ideas than from all the rest of the 
world combined. Its manufactures have flooded all parts of 
the earth. Politically it dominates about 60 per cent of the 
earth's surface. Socially its domination is still greater. The 
United States has long been chagrined because South America 
has looked to Europe not only commercially but for her inspira- 
tion in literature, art, education, and almost every other phase 
of activity. Politically the United States helped greatly in 
inspiring the South American republics, and was at the front 
in stirring Japan to the new life of the last half-century. Yet 
those countries have turned their faces Europeward, because 
that is where ideas have been most numerous and have been 
most fully embodied in the concrete form of institutions, inven- 
tions, or scientific principles. 

Wherever one turns, he feels the tentacles of the great Euro- 
pean center of civilization reaching out and vivifying the life 
of the whole world. To tell why this is so would require a 
volume. The position of western Europe, the strong racial 
inheritance of its people, their legacy from the civilizations of 
the past, their inspiring religion, their political freedom, and 
their many powerful institutions, all play an essential part. 
With these, however, and as one of the conditions which make 
them possible, stands the fact that western and central Europe 
is the only large region which for many centuries has had these 
advantages and at the same time has enjoyed a highly stimu- 
lating climate. 



264 CIVILIZATION AND CLIMATE 

The American high area differs somewhat in shape on the 
maps of civilization and climate, but not to any essential de- 
gree. In general, it occupies the portion of the United States 
lying north of about latitude 88*^ and east of the Rocky Moun- 
tains, together with the adjacent strip of southern Canada. Its 
area, taking the average of the black portions of the two maps, 
is approximately the same as that of the similar European 
region, that is, about 1,100,000 square miles. The popula- 
tion, however, is only 60 or 70 million. Here, then, we have 
another two per. cent of the earth's land surface, containing 
between four and five per cent of the earth's total population. 
Consider how disproportionately great an influence it exercises. 
To be sure, it falls far behind Europe, but that is partly be- 
cause it is newer and less densely populated. Yet it differs 
from Europe only in the degree, not the kind of influence. We 
have already referred to some of its inventions. AU the world 
recognizes that the telephone and telegraph and many other 
forms of applying electrical energy are primarily American. 
In architecture we have evolved such wholly new types as the 
sky scraper. In art and literature we follow far in the wake 
of Europe. Yet we have done some things which are widely 
known in other countries, and which are steadily molding the 
world's opinion. The same is true in science, for the day is 
past when Europeans can ignore the work done on the western 
side of the Atlantic. In the future the disparity between 
Europe and America along this line bids fair to decrease 
rapidly, for great institutions devoted to pure science are 
growing on a scale unknown in other lands. 

This is in part the result of another line of effort in which 
Americans have achieved unusual success. By this I mean what 
is sometimes called ^^big business," the amalgamation of many 
minor industries or branches of an industry into one huge 
whole. It is illustrated in such organizations as our great rail- 
road systems, the Steel Trust, or the Standard Oil Company. 



SHIFTING CENTERS OF CIVILIZATION 256 

These represent in part the effect of unusual opportunities, but 
they also indicate a great expenditure of energy in planning 
and directing such widely ramifying activities. Lastly, and 
perhaps most important of all, the United States has touched 
the world upon the political and social side. In spite of politi- 
cal sins, which are many, this country has stood for freedom 
and justice. Its example has inspired other nations, including 
parts of western Europe, and has given them a stronger desire 
for equality of opportunity and for the breaking down of unfair 
discriminations between man and man. In more backward 
places a similar influence is felt. Good judges say that in 
Turkey, for example, one of the most potent causes of the 
revolution of 1908 and the establishment of representative 
government was the teaching of American missionaries. The 
same is true in China, except that there the Americans have 
been associated with missionaries of many other nations, while 
in Turkey they have been almost alone. In many other ways 
the ideas of this small area radiate in all directions. In that 
lies the essential point. Because this four or five per cent of 
the world's population are endowed with unusual energy, they 
are rapidly obtaining an influence wholly disproportionate to 
their numbers. 

The third important region of high civilization and energy 
is Japan. Although the area is only about one tenth that of 
the corresponding portion of Europe and America, the popu- 
lation is over 60,000,000. In proportion to population, its 
influence upon the world is less than that of the European 
countries and the United States, which perhaps corresponds 
with an apparently lower degree of climatic energy. Yet we 
all recognize that Japan is a factor to be reckoned with. We 
admire its art and the skill and certainty with which the coun- 
try has made use of our western civilization. We see students 
flocking thither from China. In India the news of the progress 
of Japan causes a stirring of dead leaves as by an autumn 



256 CIVILIZATION AND CLIMATE 

■ 

wind. As Japan has done, so India would do. In India, how* 
ever, the agitators only talk and commit violence, whereas in 
Japan they go to work quietly without much talk or violence 
and make themselves so efficient that they do not need the help 
of Europeans. When Japan sees an opportunity, such as was 
afforded by the war in 1914, she takes it, cuid thus advances 
another step in her rSle as the most capable nation in Asia. 
Like Europe and America she makes mistakes sometimes, but 
they are the mistakes of strength more than of weakness. 

Next to Japan among our areas of high civilization comes 
New Zealand, together with the adjacent corner of Australia. 
Here we have chiefly a reflection of British civilization. Most 
of the five or six million people are grouped in an area some- 
what more than twice the size of Japan. The question is not 
whether they show evidences of a high civilization, which they 
certainly do, but whether they have added to the endowment of 
ideas and institutions with which they came from England. 
They have clearly done so, for when we think of Australia there 
come to mind such things as the Australian ballot whereby a 
man is enabled to vote freely without undue influence from 
bystanders. We think also of progressive labor legislation, 
and of a pioneer attempt at old age pensions, especially in 
New Zealand. We are made conscious that these people are not 
mere followers, but are blessed with ideas which they themselves 
originate, and which spread out from them to other parts of 
the world. 

The last area which rises to the very high grade on the map 
of civilization is California and the coast farther north. The 
population is still relatively small, and the majority grew up 
in other regions. Hence, it is too soon to judge of the ulti- 
mate status of this area. It is so bound up with the rest of 
the United States and Canada that its particular contribution 
to civilization cannot be clearly differentiated. Yet, through 
their universities and their readiness to attempt great things. 



SHIFTING CENTERS OF CIVILIZATION 267 

the people of the Pacific coast impress the world as unusually 
capable and energetic. All together these five regions com- 
prise less than one twentieth of the lands. Though they are 
densely populated because of the skill of their people in agri- 
culture and manufacture, they contain only about one fourth 
of the world's population. In influence, however, they many 
times outweigh the remaining three fourths. If they decide 
on anything the rest of the world must submit. They never 
care to imitate the more backward nations, whereas such 
nations show a growing desire to imitate Europe, the United 
States, or Japan. The reason seems to be that the favored 
one twentieth of the land is inhabited by people of great energy ; 
and this energy appears to be due, in part at least, to the 
frequency of cyclonic storms with their stimulating changes 
of weather from day to day. 

This leads to the question whether similar conditions pre- 
vailed in the past. Throughout the course of history there have 
been centers of civilization like those which exist today. One 
of the most important was the plain of Mesopotamia. Here, 
in the earliest days, the people of Sumer and Accad invented 
hieroglyphs, founded great cities, built mighty irrigation 
works, drained the marshes, and laid the foundations of a 
complex system of law and religion. They clearly possessed 
the power of originating ideas and of putting them into effect 
in a way that is now characteristic of the modem centers of 
civilization. Where they originally came from we do not 
know, but apparently they were not Semitic. In course of 
time, they were overwhelmed by Semites who presumably came 
in from the desert. Then there happened one of the most 
characteristic events in the history of centers of civilization. 
The Semites dropped their old culture and adopted that of 
the people whom they had conquered. They began also to be 
inventive like their predecessors, and thus developed cuneiform 
writing out of the hieroglyphics of the Sumerians. In later 



268 CIVILIZATION AND CLIMATE 

days, other Semitic invasions took place. In each case the 
invaders had done no great things in their original homes so 
far as we know, but when they came to Babylonia they blos- 
somed into people of inventive minds full of new ideas which 
caused the arts to rise to higher and higher levels. Then the 
Semites were conquered by a non-Semitic race, the Scythians, 
who were also called Medes, and they in turn were stirred to 
great achievements. They were conquered by still another 
people, the Persians under Cyrus, and once more the old 
process of stimulation was repeated. 

One of the most significant things in Mesopotamian history 
is the way in which each invading race seems suddenly to have 
risen in civilization as soon as it reached the new country. 
This raises the question whether the invaders were of special 
ability, or were stimulated by the conditions of the lands to 
which they came. If they were thus stimulated, how much of 
the stimulus was due to contact with a higher civilization, how 
much to more abundant opportunities afforded by the new 
environment, and how much to a direct physical invigoration? 
I shall not try to answer these questions. That some of the 
invading races achieved great things because they possessed 
innate ability seems certain. That their minds were rendered 
more alert by contact with the achievements of the races which 
they conquered is likewise beyond doubt. That the wealth and 
agricultural possibilities of Mesopotamia and the abundance of 
labor stimulated the invaders to construct palaces and temples, 
build irrigation works, gather stores of treasure, carve huge 
monuments, spend money in supporting libraries and students, 
and carry on other great enterprises also seems certain. These 
principles are so firmly established that there is no need to 
discuss them. The question before us is simply whether there 
may also have been a climatic stimulus comparable to that 
which now seems so important according to our maps of 
civilization and energy. 



^is^ 



SHIFTING CENTERS OF CIVILIZATION 269 

I do not purpose to discuss the empires of antiquity. I 
merely wish to point out some of the features of their location 
and history which pertain to our main hypothesis. While 
Babylonia was fiourishing, Egypt in the same latitude was 
also developing a great civilization. The two were rivals. 
Which rose higher it would be hard to say. They moved along 
parallel lines, and at last both fell during the same general 
period, although Egypt retained a moderate importance for 
some centuries after Mesopotamia had lapsed into insignifi- 
cance. Far to the south the Sabasans in southwestern Arabia 
also developed a fairly high civilization, but they formed in 
no sense a great center. We know little about them, but 
apparently they were behind Mesopotamia and Egypt in the 
way that modem Bulgaria is behind England. Therefore, we 
may pass them by for the present although they will come up 
again in another connection. East of Mesopotamia the high- 
lands of Persia were the seat of a comparatively high culture, 
but it scarcely rivalled that of the two great countries in the 
river valleys. Going on still farther toward the rising sun, 
we find high civilization in northern India at a very early time. 
That region never rose to such a pitch as did the countries 
farther west, and it decayed somewhat earlier. Beyond India 
the chain of ancient empires is broken until we come to China. 
In Indo-China, to be sure, traces of a state of culture higher 
than that of today are found, but they belong to a compara- 
tively late date, and it is doubtful whether they were indige- 
nous. They are important, but do not apply to the period 
now under discussion. China, however, stands in the same class 
with Egypt and Mesopotamia. It reached a high state of 
development about as long ago as they did. Here, too, the 
art of writing developed, inventions of many kinds were made, 
strong governments were organized, other powerful institu- 
tions were evolved, and in general there was intense mental 
activity. 



280 CIVILIZATION AND CLIMATE 

At this point the reader is advised to consult a map of Asia 
and Europe. Notice how the great countries of the past lie 
along an arc. They begin on the east with China, whose main 
center was and is the Yangtse basin. The civilization which 
flourished there possessed qualities like those of modem Europe 
and America. The Chinese were an aggressive, active people 
able to fight or to evolve a new religious system as the case 
might be. The sword was in their hands not merely because 
those were ancient days, but because the people or their rulers 
wanted to make conquests, or because they were quick to 
resent infringements of their rights. They were not like their 
modem successors who see themselves defrauded because they 
have not the power to cope with their despoilers. Follow the 
map westward along a band eight or ten degrees wide with 
the thirtieth parallel a little south of its center. At first we 
find ourselves among lofty mountains which merge into the 
great Tibetan plateau. Here we should not expect any great 
development because of the unfavorable topography. At 
length, however, our band descends to the plain of northern 
India. On the flank of the Himalayas lived Gautama, the 
great thinker who founded Buddhism. Out on the plains 
around Delhi and Agra and in surrounding regions was the 
home of the early Aryans, who developed the Sanscrit lan- 
guage, wrote the Vedas, and made a real contribution to human 
progress. Here, just as in China, a broad expanse of arable 
land was favorable to the development of a great people. Next 
our band strikes the high mountain rim of Baluchistan and 
Afghanistan, and then passes over the plateaus of those 
countries, high and rugged in the north, lower and intensely 
desert in the south. In these regions the ancient civilization 
was higher than that of today, but not until we reach the 
western side of the plateau do we come upon the really advanced 
country of ancient Persia. 

As our band leaves the Persian highland, let us change its 



SHIFTING CENTERS OF CIVILIZATION 261 

direction a trifle so that its central line will point toward the 
center of the Mediterranean Sea. First it lies over Mesopo- 
tamia. There in the highly fruitful plain we find the two great 
empires of Babylonia and Assyria. They were like their mod- 
ern successors in the Europe of our own day. When they were 
weak they were invaded by the more backward people from 
the mountains on the north and east or from the desert on the 
south and west. When they were strong they waxed ambi- 
tious ; they strove to extend their borders ; they desired to rule 
the world; and they were jealous of rival nations. Thus, at 
their strongest, like the great European nations which are 
locked in a death struggle as these words are written, they 
fought tooth and nail for supremacy. The fighting in itself 
is a proof of superabundant energy. A weak people may fight 
in self-defense, or to gain new lands when sorely pinched with 
want at home, but only a people who have a surplus of both 
strength and wealth can stand the strain of great wars whose 
purpose is primarily national aggrandizement. 

On the flanks of our band of culture, as we call it, lay the 
Hittites on the borders of Mesopotamia and Anatolia. Beyond 
the Syrian desert the Phoenicians, Syrians, and Jews lived in 
the center of the band. Their degree of culture was equal to 
that of the Mesopotamians, but displayed itself in different 
ways, partly because of the accidents of mountain chains and 
seas, and partly because of peculiar circumstances of their 
racial character or history. Next comes Egypt, still within 
the belt. Here still another fertile plain gave opportunity for 
the accumulation of great wealth and for the leisure which is 
essential to a part of the population if new ideas are to be 
developed. They fought the same kind of wars as did their 
neighbors on the east. When they were most powerful, their 
strength and energy were such that the mere conquest of their 
immediate surroundings did not satisfy them. Taking Pales- 
tine, they penetrated Syria and even advanced to the 



262 CIVILIZATION AND CLIMATE 

Euphrates to fight with Assyria, their great rival. And the 
Assyrians in turn came down through Palestine to wrest the 
sovereignty from Egypt. 

Now we pass on, curving our band a little more, so that its 
center shall pass along the main axis of the Mediterranean Sea. 
Rhodes, the JEgean Sea, Greece, Italy, and Carthage fall within 
its limits. Here, too, we see the same phenomena of the rise and 
fall of great nations. The rise did not begin quite so early in 
the west as in the east, and the fall did not come so soon. In 
Greece, as in Mesopotamia, a growth in strength brought with 
it a great struggle for supremacy, which did not end till Athens 
had subdued her rivals. The wars of Rome and Carthage were 
of this same kind in which great nations, jealous of the great- 
ness of a rival, weU-nigh destroy themselves. 

In this rapid sketch we have mentioned each of the chief 
civilizations of Asia cmd Europe up to the time of Christ. All 
were in their day centers comparable to those which we have 
seen to exist at present. One main center lay in China, and 
corresponded to that of modem Japan. A second, less impor- 
tant and less enduring, was located in northern India. It has 
no modem representative, unless we hold that the vogue of an 
esoteric Hinduism among a few people in America and Europe 
is a sign of the existence of a widely pervasive infiuence derived 
from an Indian center. The third center extended widely. Its 
eastern limit was on the western border of Persia. It embraced 
Mesopotamia, Syria, Egypt, and Greece, and on its flanks in- 
cluded surrounding countries such as Asia Minor. Ultimately 
it moved westward, so that Mesopotamia and then Egypt 
ceased to belong to it, while Italy was included. Finally, it 
migrated still farther westward and also northward until now 
Italy is on its southeastern border, and its main area is the 
great European center of our own time. 

In the western hemisphere only two centers of civilization 
seem to have existed in ancient times. One was in Peru. We 



SHIFTING CENTERS OF CIVILIZATION 268 

shall not consider it here, partly because it will come up in 
another connection, and partly because it failed to rise to a 
great height, and never succeeded in spreading its ideas very 
widely. The other ancient American civilization, that of the 
Mayas, is much more important. It falls into the same class 
with those of Eurasia. Its fertility in ideas has already been 
discussed. Its influence spread to other lands, and may be seen 
in various ruins in Mexico, and in the calendars which were 
employed by several races in that country. It must have lasted 
many centuries, for we find splendid buildings whose dates are 
at least seven hundred years apart and possibly more. More- 
over, before the first of these was constructed there must have 
been a long period of development during which the arts of 
architecture and sculpture were perfected. At that same period 
the Mayas must have been so far advanced that they kept most 
accurate records of astronomical phenomena, for otherwise 
they could not have determined the length of the year with the 
extraordinary accuracy displayed in their calendar. In all 
these respects the Maya center resembled those of Eurasia. 
It differed from most of them in not leaving a successor. 

So much for the ancient distribution of civilization. Now 
for that of climatic energy. Storms, as we have seen are the 
most variable of the climatic elements and also one of the most 
important in their effect on human energy. Figure 88 shows 
the approximate distribution of storminess in the northern hemi- 
sphere at the present time. It is constructed with the north 
pole in the center to show the complete storm belt encircling 
the north temperate zone. The lands are shaded to represent 
three grades of storminess. Heavy lines indicate the centers of 
the main storm belt and its branches. The region of maximum 
storminess lies in southern Canada north of Lake Ontario. 
Thence the main belt extends eastward along the St. Lawrence 
River to the southern edge of Newfoundland, where it is joined 
by a branch coming up the Atlantic coast. Then it crosses the 



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SHIFTING CENTERS OF CIVILIZATION 265 

Atlantic with a slight inclination toward the north, and before 
reaching Ireland splits into three branches. One passes along 
the northern edge of Scotland, through northern Scandinavia 
and thence along the Arctic coast of Europe toward Asia where 
it almost dies out and probably merges with the second or main 
branch. The latter splits into two parts which unite again. 
One passes through Scotland and southern Scandinavia. The 
other goes through southern England, follows the Baltic Sea 
and then, after joining its companion, extends eastward in the 
latitude of Moscow for an indefinite distance into Siberia. It 
apparently passes entirely across Asia, but in an attenuated 
form. The third branch swings from the central Atlantic 
toward the Bay of Biscay. It becomes weakened over southern 
France, strengthens once more in the stormy Gulf of Lions, con- 
tinues with great intensity in northern Italy, then loses intensity 
as it crosses the Bosnian highland, and finally passes through 
southern Russia where it rapidly dies out. Returning to the 
main belt of storminess we find that after it has crossed Asia it 
is joined in the Pacific Ocean by a branch which has been highly 
developed in Japan, but which weakens northward. The com- 
bined branches cross the Pacific Ocean to the American shore. 
Then in southern Canada and the northern United States, after 
crossing to the east side of the Rocky Mountains, the belt once 
more becomes extremely stormy. It is joined by a branch from 
Colorado and so completes its course back to the point of great- 
est intensity. 

Several features of Figure 88 deserve careful attention. In 
the first place, wherever the storms in their eastward course 
approach an extensive highland they tend to be weakened or 
deflected, after which they may or may not recover their former 
intensity. This may be seen on the western side of North 
America where storms are relatively rare until the Rocky 
Mountains have been crossed. The highlands of western Europe 
are not great enough to destroy the storms, but the main belt 



266 CIVILIZATION AND CLIMATE 

is broken into several branches, each of which seeks to avoid 
the high country. The northern branch would apparently skirt 
the whole of Scandinavia were it not that some unknown force 
prevents it from going much to the north of the Arctic circle. 
The next avoids the Welsh and English highlands, crosses into 
the North Sea over the lowest part of England, receives an 
accession of intensity, and follows the line of least resistance 
along the Baltic and across the plains of Russia. Ultimately, 
however, the vast expanse of Eurasia, especially when it be- 
comes a high pressure center in winter, largely overcomes the 
tendency of the air to move in the cyclonic fashion, and storms 
become rare. The third branch, which swings still farther 
south, is also greatly weakened when it reaches the land of 
southern France, but becomes very pronounced in the northern 
Mediterranean, only to be weakened once more by the Balkan 
highland. 

Another important feature of Figure 88 is the peculiar 
detached areas of high storminess in northern Italy and Japan. 
In the United States two similar areas are visible on a large 
scale map of storms, although they are masked in Figure 88. 
In both cases they are clearly remnants of the southern, or sub- 
tropical belt whose existence at times of many sunspots we 
have already considered. When sunspots are numerous the 
American areas move somewhat southward, become intensified, 
and lengthen east and west until they coalesce forming a con- 
tinuous, although very faint, belt. In Eurasia the same thing 
seems to happen, although the meteorological records in Asia 
are not yet sufficient to permit us to test it. If the American 
subtropical belt were intensified in the way that appears to have 
occurred in the past, the place of maximum storminess would 
probably be in the Gulf of Mexico. There the obstacles pre- 
sented by the highlands of the southwestern United States and 
Mexico give place to the open sea and allow free play for the 
development of storms. Under such circumstances the center 



SHIFTING CENTERS OF CIVILIZATION 267 

of the stormy area would probably be farther south than the 
southern belt of increased storms which appears in Figure 86. 
A southward shoving of the storm tracks seems to be a pro- 
nounced feature of the changes which now take place from sun- 
spot minima to maxima, and would presumably be magnified if 
the changes were on a greater scale than those of the 11-year 
cycle. Hence, we should infer that when the Mayas made their 
greatest progress, their coimtry was blessed with a stormy area 
like that of the Gulf of Lions which now does much to make 
northern Italy far more progressive than the southern part of 
the country. Under such conditions the climate of Yucatan 
would have been comparatively stimulating in spite of its 
warmth, for during much of the year cool waves from the north 
would have been frequent. 

In Eurasia the same principles apply with appropriate 
modifications because of the topography and size of the conti- 
nents. If the subtropical storm belt should be magnified in the 
way that seems characteristic of times of many sunspots, it 
would apparently reach its chief development in the places 
where the great civilizations of the past were located. The 
present Italian center would presumably move south and then 
expand eastward along the open Mediterranean. Leaving the 
highlands of Asia Minor on its northern flank, it would pass 
over the Syrian mountains because it could not spread eastward 
in any other way. Possibly it would be forced a little southward 
so that northern Egypt and Palestine would get its full force. 
In the lee of the mountains the storminess of the Syrian desert 
would be less than that of Syria, but by the time the storms 
reached Mesopotamia they would have had an opportunity to 
form themselves anew, and we should expect a well-developed 
center. In Persia, judging by what happens today, this would 
be weakened but not destroyed. Then the great plains of 
northern India would permit the storms to gather once more 
in a center corresi>onding to the faint one of today. That 



268 CIVILIZATION AND CLIMATE 

would probably be the end of any distinct belt for a thousand 
milesy for the eastern Himalayas and the moimtains of western 
China interpose so tremendous a barrier that we should not 
expect the Japanese center, even though it moved southward 
and westward, to coalesce with the Italian. The plains of 
central China, especially the Yangtse valley, would be the place 
where the present Japanese center would be most highly devel- 
oped, provided it suffered changes corresponding to those indi- 
cated in the corresponding American area. Japan, on the other 
hand, would presumably be less stormy than now, for the storm 
tracks would be pushed southward and oceanward. 

If these things actually occurred at the times indicated by 
our California curve, the countries which now stand highest in 
civilization would then have had long, cold winters, with few 
storms. The stimulating qualities of the climate would have 
been less than now, and the possibilities of agriculture, espe- 
cially in such places as Gkrmany, would have been much dimin- 
ished. In the countries like Greece where civilization was then 
at its highest, on the contrary, the number of storms and the 
duration of the stormy period would have been decidedly greater 
than now. The rainfall also would have been greater so that 
agriculture would have been favored. More important than this, 
however, would have been the high degree of climatic stimulus 
because of frequent changes of temperature. To apply the 
matter concretely, lower Egypt has an average temperature 
of about 80^ during July, and Mesopotamia and northern India 
are even hotter. Three thousand years ago the heat was prob- 
ably almost equally intense at certain periods, although some- 
what less extreme on an average, and by no means so uniform. 
All the summers were probably hotter than was the summer of 
1911 in the northeastern United States. That summer, it will be 
remembered, was the most severe for a century. Yet its effect 
on work was no worse than that of an ordinary winter. In 
Mesopotamia and Egypt, summers of that kind doubtless made 



SHIFTING CENTERS OF CIVILIZATION 269 

people slow and inert. They were probably not so bad as the 
present summers, however, for although no appreciable quan- 
tity of rain may have fallen, a large number of storms must 
have passed over regions not far to the north. Such storms 
would stir the air and bring fresh breezes. Every one knows 
that in hot weather a change in the wind even without rain is 
most refreshing. When the summer was over, the storm belt, 
according to our hypothesis, would migrate southward in its 
normal fashion, and soon Egypt and Mesopotamia would be 
swept by storm after storm. During the early fall and late 
spring conditions would be about as they are in the homes of 
our Connecticut factory operatives during cool summers such 
as 1912 or 1918. For the remaining five or six months the 
average temperature would range from about 66^ to 65^ F., 
there would be a constant succession of cool waves, and the 
conditions would be almost ideal for great physical activity. 
Thus, even though the summers were distinctly bad, the total 
debilitating effect would be little greater than that of summer 
and winter combined in Connecticut. In Greece and Italy, with 
their more favorable mean temperature, conditions would be 
still better than in Egypt or Mesopotamia. In the same way 
favorable conditions appear to have prevailed in each of the 
great countries of the past at the time when it made its most 
rapid progress. 

The two phases of our climatic hypothesis are now before 
us. In point of time, though not of presentation in this book, 
the first step was a study of the climate of the past. Ten years 
of work along this line have led to the hypothesis of pulsatory 
changes, and finally to the idea that the changes consist pri- 
marily of a shifting of the belt of storms. After this conclusion 
had been reached, a wholly independent investigation of the 
effect of present climatic conditions upon human activity led to 
two conclusions, neither of which was anticipated. One was 
that under proper conditions a relatively high temperature is 



270 CIVILIZATION AND CLIMATE 

not particularly harmful provided it does not go to undue 
extremes. The other was that changes of temperature from 
day to day are of great importance. On the basis of these two 
conclusions it at once becomes evident that the stimulating effect 
of climates in the same latitude and having the same kind of 
seasonal changes may be very different. It also becomes clear 
that the distribution of civilization at the present time closely 
resembles that of climatic energy. From this the next step is 
naturally back to our previous conclusion that changes of 
climate in the past have consisted largely of variations in the 
location of the storm belt. If this is so, evidently the amount of 
climatic stimulus must have varied correspondingly. Thus we 
are led to the final conclusion that, not only at present, but also 
in the past, no nation has risen to the highest grade of civiliza- 
tion except in regions where the climatic stimulus is great. This 
statement sums up our entire hypothesis. It seems to be the 
inevitable result of the facts that are before us. Other expla- 
nations may indeed be offered, and modifications will certainly 
be necessary. Yet unless we have gone wholly astray, the sur- 
prising way in which independent lines of investigation dovetail 
into one another seems to indicate that a favorable climate is 
an essential condition of high civilization. 



CHAPTER Xm 
The Cumatic Hypothesis of Civiuzation 

The hypothesis that a particular kind of climate is necessary 
to the development of a high civilization is sure to encounter 
many objections. Some will be directed against the idea that 
the present distribution of civilization agrees with that of 
climatic energy. Important as such objections are, I shall not 
consider them here, for they cannot be properly tested without 
further statistics. Moreover, they are much less serious than 
the arguments which may be presented against the idea that a 
stimulating climate has been an essential condition of the rise 
of great civilizations in the peist. By far the weightiest objec- 
tion to our hypothesis is the fact that students are not yet 
agreed as to the reality of climatic changes. Inasmuch as I 
have already considered this matter not only in this volume, 
but at much greater length elsewhere, further discussion does 
not now seem advisable. Yet the matter ought to be mentioned 
here at the beginning of our consideration of objections, for the 
fate of the climatic hypothesis of civilization depends primarily 
upon the decision of scientists as to the occurrence and nature 
of historic changes of climate. 

Recognizing the limitations imposed by this objection, let us 
now examine certain others which will arise even if it appear 
that climate has actually changed. In reading what has been 
said about Egypt, for example, the reader has probably said 
to himself: ^^This book claims that the people there were once 
energetic because of frequent storms. If that is so, the rainfall 
must have been much more abundant than now. For the sake 



272 CIVILIZATION AND CLIMATE 

of argument we grant that at certain periods the precipitation 
was greater than at present, but we cannot possibly believe 
that it increased to the extent demanded by this hypothesis.'' 

This objection is so important that I have made a special 
investigation to determine the exact relation between stormi- 
ness and rainfall. The word storm, as already explained, does 
not primarily mean rain. To the meteorologists a storm is an 
area of low barometric pressure which is always accompanied 
by inblowing winds, and usually, but not invariably, by rain. 
Even if there is not a drop of rain, a storm may otherwise be 
fully developed and may cause strong winds which give rise to 
changes of temperature. The matter is well illustrated by com- 
paring Colorado and Greorgia. According to Kullmer's maps, 
Colorado is one of the stormy parts of the United States. It is 
crossed by the centers of about three times as many storms as 
Georgia. Yet its rainfall is only about one third as great. 
In other words, Greorgia has nine times as much rain in pro- 
portion to its storms. The reason is simple. Colorado lies far 
from the ocean, and the air which rises in the centers of its 
areas of low pressure has already lost most of its moisture. 
Greorgia, on the other hand, lies so near the broad Atlantic 
and the warm Gulf of Mexico that storms draw in great quanti- 
ties of moisture. The lands around the eastern Mediterranean 
and in western Asia have a climate far more like that of Colo- 
rado than of Greorgia. Part, to be sure, are near the Mediter- 
ranean Sea, but that furnishes only a little water compared 
with the great oceans. 

The comparison between Greorgia and Colorado shows how 
two diverse regions differ in relation to storms and rainfall. 
Let us now compare times of many sunspots with those of few. 
In the entire United States the ratio between variations of 
storminess and rainfall is about two to one. That is, if the 
number of storms increases 20 per cent during a given series 
of years, the rainfall increases scarcely 10 per cent. In the 



CLIMATIC HYPOTHESIS OF CIVILIZATION 278 

arid southwest, however, the ratio is larger, being three to one 
for all available stations. These figures apply to present con- 
ditions where the variations are slight and of short duration. 
If larger, more permanent changes took place, the rapidity of 
the atmospheric circulation would be so much increased that 
the air would have less opportunity than at present to remain 
over the oceans and become saturated. Hence, the ratio between 
increase in storminess and in rainfall would probably be greater 
than at present, and might be four, or even six to one. The 
drier the region, the greater would probably be the ratio. 

Supj>ose that the ratio were four to one in Syria. A change 
which would increase the storminess by 200 per cent would 
involve a change of rainfall amounting to 60 per cent. That is, 
the number of stimulating changes would be three times as 
great as now, while the rainfall would only increase by one half. 
Such a change would render the PhcBnidan coast much more 
stimulating than at present. It would also increase the agri- 
cultural wealth, and would cause the limits of permanent habi- 
tation to advance some miles into the desert. There the stimu- 
lating influence might be less than on the coast, because the 
storms might be somewhat interrupted by crossing the moun- 
tains. Nevertheless it would be important. The eflfect of 
increased storminess upon habitability, however, would be much 
less noticeable than upon energy or than in better watered 
regions. An increase of 60 per cent in a rainfall of twenty 
inches, such as is now enjoyed by many parts of Syria, would 
raise the precipitation to thirty inches, a figure which permits 
great prosperity. A corresponding change in Egypt would 
increase the rainfall of Alexandria from 8.8 inches to 18.2, that 
of Port Said from 8.8 to 6, and that of Cairo from 1.8 to 2. 
Farther east in Mesopotamia, Bagdad would change from 9 to 
18.6, while in Persia, Teheran would rise from 10 to 16 and 
Ispahan from 6.2 to 7.8. Deserts would still be deserts. They 
would be easier to cross than at present, and the number of 



274 CIVILIZATION AND CLIMATE 

inhabitants might be greater, for there would be more pasturage 
for camels and sheep. The springs would also be larger and 
more permanent than now, and some new ones would appear. 
Yet the predominant feature would still be great wastes of 
blowing sand and barren gravel; the people would have to be 
nomads; and those who entered the desert would frequently 
encounter rigors like those of today. Thus a large change in 
the stimulating qualities of a subarid or desert climate is pos- 
sible without a change of rainfall greater than that for which 
there seems to be good evidence. 

Let us turn now to another type of objection, historical 
rather than physical. ^^How about the high civilizations of the 
past in places outside the storm belt?*' the objector may say. 
^^Yucatan and Guatemala may possibly have been stormy, but 
surely not Peru, southern Arabia, Rhodesia, Ceylon, Java, and 
Indo-China. Yet these have boasted a civilization much higher 
than now prevails there." 

The force of this objection must frankly be admitted. The 
ruins of Indo-China and northern Ceylon, and any other traces 
of high civilization located in tropical lowlands, with the excep- 
tion of Yucatan and Guatemala, do not appear to have any 
relation to our hypothesis. They may require a modification of 
it. More probably they represent the triumph of other factors 
over the climatic factor. They apparently indicate temporary 
energy due to the incursion of higher cultures from more 
favored regions such as India or the neighboring highlands. If 
that is so, they possess no more significance for our climatic 
hypothesis than do the railroads and other innovations intro- 
duced by Europeans within the past few decades. If, on the 
other hand, they indicate that a highly competent race actually 
grew up in these regions, they must be weighed most carefully. 
Under such circumstances they may show that while the hy- 
pothesis is true in general, the effects of climate may be entirely 
overcome by a race of unusual strength or by some other 



CLIMATIC HYPOTHESIS OF CIVILIZATION 276 

special circumstances. Another possibility is that the supposed 
subtropical storm belt may have divided in eastern India be- 
cause of the barrier of great mountains, just as the main belt 
now divides when it approaches Europe. One branch may have 
passed over into China, after being much broken by the high- 
lands, and the other may have swung southeast around the 
lofty Burmese mountains to the neck of the Malay Peninsula. 
There it may have turned northeast to rejoin the other branch 
in the Pacific. In crossing the plains of Cambodia, where the 
most remarkable ruins are located, it may have developed a dis- 
tinct storm center like that of northern Italy. The conditions 
would resemble those inferred in Yucatan and Guatemala, 
although less favorable because cold waves would be checked 
by the great moiintains. Indo-China and Central America lie 
in the same relative position in their respective continents, a 
fact which may have considerable significance. In view of the 
numerous possibilities, it seems wisest to leave Indo-China and 
its neighbors out of accoimt for the present. They cannot be 
said to support our hypothesis, but neither do they militate 
against it. 

Peru, Yemen, and Rhodesia furnish admirable examples of 
comparatively high civilizations which developed in tropical 
highlands and lasted for a considerable period without much 
intercourse with regions of higher culture. They lie at such an 
altitude that the mean temperature never departs far from the 
optimum. For instance, at Cuzco, where the famous Peruvian 
ruins are located, the monthly mean temperature according to 
Hann ranges from M^ in July to 62^ in November. At Hope 
Fontein, near the Rhodesian ruins of Zimbabwe, the figures are 
64° in June and 71** in November. For Yemen none are avail- 
able, but judging by the altitude its temperature is probably 
slightly lower than that of Rhodesia. So far as this one factor 
is concerned, the conditions in Peru are almost ideal, while in 
the other places they are distinctly favorable. When inmu- 



276 CIVILIZATION AND CLIMATE 

grants came to a region with a mean temperature so near the 
optimum, they would naturally be stimulated. If they hap- 
pened also to have inherited more than ordinary ability, the 
combination of the two conditions would speedily enable them 
to dominate the indigenous population, and to develop many 
new ideas. Yet we should not expect such a civilization to 
endure so long or rise so high as those in more favored regions. 
The people would tend to exhaust themselves for they would 
never experience any restful changes of seasons, and would be 
stimulated at all times. To revert to an earlier illustration, 
their condition would be like that of a horse which is always 
driven at full speed. Such a horse might go rapidly for a 
while, but would wear himself out at an age when carefully 
driven animals were in their prime. The constant nervous 
excitation produced by such a climate in immigrants from a less 
favorable region would induce both progress and decay. The 
most nervous people would die out partly because they would 
exert themselves too strenuously, and partly because nervous- 
ness is a potent agency in reducing the birthrate. Self-control 
would also be weakened, thus leading to vice and excesses of 
various kinds. The chewing of the coca leaf, a narcotic stimu- 
lant which is thought by many people to be one great cause of 
the backwardness of Peru today, would harm the high-strung, 
competent parts of the community more than the dull, apa- 
thetic ones. In various other ways such a climate as that of 
Peru would be stimulating for a while, but would lead to exhaus- 
tion sooner than would one where greater variability prevails. 
We now come to perhaps the strongest objection aside from 
the question of the reality of climatic changes. A large part 
of this book has been concerned with the United States. The 
present status of that country is one of the main foundations 
which originally led to the framing of our hypothesis. Yet 
before the coming of the white man savagery prevailed where 
civilization is now highest. In the sixteenth century the cli- 



CLIMATIC HYPOTHESIS OF CIVILIZATION 277 

mate must have been approximately the same as today, so that 
no explanation can be sought along that line. The contrast 
between the relatively advanced position of the Incas in a 
climate of only moderate excellence and the low position of the 
Indians of the northeastern United States in one of the two 
most highly favored regions of the world is striking. We may 
attempt to explain this anomaly by saying that the Incas were 
endowed with a peculiarly strong heritage, while the north- 
eastern Indians, although belonging to the same great racial 
stock, had suffered some historic accident which left them devoid 
of capacity and unable to rise even under the most stimulating 
environment. Such an assumption begs the question. We have 
not an iota of proof that it is true. On the contrary, so far 
as we know, the opposite is the case. In both the United States 
and Peru the poor Indian has been oppressed for three cen- 
turies or more. At present few people would question that he is 
more competent and energetic in the northern country than in 
the southern. An admixture of North American Indian blood 
is not considered a misfortune. Americans in high stations, 
senators for example, boast of it. To this day, in spite of a 
long racial conflict, we admire the activity, self-control, and 
wonderful endurance of the former owners of the continent. 
We realize that among the more advanced tribes a high type of 
social and political organization prevailed. Treaties between 
tribes such as the Five Nations were honorably maintained. 
Although the Indian is often accused of treachery, he appar- 
ently kept faith with the white man as well as the white man 
kept it with him. In many ways a strong case can be made in 
favor of the idea that the Indians were people of high capacity. 
The matter is well summed up by an eminent English anthro- 
pologist in a letter which was quoted when we were discussing 
the distribution of civilization. I did not then realize that I 
should want to use his words again, but they are worth repeat- 
ing. Quoting from my definition of civilization, he says : 



278 CIVILIZATION AND CLIMATE 

'' The power of self-control, high standards of honesty and 
morality, . . . high ideals, respect for law' are eminently char- 
acteristic of many savage and barbarian peoples, notably the 
North American Indians, and in my opinion these latter stand 
▼ery much higher than the average American citizen, but the 
latter lead in 'the power to lead and control other races, and 
capacity for disseminating ideas . • . inventiveness, highly 
developed systems, etc' " 

All this, so far as it goes, is in harmony with our climatic 
hypothesis. It becomes still more so when we consider that there 
was a great difference between such fine tribes as the Iroquois, 
Sioux, and others who lived in the North, and the Seminoles of 
Florida, the Apaches of Arizona, and the Digger Indians of 
southern California. The more competent tribes lived in the 
regions where the climate is the most stimulating. 

In spite of this we are still confronted by the stubborn fact 
that before the coming of the white man no great civilization 
had ever developed in the northern United States, while Mexico, 
although far inferior climatically, harbored a relatively civil- 
ized population. At first this seems to prove that our hypothe- 
sis cannot be correct. Yet more careful examination leads 
to a different conclusion. The distribution of civilization in 
pre-Columbian America merely brings out a fact which I have 
again and again tried to emphasize : although climate is highly 
important, there are other factors whose weight is equally 
great. Even if our hypothesis be fully accepted, no less im- 
portance will thereby attach to the other great factors which 
condition the events of history. Because a man dies for lack of 
air, we do not think that air is more essential than food, drink, 
warmth, the circulation of the blood, the reproduction of the 
S]>ecie8, the absence of virulent germs, and many other condi- 
tions. So it is in history. Even if our climatic ideas are correct, 
it will still be true that the ordinary events of the historical 
record are due to the differing traits of races, the force of 



CLIMATIC HYPOTHESIS OF CIVILIZATION 279 

economic pressure, the ambition of kings, the intrigues of 
statesmen, the zeal of religion, the jealousy of races, the rise 
of men of genius, the evolution of new political or social insti- 
tutions, and other similar circumstances. Yet a comprehension 
of the part played by the climatic factor will enable us to ex- 
plain some of the many events which hitherto have puzzled us. 
Not all will be thus explained, for others must wait until the 
action of some other set of as yet unknown conditions is under- 
stood. 

Where so large a number of factors work together no one of 
them will always be dominant. Even the strongest will some- 
times be neutralized. For example, during the Russo-Japanese 
War the ties of a conunon religion and a common inheritance of 
European culture were powerless to make the Americans sympa- 
thize with the Russians. England and Germany are probably 
as closely bound together in race, religion, and culture as any 
two nations which do not speak the same language. Yet in 
1914 a di£Perence in economic interests and in ideals completely 
nullified these factors. So it is with climate. A great genius 
like Mohammed may cause his people to occupy a position quite 
different from what we should expect if climate were the only 
factor or even the main factor. Many other influences may 
obliterate or neutralize the effect of climate. A race of idiots 
would not develop a high civilization wherever they might live. 
Such a race as the primitive Australians might be stimulated 
under favorable conditions, but there is not one chance in a 
thousand that they could rise to the level of the French. Nor 
could the French have attained their present position, even 
though blessed with the best racial character and with the most 
stimulating climate, unless great men had been bom among 
them, Christianity had prevailed, and new institutions had de- 
veloped from century to century. All this is familiar. Scores 
of people have said it for generations. Yet it needs repetition. 
Each phase of a subject must be emphasized at the appropriate 



280 CIVILIZATION AND CLIMATE 

time, and the f^se which has been most neglected ought tem- 
porarily to receive more attention than the others. Climate 
seems to be a factor whose importance in hmnan development 
has not been fully recognized. Hence, it is here emphasized. 
Nevertheless, it is fortunate that the American Indians remind 
us that other factors are equally strong, and sometimes 
stronger. 

Two factors seem to be of chief importance in explaining the 
low culture of the Indians of the northeastern United States. 
One is the absence of tools of iron, and the other the lack of 
beasts of burden. These, in conjunction with the type of 
vegetation, offer such hindrance that the Indians could prob- 
ably never have developed a very high civilization, even if they 
had been as competent as the races of Europe. The discovery 
of the use of iron depends on the coincidence of three conditions 
whose occurrence is almost accidental. One is the birth of a 
man with sufficient inventive genius to devise a way of obtaining 
the metal from rocky ores. The second is the occurrence of ores 
and other necessary materials within easy reach of such a man. 
The third is that the genius must be so relieved from the fear 
of enemies, the danger of starvation, and the ravages of 
disease that he has both time and strength to elaborate his 
idea. The combination of these three fortunate circumstances 
never occurred in America. Although a little native copper 
was used, we have no assurance that the ore was ever smelted in 
any large amounts. It certainly never was used to any great 
extent. Iron was absolutely unknown. Hence, through acci- 
dental circumstances, which were no fault of their own, the 
original Americans were dependent upon such tools as they 
could fashion from flint, obsidian, and other stones, or from 
bones, shells, wood, and similar materials. 

We are so accustomed to iron tools that we scarcely realize 
their immense importance. Consider their effect upcm agri- 
culture. Go into a virgin forest with its labyrinth of trees. 



CLIMATIC HYPOTHESIS OF CIVILIZATION 281 

Imagine the task of cutting them down with a stone hatchet. 
The mere physical labor is such that none but people of high 
energy would ever attempt it. An easier way is to girdle the 
trees, cutting off the bark in a circle, and then leaving them to 
dry until they can be burned. Even that, however, is a long 
process. In the moister parts of the world its difficulty is 
greatly increased by the fact that while the trees are becoming 
dry enough to burn, new vegetation is rapidly growing. In 
many tropical regions, as we have already seen, the clearing of 
the forests is scarcely feasible even today. In temperate for- 
ests the difficulties are not so great, but they are practically 
insurmountable from the standpoint of a savage who has never 
known the meaning of hard, steady work. In the hunting 
stage a man may follow the trail until he falls from exhaustion, 
but that does not give him the power to wield a stone axe day 
after day upon stubborn trees. Hence, if agriculture is to be 
practiced by primitive people, it must originate in regions 
where there are no forests. The vegetation must be such that 
the primitive savage with his hands or with a stick or stone can 
easily grub it up. Or else it must be so scanty that it will not 
interfere with his crops. Anyone who has seen the agriculture 
practiced by people who are just emerging from some other 
mode of making a living knows that the fields are sown in the 
spring and then generally left untended until the time of 
harvest. Since the people are not yet able to get their living 
entirely from the crops, which is always the case during the 
transition period, they must perforce carry on the old occupa- 
tions while the crops are growing. Hence, the weeds are allowed 
to grow as freely as the grain. In a dry climate where the 
natural growth consists only of bunchy grasses or low bushy 
weeds which grow apart from one another and can easily be 
pulled up with the hands before the next sowing, this does 
little harm. In wetter regions, such as the forested areas, the 
weeds are much more difficult to eradicate. 



282 CIVILIZATION AND CLIMATE 

The reader has probably noticed that I have said nothing 
about grass-lands. The reason is that primitive people never 
attempt to cultivate them. If grass covers the entire ground 
and forms what we commonly call sod, crops cannot be raised 
in it. The dry grass may be burned off in the early spring, and 
seeds may be dropped in holes punched with a sharp stick, but 
no crop will be reaped. The roots of the grass are not killed. 
The new blades shoot up at once, and by the time the seeds 
begin to sprout are so high as to strangle them. The primitive 
savage who has no iron tools cannot possibly dig up the sod. 
Even if he has such tools, the laboriousness of the task bans it 
as a practical method of making a living. If anyone doubts 
this, let him spade up a turfy spot ten feet in diameter. Then 
let him calculate how many days he would have to dig in order 
to make a living for himself and his family by sowing grain. 
Let him also determine how a primitive savage who had to do 
this task would support himself and his children while he was 
digguig before he could get a first crop. Finally, remember 
that the savage had no good spade to help him, but only a 
clumsy, heavy stone set in a handle, or a piece of wood rudely 
shaped into a flat implement. 

I have emphasized the difficulties of grass-land because they 
apply directly to the problem of civilization among the Indians. 
The part of North America which is highly stimulating cli- 
matically is covered either with grass of the prairie and great 
plains type, or with temperate forest. It is universally recog- 
nized that a high state of civilization is impossible unless it is 
based on agriculture. Otherwise people must wander all the 
time. They cannot accumulate the appliances which are essen- 
tial even to the lowest real civilization. They are not attached 
to the soil, and thus have no incentive to improve a particular 
tract. If they possess domestic animals, the case is better, for 
these foster the sense of ownership and various other feelings 
which serve as uplifting infiuences. In North America no 



CLIMATIC HYPOTHESIS OF CIVILIZATION 288 

dcHnestic animalH except the dog and the turkey were known to 
the aborigines. This was not the fault of the Indians. The 
horse and camel families were then extinct in North America. 
The Uson was the only animal of the ox family with which the 
Indians came in contact. It was too large and fierce to be 
domesticated. The mountain sheep might possibly have been 
tamed, but it is very wild, its habitat is the barren mountains, 
and it is too small to plough sod. Even if the Indians had been 
familiar with the idea of taming beasts of burden, they could 
not have achieved any important success. 

Without beasts of burden ploughing is impossible. Unless 
the ground is ploughed, grass-lands, as we have seen, cannot be 
cultivated. Therefore, civilization could not flourish in the 
grassy plains of North America before the coming of the white 
man. A few highly favored spots such as river flood plains 
where the grass grows in bunches and does not form turf were 
cultivated, but the areas of that kind were too small and scat- 
tered to give rise to any widespread progress. They were ex- 
posed to the ravages of Indians who had not yet learned the 
value of permanent abodes and individual property, two pri- 
mary requisites of civilization. The people who lived upon them 
were swamped in the flood of surrounding savagery. More- 
over, the places which they were able to cultivate were subject 
to floods and other disasters, so that the cultivators were often 
forced to rely on the chase. Then again, without iron tools or 
beasts of burden, a man cannot cultivate a large area because 
the task is so great. Therefore, the crops were likely to be 
insufficient to support the family throughout the year even 
when the harvest was good. The only recourse was the chase. 
In Asia people who were in such circumstances might rely on 
domestic animals, but not in America. Hence, it was practi- 
cally impossible for the Indians of the grassy plains to get 
away from the savage life of the hunter. 

In the forests which covered all the eastern states conditions 



284 CIVILIZATION AND CLIMATE 

were scarcely better. A man might girdle enough trees and cut 
enough brush to make a small field. When the wood was dry, 
he might bum it and obtain a crop of com. While it was 
maturing he and his family would make a living by hunting and 
fishing. The crop would support them through the winter, but 
it is extremely doubtful whether they would ever cease to regard 
hunting as a main source of livelihood. The reason is this. The 
first crop on a burned piece of forest land in the eastern United 
States meets with little difficulty. For the second crop it is 
necessary to cut down and bum the weeds and bushes that have 
grown up during the preceding summer. Remember that the 
savage has no iron hoe, his seeds are planted haphazard here 
and there among the stumps, and he cannot tend his garden 
while it is growing, but must go off and hunt. When he cuts 
the bushes and weeds the second spring he does not root up the 
grass. He has no spade with which to dig it up, and no ox or 
donkey to draw a plough. If he takes good care of his field 
he soon finds that he has a meadow of tough sod on his hands. 
If he neglects it, he has a few acres of bushes. In either case if 
he would make a living from agriculture, he must go through 
the labor of clearing a new field. Meanwhile he still must be a 
nomadic hunter. He takes no great pride in his field ; he does 
not care to improve it; he rarely builds a permanent house 
beside it. Why should he? Next year, or at most in two or 
three years, he must build another. In a few specially favored 
spots the conditions may be such that agriculture is not quite 
so difficult. In the North, where the stimulating climate is 
found, such spots are few and small. The chief reason for 
wonder is that the Indians had energy to cultivate any crops 
whatever. In the southern states the grass does not form so 
dense a sod as in the North, but even there the difficulties are 
great. Yet a beginning had been made, and the civilized na- 
tions, including the Cherokees and others, lived in permanent 
villages and practiced agriculture as their main means of 



CLIMATIC HYPOTHESIS OF CIVILIZATION 286 

getting a Hying. If they had had iron tools and oxen, the 
chances are that America today would be filled with highly 
dyilized Indians instead of Anglo-Saxons and other Europeans. 
Thus it appears that although appropriate climatic conditions 
on the one hand, and an inheritance of strong mental qualities 
on the other, may be essential to the rise of a great ciyilization, 
these two conditions may be at their best, and yet savagery 
may prevail because other essentials such as iron or beasts of 
burden are lacking. 

It would be easy to discuss other objections to the hypothe- 
sis that climate is an essential factor in civilization, but so far 
as now appears, no new principles would be illustrated. Doubt- 
less I have overlooked many things, and I shall welcome sug- 
gestions, no matter whether they harmonize with our hypothe- 
sis or demand its revision. Long and careful discussion is essen- 
tial, for the final decision of scientists as to the truth or falsity 
of our conclusions will have a deep bearing not only upon the 
interpretation of history, but upon man's conscious plans for 
his own future. 

As we come to the end of this volume I am well aware that to 
those who accept the climatic hypothesis, it may seem depress- 
ing. To the dweller in the less favored parts of the world it 
may appear to sound the knell to his hopes for great progress 
in the land that he loves. To his brother in the center of modem 
activity a most disquieting vision of possible retrogression is 
disclosed. If our reasoning is correct, man is far more limited 
than he has realized. He has boasted that he is the lord of 
creation. He has revelled in the thought that he alone among 
created beings can dwell in the uttermost bounds of the earth. 
One more of the bulwarks of this old belief is now assailed. Man 
can apparently live in any region where he can obtain food, but 
his physical and mental energy and his moral character reach 
their highest development only in a few strictly limited areas. 
The location of those areas appears to have varied greatly in 



286 CIVILIZATION AND CLIMATE 

the past; it may vary greatly in the future. In a thousand 
years, for all that we can tell, — so the prophet of evil wiU say, — 
no highly favorable region may exist upon the globe, and the 
human race may be thrown back into the dull, lethargic state 
of our present tropical races. Even without so dire a calamity, 
the location of the regions of greatest climatic energy may in 
a few hundred years change again to Egypt, Mesopotamia, and 
Guatemala. The consequent rise of new powers and the decline 
of those now dominant may throw the world into a chaos far 
worse than that of the Dark Ages. Races of low mental caliber 
may be stimulated to most pernicious activity, while those of 
high capacity may not have energy to withstand their more 
barbarous neighbors. 

Even if such extreme disasters should not occur, the prospect 
is depressing. Take such a favored country as the United 
States. In the South we find less energy, less vitality, less edu- 
cation, and fewer men who rise to eminence than in the North, 
not because southerners are in any way innately inferior to 
northerners, but apparently because of the adverse climate. In 
the Far West people seem to be stimulated to such a degree that 
nervous exhaustion threatens them. In the North we see still 
another handicap. In spite of a wonderfully stimulating climate 
most of the year, the people suffer sudden checks because of the 
extremes of temperature. These conditions favor nervousness, 
and worst of aU they frequently stimulate harmful activities. 
That, perhaps, is why American children are so rude and bois- 
terous, or why so staid a city as Boston has six times as many 
murders as London in proportion to the population. Our 
country takes immigrants of every mental caliber, and then 
stimulates some to noble deeds and others to commit murder, 
break down the respect for law, and give us city governments 
that shame us in the eyes of the world. All these things would 
apparently not happen to such an extent were our climate less 
bracing and did not its extremes often weaken the power of 



CLIMATIC HYPOTHESIS OF CIVILIZATION 287 

sdf-control. Other lands also have their drawbacks. Germany 
is much like the eastern United States, although not so extreme. 
France on the other hand is less stimulating. England suffers 
from too great dampness, and in Ireland this becomes a factor 
of serious import. If the best parts of the earth have such 
climatic disadvantages, what shall we say of Russia weighted 
down with benumbing cold and comparative monotony or with 
changes so extreme that they are harmful? What of China 
under a much heavier handicap of monotony; or of tropical 
lands burdened most heavily of all? If climatic conditions influ- 
ence character as we have inferred, does not our hypothesis 
weaken man's moral responsibility? Will not people more than 
ever ascribe their failings to nature, and so excuse themselves? 
In the favored regions will not men became increasingly arro- 
gant and overbearing, because they will be surer than ever that 
the rest of the world cannot resist them? If all these sad results 
are possible, is it well to know that climate so strongly influ- 
ences us? We cannot change the climate, so why ascribe to it 
such great effects merely to destroy hope in some and moral 
responsibility in others? 

The answer to these questions may be put in the form of a 
parable. Ages ago a band of naked, houseless, fireless savages 
started from their warm home in the torrid zone, and pushed 
steadily northward from the beginning of spring to the end of 
summer. They never guessed that they had left the land of con- 
stant warmth until in September they began to feel an uncom- 
fortable chill at night. Day by day it grew worse. Not knowing 
its cause they travelled this way or that to escape. Some went 
southward, but only a handful finally returned to their former 
home. There they resumed the old life, and their descendants 
are untutored savages to this day. Of those who wandered in 
other directions all perished except one small band. Finding 
that they could not escape the nipping air, the members of this 
band used the loftiest of human faculties, the power of conscious 



288 CIVILIZATION AND CLIMATE 

inyention. Some tried to find shelter by digging in the ground, 
some gathered branches and leaves to make huts and warm beds, 
and some wrapped themselves in the skins of the beasts that 
they had slain. Soon these savages had taken some of the 
greatest steps toward civilization. The naked were clothed; 
the houseless sheltered; the improvident learned to dry meat 
and store it with nuts for the winter, and at last the art of 
making fire was discovered as a means of keeping warm. Thus 
they subsisted where at first they thought that they were 
doomed. And in the process of adjusting themselves to a hard 
environment they advanced by enormous strides, leaving the 
tropical part of mankind far in the rear. 

Today mankind resembles these savages in certain respects. 
We know that we are limited by climate. As the savages faced 
the winter, so we are face to face with the fact that the human 
race has tried to conquer the arctic zone, the deserts, and the 
torrid zone, and has met with only the most limited success. 
Even in the temperate zone he has made a partial failure, for 
he is still hampered in hundreds of ways. Hitherto we have 
attributed our failure to economic conditions, to isolation and 
remoteness, to racial incapacity, or to specific diseases. Now 
we see that it is probably due in part to lack of energy or to 
other unfavorable effects produced directly upon the human 
system by climate. This is no reason for despair. We ought 
rather to rejoice because, perhaps, we may correct some of the 
evils which hitherto have baffled us. 

Again and again in our discussion of factories and other 
matters we have come upon ways in which a change in our 
methods may do much to overcome the harmful effects of cli- 
mate. I do not propose to enumerate them, for the specific 
application of our results may well be deferred until we know 
whether our main hypothesis is likely to stand. Yet one or two 
general lines of progress may properly be pointed out. Take 
the harmful winters of the northern United States. It is highly 



CLIMATIC HYPOTHESIS OF CIVILIZATION 289 

probable that the loss of energy which occurs at that time may 
be largely avoided, or at least greatly diminished^ Much of it 
arises from the fact that after the wonderfully stimulating 
autumn weather, when we have been living under almost ideal 
conditions of mean temperature, of humidity, and of variability 
from day to day, we suddenly begin to heat our houses. We 
create an indoor climate of great uniformity, of unduly high 
mean temperature, and of the most extreme aridity. All these 
conditions are harmful. If our houses were kept at lower 
temperatures, if the temperature were varied from day to day, 
and if the humidity were kept at the optimum, we should in- 
crease our efficiency greatly. We should be comfortable, also, 
for with proper humidity, and with changes from day to day, 
we should not feel the need of the high temperatures which we 
now require because the extreme dryness forces the body to give 
up much more heat than would be demanded by air of greater 
humidity. Moreover, the uniform dryness within doors does 
almost untold harm in parching the mucous membranes and 
thus rendering us peculiarly liable to colds, grippe, and similar 
ailments which often lead to serious diseases such as pneu- 
monia and tuberculosis. Of course we could not entirely avoid 
colds by the method here suggested, but we surely could diminish 
them. In the autumn before our houses are heated, colds are 
comparatively rare, and the same is true among people who live 
out of doors in winter. If the conditions inside our houses could 
be like those that prevail in the autumn, the general health of the 
community would probably be much improved. In this one way 
there might be a saving not only of millions of dollars' worth of 
valuable time, but of an immense amount of nervous energy 
which is wasted because persons who are irritated by colds do 
or say things that they would scorn under normal conditions. 

Along still other lines great improvements might be possible. 
For instance, in many factories the same amount of work is 



290 CIVILIZATION AND CLIMATE 

expected each month. Hence, at certain seasons many opera- 
tives, especially girls, work harder than they ought, while at 
others they do not work so hard as they easily could without 
special effort. If factories were run in accordance with a 
well-established seasonal curve of energy, we should find the 
machinery running slowly in winter, faster in the spring, and 
in May perhaps 10 or 16 per cent faster than in January. 
Then in the summer it would run more slowly than in May, but 
not so slowly as in winter. Finally, in the autumn it would run 
at greater speed than at any other time of year. The operatives 
would scarcely be ccmscious of the difference, and they would 
probably do more work and preserve their health better than 
under the present system. 

If our hypothesis is true, it is likely to prove helpful not only 
to places where the climatic disadvantages are slight, but where 
they are great. Consider regions which have a winter of great 
severity, but an invigorating summer. Contrast them with 
places where the summer is too hot, but the winter favorable. 
Russia and Mesopotamia may serve as examples. Today we 
already have a small number of people who move back and forth 
each year between places of this sort, for instance northern 
Grermany and the Riviera, New England and Florida. Unfor- 
tunately, those who do this are usually not the workers, but the 
idlers or those whose work is almost finished. In the future, 
however, if the principles here laid down find acceptance, we 
may expect that such interchanges will take place on a scale to 
stagger the imagination. Not only the leisure classes, but 
laborers and farmers may thus move back and forth. In winter 
most of Russia's peasants have little to do, and their enforced 
idleness is harmful. They might go to Mesopotamia where 
most of the farm work is done between October and May. If 
people could move thus from place to place, not only would 
there be an enormous increase in production, but many other 



CLIMATIC HYPOTHESIS OF CIVILIZATION 291 

benefits. The part of the population that moved would be 
stimulated not only by the change of climate, but by contact 
with other races and new methods. They would be more 
tolerant, more progressive, and more eager for education. 
Both countries would benefit by such an interchange of workers, 
and much of the handicap of places like Russia might possibly 
be overcome. Perhaps the day will come when only the poorest 
families will stay in an unfavorable climate more than a few 
years at a time without going at least for a season to some 
place where they will receive new stimulus. 

In tropical countries the chances for improvement are at a 
maximum. Already most Europeans and a few natives appre- 
ciate the necessity for spending part of the year among the 
mountains or in a climate different from that where they usually 
live. For the most part the lowlanders go to the highlands, but 
in lofty plateaus like Mexico it is not uncommon for foreigners 
to take a run down to the coast for a change of air. Of course 
altitude has much to do with this, but even though Vera Cruz 
has a bad climate for permanent residence, it is stimulating for 
a short while when one comes from a wholly different environ- 
ment. In the future we can scarcely doubt that this method of 
overcoming the evil effects of a tropical climate will be resorted 
to on a vast scale, not only by foreigners, but by the more 
intelligent portion of the natives. 

In the warmer parts of the earth there is another side to 
the question. Mankind needs not only seasonal changes, but 
variations from day to day, or week to week. Two methods of 
obtaining these suggest themselves. One is by cooling the 
interiors of houses. Today this is done on a small scale by 
shutting out the sun and sprinkling water to cause evaporation. 
There is no reason why the same result should not be produced 
on a large scale. We already know how to cool houses as well 
as to heat them. We do it in ice-plants. A thousand years ago 



292 CIVILIZATION AND CLIMATE 

men would have laughed at the idea that hundreds of rooms 
would some day be heated by a single fire, yet we see it in every 
ofSce building or hotel. In equatorial regions there is as much 
reason for equipping the houses with coolers as there is in 
temperate regions for equipping them with heaters. In both 
cases uniformity of temperature is apparently a mistake, for 
moderate changes from day to day appear to be favorable. 
Even though a man's work may be out of doors, it seems prob- 
able that he would be much stimulated and much better enabled 
to work hard in the heat if he could sleep in a comparatively 
cool house. If he lives where the climate is too damp, he would 
be benefited by having the house relatively dry, just as the 
northerner in winter apparently ought to have his house more 
moist than is now his habit. Both need to enjoy the optimum 
conditions. 

A second method of obtaining frequent changes may possibly 
prove of much importance. Today the seacoast in many 
regions, for example on the Atlantic shore of America from New 
York to Boston, is bordered by an almost continuous line of 
houses. At first people went to these only in the summer. Now 
many go for week-ends at almost all seasons. Fifty years ago 
such a thing was almost unknown. Fifty years hence it will 
probably be many times more prevalent than now. In tropical 
countries we may perhaps expect that some day millions of 
people will not only move to other climates during part of each 
year, but that many will move back and forth from the lowlands 
to the highlands every few days. Their work may be arranged 
so that they can spend two or three days a week in the highlands 
and the rest in the lowlands. Not only the men ought to do 
this, but the whole family, for all need the stimulus. Schools, 
factories, and almost all kinds of work except those like farming 
or mining, which actually take something from the soil, can be 
located where the climatic conditions are best, a matter which 



CLIMATIC HYPOTHESIS OF CIVILIZATION 298 

is beccMning increasingly easy as our facilities for communica- 
tion improve. Yet if these are to be within the tropics, the 
people engaged in them must have an opportunity to obtain 
the stimulus of changes. Perhaps they will frequently go from 
their places of work in the highlands to the neighboring low- 
lands or to the high mountains. 

The expense of such a system of having two homes for a 
large part of the population will doubtless be enormous, but 
that is relatively unimportant. If the farmers of the tropics 
were as e£Bcient as those of the temperate zone, one man's labor 
would produce two or three times as much as in Europe or the 
United States. If white men can devise a means whereby they 
can live in the torrid zone and retain approximately the energy 
which they possess in their own countries, or if they can largely 
increase the efSciency of the natives, they can afford to spend 
enormous sums in creating favorable conditions. How we shall 
go to work in detail cannot yet be determined, but that will 
easily be discovered. For the present it is enough to see that 
the hypothesis of climate as a condition of civilization is far 
from depressing. It holds out hope that the inhabitants of even 
the most favored parts of the temperate zone may improve their 
condition. It holds out still more hope that the people of the 
less favored parts of that zone and of the subtropical zone may 
be benefited. And it holds out far the greatest hope to those 
who dwell in the tropical regions which now are the most hope- 
less. 

If our hypothesis is true, man is more closely dependent upon 
nature than he has realized. A realization of his limitations, 
however, is the first step toward freedom. In suggesting pos- 
sible ways of obtaining a new ascendancy over climatic handi- 
caps we have dealt largely with material matters. Bound up 
with these, and far more important, are great moral issues. We 
are slowly realizing that character in the broad sense of all that 
pertains to industry, honesty, purity, intelligence, and strength 



294 CIVILIZATION AND CLIMATE 

of will is closely dependent upon the condition of the body. Each 
influences the other. Neither can be at its best while its com- 
panion is dragged down. The climate of many countries seems 
to be one of the great reasons why idleness, dishonesty, immo- 
rality, stupidity, and weakness of will prevail. If we can con- 
quer climate, the whole world will become stronger and nobler. 



APPENDIX 



APPENDIX 

(A) CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE MAP. OF 

CIVILIZATION 

1. Ameeicaks 

J. Barrelly gecdogist. New Haven, Conn. 

P. Bigelowy traveler and author. Maiden, N. Y. 

L Bowman, geographer. New York, N. Y. 

W. M. Brown, geographer. Providence, R. I. 

R. D. Calkins, geographer, Mt. Pleasant, Mich. 

J. S. Chandler, missionary, Madura, India. 

A. C. CooUdge, historian, Cambridge, Mass. 

S. W. Cushing, geographer, Salem, Mass. 

L. Farrand, anthropologist. New York City. 

C. W. Furlong, traveler and author, Boston, Mass. 

H. Gannett, geographer, Washington, D. C. 

E. W. GriiBs, traveler and author, Ithaca, N. Y. 

A. Hrdlicka, anthropologist, Washington, D. C. 

E. H. Hume, physician and missionary, Changsha, China. 

E. Huntington, geographer. New Haven, Cmin. 

M. Je£Person, geographer, Ypsilanti, Mich. 

A. G. Keller, anthropologist. New Haven, Conn. 

E. F. Merriam, editor, Boston, Mass. 

J. H. Potts, missionary, Shanghai, China. 

E. Sapir, anthropologist, Ottawa, Canada. 

J. R. Smith, economic geographer, Philadelphia, Pa. 

E. V. Robinson, economic geographer, Minneapolis, Minn. 

W. S. Tower, geograj^er, Chicago, 111. 

R. H. Whitbeck, geographer, Madison, Wise 

S. W. Zwemer, missionary, Cairo, Egypt. 

Anonymous, New York City. 



298 APPENDIX 

2. B&ITI8H 

George Black, Sydney, AuBtralia. 

James Bryce, statesman, London. 

Leonard Darwin, soldier, Londcm. 

T. H. Holdidi, soldier, London. 

H. H. Johnston, administrator, Arundel, England. 

J. S. Keltie, geographer, London. 

T. S. Longstaff, geographer, London. 

D. Carmthers, explorer, Manningtree^ Eng^d. 

8. Teutons from Continental Europe 

S. de Geer, geographer, Stockholm, Sweden. 
H. F. Helmholt, historian, Mtinchen, Germany. 

A. Kraemer, ethnographer, Stuttgart, Germany. 

Mrs. M. Krug-Genthe, geographer, Cbemnlts, Germany. 

H. H. Reusch, geologist and geographer, Kristiania, Norway. 

H. ten Kate, anthropologist, Geneva, Switzerland. 

F. von Luschan, anthropologist, Berlin, Germany. 
K. F. Sapper, geographer, Strassburg, Germany. 

4. Latins (and Other Europeans not Already Classified) 

D. n Anoutchine, geographer, Moscow, Russia. 

L. Gallois, geographer, Paris, France. 

V. Giuffrida-Ruggeri, anthropologist, Naples, Italy. 

G. Papillault, anthropologist, Paris, France. 

B. y Rospide, geographer, Madrid, Spain. 
G. Sergi, anthropologist, Rome, Italy. 

5. Telles, geographer, Lisbon, PortugaL 

5. Asiatics 

Katsuro Haro, Imperial University, Kyoti^ Japan. 
Inaso Nitobe, Imperial University, Tokyo, Japan. 
Naomasa Yamasaki, Imperial University, Tolcyo, Japan. 
Jeme Tlen-yow, Shan^ai, China. 
Wang C3iing-<:hun, Tientsin, China. 
Wu Ting-fang, Shanghai, China. 



APPENDIX 299 

SUMMABT OF CONTEIBUTO&S 

Letters sent Replies Contributors 

Americans 64 57 95 

British 43 38 8 

Teutonic Buropeans 49 93 8 

Latin Europeans 97 8 6 

Asiatics 91 8 6 

Non-Teutonic and non-Latin Buropeans .10 9 1 

Latin Americans 6 9 

Total 914 138 54 



(B) THE RELATIVE CIVILIZATION OP THE 
COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD 

The following list contains the final results of the classifica- 
tion made by the preceding contributors. In examining this the 
reader should remember that the division into regions and the 
grouping of the regions according to race make no claim to 
perfection. Convenience in obtaining units small enough to 
give a detailed map and yet to be known to people of many races 
has been the primary object in dividing the different countries 
of the world into smaller sections. The sections are small in 
Europe and the United States because these regions are well 
known, and large in Siberia because very few people can dis- 
tinguish sharply between different parts of that country. In 
a few cases I have added minor divisions such as southern 
Alaska, with a special object not connected with the present 
book. The grouping by races in Europe, Asia, and North 
America has been guided also by motives of convenience. Such 
places as Ireland, Asia Minor, Bulgaria, Baluchistan, and 
others might properly be placed in other groups as well as in 
those where I have put them. The reader can easily rearrange 
for himself. My purpose has been merely to make a convenient 
classification for our immediate purpose without respect to its 
applicability elsewhere. 



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810 APPENDIX 

Nor. — ^In the Andean countries of South America, except Chili, the 
most advanced districts are found In the hig^ilands. Tht eastern lowland, 
wfaidi is heavily forested or else covered with savannah, contains only a 
scanty population composed almost wholly of Indians. The way in which 
each of these countries is divided into a 'Mountainous part," and an ''east- 
em lowland" seems to have created confusion in the minds of many con- 
tributors. They apparently thought of the lofty mountains, and not of the 
plateau as was intended. Hence they rank the lowlands higher than the 
mountains. As a matter of fact, the lowlands are in almost the same 
condition as the Amaion Basin (No. 185). Therefore, after the figures for 
Veneiuela, Colombia, Peru, and Bolivia, I have added in parentlieses a 
series of numbers indicating the rank of these countries if in each case the 
higher value in any given classification is taken as intended for the more 
advanced portion, that is, the highlands. The numbers in parentheses are 
probably nearer right than the others, and have been used in preparing the 
map of dviliaation. Figure 45. 



APPENDIX 811 

Cl«A88IFICATION OF THE StATSS AND PbOVINCES OF THE UnITED 

States and Canada 

e & e 

K^s I5jg i8« i i 

^is III |{| 14 

5l§ sis Qi< £&i 

Ukitbd Statbs a. B. C. D. 

1. Alabama 9.1 1.9 0.9 9.0 

9. Arisona 13 1.7 0^ 1.6 

3. Arkansas 9.3 1.9 0.4 9.0 

4. CaUfornia 5.3 4.8 0.6 5.1 

5. Colorado 4.1 4.1 0.0 4J 

6. Connecticat and Rhode Island 5.9 5.8 0.1 5.8 

7. Delaware 4.0 3.9 0.1 4.0 

8. Florida 9.0 9.0 0.0 9.0 

9. Georgia 9.1 9.5 0.4 9.5 

10. Idaho 9.5 9.5 0.0 9.6 

11. Illinois 5.7 5.7 0.0 5.7 

19. Indiana 5.3 5.6 0.3 5.4 

13. Iowa 63 5.1 0.1 5.0 

14. Kansas 4.8 5.0 OS 4.9 

15. Kentncky S3 3.3 0.1 3.3 

16. Louisiana 9.0 1.7 03 9.0 

17. Maine 4.9 5.0 0.1 4.8 

18. Maryland 4.1 4.0 0.1 4.1 

19. Massachusetts 6.0 6.0 0.0 6.0 

90. Michigan 5.4 5.6 03 5.4 

91. Minnesota 5.1 5.4 0.3 63 

99. Mississippi 1.7 1.4 0.3 1.7 

93. Missouri 3.7 3.5 03 3.7 

94. Montana 3.0 3.9 03 3.1 

95. Nebraska 4.4 4.3 0.1 4.4 

96. Nevada 1.3 1.9 0.6 1.7 

97. New Hampshire 4.8 4.8 0.0 4.6 

98. New Jersey 5.7 5.4 0.3 5.6 

99. New Mexico 1.6 1.5 0.1 1.6 

80. New York 5.9 5.7 03 5.8 

31. North CaroUna 3.1 9.8 03 9.9 

39. North DakoU 3.8 3.8 0.0 3.8 

83. Ohio 5.8 5.9 0.1 5.8 



812 



APPENDIX 



J 

3:1 

UVITID StATn (CoMlMNMd) A. 

34. Oklahoma 8.7 

35. Oregon 4.6 

36. Pennsylvania 6.6 

37. South Carolina 1.6 

38. South Dalcota 3.8 

39. Tennessee 3.0 

40. Eastern Texas 3.1 

41. Western Texas 1.8 

49. Utah 9.4 

43. Vermont 4.4 

44. Virginia 3.8 

45. Washington 4.8 

46. West Virginia 9.5 

47. Wisconsin 5.4 

48. Wyoming 9.9 

49. Southern Alaslca 1.5 

Cakada a. 

50. Newfoundland 1.9 

51. Prince Edward's Island . . 9.6 

59. Nova Scotia 3.8 

53. New Brunswick S3 

*54. Quebec, east of longitude 79<» 30^ 3.1 

*55. Quebec, west of longitude 79* 30^ 4.1 

56. Ontario, east of Lake Huron . 5.4 

57. Ontario, north of Lakes Huron 

and Superior 3.0 



1i 


between 
AandB 


Final rmnk 
contribnton 


B. 


C. 


D. 


3.1 


0.6 


3.4 


5.0 


0.4 


4.9 


5.5 


0.1 


5.6 


9J 


0.6 


IS 


3.7 


0.1 


3.7 


9.6 


0.4 


9.8 


9.8 


03 


3.1 


1.6 


OS 


1.9 


9.3 


0.1 


9.5 


4.7 


0.3 


4.4 


3.8 


0.0 


SS 


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OS 


5.0 


93 


0.4 


9.8 


5.8 


0.4 


5.6 


9.6 


03 


9.8 


IS 


03 


1.5 


B. 


a 


D. 


9.0 


0.1 


9.0 


9.1 


0.5 


9.5 


3.4 


0.4 


3.6 


9.9 


0.4 


SS 


9.6 


0.5 


3.0 


9.6 


1.5 


3.4 


4.7 


0.7 


5.1 



9.0 



1.0 



9.6 



* In this case some contributors may have misimderstood what was 
intended. At least, several of them placed the part of Quebec containing 
Montreal lower than the sparsely populated portion from Quebec eastward. 
If each contributor's higher figure be taken as meant for the part of the 
province containing Montreal, the final numbers in column D become East 
Quebec 9.5 and West Quebec 3.9. I am stron^y inclined to think that 
many of the Canadian figures are too low, because all but one of the 
contributors were from the United States. For this reason Canada is not 
included in Figure 43. 



APPENDIX 818 



5 ^o3 g. •« I 



M ^1 i§» s s 

I'l 111 III 1?1 

Is! iSi§ Qii^ l&§ 

Cawada (^Contmusd) A. B. C. D. 

5a Manitoba S.5 4.4 0J9 4.0 

59. Saskatchewan, southern half, i.e.» 

south of latitude 55* . . . S.0 3.0 0.0 S.1 

60. Saskatchewan, northern half, 

i.e., north of latitude 55** 

61. Alberta, southern half . . . 
69. Alberta, northern half . . . 

63. British Columbia, southern half 

64. British Columbia, northern half 



1.3 


9.0 


0.7 


1.7 


9.9 


9.9 


0.0 


3.1 


l.T 


1.7 


0.0 


1.8 


3.8 


3.4 


0.4 


3.8 


1.3 


1.9 


0.6 


1.7 



(C) EFFICIENCY AND MEAN TEMPERATURE 

A Table Based on the Wobk of 810 Men and 196 Women 
AT New Haven, New Beitain, and Beidoe- 

POET IN 1910-1918 



nncisxcT tbmp. sfficiexct 



a 




a 




— S5» 


99.8% 


— 91» 


93.5% 


— 34* 


99.8% 


— 90* 


93.6% 


— SS" 


99.9% 


— 19* 


93.6% 


— 39* 


99.9% 


—18*' 


93.7% 


— 31* 


99.9% 


-17* 


93.8% 


— 30* 


93.0% 


— 16« 


93.9% 


—SO** 


93.0% 


— 15* 


94.0% 


—as** 


93.1% 


— 14** 


M.1% 


— 97' 


93.1% 


— 13* 


94J8% 


— 96<» 


93J% 


— 19* 


94.3% 


—95*' 


93.3% 


—11' 


94.4% 


—94* 


93.3% 


— 10« 


94.5% 


— 93« 


93.4% 


— 9* 


94.6% 


— 99" 


93.4% 


— 8'» 


94.7% 



814 APPENDIX 



TEMP. 


ETPICXBirCT 


TEMP. 


EFncxxvi 


C. 




C. 




— 7* 


W.»% 


15* 


100.0% 


— 6* 


W.1% 


16* 


99.9% 


— 5« 


W3% 


17» 


W.7% 


— *• 


95.5% 


W 


99.3% 


— S* 


W.7% 


W 


98.9% 


— JO 


95.9% 


90* 


»8.*% 


— !• 


96S% 


gjo 


97J>% 


o<» 


w^% 


W 


•7.4% 


V 


96.8% 


W 


96.9% 


«• 


•7.1% 


94* 


96.4% 


s« 


»T.4% 


<I50 


95.9% 


4« 


97.7% 


96* 


953% 


5* 


98.0% 


97* 


W.6% 


6« 


98.3% 


98» 


93.9% 


7» 


9a6% 


99» 


98J% 


8** 


98.8% 


80* 


99.5% 


9» 


99.0% 


31* 


91.7% 


10* 


99J% 


39* 


90.5% 


11** 


99.4% 


83» 


89.0% 


W 


99.6% 


34* 


86.8% 


W 


99.8% 


85* 


84.3% 


W 


99.9% 


36* 


81.0% 



INDEX 



INDEX 



Abnormalities, among Batiamans, 
38. 

Abyssinians, and religion, 906. 

Acadia College, 177. 

Actinic rays, effect on man, 88. 

Adirondacks, consumptives in, 65 f. 

Africa, civilization in highlands, 
904; desiccation of, 948; distribu- 
tion of civilisation in, 170; sea- 
sonal changes in, 139; ease of life 
in, 99. 

Africans, character of, 35. 

Age, and climatic resistance, 100, 
114. 

Agra, 960, 140. 

Agriculture, advantages of South, 
18; effect on education, 193; rela- 
tion to tools and animals, 980 ff.; 
in torrid sone, 939. 

Alabama, illiteracy, 191; education, 
199, 195; negro versus white 
farmers, 19 ff. 

Alberta, civilisation and energy, 
909; ophiions as to civilisation, 
169, 177, 180. 

Alcohol, in tropics, 44 ff. 

Alexandria, rainfall of, 973. 

Altitude, effect in tropics, 136; 
effect upon blood, 50 f . 

America, ancient civilisation in, 
969 f.; as a center of civilisation, 
959 ff. (See North and South 
Americfi,) 

American Revolution, emigration 
due to, 97. 

Americans, opinions as to civilisa- 
tion, 179 ff.; racial character of, 
183 f. 



Anger, in tropics, 41, 43 f. 

Anglo-Saxons, in Bahamas, 14, 97 
(see also Teutom and Enffli9h)i 
in southern factories, 70 f. 

Annapolis, marks and climate at, 8, 
77 ff., 117 ff. 

Anthropologists, opinion of map of 
civilisation, 157 f. 

Apaches, 978. 

Arctic regions, climatic energy in, 
143 f. 

Arctic plants, temperature optimum 
of, 104. 

Arctowski, H., cited, 945. 

Argentina, civilization and energy 
in, 904. 

Aridity, effect on map of climatic 
energy, 140 f.; in houses, 85 ff., 
989. (See Humidity, and DeHc 
cation.) 

Arizona, education in, 195; effect of 
aridity, 140; illiteracy in, 191; 
rank in civilization, 196. 

Arkansas, civilization in, 197; emi- 
nent persons in, 916. 

Armenians, and Christianity, 906. 

Art, as part of civilization, 159. 

Aryans, civilization of, 960. 

Asia Minor, ancient storminess of, 
967; relation to civilization, 
961 f.; Teutonic blood in, 906. 

Asia, civilization and energy in, 
901; climatic character, 139 f., 
135, 931; climatic energy hi, 144; 
desiccation of, 6, 948; expeditions 
to, 4; rainfall in western, 979; 
rank in civilization, 168 f. 



818 



INDEX 



Asiatics, opinion as to civilisation, 

180. 
Assyria, andent civilisation, 961. 
Astronomy, among Mayas, MO. 
Athens, wan of, 909. 
Atlanta, Ga., climate, 39. 
Atlantic coast of U. S., civilisation 

of, 175, 180; energy compared 

with cmlnrnce, 918. 
Atmospheric pressure. (See Baro- 

m4trie pr$»s%r$,) 
Anjeh, 943. 
Australia, civilisation in, 167, 16i>, 

909, 966; climatic energy in, 148, 

909. 
Austrian Alps, rank in civilisation, 

167 f. 

Babylonia, civilisation In, 968, 961. 

Bagdad, rainfall of, 973. 

Bahama Islands, English versus 
negroes, 14, 97 ff. 

Baltic Provinces, energy in, 145; 
rank in civilisation, 167. 

Baltic region, civilisation and energy 
in, 901. 

Baltic Sea, f reeshig of, 936. 

Baluchistan, civilisation in, 960. 

Bantus, in South Africa, 94 ff., 97. 

Barbarian invasions, 6. 

Barometric changes, and civilisa- 
tion, 7, 8. 

Barometric pressure, eifect of, 51, 

119. 
Barrett Expedition, 4. 
Basutos, 94. 

Baths, effect on circulation, 191. 
Beasts of burden, 980, 989 f. 
Beersheba, 948. 
Berliner, cited, 7. 
"Big Business" in America, 955. 
Big trees of California, 5. 
Bigelow, F. H., cited, 945. 



Binet tests, at Odumbia, S. <X, 19. 

Birthplaces of eminent persons in 
U. S., 919. 

Bison, 989. 

Blissards, in Siberia, 145. 

Blood, effect of altitude upon, 50 f.; 
effect of temperature on drcula- 
tion, 116, 191. 

Boers, in South Africa, 94 ff. 

Bohemia, rank in civilisation, 167. 

Bolivia, civilisation and energy in, 
904. 

Bombay, effect of humidity, 140. 

B<mus work, 63. 

Books, in warm climates, 33. 

Boston, climatic excellence of, 199; 
murders in, 986. 

Brain, wliite versus negro^ 11. 

Breath, CO^ in, 108 ff. 

Bridgeport, factory operatives in, 
8, 53 ff., 114 ff. 

British, children in India, 37; colo- 
nists in Canada, 97 (see also Eng^ 
^h)i government, attitude to^ 
ward negroes, 14; opinion as to 
civilisation, 175 f. 

British Columbia, relation to ideal 
dimate, 130, 133. 

Brown, L^ dted, 65. 

Brunnow, dted, 106. 

Bryce, J., dted, 161 f., 196. 

Buckle, dted, 9. 

Buddhism, and dvilisation, 906, 960; 
European diaracteristics of, 163. 

Burans, in Siberia, 145.* 

Bushmen, 95. 

Business, effect on wages in Con- 
necticut, 64; hi Florida, 74 f.; at 
Pittsburgh, 77. 

Cairo, rainfall of, 973. 
Calcutta, humidity, 140. 
Calendar, of Mayas, 940, 963. 



INDEX 



819 



California, as a center of ciTllisa- 
tion, 966 f . ; changes of climate in, 
5, 988, 930, 937, 943; civilisation 
and energy, 199, 903; eminent per- 
sons in, 913; illiteracy in, 191; 
influence of cities in, 199; insan- 
ity in, 134; lakes in, 994, 933 f.; 
relation to ideal dimate, 134. 

Cambodia, storms and ruins in, 975. 

Campecfae, malaria in, 940. 

Canada, energy in, 143, 909; com- 
pared with Bahamas, 97; with 
South Africa, 96; civilisation in, 
196; diversity of opinion as to, 
169, 177, 180; relation to ideal 
dimate, 133; storms in, 963. 

Cape Colony, 95. 

Cape Horn, storminess at, 140. 

Carbon dioxide, emission at hig^ 
altitudes, 50; and temperature, 
106 ff. 

Carnegie Institution of Washington, 
4,5,930. 

Carpenters, at Jacksonville, Fla,, 
79. 

Carthage, European diaracter of, 
164. 

Caspian Sea, variations in, 999, 937. 

Cattell, J. McK., 109. 

Cause of climatic changes, 944 ff. 

Census, of U. S. used in map-mak- 
ing, 17, 183 fF.; statistics as to 
farmers, 18 ff. 

Centers of dvilization, 951 if. 

Central America, 5; dvilisation and 
energy in, 904; missionaries in, 
48; ccHnpared with Indo-China, 
975. 

Central Asia, expeditions to, 4. 

Ceylon, ruins in, 974. 

Chad, fluctuations of Lake, 938. 

Chamberlin, T. C., dted, 994. 



Changes of dimate, at present, 945; 
difficulty of problem, 999; geologi- 
cal, 993 ff. 

Changes of temperature from day to 
day, 8, 113 ff.; distribution of, 
131 ff., 139 f . 

Character, origin of, 48; statistical 
tests of, 188 ff. 

Chemical activity, law of, 106; of 
Ught,83. 

Chemical evidence, 933. 

Cherokees, agriculture among, 984. 

Chicago, 914. 

Children, immunity to disease, 39; 
mortality among, 68; percentage 
in school, 199 ff.; scardty among 
best families, 916; tests of negro 
versus white, 19; unruliness in 
America, 986; of white races in 
tropics, 49 f. 

Chili, relation to ideal cUmate, 130. 

China, a center of dvilisation, 959 f., 
969; effect of America on, 955; 
effect of climate on, 147, 901, 937, 
949, 968, 987; European diaracter 
of, 164; rank in dvilisation, 168 f. 

Chinese Turkestan, dead forests in, 
996; effect of aridity, 140; expe- 
ditions to, 4; ruins in, 931; monot- 
ony of, 135. 

Chlorine, in Owens Lake, 933; in 
Pyramid and Winnemucca, 935. 

Christianity, and dvilisation, 906; 
and negproes, 17. 

Christmas, effect on wages, 64. 

Cigar factories, effect of days of 
week, 98; white versus colored 
labor, 13. 

Cigar-makers, shiftlessness of, 75. 

Circulation, effect of temperature 
on, 116, 191. 

Cities, death rate in, 187. 



820 



INDEX 



CivUUation compared with climatic 
energy, 7, 190 ff^ 901» 939 f.; con- 
ditions of, 9, 199 ff.; definition of, 
160, 158, 169 f^ 164 f.; distribu- 
tion of, 148, 951 fF.; effect upon 
lower races, 37; and government, 
907; map of (see Map) ; past dis- 
tribution of, 999, 951 ff., 976 ff.; 
and race, 905; and religion, 906. 

Clear weather, effect of, 191 ff. 

Climate (see also Seasons, Tempera- 
ture, Aimoepherie preeeure, Hu- 
midity, etc.), effect on racial char- 
acter, 11-34; effect of the seasons, 
49 ff.; ideal, 199 ff.; difficulty of 
reconstructing past, 3f., 999; 
magnitude of effects of, 194 ff. ; 
place among factors in ciYilisa- 
tion, 978; summary of investiga- 
tions, 1-10; summary of conclu- 
sions, 918; versus weather. 111. 

Climatic changes, deforestation hy- 
pothesis, 995; in geological times, 
993 ff.; growth of idea of, 4ff.; 
hypothesis of uniformity, 996; 
progressive desiccation hypothe- 
sis, 996; pulsatory hypothesis, 5, 
999; solar hypothesis of, 944 ff. 

Climatic energy, ancient distributicm 
of, 963; compared with civilisa- 
tion, 199 ff.; map of, 137 ff.; map 
of in U. S., 184, 186 ff. 

Climatic hypothesis of civilisation, 
objections to, 971 ff.; dangers of, 
985. 

Clothing, effect of compared with 
climate, 196. 

Cloudiness, effect on man, 119, 
191 ff. 

Coca leaf, in Peru, 976. 

Cold, effect on physical activity, 
116; on mental activity, 117. 

Cold-blooded animals, relation to 
temperature, 107. 



Colds, effect of dryness on, 87, 989. 
Colombia, civilisation and energy in, 

904. 
Colonies, relation to dvilisation, 

909. 
Colonists, in North and South of 

U. S., 99 f . 
Colonisation, in tropics, 38 f., 49 f., 

136, 144, 914 ff. 
Colorado, education in, 194; storms 

versus rainfall in, 979. 
Color line, in Bahamas, 14; in Flor- 
ida cigar factories, 13. 
Columbia, S. C, cotton mills in, 71; 

tests of negro children at, 19. 
Compass plant, 113. 
Complexion, of women in Bahamas, 

31; in Florida, 39. 
Congo, effect of humidity, 140, 149; 

monotony of, 139. 
Conjugation, in paramcedum, 104. 
Connecticut, average temperature, 

59 (fig.)* effect of temperature, 

100, 114 ff., 137; eminent persons 

in, 913 ff.; factory operatives in, 

8, 53 ff., 59; illiteracy in, 191. 
Consumption in relation to climate, 

65 f. 
Contributors, to map of civilisation, 

149 f., 156, 196. 
Copenhagen, school children in, 69 f.; 

tests of strength at, 109. 
Copper, in early America, 980. 
Corpuscles, red, at hig^ altitudes, 

50 f. 
Correction of curves, 58 ff., 79, 109. 
Corsica, rank in civilisation, 167. 
Cotton, as money crop, 18; and war 

of 1914, 71. 
'"Cradcers," origin of, 94, 916. 
Crayfish, and temperature, 106. 
Creole regions of U. S., 180. 
Cuba, opinions as to» 175, 180. 



INDEX 



821 



Cubans, in Florida cigar factories, 
IS, 73, 98; sensitiveness to cli- 
mate, 101. 

Cusco, temperature of, 975. 

Cycles, dimatic, 248 f . 

Cyclonic storms (see also Siormt, 
and 8torminei9)t in China, and 
Japan, 147; and civilisation, 7; 
and daily changes, ISl If. ; distri- 
bution of, 133; nature of. 111 f.; 
and sunspots, S45 ff. ; in tropics, 
136. 

Dakotas, civilisation in, 177, 197; 

education in, 193 f . ; eminent per* 

sons in, 317. 
Dampness, variability of, 131. (See 

Humidity,) 
Davis, W. M., 4. 

Day of week, effect on wages, 94. 
Day workers, effect of week on, 97. 
Dead Sea, as a measure of climate, 

894,347. 
Death, due to temperature, 107. 
Death rate, effect of dryness on, 87; 

in Japan, 68; in Massachusetts in 

1911, 90; in New York, 68; in 

U. S., 184, 186 ff. 
Deforestation, an abandoned hy- 
pothesis, 995 f . 
Delaware, eminent persons in, 913. 
Delhi, 960. 
Denmark, rank in civilisation, 166; 

tests of strength in, 51, 68, 109. 
Denver, effect of wind in, 119. 
Desert Botanical Laboratory, 5. 
Desert winds, effect on human 

actions, 47. 
Deserts, ancient rainfall of, 973; 

evidences of desiccation in, 995. 
Desiccation of Asia, 6; evidences 

of, 995 ff.; and sunspots, 948 ff. 
Dexter, cited, 7, 119. 
Digger Indians, 978. 



Diseases, in Bahamas, 98, 30; in 
Central America, 939 f . ; and cli- 
mate, 94; effect upon temper, 43; 
among Mayas, 949; relation to 
dry houses, 989; relation to 
energy, 188; in tropics, 37, 39 f. 

Douglass, A. E., cited, 999. 

Drakenberg mountains, 94. 

Dress, and morality, 46. 

Drunkenness, in tropics, 41, 44 ff. 

Dry season, value in tropics, 943. 

Dryness. (See Aridity, and Humid- 
ify') 

Dynamometer, tests with, 51. 

East Indians, character of, 35. 

Ecuador, civilisation and energy In, 
904; temperature of, 136. 

Education, effect on negroes, 16; as 
test of civilisation, 199; in U. S., 
199 ff., 197. 

Efficiency, and climate, 49 ff., 139; 
tests in Connecticut, 53 ff. 

Egypt, ancient storminess off 967 f., 
979; civilisation and energy in, 
6, 164, 909, 959, 961; effect on 
Teutons versus negroes, 11, 33. 

Egyptian Sudan, aridity of, 140, 
149. 

Electricity of air, 7. 

Eminent persons, distribution of In 
U. S., 908 ff. 

Energy, ancient distribution oU 6, 
963; a condition of civilisation, 
907; effect on eminence, 911, 
917 ff.; map of dimatic, 8, 137; of 
Mayas, 949. 

England, effect of climate on, 987; 
experiments on CO2, 108 f.; rank 
in dvilisaticMi, 166; ideal dimate, 
199 ff., 193, 135; rahi in 14th cen- 
tury, 936. 

English, marks in, 78 ff. 



822 



INDEX 



EngUflh* u colonists in tropics, 97; 
in Soutli Africa, 94 If. (See also 
AnffUnSiMani, BritUh, and T««- 
t<m$.) 

Environment, versus lieredity, 11 fP. 

Eskimos, ineiBciency of, 143 f . 

Eugenics, 916. 

Eurasia, storminess of, 966 ft. 

Europe, barbarian invasions of, 6; 
civilisation and energy in, 169 ff., 
165, 901, 961 fP.; distribution of 
seasonal changes, 139; ideal cli- 
mate, 130 ff.; storminess and sun- 
spots in, 133, 936, 945 f., 967; war 
of 1914, 95. 

Europeans, eifect of migrations of, 
905; in tropical lands, 35. 

Exiles, effect of climate on Russian, 
145 f. 

Experiments, difficulty of dimatic, 
196 f. 

Extremes of temperature, effect 
of, 99 ff. 

Factories, in Ckmnecticut, 53 ff.; in 
Florida, 39; effect of changes of 
temperature in, 114 ff., 989 f.; 
investigation of, 8. 

Farmers, health in tropics, 40; ^riilte 
versus colored, 18 ff. 

Ferrell, J. A., cited, 98. 

Finland, rank in civilisation, 167. 

Five Nations, 977. 

Flint tools, 980; among Mayas, 941. 

Floods in France, 936. 

Florida, effect of climate, 39, 100, 
118 ff.; factories in, 8, 98; illiter- 
acy in, 191; negro versus white 
farmers, 18 ff.; wages in, 71 ff. 

Food, compared with climate, 196 f . 

Forests, effect on rainfall, 995; in 
tropics, 41, 939. 

Fraas, O., 6. 



France, effect of climate on, 987; 

rank in civilisation, 167. 
Fresno, temperature of, 130. 

Gale, H. S., cited, 933 f . 

Gambling, in tropics, 41. 

Gautama, 163, 960. 

Genius, distribution of, 907 f. 

Geographers, opinion of map of 
civilisation, 157, 161 f. 

Geography, effect on civilisation, 
167; methods of reasoning, 990 f. 

Geological changes of dimate, 
993 ff. 

"Geopsydiiscfae Erscheinimgen," 7, 
50. 

Georgia, climate compared with 
Florida, 39; complexity of, 161; 
cotton mills in, 71; education in, 
195; emigration from during 
Revolution, 97; eminent persons 
in, 913; illiteracy in, 191; negro 
education in, 195; negro versus 
white farmers, 18 ff.; storms ver- 
sus rainfall in, 979. 

Germans, opinion as to civilisation, 
177. 

Germany, ancient climate of, 936, 
968; effect of climate on, 987; 
rank in civilisation, 166; relation 
to ideal cUmate, 133, 135. 

Girls, sensitiveness to climate, 99, 
100 f., 114, 116, 119. (See also 
Women.) 

Glacial period, 993; causes of, 937, 
938, 947. 

Gouldsbury, cited, 46. 

Governments, and civilisation, 907. 

Grass, relation to early civilisation, 
989 f. 

Great Lakes, storminess near, 140. 

Great Salt Lake, strands of, 937. 



INDEX 



828 



Greece, andent climate of, 6, Md, 
968 f.; center of dyiliiation, 163, 
969. 

Greek Christianity, and dTiliiation, 
906. 

Greenland, diversity of opinion as 
to, 167, 169, 180. 

Gregory, H. E., dted, 51. 

Grenf eU, dted, 144. 

Grippe, effect of dry houses on, 989. 

Guatemala, currency in, 44; drunk- 
enness in, 44 f.; ruins, 5, 939 f. 

Hampton Institute, 16. 

Hann, J., dted, 138, 141. 

Health, relation to energy, 188. 

Heat, effect <ki physical actirity, 
90 ff., 101, 116, 137; and mental 
activity, 117. 

Hebrides, temperature of, 130. 

Hebron, 943. 

Hellman, dted, 945. 

HeUpadi, dted, 7, 47, 50, 193. 

Heredity, compared with oppor^ 
tunity, 917; versus environment, 
11 ff. (See also InheHtane€.) 

Highlands, effect on dviliiation, 
136, 904^ 975 f.; effect on storms, 
965 f.; versus lowlands in tropics, 
49, 136. 

Himalayas, effect on storms, 968. 

Hinduism, in America, 969. 

Hindus versus Europeans, 163. 

Historical changes of climate, 995 ff. 

Hoboken, suidde in, 184. 

Holland, rank in dviUzation, 166; 
storms in 14th century, 936. 

Hookworm, 94, 39, 916. 

Hope Fontein, temperature of, 975. 

Horse races, in mountains, 51; used 
as climatic figure, 197. 

Hottentots, 95. 

Houses, effect of confinement in, 
84 f., 87; wrong method of heat- 
ing, 989. 



Huguenots, inheritance from, 915. 

Humboldt, 49. 

Humidity, effect on cotton weaving, 
71; on death rate in Japan, 69; 
on map of energy, 140 f . ; on to- 
bacco, 75; indoor versus out-of- 
door, 85ff.; in Japan, 147; rda- 
tion to ideal climate, 131; and 
temperature in Manchester, 108. 
(See also Belatioe HumUUty and 

Humor, among negroes, 19. 
Hurricanes, in tropics, 136. 

Icdand, rank in dviliiation, 167, 
169, 180. 

Ice sheets, 993. 

Idaho, dvilisation of, 177; eminent 
persons in, 917; illiteracy in, 191; 
life insurance in, 187. 

Ideal dimate, 199 ff. 

Illinois, eminent persons in, 913; 
negro versus white farmers, 19 ff. 

Illiteracy, as a test of dvilisation, 
190. 

Immigrants, effect of American 
dimate on, 986; problem of U. S., 
914 ff.; in tropics versus north, 
38 f. 

Immorality, in tropics, 45. 

Incas, dvilisation of, 940, 977. 

Inclination to work versus capadty, 
73, 109. 

India, British chUdren in, 37; Brit- 
ish domination, 37; diaracter of 
people, 35, 163; dvilisation and 
energy in, 901 f., 959, 969; humid- 
ity versus aridity, 140, 149; effect 
of Japan upon, 955 f. ; migrations 
from, 974; storms in, 949, 967 f. 

Indian Meteorological Service, 940. 

Indiana, eminent persons in, 913; 
negro versus white farmers, 19 ff. 



824 



INDEX 



Indians, of Central America, 939 f.; 
ciyilisation in Nortli America, 
977; horse races among, 51; in- 
heritance of, 914. 

Indo-China, dvilication and energy 
in, 901, 959; compared with Cen- 
tral America, 975; ruins in, 974. 

Industry, in tropics, 41 ff. 

Inefficiency, and drunkenness, 45. 
(See also InerHa, Lazin^ii, Indhu^ 

try.) 
Inertia, in Bahamas, 99 f.; in Siberia, 

146 f.; tropical* S3, 35, 41 ff. 
Infusoria. (See Paramaeimm.) 
Inheritance, effect on ability, 99 f., 

911 ff.; relation to climate, 909. 

(See Heredity.) 
Initiative, lade of in Siberia, 146. 
Insanity, and climate, 134. 
Intermarriage, in Bahama Islands, 

98. 
Invasion, of Europe by barbarians, 

6. 
Iowa, character of immigration, 

915; eminent persons in, 913; 

opinions as to dvilisation of, 177. 
Irdand, humidity of, 131, 140, 149, 

987; rank in dvilisation, 166 f., 

168. 
Iron, importance to dvilisation, 

980 ff. 
Iroquois, 978. 
Irrigation, effect on education, 194; 

in Syria, etc., 996. 
Ispahan, rainfall of, 973. 
Italians, in brass factory, 56 f ., 100. 
Italy, dvilisation in, 167, 901, 969; 

climate of, 969; morality in, 47; 

storm center, 967. 

Jacksonville, Fla., dgar factories at, 

13, 79 ff. 
Jamaica, negroes in, 36. 
James, W. B., dted, 191. 



Japan, dvilisation and energy in, 
143, 147, 901, 955 f., 969; complex- 
ity of people, 161; death rate in, 
68; rank in dvilisation, 168 f.; 
stozminess in, 133, 949, 968; Teu- 
tcmic blood in, 906. 

Japanese race, and dvilisation, 906. 

Java, dvilisation and energy in, 909. 

Jefferson, M., dted, 188, 199. 

Jewish atrodties in Russia, 167. 

Jews, dvilisation of, 163, 961. 

Johnson, D. W., dted, 939. 

Jones, J. C, dted, 934. 

Kansas, dvilisation in, 197. 
Kentucky, eminent persons in, 916; 

illiteracy in, 191; negro versus 

wliite farmers, 19 ff. 
Khartum, effect of diyness, 140. 
Kidneys, diseased, effect on para- 

moedum, 106. 
Korea, climatic energy in, 143. 
Kropotkin, dted, 4, 6. 
KuUmer, C J., dted, 7, 945, 964, 

979; scale of storms, 140. 

Labor, in tropics, 36, 38; method of 
determining effidency of, 141. 

Labrador, fisherman, 144. 

Lakes, concentration as climatic evi- 
dence, 933 ff. (See also StraiuU,) 

Latin America, and Christianity, 
906; dvilisation and climate in, 
904; radal character of, 37. 

Latins, and dvilisation, 906. (See 
also Bomanee.) 

Lasiness, in Bahamas, 30 ff.; in 
tropics, 41 ff. 

Lehmann, dted, 7, 51, 69, 77, 109, 
119. 

Length of day, effect of, 84. 

Letters, a test of dvilisation, 189. 

Life insurance, statistics of, 186 ff. 

Light, effect on dgar making, 73 f.; 
effect on human activity, 83. 



INDEX 



826 



Lincolnshire, storms In 14th cen- 
tury, 936. 

Liverpool, temperature of, 190. 

Livingstone, D., cited, 46. 

Loess, origin of, 947. 

London, climatic excellence of, 
199 f.; effect of temperature, 139; 
murders in, 986. 

Lop Nor, fluctuations of, 937. 

Loram, cited, 13. 

Los Angeles aqueduct, 933; suicide 
in, 134; temperature of, 130. 

Louisiana, illiteracy in, 191; negro 
education in, 196; civilization of, 
180; school attendance in, 199. 

Loyalists, in Bahamas, versus Can- 
ada, 97. 

Lumber industry in Bahamas, 16. 

MacDougal, D. T., dted, 6, 103 f. 

McHattie, quoted, 98. 

Maine, eminent persons in, 919; 
handicaps of, 917. 

Malaria, in Bahamas, 98; in Central 
America, 939 f.; in South, 94; in 
tropics, 38. 

Malay Peninsula, character of peo- 
ple, 35. 

Malta, course of storms near, 940. 

Manchester, experiments in, 108 f. 

''Manchester Memoirs," cited, 108. 

Manufactures, as a test of dviliza^ 
tion, 189 f. 

Manufacturing, effect on death rate, 
187. 

Map of civilisation, 148 ff.; method 
of preparing, 151, 164 f.; purpose 
of, 151; reliabiUty of, 180, 188 ff. 

Map of climatic energy, 137 ff. ; test 
of, 183 ff. 

Maritime climate in Connecticut, 93. 

Maritime Provinces, civilication of, 
177. 

Marriage, dangers of modem sys- 
tem, 916. 



Maryland, effect of temperature in, 
117 f. 

Massachusetts, death rate in 1911, 
90; eminent men in, 908, 910 ff., 
914; good fortune of, 918; illiter^ 
acy in, 191; insanity in, 134; negro 
education in, 195; railroads in, 
189; rank in civilization, 196; 
schools in, 199 f. 

Massaua, effect of heat, 139. 

Mathematics, marks in, 78 ff. 

Mayas, civilisation of, 164, 963; 
dates, 949 f.; relation to storms, 
967; ruins of, 5, 939 f.; skill of, 
940 ff. 

Mayo, cited, 13. 

Medes, effect of Mesopotamia upon, 
957 f. 

Mediterranean Sea, relation to civi- 
lization, 969; rainfall of, 979; 
storminess in past times, 949, 967. 

Melon, wild, 113. 

Men, resistance to climate, 100, 114^ 
116, 119. 

Mental activity, effect of climate on, 
39, 77 ff., 101 ff., 117; mental ver- 
sus physical optimum, 109 f.; su- 
preme importance of, 916; white 
versus black, 19. 

Mescal, 44. 

Mesopotamia, civilisation of, 164, 
957 f., 961; ancient climate of, 
967, 968; storminess in, 949, 973. 

Metabolism, and temperature, 106 ff. 

Metal, absence among Mayas, 941. 

Mexicans, education in U. S., 195; 
illiteracy of, 191; inheritance of, 
914. 

Mexico, civilisation in, 175, 904, 
963; effect of climate, 991; cli- 
matic investigations in, 5; drunk- 
enness in, 44. 

Mexico, storminess in Gulf of, 949. 



826 



INDEX 



Michigan, negro versus white farm- 
ers, 19 ff. 

Middle Atlantic states, colonists of, 
93, 915. 

Migrations, effect of climate on, 6, 
990. 

Mind, effect of tropics on, 43 ff. 

Miners, and life insurance, 187. 

Minnesota, illiteracy in, 191; civili- 
sation of, 177. 

Missionaries, character of, 47; cited 
as to morality, 46; in Turkey and 
China, 955. 

Mississippi, education in, 195; illit- 
eracy in, 191; negro versus white 
farmers, 19 ff. 

Mohammedanism, and civilisation, 
906. 

Monarchies and civilisation, 907. 

Money, in Guatemala, 44. 

Mongolia, climatic energy in, 144. 

Mono Lake, strands, 937. 

Monotony, effect upon activity, 59. 

Montana, eminent persons in, 917; 
life insurance in, 187; civilisation 
of, 177. 

Moraines, as a measure of climate, 
994. 

Moral character, effect of race con- 
tact on, 38. 

Moral responsibility, relation to cli- 
mate, 987, 993. 

Mormonism, 197; effect on educa- 
tion, 194. 

Morse, J., cited, 19. 

Mortality, in Japan, 68; in New 
York, 68; in U. S., 184, 186 ff. 

Mountaineers, cause of strength of, 
51. 

Mountains, effect on South, 916. 

Mucous membranes, effect of dry- 
ness on, 87, 989. 

Murders, in U. S. versus England, 
986. 



Nansen, F., dted, 146. 

Natal, 95. 

Nationality of contributors to map 
of civilisation, 156; of piece work- 
ers, 55. 

Natural selection, in tropics, 40, 49. 

Nearing, S., dted, 907 ff. 

Nebraska, eminent persons in, 910, 
913 f . ; energy compared with emi- 
nence, 917; dvilisation of, 177. 

Nebular hypothesis, relation to cli- 
matic changes, 993. 

Negroes, character of, 16; compared 
with Teutons, 11 ff., 94 ff.; educa- 
tion, 199, 195; effect of United 
States upon, 35 f.; in Florida dgar 
factories, 73; school attendance 
of, 199; tests at Columbia, S. C^ 
19. 

Nervousness and dimate, 134 f.; in 
Europe, 146; and storms, 59; in 
tropics, 49 f . 

Nevada, dvilisation in, 197; educa- 
tion in, 194; energy compared 
with eminence, 917; illiteracy in, 
191; railroads in, 189. 

New Britain, factory operatives in, 
8, 53 ff., 114 ff. 

New England, early settlers, 93 f.; 
extreme seasons, 93; effect on im- 
migrants, 38; eminent men in, 
908, 911 ff., 914 f.; energy com- 
pared with eminence, 917; factory 
operatives in, 53 ff.; illiteracy in, 
191. 

Newfoundland, dvilisation of, 177, 
180; fishermen, 144; rank in dviU- 
sation, 167. 

New Hampshire, eminent persons in« 
919. 

New Haven, factory operatives in, 
8, 53 ff., 114 ff. 

New Jersey, negro versus white 
farmers, 19 ff. 



INDEX 



827 



New Mexico, dTilisation, 196; edu- 
cation in, 193» 195; eminent per- 
sons in, 910, SlSf.; illiteracy in, 
191. 

New York State» death rate in, 68» 
187; effect of temperature in, 
117 f.; eminent persons in, 811 f.; 
insanity in, 134; negro versus 
wliite farmers, 19 ff.; negroes in 
high schools, ISf. 

New York State Conmiission on 
Ventilation, 73, 101. 

New Zealand, civilisation of, 956; 
climatic energy in, 143; relation 
to ideal climate, 130 f . ; storminess 
of, 133. 

North Africa, rainfall and sunspots 
in, 947. 

North America, civilization in, 
179 if.; climatic energy in, 143; 
domestic animals in, 989 f.; for- 
mer storminess of, 967; seasonal 
changes, 139; rank in civilization, 
169. 

North Carolina, eminent persons in, 
913, 917, negro versus white farm- 
ers, 19 ff. 

North Dakota. (See Dakotat,) 

Norway, effect of altitude in, 51. 

Norwegians, compared with Siber- 
ians, 146. 

Nova Scotia, civilisation of, 177. 

Oakland, suicide in, 134. 
Objections to climatic hypothesis, 

999, 971 ff. 
Ocean, relation to ideal climate, 130. 
Ohio, eminent persons in, 913; negro 

versus white farmers, 19 ff. 
Oklahoma, illiteracy in, 191. 
Old age, time of mortality, 68. 
Opinion, use in map-making, 148 ff. 
Opportunity, effect on eminence, 

911, 916 ff. 



Optimum, of humidity, 87. 

Optimum temperature, of crayfish, 
106; of infusoria, 106; law of, 
110; of man, 108; of North ver- 
sus South, 100; of plants, 108 f.; 
versus changes, 190. 

Orange River Colony, 95. 

Oregon, eminent persons in, 913 f.; 
illiteracy in, 191. 

Ostiaks, inefficiency of, 144. 

Owens Lake, as climatic evidence, 
933 f. 

Oxygen, absorption at hig^ altitudes, 
50. 

Pacific coast of America, civilisa- 
tion of, 175, 956 f. ; climatic energy 
in, 143; energy and eminence, 917; 
ideal climate, 130 f . 

Palestine, changes of climate in, 
994, 931, 943, 967; civilisation, 
961; expedition to, 5. 

Palm, as evidence of climatic sta- 
bility, 931. 

Panama, health at, 40, 940. 

ParamcDdum, relation to tempera- 
ture, 104 ff. 

Patagonia, relation to ideal climate, 
130 f. 

'Pedagogical Seminary," 19. 

Pedersen, cited, 7, 51, 69, 77, 109, 
119. 

Peking, cold waves in, 147. 

PeUagra, 39. 

Penck, A., cited, 5, 937 f., 947. 

Pennsylvania, character of inmiigra^ 
tion, 915; eminent persons in, 
913; negro versus white farmers, 
19 ff. ; seasonal variations in wages 
in, 75 ff. 

Permian glaciation, 993. 

Persia, civilisation of, 959 f., 969; 
palm trees in, 939; storminess in, 
949, 967, 973 f., wind in, 119 f. 



828 



INDEX 



Peru, civiliMtion In, 904, MO, 863, 

975. 
Peten, malaria in, 940. 
Pfeffer, cited, 104. 
Philippines, civilisation and energy 

in, 909. 
Phcenicia, ancient climate of, 9T3; 

ciYilixation, 961. 
Physical conditions yersus esthetic, 

193; versus mental, in Bahamas, 

89; versus social among negroes, 

36 f. 
Physiological effect of changes of 

temperature, 166 f.; of dimate, 

50 ff. ; of optimum temperature, 

107 ff. ; relation to character, 41 ; 

versus psychological effects, 193. 
••Physiology of Plants,** by Pfeffer, 

dted, 104. 
Piece-workers, in Connecticut, 53 ff.; 

effect of week on, 97 f. (See also 

Wag€9, and Factory Operative*,) 
Pilgrims, contribution to North, 

99 f., 914. 
Pittsburgh, wages at, 59, 75 ff. 
Plains, and civilisation, 957, 961 f. 
Planetesimal hypothesis, 994. 
Plants and temperature, 103. 
Pocy, cited, 945. 
Poisons, due to hig^ temperature, 

107. 
Political equality in tropics, 38. 
Polygamy, 197. 
Poor whites, in Bahamas, 14, 97; in 

cotton mills, 71; origin of, 33, 

916; in South Africa, 95. 
••Popular Science Monthly," 19, 907. 
Population, increase in tropics, 37. 
Port Said, rainfaU of, 973. 
Practice, correction for, 109; effect 

of upon wages, 60. 
Premium work, 6Q, 
Pressure of atmosphere. (See Baro- 
metric change* J) 



Progressive desiccation hypothesis, 

996. 
Promotions of ^riiite children versus 

colored, l.S. 
Protestant Christianity and civilisa- 
tion, 906. 
Protoplasm, relation to temperature, 

104. 
Psychological effects of climate, 

50 ff., 193. 
Public opinion, in tropics, 48. (See 

also Social reetrainte.) 
Pulmonary tuberculosis, and weight, 

65 f. 
Pulsatory hypothesis, 5, 6, 999 ff. 
Pumpelly, R., 4. 
Puritans, contribution to Nortli, 93; 

eminence of descendants, 914; 

slavery among, 93. 
Putter, dted, 106 f . 
Pyramid Lake, climatic evidence of, 

933 f.; strands, 937. 

Quakers, inheritance from, 914. 
Qualitative method of research, 990. 
Quantitative method of research, 

990 f. 
Quintana Roo, malaria in, 940. 
Quito, temperature of, 136, 139. 

Race, and dimate, 117, 901 f.; com- 
pared with dvilisation, 905 f.; dif- 
ferences of, 163; effect on educa- 
tion, 194; and illiteracy, 191; ver- 
sus place, 11 ff.; prejudice, 165. 

Radal character of continents, 165. 

Railroads, as a test of dvilisaticm, 
189. 

RainfaU, causes of variations, 995 ff., 
946 f.; of past times, 979 ff.; ver- 
sus storminess, 979 f. 

Rajputana, rank in civUis&tlon, 169. 

Ranch life, effect on education, 194. 

Range of temperature, effect of, 
119. 



INDEX 



829 



lUtxel, 49. 

Reading, in wann climates, 39. 

Redus, 4. 

Red Sea, effect of heat, 139. 

Relative efficiency, and temperature, 

139. 
Relative humidity. (See Hwnidity.) 
Religion, and civilisation, 306 f . 
Religious refugees, inheritance from, 

215. 
Reproduction, in paramoecium, 104. 
Republics, and civilisation, 907. 
Rhode Island, eminent persons in, 

913 f.; railroads in, 189. 
Rhodes, civilization of, 969. 
Rhodesia, 95; ancient dvilixation in, 

975; morality in, 46. 
Rivers, composition of water, 933. 
Roads, effect on education, 193. 
Rodcefeller International Health 

Commission, 98. 
Rocky Mountain states, civilisation 

of, 177, 180, 197; education in, 

193 f. 
Rodishev, cited, 146. 
Romance nations, rank in civilisa- 
tion, 167, 177. 
Romans, attempts to get water, 

996 f.; European character of, 

163. 
Roman Catholicism, and civilisation, 

906. 
Rome, civilisation of, 969. 
Roumania, civiliEation and energy 

in, 901. 
Rum, in tropics, 44. 
Russia, climatic energy in, 145, 987; 

rank in civilisation, 167. 

Sabseans, civilisation of, 959. 
Sacramento, suicide in, 134. 
Saint Louis, suicide in, 134. 
Saint Paul, European character of, 
163. 



Salt lakes, as measure of climate, 
994. 

San Diego, suicide in, 134; tempera- 
ture of, 130. 

Sand dunes, as climatic evidence^ 
938. 

San Francisco, effect of heat, 139; 
relation to ideal climate, 134, 139; 
suicide in, 134; temperature of, 
130. 

Sanitation, relation to dimate, 94, 
188. 

Saranac Lake, tubercular sanitar 
rium at, 65 f . 

Sardinia, rank in dvilisation, 167. 

Saskatdiewan, dvilisation in, 177, 
180, 909. 

School children, white versus blade, 
19 f.; effect of wind on, 119. 

Schools, in U. S., 199 ff. 

Scotland, humidity of, 131; rank in 
dvilisation, 166. 

Screws, packing, 55. 

Scythians, effect of Mesopotamia 
upon, 958. 

Seacoast, effect on health, 41, 999. 

Searles Lake, as measure of di- 
mate, 994. 

Seasonal range of temperature, 
131 f., 136. 

Seasons, effect of, 49 ff., 59, 57 ff., 
77 ff., 139. 

Seattle, temperature of, 130. 

Seistan, effect of wind in, 113. 

Self-control, in tropics, 43 ff., 976. 

Seminoles, 978. 

Semites, effect of Mesopotamia up- 
on, 957 f. 

Sequoia, as index of dimatic 
changes, 930. 

Settlers, in North and South, 99 f . 

Sex, and sensitiveness to dimate, 
100, 114, 116, 119. 



880 



INDEX 



Sexes, reUtion of In tropics, 38, 41, 
45 ff. 

Sheone, cited, 46. 

Sheep, wild, 883. 

Shifting of climatic sones, 6, 990 ff., 
938 ff.; effect on disemset 949; 
effect on agriculture, 949. 

Shifting, of centers of civilisation, 
951 ff. 

Shifting, of storm helt, 964 ff. 

Siam, civilisation and energy in, 
901 f. 

Siberia, civilisation and energy in, 
901; climatic energy in, 145 ff.; 
ineiBciency In, 144. 

Sierra Nevadas, lakes near, 933 ff. 

Sioux, 978. 

Sirocco, effect on character, 47. 

Slaves, in Bahamas, 99; among 
Puritans, 93; effect on South, 
99 f. 

Slavs, and civilisation, 167 f., 906. 

Sleepiness, due to climate, 50. 

Smolce Creek Desert, 935. 

''Smokes'* in cigar factories, 75. 

Smoothing, of curves, 58. 

Social environment, effect on ne- 
groes, 36 f . 

Social restraints, in tropics, 45 ff. 

Sodium in Owens Lake, 934; in 
Pyramid and Wlnnemucca, 934 f. 

Soil, denudation of, 995. 

''Solar hypothesis," 944. 

South, advantages of, 18; attitude 
of volume toward, 17; causes of 
backwardness, 99 ff . ; civilisation 
and energy in, 180, 903, 918; edu- 
cation in, 199 ff.; illiteracy in, 191; 
lack of opportunities in, 916; 
mortality in, 187 f . 

South Africa, civilisation and energy 
in, 909; economic problem of, 49; 
Teutons versus negroes, 94 ff. 



South America, civilisation in, 171, 

904; climatic energy in, 143; horse 

racing in, 51; storminess of, 133; 

relation to ideal climate, 130 f. 
South American Indians, character 

of, 35 f. 
South Carolina, cotton miUs in, 71; 

eminent persons in, 910, 913, 

915, 917, 918; illiteracy in, 191; 

negro versus wliite farmers, 18 ff.; 

negro education in, 195; school 

attendance in, 193. 
South Dakota. (See Dakoiag,) 
Spain, rank in civilisation, 167. 
Spaniards, in Florida dgar facto- 
ries, 73; in South America, 904. 
Spanish blood, advantages of In 

Mexico, 914. 
Spleen, effect of malaria upon, 39. 
"Spring fever," 109. 
Statistics, use hi map-making, 

148 ff., 183 ff. 
Stevens, dted, 96. 
Stone implements, 980 f. 
Storm belt, shifting of, 964 ff. 
Storm tracks, modem location of, 

963 ff. 
Storminess, distribution of, 963 ff.; 

method of computing effect, 140; 

in past times, 967 f.; versus rain* 

faU, 979 f.; in Russia, 145; and 

sunspots, 945 ff. 
Storms, effect on activity, 50, 193; 

effect on nerves, 59; nature of, 

111 f.; in 14th century, 936. (See 

also CyeUmie Storm.) 
Strands, as climatic evidence, 935 ff., 

947 ff. 
Strength, seasonal variations in 

Denmark, 69 f. 
Strong, cited, 19. 
Students, effect of heat on, 101; 

effect of seasons on, 77 ff . ; inves-^ 

tigation of marks of, 8. 



INDEX 



881 



Subtropical stonn belt, 966, 975. 

Sudan, effect of aridity, 140, 14d. 

Sumer and Accad, 957. 

Sununers, hot, 90 ff.; value of vaca- 
tions in, 88. 

Sun, cause of climatic phenomena, 
944 ff. 

Simspots, relation to climate, 
944 ff.; and storms, 967 ff., 979 ff. 

Sweden, cold in 14th century, 936. 

Swedish bath, 191. 

Syria, andent climate of, 967, 97S; 
dvilication in, 961; forests in, 
996; irrigation in, 996; rainfall 
and sunspots, 947 f.; storminess 
in, 949; Teutonic blood in, 906. 

Syrian Desert, rank in dvilisation, 
169. 

Takla-Makan Desert, monotony of, 
135. 

Tampa, Fla., dgar factories at, 14, 
73 ff., 96. 

Tdieran, rainfall of, 973. 

Temper, in tropics, 41, 43 f. 

Temperature. (See also Change* 
of Temperature); in Connecticut, 
59 (flg.); and CO2, 106 ff.; and 
cotton weaving, 71; method of 
computing effect, 138 f . ; and or- 
ganic activity, 8, 89 ff., 94, 98 ff.; 
range of, 119. 

Ten Kate, H., dted, 160. 

Tennessee, civilization in, 197; emi- 
nent persons in, 916; negro ver- 
sus white farmers, 19 ff. 

Teutons, and dvilization, 167, 905; 
compared with negroes, 11 ff., 
94 ff.; character of, 16. (See also 
AnglO'Saxone, Britieh, and Eng- 
Ueh.) 

Texas, dvilisation in, 197, 199; edu- 
cation in, 195; illiteracy in, 191. 



Thomson, dted, 108 f. 

Tibet, climatic energy in, 144; effect 
on dvilisation, 960. 

**I1irough Siberia," cited, 146. 

Thunder storms, in tropics, 136. 

Tobacco, as money crop, 18; fac- 
tories, in N. C, 70, 75. 

Tools, importance to dvilisation, 
980 ff.; among Mayas, 941. 

Torrid sone, dvilisation in, 939. 

Transvaal, 95. 

Trees, as evidence of shifting of 
zones, 943; and high winds, 113; 
as index of climatic changes, 999. 

Tropical highlands, 144, 975. 

Tropical hurricanes, relation to sun- 
spots, 945 f . 

Tropics, effect on white man, 35 ff.; 
improvements in, 991; inertia, 33; 
labor in, 36; life insurance in, 
187; light in, 83; relation to ideal 
climate, 136. 

Truckee River, salt hi, 934. 

Tuberculosis, and wdj^t, 65 f.; and 
life insurance, 187. 

Turkestan, climatic energy in, 144; 
expeditions to, 4. 

Turkey, Americans in, 955; first 
storm, 59; heat in, 47. 

Typewriting, effect of seasons on, 
109. 

Uniformity, bad effect of, 114 ff., 
190, 136. 

United States versus Asia climatic- 
ally, 931; areas of hi{^ energy in, 
149 f . ; dvilisation and energy in, 
171, 196 ff., 199 ff., 909 ff., 959 ff.; 
climatic investigations in, 5; cli- 
mate and rate of work in, 49 ff. ; 
climatic variety of, 137; ability 
in, 908 ff.; education in, 199 ff.; 
effect upon negroes, 35 f . ; aridity 



882 



INDEX 



and map of, 141; effect of di- 
matic hypothesis upon, 986; 
hannful winters in, 888; illiteracy 
in, 190; mortality in, 186 ff.; 
North compared with South, 17; 
political contribution of, 353; 
Pre-Columbian dvilisation in, 
976 ff.; rainfall and sunspots in, 
947 ff.; relation to ideal climate, 
130 f.; statistical advantages of, 
149, 183 ff.; storms in, 139 f., 949, 
966; white versus colored farm- 
ers, 18 ff. ; work at Panama, 40. 

United States Commissioner of 
Education, 199. 

Unruliness, among school children, 
199. 

Utah, civilisation in, 197; eminent 
persons in, 917; illiteracy in, 191; 
school attendance in, 199 ff. 

Vacations, best season for, 94; ef- 
fect on energy, 88. 

Van't Hoff's law, 106. 

Variability of climate, value of, 39; 
law of, 190. (See Changes of 
tetnp0r€Uure») 

Vedas, character of authors, 163. 

Vegetation, relation to civilisation, 
980 ff.; of tropics, 939. 

Venezuela, civilisation and energy 
in, 904. 

Ventilation, New York State Com- 
mission on, 73, 101. 

Vera Crus, effect ot climate, 991. 

"Vergleichende Physiologie," dted, 
106. 

Vermont, eminent persons in, 919. 

Violence, and heat, 47. 

Virginia, factory operatives in, 8; 
illiteracy in, 191. 

Vitality, in U. S., 186 ff. 



Wages, effect of heat on, 90 ff.; 
effect of war on, 70; and over- 
head charges, 69; among piece- 
workers, 53 ff.; seasonal varia- 
tions of, 57 ff. ; in tropical coun- 
tries, 36; of ^Hiites versus negroes, 
13 ff. 

War, of 1914, 95, 70, 951; reUtion 

to centers of dvillsatlon, 951, 

961 f.; of Secession, 99. 
Washington State, education in, 

193. 
Washington, D. C, colored pupils 

at, 19. 

Water supply, historic dianges in, 
995. 

"Weather Influences," dted, 7, 119. 

Weather, effect of, 59; versus cli- 
mate, 111; and work. 111 ff. 

Weds, days of, 94. 

Wei{^t, and climate, 65 f. 

West Indies, dviUsation in, 175. 

West Point, changes of tempera- 
ture in, 117 f.; effect of seasons 
on marks at, 77 ff.; marks at, 
8, 78 f.; vacation at, 117. 

West Virginia, eminent persons in, 
916. 

Wet weather. (See Humidity,) 

"Wetter und Arbdt," 7. 

Wheat, and temperature, 103, 116. 

"White and Black," dted, 96. 

White children compared with col* 
ored, 19. 

White colonists in tropics, 35 ff., 
38 f., 144, 939 ff.; effect on natives, 
35 ff. 

"Who's Who in America," 908 ff., 
913 f. 

Will power, supreme importance of, 
916; in tropics, 41 ff. 

Winds, effect on man, 119 f.; rela- 
tion to ideal cUmate, 130. 



INDEX 



888 



Wind of 190 days, 113. 

Winnemucca Lake, 833 f. 

Winnipeg, civilisation of, 177. 

Winston-Salem, N. C, 70. 

Winters, cold, 93; effect upon ac- 
tivity, 59; effect of close houses 
in, 84 if., 988 f.; value of vaca- 
tions in, 88. 

Wisconsin, character of immigra- 
tion, 915; negro versus white 
fanners, 19 ff. 

Woodruflf, a W., dted, 88. 

Woodruff, L. L., cited, 104. 

Women, in Bahamas, 30 f.; as pieoe- 
woikers, 55 If.; in tropics, 46 f. 

Work, effect of climate on, 49 ff.; 
and weather. 111 ff.; time of fast- 
est, 59. 



Workmen, white versus colored, 
13 f. 

Writing, among Mayas, 940. 

Wyoming, education in, 194; emi- 
nent persons in, 917; civilisation 
of, 177. 

Yale Expedition to Palestine, 5. 

Yale University, and Acadia Col- 
lege, 177. 

Yangtse basin, civilisation in, 960; 
ancient storminess of, 968. 

Yemen, ancient civilisation in, 975. 

Yucatan, changes of climate in, 5; 
European character of early, 164; 
ruins, 939 f.; storm center, 967. 

Zones, shifting of climatic, 5. 
Zulus, 94; immorality among, 46. 



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