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CIVIL WAR AND REBELLION
ROMAN EMPIRE
MACMILLAN AND CO., Limited
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TORONTO
GALBA.
From a bust in the Capitoline Museum, Rome.
w
Civil War and Rebellion
in the
Roman Empire
A.D. 69-70
A COMPANION TO THE 'HISTORIES' OF TACITUS
BY
BERNARD W. HENDERSON, M.A.
SUB-RECTOR AND TUTOR OF EXETER COLLEGE, OXFORD
SOMETIME FELLOW OF MERTON COLLEGE, OXFORD
AND FELLOW OF UNIVERSITY COLLEGE, LONDON
AUTHOR OF
'THE LIFE AND PRINCIPATE OF THE EMPEROR NERO '
' HISTORY OF MERTON COLLEGE, OXFORD,' ETC.
WITH MAPS AND ILLUSTRATIONS
%0
MACMILLAN AND CO., LIMITED
ST. MARTIN'S STREET, LONDON
1908
Ho
Cop S
TO
MY "GREATS" PUPILS AT EXETER COLLEGE
AND IN PARTICULAR
TO THOSE
MY COMPANIONS ON THE ROAD IN ITALY
PREFACE
From the days of the elder Pliny to the present
there have been many who have written concerning
the history of the Civil Wars of a.d. 69 and 70. Of
the writers whose works are extant, Tacitus stands
easily first. Without his "Histories" we should
indeed have but an inferior story of the struggle
between the Emperors Otho and Vitellius, and a
still poorer story of that between Vitellius and
Vespasian. And yet always from the very first
the strategic and military aspect of the three cam-
paigns narrated by Tacitus has been neglected.
To write the history of those campaigns by the
aid of, and as illustrative of, modern strategical
principles is the main purpose of this book.
Two recent writers, it is true, have to some
extent recognised the interest and value of such a
treatment of Tacitus' story. Gerstenecker in 1882
contributed some suggestions on the military history
of the war between Otho and Vitellius.1 These,
1 Der Krieg dcs Otho und Vitellius in Italien im J. 6g, von Joh.
Gerstenecker. Programm des Kdniglichen Maximilians-Gymnasiums fur das
Schuljahr 1881-82, Svo, Miinchen, 1882, pp. Si.
Vlll
PREFACE
however, seem to me of peculiarly little value in
spite of their considerable length, lacking alike in
military knowledge and in insight. Mommsen's
short paper, on the other hand, published in 1871,
is full of valuable suggestions.1 It will always be
almost impertinent for any student of Ancient
History to commend any paper by the German
master. This article, however, is very brief, deals
scarcely at all with the strategy of the campaigns
before the actual contact of the opposing armies
upon the field of battle, and is still, I think, in one
or two respects unduly captive to Tacitus, whom
Mommsen himself has called, once and for all time,
" the most unmilitary of historians."
For in very truth the inadequate and short-
sighted treatment of the military problems and
history of these two years has to be referred back
to the Roman historian. The more often I read
Tacitus, the more convinced I become that in
matters military his information represents little but
the common gossip of the camp, the talk of the
private soldier or subordinate officer, reproduced at
second-hand with all the literary power of a great
writer who possessed the most vivid visualising
power (if I may so call it). The troops on the
blood-stained plain outside the red walls of Cremona
battled, as it were, before Tacitus' very eyes, as
1 Die zivci Schlachtcn von Betriacum imjahre 6g n. C/ir.} " Hermes," Band
v. (1871), pp. 161-173 ; recently republished in Mommsen's Gesammelte
Schriften, Band iv. pp. 354-365, 8vo, Berlin, 1906.
PREFACE ix
he sate writing in his study. But the historian was
but a pleader at the Roman bar who had taken to
history. How should such a rhetorician care to
inquire very deeply into the strategical causes which
led to that battling in that precise position? He
seems to have felt no interest in any such inquiry,
and distance of time did not increase for him clear-
ness of vision. Generals are criticised hastily ;
impossible plans are ascribed to them ; strategies
are ignored or misrepresented ; events strategically
connected are treated as isolated movements ;
success or apparent failure is the one criterion of
judgment. With all this, the troops' endurance and
pluck are rightly recognised ; brilliance and " dash "
are duly appraised. But the result of such an
attitude to events is but an unsatisfactory military
history, as we in this country have had recent cause
to know. Yet it is surely the military history of
these campaigns which is of great, perhaps chief,
interest. " Nothing," remarks a modern writer of
military history, " is so misleading as the camp
gossip which is reproduced in many memoirs." '
Tacitus' "camp gossip" has been too faithfully
repeated as the whole sound sense of the matter
by historians who have had to rely almost entirely
upon his narrative for their facts.
During these last twelve years it has been my
good fortune to roam on foot many times in different
1 Maj.-Gen. Sir J. F. Maurice, The Diary of Sir John Moore, ii. p. 373.
x PREFACE
parts of Italy. If in this book I now attempt, after
two recent visits of my own to the actual theatre of
war in the Lombard plain, to trace again the history
of these campaigns, it is with the hope chiefly of
calling attention to a somewhat neglected part of
them, namely, the strategical and geographical
questions which they involve. For this more
prosaic purpose such fineries of language as, for
example, adorn Merivale's record of these wars
cannot be allowed to me. For me the Vitellian
columns of invasion cannot be seen " beetling on
the summits of the Alps," nor can Otho be found
" bounding from his voluptuous couch at the first
sound of the trumpet." An insistence on a different
method of treatment of these wars must be, if it so
happen, my justification for yet another handling of
an old theme.
BERNARD W. HENDERSON.
Oxford, March 1908.
~\
CONTENTS
CHAPTER I
The Campaign of Otho and the Vitellians
January-April a.d. 69
§ 1. The origins of the civil war ; the fall of Nero ; the rule
of Galba ; the revolt of Vitellius and the " Army of
Germany " ; the accession of Otho .... 1
§ 2. The troops engaged ; the military system as cause of
the civil war ; strength and position of the opposing
armies ; the strategic initiative . . . . 16
§ 3. The strategical aspect of the opening campaign, and
opportunities of the two sides ..... 38
§ 4. The march of the two Vitellian advance columns under
Valens and Caecina . . . . . . 57
§ 5. The Othonjan measures of defence ; use of the fleet ;
the mobilisation of the " Army of the Danube " : the
loss of Cremona ....... 70
§ 6. The first encounters ; assault on Placentia ; battle of
Locus G&Stprum . . . . . . . 81
§ 7. The strategies of the final struggle ; Vitellian " strategy
of penetration " ; Otho's Council of War ; Othonian
" strategy of envelopment " . . . . . 92
§ 8. The " Battle of Bedriacum " 114
§9. The death of Otho /124
xi
PAGE
xii CONTENTS
CHAPTER II
The Flavian Invasion of Italy
July-December a.d. 69
§t ia Vitellius and his army in Rome . . . . .128
§ 2. The gathering of the storm . . . . .132
§ 3. Flavian plans of war : —
The muster of the Eastern army ; the Council of
War at Berytus ; the " strategy of exhaustion " ;
the Council of War at Poetovio ; the " strategy
of annihilation " . . . . . .141
§ 4. The strategy of the defence . . . . . 165
§ 5. The strategies compared . . . . . .173
§ 6. The second " Battle of Bedriacum " : —
The Flavian advance to Verona ; the race for
Cremona ; the battle of Cremona ; the sack of
Cremona . . . . . . .185
§ 7. The advance to Rome : —
The halt at Fano ; movements of the Vitellian
forces ; the capture of Rome . . . .206
§ 8. The death of Vitellius 228
CHAPTER III
The Rebellion on the Rhine
a.d. 69, 70
§ 1. The tribes of the " Low Countries " . . . . 231
§ 2. The cause of the rebellion : —
The " armed plea for liberty " ; the peoples of the
revolt ; the leaders : Classicus, Tutor, Sabinus,
Civilis ........ 237
CONTENTS xiii
PAGE
§ 3. The Roman army on the Rhine : —
Its composition and numbers : ( 1 ) legionaries, (2)
auxiliaries; its weakness . . . . 250
§ 4. The war, up to the relief of Vetera : —
The clearing of the " Island" ; the siege of Vetera ;
the advance of the relieving army ; the relief of
Vetera . . . . . . . .261
§ 5. Flood tide : the success of the Mutiny : —
The retention of Vetera ; the death of Vocula ; the
loss of Germany . . . . . .276
§ 6. The Ebb : reduction of the Gallic revolt : —
The gathering of the Romans ; the struggle with
the Treveri ; the advance to Cologne . . 290
§ 7. The submission of the Germans ..... 306
§ 8. The lessons of the Mutiny : —
The results in Gaul and Germany ; the results in
the Roman army : (1) legionaries, (2) auxiliaries ;
the Flavian Army of the Rhine ; the victory and
strength of Rome . . . . . .318
NOTES
To Chapter I.
A. The Movements of the Danube Legions .
B. The Capture of Cremona by the Vitellians
C. The Site of Bedriacum ....
D. The " Distances " in Tacitus, ii. 39, 40 .
E. Tacitus as Military Historian
337
338
339
34o
346
To Chapter II.
F. Valens' March to the North ..... 348
To Chapter III.
G. Vetera and Harper's Ferry . . . . 350
H. The Flavian Army of the Lower Rhine . . . 352
ILLUSTRATIONS
Galba (from a Bust in the Capitoline Museum, Rome)
Otho (from a Bust in the Capitoline Museum, Rome)
Vitellius (from a Bust in Vienna) ....
Vespasian (from a Bust in the Museo Nazionale,
Naples) .......
Coins of Galba, Otho, Vitellius, Vespasian
PAGE
Frontispiece
To face I
,, i _u
„ 138
„ 26l
Note. — The busts of Galba, Otho, Vitellius, and Vespasian are reproduced
from Rom. Ikonographie ii., by kind permission of Prof. J. J. Bernoulli.
MAPS AND PLANS
Diagram .
Diagram .
Diagram .
Diagram .
The Theatre of War,
Plan
Diagram .
Diagram .
The War on the Rhi
The Via Postumia
Diagram .
Diagram .
68-69
le, A
D. 69-
70
41
48
no
199
To face 230
233
299
302
To face 336
339
• 345
• 35i
OTHO.
From a bust in the Capitoline Museum, Rome.
CHAPTER I
THE CAMPAIGN OF OTHO AND THE VITELLIANS
After a war one ought to write not only the history of what has happened,
but also the history of what was intended ; the narrative would then be
instructive. — Von der Goltz.
§ i . The Origins of the Civil War
Soon after daybreak on the 9th of June a.d. 68
the Roman Emperor Nero died by his own hand.
He who had been for thirteen years the master of
the Roman world ended his life in squalor and in
misery, with only three freed slaves and a treacherous
centurion present to watch his death. He who was
the last descendant of Julius Caesar, the last Prince
of the Julian line, enjoyed for resting-place on the
last evening of his life the gloomy underground
cellar of a villa in the suburbs of his capital ; for the
furniture of his death-chamber a scanty mattress
and a ragged quilt ; for the final banquet a little
lukewarm water and old crusts of bread. Thanks
to others' falseness and his own faint-heartedness
he had to die. His cruelty and lust had cost him
many friends ; his passion for art and music had
cost him more. But the chief cause of his ruin was r
B
2 THE CAMPAIGN OF OTHO ch.i
the indifference shown by him towards his troops,
towards the art of war, towards the practice of the
camps. The nobles, who had found a ruthless perse-
cutor in him ; the philosophers, who wrote him down
a frenzied tyrant ; the Christians, who supposed him
to be the Antichrist, lord of a world abandoned by
God, — these all rejoiced at his miserable end and
defamed his memory. But the lower classes in Rome
mourned for him. Unknown hands yearly decked his
tomb in the gardens of the Pincian Hill with spring
and summer flowers. The countless inhabitants of
Italy and the provinces of the Roman Empire had
no reason to welcome his overthrow. Not a few
of these in the past had enjoyed his care for them,
and might in gratitude sorrow for his fall. Neither
had the Imperialist any reason to denounce this the
last Julian Emperor. Britain had been well-nigh lost,
but the triumphant courage of Nero's legionaries had
saved it to the Empire. The war upon the eastern
frontier with Rome's old and bitter Parthian enemy
had at last been ended, not without glory to the
Roman arms, and now, after a century of hostility,
there was a fair promise that the agreement
reached would be an enduring peace with honour.
But all such blame and all such praise availed
Nero little when his soldiers felt no love for him,
and had no reason to admire him or fear him as
their General. When the standard of rebellion was
raised in distant Spain, his Guards at Rome, piqued
and deceived, deserted their Prince. Nero,
abandoned, treacherously betrayed, slew himself.
The whole Empire, if it had good cause for joy
//
sec. i AND THE VITELLIANS 3
at the death of the man, had speedily reason to
regret the downfall of the Emperor.
For now, to use the words of the Roman historian
Tacitus, the secret of the Empire was revealed.
"A prince could be appointed elsewhere than in
the city of Rome." Hitherto, under Tiberius, I
Caligula, Claudius, and Nero, the Imperial power
had in practice been but the heirloom of the Julian
family. Now the last of the family was dead. Yet
some Emperor there must be. The vast body of
the Empire could not " stande without governour." *
But there was no heir to the throne. The Prince 1
must now in actual fact be "elected," and thus the
theory of election which, as a theory, had persisted
from the beginning must be realised in practice.
Men flattered themselves that such an election was
a sign of liberty restored. It was in reality no gain
to liberty that the might of armed force now took
the place of such a right as inheritance might give.
It was no gain to liberty that " two common soldiers
of the line took upon themselves the task of trans-
ferring the Empire over the Roman people from
one Prince to another, and transferred it." 2
At this time, in fact, the army of the Roman
world was not at unity with itself. Upon the death
of Nero different armies in different quarters of
the Empire set up their own popular leaders and
generals as claimants to the Imperial power. Why
should the legions of Germany, or the proud
1 Sir H. Savile's translation of Tacitus, Histories, i. 16 (1591).
2 Tacitus, Histories, i. 25. All references henceforward to Tacitus in the
notes which give a number only are references to the Histories.
4 THE CAMPAIGN OF OTHO ch.i
Praetorians of Rome, submit to an Imperator
appointed by the troops in Spain ? Why should
the veteran and victorious army of the East or the
hardy garrison of the Danube frontier tamely
accept an Emperor at the hands of the rebel
soldiery of the Rhine ? The miserable death of
Nero was ominous of the greater misery to come,
of the terrors of a year of savage civil strife. The
Empire was the prize for which the armies battled ;
Italy was the battle-ground. Twice within eight
months armies of invasion swept down over the
Alps upon the unhappy land. " Ah, would that
Italy had never been dowered at Fortune's hands
with the luckless gift of beauty ! " cried the
Florentine poet of the seventeenth century :—
Ch' or giu dall' Alpi non vedrei torrenti
Scender d' armati, e del tuo sangue tinta
Bever 1' onda del Po gallici armenti.
But now it was the very Empire of the Roman
world which called the rivals down to Italy.
Nero had been indifferent to war and its pursuits.
Such interests were unworthy of an artist, if not
of an Emperor. This indifference on his part
revenged itself upon the fairest of all beautiful
lands. Four Roman Emperors perished within
twenty months. Two of these, Nero and Otho,
fell by their own hand. Two, Galba and Vitellius,
were murdered in open daylight by order of their
conquerors. The death of each of these selfish and
ambitious princes might have seemed a gain to the
Roman world, had not each been followed by such
AND THE VITELLIANS 5
a successor. Then at the last Vespasian came, and
the land had peace. It was always Italy which paid
the chief part of the price of this, the contending of
the Emperors. Those who have ever seen her
dancing sunlight and luxuriant plains, her rushing
rivers and her sombre mountains, know that this
land alone might seem worth all the striving.
Servius Sulpicius Galba1 had already been in~
arms against his Emperor for some two months when
the Roman Senate elected him " Princeps " on the
day of Nero's death. He was a man of high birth, J-
descended on his mother's side from Lucius
Mummius, the destroyer of Corinth in 146 B.C.
After a long and honourable civil and military
career in other parts of the Empire, Galba had been
sent by Nero to govern the province of Hispania
Tarraconensis (North -East Spain) eight years
before, and there as governor he had stayed ever
since. There, too, increasing years and familiarity
with his duties had presently changed him from a
vigorous and efficient governor to one careless and
indolent. No one, he said, had to render an account
of his idle hours. But an alarming rebellion in the
neighbouring land of Gaul broke out in the spring
of a.d. 68, and compelled him to take action either
with or against the rebels. Impelled by the offers
of the rebel leader Vindex and by his own personal
ambition, he chose the former course and renounced
his allegiance to Nero. The Gallic rebellion
indeed was promptly crushed by the Roman army
1 Galba, cf. Suetonius, Galba, 1-9; Plutarch, Galba, 3, 4, 8. His prae-
nomen Lucius he changed to that of Servius in A.D. 68.
6 THE CAMPAIGN OF OTHO
in the district of Upper Germany under its famous
general Verginius Rufus. But the infection of dis-
loyalty was in the air, and even Verginius' victorious
troops were eager to march to Rome and set up
their general there as Emperor. But Verginius
was well content with his achievement. He had
saved the integrity of the Roman Empire and now
would preserve his own. It was still possible to
find in the Roman Empire a general of repute who
was untainted by any ambition save by that of
serving his country. He declined the offered gift
of Empire, and his troops had sullenly to acquiesce.
Galba therefore, despite his great miscalculation,
reaped the fruits of Verginius' refusal, and had his
short-lived joy of them. He was now an old man of
seventy-three years of age, but the crisis called out
his better military qualities. On receiving from
Rome the tidings of Nero's death and of his own
election as Princeps he marched for Rome at the
head of a newly-raised legion, the Seventh Galbiana,1
and found his progress unopposed. Towards the
middle of October in the year a.d. 68 he entered
the city, and though his entry had been marred
by scenes of needless bloodshed and panic, no
rival yet disputed with him his possession of the
Imperial power. For some three months after his
entry Galba remained Emperor of Rome. But
then the end came. It took but these three months
for him to lose the popularity which, by remaining
1 This legion later was known as the Seventh Gemina, but this title seems
to have been given it first by Vespasian, when he disbanded the First legion
(so Heraeus, note to Tac. i. 6). Galba evidently sent it almost at once to
Pannonia, as it is found here in January A.D. 69.
sec, AND THE VITELLIANS 7
unknown, he had gained. His Ministers and
dependents justly earned dislike by their venality
and greed, and this dislike was extended to the old
Emperor, who made no attempt to check their
rapacity. His own severity, amounting in cases to
cruelty, his age, his ugliness, above all his fatal
parsimony, cost him the support of all classes in the
city, who were quick to contrast him in all these
respects with the Nero whom he had supplanted.
He was, it is true, a brave disciplinarian, and
scorned to secure by purchase the doubtful fidelity
of his wavering Guards. The exhausted state of
the Roman Treasury would indeed have amply
justified the greatest thrift and the most careful
financial administration on the part of any ruler save
one who, like Galba, could only buy the goodwill
of the soldiery by donatives, the affection of the
unruly populace by extravagance. Tacitus' biting
epigram has characterised Galba for all time :
" Omnium consensu capax imperii nisi imperasset."1
The disaffection of the troops in Germany and the
treachery of one of his disappointed adherents in
Rome showed how shifting and unstable was the
foundation of honesty upon which Galba had striven
to build his rule. It was not for the enjoyment of"
such an Emperor that Nero had been overthrown.
The trouble began in " Germany." This was
the name given by the Romans of this time to the
districts lying on the left bank of the river Rhine
from Lake Constance to the sea. Augustus had
renounced the attempt to add to the Empire
1 Tac. i. 49.
8 THE CAMPAIGN OF OTHO ch. i
territory over the river, and the German savages
between the Rhine and the Elbe remained inde-
pendent of Roman government henceforward.
Those tribes who lay immediately opposite the
Roman settlements and garrisons on the left bank
were to a certain degree civilised by their acquaint-
ance with their Roman neighbours and Romanised
kinsmen, and Roman traders ventured in their
pursuit of wealth to penetrate districts which were
to the Roman legionary forbidden land. But the
venturesome traders took their lives in their hands,
as they had done among the independent Gallic
tribes in the days of Julius Caesar, and the farther
east they travelled among the black forests and
mountains of the land which is modern Germany, the
more barbaric and terrible they found the German
tribes. Migrations of whole peoples were not
uncommon, and each tribe lived by plundering its
neighbours when the whim seized it. Restless
savagery and lust for bloodshed, precarious peace
and internecine war, such were the pursuits and
characteristics of the hordes who roamed the lands
east of the Rhine. The more restless cast greedy
eyes on the fields lying west of the river ; the more
peaceable were driven by the irresistible pressure
of wild tribesmen from the unknown forests of the
interior to strive to put the barrier of the river
between themselves and their assailants.
The Roman Empire was therefore compelled to
" police " its side of the Rhine by a strong stand-
ing army. For this purpose the left bank was
marked out into two districts, each of which was
AND THE VITELLIANS 9
garrisoned by four legions with auxiliaries to help
them, and was under the military control of a
governor, the Legatus Augusti pro praetore.
" Upper Germany " stretched from Lake Constance
to a point midway between Coblenz and Bonn
(now Brohl, between Andernach and Remagen) ;
" Lower Germany " reached from this point to the
sea. For civil administration " Germany " belonged
to the province of Gallia Belgica down to the days
of Domitian ; for financial, at least half a century
longer.1 But the governor of Belgica had no
regular troops at his command, so pacified by now
seemed the Gauls ; and the two governors of Upper
and Lower Germany, commanding, as they did,
powerful armies on the frontiers, were the men
on whose sagacity depended the security of the
Empire, on whose fidelity that of the Emperor at
Rome.
Galba shortly after his accession had recalled
the governor of Upper Germany, Verginius Rufus,
and executed the governor of Lower Germany,
Fonteius Capito. To take their places he had
appointed to Upper Germany an old and infirm
man, Hordeonius Flaccus, who proved utterly
unable to control turbulence or mutiny among his
troops. To Lower Germany he sent Aulus
Vitellius.
Vitellius was then fifty-five years of age. His
career up to that time had been a curious mixture
of good and evil. As a boy he had been in
attendance upon the morose old Emperor Tiberius
1 See below, Chap. III. § 3.
io THE CAMPAIGN OF OTHO
CII. I
in his retreat on the island of Capri, and men were
therefore but too ready to speak ill of him. In
Rome he had won the young Caligula's favour by
his skill in chariot-driving, and the goodwill of the
next Emperor, Claudius, by his love of dicing. But
when sent out as governor of Africa by Nero he
too, like other Roman nobles of the time, left his
worst qualities behind him in Rome, and displayed
integrity and justice in his administration, so that
at the last crisis of his life only Africa showed any
zeal on his behalf. He had returned from Africa
in a.d. 61, and lived the next seven years, it seems,
in obscure retirement at Rome. Either his
integrity as governor or his gluttony, which was
notorious, reduced him to such straits of poverty
that when Galba commanded him to proceed as
governor to Lower Germany in the autumn of a.d.
68 he left his family behind him living in a hired
garret, and pawned his mother's earrings to obtain
the money necessary for his travelling expenses.
By such means he was able to reach his province
on the ist of December of this year.
Both new governors found their troops sullen
and disloyal to Galba. The attempt of the army
of Upper Germany to proclaim Verginius Emperor
had recently been baffled first by his refusal, and,
soon after, by his recall to Rome. But they loved
Galba none the better for that. Galba had recently
been lavishing favour on the Gauls, rebels to the
Empire, whom they, true soldiers of the Empire,
had lately crushed. Galba was but the nominee
of the troops in Spain, troops whom they, the proud
sec. i AND THE VITELLIANS u
and warlike frontier army of Germany, could have
annihilated with ease. Neither governor was a
disciplinarian ; neither was attached to Galba by
any ties of affection or loyalty. The troops' dis-
content was not long in coming to a head. The
legions of Upper Germany refused the military
oath of allegiance to Galba on the ist of January
a.d. 69, and in default for the moment of a rival -
Emperor they proclaimed as rulers of the State the
Senate and People of Rome. But Republicanism
had never any real influence in the Roman army
after the days of Sulla a century and a half ago.
The legions of Upper Germany had not long to
wait before they found a new Emperor. Next day
their comrades in Lower Germany, who the day
before had taken the oath of allegiance to Galba
with very bad grace, renounced it, and proclaimed
their governor, Vitellius, Emperor at Cologne.
The army of Upper Germany at once accepted him,
and followed the example on January 3. Vitellius
for his part was far too slothful and too flattered
to resist the dangerous honour. Two men, each
of them in command of a legion, both of great
influence with the armies, found it an easy task to
persuade him. Fabius Valens, of Anagni, legate Anagnia.
of the First legion in Lower Germany, was an able
general who had won Nero's favour by doubtful
means and his troops' admiration by soldierly
qualities.1 Aulus Caecina Alienus of Vicenza, also Vicetia.
legionary legate in Upper Germany, was a younger
man and the darling of the troops. Handsome,
1 Valens, cf. Tac. i. 52, iii. 62 ; Plutarch, Galba, 10.
12 THE CAMPAIGN OF OTHO
tall, and energetic, he was also to show true
military qualities of daring and resource. He had
at first, when quaestor of the province of Baetica in
Spain, been a partisan of Galba, until his friendship
was changed to enmity when Galba ordered his
prosecution for embezzlement.1 These two men,
Valens in the Lower Province, Caecina in the
Upper, worked hard to secure the proclamation of
Vitellius by the troops. By the 3rd of January
their object was won. The army of Germany was
united in its declaration. Vitellius was named
Emperor, and open defiance hurled in Galba's
face.
When in a few days news of this reached Rome
the old Emperor affected to make light of it. But
it finally determined him to take a step which he
had for some time past been meditating, and to
associate with himself a younger man as colleague
in the Empire. There was both good precedent
for the plan and also every hope of strengthening
his own position thereby, had he chosen his
colleague wisely. Unhappily for himself, Galba
made a foolish choice, and paid for it in a week
with his life.
The man whom he presented to the troops and
to the Senate as his comrade henceforward in the
Iburdens of Empire came of an honourable but
unlucky family. Lucius Calpurnius Piso was by
now thirty years of age. Two of his elder brothers
he had already seen slain — the one by Claudius, .
1 Caecina, cf. Tac. i. 53, iii. S : "privala mala reipublicae malis operire
statuit."
AND THE VITELLIANS 13
the other by Nero. He himself had lived long in
exile, and was equally without experience of civil
administration or military service. Staid, sedate,
melancholy, he was a man on whose honour the old
Emperor could rely for sober counsel and loyal
support. But he was not a man to gain the
devotion of the Guards or fascinate the populace.
And even on the very day of his adoption by the
Emperor, when the greedy Praetorians might not
unreasonably have received the donative customary
on any such occasion, Galba's old-fashioned thrift
conceded nothing. His maxim, that it was his
wont to choose his soldiers and not to purchase
them, was worthy of an ancient Roman, but won
small sympathy from the Praetorians of his day.
Piso's adoption by Galba on the 10th of January
a.d. 69 was received sullenly by the troops in
Rome — men soon so resolute to fight and quick to
follow a general whom they knew and loved, but
impatient of control and resentful of what they
deemed neglect. Civil war was already threatening,! 1
and military discipline is the first virtue to fly at its-
approach.
The discontent of the Guards was all the more
dangerous because it quickly found a leader, in
whose heart anger at Galba's choice of Piso burned
all the more deeply because he himself had expected
to be chosen. And indeed Marcus Salvius Otho,
of Ferento in South Etruria,1 had some reason to
indulge in his hopes, now disappointed.
1 In Tac. ii. 50, Ferentio must be read instead of Ferentino. Cf. Suetonius,
Otho, I.
14 THE CAMPAIGN OF OTHO
Otho is one of those perplexing figures in
history whom it is very easy to condemn and very
hard to dislike. His wayward brilliance and calm
courage, his strong affections and the gentleness
and mercy which he showed when Emperor even
to his enemies, were qualities which endear him to
the memory of following ages as they won for him
the praise and the love of the Romans of his own
day. Yet his youth had been stained by vice,
luxury, and immodesty, and he gained his power by
base treachery and murder. But the men of his
own day judged these faults of character the more
leniently as they were the more familiar with them
in men who had none of Otho's charm to com-
pensate. As Nero had won men's approval, so did
Otho also, and when the careless Roman mob nick-
named him Nero, Otho gladly accepted the name at
their hands.
Now in these early days of January Otho had
counted on Galba's choice falling on himself. He
had done good service to the Emperor in Spain.
For Nero had determined to take Otho's beautiful
wife Poppaea for his own, and to secure this end
had banished the husband to honourable yet real
exile as governor of Lusitania, the modern Portugal,
- in a.d. 58. Here he had of necessity stayed ten
years, surprising all who had known his dissolute
life in Rome by his suavity and uprightness, when
once removed from the accursed atmosphere of the
Court at Rome. But he never forgave Nero for
Poppaea's loss, and it was one of his earliest acts as
Emperor to set up again the statues of her which
AND THE VITELLIANS 15
the mob had overthrown. Hence when Galba had
meditated treason, Otho had urged him on. At his
side he had come to Rome. Presently in his place
he had hoped to reign. Now he suddenly found a
younger, untried, and unpopular man preferred
before him.1
It was an age when few men in high places -
acted on any principles save those of personal
ambition ; when safety was sought in treachery ;
when treason was the speediest refuge in distress.
Five days' plotting followed. Then on the morning
of January 15, Otho left the side of the old
Emperor Galba as he stood sacrificing — " impor-
tuning the Gods now of another man's Empire"2 —
and, muttering some lying excuse, hurried to the
Praetorians' Camp, which lay by the city wall a
short distance away.
A handful of troops acclaimed him Emperor.-
Galba and Piso, lured down to the forum from the
height of the Palatine, were abandoned by an
indifferent mob and treacherous soldiers to their I
fate, and Otho reigned sole Emperor of Rome.
Fourteen days before, the army of Germany had
proclaimed Vitellius Emperor. The rivals must
meet in open war. All embassies passing between
the two were useless, for neither would yield place
to the other. Galba had been treacherously slain.
But open war should decide between Otho and
Vitellius.
1 For the Nero-Otho-Poppaea story and its different versions see my Life
and Principate of the Emperor Nero, pp. 1 1 6- 1 17, 467.
2 Savile's translation of Tac. i. 29.
16 THE CAMPAIGN OF OTHO ch.i
§ 2. The Troops Engaged
Civil war between Otho and Vitellius, the first
of the three great wars of these years a.d. 69 and
70, was thus imminent in the month of January in
the former year. The various parts of the whole
Roman Empire would have to choose sides. Some
of the provinces, however, were " unarmed," that
is, possessed no regular troops in them, and their
goodwill or hostility therefore counted for little in a
struggle which only the sword could decide. For
at this time the Roman army, apart from the garrison
of Rome, was for the most part distributed along
the frontiers of the Roman Empire, and the provinces
within those frontiers enjoyed security without the
presence of troops. Even of the frontier provinces
some were garrisoned only by local auxiliary troops,
and their contribution to the military strength of
either side could be but trifling, while their
sympathies were determined by the wishes of a
neighbouring province of which Roman legionaries
formed the garrison.
The Roman army at this time consisted of thirty
legions, and a force of " auxiliaries " which probably
equalled in strength that of the legions.1 The
legionaries, all of whom were Roman citizens, may
have numbered upward of a hundred and fifty
thousand men. All of them were men who had
made the practice of arms their profession ; all
1 This is generally assumed, and is a conclusion based on Tacitus [Annals,
iv. 5, and Histories, v. I) ; but though the numbers and names of a vast
number of auxiliary alae and cohortes are now known, it is quite impossible
to supply any more precise data of their total strength.
sec. n AND THE VITELLIANS 17
of them were heavy-armed ; most of them were
disciplined and efficient. Each legion bore a
number, and almost always a distinctive title ; and
in some of the legions regimental pride and
loyalty were strong inducements to valour. The
legionary cavalry, however, were few in number,
and the bulk of the horse, as well as considerable
numbers of infantry, mostly light - armed, were
supplied by the auxiliaries. These were organised
corps, known as alae (of cavalry) and cohortes
(both infantry and cavalry, or infantry only), usually
marked by a number and a special name. The
name was sometimes derived from the man who
first enrolled the corps, sometimes from the nation-
ality of the troops who composed it, sometimes
from the particular equipment which distinguished
it from other troops. These special corps were
either five hundred or a thousand strong. The
auxiliaries for the most part were at this time not
Roman citizens, but earned the citizenship by
twenty-five or more years' service, and were granted
it by the Emperor on their discharge. Legionaries
served twenty years with the colours, but after that
term of service many continued in the army, being
formed into special cohortes veteranorum.
The Roman military system was thus a long-
service system. And although a legion or auxiliary
corps was always liable for service in any part of
the known world, there had been developing since
the beginnings of the Empire a tendency to keep
the same troops in the same province for years
together, and to recruit the legions on the spot.
c
18 THE CAMPAIGN OF OTHO
The legions were established in more or less per-
manent camps, and while these " castra stativa "
served as headquarters for the troops, in course of
time civil settlements of veterans, with their wives
and families, and of traders, began to cluster round
the military lines. Thus the children of the legion-
aries grew up in close touch with the legions, and
the children of the auxiliaries in like manner would
be able and inclined to take service in the legions,
for which service they were duly qualified as soon
as their fathers had received the Roman citizenship
on their discharge. The problem of recruiting
became an easy one, and the Roman army was in
truth a voluntary army, although the old civic
liability on every citizen to be called out to war was
never formally abolished. Always every citizen
must be ready and able to fight for his country
if need arose. But since the days of Marius the
Roman army was never the " Nation in arms,"
except in theory. In compensation for this, the
experience and courage of the legionaries were alike
notable, and the numbers of the army, though
small, were adequate for all the work, defensive and
offensive, which it was from time to time called on
to perform. Military service on the whole was
popular. The troops were well cared for during
service, and a system of pensions provided comfort
for them in their old age. The permanent camps
upon the frontiers were centres of Romanisation
and civilisation just where such were most needed,
namely, on the outskirts of Empire, where Rome
came into contact with still uncivilised and savage
sec ii AND THE VITELLIANS 19
tribes. The camps guarded the frontiers, proved
the beginnings of towns later to be famous, and
were places of refuge when the unquiet natives
threatened war. And the steady growth in the
number of Roman citizens during the first two
centuries of the Empire, with all that this implied
in the feeling of pride, responsibility, and dignity,
on part of the individual, was due chiefly to the
Roman military system as established by the first
and greatest of the Emperors, Augustus.
Upon this system, now comfortably practised
for half a century, and upon this Roman army dis-
tributed for the most part in cantonments along the
frontiers of the Empire, there broke the storm of
civil war. Then was shown the one great blemish
of the system ; for it could not but stimulate the
growth of local sympathy in the various frontier
armies at the expense of their loyalty to the Empire
as a whole and to the Emperor at Rome. This
danger was less ominous so long as the Emperor
was known through the Roman world either to be,
like Tiberius, a soldier himself, of tried military
capacity, or to be one who, like Claudius, would
always put himself at. the head of his troops — at least
at the end of a difficult or dangerous campaign.
The danger was also less ominous if the governors
of the frontier provinces were changed from time to
time and not allowed protracted periods of com-
mand. Nero had been the first Emperor to
disregard both principles together. He had in
consequence been deserted by the troops, and
perished. The danger of local feeling, of local
20 THE CAMPAIGN OF OTHO ch.i
rivalries, in the frontier armies, became at once
pronounced, and the length and bitterness of the
civil wars of a.d. 69-70 were directly the result. And
hence, when finally Vespasian won the victory, the
interest taken both by him and by all his successors
in the army and its welfare is very marked. Whether
the Emperor were a man of war, like Domitian or
the great Trajan, or a cultured gentleman and man
of peace, like Hadrian or Antoninus Pius, or a
veritable philosopher, like Marcus Aurelius, made
no difference. He was bound to know his troops
and to be known by them.
The civil wars enforced this lesson of the Roman
military system. They also emphasised another
danger of the system which becomes clear in the
great native rebellion on the Rhine towards their
close, and will then be explained. But at the outset,
when the Roman legionaries were called on to
choose sides between Otho and Vitellius, there
seemed no reason why they should hesitate to take
up arms for the one or the other, according as their
private interests or affections or passions should
command. For eighteen months selfishness was
lord paramount of most men in the Roman Empire.
The Roman army was agreed on but two things:
firstly, that it would not restore the Republican
form of government ; secondly, that so splendid an
opportunity for fighting and for plunder as had now
arisen was not to be let go. In the course of the
struggle the troops from time to time displayed
courage to the point of heroism, and loyal affection
for at least one of their generals to the degree of
sec. n AND THE VITELLIANS 21
the very passion of love itself. Yet the main
interests of the campaigns are strategical and
military. They are no battle for Country or for
Liberty when war is glorious, and to refrain from
arms is contemptible.
The Eastern provinces and their armies, Italy
and the garrison of Rome, and the regular troops
of the "Danube" frontier, were for the most part
in sympathy with Otho ; the Western half of the
Empire was with Vitellius. But some of the
adherents on both sides were too far removed
from the scene of conflict to take an active part
in it.
The army of the Eastern frontier (including
Egypt) consisted of eight legions. Three of these
— the Fourth Scythica, Sixth Ferrata, and Twelfth
Fulminata — were stationed in Syria. The governor
of Syria at this time was Caius Licinius Mucianus,
an able soldier and statesman, who had been ap-
pointed to this duty by Nero in a.d. 67. Three
more legions were still engaged in quelling the
fierce rebellion of the Jews, which was to be
ended by the fall of Jerusalem on September 2,
a.d. 70.1 These legions were the Fifth Mace-
donia, the Tenth Fretensis, and the Fifteenth
Apollinaris. Their general was Titus Flavius
Vespasianus, at this time a man of fifty-nine years
of age. Vespasian was of humble origin, from a
small hamlet near Rieti in the highlands of the Reate.
Abruzzi in Central Italy, but of long and honour-
able service and of proved military ability. In the
1 For this Jewish war, see my Life and Principatt of Nero, chap. x. § 5.
22 THE CAMPAIGN OF OTHO ch.i
first conquest of Britain under Claudius he had
subdued the Isle of Wight after many battles, and
since then, after peaceful duty as governor of Africa,
had been chosen by Nero to command in the Jewish
war. A keen and active soldier, blunt, outspoken,
hardy, thrifty, and temperate, a man possessing
alike common sense and dry humour, Vespasian was
reserved by the Fates to heal the wounds of the
Roman Empire after the sore months of civil war
were ended. But in January a.d. 69 he was still
busily engaged with the war in Judaea, and not
ready to make his bid for Empire. He had sent
the elder of his two sons Titus and Domitian to
carry his homage to Galba from the seat of war.
But the news of Galba's death reached Titus when
he arrived at Corinth on his voyage to Italy. Titus
therefore returned from Greece to Syria, and both
Vespasian and Mucianus with their respective
armies swore fidelity to Otho. Finally, in Egypt
there were two legions, the Third Cyrenaica and
the Twenty-second Deiotariana. This restless, rich,
and turbulent country was at this time happily con-
trolled by a governor of striking ability, Tiberius
Julius Alexander. He was a Jew by birth who
had renounced Judaism, and after serving with
Corbulo in the Armenian war had been made
Prefect of Egypt by Nero in a.d. 63, and continued
in that office under Galba. A long edict by him is
still preserved, checking the extortion of officials
and the greedy activity of professional informers.
Under his direction Egypt and its army were well
disposed to Otho. Subsequently he acted as chief
sec. ii AND THE VITELLIANS 23
of staff to Titus in the Jewish war, with zeal and
ability.
The eight legions in the East took no part in
the civil war between Otho and Vitellius, but their
open sympathy with the former quickly bore fruit
after the triumph of his rival. For the time being,
however, " the East was undisturbed." l
The Roman province of Africa had lately been
greatly disturbed by the foolish ambition of the
legate of the one legion, the Third Augusta, which
at this time occupied the military district of Numidia
(which for administration counted as part of Africa).
This man, Lucius Clodius Macer, had revolted
against Nero and posed falsely as a Republican
enthusiast, when in reality he was seeking his own
selfish ends. Galba had secured his death without
difficulty, and thereupon the province was only too
happy to be quiet, " being content with any kind of
a Prince after its experience of a petty master."
Following the lead of its chief town Carthage, it
professed mild interest in Otho's cause. But its
legion took no part in the war.2
If Otho was thus unable to use nine friendly
legions in the East and South, Vitellius in like
manner, though to a less degree, could not employ
all the troops who wished well to his cause in the
West.
1 Position, etc., of the legions: Tac. i. 10; v. I. Mucianus : Pliny,
Hist. Nat. xii. 9 ; xiii. 88 ; Tac. i. 76 ; ii. 5. Vespasian : Sueton. Vit.
Vesp.; cf. Tac. i. 50; ii. 5, 6, 78; iv. v. passim. Titus: Tac. i. 10; ii. I,
2. Egypt and Tib. Julius Alexander : Tac. i. 1 1 ; Ann. xv. 28 ; Josephus,
Antiq. xx. 5. 2 ; Bell. Jud. ii. 15. 1 ; 18. 7, 8 ; Corpus Inscr. Graec. No.
4957-
2 Africa : Tac. i. 11, 76, 78; Macer: Tac. i. 7; ii. 97; Plutarch,
Galba, 6.
24 THE CAMPAIGN OF OTHO ch.i
In Britain there were now left three of the
famous four legions which had "conquered" the
island under Claudius and kept it for the Empire
at the time of the furious rising of the natives led
by Queen Boudicca (Boadicea) against Nero. These
legions were the Second Augusta, Ninth Hispana,
and Twentieth Valeria Victrix. Their old comrades
of the Fourteenth Gemina had lately been trans-
ferred to Dalmatia. The governor of Britain at
the time of Galba's accession was Marcus Trebellius
Maximus. But he incurred the displeasure of his
troops, and the men of the Twentieth legion took
upon themselves to turn him out of the country
without more ado. In his absence the legates of the
three legions administered the province, sharing the
duties between them, until Vitellius after his victory
sent out a new governor in the person of Marcus
Vettius Bolanus. Separated by the sea from the
rest of the Empire, and with trouble threatening
from the tribesmen of Yorkshire and the north, the
army of Britain displayed no lively interest in the
opening stages of the civil wars.1
Spain was garrisoned by the two legions, the
Sixth Victrix and the Tenth Gemina. Galba had
been followed as governor of the district Tarracon-
ensis by the historian Cluvius Rufus2; and Otho,
familiar with the land, and a fellow-courtier with
Cluvius under Nero, had hoped to gain the support
of the Spanish army and strengthen his position in
Spain by favours bestowed on the province. New
1 Britain : Tac. i. 9, 60 ; iii. 22 ; cf. my Life of Nero, chap. vi.
2 Clu%'ius Rufus : cf. my Life of Nero, p. 429.
sec. ii AND THE VITELLIANS 25
settlers were sent by him to the two colonies of
Hispalis (Seville), in the province of Baetica in
South Spain, and Augusta Emerita (Merida) in
Lusitania (Portugal), and the Roman citizenship
was probably bestowed by him on the Lusones, a
Celtiberian tribe round the sources of the Tagus.1
Certain " towns of the Mauri " also, lying in the
district of Mauretania, the other side of the Straits
of Gibraltar, such as Tingi (Tangiers), were added
by him to Baetica for administrative and revenue
purposes. But neither the Spanish provinces nor
the Spanish army nor Cluvius Rufus gave Otho
any support. It may well be that the soldiers
resented his murder of their former governor Galba.
Indeed, when the procurator of Mauretania, one
Lucceius Albinus, threatened Spain in Otho's
interests, Rufus guarded the Straits and persuaded
Albinus' army to murder their procurator. This,
however, was the only service which the Spanish
army rendered to Vitellius ; and later they aban-
doned his cause when his doom was coming close.2
Of the thirty legions of the Roman army, four-
teen, therefore, were not concerned with the war
between Otho and Vitellius. The remaining sixteen
were divided in allegiance. Seven legions in
Germany and one in Gaul, on the one hand, formed
Vitellius' army of invasion. On the other hand,
1 Tac. i. 78, accepting the emendation " Lusonibus " for the text
" Lingonibus " — as the sentence is sandwiched between two others, both of
which refer to Otho's Spanish measures. Other suggestions are Ilurconibus
(Ilurco = Pinos Puente in Baetica) and Lanciensibus, a Lusitanian folk
mentioned in an inscription of A.D. 5. Cf. C.I.L. ii. 460.
2 Otho's gifts to Spain : Tac. i. 7S. The legions, etc. : Tac. ii. 58 ;
iii. 44 ; Albinus, ii. 58, 59.
26
THE CAMPAIGN OF OTHO
seven stalwart legions in the "Danube provinces"
and one at Rome declared for Otho, who besides
commanded the support of the garrison of Rome,
the most famous regiments of " Guards." Four of
the seven legions of the German army were sta-
tioned in the Lower Province, three in the Upper ;
all seven being on the left bank of the Rhine and
in the immediate neighbourhood of the river.
Nearest the sea the " Old Camp," Castra Vetera,
served as the usual headquarters for two legions,
the Fifth Alaudae and the Fifteenth Primigenia.
The First legion was probably encamped at Bonn,
near the southern frontier of the province, and be-
tween these two camps the Sixteenth legion lay
at Novaesium. In Upper Germany Mainz supplied
a double camp for the two legions, the Fourth
Macedonica and Twenty-second Primigenia, while
the Twenty-first Rapax was stationed at Vindonissa,
east of the great northward bend of the Rhine.1
The four Gallic provinces — Belgica on the north,
Lugdunensis in the centre, Aquitania on the south-
west, and Narbonensis on the south-east — were
sufficiently guarded against the barbarians by the
powerful garrison in the two Germanies on the
Rhine, and only the city of Lugdunum itself at the
meeting-place of the Rhone and Saone was guarded
1 It must be remembered that some of the evidence for these places as
headquarters for these legions belongs to the year 70. But in the absence of
contrary evidence we may suppose it to be true of the year before. The
evidence is, for Leg. I. : Tac. i. 57 ; iv. 25 ; V. and XV. : ibid. iv. 22, 35 ;
XVI. : ibid. iv. 26, 61; IV. and XXII.: ibid. i. 55; iv. 24, 25; XXL:
ibid. i. 61 ; iv. 61, 70. Throughout I use the more familiar name of the
place, whether ancient or modern, placing its modern or ancient equivalent
in the margin.
sec. i. AND THE VITELLIANS 27
by troops. Here in the most important city of the
whole land were stationed the First Italica legion ;
an auxiliary cavalry regiment, the ala Tauriana,
so called from the name of Statilius Taurus, who
first enlisted it ; and the eighteenth cohort of the
Guards.1 The town and garrison of Lugdunum
embraced eagerly the cause of Vitellius. Twenty
miles down the Rhone, nestling, like its enemy,
under precipitous heights, lay the hated city of
Vienne, and never did bitterness felt by one little
Greek city-state for a neighbour exceed that anger
which Lugdunum cherished against Vienne, both
towns though they were of the Empire. This hos-
tility was doubtless partly due to tribal feeling,
partly perhaps to the very Greek element persisting
in the valley of the Rhone. And it is curious to
reflect that just as Lugdunum was the new proud
centre for the great political institution of Caesar-
worship, so it was at Vienne that Christianity, the
foe of, and at last the victor over, the Imperial cult,
had its chief beginnings in the West. During the
recent revolt of Vindex and his Gauls, Vienne had
been enthusiastic for the national cause ; Lugdunum
had triumphed over her when the Roman legions
of Germany crushed the national rising.2 Yet
Galba, Emperor of Rome, had shown favour to
Vienne ; and Otho had actually named as consul
one of her citizens. Lugdunum would never for-
give this injustice, nor forget the slight put upon
1 See below for this cohort. Evidence for the garrison of Lugdunum,
Tac. i. 59, 64.
2 For Lugdunum v. Vienne in the revolt of Vindex see my Life of Nero,
chap. xi. § 5 ; Otho and Gaul, Tac. i. 76, 77.
28 THE CAMPAIGN OF OTHO
her loyalty. Old ally of the Roman legions of
Germany, she welcomed the day when Vitellius'
troops marched down stream to take vengeance,
she hoped, upon her enemies and those of Rome,
as well as on his own.
The military camp of Vindonissa was but a few
miles from the eastern border of Roman Germany.
The point where the Rhine flowed out of Lake
Constance marked the beginning of that district,
and the river formed its frontier from the lake to
the sea. A few miles north of that camp there rose
in the recesses of the Black Forest a far mightier
and more wonderful river, the course of which from
its source to its outflow into the Black Sea traced for
many years the northern limit of the Roman advance
into the heart of Europe. Along its southern bank
the Romans made four districts. Raetia, the most
westerly, stretched from the frontier of Upper
Germany at Lake Constance, and south of this from
the land of the Helvetii and the Lake of Geneva, to
the valley of the lower Inn and the point where this
muddy, rushing river joins its waters to the cool,
clear, beautiful stream of the Danube at Passau.
From this point Noricum reached well-nigh as far
as Vienna, to be succeeded by the province of
Pannonia, whose northern and eastern boundaries
alike were formed by the Danube. The issue of
the river Save from the west into this river at
Belgrade was the beginning of the province of
Moesia, which stretched all the many hundred
miles from this point along the southern bank to
the sea.
sec. it AND THE VITELLIANS 29
As the Danube far excels the Rhine in power,
so did the native tribes north of the river surpass
those beyond the Rhine in restlessness and terror.
If the " Army of the Danube " in the middle of the
century was slightly inferior in numbers to the
troops who guarded the line of the Rhine, this was
due to the fact that the greater danger which
threatened the Roman peace from the trans-Dan-
ubian peoples seemed less imminent during the
first half of the first century, and came to be realised
more and more vividly only towards its close. None
the less there were already seven legions appointed
to form this army. In Raetia and Noricum no
legionaries were stationed. Just as in earlier days
the master of an army in Cisalpine Gaul between
the Alps and the Rubicon had held the key to Italy
in his grasp, so now when Italy reached as one
country to the Alpine chain the governor of the
district of Raetia, which commanded all the northern
passes over the mountains, would have had Italy
and the Emperor of Rome too directly and immedi-
ately at his mercy, had he been placed in control of
a legionary army. Raetia, therefore, was but a
minor command under control of a procurator, and
his only troops were such native levies as he could
raise in the case of any sudden peril. If a serious
danger threatened the Raetian frontier, the governor
of Upper Germany must see to it. In the same
way, Noricum was administered by a procurator
only, who depended for his protection ultimately
on the legions in the province of Pannonia on
his eastern border. The great frontier commands
3o THE CAMPAIGN OF OTHO
were those of Pannonia and Moesia. In Pannonia,
in January a.d. 69, were two legions — the Seventh
Galbiana and Thirteenth Gemina; in Moesia three
— the Third Gallica, which had newly come to the
province from Syria, the Seventh Claudia, and the
Eighth Augusta ; and as a great reserve force to
the army of the Danube, two legions kept the
province of Dalmatia — the Eleventh Claudia, and
the most famous of the legions of the war in Britain,
the Fourteenth Gemina. This province of Dal-
matia extended all down the eastern shore of the
Adriatic Sea, from the promontory of I stria on the
north to the Macedonian frontier by Lissus on the
south. Thus its army acted as a great rearguard
alike to the troops in Pannonia on the north and to
those in Moesia on the east. And its two legions
are justly counted as part of the Army of the
Danube.1
These legions of Dalmatia, Pannonia, and Moesia
duly swore allegiance to Otho in the early part of
the year a.d. 69. They were too widely separated
from one another to be likely eagerly to act in
concert on behalf of some nominee of their own.2
Moreover, Otho was the emperor accepted by the
Senate and People of Rome, ruling from the city of
Rome, which was the very "head of the Empire
and glory of all the provinces," 3 and there was no
1 Legions in Pannonia: Tac. ii. II, 86; in Moesia, i. 79; ii. 85; iii.
24; C.I.L. iii. 2715; in Dalmatia, ii. 11. For the Fourteenth legion
in Britain see my Life of Nero, pp. 200, 211 so. For VII. Galbiana (later
Gemina) see note to p. 6, above.
2 Cf. Tac. i. 9 : " Longis spatiis discreti exercitus, quod saluberrimum
est ad continendam militarem fidem."
3 "Caput imperii et decora omnium provinciarum," i. 84.
sec. ii AND THE VITELLIANS 31
reason why they should love the rival set up by the
rebellious army of Germany. The appreciation
of Otho, however, was of a slightly passive nature,
save in the case of the legion from Britain, the
Fourteenth, which was enthusiastic on his behalf.1
Moreover, the governor of Moesia, Marcus Aponius,
and his troops had suddenly in the spring of this
year a task imposed upon them which left them
small leisure for pondering over Otho's virtues.
Already, in the winter, the Roxolani, a tribe
belonging to the wild Sarmatian hordes of Eastern
Europe, had raided across the frontier and cut to
pieces two cohorts of auxiliaries. And now in the
early spring they repeated their attack, encouraged
by the rumours of civil war among their foes which
had rapidly spread to them. Nine thousand horse-
men clad in chain armour or leathern jerkins crossed
the Danube to plunder. Then the Third legion,
with auxiliaries to help them, did good work for
Rome. On a February day, when the deep snows
of winter were melting and rain was falling, when
the rude tracks were well-nigh impassable, and
horses could scarcely keep their feet, the Roman
infantry fell unexpectedly upon the straggling and
unsuspecting foe, and had them at their mercy.
They were unable to ride away ; they were hurled
from their horses or pierced by the Roman javelin ;
they lay prostrate in the watery snow, and were
unable to struggle to their feet for the weight of
their armour ; their pikes, their long swords, need-
ing two hands to wield, were useless ; shields they
1 Tac. ii. 11.
32 THE CAMPAIGN OF OTHO ch. i
had none, nor any courage to defend themselves
on foot against the exultant legionary and his
native ally. They put their trust in their horses,
and they were destroyed with an utter destruc-
tion by the short stabbing-blade of the Roman.
Only a handful of the raiders escaped to lurk
in the marshes, there miserably to die of cold or
wounds.1
Otho gladly seized the chance given him by the
annihilation of the Sarmatians to reward the governor
of Moesia and the legates of all three legions,
though only one of the three had won the victory.
But it was no time for making distinctions and
exciting jealousies. It was for him to gain the
goodwill of all the officers. And the Danube army
might reasonably now be proud of, and loyal to, an
Emperor on whose brief annals they had been the
first to inscribe deeds worthy of remembrance.
With this intent, Otho celebrated their prowess and
published it abroad in Rome. And the seven
legions of the Army of the Danube were true to
him to the day of his death.
There remained the garrison of Rome itself,
which was devoted to his cause, and such other
troops as were to be found in Italy. In Rome itself
at this time a large body of troops was gathered
together. Foremost among these were the soldiers
who formed the regular garrison of the city — nine
cohorts of Praetorian Guards, and seven cohorts of
1 Tac. i. 79. Cf. the "Ob Laurum," ap. Acta fratrum Arvalium for
March 1. For earlier relations with the Roxolani under Nero, cf. C.I.L.
xiv. 360S, and my Life of Nero, p. 225.
sec. ii AND THE VITELLIANS 33
Urban Guards. The strength of a cohort was one
thousand men. The Praetorians, the only troops
whom Italy contributed regularly to the Imperial
forces, were the very flower of the Roman army.
All had volunteered for the service, which lasted
for them only sixteen years, and was rewarded by
higher pay than that which the legionary received.
They were commanded by two Prefects, men speci-
ally chosen by the Emperor out of the staff of his
own Civil Service, and this Prefecture formed the
crown of the Service. The seven Urban cohorts
were men well trained and fought well, but they
were held in less repute than the " Guards " proper.
In these sixteen cohorts Otho had a force of sixteen
thousand men, the most famous regiments in the
army, and all enthusiastic for a Prince to whom
they had given the power.
Besides these, there was then at Rome the First
Adjutrix legion, newly levied by Nero from the
sailors of the fleet, and recently given its legionary
" eagle," the ensign and emblem of due enrolment,
by Galba. But on their entry into Rome Galba's
troops had hewn down many of these legionaries,
who had poured out of the city somewhat turbu-
lently to greet the new Emperor and clamour for
their " eagle." Hence he had been frightened,
and had given orders to slay. The sole tradition,
therefore, of the new regiment was one of hatred
for the dead Prince, and it could be trusted to serve
his slayer well. Moreover, its spurs were yet to
win, and the men were not unmindful of this when
a few months later they stood face to face in their
D
34 THE CAMPAIGN OF OTHO ch.i
first battle with a veteran regiment of the German
army.
Besides the Guards and this legion there also
chanced to be in Rome detachments of troops
properly belonging to the armies of Britain, Ger-
many, and the Danube. For just before his death
Nero had summoned these " vexilla " and " numeri "
to Italy when he was making preparations for an
expedition against the Alans in the Caucasus. The
revolt of Vindex had caused him to call these forces
hurriedly to Rome, where they remained, it seems,
after his death and during the short Principate of
Galba.
Finally, there was one cohort, the Seventeenth,
in garrison at Ostia 1 ; and upon the river Po,
whither the storm-clouds of invasion were sweeping,
one auxiliary squadron of horse, nine hundred and
sixty strong, the ala Siliana, was stationed. Nero
had called it to Italy from Egypt on the news of
Vindex's revolt, and sent it north to guard the line
of the river.2
These then were the troops which might be
counted on by both sides as able to take part in the
coming civil war : —
1 The Cohortes XVII. and XVIII. are counted on from the Urban
Cohorts (Coh. X.-XVI.), just as these are counted on from the Praetorian
(Coh. I. -IX.). Under Tiberius, Cohors XVII. is in garrison at Lugdunum
"ad monetam" (Tac. Ann. iii. 41 ; C.I.L. xiii. 1499; Tac. Hist. i. 80).
But as in a.d. 69 it is found at Ostia, it is probable that Nero recalled it
from Lugdunum and sent it there, placing Cohors XVIII. at Lugdunum
instead. Cf. Hirschfeld, ap. C.I.L. xiii. p. 250.
For Leg. I. Adjutrix and the garrison of Rome, cf. Tac. i. 6, 31 ; ii. n.
The Caspian expeditionary troops, cf. my Life of 'Nero, p. 227, and references
in note.
2 The ala Siliana, so called from C. Silius, legate of Upper Germany under
Tiberius. Tac. Ann. i. 31 ; Hist. i. 70.
sec. ii AND THE VITELLIANS 35
(1) On the Vitellian side:
Legio I. in Lower Germany, at Bonn
Legio V. Alaudae ,, ,, at Castra Vetera
Legio XV. Primigenia „ „ „
Legio XVI. „ „ at Novaesium
Legio IV. Macedonica, in Upper Germany, at Mainz
Legio XXII. Primigenia ,, „ „
Legio XXI. Rapax „ „ at Vindonissa
Legio I. Italica in Gaul at Lugdunum
Ala Tauriana ,, „
Cohors XVIII.
and an indeterminate but large number of auxiliaries, horse and
foot, besides such irregulars, native levies, etc., as could be
enlisted.
(2) On the Othonian side:
Legio VII. Galbiana, in Pannonia
Legio XIII. Gemina „
Legio III. Gallica, in Moesia
Legio VII. Claudia „
Legio VIII. Augusta „
Legio XL Claudia, in Dalmatia
Legio XIV. Gemina „
Legio I. Adjutrix in Rome
Cohortes I.-IX. (Praetorian) „
Cohortes X.-XVI. (Urban)
Cohors XVII. at Ostia
Ala Siliana in Upper Italy
and an indeterminate but large number of auxiliaries, horse and
foot, besides such irregulars, native levies, etc., or gladiators
from the schools at Rome, as could be enlisted.
The struggle, therefore, seemed likely to be one
between the troops in Germany and Gaul on the
l'"t>he'side, and those of Italy and the Danube pro-
vinces on the other. In this reckoning each of the
rivals could employ eight legions.
36 THE CAMPAIGN OF OTHO ch.j
Vitellius' army numbered over a hundred thou-
sand men of all arms. When he moved on Italy,
his two advance columns consisted, the one of forty
thousand, the other of thirty thousand men, when
they left the Rhine, and the column which marched
through Gaul continually gathered in fresh troops
from the country. Vitellius himself followed later
with the rest of his available strength, and he too
received reinforcements on the march, as by this
time the army in Britain found itself able to con-
tribute to his forces. Only a few men were left
behind under Hordeonius Flaccus to garrison the
bank of the Rhine against the peril from the natives
over the river, who happily for the time remained
quiet.1
To resist this attack, Otho had two armies to
put into the field. At Rome his army cannot have
largely exceeded twenty - five thousand men in
number, though the majority of these were excellent
soldiers. But in the Danube provinces his troops,
when and if concentrated into a single striking
force, would scarcely be inferior to the German
army in number. The Emperor could reckon them
as at least upwards of seventy thousand men of all
arms.
In actual numbers, as also in the probable quality
of the soldiers, Otho was thus not inferior to
Vitellius. But one great difference in his situation
1 Tac. ii. 57- The numbers of the columns of Caecina and Valens are
given precisely by Tacitus ; but Vitellius himself is described as to follow
"tota mole belli," i. 6i. If we insisted on this very vague and worthless
phrase, we might increase Vitellius' available numbers to 150,000 men. But
the lower total seems to me the more probable.
nc.ii AND THE VITELLIANS 37
became clear at once. The Army of Germany was
more easily concentrated, more easily set in motion
under one command. His own troops consisted of
two widely separated armies — the smaller Army of
Italy, the larger Army of the Danube. But this last
army also was far from being concentrated. The
obvious base for its military operations, and there-
fore its place of muster, was Aquileia, the town look-j
ing due southwards over the Adriatic. Aquileia is
to-day a petty village in the marshes, some fifty-five
miles north-east of Venice. But in Roman days,
when Venice did not exist, it was the most
important military stronghold on the Italian north-
eastern frontier, and the great military roads from
the " Danube provinces," Dalmatia, Pannonia, and
Moesia, first converged upon it. The chief military
centre of Pannonia, the town of Poetovio, lay a
hundred and fifty miles to the east of it ; the chief
town of Moesia, Naissus, some four hundred miles
beyond Poetovio, and from Scodra, chief town of
Dalmatia, to Aquileia direct was also four hundred
miles. There is no evidence of the actual position
of the legions of the three provinces in January
a.d. 69. But it was evident that to muster the
whole, or even a considerable part of, the Army
of the Danube at Aquileia would require much,
organisation, and take probably a longer time than
was needed for the mobilisation of the German
army within striking distance of Italy. Although)
Otho sent orders at once to the nearest legions,
those of Pannonia and Dalmatia, to march on Italy,
yet the enemy possessed the great initial advantage j
38 THE CAMPAIGN OF OTHO ch. i
of a concentrated over a dispersed army. The very-
force of circumstances therefore dictated the initial
. strategy of the coming campaign. The strategic
— > initiative rested with the Vitellians. It was not
only because Otho was actual Emperor of Rome
land Vitellius challenged his right to rule, that the
Army of Germany had to attack. Before a soldier
left camp, the strategy of offence and invasion was
clearly marked out for the Vitellians by the position
of the opposed armies and their numbers. When
— Otho's scattered armies were united, it might well
be that they would prove more than equal to
Vitellius' troops. But at the outset there existed
— great gaps between the dispersed fragments of the
Othonians. While they were mustering, Vitellius
must strike. Possibly even he might have the
opportunity to penetrate between the foe's divided
f forces. This " strategy of penetration " gives the
chance of dividing up and defeating the enemy in
detail. It has risks and obvious perils of its own,
and all its success depends upon careful timing.
But at the outset it was clear to all concerned that
circumstances and numbers dictated to the Vitellians
the strategy of offence and the invasion of Italy.
They possessed the strategical initiative.
/
§ 3. The Strategical Aspect of the Opening
Campaign
The Army of Invasion had two ultimate bases of
operation. These may be taken to be Cologne for
the force in Lower Germany, and Vindonissa for
sec. in AND THE VITELLIANS 39
that in Upper Germany. The objective of both
forces was the enemy's army, which must be j
destroyed. That army was not likely to be met
north of the Alps, nor indeed north of the Po, for
reasons partly of time, partly of strategy, which
were obvious to both sides.1 The theatre of war
was likely to be the great plain of this river, that i
plain which has been the scene of more fighting I
in the course of history than even have the Low
Countries. The immediate geographical objective,
therefore, of the Army of Invasion was the section i
of the Po between Placentia on the west and
Hostilia on the east. At the former place was the
crossing of the river by the great highway which
led south-east, skirting the Apennines, to Ariminum
and so to Rome ; and this road would have to be
pursued by a force crossing any of the Alpine
passes on the west and north-west of Italy. And
at Hostilia was the second chief crossing of the
river by the road which ran from Verona on the
north to join the great highway at Bologna, fifty Bononia.
miles to the south ; and by this road an army
marching by any of the northern passes down on
Italy would have to come.
It was therefore necessary for the Army of I
Germany to cross the Alps as speedily as possible. I
The natural difficulties of the passage of the moun-
tains in early spring by a large force, as well as the
problem of supplies, made it expedient for the
Vitellians to divide their army. Moreover, it was
1 I postpone the explanation of these to the paragraphs dealing with the
strategical position of the Othonians.
\
40 THE CAMPAIGN OF OTHO
important to secure Gaul, as this country lay on
the flank and in rear of the advance, and further to
increase the numbers of the invading army by
Gallic reinforcements swept in during the forward
movement. But if the whole army marched
through Gaul and over one of the western passes,
the delay caused by the long detour might well
imperil the success of the whole campaign. There-
fore it was decided that the Army of Germany
should remain divided, and that two columns of
invasion should march at once. The Vindonissa
column was to proceed direct from Upper Germany
to Italy; the Cologne column, as it may be called,
was to march through Gaul, and strike thence east-
wards over one of the western passes of the Alps.
The distance to be marched by the Cologne column
was nearly three times as great as tKaTof the other.
It would arrive later at the objective, and there join
the Vindonissa army, should the latter need help.
The Arnry_jof Defence had also two ultimate
bases of operation — Rome for the Army of Italy, and
Aquileia for the Army of the Danube. Both of
these were similarly many miles away from the
river Po, and, besides this, the concentration of the
whole or, at least, part of the Army of the Danube
at Aquileia must first be effected. A diagram may
serve to illustrate the strategical position at the
beginning of the campaign.1
Although the distance from Rome to the ob-
1 The diagram is drawn roughly to scale according to the distances which
the troops marched by the ways they actually pursued, and these are the
distances given in round numbers.
sec, in AND THE VITELLIANS 41
jective was longer than that from Vindonissa, the
time taken by an army marching from Rome would
be much shorter, as the natural difficulties which
hindered the pace of the Vindonissa column were
1? Cologne
IN
//
1*0
vo
\» jo Poetovio
» rf\Ue?-" (Pannonia)
25 mjJ£HAquileia
Pi3r,»nf;^Objective-r^^-'
-zrt. „ — 7-6^miles \HostUia \
Rome
o Scodra
(Oalmatia)
far greater, and, as it proved, these troops indulged
in some petty fighting with the tribes north of the
Alps before they set out resolutely on the road.
A. Strategical Opportunities of the Othonians. —
Until the Danube army arrived in North Italy to
co-operate with them, Otho's troops in that country
42 THE CAMPAIGN OF OTHO
were so greatly inferior in numbers to the approach-
ing invaders that their only possible strategy at
first was a defensive one. It is true that such a
strategy, unless it were unexpectedly crowned by a
decisive victory on the field of battle, could never
be expected to end the war.
The records of warfare contain no instance, when two
armies were of much the same quality, of the smaller army
bringing the campaign to a decisive issue by defensive tactics.
Wellington and Lee both fought many defensive battles with
inferior forces. But neither of them under such conditions
ever achieved the destruction of the enemy. They fought such
battles to gain time, and their hopes soared no higher. l
Defence was forced upon the Army of Italy until
their comrades should arrive, but only for so long.
For defence pure and simple sometimes wins
battles, but wars scarcely ever.
It was therefore, above all, important to retard
the advance of the Vitellians into Italy by every
possible means. All Othonian efforts in Italy had
to be directed at first to secure this end, and to
give time for the Army of the Danube to arrive.
The questions, therefore, which arose were two.
Firstly, what precise line of defence should be
chosen ? Secondly, what means of delaying the
enemy's march could be employed ?
(i) Line of (i) Two possible lines of defence suggest them-
Defence.
selves at once to a general who wishes to defend
(a) The North Italy, namely, the Alps and the Po.
But for Otho the blocking of the Alpine passes
J was impossible. In the first place, had he even
1 Stonewall Jackson, by Lieut. -Col. Henderson, vol. ii. p. 228.
sec. in AND THE VITELLIANS 43
wished to block them, time, distance, and numbers i
forbade this. Actually he had in North Italy in
January a.d. 69 but one small regiment of horse,
the ala Siliana, and this quickly turned traitor to
his cause. The troops in Rome could scarcely
reach the Alpine passes on the north and north-
west before the troops of Upper Germany had/
seized them. And it would be madness for them
to block the western passes, whither they might
have arrived in time, when the foe advancing from
the north would already be down in the plain of
the Po. But even if the Vitellians delayed their
approach, and thus gave Otho time to block the
passes (and he could not count upon this for a
moment), the Emperor was quite uncertain which
route or routes his foe would choose. The Army
of Italy, scarcely twenty-five thousand strong, would
have been distributed along the chain of mountains
in isolated, widely separated fragments. A reverse
suffered in any single pass would snap at once
the chain of resistance. The whole scheme of
defence would have been destroyed, and the entire
army would have been in danger of piecemeal
annihilation.
In the next place, the proper method of defend-
ing a mountain ridge is not the blocking of the
passes, when several such passes over the ridge
exist. To place a division sitting on top of each
pass in entrenchments, however strong, is but to
court disaster. No mountain barrier, whether
Himalaya or Pyrenees, Jura or Alps, ought to be
defended in this way, or ever has been for long
44 THE CAMPAIGN OF OTHO
successfully defended in this way. Picquets and
outposts, varying in strength, must be placed in
tne~ actual passes. But the main Army of Defence
| /must be kept on the more level ground behind the
'ridge, concentrated and as near to the issues of the
passes as the nature of the ground allows. From
such a position it can deal a vigorous blow at its
foes when these, forcing back the outposts, struggle
by one or more passes with difficulty over the
mountains, and emerge more or less exhausted
i upon the lower ground beyond. It is then that
they must be attacked, before they have recovered
from the stress of the passage of the heights, when
a dangerous country lies immediately in their rear,
and when, if they have chosen to cross by more
passes than one, the detachments of their troops
are perhaps separated by the difficult foothills of
the mountain ridge. Then the Army of Defence,
perfectly informed by its outposts of the advance
of the enemy, with its communications from the
flanks to the centre running easily over the more
level country which the army occupies, can move
to the attack with vigour unimpaired and confidence
high, and by a tactical offensive give its strategical
defensive the victory. Such was the strategy by
which, for instance, the Argives ought to have
defended their northern rampart of mountains
against King Agis of Sparta in 418 B.C. Such is
the strategy by which Italy to-day would defend
her Alpine barrier against a foe to north or west
of it.
Unhappily, Otho had neither men enough nor
sec. m AND THE VITELLIANS 45
time enough to choose this, which otherwise would
have been the right, method of defending Italy.
He was compelled to abandon all thought of hold- \
ing the line of the Alps. He could not prevent
the enemy's columns, marching by widely different
routes, from concentrating in the plain of the Po
unhindered. In modern history, in the Napoleonic
wars and in the fighting for the liberation of Italy,
"the battles lost or won at the foot of the Alpine
passes, and in the vineyards of the great northern
plain, Rivoli, Marengo, Magenta, Solferino," *
decided then too the fate of Tuscany, Rome, and
the South. As Otho could not guard the foot of
the passes, he must fall back upon the second
natural line of defence — upon the river which flows:j
through the great northern plain and its vineyards.
This line could be more easily defended. To (^)ThePo.
the west lay the great fortress of Placentia, south'
of the river, placed upon the military road where
it crossed the Po, and guarding the passage of
the river. Placentia if garrisoned strongly and Piacenza.
resolutely held would be an invaluable " pivot of
manoeuvre " for Otho's defending army, which, I
with its left flank secured by the fortress,, could
deploy eastwards along the river in safety. V In the
same way the crossing of the river to the east must |
be secured and defended, and at the same time the
communications with the Danube army at Aquileia
must be kept open and safe from the enemy. A
1 Trevelyan, Garibaldi's Defence of the Roman Republic, p. 45.
C2±3* A ' pivot of manoeuvre ' is a force, fortress, or natural obstacle which
secures a flank " (Henderson, Science of War, p. 64).
46 THE CAMPAIGN OF OTHO
i strong garrison at Verona or at Mantua would best
i achieve this double object. It was vital to Otho to
\ take precautions against the risk that the enemy
would come down upon Italy by the Brenner Pass
and seek to thrust in between his own army and
that at Aquileia, severing the communications
; between these. At least the Mantua-Hostilia line
I must at all costs be stoutly defended.
The Army of Italy, therefore, should be spread
\ along the line of the river from Placentia to
' Hostilia, with special concentration of strength at
both ends of the line. And as at the western end
the fortress in itself offered a means of strong
defiance, the bulk of the defending forces must be
directed to the eastern part of the line of defence.
This line the Vitellians would doubtless assault
with vigour. But it was unlikely that they would
try to break it in the middle, at least at first, or
that, if they tried, they would succeed in the
attempt. The river here is wide and deep, with
shifting sandbanks and dangerous eddies, and its
current, swollen in spring, is impetuous. It was
far more probable that they would attack one of
' the two ends. A successful forcing of the eastern
end would indeed be ominous of disaster for Otho.
His army here must see to it that this did not
/ happen. But the point of attack nearest to the
most probable place of concentration for the
-- Vitellians in North Italy was certainly Placentia.
If then the enemy combined to assault this fortress,
if they even forced the passage of the river here,
then at once the advantage which Otho possessed
/
sEcm AND THE VITELLIANS 47
in his double base of operations would come into \
play. For as the Vitellians advanced down the
great road from Placentia, the Othonians defending
the river could retire before them unhurt, and fall
.. back upon their second base Aquileia. This would
compel the enemy to choose one of two courses of
action. They might either neglect this force or/
pursue after it. If they dared to neglect it, and to
press on regardless down the great highway for
Rome, by so doing they would expose their own/
line of communications defenceless to the force at
Aquileia. This then, strengthened by the arrival-*/
of the Danube army, would sally forth to cut the
line. Now it is one of Napoleon's sayings that the-^/
secret of war lies in the communications. It is
true that under exceptional circumstances an army
can afford to cut itself loose from its line of com-
munications with the base — when, that is, it is
prepared to live entirely upon the country through"
which it is marching. But for the most part in all,
warfare, ancient as well as modern, an army needs '
to keep its communications open with some friendly
base in the rear of its advance for the safe convoy
of supplies and reinforcements, and if it is invading
a hostile land it is likely to be extremely sensitive
as to the perfect safety of its line or lines of com-
munication with the rear. By neglecting this j
principle Alexander at Issus was trapped in a |
hopeless position, unless he won a great tactical
victory. Napoleon at Madrid hurriedly abandoned
all his year's schemes for the conquest of Portugal
because a small British force moved boldly out in
48 THE CAMPAIGN OF OTHO
the far north of Spain to threaten his line of com-
munications with France. Therefore a Vitellian
invading force advancing down the road to Rome
was not likely to allow the enemy to cut the one
line by which reinforcements could come to it, the
one line by which its own retreat, in case of
disaster, was secured. Threatened by an advance
from Aquileia, the Vitellians would surely turn to
face the advancing foe. They would then find
themselves in a position which is the most hazardous
position for an army compelled to fight a decisive
tactical engagement. This is the position techni-
cally known as that of an army with its " front to a
flank." A diagram may make this clear : —
The Vitellians in
this position have been
formed to a front on
their left flank. When
a force is thus drawn
up, the enemy's main
attack is always directed
*c upon the flank which is
A = Vitellian base, over the river beyond nearest tO the base.
Placentia. -r-. >r ,1 c u
BC = Direction of Vitellian march for " OT II me lOrCe Can De
c**£TZ** »„— non, defeated on this flank
w.th their base. its yme 0f communica-
D = Direction of Othonian attack on CB
from Aquiieia. tions is thereby cut,
E = Vitellian front to meet the attack.
and the whole force is
separated from the hope of succour. Whereas if it
is worsted on the flank farthest removed from the
base, the line of communications is still open to
the defeated army, and retreat, if difficult, is at
sec. in AND THE VITELLIANS 49
least possible for them. As a general, if not his
army, must always take into account his position
in the event of defeat as well as in that of victory
(unless he is staking all on a single throw, and
wishes for no choice save that between victory and
annihilation), the Vitellian commander could not
contemplate with equanimity an advance which
might compel him at any moment to form front to
a flank in face of the enemy, if he was unwilling
to surrender altogether his line of communications
to their mercy.
If then the Vitellians forced the passage of the
river at Placentia, it was more probable that they
would not straightway pursue their march south-
east along the road. They would rather follow
upon the heels of the retiring Othonians towards
Aquileia. This would suit Otho well. He would
be retreating in the direction of the advancing
Army of the Danube, and the aim of his defence
of the river — concentration with this — would be
achieved. Doubtless it was better not to abandon
the whole of North Italy to the invader, for political
if not for military reasons. The invader should
not be allowed to cross the river without fighting,
at least to prevent murmurs and discouragement
in Rome and among the Emperor's troops. But
if, by fighting, the foe forced the passage at
Placentia, even so the tactical would not be a
strategical defeat for Otho.
(2) The first means of delaying the Vitellian (2) Means
1 . r of Delay.
advance was, therefore, the occupation in force of
a line of defence on the river Po from Placentia j
E
/
50 THE CAMPAIGN OF OTHO ch.i
to Hostilia. Twenty thousand or twenty -five
thousand men could surely maintain their position
here for some time, helped, as they would be, by
the river. It is true that this could be but a tem-
porary measure of passive defence. "The defence
of rivers . . . has hardly ever been successful for
any length of time. Neither the Danube nor the
Rhine has stopped armies." A river, like a moun-
tain range, is an " insurmountable impediment which
is invariably surmounted."1 The Po could not be
permanently held, any more than was the Tugela,
in the face of repeated and vigorous attempts to
force the passage, especially when, as in both these
cases, thanks to inferior numbers or irresolution,
no counter-stroke over the river could be dealt the
assailants by the defending army. But as a means
of delay rather than as a permanent obstacle the
river was of the greatest value to the Army of
Italy.
The second means of delay was the fleet. The
command of the sea was absolutely Otho's. An
invasion of North Italy from Germany, it might
seem, affords the least possible chances that the
command of the sea should have any influence
at all upon the conduct of operations. No more
unpromising field for the application of the pet
modern theory, it might be urged, could possibly
be found. Yet none the less, as in the days of the
second Punic war, although for different reasons, so
in the civil war of a.d. 69, the invader of Italy had
1 Von der Goltz, The Nation in Arms, Eng. Trans, p. 261. Cf.
Hamley, Operations of War, part v. chap. iii.
sbc. in AND THE VITELLIANS 51
cause to regret the fact that the control of the sea
rested with the defender.
The reason for this in a.d. 69 was that the
flank of an army which proposed to cross one of ';
the western passes over the Alps was vulnerable '
from the sea. If Otho could spare the troops, a
force could speedily be conveyed on shipboard
to Frejus, and there landed. With the fleet asl Forum
its base it could march up country to threaten
the right flank of a column crossing the Alps by^
the Mont Genevre or Mont Cenis Pass. If the
enemy turned upon it with superior numbers, it I
could retreat to the coast as securely, for example,
as the British army of the Peninsula in 1808- 1809
fell back on the fleet at Corunna when pursued by ;
the thronging battalions of the French. And every
soldier thereby detached from the invading army,
every hour's delay to the final concentration of the
Vitellians in North Italy, was so much pure gain
to the Emperor.
This, indeed, would be but a minor operation*
intended to cause a diversion, and by no means!
the chief drama to be played in the theatre of\
war. But, as its object would be entirely con-
sistent with, and favourable to, the development
of Otho's main strategical plan for the beginning
of the campaign, it would be entirely justifiable.
The expeditionary force to be sent with the fleet
must not, indeed, be so large that the main army
on the Po would be too weak, owing to its
absence, to fulfil the task of defence assigned
to it. Nor, again, must it be so small that its
\
52 THE CAMPAIGN OF OTHO
intended menace could be contemptuously neglected
by the enemy. Some expeditionary force must be
sent, if the fleet were to be of any service at all.
Thus when Napoleon's line of communications with
France in his invasion of Italy in 1796 ran along
the coast through Savona, the British fleet, although
it "completely dominated the Mediterranean littoral,"
was quite unable to threaten these communications,
since it had no force on board with which to strike
a blow at them. The use of an army for such
operations, conveyed by and based upon a fleet,
however inferior in numbers this army may be
to the enemy, is a vital element in the strategy
of the command of the sea, although this principle
seems hard to realise from the days of Pericles
down to our own generation.
If then Otho could spare a few thousand men
from the Army of Italy to be carried on ship and
disembarked at Frejus or some other port on the
coast of Provence— the "Province" — this might
be a second useful means of delaying the advance
and concentration of the enemy till such time as the
Army of the Danube arrived at Mantua.
Then at last would come the time for offence,
and Otho's united army could be sent against the
enemy to hurl them back through a land long since
exhausted by their stay in it ; back against the grim
barrier of the mountains which cut them off from
safety — back with weakened strength and diminished
numbers, to perish, starved and fighting, penned
up against the Alpine wall. " Happy the soldier
to whom fate assigns the part of assailant." Or
sec. in AND THE VITELLIANS 53
perhaps Otho need not wait for the arrival of the
entire Danube army when once these were hard
at hand. "The essential in war is not the massing^?',
of troops but their co-operation." * " Envelopment, 1 ,
not mere weight of numbers, is the true secret of l^A
decisive success."2 Some more daring plan of
attack might suggest itself which promised speedier
victory than the frontal attack by a united army.
Could not the stubborn fighting, the many weary
miles of marching which lay between the river and
the mountains, the last desperate stand of despair-
ing men, — could not all this be avoided by some
masterpiece of manoeuvre and surprise ?
But all such plans must for the present be!
delayed until the Danube army should arrive.!
Meanwhile one step was enough. Strategy cannot
look to the horizon lest she stumble in the ditch at
her feet. " No plan of operations can with any
safety include more than the first collision with the1
enemy's-main force."3 So for the time the Army
of Italy should make resolute defence along thej
line of the Po, and the command of the sea should'
be used to assist it to delay the Vitellians' advance.
This strategy surely promised well. It had,<=-—
however, two defects in chie£/ylt failed to prevent
ultimately the enemy's concentration in the plain of
the Po, though delay might be caused by the fleet.
Gsx And the strategy of defence, however temporary,
might at any time impair the confidence and morale
of the men of the army on the river, and especially
1 Von der Goltz, op. cit. p. 304. - Henderson, Science of War, p. 415.
3 Von der Goltz, op. cit. p. 187.
54 THE CAMPAIGN OF OTHO
so at a time of civil war, when all the troops
were excited and impatient. For the game of war
as played in the field is anything but the War-game
of the drill hall. Would the Guards, the flower
of the Roman army, consent to stand for some
weeks on the defensive against a hated foe? If
they obeyed such orders, would their military fire
and zeal not be impaired? Such questions had to
^be considered by the Emperor. Yet he knew that
his men were devoted to his cause. The strategy
of defence on the river was the wisest for him, and
Otho might well feel that he could rely upon his
men for any manoeuvre — even that most dispiriting
one of waiting to be attacked. Further than the
I Po he would not retreat. Not though the Apen-
nines in spring are deep with snow, and their
mountain tracks hazardous and well-nigh impass-
able,1 would he fall back under cover of their
shelter, and seek to lure the foe on to venture into
their recesses or perhaps be ensnared between them
and the sea. Retreat to the river was far enough.
Beyond the river the one maxim laid down by our
English general for an invaded country held good
I for Otho and his men : " No foot of ground ceded
that was not marked with the blood of the enemy." "
B. Strategical Opportunities of the Vitellians. —
The Vitellians, on the other hand, enjoyed the
advantage of being the attacking party, but very
few advantages besides. The courage and con-
fidence characteristic of good troops who move
, ' In April 1907 snow lay 10 to 20 feet deep in places on the Abetone Pass
between Modena and Fistoia. - Diary of Sir John Moore, vol. ii. p. 75.
sbc in AND THE VITELLIANS 55
to the attack, and apt to be lacking in those
kept on the defence, might certainly be theirs.
Yet perhaps this would hardly do more for them
than compensate for their original inferiority as
troops of the line to the Guards. Clausewitz's
familiar assertion that the defensive form of warfare
is in its nature stronger than the offensive, causes
very great searchings of heart to the strategists
among his countrymen to-day. But if ever a strat-
egical position were wanted to justify the assertion,
that of the spring of a.d. 69 might seem to be the one
desired. For then the Vitellian chances of prosper*
ous attack seemed somewhat meagre compared with
the Othonian of happy defence. The most obvious^
perhaps the only possible, strategy for the invaders
was a rapid descent over the mountains to the plain
of the Po, and a frontal assault upon the position
garrisoned by the Army of Italy. Time was of the 1
most vital importance to the Vitellians. They
must hasten to move upon Italy in time to anti-]
cipate a possible blocking of the Alpine passes. |
They must hasten to fall upon the Army of Italy
before the Army of the Danube had time to come
to its aid. Only if they could crush the former force !
before the arrival of the latter in strength would they
have the undoubted superiority henceforward in the
strategy of the war, should the war continue. The '
movement upon Italy in two columns by different I
passes was necessary. The column which, travelling \
by the nearer route, first arrived in Italy must, if
strong enough, attack the enemy at once ; if too
weak, or beaten in its onset, it must wait for the
56 THE CAMPAIGN OF OTHO
coming of the second column to reinforce it. And
the race between the reinforcements of both sides
would in truth be an anxious one. Speed, concentra-
tion, and frontal attack seemed the sole means to
the Vitellians of achieving success. And the
strength of the defenders' position combined with
the means open to them of delaying the assailants'
approach might neutralise the advantage of
numerical superiority enjoyed by the latter.
An alternative strategy to this of concentration
Vind frontal attack might be considered. The
" strategy of penetration " justly wields much
I fascination, and for modern war has all the support
I of Napoleon's favourite practice behind it. If the
Vitellians could thrust boldly between the two
fractions of Otho's gathering army, could they not
defeat them in detail ? The Brenner Pass in the
north offered the easiest access to Italy of all the
Alpine passes, and led straight down to the very
centre of the hostile position. Could the Vitellian
generals use the advantage of superior numbers
which they enjoyed at the outset, and drive in a
great wedge of their own men, penetrating the
defenders' lines midway between Placentia and
Aquileia ? This alternative strategy deserved
consideration by the Vitellians at the beginning
of the campaign. But the reasons which caused
Caecina to reject it were adequate.1
Such were the strategical opportunities of both
sides at the outset of the struggle. No campaign
ever yet followed precisely the course marked out
1 See below, § 4.
sec. iv AND THE VITELLIANS 57
for it by the strategist. The weavers at the loom
of war might think to have but a common and
familiar pattern for their work. But the designer
who cuts out the cards for them may have indulged
a free fancy in the pattern which he gives them.
§ 4. The March of the Vitellians
Confident in his greater numbers, Vitellius
issued orders for the immediate invasion of Italy.
He divided his forces into three parts. Two of
these were advance columns of invasion ; the third
was the reserve, to follow later in support.
The advance columns were ordered to penetrate
into the valley of the Po by different Alpine passes.1
The first of these, the " Cologne Column " from
Lower Germany, under Fabius Valens, was to
march through Gaul and cross the Alps by the
Mont Genevre Pass on the west of the mountains.! Aipes
I Cottianae.
This column was composed of the Fifth legion
with its " eagle," and of detachments (" vexilla ") of
the' First, Fifteenth, and Sixteenth legions, together
with auxiliary squadrons (" alae "), and cohorts from
11 Germany." Its strength was reckoned as forty
thousand troops. The second of the advance
columns, the " Vindonissa Column," from Upper
Germany, was commanded by Aulus Cjaeclna
Alienus. It consisted of the Twenty-first legion,
detachments of the Fourth and Twenty - second,
and German auxiliaries, and amounted to thirty
thousand men. This column was bidden enter
1 For the reasons dictating this see above, p. 39.
58
THE CAMPAIGN OF OTHO
Italy on the north-west by the Great St. Bernard
Pass. The reserve, consisting of such other forces
as could be raised in Germany and elsewhere, was
to march under the personal command of Vitellius
himself, advancing with such greater deliberation
as befitted their general's ripe years, great import-
ance, and unwieldy frame.1 And, in fact, the
campaign was decided six weeks before he himself
arrived upon the scene of the decisive battle.2
A. The March of Valens? — From its place of
concentration on the Lower Rhine, in the neigh-
bourhood of Cologne, Valens' column marched up
that river as far as the modern Andernach, a little
short of the point where, at Coblenz, the Moselle
enters the Rhine. It was probably at Andernach
that Valens left the main river and struck over the
hills through the territory of the Treveri to the
capital of that tribe, now Treves, in the valley of
the Moselle. Thence Valens led his troops to
Metz, higher up the valley, and from Metz to Toul,
the capital of the Leuci. At Toul the column left
the Moselle, and crossed rolling country to the
chief city of the tribe of the Lingones, now Langres,
hard by the source of the Marne. Here it was
1 Tac. i. 6 1. "Vitellius . . . tota mole belli secuturus," an exaggerated
phrase. For Valens and Caecina see above, pp. n-12.
3 The "battle of Bedriacum," April 15. Visit of Vitellius to the battle-
ground, May 24.
3 Tac. i. 62-66 ; ii. 27-30. The Corpus Inscriptionum Latinarum
("C.I.L.") enables us to identify the places mentioned in Tacitus' narrative
with their modern equivalents. I use the latter in the text, placing the
Latin titles in the margin. Certain picturesque incidents which befel on the
march, but did not affect the military situation, are omitted.
4 C.I. I., xiii. I, fasc. 2, p. 662.
s C.I.L. xiii. 2, p. 702.
6 C.I.L. xiii. 2. 1, p. 109.
sec. iv AND THE VITELLIANS 59
joined by eight Batavian cohorts. These were
properly associated as auxiliaries with the Four-
teenth legion. This legion had belonged to the
Army of Britain, but had recently been transferred
to Dalmatia. The eight cohorts, however, had
refused on the march to follow it to its new
province, and were sulkily making their way back
to Britain when, at Langres, the news of Vitellius'
rising reached them. Here then they waited
events, until Valens on his arrival added them to
his force. They proved but sorry allies. At once
they quarrelled violently with his legionaries, and, in
fact, gave the general endless trouble — not indeed
because they had the least sympathy with the
Othonian cause (as their actions subsequently
showed), but through their native ferocity and
impatience of discipline.1
The Aedui, into whose territory the army next
entered, hastened to buy the goodwill of the
soldiers by satisfying their hunger, as they con-
ciliated Valens by satisfying his demands for
money and arms. This tribe occupied the high
land between the rivers Saone and Loire, but the
army passed through their borders only, following
the road which runs from Langres through Dijon
to Chalon-sur-Saone, and did not visit their chief Cabil-
lonura.
city, on the site of the modern Autun, which lay
away on the right flank. From Chalon they
marched down the valley of the river Saone to its
meeting with the Rhone at Lugdunum. Here the
1 Tac. i. 59, 64 ; ii. 27, 66, 69. They subsequently did good service in
Mritain with Agricola : Tac. Agric. 36.
60 THE CAMPAIGN OF OTHO c.,.,
townsfolk welcomed them with open arms. Their
grudge against Galba for his favour shown to
their bitter rivals of Vienne was deep, and Otho
had done nothing to appease it. The legions of
Germany were their old comrades in arms against
the rebel Gauls, and the citizens dreamed fondly
that the day of their vengeance upon their enemies
lower down the river had dawned at last.1 And,
indeed, it had done so, had not the men of Vienne
won safety by tears, entreaties, and gifts to gain the
soldiers' pity, and by enormous bribes, it was said,
to the general. At Lugdunum Valens strengthened
his force by the addition of the greater part of the
garrison of that city, the First legion Italica and
the ala Tauriana, and left only the Eighteenth
cohort to guard the place. Then the army marched
away down-stream, passed peaceably through the
streets of Vienne, between the river and the over-
hanging heights, and followed the left bank of the
Rhone through the Allobroges' territory southwards
by way of Valence as far as its tributary the Drome.
Thence the column pursued its slow and terrifying
way up this stream, extorting money, by menaces
and fire, from the little places through which it
passed, and, when there was no money, appeasing
its disappointment by gratifying its lust. One
hope only of speedy relief from the army's presence
was left to the landowners and magistrates on the
army's route. Valens' cupidity would sell even
this relief for a price. Such profitable trafficking
had long been known to Roman generals, and
1 See above, p. 27.
sec. iv AND THE VITELLIANS 61
Valens, too, reaped his harvest of gain as he led his
troops on their infamous march to Italy. In such
wise the army marched by the modern little towns
of Die and Luc-en-Diois on the Drome to Briancon, Dea
Vocoi\-
and, crossing the Alps by the Mont Genevre Pass, tiorum.
came down the Doria Riparia valley by Susa to the Augjusti.
Po at Augusta Taurinorum (Turin). Brigant,a
But the mountains were not the only difficulty
which Valens had to surmount. At some point
during the march from Vienne to the Po, and
probably before the army had crossed the Alps,
he had become conscious that the activity of the j
enemy's fleet on the coast at Frejus threatened the
security of his right flank.1 Anxious to strengthen,'
the Vitellian forces on the coast, he therefore
detached a few of the unruly Batavian cohorts
from his main army and sent them away to the
rescue. Also they were turbulent boasters, and
he was glad of the chance to be rid of them. But
strategical needs above all dictated the general's
orders. His other troops, however, discovered
their departure, and resented it. Ignorant of the
imperative strategical necessity of guarding their
flank and their sole line of communications, they
thought only of the strength of their own force, and
clamoured that " so powerful a limb should not be
torn from the body." They would, they declared,
all proceed to the Province, or they would all
march to Italy together.2 When Valens attempted
to quell the growing disturbance, open mutiny
1 See below, § 5.
a For the strategical aspect of the question see above, pp. 50-52.
62 THE CAMPAIGN OF OTHO ch.i
broke out. The general fled in terror, and while
he, clad in a slave's garb, lurked concealed in a
subaltern's tent, the happy troops ransacked his
quarters, searching vainly for the gold of Vienne.
When the excitement died down, and anger gave
place to repentance and shame, Valens pitifully
presented himself again to his men. General and
soldiers wept together in the joy of reconciliation,
and a few rioters were punished by reprimand.
And this is a Roman army ! Truly may the
Roman historian remark that in times of civil
war the soldiers' license exceeds that of the
general.1
So Valens led his repentant troops over the
Pavia. Alps to the Po, and down this river to Ticinum.
\ Here at the beginning of April his army was
engaged in fortifying a camp when the news
reached them that their comrades of the Second
Army were in a sore plight lower down the river,
at Cremona. Already Caecina and his Vindonissa
column had met the enemy and had been defeated.
The news called for instant action. Valens broke
up his camp and marched at full speed to join his
colleague at Cremona. He arrived here in the
second week of the month.
B. The March of Caecina? — The headquarters
of Caecina and the Second Army were at Vindo-
nissa. This camp was situated on the tongue of
land which lies between the rivers Reuss and Aare.
A few miles to the north, the Aare flows into the
Rhine between Schaffhausen to the east and
1 Tac. ii. 29. 2 Tac. i. 67-70.
sec. iv AND THE VITELLIANS 63
Sackingen to the west. In the neighbourhood of
the camp and to south and south-west of it lay the
tribe of Helvetii, once the early and stalwart foes of
Julius Caesar, but now a civilised folk, who supplied
auxiliaries to the Roman army, and had gained in
culture what they had lost in pluck. Opportunities
for plunder afforded by civil war were even more
welcome to Caecina than they were to the more
indolent Valens. The tribe and its belongings
offered an easy prey to his disciplined troops, and a
pretext for attack upon them was the more easily
found as they were ignorant of Galba's death and
refused to accept Vitellius. It was Caecina's clear
duty to his Emperor to press on into Italy with all
possible speed.1 Instead of this he let loose his
army upon the unlucky natives, and sent bidding
his friends, the procurator of Raetia and his
auxiliary troops, to harry them from east and south
while he himself descended upon them from the
north. The task was as easy as it was profitable,
and the miseries of the tribe were great. Their
country was laid waste far and wide ; their resist-
ance was spiritless and availed them nothing. The
hot medicinal springs of Baden on the river Limmat,
some sixteen miles to the north-west of the town
and lake of Zurich, from which lake the river flows,
were already known at this time, and the place,
under the title of Aquae Helvetiorum, had become
a popular watering-place, frequented by the tribe.2
1 See the strategical reasons for this above, p. 55.
- " Locus . . . amoeno salubrium aquarum usu frequens.' Cf. C.I.L.
iii. 6017 ; xiii. 5233 ; xiii. 2, p. 42.
64 THE CAMPAIGN OF OTHO ch.i
Caecina sacked and destroyed it. The Raetian
auxiliaries swept down from Lake Constance upon
the victims. The refugees from the general
slaughter flung away their arms and fled to the
Mons hills of the Botzbem (which form the extreme
Vocetius. T i-
north-east end of the Jura range, and lie a few
miles west of Windisch). They were driven out
by a cohort of Thracian auxiliaries, and thousands
more were butchered in the pursuit. Caecina next
marched upon the capital city of the tribe, Aven-
ticum. This, the modern Avenches,1 lies hard by
the lake of Morat, five miles to the east of the lake
of Neuchatel. Aventicum surrendered. The
general allowed the townsfolk to appeal for mercy
to Vitellius. They won pardon with difficulty,
thanks to a sudden change of feeling towards them
on part of Vitellius' army, which, of course, took
upon itself to decide the matter. If the Roman
legionary of the time could once be induced to
weep, then there was hope of mercy at his hands.
Streams of tears saved the remnant of the Helvetii
from the extremes of Imperial vengeance. Later,
Vespasian the Emperor bestowed the Jus Latinum
on the place in recompense for its sufferings at the
hands of his enemies, and under the proud title of
Colonia Pia Flavia Constans Emerita Helvetiorum
the town might perhaps forget its earlier woes.2
While Caecina stayed dallying at Aventicum,
news reached him from Italy which called for
1 German, Wiflisberg.
2 C.I.L. xiii. 5089, 5093, 5063, and Zangemeister, ap. C.I.L. xiii. 2,
PP- 5. 6» 18.
sec. iv AND THE VITELLIANS 65
prompt action on his part. At the outbreak of the
war, as has been said, Otho's only troops actually
in the valley of the Po were one squadron of
auxiliary horse, the ala Siliana. But this same
ala had chanced to be quartered in Africa eight I
years before, at the time when Vitellius adminis-
tered the affairs of that province. Its officers
therefore succeeded in persuading the men to
throw in their lot with their old governor, and the
more easily as the numbers and valour of the Army
of Germany inspired the regiment with much awe.
It therefore at this point revolted from Otho, and
brought over with it to the Vitellian side the four
strongest towns1 of the Transpadane district in
North-west Italy, which lay north of the Po. If
these four towns, Mediolanum (Milan), Novaria
(Novara), Vercellae (Vercelli), and Eporedia(Ivrea),
once fell into the hands of the enemy, the Othonians
had no choice but to limit their attempts at defence
to the line of the river itself. This was the news/
which reached Caecina at Aventicum. The whole
of North-west Italy, with its garrison towns com-
manding the issues of the Great St. Bernarcl,
Pass, was offered to him. By this pass he haaj]
been ordered to enter Italy. But the one little
regiment of horse could not hold the tract for long
in face of the enemy moving up from the south.
Caecina therefore, without more delay, hurried strong
reinforcements over the Alps to its help. These
consisted of Gallic, Lusitanian, and British auxiliary
cohorts, detachments ("vexilla") of German troops,
1 " Firmissima municipia."
66 THE CAMPAIGN OF OTHO
CH. 1
and another squadron of cavalry, the ala Petrlana.1
I For the moment, these troops on arrival might well
hold in check any attempt by the enemy to cross
the Po in force. And then Caecina had to set
himself anxiously to consider what his main plan of
campaign should now be.
To carry out Vitellius' orders, it was right for
him to follow with the rest of his army over the
Great St. Bernard, in the wake of his advance
guard, as speedily as possible. But the idea of an
alternative and more daring strategy was first at
least to be considered.
This was the "strategy of penetration." If
Caecina could cross the Alps farther to the east he
could perhaps thrust his force between the two parts
of the Othonian defending army upon the Po. For
this purpose the Brenner Pass, by which the great
road from Innsbruck crosses the Alps to Verona,
was most suitable. It was by far the easiest, the
lowest, and the best known of all the Alpine passes.
If Caecina came down upon Verona by this route he
might hope to cut completely the communications
of the Danube army at Aquileia with the Army of
Italy upon the river, by penetrating between them.
If Valens, then, approached from the west, and if
the mobilisation of the Danube legions at Aquileia
proceeded slowly, surely the Army of Italy would
be caught in the middle and annihilated with ease.
The plan was a tempting one, but very daring.
There was always the chance that the penetrating
army would find the tables turned and itself be
1 Cf. Tac. ii. 17.
sec. iv AND THE VITELLIANS 67
surrounded. If the movements of the Danube
army should be quicker than those of Valens'1
column, Caecina at Verona or Mantua might find
himself very uncomfortably placed, especially if he
found any large part of the Army of Italy blocking
the way on the Adige at Verona. Valens, too, had
already started on his march through Gaul. Even
if Caecina sent him an urgent message to hurry, he
would not improbably disregard it entirely.
But geographical obstacles proved finally fatal
to the plan. The road from Innsbruck to Verona
over the Brenner was indeed an easy one. The
top of the pass is under 4500 feet in height. But
it was by no means such an easy matter to get
trom the north of Switzerland, where Caecina then
was, to the valley of the Inn over the " Raetian
heights." For this purpose he would have to
march by Lake Constance to the valley of the 111
river at Feldkirch and then cross the mountains
to Innsbruck by the Arlberg Pass. This pass is
nearly 6000 feet in height. In April 1906 it was
deep in snow for several miles on either side of the
top, and could be crossed only on snow-shoes. In
February a.d. 69 it was not likely to have been less
difficult of passage by an army.] That Caecina did
1 That "Raeticis jugis " means the Arlberg Pass is surely beyond doubt.
The suggested alternative is that of the Stelvio (or Umbrail) Pass, which
leads from Nauders in the Engadine to Bormio and Tirano, and so to Como
or to the Val Camonica and Iseo. To reach this pass on the Tyrolese side
Caecina's route would have lain by Ragatz, and the Fliiela and Ofen Passes
first. The heights of the passes are as follows : Arlberg, about 5900 feet ;
Stelvio, 9000 ; Fliiela, 7835 ; Ofen, 7070. It seems at least uncertain
whether tracks existed over these last three passes in Roman days. How-
ever this may be, Caecina could hardly have contemplated coming this way in
February. The difficulties of the Arlberg would be as nothing to those of
the Stelvio ; the latter pass would have been no service to him against the
68 THE CAMPAIGN OF OTHO ch.i
consider the plan is shown by the action of the
procurator of Noricum, Petronius Urbicus, who was
ranged upon the enemy's side. Some fifty miles
east of Innsbruck down the Inn river lay the
frontier of his province. The procurator, who, like
his fellow-procurator of Raetia, had only auxiliary
troops at his disposal, promptly destroyed all the
bridges over the river,1 trusting to that fiercely-
rushing stream to save him from attack if Caecina
came that way. As a matter of fact, if Caecina had
crossed the Arlberg it was not Noricum, with its
petty force and unimportant governor, which would
have been in his thoughts, but rather the Brenner
Pass and Italy ; and the procurator had in any case
alarmed himself needlessly. Had Caecina come
that way, Petronius Urbicus should indeed have
made vigorous demonstrations on the flank of the
enemy's column at Innsbruck, with intent to delay
its passage over the Brenner. Instead of this he
was preparing to stand stoutly on the defensive.
It is a well-known fact of military history that "all
local commanders are firmly convinced always that
it is upon them that the brunt of the fighting is
destined to fall."2 Petronius Urbicus saw that the
Othonian position. Even had lie diverged east from Tirano lie would have
come down on Iseo, Brescia, and Cremona. These places were much
more easily reached from Neuchatel by the Great St. Bernard. And the
Stelvio could not possibly have excited the attention of the procurator of
Noricum. Hence my choice of the Ailberg-Brenner combination. I owe
thanks to Mr. K. L. Poole for calling my attention to the proposed alternative.
Of course the Great St. Bernard — height 8 no feet — was hard enough
to cross, as Napoleon found it in May 1S00. But the Stelvio would
be much worse. And the Roman column would not march with artillery.
1 Tacitus says " interruptis Jhitninum pontibus." The plural is un-
meaning. Only the Inn is concerned.
- Sir Ian Hamilton, A Staff-Officers Strap-Book, vol. i. p. 94.
sec. iv AND THE VITELLIANS 69
pass over the " Raetian heights " led the enemy
to the Inn, and concluded that Caecina, if he came
that way, meant to attack him. For Petronius, in an
anxious position and with a small handful of troops,
there was much excuse. But there is little excuse
for the strategical blindness of the Roman historian
Tacitus, who complacently reproduces the tale that
Caecina hesitated whether to attack Noricum or
Italy, and finally preferred Italy as being more
important. Such a question could need no de-
liberation at all. Italy was from first to last'
Caecina's objective. The very important problem
for his decision was that of the pass by which
he should deliver his attack on Italy. Petronius
Urbicus might easily fail to recognise this. Tacitus
has no right to be so blind.1
Caecina therefore gave up the plan of strategical
penetration of the enemy's position. Apart from
the military risks which it involved, the delay which
the snows of winter would have caused compelled \
him to abandon it. Probably it was with reluct-
ance that he rejected it ; for a few weeks later he
strove, on the Po, to pursue this same device of
piercing the enemy's lines, though on the later
occasion his attempt was one of tactical rather than
strategical penetration.2
He therefore now resumed his march for Italyv
by the direct route, carrying out the original orders
which Vitellius had given him. From Aventicum
he followed in the steps of his advance guard to
1 See below, Note E, "Tacitus as Military Historian."
- See below, p. 94.
jo THE CAMPAIGN OF OTHO ch.i
the head of Lake Geneva, and up the Rhone valley
to Martigny. Thence by the Great St. Bernard
Pass he crossed the " Pennine Alps " to Aosta, and
proceeded down the valley of the Dora Baltea to
Eporedia. By the second week in March, a month
before Valens' column entered Italy, Caecina had
/crossed the Alps, and was in touch with the
/ enemy's outposts in the valley of the Po.
§ 5. The Othonian Measures of Defence
Meanwhile the Emperor Otho was busy arrang-
ing for the defence of Italy against the invader.
)His preliminary measures of defence were two in
number. In the first place, he sent part of his force
of Guards on board the fleet to Narbonese Gaul, to
threaten the flank of Valens' invading column, and at
least delay, if they could not interrupt, its march.
■ Secondly, a strong advance guard, under the two
generals Annius Gallus and Vestricius Spurinna,
was ordered to leave Rome at once for the north.
This force consisted of five Praetorian cohorts, the
First Adjutrix legion, two thousand gladiators, and
some detachments of cavalry. It was their duty to
secure the line of the Po. As soon as the treachery
of the ala Siliana was known, it was clearly im-
possible to hope to hold the country west and north
■ \ of Placentia, or to attempt to prevent the muster of
I \ the Vitellians north of the river. Spurinna there-
fore, with part of the troops, threw himself into
Placentia to block the passage of the river at that
fortress, and therewith the great road to the south.
secv AND THE VITELLIANS 71
Gallus, for his part, moved with the rest of the
advance guard to secure the communications with
the Danube army then collecting at Aquileia.
This he would best do by crossing the river at
Hostilia and moving forward to a position in the
neighbourhood of Mantua, which covered that cross-
ing and the road to the east.1
To Otho himself at Rome there was still left a
considerable number of excellent troops in fighting
trim and eager for the fray. He left the city, at ,
the head of these, for the theatre of war in North j
Italy on March 14. He was accompanied by a
large general staff, including the most renowned^
general of the day, Suetonius Paulinus. In his
train came many unhappy senators, reluctantly and
of gentle compulsion. These were left behind at
Mutina when the army moved forward to the front.
Their panics and distresses, their discomforts and
perils, their shifts and evasions, form a somewhat
humorous relief to what henceforward is but a grim
and sombre story.2
These military dispositions were sound. The |
best defensive position was thereby occupied. •
Means for delaying the muster of the enemy were
employed. And, above all, the communications of
the army on the Po with that of the Danube;
provinces were secured. The superstitious and
silly folk in the capital criticised gloomily the
1 Tacitus does not tell us anything of Gallus' movements when he
separates from Spurinna. But as when Gallus next appears he is marching
from the east on Placentia, the statement in the text is the probable infer-
ence, especially as some of the Danube army is then with him. CI. Tac. it.
18, 23.
2 Tac. i. 87 ; ii. II, 52.
72 THE CAMPAIGN OF OTHO en. i
Emperor's speedy departure from Rome. It was
the month of the dancings of the sacred priesthood,
the Salii, and the Ancilia, the twelve famous shields,
could not be restored to their resting-place in Mars'
Sacrarium until the month was ended. Surely,
they urged, Otho ought to wait in Rome for the
sixteen days, until such time as the Salii had
finished their dancings and the sacred shields were
restored to their shrine. The very gods seemed
to desire this. Fearsome omens were recorded,
and Mars' plain was flooded deep by one of
those terrible inundations which the Tiber from
time to time inflicts on the city up to this day.1 No
muster or review of the Imperial Army could be
held on the Campus Martius, and the Via Flaminia,
the great high-road to the north, which, after leaving
the city gate, ran parallel to and not far from the
river, was blocked for some distance. But such
scruples and hindrances could not delay Otho. The
Emperor was a soldier, and was well aware of the
supreme importance of time in operations of war.
. Caecina, he knew, had already crossed the Alps,
u Delay had proved fatal to Nero; it should not
/ imperil him. By the earliest date which his final
preparations allowed, the 14th of March, he led
his troops out from Rome. The jumping priests
must jump for a fortnight without him. They will
jump all the more merrily next year if he comes
back in triumph. " Deorum injurias dis curae."
1 The Campus Martius, lying on the river bank, is peculiarly liable to
these floods. The tablets recording the height of the river at such times,
e.g. in the Piazza of the Pantheon, are familiar to visitors to Rome. In
some cases they are as high or higher than the reader's head.
sec.v AND THE VITELLIANS 73
Otho will trust rather to the devotion of his !
soldiers than to divine patronage. Armed with
cuirass of iron the Emperor marched on foot in
front of the standards, rough in dress and look, and j
careless of comfort. This was not the Otho whom
men had known in former days. It was a soldier
Emperor marching to defend his empery.1
Yet, excellent though these measures of defence
were, the course of events, as they developed, dis-
covered three flaws in them. The force sent on
shipboard acted too feebly ; the Army of the Danube
gathered together too slowly; and Cremona fell intov
the hands of the foe.
(1) The Action of the Fleet} — Otho entrusted
the command of the naval expedition to three men.
Their incapacity was equalled only by their in-
significance. Otho lacked entirely that admirable)
faculty of being able to choose men, which his pre-j
^decessor Nero had possessed in marked measureJ
^\6lt was this lack which ruined him. Of the three
•commanders of the fleet, one was put in irons by his
troops ; the second was unable to control them ; the
third to control himself. There was no discipline,
and the fleet sailed up the north-west coast of Italy
like a pirate fleet, ravaging and murdering. One
of the victims was the mother of Agricola ; and the
Roman historian, who found in this general the hero
of his youth, writes bitterly of the ferocity shown
by the Othonian troops who were sent on this
expedition : —
1 C(. Tac. i. S6-89; ii. II.
2 Tac. ii. 12-16 ; Agricola, c. 7.
74 THE CAMPAIGN OF OTHO ch.i
It seemed they entred not into Italie, their owne native
countrey and soile : as if it had bene forraine coasts and cities
of enemies, they burned, wasted, and spoiled, with so much
the more outrage and harme because no such invasion was
feared, and therefore nothing provided against it : the fields lay-
full of commodities ; the houses wide open ; the masters meeting
them with their wives and children, through the security of
peace, were overtaken with the misery of warre.1
The hill men who came down to the rescue were
easily routed and dispersed by the regular troops,
who proceeded in their wrath to sack the town of
Intimilium, now Ventimiglia, the Riviera town on
the frontier between France and Italy.2
The pezants were beggerly, their armour not worth taking
up ; and beside, being swift of foote and skilfull in the countrey,
they could not be taken : but the sacke of the poore innocent
towne paied the reckening, and contented the covetous soldier.
The odiousnesse of which fact was greatly increased by a notable
example which happened there of a Ligurian woman : who
having hid her sonne, the soldiers supposing she had hid her
money withall, and thereupon by torture examining hir, where
she had hid him, shewing hir belly answered that there he was
hid : neyther could she by any manner of torment afterwarde,
or death at the length, be induced to change that worthy
answere.
While the fleet was thus pleasantly occupied, a
messenger rode off in hot haste to Valens imploring
help. That general saw at once the danger which,
if the plunderers were not checked, threatened
1 This and the following quotation are from Sir II. Savile's translation of
the Histories, A. D. 1 591. This cannot always be trusted for accuracy, but it
deserves to be remembered, and that not only by Mertonians, if for no other
reason yet at least for its splendid address "To the Reader."
2 There is no doubt that Intimilium, not Albintimilium, is the right
form.
secv AND THE VITELLIANS 75
not only the coast of the Maritime Alps and the
Province, but also his own march to Italy. He
therefore sent at once a strong force, mainly of
cavalry, including the ala Treverorum. This last
squadron was under command of a man soon to
become only too well known to the Romans, but then
merely a subordinate officer of auxiliaries in the Army
of Germany. But this man, Julius Classicus, was a
great noble in his clan, and one of the leaders in the
near future of the rebellion on the Rhine.1 Of this
force, part was ordered by Valens to strengthen the
garrison of Forum Julii (Frejus) against the risk of I
attack. The rest joined the local troops collected 1
for purposes of defence, and marched against the '
enemy. These they seemed to have found in the v
neighbourhood. The brief campaign which followed
was, though indecisive in results, not without its;
interest. It served to illustrate the superiority of
the Guards as soldiers over the Vitellian auxiliary r
troops, and supplied another example of the use
which may be made of a fleet during a tactical
engagement upon the coast, whereby men can be .
landed from it ashore on the rear of the enemy's 1
battle line, thus recalling the device employed by J
Pompey in old days at Dyrrhachium. The tide
of success in the fighting ebbed and flowed, but on
the whole the Othonians had the better of it, and
Valens had to send off more reinforcements to the
scene of war.J But at the end both sides withdrew
their forces at such a distance from one another that 1
neither the cavalry of the one side nor the fleet ot
1 See below, Chap. III. - See above, p. 61.
76 THE CAMPAIGN OF OTHO ch.i
i the other could cause any sudden alarm. The
Antipoiis. 1 Vitellians retired to the low promontory of Antibes ;
, the Othonians to Albingaunum, now the many-
I towered little city of Albenga, which lies in the
small swampy plain of the Centa, sixty-five miles
east of Antibes. At Albenga there is one of the
few pieces of open shore of any extent along the
whole rocky coast of the Riviera, from Savona to
Cannes, and the ships could here be beached. But
it was unnecessary to retire so far eastwards for the
purpose, as the small harbour of Porto Maurizio
would have given excellent shelter to the fleet, and
have been more in touch with the enemy. The
, fact was that both sides had by tacit consent ceased
from all warlike activity, and the short maritime
■ campaign was ended. Sardinia and Corsica were,
it is true, secured for Otho, but peace henceforward
\ reigned on the coast of Provence.
If these tentative and half-hearted operations of
the fleet and the force which it carried are to be
viewed merely as an isolated episode in the history
of the war (and it is in this light that the Roman
, historian Tacitus regards them), Otho is convicted
of a strategical blunder in commanding them to
'. take place. For thereby he weakened his numbers,
already inferior to those of the enemy, by detaching
1a force for the purpose of a minor operation of war,
when his whole energies should have been concen-
trated on the main issue, the defence of North Italy.
Otho's order would, in this case, be but an example
the more of that familiar failing in generalship, for
' which the dispassionate German critic blames our
sec.v AND THE VITELLIANS y7
own commanders in the recent Boer war.1 To
plunder a town or two on the Riviera, to secure
Corsica and Sardinia, to worry the local forces of
the enemy, — these were petty successes which
counted for nothing in the general course of the
war.2 Whereas the loss of strength which these
successes inflicted upon Otho's main army counted /
for a good deal.
But this view of the matter is short-sighted, and
based rather on the actual results of the campaign /
on the coast than on the intentions of the Emperor/
when he sent the fleet. Otho did not intend to use
the command of the sea merely to secure such-
secondary objects. The fleet's activity was meant to
harass Valens, to weaken his army, to delay its march.-'
The operations of the fleet were therefore intimately
connected with the concentration of the Army of the
Danube at Aquileia, and were part of the whole
well-designed strategical plan. To a certain extent :
Otho's hopes were realised. Twice Valens had to
detach troops from his column and send them to the1
coast. And the disturbance caused in his army on
one of these occasions, which has been narrated,3 1
was a greater success for Otho than he could
reasonably have anticipated. It would indeed have
been a curious freak on the part of the Genius of War
1 "The mania of the British leaders for detaching troops for minor
operations, whereby they weakened themselves prior to a crisis, often had
disastrous results, and might easily have led to a catastrophe at Driefontein
also" {German Official History of the Boer War, Eng. Trans, ii. p. 49).
At Driefontein we were compelled to throw all our scanty reserves into
the line of battle to carry the position in one last effort.
- Tacitus himself rightly comments on the small importance of Corsica in
this connection, ii. 16.
3 See above, p. 62.
;8 THE CAMPAIGN OF OTHO
CU. 1
had the command of the sea in this year by the foe
cost Valens his life, thanks to the mutinous spirit
of his troops. In this event Caecina would in all
likelihood have been crushed, and Valens' leaderless
column have recoiled on Gaul. Such events were
not to happen, nor could Otho have expected them.
But that the action of his fleet did not bring him at
least a greater measure of success than it did was
due, not to the Emperor's strategy, but to his officers'
misuse of their chances. Had these, after their
victory over the Vitellians on the coast, dared to
push up country in the direction of Briancon
instead of weakly retiring to Albenga, Valens'
whole march over the Alps might have been
arrested for at least some days, if not weeks. This
delay might well have resulted, as events showed,
in the entire destruction of Caecina's column at
Cremona. For only Valens' arrival saved his
colleague. The Othonian force marching on
Briant^on could probably have retreated in safety
to its base the fleet, had Valens, as might then be
hoped, turned savagely upon it with his whole
army. Even had it been cut off and perished, it
would by its defeat have won victory for its Emperor
in the main campaign. In this way failure some-
times spells triumph in the lesson-book of war. In
this way Sir John Moore, in like manner trusting to
the fleet at Corunna for his base, splendidly hurled
his little column at Napoleon's line of communica-
tions in North Spain and saved the Peninsula. But
Otho's officers lacked either the pluck or the insight
of such a general. It may be that they distrusted
sec.v AND THE VITELLIANS 79
the uncertain character of their initial success ; it may
be that they dared not run the great risk involved.
It is probable that they were quarrelling among
themselves. Whatever the reason, the fleet and the'
force on board of it missed their chances, and Otho's 1
position of defence was greatly weakened thereby.
(2) The Mobilisation of the Danube Ar?ny. — A
second and more damaging flaw in Otho's armour *
of defence was the fact that the Army of the Danube
was concentrating at Aquileia far too slowly. The ■
four legions of Pannonia and Dalmatia were the\
nearest to the scene of the coming struggle. To
some extent they realised the importance of speed,
and, since they themselves were not yet ready to
march as whole units, each sent forward a special
detachment ("vexillum") of its men in front of it.
These detachments were each two thousand strong.
But even of these only one arrived in time to takes
part in the first battle in the field, that of Locus I
Castorum on April 6. Behind this solitary detach-
ment were the three similar ones ; behind these
the bulk of their legions ; and farthest from the
theatre of war were the Moesian legions, slowly
assembling. This slackness on the part of the
Danube army, says the Roman historian, was due I
to over - confidence : "E fiducia tarditas inerat."
Yet it was a time when every day that passed
before that army came in strength might spell ruin
to their cause and to their Emperor. There is no
excuse for their deliberation in movement or for 1
their confidence.1
1 See Note A, " The Movements of the Danube Legions."
8o THE CAMPAIGN OF OTHO ch.i
(3) The Loss of Italy north of the Po, including
Cremona. — Finally, the speed of Caecina's advance
guard had already cost Otho dear. When Spurinna
arrived at Placentia, he found that a cohors Pan-
noniorum of the Army of Defence had already been
captured at Cremona, and this strongly-walled city
fell into the enemy's hands about the same time.
I " All the fields and cities between the Po and the
Alps were held by the Vitellian forces." l The loss
of Cremona, though unavoidable, was a serious
disaster. This city lies on the north bank of the
Po, some twenty-five miles from Piacenza to the
west,2 and forty from Mantua on the east. It had
originally been built three centuries before as a
Roman outpost north of the river to keep the
Gallic tribes in check, and it was still strongly
fortified. There does not seem to have been any
bridge in a.d. 69 at the city over the river. To-day
there is a bridge over the Po of enormous structure
and great length, separated from the city gate by a
mile of weary road. But Cremona in a.d. 69 pos-
sessed no " bridge-head " on the southern bank of
the Po, which would have put a force holding the
town in a position to turn the flank of the gar-
rison of Placentia, and render the holding of that
fortress useless. Yet its seizure by Caecina gave
the Vitellian general a strong base of operations for
movements of offence against the Othonian line of
defence, a place of refuge in the event of defeat
or the advance of the enemy in force, and a safe
1 Tac. ii. 17.
- By road vid Codogno on the left bank ; in a bee-line, 16 miles only.
sbc. vi AND THE VITELLIANS 81
resting-place in which he could await the arrival of
his colleague, Valens. Its loss, therefore, to Otho
was serious. It was only the Emperor's strategical
brilliance which later all but turned this loss to
positive gain, and made the fortress not Caecina's
harbour of refuge but a prison-house for him and
his army.1
In these three respects, therefore, Otho's position
at the beginning of the " tactical chapter " in the
history of the campaign was not so favourable as it
would have been had his generals been abler men.
He himself had made no mistake in his measures^
of defence. But the force on shipboard had not
done its duty ; the legions of the Danube army
were sluggish ; and all the north bank of the Po I
from Alps to Cremona had fallen at once into the
enemy's hands. But if, so far, Fortune had been
unkind to the Emperor, yet his main line of defence
south of the river was stoutly held, and Fortune!
never yet showered all her favours on one side only
in any war. And now at last the armies were in
touch.' Spurinna at Placentia, Gallus at Mantua,
held the two ends of the defensive position. They
had to expect that the enemy would seek to break
through, and that immediately.
§ 6. The First Encounters
When Spurinna reached Placentia he found the,
enemy hard at hand. An outpost force of his own I
1 See below, § 7. Cf. Note B, "The Capture of Cremona by the
Vitellians."
G
82 THE CAMPAIGN OF OTHO ch.i
troops, numbering eleven hundred men, was cut off
by them between the fortress and Ticinum, the
present town of Pavia. His patrols also speedily
came into touch with their skirmishers and were
roughly handled by them. Their Batavian and
German auxiliaries, excited by success and by the
sight of a great river again after their many weary
miles of mountain roads, adepts as they were at
the means of crossing such an obstacle, swarmed
across the Po higher up stream and bore down on
Spurinna's lines. The general, however, was con-
vinced, as was indeed the case, that Caecina himself
— and his legionary army had not yet arrived. It
was his obvious policy to make a reconnaissance in
force westwards along the river bank to discover,
;if he could, the strength and intentions of the
enemy.1
With this intent he marched out from Placentia
over the Po a day's march, and when night fell
fortified his position by the river.2 He had not
1 Tacitus asserts (ii. 18) that he was compelled to march out against his
own wishes by his insubordinate troops, who realised their folly next day.
This seems to me a silly story, told later in the camp, where generals' actions
are always pulled to pieces.
2 " In conspectu Padus " (ii. 19). These words greatly trouble the German
editors. Heraeus, e.g., proposes "e conspectu Padus," on the ground that,
as Placentia lay on the river and as Spurinna crossed it, he must have led his
men north, and have been "out of sight of the river," therefore, when he
halted them. If Oxford were threatened by an enemy who lay in the direc-
tion of Reading, the commander of the Oxford garrison would surely conduct
his reconnaissance and feel his way along the Thames, choosing for his night's
camp a position at Abingdon. Would he strike for the Ridge Way at, e.g.,
Wantage? Classen proposes "in conspectu hostis." Would Spurinna be
likely to choose such a position for his camp ? In the first place, it would
have been foolish. In the second place, during his reconnaissance he did
not come into touch with the enemy at all. The words "in conspectu
Padus " present no difficulty at all, from a military point of view. The river
would be an additional protection to the camp.
sec. vi AND THE VITELLIANS 83
met with any opposition, and to advance farther
along the stream next day was not prudent. He
therefore left patrols along the river bank and with-
drew to the fortress. His reconnaissance had been
fruitless of results, and his troops were well content
to be back again in shelter.
Shortly afterwards Caecina himself with his main
army arrived outside the fortress. His march
through the plain of North Italy had been a rapid
one, and he had kept his men well in hand, not allow-
ing them to plunder the towns through which they
passed. Caecina, in fact, had " left his cruelty and
profligacy on the other side of the Alps." In
presence of the enemy, other and more soldierly
qualities had to take the place of these. The citizens
of those towns were reduced to grumbling at
the general's " barbarian costume," disliking the
trousers which he wore, and at his wife Salonina's
gallant display on horseback in a purple robe.
They were happy that they had no other cause for
grumbling than a man's novel taste in dress and
a woman's usual love of show and finery. Caecina
therefore had no reason to dread any rising in his
rear when he crossed the Po above Placentia and
marched down-stream upon the town. It was indeed'
imperative for him to seek to take that fortress.
If he neglected it and passed it by, it threatened
his one line of communications with Valens'
column. Of this general's approach there was as
yet no sign, and Caecina must keep the road open
at least on the north of the river as far as Cremona,
a town now held by his troops. It was doubtless
84 THE CAMPAIGN OF OTHO ch.i
very expedient to win an early success.1 It was an
attractive method of attack upon the foe's line of
defence to assault the extreme flank of it and seek
to "roll it up" from west to east. But, above all,
it was necessary for him to guard his own com-
munications north of the river from the constant
menace of interruption by a sally over the bridge
from Placentia, if that fortress remained in posses-
sion of the enemy's garrison. Caecina was bound
to get possession of it at once if possible.
Negotiations were opened between the two
sides, but resulted in nothing save mutual revilings.
It was indeed "easier to blame than to praise" the
characters of Otho and Vitellius. Caecina therefore
wasted little time on words, but for two days
delivered a vigorous assault on the fortress. This
was stubbornly and successfully resisted by the
garrison, and the Vitellians sullenly admitted their
first reverse. The first wave of attack spent its
fury in vain and retreated.2 Caecina drew off his
defeated army and marched for Cremona, into which
town he threw himself. His strategical position
was one already of some risk. To the west lay his
imperilled line of communications and, if necessary,
retreat. In front of him, in the centre of the
Othonian line of defence, was a small but active
, and annoying body of gladiators, under Martius
Macer, who made stinging raids over the river
— a little hornets' nest which it was hard to
1 This is the one and only motive ascribed to Caecina by Tacitus ! It is
by far the weakest of the three.
- Siege of Placentia at length in Tacitus, ii. 1S-23.
sec. vi AND THE VITELLIANS 85
reach. And on the east a third enemy speedily
appeared.
For Gallus at Mantua, on hearing of the assault
on Placentia, had moved forward towards the west,
to relieve the pressure on the fortress, the import-
ance of which he well knew. While on the road,
north of the river, he received news from Spurinna
that Caecina had raised the siege and drawn off
his troops. Gallus therefore halted his army and
promptly fortified his position. He was then at a
village hitherto unknown to history, but hencefor-
ward to be doubly famous in the annals of war — the
village of Bedriacum.1
The broad, dusty Italian high-road which runs
to-day through the great plain of the Po westwards
from Mantua, after crossing the Oglio, one of the
larger tributaries of the main river, some fifteen
miles from the city, passes by two small towns named
Bozzolo and Piadena on its way to Cremona. Mid-
way between these towns, which are nine kilometres
apart,, and a quarter of a mile north of the road,
there lies a tiny hamlet, consisting of a church and
a cluster of small houses nestling together under
its spire. This hamlet is named Calvatone. It is
as peacefully remote from the dust and traffic of
the highway as any Cots wold village which just
escapes the great Bath road. But here at Calvatone
1 I think this should be pronounced Bedriacum, despite the analog}- of
such names as Moguntiacum. For Juvenal's line runs :
" Bebriaci in campo spolium affectare Palati" (ii. 106).
Of course the poet could not manage Bebriacum at all, and it is possible
that he may have taken a licence of mispronunciation, as modern poets have
done with the name Trafalgar. But, as we have no other evidence at all,
perhaps we had better half-heartedly follow the poet.
86 THE CAMPAIGN OF OTHO ch.i
in Roman days two great roads met — that from
Hostilia at the crossing of the Po to the south, and
that from Mantua, both making for Cremona. The
village where they joined was named Bedriacum.
As a military post, when war swept over the plain,
it was both important and easily defensible. A
force entrenched here covered both the line of com-
munications with Aquileia and the east, and also
the crossing of the river by the road which led to
the great highway to Ariminum and Rome. A
short distance to the north of it there flowed the
river Oglio, a broad muddy stream with steep high
bank on the southern side, not easy to cross, whose
rapid and broad current turns two long rows of
water-mills to-day, not unlike those on the Danube.
There might have been one danger to Gallus when
he encamped his legions here — the fear lest the foe
should come down into Italy by the Brenner Pass
and so cut him off from the Danube army. But by
this time it was known that Caecina had not chosen
this way, and there were no enemy in the pass.1
At Bedriacum, therefore, Gallus halted his
troops. And here he was soon afterwards joined
by the main Army of Italy under its generals
Suetonius Paulinus and Marius Celsus. A most
welcome detachment also of two thousand men
from the Thirteenth legion of Pannonia marched
into camp, seeming an earnest of the rest of the
Army of the Danube to come, and with them came
six auxiliary cohorts and one cavalry squadron
belonging to this army. Caecina and his troops
1 See Note C, "The Site of Bedriacum."
sec. vi AND THE VITELLIANS 87
were still at Cremona, a few miles down the broad
white road, alone. There was no news of Valens'
column. And the garrison at Placentia kept grim
watch upon his line of retreat.
But the Vitellian general was not down-hearted.
Always in war the force which attacks is likely to
fight better than that which is attacked. Caecina's
army was a strong one — stronger in numbers almost
certainly than the full muster of Otho's men at
Bedriacum. He resolved at once to take the
offensive, lest delay should bring the Danube army
upon the scene. Purely frontal attacks, however,
were hazardous and costly. He planned to lure
the Othonians into a snare and so destroy their
army.
Some twelve Roman miles east of Cremona,1 the
Postumian way (which as a great Roman military
road was raised up high above the level of the rich,
damp, cultivated land on either side of it) ran for
a short distance through woods on both sides. On
emerging from the trees it passed through vine-
yards. These Italian vineyards of the north are
not the forest of short upright stakes, such as those
which line and disfigure the banks of the Rhine and
the Moselle, but in North Italy the vine stems are
linked from fruit-tree to fruit-tree in long droop-
ing and graceful festoons, while the rich earth in
April supplies enough nourishment also to cover
the ground under the vines and under the fruit-
trees with a green carpet of corn. It is indeed
hard to make one's way through the fields by
1 I.e. about io| English miles.
88 THE CAMPAIGN OF OTHO
Cremona save where road or track is cut through
the vineyards.
Here, just where the road left the cover of the
trees, Caecina placed an ambush, at a place called
Locus Castorum, ten miles away from the camp at
Bedriacum. Some auxiliary infantry were hidden in
the woods on either side of the way. The cavalry
were ordered to ride forward towards the enemy
and provoke them to attack. Then they were to
fall back along the road in feigned retreat, drawing
the Othonians in pursuit after them through the
wood, when the infantry would sally out from the
trees and have them at their mercy on either
flank.
It was not a very brilliant plan, and Caecina
might have foreseen that, in a time of civil war, it
would be promptly betrayed to the other side.
Moreover, he managed the ordering of his troops
clumsily enough. No Roman general, except
Julius Caesar, seems ever to have been a master
of ambushes and surprises. In this case the biter
was bit. Otho's generals, Suetonius and Celsus,
were duly told the whole of Caecina's plan, and took
their measures accordingly. Tijey marched out
from camp, three Praetorian cohorts in column on
the road : on the right flank the First legion, two
auxiliary cohorts of foot, and five hundred cavalry ;
on the left flank the two thousand legionaries of the
Thirteenth legion, four auxiliary cohorts of foot, and
five hundred cavalry. These cavalry formed the
extreme wing on either side, and finally one thousand
other cavalry formed the rear-guard, keeping open
sec vi AND THE VITELLIANS 89
the communications with the camp at Bedriacum,
ready, in case of retreat, to open out and let the'
infantry through, and cover their retirement. In
this order the Othonians moved out to meet the
foe. Presently the Vitellian cavalry came in sight,—
charging along the road. At this Suetonius halted
his infantry, throwing forward slightly his auxiliary
foot on either side of the road ; the cavalry under
Celsus slowly trotted forward as if to receive the
charge of the enemy's horse. These, obedient to—
orders, promptly began to retire. But then Celsus —
for his part halted his men. At this unexpected
turn of events the Vitellian infantry in the wood """
seem to have lost patience ; for they rose from their
ambush, and pouring tumultuously out upon the
road came charging down upon Celsus, with their
own cavalry, it may be, thrust forward in their van
like the foam of a wave. Nothing could have suited-^
Celsus better. Quietly withdrawing his men, when
he came into touch with his infantry, he passed
through their ranks, which opened out to allow this,
and the pursuing Vitellians suddenly found them-" —
selves trapped in the middle of the enemy's foot.
The Guards faced them in the front ; the auxiliaries
threatened them on the flanks ; and Celsus with his
thousand horse, who had led them into the snare,
now emerged again from behind his infantry and
threatened to fall upon them on the rear. It was,- —
in fact, very nearly a second Cannae. For it was by
this same device that Hannibal long years ago had
caught and massacred the Romans.
But Suetonius Paulinus was no Hannibal, and 1
90 THE CAMPAIGN OF OTHO
all became confusion. While he was hesitating and
troubling himself about ditches and extensions to
the flank, as if it were drill upon a field day, not a
grim melde on the field of battle, the Vitellians
slipped away from the closing circle into the com-
fortable shelter of the friendly vineyards. When
however they, with greater daring than prudence,
reappeared from cover, the Othonians charged at
' last, and Caecina's men were driven in rout off the
field. Nor was their plight in any way redressed
by their general ; for he had hurriedly sent to
Cremona for reinforcements, and these came hasten-
ing down the road in small detachments, only to be
involved in the general rout and to make confusion
worse confounded. The battle on the road became
a nightmare of disorder, until Suetonius checked
the pursuit and recalled his men. The discomfited
Vitellians, grateful for the respite, ignominiously
made good their escape to Cremona. They were
sated with ambushes for the future. They were
the smaller of the two Vitellian armies. Where,
they disconsolately asked, were Valens and his
larger force ? Were they themselves, a " mere
handful " in comparison,1 to bear the whole brunt
of the fighting ? 2
In reviewing the story of this extraordinary
battle, the reader must see that both Suetonius and
Caecina may be blamed too easily. There were, it
1 " Tanto pauciores," ii. 30.
J Tacitus's account of the battle of Locus Castorum (ii. 23-26) is in itself
a historical nightmare. The account in the text is an attempt to make sense
out of it. But, even so, infantry and cavalry must have been horribly mixed
up together. A Roman road is not a Salisbury Plain. And cf. Hardy,
Plutarch 's Galba and Otho, pp. 239-241.
AND THE VITELLIANS 91
v
is true, bad mistakes made on both sides. Caecina's
ambush was a clumsy affair ; he could not keep his I
troops in hand, and when the battle took an un-
expected course and went against him, he lost his
head completely. To hurry reinforcements in
driblets into the firing line when it is yielding is a
not uncommon device of inferior generals, and is I
always worse than useless. But in his general idea
of attacking the Othonians at Bedriacum promptly
before the Danube army had arrived to their succour)
Caecina was absolutely right. The Roman historian
blames him for attacking " more hurriedly than
wisely," and ascribes his haste to a mere jealous fear
lest, if he waited, Valens should acquire all the/
renown for the war.1 Tacitus has a genius for mis-
understanding the essentials of a military situation.
It might so easily have happened that the Danube
army outstripped Valens in its coming. Caecina's
was a sound strategical plan spoilt by faulty tactical!
execution.
In like manner, Suetonius (who displayed nox
small tactical skill) was over-cautious on the field of
battle, and let slip a good opportunity for crushing
the enemy. The vigour which he had once shown 1
in the black days of the rebellion in Britain seemed \
to have deserted him. In battle, something must.v
be risked or nothing will be achieved. But that
he was thoroughly justified in calling his men off
from the pursuit can hardly be doubted, although
men blamed him for this at the time, and his reputa-j
tion has suffered for this ever since. Had he\
1 Tac. ii. 24.
92 THE CAMPAIGN OF OTHO
allowed the pursuit to continue, his critics urged,
(the Vitellian army must have been annihilated.
The result in reality would have been very different.
Caecina's force must have outnumbered his own in
a proportion of three to two. The fighting had
taken place some ten miles from his base camp at
Bedriacum. The pursuit, if allowed, would have
I followed yet another ten miles up to the walls of
I Cremona. There it would have been stopped
abruptly by Caecina's entrenchments ; and Suet-
onius' straggling, exhausted, tired troops would
at once have been exposed to a counter-stroke of
the rudest and most effective kind. In refusing to
permit his men to incur this risk, Otho's general
displayed a sound common sense which is lacking
in the critics of his generalship.1
§ 7. The Strategies of the Final Struggle
-* A. The Vitellian" Strategy of Penetration" — By
the time that Caecina had fought and lost the battle
of Locus Castorum, Valens had at last crossed the
Alps and arrived at Ticinum. When the news of
the defeat reached him he acted promptly, and
marched at once to Cremona, where he joined
forces with his colleague. At last the Army of
Germany was united. And not only were Valens'
numbers by this time nearly twice as large as those
of Caecina, but the misfortunes of the smaller army
stiffened discipline through the entire force. It
1 Even Tacitus seems to approve and understand Suetonius's caution (ii.
26, fin.).
skcvii AND THE VITELLIANS 93
was realised that the enemy were prepared to offer
a stout resistance. They had already given unwel-
come proof of their valour. The crisis of the
whole campaign was at hand, and the Vitellians
braced themselves for a sterner effort.
In camp together at Cremona the two generals
took counsel what to do. One possible plan, now
that they had so large an army at their command,
was to renew the direct attack upon the enemy at
Bedriacum, not now by any attempt at a lure or
ambush, but by an honest frontal attack down the
Postumian way. But they hesitated to adopt this
plan. The last fighting had gone very badly. That
Otho was now himself present and was receiving
reinforcements was well known. Any day might
see the arrival of the whole Army of the Danube
in his camp. Even if they carried the position by
the dangerous method of a frontal attack before its
arrival, the enemy would only fall back upon the
support and shelter of this army. Caecina's energy
and impulsiveness had ended in defeat. The older
and more cautiousJValens induced his colleague to
agree to a more cautious strategy. Their Emperor
Vitellius would presently arrive with large reinforce-
ments. They must wait for him, unless themselves
attacked. On his arrival, with the whole of their
resources available, they would proceed to the final
struggle. But meanwhile much could be done.
The assault on Placentia iiad been a bad failure ;
but the fortress still menaced both their own position
and Vitellius' when he came. From it the enemy's
line stretched eastwards along the southern bank of
/
94 THE CAMPAIGN OF OTHO ch. i
the Po, and immediately opposite Cremona Macer
and his gladiators were annoying them. They
- decided to penetrate the enemy's line here in the
centre, where very probably it was weakest, as it
relied on the cover afforded by the river. Certainly
- the troops of the enemy here employed were not
his best soldiers. Every Roman army was skilled in
the art of bridge-building ; therefore the engineers
were set to work under Caecina's directions to
bridge the Po opposite Cremona.
The attempt was vigorously opposed by Macer
and his gladiators on the southern bank. Every
device was employed to interrupt the building. But
despite direct attacks on the bridge by boats, and
the use of fire-ships, the Vitellians were able, by
dint of steadfast and, for the most part, successful
fighting, slowly to push on the work. It appeared
as if the plan of the tactical penetration of the
hostile line would be achieved and Placentia hope-
lessly isolated. Caecina was urging on the effort
when a hurried message reached him from Valens'
headquarters in Cremona. The enemy had appeared
in force marching for the town. He, Valens, was
moving out to face them. Caecina must instantly
bring all his available men up to the front to
assist.
In fact, while the Vitellian commanders had been
busy on their own tactical plan, the Othonians had
been far from idle. If the Vitellians remained quiet
at Cremona, the initiative had passed to Otho's
men, so long as their general on the river made
good the defence of the centre. The Emperor had
sec. vii AND THE VITELLIANS 95
seized the chance offered him by Valens' cautious
strategy.1
B. Othos Council of War} — Shortly after the
victory of Locus Castorum, the Othonian generals
welcomed the arrival into camp of the Emperor and'
his brother Titianus. Otho had summoned Titianus
from Rome, intending him to take command, when
he learnt that Suetonius had displeased the troops*
by checking their pursuit after the battle. But,
besides the full muster of the Army of Italy, the,
Army of the Danube was now fast approaching.^
Already after the victory the rest of the Thirteenth
legion, under its legate Vedius Aquila, had
arrived in camp, to join its vexillum, which it had
sent before in time to take part in the fighting.
There also came a detachment of the Four-
teenth legion from Dalmatia, and a second cavalry
squadron belonging to the Danube forces.3 To
increase, their numbers still further, Spurinna wasj
summoned from Placentia with the bulk of the)
garrison of that fortress. He left only enough in
the town to hold it against sudden surprise. In
case of any more serious emergency it could easily
be reinforced again.
By the second week of April these forces were]
mustered at Bedriacum. The enemy lay quiet
at Cremona, trying, it seemed, to bridge the river,,
and Macer must frustrate this. But they certainly1
showed no signs of advancing to attack Bedriacumi;'
1 The Bridge - Building : see Tac. ii. 34-36, 41; Plutarch, Otho, 10.
On Tacitus' short-sighted view of this see Note E.
2 Tac. ii. 31-33.
3 Tac. ii. 24, 43, 66 ; iii. 2.
96 THE CAMPAIGN OF OTHO
Otho summoned a council of war to discuss the
situation.
At this council of war the three generals
Suetonius, Celsus, and Gallus agreed in the advice
which they offered. All three had been remarkably
successful hitherto by their defensive strategy.
Thanks to it the victory of Locus Castorum had
been won. They had, it is true, been reinforced,
but the Vitellians had been much more strongly
reinforced. If the enemy did not move to the
attack, why should they themselves desert the safe
course and take the offensive ? The bridge-build-
ing was not a matter of great concern. It was an
easy matter to look to this.
Suetonius therefore, supported by the other two,
strongly urged Otho to remain on the defensive
luntil the summer came. As a "second-best"
strategy, if the Emperor should be reluctant to wait
so long, let him at least do nothing for a few days
longer until the bulk of the Fourteenth legion
and the " Moesian army " arrived in camp. Already
detachments of the three Moesian legions had
arrived at Aquileia.1 But the three generals, for
their part, advised the first plan, of a strict defen-
sive until the summer. Their arguments were, in
I the main, three in number.
In the first place, they urged, the enemy could
expect very few more reinforcements, if any. The
Gallic provinces were in a ferment : Narbonensis,
for instance, was seriously alarmed by the operations
of the fleet. The troops in Britain had their own
1 Suetonius, Vesp. 6.
sec.vm AND THE VITELLIANS 97
native foes in the island to keep them busy, and,
moreover, the sea rolled between. Spain had
scarcely any troops to send. The bank of the
Rhine had to be guarded by some troops against
the tribes over that river. The generals therefore
were of opinion that even when Vitellius himself!
arrived, he would bring but a scanty force with him/
In the next place, delay and defence on their
own part would involve the foe in very serious
commissariat difficulties. No supplies could reach
him by sea. The Alps were a great hindrance to
the carriage of supplies by land, and the strip of
country on which he depended — at least, immedi-
ately for food and forage — that between the Po and
the mountains, was laid waste and already exhausted.1
All that was wanted to complete the demoralisation
of a hungry army of northerners was the hot sun of '
an Italian summer.
Very different in all respects, they concluded
finally, was their own position. The longer they
themselves could delay, the stronger they would |
become. They had vast quantities of money. In
civil war money was stronger than the sword, j
Desertion was easily bought. Upon their side J
they had all the provinces of the Danube and the
east, with their strong and vigorous armies, which
as yet had taken no part in the fighting and were
theirs to employ. Italy was theirs; theirs, above
all, was the favour of the Senatus Populusque I
Romanus. Theirs was the rightful cause. Let them
then wait till summer came. Their position was
1 Surely " vastam " in ii. 32 can only be in error for " vastatam " ?
H
\
98 THE CAMPAIGN OF OTHO
impregnable, as Placentia's resistance had shown.
And men of the Army of Italy had no reason to
dread the fierceness of an Italian July sun: they
' were used to it.
For these reasons Suetonius, supported by his
colleagues, gave counsel of delay.
There is no reason whatever to suspect him of
any but the best motives. A wild story, indeed, was
presently afloat that the general hoped that such
delay would lead both armies to weary of their
emperors and depose them ; that the Senate would
thereupon proceed to choose another prince ; that
his own great reputation would then carry the elec-
tion.1 This indeed was a wild tale enough. The
soldiers of both armies were devoted to their
respective emperors. Suetonius was already un-
popular with his own men. Even the Roman
historian, despite his pitiless insight into men's
baser thoughts, rejects this story. When Suetonius
counselled delay, he believed this to be Otho's
' wisest strategy.
And Suetonius' words would carry weight. He
was " the most experienced general of the day." "
His fame had been early won in Mauretania, when
he had been the first Roman to cross the Atlas
range of mountains.3 If imperilled in Britain
recently, that fame had been vindicated by his
notable victory over the savages in the island, and
he had crushed their furious rebellion.4 He came
1 Tac. ii. 37. - Tac. ii. 31.
3 Pliny, Hist. Nat. v. 1, 14 ; Dio Cassius, lx. 9.
4 See my History of Nero, chap. vi. § 3.
sec. vii AND THE VITELLIANS 99
to the council of war fresh from the field of victory ;
and he adduced grave arguments to support his
views.
Yet a good tactician is not always a good strate-
gist, and all Suetonius' successes had been tactical.
Now, in the council of war, he was urging delay ,
and caution as a strategical plan. That such a
cautious strategy would be recommended was
indeed likely.
How greatness of intellect, which in times of peace enjoys
the highest consideration, decreases in value in times of war
when opposed to will, is shown by the result of nearly every
council of war. It cannot be denied that in an assembly of
experienced and capable men, the highest aggregate of intelli-
gence must be collected. Yet Frederick the Great was right in
peremptorily forbidding his generals to hold a council of war.
That keen judge of human nature knew full well that nothing is
ever gained by it save a majority for the "timid party." The
intelligence collected in a council of war is wont to be productive
of no other, advantage but that of assiduously searching out all
the weak points of an army, and of demonstrating the danger of
action.1
Suetonius had certainly produced " a series of
plausible arguments for leaving well alone." - But
indeed the Emperor had reason to criticise them.3
It certainly was not true that Vitellius would bring"
only scanty reinforcements. Many Gallic levies
and as many as eight thousand chosen men of the
Army of Britain, in spite of sea and savages, joined
his march, and he was over the Alps by May.4
1 Von der Goltz, op. tit. p. 64.
- Ian Hamilton, Staff-Officer s Scrap-Book, p. 120.
3 Tacitus adduces no reasons at all for the rejection of Suetonius' advice ;
for his "imperitia properantes " of ii. 33 is shallow. Cf. Note E.
4 Tac. ii. 57 ; cf. i. 61.
ioo THE CAMPAIGN OF OTHO ch. »
I Commissariat difficulties, also, might be foolishly
jexaggerated. Caecina had kept a stern control of
his men on his march through North Italy, and the
land had not been indiscriminately pillaged. All
that could safely be admitted was that the power of
the Italian sun in July is fatal to any prolonged
activity at all. But despite it, the immobile defend-
ing force was more likely to lose heart because of
an inactivity imposed by command than was the
attacking force because of a rest imposed by the
>heat. It was on all accounts inexpedient to prolong
the war passively till the summer. Suetonius was
^ impressed by the strength of their line of defence ;
/ but in his admiration of the river and the forts he
was forgetful of men's hearts. Otho's troops de-
y manded to be led against the invader. They were
not machine-made puppets, that they could have
their keen zeal blunted, their passion disappointed,
with impunity.
Therefore Otho rejected the advice offered him
in his council of war. He determined to take the
offensive against the enemy, and that at once. His
plan embraced all his forces and was brilliant -in
conception. Because it failed in execution"; the
ancient historian failed to understand it.
C. Othds "Strategy of Envelopment." — The
Vitellian generals at Cremona were seeking to
carry out the plan of the tactical penetration of
the enemy's line. Otho's answer to this was a
scheme for the strategical envelopment of the
(entire Vitellian army. The elements of the
scheme were these : —
sec. vn AND THE VITELLIANS 101
A large part of the Army of the Danube was
already at Aquileia ; some of its troops were perhaps
already on the ,road between Aquileia and Bedri-
acum.1 This army was to concentrate at Bedriacum
with all possible speed.
Meanwhile the troops already at Bedriacum were
to be moved to the west of the enemy's position at
Cremona, and flung across the foe's one and only
line of communication and succour. Seven miles
to the west of Cremona the river Adua, the modern
Adda, flows from the north into the Po. This is
a broad and navigable stream, the outflow of the
waters of Lake Como. A strong force posted at';
the confluence of the Po and Adda, behind the
latter river, would isolate an enemy at Cremona.
The Cremona force, cooped up in the town, reduced
J for its supplies to the few miles of country in its
immediate neighbourhood, unable to force its way
over the Po to the south, would be envejuped and1
invested. Hunger would speedily compel it to try
and cut its way out through the force posted on the
Adda. It might, it is true, find a way of retreat
open on the north towards Brescia ; but this way
led it nowhere, save up against the barrier of the
unfriendly Alps, and still the foe on the Adda lay
between it and its Emperor Vitellius. If it could ,
not cut its way through this force it must very soon
capitulate. Even if it did force the passage of the
Adda with heavy loss, it would be an escaping
army, fleeing back to a far-off base. Its prestige
1 E.g. the vexilla of the Seventh legion from Pannonia and Eleventh from
Dalmatia (ii. 1 1).
102 THE CAMPAIGN OF OTHO ch...
- would be gone and Vitellius' cause ruined. If it
chose rather to force the passage of the Po, then
Placentia lay like a lion in its path, and the army
on the Adda could reach and notably strengthen
the garrison long before the disheartened column
of the Vitellians in retreat could arrive outside
II that fortress. The enemy at Cremona should be
"enveloped" by the transferring of the army at
Bedriacum to the line of the Adda, while the Army
of the Danube marched to take its place at
Bedriacum and complete the investment.
When Otho had once conceived the main idea,
three questions arose in connection with the method
of its execution : —
( i ) The Route of the Flank March. — The Emperor
directed his army to march by the northern bank of
the river. At some safe distance from Cremona,
when the generals thought the time had come, the
force was to leave the Postumian way, and strike
off to their right flank, to circle round on the north
side of the town of Cremona, and so to come down
upon its intended position on the Adda. This
position was therefore to be reached by a flank
march in the immediate proximity of the enemy.
The dangers of this route seemed obvious. Why
' then did not Otho choose the route on the southern
side of the Po ? This would have been absolutely
safe ; and the army would have crossed by Placentia
and turned eastwards thence to the confluence.
But this, the safer route, could not be chosen. The
march from Bedriacum, in that event, would first have
been an apparent retreat to cross the river at Hostilia.
sec. vii AND THE VITELLIANS 103
On the way to Hostilia the army might then
have met the forces coming up from Aquileia to;
take its place at Bedriacum. The confusion which
would have resulted would have been inextricable.
There was but a single road, and the country on
both sides of it was either a marsh or heavily culti-
vated. And the effect of the apparent retreat on^
the enemy at Cremona had to be considered. If
the force in front of them had thus disappeared,
their attention must at once have been excited.
Had they guessed Otho's intended manoeuvre they
would have had abundance of time to occupy the line
of the Adda themselves, and safeguard their line of
communications to the west. The whole plan of
••> strategical envelopment would fail dismally. Had
they, however, as was far more probable, pursued
after the retreating column, the feigned retreat
might easily have become a real one ; or if the Army
of Bedriacum safely crossed the Po at Hostilia, the
Danube army, moving up piecemeal, might have
met the foe hotly pursuing the others, and in that
case would have been rolled up in disaster, and
flung back discomfited upon Aquileia. Once more
the plan of envelopment would be ruined ; and the
Army of Italy would find itself between a victorious
foe to the east of it and Vitellius' army approaching
on the west.
But if, on the contrary, the force at Bedriacum
marched by the northern route, not only was this
less than half the distance, but its effect on the
enemy would surely be just that which was most »
desired. The foe was apparently quiescent in his
io4 THE CAMPAIGN OF OTHO
entrenched lines at Cremona. On hearing of a
forward movement on part of the force at Bedriacum,
surely they would be tempted to cling all the more
closely to their fortified lines, and thus give the
Othonians exactly the opportunity which they de-
sired for passing unmolested round the town on
the Brescia side. Before the Vitellians recovered
from their surprise the flank march would be ended,
and the invaders be trapped at Cremona. There
was also another consideration : the enemy were
trying to bridge the Po. If they succeeded, an army
marching by the southern route might be assailed
violently on the flank where they deemed themselves
safe. This would be fatal ; for a flank march is
horribly dangerous, chiefly when the men engaged
upon it do not realise the nature of the movement,
and any sudden appearance of the foe upon their
own flank is therefore utterly unexpected.
The soldiers in the marching columns always assume that
their commanders suppose the enemy straight before them. If
the latter suddenly appears on the flank, the men may easily
imagine that they are surprised, and this destroys their confidence.
Flank marches, which even the private soldier knows to be such,
are easy to execute. This is proved by the numerous marches
within the investing lines before Metz and Paris in 1870, for the
purpose of concentrating troops at certain points. They all in
their nature were flank marches in relation to the enemy's forces
stationed between and behind the works of the fortress. But
here the whole situation was clear, for every soldier knew that
during the march they could only be attacked from the side of
the fortress, and the feeling of being placed in an extraordinary
position disappeared. The troops marched quite unconcernedly
along or close behind the line of investment.1
1 Von der Goltz, The Nation in Arms, p. 237.
bbc. vii AND THE VITELLIANS 105
No soldier marching from Bedriacum to the
Adda by the northern route could have failed to
realise the situation. On the southern route he— ~
might have been unexpectedly attacked and dis-
mayed. Whereas, if the northern route were chosen,
the closer the attention which the enemy paid to
their bridge-building, the better the chance of passing
quietly by them on the opposite side of the town.
Cremona was to be the Metz of the campaign. The
Vitellians were the French ; the Othonians the
Germans.
The northern route, then, was the one rightly
chosen by Otho for the flank march of the envelop-
ing column.
(2) The Command for Simultaneous Movement. —
But why, it might be asked, was not Suetonius'
advice accepted that Otho should at least wait a'
few days for the arrival of the Danube army at
Bedriacum ? Why did he rely rather on a simul-
taneous movement of both armies — the one to the
Adda from Bedriacum, the other to Bedriacum
from Aquileia ?
The answer to this, again, is not far to seek.
Had the Othonians made no movement until the.
Danube legions had arrived at Bedriacum, the
enemy at once must have heard of the arrival of
these, and have been anxiously upon their guard.
For the moment they seemed lulled in inactivity by '
a false sense of security. It was this false sense of
security of which Otho could so brilliantly avail
himself. Once let the Danube army arrive at
Bedriacum, any forward movement after its arrival '
106 THE CAMPAIGN OF OTHO ch.i
t
J would find the foe ./thoroughly awakened out of
sleep. There would be no chance of envelopment
by a flank march without stubborn fighting front to
front. The strategical opportunity would be lost.
The simultaneous movement of two or more columns
to the same place needs, indeed, the most careful
timing to be successful. Yet it is by this that in
modern warfare the most striking triumphs are won,
such as that of Koniggratz in 1866. More and
more such a device of the simultaneous movement
of converging columns will be employed. But
Otho's columns had not so hard a task, as their
simultaneous movement was directed on different
places. There was no reason why it should not be
properly carried out by both armies. Certainly the
whole idea of strategic envelopment depended on
this simultaneous movement.
(3) The Position of the Emperor. — Otho himself
neither waited for the arrival of his Danube army
at Bedriacum, nor did he put himself at the head
of the column of march for the Adda. He himself
crossed the river to a place named Brixellum, the
modern little town of Brescello, which lies on the
southern bank of the Po, about midway between
Hostilia to the east and Cremona to the west.
With him he took a considerable force of Guards,
light-armed troops, and cavalry. The Bedriacum
column was to be led by the Emperor's brother
Titianus and the prefect of the Guards, Licinius
Proculus, with Suetonius and Celsus to help them.
No part of the whole strategical plan has been
more misrepresented and misunderstood than Otho's
SEC. VII
AND THE VITELLIANS 10:
withdrawal to Brescello. The Roman historian
thoughtlessly ascribes it to the Emperor's care for-"
his own personal safety. His troops adored him ;^.
he had endeared himself to them by a display of
sterling military qualities on the march from Rome-p-
he was presently to die with calm courage. And
yet Tacitus believes that at this, the very crisis of
the whole campaign, he ran like a coward. More-
over, at a time when his Army of Bedriacum was
greatly inferior in numbers to the enemy, and was'^
about to make a flank march of no small risk, he, the
Emperor, still further weakened it by detaching the
troops which he took with him to Brescello to serve
as his own personal bodyguard. " That day was
the beginning of ruin to the Othonian cause," wrote
the historian ; " the spirit of the troops left behind
was broken." l Like the Duke of Argyle in face of
Montrose, Otho, according to this view, found his
courage fail him, and, when urged by his staff that |
his life was more valuable than his presence, was |
easily persuaded to withdraw. And the officers and
men of the Guards felt his desertion, as did the
knight of Ardenvohr that of the chief of his clan : —
" It is better it should be so," said he to himself, devouring
his own emotion ; " but — of his line of a hundred sires, I know
not one who would have retired while the banner of Diarmid
waved in the wind in the face of its most inveterate foes ! " 2
Surely Otho's Roman courage and his Imperial
position might well take the place even of a hundred
sires, now that the very last stake was to be played.
i Tac. ii. 33.
2 Cf. Sir W. Scott's Legend of Montrose^ chaps, xviii.-xx.
/
io8 THE CAMPAIGN OF OTHO
The galley on Loch Eil saved the craven chieftain's
life when the battle was lost. No galley on the Po
could save the Emperor from the last consequences
of defeat.
In actual fact, it was not Otho's duty to lead the
y flanking column. He was bound to take up such a
central position as to be able from it to control the
development of all parts of the combined scheme of
envelopment. One force was to march to the
Adda, another to Bedriacum, and all the while the
defence of the line of the river on the south had to
be maintained. The commander-in-chief was bound
to occupy as headquarters a place where he could
be in touch with all his separate forces which were
co-operating to secure one end. The commander-
in-chief in such a case is not allowed to take the
personal command of one of those separate forces,
not even of that exposed to the greatest risk of
contact with the foe. He must be found in a
situation whence he has a grip of the whole de-
velopment of the main idea, from which he can, if
. ' necessary, send troops to any vital and threatened
point in the whole area of events. Such a central
position was Brescello. It was in touch with
Bedriacum, with Hostilia, and with the whole
^ southern bank of the Po as far as Placentia.
From it, as a matter of fact, Otho could send a
member of his staff to take Macer's place when the
latter's resistance to the bridge-building at Cremona
was proving inadequate, so great was the advantage
of the presence of the Emperor at the central posi-
tion. Because Brescello was out of harm's way,
sec. vii AND THE VITELLIANS 109
because the Emperor took no share in the fighting
which presently fell to the lot of the Bedriacum
column, men forgot that he was commander-in-
chief and not a mere general of division, and
foolishly accused him of cowardice. Such easy
imputations are part of the heavy burden of supreme
command. " The magnitude of the personal re-
sponsibility inseparable from command against the
enemy " l is surely load enough for the general-in-
chief without his having also to bear such charges,
lightly brought and readily believed.
The more, therefore, that clear-sightedness and intelligent
direction in the development of a battle is demanded of a
general, the greater the reason that he should keep out of
serious danger. The best post for a commander-in-chief is one
from which he has a clear view of the lines of advance of his
columns as well as of the enemy's line of battle. Such places
are usually found only at a considerable distance completely
beyond the range of fire ; but it would be an entirely false sense
of honour' to reject them on that account. By displaying his
contempt of death, a commander-in-chief can scarcely effect
more than any subordinate officer; but, by clearness and cool
deliberation in his plans, he will, on the other hand, become
the benefactor of hundreds of thousands.2
The principle applied here in the sphere of
tactics is true in that of strategy. The great
scheme of envelopment meant the moving of many
pieces together on the strategical chessboard. The
Emperor must be the player and set them all in
motion from Brescello, not be himself the hardy
knight to cry checkmate after its skilful moves. The
1 Henderson, Science of War, p. 50.
2 Von der Goltz, The Nation in Arms, p. 133.
)
no THE CAMPAIGN OF OTHO ch.i
flank march of the one column had to be entrusted
/ to his divisional commanders. The general officer
commanding must rely on the sagacity and bravery
of his subordinates. If they prove incompetent he
jjj pays the penalty, as did Lee at Gettysberg.
A rough diagram, then, may illustrate the plan
of strategical envelopment as it might have pre-
sented itself to Otho's mind, when the investment
was completed : —
Ta^51""
<*? vg ;t... \- .,j»r--
*».. V^. ' •••• \o fin''1''
:T9_Pquia_ 1;.V , L, *• RA=^ ■{o t-'~
m
\
p Fo Og Po *0 Po h
A = proposed position of the force marching from Bedriacum (B) by dotted line
and based on Placentia (P), thus cutting the communications
of the Vitellians at Cremona (C) with the west, via either Milan or
Pavia (Ticinum).
B = proposed position at Bedriacum of the force from Aquileia.
C = the Vitellians " enveloped " (as a result of the flank march) at Cremona.
"0 = Otho's headquarters at Brescello.
^>G = Macer's gladiators defending the river against the bridge -building at
Cremona.
PandH = the only passages of the Po, at Placentia (P), and Hostilia (H) ;
both in Otho's hands.
The road to Brescia is a cul-de-sac for the Vitellians, as the passage of the
Adda farther north (via Bergamo) would be easily controlled by the foe
at A.
To achieve the envelopment of the enemy, Otho
ordered the force at Bedriacum to advance towards
the enemy upon its flank march to the confluence
of the Adda and the Po.
D. The Possibility of Success. — The crucial move-
ment in the strategical plan of envelopment, upon
which its whole fortune depended, was the flank
march of the Bedriacum army. The plan itself
sec. vn AND THE VITELLIANS in
was a brilliant one. For modern war it has been
declared that " envelopment, not mere weight of
numbers, is the true secret of decisive success."1
Such was the strategy by which the Emperor Otho
planned to defeat the enemy, rather than stay idly
on the defensive, as his older generals recom-
mended, or make, with inferior numbers, a frontal
attack on the foe. But were not the dangers of the1
flank march too great to allow success ? The plan
was a daring one. Was it not also a rash one,
which merited failure ? Criticism might fasten on
two points — on the enormous risk of the flank
march itself, and on the precarious situation of the
force at the confluence even if the flank march was
accomplished.
Neither, however, of these dangers was such as
reasonably to deter Otho from carrying out his
scheme.
(i) The Flank March. — "These," writes the
German expert concerning flank marches, "have
the reputation of being difficult and dangerous
undertakings. Military history, however, teaches
us that in the matter of flank marching one may
venture more than theory jwould seem to allow.
Frederick the Great at Prague made a flank march
round the right wing of the Austrians, and at Kolin
even along their whole front . . . even in manoeuvres
flank marches are successfully executed even within
sight of the enemy." 2
All depended on the immobility of the enemy and,
1 Henderson, Science of War, p. 415.
2 Von der Goltz, op. cit. pp. 234, 235.
ii2 THE CAMPAIGN OF OTHO
especially, on the discretion of Otho's generals.
They must act rapidly and with decision, and must
choose the fitting place for striking away north-
wards from the main road before they came within
sight of Cremona or in touch with the Vitellians in
the town. The object to be gained by the march
was worth many risks.
The greatest advantage of all turning movements is that, if
they succeed, they finally result in the whole of the enemy's
army, or a part of it, being caught between two fires. Scharn-
horst expressed himself to the effect that " troops attacked upon
more than one side may be regarded as defeated." This pro-
nouncement is not true unconditionally, yet it is founded upon
the fact that he who finds himself between several enemies
threatening him from different directions, is constrained to
eccentric action which tends to split up his forces and thus to
weaken him, while the former work concentrically and gain in
strength.1
If the march were successful the foe would be in
the trap, and if they escaped at all, it would be only
to retreat with loss and disgrace. The risks must
be run. " He who would always in war be on the
safe side will hardly ever attain his object." J
(2) The Position on the Adda. — Otho's force,
if it reached the confluence, might seem to be
very uncomfortably placed between the enemy at
Cremona and Vitellius' approaching reinforcements;
but this in reality was hardly the case. Vitellius
had not crossed the Alps, and the crisis of the
situation must come in a very few days after its
arrival at the confluence. Valens and Caecina had
1 Von der Goltz, op. cit. p. 283.
2 A saying of Von Moltke's a propos of the campaign of 1866.
sRc.vn AND THE VITELLIANS 113
not supplies enough to stay sulkily in Cremona, nor
indeed would their troops be likely tamely to submit
to this. This force, then, at Cremona was the
danger, and the Adda was a splendid stream for-
Otho's men to defend even against a much larger
army, especially when their comrades from the old
camp would be pressing upon the rear of the
attacking enemy. The strong fort which is to-day
placed on both banks of that river at Pizzighettone,
where the road and rail for Cremona cross the
stream, shows the value still placed upon the Adda
as a military obstacle. Here, then, the force would
serenely expect the attack of the desperate foe,
even though it had temporarily surrendered its
own line of communications with the east.
It never occurred to any one in the German army at the time
that on August 18, 1870, we were fighting a great battle with
reversed front, and that, in our outflanking attack upon the
French right, we had completely cut ourselves off from our
established lines of communication. All attention was centred
forwards in victory and not backwards in retreat.1
But the Othonians at the confluence would have .
been more happily placed in the event of a reverse
than were the Germans outside Metz ; for the
former could fall back on Placentia, and so regain
safety and their communications once more. And
they were Romans. Otho's strategical plan of
envelopment was bold in conception, and needed
energy and intelligence in execution. But its
daring and possibility merited success ; and the
alternatives to it of quiescence or of frontal attack
1 Von der Goltz, op. cit, p. 355.
I
ii4 THE CAMPAIGN OF OTHO ch.j
promised very little, if any, triumph for the
Emperor.
§ 8. The " Battle of Bedriacum "
After Otho had departed from the camp at
Bedriacum, the generals left in command prepared
to carry out his orders. Part of the force under
Gallus was kept in camp to guard it, and to await
the arrival of the Danube army. The rest of it
marched out on April 14, along the road to
' Cremona. In the day's march they covered four-
teen miles and halted for the night.1 The generals
judged it safe to approach within eight miles of the
city before diverging to the north. The troops
were marching to take up a new position at the
confluence of the Adda and Po, and entrench them-
selves there. They therefore were naturally in full
marching kit and accompanied by a baggage train.
It was most desirable to keep to the broad, paved
way as long as possible. Hence the generals ven-
tured along it as far as fourteen miles, and en-
camped for the night. Their ultimate objective,
the confluence, lay some fifteen miles away in a
straight line. The next day's march would, how-
ever, have to be a longer one by reason of the
J detour round Cremona.
But neither generals nor troops were in good
spirits. Even in April the sun can be extremely
hot and the road exceedingly dusty between Calva-
1 Reading "ad quartum decimum " for "ad quartum '' in ii. 39. See
Note D, "The Distances in Tacitus ii. 39, 40."
sec. viii AND THE VITELLIANS 115
tone and Cremona. The fourteen miles had been
fatiguing, and the troops had been distressed for
lack of water. This indeed was not the generals'
fault, unless (which seems improbable) they had
been able to improvise water - carts and had
neglected to do so. For although in the flat plain
to the east of Cremona there are to-day ditches,
innumerable, yet in April these were either dry or*
contained only a little stagnant filthy water.1 Of
rivers there were none ; for every step along the
road took the thirsty troops farther and farther
from the Oglio, and their camp for the night in
the neighbourhood of the modern hamlet of Pieve
Delmona lay midway between the Oglio on the
north and the Po on the south, and some six or
seven miles from both. In the immediate presence!
of the unsuspecting enemy the men could not bej
allowed to straggle in search of water, either on)
the march or from the evening's camp. It might
indeed have been better if the generals had left
the main road earlier and encamped beside the
Oglio for the night. But the attractions of the,
highway proved too strong.2
The soldiers were therefore in a bad temper and ■
angry with their generals. In their discontent and
1 This at least was the case between Calvatone and Piadena in April
1906.
2 Tacitus ii. 39 : " Adeo imperite ut quamquam verno tempore anni et tot
(sic) circum amnibus penuria aquae fatigarentur. " This, of course, is mere
nonsense if the march were only four miles. If fourteen, still it is the private
soldier's view (as always) which puts his sufferings down to lack of skill on
part of his generals. Tacitus never realises a military situation. He does
not even tell us that the march lasted two days, although we should have
inferred it from probability, had not Plutarch directly told us. For the
impossibility of reconciling Plutarch"s whole story with Tacitus, cf. Note D.
n6 THE CAMPAIGN OF OTHO ch.i
impatience they loudly lamented the Emperor's
absence. The generals meanwhile were fiercely
quarrelling among themselves. Suetonius and
Celsus disliked and distrusted the whole scheme
from the beginning. They now gloomily pointed
(out its risks to Titianus and Proculus, who were,
/for their part, eager and ready to carry out Otho's
■ orders. The foe, urged the malcontents, were all
but in sight. In case of attack these had but four
miles to tramp (a characteristic underestimate).
But their own troops were in marching order, not
fighting trim, and wearied by the march. These
j recriminations and gloomy reflections came too
late, and were indeed out of place. The troops
could not but mark the acrimonious dissensions
-between their leaders, and these must have the
worst effect upon them, especially in their present
temper. There was no doubt that they had come
too far along the road, too near the enemy, for
safety. And now the generals were busy discuss-
ing again what had already been decided. It was
Ih grand error on Otho's part to entrust the column
/to a committee of generals in place of one supreme
commander. Roman generals did not always agree
together. Two were bad enough, but a council of
four was indeed likely to ruin any plan. The
Emperor sought to remedy the evil by his own
control. He despatched a Numidian mounted
orderly from Brescello with the stern and impera-
tive order to the generals to advance. It may
be that they misread the order, *and thought that
it countermanded the original plan in favour of a
sec. viii AND THE VITELLIANS 117
direct attack upon the Vitellians at Cremona. -£)r
perhaps Otho himself, hearing that the force had
come so near to the enemy, judged that there was
no room for the flank march left, and himself com-
manded a frontal attack instead. Or, again, the
generals may have relied on the enemy's inactivity
and still moved forward, intending to strike north
presently, allured by the fatal attractions of the
highway. Whose the blunder was can never nowr
be determined. All that is certain is that Otho's Uv
whole strategical scheme miscarried ; for when the
column resumed its march, obedient to orders, on
April 15, they blundered straight upon the foe.
The head of the column suddenly found the
enemy's horse charging full upon them.
Valens had not been caught unready that*v.
morning. Under screen of his cavalry charge he
marched his army out of camp and drew it up
ready for battle. Caecina and his men were quickly
summoned from the half- made bridge. The full
Vitellian army stood ready to fight, drawn up
quietly despite the near approach of the foe.
Thick brushwood on either side of the road hid the
Othonian approach, and in consequence the Vitellian
regiments moved to their allotted places without
alarm or disorder. Their cavalry indeed came
presently reeling back, for the head of the Othonian
column stood its ground valiantly and repulsed
them. It needed the levelled pikes and the taunts
of the First infantry legion of the Vitellians toj
compel the shaken horse to pull bridle and rally./
Then the whole army moved forward on a wide
n8 THE CAMPAIGN OF OTHO ch. i
I front stretching some distance on either side of the
' road. The repulse of the enemy's cavalry had
j given the generals on the Othonian side time to
extend their front, and dress it to meet their
opponents to some degree. But their confusion
was still great. Some indeed believed that the
advancing foe had abandoned Vitellius' cause and
[were joining them in all love and amity. Some
pressed boldly on to the front seeking honour ;
some hurried as eagerly to the rear in search of
safety. There was more uproar than there was
discipline. At the height of the confusion the
.Vitellian line charged.
But the fighting was stubborn. Between the
river and the road two legions strove fiercely.
The Othonian First Adjutrix, eager to gain its first
laurels (for it had been but recently levied), rushed
fiercely upon the Vitellian Twenty- first, a legion
of old renown, overthrew its first ranks, and carried
off its eagle in triumph. In bitter anger the
veterans rallied and thrust hard upon the foe.
The legate of the First fell, his men were routed,
and the loss of the eagle was made good by the
v capture of many colours from the enemy. On the
other flank, the men of the Fifth legion of the
German army drove the Pannonian Thirteenth
legion in flight off the field. The detachment of
the Fourteenth legion, the famous legion of Britain,
stood true to their absent comrades and the tradi-
tions of the regiment. But they, a mere handful,
could not save the day for Otho, and they fought
vainly but desperately, surrounded by a ring of
sec. via AND THE VITELLIANS 119
foes. It was, like Inkermann, a soldiers' battle.
Otho's generals had already done their utmost to~
ruin his cause by their quarrels. They had igno-
rantly exposed their army, unprepared and in dis-
order, to the frontal attack of a more numerous
and well-ordered veteran force. One thing only
was lacking. They fled from the field. But their
men went on fighting. From the southern bank
of the Po, the gladiators crossed the river in boats
to help their comrades. Then the Vitellians made
their last supreme effort. Valens and Caecina flung
their reserves into the battle-line. The enemy's
centre was pierced. The Batavian auxiliaries of
the German army cut the gladiators to pieces even
before they reached dry land, and, hastening in the
flush of victory, came charging upon the left flank
of the stubborn foe. This flank charge decided
the issue." The Othonians broke and fled wildly.
The battle was ended.
The pursuit rolled on for many miles. No
quarter was given, for, says the Roman historian
grimly, " captives in civil wars cannot be turned
to profit." The ways were heaped high with the
bodies of the slain. The survivors of the rout
found refuge only with Gallus and the camp at
Bedriacum, twenty miles away. The Vitellians
checked their pursuit four miles from the camp,
and bivouacked for the night just west of the
modern town of Piadena. Next day, April 16,
they advanced to Bedriacum, and the garrison
surrendered.1
1 Tac. ii. 39-45-
120 THE CAMPAIGN OF OTHO ch. i
Thanks to the mistakes of the enemy, Vitellius'
generals had won for their master the final victory,
and with it the Empire. He himself visited the
scene of the struggle on the 24th of May, six
weeks after it had been fought. No attempt
had been made to bury the dead. Caecina and
Valens showed their Emperor over the battle-field
and explained to him the details of that bitter fight.
His one saying is recorded : —
When hee came into the fields where the battaile was
fought, and some of his traine loathed and abhorred the
putrified corruption of the dead bodies, he stuck not to harten
and encourage them with this cursed speech : that an Enemie
slaine had a very good smell, but a Citizen farre better. How-
beit to qualifie and allay the strong savour and sent that they
cast, hee poured downe his throat before them all exceeding
great store of strong wine, and dealt the same plentifully
about.1
Vitellius is the one utterly contemptible figure
of the century.
Thus the first " Battle of Bedriacum " 2 was
fought, and Vitellius won his throw for Empire.
A review of the military measures of both sides
shows that both made mistakes, or at least failed
in their intentions. Neither the plan of tactical
penetration on the one side, nor that of stra-
tegical envelopment on the other, was fully carried
out. As Otho's had been the more brilliant and
1 Suetonius, Vitellius, 10. Philemon Holland's translation (a.d. 1606).
Cf. Tac. ii. 70.
2 The title " Battle of Bedriacum " is a misnomer, as the actual fighting
took place just outside Cremona, twenty miles away, and that of the " Battle
of Cremona " would be more fitting. But the former name is consecrate by
custom.
VITELLIUS.
From a bust in Vienna.
SEC. VIII
AND THE VITELLIANS 121
daring conception, so its failure, which precipitated
the final fight, was the more ruinous, and brought
defeat and death upon him.
The great cause of its failure was the incompetence^
of Otho's generals. As the story of the battle shows,
they clung to the main road too long, calculating
too confidently upon the enemy's immobility. But
the enemy gladly sallied out to attack, and Otho's
troops were caught encumbered with baggage and
tools, unready for a fight and not expecting it.
To incompetence the generals added cowardice, of
which later they blandly made a merit, and won
Vitellius' pardon by this means. \] There was small
wonder that with such generals Otho lost the day.
His troops fought well for him against all possible
odds. It had been better for Suetonius had he
died eight years earlier amid Boadicea's war-
chariots. ■ He saved Britain. But now he had
lost himself.
Otho's generals failed him, as Lee's subordinates
failed to carry out their orders in the Gettysberg
campaign. Decisive defeat was the result in both
cases.
But the whole campaign has been misunder-
stood by the Roman historian. Otho's strategy
was hidden from him. The reason of this blind-
ness on Tacitus' part is easily to be found. The
Emperor could not explain his strategy to his
troops lest the enemy should hear of it before-
hand. " The one fixed law of all military
experience is that whatever is believed in one's
own camp is believed also to be true in that
122 THE CAMPAIGN OF OTHO
of the enemy."1 Very little happened in the camp
at Bedriacum without the foe being at once in-
formed of it. Civil war produces a rich crop of
traitors on both sides — above all when the com-
batants are fighting on behalf of persons and not
s on behalf of principles. On the very morning of
April 15 itself, two tribunes of the Praetorian
Guard sought for, and were "granted, an interview
with Caecina, which was interrupted only when
the battle called the general away in haste.2 Otho
therefore, having planned to envelop the enemy by
a flank march, was bound to seek to deceive them
as to his intentions. If they misread his own
, departure to Brescello as a sign of cowardice, so
I much the better. They would be all the less on
their guard. But by misleading the enemy, the
Emperor misled also the common soldier in his
own camp, and in his train he misled the most
unmilitary of historians. The soldier saw that
Otho's orders to advance had led to the battle.
He jumped to the conclusion that Otho had
1 intended that battle from the first. Tacitus
solemnly repeats his view. The soldier regretted
his Emperor's absence and wondered at it. The
historian explains it with great satisfaction as due
to cowardice. The soldier found the battle badly
mismanaged, and heavy defeat the result. The
historian put it all down to a foolish order to
advance for a frontal attack. True, the latter had
discovered in his records or inquiries some faint
1 Maj.-Gen. Maurice, Diary of Sir John Moore, ii. p. 354.
- II. 41 j cf. ii. 34.
sEc.vn, AND THE VITELLIANS 123
traces of an idea of reaching the confluence. But
as the direct way to it from Bedriacum lay straight
through Cremona, he concluded that the troops
were bound to march that way and hence would
have to fight. The troops notoriously did march
that way. The proof was complete. Otho was
reckless, impatient, foolish, a coward ! He had
made no mistake up to the time when he issued
his last orders. This was all the more reason for
an accumulation of errors in them. His troops,
adored him after the defeat as before. It was
curious ; but what will not defeated troops do ? He
died with unshaken serenity. Any coward can do
that ! He would not, as he might well have done,,
prolong the war, falling back on his Danube army,'
where the line of safe retreat was open to him \
he would not challenge Fortune's verdict upon
second field. He would redeem Italy from war'i
horrors by the willing sacrifice of his own life]
This was conduct truly worthy of a coward. The
common soldier was too ignorant to see fully his
general's incapacity and shrinking. The historian
took from him the tales of what befel and of what
was said, and wisely added the explanations.
That the military knowledge of the common
soldier, with all its hopeless limitations, should
become the wisdom of the journalist is a feature
of historical writing but too familiar to us of late
years. Otho sought, as it were, to make a Metz
of Cremona. Had his strategical idea succeeded,
Tacitus might have realised its meaning if not its
brilliance. It failed, and in consequence left but
i24 THE CAMPAIGN OF OTHO
one puzzling trace of itself in the historian's
narrative, when, that is, he speaks of the inten-
tion to reach the confluence of the Adda and
the Po. But the historian does not see the
meaning of this, and gives us in consequence
a story of the whole campaign which is indeed
" unintelligible from a military point of view." '
Even had the Germans failed in their attempt to
invest Metz — and they too came near failing — their
effort would not have been caricatured. To that
extent, at least, military science has advanced since
the days of Otho, and left its mark even upon the
intelligence of the historian. "
§ 9. The Death of Otho
When the tidings of defeat reached the Emperor
\ at Brescello, his troops there implored him to
continue the struggle. The legions from Moesia
were hastening to the front and hard at hand.
I Had Otho willed to live, he might yet have been
the victor.
But he refused to be cause of bloodshed any
longer. Though his men were eager to fight — if
need were, to die — for him, he would not suffer it.
The wife, the children, the brother of his triumphant
1 rival were in his power. He would take no venge-
) ance upon them. He blamed none, neither men
1 Mommsen.
2 The material upon which is based the view of the campaign contained
in this section, and a discussion of the difficulties of the Tacitean story, are to
be found in Note D. I have judged it best to give my conclusions in the
form of a direct narrative.
sec. ix AND THE VITELLIANS 125
nor gods, for the calamity which had befallen.^
" Such blame rather befitted him who still longed
to live." Otho had no such longing. He had
played gallantly for Empire; he had staked his;
fortune on a throw and lost. He himself would
pay the forfeit, but no other one besides. The
miseries of civil war had lasted long enough, and
he would not prolong them. If only his own life
stood now in the way of amity and peace, the way
should speedily be made open.
Intrepid in his looks, courteous in his entreaties,
he now besought, now commanded, his officers to
hasten to make their peace with the victor, and
himself rebuked the wrath of the troops with those
who obeyed and hurried from the camp. Nor
would he rest until he knew that all had fled. His
young nephew at his side was panic-stricken. He
cheered the boy and bade him hope for the new
Emperor's clemency. " Be brave," he said, " and
grasp life sturdily ; remember that Otho was your
uncle, yet remember it not overmuch." He sought
out and destroyed all letters in which were written
any words of love for him, of hatred for Vitellius.
In such-wise and in leave-taking of his friends
Otho's last day drew to evening. Then, when
darkness fell, he quenched his thirst with a little
cold water and lay down in his tent quietly to
sleep.
The light of dawn woke him, and he called
to his freedman in the tent. Had his friends, he
asked, who had left him the day before, fared well
upon their going? His servant answered that no
126 THE CAMPAIGN OF OTHO ch.i
ill had befallen any. " Go then," said the Emperor,
" and show yourself now to the troops, lest thou
die miserably at their hands as having brought
death upon me." The man went out. Then Otho
drew from under his pillow a dagger which he
\ had chosen and hidden there the evening before,
; and, turning, fell upon it. Hearing a single groan,
his slaves, still faithful, and Firmus, his loyal pre-
fect of the Guards, rushed into the tent and found
their Emperor dead. Death had come quickly to
him, nor did he die with any Stoic pose. " It is
the coward who talks much about his death," he
had yesterday told his soldiers. He might have
added, " and the philosopher." Otho was a soldier,
\\ and spent not many words on death.
His troops carried his body to the pyre, weeping,
1 kissing, now his hands, now his wounded breast.
The flame was kindled beneath the funeral pile,
and, as it blazed upwards, some of his men slew
themselves beside it for very rivalry of honour and
of sorrow for their Prince. Others too, when they
heard of it, in the camps at Bedriacum, Placentia,
and elsewhere, did the like. The officers might flee.
I The men followed their Emperor through the gate of
death. " They had received nothing of great price
at the dead man's hands, nor did they think to
suffer any dread doom at his conqueror's. But in
no tyrant ever, it seemeth, in no monarch hath
there ever been begotten so terrible, yea so mad,
a lust for rule as was their lust to yield obedience
and submit themselves to Otho's governance. Verily
that fierce longing left them not, no not though he
sec. ix AND THE VITELLIANS 127
was dead, but it abode and passed in the ending of
it into loathing unquenchable for Vitellius."1
It is hard calmly to appraise, dispassionately to
measure out, such love. It is hard to pass judg-
ment of indifference or disparagement upon the
Emperor who inspired it. Otho was careless, 11
licentious, ambitious, frankly selfish, treacherous ;'J.
but he died like a true Roman when all was done.
Fate gave him but thirty-seven years of life and a
bare three months of Empire. He bade farewell
to both unmoved, as one who goes a journey and
will presently return. Like Petronius, he is scornful |
of life with a quiet contempt born of native courage./
For him, too, the thought of death, and of the loss
by death of those good things of life which he has
enjoyed to the full, cannot cast a shadow on his
peace when the last call sounds. Like Antony, as
he answers to that call, he makes one claim to an
immortality of renown, if there be any such ; for
he, too, has won the love- -of his men in surpassing
measure. And to have won such love is not to
have failed utterly in life after all.
1 Plutarch.
CHAPTER II
THE FLAVIAN INVASION OF ITALY
How oft, indeed,
We've sent our souls out from the rigid north
To climb the Alpine passes and look forth,
Where booming low the Lombard rivers lead
To gardens, vineyards, all a dream is worth.
E. B. Browning : Casa Guidi Windows
§ I. Vit el litis and his Army in Rome
The first " Battle of Bedriacum " was fought on
April 15, a.d. 69, and Otho slew himself next
morning. The news of the victory reached his
rival Vitellius at Lugdunum, where he was met by
his victorious generals Caecina and Valens as well
as by the fugitive leaders of the defeated army,
Suetonius and Proculus. The former were suitably
honoured by the new Emperor ; the latter, when
they pleaded that their own treachery to Otho had
lost him the battle, were acquitted of the charge of
honour and received pardon. From Lugdunum
Vitellius went on his way slowly to Rome, escorted
by his generals, who showed him the battle-field1
and entertained him with gladiatorial shows at
1 On May 24.
128
sec. i FLAVIAN INVASION OF ITALY 129
Cremona and Bononia. To his large and trium-
phant army which accompanied him was given on
the march every license of plunder and debauchery,
and it did not hesitate to follow the example set by
its Emperor.1 News speedily reached Vitellius that
the legions of the East, under Mucianus in Syria
and Vespasian in Judaea, had accepted the fact of
his victory and recognised him as Emperor. His
last anxiety, therefore, was allayed, and he gladly
abandoned himself and his army to the full enjoy-
ment of the sweets of power. His mercy and
his cruelty were alike capricious. Otho's brother,
Salvius Titianus, was pardoned. Galerius Trachalus,
the orator, who was suspected of writing Otho's
spirited harangues for him, happily enjoyed the
protection of his relative Galeria, Vitellius' second
wife.2 But some of the centurions of the enemy's
army, whose crime was that of military loyalty to
their dead Prince, were executed in cold blood.
They had not the wit of their generals to plead
treachery as their reasonable apology. Thus dis-
pensing favours to some and punishments to others,
and always chiefly intent on the pleasures of the
appetite, the glutton Emperor made his slothful
progress to Rome. He entered the city in great
state at the head of sixty thousand troops and a
larger rabble of camp-followers. The troops spread
themselves over the city, lodging where they liked
and doing what mischief they pleased. All dis-
1 Tac. ii. 56, 71.
- His first wife was Petronia, now divorced and married to Dolabella —
who was presently slain for his temerity, ii. 64.
K
i3o FLAVIAN INVASION OF ITALY ch.ii
cipline was at an end. The officers had no control
over the men, the men none over their appetites.
The torrid heat of the Roman summer, the un-
healthiness of the city, the self-indulgence of the
troops, completed a demoralisation begun by victory
and plunder. Many of the men encamped on the
right bank of the Tiber, upon the low-lying plain
of the " Vatican." This flat land, now occupied by
the crowded " Leonine City," St. Peter's, "and the
Papal palace, has always been notoriously un-
healthy ; and then, when the troops new come from
the cold north hastened without self-restraint to
quench their raging thirst with the foul, polluted
river water, disease took an ominous toll of life.1
Even regimental esprit de corps was suffering ; for
* Vitellius, having disbanded all Otho's Praetorian
Guards, set to work to enrol twenty new regiments
of Guards (sixteen Praetorian cohorts and four
Urban, each a thousand strong). The men were
chosen at haphazard, with scant regard to their
merit or their services, and as a result the legions
were depleted, but no really efficient corps of
y Guards was created to compensate for this.2 Such
thoughtless army reorganisation did but corrupt
and spoil a fine force in its attempt to remedy
an existing deficiency. Recruiting also for the
legions was stopped, with intent to save money,
and many of the troops were invited to accept their
discharge from the ranks. The Gallic auxiliaries
1 I see no reason to suppose that this disease was malaria, as suggested by
Mr. W. H. Jones in his essay on "Malaria." This disease is not rapidly
fatal, even to northerners
2 Tac. ii. 93, 94.
sec. i FLAVIAN INVASION OF ITALY 131
were sent off home, and the unruly Batavian cohorts
despatched to Germany, there soon to kindle savage
rebellion. Death and folly played havoc with the
splendid Army of Germany, and at the end of six
months' loose living in Rome it seemed to be
going to rack and ruin.1
Meanwhile the Emperor played at "constitu-
tional government," and devoted his more serious
thoughts to problems of the palate. When he was
at Lugdunum, it was said, men heard the roads
which led to the city ringing with the hurrying feet
of those who came carrying the dainties of all lands
to whet his appetite, his " foul insatiable maw." 2
But the capital offered him nobler opportunities of
delicacies, and during his few months' stay in Rome
he is said to have spent nine hundred millions of
sesterces.3 He had at least the merit of a con-
sistency of taste, whether the object of his ex-
travagance was large or small. Nero had built
a palace for his soul's delight, famous and hated as
the " Golden House." For it he had clothed the
squalid slopes and dusty purlieus of the Esquiline
with woodland glades and garden greenery, re-
freshed them with cool waters and with quiet shade,
and made the arid desert of Rome's hovels blossom
as the rose.4 Otho, the " second Nero," had added
to its beauties and extent. Vitellius complained
at it : he felt himself cramped by such a meagre
habitation. But if he himself could not roam
1 Tac. ii. 67, 69.
2 " Epularum foeda et inexplebilis libido," ii. 62.
3 Over ,£7,000,000.
4 See my Life of Nero, pp. 243-247.
132 FLAVIAN INVASION OF ITALY ch.h
afield as widely as a fitting pleasaunce might
have suffered him, no such limits could fetter
the activity of his mind's intelligence. A new
recipe for hotch-potch was the child of that
intelligence, planned on so vast imperial a scale
that no mere potter could fashion a dish large
enough to contain it. The silversmith alone
succeeded where the potter failed, and his silver
dish remained an object of wonder to succeeding
generations until the thrifty Hadrian melted it
down for coin. In drunkenness and revelling, in
gluttony and foulness, the Emperor Vitellius spent
his few months of rule.1 And all the while his
splendid army was decaying and its two victorious
generals grew more jealous each of the other every
day. " Truly it was to the State's good that
Vitellius was vanquished."2
§ 2. The Gathering of the Storm
Meanwhile heavy storm-clouds were gathering
on the far horizon to east and to north-east. Vitel-
lius' treatment of the victorious army was senseless
enough, even though he believed all danger of
further war at an end ; but his method of dealing
with the vanquished army was not of such wisdom
as to warrant such a belief. Some small efforts
indeed were made to remove the defeated legions
from the neighbourhood of Italy. The First Adju-
1 Tac. ii. 62, 94, 95. Cf. Suetonius, Vitellius, 3, 10-13. There is
no reason to discredit these accounts.
- " Reipublicae haud dubie intererat Vitellium vinci," Tac. iii. 86.
sec. ii FLAVIAN INVASION OF ITALY 133
trix legion, which had fought gallantly for Otho in
the recent battle, was sent to Spain. The veteran
Fourteenth legion was known to be in a most
dangerous temper. Only a detachment of the
regiment had taken an active part in the war, and
this had stood its ground to the last outside Cremona
in the centre of a ring of foes. The legion as a whole
had not been defeated, and indignantly disowned
a share in the blame for the defeat. It was promptly
ordered to return to its old quarters in Britain.
At the time it lay at Turin, fretting and rebellious,
quarrelling as usual with the ferocious Batavian
cohorts attached to it. So anxious was the Govern-
ment to dispose of it without the chance of further
friction of any kind, that the Batavians were finally
detached from it and sent off to Germany, and it
itself was bidden avoid the town of Vienne on its
march through Gaul. The townsfolk of this city
had always wished Vitellius so ill that it was feared
the legionaries might be encouraged to make a
stand here and refuse obedience any more. Hence
they were made to march by the Little St. Bernard
Pass over the Graian Alps to Montmelian and
thence, instead of pursuing the usual route by
Grenoble to Vienne, to strike away to Chambery,
and so direct to Lyons.1 These prudent precau-
tions were of avail, and the legion arrived in
Britain. It had done no damage on the way,
except that it had left its camp-fires burning on the
night when it marched from Turin, and by some
1 " Eo flexa itineris," Tac. ii. 66. The use of the modern names is
perhaps justified for clearness' sake.
134 FLAVIAN INVASION OF ITALY cr.ii
means or other, thanks to this, part of the unlucky
colony was burnt to the ground. This was a
small price to pay for riddance of the legion.
Its Batavian comrades also duly reached their
homeland on the lower Rhine. But fortune had
not separated the cohorts and the legion for long.
The folly of the Roman Government had sent the
Batavians, now proud and experienced troops, back
to their tribesmen to add fuel to their discontent
and strength to their plots. The " Indian Mutiny "
of Roman history was, within a few months, the
result. Then when the tide of massacres and
Roman defeats at last was ebbing, and Vespasian's
Government set grimly to work to crush the
mutineers, the men of the Fourteenth legion came
gleefully from oversea to take vengeance upon
their ancient enemies and old-time false comrades
for all the insults endured at their hands.1
These events were quickly to happen. But for
the moment Vitellius had rid Italy of two of
the " conquered legions." With this, however,
his stock of wisdom was exhausted. The Guards
and the Danube army had also belonged to Otho's
strength. These he now treated with less prudence.
The Guards were disbanded, with the exception of
two cohorts which had done good service in helping
to overawe the Batavians while these were still in
camp with the Fourteenth legion at Turin. Though
the disbandment was well managed, the cohorts
being separated before the order was issued, and
though the men were given the customary rewards
1 See below, Chap. III. Cf. Tac. ii. 66.
sec. ii FLAVIAN INVASION OF ITALY 135
on retiring from the service1 (a treatment indeed
which was more generous than perhaps they had
any right to expect), yet they regretted the loss of
their career, and gladly seized the chance of taking
up arms again, which Vespasian's rising so soon
gave to them. These Guardsmen formed " the v
strength of the Flavian cause."2 If Vitellius had
been able to retain them under arms and attach
them by interest to his service, they might have
forgiven and forgotten their own defeat and Otho's
death. But the new Emperor judged that he had
too many troops of his own. How then could he
find room in his army for those who had fought
against his cause ? Moreover, there was the risk
of treachery in case of disturbance. The problem of
dealing with Otho's Guards was certainly a delicate
one for Vitellius, but the event did not justify the
easy solution which pleased him.
The Danube army was differently treated. This
had consisted of seven legions : two in Pannonia
(VII. Galbianaand XIII. Gemina); two in Dalmatia
(XI. Claudia and XIV. Gemina); and three in Moesia
(III. Gallica, VII. Claudia, and VIII. Augusta). The
Fourteenth legion had now been sent to Britain.
Of the other six, only the Thirteenth legion from
Pannonia had been present at the battle of
Bedriacum. The survivors of this regiment were
at first set to work to build amphitheatres at
Cremona and Bononia, in which Vitellius was to be
1 The "honesta missio" probably carried with it the pension paid by the
Aerarium militare.
2 Tac. ii. 67, "robur Flavianarum partium."
136 FLAVIAN INVASION OF ITALY ch...
entertained when he arrived in Italy. Such work
was inglorious, and the strain was not relieved by
the gibing of the townsfolk who, at Cremona at
least, sharpened their silly wits upon the vanquished
and labouring soldiers. That merriment was pre-
sently to be recompensed, and the men of the
Thirteenth exacted the full price, and more, when
autumn came. But now it was summer, and the
soldiers performed masons' work till the buildings
were done. Then they were sent back to their old
headquarters in Pannonia at Poetovio (now Pettau
on the river Drave *). Their comrades of the
Seventh legion had preceded them on their return
to the province at Vitellius' orders. There the
two legions waited, nursing wrath in their hearts,
longing for the hour of requital for Otho's defeat
and for their damaged reputation. The Eleventh
legion had in the same way returned to its province
Dalmatia. It too had had no glut of fighting, and
was ready to strive again.2
But the three Moesian legions, the Third,
the Seventh, and the Eighth, were bolder, and
refused any parleyings with their triumphant rivals,
the men of the German army. They were in full
strength, marching for Aquileia, standing, as it were,
on the very threshold of the war, at the moment
when the battle was being fought at Cremona a few
miles to the west. Had they come so far to find
the door shut violently in their very faces upon all
their hopes of merry battle and the soldier's sure
reward ? Messengers came bringing the tidings of
1 Tac. iii. I. 2 Tac. ii. 67, 86 ; cf. iii. 32.
SEC. II
FLAVIAN INVASION OF ITALY 137
Otho's defeat. They chased them roughly from
the lines, and hastened forward to the frontier town
as if scornful of the rumour of disaster. Colours
were found bearing Vitellius' name. They rent
them in pieces. If they had not enjoyed the fight-
ing, at least they would not forgo the plunder.
They seized on the legions' military chests, broke
them open, and divided up the money. They
sought spoils on every hand. They were in the
enemy's land, and as the enemy's land it should be
treated. Vitellius was leading his placid and gross
life at Rome. Caecina and Valens were contend-
ing there for the prize of greater honour at their
master's hands. But on the north-east frontier of
Italy were three legions, which still defied them
all, and formed the centre for the gathering storm.
News reached the legionaries from the distant East.
The Empire was not at peace. The provinces did not
all rest quiet under Vitellius' rule. It was but the
German army which had won him the victory. The
great army of the Eastern frontier would acquiesce
no more in a triumph so lightly won, would accept
no longer so despicable an Emperor. Vespasian had
risen. Mucianus, Governor of Syria ; Alexander,
prefect of Egypt ; all the kings, princes, peoples,
and soldiers of the Eastern Empire were leagued
together under his banner against the glutton, the
puppet nominee of the savage German army. The
legions at Aquileia heard the news and embraced
the opportunity. They had disowned allegiance
to Vitellius : this then might be counted loyalty
to Vespasian their Prince. They had plundered
138 FLAVIAN INVASION OF ITALY ch.h
Italy: this was clearly a land hostile to his
cause. With speed they sent to their com-
rades in Pannonia. The Seventh legion, swayed
by desire for revenge and by the promptings of
their legate, Antonius Primus, gladly answered to
the call. The Thirteenth legion had still better
reason to join the growing army. The Dalmatian
army, the Eleventh legion, hesitated. But the
Army of the Danube was so far united that five
legions were ready to strike in Vespasian's name
against their old enemies and conquerors. Letters
were at once sent to the other remnants of Otho's
army. Surely they would not now hold back from
the cause which had revived again. The First
legion in Spain, the Fourteenth in Britain, received
from their old comrades the news of the great rising
and the call to arms. Manifestoes were scattered
broadcast through Gaul. The little cloud in the
East had become a rushing tempest. " In the
twinkling of an eye the flame of a mighty war leapt
up." The banner of the Flavian cause was waving
on the north-eastern frontier of Italy.1
Flavius Vespasianus, the general then busy
with the Jewish war, was at this time nearly
sixty years old. Neither his age nor his blunt
soldierly character of good-humoured common sense
encouraged him to embark upon so desperate an
enterprise as that of challenging Vitellius, the
Emperor now recognised in Italy and Rome, for his
Imperial power. Vespasian had survived the shock
1 " Momento temporis flagrabat ingens belluni," Tac. ii. 86; cf. ii. 85.
Suetonius, Vespasian, 6.
VESPASIAN.
From a bust in the Museo Nazionale, Naples.
sec. ii FLAVIAN INVASION OF ITALY 139
which his untimely gift of sleep had once given
to Nero's artistic sensibilities.1 He had placidly
accepted Galba as his Prince, and sent his elder son
Titus from Judaea to do the old Emperor homage on
his father's behalf. He was not inclined to quarrel
with Otho, and his army in due course took the
oath of fidelity to him. Even Vitellius' victory had
been recognised in the same way. Left to himself,
Vespasian might well have been content to smoke
out the hornets' nest in Judaea, whatever prince
ruled at Rome. The burning of the Capitol at
Rome might have been spared, and the burning of
Jerusalem have been the chief glory of the Flavian
leader, not of Titus his son. But the Fates of the
Roman Empire pressed hard upon him. Every
influence was brought to bear to move his caution
and provoke him to defy Vitellius. His own
army and the great Army of Syria demanded the
right to challenge the insolent troops of Germany
for the mastery. Mucianus, Governor of Syria, who
had become his close friend through Titus' willing
offices, was instant in his urging that not even safety
could now be won save by accepting the last risk,
and promised him his powerful support. Men
worked upon that superstition which in him was so
curiously interwoven with a hardy scepticism and
healthy vigour of thought — a purple strand in a
thick grey robe. The towering cypress tree which
rose above the ancestral mountain -farm in far-off
Samnium, and in Vespasian's youthful days had
fallen only to rise again the following day more
1 See my Life of Nero > p. 380.
140 FLAVIAN INVASION OF ITALY ch...
green, more beautiful, and all unhurt ; the statue of
the murdered Julius at Rome, which, as Galba's
star was setting, turned to face the rising sun ; the
two eagles which, before the armies clashed
together on the battle - field of Bedriacum, were
seen contending in the air, when, behold, from
the eastern quarter of the heavens a third came
speeding and chased the victor from his victory, —
how could omens such as these, remembered from
the past or carried to his credulous ear by eager
faithful friends, how could they be mockeries with-
out meaning? His Jewish captive, Josephus, was
always whispering promises of coming Empire to
his master. The very gods of the mysterious land
which he held in iron grip knew of his coming
glory. Again, there was an altar built on Mount
Carmel to the unknown, unseen God ; again, the
priest stood to offer sacrifice upon it, and the Deity
vouchsafed his answer, not now by fire from heaven
to confound the impious, but by quiet promise
through the priestly assurance that the Roman
general who stood with hidden thoughts offering
the sacrifice should have full fruition of his secret
hopes.1 That nothing should be lacking to rouse
Vespasian to put his fate to the touch, letters were,
it was said, brought to him, purporting to be
written by Otho in the brief time between his
defeat and death, commanding him to take venge-
1 This extraordinary tale finds a place in both Tacitus and Suetonius. It
evidently made a deep impression on the Roman mind, which always loved to
toy unintelligently with Jewish rites and mysteries. The very priest's name —
Basilides — is given. For the omens in general, of which I give only a selec-
tion, cf. Tacitus, ii. 78 ; Suetonius, Vespasian, 5.
nam FLAVIAN INVASION OF ITALY 141
ance on the victor for his Emperor's ruin, and
imploring him to help the State in its bitter need.
Still the general hesitated, counting the strength
and valour of the legions of Germany. How could
he pit his own less war-worn troops against those
tlushed with so notable a victory ? But his friends'
impatience brooked no longer delay ; his soldiers'
enthusiasm for their general cast for him the
decisive throw. Tiberius Alexander, prefect of
Egypt, proclaimed Vespasian Emperor to his troops
at Alexandria on July 1. His own army acclaimed
him Emperor on the 3rd, and the three legions of
Syria, with Mucianus the Governor, saluted the
name and ensign of the new Prince a fortnight
later. How the Danube army welcomed the news
has been related. The fire of revolt was kindled
again on the frontiers of Italy.
§ 3. Flavian Plans of War
A. The Muster of the Eastern Army. — Even
apart from the six legions on the north-eastern
frontier of Italy which had declared for him,
Vespasian's army in the East was a truly formidable
one. In Syria were the three legions — the Fourth
Scythica, Sixth Ferrata, and Twelfth Fulminata.
The fourth legion which properly belonged to this
province was the Third Gallica, but this had
recently been sent to Moesia, and was now with
the other troops of Moesia at Aquileia.1 It was
1 Hence Tacitus speaks loosely of the Syrian legions as four : " Quattuor
Mucianus obtinebat in pace " (ii. 4), and counts the Third Gallica as one of the
'•novem legiones integrae e Judaea et Suria et Aegypto " (ii. 76), for there
were three legions in Judaea and two in Egypt.
142 FLAVIAN INVASION OF ITALY ch.h
indeed a curious chance that a habit acquired by
this legion during its stay in Syria should help
largely to decide the issue of the desperate battle
which was soon to be fought in the plain of the Po.1
The Syrian legions were as devoted to Vespasian's
cause as were his own veteran troops in Judaea,
not only because they felt themselves part of the
whole Army of the East, whose interests were not
divisible, but also because Mucianus in his guile
had warned them that it was Vitellius' intention to
remove them to the German frontier, and to send
his own legions of Germany to enjoy the climate
and luxuries of Syria in their stead. The mere
thought of the bleak north, of the savage wilds of
the German marches and their barbarian inhabitants,
of the black forests and cold, wind-swept marshes,
of the unceasing toil and pitiless, inclement weather,
which were the unfailing lot of those encamped
upon the Rhine, and the contrast of it all with their
own peaceful, happy life under the warm Syrian
sun, amid the groves and fountains, the thronging,
busy streets and booths, the never-ceasing merri-
ments and festivals of Antioch, excited in the
breasts of the legionaries of Syria the direst feelings
of resentment against the Emperor at Rome."
Very reasonably Vespasian might count all the
Syrian legions as " his own."
Equally eager, splendidly disciplined, and better
acquainted with their general were the three
legions in Judaea — the Fifth Macedonica, Tenth
Fretensis, and Fifteenth Apollinaris. These had
1 Tac. iii. 24. See below, p. 202. 2 Tac. ii. 80.
SEC... FLAVIAN INVASION OF ITALY 143
borne with him the burden of the ferocious Jewish
war, a struggle stained by every horror that the
savagery and brutality of the religious fanatic could
devise. Weary marches, desperate sieges, merci-
less pursuits, had led the veteran troops at last
within sight of the goal of the bitter enterprise, and
only the walls and precipices of Jerusalem itself
still defied the Roman arms. There is small
wonder that the soldiers in Judaea would follow the
general who had redeemed the Roman honour and
redressed disgrace, who had given them unfailing
victory and immeasurable spoil, even to the gates
of Rome itself with devotion and proud confidence.1
The two legions in Egypt — the Third Cyrenaica
and Twenty - second Deiotariana — brought the
number of the legions of Vespasian's Army of the
East to eight. But in addition to the legionaries
there were to be counted the auxiliary forces of the
Roman provinces and subject princes of the Eastern
Empire. Sohaemus, Prince of Sophene (the strip
of land which borders Upper Euphrates on its
eastern bank and surrounds the sources of the
Tigris), came with his native levies. Antiochus,
King of Commagene (the district on the great river
wedged in between the Roman provinces of Syria
on the south and Cappadocia on the north), who
was the richest of the princes of the East owning
Roman overlordship, offered Vespasian the resources
of his kingdom. Herod Agrippa II., ruler of Peraea,
was secretly summoned from Rome, to which he
had gone in the early part of the year, and sailed
1 " Miles ipsi adeo paratus," Tac. ii. 74.
144 FLAVIAN INVASION OF ITALY ch.h
swiftly back to Syria, leaving Yitellius ignorant of
his flight from the city. His sister and Queen, the
beautiful Berenice, then " at the height of her
beauty," l eagerly embraced the Flavian cause.
Titus, still an impressionable youth at twenty-eight,
was young enough to be enamoured of her mature
charms ; Vespasian was old and wise enough to be
pleased by the magnificence of her gifts. There
was, finally, no portion of the Roman world from
Greece to Armenia, from Egypt to the Black Sea,
which did not swear allegiance to Vespasian. New
troops were levied. The veterans were recalled to
the standards. The mint at Antioch poured out
new gold and silver. Cities rang with the clank of
hammers and the forging of arms. The rich con-
tributed their wealth of free will or compulsion.
And the chiefs of the party, the officers and more
experienced veterans of the army, the princes of
the East with brilliant retinues, gathered together
at Berytus for a council of war. The massing of
the infantry and cavalry, the emulous rivalry of the
royal pomp and trains, made the Syrian seaport
indeed present the appearance of a city of the
Imperial Court.2
B. The Council of War at Berytus: the "Strategy
of Exhaustion." — The council of war, assembled
at Berytus to discuss and choose a strategy for the
coming campaign, had to take into account not only
the distance between the Syrian army and Italy,
1 Her first husband (and uncle), Herod, Prince of Chalcis, had died twenty
years before this. But the Romans in the matter of beauty were Venetian
rather than Florentine or English in taste.
2 Tac. ii. 8 1.
sec. mi FLAVIAN INVASION OF ITALY 145
but also that between it and the Army of the
Danube. The Flavian forces were strong and
their resources adequate ; but they were in two
widely separated halves, and, moreover, the un-
finished Jewish war could not be neglected. John
of Gischala and the Zealots were not men to wait
upon Vespasian's convenience. But the council
was confident that their numbers were large enough
for both wars. Happily, there was no other danger
on the Eastern frontier. The kings of Armenia
and Parthia alike were friendly to the Flavian cause,
and the latter, King Vologeses, the hero of the
great struggle with Rome in the days of the
Emperor Nero, actually made Vespasian the offer
of forty thousand Parthian cavalry, the most famous
horsemen in the world, to help him against his
enemies. Nothing serves so forcibly to illustrate
the wisdom of Nero's final solution of the problem
of the Eastern frontier as does this peace on that
frontier during the Roman civil wars. It was
exactly the time when the Parthian might have
been expected to take advantage of the discord
which was rending in twain the strength of his
hereditary enemy. But neither Vologeses, nor his
brother Tiridates in Armenia, showed any desire
to break the peace and friendship recently secured
by the Neronian policy. The Flavian leaders could
therefore devote part of their forces in the East to
quell the rebellion of the Jews, and could direct the
rest to Italy undisturbed by any fear of an invasion
of the frontier or of a sudden attack upon their rear.
Titus and the greater part of the Army of the East
L
146 FLAVIAN INVASION OF ITALY as. ■
were set apart to end the Jewish war. This policy-
determined, the council turned its thoughts to the
war with Vitellius.1
Vespasian himself, it was decided, should not
conduct the campaign in person. He departed to
Egypt to seize and secure firmly the " keys of the
country," Alexandria and Pelusium. No corn-ship
could sail thence to Italy without his pleasure.
From Egypt as a base he intended to proceed by-
sea and land against the other granary of Rome,
the province of Africa. By this means he thought
that the enemy in Italy could be put to great
distress, and that discord would be the result of it,
even though no single Flavian soldier had set foot
in Italy.2 Meanwhile, Mucianus was to march by
land through Asia to the Bosporus. The best ships
of the Pontic fleet, forty in number, were summoned
to Byzantium to effect and secure the passage of
his army. Mucianus himself led the van of the
column, consisting of light armed troops ; but there
followed as its main strength the Sixth legion and
thirteen thousand veterans besides. At Byzantium
he halted, hesitating between two strategies.2
Two plans of campaign, in fact, seem to have
been considered by the Flavian leaders. The first
was that of offence pure and simple. In pursuit
of this strategy, Mucianus should march from
1 Tac. ii. 82; iv. 51. Jerusalem was not taken and destroyed by Titus
until September a. d. 70.
2 Tac. ii. 82 ; iii. 8, 48.
3 Tac. ii. 82, 83 ; iii. 47. The withdrawal of the ships and the Roman
troops in the province to join Mucianus' column gave the opportunity for a
local rising in Pontus, which was, however, easily suppressed by a small force
sent later for the purpose by Vespasian (iii. 47, 4S).
sec. in FLAVIAN INVASION OF ITALY 147
Byzantium by the well-known military road, the
Via Egnatia, through Macedonia to the seaport of
Dyrrhachium on the Adriatic. There, if he had
the ships to cross to Italy, he could threaten a
landing at any one of the harbours within reach as
opportunity offered. Not only Brundisium, the
Dover of Italy, lay opposite and open to his land-
ing, but Tarentum, and all the coast-line of Lucania
and Calabria were equally exposed to a hostile
descent. Vitellius would be in sore perplexity, not
knowing how to guard so long a coast -line, and
already threatened on his north-east frontier by the
Danube army. If he sent his troops to defend the
line of the Po or the Julian Alps, which lay to the
east of Aquileia, surely then Mucianus could make
a dash on Southern Italy, even on Rome itself; for
the road over the Apennines from Brundisium to
Capua and the capital had been used before now
by many an army. If, on the contrary, Vitellius
massed his troops round Rome, he surrendered all
North Italy to the Danube army, and with it the
courage and confidence of his men. If he divided
his army and sent one half northwards, keeping the
other to watch the coast, his resistance to the
vigorous attack on both sides was likely to be but
an enfeebled one. The march to Dyrrhachium
from Byzantium involved the strategy of offence
and co - operation between the Danube and the
Eastern army.
But this was not the strategy which Vespasian
himself wished his troops to adopt. He preferred
to rely upon slower means for exhausting and
148 FLAVIAN INVASION OF ITALY cb.ii
wearing out the enemy. If his own strategy were
followed, Mucianus was to march from Byzantium
by the valleys of the Moritza and Morava through
Moesia, and up the valley of the Drave through
Pannonia and over the Julian Alps to Aquileia. The
Army of the Danube was to wait there until Muci-
anus arrived. So the whole Flavian force would
be concentrated to threaten Italy on the north-east,
and meanwhile all supplies of corn to the enemy
would be cut off by Vespasian's activity in Egypt
and in Africa. Hunger and despair, the would-be
emperor hoped, would do the work. The Vitellians,
starved and desperate, would submit without fight-
ing. The strategy of exhaustion and combination,
not that of offence and co-operation, should be
employed. And at Byzantium Mucianus definitely
chose this plan. He sent bidding the Danube
army not to move from its lines at Aquileia, and
marched himself with his whole force for that city.1
The other strategy, that of offence, was indeed
attractive. The plan of a "double objective"
always perplexes the enemy, and when skilfully
used, as by the Japanese in the war of 1894, mav
always lead to notable successes. Such a plan was
involved in this Flavian strategy of offence. But
apart from its greater risks, which might well have
been ventured, two difficulties in its way were
serious. From the middle of July to the middle
of August the prevailing wind in the Adriatic is
that from the north-west, and this greatly hampered
naval operations from Dyrrhachium as a base. A
1 Tac. ii. 83 ; iii. 8.
sec. ,ii FLAVIAN INVASION OF ITALY 149
still more weighty objection was the fact that the
command of the sea was as yet by no means en-
sured to the Flavians. About the very time that
the plan of invasion oversea was being discussed at
Berytus, a Flavian general, at the council of war
held by the officers of the Danube army at Poetovio,
pointed out that the enemy had two fleets, those of
Ravenna and Misenum, and that these might easily
take the offensive by sea, for there was no Flavian
fleet in the Adriatic to stop them. At the outset
of the campaign, indeed, the command of the sea
rested with the Vitellians. It is true that the
Ravenna fleet quickly proved treacherous to their
cause ; but its coming treachery was not an element
in the strategical situation on which plans could be
built, or by which strategy could be determined,
either at Berytus or at Poetovio. In old days Sulla
had crushed the democrats at Rome by his strategy
of attack oversea from Dyrrhachium. Later in the
century, Julius Caesar, for fear lest the like strategy
should be used by Pompey against him, had been
forced to risk the passage of the Adriatic in face of
the enemy's superiority at sea, and to seek out his
foe in Epirus. Still later, Antony had threatened
Octavian with the same strategy. But both Sulla
and Pompey had had command of the Adriatic.
Antony had been master of a powerful fleet.
Mucianus neither possessed the command of the
sea, nor had as yet any means of gathering a fleet
to secure it. The familiar strategy of offence by
sea had therefore to be abandoned by him.1
1 Cf. Tac. ii. 98 ; iii. 2 ; Annals, vi. 55. Pliny, Nat. Hist. ii. 124.
150 FLAVIAN INVASION OF ITALY ch.u
But it by no means followed as a consequence
that no strategy of offence could be tried. Ves-
pasian's proposed "strategy of exhaustion" deserved
hearty condemnation. Apparently he intended his
army at Aquileia to do nothing, even after Mucianus
and his force had joined the Danube legions there.
The Vitellians were to be starved into submission
and blockaded during the process on the north-east
frontier. From a political point of view it might
be urged that this plan would save bloodshed.
From a military point of view there was nothing to
be said for it at all. Many losses have been caused,
many campaigns well-nigh ruined, by the interfer-
ence of the politician with the conduct of military
operations. Virginia, Natal, the Yalu, have all
recently enforced again this lesson, which is as old
as the history of war. But Vespasian hitherto had
been far more of a soldier than a statesman, and his
plans for the campaign against Vitellius remain all
the more a puzzle ; for how could it be expected
that this "strategy of exhaustion" would end the
war in his favour ? Sextus Pompeius had tried the
plan of starving Italy before now, but Octavian had
defied even this risk ; and Octavian was far less
popular with his troops than was Vitellius with his
army, which was still devoted to his interests. The
civilian in Italy might suffer if no corn-ships came
from the South ; but the soldier would find a way,
even at the civilian's expense, to feed himself. And
not even to-day are the issues of war decided by
the clamour of civilians ; still less would this have
been the case during the civil war of a.d. 69.
sec. in FLAVIAN INVASION OF ITALY 151
Neither was Italy so barren of food, so dependent
on sea-borne corn, so pitifully unable to feed her
own children, as England is to-day. The proleta-
riate in Rome might have felt the pinch of need,
and its anger was doubtless dangerous enough to
an emperor in Rome ; but there was no need
(other than the excellence of the palace kitchen)
for Vitellius to stay in the city and listen trembling
to the howling of the hungry mob. There is no
evidence that the corn from Egypt or Africa was
necessary for any place save Rome, or even ever
sent up country at all. Italy fed herself even
though Rome starved. There was no transport
for corn, no commerce in corn, from Rome to the
other districts of the land any more in a.d. 69 than
there was in the days of the Gracchi. Vespasian's
" strategy of exhaustion " was not in the least likely
to exhaust the Vitellian army. Its ultimate base of
supplies was still the western part of the Empire,
Germany and Gaul. Neither Vespasian in Egypt
nor Mucianus at Aquileia threatened in any way
the safety of the enemy's communications with the
lands which were still the source of their strength,
the place of replenishment for their resources. The
strategy of masterly inactivity, if pursued in this way
by the Flavians, would not discourage the temper
of the Army of Germany. They, after all, were the
men in possession. Rome and Italy were the sign
of Empire, the crown of conquest. It must be the
Flavians' part to attack and evict, for theirs had
been the challenge. If they rested quiet, the Vi-
tellian army in high scorn might take the initiative
152 FLAVIAN INVASION OF ITALY
themselves. They, by means of the fleet, might
descend upon the motionless force at Aquileia, land
in their rear, and cut them off hopelessly from their
base and line of retreat, while the Vitellians could
always use the fleet as a base. The value of the
possession of the strategical initiative in war cannot
be set too high. The force which possesses the
command of the sea is the more likely to possess
this initiative if numbers are equal ; and, possess-
ing it, such a force compels the enemy to make
his dispositions conform to its own plans for
the campaign. But the Flavians, if the attacking
party, might seize at the outset the strategical
initiative, thanks to the fact that a large army lay
already on the frontier of the enemy's country when
the war broke out, whereas the defending army was
slowly moving north from Rome. If they let the
opportunity slip, the initiative would naturally pass
to the Vitellians. The " strategy of exhaustion,"
which would have been no exhaustion at all of the
Vitellians, wilfully abandoned this the Flavian great
military opportunity. It made a present of the
strategical initiative to the foe. This strategy,
in fact, is appropriate only to the weaker side,
and then under very special conditions. Fabius
Maximus used it at a crisis and saved Rome. But
it was not this strategy which gave Rome at last
the victory in the second Punic war. Pericles
used it against the Peloponnesians, and thereby
ran the ship of State hard on the rocks, whence
more skilful pilots had to rescue it. Frederick the
Great saved his kingdom by its use, and had indeed
sec. in FLAVIAN INVASION OF ITALY 153
no other choice. But the quarrel was not of his
seeking, and his prize of victory was not conquest
but his country's preservation. Such a strategy
might have been appropriate to the Vitellians : the
choice of it by the Flavians, whose part it was
to conquer, not to preserve, must have gone far
to ruin their cause. The Danube army meant to
fight. Were they to be told that fighting was too
dangerous ? For what other purpose were they
at Aquileia ? — To wait attack by the hated foe ?
To be cut off by an enemy landing from the sea
in their rear, and a chain of fortresses in a hostile
land to their front ? Roman war is fought with
men, not with automata. The Flavian was the
challenger. He had flung down the gauntlet.
Was he to retire to his tent until the other
champion came to turn him out with ignominy,
scarcely leaving him time to mount his lazy steed ?
Offensive strategy alone can quickly end a war. The passive
attitude may eventually induce the weary enemy to seek for
peace ; it can never produce the same effect as the offensive
crowned with tactical victory. Hence in strategy the defensive
should never be assumed except as a temporary measure, or by
the weaker side, to be changed to the offensive as soon as
opportunity offers. A nation which declares war and acts on
the defensive shows that it does not understand the condition
most essential for success.1
Whether in reality this " strategy of exhaustion "
would have been pursued by Mucianus after his
arrival at Aquileia or not cannot be determined ;
for despite his orders sent to the Danube army
1 James, Modern Strategy, pp. 41, 42.
i54 FLAVIAN INVASION OF ITALY
there, and long before his arrival, this had taken
the bit in its teeth and charged furiously upon the
foe.
C. The Council of War at Poetovio : the "Strategy
of Annihilation." — While at Berytus Vespasian and
Mucianus were discussing plans for the war, the
officers of the Danube army met at Poetovio, the
town near the western frontier of the province of
Pannonia, to deliberate on their own account. The
actual governors of the three provinces — Pannonia,
Dalmatia, and Moesia — took but a small part in
the council and in the military operations which
followed. The Legate of Pannonia, Lucius Tampius
Flavianus, does indeed seem to have been present,
and he presently accompanied the army of invasion
as far as Verona ; but he was cautious by nature,
old in years, and, moreover, a kinsman of Vitellius,
and at first, when the disturbance began in Pan-
nonia, fled hastily to Italy to be out of the way of
danger. The persuasions of Cornelius Fuscus,
procurator of the province, induced him to return.
The procurator desired for his party the prestige
attaching to the name of one who had been consul ;
the governor hoped to pluck some profit from the
rebellion. But the troops naturally mistrusted him,
and at Verona they made an excited attack upon
him, which nearly cost him his life, and got rid of
him away from the army for good and all.1 Marcus
Pompeius Silvanus, Governor of Dalmatia, was, like
1 Tac. ii. 86 ; iii. 4, 10. Cf. Fliny, Nat. Hist. ix. 26. He was consul
about a.d. 46 and again under Vespasian in 74. He seems to have given his
name to the ala I. Pannoniorum Tampiana, C.I.L. iii. p. S64.
sec. in FLAVIAN INVASION OF ITALY 155
Tampius, old, rich, and more of a financier than a
general. He certainly was not of any weight in
the council, if present ; for the one legion of his
province, the Eleventh Claudia, was still hesitating,
and, in fact, the legion and its governor appeared in
the Flavian camp only after the first great victory
had been won and Cremona had fallen. These
were incidents which relieved the anxiety of general
and private concerning the probable issue of the
struggle, but gave them matter for anxious thought
concerning their reception in the victors' camp if
they delayed longer to join them. Silvanus, a man
" apt to waste in words the hour for deeds, and a
sluggard in war," was wholly ruled by the legate
of the Eleventh legion, Annius Bassus, who by
judicious deference to the old governor won his
assent to all his own plans and carried them out
quietly and ably.1 Thus neither Tampius nor
Silvanus added any strength to the Flavian cause
except the lustre of their names and the benefit
of their actual insignificance. The third of the
three legates, M. Aponius Saturninus, Governor of
Moesia, was absent from the council of war. He
had indeed written hurriedly to Vitellius the news
that the Third legion in Moesia had mutinied
against his authority. Later, however, he had seen
fit to follow the lead of his troops, and declare for
Vespasian, and early in the campaign he appeared
in the Flavian camp with one of the three legions
of his province, the Seventh Claudia. But some
1 Silvanus: consul a.d. 45. Cf. Tac. ii. 86; iii. 50; iv. 47 ; Annals,
xiii. 52. In 74 he was consul again with Tampius.
156 FLAVIAN INVASION OF ITALY ch...
letters which he was supposed to have written to
Vitellius were one day published in the camp, and
the fiery and suspicious troops indignantly joined
in an eager hunt for the traitor through the
gardens where he was staying. Aponius saved
his life by hiding promptly in the furnace of some
disused baths, and, when the storm blew over,
retired to Padua and took no further part in the
war.1 It was not to such time-servers as an
Aponius, a Tampius, a Silvanus, that Vespasian
owed his Empire. Three men of lower rank,
whose military energy was spoilt by no politic
caution, whose zeal on his behalf was hampered
by no considerations of their own dignity, swayed
the counsels of the Danube army and led irresolu-
tion captive to daring.
Cornelius Fuscus, the procurator of Pannonia,
had as a mere youth preferred the Imperial Civil
Service to the Senatorial career which, as a lad
of good family, he would naturally have followed.
Renouncing the rank to which his birth entitled
him, he chose the career which, if of less repute,
gave greater opportunities of a fortune. But the
tempestuous days of the civil wars afforded him
chances of action which he loved better even than
money-making. To him, now in the vigour of his
early manhood, battle was a delight, risk more
joyous than certainty, peril than the rewards of
peril. His services in the war won him honour
and promotion. Under Domitian he was prefect
of the Praetorian Guard, and he perished at the
1 Tac. ii. 96 ; iii. 5,9, II.
sec. ,.i FLAVIAN INVASION OF ITALY 157
head of his troops, trapped and destroyed by the
barbarians in the second Dacian war of a.d. 89. x
Arrius Varus was probably an older man, but
the military experience which he had gained while
serving under Corbulo in the Parthian war twelve
years before served him in good stead. The
rapidity with which the column of invasion swept
down upon North Italy showed that he had not
forgotten the lessons taught him in the field by his
old master in the art of war.2 His very success
earned for him, later, Mucianus' suspicion, and he
had to suffer degradation from the office of Prae-
torian prefect, which had been his reward, being
given instead the inferior position of prefect of the
Corn Supply.3
Such energy was exhibited also in an equal,
if not in still larger, measure by the third of the
three leaders, M. Antonius Primus. This officer
is the hero of the successful Flavian invasion
of Italy. His earlier career, indeed, did him
little credit. Eight years before, he had been
condemned at law as one of the witnesses to a
forged will ; but Galba had restored him to his
senatorial rank and given him the command of his
new legion, the Seventh Galbiana. Antonius had
a happy confidence in his own ability, and men said
that he had written to Otho offering himself as
general-in-chief for his war with Vitellius. That
Emperor was already plagued by too many general
officers, and took no notice of the offer. But now
1 Tac. ii. 86 ; iii. 4, 12, 42 ; iv. 4. Suetonius, Domitian, 6.
2 Tac. iii. 6 ; Annals, xiii. 9. 3 Tac. iv. 68.
158 FLAVIAN INVASION OF ITALY «*. u
at last Antonius' chance was come. He was an
able speaker, and, when the news of Vespasian's
rising reached Pannonia, he at once harangued the
troops on behalf of the Flavian general, and that
in no ambiguous terms. Others might strive to
face both ways, but Antonius was impatient of such
shallow cowardice. The blunt soldiers found in
him a man after their own heart. His unscrupulous
dexterity might bring disgrace upon his rivals ; he
might rob with the one hand and fling money
broadcast with the other ; but he was a stalwart
soldier who knew his own mind, and if he advertised
his own merits, at least they were merits which his
fellow-soldier loved, and he really possessed them.
The men of the Seventh legion knew that they
had found a man to lead them, however hazardous
the enterprise, and were impatient of any other
general.1
When such officers met in council at Poetovio,
it is not surprising that a vigorous strategy found
favour. There were indeed some who urged that
they were bound to wait for the arrival of Mucianus
and their comrades of the Syrian army. They
dwelt upon the strength, the fame, the recent
victory, of the enemy. Their own position, they
urged, could easily be made impregnable against
attack until the reinforcements came. The high
road from Poetovio by Emona and Nauportus to
Aquileia, a hundred and fifty miles away, had to
cross the mountain chain of the " Pannonian Alps "
to the north of the Istrian promontory. The
1 Tac. ii. 86 ; iii. 3,11; Annals, xiv. 40.
sec. in FLAVIAN INVASION OF ITALY 159
passes of the ridge, they argued, could be blocked,
and their army would then rest in safety under
cover of the mountains. " Conquered troops," they
asserted, alluding to the recent defeat which some
of their army had suffered at Bedriacum, " may talk
as boldly as they please, but they have not the
courage of their conquerors for all that."
A fiery speech by Antonius consumed this
advocacy of delay in a moment. The council of
war was held in open air, and the centurions and
even private soldiers came thronging up to assist
the deliberations of their officers. Antonius' clear
loud voice rang through the camp, and he carried
even the more cautious away by his fierce eloquence.
In bitter terms he described the demoralisation of
the Vitellian soldiery. " Scattered through the
townships of Italy and no longer under arms,
sluggard guests dreaded only by their hosts, drain-
ing the cup of new, strange pleasures with a wild
zest, a zest as great as was that rude ferocity which
once was theirs and was theirs no longer, these
erstwhile soldiers of Vitellius had lost their hardi-
ness in the circus, the theatre, the allurements of
the capital. Yes, but they were soldiers still.
Give them but time, and the very thought of war
would brace them again to valour. Germany and
Gaul, Britain and Spain, Italy and Rome itself,
would send out new armies to fill their ranks.
Nor would their own position be safe behind the
ramparts of the mountains. Vitellius' fleets com-
manded the Adriatic, and it would be easy to land
an army in their rear. Where then would be the
160 FLAVIAN INVASION OF ITALY ch.h
service of their delay, and where the food and
money for the troops if they lay idle till next year's
summer came ? They had not been defeated, but
tricked into submission. The day for vengeance
for this trickery was come. Their comrades of the
Moesian army had lost no single man. What did
it matter that they were inferior in legionaries ?
In discipline, in sobriety, in very numbers, if
men of every arm were counted, they had the
mastery of the foe. Above all, in cavalry lay their
own great strength. In the battle lately fought
two little squadrons had charged and broken the
enemy's line. Were these defeated troops ? But
now sixteen squadrons of horse would overwhelm
with the thunder of the onset of their serried ranks,
would bury beneath the rushing wave of their
furious charge, horses and horsemen forgetful of
battle. Keep back the legions," he cried, turning
scornfully to the advocates of caution ; " keep back
the legions, you who risk nothing by defeat,1 and
give me the cohorts only.2 I have planned, and I
will carry out the plan. You will be glad enough
to follow in my steps when the victory is won."3
After such a speech there was no room left for
moderate counsels. The soldiers cheered " their
one and only leader " to the echo, and the council
broke up intent on an immediate advance into Italy.
A message was sent to Aponius Saturninus bidding
him hasten to bring the Moesian army into the
1 " Quibus fortuna in integro est," i.e. who have not compromised them-
selves fatally with Vitellius, but still hope to be able to sit on the fence.
- I.e. the auxiliaries.
3 Tac. iii. 1-3.
sec. in FLAVIAN INVASION OF ITALY 161
field.1 Certain precautions also were taken to
ensure the safety of the northern frontier when the
provinces south of the Danube were stripped bare
of troops. There was, in fact, danger all along the
Danube frontier. West of Pannonia lay the dis-
trict of Noricum, which was threatened by the
procurator of Raetia, who was firmly loyal to
Vitellius. On the north of Pannonia, occupying
the district north of the Danube between the rivers
March and Waag, lay the tribe of the Suebi, ruled
by two princes jointly, Sido and Italicus. Though
vaguely in the sphere of Roman influence the
Suebi were practically independent of Rome. The
Danube, after flowing in an easterly direction for
many miles, turns abruptly to the south at a point
about a hundred and forty miles east of Vienna,
and continues on the southerly course for not far
short of two hundred miles. This reach of the river
formed the eastern boundary of Pannonia. Some
fifty or sixty miles to the east of it the Theiss flows
parallel to the Danube, and joins it from the north
after the greater river has turned eastwards again.
1 Tacitus, whose account of the P'lavian invasion is far more satisfactory
than that of the war of Otho and Vitellius, leaves us, however, in great
perplexity as to the actual position of the three Moesian legions at this time.
In April they have already "entered Aquileia" (ii. 46), and are there when
they refuse allegiance to Vitellius, " Aquileiam progressae " (ii. 85). But
the council of war at Poetovio sends bidding Saturninus " cum exercitu
Moe.^ico celeraret " (Hi. 5), and Antonius' first act is to occupy Aquileia
with his auxiliaries (iii. 6). When he moves on to Verona, it is some days
before the Moesian army joins him there (iii. 9), and then they arrive in two
detachments, the Seventh legion first, and then the Third and Eighth (iii.
9, 10). It is possible that they were at Aquileia all the time, as Vespasian
appoints this town for the general rendezvous (iii. 8). But iii. 5 seems to
imply that they had withdrawn again to Moesia. Tacitus, however, never
tells us this directly, and this is characteristic of the looseness of his military
narrative.
M
162 FLAVIAN INVASION OF ITALY ch.h
The strip of land between the Danube and the
Theiss, some two hundred miles therefore in
length, was occupied by a tribe of Sarmatian stock,
the Jazyges, which always maintained its independ-
ence of the Roman Empire even after Trajan's
conquest of Dacia many years later. A tribe of
hardy horsemen, they could defy any attempt of
the slow-moving legionary to subdue them in their
native wilds. East of the Jazyges, north of the
Danube and the province of Moesia, lay the power-
ful and restless tribesmen of the Dacians, and the
lower course of the river to the sea had roving
Sarmatian tribes, such as the Roxolani, upon its
northern bank.
So far as was possible, the Flavian leaders
secured the safety of all this vast length of frontier
before they directed the army which garrisoned it
upon Italy. A special expeditionary force was sent
under an able officer to assist the native levies of
Noricum to defend the line of the river Inn against
attack from Raetia. This force, consisting of eight
cohorts of auxiliary infantry and one squadron of
Spanish horse, the ala I. Hispanorum Auriana,
under Sextilius Felix, was unmolested by the
enemy over the river.1 Sido and Italicus, princes
of the Suebi, with a cavalry bodyguard of their own
people, actually joined the column of invasion, and
fought for Vespasian's cause at Cremona.- In like
manner the chiefs of the Jazyges offered their ser-
vices and those of the horse and foot of the tribe.
The latter offer was declined, since the Flavian
1 Felix, cf. Tac. iv. 70. - Ibid. iii. 21.
sec n, FLAVIAN INVASION OF ITALY 163
leaders could not trust such allies' loyalty, if it
should be tempted by bribes from the enemy. But
they prudently secured pledges for the peace of
that section of the frontier by taking the chiefs
themselves with them. By such measures the
safety of Pannonia was guaranteed in the absence
of its garrison ; but the longer Moesian frontier
was left dangerously denuded of Roman troops.
The Governor of Moesia may have relied upon the
effect of the crushing blow which had in the pre-
vious winter been dealt to the raiders of the
Roxolani in the province.1 But the Dacians were
but eagerly watching for their opportunity. As
soon as the legions marched for Italy, they crossed
the river and fell upon the Roman camps on the
southern bank. Happily for the Roman province,
Mucianus was already in Moesia on his march to
Italy, and sent off the Sixth Ferrata legion of the
Syrian army in hot haste to the rescue. For a
short time the Dacians were repelled, but the
situation on the lower Danube grew more and
more ominous.2
But, meanwhile, Italy had been the scene of
fighting. Antonius and his fellow-generals had
taken such precautions as seemed to them neces-
sary or possible to guard the frontier from
Passau to the sea. But for the main enterprise
every legionary, despite Antonius' vaunt, must be
called to the war. Antonius himself, with Arrius
Varus at his right hand, led the advance of the
invading column. If the orders from Syria to
' See above, Chap. I. pp. 31-32. - Tac. iii. 46.
1 64 FLAVIAN INVASION OF ITALY ch.h
await Mucianus' arrival ever reached him, these
were blandly disregarded. At the head of a picked
band of auxiliaries and part of the cavalry Antonius
and Varus crossed the Pannonian Alps and swept
down upon Aquileia, leaving the rest of the army
and the legionaries to follow with what speed they
could. They seized Aquileia, and pressed at once
on westwards. The strategy of instant attack had
carried the day. The Flavians would seek out the
enemy to annihilate them, if it might be so, in
battle. While their supreme leaders in far-off
Eastern lands were devising schemes of " exhaus-
tion " and devious strategies of war, the Danube
army flung caution to the winds and rushed to the
attack.1
Thus the Flavian invasion of Italy led to a
struggle once more between the old enemies of the
war in the spring of the year — the Rhine army and
the Danube army. In April the Danube army had
had but a part of its strength engaged, but it had
enjoyed the co-operation of the Army of Italy, upon
which indeed the chief brunt of the fighting had
fallen. In April the Rhine army had been the
army of invasion. In October the Danube army
was at full strength, but there was no friendly army
marching from the south to combine with it. The
relics of the former Army of Italy were either
enlisted in its ranks or scattered to the four winds,
and some were even fighting for the enemy. The
Rhine army had become the army defending Italy
against invasion. It had itself suffered in strength,
1 Tac. iii. 5, 6.
sec. iv FLAVIAN INVASION OF ITALY 165
thanks to Vitellius' discharge of many of its troops,
and in efficiency, thanks to six months' loose living
in Italy. But it had added on to it all available
soldiers in Rome and Italy, and the two victorious
generals of the first campaign, Valens and Caecina,
were once more in command of it. The strategy of
the October campaign is more simple and there-
fore less interesting than that of April ; but the
struggle was a fiercer one, even to the death. In
April the seeds were abundantly sown of bitterness
and passion. Now the late harvest-time had come,
and the furious soldiery were the reapers.
§ 4. The Strategy of the Defence
The tidings of the mutiny in Moesia against his
authority had first reached Vitellius at Rome in a
letter from' Aponius Saturninus, governor of the pro-
vince. But Saturninus sent word only that the
Third legion had revolted, and flattering friends in
the Imperial Court made light of the whole disturb-
ance. Trustworthy news was indeed difficult to
obtain as soon as the Danube army had blocked
the road over the Pannonian Alps, for if the north-
west wind in the Adriatic hampered any naval
movements on part of the enemy, it at least also
hindered the coming of despatches from the East
overseas. Vitellius, however, sent to Britain, Spain,
and Germany for reinforcements. But his sum-
mons were tardy, nor were they very urgent.
Vespasian's spies and agents were everywhere, and
men had no confidence in Vitellius' chances of
1 66 FLAVIAN INVASION OF ITALY ch.h
victory. Three of the four legions in Britain did
indeed send detachments in time to take part in the
struggle.1 The fear of troubles in the country and
the half-heartedness of its governor restrained the
rest. The legates of the three legions in Spain
with one consent held all their troops back.2 They
would not help to prop a falling cause. In Upper
Germany was an old and timorous governor,
Hordeonius Flaccus, whom Vitellius had left there
to guard the bank of the Rhine. But he by this
time was alarmed at the signs of revolt against
Rome, which were now but too clear lower down
the river, and wisely kept the few troops at his
disposal in the province. Only the one legion in
Africa 3 and the provincial troops here were ready
and eager to fight for their old governor Vitellius,
but their legate, Valerius Festus, wavered, and
they did not cross the sea. When, therefore,
the instant and alarming approach of the danger
soon put its reality beyond question, Vitellius had
to confront it with such troops as he had in Italy,
together with the timely, if weak, reinforcements
from Britain. Alike the West and the South
were happy to be spectators of the combat, and
were ready to applaud the victor heartily enough.
Self-interest in such a civil war was bound to be
men's ruling instinct.
But no such reproach of timorousness or
1 Viz. II. Augusta, IX. Hispana, XX. Valeria Victrix. The Fourteenth
legion was, of course, hostile to Vitellius, and sent no aid. Cf. above,
P- 133-
2 Viz. I. Adjutrix, VI. Victrix, X. (Temina.
3 Viz. II T. Augusta.
sec. .v FLAVIAN INVASION OF ITALY 167
indifference belongs to the Emperor's old troops,
the soldiers of the former German army. They
from first to last were loyal and devoted to
Vitellius. Nor, indeed, were their numbers small.
Their old generals, Caecina and Valens, were
ordered to march at once to the seat of war in
North Italy as soon as the general revolt of the
Danube army was beyond doubt. Valens was
handicapped by illness, and unable to leave Rome
at once. But Caecina, after taking an affectionate
farewell of the Emperor, whom he intended to
betray, marched for the north at the head of an
imposing column of infantry, preceded by a cavalry
detachment. In the van of the foot there marched
the veterans of four legions — the First, Fourth
Macedonica, Fifteenth Primigenia, and Sixteenth.
The centre consisted of the Fifth Alaudae legion
and the Twenty-second Primigenia. In the rear
of the column came the First Italica legion, the
Twenty - first Rapax, and the detachments from
the three legions of Britain — the Second Augusta,
N inth H ispana, and Twentieth Valeria Victrix. The
whole number can hardly have fallen short of forty
thousand legionaries. Four of these legions had
belonged to Valens' old command in Lower Ger-
many,1 and he sent bidding them wait upon the
march until he could overtake them. But Caecina
overruled the order, and he had every possible
military justification for so doing.
The writers of the principate of Vespasian loved
to paint in gloomy colours the appearance which the
1 Viz. I. Italica, V. Alaudae, XV. Primigenia, XVI.
1 68 FLAVIAN INVASION OF ITALY ch. n
soldiers of his defeated rival presented as they
marched to the front from Rome by the great north
road, and the Roman historian of a later age had no
choice, it seems, but to tell their story over again.
If these writers dared to ascribe honourable motives
to men, Tacitus' critical faculty was at once aroused ;
but the mere record of supposed facts, if they
were picturesque, excited no suspicion in his mind.
Yet the soldier's trade is war, and many an army
has marched out to defeat as cheerfully and made
as brave a show as have the coming victors in the
battle. When the defeat is history of the past then
the curious scribes find presage for it in the
imagined demeanour of the troops as they marched
for the front. The change in the bearing of the
German army, says the Roman writer, was indeed
great as it left the city. There was no strength in
their bodies, no fire in their hearts. The column
rolled heavily along, sluggish and scattered, the
weapons dull with long neglect, the very horses
moving listlessly. The soldier, grumbling at the
sun, the dust, the weather, shirked his duty, and
made up for it by quarrelling with his comrade.1 It
is a sombre military picture. Yet this is the army
which, after a march of three hundred miles in
summer heat, is ready, in spite of the desertion of
its general, to march some thirty miles on a short
October day, and, without taking rest, fight strenu-
ously in hand-to-hand combat with the enemy the
whole of the following night until the sun rose !
Moore's Englishmen, Blucher's Prussians, young
1 Tac. ii. 99 : cf. ii. ior.
sec. iv FLAVIAN INVASION OF ITALY 169
General Bonaparte's ragged troops, happy in their
desperate victories, happier still in their generals,
would yet find comrades to their heart in the
Romans of Caecina's leaderless army — soldiers, in
truth, for all their grumbling, and no craven, no
undisciplined, mob of recreants.
The force of circumstances compelled the Vitel-
lians to adopt the strategical defensive. To this
Caecina now chose to add the tactical defensive as
well. He contented himself with the occupation of
a strong position guarding the line from Cremona
to the sea. The thrust of the assailants would
come from the north-east. Caecina made due pre-
parations to repel this attack upon his lines. North
of the main stream of the river Po, between the
marshes of Mantua and the lagoons of Maestra, two
rivers at no great distance apart flow through the
level plain-. The first of these, the Tartaro, is
distant some five miles, at an average, from the
Po for the greater part of its course. North of
this again the splendid stream of the Adige, which
comes foaming down from the Brenner Pass and
sweeps in a magnificent semicircle round the
fortress of Verona, leaves the hills at that city,
and for the rest of its course cuts through the
marshy level to the sea by Chioggia with a quieter
Mood. In Roman days there was no bridge over
the Po from Hostilia for over forty miles to the
east. From the passage of the river at Hostilia
the main road ran north-east through Ateste (Este),
Patavium (Padua), and Altinum (Altino) to Aquileia.
This road crossed first the Tartaro at three miles'
170 FLAVIAN INVASION OF ITALY ch.h
distance from Hostilia, and then the Adige eight
miles from its crossing of the Tartaro. Here,
guarding the passage of the Adige, is to-day the
fortress [city of Legnago, one of the four great
fortresses of the " Quadrilateral," famous in the
times of the Austrian domination of Italy.1 In the
first century of our era a little Roman market-town,
by name Forum Alieni, lay on the site of the
fortress of Legnago.2
The advance guard of cavalry was sent on at
once to occupy Cremona, and it was followed to
the town by the First Italica legion and the
Twenty-first Rapax. The rest of the large army
was directed straight upon Hostilia. Caecina
himself turned aside to visit the naval station at
Ravenna, where lay the fleet under the command
of its prefect, Sextus Lucilius Bassus. Ravenna,
indeed, was necessary to the completeness of the
defence. For although the invaders had no fleet
able to cope with the Vitellian fleet at Ravenna,
yet there seems to have been a coast road leaving
the main road from Aquileia to Padua some miles
short of this latter city, and striking due south by
Adria to Ravenna ; and if the enemy had chosen
this road, the defenders' position from Cremona to
Hostilia would have been outflanked and turned.
But the presence of a friendly fleet at Ravenna
would make any such scheme of advance far too
1 The four fortresses were : N.W. Peschiera; N.E. Verona; S.W. Mantua;
S.E. Legnago.
- There cannot be reasonable doubt as to this identification. The sug-
gestion that Ferrara is Forum Alieni is impossible in view of the military-
operations of this campaign.
sec. iv FLAVIAN INVASION OF ITALY 171
dangerous to adopt. Thus the line of defence ran
from Cremona to Hostilia, from Hostilia to
Ravenna. And thrown forward at Forum Alieni,
guarding the bridge over the Adige, was a small
outpost, consisting of three cohorts of auxiliary
infantry and a squadron of Gallic cavalry, the
ala II. Gallorum Sebosiana. The breadth of
the river and the single bridge should make its
defence possible even by so small a force if it
observed the elementary duties of an outpost,
constant scouting by the cavalry, and watchful
pickets at night.
The first blow dealt to the defence fell upon this
force at Legnago, which the enemy successfully
rushed at dawn. The camp was completely sur-
prised, and many were cut down before they could
reach their weapons. This disgrace was the result
only of inexcusable carelessness on part of the
sentries, or of the commander, if no sentries were
posted.
Men on the line of defence cannot sleep at ease at night,
or kindle fires to warm themselves. The night is the time
when they must be most vigilant and wide awake. The patrols
on the picket line and the scouts far in front must try to take in
everything. However tired they may be from their day's work,
at night they must not even allow a singing insect or a flying
bird to pass unnoticed.1
The outposts of the camp on the Adige, if there
were such, incurred great dishonour. But the
reverse was partially redeemed by some of the
1 Human Bullets, by Lieut. Sakurai, p. 67. The Japanese siege of Tort
Arthur puts most warfare, ancient and modern, to shame.
i;2 FLAVIAN INVASION OF ITALY ch. n
troops who, though surprised, held their ground
long enough to allow the destruction of the
bridge, and by this means checked for the time
the pursuit and advance of the invaders. But
when the news of this reverse reached Caecina, and
his outposts also came into touch with the enemy's
skirmishers, who presently crossed the Adige, the
Vitellian general moved his main camp at Hostilia
a few miles forward, and entrenched a strong posi-
tion on the northern bank of the river Tartaro.
To its rear, therefore, lay this river, crossed by a
bridge ; on both flanks the marshes of that muddy
stream safely guarded it.1 With its front only
exposed to attack and this strongly fortified, secured
on the west of the whole line by Cremona, on the
east by the fleet at Ravenna, the camp on the
Tartaro might surely defy the assaults of the
enemy.2
While Vitellius' legions lay upon the Tartaro
or at Cremona, maintaining a strictly defensive
attitude, the Emperor's second general, Fabius
Valens, in due course left Rome and moved slowly
northwards along the northern highway, following
in the steps of the army towards Ariminum (Rimini)
which lies on the road thirty miles south-east of
1 This position is described by Tacitus in iii. 9 as "inter Hostiliam et
paludes Tartari fluminis." From this it would appear as if it lay on the
south bank of the Tartaro and that the " flumen " at its rear (loc. cit.) is the
Po. But when in iii. 14 the troops evacuate it, Tacitus describes the
movement as " relictis castris, abrupto ponte Hostiliam rursus, inde
Cremonam pergunt." Therefore the bridge broken down lay between the
camp and Hostilia, and as this latter place lay on the north bank of the Po,
it can only have been a bridge over the Tartaro. As this bridge lay in rear
of the camp (iii. 9), the camp must have been on the north bank of this
latter river.
fe& - Movements of the Vitellians : cf. Tac. ii. 99, 100 ; iii. 6, 9.
sec.v FLAVIAN INVASION OF ITALY 173
Ravenna, and one hundred miles from the camp on
the Tartaro. In his train he seems to have brought
more women than soldiers, more eunuchs than
legionaries. The march of so soft a column was
naturally slow. Valens possessed military ability ;
but, at a time when there was crying need for it at
the front, he preferred to postpone its exercise to
the gratification of an unbridled and horrible lust
with which he amused himself at his frequent halts
along the road. The army at Cremona and the
Tartaro could look for small reinforcements to
arrive with this general when he came, and might
look for his coming for long in vain.1 Caecina's
army was, in fact, the Emperor's one hope. It had
marched swiftly to the north. Now it lay sullenly
in its lines waiting attack by the foe. To the
strategy of attack, chosen by Antonius Primus and
the Flavian generals of the Danube army, the
Vitellians opposed a strategy of defence. Such a
strategy may be executed by a tactical offensive as
well as by a tactical defensive. But Caecina chose
the latter, and destroyed his Emperor by his
choice.
§ 5. The Strategies compared
The comparison between the advantages of the
offensive and the defensive in strategy is a favourite
theme with military scientists, and Clausewitz's
1 Tac. iii. 40. Tacitus' account of Valens' actual movements is the
vaguest and worst possible. See below, Note F, " Valens' March to the
North."
174 FLAVIAN INVASION OF ITALY ch. n
expressed preference for the latter has produced
a rich crop of explanations, interpretations, even
apologies. Certain advantages of the attack are
indeed evident, and are as visible in strategy as
they are in tactics. The attacking army is the
more likely to be keen, even enthusiastic ; its
confidence is probably greater ; its sense of daring
stimulates courage and at the same time enforces
discipline. " The greater vitality resides in the
attack."1 The invasion of a hostile country especi-
ally fires the imagination and stimulates the vigour
of the soldier. An advantage in numbers over
the enemy is indeed greatly to be desired by the
invader. Lines of communications have to be
guarded, and these are always increasing in length.
Fortresses have to be seized and garrisoned, or
blockaded ; important strategical points have to be
secured. Supplies are obtained with greater diffi-
culty in a hostile than in a friendly land. Losses
in battle are made good less easily. Stragglers
are cut off and cannot rejoin. The sick and
wounded cannot be left to the care of the in-
habitants, but must be tended and guarded by the
invading army. To supply these many demands
for men, and yet to retain a force strong enough to
push ever deeper and deeper into the heart of the
enemy's country, and able to defeat the foe when
these choose to stand their ground rather than to
surrender still more of the homeland to their foe, —
these requirements make a superiority of numbers
on part of the invader and his constant reinforce-
1 Von der Goltz.
secv FLAVIAN INVASION OF ITALY 175
merit well-nigh essential.1 " Armies acting on the
offensive melt like fresh snow in spring."2
It is thus plain that the offensive is only possible when large-
numbers enable a leader to overcome the difficulties it offers,
and good organisation ensures the rapidity necessary for carrying
it out. But, given these, there can be no doubt of its advantage.
The moral gain is great ; the soldier feels he is superior to his
adversary when led with determination against him ; and this
mental attitude leads more than half-way along the road to
victory.3
There are few generals who would not prefer
to conduct rather than to resist an invasion ; who
would not choose to attack rather than to defend.
Even though, on the actual field of battle, the
lot of the defender may seem to have fallen in
pleasanter places, to act on the defensive in the
whole theatre of the war is but a gloomy busi-
ness. There are indeed no generals who would
not desire to have for their invasion or attack an
efficient army larger than that of the defender.
And yet the brilliant genius of the commander
has in times past more than made good even an
inferiority of numbers possessed by the invading
army when it crossed the enemy's frontier. Hannibal
in Italy, Cromwell in Scotland, Lee and Jackson in
Maryland, took no account of the general rule that
1 Of the drain in men suffered by an invading army there are stock
examples in the military text-books : Napoleon in 1812 crossed the frontier
of Russia with over three and a half million troops : at Moscow he had barely
a hundred thousand; in 1877, 450,000 Russians crossed the Danube: 43,000
arrived outside Constantinople; the Germans in 1870 invaded France with
three and a half million men : six weeks later they had only half the number
before Paris. Cf. James, Modern Strategy, p. 37 ; Von der Goltz, The Nation
in Arms, p. 258.
- Von der Goltz.
;i James, Modern Strategy, p. 3S.
176 FLAVIAN INVASION OF ITALY ch. n
the invader must greatly outnumber the field army
of the defender.1 But the world sees few com-
manders such as these. And even so, alike in Italy
and in America, the brutal weight of numbers had
in the end its revenge.
The Flavian invading army was far from en-
joying any such superiority of numbers. But
the leader of the invasion, Antonius Primus,
was a commander, as the event showed, who
won the admiration and devotion of his troops to
a high degree, and inspired them with his own
self-confidence and energy. The troops which he
led across the frontier were spirited and ready for
any desperate enterprise. No invading army could
in temper have been better fitted for its work.
Neither did the general lack ability or a keen insight
into the possibilities of a military situation. The
German general would have his brother-officers go
to school of Goethe's Mephistopheles : —
An Kiihnheit wird 's euch auch nicht fehlen,
Und wenn ihr euch nur selbst vertraut,
Vertrauen euch die andern Seelen.'2
It was just this supreme confidence in himself
which, added to his courage and " dash," endeared
Antonius to his men, and seemed to make him an
ideal leader of an invading army.
1 Of course this rule applies only when the hostile nations and their
armaments are of similar character and their troops display similar qualities.
It does not hold good in contests between European troops and most Asiatic
nations, or barbarians ; e.g. an Alexander or a Caesar, a Cortez or a Clive, is
not an example to the contrary of this rule. Nor does it apply to mere raids
across the frontier where no fighting or occupation of the enemy's land is
intended.
2 I take the quotation from Von der Goltz, The Nation in Arms, p. 388.
sec.v FLAVIAN INVASION OF ITALY 177
The invasion of Italy by the Danube army was
clearly a daring, even a perilous, strategy to adopt.
But when invasion is conducted by such a general,
when in itself it has such advantages over the
defence, surely the plan might seem justified ?
In the zeal to inflict injury upon the enemy, a resolution must
not aim at the unattainable, though it should venture to go to
the extreme limit of the permissible. In war, nothing rational
must be considered impossible as long as it has not been tested ;
and we may dare everything we believe we can carry out.1
" In war, nothing rational must be considered
impossible." The Flavian invasion of Italy as con-
ducted in the autumn of a.d. 69 had no rational
prospect of success. It ought to have been hurled
back in ruinous defeat and panic-stricken disgrace
over the Pannonian Alps.
For the Flavian forces struggled over the
mountains down to the plain of North-east Italy in
widely separated detachments. Those who arrived
first flung themselves forward regardless of any
co-operation with those who were to come after
them. Here came a band of auxiliaries ; then, after
a gap, came a legion ; then, after a pause of some
days, other legions. The whole conduct of the
enterprise in face of a foe who knew how to use his
opportunities was mad. Even when concentrated,
the invading army was hardly equal in numbers to
the Vitellian forces on the river. If the defenders
had taken the tactical offensive as soon as the foe
appeared in the plain south and east of Aquileia,
1 Von der Goltz, op. cil. p. 383.
N
178 FLAVIAN INVASION OF ITALY ch.h
there was no hope for the invaders but that
they would have been swallowed up piecemeal.
The legions which came tardily down over the
mountains, because encouraged by the unopposed
progress of Antonius and the advance guard,
would have hesitated longer had a few frightened
fugitives come speeding back to them for refuge
from the pursuit of a victorious foe. Antonius'
numbers for the first few days after he had come
into touch with the enemy were contemptible.
But the legions of Vitellius lay passively in their
entrenchments, looking dully at the stream of
the enemy which flowed past their front in inter-
mittent waves. The procession of the Flavian
troops passed gaily along day after day, always
exposing their flank. They seized town after town,
fortress after fortress, a few miles away from the
torpid Vitellian army. They concentrated undis-
turbed, unopposed, in high spirits, and at leisure, at
the powerful fortress of Verona. Even after this,
their whole line of communications lay open to
attack. If the enemy fell on them they must of
necessity have formed front to a flank outside
Verona's walls, and their defeat would have meant
annihilation for them. During the weary days while
they were mustering, a single victory (and it was
impossible that the Vitellians should not gain it)
would have ruined the whole scheme of invasion —
at least until Mucianus arrived, and would have
given even him much cause for thought. So sensi-
tive is the barometer of men's inclinations in days of
civil war to the storms of failure or the sunshine of
sec.v FLAVIAN INVASION OF ITALY 179
success that the mere rout of the advance guard of
the Danube army might possibly have wrecked
Vespasian's whole enterprise. This, perhaps, would
have been too much to expect. Hardrada is routed
at Stamford Bridge, but the Norman still lands at*
Pevensey and Harold falls at Senlac. But, even
so, the Northman did not invade on Duke William's
behalf. At least the frontier of North-east Italy
might have been securely guarded had Vitellius'
men quitted their stagnant lines and advanced to
battle. Mucianus' heart might well have failed him,
or his discouraged troops have refused to follow
him ; and then the victorious army might have
marched south again, as did Harold's men, and have
defied the Eastern invader to make good his landing
from overseas, or, if he landed, have fought him to
the death. Antonius' invasion would have remained
on record but as a monument of rash folly. The
real struggle for Empire might once more have
been waged outside the walls of Rome. And who
then would with surety forecast the victory for
Vespasian ?
It was treachery which defeated Vitellius' soldiers
and their Emperor, not the strategy of the enemy.
Two men were faithless to the cause. Caecina, the
general, of subtilty kept his splendid army idle in
its entrenchments. Lucilius Bassus, prefect of the
fleet at Ravenna, sought to entice the sailors from
their loyalty. Both men's motives were despicable.
However unworthy their Emperor, it was not for
these men who had received honours at his hands to
plot craftily against him. Happy indeed was Rome
180 FLAVIAN INVASION OF ITALY ch.h
and fortunate the Empire which lost Vitellius to
gain Vespasian as Emperor ; but the traitor's taint is
not therefore sweet-scented. Bassus, a mere cavalry
captain, had hoped for the prefecture of the Guards
at Rome. Preferred to the lower post of Admiral of
the Fleet, he sought in a dastardly perfidy the remedy
for his disappointment. Caecina, vain and ambitious,
ever craving popularity, secretly resentful at the
greater fame which his colleague had won in the
recent campaign, believed that Valens enjoyed the
greater share of Vitellius' esteem. The two had in-
dulged in envious rivalry of pomp, parade, and self-
advertisement during the last few months at Rome.
Caecina had yielded himself a slave to indolence and
luxury. His ambition waxed as his self-control
waned. Envy preyed upon him, jealousy mastered
him. The man brooded over his wrongs until, as
often happens, he lost his sense of honour. He
who first should make terms secretly with the
Flavians would doubtless receive the greater rewards
at their hands. Without shame and without scruple
Caecina and Bassus conspired together at Padua to
bring fleet and army over to the enemy.1
There was little difficulty with the fleet. The
sailors, loyal to Otho, had accepted Vitellius' rule
with chagrin. Many of them were drawn from the
provinces of Dalmatia and Pannonia, now in arms
for Vespasian. In a night the mutiny was accom-
plished. The Ravenna fleet declared for the
Flavians with Bassus' full approval, and chose
Cornelius Fuscus as their new prefect. Bassus
1 Tac. ii. 56, 92, 93, 100, 101.
sec.v FLAVIAN INVASION OF ITALY 181
gained little by his treachery save the loss of his
command and a short stay in prison at Adria.
Later he was employed by the victors again as
cavalry captain on petty operations in Campania.
His ambition had sorely overleapt itself, and he had
this excuse for his treachery that he had failed to
profit by it.1 But Caecina had a harder task with
the army. The general could urge with truth that
the mutiny of the fleet had made their position on
the Tartaro untenable, and that Vitellius' cause had
suffered a grievous blow. With some success he
laid insidious siege to the loyalty of the centurions
and a few of the soldiers, who at last allowed his
arguments and their fears to prevail over their
fidelity. But though for a moment's space Vespasian
was proclaimed in the Vitellian camp, the bulk of the
soldiers and the higher officers held firmly by their
Emperor. " What did the miserable fleet count,"
they passionately asked, "in comparison with eight
legions ? Were they, the proud, victorious army of
Germany, to be handed over to an Antonius Primus
as so many cattle, so many slaves, for sale ? Caecina
and Bassus might seek to rob the army of its
Emperor ; but how could they, soldiers who had in
this campaign tasted nothing as yet of bloodshed,
make answer to their enemies or look them in the
face when asked tauntingly of their victories or
defeats ? "
The Fifth legion Alaudae overthrew Vespasian's
standards with bitter indignation ; the others swiftly
followed suit. Caecina was put by the men in irons.
1 Tac. ii. 101 ; iii. 12 ; iv. 3.
iS2 FLAVIAN INVASION OF ITALY ch.ii
The army on the Tartaro was loyal to its Emperor.
Its inactivity, its hopeless reliance upon the tactical
defensive, had been forced on it by guile and by
treachery. Its opportunity for avenging the folly
of the invader on his head was indeed lost. The
mutiny of the fleet must force them to retire from
their useless lines. Their general, too, was lost to
them. But honour was not lost, and they were
still eight legions with arms in their hands and
burning anger in their hearts.1
The strategy of invasion should have been met
and defeated by the tactics of offence employed
by the strategical defensive. Success crowned
Antonius' rashness. If he had reason to hope that
Caecina would play the traitor, the prize was worth
the risk, and Antonius who ventured it was truly a
great general. But if, when he descended from the
mountains upon Aquileia, he knew nothing of the
temper of the sailors at Ravenna or of Caecina's
meditated treachery (and the scanty evidence points
to this conclusion), he cannot be acquitted of an
impulsive rashness which properly deserved defeat.
For in this case he was presuming upon a degree
of sloth, ignorance, and incapacity on part of the
enemy which it was incredible that they should
display. Judged by results, the Flavian strategy
of invasion was a notable success. Yet there are
victories in war as in games which rightly give
small satisfaction to the victors. Every general
makes mistakes ; but it is not scientific strategy
which is built upon nothing but the expectation of
1 Tac. ii. ioi ; iii. 13, 14.
sec.v FLAVIAN INVASION OF ITALY 183
the foe's mistakes. When Antonius rushed to
knock his head against the enemy's wall, he deserved
a headache rather than the discovery that the wall
was lath and plaster.
And on the other side, Valens, so far as he was
able, completed the ruin begun by the traitor
general and admiral. When the Vitellian army
quitted the position on the Tartaro and concentrated,
ably enough, at Cremona, it lacked nothing even
then but a general. One fatal error gave the
hard-won victory to the foe. From this Valens'
ripe wisdom would surely have saved the army.
But Valens was not at Cremona. While still on his
slow march to the north, he received the news of
the mutiny of the fleet. He was then already
probably north of Ariminum, not very far from
Ravenna, to which city he was marching to co-
operate with the fleet.1 The harbour now was
hostile, and he could not venture to march forward.
His disorderly rabble was not an army. But still
he might have turned aside by a cross road to the
main road from Ariminum to Bononia, and, if he
travelled with great speed, have perhaps reached
Caecina on the Tartaro in time to dissuade that
wavering general from his treachery. Bassus'
action seems to have befallen before Caecina
expected it, and the general was still hesitating.
Or, Valens might certainly have reached Cremona,
had he pushed on fast, before the critical battle was
fought. But Valens never at any time in his career
showed resolution or rapidity of movement. He
1 See Note F, " Valens' March to the North."
1 84 FLAVIAN INVASION OF ITALY ch...
halted his column in miserable indecision, and finally
sent to Rome begging for reinforcements. A poor
little force was sent him, of no avail for any useful
purpose. These he despatched to Ariminum. He
himself gave up all thoughts of taking any part in
the campaign on the Po, and crossed the Apennines
to reach the Arno valley and the sea at Pisa. Great
schemes of future warring at the head of the forces
of Gaul and Germany floated through his mind, and
he took ship at Pisa for the coast of Gaul. This
plan ended lamentably. At Monaco on his voyage
he heard that all the coasts had declared for
Vespasian. Most of his comrades promptly followed
the example set them, and Valens himself with but
ten companions, setting out upon the unfriendly sea,
was driven by a gale upon the Stoichades islands.1
There he was captured and sent as a prisoner of
war to the Umbrian hill-city of Urbinum.-
Long ere this, the Vitellians in North Italy
had fought their final battle there without a
general to lead them. When so many were the
blunders of the defence, when the defending army
had for its generals a Caecina and a Valens, the
traitor and the faint-heart, there is small wonder
that the strategy of offence and invasion prevailed
against it. A combination by the Vitellians of the
tactical offensive with the strategical defensive must
have given them, at first at least, the victory.
The Imperial army was wilfully sacrificed by in-
competence and treachery.
1 The lies d'Hyeres, off Toulon rather than (as Tacitus describes them) off
Marseilles. 2 Tac. iii. 41-43 ; cf. Note F.
sec. vi FLAVIAN INVASION OF ITALY 185
§ 6. The Second " Battle of Bedriactim "
A. The Flavian Advance to Verona. — Antonius
led the van of his invading army rapidly down upon
North-east Italy. The towns which lay upon the
roads leading west and south-west from Aquileia,
far from resisting him, even welcomed his coming.
Opitergium, the modern Oderzo, forty-five miles
from Aquileia, and Altinum (Altino) to the south of
it, fifty-five miles from Aquileia, opened their gates
to him. Altinum was a position of importance, as
a few miles to the west of it the road from Ravenna
which crossed the Po at Adria joined the road from
Padua and Hostilia to Aquileia. It was Antonius'
intention to press rapidly forward down this latter
road. While then the fleet at Ravenna belonged
to the enemy, there was a danger lest a hostile
force should advance by the former road from the
seaport and throw itself astride of the road by which
the Flavian vanguard had come after these had
passed by. In this event, their van would be cut
off from the rest of their army and from their
communications. Its position would be perilous.
Antonius knew nothing as yet of the intention of
the fleet to desert from the enemy. He therefore
left a garrison in Altinum to guard the communica-
tions, and pressed on with the main body to Padua,
and beyond it to Ateste, the modern Este. Both
of these towns admitted him. At Ateste he was
but some seventeen miles from the enemy's outpost
which was guarding the bridge over the Adige at
Forum Alieni. This outpost, as has been seen,
1 86 FLAVIAN INVASION OF ITALY ch.h
was successfully rushed at dawn and dispersed.
But it found time to destroy the bridge and check
the pursuit.1 4.
While Caecina the enemy's general, upon news
of this reverse, moved his army from Hostilia forward
to the camp on the Tartaro and entrenched himself
there, Antonius lay quiet at Padua. The first wave
of the invasion had swept forward eighty miles, and
had for the moment spent its force. But the news
of the advance and of the success gained on the
Adige was quickly carried back to Poetovio, and
the two legions of Pannonia, the Seventh and the
Thirteenth, started out forthwith with much greater
confidence, and joined Antonius in due course at
Padua, meeting with no difficulty on the way.
Here they were given some days' rest to recover
from the march.
Antonius and the other Flavian leaders had now
to consider their next movements. The enemy lay
quiet in their lines beyond the Adige, and showed
no sign of advancing themselves to the attack.
This left the initiative still comfortably in the
invader's keeping. To assault the position on the
Tartaro, however, seemed most unwise. It was an
exceedingly strong one, and, moreover, was held
by a veteran army which was far stronger in
numbers than were the troops who had up to
that time arrived at Padua. It was also becom-
ing evident that Caecina's heart was not towards
Vitellius any longer, and it was far better to
give him time for quiet thought and a fur-
1 See above, p. 171.
sec. vi FLAVIAN INVASION OF ITALY 187
tive correspondence with the Flavians than to
hurry him into a loyal resistance by an ill-timed
attack. And two other thoughts had weight with
Antonius. The strength of his force lay largely
in its cavalry. If Caecina should make up his mind
after all to advance his standards against the invader,
Antonius needed a battle-ground where he could
deploy all his horse to best advantage. There was,
indeed, plenty of level ground round Padua at the
foot of the green Euganean Hills. But these hills
might screen the advance of the enemy, and, besides,
to stay at Padua would seem a confession of fear.
The advance must continue. The second con-
sideration which influenced the Flavian general was
the very lively dread lest large reinforcements
should reach the enemy from Germany by way of the
Brenner Pass. Raetia, on the northern side of the
Alps where this pass began, was loyal to Vitellius,
and the Flavian forces already sent to the line of the
Inn might indeed defend Noricum against an attack
from Raetia, but were too weak to intercept the
coming of reinforcements to Italy over the Brenner.1
If there were an army on the march by this road —
and Vitellius had certainly sent to Germany for
help — and if it reached Hostilia, little would be
heard henceforward of Caecina's wavering. One
town, however, guarded the issue of the Brenner
Pass from the mountains, the strong and important
city of Verona, across the river Adige, some forty
miles up stream above Legnago. To the south of
Verona was a plain suited in every way for cavalry
1 See above, p. 162.
188 FLAVIAN INVASION OF ITALY ch.h
manoeuvres. If he seized this town, Antonius
would have not only the prestige of holding one of
the greatest cities of North Italy, but also a suit-
able base for his future operations. Moreover, at
Verona he would be able to intercept any German
reinforcements coming to the enemy from the
north ; and Verona was half- way from Padua to
Cremona. Poised at this central point he could
swoop down upon any part of the enemy's long
line of defence, which reached from Cremona to
Hostilia and beyond.
As soon, therefore, as his men were ready again
for marching Antonius marched from Padua to
Verona. On the road lay the town of Vicetia, the
modern Vicenza under the Monti Berici. To-day
this busy city numbers nearly half as many in-
habitants as Verona herself; but in Roman days
it was a small place of little importance. It gave,
however, peculiar pleasure to the Flavians to take
possession of the town, since it happened to be
Caecina's birthplace, and they gleefully thought
how the news would be spread abroad that " the
enemy's general had been despoiled of his native
land."1 The town, however, was of no military
importance, and Caecina, who was pondering matters
of greater moment, was not likely to be greatly
moved by so trivial an incident. From Vicetia the
army moved forward to Verona, thirty miles away,
and the town gladly received them. Entrenchments
were thrown up and a halt of some time was
called.
1 " Patriam hostium duci ereptam,'' Tac. iii. 8.
sec. vi FLAVIAN INVASION OF ITALY 189
From this position, says the Roman historian,
Caecina could doubtless have hurled them, had he
so chosen. But the traitor kept his army quiet,
and soon the coming of the Moesian army relieved
Antonius from the more instant peril of defeat
First the Seventh Claudia legion arrived under
command of a stalwart tribune, Vipstanus Messalla,
and accompanied by the Governor of Moesia him-
self, Aponius Saturninus. The tribune had taken
direct command himself of the legion, since its
legate was at this time fleeing for his life over the
Balkans from the private vengeance of the governor.
Messalla, says Tacitus, " was the one and only man
who brought an honest heart to that war." Later
he wrote the history of it, and Tacitus has certainly
thanked him gracefully for the use which he himself
made of his history.
After the Seventh legion came the other two,
the Third and Eighth. By this time at last the
Flavian leaders had assembled a truly powerful
army at Verona. It cannot have been greatly, if at
all, weaker than the enemy's force on the Tartaro.
One thing was lacking to its strength, namely, per-
fect discipline. And it enjoyed too many possible
generals. The one evil remedied the other. The
turbulence of the men scared away the governors
of Moesia and Pannonia from the camp. Antonius
was left in undisputed command, so far as any man
had command over the unruly spirits of the soldiers,
and he could rely on Arrius Varus to help him.1
B. The Race for Cremona. — Then to the Flavian
1 Tac. iii. 6-1 1.
i9o FLAVIAN INVASION OF ITALY
camp at Verona there came exciting news. Antonius
had for some time past been in correspondence
with Caecina. The latter had doubtless assured
the Flavian commander that he could induce his
army to follow his example in renouncing its allegi-
ance to Vitellius. Caecina tried and failed. His
indignant troops put him in chains ; but they wisely
judged their position on the Tartaro to be no longer
tenable. The Ravenna fleet threatened their rear ;
the Flavian army at Verona, within a few miles of
their front, was now strong, and might advance
against them when they were in confusion and had
no leader to inspirit their defence. To the west
at Cremona, however, lay two legions and a force
of cavalry of their comrades. The troops resolved
to march to join them at once. The direct road to
Cremona from Hostilia lay north of the Po, and ran
by Mantua and Bedriacum. By this route Cremona
was not quite sixty miles away from Hostilia. But
if they marched by this route they would be peril-
ously near the Flavians at Verona, and their right
flank would be exposed to attack by these at any
point along the road. If the Verona army marched
down upon their column (and Antonius would
certainly not miss such an opportunity) they would
have hurriedly to deploy into order of battle by the
right with the enemy's cavalry rushing down upon
them, and they would fight with flanks unprotected,
without cavalry of their own, and with their backs
to the broad and unfordable stream of the Po.
Though they now lacked Caecina's guidance, the
legate of the Fifth legion and the Camp Prefect,
sec. vi FLAVIAN INVASION OF ITALY 191
to whom the soldiers had entrusted the command,
were able to realise that such a position must
mean ruinous defeat. The march by Mantua was
impossible. Their only alternative was to cross to
the south of the Po, and march by Mutina, Parma,
and (possibly) Placentia. It was a terribly long
detour and a long and trying march of a hundred and
ten miles.1 But at least their right flank would be
safe, and distance would be their only enemy. They
must trust to speed of marching to bring them to
Cremona in time. And, in truth, never did troops
merit better the praise which belongs to the Roman
soldier than do these betrayed and leaderless men
of the Vitellian army. Placed in so disheartening
and critical a position, the modern European soldier
might but too easily lose heart entirely, or lack the
initiative and foresight which the Roman at this
time displayed. There have been few troops in the
world to equal those of Rome.
The Vitellians abandoned their camp on the
Tartaro and fell back to Hostilia. They crossed
the Po there, broke down the bridge behind
them,2 and disappeared entirely from the range and
ken of Antonius' scouts. The crisis of the cam-
paign evidently was hard at hand.3
1 Distances : Hostilia to Mutina, 30 miles ; Mutina to Parma, 30 ; Parma
to Placentia, 35 ; Placentia to Cremona, 15.
2 An obvious inference from military requirements. The broken bridge in
Tac. iii. 14 is, of course, that over the Tartaro.
3 Tacitus has not the least interest in the march. He merely remarks,
"Abrupto ponte Hostiliam rursus, inde Cremonam pergunt." That they
marched vid Parma, as Mommsen suggests, is shown by the fact that
Antonius, on their departure, makes a forced march of two days from
Verona to Bedriacum (some thirty-three miles), but never gets in touch with
the Vitellian retreating army, and he arrives outside Cremona after a day's
fighting as soon as they do. And these have marched with desperate haste,
192 FLAVIAN INVASION OF ITALY ch.h
Antonius understood at once the meaning of
the empty camp. There was now to be a race for
Cremona and its small garrison between his own
and the Hostilia army. The two divisions of the
enemy must not be allowed to join. Cremona must
be taken before the eastern division could march to
it, and before it could be reached by Valens, who
surely (so judged the soldier Antonius) would hasten
to join the enemy's army on hearing of Caecina's
betrayal. Vitellian reinforcements, too, were said
to be mustering from Britain, Gaul, and Germany.
He had the shorter march by fifty miles. But the
garrison of Cremona was strong enough to offer
a sturdy resistance. Without hesitation or delay,
Antonius led his entire force south from Verona.
The race for Cremona had begun.
By the evening of the second day Antonius and
his army had marched thirty-five miles from Verona
to Bedriacum, where the road from Mantua to
Cremona joined their own. Cremona itself lay
twenty-two miles away by the Via Postumia to the
west.1 There had been no sign of the enemy on
the march. Evidently he had not risked the direct
route from Hostilia to Cremona.
Next day, October 27, a.d. 69, Antonius left
his legions at Bedriacum with orders to com-
plete the defences of that camp. He himself
rode out at the head of four thousand cavalry
thirty miles on the day before the night of the final battle. Verona to
Cremona is fifty-five miles. If the Vitellians found a road striking off straight
to Cremona at some point on the main road short of Placentia, the distance
from Hostilia to Cremona, vid Parma, may be reckoned at about ninety to
ninety-five miles.
1 For the site of Bedriacum-Calvatone see Note C.
sec. vi FLAVIAN INVASION OF ITALY 193
eight miles along the road in the direction of
Cremona. His auxiliary infantry were sent out
on both sides of the road to plunder and taste
beforehand the sweets of victory, which could
only be fully theirs when they had won the battle.
This strange order could not be justified save by
the character which civil war breeds in the troops ;
and, in fact, it was quickly punished. At eleven
o'clock a mounted scout, who had been sent forward
by Antonius, came riding back in hot haste with
the news that the foe were advancing along the
road. He had himself seen but a small body of
their horse, but " the noise and the movement
of the enemy could be heard far and wide." This
somewhat vague report * caused Arrius Varus, with
part of the cavalry, to ride on to investigate its truth.
Antonius, with greater foresight, halted and drew up
the remainder, leaving room on the road to receive
Varus and his troopers into the shelter of the centre
should they be driven back by weight of numbers.
Messengers were at once sent off to bid the legions
march forward from Bedriacum, and signals were
displayed to summon the plundering auxiliaries to
the spot. Very soon Varus and his company were
seen galloping back at full speed along the road,
hotly pursued by superior numbers of the enemy's
horse. The garrison of Cremona had boldly sallied
out to the attack. The runaways plunged madly
into the midst of the 'Flavian battle - line. All
Antonius' precautions were vain, and the whole
mass of his four thousand cavalry fled back along
1 It is a report more worthy of the historian than of the scout.
O
194 FLAVIAN INVASION OF ITALY ch.ii
the road in hopeless panic and confusion, their
general swept along in the rout, vainly protesting,
imploring, reproaching. Their flight was checked
only by a small stream with steep banks and danger-
ous to ford, which crossed the line of the road.1 The
bridge over it had been broken, and Antonius seized
the last chance of rallying the fugitives here. A
standard-bearer came wildly riding in flight down
upon him. He thrust the coward through with
a lance, grasped the standard, and himself turned
it to face the pursuing foe. A handful of his men,
not more than a hundred, saw the sight and made
a stand round their general upon the streamlet's
bank. The mass of fugitives, their flight checked,
rallied round them. Discipline had already been
restored and some kind of order formed when
the pursuers came in sight, following the rout
recklessly in a long scattered line. They were
roughly handled, and the tide of pursuit turned.
Back towards Cremona hurried the Vitellian horse,
and in their wake followed the Flavian army, now
continually reinforced by legionaries from the camp
and auxiliaries from the fields. A confused mass
of horse and foot, like a muddy tide, rolled along
the Postumian way for at least ten miles, until it
1 Heraeus, quoting one Rycke, calls this stream " the Delmona, a tributary
of the Oglio." There is to-day a " Dugale Delmona " south and east of
Piadena. But the Tacitean stream may be a brook more to the north, running
(sic) from near Drizzona to the Oglio near Isola Dovarese, which probably
crossed the line of the ancient road from Calvatone westwards. Precise
identification is impossible, owing to the modern drainage channels. There
is a marsh north of San Lorenzo dei Picenardi and, a mile to the west, a
moated castello, and lakelet at Torre dei Picenardi, and there may well have
been a stream here in old days. The " Delmona " (sic) is too far to the east
and much too near to Calvatone.
sec.v, FLAVIAN INVASION OF ITALY 195
presently dashed upon the enemy's infantry. The
two legions had marched out under cover of their
cavalry's advance, and halted four miles from
Cremona. Their steadfast array and standards
glittering in the sun gave promise of a firm resist-
ance as of a line of stubborn cliffs against the flood.
But the Flavians were not to be denied. Their
camp lay eighteen miles behind them ; they had
fought and pursued breathlessly the last ten miles.
But the Vitellians had no general to marshal them
to admit their fleeing horse within their ranks, or to
take advantage of the enemy's weariness. They
stood stolid and perplexed, and when Vipstanus
Messalla hurled himself upon them, they broke
and fled. Shelter was near. Outside Cremona's
city walls lay their own fortified camp. They
quickly found refuge in it, and the road up to its
very gates remained in possession of the Flavian
troops.
The evening shadows were falling when the
mass of Antonius' army was gathered on the scene
of the victory. His troops clamoured to be led
to the final assault. Thoughts of the sack and
gluttonous rapine of a helpless city when night
covered every deed of darkness spurred on the
infuriated soldiery. Their general knew well that
to assault the enemy's position that night was a
task fraught with the greatest peril. His men were
tired with the busy day's fighting and pursuit; they
had no siege implements ; they knew nothing of the
nature of the fortifications which confronted them.
While he opposed their demands, he sent the least
196 FLAVIAN INVASION OF ITALY ch.h
wearied of his horsemen back to the camp at Bedri-
acum to bring supplies and a siege train up to the
front as speedily as possible. But that night he
would advance no further. All Antonius' entreaties
and arguments, however, could not prevail over the
impatient ardour of his troops. They were on the
point of advancing madly forward when scouts
were seen speeding back from the direction of the
city. The tidings which these brought hushed
the clamour in a moment and gave the soldiers
food indeed for saner thought. The whole Hostilia
army, the scouts reported, was even now within the
city walls and preparing to march out at once to
the attack.
The veterans of Caecina's army had indeed
accomplished a feat well-nigh beyond the possible.
In four days1 they had covered a hundred miles.
That morning they had quitted camp thirty miles
away from Cremona, and now, as evening fell, they
marched into the city, as their comrades came
fleeing back under its shelter. The whole army
was at last united. Once more the scale of victory
seemed to incline towards the Vitellians. They
needed but a general of their own to throw his
sword into the scale and the day was theirs.
Had that night been allowed to pass without
fighting, the Flavian army must on the morrow have
been in sorry plight. Hungry and stiff and anxious,
encamped all night long upon the open road within
1 I allow a day for the news of the evacuation of the camp to be brought
to Verona and for Antonius to make his dispositions for the march to Cremona.
Not even Vitellians could have marched a hundred miles in three days and
fought on the evening of the third.
sec. vi FLAVIAN INVASION OF ITALY 197
striking distance of the enemy, constantly alarmed
and ever under arms, without food or fires or
entrenchments, they would have passed the night
in as miserable a state as that of an army expecting
attack could well be. Meanwhile the Vitellians,
safe within their lines, warm and with abundant
supplies, would have rested from their long day's
march, and risen for the battle on the coming day
with a fresh energy and confidence equal to their
courage and determination to conquer. One charge
of theirs, it might be thought, would have broken
the cold and wavering Flavian line, and then there
remained for them but the grimmest and the most
savage of pursuits.
What spell of Fortune's weaving was it that
bewitched the men of the German army ? Surely
Heaven was resolute that Vitellius' rule must end,
though his foes in the field sought by their mistakes
to maintain it. Once Antonius had offered the
enemy victory on the plains by Padua and Verona,
and had been saved by treachery. Now on the
morrow he promised them easy victory again.
They had only to wait for it. But now Folly came
to Treachery's aid and finished the work. The
Hostilia army, weary and footsore, impatiently
brooked no single night's delay. They had no
general to compel them to be wise. At nine o'clock
that night the whole Vitellian force marched de-
fiantly out from their camp under the walls of
Cremona and challenged their hated foe to the final
struggle. The hour for which they had been
waiting so long had come at last ; the prize they
198 FLAVIAN INVASION OF ITALY ch.h
had toiled so heavily to gain seemed at last within
their grasp. A night's delay might let it slip. But
now there should be no escape for the enemy.1
C. The Battle of Cremona. — Thus " indigus rec-
toris, inops consilii," the Vitellian army marched
out and drew up in order of battle. On the left of
the raised Postumian way were stationed the men
of the Twenty-second, Sixteenth, and First legions ;
on the road itself the Fifth and Fifteenth legions,
with the detachments of the Second, Ninth, and
Twentieth behind them ; on their right flank stood
the Fourth legion. Men of the First legion Italica
and the Twenty-first legion were scattered along
the entire line. No precise position is given for
the cavalry and auxiliaries, but the former at least
were doubtless posted on the extreme wings. The
Flavians were already drawn up in line of battle to
meet them. On the road in the centre was the
Thirteenth legion. North of the road, forming the
Flavian right wing, and drawn up along a cross
road, were the Eighth legion next the main road ;
then the Third legion, distributed in the intervals of
thick brushwood ; and next to them the band of
Otho's old Praetorians who had joined Antonius'
standard. On the left wing were the men of the
Seventh Galbiana legion next the road, beside whom
stood those of the Seventh Claudia legion, whose
front was protected by a ditch. The auxiliaries
were placed beyond the legionaries on both wings,
beyond whom again were some of the cavalry, while
the rest were kept in reserve in the rear. The
1 Tac. iii. 12-21.
FLAVIAN INVASION OF ITALY 199
battle plan can therefore be represented by the
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200 FLAVIAN INVASION OF ITALY ch.h
Fighting began about nine o'clock at night, and,
as always happens in battles by night, was confused.
Order was quickly lost, and hand-to-hand conflicts
were waged all over the field. The two armies
were armed alike ; the watchwords quickly became
known to the men on both sides ; and captured
standards displayed here and there by both com-
batants increased the perplexity and disarray. The
Flavian left was hard pressed, and the Seventh
Galbiana legion lost men quickly. Its very eagle
was all but taken, and rescued only by the desperate
valour of a centurion, who died to save it from the
enemy. Antonius summoned the Praetorians from
the right wing to strengthen the wavering line, and
the battle, now restored, swayed to and fro in alter-
nate advance and retreat. The Vitellian artillery
had at the beginning of the fight been scattered up
and down the line of battle, and its missiles had
gone hurtling among the bushes opposite without
doing great hurt to the enemy. But later all the
engines were massed together on the high-road,
and their fire, concentrated on the clear space in
front of them, made the Flavian centre suffer
heavily. Here again the tide of war seemed
setting against Antonius, when two of his soldiers
found a remedy. Their names are not known, but
their deed is not forgotten. Snatching up shields
from two of the enemy's dead, they made their way
undetected over to the hostile line, and cut the
ropes of the engines. At once they fell, pierced
with wounds ; but they had saved their comrades
and their general, for now the enemy's artillery was
sEcv. FLAVIAN INVASION OF ITALY 201
useless. Presently, late at night, the moon rose
in the east, and shone full upon the faces of the
Vitellians. The moonlight, disabling their own
sight, exposed them to the sure aim of the foe,
while they themselves smote vainly at the shadows
which the dark figures of the soldiers opposite cast
far on the ground before them. Ever and again
clouds drifted over the face of the moon, and then,
as by common consent, the fighters drew apart and
rested, leaning on their weapons, until the moon
shone out full again. Women came out from
Cremona, some themselves to plunge into the battle
and be slain, fighting fiercely for the cause ; some
to carry food and drink to the soldiers of their
army. The Vitellians ate and drank, and offered
of the fare also to the enemy. " Come, comrades,"
they cried. " Here is meat and drink : take
and eat ; take and drink ; that we may slay and
be slain, but strong and not fainting." Then
arms were grounded, and the men ate and drank
together. But, the short rest over, they fell
again to fighting with bitterness and anger all the
greater.
All through the long autumn night the battle
raged with unabated fury. Here son slew father
unawares ; here brother cut down brother. Men
shuddered at such sights, and, hastening, did the
like. The Flavian general was to be seen every-
where in his battle - line, encouraging, taunting,
rebuking, cheering his soldiers on to yet stronger
blows and a more stubborn stand. "On that same
battle-field, yet cumbered with the relics of their
202 FLAVIAN INVASION OF ITALY ch.ii
dead, the Pannonian legions must redeem their
honour from the stain of the defeat which they had
once suffered there. The men of Moesia had been
bold enough of speech against the foe : could they
not show the deeds to match ? Dared the men of
the Third to shame the records of the regiment ?
Had it not fought under Mark Antony in Parthia,
under Corbulo in Armenia? Had it not but newly
crushed the wild Sarmatian invader and saved their
province ? Why above all, he fiercely demanded,
were the Guards hanging back in the final hour of
trial ? Had they not even yet drained ignominy
to the full ? Boors and peasants that they were,
soldiers no more, did there remain for them yet
another Emperor, another camp, to shelter them ?
Their standards, their arms, were with the enemy ;
for them death alone was guerdon of defeat."
Everywhere the men wildly cheered their fiery
leader as he rode up and down the line, and grimly
they held their ground, until at last the sun rose
upon the scene.
Then the Third legion, lately come from Syria,
saluted it, as was their wont, and the chance salute
decided at last the day. The word ran fast down
the Flavian line, that Mucianus and their comrades
of the Eastern army had come at last. Their
hopes rose high. The enemy caught the rumour
and wavered. In one final heave of massed
column the Flavians thrust desperately at the
Vitellian line, now ragged, thin, despairing. The
line bent and gave. There was no rally. Ensnared,
inextricably involved, among the broken engines,
sec.v. FLAVIAN INVASION OF ITALY 203
the waggons, the heaps of slain, the Army of Ger-
many broke up into a rout of fugitives, and the
enemy's horse, cutting, hewing, butchering, drove
them to their camp. The battle on the open field
was ended.
The tide of victory surged up against the gates
and ramparts of the camp. The troops had
marched and fought for twenty miles and twenty
hours. Still Antonius gave them no rest, but
called on them for the last great effort, and, as one
man, they answered to the call. A very storm of
missiles raged for some time on either side. Then
two columns of assault rushed at the ramparts and
the gates on the eastern and the northern roads,
towards Bedriacum and Brixia. The men were
hurled back. Antonius flung himself among them.
With significant gesture he pointed to the city :
Cremona was theirs to sack, if they would rally.
Himself at the head of the storming column, he led
the Third and Seventh legions again up to the
Bedriacum gate. Down crashing on their heads
came the great engine of war itself, hurled by the
desperate defenders, and they recoiled once more.
It was but for a moment. The engine's fall had
torn away with it part of the rampart. Fresh
assailants swarmed to the breach, the men of the
two legions vying with one another in eager regi-
mental rivalry. The gate was hewn down with
axes and with swords. Volusius of the Third was
the first man in. The others poured over and
through the defences. The Vitellians leapt de-
spairing from the ramparts as the foe rushed in.
204 FLAVIAN INVASION OF ITALY ch. »
The camp was cleared of the living among the
enemy up to the city's walls.1
D. The Sack of Cremona. — The actual town
itself seemed still to defy assault. It was crowded
with citizens and many strangers who had gathered
there for the fair, which had chanced upon those
very days ; and many of the defeated troops had
escaped within the city and thronged its lofty walls
and towers, menacing the foe. But Antonius never
hesitated. Soon the inhabitants saw the fairest of
their buildings outside the walls in a blaze of fire,
and others, which overtopped the ramparts, crowded
with soldiery. A rain of missiles and flaming
brands again began to descend upon the walls, and
under its cover the legionaries were seen moving
to the assault. For nearly three centuries the proud
and stately city had been queen of the valley
of the Po. In her earliest years the fierce Gallic
tribes had raged round her walls in vain.2 Temples
and palaces gave her beauty ; walls and iron-clamped
gates glorified her strength ; the river bestowed
riches on her fields and prosperity on her citizens.
Now at last an enemy sterner than the Gaul, fiercer
than the barbarian, was at her gates. And the
garrison played her false. The officers, hopeful of
mercy for themselves, surrendered the city. The
soldiers sullenly allowed it, or, careless of the end,
roamed through the streets, plundering or fighting.
Caecina, who had been hurried there by the army
which once owed him obedience and cast into the
1 Tac. iii. 21-29; Dio lxv. 12-14.
- 200 B.C. The city was founded as a Latin colony in 218.
skc.v, FLAVIAN INVASION OF ITALY 205
city prison, was released from his dungeon, clad in
the robes and decorated with the insignia of his con-
sular office, and the men begged him humbly that
he should plead for them with the victors. " It was
the last of evils that so many valiant men should
implore the traitor's aid." The gates were thrown
open ; the garrison laid down their arms, and
marched out between lines of jeering troops. But
soon mockery was changed to pity. The victors
had been vanquished by the vanquished of to-day,
and as they had received mercy at the others'
hands, so now it should be shown these in return.
Only when Caecina came proudly out from the
gate, glittering with his train of lictors, did a fierce
cry of scorn and hate arise. Antonius checked it,
and sent the traitor under guard to Vespasian.
For the moment the city itself was spared, but
only for the moment. The soldiers had not for-
gotten the insults which the citizens a few months
earlier had heaped upon them.1 And never did city
promise richer plunder. At the crisis of the struggle
the general had spurred his troops on by the thought
of spoiling it. He should not restrain them now.
Already the flames were spreading, and one chance
word did the rest. Antonius hastened to the baths
to wash off the blood and grime which covered
him. The water was cold. " Were not the fires
lit ? " he impatiently demanded. An anxious slave
hastened to him with the assurance : " It will soon
be warm." Question and answer ran from mouth
to mouth. The time had come to light the fires
1 See above, p. 136.
206 FLAVIAN INVASION OF ITALY ch.h
of rapine : this was their general's meaning. Forty-
thousand armed men, and a yet larger and more
horrible army of sutlers, camp followers, the refuse
and sweepings of the vilest, broke into the city.
For four days it was given up to their maddened
lust and rage. The chapter in which the Roman
historian tells the story of the sack equals in ghast-
liness the tale of the sack of Rome by the forces of
the Constable de Bourbon, of heretic Antwerp by
the fanatic Spaniards. When four days had passed,
fifty thousand had perished by the sword and
torture, by fire and by lust. Flames consumed the
city. Only a solitary temple, that of Mefitis out-
side the city walls, remained untouched by them.
The very spoilers were driven to encamp three
miles away by the reek of the blood which rose
from the poisoned soil. In this way Cremona came
to its end.1
There are wars, even civil wars, which inspire
devotion and self-sacrifice ; this struggle of a.d. 69
displayed the horrors of war in all their nakedness.
§ 7. The Advance to Rome
A. The Halt at Fano. — The sack of Cremona
ended on October 31 ; there were still nearly two
months to pass before the end of the war came.
News of the victory was sent at once by
Antonius to the western provinces, Spain, Gaul,
and Britain. All three presently declared for
1 Tac. iii. 30-35 ; Dio lxv. 15. The city was rebuilt under Vespasian, but
the disaster remained proverbial.
sec. vii FLAVIAN INVASION OF ITALY 207
Vespasian, the First Adjutrix legion in Spain
setting the example. This legion had never for-
given Vitellius' rise to power and Otho's fall.1
Next, the defeated army had to be sent away to a
safe distance, lest it should still take a part in the
resistance which the Emperor would offer. The
men were sent to the Danube provinces, save for
a few cavalry who took service with the Flavians.
Distributed skilfully through Dalmatia, Illyricum,
and Moesia, they gave after this no cause for
anxiety, and in Moesia were of excellent service
against the marauding Dacians.2 There then
remained only the fear lest Germany should still
send men to Vitellius' aid. Antonius therefore
at once sent troops to occupy the Alpine passes.
The mutiny against Rome which shortly afterwards
broke out on the Rhine was already so far afoot
(under the guise of a war in Vespasian's interests
against the Vitellian troops on the river) that the
army in Germany was but too busily occupied, and
not a man was sent to cross the Alps. It was
Antonius who, by letters, had provoked this rising
on Vespasian's behalf, and his scheme was so far
magnificently successful.3 But, in very truth, to
encourage those who were little better than bar-
barians to rise against the Romans, even though
these last might be of the opposite faction, was
nothing else than to play with fire, and brought
quickly a terrible retribution in its train. It was
as if the English had let loose the Basutos upon
1 Tac. iii. 35, 44. 2 Tac. iii. 35, 46.
3 Tac. iv. 13 ; see below, Chap. III., for the history of this rising.
208 FLAVIAN INVASION OF ITALY
their enemy in the recent Transvaal war. To this
extent Antonius lacked the true Imperial feeling
which, if it delayed sorely the coming of peace, yet
gave us the chance of goodwill when peace at last
did come.
No such thoughts troubled Antonius the Roman.
The immediate military need was his only care,
and for this at least he had made most wise pro-
vision. That he had opened the floodgates to
rebellion and savagery in the far North, and that
the flood would not hereafter be arrested at his
word, he refused or was unable to perceive. At
least he had stayed the coming of all reinforcements
from any quarter of the Empire to Vitellius. And
with this he was well content.
Having taken these precautions, the general
turned his thoughts to the enemy in the South.
The Emperor at Rome might be inert and torpid,
but at least he would not, like Otho, save his foes
the need of further fighting by slaying himself,
because his army had been vanquished on the
banks of the Po. Moreover, he still commanded
troops of excellent quality and by no means
contemptible in numbers. Twenty-five thousand
infantry, and most of these the veterans whom he
had made his Guards, could not be played with as
if they had been a toy army or a rabble of recruits.
The campaign had opened for the Flavians well
indeed, but much work yet remained to be done.
The invading army must of necessity advance
towards the capital.
Yet such an advance promised many difficulties.
sec. vii FLAVIAN INVASION OF ITALY 209
From Cremona to Ariminum the road was easy all
through its length of one hundred and fifty miles. It
ran over a perfectly flat plain, skirting the mountain
chain upon the right hand. But after Ariminum the
troubles began. The great highway to Rome, the
Via Flaminia, crossed the ridge of the Apennines
at its lowest point. From Ariminum it ran along
the sea-shore to Fanum Fortunae (Fano), and there
struck inland up the stony winding channel of the
Metaurus, entering the hills at Forum Sempronii,
a name corrupted to-day into that of Fossombrone,
the last comfortable village of the lowlands. From
that point the climb began, by Cales (Cagli) and
the wild ravine of Cantiano to the top of the pass,
which lies at a height of 2400 feet above the sea.
The rise to this was very steep. Thence it
dropped to Nuceria (Nocera Umbra) and Fulginium
(Foligno). From Fulginium it crossed the five-
mile expanse of level plain to Mevania (Bevagna)
opposite, and the chief natural difficulties of the
road were ended. But if at places this road runs
through a fair and smiling land, adorned with fields
and lanes, flowers and fruit-trees, worthy of the
county of Devon, at others it pierces rocky ravines,
crawls up through gorges and rocky mountain sides
black with oakwoods or bare to all the blasts of
heaven. The mountains shoot steeply up first on
the right hand, then on the left, rugged, inhospit-
able, cleft by great red ravines and strewn with
broken rocks and screes. The hamlets are squalid
and miserable, the mountaineers in appearance a
rude and lowering race. Other tracks cross the
p
210 FLAVIAN INVASION OF ITALY a....
central ridge, but there is none which can so easily
be traversed as this of the main highway. Many
miles to the south the Via Salaria crosses the
central heights of the Abruzzi from Ascoli to Rieti,
but the difficulties of the Flaminian way are as
nothing to the toils which await the traveller who
plunges by this route into the heart of Italy's wildest
mountains. More than a hundred and eighty miles
separate Ariminum and Rome ; for the first hundred
miles the road is mountainous. And to Antonius
and his army the late season of the year increased
the difficulties. Already in November snow had
fallen on the mountains, and bad weather had set
in. There was little food to be obtained along the
road until he reached the great central Umbrian
valley at Foligno, and December would be upon him
first, even if the enemy made no effort to block the
way. Even Vitellius could hardly fail to seize this
great chance which the winter offered him. And if
the pass were blocked by the Emperor's army, with
a strong force at its summit, and fifteen thousand
men in camp at Foligno, Antonius could never force
the passage of the mountains in that year.
Other causes also made the general hesitate.
There was dissension in his staff, some urging the
advance, some bidding him delay till Mucianus
came. Mucianus himself wrote to him in ambigu-
ous terms. He doubtless desired himself to lead
the victorious army into Rome. Antonius, some-
what of a braggart, a veritable soldier of fortune,
it might seem to the other, had gained success
enough. The two men hated and distrusted each
sec. vn FLAVIAN INVASION OF ITALY 211
the other, and on Antonius' staff were many who
looked to the greater man for their promotion, and
sought now to thwart the general who had led
them to victory. If Antonius gave the order to
advance, all the penalties of failure would be visited
on his head. Mucianus clearly washed his hands
of all responsibility. The very troops, knowing
well the quarrels in the staff, were turbulent and
clamorous for " shoe-money." Jealousy and insub-
ordination, difficulties of supply, perils of the road,
defiance by the enemy, — all these troubles, actual
or possible, pressed heavily on Antonius.
He moved forward to Ariminum. The town
was still in the enemy's hands, but the fleet under
command of Cornelius Fuscus had by this time
closely invested it by land and sea. There was
therefore no army upon the eastern side of the
mountains and down the Adriatic coast to oppose his
advance. And the timely capture of Valens on the
Riviera was in every way most fortunate.1 Yet even
the march to Fanum Fortunae, twenty-eight miles
beyond Ariminum, was not without its difficulties.
Heavy autumn rains had swollen the Po and its
tributary streams, and the low country of the valley
at foot of the mountains was flooded to such an
extent that the heavy baggage of the soldiers had
to be left behind. Commissariat troubles, too, began
early. Antonius failed to keep his troops in hand,
and they indulged in indiscriminate plunder on the
way. This of course at once doubled the difficulties
of supply. The force which arrived at last at Fano
1 See above, p. 184; cf. Tac. iii. 44 for its effect.
212 FLAVIAN INVASION OF ITALY ch.h
was neither a strong one nor in good temper. All
the sick and wounded had been left behind at the
base, Verona, but also the greater part of the legion-
aries remained there, and Antonius at Fano mustered
only picked troops from these, together with auxiliary-
infantry and cavalry. The mountains rose before
him, and he halted. Further advance was not
possible until his force was strengthened, supplies
were collected, and the country in his front was
explored. Antonius set his hand resolutely to all
three tasks. The legions were summoned, supplies
hurried up by sea, and cavalry scouts sent forward
to discover if the enemy had occupied the pass.1
But all this involved delay, and winter was fast
approaching. Vitellius had his opportunity, if he
had the wit to use it.
B. Movements of the Vitellian Forces. — The
Emperor had meanwhile been waiting on circum-
stance, and this at last had roused him to action.
At first, as soon as his army had marched for the
north under Caecina, and when Valens had pre-
sently followed after it, Vitellius took no further
interest in the war. In the pleasant shade of his
gardens, or under the trees of the woods which
clothe thickly the sides of the Alban hills at
Aricia, a few miles south of Rome, the ruler of
the Empire dozed the days away, heavy with food
and slumberous, torpid as a fat and well-fed toad.2
1 Tacitus explains that he sent the cavalry on to explore the whole of
Umhria : "si qua Appennini juga clementius adirentur," iii. 52. That the
Via Flaminia was the easiest route could hardly be in question.
2 " Ut ignava animalia quihus si cibum suggeras jacent torpenlque," Tac.
iii. 36.
sec. vn FLAVIAN INVASION OF ITALY 213
The news of the mutiny of the Ravenna fleet
scarcely moved him. Valens' urgent request for
reinforcements was answered by the sending of a
petty force which was far too weak to be of any
use.1 Only at last the tidings of Caecina's treachery
and the troops' loyal requital of it woke him from
his slumbers in the greenwood. " With that dull
soul joy had a greater weight than trouble."2
Vitellius came to Rome and harangued both Senate
and people. When the news came of the battle
of Cremona the orator's powers abruptly failed him.
Every one at Court went about silently, and no one
made any allusion to so unfortunate an incident.
They whispered in the anterooms and streets, but
in the Emperor's presence no one had heard any-
thing of the battle. The Government ordered
silence on the topic, and, if it were possible, the
disaster was magnified in consequence.3
The spies sent out were courteously welcomed
by the enemy and escorted round their camp.
Vitellius blandly shut his ears to their reports. At
last a brave centurion, Julius Agrestis, convinced
his Emperor that it was time to be up and doing.
Allowed at his own request, so ran the tale, to go
out from Rome to discover the actual facts of the
situation, he went openly to Cremona and straight
to Antonius, avowing his mission. That general
readily gave him guides and showed him every-
thing— his army, the battle-field, the prisoners of
war. Back came Agrestis to Vitellius and told
1 See above, p. 184.
" "Plus apud socordem animum laetitia quam cura valuit," Tac. iii. 36.
3 Tac. iii. 36, 37, 54.
2i4 FLAVIAN INVASION OF ITALY
CH. II'
him all the truth. The Emperor refused, as usual,
to believe a word of it, and suggested that he had
been bribed to bring such news. The centurion
was indignant. " Since," he cried, " you have need
of a sure proof, and have no longer any other use
whether of my life or death, I will give you proof
verily to believe." With these words he hastened
from Vitellius' presence and slew himself. Then
at last, " as one roused from sleep," the Emperor
took measures of defence.1
His available forces consisted of sixteen cohorts
of Praetorian, and four of Urban, Guards — twenty
thousand men in all. To these was added a new
legion, hurriedly levied from among the sailors of
the fleet at Misenum, which may have numbered
five thousand more.'2 Besides these he had a small
force of cavalry at his disposal. With such forces
he still might defend Italy, at least unless Vespasian
came at the head of all the armies of the East. And
of him there was no sign.
The greater part of this force was sent north-
wards along the Flaminian road to defend the
ridge of the Apennines. Fourteen of the sixteen
Praetorian cohorts, the new legion, and the cavalry
marched out promptly as far as Mevania (Bevagna),
eighty miles from Rome, near the issue of the road
from the northern mountains. The other two
1 Tac. iii. 54.
- This '• legio e classicis " is of course not Legio I. Adjutrix, which was then
in Spain (Tac. ii. 67, 86 ; iii. 44), but the nucleus of the legion later formally
enrolled by Mucianus in the name of Vespasian under the title of Secunda
Adjutrix. There is a military diploma of March 7 a.d. 70, applying to
some who have seen service with this legion. Cf. Dio lv. 24 ; C.T.L. iii.
849, 907. Hardy, Studies in Romaji History, p. 207.
s.x.vii FLAVIAN INVASION OF ITALY 215
Praetorian cohorts with the four cohorts of Urban
Guards were left in Rome, under the Emperor's
brother Lucius, to garrison the city. Vitellius him-
self still dallied for some time in Rome, but at last,
at his army's urgent entreaty, joined the camp at
Mevania. No enemy as yet had been seen upon
the pass. He had even men and time enough to
cross it and descend upon the scattered enemy from
the hills, hurling them, if fortune served, back in
rout from Fano towards the flooded valley of the
Po. The Roman historian himself maintains this
strategy to have been the right one for him : —
It was open to Vitellius to cross the Apennines with the
vigour of his army unimpaired, and to fall upon the foe while these
were weary with the winter's cold and hunger. But he divided
up his strength and scattered it ; he gave over to slaughter and
captivity troops of the keenest courage and faithful to the last.
Though the most skilful of his centurions opposed his plan and
would have told him the truth had he but inquired of them, his
friends held them back from coming to his presence.1
Not only did the Emperor refuse to advance
over the mountains, but very soon "he divided up
his strength and scattered it." Dire omens, indeed,
were seen at Mevania, but, as the historian grimly
says, " Vitellius was his own worst portent. . . .
Ignorant of soldiering, improvident of counsel, here
asking one concerning the drill of marching order,
there another concerning a scout's duties ; here
questioning whether it were well to hasten on the
final issue, there whether to delay it ; in his face
and limbs alike making manifest his fear when each
1 Tac. iii. 56.
216 FLAVIAN INVASION OF ITALY ch. n
new messenger arrived ; and at the last reeling
drunken round the camp " — such was Vitellius the
Emperor among his troops.
He alone
Dealt on lieutenantry and no practice had
In the brave squares of war.
The very camp became wearisome to him ;
doubtless the camp kitchen pleased him ill ; and
when one more message of disaster reached him
he left Mevania and returned to Rome. The fleet
at Misenum had mutinied against him. The rebels
had seized the city of Tarracina, where the road
creeps round between the sea and the sheer cliff
which towers many hundred feet above it and all
but bars its passage. The city's walls and strong
position made it a fortress all too hard to storm.
And now it too was in an enemy's hands, and
Campania, south of Rome, in a ferment.
The Emperor at this lost the last portion of
military wisdom which was his. In that desperate
situation one with cool head would have seen that
Campania mattered very little. The enemy there
were still but a sorry band, and the fierce local
jealousies between its cities preserved the loyalty
of some and thereby hampered the hostility of
others. A very small force sent from Rome would
have been enough to keep the rebels of Campania
in check. The true danger lay, as always, north of
the Apennines.
But now Vitellius issued his last and most fatal
orders for the redistribution of his troops. The
Emperor himself took seven cohorts and part of the
sec. vii FLAVIAN INVASION OF ITALY 217
cavalry with him to Rome. A poor seven only,
with the legion and part of the cavalry to help
them, were left to defend Italy against the attack
from the north. On arriving at Rome, Vitellius
sent his brother with six cohorts and five hundred
horse to Campania, keeping with him in the city
three Praetorian cohorts, and probably the Urban
cohorts as well.1
Thus, instead of concentrating his army where
it was above all needed, the Emperor made three
divisions of it ; instead of advancing, as a bold
general might perhaps have advanced, over the
pass to search for the enemy, he recalled the
division now left at Mevania back to Narnia, thirty
miles in the rear, and only some fifty miles from
Rome ; instead of at least attempting to block the
pass by which the Flaminian road crossed the
mountains, he left it bare of all defence, opposing
the foe's advance over it by nothing save by the
snow which had fallen upon it. " Fortune," com-
ments the historian, " helped the Flavian leaders
not less often than did their own counsels."2 The
cup of Vitellius' blunders was now indeed full to
the brim.
1 The figures work out as follows: there were 16 cohorts of Praetorians
(Tac. ii. 93); of these 14 go to Mevania (ibid. iii. 55), thus 2 remain in
Rome. Later there are 6 with L. Vitellius in Campania (ibid. iii. 58), and
3 at Rome storm the Capitol (ibid. iii. 78). If these 3 were Praetorian and
not Urban cohorts, which is probable, this leaves 7 only for the force at
Narnia. These would be the "pars copiarum Narniae relicta" (ibid. iii.
58). Of the original 14 at Mevania, therefore, 7 go back to Rome, making
with the 2 left here 9. Of these 9, 6 are sent to Campania and 3 stay
behind in Rome, where also the Urban cohorts probably remain and take part
in the defence of the city.
a " Fortuna quae Flavianis ducibus non minus saepe quam ratio admit,"
Tac. iii. 59.
2iS FLAVIAN INVASION OF ITALY ch.ii
The diminished army of defence now amounted
to some twelve thousand infantry and a handful of
cavalry, some four hundred in number. Certainly,
now that the pass was surrendered to the enemy
and Mevania evacuated, the position occupied at
Narnia was the best possible for defence. The
river Nar here tears through a narrow rocky ravine,
hurrying south to join the Tiber, and the Flaminian
way spanned the valley by a great bridge of three
enormous arches. An army posted above the
ravine might easily make the passage of the bridge
most hazardous to an enemy.1 From Mevania
again two roads led to the south — one the Flaminian
way itself; one a longer road running up the vale
of the Clitumnus to the picturesque little fortress
city of Spoletium (Spoleto) at the head of it, and
thence crossing a low ridge to Interamna (Terni),
a few miles higher up the Nar than Narnia. From
Interamna it ran down-stream to join the Flaminian
road at this city. Thus an army retreating from
Mevania was bound to retire as far as Narnia before
it made a stand again, or its flank could be turned
and its retreat intercepted by a force which followed
the longer road. The cavalry of the Vitellians were
pushed forward up this road as far as Interamna;
the infantry remained at Narnia. In this position
the small army which was the Emperor's last hope
awaited the coming of the enemy.
C. The Capture of Rome. — That coming was not
long delayed. Antonius' cavalry scouts, whom he
1 So the actual position taken up was above the " subiectos Narniae
campos," Tac. iii. 63.
SEC. VII
FLAVIAN INVASION OF ITALY 219
had sent forward to explore the pass, returned to
him at Fano with the welcome if unexpected news
that it was clear of the enemy. The general there-
upon ordered an advance, and his troops made their
way over the ridge, encountering no worse foe than
the snow of mid-December which lay upon the pass.
There was still the fear lest the unoccupied pass
should be a snare of the enemy's setting, and that, as
the Flavians emerged exhausted from the mountains,
the Vitellians would fall upon them from Mevania.1
But no such danger was encountered. Without any
opposition the army crossed the pass, came down
into the central Umbrian plain, and advanced clown
the Flaminian way as far as the town of Carsulae.J
Here the army was halted. Ten miles away the
enemy were reported to be holding a strong posi-
tion in their front at Narnia. Carsulae served the
Flavians very well for a place of encampment.
From it two roads sloped gently down hill to the
valley of the Nar, the one on the right hand to
Narnia, the other on the left to Interamna, and the
position commanded a wide and uninterrupted view.
Moreover, the countryside was friendly to them.
The retreat of the Vitellians from Mevania had
convinced the flourishing little Umbrian towns that
the Emperor's cause was a losing one. Prosperous
cities on the line or on the flanks and rear of the
Flavian advance, such as Foligno, Spello, Assisi,
Todi, hastened to send supplies. There seemed to
the Flavian leaders no need for hurry. The moun-
1 For this strategical method for defending a mountain ridge see above,
pp. 43-44. J Now iuins on'y-
220 FLAVIAN INVASION OF ITALY ch.h
tains had been crossed. Vitellius might submit
without a blow, and surely there had been enough
of bloodshed and rapine. The sack of Cremona, it
was felt, had sorely besmirched their fair name.
Heaven forfend that Rome herself should run any
such risk, if Vitellius would spare both her and
himself by making terms with the conqueror while
there was yet time. Indeed there seemed a good
hope that the war might end in this way. Ves-
pasian's elder brother, Flavius Sabinus, had all
through these months of war stayed unmolested in
Rome. He had been thirty-five years in the public
service, of which seven were spent by him as
Governor of Moesia, twelve as prefect of the city.
A man much esteemed and honoured, he was far
from ambitious, and would welcome a peaceful and
friendly settlement.1 In Rome also was Vespasian's
younger son Domitian, now a lad of eighteen
summers. He, too, might serve as a pledge of
friendliness. Negotiations between the Emperor
and Sabinus were already afoot. Vitellius' lethargy
seemed now not unlikely to be his salvation. The
Flavians had little fear of him personally, nor was
he himself unwilling to lay aside the cares of
Empire and the dangers of an unstable princedom
for a modest competence which should secure him
comfort and good fare for the rest of his life in
some luxurious Campanian country-house. It
would not assist the hopes of so genial a settlement
if the Flavian army advanced in hostile guise up to
the city. But the Emperor must be made to realise
1 Cf. Tac. iii. 75.
sec. vir FLAVIAN INVASION OF ITALY 221
that he had no chance of prolonging a successful
resistance. " Out of the whole world nothing was
left to him save the land which lay between Narnia
and Tarracina." l Yet still he might be tempted to
put trust in his armies. It was indeed hard to
drive sheer facts home into a brain so dull.
For some days Antonius remained in camp at
Carsulae. He was waiting for the arrival of the
main legionary force, which was following in the
steps of his advance guard over the pass. Until
this arrived, he had no wish to provoke a fight.
Its coming made his army strong enough for
any enterprise and alarmed the enemy at Narnia.
The hearts of the defending force sank within
them. The sailor legion was raw and had seen
no fighting ; the Praetorians must have known that
events in Rome were tending towards peace.
Theirs is indeed a hard fate who without need or
gain die upon the last battle-field in the war —
fighting when all reason for fighting is ended, slain
in the darkness of the valley when the day of peace
is already dawning on the mountain-tops. It needed
but a little to turn the scale of the defenders' waver-
ing. From the hill at Carsulae, Varus and his
cavalry rushed upon the enemy's horse at Interamna
and dispersed it utterly. The infantry at Narnia
were isolated. Antonius again and again sent
offers of welcome and good treatment to the officers
if they would submit, and these passed over one
by one to the Flavian camp. Still, however, the
common soldier remained stubbornly loyal to his
1 Tac. iii. 60.
222 FLAVIAN INVASION OF ITALY ch.h
Emperor. His own prefects and officers might
desert him, but he trusted yet that his old general
Valens with a new army from Germany would
suddenly appear, coming down the ridge to his
succour. To this hope Antonius made a grim
reply. He sent and beheaded Valens in his prison
at Urbino. As the general Claudius Nero in old
days had hurled into Hannibal's camp the head of
Hasdrubal his brother, so now Antonius sent the
head of Valens to the force at Narnia. Then the
Vitellian soldiers, long hoping against hope, saw at
last that such hopes were vain. They surrendered,
but with honour. Proudly, in military array, with
standards and colours and all the panoply of war,
they marched down from their lines on the hillside
to the plain beneath, where the Flavian army was
drawn up in battle order to receive them between
their lines. Antonius spoke kindly to them, and
bade them remain at Narnia and Interamna. He
left with them some of his troops — as many as would
be able to suppress any rising on their part, yet not
so many as could terrify or maltreat them. For the
remainder of his force the path to Rome lay open.
With this he now moved forward a few miles
farther down the Flaminian way to Ocriculum
(Otricoli), a place in the Tiber valley, thirty-five
miles north of Rome. The days of the Saturnalia,
the great December festival of the Romans, were
at hand, and Antonius determined that his army
should celebrate the feast at this small town. The
news from Rome was promising : the Emperor, as
soon as he had heard of his army's surrender at
sec. mi FLAVIAN INVASION OF ITALY 223
Narnia, had practically consented to resign, and to
entrust the government at Rome to Sabinus until
Vespasian should come himself. The soldiers were
better kept away from the city, and the war seemed
ended. But though Antonius himself kept the
infantry in camp at Ocriculum, he sent a thousand
cavalry forward under the command of a kinsman
of Vespasian, O. Petilius Cerialis. Cerialis was a
tried soldier, who eight years before had seen service
in Britain as legate of the Ninth legion. He had
just escaped from Rome disguised as a rustic,
and had joined Antonius during the march over
the mountains. As an officer of experience (whose
chief fame, however, was speedily to be won in the
far north), he could be trusted to lead the cavalry
forward. But so small seemed the need for haste,
that Antonius bade him ride by cross-roads to the
Via Salaria and enter Rome by the Colline gate, to
which this road led, instead of following the direct
road by the Flaminian way.1 By passing through
this gate the cavalry might attract less notice, and
the risk of opposition or disturbance be lessened.
The greater time which this route would require
seemed not worth consideration, when all at Rome
was said to be so quiet.
The mistake made by the Flavian commanders
led to the gravest and most terrible results. Had
they arrived outside the gates of the city forty-eight
1 Perhaps Cerialis was sent off earlier, from Narnia, when he could reach
the Via Salaria by marching to Interamna, climbing the height by the mag-
nificent falls of Terni to the valley of the Velinus, the " Rosy Vale," and so
to Rieti, at the great bend of the Salarian way. This road crosses the
Apennines from Ascoli on the Tronto to Antrodoco and Rieti. It pursues a
mountainous route, and is rough going as far as Rieti.
224 FLAVIAN INVASION OF ITALY ch.h
hours earlier, their strength would have been enough
to overawe the numerous partisans of Vitellius within
the walls, and the indignation which these in ever-
increasing measure felt for the Emperor's pusillan-
imity would without doubt have been checked.
The stormy day would have sunk to rest in a calm
and tranquil evening. But the Fates willed that
Vitellius' sun should set in gloom and raging storm,
in a consuming fire of slaughter and grim vengeance.
Antonius and Cerialis had failed to realise the
passionate anger of Vitellius' soldiers in the city,
their dogged determination of despair. On the
morning of the 19th of December a messenger
rode at full speed into the Flavian camp at Ocricu-
lum, demanding to see Antonius at once. He was
the bearer of tidings sent the evening before from
Rome, thirty-five miles away. From him Antonius
learnt that the day before, while he and his men
were keeping jollity, the soldiery and mob in Rome
had risen, compelling Vitellius to do after their
own pleasure : that Sabinus, Vespasian's brother,
Domitian, his son, and a little band of adherents,
were blockaded and besieged in the Capitol by a
Vitellian rabble, howling for their blood. If he
would save them from massacre, Antonius must
march at full speed to the rescue. Even so, it
might be too late.
Not a moment was lost. The Flavian general
issued orders for an instant march, and he and his
army hastened at top speed for Rome. There was
life to save and treachery to be requited. The fall
of evening never stopped them, and it was deep
sbc. vii FLAVIAN INVASION OF ITALY 225
night when they reached a point on the road known
as " The Red Rocks," six miles only from Rome.
They had marched nine and twenty miles without
ceasing. But all their speed was vain. There
the news came to them that all was over. The
Capitol had been stormed that day, and its garrison
cut to pieces. Sabinus had been taken and
butchered in cold blood at Vitellius' very feet.
The great temple itself, the glory of Rome, tower-
ing up to heaven on its sheer rock with the busy
Forum at its feet, the home of the greatest of the
gods of Rome, had been destroyed by fire. Glutted
with blood and fury, the Vitellians had manned the
walls and held the city.
The army of rescue became an army of venge-
ance. Swift and keen as a beast of prey terrible
in his wrath, the soldiers, when morning dawned,
leapt upon the doomed city. Cerialis, too, had
heard the news, and, pushing faster forward, had
been ensnared among the gardens and orchards
at foot of the Pincian hill by the enemy's horse
and foot, routed with loss, and pursued back for
some miles as far as Fidenae. But when the
pursuit drew off, he rallied his troopers and ad-
vanced again towards the city. There was not a
man in the Flavian army who would lightly now
withhold his hand from the work to be done.
Messengers came out from the city to Cerialis and
Antonius, speaking of terms to be agreed upon.
Cerialis sent them hurrying back, answering with
scorn and insult, Antonius with courtesy but with
equal firmness. No truce was henceforth possible.
Q
226 FLAVIAN INVASION OF ITALY ch.h
A Stoic philosopher judged it the time to preach
to the troops of mercy and of peace. His " un-
timely wisdom " came near to costing him his life,
and he was contemptuously brushed aside. The
Vestal Virgins came in procession from the city to
bear to the Flavian general a letter from Vitellius,
begging the respite of a single day. He sent the
Vestals back with all honour, but instantly refused
the Emperor's request. The murder of Sabinus,
the burning of the Capitol, had made the war a
" truceless war " for ever.
The army swept forward over the Mulvian
Bridge1 which crossed the Tiber. Antonius here,
it is said, would have halted them awhile, but his
men brooked henceforth no restraint. They moved
to the assault in three columns of attack, the
cavalry leading and driving back the Roman mob
before them. The centre column advanced by the
main road upon the gate under the Pincian hill.2
To its right, another column moved along the bank
of the river to storm the wall. To the left the
third column moved round outside the wall to the
Salarian way to assault the Colline gate, the scene
of Sulla's desperate battle a century and a half
ago.3 The Vitellians defended gates and walls
with the fierce courage of men who knew that for
them there was henceforth no pity. From the
garden walls of the " Hill of the Gardens," to-day
the pleasure resort of the Romans, the defenders
1 Now the Ponte Molle, two miles from the gate.
2 Now the busy Porta del Popolo.
3 Hard by the Porta Pia, the scene of the far more famous entry of the
troops of the kingdom of Italy into Rome on September 20, 1870.
sec. vn FLAVIAN INVASION OF ITALY 227
hurled javelins and stones upon the Flavian troops,
who struggled in a network of lanes upon its outer
slope and suffered heavy loss. Here the assailants
gained no ground till late in the day. But then
the cavalry forced at last an entrance by the Colline
gate, and rode round to take the enemy in the rear.
The Vitellians broke and fled, and the hill was
carried. Meanwhile their comrades of both the
other columns had also forced an entrance, and
pushed through to the Campus Martius, fighting
their way forward inch by inch. At last the
Flavians were inside the very walls of Rome.
But still the soldiers of Vitellius fought with
fury, as they fell slowly back along the narrow
streets. The unarmed citizens of Rome crowded
to look on as at some gigantic gladiatorial con-
test waged for their marvelling and applauding.
Wounded and fleeing soldiers who sought refuge
from the pursuer in shops and houses by the way
were hounded out again to meet their doom, and
the base civilian reaped the harvest of the plunder
of the dead while the legionary sped forward,
always bent on slaughter. Among the heaps of
the slain, which cumbered every way, roysterers
and harlots made merry in riotous-glee. One last
stand was made by the defenders at the Praetorians'
Camp hard by the Porta Pia. And there, in one
last splendid sally out upon the swarming foe,
Vitellius' soldiers perished to a man, all their
wounds in front, and their faces to the enemy.
Night fell, and Rome was taken.1
1 Tac. iii. 59-84.
228 FLAVIAN INVASION OF ITALY ch.h
§ 8. The Death of Vitellius
Thus the Emperor Vitellius lost the greater
cantle of the world with very sloth and gluttony ;
he had slept away kingdoms and provinces. The
end of this his pitiable life may be told in the
words of Suetonius, the biographer of the Caesars.
Suetonius' father had fought in Otho's army at
Bedriacum in the spring of the year as tribune
of the Thirteenth legion from Pannonia,1 and may
himself have seen and told his son the scene which
the latter tells as follows :2
Word was brought unto him by his espiall that the enemie
approched. Immediatly therfore shutting himself close within
a bearing chaire, accompanied with two persons onely, his
baker and his Cooke,3 secretly hee tooke his way to the Aven-
tine hill and his fathers house : minding from thence to make
an escape into Campania. Soone after, uppon a flying and head-
lesse rumour, That peace was obtained, he suffred him selfe
to be brought backe to the Palace. Where, finding all places
solitary and abandoned : seeing those also to slinke from him
and slip away who were with him, he did about him a girdle
full of golden peeces of coine,4 and fled into the Porters lodge,
having first tied a ban-dog at the doore and set against it the
bedsteed and bedding thereto. By this time had the Avant
curriers of the maine armie broken into the Palace : and meeting
noe bodie searched as the manner is, everie blind corner. By
them was hee plucked out of his lurking hole : and when they
asked who he was (for they knewe him not), and where upon
his knowledge Vitellius was, he shifted them of with a lie : after
1 Suetonius, Otho, io.
2 Suetonius, Vitellius, 16, 17. I use the translation of Philemon Holland,
A.D. 1606. The notes to the translation are his, not mine.
3 "That made his deinty pastry works and sweet meates : meete grooms
to accompanie such a glutton."
4 "15 shilling peeces and better.''
sEcvm FLAVIAN INVASION OF ITALY 229
this, beeing once knowen, hee intreated hard (as if he had
somewhat to deliver concerning the life and safetie of Vespasian)
to be kept sure in the mean season, though it were in some
prison : and desisted not untill such time as having his hands
pinnioned fast at his backe, an halter cast about his necke, and
his apparell torne from his bodie, he was haled halfe naked into
the Forum. Among many skornefull indignities offered unto
him both in deede and word throughout the spatious street
sacra via from one end to the other, whiles they drew his head
backward by the bush of his haire (as condemned malefactours
are wont to be served) and set a swordes point under his chinne,
and all to the end he might shew his face and not holde it
down : whiles some pelted him with dung and durtie mire, others
called him with open mouth Incendiarie1 and Patinarium:2 and
some of the common sort twitted him also with faults and
deformities of his bodie (for, of stature he was beyond measure
tall : a red face he had, occasioned for the most part by swilling
in wine, and a grand fat paunch besides : hee limped somewhat
also by reason that one of his thighes was enfeebled withe the
rush of a chariot against it what time he served Caius3 as his
henxman at a Chariot running) : and at the last upon the staires
Gemoniae with many a small stroke all to mangled he was and
killed in the end : and so from thence drawne with a drag into
the River Tiberis.
One saying only by him, as he was led along
amid mockery and torment, and that indeed worthy
of a man, was recorded, when to a tribune who
stood insulting him he answered, " Yet once I was
your Emperor."4 And presently, on the very spot
where two days before the body of the murdered
Sabinus had lain, Vitellius, too, lay dead.
Rome was taken on the 21st of December
1 "Or firebrand, because he burnt the Capitoll."
2 "Or Platter Knight, for his gormandize and huge platter aforesaid."
See above, p. 132.
3 Caligula. * Tac. iii. 85.
23o FLAVIAN INVASION OF ITALY ch.h
a.d. 69. Within a very short while the Vitellian
army in Campania laid down its arms, and Lucius
Vitellius was put to the sword. The ten months'
fighting was ended. It remained for the wise and
thrifty Vespasian to heal the wounds which that
bitter civil strife had cut so deep into the body of
the Roman State.
CHAPTER III
THE REBELLION ON THE RHINE
Strong heart with triple armour bound,
Beat strongly, for thy life-blood runs,
Age after Age, the Empire round —
In us thy Sons,
Who, distant from the Seven Hills,
Loving and serving much, require
Thee, — thee to guard 'gainst home-born ills,
The Imperial Fire !
Rudyard Kipling.
§ i. The Tribes of the "Low Countries "
The Rhine is the only great river of Europe which,
although not absorbed into a larger stream, yet
fails to keep its name as far as the sea for at least
the greater bulk of its waters, and thus all but
loses, as it were, its own identity. After a course
of some five hundred miles from the Lake of Con-
stance, of which more than four hundred, from
Basle northwards, have lain entirely in German
territory, the river a mile or two below Emmerich
crosses the Dutch frontier and, almost immediately
dividing into two channels, surrenders its name.
The northern channel, called the Lek, flows by
Arnhem to Rotterdam ; the southern channel,
231
232 REBELLION ON THE RHINE cH.ra
called the Waal, by Nymwegen * to Dordrecht.
Fifteen miles above Dordrecht the river Maas
enters the Waal from the south, and the combined
stream is called the Merwede as far as that town.
Here at Dordrecht the southern stream is again
divided. A broad northerly channel, the De Noord,
flows to join the Lek a few miles above Rotterdam,
and this channel from that point to the German
Ocean takes the name of the Maas again. The
southerly stream from Dordrecht to the sea by
Briel is called the Oude Maas. The actual name
of the Rhine clings only to a small channel leaving
the Lek by Wyk, and called the " Crooked Rhine "
— Kromme Rhyn. This at Utrecht again divides :
one branch, now called the Vecht, flowing north to
the Zuider Zee ; the other, under the name of the
" Old Rhine " — Oude Rhyn — passing by Leiden to
the North Sea at Katwyk. A sketch plan may
serve to illustrate these divisions of the stream for
the last hundred miles of its course from Emmerich
to the sea.2
The land enclosed by the two arms of the Rhine,
the Lek on the north and the Waal on the south,
measuring some sixty miles in length and about
twelve at its greatest breadth, was known to the
Romans as the " Island of the Batavians " — Insula
Batavorum. These folk were a German tribe who
originally counted as part of the larger tribe of the
Chatti, who dwelt chiefly north of the Taunus
1 In Dutch " Nijmegen."
2 No attempt is made to show the actual course of the streams, whose
windings are innumerable, but distances are roughly to scale.
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234 REBELLION ON THE RHINE ca.ni
mountains by the upper waters of the Lahn.1 But
quarrels at home had driven the " Batavians" to
take up their goods and chattels and wander off to
the north-west, until they settled in the " Island "
and westwards of it as far as the sea. There they
were when Julius Caesar heard of them, and there
they have remained ever since, still as in Tacitus'
day " famous for valour." The Dutch name
" Betuwe " for the land in the eastern part of the
" Island " preserves their name, as their de-
scendants continue to preserve their independence
of their neighbours and remote kinsmen, the
Germans.2
Side by side with them in their " Island,"
probably in the western part of it, there dwelt
another tribe of close kinship with them, speaking
the same language, and not inferior to them in
courage, though fewer in numbers. These, by
name the Cannenefates,3 seem to have spread also
northwards along the narrow strip of land between
the Zuider Zee and the ocean, from Amsterdam to
Helder in " North Holland," if the Dutch name for
the coast here, viz. Kennemerland, keeps their
memory. North-east of the Zuider Zee and along
the marshes, dunes, and islands of the coast dwelt
the Frisii, a hardy race of cattle-breeders and fisher-
folk, as are their descendants, the men of Fries-
land, to-day. In Germany and Gaul tribe after
1 Now Hessen-Nassau.
2 Caesar, E.G. iv. io; Tacitus, Germania, 29; Histories^ iv. 12.
3 Cannenefates, Heraeus and Mommsen ; Canninefates, Halm ; but the
e occurs several times in the Medicean MS. and ap. Pliny, N.H. iv. 101.
In inscriptions the name is spelt in at least five different ways, but Cannene-
fates seems the most common. Cf. Ruggiero, Diz. Epig. ii. p. 80, sub voc.
sec. i REBELLION ON THE RHINE 235
tribe have wandered over the country, and the
history of these lands is a veritable kaleidoscope of
races. But the great gift of the German rivers to
their children in the Low Countries has been so
great a security from enemies, owing to the
difficulty of attack and the poverty in earlier days
of the plunder to be won, that their sturdy valour,
already famous in Roman days, has known how to
maintain them in unconquerable possession of their
still quiet, land of slow -moving streams. And
the Romans, perhaps better than any race since
their day, knew how to make of these peoples
faithful and useful allies rather than ever bitter
foes. The Batavians were not called upon to pay
tribute, but supplied as many as one thousand
cavalry and nine thousand infantry to the Roman
army. The eight cohorts of Batavians attached to
the Fourteenth legion were stalwart if quarrelsome
troops, proud of their nation and of indomitable
courage. The Imperial bodyguard itself, which
protected the person of the Emperor at Rome, was
formed of men of this tribe. They were com-
manded by their own nobles and not by Roman
officers, and by virtue of this privilege also the
Batavian regiments ranked high among the auxiliary
troops of the Roman army. Their kinsmen, the
Cannenefates, in like manner paid no money to
the Roman treasury but gave men to the army.
The Frisii sent hides yearly by way of tribute, and
men as well. These also had been faithful allies
of Drusus and Germanicus in their wars over the
Rhine under the Emperors Augustus and Tiberius.
236 REBELLION ON THE RHINE ch.ih
But they were farther away from the Roman
influence, and rose in revolt in the year a.d. 28.
Since that time they had given no small trouble to
the Romans ; and though, later, Corbulo, the first
general of his time, had punished them severely,
the greater part at least of the Frisii remained
independent of Rome after the Emperor Claudius
had withdrawn all Roman troops to the west bank
of the Rhine. Their neighbours to the east, the
Chauci, a tribe of very great size, resident between
the Ems and the Elbe, mariners and fishermen,
owned no allegiance to Rome.1 But at least the
"Island" counted as being within the frontiers of
the Roman Empire. For Drusus' great engineer-
ing works, made in 9 B.C., had done much to secure
this. Under his direction the Roman army of the
Lower Rhine had in that year constructed both a
Fosse and a Mole. The mole or "Agger" was
thrown out into the Rhine from the left bank just
above the parting of the channels below Emmerich,
not far from Cleve.2 By this the greater bulk of
the river's water was directed into the northern
arm, the Lek, and thus the "Island" was easily
reached from the Roman shore, while it was
separated from the tribes over the Lek by a great
mass of water. The use of this Agger was
great, and it was strengthened again by Pompeius
Paulinus in a.d. 55. The fosse was dug from the
Lek, a mile or two above Arnhem, to the river
1 Cf. Tacitus, Germania, 35.
2 Cleve, probably the " Oppidum Batavorum " of Hist. iv. 19, was then
<>n the Rhine bank ; it is now some distance away.
sec. ii REBELLION ON THE RHINE 237
Yssel, upon the course of the " New " or " Guelders "
Yssel, and thus gave the Roman flotilla upon the
Rhine access to the Zuider Zee. This was equally
useful for the purpose of any hostile operations
against the Frisii, and for interrupting in case of
need the communications of the Batavians and
Cannenefates with the Frisii and Chauci.1 By such
means, and by requiring of them service in the
Imperial army, the Romans for long years kept a
grip over the two tribes of the Island. And their
Gallic neighbours on the south, chief of whom were
the Nervii in modern Belgium, had for long years
past been fully subject to Rome.
Yet once, in the years a.d. 69-70, a great storm
of mutiny of the native troops in the army, and
of rebellion among the tribes in these the Roman
11 Low Countries," broke upon the Roman dominion
and all but overthrew it. It was truly the " Indian
Mutiny " of Roman history.
§ 2. The Cause of the Rebellion
The cause of this rising was the natural love
of independence and of liberty which was felt by
the German tribes who came, however remotely,
under Roman influence. In its beginnings,
indeed, the real meaning of the war was hidden
under the disguise of a movement in favour of
Vespasian against the Emperor Vitellius, and
the rising was not only encouraged, but even
1 The Fosse, Tac. Ann. ii. 8. I. The Agger, Tac. Ann. xiii. 53. 3 ;
Hist. v. 19. 3.
238 REBELLION ON THE RHINE ch.hi
directly promoted, by the Flavian leaders. None
the less this opportunity so recklessly given to the
tribes was from the first but the mere pretext or
occasion of their fighting. From the beginning of
the revolt among the Batavians to their final proud
submission, the war was an armed plea for liberty.
The use made of this liberty, had the tribes won it,
would doubtless have been ferocious and barbaric.
Circumstances made of the war " one of the most
singular and most dreadful in all ages."1 The
motives of the leaders of the revolt were in large
measure those of private revenge and selfish
ambition. To the annals of the Roman army the
war contributed little but a record of lamentable
cowardice and dishonour. And yet, in spite of all
these undoubted facts, the cause of the war suc-
ceeds in ennobling its history beyond that of the
other fighting of these two wild years of strife.
Apart from the audacity or calmness of a few, the
splendid courage of the Roman troops engaged
upon both sides, or the misdirected loyalty of
soldiers to their generals, there is no sunshine to
light up the thick gloom which enwraps the civil
wars of Otho and Vitellius, Vitellius and Vespasian.
There was no great principle at stake in either
war, and only such can justify the appeal to arms.
The tribes were fighting for a principle. They
fought savagely, ignorantly, treacherously. They
were happy even in their ultimate defeat. Yet the
cause of their rising did them honour.
That this was the cause of the rebellion is
1 Mommsen.
sEc.n REBELLION ON THE RHINE 239
shown alike in the peoples and in the leaders who
shared in the enterprise.
A. The Peoples of the Revolt. — The peoples
rose for liberty. No other battle-cry would have
gathered to the Batavians' standards the other
tribes of the Rhine, some already subject to Rome,
some threatened by her in past years, and eager for
revenge as well as plunder. The obvious weakness
of the Roman army on the German frontier, when
Vitellius had drained it of all its best troops for his
march to Italy, and the fierce internecine struggle
raging in Italy itself, seemed to give the restless
German tribes a unique opportunity for rebellion
and defiance. Thus the Batavians and Cannene-
fates were not left long alone in their endeavour.
They presently found allies in the Marsaci at the
mouth of the Scheldt.1 The Frisii joined them at
once.2 The tribes beyond the Rhine seized the
chance offered them. The Tencteri opposite
Cologne, the Bructeri on the Ems, shared in the
first attack on Castra Vetera.3 Higher up the
river, the Chatti from the north of Taunus, the
Mattiaci from its southern slopes, the Usipi from
the lands opposite Coblenz, made an early onslaught
on the great Roman fort at Mainz.4 The Chauci,
the tribe lying to the east of the Frisians, sent the
insurgent leader aid not only at the height of the
struggle, but even again when he seemed in his
last most desperate straits.5 Of all the famous
German tribes beyond the Rhine known at this
1 Tac. iv. 56. 2 Tac. iv. 15. 3 Tac. iv. 23 ; see below, pp. 264-268.
4 Tac. iv. 37 ; see below, p. 284. 5 Tac. iv. 79 ; v. 19.
24o REBELLION ON THE RHINE ch.ih
time to the Romans, not one gave the latter any
help, and two only took no interest in the war.
The Cimbri were but a shadow of their former
selves ; the Cherusci allowed their native indolence
free play.1
On the Roman side of the Rhine the Cugerni
to the west of Castra Vetera joined the insurgents
at once, and remained true to them to the end.2
Their neighbours the Ubii, inhabiting Cologne and
the surrounding district, had for some years past
been a centre of Roman influence among the wilder
tribes over the river, and were hated and distrusted
by these in consequence. But the tide of German
successes swept even these into the movement at
last, though their motive was always self-preserva-
tion rather than any active dislike of Rome, and
they returned to their early allegiance at the
earliest possible moment.3
Finally, there dwelt in Gaul a German tribe, the
Tungri, far removed from the fatherland. These
had expelled the Gauls from the district round the
present town of Liege, in Belgium, in the valley of
the Meuse (the Maas of Holland) ; and the city of
Tongres, fifteen miles to the north of Liege, pre-
serves their name. This folk supplied at least two
auxiliary cohorts to the Roman army, and these
had fought for the Vitellians against Otho. But
the German rising excited at once their national
feeling. One of the cohorts went over to the
enemy in the first engagement ; the other quickly
1 Cf. Tac. Germ. 36, 37. 2 Tac. iv. 26; v. 16, 18.
3 Tac. iv. 28, 55, 63, 77 ; v. 24 ; cf. Germ. 28.
sEc.n REBELLION ON THE RHINE 241
followed suit ; and the whole tribe threw in their
lot with the rebels.1 Practically all " Germany " on
both banks of the Rhine was at one time in arms
against the Romans in this war. Only a truly
" national war " could have produced such a unity
among so many widely scattered tribes. The call
to liberty found then an instant answer in the
German's heart. The struggle between Roman
and Teuton never ceased. " Tarn diu Germania
vincitur." 2 And this most dangerous plague of
" nationalism " spread even to Gaul, though here
the tribes, accustomed for a century to the Roman
rule, resisted the infection longer, and many suffered
no taint of it at all. But the Gallic districts on the
north and north-east, which came into close contact
with the Germans, could not but be affected by the
movement.
The Belgae, chief of whom were the Nervii,
famous foes of Julius Caesar in old days, were
neighbours of the Batavians and Tungri. The
small tribe of the Baetasii dwelt between the Nervii
and Tungri in Brabant, where the village of Betz,
near Brussels, recalls their name. The Moselle
valley gave easy access from the Rhine at Coblenz
to the spread of the disorder to its tribes, the
Treveri, whose name is kept in that of the capital
city of the valley, Treves, and, higher up the river,
the Mediomatrici, in whose territory Metz lies.
The news of the rising penetrated the Ardennes,
travelling up the long valley of the Maas, and
1 Tac. ii. 14; iv. 16, 55, 66, 79 ; cf. Germ. 2.
2 Tac. Germ. 37.
242 REBELLION ON THE RHINE ch.ih
reached the Lingones at the source of the river.
From this tribe it could be carried over the water-
shed to the valleys of the Saone and Rhone, and
be told to the powerful tribe of the Sequani, who
lay between these rivers and the Jura. And a little
to the west of the middle course of the Maas,
separated from the Treveri by this river, the Remi,
" the leading canton in Belgica," x quickly received
tidings of the rebellion on the Rhine.
But from the days of Julius Caesar the tribes of
Gaul had ever been jealous of one another, and,
when even the national hero Vercingetorix failed
to unite them all in his magnificent struggle against
the Roman invader, no lesser man coming after
him, when the Romans held the land in their
masterful grip, could achieve even the like amount
of success. Gallic nationalism was an ever-present
peril to the Romans for more than a century after
the death of its greatest champion. There was no
single Emperor from Augustus to Vespasian who
was not made aware of its existence. Yet the
attempt to win liberty was always spasmodic, and
a tribe which took up arms for this cause at one
time would be found a few years later resisting the
similar efforts of a neighbouring canton. When
Julius Vindex in the last year of Nero's principate
gathered round his standard a hundred thousand
Gauls to fight for Gallic independence,2 the Sequani
were among those who took up arms for him ; but
1 Mommsen.
2 Tac. i. 1 6, 51, 53, 64 ; Plutarch, Calba, 4 and 6 ; see my Life of Nero,
pp. 496-497-
sec. ii REBELLION ON THE RHINE 243
the Treveri and Lingones not only held aloof from
his cause, but gleefully assisted the Roman Army of
Germany under Verginius Rufus to crush the rising.
The two tribes steeped their hands in the blood of
the twenty thousand slain at Vesontio,1 capital city of
their Gallic kinsmen, the Sequani. Yet the Treveri
had fought for Florus and Sacrovir when these
rose against the Romans in the principate of
Tiberius.2 And little more than a year had passed
since the death of Vindex, when the policy of these
three tribes was to be completely, almost ludi-
crously, reversed ; when the Treveri and Lingones
were to be found among the foes, the Sequani
among the friends, of Rome. The German leader
had every reason to declare with emphasis that
" Gaul had fallen by its own strength." 3 But all
his urging of this home-truth was unable to get the
mastery of this ineradicable tendency of the Celt.
The great German historian of our own day cannot
refrain from gibing at this characteristic weakness
of the Gauls ; for when the attempt was made by
them in the year 70 to follow the example of their
German allies and to erect an Imperium Galliarum
independent of Rome, he labels it " a tragedy and
at the same time a farce." 4
When, therefore, the Gallic tribes, their neigh-
bours, were invited by the rebel Germans to take
part in their enterprise, their answer was far from
unanimous. At first indeed they gave ready, even
1 Besancon. 2 Tac. Ann. iii. 40, 42.
3 " Gallias suismet viribus concidisse," Tac. iv. 17.
4 Mommsen.
244 REBELLION ON THE RHINE ch.ih
strenuous, aid to the small Roman army which
sought to make headway against the rebels. The
Treveri stood stoutly on the defence against the
Germans, even running a palisade and trench along
the whole line of their threatened frontier, and con-
tending vigorously with the assailants. A hundred
years before, the Remi had been Caesar's most
faithful allies, and now no Roman disaster shook
their loyalty. The Sequani also refused always to
join the enemies of Rome. But the early triumphs
won by the insurgents, and especially the siege of
Castra Vetera, the Roman stronghold of the Lower
Rhine, made the loyalty of some others grow cold.
They remembered the money which they gave
each year to the Treasury, the men whom they
were compelled to supply to the armies, of Rome.
The Treveri, Lingones, Baetasii, and Nervii, joined
the insurgents.1 The "hope of liberty" beguiled
them.
And when once the iron hand of the conqueror
was removed, the old struggling for primacy
among the tribes could be renewed, and more than
one folk dreamt of glory to be gained at the
expense of their kinsmen.'2 Surely Rome's end
seemed hard at hand. Once more, as in Caesar's
day, the Druids preached rebellion, proclaiming
that the burning of the Capitol was a sign from
Heaven that the Empire was departed for ever
1 Tac. iv. 25, 26, 37 (Treveri) ; 56 and 77 (Lingones) ; 56 and 66
(Baetasii) ; 66 (Nervii) ; 67 (Sequani) ; 67-69 (Remi).
2 " Mox valescentibus Germanis pleraeque civitates [Gallorum] adversum
nos arma sumpsere spe libertatis et, si exuissent servitium, cupidine imperi-
tandi," Tac. iv. 25.
sec. n REBELLION ON THE RHINE 245
from Rome. And the people were but too ready
to be credulous when the priest preached a holy
war.1 Not for a moment was any appeal made to
any Flavian sympathies which perhaps some Gauls
might have. But they were bidden think of the
ills endured for so many weary years, of the " hap-
less servitude which falsely they called peace." 2
First war, then liberty, then Empire, but an
Imperium Galliarum, not an Empire of Rome
— such was the bait which ensnared them.3
The miserable pretext of Vespasian's name was
quickly flung aside. The secret meeting of con-
spirators held in the private house at Cologne
agreed gaily enough together : Liberty must first
be firmly rooted in the land ; then the tribes need
but "discuss" together the question of the limit
they might choose to set to their exercise of power.4
These rebels had not even the wretched mockery
of a senile Emperor for whom to fight, as had our
own sepoys in times past. " Far be it from us,"
cried Civilis to the Tungri, " to seek rule over
others. It is not for this that we have taken up
arms, that Batavians and Treveri may govern the
nations. Far be such arrogance from us." 5 When
the company of urchins set out to rob the pastry
cook of his richest cake, they fared out together
in all amity; it was afterwards that they fell to
quarrelling about the largest slice.
B. The Leaders of the Revolt. — This cause, the
1 Tac. iv. 54. 2 Tac. iv. 16, 17. 3 Tac. iv. 59.
4 " Coalita libertate disceptaturas Gallias quern virium suarum terminum
velinty' Tac. iv. 55. 6 Tac. iv. 66.
246 REBELLION ON THE RHINE ch.hi
desire to be freed for ever from the Romans, was pro-
fessed by the leaders of the revolt, at first secretly,
but later on with open frankness. Their names
seem those of Romans ; their military experience
had been gained in Roman armies and Roman
camps ; but they were no more Roman in sympathy
than they were in race. Long since, the history of
Arminius, somewhat grotesquely celebrated as the
"liberator of Germany," had shown that a Roman
education was not the slightest guarantee for loyalty,
but rather an inducement and encouragement to
disaffection and secret treason. Other instances
since had confirmed this gloomy fact. The native
chiefs would come to Italy for education, would
learn Roman manners and the Roman language,
and return home to kindle rebellion against Rome.
As early as the first century of our era educa-
tion bred sedition. Omne ignotum pro magnifico.
It had been better if the ruling nation had
been less well known to the princes of Germany.
It was easy for them to see signs of her weak-
ness and vacillation. It was hard for them to
realise the grim strength of courage and deter-
mination which was still, even after many years
of Empire, the bedrock of her people and even of
some among her rulers. So both Rome and the
Germans paid dearly for their common mistake.
But while the common folk who rose against Rome
may win men's admiration, little of this can be
reserved for those who of selfish ambition played
upon their people's ignorance, turned the arts which
they had learnt from Rome, the skill which they
sec. ii REBELLION ON THE RHINE 247
had there acquired, to the hurt of their teachers,
and therefore inevitably added ingratitude and
treachery to the more venial charge of self-seeking
which can be brought against them.
The three chief leaders of the Gauls in the revolt
were Julius Classicus and Julius Tutor of the
Treveri, and Julius Sabinus of the Lingones. The
one great German leader was Julius Civilis.
Classicus was prefect of the ala Treverorum,
which served as an auxiliary squadron in the Roman
army. Tutor had been appointed by Vitellius
" prefect of the bank of the Rhine." l Sabinus
boasted that he was great-grandson of Julius Caesar
himself.2 Yet there was little Roman about these
men save the name Julius, and this was the com-
monest of names for the chieftains of Gaul.3 Classicus
was the noblest by birth as well as the wealthiest
in his tribe. He was a descendant of its early line
of kings, and his royal ancestors had ever been the
adversaries rather than the allies of Rome.4 Tutor
fought the Romans to the last. Sabinus used his
supposed descent only to bid his followers call him
Caesar.'' Julius Civilis,'' above all, was all the more
1 I.e. to guard the strip between the Nava and Moselle (Heraeus). The
general "cura ripae " belonged to Hordeonius Flaccus, Governor of Upper
Germany (Tac. ii. 57). 2 Tac. iv. 55.
3 Cf. Julius Florus of the Treveri ; Julius Sacrovir of the Aedui (Tacitus,
Annals, iii. 40) ; Julius Vindex, the Aquitanian noble ; Julius Valentinus of
the Treveri ; Julius Auspex of the Remi {Hist. iv. 69) ; Julius Biiganticus,
the Batavian {Hist. ii. 22) ; Julius Calenus of the Aedui {Hist. iii. 35) ;
etc. Claudius was also a common praenomen.
4 Tac. iv. 55. 6 Tac. iv. 67.
6 According to the Medicean MS. of Hist. iv. 13, "Julius Paulus et
Claudius Civilis." But we have Julius Civilis, ap. Hist. i. 59, and Frontinus,
Strateg. iv. 3. 14. Hence the MS. reading in iv. 13 is altered to read
"Julius Paulus et Julius Civilis" (Halm), or "Julius Civilis et Claudius Paulus"
(Heraeus).
248 REBELLION ON THE RHINE ch. m
a barbarian at heart for the Roman veneer upon
him.
This man was of royal Batavian stock. He had
served twenty-five years in the Roman army, and
was, according to his own story, an early friend of
Vespasian himself.1 He was brave, eloquent, and
a ready speaker. Twice he had run no small risk of
his life : once under Nero, when the then Governor
of Lower Germany, Fonteius Agrippa, sent him in
chains to Rome to answer a charge of planning
rebellion ; once, still more recently, when in January
a.d. 69 the Army of the Rhine declared for Vitellius.
From the former peril Galba's clemency had released
him ; from the latter his own influence with his tribe.
For the Vitellian leaders feared lest his punishment
should anger the Batavian cohorts who were at
that time quartered among the Lingones.2 Civilis,
however, was not a man to forgive such insults.
With the craft of a savage he hid his resentment
for a time, but waited his opportunity. This came
when Antonius Primus, the Flavian leader, just
before his invasion of Italy, wrote to him inciting
him to cause the Batavians to revolt, wishing to
hinder thereby the sending of any reinforcements
to Vitellius from Germany. Hordeonius Flaccus,
the Governor of Upper Germany, himself specially
appointed by Vitellius to guard the bank of the
Rhine, urged the same upon him in a private inter-
view.3 Encouraged by these two Romans, Civilis
declared for Vespasian, even as Vindex in the
1 Tac. iv. 13, 32; v. 26. 2 Tac. i. 59; iv. 13.
3 Tac. iv. 13 ; v. 26.
sec, i REBELLION ON THE RHINE 249
preceding year had risen nominally on Galba's
behalf. But just as Vindex had harboured other
thoughts in his heart when he revolted, so Civilis
nourished a " deeper plan." 1 When in November
Antonius, now that the battle of Cremona had been
won, sent again bidding him cease from further
warfare, Civilis threw off the mask. By refusing
to obey, he changed the outward aspect of the
Batavians' revolt from participation in the civil war
to that of flat rebellion against Rome. He had
never intended anything else from the beginning.
His very personal deformity — for he had lost the
sight of one eye — he was wont to quote as sign of
his enmity against the Romans, comparing himself
in this also to Hannibal and Sertorius, the foes of
Rome.2 But neither Sertorius nor Hannibal was
guilty of the cruel tricks which delighted the German
savage. The massacre of the heroic little garrison
of Castra Vetera, when they surrendered at last on
promise of their lives and, disarmed and marched
out five miles along the road, were there butchered
in cold blood, Civilis professed to deplore. Even
the Nana at Cawnpore was saved from this hypocrisy
by drunkenness. It was after this deed that, to
celebrate the work of destruction which was, he
gleefully thought, now fully accomplished, the
German barbarian fulfilled the vow which he had
made when he took up arms, and for the first
1 The " altius consilium " to which he " studium partium praetendit " (Tac.
iv- x3> x4)-
2 Heraeus' note is comic enough to deserve repetition : " Er war einaugig,
wie Hannibal und Sertorius (gleichfalls Todfeinde Roms), Ziska und Nelson ;
vgl. die Kemerkung Plutarch's Serf. I."
250 REBELLION ON THE RHINE
time cropped short the hair which, stained red
with dye, flowed about his shoulders. And others
also should have joy of his gallantry and triumph.
To rejoice the heart of the fierce maiden pro-
phetess Veleda, who dwelt amid the black forest
on the river Lippe's banks, one Roman legionary
legate was reserved as booty from the butchery.
Happily his escort murdered him while yet upon
the journey towards her. And for his little son's
delight, so ran the tale, this Civilis, this eloquent
Roman soldier of twenty-five years' service, set up
captives tied to stakes, to be the mark for the
child's darts and javelins.1 This was the leader who
plunged his tribesmen into desperate war, and above
all others shook the structure of Roman dominion
on the Rhine to its lowest foundations.
§ 3. The Roman Army on the Rhine
The usual garrison of Germany, or " Army of
the Rhine," consisted of eight legions and a corre-
sponding number of auxiliaries.2 Of the legions
four were in Upper, and four in Lower, Germany,
these two provincial districts meeting at a point
about half-way between Bonn and Coblenz, near the
village of Brohl.3 The troops of each district were
under the command of a legate of at least praetorian
rank,4 although the civil administration in them
remained in the hands of the Governor of Gallia
1 Tac. iv. 60, 61. 2 Cf. Tac. Ann. iv. 5.
3 Cf. Mommsen, Provinces, Eng. Trans, vol. i. p. 119.
4 I.e. who had at least been praetor at Rome.
SEC. Ill
REBELLION ON THE RHINE 251
Belgica until the principate of Domitian,1 and the
collection of taxes was controlled by the procurator
of that same province until at least the middle of
the second century of our era.'2 The Rhine was
now the limit of Roman military occupation and
administration. The Emperor Claudius had with-
drawn all Roman troops to the left bank of the river
in the lower province after Corbulo's campaign in
a.d. 47,3 and Dubius Avitus, after a punitive expedi-
tion against the Frisii ten years later, had again
retired behind the river.4 In the upper province
since the days of Augustus there had twice been
trouble with the tribe of the Chatti in the valley of
the Main, which enters the Rhine at Mainz, and
two Roman armies had penetrated up the valley of
the tributary to punish the natives — the first in
a.d. 41 under Galba, who later became Emperor of
Rome ; 5 the second, nine years later, under the poet
Publius Pomponius Secundus.6 But though the
small tribe of the Mattiaci under the Taunus hills
remained under Roman control, and Romans enjoyed
the hot springs of Wiesbaden and worked the silver
mines in the neighbourhood,7 no Roman troops
seem to have been quartered in the Main valley or
on the right bank of the Rhine, except that the
bridge-head opposite Mainz was occupied by a
1 The first known "legatus Germaniae," as distinct from the "legate of
the army in Germany,"' is Javolenus Priscus, the jurist, in A.D. 90 (C./.L.
iii. 2864).
2 Procurator of Belgica and of both Germanics, Dessau, Inscr. Lat. selectae,
No. 1340 (? Hadrian), 1362-1 (c. a.d. 160).
3 Tac. Ann. xi. 18, 19. 4 Ibid. xiii. 56.
5 Dio, lx. 8. 6 Tac. Ann. xii. 27, 28.
' Cf. Pliny, N.H. xxxi. 2 ; Tac. Germ. 29.
252 REBELLION ON THE RHINE ch. hi
castellum, and is therefore still called Castel to-day.
It was not until the annexation of the Neckar valley
by Vespasian in a.d. 74-75 that the Romans began
to push their military frontier forward beyond the
Rhine in the upper province, and the chapter opens
concerning the great defensive works, walls, forts,
ramparts, and palisades which were made to link
the Rhine and Danube together.1
Claudius' invasion of Britain had caused a con-
siderable displacement of troops on the Rhine
frontier, since in the first century a.d. the " German
Army " was the most conveniently placed of all the
legionary forces in Europe for the purpose of invading
the island and strengthening the army of occupation
when it had landed and gained its first victories.
Hence in a.d. 68 only seven legions lay on the
Rhine.2 And the civil wars, above all the Vitellian
invasion of Italy in the spring of the next year, had
very greatly drained away the strength of the Rhine
army to the south. By the summer of a.d. 69 nearly
one hundred thousand men of all arms must have
been withdrawn by Vitellius from the German
provinces.3 To a certain small extent new levies
had partially replenished the legions, or the portions
of the legions, which had been left behind. But the
new recruits hastily enlisted on the spot were drawn
largely, if not entirely, from the local auxilia, and
were Roman in nothing but in name and in the
1 By far the best succinct account of the Roman " Limes :' here, and of its
history from Vespasian to Marcus Aurelius, has been given us recently in the
last published work of our Master in Roman History, Professor Pelham, in
his paper, "A Chapter in Roman Frontier History " {Transactions of the
Royal Historical Society, N.S. vol. xx. 1 906).
2 See above, p. 26, for these. 3 Cf. Tac. i. 61.
sec. .1. REBELLION ON THE RHINE 253
citizenship which their enrolment in the legions
gave to them.1 There was therefore a great de-
terioration of the troops, not only in numbers, but
also in quality, discipline, fidelity, as the event was
but too quickly to prove.
In the autumn of a.d. 69 the Batavian chief
Civilis declared for Vespasian. At that moment
the troops on the Rhine seem to have been distri-
buted as follows : —
(1) The Legionaries. — The legionaries nearest
the sea were those in camp at Castra Vetera,"
nearly one hundred and fifteen miles from the
coast, and twenty-five from the parting of the
channels at the east end of the " Island of the
Batavians.a This place, situated at Birten by
Xanten, on the left bank of the Rhine just
below Wesel, was then the chief fortress of
Lower Germany, and was garrisoned always, until
the days of Domitian,4 by two legions encamped
together. The two legions in a.d. 69 were the
Fifth Alaudae and the Fifteenth Primigenia, the
latter under Munius Lupercus as legate. But the
main bulk of the Fifth with its eagle had marched
for Italy, and only a detachment (vexillum) was
left in camp. The Fifteenth, on the other hand,
had sent only a detachment to the south, and its
eagle stayed behind with the greater part of the
regiment. But, taken together, the men of the
two legions at Vetera mustered scarcely five
1 Cf. Tac. ii. 15.
- This I call "Vetera" simply henceforward, following Tacitus, iv. 35,
57, etc.
3 See above, p. 232. 4 Cf. Suetonius, Domitian, 7.
254 REBELLION ON THE RHINE ch.hi
thousand men, and did not amount to the strength
of a single legion when this was fully up to
strength.1
Thirty-five miles up stream from Vetera lay
Novaesium, the modern town of Neuss on the left
bank, twenty-two miles down-stream from Cologne,
and nearly opposite Dusseldorf.2 This was the
camp of the Sixteenth legion, the most " stay-at-
home " of all the legions on the Rhine,3 and its
eagle had never left Germany, though up to a.d. 40
it had been quartered at Mainz. Its legate was
probably Numisius Rufus, but he was at this time,
for some unexplained reason, not with his legion,
but at Vetera.4 This legion had sent a vexillum to
the war in Italy. Its strength in camp therefore
at Novaesium cannot be put above four thousand
men at most.5
No legionary troops were at this time stationed
at Cologne. But twenty miles up-stream from
Cologne, at Bonn, there lay the First legion under
its legate Herennius Gallus. Most of the men of
this, the " premier regiment " in the Roman army,
had been summoned to Italy. In spite of new
levies it could place only some three thousand
men in the field.6
In Upper Germany, the only legionary troops at
1 Tac. iv. 22.
2 Neuss is now a mile and a half from the Rhine. The actual site of the
camp is said to have been at Grimlinghausen, a mile away from the modern
Neuss up-stream. Neuss itself was on the river as late as A.D. 1310. See
Heraeus' note on Tac. iv. 26.
3 "Sesshaft" — Pfitzner, Gesch. d. Kaiser legionen.
4 By a comparison of Tac. iv. 22 and 59.
5 Tac. iv. 26 ; ii. 100.
6 Tac. ii. 57 ; iv. 19, 20.
sec. in REBELLION ON THE RHINE 255
this time on the Rhine were those in camp at
Moguntiacum, the modern Mainz, then as always
the chief Roman fortress on the upper course of the
river, and about a hundred miles south-east of
Bonn. This also was a "double camp," and con-
tained the two legions, Fourth Macedonica and
Twenty-second Primigenia. The latter was under
the command of the legate Dillius Vocula, who was
the only general of the smallest merit upon the
whole course of the river when the revolt broke
out. The Fourth had sent a detachment to Italy,
and its eagle stayed behind. It therefore may
have numbered some four thousand men at most.
Its regimental reputation was a poor one, and it
was not to increase this in the coming war. The
bulk of the Twenty-second legion had marched
south with the Vitellians. The whole legionary
garrison of Mainz can scarcely have numbered more
than six thousand men.1
Finally, at Vindonissa, the modern Windisch,
near Basle, one hundred and seventy-five miles
south of Mainz, there should have been encamped
the Twenty-first legion Rapax, a regiment notorious
for savage courage marred by a tendency to insub-
ordination. But the entire legion had by this time
vanished with Caecina over the Alps, there to do
desperate deeds.2
The entire legionary Army of the Rhine, there-
fore, at this time numbered barely some 18,000 men,
distributed as follows : —
1 Tac. ii. 100 ; iii. 22 ; iv. 37.
2 Tac. i. 61, 67 ; ii. 43, etc.
256 REBELLION ON THE RHINE ch. m
At Vetera : Leg. V. and XV. = 5000 men
„ Novaesium : Leg. XVI. = ?4ooo „
,, Bonn : Leg. I. = 3000 „
,, Mainz : Leg. IV. and XXII. = ?6ooo „
Total 18,000 men
(2) The Auxiliaries. — It is quite impossible to
form any estimate at all of the total number of
auxiliary troops at this time forming part of the
garrison of the Rhine. A little is known of their
nationality, their position, and their value ; nothing
at all of their numbers.
In nationality the auxiliary cohorts found upon
the Rhine before the year a.d. 70 were mostly
natives of Germany, Gaul, or the Upper Danube.
Thus the cohorts of Batavians, Cannenefates,
Tungri, and Ubii were Germans ; those of Belgae,
Nervii, and Nemetes x were Gauls ; those of Raeti
and Vindelici were natives of the districts on the
Upper Danube. Cohorts of other races also served
on this frontier, such as those of the Asturians and
Vascones from Northern Spain, the Breuci from
Pannonia, and Silaunenses perhaps from the east.
But it seems certain that the majority of the
auxiliary cohorts was composed of native troops
levied near the frontier itself. Cavalry squadrons
were in like manner furnished by the Cannenefates,
Batavians, and Treveri.2
The places of encampment for some of these are
1 The Nemetes dwelt upon the eastern slopes of the Vosges on the left
bank of the Rhine by Speier, the Roman Noviomagus, and south of Speier
towards Selz.
3 Cf. Alex. Riese, ap. Dizionario Epigrafico, sub voc. "Germania."
sec. m REBELLION ON THE RHINE 257
known. Nearest the sea of all troops of the Roman
army upon this frontier were two cohorts of Gauls
who occupied some petty Roman forts in the
Island of the Batavians, and probably other corps
besides of Nervii and Tungri very recently enlisted.1
In garrison with the legionaries at Vetera there
were Ubii, cavalry of the Treveri, and one squadron
of Batavian horse under Claudius Labeo.2 Labeo
was himself kinsman to the insurgent leader Julius
Civilis, but hated him so intensely that his loyalty
to the Romans was unshaken alike by imprisonment
and constant pursuit which he endured at the hands
of the rebels. He was throughout a constant thorn
in their side.3 Higher up the river there was one
squadron of horse at Asciburgium (Asberg by
Mors4); at Novaesium there were some auxil-
iaries ; 5 at Bonn cohorts of the Belgae, with the
Italian ala Picentina ; 6 and at Mainz were the
cohorts of the Batavians and Cannenefates.7
The best troops among these auxiliary forces
were certainly the eight cohorts of Batavians who
had been attached to the Fourteenth legion. They
had seen much service in Britain, and more recently
during the Vitellian invasion of Italy. But their
temper gave great ground for distrust. They had
quarrelled fiercely with their comrades of the
legion during Valens' march for Italy, and broken
out into open mutiny, which it had been difficult to
1 Tac. iv. 15, reading " Tungrorum " for " Germanorum."
- Tac. iv. 18. 3 Tac. iv. i8, 56, 66, 70.
4 On the road between Vetera and Novaesium, twenty miles from the
former (Tac. iv. 33).
6 Tac. iv. 62. G Tac. iv. 20, 62. 7 Tac. iv. 19.
S
258 REBELLION ON THE RHINE ch.hi
quell.1 They had repeated the offence later in the
year while quartered at Turin with the legion, and
the Emperor had been compelled to separate them
once and for all from the legionaries.2 They had
therefore been sent back to the Rhine, and were,
at the moment when Civilis raised the standard of
revolt, in the lines at Mainz, together with their
kinsmen the Cannenefates. Before news of Civilis'
rising reached them, however, Vitellius, alarmed
at last at the threatened invasion of Italy by the
Flavian troops, sent recalling the cohorts of both
tribes to Rome. They had started on the march
when a messenger reached them from Civilis im-
ploring their help. They hesitated not a moment,
but abruptly turned and marched for the north.3
The hatred of Rome thus displayed by these
cohorts was commonly shared by all the German
and Gallic auxiliaries a*t this time on the Rhine.
The sudden flood of the mutiny swept the whole
native army away, so that no single regiment could
be trusted. Old and new grievances, the remem-
brance of ancient liberties, suspicion and long-
nurtured ill-will felt towards the alien, jealousy of
the regular army, dislike of the officers, all com-
bined to excite the native troops against the
Romans on the Rhine as they roused the sepoys
against us in India fifty years ago. Their own
native officers for the most part stimulated or
acquiesced in their mutiny. Julius Classicus, the
insurgent leader himself, was prefect of a squadron
1 Tac. i. 59 ; ii. 27-29. - Tac. ii. 66, 69.
3 Tac. iv. 15, 19.
sec. ni REBELLION ON THE RHINE 259
of horse of the Treveri.1 When an officer like
Claudius Labeo was found to lead his men against
the rebel army, they deserted him and went over to
their brethren, and he was happy indeed to escape
with his life.2 It was, in fact, now for the first time
that the Roman army system in its method of
recruiting native auxiliaries was seriously tested,
and it broke down hopelessly. Recruiting, of
course, was far more easy when the natives were
enlisted to serve in clan-corps in or near to their
own homeland. But that such a saving of trouble
was very dearly purchased was a lesson first taught
the Roman military authorities by the mutiny of
the native army on the Rhine. That Vespasian
had duly learnt this lesson will be shown at the end
of this chapter.3
In the autumn of the year a.d. 69 the Roman
Army of the Rhine was therefore weak in numbers,
and weaker still in discipline and loyalty. It was
strewn in widely separated fragments along three
hundred miles of frontier from Mainz to the
German Ocean. Its commander-in-chief, the
governor Hordeonius Flaccus, had but recently
been appointed. He was old, slothful, timorous, a
martyr to gout, secretly treacherous to the Emperor
Vitellius, distrusted and despised by the troops.4
The army had lost its ablest leaders and many of
its best troops. It was soaked through and through
with disaffection, mistrust, inefficiency. It was
1 Tac. iv. 55. 2 xac. iv. 18, 66.
3 See below, pp. 329-331. 4 Tac. i. 9, 56, 88; iv. 13, 24.
260 REBELLION ON THE RHINE ch.ih
ever more and more bewildered and distracted by
the doubtful issue of the struggle for Empire raging
furiously in Italy, and, when at last Vespasian's
cause won the day, it was hostile to that new and
unknown Emperor. It saw the strength of the
Roman Army and Roman State rent, as it seemed,
in pieces before its eyes. It was upon this army,
in a state so sorrowful and hazardous, that there
suddenly burst the tempest of a great national
insurrection, with the objects of which a great part
of that army sympathised heartily. That disaster
followed disaster, that this Army of the Rhine
ceased to exist, that the flame of revolt ran along
the entire length of the frontier like fire along a
gunpowder train, — these were but natural results.
Never had Rome known or endured the like. Her
army had played her false. Yet in such an army
how could she have confidence ?
In the course of a few months soldiers successively of Nero,
of the Senate, of Galba, of Vitellius, and of Vespasian ; the only
support to the dominion of Italy over the two mighty nations of
the Gauls and the Germans, while the soldiers of the auxiliaries
were taken almost entirely, and those of the legions in great part,
from those very nations ; deprived of their best men ; mostly
without pay ; often starving ; and beyond all measure wretchedly
led — they were certainly expected to perform feats inwardly and
outwardly superhuman. They ill sustained the severe trial.1
But though her army on the Rhine disappeared,
though her forts and frontier defences were shat-
tered, though mutiny seemed victorious and
treachery triumphant, Rome was still invincible.
1 Mommsen, Provinces, Eng. Trans, vol. i. p. 146.
Coin of Galba.
Coins of Otho.
Coin of Vitellius.
Coin of Vespasian.
sec. iv REBELLION ON THE RHINE 261
§ 4. The War, up to the Relief of Vetera
A. The Clearing of the "Island" — Julius Civilis,
the Batavian chieftain, had been encouraged to raise
a revolt on the Lower Rhine in the interests of
Vespasian, that he might keep Vitellius' troops
on that river busily employed. In his heart he
cherished the deeper design of striking for the
liberty of his native land. The opportunity for
action was quickly given him. The Emperor
Vitellius, on news of the Flavian invasion of Italy,
sent commands for a general conscription through
the Batavian lands.1 The officers whom the governor
appointed to carry out the orders acted harshly at
least, and perhaps the graver charges of injustice
and lust brought against them were not entirely
lacking in truth. Civilis called his tribesmen into
the secret recesses of one of their sacred groves
and made to them a fiery speech.2 They at once
decided to rebel, refused to obey the Roman demand
for men, and sent messengers to the Cannenefates
their neighbours, and to the cohorts of their people
stationed at Mainz, urging them to join.3
The first blow was struck by the Cannenefates,
who joyfully lent their aid. There was one of
their tribe, Brinno by name, whose father had
defied and fought the Romans in the principate of
Caligula, and the son loved them no better. Placed
upon one of the large German shields, and raised
1 Tac. ii. 97 ; iv. 13.
• Tacitus was not in the grove. Whether some one there later told him
the speech, or he invented it, cannot be shown ; the latter is the more
probable. 3 Tac. iv. 14.
262 REBELLION ON THE RHINE ch.ih
on high above the crowd by his eager followers, he
was elected leader after the fashion of his tribe, and
forthwith called them to arms. He sent also to the
Frisii, calling them to the field, and with his tribes-
men fell suddenly upon two Gallic cohorts of
auxiliaries, quartered in the " Island." These fled,
and, after burning some small Roman forts in the
neighbourhood, fell back to the upper end of the
island where with the rest of the Roman auxiliaries
in the district they stood at bay.
Then Civilis himself took the field, at the head
of a mixed company of Batavians, Cannenefates,
and Frisii. Near Nymwegen or Arnhem,1 he and
his army attacked the auxiliaries. These now had
the Roman Rhine flotilla on their flank to help
them. But treachery quickly got the better of both
army and fleet. A Tungrian cohort in the former,
and the Batavian oarsmen employed upon the latter,
played them false, and the Romans were speedily
defeated and expelled one and all from the " Island,"
while the whole fleet of twenty-four vessels was
either captured or destroyed.
It was time for the Roman legionary to come to
the rescue. Hordeonius Flaccus sent ordering the
garrison of Vetera to advance at once against the
rebels, under command of Munius Lupercus, legate
of the Fifteenth legion. He marched the twenty-
five miles down-stream to the " Island," and threw
his force into it over the Waal. His army was com-
posed of the legionaries of the Fifth and Fifteenth
legions, cavalry of the Treveri and Batavians, and
1 Tacitus' geographical knowledge is vague and incredibly unsatisfactory.
sec. iv REBELLION ON THE RHINE 263
also auxiliaries of the Ubii. He found Civilis quite
ready to fight him, probably again in the neighbour-
hood of Arnhem. In the battle the native regiments
with one consent betrayed him. The Batavians
promptly went over to the foe : the Ubii and
Treveri ran. His legionaries indeed stood firm,
and, when the battle was lost, drew off in good order
to Vetera again. But the outlook was ominous
enough. A mere handful of legionaries could do
little to withstand or suppress a national rising.
And soon the rebels received reinforcements more
valuable than any which Civilis had as yet gathered
to his cause.1
This befell when the cohorts of Batavians and
Cannenefates from Mainz marched into Civilis'
camp, proud and exultant after forcing their way
through the Roman legionary line itself. The
men of the First legion had sallied out from their
camp at Bonn to bar the way north to the rebel
cohorts. They had trusted that the governor
Flaccus was hard upon the rebels' heels with the
garrison of Mainz, and they had hoped therefore
to catch the cohorts between two fires. Their
own legate, Herennius Gallus, had been reluctant
to run the risk. His hesitation showed prudence
if scanty pluck. For no Flaccus ever appeared
pursuing after the enemy. The cohorts, experi-
enced and bold veterans, feared not a whit the
legionaries and their auxiliary allies whom they saw
thrown across their road outside the gates of Bonn.
They formed square and thrust hard at the Romans,
1 Tac. iv. 16-18.
264 REBELLION ON THE RHINE ch.hi
whose auxiliaries fled as usual, and the angry
legionaries found their line pierced, themselves
flung aside, and the cohorts disappearing gaily down
the road towards Cologne. Pursuit was out of the
question, and the legion was left to digest its dis-
grace as best it could, while the cohorts marched
calmly north, leaving Cologne untouched, past the
ramparts of Vetera, and reached Civilis with their
new honours thick upon them. The bitter re-
crimination which now occupied the leisure of the
legionaries at Bonn did not greatly avail to sweeten
the cup of a very notable defeat.1
Civilis was justly encouraged. He was now
leader of a very respectable force,2 and could carry
the war outside the limits of the " Island " on
his own account. Having made his entire army
take the oath of fidelity to Vespasian, he sent
a message to the garrison at Vetera, twenty-
five miles away, bidding this do the like. It
defiantly refused. Thereupon with his entire avail-
able force marching by both banks of the Rhine
and with his fleet moving up-stream in company,
Civilis led the rebel force to the siege of Vetera.
This stronghold of the Romans on the Lower Rhine
must be taken.
B. The Siege of Vetera. — " The tide of warfare,"
it has been said, " ebbs and flows on an ocean which
is studded with strategical objectives." But this tide
of the German mutiny rolled fast in a narrow bed,
pushing its surging flood steadily up the valley of
the Rhine, and presently casting a secondary wave
1 Tac. iv. 18-20, 25. 2 "Justi exercitus ductor," Tac. iv. 21.
sec. iv REBELLION ON THE RHINE 265
along the course of the lateral valley of its tributary
the Moselle, while the main flood went steadily
sweeping up the greater river to the south. Then
in due course it receded heavily back down both
the streams, and its last murmurs died away in the
peaceful slow-moving waters of the Northern Sea.
In its rising it lapped greedily round the walls of
many a Roman fortress ; in its ebb it left behind
it white staring ruins, and rotting heaps of slain.
Nowhere did it beat more furiously in its onset than
upon the ramparts behind which the scanty little
garrison of Vetera stood staunchly on the defensive.
Hurled back ever and again, it still foamed up upon
the defiant barricades, or worked stealthily to under-
mine the foundations of them. So in the end the
cruel flood worked its will, and Vetera fell. But
before this came to pass many weeks went by, of
siege and relief, of hope and despair, of famine and
surprise. The siege of Vetera is the one heroic
episode in the first chapter of this war.
As was the case with the Residency of Lucknow
and its small company of defenders, so Vetera and
its garrison were but ill-prepared to stand a siege.
Its troops, like our own, had sallied out to find the
foe, and been beaten back to find shelter in its walls.
They, like our own, felt the pinch of hunger as the
days went by, and the assailants pressed them close,
now by fierce onslaught, now by sullen blockade.
They, like our own, had scarcely men enough to
defend the walls, " only 5000 men to defend a
camp built to hold two legions." They, like our
own, were hampered and embarrassed by a crowd
266 REBELLION ON THE RHINE ch.ih
of civilians, traders, women, children, who took
refuge behind the walls defended by the troops.
For in the long years of peace upon the Lower
Rhine many buildings had grown up round about
outside the military camp " in manner of a town-
ship,"1 where the Roman merchants and traders
had their dwellings and stored their goods, and
where the women and the children of these and of
the troops had their homes. All these buildings
had for purposes of the defence to be destroyed,
and the non-combatants given shelter behind the
fortifications. This made the demand upon the
stock of provisions all the heavier, and these, largely
through the garrison's own fault, were already too
scanty. The very defences themselves had been
built in the days of Augustus rather to serve as a
good base of operations directed against the German
tribes over the river, and as a post from which to
observe their movements, than to protect Roman
legionaries against attack. The greatest and most
prudent of all the emperors had not foreseen so
desperate a reversal of fortune. Hence the very
fortifications were inadequate. If the Roman did
not entirely accept the modern maxim that the
history of entrenched camps is almost always the
history of capitulations, yet at least he too relied on
arms in the field rather than on stone walls for
victory and for safety.2
Yet for all this there was never a moment's
1 " In niodum municipii " : an excellent example of the growth of towns
as due to the system of permanent cantonments.
- Tac. iv. 21-23.
sec. iv REBELLION ON THE RHINE 267
thought of capitulation, of even parleying with the
rebels. " They would not," they sent answer to
Civilis, " listen to a traitor's advice nor to that
of enemies. Vitellius was their Emperor : they
would keep their faith to him and their weapons
until their last breath. Let not a runaway Batavian
think to control the destinies of Romans. Let
him rather expect the due penalty of his desertion."
In the old spirit of the Romans in Gaul a century
earlier, they provoked the enemy to wrath and bade
him do his worst. Walls and entrenchments were
hastily strengthened, and the garrison waited for
the coming of the rebels.
They had not long to wait. Furious with
wrath at the answer given to his challenge, Civilis
passionately hurled his motley army upon the fort.
Here veteran troops advanced under the worn
colours of the Roman army, and plied all Roman
arts of siege-craft. There wild barbarians rushed to
swarm over the defences, brandishing on high the
rudely carved images of wild beasts, which signified
each its special tribe and nation, and had been
brought from the gloomy recesses of sacred forests
to urge their savages forward to the work of plunder
and of butchery. With rocks and stones hurled by
the catapults mounted on the walls, and with fiery
spears, the garrison, grimly fighting, drove back
all assaults, and when night fell the fort was still
inviolate. Civilis' first attempt had failed.
The insurgent leader knew that but a few days'
provisions were all that remained to the besieged.
He ceased from further direct attack, and his army
268 REBELLION ON THE RHINE ca.ni
was spread round the walls, waiting for hunger or
for treachery to do the work where force had
failed, like some crafty beast of prey couching
long before the final spring. Now, if ever, the
Romans higher up the river must march to relieve
the garrison and raise the blockade.
C. The Advance of the Relieving Army. — Even
the old infirm governor, Hordeonius Flaccus him-
self, saw that Vetera must if possible be saved.
Not only did he issue orders at Mainz for the
instant sending of a relieving army from that camp,
but he himself accompanied it. Fearful, however,
of the toils of a march, he journeyed by water down-
stream, which failed to increase the small respect in
which his troops already held him. The officer
appointed to lead the force by land was Dillius
Vocula, legate of the Twenty-second legion. His
army consisted of picked soldiers from the two
legions encamped at Mainz, the Fourth and Twenty-
second, and was constantly increasing in numbers
during the march to the north by the addition of
Gallic auxiliaries who, at Flaccus' orders, came to
join the army. The distance from Mainz to Vetera
was one hundred and seventy-five miles. For the
first hundred miles, as far as Bonn, Vocula met with
no opposition, and advanced by forced marches.
At Bonn the men of the First legion were added
to the relieving column. And at Cologne, twenty
miles on, Hordeonius Flaccus, finding himself hope-
lessly unpopular with the troops, finally handed
over the entire control of all the operations to the
legionary legate. Vocula had put down disaffection
sec. iv REBELLION ON THE RHINE 269
and lack of discipline with a firm hand, and the
soldiers admired him the more they feared him.
But from Cologne onwards the difficulties of the
relieving army multiplied. Vocula was hampered
not only by lack of supplies and an inefficient com-
missariat staff, but also by an exceptionally low
Rhine. The state of the river not only made
all navigation very difficult, and delayed the corn
ships, but it also made it necessary to post patrols
at intervals all along the left bank to prevent parties
of Germans crossing and falling upon the flank or
rear of the Roman column as it advanced. Pro-
gress was, therefore, very slow, the more so as the
men were dispirited, and troops in this state of
mind march very badly. " The old defences of the
Empire," they said, " were deserting them : the gods
were angry." At Novaesium, however, twenty-two
miles below Cologne, fresh reinforcements were
picked up in the men of the Sixteenth legion ; and
the legate of that legion, Herennius Gallus, now
shared with Vocula the responsibilities of command.
But here part of the army was left in camp with
Flaccus, the governor. The foe were now close at
hand, and a fortified base camp was necessary.
The rest of the column then marched slowly for-
wards as far as Gelduba, where a small fort on
rising ground overlooked the Rhine.1 This is now
the village of Gellep, between Kaiserwerth and
Urdingen. Here the two generals, Vocula and
Gallus, halted their men. Vetera was only twenty-
five miles away, but the country was swarming with
1 Cf. Pliny, Nat. Hist. xix. 5, 90.
270 REBELLION ON THE RHINE
foes in front and on both flanks. The fort was hold-
ing out stubbornly, and the generals of the reliev-
ing army would take no risks with their own force.
The position at Gelduba was strongly entrenched,
and some time actually was spent in drilling and
exercising the army. More valuable training, how-
ever, was afforded by an expedition of part of the
force under Vocula against a hostile tribe, which
threatened the left flank of any farther advance.
These, the Cugerni, were Germans, and possibly the
remnants of the ancient Sugambri, whom Tiberius
sixty years before had settled on the left bank of
the Rhine. They now dwelt in the district round
the modern small town of Goch, thirteen miles
west of Xanten (Vetera). They had joined Civilis,
and a raid upon their territory, it was hoped, would
teach them to keep quiet for the present. During
Vocula's absence a stranded corn ship led to a fight
between the Romans left in camp at Gelduba and
the marauding Germans, who came down upon the
vessel to plunder her. In this the Romans got
the worse, and lost the ship. The troops, as
usual, were furious with their general Gallus, and
only Vocula's timely return and stern treatment of
the ringleaders stopped another incipient mutiny.
The patrols on the river bank had proved quite
unable to prevent German roving bands from
crossing the stream. Vocula, therefore, found the
enemy active behind him, threatening his supply
trains, and ravaging the lands of his still faithful
allies, the Ubii round Cologne. Even Marcodurum,
the present Diiren on the Roer, twenty-four miles
nc.iv REBELLION ON THE RHINE 271
west-south-west of Cologne, garrisoned carelessly by
a cohort of this loyal tribe, who trusted for safety
rather to their distance from the Rhine than to
vigilance, was surprised and sacked by the enemy,
contemptuous alike of the Roman camps at Nova-
esium and Gelduba. That the relieving army was
itself in a state of semi-blockade at Gelduba is
shown by its long-continued inactivity.1
Meanwhile the Germans grew weary of the
blockade of Vetera. The garrison might be
starving, but it gave no signs of any thought of
surrender. The approach of the relieving army
also seemed to call for greater efforts by the
besiegers, and while Vocula and his men were
miserably wasting time at Gelduba instead of
pushing right through to the beleagured fortress,
a fierce assault by the enemy again tested the
endurance and valour of its garrison to the utmost.
All messages to them from the relieving column,
all news of its despatch or approach, had been care-
fully intercepted by Civilis. For all they knew
they were left to their fate, to starve or to perish
fighting, unless they would betray their honour.
And now a still greater mass of German savages
from over the Rhine flung themselves upon the
entrenchments. The night did but add to the
perils and horrors of the day. Huge fires were
seen blazing in the enemy's lines, just outside their
ramparts, and the figures of the barbarians were lit
up by the flames as they sat drinking and carousing.
Then, hot with wine, the savages swarmed again to
1 Tac. iv. 24-28.
272 REBELLION ON THE RHINE ch.hi
the assault. But the light of the fires made their
bodies an easy mark for the steady, deliberate, and
unerring aim of the legionaries. Many of their
bravest chiefs had been picked off, while the walls
of the camp, dark and frowning, defied the blind
shooting of the enemy, before Civilis noticed the
error of his men. Then the fires were stamped
out, and the blackness of night covered the move-
ments of besiegers and besieged alike. But the
legionaries fought grimly on by ear, now that sight
failed them. Heavy stakes and stones were hurled
down into the darkness where the noise was loudest.
The sound of scaling ladders planted against the
walls called them instantly to the spot. They
thrust the stormers back with their shields, and
followed their flight with a rain of javelins. Yet
many of the foe made good their footing on the
ramparts, there to meet death from the short stab-
bing sword of the legionary. The grey dawn
brought new methods, but no relaxation of attack.
The Batavians wheeled a great two-storied tower
crammed with men up to the Praetorian gate, where
the level ground gave them easy access. It was
battered to pieces by the Romans with poles and
beams, and a sudden sally drove the enemy off.
If one more rash than his comrades approached
within reach of the walls, he was suddenly
gripped by the iron hand of a crane, whirled up
into the air before his fellows' very eyes, and flung
a mangled body over the rampart wall into the
heart of the camp. Once more the garrison had
repelled this most savage of onslaughts. The dis-
sec. iv REBELLION ON THE RHINE 273
comfited Germans drew off, and sate down sullenly
again to beleaguer the fort which no courage of
theirs could take.1
D. The Relief of Vetera. — At this point there
arrived in the Roman camp at Gelduba the news of
the battle of Cremona. It made no difference to
the military operations. The tidings, it is true,
were at once sent to Civilis. He was informed
that the Roman army on the Rhine had renounced
its allegiance to Vitellius and declared for Vespasian.
His object, therefore, had been won, and it was
time for him to cease from all further hostilities.
Civilis took no notice, but with still greater energy-
urged on the war. Thereby he at last threw aside
the mask, and the struggle, which up to this point
could have been in theory viewed merely as a
chapter in the history of the Civil War, hence-
forward took on its. true colours of a national rising
of the Germans against Rome. Politically and
historically this was most significant. But its
only influence upon the course of the war was
that it lent all the greater reason for hate, if not
the greater hatred, to the combatants on both
sides.2
The relieving army was not left undisturbed in
camp at Gelduba. Civilis, keeping enough men
to carry on the blockade of Vetera, sent the rest to
rush the Roman camp. Sacking a small fort on
the way at Asciburgium, near Mors, twenty miles
south of Vetera, the Germans completely surprised
the Roman army, and, forcing their way into the
1 Tac. iv. 28-30. 2 Tac. iv. 31, 32.
T
274 REBELLION ON THE RHINE ch.™
lines, began a ready massacre in the midst of the
general panic. The German and Gallic auxiliaries
of Vocula were utterly terrified, and their cowardice
all but led to a complete disaster. From this the
Roman general was saved only by the timely arrival
of some cohorts of Spanish auxiliaries, the Vascones.
These, who had recently been levied by Galba,
none the less understood the primary duty of the
soldier, and, hearing the noise of the fighting when
they were still some distance from the camp,
marched straight to the sound. They came un-
expectedly upon the enemy in the rear, and the
consternation which they caused gave time to the
legionaries to rally from their first shock of sur-
prise, and drive the Germans with heavy loss from
the camp. But Vocula or his sentries had done
little to earn the esteem of the army by this
engagement.
Neither did he follow up at once the success
which, somewhat in his own despite, he had gained.
Had he done this, in the opinion of the Roman
historian, the German army would have melted
away, and Vetera would have been relieved without
further trouble. But still Vocula tarried at Gel-
duba, and thereby gave Civilis the chance to play
one last card. Direct assault had twice failed.
Hunger had been defied. The attack upon the
relieving army had been repulsed. Perhaps strata-
gem would give him the prize which seemed so
nearly in his grasp. The garrison had heard
nothing of the approach of a relieving force, until
one morning they saw paraded outside the ramparts
sec. iv REBELLION ON THE RHINE 275
the captive standards of a Roman army and a string
of Roman prisoners. They were colours and men
taken in the attack on Gelduba, and were con-
temptuously displayed as sole survivors of the one
army which could have come to save the fort. But
Civilis' trick recoiled on his own head. One of
the prisoners — and history would have done well to
record his name — shouted to the besieged a few
words, enough to tell them the truth, that the Army
of the Rhine was not destroyed, but was even then
hard at hand. His captors struck him dead to
earth, but his heroism had saved the garrison from
despair. And soon, as they strained their eyes
over the illimitable expanse of plain towards the
south, they saw smoke rising upon the horizon.
Vocula and his army had struck camp at last, and
the burning houses, which on their advance they
put to the flames, gave the signal of their approach.
The whole German beleaguering force drew out to
meet the coming foe. The anxious garrison saw their
comrades rapidly advance, and halt. Next came a
moment's pause, when it seemed as if they would
entrench themselves against the German onslaught.
But then the whole weary army, animated as by
one wild longing for battle, in little order but with
fierce shouts, dashed upon the waiting Germans.
Every gate of Vetera was at once flung open, and
the besieged garrison sallied out to join in the
last desperate onset on the enemy. The fighting
was bitter. But presently down went the rebel
leader's horse, and the rumour spread fast that
Civilis was slain. The Germans fled in wild panic,
276 REBELLION ON THE RHINE gk.hi
and the Romans at last marched into the camp
which had been so stoutly defended.1
§ 5. Flood Tide : The Success of the Mutiny
A. The Retention of Vetera. — Vetera was success-
fully relieved. There then followed on Vocula's part
an action which remains the one military puzzle of
this war. The general strengthened the defences
of the camp, sent away all non-combatants under
escort up-stream to Novaesium, took one thousand
of the best men from the old garrison and added
them to his own force, and with this small addition
to his strength retired again up the river to Gel-
duba. In actual fact, against his orders more than
one thousand followed the return march, and when
these were commanded to return to Vetera they
refused, saying that they had endured the hard-
ships of a siege long enough already. There was,
therefore, a Roman garrison still left behind in the
fortress, of numbers smaller by more than a fifth
than before. It is true that a certain amount of
provisions had been supplied to them ; they were
relieved from the presence of a hungry unwarlike
crowd of civilians, and their defences had been im-
proved. None the less they sent after Vocula,
complaining bitterly that he had abandoned them
to their fate, and imploring him to return. Certainly
they were left to themselves in the middle of a
savagely hostile country, and at any minute the
fate from which Vocula had marched to save them
1 Tac. iv. 33, 34.
secv REBELLION ON THE RHINE
77
might seem to threaten them again. Had they
been once relieved only to endure again the agony
of suspense, the perils of assault, the miseries of
blockade ? The Germans had vanished ; but when
the Roman army withdrew southwards, how could
it be but that they would reappear in greater
numbers and lively exultation ? Then, would
Vocula again come to save them ? Who knew but
that the uncertainties of war would compel his
presence elsewhere? If this were the case they,
a weakened garrison, must endure the extremest
penalties at the savages' hands.
When once the relief of Vetera had been accom-
plished at the cost of such toil and fighting, one of
two courses might have seemed open to the Roman
general. He might have held the fort with his
whole force and made it the base of operations
for an advance upon the foe whom he had just
heavily defeated. Or, if he judged this too rash,
he might, now that the primary object of his march,
the rescue of the garrison, had been gained, have
evacuated and destroyed Vetera, falling back with
the whole army as far towards Mainz as he thought
it expedient, taking the rescued with him. A very
few days proved clearly that the first of these plans
was beyond his strength, owing to the difficulty
of supplies. The enemy were by now complete
masters of the river. All supplies, therefore, had
to come by road from Novaesium. A first convoy
got through safely, while Civilis was recovering
from his recent defeat. But a second attempt met
with woeful results. Vocula had again despatched
278 REBELLION ON THE RHINE ch.ih
the corn collectors with a strong escort and waggons
north to Novaesium. The escort was guilty of
scandalous carelessness. They never gave a thought
to the possible appearance of the enemy, but stowed
their heavy weapons gaily in the empty waggons,
and strolled blithely along the road beside them or
wandered over the countryside. Presently the
convoy halted. There was an obstacle on the
narrow road in front. Up from ambush sprang the
Germans and fell upon them. Sheer desperate
fighting, lasting all the day, did at the end carry the
Romans through to Gelduba, where they found
protection at the camp there. But to escort a
laden convoy thence back along the road to Vetera
seemed beyond their powers.1 It was clear that
Vocula, if he stayed at Vetera, had not men enough
to guard his line of communications and to carry on
offensive operations as well.
The Roman historian himself at this point passes
judgment upon Vocula in a manner which does little
credit to the general's military intelligence, and
none at all to his own. It is a veritable master-
piece of improbability, almost of folly. Tacitus
states his belief that, after his victory over Civilis
outside Vetera, Vocula ought again immediately
to have pursued the flying enemy. If, instead of
this, he busied himself in strengthening the fortifica-
tions, " as if another siege were threatening," " he
1 I do not know why Mommsen {Provinces, Eng. Trans, vol. i. p. 135)
supposes the attack on the convoy to have been when it was proceeding " with
provisions *' in the reverse direction from Novaesium to Gelduba. It is clear
from iv. 35 that the waggons were empty, and that the "quantum in regressu
discriminis adeundum foret " is a thought for the future, not an experience of
the past.
sec.v REBELLION ON THE RHINE 279
had misused victory so often that he was rightly
suspected of preferring war." l This preference, it
is to be supposed, was for war rather than peace,
and not for war rather than victory. Presumably
the general felt that his talents were best displayed
in war, and therefore desired this to continue ! He
therefore fortified Vetera instead of pursuing the
enemy.
It is hard to speak calmly of such a judgment, of
him who passed it, of those who seem to accept it."
Vocula had already had every reason to distrust the
temper of his own troops, to appreciate the great-
ness of the danger threatened by the Germans'
bravery and cunning. He had just extricated a
beleaguered garrison with very serious difficulty.
He was involved in a country swarming with savage
foes. His own life was every moment at stake — not
only imperilled by the enemy, but also by mutiny
and treachery among his own troops. Only inflexible
severity and success in war had kept his own regi-
ments in hand. Had another immediate success
been possible for him, as Tacitus supposes, not
only military fame and honour, but self-preservation
itself, must have compelled him to do his utmost
to secure it.
If Vocula did not pursue the enemy, either
1 Tac. iv. 34 : " Sed Vocula, omissis fugientium tergis, vallum tui risque ca-
strorum augebat, tamquam rursus obsidium immineret, corrupta totiens victoria
non falso suspectus bellum made."
2 As e.g. in Church and Brodribb : " The line of conduct which he actually
pursued was so inexplicable as to suggest suspicions of treachery, which the
historian himself seems to have thought justified by the facts" (The History
of Tacitus, p. 243). Cm bono the " treachery " ? Vocula at least lost his
life.
280 REBELLION ON THE RHINE ch.ih
at once or after some days had passed, the simple
explanation is that he did not feel himself strong
enough to do so. His object had been the rescue
of the garrison. This was at last effected. But
pursuit was a very different matter. Even after a
battle fought and won for the sake of victory upon
the field, immediate pursuit does not follow as a
necessary consequence.
The fear of a return blow provoked by premature pursuit and
of losing the fruits of victory in the endeavour to make it more
complete will always restrain him [the commander-in-chief]. . . .
Every battle entails extreme excitement and the utmost strain
of all the intellectual and physical forces. A state of exhaustion
accordingly follows as a natural consequence. After a victory,
moreover, there is a feeling that further sacrifices are purpose-
less, or that they would not be sufficiently recompensed by the
probable additional results.1
Certainly for immediate pursuit after a desperate
battle, and with troops utterly worn out by marching
and fighting, Vocula could have neither inclination
nor the means. For an advance northwards against
1 Von der Goltz, The Nation in Anns, pp. 362-363. Of course this
writer insists that this reluctance to pursue is due chiefly to modern conditions
of war: "This immediate pursuit," he goes so far as to say, "has not only
nearly always not taken place in late wars, but it lies in the nature of the
modern battle that it will, as a rule, be absent." The Russo-Japanese War
confirms his statement. Cf. too the very striking sentence of our own British
general : "It is perhaps necessary to have been a responsible commander
during an attack to realise the immense reaction of relief when success is
attained, a reaction coincident with an intense longing to tempt fate no
further. ' You have won the battle,' a voice seems to whisper in your ear ;
* the enemy are going : for God's sake let them go ; what right have you to
order still more men to lose their lives this day ? ' " (Sir Ian Hamilton, A
Staff-Officer's Scrap-Book, vol. i. p. 117). Part of this feeling would hardly
be applicable to Vocula, or indeed to any other general in savage warfare.
But the " reaction" felt after victory would be all the stronger when the fruits
of victory were the very tangible ones of a rescued garrison, and these had
been fully secured by it.
sEc.v REBELLION ON THE RHINE 281
the Germans after allowing his men a few days'
rest, the general had neither men nor, as has been
seen, food enough. Truly it needed " the most
unmilitary of historians " to suggest that the suspi-
cion, product of ignorance and malignity combined,
was true, that Vocula failed to pursue because he
desired to protract the war. This, too, must be
added to the large rubbish - heap of Tacitus'
41 military " judgments.
The Roman general was therefore unable either
to advance against the Germans from Vetera or to
remain there with his force. But — the real problem
— why did he not then evacuate it altogether ? 1
It cannot be supposed with probability that
Vocula deliberately intended to sacrifice to his own
safety the remnants of the garrison whom he left
behind ; that to cover a dangerous retreat it was
necessary to leave a force behind him in Vetera,
although he knew that this force would, as a conse-
quence, be destroyed. It is true that, if this situa-
tion had then actually existed, a Roman general
might have been willing to demand this self-sacrifice
of his rear-guard. This had actually happened but
a short while before in Judaea, where at Bethoron
a gallant little rear-guard of four hundred men
1 Mommsen supposes that when the convoy was cut up Vocula went
temporarily to Gelduba to its support, but always intended to return to
Vetera. His men, however, refused to return "and to take upon themselves
the further sufferings of the siege in prospect ; instead of this they marched to
Novaesium, and Vocula, who knew that the remnant of the old garrison of
Vetera was in some measure provisioned, had for good or evil to follow "
{Provinces, Eng. Trans, vol. i. p. 135). There is not a hint of anything of
this in Tacitus, and, though we may criticise the motive ascribed him by the
historian, yet in the fact as stated that he chose to do what he did we must
needs believe. Surely Mommsen's view is based on a wrong interpretation
of the words " aliis redire in castra abnuentibus " ?
282 REBELLION ON THE RHINE ch.hi
had willingly laid down their lives in order to
ensure the safe retreat of the main army.1 When
Havelock relieved Lucknow, he found himself un-
able to extricate the garrison and non-combatants.
He therefore, being also unable to keep open his
line of communications, allowed himself and his
force to be besieged anew until Colin Campbell's
second army of relief advanced to save the whole.
There were Roman commanders who would, under
these conditions, have done their utmost to extricate
the troops and have left the non-combatants to
their pitiable fate.2 But, as a matter of fact, things
were not yet so desperate with Vocula and his
army. The non-combatants had been sent away
to safety without difficulty. The whole force might
have been withdrawn with still greater ease, since
the Germans took some time to recover from their
defeat.3
That the Roman general had some strategical
object in view when he left a garrison in Vetera is
certain. That in this he made a bad miscalculation
events quickly proved. That he himself recognised
this and made heroic, if unavailing, efforts to repair
1 Cf. my history of the principate of Nero, p. 371.
2 E.g. Suetonius Paulinus, on his retreat from London towards Chester
in a.d. 60. Cf. my Nero, p. 213. But it must be remembered in his excuse
that his army was then the one and only hope of every man, woman, or child
of the Romans at that time in the island of Britain.
•! It was once suggested to me by an Undergraduate, in answer to an
invitation to a class in lecture for suggestions, that Vocula only went to Vetera
to get his thousand men, and did not care what happened to the rest. I fear
this does not seem to me very probable. In view of the difficulties which the
relieving column had to face, this would seem to be a case of plenty to do and
little to get, without Sam Weller's comment. Neither would Vocula have
strengthened the fortifications in this case. This suggestion, like Mommsen's,
I therefore banish to a note.
secv REBELLION ON THE RHINE 283
his mistake was also speedily to be shown. His
intention was probably to keep the Germans in
check by a fort threatening their rear if they ad-
vanced south, while he himself was busy collecting
all available forces with which to return to Vetera
and, using it as his base of operations, penetrate
the enemy's country and finish the war. Now that
the news of the battle of Cremona had come, he may
have looked for the speedy arrival on the Rhine ot
reinforcements from over the Alps, and have marched
south to meet them and move them forward.1
That some weeks must pass before the struggle
in Italy was ended Vocula perhaps did not
foresee. And certainly he did not anticipate the
series of disasters which immediately after his
return up the Rhine befell the Roman arms on the
river. In holding Vetera, even though this fort
had now been strengthened beyond the fear ot
capture by assault, he committed an error of over-
confidence, somewhat akin to that of which the
Federal Government at Washington was guilty
when, in defiance of the advice of its military
commander, it ordered the garrison at Harper's
Ferry to stay at its post in September 1862. In
both cases the fort was meant to check the depreda-
tions of a vigorous foe. In both cases the fort was
sacrificed and the garrison lost.2 It is possible that
Vocula had this reason as well for seeking to retain
Vetera in Roman hands, that he saw that the Gallic
tribes in the neighbourhood of the Lower Rhine
1 As suggested to me by another Undergraduate on the same occasion.
2 See Note G, "Vetera and Harper's Ferry. "
2S4 REBELLION ON THE RHINE ch.hi
were becoming restless and that conspiracy was
hatching among them. This was a new and a
terrible danger. If the Romans evacuated the one
great Roman fortress on the lower river, this
evacuation might well be the spark which exploded
the mine.
B. The Death of Vocula. — No sooner had Vocula
and his main army left Vetera and marched back
to Novaesium, passing Gelduba on the way, than
Civilis and his Germans appeared, following hard
upon his heels. They took Gelduba, and their
cavalry pressed forward to Novaesium, outside of
which place they met and routed the Roman horse.
Inside there raged mutiny and bloodshed. Flaccus,
the governor, was dragged one night from his bed
and murdered by a mob of soldiers. Vocula himself
barely escaped the same fate by disguising himself
in the garb of a slave. But the approach of Civilis
frightened the legionaries back to their obedience.
Then, however, there came the news of peril on the
Upper Rhine, even at Mainz itself, which was being
threatened by a mixed force of Germans, belonging
to the three tribes of the Chatti, Usipi, and Mattiaci.
Vocula was compelled to hasten to its relief, lest he
and his army should be cut off completely from his
communications with Italy and the hope of rein-
forcements. The tribesmen were caught unawares
and routed with loss. Mainz was saved for the
time. But meanwhile the whole of the lower course
of the Rhine was left to itself, and the rebellion
spread unchecked.1
1 Tac. iv. 36, 37.
secv REBELLION ON THE RHINE 285
Then indeed, at the beginning of the year a.d.
70, the Roman cause seemed at the lowest ebb,
and the Gauls first wavered, then renounced their
loyalty. The victories of their German neighbours
excited them ; the news of the burning of the
Capitol became the text for the Druids' eloquence
concerning the coming doom of Rome ; and rumours
also reached them of successes gained upon the
Danube frontier by Dacian and Sarmatian tribes.
It was surely time for them to show their national
patriotism, when care for their own safety seemed
to suggest this course. The three Gallic chieftains,
Classicus, Tutor, and Sabinus,1 met secretly in a
private house at Cologne, and their council was
attended also by representatives of the tribes of
the Ubii, Tungri, Treveri, and Lingones. The
conspirators decided to call the Gauls to arms, and
to block the Alpine passes against the coming of
fresh troops from Italy. The infection of mutiny
had gripped them at last.
The hatching of the plot was at once betrayed
to Vocula at Mainz. His troops were fractious
and insubordinate. They still resented Vespasian's
triumph, and grudged to own him as their Emperor.
The general was sorely straitened on every side.
Yet he never hesitated or flinched. Certainly he had
made mistakes, but he was a true Roman — the only
one left upon the Rhine. He marched at once
down-stream for Cologne, and thence for Vetera.
With so deadly a new danger threatening, the
garrison must at all costs be relieved and the
1 For these leaders see above, p. 247.
286 REBELLION ON THE RHINE ch.«i
fort evacuated. He had left them, as events now-
showed, in dire peril. He would not abandon them
without an effort to save them. Already he was well-
nigh within sight of the camp when his auxiliary7
leaders, Classicus and Tutor, deserted with their
tribesmen to the Germans. The traitors had been
waiting their best opportunity. They allowed the
general to surround himself with foes and to
see the object of his determination all but won.
Then they played him false. There is little
that is sweet about Gallic falseness. Freedom
is better won by sacrifice than by black treachery.
Vocula had no choice left him but to retreat.
He withdrew his legionaries, all that remained
to him, back to Novaesium. He knew them
to be desperate, and not for one moment to
be trusted. Emissaries from the mutineers were
almost openly busy in their ranks. There was no
succour, no refuge for them nearer than Italy. The
Germans were up in their front, the Gauls of the
Moselle valley on their flank and rear ; the savages
across the Rhine were separated but by the river,
on which was only a German fleet. Many of his
men preferred a Civilis to a Vespasian. They
were cowed and angry. To such a recreant band
of men, once Roman soldiers, their general, Vocula,
made at Novaesium his last appeal. The purport
of it was long remembered in after years. The
historian, however great a master of the sham
rhetoric of the schools, could hardly have invented
a speech which breathes so passionate a scorn —
the scorn of a Roman whose troops threatened to
sKcv REBELLION ON THE RHINE 287
join Germans and Gauls against the Imperial city.
Their old comrades of the auxilia were urging
them to murder their officers and come over to
them. Vocula knew the whole. Many implored
him to escape secretly while yet there was time.
But he despised safety if so be that he could save
his honour and, if there should yet be shame in
their hearts, the honour of his troops as well. He
faced them, noisy and turbulent, with treachery and
murder in their thoughts, boldly and alone. " As
to his own fate," he told them, " he cared not a
whit. But the honour of the Roman army was
at stake. What though fortune seemed to fail
them, though their courage seemed for the moment
shaken ? Could they forget the examples of old
days, those many times when Roman legions
perished at their posts rather than yield ground
to the foe ? Such memorials did not fail them.
Would they march humbly in the train of Germans
and of Gauls against the walls of Rome ? mount
guard for a Trevir? ask a Batavian for the battle
signal ? For eight hundred and twenty years the
army of the Roman people had done homage to
Jupiter, their great and glorious god, by offering
the spoils of countless triumphs won. To Jupiter,
and to Ouirinus, parent of their city Rome, he
turned to pray that they might never suffer a Tutor
and a Classicus to defile the camp of a Roman
army."
He ended his appeal, and a confused clamour was
heard in the ranks. But it was not the clamour of
repentance and applause. The men of the last
288 REBELLION ON THE RHINE ch.™
Roman army on the Rhine had made their choice.
Vocula had failed. So let death come to him when
it willed. His very slaves baffled him when, like a
Roman, he would have turned his sword against
himself. It mattered very little. The murderer,
a deserter, was sent by Classicus, and passed
openly on his business through the ranks of the
men to their general's tent. So Vocula found rest
from soldiering at last.
A fouler page of history was never written in
the military annals of Rome.1
C. The Loss of Germany. — Vocula was dead ;
the other legates of the traitor legions were in
chains. The men joined the rebels, part of whom
under Tutor fell upon Cologne and Mainz, and took
both without trouble ; part under Classicus hurried
to make an end at last of the heroic little garrison
at Vetera, which Civilis still besieged in vain. Now
all the tossing waves of mutiny surged round the
last stronghold of the Romans on the Rhine. It
stood alone, as a grim dark rock amid the foaming
of the raging western sea. Still the scanty, hungry
garrison held out desperately. There was no one
now to shout the news of relief to come, nor any
need for the barbarian to parade prisoners before their
eyes. The rebel army, mutineers and Germans,
lay passive round about the walls, waiting the end.
Every living animal within the camp was consumed
for food. The besieged devoured roots and shrubs,
1 Tac. iv. 54-59. Cf. Mommsen : " In Roman military history Cannae
and Carrhae and the Teutoburg Forest are glorious pages compared with
the double disgrace of Novaesium."
secv REBELLION ON THE RHINE 289
the very grass in the streets and on the ramparts.
Even then the rebels dared not storm the fort,
but won the hungry men at last to surrender by
the solemn promise of their lives.1 Then all who
were left of the Four Thousand laid down their
arms and marched out defenceless through the gate,
trusting to the word of a savage. They marched
five miles along the road. Then the barbarians fell
upon them. Those who escaped fled back towards
Vetera. They found their fort in flames, and
perished with it. So the Four Thousand of Vetera
died, as died the garrison of Cawnpore.
The legionary legate Lupercus was saved from
the massacre to be sent to the prophetess Veleda2
of the Bructeri. As he was being taken up the
river Lippe his escort slew him. A few of the
under-officers were kept as prisoners. This was
the end. The Roman legions on the Rhine were
traitors or destroyed. Some of the former, men of
the First and Sixteenth, regiments, were ordered
by the mutineers to Treves, under command of a
certain Claudius the Holy, a man, says the historian,
with one eye lost, repulsive of appearance, and even
more weak in intellect. He was a worthy leader
of such troops. But one auxiliary squadron of
Italian horse, the ala Picentina, could brook the
1 And Tacitus calmly writes : "Donee egregiam Iaudem fine turpi macu-
larent," iv. 60. Whose is the cold "disgrace" if not his who cannot realise
the sufferings and the heroism of these men ? No doubt he felt, as he
penned the lines, that he was the truest Roman of them all— he, a stilted
pleader at a decadent Bar.
2 Veleda, ap. Statius, Silvae, i. 4, 90. BeXfjSa, a/>. Dio lxvii. 5. The
MSS. readings of the Histories and Germania, c. 8, vary between Veleda and
Velaeda.
U
29o REBELLION ON THE RHINE ch.ih
misery and disgrace no longer. They defiantly left
the line of march and rode bravely back to Mainz,
there to wait for better days. On the road they
met by chance with Vocula's assassin and slew him.
His name is given to us ; but why should the scroll
of infamy be lengthened needlessly ?
Only Claudius Labeo now was left, and he strove
to hold out with his auxiliary corps of Baetasii,
Nervii, and Tungri behind the line of the Maas.
It was a vain hope. His native troops promptly
joined the German rebels, and Labeo was happy
to escape, a fugitive.1
The tide had reached its height. The Roman
Army of the Rhine was no more. All Roman forts
were burnt, save Mainz, and Vindonissa, a lonely
fort far in the south, then without a garrison.
Civilis and his Germans were triumphant. Ger-
many was free. The " Empire of the Gauls," the
Imperium Galliarum, had, as it seemed, dethroned
Rome from her supremacy in northern lands. " The
whole proud Army of the Rhine, the first army of
the Empire, had surrendered to its own auxiliaries.
Rome had surrendered to Gaul."2
§ 6. The Ebb : Reduction of the Gallic Revolt
A. The Gathering of the Romans. — Then at last
Rome bestirred herself. It was now the spring
of the new year a.d. 70, and the Civil War was
ended. The Flavian cause had triumphed. Ves-
pasian was on his way to Italy. Mucianus,
1 Tac. Lv. 60-66. For Labeo see above, p. 257. 2 Mommsen.
sec. vi REBELLION ON THE RHINE 291
until he came, was regent at Rome. In quick
succession the latter despatched legions from
Italy northwards to the scene of war. No longer
were treacherous auxiliaries, half-hearted and
mutinous legionaries, captains inert, unskilled, or
betrayed, to contend with Germans and Gauls,
flushed with victory over so contemptible a foe.
But a veritable Roman army of eight veteran
legions under brilliant and tried generals was now
to strive with tribes who could gain freedom, but
who used it in heart-breaking quarrels among them-
selves. Men who fight for freedom are not seldom
apt to translate it in terms of mastery over others.
For the woes of the uncivilised at least, liberty from
Rome was not a panacea.
Five legions were sent from Italy to the Rhine.
Three of these belonged to the victorious Flavian
army. These were the Eighth Augusta, the
Eleventh Claudia, and the Seventh Claudia.1 Two
others had been part of Vitellius' army, the Second
Adjutrix2 and the famous Twenty-first Rapax.
But for war against the German these soldiers
were of equal service. These five legions crossed
,the Alps by the three passes of the Great St.
Bernard (Pennine Alps), Little St. Bernard (Graian
Alps), and Mont Genevre (Cottian Alps). Summons
also were sent to Britain for the Fourteenth legion,
1 A MS. imperfection has led some editors to substitute XIII. Gemina
for VII. Claudia, ap. Tac. Hist. iv. 68. Both Halm and Heraeus have
omitted the Third legion altogether. Since E. Ritterling's paper (in the
Westdeutsche Zeitschrift fiir Geschichte und Kunst, Jahrgang xii. (1893),
Heft 2, pp. 105 sqq., " Zur romischen Legionsgeschichte am Rhein," i.,
VII. Claudia must be read.
2 For this legion see above, p. 214.
292 REBELLION ON THE RHINE CH. m
the old and deadly foes of the Batavian cohorts,1
and to Spain for two legions, the First Adjutrix2
and Sixth Victrix. These speedily arrived. The
army was divided into two, and two commanders
were appointed. Petilius Cerialis, the cavalry leader
of the last part of the Flavian advance to Rome,3
was selected to conduct the war on the Lower Rhine ;
Annius Gallus, Otho's old general,4 was bidden clear
the Upper Rhine of rebels, and bring the hostile
tribes again to subjection. The larger part of the
army, consisting of the Legions I. Adjutrix, VII.
VIII. and XL, was given to Gallus. Cerialis had
at first only the Twenty-first legion under his com-
mand. But it was not long before the remaining three
legions, II. VI. and XIV., joined him. And, so far
1 See above, p. 59.
2 There is no doubt of the MS. reading " sexta ac prima ex Hispania
accitae," iv. 68, i.e. I. Adjutrix. Halm, however, substitutes "decuma" for
"prima," i.e. Leg. X. Gemina, following a suggestion first made, so far as I
know, by Sir Henry Savile, in his translation of the Histories three centuries
ago. The reason for the change seems to be that X. Gemina, undoubtedly a
Spanish legion, is found later engaged in this war upon the Rhine (Hist.
v. 19), while the presence of I. Adjutrix is not elsewhere mentioned. Also,
it is urged, the order VI. and X. is more natural than VI. and I. Ritterling,
however (op. cit. pp. 112-114), argues convincingly for the MS. reading and
destroys the objections. That I. is not again mentioned is due to the fact
that it belonged to the Upper army, the records of whose war are lost, thanks
to the sudden break in the Tacitus MS. after Book v. c. 26. The legion
has, however, left records of itself in Germany, dating to the years a.d. 73
and following. Cf., too, Hardy, Studies in Roman History, p. 209. The
cause of the arrival of X. Gemina, not given in Tacitus, is well explained by
Ritterling as follows : — In the summer of the year there was a great inroad
of Sarmatians into Moesia, which resulted in the defeat and death of the
governor, Fonteius Agrippa (Josephus, Beit. Jud. vii. 4 fin.). Vespasian,
therefore, sent Rubrius Gallus as governor to Moesia, and ordered Annius
Gallus to send Leg. VII. Claudia from Upper Germany to his help. In place
of VII. Claudia he received Leg. XIV. from Cerialis in Lower Germany, and
X. Gemina was called up from Spain to be sent to Cerialis in place of Leg.
XIV. In the autumn of a.d. 70, therefore, VII. Claudia is in Moesia, XIV.
in Upper Germany, X. Gemina in Lower Germany, where it is found, ap.
Hist. v. 19.
3 See above, pp. 223-225. * Hist. i. 87. See above, p. 70.
sec. vi REBELLION ON THE RHINE 293
as the incomplete records of the war are concerned,
the great brunt of the fighting fell on him. Practically
nothing is known of Gallus' equally successful opera-
tions in the Upper German province.1
The Twenty-first legion, marching by the most
direct route of the Great St. Bernard, arrived first
at its old headquarters Vindonissa. There it was
joined by the auxiliaries of Noricum under Sextilius
Felix, who marched through Raetia over the
Arlberg Pass, and so by Feldkirch to the Lake
of Constance and the Rhine. A special picked
squadron of cavalry of mixed nationality, called
the ala Singularium, also joined the army here.
Significantly enough, it was commanded by Civilis'
own nephew, Julius Briganticus, whose hatred of
his uncle was cordially felt in return by him. This
army under Cerialis was to march at once down-
stream on Mainz and Lower Germany. Meanwhile
the greater part of the troops, diverted over the
other two passes to the valley of the Rhone, was to
march up that river upon the hostile Gallic tribe of
the Lingones. These subdued, this army under
Gallus could either threaten the Treveri on their
rear and thus secure Cerialis from their attack, or,
if Cerialis, operating from the Rhine, had already
received their submission, could march by Besancon
for the Upper Province to complete the work in
that district which Cerialis, pressing ever north-
wards, had left unfinished.2
1 Tacitus' unfinished MS. tells us nothing of this. See below, p. 315.
2 This is the strategy, I think, to be deduced from the very fragmentary
hints in Tacitus' narrative. It is clear that the Lingones had to be subdued,
and, from Frontinus, Strat. iv. 3. 14, that they were actually so subdued.
294 REBELLION ON THE RHINE ch. m
B. The Struggle with the Treveri. — While this
Roman army was gathering to reap the harvest of
vengeance, all was confusion and dissension in the
rebel ranks. The insurgents had not even to
wait for the coming of the Romans to suffer
their first reverse. The Lingones under Sabinus
attacked their neighbours the Sequani and were
rudely repulsed. This first blow to Gallic Unity,1
added to the rumours of the approach of the
new Roman army, caused the feeling in Gaul
to change. The new movement was speedily
voiced in a great Gallic Council, which itself was
called together by the Remi, the tribe inhabiting
the region between the rivers Marne and Aisne,
a folk long since notorious for its loyalty to the
Romans. The Council voted for submission and
When, however, this happened is uncertain, but that it befell early, and at
Gallus' hands in co-operation with Cerialis' advance north, seems to me
probable. For the army destined for the Lower Rhine must hasten forward
as speedily as possible, but must not have its advance endangered on its left
rear. If Cerialis and not Gallus subdued the Treveri in the Moselle valley,
this was due to the facts, probably, that the Lingones gave Gallus some
trouble, that the Treveri were cut off from the Lingones by the Mediomatrici
higher up the valley (cf. below), and turned their whole attention, therefore,
to the Rhine, and that, therefore, Cerialis could not afford to advance upon
the Germans leaving his rear endangered by them. It is a great pity that
even the Tacitean account of Gallus' operations is not preserved to us.
At Mirebeau-sur-Beze, thirteen miles north-east of Dijon, and so in the
Lingones' land, were recently found building tiles stamped Vexilla legionum,
with marks of the legions I. VIII. XL XIV. XXI. Mommsen-a/.
Hermes, xix. pp. 437-441 — regarded this as evidence of a reserve depot built
by the detachments of these legions during their advance to the north in this
year a.d. 70. But there are difficulties in the way of this view, e.g. the
presence of vexilla of XIV. and XXI. — for XIV. as a whole has not yet
arrived from Britain (cf. iv. 79), and XXI. is only heard of as being,
apparently as a whole, at Vindonissa. Ritterling (op. cit. pp. 1 16-120),
followed by Hardy (op. cit. p. 215), therefore refers these tegulae to the
muster of the Upper German army for Domitian's war against the Chatti in
A.D. 83, or against the rebel Antonius Saturninus five years later. Probably,
therefore, they are not to be connected with the strategy of a.d. 70 or the
reduction of the Lingones, though the idea is a tempting one.
1 " Sequanorum prospera acie belli impetus stetit," Tac. iv. 67.
src. vi REBELLION ON THE RHINE 295
peace. Old inter-tribal animosities determined the
vote. Only Treveri and Lingones refused com-
pliance, and their warriors still remained in the
field. But, even so, no concerted action was taken
by the three chief rebel leaders — Civilis of the
Germans, Classicus and Tutor of the Gauls. Their
preparations to meet the coming attack were scanty
and inadequate. To Tutor the task of blocking the
Alpine passes does seem to have been entrusted ;
but he left them serenely alone, and the Romans
had no difficulty in crossing any one of them.
Civilis went gaily hunting after the slippery fugitive
Labeo, who lightly baffled all his efforts to catch
him. Classicus peacefully rested upon his uncertain
laurels.1
Such efforts at defence, however, as Tutor made
succeeded in collecting a considerable army com-
posed not only of the Treveri with infantry and
cavalry of the sometime Roman army, but also of
new levies furnished by three small tribes — the
Triboci in Lower Alsace, the Vangiones in the
district of Worms, and the Caeracates.2 With this
force Tutor at first showed some activity. Sextilius
Felix was in command of the advance guard of
Cerialis' army, and sent forward one auxiliary cohort
to reconnoitre on the march from Vindonissa. This
cohort came into touch with Tutor's men and was
destroyed. But on the advance of the Roman army
in strength, the Gaul's force melted away rapidly.
1 Tac. iv. 67-70.
2 A tribe not elsewhere mentioned, but perhaps situated on the left bank
of the Rhine behind Mainz.
296 REBELLION ON THE RHINE
The former veterans of the Roman army returned
promptly to their old allegiance, and the native
soldiers of the three tribes followed them over into
the Roman camp. Tutor was left with none but
the Treveri to obey him. He was therefore forced
to fall rapidly back before the Roman advance,
and, avoiding Mainz, now garrisoned by the ala
Picentina which wished him no good,1 he retreated
to the northern bank of the river Nava, where he
hoped to be able to make a stand. This small
stream, the modern Nahe, flows into the Rhine
between the townships to-day of Bingen on its
right and Bingerbrtick on its left bank. At the
latter was the Roman town of Bingium, and the
road from Mainz northwards crossed the Nahe by
a bridge to the town. This bridge was destroyed
by the Gauls who lined the farther bank to frustrate
the Romans' passage of the stream.2 But Felix,
on arriving opposite the enemy's position, was not
long baffled. A deserter showed him a ford, and
Tutor's men were driven from their position.
Tutor fled, and the tribesmen were scattered and
sorely dismayed.
By this time Cerialis himself had arrived with
the legionary army at Mainz. Evidently distrusting
his Gallic auxiliaries, he dismissed them to their
homes, saying to them briefly that a war undertaken
by Roman troops needed no help from them, but
was as good as ended already. The Gauls retired
1 See above, pp. 2S9-290.
2 This, as Heraeus says, must have contained more water in Roman days
than it does to-day.
secvi REBELLION ON THE RHINE 297
both thankfully and humbly — " proniores ad officia
quod spernebantur." 1 Cerialis' action was not the
result of disdainful self-confidence, but rather of
great wisdom and insight into the native character.
After the recent disasters which had befallen Roman
troops on the Rhine, it was good policy for the
new general to openly assure the Gauls, by word
and deed, that even they were not indispensable.
British officers have before now used similar methods
with native troops, and with good results.
At Mainz, Cerialis quickly decided that his next
step must be the reduction of the Treveri in the
Moselle valley. Eager as he was to penetrate to
the heart of the mutiny in Lower Germany, he
could not advance beyond Coblenz, where the
Moselle enters the Rhine, unless he had secured
himself from attack on the rear by these most
troublesome Gauls. . Gallus was engaged to the
south of them with their allies the Lingones. The
Treveri could not at once be left to him. The
time had come to make an end of their resistance.
Already they were isolated from help. The traitor
legionaries of the First and Sixteenth legions who
had been sent to their capital city, now Treves,
had felt the prick of repentance as soon as the
Roman army had forced the passage of the Nahe.
They solemnly administered to themselves the oath
of loyalty to Vespasian, and, though at once the
boy rebel-leader Valentinus hurried to the town,
they remained defiant of him, and marched away
up-stream to the friendly folk of the Mediomatrici,
1 Tac. iv. 71.
293 REBELLION ON THE RHINE ch.hi
centred round the modern Metz. Here they halted
and waited cautiously on the development of events.
To Valentinus and to Tutor, who, after his defeat,
had found his way also to Treves, was left only the
melancholy pleasure of butchering in cold blood the
two captive legates of the legions. So Freedom
was justified of her barbarian children.
The Treveri now prepared for resistance to the
last, being greatly encouraged by Valentinus' youth-
ful energy and raging. The road to their capital
city left the Rhine north of the inflow of the Nahe,
and crossed undulating country to the Moselle
below Neumagen. Thence it ran to Treves, keep-
ing on the right bank of the river. From Bingen
to Treves the distance is some seventy miles.
Cerialis would doubtless advance by this road.
His intention to attack them was soon discovered
by the tribe. Valentinus, therefore, and his army
moved out of the capital six miles down-streamf
where they took up and fortified a position at
Rigodulum, the modern hamlet of Riol, on rising
ground overlooking the Moselle. Encamped here,
they covered the approach to their city. Here,
therefore, Valentinus waited for Cerialis' coming.
The other rebel leaders, Civilis and Classicus,
on hearing of Tutor's defeat at Bingium, had
joined forces, and now sent to Treves bidding
Valentinus not to fight. It is possible that their
plan was to evacuate the valley of the Moselle and
to draw the soldiers of the Treveri north to join
their own main army. If this was their intention,
it failed, — partly owing to the natural reluctance of
skc.v, REBELLION ON THE RHINE 299
the tribesmen to surrender their homes to the
enemy ; partly, perhaps, because the boy leader
scorned the counsel of the older men ; partly by
reason of Cerialis' rapidity of movement. This
general having once decided upon a short campaign
against the Treveri, wasted no time. In three days
he marched his men sixty miles up the Moselle,
and was upon the native army.
There was but little spirit left in the tribesmen,
and they made but a feeble defence of the position
at Riol. The hill had the Moselle on its left, and
the brook of the Fellerbach circling round its rear.
Its crest was lined by the defenders. The position
mav be sketched as follows : —
To Coblenz
'cselle R 1 r e~ _
— ;^^«»™">^ ^-^ Lines of attack by
%■* 1i ^^^Roman infantry
^-Crqman^ caualrgjidvapji8.'-'
While the Roman cavalry were sent round the
hill by the slopes between its crest and the brook,
the infantry were launched in a frontal attack up
hill against the foe. They stormed it with vigour
and success, and Valentinus' army was hurled, a
routed mass of fugitives, down the further slope
upon the cavalry waiting to receive them and hew
them down. They went down the hill, says the
Roman historian, like a house falling.1 Valentinus
1 " Ruinae modo. "
3oo REBELLION ON THE RHINE ch. m
himself was taken prisoner, but Tutor, if he ever
took a part in the defence, escaped. Next day
Cerialis entered Treves unopposed. There he was
presently met by the repentant legionaries from
Metz. He had sent for these to co-operate with
him in his attack on the Treveri by advancing
upon the tribesmen's rear. They arrived, however,
too late to take any part in the engagement at Riol.
They were pardoned by the general, and received
into his army. The Treveri also, and such of the
Lingones as were with them,1 made their formal
submission, which was accepted, and no further
penalty was imposed on them. The Roman
general prepared to stay for some days in the
town, until reinforcements should reach him and
enable him to essay the last and most perilous part
of the campaign by moving against the Germans.
Meanwhile he busied himself in receiving the
tribes' submission, and in speech -making. All
seemed safe on the Moselle, but in fact was far
from being so.2
For while the Roman army lay resting in the
town by the river, on the hills to the north of it
the tribesmen were gathering in great numbers.
Civilis and Classicus themselves had hastened
towards the town, and Tutor joined them. Lin-
gones and Batavians, Ubii and Tencteri and Bruc-
teri, all were massing together under shelter of the
1 This and iv. 77 are the only mentions of the Lingones in connection
with the whole campaign against the Treveri. It does not seem at all
probable that the whole tribe was engaged in the defence of their allies'
capital. But again we cannot be certain of anything about them in the
absence of information about Gallus' movements.
2 Tac. iv. 70-74.
secv. REBELLION ON THE RHINE 301
friendly hills. A great storm was preparing to
sweep down upon the valley which reposed at last
so peacefully beneath.
This news of the gathering of the tribes reached
Cerialis in due course, and roused him from his sense
of security. Ov yap \6yots irvpyovrat tt6\i<;. At once
he issued orders that the legionaries should fortify
their camp at Treves. The general, says the Roman
historian, was blamed by many for allowing the
natives to collect together on the hills undisturbed.
But only the sending out of flying columns could have
hindered this, and this method not only demanded
more men than Cerialis had as yet at his disposal,
but it also was far too dangerous ; for such
columns might easily have been entrapped and cut
to pieces among the hills by the swift tribesmen.
No blame attaches to the Roman on this account ;
but he can hardly escape censure for his serious
failure to appreciate beforehand the suddenness and
ferocity of that favourite Gallic device, a surprise. /-
The city of Treves, Colonia Augusta Treverorum,
was founded as a Roman town perhaps by Augustus,
and owed its colonial status to the Emperor
Claudius. It lay on the right bank of the Moselle.
Its Roman remains, covered some of them with
creepers and greenery, far surpass in beauty those of
any other Roman town in Europe whose picturesque-
ness has been spoilt for ever by the excavator's
spade. These, however, date to a later time than the
first century of our era. But still to the spectator,
standing on the vine-clad hills to the north-west of
the city, and looking down on its towers and rose-
302 REBELLION ON THE RHINE ch. m
red walls in the rich plain at his feet, where one
busy bridge spans the rapid river, it is easy to see
again the little slumbering settlement, the Roman
bridge, the camp of the Roman army on the left
bank beyond the bridge, the drowsy sentinels,
hardly aware that dawn is already breaking on
the surrounding hills, and the wild onrush of the
Gauls, striking their last blow in history for
freedom from the Roman. The enemy rushed to
the assault in triple column. The Batavians came
swarming down from the heights which overhung
the camp on north and west ; Ubii and Lingones
hastened up the road which led from the camp
northwards down the river's left bank ; Bructeri
and Tencteri rushed through the gap left between
road and river. A sketch may serve to illustrate
the onslaught : —
On the night of the attack Cerialis was sleeping,
not, as was his duty, in the general's quarters in
centre of the camp, but in the town. The sentries,
Sec. vi REBELLION ON THE RHINE 303
probably on that account, were the more careless.
The enemy were upon them and over the ramparts
before any alarm was given. Then, as at the
surprise of Gelduba, followed a scene of wild con-
fusion, slaughter, and plunder. The legionaries
fought desperately enough in little knots of men,
and their officers sought to cheer them on to a
stout resistance. But their exultant and agile foes
rushed through the camp and seized the bridge,
driving over it a mob of terrified fugitives. At the
town end of the bridge their general met them.
Hastily roused from sleep, Cerialis had hastened to
the noise of the fighting, and now played verily the
man. To rally some of the fleeing, and with them
make a fierce attack on the bridge, was the work
of a moment. The bridge was retaken, and the
general, at the head of such troops as he could
muster, crossed it to the camp. His coming saved
the day, by that time well-nigh lost. His entreaties
and rebukes, his energy, as he hastened from post
to post reckless of his life, restored discipline and
courage to the legionaries. The steadiness of the
Twenty-first legion shamed the wavering men of
the two unlucky traitor legions, but newly restored
to the rank of Roman soldiers. The Germans and
Gauls, thinking that the victory was won, were
already scattered far and wide through the camp,
gleefully gathering up the spoil. But their chief
spoil that day was the saving of their lives — by
the few who at the last escaped back over the ram-
parts to the hills, leaving the camp strewn thick
with the bodies of their slain. Treves and the
304 REBELLION ON THE RHINE ch.ih
Roman army were saved. That same day the
enemy's camp on the heights was stormed, and the
foe melted away to the north. Civilis, Tutor, and
Classicus saved themselves by flight. A handful
of the leading men of the Treveri1 still followed
their leaders' fortunes. But the resistance of this
tribe was now finally at an end.2
C. The Advance to Cologne. — But Cerialis could
not tarry longer at Treves. He and his army were
needed urgently at Cologne, and it was now safe
for him to continue his advance down the Rhine
towards that city. Its inhabitants, the " Agrippi-
nenses," easily the most cultured and Romanised of
all the Germans on the river, had remained loyal to
the Roman cause so long as they dared, and their
city had hardly escaped destruction at the hands
of the angry Germans across the Rhine in their
hour of victory. A timely recognition by the
Agrippinenses of facts and the humble answer which
turns away wrath had saved their city. But now
again the tide of German triumphs had turned and
was sweeping fast out to sea. The citizens were
eager to return to their old faith, and to propitiate
the wrathful Romans by a sweet-smelling sacrifice.
Twenty miles away to the south-west of Cologne,
at Tolbiacum, the modern ZiAlpich,3 Civilis had
placed in garrison one of his most warlike and
valued cohorts, of Chauci and Frisii combined.
Now, fresh from the scene of his bitter defeat at
1 Tacitus is careful to give a most precise number, viz. 1 13 ! (v. 19).
2 Tac. iv. 75-78.
3 Famous later for the defeat here in a.d. 496 of the Alemanni by the
Franks, and Clovis' consequent conversion to Christianity.
sec.v! REBELLION ON THE RHINE 305
Treves, the German leader, sore and angry, was
hurrying towards Cologne, where his own wife and
sister, together with Classicus' daughter, had been
left as pledges of the alliance. The anxious citizens
resolved to carry out at once their desperate resolu-
tion. The unsuspecting Germans, scattered through
the houses in the city, were massacred. The
famous cohort at Ziilpich was invited to a banquet
and there largely entertained, while wine flowed
freely. As the guests lay buried in drunken
slumber, their hosts stole from the hall of feasting,
made fast the doors, and burnt the whole with
fire to the ground. Then the Agrippinenses sent
begging Cerialis to march instantly to their
succour, and save them from the vengeance of
Civilis.
By forced marches the Roman general out-
stripped the Germans and reached the town in
time. Civilis, at the bitter news, turned aside, and
retreated northwards, sorrowing for his lost cohort.
But though Gaul was also lost to him, though his
women-folk were prisoners in the Romans' hands,
the courage of the rebel general never failed him.
The Gauls must be let make their peace with the
foe. The Treveri and Lingones had at last been
quelled. The Nervii and their German neighbours,
the Tungri, followed the example ; for the Four-
teenth legion, landing at Boulogne from Britain,
marched through the territory of these tribes on its
way to the Rhine, and scared them into submission.
Yet for all this Civilis was not moved. Still he had
his Germans, Batavians, and Cannenefates left to
x
306 REBELLION ON THE RHINE CH. m
him. With these he had begun the revolt. With
these he had driven the Romans from the Rhine.
With these he would yet maintain his cause. A
couple of small reverses soon " spoilt the fame of
the victory " at Treves, and showed to Cerialis that
the Germans were yet to be subdued. A small
Roman flotilla, known as the Classis Britannica,
which kept guard in the North Sea and Channel,
was attacked on the German coast by the Can-
nenefates and dispersed.1 And one of Cerialis'
advance squadrons of cavalry was cut to pieces by
Civilis at Novaesium. The Gallic bid for Empire
had failed ; but the German army mustered north
of Vetera still dauntless. There were mutineers
yet in arms, and Cerialis' hardest task lay before
him.2
§ 7. The Submission of the Germans3,
Cerialis found no difficulty in advancing from
Cologne down the Rhine until he came again to the
neighbourhood of Vetera, where Civilis had col-
lected together his largest possible army, intending
to make a resolute stand at this place. Both the
Roman and the German general had received re-
inforcements since they had met in their first
encounter at Treves. Cerialis' strength had
been more than doubled by the arrival of three
new legions — the Fourteenth from Britain, and the
1 Probably it had, as Mommsen suggests, just conveyed the Fourteenth
legion from Britain to Gaul.
2 Tac. iv. 79. Tacitus' narrative is now continued first in v. 14.
3 Tac. v. 14-26.
sec. vii REBELLION ON THE RHINE 307
Second Adjutrix with the Sixth Victrix from Spain.
Numerous auxiliary troops, both horse and foot,
were now added to the legionaries. Civilis had
persuaded men of the Cugerni and Transrhenane
tribes to join his banner. Germany was in the field
against Rome.
It was by this time autumn. The great river,
which in the preceding year had caused such trouble
to Vocula and the other Roman commanders by
its scanty stream and shallows,1 at this time
rolled a full flood to the sea, and the low ground
round Vetera was a great morass of mud and
swamp. In such ground for battle the lightly-armed
Germans delighted. Used to swimming from their
childhood up, strong-limbed and tall in stature, the
natives of the Lower Rhine had no fear of sudden
plunges into treacherous pools, of quaking ground,
or hurrying stream. But the short, sturdy legionary
of Rome, encumbered with heavy armour, and easily
lured in his ignorance on to treacherous ground,
fought but badly, because with little confidence, on
any but firm soil. Certainly the German river was
striving to help its children.
The spot first selected by Civilis in the neigh-
bourhood of Vetera on which to offer battle was
carefully chosen and prepared. Swampy by nature,
a dam cleverly thrown into the Rhine from the
bank had impeded the flow of the stream,
and added thereby to the depth of water on
the ground. The river was on one side of it — a
refuge for swimmers if they were driven off the
1 See above, p. 269.
3o8 REBELLION ON THE RHINE ch. m
field. And the memory of triumphs already won
at Vetera spurred the Germans on to emulate their
former deeds. The conflict, skilfully provoked by
the German and rashly accepted by the Roman,
ended in a bad reverse for the latter. The swamp
was like that road of historic fame in Virginia on
which the Federal officer, sent to reconnoitre it,
reported that the road was there, but " he guessed
the bottom had fallen out." Water and mud suc-
cessfully worsted Cerialis' struggling men, and for
the moment ill-fortune seemed again to haunt the
Romans on the Rhine. But the check was only
for a day. Next morning Cerialis renewed the
battle ; and, after a stubborn contest, a deserter
showed the cavalry a path by which they could
skirt the morass on firm ground and fall upon the
Germans' flank. This decided the battle, and the
enemy fled. But the Roman fleet, which Cerialis
had expected to appear to cut off the German flight
across the Rhine, did not come. The cavalry
pursuit was checked by heavy rain and nightfall.
And the Germans, therefore, made good their
retreat without serious loss.1
Civilis by this defeat was compelled to cross the
Waal into his last refuge, the " Island of the
Batavians."2 He therefore evacuated the Oppidum
Batavorum (which was built probably on the site
of Lohengrin's town, Cleve, some seven miles
1 This part of Tacitus' narrative is made both dull and unreal by a
number of invented speeches. Their pretty rhetorical tropes do but hinder
the military narrative, and I omit them all.
2 For the whole of the following narrative, the plan of the " Island " on
p. 233 must be consulted.
sec. vn REBELLION ON THE RHINE 309
south-east of the parting of the channels), carried off
all that he could from it, and burnt it to the ground.
To add to the security of his position in the island,
he destroyed Drusus' mole, and thus diverted the
greater bulk of the waters of the Rhine from its
northern arm, the Lek, into its southern, the Waal.1
The Romans, he judged, had not enough vessels
to bridge the greatly swollen waters of the latter
channel, and his own communications over the
shallow northern branch with his friends beyond
were made both safe and easy. Once in the Island,
though driven back like a hunted beast to its lair,
he turned savagely and stood at bay. Now, too,
the Chauci sent him men besides to help him in the
defence of his " Island " home.
Cerialis and his army ~ pushing northwards found
themselves stopped by the Waal. There was no
help for it. The river must be bridged before they
could get to grips with the foe. And the year was
growing old ; the river, swollen by autumnal rains,
was rising ever higher. There seemed little pro-
mise of a speedy finish. Cerialis distributed his
army along the southern bank of the river ; sent
emphatic messages bidding- the tardy fleet come at
once to his help ; and ordered the winter quarters
for the troops to be rebuilt at Novaesium and
Bonn.3 His main army was divided between four
camps on the Waal. The two eastern camps were
1 See above, pp. 236-237.
2 Leg. X. Gemina from Spain now takes the place of Leg. XIV. sent to
Upper Germany. See note on p. 292.
:! Destroyed, after their victory over Vocula, by the Germans in the pre-
vious year.
310 REBELLION ON THE RHINE ch.hi
allotted to the legionaries. These were Arenacum,
given to the Tenth legion, which perhaps was
situated at Ryndern by Cleve ; and Batavodurum,
the camp of the Second legion, almost certainly
at Nymwegen. Here, too, the soldiers began to
attempt the building of a bridge.1 The auxiliaries'
camps were at Grinnes and Vada, but these places
cannot now be identified.
The river, however embarrassing it might be to
the Romans, was small obstacle to the movements
of Batavians. The fourfold distribution of the
Roman army seemed to give to Civilis a notable
opportunity of a simultaneous attack upon all four
camps. The Germans sallied out over the Waal,
and fell at one and the same time upon them all,
but not with equal vigour. The legionaries had
little trouble in driving off the assailants. But
Grinnes and Vada were attacked with great deter-
mination, and it was not until the Roman com-
mander-in-chief himself came to his hard-pressed
auxiliaries' help at the head of a picked troop of
horse that the Germans were forced here also to
fall back again over the river. By evening the
enemy had all again crossed the Waal, swimming
or by boats, and the attempted surprise had this
time failed.
1 It is abundantly clear at least that all four camps were south of the
Waal. The proposed identifications, therefore, of Arenacum with Arnhem,
and Batavodurum with Wyk-by-Durstede are quite impossible, as both
Arnhem and Wyk are on the Lek. At Nymwegen there are to-day a
railway bridge and also a swing-bridge. I have not found on the map
another bridge over the Waal between it and Bommel, thirty odd miles to
the west. If, however, Noviomagus is identified, as is usually the case,
with Nymwegen, Batavodurum must be sought elsewhere.
sec. vii REBELLION ON THE RHINE 311
But the Romans could do very little without
their fleet. Cerialis, therefore, left the army, and
journeyed up-stream to look for it and to super-
intend the building of the camps at Novaesium and
Bonn. The Roman historian gives a number of
reasons to explain the fleet's delay. The sailors
were afraid ; they were employed elsewhere ; they
had not been given time enough in which to arrive.
One of these three explanations would have been
enough. The effect of the three combined is
somewhat ludicrous. But Cerialis did manage to
discover his navy, and brought it back with him
rejoicing. His was a short-lived joy. It happened
on a night black with clouds that Cerialis and his
escort were encamped beside the river on the
return journey. The ships, the object of his toils,
lay moored in the stream beside the camp. The
sentries gazed sleepily out into the night. The
general was not on the admiral's galley, where
his ensign flew, but dallying, so scandal said, on
shore with a native woman. A band of Germans
silently crossed the river a short way above the
camp, and stole down beneath the ramparts. The
sentries noticed nothing, and the foe clambered
quietly over the defences. In a moment the sleep-
ing troops found their tents falling upon their heads.
The Germans had cut the ropes. Then hideous
and ferocious cries rent the stillness of the night,
as the natives fell with joy to slaughtering the
Romans, recumbent and struggling beneath the
fallen canvas, or emerging bewildered and half-
naked into the open. Others of the foe, coming in
312 REBELLION ON THE RHINE ch.hi
boats down-stream, hurled grappling-hooks aboard
the ships and towed them away.
Their chief triumph was the capture of the
general's ship and ensign. The squall had been a
sharp one, and had broken with fury over the hap-
less Romans. Then it passed away. The Germans
vanished. The Romans were left to straighten
their disordered camp and peg their tents again.
But when morning broke, the angry and mortified
legionaries, gazing disconsolately out over the river,
saw their own ships, crowded with the laughing foe,
moving over to the opposite bank. Only the flag-
ship was not there : it was being towed up the
Lippe river,1 yet another offering to Veleda, the
maiden prophetess. But to the Germans' grief,
they had found no Cerialis asleep on board the
ship.
Autumn was passing into winter, and no progress
had of late been made. The Waal still rolled
between. Civilis, exulting in his new-won ships,
thought the time come for a naval display. In the
broad channel of the Maas, hard by the modern
Rotterdam,2 he gathered together all his motley
crowd of vessels, gay with every kind of bunting
and parti-coloured sails. A favouring breeze sent
them merrily up-stream, until they hove in view of
Cerialis and his astonished men. The Roman was
not to be outdone. He had collected other craft,
1 The Lippe flows into the Rhine at Wesel, a few miles above Xanten.
2 The review is held in a "spatium velut aequoris electum, quo Mosae
fluminis os amnem Rhenum Oceano adfundit." The broadest part of the
Maas would be that where the De Noord channel enters the Lek above
Rotterdam. From this point to the sea the Lek takes the name of the Maas.
sbc. vn REBELLION ON THE RHINE 313
and still had the remnants of his former fleet which
had escaped the grappling-hooks. His pilots, too,
were now experienced men. The Roman fleet
therefore put out from the shore, and drifted
slowly, with sails furled, down the stream to meet
the advancing foe. Each gallant fleet passed the
other, moving in column of line ahead. As they
sailed by a few missiles flew between. And there
ended the last great naval engagement of the
war.
Heavy rain had fallen, and the campaigning
season in those inclement barbarian northern wilds
was fast drawing to a close. Even Civilis must
have found his position in the Island uncomfortably
damp. For he quietly evacuated it, and drew all
his men with him over the Rhine } to the northern
bank. Then at last Cerialis and his men struggled
over the Waal without resistance, and the Island,
so long the object of their patient striving, lay at
their mercy. Plunder was pleasant, but of a truth
the land was very damp. The entire Roman camp
bid fair to be washed for good and all away. And
now once more their errant fleet had lost itself.
Behind them the swollen waters of the Waal rolled
heavily seawards. Their position was uncomfort-
able.
So uncomfortable in fact was it that, in Tacitus'
opinion, a third onslaught by the Germans must
now have put an end once and for all time to
Cerialis and his men, in which case the Yorkshire
wolds might have preserved their independence of
1 I.e. the Lek.
3i4 REBELLION ON THE RHINE ch.ih
Rome a few years longer.1 But now, for his part,
Civilis had had enough of war. For some eighteen
months he had led an enjoyably exciting life, pur-
suing and pursued, defeated and victorious, triumph-
ant and fugitive, faring now up, now down, the
valleys of the Moselle and the Rhine. He had won
fame, and, at least for a brief time, liberty from
Rome for himself and his tribe. But by this time
his own people showed signs of restiveness. The
Germans, too, across the Rhine were grumbling,
not liking the thought of having to support the
rebel army through the winter months. Messages
reached him from Cerialis offering life on submis-
sion, but full of threats if he refused compliance.
Even among Batavians there were traitors. Civilis
judged it more profitable to surrender than to be
surrendered to the Romans. His faithful Batavians
were quite capable of making a scapegoat of their
general. Civilis therefore sent word to Cerialis,
and a meeting was arranged between the two com-
manders, to take place on the river Nabalia.'2 A
bridge over the river was broken in the middle,
and at the two ends of the pieces left in place the
two opponents stood to exchange speeches and
arrange terms over the gap. But what thereafter
took place remains unknown to us. For Civilis
has hardly made a fair beginning of what was
1 Cerialis was Governor of Britain under Vespasian's principate from
A.i). 71-73. For his successful expeditions against the Brigantes cL Tacitus,
Agrnola, 17.
2 This river is nowhere else mentioned, and Tacitus, of course, gives no
clue which leads to any certain identification. It may have been the Lek,
or the Kromme Rhyn, or the New (or Guelders) Yssel. The last is the
favourite choice. See the plan on p. 233.
sec. vii REBELLION ON THE RHINE 315
doubtless to be, at least in Tacitus, a long excul-
patory harangue, than the text of the historian is,
like the bridge, abruptly broken off. And, with
this, Julius Civilis, the Batavian prince and rebel,
vanishes for ever from our ken. History speaks ot
him no more.
But the war in Lower Germany was certainly at
an end. Of that in Upper Germany, with which
Annius Gallus was entrusted, no record remains.
Gallus had four legions under his command, and
besides the reduction of the Lingones, of which a
Roman military writer makes one passing mention,1
the German tribes in the lower Main valley, who
had raided up to the walls of Mainz, merited
chastisement. If they did receive this it had
no very lasting effect, for the Emperor Domitian
thirteen years later found it necessary to conduct
a serious campaign against the most redoubtable
of these very offenders, the Chatti. But of any
military operations on the Upper Rhine in a.d. 70,
after the coming of Gallus, there exists no story.
Rome treated the rebels, both Gauls and
Germans, with politic mercy. Only submission
was demanded of them, and a return to their old
condition of subjection. The Batavians and
Cannenefates still paid no tribute. No Roman
tax-gatherer was to plague their soil. They must
continue to furnish troops to the Roman army as
had been their duty before the mutiny. And so
the German " honour " suffered no infringement.2
1 Frontinus, Strat. iv. 3. 14.
2 " Manet honos et antiquae societatis insigne,"' Tacitus, German in, 29.
316 REBELLION ON THE RHINE CH. tit
Rome had no desire for vengeance on the common
folk, in spite of the losses which she had suffered at
their hands. Veleda, the fierce prophetess maiden,
was indeed captured later and brought a prisoner
to Rome. But it is unlikely that she endured any
worse fate than to become a subject for mediocre
poets' verse.1
But Rome's attitude to some at least of the
tribal chieftains was sterner : for it was always
the ambition of such men, both in Gaul and
Germany, which was dangerous to the peace of
those lands and to her own supremacy. Cerealis
explained very clearly to the Treveri the reason of
Rome's presence on the Rhine. " We have not
planted ourselves upon the Rhine," the Roman
historian makes him declare, "to guard Italy, but
for fear lest some second Ariovistus should make
himself lord of the kingdom of the Gallic lands.
Men talk of liberty, and use other such specious
words. There was never a man, if he sought for
power and dominion for himself at cost of others'
slavery, who did not use such language. Should
we Romans ever be expelled, which may Heaven
avert ! what remains for all the world save a never-
ending war of nation against nation?"2 It was
true, every word of it. The right of Rome to
control Gaul and " Germany " was to this extent
precisely the same as our right to govern India
and its many peoples. The Pax Romana had to
be preserved upon the Rhine lest bloody war
should in due course, after long years of savage
' Statius, Silvae, i. 4. 90. See Note H, p. 352. - Tac. iv. 73, 74.
sec. vii REBELLION ON THE RHINE 317
horror, beget one chief as Tyrant. This reason had
made Julius Caesar in old days march his trembling
army against King Ariovistus the German.
Chieftain after chieftain in Gaul in the Caesarian
period between 59 b.c. and 50 B.C. had dreamt
this dream of lordship for himself. Vercingetorix
had all but made of the dream a waking vision.
Peril of disturbance from such ambition in Gaul or
Germany had haunted Tiberius, Caligula, Claudius,
Nero. In their last sore straits Civilis and
Classicus had even sent proffering Cerialis the
" Imperium Galliarum " ; 1 so strong and deep-
rooted has been the notion of kingship on the
Rhine.
Therefore, her honour at last splendidly vindi-
cated, and the mutiny finally quelled, Rome showed
mercy to the peoples ; but some at least of the
leaders of the revolt felt the power of her wrath.
Civilis almost certainly bargained for his life.
Classicus and Tutor are never heard of more. It
is idle to speculate upon their fate. But the boy
leader Valentinus, who had revived a dying cause,
was sent to Vespasian, and by him executed. -
And most significant of all was the fate of Julius
Sabinus of the Lingones. After his defeat by the
Sequani 3 he disappeared entirely from the Roman
sight. The house to which he had fled was shortly
afterwards burnt to the ground, and men commonly
thought that he had sought death for himself in
1 Unless, indeed, this offer was but a ruse to lull Cerialis into security at
Treves while the foe were gathering in the hills for their night attack on the
camp. Cerialis, of course, sent no answer to the offer (Tac. iv. 75).
- Tac. iv. 85. 3 See above, p. 294.
318 REBELLION ON THE RHINE ch.hi
the flames. But for nine long years, so runs the
romantic tale which impressed the imagination of
Greek and Roman writers, Sabinus lay hid with his
faithful wife Epponina in a secret cave. There she
gave birth to two boys, and the little lads grew up
with father and mother in their dark and gloomy
cavern. For nine years they were hidden. After
nine years they appealed to Vespasian for pardon.
After nine years the Emperor ordered their execu-
tion in cold blood, though he spared the boys. So
should we English have treated the villain Nana,
could we but have caught him. Sabinus' deeds
were no atrocities of a Nana, nor even of a Civilis.
But he had dared to call himself Caesar, and for
him there remained no mercy.1
§ 8. The Lessons of the Mutiny
Gauls, Germans, and Romans, all had learnt
lessons taught them by the great mutiny.
A. The Results in Gaul and Germany. — The
cause of the rebellion had been the natural aspira-
tion for freedom felt by all men worthy of the
name. This aspiration had been fed, in case of
the Gauls, by a century of striving for liberty, by
memories both new and old of risings and struggles
on its behalf; in case of the Germans subject to
Rome, by more recent recollections of independ-
ence, by the lively example of their kinsmen over
1 Tac. iv. 67 ; Dio, lxvi. 16 ; Plutarch, Amat. 25. Tacitus promises to
give the whole story when he comes to the year in question (i.e. A.D. 79) :
but this part of his work, if it was ever written, is of course lost to us.
Plutarch says that he was personally acquainted with one of the boys.
skcviii REBELLION ON THE RHINE 319
the Rhine who, once like themselves in servitude
to the Roman, had boldly struck for freedom, won
it, and retained it ; and by the harsh, careless, and
unjust treatment which they had endured at the
hands of the military agents of the Roman Govern-
ment. Moreover, there was not a race or people,
save the effeminate and worthless subjects of the
old Syrian monarchy, who, conquered by Rome,
had not at least once risen against their masters in
desperate rebellion before they had learnt to receive
and to enjoy the yet prouder and more ennobling
position of citizens of the Roman Empire. To
the Batavians their broad streams flowing to
the boundless unknown ocean, and their pathless
wastes, by themselves spoke of wide unfettered
liberty. They were not men tamely to bow their
necks beneath the yoke of alien domination, if so be
that they could break it and cast it off.
And never had so fair an opportunity been
given to both Gauls and Germans to strike a blow
for freedom as during these terrible months of Civil
War following on the death of Galba, when the
Empire, which subdued them and, as they said,
oppressed them, seemed rent utterly in pieces by
the fury of contending selfish factions. The mal-
contents indeed had not been men had they let
their chance pass unheeded.
But the great effort miserably failed. And no
like opportunity occurred again. Moreover, the
course of mutiny had shown the tribes their weak-
ness, while Rome at the end was wisely merciful,
and trampled neither on their lives nor on their
320 REBELLION ON THE RHINE
honour. The Imperial State remembered her
duty to her subjects, lessons learnt by her long
since in Italy and Spain and Macedonia, and now
taught to her again on the Rhine. The meanest
Roman henceforth who did outrage, were it but to
a child of the conquered peoples, was a greater and
more despicable traitor to his country than he who
risked his life in mutiny against her.
The war had proved that neither Gauls nor
Germans could for long combine in a national
war against the Roman. It was easy to preach
eloquently on nationalism ; it was impossible for
the nationalists to overcome for any length of time
the local jealousies which proved the ruin of the
movement to the end. Civilis, who openly dis-
claimed with patriotic indignation any desire on
part of Batavians or Treveri to rule any other
tribe, is found contemplating a war for this object
with calm confidence in the prospect of a German
victory.1 Civilis' own nephew fought fiercely to
the death against him.2 Tencteri hated Ubii ;
Ubii massacred Chauci and Frisii ; Sequani fought
Lingones.3 The Gallic tribes rose in the " hope of
liberty." But the desire for rule over their neigh-
bours was a more powerful, if more secret, motive
with them. There was to be " One Gallic Em-
pire." This, doubtless, was excellent. But whose
district should be chosen as the seat for that
Empire?4 Indeed this was an apple of discord
cast in upon the banquet of the victors by Mischief
1 Cf. Tac. iv. 61 with iv. 66. 2 Julius Briganticus, iv. 70; v. 21.
3 Tac. iv. 64, 67, 79. 4 Tac. iv. 25, 69.
sec.vui REBELLION ON THE RHINE 321
smiling. And most Gauls thought that Rome's
impartial if alien rule was better after all. And
therefore the mutiny of the years a.d. 69 and 70
was the last rising on behalf of independence which
affected Gaul or the German tribes on the Roman
side of the Lower Rhine. The page on which is
written the record of Gallic rebellion against the
Roman conqueror contains the history of a hundred
and twenty years. But now at last the leaf was
turned, and no story of Gallic self-sacrifice or
treason on behalf of liberty embellishes or sullies
the chapter any more. " This was the last blood
shed for the cause of ancient Gaul, the last act of
devotion to a social order, a government, a religion,
the return of which was neither possible nor
desirable." '
Whether a mutiny in the "native army" is
caused by " outward and accidental causes " or by
the " inner necessity of things" is a question likely
to be always debated. Some would still maintain
that there existed no such inner necessity for the
sepoy mutiny in India, and would perhaps still
point confidently to the " apparently complete
quiet " which has prevailed in the Indian army
since the Mutiny as proof of their contention.
In like manner the German historian ascribes
the Batavian mutiny to " outward and accidental
causes," and cites the peace prevailing after it upon
the Rhine as the evidence for his contention. Yet
surely it was no mock plea for liberty which called
1 Thierry, translated and quoted by Merivale, History of the Romans
under the Empire, vi. p. 527.
Y
322 REBELLION ON THE RHINE ch.hi
so many German tribes and peoples round Civilis'
standard, and made them faithful to their leader
well-nigh to the very last. We honour the bar-
barian and the mutineer too greatly if we ascribe
to him the pure feeling of passionate devotion to
an ideal such as sent thousands of Italy's sons
joyfully to the dungeon, to the gibbet, and to death
on the field, sixty years ago. Liberty to the
ancient German may have spelt little save revelling
in lust, in plunder, and in butchery. Therefore
civilised man applauds the victory of Rome, of
peace, order, government, and law. The barbarians'
temper was wild and passionate ; their deeds were
treacherous and foul ; their cruelty was savage.
Yet the seed which, when planted in so rude a soil,
sprang up a rank and poisonous growth, in kinder
and more congenial climes has borne the noblest
fruit which ever glorifies Man and marks him apart
from the brute. Not liberty, but the use men
make of it, is its sole justification. But the fierce
Batavian mutineer, the veriest German savage,
who dreamt perhaps vague dreams of freedom,
deserved indeed no victory, yet his merited failure
was not utterly barren of honour. In the history
of races as well as of individuals the child is father
of the man.
But the German children had learnt their lesson.
They were quick at least to see that petulance
brought punishment, and their manhood was not
yet. Though we may venture to think their rising
due to other causes besides those of the recruiting
officer and the happiest of opportunities, yet for its
sec. v.., REBELLION ON THE RHINE 323
issue it is enough to cite the same historian's
words : " The Roman Germans were merged in the
Empire no less completely than the Roman Gauls ;
of attempts at insurrection on the part of the former
there is no further mention. At the close of the
third century the Franks, invading Gaul by way of
the Lower Rhine, included in their seizure the
Batavian territory. Yet the Batavians maintained
themselves in their old, though diminished, settle-
ments, as did likewise the Frisians, even during
the confusions of the great migrations of peoples,
and so far as we know, preserved allegiance even
to the decaying Empire as a whole." :
B. The Results hi the Ro?nan Army. — The
Roman Government showed that it too had learnt
lessons from the mutiny in its treatment of both
the legions and the auxiliary forces on the Rhine.
(1) The Legions. — The outbreak of the mutiny
had revealed serious defects in the prevailing system
of "clan-regiments," taken from the native tribes
to serve as auxiliaries in the Roman army, when at
least these were stationed in the country of their
birth. The rapidity of the spread of the movement,
the feeble resistance to it offered by, and even
the mutinous tendencies shown in, the regular
legionary regiments along the whole course of the
river, made manifest that some defect of organisa-
tion existed also in this, the more important, branch
of the Roman Imperial military system.
It seemed evident that the legions on the Rhine
in a.d. 69 were tainted with native German sym-
1 Mommsen.
324 REBELLION ON THE RHINE ch.im
pathies. This pointed to the fact that the recruit-
ing system was to blame. The Emperor Augustus
had sought to establish the general practice that
recruits for legions serving in the western part of
the Empire should be drawn from the eastern
provinces, and that legions on duty in the latter
should be recruited from the west. The principle
was the same as that in the modern Kingdom
of Italy, where Lombard and Tuscan regiments
tend to be quartered in the south, Sicilian and
Calabrese in the north of the peninsula. By
such means the army itself becomes a means of
promoting unity and unification. Moreover, in
the event of a disturbance, the troops on the spot
are more likely to be utterly true to their military
discipline because they do not share in, or perhaps
even realise, local feelings and aspirations. But
to combine this sound principle of recruiting with
the equally wise system of permanent military
camps upon the frontiers of the Empire was
proving a very hard task for the Government.
These camps, again devised by the extraordinary
foresight of Augustus, were invaluable to the peace
of the Empire, the popularity of the army, the
prosperity of the provinces, and the Romanisation
of the outlying districts of the Empire and the
tribes beyond its limits. But as time went on,
and the children of the legions grew to manhood,
the regiment, stationed for years together at the
same frontier camp, could not but gather its
recruits from the sons of its soldiers, many of whom
married the women of the district, and from the
skc.vii. REBELLION ON THE RHINE 325
native auxiliaries serving side by side with them.
The result was that Augustus' principle of recruiting
was not to be reconciled with, and had to yield to,
his system of permanent cantonments. And hence
a legion and a locality became identified so closely
that the interests and hopes of the latter became
those of the former. To the Roman Empire the
introduction of the territorial system into the army
had grave disadvantages.
The six legions engaged at first in the German
rising of a.d. 69 were the First, Fourth, Sixteenth,
and Twenty-second, whose men proved mutinous
and treacherous, the Fifth Alaudae and Fifteenth
Primigenia, some of whose men at least fought
most gallantly and died for Rome. Of these six
legions it appears that the First had been in Lower
Germany, the Sixteenth in Upper Germany, since
the days of Augustus ; the Fourth and Twenty-
second since a.d. 43. Thus the leaven of local
sympathy had had time to work with these men.
It is true that the Fifth legion Alaudae had also
been in Lower Germany since Augustus' time,
save for a passing excursion to Britain under
Claudius. But this regiment had great traditions
of bitter fighting with the Germans, in former days
under Lollius, and recently under Corbulo. The
small heroic vexillum left behind at Vetera when
the bulk of the legion marched for the Vitellian
cause to Italy was, therefore, proud to preserve its
regimental tradition. Its comrades of the Fifteenth
legion were probably swayed by the example of
the men of the Fifth who were in garrison with
326 REBELLION ON THE RHINE ch.hi
them. It is possible, too, that the Fifteenth legion
was but newly raised, and had been but a few years
in Germany, so that its loyalty in this case would
be a striking illustration (from opposites) of the
thesis advanced above that the mutinous tendencies
might be produced by a long stay in Germany. If,
however, this legion also had been in the country
since a.d. 43, as some suppose, the loyalty of their
comrades must be held responsible for the bravery
of its own soldiers.1
When the revolt was ended, and the new
Emperor, Vespasian, dealt with the question of
the garrison of the Rhine, he made sweeping
changes in its composition. So shrewd a soldier
as was this sagacious Prince might approve the
pardon granted by his general to the mutineers
who repented, but their regiments had stained their
reputation beyond forgiveness. Vespasian promptly
struck three of the " traitor legions " from the roll
of the army. The First, the Fourth Macedonica,
and Sixteenth Gallica ceased henceforth to exist.
The place of the last two in the army list was
taken by two new legions, the Fourth Flavia
firma, and the Sixteenth Flavia felix. In the year
a.d. 82 a third new legion was also added, the
1 Legio XV. Primigenia seems to make its first appearance in Tacitus,
Histories, i. 55, a.d. 69. Pfitzner thinks it was created in a.d. 62 ;
Grotefend, that both XV. Primigenia and XXII. Primigenia were created
as separate from the two legions, XV. Apollinaris and XXII. Ueiotariana,
on the occasion of the invasion of Britain in a.d. 43. The name Primigenia
implies "first existing"; i.e. when a legion was duplicated, the part which
retained the old eagle was Primigenia ; the other legion of the same number
received a new eagle and retained the old distinctive title. But there are
other explanations of the title, for which see Pfitzner, Geschichte der rom.
Kaiser-legionen, p. 8.
sFx.vm REBELLION ON THE RHINE 327
First Flavia Minervia pia fidelis, and was encamped
at Bonn, where it still lay as late as the year
a.d. 295. 1 Only the Twenty-second legion of the
four disgraced regiments was spared, and kept still in
the country in camp at Vetera from a.d. 71 to a.d. 90.2
Vespasian's reasons for such a difference of treat-
ment between this regiment and its three partners
in dishonour are not preserved to us.
Some uncertainty attaches to the fate of the
two loyal legions, the Fifth and the Fifteenth. It
is quite possible that these were also both dis-
banded.3 If so, Vespasian had evidently deter-
mined to make an almost entirely clean sweep of
the regiments of the former garrison of the Rhine.
It is, however, a greater pleasure to suppose that
the proud and valiant Fifth did continue to exist,
and sealed its long services to the Empire on the
dire field of battle in Moesia against the Sarmatians
about a.d. 92, perishing there to the last man.4
One fact at least is certain — that the garrison
of the Rhine after a.d. 71 was, with the two excep-
tions of the Twenty-first and Twenty-second legions,
1 Cf. Dio, lv. 24, 3 ; Ruggiero, Dizionario Epigrafico, ii. p. 513;
Ritterling, W.-D. Zeitschrift, xii. 3, p. 234.
2 Tiles and tombstones of the legionaries of XXII. are found at Xanten and
Nymwegen, without the addition of pia fidelis to the name of the legion which
it subsequently gained. Cf. Brambach, C.I.R. ; Weichert, W.-D. Zeitschrift,
1902 ; Ritterling, ibid. xii. 3, p. 230; Diz. Epig. ii. p. 514 ; Hardy, Studies,
p. 2IO sqq.
3 This is Mommsen's view. For a discussion of the question cf. Hardy,
Studies, p. 213, note.
4 The legion destroyed by the Sarmatians (cf. Suetonius, Domitian, 6)
has been supposed to be either V. Alaudae or XXI. Rapax. So Riese in
the Diz. Epigrafico, ii. p. 514, believes it to have been the latter. Ritter-
ling (IV.-D. Zeitschrift, xii. 3, p. 234) believes that V. Alaudae did continue
to exist, but was destroyed under Domitian by the Dacians, while XXI.
endured this fate at the hands of the Sarmatians a few years later.
328 REBELLION ON THE RHINE ch.hi
composed of entirely different regiments from those
which had hitherto been encamped on the river.1
In both Lower and Upper Germany there were
again four legions. In the former district Legio
X. Gemina was stationed at Noviomagus (possibly
Nymwegen2); XXII. Primigenia at Vetera (by
Xanten) ; VI. Victrix at Novaesium, till about
a.d. 105, when it was moved to Vetera to take the
place of the Twenty-second; and XXI. Rapax at
Bonn up to a.d. 82, when it was moved to Mainz,
and its place at Bonn was taken by the new legion,
I. Flavia Minervia. This allotment of the legions
shows that Vespasian thought it desirable to keep
one legion in immediate touch with the Batavian
land (at Nymwegen ?), whereas hitherto there had
been no legionary camp on the river lower down
than Vetera. In Upper Germany, Legions I.
Adjutrix and XIV. Gemina were encamped together
at Mainz, the defences there being strengthened ;
XI. Claudia was stationed at Vindonissa ; and,
in between the two places, VIII. Augusta was
stationed at Strassburg (Argentoratum), a camp
which had not been occupied since its legion, the
Second Augusta, had been sent to Britain in, or
perhaps before, a.d. 43. 3
In the system of recruiting for the legions
Vespasian is not known to have made any change.
1 But Legio XXL, usually in garrison at Vindonissa, had been absent at
the time of the mutiny.
2 See note above, p. 310.
3 For these legionary arrangements in Germany, cf. Riese, ap. Kuggiero,
Diz. Epigrafuo, sub voc. " Germania," vol. ii. pp. 513, 514. One recently
found tile of Legio II. at Strassburg is said to be earlier than a.d. 43
(IVestd. Zeit. 1905, p. 330).
sKc.vm REBELLION ON THE RHINE 329
No change, in fact, seemed possible. Neither were
the legions shifted at short intervals from camp
to camp, or summoned away save when urgent
wars elsewhere made demands on the Rhine army.
For the loyalty of that army Vespasian must have
relied on the change of regiments for the immediate
present, and, for the future, on the absence of such
local discontent as had excited the sympathy of the
former Vitellian army. He was not disappointed
in his trust, and the legions on the Rhine gave him
no cause of concern. Thus, after all, Augustus'
system of permanent camps was justified.
(2) The Auxilia. — The practice of using clan-
regiments of auxiliaries in their native country had
proved disastrous during the mutiny. Doubtless it
had had the effect of popularising this branch of
the service and of making recruits easy to obtain.
In the case also of war in the adjoining districts
such regiments might be expected to be well
acquainted with the enemy's methods of fighting
and the ground, and could obtain information and
supplies far more easily from the country than could
auxiliaries who were aliens and strange to the land.
As the Roman army relied upon its auxiliaries for
the all-important duties of reconnaissance and scout-
ing, the advantages of using clan-regiments in their
own country were indeed very great, quite apart
from the great saving of expense of transport and
maintenance which this system secured, and which
counted not a little in the careful financial organisa-
tion of the wiser and more thrifty of the early
Emperors. There was, therefore, every reason for
33© REBELLION ON THE RHINE ch.hi
the choice of this system by Augustus and his
immediate successors. But the mutiny had opened
the eyes of the Roman Government to its risks.
By the Flavian Emperors its many advantages were
counted as nothing compared to its dangers, at least'
upon the Rhine. No attempt was made to abolish
clan-regiments. This indeed would have been far
too sweeping a measure, and might have destroyed
the auxiliary system completely. But, with very
few exceptions, such regiments, both infantry and
cavalry, are found serving in countries other than
those of their origin.
Thus the indigenous cohorts and alae, which
before a.d. 70 had served on the Rhine, after that
date were either disbanded or sent far afield to
Britain, Raetia, Pannonia, Dacia, Moesia, even
Mauretania.1 In Lower Germany neither Germans
nor Gauls seem to have been employed as troops
under the Flavians. In Upper Germany there is still
found under Vespasian and Domitian a squadron of
Cannenefates, significantly removed from their own
district at the mouth of the Rhine, and solitary
cohorts of " Gauls," " Germans," and Bituriges.
But the great majority of auxiliary troops in both
provinces come from other countries. Cavalry
squadrons of men from Africa, Ituraea, Moesia,
Noricum, Thrace, serve in the Lower province.
Cohorts, either infantry or mixed infantry and
' E.g. in Britain are found Baetasii, Batavi, Cugerni, Frisii, Lingones,
Menapii, Morini, Suebi, Tungri, Vangiones ; in Pannonia, Batavi, Cannene-
fates, Helvetii ; in Raetia (from a.d. 103) and Dacia, Batavi ; in Moesia,
Mattiaci, Ubii, Tungri ; in Mauretania, Sugambri. (List from Riese, cf. next
note. )
sEc.vni REBELLION ON THE RHINE 331
cavalry, of Dalmatians, Spaniards, Lusitanians,
Vindelicians, are found in the Lower province ; and
in the Upper, of Aquitanians, Asturians, Dalmatians
(at Wiesbaden and Bingen), Ituraeans and Damas-
cenes from the East, Raeti (at Wiesbaden and
Vindonissa), Pannonians (at Bingen), men of Cyrene
(at Neuenheim), Thracians, and Vindelicians. The
mere list shows how complete was Vespasian's
reversal of the former practice, how utterly different
was the army, as well of auxiliaries as of legionaries,
which garrisoned the Rhine in his own and his sons'
days from that which was submerged by the great
flood of the mutiny or helped to swell its volume.1
Auxiliaries as well as legionaries are henceforward
loyal to the Empire. " Vespasian was a soldier of
sagacity and experience ; it is probably in good part
a merit of his if we meet with no later example of
revolt of the auxilia against their legions." 2
The garrison of the Rhine of men of all arms in
1 These details concerning the auxilia I take from Alex. Riese's valuable
article " Germania " in the new Dizionario Epigrafico of Ruggiero, published
last year. The whole subject of the auxiliary troops of the Imperial military
system is as yet in a most dishevelled condition, and no good and complete
treatment of it as a whole has yet, to my knowledge, been published. See
Note H, "The Flavian Army of the Lower Rhine."
2 Mommsen, Provinces, Eng. Trans, vol. i. p. 144, who also comments on
the disappearance from the auxilia after this date of native officers, such as
Arminius, Civilis, Classicus. But the clan-regiments surely continued to
exist, though Mommsen seems to doubt this. "The men serve, without
distinction as to their descent, in the most various divisions." This, of course,
is true of such corps as the First and Second ala Flavia Gemina, the ala
Singularium, the numerous cohortes voluntariorum civium Romanorum, etc.,
found in Flavian times on the Rhine. And the "special" corps, e.g. Cohors
Sagittariorum, continue to be raised. But the great majority of regiments in
Riese's long list bear at least clan names, and presumably continued to be
composed, at least largely (? entirely), of the natives of those tribes or countries
whose names they bear.
332 REBELLION ON THE RHINE
Flavian times has been reckoned at some sixty-nine
thousand men, of whom thirty -four thousand be-
longed to the Upper, thirty-five thousand to the
Lower, German province.1 But as time went by,
and men's memories of the mutiny grew dim, the
Lower province, the scene once of its greatest fury
and carnage, was found so peaceful that part of its
troops, urgently needed by wars elsewhere, could
with safety be withdrawn. Vespasian's annexation
of the district of the Agri Decumates and the valley
of the Neckar in a.d. 73-74, Domitian's warring
with the Chatti some ten years later, employed the
troops, without disturbing the peace, of the Upper
province. And soon the storm-clouds came rolling
up black and threatening ruin to the Roman Empire
upon the Danube frontier. Under Marcus Aurelius
two legions only were left in garrison upon the
Lower Rhine. The tide of war had swept steadily
eastwards, carrying with it the line of Roman forti-
fications on the Upper Rhine and the military camps
upon the Danube. The Teuton was yet to be at
death-grips with the Roman. But the desperate
struggle was to be waged upon both banks of the
greater river and with new invading tribes. Few
storms of war disturbed the calm surface of the Rhine
after a.d. 70, and those were of brief duration. And
the German tribes upon the Roman bank joined with
Rome's troops upon the river in accepting loyally
and placidly her sway. The great mutiny left no
heritage of ill - will behind it to any generation.
Rome was always truly victor because she knew
1 Ritterling W.-D. Zeitschrift, xii. 3. p. 242.
sbc. vni REBELLION ON THE RHINE 3t>3
how to use victory well. Her citizens shirked no
military duty for pleasure or for any folly of
humanitarian sentiment which, if indulged in,
defeats its own ends. In the strength as in the
valour of her " National army " she defied her
enemies. Where she conquered she civilised.
To those whom she defeated she taught the use
of arms on her own behalf, as well as order and
law. Her very rebels and subject races learnt the
patriotism of Romans, a patriotism of self-sacrifice
and deeds, not of boasts and empty words. And
therefore, still in the days of her Emperors as in
those earlier days when the citizen-soldier, trained
from boyhood to the use of arms, crushed his Mace-
donian or Carthaginian enemy, and hurled the
Asiatic back behind the barriers of Taurus and
Euphrates, Rome was an Imperial State. Still her
patriotism was no mock patriotism, loud-tongued,
afraid of burdens. Still the rock of her strength,
though fiercely assaulted by the jealous hatred of
her enemies, stood firm, because it was not yet
undermined by cowardice and pleasure-seeking on
the part of her citizens.
POSTSCRIPT
During the time of the writing of this book I
chanced to have been reading again part of the story
of the making of modern Italy, that great epic of the
nineteenth century. The contrast between the two
periods of war in Italy and struggle with the German
ene?ny, that of my writing and that of my reading,
could not fail to present itself vividly.
Ancient Rome won the unity of Italy, and then, in
due course, her Empire, by the unflinching heroism
and pure devotion to their country of her sons. Then
it came to pass that greed and selfishness, ambition
and passion, triumphed over patriotism, self-sacrifice,
si7nphcity. In this book we have seen rival Italian
leaders contending in furious struggle for the personal
mastery. And all the while Italy lay unheeded, sorely
wounded. Her life-blood was draining away ; her
sons slew one another remorselessly ; while the da?igcr
from the northern barbarian gathered ever more
gloomily upon her frontiers.
Now it is scarcely a generation since men have
seen Italy won at last again to unity by the bravery
and the endurance of her children. Mere boys and
334
POSTSCRIPT 335
youths in the pride of their strength faced the cannon
and the executioner with smiles on their lips ; women
endured all agony of pain and loss ; men battled
forward to victory in spite of peril, failure, and
disaster. So unselfishness and patriotism won here
their most renowned victory of modem times.
Hurtful indeed and well-nigh ruinous to Italy ivas
the "year of the four Emperors," when men fought
for the sake of greed, or, more nobly, as in the case of
our own Wars of the Roses, for personal devotion to
so?ne leader, but not for love of country. For any
cause other than the highest a man, it might be thought,
would not willingly die. Yet these men in Italy of
olden days did face death cheerfully for causes lower,
and many of the?n base enough. And this is a glory,
albeit a lesser glory, of Roman manhood.
Salve, magna parens frugtim, Saturnia tellus,
magna virum.
For there are diseases of the body politic which
cost a nation the loss of strength and manhood, and
these are more injurious than is Civil War. Such
were in due course to inflict upon Italy yet greater
miseries than did even the masterful strivings of the
rivals for Empire, before the time of her redemption
came at last. Greater perils to a land even than
armed ambition and cruelty are that craven self-
regarding sloth and that veritable diruTr) rod irXovrov,
deluding rich and poor alike by its enchantment,
which, however fair- seeming may be the titles of peace
336 POSTSCRIPT
and humanity under which they seek to disguise
themselves — and what nobler names than these could
ever be so misused? — would yet surrender the country
indolent, poorly -armed, tim'eady, to the sudden on-
slaught of a jealous and a vigorous foe.
" Does the red stand for rose-leaves on our flag ? "
NOTES
A. — The Movements of the Danube Legions (p. 79)
Tacitus (ii. 11) says: " Laeta interim Othoni principia belli,
motis ad imperium eius e Dalmatia Pannoniaque exercitibus. Fuere
quattuor legiones, e quibus bina milia praemissa ; ipsae modicis
intervallis sequebantur." Again, in his enumeration of Otho's troops
engaged in the battle of Locus Castorum (ii. 24) he writes : "Tertiae
decumae legionis vexillum, quattuor auxiliorum cohortes et quingenti
equites in sinistra locantur ; aggerem viae tres praetoriae cohortes
altis ordinibus obtinuere ; dextra fronte prima legio incessit cum
duabus auxiliaribus [MS. vexillaribus] cohortibus et quingentis
equitibus."
The " Thirteenth " legion was one of the two in Pannonia ; the
"First" was the legion from Rome belonging to the Army of Italy.
It has been argued {e.g. by Pfitzner in his Geschichte der
Kaiserlegionen) that by the time of this battle all four vexilla from
the Pannonian and Dalmatian legions had arrived on the scene and
not the one only of the Thirteenth legion. Hence for the unmeaning
MS. reading "vexillaribus" in ii. 24 he would substitute " vexillariis "
and take these two " vexillariae cohortes " to be two of the remaining
three.
This view is to be rejected. It is clear, as Gerstenecker {pp. cit.
pp. 20-22, and note 47, p. 64) points out, that the vexillum of a legion
cannot be properly described as a vexillaria cohors. The right form
of description is already given in ii. 24 in the phrase "tertiae
decumae legionis vexillum " ; i.e. the legion to which such a vexillum
belonged is named. Moreover Tacitus, after his enumeration of the
Othonian forces present at the battle, says expressly that there was
no reserve, " nullum retro subsidium " (ii. 26). But he has not
mentioned a fourth vexillum at all, supposing the two vexillariae
337 Z
338 NOTES
cohortes were numbers 2 and 3. The proper inference is that there
was no fourth vexillum present. Hence in ii. 24 we should accept
the proposed " auxiliaribus " for the MS. " vexillaribus," and take
these two cohorts to belong to the auxiliaries, not to be two of the
vexilla of the Danube legions. In this case only one of the four
vexilla has arrived on the scene by April 6, and hence my statements
in the text are based on this conclusion.
B. — The Capture of Cremona by the Vitellians (p. 81)
Plutarch {Otho, c. 7) believes that Cremona remained in
Othonian hands until after Caecina's vain attack on Placentia ; that
Caecina then marched on the town to take it ; that Gallus marched
thereupon to defend its garrison ; and that the battle of Locus
Castorum was the result.
This is certainly not Tacitus' view. According to him Cremona
must have been occupied by the advance guard which Caecina sent
/ over the Alps. It is certainly included in the phrase " florentissimum
Italiae latus, quantum inter Padum Alpesque camporum et urbium,
armis Vitellii tenebatur" (ii. 17), for it was "at the same time"
(iisdem diebus) as the assault on Placentia that the Vitellian
auxiliaries, fleeing before the foray of Macer's gladiators over the
""fijiver, took refuge in the city (ii. 23). When then Caecina, on his
jjtmarch from Placentia, "Cremonam petere intendit " (ii. 22), the
words are not to be taken in the sense of a hostile movement.
Probably Cremona was taken at the same time as the " Cohors
Pannoniorum apud Cremonam," which may have been its garrison.
Gerstenecker adopts Plutarch's view and supports it by a truly
quaint argument, befitting an arm-chair student rather than any one
with a knowledge of geography and military history. He maintains
that had Cremona been captured before the attack on Placentia this
I attack need never have been delivered at all. " Placentia would
have been completely paralysed by Cremona" {op. at. p. 17). And
he thinks this proved by the fact that subsequently Otho recalled
Spurinna from Placentia when Cremona, without doubt, was occupied
by the enemy (ii. 36). This last fact, however, proves nothing in his
favour, as it is the eve of the last struggle and Otho must have
every man available. Yet even so a garrison is still left by him
in Placentia sufficient to hold the town. One fortress does not
" paralyse " another. Placentia was invaluable to Otho when there
NOTES 339
was no bridge over the Po at Cremona. Does the German student
expect Placentia to take the field, like Birnam Wood ? It was held
to guard the great crossing of the river, and served this purpose
equally well even if fifty Cremonas on the north bank were in the
hands of the enemy.
C. — The Site of Bedriacum (p. 86)
The exact site of ancient Bedriacum has been a matter of dispute.
There are three pieces of evidence : —
(a) Tacitus.
In ii. 23 Tacitus calls it a vicus "inter Veronam Cremonamque
situs." Naturally, therefore, it would lie on the Roman road between
these two towns. In iii. 1 5 he implies that it was situated where
this road from Verona to Cremona was joined by the road along the
north bank of the Po, which road he calls the Via Postumia (iii. 2 1 ;
cf. C.I.L. i. 540). This was probably the road from Hostilia to
Cremona.
This information is very precise, but, unfortunately for purposes
of modern identification, the actual course of the Roman roads in
this district has not been determined. The country here to-day is
very flat, and well drained by modern ditches. Centuries' ruin and
flood have obscured every trace of the old roads ; nor do any such
traces remain, it seems, even of the Roman bridges, e.g. over the
Oglio, which would greatly assist the inquiry. If, then, we do not
know the actual course of the two roads, we are not greatly helped
by learning that the village of our search lay at the point where they
joined.
(b) The scholiast to Juvenal, ii. 99 and 106.
Here Bedriacum is said to have been twenty miles from Cremona,
and to have lain between Cremona and Hostilia.
(c) The " Peutinger Table." l
1 Conrad Peutinger of Augsburg (a.d. 1565-1647) possessed, it seems, a
thirteenth-century copy of a Roman map of the third century A. D. , which he
published. This gives a picture of the roads of the Roman Empire, naming
the chief stations on them, and giving in figures the distances between them.
It does not attempt to give any accurate delineation of shape, or to draw
distances to scale. The result is a series of long strips of country which
presents a very quaint appearance. But its information on vexed questions
of site may of course be valuable, as in this case.
34Q NOTES
This reads as follows : —
Cremona — xxii. — Beloriaco — ,, — Mantua — xl. — Hostilia.
Beloriaco is obviously Bedriacum. But there are two difficulties
here : (i.) No distance is given between it and Mantua ; (ii.) The
distance from Mantua to Hostilia is twice the correct number of
miles. Mommsen's suggestion (op. Hermes, v. p. 163 n.) is that forty
was the number of miles between Bedriacum and Hostilia, and that
Mantua lay on a branch road which, " as often happens," has dis-
appeared from the map. Hence the right reading should be
Cremona — xxii. — Bedriaco — xl. — Hostilia.
This would explain why the Juvenal scholia placed Bedriacum
between Cremona and Hostilia rather than between Cremona and
Mantua.
The difficulty in Mommsen's view is that it is hard to see why
Mantua, an important town, should lie on a side road which would
have been an exceedingly short one, and why, even on grounds of
military exigency (as Mommsen urges), it should have been avoided
by the main road. The explanation, however, of the difficulty of the
Peutinger Table datum is the only one which we have, and holds
the field.
The distance of the modern village of Calvatone from Cremona
tallies practically to a yard with that given by the Table for
Bedriacum (33.02 kiL = 2oi English = 22 Roman miles). The
scholiast's "twenty" is less trustworthy. The distances from Cremona
of other villages suggested — Carneto, Cividale, S. Lorenzo Guazzone
— suit neither of the figures. I have little doubt that Calvatone lies
on the site of Bedriacum, and that the Roman road ran a quarter
of a mile north of the modern high-road from Cremona to Mantua.
D. — The '■'■Distances" in Taciitis, ii. 39, 40 (p. 114)
Two statements of distance in Tacitus' account, when put
together, present very great difficulties : —
(1 ) ii. 39. " Promoveri ad quartum a Bedriaco castra placuit, adeo
imperite ut quamquam verno tempore anni et tot circum amnibus
penuria aquae fatigarentur."
According to this the troops reach the fourth milestone from
Bedriacum, i.e. a point eighteen miles from Cremona. See above,
Note C, Position of Bedriacum.
NOTES 341
(2) ii. 40, 41. When the troops resume their march from this
point —
" Non ut ad pugnam sed ad bellandum profecti confluentes Padi
et Aduae fluminum sedecim inde milium spatio distantes petebant."
Celsus and Paulinus, in the next sentence, remonstrate against
exposing their tired troops — " militem itinere fessum " — to an enemy
who — " vix quattuor milia passuum progressus " — would be likely to
attack them with vigour.
The crux here is that the confluence is seven miles west of
Cremona, and thus some twenty-five miles from the position in (1),
not sixteen miles.
Other difficulties of explanation are added, e.g. : —
(i) How can a four-mile march distress the troops for want of
water ? It seems absurd, however hot the sun.
(2) Why do the troops want to get to the confluence at all ? No
motive is given for this extraordinary objective.
(3) How can the troops possibly expect to get to the confluence
without fighting, as the road lies via Cremona ? What, then, is the
meaning of "non ut ad pugnam sed ad bellandum profecti" ?
Plutarch, it is true (Ot/to, ii.), has a different and straightforward
account which presents none of these difficulties. According to him,
the troops march first day fifty stades from Bedriacum, i.e. about six
miles, and then encamp. The want of water is due to the " ludicrous "
position chosen for the camp. Next day Proculus wishes " Trpodyew
i~l roi'5 TToAe/itovs 68bv ovk eXdrrova (rraoYcoi' €ko.t6i>." 1 00 stades
= 1 2 miles. This would bring the force to a point some four miles
short of Cremona. Plutarch appears to have thought Cremona
nearer than it actually was, or, more probably, the battle actually
took place here. (See below.) But Suetonius and his party object-
ing, nothing is done until Otho's orderly arrives with orders " fitj
fievetv fii]8e 8ia.Tpi/3et,v, dW dyew evdvs cttI to us irokefuovs." They
therefore "cipavres €\(opovv." Immediately the scene shifts to Caecina
and Valens and the battle, without any further hint of its precise
position on the road.
This account is in itself not altogether satisfactory. But it does
not raise the difficult questions presented by Tacitus. There is no
word of the confluence in it, no hint that the troops were not
marching out to make a frontal attack upon the Yitellian position at
Cremona. On the contrary they marched along the road to fight,
and, reasonably enough, did fight as soon as they met the enemy,
342 NOTES
at or near the city : four miles away, if we insist on Plutarch's
distances. But his " ovk eAa-rrova" allows us some margin to play
with.
But if Plutarch has (on the whole) a simple straightforward view
of events, this does not help us in the least to solve the perplexities
of the Tacitean story, unless it induces us to reject the latter
altogether in favour of the alternative. We have no right, and small
inclination, to adopt this heroic course.
Various solutions have been suggested of the perplexities of the
second passage in Tacitus : —
(a) Gerstenecker proposes a remarkable translation for it :
" Nicht wie zu einer Schlacht, sondern wie zu einem Feldzuge
aufgebrochen, befanden sie sich auf dem Marsche nach der
Mtindung der Adda in den Po, sechzehn Milien davon entfernt "
(op. cit. p. 32), i.e. "having set out, they found themselves at a
distance of sixteen miles from the objective of their march, the
confluence."
This version separates " confluentes " and "distantes"; makes
" distantes " agree with the subject of " petebant " ; and translates
"petebant" as the equivalent of "arrived at" instead of "were
making for." All this is surely impossible as a mere matter of the
general run of a Latin sentence. It also gives no answer at all to
the question of the reason for the objective, or to the question why
the troops did not expect a battle. And it brings the army nine miles
from Cremona ( = sixteen from the confluence) for the battle site, which
agrees with no other datum of any kind and is intrinsically wildly
improbable. Gerstenecker outrages Latin and only makes confusion
worse confounded.
(a) The new Kiepert map of North Italy (Berlin, 1902), to my
amazement, I find escorting the Adda into the Po through the very
town of Cremona itself. I can only infer that this is Kiepert's effort
to solve this very problem. Bedriacum to Cremona = twenty miles
(according to the scholiast's account) : the troops march four miles :
they are then sixteen miles from the confluence. It must follow that
Cremona is at the confluence and the confluence at Cremona ! If
Tacitus will not suit the course of the river, then the course of the
river must suit Tacitus ! Dr. Grundy's recent map of Italy (Murray,
n. d.) avoids this error. Of course this solution cannot be entertained
for a moment.
(c) The words " Confluentes Padi et Aduae " give all the trouble.
NOTES 343
How simple, then, is the remedy of rejecting the words " Padi et
Aduae " entirely as an addition by a very ignorant scribe which has
crept unluckily into the text ! The troops are making for a " con-
fluence " sixteen miles away. What confluence is the proper distance
from their first camp ? At this point a stream, the " Caneta " by
name, is produced by Nipperdey, flowing from the north into the
Po. Nipperdey's "Caneta" is cheerfully quoted by Professor Bury
(Students' Rowan Empire, p. 349), and Mr. Hardy believes in "a
small stream from the north " (P/utarch's Lives of Galba and Ot/10,
p. 254; cf. his whole note on the matter, pp. 253-55, w'tn its
despairing conclusion). On this view of the situation the troops
intend to diverge from the main road southwards towards the Po
" to get into touch with Macer's gladiators." But they all mean to
fight, and the words " non ut ad pugnam sed ad bellandum profecti "
are merely meant as a picturesque description of the general careless-
ness and disorderliness of their march.
This indeed is a violent remedy, when a puzzled scholiast is in-
vented to create the whole difficulty. Not even a scholiast would
lightly have thought that the Adda joined the Po east of Cremona.
Why in the world should he have inserted an impossible river into
the narrative ? Why should an impossible insertion have been
accepted ever since ? Praestat difficilius ? Not a bit of it ! We
get rid of the words which cause the whole difficulty and build our
hopes on the river Caneta !
Veritably they are built on sand and not on a river at all ! The
large scale Italian ordnance map of Cremona lies before me as I
write (Fo. 61, 1897, scale 1 : 100,000). For the twelfth time I
search seventy-five square miles of country east and south-east of
Cremona to find the name of Caneta. There are plenty of " Ca,"
but this presumably stands for "Casa.!' There is no Caneta. Very
wisely Mr. Hardy wrote of his "small stream from the north" with-
out naming it. But there is a brooklet or a ditch called, it seems,
Dugale Pozzolo, with a course (so far as I can track it) of some
seven miles, which enters the Po from the north at Isola Pescaroli.
Its beginning seems to be four miles away from Cremona. Its
"confluence" is nine miles from the camp, "fifty stades west of
Bedriacum." This distance refuses to suit anything. Is this "Dugale
Pozzolo " (if that be its name) the notable stream which makes a
confluence? Is the "confluence" an error for the source of this
noble river (9 + 7 = 16)? What then befalls Macer's gladiators,
344 NOTES
who could have jumped this ditch here? All this Caneta- erratic
scholiast story is a mere tissue of silliness.
(d) Mommsen {Hermes, v. pp. 171-73) proposes to regard the
distance, sixteen miles, as due to a confusion in Tacitus' own mind
between the ultimate objective of the whole march, viz. the confluence
of the Adda and Po, and the proposed end of the first day's march
on the way to the objective. In his view the army did not set out
to fight, nor did it intend to march for the confluence by way of
Cremona. But the plan was that, after marching for some distance
along the main road, it should diverge to the north-west and plant
itself astride the Cremona-Brescia road to the north of the former
town. The proposed end of the first day's march is sixteen miles
away from the camp, four miles from Bedriacum. [This would not
have reached the road to Brescia.] But the troops do not get so
far. For after marching along the road twelve miles (Plutarch's one
hundred stades) to the point where they mean to leave it. at this
point they meet the enemy come out from Cremona to fight.
Tacitus' whole account is unintelligible because he misunderstands
the military situation. The army is ordered to provoke a fight, not
by marching straight on the enemy but by threatening their com-
munications ; and the distance of the intended end of the first day's
march is confused with that of the confluence, the ultimate objective.
Mommsen thus accepts the objective and propounds briefly the
idea of a flank march, but rejects the number sixteen as given for
the distance of the objective. He regards, it seems, Brescia as
being of some importance, whereas this road, as I have explained in
the text, mattered little or nothing to the Vitellians. And the whole
march is treated in isolation instead of as part of one great strategi-
cal idea. The criticism of Tacitus' failings as a military historian
must win the acceptance of every student of the historian. To
Mommsen's whole paper the student of the Histories owes much,
and not least in the consideration of the difficulties of these particular
passages in Tacitus' account.
I have endeavoured in the text of this chapter to develop my view
of the whole strategy of the battle. But with regard to the special
difficulties of the Tacitus sentences mentioned at the beginning of
this note, I would suggest that one simple alteration of a numeral in
the first passage will clear most of them up. To alter the "sedecim"
(as has been proposed), of course, would get rid also of the main crux
of the second passage, but leaves the " water " difficulty of the first
NOTES 345
unexplained. But an alteration of " quartum " to " quartum decu-
mum," if allowed, solves both. The plan works out as follows : —
end of first day's
march. (14 miles)
Confluence , ■, Cremona 0 •, ■,. ■, Bedriacum
^ 7 miles %s Smiles k 74 miles £\
Cremona to Bedriacum 22 miles
The first day's march is fourteen miles. This is eight miles
from Cremona (22-14) and thus fifteen from the confluence. The
discrepancy of a mile (roughly) need not trouble us greatly.
The force is then " fifteen miles from the confluence " in a straight
line. Perhaps the sixteenth mile allows for the circle round the city;
for of any wide turning movement Tacitus has no notion. The
troops are naturally distressed for want of water after fourteen miles,
as well as because where they encamp there is none (Plutarch). Next
day Suetonius urges that the enemy will have "barely four miles to
march." It looks as if he thought both sides would set out to march
at the same time, and so would meet in the middle of the eight miles
which then separated the Othonians from the city.
Tacitus seems to believe the whole march and fight took place in
one day, which accounts best for his making Suetonius insist on the
weariness of his own men. Plutarch definitely says the fight was on
the second day after leaving camp. This is more probable. But 1
can make nothing of Plutarch's figures. They disagree entirely with
Tacitus' whether we read four or fourteen, save that, if we read
fourteen and then make the force advance four miles farther next
day for the battle (the "half eight" required by Suetonius' state-
ment of the distance to be marched by the enemy), then in Tacitus'
account as well as in Plutarch's the battle takes place eighteen miles
from Bedriacum (150 stades) and four from Cremona.
My whole account in the text of the movements of the troops is
based on my " fourteen miles " suggestion and on the importance of
the mention of the confluence of Adda and Po. Of course, the view
there taken of Otho's strategy as a whole is entirely independent
of the difficulty of the figures names are far more valuable than
figures) and of the proposed alteration of these.
346 NOTES
E. — Tacitus as Military Historian
In my Preface I have stated my view that Tacitus' information
"in matters military represents the common gossip of the camp, the
talk of the private or of the subordinate officer."
The narrative and the notes to it have given not a few instances
in support of this contention. A bare summary of the more import-
ant of these from Chapter I. may be presented here, in proof of the
contention, for clearness' sake : —
(i) Caecina's hesitation as to his route to Italy: described by
Tacitus as a choice between an invasion of Italy and an attack on
Noricum. (Tacitus, i. 70.) See above, § 4, pp. 66-69.
(2) Otho's motive for sending the fleet to Narbonese Gaul :
Tacitus fails to understand its bearing upon the general strategical
situation. (Tacitus, i. 87 ; ii. 12-16.) See above, § 5, pp. 73-79.
(3) Valens' despatch of the Batavian cohorts to the coast to
guard his flank : Tacitus reproduces the complaints of the common
soldiers. When the private marching east sees his comrade detached
to march south, he does not think of strategic necessities, the safety
of lines of communication and retreat, etc. etc. When he murmurs
secretly, or, in the time of civil war when discipline has gone to the
dogs, grumbles openly, he is thinking that the enemy, of unknown
strength, will have twice as good a chance of disposing of his own
valuable life. Hence he enunciates in exactly the wrong place a
splendid principle of strategical concentration, " Let the whole army
stick together," etc. Tacitus himself sees in Valens' action only
his desire to "guard his allies and to get rid of mutineers from his
army " ; both only primary and not ultimate strategical reasons, if
true. (Tacitus, ii. 28.) See above, § 4, pp. 61-62.
(4) Spurinna's reconnaissance in force from Placentia : according
to Tacitus forced by a mutinous soldiery on a reluctant general.
(Tacitus, ii. 18, 19.) See above, § 6, pp. 82-83.
(5) Caecina's attack on Placentia: Tacitus explains it as due to
his desire to score an opening success— a motive of very secondary
weight. (Tacitus, ii. 20.) See above, § 6, pp. 83-84.
(6) The battle of Locus Castorum : a most confused tale in
Tacitus. But he does seem to understand and appreciate Suetonius'
reasons for recalling his troops from pursuit. (Tacitus, ii. 24-26.)
See above, § 6, pp. 87-92.
(7) The bridge-building at Cremona, and—
NOTES 347
(8) Otho's order "to attack."
According to Tacitus, Caecina and Valens hear of the Othonian
intention to attack, and so " like wise men stay quiet to take advan-
tage of others' folly": "Caecina ac Valens, quando hostis imprudentia
rueret, quod loco sapientiae est, alienam stultitiam opperiebantur."
But in order to give their idle troops something to do, they begin
their mock bridge-building — "ne ipsorum miles segne otium tereret "
(Tacitus, ii. 34). Even Mommsen himself agrees that the bridge-
building "cannot have been seriously meant" {Hermes, v. p. 165).
This entirely fails to realise the whole strategical plans of both
sides. It is a shallow conclusion from results. Because the bridge
was not finished, it was not meant to be finished. Because the
Othonians' advance led to an attack, they meant to attack. Because
they were defeated, their attack was folly.
I have endeavoured to show the deeper significance of the plans
of both sides, the evidence for them, and the reasons why Tacitus
failed to understand them, in the whole of §§ 7, 8.
(9) Otho's withdrawal to Brixellum with a considerable number
of troops : described by Tacitus as a step urged on him and agreed
to by him in order that he might not incur the risk of the battle
(Tacitus, ii. 33). I have commented on the improbability of this in
§ 7, p. 107. Apart from its inconsistency with all that we know
besides of the Emperor's character and acts, he did not need so large
a bodyguard if all that he and others were thinking of had been his
own personal safety.
Tacitus' whole account of these closing scenes of the campaign
makes the Vitellians act like babies ("Satan finds some mischief
still," etc.), and Otho a strategical idiot and a craven as well. He
becomes himself again only just in time to die.
The picture of Vitellius, however, is harmonious throughout and
a masterpiece. So simple a character could hardly be misunder-
stood.
In the following two chapters Tacitus' failings are those of the
lack of strategical insight upon more than one occasion. They lend
themselves, however, less easily to the purposes of a catalogue, and
may be left to the discovery and appreciation of the reader. See
also the Index, "Tacitus as Military Historian."
348 NOTES
F. — Valetis' March to the North (p. 173)
Tacitus' account of this (iii. 41, 42) is very perplexing. Accord-
ing to it, Valens receives the news of the mutiny of the Ravenna
fleet "while on the march," i.e. from Rome. He was, of course,
marching by the Via Flaminia. This road runs through Southern
Etruria for a few miles after leaving Rome, enters Umbria near
Ocriculum, and continues in this district up to and beyond Ariminum,
which town is in Umbria. From Ariminum there is a choice of
roads. The coast road runs north to Ravenna, crossing the Rubicon
a few miles from Ariminum. This river formed the northern
boundary of Umbria. The main road, however, strikes away north-
west from Ariminum, leaves Umbria near the town of Cesena, and
continues via Faventia to Bononia, whence a road runs north to
Hostilia, while the highway continues in a straight line to Placentia.
The puzzle is to discover where Valens was when he heard of the
mutiny of the fleet. Tacitus' account is that, when the news came, if
Valens had hastened he might have reached Caecina while the latter
was still wavering, or have reached the legions before the critical battle.
There were actually some who advised him " ut per occultos tramites
vitata Ravenna Hostiliam Cremonamve pergeret." But he halts
where he is, and sends to Rome for reinforcements. When these
arrive in small numbers, viz. three cohorts and one ala, he is unable
"to force his way through the enemy" (vadere per hostes). He is
fearful, too, of their scanty loyalty. " Eo metu cohortes Ariminum
praemittit, alam tueri terga iubet : ipse . . . flexit in Umbriam
atque inde Etruriam." In Etruria he hears of the battle at Cremona,
and makes his way to the sea at Pisa (iii. 42).
From this account, studied in connection with the geography, I
conclude that Valens must have been already on the road between
Ariminum and Ravenna when the news of the fleet's mutiny came.
Had he still been south of Ariminum the following difficulties present
themselves : —
(a) There was not the slightest need for him to march "per
occultos tramites " if he desired to get to Hostilia as quickly as
possible while avoiding Ravenna. The quickest route for him, if
still south of Ariminum, was by the main road via Bononia. But if
he were already north of Ariminum and near Ravenna, then the
cross-roads recommended to him, e.g, from Cesenatico to Cesena,
would save time.
NOTES 349
(b) When his reinforcements have arrived he will not inarch via
Ravenna, as they are too weak. He therefore "sends the infantry
before him to Ariminum, and bids the cavalry guard his rear."
Now, if he is marching in a hurry north to Ariminum, these dis-
positions are too ludicrous for words. The danger is all in his
front : he therefore puts his cavalry to guard his rear ; the need for
speed is urgent : he therefore places his infantry at head of the
column ! But if he is retiring on Ariminum from the north the
arrangement is clear. The cavalry are properly placed to guard
the rear of the retreat. He himself, however, does not accompany
the column, as he has given up the plan of getting to the Po at all.
(c) He himself "turns aside first to Umbria, next to Etruria."
But if he is south of Ariminum he is already in Umbria. For he
cannot have been still within a few miles of Rome. (Why should
the cavalry guard his rear, above all, in this case ?) If he has alreadv
crossed the Rubicon, he may have recrossed it into Umbria before
leaving that district again for Etruria and the west. But even this
would give him but a mile or two in Umbria, as he clearly did not
accompany his troops to Ariminum, which is hard by the boundary
of the province. The words " flexit in Umbriam " are, indeed, almost
unmeaning. Valens' obvious route, if (for reasons (a) and (6)) we
believe him to have been north of Ariminum, was to proceed via
Cesena to Faventia (Faenza), thence cross the mountains by the
well-known road to Florence and the valley of the Arno, and so to
Pisa at the mouth of this river. This ridge of the Apennines is not
easily crossed even by a small company, as those who have roamed
about the Prato Magno chain or crossed from the Casentino and La
Verna to Badia Prataglia and Urbino can tell. Even the road over
the Consuma Pass has only just been opened. The mountains are
truly magnificent, and I saw no snow on Falterona in September.
But the going is hard. I doubt if Valens and his small faithful
band disturbed the autumn leaves in Vallombrosa. North of the
Metaurus and the Furlo Pass (whence the Arno valley can be
reached by Urbania and Borgo San Sepolcro, or by Gubbio farther
south) the first good track to the Arno valley is the route now
followed by the railway from Faenza via Brisighella and Borgo San
Lorenzo to Florence. If Valens was in the neighbourhood of Rimini
and wished to get speedily to Pisa, this was his natural road.
If, then, Valens had crossed the Rubicon travelling north, his near
approach may account for the sudden mutiny by night at Ravenna,
350 NOTES
which seems to have surprised Caecina before he was ready also
to play the traitor. For Tacitus says that Valens could still have
reached him by rapid movement before he, too, went over.
But if there were, as Tacitus suggests, a secret agreement between
Caecina and liassus, Valens must have been near at hand indeed if
he could have arrived in time to dissuade Caecina from following his
fellow-traitor's example.
The whole discussion may at least serve to illustrate Tacitus'
inexcusable vagueness in his military history. His interest in geo-
graphy is evidently of the most casual description. One other
example of this blemish in the history may here be appropriately
mentioned. Valens is presently captured by the Flavians at the
lies d'Hyeres, near Toulon (iii. 43). When Tacitus next mentions
him it is to remark casually that he is in prison at Urbinum (iii. 62).
Why at this little mountain city in Umbria, of all places in Italy ?
Why, when, and how did the Flavians take him there ? Doubtless
his head was useful to the enemy marching for Rome, and it must
have been forwarded to them for use at Carsulae, eighty miles to the
south. After all, Hasdrubal's head travelled a longer journey down
the same road. But why the unlucky Valens should have been
escorted for execution to Urbino, which lies up in the hills ten miles
from Fossombrone and away from the main road south, is a problem
to which I can give no answer, and Tacitus vouchsafes no explana-
tion. If Valens had been a Garibaldi fleeing through these moun-
tains for dear life, Urbino might have been his San Marino, and the
problem would be easier. But Valens was a prisoner.
G. — Vetera and Harper's Ferry (p. 283)
The situation on the Potomac at the time of the Confederates'
invasion of Maryland, following upon their brilliant victory of Second
Manassas in September 1862, was so similar to that on the Rhine
towards the end of a.d. 69 that the former may, it seems to me,
help to explain the latter so far as Vocula's decision not to evacuate
Vetera is concerned. Of course no other comparison is intended,
for never did the brilliant genius of the Southern commanders in
civilised warfare more completely outshine the mediocre respect-
abilities on the Federal side than in this campaign, and the mere
thought of a Stonewall Jackson and a Civilis together seems
ludicrous. But a brief note may be desirable to explain the point
of the comparison in the text.
NOTES 35,
A bare sketch may serve to illustrate the note : the Roman
"equivalents" are printed in capitals. Points of the compass, of
course, are of no matter in such a comparison, and the Potomac-
Rhine may be taken as flowing in any direction : —
_ , . n Baltimore
Frederic u cologne:
D-0ELDW6A y
A
!
a
Harper's Ferry
VETERA
Potomac River —~ QWashington
- RHINE mainz
D
Leesburg
Dotted lines show the direction of attack (expected or actual) by the
Confederates or Germans.
At Harper's Ferry there was a Federal garrison of twelve thousand
men ; at Washington, M'Clellan's main army of ninety thousand men.
The Confederates, fifty thousand strong, invaded Maryland, from
Leesburg to Frederic, and threatened an advance on Baltimore, if
not on Washington itself. The question for the Federal authorities
was whether, while there was still time, the garrison at Harper's
Ferry should be recalled. M'Clellan desired this, but his political
superiors overruled him. It was clear that so strongly garrisoned a
fort must seriously threaten the line of communication of the Con-
federate invaders. Might it not be expected to stop their projected
inroad entirely ? And if from Frederic they turned on Harper's
Ferry, surely they could be caught between two fires — the garrison
and M'Clellan's army — and, outnumbered (as usual) by two to one,
be annihilated. So the parallel works out thus : —
_ Federal . Harper's Ferrv ... .
Cal1 thC ROMAN gamSOn at VETERA ^^ °r t™*™*
.. , Baltimore , , . Confederates ., ,
the advance on „„„ made by the „ if these propose
Cologne ' Germans ^ v
to neglect it and advance via „ , leaving the fort in their
Gelduba' °
rear ? And if not, can the foe not be driven back upon the hostile
f . , ., Federal M'Clellan , up
iort by the main „ army under ,T advancing ,
' Roman ' Vocula down
.. Potomac , Washington ,
the river _ from »» ?
Rhine Mainz
352 NOTES
In the result, the Federal Government risked it and ordered
the garrison to remain. The Confederates thereupon dared to
detach a force of twenty-five thousand men upon Harper's Ferry,
despite the imminent peril from M'Clellan, and the garrison of the
fort (somewhat ignominiously) surrendered after some show of
resistance. Vocula similarly risked it, and also lost his fortress
in consequence, under the circumstances detailed in the text. But
I take it that the retention of both Harper's Ferry and Vetera was
dictated by much the same military considerations.
H. — The Flavian Army of the Lower Rhine (p. 331)
A newly-found military diploma, of date April 1 5, A.D. 78, shows
that there were then stationed on the Lower Rhine these six alae,
viz. : ala Noricorum (placed by Ritterling at Burginatium by Calcar),
ala Singularium (at Vada), ala Moesica (at Asciburgium), ala
Afrorum veterana (at Vetera ?), ala Siliana, and ala Sulpicia (? at
Bonn, Noviomagus, or Neuss), and also the Cohors I. Flavia
Hispanorum. To these must be added the ala Indiana (at
Worringen). Ritterling supposes that all these troops made their
first appearance on the Rhine under Vespasian. The actual
recipient of the diploma, though belonging to the ala Moesica, is
by nationality a Trevir. Otherwise this evidence is consistent with
the view taken on pp. 330-331.
Besides the above cohort, Ritterling gives the following cohorts
to the Flavian army of the Lower Rhine: — II. Asturum, II. Britt.,
I. and II. civ. Rom., III. Dalmatarum, VI. ingenuorum, II. His-
panorum, . . . Lucensium, III. Lusitanorum, I. Tracum (?), II.
Varcianorum, I. Vindelicorum, and XV. voluntariorum. This is a
completer list than Riese's, but the conclusions to be drawn from it
are the same.
Also Legio VII. Gemina seems to have been employed on the
Rhine by Rutilius Gallicus in A.D. 77-78 in his war with the Bructeri.
It was probably in this war that the prophetess Veleda was captured
(see p. 316). Cf. E. Ritterling ap. Korrespondensblatt der westd.
Zeitschrift, xxv. (1906), pp. 20-28, and von Domaszewski in Linden-
schmit's Heidn. Altert. Bd. v. Heft vi. (1905).
INDEX
Abetone Pass, the, 54
Adda, the river (Adua), 101-114, 124>
341-345
Adige, the river, 169-172, 185, 187
Aedui, the, 59
Agrestis, Julius, 213, 214
Agricola, 73
Albenga (Albingaunum), 76, 78
Albinus, Lucceius, 25
Alexander, Tiberius Julius, 22, 23,
137. 141
Allobroges, the, 60
Alps, the Cottian. See Mont Genevre
Pass
the Julian or Pannonian, 147, 148,
158, 159, 164, 165
the Pennine. See St. Bernard Pass,
Great
Passes of the, 39, 40, 42-45. 57. 58-
67, 68, 291
Altino (Altinum), 169, 185
Andernach, 58
Annius Gallus. See Gallus
Antibes (Antipolis), 76
Antioch, 142, 144
Antiochus of Commagene, 143
Antonius Primus, M., 138, 157-164,
176, 178, 179, 182-213, 218-227,
248, 249
Antonius, Saturninus, rebellion of, 294
Apennines, passes of the, 54, 209-
212, 349
Aponius Saturninus, M., 31-32, 155-
156, 160, 165, 189
Aquae Helvetiorum (Baden), 63
Aquae Mattiacae (Wiesbaden), 251,
33i
Aquileia, 37, 40, 46-50, 56, 66, 71,
77> 79' 86, 101, 103, 136, 141,
148, 158, 161, 164, 169, 170,
177. 185
Arenacum (Ryndern?), 310
Argentoratum (Strassburg), 328
Aricia, 212
Ariminum (Rimini), 39, 172, 183, 184,
209-211, 348
Arlberg Pass, the, 67, 293
Army, the Roman :
the Imperial military system, 16-19,
329-331
the permanent camps(Castrastativa),
18-19, 266, 324-329
the system of recruiting, 17-18, 259,
323-329
the cavalry, 17, 160
the Cohortes praetoriae (Praetorian
Guards)
under Nero, 2
under Galba, 7, 13, 15
under Otho, 26, 27, 32-35, 54-55.
70, 75, 88-89
under Vitellius, 130, 134-135, 198-
200, 202, 208, 214, 2T5,
217
the Cohortes urbanae, 32-35, 130,
214-215, 217
the Auxilia :
numbers, etc., 16, 17, 256
system of "clan regiments," 257-
259. 329-331
Alae :
Afrorum, 352
Batavorum, 257, 262
Gallorum Sebosiana, 17J
Hispanorum Auriana, 162
Moesica, 352
Noricorum, 352
Petriana, 66
Picentina, 257, 289-290, 296
Siliana, 34, 35, 43, 65, 70, 352
Singularium, 293, 331, 352
Sulpicia, 352
Tampiana, 154
Tauriana, 27, 35, 60
Treverorum, 75, 247, 256, 257,
259, 262, 263
! 2 A
354
INDEX
Cohortes :
Asturum, 256, 331, 352
Baetasiorum, 290, 330
Batavorum, 59, 61, 131, 133,
134, 248, 256-258, 263,
33°
Belgarum, 256, 257
Breucorum, 256
Cannenefatum, 256, 257, 263,
33°
Dalmatarum, 352
Flavia Hispanorum, 352
Lusitanorum, 352
Nemetum, 256
Nerviorum, 256, 257, 290
Pannoniorum, 80, 331, 338
Raetorum, 256, 331
Silaunensium, 256
Thracum, 352
Tungrorum, 240, 241, 256,
257, 262, 290, 330
Ubiorum, 256, 257, 262, 263,
271. 33°
Varcianorum, 352
Vasconum, 256, 274
Vindelicorum, 256, 331, 352
the Legions :
I. 6, 11, 35, 57, 88, 167, 198,
199, 254, 256, 263, 268-
276, 289, 297, 300, 325,
326
I. Adjutrix, 33-35, 70, n8, 132,
133, 138, 166, 207, 214,
292, 294, 328
I. Flavia Minervia, 327, 328
I. Italica, 27, 35, 60, 167, 170,
198, 199
II. Adjutrix, 214, 291, 292, 307
II. Augusta, 24, 166, 167, 198,
199, 328
III. Augusta, 23, 166
III. Cyrenaica, 22, 143
III. Gallica, 30-32, 35, iSS'^.
141, 142, 155, 161, 165,
189, 198, 199, 202, 203
IV. Flavia, 326
IV. Macedonica, 26, 35, 167, 198,
199, 255, 256, 268-276,
325- 32°
IV. Scythica, 21, 141
V. Alaudae, 26, 35, 57, 118, 167,
181, 190, 198, 199, 253,
256, 262, 264-276, 325,
327
V. Macedonica, 21, 142
VI. Ferrata, 21, 141 163
VI. Vtctrix, 24, 166, 292, 307, 328
VII. Claudia, 30, 35, 135-137, 155,
161, 189, 198, 199, 291, 292
VII. Galbiana (or Gemina), 6, 30,
35, 101, 135, 136, 138,
157, 158, 186, 198, 199,
200, 203, 352
VIII. Augusta, 30, 35, 135-137, 161.
189, 198, 199, 291, 292,
294, 328
IX. Hispana, 24, 166, 167, 198,
199, 223
X. Fretensis, 21, 142
X. Gemina, 24, 166, 292, 328
XI. Claudia, 30, 35, 101, 135, 136,
13^> 155- 291, 292, 294,
328
XII. Fulminata, 21, 141
XIII. Gemina, 30, 35, 86, 88, 95,
118, 135, 136, 138, 186,
198, 199, 291, 337
XIV. Gemina, 24, 30, 31, 35, 95,
118, 134, 135, 138, 166,
235- 257. 291, 292, 294,
305, 306, 328
XV. Apollinaris, 21, 142, 326
XV. Primigenia, 26, 35, 57, 167,
198, 199, 253, 256, 262,
264-276, 325, 326, 327
XVI. 26, 35, 57, 167, 198, 199, 254,
256, 269-276, 289, 297,
300, 325, 326
XVI. Flavia, 326
XX. Valeria Victrix, 24, 166, 167,
198, 199
XXI. Rapax, 26, 35, 57, 118, 167,
170, 198, 199, 255. 291-
294, 303, 327, 328
XXII. Deiotariana, 22, 142, 198, 199,
326
XXII. Primigenia, 26, 35, 57, 167,
255,256, 268-276, 325-328
Arnhem, 231, 236, 262, 263, 310
Arrius Varus, 157, 163, 164, 189, 193,
221
Asciburgium(Asberg by Mors), 257, 273
Ateste (Este), 169, 185
Augustus, the Emperor, 7, 19, 235,
251, 266, 301, 324, 329
Auspex, Julius, 247
Auxilia, the. See Army, the Roman
Aventicum (Avenches), 64, 69
Baetasii, the, 241, 244, 330 ; and see
Army, the Roman
Bassus, Annius, 155
Bassus, Sextus Lucilius, 170, 179-181,
183
INDEX
355
Batavi, the, 232-241, 245, 248, 261,
262, 300, 302, 305, 314, 315,
319. 32I-323. 33°
Batavian cohorts, the, 59, 61-62,
235, 248, 257, 258, 261
Insula Batavorum, 232-234, 236,
253' 257. 262, 308, 309, 313
Oppidum Batavorum (? Cleve), 236,
308
Batavodurum (? Nymwegen), 232, 262,
310, 328
Bedriacum (Calvatone) :
site of, 85-86, 339-340
Othonian camp at, 85, 95, 101-114
first battle of, 114-121, 140
second battle of, 192-204
Belgae, the, 241, 256 ; and see Nervii,
the
Berenice, Queen, 144
Berytus, 144, 154
Bingium (Bingerbriick), 296, 298, 331
Bolanus, M. Vettius, 24
Bonn, 9, 26, 254, 257, 263, 264, 268,
309, 311, 327, 328, 352
Bononia (Bologna), 39, 129, 135, 183,
348
Brenner Pass, the, 46, 56, 66-69, 86,
169, 187
Brescello (Brixellum), 106, 107, 116,
122, 124
Brescia (Brixia), 101, 203, 344
Briancon (Brigantio), 61, 78
Bridge at Cremona, the, 94-96, 104,
105, 346-347
Briganticus, Julius, 247, 293, 320
Brinno, 261-262
Britain, the Army of, 24, 36, 59, 96,
99, 166 ; and see Provinces, the
Roman
Bructeri, the, 239, 289, 300, 302, 352
Brundisium, 147
Byzantium, 146, 148
Caecina Alienus, Aulus :
early career, 11-12
invasion of Italy, 57, 62-70, 78, 83-
92
first campaign of Bedriacum, 92-95,
117-120, 122
under Vitellius, 128, 137
second campaign of Bedriacum, 167,
184, 186-190, 204-205
generalship, 88-92, 100
character, 63, 83, 93, 180
Caeracates, the, 295
Cagli (Cales), 209
Calenus, Julius, 247
Caligula, the Emperor, 3, 10, 229,
261, 317
Calvatone. See Bedriacum
Campania, 216-217, 230
"Caneta," the, 343"344
Cannenefates, the, 234, 235, 237, 239,
258, 261-262, 305, 306, 315, 330
Cantiano, 209
Capito, Fonteius, 9
Capitol, the burning of the, 224-225,
244, 285
Carmel, Mount, 140
Carsulae, 219, 221, 350
Castel by Mainz, 251-252
" Castra stativa," the, 18-19, 324-329
Castra Vetera. See Vetera
Cerialis, Q. Petilius, 223-225, 292-317
Chalon-sur-Saone (Cabillonum), 59
Chatti, the, 232, 234, 239, 251, 284,
294. 3!5> 332
Chauci, the, 236, 237, 239, 304, 309,
320
Cherusci, the, 240
Cimbri, the, 240
Civilis, Julius, 245, 247-250, 257, 258,
261-277, 284, 288-290, 295, 298,
300, 304-315, 317, 320, 322
Classicus, Julius, 75, 247, 258, 285-
288, 295, 298, 300, 304, 305, 317
Claudius, the Emperor, 3, 10, 12, 19,
22, 24, 236, 251, 252, 301, 317
Claudius Sanctus, 289
Cleve (? Oppidum Batavorum), 236, 308
Cluvius Rufus, 24, 25
Coblenz (Confluentes), 9, 58, 239, 241,
297
Colline gate, the, 223, 226-227
Cologne, 11, 38, 58, 239, 240, 245, 254,
264, 268-270, 285, 288, 304, 351
" Cologne Column," march of the, 40,
57-62
Constance, Lake, 7, 9, 28, 231, 293
Consuma Pass, the, 349
Corbulo, Domitius, 157, 202, 236, 251,
325
Corsica, 76, -]-j
Cremona :
in the Vitellian invasion, 62, 80-81,
83-87, 90, 92-95, 101-124, 129,
T-2>b-i?£>, 338-339
in the Flavian invasion, 169-173,
183, 190-204
sack of, 204-206, 220
Cugerni, the, 240, 270, 307, 330
Dacians, the, 162, 163, 207, 285, 327
Danube, the, 28, 29, 161, 162
356
INDEX
" Danube Army," the :
under Otho, 26, 29-32, 36, 79, 95,
101-106, 337-338
under Vitellius, 135-138, 153, 154,
161, 164-165, 177-179
" Delmona," the, 194
Die (Dea Vocontiorum), 61
Domitian, the Emperor, 9, 20, 22,
156, 220, 224, 251, 253, 294,
3I5. 327- 332
Doria Riparia, the, 61
Drome, the river, 60
Druids, the, 244-245, 285
Drusus Claudius Caesar, 236
Drusus' Agger, 236-237, 309
Drusus' Fosse, 236-237
Dubius Avitus, 251
Dyrrhachium, 147, 148
" Eastern Army," the, 21-22, 137, 141-
144
Egypt, 21-23, 34, 143, 146
Elbe, the, 8
Emmerich, 231, 232, 236
Eporedia (Ivrea), 65, 70
Epponina, 318
Fano (Fanum Fortunae), 209, 211,
212, 215, 219
Faventia (Faenza), 348-349
Ferento (Ferentinum), 13
Finance, Roman, 7, 131
Firmus, Plotius, 126
Flaccus, Hordeonius, 9, 36, 166, 248,
259, 262, 263, 268, 269, 284
Fleet, the Roman :
under Otho, 50-52, 61, 70, 73-79
under Vitellius, 149, 180-181, 214,
216, 348-350
the Flavian, 146-149
the Rhine flotilla, 237, 262, 308-313
the " Classis Britannica," 306
Florus, Julius, 243, 247
Foligno (Fulginium), 209, 210, 219
Fonteius Agrippa, 248, 292
Forum Alieni (Legnago), 170, 171,
185, 187
Fossombrone (Forum Sempronii), 209
Frejus (Forum Julii), 51, 52, 61, 75
Frisii, the, 234-237, 239, 251, 262,
304, 320, 323, 330
Frontiers :
the Danube, 29-32, 157, 161-163,
285, 292, 332
the Eastern, 21, 143, 145
the Rhine, 8-9, 28, 142, 236-237,
251-252, 266, 332
Furlo Pass, the, 349
Fuscus, Cornelius, 154, 156-157, 180,
Galba, Servius Sulpicius, the Emperor:
descent and early career, 5, 24-25,
251
election as Emperor, 5-6
principate of, 6-15, 23, 27, 33, 6o,
139, 157, 248
death, 15, 22
Galeria, 129
Galerius Trachalus, 129
"Gallic Independence," 242-245
Gallic tribes :
See Aedui, Allobroges, Baetasii,
Belgae, Caeracates, Helvetii,
Leuci, Lingones, Mediomatrici,
Nemetes, Nervii, Remi, Se-
quani, Treveri, Triboci, Van-
giones
Gallus, Annius, 70, 71, 81, 85, 86, 96,
114, 292-294, 297, 315
Gallus, Herennius, 254, 263, 269, 270
Gaul. See Provinces, Roman
Gelduba (Gellep), 269-271, 273, 275-
278, 284, 303, 351
German tribes :
See Batavi, Bructeri, Cannenefates,
Chatti, Chauci, Cherusci, Cim-
bri, Cugerni, Frisii, Marsaci,
Mattiaci, Suebi, Sugambri,
Tencteri, Tungri, Ubii, Usipi
Germany, Lower and Upper. See
Provinces, Roman
" Germany, the Army of" :
under Galba, 9-12, 26-28, 130-131
under Otho and Vitellius, 159, 164-
169, 181-184, 196-197, 250-
260, 323-332
Germany, Independent, 7-8, 239-240,
307, 318-319
Gladiators as troops, 70, 84, 94, 119
Goch, 270
"Golden House," the, 131
Grinnes, 310
Hadrian, the Emperor, 132
Helvetii, the, 28, 63-64
Herod Agrippa II., King, 143, 144
Hordeonius Flaccus. See Flaccus
Hostilia (Ostiglia), 39, 46, 71, 86, 102,
103, 106, 169-172, 185-187, 190,
192, 348, 349
" Imperium Galliarum," the, 243-245,
29c 3T7. 320-321
INDEX
;57
Inn, the river, 28, 67-69, 162, 187
Interamna (Terni), 218, 219, 221-223
Intimilium (Ventimiglia), 74
Isola Pescaroli, 343
Istria, 30, 158
Italicus, Prince of Suebi, 161
" Italy, Army of," 37, 42, 43, 164
Ivrea. See Eporedia
Javolenus Priscus, 251
Jazyges, the, 162
Jerusalem, 143, 146
Jewish war, the, 21-23, 138-i39> 142-
r43. I4S. M6, 281-282
Josephus, 140
Julius Caesar, 241, 242, 244, 247, 317
Jura, the, 64, 242
Labeo, Claudius, 257, 259, 290, 295
Langres (Andemantunnum), 58, 59
Legions, the Roman. See Army, the
Roman
Legnago (Forum Alieni), 170, 171,
185, 187
Lek, the river, 231, 232, 236, 309,
312
Leuci, the, 58
Lingones, the, 25, 58, 242-244, 248,
285, 293-295, 297, 300, 302, 305,
3i5. 320, 330
Lippe, the river, 250, 289, 312
Locus Castorum, battle of, 88-92, 338
Luc-en-Diois (Lucus Augusti), 61
Lugdunum (Lyon), 26-28, 34, 59, 60,
128, 131
Lusones, the, 25
Maas, the river (or Meuse), 232, 240,
241, 290, 312
Macer, L. Clodius, 23
Macer, Martius, 84, 94, 95, 108
Mainz (Moguntiacum), 26, 239, 251-
257, 263, 268, 284, 285, 288,
290, 296, 297, 315, 328, 351
Mantua, 46, 71, 81, 85, 86, 190-191,
339-340
Marcodurum (Diiren), 270
Marius Celsus, 86, 88-89, °6. 106,
116, 119, 121
Marne, the river, 58
Marsaci, the, 239
Mattiaci, the, 239, 251, 284, 330
Mauretania. See Provinces, the Roman
Maximus, M. Trebellius, 24
Mediomatrici, the, 58, 241, 294, 297
Merwede, the, 232
Messalla, Vipstanus, 189, 195
Metaurus, the river, 209, 349
Metz (Divodurum), 58, 241, 298
Mevania (Bevagna), 209, 214-219
Milan (Mediolanum), 65
Mirebeau-sur-Beze, 294
Moguntiacum. See Mainz
Monaco, 184
Mont Genevre Pass, the, 51, 57, 61,
291
Moselle, the, 58, 241, 265, 286, 294,
297-304
Mucianus, C. Licinius, 21, 23, 129,
137. 139. 141. 142, 146-153. »S7.
163, 179, 210, 211, 214, 290-291
Munius Lupercus, 253, 262, 289
Mutina (Modena), 71, 191
Nabalia, the river (? Yssel), 314
Nar, the river, 218, 219
Narnia, 217-222
"Nationalism," 242-245, 320, 321
Nava, the river (Nahe), 296, 298
Neckar, the, 252, 332
Nemetes, the, 256
Nero, the Emperor, 1-6, n, 13, 14,
19, 21-24, 34, 73, 131, 139, 145,
242, 248, 317
Nervii, the, 237, 241, 244, 256, 257,
305
Nocera Umbra (Nuceria), 209
Novaesium (Neuss), 26, 254, 257, 269,
271, 276-278, 284, 286, 288,
306, 309, 311, 328
Novara (Novaria), 65
Noviomagus (? Nymwegen), 310, 328
Numisius Rufus, 254
Nymwegen (Batavodurum or Novio-
magus), 232, 262, 310, 328
Ocriculum (Otricoli), 222-224, 34^
Oglio, the river, 85, 86, 115, 194
Opitergium (Oderzo), 185
Ostia, 34
Otho, Marcus Salvius, the Emperor :
birth and earl}' career, 13-15, 24
principate, 15, 22-27, 30-32, 131,
157
campaign against the Vitellians, 71,
95"I24
as strategist, 70-73, 77-81, 100-114,
116, 120-124
death, 124-127
character, 14, 107, 123, 127
Padua (Patavium), 170, 180, 185-188
Pannonian Alps. See Alps
Parma, 191-192
358
INDEX
Parthians, the, 2, 145, 157
Passau (Castra Batava), 28, 163
Paulinus, Pompeius, 236
Petronius Urbicus, 68, 69
" Peutinger Table," the, 339
Piadena, 119
Pieve Delmona, 115
Pincian Hill, the, 225-226
Pisa, 184, 348, 349
Piso, L. Calpurnius, 12-15
Pizzighettone, 113
Placentia (Piacenza), 39, 45-50, 56,
70, 80-84, 87, 93, 96, 98, 102,
113. 338-339
Plutarch :
on Otho, 126-127
on the first battle of Bedriacum, 341-
345
Po, the, 39, 45-46, 49, 50, 102, 169
Poetovio, 37, 136, 149, 154, 158
Pomponius Secundus, P., 251
Pontic fleet, the, 146
Poppaea Sabina, 14, 15
Portents, belief in, 140
Praetorian Guards, the. See Army, the
Roman
Proculus, Licinius, 106, 116, 119, 121,
128
Provinces, the Roman :
Africa, 10, 22, 23, 65, 146, 166
Britain, 2, 22, 24, 59, 96, 98, 133,
206, 252, 314
Dalmatia, 24, 37, 59, 154, 207
Gallia Belgica, 9, 26, 206, 240-242,
250-251
Gallia Lugdunensis, 26
Gallia Narbonensis, 26, 70, 96
Germany, Lower, 9, 26, 250
Germany, Upper, 6, 9, 26, 250
Mauretania, 25, 98
Moesia, 28-32, 37, 141, 154, 162,
163, 207, 292
Noricum, 28, 29, 68, 69, 161, 162,
187, 293
Pannonia, 28-32, 37, 154, 161, 163,
186
Raetia, 28-29, 63-64, 68, 161, 162,
187, 293
Spain, 2, 5, 14, 24, 25, 97, 166,
206, 207
Syria, 21, 22, 141, 142
Ravenna, 170-172, 179, 180, 183, 185,
348-350
Recruiting, system of, 17-18, 259, 323-
329
Remi, the, 242, 244, 294
Republicanism, Roman, n, 20, 23
Rhine, the, 7, 8, 28, 231-232, 251-
252, 264-265, 269, 307
Rhone, the, 26, 59, 60, 242, 293
Rieti (Reate), 21
Rigodulum (Riol), 298-300
Rome :
importance in the civil wars, 97, 151
under Galba, 6
under Otho, 30, 40
under Vitellius, 129-130, 215
burning of the Capitol, 224
capture by the Flavians, 225-229
Rotterdam, 231, 232, 312
Roxolani, the, 31-32, 162, 163
Sabinus, Flavius, 220, 223-225
Sabinus, Julius, 247, 285, 294, 317-
3i8
Sacrovir, Julius, 243, 247
St. Bernard Pass, Great, 58, 65, 66,
68, 70, 291, 293
St. Bernard Pass, Little, 291, 293
Salii, the, 72
Salonina, 83
Saone, the, 26, 59, 242
Sardinia, 76-77
Sarmatians, the, 31-32, 162, 285, 292,
327
Savile, Sir Henry, translation of the
Histories, 74, 292
Saxa Rubra, 225
Sea, command of the. See Strategy
and Tactics
Sequani, the, 242-244, 294, 317, 320
Sextilius Felix, 162, 293, 295, 296
Sido, Prince of Suebi, 161, 162
Silvanus, M. Pompeius, 154-155
Singidunum (Belgrade), 28
Sohaemus, Prince of Sophene, 143
Spoleto (Spoletium), 218
Spurinna, Vestricius, 70, 80-85, 95
Stoichades Islands (lies d'Hyeres),
184, 350
Strategy and Tactics :
ambushes and surprises, 87-92, 273-
274- 3OI"304
annihilation, strategy of, 154-165 ;
and see Offence, strategy of
artillery and siege-engines, 200, 203,
272
base of operations, double, 47
cavalry, use of, 88-89
commander - in - chief, position in
battle, 108-109
commissariat and supplies, 211,
212, 269, 277-278
INDEX
359
communications, line of, 47-49, 61,
71, 78, 84, 113, 178, 185
concentration on the field of battle, 55
councils of war, 99
defence, strategy of, 42, 53-55, 96-
100, 148-153. I73"l84
defence, tactical, 169-173, 178-179
double objective, strategy of, 148
envelopment, strategy of, 53, 100-
114, 120-124
exhaustion, strategy of, 148-153, 164
flank marches, risks of, 102-105,
110-112, 190-191
fortresses, use of, 266, 283-284
front to a flank, tactical position
of, 48-49, 178
Initiative, value of strategical, 38, 152
minor operations of war, 51, 76-77
obstacles, strategical :
mountains, 42-45, 52, 219
rivers, 50
offence, strategy of, 38, 52, 54, 55,
146-153, i73"l84
outposts and sentries, 171
penetration, strategy of, 38, 56, 66-
69, 92-95
penetration, tactical, 100, 120
pivot of manoeuvre, a, 45
pursuit, 91, 92, 280-281
rearguard action, 281-282
reconnaissance in force, 82-83
rivers, defence of, 50
scope of strategy, 53
sea, command of the, 50-52, 61-62,
75-79- 149. IS2-IS3. i59-i6o
speed, importance of, 55, 63, 72, 79
surprises. See Ambushes and sur-
prises
tactics, relation of strategy to, 91, 99
Suebi, the, 161, 162
Suetonius the biographer, 228
Suetonius Paulinus, 71, 86, 88-92, 95-
100, 106, 116, 119, 121, 128,
282
Sugambri, the, 270, 330
Syria. See Provinces, the Roman
Syrian legions, the, 141, 142
Tacitus :
characteristics, 168, 173, 206, 286,
289, 348-350
as military historian, 69, 76-77- 82,
90-92, 99, 107, 115, 121-124,
161, 191-192, 278-281, 289,
344, 346-347 ; and see Preface
quoted, 3, 7, 15, 30, 62, 74, 119,
132, 138, 189, 203, 215, 217
Tampius Flavianus, L., 154-155
Tarracina, 216
Tartaro, the river, 169, 172, 173, 181-
183, 186, 190, 192
Taunus, 232, 234, 239, 251
Tencteri, the, 239, 300, 302, 320
Theiss, the river, 161, 162
Tiber flood, the, 72
Tiberius, the Emperor, 3, 9, 10, 19,
235. 243. 270, 317
Ticinum (Pavia), 62, 82, 92
Tiridates of Armenia, 145
Titianus, Salvius, 95, 106, 116, 119,
121, 129
Titus, the Emperor, 22, 23, 139, 144,
M5
Tolbiacum (Ziilpich), 304-305
Tongres, 240
Toul (Tullum), 58
Trajan, the Emperor, 20, 162
Treveri, the, 58, 241, 243-245, 257,
285, 293-305
Treves, 58, 241, 289, 297-304, 317
Triboci, the, 295
Tungri, the, 240-241, 245, 285, 305, 330
Turin (Augusta Taurinorum), 61, 133,
134, 258
Tutor, Julius, 247, 285-288, 295, 296,
298, 300, 304, 317
Ubii, the, 240, 270, 285, 300, 302,
320, 330
Urbinum, 184, 350
Usipi, the, 239, 284
Vada, 310
Vahalis, the river (Waal), 231, 232,
308-310, 312, 313
Valence (Valentia), 60
Valens, Fabius :
birth and early career, 1 1
invasion of Italy, 37-62, 74-75, 92
first campaign of Bedriacum, 92-95,
117-120
under Vitellius, 128, 137
second campaign of Bedriacum, 167,
172-173, 180, 183-184, 211,
213. 348, 35o
death, 222, 350
character, 60, 93, 180
Valentinus, Julius, 247, 297, 298, 317
Valerius Festus, 166
Vangiones, the, 295, 330
Vatican, the, 130
Vedius Aquila, 95
Veleda the prophetess, 250, 289, 312,
316, 352
;6o
INDEX
Vercellae (Vercelli), 65
Vercingetorix, 242, 317
Verginius Rufus, L. , 6, 9, 10, 243
Verona, 39, 46, 66, 67, 154, 169, 178,
187-192, 212
Vesontio (Besancon), 243, 293
Vespasian, the Emperor, 6, 20-22, 64,
129, 137-153' 214, 230, 248,
252, 259, 264, 290, 317, 318,
326-329, 332
as strategist, 147-153
character, 22, 138-140, 230
Vetera, Castra, 26, 239, 244, 249, 253,
254. 2S7. 262-289, 306-308,
325. 327. 328, 3S°-352
Via Egnatia, 147
Via Flaminia, 72, 209-210, 214, 218,
222-223, 348
Via Postumia, 87, 102, 192, 194, 198,
199. 339
Via Salaria, 210, 223, 226
Vicenza (Vicetia), 11, 188
Vienne, 27, 60, 133
Vindex, the revolt of, 5-6, 10, 27, 34,
242-243, 248-249
Vindonissa (Windisch), 26, 28, 38, 62,
255, 290, 293-295, 328, 331
" Vindonissa Column," inarch of the,
40, 41, 57, 62-70
Vitellius, the Emperor :
birth and early career, 9-1 1, 65
in Germany, 11, 12, 15
invasion of Italy, 24, 36, 57-58, 99,
112, 120, 128-129
in Rome, 129-132
defensive measures, 165-166, 212
218, 258, 261
death, 228-229
character, 11, 58, 120, 129, 131-132,
208, 212-216, 220, 221, 229-
230
Vitellius, Lucius, 215, 217, 230
Vocetius, Mons, 64
Vocula, Dillius, 255, 268-284, 3°7
death, 284-288, 290, 350-352
Vologeses of Parthia, 145
Volusius, C. , 203
Xanten. See Vetera, Castra
Yssel, the river, 237
Zuider Zee, the, 232-234, 237
«.*>
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