COLONIAL PIPEUNE RUPTURE
(103-20)
Y 4. P 96/11:103-20
Colonial Pipeline Rupture, (103-20)...
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
INVESTIGATIONS AND OVERSIGHT
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON
PUBLIC WORKS AND TRANSPORTATION
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED THIRD CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
MAY 18, 1993
Printed for the use of the
Committee on Public Works and Transportation
COLONIAL PIPEUNE RUPTURE
(103-20)
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
INVESTIGATIONS AND OVERSIGHT
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON
PUBLIC WORKS AND TRANSPORTATION
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED TfflRD CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
MAY 18, 1993
Printed for the use of the
Committee on Public Works and Transportation
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
71-703 WASHINGTON : 1993
For sale by the U.S. Government Printing Office
Superintendent of Documents, Congressional Sales Office, Washington, DC 20402
ISBN 0-16-041564-0
COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC WORKS AND TRANSPORTATION
NORMAN Y. MINETA, California, Chair
JAMES L. OBERSTAR, Minnesota
NICK JOE RAHALL II, West Virginia
DOUGLAS APPLEGATE, Ohio
RON DE LUGO, Virgin Islands
ROBERT A. BORSKI, Pennsylvania
TIM VALENTINE, North Carolina
WILLIAM 0. LIPINSKI. Illinois
ROBERT E. WISE, Jr., West Virginia
JAMES A TRAFICANT, Jr., Ohio
PETER A DeFAZIO, Oregon
JIMMY HAYES, Louisiana
BOB CLEMENT, Tennessee
JERRY F. COSTELLO, Illinois
MIKE PARKER, Mississippi
GREG LAUGHLIN, Texas
PETE GEREN, Texas
GEORGE E. SANGMEISTER, Illinois
GLENN POSHARD, Illinois
DICK SWETT, New Hampshire
BUD CRAMER, Alabama
BARBARA-ROSE COLLINS, Michigan
ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of
Columbia
LUCIEN E. BLACKWELL, Pennsylvania
JERROLD NADLER, New York
SAM COPPERSMITH, Arizona
LESLIE L. BYRNE, Virginia
MARIA CANTWELL, Washington
PAT (Patsy Ann) DANNER, Missouri
KAREN SHEPHARD, Utah
ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey
JAMES E. CLYBURN, South Carolina
CORRINE BROWN, Florida
NATHAN DEAL, Georgia
JAMES A. BARCIA, Michigan
DAN HAMBURG, California
BOB FILNER, California
WALTER R. TUCKER, California
EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas
BUD SHUSTER, Pennsylvania
WILLIAM F. CLINGER Jr., Pennsylvania
THOMAS E. PETRI, Wisconsin
SHERWOOD BOEHLERT, New York
JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma
BELL EMERSON, Missouri
JOHN J. DUNCAN, Jr., Tennessee
SUSAN MOLINARI, New York
WILLIAM H. ZELIFF, Jr., New Hampshire
THOMAS W. EWING, Illinois
WAYNE T. GILCHREST, Maryland
JENNIFER B. DUNN, Washington
TIM HUTCHINSON, Arkansas
WILLUM P. BAKER, California
MICHAEL A. "Mac" COLLINS, Georgia
JAY KIM, California
DAVID A LEVY, New York
STEPHEN HORN, California
BOB FRANKS, New Jersey
PETER I. BLUTE, Massachusetts
HOWARD P. "Buck" McKEON, Califoroia
JOHN L. MICA Florida
PETER HOEKSTRA, Michigan
JACK QUINN, New York
SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS AND OVERSIGHT
BARBARA-ROSE COLLINS, Michigan
Vice Chair
ROBERT E. WISE, Jr., West Virginia
LUCIEN E. BLACKWELL, Pennsylvania
LESLIE L. BYRNE, "STirginia
JAMES A BARCIA, Michigan
BOB FILNER, California
EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas
(Vacancy)
(Vacancy)
NORMAN Y. MINETA California
(Ex Officio)
ROBERT A BORSKI, Pennsylvania, Chair
JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma
JOHN J. DUNCAN, Jr., Tennessee
SUSAN MOLINARI, New York
WILLIAM H. ZELIFF, Jr., New Hampshire
WAYNE T. GILCHREST, Maryland
WILLIAM P. BAKER, California
BUD SHUSTR, Pennsylvania
(Ex Officio)
(ID
CONTENTS
Page
Summary of Subject Matter V
TESTIMONY
Brinkley, Donald R., Chief Executive Officer, Colonial Pipeline Co., accom-
panied by Victor A. Yarborough, director of engineering. Colonial Pipeline
Co., and Harold R. Melendy, senior manager of the Eastern Division, Colo-
nial Pipeline Co 75
Buttleman, Keith J., Deputy Director, public and intergovernmental affairs,
Virginia Department of Environmental Quality 103
Davis, Thomas M., Ill, chairman, Fairfax County Board of Supervisors 103
DeNoyer, John M., Ph.D., Councilman, town of Hemdon, VA, and chairman,
Fairfax County Environmental Advisory Coimcil 103
Garegnani, Jerry J., Chairman, Friends of Sugarland Run 103
Hart, Christopher A., Member, National Transportation Safety Board, accom-
panied by Larry Jackson, Acting Chief, Pipeline Division, National Trans-
portation Safety Board 27
McMurray, Rose A., Acting Administrator, Research and Special Programs
Administration, U.S. Department of Transportation, accompanied by George
W. Tenley, Associate Administrator, Office of Pipeline Safety, U.S. Depart-
ment of Transportation 37
Li, Allen, Associate Director, Transportation Issues, Resources, Community,
and Economic Development Division, U.S. General Accounting Office, ac-
companied by Barry Kime, senior evaluator, and Dr. Manohar Singh, con-
sultant engineer 67
Luftig, Stephen, Deputy Director, Office of Emergency and Remedial Re-
sponse, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency accompanied by Alfred
Lindsey, Director, Office of Environmental Engineering and Technology
Demonstration, and Dennis Carney, Chief, Region III Superfimd Removal
Branch 22
Rackleff, Robert B., President, Friends of Lloyd, Lloyd, FL 117
Schwartz, Dr. Stuart S., Director, Interstate Commission for the Potomac
River Basin, Section for Cooperative Water Supply Operations, accom-
panied by John Corless, Washington Surburban Sanitary Commission,
Perry Costas, Chief, Washington Aqueduct Division, U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers, and Jim Warfield, Fairfax County Water Authority 117
Wolf, Hon. Frank R., a Representative in Congress from Virginia 19
PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
Blackwell, Hon. Lucien E., of Pennsylvania 7
Mineta, Hon. Norman Y., of California 3
PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED BY WITNESSES
Brinkley, Donald R 217
Buttleman, Keith J 230
Davis, Thomas M., Ill 235
DeNoyer, John M., Ph.D 241
Garegnani, Jerry J 247
Hart, Christopher A 249
McMurray, Rose A 257
Li, Allen 270
Luftig, Stephen !.!!!!!!!!!!.! 291
(III)
/ IV
Page
Rackleflf, Robert B 306
Schwartz, Dr. Stuart S 327
Wolf, Hon. Frank R 345
SUBMISSIONS FOR THE RECORD
Brinkley, Donald R., Chief Executive Officer, Colonial Pipeline Co.:
Supplement to testimony regarding the training of Colonial Pipeline Co.'s
oitch and back hoe operators 84
Responses to post-heanng questions 98
Buttleman, Keitli J., Deputy Director, pubUc and intergovernmental affairs,
Virginia Department of Environmental QuaUty, responses to post-hearing
questions 114
Davis, Thomas M., Ill, Chairman, Fairfax County Board of Supervisors, letter
supplementing testimony 112
Hart, Christopher A., Member, National Transportation Safety Board, re-
sponses to post-hearing questions 37
Li, Allen, Associate Director, Transportation Issues, Resources, Community,
and Economic Development Division, U.S. General Accounting Office, re-
sponses to post-hearing questions 72
McMurray, Rose A., Acting Administrator, Research and Special Programs
Administration, U.S. Department of Transportation, responses to post-hear-
ing questions 44
Rackleff, Robert, President, Friends of Lloyd, Lloyd, FL:
News articles 125
Responses to post-hearing questions 159
ADDITIONS TO THE RECORD
Berlage, Hon. Derick P., Chairman, Environmental PoUcy Committee, Metro-
politan Washington Council of Governments, statement 350
Cole, Norman M., MPR Associates, Inc., engineers, letter with attachments .... 357
Jonas, EA., P.E., letters to J.A. Cox, Colonial Pipeline Co 368
Morin, Fred C, Chairman, Fairfax County Water Authority, letter 370
Stutzman, H. Garon, statement 373
•uDSMutm. w
FROM:
RE:
H.^. House of llqn-efinnatities
COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC WORKS
AND TRANSPORTATION
SUITE 2186 RAYBURN HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING
WASHINGTON. DC 205 IB
(202) 226-4472
May 17. 1993 -«o«»«-r^
Members of the Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight
Committee's Investigations and Oversight Staff
SUMMARY OF SUBJECT MATTER for Investigations and Oversight
hearing on the Colonial Pipeline Rupture of March 28. 1993, and an
assessment of the adequacy of existing pipeline safety regulations, especially
current pipeline inspection practices. The hearing will be held on Tuesday,
May 18. 1993. at LOO pjn.. in Room 22S3. Raybum House Office Building.
Background of the Spill
On Sunday. March 28. 1993, at 8:48 ajn., a pressurized thirty-six inch diameter
petroleum product pipeline owned and operated by Colonial Pipeline Company ruptured
near Hemdon, Virginia. The rupture created a geyser which sprayed diesel fuel over
seventy-five feet into the air, coating overhead powerlines and adjacent trees, and misting
the adjacent Virginia Electric Power Company buildings. The diesel fuel spewed out of
the ruptured line into an adjacent storm water management pond and flowed overland
and through a network of storm sewer pipes before reaching Sugarland Run Creek, a
tributary of the Potomac River. From this point, Sugarland Run flows north for
approximately seven miles before emptying into the Potomac River. See attachment L
The pipeline rupture occurred in a section of the pipeline that runs underneath the
rear parking lot of Reston Hospital Center. The depth to the pipe is approximately ten
feet below grade. The western edge of the parkii^ lot is constructed over the top of four
parallel utility easements of varying widths. The utility easements contain two liquid
petroleum product lines-a thirty-two inch as well as the ruptured thirty-six inch line,
which are owned and operated by Colonial Pipeline Company: one twenty-inch diameter
(V)
VI
liquid gas line owned and operated by the Columbia Pipeline Company; and a forty-eight
inch Fairfax County Water Authority water main. In addition, a Virginia Electric Power
Company easement with overhead electrical lines runs parallel to the underground lines
just beyond the parking lot The fact that these utility lines are located so dose together
may be significant, because the fact that damage has occurred to one of these lines
increases the possibility that damage may have been also sustained by the other lines. See
attachments
The pipeline stretches from Texas to New Jersey, alternately transporting diesel
fuel, jet fuel, and gasoline. The thirty-six inch diameter pipeline transports over
thirty-two million gallons of diesel fuel each day, supplying up to twelve percent of the
nation's daily diesel fuel consumption. The pipeline was laid in 1980 and is considered a
relatively young pipeline in the pipeline industry.
According to Colonial Pipeline officials, the rupture caused a dramatic drop in
pipeline pressure, which in turn set off an automatic hydraulic alarm located in the
manned Dorsey Junction. Maryland, station approximately 35 miles from the rupture site.
Within minutes. Colonial personnel in the Atlanta, Georgia, control center began the
process of shutting off the flow of fuel by closing the remote valves along the pipeline.
By 8:55 aon. the entire line from Greensboro Junction. North Carolina through Dorsey
Junction. Maryland, was shut down.
The rupture occurred approximately ten miles downstream from the remote valve
located at the Chantilly pumping station and 35 miles upstream from the remote valve
located at the Dorsey Junction pumping station. A manually operated block valve located
approximately five miles downstream from the site of the rupture, near the Potomac
River, was closed approximately ninety minutes following the rupture.
The Fairfax County Hre and Rescue Team arrived at the rupture site around 9M
ajn.. confirmed the location of the discharge, and immediately attempted containment
efforts. These eff orU were hampered by high, swift waters and four to twelve mile per
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hour winds, causing Fairfax County to request State and Federal assistance. Initial
estimates of the amount of the spill varied widely, hampering early assessments of the
magnitude of the accident and the emergency response effort.
At approximately 1(H)4 ajn., the National Response Center was notified. The
National Response Center is the primary federal point of contact for reporting all oil.
chemical, biological, and etiological (disease causing) discharges into the environment
anywhere in the U.S. and its territories. By 10:10 ajn. the Regional Response Center had
been notified and by 2:00 p.m. the EPA On-Scene Coordinator and the EPA Technical
Assistance Team had arrived at the site and assumed control of the emergency response
effort from the Fairfax County Fire and Rescue Team. The U.S. Coast Guard Atlantic
Strilce Team, downstream jurisdictions, and authorities whose water intake facilities are
located along the Potomac River were also notified.
Spill mitigation measures included the use of vacuum trucks and tankers, the
construction of an underflow dam, and the deployment of oil skimmers and entrapment
and sorbent booms; however, due to high water levels caused by seasonal rains, much of
the oil escaped the booms and continued to flow quickly downstream. A special pump was
lowered by a Marine Corps helicopter to the marshy site where Sugarland Run joins the
Potomac. At approximately 8K)0 p.m. on Sunday night, the leading edge of the oil sheen
was reported to have reached the Potomac River.
As the fuel oil spill neared the Potomac River, the Fairfax County Water
Authority was forced to shut down the Corbalis water intake facility which is located on
the Potomac River, approximately 200 yards downstream from Sugarland Run. The
facility remained dosed for twelve days, was opened briefly, and then quickly redoaed
after a storm flushed lingering traces of oil from Sugarland Run into the Potomac River.
The Corbalis plant was reopened the following day and is being continuously monitored at
this time. The Fairfax County Water Authority provides water for over 900.000 people.
The Washington Suburban Sanitary Commission, which supplies water to both
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Prince George's and Montgomery counties, draws water from the Potomac River at a site
located about four miles downstream from the Corbalis facility. The District of Columtna
and Arlington County water supply is drawn from a facility located on the Potomac River
near Great Falls, downstream from Sugarland Run. Fortunately, these facilities were not
affected and remained open with continuous monitoring following the spilL
The Fairfax County Health Department issued a recommendation to the public to
avoid the Sugarland Run area due to the noxious fumes associated with the oiL Strong
fumes were reported as far south as Alexandria, Virginia, several days after the rupture.
Forty-one residents of Loudoun County voluntarily fled their homes, and nearby County,
State, and National parkland was restricted from public use.
Throughout the episode, the residents of Reston, Hemdon, and Fairfax were
actively involved in the response and cleanup effort. Residents of the Sugarland Run
Creek area were very vocal in expressing their concerns over the health hazards created
by the spill, including noxious fumes, polluted soils and water, and the effect on the area's
wildlife. Concerns were also raised over the potential for contamination of ground water
and private well systems. Property owners with homes located adjacent to Sugarland Run
were particularly concerned with the spill's effect on reducing property values. A legal
effort mounted by several local citizens, to prevent Colonial from reopening the pipeline
until after the cause of the rupture was determined, failed when a federal court judge
ruled in favor of the pipeline company.
Investigation and Remediation
On March 29, 1993. the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) examined the
ruptured pipe. The NTSB is responsible for investigating, determining the probable cause
of, making safety recommendations on. and reporting the facts and circumstances of all
pipeline accidents which result in a fatality or in substantial property damage. The initial
examination at the site indicated that the rupture was located near the top of the pipe,
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and was longitudinal, extending approximately forty-two inches. NTSB ordered that an
additional 700-foot section of the pipe be excavated and the outside cleaned and inspected.
The inspection revealed several longitudinal gouges, probably caused by mechanical
damage, as well as a six-inch fatigue crack and two dents.
On March 31. 1993, an eighteen-foot section of the pipe containing the rupture and
associated damage marks was saw cut removed and transported to the NTSB lab for
metallurgical testing. On April 1. 1993. an additional eighteen-inch long section of the pipe
was removed and sent to NTSB. The section contained a large depression which was
originally located on the bottom of the pipe, approximately thirty feet north of the
pipeline rupture. Further evaluation by NTSB of the removed sections of pipeline may
reveal additional information useful in determining the source of the damage to the
ruptured pipeline.
Repairs to the pipeline were made and the pipeline was allowed to resume
operation on April 4, 1993. under a Hazardous Facility Order issued by the Department of
Transportation Office of Pipeline Safety. The Office of Pipeline Safety, which is under
the Research and Special Programs Administration of the Department of Transportation,
is responsible for the implementation of the national program of pipeline regulation,
enforcement, training, and research. The Hazardous Facility Order was issued for the
segment of pipe between Chantilly. Virginia, and Dorscy Junction, Maryland. The Office
of Pipeline Safety had inspected both the thirty-two inch and the thirty-six inch pipelines
on March 1, 1993, just four weeks before the rupture occurred: no violations were issued.
The Hazardous Facility Order allows Colonial to continue to operate the pipeline at
fifty percent of the maximum operating pressure. Additionally, the company was
required to submit a plan by midnight. Monday, April 12. 1993, for an inspection of the
line from Chantilly, Virginia, to Dorsey Junction, Maryland, using an instrumented
internal inspection device, otherwise known as a "smart pig".
On April 2, 1993, the EPA issued Colonial Pipeline Company a Unilateral
Administrative Order to protect 'Public Health and Welfare and the Environment.' In
issuing this order, the EPA directed Colonial Pipeline Company 'to study, abate, mitigate,
and eliminate such threats from oil and hazardous substances that may exist to the public
health, welfare, and/or the environment at and around the site.* Under this order the
EPA assumed responsibility to direct Colonial's response effort and required Colonial to
submit a Response Action Plan specifying a long-term monitoring and cleanup plan for
restoration of the damaged areas. The plan requires a public hearing and weekly reports
to the EPA outlining the cleanup and restoration effort progress.
On Monday. April 5. 1993. Colonial Pipeline Company excavated an area
surrounding their thirty-two inch diameter pipeline to inspect two small dents in the line,
also suspected to have been caused by mechanical damage. The thirty-two inch line runs
parallel to the ruptured line, approximately fifty feet away. The company knew about
the existence of the dents after inspecting the pipeline several years earlier with a smart
pig. After discovering the dents and evaluating the data generated by the smart pig
inspection, the company decided that the dents did not affect the overall structural
integrity of the pipeline.
At the time of this writing, all containment booms have been removed, and the
spill remediation effort continues as Colonial Pipeline Company employees,
environmental cleanup personnel contracted by Colonial. EPA representatives, and State
and local officials remain on site to oversee the cleanup effort. EPA officials are in the
process of evaluating soil decontamination methods; including bioremediation. for use on
the contaminated banks of Sugarland Run, the area where the oil flowed overland, and
the stockpiled soil removed from around the rupture site. Bioremediation is an iimovative
technology in whidi microorganisms are introduced into contaminated soil. The
microorganisms use the contaminants for food, breaking them down typically into carbon
dioxide and water.
According to NTSB officials, the current estimate (as of May 4, 1993) of the total
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amount of diesel fuel spilled is 412.000 gallons, with 3SS.446 gallons of fuel recovered. In
addition, 4,073 gallons of contaminated water were coUected.
rnlnni'al Pipeline Company
Colonial Pipeline Company was incorporated in 1962 with representatives from
nine major oil companies. The name Colonial was chosen because the proposed pipeline
was to pass through nine of the original thirteen colonies between Texas and New York.
According to company records. Colonial's original 2.853 mile system from Houston. Texas,
to the New Jersey/New York Harbor, was at the time the largest privately financed
American construction project ever attempted. The entire system now includes over 5,315
miles, and has become the world's largest-volume refined petroleum products pipeline
system. According to Colonial, the company transports more barrels of refined petroleum
products more miles than any other pipeline in the world, including the Trans-Alaska
Pipeline System. The company transports on the average 77.811.712 gallons of petroleum
products per day.
Colonial Pipeline Company began construction of their system during the 1960's.
During this period it was common practice to transport pipe using flatbed rail cars. The
vibration caused by the motion of the train created stress in the pipe which over time
became fractures, and eventually caused sections of the pipeline to fail. This type of
pipeline failure has become known as railroad fatigue. Colonial has had three failures on
the thirty-two inch pipeline in Virginia which were the result of railroad fatigue.
According to spill reporting records kept by RSPA. Colonial Pipeline Company
reported fifty-one spills between October, 1985, and February. 1993. The spills ranged in
size from one to 13,100 barrels. Of the fifty-one spills reported, seven occurred in the
state of Virginia. Of those seven spills, four were the result of mechanical damage caused
t^ a third party, one resulted from a rock under a pipe, one was due to a failed pipe, and
one was due to a valve stem leak. Including the March 28, 1993 spill, four of the eight
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largest spills reported nationwide occurred in Virginia.
Fairfax County. State of Virginia, and Federal agencies have described Colonial's
response to the incident as aggressive and fully cooperative.
Statutory Authority
Pipelines are a major means of transporting petroleum products. According to the
Annual Report on Pipeline Safety published by DOT for calendar year 1991. there are
approximately L7 million miles of natural gas pipelines and 152,300 miles of hazardous
liquid pipelines under Federal regulatory authority.
The pipeline safety program is administered by the Research and Special Programs
Administration OlSPA) of the Department of Transportation. The Natural Gas Pipeline
Safety Act of 1968, as amended (49 U.S.C. app. 1671 cl seflX regulates gas pipelines, and
the Hazardous Liquid Safety Act of 1979, as amended (49 U.S.C. app. 2001 el SfiH-).
regulates hazardous liquid pipelines. The most common hazardous liquid transported is
oiL Both AcU regulate interstate and intrastate pipeline transportation; however, states
may impose more stringent regulations over intrastate pipelines.
The federal government is primarily responsible for developing, issuing, and
enforcing minimum safety standards for interstate and intrastate pipelines. Pursuant to
an agreement with RSPA. a state agency may participate in all or part of the enforcement
of safety regulations for intrastate pipelines. The DOT may also permit a state to act as
its agent and inspect interstate pipelines traversing the state, the Department is then
responsible for taking appropriate enforcement action. Participating states are
reimbursed by the Federal Government for up to fifty percent of the costs of
implementing the pipeline safety program. The state of Virginia does not participate in
the Hazardous Liquid Program; however, it does participate in the intrastate Natural Gts
Program.
Under Section 7005 of the C:onsolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985
xin
(Pub. L. 99-272. 49 U.S.C. App. Sec. 16S2a), the Secretary of Transportation assesses and
collects annual fees from the pipeline industry to fund the cost of the pipeline safety
program. The fees are based on pipeline mileage.
The Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1972 (also known as the Clean Water
Act 33 U.S.C. 1321 eLseo) mandated the development of the National Oil and Hazardous
Substances Pollution Contingency Plan. This plan was established for the purpose of
creating a federal spill response mechanism to help meet the challenge of responding to
spills into U.S. waters and the adjacent shorelines. The National Response Plan establishes
three organizational levels-the National Response Team, Regional Response Teams, and
Federal On-Scene Coordinators-and four special force components.
This multi-level response plan combines federal, regional, state, and local resources
and establishes an organizational framework in which these resources are readily
accessible in the event of a spill. Over forty federal, state, and local agencies were
involved in various aspects of the emergency response and clean-up effort associated with
the Colonial pipeline rupture of March 28. 1993.
The Oil PoUution Act (OPA) of 1990 (PI.. 101-380) amended section 311 of the
Federal Water Pollution Control Act to clarify federal response authority and to expand
oil spill prevention, preparedness, and response capabilities of the federal government and
industry. The Colonial oil spill of March 28. 1993. was the first oil spill during which EPA
used the new authority granted to it under the OPA to direct an emergency response
effort
The OPA also required that operators of pipelines and other facilities capable of
causing oil pollution submit spill contingency plans for federal approval by the Office of
Pipeline Safety. The statutory deadline for submission of these plans was February 18.
1993. According to the Office of Pipeline Safety. Colonial Pipeline Company filed a spill
contingency plan by the deadline.
The Pipeline Safety Reauthorization Act of 1988 (PI.. 100-561) included several
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■gnifimnt requirements to improve pipeline af ety. Included was a requirement that the
Secretary of Tranqwrtation establish minimum Federal standards requiring operators of
both natural gas and hazardous liquid pipeline facilities to provide information relating to
the operation of the pipeline, such as emergency telephone numbers, maps showing the
location of the pipelines, descriptions of all transported products, operations and
maintenance manuals, an emergency response plan, and a pipeline inventory describing
the type of pipe used and the material and leak history. The Office of Pipeline Safety
intends to issue a rulemaking on this provision in the fall of 1993.
The Pipeline Safety Reauthorization Act of 1988 also directed IX>T to prepare a
feasibility study on requiring the use of internal inspection devices to inspect natural gas
and hazardous liquid transmission lines and to establish regulations requiring that new
and replacement pipelines be designed and constructed, to the extent practicable, so as to
accommodate internal in^)ection devices. In November 1992, DOT issued the feasibility
study which among its conclusions stated that
* It is not feasible to require the inspection of gas transmission and hazardous
liquid pipelines with an internal inspection device if the pipelines are not
constructed so as to accommodate the device.
* It may be feasible to ccmduct periodic inspections of hazardous liquid
pipelines with an internal inspection device in highly populated areas, if the
pipeline can aoooounodate the device and has launching traps.
The Pipeline Safety Act of 1992 (PI> 102-508) is significant in that, for the first
time, consideration was given to regulating pipelines so as to protect the environment, and
increased attention was paid to pipelines running through high-density population areas.
The Act required that all pipeline operators identify all pipeline facilities in high-density
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areas and hazardous liquid pipelines that cross a navigable waterway or that are in areas
deemed environmentally sensitive. The Act also revised the property damage threshold
reporting requirements from SS.OOO to "an amount established by the Secretary."
The additional regulations required by the Pipeline Safety Act of 1992 will be
promulgated by the Department of TransporUtion's Office of Pipeline Safety. The Act
requires that forty-eight regulations be issued, four reports be made to Congress, and that
three surveys and two studies be conducted. (See attachment 3.)
Pipeline Inspection
Pipeline corrosion is second only to third party mechanical damage in causing
pipeline incidents. Regular pipeline inspection is essential to maintaining the structural
integrity and safety of natural gas and hazardous liquid pipeline facilities and requires the
use of several technologies. These technologies include visual inspection, X-raying pipe
welds, hydrostatic pressure, and the use of instrumented internal inspection devices, often
referred to as 'smart pigs'.
Visual inspection methods include excavating sections of pijxline suspected of
corrosion and inspecting the condition of the external coatings. When external corrosion
is observed then internal corrosion can be tested for by using a hand-held ultrasonic
instrument This inspection technique is used most commonly on short segments of
pipeline. Pipeline companies also routinely survey their pipelines both by air (using light
planes and helicopters) and by land. These inspections can reveal dying vegetation,
ground cavities and water bubbles, often indicative of a pipeline leak. Illegal construction
activities occurring within the pipeline easement are also detected during aerial
inspections.
Hydrostatic testing provides information on the pressure integrity of the {ripeline
by forcing water through the pipeline at a pressure equal to 125 percent or more of the
pipeline's maximum operating pressure. Significant pipeline defects cause the pipeline to
XVI
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rupture during hydrostatic testing.
Hydrostatic testing has several limitations. It does not provide information on the
nature or extent of remaining oorrosion damage, and some experts believe that
hydrostatic testing can weaken the pipeline. In addition, the pipeline must be removed
from service during hydrostatic testing, and must be cleaned before and after the test
with cleaning pigs. Also of some concern in some areas of the country is the cost and
availability of the quantities of water required to conduct the test— and the proper
disposal of the contaminated test water.
Current regulations require pipeline operators to conduct hydrostatic testing of
their lines prior to initial operation, following replacement of pipe, and when a company
wishes to increase the volume of the transported fueL
The use of internal in^)ection devices (smart pigs) b the only pipeline inspection
technique that can detect internal and external corrosion without actual excavation of the
fnfie. Smart pigs are also able to detect certain irregularities or anomalies in the pipeline
wall, such as dents. The pig is inserted into the line and is propelled by the movement of
the fluid inside. The device carries recording equipment enabling it to record the
existence, location, and relative severity of the anomaly. Currently there are no federal
regulations on the use and frequency of smart pig inspections.
There are several different types of smart pigs in common use, including the
magnetic-flux pig. caliper or geometry pig, and ultrasonic pig. The magnetic-flux pig is
the most commonly used instrumented device. It is used primarily to detect loss of
material in the inside or outside surface of the pipe and is useful in the detection of
anomalies in the i»pe wall, such as gouges, local corrosion leading to corrosion pits, and
general corrosion.
Caliper or geometry pigs are the second most commonly used devices and are
useful in detecting dents, buckles, and wrinkles. They are primarily used following
construction of the {npeline to detect construction damage and are also used to determine
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whether the pipeline will accept a magnetic-flux or ultrasonic pig. The caliper pig has
been available since 1971. and can be used in both natural gas and hazardous liquid lines.
Many experts recommend that a baseline pig run be conducted prior to starting service in
new lines.
Ultrasonic pigs are capable of being used only in liquid pipelines although
technology is underway to design an ultrasonic device that can be used in gas pipelines as
welL Ultrasonic pigs have been useful in detecting losses in pipeline material and cracks.
The current state of instrumented internal inspection device technology is not
without limitations. Currently available smart pigs can not detect longitudinal cracks,
locate potential pipe seam failure in electric-resistance-welded pipes, or detect metal loss
in circumferential welds. They are also not readily available in sizes to fit all pipelines
and are often unable to negotiate a pipe with sharp bends, which are common in older
pipelines. Additionally, some pipelines have valves which do not permit the passage of the
pig.
Instrtimented internal inspection device technology is rapidly advancing. As the
use of this technology increases and attracts more vendors, it is expected that devices will
be available which will be able to overcome many of the current limitations. At the
present time, however, hydrostatic testing combined with the use of smart pigs and
traditional visual inspection techniques provides the highest level of safety.
In September of 1992. the General Accounting Office issued a report entitled
Natural Gas Pipelines: Greater Use of Instrumented Inspection Technologv Can Improve
Safely (GAO/RCED-92-237). According to GAO, smart pigs have been used by pipeline
companies since the 1960's, and cleaning pigs were used as early as 1890. In this report
GAO provided an indepth analysis of the benefits and limitations of using smart pigs in
pipeline inspections. Much of the information in the report is applicable to both natural
gas and hazardous liquid pipelines.
xvm
-M-
ISSlfi
The Colonial Pipeline rupture of March 28, 1993, focuses attention on the issue of
pipeline safety and raises a number of questions regarding whether the existing
regulations are sufficient to ensure safe pipeline operation. The following list includes
several of these issues:
1. There are no federal requirements regulating the distance between or the
type of shut-off valves used. In the March 28, 1993, spill, even though the
flow of fuel was shut off uithin minutes of the rupture, over 412,000 gallons
of fuel were spilled, because the rupture point was 10 miles downstream from
the closest shut-off valve.
2. A current regulation requires that shut-off valves be used on pipelines on
both sides of watercrossings where the body of water is more than 100 feet
wide. In most cases, these valves are manual shut-off valves which are often
not quickly accessible. Since pipelines often cross streams and rivers less than
100 feet wide that are tributaries of larger ^-aterbodies, it is not dear, given
the new emphasis on protection of the environment, that this regulation
provides sufficient protecti(xi.
3. Statistics indicate that third party damage is the leading cause of pipeline
failure, yet there is no federal regulation requiring states to participate in
"One-Call" systems.
4. Pipeline inspection using internal inspection devices is the only way (without
excavation) to detect internal and external pipeline corrosion; the second
leading cause of pipeline failure. There is currently no regulation requiring
xrx
-15-
tbese in^xctkxu.
5. There are no ttandards available oo whkfa pipeline operators can base
decisions cm what action to take as a result of detecting, through smart ptg
nins. pipeline defidencies and anomalies of any given d^ree of severity.
Data interpretation u instead conducted by individual companies, based on
individual experience. The lack of industry-wide standards can lead to the
misinterpretation of internal inflection data and result in otherwise avoidable
pipeline accidents.
6. In passing the Pipeline Safety Acts of 1988 and 199Z Congress has continued
to strengthen federal statutes in an effort to improve pipeline safety. The
Office of Pipeline Safety faces a tremendous backlog of regulations required
to fulfill the pipeline safety goals of Congress. It is not clear as to whether
the federal resources dedicated to pipeline safety are adequate to cover the
additional work required.
7. Colcmial Pipeline has had four serious pipeline ^jills in Virginia since 1985.
At question is to what extent Colonial's construction techniques, maintenance
practices and inspection methods are contributing factors.
8. The Colonial Pipeline ^nll was the first oil spill during which EPA exercised
its authority under the 1990 Oil Pollution Act An examination of the overall
re^xnse effort may provide useful insight in determining the adequacy of
the legislation m addressing future emergency response efforts.
XX
Initial Spill Location
ATTACHMENT 1
XXI
««»... lU.»t»T [T]
fnncMJ las
ATTACHMENT 2
XXII
FACT SHEET
"THE PIPELINE SAFETY ACT OF 1992"
The major provisions of th« Pipelin* Safety Act of 1992 are
sunnarized as follows:
o Adds environmental protection, in addition to need for pipeline
safety, as a goal of Federal safety standards;
o Requires all pipeline operators to identify pipeline facilities
in high-density population areas, and in the case of hazardous
liquid lines, areas deemed environmentally sensitive or those that
cross a navigable waterway;
o Requires periodic inspection of all pipelines and directs D.O.T.
to prescribe the circumstances, if any, under which such
inspections should be conducted with the use of a smart pig; If
smart pigs are not required, an inspection method that is at least
as effective, is required to be used; Also provides that D.O.T.
can require an existing transmission facility to be modified (i.e.
remove valves) to accommodate a smart pig, as long as its current
basic construction would accommodate such a device;
o Requires D.O.T. to issue regulations to prescribe circximstances,
if any, where operators of natural gas distribution systems must
install excess flow valves in new and renewed service lines;
D.O.T. must issue a report to Congress on the reasons for any
determination that EFV's would not be required in any circumstance;
D.O.T. must issue regulations prescribing performance standards for
EFV's; Operators of natural gas distribution systems must notify
customers on new and renewed lines where an EFV could be installed,
in accordance with the performance standards, of the availability
of an EFV and install the device where the customer pays all costs
associated with the installation;
o Requires the appointment of two individuals with backgrounds in
environmental protection to each Pipeline Safety Standards
Committee and requires at least one member of each Committee to
have no financial interest in pipeline, petroleum or natural gas
industries;
o Requires D.O.T. to issue minimiim operator training requirements
for all pipeline operators and authorizes the Secretary to provide
for self -certification by operators;
o Requires D.O.T. to publish a notice as to the availability of
the industry guidelines for the replacement of cast iron pipelines;
o Expands inspection requirement for Gulf offshore pipeline
facilities to all offshore pipelines and those in navigable
waterways;
ATTACHMENT 3
XXIII
-2-
o Directs D.O.T. to define by regulation the tern "gathering line**
and "regulated gathering line"; Exempts crude oil gathering lines
of nominal diameter of six inches or less, operating at low
pressure, and located in rural areas that are not unusually
sensitive to environmental damage from definition of regulated
gathering line;
o Clarifies the Secretary's authority to regulate intrastate
pipeline transportation to the extent that the certifying state is
not adequately doing its job;
o Raises the minimum civil penalty for a violation of the Acts
from $10,000 to $25,000;
o Gives state officials responsible for pipeline safety, notice
and opportunity to comment on any agreement proposed to be entered
into by the Secretary to resolve a proceeding; Comments of local
officials may be incorporated;
o Requires operators of natural gas distribution systems that do
not maintain customer-owned service lines up to the building walls
to advise their customers of the requirements for maintenance of
those lines; Directs D.O.T. to conduct a comprehensive safety
review to evaluate existing policies, procedures and rules with
respect to customer-owned service lines, the extent that lack of
maintenance of customer-owned service lines raises safety concerns,
and make recommendations regarding maintenance of those lines,
including any legislative and regulatory action; Requires D.O.T.
to conduct a survey of owners of customer-owned service lines to
determine the views as to whether distribution companies should
assume responsibility for the operation and maintenance of
customer-owned lines; After completion of the study and report to
Congress, D.O.T., in cooperation with State and local authorities,
shall take action, as appropriate, to promote adoption of measures
that would improve the safety of customer-owned lines;
o Ensures that only states which have certified pipeline programs
can adopt different safety standards from the federal program;
o Makes abandoned pipelines subject to the safety oversight of
D.O.T.; D.O.T. must define what constitutes a hazard to navigation
with respect to underwater abandoned pipeline facilities;
Operators must report abandonments to D.O.T.; State officials must
report to D.O.T. information on collisions between vessels and
abandoned pipeline facilities;
o Prohibits any exception from hazardous liquid pipeline safety
regulations based solely on the fact that facility operates at low
internal stress;
o Requires D.O.T. to survey and assess the effectiveness of
emergency flow restricting devices and issue rules prescribing
circumstances under which operators of hazardous liquid pipeline
facilities must install emergency flow restricting devices;
xxrv
-3-
o Requires MTSB to investigat« and report on pipeline accidents
that involve significant injury to the environment, in addition to
the current requirenent to investigate pipeline accidents involving
loss of life or substantial property damage;
o Makes it a criminal violation of the Acts for an excavator to
fail to call a one-call system or heed marking information and
subsequently damages the facility causing death, serious bodily
harm, actual damage to property over $50,000, or release of more
than 50 barrels of product; Makes civil and criminal penalties
apply to pipeline operators who fail to accurately mark facilities
or fail to participate in a one-call system; Requires D.O.T. to
notify OSHA of any pipeline accident in which an excavator may have
violated OSHA regulations;
o To the extent funds are provided in advance in appropriations
acts, authorizes D.O.T. to hire twelve new additional pipeline
safety inspectors;
o Authorizes $500,000 for D.O.T. to carry out a research and
development program on underground utility location technologies;
o Authorizes D.O.T. to conduct a study of the abandonment of
underwater pipeline facilities;
o Authorizes appropriations for the pipeline safety programs for
fiscal years 1992-1995;
o Establishes the Research and Special Programs Administration as
an agency within D.O.T. by statute (RSPA has existed by delegation
of authority within D.O.T.);
o Makes various technical amendments to the Hazardous Materials
Transportation Act;
o Provides for an exemption for certain rail-motor carrier
mergers.
COLONIAL PIPELINE RUPTURE
TUESDAY, MAY 18, 1993
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight,
Committee on Public Works and Transportation,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 1:20 p.m., in room
2167, Raybum House Office Building, Hon. Robert A. Borski (chair-
man of the subcommittee) presiding.
Mr. Borski. The subcommittee will come to order. The sub-
committee today will be examining the rupture of the Colonial Oil
Pipeline which spilled 412,000 gallons of diesel into Sugarland Run
and tiie Potomac River in Northern Virginia on March 28th.
This unfortunate incident has caused considerable and justifiable
concern and distress in Northern Virginia and I want to express
my appreciation to the gentlewoman from Virginia, Ms. B3me, for
bringing this matter to the attention of the subcommittee as quick-
ly as she did.
The issue before us is whether something could have been done
to reduce the likelihood of this spill in an area that is both highly
populated and environmentally sensitive. Was this spill inevitable
or could it have been prevented through more frequent and more
rigorous inspections and other precautions?
Oil spills and environmental damage are the all too frequent
price we pay for the conveniences and advances of modem society.
We must reduce that environmental damage to the bare minimum
through the concentrated use of the most advanced technology
available to us and through constant vigilance.
The question this subcommittee will attempt to answer today is
whether the maximum precautions were taken in the case of the
March 28th spill. It is important for us and for the people of North-
em Virginia to find out what the Colonial Pipeline Company has
done in the past to prevent this type of rupture and spill and what
precautions are being taken to prevent it from happening again.
It is also our job to look closely at the actions of the Federal reg-
ulators. The Office of Pipeline Safety has a big job, overseeing nat-
ural gas pipelines which extend 1.7 million miles and hazardous
Uquid pipelines which cover 152,000 miles.
Throughout its system, Colonial transports 77 miUion gallons of
petroleum products each day. The vast majority is moved safely
and without incident but when confronted with the significant and
serious damage that can be caused by these hazardous substances,
even a minor spill can be intolerable.
(1)
It was because of the extensive system of pipelines that Congress
moved in 1988 and in 1992 to upgrade the safety requiremente. At
the same time, however, the resources available to the Office of
Pipeline Safety for its regulatory activities and the National Trans-
Eortation Safety Board for its investigation of accidents have not
een increased.
The most troubling question of all is why with the attention that
has been paid to pipeline safety and regulation during the last five
years was no one able to detect the impending rupture of the Colo-
nial Rpeline in Northern Virginia?
With hundreds of millions of gallons of hazardous liquids and bil-
hons of cubic feet of natural gas moving through pipelines each
day, it is essenti£d to find out if this is a case of faulty laws and
regulations or faulty implementation.
The Northern Virginia spill was the first use of the Unified Com-
mand to direct the emergency response to oil spills that was en-
acted in law after the Exxon Valdez spill. This hearing gives us an
early opportunity to evaluate the workings of the unified command
but our focus should be on preventing spills with the widespread
damage that even small amoimts of petroleum can cause.
Before we continue, I will place in the record statements received
firom Hon. Norman Y. Mineta, Chair of the Committee on Public
Works and Transportation, and Hon. Lucien E. Blackwell.
{Statements referred to follow:]
CHAIRMAN NORMAN Y. MINETA
SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS AND OVERSIGHT
COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC WORKS AND TRANSPORTATION
HEARING ON THE COLONIAL PIPELINE RUPTURE
MAY 18, 1993
I WANT TO THANK OUR NEW COLLEAGUE FROM THE
IITH DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA, LESLIE BYRNE, FOR
ENCOURAGING THIS COMMITTEE TO LOOK INTO THE
CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE RUPTURE OF THE COLONIAL
PIPELINE THAT TOOK PLACE IN HER DISTRICT ON MARCH
28, 1993. I SAY THAT BECAUSE THIS SPILL BRINGS INTO
SHARP RELIEF THE ISSUES OF SAFETY AND ENVIRONMENTAL
RISK THAT SHOULD BE THE FOCUS OF OUR PIPELINE
REGULATORY SYSTEM.
NO LIVES WERE LOST AS A RESULT OF THIS SPILL,
AND NO INJURIES OCCURRED, BUT THE ENVIRONMENTAL
DAMAGE WAS MAJOR. OVER 50,000 GALLONS OF DIESEL
OIL HAVE BEEN LOST INTO THE ENVIRONMENT, AND
REMEDIATION OF DAMAGED SOILS WILL TAKE YEARS.
THIS SPILL REMINDS US OF THE IMPORTANCE OF THE
AMENDMENTS WE MADE LAST YEAR TO THE PIPELINE
SAFETY PROGRAM TO MAKE ENVIRONMENTAL DAMAGE A
MAJOR FOCUS OF THE PROGRAM. I LOOK FORWARD TO
HEARING FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
HOW THEY PLAN TO IMPLEMENT THIS NEW FOCUS OF THE
PROGRAM.
CLEARLY, NOT ALL THE ANSWERS ARE IN ON THE
CAUSES OF THIS SPILL. BUT SOME POTENTIAL CAUSES
ARE CLEARLY APPARENT. THE NTSB METALLURGICAL
REPORT POINTS CLEARLY TO MECHANICAL DAMAGE AS THE
CAUSE OF THE RUPTURE. THE ONLY QUESTION IS, DID
IT TAKE PLACE WHEN THE PIPELINE WAS LAID, OR DID IT
OCCUR LATER?
IF IT TOOK PLACE WHEN THE PIPELINE WAS LAID, WE
CLEARLY NEED EITHER MORE STRINGENT CONSTRUCTION
STANDARDS OR MORE STRINGENT ENFORCEMENT OF
EXISTING STANDARDS. IF IT TOOK PLACE LATER. THEN
WE NEED TO FOCUS MORE ON THE PROBLEM OF
THIRD-PARTY DAMAGE THAT HAS ALREADY BEEN
IMPLICATED AS THE CAUSE OF OTHER PIPELINE SPILLS.
IN EITHER CASE, WE NEED TO LOOK AGAIN AT THE
ADEQUACY OF OUR INSPECTION REQUIREMENTS, SINCE AN
INTERNAL "SMART PIG" INSPECTION PROBABLY COULD HAVE
DETECTED THE FLAW THAT CAUSED THIS PIPE TO BREAK.
I LOOK FORWARD TO THE RESULTS OF THIS HEARING,
AND I AM CONFIDENT THAT IT WILL BE ONE MORE STEP IN
THE PROCESS OF IMPROVING THE SAFETY OF OUR PIPELINE
SYSTEM AND REDUCING ITS ADVERSE ENVIRONMENTAL
IMPACT.
STATEMENT OF CONGRESSMAN LUCIEN E. BLACKWELL
SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS AND OVERSIGHT
COLONIAL PIPELINE INCIDENT HEARING
MAY 19, 1993
Mr. Chairman, First, I wish to
commend you and the
gentlewoman from Virginia for
bringing this crucial issue to the
forefront of the Subcommittee
agenda.
An oil spill is perhaps one of
the most environmentally tragic
consequences of our everyday
reliance on petroleum products.
Nobody wants an oil spill, and
when one occurs, we would all
like to think that we have done
everything in our power to prevent
such a catastrophe.
But the sad truth is Mr.
Chairman, that oil spills do occur,
Sometimes, as we all know,
these spills are massively
devastating.
10
Our recent memory of the
1 989 grounding of the Exxon
Valdez which resulted in a 35,000
ton oil spill in one of our nation's
most environmentally fragile areas,
or Saddam Hussein's deliberate
dumping of nearly 1.5 million tons
of crude oil into the Persian gulf,
makes the topic of oil spills one of
the hottest environmental issues
today.
11
But what about the smaller
spills, that happen literally, right in
our back yards?
On March 28th when 400,000
gallons of diesel fuel spewed from
a Colonial Pipeline into Sugarland
Run, and eventually a 50 mile
stretch of the Potomac, we
realized just how vulnerable every
community in this nation is to the
hazards of a potential oil spill.
12
Residents were forced to flee
their homes. Plants and wildlife
were instantly killed. Water
supplies were threatened. The
spill drew the anger of residents
throughout the community, many
of whom had no idea that millions
of gallons of oil flowed beneath
their homes each and every day.
13
We have assembled here
today, not to point fingers, or
place blame. That would clearly
be counter-productive to what this
vital hearing is attempting to
accomplish.
What we must concentrate on
is the issue of pipeline safety, and
the multitude of questions
surrounding the complex operation
of these vital energy lines.
14
We need to examine current
regulations pertaining to sliut off
valves in the event of similar
disasters.
We must consider the need to
enact universal standards for
pipeline inspections.
15
The technology of "smart-
pigging" carries great promise for
detecting defects, but unless we
can make good use of this data, it
will be sacrificed in vain.
16
With four serious pipeline spills
in Virginia since 1985, the time
has also come for the Colonial
Pipeline Company to take a look at
some of their own individual
practices, particularly in regards to
inspection.
10
/
17
I am confident that the results
of this hearing will prove most
fruitful as this Subcommittee seeks
to determine how we can avoid
these environmental tragedies in
the future.
I welcome all of our witnesses
here today, and once again Mr.
Chairman, commend you for all of
your hard work. Thank you.
11
18
Mr. BORSKI. Let me recognize oxir distinguished Ranking Mem-
ber, tiie gentleman from OMahoma, Mr. Inhofe.
Mr. iJraOFE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and I want to
also thank and commend Congresswoman Byrne and Congressman
Frank Wolf for calling our attention to this and bringing this issue
to the attention of the subcommittee.
As a representative of the oil capital of the world, pipeline safety
has always been of interest to me. Unfortunately several years ago
my district was the site of a pipeline accident. In our case, it was
an explosion which was due m part to the introduction of foreign
matter into the pipeline.
Not only did the explosion damage the pipeline, it released haz-
ardous ftimes into the air and threatened the safety of pipeline em-
ployees.
The most important lesson learned from the explosion is that the
key to minimizing public health risks and environmental damage
is to have a workable emergency response plan.
It is my understanding that all involved in the emergency re-
sponse to the March 28th spill in Reston are to be commended. Due
to the immediate efforts of the Fairfax Fire Department and Colo-
nial Pipeline Company emergency response teams, the extent of
damage was not as e3ctensive as it could have been given the vol-
ume tnat was spilled. Once the degree of the spiU was known, addi-
tional help was asked for and received from various Federal and
State agencies.
While there is never a good time for a spill, it appeared that in
this incident all the relevemt governmental and private entities
were able to come together and respond to the emergency in a com-
prehensive and effective manner.
In retrospect, we must now answer the question how safe is safe
enough or what more needs to be done to prevent future spills?
WWle it is relatively simple to require periodic pigging and in-
crease the freauency of emergency or remote shut-off valves, the
difficulty is balancing these requirements with economic realities.
Unfortunately we can never make a system completely fail proof,
even if it were technically feasible, it would be economically impos-
sible.
Equally impossible is placing an economic value on spill preven-
tion. Thus we must balance the value of increased regulation
against the cost of compliance.
Also we must recognize that pipeline owners and operators are
not the only entities that require oversight. Equally important is
the need to address issues involving sharing of easements and pos-
sible third-party violators.
It is my hope that our efforts here today will result in a well
thought out viable comprehensive response to future pipeline re-
quirements and not just a reaction to one incident.
Mr. Chairman, given the large niunber of witnesses, I will stop
here and I look forw£u*d to hearing these witnesses.
Mr. BORSKI. The Chairman would now like to recognize the dis-
tinguished gentlewoman from Virginia, a valuable Member of this
subcommittee.
Ms. Byrne. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would also like to thank
you for providing us the forum. By the turn out today, you see it
19
has gathered a lot of interest and we are here to discuss the Colo-
nial Pipeline rupture on March 28th, in the 11th congressional dis-
trict. And to see what measures to prevent such disasters in the
future we can address.
First of all I, too, would like to thank and congratulate Colonial
Pipeline, the EPA, Fairfax County Fire and Rescue, and the many
other agencies that played an integral role in the cleanup effort.
The emergency phase product recovery rate was impressive. And I
hope that the long-term efforts proceed in the same manner.
With more than 400,000 gallons of number two diesel fuel
spilled, they had a difficult job on their hands and all of these that
I mentioned rose to the occasion. And I commend them for that.
There is no question that pipeline transportation of petroleum
products and natural gas is a fact of life. It is more affordable and
safer than many other modes of fuel transport.
However, since these intricate systems of transport are
honeycombed underneath our homes, our businesses, our roads,
and our hospitals, in this case, we must insvire the safety of our
institutions and the individuals who live and work on top of them.
This is the second major incident involving oil in my district. Be-
tween the tank farm on Pickett Road and the pipeline, Fairfax
County is starting to look like the Exxon Valdez.
My constituents and I have grave concerns about the health and
environmental effects of these spills. We are curious about why
they continue to happen and wonder why the industry seems ad-
verse to making changes that would make some catastrophes less
likely.
We have all called this hearing today to determine if there are
ways to prevent the latest occurrence and three major spills by Co-
lonial in the Commonwealth of Virginia in the past and many more
throughout the United States by this pipeline company and others.
Our goal today is to ascertain what the pipeline industry can do,
what the agencies involved can do, and what we in Congress can
do to insure the health, safety and welfare of our citizens.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
TESTIMONY OF HON. FRANK R. WOLF, A REPRESENTATIVE IN
CONGRESS FROM VIRGINIA
Mr. BORSKI. The Chair thanks the gentlewoman.
First I would like to welcome our first witness, the distinguished
gentleman from the State of Virginia, the Ranking Member of the
Appropriations Subcommittee on Transportation, Congressman
Frank Wolf.
Mr. Wolf. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to submit my
full statement if I may for the record and summarize.
Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding the hearings on the recent
Colonial pipeline break in Northern Virginia. In addition, I want
to publicly commend the Fairfax Hazmat Team and the other Fed-
eral and State and local agencies for their response to this unfortu-
nate spill, and also pay a tribute to local officials in Loudoun Coun-
ty and supervisor Bob Dix, whose district this is, and chairman
Tom Davis. Both of them provided day-to-day, hour-to-hour leader-
ship on this issue. In interests of brevity I will summarize.
20
As the Chairman and Members of this committee know, the Poto-
mac River tributary, Sugarland Run, into which most of the
400,000 gallons of diesel spilled, traverses Virginia's 10th congres-
sional district, which I represent.
I appreciate, Mr. Chairman, the opportunity to share with the
committee my concerns and thoughts about some possible steps to
avoid these disasters, or at least mitigate their impact. My testi-
mony will stress proactive ideas to supplement or replace what
seems to be reactive poUcy.
It has been suggested that the Office of Pipeline Safety, OPS,
does not belong in the Department of Transportation and would
more appropriately fit into the portfolio of another Federal agency
such as the Department of Energy. True, pipelines are a mode of
transportation but only in the sense that utility lines are also, and
pipelines transport energy.
In addition to a more natural fit in terms of subject matter, the
Department of Energy seems to be a more compatible home for
pipeline safety for two other reasons. First the Department of En-
ergy has expertise with costs and market circumstances affecting
the energy industry which is important since any regulatory activ-
ity needs cost benefit analysis.
And second, the DOE also has extensive emergency response ca-
pabihty with respect to energy catastrophes.
Currently OPS is within the Research and Special Programs Ad-
ministration, RSPA, of the Department of Transportation. RSPA is
one of the most enthusiastic and hard working groups in the de-
partment, and let me just say, my statement today is not meant,
and I want to stress this, is not meant as any criticism. They have
done a very good job.
While this group is one of the most enthusiastic and hard work-
ing, they simply do not have the staff or the resources to carry out
the duties assigned to them. The result is that the Nation's pipe-
line network is not receiving adequate oversight.
Mr. Chairman, I would emphasize again, I am not being critical
of RSPA, which cheerfully performs admirably on a shoestring
budget. The people are hard working and dedicated.
I will give you a graphic example of just how overwhelmed RSPA
is. In a recent hearing of the transportation appropriations sub-
committee on which I serve as the ranking Republican Member, we
were discussing their fiscal year 1994 budget request for $2.6 mil-
Uon to contract out the review of detailed emergency response
plans submitted by private pipeline operators as required by the
Oil Pollution Act of 1990. Mr. Chairman, there is a room at RSPA
literally stacked with hundreds of plans awaiting review. No one
has actually looked at them because they don't have the staff. It
is not a criticism, they just don't have the manpower.
I don't know, whether prior to the spiU, Colonial's pipeline plan
had been read or was gathering dust like all the others in the
RSPA holding tank. Nor am I claiming prior review of this plan
would have prevented the spiU we are discussing today. However,
it is important to remember that a major factor in the high-volume
release of product into the environment during Colonial's spill was
the delay of up to one and one half hours in getting to the mtmual
valves. This underscores the importance of an emergency response
21
plan as well as the obvious assumption that these plans need
prompt review so that emergency sta*ategies can be amended as
necessary before disaster strikes.
Why is the Office of Pipeline Safety in RSPA? I go into great de-
tail in my full statement. RSPA does an outstanding job. They have
the Volpe Center which is on the cutting edge of research such as
IVHS technology. OPS has been placed in RSPA because there isn't
any other place in the Department of Transportation where they
would fit.
Mr. Chairman, I thoroughly beUeve there are immediate steps
that can be taken to make pipelines' safety more proactive. First,
is the use of internal inspection devices, "smart pigs," which Jim
Inhofe mentioned.
Last year the GAO concluded that widespread use of smart pigs
could save Hves and protect property by improving the safety and
rehabihty of natural gas and hazardous hquids transmission lines.
In 1988, Congress required RSPA to establish minimum federal
safety standards so that all new and replacement pipelines could
accommodate smart pigs. Prior to this 1988 congressional mandate,
the National Transportation Safety Board had recommended in
1987 that RSPA required natural gas and hazardous liquid pipeline
transmission operators to make modified and repaired pipelines
piggable.
RSPA has not issued either of the required regulations or fea-
sibility study which was due in May. I nope this committee will
push for a speedy final rule making in this area.
Second, Mr. Chairman, there is another issue pending on the
long delayed rule making docket at RSPA. For many years the Na-
tional Transportation Safety Board, NTSB, has requested that
RSPA issue regulations requiring excess flow valves.
In addition, the 1992 Pipeline Safety Act reqmres RSPA to issue
regulations in this area and indeed RSPA has issued an advanced
notice of proposed rule making. However, the next step in the regu-
latory process, issuing a notice of rule making, has not yet followed.
I would hope this is an area where the committee will do what
it can to speed up action as well as urging frequent spacing for
these valves which will maximize protection, especially in heavily
populated areas and areas with fi"agile ecosystems.
Finally, Mr. Chairman, there is the issue of third partv damage.
I think that has to be dealt with. This committee should look into
that. It is very, very important.
In the area where there is an ongoing rule making, I would urge
the committee to explore options that would speed up the process.
I am specifically referring to the rule making concerning tiie one-
call systems such as Miss Utility. All owners of underground utili-
ties should be required to belong to a one-call system so that prior
to an evacuation, a call would be made which would result in the
location of all underground utiUties. An emerging technology, sub-
surface utiHty engineering, can further help pinpoint the location
of utiUties. I was told that some utihties are not members of Miss
UtiUty. I was also told that about a number of locahties around the
country.
Someone told me, and it may not be accurate, the other day that
Arlington County, which used to be in my congressional district.
22
does not participate in Miss Utility. That may be wrong. I think
from a UabiUty point of view, any utility would want to be part of
it.
I just think it is so important to — almost as a protection for the
utility — that it would want to be involved and certcdnly any local
government or county or a unit of government would want to be
involved.
So there are the three major points upon which we elaborate in
detail in my testimony because I don't want to take the committee's
time and I again thank the Chairman for holding the hearings, I
appreciate it very much.
Mr. BORSKI. I thank the gentleman.
Questions for this gentleman?
If not, let me thank you for your testimony. As always, it is very
thoughtful.
Mr. Wolf. Thank you. Bob.
Mr. BORSKI. Thank you, sir. We would like to welcome our sec-
ond witness, Stephen Luftig, Acting Deputy Director, Office of
Emergency and Remedial Response.
He is accompanied by Mr. Alfred Lindsey, Director, Office of En-
vironmental Engineering and Technology; and Mr. Dennis Carney,
Chief, Region III Superfund Removal Branch.
Would you please stand.
[Witnesses sworn.]
Mr. BORSKI. Let me first thank all of our witnesses for appearing
before the subcommittee today. We have an extraordinanly full
agenda this afternoon. So that we might be able to hear from all
of our witnesses, we would ask that each of you summarize your
statements. Of course, your entire statements will become part of
the record.
Mr. Luftig?
TESTIMONY OF STEPHEN LUFTIG, ACTING DEPUTY DIREC-
TOR, OFFICE OF EMERGENCY AND REMEDIAL RESPONSE,
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, ACCOMPANIED BY
ALFRED LINDSEY, DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF ENVIRONMENTAL
ENGINEERING AND TECHNOLOGY DEMONSTRATION; AND
DENNIS CARNEY, CHIEF, REGION HI SUPERFUND REMOVAL
BRANCH
Mr. LUFTIG. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
My name is Stephen Luftig, Acting Deputy Office Director for the
EPA's Office of Emergency and Remedial Response within EPA's
Office of SoUd Waste and Emergency Response. And I am pleased
to represent EPA here today.
I am pleased to have the opportunity to address your subcommit-
tee on tne subject of the recent Colonial Pipeline Company oil spill
in Fairfax County, Virginia.
With me today are two other EPA representatives, Mr. Alfred
Lindsey, Director of the Office of Environmental Engineering and
Technology Demonstration, which is within EPA's Office of Re-
search and Development; and Mr. Dennis Carney of EPA's Region
III, Superfund Removal Branch.
With your permission, I would like to submit written testimony
for the record.
23
Mr. BORSKI. So ordered.
Mr. LUFTIG. EPA is one part of a large emergency response net-
work that includes many Federal, State, and local participants
throughout the country. EPA's role is described in the National
Contingency Plan which is our regulatory blueprint for emergency
planning and response.
In addition to the national plan, each EPA regional office has a
regional contingency plan in place covering various parts of the
country. In general, we differentiate between planning for oil spills
and responcfing to spills once they occur. It is our goal, of course,
to prevent oil spills from occurring. However, when spills do occur,
EPA assumes a lead role in responding to oil spills in the inland
areas of the United States, while the Coast Guard has the lead re-
sponse role for spills in the coastal areas. Great Lakes, and some
large rivers.
On Sunday morning, March 28th, the National Response Center
telephoned the EPA Region III duty officer who is on call 24 hours
a day to report a major pipeline oil spill. The spill was initially es-
timated at several hundred thousand gallons and impacted the
Sugarland Rim, a tributary of the Potomac River.
Upon his arrival at the spill that afternoon, EPA's on-scene coor-
dinator met with county emergency personnel who had already
promptly initiated response measures that morning by deplo5dng
booms to begin containing the spilled oil. In cooperation with State,
county, and local officials, EPA employed a unified command sys-
tem in accordance with the Region III Regional Contingency Plan-
ning.
This pre-set arrangement allowed EPA to direct spill response ef-
forts as required by the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 and forced the
productive use of all available response resources.
This coordination is vital because there are several competing
priorities to consider in such a response. To protect pubhc health,
drinking water faciUties must be immediately notified. As a result,
some water intakes were temporarily closed and others were mon-
itored frequently for any contamination. To prevent spilled oil from
entering the Potomac River, and to protect the areas environment,
booms and other spill mitigating devices were employed at the
most accessible areas of Sugarland Rim. To keep the pubhc in-
formed, a telephone pubhc information hotline was quickly estab-
Ushed and staffed by Fairfax County. Response personnel were on
the scene round the clock for several days. It is estimated that
about 407,000 gallons of No. 2 fuel oil, a heating oil, were dis-
charged from the pipeline.
Our assessment of the Sugarland Run identified a considerable
amount of shoreline contamination as well as wildlife injury. From
the beginning of the incident. Colonial Pipeline had participated in
the response activities; and on April 2nd, EPA issued a xinilateral
administrative order to Colonial Pipeline.
In response. Colonial Pipeline provided a draft response action
plan detailing their future activities including long-term monitor-
ing along Sugarland Run and the Potomac River and cleanup of oil
contaminatedf areas.
Now, several weeks after the spill, a considerable amount of
work remains to be completed. Activities are under way to remove
24
excavated soil and to more fully assess the extent of contamination
and any environmental damage.
I would like to put this particular spill into perspective with
other spills. About 19,000 oil spills were reported last year to the
Federal Government. About 9 percent of tiiese are attributed to
pipelines. The Colonial Pipeline spill was a very large spill. It was
the second largest pipeline spill reported to the National Response
Center during the past 12 months.
Thsuik you for the opportvmity to appear before your subcommit-
tee. My EPA colleagues and I will be pleased to answer any ques-
tions you or the other subcommittee Members might have.
Mr. BORSKI. Thank you very much, Mr. Luftig.
Generally speaking, the emergency response to the Colonial spill
seems to have gone pretty well, with the staff from EPA, local fire
and rescue companies, and Colonial working well together.
But suppose the spill had been worse, suppose the spill had oc-
curred closer to the Potomac so that it was not contained within
the Sugarland Run, and suppose more oil had escaped, how ade-
quate would our resources have been? What m£u*gins of safety do
we have in our preparedness?
Mr. Luftig. As you say, the coordination went well and there
was sufficient equipment and on-time response to trap a lot of oil
in Sugarland Run oefore it hit the Potomac. And it would be dif-
ficult to judge what would happen if more oil spilled closer to the
larger Potomac River and difficult to evaluate the weather condi-
tions and situations under those circumstances.
We were able to bring a lot of spill response equipment to the
site quickly. ITie Coast Guard helped us through a couple of their
response centers, shipping equipment quickly to the site. We bor-
rowed a helicopter fi-om the United States Army, and a lot of equip-
ment was deployed very quickly.
If the site had been more inaccessible and closer to the Potomac,
likely more oil would have reached the Potomac River.
During this high flow time, I think less oil impacted the drinking
water intakes than might have impacted the intakes during lower
flow times or if more oil had been discharged. But a larger spill,
closer to the Potomac, would have had a greater impact on the Po-
tomac River.
Mr. BORSKI. So our preparedness really wouldn't change had that
occurred again?
Mr. Luftig. Depending on the volume of oil present. I think we
were able to deploy a lot of equipment very quickly, though, to trap
most of this oil.
Mr. BORSKI. The gentleman fi*om Oklahoma?
Mr. Inhofe. Tha^ you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Luflig, would you just characterize in one or two sentences
the level of cooperation that received fi*om Colonial during this inci-
dent?
Mr. Luftig. I would say that they were cooperative. They were
there early during the response with the county responders, and
they have been fulfilling the requirements that we have asked
them to undertake thus far within our administrative order.
Mr. Inhofe. I always look at these things as hoping to make
them learning exp>eriences.
25
Do you think, as a result of this accident, along with the work
you have been doing, that we have better prepared ourselves for
something like this in the future?
Mr. LUFTIG. I think that the groups that got to work together,
\infortunately, because of this spill are now better prepared even
than before. They know each other better and are more aware of
others* available resources to do things, like notify the public, keep
a hotline open; but the groups were already famiUar in that they
did have the regional contingency plan in place. And I think we
were fortunate in that regard.
Mr. Inhofe. I think Representative Wolf made it pretty clear
when he said that everybody was cooperative, everyone worked
hard, but perhaps we are just lacking some resources. There are
never enough resources.
In one of the written testimony that was submitted, one of the
witnesses suggested tiiat the leading source of oil pollution in the
United States is pipelines.
Do you agree with that statement?
Mr. LUFTIG. It is difficult to say. We go by data that is reported
to the National Response Center. And as I mentioned, there were
about 19,000 oil spills reported last year, and approximately 9 per-
cent of those were pipeline oil spills.
About 13.2 percent of the quantity of oil spilled was reported last
year. In 1991, about 13.2 percent of the quantity of oil spilled was
reported to have come from pipelines.
Mr. Inhofe. That answers the question. Thank you very much.
Mr, BORSKI. The gentlewoman from Virginia.
Ms. Byrne. It is my understanding that the EPA monitored the
product recovery as the cleanup was going on; and in the initial
stages of this, it was reported that we had 200,000 gallons; and
then, incrementally, it kept going up as more product, I guess, was
discovered. And it struck me then, how do we verify the numbers
that we get from Colonial?
Is that your job? Do you verify those numbers?
Mr. LUFTIG. Ms. Byrne, it was very hard to estimate the amount
of oil that was beiug recovered. And the way it was done and con-
tinues to be done is that as oil is pulled out with water, it is then
separated, and the oil is usually recovered.
And based on the first batches of oil that were removed and sep-
arated, the Colonial Pipeline people gave us an estimate of how
much oil was being removed with each batch. And that was then
projected to the future as far as futiu*e oil removals.
So it was a guess based on separating oil in the first few batches,
and it certainly did vary over time. I think our closest estimate
now is about 350,000 gaUons. We rely on their estimates, the folks
that EPA had on scene. And at one point we had four or five people
there. Response people, aroimd the clock, were really involved with
deploying the equipment and managing — helping to manage the
site. And we were reljdng on the pipefine compan/s estimate of the
amount of oil recovered.
The other part, too, if I may, is that the numbers reported as vol-
ume recovered are interesting but don't direct our response, nec-
essarily. That is mostly a visual kind of response. Where we see
the oil and think we can get it, we go afl;er it.
26
Ms. Byrne. So do you feel that the recovery rates on these fig-
ures that were given by Colonial are fairly high?
I mean, I think it is estimated that we recovered all but 50,000
gallons or something like that.
Is that a fairly high figure for recovery rate on this kind of spill?
Mr. LUFTIG. It is very high, yes.
Ms. Byrne. Let's get into what we are going to do now, a little
bit about long-term mitigation.
What kinds of mitigation, long-term — now that we have got the
dirt separated and everything pulled out of there that we saw
today, what do you think is going to happen to it?
And how long will it take to make the decision about what is
going to happen to that contaminated soil?
And when can we expect the aifected areas to regain their status
prior to the spiU?
Mr. LUFTIG. I will pass that to Mr. Carney who is managing the
site cleanup.
Mr. Carney. First of all, with regard to when we will be making
some decision with regard to disposal of soil and things, under the
administrative order that we issued to Colonial, they are required
to provide us with some plans on options on how to handle that soil
and, presuming they want to do off-site treatment on some loca-
tions, where they would want to take it.
Upon our review, then, we would give them the authority to go
ahead and implement that. We have not received those plans, but
we expect them soon. In terms of when the area itself may be re-
stored to its original conditions — ^which is, I guess, the question as
I understood it — ^that is very difficult to judge.
This area was significantly, as you know, and seriously impacted
environmentally by the oil spill. The stream itself served almost
like an open culvert, if you will, for people to be able to boom
across and work along while we recovered the oil. And because it
was like that, that is why there were such high volumes of oil re-
covery, why there was such an ability to — a good ability to retain
it in the stream before it got to the Potomac.
It is very difficult to judge. We will continue to work with the
State and local governments and the local town of Hemdon and
others to give them opportunities to review plans that we receive
fi*om Colonial so we can get local input into the assessment and re-
mediation process so that we can try and make sure it gets done
as quickly as possible.
Ms. Byrne. I just have one last question, Mr. Chairman.
Last Monday, I think it was, in The Washington Post, there was
an article regarding long-term effects of diesel oil. Did any of you
happen to see that and the experiment that was done that diesel
oil as it breaks down in the environment becomes more toxic and
not less; and one of the remediation efforts that have been talked
about is letting it degrade in the environment, biodegradability I
guess it is.
Could you comment? Have you any knowledge that diesel be-
comes more toxic rather than less toxic as it is exposed to the envi-
ronment?
Mr. LuFTlG. Mr. Lindsey will answer that.
27
Mr. LiNDSEY. I, xinfortunately, did not see that article, and I will
have to find it and take a look at it.
What happens in the environment, typically, is that, over time,
the oil bioremediates naturally. Microorganisms break it down and
use it as foodstuffs, if you will. In the Valdez situation in Alaska,
we did rather large-scale controlled tests and then treated a lot of
the coastline via this method by trying to augment, if you will, nat-
ural bioremediation by using nutrients.
We did, in that case, spend quite a bit of resources looking at
that issue. And we were not able to find any increase in toxicity
in the breakdown products. Of course that was crude oil and not
No. 2, so I can't vouch for what specifically might happen there.
But we will have to get that information and take a look at it.
Ms. Byrne. It was a study done by the Portel Marine Science
Laboratory in Sequim, Washington, that showed the differences be-
tween diesel oil, crude, and other types of petroleum products. And
I would recommend that to you before we decide on the remedi-
ation on the site.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. BORSKI. The Chair thanks the gentlewoman.
Mr. Lindsey, let me follow up. Is EPA considering using
bioremediation in this Sugarland Run area?
Mr. Lindsey. That is one of the options on the shoreline-some of
the contaminated shorelines which is a possibility.
I think I would defer to you, Dennis, on that.
Mr. Carney. Again, the administrative order which we have is-
sued to Colonial basically gives them the opportunity to provide us
a plan with various options or alternatives on how to best handle
the remediation of not only the soils and piles where excavation oc-
curred, but along the shoreline as well.
Bioremediation is certainly an alternative that they may consider
as well as enhanced bioremediation where you actually try to do
something to stimulate the naturally occurring organisms locally,
or there may be some other options that seem appropriate.
We have not received that plan yet. We expect it soon.
Mr. BoRSKi. If the plan came in did not include bioremediation,
would that be something you could encourage them to do?
Mr. Carney. I think we need to take a look at what their pro-
posal was first.
Mr. BORSKI. Any other questions?
If not, thank you very much.
Mr. BoRSKl. We would like to welcome our third witness, Mr.
Christopher A. Hart with the National Transportation Safety
Board. Mr. Hart is accompanied by Mr. Larry Jackson, Acting
Chief, Pipeline Division, National Transportation Safety Board.
Gentlemen, would you please rise?
[Witnesses sworn.]
Mr. BORSKI. Mr. Hart, you may proceed.
TESTIMONY OF CHRISTOPHER A. HART, NATIONAL TRANS-
PORTATION SAFETY BOARD, ACCOMPANIED BY LARRY
JACKSON, ACTING CHIEF, PIPELINE DIVISION, NATIONAL
TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD
Mr. Hart. Thank you.
28
Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman and Members of the subcommit-
tee. I appreciate the opportunity to appear on behalf of the Na-
tional Transportation Safety Board to discuss our ongoing inves-
tigation into the recent Colonial Pipeline Company accident in
Northern Virginia.
With me today to help with questions is Larry Jackson, the Act-
ing Chief of our Pipeline Division.
In the Umited time available, I would like to give a synopsis of
my written testimony that you now have before you. But I would
ask that the written testimony be included in the record.
Mr. BoRSKi. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. Hart. Thank you.
As this panel knows, the National Transportation Safety Board
is an independent agency that is charged with investigating trans-
portation accidents, determining their probable cause, and propos-
uig safety recommendations to help prevent their recurrence.
The Safety Board also conducts safety studies and evaluates the
effectiveness of the programs of other government agencies and
companies in the transportation industries for preventing transpor-
tation accidents.
Liquid pipelines transport about 54 percent of our Nation's petro-
leum products. When released during accidents involving such
pipelines, these products can cause mmions of dollars in environ-
mental damage and other disruptions.
These losses were not considered in developing pipeline safety
standards until recently when the Pipeline Safety Act of 1992
added environmental protection as an objective for pipeline safety
standards.
The accident we are discussing today is the March 28th, 1993,
rupture of the 36-inch Colonial Pipeline Company pipeline in Hem-
don, Virginia, that runs behind the Reston Hospital Physicians Of-
fice Building.
This rupture occurred in a section of pipeline between a pump
station in Chantilly, Virginia, and another station 45 miles from
there in Dorsey, Maryland. At the point of the rupture, the top of
thepipeline was approximately eight feet below the surface.
The company's controller in Atlanta received an alarm from the
Dorsey station, and within minutes, remotely closed certain valves.
In addition, two pumps at the Dorsey station automatically
stopped, and the Dorsey station operator remotely closed another
Dorsey station valve.
Between these remote control valves were several manually oper-
ated valves, and local Colonial employees drove to some of the
valves downstream of the rupture on both sides of the Potomac
River and closed them to further isolate the line.
The 45 miles of pipeline between the remotely operated valves
are estimated to have a capacity of about 12.4 million gallons, or
about 295,000 barrels. The company. Colonial, estimates that about
407,000 gallons, or about 9,700 barrels of No. 2 fuel oil, escaped.
And they estimate that they recovered about 87 percent of that.
Near the rupture site was a nm-off pond for the hospital parking
lot, and the escaping fiiel oil from the rupture quickly filled that
pond and entered into a storm drain that entered into Sugarland
Run Creek, from which it flowed into the Potomac River and
29
threatened the nearby water intake for Fairfax County. The water
intake was subsequently closed, and citizens in the immediate area
were evacuated.
When the pipeline was excavated after the accident, there were
large boulders and rocks on and around the pipeline that could be
seen. The boulders and rocks were removed dxiring excavation.
When the excavation reached the pipe, the 42-inch rupture on the
top of pipeline was exposed.
An 18-foot section of the pipeline was taken to the Safety Board
Material Laboratory for further examination. Microscopic inspec-
tion of that section in o\ir lab preliminarily suggests a metal scrap-
ing on the top of the pipe, although no determination has yet been
made as to me source of this scrape. There were also some dents
on the pipe.
Several days after the accident, the Office of Pipeline Safety of
the Research and Special Programs Administration within DOT re-
quired Colonial to expose and examine an additional 700 feet of the
pipeline to search for additional damage along the medical office
parking lot.
This pipe segment rested on a protruding bedrock, and during
the lifting of the pipeline, a dimple was discovered in the bottom
of the pipe. The Board requested Colonial to also remove this dent-
ed pipe section located 28 feet downstream from the rupture. It
was also taken to our laboratory where the dent was observed to
be about three-quarters of an inch deep and about 10 inches across.
The on-scene phases of the Safety Board's investigation are now
finished, and we are now reviewing Colonial's design and construc-
tion records as well as its previous pipeline accidents and operating
and maintenance history.
The issues we are now examining include the adequacy of inter-
nal electromagnetic, ultrasonic, and other pipeline inspections,
their utilization by Colonial, and existing requirements for their
use.
We are also looking at the adequacy of inspections during pipe-
line installation and during construction and maintenance that oc-
curs near a pipeline; remotely operated and automatic shut-off
valves; early leak detection procedures and their performance in
conjunction with supervisory control and data acquisition systems,
such as the one that was in use by Colonial; the structure and in-
tegrity of the pipeline; and Feder^ oversight of the Colonial Pipe-
line activities.
As this subcommittee knows, these are not new issues for the
Safety Board because we have recommended for some time the use
of appropriate pipeline internal inspection eqmpment at least since
1987.
We have also recommended appropriately spaced remotely oper-
ated valves to enable the prompt isolation of sections that pass
through populated areas.
Again, the Safety Board thanks the subcommittee for the oppor-
tunity to testify, and I would be very pleased to answer any ques-
tions that the panel may have.
Mr. BORSKI. Thank you very much, Mr. Hart.
Mr. Hart, in your testimony, you stated that the remote control
valves on the ruptured 36 inch pipeline were located 45 miles apart
30
and that the 45-mile segment of the pipehne had the capacity to
hold 12.4 mUUon gallons. Based on your experience with pipeHnes,
is 45 miles an imusually long distance between valves or is it fairly
typical in the pipeline industry?
Mr. Hart. Mr. Jackson will take that question.
Mr. Jackson. The spacing of valves, there are no regulations
with respect to that. For liquid valves, tiiere are some in the natu-
ral gas regulations. But with respect to this, in this area, there are
none. The spacing typically has been used depending on what they
thought was neetfed on the length and pumping of the stations.
In this case, tiie valves were at the pump stations, 45 miles
apart, and you needed additional force to get the material through
the pipeline.
Mr. BORSKI. The safety board issued recommendations in the
past on pipelines which pass through highly populated areas. Does
the safety board have any specific recommendations regarding the
spacing of these valves either in highly populated or sensitive
areas, and what recommendations do you have outstanding that
might affect the length of the spacing?
Mr. Jackson. I think the safety board's history started about
1971 when we said, remote valves should be placed throughout the
system. Numerous studies were done in the early 1970s which said
they were not cost beneficial. As we entered the late 1980 era and
issued recommendations again in this area.
The strategy we used to, hopefully, get some adoption of regula-
tions in this area is they are cost beneficial in the populated areas
and where there is possible environmental impact damage. We
made those recommendations in 1987. I think RSPA has since done
a study which shows that it is feasible in those areas. Of course,
PubHc Law 100-561 indicated that RSPA should go forward in that
rule-making process.
Mr. BoRSKi. The gentleman fi*om Oklahoma.
Mr. Inhofe. Mr. Hart, your testimony indicated that there are
a niimber of NTSB recommendations that have been made concern-
ing pipeline internal inspection equipment and insulation of re-
motely operated valves. Could you enlighten the subcommittee as
to what the status is of those recommendations, if they have been
acted upon, or if there are any outstanding?
Mr. Hart. There are some outstanding, but we have deemed the
response to be unacceptable. Mr. Jackson can supply the details.
Mr. Jackson. As a result of the Beaumont, Kentucky Act, we is-
sued 87-6 and 87-6 to RSPA. They replied that they were related
to what they were doing. There was no action taken in this area
until the 1988 Public Law 100-561. They began a study on the fea-
sibility of requiring operators to use the devices.
That study was completed and submitted to Congress in 1990.
Meanwhile, we had additional accidents involving the Southern Pa-
cific in San Bernardino, California. That was the train accident
when the pipeline was scraped and it ruptured several days later.
We reiterate the recommendation.
Currently there is a MPRM that RSPA has out on internal in-
spections. We are very concerned with that. It says you should be
able to run inspection devices through their lines. There is no re-
quirement that you have to have the ability to get that device into
31
the line and receive it. That is one of the problems we saw in the
California accident where they are going to have to run two or 300
miles. And the speed of two or 300 miles per hour, it would take
a very long time to get that pipeline opened again.
In 1990, GAO did a study pertinent to natural gas, but much of
that occiured to the Uquid pipelines. In 1993, they responded to the
recommendations of 86 and 87, and the board voted to change that
to unacceptable response. We were glad to see tiie public laws and
we were hoping RSPA will see action in this area very soon.
Mr. Inhofe. Let me ask the same question I asked the previous
witness. As a responding organization, how would you characterize
the efforts and performance of Colonial, of EPA, the State and local
entities.
Mr. Hart. If I might again, I would like to defer to Mr. Jackson.
Thank you.
Mr. Jackson. At this point, I think it is premature for us to
m£ike any statement to that effect. We are still collecting a tremen-
dous amount of data. Typically, the safety board will look at some-
thing from two or three different angles or aspects. Until we ana-
lyze it different ways, I think it is premature to say how Colonial
performed or Fairfax or the water authorities or EPA.
Specifically, we have not even gotten the EPA reports and not
gotten into the aspect of litigation, so I think it is premature.
Mr. Inhofe. Then how would you characterize their cooperation?
Mr. Jackson. We have had tremendous cooperation from them
with the material and information we have requested from them.
From that standpoint, there has been a good working relationship
with all the organizations.
Mr. BORSKI. The gentlewoman from Virginia, Ms. Byrne.
Ms. Byrne. Are you saying the pipeline rupture was due to me-
chanical damage but you are not willing to assess when, where or
who damaged tiie pipe?
Mr. Hart. No, I uiink what we have discovered preliminarily is
that there are some metal signatures on the pipe that indicate a
scraping of metal. It is not that we are not willing, but we are in
the process of conducting that examination as we speak, and we
are yet not able to determine. If Mr. Jackson has additional details,
I would defer to him.
Mr. Jackson. Before we get to the bottom of that question, we
plan to do metallurgy analysis looking at how many fatigue sched-
ules it went through. About 30 percent went through those fatigue
signs. We want to try to get an idea for perhaps when the initial
mechanical damage occurred. We also want to combine that with
all Colonial's flights, where they observed information along the
line, somewhat going on. We also want to combine that by looking
at this utility data we are still seeking and getting slowly.
We will also look at Fairfax County permits and we may go into
the individual logs for various construction projects along the right
of way in that area. That is going to be an intensive effort that will
take time.
Mr. Hart. That right of way is qxiite crowded. There are some
other Colonial pipelines and other lines overhead.
Ms. Byrne. I think we should talk about some other right of
ways that are there later on this eiftemoon, too.
32
The Water Authority of Fairfax County was out at the site dur-
ing the time this pipe was made and had brought us photos that
I am going to share with you and make part of tiie record and give
you a set of them. But it was at the time and the site of the laying
of Colonial.
[The photographs follows:]
33
34
35
36
Ms. Byrne. The first one, Mr. Chairman, shows an unusual
gouge, an indentation at least as this pipe was being laid. I wanted
you to have a copy of this and try to determine if you recognize
these types of gouges in this pipe as the type of longitudinal gouges
that you talked about, because I think it is indicative of somethmg
other than a third-party damage. So we will pass these on to you
for you to take a look at.
In your other testimony, you also stated that when they dug the
pipe up, there were a large number of boulders?
Mr. Hart. Yes, rocks and boulders.
Ms. Byrne. As product oil goes through these pipelines, they vi-
brate and that is the reason why we really don't want a lot of back-
fill that has large boulders. There is a standard, I believe, about
how big backfill can be in terms of you have to be able to hold it
in your hand. Can you help me on that?
Mr. Jackson. We are not aware of any Federal regulations to
that. What we will look at the contract specifications for that. The
backfill issue is definitely an area that we will look into in the in-
vestigation and determine if that was a role in this accident or if
it was a good practice.
We are concerned about this because we looked at the research
and data there. We found 51 Colonial accidents in the case and
they did talk about them being due to rocks and boulders. So we
are interested in that area and we will explore it. With regard to
Fairfax, they have provided us with some pictures during initial
construction and showed some large rocks and boulders in the area.
Ms. Byrne. Mr. Chairman, I have two photographs, as I men-
tioned before, where these pipelines are being laid at the time on
the site. It shows the backhoe putting rather large boulders back
in the hole around this pipeline.
I will also submit these to the safety board and the committee
so they can make them part of the record. We are really not at the
point where we can assign what happened in this particular rup-
ture, are we?
When we hear people say there had to be third-party damage
during the construction, we are not at that point?
Mr. Hart. Given our resources, it will probably be at least a year
from the accident until we come up with a completed report and
a probable cause determination. In that report, we may also look
at other Colonial accidents.
Ms. Byrne. One last follow-up question, Mr. Chairman. Mr.
Chairman, you asked about the 45 miles between the shut-off
valves. Is that an average? We talked about no regulations apply-
ing. But is there an average? Can you determine what the average
is between shut-off valves?
Mr. Hart. I will defer on that to Mr. Jackson.
Mr. Jackson. If we wanted to get some type of feel for that infor-
mation, we would have to do it on Colonial's basis or perhaps do
some kind of inventory and ask a number of companies to provide
us information on that. But we ourselves right now do not have
that information.
Ms. Byrne. Thank you. That is all I have, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. BORSKI. Are there any other questions? If not, thank you
both for your testimony.
37
[Subsequent to the hearing, additional question were submitted
to Mr. Hart (NTSB). The questions and responses follow:]
Questions for the Record Submitted by Chairman Borski (NTSB)
1. When the ruptiired pipe was excavated, were soil samples taken firom below
the pipe to determine if product other than diesel fuel was leaking prior to the main
rupture?
Response. Soil samples were not taken from below the pipe, since the initial re-
view and field examination of the failure, conducted by a Safety Board metallurgist,
suggested that the rupture was catastrophic with no opportunity for a small leak.
Later, this field assessment was confirmed by the in-aepth metallurgical analysis
that was conducted in our laboratory.
2. Were the anomalies discovered in the excavated Colonial pipeline greater than
the industry standard of less than 6% of the thickness of the pipeline w^?
Response. Anomalies observed on the pipe included dents, scrapes and a fatigue
crack. ASME standard B31.4 (1992 edition), section 451.6.2 defines the limits for re-
moval of pipe. Gouges and grooves having a depth greater than 12.5% of the nomi-
nal wall thickness and dents exceeding 6% of the nominal pipe diameter are to be
removed or repaired. Since the pipe was 36-inches in diameter and 0.344 inches
thick, the dents had to be 2.16 inches deep and gouges and grooves had to be 0.043
inches deep to require removal. The dents, gouges and ^tmves did not approach
these deptns and would not have required replacement. The scrape progressed to
a fatigue crack that extended to a depth of a third of the wall thickness. If this
crack had been detected prior to rupture it would have been removed or repaired
based on the ASME standard.
3. One of the central responsibiUties of NTSB, as it relates to pipeline safety, is
to investigate pipeline accidents in an effort to determine the cause of the accident
and to propose safety recommendations to prevent further accidents from occurring.
According to yovir records, of over 2,000 pipeline accidents reported annually, onfy
25-30 accidents are investigated by NTSB's two pipeline investigators. Does NTSo
have the necessary personnel to effectively fulfill its mandated pipeline safety re-
sponsibiUties?
Response. Currently, there tire about 400 pipeline accidents annually that are re-
quired to be reported to RSPA by the companies. When the severity of an accident
exceeds $500,000, results in a fatality, or an extensive release of highly volatile liq-
uids, the Safety Board investigates the accident. The Safety Board's pipeline inves-
tigators conduct 10 to 20 accident investigations annually. In addition, the States
or RSPA are requested by the Safety Board to investigate an additional 10 to 20
accidents. Because of changes in the 1992 Pipeline Safety Act, the Safety Board also
investigates accidents that result in significant iiyury to the environment.
The Safety Board does not have sufficient resources to investigate all pipeline ac-
cidents. The accidents are screened carefully to determine the severity of^the acci-
dents and the possible issues. This screening process allows the Board's limited
pipeline investigation resources to be applied to those accidents that have a signifi-
cant impact on pipeline safety on a national scale. To assist in future investigations
that involve significant iiyury to the environment, as mandated, the Safety Board
is seeking an additional position in the fiscal year 1995 budget.
Mr. Borski. We would like to welcome our next witness Mrs.
Rose A. McMurray, Acting Administrator, Research and Special
Programs Administration, Department of Transportation accom-
panied by Mr. George W. Tenley, Associate Administrator Office of
Pipeline Safety.
[Witness sworn.]
TESTIMONY OF ROSE A. McMURRAY, ACTING ADMINISTRATOR,
RESEARCH AND SPECIAL PROGRAMS ADMINISTRATION, DE-
PARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, ACCOMPANIED BY
GEORGE W. TENLEY, ASSOCIATE ADMINISTRATOR, OFFICE
OF PIPELINE SAFETY, DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Ms. McMurray. Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman and members of
the committee. I am pleased to appear on behalf of the Secretary
of Transportation concerning important issues arising out of the
38
Colonial Pipeline Company spill of diesel fuel on March 28, 1993,
into Sugarland Run in Fairfax County, Virginia. Appearing with
me is George W. Tenley, Jr., Associate Administrator for Pipeline
Safety.
My testimony follows the format presented in the Subcommittee's
letter requesting the Department's appearance. I have provided for
the record testimony which outlines the Subcommittee's request. In
that written testimony, I discuss our mission, areas of oversight,
goals and challenges.
Simply put, our goal is to assure the highest level of pubUc safety
and environmental protection at a cost commensurate with real
risk. Among the many challenges we face, we beUeve we must have
a comprehensive risk management system. We have plans to use
the system to consider the relative risks of all potential causes of
accidents and the probability of fluorocarbons.
The pipeline program is in transition as we work toward manag-
ing the program on the basis of comprehensive risk assessment. We
have basically six areas of operational focus: Data analysis and in-
formation systems, research and development, regulatory pro-
grams, compKance, training and information dissemination, and
emergency response.
The most important element of our risk assessment process, and
the one which we acknowledge needs much more attention, is reU-
able data.
The 36-inch pipeline that ruptured in Reston, Virginia is cur-
rently in service at a pressure of 50 percent of its maximum operat-
ing pressure.
In accordance with RSPA's hazardous facility order. Colonial sub-
mitted a plan for the internal inspection of the pipeline using an
instrumented diagnostic device. This is commonly referred to as a
"smart pig." Based on negotiations with Colonial, our agency will
determine the most appropriate pig to run in this pipeline. We ex-
pect to conclude these negotiations no later than next week.
The Colonial incident demonstrates the value of new construction
inspections. If we had been able to be on the scene when the 36-
inch line was constructed, we woxild be in a better position today
to assure you our construction standards were properly followed.
However, with only two inspectors in 1980 for the entire eastern
region, we could inspect very few new construction projects.
Concerned about the environmental impact of the Colonial spill.
Secretary Pena, in one of his earhest acts as Secretary of Transpor-
tation, directed we review the adequacy of the Federal pipeline pro-
gram in providing environmental protection. This will quickly re-
sult in an action plan ensuring that additional environmental pro-
tection measures are put on a priority timetable.
As the Secretary has made clear, the actions we take to meet his
strong commitment to environmental protection must be weighed
against actions necessary to meet our public safety mission.
The environmental mandate is relatively new to RSPA. An im-
portant first step is the identification and rank of those areas of
geographical risk of pollution fi*om hazardous Uquid pipelines. We
are particularly interested in rivers that are sources of drinking
water.
39
Once these areas £u*e known, we will apply our primary regu-
latory strategy, putting emphasis on prevention of accidents and
spills and the maintenance of pipeline integrity. This means keep-
ing the product in the pipe. While spills from pipelines are undesir-
able, the unfortunate reality is that probably more spiQs will occur.
To limit the numbers and consequences of these spills, we are
looking at putting added emphasis on monitoring and emergency
response procedures. In our comphance program, we are assessing
means to reduce environmental risk through a redirection of in-
spection time related to liauid operators, new construction, and
field time inspections of pipelines and related facihties.
With respect to the important State programs, we are evaluating
the extent of State participation in the hazardous Uquid program.
We £u*e determining how to enhance our field comphance presence
and the number of pipelines inspected by States.
In implementing the Oil Pollution Act, or OPA, we beUeve we
need to reach out to industry and the States to collaborate in a na-
tional effort to map pipelines. Also, we want to better support the
area of contingent planning efforts for setting environmental prior-
ities.
Historically, accidents like the recent Colonial spill in Virginia
have provided valuable lessons. The Federal pipeline program that
we have today has been derived from lessons learned from similar
accidents which became mandates through past and current pipe-
line legislation.
We are concerned that lessons learned be viewed in terms of
their relative merits. All risks associated with pipeline transpor-
tation are not equal.
As we implement the 14 rule-makings, studies, reports and other
mandates of the Pipeline Safety Act of 1992, RSPA will prioritize
those initiatives based on risk assessment.
As we go through the Oil Pollution Act, we go through areas such
as pipeline reauthorization mandates as interrelated to OPA work.
Our analysis of OPA response zones involve areas of environmental
importance and the means to provide adequate protection whether
through protection or response.
With the data provided from OPA response plans, we are begin-
ning work to map geographic information systems to benefit the
base program. Since low stress lines are regulated under OPA, we
have information on those lines which help us with those manda-
tory initiatives under the Pipeline Safety Act.
We have advocated a comprehensive approach to management of
the program. This requires an effort in which all involved with
pipeline safety and EPA join with resources and data to address
the causes of pipeline accidents. This requires States availing
themselves of the opportunity to assume the broadest possible ju-
risdiction for overseeing intrastate pipeline regulations.
Government, academia and States must all work together to xm-
derstand the emerging trend, solve safety and environmental pro-
grams, and accept program priorities within available resources.
To achieve the best possible record, we must end the historical
and adversarial paradigm of regulator versus the regulated. We
stand ready to work with this committee and others to meet their
goal.
40
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Tenley and I are prepared to an-
swer any questions that you have.
Mr. BORSKI. RSPA has received numerous recommendations from
NTSB, GAO, and others, many of which have not been imple-
mented. Would the Colonial spill or others have been avoided if
those recommendations had been implemented? I'm talking about
the use of the smart pigs, criteria for hydrostatic tests and installa-
tion of remote operated valves?
Ms. McMURRAY. In each case, there has been some effort that
has been undertaken in the Office of Pipeline Safety to study the
NTSB studies. Not all of them have proceeded into an actual rule.
We have right now a study of the smart pig program as part of our
mandates of the 1992 Act.
We have been working coUegially, I beheve, with the NTSB in
making progress in each and every one of those areas. While we
wish we could report more closed and acceptable actions from the
NTSB, we still would assert we have been working with them to
proceed to the goal of mitigating the pipeline problems we have in
this country.
Greorge may want to add to that.
Mr. Tenley. If all those means were in place, then I would have
to say, yes, you would reduce the number and consequences of
spills. To the extent they emanate from NTSB recommendations, to
determine the probable cause of an accident, we have to look at
these issues and others. Sometimes that slows us down.
Mr. BORSKI. What is the status on the emergency slow flow re-
striction devices required by the Pipeline Safety Act of 1992?
Would these have made a difference in Northern Virginia?
Ms. McMuRRAY. We had a report issued in 1991 on that subject,
I beheve. We are currently considering how we might proceed with
the recommendations in that study.
Mr. BORSKI. Would you care to comment if they would have
made a difference in this particular incident?
Mr. Tenley. I don't beheve it would have. Clearly, again, you can
say that 45 miles is too broad a distance in that area for remotely
controlled valves and they should have been closer, but in deter-
mining where to put them, you have to consider topography of the
land and other things. You still would have had a drainage if they
were closer. You have to consider these issues in how to place your
valves.
Mr. BORSKI. What is your opinion of the unified command re-
sponse to the March 29 spill?
Ms. McMuRRAY. Being someone in an acting capacity, I had my
first experience with responding to a m^or oil spill. It seemed to
me there was a great deal of cooperation, collegiality and commu-
nication.
Our office dispatched to the scene right away, an inspector from
the eastern region. He reported back to us on tiie response by the
coimty and the Coast Guard. And other jurisdictions were nothing
short of a case study in regional cooperation.
Mr. BORSKi. The gentleman from Oklahoma?
Mr. Inhofe. I have no questions.
Mr. BORSKl. The gentlewoman from Virginia.
41
Ms. Byrne. It is my understanding that for an anomaly in a pipe
to be required to be fixed by your office, it has to be 6 percent of
the thiclmess of the pipe.
Is that correct?
Ms. McMuRRAY. I beheve that is the engineering standard that
we adhere to and implement.
Ms. Byrne. In the safety board's testimony, they talked about
the pipe having dents and scratches that exceed this threshold. I
assvime you didn't know they had dents and scratches that ex-
ceeded 6 percent?
Mr. Tenley. We are aware fi-om our examination conducted with
NTSB and Colonial tiiat any of the dents in the pipeline in that
range were repaired. It is news to me that there was a large num-
ber of impairments. I will look into that information.
Ms. Byrne. How large does a spill have to be before it is reported
to you?
Mr. Tenley. Irrespective of injuries or cost damage, it is 50 bar-
rels.
Ms. Byrne. Ms. McMurray, you stated in 1980 you only had two
inspectors for the whole eastern region?
Ms. McMurray. That is right.
Ms. Byrne. So this pipe, as it was laid, was not inspected by you.
There is no evidence of that in your office or in your files?
Ms, McMurray. I understand that we did not have an inspector
on-site.
Ms. Byrne. In researching what happened here, do you know if
anybody did an inspection as this pipe was put down?
Ms. McMurray. I have to believe that the Colonial Pipeline
Company had their staff of experts during construction of the pipe
to assure that the pipeline was installed properly. But no, I have
no definite reason to know that they in fact had someone on site.
Ms. Byrne. When we hydrostatically test these pipes after they
have been welded and before they go into operation, that is a re-
quirement that we hydrostatically test them; right?
Mr. Tenley. That is right.
Ms. Byrne. Who certifies these tests; do you?
Mr. Tenley. We don't certify them. The operator self-certifies
they were performed and we check the records to be sure they were
performed. When they do new construction inspections, we can be
there during the hydrostatic testing.
Ms. Byrne. But you were not in that instance?
Mr. Tenley. No.
Ms. Byrne. It was reported that that line was inspected weeks
before the rupture. Do you have any knowledge of what kind of in-
spection was done? Do you think that something could have been
detected if a fiill inspection had been done?
Do you remember Colonial said they inspected this pipe a few
weeks before the rupture?
Mr. Tenley. On me 29th, they ran a caliper pig through it. Our
inspection in March of 1993 was a standard inspection. We also go
out and do field inspections of certain facilities. In this case, we
checked the valve on the Virginia side of the Potomac River and
it did pass inspection and in fact properly operated at the time of
the accident.
42
Ms. Byrne. Was this a normal inspection? Did you have a reason
to inspect this?
Mr. Tenley. It was a scheduled routine standard inspection.
Ms. Byrne. So the valve was okay?
Mr. Tenley. We looked at the pump station, the records and the
valve.
Ms. Byrne. But no one looked at the pipe?
Mr. Tenley. No, we would not typically look at the buried pipe.
Ms. Byrne. Thank you.
Mr. BORSKI. The gentleman from Tennessee, Mr. Duncan.
Mr. Duncan. Thank you. I have not been here for the whole
hearing and I know very httle about pipelines and things of that
measure, but I understand the pipeline transportation is, in fact,
tiie safest method of transporting petroleum products; is that true?
Ms. McMuRRAY. Yes. Liquid pipelines carry 50 to 55 percent of
the ye£u*ly consumption of petroleum products. It is the safest form
of transport of those products.
Mr. Duncan. I also read in the material here that the Colonial
Company — and I certainly have no connection with them — but they
transport over 80 miUion gallons of product a day and they have
one of the best records on safety.
Is that true or false?
Mr. Tenley. It is about 28 percent of the product deUvered to the
New York area and Northeast. Their record is standard and rep-
resentative of the industry as a whole.
Mr. Duncan. In your testimony, you say, "If we had been able
to be on the scene in 1980 at the time the Colonial 36-uich line was
constructed, we could have assured that our standards were fol-
lowed and would have had a better understanding today as to the
cause of the accident."
But you are not saying anybody did anything wrong at that time
or there was improper construction; is that right?
Ms. McMuRRAY. No, sir. There is no way for us to ascertain that.
Mr. Duncan. It is not only possible, but it is highly probable that
if an inspector had been there, it would have done no good at all.
I mean, the construction would have been the same and you would
have found that everj^thing was being done properly.
Ms. McMuRRAY. It is certainly hard to speculate whether all
standards would have been met. One would think that, at a mini-
mum, a deterrent factor would be in play. If there had been an in-
spector physically and visibly inspecting construction practices that
there might be, one might surmise that there would be a tendency
to protect and comply with construction standards that we have is-
sued.
Mr. Duncan. Thank you very much.
Mr. BORSKI. Mr. Tenley, the rules of pipeline safety require that
shut-off valves be located on each side of a water crossing that is
more than 100 feet wide from high water mark to high water mark
unless the Secretary finds the valves are not justified. In the recent
Colonial spill, a manual shut-ofiT value was located one and a half
miles firom the Potomac River on the downstream side of the rup-
ture?
43
Are there no regulations about how close the valve can be to the
river? Is this adequate to protect environmentally sensitive areas
and the water supply?
Mr. Tenley. I thmk we will look at the valve spacing to see if
it is reasonable. A mile and a half from a water source that sup-
pUes the water supply that this river provides, we might have to
tighten up on that. We don't prescribe in the regulations a defini-
tive standard as to where the valve is placed.
Mr. BORSKI. Are there further questions? If not, thank you very
much for your testimony.
[Subsequent to the hearing additional questions were submitted
to Ms. McMurray. The questions and responses follow:]
o
44
The Admmiilwlor 400 Seventh Sireel. S W
1 ic ruaonrtrrvnt The Admnitlralor «« oevwim anm. o r,
U.b.U)eparTmeni WeshSngion. D C 20590
Of Transportanon
Research and AUG I I 1993
Special Programs
Administration
The Honorable Robert A. Borski
Chairman, Subcommittee on Investigations
and Oversight
Committee on Public Works and Transportation
U.S. House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515
Dear Mr. Chairman:
The Research and Special Programs Administration (RSPA)
appreciated the opportunity to appear before the Subcommittee on
Investigations and Oversight on May 18, 1993, to testify on the
Department of Transportation's actions following the March 28,
1993, Colonial Pipeline Company spill of 400,000 gallons of
diesel fuel into the Sugarland Run.
RSPA has completed an environmental examination of the hazardous
liquid pipeline safety program directed by Secretary Pena
following the Colonial spill. A plan of action is currently
undergoing review within the Department. Please be assured that
RSPA intends to proceed proactively in implementing measures to
prevent environmental damage caused by pipeline spills.
Our answers to additional questions are enclosed for inclusion in
the hearing record. If we can be of further assistance in this
matter, please contact me or Ms. Patricia Klinger, who handles
our congressional inquiries, at (202) 366-4831.
Sincerely,
Rose A. McMurray ^— '
Acting Administrator
Enclosure
45
\
OFHCE OF PIPELINE SAFETY ANSWERS TO
QUESTIONS FOR INCLUSION IN THE COLONIAL
PIPELINE PUBLIC HEARING RECORD
QUESTION:
Section 2020) of the Pipeline Safety Reauthorization Act of 1988 stipulated that the
Secretary establish minimum standards requiring operators of pipelines to submit an
inventory of all pipes in the operator's system, along with additional information such
as the pipe material history and the leak history. TTie inventories were required to be
submitted to the Department of Transportation's Office of Pipeline Safety no later
than October 31, 1988. What is the status of this mandate by Congress?
ANSWER: A Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) that would establish the
inventory requirement has been approved by the Office of the Secretary of
Transportation. The notice is now being considered by the Office of Management and
Budget (OMB) under Executive Order 12291. We will publish the notice for public
comment as soon as OMB grants approval under the Executive Order.
46
nUESTION:
Without the benefit of information regarding pipeline age, material, leak history, and
inspection and operation data, what criteria does OPS use for assessing risk in
implefnenting its risk based pipeline inspection program?
ANSWER: As of August 1, 1990, the Office of Pipeline Safety (OPS) transitioned
from a resource based inspection plan to a risk based inspection plan. This risk based
plan was sent to the Chairman of the House Appropriations Subcommittee on
Transportation on May 30, 1990. The risk based plan currently used by OPS does
incorporate limited leak history as well as accident data, OPS inspection history, and
operator compliance history by utilizing, as a management tool, our Pipeline
Inspection Priority Programs (PIPP 1 and 2) computer programs. OPS recognizes that
PIPP has limitations caused by the absence of certain information. As noted in the
answer to the previous question, OPS has developed an NPRM which proposes that
operators be required to submit definitive information on pipeline age and material,
along with additional leak history. TTie NPRM also proposes that hazardous hquid
pipeline operators would be required to provide OPS aimual reports for the first time
on the characteristics of their pipelines. (Gas distribution, transmission, and gathering
system operators have been providing annual reports since 1970.) OPS will
incorporate the additional data into its risk based plan after the rule becomes
effective.
47
QUESTION:
What criteria does OPS use in issuing Hazardous Facility Orders? What type of
follow-up is there to ensure that the companies have complied with the order?
ANSWER: Hazardous Facility Orders are issued where a likelihood of serious harm
to life or property may exist. OPS employs site inspections and documentation reviews
to ensure compliance with Hazardous Facility Orders.
48
QUESTION:
In 1987, the National Transportation Safety Board recommended that OPS develop
criteria for determining safe intervals between hydrostatic pressure testings. What is
the status of OPS's response to this recommendation and when does OPS plan to
develop and issue such criteria?
ANSWER: OPS does not believe a blanket requirement is warranted to include
criteria for determining safe service intervals between hydrostatic tests. Available data
do not support a positive cost-benefit ratio, limiting the chances for a viable
rulemaking to implement the National Transportation Safety Board's (NTSB)
recommendation. In an attempt to resolve the difference of opinion with NTSB, a
representative of OPS met with a representative of NTSB on February 18, 1993, to
discuss the disposition of the recommendation (Recommendation P-87-23). The two
representatives were in general agreement that there is not a need for hydrostatic
retesting of all pipelines. They also agreed that risk assessment of pipelines or
pipeline segments based on such factors as type of and age of pipe, leak history, fluid
transported, personnel training, control systems, population density, and environinental
conditions should be used on a case-by-case basis to determine when and if a pipeline
should be hydrostatically retested and the period between retests. As a result, we do
not intend to develop criteria for determining safe intervals between tests.
Currently, OPS is developing a process for prioritizing risk and a plan of action for
using this information to develop an agenda for the OPS regulatory and compliance
program.. This process is expected to be completed by the end of 1993, and we will
then assess the priority of developing safe intervals between hydrostatic pressure
testings.
49
QUESTION:
Hydrostatic pressure testing is the only method which tests pressure integrity and can
detect defects caused by railroad fatigue and by fluctuating pressures which are
common in hazardous liquid pipelines. Opponents of hydrostatic pressure testing
argue that the tests can cause damage to the pipeline which can later cause the
pipeline to fail. In the opinion of OPS, is this a valid argument against the use of
hydrostatic pressure testing, or should regular hydrostatic testing be required of
pipelines which are located in high density population and environmentally sensitive
areas?
ANSWER: OPS agrees that hydrostatic testing is the only method which tests the
pressure integrity of a pipeline and can detect longitudinally oriented cracks, such as
those defects initiated by railroad fatigue and grown by fluctuating pressures which are
common in hazardous liquid pipelines. Currently, instrumented inspection devices
(smart pigs) are not capable of reliably detecting longitudinally oriented cracks in
pipelines. Opponents of hydrostatic testing technically are correct that such tests can
damage the pipeline and later cause the pipeline to fail. However this damage and
subsequent failure, commonly called "pressure reversal," is infrequent. The damage
may occur at defects nearly large enough to fail during testing and depends on the
pressure level and the length of time at pressure during the test.
In the opinion of OPS, the benefit of removing defects large enough to fail during
hydrostatic testing far outweighs the minimal risk of a failure attributed to pressure
reversal. - Hydrostatic testing is the preferred action, especially for pipelines that have
a history of a sequence of failures at similar cracks that have grown by fatigue.
50
QUESTION:
Is there any type of leak detection system that has a reasonable chance of detecting
the leakage from a crack before the crack reaches the "critical crack stage" and the
line grossly ruptures?
ANSWER: At this time, there is no leak detection system that can detect the small
amount of leakage which occurs from a crack. Industry has extensively compared
pipeline failures resulting from leaks versus failure resulting from ruptures. The
conditions that exist in a pipeline may lead to either a leak or a rupture, but in almost
all cases, a leak is not followed by a rupture. Therefore, it is incorrect to conclude
that the detection of a leak will prevent a rupture. Typically, ruptures occur without
a prior leak at the rupture site. Engineering calculations in the field of fracture
mechanics are available to estimate the likelihood that a defect will leak versus
rupture if sufficient data are known regarding the pipeline materials and operation.
51
QUESTION:
When the ruptured pipe was excavated, were soil samples taken from below the pipe
to determine if product other than diesel fuel was leaking prior to the main rupture?
ANSWER: No, soil samples were not taken. However, OPS believes that the pipeline
was not leaking at this location prior to the incident based on a review of Colonial's
operating pressures and the factual report issued by NTSB's metallurgist.
52
QUESTION:
Please describe what Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition Systems (SCADA) are
and how their use might affect pipeline operation. Also, please provide information
as to (he extent that SCADA is currently employed by the pipeline industry.
ANSWER: SCADA systems are installed on many pipehnes utilizing computer
technology to analyze data, such as pressure, temperature, and delivery flow rates, as
the data are continuously gathered from remote locations on the pipeline. Computer
analysis of these data is utilized in day-to-day operating decisions on the pipeline and
to provide input for real-time models of the pipeline operation which can identify, size,
and locate leaks.
The American Petroleum Institute conducted a survey of hazardous liquid pipeline
companies regarding the use of SCADA systems with a leak detection system (Analysis
of a Software-Based Pipeline Leak Detection Systems Survey; February 20, 1991).
One hundred fifty-five companies, representing most of the hazardous liquid volume
transported by pipeline, reported that about 50 percent of those companies had
SCADA with a leak detection system.
53
QUESTION:
Virginia is part of the Office of Pipeline Safety's Eastern Region which includes 13
other states. How do three inspectors effectively cover 14 states? What is the
percerttage of inspections in which serious violations are observed by the inspectors?
ANSWER: The Eastern Region annually prioritizes its inspections according to the
risk based inspection plan referenced above. Accident investigations and follow-up
inspections to assure that the operator takes adequate remedial measures after an
accident always have highest priority. It is estimated that the Eastern Region can
inspect all current jurisdictional inspection pipeline units on the average of a 2.5 to 3
year interval. Operators identified as highest risk will be inspected at least annually.
The average inspection interval will increase when OPS begins to regulate hazardous
liquid pipelines operating below 20 percent of specified minimum yield strength. It
is estimated that with this new jurisdiction the average interval of inspection will be
approximately 4 years. On approximately 33 percent of our inspections, probable
violations of the safety code are found.
54
Does a pipeline that extends through several regions over numerous states, such as the
Colonial pipeline, cause any special inspection and enforcement difOculties given the
limited number of inspectors available?
ANSWER: No, Colonial extends through three of our regions and each region is
responsible for inspection of Colonial pipeline facilities in its territory. Regions share
information about operators, including those operating in more than one region, by
utilizing our computer system and by requiring all regions to send copies of accident
reports and enforcement actions to all other regions.
55
QUESTION:
There is great concern among the residents of the Sugarland Run area who claim
there is insufficient care in the planning, siting, construction, and operation of
pipelirtes. How would you reassure these people?
ANSWER: The Hazardous Liquid Pipeline Safety Act does not provide the
Department of Transportation with the authority to approve the routing of pipeline.
The Act also does not provide the Department with the authority to regulate land use
along pipeline rights-of-way. These activities are generally the responsibility of state
or local government authorities.
OPS does regulate the design, construction, operation, and maintenance of pipelines.
OPS has issued a Hazardous Facility Order to Colonial for its 36-inch pipeline which
restricted the operating pressure to 50 percent of the maximum operating pressure
between Chantilly, Virginia, and Dorsey Junction, Maryland. T^ie Order also required
Colonial to develop an internal inspection plan for this section of pipeline. On
June 4, 1993, OPS accepted the internal inspection plan. Two separate internal
inspection tools (pigs) have been run. The first pig (magnetic flux leakage tool) was
run on June 26, 1993. The second pig (slope/deformation tool) was run on July 16,
1993. The results of these pig runs will be graded by the third party vendor in
Houston, Texas. The final graded logs will not be available until after mid-August.
OPS has observed all phases of these pig runs, reviewed the raw data collected, and
will review the data from the pig-run graded logs. OPS will be present to inspect the
pipe at all excavations of pipe resulting from the graded logs. OPS will not allow the
operating pressure in the pipeline to be increased until all required repairs have been
made to the pipeline, based on data from pig runs. OPS has determined that no
further remedial actions are necessary.
56
QUESTION:
The Oil Pollution Act of 1990 required pipeline operators to submit emergency
response plans by February 18, 1993. Facing an overwhelming backlog of rulemakings
and studies, how does OPS plan to ensure that these plans receive the necessary
review and evaluation.
ANSWER: When we were delegated the Oil Pollution Act (OPA) responsibilities, we
formed an interdisciplinary team from within our base program resources. This team
has worked closely with other federal agencies having OPA responsibilities to deal
most effectively with regulatory and implementation issues. The Coast Guard, in
particular, has provided significant assistance.
We have requested $2.5 million in Fiscal Year 1994 for contract support to undertake
analytical tasks which will greatly assist our internal approval process. These tasks will
include analyzing plans to determine minimal adequacy and areas of suggested
improvement, performing a quality control check on operator-provided data and
assumptions, analyzing impacts and consequences of spill scenarios, and identifying the
location of pipelines in relation to environmentally sensitive areas and drinking water
intakes.
Further, the results from analysis of these response plans required by OPA will
provide data useful in completing other studies and rulemakings that are part of our
base program activities.
57
QUESTION:
Could stiffer requirements for self-policing and more frequent inspections by the
pipeline operators substitute for a lack of federal inspection resources? Are adequate
resources devoted to pipeline safety?
ANSWER: As part of the growing emphasis on performance measurement and
reinventing government, OPS will be exploring the possibility of using a pipeline
operator's existing internal audit program, or lack of such a program, as an additional
input to PIPP with the intent of improving our inspection prioritization process.
In the meantime, OPS has developed changes in its compliance program that will
result in more effective inspections. OPS intends to include coordinated inspections
(involving more than one OPS region) of an interstate pipeline operator's Operation
and Maintenance (O&M) plans at the operator's headquarters. OPS believes this
change will result in improved safety and environmental protection because of the time
spent observing actual field conditions instead of repetitive O&M plan review which
often results in only "paperwork" violations. OPS is planning to implement this new
procedure in Fiscal Year 1994.
The pipeline safety regulations are written as performance standards. They set a
minimum level of safety to be attained, allowing the pipeline operator discretion as
to the method and frequency of inspection and testing to assure the safety of the
operator's pipelines. We expect an operator to exceed the minimum level, where
appropriate, based on the operator's determination of the condition of its pipelines.
During our standard inspections, we ascertain whether an operator's O&M procedures,
including its inspection and testing programs, are adequate to assure the safety of its
pipelines.
In addition, OPS may require an operator subject to compliance action to conduct an
Operational Reliability Assessment (ORA) of its pipeline. The ORA determines the
need for and frequency of additional inspections to be conducted by the pipeline
operator to assure the safety of its pipeline.
The combined resources of federal and state pipeline safety operations are believed
to be adequate for pipeline safety. Federal inspection resources are allocated using
a risk-based inspection plan. Increasingly, states are also using a risk-based plan to
establish inspection intervals and priorities.
58
QUESTION:
Section 7005 of the Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985 allows
the Secretary to assess and collect annual fees from the pipeline industry to fund the
cost of the pipeline safety program. Have the fees been increased since the enactment
Qf the 1988 Act to cover the cost of achieving the pipeline safety goals of Congress?
ANSWER: Yes, the fees have increased. The dollar/per mile assessment for both
gas and liquid pipelines for the last 3 years follows:
Ygar izas Liquid .
1990
$29.22
$9.28
1991
30J7
13.53
1992
43.64
17.88
59
QUESTION:
What criteria does OPS use in determining whether and how much to fine pipeline
operators whose pipelines have ruptured?
ANSWER: If a violation of the pipeline safety regulations has occurred as a result of
a pipeline accident, the pipeline operator is subject to compliance action. The nature
and circumstances of the violation would determine the type of compliance action
appropriate to assure the safe operation of the pipeline system. Civil penalties are
limited by statute to a maximum of $25,000 a day for each violation and a total of
$500,000 for any related series of violations.
In assessing a civil penalty, the following must be considered: (a) the nature,
circumstances, and gravity of the violation; (b) the degree of culpability; (c) the history
of prior violations; (d) the ability to continue in business; (e) any good faith in
attempting to achieve compliance; (f) the ability to pay the penalty; and (g) such other
matters as justice may require.
60
QUESTION:
Please explain how the membership of the Technical Pipeline Safety Standards
Committee is determined. Are members prohibited from having a vested financial
interest in the pipeline industry while serving on the board?
ANSWER: As directed by Congress, the Research and Special Programs
Administration (RSPA) consults with representatives of the National Association of
Regulatory Utility Commissioners and National Association of Pipeline Safety
Representatives in filling government vacancies on the Committee and with industry
representatives (e.g., American Petroleum Institute, American Gas Association) in
filling industry vacancies. RSPA consults with other associations, such as the National
Association of Corrosion Engineers, Wilderness Society, and National Fire Protection
Association, in filling public vacancies.
Committee members are generally not prohibited from having a vested financial
interest in the pipeline industry since by definition members must be experienced in
the safety regulation of pipeline transportation or technically qualified by training,
experience, or knowledge in one or more fields of engineering applied in pipeline
transportation. The Pipeline Safety Act of 1992, however, now requires that at least
one of the public members should have no financial interest in the pipeline,
petroleum, or natural gas industries.
61
OTIESTION:
What is the reason behind proposing to relax the threshold reporting requirements for
hazardous liquid pipeline accidents by raising the threshold from $5,000 to $50,000?
Is damage to the environment calculated in this figure?
ANSWER: President Bush's moratorium to review and revise existing regulations to
eliminate unnecessary and overly burdensome requirements encompassed a review of
the telephonic reporting requirements for hazardous liquid pipeline accidents.
Because the $5,000 rei>orting requirement requires the reporting of minor accidents,
RSPA proposed to increase the reporting threshold to $50,000, the same level as
required for natural gas pipelines. Other reporting criteria will remain the same,
assuring the reporting of significant accidents. These criteria require accidents to be
reported that involve death of any person; personal injury requirng hospitalization; fire
or explosion; or pollution of any stream, river, or similar body of water.
Environmental clean-up and recovery of lost product are included in the threshold
amount calculation.
62
QUESTION:
How do you respond to Mr. Robert Rackleffs assertion that "The zeal of pipeline
companies to prevent state regulation of pipelines has ensured that the OPS program
with state regulators will not expand in coming years?" Has OPS encountered
substantial lobbying by pipeline companies opposed to self-regulation by states?
ANSVv'ER: RSPA disagrees with Mr. Rackleffs assertion. Over the last several years,
OPS has very actively promoted expanded state safety jurisdiction to cover all
intrastate gas and hazardous liquid pipelines as part of the phase-in of a performance-
based formula for allocating grant funds to state pipeline safety -programs. RSPA is
not aware of any industry lobbying efforts to reduce or dilute state regulation of
pipeline safety.
63
QUESTION:
Are states allowed to create and enforce environmental and safety standards that are
more festrictive than those of the federal government in order to protect sensitive and
unique environmental and cultural resources from damage from pipeline accidents.
ANSWER: The pipeline safety statutes provide that an agency of a state that certifies
it has adopted and enforces the federal standards, and has assumed jurisdiction over
intrastate facilities, may adopt additional or more stringent safety standards for
intrastate pipeline transportation, if such standards are compatible with the federal
minimum standards. However, no state agency may adopt or continue in force any
such standards applicable to interstate transmission facilities.
Further, the Federal Water Pollution Control Act and amendments to that statute by
OP A, do not preempt states or political subdivisions from imposing requirements or
liability with respect to the discharge of oil or hazardous substances into any waters
within a state, or with respect to related removal activities. In fact, many states have
enacted more stringent requirements for response plaiming and exercises and have
imlimited liability for costs or damages associated with spills affecting environmentally
sensitive areas.
64
QUESTION:
According to Department of Transportation data contained in the Annual Report on
Pipeline Safety, incidents reported to the Office of Pipeline Safety involving natural gas
pipelines appear to be on the decline, while incidents involving hazardous liquid pipelines
appear to be on the rise. To what do you attribute these differences in trends? Do you
^gree with Mr. Donald Brinkley of Colonial Pipeline Company who testified that internal
corrosion is not a problem in hazardous liquid pipelines?
ANSWER: In 1984, the property damage threshold for reporting natural gas incidents was
increased from $5,000 to $50,000 (at present, the threshold for hazardous liquid accidents
is still $5,000). That change resulted in a dramatic decrease in the number of reportable
gas incidents reported in the 1984-1986 time frame. Since then, there appears to be a
continuing decline in the number of reportable gas incidents and an increase in liquid
accidents. However, we would be remiss in declaring this a statistically significant trend,
since there has been some fluctuation over the years (for example, in 1990, there were 199
reportable gas incidents, but in 1991, 233 gas incidents were reported).
A number of safety initiatives have been implemented over the last several years that may
be contributing to the apparent reduction in natural gas accidents—increased use of one-call
notification systems to prevent accidents caused by outside force damage, the leading cause
of pipeline accidents; enhanced training of federal and state safety insjjectors; better
education of pipeline operators; and improved safety practices. With respect to liquid
pipelines, there is greater recognition of pipeline safety and particularly environmental
protection requirements due to new mandates imposed by OPA. The resulting increase
in operator awareness of reporting requirements may be contributing to more liquid
accidents being reported than would otherwise have been reported.
In 1992, 5 percent of all reportable liquid accidents were attributed to internal corrosion.
RSPA will be assessing the relative risk of internal corrosion in its risk assessment
prioritization process.
65
QUESTION:
In your testimony you state that pipelines are the safest form of transportation of
petroleum products. Yet Mr. Rackleff states that OPS data on pipeline spills support
his assertion that pipelines spill more product than water carriers. How do you
respond to this conflicting testimony? Has DOT or OPS conducted a safety analysis
comparing different modes of petroleum transportation to support its position? Please
provide the data for the record.
ANSWER: Over the years, RSPA has made statements based on data collected by
the Department to the effect that pipelines are one of the safest modes of
transportation, taking into account the numbers of fatalities, injuries, and property
damage. With the increasing focus on the environment, we have become concerned
about the lack of data on environmental damage from hazardous liquid pipeline spills.
In the past, we have not collected data on gathering lines and lines operating at 20
percent or less of specified minimum yield strength. We are moving toward improving
our data collection in these areas. We have been in contact with Mr. Rackleff and are
trying to reconcile data differences.
66
OI lESTION:
The ruptured pipeline was under approximately nine feet of fill, which is substantially
more than what is required by 49 CFR Part 195 Section 195.248 of the Pipeline Safety
Regulations. Section 195.210(b) requires that pipelines be located a minimum of 50
feet from dwellings and buildings where people congregate unless an additional twelve
mches of cover is provided. What effect does twelve inches of extra cover have in
ensuring public safety when an additional sLx feet of cover resulted in an accident such
as the Colonial spill? Does twelve inches of additional cover justify the construction
of a pipeline less than fifty feet to a dwelling? What would the results of the Colonial
spill have been if the pipe had ruptured fifty feet or less from the facade of a
residential building?
ANSWER: The purpose of adding extra cover over a buried pipeline above the 3-foot
requirement is to further protect the pipeline against physical damage from excavation
activities, the leading cause of pipeline accidents. Although excavation can damage
a pipeline regardless of its burial depth, NTSB has not determined whether the
damage to Colonial's pipeline occurred during or after the additional 6 feet of cover
was installed. The damage may have occurred during construction of the pipeline,
before it was initially covered. Or an excavator at a later date may have damaged the
pipeline during other construction activities, including regrading of the overlying
terrain, thus adding to the initial cover.
Twelve inches of extra cover does not justify the construction of a pipeline less than
50 feet from a dwelling. Operators avoid locating a pipeline within 50 feet of a
building. '"
Although we can only speculate, if a residential building had been within 50 feet of
the Colonial pipeline spill, the results may not have differed significantly from the
actual event. The spilled liquid fortunately did not vaporize rapidly. So it did not
ignite, which is the main danger presented by spills of flammable liquids near
residential buildings.
67
Mr. BORSKI. We would like to welcome our next witness, Allen
Li, Associate Director, General Accounting Office. He is accom-
panied by Mr. Ron Wood, Assistant Director, General Accounting
Office.
[Witness sworn.]
TESTIMONY OF ALLEN LI, ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR, GENERAL
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, ACCOMPANIED BY RON WOOD, AS-
SISTANT DIRECTOR, GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, BARRY
KIME, SENIOR EVALUATOR, AND DR. MANOHAR SINGH, CON-
SULTANT ENGINEER
Mr. Li. We have a few graphics today that may take us a few
seconds to set up.
Mr. Chairman, it is good to see you again. Allow me to introduce
my colleagues. On my rig^t is Ron Wood. Barry Kime will be help-
ing us wi^ our graphics. Also with us today is Dr. Manohar Singh,
our consultant engineer.
Today we will discuss our September 1992 report which was re-
ferred to earUer today on the role that instrumented internal in-
spection devices can play in improving pipeline safety. While our
report focused on pipelines, our reference to smart pigs has bearing
on Uquid pipelines as well. We will also speak today about the
pipeline accident in Reston, Virginia.
A smart pig is the only pipeline inspection technique that can de-
tect internal eind external corrosion without excavating the pipe. In
front of me is a photograph of a smart pig. This device is propelled
through the pipeline to detect flaws like gouges and dents.
0\ir other photograph shows the capability of this technology. At
the top is a photograph showing the corroded section of pipeline.
At the bottom is a strip chart that shows the results of the smart
pig identifying the location of corrosion.
Pipeline corrosion is the second leading cause of natural gas
pipeline incidents. Damage caused by accidental excavation is the
number one cause. However, smart pigs do have their limitations.
They csinnot detect defects such as longitudinal cracks and metal
loss in pipe welds.
Furthermore, while many pipelines can accommodate smart pigs,
others cannot because of sharp bends in the pipeline. Those re-
sponding to our survey reported that in 1991, me i>er mile cost of
using smart pigs ranged fi:^m $650 to $2,400.
As you heard today there are currently no Federal regulations
governing the use of smart pigs or tlie frequency of smart pig in-
spections. In addition, there are no Federal regulations setting
forth, frequency criteria for when pipelines must be hydrostatically
retested or requiring installation of remotely controlled operating
valves. The absence of Federal regulations cannot be attributed to
the lack of recommendations.
As you just heard, NTSB has investigated numerous pipeline in-
cidents and has made several recommendations £dmed at enhanc-
ing pipeline safety. Thev recommended that new or replacement
pipelines be capable of accommodating smart pigs. They rec-
ommended that RSPA require installation of remotely-operated
valves on pipelines that transport hazardous Uquids.
68
In response to our report recommendations, RSPA issued the fea-
sibility study on smart pigs. Also, they have initiated a rule-mak-
ing to develop the regulations mandated by the 1988 act. This re-
quires pipelines to accommodate smart pigs.
My final point: The Colonial Pipeline Company plans to use
smart pigs as part of their agreement with RSPA. In response to
the hazardous facility order it received after the Reston spill. Colo-
nial submitted a plan stating that it would inspect the pipeline seg-
ment between Chantilly, Virginia, and Dorsey Junction, Maryland
with a caUper pig. The caUper pig may identify dents, wrinkles,
and flat spots. After using the caliper pig. Colonial plans to run a
magnetic pig.
RSPA told us the Colonial Pipeline Company has made heavy
use of smart pigs in the past. They used a caUper pig on this seg-
ment in 1989. However, they have never inspected it with a mag-
netic-flux pig.
Some other matters of interest to the subcommittee: RSPA told
us Colonial has not hydrostatically tested this segment since 1980.
It does not have remotely-controlled operating valves in the trans-
mission line between the Chantilly and Dorsey pumping stations.
Such valves located closer together could have reduced the amount
of spill. However, there are no federal regulations requiring the use
of smart pigs, periodic hydrostatic testing, or the installation of re-
motely-controlled valves.
In conclusion, aging pipelines are of concern because there is a
higher risk that they will result in incidents. The Reston incident
points out that even relatively newer pipelines are subject to fail-
ure. The true cause of the failure is yet to be determined. However
that incident points to the necessity for pipeline companies to peri-
odically inspect their pipelines to identify defects and flaws and
take the necessary corrective action.
We believe our approach incorporating smart pigs can strengthen
the federal strategy to ensure pipeline safety and minimize inci-
dent damage.
This concludes my statement.
Mr. BORSKI. While natural gas pipelines show a reassuring pic-
ture of declining incidents and most incidents are caused by out-
side forces, hazardous Uquid pipes show an alarming pattern of
steady increases in incidents during the past three years because
of corrosion, defective construction and incorrect operations. What
do you think accounts for these different patterns in hazardous gas
and Uquid lines?
Mr. LI. We did not look into the causes of why hazardous Uquid
pipelines are having these problems in our report. However, in our
prepared statement today, we included a chart that shows the
number of incidents in the hazardous liquid pipeline area has been
steadily going up.
I speculate that this has something to do with not only increas-
ing housing development near the lines, but also the corrosive na-
ture of the liquids going through the pipelines. It has taken some
time for that corrosion to take place and, unfortunately, it may be
showing up now.
Mr. BoRSKi. In yoiu* testimony you say CongressionaUy man-
dated regulations have been delayed because DOT is devoting re-
69
sources to other work? Can ^ou describe what that other work has
been and can you give an opinion on the safety benefits of the other
work compared with the regulations mandate by the Congress?
Mr. Ll. We did not look at the totcdity of RSPA's work and prior-
ities. When we asked them why there was a delay in conducting
the study, they said other priorities were impacting their work. My
belief is that RSPA does indeed have, as was indicated earlier,
much on their plate. Unfortimately, this is a safety concern that
needs to be addressed.
I beUeve, Mr. Chairman, that the pace at which some of these
rule-makings are taking place is much too slow and I believe the
subcommittee can help expedite that.
Mr. BORSKI. Accorduig to your testimony, Colonial used a caliper
pig on this segment of me pipeline in 1989, but the pipeline cannot
easily accommodate a magnetic flax or ultrasonic smart pig. Are
the launching requirements different for these devices?
Mr. Wood. My understanding is that caliper pigs have arms on
them that can open up to various sizes depending on the pipeline.
A magnetic-flux pig can only go thru one size pipeline sucn as a
32-incn pipeline.
Mr. BORSKI. Mr. Inhofe?
Mr. Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Li, in your testimony you stated that the overall safety
records of pipelines is relatively good in comparison with other
transportation modes of hazardous materials. I assume you have
statistical data that backs that up. And when you are comparing
to other modes, you are talking about water carriers, per gallon
spills, and this kind of statistic to show that this is true?
Mr. Ll. Yes, sir. The information actually came from a report
written by the Transportation Resources Board. What they did, Mr.
Inhofe, is that they compared other modes of transportation that
would transport hazardous Uquids. We are talking here in terms of
a product ton-mile unit. As a result of transportation distances, the
pipelines did turn out to be a safer mode of transportation than for
example rail cars.
Just to add, the other aspects of safety referred to in that report
were on fatalities. The number of fatalities using pipelines was
lower than other means of transportation.
Mr. Inhofe. If the Chairman will allow me, it is not directly re-
lated, but you might remember. How long have you been in your
position?
Mr. Li. I have been at GAO for 14 years, sir.
Mr. Inhofe. You can recall four years ago we had the problem
of injecting hazardous WEiste materials into oil pipelines. Do you re-
member that incident?
Mr. Ll. No, sir, I don't.
Mr. Inhofe. According to your survey, you reported that the cost
of using smart pigs with between $650 and $2,000 a mile in 1991?
Mr. Ll. That is right.
Mr. Inhofe. Do these cost estimates apply not only to natural
gas pipelines, but also hazardous Uquids?
Mr. Ll. No, they don't. However, hazardous liquid and gas pipe-
lines can both use the magnetic-flux pig. The ultrasound pig needs
a liquid medium. So if you are inspecting a natural gas pipeline
70
with an ultrasonic pig, you would have to inject some liquid in it.
But it is true, you can use pigs for both liquid and natural gas.
Mr. INHOFE. The range of the $650 to $2,000 is quite a range.
Which is more expensive, the use of that device with natxiral gas
or liquid?
Mr. Li. Our report and those numbers you referenced, $650 to
$2,400, only dealt with nat\iral gas so I cannot answer from that
perspective. However, we do know that the cost is variable. And
the reason why it is variable is that the diameter of the pipeline
that you are testing has a bearing on the cost. The other variables
woiUd be the bends in the pipe, and how much time it would take
for you to do the analysis.
These people analyzing the inspection data are paid by the hour.
So tide longer you run the inspection, the more money it would cost.
The level of smart pig competition also has a bearing on the overall
cost per mile. If you nave many vendors at that point in time who
are willing to do the job, then that price will in essence go down.
Mr. iNHOFE. TTiank you.
Mr. Ll. You are welcome.
Mr. BORSKI. The gentlewoman from Virginia.
Ms. Byrne. Have you done any studies about the cost of jperiodic
pigging of these lines as opposed to the cleanup of the spills?
Mr. Ll. No, we have not.
Ms. Byrne. When we talk about the size necessary for this type
of smart pig that you have in front of you there, the reason I un-
derstand that it w£is not used or could not be used on this particu-
lar section is that pipe, while it was 36 inches in diameter, had a
thirty-two-inch valve on it.
Mr. Ll. That is our understanding. We have asked OPS to pro-
vide that information and that is correct. There are some changes
in pipeline diameter that make pigging very difficult. However, we
understand that Colonial has told kSPA that they intend to make
the line pig-able.
Ms. Byrne. Do you know why you would put a smaller valve on
a bigger pipe?
Mr. Ll. No, ma'am, I don't know the reason.
Ms. Byrne. When we look at the pipeline regulations, we tend
to lump natural gas pipelines in with liquid pipelines. Is there any
indication that Uquid pipelines of the type that we are talking
about are more corrosive, for example, on the interior of the pipe
than natural gas?
Mr. Ll. Liquid pipelines are more corrosive. The type of material
being transporteo, because of some of the chemicals being trans-
ported, will in essence create more corrosion. Water is present in
many of these products.
Ms. Byrne. Would that suggest to you that majrbe in terms of
standards that we should set separate standards for Uquid as op-
posed to natural gas?
71
Mr. Ll. There are already separate Acts, and the regulations deal
separately with liquid and natural gas pipelines.
Ms. Byrne. Thank you.
Mr. BORSKI. There being no further questions, Mr. Li, thank you
for your testimony. It was very helpful as always.
[Subsequent to the hearing, additional questions were submitted
to Mr. Li. The questions and responses follow:]
72
GAO
United §Ute*
General Acooonting Ofllce
Wuhlntton, D.C. 20548
Besonrccs, Commiuilty, mnd
EcoDomic Development Division
July 9, 1993
Mr, Jack Wells
Staff Director
Subcommittee on Investigations
and Oversight
Committee on Public Works and
Transportation
House of Representatives
Dear Jack:
Enclosed are our answers to
the three questions contained
in Chairman Borski's June 18, 1993,
letter relating to our testimony on
the use of instrumented internal
inspection devices in pipelines
and on the rupture of the Colonial
Pipeline Company's hazardous liquid
pipeline in Reston, Virginia. We
appreciated the opportunity to
testify and hope that the heaijings
will have a positive impact o^n
pipeline safety.
Sincerely,
Allen Li
Associate Director,
Transportation Issues
Enclosure
73
ENCLOSURE-. ENCLOSURE
1. Ouestlon. Based on GAO's knowledge of the capabilities of
instrumented internal inspection devices, and after seeing
the anomalies present in the section of the excavated
pipeline, could these anomalies in your opinion have been
detected by an instrumented internal inspection device
prior to the rupture?
GAP Reply. Instrumented inspection devices, such as
magnetic- flux smart pigs, are designed to detect pipe flaws
such as corrosion, mechanical damage, gouges, and dents.
Mechanical damage and dents were evident on the ruptured
pipeline. Therefore, we believe an instrumented inspection
device could have detected these anomalies. Our view is
further supported by a RSPA official. He recently informed
us that an official of Vetco Pipeline Services, a
manufacturer of instrumented internal inspection devices,
examined the ruptured pipeline and stated that an
instrumented internal inspection device would have detected
the anomalies prior to the rupture.
2. Question. In your testimony you state that a possible
reason for an increase in the number of incidents relating
to hazardous liquid pipelines is internal corrosion. Mr.
Donald Brinkley of the Colonial Pipeline Company testified
that internal corrosion has never to his knowledge been a
problem with Colonial's pipelines or in the hazardous
liquid pipeline industry. How do you respond to this?
GAP Reply. In response to a question at the hearing, I
stated that we had not looked into the causes of the
increases in hazardous liquid pipeline incidents. I
speculated, however, that one possible reason for this
increase was internal corrosion. My response was based on
incident information reported by pipeline companies to
RSPA/PPS which is included in RSPA's annual reports on
pipeline safety and the fact that the nation's pipelines
are quite old. The RSPA annual reports for 1989 to 1992
show that the percent of hazardous liquid pipeline
incidents caused by internal corrosion increased more than
any other cause from 1989 to 1991 before decreasing in
1992. Incidents are reported to RSPA when they meet RSPA's
reporting criteria and include incidents on any part of the
pipeline system, including equipment on tank farms and pump
stations.
Our review of incident reports submitted by Colonial
Pipeline Company to RSPA from October 1985 to February 1993
showed that Colonial reported seven incidents on their
pipeline system caused by internal corrosion. The reports
show that the incidents occurred on equipment at tank farms
and pump stations as opposed to being on the pipelines
74
ENCLOSURE ' ^ ENCLOSURE
themselves. Mr. Brinkley's comment apparently is referring
only to the actual pipeline and not the total pipeline
system.
3. Question. Mr. Robert Rackleff stated In his testimony that
transportation of petroleum products through pipelines is
not as safe a means of transport as by water carriers. In
your written testimony you state that "the overall safety
record of pipelines is relatively good in comparison with
that of other modes that carry hazardous materials . " What
do your data show in terms of comparing pipelines with
water carriers?
GAO Reply. My statement was a general comment on the
overall safety record of pipelines and not a detailed
comparison of the different transportation modes as in Mr.
Rackleff 's testimony. Also my statement was based on
fatalities and injuries incurred by the various modes that
transport hazardous materials, whereas Mr. Rackleff 's
testimony was based on the number and amount of hazardous
material spills by the various modes and the resulting
damage to the environment. Nevertheless, as discussed
below, even though we used different data bases, our
supporting data shows that transporting hazardous materials
by water carriers was safer than transporting hazardous
materials by pipelines, which is in line with Mr.
Rackleff 's testimony.
My statement was based on a Transportation Research Board
report^ which showed that between 1982 and 1985 hazardous
liquid pipeline accidents resulted in fewer annual
fatalities and injuries on average than any of the
alternative modes transporting hazardous materials except
by water. The report goes on to say that when fatalities
and injuries (casualties) are adjusted for ton miles of
hazardous material product carried, average annual rail
tank car and tank truck casualty rates were 100 and 40
times greater, respectively, than casualty rates for liquid
pipelines; and that the only safer mode was water tanker.
Data in recent National Transportation Safety Board annual
reports compare transportation fatalities for all modes and
show that the number of pipeline fatalities is small in
comparison with other transportation modes.
^Pipelines and Public Safety. Special Report 219. Transportation
Research Board, National Research Council.
75
Mr. BORSKi. We would like to welcome Mr. Donald R. Brinkley,
President and CEO, Colonial Pipeline Company; accompanied by
Victor A. Yarborough, Director of Engineering; and Harold R.
Melendy, Senior Manager of the Eastern Division.
[Witness sworn.]
TESTIMONY OF DONALD R. BRINKLEY, PRESIDENT AND CEO,
COLONIAL PIPELINE COMPANY, ACCOMPANIED BY VICTOR
A. YARBOROUGH, DIRECTOR OF ENGINEERING, COLONIAL
PIPELINE COMPANY; AND HAROLD R. MELENDY, SENIOR
MANAGER OF THE EASTERN DIVISION, COLONIAL PIPELINE
COMPANY
Mr. Brinkley. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. My name is Donald R.
Brinkley. I am the President and Chief Executive Officer of Colo-
nial Pipeline Company.
Colonial is a Delaware and Virginia corporation that operates
pipeline faciUties through 14 states in the southeastern and east-
em United States. Our pipeline system transports nearly 80 mil-
Uon gallons of petroleum products per day to serve the needs of the
citizens of these and surrounding states; this amount represents
roughly 12 percent of the United States' daily consumption of pe-
troleum products.
In the State of Virginia, the petroleum products dehvered by Co-
lonial accounted for approximately 80 percent of the gasoline, fuel
oil, and kerosene consumed during 1989, the last year for which
consumption data is generally available.
First, Colonial deeply regrets the fact that this incident occurred.
We apologize for the inconvenience and concern that this accident
inflicted on the community despite our best efforts to mitigate its
effects.
At 0848 on Simday, March 28, our Line 3 suffered a catastrophic
failure between Chantilly Station and Dorsey Jimction, Maryland.
This failure immediately activated alarms in our control center in
Atlanta, and the Line 3 controller initiated shutdown of the line
from Greensboro, North Carolina.
Chantilly Station was shut down and blocked in at 0850 and
Dorsey Station, the downstream station, was run imtil it went
down on low suction pressure at 0855.
At 0905, Colonial received a call from the Fairfax County Fire
Department advising us of the leak location. Local response teams
were dispatched to the site, the corporate emergency response team
was activated, and maintenance and spill contractors were called
in, all in accordance with Colonial's Contingency Plan.
At peak activity, we had 110 Colonial employees and 300 con-
tractor employees on scene, along with sufficient equipment to
properly mount containment and recovery operations.
I would like to take this opportunity to commend the EPA, the
USCG, the Fedrfax County Safety Forces, and the other nearly 40
Federal, State, and local agencies who play a role in this response.
Through all of our efforts, I believe that we were able to produce
a timely, effective recovery operation that served to mitigate the
immediate impact of the spill. Within five days, recovery was es-
sentially complete, with recovery of over 355,000 gallons from a
total release of 407,000 gallons. That is a recovery rate of about 87
76
percent and incidentally it is one that we have experienced in other
similar situations before.
Although the product recovery phase has been completed, envi-
ronmental remediation has just begun and Colonial and its contrac-
tors will continue these efforts until the environment has been fully
restored.
I presume that the reason for this hearing being convened is to
address the questions of what happened smd what can we do to
prevent another happening. What occurred is painfully obvious to
us at Colonial. We nave seen this type of damage at Simpsonville,
South Carolina; at Orange County, Virginia; at Craney Island, Vir-
ginia; at Linden, New Jersey; at Lost Mountain, Greorgia, and of
course in its most egregious form at Centreville, Virginia.
The cause was third-party damage through improperly operated
excavating equipment. In this instance, the culprit looks like a
backhoe, judging from the long longitudinal scrapes and the Na-
tional Transportation Safety Board metallurgical report indicating
traces of foreign, high-chrome steel in the origin area. At this point
in time, we have no idea as to who might be responsible for these
misdeeds, so let's turn to the second question: ^Hiat can we do to
minimize the chances of a recurrence?
We have four suggestions. First, strengthen the one-call systems.
Since the advent of these systems in the late 1970s, a lot of third-
party accidents have been avoided. But as I recounted in my writ-
ten testimony, many contractors violate the one-call laws.
The HLPSA amendments of 1992 provide for criminal sanctions
that result in serious harm, but these are properly cumbersome.
We suggest that DOT be given authority to levy substantial civil
penalties for an excavator's failure to use one-caU systems, regard-
less of the damage caused by that failure.
Second, the Ou Pollution Act provides for civil penalties of up to
$100 a barrel against the owner or operator of a facility that has
an oil spill. The statute should embody the flexibiHty to impose
that penalty upon a responsible party, even if it is different from
the owner/operator.
Third, as illustrated by our experience at Centreville,
Simpsonville, Lost Mountain, £uid many other instances, most con-
tractors have no pollution liabiHty insurance and they have assets
insufficient to cover damages they are likely to incur in an en-
croachment incident. The contractor working in or near pipeline
easements or the person hiring the contractor should be required
to demonstrate proper finsmcial responsibility, including proof of in-
surance coverage for pollution or environmental damage.
Pipeline operators should be given authority to seek injunctive
reUef in Federal court to prevent excavation in its easements if
third parties cannot provide evidence of financial responsibility.
And fourth, local governments can also play an important role in
pipeline safety by using their land use regulatory authority to re-
strict unnecessary construction in pipeline easements. Pipeline
companies such as Colonial have no autnority to restrict or bar con-
struction in their easements unless the construction actually inter-
feres with the operation of the pipeline.
If local governments were to consider as part of the approval
process for site plans and building permits the need to reduce the
77
number of encroachments into utility easements, pipeline safety
would be promoted by reducing the opportunity for third-party
damage.
In closing, I would like to stress that when leaks occur, the pipe-
line operator is in the final analysis one of the most severely dam-
aged parties. Certainly incidents such as the one we are discussing
today cost millions of dollars of Colonial's money to correct, but
more importantly, they immeasurably damage our corporate rep-
utation. We try very hard to prevent them.
Colonial beheves that the lessons of these incidents will likely be
that Federal, State, and local governments can do much more to
aid pipeline companies in their efforts to prevent third-party dam-
age to interstate pipeline facilities. The efforts of pipeline operators
to regularly patrol their lines and to have ground personnel deal
directly with third parties who wish to encroach on pipeline rights
of way are, of course, our first lines of defense.
However, policies that provide swift and certain penalties against
violators of one-call statutes that ensure that only fiinancially se-
cure, reputable contractors work near their utiUty lines and that
promote sensible land use policies near such lines will aid us in the
prevention of these accidents.
One last point, Mr. Chairman. You will be hearing later fi*om the
Interstate Commission on the Potomac River Basin, which is an en-
tity created by Congress to coordinate multi-State efforts to reduce
pollution and the potential for pollution in the Potomac.
For the record, let me state that Colonial was not asked by the
commission to provide detailed information regarding its operations
in Maryland, Virginia, and Pennsylvania. Since it is a public entity,
one would expect that the broad, sweeping, and in some cases erro-
neous conclusions contained in its testimony were based on soimd
technical data buttressed by scientific studies or extensive fact
finding by the staff.
Colonial stands ready to meet with the commission or any other
competent State or Federal authority to discuss our operations.
However, we strongly object to some of the conclusions drawn by
the commission and question their basis in fact.
We will stand ready to answer any questions that you may have,
Mr. Chairman.
Mr. BoRSKl. Thank you very much, Mr. Brinkley.
Mr. Brinkley, when you bmlt your 36-inch pipeline in 1980, you
were famihar with the Trans-Alaska pipeline which had recently
been completed; is that correct?
Mr. Brinkley. Yes.
Mr. BORSKI. Were you aware that the Trans-Alaskan pipeline
had been designed to be inspected by smart pigs?
Mr. Brinkley. Yes, we were.
Mr. BoRSKi. Could you tell us why you didn't design your 36-inch
line to allow it to be inspected by sm£u*t pigs?
Mr. Brinkley. Colonial Pipefine Company has probably had as
much experience as anyone in the industry in using smart pigs. We
began using smart pigs on an extensive basis in 1985 starting with
those lines that were the oldest lines in our system.
And we are still continxiing a program of running smart pigs in
all of our systems and it is now very close to being complete.
78
We prioritized the lines by a number of criteria, including what
lines appeared to have the most corrosion-potential for corrosion
damage, which ones were the oldest and hence the coatings were
perhaps not quite as good as those newer lines.
The last line in our priority Ust was line three from Greensboro,
North Carolina, to Dorsey Junction, Maryland and the reason for
that is that it was our newest line. It is still by pipeline standards
quite a new line. It was constructed in 1980 so it is only 13 years
old. During that ensuing time as a result of a lot of construction
in and around Northern Virginia, we have had ample opportunity
to inspect that line visually and we find that the cathodic protec-
tion is in very good shape. The coating is in excellent condition and
all of those observations gave us every opportunity to beUeve that
we had the lines correctly prioritized.
All of Colonial's system is piggable. Even that line is piggable,
but it is not piggable by a magnetic flux pig. We have run caliper
pigs, which are just another kmd of smart pig. They tell you a few
different things.
The reason was that during the time that that line was con-
structed in 1980, there was a single line. The original 32-inch line
that was being used to move products from the Gulf Coast into this
part — Northern Virginia and on into New York Harbor, was over
subscribed and was being operated at its absolute capacity.
Those pump stations were in use on that 32-inch line until the
36-inch Ime was completed and then it was cut into alternate pimip
stations. So it is not a case of having a valve that is 32 inches. It
is the case of having pump station piping on this particular seg-
ment of the line that is 32 inch rather than 36 inch.
In 1989, Colonial's management devised a plan for the 1990s, a
long-range plan that enumerated a number of things that we were
going to do to increase the integrity of the pipeline system and to
address what we felt were upcoming environmental issues. One of
those projects which was in that plan and is still in that plan and
was to be completed on an unspecified time frame within that pe-
riod of time was to modify the line from Greensboro to Dorsey
Junction so that we could run a magnetic flux pig in it.
That still is a part of our plan and there is probably some reason
to beUeve that that plan might be somewhat accelerated now.
Mr. BORSKI. Let me ask you, sir, NTSB foimd a three-quarter
inch deep dent on the under side of the pipe 28 feet north of where
the rupture occurred. The pipe at that point was resting even
though your specifications require one foot of padding on the bot-
tom of the pipe between the pipe and any rock. Can you explain
that?
Mr. Brinkley. While we attempt to make certain that the pipe-
line is properly padded when it is being laid in a rocky area, none
of those specifications are ever 100 percent successful in keeping
pipe, particxilarly large diameter pipe off a rock.
That particular dent would not have required immediate repair
by the standards under which we repair and maintain pipelines.
We have — ^we have had a number of instances, obviously when you
have 5,300 mUes of pipe, you are going to occasionally find it sit-
ting on a rock.
79
We have never had an instance where that kind of problem has
ever caused a catastrophic failure such as the kind that occurred
at Reston. On the other hand, we have had many, many instances
where pipe has been damaged either immediately or perhaps as
much as 10 years before on the top of the pipe and that is the kind
of failure that we have had in this instance.
Mr. BORSKI. Let me ask you if I may in light of the recent acci-
dent, does Colonial have any plans to instaU additional remotely
operated valves?
Mr. Brinkley. At the moment we don't. Let me speak to that.
Remotely operated valves are, at first glance seem to be — and clos-
er valve space, let me take the two things together.
Mr. BORSKI. Please.
Mr. Brinkley. Seems to be the panacea for a great number of
things. However, the line fill of a 36-inch pipeline is 5,300 barrels
a mue so if you had valves a mile apart, it wovild still be able to
spill 5,300 barrels and that is a very big spill.
In liquid pipelines, the valve spacing is not quite as simple as
just adding up the volume of product oetween one valve and the
next one because the amoimt that is released in an accident such
as this is composed of two things: The amount of liquid that is re-
leased fi*om the pipe in order to reduce the pressure to atmospheric
pressure and in this particular instance, at the pressures that this
pipeline was operating, that is something like 2,300 barrels.
So even if you had the valves right beside one another and a leak
in between, you would still have 2,300 barrels of loss. The rest of
this spill is a fact of geography: How much product will drain down
fi-om both sides of me place where the leak occurred in order to
equaUze the pressure?
In this particular case, if there had been a remotely operated
valve at Potomac River and if it had been closed immediately at
the same time that the rest of the remotely operated valves were
closed, it would have made no difference whatsoever in the amount
rele£ised.
In fact, if we had had a valve three miles downstream and three
miles upstream of the leak site, it would have made no difference
no matter how fast those valves could have been closed.
So it is — ^when we are talking about very large pipelines, a
breach of a pipeline is going to cause a very large spill, no matter
how close the valves are for any practical purposes. Vic, do you
have anything?
Mr. Yarborough. I agree with Mr. Brinkley. It all depends on
the topography of the pipeline as it goes over hills and in the val-
leys. Obviously a product will come off the hills and go to the low
spots and every accident site is different and every scenario is dif-
ferent. What you can say generally about large pipelines, when you
have a catastrophic failure, you are going to have a Isirge amount
of product out.
And the abiUty of this valve to reduce that amount of product
out, depends on tiie specific site and the profile on either side.
Mr. BORSKI. lyield this point to the gentleman from Oklahoma.
Mr. Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Brinkley, one of the
questions that the Chairman asked I thought he might have been
alluding to the article that was in the Washington Post today
80
wherein they talk about the Reston spill and this is a quote,
"Points up the need to require the same kind of tough pipeline
safety precautions along the Potomac River as are in effect on the
Alaskan pipeline."
Do you agree with that statement?
Mr. Brinkley. No, I don't. And before coming to Colonial Pipe-
line, I spent nearly 10 years on the owners' committee of the
Trans-Alaska pipeline and indeed was chairman of the owners'
committee for some period of time.
I don't know where that particular — I don't know where that par-
ticular piece of information or misinformation may have come from.
I presiune it speaks to what we call leading edge flow meters which
are installed one at each pump station on the Trans-Alaska pipe-
line. They are not very accurate flow meters. They certainly don't
do anything remotely resembling what the newspaper article pur-
ported them to do.
Incidentally, I might, since you have asked the question, let me
just make an observation. The only pipeline that I know of that has
ever been constructed that had mandated valve spacing was the
Trans-Alaska pipeline. And that pipeline has more valves than any
pipeline that I have ever seen and they are designed to prevent any
spill from being larger than 50,000 barrels.
That is over 2 milUon gallons so that is what we are talking
about.
Mr. Inhofe. Well, I suspected that was the case and I had heard,
Mr. Brinkley, that you had a position at one time when the Alas-
kan pipeline went through. So I appreciate you giving that to us
for the record.
You have heard the various regulators who are testifying. Have
you been here during the whole hearing this afternoon?
Mr. Brinkley. Yes, sir, I have.
Mr. Inhofe. You probably heard that they have almost unani-
mously said that the pipeline method of transportation is the safest
in the industry and I think that certainly is what I have heard and
I come from a State where pipelines are very, very prevalent.
The third-party issue that was brought up is kind of interesting
to me and I was a little confused because you were not referring,
then, to a third party who was hired by your company to do the
excavating and the lajdng of the pipeline but instead some com-
pany that disturbed the environment after your pipeline was al-
ready in; is that correct?
Mr. Brinkley. That is right.
Mr. Inhofe. Could we see the pictures once more that the
gentlelady from Virginia was kind enough to share with us? It is
very difficult for me not being in the business, not being more fa-
miliar with it to identify what was characterized as a gouge as
being that, a gouge. Can you look at that from your experience and
tell us what that is?
Mr. Brinkley. Yes, sir. This is the longitudinal weld in this pipe-
line.
[Photographs referred to, previously entered into the record, ap-
pear beginning on page 33.]
Mr. Inhofe. There is an obvious weld there. We want to make
sure that we are looking at the one that is perpendicular.
81
Mr. Brinkley. Yes. This is a girth weld. This is where the joints
of the pipe are joined together in the field. This is a longitudinal
weld which is the way that the flat plate is bent around and then
welded to form a tube in the pipe mill.
Mr. LsfHOFE. All right.
Mr. Brinkley. We don't know where these pictures came fi*om.
Obviously they did not come from a site an5nA^here close to the spill
site in Reston, Virginia, because this is a piece of concrete coated
half-inch heavy wall river pipe. And I guess the closest place that
we can think of that these might have come from would be the Po-
tomac River crossing.
Mr. Inhofe. Well, perhaps the location of where those were
taken would be shared with us in just a moment. On the picture
that would be the second picture, you have what appears to be a
backhoe and was that taken during the laying of the pipeline?
Mr. Yarborough. We are short one picture.
Mr. Brinkley. Well, here is a backhoe over there.
Mr. Yarborough. There is another picture that shows the line.
Mr. Inhofe. I was looking at the one that actually has the back-
hoe in there.
Mr. Brinkley. You are probably more familiar with that and the
location. Go ahead.
Mr. Yarborough. If I may, this is not a backhoe it is what is
known as a drag hne. It is a piece of equipment that you may have
seen working in and around rivers before. It has a big bucket that
is suspended from the boom by cables and generally the — it has an-
other cable that comes toward the cab and the operator can swing
the bucket out and let it down on say a river bottom or ditch bot-
tom and then use a cable to pull the bucket towards him and then
it fills up with whatever he is excavating, and he picks it up and
lays it over to one side.
It is an excavating machine but it is not a backhoe that is t5T3i-
cally used in and around water crossings.
Mr. Inhofe. I am referring you to the one that is over here. That
is not a backhoe; is that correct?
Mr. Yarborough. This is a backhoe here.
Mr. Inhofe. Yes I thought so. At least in Oklahoma we call those
backhoes.
Mr. Yarborough. We call them that in Virginia, too.
Mr. Inhofe. Okay. But the question I have about that is when
I looked at the picture, it appeared to me that the excavation had
taken place and that there is adequate room in that picture for
padding to go back in, the mere proximity of the material that was
taken out, shouldn't be a basis to pass any judgment as to whether
or not that was used for padding or put back in.
Where in that picture would the padding be located? Somewhere
else, trucked in and put in as a normal procedure?
Mr. Yarborough. Oiu* specifications say if it is not available
near the right of way, then it has to be trucked in. What we re-
quire is where you have rocks in the bottom of the ditch that you
put as in this particular construction project, urethane pads ap-
proximately every 10 feet and then fill in between the pads with
the pad material and in addition, someplaces, we will put another
material around the pipe, which is this white stuff", I believe is
82
what we call rock shield, it protects the coating during backfill if
there is any, not supposed to have any large rocks adjacent to the
pipe but there could be some small rocks in there.
Mr. Inhofe. I thought that was the case and let me just lastly
compliment you because in your testimony I wish more of our wit-
nesses would be as specific as to recommendations.
You outline four recommendations and this committee certainly
will look at those to prevent things like this fi*om happening in the
future.
Thank you, very much.
Mr. Brinkley. Thank you, sir.
Mr. BORSKI. I have one question if I could before I go to the gen-
tlewoman. In that picture with the — ^there is a rock in the ditch
and obviously more rock in kind of a fill material. Could you ex-
plain to me what would happen? You would fill that area around
the pipe first with what?
Mr. Yarborough. Padding material, typically sand or any soft:
nonabrasive material without any large rocks in it.
Mr. BORSKI. And would that material be used to complete the
fiU?
Mr. Yarborough. No.
Mr. BORSKI. You wouldn't use any of that at all?
Mr. Yarborough. Wait, this material?
Mr. BORSKI. Yes, whatever came out.
Mr. Yarborough. Once you have a foot of this padding material
around the pipe, specifications allow the contractor to complete the
backfill with rocks — ^that is not a very scientific statement, but it
says no bigger than one man can carry, okay.
Mr. BORSKI. The gentlewoman fi'om Virginia.
Ms. Byrne. Well, since you have got the pictures, let's stick with
them for a minute. That weld that you spoke of, it is usual to have
a weld that is indented from the surface rather than like the weld
that connects the two pipes together that is raised?
Mr. Brinkley. These are both raised.
Ms. Byrne. If you look at the shadow, sir, Mr. Brinkley, I think
you will see that it is indented, not raised.
Mr. Yarborough. I have to agree with Mr. Brinkley, it looks like
it is raised and a typical longitudinal weld. It may be the way the
light falls on it when the picture was taken.
Ms. Byrne. Right. Do you paint over those welds? When you
paint the pipe, do you paint over the welds?
Mr. Yarborough. Yes, but that is not paint. That is the coating.
The coating was applied in the pipe mill.
Ms. Byrne. Mr. Brinkley, in your testimony, you have already
stated that you were here when Mr. Jackson and Mr. Hart gave
their testimony and I asked them specifically who, when, where did
the mechanical damage happen?
And they were unable to state with a degree of certainty that you
stated in your testimony that was third party and yet you rely on
their findings as part of your statement. Were you here when they
testified that they could not with any certainty say that it was
third-party damage?
Mr. Brinkley. Yes, I was.
83
Ms. Byrne. Let's talk a little bit about the inspectors. When you
put this pipeline down in 1980, did you have an inspector on the
site?
Mr. BRl>fKLEY. Yes, we did.
Mr. BORSKI. What kind of training do these inspectors have?
Mr. Brinkley. Basically these are people who have worked for
Colonial for a niimber of years and who have training ranging from
being engineers just to years and years of pipeline experience.
Ms. Byrne. Do we know who the inspector was on this pipeline?
Mr. Brinkley. I don't know at the moment, no.
Ms. Byrjie. Do you keep any records of who inspects what pipe?
Mr. Brinkley. If we — those kinds of records are not part of the
construction records that are required under HLPSA 195, which is
the Hazardous Liquid Pipeline Safety Act that governs construc-
tion, operation, and maintenance of pipelines.
However, I do believe that we know who the inspectors were.
There are a number of inspectors on a pipeline job. There is a
ditching inspector. There is a coating inspector. There is a string-
ing inspector. There is a welding inspector. There is a lowering in
inspector. There is a backfill inspector and over them all is the
chief inspector.
So there are a lot of inspectors on any given job.
Ms. Byrne. Well, if you have with some certainty the knowledge
of who these inspectors were for the backfill inspector and the ditch
inspector, could you give me any idea what kmd of training they
had for their jobs?
Mr. Brinkley. Offhand, I can't, no.
Ms. Byrne. Okay. Could you get back to us with that informa-
tion?
Mr. Brinkley. Yes.
[The following was received fi'om Mr. Brinkley:]
84
The following information is submitted in response to
Congresswoman Byrne's May 18 question regarding the training of
Colonial Pipeline Company's ditch and backfill inspectors.
Colonial used freelance inspectors for its construction
projects, as was commonplace in the pipeline industry, until the
mid 1970 's. These inspectors were typically retired pipeline
company or contractor employees with experience in construction.
This philosophy changed at the time of Colonial's last major
expansion program. It was felt that regular employees, with a
direct and long lasting interest in the company, might be more
effective inspectors. Dedicated employees with good employment
records, who expressed interest in serving as construction
inspectors, were chosen for these positions. This policy has
served us well, and it remains in effect today.
The ditch inspector on Colonial's 1980 36-inch pipeline
construction project was Gary A. Shoemake. Prior to being hired by
Colonial Pipeline Company, Shoemake served in the U.S. Army. He
attended the army's Aviation School and became foreman of a
helicopter repair shop. After receiving an honorable discharge, he
worked and became experienced in all phases of home construction.
He received an Associate Degree in Business Administration from
Kennesaw College in 1976.
85
Shoemake was hired by Colonial February 28, 1977. He
completed the company's Pipeline Operator Training Program in
August of the same year. This extensive formal program comprises
a combination of written material and practical factors. It
familiarizes the employee with pipeline equipment and all facets of
operations. Having demonstrated diligent performance in pipeline
operations for approximately two years, Shoemake was assigned as
ditching inspector on a 40-inch pipeline construction project in
Texas from April to September 1979. He completed this assignment
in an exemplary manner before returning to his operating position
in Atlanta.
Colonial's backfill inspector on its 36-inch pipeline project
was Thomas E. Blackstone. Prior to fc-^ing employed by Colonial,
Blackstone was an electrician in the U. S. Navy. He was honorably
discharged in May 1969 and entered private industry. He worked as
a journeyman electrician and then for a year as a construction
foreman .
Blackstone was hired by Colonial March 12, 1979. He, too,
completed the Pipeline Operator Training Program. Thereafter,
while serving as a pipeline operator, Blackstone completed a
Technical Training Program through Cleveland Institute of
Electronics. He was promoted to pipeline technician in September
1979 in recognition of his aptitude and achievements.
86
Both these employees were assigned to the 1980 construction
project in March, etbout two weeks prior to its commencement. This
time was used to thoroughly fauniliarize the inspectors with all
aspects of the project under the direct supervision of a highly
seasoned Chief Inspector and included a refresher training session
for these inspectors with the company's engineering staff. They
studied the Construction Specifications, especially the sections
that applied to their respective areas of responsibility; ensured
their familiarity with the various reports and other paperwork that
they would be required to complete on a daily basis; familiarized
themselves with the route of the pipeline, both on maps and on the
ground; met with contractor representatives; and performed other
duties as assigned by the Chief Inspector.
Throughout their construction assignments these men continued
to learn from their daily experiences. They were subject to the
continuous scrutiny of the Chief Inspector, a Spread Engineer, a
Project Engineer, and a Project Manager. Both performed admirably
without incident and returned to their normal duties at the
conclusion of the project.
Attached are copies of the specifications which governed the
activities of these inspectors in the performance of their duties.
87
Page 10-1
SECTION 10
BENDING, LAYING, AND LOWERING-IN
Field Bending
Contractor shall make all necessary pipe bends required In the
construction of the line; but. Company may at its option furnish factory
bends for installation at points where, in its Judgment, the use of such
bends is preferable.
Each field bend must comply with the following:
1. The bend must be smooth and uniform.
2. After bending, the pipe must be free from buckling, cracks, or any
other mechanical damage and must conform to the profile of the
completed ditch.
3. There must be no wrinkle bends or miter bends.
4. Bending through a girth weld is permissible provided:
a. The longitudinal weld is kept as near as practicable to the
neutral axis of the bend, i.e., when placed in the bending shoe
the longitudinal weld shall be as close as practical to the
three o'clock or nine o'clock position, and
b. Each girth weld located within the radius of a bend is 100%
x-rayed before or after bending. It shall be the Contractor's
responsibility to clearly mark this weld to call attention to
the need for x-ray.
5. The difference between the maximum and minimum diameter at a bend
must not be more than 2-1/2 per cent of the nominal diameter.
6. The wall thickness of the pipe after bending shall not be less than
tlie minimum permitted by the pipe specification.
All benaing shall be done by a cold stretch bending method, and due care
shall be exercised to avoid buckling the pipe or weakening welds. Any
bend that is buckled, or does not fit the ditch to the satisfaction of
Company Representative, shall be cut out and replaced at Contractor's
expense, and pipe thus removed will be charged to Contractor as damaged
material at the delivered cost. In general, the curvature of all bends
shall be distributed throughout as great a length as possible. All
equipment used to make bends shall be approved by Company Represen-
tative. Padded bending dies for the bending machine shall be required
at no aoditional cost if, in tht Compan^' nepresentat i ve ' s opinion, it is
necessary to protect the coating.
88
Page 10-2
Normal tangents of 6 feet shall be left on the ends of all bent Joints.
No pipe shall be bent in excess of 0.6° per linear foot nor more than
17" per 40 foot pipe joint. Extreme caution shall be exercised in the
use of internally expanded mandrel type bending machines so that the
diameter of the pipe is not increased. In bending, the difference
between the maximum and minimum diameter shall be as stated in (5)
above.
Lowering-In
The Contractor may employ any acceptable means of lowering provided that
such means secures the necessary amount of pipe centered in the bottom
of the ditch and does not injure the pipe or protective coatings.
Whenever possible, pipe shall be lowered into the ditch before the
atmospheric temperature exceeds 80° F. Any excess pipe shall be removed
by the Contractor by cutting out the excess pipe as directed by
Company's Representative and rewelding the resulting two ends of the
line together. All pipe installed in the ditch must be installed in a
manner that minimizes the introduction of secondary stresses and the
possibility of damage to the pipe.
A non-abrasive canvas padded sling or other Company approved device
shall be used in lowering all coated pipe sections without Injury to the
protective coating. Anv coating injured in handling or lowering the
pipe shall be repaired by the Contractor and left in a condition equal
to that of the undanaged coating. Protection shields of plywood (or
equivalent material) shall be placed alongside walls of trench
containing rock or other hard object. These shields are to be taken out
when pipe is not subject to further movement.
All sae-bends and side-hends shall fit the trench neatly, and the inside
of all side-bends or over-bends shall clear the side or bottom of the
ditch by a minimum of 12 inches. In blasted rock ditch the pipe shall
clear both side walls by three feet.
Kg line shall be lowered into the ditch until Company's Representative
has been notified and his approval has been given and the line has been
subjected to electrical holiday testing in accordance with Section 9 of
these Specifications.
Submerging Pipe
At locations along the pipeline route where concrete jacket Is not
specified and water In the ditch prevents lowering the pipe. Contractor
shall pump the water from the ditch to permit lowering. In lieu of this
method. Contractor may, with Conpany's approval, submerge the pipe by
filling It with filtered fresh water. If water Is utilized for
submerging the pipe. It shall not be removed until after the ditch has
been backfilled.
89
Page 10-3
Where factory bends are specified by the Company, Contractor, at no
additional charge, shall cut required degree segments from Company
supplied standard 3R 30", A5* and 90° elbows. No segment of a factory
bend may be employed where the arc distance measured along the crotch Is
less than 2 Inches. If the Internal diameter of such fittings differs
by more than 3/16" from that of the adjoining pipe, the Contractor, at
no additional expense, shall prepare and make the transition as shown on
Attachment 38 and as specified in Section 8 of these Specifications.
Laying
Each Joint of pipe shall be swabbed with an internal line-up clamp or
with a leather or canvas belt disc of the proper diameter, to the
satisfaction of the Company's Representative, to remove dirt, mill scale
and other foreign material before placing pipe In an alignment for
welding.
Longitudinal seams shall be on the upper surface of the line and within
30° from top center. Successive joints shall be rotated to right or
left to avoid aligning the seams in adjoining joints.
The open end of the line shall be securely closed at the end of each
day's work to prevent the entrance of water, small animals, trash or any
other obstructions and shall not be opened until work is resumed. Where
the line is left apart at intervals for any reason, both ends shall
likewise be securely closed.
Contractor shall pick up, haul and insert in the line short pieces of
pipe which have been cut off when tying sections of the line together.
These short pieces of pipe shall not be allowed to accumulate but shall
be moved ahead and welded in the line intermittently with pipe of the
same wall thickness and grade. The shortest pipe pup permissible under
these conditions shall be 10 feet in length. With specific Company
Representative approval, shorter lengths may be employed when necessary
to facilitate tie-ins, etc., but in no case shall pipe less than one
pipe diameter in length be installed anywhere in the line.
CAUTION Company may elect to impose additional special
conditions, restrictions or limitations on the
quantity and length of pup joints permitted,
their use in the line, final disposition, Con-
tractor responsibility, etc. Such additional
special conditions, restrictions, and limitations
shall be set forth in Section 17 of these Spefici-
catlons.
Pipe Transitions
Company may elect to utilize pipe transition pieces on this project.
Welding transition pieces in the line shall be the Contractor's
responsibility and shall not be a basis for extra payment. All mainline
valves are weld-end and will be supplied with ends to match, or
approximately match, adjoining pipe wall thickness. At any location
where the pipe wall thickness changes and the difference in thickness
exceeds 3/32", and transition nipples are not specified, the Contractor,
at no additional expense, shall prepare and make the transition as shown
on Attachnenc 38 and as specified in Section 8 of these Specifications.
90
Page 11-1
SECTION 11
BACKFILLING, RETARDS, CLEANUP
Backfilling - General
No ditch shall be backfilled unless the pipe has proper depth and fit.
Absolutely no rocks, hard clods, or other hard objects shall be allowed
to remain on or against the coated pipe. No timber, roots, wood, excess
coating material, containers, packaging material, metal, or other such
items shall be permitted In the backfill. Approval of Company Represen-
tative shall be obtained prior to backfilling any section of ditch.
Backfilling - Normal Terrain
Backfilling shall be done in such a manner as to insure filling the
space below and up the sides of the pipe to a point at least 12 inches
above the pipe with soft, loose earth. The backfill material 12 Inches
and higher above the pipe shall meet the general conditions above or the
specific conditions stated below. Use of auger type backfill equipment
is approved and preferred.
Contractor shall employ any acceptable method approved by Company Repre-
sentative which will insure adequate compaction of the backfill and at
the same time not deform the pipe from its normal roundness. Upon
completion of the compaction, the remaining backfill shall be spread
over the pipeline ditch as shown in Attachment 62, and the earth on both
sides of the ditch, which has been disturbed during construction, shall
be graded to the satisfaction of the Company Representative, the
lant'ovjner, or his tenant, and fertilized and seeded when so directed by
Company (see "Cleanup of Right of Way" below).
Contractor shall open all natural water courses disturbed by construc-
tion. When directed by Company Representative, Contractor shall
construct furrows and terraces across the pipeline ditch to divert the
flow of water away from the backfilled ditch and into natural drainage
courses.
Backfilling - Rock Ditch
All coated pipe, other th;in concrete coated pipe, installed in a blasted
or rock ditch line must be placed on Company approved supports 10 feet
on center with 1 foot minimum clearance above bottom of ditch and at a
sufficient depth to provide the required cover over the installed line.
(See section on "Retards" and Attachment 37 herein.)
91
Page 11-2
Following placement of supports, the ditch shall be filled with soft
earth padding to the top of the supports. The pipe shall then be placed
on the supports and additional soft earth shall be added in 6" lifts
until there Is 12" of padding above the pipe. Contractor shall provide
adequate compaction on each side of the pipe to prevent "egging" when
the ditch is completely backfilled.
in anv area where there is insufficient loose, clean dirt on the right
of way for this padding. Contractor shall furnish, haul and place such
dirt padding as required at no additional charge to the Company.
Backfilling shall then proceed as defined above under "Normal Terrain"
with the exception, and at the discretion of the Company Representative,
some rock, no larger than one man can carry, may be placed in the
backfill after the above mentioned padding is in place. In cultivated
areas, no rock shall be placed in the top of the backfill which would
interfere with plowing or cultivating. All surplus rock shall be
disposed of by Contractor to the satisfaction of Company, landowner, or
tenant at no additional compensation.
In a blasted or rock ditch line that cannot be drained, such as small
stream crossings. Company may elect to furnish and utilize a "pipe
shield" material on the underside of the line pipe. This material will
generally be made of polyester, resin, fiber glass, and silicon. It
will be supplied by the Company in 1/2" to 3/4" thicknesses, 120''-180''
segments, and in random 5' to 10' lengths (see Attachment 69).
Contractor shall supply labor to Install and necessary banding. Payment
for installation shall be on a Unit Price Basis, Exhibit "C".
Backfilling of Public and Private Road Crossings
Where a ditch has been opened across a public or private road or
highway, Contractor shall, immediately after lowering in the pipe,
backfill that part of the ditch line crossing the roadway. Contractor
is cautioned backfill requirements may vary to meet the requirements of
County Road Commissioners or the equivalent City, County, State, or
Federal officials or private road owners.
In lieu of such special requirements, backfilling of all road crossings
not bored shall be performed in the following manner: The backfill
under, around, and to a point 6 inches above the top of the pipe or
casing shall be of loose earth, free of clods or rocks, and shall be
placed in tamped layers not to exceed 6 Inches in thickness. Each
succeeding layer, to a point 12 inches below the normal road surface,
shall be placed In 6" layers, each layer being thoroughly tamped and
watered if necessary, but need not be free of rock or clods provided
that any rock placed In the backfill shall not exceed 6 inches in
diameter and shall be placed in layers with soil or fine rock placed
between to fill all voids. On graded dirt roads, the top 12 inches of
backfill shall be well graded crushed rock or gravel mixed with clay and
placed in the backfill in 4" layers. Each layer shall be thoroughly
tamped, using water if necessary, before placing the next layer. On all
surfaced roads, which are not bored, the top 12 inches of backfill
92
Page 11-3
and the surface shall be replaced In a manner satisfactory to the
Company Representative and to the authorities having jurisdiction
thereof. Contractor is cautioned that most road authorities will
require 90% to 1002 compaction which, when required, is the Contractor's
responsibility and shall not be a basis for extra payment.
Contractor shall arrange whenever possible to complete all road
crossings before the end of the work day to avoid hazards to night
travel.
Backfilling - Terraces, Crossings, Drain Tile, Etc.
In backfilling across farm or other terraces or in small stream
crossings. Contractor shall backfill as required above and shall restore
the terraces and/or banks and, if necessary, shall reinforce the
backfill with earth filled bags, sprayed urethane, rock, rip-rap, or
concrete headwalls as directed by Company Representative.
Contractor shall repair all drain tile removed or damaged by the method
shown in Attachment 70 or by a method approved by Company
Representative.
Backfilling - Designated River Crossing
Contractor shall backfill designated river crossings In accordance with
the special drawings and/or restriction list provided with sane.
Distance Between Rough Backfill and Lowering-In
Contractor shall keep the rough backfill as close as possible to the
lowering-in operation and at no time shall the distance between exceed
one mile unless specifically approved by Company Representative.
Maintenance of Backfill
Contractor shall at his own expense repair damage to levees, roadways,
lands, private driveways, and farm terraces caused by settling or
washing along right of way up to and including date of acceptance by
Company of work included herein.
Retards •
It is the intent of the Company to have the Contractor erect on
•lillsides or slopes "retards" to prevent the loss of material from the
hotton of the ditch line by "washing". Contractor shall provide retards
consisting of sand bags or sprayed urethane foam as requested by Company
Representative. When Company reouests use of sand bag retards,
Contractor shall supply the sand bags and erect the retards. In such
93
Page 11 -A
Instances, sand bags two or more high shall be placed completely across
the ditch before the pipe Is lowered Into position. Additional sand
bags shall then be placed around, over, and above the pipe. Each retard
shall be built completely across the ditch and to the height designated
by the Company Representative (see Attachment 64). Company
Representative will designate the number and location for all retards.
Payment for sand bag retards shall be on a Unit Price Basis In
accordance with Exhibit "C.
When Company requests use of urethane foam retards. Contractor shall
spray liquid urethane furnished by Company across the ditch line
generally as shown on Attachment 63. Pipe shall then be placed on the
retard, and Contractor shall spray urethane around the pipe and
completely across the ditch and to the height requested by the Company
Representative. Any forming material required to attain the height
requested shall be the responsibility of the Contractor. Payment for
urethane form retards shall be in accordance with Exhibit "C".
Cleanup of Right of Way
As soon as backfill is completed, Contractor shall immediately clean up
the right of way, removing to places designated by Company all surplus
and defective materials, and disposing of all refuse such as brush,
sheet iron, broken skids, enamel, glass fiber, etc., to the satisfaction
of Company's Representative. All rock, which has been scattered along
the right of way or on property adjacent to the right of way by
Contractor's operations, shall be gathered up by Contractor and disposed
of by Contractor so as not to cause damage to property of others.
Insofar as possible, the earth on both sides of the pipeline ditch,
which has been disturbed during the construction of the pipeline, shall
be smoothed up. On all land subject to cultivation, a chisel plow of
type acceptable to Company shall be used and the entire right of way
plowed to a depth of 10 inches unless the right of way easement
specifically omits this requireraent. On pasture land, the entire right
of way shall be disked and left in a condition satisfactory to the
Company Representative. Contractor is to fertilize and seed all
dlstrubed right of way except right of way normally inundated with water
or under cultivation. Company will furnish required seed and
fertilizer. All temporary fills and bridges shall be removed and
cleaned up to the satisfaction of both the landowner and Company
Representative.
To control and prevent soil erosion and/or sedimentation at water
crossings. Contractor shall erect berms across the right of way near the
water's edge on each side of each water crossing. These bcrns shall be
of sufficient height and width to turn water washing down the right of
way to right and left, well away from the point where the ditch line
enters the water crossing. In certain areas, to further control
94
Page 11-5
erosion, washing, and/or sedimentation, Contractor may be required to
place straw mulch, baled filter straw, or other Company approved
material on the right of way. Payment for mulch and bale placement
shall be on a Unit Price Basis in accordance with Exhibit "C".
Company will not prevent Contractor from attempting to clean up on
account of weather or ground conditions. If Contractor proceeds with
cleanup during adverse weather or when adverse ground conditions
prevail. Contractor will assume full risk of acceptance and may be
required by Company to again do such cleanup at the Contractor's expense
to meet the Company's normal dry weather cleanup specifications.
Repairs to Fences
Upon completion of all backfilling and the cleaning up of the right of
way, permanent repairs shall be made to all fences by using new and like
kind of fencing materials. Contractor shall furnish and install good
pressure creosoted or cedar post of 3" minimum top diameter in all
fences except where steel, concrete, or specially constructed posts are
encountered, in which case Contractor shall furnish and install such
posts. All fence repairs shall be satisfactory to Company, landowner,
and his tenant.
It is not the intention of the Company to install permanent gates along
the route of the line; however, at some locations landowners may require
such gates, and wherever they are necessary. Company's Representative
will so advise Contractor. In such cases, Company will furnish gate and
gate posts, and Contractor will install and furnish any other material
that may be required at no extra expense to the Company.
Distance Between Final Cleanup and Backfill
The distance between final cleanup and backfilling, which shall include
all tie-ins, shall not exceed five miles unless approved by Company
Representative.
95
Ms. Byrne. You had mentioned in your testimony and I agree
that the one-call system needs to be tightened up and we men-
tioned about what local and State and Federal Grovemment can do
to prevent these kind of oil spills in the future.
Do you have any things that you want to do within the company
to prevent these land of spills in the future? You have told us what
you thought government should do. What should Colonial do?
Mr. Brinkley. I think what Colonial has been doing has been
quite successful. Unfortunately we were not able to get to this pipe-
hne yet and I have explained how we prioritized the system and
why this was put down on o\ir priority list.
But Colonial will continue their program which is not required
to inspect these pipelines with magnetic pigs, to repair any anoma-
Ues that show up on these magnetic pig runs.
And while I am on that subject, let me set the record straight.
There is no problem with internal corrosion in product pipelines
such as ours. We have never had a problem with internal corrosion
insofar as I know, neither has anyone else in the business.
So the only corrosion — and that is what magnetic pigs are really
designed to do is to detect corrosion both internal and external, but
in our case internal is not an issue. External corrosion is of course
an issue. We have foimd through this program many places where
we needed to repair the pipe and we have repaired the pipe before
we had a failure so we have averted many spills through our pipe-
line pigging program and will continue to do that.
We have spent probably $40 or $50 million over the past five or
six years in smart pig inspections, excavations and repair of pipe-
lines.
Ms. Byrne. How much have you spent on this cleanup so far?
Mr. Brinkley. As of March the 5th. we had spent $3.5 million.
It will certainly cost between $5 and $10 miUion before we finish.
Ms. Byrne. You spent $50 miUion on pigging and you spent $5
milUon, was it, on cleanup?
Mr. Brinkley. We have spent $3.5 milUon so far. We have not
yet received the expected request for money from the EPA, from
the Coast Guard and other Federal agencies and of course we
haven't — ^we haven't begun, really, substantial expenditures for the
remediation efforts yet.
Ms. Byrne. But you haven't spent as much on cleanup as you
spent on inspection?
Mr. Brinkley. No, we haven't.
Ms. Byrne. I presume, I am just thinking out loud here, I pre-
sume that you get to deduct the cost of cleanup from your cost of
doing business; is that correct?
Mr. Brinkley. That is right.
Ms. Byrne. So really those losses are being felt by taxpayers, too,
because that is income that would have been there that is not
there.
Mr. Brinkley. I guess that is true. On the other hand, when we
make money, we pay some of it to the Federal Grovemment, so
Ms. Byrne. I understand. I understand. You talk in your testi-
mony about the third-party damage and the only construction that
took place in this area was seven years ago. I presume that you
96
in those seven years since that construction happened, you did
some kind of inspection.
Did you discover anything that would indicate that you had a
problem here? Is there anj^hing you could have fixed prior to the
rupture?
Mr. Brinkley. Certainly if we had known there was a gouge in
the pipe, we would have fixed it. We know that gouges in the pipe-
line make it subject to failure by cyclic fatigue after a long enough
period of time.
We did run a caliper pig in this line in 1989. This particular
gouge did not show up on the caliber pig chart, although going
back and expanding the chart and looking at it very carefolly, you
can actually see it but you would have to know where to start.
Ms. Byrne. So you — there was something there you just didn't
deal with it at that time.
Mr. Brinkley. No, it wasn't — ^we coidd not have found it unless
we knew where it was.
Ms. Byrne. Okay. You also state that the damage resulted fi-om
third party because of similar scrapes and marks that were found
on the adjacent 32-inch pipe. Was this section of pipe replaced
when you found these anomalies?
Mr. Brinkley. I am sorry the 32 inch?
Ms. Byrne. One of yovu* reasons for saying it was third-party
damage is you found similar marks in the adjacent 32-inch pipe as
the marks you foimd on the 36-inch pipe.
Mr. Brestkley. That is right.
Ms. Byrne. I am asking was that pipe taken out and replaced?
Mr. Brinkley. We repaired it with a full encirclement sleeve
which is an approved way to repair such a piece of damage.
Ms. Byrne. You didn't want to take that section of pipe out. I
mean if you had one pipe — ^you had a 36-inch pipe that you just
didn't want to put a new section in.
Mr. Brinkley. No, the sleeve is as good a repair as taking out
the section of pipe.
Ms. Byrne. Again, we had talked about this pigging and you had
mentioned in your testimony before the Chairman that you had
maybe some plans about making this pipe piggable.
Mr. Brinkley. Making it piggable by magnetic flux tools, yes.
Ms. Byrne. Do you have any idea what the time fi*ame might be
for that?
Mr. Brinkley. I don't have — ^we haven't addressed that at this
moment. It could be as early as next year. It depends perhaps on
exactly what kinds of materials are required.
We are talking about an expenditure of probably well over $20
million and 36-inch valves are long delivery items, so that would
probably be one of the major factors in exactly when we could make
this pipeline a single diameter all the way through or make it so
we C£in run a magnetic flux pig in it.
One of the other things that kind of colored our thinking was
that during the period of time when we were struggling with the
question of are we going to modify this line or how are we going
to modify this line, some of the suppliers of smeirt pigs kept telling
us that they were on the verge of being able to develop a pig that
97
would indeed inspect the 36-inch line and go through the 32-inch
station piping.
However, they haven't come up with one yet and we are begin-
ning to lose hope that they will. So we will probably have to modify
the pipeline to take the large diameter pig.
Ms. Byrne. Why wasn't that done in the first place since the
technology was available? You had the 32-inch station piping and
you had a 36-inch pipe and was it just a matter of cost savings,
cost cuttings, convenience, what?
Mr. Brinkley. No, as I explained earUer and in 1980 when that
pipeline was built, tiiis was not proven technology. In fact, it was
very unproven technology and the pigs that were available at those
times didn't do a very good job, probably gave you more misin-
formation than information, so it wasn't nearly as important.
We wanted to make sure that we could get cleaning pigs through
it. Which we regularly do. We run a cleaning pig through about
once a quarter but it was not nearly as important in those days be-
cause the technology was not developed to be able to run a mag-
netic flux pig. . .
And the reason that they ended up with 32-inch station pipmg,
as I tried to explain, was that this was a parallel line, what we call
a loop to an existing line that was being operated at maximimi ca-
pacity in order to supply the demands for petroleum products in
this area and on fiuther into New York Harbor and just didn't
have that opportunity to build these stations and modify them,
they were just — these stations were cut off at the 32-inch line and
tied into the 36.
Ms. Byrne. Thank you, Mr. Brinkley.
Mr. BORSKI. I thank the gentlewoman. Any other questions? Mr.
Brinkley, we have a time problem here. I am going to submit ques-
tions to you in writing if I may and appreciate your rapid response
if we could.
Mr. Brinkley. Certainly we welcome that, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. BORSKI. Thank you very much for your testimony today.
[Subsequent to the hearing additional questions were submitted
to Mr. Brinkley. The questions and responses follow:]
98
Colonial Pipeline Company
QUESTIONS FOR COLONIAL PIPELINE COMPANY AS FOLLDW-HP
TO THE COLONIAL PIPELINE HEARING OF MAY 18. 1993
Q. 1. Vlhen do you anticipate coopletion of the necessary modifications to
the 36- inch dianeter pipeline so that it can accept a magnetic -flux
inspection device?
A. Colonial is pursuing the possibility of having a vendor build a
magnetic inspection pig that will traverse this line in its present
configuration. If an appropriate pig cannot be built in a timely
fashion, Colonial will include the modifications in its capital
budget for 199A. Engineering, drawing, and material acquisition
will take place in the first half of 1994 with construction in the
last half. Modifications should be complete by year end.
Q. 2. Are pipeline companies insured against pipeline accidents such as
that which occurred on March 28, 1993? If so, to what extent does
the insurance industry provide incentives or requirements regarding
preventative spill maintenance of pipelines?
A. Pipelines generally carry insurance to indemnify against accidents
similar to the March 28, 1993 event. Specifically, the level of
self-instired retention and upper limits of liability coverage vary
from company to company.
There are no formal incentives or requirements other than the desire
of any businesses to reduce the financial risk associated with an
extradordinary catastrophic event. Pipeline companies perceived by
insurance markets to be proactive in preventive maintenance,
employee training for damage control and spill response, and
discovery and remediation of environmental hazards are more likely
to find coverage to be more readily available at more stable rates
than those who are not as careful.
Q. 3. Does Colonial Pipeline Company have internal guidelines on
hydrostatic pressure testing?
A. Colonial hydrostatically tests all new pipe installations in
accordance with DOT regulations.
q. 4. Hydrostatic testing is the only testing method available that can
test the pressure integrity of a pipeline and detect defects caused
by railroad fatigue and by fluctuating pressures which are common in
hazardous liquid pipelines. Does Colonial regularly use hydrostatic
testing to test the pressure integrity of its hazardous liquid
. pipelines? If not, why?
A. As a point of clarification, while it is true that fluctuating
pressures are common in hazardous liquid pipelines, those
fluctuations are not a cause of pipeline defects. Furthermore, the
99
Colonial Pipeline Company
existence of defects caused by railroad fatigue is not 'coomon'' in
hazardous liquid pipelines, althou^ Colonial has experienced this
problea with one vintage (1962) of large diameter pipe from a
certain aanuf acturer .
Colonial hydrostatically tests new pipelines in accordance with DOT
regulations. Colonial «loes not regularly use hydrostatic testing to
pressure test the pressure integrity of its pipelines because a
hydrostatic test does not reveal all defects - only those that are
severe enough at the time of the test to fail at or below the test
pressure. Colonial feels that because of the cost, the difficulties
in acquiring and disposing of water, and the disruption in the
supply of refined products to the area served by the pipeline,
hydrostatic tests are not warranted unless it is perceived that
there exists a nuniber of harmful defects that cannot be detected by
some other means.
Q. 5. When Colonial hydrostatically tested the 32 -inch line from Mitchell
Jimction to Dorsey in August and September 1990, the section between
Lousla, Virginia, and Remington, Virginia, had a blow out. What was
the basis for the decision to test that line? Has the entire length
of the 32- inch diameter pipeline been hydrostatically tested since
the time of its construction in the 1960 's7
A. The basis for the decision to test that line was the occurrence of
a pipeline rupture downstream of Louisa in December of 1989. The
cause of the failure was attributed to railroad fatigue and was near
a similar failiure that had occurred in 1980 (both failures involved
the previously mentioned 1962 vintage pipe). It was Colonial's
contention that, despite the two failures, the railroad fatigue
problem was not widespread because pipe loading specifications in
effect at the time would have prevented the problem if all rail cars
had been loaded per the specifications. Apparently some small
number of Joints was loaded improperly. Of the 144 miles of pipe
tested, the only failure was in the remaining portion of the joint
of pipe that had failed in 1980 (at the time of the 1980 failure
only the affected portion of the pipe Joint had been removed and
replaced - the remainder of the Joint was examined radiographically
but that failed to show small cracks that were present) . In sximmary
the hydrotest revealed no additional defective Joints of pipe beyond
those that had failed in 1980 and 1990.
The remaining length of the 32 -inch line was hydrotested vhen first
constructed but not since that time. The pipe in this section is
from different manufacturers and has experienced no failures due to
railroad fatigue in over 30 years of service.
Q- 6- Colonial provided the Office of Pipeline Safety (OPS) with
information that 4,636 miles of pipeline are piggable with a smart
pig and that 3,848 miles have been pigged. What internal criteria,
factors, or guidelines were considered in deciding to pig the 3,848
miles of pipeline? What is the frequency of inspecting your line
with smart pigs?
100
Colonial Pipeline Company
A. The criteria was slnply to start by pigging the older lines first as
smart pigs became available. Some lines had to be modified to run
the pigs. Inspection of some of the smaller lines had to be delayed
xintll pigs were developed that could negotiate small radius bends.
Colonial is still conducting the first round of smart pig
inspections. Criteria for fut\ire inspections will depend on several
factors including leak history, results of the first round of
inspections, etc. Colonial expects to be doing some amount of
internal inspection every year.
Q. 7. Why was the 36-inch line not caliper-plgged in 1980 when the line
was commissioned, as is the practice in the Industry, to ensure that
the line was free of dents and defects?
A, This line was proven to be free of what would be considered
significant dents or buckles by running what is known as a "gauging
pig" through the line. This is a pig with an aluminum gauge plate
attached to the front. If any significant dents or other reductions
in pipe diameter were present the gauge plate would be deformed. It
was neither Colonial's practice nor general industry practice in
1980 to run a caliper pig.
Q. 8. Why did Colonial run a caliper pig rather than the more advanced
geometry pig (which is fitted with a gyroscope and can detect
horizontal and vertical changes in alignment) in the 36 -inch line
between Chantilly and Dorsey Junction, given that both types of pigs
were readily available in 19897
A. Line 3 from Greensboro Junction, North Carolina, to Dorsey Junction,
Maryland, is a 36-lnch line with five pump stations. Because these
stations were originally constmcted to serve an earlier vintage 32-
inch pipeline, all of these pump stations are equipped with 32 -inch
station piping. Both the cleaning pigs that we normally run and
caliper pigs such as that run in 1989, can pass through the
restricted station piping, whereas more advanced geometry pigs
cannot. Furthermore, the only advantage to a geometry pig is that
it can detect horizontal and vertical changes in alignment. A
pipeline such as Colonial's pipeline in this area, which is burled
in stable ground, would not be subject to such changes and we would
not consider this data to be of any advantage to the objective of
maintaining the pipeline.
Q. 9. Did the pig run identify any of the dents which were subsequently
discovered when the pipe was excavated such as the dent which was
found on the underside of the pipe?
A. Colonial's requirement to the pig vendor was to identify all dents
. that were 3 percent of the pipe diameter or greater (1.08" in
diameter or greater) . Piping codes require that all dents greater
that 6 percent be repaired. The report did not Identify the dent on
the xinderside of the pipe.
101
Colonial Pipeline Company
After the Reston accident, Colonial asked the vendor to re -examine
the charts and nagnlfy the graphical data In the area o£ the
accident. Once this was done, one could see a snail Indication
that appears to natch the location of the dent on the underside of
the pipe.
Q 10. Please describe the specific actions which Colonial plans to take to
ensure pipeline safety In high population and environmentally
sensitive areas?
A, Those areas which Colonial considers to be densely populated or
environmentally sensitive are given extra svirvelllance and higher
maintenance priorities than other areas.
Within the Department of Transportation, the Office of Pipeline
Safety Is obligated under the provisions of the 1992 Amendments to
the Hazardous Liquid Pipeline Safety Act to define those areas and
establish further procedures for protecting them If necessary. When
those procedures are developed, Colonial will comply.
Q. 11. Mr. Brlnkley stated In his testimony: "There Is no problem with
Internal corrosion In product pipelines such as ours. We have never
had a problem with Internal corrosion Insofar as I know, and neither
has anyone else In the business." How then do you explain that on
page 49 of the Annual Report on Pipeline Safety for calendar year
1991, published by the Department of Transportation, 19 accidents
were directly attributed to Internal corrosion In hazardous liquid
pipelines discharging almost 39,000 barrels of petrolevnn?
/^. Mr. Brlnkley 's accurately described the situation with respect to
internal corrosion In product pipelines. His comment was made in
the context of the GAO testimony on using smart pigs to detect
internal corrosion. While it is certainly true that internal
corrosion is a problem with certain crude oils which may contain
fairly substantial amounts of sulphur and water, Mr. Brlnkley was
reacting to the testimony of the gentleman from the GAO who stated
that petroleum products such as those that Colonial pumps are very
corrosive. This is simply not the case, as corrosion Inhibitors are
added to the products before they are shipped on the pipeline.
These are the same products that are stored in an automobile's gas
tank or home heating oil tank.
Of the 19 accidents attributable to internal corrosion only four
involved refined products and only 248 of the 39,320 barrels
released were refined products. The remaining 15 accidents and the
vast najorlty of the volume released Involved crude oil pipelines.
Of the four accidents involving refined products, three were
attributed to water and/or trash In auxiliary lines, which usually
are within pipeline facilities such as pump stations and tank farms
and Involve small fittings susceptible to trapping such water and
trash. One was in a tank line and was caused by urea ammonia
nitrate solution which had been stored in the tank In times past.
None of the four were located in line pipe accessible by smart pigs.
102
Colonial Pipeline Company
Q. 12. According to data supplied by the Departnent of Transportation's
Office of Pipeline Safety, the nunber of incidents involving natiiral
gas pipelines appears to be declining, while the nximber of incidents
reported involving hazardous liquid pipelines is steadily
increasing. To vhat do you attribute this increase?
^^ This question is probably best answered by the Office of Pipeline
Safety. However, from Colonial's perspective we offer the following
comments :
The criteria for reporting accidents for liquid pipelines is
significantly different from the criteria for natural gas pipelines.
Though both types of pipelines have to report any accident Involving
a death or injury, natural gas lines have to report accidents with
property damage over $50,000, while liquid pipelines have to report
any accident with property damage over $5,000. Often in the past,
leaks were not reported unless they met the 50 -barrel minimum
release criteria provided in the regulations. However, the Office
of Pipeline Safety has advised Colonial that property damage
includes the cost of environmental remediation. As a result.
Colonial has been reporting (Including making telephonic notice to
the National Response Center) small leaks such as one or two
barrels because the cost of responding to the leak almost always
exceeds $5,000, if one includes environmental costs, even if this
involves only testing to prove that contamination was prevented or
limited. Other than the environmental concerns, inflation has
Increased the cost of pipeline repairs but the $5,000 trigger level
has been in effect for a number of years and has not been adjusted
for inflation. As a result, the statistics for pipeline releases
reported to DOT for recent years will be skewed when compared to
past years.
103
Mr. BORSKI. On our next panel we would like to welcome Keith
Buttleman, Deputy Director, Public and Intergovernmental Affairs,
Virginia Department of Environmental Quality; Dr. John M.
DeNoyer, Councilman, Town of Hemdon and Chairman, Fairfax
County, Environmental Quality Advisory Council; Thomas M.
Davis, III, Chairman, Fairfax County Board of Supervisors; and
Jerry Garegnani, Chairman, Friends of Sugarland Rim.
[Witnesses sworn.]
TESTIMONY OF KEITH BUTTLEMAN, DEPUTY DIRECTOR, PUB-
LIC AND INTERGOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, VIRGINIA DE-
PARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY; DR. JOHN
DeNOYER, COUNCILMAN, TOWN OF HERNDON AND CHAIR-
MAN, FAIRFAX COUNTY ENVIRONMENTAL ADVISORY COUN-
CIL; THOMAS M. DAVIS, HI, CHAIRMAN, FAIRFAX COUNTY
BOARD OF SUPERVISORS; AND JERRY GAREGNANI, CHAIR-
MAN, FRIENDS OF SUGARLAND RUN
Mr. BORSKI. Mr. Buttleman.
Mr. Buttleman. Thank you. My name is Keith Buttleman, Dep-
uty Director for Public and Intergovernmental Affairs of the Vir-
ginia Department of Environmental Quality.
The Commonwealth of the Virginia is vitally interested in the
regulation of petroleum pipelines because of our experiences in Vir-
ginia with spills. I am here today to briefly discuss the Colonial
Pipeline spill near Hemdon and a couple of other recent incidents.
On the morning of March 28th, 1993 a section of the Colonial Pipe-
line near Hemdon, Fairfax Coimty, Virginia, mptured, releasing
diesel petroleum into the environmental. The spill contaminated
about nine miles of Sugarland Rxm which empties into the Potomac
River.
The Fairfax County Fire Department responded immediately and
did an excellent job of initial damage control. The Virginia Depart-
ment of Environmental Quality and the Virginia Department of
Emergency Services along with the Environmental Protection
Agency and the U.S. Coast Guard Atlantic Strike Force responded
immediately as did the pipeline company with their own personnel
and several cleanup contractors.
As described under the Oil Pollution Act of 1990, a Unified Com-
mand Structure was estabUshed between Fairfax County and the
Department of Environmental Quality and EPA to oversee emer-
gency response.
Initial activity focused on collecting the diesel fuel behind con-
tainment booms in Sugarland Run to prevent it from migrating
downstream, and on recovering the product into tanker trucks. Pro-
tection of human health was an immediate priority and air quality
monitoring of adjacent neighborhoods was conducted to assure
there was no immediate health risks. Residential wells were also
monitored to assure that ground water was not affected.
Initial recovery efforts were successful, but were quickly ham-
pered by a shortage of tanker trucks and locations to store recov-
ered oil. High flow conditions in Sugarland Rim and the Potomac
and difficult access at the mouth of the Sugarland Run also com-
pUcated the recovery efforts.
104
The public drinking water intake on the Potomac River which
serves half of Fairfax County was closed because of oil sheen at the
intake. Within 24 hours, animal recovery efforts were organized by
the Fairfax Animal Control Department to collect and rehabilitate
affected beaver and waterfowl.
The Unified Command Post was required to maintain 24 horn-
operations for the first week after the spill to oversee emergency
cleanup. Ultimately, it appears that more than 400,000 gallons
were released and the cause of spill remains uncertain.
The extent of the environmental damage has yet to be fully de-
termined. Potentially sensitive wetland areas have been affected.
The Fairfax County Water Authority was forced to keep its Poto-
mac facility closed for 11 days and had intermittent shutdowns fol-
lowing that. Preliminary indications are that the fish populations
in Sugarland Rxm were completely eliminated and most other
aquatic communities were severely damaged. Damage assessment
is continuing at this time.
Colonial Pipeline is currently developing a plan for remediation
of Sugarland Run under the direction of county, State and Federal
authorities. At this time it is uncertain what will be required or
how long the cleanup will take. It appears that there is no longer
an immediate threat to residents and that the emergency phase
has ended.
This spill is one of a series of pipeline releases which the Com-
monwealth of Virginia has experienced in recent years. Since 1985
at least four other major spills have released over 400,000 gallons
into State waters.
In November of 1985, over 120,000 gallons of heating oil was re-
leased due to a pipeline break in Chesterfield County. About 93,000
gallons of product was actually lost into the James River, but ex-
tremely high flood conditions mitigated an adverse environmental
effects.
A pipeline rupture near Locust Grove in Orange County, Virginia
resulted in over 200,000 gallons of kerosene being released into
Mine Run and ultimately the Rapidan River and then the Rappa-
hannock River. This spill in December of 1989 resulted in the city
of Fredericksburg's water intake being shut down for nine days and
the city had suffered a similar effect from a Colonial Pipeline break
in March of 1980 near the same sight.
In June of 1990 a line break caused damage to — a line break
caused by damage to the pipeline by a backhoe spilled over 80,000
gallons of number 2 fuel oil into a farm pond in Chesterfield Coun-
ty. Almost all of that product was contained in the pond and was
recovered.
And also in August of 1990, a pipeline ruptured in the city of
Chesapeake, Virginia, spilled over 60,000 gallons of marine diesel
into Drum Creek, a tributary of the EUzabeth River and affected
a considerable area of tidal wetlands.
The history of repeated spills by petroleum pipelines has caused
the Commonwealth to be gravely concerned over the adequacy of
pipeline regulations. On April 1st, 1993, after personally touring
the area EUiected by the recent spill in Fairfax County, Governor
Wilder instructed the State to actively pursue all avenues to
strengthen pollution prevention requirements for petroleum pipe-
105
lines. We believe that States must have a substantive role in these
regulations in order to protect our public interest,
Mr. BORSKI. We will hear from all paneUsts first and hold all
questions to the end.
Mr. DeNoyer. Mr. Chairman, Members of the subcommittee, I
am a town councilman in Hemdon and also the chairman of the
Fairfax County Environmental Quality Advisory Council. My boss
is sitting to my right, Tom Davis. I would like to siunmarize my
statement and submit the total copy for the record.
Mr. BORSKI. Without objection it is so ordered.
Mr. DeNoyer. Mr. Chairman, I would like to cover a few topics
that have not been covered by other people because many of the
things I have written have been covered by others. First of all, we
were very, very lucky in this oil spill. It could have been a lot
worse and I thank we have to think in terms of much worse sce-
narios that could have happened.
First, the material that was spilled was not gasoline — ^it was a
fuel oil not gasoline. If this had been gasoline, we could have a ter-
rible situation, probably fire and much more toxicity. Second, the
ground was saturated with water which minimized the amount of
penetration of oil into the water. Third, the water table was high.
That tends to mitigate the contamination of groundwater because
the flow is generally from the high water table into the stream at
this time, although there is reverse flow going on. Fourth, the
stream was in full bank. This prevented the floating oil from se-
verely contaminating the stream bottom and since the stream was
not at flood stage the oil did not spread out over the flood plain
except in localized low areas or where impoundment structures
such as beaver dams were present. Fifth, the cleanup and recovery
operations were able to recover a significant part of the oil that
spilled, reducing the amount that remained in the environment. I
think we all have to commend everybody involved in their excellent
response and ability to recover as much as possible.
Sixth, we had several heavy rains following the oil spiU that
helped flush out the oil from the stream. And seventh, the warmer
weather has helped evaporate the volatile portions of the oil.
Regardless of these good things, the environmental impact was
significant and while some life can be found in the stream, it is cer-
tainly not a completely recovered ecological system at this time. In
order for that to happen, the residual oil must be removed in one
way or another and the food chain for the entire water dependent
life in the stream must be redeveloped. This is something that will
take a number of years in all probability.
Also damage to vegetation, especially trees is something that is
hard to assess initially because trees can be stressed and not show
the signs for several years. The point I want to emphasize is the
next step in this recovery operation is one that I find very fi*ustrat-
ing.
The techniques of bioremediation are quite well known. In terms
of contingency planning it seems nothing has been done in the past
to plan for the remediation and final recovery of an area of this
type.
And I think that this is something that needs to be added into
the overall in terms of pipeline safety and other hazardous mate-
106
rials safety. The technique of bioremediation either augmented or
natural is that microbes eat — use the oil as a food source. They use
it as a carbon source and they consume it and break it down into
simpler materials.
I did not see the article in The Washington Post, Ms. Byrne, the
intermediate harmful products from diesel fuel, I am unfamihar
with that. However, in general the hydrocarbons are broken down
into carbon dioxide and water which are basically harmless.
The technique can be to leave it alone or to augment it slightly
with fertilizer to augment the bioremediation with the bugs that
have been accustomed to eating the oil and they do work best
under damp conditions when oxygen is present and diiring warm
weather.
Since the spill, we have lost over a month now in terms of time
when rapid implementation of bioremediation could have been suc-
cessful. Hopefully, this will change in the near future. The Treat-
ment Technologies Working Group, of which I am a member, did
give some guidance to EPA and Colonial at the last meeting on
May 12th and we plan to meet again I believe it is on May 26th
or 27th to continue to review the response of Colonial.
So hopefully this bioremediation progrsmi will get started in
early June and the sooner the better because we are losing valu-
able summertime.
Mr. Chairman, I have done some research on pipeline safety and
also some investigation of smart pigs. And I summarize some of
this information in my statement. The comments so far have been
largely directed at magnetic flux pigs. Magnetic flux pigs are good,
but I feel that the ultrasonic pig is something that is still a very
important instrument in terms of measuring actual wall thickness
of pipelines. Also from the best information I have gotten there are
not satisfactory ultrasonic pigs for this 36-inch diameter pipe and
larger diameters. I feel this is an area that needs attention and
that these ultrasonic pigs should be developed as soon as practical
and used in these types of pipelines.
I have attached several recommendations to my statement. I
think the most important is the first one and that is that Public
Law 102-508, Pipeline Safety Act of 1992 should be implemented
as fast as possible to provide for the safety of all of us.
Thank you.
Mr. BORSKI. Thank you.
Mr. Davis. Mr. Chairman and Members of the subcommittee, my
name is Thomas Davis, Chairman of the Fairfax County Board of
Supervisors, and I thank you for this opportunity to discuss issues
and facts related to the recent rupture of the Colonial Pipeline in
northwestern Fairfax County. I wish to especially themk Represent-
ative Leslie Byrne for her initiative in bringing this matter before
you.
On Sunday, March 28th, at approximately 9:00 a.m., Fairfax
County, Virginia Fire and Rescue Department units responded to
the report of a petroleum release near the rear of the Reston Hos-
pital Medical Center in the Hunter Mill District. The release was
thought to have originated from one of Colonial Pipeline Compeuiy's
petroleum transmission lines along Fairfax County's western end.
The source of the release was later confirmed to be Colonial's 36-
107
inch pipeline, which at the time of failure was carrying number 2
fiiel oil, a product commonly used for home heating.
At the site, our emergency units foimd petroleum product pooling
in a nearby storm retention pond, covering portions of adjacent
parking lots, and extending through a combination of storm drain-
age pipes and wetlands into and down Sugarland Run leading
north towards the Potomac River. Emergency units quickly moved
to: Contain as much of the product as possible at the origination
site; determine the extent of the release; request assistance from
responsible agencies; and attempt to contain and control the prod-
uct migrating via Sugarland Run to the Potomac River.
WitMn an hour, first responders were joined by officials from Co-
lonial Pipeline, and subsequently by Colonial contractors, local offi-
cials from the Town of Hemdon and Loudoim Coimty, as well as
Federal and State representatives. Over 40 local, State, Federal
and private agencies were notified and were operating on the scene
within the first six hours of the incident.
By managing the incident through clearly defined objectives and
a unified command, resources were effectively employed over the
next eight days to control and recover a large portion of the esti-
mated 407,000 gallons of fuel oil that were released. We believe
this is a model example of local. State, Federal, and private co-
operation that allowed us to respond well in very difficult and sud-
den circumstances.
Although the emergency phase of this incident has ended, we are
left with unsettling questions about its cause as well as the lessons
to be taken from our experience. The incident on March 28 is the
third time in the last 13 years that a petroleum pipeline has re-
leased a significant amount of product in Fairfax County creating
public health, safety, and environmental concerns. In each incident
lives have been disrupted, hundreds of thousands of dollars have
been spent on clean-up, and extensive investigations of cause and
effect have been performed. Our experience with these incidents
leads us to conclude that more effort needs to be focused on: Pre-
vention through improved, regular, periodic inspections; detection
of leaks while they are still small; and reducing the volume of prod-
uct that can be released following a failure, particularly in areas
where water supplies are involved.
No one of these three efforts alone will prevent reoccurrence of
the failure we experienced. Each of these action areas must be up-
graded and used in combination to improve leak detection.
The regulation of interstate pipelines is clearly a Federal respon-
sibility. I imderstand that Federal officials are investigating this
incident, and I strongly urge that they use information learned
from this and other pipeline failures to strengthen pipeline regula-
tions and improve inspection and monitoring of pipeline installa-
tions and operations.
We specifically suggest that the Department of Transportation
Office of Pipeline Safety intensify the types, intervals, and methods
of pipeline inspections. This should include authorizing local gov-
ernments to inspect and monitor pipeline construction and repair
using Federal standards.
"Smart pigs" and "cahper pigs" that detect abnormalities in pipe-
line wall thickness should be mandated at regular intervals for all
108
sizes of main and lateral lines. Improved c£dibration standards
should be established reg£irding what size of defect in a pipe can
be detected by inspection pigs. For example, there were reportedly
scars on the outside of the pipe that contributed to the final pipe
rupture in Fairfax County. Whey weren't these defects detected by
the inspection pig? We should know what level of confidence, or put
another way, what size of defects, we can really expect to detect
fi*om inspection by these pigs. It would appear the sensitivity and
calibration control of these pigs need great improvement to help
prevent problems such as we have experienced.
In some cases it may be appropriate to require that the damaged
line be uncovered. Additional inspection by means of internal or ex-
ternal devices should be required for any repaired or adjacent sec-
tion of pipeline to assure pipe and weld integrity before the pipe-
line is returned to service.
More precise technologies that monitor product flow should be
mandated to detect sm^ losses of product from initial pipeline
cracks before tiiey become catastrophic. I understand that highly
precise flow measurement technology to detect very small leaks has
been used on the Trans-Alaskan Pipeline. I also am told that the
nuclear industry uses varied means to achieve leak detection before
rupture. Since improved technologies exist, they should be used in
the pipeline industry.
Particularly in densely populated areas such as Fairfax County
and where water supphes are involved, pipelines should also be re-
quired to have additional isolation valves. For example, an addi-
tional estimated 100,000 gallons of product was discharged on
March 28 after the pipeline was shut down.
The pipeline industry has demonstrated an admirable safety
record relative to other forms of petroleum transportation. How-
ever, that record is far fi*om perfect. As painfully demonstrated by
the March 28 Colonial release, an incident of this kind poses seri-
ous consequences. We believe the cost of prevention is less and a
better investment than the cost of clean-up.
As bad as this incident was, can we imagine, for example, the re-
sult had the released product been gasoline rather than fuel oil?
The consequences could have been far more grave and in addition
to all that happened, we might be talking today about massive
evacuations, potential explosions, and acute dangers to Ufe and
property. We do not want that to occur in Fairfax Coimty or any-
where else. We, therefore, strongly recommend that the Federal
Government improve its oversight of this very critical aspect of
interstate commerce by upgrading the pipeline system in the three
basic areas I have discussed at a minimum.
In closing, I wish to express my deep appreciation to our Fairfax
County agencies and employees for their prompt and professional
response to this urgent problem. I also want to thank my colleague.
Supervisor Bob Dix, who represents the Hunter Mill District, for
his outstanding leadership in helping bring the resources together
to handle this emergency. I believe the consequences of this mas-
sive rupture would have been far worse in most other loccd commu-
nities that are simply not as well equipped or prepared to handle
such a crisis.
109
Thank you again, Mr. Chairman and Representative Byrne, for
your concern by holding this hearing. I would be pleased to answer
questions or furnish additional information for the record.
Mr. Garegnani. Good afternoon. I am chair of the Friends of
Sugarland Run. I appreciate this opporhmity to share my group's
view on the Colonial pipeline spill of fuel oil into the environ-
mentally sensitive area oi Sugarland Run in March 1993.
Just some backgroimd on the Friends of Sugarland Run. We are
a group of citizens and business people who have come together to
protect one of the last natural areas in the heavily urbanized re-
gion of northern Fairfax and eastern Loudoun Coimties. Our goal
is to establish a continuous greenway along the 10 mile Sugarland
Run stream valley to support a diversity of wildlife and allow their
migration from the Potomac River deep into Fairfax County. As
part of a national greenway movement in this country, the FOSR
intends to accompHsh this with minimal public funds using volun-
teers to raise funds, perform monitoring, and provide necessary
labor. In fact the FOSR had just, prior to the spill, received from
the Conservation Fund a grant from the DuPont Greenways
Award.
As part of the effort to establish a greenway, we have spent time
identifying threats to the habitats along Sugarland Run. We were
lulled into thinking that the most significant threats were pri-
marily from the heavy development in the watershed causing se-
vere sedimentation and erosion problems degrading the ability of
the stream to support the aquatic Ufe which starts the food chain
for a healthy habitat. Suddenly a threat we weren't even aware of
destroyed the existing Sugarland Run ecosystem in a matter of
hours by dimiping over 400,000 gallons of number 2 fiiel oil into
the stream.
There are several aspects of this disaster that are now apparent
and which we find disturbing due to the lack of adequate controls
and potential reoccurrence of a spill.
Lack of regular internal inspection of the pipeline to measure
wall thickness using "smart pigs". The technology for this exists
but is not being applied. Lack of post-construction inspections. Co-
lonial was aware of the construction at the Reston Hospital site
and even excavated the pipe to aid in its protection, but they did
not visually inspect the pipe before it was re-buried.
Lack of adequate shut off valves leaving vast distances between
valves. Even though the pipeline was shut down almost imme-
diately after the burst occurred, over 400,000 gallons were dumped
into the stream. The pipeline which burst in March usually carries
gasoline. If the spill would have been of 400,000 gallons of gasoline
with its explosive potential and high levels of carcinogens, the dis-
aster would have been terribly worse.
These weaknesses reflect decisions made by Colonial for which
no Federal guidance, regulations or negative incentives exist to
adequately protect environmentally sensitive areas. The decisions
made by Colonial were based upon their economic feasibility with
regard to profitabiHty. This is to be expected from a free enterprise
system and I will be the first to say it is the best system in the
world. However, it depends upon some level of control to make up
for the gap between the good of the corporation and the overall
110
public good. This disaster clearly points out that the gap between
corporate and pubhc good is not being adequately addressed by
interstate pipelme safety controls or negative incentives.
The hundreds of us who live along Sugarland Run place a very
high value on the recreation and aesthetic quaUty of the stream
vadley in our back yards. Unfortunately, that value does not have
associated with it a dollar price tag. On the other hand, it is very
easy for a pipeline company to calculate the cost associated with
a spiU in lost product and fines, to apply a risk factor, and decide
not to address known weaknesses in their system. This decision
causes the citizens near the pipeline to carry the burden of risk
and, if an accident occurs, the value lost by the citizens essentially
goes to subsidize the pipeline company. It is true that if pipeline
companies were forced to respond to more government control, the
price for their products would go up; however, instead of the citi-
zens who hve near the pipeline subsidizing the real cost of depend-
ence on these products, tne cost would be evenly spread among all
the users of the product. There is also a long term benefit to this,
as members of the committee probably know, higher energy costs
drive technology for cleaner ana cheaper energy.
A significant amount of money is now being spent to clean up
Sugarland Run. Had that money been spent in prevention instead
of post-accident clean up, we citizens would still be enjoying our
stream valley instead of trying to keep our kids away from the
stream, assessing the effects on property values, and worrying
about when the pipeline may dump gasoline into the stream.
In summary, from those of us who have lost something of great
value, we ask this committee to consider more stringent regula-
tions and fines to prevent continued destruction of our diminishing
natural areas.
Thank you for this opportunity to express our views.
Mr. BORSKI. Thank you gentlemen. The gentlewoman from Vir-
ginia.
Ms. Byrne. Mr. Chairman, I am going to submit questions to all
of the panel, but I would like to ask Mr. Buttleman from Vfrginia
we have heard testimony that talks about the one-call laws today
and they come into question.
How do you perceive Virginia's one-call laws and what kind of
enforcement do we have for those in Virginia?
Mr. Buttleman. Representative Byrne, that is a question that I
will have to get back to you on. Our analysis of this situation is
continuing at this time. We are not prepared to make any conclu-
sions quite yet on that.
Ms. Byrne. Okay.
Chairman Davis, does the county have a map that shows where
Colonial Pipeline is? Do you actually physically nave a map?
Mr. Davis. Yes, we do.
Ms. Byrne. When the construction permits were obtained for ex-
cavation in the area, when Reston Hospital was built, how many
were obtained and when and by whom?
Mr, Davis. I don't know if I have it here. We will supply that
to you within a week.
Ms. Byrne. My understanding, Mr. Chairman, is that current
law says that these pipelines have to be at least 50 feet from in-
Ill
habitable bxiildings and I was wondering if Fairfax Coimty has any
regulations itself prohibiting the building within 50 feet of such a
pipeline.
Mr. Davis. We don't have one as we speak, but we are in the
process of looking at it now as a resxilt of this incident.
Ms. Byrne. When we were out at the site today, Chairman
Davis, someone mentioned that right along this area where the
pipeline is currently sited, there is a Virginia Department of High-
way somebody's right of way for a road.
Can you tell us what road is going next to this pipeline?
Mr. Davis. There are numerous roads that go across the pipeline
throughout the county. The project is paid for by the county, but
designed and approved by the State. We can try to get you a cross-
section of every road that runs across.
Ms. Byrne. I understand it is a proposed roadway or right of
way. It may be Dominion or the right of way, but it looked to be
fairly close to the pipeline.
Mr. Davis. If it were the Fairfax Parkway, that would have been
designed by the State. We will look at that. There have been nu-
merous design hearings, but the State Transportation Board con-
trols that. I will get that information to you in more particulars.
[The following was received from Mr. Davis:]
112
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
County of Fairfax
BOARD OF SUPERVISORS
OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN
sums30
12000 COVKNMENT CINTBl MIKMWT
lAIKfAX, VIICINIA 2201S407I
TEL£l>HONE (7D3) 324-2321
FAX (703) 324-3955
The information requested for the record (as clarified by Ms.
Jennifer Beens of Representative Byrne's staff) is as follows:
1. Does Fairfax County have any regulations affecting or limiting land use.
particularly such as locating Inhabitable buildings, within any proximity
of a pipeline?
The Fairfax County Zoning Ordinance contains provisions requiring approval
of a special exception for pipelines, however, there are no provisions that
provide for any minimum yard requirements or other setback requirements
for structures located within any proximity of a pipeline.
2. Is any new construction, particularly related to highways, expected to go
on near the pipeline In the affected area?
Future highway plans In the area Include continued construction of the
Fairfax County Parkway which will parallel the pipeline easement within
100 feet from the WOU) trail overpass to approximately one quarter mile
north of Baron Cameron Avenue where It then bears north and away from the
pipeline easement. Also, a bike path will parallel the easement within 75
feet of the pipeline. A ramp off the Fairfax County Parkway Is planned to
cross the pipeline easement at the Baron Cameron Avenue Intersection.
Also. Hew Dominion Parkway Is planned to cross the easement approximately
1.800 feet south of the rupture area.
A thorough review of our records and documents Indicates that plans for a
townhouse/condomlnlum project near the area have been submitted to Fairfax
County. The nearest building In the project will be approximately 80 feet
from the nearest pipeline. This project 1$ In the vicinity of Baron
Cameron Avenue where It crosses the pipeline. As you are aware, there is
currently a construction project underway, the Reston Hospital Extension
parking lot. which Is within the pipeline easement directly over the
pipeline In the vicinity of the rupture.
113
Ms. Byrne. Thank you. That is aU I have, Mr. Chairman
Mr BORSKI. The Chair thanks the gentlewoman. The Chair also
would have some questions to submit.
4. ^^*^^?f ^Sf ^* *° *ii,® hearing additional questions were submitted
to Mr. buttleman. The questions and responses follow:]
114
COMMONWEALTH of VIRQINIA
DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY
Public A Intergovernmental Affairs
202 North Ninth SL, Suite 900, Richmond, VA 23219 (804) 786-4500
July 22, 1993
The Honorable Robert A. Borski
U.S. House of Representatives
Committee on Public Works and Transportation
Chairman, Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight
Suite 2165, Raybum House OfQce Building
Washington, DC 20515
RE: Colonial Pipeline Rupture of March 28, 1993 and Other Pipeline Accidents
Questions of the Subcommittee
Dear Congressman Borski:
As requested, we have responded to the additional questions posed by the
Subcommittee. The questions posed are listed for reference and followed by our
response.
1. Since 1985, Ae State of Urgpiia has sustairted darrutge from seven Colonial Pipeline
Compare oU s/hHs. In your opinion, has Colonial's response been fully cooperative and did
they respond t^gg^essivdy to remediate aU damage caused by these ^hDs?
Our experience is that Colonial Pipeline has responded promptly to their oil spill
incidents. Although there were occasional temporary shortfalls, they quickly mobilized
their internal response resources and brought in sufficient contractor resources. They
always cooperated with the State officials in the containment and removal activities and
responded to our recommendations and concerns. In no case have we found it necessary
to initiate enforcement actions for a failure, on Colonial's part, to contain and clean-up
spills as required by State law.
115
2. In your testimony, you discuss sevGul pipeline spills that have occurred in Virgmia in
recent years. One Sf^ that you did not discuss is the spSl that took place in CentreviUe,
Virginia in 1987. Colonial discusses this spill in some detail in their testimony, and they
allege that the building contractor who caused the spUl was not adequately punished for
vitiating Virginia's 'one<all' statute. Wouldyou comment on whether you think Virginia's
errforcement of its one-call statute is adequate?
The Virgima Underground Utility Damage Prevention Act, Virginia's one-call
statute, does not provide state enforcement authority of its provisions. The State
Corporation Commission, with the concurrence of the Virgima General Assembly, has
created a task force that is currently studying the Act and one of the issues imder review
is the adequacy of enforcement. The Commission has indicated that there is a possibility
that prop>osed amendments relating to state enforcement of the Act will be brought
before the 1994 session of the General Assembly.
3. In your testimony, you stated that as a result of the Colorual pipeline rupture, the fish
popidation in Sugariand Run had been completely eliminated, and potentially sensitive
wetland areas had been ejected. Based on your past experience with similar pipeline spills,
how permanent is the damage to the Sugariand Run area, and how long do you expect it
win take to fully restore this ecosystem?
Virginia is conducting a Natural Resources Damage Assessment (NRDA) for the
Sugariand Rim area. The NRDA process mandated in the federal Oil Protection Act of
1990 is designed to provide a mechanism for determining the environmental damage
resulting from oil spill events and the measures to be implemented to assure the
restoration of the ecosystem. Until the study has been completed, I am imable to offer a
conclusive answer to this question. Our experience with petroleimi spills is that the
damage to flowing freshwater aquatic ecosystems is very severe in the short term. After
the initial clean-up, most systems are resilient and there are few long term effects which
can be observed Jifter several years.
4. Did representatives from the Commonwealtfi of Vir^rua take arty soU samples of the soil
located urtder the n^tured pipeline? If so, what petroleum products (Oher than dieselfuel
were present?
Samples of Sugariand Run stream sediment were collected by DEQ staff
immediately following the spill. The stream sediment station closest to the spill site
contedned polynuclear hydrocarbons (PAH) at the concentration of 0.7 ppm and total
petroleum hydrocarbons (TPH) at 130 ppm. The sediment sample from Sugariand Run
at the Algonkijm Park access road (located downstream) contained 1320 ppm TPH and
86 ppm PAH. The classes of compounds found during DEQ sampling were consistent
with the constituents expected to be found in No.2 fuel oil.
116
Thank you for the opportunity to respond to the questions of the Subcommittee.
Please contact me if you have further questions.
Sincerely,
Keith J. Buttleman
Deputy Director for Public and
Intergovernmental Affairs
The Honorable Elizabeth H. Haskell, Secretary of Natural Resources
Richard Burton, Director of DEQ
William Woodfin, Deputy Director of DEQ Operations
117
Mr. BORSKI. On our final panel, we would welcome Mr. Robert
Rackleff, President, Friends of Lloyd, Lloyd, Florida; Mr. Stuart
Schwartz, Director, Interstate Commission for the Potomac River
Basin, Section for Cooperative Water Supply Operations; accom-
panied by John Corless, Washington Suburban Sanitary Commis-
sion, Perry Costas, Cluef, Washington Aqueduct Division, U.S.
Army Corps of Engineers, and Jim Warfield, Fairfax County Water
Authority.
Mr. Rackleff.
[Witnesses sworn.]
TESTIMONY OF ROBERT RACKLEFF, FRESmENT, FRIENDS OF
LLOYD, LLOYD, FLORIDA; STUART SCHWARTZ, DIRECTOR,
INTERSTATE COMMISSION FOR THE POTOMAC RIVER
BASIN, SECTION FOR COOPERATIVE WATER SUPPLY OPER-
ATIONS, ACCOMPANIED BY JOHN CORLESS, WASHINGTON
SUBURBAN SANITARY COMMISSION, PERRY COSTAS, CHIEF,
WASHINGTON AQUEDUCT DIVISION, U.S. ARMY CORPS OF
ENGINEERS, AND JIM WARFIELD, FAIRFAX COUNTY WATER
AUTHORITY
Mr. Rackleff. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have submitted writ-
ten testimony for the record. I will sumr« arize very briefly.
I am Bob Rackleff, President of the Friends of Lloyd, a citizens
group in North Florida which has been opposing a proposed gas
line and pipeline tank mine project in our commimity.
Lloyd is a small village 15 miles east of Tallahassee. For over 15
years, if there is one lesson we have learned and one we would like
to leave with you today, it is this, the Colonial Pipeline spill on
March 25 was not an isolated situation. Pollution from pipelines is
a serious national problem that needs the attention of Congress.
Consider these facts: In the past 23 years, pipelines have spilled
or leaked three times more than tankers and barges in a com-
parable 20-year period.
Pipelines have spilled an annual average of 11.8 milhon gallons
while water carriers have spilled 11.6 milUon on average. Accord-
ing to a report released yesterday about pollution by the oil indus-
try, it estimates that pipelines spill 25 to 30 milhon gallons a year.
I nave no way of verifying that.
What you heard earher this afternoon are far different figures.
Both EPA and AEO have told vou pipelines have a very good
record for preventing injuries and fatalities, but when it comes to
preventing pollution, it is a far different stoiy.
The figures that they use come from the Cfoast Guard which seri-
ously undercounts pipeline spills. The figures that I have used
come fi*om annual reports of pipeline safety reported every year by
the Office of Pipeline Safety.
To give you an idea of how the Coast Guard figures undercoimt
the problem, in the 1980s, the Coast Guard reported about 20 mil-
hon gallons of spills from pipelines under water. During the same
10 years, 1980 to 1989, the Office of Pipeline Safety counted about
109 million gallons of pipeline spills.
About Colonial Pipeline, in the past four years. Colonial spilled
about 1.5 milhon gallons as reported to the Coast Guard and the
Office of Pipeline Safety. In the past two years, all pipelines have
118
spilled 15.5 million while tankers and barges have spilled 529,893
gallons. In the last two years, they have spilled 30 times more vol-
ume than tankers and barges.
And, in fact, Colonial, in those two years, spilled 37,000 more
gallons of oil than did all the tankers and barges in the United
States in 1991 and 1992. And in case you think I am talking about
ancient history, since the March 28 spill imtil May 10th, the Office
of Pipeline Safety received 280 telephone reports of pipeline spills.
One of them was in the Los Angeles area where an Arco pipeline
spilled 260,400 gallons on April the 6th.
These statistics tell us something important. 0\ir system of mov-
ing oil by pipeline without polluting oxir ground and water is bro-
ken and it needs to be fixed. And at the heart of the problem is
an industry that has grown complacent with its own primitive op-
erating and technical standards and a Federal regulatory agency
which is doing Uttle to solve the problem.
A year ago when I wrote to the Office of Pipeline Safety to verify
some of Colonial's claimed environmental record, I received this
reply, and I quote, "We cannot at this time categorically verify or
deny them. We would have to imdertake a significant amount of
validation, analysis and interpretation to arrive at any responsible
conclusion."
In other words, the Office of Pipeline Safety had never bothered
to study the environmental impact of dedly spills bjr oU pipelines.
So we did our own study using data fi*om the Office of Pipeline
Safety, Coast Guard, and the Association of Oil Pipelines.
We adjusted the spill data that I just told you about for ton-miles
of oil transported by each competing mode and we foimd that pipe-
lines spill an average of 21,000 gallons of oil per billion ton-miles,
while tankers and barges spill about 10,000 gallons per biUion ton-
miles. If pipelines are safer than tankers and barges, then that
claim certainly does not hold up with the data that are available.
Now, this comparison is important because Congress and the
pubHc recognize that tanker barges and spills are a serious prob-
lem, but not pipelines.
Another interesting comparison is that ft-om 1979 to 1991, the
Office of Pipeline Safety collected $427,300 in civil penalties fi-om
pipeline companies, which during that same period had spilled 126
million gallons. This works out to penalties of 3.4 cents per gallon
spilled, which is one of the great regulatory bargains of our time.
My written testimony details many specific problems with both
the industry and the Office of Pipeline Safety, but they boil down
to the reality that there is little compulsion or incentive for pipe-
line companies to prevent and detect leaks.
We have heard repeated the industry claim that, well, we lose
money when we spiU so it is just good business to do everything
we can to prevent and detect leaks. That simply isn't true. It is far
cheaper for the industry to let the pipelines leak than it is to invest
in effective means Uke double-wall pipes and hydrostatic testing.
In fact, their main objection to advances like this is it would cost
too much. And when the inevitable spills happen, they blame out-
side damage. Yet in three out of four pipeline spills, by volimie and
by number of incidents in the last half dozen years, outside damage
accounts for only one-quarter of all the pipeline spills. Three-quar-
119
ters of it come from things that the company does, either sloppy op-
eration or equipment failures.
We need to change the economics by requiring tougher standards
and imposing heavier costs on companies when they spill. You have
just heard from Colonial Pipeline that they don't really intend to
do very much to correct the problems that they have. So it will take
congressional action.
Another part of this equation is that the Pipeline Safety Act
could be more properly called the pipeline company protection act.
It protects pipeline companies from State and local governments by
preempting their regiUations that exceed Federal standards and by
excluding tiiem from negotiations when a pipeline spill happens.
It protects pipeline companies from lawsuits by owners of prop-
erty damaged by spills, by barring suits until administrative pro-
ceedings are finished which could be years. And by its lax stand-
ards and enforcement, it protects companies from paying the true
cost of the widespread pollution that they cause.
Let me briefly svunmarize some of the suggested changes to the
law which can nelp. First and foremost, encourage States to regu-
late pipelines by removing the preemption clause that prevents
tiiem from meaningful participation.
Second, allow individuals and other interested parties to sue for
damages and penalties when spills affect them and to allow them
to participate in what are now essentially secret negotiations be-
tween tiie Office of Pipeline Safety and the companies.
I find it ironic that Colonial Pipeline just asked you to allow
them to sue for injunctive relief from parties which may cause out-
side damage when they themselves are insulated from that very
same remedy by the Pipeline Safety Act.
Third, I would require pipeline companies to report spills over a
gallon or which produce a sheen on water. Verify and strictly en-
force accurate reporting so we can get an accurate picture of the
problem. The pipeline figures that I have given you from the an-
nual reports include spills that do not include spills that are under
2,100 gallons or from pipelines that aren't regulated, like gathering
lines. We simply don't have an accurate picture of the problem at
this point.
Fourth, because the Office of Pipeline Safety has dragged its feet
over the past decade to the neglect of stricter standards. Congress
should study metitiods to reduce spills by at least half to achieve
a record that should be at least as good as water carriers.
Included in these standards would be such technologies as dou-
ble-wall pipes, hydrostatic testing, monitoring wells and improved
cathodic protection. We should explore other ideas such as building
pipelines in critical areas above groimd where we can see leaks
after they are properly sealed against vandalism and other sorts of
outside damage.
While this is under way, we should have a moratoriimi on new
construction, otherwise we will sdlow the construction of sub-
standard pipelines destined to leak or spill and continue the sorry
record of pipelines.
Finally, we should increase penalties to the levels applied to
other forms of the oil industry. And let me make one final point.
It is something that I started thinking about just this morning.
120
which was, it seems to me, that part of the problem is that we
liimp together the regulation of two kinds of pipelines for which the
problems are very different. We have an agency that regulates both
natural gas and oil pipelines.
The problem with natural gas pipelines is a safety problem. They
blow up and hurt people. They don't pollute, however. The problem
with oil pipelines is pollution. Whenever they leak, they cause a
great desd of pollution. They sometimes explode and hurt people,
but that is a much smaller problem with them than it is with natu-
ral gas pipelines.
It seems to me that we ought to consider dividing the regulatory
responsibihties so that we regulate oil pipelines for what the prob-
lem really is, which is pollution, regulate natural gas pipelines for
the public safety aspect.
I would like to close on that note. Thank you very much for hav-
ing me here, sir.
Mr. BORSKI. Okay, Mr. Rackleff, thank you.
Mr. Schwartz.
Mr. Schwartz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, members of the com-
mittee. We appreciate the opportunity to appear here this after-
noon. I woTild ask, if I may, that my prepared statement be in-
cluded in the report.
I am Stuart Schwartz from the Interstate Commission on the Po-
tomac River Basin where I am the director of the Section for Coop-
erative Water Supply Operations and I am here with representa-
tives of the three major water supphers in the Washington area:
Mr. John Corless, the manager of water supply operations for the
Washington Suburban Sanitary Commission; Mr. Jim Warfield, Di-
rector of the Administration Division with the Fairfax Coimty
Water Authority; and to my far left. Perry Costas, Chief of the Aq-
ueduct Division of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. And we are
here to share with you our concerns regarding safety of the region's
water supply.
What I would briefly like to do is describe ICPRB's role and the
role of the Section for Cooperative Water Supply Operations in the
regional management of water supply and spill response and notifi-
cation and share with you four observations we have drawn from
the events surrounding the break on March 28th.
Very briefly, the Interstate Commission on the Potomac River
Basin is a nonregulatory interstate compact commission created in
1940 with members from the States of Virginia, West Virginia,
Maryland, Pennsylvania, District of Columbia and the Federal Gov-
ernment.
The Commission acts to support and enhance the management
of water and associated lands resources of the basin, and as a re-
sult of the spill in Sugarland Run on March 28th, we have received
clear direction from our Commission to imdertake a comprehensive
assessment of the risk of spill in the Potomac River Basin, both
from pipelines and from multi-modal transport and stationary
sources, as well as a review of opportunities for pollution preven-
tion in the Potomac.
Again, briefly, the Section for Cooperative Water Supply Oper-
ations was created to provide regional coordination for the coopera-
tive water supply for the Washington, D.C. MetropoUtan area. And
121
the co-op section is designated as the agency that monitors de-
mands, allocates flows, schedules reservoir releases in times of
drought and emergency in order to maximize the reliability of the
region's water supply.
The Commission also maintains a transport model that is used
in the event of spills to the Potomac and we work cooperatively
with the basin states to provide travel time information, warning
and notification to mimicipal water supphers using the Potomac.
From that regional perspective, I would like to briefly share with
you foxir concerns we nave growing out of the spill on March 28th.
First and foremost, as I said, we are here to share with you our
concerns regarding the safety of the region's water supply. We feel
the bottom line is that as serious as this spill was, shutting down
the Fairfax County Water Authority for 11 consecutive days, from
a regional perspective, we dodged the bullet with respect to this
particular accident.
If the accident had occurred under slightly different conditions,
low simimer flows, if the spill had been closer to the Potomac or
occurred in the Potomac where the pipelines cross into Maryland,
the consequences could have been severe. Under low flow condi-
tions, contamination could have been expected to linger in the river
for weeks.
In the case of the Washington aqueduct division, which has no
other source of treatable water but the Potomac, they would quick-
ly run out of treatable water. Within no more than 48 hours, there
would be a severe shortage of potable water and some difficult deci-
sions would have to be made.
Aside from the economic impacts to the region from the massive
disruption of municipal and commercial activities, the con-
sequences to public health and public safety from shortages of pota-
ble water, water for sanitation purposes, fire protection, would be
severe.
We think the consequences would be severe and that these risks
are real, and in view of the photographs that you have seen in
some of the earlier testimony, I think you can understand why we
continue to have ongoing concerns regarding the physical integrity
of this pipeline, concerns that we think might be most e3cpedi-
tiously resolved with an independent review of the physical integ-
rity of this pipeline.
Beyond these regional concerns, we see some opportunities aris-
ing out of this accident to reassess the ways in which we manage
the risks associated with pipelines. And two suggestions I briefly
offer that might fall in the category of appUcation of appropriate
technology would be a need that we see for a mechanism to institu-
tionahze the review of both the technologies that are available and
the risks that are posed in these transportation corridors to assure
that the appropriate technology continues to be matched to the
risks posed from the transport activities as they continue to
change.
In respect to the Potomac corridor, we see a need to find a mech-
anism that would expedite the designation of a high hazard cor-
ridor, the corridor within which the consequences of an accident
are recognized as being severe enough that they require the most
stringent technology.
122
In the case of the Potomac water supply, there are pipeline cross-
ings not only in the Potomac, but also in the watersheds of the
Occoqu£in and Patuxent Reservoirs which provide the only alter-
nate sources of supply. So all three sources of supply for the Wash-
ington D.C. area potentially could be exposed to these accidents
and we think that this region in particular, this corridor, is a good
example of one that would warrant this high hazard designation.
With that, Mr. Chairman, let me conclude in thanking the com-
mittee for the opportunity to appear here. Happy to answer any
questions you may have.
Mr. BORSKI. Thank you very much, Mr. Schwartz. The gentleman
from Oklahoma.
Mr. Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Rackleff, I must say that after having served in this body
and sat through these various hearings like this for some six and
a half years, I think this is the first time this has happened.
Those who testify prior to you either in person or vicariously tes-
tified that the pipeline system of transportation is the safest sys-
tem that we have. We heard fi*om the EPA, from the Coast Guard,
from the GAO, from the National Transportation Safety, and from
the Department of Transportation, and having dealt with all these
organizations for a long period — in fact, I am on the Coast Guard
Committee and I deal with them quite frequently — I would say
that in the area of pipeline expertise, we are talking about maybe
a thousand top ranked technicians all who have come to the same
conclusion that the pipeline system is the safest system.
You come in here and contradict them. Why should we believe
you?
Mr. Rackleff. Well, I suggest that they read the annual reports
of pipeline safety, which is what I did.
Mr. Inhofe. You don't think that these organizations read those
reports?
Mr. Rackleff. Well as I told you before, they were looking at a
different database. They are looking at the — ^what is called the
ERNS, Emergency Response Notification System. It is a databank.
It originates from Coast Guard data and it does not accurately re-
flect the extent of pipeline spills in America.
For example, I received a copy of the report — ^the Coast Guard
report on the pipeline spill in — ^near Hemdon on March 28th and
its entry for the column that says amount spilled says zero, so
Mr. bJHOFE. Although there isn't time now, I would advise the
chairman that I will be asking the questions of those individuals
who have — and entities who have already testified if they have
made themselves or this data available to them for their conclu-
sions.
In the opening of your written testimony, you state that your pri-
mary concern over four years has been the Friends of Lloyd.
Mr. Rackleff. Yes.
Mr. Inhofe. Among other things, to stop construction of the Tex-
aco gas line tank farm and Colonial pipeline project, et cetera, et
cetera. Who is Friends of Lloyd?
Mr. Rackleff. The Friends of Lloyd is a citizens group. It is
made up of— -that has had the active participation of roughly 1,500
people in the last four yegirs who have gone to hearings, who have
123
contributed to our treasury, who have come to rallies that we have
had, they have written letters on our behalf. It has been
Mr. Inhofe. You are the President?
Mr. Rackleff. And I am the President of it.
Mr. Inhofe. Who are the other officers?
Mr. Rackleff. My wife and my sister-in-law. We are incor-
porated. It is a nonprofit organization, and as I said, we have had
the active participation of roughly 1,500 people.
Mr. Inhofe. It would take a lot of money to do the work that you
do. And could you tell me your funding source? And specifically, is
the Florida AUiance actively involved in supporting you in your ef-
forts?
Mr. Rackleff. The Florida Alliance has been actively involved
and they have contributed roughly $300,000 for our legal expenses.
We have raised another $100,000 or more fi'om individuals and
other organizations. It is a — it is a very expensive proposition to go
up against a major oil company and a company like Colonial Pipe-
line.
Mr. Inhofe. It may be expensive — I was looking at the receipts
of the Florida AUiance and find that in one of their year-to-date
statements dated May 31st of 1990 they talk about raising during
that period of time in contributions $153,000. Half came from the
Port Everglades Authority, and the Port Everglades Authority — in
fact, all of these individuals who made — or entities that made con-
tributions are movers or transporters, all except the pipeline indus-
try.
So wouldn't it appear that those individuals or entities there
would have a prejudiced perspective?
Mr. Rackleff. Perhaps they do. What we have is what is called
a coaUtion. It is — ^we aU have a common interest in stopping the
Colonial pipeline project because it is environmentally hazardous,
and they are — the Florida Alliance has its reasons and I have my
reasons.
Mr. Inhofe. For clarification, Mr. Rackleff, on three different
documents I noticed the figures that your Friends of Lloyd received
from the Florida AUiance. At one time, it is $190,000, one time it
is $300,000, then again I saw a figure of $600,000. What is the
amount that you have received from the Florida AUiance?
Mr. Rackleff. We have received about $300,000 for our legal ex-
penses. Not everjrthing that the Florida AUiance spends comes to
the Friends of Lloyd.
Mr. Inhofe. Because I know we are out of time, and I want to
give the gentlelady from Virginia the last five minutes, I would like
to read the first three paragraphs of an editorial from the Miami
Herald dated August 22, 1991.
Keep in mind that the Port Everglades Authority is the largest
contributor to the Florida AlUsince. I wiU read this and then submit
the rest for the record, Mr. Chairman.
"Snuffle, snuffle, once again here comes the Florida AlUance wad-
dling towards the pubUc trough. This Uttle piggy is already fat on
more than $600,000 in pubUc fimds.
The Florida AUieince pretends to be a coaUtion of maritime busi-
nesses interested in staving off environmental disaster or, in its
124
words, in leveling the regulatory playing field between oil tankers
and pipelines.
"In reality, the Alliance survives because of politicians who dip
into the Port Everglades public till for their patrons. In shipping,
leveling the playing field means using the regulatory process to
strangle competition. For this, the public has paid more than $1,5
milUon."
I ask unanimous consent to submit the entire text of that Miami
Herald editorial for the record,
Mr. BORSKI. So ordered.
Mr. Inhofe. I have no other questions.
Mr. BORSKI. Mr. Racklefif.
Mr. Rackleff. I would like the opportunity to submit other news
articles as well that directly contradict the claims tiliat Colonial
Pipeline has made to you.
Mr, BORSKI. The record will remain open.
[The articles submitted by Mr, Rackleff follow:]
125
4 / Thursday, June 10. 1993 Florida Flambeau
Florida Flambeau
Out of hand
The Saturday araMi <rf an historic country store in Lteya^owned by
tenacious environmental activist Bob Rackleff was no doubt a retaliation
against Rac]de£rs actions as the vanguard of the fight against the
Colonial Pipeline company.
Rackleff, who has fought for -more than four years to prevent the
company from running a gas pipeline from Bainbridge, Ga. to a storage
facility in the small Jefferson County town because of potential
environmental damage, has been the victim of a smear campaign by
Colonial officials.
As most readers know, the Flambeau has taken a position against
Colonial's efforts. Like Rackleff, many Jefferson County residents,
several local government "fRriaU in Tallahassee and Leon County, and
many others, we are concerned that damage to a gas pipeline could spell
environmental disaster.
A pipeline catastrophe could easily affect Leon County residents. The
Floridan aquifer, an underground reservoir from which all of North
Florida and much of Central Florida gets its drinking water, could
potentially be t^'in*^ as a result of a spill. One need only look at the
recent massive Col«iial pipeline spill in Virginia to see the danger
involved.
This basic fact is the impetus for the propaganda the company has
disseminated in its effort to destroy Rackleff's reputation. Colonial's
message is clearly designed to rally community support in favor of the
pipeline project, wdiidi Colonial officials also say will bring jobs to the
community.
While we would never imply that Colonial officials are directly
responsible for the destruction of Rackleff's country stw«, which was
built in 1910 and was listed in the National Registry of Historic Sites,
the pipeline company's anti-Rackleff rtietoric no doubt inflamed the
emotions of some crazy, spurring him or her to torch the store in an
ill-conceived effort to further deter Rackleff from his fight.
Interestingly, in one of several Colonial bocJdets sent to all Jefferson
County property owners earlier this year. Colonial had these seemingly
prophetic words about Rackleff and the sUsre:
'... The "historic* Lloyd store he owns and repeatedly says he
intends to restore is a bumed-out eyeaare in the middle ot town.
"One benefit from the pipeline and terminal Mr. Rackleff might
welcome is Texaco's promise of a fire truck and training for Lloyd's
volunteer fire department. With that trudi at the ready, Lloyd residents
could respond more effectively if Mr. Rackleffs store catches fire
again while he drives over from his home in Tallahassee.*
We hope the state fire marshal will be able to determine who torched
Rackleffs country store. More impcartantly, we hope those who have
sided with pipeline advocates in the past, will recognize the divisive —
and now destructive — seeds Cidonial has sewn in the little town of lioyd.
There will be a fundraising benefit concert for RacklefTs
efforts to defeat the Colonial pipeline project Friday the
18th at the Warehouse. Several musical acts, including Bill
Wharton, will be on hand starting at 8 p.m. There will be
a $7 cover charge.
126
Zi)t free Cance-Star
I KHOERlCKSBURt;. VIRGINIA
IHLRSDAY. SEPTEMBER 10. 1992
ENVIRONMENT
To dramatize the <
nmenlal ugliness o* a tank farm. Rackleff poses next to a set of rusting tanks in Tallahassee, Fla.
Fighting Big Oil
When Robert Rackleff started to re-
store his Florida dream house, he
thouKht of Fredericksburg.
He had passed through the city
only twice, about 13 years ago. on a tnp from Wash-
ington to Norfolk and back again
He recalled the'beauly of the Rappahannock
River, the charm of the 19th century architecture
downtown. He envisioned similar restorations on
the 19th century homes in his tiny panhandle town
of Lloyd.
Now, Rackleff looks to Fredencksburg lor an ex-
ample of a different kind He looks at the time in
1989 when the Virginia city shut off its water sup-
ply because a petroleum spiU had polluted the I^p-
pahannock.
He looks at the environmental problems that lin-
ger, the cost of the cleanup, the frustration of Fred-
ericksburg officials-
And he says Colonial Pipeline, the culpnt m Fred-
ericksburg, will do the same thing to Uoyd
Rackleff lias always been interested in the envi-
ronment Twenty years ago. he wrote a book. "Qose
to Crisis— Environmental Problems in Florida "
At the time, he didn't even think to include oil pipe-
lines as one of those problems.
Now. he can't slop thinking about them
The object of Rackleff's dread is a petroleum tank
farm in Lloyd, a town about 15 miles east of Talla-
hassee, in Jefferson County.
The story is long and comphcated. but this is the
crux of it.
Right now. the tank farm only exists on paper.
Bob Rackleff says his small Florida
town is threatened by the same
pipeline company that's
responsible for two major spills
near Fredericksburg. To some,
Rackleff is standing in the way of
economic progress; to others he's
sounding an important
environmental warning.
but three oil companies— Texaco Amoco, and
Citgo— have permission from Jefferson County to
build in Lloyd.
Now it's ail up to Atlanta-based Colonial PipeUnc.
which is trying to get approval to build a line thiii
would supply the tank farm
The most direct route from Colonial Pipeline's
Georgia facilities to Uoyd is through adjoming I -eon
County, the county that includes Tallahassee. But
Leon officials have said no, and a court upheld their
decision.
So Colonial Pipeline is trying to secure a route
through Jefferson County, and Rackleff and his sup-
pnrtprs ^Tp t'^ing to ^top th'^m
"They can't say, 'If we come here, we will not
pollute." Up until now, these facilities have ahva\ s
polluted," Rackleff says.
The project, he says, would ruin Uoyd.
What is so special about Uoyd? That depends on
whom you talk to.
"There'sjustasignthere. crossroads, and a few
homes." says Richard Calupca , the semor mana»:iT
of Colonial's western region
Rackleff looks at it a bttle differently
"Uoydiskindof a state of mind." he sd>s. Willi
a laugh. About 300 people bve m the central village
area. About 2,000 more Uve withm a ^mile radius.
The town sprang up in the mid-1800s around a
railroad station The trams still go throughlhere.
but prosperity has passed it by The mam street
is unpaved, and most downtown businesses closed
years ago.
The Rackleffs' house was built m the 1850s. It luid
belonged to a friend of the couple, and Bob and his
Please see Pipeline oaqo Di'
127
128
129
rirLLii\L:
Indisputable
statisUcs are
unavailable
the area by moving petroleum
more safely, does ii belong above
the precious Flondan Aquifer?
Aquifer's the source
of water — and controversy
The Flondan Aquifer floats bke a
huge, water-soaked limestone sponge
under all of Florida and parts of AJa-
bama, Georgia and South Carolina
There's about a 90i)erceni
chance that the water you draw
from your kitchen tap is Rondan
The aquifer is also the source for
recreational waters — Wakulla
Springs and the SL IS4arks and Wa-
kulla nvere.
The aquifer is replenished as wa-
ter flows through the ground and
sinkholes scanered thrtxigh the lime-
stone-anchored regioa
Stabbing tus hoger at a map of
the proposed pipeline route. Leon
County Commissioner Gary Yordon
works himself into a lather because
the pipeline would lie entirely within
^ne of these replenishment areas of
■•h;gh recharge"
There's only one way to assure
that ii won't affect your water supply
and that's if it's not over it," Yordon
says
Fighting the pipeline has become
a raison d'etre for Yordon, who
counts the issue as a main reason
for his plans to run for a third term
in 1994.
Scores of speakers at Jefferson
County pubUc hearings have plead-
ed the same case — that any risk to
the aquifer is too great to take.
One gallon of gasoline will con-
taminate 1 million gallons of water
to the extent that fish will die, says
opponent Bob Rackleff.
But Colonial and Texaco offi-
cials say thousands of dollars worth
of scienufic studies prove the aqui-
fer will be adequately protected t^
the project's engineering.
Tom Kwader. a hydrogeologist
hired by the oil interests to study
the risks, then paid by Jefferson
County to present them at a public
heanng. downplays concerns.
Kwader says petroleum that
leaked into a sinkhole would float
and never enter the aquifer.
Bui Tom Pratt, chief of the
groundwater bureau for the North-
west Florida Water Management
District, says petroleum products
regularly dissolve and sink in waler
Statistics abound
for making each case
Underground oil qnlls are bard to
visualize. No oily l>eaches. No sorry
But visualize this Each year,
more petroleum spills from pip^es
than the 11 milhon gallons that
leaked into the Alaskan wilderness
from the Exxon Valdez in 1389.
Of the 100 worst spills that took
place in the 12 months following the
Valdez disaster, pipelines accounted
for 46 spUls. tank farms tor 16. releas-
ing 8.5 million gallons for 79 percent
of the total spilled, Rackletl wrote in
an article published by The Wash-
ington Post
Colonial spokesman John Bal-
lentine has campaigned in person.
by phone and through advertising
to shift the spoUight to barge, tank-
er and nucktralflc, saying the pipe-
line win be cleaner and safer..
Most spills have , occurred In
pipelines built with old technology,
some of wtii<Ui d^te back to Colo-
nial's flrst In 1962, Ballentlae says.
And Colonial's record of spills )S
seven times better than the pipeline
industry's average, be sayi'
Both sides have statistics to bol-
ster their sides — thai the other
mode of trajisportatioD Is dirtier
and more dangerous.
Unassailable statistics are urv
available No federal or state agen-
cy collects them.
Feder^ law does not require the
reporting of most pipeline spills of
fewer than 2.100 gallons.
But the petroleum industry
agrees there Is a problem. Ray
Karnes, of the Petroleum Market-
ing Association of Wisconsin, says
100 percent of. his organlzabon's
members' abov&f;round tanks have
coniaminaied the ground around
Cleaning the groundwater con-
taminated by above-ground storage
tanks cost the petroleum industry
r790 milhon a year, according to the
US Envtronmental Protection
Agency. '^
That does not include reimturs-
mg resldentsrfpr fi^c^I Qeeds,
property loss orfbe^ cost of Ihfl lost
product ^Ai-^'i'- ■' '' .
BallentUie(t^ys~^tQSt 1$ an |QCCp-
tive not to ^iU. i - '" -'^''^f'
But ^Uisjiiappgn: - :■ '/(■
And once- they -^Jiappen, ifs
cheaper to Ignore' them "than to
clean them up, says Lois Epstein, an
engineer with the Environmental
Defense Fund.
Colonlal to public:
Trust our safe^ards
Colonial's pipeUne will span 60
miles in length and 12 inches in di-
ameter, made of steel seven-thirty-
secondstb- to . nirtQ4tUrty-secondsth-
of-an-inch tblck.
Its walls and welds will have been
tested to a pressure of 1^ pounds
per square Inch. Its products will
move at pressures between 60 and
100 psi, although at other spots along
thejine to the north, pressures rise to
1.40a says Colonial project coordina-
tor Joel Boisven
Tliat Is as specific as^ pipeline
plans ge( /tght now, say? company
spokesman BallenCm?.
But Ballentloe says the public can
trustihat shut-cir valves will be close
enough together, thalleak-checking
machines called "'traart pigs" will be
used frequently enough, and that the
pipeline will be padded and protect-
ed enough to avoid spills.
And Colonial has other means of
detecUng leaks once they happea Pi-
lots fly in search of dead vegetation,
dogs sniff for fumes, and computers
measure pressure changes within the
pipes, to name a few.
All of these protections did not
prevent a March 28 spill in Virginia
from leaking 407,000 gallons of Colo-
nial petroleum Into a tributary of the
Potomac River
The Virginia pipelined technol-
ogy was basically the same as is
planned here, but the line was signifi-
canUy larger — 36 inches in
diameter
Colonial has been fined J2^ mil-
lion for that spill, which has led to
congressional hearing and pledges
by Secretary of Transportation Fe-
derico Pena that lougher pipeline
regulations are on the way.
Led by Rackleff, pubUc outcry
during the tank farm's two-year ap-
proval process in Jefferson County
caused plans for the 23-acre terminal
to exceed legal requirements Ifs fi-
nal cost wiU be twice the original
estimates, Texaco representatives
say.
Two plastic liners and an 18-inch
layer of clay would protect the
groundwater from a possible spill
There would be a built-in fire-protec-
tion system And piping within the
terminal would be above grtxind for
easy inspection.
Colonial officials expect the same
for the pipeline.
"If and when we get this project
going, it will probably be the safest
"This situation here is
very unique for us.
Nowhere, ever, have
we had opposition like
this. "
— Joel Boisvert, Colonial
protect coordinator
pipehne in the wortd when (Rack-
leff) is through with us." says
Ballentine.
The companies cite other advan-
tages to the pipeUne.
Although 100 trucks a day would
dehver petroleum to Tallahassee ana
regional gas stations, fewer trucks
would make the dnve Irom SL
Marks, says Texaco attorney Guyte
McCord.
Gas prices could fall a nickel a
gallon, Colonial offiaals say. due to
added competition. As business
dropped at the SL Marks terminal, so
would the amount of spillage there
And property-lax revenue would go
10 cash-starved Jeftereon County.
The companies would like to be
more trusted.
"Our opponents are always ask-
ing. "What if this were to happen,
what if that were to happen?" . .
We'll have contingency plans ' in
place to clean up," says Boisvert He
predicts the odds of an accident as
"so infinitesimal that irs probably
not even worth considering"
Huge profits at stake:
future plans unclear
Texaco otGcials swear they have
no plans to expand the tank farm
beyond the five tanks, stonng 6.3 mil-
lion gallons, now planned.
But Amoco and Qtgo have ex-
pressed Interest in the project. Bdis-
vert says. And the big oil markels'Of
Jacksonville and Central and South
Florida are a temptation.
"We cant rule that out — thai
Colonial someday will end up going
there," Boisvert says
His statement is at odds with ear-
lier promises to the contrary made
by Ballentine and McCord.
Colonial serves nine oil compa-
nies other than Texaco, including
Amoco and Qtgo.
Tallahassee, with population
grov^ pn^ected at 20 percent by
the turn of the century, is a npe
markeL Rorida is the largest single
slate market not yet served by an
interstate petroleum pipehne
So there are big profits at stake
Colonial estimates it would grab
555,000 gallons a day in business
from the St Marks barge interests,
represented liy the Flonda Alliance,
Tliat r^)resents $10-20 million a
year in wholesale profits to Texaco,
according to two industry analysts, in
addition to about $6 million to
Colonial
And it represents such a loss to
the SL Marks barge interests,' repre-
sented tjy the Flonda Alliance, thai
they have contnbuted (300.000 to the
pipeline's environmental opposiuon
movanenL
And there's more rrwney coming,
says Rackleff, who has a many-
pronged strategic plan to continue
the figbL '
So much for the raitine projecL
This sltuatioo here is ve^y
unique for us^" says Boisvert. "No-
where, ever, have we had opposition
like this."
130
REGUIATIOIVS: Eminent domain is a
serious issue in tiie pipeline struggle
Colonial Pipeline officials dis-
agree with the GAO. They applaud
the government's system of
regulation.
"With more than 200,000 miles of
oil pipelines in the United States,
the federal government has the ex-
perts, the staff and the expertise to
regulate pipelines," said one of
three Colonial brochures published
to state the company's viewpoint on
the pipeline.
But the federal Office of Pipe-
line Safety — which is responsible
for regulating hazardous-liquid pipe-
lines — has only three inspectors to
cover seven states in the southeast-
em United States.
Only one agency, and
not 'a very big program'
The agency acknowledged in
. 1989 that it routinely inspects records
, in offices rather than pipes in the
ground.
"We don't have a very big pro-
gram," says Cesar de Leon, OPS reg-
ulatory program director in Wash-
4ngton.
But OPS has the only federal
progrjim.
E)e Leon says states do more in-
specting than OPS. This isn't so in
Florida, he says, because Florida is
not among the 10 states that regulate
hazardous-liquid pipelines.
The petroleum industry is ex-
empted from Superfund regulation,
due at least in part to heavy lobbying
by oil interests when Superfund was
created.
Spills of petroleum must be re-,
ported under Qean Water Act regu-
lations, but no federal reporting re-
quirements exist for underground
releases or leaks, according to Lois
Epstein, an engineer with the Envi-
ronmental Defense Fund in
Washington.
Landowners worry
about pipeline route
Many property owners in South
Georgia and Jefferson County fear
their lands will be marred by the
clear-cuts required to keep a pipe-
line's path visible. They worry that
land values will fall and that their
lands' uses will be limited because
construction cannot take place on
the pipeline's right-of-way.
Since 1957, oil pipelines have
wielded the power of eminent do-
main in Florida
That means they can condemn
and purchase the property they want
and landownere" only recourse is to
sue.
That process has begun in Jeffer-
son County, where owners of proper-
ty along Colonial's preferred route
have received forms that grant, for
$25, consent for a survey. The forms
carefully state that the fee is a "cour-
tesy" and that permission is granted
not by the owner but by the law.
More litigation
may be ahead
The opposition Is meeting Colo-
nial and Texaco every inch of the
way. Eminent domain may be the
source of a 12th lawsuit against the
project, and a 13th lawsuit has t)een
threatened as well
Opponents' attorneys are prepar-
ing a constitutional challenge of the
state's eminent-domain law.
Leon County has threatened to
sue Jefferson County, saying the
plans violate the Comprehensive
Plan.
What seemed so simple five years
ago has been anything but
131
12a
ST. PETERSBURG TIMES
WEDNESDAY. JULY 25. 1990
opinion
EDITORUU.S
Safe, but not safe enough
■ The Colonial Pipeline Co. and Texaco may have
tiiought they had an ideal plan when they proposed
to extend a pipeline from Bainbridge, Ga., and build
a petroleum products tank farm at the small north
Florida community of Lloyd. The site was adjacent
to an interchange on Interstate 10, only 16 miles
east of the fast-growing Tallahassee market. Tiny
Jefferson County would be grateful for the addition-
al property taxes. And with only 300 people living
at Lloyd, there wasn't much risk of significant
opposition.
■ But one of those residents happened to be
Robert Rackleff, a free-lance writer and public
relations consultant whose resume includes
speech-writing for President Jimmy Carter, two
Cabinet members and a U.S. senator. When Rack-
leff, a Tallahassee native, came home years ago, it
was just after working in the corporate headquar-
ters of Time Inc.
Rackleff knew how to fight even big corpora-
tions like Colonial and Texaco. A year and a half
later, their project is stalled by a lawsuit alleging
zoning and sunshine law violations, and state policy-
nlakers are faced with a controversy that won't go
away regardless of how the litigation concludes.
Among other things, the dispute has highlighted
serious loopholes in Florida's environmental laws.
For example, Jefferson County has only five
full-time firefighters. Tampa needed 50 to tontrol
the fire that raged at a Hooker's Point tank farm
April 15 after a fatal explosion involving vapor
recovery equipment like that the Lloyd facility
would use. Should a similar disaster strike at Lloyd,
Jefferson County would need help from neighboring
Tallahassee — but it is Jefferson County, not
Tallahassee, that will be receiving Texaco's taxes.
The shortcomings in fire protection almost
certainly would disqualify the Texaco tank farm if it
were presented as a development of regional im-
pact (DRI) imder the state's growth management
laws. But the tank farm is projected at 157,000
barrels, just 3,000 fewer than the minimum level at
which the Department of Community Affairs could
assert jurisdiction and classify it as a DRI. Any
petroleum storage facility should reqviire DRI ap-
proval.
Though pipeline companies have the right of
I eminent domain, which allows them to condemn
j land and lay pipe almost anywhere they please,
there are insufficient environmental and public
safety safeguards under either state or federeil law.
This is a critical issue, because the federal Office of
J Pipeline Safety (OPS) customarily delegates re-
\' sponsibility wholesale to state fire marshals.
Though the OPS has oversight of 1.7-million miles
of pipe carrying hazardous materials, it employs
only 15 inspectors. Hearings by Congress and the
National Transportation Safety Board have ex-
plored the weakness. With more petroleum pipe-
lines coming to Florida, including a major line from
Port Tampa to Fort Myers, Florida plainly needs to
assure itself that the state fire marshal's office is
staffed for the challenge.
Florida also needs a law imposing strict environ-
mental standards on the pipeline routes and requir-
ing carriers and terminal operators to post bonds or
proof of insurance against spills, fires and explo-
sions. Florida's dependence on ground water leaves
little margin for error.
But the Lloyd experience should not become a
pretext for barring pipelines, as some of the proj-
ect's opponents are trying to do. The Florida
Alliance, a lobby supported by the Port Everglades
Authority and several maritime shippers and mari-
time unions, has been trying to persuade county
commissions in north Florida to pass prohibitive
local pipeline ordinances. It has asked the Legisla-
ture to repeal eminent domain for pipeline compa-
nies, which for all practical purposes would stop
them in their tracks. (The alliance has also helped
to pay for the Friends of Lloyd lawsuit, even though
a pipeline from Bainbridge to Lloyd poses no con-
ceivable competition to barge and tanker traffic at
Port Everglades.)
The fact is that pipelines are a relatively safe
means of transporting hazardous liquids. A 1988
report of the Transportation Research Board of the
National Research Council said that liquid pipeline
casualty rates, adjusted for volimie and distance,
are "significantly lower" than those for rail and
truck transport and "only slightly higher than for
transportation by water."
They are not, however, safe enough. Some
10,000 failures in the years 1971 through 1986
spilled nearly 5-million barrels of petroleum prod-
ucts, causing 178 deaths and 770 injuries. It's small
consolation to say losses would have been greater
had all that fuel been carried by rail and truck, or to
rationalize that outside forces such as train derail-
ments and careless backhoe operators were most
frequently the cause.
This is why Florida should pass a responsible
pipeline siting law — one that would both allow the
state to overrule unreasonable local restrictions
and also keep pipelines and tank farms away from
encroaching development and out of places like
Lloyd, where they shouldn't be.
132
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133
^-^ Tallahassee Democfai/Tue . Mi
Opinion
Our
VIEW
The ediionals below represent the
opinion o( ihis edilonal board"
Carrol Dadlsman, publisher
Bob SlIH, execuitve edilor
Bill Mansfield, edilonal page edilOf
Susannah Lyie, associate editor
Jim MInter, associate editor
Fred Mott
general manager
Bill Fuller
managir^ editor
Oil pipelines
Why we can't 'leave it to the feds'
Pipelines. Federal responsibility, regulalions changed reporting require-
Right? ments. Before then, spills of 210 or more
• Best answer Well. er. yes. maybe. P".°"^ h^" '" ."^ ''.^Sltul" ^T'^' ^^r
• ' ' ' limit was upped to 2.100 gallons (50 bar-
The Office of Pipeline Safety, in the rels). Subsequently, the number of inci-
US. Department of Transportation, is dents reported dropped That puts asser-
charged with oversight of the 1.7 mil- tions about "safety performance" In a
lions miles of pipelines that traverse the different light.
nation carrying hazardous liquids.
which includes petroleum products, and
natural gas.
A report put out by the Wilderness
Society in March looks at a year's worth
That office has 15 inspectors. In a of spills In "100 Spills, 1.000 Excuses,"
congressional hearing in 1989. one in- the Wilderness Society writes:
spector said:
"EssenUally our inspections consist "No one has final figures, but ex-
primarily of reviewing Iheir operating Pe"s estimate that there have been
records and their operation and mainte- roughly 10.000 spills since the Exxon
nance manuals, and spot checking pipe- y.^'?^5_'?''* °.P^"' .P.""",','"?. ^™I;f,!'"'f
lines in the field. . "
With limited staffing and resources,
the Office Pipeline Safety is limited in
how well it can do its job.
Pipeline accidents have the polen-
land and water
gallons of oil.
'ith 15 to 20 million
"The explanations for the spills,
most of which involve pipelines, are al-
most as numerous as the spills them-
lial \a harm water supplies as well as selves Pipelines corrode, their valves
cause fires. A state oversight role is break, their welds fail, and during the
needed.
A bill in the Florida Legislature that
cleared the Senate Natural Resources
Committee in early May would give that
job to the state Department of Environ-
mental Regulation. Sen. Tom McPher-
son's bill would allow DER to set rules ,^ , , ^ ., .
(or the construction and operation of Board of the National Research Council
pipelines. Currently the DER has over- states,
sight of fuel storage tanks, and pipelines
that go across wetlands.
past year, one pipeline was ruptured by
a pile driver."
State regulation is even more crucial
as Florida continues to be developed. In
the forward to "Pipelines and Public
Safety." the Transportation Research
"The development of residences.
work places and shopping areas near
And the Public Service Comrnission once-isolated transmission pipelines.
which carry gas and liquids at high
pressures from producing areas to refin-
and state Treasurer participate in a fed-
eral program lor natural gas inspection
A state role is needed in the inspection g^igj ^^ distribution networks, threatens
of intrastate pipelines carrying hazard- ,(, mcrease the risk of pipeline failure
ous liquids. caused by inadvertent excavation
Russell Rockwell, consultant to the damage."
administrator. Research and Special
Programs Administration. Department With the federal government taking
of Transporlalion. says when stales par- a minimalist approach. Florida needs to
ticipate in inspection of intrastate pipe- step in to the pipeline oversight business
lines, "the federal government will re- to protect the public's interests,
imburse . . up to 50 percent of the cost
of their operations." ,^ . j
McPherson s bill should go the dis-
Pipelines transport an awesome tance this legislative session,
amount of petroleum products annually
— approximately 500 billion ton miles
of crude oil and petroleum products, ac-
cording to a federal report, plus an addi-
tional 15 trillion cubic feet of natural
; A special report. "Pipelines and Pub-
lic Safety." by t^e Transportation Re-
search Board of the National Research
Council states. "The safety performance
of transmission pipelines is good in com-
parison with that of other transporta-
tipn modes that carry hazardous
niaterial."
Find out more
The Transportation Research
Board of the National Research
Council authored "Pipelines and
Public Safety." Copies may be ob-
tained for $14 by writing the board
at 2101 Constitution Ave. N W..
Washington DC. 20418 The Wilder-
ness Society report, "100 Spills, 1.000
Excuses." may be obtained for $2 by
writing the society at 1400 Eye St.
N W.. Washington DC. 20005.
134
■ 1>|L Bun.a»min>l, VVdr>»x»y, April 11. 1»90 N
^
Sun-Sentinel
OMW«r«tf M blng M* mo»l ImponanI
Intormatten ptvutOit *t Bnwatd anti
Palm Maaeti counilaa, norUa
Tnomtt P. 0'Oonn«ll, Pra*idantA PubUahar
» ■
Qan* Cry«r, editor
Ecrl Mauokar, Manaeing Editor
»
Klna*l«y Ouy. Editorial Pega Editor
EDITORIALS
State must regulate oil pipelines
to reduce threat of water pollution
Evoryon* ihovld know by now )usl
how vulnerable Florlda'i fragile
wetlendi and underground water
suppUee are to pollution.
That'* why It'i hard to
undenund why Florida hat no atate law* at all
regulating a major threat to thote wetlands
and water luppliea — oil pipollnes.
That failure riika an snvlronmenlal
cataitruphe. PIpellnea routinely span iwainpt,
lakaa, canala and itreams and run atop
undergruund aqulfem aupplying drinking wutrr
to milUona of people. One gallon of refined
petroleum can pollute 1 million galloni of
water.
A crude oil pipeline running acroM
Alligator Alley io Port Everglades has suffered
81 iplllJ since 1972. The sute already hat
hundreds of miles of pipelines, including somu
croulng South florida'i vital water storage
area, the Biscayne Auulfer. Pelruluuia
coiapanies are actively pui-suiue eifoil>> U>
build additional pipeilnos into Norlh Florida
and then throughout the state.
Although Broward, Palm Beach and Dade
•couptlea have adopted tough pipelioo
'ordinancet, Flwlaa needs its own law.
Poitunately, it could have that law if
lawmakers adopt a bill by Senate Natural
Resources Committee ChalrrauD Tom
McPherson, IM^ooper City.
' The bin makes tnree simple, sensible and
long-overdue changes in the law.
■ It roqutres a pipeline company to f.et
development ordem from lorul j'ovwnn.cni:
priur to exercising Its power to buy private
property for the project.
■ It gives the atate Department of
Environmeotal Regulation authority to regulate
pipelines and requires it to adopt rules to
carry out that authority by March 19Q1. The
rules must cover design, installation,
maintenance, inspection and handling of
•margenciea.
■ And it says a pipeline ovor five miles
long that crosses a county line must comply
with strict requirements as a development of
regional impact.
Tuo main reason lawmaker* should vote
for this bill U to f ulf lU their legal obUgatlon to
prutect public safety. Without adequate State
rogutallon, a pipeline could in theory be
constructed io unsafe areas or wnys that
would allow leaks to threaten plant and animal
life and poison drinking water supplies.
Another reason Is to Movlde a reasonably
level playing field for tna two competing kinds
of companiM that transport petroleum
products. Shipping companies must spend a lot
of money to comply wltb strict Coast Guard
regulatlooa. Pipeuoe (Irmt don't have to meet
any state reguuttoos In Florida.
The federal government has tharplv out
back its commitment to pipeline safety; federal
regulations are minimal, and the National
Transportation Safety Board has only two
plpeilni Inspectors for the entire country.
. Florida must step in now-, it cannot afford
to continue to duck Its responsibility to regulate
oil pipullneii.
135
10A
SARASOTA HERAI
QidLrMxzXft^
\^'=\o
A non-partisan newspaper
Published every morning of the year at 801 South Tamiami Trail.
Sarasota, Florida 34237
•
Elvan Grubbs. Publisher
News: Editorial:
William F. Mcllwain, Executive Editor Waldo Proff itt Jr., Editor
Karry Slagla. Managing Editor C. Herbert Harrigan. Editorial Page Editor
k M€W V0« TIM6S COMPANY
Editorials
Is a LONG Pipeline Better?
Plans announced recently to build a
petroleum products pipeline from the
Port of Tampa to Fort Myers trigger
mixed feelings in many if not most
observers.
While apparently not as hazardous as
ship or truck tankers, a pipeline buried
beneath several feet of soil prompts
reservations precisely because leaks,
seeps and outri^t breaks cannot be
readily seen.
And while we share Manatee County
Commissioner Ed Chance's elation that
a proposed petroleum pipeline travers-
ing several miles of the Lake Manatee
watershed will now be displaced, we
note the threat of pollution, if any, has
been extended across a broader region.
Regardless of whether a public reser-
voir watershed lies in its path, any such
pipeline poses a potential risk because
petroleum prtxlucts leaking from it
could penetrate water table and aquifer
formations tapped by private and public
wells. Adulteration by petroleum prod-
ucts of such wells would be expensive to
remedy and difficult, if not impossible.
to reverse.
P|%sumably, high technology devices
are available to detect any problems,
and we are certain promoters of the
pipeline - the GATX Corp. of Chicago -
will so reassure us, but we aren't likely
to take much comfort from guarantees
made so far.
A spokesman for the project, who
stated the company had no plans to
traverse any watersheds, obviously
needs a lesson in Southwest Florida
geography as we cotint no fewer than
six mtgor watercourses - from the
Alafia to the Caloosahatchee rivers - to
be crossed by this conduit
That is not to say we categorically
oppose the construction of what could
prove to be a safe and vital method of
moving petroleum fuels from the port to
various recipients - including the Tam-
pa Electric Co. which had proposed the
Lake Manatee watershed transection.
But, we plan to keep a close watch on
the progress of this project and rest
assured others, too, will be paying at-
tention.
136
Tallahassee Oemocrat/Tue.. March 20, 1990
^^^^ laiianassee uemocrat/iue. I
lOA Opinion
Our
VIEW
The ediionals Deiow represent the
opinion pi Ihis eOilorial board:
Carrol Dadltman, publisher
Bob sun. executive editor
Bill Manslield, editonai page eonor
Susannah Lyie, associate editor
Jim MInter. associate editor
Fred Moti
general manager
BUI Fuller
managirtg editor
State review
Needed for tank farm
The consultants hired by the Jefrer-
son County Commission — Darabi and
Associates Inc. — turned in their report
two weeks ago on the proposed 6.6-mil-
lion gallon tank farm lor Lloyd. The
commission is scheduled to take up the
proposal March 29.
Considering the past performance of
tanks farms across Florida and in other
states, the threat of contamination to
the Floridan Aquifer, which runs under
the site and on into Leon and Wakulla
counties — must be taken seriously.
Currently the only review is what
Jefferson County deems necessary as it
considers a rezoning application (from
agricultural to commercial).
It is time — as the Tallahassee City
and Leon County commissions have re-
quested — for Gov. Martinez to inter-
cede. The governor has done well fight-
ing oil-drilling efforts in sensitive
offshore waters. And he successfully
pushed for ocean-going vessels near the
Keys to further skirt the Florida coast.
This problem closer to home needs his
attention, too.
Sited as it would be on a hill in Lloyd,
the tank farm would be well positioned
to threaten a multi-county water supply.
Writes the consultant about the flow of
stormwater from the 23.14 acre site:
"It is obvious, due to Ihe natural
slope of the property, that it currently
drains into the low area located adja-
cent to the southeastern corner of Ihe
site. From here, drainage flow mean-
.(Jers through the woods until it crosses
under Jefferson Road, into the system of
ditches along MO, west into Still Creek,
and then either north into Bird Sink or
south into tributaries that eventually
discharge into the Si. Marks River."
The purity of the Floridan Aquifer
should not rest on a Jefferson County
zoning decision — one that has been
heavily lobbied by a billion-dollar corpo-
ration. Clean-up ol contaminants in wa-
ter supplies is extremely expensive All
precautions should be taken to prevent
that eventuality Yet the consultant
found the proposed liner inadequate.
"Texaco and Colonial have proposed
utilizing high density polyethylene
(HOPE) as the liner malenal This will
not be acceptable in that HOPE is not
compatible with gasoline as indicated in
the tables shown in Appendix F. . . "
Already the Texaco plan is chal-
lenged by one outside engineer. What
would a state review find?
The purity o( Ihe Floridan
Aquiler should not rest on a Jellerson
County zoning decision — one thai
has been heavily lobbied by a billion-
dollar corporation. Clean-up of
contaminanis in water supplies is ex-
tremely expensive. All precautions
should be taken to prevent thai even-
tuality. Yet Ihe consuliant found the
proposed liner inadequate.
Last year local government officials
in Leon County asked the Department
of Community Affairs to consider the
tank farm — and the Colonial pipeline
that would connect it with points north
— a Development of Regional ImpacL
That designation would bring a broad-
based state review. The department de-
clined, on the grounds that theamount
of gas to be stored at the proposed site
would fall below the state-review
threshold.
But state review is needed. Other
tanks from other companies could easi-
ly be added atlcr rezoning — without
any review being required. And the gas
continuously stored in the feeding pipe-
line would push the number of gallons
above the state-review limiL
Tank farms are a fact of life in our
highly mobile society. Those served by
pipelines, as this farm would be may
well offer less threat to the environment
than those served by tankers. But they
should be situated in areas where the
risk to the public can be minimized.
The consultant's executive summary
gives further reason why state review is
necessary:
"While detailed engineering and de-
sign calculations and plans have not
been prepared by Texaco, it is believed
the site soil and hydrogeological limita-
tions can be potentially overcome wiih
the application of engineering
principles. . . "
What if they are not potentially
overcome?
Who will be watching that they are?
Who will force corrective action if they
are not?
Because many residents outside Jef-
ferson County could be affected by a
series of continuous spills, or one large
one, the watching needs to be done
beforehand.
Just ask the residents of Prince Wil-
liams Sound — Alaska.
137
4B/Saturdav,MaY22, 1993
Tallahassee Democrat
NEIGHBORHOODS
Woodgate and Lightsey are tops
in eyes of neighborhood council
The awards recognize
those who act on behalf
of neighborhoods and
perform outstanding
public service.
By Gary Fineout
DEMOCRAT STAFF WHITER
Woodgaie, ihe large neighbor-
hood off Thomasville Road, and
City Commissioner Debbie Lightsey
look lop honors in the annual
awards banquet held this week by
neighborhood leaders
Bob Rackleff, a vigorous Colo-
nial Pipeline opponent, was named
"David Krause Neighbor of the
Year"
The Council of Neighborhood
Associations (CONA), the 14-year-
old conglomerate of more than 50
Tallahassee neighborhoods, handed
out five awards Thursday night.
The awards recognize those who
act on behalf of neighborhoods and
perform outstanding public service.
"Since neighborhoods are the
most vital part of any community,
CONA feels it's important to recog-
nize the outstanding neighbor and
outstanding neighborhood as it re-
lates to decisions affecting the com-
munity," said Bev DeMello, one of
CONA's vice presidents.
The award winners were:
■ Neighborhood of the Year
Award: Woodgate Neighborhood
Association.
■ Carol Bellamy Official of the
Year Award: City Commissioner
Debbie Lightsey The late Bellamy
was a CONA leader and city
commissioner.
■ David Krause Neighbor of
the Year Award: Bob Rackleff. Da-
vid Krause was one of the organiz-
ers of CONA.
Rackleff has led the opposition
against a plan to build a 60-mile
petroleum pipeline from Bain-
bridge, Ga., 10 Lloyd in Jefferson
County, a project that opponents
say will threaten the Floridan Aqui-
fer, the area's major source of
drinking water
■ Youth Recognition Award:
Students Against Violent Environ-
ments (Godby High School),
■ Citizen's Service Award: Del-
ta Kappa Omega Chapter of Alpha
Kappa Alpha sorority
CONA board of directors mem-
ber Wally Senter said Woodgaie
took top honors this year for lis
long-standing habit of doing neigh-
borhood projects, including bicycle
rallies and beaulificaiion efforts, as
well as being well-organized.
Lightsey, CONA officials said,
was tapped as the top elected offi-
cial for her support of the Compre-
hensive Plan and her defense of
neighborhoods
"As I told CONA, accolades are
few and far l)etween in this busi-
ness, and when one comes from u
group like this it is even dearer. '
Lightsey said Friday
Godby High's SAVE group was
recognized for its campaign to siup
school violence.
The sorority group was awarded
for its community involvemenl on a
reading and mathematics enrich
mem program
138
139
A CRACK IN THE PIPE
Bob Rackleff used to write speeches for Presi-
dent Jimmy Carter. Today he finds leaks in
pipelines and probably knows moreabout die
petroleum pipeline business than many in-
dustrial experts.
Rackleff came to this avocation not in pur-
suit of a second career as a petroleum en-
gineer, but rather as an ordinary citizen. In
1988, he and his family retired from the
Washington D.C. fast-track and moved to
what they thought would be a more comfort-
able existence in the rural community of
Lloyd, Florida.
Not longafter they arrived, however, Rack-
leff and his wife JoEllyn learned that a
petroleum pipeline and a 6.5 million gallon
gasoline tank farm were coming to their
neighborhood.
Texaco, Amoco, Qtgo, and the Colonial
Pipeline Company, which the oil companies
own in part, planned to extend an existing
pipeline from Georgia into Lloyd, where it
would connect to the proposed gasoline tank
farm. Marketing officials, with an eye on
boonung Horida growth and the growing
gasoline market of Tallahassee, less ttian 20
miles away, thought the location was ideal for
a terminal.''
But Bob Rackleff and his neighbors had
another view. They started asking questions,
digging up statistics, and filing lawsuits.
Rackleff soon became a leader in raising ques-
tions about the proposal. What he learned
about petroleum pipelines in the United
States of America astounded him.
He discovered, among other things, that
■ neither the federal government nor most
state governments have accurate maps of
where pipelines are located;
■ 41 states do not regulate pollution from
pipelines; ,
■ there are no federal requirements for oil
companies to monitor pipelines;
■ the Office of Pipeline Safety (OPS) in the
U.S. Department ofTranspprtation (DOT),
an agency charged with regulating some
aspects of pipeline sjifety, had too few in-
spectors to cover the nation's pipeline sys-
tem — for example, 4 federail inspectors
cover all the interstate pipelines in 13 Mid-
western states;
■ there can be wide discrepancies in the
number of pipeline spills reported at the
federal level and those reported at the state
level;
■ from 1987 through 1989 — when pipeline
companies spilled almost 33 million gal-
lons in 580 separate instances — OPS fined
the companies a total of $188,000; and
■ the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) has no role in regulating or prevent-
ing pollution from pipelines, but can be
called in to clean up spills.*
There are more than 200,000 miles of inter-
state and intrastate petroleum pipelines in the
United States. They are found in all 50 states,
and they carry every conceivable oil product,
from crude oil to gasoline to jet fuel. The
pipelines range in size from several inches to
more than four feet in diameter.
Most were built between 1947 and the mid-
1960s — laid segment by segment and joined
seam by seam into one of the largest transpor-
tation systems ever built. The system is under-
ground for the most part. So when something
goes wrong, most people never see or hear
about it.
But something has gone wrong, and even
the people that should know don't really have
a handle on it.
A Miinoa Gallons A Month
America's petroleum pipelines are leaking
— leaking badly. Friends of the Earth es-
timates that petroleum pipelines leak at least
12 million gallons a year. But that's a conser-
"Pelroleum
pipetmes have
operated for
decades fooling
people that 'out
of sight, out of
mind' means a
good pollution
record."
— HoTOlurai.riiJMfc
rwBl, Port Angelc, Woshnglw"
Frienik of iIm Earlli
CIUDE AWAKENING 79
140
TABLE 6-1
U.S. INTERSTATE & INTRASTATE
PETROLEUM PIPEUNES
Cnide Oil Trunk Lines
Gathering Lines
Produd Lines
TOTAL
A CRACK IN
vative estimate, for several reasons:
■ First, as of 1985, spills of 2,100 gallons or
less do not have to be reported.
■ Second, some pipelines — such as low-
pressure gathering lines, which account
for 15 percent of all petroleum pipelines —
have been exempt
from federal leak-
reporting require-
ments.
■ Third, according to
U.S. General Ac-
counting Office
(GAO), most com-
panies do not com-
ply with the
reporting require-
ments that do exist.
■ Fourth, no single federal agency has an
accurate list of the number, age, and loca-
tion of all the nation's pipelines.
One study of pipeline leakage, based on
leaks reported to the DOT's Office of Pipeline
Safety, indicates that more than 256 million
gallons of peti-oluem leaked from pipelines
between 1970 and 1990 — an average of 12.2
million gallons per year. But Bob Rackleff and
other observers believe that, because of un-
detected leaks and unreported spills, total
pipeliiw leakage may be as high as 20 to 30
million gallorts per year.
PipeGne Pollutioi
Pipeline leakage — like storage tank
leakage (see Chapter 3> — can cause environ-
mental harm, such as polluted drinking
water.
According to DOT, almost all petroleum
pipelines travel through or near bodies of
water.' Yet, as the GAO discovered in its 1991
investigation, "there is no federal program
with the goal of preventing water pollution
from pipelines."
Although DOT is resporwible for prevent-
ing water |X)llution from petroleum pipelines
under the Clean Water Act, "it has not estab-
lished a program to prevent water pollution
caused by pipeline spills," according to GAO.
In fact, until 1992, DOT's Office of Pipeline
Safety allowed low-pressure petroleum
pipelines to be completely exempt from
reiigulation, regardless of their potential for
causing water pollution. Nor did OPS require
■ 65,500,
56,000
91,000
212,000
THE PIPE
that nearby waterways be considered in the
routing and building of new pipelines.
It's no wonder then that pipelines have
been polluting the nation's water resources on
a regular basis.
"Pipelines have experienced, on average,
more than one water-
polluting spill per day
between 1980 and
1989," reported GAO.
"These spills range in
size from less than 1
gallon to 35 million gal-
lons, averaging 5,000
gallons each..."
Now, under new
regulations mandated
by the Pipeline Safety
Act of 1992, OPS in consultation with EPA
must issue regulations to define environmen-
tally ser\siuve areas and identify all pipelines
that cross navigable waterways. The regula-
tions, however, are not expected to be final
until November 1994.
Who's Responsible?
Most of the pipelines that operate in the
U.S. today are owned and operated by the
major oil companies — either through their
subsidiaries or ttirough joint ventures. Oil-
company owned pipelines account for one-
third of all oil transported in pipelines, while
joint ventures account for 45 percent." Oil
companies, in other words, have at least some
equity in about 80 percent of the petroleum
pipeline network.
Table 6-4 and Appendix X illustrate that
these oil<ompany controlled pipeline com-
panies have been responsible for numerous
spills and leaks.
But oil companies often give pipeline com-
panies full title to the oil while in transport, a
practice which can relieve the oil company of
legal responsibility should a spill occur. In
Florida, for example, Exxon uses the Sun-
niland Pipeline Company of Fort Lauderdale
to move oil across the Everglades. Exxon
claims it isn't responsible for what happens to
tine oil in Surmiland's pipeline.'* So Exxon
bore no responsibility when Sunniland
spilled 21,000 gallons of crude oil in March
1989 in south Florida.
BOaUDEAWMCENIHG
FriMdiodlMEHlli
141
A CRACK IN THE PIPE
Oil Company Record
Government records indicate that many
pipeline leaks could have been prevented.
"The spills could have been prevented,
either by management or by the persons that
caused the spills," vi'rote Langley Adair, a
Florida Department of Environmental
Resources (DER) official, after an unsuc-
cessfull attempt to fine Sunniland $15,000 for
a series of oil spills that occurred between
November 1983 and February 1985.'^
A review pipeline-related court action sug-
gests that Adair's sentiments are shared by
govemment officials across the nation:
New York — In February 1990, New York
City took Exxon to court, charging that the
company had submitted false pipeline safety
reports since 1984, a practice that contributed
to a January 1, 1990 spill of 567,000 gallons of
heating oil into the Arthur Kill waterway.^
Prior to the lawsuit, Exxon publicly ad-
mitted that its leak detection system had not
worked properly for 12 years, and that it fre-
quently gave false signals. It was corrunon
practice to ignore leak signals and override a
system that automatically shut down the
pipeline when a leak was detected.
That became a fateful practice on the eve-
ning of January 1, 1990, when workers twice
overrode a leak signal they thought was false.
The mistake allowed oil from a broken under-
water pipeline to flow into the Arthur Kill for
five hours."
In March 1991, Exxon settled out of court
with the city, agreeing to spend $10 to $15
million on environmental improvements to
avoid litigation. Some of this money was used
to buy wildlife habitat and undertake ecologi-
cal studies. Exxon never formally faced tifie
fraud charges.^
Alaska — The state fined ARCO $200,000
after it under-reported the size of an August
1989 pipeline spill in its Kuparuk field. An
estimated 312 to 603 barrels spilled onto the
tundra when a valve failed. ARCO initially
reported a spill of only one barrel. Two weeks
later it raised the estimate to the full amount
ARCO says it did not intentionally under-
reptort the size of the spill. Nevertheless, the
state ordered ARCO to improve its spill
reporting procedures, clean up the site, and
accelerate pipdine maintenance. In Septem-
ber 1991, the site was still being cleaned up.^'
Washington —
The state fined U.S.
Oil & Refining Co.
$45,000 for a 600,000
gallon spill from a
broken 16-inch un-
derground pipeline.
The January 1991
break apparently
resulted from heavy
equipment operating
over the pipeline. U.S.
Oil was found
negligent for not ade-
quately protecting
and marking the
pipeline right-of-
way.
"Only one foot of
soil covered the
pipeline where the
rupture occurred and
there were no warn-
ing signs over any
portion of the 5,000-
foot pipeline," noted
the state Department
of Ecology.*'
Montana — In
April 1992, a pipeline
gasket failed at the
Yellowstone Pipeline
temunal in Missoula,
Montana, allowing
5,000 gallons of gasoline to spray from the
pipe. It was the fifth spill at the terminal — run
by Conoco, Du Font's energy unit — since
November 1990." City health officials, con-
cerned that the spills might pollute the city's
drinking water, ordered ConocO to protect the
Missoula aquifer below the site.
"We are, as a community, just coming to
terms with the fact that we live above our
drinking water," said Ellen Leahy, director of
the Missoula City County Health Department
in issu ing the order. "The protective measures
you've taken to date don't measure up to what
is required. "*'
Conoco had no alarm system at the ter-
minal, and nearly all of the leaks had been
reported by passers-by. An investigation of
the 1992 spill also revealed that the temninal
lacked an automatic shut-off system; it took a
TABLE 6-2
REPORTED PIPELINE SPILLS
YEAR
GALLONS
1970
22,097,418
1971
9.805,362
1972
14,462.700
1973
15.727,404
1974
12.127.962
1975
13.312.614
1976
10.060.722
1977
9.403.338
1978
11.779,530
1979
22,900,248
1980
12,005^38
1981
8,588,622
1982
9,214,926
1983
16,020.942
1984
12,008,010
1985
7,065,702 •
1966
11,756,850
1987
15,341,634
1968
9,089,640
1989
8,452,076
1990
5,206,656
TOTAL
256,427,594
Average
12,210,838
Sourw; Annul Report ol PIpsBw Safety (t97B.199<l), Ollics ol
Pipeline Salely. U S OepailinenI ol Transponallon (■) Pf>eline
spills from 19es lo preseni reported If ffiey exceed 2.100 gellons.
prior 10 198S all spills lai^r tfian 210 gallons were si^posed lo oe
reporfed
Frieads of th« brlh
CRUDE AWAKENING 81
142
A CRACK IN THE PIPE
TABLE 6-4
Ttie Top 30 Pipeline Spills, 1 985-1993
COMPANY
Lakehead Pipeine
Amoco
Texaco
ShellTexaco
Shell
US Oil
Exxon
Colonial Pipeine
Exxon
Coastal Derby
Marathon P|)eine
GATX
Texaco
Colonial Pipeline
Amoco
Shell
Amoco
Chevron
Amoco Pipeline
Pelrofna
Williams Pipeine
FinaOil
Platte Ppeine
Scf Pefmian(Anioco) 5 Feb 92
Texaco
Conoco
Sun
Amoco Oil Co.
Mobil
BP
LOCATION GALLONS PRODUCT
Grand Rapids. MN 1.700,000 cnide
Denver City. TX 1.450.000 ctvjde
Winkler Co .TX 900.000 cnjde
Vienna. MO 840.000 erode
Roxana. 1 672.000 cnjde
Tacoma. WA 600.000 cnjde
Arthur Kii. NY 567.000 12 healng oil
Greenville. SO 546.000 tuel oil
13Jan89 Eugene Island. LA 588,000 crude
25 Dec 90 SedgwckCo.KS 447,720 naphtha
Newton. IL 452.550 cnxJe
Carteret. NJ 420.000 jet tuel
San Joaquin Valley. CA 420,000 cnjde
Fairfax Co.. VA 400.000 dieseloil
Alberta. Canada 360.000 It crude
28 Nov 92 McCameyASouslon. TX 357.000 oil 4 water
6 Nov 90 Salisbury. MO 300.000 cnjde
Beaumont, TX 231.000 cnjde
Bowring, OK 210,000 cnjde
Crane Co., TX 207.300 cnjde
Renner. SO 200.000 gas & diesel
Port Arthur. TX 189.000 cmde
Salisbury, MO 172.000 cnjde
Johnson Co. WY 168.000 cnjde
Augusta, KS 160.000 It crude
Judith Basin. MT 160.000 «. crude
Lfcerty.TX 147.000 cnjde
DetlaCo.Ml 126.000 I2tuel
Gorman. TX 1 10.000-210.000 cnjde
Oregon. OH 105.000 decanted hjel"
DATE
3M»91
29Jun91
23 Jan 89
Dec 88
19Feb90
6Jan91
2Jan90
19 Dec 91
27 Apr 85
3 Aug 90
26 Mar 89
29 Mar 93
5Jun90
20 Dec 89
17Jan92
220CI89
13Jan92
22 Sep 91
9Jan92
8 Jan 91
14 Sept 89
11Jun89
16Mar92
26 Apr 90
29 Nov 90
DAMAGE /POLLUTION/OTHER
Prairie River & wetlands^'
ground spdl^
spilled on ranc^land
Shoal Creek, Gasconade, Miss & Mo Rivers^
refinery spiir
Blair Waterway (Puget Sound) & soiP'
polkitkin o( Arthur Kill:400 dead binls^
poUutiop ct Durbin Crk & Enoree River*^
corrosion, most rvcoverea
ground spill
pipe njpture: pollulion of Newton Lake^^
contained: 300 yards from Arthur Kiln
line rupture: into d^ bed of Salt Creek^
Sugarland Crk& Potomac River
seam failure, most cleaned up
line njpture
pipe njpture: wat pollutk>n & fish kill'
polkjtion of Hiklebrandt Bayou"
corrosion. 175.000 prop, damage
ground spilr
leaked onto familand*'
ground sptlf"
seam failure: farmland spill
ground spill
some oil in kical creek
land spii: half recovered*'
pollution o( Trinity R.*'
ground spiff"
poUulkw of Sabana River 6.000 fish dead
Soufca Frnnds ol the Earth. WuMnglon. D C CompiM Irom piDlishei) sources and r
m piptliiw spins, bf daU. location ami amounl g>Hle(l
s sources See also Appenda includes an addnnnal company^)y-companv listing
worker 20 minutes to manually crank a valve
120 times to close the pipeline. An automatic
system would have taken two minutes.
Conoco says it will install motorized block
valves at points leading into and out of the
Missoula terminal. The new valves will be
controlled by pipeline managers in Houston,
who oversee the operations of the entire line,
which runs from Billings, Montana to Moses
Lake, Washington.
New Mexico — Twenty-five miles
northwest of Carlsbad, New Mexico, in
country known mostly for its rattlesnakes and
desert, the Marathon Oil company has
operated the Indian Basin gas processing
plant since 1966. The plant, which produces
petroleum condensate, has four incoming
gathering lines.
Through 1989 and most of 1990, produc-
tion at the plant was about 1 1,000 barrels per
day. Then, in November 1990, production
suddenly dropped to 4,600 barrels. Some-
thing was wrong."
Four months later, on April 12, 1991,
workers found the problem. They discovered
a colorless, salty mixture of oil and water
bubbling out of Gathering Line #4 about 800
feet south of the plant. According to
Marathon, corrosion caused the line to break.
Company officials estimated that the break
had occurred the previous fall and calculated
losses of 1.5 million gallons of oil and 840,000
gallons of produced water. It was the largest
leak ever recorded in New Mexico.
At the state's request, Marathon dug
monitoring wells that revealed as much as a
82aUDEAWAKENIIIG
Frientis of flw Eorlli
143
A CRACK IN THE PIPE
foot of oil floating on groundwater. The
plume was moving at the rate of six inches to
a foot each day, and by August 1991 had
moved about a mile east of the pipeline break.
New Mexico officials believe it will be
some bme before the plume threatens drink-
ing water supplies — the nearest wells are
about three rtules away — but they don't
know if heavy rains will speed the plume's
movement.
Chris Shuey, Director of the Community
Water Qualify Program at the Southwest Re-
search and Information Center in Albuquer-
que, believes Marathon was negligent in
dealing with the leak. He maintains that the
company could have prevented the leak with
better pipeline installation and monitoring
practices. For example, he says the gathering
lines should have been equipped with flow
meters, which would allow workers to detect
and address any loss in volume quickly. The
pipelines should have also included a cor-
rosion prevention systems.
Shuey believes the state should have
sought fines and penalties in the incident.
given the magnitude of the leak and the
toxicity of the pollutants. "These leaked fluids
Ccin be acutely and chronically toxic to both
humans and animals," he said. "The damage
that these long-term discharges may bring to
the regional ground water system may not be
knovknn for years."**
Kansas — Mary and Ray Simmons of
Wichita, Kansas were just about to break
ground for a new home when they learned of
the contamination. The groundwater beneath
their land — their sole source of drinking
water — contained 17,000 parts per billion
benzene, a chemical which can cause cancer.
Where did the benzene come from? The Sim-
mons believe it came from a nearby Conoco
pipeline. In February 1990, a weld gave way,
allowing 42,000 gallons of jet fuel to spill from
the pipeline. Unaware of the spill, the Sim-
mons purchased their property a year later.
Today, their construction plans are on hold
and they are in court seeking relief from Con-
oco."
Conoco pipelines, which are also impli-
cated in spills in Valley Center and east of
TEXACO SPILL ON TEXAS RANCH
Rex Pigmon had seen oil spills on his West Texas ranch before. Bui the one on January
24, 1989, was different. The 62-year old Winkler County cattleman sat in his pickup for a
long minute, watching the stream of smelly crude flow across his land toward the road.
He thought about getting out for a closer look, but the danger of poisonous gases and
explosion made him stay put...
...Within a few hours, three bulldozers, a herd of trucks, and two dozen men were at the
site, scrambling to contain the thousands of gallons of crude draining out of, the 20-inch
diameter Texaco pipeline. The bulldozers built levees to contain the gushing oil. As the
dozers worked to wall in the spill, two vacuum trucks sucked up the heavy-smelling crude.
As soon as one truck was full, it turned around and headed for the row of huge gray oil
tanks at the pump station. But there just weren't enough trucks to keep up with the rising
oil. Soon the levees gave way and the sulfurous oil crept over the arid terrain. Before the
oil stopped flowing, six acres of Pigmon's land — an are the size of four and a half football
fields — was covered with oil.
Twenty-four hours after Pigmon found the leak, the pipeline was still draining. The
welders and pipe fitters waited and watched as the oil occupying the twenty miles worth
of pipe oozed out onto Pigmon's property. Finally, around noon, the damaged pipe was
empty. Backhoes dug out the buried pipe, and the ruptured section was cut out. Seventy-
four feet of new pipe were laid in place, and by six o'clock that evening, the welders were
gone. The dozers leveled the dikes. The oil that couldn't be vacuumed up was covered
over with dirt. That done, the remaining crew loaded the equipment and drove away —
leaving a chunk of Pigmon's land oil-soaked and sterile. ...When [Pigmon) learned two
pionlhs later that nearly one million gallons of crude had leaked onto his land and was
beginning to contaminate his groundwater, he got mad. And when Texaco offered him
Sl,2000 for damages, he got a lawyer...
(Excerpted from Rol}en Bryce. 'More Precious Than Oil,' Texas Uonthfy. ftbiMrf 1991 )
Frienik oi tli« brtli
CIUDE AWAKENING 83
144
A CRACK IN THE PIPE
WYOMING SPILL WIPES OUT TROUT; TAINTS WATER
It was April 1987. N4ike Sullivan, then governor of Wyoming, was surveying the damage to the North Platte
River from a circling helicopter. A Conoco pipeline near Casper had ruptured, spilling gasoline into the river.
Dead fish were washing up on river banks — some were calling it the worst disaster in Wyoming history for a
prime trout fishery. ., , u j u
Bill Wichers, a Wyoming fisheries supervisor, reported that about 1,250 trout per mile of stream had been
killed, about 14,000 fish in total. More fish were expected to succumb to the spill. Wichers estimated it would take
three to four years for the fishery to recover.
Joe White, chief of fisheries for Wyoming Game and Fish, was optimistic about the long term. He said the spill
would not have a long-lasting environmental impact on the river. The spring runoff from upstream reservoirs
would flush the river of fuel, he said.
Conoco promised to restock the river. But dead trout weren't the only problem. Near Casper, residents were
told not to drink or cook with their tap water. At one water treatment location, officials repomd contamination
levels of .9 ppm gasoline at the top of a water storage tank and .14 ppm at a treatment plant.
"The purpose of the ban is to make sure that someone is not going to drink gasoline or any water with gas in
it," explained Dan Coughlin, Manager of the Brooks Water and Sewer District.
At the time, however, Wyoming's DEQ did not plan any enforcement action against Conoco.
Wichita, aren't the only ones leaking in Kan-
sas. Coastal, for instance, has a number of
leaking pipelines in the state. In Conway
Springs, residents discovered oil pollution
beneath their land and new homes, the result
of a leak in the Coastal Derby Pipeline, a crude
oil gathering line that is exempt from federal
regulation. Another Coastal pipeline leaked
refined petroleum at Park City.
A Coastal line near Kechi spilled naphtha
in December 1989. The naptha line leaked
again on Christmas Eve, 1990 rwar Benton,
spilling 420,000 gallons and forcing four
families to leave their homes." According to
John Stoner, spokesman for DOT's regional
pipelir\e safety office, the agency didn't even
know the Coastal naptha pipeline existed
until the second incident was reported. Coas-
tal now has a computerized leak monitoring
system on the line.
Other Kansas pipeline leakers include:
Kaneb Pipeline (spilled gasoline at Arkansas
City and Augusta); Amoco (spilled crude near
Valley Center); Koch (leaked gasoline at
Maize); and Phillips (nught have a gasoline
leak from a pipeline near its Wichita ter-
minal).
"From our standpoint, [the pipelines] are
urvegulated, " says Kyle Parker, a geologist
with the Kansas Department of Health and
Envirorunent. "That is the biggest problem.
As far as preventive regulations, our depart-
ment has none. As far as specific cleanup regs,
our department has none. It is pretty difficult
to deal with.'
Mobd's 'Chronk Leaker"
Mobil called the 28,980galloncrudeoil leak
from its pipeline into Bull Creek at Granada
Hills, California "an isolated incident." That's
the term company officials used in an April
1986 a letter to the state Fire Marshall's office.
But the leaks continued over the next few
years. The line, which carried heavy "tarry"
crude oil from Mobil's oil fields in Kem Coun-
ty to its refinery at Torrance, had seven leaks
greater than 2,100 gallons between 1985 and
1991. This is an accident rate about 10 times
higher than that for similar crude pipelines.
The leaks — of crude heated to 180 degrees
to keep it flowing — included:
■ 2,520 gallons in Van Nuys, November
1985;
■ 28,980 gallons in Granada Hills, April
1986;
■ 6300 gallons in Torrance, June 1986;
■ 105,000 gallons in Ubec, June 1987;
■ 132,000gallonsinEncino,Septemberl988;
■ 120,000 gallor« of oil & water in Sherman
Oaks, September 1988;
■ 1,040 gallons in Valencia, May 1990; and
■ 74,634 gallons again near Valencia in
January 1991 (some of the oil made its way
to the Santa Clara River)."
"The line's a chronic leaker," said Jim Waif,
chief of the Los Angeles Fire Marshal's
pipeline safety division. And Ken Cude,
division engineer for the L.A. Department of
Transportation, cited the line's "inordinate"
number of spills."
What was causing the problem?
84 aUDE AWAKENING
Friends ol tkt brth
145
A CRACK IN THE PIPE
Some theorized it was age — parts of the
Mobil pipeline were 50 years old. But many of
the leaks occurred in portions of the line that
were less than 20 years old, so age wasn't the
only factor.
"There's something else that's going on, no
question about it..." said Richard Beam,
deputy associate administrator of DOT's Of-
fice of Pipeline Safety. "It's a question of how
the line was designed, constructed, and what
its maintenance record is."
And, Beam could have added, it also may
be a queshon of what kind of protective coat-
ings Mobil was putting on the inside of its
pipelines to prevent corrosion.
Mobil's April 1986 "isolated" leak, for ex-
ample, was blamed on an ineffective coating
called "T-1," which had been installed in 1964.
After the spill, Mobil told the Fire Marshall's
office that it was replacing line segments that
were coated with T-1 .
The incident illustrates that the science of
pipeline coatings isn't as far along as some
might expect. James Nunn, corrosion
manager for Mobil's pipeline subsidiary,
wrote about the uncertain business coatings
in the May 1987 Oil & Gas journal.
Nunn wrote that Mobil expected each new
coating it tried "to be superior to its predeces-
sor." But some coatings — including several
designed to prevent corrosion at high
temperatures — "failed to reach full expecta-
tions."'^
Nonetheless, Mobil keeps experimenting
with its new coatings — and public safety —
in the field. Recently, for example, it intro-
duced a new, "state-of-the-art" coating
developed by Du Pont Canada and Valspar
Inc. But even this state-of-the-art coating car-
ries no assurances. "We do not know, it is true,
that in 50 years (it) will not spring any leaks,"
says Valspar technical consultjmt Toni Pfaff.
"But the new hybrid coating is the very best
that the industry has been able to come up
with."
Mobil Pays The Piper
The prorruse of better pipeline coatings in
the future, however, was not enough to
prevent the Los Angeles officials from filing
twelve misdemeanor criminal charges against
Mobil for negligent upkeep of its pipelines
after the company's September 1988 spills."
"We believe the evidence shows that the
rupture cind spill could have been avoided if
Mobil had detected the corrosion problem
through proper monitoring of the pipeline,"
said Los Angeles City Attorney Jim Hahn.
After the second Mobil spill, oil had bub-
bled out of the ground and flowed into storm
drains that dump into the Los Angeles River.
Oil also went into the city sewer system, and
PIPELINES LEAK OFFSHORE, TOO
Offshore oil development has been booming around the globe in recent years and
so has the construction of offshore pipelines, which connect drilling platforms to
onshore facilities. This underwater pipeline network is vast. Exxon alone, for example,
has 3,000 miles of offshore oil and gas pipelines worldwide.
The offshore pipeline system is even more dimly understood than the onshore
system. But it too is leaking.
In the Gulf of Mexico, for example, 690 offshore pipeline failures were reported to
the U.S. Minerals Management Service between 1967 and 1987. Of these, 290 resulted
in "measurable pollution," summarized in the October 1990 Oi7 & Cas journal as
follows."
■ 274 spills — less than 4,200 gallons
■ 9 spills — between 4,200 and 42,000 gallons.
■ 5 spills — between 42,000 and 420,000 gallons.
■ 2 spills — more than 420,000 gallons.
Gulf of Mexico pipeline failures appear to be increasing. Between 1967 and 1977,
companies reported more than 40 pipeline failures in only one year. But between 1978
and 1987, there were five years in which companies reported 50 or more spills.
"The significant increase in failures since 1975," Oi7 & Cas journal concluded, "can
be attribuied to the increase in the pipeline population, aging of the pipelines installed
earlier, and the increased offshore construction activity."'
Friendi si iIm brtk
CRUDE AWAKENING 85
146
A CRACK IN THE PIPE
vacuum trucks had to pump more dian 60,000
gallons out of collection tanks at the Hyperion
sewage treatmait facility.
The maximum punishment could have
been six months in jaiL Mobil received a better
deal, however. Fearing additional lawsuits,
6\e company "pled to the most anomalous"
counts, according to city attorney Virus Sato.
In an off-the-record agreement, Mobil paid a
$2,000 fine plus emergency response and
clean-up costs of about $100,000.
But that wasn't the end of Mobil's travail.
The Los Angeles District Attorney for the
State of California filed a felony complaint
against the company for fouling the Santa
Clarita River and violating the state's hazard-
ous waste disposal law. That case is still
pending.
SpiBs Expedite New Line
Mobil did not go away empty-handed
from its Los Angeles ordeal. In fact, the spills
along the Kem County-to-Torrance line —
especially those occurringafter 1988 — actual-
Table 6-3
Oil Company Pipelines
Ainou
Operates a 17,193-mile pipeline system in North America, including 2,781 miles of
gathering lines & 14,412 miles of trunk lines. Shipped 373 million bbls of crude oil & 366
million bbls of refined product & feedstock in 1991; holds minority interests in 10 other
lines, including: 14.3 percent in Colonial Pipeline and 10.5 percent in Endicott Pipeline,
which feeds into the Trans Alaska Pipeline.
Askload
Capline System (LA), Rancho Pipe Line System (TX), Tecumesh Pipe Line Co. (IN &
OH), Minnesota Pipeline Co. (MN)
Mobil
Owns or partly owns 18,479 miles of crude oil natural gas hquids, natural gas, and
carbon dioxide trunk & gathering Unes, and 8,071 miles of product lines; owns Mobil
Alaska Pipeline Co., Mobil Pipe Line Co., and holds a 9.085 percent interest in the Trans
Alaskan Pipeline System (U5.)."
Occidmkil
Owns MidCon Corp., a pipeline transportation subsidiary & the Natural Gas Pipeline
Co. of America.
ShelKUi.)
Owns or partly owns more than 17,800 miles of petroleum pipelines in U.S.; owns Shell
Pipe Line Corporation.
Sun
Owns & operates crude oil gathering lines & crude oil and petroleum product pipelines
in 9 states; holds equity interests in other crude oil and refined product pipelines, including
the Mid-Valley, West Texas-Gulf, Explorer, and Inland systems.
Texoco
Owns or has interests in some 30,000 miles of pipelines worldwide; owns Texaco
Pipeline, Inc.
Unocal
Owns, partly owns, or leases 9,500 miles of raw material pipelines; holds 20.75 percent
interest in Colonial Pipeline Co; holds 1.36 percent interest in Trans-Alaskan Pipeline
System; the Unocal Califorma Pipeline Co. owns & operates crude oil gathering lines &
trunk lines in California.
86 nUDE AWAKENING
Friends of lix Earth
147
A CRACK IN THE PIPE
ly worked to Mobil's advantage, because they
helped the company secure approval for
building a new replacement line. Mobil an-
nounced plans for the new line in August
1989."
In April 1991, Los Angeles Transportation
Commission member Marion C. Fay cast her
vote in favor of the new line, saying "The
current pipeline is dangerous to the point of
certain rupture."
Some observers, however, say the safety
issue was simply part of Mobil's strategy for
getting permission to bring more crude into
the region for refirung, which would mean
more air pollution in the already smog-
choked L.A. area. Others also saw the new
pipe's increased capacity — up to 126,000 bar-
rels per day, or twice that of the existing line
— as a back door route to an additional
pipeline in the region.
To address these concerns, Mobil was
restricted to 75 percent of the pipe's design
capacity, or 95,000 barrels a day. That was still
about one-third more oil than the old line
carried. But Mobil said its refining level
would remain the same, since it would be
cutting back on deliveries from other sources.
The new line — now being built over the
objections of some citizen groups — will be
much improved, according to Mobil. It will
include the latest state-of-the-art coating and
have a uniform 16-inch diameter — unlike the
existing line. This will allow the company to
use a "smart pig" — a robot that crawls along
the line — to scan periodically for corrosion.
WiDlams: A Careless PipeBie Company
In January 1992, a visitor noticed dis-
colored soil on Vernon Berg's farm near Ren-
ner. South Dakota. The dark stain signaled a
larger problem below the surface — a pipeline
leak of more than 200,000 gallons of gasoline,
diesel and jet fuel. A hairline crack in the
pipeline, owned by the Williams Pipeline
Company, had allowed the fuels to seep out."
This was not the first time that Williams'
pipelines were found leaking. Indeed,
throughout the company's 10-state operating
region, pipeline leaks and explosions had oc-
curred on numerous occasions:
■ In Mounds View, Minnesota in July 1986,
a Williams gasoline pipeline exploded into
a raging fireball, shooting flames 50-feet
into the air, killing a mother and daughter
running from their home."
■ In Iowa, explosions in Milford and
Pleasant Hill in 1986 killed four Williams
workers.
■ In Kansas, Williams' pipelines spilled
192,000 of crude oil in 1979."
Williams' pipelines, in fact, have been spill-
ing oil for nearly 30 years (see Table 6-5). Be-
tween 1982 and 1992, company liiwsk^t more
than two million gallons of petroleum
products and fertilizers."
Investigations following the 1986 Mounds
FARMER RECALLS COMPANY ARROGANCE IN SPILL OF '47
"...The pipeline spill near Corson is similar to one that occurred on our farm ...in April
7947. No official gallonage was given because at that time there was no legal recourse for
something like this.
"1 discovered this spill when I found four or five inches of diesel fuel on top of the water in
a pasture creek, eighty rods from the spill. The company (not Williams) said they were short
50 to 100 barrels of fuel, but they didn't know if this was the only leak. The only clean up at
that time was to set fire to the fuel on the surface and bum it off.
"The only means of communication between the repair crew and the company office was
the phone at our house. When the office called the crew, they asked my wife (eight months
pregnant) to walk sixty rods out to the crew and have them come to the house for the call. This
was almost a daily occurrence, sometimes more than one a day. Even after the baby was bom,
the calls kept coming until the work was completed in September.
"I asked the company official what we could expect for my wife's cooperations and damage
to the land.
"He replied, 'If you want anything, you can take it to court. That's what we keep our
lawyers for." We never received one cent or even a letter of thanks from the company.
"This spill turned up in our 600-foot Dakota Sandstone well about 10 years later..." —
Kerwin Ulrickson, Canton, S.D.
Frjends of th* brth
CRUDE AWAKENING 87
148
A CRACK IN THE PIPE
View explosion found that Williams had in-
adequately maintained and protected the
pipeline against corrosion. The company,
which knew that the pipe was inadequately
protected for five years before tfw accident,
was fined $115,000 by DOT's Office of
Pipeline Safety, the largest fine ever collected
by the agency at the time.
The Mounds View incident also touched
off a Minnesota probe into Williams' record,
which turned up 64 spills in the state between
1967 and 1986. Thirty-one spills were caused
by corroded equipment. Minnesota levied
some $190,000 in fuws on the company for
spills during that period.
In South Dakota, politidarw and the public
are still seething over a 1987 spate of Williams
pipeline and tank farm spills in Sioux Falls
and Watertown (see Chapter 3). "Williams Pipe
Line Co. reminds us of a politician with good
instincts and no conscience," said the editors
of the Sioux Falls Argus Leader in a February
1992 editorial. "Company officials talk with
great sorrow and concern every time one of
their aging pipelines leaks, polluting the en-
virorunent and endangering public health.
They seem to do whatever needs to be done at
the moment, but nothing more. As soon as
public attention turns away, if s back to busi-
ness as usual."**
That view appeared to be shared by Illiiwis
officials who had worked with Williams.
"When they're pushed into a comer, they're
responsible," said Jim O'Brien of the Illinois
Environmoital Protection Agency. "Other-
wise, it's.. ..just see what they can get away
with."
A Big Compoay
The Williams Companies of Tulsa, Ok-
lahoma is no small outfit It is the fourth
largest petroleum products pipeline company
in the nation, right behind Amoco, Mobil arwl
Exxon. The company operates more than
8,500 miles of pipelines that transport crude
oil, petroleum products and liquid fertilizer to
some 45 terminals in North and South Dakota,
Nebraska, Kansas, Iowa, Missouri, Min-
nesota, Illinois and Wisconsin.
Some of Williams' oldest lines were built in
the 1930s without any corrosion protection.
And although the company decommissioned
about 2,100 miles of its oldest lines, it left
hundreds of miles of deteriorating lines in
operation.
In early 1992, VS. Senator Tom Daschle
(D-SD) wanted to know why the company's
aging lines weren't being monitored more
closely, or better still, replaced. "It's unfor-
timate we've had to just wait for another
spill," he said. "If Williams were a good cor-
porate citizen, you'd expect them to be
morutoring these aging lines closely.'
What was particularly troubling to Daschle
and other South Dakota officials was the fact
that a leaky Williams pipeline passed over the
Big Sioux Aquifer, which supplies half of
Sioux Falls' drinking water. To protect the
aquifer. South Dakota's Attorney General had
filed a civil action against Williams and, at one
point, Sioux Falls city commissioners dis-
cussed rerouting the pipeline.
By April 1992, a Sioux Falls Pipeline Safety
Committee had issued a seven-point plan for
dealing with the Williams lines. They called
for vapor and corrosion testing along the line;
lowering the operating pressure; installing
remote-controlled valves with electronic
sensing devises; and requiring Williams to
complete a spill response and clean up plan
for the Big Sioux Aquifer area. *
Earlier, in February, the South Dakota
Senate unanimously passed a resolution
urged Williams to install monitoring and
sensing devices in sections of the pipeline that
threatened groundwater. But in the House, a
measure aimed at regulating pipelines was
watered dovm to request a year-long study of
pipeline safety.
A Deterioratiag System
South Dakota isn't alone in grappling with
pif>eline safety. Other state and federal offi-
cials are also taking a closer look at the
nation's peh-oleum pipeline system. They are
finding an aging, corroding network in need
of extensive repair and replacement.
"A major challenge ahead is the general
aging of the pipeline infrastructure," sayi-
Travis Dungan of DOTs Office of Pipeline
Safety."
In New Mexico, the director of the state's
Oil Conservation Division (OCD), William J.
LeMay, reported that in the first four months
of 1991, "60 percent of production line leaks
reported to OCD and 86 percent of injection
laUDEAWUENING
fnaii^^biiii
149
A CRACK IN THE PIPE
line leaks were attributed to corrosion —
totalling approximately 3,400 barrels of oil
and 3,900 barrels of [produced] water...""
In the Great Lakes states, "a potential spiU
from storage tanks and pipelines is particular-
ly acute because of the aging pipeline and
storage tank infrastructure," concluded a Sep-
tember 1991 report to the region's gover-
nors."
In the Gulf of Mexico, "corrosion is the
leading cause of failures of subsea pipelines,"
an industry investigator reported in Oil & Gas
journal.'"
The Alaskan Pipline
Pipeline corrosion is not always the hand-
iwork of time and nature. Indeed, sometimes
those who designed and built the pipeline
must carry the blame for the speed and extent
of corrosion.
The Trans-Alaskan Pipeline System
(TAPS), for example, was supposed to be the
engineering marvel of its time. The oil in-
dustry boasted that it would last 30 to 40
years. Some even called it "rustproof."
But in 1990, only 13 years after the line
opened, Alyeska — the oil company consor-
tium that owns and operates the pipeline —
found hundreds of corroded spots in the
pipe's steel walls, some as large as quarters.
"What's surprising to us is the degree of
corrosion," said DOT's pipeline safety direc-
tor, George W. Tenley, when the corrosion
reports first arrived. "I don't think anybody
expected to see this much rust this soon.""
It turns out that some of the premature
rusting was due to sloppy work, perhaps the
result of market pressure to speed construc-
tion. "They were in a real hurry to turn the
sucker on and start getting a cash flow when
they misapplied the pipe's protective coat-
ing," explained Robert LaResche, an inves-
hgator for the State of Alaska.'"
Given the hostile environment it would
traverse — 800 miles, 3 mountain ranges,
hundreds of rivers, temperatures that range
between 90 degrees in the summer Jind 75
below in the winter — the TAPS had to be
more than just a run-of-the-mill pipeline. It
had to be a pipe four feet in diameter that
would carry about 80 million gallons of warm
oil every day south from Prudhoe Bay to the
port of Valdez. Half the pipeline would be
buried — often in frozen soil — while half
would be built on above-ground trestles.
The Alyeska Pipeline Service Company
TABLE 6-5
The Williams Record: A Slew Of Spills, 1964-1992
DATE
LOCATION
GALLONS
FUEL
CAUSE
Dec 64
Rosevaie. MN
44,100
gasoline
tank overfill
Feb 66
Albert Lea. MN
67,620
gasoline
seam failure
Oct 67
Steele Co.. MN
109,914
gasoline
seam spin
Feb 68
Freeborn Co, MN
67200
gasoline
seam split
Dec 66
Anoka Co. MN
46200
«2fuel
pipe mpture
Dec 76
Clariis Grove, MN
41,370
X-9oil
seam split
Apf77
Clarks Grove, MN
47,796
gasoline
searn splK
Feb 78
Latimer, lA
140,070
liquid propane
spill
Mar 79
Lyon County. KS
192276
etude oil
spill
Apr 80
Rosevile, MN
92,400
gasoline
fire/pump
Jul 81
Maplewood, MN
100,000
gasoline
corrosion
Oct 81
Superior, MN
114,000
valve failure
Jan 82
Circle Pines, MN
42,000
girtli weld failure
Mar 82
RosemounI, MN
250,000
«2oil
tank failure
Feb 83
Owalonna, MN
280.000
weld failure
Dec 83
Sturgeon Lake, MN
68,000
gasoline
pipe njpture
Jun84
Rosevile, MN
17,934
fuel oil
line break
Nov 86
Walertown, SO
14,000
hole in terminal lank
Feb 90
Walertown, SO
13,900
gasket failure
Jan 92
Renner, SD
200,000
crack In pipeline
Sources SUH rKonls I wws reports "
FrieiKk oi fix Earth
CRUDE AWAKENING 89
150
A CRACK IN THE PIPE
directed the design and construction of the
pipeline; today, it is responsible for its opera-
tion and maintenance. Alyeska was created —
and is owned — by seven oil companies:
Amerada Hess, ARCO, BP, Exxon, Mobil,
Phillips aitd Unocal.
When Congress approved the TAPS,
Alyeska promised to install a special package
of corrosion-resistance and early-warning
technologies. First, the company would coat
the steel pipe with epoxy and a protective tape
to keep water away. Second, it would install
a cathodic protection system, which used an
electric current to thwart corrosion. Third, it
would develop automated "smart pigs" —
robots that crawl through the pipe — to detect
corrosion before it became a problem.
During construction, Alyeska even con-
vinced U.S. Interior Department officials to
allow improperly coated and taped sections of
the pipeline to be buried on assurances that
the cathodic protection system and corrosion-
detecting pigs provided adequate safety.
But government officials never required
Alyeska to assess whether the cathodic
protection system could in fact protect the
pipeline."" And years later, after the pipeline
was built, the officials would learn that much
of the promised system was untested and ex-
perimental. "Neither the cathodic protection
system nor the corrosion-detecting pigs had
been used on a pipeline the size of TAPS or
under harsh conditions," concluded the VS.
General Accounting Office (GAO).""
What about the smart pigs? By 1984, Alyes-
ka had discovered they weren't so smart after
all — the best pig could only detect spots
where 50 percent of the metal had already
corroded. After a worldwide search for new
technology, the company began using more
sophisticated pigs in 1988. The new devices
could detect spots where as little as 10 percent
of the metal had corroded.'"
In October 1989, the new pigs helped
Alyeska identify 827 spots with potential ex-
ternal corrosion. Two years earlier, the com-
pany had found only 14 such spots. Further
— in direct contradiction to what Alyeska had
told government officials during construction
— the company admitted that no cathodic
protection system could protect buried pipe
where the coating aiuJ protective tape had not
bonded properly.
90CIUDEAWAK£NING
Alyeska has begun patching the pipeline's
weak spots, using steel sleeves in some spots
and installii\g new pifw in other locations.
Over the next five years, the company will be
working on at least three weak segments.
'State-of-tlw-Arr Leak DetecHoi
The problem of detecting pipeline leaks,
however, still remains. In theory, detecting
and pinpointing leaks in a modem pipeline
system shouldn't be difficult Loss of pump-
ing pressure and declines in volume are ob-
vious indicators of a problem. But even the
most modem technologies — such as com-
puterized leak-detection systems — have
deficiencies.
According to GAO, "although Alyeska has
a computerized leak detection system, none of
the spills that occurred along the pipeline
since operations began in 1977 were initially
detected by the system."
Alyeska's system was originally designed
to trigger an alarm if a leak was bigger than
31,500 gallons per day.'°* But after the com-
pany experienced an "unacceptable" number
of false alarms, it asked to recalibrate the sys-
tem so that it would only trigger an alarm for
bigger spills.
In July 1989, Alyeska reported that the sys-
tem was accurately warning them of leaks of
nejOOO gaUons per day. When the pipeline
was at extremely stable operation, they
reported it could also detect smaller leaks,
down to 25,200 gallons per day.
But GAO investigators found that the
alarm system wasn't working as well as the
company cUimed. In 1988 and 1989, company
documents show, the system sometimes
would allow potentially large leaks — over
500,000 gallons per day — to occur without
triggering the alarm.
Another weakness in the system, GAO
found, was that it did not identify a leak's
location. "In most cases," GAO reported, "the
exact location must be determined by visual
surveillance," which is not always easy in the
dark Alaskan winters."
Once a large spill is found, GAO is also
unsure of Alyeska's capability to respond.
"Alyeska's ability to respond to a large-scale
spill along the pipeline or at the terminal is not
known," the agency concludes.
Noting that the TAPS transports nearly 25
Friends of tin brlli
151
A CRACK IN THE PIPE
percent of the nation's domestically produced
crude oil, GAO warns that "A major break in
the pipeline could spill tens of thousands of
barrels of oil on Alaska's fragile environment,
and an extended shutdown for repairs from
such an accident could affect the nation's
domestic oil supply." '"
Meanwhile, Alyeska says it is reviewing
ways to improve its computerized leak detec-
hon system.
Too Cozy With Indostry?
A major obstacle to properly regulating the
Alaskan pipeline — and for regulating
petroleum pipelines generally — has been the
cozy relationship between industry and
government regulators.
For example, GAO found that the five
federal and state agencies that had primary
responsibility for overseeing TAPS did not
have the "systemabc, disciplined and coor-
dinated approach needed." Instead, "these
agencies relied on Alyeska to police itself..."""
The Wilderness Society charges that "For
the past 13 years, both [Bureau of Land
Management and DOT) oversight consisted
largely of accepting whatever Alyeska told
them about the pif>eline and corrosion."'"
Florida pipeline activist Bob Rackleff has
noticed a similar problem at DOTs Office of
Pipeline Safety. It has, he says, consistently
deferred to industry on safety issues. "The
industry has far too much influence.. .for OPS
to carry out impartial studies that viill lead to
significant improvements," he told a U.S.
Congressional committee in 1991."' In some
cases, even in the aftermath of spills, the "or-
ders" that OPS issues to pipeline owners area
weak substitutes for real enforcement
Take what happened in Fredericksburg,
Virginia, for example. Colonial Pipeline Com-
pany spilled 212,000 gallons of kerosene into
the Rappahannock River, forcing the city to
close its municipal water supply.
After an OPS investigation. Colonial and
the agency entered into an operating agree-
ment in August 1990. This agreement, used in
place of a more formal enforcement action or
consent order, is typical of how the pipeline
industry is "regulated" by the federal govern-
ment and how OPS has often neglected state
and loccil authorities.
Colonial and OPS agreed that the pipeline
Friends of the brtli
would operate at a lower pressure until an
ORA — Operational Reliability Assessment
— could be completed. The agreement also
required Colonial to subject the line to
hydrostatic, or water-pressure, testing. All
testing was to be complete by the end of 199 1 .
The agreement was billed by OPS more as a
"testing agreement" than the basis for an en-
forcement action. It also fell short on other
fronts."'
■ First, the agreement never included con-
sultation with the State of Virginia or the
City of Fredericksburg.
■ Second, the agreementallowed Colonial to
hire and supervise a consultant to analyze
the incident and predict the likelihood of
future spills. "To allow a knovkTi violator
such as Colonial to hire and supervise the
consultant whose work would form the
basis for an OPS enforcement decision
creates ... a situation which at least gives
the appearance of a conflict of interest,"
said Fredericksburg City Attorney Jim
Pates."'
■ Third, the agreement allowed Colonial to
resume normal operating pressure and to
terminate the OPS agreement upon notice
to OPS. Says Frederickburg's Jim Pates,
"The City would have strongly urged OPS
to prohibit Colonial from increasing the
operating pressure or terminating the
Agreement until the ORA had been com-
pleted and made available for public com-
ment. The City was prepared to present
proof that the pipeline, it its defective con-
dition, presented serious and continuing
threat to thousands of citizens in the
Fredericksburg area.""'
Where's The Regulation?
Ten years ago, an EPA contractor writing
about a new agency report on the hazards of
petroleum pipelines wrote the following:
"...Petroleum accidents cmd leakage cause
many pollution incidents that are detrimental
to both the national interest and the oil in-
dustry. These accidents result in the loss of
large quantities of petroleum, cause sig-
nificant envirorunental problems, and subject
segments of the population to potential
hazards. Even small losses from a pipeline
system cannot be tolerated, and it is the
CRUDE AWAKENING 91
152
A CRACK IN
responsibility of government and operating
companies to protect the comntimity from
possible damages resulting from a leak.""
Today, with more than 12 million gallons
of oil and petroleum products leaking each
year from pipelines, and countless com-
munities across America still threatened by
corroding pipelines, it is clear tt«t the federal
govenunent and operating comparues have
not met their respor^ibilities.
Although the Pipeline Safety Act of 1992 is
now law, the changes in the statute may not
amount to much given the long-standing
relationship between industry aiul govern-
ment.
The new law calk for DOTs Office of
Pipeline Safety to issue regulations on safety,
standards, and reporting "to take into ac-
count" protection of the envirorunent. And
there are also new requirema\ts for identify-
ing and mapping pipelines located in en-
vironmentally sensitive areas and those
which cross navigable waterways.'"
Pipelines in these two latter categories are
supposed to receive "periodic inspection" ac-
cording to the 1992 amendments, the regula-
THEPiPE
tior« for which are ru)t due until October 1995.
But OPS has already missed the May 1990
deadline for an inspection report that was to
be delivered to Q)ngress."'
OPS, in fact, was supposed to begin in-
specting pipelines at two-year intervals
begiiuiing in 1989, subject to appropriations.
Today, the ageiKy says it focuses on high risk
pipelines. Yet, in reality, its inspection force
doesn't even allow that.
"We're very under-resourced," said John
Stoner, spokesman for OPS in February 1992.
"We regulate 2,200'operators of pipelines and
a network of 1.7 million miles...lt's a daunting
task." According to Stoiwr, the agency has 60
inspectors, or one ii\spector for every 28300
miles of pipe.'"
In 1990, according to Bill Shrank of the
Natural Resources Defa«e Council, OPS as-
sessed civil penalties in 46 cases averaging
about $6,500 per case, or roughly $300,000
overaU.'"
Timid Steps
The new federal law takes a few steps
toward including environmental protection
PIPEUNE LEAKAGE ABROAD
Leaking pipelines and lack of regulation aren't problems only in the U.S. Overseas,
the situation is even worse.
Consider the Trans-Ecuadorian Pipeline in the Amazon. A consortium lead by
Texaco spent $150 million to build the 300-mile pipeline in 1972. Known the
Ecuadorian acronym SOTE, the line runs from the oil fields of the Oreinte, across the
13,000-foot Andes, and down to the Pacific oil port of Esmeraldas. The line has a
capacity of 300,000 barrels per day. There are also some 240 miles of secondary
lines."*
According to Judith Kimerling, writing in Amazon Crude for the Natural Resources
Defense Council, the Ecuadorian government has recorded approximately 30 major
spills from the SOTE, with an estimated loss of 16.8 milhon gallons of crude oil.
However, these are only the reported spills. With the system aging and corroding,
more spills are expected.
Spill control and clean-up are typically late or non-existent. "In the Oriente,"
Kimerling explains, "no equipment is available to mitigate or clean up oil spills. Spill
response is limited to locating the source of the drop in pressure in the pipehne,
turning off the flow of oil into the damaged portion of the line, waiting for the oil to
spill out, and repairing the pipeline. Because valves along pipelines are designed for
pumping purposes only, not for safety shut-offs, the nearest valve to a spill can be
tens of kilometers away. Oil can spill for days before the breached line is
evacuated."
In Russia, leaking oil pipelines are also a major environmental problem. To speed
construction of one pipeline, officials allowed builders to install cut off valves every
30 miles instead of every three, meaning that a rupture could release the oil in 30 miles
of pipe. In Siberia, one spill formed a small lake: 4 miles wide, 7 miles long, and 6 feet
deep."'
92 CtUDE AWAKENING
Friinds o( the brill
153
A CRACK IN THE PIPE
in DOT'S regulations, but it gives the agency
wide discretion in making changes. But the
new law is not really aimed at preventing
pipeline spUls.
Lacking, for example, are provisions for
regularly spaced shut-off valves, regular
hydrostatic testing of pipelines, use of double-
walled pipes in new construction, or com-
puterized leak detection systems — all of
which are proven ways to prevent pollution.
Nor do the new provisions allow citizens to
intervene in administrative proceedings or to
bring their own lawsuits when serious viola-
tions persist and federal enforcers fail to act
There is a provision that allows stales to
take responsibility for pipeline regulahon —
with the federal government paying 35 per-
cent of the costs. But the law bars states from
enacting laws that are tougher than federal
standards — a rule that provides states with
little incentive to aggressively address
pipeline pollution.
"Why should we take over regulations that
don't have teeth in them?," asks Bill Markley,
an inspector with South Dakota's Department
of Environment and Natural Resources.'"
If this provision were changed, states and
localities — which are often closer to pipeline
problems — might take strong action. "Local
and state officials are often more aware of the
real-life effects of pipeline accidents than OPS
is," says Fredericksburg city attorney Jim
Pates. "They are certairJy more aware of the
potential health and environmental risks of
pipeline accidents to their particular localities
than federal officials are."
Meanwhile, Bock In Florido-.
By early 1993, Bob Rackleff and his wife
JoEllyn had logged many hours with their
neighbors and the Friends of Uoyd in fighting
Texaco and the Colonial Pipeline Company
over the proposed pipeline/tank farm com-
plex.
In their research, they learned that Colonial
Pipeline Company was owned by nine oil
companies — Amoco, Texaco, Citgo, Mobil,
Du Pont, Phillips, BP, ARCO, and Union Oil.
They also learned that Colonial had reported
at least 25 spills and leak between 1982 and
April 1990, amounting to more than 1.1 mil-
lion gallons." They also discovered that DOT
had fined Colonial $10,500 in August 1989 for
Frienik of the brih
failing to correct seven problem spots in two
pipelines near Richmond, Virginia."
They presented this and other information
at countless meetings — organizing citizen
testimony for no less than seven public hear-
ings. They also filed civil lawsuits against
county commissioners for holding private
meetings. They raised concerns about
groundwater contamination. They convinced
state legislators to introduce bills that would
limit pipeline eminent domain powers and
tighten pipeline and tai\k farm standards.
They proposed local pipeline sifety ordinan-
ces. They brought a nuisance suit against
Colonial. They insisted on competitive bid-
ding procedures in the county reviews of
Texaco's plans. They made TV ads to get their
message out. And they formed key alliances.
One very important alliance was with a
group of South Florida shipping and uiuon
interests called the Florida Alliance. The Al-
liance — made up of marine shippers of
petroleum and gasoline who feared that the
pipeline would damage their business —
provided over $135,000 to Rackleff and his
organization. Most of the money was used to
cover litigation and advertising costs.'
Texaco and Colonial Pipeline, of course,
did not stand still.
Texaco's FuH-Court Press
Texaco, after having its first pipeline
proposal rejected on technical grounds by Jef-
ferson County in May 1989, released a "new
and improved" plan two months later. The
company defended the new proposal with
full<ourt press — undertaking a determined
public relations effort, meeting with public
officials to assuage their concerns, and releas-
ing a public opinion poll showing that a
majority of county residents supported the
new plan.
They also spent big bucks on a local media
campaign.
"They began a three-month media blitz
that cost what 1 estimate was $300,000 for
saturation local TV ads and print ads in the
two newspapers," recalls Rackleff. "They also
printed a newsletter and distributed it to
every household in the county . Their ads were
strongly negative against us. One radio ad
compared us with Chicken Little — with a
punch line of: 'Makes you wonder how
CRUDE AWAKENING 93
154
A CRACK IN THE PIPE
America ever put a man of the moon, doesn't
One of Texaco's TV ads — run on all the
local stations during prime time — attacked
Rackleff personally. It included a clip of him
speaking at a public meeting as a Texaco nar-
rator asked "Who's side is Bob Rackleff really
on?
By the summer of 1991, however, the
Texaco star was loosing its luster in Florida
and elsewhere. A huge tank farm leak in Fair-
fax, Virginia — just across the Potomac River
from Washington — put Texaco in an unflat-
tering light and raised the national visibility
of leaking pipelines and lank farms (see Case
Study n3).
Colonial Pipeline, meanwhile, had
troubles of its own. In December 1991, a com-
pany pipeline ruptured near Greenville,
South Carolina, spilling more than 400,000
gallons of fuel oil and gasoline into a nearby
waterway, ttveatening the drinking water of
two towns.129
Then, in April 1993, a Colonial pipeline
spilled 400,000 gallons into Sugarland Run, a
small tributary of the Potomac near
Washington, D.C. Those visiting the city's
famed Cherry Blossom Festival were greeted
by fumes and sheerw of oil on the Potomac.
Colonial had also been stynued in Florida.
In August 1991, the company brought a
federal lawsuit challenging a land use deter-
mination by Leon County (the county ad-
jacent to the proposed Texaco tank farm). The
County was requiring Colonial to abide by the
county comprehensive plan — which did not
include the pipeline route. Colonial's suit
charged that federal pipeline regulations pre-
empted state and local regulations.
That argument brought the Florida Attor-
ney General into fte fray, as Florida asserted
the right of state and local governments to
regulate land use via the state's Growth
Management Act. Colonial lost its challenge.
For a time, the company flirted with an appeal
but withdrew its notice in April 1992.
Colonial and Texaco haven't left town,
however. They are still attempting to win
public approval for their pipeline/tank farm
project and are still negotiating with local
authorities in Jefferson and Leon Counties to
am'end local plans and zoning. But the project
is, for the moment, blocked by a stalemate.
Bob Rackleff, meanwhile, is writing
speeches for himself these days. He has be-
come a hot property on the speakers' circuit,
sharing his experiences with other citizens
who have discovered the environmental
dangers and operational shortcomings of
petroleum pipelines.
94 UUDE AWAKENING
FriMik of the Eortli
155
CRUDE AWAKENING: References
Sa Man Ool, •Pipeline Safely: A Leaky Hiuoryr Arpa Lmdfr. Sunday, Febiuary 9, 1992, p. 4-A.
89 See, for exunpte, Minncsou Pollution Control Agency, Water Quality Stipulation Agreements with the Williams Pipeline Company - March 15,
1984, 12 pp; August 23, 1983, pp- 2-5; and Ntovember 28, 1979, pp. 2-7; See alio, Miimesota Pollution Control Agetwy compilation, "Williams Pipeline
Incidents,' 1951-1986, U pp, and, Todd Murphy, "Williams Leaving Trial of Leaks, Spills," Argut-Limkr, May 3, 1987, p 1-A
90 Editorial "Put More Pressure On Pipeline Firm," Argus Imdxr, Februaiy 11, 1992, p 8-A
91. Matt Cecil, "Seun Failures A Long-Slanding PloUeilv* In Special Sectioa "Pipeline Safety: A Leaky History," Arfia Leader, Sunday, February 9, 1992,
p 4-A.
91 Letter to the Editor, 'Effect of Pipeline Spill Can Last Forever," Af;^ haitr, Sunday, March 1, 1992.
93 Lisa Gaumnitz, "City Wants Firm To Move Fuel Pipeline,' Aigut Leaitr, February 19, 1992, p. 3-C
94^ "Committee's 7-Point Flaiv' Arfia Lmia, April 16, 1992.
95. Robert Racklcff, "Out of Lme," EnrnntmBOai Action^ November /December 1991, p. 18
96. William J. LeMay, Director, Oil Conservation Division, New Mexico Department of Energy, Minerals and Natural Resources, Letter to Mr W.J.
Mueller, Phillips Petroleum Company, Odessa, TX September 3, 1991. «
97 Council of Great Lakes Governors, "A White Paper on Protecting the Great Lakes from Spills," September S 991, p. 7.
98. J S. Mandke, "Corrasion Causes Most PipeUne Failures ui Gulf of Mexico," Oil & Gas Imimtl, Oaober 29, 1990, pp40-t4
99. Timothy Egan, 'AlKka Pipeline Faces Costly Work to Stop Rust,' The Nm ror* Tims, March 11, 1990, p 22
100 Timothy Egan, 'Alaska Pipeline Faces Costly Work to Slop Rust,' TV Nm ViMk Tiines, March 11, 1990, p 22
101 US General Accounting Office, Trans- Afasb Pipeline, "Regulators Have not Ensured That Government Requirements Are Being Met," GAO/RCED-
91-89, July 1991, p 23
102. U.S. General Accounting Office, Tnns-AlBia Pipeline, 'Regulators Have not Ensured ThalCovemment Requirements Are Being Met,' GAO/RCED-
91-89, July 1991, p 23.
103. U.S. General Actounbng Office, Trans-A/asAsPipe/ine, "Regulators Have not Ensured That Govenunent Requirements Are Being Me^'CAO/RCED-
91-89, July 1991, p 23
104 U.S. General Accounting Office, Tmns-Atmka Pipdine. 'Regulators Have not Ensured That Government Re(]uirements Are Being Met' CAO/RCED-
91-89, July 199L p. 23
105. US General Accounting Office, Tmns-Altsbi Pipelint, 'Regulators Have not Ensured That Government Requiiemenis Are Being Met,' GAO/RCED-
91-89, July 199L p 27
106 US General Accounting Office, Tmtis-AUaka Piprhne, 'Regulators Have not Ensured That Government Requirements Are Being Met," GAO/RCED-
91-89, July 1991, p 27.
107 US General Accounting Office, Tnins-AJasta Pipeline, 'Regulators Have not Ensured That Government Requirements Are Being Met,' G AO/RCED-
91-89, July 1991, p 27
108 US General Accounting Office, Tniiis-Alasb Pipdine, p 39
109. U.S General Accounting Office, Tmns-Alaska Pipeline, 'Regulators Have not Ensured ThalCovemment Requirements Are Being Met,' GAO/RCED-
91-89, July 1991, p. 2
1 10. U.S. General Accounting Office, Trans-Alaska Pipeline. 'Regulators Have not Ensured That Government Requirements Are Being Met,' GAO/RCED-
91-89, July 199L p 3
HI. Daily News (Anchorage, AK) story ated by the Wilderness Soaety, A Hundred Spills. A Thmtmnd Excuses. March 1990, p.3.
112 Testimony of Robert B. Rackleff, President, Friends of Uoyd, Before the House Subcommittee on Surface Transportation, Committee on Public
Works and Transportation, Hearing on Pipeline Safety Act of 1991, US. Congress, Washington, DC, September 25, 1991, p 11
113 Letter of Jim Pales, City Attorney, Gty of Fredericksburg. Virginia, to Hon. Norman Y.Mineta, Chairman, Subcommittee on Surface Transportation,
Committee on Public Works k Transportation, U.S. House of Representatives, RE H.R. 1489, Pipeline Safety Act of 1991, April 6, 199Z p 2
114 Ibid
115 Ibid.
116 John R. Mastandrea, Projea Summary, 'Petroleum Pipduw Leak Detection Study," US. Envirotunenlal Protection Agency, Research and
Development, Municipal Environmental Research Laboratory, Gncinnati, OH, EPA-6OO/S2-S2-O40 April 1983, p. 1
117 Bill Shrenk, 'Hazardous Liquid Pipeline Safety Act - Regulations and Reports Under the Act But Ntn Completed and Other Questions,' Natural
Resources Defense Council, New York, December 17, 1992, p 3
1 18 Bill Shrenk, 'Hazardous Liquid Pipeline Safety Act - Regulations and Reports Under the Act But Not Completed and Other Questions,' Nahiral
Resources Defense Counal, New York, December 17, 1992, p. 3
119 Matt Cecil, "Safety Offiaal Agency Lacks Funding, Staff," Argus Laider. Sunday. Feoruary 9, 1992, p 4-A '
120. Bill Shrenk, 'Hazardous Liquid Pipeline Safety Act - Regulations and Reports Under the Act But Not Completed and Other Questions," Natural
Resouraes Defense Council, New York, December 17, 1992, p 3
121 Malt CeQl, "Safety Official; Agency Lacks Funding, Staff,' Argus Leader, Sunday, February 9, 199Z p. 4-A
122 Letter of Jim Pates, City Attorney, Gty of Fredericksburg Virginui, to Hon. Norman Y. Mineta, Chairman, Subcommittee on Surface Transportation,
Committee on Public Works li Transportation. US. House of Representatives, RE: RR 1489, Pipeline Safely Act of 1991, April 6, 1992, p 3.
123 George Thurston. Tank Fight Crew From Experience,' Tallahasee Democrat. March 26, 1990, p 1-A.
124 Judith Kimerling, et al. Ammum Crude. Natural Resources Defense Counal, New York, 1991, p 43.
125 Judith Kimerling et al., Amazon Crude, Natural Resources Defense Council, New York, 1991, pp 69-70
126 "Toxic Wasteland.' US. Neas b WtMd Report, April 13, 1992, p 42
127 Remarks of Bob Rackleff, President. Friends of Lloyd, Before the Florida Defenders of the Environment 1991 Statewide Environirwntal Grassrtiots
Networks Forum, Gainesville, FL. November 2, 1991, p. 5.
128. Remarks of Bob Radileff, President Friends of Uoyd, Before the Florida Defenders of the Environment 1991 Statewide Environmental Grassroots
Networks Forum, Gainesville, FL, November 2. 1991, p. 5.
129 Associated Press, 'Pipe Spills Fuel in South CaroUna,' TTie New Yortt Times, December 22, 1991, p. A-30.
130 Julie Hauserman, 'Colonial Pipeline Sues Leon County,' Tallahassee Democrat, August 17, 1991, p. 1-A
Fricsds of the Eaifh is
156
CRUDE AWAKENING: References
Supply Looks Safe." Argta Laider, Febniary 4, 1992, p 2-A; and Steve Young, "Siie of Williams Leak Revised.' Argus later, March 3, 1992
44. 'InlemaDonal Spill Stabstics, 1991," Oil Sptll Inldligma Rtport. March 26, 1992, p 18
45 "Inlernalional Spill Stalisba, 1991." Oil SpUl InUlligaice Rtport, March 26. 1992. p 5
46 Wilderness Soaety. 100 Spills, 1.000 Excuses, March 1990, p 4; and Cutter Information Corp., "international Spill Statistics, 1989-1990," Oil Spill
Inldhgma Report, March 28, 1991. p 11
47 Cutter IrJormation Corp . "International Spill Statisbcs. 1989-1990." Oil Spill Inltlligma Riport, March 28, 1991. p 8
48. National Response Center. U.S. Coast Guard. U,S. Department of Transportation. Washington. D.C. Freedom of Informaoon Act request. Summary
of Reports received by Jack Doyle from 1992 database. Report • 111037. p 103.
49 Cutter Irtformation Corp . "International Spill Statisbcs. 1989-1990." Oil SpUl Inltlligma Report, March 28. 1991, p. 26.
50 'International SpUl Statisbcs. 1991." Oil Spill Inltlligma Rtport, March 26. 1992. p 10
51. Washington State Department of Ecology. News Release. 'U.S. Oil And Texaco Fined For Pipehne Spills.' December 4. 1991, p. 1.
52. Associated Press, "Gas Contaminated Soil Dug Up," Billings Gazjttte, April 22, 1992, and, Assoaated Press. "Missoula Raps Conoco - County Deutands
Oil Company Protect Groundwater," Biflin^ CaitUt, April 25, 1991 ,
53. Associated Press, "Missoula Raps Conoco - County Demands Oil Company Protect Groundwater," Billings 6a2ttte. April 25. 1992
54 Ibid,
55 This account is based on Chuck McCutcheon, "Carlsbad Oil Leak Spreading Concern." Albiufutnfut journal, August 18. 1991, p. F-1, and Chris Shuey,
Director, Community Water (Quality Program, Southwest Research and Informabon Center, Albuquerque, NM "Marathon Indian Basin Gas Plant
Gathering Line Leak - Incident Summary and Recommendabons for Enforcement Acbon," July 16. 1991, 5 pp. (information and data based on
docutnents provided by Marathon to the New Mexico Oil Conservabon Division through July 8, 1991 and on interviews with state and federal officials)
56. Chris Shuey. Director. Community Water Quality Program, Southwest Research and Informabon Center. Albuquerque. NM. "Marathon Indian Basin
Gas Plant Gathering Line Leak - Incident Summary and Recommendabons for Enforcement Action." July 16. 1991. p. 5
57. Chuck McCutcheon, "Carlsbad Oil Leak Spreading Concern," Albiu^uerifut ]oumat. August 18, 1991, p. F-2.
58 Denise Allen Zwicker, "Unseen But Essenbal:
59. Denise Allen Zwicker, "Unseen But Essenbal
60. Denise Allen Zwicker, "Unseen But Essenbal
The Role o( Offshore Pipelines," Tht Lamp (Exxon Corporabon), Winter 1991, pp. 14-19
The Role of Offshore Pipelines," Ttit Lamp (Exxon Corporabon), Winter 1991, pp. 14-19
The Role of Offshore Pipelines," TTir Lamp (Exxon Corporabon), Winter 1991. pp. 14-19
61. Jean Hayes. "Hidden Hazards: Spill Victims Quesbon Pipeline Regulations," TTir Wic(iil» Eagle. Sunday, June 7, 1992. p 1-C
62 Ibid
63. Ibid
64 Ibid
65. Ibid.
66 Ibid
67 Associated Press. "Gas Spill Disastrous to Prime Trout Fishery," Rapid City journal (Rapid City, SD), April 12, 1987
68 Assooaled Press. "Gas Spill Disasbous to Prime Trout Fishery," Rapid City journal (Rapid City, SD), April 12, 1987.
69 Associated Press, "Gas Spill Disastrous to Prime Trout Fishery," Rapiil City journal (Rapid City, SD), April 12, 1987
70 Myron Levin and Traoey Kaplan, "Mobil Hopes To Stem Flow of Pipeline's Problems," Los Angties Times (Valley Edibon), Sunday. July 14. 1991,
and Myron Levin and Tracey Kaplan, 'Pipeline Flawed, But Will New One Be Better?", Los Angeles Times. July 18, 1991, p B-5
71 Myron Levin and Tracey Kaplan, "Pipeline Flawed, But Will New One Be Better?", Los An^ric Times. July 18. 1991. p. B-5: and George Stein, 'Mobil
Decides to Replace 75 Miles of Leaky Pipeline," Los Angties Times. August 29, 1989, p 1.
72 Myron Levm and Tracey Kaplan, "PipeUne Flawed. But Will New One Be Betterr. Los Angela Times, July 18. 1991. p B-5
73 Myron Levin and Tracey Kapla
74 Myron Levin and Tracey Kapla
75. Myron Levin and Tracey Kapla
76 Myron Levin and Tracey Kapla
"Pipeline Flawed, But Will New One Be Better?". Los Angeles Times, July 18, 1991. p B-5
"Mobil Hopes To Stem Flow of Pipeline's Problems," Los Angdes Times (Valley Edition), Sunday, July 14, 1991
"Pipeline Flawed, But Will New One Be Better?", Los Angela Tima. July 18. 1991, p B-5
, "Pipeline Flawed, But Will New One Be Better?", Los Angela Tima, July 18, 1991, p. B-5
77 Amy Pyle, 'Criminal Case Filed Against Mobil Over Pipeline Ruptures," TTit Los Angdes Times. September 9, 1989, p B-1
78 Office of Los Angeles City Attorney James K Hahn, "Hahn Charges Mobil Over Oil Spill Into LA River," News Release, September 8, 1989, pp
2-3
79 Telephone conversabon with Vincent B. Sato, Deputy Qty Attorney, Office of the City AtbDrney, Los Angeles, CA, July 12, 1991. and Sentenong
Documents. Case No. 89R38169. People vs. Mobil Oil Corporation, el a/ . Judge Kwong, January 1, 1989, p. 1.
80 California v. Mobil Oil Corporalion, In The Municipal Court of the Los Angeles Judical Distjia, Country of Los Angeles. State of California. Complaint
Felony, No BA051493
81 George Stem, "Mobil Decides To Replace 75 Miles Of Leaky Pipeline." Los Angdes Times. August 29, 1989. p. B-1
82 Tracey Kaplan, 'Oty OKs First Stage In Replacing Oil Pipeline,' Los Angdes Times, April 12, 1991, p. B-1.
83 Myron Levin and Tracey Kaplan, 'Pipeline Flawed. But Will New One Be Better?", Los Angela Tima, July 18, 1991, p B-5
84 Steve Young, "Williams Blaming Spill on Hairline Crack in Pipe," Argus Leader. January 15. 1992, p 1-C
85 See, for example Charles Laszewski, "Tests Confirm Flaw in Pipeline," and "Perpich Appoints Panel To Study Pipeline Safety," Sf. Vaul Pioneer Press
and Dispatch. July 16, 1986, p. 1-A; Jacqui Banaszynksi, "Dad And Daughter Struggle to Keep Faith in Tomorrow," SI. Paul Pioneer Press and Dispatch,
July 20, 1986, p. 1-A; Paul Gusbifson and Bruce Benidt, "Willianu Dispatcher Knew of Leak 20 Minutes Before Blast," Minneapolis Star and Tribune,
October 23, 1986, p. 1-A; and, Minnesota Department of Energy and Economic Development, Policy Analysis Division, Minnesota Commission on Pipdine
Safely. Findings and Recommendations, December 1986, 55 pp.
86 Todd Murphy, 'Williams Leaving Trail of Leaks, Spills," Argus Under (Sioux Falls, SD), Sunday, May 3, 1987, p 1-A
87. Minnesota Pollution Control Agency, see Water Quality Stipulation Agreements with the Williatns Pipeline Company - March 15, 1984, 12 pp,
August 23, 1983, pp 2-5; and November 28, 1979, pp 2-7, See also, Minnesota Pollution Conool Agency compilation, "Williams Pipeline Incidents,"
1951-1986. 14 pp; South Dakota Department of Water and Natural Resources. "Williams Pipeline Company Sioux Falls Spills." a table lisbng 10 spills
thru April 1987, 1 pp.; Todd Mujphy, 'Williams Leaving Trial of Leaks. Spills," Argus-Leader (Sioux Falls, SD), May 3, 1987, p 1-A
fpradi of the Earth
157
CRUDE AWAKENING: References
3A Cutter In/ommioii Croup, Imernanonal Oil Spill Staushcs, 199i- Oil SpiU IntriligMice Report, March 18, 1993. p 25 )
Chaptcf 6: A CRACK IN THE PIPES
1. U-S. Congras, Slaletnent Before the Subcomnuttee on Energy k Power, House Energy and Commerce Committee, May 22, 1991.
2. Robert RacUeff, "Out of Une," EntTinniineiilaf Achm, November/ December 1991, p 16
3. Author conversations with Bob Rackleff and other sources, induding: Matt Bokot, "Fuel Plan Ignites PR Exec, Tiny Town," TV Mum HotIiI,
November 12. 19», p 6-B; Ceorge Thurston, Tank Fight Crew From Experience," r«n«taB«r DeiKicnii. March 26, 1990, p 1-A, Bob Rackleff, "Fighting
A Hotida Pipeline," Emnniiiinoilaf Adim, November /December 1991, pp 16-17, and Marie loyoe, "Fighting Big Oil" TV Fr<r Lanor-Slar (Fredericksburg,
VA), September 10, 1992, p- D-1
4. See, for example. Remarks of Bob Rackleff, President, Friends of Uoyd, Rorida Defenders of the Environment, 1991 Statewide Environmental
Grassroots Networks Foninv Gainesville, FU November 2. 1991, 16 pp ; Renurks of Bob Rackleff, Friends of Uoyd, The Hidden Dangers of Oil
Pipelines," Environmental Defense Fund CxMifetence on Pollution Prevention to Protect Groundwater; Chicago, L November 17, 1991, 11 pp.; Bob
Rackleff, The Oozing of America," TV W«s)iiii|tim Posl. September 15, 1991. p C-5; and Bob Racklert, "Out of Line," EntnnminCTital Acfion,
November/ December, 1991, pp 15-18
5 US. General Accounting Office, Polluhtm From Ptpc/ina, DOT Lacks Prevention Program and Information for Timely Response, CAO/ RCED-91-60,
January 1991
6 US. General Accounting Office. PMulion From Pipdimj, GAO/RCED-91-60, January 1991, p 1
7 US General Accounting Office, PoHulion Fnmi Pipdina. "DOT Lacks Prevention Program and Infonnation for Timely Response,' GAO/RCED-91-60.
January 1991. p. 2.
8. US. General Accounting Office, Pollulwn From Ptpdina, "DOT Lacks Prevention Program and Information for Timely Response," CAO/ RCED-91-60,
January 1991, p 2
9. Ibid , CAO, January 1991. p 5
10. US General Acn>unting Office. Pollulion From Ptpdines. GAO/RCED-91-60. January 1991. p 3
II /^ssoaauon of Oil Pipelines. Chi Pipdutes o^lV Umlof Slates Pnijnss «iul Outlook. Washington. DC. August 1991, p 7
12. Friends of Uoyd. The Real Colonial Pipeline Record." September 9. 1990. 1 page (based on reports from the US Department of Transportation.
Research k Special Prograim Adnuiustraoon, ColonUI Pipeline Accident Reports, and Office of Pipeline Safety reports)
13 Daryl Lease, "Pipeline Company Disaplined 3 Times," TV Frrc Pros (Fredericksburg, VA). January 6, 1990. p 1
U Robert McQure. XM Spills Endanger Delicate Everglades." Sun Soilinel. March 6. 1990. pp 1-A k 9-A
15 Robert McQure. XM SpUls Endanger Delicate Everglades." Sun Sendnri, March 6, 1990. pp 1-A k 9-A
16. Robert McQure. "Oil SpUls Endanger Delicate Everglades." Sun Soilmtl, March 6. 1990, pp. 1-A k 9-A.
17 Robert McQure. "Oil Spills Endanger DeUcate Everglades." Sun Smlincl. March 6. 1990. pp 1-A ic 9-A
16 Amoco Corporation. Form 10-K (1991), US SecuriUes and Exchange Commission. January 31. 1992, p 6
19 US Securities and Exctiange Commission, Form 10-K, Mobil Corporation. 1991, pp 1, 13. k 38
20- US Securibes and Exchange Commission, Form 10-K, Shell Oil Company, 1991. p 13
21 US Securities k Exchange Commission, Form lO-K. Sun Company. Inc. 1990. p 8
21 Unocal Corporation, Ftjcm 10-K, U.S. Securibes and Exchange Coirunission, 1991, p. 9
23 Leonard Buder, "New York Gty Accuses Exxon of Fraud in Spill." TV Nra Vort Tims. February 8. 1990, p. B-2, and "New York Qty Sues Exxon
Over Oil Spill in January," TV W«J/ SIrtrt \mmul, February 8, 1990. p A-8
24 Leonard Buder, "New York Qty Accuses Exxon of Fraud in Spill." TV Nno Yorik Tims. February 8. 1990, p B-2
25 Allan R. Cold, "Exxon To Pay Up To $15 MiUion for SpUl," TV Nnir Yor* Time. March 15. 1991, p B-1.
26 Patrick Lee, "Al»k«'s OU: New Fuel for Old Debate," TV Loj Angda Tima. September 15. 1991. p. A-10
27 "International SpUl Stalisocs, 1991," OU SpiU Intdhgtm Rifnrt, March 26. 1992. p 8
28 'Intemabonal SpiU SoUltics. 1991." Oil Spill hldligmct Rrport, March 26, 1992. p 15
29 Caleb Solomon, "Shell, A Fallen Champ of Oil Industry, Tries to Regain Its Footing" TV Wdl Sired Imrml, August 30. 1991, p 1
30. WUderness Soaety. 100 SpUla, 1,000 Eicues. March 1990. p 8
31. Unda Shaw k Thom» Guillen. "Major Oil SpiU Cortalled." S<*lllc Time. January 7. 1991. p A-1; Kathy George. "Oil SplU iOfiOO Larger
Than Suspecvd," St*ttlc Pimt- Inldligtxxr, January 8. 1991. Joni Baiter k Thomas Guillen. Inodenl In Tacoma Not First For US Oil."
Sattic Tints. January 8. 1991. p 1, John Ballet, "Finn Mops Spill, But Dirt Goes Unclaimed," SaHIt Tima, January 9. 1991, p B-4, and
Associated Press, "Spill Esbmale Now 600,000 Gallons,' Saltlr Times, January 16. 1991
31 Cutter Information Corp . 'Internauonal Spill Sutisucs. 1989-1990." Oil SpUl Inlrlligma Rrport. March 28. 1991. p 16
33 Daniel Dighton. "Upsute Pipelme Spews Oil." TV Slatt (Columbia. SC), December 21. 1991, p 1. and Associated Press. "Fuel Leaking to Creeks in
Upstate S C." TV Tima-Ntat (Hender-sonvUle. N C) December 21. 1991. p. 5
34 Cutter Information Corp, "International Spill Statistics. 1989-1990." Oii Spill Inlclligmct Report, March 28. 1991, p 3
35 Illinois Environmental Protection Agency. Offiie of Chemical Safety. "Newton Lake Oil Spill." File. DS:syg/sp/1753|/8. 19 pp
36 Cutter Information Corp, "International SpUl Statistics. 1989-1990," Oil Spill InltlligBia Rrport. March 28, 1991, p 23
37. "Oil Transport Une Bursts," Los Angtla Times, April 5, 1989.
38 Cutter Information Corp, "International Spill Statistics. 1989-1990.' OU SpUl InUlligma Rrport. March 28, 1991, p. 21
39 Blooinbeig Business News, "Shell Pipeline Fiiushes Repairs on Ruptured Une," TV Nm York Times, December 1, 1992, p D-5.
40 Cutter Information Cocp, "International Spill Stataoo, 1989-1990," Oil SpiH Inttlligmcc Kifort. March 281 1991, p. 26.
41 WUderness Society, 100 SpiUa^ 1,000 Einiso, March 1990, p 7
42. WUdemeis Society, 100 Spills, 1.000 Exnnea, March 1990.
p 6
43. See, for example. Associated Press. "Fuel Leak Unked to Hairline Crack in Buried Pipe," Rapitf City /ounial (Rapid Cty, SO), January 17, 1992; Carson
Walker. "Bpeline Leak Would Ei^danger Cty Water," Argus Leader (Sioux Falls. SD). January 31. 1992; Carson Walker. "EPA To Evaluate Spill; Water
Fticads Df Ike Eartk 11
158
Mr. BORSKi. The gentlewoman from Virginia.
Ms. Byrne. Mr. Rackleff, I just want to thank you for being here
to show that these concerns are not just Fairfax County or North-
em Virginia or the Washington metropoUtan area. They are truly
national in scope. And as the Congresswoman that represents both
the Texaco Tank Farm and Colonial Pipeline, I can tell you that
your concerns are well founded and I thank you for being here.
Mr. BORSKI. No fiuther questions?
Thank you very much. We appreciate your testimony and we
thank you for coming to Washington to help us out. This sub-
committee hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 4:27 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
[Subsequent to the hearing, additional questions were submitted
to Mr. Rackleff. The questions and responses follow:]
159
Robert B. Rackleff
816 Cherry Street
Tallahassee, Florida 32303
(904) 222-9789
fax (904) 222-5026
June 29, 1993
Honorable Robert A. Borski, Chairman I
Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight
Committee on Public Works and Transportation
U.S. House of Representatives
Suite 2165 Rayburn House Office Building
Washington, D.C. 20515
Dear Mr. Chairman;
I am delighted to respond to the questions in your letter of
June 21, 1993 and welcome the interest of the subcommittee in the
serious problem of pollution from oil pipelines. Let me also
thank you for the opportunity to share my information with the
subcommittee at the May 18 hearing. Besides my written response
in this letter, I request that you also include in the hearing
record the materials I enclose about my sources of data.
Question #1: The Department of Transportation Office of
Pipeline Safety, the National Tranportation Safety Board, the
Environmental Protection Agency, and the General Accounting
Office have all testified that pipelines have the best overall
safety record in terms of transporting petroleum products.
You've asserted that pipelines spill more product than water
carriers, and have stated for the record that your assumption is
based on data which are provided by the Office of Pipeline
Safety. How do you explain this discrepancy?
I assume that when you wrote "safety," you meant the volumes
of leaks and spills rather than public safety as measured in
fatalities and injuries. I stated in my written testimony that
the claims of oil pipelines' superior record were based on flawed
data that seriously undercount the volumes which pipelines spill.
In several telephone conversations later in the week of the May
18 hearing, I confirmed that, indeed, they used these data.
The agencies you mentioned all used pipeline spill data in
the Emergency Response Notification System (ERNS) , which compiles
raw data from reports to the U.S. Coast Guard National Response
Center. For a variety of reasons, pipeline operators do not
report most oil pipeline spills to the Coast Guard, which is
primarily concerned with spills in U.S. waters, and not inland
pipeline spills.
160
Although ERNS data show about twice the number of spills as
OPS data, they seriously undercount the volume of these spills.
As the GAO noted in its 1991 report, "Pollution from Pipelines:
DOT Lacks Prevention Program and Information for Timely
Response," ERNS data show that oil pipelines spill "nearly 20
million gallons" for the years 1980 to 1989. Yet the OPS's
Annual Report on Pipeline Safety for the same years reported
spills of 109,543,640 gallons. ^
I invite you to check my methodology, in which I obtained
all of OPS's annual reports and added up the volume of crude oil
and petroleum products spilled each year. I enclose copies of
the relevant tables showing spills from 1970 to 1992. I obtained
data about spills from tankships and barges from 1973 to 1992
from the Marine Environmental Protection Division, U.S. Coast
Guard, and enclose copies of those tables. To adjust for ton-
miles transported, for a fair comparison, I obtained that data
from the Association of Oil Pipe Lines.
These data show that pipelines spilled 272,015,306 gallons
of crude oil and petroleum products from 1970 to 1992, and that
marine carriers spilled a total of 92,340,884 gallons of crude
oil and petroleum products from 1973 to 1992. Adjusted for ton-
miles transported, pipelines spilled 20,928 gallons per billion
ton-miles and water carriers spilled 9,947 per billion ton-miles.
Thus, pipelines are not the most environmentally compatible mode
of transporting oil.
In the 1988 report. Pipelines and Public Safety, the
Transportation Research Board, National Research Council, used
the same OPS data as I did. It reported on page 2, which I
enclose:
Despite this good [public] safety record, pipeline
operators reported more than 10,000 failures to liquids
and gas transmission and gathering lines between 1971,
the first full year of federal required reporting, and ^
1986, the latest year for which data are available.
These failures resulted in total estimated property
loss of approximately $300 million in 1986 dollars, and
commodity loss of nearly 5 million barrels of crude oil
and petroleum products plus an unguantified amount of
natural gas. [emphasis nine]
Five million barrels are, of course, 210 million gallons.
The Houston Post recently published three articles about
leaking oil pipelines and tank farms which also used the same
data I did. It reported on May 23, 1993 that oil pipelines
"spilled more than twice the 4.6 million gallons tankers and
161
barges spill annually." I enclose a copy of the three articles,
which I request that you reprint in the hearing record.
In the data I have submitted, you may be able to note a fact
which I find astonishing: In 1991 and 1992, one company alone,
Colonial Pipeline, spilled more than did all tankships and barges
throughout the United States in those two years. Colonial
spilled 566,496 gallons, according to OPS incident reports, and
all water carriers spilled 529,693 gallons, according to the
Coast Guard's Marine Environmental Protection Division, in those
two years.
I was also astonished to hear OPS officials at the May 18
hearing claim that pipelines are more environmentally compatible
than other modes of transporting oil, because they have
previously stated that they have not studied the data and have
never drawn such conclusions. In a letter to me on March 16,
1992, Travis Dungan, Admnistrator, Research and Special Programs
Administration, stated,
In Congressional hearings and various
publications, we have characterized pipelines as "one
of the safest modes of transportation" and have
referred to the "excellent safety record of pipeline
transportation." These assertions have been made in
relation to safety (e.g., number of fatalities and
injuries) and not environmental protection (e.g.,
number of barrels lost) . To my knowledge, no one from
RSPA has ever made a claim that pipelines offer the
most environmentally compatible method for
transportation of petroleum. [emphasis mine]
On April 17, 1992, George W. Tenley Jr., Associate
Adminstrator for Pipeline Safety, wrote to me that the Florida
Energy Pipeline Association had falsely cited the U.S. Department
of Transportation as the source of data which the FEPA stated
showed the superior spill record of oil pipelines. Tenley wrote:
We did not recognize the statistics in the article
and called the FEPA Executive Director to determine the
source. He, in turn, referred us to the contributing
author who, upon checking, acknowledged the statistics
were not from DOT but from a brochure published by the
Association of Oil Pipelines. . . .
To avoid any further confusion, we are requesting
the FEPA Executive Director to issue a retraction in
the next issue of the newsletter. . . .
With respect to the assertions in the article, we
cannot at this time categorically confirm or deny them.
162
since the statistics are not from DOT data bases, we
would have to undertake a significant amount of
validation, analysis, and interpretation to arrive at
any responsible conclusions. [emphasis nine]
I enclose copies of the letters quoted above and request that you
reprint them in the hearing record. If the Office of Pipeline
Safety has carried out the "significant amount of validation,
analysis, and interpretation" necessary to justify its claim at
the May 18 hearing, I would appreciate receiving such documents
to review and comment on. '
Having stated that OPS data about oil pipeline spills are
more accurate than the ERNS data, let' me hasten to add that the
OPS data also undercount these spills, albeit less than the ERNS
data. As a result, the data are deeply flawed as a basis for
policy development or public information. For example, there is
no way of knowing whether a pipeline operator's good record at
OPS is genuine or a result of underreporting the volume of spills
or not reporting them at all.
This is partly because the OPS in 1984 inexplicably relaxed
its reporting requirements so that it now requires hazardous
liquids pipeline operators to report spills or leaks of more than
2,100 gallons (50 barrels), or that involve $5,000 or more in
property damage or injury or death; the previous requirement was
to report all spills over 210 gallons (five barrels) .
As a result, the average number of liquids pipeline spills
reported to OPS was fewer than half the 391 annual average spills
compiled by the GAO. Note also that the GAO reported on spills
in U.S. waters only, while the OPS data are supposed to reflect
all spills, inland or in U.S. waters.
Moreover, the GAO reported in 1987 that few pipeline
companies complied fully with even the relaxed OPS reporting
requirements and that the OPS was unable to monitor compliance
with reporting requirements. The GAO was unable to determine the
full extent of this underreporting. Other problems, as noted in
1990 by an OPS official in conversation with me, are pipeline
companies which underreport the size of spills, and failure to
revise reported spill volumes upward after their initial report.
As one test of OPS data accuracy, we compared the number of
reported spills at OPS with known data about a crude oil pipeline
which traverses the Florida Everglades. The Florida Department
of Natural Resources has on file approximately 40 spills by
Sunniland Pipeline; the OPS has two on file.
There are even more glaring omissions, such as a leak in a
Marathon Oil pipeline near Carlsbad, New Mexico. It leaked 1.47
163
million gallons of unrefined natural gas condensate and 840,000
gallons of contaminated waste water between November, 1990, and
April, 1991, according to the New Mexico Oil Conservation
Division. The pipeline was so poorly operated that Marathon had
not even installed flov neters at both ends, which would have
detected such a passive leak. And because this was a gathering
line deregulated by OPS in 1984, it was never included in the OPS
spill data; it never happened, according to the OPS. I enclose a
copy of a report about this leaX and request that you reprint it.
I also enclose a letter from the New Mexico Oil Conservation
Division expressing its concern about the growing problem of oil
pipeline leaks because of corrosion. ; "Also," the letter states,
we have reason to believe that the reported spills represent only
10 to 50% of actual leaks. I request that you reprint it.
Another recent, but unreported, leak occurred in Winkler
County, Texas, in which a Texaco gathering line leaked almost
750,000 gallons of crude oil on a remote ranch on January 24,
1989. Because the pipeline was deregulated by OPS in 1984, this
spill never happened, according to OPS data. I enclose a copy of
a Texas Monthly article about this spill and request that you
reprint it.
In short, the inadequate data on pipeline spills are a
serious shortcoming which distort the safety and environmental
record of petroleum pipelines and thereby impair objective
analyses of risks and the development of policies to reduce those
risks. An important step forward would be to require pipeline
operators to report all spills of one gallon or more, and to
require these reports from all oil pipelines, including those,
such as gathering lines, which have been unregulated.
As for the federal agencies you list in the question, I hope
that you require them to submit documents which support their
assertion that pipelines are the most environmentally compatible
mode of transporting fuel. I would like to obtain those
documents and comment on them.
Question #2: In your testimony you state that the Coast
Guard severely underestimates the amoxint of oil spilled by
pipelines. On whose data do you base your figures for the amount
of oil spilled by water carriers?
As I wrote in answer to question fl, the ERNS data report
that oil pipelines spilled "nearly 20 aillion gallons," as noted
by the 1991 GAO report. Yet the OPS's Annual Report on Pipeline
Safety for the same years reported spills of 109,543,640 gallons.
164
The data for oil spilled by water carriers come from tables
compiled by the Marine Environmental Protection Division, U.S.
Coast Guard. The reports are enclosed.
The materials I submitted in answer to question #1 are the
primary sources from which 1 obtained these data.
Question #3: How do the product recovery anoimts compare
for pipeline and water carrier spills?
I
I have no data about this, but would be delighted to review
and comment on any you may have.
However, you question raises an important consideration,
which is that where pipelines spill and leak can be more
important than how much they spill and leak. Pollution from
pipelines and water carriers both are serious problems, but we
must remember that pollution from pipelines primarily
contaminates fresh water while water carriers primarily
contaminates salt water.
Pipelines primarily leak and spill underground ,. on land, and
on inland waters, immensely complicating cleanup efforts and
jeopardizing vital water supplies for municipal, industrial, and
agricultural users. At a time, when our nation must turn
increasingly to groundwater sources for our water, it is growing
more important than ever to protect groundwater from pollution.
This concludes my response to your questions.
To the three you asked, I would add a fourth question, Is
there a safe way to transport oil? The answer is no, that all
modes of transporting oil cause pollution, and Congress must help
prevent this pollution at every opportunity. This is one of
those opportunities.
Again, I appreciate the opportunity to share my information
and hope that the subcommittee takes decisive action to remedy
this serious problem.
Sincerely yours,
:obert B. Rackleff ff
165
COMPARATIVE SPILLS AND LEAKS BY PIPELINE AND WATER CARRIERS
OF OIL AND PETROLEUM PRODUCTS IN THE UNITED STATES, 1970-92
BY VOLUME AND TON-MILES TRANSPORTED
Pipeline
Water
Water Carrier
Pipeline 1/
Ton-Miles 2.1
Carrier 2/
Ton-Miles
Y^ar
Spills faals)
m
Lllions)
SDills foals)
fbillionsi
1970
22,097,418
n/a
n/a
n/a
1971
9,805,362
n/a
n/a
n/a
1972
14,462,700
475.8
n/a
330.0
1973
15,727,404
507.0
4,404,390
296.8
1974
12,127,962
506.0
3,535,385
297.0
1975
13,312,614
507.0
11,296/669
298.0
1976
10,060,722
515.0
11,018,486
306.9
1977
9,403,338
546.0
1,769,202
333.3
1978
11,779,530
585.0
3,569,813
530.6
1979
22,900,248
608.3
3,352,052
522.9
1980
12,005,238
588.2
3,335,011
617.8
1981
8,588,622
563.7
5,369,100
617.2
1982
9,214,926
565.7
3,366,433
616;9
1983
16,020,942
556.1
1,953,673
630.5
1984
12,008,010
568.1
7,152,367
.570.7
1985
7,065,702 4/
564.3
4,417,032
• 590.4
1986
11,756,850
577.9
3,031,437
568.1
1987
15,341,634
586.8
2,222,546
.566.5
1988
9,089,640
601.1
4,034,490
543.7
1989
8,452,076
584.2
12,126,258
466.2
1990
5,206,656
583.8
5,857,070
454.5
1991
9,196,530
n/a
n/a
n/a
1992
6,391,182
n/a
n/a
n/a
Total
272,015,306
10
,590.0
91,811,414
9.158.0
Average
11,827,242
557.4
5,100,634
482.0
Avg Gals 21,207
10,355
Spilled
per
Billion
Ton-Miles
XI Source: Annual Report of Pipeline Safety (for years 1978-90),
Office of Pipeline Safety, U.S. Department of Transportation; 1991
data from OPS letter of March 16, 1992.
2/ A ton-mile is movement of a ton of cargo one mile. Source:
Annual Reports on Shifts in Petroleum Transportation, Association of
Oil Pipe Lines.
3/ Water Carriers are tankships and tank barges. Spills were in
U.S. waters. Source; Oil Pollution Incidents, Marine Environmental
Protection Division, U.S. Coast Guard.
4/ Annual pipeline spill totals from 1985 to present reflect OPS
change to require reports for spills of more than 2,100 gallons.
Until 1985, reports were required for spills of more than 210 gallons.
Prepared by the Friends of the Aquifer, Tallahassee FL, May 13, 1993
166
1992 auNuer ce ueuto pipojie
lUCIDCVT SUWMY IT
CAUSE 1
• or
iwaaeea
TOXM.
«.91
tacT
2,«3S
ESTihATO
WKPCTTT
U«MS
Sl.*a,1«B
xor
TOTAL
2-fr
FATALITIlt
IMJUttFS
Internal CarreBlen
11
Ixtamtl Cerrwfcn
it
».19
39^1«
rtS ,732,980
2«.e
Defactiv* U»ld
15
«.7t
si.wr
«.876,Aa8
4,te
Ineerr«ct Opcratien
14
7.U
5,271
SI ,523.566
tut
Dafacttv* Kpa
11
A.91
7,«a
«i,na,i«6 .
2.15
Outside OiMoa
«1
18 JO
«0,Q54
n.113,S73
12.82
Naif, cf Equipaant
10
A.M
8,2S8
e,3SS.250
3.72
0
Other
86
Z2U
38 J9
IOC. 00
27.2S0
"iS2,sei
S29,<98.8W
46.ra
28
TOTAL
*63,7m^,230
100.00
SB
iMciDBn gtaauLiY rr eowiootTr
* OF
CSMCOITT INCIDEVTS
XOF
TOTAL
■AUELS
LOST
I i.>ATS)
P>:t»'E«TT
OMAflCS
X OF
TOTAL
0.01
FATALITIK 1
1
INJUS
AnhydrajB Anenia
S
2.23
410
S,955
i
ConaanHtt
1
0U4
C
SO
0.00
0
c
Cruda Oil
81
S6.16
«7,618
S49. 100.232
77.60
1
\
Diesel fuel
11
4.91
2,220
S433,S00
0.69
0
2
ttn... Anen. litr.
0
0.00
0
SO
0.00
0
0
jvi on
17
7.59
4,522
82,811.898
4.44
0
0
uk&»Une
49
21.88
36,792
S5,735.817
9.10
0
0
Jet ruel
U
SJ6
4.317
S900.000
1.42
0
0
iCeroaane
A
1.79
348
126,000
0.04
0
0
L.P.6.
■11
4.91
11,132
(881,750
U9
3
31
Natural Ces Liquid
11
4.91
14,936
S2.4U,578
3.82
0
2
on «^ oaeolfne
S
2.2S
S9S
890,000
o.u
0
0
leluane
1
0.4A
400
&23.000
0J&
0
0
Tjrfoine Fuel
7
3.13
2.465
S217.600
0J4
0
0
VarieuB Petrel Proc
7
3.13
6.775
S312.100
0.49
0
0
Xylene
2
224
0.89
100.00
291
SIOO.OOO
0.16
0
0
TOTAL
152.581
863.274,230
100.00
5
38
167
©
ANNUAL REPORT ON PIPELINE SAFETY
Calendar Year 1991
Research ana
Specai Prog'STis
Aamtnisvahon
PrepaieO fry
U S Depanmem o' Transponanon
Research ana Special Programs AOmmistraiion
OHice ol Pipelir)e Safety
Washington D C 20S90
168
Table 13
Hazardous Liquid Pipeline Accidents Reported in 1991
by Cause
20 48%
27.14%
□ Outside Damage j
0 External Corrosion '
0 Internal Corrosion j
n Incorrect Operation |
Q] Defective Weld
Q Defective Pipe
B Equipment Malfunction j
D Other
1
Cause
Accidents
Barrels
Lost
Property
Damage
Deaths
Injuries 1
Outside Damage
46
48,305
$8,555,831
0
0
External Corrosion
43
10,334
$1,427,659
0
0
Internal Corrosion
19
38.966
$494,100
0
0
Incorrect Operation
12
5,375
$127,973
0
5
Defective Weld
11
4,809
$7,927,500
0
0
Defective Pipe
11
30,576
$2,177,433
0
0
Equipment Ma/funct
on
11
1 1 ,072
$56,478
0
0
Other
57
69,796
$4,187,105
0
3
Total
210
219,233
$24,954,079
0
8
49
169
Table 15
Summary of Liquid Pipeline
Accident Reports (DOT Form 7000-1)
Received in 1991
Cemmodlly
# of
Incldanta
% of
Tetll
B«rr*l»
Loit
Property
Damag*>
* ol
TeUI
D»ths
ln|url*> 1
A..,.,.
0
0.00
0
$0
000
0
I
° 1
Anhydrous Ammonia
s
4.29
268
$30,209
0 12
0
Condensaie
2
0 95
77
U25.000
0.90
0
0 1
Crude Oil
go
42 S6
146382
$17,707,932
70,96
0
0
Ditsel Puel
13
E IS
9477
$1,677,048
7 52
0
0
Ftrl. Ammon Nitr
0
000
0
$0
000
0
0
Fu«l Oil
23
10.95
28836
$1,144,653
4.59
0
°
Gasoime
2S
1334
6177
$2,724,267
10.92
0
0
Jet Fuel
2
095
166
$34,350
0 14
0
0
Ke-osene
2
095
1702
$40,500
016
0
0
L PG
13
eie
140S2
$283,900
114
0
0
.5-, ^'31 Gas Liquid
20
9 52
7704
$329,020
1,32
0
4 i
■ :. Gasoline
0
0.00
0
$0
000
0
3
..i.ne
0
0.00
0
$0
0.00
0
0
Turbine Fuel
2
095
2411
$329,000
1-32
0
° P
Various Petrol Proa
3
1 43
26
$16,000
006
0
° 1
Xylene
3
1 43
1901
$212,000
065
0
° 1
Total
210
100.00
219233
$24,»S4.079
100.00
0
J
51
170
Table 14
Summary of Hazardous Liquid Pipeline
Incident Reports Received in 19iK)
Summary by Commodity
psKsm
for
IKtpfUS
tOF
IWHLS
PaOFCITT
xor
TOT*L
BCATg
IIJMUQ
Alkyat*
0.00
0
t 0
0.00
Artiydrout Maoii*
0.S6
2.622
100.000
0.64
•utane
1.13
2,600
66,000
0.42
Condensate
0.S6
UO
0
0.00
Crude OM
91
51.41
66,8M
8.256.629
52.88
Diesel Fuel
5.0B
S,697
1,661.450
10.64
Fert., Mmon. Ritr.
O.DO
0
0
0.00
Fuel on
IS
8.«7
5.922
319,000
2.04
Gasoline
27
15.25
16,906
1,979,327
12.68
Jet Fuel
2.26
2,790
1,689,000
10.82
Keroaane
0.00
0
0
0.00
L.P.C.
IB
10.17
6,329
1,169,039
7.49
natural Cas Liquid
2.82
9.400
211,492
1.35
Oil and Gasoline
0.56
2
50,000
0.32
Toulene
0.00
0
0
0.00
Transaix
1.13
2.506
12,500
0.08
Turbine Fuel
0.56
20
100,000
0.64
Xylene
_fi
9.99
9
0
.9^29
J
J
TOTM.
177
99.M
123.908
•15,614,437
100.00
s
7
49
171
SMWRT OF HAZARDOUS LICUID PIPELINE
INCIDENT SEPOITS RECEIVED IN 1989
suNMrr rr cawxiTi
COMUDITT
f or
INCIDENTS
XV
TOTAL
BARELS
LOST
PBOPEsrr
DAMAGES
X OF
^ TOTAL
DEATHS
INJURIES
— Alkyate
0
0.00
0
SO
0.00
0
0
Anhydrous Aamonia
1
0.62
1
: to
0.00
0
1
.— Condensate
1
0.62
40
$26,000
0.36
0
0
^ Crude Oil
68
42.24
117,082
S3, 352, 568
46.27
0
, 2
y^ Diesel Fuel
7
4.35
3,511
S253,740
3.50
0
0
Fert . , Anmon.
Nitr. 0
0.00
0
SO
0.00
. tr
0
^ Fuel Oil
11
6.83
3,550
$536,196
7.40
0
0
^ Gasoline
40
24.84
18,113
$1,029,220
14.21
2
32
Jet Fuel
2
1.24
2,037
$56,920
0.79
0
0
, — Kerosene
2
1.24
5,1|0
$79,600
1.10
0
0
--' L.P.G.
IS
9.32
19,239
$1,450,678
20.02
1
0
^_ natural Gas Liqui
d 11
6.83
27,432
$451,743
6.24
0
3
^- Oi 1 and Casol
ine
I
0.62
75
$3,500
0.05
0
0
^ Toulene
1
0.62
211
$5,000
0.07
0
0
^ Turbine Fuel
1
0.62
4,843
$0
0.00
0
0
Xylene
0
0.00
0
$0
0.00
_0
_0
TOTAL
^^'^161/ 100.00
201,244 $7,245,165
100.00
3
38
Cl-^H
'^
?,^r2,2o^
su
/S, Z'^i, C3"/ 's-r
172
o o o o
O Ol o-
1 2
!
B
i
i
m
Sooooooooo'o^
o oi rtj
si
O ^ » g- O
"■ s ^-^
^ to
n i ..
lA S> i?» o * SS o o -; « o
•- «-! O
*- o ol o
o o •-
O'OO''^"*®*'^
& s
£ i i 5 : - 5 ^ $ 2 .
1 I I I £ t X s : ! ^
■ — S 3 ">■
o •- •- *<
52
173
TIBLB 12
satiAXS or uqdid rz?iLiD
IKIDKKT DSPOBTS (DOT POEM TOOCI)
nCCTB) POB 1987
imaoT sataxi m comoditx
(BASED Oi lODIT COKPLKTE) V22/S8}
CIDSE
# OF
lUCIDEKTS
S OP
TOTAL
BARRELS
LOST
DEATHS
iijimiss
Alkyate
0
0.00 .
0
0
0
A&bydrouB Aaoosla
0
0.43
2
0
1
Condensate
1
0.*3
1,500
0
0
Crude Oil
1U
«8.51
118,299
0
$
Slasel Fuel
12
5.11
6,081
0
0
1
0.43
110
0
0
Fuel Oil
17
7.23
5,*21
0
0
Gasoline
51
21.70
31,933
0
2
Jet Fuel
3
1.28
3,602
0
2
Kerosene
0
0.00
0
0
0
L.P.C.
15
6.38
146,483
0
1
natural Cas Liquid
U
5.96
43,132
0
3
Oil and Gasoline
2
0.85
250
0
0
Toluene
0
0.00
0
0
0
Turbine Fuel
4
1.70
1,576
0
0
TOTAL
235
100.00 365,389
0»
17
* There Mre 3 fttalitles as a rasult of an ineideat IsTolTlaf an iatra-
state operator for wbleb a wrlttao report, as required by Section 195.54,
was Bot filed.
■:^r, 2 77
.K^ ^^-r 57 '
/i-^wWic^ >2?4^
/=, ^"^i: Cji
174
Tabic*
SVMMARV Of UQUID nTEUNC WaDENT REPORTS RECEIVED IN 19U
( ACaOENT SVMMAAY BY CAUSE
No. 0/
Cant* iHCidtna
Toial
• o/
Toitl
Dtaihs Injurits
Iniemal Corrotion
ExternaJ Corrosion
Dtfeciivt Weld
Incorrtci Operwion
Defective Pipe
Outside Damage
Malf. or Equipment
Olher
II
S.42
6.n3
39
19.21
24.134
S
3.94
3.r74
12
S.91
27.073
16
7.g|
23.B13
66
32.SI
92.IM
4
1.97
494
47
23.13
)00.7M
S 20.933
S 1.974.911
S 1,724,962
S MJ6I
S 643Jt3
S 4.073.929
S 700,000
S 3.923.073
.14
I3.0(
11.43
J3
4.27
26.91
4.64
39 J3
0
0
^
2
2
1
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
29
TOTAL 203 100.00
279.925
$15,097 J«l
100.00
3
32
INODEVr SUMMARY BY COMMODfTY
No. of » o/
Commodiif lnadt%a Toll
Lea
Pnptrty
Damttta
TofI
Dnihs
Injuhtt
Alkyate
0
.00
xo
0
0
Crude Oil
lot
53.20
113.724
$ (.232.614
54.53
0
3
Gasoline
38
18.72
98,377
$ 2.924 JOO
19.37
2
27
Natural Gas Liquid
17
8.37
I5.70S
S lJ26,2lt
1.12
I
2
Fuel Oil
4.43
5.042
731.625
4.83
0
0
L.P.C.
3.45
19.619
S4.533
.56
0
0
Jet Fuel
.99
552
50.000
M
0
0
Diesel Fuel
14
6.90
20JS4
1.636.721
10.84
0
0
Anhydrous Ammonia
.00
.00
0
0
Kerosene
.49
320
150
.00
0
0
Turbine Fuel
1.41
•06
151,000
1.00
0
0
Oil and Gasoline
.49
i.no
14,000
.09
0
0
Condensate
.99
3.693
33J00
J2
0
0
Fen., Ammon. Nitr.
.00
.00
0
0
TOTAL
203
100.00
279,925
$15,097 J61
100.00
3
32
37
175
Table 7
SUMMARY OF LIQUID PIPELINE INCIDENT REPORTS RECEIVED IN 1985
TOTAl.
1M.457 S.U2.M7
-;^^iVMHAR\ BY CAUSE
r*>. »/
«o/
Laa
Total
»o/
Cmut
ywrimc
Total
/Bamb)
Demaiaiti
ToiqI
Dtaihs
Injuries
1„IB1>»I Cono5)OD
16
8.74
4.302
83.670
1.63
0
1
jjojnjil Conwioo
38
20.76
26,808
1.089.399
21.22
0
0
Defective Weld
0
.00
0
< 0
.00
0
0
iBCorrect Openuon
15
8.20
19.805 •
1.619.500
31.55
0
1
Otleca"' Pip*
8
4.37
23.032
316.000
6.16
0
0
Ouisde DiiM»e
52
28.42
55.622
817J73
15.93
1
3
ma of Equipment
2
1.09
9S6
29.250
.57
0
0
Oibcr
S2
28.42
39.032
I. 177.255
22.94
4
13
5,aD£.VT Sl-MMAIIY BY COMMODITY
No. of
liKUknu
Total
Loa
(BarrHU
Total
DamattUI
Total
0
.00
0
0
.00
93
50.81
76.132
2.389.915
46.56
46
25.14
23.336
665.638
12.97
11
6.01
26.704
50.799
.99
4.92
5J86
547.405
10.66
4.92
29.027
285.930
5.57
2.19
2.218
1.153.150
22.46
2.73
2.712
10.100
.20
1.09
226
500
.01
1.09
1.299
29,010
.57
.55
100
200
.01
0
.00
0
0
.00
0
.00
0
0
.00
1
.55
I.4I7
0
.00
1M.457 S,132,«47
27
176
Table 7
SUMMARY OF UQUID PIPEUNE INCIDENT REPORTS RECEIVED IN 1984
ACCIDENT SUMMARY BY CAUSE
So. 0/
Accufenrs
Taui
Damates
Deaths
Cauit
Loss
fBvrels)
Carritr
Otktr
Total
Injuries
Iniemal ConosioB
11
5.42
6.126
48.040
2,700
50,740
0
0
External Corrosion
38
18.72
33.403
11.977
8J00
20,177
0
0
Defective Weld
S
2.46
1.826
1.510
550
2,060
0
0
Incorrect Operation
12
5.91
11.001
3,000
9.oqb
12.000
0
0
Defective Pipe
7
3.45
5.810
11,115
2,800
13.915
0
0
Equip. Rupi. Line
53
26.11
53.235
79.621
677,020
756,641
0
18
Other
77
37.93
180.725
4,025,732
■ 552,570
4,578.302
0
1
TOTAL
103
100.00
292,126
S4,1S0,995
SI. 252.840
SS.433,83S
0
19
So. cf
Acadms
Total
Domatt
Deaths
Commodity
Loss
(Barrels/
Carritr
Other
Total
Injuries
Alkyate
1
.49
3.900
600
8.000
8.600
0
0
Crude Oil
102
50 J5
178.847
3,967.498
367.770
4.335,442
0
2
Gasoline
3$
17.24
33.951
99,197
400.450
499,882
0
12
Natural Gas Liquid
17
8.37
37.763
r,791
180.600
208,391
0
5
Fuel Oil
18
8.87
10,124
14,459
6.250
21,269
0
0
L.P.G.
5
2.46
8.703
35,666
275,700
311,366
0
0
Jet Fuel
5
2.46
2,926
2,423
1,520
3,943
0
0
Diesel Fuel
11
5.42
7.339
2,411
9,550
11,961
0
0
Anhydrous Ammonia
3
1.4«
6.221
25,100
1.500
27,287
0
0
Kerosene
2
.98
416
0
0
0
0
0
Turbine Fuel
1
.49
55
1,500
0
1,500
0
0
Oil and Gasoline
1
.49
1.543
0
0
0
0
0
Condensate
2
.98
338
4.350
1.500
5,850
0
0
TOTAL
203
IW.OO
292.126
$4,1*0,995
$1,252,840
SS.43S.S35
0
19
26
177
Table 9
SanavT of UqoM PIpHlDe Uddetl Reportt RcetiTcd la 1N3
ACCIDCNT SUMMABV BY CAUSE:
No of
»o/
Lob
*o/
Amdtna
Toul
Ctrrwr
Oititr
Toul
Teul
InirrntI Corroiion
11
«.n
t.m
*t.«90
5.700
M.390
.77
Ejnenift] Corroooa
33
a).5o
10740:
13,621
46J33
60.576
.16
D«fecti«c Weld
1
^
«.7O0
BCD
ijat
JJOO
.08
Incorrect OperiuoB
9
5J»
LOS*
3.320
«.no
Ita20
.12
Defeaive Pipe
5
3.11
<.602
i.633
10.100
11.733
J7
Equip Rupi. Line
50
31.06
71.355
57.906
1.903.926
1.9».t32
21 ja
Other
32
3i.30
17«J67
4.630.133
265.450 .
4.193.513
69.62
3M47< 4.7i3.]t3 2061331 7.S32.034
ACCIDENT SUMMARY BY COMMODITY:
.VO 0/
• 0/
Lm
*o/
Ctfuir or Commodity
Aecidna
Tout
Camrr
OtHtr
Toal
Toul
Alkyue
0
.00
0
0
0
0
.00
Crude Oil
73
43.34
111.542
4.241.673
217.355
4.536.030
64.51
Cuoline
30
11.63
16.761
r7.662
54.370
332.032
4.72
NaiuriJ Gu Liquid
11
6.13
93.335
1.503
1.733.504
1.734.504
24.67
Fuel Oil
7
4.35
3.701
7.70O
7.100
14.100
.21
L.P.G
16
9.94
49.126
26.306
175.505
201,111
2.17
Jet Fuel
5
3.11
695
6.409
2.100
1.509
.12
Diexl Fuel
9
5.59
16.910
103. I9>
600
105.791
1.50
Aahydrouj Ammonii
2
1.24
3.219
700
2.400
3.100
.04
Kerotese
3
1.U
555
S3. 000
0
13.000
1.11
Turbine Fuel
2
1.24
l.7»
3.100
5.000
lO.UO
.15
Zni uid Cuolise
1
.62
95
0
0
0
.00
Condeuaie
2
1J4
111
150
1.5X
1.650
.02
TOTAL
* Percenuies Rounded
3*4470 4.7(3.103 2JttJ31 7.032.134
28
178
TABLE 11
SWORT OF l.l-siun> TIPELINE ACCIDENT RTPORTS RECEIVED IK 1982
«.'.•:.'■:'•• i.—^'' I' C»u5r:
Kc. b' 1 ef» l«s I oft Duu» 1 of« BtilbiU InjuiitUt.
.:i.=:.;i.:c»«DiU» iccideLts.lotiJ .iiiiitii: ItUl Cuuix Bli«i IflliJ IoUJ.Jitl.J(oo*»il-aitl-«ODt»i;
;»:.■(«-. lO«-:;;> k t-v>. ii.w i.i> ?».;'i n.«f «.B7i z.bj « o o c
ti-.r;i.i. co'-;f:c»« « ;i.x 3:.^4i m.w moo: k.ioc ?«.3c: i.tb o o c «
TEri-TU'C ilELP « J. 00 lOiBSO 4.»0 13.376 1.600 H.97B J.Ol 0 0 0 0
>v-i::- orffi-;9»- g ^.rip . 9,M" 4.J6 ;56.400 5.500 241. WO 17. 4» 0 0 0 P
H'ir-M '.•: 7 :.M 7.455. 3. J' 4,1»0 1.500 5.490 .36 0 0 0 C
i:-.". fj=". i^E 4f 34.:; w.ti* «:.f? :i:3n 241.170 47;.i4e Ji.?3 0 1 0 : '
y.ri: Z: 26. ft M.5~° r« V Vt'^il 244,290 657,121 44.38 0 0 0 C "
»::;. 25C lOC.f; 221.«1! lOO.OO ni.760 55B.770 1.4M.530 100.00 0 10c
•o. tf 1 cM losi I of! Jtnuti 1 ofi — Dtttbstt loj^znill.
.lolal IoUl..t»l..llaonil.^tLl..liaaeti:
c:. "I D'"i
.(•
p
0
P
.00
0
0
•l.CO
i2f.t:;
j-.t;
324.015
204. 05P
530.065
35.80
0
0
I".:'
4-.?:
:c.:3
2".2P
B-O'C
35.28-
:.3E
0
c
:.o:
1,34-
1.51
250.003
0
250.0C'3
16.8^
0
0
( -Ct
».l'-
?-
r«-"5
19.40C
44.J»5
3. OP
t
::.'•
:?•;■'*
ir,.;?
i4!,t!.r
101 -450
247.ir:
14.6'
0
0
:■•::
1-4:
1.217
0
1.213
.oe
0
0
l.i'
:-.:-3i
1.(1
2.615
50t
3.14S
.21
0
0
2.0"
:.oc'
.»!
700
1.300
2.000
.14
0
0
1.50
1.58;
.71
123.B00
214.000
339.800
22.95
0
0
.00
0
.00
0
0
0
.00
0
0
:.o;
lv.4-4
♦.■J
21.5P<.
4.000
27.500
1.86
0
0
.00
r,
.00
0
0
0
.00
0
0
Vi. 2C-: lOO-O: 221.4:1 10c. OO 921.740 558-770 1.480.530 100.00 0
27
179
T«bl« 14
Liquid Plp*»n« AccM*nt SitmiMFy ky Cm(M— 1M1
Cause
(Btrr»at
Canal
OM'
Tott.
S of CMrrmr Non CMrrier Nor
Toul £mplo/9es EmptoyBes Emp/oyees Empioyees
Inltrnal Corrosion
Exltmal Corrosion
?«l*Cllv« WtIO
Incorroct Operation
0«f*citv« Pee
Equv Rupi Lnc
Oliwi
4«6 7.ME 3}2 ^%aeaa 4.000 197.600
M90 209TO S7S 106.076 127.450 233.S26
\B7 6J01 i»* 282 50.000 S0282
668 11.589 540 600450 61.000 661.850
4.60 6.900 3.22 10J88 2.275 13.163
4142 111488 5219 1*03.672 1.777^60 3*80.922
2385 49«40 2315 372.710 27.575 400.285
377
4 46
7058
7 64
TOTAl.
7» 100M 214JM IWJte *,1(M7* UHtiM UWMt 1WJ«
Tabtel5
muU Plp«lln« AecM«nt Summary by C»mm«4lty— 1981
froptny DlTitgt (Si
Lots
(Btrme)
Carrier
Omar
Tola/
S of Carrier Non Carriei Not
Total Emptoiaas Employaas Empioyaas Emptoyaes
4812
1955
5 02
4 60
14 64
12€
76559
30*03
31*46
7S85
46.974
2.799
1541
35 57 1*74*96 971.125 2*46.121
1457 I3S.132 740*50 880.082
14*0 396440 160.800 557540
3 72
21*1
7*56
637538
7.000 14*56
54.375 691*13
6,146
10*71
5655
16.80
1064
58
44.000
tOJOOD
47.850
60.0X
Conoensaie
2
84
1^52
C3 21*99 500 22.199
42 0
0
0
0
TOTAL
a»
1MM
214484
laUQ l,1U^n 2;»48*W MIT*2i
10U0 1
4
s
27
.40
180
TMM 16
Liquid PIpcirn* Accident Summary by CommodltiM Invohrad For th« Y«ar 1980
-»-<t
Lm
Tmt
fnfmtyOmmXU
AMt «v«mf
Oliiiw Aeatmt
Omrm Omm r«K
• «/■
■ttml
Cmntr Mn C^Twr Mot
C«w^itu ri»tijM Cmfitmi Emficma
tm m» \n.TTr
4M1» 4MIM4 tTIMO
A.-iny«eui
Ouoiin*
0>«neauo>«*
0—m fiim
Conoanuw
LPG
NQl.
unknown
Ui«
1 1
7J
MO
173
joarr
104
J.17SJ67
3»7«70
357X23»
•.m
J4
602
0
608
2J«2
1
.•^
45300
- 46.170
tjDOO
2«
«M
0
■ S34
2**1
10
5131
4550
9M1
a.rt3
30
65 9M
2525
66«13
75
00
0
0
0
S0.M1
17«
172236
277.760
45ao'<«
2o.n»
7J
153531
125556
27».067
1J017
4
1f.«00
500
16J00
1604 mtAtt WftS 4j67«JM 1>46M6 6421X1
w
181
TabKS
Liquid Pipeline Accident Summary
by Commodities Involved
For the Year 1979
No. el
Aceldama
% 01
Total
Loaa
(Banala)
% ol
Total
Proparty Oamaga (S)
C>uM ol Accldtnl
Opvrillon Aceldvnli
Carrlar
Olhat
Total
% ol
Total
Crudt Oil
131
S2 2
138.163
25 2
4.?ii.»l3
1.527.077
5 777.490
48
Alkyll*
0
0
0
O
0
0
0
0
Anhydioui Ammonii
1
*
3425
e
200
2000
2.201!
0
J*l Fu«l
5
JO
3J33
6
9 150
0
9.15(!
0
Gatolln*
3e
15 1
25 411
46
ioi.5ne 142
303.4 11
101.811.55-.1
8<17
oil and GatBlIn*
e
H
1922
4
15960
402.000
417.96(1
3
Tucblna Fual
t
'
ISO
0
0
0
(1
0
Karosana
0
0
0
0
0
0
•, 0
0
Diaaal Fual
e
?4
5397
10
19.571
7.200
26.771
0
Fual oil
2}
86
34 237
62
44 321
552 700
597.021
5
Cendanaaia
1
4
584
1
2000
750
2.750
0
LFO
U
135
321.446
5«6
10444.6O8
978.000
1 1 422.608
95
NQL
i
20
14 601
3r
47.963
40000
87 963
1
Unknown
0
0
0
0
0
4.000
4000
0
Tolala
251
996
546669
1000
116 342.328
3.817.138
120 159466
100 0
CaiTlar Non Canlar
Total Employaai Employaaa Employaai I
through a longitudinal weld, one of several small
cracks on or near a wrinlde in the pipe. The June 15
leak occurred north of pnmp station no. 12 through a
3-inch crack near a wrinkle in the pipe. Alyeska
estimated a total commodity loss of 1,800 barrels
from both leaks.
NTSB Report Issuance
In 1979 NTSB issued a report on its investigation of
a liquid petroleum gas pipeline rupture and fire which
'jcurred near Donnellson, Iowa on August 4, 1978.
r'ropane that had vaporized and spread widely from a
ruptured 8-inch pipeline was ignited by an unknown
source. The intense fire killed three people, critically
burned two others, and destroyed a farmhouse and
six outbuildings. Before the fire burned out, 3,750
barrels of propane had burned and 75 acres of corn-
fields and woods were damaged.
NTSB determined that the failure resulted from
stresses exerted on the pipeline when it was lowered
three months before the accident and to a dent and
gouge which had weakened the pipe.
Enforcement Activity
MTB regional engineers conducted 6(1 inspections
of liquid pipeline facilities under the Bureau's direct
safety jurisdiction, expending 166 person-days. En-
forcement actions were initiated against 13 liquid
carriers believed to be in violation of the Federal
regulations. Five investigations were clused without
penalty as safely issues were resolved. Regional
Chiiifs sent six warning letters to carrier'f found to be
in violation of the Federal liquid pipeline safety
regulations. Sixteen cases' remained active at the end
of 1979. (See Appendix E.)
The United Sutes District Court for Hie Southern
District of Iowa levied a criminal penalty of $4,000 on
the Mid-America Pipeline Company of Tulsa,
Okltihoma for violations of the Federal r>'gulations.
30
182
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S '
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o
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H-4
183
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184
USDeparmreitt
of Transportation
United StatM
Coact Guard
Commandant
U.S. Cout Guard
2100 Sacond Straat S W
Wathinoton. DC 20593-0001
Stafl Symbol: G-MEP
'*'^ (202) 267-6670
5720
92-0236
f4r. Robert B. Rackleff
816 Cherry Street
Tallahassee, Florida 32303
HAR 21992
Dear Mr. Rackleff:
This is In response to your letter dated February 14, 1992,
requesting a table of annual totals of oil spills In U.S. Waters
from tankships and tank barges. Please be advised that any
pollution data provided may be ongoing and could change or be
deleted at anytime.
Enclosure (1) is the number of oil spills by calendar year and
source. Enclosure (2) is the number of gallons of oil spilled by
calendar year and source.
Should you have any questions concerning this information, please
contact me at the above number.
Sincerely,
^cxy^^cW—
Mary Wobey ^
Management Information Systems Analyst
By direction of the Commandant
End:
( 1 ) Number of Incidents
(2) Amount spilled
185
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186
UNITED STATES COAST GUARD
MARINE
ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION
DIVISION
TELECOPIER COVER SHEET
TIME:
. _/5 (S
DATE; 5'/^-?\.
UMBER OF PAGES
^ISPAGE; 0A
NUMBER OF PAG.^S INCLUDING
THIS
TO: fh^Qh J^KUff- FROM: . Pl<^ry Kobe/
PHONE:.
PH0HB:JMLl2^£DjLQmi.
SUBJ:
COMMENTS REQUESTED BY;
THE NUMEHF. FOR THIS FACSIMILE MACHINE IS (202) 267-4085
187
fill
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189
O
licrtarvvtmartf Tht **nini»li«lor 400 S»«nni SirMt S W
Ui-Uepoimere W«shinolon. O C 20590
o( Iconsportatnn
RMCorchond
Spcciol Programt
AdmiriBlration
MAR 16 1992
Mr. Robert B. Rackleff
816 Cherry Street
Tallahassee. FL 32303
Dear Mr. RackJeff:
Thank you for your January 25. 1992, tetter regarding the pollution record of oil
pipelines. You indicated in your letter that Research and Special Programs
Administration (RSPA) officials have made statements to the effect that pipelines offer
the most environmentally compatible method for transporting petroleum.
in Congressional hearings and various publications, we have characterized pipelines as
"one of the safest modes of transportation" and have referred to the "excellent gafgty
record of pipeline transportation." These assertions have been made in relation to
safety (e.g.. number of fatalities and injuries) and not environmental protection (e.g..
number of barrels lost). To my knowledge, no one from RSPA has ever made a claim
that pipelines offer the most environmentally compatible method for transportation of
petroleum.
Historically, the primary focus of the Department of Transportation's pipeline safety
program has been public safety. Since the March 24, 1989 Exxon Valdez incident
(which did not involve a pipeline) and the January 1. 1990 Arthur Kill Waterway spill,
public concern has heightened over the potential environmental impacts of hazardous
liquid pipeline accidents. The Administration's proposed legislation and other bills to
reauthorize the pipeline safety program would, in fact, recognize that "protection of the
environment" is a basis for regulation of hazardous liquid pipelines. Such legislation
would effectively elevate environmental protection alongside public safety as a major
program objeaive.
In line with the new emphasis on environmental protection, we have initiated a number
of activfties to prevent potential pollution problems associated with hazardous liquid
pipelines:
190
1. We will conduct a multi-year study in which we will define, identify, and
investigate various types of "environmentally sensitive areas" traversed by
hazardous liquid pipelines, such as wetlands, navigable waters, and aquifers,
and determine if it is reasonable to ran;< the areas in order of potential harm
from pollution by liquids trarvsported.
2. We will undertake another muW-year study in which we will investigate and
analyze the various computer-based supervisory control and data acquisition
(SCADA) systeiTO used to detect leaks in hazardous liquid pipelines to
determine if any of them are suitable for general application in the pipeline
industry. The study will also pinpoint areas where further research is needed
to minimize teak detection time.
3. We have issued a final rule requiring pipeline operators to conduct underwater
inspection of pipelines in the Gulf of Mexico and Its inlets located in water less
than 15 feet deep; report to the U.S. Coast Guard pipelines exposed or
otherwise a hazard to navigation and mark with a buoy; and bury those
identified pipelines.
4. We have begun other prevention-focused regulatory projects related to
hydrostatic testing of older pipelines, hazardous liquid pipelines operated at 20
percent or less of specified minimum yield strength, and use of internal
inspection devices.
5. We have increased the use of hazardous facility orders following hazardous
liquid accidents to assure that the future operation of the pipeline is safe and
environmentally sound.
In response to your request for spill and leak data, we are enclosing a table showing
the number of hazardous liquid accidents reported to RSPA over the last seven years,
along with an indication of barrels lost, property damage, deaths, and injuries.
1 hope this letter clarifies our past statements related to the "pipeline safety record."
Please be assured that we are grappling with the pollution implications of hazardous
liquid pipeline accidents.
Sincerely,
Travis P. Dungan
Enclosure
191
O
ReMarchand ADD I 7 1992
Special Progrom* "^'^
Administration
Mr. Robert B. RackleJf
816 Cherry Street
Tallahassee. FL 32303 ,
Dear Mr. Rackleff:
This letter is in response to your March 22, 1992, correspondence to Travis P.
Dungan, regarding the environmental soundness of liquid pipelines. We were
surprised to see the article in Hie Florida Energy Pipeline Association (FEPA)
newsletter entitled "Pipelines: Safe and Environmentally Sound" attributed to the
Department of Transportation (DOT).
We did not recognize the statistics in the article and called the FEPA Executive
Director to determine the source. He, in turn, referred us to the contributing author
who, upon checking, acknowledged the statistics were not from DOT but from a
brochure published by the Association of Oil Pipe Lines (AOPL). (Jhe author
further admitted the article had been inadvertently attributed to DOT.)
We subsequently verified that the AOPL brochure, "Oil Pipelines of the United
States: Progress and Outlook." was the source of both the statistics and narrative
used in the article. We have enclosed a comparison of the article and the AOPL
brochure. Indeed, in most cases, the statistics and narrative have been lifted
almost verbatim. To avoid any further confusion, we are requesting the FEPA
Executive Director to issue a retraction in the next issue of the newsletter.
With respect to the assertions in the article, we cannot at this time categorically
confirm or deny them. Since the statistics are not from DOT data bases, we would
have to undertake a significant amount of validation, analysis, and interpretation to
arrive at any responsible conclusions.
Sincerely,
^'
SuJ^JL^'T^''^
George W. Tenley, Jr.
Associate Administrator for
Pipeline Safety
Enclosure
192
REX PIGMON HAD SEEN Oa SPIUS
on his West Texas ranch before. But
the one on January 24, 1989, wa> differ-
ent. The 62-year-old Winkler County
cattleman ut in hit pickup for a long
minute, watching the scream of smelly
crude flow across his land toward the
road. He thought about getting out for
by Bebarl Bryc*
193
^ pAlloto^krall-
BaU •ctivtty,
Ifca caiaiiM-
•igaadtolb*
T«MU ■■Ht— it
•nagaBcf wilb
• rvpoUdoa
lor baisg Bor*
caacaiBad
about prodac-
Hob oI oU Umb
piotodioB
ol water.
■ closer look, but the dviger of pouon-
ous guet and cxploiion made him tuy
put. He watched the spill for a icw
- more seconds, then in a torrent of dust
and flying sand, he wheeled his truck
around and sped toward the pipeline
pump sution, about a mile away.
Butch Higdon, Texaco's pump su-
tion supervisor, was hurrying out the
door when Pigmon pulled up. "I don't
have time to visit," Higdon said impa-
tiently, heading for his truck. "I'm
(A~lr.iig hr a pipeline leak."
**You jun {oftow Bw," aaid the tancb-
cr. TU take you right to it.''
Five minutes later, the tHti aen were
(utvcying ikc tafudly growing black
civcr. "Looks like I better get busV,"
Higdon said. With that, he jumped
back in his truck and sped do«>m the
bumpy caliche road toward the town of
Wink, five miles away. Within a few
hours, three bulldozers, a herd of
trucks, and two dozen men were ai the
site, scrambling to contain the thou-
sands of ga|l"P« of crude draining out
ol the 20-incb-diametcr Texaco pipe-
line. The biiUdcoen built levees to con-
tain the gushing (A. As the dozers
worked to wall in the spill, two vacuum .
trucks sucked up the heavy-smelling
crude. As soon as one truck was full,
it turned around and headed for the
row of huge gray oil tanks at the pump
sution. But there just weren't
enough trucks to keep up with the ris-
ing oil. Soon the levees gave way and
the suUurous oil crept over the arid
terrain. Before the oil stopped flow-
ii^ six acres of Pigmon's land -an
area the size of four and a half foot-
ball fields-was covered with oil.
Twenty-four hours after Pigmon
found the leak, the pipeline w^ still
draining. T1>e welders and pipe fitters
waited and watched as the oil occupying
twenty miles worth of pipe oozed out
onto Pigmon's property. Finally,
around noon, the damaged pipe was
empty. Backhoes dug out the buried
pipe, and the ruptured section was cut
out. Seventy-four feet of new pipe were
laid in place, and by six o'clock that
evening, the welders were gone. The
dozers leveled the dikes. The oil that
couldn't be vacuumed up was covered
over »nth dirt. That done, the remain-
ing crew loaded the equipment and
drove a«iray- leaving a chunk of Pig-
moo's land oil-soaked and sterile. But
the rancher didn't know how much oil
had spilled. No one from Texaco called
him. So he waited. And when he learned
two months later that nearly one million
gallons of crude had leaked onto his
land and was beginning to contamuute
his groundwater, he got mad. And when
Texaco offered him ^1,200 for dam-
ages, he got a lawyer.
HAVING POaUTED WATER, A GOOD
lawyer, and a pending lawsuit against a
major oil company has become a tradi-
tion in West Texas; Pigmon is jusi one
of dozens of landowners fighting oil
companies, which seem impervious to
lawsuits and regulations. But this is
only a modem extension of an ancient
fight between ranchers and oilmen, one
that was immortalized in Edna Ferber's
novel Cunt. Bick Benedict was the no-
ble rancher who loved the land; Jett
Rink was the low-life wildcatter who
plundered the surface to get to what lay
underneath. Ranchers still see them-
selves as caretakers of the land, and
they still beUcve— with good cause— that
oil operators regard the land only as
something that stands in the way of
their objective. Much of the work of
finding oil in Texas has been performed
by high-living, free-spirited roughnecks
who were not the sort to worry about a
Jittle brine here or a little oil leak there.
Huge patches of West Texas have be-
come oil-field deseru, because for years
the salt water that is a result of oil
production was released to flow across
the land, leaving it bare.
Eventually oil-field carelessness shows
up in the groundwater. The upper
reaches of the Colorado River arc being
polluted with salt water from abandoned
oil wells. Groundwater near the Odessa
Petrochemical Complex is contaminat-
ed with cancer-causing benzene. Texas
Water Commission investigators be-
lieve a refinery in the complex is re-
sponsible for a six-foot layer of benzene
that hes on top of the local groundwater
supply. Children in the El Ranchito sub-
division, a few hundreds yards east of
the refinery, can't bathe in the water be-
cause it causes skin rashes.
rsstUASir
194
Chemkals tued during the oil-well
drilling process often contain highly
toxic elemenu, such as barium, chromi-
um, cadmium, and arsenic. Drilling
muds, corrosion inhibitors, workover
fluids, and other oil-£eld materials ate
often dumped into unlined earth piu,
spread over large areas, or used oo oil-
field roads for "dusi cootroL" Tlwse
toxic chemicals, which would be highly
regulated if they were produced by any
other industry, are exempt ftom scruti-
ny m the oil patch. In 1988 the staff of
the Enviroiunental Protection Agency
recommended that oil-field waste prod-
ucu be regulated as hazardous waste.
However, the staff was overruled by two
appointees of Ronald Reagan: adminis-
trator Lee Thomas and assistant admin-
istrator J. Winston Porter. EPA oft-
cials have said that it was Porter who
made the decision oo Ae oD-ficU taste
designation. At the tiaw il>e Juiiiim
was made, Ponrr owned as anani in
two oil and gas wells in New Mciica
The EPA estimates that about one
million tons of hazardous waste arc gen-
erated in American oil fields every year.
The EPA h^s put seven Texas sites that
are direcdy related to the production
and refining of oil and gas on the feder-
al superftind list. (The Texas Waur
Commission has put eight other sites
that are contaminated with oil and gas
wastes on the sute superftind list.)
The watchdog for the oil industry in
Texas is the Texas Railroad Commis-
sion, an agency frequendy scorned by
ranchers such as Pigmon for its laissez-
faire attitude toward the problem of
groundwater contamiiution. After the
tiiscovery of oil in East Texas at Spin-
dlctop in 1901, pipelines were deemed a
mode of iniersute transportation just
like the railroads; thus began the Rail-
road Commission's entry into the busi-
ness of regulating the oil industry. Over
the years, the commission has devel-
oped a repuution for being more con-
cerned about production of oil than
protection of water. For decades it has
looked the other way while oil compa-
nies have disposed of salt water and
dangerous chemicals on roads, in wasu
pin, and in creeks that flow into the
Gulf of Mexico. Rccendy the U.S. Fok
and Wildlife Service started prosecut-
ing oil producers because the piu that
many of them use to dispose of waste
oil attract -and kill -hundreds of thou-
sands of migratory birds every year.
During the course of their crackdown,
agents have found hundreds of piu chat
arc being used to store and dispose of
tvaste oil. This ( cokhnued on ^aCE hi ]
Robert Bryet is <n Aiutia fmUttct vriur
who tpttitliits in ttmromunul itsuti.
11 from a
brokan pip*-
Una satiuatad
liz acres of Bax
Pigmon't
ranch, kUUag
th* toil and
grass and con-
taminating th*
water. Texaco
offered SI, 200
for the dam-
age—bnt a
cleanup would
coft $9 million.
195
More Precious
Than on
In I9S8 T. G. Herring, a rancher in
Andrews County, had a water well on hii
ranch go aalty. Tests on his water pet-
farmed by the Water Commission indi-
cated high levels of chloride, sulfate, and
•T '- sodium -compounds conunonly feuikd in
( CONTINUED noM PAGE iw ] use of opcn oil-freld brine. Chloride and sodium lev-
pits was legal until 1969, when the Rail- els in the water were nearly 12,000 parts
roid Commission finally adopted the "no per million -48 times greater than fed-
pit rult." «"1 drinking water standards. The Water
Despite numerous complainu about Commission deemed the contamination
the Railroad CacnmiSSMMi's Uck of cavi- to b* oil-field related and turned it over
roiuacniaJ concern, the ^raCT remains to the Railroad Commission. Despite the
the sole atWci ■ cmks ^ wbieh wasi Water Commission's findmgs, ilie Rail-
has been contaminMed br aal-fcaU actiri- road Cooanission determined the water
ty. Numerous landowners have appealed was contaminated by "natural causes." In
to the Texas Water Commission hr help, the report, the investigator blamed die
but if its tesu detertmne the pollution is high sulfate levels in the water o^ sulfur
coming from oil-field activity, the Water mining. The closest sulfur mine to Het-
Commission can only turn the case back ring's ranch was sixty miles away. The
to the Railroad Commission. And even if closest oil well was just six hundred feet
the Railroad Commission wanted to pur- north.
sue each contamination case, it doesn't The methods used by Railroad Com-
havt the resources to do it. In 1989, mission investigators are as suspect as
f II.) million was allotted for enforce- ihcu findings. While testing Glenda Kik-
ment of state laws that govern Texas' er's water m West Odessa, an investiga-
second-largcst industry-not just poUu- tor from the Midland office tied a string
tion laws but everything from drilling to a dirty coffee cup to sample the con-
permits to oil-field trucking. The City of tammated wcfl fee bacteria-despite the
Austin spends more money eadi year on (*a that smile bailers and containers are
parks and recreation-about fl6 million essential for proper resulu. When she
-than the Oil and Gas Division of the saw her well being tested with a coffee
Railroad ComimssioD spends regulating cup, Kiker became furious. "I could see
the ot! mdusny m Texas. About 5 per- the coffee grounds in the bonom of the
cenc-?1.02 billion-of the ^21 billion cup. What were they going to find-that
1989 state budget came from taxes the my ivater's high in caffeine?"
state collects on oil and gas. However, How many cases of oil-field pollution
the state spends only .000) percem of has the Railroad Commission uncovered
its annual budget to police the oil in- in the Permian Basin? Mark Ehrbch, the
dustry-an industry that sold more than complaint coordinator from the Midland
917 billion worth of oil and gas ia I9B8. office, says, "I haven't found one case
In effect, oil-field pollution is viztual- where groundwater has been cootaminat-
ly unregulated. cd by oil and gas activity in this region."
As fr>r his use of the coffee cup, EhrUch
W.ATER HAS LONG BEEN MORE says, "There is no difference between
valuable m West Texas than oil. testing %vith a sterile bailer and testing
During the thirties after a boom in the with a coffee cup"-a claim that Water
small t«>wn of McCamey, a barrel of Commission invesugaiors greeted with a
watei cost a dollar. A barrel of oil chorus of derisive laughter,
brought five cents. Last summer in Mid-
land, before Iraq invaded Kuwait, water ^ FTER ABOUT RDUR YEARS AS A
was still more expensive than oil. The ^% professional rodeo cowboy in the
price of 42 gallons of crude oil-OBe forties. Rex Pigmon returned to the
barrel -hovered around ^7. TWc price ranch that was homesteaded a ccouty
of 42 gallons of groundwater, based on ago by his grand^ther Bill Vest. De-
the prevailing cost of SO cena a gallon, cades of working long hours on horse-
was $21. back in the hot sun have left Pigmon's
Half of aU Texaas rely on ground- arms and face a deep reddish-brown. A
water In West Texas the percentage is heavy-set, quiet man, Pigmon doesn't
much higher. In Winkler County, tvhere waste words. He doesn't like discussing
Rex Pigmon Lves, over 90 percent of all the spill or dealing with the lawyers and
residents use well water. But in doieiu of engineers who are investigating the meu.
groundwater contamination cases, Rail- If he had his druthers, he would just go
road Commission investigators from the quiedy about his business, tending the
Midland office have blamed improperly eight hundred cattle that roam the sparse
cased water wells, fertilizer runoff, and grassland. But Pigmon has seen the
septic tank leaks for waur polluaon asphaltlike scars left by leaking tanks and
problems. They have seldom blamed oil pipelines. These leaks kill the soil and
production. the grass. [ CONTINUED ON PAGE is> ]
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196
I COKTIMUED HiOM PACE Ml ] And in a dry
region where each cow needs iky or
more acres of browse just <io uuvive,
every little bi^counu. *
Lying in the,^iddle of the oil field that
caused a boom in the town of Wtnlc dur-
ing the twenties, the 38-square-mile Vest
Ranch has been explored for oil for six
decades. Some four hundred active wells
produce oil ami f^ on the ranch, and it
bears lite scars. Abeadoned weils, barren
drilling sites contairuiutr<) Mii UMoc
heavy metals, and rusting etjuipmcac fit-
ter the landscape. Hof moc^ royalty in-
come does Pigmoo get &otn the oil
pumped from bcneadi his land? PigoKO
chuckles. "None," he says. "My grand-
dad sold all the minerals in 1918. We only
get money for surface damage."
Though he has worked' around the oil
industry all his life, none of his experi-
ences picpaicd him for the trouble that
began the day he discovered the Texaco
pipeline break. Two months after the
spill, when he hadn't heard anyiKmgfrcun
Texaco Pipeline or the Railroad Commit-
sion, Pigmon decided to find out for Kim-
self what had happened. He looked up
commission records, which indicated that
on January 2i, 1989- the day after the
spill -Texaco Pipeline notified the Rail-
road Commission office in Midland that
3,200 barrels of oil had leaked from the
pipeline and that 2,700 barrels had been
recovered. Accepting Texaco's version,
the initial Railroad Commission report
filed Monday, February 6, reads, "Oper-
ator cleaned up spill and replaced line.
Oil spill aifected about % mile of land by
100 yards wide." The following day,
however, Wayne McClung, a field super-
visor from the Midland office, went to
the Vest Ranch. He surveyed the spill
site and wrote, "Tliree feet of sand in low
area oil soaked. Loss -23,) 34 barrels.
Recovered- 5,849, Net loss-17,685."
Neither report was even dose to accu-
rate. The leak Texaco had originally
described as only 500 unrecovcred bar-
rels of oil turned out to be £ar worse.
Nearly 20,000 barrels -about 750,000
gallons— of crude oil had soaked into the
soil on Pigmon's ranch and no one knew
about it. None of the local papers carried
the story. This was not like an oil slick
at sea-no dead tea lions or oil-coated
birds to be rescued— it was ju*t a big
greasy spot in the sandy West Texas ioiL
For six months after the spill. Railroad
Commission investigators monitored how
much oil had saturated the soil. Tliey
dug holes to see how much oil was flow-
uig beneath the surface. When oil stopped
flowing into (he holes, they determined
that the investigation was finished, filled
in the holes, and closed the case.
The final field report on the spill was
filed July 6 by Mark Ehrlich from the
Midland office. Ehrlich's report reads,
"Mr. Pigmon suted that Texaco offered
^100 an acre for the six acres damaged,
and that for being such a cooperative guy
they would pay him total of fl,200 for
damage. Rex refiised the offer to him, be-
cause be doesn't know the long-term
effect of the spill and (hat to him his land
damage is about ^250,000. . . . Texaco
has not been very cooperative in conuct-
ing him about what is occurring on status
of spill or (he settlement. Rex would ap-
prcoatt all ibe help we could offer to
ke^ka.-
E^Hcli «as right. Pigmon needed Uik.
But the Railroad Commission wasn't gi>-
ing to give him any, and neither was Tex-
aco. By July, Pigmon kad found abother
commission report on the spiB in<ftuig^
tion. Dated June 28, it said, 'K>n June 1,
1989, no more oil was seen within the
monitor holes and it was decided that
these holes should now be closed. Mr.
Pigmon expressed satisfaction since there
was no evidence of oil in the monitoring
holes. The spill in question is underlaid
by a very iiard caliche layer and is not be-
lieved to be a threat to groundwater sup-
plies. ... As Mr. Pigmon appeared sat-
isfied with the effbru, wc believe no
fijrther action is liecessary as this timt."
Pigmon laughs when he reads the report.
"I never expressed any satisfaction to
these people," he says. "Tliey are just
trying to weasel out of this thing."
Contrary to the commission's findings,
the spill hadn't gone away, and it was be-
ginning to cause groundwater problems.
A monitor well dug by Petro-Global
Consultanu, a Midland engineering firm,
showed that two dangerous constituenu
of crude oil— benzene and toluene— were
showing up in the shallow water ubie six-
ty feet below the surface. Petro-Global
also gave Pigmon a rude shock when its
consultanu estimated that the cost of
a complete cleanup on the site would be
f9 million. The ^1,200 offered by Texaco
wouldn't be enough to buy fuel for all the
trucks and heavy equipment needed to
remove the thousands of cubic yards of
contaminated soil.
TWO DAYS AFTER THE SPUi, UN-
known to Pigmon, Chevron had
hired Martin Water Labs in Midland to
test a sample of fresh water iltawn from
one of Pigmon's wells. The test wasn't
being 6oot out of concern fer Pigmon's
water resource*-, it was being done to de-
termine if Chevron could use Pigmon's
fresh water for waterflooding an oil well
on the Vest Ranch.
As oil wells get older and their produc-
tivity decreases, oil producers inject wa-
ur tmder pressure to force more oil to
the sur&ce-an activity called secondary
recovery. And though some companies
use the salt water that is produced during
oJ production for waterflooding, many
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197
prefer to use 6cib water. Unlike (alt
water, which ii high in diuoivcd solids,
fttA water doesn't clog pipe* and pump-
ing equipment. *
Nothing nukes West Texas ranchers
and fanners madder than the use of fresh
%yater far wattt^ooding an oil well, and it
doesn't take them long to tell you why.
Even if a fermer irrigates his crops on the
honest day of the year at high noon, the
water SLsys in the wcadicr system. If it
cvaponnt, b later ibrau clouds and
comet back in the form of tain. Bat if
that same 6cah water is mfvati mao the
ground fot tmrnitty recovcey, it's gooc
forever. Pennanesnir po&uted, it «nU stay
in the oil cavity for coos, newer lo be
useful again. In Texas io 1974, almost a
billion barrels of ircsh water were used
for secondary recovery. In 19S1, the last
year for which accurate records are avail-
able, 600 million barrels of fresh water-
enough to supply the city of San Angelo
for nearly three and a half years-were
flushed down oil wells. And ndule the
Railroad Comimssion says it discouxagcs
the practice, randiers like Pigmon are
finding that oil producers are still using
copious amounu of firesh water for sec-
ondary recovery.
Walter Bertsch has ivorked for die Soil
Conservation Service in West Texas for
}1 years and is now based in the small
Gaines Counry oil-aod-cottoo town of
Seramole, eighty miles southwest of Lub-
bock. He has seen hundreds of water
wells drilled to provide fresh water for
secondary recovery. In Gaines County
alone, about 1} million barrels of freih
water a year are used for secondary tc-
covery. More than 1,400 wells in eight
West Texas counties -Winkler, Ward,
Andrews, Gaiiws, Crane, Ector, Mid-
land, and Martin— are currently using
fresh water for secondary recovery.
Three of the eight counties-Midland,
Ward, and Wmklet-have been designat-
ed critical waur tones by the Texas
Water Commission because of declines in
the water taUe and subsequent short-
ages. Four more counties-Ector,
Gaines, Andretvs, and Crane-may soon
be added to the critical water xone list.
Despite declining freshwater resources,
an antiquated law called right of capture
governs groundwater usage in Texas.
Based on English conuaon law, it allows
landowBCTS to pump as much water as
diey warn from under their land. Up un-
til the twenties, the law also applied to oil
underground. In those early days, oil
wells were crowded close together and
well owners competed to pump as much
oil, as fast as they could, from the same
pool. Since this deplcttd the reservoir
needlessly, producers decided to appor-
tion the production from a single oil field
to the various owners. Unfortunately,
this idea doesn't apply to groundwater.
Companies can buy land or water righu
and pump as much u they like-regard-
less of the needs of neighboring ranchers
and frrmers who share the aquifer.
Bensch thinks the use of fresh water
for secondary recovery could be the
death of agriculture in West Texas,
"niiere ivill still be people wanting to live
here afrer the oil is gone. And if there's
no fresh water, this area will dry up."
Pigmon still fiunes when he thinks
about Chevron's attempt to use fresh
water for secondary recovery. The appli-
cation Chevron filed with the Railroad
Com million shows that the company
planned to use 600 barrels of water a day
to recover 37 barrels of oA. In other
words, for each barrel of oil produced, 16
barrels of %vaur tvould be permanently
lost. Although Pigmon talked to Chev-
ron represcnatives and was able to per-
suade them not to use (he water, he is
infuriated about the attempt- particularly
because it happened so soon after Texa-
co's pipeline spill.
"^Y uncle Earl Vest fisught the oil '
companies all his life," says Pigmon,
"and I have fought them for most of my
lifr too. These oil companies think us
ranchmg people are kind of stupid coun-
try hicks that don't know anything, fiut
we put a stop to them using fresh water
on that project damn quick. I wasn't
about to let them waste my fresh water."
Pigmon figures more than a thousand
oil and gas wells have been drilled on his
ranch over the years. Some of them came
in; most did not. Those operators «4io
lost, Pigmon says, packed up their tools,
threw their garbage down the deep, nar-
row hole that they thought would make
them rich, and moved on.
Little did the old wildcatters know that
the holes they were leaving across the
state would cause so much concern to-
day. Reaching thousands of feet into the
earth, oil wells are essentially long verti-
cal pipelines that allow oil to flow or be
pumped to the surface. Very often, oil-
bearing tones also have large saltwater
formations in the vicinity. To prevent the
deep salt water from traveling upward
into freshwater aquifers near the surface,
a well must be plugged «nth cement after
it is shut down or if it contains no oil.
But of the l.t million oil wells drilled
n Texas, approximately one million are
left unplugged. Unplugged weOs are par-
ticulaiiy dangerous in the region around
San Aiigelo because of the Coleman
Junction, a highly pressurized saltwater
formation that underlies the area. When
oil iwclls are drilled through the Coleman
Junction, the highly corrosive salt water
begins to eat away at the steel pipe that
lines the well. If the well isn't properly
plugged, the salt water eventually eats
through the pipe and flows to the sur&ce.
One unplugged well, near the town of
Rowena, northeast of San Angelo,
spewed millions of gallons of salt water
into the Colorado River for decades until
■c was plugged in the mid-sixties by the
Railroad Commission.
A FEW MILES EAST OF. ROWENA.
Runnels County farmer Ralph
Hoclscher looks at the salt crystals lying
atop the powdery soil that used to grow
cotton and says, "My father-in-law
worked this piece of land his whole life.
And his fethcr before him. This old soil
is so salty now it won't even grow grass."
Pointing to a nearby rise, the soft-spoken
farmer explains, "There has to be an un-
plugged well right around here."
Few people know more about un-
plugged oil wells in West Texas than
Ralph Hoelscher. A self-educated expert
on the problem, Hoelscher has been on
a one-man crusade for ten years. He
even ran for railroad commissioner a few
years ago, losing narrowly to another
Republican candidate, Jun Nugent, in
the primary. When he is not tcndmg his
crops of milo and grain sorghum, Hoel-
scher is talking to other farmers and to
anyone else who will listen about the
danger of unplugged wells. In Runnels
County alone, Hoelscher has found
about one hundred unplugged wells. In
neighboring Tom Green County, he has
been worlong with Wayne Farrell, the
director of the Tom Green Counry
Health Department, to locate unplugged
%vells around San Angelo that are fouling
the drinking-water supply. One was un-
derneath the main street through town;
two more ivere below O. C. Fisher Lake,
tvhich flows into the Colorado River.
Two reasoiu why so many wells in the
sate haven't been plugged are the lack of
enforcement by the Railroad Commission
and carelessneu on the part of the oil
operators. Almost a century ago, the
state Legislature mandated that aban-
doned wells be plugged. The Texas
House of Represenutives approved a
rule in 1899 requirmg operators aban-
doning a well to "securely fill such well
«nth rock, sediment or with morur com-
posed of two paru sand and one part ce-
ment or other suiuble material to the
depth of two hundred fret above the top
of the first oil and gas bearing rock." In
1919 another law was passed that gave the
Railroad Commission authonty to en-
force well-plugging. Despite these and
other laws, thousands of operators simply
lefr well holes open. Operators drilling
on shoestring budgets had little incentive
to spend more money on dry holes, espe-
cially when they knew that the Railroad
Commission was unlikely to catch them.
Tlie penalties for not plugging wells were
not severe and many operators declared
bankruptcy to avoid liability. Compound-
ing the problem of unplugged wells are
198
inaccurate Railroad Commission records.
Hoelscher and Tom Green County
health inspector David Hale<iook me to
numerous oil wells that h^ never beep
plugged— des^tc commission records
thai said they had been.
I.S' LATE 1990 THINGS BEGAN CHANG-
ing at the Texas Railroad Commiasion.
New commissioner Bob Krueger ran tel-
evision spots durmg the November eiec-
rjon thar emphaiized the environment.
Lena Guernro, as Austm IcgisUtor ap-
pomted to the commissioirby Gcwcxao*
Ann Richards, has a hiuory of cimiiuu-
mental aaivism. The staff of the Oil aiu)
Gas Division has also been s^ukcn u^
Jim Morrow, the former bead of the divi-
sion, and Willis Steed, the former head
of regulatory enforcement, have been
replaced. After numerous complaints
from the Martin County Underground
Water Conservation District about an ex-
tensive saltwater leak that was ignored
by the Railroad Commission, Ronald
Strong, the director of the commission's
district oftce in Midland, was fired.
Strong's second in command. Hank
Krusekopf, was demoted. Citing docu-
ments received under the Texas Open
Records Act, Hank Murphy of the Lui-
hock Avalanche-Journal reported last sum-
mer that some of the workers in the Mid-
land Acid ofiice were accepting gratuities
in the form of turkeys and hams from oil
companies
The new head of the Oil and Gas Divi-
sion, David Garlick, told me that a new-
era of cooperation and vigilance has be-
gun at the Railroad Commission. Even if
Garlick can overhaul his division, the 101
field investigators spread among ten dis-
trict oAces face an industry of over-
whelmmg size; }60,000 oil and gas wells
are currently operating in the nau— not
to mtntion pipelines and abandoned wells
— that should be checked periodically by
commission investigators. The Midland
oAce of the Railroad Commission may
be the worst in terms of manpower. With
more than 40,000 wells in the district,
the office has only 9 full-time field
inspectors.
The field oAces are also responsible
for regulating 364 natural-gas processing
plants, thousaitds of miles of pipeline,
and thousands of waste pits. Intidtti at
the Railroad Commission acknowinige
that they are understaffed', oise who rc-
ijuesied aaeeiymiiy said, "We could use
five times as many field techniciaiu as we
have. And they would be busy all the
time." Garlick himself believes an in-
crease of ^7 to jlO million is needed to
properly regulate the industry.
Former railroad commiuioner Kent
Hance agrees that the division needs
more employees, but he believes a 10 per-
cent increase in the budget will be
enough. "I think we do a great job,"
Hance said. "We could improve, but it
becomes a question of money and wheth-
er the Legislature would give us that kind
of money." Fining operators that violate
Railroad Commission rules could add
money to the coffers, but the commis-
sioners have shown extreme reluctance to
levy Urge fines to get compliance from
the industry. One of the highest fines
ever levied by the Railroad Commission
was ^0,000 against Clinton Manges and
tiie Duval County Ranch Corporation in
I9ft4 iui not pkuggutg several abandoned
wells. Compared to those of the Texas
Water Commijsion, the Railroad Com-
miuionH fines arc minuscule. When the
City of Houston violated wastewaller reg-
ulations a few years ago, the Water Com-
mission slapped the city with a fine of
9^00,000. Last spring the Watet Com-
mission levied a ^244,060 fine against
Formosa Plasties fi>r wastewater viola-
tions at the company's Point Comfon
facility.
DESPITE PERSONNEL CHANGES AT
the RaJroad Commission, land-
owners—including Pigmon and Hoel-
scher—are still skeptical. And farmers
aisd ranchers share a common sentiment:
Having the commission watch over the
oil industry is like having the fox guard
the henhouse; landowners simply don't
trust the commission to do anything that
will harm the most powerful industry in
the state. While the oil mdustry has en-
riched the state treasury, the University
of Texas, and many individual Texans, a
legacy of the oil busmess — contaminated
groundwater -will last long after the oil
and the money have run out.
Pigmon's white-faced Hereford cattle
still drink the water brought up by wind-
mills near the pipeline spill sue. It is al-
ready too salty for humans to drink, and
Pigmon figures even the cattle will soon
quit. Wells that yielded ftesh, clear water
when he was a boy are now fouled with
salt water and other oil by-products. To
stay in the cattle business, Pigmon will
have to drill a dozen new water wells, all
of them at least 3)0 feet deep. At a cost
of jlO a foot, the rancher figures he'll
have to spend ^3^,000 to reach the last
remaining pocket of uncontaminated
fresh water imder his ranch. As for the
lawsuit, Pigmon shrugs and says, "The
lawyer told me he was going to take care
of it, to Fm going to let him."
Pigmon doesn't have much to offer
when asked how he would change the
Railroad Commission or the oil industry.
Taking off his hat, he wipes the sweat
from his face. "You know, I don't know.
But something has got to change -that's
for damn sure. 'Cause without good
water, Vm out of business. "♦
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200
■A-22 /Th* Houllon Poil/Sundoy, Moy 23. 1993 ♦♦
PIPELINES: Leaks posing
untold environmental perils
petroleum products that some-
times spew in torrents and some-
times seep imperceptibiy from
the nation's vast and aging infra-
structure o! pipelin«s
and storage tanks.
A six-month examination d
stale, federal and induilr) re-
cords by The Houston Post shows
liquid pipelines and petroleum
slorage tanks leak the equivalent
of several Exxon Valdezes each
year, causing billions of dollars
in damage.
As a rule, pipelines and stor-
age tank spills do not often result
in human tragedies such as the
San Bernardino fire or the explo-
sion of a liquid petroleum gas fa-
cility in Brenham last year that
killed three people From this
perspective, the nation s 225.000
miles of pipelines that account
for a staggering 578 billion ton-
miles, and the 2,400 major tank
facilities storing virtually the en-
tire petroleum needs of the coun-
try, are safe
But out of this record has come
a misconception that industry
and even government officials
have done little to correct, that
pipelines and siorage tanks are
efficient and environmentally be-
nign
In fact, pipelines spill much
■ more than the other principal
bulk petroleum transportation
method — tankers and barges.
And storage unks account for
most of the largest spills in VS.
hist or)'
Among the facts that bear this
out
■ Pipelines report spilling
224,254.544 million gallons of oil.
gasoline, kerosene and other
products o\er the last two dec-
ades At an annual rate of about
113 million gallons, they spill
more than an Exxon Valdez —
the oil tanker thai dumped 10 8
million gallons of crude oil into
Alaska's Prince 'Mlliam Sound in
1989 — each t-ar They spill
more than twic-, the 4.6 million
gallons tanker': nd barges spill
annually
■ As a resu f the lifting of
liability caps 01 larine spills af-
ter the Exxon \ ^Idez. tanker and
barge operators have considera-
bly improved their record, while
n.no'ire fiprra'nrs — whn cannot
not as an environmental one
In fact, neither gather Dor dis-
seminate any data on environ-
mental damage by spills. Many
property owners and local gov-
ernments aroond the country
consider the OPS Jo be an imped-
■nent to recovering liamages.
But more than the absence of
mat/i federal oversight, it is the
lack oi sensationalism behind
pipeline and storage tank spills
thai prevents them from garner-
ing attention, say a variety of
sources Compared to a tanker
breaking up on the coast of Scot-
land, or even a barge run
aground on the Mississippi River,
they are not compelling to those
not directly affected.
"When a pipeline or tank farm
leaks, about tbe best you can see
IS a grease spot on tbe ground,
and It just isa t good televisioo,"
says Bob RacklefJ, a Florida ac-
tivist fighting the addition of a
pipeline and tank farm in his
community.
Tbe power of pictures in the
E»xon Valdez spill helped create
a flurry of major actions in Con-
gress — the enactment of double-
hulled tanker legislation, the cre-
ation of a 16-ship rapid response
unit, the lifting of liability caps
on damages caused by spills, and
the indefinite postponement of oil
and gas exploration in Alaska's
Arctic National Wildlife Refuge.
In contrast, the few people
hoping to make a cause out of
pipeline and storage tank spills
have not gotten their message on
television and have been largely
Ignored in Washington Even en-
vironmental groups — never shy
of a good fight with big oil com-
panies — have not been particu-
larly responsive.
"It just seems they're not in-
terested in tbese things," says
Michele Grumet, a pipeline ac-
tivist in California "It's not real-
ly dramatic, its not like save the
whales, or a tanker."
Tracing its history
A good bit of what passes
through San Bernardino starts at
a refinery in El Segundo. an in-
dustrial community on the Pacif-
ic Ocean in the shadow of the Los
Angeles International Airport.
If there were any doubt about
the size and scope of pipeline and
•:'r>raee tank farm pollution it
HOW MUCH
WE LOSE
Here are the losses (in
gallons) horn pipeline and
tanker/barge spills reported
in trie United States from
1973 through 1992
"
TANKER/
PIPEUNE
BARGE
«AR SPtOS
SPILLS
1973 15.727,404
4,404,390
1974 12.127,962
3,535,385
1S75 13.3)2.«14
11^96,669
1976 10.060 722
11,018.486
1977 8.403,338
1,769202
1978 11,779.530
3,569,819
1979 22,900^48
3,352,052
1980 ti005i38
3,335.011
ISei 8.S88,S22
5J69100
1982 9.214,926
3,366,433
1983 16,020,942
1553,673
1984 12,008,010
7,152,367
1985 7,065.702
4,417,032
1986 11,756,850
3.301,437
1987 15^1.634
2222,546.
1988 9.089,640
4,034,490
1989 8,4S2;j76
12,126^58
1990 5,206,656
5,857,070
1991 9,196,530
338235"
1992 4,997,990
191,458
TOTAL 224,254,544
92.611.113
Sourc* Offict o< P«>eur« S*l«y. |
u S Coast Gu*n:
1
The Houston Post
the very cutting edge of this kind
of technology," says Spackman.
But even with tbe aid of high
technology and lots of money, for
the foreseeable future the goal is
not to clean op the spill, but
merely to contain it. At a mini-
mum, experts say, it will take 10
to 15 years before any significant
percentage of pollution is actual-
ly removed from the groundwa-
ter.
Even then there is consider-
able doubt as to bow successful
Chevron can be in permanently
cleaning up the site. Groundwa-
ter never has been totally
cleaned up on any significant
scale and even the most optimis-
tic forecasts have the company
successfully removing 70 percent
of the contamination
"Most people realize they don't
expect to remove all the con-
tamination," says Tom Kelly, an
environmental engineer with the
EPA's California office "That's
not a realistic goal"
To make matters worse, the
soil under the El Segundo refin-
ery is "smeared" with oil as the
changes in tides raise and lower
HL&P: Says
From A- 1
overturned and remanded
commission
"We don't have any i
power plants under constr
for the first time since
War II — it IS really a i
situation," said Graham P,
HLiP spokesman "That i;
is driving our present su
not because the regulator;
overly generous during oi
rate hike hearing"
The two-year freeze Wi
of a negotiated settli
among HL&P, the city of
ton and 42 cities that pav
way for approval of tbt
1991 hike
The settlement was
longed, however, by the Of
Public Utility Cou.-,3el, at
pendent state-funded offn
represents small busine^
residential ratepayers on
of tbe sute. Tbe settleme
upheld at the district com
and is pending before the
of Appeals for the 3rd Dis
Austin.
OPUC appealed the ra
on grounds the PUC "is
ratepayers to pay excessi
just and unreasonable ra
HL&P's service."
HL&P officials, includi
Hogan. group vice presid
external affairs, recentl
that the outcome of thi
school financing issue c
with a possible energy ta>
on British thermal unit '
will be determining fact
whether the company dec
seek a rate hike soon.
But Painter said. "No o
here is feverishly prep,
rate hike filing " Such i
typically takes a few mc
prepare and is based on
year that must begin and
a quarterly basis
Luis Wilmont. public
for OPUC. said the ene;
issue IS all smoke," bees
tax will likely be added c
top of electric bills and ■
increase HLiP's operatin
Painter said if the lax
ied. HLiP would favor :
"simple and clear." for ■
ers to see on each mom
how much they are payini
eral energy taxes
If inflation. Houston's ■
ic growth rate, federal
201
biy Improved their'record. wlule
pipeline operators — who cannot
even be sued while the federal
governrnent is involved — have
not As a resuUj^in 1991 and 1992
pipelines reported spilling 29
times more than did tanker and
barges
_ ■ The actual number and siie
of pipeline spills are likely to be
considerably larger than report-
ed because pipebnes classified as
rural gathering lines w pipelines
operating at oi below 10 percent
capacity are unregulated an4 io
not show up OD yearly spill totals
compiled by the federal Office of
• Pipeline Safely. Some of the
■largest spills in the last five
years fall into these two catego-
ries
■ In a recent survey by the
American Petroleum Institute,
70 percent of refineries and 39
percent of local distribution tank
"farms reported cleaning up from
one or more spills from above
ground petroleum storage tanks.
;_ ■ Many leaks, particularly
-■• those from storage Unks at ma-
jor refineries, have been going on
."for decades and are estimated in
"ahe tens of millions of gallons At
least one slow leak in California
^is estimated in the hundreds of
,;;nillions of gallons
Spills from pipelines and slor-
-.age tanks have polluted ground
-and surface water, sometimes
..shutting down water systems
temporarily or permanently.
Thev have polluted major waler-
;^ way's, such as the Arthur Kill wa-
'terwav running between New
Jersey and New York s Staten Is-
land, as well as creeks and wet-
lands
They have devalued property
by jO percent and more And in
some cases have forced people to
abandon their homes, businesses
and even schools as toxic and
flammable fumes have seeped
into basements
Despite all this pipelines and
storage tanks go largely unno-
ticed while even minor tanker
and barge spills often gamer na-
tional attention
In part, th;s may stem from
relatively lillle oversight from
the federal and state govern-
ment The Environmental Pro-
tection Agency regulates above-
• ground storage tanks only in as
much as they might cause "cata-
, slrophic' leaks Pipelines are po-
liced by 24 federal agents that
have 18 million miles to cover
Both the OPS and the Texas
Railroad Commission have his-
torically monitored pipelines
the size and scope of pipeline and
storage tank farm pollution it
ends here. Under the complex of
more than 200 Unks and hun-
dreds of miles of pipeline is a
plume of various refined prod-
ucts that Chevron estimates at
somewhere between eight and 23
times the size of the Exxon Val-
dez spill.
Based on the types of fuels
found in the ground — high sulfur
diesels and gasolines, beating oil
aad keiosene grades that have
not been sold m America since
early in this century — Chevron
tas concluded tlie spill could go
back as far as the plant's 82year
history
"It's not stuff we were making
yesterday by any stretch," says
Chevron spokesman Rod Spack-
man. "This problem has been
with us for a very, very long
time"
The problem first appeared in
the late 1970s, when petroleum
products starved showing up in
tidal pools in Uie Pacific Ocean.
In the mid-1980s, the community
around the refinery started
smelling fumes from the ground.
Fortunately there are two fac-
tors working to keep what is
probably the largest spill in U.S.
history from causing major near-
term environmental devastation
First, the three aquifers under
the site are not used for local
drinking water and do not feed
water to the surface And second.
Chevron has mounted an enor-
mous containment and cleanup
effort
Already the company has
spent between $200 million and
J300 million and may spend that
again in years to come Engi-
neers have put new bottoms on
130 above-ground tanks and have
uncovered all of the refinery's
piping and have retrofitted much
of it
They have developed a sophis-
ticated computer model to study
the earths topography and have
dug hundreds of wells for a va-
riety of purposes
There are wells that extract
vapors. There are wells that do
nothing but monitor the outward
extent of the plume
There are wells that pump out
pollution There are wells that
pump out water, in an attempt to
make the pollution flow toward
the pollution pumps And finally
there are wells lined up along the
beach that pump in water to keep
the pollution from going into the
Pacific and other unwanted di-
rections
"eryis "8m«»rea- wiui «ni ■■ *n« ■;
changes in tides raise and lower
the water Uble and all of its pol-
lutants. Talks between Chevron
and local environmenul authori-
ties on what to do with the soil
are begiiming
Fear of disaster
Back in San Bernardino, the
problem is not long-term pollu-
tion but a lingering fear that dis-
aster might strike again
As it turns out, the pipeline ex-
plosion was not caused by some
freak occurrence, or some long-
standing problem with the pipe-
Ijne. but by a tragic accident that
happened 10 days before the ex-
plosion.'
Behind the story of the San
Bernardino pipeline is what may
be the best example of the short-
comings of the Office of Pipeline
Safety.
OPS officials were on site and
watched as rescue workers
dragged the scrap metal tha^
was once a freight train from the
side of a track Under which lay
the submerged pipeline.
The derailment- itself caused
the death of three people and in-
jured another 11 as the train ca-
reened out of control on a sharp
curve at the bottom of a hill.
As the accident was cleaned
up, heavy equipment rumbled
over the pipeline picking up
pieces of metal, in some cases
digging them up. When the work
was done, the OPS went home
and ordered the resumption of
service in the line over the objec-
tion of local officials The pipe-
line had been inspected in a few
select points only, and no effort
was made to see il the excavat-
ing equipment could have dam-
aged the line.
"Their attitude seemed cava-
lier to say the least," said city
attorney James Penman "l
would hope they learned some-
thing from the experience"
The city certainly learned
something 11 Penman could do it
over he says he would declare the
area a crime scene, close it off
and press negligent homicide
charges.
Monday Regulation, or a cozy
relaUonship^
Inu
Thene
The Family
deMgned gr
in.d can )^l
F-imiiy A*,
inp plans 2
li.iljncesar,
pri lieges. 1
.iivT waixt-
nr charge*
cumulau\-e
requiremcn
niei Youll
coupon bu
financial dr
and other s
V an adde
convenienc
202
A-20 /Th. Moulton Po«l/Sun*>y, Moy J3, 1993 *
TexaS:was marred by 42 spills!
over 10,000 gallons last year
By Dan CARNEr
POST WASHINGTON BUREAU
WASHINGTON — Last year,
there were 42 liquid ptpeliDe and
storage tank spills of at least
10,000 gallons in the suie of Tex-
as.
From Beaumont to El Paso,
from the Rio Grande Valley to
the Panhandle, a total of 2 34
million gallons of various petro-
leum products weit spilled, ac-
cording to documejAs from two
sources
The Texas Railroad Commiv
sion. which monitors only intra-
state pipelines that begin and end
within the state, recorded 1 25
million gallons spilled Oil Spili
Intelligence Report, an Arling-
ton, Mass -based company that
collates documents from several
federal sources, found another
11 million gallons from storage
tanks and pipelines that did not
show up on the Railroad Com-
mission's list
The worst spills were in San
Patricio County, across the Nue-
ces Bay from Corpus Christi
Pipelines operated by Coastal
States Crude Gathering Co
spilled three times between Sep-
tember and December, dumping
56 1 .792 gallons of jet fuel, butane
and diesel fuel. (One of the lines
was leaking again last week
when The Houston Post inter-
viewed local officials by tele-
phone)
Big pipeline spills also were
recorded in Bee County, immedi-
ately to the north of San Patricio
County, in Hulchins County in the
Panhandle and in Wichita Falls
The biggest tragedy of lb*
year occurred in Breoham,
where an explosion of a salt
dome operating as a storage fa-
cility for liquid petroleum caused
the death of three people
Being the energy capital of the
United States, Texas has clearly
had more than its share of pipe-
line and storage tank leaks But
for all the spills in the state, the
Houston area has done remark-
TEXAS SPiLLS '92
&( mwim. here ae the
number of bcxh intrastate and
inierstaie pipetine-reJaied
split IP Texas tc 1992
SPaiAGE I
MONTH
NUMBER
(taHont)
Jsnuanr
5
402,430
February
6
348.362
Uardi
7
398.550
Apnl
2
70.000
May
3
52,000
I June
S
134,000
Jut»
6
237,000
August
3
3e.ooo
Septembtc
2
84,000
October
1
273,000
MiMBto
0
0
December
1
246,000
TOTAL
42
2i»1.M4
Here are the number of
pipeline-related spills for the
past five
years (Of facilities |
trial begi
1
land end
in Texas
SHLLAGE
YEAR
NtmBBn
totHon)
1968
1989
u
776,000
i
552.000
1990
23
. 361,000
1991
13
1,030.000
1992
at
1,300.000
TOTAL
76
4,021,000
Source Teus Railroad Commjuon
The Houston Post
able well, at least on paper.
Despite having a vast web of
interstate and intrasute pipe-
luves carrying a variety of liquid
products through the area, the
area has fared relatively wen on
papa
In 1992. a Panhandle Eastern
Pipeline spilled 16,000 gallons
into Buffalo Bayou, a Texas
Eastern pipeline spilled 63,000
gallons in Deer Park and a
Coastal States pipeline spilled
30,000 gallons of butane, which
caught fire
In 1991, a year in which a sin-
gle pipeline in the Panhandle
leaked 1.4 million gallons, the
Houston area saw only one
10,000''galloo.leak, in Baytown.
Some experts believe the
Houston area might benefit from
its cadre of trained inspectors
and other energy industry per-
sonnel, and from the fact that
operators of heavy equipment
that can puncture lines are more
careful, given all the under-
ground pipelines in the area.
"I would say, given the concen-
tration of pipelines in the Hous-
ton area, the companies are
probably more attuned to pipe-
line location and maintenance,
. than in other areas," says Brian^
Scbaible, a spokesman for the
Railroad Commission.
Another theory held by some is
that Houston-area industry and
local municipalities have some of
the best emergency response
units in the country '
William Zagorski, the San Pa-
tricio emergency coordinator.'
says the reason his county, and
neighboring Corpus Cbnsti, have
reported so many spills is not be-,
cause companies operating there'
are unusually sloppy Rather, be
says, the area has one of the most
aggressive and "proactive" poU-
cies of ferreting out environmen-
tal and public safety disasters
before they happen.
To that end. the many refiner-
ies and pipeline companies in the
area are constantly being visited
by local emergency officials.
"It's not that we have a whole
lot more than anybody else, but
it's reported," Zagorski says.
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203
tJ9ttof»v?(rtf h^^Mj"^^^
J^ firms have pipeline to regulators?
Critics say agency lax
in stopping accidents
Tbis is the second of three reports
eiamining pipeline and storage tank
leaks and tbeir regulaUoa Today:
RegtilatioD. or a cozy relatioBship?
By Dan Carney
post washington bureau
WASHINGTON — Not far Irom
Fredericksburg, Va., two migbty riv-
ers converge. From the west, the
Rappahannock descends from the
Shenandoah Moun-
tains oc its way to
the Chesapeake
Bay. From the
south, one of Colo-
nial Pipeline Co.'s
trunk lines brings
refined petroleum
products from
Houston to the
Northeastern Unit-
ed SUtes.
Normally, the
pipeline passes un-
der the river unnoticed. But on a frig-
id night at the end of 1989, it rup-
tured, sending 210,000 gallons of
kerosene into an open field.
iJ^ik^A
Fighting freezing temperatures,
crews' hired by Colonial constructed
earthen berms and assured the city
they would contain the spill. For 14
days they were right.
"We bad been lulled into a false
sense of security by their assur-
ances," says City Attorney Jim Pates.
"When in fact we didn't realize the
dangec that awaited us."
The danger manifested itself on
New Year's Eve when the kerosene
broke through and poured into a trib-
utary of the Rappahannock. From
there it flowed into the big river and
right up to the intake point for the
Please see SPILL, A-a
204
SPILL: Critics say industry has pipeline to regulators, control lax
MmA-i cy coosidcn tfat biuot rlik **>
aliQde^ttL
e«y« wiur «y«enu- "I've never tea i r*f«l*'«7
For the tirjt week o( ttae new agency k mucb Is bed with IB-
ytar Fr«lenckiburt WM withoat iiatiy." uys P«le». "PipeUae
■Iter and the the |0*enior de-
cUrtd the county t diiutcr area
Had thu been a one-time oc-
arrence, the city would have
ihragged it oil Biit the tame
pipeline bad njptured in the
tame place mnt yean bdore, for
the tame reaton. aid with the
tame coosequencet-
: Of aU tilt IM.OOO miloona-
tertute Imuid-cirryioj pipeline
: wiUun the United Sutet thai tpUl
' an average of more than 11.3
'- million gallons a year, and al-
most • quarter of a tuUuw gal-
. Ions over two decades, the Colo-
nial line is perhaps the most
: notorious
' Colonial katw cf a potential
■ problem m ua thin-wj/fed hif h-
ductile tteel pipeliM wtaea a. was
: Uid in the early l«Wt It even
hired a company to study ways ol no
. preventing the problem, which is
known as "railroad fatigue." and
is caused by tuiy cracks that d»
velop when the pipeline is
' shipped to nte by train.
Despite careful thipping. in
1970 the company had its first
railroad faugue rupture oea
4.6 million gallont per year,
which translatet to t,H7 (allons
per hillioo loD-milet Tbe ll.>
millioo faUoot a year pipeliDet
•pilled traotlatet lb M^U gal-
lons per billion tno-mllet.
The oumbert are even more
ttrlkiog is IMl and 1N2, after
the unker industry dealt with the
Exxon Valdei spill of 10 I mil-
lion gillons of crude oil into
Alaska's Prince William Sound in
Ilia During thoae two yean
pipelines spilled U.SI million
laUoas to SIO.OOO ipilled by
ttnkcn aad barges
This huge dilpartty pacaa de-
•pKe ttae lact that taoken and
barges lace a number of advene
condiuons that do not effect pipe-
lines, including Korms, tides,
currents, winds, fop and cap-
tains who are not always at the
helm
Just beginning to rcaliie the
extent of the problem. Cofrta
in IMl propoaed pipeime legitla-
Mtm. The act tpecified a number
OPS Director Gcorft Tenley al procedural chasget but p«r-
tays thai much o( Ok criticism haps its most radical feature is
accident victims have abtolntely
no ttaoding over at OPS. We
can't partiapate is their hear-
ings They wool provide docu-
menu filed as pan of enforce-
ment proceedings We have
IH^iiing "
Other aitia tt ttae agency ar-
gM that CMS U it tectded to
crack daw* so pipeline compa-
■iet. il It a muipprt eo *> to
With oaly 24 iaspectort ana as
equal number of office wwken.
It IS expected to monitor 160,000
miles of liquid pipelinet and 17
million milet of gas lines
"OPS U only about SO people,"
says Charles Batten, of the Na-
tional Transportation Safety
Board "If you look at what It's
charged with, and lay: 'Fifty peo-
ple are gomg U do that?' Ttaere'i
bis agency comes under u unfair,
often driven by pobticians who
legitimately Hand up for local
interesu but aren't tesstlUve to
the disruptions In interstate com-
merce they can cause.
Tuscaloosa, Ala The same thmg f^^^ political decisions
happened again in Mercer Coun- "^
ty. NJ , -u 1«75 and twice in
"State and local people uy, 'I
was elected to leak out lor the
people's interest and you aren't
letting me do this.' " Tenley tays
Bui these are decisions that
have to be made outside of a po-
litical arena."
Regarding the number of fed-
eral inspectors, he says no num-
ber will be sufficient if compa-
nies don't adequately oversee
themselves and if users of hack-
hoes and other beav)- equipment
thai can rupture pipelines oper-
ate oblivious of whai is under-
foot
"If 1 had a thousand inspec-
tors, most of the ipills in the last
five years probably would have
occurred anyway." Tenley says
_^. .... According to Tenleys agency.
uons but has no enforcement ao- pipelinet carrying crude oil, gas-
thority - blamed the tplU on oline. heating oil, keroiene and
railroad faugue II urged the Of- other products spilled 126 million
tice of PIpebne Safety, wtocb pUons in the 20 years ending -
regulates all interstate, and
GreenvUle. S.C. — in May and
June 117!
Spills in Beaumont In l>71. and
Housion in 1>76. appeared to
' have tht same cause, a federal
report concluded But no defini-
tive conclasiorB were reached
since meullurgical studies had
not been conducted before the
pipelines were lehoried
Easy to idantify
With this much of a history of
railroad laugue spills, the Na-
tional Trantporlation Safety
Board had no problem after the
first Fredericksburg tplll m 1»»0
identifying the cause
The board — which issues find-
ings and makes lecommcnda'
many mtrasute. pipelines to «
der a replacement of certain por-
tions of the line
The OPS Ignored the wtnat
■ and history repealed ittell m a
field outside Fredenckshurg
1W2 — or a Utile over lU tnil-
lion gallons a year
The numbert do not reflect
spills companies say are below a
threshold amoom — 2.100 gal-
loot before IMS and 210 gallont
. ttnee then Nor do they r^lecf
To this dav the dty doo not pipelints that are eiempt from
believe the problem has been regulauon, including low-pret-
corrected and like many other sure linet and rural I'tberlng
communities around the country, lines such at a Marathon Oil Co
has developed ao adversarial re- pipeline la Carlsbad. N M, that could see no reason lor Increat-
UUonship with the OPS leaked 1 4 million gaUont Ing the number ol thuloti valves
The city liled a oetiuoo under Despite these eicepuoot the In addition to more thutoll
the Freedom ol Information Act rate of pipeline spills u more valves, there are a number of
to find out what the agency knew than twice the rate ol unker and proposals often made lor de-
about the condition ol Colonial barge spUls recorded by the US creasing the number and amount
pipeline The peuuoo was denied Coast Guard, both in absolute of pipeline spUls.
A similar petition by The numbers and as a percenuge of One method is knows as hydro-
Houston Post lor OPS dau mdi- too-miles ol shipped product stauc testing, where compania
eating which pipelines the ageo- Tankers and baLjes tpiU about thui down a pipeliie. fUl It with
that it adds the phrase "and the
protection ol the environment"
to eiistmg legulation governing
the Office ol Pipeline Safety
As odd as It may teem, the
OPS had never considered pro-
tecting the environment part of
Its mission, and It had never con-
sidered environmental coctt of
spills when deciding what kind ol
requirements to place on pipeline
companies.
It wat actually the National
Transporuiios Salety Board that
Intitted on the change, teeing
talely and pollution as going
hand- In- band.
The NTSB realiied the OPS
wasnl requiring enough remote-
ly controlled shutoll valves and
other devices to prevent spills
because iu studies showed they
were not worth the cost
Bookkaaping awry
But tbe OPS's cott-benefit
itudies did take into account en-
vironmental cottt. which are of-
ten the tingle largest part ol a
^lUl
For example, when an Exxon
pipeline under the Arthur Rill
Waterway linking New Jertey
and New York's SUten Iiland
ruptured Is 1019. ttae company
spent miUions oo Iu own on
cleanup ellons and then paid out
IIS millioo u a court tetUcment
Bat OB ttae OPS books, the tpUl
wMld go down at a relatively
minor one tlnce no one was killed
or Intnred and do property wat
allected With a databate ol
these kinds ol Incidents, the OPS
PIPELINE
SPILLS '92
By month. h«f» art th«
numb«f ot pip»iin«-r«lai»d
tpiUs in th« Un(1*d St«tM
tor 1902 CauMsbst*d
rtdud* corroton,
•qutpTiani mAtlundion. tin*
br*«kl and unknown.
SPILUCC
mum
mmi. w.-
tjGS3^0()0.
f*(U«Y 1?..
;"776JS<ip.'
Aprt .,._ _ y.
W.J --1
»i?X
^ 13
259 000
fi~- " JJ
co«.w>
525,100
"220^000
Odobw 3
Its^wse - i--
43,000
OKmttM 2
'roriiL" 114
4.Kr*)0
S«n. CM Son nri««><» nwov
Th« i«us»n Pott
water and Increase the presture
well beyond where It would olh-
erwite be. Inspectxirt then look
lor pools ol water
It Is arguably the single most
eflective leak prevention meth-
od, but pipeline companies don't
like It^ 11 causes them to lose rev-
enue and they argue it can cause
ruptures under the high water
presture that wouldn't otherwite
happen.
Another technology in use Is a
device known as a "smart pig."
which moves through the pipeline
with iu normal flow, surveying
the inside ol lU walls It can be
effective In some cases, but
much of the pipeline infrastruc-
ture was not built with the most
sophisticated kmds ol pigs In
mind and contains turns thai are
too sharp, changmg pipeline ap-
ertures and other Impedimenu
Vapors can sometimes be
smiled by machines known as
chromatographs. or even as Esso
Chemical Canada iound out by
more conventionlional snillers
— dogs
Fredericksburg has not bad
another spill since 1919. but Colo-
nial has had three other spills In
the area, culminatmg on March
21 ol Ihis year when 27S.000 gal-
lons spewed out ol one ol lU lines
Into a creek u Reston, Va
Perhaps because ol lU proxim-
ity to Washington — some ol the
heating oil flowed through the
nation's capiul oo the Potomac
and could be smelled as lar away
as Mount Vernon — this spill has
caught the ailenuon ol govern-
ment ollicials.
Touring the site alterward.
lederal olliciali ordered a lull m-
vestigation and declared that
when i! comes to pipeline regula-
tion "environmental protection is
as imporunt as public taleiy "
Tut irfij Uvwg wiu tt*r-
205
a
ess
t Uken on 1
n. after decU
authority ov
tlon of the si
e
OB
m
that hav
Ken Ode
federal
investig
e
tal
ocal media,
ipanies.
ly Attorney
in state am
irted hi3 own
*
r^ zi 11-
le
ipatb
lifar
rravia
a va
kfar
1
41 P ill llill
III ll '|=I^-P^*
206
STATE OF NEW MEXICO
ENERGY JtfllNERALS AND NATURAL RESOURCES DEPARTMENT
OIL CONSERVATION DIVISION
September 3. 1991
•os'C'Cieo" ??(
SANTA 'E NEWM(I.::{
Mr. W. J. Mueller
Phillips Petroleum Company
4001 Pennbrook
Odessa. TX 79762
Re: AGING INFRASTRUCTURE INDUSTRY COMMITTEE . '
Dear Mi. Mueller.
Thank you for agreeing to serve on the Agijig liiriasinicliire Cosiiuiiltce. I believe that this
committee will address iome of ihe most critical and complex issues facing the oil and gas
industry' loday and in the future. In the first four months of this year, 60% of production line
leaks reponed to OCD and 86% of injection line leaks were attributed to corrosion — totaling
approximately 3,400 barrels of oil and 3,900 barrels of water. These losses are exclusive of the
35,000 barrel condensate loss reponed by an operator in the Indian Basin field. Also, we have
reason to believe that the reponed spills represent only 10 to 50% of actual leaks.
Bill Mueller with Phillips Petroleum in Midland, Texas has agreed to chair this commiiiee.
Following is a list of issues for your consideration and deliberation. Please do not feel limited
by this list or feel that all items on the list need addressing or are of equal importance.
1. Equipment corrosion — valves, tanks, but especially flow lines and gathering systems.
a. Investigate the frequency of mechanical failures and ihe conditions affecting
failure. How does pressure, temperature, fluid properties, and composition and
age of the pipe effect the mechanical integrity of pipe and equipment and what
remedies can be employed to prevent failure.
b. Recommendations for additional regulations or industry guidelines.
2. Procedures for increasing product inventory conirol — icpon unaccounted product loss
■or gain even when spills are not evidenced.
a. Recommendations for additional regulations or industry guidelines.
207
3. General review of the current status of well bores and maintenance and testing
procedures which could ensure mechanical integrity of casing and cement jobs over
periods of 20 to 50 years. What can/should industry do to extend the mechanical life of
producing wells?
a. With our current c(7orts to extend ilic useful life of producing wells and to
encourage additional ternary technology and application, there may be procedures
and/or techniques which will allow longer service )ife for our existing wellbores.
I have enclosed a list of committee members, their addresses^and telephone numbers. By copy
of this letter, I am requesting a committee representative from B.L.M. and the State Land
Office. A member of OCD's Environmental Bureau will also be attending meetings and can
provide the committee with reported spill occurrence and frequency information. The next
contact you will receive will be from Cliniriii.in Mueller who will set the agenda and time and
place for your first mectmg. Let me know if I or any member of the OCD staff can be of help
in supplying information or pursuing ilie goals of this committee. 1 appreciate your willingness
to serve and look forward to receiving the results of your study.
Very truly yours
/ILLIAM J. LeMAY,
Director I
WJL/dp
Enclosure
208
SOUTHWEST RESEARCH AND INFORMATION CENTER
P.O. Box 4524 Albuquerqu*. NM 87106 505-262-1862
MARATHON INDIAN BASIN GAS PLAN7 GATHERING LINE LEAK -
INCIDENT SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ENFORCEMENT ACTION
prepared by
^hris Shuey
Director, Community Water Quality Program
Southwest Research and Information Center
July 16, 1991
For 20 years a continuing tradition of affective dtizen action
209
MARATHON INDIAN BASIN GAS PLANT GATHERING UNE LEAK -
INCIDENT SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ENFORCEMENT ACTION"
prepared by
Chris Shuey, DirecJor, Community Water Quality Program
Southwesl Research and Inlormalion Center
July J6, 1991
This paper summarizes the available information on the leak of petroleum
condensate and produced water at the Marathon Oil Company Indian Basin gds-
processing plant near Carlsbad, N.M. The information and data herein are based on
SRlC's review of documents provided by Marathon to the New Mexico Oil
Conservation Division (NMOCD) through Monday July 8, 1991, and on intervi.^ws
with officials of relevant state and fedeia] agencies.i Much of the most recent
information was taken from documents provided by NMOCD -to the Wal?: Quality
Control Commission (WQCC) on July 9 and in SRIC's telephone interviews with
NMOCD officials on July 10 and July'l2 and with U.S. Bureau of Land Managemen';
(ELM) officials on July 15 and 16. SRIC's concerns about the leak and its
recommendations for enforcement action to deter future leaks are discussed
SOURCE AND LOCATION OF THE LEAK - The leak occurred in Gathering Lin= ='
a point about 800 feel south of the Marathon Indian Basin plant in section 23,
T.21.S., R.23.E., Eddy County, New Mexico, about 25 miles northwest of Carlsbac.
VOLUME AND CHEMISTRY OF LEAKED FLUIDS - According to NMOCD, 1.47
million gallons (35,000 barrels) of unrefined natural gas condensate and 840,000
gallons (20,000 barrels) of produced water le<.ked from the gathering line between
November 1990 and April 12, 1991, when the leak was discovered by Marathon
personnel. David Boyer, NMOCD environme.ital bureau chief, told the WQCC on
July 9 that he assumes that the produced water is at least as salty as sea water, that is,
that it has a total dissolved solids concentration of at least 35,000 parts per million.
He also said ihat the n jiural gas condensate its.elf is a complex mixture of aromatic
and aliphatic hydrocarbons in extremely high concentrations. "
CAUSE OF THE LEAK ~ Marathon stated in a Jvne 11 report to the Enviro..r->r.'ntal
Protection Agency (EPA) that the gathering line failure was "the result of ' -r
H2S (hydrogen sulfide) corrosion in the bottom, water carrying portion of tl>-
•5EOLOGY OF THE SJTE — The leak site is underlain by 12 feet to 16 feet of gravnily
'•uvium i.". r;ocky Arroyo. The alluvium rests or alteuidling beds of dolomite (or
.agnesiuin limestone") and sandstone. Fracture;, and joints persist throughout
these strata and are acknowledged by NMOCD to '.ie a principal path for migration of
iSRIC has not reviewed Maratho-. "s latest report, w.hich was subndttec tc
NKOCD on Tuesday July 9, 199I.
210
fluids to the Lower Queen aquifer, which supplies potable water to wells in the
region and which begins about 175 feel below the land surface at the plant site.
EXTENT OF CONTAMINATION — As of June 25, condensate and produced water were
detected in several boreholes in the alluvium and in the top few inches of the
dolomite at a maximum distance of 3,800 feet from the leak site. Two boreholes
drilled into the dolomitic bedrock to 76 feel and 65 feet (boreholes #80 and #81 on
attached Map 1) haJ hydrocarbon odois; a third bedrock borehole, #82, encountered
liquid condensate at 41.5 feet below the land surface. These three boreholes are
located at distances of 2^00 feet, 3300 feet, and 3,700 feet from the leak site. A trace of
benzene, a petroleum coi\stituent, was delected In ground water in the Lower Queo'-.
aquifer at 175 feet below the land surface in a borehole (#83) located at the
southeastern edge of the contaminant plume about 3.200 feet from the leak site.
During the first week of July, condensate was detected floating on the water table of
\s Lower Queen in two ground water monitoring wells. Borehole #84, which is
!• icafed 4,200 feet northeast of the leak point, contained one-quarter inch of
C'ir.densate; borehole #85, which is located about 5,000 feel due east of the leak s.:e,
contained one foot of condensate. (See Map I.) Tne depth to ground water in thr.se
two wells is about 207 feel. Detection of condensate on the water table of the Lo\.er
Queen suggests leakage through the dolomite via fractures and joints.
Mr. Boyer told SRIC on July 12 that a new monitoring well drilled 1300 fee( ea>l (or
downgradient) of borehole #85 did not show condensate contamination. As :.t '' jI'.-
16, BLM officials said Marathon is still trying to determine the areal extent of li..
contaminant plume while recovering as much petroleum product as possible.
SOURCE OF THE CONDENSATE - According to NMOCD. Marathon official , said
last week that the condensate in borel-.clcs #84 and #85 is "weathered" and does no.
chemically match that of the leaked fluids. As of late on July 12, NMOCD officia s
had not verified Marathon's claim. Howevei, Mr Beyer told WQCC members on
July 9 and SRIC staff in telephone conversations on July 10 and 12 that the agency
holds Marathon responsible for the contaminaiion since tliere are no other sources
of petroleum pollutants in the area. NMCXD Director William LeMay confirmed
the agency's position in a telephone conversation with SRIC staff on July 11.2
REGULATORY ORDERS TO DATE — Upon notification that a spill had occuned on
April 12, Marathon was ordered by both NMOCD and BLM to begin an investigatio:.
of the cause and exteivt of the kak. Soil organic vapor aixilyses were submitted bv
Marathon to NMOCD during the last week of April and first week of May; those
data depicted a plume of confaminanli grading eastward from the spill site along i!
2An inopectlon of a imp contained in Marathon's June 11 report to EPA
shows that a condensate and produced water gathering line (Line 13) travel ses
Section 2< In the approxiiBat© area of borehole #35. (See attached Map II.) If
the chemistry of the condensate In that monitoring well is confirmed to be
different than that of the leaked fluids, the possibility of previous leaks
from Line 43 should bo investigated.
2
211
axis o/ Rocky Arroyo. (See Map I.) A NMCXTD letter of May 15 directed Marathon to
conduct further investigations and to recover condensate and produced water. By
mid-June, Marathon had received p>ermiss;on from NMOCD to drill monitoring
welJs through the dolomite and info the Lower Queen aquifer. The detection of
condensate in the Lower Queen wells n>oreholes #83, #&4, and #85) at distances of
up to neatly one mile from the leak site prompted NMOCD on July 4 to order
Marathon to drill atvl complete addition iJ monitoring wells 1,500 feet east of
boreholes #ft4 and ^B5, or approximately 1.2 miies from the point of the pipeline
leak. Marathon also is required to subjiiil a comprehensive remediation plan to
NMOCD and BLM once the full extent of the contamination is determined.
DAMAGE TO PROPERTY — NMOCD offjcials said that the closest water wells aiid
springs used for drinking purposes are located about 3 miles east of the plant site
along Rocky Arroyo Marathon's weekly sampling and analyses of water from thosf
sources have not detected petroleum-reJaled contamination, NMOCD and BLM
officials said. The Pecos River is about 1? miles east of the nearest domestic well.
MARATHON COMPLIANCE — As of the /jrst of July, U\e company had drilled 85
boreholes, of which 50 are completed as recovery wells. Of those, 20 to 30 are
recovering fluids from atop the doloniite at its interface with the alluvium. Mr.
Boyer said that as of July 1, the company had recovered nearly 3,400 barrels of
condensate (about 9.7 percent of the volunie leaked) and more than 8,000 barrels of
produced water (about 40 percent of the volume leaked)
HISTORY OF THE LEAK — Mr. Boyer told the WQCC that the leak probably began
sometime in November 1990. During that month, Marathon reported a more than
50-percent reduction in condensate production. Until the time the leak was detected
in April, the company told state and federal officials that it could not determine the
reason for the discrepancy between actual production and theoretical productior.
The discrepancy persisted, however, through March 1991 when condensate
production was only about a quarter of normal, as shown in Table 1 below.
At the time of the leak, the condensate and produced water gathering lines were nor
equipped with meters to measure flow; the total combined flow from the four
gathering lines was (and continues to be) measured Inside the plant. BLM officials
said that condensate and produced water are sepju-ated at the production wells before
being recombined for transport to the plant through the gathering lines.-"-
N'isual inspections of the gathering lines by company personnel did not delect
leakage until plant workers observed a "sinkhole" at the leak point on April 12. The
leak occurred in a section of steel pipe that was installed five years ago after a fla:;h
flood in Rocky Arroyo broke an existing PVC gathering line, resulting in a much
^Saltwater and condensate are piocJuced ftom about 40 natural gas wells
located within a 7-{nilw radius of the plant, Marathon docxunents show.
212
TobI* 1. CoAd*n»at« PreduOion at Morothon Indian Botin Plant
(selccled data fiwn 1989. 199C, and 199], in barrels, daU from NMOCD)
Month/Year
Production
Apnll9B9
12,000
November 1989
10,600
December 1989
UOOO
April 1990
11,000
October 1990
If. 600
November 1990
4,600
December 1990
4,400
January 1991
5,600
February 1991
3300
March 1991
2300
April 1991
7,700
smaller leak. (All gathering Jines coming into the plant are made of PVC.) The nev
steel section was not equipped with cdthodic protection to prevent external or
internal corrosion. Since the April 12 leak, the failed section of gathering line has.
been replaced with a section of PVC inserted into a larger-diameter steel pipe
FUTURE REGUIATORY RESPONSES — NMOCD officials say that are concerned
that the advancing age of oil-field infrastructure (gathering lines, product pipelir.ci,
storage tanks, production well casings, etc.) is causing inaeased environmental
damage in the southeast oil fields. Mr. Boyer reported that NMCX^D has observfd a
significant increase in leaks and spills in the last two to three years and thai mudi o)
that increase is attributable to corrosion of gathering lines and injection lines.
N.MOCD statistics for the first four months of 1991 reveal the extent of the proticn.
of a^i. .g ii\fraslructure and the apparent widespread lack of compliance by oper alo: >
w:th th£- spill reporting requirements of the WQCC and NMOCD regulalions:
• Corrosion caused 61 percent of al! production-line leaks and 86 peicent of 2ll
injection-line leaks.
• About 3/400 barrels of petroleum condensate were lost from corrosion-causea
leaks in lines and tanks; that numlHir represents 55 percent of all .:. ' issi ;
reported by operators to NMOCD in the first third of 1991.
• CojTosion was responsible for 8S psicent of the 3,900 barrels of pioduw-c; v.a'..r
Icst from leaks in production and injection lines.
• OiJy 10 percent to SO percent of a:! leaks are actually reported to NMOCC.
The Marathon leak points to the need fo require operators to demonstrat'-* the
213
.. --I 'Ay of their pipes, casings, tanks and other facilities on a regular basis, Mr.
Bc; w. lOld the WQCC, adding that NMOCD will move aggressively by next spring ti*
propose and adopt new regulations to ensure integrity of pipelines in order to
prevent leaks. Mr. LcMay told SRIC that NMOCD intends to convene a task force to
study the issue and make recommendations foi leguJatory actions.
SRIC? CONCERNS-,— SRIC is concerned that the state is not contemplating
additional enforcement action against Marathon. There are several reasons why-
court-imposed fines and penalties should be sought, including —
«
• The magnitude of the leak. At 2.3 nullion gallons, the Marathon leak is one
of the largest unrefined petroleuu; spills in the state's history, possibly second
only to the more than 500,000 barrels of crude oil that has leaked into the
Ogallala Aquifer in Lea County frum hundreds of corroded oil well casings
who£* construction dates> to the 1920s and 1930s.
• The toxicity of the fluids. The leaked fluids can be acutely and chronically
toxic to both humans and animals The condensate and produced water tire
likely to conlaii\ very high levels of aron^dtic hydrocarbons such as bejizt-ne 'a
known hun\an carcinogen), toluene, etliyll>en2ene, and xylenes. The
produced water is corrosive because it is a concentrated brine. Tlie produ».ea
water may also contain elevated toncentratiojis of naturally occurring
radioactj-e materials including radium-226, another carcinogen.
• The extent and duiation of environmental damage. Although the exter. lo
which ground water has been polluted ren-ains uncertain, a large area of soils
and rock has been contaminated and will remain so for years, if not decacies.
The fractures in the dolomite have been shown to be effective conduits f -r
contaminant migration. The fact that condensate from some source has l'.-;-
found on top of the water table of the Lower Queen aquifer is indicativ-. ■ il
potential for long-term, continuing discharges of toxic pollutants to the
ground water. The damage that these long-tern\ discharges may bring to ;;-.e
regional ground water system may rvot be known for severjj years.
• Company negligence. Marathon could have prevented this leak if it had
equipped the 200-foot steel section of Line U4 with cathodic protection or
installed flow meters on each of tl-.e four gathering lines coming into the
plant or at the individual wellheads. The company apparently did not stare
diligently for the cause of the discrepancy in its condensate produc!»or
volumes when the 50-percent-plu.s loss was noted in November bird;,ie tha.
discrepancy ^ew even larger over the following four months. <
<The law enforcemfent unit ^.f bLy.'s stsi* c-fClct in Santa Fe is
Co:nd'JCting a "rou'.ine" invescigaticri rt.o the cause jt th« leak and wh«tLri>3r
any fedeial envlro.irriental, niineial. '..■ fraud laws were vioiated.- BLt-: offiuia-s
ct.nfi rmed. BLM law enforcement persoi..'.-;! havt visited the plant site and
i .te: . '--ed Karathon employees about ti.e cause and history oi the leak.
214
• Possible violation of WOCC Regulations. NMOCD officials said they "take as
a given" that the numerical standards of the Commission's regulations have
been, or will be, violated once the fluids reach ground v^ater, if they have not
already as a result of migration of pollutants to the Lower Queen aquifer.
SRtC'S R£COMMEN0ATJ0NS — SRJC believes that state must take additional
enforcement action gainst Marathon in order to send a dear message that the
people of New Mexico expect industry to lake proactive steps to prevent leaks and
spills of toxic substances. TWo lega^ avenues vre available to the state in this regard.
I
• Court-imposed penalties and fines. 9iould ground water be confirmed to
have been cdntanuiuted as a result of the leak. NMOCD, on behzdf of the
Water Quality Control Commission, should initiate a dwl action in state
district court for Eddy County against Marathon for violation of the
Cor.jnission's regulations Suc!\ action is authorized by the state Water
Quality Act (WQA, §74-6-10.8.;. The actioii $hi»uld seek-fines commenvuratt-
with the damage cattsed by Jhe it^k and recow-ry of expenses incurred m
investigating the leak and prosecuting the claims.
• Assurance of piscontiiiuance. Either independent of a courl action o: *.: :i
result of it, the Commission shouIJ require Marathon to enter into :■■■:
Assurance of Discontiiraance (auii-.orized by WQA §74-6-10.D.) that will guicU
cleanup of tht? Jcik and serve to rigulate Und mitigate) ongoing leaka^-? ;>l'
].yiutants through the bedrock imo the aquii'er below.
To e.nsure that leaks and spills are orovented and to facilitate state legal actior. win
pollution oj-cure. at least two regulatory and slatutor> charges are needed.
• New regulation.- for aging infras'riicture. As soon as is reasonably ieari'.'e.
N'MCXTD should piopc<se and adu-Ji. .ifter notice and opportunity for pubiic
comment and hearings, regulatioris thai rt-quirt; demonstration of th-^
integrity of all lines and equipmt: I that have the potential to leak
contaminants into the waters oi the slate.
• Administrative penalties and citizens suits. The Water Quality Act (§74- ;>-l
tlu-cugh 13, N.M.S.A. 1978, as amended) and the Oil and Gas Act (S70-2-:
throL^jh 36, N.M5JL 1978, as a:.ntnded) should be amended to crant the
W'QCC and ils conititusnt agenda's and the Oli Conservation Corr;mis5ic)n
the authority to Impose adinir.:.«;trative penalties and fines for violations of
the ?..'ts and their i.-nplemenline rc-iiridationc Thve&e statutes also should be
anie; Jed lo allow {<x private causes of acti.m by citizens against state agencies
thai fail to carry out nondiscretionarv dutJer- and against operators that vioiai*
ktate laws and regulations.
215
,35
|1-o-|| —
IJVW
216
MAP II
JUN 1 7 1991
oil CONSERVATION DV.
217
PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED BY WITNESSES
Testimony for the Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight
of the House Public Works and Transportation Committee
I am Donald R. Brinkley, Chief Executive Officer of Colonial
Pipeline Company. Colonial is a Delaware and Virginia corporation
that operates pipeline facilities through 14 states in the
Southeastern and Eastern United States. Colonial's pipeline system
transports nearly 80 million gallons of petroleum products per day
to serve the needs of the citizens of these and surrounding states;
this amount represents roughly 12 percent of United States' daily
consumption of petroleum products. In the State of Virginia, the
petroleum products delivered by Colonial accounted for
approximately 80 percent of the gasoline, fuel oil, and kerosene
consumed during 1989, the last year for which consumption data is
generally availeOsle.
Colonial appreciates the opportunity to address this committee
concerning the March 28, 1993 leak near Reston, Virginia, and the
implications that incident has for pipeline safety. Colonial
always welcomes the opportunity to discuss issues concerning
pipeline safety, and I am prepared to answer any questions you may
have regarding the Reston incident, the clean-up effort and the
many actions Colonial has undertaken in connection with this
incident.
Data show that pipelines are the safest mode of transportation for
petrolevim emd petroleum products, and I must emphasize that
218
Colonial's record is significantly better than that of the oil
pipeline industry in general. In 1991, for example, releases from
the Colonial system were less than one-third that of the overall
industry average on a ton-mile transported basis. Our recent
experience in Virginia should also be viewed from the perspective
that, while our Virginia leaks since 1968 have comprised 11.4
percent of overall DOT reportable leaks, pipeline mileage in
Virginia comprises 14 percent of the mileage of the entire system.
In our experience, there is a single thread running through the
series of leaks in Virginia and that is the prevalence of third-
party damage as the cause. Of the 10 reporteible leaks in Virginia
since 1980, fully one-half were due to third-party damage.
Based on the currently available physical evidence, it is clear
that the cause of this leak is mechanical deunage from a so-called
outside force. The NTSB metallurgical report, issued on May 11,
1993, indicates that the damage was caused by some sort of
excavating equipment.* As witnesses have testified or will testify
to this committee, much investigation remains to be done on who may
have damaged this pipeline. Nonetheless, the evidence so far
indicates that the excavation equipment was operated by a third
^ Tlw RTSB MatalluxgKt'a Faecual Kaport 1« cinul«t*nt with Colonial Pipollna'* original opinion that tha
36- inch lina rupturad bacauaa of outslda machanieal forca damaga. Tha diaeovary of traeas of foralgn natal In
tha OTitin »raa of tha groova duzin« tha HISB anal7>i« aupporta tha thaory that tha naehanieal daaa«a raaultad
froa axcavatins aqulpmant.
219
party.* Since all the facts regarding the damage to Colonial's
pipeline in Reston, Virginia are as yet unknown, insight into the
risks posed by third-party contractors can be gained by considering
another incident that occurred on the Colonial system in Fairfax
County. The particular incident to be discussed is the 1987
gasoline leak at Singleton's Grove subdivision near Centreville,
Virginia.
The Singleton's Grove Incident
The Singleton's Grove subdivision in Centreville, Virginia was
developed by the U.S. Home Corporation ("U.S. Home"). U.S. Home
designed the subdivision such that it is literally bisected by the
pipeline easement, containing both a 32-inch and a 36-inch
pipeline. Half of the subdivision was built on one side of the
pipelines and half on the other side. The subdivision is connected
by a street over the pipelines known as "Singleton's Way." In
addition, storm sewers, sanitary sewers, water, electrical and
telephone lines cross through the pipeline easement to connect both
halves of the subdivision.
^ Foe ««ir«r*l raasona, Coloolal could not hsv« b««a tha sourc* of tha daaa«a which causod the niptura.
Flrat, tha touca on tha ptpallna vhlch lad to tha fallura vaa loncltudlnal Ln natural that It followad tha llna
of tha plpa indieataa that tha aqulpaant vfaich daaa«ad tha llna vas oparatln* dlractly ovar tha plpalina, a
condition that- would not axiat in original construction. Second, aftar tha nptiira. Colonial raaovad tha covar
abova ita adjacant S2-lnch plpalina to Inapact ita condition in tha araa wfaaca tha 36-inch plpalina rupturad.
Colonial diacovarad toucaa on tha 32-lnch plpalina alailar to tha («>••• «» ^i>' 36-inch plpalina. It ta
azcaadinslr unllkaly that tha 32-lnch plpalina, which waa inatallad 20 raara prior to tha 36-inch plpalina,
would hava ataiilar (oucaa in tha a«M araa if tha daaa«a occurrad durin* initial inatallatlon of tha plpalina.
Finally, and aoat laportantlr to Coloalal, wa rasard tha poaaibilitF of danafa durinc original conatructlon to
have baen low bacauaa of our ajtactin* coaatructioo atandarda and tha hi«h dacraa of apaciallsad profaaalonaliaai
of our contractors .
220
As discussed below. Colonial had no input into the design of the
Singleton's Grove subdivision or the desirability of repeatedly
crossing its easement. Once the developer obtained site plan
approval for the sxibdivision from local officials, Colonial had no
authority to bar construction over its easement unless the proposed
encroachment actually threatened pipeline operations.
U.S. Home retained a s\ibcontractor , F.E. Gregory & Sons, Inc.
("Gregory") , to make a number of the utility crossings through the
pipeline easement. Gregory was also hired by U.S. Home to build
Singleton's Way over the pipeline easement.
At the time it was hired by U.S. Home, Gregory was in financial
difficulty and under Chapter 11 bankruptcy reorganization.
Further, while U.S. Home required Gregory to submit proof of
insurance, the bulk of Gregory's insurance did not cover
environmental or pollution damage that might occur if Gregory
struck one of the pipelines. In short, U.S. Home retained a
contractor to work in the pipeline easement who had no financial
ability to respond to any damage to the pipeline and no insurance
to cover any environmental or pollution damage if it struck the
pipelines.
Shortly after Gregory was hired, it began construction on an 8-inch
sanitary sewer that was designed to cross under Colonial's
pipelines. Colonial reviewed the drawings and procedures for
221
installation of the sewer svibmitted by U.S. Home. Colonial
requested that certain safeguards be implemented to protect the
pipelines, including restrictions on use of mechanized equipment
tmd prior notification to Colonial of any excavation of the
pipelines. The pxirpose of the notification requirement was to
permit a Colonial representative to be present when the pipelines
were exposed. Colonial's safety procedures were reduced to writing
in the form of a letter agreement between U.S. Home and Colonial.
On October 28, 1986, a Colonial representative went to the
Singleton's Grove sxibdivision responding to a call that had been
placed by Gregory to Miss Utility, the Virginia one-call service.
One-call services are central clearinghouses which contractors
notify prior to excavation so that companies with buried facilities
in the area can be notified and given an opportunity to respond.
Colonial's representative discovered that Gregory's employees were
in the process of exposing Colonial's pipelines with a backhoe.
This action was in violation of the written agreement Colonial had
with U.S. Home requiring notification and the presence of a
Colonial representative prior to excavation near the pipelines.
Gregory's excavation within the easement also violated the Virginia
one-call statute and Fairfax County ordinances, which required that
Gregory's employees make the Miss Utility call 48 hours before
excavating in the easement.
222
The Colonial representative halted Gregory's work and called a
Colonial supervisor. The Colonial supervisor lectured Gregory's
on-site foreman, Keith Carpenter, about Gregory's unauthorized
conduct. Colonial had no authority, however, to penalize Gregory
or to bar Gregory from working in the pipeline easement.
Approximately seven months later, Gregory began construction on
Singleton's Way, the street that crossed over the pipeline
easement. Colonial had reviewed the construction drawings for the
street submitted by U.S. Home and had requested a nximber of
safeguards to protect the pipelines. These safeguards included:
installation of protective concrete slabs over the pipelines where
the street crossed them, restrictions on the use of mechanized
digging equipment in the easement, and notification to Colonial so
that a Colonial representative could be present whenever work was
to be performed near the pipelines. Once again, these safeguards
were reduced to writing in a letter agreement between Colonial and
U.S. Home .
On June 11, 1987, Keith Carpenter, the same Gregory employee whom
Colonial had previously caught exposing the pipelines, struck
Colonial.' s 32-inch pipeline while excavating in the easement with
a 48-inch ripper blade attached to a bulldozer, this time without
any notice to Colonial or Miss Utility of the intended work. The
tip of the ripper blade punched a 4-inch by 4-inch hole in the 32-
223
inch pipeline that resulted in the release of approximately 15,000
gallons of premium grade gasoline into the Singleton's Grove
subdivision. The leak required extensive remediation efforts by
Colonial, U.S. Home and Fairfax County.
ACTIONS NEEDED TO PREVENT THIRD-PARTY DAMAGE
What lessons can be drawn from Colonial ' s experience at
Centreville, Virginia and, to the extent facts are known, from the
recent leak near Reston, Virginia? One clear lesson of the
Centreville incident is that the one-call systems available in this
country need strengthening. As noted above, no U.S. Home or
Gregory employee ever notified Colonial of the proposed use of the
ripper blade over the pipelines on June 11, 1987, either by calling
Colonial's office directly or by calling Miss Utility. This was a
breach of Colonial's letter agreement with U.S. Home and a
violation of the Virginia one-call statute and Fairfax County
ordinances. Despite the seriousness of this conduct, however, the
employee who struck the pipeline was never prosecuted. Charges
were brought against Gregory under the Fairfax County ordinances at
the initiative of Fairfax County's Department of Environmental
Management. This prosecution in the Fairfax County General
District Court ended with a fine of $1,000, $500 of which was
suspended. This nominal penalty is not an appropriate deterrent
for actions that potentially threatened the lives of construction
workers at the site and residents of the subdivision, and caused
substantially more than $2,000,000 in property damage.
224
A good initial step to strengthen one-call systems was taken by the
Congress in enacting § 304 of the Pipeline Safety Act of 1992,
which provided for criminal sanctions for one-call violations that
result in death, serious bodily injury or property damage, or the
release of more than 2100 gallons of petroleum. On the other hand,
these criminal sanctions can be a cumbersome method of dealing with
infractions of one-call rules and can only be invoked after a
sloppy excavator has caused serious damage. For example, § 304 of
the Pipeline Safety Act would not have permitted criminal sanctions
against Gregory the first time it was detected violating the one-
call rules at Singleton's Grove. Criminal sanctions for serious
accidents should hence be supplemented. One additional measure
that would strengthen one-call provisions would be to grant
authority to the Department of Transportation to levy substantial
civil penalties for an excavator's failure to utilize available
one-call notification systems regardless of the damage caused by
that failure. Granting the Department this authority will provide
additional incentive to those parties to comply with one-call
rules, and such incentive may, in fact, be greater than that
provided by rarely- invoked criminal sanctions.
The minor penalty assessed against Gregory Construction Company
after the Centreville incident also points out a related deficiency
of the penalty provisions of the Federal Oil Pollution Act. Under
that statute, a penalty of up to $1,000 per barrel can be assessed
against- the owner or operator of a facility while no penalty of a
8
225
corresponding magnitude can be assessed against the person who
causes the spill, if different from the ovmer or operator. In this
respect, OPA contrasts unfavorably with the provisions of the
Virginia oil spill statute under which the Virginia Department of
Environmental Quality has ample authority to seek penalties against
the person who ultimately is responsible for causing the spill.
Another lesson of the Singleton's Grove incident is that greater
controls are needed over contractors who are authorized to work in
pipeline easements. Colonial presently has na authority to
regulate the qualifications of contractors working in its
easements. Obviously, it is not desirable to have financially
troubled contractors working in pipeline easements because such
contractors present special risks. Generally speaking, they have
less qualified employees and a higher rate of employee turnover.
Inexperienced and improperly supervised employees operating
mechanized equipment near a pipeline increase the potential risk to
the pipeline.
Economic pressures may also force bankrupt contractors to take
short cuts that compromise safety. At Singleton's Grove, for
instance, Gregory was many months behind its construction schedule.
In part- to induce Gregory to work faster in constructing
Singleton's Way, U.S. Home renegotiated Gregory's contract such
that Gregory stood to lose more than $60,000 if it did not complete
the street on an expedited time table. The pressure on a
226
financially troubled contractor to cut comers to speed its work
under these circumstances compromises safety.
Forttmately for the public. Colonial possesses the financial
resources to address leaks such as Singleton's Grove and the recent
Reston incident, but it is sensible policy to require contractors
working near interstate pipelines to demonstrate that they have the
financial wherewithal to properly address the risks of their
operations. As Singleton's Grove indicates, many, if not most,
contractors (perhaps unknown to them) , have pollution exclusions in
their general liability policies. This exposes the public to an
additional degree of risk that the party causing an oil spill
incident will be financially unable to respond to. Accordingly,
Colonial believes that the following measures should be taken to
assure contractor solvency: (1) contractors working in or near
interstate hazardous liquid pipelines should be required to
demonstrate an appropriate degree of financial responsibility,
including maintenance of insurance that does not exclude coverage
for pollution or environmental damage; (2) if the contractor cannot
demonstrate financial stability and adequate insurance, the
property owner or other person hiring the contractor should be
required to provide adequate insurance to cover damage resulting
from the- contractor's negligence; and (3) pipelines should be given
the authority to seek injunctive relief in federal court to prevent
excavation in its easement if a contractor, landowner or other
person cannot provide evidence of adequate insurance. The cvirrent
10
227
system is unfair to pipeline companies because it penalizes them
for the negligence of third-party contractors they did not hire and
over %rtiom they have little or no control.
Local governments can also play an important role in pipeline
safety by using their lemd use regulatory authority to restrict
unnecessary construction in pipeline easements. Pipeline companies
such as Colonial have no authority to restrict or bar construction
in their easements unless the construction actually interferes with
the operation of the pipeline. If local governments were to
consider as part of the approval process for site plans and
building permits the need to reduce the number of encroachments
into utility easements, pipeline safety would be promoted by
reducing the opportunity for third-party damage.
Singleton's Grove presents a good exzunple of how local governments
could have reduced the risk of third-party damage to the pipelines
by incorporating into the site plan approval process a requirement
that encroachments in utility easements be minimized. The design
of the Singleton's Grove subdivision sxibstantially and
unnecessarily increased the number of encroachments in the pipeline
easement for installation of storm sewers, sanitary sewers, water
and electrical lines, and streets and sidewalks. The subdivision
did not have to be designed in a manner that required such
extensive crossings of the easement. By reconfiguring the streets
leading into the subdivision, the developer could have constructed
11
228
two entrances to the subdivision, thereby eliminating the necessity
for building a road across the easement. Similarly, it would have
been possible for the developer to reconfigure the utilities
located in the subdivision to avoid or reduce the number of
pipeline crossings. Thus, by conditioning approval of the site
plans and building permits on reducing the number of encroachments
in the easement, the existing subdivision could have been built
without exposing the pipelines to so many potential third-party
incidents .
Local government actions restricting unnecessary construction in
easements are also appropriate in light of federal law and state
laws that require, to the extent practicable, construction of new
utility lines in existing rights-of-way.^ The requirement that
utilities share easements means there is often a concentration of
lines in the seuae utility corridor. The greater the number of
utilities in a corridor, the greater the chance that one of those
utilities will be struck whenever construction occurs in the
easement. Local governments could aid the objectives of the
federal legislation by controlling unnecessary encroachment in
these corridors.
See Fadaral Power Coonlaslon Order Mo. tl4. Doe. No. R-368, November 27, 1970, edoptin( Culdelinei for
the Protection of NeturaL, Historic, Scenic end Recreational Values In the Design and Location of Rl(bta-of-Wa7
and Transmission Facllltlesi see also Virginia Code S 56-259 (1986), requiring public service corporations such
as Colonial to consider the feasibility of locating new facilities on, over, or under existing easements and
rlghts-cf-waj.
12
229
In closing, I'd like to stress that when leaks occur, the pipeline
operator is, in the final analysis, one of the most severely
damaged parties. Certainly incidents such as the one we are
discussing today cost millions of dollars of Colonial's money to
correct, but, more importantly, they immeasuraOsly damage our
corporate reputation. We try hard to prevent them. Colonial
believes that the lessons of these incidents will likely be that
federal, state and local governments can do much more to aid
pipeline companies in their efforts to prevent third-party damage
to interstate pipeline facilities. The efforts of pipeline
operators to regularly patrol their lines and to have ground
personnel deal directly with third parties who wish to encroach on
pipeline rights of way are, of course, the first lines of defense.
However, policies that provide swift and certain penalties against
violators of one-call statutes, that ensure that only financially
secure, reputzdsle contractors work near utility lines and that
promote sensible land use policies near such lines, will aid in the
prevention of these accidents.
13
230
TESTIMONY BEFORE PUBLIC WORKS AND TRANSPORTATION COMMITTEE
Keith J. Buttleman
Deputy Director for Public and Intergovernmental Affairs
VIRGINIA DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY
May 18, 1993
The Commonwealth of Virginia is vitally interested in the
regulation of petroleum pipelines because of our experiences in
Virginia with spills. I am here today to briefly discuss four
recent incidents.
On the morning of March 28, 1993 a section of the Colonial
Pipeline near Herndon, Fairfax County, Virginia, ruptured,
releasing diesel petroleum into the environment. The spill
contaminated approximately 9 miles of Sugarland Run which empties
into the Potomac.
The Fairfax County Fire Department responded immediately and
did an excellent job of initial damage control. The Virginia
Department of Environmental Quality, the Virginia Department of
Emergency Services, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, and
the Coast Guard Atlantic Strike Force responded Immediately, as did
the pipeline company with their own personnel and several cleanup
contractors .
As described under the Oil Pollution Act of 1990, a Unified
Command Structure was established between Fairfax Coxinty, the
Department of Environmental Quality, and EPA to oversee emergency
response .
Initial activity focused on collecting the diesel fuel behind
containment booms in Sugarland Run to prevent it from migrating
downstreeun, and on recovering the product into tanker trucks.
Protection of hviman health was an immediate priority and air
quality monitoring of adjacent neighborhoods was conducted to
assxire there where no immediate health risks. Residential wells
were monitored to assure that grovmd water was not affected.
Initial recovery efforts were successful, but were quickly
hampered by a shortage of tanker trucks and locations to store
recovered oil. High flow conditions in Sugarland Run and the
Potomac and difficult access at the mouth of Sugarland Run also
complicated recovery efforts.
The public drinking water intake on the Potomac River which
serves half of Fairfax Co. was closed because of oil sheen at the
intake. Within 24 hours, animal recovery efforts were organized by
the Fairfax Animal Control Department to collect and rehabilitate
affected beaver and waterfowl.
The Unified Conunand Post was required to maintain 24-hour
1
231
operations for the first week after the spill to oversee emergency
cleanup. Ultimately, it appears that more than 400,000 gallons
were released and the cause of the spill remains uncertain.
The extent of environmental damage has yet to be fully
determined. Potentially sensitive wetlands have been affected.
The Fairfax water Authority was forced to keep its Potomac facility
closed for 11 days and had intermittent shutdowns following that.
Preliminary indications are that the fish population in Sugarland
Run was completely eliminated and most other aquatic communities
were severely damaged. Damage assessment is continuing at this
time.
Colonial Pipeline is currently developing a plan for full
remediation of Sugarland Run under the direction of County, State,
and Federal Authorities. At this time it is uncertain what will be
required or how long the cleanup will take. It appears that there
is no longer an immediate threat to residents and the emergency
phase has ended.
This spill is one of a series of pipeline releases which the
Commonwealth of Virginia has experienced in recent years. Since
1985, at least four other major spills have released over 400,000
gallons into state waters.
On November 8, 1985, 120,750 gallons of heating oil was
released due to a pipeline break in Chesterfield County.
Approximately 93,000 gallons of product were actually lost into the
James River, but extremely high flood conditions mitigated any
adverse environmental effects.
A pipeline rupture near Locust Grove, Orange County, resulted
in 212,000 gallons of kerosene being released into Mine Run and
ultimately the Rapidan River and the Rappahannock River. This
spill on December 18, 1989 resulted in the City of Fredericksburg's
water intake being shut down for nine days (the City had been
similarly affected during a Colonial Pipeline break in March,
1980) .
In June, 1990, a line brezUc caused by deunage to the pipeline
by a backhoe spilled 84,000 gallons of /2 fuel oil into a farm pond
in Chesterfield County. Almost all of the product was contained in
the pond and was eventually recovered.
Finally, in August, 1990, a pipeline rupture in City of
Chesapeake spilled 67,200 gallons of marine diesel into Drum Creek
(a tributary of the Elizabeth River) and affected a considerable
area of tidal wetlands.
This history of repeated spills by petroleum pipelines has
caused the Commonwealth to be gravely concerned over the adec[uacy
of pipeline regulations. On April 1, 1993, after personally
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touring the area affected by the recent spill in Fairfax Coxinty,
Governor Wilder directed the State to actively pursue all possible
avenues to strengthen pollution prevention requirements for
petroleum pipelines. States must have a substantive role in these
regulations in order to protect our public interests.
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The following information is provided concerning three
significant Colonial Pipeline spills in Virginia that have
occurred in recent years:
1. On November 8, 1985 at about 7:30 a.m., a rupture in
Colonial Pipeline's 16 inch pipeline at the Exxon Bulk
Storage Facility in Chesterfield County resulted in 2,875
barrels (120,750 gallons) of fuel oil being released. State
personnel were informed of the incident by the Chesterfield
Fire Department at 1:00 p. m. and responded to the site.
Colonial Pipeline personnel and a cleanup contractor were on
site when State Water Control Board staff arrived. Most of
the product lost was spilled into the James River at the
time of the initial release; no instream cleanup was
undertaken and no adverse effects were noted because the
river was at extremely high flood stage at this time.
Cleanup actions on shore were conducted by the responsible
party at the direction of the State. In the end, 685
barrels (27,636 gallons) were recovered, and an estimated
2190 barrels (93,114 gallons) were lost into the James
River. On-site recovery from contaminated ground water was
undertaken, and these efforts continued until late 1988.
Colonial Pipeline concluded that the rupture was the result
of damage to the pipe by other parties.
2. A rupture in the 32 inch pipeline operated by Colonial
Pipeline near Locust Grove, Orange County on December 18,
1989, caused 5,043 barrels (212,000 gallons) of kerosene to
be released into Mine Run. The break occurred at 10:27
a.m., and the actual location of the problem was determined
by Colonial Pipeline at 1:00 p.m.; the State Water Control
Board was notified by Colonial at 3:30 p.m. and responded
immediately. Colonial had initiated containment measures
with their own personnel and had mobilized a cleanup
contractor. Cleanup and removal was generally overseen by
the State Water Control Board, but the Environmental
Protection Agency did inspect the site periodically.
Weather greatly complicated the cleanup activities when a
severe storm flushed an estimated 84,000 gallons out of Mine
Run into the Rapidan River and ultimately the Rappahannock
River. The presence of petroleum in the Rappahannock River
necessitated the closing of the City of Fredericksburg water
supply intake for nine days. A Corrective Action Plan was
developed to address ground water contamination at the spill
site; these remediation efforts are now nearly completed.
The cause of this rupture was determined to be a structural
failure of the pipe as a result of stresses experienced
during shipping.
3. On August 30, 1990, a Colonial Pipeline delivery line in the
City of Chesapeake ruptured and 67,200 gallons of marine
diesel fuel was spilled into Drvun Point Creek. The event
probably occurred before midnight, April 29, but was not
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confirmed by field inspection until 1:00 a.m., April 30.
Product flowed in a ditch paralleling an abandoned railroad
right-of-way into a marsh area that constitutes the
headwaters of Drum Point Creek. Colonial personnel and
cleanup contractors were on-scene soon after the release was
discovered. U. S. Coast Guard and the State Water Control
Board were involved in directing the cleanup activities.
Approximately 47,000 gallons of product were recovered.
Wetland eureas were considerably impacted by this spill. A
final Corrective Action Plan to address soil and ground
water contamination at the spill site has not been
developed. Colonial Pipeline claims that this rupture was
the result of third party deunage to the line.
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STATEMENT OF THOMAS M. DAVIS. III. CHAIRMAN. FAIRFAX
COUNTY BOARD OF SUPERVISORS. TO THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON
INVESTIGATIONS AND OVERSIGHT OF THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON
PUBLIC WORKS AND TRANSPORTATION. MAY 18, 1993
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee, ray name is
Tom Davis. Chairman of the Fairfax County Board of
Supervisors, and I thank you for this opportunity to discuss
issues and facts related to the recent rupture of the
Colonial Pipeline in northwestern Fairfax County. I wish to
especially thank Congresswoman Leslie Byrne for her
initiative in bringing this matter before you.
On Sunday. March 28. 1993, at approximately 9:10 a.m..
Fairfax County. Virginia Fire and Rescue Department units
responded to the report of a petroleum release near the rear
of the Reston Hospital Medical Center in the Hunter Mill
District. The release was thought to have originated from
one of Colonial Pipeline Company's petroleum transmission
lines along Fairfax County's western end. The source of the
release was later confirmed to be Colonial's 36" pipeline,
which at the time of failure was carrying #2 fuel oil, a
product commonly used for home heating.
At the site, our emergency units found petroleum product
pooling in a nearby storm retention pond, covering portions
of adjacent parking lots, and extending through a combination
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Page 2
of storm drainage pipes and wetlands into and down Sugarland
Run leading north towards the Potomac River.
Emergency units guickly moved to:
1) contain as much of the product as possible at the
origination site,
2) determine the extent of the release.
3) request assistance from responsible agencies, and
4) attempt to contain and control the product migrating
via Sugarland Run to the Potomac River.
Within an hour, first responders were joined by
officials from Colonial Pipeline, and subsequently by
Colonial contractors, local officials from the Town of
Herndon and Loudoun County, as well as Federal and state
representatives. Over 40 local, state. Federal and private
agencies were notified and were operating on the scene within
the first six hours of the incident.
By managing the incident through clearly defined
objectives and a unified command, resources were effectively
employed over the next eight days to control and recover a
large portion of the estimated 407.000 gallons of fuel oil
that were released. We believe this is a model example of
local, state. Federal, and private cooperation that allowed
us to respond well in very difficult and sudden circumstances
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Page 3
Although the emergency phase of this incident has ended,
we are left with unsettling questions about its cause as well
as the lessons to be taken from our experience. The incident
on March 28 is the third time in the last 13 years that a
petroleum pipeline has released a significant amount of
product in Fairfax County creating public health, safety, and
environmental concerns. In each incident lives have been
disrupted, hundreds of thousands of dollars have been spent
on clean-up, and extensive investigations of cause and effect
have been performed. Our experience with these incidents
leads us to conclude that more effort needs to be focused on:
1) prevention
2) detection of leaks while they are still small, and
3) reducing the volume of product that can be released
following a failure.
The regulation of interstate pipelines is clearly a
Federal responsibility. I understand that Federal officials
are investigating this incident, and I strongly urge that
they use the information learned from this and other pipeline
failures to greatly strengthen pipeline regulations and
improve inspection and monitoring of pipeline installations
and operations.
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Page 4
We specifically suggest that the Department of
Transportation Office of Pipeline Safety beef up the types,
intervals, and methods of pipeline inspections. This should
include giving authority to local governments to inspect and
monitor construction and repair of pipelines following
Federal standards, "Smart pigs" and "caliper pigs" that
detect abnormalities in the thickness of a pipeline wall
should be mandated at regular intervals for all sizes of main
and lateral lines. Minimum standards should be set for
abnormalities discovered through "pigging" to assure closer
inspection and/or repair. In some cases it may be
appropriate to reguire that the damaged line be uncovered.
Additional inspection by means of internal or external
devices should be reguired for any repaired or adjacent
section of pipeline to assure pipe and weld integrity before
the pipeline is returned to service.
More precise technologies to monitor product flow should
be mandated. Emphasis should be placed on detecting small
cracks or other breaches before they become catastrophic. I
understand these technologies have been employed along the
Alyeska pipeline and in the nuclear industry.
Particularly in densely populated areas such as Fairfax
County pipelines should also be reguired to have additional
control valves. For example, an additional estimated 100.000
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Page 5
gallons of product were discharged on March 28 after the
pipeline was shut down.
The pipeline industry has demonstrated an admirable
safety record relative to other forms of petroleum
transportation. However, that record is far from perfect.
As painfully demonstrated by the March 28 Colonial release,
an incident of this kind poses serious consequences. We
believe the cost of prevention is less and a better
investment than the cost of clean-up.
As bad as this incident was. can we imagine, for
example, the result had the released product been gasoline
rather than fuel oil? The consequences could have been far
more grave and in addition to all that happened, we might be
talking today about massive evacuations, potential
explosions, and acute dangers to life and property. We do
not want that to occur in Fairfax County or anywhere else,
and we hope that the Federal Government can improve its
oversight of this very critical aspect of interstate commerce,
In closing. I wish to express my deep appreciation to
our Fairfax County agencies and employees for their prompt
and professional response to this urgent problem. I also
want to thank my colleague. Supervisor Bob Dix, who
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Page 6
represents the Hunter Mill District, for his outstanding
leadership in helping bring the resources together to handle
this emergency. I believe the consequences of this massive
rupture would have been far worse in most other local
communities that are simply not as well equipped or prepared
to handle such a crisis.
Thank you again for your concern by holding this
hearing. I would be pleased to answer questions or furnish
additional information for the record.
241
Testimony of John M. De Noyer, Ph.D.
To the Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight
of the
U. S. House of Representatives
Committee on Public Works and Transportation
May 18, 1993
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:
I am Dr. John M. De Noyer. I live at 600 Austin Lane in the Town of
Hemdon, Virginia. I am a retired earth scientist with nearly 40 years of experience
in a wide variety of roles in the Federal Government, academia, and the private
sector. At the present time I am an elected member of the Hemdon Town Council
and am serving in an appointed position as Chairman of the Fairfax County
Environmental Quality Advisory Council (EQAC). My background as a scientific
observer, elected official of an impacted local jurisditrtion, and advisor to the Board
of Supervisors on the environmental quality of Fairfax County, Virginia, forms the
basis for the comments contained in this statement
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT:
The March 28, 1993, oil spill from the Colonial pipeline just outside the
Hemdon Town limits dumped about 407,000 gallons of #2 fuel oil onto commercial
properties near the spill site and through a storm drain into Sugariand Run.
SugaHand Run flows along the eastern edge of Hemdon into stream valley parkland
in Fairfax County, into Loudoun County, and into the Potomac River upstream
from the water intake for the Corbalis water treatment plant The distance from the
rupture location to the confluence with the Potomac River is about nine miles.
A number of conditions reduced the environmental impact of this spill. First,
the material spilled was No. 2 fuel oil. If gasoline had been being transported at the
time, the danger from fire and the toxicity of the fumes would have been much
greater Second, the ground was saturated with water. This saturated condition
minimized the absorption and adsorption capability of soils in the stream valley.
Third, the water table was high. Under these conditions, the majority of the
groundwater flow was from the watertable into the stream. This direction of
242
groundwater flow was important because it minimized groundwater contamination.
Fourth, the stream was at "full bank" stage. This prevented the floating oil from
severely contaminating the stream bottom and since the stream was not at flood
stage the oil did not spread out over the flood plain except in localized low areas or
where impoundment structures such as beaver dams were present Fifth, cleanup
and recovery operations were able to recover a significant part of the oil that spilled,
reducing the amount that remained in the environment. Sixth, several heavy rains
helped to flush residual oil from the stream valley. Seventh, the warmer weather
has helped evaporate the volatile fractions of oiL
At the present time, the upper reaches of Sugarland Run do not show signs of
life. Crayfish that are usually abundant are absent Minnows are only present
where tributaries are contributing fresh water to the stream. The macro-
invertebrates that are essential to the food chain are absent Minnows are present
farther downstream where Sugariand Run flows under Route 7. It is, however, not
clear that the aquatic food chain is adequately reestablished to support them.
Others are better qualified to comment on the environmental impacts on the
Potomac River. The conditions that helped minimize the impact on Sugariand Run
probably made it more difficult to protect the Potomac River. The short time
between the spill and entry of oil into the river made it difficult to contain and
recover the product before water supplies and ecological systems were threatened.
There is little comfort to be gained from the natural conditions that reduced
the environmental and societal impact of this spilL The spill might have happened
at the end of the summer and the material spilled could have been gasoline. If this
had happened we would have had a major catastrophe with probable fire, loss of
human life, long-term health problems, and much more serious environmental
impacts from both the spilled product and the essential cleanup methods.
ECOLOGICAL RECOVERY:
The first steps are to remove as much of the free product as possible. This
has been done during the emergency phase of cleanup. The remaining oil is in the
soil, vegetable matter along the stream, and possibly in the groundwater.
The long-term effects are difficult to predict The effect of the oil on tree
roots exposed along the stream and the effects of residual oil in the soils near trees
may take months to years to become apparent These trees are important for bank
stabilization and as habitat in Hemdon's Runnymede Park and in the county
stream valley parks along Sugariand Run. There are several places where the
stream did flow out of bank or oil was impounded. These areas remain
contaminated. Highly contaminated soils near the spill site are being removed. No
remedial action has been taken for the less contaminated soils along the stream.
Removal of these soils or treatment with chemicals or steam cleaning would only
243
add to the environmental insult. Oil remaining in the soil will continue to seep out
to the surface and constitute a continuing source of contamination until it is reduced
to an insignificant level. This could take many months or even several years.
Fortunately, the method for treating these less contaminated soils is well
known. It is called bioremediation. The technique uses naturally occurring
microbes that have adapted to using petroleum products as a food source. The
microbes break the petroleum products down into harmless products. The method
of application is to spray a slurry containing microbes and nutrients (fertilizer) on
the affected areas. The microbes multiply rapidly and consume the petroleum
products. This method works best during warm weather and under moist
conditions. The conditions along Sugarland Run are ideal for bioremediation
during the summer months. Bioremediation can be expected to accelerate the
removal of hydrocarbons by a factor of three to twenty. When the oil is gone the
microbes die. They do not harm anyone while alive or dead.
I recommended bioremediation as the preferred approach at a meeting on
remediation planning soon after the spill and again at a preliminary meeting of the
Sugarland Run Task Force on April 8, 1993. At the first regular meeting of the
Sugarland Run Task Force on May 3, 1993, Colonial reported that their
environmental consultant was studying the method and other alternatives. The
EPA coordinator stated that they may try a pilot project. The summer will be over
by the time a pilot project is planned, implemented, and evaluated. No one denies
that the method works. The excuse seems to be that the fertilizer applied with the
microbes might cause algae blooms in the Potomac This is nonsense! The amount
of fertilizer applied is small and the areas where application are needed are limited.
Water quality monitoring in the stream can be used to measure any significant
increases in nitrogen or phosphorous. If increases are observed, the amount of
fertilizer can be reduced before any harmful affects occur. The amount of fertilizer
runoff from improper spring lawn fertilization will greatly exceed any additional
runoff from bioremediation. In the meantime, we have lost at least a month of
valuable time for effective removal of hydrocarbons from Sugarland Run. It should
have been possible to have most of the oil removed by the end of the summer, but
this may no longer be possible because of procrastination.
The Treatment Technologies Work Group met on May 12, 1993, to discuss
bioremediation methods. Colonial's environmental consultant recommended an
approach to bioremediation that would add nutrients to the soil by applying mulch,
tilling the soil, and using hydroseeding or other methods to stabilize the soil. The
proposal was to apply this technique to three locations as pilot projects. The
proposed locations were an upland area near the spill site (wooded but future
highway right-of-way), a wooded wetlands area where the spill flowed into
Sugarland Run, and a partially wooded location in Algonkian Park where
Sugarland Run flows into the Potomac. Open field methods and equipment are not
realistic in wooded, rocky terraine and ecologically sensitive areas. The prospect of
244
increasing the erosion potential by tilling the soil in the stream valley and
introducing alien species into natural park woodlands met with strong objections.
In addition, a contaminated area in Runnymede Park where the stream flowed out
of bank because of a beaver dam obstruction was not included in the
recommendation. The EPA Coordinator instructed Colonial and their
environmental consulUnt the revise the plan to use low-impact topical application of
commercial microbes and fertilizer in the wooded stream valley and to add the
location that had been identified in Runnymede Park. There was also general
agreement that the term "pilot project" should be replaced with "initial
implemenUtion" and that other localities will be added as they are identified.
Hopefully, a bioremediation program can get started in early June.
It is ironic that an effective remediation program takes so long to develop
and implement in contrast to the efficient and effective containment and recovery
effort of the emergency phase following this oil spill. Future contingency planning
needs to consider follow-on requirements and organizational structure for
remediation and recovery as well as initial cleanup activities.
Once the oil is removed as a source of continuing contamination the stream
can start its true recovery as an ecological system. The food chain will have to be
reesUblished for all of the life forms that were present before the spilL The presence
of a few species does not signal recovery. It only indicates that the process is
progressing. Full recovery of the ecological system may take three or more years if
bioremediation is used. Longer if bioremediation is postponed or not used.
Runnymede Park in Hemdon has been designated as a nature park. Our
intention has been to use the park as a nature education resource. We will continue
to pursue this objective. The lessons, however, will be different Now we will be
emphasizing how the human race can destroy the environment and how ecological
systems respond and recover if we act responsibly. The most important lesson may
be learning that attention to prevention is critical and that our actions cause serious
problems for both the natural environment and ourselves (<.& protecting our water
supply and air quality).
PIPELINE FAILURES:
Our society has become dependent on the use of large quantities of
hydrocarbon products. This will continue until this finite supply diminishes to the
point that supply can no longer meet demand. There is no doubt that pipelines are
much safer than most forms of surface transportation for transporting large
amounts of petroleum products. It is also true that when a pipeline ruptures the
potential exists for a major disaster. This is analogous to aircraft travel.
Statistically, it is a lot safer to fly than to ride in an automobile, but when a large
passenger plane crashes the loss of life is usually great.
245
1 here are many possible causes for pipeline failure. These included faulty
materials, improper installation, damage during installation, damage after
installation, deterioration of the metal in the pipe due to abrasion and electrolytic
action, and earth movements such as earthquakes and landslides. All of these causes
should be preventable except for earth movements if adequate inspections, quality
control, and monitoring are carried out The hazards of earth movements can be
minimized by careful attention to the geologic conditions where the pipeline is
placed and use of cutoff valves to minimize the amount of potential spills where
hazardous geologic conditions can not be avoided. Why then do so many pipeline
accidents occur? The answer seems to be that insufficient care is exercised in the
planning, siting, construction, and operation of the pipelines.
Public Law 102-508, the Pipeline Safety Act of 1992, amended several
previous pipeline safety acts for gas and oil pipelines. This act recognizes high-
density population areas, environmentally sensitive areas, and the need for using
internal inspection devices. The Secretary of Transportation is to provide
regulations not later than three years after the date of enactment I hope that the
Secretary will provide these regulations in less than the three years specified in the
act No regulations had been provided four years after another pipeline safety act in
1988. The pipelines are getting older and will be increasingly susceptible to failure.
More high-density population areas are being built in locations that are close to
pipelines. Environmentally sensitive areas are already subject to many pressures —
they don't need oil spills on top of everything else.
INTERNAL INSPECTION - SMART PIGS:
The GAO report "Natural Gas Pipelines, Greater Use of Instrumented
Technology Can Improve Safety" (GAO/RCED-92-237) discusses the use of smart
pigs for both gas and liquid pipelines. The two types of smart pigs that are available
are magnetic flux and ultrasonic The magnetic flux pigs provide qualitative
information about the condition of the pipe. The ultrasonic pigs have the capability
to measure the wall thickness and provide quantitative information. Both types of
pigs probably have their uses, but the ultrasonic pig should provide the most
relevant and needed information concerning the condition of the pipe. Colonial has
informed me that the ultrasonic pigs that are available for larger pipe diameters (32
inch and larger) do not provide reliable results. I have verified this through other
sources. I have had the opportunity to examine proprietary reports of results from
two major oil companies that have had excellent results from using ultrasonic pigs
for smaller diameter pipelines. There is no reason that an ultrasonic pig can not be
developed for larger diameter pipes. The deficiency in one of the existing large
diameter smart pigs appears to be in the signal processing technology that is used.
A concerted effort needs to be made to develop a reliable and functional ultrasonic
pig for the larger diameter pipelines.
246
RECOMMENDATIONS:
1. The Secretary of Transportation should provide regulations in response to
Public Law 102-508 ahead of the three year mandated period.
2. The spacing of shut-off valves in environmentally sensitive and high-density
population areas needs to be examined closely. Cutoff valves should be spaced
close enough so that emergency response teams can effectively respond and
control the volume of oil that may be spilled. A spill of 407,000 + gallons in a
high-density population and environmentaUy sensitive area is inexcusable.
3. Internal inspection of pipelines of all diameters needs to be conducted on a
regular schedule. Oversight of these inspections needs to be provided by parties
that do not have a vested interest in the results and the results of the testing need
to be reported.
4. Ultrasonic smart pigs for large diameter pipelines need to be developed that are
of equal reliability to the ultrasonic pigs for smaller diameter pipelines.
5. All major pipelines, especially those that pass through high-density population
areas and environmentally sensitive areas should be constructed or modified
with launching and recovery ports to accommodate smart pigs.
6. Inspections during construction, modification, or repair of pipelines should be
conducted by qualified inspectors who are not affiliated with the pipeline
companies or their contractors.
7. Site specific contingency plans should be developed by the pipeline companies
for high-density population areas and environmentally sensitive areas. These
contingency plans should include weather and stream conditions, rate of
transport, type of material, access to points where effective collection and
recovery are possible, organizations that will be involved, and public information
networks. These contingency plans need to include options for remediation and
recovery operations.
8. Local jurisdictions need to organize and practice for hazardous materials
incidents. Fairfax County was fortunate in having an excellent HAZMAT team.
The rapid response of this team and its ability to establish an initial command
system were essential in reducing the impact of this oil spilL
9. Local jurisdictions need to exercise greater supervision and control when third
party land disturbing or construction activities occur near existing pipelines.
Unbiased inspectors should be present throughout any such construction and
should be required to report any incident that might cause an immediate or
delayed threat to pipeline integrity.
247
TESTIMONY OF JERRY J. GAREGNANI, CHAIRMAN
FRIENDS OF SUGARLAND RUN
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC WORKS AND TRANSPORTATION
SUB-COMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS AND OVERSIGHT
TUESDAY, MAY 18, 1993
Good Afternoon, I am Jerry Garegnani Chairman of the Friends of Sugarland
Run (FOSR). I appreciate this opportunity to share my group's view on the
Colonial pipeline spill of fuel oil into the environmentally sensitive area of
Sugarland Run In March, 1993.
The Friends of Sugarland Run ,a sub-committee of the Audubon Naturalist
Society, is a group of citizens and area business people who came together a
year ago to protect one of the last natural areas in the heavily urbanized region
of northern Fairfax and eastern Loudoun Counties. Our goal is to establish a
continuous greenway along the ten mile Sugarland Run stream valley to
support a diversity of wildlife and allow their migration from the Potomac River
deep into Fairfax County. As part of a national greenway movement in this
country, the FOSR intends to accomplish this with minimal public funds using
volunteers to raise funds, perform monitoring, and provide necessary labor. In
fact the FOSR had just, prior to the spill, received from the Conservation Fund a
grant from the DuPont Greenways Award.
As part of the effort to establish a greenway, we have spent time identifying
threats to the habitats along Sugarland Run. We were lulled into thinking that
the most significant threats were primarily from the heavy development in the
watershed causing severe sedimentation and erosion problems degrading the
ability of the stream to support the aquatic life which starts the food chain for a
healthy habitat. Suddenly a threat we weren't even aware of destroyed the
existing Sugarland Run ecosystem in a matter of hours by dumping over
400,000 gallons of No. 2 Fuel Oil into the stream.
There are several aspects of this disaster that are now apparent and which we
find disturbing due to the lack of adequate controls and potential for re-
occurrence of a spill.
• Lack of regular internal inspection of the pipeline to measure wall
thickness using "smart Pigs". The technology for this exists but is not
being applied.
• Lack of post construction inspections. Colonial was aware of the
construction at the Reston Hospital site and even excavated the pipe to
aid in its protection but. they did not visually inspect the pipe before it
was re-buried.
248
• Lack of adequate shut off valves leaving vast distances between
valves. Even though the pipeline was shut down almost immediately
after the burst occurred, over 400.000 gallons were dumped into the
stream.
• The pipeline which burst in March usually carries gasoline. If the
spill would have been of 400,000 gallons of gasoline with its explosive
potential and high levels of carcinogens, the disaster would have
been terribly worse.
These weaknesses reflect decisions made by Colonial for which no Federal
guidance, regulations, or negative incentives exist to adequately protect
environmentally sensitive areas. The decisions made by Colonial were based
upon their economic feasibility with regard to profitability. This is to be expected
from a free enterprise system and I'll be the first to say its the best system in the
world. However, it depends upon some level of control to make up for the gap
between the good of the corporation and the overall public good. This disaster
cleariy points out that the gap between corporate and public good is not being
adequately addressed by interstate pipeline safety controls or negative
incentives.
The hundreds of us who live along Sugarland Run place a very high value on
the recreation and aesthetic quality of the stream valley in our back yards.
Unfortunately, that value does not have associated with it a dollar price tag. On
the other hand, it is very easy for a pipeline company to calculate the cost
associated with a spill in lost product and fines, to apply a risk factor, and decide
not to address known weaknesses in their system. This decision causes the
citizens near the pipeline to carry the burden of risk and, if an accident occurs,
the value lost by the citizens essentially goes to subsidize the pipeline
company. It is tme that if pipeline companies were forced to respond to more
government control, the price for their products would go up; however, instead
of the citizens who live near the pipeline subsidizing the real cost of
dependence on these products, the cost would be evenly spread among all the
users of the product. There is also a long term benefit to this, as members of the
committee probably know, higher energy costs drive technology for cleaner and
cheaper energy.
A significant amount of money is now being spent to clean up Sugariand Run.
Had that money been spent in prevention instead of post-accident clean up, we
citizens would still be enjoying our stream valley instead of trying to keep our
kids away from the stream, assessing the affects on property values, and
worrying about when the pipeline may dump gasoline into the stream.
In Summary, from those of us who have lost something of great value, we ask
this committee to consider more stringent regulations and fines to prevent
continued destnjction of our diminishing natural areas. Thank you for this
opportunity to express our views.
249
o^^\ National
I^Pl^° IVansportatiiMi
'^'"'^ Safety Board
Safety Information Washington, dc. 20594
Testimony of
Christopher A. Hart, Member
National Transportation Safety Board
before the
Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight
Committee on Public Works and Transportation
House of Representatives
regarding the
March 28, 1993. Colonial Pipeline Ruptiire
May 18. 1993
250
Good afternoon Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee. I ^>preciate the
opportunity to appear on behalf of the National Transpodation Safety Board to discuss our
ongoing investigation into the March 28, 1993, Colonial Pipeline Company accident in Northern
Virginia.
As this panel knows, the National Transportation Safety Board is an independent agency
charged with investigating transportation accidents, determining their probable cause(s), and
proposing safety recommendations to prevent their recurrence. The Safety Board also conducts
safety studies and evaluates the effectiveness of the programs of other government agencies and
companies in the transportation industries for preventing transportation accidents.
Liquid pipelines transport about 54 percent of our Nation's petroleum products, and when
released during accidents they may cause a significant impact to our safety and the environment,
wildlife, other transportation activities, and community water suppUes. Recent liquid pipeline
accidents have emphasized that while they do not cause large numbers of human casualties (five
in 1992, according to preliminary figures), they result in millions of dollars in environmental
damages, disruptions to communities, and other losses.
Historically such losses were not considered in developing safety standards for detecting
abnormal pipeline operations or for developing systems for minimizing the quantity of products
released from pipeline failures. This changed with the enactment of the Pipeline Safety Act of
1992, which added environmental protection as an objective when establishing minimum Federal
251
2
safety standards for {Hpdine tranqxHiation. This Act also authorizes the Safety Board to
investigate and report on jripeline accidents that involve significant environmental damage.
Consequently, Safety Board investigations are being targeted to better define and
document safety improvements needed to identify pipe failure occurrences earlier, and to control
petroleum product pipeline spHls more quickly in order to reduce societal losses.
The recent Colonial Pipeline Company pipeline rupture accident and the resultant oil spill
in Virginia offer a unique opportunity to study and assess these very issues.
At 8:48 a.m., on March 28, 1993, a 36-inch outside diameter pipeline owned and
operated by Colonial Pipeline Company ruptured in Hemdon, Virginia, adjacent to and
immediately behind the Reston Hospital Physicians Office Building. At the point of rupture, the
top of the pipeline was about 8 feet below the surface. At 8:49 a.m. the company's controller
in its Atlanta control center received an alarm on the supervisory control and data acquisition
(SCAD A) system indicating low suction pressure on Colonial's Line 3. The alarm was received
from the company's Dorsey Junction, Maryland pump station (Dorsey Station). The pipeline ran
firom a station in Chantilly, Virginia to Dorsey, Maryland.
At 8:50 a.m., the controller in Atlanta transmitted commands to close remotely operated
valves and shut down pump units 1 and 3 at Chantilly. Due to low suction, two pump units at
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3
the Dorsey Station automatically shut down at 8:S1 a.in. At 8:52 a.ni., the Chantilly discharge
valves were shut off and the Chantilly block valve was closed at 8:54 a.m, both by the controller
in Atlanta, Georgia. The Dorsey Station operator remotely closed the Dorsey Station suction
valve at 8:53 a.m.
Colonial Pipeline's remote control valves on Line 3, the segment of pipeline that ruptured,
were spaced 45 miles apart at the Chantilly and Dorsey stations. There are also manually
operated block valves between the remote control valves located on the Virginia side and the
Maryland side of the Potomac River. Local Colonial employees drove to the manually operated
block valves in Virginia and Maryland located downstream of the pipeline rupture and closed
them to further isolate Line 3.
The 45 miles of pipeline are estimated to have a capacity of 12.4 million gallons (295,000
barrels). The Colonial Pipeline Company has provided an estimate to the Safety Board that
407,000 gallons (9,700 barrels) of No.2 fiiel oil escaped from the ruptured pipeline, of which
87 percent of the fuel oil has been recovered.
The pipeline rupture area was located in a north-south oriented utility right-of-way that
parallels the edge of the parking lot behind the medical office building. Within this right-of-way
are overhead power lines, a 48-inch water line, a 20-inch gas line. Colonial's Lines 3 and 4, and
a run-off pond for the parking lot. The escaping fiiel oil from the pipeline rupture quickly filled
the run-off pond and entered a storm drain that emptied into Sugarland Run Creek, ultimately
253
4
flowing into the Potomac River. The spill that flowed into the Potomac River threatened the
nearby water in-take for Fairfax County and the in-take was subsequently closed. Citizens in the
immediate spill area were also evacuated.
When the pipeline was excavated after the accident, large boulders and rocks on and
around the pipeline could be seen. The boulders and rocks were removed during excavation.
When the excavation reached the pipe, the 42-inch rupture on the top of pipeline was exposed.
The damaged pipe section was photographically documented and an 18 1/3 foot section of the
damaged pipeline was removed under Safety Board supervision and taken to our materials
laboratory in Washington D.C. for further examination.
The Safety Board's metallurgist's Actual report was recently completed and a copy of the
report has been provided to the Subcommittee. The metallurgical examination of the 18 1/3 foot
section of the pipeline found:
► Mechanical damage (similar to a scrape) along the top of the pipeline in
a longitudinal direction with a trace of metal deposits different in chemical
properties from that of the pipe (the pipe surface was deformed from north
to south);
»• Two dents 1/2 and 1/4 inch deq) on the pipe section - one close to the
rupture and the other away from the origin of the rupture; and
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5
► An overstress fracture near the outside wall., which was followed by
fatigue progressing over time to an overall depth of one-third of the pipe
wall thickness and a longitudinal length of S 1/4 inches.
In summary, microscopic viewing of the damage is indicative of an object sliding
longitudinally against the pipe in the southerly direction. No determination has been made as to
the source of the longitudinal scrape.
Several days after the accident, the Department of Transportation's Research and Special
Programs Administration's (RSPA) Office of Pipeline Safety required Colonial Pipeline to expose
and examine an additional 700 feet of Line 3 to search for additional damage along the medical
office parking lot. During this examination, which was also observed by Safety Board staff, a
dent on the bottom of the pipe was observed during the lifting of the pipeline. This pipe segment
rested on protruding bedrock.
The Board requested that Colonial remove this dented pipe section (a 16-inch segment of
the pipe), which was located 28 feet downstream (north) of the accident rupture. This second
piece of pipe was taken to the Safety Board's laboratory for further examination. The dent
observed was about 3/4-inch deep and 10 inches across.
The on-scene phase of the Safety Board's investigation has ended and we are now
beginning to review the company's design and construction records. An assessment of the firm's
255
6
previous pipeline accidents, as wdl as its operating and maintenance history, is also underway.
The issues the Safety Board is examining as part of our ongoing investigation are the adequacy
of:
» Intonal electromagnetic, ultrasonic, and other pipeline inspections, their
utilization by the Colonial Pipeline Company, and existing requirements
for their use;
► In^>ections during pipeline installation and when subsequent
construction and maintenance is being performed adjacent to a
pipeline;
- Remotely operated and automatic shut off valves and their spacing;
► Early leak detection procedures and their performance in conjunction with
supervisory control and data acquisition systems;
► Structural integrity of the pipeline for designated service; and
► Federal oversight of Colonial Pipeline Company activities in federal safety
standards enforcement.
256
7
As the Subcommittee knows, these are not new issues of concern to the Safety Board.
Safety recommendations have called for the correct and timely use of appropriate in-line pipeline
internal inspection equipment since 1987. The Safety Board has also issued recommendations
concerning the installation of remotely operated valves on pipelines to enable the prompt isolation
of those sections that pass through highly populated areas.
The Safety Board again thanks the Subcommittee for the opportunity to testify, and I
would be pleased to answer any questions the panel may have.
257
STATEMENT OF ROSE A. MCMURRAY
ACTING ADMINISTRATOR
RESEARCH AND SPECIAL PROGRAMS ADMINISTRATION
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS AND OVERSIGHT
HOUSE COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC WORKS AND TRANSPORTATION
May 18, 1993
Good afternoon Mr. Chairman, and members of the Subcommittee. I
2un pleased to appear before you today to testify on behalf of
Secretary Pena and the Department of Transportation concerning
important issues arising out of the Colonial Pipeline Company
spill of diesel fuel on March 28, 1993, into Sugarland Run in
Fairfax County, Virginia. Appearing with me is George W. Tenley,
Jr., Associate Administrator for Pipeline Safety.
My testimony follows the format presented in the Subcommittee's
letter requesting the Department's appearance.
I. Overview
The mission of the pipeline safety program of the Research and
Special Programs Administration (RSPA) , administered by RSPA's
Office of Pipeline Safety (OPS) , is "To protect the people and
the environment of the United States through a comprehensive
pipeline safety progreun that includes effective risk management,
thorough pipeline operator compliance, high quality training and
a strong, balanced federal state partnership."
Our oversight responsibility covers transportation by pipeline of
258
natural gas to 55 million residential and commercial customers,
and transportation of 25 percent of the nation's intercity
freight, consisting of over 605 billion ton miles annually of
petroleum and other materials.
Our goal continues to be assuring the highest level of public
safety and environmental protection at a cost commensurate with
real risk. Our primary strategy is emphasizing prevention of
accidents and spills by stringent design and construction
standards, operational practices which maintain pipeline
integrity, adequate monitoring and leak detection systems, and
emergency response procedures that mitigate consequences to the
maximum degree practicable. The Colonial incident demonstrates
the value of new construction inspections. If we had been atole
to be on scene in 1980 at the time the Colonial 36 inch line was
constructed, we could have assured that our construction
standards had been properly followed and we would have a better
understanding today as to the cause of the accident. However,
with only two inspectors in 1980 for the entire Eastern Region,
we could inspect only a very small number of new construction
projects.
We face a nxiaber of challenges as the stewards of the pipeline
program. Including increased pxiblic, state, and Congressional
demands for more safeguards; increased importance of
environmental protection; an aging infrastructure; increasing
259
population development encroaching on pipeline rights-of-way; and
financial pressures on the industry to control costs.
Historically, accidents like the recent Colonial spill in Fairfax
County, Virginia, have given rise to increased pipeline safety
legislation, as well as recommendations from the National
Transportation Safety Board and the General Accounting Office.
While these accidents have provided valueJsle lessons and led to
improved standards and practices, RSPA believes that we must now
focus our attention on the relative risks of all potential causes
attributed to pipeline accidents and their probeibility of
occurrence. RSPA believes strongly that more reliable data are
needed to form the basis for credible decision making and risk
management .
II. Prooreun Operation
This is a time of transition for the pipeline safety progreun, as
we work toward managing the program on the basis of comprehensive
risk assessment and allocating resources to implement program
priorities accordingly. The progreun has six areas of operational
focus which are each increasingly risk-based in approach:
1) Through Data Analvsis and Information Svstems. we are
attempting to make full use of available information systems
technology to juialyze and predict risk and set safety and
260
environmental priorities. We are redesigning outdated
organizational structures and work processes, including
decentralizing operations, reassessing inspection priorities,
streamlining accident investigations and upgrading information
systems .
2) Pipeline Research and Development primarily supports the
development of regulations, compliance, and training. We are
identifying new technologies which have a high potential for risk
reduction and a positive cost benefit ratio; striving to identify
high population density and environmentally sensitive geographic
areas that require more stringent prevention measures; and
finalizing development of a risk assessment model.
3) Through our Regulatory Program, we evaluate safety and
environmental problems and develop regulations or alternatives to
regulations that assure safety in the design, construction,
operation, and maintenance of pipelines. We are prioritizing
rulemakings and studies to assure prompt action on those with the
potential for preventing the greatest risks with the least impact
practicable on industry. Our criteria for prioritizing our work
include accident statistics, trends, and system-wide problems
that show up in more than one operator's facilities. Some
alternatives to rulemaking include alert notices, advisory
bulletins, technical assistance, and public education.
261
4) The foundation of the Compliance Proareun has been risk-based
for several years, allowing RSPA to direct its inspection
resources to those problem areas for which an accident would
likely have significant consequences on public safety or the
environment. We inspect all pipelines under Federal jurisdiction
within a three to five year cycle and higher-risk pipelines more
frequently. Once new regulations mandated by law become
effective (e.g., low- stress hazardous liquid pipelines), the
inventory of pipelines subject to Federal jurisdiction will
increase about 50 percent.
Existing Federal resources alone will not adequately ensure the
safe operation of pipeline facilities, given the size of the
regulated community and the complexity of operations. State
adoption and enforcement of Federal pipeline regulations under an
annual certification program result in a uniform nationwide
progreun. While the gas and hazardous liquid pipeline safety laws
authorize grant funds to reimburse states up to 50 percent of the
actual cost of state programs, appropriations for the last
several years have permitted funding of approximately 35 percent
for state gas programs, and 26 percent for state hazardous liquid
progrzuns. .The allocation formula emphasizes state program
performemce. Our regional staff monitors euid supports states in
striving to improve their progreuns.
5) Training and Information Dissemination are critical to ensure
262
that state regulatory and compliance personnel better understand
and apply pipeline regulations. RSPA provides comprehensive
information, guidance, and direction through formal training and
technical assistance provided by the Department's Transportation
Safety Institute in Oklahoma City.
6) Emergency Response is an area where we are placing increased
attention in the pipeline program. We are implementing new
authority for the oversight of response planning by hazardous
liquid operators mandated under the Oil Pollution Act of 1990
(OPA) , and working to determine what information on pipeline
locations and operations would facilitate the work of emergency
and environmental planners at the Federal, state, and local
levels of government. We are evaluating how to provide this
information in a user-friendly form through geographic
information systems. We promote and support the National
Response System, mandated by the Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act and the Clean Water
Act, and the U. S. Coast Guard's National Response Center, which
receives reports and initiates actions for the immediate response
to incidents.
III. Report on the Status of the mioniai Spill Investigation and
Monitoring of Other Pipelines in thg Arga
Last week, the NTSB released its metallurgical report covering
263
its analysis of the failed pipe involved in the Colonial spill.
Our review of the Board's report leads us to conclude that the
cause of the failure is mechanical damage. Neither OPS nor the
Board is prepared at this time to conclude when the damage
occurred .
At the present time, the 36-inch pipeline that ruptured is in
service at a pressure of 50 percent of its maximum operating
pressure (a service pressure of approximately 325 psi) . This
limitation was imposed on Colonial in an April 5, 1993 amendment
to the Hazardous Facility Order RSPA issued to Colonial on March
30, 1993. In accordance with the Amended Order, Colonial
submitted a plan for the internal inspection of the pipeline
using an instriimented device, commonly referred to as a "smart
pig." After an initial review of that plan, OPS requested
additional information in order to evaluate the plan fully.
Following a meeting between Colonial representatives and OPS
engineers, the Company provided answers to all questions posed by
OPS.
Since that time, OPS has met with companies that offer smart pig
services to the pipeline industry to determine the proper device
to run in the pipeline to find the type of conditions that
existed on the failed pipeline (i.e., dents and gouges associated
with mechanical damage) . We will meet with Colonial
representatives next week to finalize the plan. As provided in
264
the Amended Order, Colonial will not be allowed to operate above
the 50 percent pressure limitation until the pig data indicate it
is safe to do so, and any anomalies are repaired appropriately.
There are two other pipelines in the right-of-way through which
the Colonial 36-inch line runs: a Colonial 32-inch petroleum
products pipeline, and a Columbia Gas Transmission Company 20-
inch natural gas pipeline. The 32-inch Colonial pipeline was
excavated in the area of the failed 36-inch line, and, based on
data from a pig run in 1987, one of two dents found was repaired
with a full encirclement sleeve. The other dent was very
shallow, had no gouges in it, and presented no concern as to the
integrity of the line.
The Columbia Gas line is approximately 150 feet away from the
Colonial 36-inch line and would not have been sxibject to damage
from the rupture of the Colonial line. However, because of the
third-party excavation that occurred in the area, Colvunbia is
reviewing its records of inspections it conducted at the time of
that excavation to determine if the line could have been damaged.
OPS will monitor the results of Columbia's review.
IV. secretarial Program Review
In the wake of the Colonial spill. Secretary Pefta directed a
review of the adequacy of the pipeline program in providing
265
environmental protection. This review will provide a basis for
assessing and prioritizing proposed actions to deal with the risk
to the environment posed by hazardous liquid pipelines. As we
take actions to meet the RSPA environmental mission, these
actions must be weighed in balance with actions necessary to meet
our public safety mission. Determining the proper balance will
be critical to assuring the delivery of a comprehensive pipeline
safety and environmental program within available resources.
In accordance with the Secretary's direction, we are assessing
programs which have the greatest potential to reduce risk,
including regulatory actions, compliance initiatives, state
programs, and implementation of OPA.
o In the regulatory area, we are looking at the integrity of
pipeline systems and the prevention or limitation of product
loss. Specifically, in pending rulemakings we are
considering hydrostatic testing, modification of pipelines
to accept internal inspection devices, requirements for
liquid operators to have deunage prevention progreuns, and
regulating low stress lines. In addition, the Pipeline
Safety Act of 1992 contains a provision on the use of
emergency flow restricting devices and leak detection
systems, subjects having a potential and direct relevance to
the Colonial spill.
266
o In the compliance program, we are assessing means to reduce
environmental risk through new areas of program emphasis.
We are considering whether there is a need to redirect
resources for more inspection time focused on liquid
operators, new construction, and inspections in the field as
opposed to headquarters facilities.
o In state programs, we are evaluating the extent of state
participation in the liquid program and assessing the
potential for benefits from increased state involvement.
Our focus is on determining how realistic it is to expect to
enhance our field compliance presence and the nvimber of
pipelines inspected by leveraging state resources.
o In the OPA progreun, we believe that there may be
opportunities for risk reduction by reaching out to industry
to collaborate in a national effort to map pipelines. We
are also determining if there are ways to better support the
area contingency planning efforts to set environmental
priorities. In addition, attention can be placed on low-
stress pipelines, which have previously been unregulated, in
the early phases of review of response plans.
V. Addressing Mandates of the Pipeline Safetv Act of 1992
In approaching implementation of the 14 rulemakings, several
10
267
studies, reports, and other actions mandated by the Pipeline
Safety Act of 1992, RSPA has prioritized those initiatives that
address the greatest risk or the shortest mandated timeline. Our
FY 1994 budget reflects an increase of $225,000 for studies to
support regulatory development or possible alternatives to
rulemaking and $275,000 for research and development initiatives.
Highest priority studies to support regulatory activity would
address:
Installation by gas distribution operators of excess flow
valves to mitigate the risk of explosion due to rupture of a
gas service line;
Qualification and training of pipeline personnel to assure
their ability to recognize and react to eUDnormal operating
conditions ;
Definition of "gathering lines" and "regulated gathering
lines" for the purpose of bringing these previously
unregulated gas emd hazardous liquid pipelines under RSPA's
regulations;
Identification of pipeline facilities located in
environmentally sensitive areas and high-density population
areas, and maintenance of related maps;
11
268
Inspection of underwater pipelines in shallow water outside
the Gulf of Mexico, reporting on the proper abandonment of
offshore pipelines, and the periodic inspection of all
offshore pipelines that pose a threat; and
Prescription of circumstances under which emergency flow
restricting devices and leak detection systems should be
used on hazardous liquid pipelines.
Research and development studies to address reauthorization
priorities would include a survey of the extent of replacement of
cast iron pipelines and a study of local government codes and
standards where customer-o%med service lines are located.
Federal regulations do not cover customer-owned lines downstream
of the customer meter, although such lines are covered in some
states.
VI. Conclusion
Based on decisions the Secretary will make in reviewing our
environmental progriUB, our priorities under the 1992
reauthorization may, in consultation with Congress, be revised
and are contingent on the availability of funding requested in
the FY 1994 budget.
12
269
To reduce the risk to public safety and the environment from
pipelines, we must maximize the expertise available in
government, industry, the environmental community, and academia.
We must work together to understand emerging trends, solve safety
and environmental problems, and set program priorities, based on
real rather than perceived risk, within available resources.
Because the problems are large and complex, and the mitigating
resources limited, we must, to the degree possible, end the
historical, and adversarial, paradigm of the regulator versus the
regulated. RSPA, the states, and the industry must strive to
pursue the same goals. This approach does not negate, but
appropriately directs, the need for a strong Federal and state
presence stimulating industry performance and providing oversight
of industry regulatory compliance.
Like the other witnesses testifying today, the Department of
Transportation is very concerned about the Colonial spill and the
issues it raises. We are prepared to take whatever practicable
steps are necessary to lessen the risks posed by this
indispenseible mode of transportation, and to do so in concert
with the Congress, the states, environmental groups, and the
industry.
Thank you.
13
For Rdease od Delivery
Expected 11
l:00pjn.EDT
Tuesday
May 18. 1993
270
United Stotes Ggneril Accountim OtBcc
(^ AjTJ Testimony
Before die Subcommittee on Investigations
and Oversight, Committee on Public Works
House of Representadves
PIPELINE SAFETY
Use of Instrumented
Technology to
Inspect Pipelines
Statement of Allen Li,
Associate Director, Transportation Issues,
Resources, Q>inmunity, and Economic
Development Division
GAO/T-RCED-93^1
271
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:
We appreciate the opportunity to be part of the Subcommittee's
review of the March 28, 1993, pipeline Incident In Reston,
Virginia, as It seeks to improve pipeline safety. Today we will
discuss our report on the role that Instrumented Internal
Inspection devices — called smart pigs — can play In Improving
pipeline safety.^ Also, we will comment on the recent Reston
incident.
Pipelines provide a vital transportation service.
Approximately one-half of the nation's supplies of crude oil and
petroleum products, and virtually all natural gas supplies, are
transported through a network of over 1.7 million miles of
pipelines. The overall safety record of pipelines is relatively
good in comparison with that of other modes that carry hazardous
materials. However, the Reston incident serves as a reminder that
Increasingly effective Inspection technologies should be
continually sought.
Our September 1992 report addressed the capabilities,
limitations, costs, and regulations associated with the use of
smart pigs in natural gas pipelines. While our report focused on
natural gas pipelines, our findings on smart pig inspection
capabilities have bearing on liquid pipelines as well. Our
testimony also discusses various actions relating to pipeline
safety that were taken after our report was issued. In addition,
at your request, we will comment on ways pipeline safety can be
enhanced to minimize the risk of incidents such as the Reston
spill.
^Natural Gas Pipelines; Greater Use of Instrumented Inspection
Technology Can Improve Safety (GAO/RCED-92-237, Sept. 28, 1992)
272
In summary, our work shows the following:
— A smart pig Is the only pipeline Inspection technique that
can detect Internal and external corrosion without
excavating the pipe.' Pipeline corrosion Is the second
leading cause of natural gas pipeline Incidents after
damage caused by accidental excavation. While smart pigs
can detect other pipe flaws such as gouges and dents, they
cannot detect defects such as longitudinal cracks and metal
loss In pipe welds. Furthermore, while many pipelines can
accommodate smart pigs, others cannot because of
operational limitations such as sharp bends In the
pipeline. Companies responding to our survey reported the
cost of using smart pigs per mile of on-stream pipeline
ranged from $650 to $2,400 In 1991.
— Currently, there are no federal regulations governing the
use of smart pigs or the frequency of smart pig
Inspections. Our September 1992 report recommended that
the Department of Transportation's (DOT) Research and
Special Programs Administration (RSPA) complete the
feasibility study on smart pigs mandated by the Pipeline
Safety Reauthorization Act of 1988 (P.L. 100-561). Also,
we recommended that RSPA issue the regulations mandated by
the act, which required new or replacement pipeline8--gas
and liquid — to accommodate smart pigs.
*Two types of smart pig technologies — magnetic-flux leakage
measuring and ultrasonic — are used to detect corrosion.
Magnetic-flux pigs are used for inspecting hazardous liquid and
natural gas pipelines. Ultrasonic pigs are used for Inspecting
liquid pipelines, because they require a liquid medium such as
methanol, glycol, or water to operate. Ultrasonic pigs can be
used, however, for Inspecting a natural gas pipeline, provided it
is emptied first and refilled with a liquid medium. A magnetic-
flux smart pig is Illustrated in app. I.
273
— In response to our recommendations, RSPA Issued the
feasibility study in November 1992 and took actions to
issue the regulations mandated by the 1988 act that could
enhance the use of smart pigs. RSPA is now evaluating the
comments received as a result of its proposed rulemaking.
— Over the years, the National Transportation Safety Board
(NTSB) has investigated numerous pipeline incidents and has
made several recommendations for enhancing pipeline safety.
For example, NTSB recommended that new or replacement
pipelines be capable of accommodating smart pigs.
— Aging pipelines are of concern because there is a higher
risk that they will result in pipeline incidents. The
Reston pipeline incident points out that even relatively
newer pipelines are subject to failure. While the true
cause of the failure is unknown at this time, that incident
points out the need for pipeline companies to periodically
inspect their pipelines to identify defects and flaws and
take needed corrective action. We believe that smart pigs,
in conjunction with other inspection techniques, and the
NTSB recommended improvements can strengthen the federal
strategy to ensure pipeline integrity and safety and
minimize incident damage.
BACKGROUND
RSPA's Office of Pipeline Safety is responsible for
developing, issuing, and enforcing safety regulations for more than
1.7 million miles of natural gas and hazardous liquid pipelines in
the United States. RSPA has five Regional Pipeline Safety Offices
with a total of 22 inspectors. RSPA's Eastern Region, which covers
Virginia and 13 other states, has three inspectors. The Colonial
Pipeline Company has a pipeline that transports refined petroleum
products from Pasadena, Texas, to Linden, New Jersey. This
274
pipeline runs through three RSPA regions having a total of 12
Inspectors.
Most of the nation's natural gas pipelines were constructed In
the 1950s and 1960s; 10 percent of the lines were constructed
before 1950 and 9 percent before 1940. Comparable data on the age
of hazardous liquid pipelines are not readily available. However,
the majority of liquid lines were built after 1950. Although the
pipeline industry has a reasonably good safety record, each year
several hundred pipeline incidents occur. The safety of aging
pipelines is of increasing concern. Older pipelines may exhibit a
greater potential for leakage or rupture than newer lines because
of pipe corrosion. Pipeline leakage can cause severe damage to
human health, property, and the environment.
From 1985 through 1992, 1,906 natural gas pipeline Incidents
involving 146 fatalities and 721 injuries were reported to RSPA.
By far, the leading cause of natural gas pipeline failure is
accidental damage caused by excavation by third parties; the second
leading cause is corrosion. ApE>endix II shows natural gas pipeline
incidents for 1985 through 1992, and appendix III shows the causes
of these incidents for 1992. For the same period, 1985 to 1992,
1,591 hazardous liquid pipeline incidents involving 24 fatalities
and 180 Injuries were reported to RSPA. The leading causes of
hazardous liquid pipeline failure are corrosion and damage caused
by outside forces, such as third parties. Appendix IV shows
hazardous liquid pipeline incidents for 1985 through 1992, and
appendix V shows the causes of these incidents in 1992.
Pipelines must be protected while being transported and
installed. During operations, pipelines must be protected from
damage and degradation from other causes such as corrosion.
275
mechanical damage, fatigue, and stress-corrosion cracking.'
Determining and maintaining the structural integrity and safety of
natural gas pipelines and improving the baseline knowledge of their
condition requires a combination of external corrosion controls and
inspection techniques.
He reported that pipeline inspection techniques include (1)
visual inspection techniques, such as line walking and the use of
light aircraft or helicopters to check for evidence of leaking; (2)
x-raying pipe welds; (3) hydrostatic pressure testing;* and (4)
placing a smart pig inside the pipe to record flaws as it is
propelled by the product being transported.
FACTORS ASSOCIATED WITH USING SMART PIGS
Our work showed that smart pigs can improve pipeline integrity
and safety. However, they have certain capabilities and
limitations associated with their use. Furthermore, companies we
surveyed reported varying costs.
Capabilities and Limitations of Smart Pios
Smart pig technology is the only pipeline inspection technique
available to detect internal and external corrosion without
excavating the pipeline. Corroded areas and other pipeline flaws
identified by smart pigs can be repaired or replaced before they
rupture. Smart pig use also produces data on the metal integrity*
'Such cracking is characterized by multiple longitudinally
oriented tight cracks- -usually accompanied by poor or distorted
coating in a coated pipeline.
'Hydrostatic testing — forcing water through a pipeline at high
pressure — provides data on the pipeline's operating pressure
integrity and identifies significant pipeline defects by exposing
the pipeline to pressure above its maximum operating pressure.
^Soundness of the pipe's metal.
276
and condition of the pipeline. Without such data, it is not
possible to evaluate the total integrity and safety of the
pipeline. On the other hand, hydrostatic testing provides
information on the pressure integrity of the pipeline. Hydrostatic
testing identifies significant defects by causing the pipe segment
to fail during testing. However, hydrostatic testing provides
confidence in the pipeline's integrity and safety only at the time
of the test. No information can be obtained about the extent or
severity of any remaining corrosion damage or other existing
pipeline flaws. Therefore, neither technique can be substituted
for the other because each produces information unique within its
own scope. An advantage of the smart pig technology is that it
does not require emptying the pipeline of the product being
transported, as hydrostatic testing does. Such emptying results in
revenue loss to pipeline operators because operations are
interrupted. Also, the water used in hydrostatic testing must be
properly treated and disposed of.
During the course of our work on smart pig technology, we
received survey responses from 15 U.S. and 3 Canadian natural gas
pipeline companies. Nine of the U.S. and all three Canadian
companies reported success in using smart pig technology.
Companies that had used smart pigs told us that the pigs identified
corrosion pitting, mechanical damage, gouges, dents, and
manufacturing defects, as well as the location of girth welds,
valves, and bends in pipelines. Some companies also noted that
smart pigs enabled them to rank repair work on the basis of the
location and severity of problems Identified, minimize pipeline
downtime, and plan effective maintenance. Other benefits cited
were that smart pig usage minimizes costly loss of natural gas,
ensures that the pipeline is being operated and maintained in a
safe manner, and enables prospective sellers and buyers to evaluate
the value of pipelines before sale or purchase of pipeline systems.
277
Companies also told us of limitations. They said that smart
pigs could not identify metal loss in circumferential welds (where
two ends of pipes are welded together) and longitudinal cracks
(cracks that run the length of pipes). They also stated that smart
pigs could not establish the integrity of external coatings,
including the location of coatings that have separated from the
pipe. We also found that neither the magnetic-flux nor the
ultrasonic pig technologies had been sufficiently developed to
locate potential pipe seam failure of electric-resistance-welded
pipes.' We also found that smart pigs cannot be used to inspect
all pipelines for several reasons: Some pipelines are not able to
accommodate pigs due to sharp bends; valves that cannot be fully
opened obstruct pig passage; and pipe walls are too thin.
We found specific instances in which smart pig inspections of
natural gas pipelines could improve pipeline integrity and safety.
For example, in one case a smart pig inspection detected the
presence of corrosion in a gas pipeline company's transmission
line. However, no follow-up action was taken. This line
subsequently ruptured, causing five deaths and property damage.
According to the state gas pipeline safety office that conducted
the Investigation, the incident could have been prevented had the
company interpreted the data from the smart pig inspection as an
impetus for corrective action. Another company found the use of
smart pigs so successful that its current 20-year plan includes pig
inspection of all of its lines. A third pipeline company
voluntarily invested $100 million to make 9,000 miles of its
pipelines "piggable" and has reported many advantages to the use of
smart pigs .
In terms of improvements they would like to see, companies
responding to our survey specified data analysis and interpretation
*A low frequency electric resistance welding method prevalent in
the United States before the 19706.
278
of inspection logs, particularly for magnetic-flux pig technology.
These companies told us that smart pigs should be Improved to
enhance their ability to more accurately measure the depth and
length of corrosion. The companies also desired improvements in
data interpretation, such as more readable inspection logs,
computerized analysis of the data on personal computers at the
field level, and correlation of pig inspection logs with actual
measurement of pipe anomalies obtained after excavation of the
line. Several smart pig manufacturers told us that, over time,
market demand would bring about such technology improvements.
Cost of Using Smart Pigs
Companies responding to our survey told us that the cost of
using smart pigs depends on a number of variables, such as the type
of smart pig used — first-generation or second-generation. In
general, second-generation smart pigs have state-of-the-art
technology and more advanced capabilities for detecting pipeline
flaws. Some companies said they used first-generation smart pigs
because of their availability and lower cost. Other companies used
second-generation smart pigs because they are capable of providing
more detailed data on pipe flaws. Other variables affecting cost
cited by these companies include the diameter of the pipeline,
cleanliness of the pipeline, length of pipeline for which the smart
pig is used, level of competition among smart pig vendors, and the
amount of data analysis and interpretation needed for the corrosion
reported. Pipeline operators may incur other costs to excavate,
inspect, and repair any pipe segments where a smart pig has
indicated significant anomalies.
These variables help to explain the broad range of costs
reported by nine of the companies responding to our survey. The
companies reported that the costs of using smart pigs per mile of
on-stream pipeline ranged from $650 to $2,400 in 1991. The only
company that provided detailed cost information on the use of smart
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279
pigs had used a second-generation pig. This company reported that
the inspection cost of a first-generation smart pig is typically
one-third to one-half of the inspection cost for a high-resolution,
or second-generation, smart pig.
REGtJLATIONS RELATED TO THE USE OF SMART PIGS
To improve the safety of natural gas and hazardous liquid
transmission pipelines, the Congress passed the Pipeline Safety
Reauthorization Act of 1988 (P.L. 100-561, Oct. 31, 1988), directing
DOT to (1) prepare a feasibility study on requiring the use of a
smart pig to inspect transmission pipelines and (2) establish
regulations requiring that new or replacement pipeline facilities,
to the extent practicable, be capable of accommodating smart pigs.
As we will discuss later, the Congress more recently passed the
Pipeline Safety Act of 1992 (P.L. 102-508), which mandates
regulations on the use of instrumented inspection technology for
inspecting pipelines.
Despite congressional mandates and the benefits identified by
several pipeline operators, there are no federal regulations on
smart pig use or on the frequency of smart pig Inspections. When we
issued our report in September 1992, RSPA had not completed the
feasibility study on smart pigs that the 1988 act mandated be issued
by May 1990. Also, RSPA had not issued the mandated regulations
requiring new or replacement pipelines, to the extent practicable,
to accommodate smart pigs. We found that the delays resulted from
RSPA's resource shortages and the agency's decision to devote
resources to other work.
In our report we recommended that the Secretary of
Transportation act to expeditiously (1) provide the Congress with
the final report from the smart pig feasibility study mandated by
the 1988 act or notify the Congress when the study would be
available and (2) issue the regulations mandated by the 1988 act.
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280
In carxylng out these actions, we pointed out that DOT should (1)
determine how smart pig technology can effectively be used in
natural gas transmission pipelines, especially those in densely
populated areas, and (2) consider the capabilities, limitations, and
costs of smart pigs in determining the role that these inspections
should play in an overall strategy for ensuring pipeline integrity
and safety.
RSPA, however, had recognized the capabilities of smart pig
inspection. Over the previous 6 years, RSPA had served hazardous
facility and consent orders to natural gas and hazardous liquid
pipeline companies following incidents in their lines. In those
cases, RSPA required the companies to use smart pig inspections to
verify pipeline integrity.
RECENT ACTIONS TO ENHANCE SMART PIGS' USE
In November 1992, RSPA issued the feasibility study mandated by
the 1988 act.^ The report assessed the feasibility of requiring
the inspection of transmission facilities with smart pigs at
periodic intervals. It concluded that, under certain circumstances.
It may be feasible to require periodic inspections of natural gas
transmission and hazardous liquid pipelines with a smart pig if the
pipelines are constructed to accommodate the pigs.
RSPA also took actions to issue the regulations mandated by the
1988 act. In November 1992, DOT published in the Federal Register a
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking requiring that new or replacement
natural gas transmission pipelines, new and replacement hazardous
liquid pipelines, and certain carbon dioxide pipelines be designed
to accommodate smart pigs. The proposed rules do not apply to
^Instrumented Internal Inspection Devices (A Study Mandated Bv
P. L. 100-56H. Research and Special Programs Administration,
U.S. Department of Transportation, Nov. 1992.
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specific installations for which such design and construction would
be impracticable. DOT invited interested parties to submit
comments. RSPA is currently evaluating the comments received and
plans to issue final regulations by the end of this year.
Subsequent to our report, the Pipeline Safety Act of 1992 was
enacted on October 24, 1992. It contains provisions that could
increase the use of smart pig inspections in pipelines. The act
directs the Secretary of Transportation to issue regulations, within
3 years of enactment, requiring pipeline operators to periodically
Inspect natural gas pipelines in high-density population areas and
hazardous liquid pipelines in environmentally sensitive and high-
density population areas. The regulations are to prescribe the
circumstances, if any, under which such inspections should be
conducted with an instrumented internal inspection device. The act
provides that, when an Instrumented internal inspection device is
not required, the Secretary shall require the use of an inspection
method that is at least as effective as the use of a such a device
in providing for the safety of the pipeline.
NTSB PIPELINE SAFETY RECOMMENDATIONS
NTSB has made several recommendations to RSPA regarding
pipeline safety that are relevant to the Reston incident. For
example, in 1987, NTSB recommended that RSPA require operators of
natural gas and liquid transmission pipelines to construct new
pipelines to facilitate the use of smart pigs and to require
operators to incorporate smart pig facilities when repairing or
modifying existing systems. These recommendations were subsequently
incorporated into the Pipeline Safety Reauthorization Act of 1988,
which, as we pointed out earlier, required RSPA to issue regulations
addressing these requirements. RSPA, however, did not issue a
Proposed Notice of Rulemaking on this requirement until November
1992.
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282
In 1987, NTSB also recommended that RSPA develop operational
criteria for determining safe intervals between hydrostatic tests of
pipelines. RSPA has not adopted this recommendation. We noted that
federal regulations require hydrostatic testing of new pipelines but
do not require retesting unless the pipeline is relocated, replaced,
or otherwise changed. However, in the course of pipeline
operations, the pipeline may be displaced, deformed, and damaged
because of movement of the earth, and/or third-party construction
damage. This damage — dents and gouges — may weaken the pipe and
remain unknown to the operator. In addition, hazardous liquid lines
are subject to fluctuating pressure changes that, in a weakened
pipe, can result in fatigue cracking of the pipe's metal. Fatigue
cracking propagates over time. These cracks can result in leaks or
ruptures. Hydrostatic testing could detect such flaws by causing
the pipeline to fail during the test.
NTSB also recommended in 1987 that RSPA require the
installation of remote-operated valves on pipelines that transport
hazardous liquids and determine the spacing of the valves on the
basis of the population at risk. In response to the 1988 act, a
1991 RSPA study found the following:
— Remotely controlled valves and check valves are the only
effective emergency flow-restricting devices.
— From a cost standpoint, it is reasonable to retrofit all
manually operated valves to be remotely controlled on
hazardous liquid pipelines located in urban areas.
— There are other locations where remotely controlled valves
should be installed to protect environmentally sensitive
areas .
The Pipeline Safety Act of 1992 requires that RSPA assess the
effectiveness of emergency flow-restricting devices — including
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remotely controlled valves — and issue regulations prescribing the
circumstances under which operators of hazardous liquid pipelines
must use such emergency flow restricting devices. To date, RSPA has
not begun to develop these regulations.
Despite the 1987 HTSB recommendations, it is worth noting that
there are still no federal regulations (1) requiring inspections
with an instrumented inspection device, (2) setting forth frequency
criteria for hydrostatically retesting pipelines, and (3) requiring
installation of remotely controlled operating valves. Furthermore,
there are no federal criteria that specify the size of dents,
gouges, and groves on pipelines that would require a section of pipe
to be repaired or replaced once they are detected.
RESTON. VIRGINIA, PIPELINE INCIDENT
He have not conducted a detailed review of the March 28, 1993,
spill in Reston, Virginia. However, as requested by the
Subcommittee, we are providing comments on these matters as they
relate to the issue of pipeline safety.
The Colonial Pipeline Company hazardous liquid pipeline which
ruptured in Reston, Virginia, spilled an estimated 336,000 gallons
of fuel oil. About 236,000 gallons of the spill entered the
Sugarland Run Creek, a tributary of the Potomac River. The pipeline
segment that ruptured is part of Colonial's 36-inch pipeline between
pump stations at Chantilly, Virginia, and Dorsey Junction, Maryland.
This pipeline was commissioned in 1980 and is part of Colonial's
overall system, which runs from Pasadena, Texas, to Linden, New
Jersey. RSPA and NTSB are currently investigating the causes of the
Reston incident.
Following the Incident, RSPA, on March 30, 1993, issued a
Hazardous Facility Order to the Colonial Pipeline Company. The
order required Colonial to reduce the operating pressure at the
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Chantllly pump station to 20 percent below the pressure prior to the
pipeline failure. It also mandated certain analysis of the failed
pipeline segment and of the failure site. Following further
Investigation Into the cause of the Incident, RSPA amended Its order
to restrict the operating pressure for the pipeline segment to 50
percent of the maximum operating pressure. The order also required
Colonial to submit a plan by April 12, 1993, for the Internal
Instrumented inspection of the pipeline between Chantllly, Virginia,
and Dorsey Junction, Maryland, and to prescribe the actions to be
taken to correct the problems found.
In its April 12, 1993, plan. Colonial stated that it would
inspect the pipeline segment with a caliper pig and subsequently
with a magnetic-flux pig. The caliper pig will Identify the
location of anomalies such as dents, wrinkles, buckles, ovalltles,
and flat spots by measuring the reduction of a pipe's diameter
resulting from these anomalies. The use of the caliper pig also
ensures that a smart pig will then be able to traverse the line.
RSPA told us that the Colonial Pipeline Company has made
considerable use of smart pigs. However, while it used a caliper
pig in 1989 on this segment of pipeline, it has never inspected this
segment with a magnetic-flux pig. RSPA also told us that Colonial
had not hydrostatlcally tested this segment since its 1980
construction. In addition, this 35-mile pipeline segment does not
have remotely controlled operating valves in the transmission line
between the Chantllly and Dorsey Junction pumping stations.
Remotely controlled operating valves located closer together could
have reduced the amount of fuel oil spilled. However, as discussed
earlier, there are no federal regulations requiring the use of smart
pigs, periodic hydrostatic testing, or the installation of remotely
controlled valves.
RSPA officials also told us that the Colonial pipeline segment
that ruptured is not designed to easily accommodate magnetic-flux or
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285
ultrasonic smart pigs. This is because the pipeline changes in
diameter from 36 inches to 32 Inches around pumping stations.
Colonial plans to modify the pipeline to accommodate smart pigs.
CONCLUSIONS
Smart pigs, in conjunction with other inspection techniques,
and the Improvements recommended by NTSB, can strengthen the federal
strategy to ensure pipeline integrity and safety and minimize
incidents and damage. Although aging pipelines are of concern
because they have a higher risk of resulting in pipeline incidents,
the Reston spill points out that even relatively newer pipelines are
subject to failure. Accordingly, there is good reason for pipeline
companies to use all available technologies to better ensure the
integrity and safety of their pipelines.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes our testimony. We would be very
happy to respond to any questions you or other Subcommittee members
might have.
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286
APPENDIX I
APPENDIX I
MAGNETIC-FLUX SMART PIG
Magnet for
Flux Induction •
OrivaCup
)n
-^
iTT
Batlary Housad Inslda
Univaraal Joint Tapa Racordar Housad Insida
Diraction ol Traval
Sourca: Vatco Pipalina Sannea*.
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287
APPENDIX II APPENDIX II
NATURAL GAS PIPELINE INCIDENTS (1985-92 ^
1«65 I9M 1H7 ItM 1«U 1M0 1991 1993
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288
APPENDIX III APPENDIX III
NATURAL GAS PIPELINE INCIDENTS BY CAUSE tl992i
Other
4%
Internal Corrosion
6%
External Corrosion
— Damage From Outside Forces
8%
Constnjction Material Defect
2%
Operator Accident
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289
APPENDIX IV APPENDIX IV
HAZARDOUS LIQUID PIPELINE INCIDENTS fl9B5-92>
MO Numtarof
n
--.n
tip
r
IMS 1»
Vmt
1M7 19M 1M9 1N0 1M1 1*
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290
APPENDIX V APPENDIX V
HAZARDOUS LIQUID PIPELINE INCIDENTS BY CAUSE ^1992\
Other
5%
Internal Corrosion
External Corrosion
7%
Incorrect Operation
5%
Oefectlva Pipe
Outside Damage
4%
Equipnnent Malfunction
(342875)
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291
ST&TBMEMT OF
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ACTIWS DBVOTT OFTICB DIKBCTOR
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or THB
OrriCB or solid WASTB and BMBRaSHCT RS8POHSB
U.S. BMVZROHIIBMTAL FROTBCTZOV AOBBCT
BBrORB THB
8UBCOIOIIVTBB OB IMVBBTiaATZOHB AHD OVERSIGHT
or THB
COmiZTTBB OH PUBLIC HOSK8 ABD TUUISPOBTATIOH
U.S. HOUSB or KBVKBSBBTATIVBS
May IS, 1993
Good afternoon, Mr. Chalman, and distinguished meiabers of
the SubcoBoiittee. I aus Stephen Luftig, Acting Deputy Office
Director for the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Office of
Emergency and Remedial Response, within the Office of Solid Waste
and Emergency Response. I am pleased to have the opportunity to
address your Subcommittee on the subject of the recent Colonial
Pipeline Company ("Colonial Pipeline") oil spill in Fairfax
County, Virginia. With me today are Mr. Alfred Lindsey, Director
of the Office of Environmental Engineering and Technology
Demonstration, irtiich is within EPA's Office of Research and
Development, emd Mr. Dennis Carney, Chief of EPA's Region III
Superfxind Removal Branch.
I will begin by briefly explaining our Nation's system for
responding to oil spills, focusing on EPA's role in that system.
I will then discuss EPA's response to the Colonial Pipeline spill
and the extent of environmental damage caused by the spill. In
addition, I would like to provide the Subcommittee with recent
data on the types and number of oil pipeline spills, and discuss
EPA's oil spill response research and development efforts.
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Th« National Rasponsa Syataa
The National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution
Contingency Plan, also knovm as the NCP (40 CFR Part 300) ,
provides the organizational structure and procedures for the
Federal Government's planning for .and response to oil and
hazardous substance spills. Generally speeUcing, EPA responds to
oil spills in the Inland Area of the U.S., while the U.S. Coast
Guard (Coast Guard) responds to spills in the Coastal Area. In
appropriate circumstances, State and local governments may
respond to Inland spills that are within their response
capability.
The NCP establishes the National Response Center (NRC) ,
which is staffed 24 ho\irs a day by the Coast Guard. The NRC
receives all reports of oil and hazardous svibstance releases
anywhere in the U.S. and its territories. The NRC, in turn,
notifies appropriate EPA Regional Offices and Coast Guard
District Offices of the spill. EPA and the Coast Guard determine
whether Federal response or oversight is necessary.
0\u: National planning and preparedness structure involves
many organizations, including EPA and other Federal agencies.
State and local governments, local planning committees, and other
interested parties. This network, which is detailed in the NCP,
is a key component of the oil spill preparedness and response
system. Our experience has shown that a pre-established
conaunlcations and planning network involving all pairties to a
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response effort, including the private sector, is critical to
successful response actions.
On-Scene Coordinators (OSCs) are the lead Federal officials
at the scene of a discharge. OSCs are responsible for managing
on-site Federal efforts and resources in responding to an
incident and are authorized to taJce all necessary actions,
consistent with Federal law, to remove an oil discharge or
mitigate or prevent a substantial threat of a discharge into
navigable waters.
While OSCs respond to emergencies, it is the responsibility
of the National Response Team (NRT) and Regional Response Teeuns
(RRTs) to prepare emd plan for emergencies. Th» NRT, which is
chaired by EPA, consists of representatives from 15 Federal
agencies who have responsibilities for environmental emergencies.
The NRT addresses issues of general applicability across
agencies, sites, and programs. One of the NRT's major
responsibilities is to maintain national prepeuredness to respond
to an oil discharge that exceeds local and State response
capetbilitles. The NRT also develops recommendations for response
training, accident prevention, and revising the NCP; coordinates
information about research and development; and shares
experiences of regional responses. In some situations,
particularly those that cross regional boundaries, the NRT may be
activated as an incident-specific team to support the OSCs
emergency response efforts. In that capacity, the NRT's role
generally consists of bringing the widest possible range of
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resources to bear and providing expertise consistent with its
position as the senior-level support organization in the national
response system.
While the NRT provides national planning and preparedness
support, the thirteen RRTs, under the direction of the NRT, are
generally responsible for regional planning and coordination of
preparedness and response actions. RRTs consist of State and
local government representatives and regional representatives of
EPA and other NRT agencies. The RRTs have many specific
functions, including evaluating regional and local responses,
encouraging the State and local response commxinity to improve its
preparedness, reviewing local response plans prepared under SARA
Title III, and conducting preparedness training exercises. The
standing RRT serves as a planning and coordination body, while
incident-specific RRTs are formed from appropriate RRT member
agencies in a limited number of situations, such as when an oil
discharge crosses State boundaries or poses a substantial threat
to the public health or welfare or the environment. Key
responsibilities of the incident-specific RRT are monitoring the
response, providing communications support, meJcing
recommendations to the OSC consistent with the RRT's expertise,
and mobilizing resoiirces available in the region, as requested by
the OSC in specific response situations.
EPA's Environmental Response Teeua (ERT) , located in Edison,
NJ, is composed of National experts in environmental response
activities, including oil spill response. ERT provides technical
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advice and support to EPA Regions and other Federal agencies.
Diiring significant international incidents, ERT has also provided
technical assistance to foreign governments.
All ten EPA Regions and the Emergency Response Division in
EPA Headquarters maintain 24 hour a day Duty Officers. The NRC
notifies the appropriate Regional Duty Officer in the event of a
spill and the Duty Officer determines the need for dispatching an
OSC to the scene of the spill. The NRC also notifies EPA's
Headquarters Duty Officer of significant incidents anywhere in
the U.S. or the world that have resulted or may result in major
effects to public health and welfare or the environment,
evacuations, loss of life, major property damag», and local (DC)
or National media attention. The Headquarters Duty Officer will,
as appropriate, notify the EPA chair of the NRT and EPA's
Administrator. Reports of significant events will be passed to
the White House as required or requested.
EPA's National Incident Coordination Team (NICT) coordinates
EPA response actions during extraordinary emergency situations of
National or international significance. The NICT is comprised of
senior-levsl representatives from each EPA Region amd
Headquartcxv. Over the past several years, EPA has been involved
in several such situations (for example, the Persian Gulf War and
the Exxon Valdez oil spill response) .
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Colonial Pipollno spill Rosponso, Daaago Assossmont, and
Rostoratioa Plans
Initial Reanonsa
The response to the Colonial Pipeline spill was a
coordinated effort by many agencies of Federal, State, and local
governments, as well as Colonial Pipeline itself. The spill
resulted from a pipeline breeOc at about 8:48 a.m. on March 28,
1993. The rupture discharged approximately 407,000 gallons of #2
fuel oil, of which it is estimated approximately 350,000 gallons
have been recovered.
The oil entered Sugarland Run creek via a storm sewer
approximately one-half mile from the pipeline rvipture site. The
oil travelled approximately nine miles through Fairfax and
Loudoun Counties, VA, before reaching the Potomac River at
Algonkian Park in Loudoun County. EPA dispatched an On-Scene
Coordinator (OSC) to the spill site on Sunday, March 28, 1993,
within 3 hours of receiving the NRCs initial report. Along with
the OSC, contractors from the Technical Assistance Team (TAT)
arrived to assist the OSC in evaluating the situation and to
provide technical support. Prior to his depeurture, the OSC
alerted th* Coast Guard Atlantic Strike Team (based at Fort Dix,
New Jersey). Based upon his initial assessment of the spill's
severity, the OSC requested that the Strike Team dispatch an oil
recovery unit to the site.
The Fairfax County Fire Department began organizing the
response and initial boom placement operations before EPA's OSC
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arrived on site. Because the Federal OSC is required under the
Oil Pollution Act of 1990 to direct all response efforts to oil
spills that pose a substantial threat to public health or welfare
of the United States, EPA organized a Unified Command System, led
by the EPA OSC.
The Unified Command consisted of decision-makers from the
Coast Guard, Virginia, Maryland, Colonial Pipeline, and Fairfax
and Loudoun Counties. The Unified Command participated in
decisions regarding resources, field recovery operations, and
response logistics and support. The EPA OSC retained ultimate
authority to direct the response efforts. The Unified Command
structure greatly aided decision-medcing and was ^.nstrumental in
response coordination, and obtaining advice from all response
organizations .
EPA's OSC requested additional equipment and personnel from
the Coast Guard's Gulf Strike Teeua, a helicopter (provided by the
U.S. Marine Corps at Quantico) , and Coast Guard personnel, who
were dispatched from their Marine Safety Office (MSO) in
Baltimore. A senior USCG officer dispatched with the Atlantic
Strike Teas \init served as an advisor to the EPA OSC.
EPA held morning and evening briefings at which all
participants engaged in the response were given the opportunity
to brief the Unified Command with regard to their organizations'
activities, concerns, and problems.
Early during the Emergency Response phase, the OSC solicited
and received input from all involved governmental agencies and
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citizen groups regarding long-term cleemup issues. These issues
were subsequently addressed in a Unilateral Administrative Order
that EPA Region III issued on J^ril 2, 1993. This Order directed
Colonial Pipeline to study, abate, mitigate, and eliminate any
threats to the public health, welfare, and the environment
resulting from the spill. The transition from the emergency
response phase to longer-term cleanup phase took place on April
9, 1993.
Environmental Assessment
EPA has coordinated two complete assessments of Sugar land
Run. The first of these assessments was performed on March 31
and April 1, 1993. During this assessment, crews assembled from
local. State, and Federal agencies under the direction of the
Unified Command were assigned to sectors of Sugarland Run and the
Potomac River. These crews walked the waterway banks and noted
environmental damage. They found most of the bank areas to be
damaged. Many emimals, including birds, beavers, and ducks,
were rescued and treated at the Tri-State Animal Rescue
Association. The U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service coordinated all
dead wildlife counts and rescue efforts.
From- April 28 through J^ril 30, EPA coordinated a second
assessment of Sugairland Run. Much of the oil along the banks had
disappeared. The CSC and representatives from State and local
agencies believe this happened for several reasons.
First, when the spill occurred the water table was excep-
tionally high. This prevented the oil from settling on and
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saturating the banks. Because oil is lighter than water, most of
the oil remained on the surface of the stream. Some was flushed
downstream dviring the first several days of the spill. Secondly,
much of the fuel oil degraded and evaporated due to weather
conditions and exposure to sunlight. As this type of oil tends
to remain on the surface, natural biodegradation occurs rather
rapidly.
In the past several weeks, crews walking the streeun have
noted evidence of sheen on the water surface. Although oil sheen
still remains in some areas, sheening from decaying organic
matter is also evident in the soils. This type of sheen is
common during this time of year when plants are growing and
organic matter naturally degrades onto the surrounding soil.
While site conditions are significantly improved, some areas
are still affected by the spill. The soils and sediments leading
to Sugar land Run Creek are still grossly contaminated in some
areas. Areas of Lowe's Island (the area where Sugarland Run
enters the Potomac River) and Runnymeade Park in Herndon still
show signs of contamination.
The Department of Interior, one of the involved Natural
Resource Trustees, has assumed the role of Lead Administrative
Trustee in conducting preassessment activities in considering
whether a Natural Resource Deunage Assessment is warranted under
provisions of the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 and related statutes.
Other Natural Resource Trustees involved include the National
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration in the Department of
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Commerce, the States of Virginia and Maryland, and the District
of Columbia. These preassessraent activities include
consideration of short and long-term effects on natural resources
exposed to the oil, including plant emd animal life in the area.
State and Federal landholdings, and services provided by the
resources .
EPA issued a Unilateral Administrative Order to Colonial
Pipeline on Friday, April 2, 1993, outlining specific response
and restoration measures they must take. Colonial Pipeline
orally notified EPA that they intended to comply with this Order
on April 3, 1993. On Friday, April 9, 1993, Colonial Pipeline
provided a draft Response Action Plan (RAP) to EPA to comply with
the terms of this Order. Some of the significant actions that
Colonial Pipeline must perform include:
Long-term monitoring emd seunpling of the water and sediments
. located along Sugar lamd Run and the Potomac River,
Cleanup of oil-contaminated areas,
A public education program,
A groundwater monitoring progreun.
Restoration of all eureas damaged by Colonial Pipeline during
the response effort.
To assure that all local emd State concerns would be
properly addressed, a copy of the RAP was delivered to each of
the agencies involved in the Unified Command for comment. The
EPA OSC reviewed these connents and decided that Colonial
Pipeline should further develop the RAP.
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A comprehensive sampling plan under the RAP is now near
completion. This plan will incorporate the assessment infor-
mation to target primary areas of concern. The focus of seunpling
performed under the Order will be to determine extent of
contamination and areas from which oil needs to be removed.
Data on Pipeline Oil Spills
We have drawn data on pipeline spills from the Emergency
Response Notification System (ERNS) , a national computer database
that stores information on releases of oil and hazardous
substances. ERNS is a cooperative effort cunong EPA, the
Department of Transportation, and the NRC. The data in ERNS
generally consist only of information provided at the time of the
release.
• Data over the past six years show consistently that oil
pipeline spills are reported as being approximately 9% of
the 15 to 20 thousand annual oil spills.
• This 9% is reported as accounting for approximately 11% to
21% of the total annual volxime of oil spilled.
• Approximately 70% of the oil pipeline spill notifications
over the past six years do not list the cause of the spill.
Of the approximately 30% that do, most are attributed to
equipment failure (approximately 72%) and operator error
(approximately 11%) .
• The vast majority (approximately 80%) of oil pipeline spill
notifications over the last six years have reported spills
of fewer than 1500 gallons..
• Initial notifications over the last six years show that a
few large pipeline spills (approximately 4%) account for
most of the oil spilled from pipelines (approximately 73%) .
• EPA conducts approximately 30 oil spill cleanups per year
and monitors approximately 200 additional oil spill cleanups
per year.
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BPA's Oil Spill R«s«arcli and D«v«lopa«nt Efforts
EPA is participating in the Interagency Research and
Development Coordinating Coninittee, which was established by the
Oil Pollution Act of 1990 and chaired by the U.S. Coast Guard.
This Committee prepared a coordinated research plan and submitted
it to Congress in April, 1992. The plan identifies research that
will be conducted over the next five years.
Under the agreement of the Committee, EPA is focusing its
oil spill research in four areas: 1) bioremediation, 2)
dispersants, 3) mechanical cleanup of Inland spills, and 4)
debris disposal. The plem submitted to Congress proposed that
bioremediation and dispersant technology would be EPA's two top
research and development priorities.
Bioremediation
EPA established the Bioremediation Action Committee (BAC) to
speed the development of bioremediation as a tool for addressing
both oil and hazardous waste spills. The BAC recommended the
development of a set of standardized protocols for determining
the effectiveness and toxicity of bioremediation products,
including both microbial products and nutrients. A panel of
experts fron industry, academia,. and government is currently
developing. the protocols.
Under Sxibpart J of the NCP, any approved bioremediation
products are listed on the NCP Product Schedule. Currently, EPA
requires bioremediation manufacturers to submit specific
laboratory data about the product (e.g., effectiveness.
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composition) before being added to the Schedule. If the
manufacturer submits all required data, EPA lists the product on
the Schedule. During a spill response, the OSC may choose to use
amy product listed on the Schedule, and other products may be
selected on a case-by-case basis. The NCP is currently under
revision, and information developed from the protocol development
research will be used to improve the current Product Schedule.
Under the auspices of the BAC, EPA has prepared a
bioremediation spill response plan for use at a future spill in
Region VI. The Region VI Spill Response Plan is a document
intended to expedite the decision of whether to use
bioremediation agents to mitigate an oil spill. « Although some of
the information in the plan is specific to Region VI, other EPA
Regions have used it as a prototype.
Dispersants
During the Exxon Valdez oil spill in Alaska, considerable
controversy arose over the use of dispersants as a response tool.
EPA has made significant progress in evaluating a test
methodology to determine the effectiveness and toxicity of
dispersantsw This is Intended to provide decision-making
officials with reliable data that could be used in responding to
a spill. The decision to use dispersants should be made quickly
after an oil spill occvirs. The protocol improvements are
intended to expedite this decisionmaking process.
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Mechanical Cleanup
Mechanical oil spill containment devices used on the high
seas or in Coastal environnents often fail when used on fast
flowing rivers and streams. EPA is investigating the use of an
innovative diversionary system based on vertical, plunging water
jets. This system could be used to divert an oil spill to a
quiescent zone for removal, and cam be used effectively in
currents up to six knots. EPA has sponsored research for this
system in small stream feasibility tests, and in 1984 published a
field manual for the use of a small-sized water jet system. The
Agency is now focusing on evaluating the effectiveness of larger
diameter nozzles and high flow rates when used in a large, higher
current river system.
Debris Disposal
Some States and local authorities regulate oil wastes as
hazardous materials. Therefore, oil-laden debris associated with
the cleanup of spilled oil is often managed as a regulated
hazardous material. This complicates waste management and often
results in long-distance shipment of large volumes of oil spill
waste to regulated hazeurdous waste facilities. So far,
acceptable shipboard or transportable land-based waste management
options have not materialized. EPA plans further research into
1) developing state-of-the-art disposal techniques, 2) evaluating
emissions from waste debris incineration, 3) evaluating several
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recleunatlon alternatives, and 4) evaluating bioremediation
technology as a means to allow future land disposal of the waste.
Thank you again for the opportunity to appear before your
Subcommittee. My colleagues and I would be pleased to answer any
questions you or the other Subcommittee members might have.
*******
306
TESTIMONY OF ROBERT B. RACKLEFF
PRESIDENT, FRIENDS OF LLOYD
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS AND OVERSIGHT
U.S. HOUSE COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC WORKS AND TRANSPORTATION
HEARING ON COLONIAL PIPELINE SPILL OF MARCH 28, 1993
WASHINGTON, D.C.
MAY 18, 1993
I am Robert B. Rackleff , President of the Friends of Lloyd,
a group of North Florida citizens organized to protect the
environmental quality of our conununity and surrounding area.
Lloyd is an unincorporated village in Jefferson County, 16 miles
east of Tallahassee. Our mailing address is 816 Cherry street,
Tallahassee, Florida 32303, phone 904-222-9789.
Our primary concern for over four years has been to stop
construction of a Texaco gasoline tank farm and Colonial Pipeline
project in the county's only high-recharge area for the Floridan
Aquifer. But a more general concern has become inadequate
federal and state regulation of petroleum pipelines. There can
be no doubt that much stronger federal and state regulation is
necessary, and that is why we are submitting this testimony.
By way of introduction, I work as a self-employed writer and
consultant for such clients as the Polaroid Corporation, American
Bar Association, Time Warner Inc., and Ford Foundation. Before
that, I was a speechwriter for U.S. Senator Edmund Muskie,
President Jimmy Carter, and Time Inc. Chairman J. Richard Munro.
My involvement in environmental issues began in the late 1960s
and includes authorship of Close, to Crisis; Florida's
Environmental Problems (New Issues Press, 1972). As President of
the Friends of Lloyd, I receive no compensation of any sort; my
involvement is voluntary and unpaid.
INTRODUCTION
I appear today to describe the extent of the problem of
pollution from harzardous liquid, or oil, pipelines in America,
as exemplified by the Colonial Pipeline spill on March 28 near
Reston, Virginia. The estimated 406,000 gallons of fuel which
spilled into Sugarland Run and the Potomac River were only part
of the more than 1.5 million gallons Colonial has spilled or
leaked in the last four years. In fact, in 1991 and 1992,
Colonial Pipeline alone spilled more than did all tankships and
barges throughout the United states in those two years. Colonial
spilled 566,496 gallons, and all water carriers spilled 529,693,
in those two years.
And Colonial Pipeline's record is only a small part of the
total spilled or leaked by an industry which is so lightly-
307
regulated that it is, for all practical purposes, that it is
self-regulated. Oil pipelines spill or leak the equivalent of an
Exxon Valdez spill every year in America, on average, year after
year. From 1970 to 1992, oil pipelines spilled a total of
272,036,562 gallons of crude oil and petroleiun products, or an
annual average of 11,827,242 gallons, according to the Annual
Reports of Pipeline Safety of the U.S. Office of Pipeline Safety.
In the six weeks after the Sugarland Run spill, from March 28 to
May 10, the OPS has received telephone reports of 280 pipeline
spills. One of them, by ARCO Four Corners Pipeline Company,
spilled 260,400 gallons in the Los Angeles area.
Pipelines are the leading point source of oil pollution in
the United States. The annual average of nearly 12 million
gallons spilled are only those reported to the OPS. The actual
volume of oil spilled each year by pipelines is undoubtedly far
higher and "may be as much as 20 million to 30 million gallons
each year," according to a report issued yesterday by the Friends
of the Earth. I mention "point source," because urban runoff, or
"nonpoint source" pollution, is the leading overall cause of oil
pollution.
Spills from oil tankships and barges are far less serious a
source of oil pollution than pipelines. In the years 1973 to
1992, tankships and barges spilled a total of 92,340,884 gallons
of crude oil and petroleum products, according to the U.S. Coast
Guard. We have no authoritative data on the annual volume of
leaks and spills from aboveground and underground storage tanks.
Moreover, as a means of transporting oil, pipelines are
twice as likely as tankers and barges to spill or leak.
Factoring in statistics on ton-miles compiled by the Association
of Oil Pipelines, pipelines have spilled 20,928 gallons of oil
per ton-mile transported, and tankships and barges have spilled
9,947 gallons per ton-mile transported. That is an important
comparison because public concern and our regulatory effort in
recent years has centered on preventing oil spills by tankships
and barges.
(See page 21 for a table showing yearly spill totals for oil
pipelines and water carriers in the United States.)
As only one indication of regulatory neglect, in contrast
with the massive volumes spilled by pipelines, consider that the
total amount of civil penalties collected from pipeline companies
by OPS was $429,300 from 1979 to 1991. It does not include
penalties collected in 1986; they were not available to me.
During those 12 years (excluding 1986), there were 2,437 reported
pipeline incidents which spilled 126,000,584 gallons of oil, yet
the OPS collected only $429,300 in civil penalties. That amounts
to penalties paid of 3.4 cents per gallon spilled — surely one
of the great regulatory bargains of our time.
308
Pipeline pollution is an environmental crisis that persists
because we have simply not taken it seriously as an environmental
threat. Until passage of amendments to the Hazardous Licfuid
Pipeline Safety Act by Congress last year, federal regulations
were concerned only with safety problems and not the
environmental disasters they are. "The U.S. pipeline industry
has an excellent public safety record," a National Transportation
Safety Board (NTSB) official stated at a Congressional hearing
two years ago. It was as if DOT officials in 1989 had claimed
that the Exxon Valdez disaster was a triumph of public safety
regulation because, after all, nobody was killed or injured —
then done nothing to prevent similar tanker spills.
The pollution of Sugarland Riin and the Potomac River by
Colonial Pipeline on March 28, despite its tragic impact, may at
least have the effect of focusing Congressional attention on this
long-neglected problem. I hope that a momentum will come out of
this hearing for a thorough aseessment of how poorly we regulate
oil pipelines and a significant strengthening of these
regulations.
I submitted written testimony in 1991 and closely followed
Congressional action on the reauthorization of the Pipeline
Safety Act enacted last October. The amendments in that
reauthorization made only marginal improvements in federal
regulation of oil pipelines. It was one more opportunity lost
for a significant advance in environmental protection and public
safety.
Today, however. Congress again has an opportunity to develop
stricter standards for location, construction, operation and
regulation of hazardous liguid pipelines, as well as a stronger
role for state governments and citizen access to the courts. I
hope that Congress makes the most of that opportunity.
LESSONS LEARNED ABOUT PIPELINE SAFETY AND POLLUTION
I want now to share some lessons the Friends of Lloyd have
learned in the last four years of research about and direct
experience with oil pipelines.
Our experience in opposing an ill-conceived gasoline
pipeline proposal by Colonial Pipeline Company is a case study of
how government pipeline regulations are not protecting the
environment and public safety at the local level. It has also
given us an opportunity to learn about the problem nationwide.
In a sense, we have learned at the retail level what results from
your work at the wholesale level, and we believe the lessons
learned here are worth considering while you consider further
actions after this hearing concludes. The most basic lesson we
have learned is that government regulation is not working.
309
Colonial has proposed extending a l2-inch pipeline which now
terminates in Bainbridge, Georgia, 55 miles to Lloyd, Florida, to
serve a proposed gasoline tank farm in Lloyd, Florida, to be
built by a partnership of Texaco, Citgo and Amoco. It would
traverse high-recharge areas of the Floridan Ac[uifer, including a
lake, wetlands and sinkhole-prone areas, jeopardizing groundwater
supplies of three counties in Georgia and two in North Florida.
The projects are still unbuilt because of the opposition of the
Friends of Lloyd and the Leon County government.
We endeavored throughout to base our opposition on
documented evidence of the safety and environmental records of
petroleum pipelines and related facilities. We have carried out
extensive research of public records, research literature, and
pretrial discovery, as well as consulting with numerous
scientific and engineering experts.
We also approached the widest possible range of federal,
state and local agencies to seek relocation of the pipeline and
tank farm. We found that these public agencies were neither
willing nor able to help. We have had to rely primarily on
privately-financed lawsuits to challenge the project, while we
have been able to bear these expenses, thsy are far out of the
financial range of most community groups. Nobody should have to
go through the strenuous efforts we have undertaken, yet this
will happen again repeatedly unless regulators exercise more
responsibility.
Here are some lessons we want to share with this
subcommittee.
LESSON #1 - FEDERAL REGULATORY AGENCIES ARE NOT PROTECTING
THE PUBLIC OR THE ENVIRONMENT.
Results should count, and the results demonstrate that the
Office of Pipeline Safety is not serious about regulating
pipelines. A record of 272 million gallons spilled in the last
23 years speaks for itself: The current regulatory structure is
broken, and it needs fixing.
General Accounting Office reports in 1984, 1989 and 1991 and
Congressional hearings in 1987 and 1989 have detailed the
shortcomings of the Department of Transportation agencies
regulating petroleum pipelines.
Among our many concerns about the numerous shortcomings is
the Inadequate staffing of the OPS and the National
Transportation Safety Board. The OPS now has three field
inspectors for the eight states, including mine, in its
Southeastern Region — and only 24 for a national pipeline system
of 1.75 million miles (including 225,000 miles of hazardous
liquids pipelines) . We understand that the 1992 amendments will
increase this number, but even that would be inadequate.
310
Inadequate staffing affects the full range of OPS
activities, from data collection, verification and compilation to
inspections. As an OPS official said in the 1989 hearing.
Essentially, our inspections consist primarily of
reviewing their operating records and their operation
and maintenance manuals, and spot checking pipelines in
the field. . . .As you know, we have a very small
program. . . . It is a constant balancing act as far
as how you deploy very limited resources.
Inadequate staffing also affects DOT's ability to
investigate pipeline accidents, a responsibility of the NTSB. In
the 1987 Congressional hearing, a NTSB official reported it had
only two pipeline accident investigators. "Of the approximately
2,000 accidents reported to the Department of Transportation, the
Safety Board is able to investigate 25 to 30," the official
stated.
The result is that the public and environment are
inadequately protected. Remember also that, in 40 states,
including Florida and Virginia, there is no state regulation of
petroleum pipelines. These 40 states rely entirely on the
federal program to protect them from pipeline leaks, spills, and
explosions.
Also, pipeline companies assert the right to route new
petroleum pipelines without meaningful restrictions by federal or
state governments. There is no federal routing process for oil
pipelines. The result is that pipeline companies routinely
ignore environmental or safety considerations in routing new
pipelines and in siting related facilities, such as gasoline
tanks farms — even when the dangers are obvious.
LESSON #2 - PIPELINE TECHNOLOGY AND OPERATING PRACTICES DO
NOT PROTECT THE ENVIRONMENT
"Liquid petroleum pipelines are the safest mode of
transportation in the United States," Joe Swift, president of Sun
Pipeline Company, told the Sharp subcommittee on May 22. Yet the
pipeline record of 272 million gallons of oil spills alone is a
repudiation of claims like this and an indictment of pipeline
operations in the United States. Other reports confirm the
enormity of the pipeline problem. For example, the General
Accounting Office (GAO) in its January 29, 1991, report,
"Pollution From Pipelines," documented 3,910 spills in U.S.
waters during the 1980s, more than one per day.
The Wilderness Society report, "A Hundred Spills, A Thousand
Excuses," released on March 19, 1990 underscored this serious
failure and suggests a comparison of pipelines with other sources
311
of oil pollution. From this report of the 100 worst oil spills
following the Exxon Valdez disaster, we found this breakdown:
46 spills - Pipelines
16 spills - Storage Tanks
13 spills - Barges
10 spills - Tanker Trucks
9 spills - Tanker Ships
3 spills - Other Ships
2 spills - Railroad Tankers
1 spill - Unknown
The Wilderness Society report showed that pipelines
accounted for more than half of the total volume of the 100 worst
spills. Here they are by category:
5,596,650 gallons (51.6%) - Pipelines
2,890,300 gallons (27.4%) - Storage Tanks
1,198,800 gallons (11.0%) - Tanker Ships
772,800 gallons (7.1%) - Barges
260,100 gallons (2.4%) - Other Ships
82,500 gallons (0.8%) - Tanker Trucks
25,500 gallons (0.2%) - Railroad Tankers
25.000 gallons (0,_2j^)_T-.Pnknpwn
10,851,650 gallons Total
The Friends of the Earth report on oil pollution, "Crude
Awakening," released yesterday, compiled from news reports a list
of 30 oil pipeline spills of over 100,000 gallons from 1985 until
to the March 28 Sugarland Run spill by Colonial Pipeline. A
report in Oil & Gas Journal of October 29, 1990, found 690
failures in Gulf of Mexico offshore oil pipelines from 1967 to
1987 and that the rate of failures was getting worse, not getting
better. The report concluded, "The significant increase in
failures since 1975 can be attributed to the increase in the
pipeline population, aging of the pipelines installed earlier,
and the increased offshore construction activity."
These and other reports demonstrate that petroleum pipelines
are far more dangerous and unreliable than both the industry and
regulators claim. Moreover, we should never lose sight of the
fact that pipeline spills tend to happen inland, and pollute the
ground and waters we depend on for municipal and agricultural
water supplies. Unlike coastal waters, where tides and other
flushing action can disperse contamination (although the
ecological effects can be devastating) , inland spills from
pipelines can produce groundwater contamination that persists for
decades and may never be completed cleaned up.
For example, a leak in an eight-inch pipe in East Setauket,
Long Island, dribbled a million gallons of leaded gasoline into
the ground for over 10 years. The underground pool of gasoline
still floats over the Long Island Aquifer, the island's only
source of drinking water. Besides pumping out undissolved
312
gasoline, cleanup efforts include a new wastewater treatment .
plant, large enough for a city of 35,000 people, to treat the
ground water containing dissolved gasoline. Officials there
expect the cleanup to take at least a decade.
LESSON #3 - SPILL AND ACCIDENT DATA ABOUT PETROLEUM
PIPELINES ARE INCOMPLETE, INACCURATE AND NEEDLESSLY DIFFICULT TO
OBTAIN.
Despite reports of 32.9 million gallons of petroleum spilled
in 1987-89, the OPS data serious underreport the number and
dimension of pipeline spills. As a result, the data are deeply
flawed as a basis for policy development or source of public
information. For example, there is no way of knowing whether a
pipeline operator's good record at OPS is genuine or a result of
underreporting the volume of spills or not reporting them at all.
This is partly because the OPS in 1984 inexplicably relaxed
its reporting requirements so that it now requires hazardous
liquids pipeline operators to report spills or leaks of more than
2,100 gallons (50 barrels), or involve $5,000 or more in property
damage or injury or death; the previous requirement was to report
all spills over 210 gallons (five barrels) .
As a result, the average number of liquids pipeline spills
reported to OPS was fewer than half the 391 annual average spills
compiled from other sources by the GAO. Note also that the GAO
reported on spills in U.S. waters only, while the OPS data were
supposed to reflect spills inland as well.
Moreover, the GAO reported in 1987 that few pipeline
companies complied fully with even the relaxed OPS reporting
requirements and that the OPS was unable to monitor compliance
with reporting requirements. The GAO was unable to determine the
full extent of this underreporting. Other problems, as noted in
1990 by an OPS official in conversation with me, are pipeline
companies which underreport the size of spills, and failure to
revise reported spill volumes upward after their initial report.
As one test of OPS data accuracy, we compared the number of
reported spills at OPS with known data about a crude oil pipeline
which traverses the Florida Everglades. The Florida Department
of Natural Resources has on file approximately 40 spills by
Sunniland Pipeline; the OPS has two on file.
The only other source of systematic pipeline spill data, the
Emergency Response Notification System (ERNS) , comes from reports
to the U.S. Coast Guard National Response Center on spills in
U.S. waters, and does not include inland pipeline spills.
Although it shows about twice the number of spills as OPS data,
it seriously undercounts the vol\ime of these spills. For the
years 1980 to 1989, ERNS reports that oil pipelines spill almost
20 million gallons, while OPS data reported spills of 109,543,640
313
gallons during the same period. More recently. Coast Guard data
on the Sugarland Run spills records the volume spilled as zero.
In short, the inadequate data on pipeline spills are a
serious shortcoming which distort the safety and environmental
record of petroleum pipelines and thereby impair objective
analyses of risks and the development of policies to reduce those
risks.
LESSON #4 - PIPELINE COMPANIES ROUTINELY MISREPRESENT THEIR
SAFETY RECORDS AND FEDERAL REGULATIONS WHICH GOVERN THEM
Even compared to the undercount of spills and accidents in
OPS records. Colonial Pipeline has misrepresented both its
company record and the industry record of spills and leaks. It
has repeatedly told North Florida residents that pipelines cause
less pollution than other means of transporting oil, especially
tankers and barges. In a newsletter published last year,
Colonial claimed that data from the U.S. Department of
Transportation showed that in 1990 pipelines spilled 18,709
gallons per billion ton-mile transported while water carriers
spilled 44,458 gallons per billion ton-mile. The same statistics
were in a Florida Energy Pipeline Association (FEPA) newsletter.
When we asked DOT about these statistics, we heard from George W.
Tenley Jr., Associate Adminstrator for Pipeline Safety:
We did not recognize the statistics in the article
and called the FEPA Executive Director to determine the
source. He, in turn, referred us to the contributing
author who, upon checking, acknowledged the statistics
were not from DOT but from a brochure published by the
Association of Oil Pipelines. . • .
To avoid any further confusion, we are requesting
the FEPA Executive Director to issue a retraction in
the next issue of the newsletter. . . .
with respect to the assertions in the article, we
cannot at this time categorically confirm or deny them.
Since the statistics are not from DOT data bases, we
would have to undertake a significant amount of
validation, analysis, and interpretation to arrive at
any responsible conclusions.
We looked at Colonial's data more closely and determined
that they came from the Emergency Response Notification System,
which counted less than 20 percent of the volume of oil pipeline
spiils in the 1980' s, as 1 cited earlier, and ignored the more
accurate OPS data.
Moreover, in aii application for a dredge-and~f ill permit in
1990, the Florida Department of Environmental Regulation asked
Colonial Pipeline how many spills it had experienced; its answer
314
was two. Also, Colonial Pipeline has repeatedly stated that its
few spills were the result of "outside force," when the actual
causes of most were equipment failures or employee error. As OPS
data show, outside force typically accounts for about one-fourth
of liquid pipeline accidents, while pipeline companies' equipment
or operational failures account for three-fourths.
Colonial Pipeline has also misrepresented the nature of
federal regulations in a concerted effort to forestall state or
local governments from regulating petroleum pipelines here. When
the Friends of Lloyd lobbied the Florida Legislature in 1990 to
enact a state program to regulate hazardous liquid pipelines,
pipeline lobbyists repeatedly claimed that "federal preemption"
made such state legislation illegal, despite OPS efforts to
encourage state involvement in regulating pipeline safety. As
recently as May 16, 1991, a Colonial attorney told the
Tallahassee Democrat, "Federal law says no state — and the
county is part of the state — shall adopt any standards related
to the safety of pipelines."
In fact, the federal government encourages states to enact
pipeline regulation. As a senior U.S. Department of
Transportation official said at a 1989 Congressional hearing,
The state programs are critical to pipeline
safety. Existing Federal resources, and any reasonably
likely expansion of those resources, are not sufficient
to ensure the safe operation of pipeline facilities
given the size of the regulated community, the extent
of their facilities, and the complexity of their
operations. Moreover, states have a strong interest in
protecting their citizens.
One obvious, but overlooked, result of pipeline company
misrepresentation is that only 10 of the 50 states are certified
to participate in the regulation of pipelines. If our experience
during the 1990 Florida legislative session is a guide, the zeal
of pipeline companies to prevent state regulation of pipelines
has ensured that the oPS program with state regulators will not
expand in coming years. The apparent reason for opposing state
regulations is that pipeline companies have grown comfortable
with federal regulators and do not want this relationship
disturbed.
For another example. Colonial Pipeline attempted two years
ago to stop a local government in Florida from determining the
route of a new pipeline within its jurisdication. It filed a
lawsuit in federal court on August 16, 1991 against Leon County,
claiming that federal law preempts the county's action, despite
federal policy that leaves such determinations to state and local
governments. Yet only weeks earlier, DOT's Administrator of the
Research and Special Programs Administration, Travis P. Dungan,
told a Congressional subcommittee that "such matters as zoning
and location of pipelines are entirely a matter of local
315
10
control." Even the Association of Oil Pipe Lines has endorsed
"the power of state and local governments to affect the location
of pipelines that cross their jurisdiction," in a written
statement on June 20, 1991. A federal judge in February, 1992,
ruled against Colonial.
Colonial has also misrepresented federal saifety regulations
about the clear-cutting of pipeline rights of way. A group of
homeowners in the Atlanta, Georgia area have filed a lawsuit in
state court to stop Colonial from clear-cutting trees adjacent to
their homes. In reply. Colonial and Plantation Pipeline
submitted a legal brief on June 28, 1990 that they had no
alternative but to clear cut because, "The pipeline companies
must clear the right of way and any obscuring side growth to
comply with the inspection requirements of Part 195.412(a) [of
DOT pipeline regulations]." However, that requirement states
simply that operators inspect rights of way at specified
intervals and nothing about methods or clear-cutting.
The March 28 spill by Colonial Pipeline is another example
of how Colonial misrepresents itself. When the spill took place,
Colonial claimed that it lost 336,000 gallons; it had the look of
a precise number, but it was exactly 8,000 barrels, and later
turned out to be about 406,000 gallons, in a newspaper ad run in
the Tallahassee area. Colonial Pipeline claimed, "Almost all of
the product spilled in Virginia was recovered — a phenomenal
recovery effort." Yet Congressional staff found that Colonial
has wildly exagerrated the volume of fuel it recovered, counting
the volume oil-tainted water it recovered as pure oil when it
recovered barely half of of the oil spilled. Colonial also
claims that outside damage scarred the pipeline and theregy
caused the spill, when it is more likely that sloppy construction
by Colonial's contractor installing the pipeline was the cause.
In short, if Colonial Pipeline's lack of veracity is any
guide, pipeline companies routinely mislead state and local
officials, as well as the general public. This will persist as
long as federal policy continues to be obscure and data continue
to be faulty and inaccessible to the public.
LESSON #5 - THE CURRENT RELATIONSHIP OF THE REGULATED
INDUSTRY AND REGULATORS MAKES SIGNIFICANT REFORM IMPOSSIBLE.
As important as inadequate funding and staffing have been as
causes of inadequate regulation of pipelines by DOT, these alone
cannot explain the history of consistently pro-industry actions
by the regulatory agencies involved, primarily the Office of
Pipeline Safety.
We do not impugn their integrity or dedication, but we also
found unmistakably pro-industry behavior of DOT staffs and
leadership during the Presidency of Ronald Reagan and George
Bush. The 1984 relaxation of the petroleum pipeline spill
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11
reporting requirements is a notable example of a decision that
could only benefit pipeline operators, to the detriment of the
public and environment.
Less than six months ago, the OPS in the Federal Register of
November 27, 1992, proposed relaxing its spill reporting
requirements so that pipeline companies would no longer have to
to raise the threshhold from $5,000 of property damage to
$50,000. The stated reason for this change was that the American
Petroleum Institute the $5,000 requirement was "outdated,
unnecessarily burdensome and results in unnecessary costs and red
tape." The OPS agreed that "the requirement sometimes requires
reporting of minor accidents." This would have further reduced
the effectiveness of an already-inadequate reporting system and
ignored the need for accurate data to understand the pollution
problem better.
We also note the pro-industry membership of the OPS's
Technical Pipeline Safety Standards Committees, which exert a
powerful influence on regulatory decisions. The most recent list
of members of the two committees shows a membership comprised of
industry, government and public representatives, each in equal
number. However, the "public" members consisted of lawyers and
consultants whose livelihood depends on pipeline companies. With
such a membership, the real public and real public interests are
invisible and unrepresented.
There is no better confirmation of this pro-industry bias
than the OPS disposition of proposed improvements in hazardous
liquid pipeline regulations, as reported in the Federal Register
of June 8, 1990, pages 23514-19. The OPS considered 18
proposals, beginning in February, 1987, including proposals by a
DOT Safety Task Force and the National Transportation Safety
Board, and requirements in the Pipeline Safety Reauthorization
Act of 1988.
After three years, the OPS in 1990 had taken final action on
only two of the 18 proposals, adoption of the one-call system and
the inclusion of carbon dioxide pipelines in its regulatory
program. The OPS decided either to study further, to modify
severely or to reject outright the 16 other proposals, erring in
all cases on a lighter regulatory burden on the pipeline
industry. The recommendations of the technical committees
determined the OPS outcomes in most of these cases.
The OPS put off for study proposals requiring such technical
improvements as automatic shut-off valves, hydrostatic testing,
lower maximum operating pressures and computer-based leak ^^-^^
detection, and rejected proposals requiring cathodic protection
and double-wall pipe. It put off for study such procedural
improvements as requiring operators to inventory types of
pipelines and systems and to submit reports on pipeline condition
every four years, and rejected proposals for operators to provide
information to local governments, to inform local residents of
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12
pipeline locations, to install more conspicuous line markers, and
to develop setback requirements.
However, in most cases where the OPS intends to study these
proposals, the results are foreordained to err in favor of
pipeline companies' interests. For example, in considering the
NTSB recommendation to require automatic shutoff valves, which
might have reduced the size of the Sugarland Run spill, the OPS
stated, "there does not appear to be sufficient justification to
require the installation . . . along the entire length," but it
would carry out a study as required by the 1988 Reauthorization
Act; the results of the study are predictable. The 1988
Reauthorization Act required the OPS to study hydrostatic testing
of pipelines, yet the forthcoming results are also predictable,
given the OPS statement that "integrity testing of all pipelines
at arbitrary, fixed intervals does not appear justified."
A review of the disposition of each proposal shows a
consistent deference to industry claims that both technical and
procedural improvements would be unnecessary financial burdens ~
and a general satisfaction of OPS with current procedural and
technical standards. In considering increased federal oversight
in design and construction of new pipelines, the OPS stated, "The
available safety data do not indicate that the actions
contemplated by this proposal for design and construction
functions are needed." However, it did agree to establish^
competency standards for pipeline company personnel, a position
consistent with companies' tendency to blame problems on human
error, and not equipment or operating procedure problems.
Of special concern to us is the consistently low regard by
OPS for informing the public or local governments. The OPS
deferred to pipeline company claims about the high cost of
requiring them to provide local governments with information
about pipeline locations and descriptions; it decided instead
that states should have that responsibility. It deferred to
company complaints that informing residents near pipelines about
locations would "create undue alarm, that landowners are not
necessarily the persons at risk, and that the costs would be
extremely high with little expected benefit"; the OPS rejected
this proposal. It also rejected more conspicuous pipeline
markers at road crossings "without regard for esthetic
considerations." In other words, the OPS has little regard for
informing the public, despite the public's right to know and the
obvious value in a better^informed public and local governments.
The 1987 Congressional hearing on pipeline safety, in the
wake of the Mounds View, Minnesota, disaster, provides another
example of OPS deference to industry interests. During that
hearing, GAO commented on OPS's "study" of the feasibility of
regulating pipeline-connected petroleum tank farms, a measure GAO
had recommended in 1984. The OPS study found that such
regulations were not necessary because, it claimed, unregulated
tank farms had safety records comparable to similar regulated
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13
ones. However, GAO reviewed crucial data in this study and found
that OPS had selected data only from operators with the best
safety records, ignoring more representative data, which would
have demonstrated an urgent need for regulation. Once again, OPS
had acted to the benefit of the pipeline industry, not the
public.
In short, it is clear that continued reliance on the Office
of Pipeline Safety by Congress to improve technical and
procedural standards, short of mandating specific standards, will
produce only marginal improvements far short of the urgent need
to improve the pipeline safety and environmental record. The
industry has far too much influence, especially through the
technical advisory committees, for OPS to carry out impartial
studies that will lead to the significant improvements.
LESSON #6 - FEDERAL REGULATIONS DO NOT, BUT SHOULD, COVER
PIPELINE-CONNECTED PETROLEUM TANK FARMS.
Despite recommendations by GAO in 1984 that the Department
of Transportation study the feasibility of regulating pipeline-
connected petroleum tank farms, DOT took no action. As a result,
a large number of inland tank farms continue to have safety and
pollution records which should concern us all. As the GAO found
in 1989, federal tank farm regulations "do not contain mandatory,
specific design and operating practices to avoid spills."
That lack of federal regulation helped lead to such
tragedies as the massive tank farm leaks in Fairfax, Virginia,
which was investigated by a commission formed by Governor Doug
Wilder. In its report of December 18, 1992, it stated.
The Commission adheres to the position stated by
the Attorney General of Virginia, the Fairfax City
Council, the Fairfax County Board of supervisors, the
Council of Civic Associations of the City of Fairfax,
the Fairfax County Federation of Citizens Associations,
and Citizens for a Healthy Fairfax, that the Pickett
Road Tank Farm is inappropriate in its present
location ■ poses an unreasonable risk to the purroundinq
public health, safety, and welfare, and must be
relocated.
The report also noted:
During the first year of operation [1965], a spill
of 2500 gallons was reported by Texaco, over t^ie n^xt
27 years, at least 20 fipills were reported by the
various owners and operators, with a t-otal spillage of.
at least 500,000 gallons of various products.
The Washington Post reported that the Virginia Attorney
General was about to file criminal charges against Texaco, which
319
14
avoided prosecution after agreeing to buy out homeowners in two
neighborhoods and otherwise compensate them in a settlement which
may cost Texaco as much as $200 million.
Texaco in Travis County, Texas, recently closed down its
tank farm in East Austin because it caused massive contamination
and health problems. To avoid criminal prosecution — just like
in Virginia -- Texaco and several other oil companies had to
close down their tank farms there permanently. The Aus.tin
American-Statesman reported on September 19, 1992,
Facing the threat of criminal subpoenas from a
five-month pollution investigation, a third oil company
agreed Friday to close its gasoline terminal at East
Austin's controversial tank farm.
Officials at Star Enterprise [Texaco] , which
operates the largest terminal at the tank farm,
notified Travis County Attorney Ken Oden that they will
halt all operations at their six-acre site as soon as
the company finds a temporary alternate fuel supply.
. . . Friday's announcement came just days after Oden
was to begin issuing grand jury subpoenas to the oil
companies that remain a focus of his investigation.
In 1991 the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) ordered a
Santa Fe Pacific Pipeline Co. fuel-tank farm near Reno, Nevada,
to begin a cleanup of leaks that total no less than four million
gallons and may be as large as 40 million gallons. This is a
staggering amount of leaked fuel which may be migrating
underground to the nearby Truckee River. If that occurs, it
would contaminate irrigation canals and Pyramid Lake downstream.
Other examples include massive contamination at pipeline and
storage tank complexes in Greensboro, N.C. and in Spartanburg,
S.C. As reported in the Greensboro News & Record, state
authorities have required a massive cleanup by Colonial Pipeline,
Plantation Pipeline and eight oil companies in Spartanburg
because resident complaints and test wells showed widespread
contamination of groundwater there. A state official "estimated
that only about 5 percent of the cleanup is complete and that it
will continue throughout the iggo's," wrote the Greensboro
newspaper on December 14, 1989.
In Greensboro, state officials found a massive underground
pool of gasoline, five feet deep in one test well, at a tank farm
operated by Colonial Pipeline, Plantation Pipeline and 16 oil
companies. Discovered in 1988, it went unreported until
November, 1989. Reported soon after was the discovery that
Colonial Pipeline buried storage tank sludge in trenches on a
farmer's field until 1980; the sludge included carcinogenic
chemicals and heavy metals.
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15
These illustrate the severe contamination that slow leaks
can cause at tank farm sites which have scores of storage tanks
and mazes of underground pipelines, any one of which can be the
source of major problems. As a report issued in February by the
Environmental Defense Fund stated,
At refineries and other facilities that store
large quantities of petroleum in aboveground tanks, it
is likely that more than half the facilities have large
underground reservoirs of petroleum which can migrate
offslte if unaddressed.
Our experience in North Florida is further evidence of this
regulatory need. Texaco and Colonial selected a site for the
first of what will be several tank farms in a major complex in
the only high-recharge area in Jefferson county. The site is
bracketed by four sinkholes in an area known to be sinkhole-
prone. Cave divers explored one of the sinkholes in November and
December, 1990 and discovered that it was part of a major
underground water system which surfaces nine miles away to form
one of Florida's last unspoiled rivers. We have edited footage
of this historic dive into a 12-minute video which we can provide
to this subcommittee.
Also, the proposed Texaco and Colonial tank farm in Lloyd is
in a community with no effective ability to monitor fire safety
at the facility or to extinguish even minor fires. Jefferson
County has only five paid firefighters for the entire county and
no effective means to enforce fire safety or extinguish a fire.
This is at a site less than 300 yards from Interstate Highway 10,
surrounded by an area slated for intensive commercial and
residential development.
In other words, as a result of this lack of federal (and lax
state) regulations on pipeline-connected petroleum tank farms,
Texaco and Colonial can site this major new facility in one of
the worst possible locations you could imagine. If federal
regulations are adequate today, why can oil companies make such
Irresponsible and dangerous decisions, without review by
competent environmental authorities?
LESSON #7 - PETROLEUM PIPELINES CAN BE MUCH SAFER AND
CLEANER, AND THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT SHOULD TAKE THE LEAD, WHILE
ALSO FULLY INVOLVING STATE REGULATORS.
Despite the self-satisfaction of the industry and federal
regulators, it is painfully obvious that improved technology and
operating standards can make petroleum pipelines much safer and
cleaner than they are, or will be, if congress continues to enact
only marginal regulatory improvements. We propose later in this
testimony several such standards which are far more promising
than those this subcommittee is actively considering.
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16
We are especially concerned that the Pipeline Safety Act
excludes states at a time when effective regulation of pipelines
calls for a federal and state partnership such as those formed in
other areas of environmental regulation. It preempts any state
safety regulation of interstate pipelines that exceeds federal
standards, but leaves open the possibility of state environmental
regulations that are stricter than Federal standards which are
necessary for protecting unique environmental conditions in that
state. States like Florida or Virginia should be able to adopt
additional standards to protect their environment, especially
groundwater. Legislation should make clear that states can
impose additional environmental standards.
We are also concerned that new pipelines incorporate
improved technologies and operating procedures before major new
pipelines are built. This is a special concern because Florida
is on the verge of major expansion of petroleum pipelines in what
the industry proclaims is the nation's third-largest gasoline
market — and because of Florida's unique dependence on
groundwater supplies which are close to the surface; 90 percent
of the water Floridians use comes from underground aquifers.
Only two inter-urban pipelines exist in Florida today, a
Sunniland Pipeline carrying crude oil from Collier County to Port
Everglades, and a GATX gasoline pipeline from Tampa to Orlando.
Plans are underway to change this, however, because of the
proposed Colonial project in North Florida and another proposed
GATX pipeline from Tampa to Fort Myers. The GATX project would
extend 128 miles through some of Southwest Florida's most
vulnerable waterways and wetlands.
In such a fragile environment, petroleum pipeline leaks and
spills would have a devastating effect on water quality, with
untold long-term effects on public health.
Much stricter federal regulations could be the most
effective means of protecting the public of Florida and other
states, but not the only means. The Friends of Lloyd and other
environmental organizations are preparing a petition for
rulemaking to the Florida Department of Environmental Regulation,
to establish a state program though administrative procedures.
LESSON #8 - A NATIONAL STUDY BY AN UNBIASED AUTHORITY IS
NEEDED TO DETERMINE THE PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS FOR PIPELINE
POLLUTION
It is painfully obvious that pipelines are a far greater
source of oil pollution than acknowledged by the industry,
regulators, the public or even most environmental organizations.
This is because current information and data about leaks and
spills are fragmented, incomplete, and anecdotal. The
uncoordinated compilation and organization of this information
322
17
makes it impossible to determine accurately the relative dangers
from different means of transporting fuels.
The foremost sources today are industry organizations, such
as the American Petrolexim Institute, and regulators like the DOT,
which have no demonstrated ability to provide impartial
information to policymakers. When the DOT commissioned a study
of pipeline safety by the Transportation Research Board of
National Research Council (Special Report 219, "Pipelines and
Public Safety") , its narrow focus on safety ignored the enormous
but unexamined problem of pipeline pollution. And as I found out
in correspondence last year with the OPS, it had never studied
the pollution record of pipelines, with the excuse, "we would
have to undertake a significant amount of validation, analysis,
and interpretation to arrive at any responsible conclusions."
The problem is so alarming that the Congress should ask for
a comprehensive study by an organization with no stake in either
existing regulatory policies or economic interests.
LESSON #9 — THE PIPELINE SAFETY ACT COULD MORE ACCURATELY BE
CALLED "THE PIPELINE INDUSTRY PROTECTION ACT"
Much of the Hazardous Liquid Pipeline Safety Act amounts to
strong protection of oil pipeline companies from other federal
agencies, state and local governments, and citizens. It protects
companies from state and local governments by preempting them
from regulating the safety of interstate pipelines, except land-
use decisions. Section 2002(d) states,
... No state agency may adopt or continue in
force any safety standards applicable to interstate
pipeline facilities or the transportation of hazardous
liquids associated with such facilities.
When a pipeline spill occurs, the Pipeline Safety Act
protects companies by preventing state or local governments from
taking meaningful actions to prevent further spills. The case of
Williams Pipeline Co. v. City of Mounds View, Minnesota, affirmed
that the city could not prevent the restarting of the damaged
pipeline only days after it had exploded and killed several
people. A 1992 amendment to the Act permits state and local
governments to comment on settlements between the OPS and
pipeline companies, but this is hardly meaningful.
Moreover, the Pipeline Safety Act protects pipeline
companies from owners of property destroyed by pipeline spills or
leaks. Section 2014(b) states.
No civil action may be commenced [for injunctive
relief] ... if the [Office of Pipeline Safety] has
commenced and is diligently pursuing administrative
proceedings . . .
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18
It usually takes at least two years, and often more, for the OPS
to complete these proceedings. As a result, virtually all owners
of property destroyed by pipeline companies settle for pennies on
the dollar, instead of waiting years just to file a claim for
damage in court.
SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER ACTION
We believe that adoption of the following suggestions can
significantly improve the regulation of oil pipelines.
1. Encourage states to adopt pipeline regulatory programs .
allowing them to adopt environmental .an?l safety standards which
may be stricter than federal standards, if the 40 states without
such programs adopted an oil pipeline regulator program, it would
vastly increase the resources put to that task. States have
shown little interest because of industry lobbying, as in
Florida, but also because federal preemption discourages them.
There are many states with unique environmental vulnerabilities
which should be alowed to protect them from inadequate federal
regulation. We suggest the following language:
Nothing in this act shall affect, or be construed
or interpreted as preempting, the authority of any
state or political subdivision thereof from imposing
any additional liability or requirements with respect
to —
(1) the discharge of oil or other pollution by oil
within such State; or
(2) any removal activities in connection with such
a discharge.
2. Allow individuals to sue pipeline companies for civil
penalties and damage to their property or selves as soon as the
damage occurs. It makes little sense to insulate pipeline
companies from lawsuits by individuals, and, in fact, it would
strengthen pipeline safety if companies were exposed to this
liability. It would bring the Pipeline Safety Act into
consistency with other federal environmental laws, such as the
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act. Most important,
individuals should be able to recover damages in full, not be
forced to settle for only a fraction of the damages, as they do
now.
3. Interested parti ps should have the right to intervene
and participate in DOT administrative proceedings ^regarding
violations., including spills and leaks. State and local
governments, environmental organizations, and individuals have
been frustrated for too long with their inability to participate
324
19
in negotiated settlements between DOT and pipeline companies.
This and the previous suggestion would help provide citizen
enforcement of pipeline regulations, as is the case in other
areas of environmental law.
4 . Regulations should require pipelines companies to report
all spills over one gallon, or produce a visible sheen on waters.
or that result in iniurv or Slbo in damage to company, private or
public property. This would make petroleum pipeline incident
reporting requirements consistent with requirements for other
forms of petroleum transportation. This would help overcome the
lack of credible incident data which has helped ensure a
widespread complacency about pipeline safety and pollution and
lax regulatory standards. It hinders the development of
meaningful risk analysis. And it hinders the ability of the
public to inform themselves about the true extent of pipeline
safety and pollution incidents.
5 . If DOT continues its weak response to new technical and
operation standards . Congress should take up the task, it was
only after Congress last year required the use of "smart pigs"
that OPS took action. If this inaction continues. Congress must
be more specific and forceful about technical standards.
For example, we believe that regulations should require
double-wall pipe for hazardous liquid pipelines, with continuous
leak detection, in environmentally-sensitive and high-density
population areas. Current detection devices cannot find small
leaks that, over days and weeks, can contaminate groundwater with
thousands of gallons of petroleum. Double-wall pipe can offer
enhanced protection much the same as double-hull tankers, double-
wall underground storage tanks, and secondary containment of
aboveground storage tanks.
We believe the bill should also require enhanced technical
standards for cathodic protection design, hydrostatic test
facilitation, pipeline valves, acoustic leak detection test
points, monitoring wells, and continuous leak monitoring pipeline
math modeling systems.
For example, regulations should require hydrostatic testing
of new pipelines at least every three years, and new pipelines
should have the technical capabilities that make that possible.
This is necessary because current leak detection methods cannot
find small leaks which, over tine, can release large amounts of
petroleum into the ground. Visual surveillance can miss leaks
which do not produce dead surface vegetation or other telltale
signs, pressure gauge calibrations miss slight drops caused by
small" leaks, flow meters cannot correct for temperature changes
which cause changes in volume, and "smart pigs" often miss faulty
welds or other defects. Hydrostatic testing can detect leaks
caused by smart pigs (which may, as they travel through pipes,
dislodge scaling or other deposits which plugged existing leaks)
and should be considered complementary to pigs.
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20
We are aware of many of the industry objections to such
technical standards, and the negative response in 1990 to similar
proposals by the Technical Pipeline Safety Standards Committees
and the office of Pipeline Safety, but it is precisely because of
the combined resistance of the regulated industry and current
regulators that pipeline pollution is such a serious problem. If
the subcommittee staff does not have the expertise to evaluate
technical standards, perhaps the Office of Technology Assessment
could provide assistance.
6. Require J;hat_all members of the Technical Hazardous
Liquid Pipeline Safety Standards Committee.haYe.no financj^l
interests in the pipeline industry. The current requirement that
only one public member have no financial interest is a pathetic
mockery of the purpose of having one-third of the members of this
committee represent the public interest. It means that the other
three "public" members of the committee can continue to be
lawyers, consultants and other individuals whose livelihoods
depend on the pipeline industry. The four "public" committee
members can represent the public only if they have no conflicts
of interest, and there is no reason for them not to be conflict-
free.
7. Federal regulations should include a process by which
pipelines and related tank farms are sited. As we already do
with interstate natural gas pipelines, we must recognize the
crucial role which siting and routing decisions can have in
minizing environmental damage. Given the sorry record of leaks
and spills by pipelines, new routes should avoid wetlands,
sinkhole-prone, aquifer-recharge areas and other environmentally-
sensitive areas. There are no such federal regulations today.
8. Appropriations levels should, provide increased staffing
for OPS and related agencies to ensure, .tha.t . ney levels reflect
the urgent need for improved inspection, data collection and
dissemination . and development of stringent. new. .technical and
rating standards .
This concludes our comments. Thank you for providing us the
opportunity to present testimony to this subcommittee.
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21
Attachment
COMPARATIVE SPILLS AND LEAKS BY PIPELINE AND WATER CARRIERS
OF OIL AND PETROLEUM PRODUCTS IN THE UNITED STATES, 1970-92
BY VOLUME AND TON-MILES TRANSPORTED
Pipeline
Water
Water Carrier
Pipeline 1/
Ton-Miles zl
Carrier 2.1
Ton-Miles
V?ar
ppillB raals^
(billion?).
Spillfii fcralBl
f>?i;iions)
1970
22,097,418
, n/a
n/a
n/a
1971
9,805,362
n/a
n/a
n/a
1972
14,462,700
475.8
n/a •
330.0
1973
15,727,404
507.0
4,404,390
296.8
1974
12,127,962
506.0
3,535,385
297.0
1975
13,312,614
507.0
11,296,669
298.0
1976
10,060,722
515.0
11,018,486
306.9
1977
9,403,338
.546.0
1,769,202
333.3
1978
11,779,530
585.0
3,569,813
530.6
1979
22,900,248
608.3
3,352,052
522.9
1980
12,005,238
588.2
3,335,011
617.8
1981
8,588,622
563.7
5,369,100
617.2
1982
9,214,926
565.7
3,366,433
616.9
1983
16,020,942
556.1
1,953,673 ■
630.5
1984
12,008,010
568.1
7,152,367
570.7
1985
7,065,702 1/
564.3
4,417,032
590.4
1986
11,756,850
577.9
3,031,437
568.1
1987
15,341,634
586.8
2,222,546
566.5
1988
9,089,640
601.1
4,034,490
543.7-
1989
8,452,076
584,2
12,126,258
466.2
1990
5,206,e56
583.8
5,857,070
454.5
1991
9,196,530
577.8
338,235
436.4
1992
6,391,182
n/a
191,458
n/a
Total
272,015,306
11,167.8
92,340,884
9,594.4
Average
11,827,242
558.4
4,617,044
479.7
Avg Gals 20,928
9,947
Spilled
per
Billion
Ton-Miles
1/ Source: Annual Report of Pipeline Safety (for years 1978-90),
Office of Pipeline Safety, U.S. Department of Transportation; 1991
data from OPS letter of March 16, 1992.
2.1 A ton-mile is movement of a ton of cargo one mile. Source:
Annual Reports on Shifts in Petroleum Transportation, Association of
Oil Pipe Lines, and Transportation in America.
2/ Water Carriers are tankships and tank barges. Spills were in
U.S. waters. Source: Oil Pollution Incidents, Marine Environmental
Protection .Division, U.S. Coast Guard.
1/ Annual pipeline spill totals from 1985 to present reflect OPS
change to require reports for spills of more than 2,100 gallons.
Until 1985," reports were required for spills of more than 210 gallons.
PrepATBd by the Friends of the Aquifer, Tallahassee FL, May 14, 1993
327
STATEMENT BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS AND
OVERSIGHT, COMMITTEE ON PUBUC WORKS AND TRANSPORTATION,
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
BY
DR. STUART S. SCHWARTZ, DIRECTOR,
SECTION FOR COOPERATIVE WATER SUPPLY OPERATIONS,
INTERSTATE COMMISSION ON THE POTOMAC RIVER BASIN
MAY 18, 1993
GOOD AFTERNOON MR. CHAIRMAN AND MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE. I AM
DR. STUART SCHWARTZ, DIRECTOR OF THE SECTION FOR COOPERATIVE WATER
SUPPLY OPERATIONS AT THE INTERSTATE COMMISSION ON THE POTOMAC RIVER
BASIN. I AM HERE REPRESENTING THE SUPPLIERS AND JURISDICTIONS
RESPONSIBLE FOR PROVIDING A SAFE AND RELL\BLE WATER SUPPLY TO THE
NATIONAL CAPITAL REGION, NAMELY THE WASHINGTON SUBURBAN SANITARY
COMMISSION, THE FAIRFAX COUNTY WATER AUTHORITY, THE WASHINGTON
AQUEDUCT DIVISION OF THE U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS, THE DISTRICT
OF COLUMBIA, THE STATE OF MARYLAND, AND THE COMMONWEALTH OF
VIRGINL\. I AM JOINED HERE TODAY BY MR. JOHN CORLESS FROM THE
WASHINGTON SUBURBAN SANITARY COMMISSION, MR. PERRY COSTAS, THE
CHIEF OF THE WASHINGTON AQUEDUCT DIVISION OF THE U.S. ARMY CORPS OF
ENGINEERS, AND MR. FRED MORIN, CHAIRMAN OF THE FAIRFAX COUNTY
WATER AUTHORITY. THANK YOU FOR THE OPPORTUNITY TO TESTIFY ON THIS
IMPORTANT MATTER.
-1-
328
WE ARE HERE TODAY TO EXPRESS OUR GREAT CONCERN ABOUT THE SAFETY
OF THE NATIONAL CAPITAL REGION'S WATER SUPPLY, DEMONSTRATED MOST
RECENTLY BY THE SPILL FROM THE COLONL\L OIL TRANSMISSION PIPELINE ON
SUGARLAND RUN. WE WOULD LIKE TO BRIEFLY DESCRIBE TO YOU THE
MAGNITUDE OF THE RISK WE FACE AND SHARE WITH YOU SOME VERY SPECfflC
CONCERNS WE HAVE REGARDING THE PHYSICAL INTEGRITY OF THE COLONIAL
PIPELINE AND THE NEED FOR MEASURES TO REDUCE THE RISK TO THE REGION'S
WATER SUPPLY.
BEYOND THIS VERY SERIOUS REGIONAL INTEREST, WE BELIEVE THE MOST
RECENT SPILL FROM THE COLONIAL PIPELINE AND THE ASSOCIATED THREATS
TO THE POTOMAC RIVER AND THE WATER SUPPLY OF THE NATION'S CAPITAL,
DEMONSTRATE HAZARDS THAT MAY EFFECT COMMUNITIES THAT ARE
SIMILARLY LOCATED ALONG THE CORRIDORS CONTAINING OIL AND GAS
TRANSMISSION PIPELINES. THE RECENT SPILL TO THE POTOMAC OFFERS BOTH
CLEAR LESSONS, AS WELL AS A TIMELY OPPORTUNITY TO REASSESS PIPELINE
SAFETY NEEDS AND THE MANAGEMENT OF RISKS ASSOCIATED WITH PIPELINE
SPILLS BEFORE A MORE SERIOUS ACCIDENT OCCURS.
-2-
329
BACKGROUND ON THE ICFRB
THE INTERSTATE COMMISSION ON THE POTOMAC RIVER BASIN aCPRB) IS A NON-
REGULATORY INTERSTATE COMPACT COMMISSION CREATED WITH THE
POTOMAC BASIN CONSERVANCY COMPACT OF 1940, APPROVED BY THE U. S.
CONGRESS ON JULY 11, 1940. THE 1940 COMPACT WAS DEVELOPED FOR THE
PURPOSE OF CONTROLLING POLLUTION IN THE POTOMAC DRAINAGE BASIN, AND
RATIFIED BY THE COMMONWEALTHS OF VIRGINL\ AND PENNSYLVANL\, THE
STATES OF MARYLAND AND WEST VIRGINL\, AND THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA.
MEMBERS OF THE COMMISSION ARE APPOINTED BY THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE
(GOVERNOR, OR MAYOR) OF EACH SIGNATORY BODY ACCORDING TO THE
PROVISIONS OF EACH PARTY'S RATIFYING STATUTE, AND BY THE PRESIDENT
FOR THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT. IN 1970, THE COMPACT WAS AMENDED TO
BROADEN THE COMMISSION'S COORDINATION, INVESTIGATION, AND EDUCATION
RESPONSIBILITIES TO INCLUDE "DEVELOPMENT, UTILIZATION AND
CONSERVATION OF THE WATER AND ASSOCIATED LAND RESOURCES OF THE
BASIN."
ICPRB'S ACnvmES CONTINUE TO EVOLVE IN RESPONSE TO THE CHALLENGES
IN THE POTOMAC RIVER BASIN AND THE NEEDS OF OUR MEMBER
JURISDICTIONS. OUR PROGRAM INCLUDES MAJOR COMMITMENTS IN
SUPPORTING THE CLEANUP AND RESTORATION OF THE WATER RESOURCES AND
LIVING RESOURCES OF THE POTOMAC RIVER AND THE CHESAPEAKE BAY,
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330
RANGING FROM THE RESTORATION OF THE ANACX)STIA RIVER IN THE
METROPOLITAN AREA TO THE REVITALIZATION OF THE NORTH BRANCH
POTOMAC RIVER IN WESTERN MARYLAND AND THE PANHANDLE OF WEST
VIRGINIA. ICPRB'S PUBUC INFORMATION AND EDUCATION PROGRAMS
COMPLEMENT INTEGRATED TECHNICAL PROGRAMS THAT SUPPORT THE
MANAGEMENT AND ENHANCEMENT OF THE WATER RESOURCES, LIVING
RESOURCES, AND THE ASSOCIATED LAND RESOURCES OF THE POTOMAC RIVER
BASIN.
IN ORDER TO PROVIDE A CONTEXT FOR OUR CONCERNS REGARDING THE
COLONIAL PIPELINE SPILL, I WOULD LIKE TO BRIEFLY SUMMARIZE ICPRB'S
ACnvmES AND REGIONAL PERSPECTIVE ON THE MANAGEMENT OF WATER
SUPPLY AND HAZARDOUS SPILLS.
MElltOPOLITAN WATER SUPPLY
WATER SUPPLY FOR THE WASHINGTON METROPOLITAN AREA IS PROVIDED
ALMOST ENTIRELY BY THREE SEPARATE UTOJITES: THE WASHINGTON
AQUEDUCT DIVISION (A UNIT OF THE U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS SERVING
THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA AND PARTS OF VIRGINIA); THE WASHINGTON
SUBURBAN SANITARY COMMISSION (SERVING THE MARYLAND SUBURBS): AND
THE FAIRFAX COUNTY WATER AUTHORITY (SERVING THE VIRGINIA SUBURBS).
ALL THREE ARE HIGHLY DEPENDENT ON POTOMAC RIVER FLOW AS A PRIMARY
331
SOURCE OF WATER SUPPLY.
THE WASHINGTON METROPOLITAN AREA HAS LONG UTIUZED THE POTOMAC
RIVER FOR MUNICIPAL WATER SUPPLY. DROUGHTS IN 1966 AND 1977
DEMONSTRATED THE FINITE NATURE OF THIS VALUABLE RESOURCE. THE
PRESSURE FROM REGIONAL GROWTH AND INCREASING WATER USE HAD THE
POTENHAL TO DEVELOP INTO A WASTEFUL COMPETITIVE STRUGGLE FOR USE
OF THE LIMITED SUPPLY OF WATER. INSTEAD, THE STATE OF MARYLAND, THE
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINL\, THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA AND THE FEDERAL
GOVERNMENT, ENTERED INTO AN AGREEMENT TO SHARE AVAILABLE
RESOURCES DURING TIMES OF SHORTAGE. THE POTOMAC RIVER LOW FLOW
ALLOCATION AGREEMENT. SIGNED IN 1978, ESTABLISHED THE FRAMEWORK AND
ADMINISTRATIVE MECHANISM FOR EQUITABLY ALLOCATING THE AVAILABLE
WATER RESOURCES IN TIME OF DROUGHT OR EMERGENCY.
BACKGROUND ON THE ICPRB CO-OP SECTION
RESPONDING TO THE NEED FOR INTERSTATE, INTER-JURISDICTIONAL
COOPERATION, THE MEMBERS OF THE ICPRB COMPACT FORMED THE SECTION
FOR COOPERATIVE WATER SUPPLY OPERATIONS (CO-OP SECTION) TO
COORDINATE JOINT, COOPERATIVE OPERATION AND MANAGEMENT OF THE
METROPOLITAN WATER SUPPLY. ICPRB WORKED WITH THE STATE AND
FEDERAL GOVERNMENTS AS WELL AS THE REGION'S WATER SUPPLY UTIUTIES
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332
TO DEMONSTRATE THAT THE WASHINGTON METROPOLITAN AREA'S WATER
SUPPLY NEEDS COULD BE REUABLY SATISFIED THROUGH JOINT, COOPERATIVE
OPERATION. THIS RESULT ELIMINATED THE NEED TO CONSTRUCT 15 MAJOR
RESERVOIRS, RECOMMENDED BY THE U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS (CORPS
OF ENGINEERS) IN 1964, SAVING THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT AND THE REGION
SUBSTANITAL CONSTRUCTION COSTS (INTITALLY ESTIMATED AT $250 MILUON).
COOPERATIVE OPERATING PROCEDURES WERE INSTITUTIONALIZED IN THE
WATER SUPPLY COORDINATION AGREEMENT. SIGNED ON JULY 22, 1982 BY THE
FAIRFAX COUNTY WATER AUTHORITY, THE WASHINGTON SUBURBAN SANITARY
COMMISSION, THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBDV, AND THE ICPRB. THE WATER
SUPPLY COORDINATION AGREEMENT ESTABLISHES THE REGIONAL FRAMEWORK
TO IMPLEMENT, MAINTAIN, AND REFINE THESE COOPERATIVE OPERATING
PROCEDURES WITHIN THE ICPRB CO-OP SECTION. THE AGREEMENT DESIGNATES
THE ICPRB CO-OP SECTION AS THE AGENCY RESPONSIBLE FOR: ALLOCATING
LOW FLOWS AND SCHEDULING RESERVOIR RELEASES TO ASSURE THE
RELIABILITY OF THE REGION'S WATER SUPPLY; MAINTAINING INSTREAM FLOWS
FOR LIVING RESOURCES; ESTABUSHING, MAINTAINING AND EXECUTING JOINT
AND COORDINATED OPERATING PROCEDURES TO MONITOR SUPPLY AND
DEMAND DURING EMERGENCIES AND DROUGHTS; AND PERFORMING DROUGHT-
MANAGEMENT ANALYSIS.
333
DROUGHT PREPAREDNESS
IN EXECUTING THESE RESPONSIBILrnES, THE REGION'S SUSCEPTIBILITY TO
DROUGHT IS REGULARLY EVALUATED AND REPORTED IN A SERIES OF WATER
SUPPLY OUTLOOKS PREPARED BY THE CO-OP SECTION THROUGHOUT THE
SPRING, SUMMER AND FALL. THE CO-OP SECTION MAINTAINS THE REGION'S
DROUGHT PREPAREDNESS BY CONDUCTING AN ANNUAL "DROUGHT EXERaSE"
TO ENHANCE READINESS AND TEST WATER RESOURCE OPERATING PROCEDURES
DEVELOPED AND MAINTAINED BY THE CO-OP SECTION. THE CO-OP SECTION
HAS THE FURTHER RESPONSIBILITY OF PROTECTING INSTREAM BIOLOGICAL
HABITAT INTEGRITY BY FORECASTING THE NEED FOR LOW FLOW
AUGMENTATION RELEASES AND ALLOCATING EXISTING WITHDRAWALS TO
ASSURE THAT REGIONALLY DETERMINED TARGET FLOWS REMAIN IN THE RIVER
DOWNSTREAM OF WATER SUPPLY INTAKES.
IN ADDITION, THE CO-OP SECTION PREPARES PERIODIC LONG-TERM WATER
DEMAND FORECASTS AND ASSESSMENTS OF RESOURCES TO MEET THOSE
DEMANDS. THE CO-OP SECTION ALSO WORKS WITH AND ON BEHALF OF THE
COMBINED WATER UTIUTIES IN THE APPRAISAL OF NEW SOURCES OF WATER,
AND SUPPORTS PLANNING FOR THE SIZING OF REPLACEMENT AND EXPANDED
WATER TREATMENT WORKS.
-7-
334
BEYOND THE DEVELOPMENT, MAINTENANCE AND IMPROVEMENT OF
FORECASTING, PLANNING AND OPERATIONAL RESPONSIBILrnES, ICPRB HAS
DEVELOPED AND MAINTAINS A TOXIC SPILL MODEL OF THE POTOMAC RIVER
AND ITS MAJOR TRIBUTARIES. THIS MODEL IS USED TO ESTIMATE TIME OF
TRAVEL WHEN DANGEROUS MATERIALS ARE SPILLED OR ACCIDENTALLY
DISCHARGED INTO THE RIVER. WHEN CONTAMINATION ACCIDENTALLY ENTERS
THE POTOMAC RIVER AND ITS TRIBUTARIES, OUR STAFF WORKS IN CLOSE
COOPERATION WITH THE BASIN STATES TO PROVIDE TRAVEL TIME
INFORMATION AND TIMELY NOTfflCATION TO WATER SUPPLIERS ALONG THE
RIVER.
TOXIC SPILL MANAGEMENT IN THE POTOMAC RIVER BASIN
THE ICPRB TOXIC SPILL MODEL SIMULATES THE TRANSPORT OF A DISSOLVED
POLLUTANT FROM THE POINT THE POLLUTANT ENTERS THE RIVER TO POINTS
OF PARTICULAR CONCERN DOWNSTREAM (E.G. MUNICIPAL WATER INTAKES)
AND ESTIMATES THE TIME OF TRAVEL FOR DANGEROUS MATERIALS THAT ARE
ACCIDENTALLY DISCHARGED TO THE RIVER. SEVERAL RECENT SPILLS IN
RIVERS WITHIN AND OUTSIDE THE BASIN UNDERSCORE THE VALUE OF THIS
METHODOLOGY.
THE POTOMAC RIVER PROVIDES AN INCREASING PORTION OF THE WATER
SUPPLY FOR THE WASHINGTON METROPOLITAN AREA. THE DRAINAGE AREA
335
XJPSTREAM OF THE INTAKES FOR THE REGION'S WATER SUPPLY UnLITIES IS
APPROXIMATELY 11,000 SQ. MILES (28,490 KM^. OVER THIS LARGE AREA
SIGNmCANT POTENTL«iL EXISTS FOR ACCIDENTAL DISCHARGES OF TOXIC OR
HAZARDOUS MATERIALS TO THE POTOMAC RIVER AND ITS TRIBUTARIES, THAT
COULD TEMPORARILY THREATEN THE POTABILITY OF THE WATER. THE RISK
OF AN ACCIDENT IS REAL - A NUMBER OF POTENTIALLY DANGEROUS SPILLS
HAVE REACHED THE POTOMAC RIVER IN RECENT YEARS. DIESEL FUEL, RAW
SEWAGE, AND OTHER MATERIALS HAVE SPILLED INTO THE RIVER AND BEEN OF
SUFFICIENT CONCERN TO REQUIRE USE OF THE MODEL TO ESTIMATE TIME OF
TRAVEL TO WATER SUPPLY INTAKES. ALTHOUGH, IN MOST CASES, THE SMALL
QUANTITIES SPILLED OR THE LONG DISTANCES TO INTAKES HAVE MINIMIZED
RISKS, THE MARCH 28, 1993 OIL PIPELINE LEAK IN FAIRFAX COUNTY, VIRGINIA
CAUSED AN EXCEPTIONALLY SERIOUS THREAT TO THE WMA WATER SUPPLIES.
IT IS THIS THREAT, AND THE HAZARDS POSED BY ACCIDENTAL SPILLS OF THIS
TYPE THAT BRINGS US BEFORE YOU THIS AFTERNOON.
SAFETY OF THE REGION'S WATER SUPPLY
AS YOU KNOW, THE SPILL OF DIESEL FUEL FROM COLONL\L PIPELINE'S 36-INCH
TRANSMISSION LINE ON MARCH 28, 1993, REPRESENTED THE LATEST AND MOST
SERIOUS EVENT IN A TROUBLED HISTORY OF CONTAMINANT SPILLS IN THE
POTOMAC RTVER BASIN. AT THEIR 15TH ANNUAL MEETING ON APRIL 29, 1993,
THE SIGNATORIES OF THE POTOMAC RIVER LOW FLOW ALLOCATION
336
AGREEMENT UNANIMOUSLY AGREED TO DIRECT THE ICPRB CO-OP SECTION TO
REPORT TO YOU THEIR SERIOUS CONCERNS REGARDING THE SAFETY OF THE
WATER SUPPLY FOR THE NATIONAL CAPITAL REGION.
THESE CONCERNS ARE WIDELY SHARED AS DEMONSTRATED IN THE VIRGINL\
HOUSE OF DELEGATES' JOINT RESOLUTION NUMBER 1005 (ATTACHED), OFFERED
TO THE VIRGINL\ GENERAL ASSEMBLY AT THE REQUEST OF GOVERNOR
DOUGLAS WILDER ON APRIL 7, 1993. THE JOINT RESOLUTION NOTES THAT THE
COLONL\L PIPELINE HAS EXPERIENCED NINE SPILLS SINCE 1977, AND PETITIONS
THE CONGRESS AND THE PRESIDENT TO STRENGTHEN THE ENFORCEMENT AND
INSPECTION PROVISIONS OF THE FEDERAL HAZARDOUS UQUID PIPELINE SAFETY
ACT OF 1977.
THE HISTORY OF EVENTS PRECEDING THE COLONIAL PIPELINE SPILL SUGGESTS
THAT A HIGH RISK TO THE REGION'S WATER SUPPLY EXISTS, REQUIRING YOUR
ACTION AND ASSISTANCE TO REDUCE THE THREAT FROM EXISTING PIPELINES
THROUGH EFFECTIVE LEGISLATIVE, REGULATORY, AND ENFORCEMENT ACTION.
MAGNITUDE OF EXISTING RISK
TO APPRECL\TE THE MAGNITUDE OF THE EXISTING RISK, ONE NEED ONLY
IMAGINE THE RECENT COLONL\L PIPELINE SPELL OCCURRING UNDER SUGHTLY
DIFFERENT CIRCUMSTANCES. AS DAMAGING AND DISRUPTIVE AS THE SPILL
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337
WAS, FORTUNATE CIRCUMSTANCES ALLOWED THE NATIONAL CAPITAL REGION
TO ESCAPE WITH RFJjtTTVFT.Y MINOR IMPACT. THE UNUSUALLY HIGH
STREAMFLOW IN THE POTOMAC DURING THE SPILL CAUSED MUCH OF THE
CONTAMINATION TO BE QUICKLY TRANSPORTED DOWNSTREAM PAST THE
MAJOR WATER SUPPLY INTAKES SERVING THE WASHINGTON, D.C.,
METROPOLITAN AREA. THE LOCATION OF THE PIPELINE BREAK SOME EIGHT
MILES FROM THE POTOMAC ALSO ALLOWED PARTL\L CONTAINMENT AND
RECOVERY OF THE PRODUCT PRIOR TO REACHING THE MAINSTEM OF THE
RTVER. THE CONTAMINATION THAT DID REACH THE RIVER HUGGED THE
VIRGINL\ SHORELINE, AVOIDING THE INTAKES OF THE WASHINGTON SUBURBAN
SANITARY COMMISSION, THE CITY OF ROCKVILLE AND THE WASHINGTON
AQUEDUCT DIVISION OF THE U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS.
EVEN SO, DURING THE PERIOD MARCH 28 TO APRIL 23, 1993 THE FAIRFAX
COUNTY WATER AUTHORITY'S CORBAUS WATER TREATMENT PLANT WAS
CLOSED FOR 11 CONSECUTIVE DAYS. FOR MORE THAN THREE WEEKS THE
PLANT OPERATED WITH PERIODS OF TOTAL SHUTDOWN AND INTERMITTENT RE-
STARTS, LEAVING THE PRODUCTION RATE FAR BELOW DESIRED CAPACITY.
EXTRAORDINARY MONITORING MEASURES CONTINUE, ESPECIALLY DURING
RAIN EVENTS WHEN RESIDUAL OIL IS FLUSHED INTO THE RIVER.
AS THE ACCOMPANYING MAP SHOWS, THIS PIPELINE, LIKE SEVERAL OTHERS,
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338
CROSSES UNDER THE POTOMAC RIVER JUST UPSTREAM OF THE WATER SUPPLY
INTAKES FOR MOST OF THE REGION'S WATER PURVEYORS. IF THE PIPELINE
BREAK HAD OCCURRED DIRECTLY IN THE RIVER DURING SUMMER CONDITIONS
OF LOW STREAMFLOW, THE IMPACT ON THE REGION'S WATER SUPPLY WOULD
HAVE BEEN DEVASTATING. UNDER LOW FLOW CONDITIONS, A SPILL IN THE
RIVER COULD BE EXPECTED TO LINGER FOR WEEKS, IF NOT MONTHS,
SPREADING TO BOTH SIDES OF THE RIVER AND AFFECTING EVERY
DOWNSTREAM WATER SUPPLY. UNDER THE MOST OPTIMISTIC CIRCUMSTANCES,
THE WASHINGTON AQUEDUCT DIVISION OF THE U.S. ARMY CORPS OF
ENGINEERS (PROVIDING TREATED WATER TO THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA,
ARLINGTON COUNTY AND FALLS CHURCH), WITH NO ALTERNATE SOURCE OF
SUPPLY, WOULD RUN OUT OF POTABLE WATER IN LESS THAN 36 HOURS. THE
UNTREATABLE NATURE OF THIS TYPE OF CONTAMINATION WOULD RESULT IN
THE DISRUPTION OR FORCED CLOSURE OF MOST MUNICIPAL AND COMMERCL\L
ACnvmES THROUGHOUT THE REGION.
IN ADDITION TO THIS ECONOMIC IMPACT, THE DIFFICULT CHOICE QUICKLY
WOULD HAVE TO BE MADE WHETHER TO RISK PUBLIC HEALTH BY PUMPING
CONTAMINATED WATER INTO THE DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM IN ORDER TO
MAINTAIN FIRE PROTECTION. THE PUBLIC HEALTH CONSEQUENCES OF SUCH
A DECISION COULD BE SEVERE, REQUIRING A MASSIVE MOBILIZATION OF
EMERGENCY DRINKING WATER SUPPLIES AND PUBLIC EDUCATION AND
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339
INFORMATION EFFORTS. BEYOND THE IMMEDIATE CONCERNS WITH PUBUC
HEALTH AND SAFETY, A LONGER-LASTING IMPACT OF SUCH A DEQSION WOULD
BE THE LENGTHY AND EXPENSIVE CLEANUP OF THE CONTAMWATED WATER
SUPPLY INFRASTRUCTURE, INCLUDING THE ENTIRE TREATMENT AND
DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA.
RECOMMENDED ACTIONS
RECENT SPILLS, INCLUDING THE MARCH SPILL FROM THE COLONIAL PIPELINE,
INDICATE THESE RISKS ARE REAL AND CONTINUING, AND REQUIRE POSmVE
ACTION ON THE FOLLOWING ISSUES:
1. WE BELIEVE THE HISTORY OF PROBLEMS . WITH THIS PARTICULAR
PIPELINE RAISES SERIOUS QUESTIONS REGARDING ITS PHYSICAL
INTEGRITY. A THOROUGH INDEPENDENT TECHNICAL REVIEW AND
INVESTIGATION OF THE CONSTRUCTION AND INSPECTION RECORDS OF
THIS PIPELINE, AS WELL AS A REVIEW OF STATE AND FEDERAL
CONSTRUCTION AND INSPECTION REQUIREMENTS, IS AN ESSENTIAL FIRST
STEP.
2. IN ADDITION TO THIS INDEPENDENT REVIEW, THE HISTORY OF
PROBLEMS WITH THIS AND OTHER PIPELINES, AS WELL AS THE
ENORMOUS HAZARD POSED BY ANOTHER FAILURE, CLEARLY
DEMONSTRATE THE NEED TO IMPLEMENT STATE-OF-THE-ART
■13-
340
TECHNOLOGY TO REDUCE THE RISKS FROM EXISTING PIPELINES.
ADVANCED DETECTION SYSTEMS LINKED TO CLOSELY SPACED
AUTOMATED SHUTOFF VALVES ARE ESSENHAL. FOR EXAMPLE,
ALTHOUGH THE COLONIAL PIPELINE SHUTDOWN SOON AFTER A PRESSURE
DROP WAS NOTICED, NEARLY A HALF-MILUON GALLONS OF OIL WAS
LOST TO THE ENVIRONMENT. AUTOMATED INSPECTION AND CONTROL
TECHNOLOGIES ARE AVAILABLE AND USED IN MANY HIGH-HAZARD
PIPELINES; PROTECTION OF THE WATER SUPPLY FOR THE NATION'S
CAPITAL DEMANDS NO LESS.
3. THE COLONL\L AND OTHER RIGHTS-OF-WAY CROSS NOT ONLY THE
POTOMAC RIVER, BUT ALSO THE WATERSHEDS OF THE OCCOQUAN AND
PATUXENT RIVERS. THESE WATERSHEDS PROVIDE THE OTHER RAW
WATER SUPPLIES THAT HAVE BEEN DEVELOPED TO SERVE THE NEEDS OF
THE WASHINGTON, D.C., METROPOLITAN AREA, AND THE ONLY SOURCE
OF SUPPLY THAT WOULD BE AVAILABLE IN THE EVENT OF A LARGE SPILL
IN THE POTOMAC. WE NOTE THAT THE OCCOQUAN RESERVOIR (WHICH
PROVIDED MOST OF THE POTABLE SUPPLY TO NORTHERN VIRGINL\
DURING THE RECENT COLONL\L PIPELINE SPILL) WAS THREATENED BY A
336,000 GALLON SPILL FROM A COLONIAL PIPELINE IN 1980. IN VIEW OF
THE MAGNITUDE OF THE THREAT TO BOTH THE POTOMAC AND THE
ENTIRE REGION'S WATER SUPPLY, LEGISLATIVE AND REGULATORY
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341
ACTION SHOULD BE TAKEN TO ASSURE THE DESIGNATION OF A "UNIQUE
HIGH-HAZARD CORRIDOR" WITHIN WHICH THE MOST STRINGENT
MONITORING AND CONTROL TECHNOLOGIES WOULD BE REQUIRED.
THESE PRECAUTIONS NEED TO BE REQUIRED OF ALL PIPELINES TRANSPORTING
CONTAMINANTS IN THE CORRIDOR.
CONCLUSIONS
THE SIGNATORIES OF THE POTOMAC RIVER LOW FLOW ALLOCATION
AGREEMENT ARE UNANIMOUS IN URGING DECISIVE ACTION TO REDUCE THE
RISK OF PIPELINE SPILLS TO THE POTOMAC RIVER AND ITS TRIBUTARIES.
ACCORDINGLY, STATE AND FEDERAL REGULATORY AGENCIES WITH
APPROPRL\TE JXJRISDICnON ARE BEING CONTACTED TO EMPHASIZE NEEDED
ACTIONS INCLUDING:
(1) INDEPENDENT INVESTIGATION OF THE PHYSICAL INTEGRITY AND
OPERATION OF THE COLONIAL PIPELINE AND SIMILAR PIPELINES IN THE
POTOMAC RIVER BASIN, INCLUDING THE LOCATION OF VALVE
INSTALLATIONS AND DETAILS RELATING TO CONTROL AND SHUT-OFF
PROCEDURES;
(2) ADDITIONAL IMPROVEMENTS TO THE EXISTING PIPELINES, INCLUDING
RETROFrmNG AS NECESSARY WITH STATE-OF-THE-ART MONITORING AND
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342
CONTROL TECHNOLOGIES COMMENSURATE WITH THE HAZARD (AS AN
EXAMPLE, ULTRASONIC FLOWMETERS ARE UTILIZED ON MANY HIGH RISK
PIPELINES);
(3) COMPREHENSIVE MONITORING AND INSPECTION REPORTING
PROCEDURES; AND
(4) THE DESIGNATION OF A "HIGH HAZARD CORRIDOR" WITHIN WHICH
THE BEST AVAILABLE TECHNOLOGY IS EMPLOYED TO MONITOR, OPERATE
AND CONTROL PIPELINE OPERATIONS, AND PREPARE FOR ACCIDENTS.
THE CO-OP UTILrnES AND MEMBERS OF THE ICPRB CO-OP SECTION STRONGLY
URGE CONGRESS TO REVIEW APPLICABLE LEGISLATION, REGULATIONS, AND
MONITORING AND INSPECTION REQUIREMENTS TO ADDRESS THESE CONCERNS.
THE RECENT COLONIAL PIPELINE SPILL TO THE POTOMAC INDICATES THE
VULNERABILITY OF THE NATIONAL CAPITAL AREA'S WATER SUPPLY, AND
REQUIRES IMMEDIATE ATTENTION TO IMPLEMENT TIMELY AND EFFECTIVE
MEASURES THAT WILL REDUCE THESE RISKS.
THANK YOU AGAIN FOR THE OPPORTUNITY TO TESTIFY ON THIS TIMELY
MATTER OF GREAT IMPORTANCE. YOUR SUPPORT AND HELP IN THESE MATTERS
WOULD BE GREATLY APPRECL\TED.
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343
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1993 SPECIAL SESSION
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54
HOUSE JOINT RESOLUTION NO. lOOS
Offered April 7, 1993
Memorializing Congress and the Clinton Administration to strengthen the Pipeline Safety
Act.
Patrons— Plum, Callahan and Mims; Senators: Howell and Waddell
Introduced at the Request of the Governor
Referred to the Committee on Rules
WHEREAS, on March 28, 1993, Colonial Pipeline Company's pipeline experienced a
break which resulted in a spill of 330.000 gallons of diesel fuel into Sugarland Run, a
tributary of the Potomac River; and
WHEREAS, the spill resulted in extensive damage to a valuable natural resource and
near total destruction of the aquatic life in a 10-mile stretch of Sugarland Run; and
WHEREAS, an oil sheen was evident on several miles of the Potomac River, and a
Fairfax County drinking water intake on the Potomac was closed for over a week; and
WHEREAS, the Colonial Pipeline has experienced nine spills since 1977 including major
spills of 212,000 gallons of kerosene in a tributary of the Rappahannock River in Orange
County in 1989, 85,000 gallons of fuel oil in Chesterfield County, 65,000 gallons of marine
diesel fuel in Chesapeake and a 336,000 gallon spill into Bull Run that threatened the
Occoquan water supply in 1980; and
WHEREAS, the authority for pipeline safety resides with the federal government's
Department of Transportation, Office of Pipeline Safety; and
WHEREAS, the federal Hazardous Liquid Pipeline Safety Act of 1979. the regulations
promulgated under it. and the enforcement of those regulations are grossly inadequate;
now, therefore, be it
RESOLVED by the House of Delegates, the Senate concurring. That the General
Assembly of the Commonwealth of Virginia memorialize the Congress of the United States
and the Qinton Administration to aggressively pursue a strengthening of the Pipeline Safety
Act and the enforcement and inspection provisions of the Act; and, be it
RESOLVED FURTHER, That the Qerk of the House of Delegates transmit copies of
this resolution to the President of the United States, the Speaker of the United States
House of Representatives, the President of the Senate of the United States, and the
members of the Virginia delegation to the United States Congress that they may be
apprised of the sense of the General Assembly of Virginia in this matter.
Official Use By Clerks
Agreed to By
The House of Delegates
without amendment D
with amendment D
substitute □
substitute w/amdt D
Agreed to By The Senate
without amendment D
with amendment O
substitute D
substitute w/amdt D
Date:
Date:
Clerk of the House of Delegates
Clerk of the Senate
345
TESTIMONY OF CONGRESSMAN FRANK R. WOLF
before the Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight
Public Works and Transportation Committee
May 18, 1993
I would like to thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this
hearing on the recent Colonial pipeline break in northern Virginia.
As the chairman and members of this committee know, the Potomac
River tributary, Sugarland Run, traverses Virginia's 10th
Congressional District which I represent. This bucolic area is
one of the Commonwealth's most beautiful and I know I don't need
to tell this committee what an unwelcome intrusion was the
introduction of 400,000 gallons of diesel into its environment.
In addition to raising safety concerns, disasters like this
take a tremendous toll on the quality of life for community
residents. I would like to take this opportunity to publicly
commend the Fairfax County Hazmat Team and 40 other federal, state
and local agencies which have responded and are continuing
remediation.
Also, Mr. Chairman, I appreciate this opportunity to share
with the committee my concerns and my thoughts on possible steps
to avoid these disasters, or at least mitigate their impact. I
will be brief, as I know the committee has several expert witnesses
to hear today, including the National Transportation Safety Board
(NTSB) and the General Accounting Office (GAO) .
Before focusing on some "preventive medicine" that could
possibly alter what seems to be a perpetual response mode, I would
like to raise the question of whether the Office of Pipeline Safety
(OPS) is misplaced in the federal hierarchy.
IS THERE A MORE COMPATIBLE "HOME"
FOR PIPELINE SAFETY?
It has been suggested that OPS does not belong in the
Department of Transportation (DOT) and would more appropriately fit
into the portfolio of another federal agency such as the Department
of Energy (DOE) . I believe this suggestion deserves the attention
of this committee. The nation's pipeline network is a
transportation mode only in the sense that utility line networks
also "transport" a product. And it is, after all, energy products
that are being transported by pipelines.
In addition to a more natural "fit" in terms of subject
matter, the DOE would seem a more compatible home for pipeline
safety for two other reasons. (1) This agency has expertise with
costs and market circumstances affecting the energy industry, which
is important since any regulatory activity needs cost-benefit
analysis. (2) DOE also has extensive emergency response capability
with respect to energy catastrophes.
346
Mr. Wolf's testimony - 5/18/93 - page 2
The Research and Special Programs Administration (RSPA) has
become the "catch-all" office in DOT which acquires all of the
tasks that do not really fit elsewhere in the department. One of
the responsibilities "housed" by RSPA is, of course, the Office of
Pipeline Safety (OPS) which we are discussing today.
RSPA's primary responsibility presumably is research and it
ably carries out most of this responsibility at the Volpe National
Transportation Systems Center in Cambridge, Massachusetts. And I
might add that as far as public notoriety goes, the Volpe Center
is one of the nation's best kept secrets. The Volpe Center
performs outstanding research in important areas such as
Intelligent Vehicle Highway Systems (IVHS) , air traffic control
system modernization, and human factors engineering. The Center
is in great demand from both governmental and private sector
"clients. "
As you know, aside from its primary research mission, RSPA's
other responsibilities in addition to pipeline safety include
hazardous materials (hazmat) safety, emergency transportation,
airline statistics, automated tariffs, university research, and the
Transportation Safety Institute.
Mr. Chairman, I believe that while this group is one of the
most enthusiastic and hard-working in the DOT, RSPA simply does not
have the staff or the resources to carry out all the duties
assigned to it, the nation's pipeline network being one of those
areas that is not receiving adequate oversight. And I want to
emphasize that I am not being critical of RSPA, which cheerfully
performs admirably on a shoestring budget.
I will give you a graphic example of just how overwhelmed this
office is. In a recent hearing of the transportation
appropriations subcommittee on which I serve as the ranking
Republican, we were discussing RSPA's FY 1994 budget request for
$2.6 million to contract out the review of detailed emergency
response plans submitted by private pipeline operators as required
by the Oil Pollution Act (OPA) of 1990. Mr. Chairman, there is a
room at RSPA literally stacked with hundreds of plans awaiting
review.
RSPA asked for an appropriation to contract out the review of
these emergency response plans because it doesn't have sufficient
manpower to perform the review in-house. In fact, it was brought
to my attention that RSPA had discussed possibly hiring temporary
or part-time graduate students to oversee this process.
One, I believe that oversight of emergency response plans has
to be higher up the chain of command. And, second, I believe that
this review would be a "federal responsibility" rather than a
"contractor responsibility" under existing 0MB guidelines which
differentiate between the two.
347
Mr. Wolf's testimony - 5/18/93 - page 3
I do not know whether, prior to the spill, Colonial Pipeline's
plan had been read or was gathering dust like all the others in
the RSPA "holding tank." Neither am I claiming that prior review
of this plan would have prevented the spill we are discussing
today. However, it is important to remember that a major factor
in the high-volume release of product into the environment during
the Colonial spill was the delay of up to one-and-one-half hours
in getting to the manual valves. This would underscore the
importance of an emergency response plan, as well as the obvious
assumption that these plans need prompt review so that emergency
strategies can be altered as necessary, and hopefully before
disaster strikes.
CAN SOME IMMEDIATE STEPS
MAKE PIPELINE SAFETY MORE PROACTIVE?
Mr. Chairman, there are three items I believe we should
"pluck" from a morass of unimplemented safety recommendations.
Rulemakings have been legislatively mandated in these areas, but
are currently moving with the speed of molasses.
I. Greater use of internal inspection devices ("smart oias"^
Last year, the GAG concluded that the widespread use of
sophisticated electronic inspection devices "could save lives and
protect property by improving the safety and reliability of natural
gas and hazardous liquids transmission pipelines."
In 1988, Congress required RSPA to establish minimum federal
safety standards so that all new and replacement pipelines could
accommodate "smart pigs." As the committee knows, these
instrumented devices are long, so many cannot negotiate a pipeline
with sharp bends. Also, the pigs cannot be used in pipelines with
valves that do not fully open. Prior to this 1988 Congressional
mandate, the NTSB had recommended in 1987 that RSPA require
petroleum and natural gas pipeline transmission operators to make
modified and repaired pipelines piggable.
RSPA has not issued either the required regulations or a
mandated feasibility study due in May 1990 on requiring the
inspection of transmission pipelines with smart pigs. The reason
for the delay as cited to the GAG: manpower and money shortages and
a need to give more attention to other matters.
As I indicated above, Mr. Chairman, it's my sense that RSPA
is trying to do too much with too little. And the result may be
that this very important safety function, by virtue of simply being
misplaced in the government, is getting short shrift.
348
Mr. Wolf's testimony - 5/18/93 - page 5
III. Measures to reduce third party damage.
According to the DOT, third party excavation damage is the
single most common cause of pipeline accidents.
In the case of the Colonial spill, the NTSB has issued a
preliminary report indicating that "microscopic viewing of the
damage disclosed what appeared to be small metal folds in the
deeper areas of the mechanical damage that were indicative of an
object sliding longitudinally against the pipe." In other words,
the Safety Board believes at this time that the pipeline rupture
was caused by a scrape. Obviously, definitive conclusions will
have to await NTSB's final report.
Again, this is an area where there is an ongoing rulemaking
and I would urge the committee to do what it can to speed the
process up. I am referring to the rulemaking concerning "one-
call" systems such as Miss Utility. I believe that all owners of
underground utilities should be required to belong to a one-call
system so that prior to any excavation, a call can be made which
will result in the location of all underground utilities.
In addition, all owners of underground utilities should be
required to provide sufficient inspection when underground
utilities are being installed to ensure that the installation
conforms to all applicable rules and regulations, such as depth and
location requirements. I am told that it is often discovered that
underground utilities which are required to be located three feet
in the ground are located just under the surface.
Finally, I believe that civil penalties should be assessed
when third party negligence is determined in ruptured pipeline
incidents. Obviously, the liability of the utility owner should
also be addressed in the event of incorrectly located utilies.
Also, there would have to be an appeals process and some
determination of the logistics of collection. I think the revenue
generated from these fines should be dedicated to the costs of
oversight and enforcement of the pipeline safety program, with the
possible result of providing additional inspectors and other
resources for a more efficient program.
Mr. Chairman, that concludes my testimony, and let me say
again that I salute your leadership in quickly holding a hearing
to look into this matter, and I appreciate the opportunity to voice
my concerns and make some suggestions.
349
Mr. Wolf's testimony - 5/18/93 - page 4
I would hope that this committee would push for a speedy final
rulemaking in this area, particularly since private operators
aren't likely to take these steps in the absence of federal
direction.
While certainly not a panacea, smart pig technology appears
to be the "only game in town" for the moment.
As the GAO noted in its recommendation, "Smart pig inspections
have demonstrated the potential for identifying internal andternal
corrosion and other pipeline flaws and for reducing pipeline
incidents. Smart pig use, supplemented by visual inspection
through localized excavations is the only reliable technique
currently available (emphasis added) for detecting internal and
external pipe corrosion."
II. More frequent spacing for remote shut-off valves.
Mr. Chairman, this is another issue pending on a long-delayed
rulemaking docket at RSPA. And I suspect that the reason is,
again, too little resources for an agency with such a diverse
mission.
For many years, the NTSB has repeatedly requested that RSPA
issue regulations requiring excess flow valves. In addition, the
1992 Pipeline Safety Act requires RSPA to issue regulations in this
area. And, indeed, two years ago, RSPA issued an advance notice
of proposed rulemaking on excess flow valves. However, the next
step in regulatory process, issuing a notice of proposed rulemaking
(NPRM) has not yet followed, even though the preliminaries were
initiated two years ago.
I hope this committee will do what it can to speed up action
in this area, as well as urging frequent spacing of these valves
which will maximize protection, especially in heavily populated
urban areas and areas with fragile ecosystems.
As you may have noted in this morning's Washington Post, major
water suppliers recommended closer spacing of pipeline shutoff
valves. The automated valves that shut the Colonial pipeline were
more than 30 miles apart on either side of the Potomac, leaving
considerable oil still in the closed section of the pipeline to
leak out. Had this disaster occurred about two months later in the
summer when both river levels and water demand are higher, these
experts said we could have faced a Washington area without an
adequate supply of potable water.
350
ADDITIONS TO THE RECORD
METROPOLITAN WASHINGTON COUNCIL OF GOVERNMENTS
Local governments working together
for a better metropolitan region
Oistrici of Columbta
Bowie
CollesePark
Frederick County
Caithersburf
Creenbelt
Montgomery County
Prince Georgcrs County
RockviUe
TakomaPark
Alcitandha
Ariinfton County
FairtiK
Fair&x County
Falls Church
Loudoun County
Prince wtlKam County
Testimony of the Honorable Derick P. Berlage
Chairman, Environmental Policy Committee
Metropolitan Washington Council of Governments
and
Member, Montgomery County, Maryland, Council
to the
United States House of Representatives
Public Works and Transportation Committee
Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight
May 18, 1993
777 North Capitol street N.E. Suite 300 Washington. D.C. 20002-42M (202)963-3200 FAX (202) 962-3201
351
Testimony of the Honorable Derick P. Berlage
Chairman, Environmental Policy Committee
Metropolitan Washington Council of Governments
and
Member, Montgomery County, Maryland, Council
to the
United States House of Representatives
Public Works and Transportation Committee
Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight
May 18, 1993
RE: Special Congressional Investigation on the March 28, 1993 Sugarland Run Pipeline
Oil SpiU
Chairman Borski and Members of the Subcommittee:
My name is Eterick P. Berlage and I eim presently cheiirman of the Metropolitan
Washington Council of Governments Environmental Policy Committee and a member
of the Montgomery Coimty, Maryland, Council. I am pleased to have the opportunity
to present comments to the Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight regarding
the March 28, 1993, Sugarland Run Pipeline Oil Spill.
Background
The Metropolitan Washington Council of Governments (COG) is a regional
orgcmization which over the past thirty-five years has provided a regional forum for the
discussion and resolution of a wide array of transportation, environmental, public safety,
human services, economic zmd informational issues. The organization is comprised of
352
seventeen member local government jurisdictions throughout the Washington
metropolitan area. The Environment2il Policy Committee (EPQ, of which I <im chairmaiv
is the principal policy advisor on environmental issues to CCXj's Board of Directors.
Membership in the EPC includes elected officials from all seventeen local government
members of COG.
The incident at Sugarland Run was a significant event highlighting many
important environmental questions. As a result of regional concerns about this incident,
and concern that current federal funding may not be adequate to fully implement
importcmt pipeline preventative measures, on April 14, 1993, the COG Board of Directors
held a speciaJ briefing on the Sugcirland Run oil spill. The Board asked that the incident
be reviewed and that recommendations be developed that would prevent and /or
minimize the re-occurrence of a similar incident. They ailso expressed strong concerns
regarding the adequacy of preventative regulations and relief that the incident was not
far worse in magnitude. The Board then directed my committee to prepaire and submit
written /oral testimony on this incident on behalf of COG to the Subcommittee on
Investigations and Oversight of the House Public Works and Transportation Committee.
The ir\formation that is presented here reflects a significant expenditure of time and
effort by the COG staff and its member jurisdictions in order to obtain and analyze
accurate and timely information on the oil spill incident The findings of that
investigation and the ensuing discussions that have taken place since the March 28, 1993,
incident are reflected in the follov^nng text.
The Sugarland Run incident also alerted regional officials that had there been a
more wddespread impact to regional water supplies that the region may not have been
prepared to smoothly deal with such an incident . There is currentiy in place a Regional
Water Supply Emergency Agreement; however, because of its age, it needs to be
modified and updated. Toward that end COG staff had previously reviewed the
adequacy of the Agreement to provide for coordinated and orderly response to
situations such as Sugarland Run. An earlier internal COG review noted that several
modifications to the agreement were necessary. In order to make such changes several
meetings with key regional organizations will be necessary. Plans are currentiy being
developed by COG to arrsmge such meetings.
Major Impacts of the March 28, 1993 Event
The March 28, 1993, Sugarland Run pipeline rupture of diesel fuel affected not
only an isolated loc«d arcci, but the entire metropolitan Washington region as well. It
raised concerns about our ability to adequately manage the pipeline trar\sportation of
hazardous liquid throughout the region and to ask ourselves if more can be done to
improve its management The 36-inch diameter pipe that ruptured behind the Reston
Medical Center in Fairfax County, Virginia, was a point along a 5,200-mile interstate
petroleum pipeline that runs from Texcis to New York, and which is capable of pumping
353
22,400 gallons of liquid petroleum product per minute. The pipeline is owned by
Colonicil, which is the largest pipeline transporter of refined petroleum product in the
United States. As a result of this rupture, approximately 400,000+ gallons of diesel
product were released. Diesel product entered the nearby waters of the Sugarland Run
in Fairfax County and flowed through the northeast portion of Loudoun County,
Virginia, where it entered the Potomac River at the Algonkian Regional Park. Once
product entered the Potomac it flowed closely along the Virgirua shoreline until it
reached the turbulent waters of the Little Falls area of the Potomac. From this point and
downriver to the Mason Neck area of Virginia, a petroleum sheen was visible on the
entire width of the river.
The impact on the local and regional environment is still being tallied and will
likely be felt for years to come. The spill affected surface waters and soils and caused
damage and destruction to the regional flora and fauna. While the groundwater appears
to have been unscathed, monitoring is continuing. The costs for the local, regional, state
and federal governments will certainly be significant. The overall response and
coordination during this incident was good, but like many incidents of this magnitude,
improvements can and should be made. In a number of incidents citizens were forced
from their homes and if the response had been less effective, many more would have
been displaced. The spill also caused disruption of traffic, the destruction of recreational
facilities and other impacts too numerous to mention.
Review of Historical Data
In examining the historical causes, frequency and locations of pipeline incidents,
we were able to determine that during the period between 1971 to 1986, the majority of
pipeline failures were a result of outside forces (e.g., excavation) and the second leading
cause appecired to be from pipeline corrosion. The cause of the Sugarland Run incident
however, is still under investigation. Based upon initial physical evidence. Colonial feels
that the rupture was caused by outside damage to the pipe. The damaged section of
pipe has been sent to a National Transportation Safety Board lab for analysis.
During this same time period (1971-1986) there was actually a decline in the
number of pipeline incidents. Further review also revealed that these types of pipeline
failures were infrequent and that, statistically, pipeline trarisport of liquids was still the
safest mode of transport, especially when compared to highway and rail. In discussing
Colonial's previous pipeline safety record, Virginia state officials noted that there had
been four sigruficant incidents in Virginia since 1985. Maryland officials stated that
Colonial was, in several areas, exceeding requirements of current federal regulations and
that Colonial's safety record is good. It is obvious, at least from an economic point of
view, that it is in the best interest of Colonial or any other pipeline operator to maintain
a good performance and safety record. Poor performance would make it very difficult
for pipeline operators to continue to attract investors and obtain optimal loan rates. In
354
addition, poor performance would result in lost revenue as a result of down time and
costs associated with environmental and civil dcimages.
CCX>'s Review of Local, State, and Federal Laws and Regulation
Another important element of our investigation included a review of all loccd,
state and federal laws and regulations which govern or influence pipeline transportation
of liquid petroleum products. We were particularly interested in the adequacy of such
regulations to prevent and /or minimize the re-occurrence of similar incidents. We
found that current federal regulations are centered around 49 CFR, Part 195, which
generally addresses safety but not environmental protection. These regulations cover
three primary areas: testing and inspection, design and construction and operator
reporting.
The current regulations reflect the mandates of the 1968 Transportation of
Explosives Act, as well as the 1979 Hazardous Liquids Pipeline Safety Act, but do not
cover construction in the vicinity of the pipelines nor their siting. Under the 1992
Pipeline Safety Act, which revised the Act of 1979, a number of new key mandates have
been added. Specifically, the 1992 Act recognizes the need to include: the protection of
the environment, increased inspections and inspectors, increased civil penalties, review
of circumstances under which additional emergency flow restriction devices (remote
val ves/ check vtilves) would be used and a one call notification system {e.g., Ms. Utility).
Many of the new mandates will aide in our ability to prevent and minimize future
incidents, but, apparently, because of the lack of adequate federal resources many of
these positive changes may not be implemented.
State and local authority to manage and regulate pipelines is somewhat limited,
although it can be expanded upon and improved. While states are encouraged to seek
and obtciin special regulatory and management authority for pipeline trcmsportation of
hazcirdous liquids from the Department of Transportation, Office of Pipeline Safety
(DOT/OPS), only a few have chosen to do so. In the case of Virginia and Maryland,
only Marylcmd is a full participant in intrastate pipeline transport. Neither state has nor
is currently seeking interstate special authority. Local governments, who are the ones
most directly impacted by pipeline tremsport and the incidents which might occur, can
exert more authority through land use controls such as zoning and subdivision
ordinances amd comprehensive plans. They also have police powers to protect jmd
improve public health and safety. Through these tools locjil governments can better
irrsure that pipeline right-of-ways are protected and that future pipeline fcdlures emd
associated safety and environmental impacts are minimized through coordinated
emergency response.
355
5
COG's Recommendations for a Strong Response
Based on our review jind assessment I would like to strongly recommend that the
following points and actions be taken into consideration and incorporated into any
revisions which may result from this special investigation. Please note that there are a
number of proposed actions that would have to be carried out in coordination with COG
member local governments. Our points are as follows:
Federal Action Required
1. We recommend that the Executive Branch and the Congress must ensure
that those mandates found within the 1992 Pipeline Safety act be fully
enacted through rulemaking procedures and where applicable that
adequate federal resources are made available to accomplish those
requirements. Specific mandates that need to be addressed include:
increased inspection requirements;
identification of environmentally sensitive /high density areas; *
increased civil penalties;
additional emergency flow restriction devices;
hiring of additional federal inspectors; (Under the 1992 Pipeline
Safety Act additional inspectors are to be hired, but because there
has been no additional appropriation, no additional inspectors have
been hired; *
increased operator training /certification. *
• (Federal resources and action needed)
2. We urge that incentives be created to encourage states to take a more
active role in intra- and interstate pipeline regulation and management.
Federal/State/Regional/Local Coordination and Action Required
3. We recommend that a comprehensive regional and national monitoring
program of pipeline systems be developed using geographical information
system technology.
356
We recommend a critical review based on procedures and conditions to be
developed be required before repaired pipelines can be reopened and
should be a very high priority. This review should include an cissessment
of the appropriate role of local authorities in this decision.
We recommend the review and development of a petroleum spill model
to assist impacted jurisdictions in planning cind coping with future oil
spills.
We recommend there be greater public education and awareness among
local, state, and federal governments; citizens; and pipeline operators
relative to pif)eline locations, safety, emergency response and operations.
Local/Regional Coordination and Action Required
7. We recommend the review of regioneil notification systems, resources and
agreements. Such a review should include a meeting of MWCOG, regional
water utilities, the Interstate Commission on the Potomac River Basin's
Cooperative Water Supply On the Potomac (CO-OP) Committee, and
regional emergency response personnel to discuss modifications to the
region's Water Supply Emergency Agreement
8. We recommend that in cooperation with local governments a review and
assessment of current local land planning, zoning, building permits and
subdivision ordinances be carried out to determine their adequacy to
address pipeline safety and operation {e.g., setbacks, pipeline operator
review and approval of subdivisions and site plans).
9. We recommend periodic review of contingency clean-up plans to insure
that environmental protection be considered as well ais Scifety.
Mr. Chairman, members of the Subcommittee, that concludes my remarks. I
would like to take this opportunity to once again thank you agciin for cillowing the
Metropolitcm Washington Council of Governments Board of Directors to speak on this
issue of importance and concern to the metropolitan Washington region. The
Metropolitan W£ishington Council of Governments, its seventeen member local
government jurisdictions, and its 3.8 million inhabitants are genuinely concerned about
pipeline safety, operations and memagement. We are committed to the continued
improvement of ctll aspects of pipeline memagement and operations and seek to
minimize impacts to the citizens of our region as well as the nation through increased
coordinated local, state and federal efforts. Thank you.
357
KMPR
ASSOCIATES INC.
ENGINEERS
May 24, 1993
Ms. Linda Komes
Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight
Committee on Public Works and Transportation
H2-586 Ford HOB
Washington, DC 20515-6259
Subject: Colonial Pipeline Hearing of May 18, 1993
Dear Ms. Komes
We would like to submit the attached report and statement for the record to be included
in the Committee's report on the hearing of The Colonial Pipeline Rupture which was
held on May 18, 1993.
It is our understanding that statements were made at the hearing by the President of
Colonial Pipeline, Mr. Donald R. Brinkley, indicating that the ultrasonic flow meter
technologies to detect pipeline leaks do not work effectively and are not capable of
detecting leaks. This is not a correct picture of the capability of this type of equipment.
Ultrasonic flow measurement systems have been installed on the Trans Alaskan Pipeline
and Alyeska has conducted rigorous calibration and performance tests on these meters.
Attached is a 1992 ASME paper written by Alyeska on recent tests that they conducted
on their leading edge ultrasonic flowmeters. The results from these tests indicate that
the absolute accuracy of the meter was .157% for flow rate, and even more important
from a leak detection standpoint, was that the standard deviation of the total flow
between two ultrasonic meters was .019%. This .019% means that leakage rates greater
than 4.18 gallons per minute (gpm) can be detected in a 36" pipe carrying 22,000 gpm of
product. The significance of this is that such a metering system can detect low levels of
leakage from the initial stages of a crack (i.e., while the crack is small and leakage is still
in the 10 to 40 gpm range). Thus, this system has a reasonable chance of detecting that
leakage and allowing time for corrective action before the crack reaches the "critical
crack size" and the line grossly ruptures where leakage rates are in the thousands of gpm.
I believe the attached Alyeska paper speaks for itself and presents a very different
picture from that presented by Colonial Pipeline. Accordingly, I request that this letter
and the attached article be made a part of the record of the May 18, 1993 hearing. If
320 KING STREET ALEXANDRIA. VA 22314-3238 703-519-0200 FAX: 703-519-022d
358
Ms. linda Koines • 2 - May 24, 1993
you have any questions regarding the measurement technology, track record or its ability
to detect pipeline leaks prior to the "critical crack size" being reached and the resultant
catastrophic failure, please do not hesitate to contact us.
Sincerely,
Honorable Leslie L. Byrne
Honorable Thomas M. Davis, III
Honorable Frank R. Wolf
4oman M. Cole
359
THE AMERICAN SOCIETY OF MECHANICAL ENGINEERS
345 E. 47 SU N«w YorK N.Y. 10017
Tha SocMy ■hall not b* rMponslbM tor sltfanwnti or opinions KtvmcMl In pap«r« or m d's-
cuBsMn « mMf lr>es of th* SocWy or ot lit OM«ions or SaetKxtt. or prtnitd tfi tM publlcalkons.
DiKuwlon ts prlntod only M tTM papor Is publlshod In an ASME Journal. Papors ara avallabl*
from ASME tor fitiMn months attar tha mMtine
PrtntKtinUSA
92-GT-426
State of the Art of Ultrasonic Liquid Flow Measurement
and it's Impact on Automated Leak Detection
in Pipelines
MICHAEL L. SMULSKI
Alyeska Pipeline Service Company
Eagle River, Alaska 99577
Abstract:
The state of the art of ultrasonic liquid flow
surement has improved greatly in the past
aHe "to wTTefe this technology exhibits
accuracy equivalent
while retaining seve
:o turbine meter
:al advantages o
Testing
for lea
1 of a
ik det<
four
!CtiO
path noi
n on the
l-il
Tri
itri
jsive mi
-Alaska
iter I
Pipe]
ised
.ine
is disc
lussed
. Per
formance
is
del
:ailed,
and
future
apDlit
:atio
ns for u
It-ri
Tic flow
Introduction :
The Trans-Alaska Pipeline stretches 800 miles
North to South across Alaska, from the Prudhoe
Bay oil fields on the Arctic Ocean to the year
round port of Valdez on Prince William Sound.
For comparison, it is a little over 600 miles
from New York to Nashville. There are no direct
flights from Prudhoe Bay to Valdei, but if
there were it would take over two hours in a
737 to cover the distance. The terrain is some
of the most strikingly beautiful in the world,
and at the same time some of the most difficult
for construction and maintenance.
The Trans-Alaska Pipeline System is operated
and maintained by the Alyeska Pipeline Service
Company, 1835 South Bragaw Street, Anchorage
Alaska, 99512. The author has been employed by
Alyeska as an engineer since January of 1983,
and has been involved in ultrasonic flow
metering as it relates to leak detection for a
large portion of that time.
are essentially at sea level. Three major
mountain ranges are crossed, with a maximum
elevation of 4,739 feet at milepost 166.6,
Atigun Pass. Ambient temperatures along the
route range from +95 degrees Fahrenheit in
summer to -80 degrees Fahrenheit in winter.
The Trans-Alaska Pipeline is capable of
transporting over two million barrels of oil a
day, and accounts for about 25 * of the United
State ' s domestic supply. The Pipeline has been
in virtually continuous operation since first
oil into Valdez on July 28, 1977, with down
time limited to a few maintenance days.
One result of Alaska's severe climatic extremes
is a sensitive ecosystem, requiring long
periods of time to recover from environmental
damage. Alaska's unique combination of climatic
extremes, difficult terrain, and lack of a road
system makes cleanup of oil spills difficult
and expensive . Because of Alyeska's sincere
commitment to maintaining the pristine Alaska
environment, Alyeska has developed a computer
based automatic leak detection system which is
among the most sensitive in the world.
There are many methods of automatic leak
detection, each having it's own strong points
and limitations. Optimum system configuration
is dependent upon parameters such as pipeline
terrain, length, diameter, wall thickness,
insulation, below/above grade, f luid (s) , flow
rate, direction of flow, pressures. Pump
of 48 inches,
above ana belc
Prudhoe Bay (n
and is equally divided between
w ground construction. Both
ile zero) and Valdez (mile 800)
a and Amvm%ffirm Cortofwa anO Exposition
360
Station locations* ambient conditions,
maintenance considerations, sensor locations
available SCADA data links, instrumentation
location and accuracy, regulatory requiremen
available computing hardware, software, and
available software maintenance personnel.
Thus there is no single best leak detection
system for all pipelines, despite claims to the
contrary from those vendors promoting their _
particular system. Alyeska utilizes four
different methods of con^uter based leak
detection. The most sensitive periodically
calculates the apparent gain or loss of oil
from the entire 800 miles internal volume of
the pipeline since the last calculation. .
Temperature and pressure effects upon the pipe w^-
geometry and the oil specific gravity are taken'^
into account, as is Reynolds number and slack
line. Statistical data processing methods are
then used on the calculated gain/loss values to
determine a predicted leak threshold, and to
determine if a leak over this threshold exists.
Student's T Distribution for 99 percent
certainty is used in the threshold
calculations.
control system is required to pass pigs though
the meters. Another advantage of upgrading the
existing LEFMs is that the transducers are
already in place and in good condition, so that
only the electronics portion would require
replacement, taking advantage of the modern
ion processing technology.
In early 1990 upgraded LEFM electronics became
available but were unproven in the necessary
size. These units combined improved pulse
transmit/receive circuitry with an IBM AT clon
processor; the old LEFMs used seven boards of
wire wrapped TTL logic chips to form the
Since the most ser
isltive system depends on the
time inteqral of c
:orrected mass flow, it is
critical that the
most accurate flou meterina
and flow totalizing be used. Presently the
system depends primarily upon custody transfer
turbine meters at Prudhoe Bay which meter
inputs from the North Slope producers, and
custody transfer meters at Valdez which meter
incoming oil at the terminal. As mentioned
previously, the volume balance is done on the
entire 800 miles of pipe.
Alyeska has 12 pumping stations along the 800
miles route. Ten of the stations pump oil;
stations 5 and 11 are flow through only and
contain no pumps.
Each pump static
>n has a four path i
ion-intrusive
ultrasonic flow
meter installed at
both the
Sys
and discharge of the station. Thes
ers were purchased from Westinghouse Marine
tems Division in the mid 1970's. This
ision produced sonar systems for the United
States Navy including towed sonar arrays and
both active and passive sonars for OSN
submarines; thus the technology used was state
of the art for that time period. These meters
are called Leading Edge Flow Meters, or
LEFMs ■
In order to improve leak detection, it would be
advantageous to perform the volume balance
between stations rather than over the entire
800 miles of pipe. This would divide the pipe
into 12 segments and reduce inaccuracies due to
slack line. (Slack line is a flow phenomena
observed on the down hill side of mountain
ranges which are steep enough that the pipe is
not full.)
Sine
Alyeska has a comprehensive progr
-Of
using both magnetic and
n/deformation pigs, the LEFM
permitting the
A repeatability requirement of 0-15 % mass flow ^
over the pressure range 0 to 1500 psi and the
(oil) temperature range of 40 to 140 degrees F.
was established. Calibration would be allowed
once per year, as opposed to turbine meters
which are proved daily and calibrated quarterly
or whenever accuracy falls below 0.15 %.
Since the required accuracy is pushing the
limits of the state of the art, it was decided ^
to test the new LEFMs at a single pump station
to purcha
Thi
as done
Pump
11 which has both suction and discharge
flow meters but no pumps or relief (storage)
tanks. Thus a direct determination of
repeatability could be made by comparing the
suction and discharge flow meters over an
extensive time period. This paper describes the
test and the results .
nd.
Ultrasonic Flowmeteriny Backgrou
Dopplar vs. Transit Tima:
There are two primary physical methods of
ultrasonic flow metering: Doppler and transit
time. Piezoelectric crystals are used as both
transmitters and receivers in most cases.
The Doppler concept works by projecting a sonic
pulse train into the m.oving fluid and measuring
the frequency shift of the return. This is a
familiar effect best exhibited in the change in
pitch of a train whistle as the train passes
the stationary observer. The fluid must contain
some discontinuity such as air bubbles, sand or
dirt to reflect the sonic beam. Clean fluid
will usually not work with Doppler meters.
Another disadvantage of Doppler meters is
uncertainty as to from where within the
velocity profile the beam is being reflected.
The velocity vector profile is radically
different between laminar and turbulent flow,
and can be non symmetrical downstream of bends
or imperfections. Typical attainable accuracy
with these meters is about +/- 5 %, but they
are non intrusive and will work in dirty fluid
where a transit time meter will not.
passage of pigs. No expensive piping network or
361
The transit time meter works by projecting a
sonic pulse at an angle other than
perpendicular to the direction of flow, across
the largest pipe diameter. The time from
transmitting on one side of the pipe to
receiving on the other side is called transit
time and is proportional to the speed of sound
in the fluid and the increase or decrease in
velocity due to fluid movement. Typical orders
of magnitude are 1400 meters per second speed
of sound in crude oil, and 3 meters per second
oil flow velocity.
First a pulse is projected upstream, then
downstream. The transit time is measured and
the difference between the upstream and
downstream time determined by subtraction. The
result is a time period equal to twice the
change in time due to fluid flow.
Since the beam passes through the fluid at an
established pipe chord, a velocity profile must
be assumed. This limits the typical accuracy of
single path flow meters to about +/- 3 %,
although better results have been obtained by
calibrating at a particular flow rate.
The next step toward greater accuracy is to
increase the number of beams in order to
somehow determine the velocity profile. The
industry has developed two methods for doing
this. The first method is to use multiple
parallel beams and a method of numerical
integration called Gaussian quadrature
integration. By determining the flow velocity
at several points, the velocity profile can be
determined quite accurately. The LEFMs use the
multiple beam (four path) system.
The second method is to use two beams at right
angles to each other, with each beam reflected
back. This has the advantage of eliminating
errors due to cross flow, or eddies. This is a
newer method and less is known about it. It was
not tested because the four path LEFM
transducers were already in place, making that
concept more attractive financially.
Clamp
Intrusiv:
One of
the
big
adva
ntaqes
of ult:
Ic
flc
meters
is
that
most
of the
m are non-i
ntr
■VI si
when me
asu
rinq
liqu
id flow
. This
permits
saqe of
install
ati
on, and a
and clea'
Hows t
he pas:
inspect
ninq de
vices.
An ultrasonic meter can be installed to measure
liquid flow in a process without shutting the
process down; an Intrusive meter (orifice
plate, turbine meter, elbow tap, etc.) requires
a shutdown to install the transducers.
As with most technical equipment, however,
there are real world complications. In actual
installations the advantages of non-intrusive
flow meters become less dramatic when high
performance is desired. For example, the four
path chordal meter used for this test in Indeed
non-intrusive, permitting easy pig passage. It
is not a clamp on, however, due to the
necessity to precisely locate the four beams
relative to each other and relative to the pipe
geometry. An expensive spool piece is necessary
to maintain the precise beam spacing,
consistent pipe roundness, and precise inner
diameter required. Four path systems can still
be installed at a fraction of the cost of
turbine meters, however.
The next quantum step for four path flow meters
would therefore be clamp on transducers to
reduce the cost.
0»BcrlptloD of Caldon Four p«th
Dltr«senle rlowaater.
Principles of Oparatlon:
The
Caldon
four
path u
Itrasc
>nic flow mei
ter
uses
a p.
recisior
1 fabi
ricated
spool
. piece with
wetted
trki
isducers
; installed
in Ins
itrument bos:
ses
at
photos of the electronics and the spool piece.
To determine corrected mass flow the fluid
velocity is measured along each of the four
paths using the transit time technique. The
velocity profile is determined, and mass flow
is calculated. Corrections are then added for
temperature and pressure effects upon oil
density and spool piece geometry.
ncURE 1: LEFM MODEL «300 AND MTTEKING SECTION
362
CONTROL t DISPLAY
FIGURE 2: LEFM MODEL 8300 ELECTRONICS CABINET, FRONT VIEW
363
Maaauricg Transit Tlaa:
A pair of transducers sends ultrasonic (500
khi) pulses to one another along a measurement
path at an angle to the flow. The transit time
depends on both the speed of sound in the fluid
and the flow velocity of the fluid along the
path. Transit time is shorter for pulses
'travelling downstream with the flow:
Td - I'p'"^*^?'
Transit time is longer for pulses travelling
upstream against the flow:
Tu
L„/ (C-V )
T^ - downstream transit time
T - upstream transit time
L - path length
C ■ speed of sound in fluid
V - flow velocity along ultrasonic
path
V - flow velocity along pipe axis -
V CosB
When pulses travel upstream and downstream at
approximately the same time the above equations
may be treated as simultaneous, and solved for
two unknowns, C and v Solving for V and
taking into account the path angle 0:
V- (Lp(T„-Tj))/(2TjTyCos0I
Using this method, the velocity measurement V
is independent of the speed of sound C, which
varies as a function of temperature, pressure,
density, and other parameters.
Calealating Gcosa Flow Rata:
The LEFM uses four pairs of transducers to
measure flow velocities along four paths. Very
specific transducer spacings are required, as
shown In figure 3. The transducer assembly is
shown in figure 4. The ultrasonic path velocity
measurements are combined using the Gaussian
Quadrature technique to obtain gross volume
measurement :
0 - DS(Mi(lTVp>i<tanai)+w2(lTVp)2<t«n02)*
*W3 "t^p' 3 """"s' *W4 "t^p' 4 "•""4 ' I
where;
Q > volume flowrate
D •■ inside pipe diameter
S - Gaussian correction factor
H^ - Gaussian weighting factors
'■pin) " P*'^'' lengths
^p(n) " '^°'' velocity along ultrasonic
paths
0„
path angles
During installation precision measurements of
inside diameter, path lengths, and path angles
are taken and inserted into the equation for
gross volume flow rate. These values and the
Gaussian constants are used to calibrate the
Caldon LEFH 8300.
Transducer inputs are used to automatically
compensate for spool piece expansion and
contraction due to changes in temperature and
pressure.
Net volume flowrate is then calculated by
correcting the gross volume flowrate to
standard oil conditions at 60 degrees F. and 0
psig. Temperature and specific gravity
correction factors are used from API Standard
2S40 table 6a,- pressure correction factors from
API Standard 11.2.1 are used.
Vactor Diagram of Trandt Tim* HaKuramanl
364
.•»■ DU
TMJISOOCZB «3SZa lUMOVKO.
FIGURE 3: LEFM TRANSDUCER SPAaNQ.
FIGURE 4: LEFM TRANSDUCER ASSEMBLY DETAILS.
365
Software Dascription:
The LEFM 8300 aoftware is an example of Object
Oriented Programming, allowing for changing and
debugging from a single point in the source
code. The bulk of the code is written in C++,
with assembler code for the high speed low
level interfaces between the CPU and AFU and
also for the high speed DMA Graphics routines .
The object oriented software allows simple
implementation of multiple configurations, and
allows for for customization for individual
application needs. Custom outputs, inputs, and
data presentation windows can be configured for
other applications.
Functional windows are used to display discrete
sets of data such as diagnostic, set-up, or
operational parameters. Each of these windows
may be selected by the operator by means of
"soft-keys" displayed in a definition box on
each screen.
Taat Deacrlption:
The falfinn Mnrto 1 mnp flow meter electronics
was installed at both the suction and discharge
sides of Pump Station 11 of the Trans-Alaska
Pipeline, using the existing spool pieces. Pump
Station 11 is located at Glenallen, Alaska at
pipeline milepost 686, about 1500 feet above
sea level. The terrain is not mountainous from
Pump Station 10 to Pump Station 11; hence,
there is no slack line between the two stations
at present flow rates. The Valdez Terminal is
114 miles South of Pump Station 11, over
Thompson Pass.
Crude oil temperature at Pump Station 11 is
about 110 degrees F., and pressure is about 600
psig. Flow rates are slightly over 76,000
barrels per hour. There are no pumps at PS 11.
■ rt 51 oooo«a/„
■t of the design
part
test (DVT) called out
atio
The purpos
the purchase
rif ieation
to determine the
repeatability and absolute accuracy of the
instrument, and to wring out those problems
which inevitably show up when the first
prototype is fielded. The DVT specified that
data would be taken for 30 days. Three major
comparisons were to be made! —
a) Comparison of Pump Station 11 suction flow
with Pump Station 11 discharge flow: since
independent spool pieces and electronics were
used for suction and discharge, this would be a
good measure of the repeatability of the flow
meter. The acceptance criteria was that the
standard deviation of the error between suction
and discharge flow rates be not greater than
+/- 0.167 % over the entire range of oil
temperatures and pressures. The temperature and
pressure compensation was done by lookup tables
using API Standard 2540 table 6a, and API
Standard 11.2.1. This section of the computer
had been previously tested at the factory and
found to introduce essentially no error.
Therefore, the entire error margin of +/- 0.167
% was used as the pass/fail criteria for this
test, even though the suction and discharge
pressures and temperatures were not exercised
over their entire range.
b) Comparison of Pump Station 11 LEFM suction
totalizer with Pump Station 11 LEFM discharge
totalizer; pass/fail criteria was the same as
in item a) above. Flow total is the time
integral of flow rate, so any offset error
between suction and discharge should become
evident over the thirty day test period.
c) Comparison of the average flow total
passing through Pump Station 11. with the flow
received at Valdez over the 30 day period. This
gives an approximation of absolute accuracy,
since the LEFMs are being compared with the
custody transfer turbine meters at Valdez
incoming. At 10 miles per hour It takes about
11 hours for the oil
11 to Valdez,
which ini
short term If
flow Is 1
was taken for
30 days.
The pass/fail
crltpria
fnr thfs ^o^^ u,a= */-
0.250 %.
Pump Station 11 data was recorded locally using
the on board data logger resident in the Caldon
model 8300 flow meter. Data for Pump Station
11, Pump Station 12, and Valdez Incoming was
recorded at Valdez using the Data General
MV10,000 SCADA computer. A comparison could
then be made between data recorded at Pump
Station 11 and Pump Station 11 data recorded at
OCC, to verify the accuracy of the SCADA data
link.
Another goal of the test program was to wring
out all the "bugs" including the man/machine
Interface, on board data logger, output update
rate, power supply fallover characteristics, dc
and ac operation, changing of set points and
parameters, compatibility of the multiplexed
BCD output with the Square D PLC communication
device, on board diagnostics. Internal timing
problems between the processor and the flow
meter, software glitches, physical layout of
parts and controls, software modification
procedures, documentation format and control,
security of access to software and set points,
and any other deficiencies which may become
evident during this test.
Data was recorded every 15 minutes for 30 dav?;
at Pump Station 11 using the Caldon on board
data logger. There were some software and
operational problems which prevented the data
from running an unbroken 30 days, but 30 full
days of data was collected.
The data was recorded in MS-DOS format by the
Caldon 8300. It was then read into a Lotus
spread sheet program, translated into Excel,
and processed on a Macintosh Ilsi. The
following parameters were recorded at Pump
Station 11. An example page of data Is shown as
figure 5.
366
il
367
Siirr Inn:
Dace
Time
Pressure, psig
Temperature, deg. F.
Flow rate, bbls/hr.
(resolution 1 bbl/hr.)
Flow total, bbls.
(resolution 1 bbl)
Perforaapce Results
The standard deviation of the difference
between the suction and discharge flow rate
taken every fifteen minutes was 0.157 % over
the entire 30 day period.
rn<;rharae:
Date
Time
Pressure, psig
Temperature, deg. F.
Flow rate, bbls/hr.
(resolution 1 bbl/hr.)
Flow total, bbls.
Resolution 1 bbl)
The
standard deviation of the differ
SfcJ/
the entire 30 day period. If
Meter factors were calculated by the OCC in
Valdez for Pump Station 11 over the 30 day
test. These factors would normally be
programmed into the Pump Station 11 flow meters
to malce them agree with the turbine meters at
Valdez; however, during this test both the
suction and discharge meter factors were left
at 1.00000 so that the error between Valdez and
Pump Station 11 could be quantified. The
suction meter factor remained constant within
0.10 % and the discharge meter within 0.06 %.
Conclusions :
performance
specified a
results wei
point, all
satisfied.
The Caldon Model 8300 LEFM met the performance
requirements of the DVT under actual field
conditions, within Alyeska's ability to measure
Although the requirements were
a percentage of full scale and the
ere presented as a percentage of
curacy requirements were 11
Future Applications of Ultrasonic Flow
metering .
Aircraft fuel metering, hydraulics
performance :
The Controlotron Co., 155 Plant Avenue,
Hauppauge New York, 11768, manufactures a line
of ultrasonic flow meters. Although
Controlotron was not chosen for the LEFM
upgrade program, Alyeska is successfully using
single path Controlotron flow meters to control
23 remote check valves.
Controlotron has established a reputation as an
industry leader with respect to new and
innovative applications, and is the only known
vendor working in the aerospace areas of
aircraft fuel and hydraulic fluid measurement.
Integrated leak detection system qsing
on-bo«rd IBM AT processor:
The fact that the LEFM is an accurate flow
meter and contains an IBM AT clone processor
makes it an excellent candidate for an
integrated leak detection system. Leak
detection algorithms could be programmed into
the flow meter, just as are programmed into the
Data General MV10,000 SCADA computer by
Alyeska. An added advantage in doing the
computations at the monitored site is that real
time, accurate data would be used. This
eliminates SCADA errors and delays in data
transmission.
There are four or five firms specializing in
leak detection and pipeline simulation
software. The flow meter vendors also have
programmers on their staff due to the nature of
their product. It is doubtful that the software
firms could develop a flow meter of the
required performance, but it is quite likely
that the flow meter vendors could develop all
but the most sophisticated leak detection
software. It therefore appears that the flow
meter vendors have the advantage as this
technology
working agr
technology
buyouts being possible.
Regulatory Trends: Internal Inspection ,
Leak Detection.
Federal and State Legislative bodies are
currently studying technology with the intent
of regulating pipelines. Proposed legislation
seems to be falling into two areas; ipterr\gl
inspecti
eq^^
e^ui
Ult
nd leak detection
flc
eters may offer
both areas .
Internal inspection is best accomplished with
smart pigs using ultrasonic, magnetic, and
inert ial technology . These pigs are propelled
through the pipeline by the oil flow.
Ultrasonic flow meters can oass these devices
through directly, eliminating the valvp*:,
launchers/ receivers, pnd control systems
needed to pass pigs through intrusive flow
In til
le field
of 1
ealc detection ultrasoi
lie flow
meter
■s offer
acct
iracy similar to turbine meters
at a
fractioi
1 9f
into __
accoL
int the !
:ost
of the four path spool piece.
Acknowladgttmants ;
1) "(Dperatlng Manual, LEFM Model 8300 Flow
Measurement System", printed November 1990 by
Caldon Inc., 2857 Banltsville Road, Pittsburgh,
Pa., ISili.
2) C. Hartman and P. Johnson, "Environmental
Atlas of Rlas)ca", Copyright 1984 by the
University of Alas)ca, Fairban)cs, Alaska.
3) Purchase Specification No. APSC 70-70,
"Four-Path Ultrasonic Flowmeter — Electronics
Only", Alyes)ca Pipeline Service Company, 1835
South Bragaw Street, Anchorage, Alaslca. 99512.
4) LEFM Model 8300 Service Manual IB 102-1190,
printed Nov. 1990 by Caldon Inc., 2857
Ban)csville Road, Pittsburgh, Pa., 15216.
368
E. A. Jonas, P.E.
CONSULTINO METALLIXROICAL ENGINEER
P.O. BOX 1428
BETHUBHEM. PA. 18016
PHONE A PAX 815 865-3300
June 4,1993
Mr. J. A. Cox
Colonial Pipeline Co.
Resurgens Plaza
945 East Paces Ferry Rd
Atlanta GA 30326 1125
Dear Mr Cox:
I am in receipt of your letter of June 1,1993 and the
accompanying photograph. This photograph shows a girth weld
and associated FBE and concrete coating cut back. Although
the size, grade and wall thickness of the pipe cannot be
determined from the photograph, it is certainly accurate to
state that the pipe in question is submerged-arc welded.
The "longitudinal indication" to which you refer in your
letter is, in my opinion, the weld reinforcement of the
longitudinal seam used to manufacture this pipe, in
accordance with API 5L. As such, it is a normal condition,
incident to the production of this size, wall and grade of
pipe.
Should you require further assistance in this matter please
call upon me.
Yours
onas, P.E.
369
Kiefner & Associates, Inc.
June 7, 1993
Mr. J. A. Cox
Manager, Technical and Regulatory
Colonial Pipeline Company
P.O. Box 18855
Atlanta, Georgia 30326-0855
Dear Jin:
I have reviewed the picture which you sent on June 1, 1993 of
Colonial's 36-inch pipeline located in Virginia tzOcen 'during
construction in 1980. The photograph shows a recently made girth
weld in the "cut-back" area of both the red, fusion-bonded epoxy
anti-corrosion coating and thick, concrete-weight coating of the
two lengths of pipe joined by the girth weld. The picture was
taken prior to the final coating of the cut-back region.
Your letter requests that I identify, as best I can, the
longitudinally oriented feature that appears in the center of the
photograph between the concrete-weight coating and the girth
weld, ending abruptly at the girth weld. This feature is the
crown of the submerged-arc-welded seam of the length of pipe to
the left of the girth weld.
Please call me if you have any questions.
Sincerely,
JFK.-gw
P.O. Box 268 Worthington. Ohio 43085 Phone (6l4) 888-8220
893 High St.. Suite L FAX (6l4) 888-7323
370
Fairfax County Water Authority
8560 ARLINGTON BOULEVARD - P.O. BOX 1500
MERRIFIELD, VIRGINIA 22116-0815
FRED C. MoRiN, Chairman
Harry F. Day, Vice-chairman
David G. Russell, secy.-Tres.
Bill G. Evans
Burton J. Rubin
Paul andino
connie houston
Philip W. Allin
Pamela b. Danner
Charles D. Hylton, III
May 14, 1993
Floyd f. Eunpu
engineer-Director
Telephone (703) 698-5600 Ext. 400
telephone (703) 698-S600 EXT. 402
FACSIMILE (703) 698-17S9
The Honorable Robert Borski
Chainnan, Subcommittee on Investigations & Oversight
U.S. House of Representatives
2161 Raybum House Office Building
Washington, DC 20515
Dear Congressman Borski:
The Water Authority is the largest supplier of water in Virginia— serving
approximately one million northern Virginians. Many of our customers are members of the
U.S. Senate and U.S. House of Representatives.
In late March the Potomac River, one of our major sources of water, and a treasured
natural resource for the national capital area... was contaminated with heating oil as a result
of a ruptured interstate oil pipeline. The pipeline, owned by the Colonial Pipeline Company,
passes through thousands of communities from Texas to New Jersey, and is only one of
several oil pipelines which traverse our country. The break which occurred in this oil
pipeline in March occurred in Fairfax County, Virginia. The oil spilled into a local creek
and within hours entered the Potomac River. The oil hugged the Virginia shoreline and
forced the closing of the Water Authority's largest water purification plant. For a total of 18
days, 1 1 consecutive days, we were forced to operate using another source of water, the
Occoquan Reservoir, and our customers were requested to curtail water use. Despite the
serious threat to our operations we were able to endure this disaster without running out of
water, however, our situation is unique.
We are one of the few water suppliers in the nation, and the only one in the national
capital area, which has an alternative source of supply of this magnitude. The consequences
would have been devastating had this oil pipeline rupture occurred on the Maryland side of
the Potomac River. Imagine our Federal City — Washington, D.C. — closed for half a month,
along with the Maryland suburbs. Picture this scenario and you will see a severe and
damaging economic impact with closed businesses and schools. The consequences would be
unthinkable — the capital of the world's greatest nation shutdown by a ruptured oil products
pipeline.
371
The Honorable Robert Borsid -2- May 14, 1993
On April 29, 1993, the Fairfax County Water Authority hosted the ISth Annual
Meeting of the signatories to the Potomac River Low Flow Allocation Agreement. A major
topic of discussion was the recent oil spill referred to previously. After numerous questions
and discussions it was the unanimous (pinion of all of the signatories (Maryland, District of
Columbia, Virginia, Corps of Engineers, (Washington Aqueduct), Washington Suburban
Sanitary Commission, and the Fairfax County Water Authority that the Interstate
Commission on the Potomac River Basin would present our concerns to any regulatory
govnnmental body that might address this issue. In particular, all parties were deq>ly
concerned iu to the affect on our Nations Capital should a break of this nature occur on the
Maryland side of the Potomac River.
The Water Authority strongly endorses the recommendations proposed to the
committee by the Interstate Commission on the Potomac River Basin, namely:
(1) verification of the physical integrity of interstate oil pipelines and the locations
of valve installations,
(2) state-of-the-art improvements to reduce the risks from existing pipelines,
including retrofitting as necessary, and
(3) comprehensive monitoring control and inspection reporting procedures.
This year's incident has not been the first time the Water Authority's water supply
has been direatened by an oil pipeline failure. In 1980 our Occoquan River supply was
victimized. We live with the constant threat of having our water sources contaminated by
aging and inadequate oil pipeline facilities.
We appreciate the time that you have devoted to this extremely important issue. Our
sta^ is available to answer any questions that you may have on this subject.
Very trtily yours,
Fred C. Morin
Chairman
Attachment - Distribution and Copies List
372
Distribution list
Committee on Public Works and Transportation
May 14, 1993
The Honorable Norman Mineta
The Honorable Robert Borski
The Honorable Barbara Rose Collins
The Honorable Robert Wise
The Honorable Greg Laughlin
The Honorable Lucien Blackwell
The Honorable Leslie Byrne
The Honorable James Baicia
The Honorable Bob Filner
The Honorable Eddie Bemice Johnson
The Honorable James Inhofe
The Honorable John Duncan
The Honorable Susan Molinari
The Honorable Bill Zeliff
The Honorable Wayne Gilchrest
The Honorable William Baker
The Honorable Bud Shuster
cc: Dr. S. Schwartz, Interstate Commission on the Potomac River Basin
Mr. F. Eunpu, Fairfax County Water Authority
Mr. P. Costas, Washington Aqueduct Division, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
Mr. J. Corless, Washington Suburban Sanitary Commission
Mr. J. Peck, Maryland Department of Natural Resources
Mr. R. Burton, Virginia Department of Environmental Quality
Mr. G. Papadopolous, District of Columbia
Col. J. R. Capka, Baltimore District, U.S. Army Corps, of Engineers
373
H. Garon Stutzman
May 24,1993
Congressman Robert A. Borski
Chairman
Investigations and Oversight Subcommittee
Raybum House Office Building
Washington, DC. 20515
Dear Congressman,
I attended your hearing regarding the ruptured oil pipeline on May 18, 1993
I appreciate Congressman Wolf including a few words on behalf of the subsurface utility
engineering (SUE) profession.
Enclosed, is my statement that I hope you will include in the official hearing documents. The time
has come for the SUE profession The SUE profession locates and certifies the three-
dimensional location of underground structures, such as utility lines, before the design of
excavation projects. Doesn't it make sense that once an excavator has the location of an
underground utility he is less likely to damage it? Did you know that traditionally the depths of
underground utilities are not available to project engineers or excavators? Unfortunately, this is a
story most people do not know and a story that the utility industry will not tell you The reason
has to do with them not wanting to be responsible to provide detailed levels of data.
Unfortunately, engineering tradition holds excavators responsible to locate utility lines at the time
of excavation. Because of the new SUE profession, requiring excavators to locate during
construction is unnecessary, dangerous, expensive and irresponsible The SUE profession
specializes in locating and protecting utility lines before design of a project ~ not at time of
excavation. The concept of SUE is simple — before an engineer designs a project requiring
excavation, the engineer should know what structures are beneath the earth and where they are
three dimensionally.
It pleases me to iumish you my statement and I would be please to discuss this issue further with
vour committee
Sincerely,
Gc
HomeOffice: 7726 WycUaod Court, CUfton, Virginia 22024 Phone/Fax (703)830-0859 (C>U Before Faxing)
374
The Subsurface
Utility Engineering
Company
8397 Euclid Avenue
Manassas Park,
Virginia 22111
(703)361-6005
Metro: 631-6967
FAX: (703) 361 -7587
Performing
out-of-sight work...
with vision!™
Statement For The Official Congressional
Hearing Into The Ruptured Colonial Oil Pipeline
May 24, 1993
We heard sworn witnesses, plus Colonial Pipeline Company, state that "pipelines
are the safest mode of transportation for petroleum and petroleum products" I
agree and want to tell you about proven new technologies that will make pipeline
transportation more safe while costing less money.
We also heard sworn testimonies that "third party damages or diggins to pipelines
are the number one cause of pipeline disruptions". I agree and want to tell you
how these new technologies not only make pipelines a safer mode of
transportation but also manage "third party damages and diggins" while costing
less money.
Many of these sworn witnesses, including Colonial Pipeline Company, went on to
say that "local government agencies should become more involved in the
regulation of development and construction around pipelines" I fully agree that
local governmental agencies should become more involved The best way for
government agencies to become involved in making pipelines a safer mode of
transportation is to protect pipelines from third party damages and diggins by
requiring three-dimensional certification of underground utilities before
issuing excavation permits.
Permit issuing agencies can add a simple check-off item to the plan review process
ensuring that project owners have obtained certified, three-dimensional (horizontal
and vertical) utility data before the issuance of an excavation permit or site plan.
This simple step would handily address the issue of "third party damage" '(the
number one cause of pipeline disruptions).
'The common denominator in almost every underground utility damage can be
traced to lack of reliable three-dimensional utility data"
'In 1981 The County of Fairfax, Virginia and in 1984 the Virginia Department Of
Transportation entered into a Subsurface Utility Engineering (SUE) program that requires a
registered professional to certify the three-dimensional location of all underground utilities on
public sector projects Since the beginning of these programs there has not been a case of a
damaged utility line on any FF.Co or VDOT project VDOT and Fairfax County are lecogni^ed
as the first and two of the l)est public agencies regarding SUE damage prevention priKedures
Please note however, neither FF Co nor VDOT requires this level of engineering quality on
pri\'ate sector projects for which they issue excavation permits. The private sector result during
the same time has been thousands of damaged utility lines
375
Unta qualified professionals are required, by permit issuing agencies, to provide certified
three-dimensional locations of underground utility lines, before excavation, there will
continue to be catastrophic utility damages.
Before the development of subsurface utility engineering (SUE) technologies' engineers designed
excavation plans using uncertified, uninsured, two-dimensional (horizontal) utility information
This information is available fi-om utility companies at no cost Utility records however are not
three-dimensional nor are they certifiable The records used are so unreliable that utility
companies and engineers add disclaimers to utility records that try to shift responsibility for utility
locations to the contractor. As you might expect, the contractor is the least professionally
competent person to locate, coordinate, survey and notify the project engineer and utility
company if utility conflicts exist This is the primary reason for third party damages and diggins!
No engineering or utility company anywhere in the nation can or will certify utility records.
Shouldn't this tell us something about the prudence of issuing excavation permits for projects
when excavation is based on utility records? Since lack of reliable utility data is the primary cause
for third party damages and diggins it only stands to reason that providing excavator's quality,
three-dimensional, underground utility data, before excavation, will reduce utility damages
Sincerely,
(^{^ -Ocrt-^ D U<^p^^*^<^'
Garon Stutzman^
^I am the recognized founder of the SUE profession I was The 1990 Entrepreneur Of The Year® in the
Washington DC area and I am a lifetime inductee into the "Entrepreneurial Hall of Fame" in
Chapel Hill, N.C. Both of these recognition's was for my work in developing the SUE profession
Additionally, I am Chairman of four companies' two of which specialize in providing SUE
services.
o
BOSTON PUBLIC LIBRARY
3 9999 05983 365 5
ISBN 0-16-041564-0
9 780160"415647
90000
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