THE LIBRARY
OF
THE UNIVERSITY
OF CALIFORNIA
PRESENTED BY
PROF. CHARLES A. KOFOID AND
MRS. PRUDENCE W. KOFOID
I
THE COMMAND OF
THE SEA
THE COMMAND
OF THE SEA
SOME PROBLEMS OF IMPERIAL DEFENCE
CONSIDERED IN THE LIGHT OF THE
GERMAN NAVY ACT, 1912
IT
ARCHIBALD HURD
AUTHOR OF
" NAVAL EFFICIENCY : THE WAR READINESS OF THE FLEET,"
"THE BRITISH FLEET I IS IT SUFFICIENT AND EFFICIENT ? "
ETC.
TEXT OF THE FIVE GERMAN NAVY ACTS
LONDON
CHAPMAN & HALL, LIMITED
1912
All rights reserved.
Printed by
HtJ
PREFACE.
THE German Navy Law Amendment Act
was passed by the Reichstag on May 2ist.
This is the last of the five enactments for
the expansion of the German Fleet, and
it is the most notable and menacing to her neighbours.
It is proposed to add only three large ships, two
cruisers and seventy-two submarines to the " estab-
lished strength " of the fleet, but the grave feature
of the Act consists in the resolve to set up a new
standard of naval efficiency.
For many years all nations in the interest of
economy kept a large proportion of their men-of-war
in reserve. Under the impetus of Germany the
tendency of administrations has lately been to
achieve rapid action quick transition from the
conditions of peace to those of hostilities. Now
the German naval authorities have taken a further
step in the same direction, which must impose on
Europe the burden of war in times of peace.
In future, within four hundred miles of the British
Isles, all the most effective ships of the German Navy
battleships, cruisers and torpedo craft will be
held on the leash manned, stored, victualled and
incessantly trained.
The German Fleet as now planned will be superior
in fighting strength and more instantly ready for
M3091.24
vi PERFACE
aggression or defence than the fleet of any Power in
the past.
So far as shipbuilding is concerned, the British
people knew in 1909 in the words of Sir Edward
Grey that " Germany was creating a fleet larger
than had ever existed before." Now it has been
decided that, winter and summer alike, at moments
when there is not a cloud on the political horizon,
and at moments when there are signs of storm,
the greater portion of these ships shall be kept on a
war footing, the remainder being furnished with
nucleus crews which can be increased to full strength
in a few hours.
The purpose of this volume is to explain the
character of the new German Navy Act and to
consider its influence upon the British Fleet and on
some of the correlated problems of British and
Imperial Defence.
The present writer can claim that during the
twenty years which he has devoted to the study of
naval affairs, he has never exaggerated the dangers
which have threatened British sea power, and in
the present volume he has set forth the facts of the
new situation without any desire to excite unneces-
sary alarm. But it must be apparent that unless
adequate measures are speedily taken by the British
peoples our naval supremacy will be in serious jeopardy
and our homes, our trade, and our Empire in peril.
Acknowledgment is made of the kind permission
of the Editor of the Fortnightly Review to use in the
preparation of this volume articles contributed to
that publication.
CONTENTS
CHAPTER PAGE
PREFACE v
INTRODUCTION ix
I THE NEW GERMAN NAVY ACT i
II THE STORY OF GERMAN NAVAL EXPAN-
SION, WITH THE TEXT OF THE FlVE
NAVY ACTS 39
III THE DANGER OF THE OVERSEAS DOMI-
NIONS 61
IV THE TRIUMPH OF THE DREADNOUGHT
POLICY, 1905-12 91
V THE NAVY'S NEED OF MEN 118
VI THE POLICY OF HOME DEFENCE :
INVASION OR STARVATION 135
(1) THE CASE AGAINST COMPULSORY
TRAINING 138
(2) THE CASE AGAINST INVASION 151
(3) THE DANGER AND THE DEFENCE 175
(4) AN ALTERNATIVE PROGRAMME 182
VII THE INVASION PROBLEM : ITALY'S
" BOLT FROM THE BLUE " 189
VIII DEFENCE AND FINANCE 210
IX THE BLESSINGS OF NAVAL ARMAMENTS 229
JUSTIFICATION OF BRITISH SUPREMACY
We should have ample margin (because)
the consequences of defeat at sea are so much
greater to us than they would be to Germany
or France. . . .
There is no parity of risk. Our position is
highly artificial. We are fed from the sea. We
are an unarmed people. We possess a very small
Army. We are the only Power in Europe which
does not possess a large Army.
We cannot menace the independence or the
vital interests of any great continental state;
we cannot invade any continental state. We do
not wish to do so, but even if we had the wish
we have not got the power.
People talk of the proportion which the
navies of different countries should bear to the
commercial interests of the different nations
the proportion of France, the proportion of
Italy, the proportion of Germany; but when
we consider our naval strength we are not
thinking of our commerce, but of our freedom.
We are not thinking of our trade, but of our
lives.
These are facts which justify British naval
supremacy in the face of the world.
We must never conduct our affairs so that
the Navy of any single Power would be able
to engage us at any single moment, even our
least favourable moment, with any reasonable
prospects of success.
First Lord of the Admiralty ', House of Commons >
March i8M, 1912.
INTRODUCTION
41 Every foreign Power knows that if we have
established, as we have, and if we mean to maintain, as
we do, an indisputable superiority on the sea, it is not
for the purpose of aggression or adventure, but it is
that we may fulfil the elementary duty which we owe
to the Empire, to uphold beyond reach, yes, and beyond
risk of successful attack from outside, our commerce,
our industry, our homes."
Thi Right Hon. H. H. Asqulth, HOY. 9th, 1908.
" There are two ways in which a hostile country
oan be crushed. It can be conquered, or it can be
starved. If Germany were masters in our home waters
she could apply both methods to Britain. Were Britain
ten times master in the North Sea, she could aoply
neither method to Germany. Without a superior neet,
Britain would no longer count as a Power. Without
any fleet at all, Germany would remain the greatest
Power in Europe."
Mr, Balfour, In the "Hord und Sud," June, 1912.
IN introducing the Navy Estimates for the
financial year 1912-13, the First Lord of the
Admiralty remarked that the Germans were
" a people of robust mind, whose strong and
masculine sense and high courage did not recoil from,
and was not offended by, plain and blunt statements
of fact, if expressed with courtesy and sincerity."
It is in this spirit that this volume, devoted to the
consideration of the problems of Imperial defence
which the action of Germany has forced into pro
minence, has been prepared.
x INTRODUCTION
We know that Germany possesses an army
without its equal in the world in numbers an army
which on a war footing would rise to a strength of
3,500,000, and that this army is being increased, and
we know that Germany, already possessing the second
largest navy in the world, has now passed an
Act for increasing her standing fleet above the
strength which the British Navy has ever attained
in the past ; but we do not know what policy is
held by Germans to justify this vast and unprece-
dented accumulation of armaments, both on land
and on sea, because the official explanations have
not been published : the intimate discussions on the
new Army and Navy Bills were conducted in secret.
In ignorance of the real motives which have
prompted these measures, the British peoples those
of the United Kingdom as well as those of the oversea
dominions whose existence depends on the supre-
macy of the Navy are compelled by the interest
of self-preservation to examine carefully the character
of the new Acts and particularly the one which has
for its aim the further expansion of German naval
power.
The cause to which this naval expansion in Germany
is attributed by leading German politicians is the
" widespread belief shared by many people of very
advanced views and friendly feeling towards the
British nation, that Great Britain will one day try
to get rid of German competition and the menace
of the German Navy by forcing war upon Germany
and destroying as many German ships as possible."
One day ? If one day, why not to-day ? If there
INTRODUCTION xi
were any foundation for this " widespread belief/'
why should England wait ? In the first twenty years
of the history of the German Empire England had a
Navy seven or eight times the size of the German
Navy, and year by year competition in trade
increased. If she was so jealous of German pros-
perity, why did she wait ? In the past ten years,
when the competition of the mart has become yet
more keen, she has had a fleet three or four times as
powerful as that of Germany. Why did she wait ?
If she still nourishes this dream of ruining her legi-
timate trade competitor by force of her arms afloat,
why has she not struck the blow in all these years
when Germany has been weak on the sea ?
The answer is very simple because the idea has
never entered the brain of a British statesman.
During a quarter of a century when the two nations
have been competing fiercely in all the markets of
the world, have been finessing for commercial and
territorial advantages in this or that quarter of the
globe, no one thought of such a scheme. But mark
this. If the mad dream of crushing a successful
trade rival by the weight of the British Fleet ever
existed, is it to be imagined that the British people
would stand by and watch ship after ship of the most
powerful types being added to the German Fleet in
accordance with successive Navy Acts until Germany
will rival England in naval armaments unless Eng-
land takes reciprocal action ? If this plan had been
thought of, would England wait, as under Liberal
and Conservative Governments, she has waited
year after year, while one German Navy Act after
xii INTRODUCTION
another has been passed in a continually ascending
scale ? If Germany is to be strangled, why does
England two to one now against Germany in
naval power hold her hand ? The truth is that
this " widespread belief " is merely one of the bogeys
deliberately created in Germany in order to foster
the naval expansion movement and excite the
national feeling, without which it was found that no
progress was made. So long as the naval agitation
in Germany was carried on with truthfulness and with
honesty, it failed to enlist support. Consequently this
bogey, which does not stand a moment's examination,
was deliberately invented against all the teachings
of Anglo-German relations. The German people,
patriotic and fearful, rose to the bait at once. The
German Navy Acts of 1900, 1906, 1908 and 1912
were passed.
The new naval situation created by Germany
under such conditions justifies feelings of alarm. As
Mr. Balfour in his article in the Nord und Sad
has reminded Germans, the position is one which
causes great anxiety :
The greatest military Power, and the second greatest
naval Power in the world, is adding both to her Army and
to her Navy. She is increasing the strategic railways
which lead to the frontier States not merely to frontier
States which themselves possess powerful armies, but to
small States, which can have no desire but to remain
neutral if their formidable neighbours should unhappily
become belligerents. She is in like manner modifying
her naval arrangements so as to make her naval strength
instantly effective.
It is conceivable that all this may be only in order to
INTRODUCTION xiii
render herself impregnable against attack. Such an
object would certainly be commendable ; though the
efforts undergone to secure it might (to outside observers)
seem in excess of any possible danger. If all nations
could be made impregnable to the same extent, peace
would doubtless be costly, but at least it would be secure.
Unfortunately no mere analysis of the German pre-
paration for war will show for what purposes they are
designed. A tremendous weapon has been forged ;
every year adds something to its efficiency and power ;
it is as formidable for purposes of aggression as for
purposes of defence. But to what end it was originally
designed, and in what cause it will ultimately be used,
can only be determined, if determined at all, by extra-
neous considerations.
The official explanation of the new and vast
expenditure upon the navy and army is that it is
intended purely for purposes of defence, and that
the German Government entertain no aggressive
designs. The difficulty is to reconcile these official
explanations with the character of the naval pre-
parations which are now about to be carried a further
step forward. For reasons which have not been
communicated to the world the Reichstag has
agreed not only to make a considerable addition to
the land forces of the Empire, but to a vast
expansion of the German Fleet.
When the scheme which has now been approved
reaches full fruition Germany will be able to
assemble at short notice in the North Sea and the
Baltic (which will be strategically one, when the
enlargement of the Kiel Canal has been completed)
no fewer than 53 ships of the line, of which in 1920
xiv INTRODUCTION
35 will be Dreadnoughts. This formidable naval
force can be reinforced by the new " flying squadron "
of four battle or armoured cruisers, as well as two
smaller cruisers, and there will be no fewer than 144
destroyers, 72 submarines and a number of aerial
craft associated with the great battle fleet which is
now about to be organised.
If this new scheme of naval preparation is con-
trasted with the plans entertained as recently as
1898 when the first Navy Act was passed, it must be
difficult for the British peoples to accept in all
sincerity, as they would desire to accept, the official
assurances that this great armada is intended merely
for the purposes of self-defence. It is common
knowledge that the ships which have recently been
built and are now being built are not designed purely
for defensive purposes ; they are vessels of maximum
power with as great a radius of action as the vessels
of the British Fleet with their world-wide duties.
In all sincerity, so far there has been vouchsafed
to the world no adequate explanation of this vast
accumulation of naval armaments. The only ex-
planations which have been given are of a dis-
quieting nature and are unofficial. The situation
is one which confuses and embarrasses all the
statesmen of Europe owing to the absence of any
official statement of motive which accords with the
facts.
In his singularly able statement on Anglo-German
relations, Mr. Balfour dismissed the idea that the
German people wish to make an attack on their
neighbours, but at the same time he called attention
INTRODUCTION xv
to the grave danger which these renewed preparations
for war throw into prominence. Mr. Balfour
reminded his German readers, familiar with the
Pan-German propaganda, what the danger is which
fills Europe with apprehension.
It lies in the co-existence of that marvellous instru-
ment of warfare which is in the German Army and Navy,
with the assiduous, I had almost said the organised,
advocacy of a policy which it seems impossible to re-
concile with the peace of the world or the rights of
nations. For those who accept this policy German
development means German territorial expansion. All
countries which hinder,though it be only in self-defence,
the realisation of this ideal, are regarded as hostile ; and
war, or the threat of war, is deemed the natural and
fitting method by which the ideal is to be accomplished.
Let German students, if they will, redraw the map of
Europe in harmony with what they conceive to be the
present distribution of the Germanic race ; let them
regard the German Empire of the twentieth century as
the heir-at-law of all territories included in the Holy
Roman Empire of the twelfth ; let them assume that
Germany should be endowed at the cost of other nations
with over-seas dominions proportionate to her greatness
in Europe. But do not let them ask Englishmen to
approve. We have had too bitter an experience of the
ills which flow from the endeavour of any single State
to dominate Europe, we are too surely convinced of the
perils which such a policy, were it successful, would bring
upon oui selves as well as others, to treat them as
negligible. Negligible surely they are not. In periods
of international calm they always make for increasing
armaments ; in periods of international friction they
aggravate the difficulties of diplomacy.
xvi INTRODUCTION
This then is the position. Germany is endeavour-
ing to become as supreme upon the sea as she is
upon the land ; it is reiterated officially that she has
no designs of aggression, while at the same time
powerful agitators throughout the Empire are
preaching a policy which is a policy of aggression.
The situation is one which is well calculated to arouse
the fears of all the nations of the world, because for
the first time in history a great Power has definitely
asserted its intention of being supremely powerful
both by sea and by land.
The predominance of Germany as a military Power
in Europe suggests problems mainly of interest to
her continental neighbours : the predominance of
Germany as a naval Power raises problems which
must be faced by all the nations of the world, because
while military power is restricted in its activity, naval
power is fluid, and can be exerted in either of the
two hemispheres, conferring unlimited range on
the army. In particular the increase in Germany's
standing Navy may affect the views which hitherto
the British people have held on the possibility of
these islands being invaded. If the German Fleet
is increased, without a proportionate increase in the
British Navy, by 1920 Germany will be in a position
to command northern waters, and the North Sea
as a barrier between the predominant army of the
German Empire and the British people, defenceless
against such military odds, would cease to exist.
It would be within the power of Germany to use her
naval and military forces as a single weapon of ag-
gression against the British or other oversea peoples ;
INTRODUCTION xvii
and even if this policy were not adopted it would
still be within the capacity of the German Govern-
ment to hold the main trade routes and starve the
inhabitants of the British Isles into submission.
It is probable that the regular process of the
expansion of the German Navy under the new Act
will proceed without any revelation of the inner
policy of the German Empire, and there are many
indications that the efforts which are now being
made on both sides of the North Sea to bring about
a better understanding between the British and
German peoples will gradually tend towards the
removal of that feeling of bitterness which has so
long existed between the two peoples. The German
Government having carried its two Defence Acts
through the Reichstag before an artificial cyclone
of public opinion incensed against England desires
our friendship. We can welcome that prospect, but
on distinct terms. Whatever our fears, one policy
only is consistent with our dignity and our safety.
Let us realise that :
(1) Naval policy, so far as it is concerned with
the provision of ships, men, and stores, has no rela-
tion to foreign policy. Our naval requirements are,
in a sense, a fixed quantity, in that they must
correspond to a traditional scale of measurement,
which is independent of our foreign relations. This
is the aspect of naval policy which is open to public
discussion, and in furtherance of which public
opinion can be usefully employed, without reference
to passing enmities, alliances, or friendships.
(2) Naval policy is related to foreign policy only
'
xviii INTRODUCTION
in respect of its employment, the number of ships
which should be kept in full commission, and their
distribution on strategical principles in accord with
our foreign relations, and the organisation of our
reserve resources of ships and men. This aspect of
naval policy must be dominated by the Foreign Office.
In consultation with that department, the Admiralty,
in full knowledge of foreign naval movements, must
so dispose British naval forces as to suit the probable
requirements of war changing from year to year,
as friendships grow hot or cold.
We should be a happier and better-loved people
because less subject to " scares " and less touchy
at every little incident if these views of our naval
policy were acted upon.
So far as the general public is concerned, naval
policy has no connection with our temporary rela-
tions with this or that Power. Yesterday we were
in a position of " splendid isolation " ; to-day we
have an entente with this country and an alliance with
that ; and to-morrow we may once more boast
with possibly our hearts in our boots of our
" splendid isolation." The face of Europe may be
changed in a week, or even a day, but it takes nearly
three years to build a man-of-war from the time when
Parliament's sanction is sought by the Admiralty, a
longer period to train a seaman gunner, and seven
years to educate a responsible officer. Who can
foresee what our relations will be with this or that
Power six or seven years hence ? The map of the
world may have been recoloured by that time.
There are good and sufficient reasons why we should
INTRODUCTION xix
have an unchallenged and unchallengable Fleet.
We have one line of defence only the Fleet. The
British Army, small in numbers, is our sword for
use on land, which we can wield in defence of the
Empire East and West and South only so long as
we have the shield the Fleet ; the Army is a corollary
to the Fleet to employ overseas, guarded to and fro
in its passage by the Fleet, as in the South African
war, or to repel any chance raiding force of neces-
sarily small proportions, which in time of war may
elude the Fleet.
Foreign policy whether it be based on alliances
or ententes or on isolation and the scale of our arma-
ments must be kept separate and apart and then we
can face the renewed crisis in good heart and without
panic, for the balance is in our favour. At this
moment, when renewed naval competition is threat-
ened, our superiority in every type of man-of-war is
unquestioned in most classes of ships, including
battleships and cruisers, we are twice as strong as
Germany. There is no doubt on this point. This
view is supported by every credible reference book
by the " Navy League Annual " and by the more
recently compiled " Naval Annual." The exact posi-
tion in which the British Navy stands in respect to
armoured ships to-day has been admirably summed
up in the following statement : *
When we talk of the naval decline of Great Britain
it is as well to realise that we have declined as regards
only one of the principal maritime Powers, and moreover
one that will not celebrate its jubilee as a nation for
* Naval and Military Record^ April I4th, 1912.
xi INTRODUCTION
some years to come yet. As a matter of fact, if the five
principal naval Powers be taken it will be found thai our
position has improved rather than declined in recent years.
In the five years 1902 to 1906 inclusive a total armoured
tonnage of 249,125 was launched for Great Britain,
Germany, France, the United States and Japan, the
tonnage and proportions of the various nations being
as follows :
Tons. Per cent.
Great Britain . . . . 87,977 35-3
Germany .. .. .. 36,106 .. .. 14.5
France 30,210 . . . . 12.1
United States . . . . 73,184 . . . . 29.4
Japan 21,648 . . . . 8.7
In the subsequent five years, from 1907 to 1911
inclusive, the amount of armoured tonnage launched
declined slightly to 243,440, thanks to the great reduction
of American shipbuilding. Of this total
Tons. Per cent.
Great Britain accounted for 89,450 . . . . 36.8
Germany 63,050 .. .. 25.9
France 39,290 .. .. 16.1
United States 33>53<> *3-8
Japan 18,120 .. .. 7.4
The greatest increase was, of course, in the case of
Germany, whose share advanced from one-seventh of the
whole in 1902-6 to just over a quarter in 1907-11, while
the proportionate share of the United States fell from
nearly a third to less than a seventh. The most unsatis-
factory feature of the comparison is that whereas the
Anglo-Saxon nations accounted altogether for 64.7 per
cent, of the armoured tonnage put afloat between 1902
and 1906, they represent only 50.6 per cent, of that
launched between 1907 and 1911.
INTRODUCTION xxi
The British Share of the Dreadnoughts of the principal
Powers is even more encouraging. Including the ships
provided for in the current year 1912-13 these five
nations possess 85 all told, and in all stages of con-
struction, and their distribution is as follows :
No. Percentage.
Great Britain . . . 36 . . . . 42.4
Germany . . . . 23 . . . . 27.1
United States . . 12 . . . . 14.1
France .. .. 7 .. .. 8.2
Japan . . . . . . 7 - 8.2
These figures, of course, only emphasise the keenness
of the competition between Germany and ourselves, and
perhaps there is little consolation in the improvement
in our position relatively to the rest of the world when
Germany has advanced so much more rapidly. In
1902-6 we launched 51,871 tons of armoured ships more
than Germany ; but in 1907-11 our superiority was
only 26,400 tons, or slightly more than a half. It is
curious to note that the combined British and American
proportion of Dreadnoughts 56.5 per cent, of the whole
included above is rather greater than our combined
share of armoured tonnage launched in 1907-11 ; but
the American Navy promises to decline very considerably
in the near future. Nor can it be forgotten that the
Triple Alliance has 22 Dreadnoughts afloat to our 26,
while their programmes, including the present year's,
total 35 to our 36.
The same tendency may be traced in cruisers and
torpedo craft. In all classes of ships the British Navy
has held its own and to-day it occupies a position of
unchallenged and unchallengable strength more
supreme in contrast with every other naval Power,
except Germany, than for one hundred years past.
xxii INTRODUCTION
It is a complete misapprehension to state that
British naval power has declined, or that we have
called the " legions home." The fact is that whereas
the fully commissioned ships were stationed mainly
in the Mediterranean and the Far East ten years ago,
now they are in the English Channel and the North
Sea. There has been no " calling of the legions
home." All that has happened is that where
danger threatens, there the flower of the Navy is
being trained in accordance with immemorial
custom. We have retraced our steps and stand
to-day where we stood during the Dutch war, but
our position in extra-European waters is stronger
than it was then. If Germany were Japan and Japan
Germany if in fact the relations of the two countries
were reversed, then we should have a strong Medi-
terranean Fleet, as the half-way house to the Far
East, and in the Far East we should have a large
naval force. The majority of the armoured vessels
of the Navy are in the English Channel and the North
Sea, not because these are our home waters, but
because first they are the main strategical theatre,
and secondly, we have no need of them else-
where, since we are supreme against every Power,
except Japan and the United States, in the Pacific
and the Atlantic. Outside European waters the
British flag is still supported in supremacy as
against every other European Navy. While alli-
ances and friendships do not directly affect the
standard of naval strength which we must maintain,
they do affect very powerfully the distribution of
naval force, and this is the explanation of the presence
INTRODUCTION xxiii
FLEETS OF THE OUTER SEAS,
MEDITERRANEAN FLEET.
FOURTH BATTLE SQUADRON (Based on Gibraltar).
Albemarle Duncan (Second Flag) Exmouth (Flag} Russell
Cornwallis
MEDITERRANEAN CRUISER SQUADRON.
Good Hope (Flag) Hampshire Lancaster Suffolk
DESTROYERS.
Albatross Chelmer Foam Jed Mallard
Angler Colne Garry Kennet Stag
CRUISERS ATTACHED TO BATTLE SQUADRON.
Barham Diana Medea
EASTERN FLEET.
CHINA SQUADRON. CRUISER SQUADRON.
Defence Flora Kent Minotaur (Flag) Monmouth Newcastle
ATTACHED SHIPS.
Alacrity Bramble Britomart Cadmus Clio Thistle
RIVER GUNBOATS.
Kinsha Nightingale Sandpiper Teal Woodcock
Moorhen Robin Snipe Widgeon Woodlark
DESTROYERS.
Fame Janus Ribble Virago Whiting
Handy Otter Usk Welland
AUSTRALIAN SQUADRON. CRUISERS.
Cambrian Drake (Flag) fPegasus fPrometheus Torch
Challenger Encounter Pioneer Psyche
EAST INDIES SQUADRON. CRUISERS.
Fox Highflyer (Flag) Perseus Philomel Proserpine
ATTACHED SHIPS.
Alert Espiegle Odin Sphinx
CAPE OF GOOD HOPE.
CRUISERS.
Forte Hermes (Flag) Pandora
WEST COAST OF AMERICA
SLOOPS.
Algerine Shearwater
S.E. COAST OF AMERICA & WEST COAST OF AFRICA.
CRUISERS.
Glasgow Dwarf
t Detailed temporarily for service on China Station.
xxiv INTRODUCTION
of most of the battleships of the British Navy in
the North Sea and the English Channel. The fleets
are being trained, in accordance with Nelson's
maxim, in the waters in which they may fight
the waters in which under present international
conditions a conflict is most possible, although,
we may hope, not probable. This is not an
argument, of course, for the abandonment of the
Mediterranean : that is an imperial and trade route
which any Admiralty would hold if it were given
the necessary ships and men by the nation.
The widespread belief in our naval decadence is
the initial difficulty in approaching the new naval
situation. We must realise that pre-eminence on the
seas to-day is not incompatible with danger in the
future and the immediate future. As a people
we have not been unfaithful to our trust. We have
responded to every challenge in the past. The
challenges have been mainly in ships some of which
lie fathoms deep in Far Eastern waters. The new
challenge is not in ships, but in sea power, ships
always manned, victualled, stored and trained
ready for action. We have known for four years
that eventually Germany intended to attain an
establishment of fifty-eight large armoured ships
fit to be in the line. The new fact is that these
ships their number now increased to sixty-one
are to be translated into instantly ready sea-power :
that the reserve vessels are to be moved into the
fighting line and provided with crews. The High Sea
Fleet is to be increased in hitting power by over
50 per cent, and it is to be maintained at this strength
INTRODUCTION xxv
ready at any selected moment to hit any other Fleet
the British Navy among others at its average
moment it may be when it is least ready to hit
back. This is the measure of Germany's new
Naval Act and it is against this peril that the British
people are bound to take precautionary measures.
Additional ships are to be built over and above
the number specified in former Naval Acts, but the
struggle of the future which will cast its shadow on
the British Navy Estimates will be in men rather
than material. Men are cheap in Germany : they
are dear in the United Kingdom. The German
naval authorities demand seamen by law and get
them for three years at low ridiculously low rates
of pay : the British naval authorities have to
invite them and get them, on an average, for nearly
ten years at exceedingly high rates of pay. The
British seaman ought to be and is the better man,
but he is very costly in comparison with the German
conscript, though in relation to the cost of living
and the wages in other walks of life his pay is low.
Consequently the decision of the German Govern-
ment to raise 15,000 additional men, increasing the
total personnel from 65,000 to 80,000 in order to
raise the effective strength of the standing Navy,
held on the leash in the North Sea, must cast a heavy
burden on the British Navy Estimates. At present
we have 134,000 men ; if we are to commission suffi-
cient ships to retain anything approaching our
present superiority and ensure an adequate margin
of safety at our average moment, the personnel
must be raised by 6,000 annually until it reaches
xxvi INTRODUCTION
160,000 or 170,000. Only by such an expansion
can we add the additional squadrons and flotillas
to the sea-going fleet in a ratio corresponding to
that authorised by the Reichstag.
The challenge of Germany consists in the raising
of the standard of instant readiness for war in
short, in the necessity of enlisting about 30,000 more
men for the British Fleet, with a due proportion
of officers. The coming contest is not so much a
struggle in material as in trained men. Material
can be fashioned in haste : men must be trained at
leisure and must be secured consequently several
years before their services are required.
Years ago, in the early stage of German naval
expansion, Sir Charles Dilke held that the German
Navy was not intended to fight but to argue with
to support diplomacy. " A fleet of British line
of battleships are the best negotiators in Europe."
We have held and practised this theory and now
Germany has adopted it. The more closely one
studies German foreign policy, the more one must
be convinced that the great end in view is the power
to dictate and only to fight in the very last resort.
Even a successful war would be a defeat to Germany,
because her highest interest now that she has become
a great commercial nation, with her ships and
cargoes in every sea, is peace. Germans the old
ruling classes in Germany do not yet realise this
change. But the fact remains. And the danger
lies in this absence of the " modern eye " in the
classes which largely dominate the exterior and
interior policy of the Empire. They do not appre-
INTRODUCTION xxvii
hend the cost even of victory much less the ruin
of defeat. German statesmen are beginning to realise
the new point of view which must be Germany's
point of view in future years. But so far there has
been no outward abandonment of the policy of
" blood and iron," no moderation in the ideals of
the Pan-Germans, no change in the policy of the
Navy League and its associated societies. It is
because these Chauvinistic ambitions are still pre-
dominant, and because they can be attained only
by the threat of force the shaking of the mailed fist
that Germany is adding to her armaments, in the
confident hope that, with the backing of a supreme
Army and a fleet of such strength that " even for
the mightiest sea Power a war . . . would involve
such risks as to jeopardise its own supremacy," she
may carve out for herself " a place in the sun " by
diplomacy and by the show rather than the use
of force. We may be sure that no thinking German,
who is conversant with Germany's economic and
commercial position, desires war, but a very
large section of Germans want the fruits of war with-
out fighting. Hence the German Naval Amendment
Act and the measure for adding to her land forces.
This is the new situation in Germany a deep-
seated conflict of interest and policy. This is not
our business. The British peoples need not meddle
in Germany's affairs ; they will have as much as
they can manage to look after their own well-being.
First of all they must realise that sea power is not
merely a matter of building ships. Men-of-war must be
manned by trained officers and men and continually
INTRODUCTION
practised at sea, and this to us is the most costly
aspect of naval preparation. Naval warfare has
reached something of the precision of a game of chess
and an action indeed the whole campaign may be
won or lost at the first move. Everything, it is now
admitted, depends on readiness and promptness.
These factors depend on an accurate disposition of
the Fleet in times of peace so as to meet the needs
of war : on the efficiency of the ships, together with
the highest strategical speed, and above all, on the
fighting efficiency of the officers and men and their
familiarity from the admirals downwards with
all the exacting demands war may make on them.
In this respect the conditions have changed. For-
merly, as has been observed by senior officers, no
one was ready, no navy had permanent crews, and
there was always time after the diplomatist had
spoken the last word to prepare for war owing to the
slowness with which the first moves were made.
To-day the diplomatist may not have an opportunity
of speaking the last word before the first blow is
struck. This is the meaning of the new German
Navy Act ability to strike the first blow. Let it
be remembered always that this Act is the supple-
ment to the Act of 1900, in the preamble of which
it was stated :
It is not absolutely necessary that the German Fleet
should be as strong as that of the greatest sea Power
because generally a great sea Power will not be in a
position to concentrate all its forces against us.
The British Fleet has world-wide duties because
the British Empire is world-wide. If our naval
INTRODUCTION xxix
strength is lowered, then an increased proportion
must be stationed in the main strategical theatre
to the danger of the outposts of the Empire, our
mercantile marine and our trade, or we must
accept as a fact full of peril, that we cannot con-
centrate adequate forces in the main strategical
theatre.
Under the German Navy Act of 1900, amended in
1906 and again in 1908 and always in the direction
of greater material strength on the seas, the German
naval establishment has been created and expanded,
and in the latest Act a routine is set up in accordance
with which the fleet will in future be held always
prepared to go into action. The word " reserve "
will have no meaning in the language of the German
navy henceforth all the ships are to be in com-
mission either with full or nucleus crews, and in the
task of preparation for war there will be not a
moment's respite.
The British peoples in the Mother Country and in
the dominions must realise, as the Foreign Secretary
once remarked, that the British Navy is the common
security of the whole Empire, and that if it ever
fails to be that it will be no use for us to discuss any
other subjects. Consequently the maintenance of the
Navy in a position absolutely assuring its ability
to win the command of the sea must be the first care
not only of the people of the United Kingdom, but
of the peoples of the United Empire.
We in the British Isles must keep ourselves free
from entangling alliances in Europe, first because
they would involve us in the military rivalries of
INTRODUCTION
Continental Powers * and deflect our policy from
its normal course, and secondly because such al-
liances and their responsibilities would be an obstacle
to closer Imperial federation. We must candidly
recognise that the old narrow European policy must
expand into the larger Imperial policy. We cannot
look to Canada, South Africa, Australia and New
Zealand, with their fresh outlook, their virgin vigour,
and their new problems, to mix themselves up in the
old jealousies and quarrels of the Continent of
Europe, and this is what an alliance in Europe
inevitably means.
The future of Empire closer union between our-
selves and our kinsmen and security lies in a
splendid isolation friendly relations with all coun-
tries which will be friendly and alliance with none.
This is the path of true Imperialism which will lead
us forth in good time a union of peaceful and
freedom-loving peoples masters of our own des-
tinies, close partners one with the other, and having
in our command the sea communications which
link together the Five Nations.
Ambassadors may come and go, hands may be
stretched across the North Sea in friendly greeting,
but this fleet of Germany's its unfaltering purpose
ever in view will remain. The German Reichstag
and not the German Ambassadors or the German
people passed the Navy Act and though statesmen
It is certain that an alliance with an European Power
would force us eventually to maintain an army on the Con-
tinental scale, and that would involve the adoption of a system
of conscription to the injury of the Navy, of our Expeditionary
Force and of our Army in India, Egypt, and South Africa.
INTRODUCTION xxxi
and ambassadors may speak fair words, and the
British and German peoples may become as brothers,
those squadrons and flotillas will remain on duty
until the Reichstag relieves them of their trust and
their responsibility of the character and extent of
which the world is still in ignorance.
Europe is suffering from the old disease of nations
jealousy, envy and all uncharitableness and one
of the outward symptoms is the piling up of arma-
ments in which Germany, with unofficial, but very
real ambitions, leads the way. We must eradicate
the disease, before the symptoms will disappear.
If we, under the British flag, deploring the disease
and its results, attempt, alone among the peoples,
to reverse the process of cure, we shall merely pro-
duce the temporary appearance of health in our
own body politic, with the certainty of eventual
catastrophe to all we hold dear.
GERMAN NAVAL PROGRESS.
ACT OF 1898.
1 Fleet flagship
2 Squadrons, each of eight
battleships, the largest
under construction dis-
placing 10,614 tons
6 Large cruisers, the largest
displacing 10,650 tons,
and mounting four 9-4
In. guns
16 Small cruisers
= 17 Ships of the line
ACT OF 1912.
1 Fleet flagship
5 Squadrons, each of eight
battleships, the largest
under construction dis-
placing 24.100 tons
12 Large cruisers, the largest
displacing 22,600 tons,
and mounting ten 12 In.
guns
30 Small cruisers
= 58 Ships of the line
3 Battleships
3 Large cruisers
3 Small cruisers
RESERVE.
The strength of the Reserve
is unspecified, but, of
course, the older ships
of war value will be
retained.
FOREIGN SERVICE.
3 Large cruisers of medium
size and power
10 Small cruisers
8 Large cruisers, eventually
to be swift battleships
10 Small cruisers
Of the eight large cruisers for Foreign Service, four
will constitute a " flying squadron " for use at home or
abroad as required, and two others will remain in the
North Sea "in reserve." Thus, on occasion, Germany
will be able to count on six more capital ships in her
home waters, raising the total to 59. Two of the small
foreign cruisers will also be at home in ordinary.
TORPEDO CRAFT.
Destroyers, 72
Submarines, none
Destroyers, 144
Submarines, 72
TOTAL OF PERSONNEL.
1898-30,000 1912-80,000
Two Divisions of COAST DEFENCE SHIPS were include
in the fleet organization of Ifc98; these ships have sinci
been refitted and are still on the active list, althoug]
they are not included in the fleet organization of 1912.
s?
Naval Expenditure of Great
Britain and Germany.
(In Million ^'s).
GERMANY.
1900
1901
10/52
1903
1904
1905
1006
1007
IQX>8
1909
1910
Total
New Con-
struction
7-6
3' 4
9*5
I0'0
47
47
io'4
4'4
lO'I
4'3
'3
47
1 2'0
5' 2
I 4 -2
5*9
Total
32-0
34'9
BRITAIN.
New Con-
struction
I0'0
10-3
1912
Increase per
cent, in 1912
over 1900
197
2T2
22'0
22'0
I97-I
I0'2
114
117
I2'2
26o'o
400
12-4
41-0
13-2
37'2
11-4
34-6
10-5
327
8-8
35'5
8-5
36-0
no
41-0
147
43'3
15-0
44'6
14-0
39'3
40-0
The guide to expansion is the expenditure on new ships.
It will be noted that between the years 1905 and 1909,
British expenditure on the Navy showed an aggregate decline
(compared with 1904) of roughly 31,000,000, and in the same
period German expenditure increased by over 23,000,000.
This was Germany's response to the British Government's
challenge to naval economy.
If the German Navy were organised on the basis of voluntary
service, and if the German Estimates included all the items
comprised in the British Estimates, they would be about nine
millions higher than they are. Therefore the comparable totals
in 1912 are really : Germany, 31,000,000 ; Great Britain,
44,600,000.
CHAPTER I
THE NEW GERMAN NAVY ACT.
BY her new Naval Law Amendment Act,
Germany is directly, definitely, and delib-
erately challenging our traditional claim
to possess such a fleet as will ensure our
naval supremacy afloat as a counterpoise to our
military weakness ashore.* We are an island people,
the builders and guardians of an Empire linked
together by the seas. To us sea power is a necessity
because by the sea we live, move, and have our
being ; to the Germans, supreme as a military nation,
and possessing no comparable Imperial responsi-
bilities, sea power is a luxury, as the first thirty
years' history of the German Empire attests.
The truth is that, while to us naval strength is an
end in itself a natural expression of our one es-
sential need to Germany it is merely a means to
an end, and that end if the Pan-Germans may be
believed is the destruction of the British Empire,
the disruption of the French Republic, and the
domination of the world.
Let there be no mistake Germany aims high ;
the stakes for which she is competing are the greatest
* A section of powerful politicians and vested interests, with
the support of the Emperor and the Marine Amt, under Grand-
Admiral von Tirpitz, have obtained control of the Government
and the most influential newspapers, and dominate German
policy.
B
2 THE COMMAND OF THE SEA
any nation has sought to obtain since Napoleon strode
the Continent. At a colossal cost heavy taxation
on luxuries and necessities alike and heavy debt*
she is pressing forward in this race in armaments,
confident that she is now entering on the last lap.
She has mortgaged so much in the contest that
either she must achieve victory abroad or meet the
storm of strife which her policy has and is still
creating at home. The ruling Germans realise that
this is the last lap in the race the crucial test of
endurance ; either we or they must fail in the silent,
bloodless war, and fail soon.
Can it be said that the British people have any
conception of the peril which threatens them of the
fact that within four hundred miles of these shores
a fleet is about to be placed on a war-footing
momentarily ready to strike greater than the
strongest fleet which we have maintained in the
past ; we with our prestige, our sea traditions, and,
above all, our sea needs ? We have never had in
home waters such a powerful, ever-menacing engine
of war as Germany proposes to set up within about
a day's steaming of the mouth of the Thames.
This is the new situation, and a Sabbath calm
reigns over the United Kingdom as though the
millennium had dawned, as though the Krupp
works, with their thousands of workmen, were busy
fashioning swords into ploughshares and gun-turrets
into bathing-machines, as though the great ship-
building yards of Germany were engaged in building
* Germany has created debt amounting to nearly ^38,000,000
for the Navy since 1900.
THE NEW GERMAN NAVY ACT 3
racing yachts, and as though the officers and men
in the German ships of war in the North Sea were
peaceful fishermen plying their craft in patient,
honest, harmless industry.
There is still a belief in England that ships are
synonymous with sea power, and that as we have
the ships therefore there is no danger. This is an
error of nations in the nursery age of civilisation. It is
the mistake which the Russians made, and for which
they paid. The Germans have got beyond this
stage. They know that ships must have crews,
coal, ammunition, and stores ; that they must be
always under training if the highest standard of war
efficiency is to be obtained. We have hitherto
been content to keep about half our fleet on a war
footing that is, fully manned and until recently
the remainder lay more or less neglected in the
dockyards, so sure were we that we should have
warning before war, and that then the final pre-
parations could be completed. The Germans are
setting up a new standard of efficiency ; a standing
fleet in the North Sea and Baltic one for strategical
purposes is being quietly and silently created,
greater even than the standing fleet we have main-
tained in our home waters in the past.
It is apparent that the significance of the action
which is about to be taken by the naval authorities
in Germany, now that the Reichstag's formal approval
has been received, is not understood in this country.
It is generally assumed that the German proposals
will merely entail upon this country the construc-
tion of two or three additional Dreadnoughts, a
4 THE COMMAND OF THE SEA
couple of small cruisers, and some more submarines
in the next six years. This is an entire misappre-
hension a delusion dangerous in the extreme.
The German scheme does involve some increase
in naval construction, particularly in the matter
of submarines ; but the provisions of the new
Bill which are of real importance, and which
will cast a heavy shadow over the British Navy
Estimates during the next six or seven years, are
those which aim at a higher standard of fleet effi-
ciency in the North Sea than any Power in its wildest
dreams has ever attempted to achieve. Now that
the new German Navy Bill has passed, the British
people must face an alarming and permanent growth
in naval expenditure in order that the necessary
measures may be taken to protect British interests
in face of this renewed challenge not merely in
ships inanimate skeletons but in actual naval
power ships manned and trained to the highest
pitch of efficiency and stationed within four hundred
miles of our shores.
The essential point to be borne in mind is that
whereas in the past the increased charges borne by
the British taxpayers have been mainly confined to
the building of new ships, which we buy in the
cheapest market, the burden which will have to be
borne in future years will consist largely of the out-
lay entailed by the necessity of keeping a larger
portion of our fleet upon a war footing and instantly
ready for any eventualities. This will involve not
only a great increase in the personnel in the number
of officers and men, whom we buy in the dearest
THE NEW GERMAN NAVY ACT 5
market owing to our voluntary system but will
also necessitate heavy additional expenditure upon
coal, ammunition, and stores, an expenditure which
will raise the Navy Estimates in the next few years
to a figure unprecedented in our experience.
I. GERMANY'S EXPANSIVE LAW.
In order to apprehend the gravity of the naval
crisis which lies ahead, it is necessary to recall the
steps by which Germany has succeeded in attaining
her present position of naval predominance among
the Continental Powers without a corresponding
appreciation in other countries and particularly
in the United Kingdom of the cumulative effect of
her acts. British methods of government are so
haphazard, illogical and unscientific so uncrafty,
so simple, so straightforward that the people
of the British Empire cannot understand what is
usually described as the logical and methodical
system of the Germans. What proportion of
the British people, for instance, realises that
under " the fixed and immutable law," to which
Germans point with pride as an indication of their
superiority to the transient policies of other countries,
the establishment of seventeen battleships fixed by
statute in 1898 has grown to an establishment of
fifty-eight battleships, and that even this establish-
ment is now about to be raised to sixty-one ? all in
accordance with a fixed and immutable law which,
as Germans boast, and with reason from their point
of view, is so much superior to the yearly programmes
of the British Admiralty. Every year the British
6 THE COMMAND OF THE SEA
authorities bring forward a shipbuilding programme,
which is examined and discussed in every country ;
if it represents increased activity, then Great Britain
is charged with nursing some sinister design, and
further shipbuilding for this or that fleet is urged
upon this or that Government ; if it represents less
activity, then it is a sign that Great Britain is
reaching the end of her resources in ships or men,
and it is urged that this is the opportunity of
striking the trident from Britannia's grasp.
How much better the " fixed and immutable law "
of Germany ! It is the custom to refer to the
Naval Law as though it was passed in 1870 and had
never been changed a moss-grown political in-
strument. The law represents, it is true, a notable
expression of policy, but it is expansive. The pro-
cedure is very simple. A Navy Law is passed, as,
for instance, the first of 1898, covering a number of
years, specifying the number of ships that shall be
laid down during the period and their general types,
but not tying the hands of the naval authorities as
to the characteristics of those ships. Under the law
an old vessel with armour on her sides carrying a few
weak guns, such as the ships of the Hagen type, is
called " a battleship," even though she displaces
only 4,000 tons, and the same description covers a
new vessel of 25,000 tons with ten 1 2-inch guns.
And under the law the latter displaces the former ;
and of course there is no deception : it is all a matter
of degree. Similarly a battleship of 27,000 tons,
with eight 1 2-inch guns and a speed of about 28
knots, though she is far more heavily armoured than
THE NEW GERMAN NAVY ACT 7
the Hagen class, is not a battleship, but a cruiser
an armoured cruiser. It is apparent that a law of
this kind affords an excellent means of hoodwinking
others. It is discussed abroad in the light of
the official explanations made at the time of its
introduction, and it is carried into effect in the light
of official explanations which are never made in
public. Obsolete ships, must, of course, be replaced
by modern vessels, but, in Germany, for a ship
of 4,000 tons is substituted a Dreadnought of
25,000 tons and 22 knots a battleship ; a cruiser
of negligible value has her place taken in the fleet
by a Dreadnought of 28 knots a battle cruiser ;
and thus a vast fleet is created behind the con-
venient screen of an innocent-looking Naval Law.
It is all so methodical in appearance, and yet so
haphazard and opportunist in execution, that it lulls
suspicion abroad, while it tickles and amuses those
of the population at home who understand the
game and appreciate the stakes.
If it is suggested to an instructed German that his
nation is forcing the pace in naval construction, he
assumes a hurt expression and asks how that can be
when Germany has her fixed standard laid down by
statute, which all the world may read. He does
not add that the Navy Law is merely an expanding
standard of measurement, like a tape measure made
of rubber, on which the nomenclature of ships is ever
changing, so that a cruiser to-day becomes a battleship
to-morrow, and a gunboat is transformed into a
Dreadnought of vast powers of offence and defence.
He does not explain that even the finance is method-
8 THE COMMAND OF THE SEA
ically unmethodical, that some of the outlay is met
out of revenue and some by loans, and that the
cost of the fleet's backdoor the Kiel Canal and
the outlay on the pensions of officers and men and
other services are not borne on the Navy Votes, but
are to be found among the civil expenditure. Man
never invented a more remarkable law than that of
Germany, which nominally regulates her naval
expansion and in accordance with which the standard
of strength is seventeen battleships in 1898, while
the same naval standard is sixty-one battleships in
the present year. It is a conjuring trick in the
political field which must win admiration.
This movement in Germany can best be appreciated
perhaps by recalling step by step the naval legislation
which has been adoped by the Reichstag in the past
fourteen years. The first Navy Act, passed in 1898,
made provision for an establishment of only seven-
teen battleships. Since at that moment Germany
had built and building men-of-war, small in number
and of negligible power in contrast with the con-
temporary ships of the great naval Powers, this
seemed a great development in strength, but no
such a development as to occasion any uneasiness
in other countries. The Act was to have run for
six years : it was superseded in two years by
another measure which was to have run for seven-
teen years, but which was amended in six years,
again amended in two years, and has again been
amended this year. This is what is called the fixed
and immutable naval law of Germany.
But that is not all. The significance of all these
THE NEW GERMAN NAVY ACT 9
various changes in the German programmes can be
appreciated only if we summarise the establishment
fixed under the successive measures. In briefest
detail, the upward movement has been as follows :
ACT. ESTABLISHMENT OF SHIPS ADOPTED.
Battleships. Armoured Cruisers.
1898 .. .. 17 .. .. 8
1900 .. .. 38 .. .. 14
1906 . . . . 38 . . . . 20
DREADNOUGHTS.
1908 58
1912 61*
Germany proposes to set up a naval establishment
which will comprise no fewer than sixty-one battle-
ships less than twenty years old. This is a larger
establishment than the British Navy has ever had
in the past, and exceeds the establishment of any
other two European navies.
The stages by which this new standard has been
reached have been planned with such apparent
ingenuousness that even to-day the significance of
the movement is not appreciated by some of the
closest observers of German politics. An illustration
of this was afforded by the Spectator of March 30th,
1912, in which an interesting article signed " R. C. L.,"
and evidently from the pen of Mr. R. C. Long,
appeared upon " Political Education in Germany."
The writer reviewed in brief terms the remarkable
* The newest German battleship of 1898 was a ship of 10,614
tons, with four 9*4 in. guns, and a speed of 17 or 18 knots ; the
battleship of 1912 is a vessel of from 25,000 to 27,000 tons, with
eight or ten 12 in. guns, and a speed of 21 to 28 knots.
io THE COMMAND OF THE SEA
literature which had recently been published in
Germany in support of the new Navy Bill, which
we are so repeatedly assured is not aimed at England.
He remarked :
Anyone who wants to see what Germans think, or
what the armaments specialists hypnotise Germans into
thinking, could do no better than order a bookseller to
send him everything which appears on Anglo-German
relations during a given month. He would be surprised
at the amount and at the uniformly " educative " note.
The writer, without making any special search, and no
doubt missing many, came across the following publi-
cations, all issued at the time of, or within a month of
Lord Haldane's visit :
England's Weltherrschaft und die deutsche Luxusflotte,
von " Look Out."
Deutschland sei Wach ! (published by the Navy League):
Die Kriegsbereitschaft der englischen Flotte im Jahre
1911, von Alexander Graf von Gersdorff.
John Bull und Wir, von Dr. H. Heiderich.
1st England kriegslustig ? von Ludwig Schreiner.
Krieg oder Frieden mil England, von Dr. Georg Hart-
mann.
England und Wir, von Dr. Paul Nathan.
Deutschland und der Islam, von Davis Trietsch.
Das Perfide Albion, von Principus Obsta.
England und Deutschland (an album of articles by
Baron von Mackay, Rear- Admiral Stiege, " A Sea
Officer," Prof. Dietrich Schaefer, Prof. Adolph
Wagner, and others).
That is the output of " educative " literature of a mere
four or five weeks. The only qualifications are that
Deutschland und der Islam is not specially anti-English,
and preaches only incidentally that a German-Ottoman
THE NEW GERMAN NAVY ACT u
Alliance would make untenable England's world-position,
and that England und Wir is by a professed Anglophile
(a collaborator of the late Anglophile Dr. Earth), who
exposes England's offences more in sorrow than in anger.
But the general tendency of these works of education
is the same. It is that Great Britain is determined to
destroy Germany ; that the way to meet the peril is to
arm more strongly on sea and on land ; and that the
German public must be impressed with the peril, and
must call for a patriotic policy should the Government
fail in its patriotic duty.
The writer dealt specifically with the pamphlet
by " Look Out." Commenting upon this publica-
tion, he said :
The pamphlet by " Look Out " is interesting for the
data which it marshals against the belief that active
ship-building does not improve Germany's position
relatively towards England. " Look Out " is sure of
the contrary. He calculates that in 1898 the German
navy stood to the British in the relation I : 6.3 ; that in
1900 the disparity was only I : 4.8 ; in 1904, i : 3.5 ;
in 1906, i : 2.9 ; in 1911, i : 2.5 ; and in 1912, i : 2.1 ;
so that from being six times the stronger Great Britain
is now only twice as strong (The figures on which this
is based indicate official information. The Service papers
say that " Look Out " is a distinguished admiral.)
And " Look Out " is sure that, despite British assurances,
the two to one standard is doomed. He foresees a time
when Germany will possess sixty Dreadnoughts (thirty-
eight only are provided by present legislation), and
predicts that when that stage is reached England will
not have either men or money to maintain the necessary
120.
These quotations are of interest as a reminder of
12 THE COMMAND OF THE SEA
the widespread propaganda against England which
is now being carried on throughout the German
Empire, but they also offer an opportunity of
correcting the error of so well-informed a writer as
Mr. Long. Even he still believes that " thirty-eight
(Dreadnoughts) only are provided by present
legislation." The fact is that the German signing
himself " Look Out " is strictly accurate. Under
the new Naval Act a standard of fifty-eight Dread-
noughts is set up ; in the next six years it is pro-
posed to build and complete two additional ships,
raising the standard to sixty ; and legislative
authority has been given for the provision of an
additional Dreadnought while postponing its con-
struction until a later period. Owing to the methods
adopted by the German naval authorities, a failure
to appreciate the significance of their act is readily
excusable. The story which lies behind this estab-
lishment of sixty-one battleships can be summarised
in a few words :
Between 1897 and 1904 Great Britain laid down
twenty-seven battleships and thirty-eight ar-
moured cruisers, a total of sixty-two armoured
ships in eight years, or an average of 7.75 ships a
year.
In this period Germany built sixteen battle-
ships and five armoured cruisers, or twenty-one
armoured ships, equal to an average of 2.62 ships
a year.
In 1905 the Admiralty determined to cease
building armoured cruisers. In that year we
laid down four " capital ships " all of them
THE NEW GERMAN NAVY ACT 13
Dreadnoughts in the next two years three
annually, and 1908 two ships only.
This was Germany's opportunity. While we
abandoned the building of armoured cruisers,
she decided to accelerate her battleship construc-
tion, and she also decided that all the armoured
cruisers specified in her law should be Dreadnoughts,
and thus from thirty-eight battleships and twenty
armoured cruisers she rose to an establishment
of fifty-eight battleships, and now this is about
to be increased to sixty-one.
The British people do not yet understand the
working of this " fixed and immutable " naval law,
which changes repeatedly, and always at a time
when our Government is working for Anglo-German
friendship. During the past twelve months or so,
while organisations in the United Kingdom have
been preaching amity with Germany, more power-
ful organisations in the German Empire have been
preaching enmity to England in order " to get up
steam " for the new Defence Bills.
If the two keels to one standard is to be adopted
in this country we must build up to an establishment
of 122 Dreadnoughts, and on the standard set up by
the Admiralty, as announced already by Mr.
Churchill, we must be prepared to adopt an establish-
ment of 103 in Dreadnoughts and a higher standard
in cruisers and torpedo craft.
The First Lord of the Admiralty has announced
how the new emergency will be met. In introducing
the Estimates to the House of Commons on March
i8th, 1912, Mr. Churchill said :
H THE COMMAND OF THE SEA
The time has come for us to readjust our standard
in closer accord with actual facts and probable contin-
gencies. The actual standard of new construction
which the Admiralty has in fact followed during recent
years has been to develop a 60 per cent, superiority in
vessels of the Dreadnought type over the German Navy
on the basis of the existing fleet law. ... If Germany
were to adhere to her existing law we believe that that
standard would, in the absence of any unexpected
developments in other countries, continue to be a con-
venient guide for the next four or five years, so far as
this capital class of vessel is concerned. I must not,
however, be taken as agreeing that the ratio of 16 to 10
could be regarded as a sufficient preponderance for
British naval strength as a whole above that of the
next strongest naval Power.
Mr. Churchill then went on to explain how he
proposed to apply the new standard contemplated
in place of the Two Power Standard. He said :
Applying the standard I have outlined to the House
that is to say, two ships a year for the next six years
because that is what the law prescribes applying this
standard of 60 per cent, to the existing German Navy
Law, and guarding ourselves very carefully against
developments in other countries which cannot now
be foreseen, it would appear to be necessary to construct
for the next six years four ships and three ships al-
ternately, beginning this year with four. That is the
least which will maintain it is a little above the 60
per cent, standard, it is really over 17 ships to 10 but
that is the least that will maintain the 60 per cent,
standard. That is what we had in our minds when we
framed the Estimates now presented to the House of
Commons.
THE NEW GERMAN NAVY ACT 15
If we are now, as it would seem to be, and I fear
it is certain, if we are now to be confronted with
an addition of two ships to the German construction
in the next six years two Dreadnoughts two ships
spread over the six years, we should propose to meet
that addition on a higher ratio of superiority (Opposition
cheers) by laying down four ships in the same period,
spreading them, however, conveniently over the six
years so as to secure the greatest evenness in our finances.
If we are confronted with three ships additional we should
lay down six over those years, and the forecast of new
construction which I now make under all reserve would
become four, beginning with this year four, five ;
four, four ; four, four ; as against the German con-
struction of two, three ; two, two ; and three, two.
Alternatively, if three were laid down by Germany in
the six years our construction would become five, four ;
five, four; and five, four, an alternation of fives and
fours, as against the German alternation of threes and
twos.
Even if the country adheres to the comparatively
modest margin of safety which commends itself to
Mr. Churchill and his colleagues of the Admiralty,
the burden which will be cast upon the country will
become extremely onerous, since we must be pre-
pared to lay down in the next six years twenty-five
or twenty-seven * large armoured ships, each costing
two millions, thus spending upon these vessels
alone, apart from cruisers and torpedo craft, a matter
* The exact number depends upon whether Germany lays
down two or three Dreadnoughts in the next six years above
the provision of the former Navy Law. The New Law specifi-
cally provides only for two of the ships, while including 3 in the
establishment.
1 6 THE COMMAND OF THE SEA
of fifty to fifty-four millions sterling. Unfortunately,
the main increase in German activity is to be in
submarines. These craft cost about 80,000 each.
Germany intends to create flotillas in the North Sea
and the Baltic, which for all strategical purposes
will in the course of a year or two be one, numbering
upwards of seventy craft. This means that during
the next six years the British authorities will be
compelled to build a far greater number of these
under-water vessels, while at the same time con-
tinuing to lay down each year not less than twenty
torpedo boat destroyers, a batch of cruisers to
act as scouts for the battle fleet and commerce
protectors, and a large number of auxiliary ships.
Unhappily, this recital of the prospective expendi-
ture upon new construction is less than half the
story that must be told, and the less serious. The
importance, and the significance, and the threatening
character of the new Navy Bill lie in those clauses
which foreshadow an increase in the standing German
Fleet by fifty per cent, with a growth in the German
personnel from its present figure of about 65,000 to
approximately 80,000 officers and men. This will
hit us hard and cost us heavily, as the Germans know.
Down to a comparatively recent period the British
Fleet was organised on the most economical lines.
Until 1902 a comparatively small force of armoured
ships was kept in full sea-going commission, and the
remainder were in the Fleet or Dockyard Reserve,
unmanned and capable of being dispatched to sea
only after an interval devoted to overhaul and
repairs. It was calculated that there would be a
THE NEW GERMAN NAVY ACT 17
period of several weeks between strained relations
and war, and that during that time a Royal pro-
clamation would place a large number of reservists
at the disposal of the naval authorities, and thus in
ample time for war, if war proved inevitable, the
whole effective Navy would be placed upon a war
footing. Germany rendered this organisation ob-
solete and dangerous, and Lord Fisher was the first
among British naval officers to recognise this.
II. THE FLEET RE-ORGANISATION OF 1905.
It was Mr. Winston Churchill's good fortune to
go to the Admiralty when the foundations of a new
Navy had been laid by successive Boards of Ad-
miralty under the inspiring genius of Lord Fisher
of Kilverstone. When this officer became First
Sea Lord in the autumn of 1904, he at once began
to set the Navy in order, so that it might respond
to the new conditions created by the development of
the German Fleet. Until then the naval defence
scheme of the Empire had been pivoted on the
Mediterranean. In the North Sea hardly a warship
had been seen ; while quite a secondary force was
maintained in the English Channel. The balance of
power had to undergo a complete reversal. The
naval power of this country had to be shifted so as to
coincide with the altered political and naval situation.
British predominance in the Mediterranean was not
abandoned, but plans were prepared so that British
influence in future should be more in evidence
in the North Sea and English Channel than it had
been in the past.
c
1 8 THE COMMAND OF THE SEA
In the spring of 1905 the traditional organisation
of the British squadrons was abandoned in order to
meet a new political situation. The changes had
one end in view the provision of an immense
striking force ready for instant use. The plans of
the Admiralty comprised :
(1) The withdrawal from distant stations of all
non-fighting ships little cruisers, sloops, and
old gunboats vessels too weak to fight and too
slow to run away from any probable enemy.
(2) The reduction of the strength of certain distant
squadrons in view of altered political circum-
stances since the existing disposition of ships
was settled ; the North Pacific Squadron and
the South Atlantic Squadron being abolished
and the ships of the North American Squadron
becoming a particular service squadron, used in
peace time mainly for training cadets and boys.
(3) The provision at the home ports of an efficient
organisation to enable the ships on the War List
in the Reserve to proceed to sea prepared in all
respects for war immediately the Admiralty
issued its orders. The officers and men with-
drawn, as stated above, from distant squadrons
were utilised as nucleus crews in the Reserve ships.
(4) The reorganisation of the battle fleets in
European waters, so as to coincide with the
needs of the Empire in the face of the shifting
of naval power from southern to northern
waters.
An essential and dominating feature of this new
scheme of British naval defence was the recall
THE NEW GERMAN NAVY ACT 19
of weak ships in distant waters " death-traps "
they were styled the abandonment of certain
squadrons the importance of which had decreased,
and the " grouping " of the cruisers on foreign and
Colonial stations on war lines. The officers and men
set free by reduction in the number of small ships
abroad and by the substitution of merchant sailors
in some other non-fighting but essential ships an
army of ten or twelve thousand of all ranks were
utilised for further expanding the fighting forces at
the strategical centre of the Empire. They enabled
the Admiralty to make the best possible use of our
reserves ships in ordinary. In recent years im-
provements had been made in naval organisation,
but the difficulty had been to secure an adequate
number of officers and men to maintain those
men-of-war at the home ports when not actually
under repair in a condition for immediate sea service.
By the withdrawal of non-fighting ships from the seas
and a reorganisation of the coastguard service a
force then comprising nearly 4,000 highly trained
men this defect was remedied.
The idea was that officers and skilled men
gunners, torpedoists, engine-room hands, &c.
should be assigned in peace time to all vessels on the
" war list," and it was determined simultaneously
that no obsolete vessels should be on this list ; the
effective vessels constituted the ships in commission
with reduced crews. On an emergency the remainder
of the complements would be immediately supplied.
By these changes the force of the blow which the
British Navy could strike at once on the outbreak
20 THE COMMAND OF THE SEA
of war was doubled, if not trebled, and this
was effected not only without additional ex-
penditure, but with immediate and substantial
economies. " Concentrate " was the watchword of
the Admiralty.
It had been the business of politicians in the
past to utilise the years of peace in preparing
for the millennium, and on the outbreak of war to
rush into operations ill-prepared, and with wasteful
outpourings of the national resources. Almost all
British wars have begun with disaster. The Ad-
miralty in 1905 and in subsequent years of further
development outraged British traditions of defence
by preparing, without a " by-your-leave " to Parlia-
ment, to meet a danger of which only the first
shadowy outlines had been observed by the public :
they locked the stable-door before the thief appeared,
instead of waiting for the thief to do his work and
then in hurried confusion set out to punish him.
In the whole story of British defence, since Great
Britain became a democratic country, the action of
the Admiralty was without parallel. It had come
to be recognised as an almost essential principle that
the British nation should not prepare for the probable
contingency of war for fear the action might hurt
some one's susceptibilities ; the Navy and Army,
in all their unpreparedness, should remain unready,
hold their breath, in fact, so as not to reveal their
existence ; then, if war should occur well, it could
be said that at least the British had not provoked it
and, after all, we usually " muddle through."
In most naval engagements we have " muddled
THE NEW GERMAN NAVY ACT 21
through " because we have had the " biggest
battalions " have eventually secured superior
power to throw at the enemy. That day had come
to an end even when Lord Fisher went to the
Admiralty. We were no longer one of two naval
Powers of the first class, as was the case even as
lately as twenty years before, but the British Fleet
was one of seven great fleets. Rivals had arisen,
and to hold what we had it was essential that we
should organise to defend it. This the Admiralty did.
There was no solid foundation for the reiterated
statement at that time that Germany sought to
embroil herself in war with this country nothing
more than a widespread suspicion but her naval
policy had given every excuse for such measures of
precaution as the Admiralty took. There was a
case for preparation not in view of the prospect of
probable hostilities in the near future, but because
the German Fleet was being increased so swiftly as
to excuse, at any rate, the belief that it might be
used as a political instrument or might serve in case
of our complication with some other country or
countries as tongs wherewith to pull chestnuts out
of the fire for the benefit of Germany. A neutral
Power can use a fleet with good effect without
striking a blow against a nation weakened by war,
even though that nation be victorious, as was Japan
in 1895. It is possible to imagine circumstances in
which the silent pressure of a strong German Navy
could compel concessions ; it might be merely
consent to some line of action, such as the assertion
of undue influence over a neutral neighbour, the
22 THE COMMAND OF THE SEA
seizure of a coaling-station here or there, or the
shifting of some boundary. A nation well armed,
as it was even then realised by the Admiralty that
Germany would be, might effect its purpose without
firing a gun or running a single torpedo. The
preparations of the British Admiralty indicated not
a shadow of animosity for the German nation. It
was admitted that Germany had a right in view of
her growing mercantile marine to a more considerable
Fleet than she had possessed in the past, but the fact
that this Fleet was increasing out of all proportion
to the extent of the Empire's merchant shipping,
its oversea trade, and its colonial possessions
expensive luxuries enough alreadydid compel
other Powers to take precautionary measures while
at the same time remaining on friendly terms.
British statesmen could not overlook the fact that
in the preamble to the Navy Act of 1900 it was
stated that " Germany must have a Fleet of such
strength that a war, even against the mightiest naval
Power, would involve such risks as to threaten the
supremacy of that Power." Great Britain as " the
mightiest naval Power," was interested in such an
assertion of policy. The Kaiser had also told the
world that Germany's " future lies on the sea," and
at another time claimed that he was " Admiral of
the Atlantic." These actions and words have been
responsible for the feelings entertained by many Eng-
lishmen. We did not ignore the growth of the French
Navy in the late 'eighties, and one reason why we
are good friends with the French Government to-day
is that we showed that we had backbone and that
THE NEW GERMAN NAVY ACT 23
we realised our inheritance and the duty that it cast
upon us that we were not, in fact, one of the late
Lord Salisbury's "waning nations." Again we were
faced in 1905 by naval aggrandisement by a neighbour,
and again the Admiralty took the necessary steps,
not with a view to war, but to safeguard our position.
From 1905, when the reform movement began,
down to the date of Lord Fisher's retirement, the
work of reorganising the whole naval administration
ashore and afloat was continued with restless energy,
with the support of Mr. Balfour, both when in office
and afterwards when in opposition. In the light of
the new naval crisis created by Germany's renewed
naval competition, it is not inappropriate to recall
Mr. Balfour's estimate of one phase of the naval
reform movement. Speaking at Glasgow on January
I2th, 1905, he said:
I do not think that as yet public opinion has thoroughly
realised either the magnitude or the importance of the
change which Lord Selborne and his Board of Admiralty
have recently effected in the constitution and arrange-
ments of the British Fleet. At first sight, perhaps, a
critic looking over the figures might say, " What has
this Government been doing ? " They have abolished
130 vessels my figures are not exact, I speak from
memory 130 vessels no longer figure upon the list of
the British Navy. They have in so doing made an
economy. They have not weakened the Navy in the
process for the mere sake of saving so many hundreds
of thousands or millions a year, for they have not sacri-
ficed the strength of the force on which the very being
of this country depends. (A Voice : " Good riddance
to bad rubbish.") That brief interruption puts even
24 THE COMMAND OF THE SEA
more concisely and pithily than I can do one of the
aspects, but only one of the aspects, of the great reform.
It is not merely that the Board of Admiralty have
laid down the rule that a ship, however useful in time of
peace and we have to do, it must be admitted, a great
deal of small police work in a time of peace, for diplomatic
or other purposes is not only useless, but worse than
useless, in time of war if it possesses neither fighting
power nor speed. It is merely a ship which exists to
embarrass British admirals and to discredit the British
flag. Well, with one courageous stroke of the pen, as
it were, these ships have been removed. The cost of
their maintenance, the cost of their repairs I won't
give you the figure to which it comes, it is a very big one
are all struck off the annual estimates.
But we have done, or I ought to say, the Board of
Admiralty have done, something much more than that.
They have distributed the fighting ships of the Fleet in
the best strategic manner to deal with any emergency at
a moment's notice, and they have done something much
more than that. They have so arranged matters that
the ships in reserve are not ships, as it were, laid up
waiting for a crew, which neither know the ship, nor its
machinery, nor its guns, nor the individual peculiarities
which make a ship and a machine so like a living and
organised being.
The Board of Admiralty have realised that there is this
wide difference between an army and a navy So far as
we, at least, are concerned in this country, it is impossible
that, either in India or on these shores, the Army should
be required at twenty-four hours' notice to come into
hostile contact with any opposing force. But we have
only got to throw our minds back to the first days of the
Russo-Japanese War to see how short is the time which
intervenes between strained relations and declaration of
THE NEW GERMAN NAVY ACT 25
war, and a maritime conflict on which the fate of nations
may depend.
The Board of Admiralty have, therefore, started this
new principle. On every one of the fighting ships of
his Majesty which is not part of the sea-going fleets
they have put a nucleus crew, and the nucleus crew
consists of everything required to manage a ship, and to
fight a ship, excepting only what may be described as
the unskilled maritime labour required for the purpose.
These nucleus crews take out their ship. They practise
the guns of their ship ; they are not liable to those
inevitable breakdowns which people changing to new
machinery for the first time always experience. They
have over them an admiral, whose specific duty it is to
see that these ships manned only, I admit, by nucleus
crews are ready at a moment's notice to fight, and the
result is and they could fight, I believe, without any
addition to them that officers, stokers, and gunners,
all the skilled members of the crew, are there, and they
could work the ship as it is, and they have to practise
the ship as it is.
The result of all these changes taken together is that
I believe the fighting power of the British Fleet during
the first twenty-four hours, let us say, of hostilities with
a foreign Power have been augmented, not once nor
twice, but threefold. I think myself that a great
performance. I do not think its magnitude has been yet
fully realised by the public, but as time goes on I think
they will feel that of all the reforms that have taken
place since the time of Nelson this is perhaps the biggest
that has yet been made.
There is no statesman of our time who possesses
Mr. Balfour's genius for exposition of policy, and
this statement of his gave the public the first picture
26 THE COMMAND OF THE SEA
of the immense task which the Admiralty began in
1905 and which successive Boards, with Lord Fisher
still as First Sea Lord, continued.
In the first speech which he delivered after his
appointment as First Lord, Mr. Winston Churchill,
faced by a new crisis, hastened to pay his tribute to
the work of the man who had laid the foundations
upon which he was to build. " The service and the
country," he remarked, at the Lord Mayor's Banquet
on November 9th, 1911, " owe ... a deep and lasting
debt of gratitude to Lord Fisher of Kilverstone, the
ablest naval administrator which this country has
known, and now that the controversies which real
reforms, and the animosities which a forceful per-
sonality often create, are passing away, we are
beginning to enjoy the results of his great work
without the friction which, perhaps inevitably, was
attendant upon its inception."
In this way the foundations were laid of a re-
organised scheme of defence and our supremacy was
for the time saved. Thus the fighting strength of
the Navy in home waters was at least doubled.
This increase was effected at practically no cost to
the country owing to the large economies which were
simultaneously effected by the recall of non-fighting
ships and by other reforms.
III. GERMANY'S LAST CHALLENGE AND THE REPLY.
During these years of British naval reorganisation
the progressive increase in the standing fleet of
Germany attracted little or no attention outside the
Admiralty. When the German Navy Act of 1900
THE NEW GERMAN NAVY ACT 27
was passed, the German Admiralty maintained in
commission four first-class, two second-class, and
two third-class battleships, a total of eight only.
In 1905, on the eve of the passage of the amending
Navy Act, the standing fleet of Germany consisted
of ten battleships, ranging in displacement from
11,130 tons to 13,000 tons, half of them mounting
nothing bigger than 94-inch guns, and half carrying
n-inch weapons. Associated with this battle fleet
were two armoured cruisers of about 9,000 tons,
six small cruisers, two tenders, and twenty torpedo
boats. According to the latest issue of the Taschen-
buch der Kriegsflotten, prepared in December last,
the active section of the German Fleet is now
organised as follows :
HIGH SEA FLEET
Fleet Flagship : " Deutschland."
FIRST BATTLE SQUADRON.
BATTLESHIPS : " Ostfriesland," * " Thuringen," *
"Helgoland,"* " Elsass," "Nassau,"* " Rheinland."*
"Posen,"* " Westfalen." * Tender " Blitz," Tender
" Hela."
SECOND BATTLE SQUADRON.
BATTLESHIPS : " Preussen," " Schleswig-Holstein,"
" Pommern," " Hannover," " Hessen," " Schlesien,"
" Lothringen," " Braunschweig." Tender " Pfeil."
SCOUTING SHIPS.
First Group of Scouts : Armoured Cruisers " Von
der Tann," * ; " Moltke " * Protected Cruisers :
"Mainz"; "Dresden"; " Kolberg."
* These ships are Dreadnoughts, and by 1915 Germany will
have twenty-three Dreadnoughts completed and in commission.
28 THE COMMAND OF THE SEA
Second Group of Scouts. Armoured Ciuiser " Yorck."
Protected Cruisers, " Coin/' " Stettin/'
While the standing Fleet of Germany has thus
been increased, the newer and most powerful ships
have been moved from the Baltic into the North
Sea, and there has been a great development of the
torpedo and submarine flotillas in the North Sea.
At present the forces in both the seas named
can be concentrated only with difficulty and delay,
but as soon as the enlargement of the Kiel Canal is
finished the two squadrons will be capable of being
as easily, rapidly, and secretly concentrated in the
North Sea as the divisions of the British Fleet
which are normally based on Portsmouth and
Devonport can effect a meeting.
Having already made this stupendous step in the
development of her standing fleet, Germany is about
to go one step further. By increasing the personnel
to 80,000 she intends to place upon a war footing,
always instantly ready, a Third Squadron consisting
of eight battleships, two battle-cruisers in other
words, swift Dreadnoughts and six small cruisers
as reconnaissance ships. When the new scheme is
completed the German Empire will have always in
full commission twenty-five battleships of the
slower Dreadnought type, eight battleships of the
swifter Invincible type, together with eighteen
protected cruisers. Behind this Active Fleet will
be a Reserve of sixteen battleships, four battle (or
armoured) cruisers, and twelve small cruisers, with
nucleus crews. Thus on a war footing the German
Navy in home waters will include :
THE NEW GERMAN NAVY ACT 29
i Fleet flagship.
5 squadrons of 8 battleships each.
12 battle (or armoured) cruisers.
30 smaller cruisers, besides 144 torpedo boat
destroyers and 72 submarines.
The scheme is even more significant than these
figures suggest. In the past, owing to the necessary
arrangements under the three years' conscription
law, about one-third of the crews in the ships of
the standing fleet have gone ashore each autumn on
their return to civil life, and their places have been
taken by raw recruits.* Thus the German Fleet from
October to May has been practically demobilised.
The British naval authorities could always count on
this period of safety and comparative rest. Under
the new Naval Bill this difficulty in organisation is
to be removed. It is proposed to provide such a
surplus of naval personnel as will enable the First
and Second Squadrons to be maintained, winter and
summer alike, upon a footing of instant readiness for
war. Presumably the Third Squadron will be on the
same status as the High Sea Fleet at present ; in
other words, it will apparently be utilised for the
early training of recruits, and will thus be less effi-
cient during the winter months, but will gradually
increase in efficiency from May to October, and
during the summer months Germany will have all
her most effective ships instantly ready for any
eventuality.
This development of the standing German Fleet
in the North Sea and Baltic is the real menace of
Germany to our naval supremacy, and Pan-Germans
* Cf. Text of Naval Law Amendment Act , 1912.
30 THE COMMAND OF THE SEA
make no secret of their belief that we shall be unable
to secure the necessary number of recruits. This
is an error. The Admiralty have no difficulty in
obtaining as many boys and men for training for the
Fleet as they require ; they are, indeed, in the happy
position of being able to pick and choose. In spite
of the increases during the past few years, it has
fortunately not been necessary even to lower the
educational and physical standards adopted when
the number of recruits required annually was far
smaller. There is no reason to anticipate that, in
spite of the activity of trade, any difficulty will be
found in obtaining whatever number of additional
men may be necessary for Fleet expansion. The
second point to which German naval enthusiasts
have attached importance is that the German naval
authorities buy their naval labour in the cheapest
market owing to conscription, while the British
Admiralty buys in the dearest market in Europe.
The Admiralty have calculated that the difference
in pay between the German and British Fleets now
amounts to about three millions sterling annually,
so cheap is the conscript, and, of course, as the
personnel increases so this disproportion will increase.
But the assurance may be accepted that even this
will prove no bar to the maintenance of British sea-
power. We may have ample confidence that when
the situation develops, we shall be able to provide
the ships, the men, and the money.
The Admiralty have already revealed their scheme
for organising the British Fleet on a higher standard
of efficiency so that it may be able at its average
THE NEW GERMAN NAVY ACT 31
moment to deal with any foreign fleet, and specific-
ally with the German Fleet, at its selected moment.
There must be a large increase of ships available in
British waters because Germany intends to keep in
home waters every one of her sixty-one Dread-
noughts except six which are for foreign service,*
thirty-two of her forty small cruisers, and all her
144 torpedo boats, and seventy-two submarines.
Seven years ago the Admiralty withdrew a number
of ships from distant waters in order to strengthen
the " home guard." In view of the new German
proposals a further concentration is now being
effected, and at the same time the number of
ships in full commission is being increased. The
Atlantic Fleet, raised in strength from six to
eight battleships, has been recalled from its base at
Gibraltar to home waters, and the battleships of the
Mediterranean Fleet, instead of making Malta their
headquarters, will in future be based upon Gibraltar,
and their number will be eight instead of six, and a
new cruiser squadron will be associated with them.
Seven years ago we brought home our battleships
from China, and now we are bringing our battleships
in the Mediterranean nearer the strategical centre.
It is a significant movement which cannot fail to
impress the people of the United Kingdom with the
serious view which the authorities take of the naval
situation, and it must surely occasion grave mis-
givings in distant parts of the Empire as to whether
* Four of these eventually to be Dreadnoughts will form a
"flying squadron," and may be in home waters at Geimany's
" selected moment.''
32 THE COMMAND OF THE SEA
the moment has not come when they should take a
hand in defending British interests by direct and
large contributions not in men, for we have a
surplus of population, but in ships and money.
Under the new scheme the British Fleet will be
organised as follows : *
FIRST FLEET.
With Full Crews.
Thirty-two Battleships and a Fleet Flagship.
First, Second, and Third Battle Squadrons with the
First, Second, and Third Cruiser Squadrons, the First,
Second, Third, and Fourth Destroyer Flotillas and
auxiliaries. Bases : Home Ports.
Fourth Battle Squadron (removed from Malta)
with the Fourth Cruiser Squadron to be subsequently
formed. (This last force will be held available to co-
operate in home waters or in the Mediterranean as
circumstances may dictate.) Base : Gibraltar.
* The First Lord of the Admiralty has explained that the
scheme will be gradually carried out as circumstances dictate,
and ships and men are available. For the present the Fourth
Squadron will consist of only four battleships, and the Sixth
Squadron is unformed. Upon the "King George V," " Cen-
turion,' 1 and " Ajax," joining the Second Battle Squadron during
the early part of 1913, the " Lord Nelson,'' "Agamemnon,'' and
*' Dreadnought," will transfer to the Fourth Squadron. These
with the " Albemarle, 1 ' will complete its strength. The arrival
in the Fleet of the "Audacious" in the autumn of 1913, and of
the " Iron Duke/' " Marlborough," " Benbow," and ' Delhi," in
1914-15, will move the five Duncans from the Fourth to the Sixth
Squadron. The ships of this year's programme will, when ready,
cause a movement of other vessels which will complete the Sixth
Squadron early in 1915. The Eighth Battle Squadron, which has
been re-inforced by the " Swiftsure " and " Triumph,'' is already
complete. In the spring of 1915, the first three battle squadrons
will consist exclusively of Dreadnoughts.
THE NEW GERMAN NAVY ACT 33
SECOND FLEET.
With Nucleus Crews.
Sixteen Battleships.
Fifth and Sixth Battle Squadrons with the Fifth and
Sixth Cruiser Squadrons and Torpedo Craft. (For
these ships the necessary officers and men to complete
their crews to full strength will be stationed at the local
training establishments, so that they can go on board
at a moment's notice. The Admiralty have announced
that the movements of this fleet will be so arranged that
one of its battle squadrons will always be present in its
home port, and consequently one will always be ready
to move as soon as steam can be raised.) Bases : Home
Ports.
THIRD FLEET.
With Reduced Nucleus Crews.
Sixteen Battleships.
Seventh and Eighth Battle Squadrons with the
Seventh, Eighth and three other Cruiser Squadrons and
Torpedo Craft. (The Eighth Squadron will be composed
of the oldest ships still of war value England's last hope.
In order that the Seventh Battle Squadron and the
Seventh Cruiser Squadron may be speedily raised to
full war strength, a special reserve to be called " The
Immediate Reserve " of ex-naval men is to be formed.)
Bases : Home Ports.
COASTAL DEFENCE.
A new officer, under the direct orders of the Admiralty,
called the Admiral of Patrols, has charge of the four
nucleus crew flotillas of torpedo boat destroyers and six
flotillas of submarines for duty on the coasts.
TRAINING SQUADRON.
Six Armoured Cruisers constitute the Training
Squadron.
34 THE COMMAND OF THE SEA
FOREIGN SERVICE SHIPS.
A Cruiser Squadron with a number of protected
cruisers, destroyers, and submarines will be based on
Malta, and the other foreign squadrons will be main-
tained.
This is the new scheme of naval organisation, and
it spells money vastly increased Estimates. In
summary it involves the following additions to our
present fully-manned force :
An additional battleship as flagship of the
Commander-in-Chief of the Home Fleets.
Two more battleships for the Atlantic Fleet,
which has been brought into home waters to join
the First Fleet of the Home Fleets.
Two more battleships, which are to be added
to the strength of six battleships hitherto in
the Mediterranean, which will in future be based
on Gibraltar, becoming the " Pivot Force."
A new cruiser squadron of armoured cruisers
which will be associated with the augmented
squadron of battleships at Gibraltar.
Besides these additions to the active fleets of the
British Navy in home waters :
The nucleus crew ships will be increased in
number as more modern vessels become available,
and these will form the Second and Third Fleets
of four battle squadrons, with associated cruiser
squadrons.
This expansion of the British naval forces will
THE NEW GERMAN NAVY ACT 35
mean thousands more men, thousands of tons more
coal, thousands of gallons more oil, more food, more
ammunition, and more general stores. It takes
five or six years to produce a trained man, and
therefore the additional men required five or six
years hence must be entered almost immediately ;
we must begin working up to a higher scale of effi-
ciency at once. Fortunately, it will be a gradual
expansion, but of its inevitability and of its cost
there is no doubt. Every naval charge must be
increased increased to an alarming extent.
In fullness of time this new scheme will give us
25 battleships fully commissioned, and 16 with
nucleus crews in home waters, vis-a-vis to exactly
the same number, in more or less the same condition
of manning, in the German Fleet.* We shall have,
in addition, 16 older battleships of the Third Fleet,
without fighting crews, and the Fourth Squadron of
the First Fleet, which, the First Lord has stated,
" will, from its strategic position at Gibraltar, be
able to give immediate assistance in home waters
or in the Mediterranean, should naval combinations
in that area render its presence necessary or useful."
In other words, we shall have in commissioned
ships, at our average moment, numerical equality
with Germany in Northern waters, and inferiority
to the Mediterranean Powers in Southern waters.
Within a short period of the outbreak of hostilities,
as the reserve force the Third Fleet is tuned up
to fighting strength, the Admiralty may be
in a position to send a considerable naval force
* Cf. Chapter II.
36 THE COMMAND OF THE SEA
into the Mediterranean again.* This is the
best that can be hoped for. So long as peace
lasts and our reserve resources are undeveloped
reserve resources which are, it is true, greater at
present than those of any other country in the world
the best ships of the Fleet must be maintained at the
strategical centre, and then, when war comes, if
come it must, the naval organisation can be re-
adjusted in the light of existing facts, and if
ships and men in sufficient numbers are available
a battle force can once more be based upon Malta.
The fact that this island is to remain the head-
quarters of a large force of cruisers carries with it
a guarantee that the efficiency of the dockyard will
be maintained. But let there be no mistake.
British prestige in the Mediterranean by the with-
drawal of the battleships from Malta to Gibraltar
is being lowered.
This in brief summary is the naval situation which
we have to face, and it will be admitted that the
Admiralty's scheme is modest in its scope com-
pared with Germany's plans. We must build more
armoured ships than it was intended to build ; a
batch of protected cruisers to take the place of older
ships which are now becoming obsolete must be
put in hand each year ; we must continue to lay
down a complete flotilla of destroyers annually,
and the output of submarines must be increased.
These are solid demonstrable facts. But the greatest
* At an outlay of about one and a half including an annuity
to replace the capital cost of the ships we could continue to
keep eight battleships based on Malta.
THE NEW GERMAN NAVY ACT 37
part of the burden which the new German Law will
cast upon us is due to the inevitable increase in the
number of officers and men, and all that they connote,
so as to augment the striking force vis-a-vis to the
striking force held always ready within four hundred
miles of our shores. We are on the eve of a real,
continuing, and cumulative naval crisis which will
test our character as a people, our finances as a
State, and our industrial resources as a manufac-
turing community.
'<H.'<'^.
5
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^rc/^z^.2-^ a
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statement nhown the numbers of Dreadnought*. in-
ought cruiser*. either built or building or authorised
ingdom and Germany, respectively, at the beginning
iving in the case of < ' eacn
down or date of giving out . < "'' >< ( .l.iir ol l.imi, K.
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CHAPTER II.
GERMANY'S FIVE NAVY ACTS.
Under the existing circumstances, in order to protect
Germany's sea trade and Colonies, there is only one
means, viz., Germany must have a fleet of such strength
that even for the mightiest Naval Power, a war with her
would involve such risks as to jeopardise its own
supremacy.
For this purpose it is not absolutely necessary that
the German Fleet should be as strong as that of the
greatest sea-power because, generally, a great Mem-power
will not be la m position to concentrate mil its forces
against us. But even if it should succeed in confronting
us in superior force, the enemy would be so considerably
weakened in overcoming the resistance of a strong
German fleet that, notwithstanding a victory gained, the
enemy's supremacy would not at first be secured any
longer by a sufficient fleet. Explanatory Note to Gtrman Navy
Act of 1900.
IN order to appreciate the significance of the
latest German Navy Law, it is necessary to
understand the basis upon which naval expan-
sion was begun in 1900 for the Act of 1898
was merely a preparatory measure and the stages
by which the naval establishment of the country
has been gradually raised until now it is far higher
than any country not excluding Great Britain
has aimed at in the past.
In the following pages official details are given
of the successive German Navy Laws, and it may
serve a useful purpose, as providing some basis of
comparison, if some details are given, in close asso-
ciation with a summary of the latest German Navy
40 THE COMMAND OF THE SEA
Act, of the naval standing of the German Empire
in 1898, when the expansion movement was
initiated.
The following statement of the naval strength of
the great Powers is based upon figures taken from
the Naval Pocket Book for 1898, and reveals the
number of ships of the various classes built, building
or ordered on February 1st of that year :
Armoured Coast Torpedo
Ship*.* CruiMT.t Defence.: Craft.}
Britain 88 154 60 313
France . . . . . . 60 74 24 288
Russia 39 29 27 188
Italy 30 23 212
Germany || . . . . 28 24 13 127
United States . . . . 21 38 13 29
Austria-Hungary . . . . 15 17 4 79
This is one picture. It reveals the German Fleet
of 1898 as a negligible quantity the smallest in
European waters. In contrast with this we have the
German Fleet of to-day.
From the Naval Annual for 1912 the following
* In the armoured ships are included all battleships, sea-
going coast defence vessels, and armoured cruisers.
f In the cruisers are included all cruisers, protected and
unprotected, and sloops.
Jin the coast defence vessels are included all non seagoing
coast defence vessels and larger armoured gunboats.
In the torpedo craft are included torpedo gunboats, torpedo
boat destroyers, and torpedo boats.
The German armoured ships included one medium battle-
ship of 1 1,000 tons, with four 9-4 in. guns, built, and two building,
together with four battleships of under 10,000 tons, six battle-
ships of 6,500 tons, and a number of old vessels of insignificant
fighting value. Most of the torpedo craft were small and
slow.
GERMAN NAVAL EXPANSION 41
statement of the present strength of the great fleets
is prepared :
BATTLESHIPS. CRUISERS.
Modern. Cruiser.*
1 Older.
Total.
ISt
nd
3rd
Total
Britain
Built
37
5
15
57
41
33
32
1 06
M
Building
10
5
15
9
2
II
Germany
Built
17
2
10
29
9
8
30
47
>
Building
IO
4
14
6
6
U. States
Built
22
9
31
15
3
14
32
>
Building
6
6
France
Built
12
9
21
15
II
10
36
Building
7
7
Japan
Built
9
4
13
13
4
13
30
Building
3
4
7
3
3
Russia
Built
7
3
10
6
8
2
16
>
Building
7
7
Italy
Built
6
2
8
7
3
12
22
N
Building
6
6
3
3
Austria
Built
6
3
9
2
4
6
>
Building
4
4
3
3
This comparative statement reveals Germany as
at present about equal to the United States, and
with an assurance that in two years' time, when the
ships now building are completed, of occupying a
position second only to that of Great Britain.
Having attained this pre-eminence among the
nations as a naval Power, which possesses the
largest army in the world, the German Government
has now secured an Act to authorise the further
expansion of the Fleet. This new measure makes
* These cruiser-battleships, or battle-cruisers, are all Dread-
noughts. One of the British ships is for Australian waters.
42 THE COMMAND OF THE SEA
provision for the following additions to the present
establishment to the Navy :
3 battleships,
2 unarmoured cruisers,
Increase of submarines to 72,
15,153 officers and men, and
Provision for aerocraft.
The period over which these additions are to be
spread is six years, and dates have been given for
beginning two of the battleships, one of which will
be laid down in 1913 and one in 1916. By 1920
the additions will enable the Fleet to consist of :
41 battleships,
20 armoured cruisers,
Of these ships, 35 will, in 1920, be Dread-
noughts, either Dreadnought battleships or
Dreadnought cruisers, in each case the same
type of battle gun being mounted.
40 unarmoured cruisers,
144 destroyers, and
72 submarines.
These ships will be organised in accordance with
the following scheme :
There will be an active battle fleet, consisting of
one flagship and three squadrons of eight battleships
each, and behind this force another battle fleet,
consisting of two squadrons, each of eight battleships
with nucleus crews.
\Yith reference to the armoured cruisers, there
will be eight attached to the active battle fleet,
and four will be attached to the reserve battle
fleet.
Attached to each battle squadron, both active
and reserve, will be six protected cruisers, making
a total of 30 in home waters.
GERMAN NAVAL EXPANSION 43
Of the 144 torpedo-boat destroyers, one-half
will be maintained in full commission and the
other half in commission with nucleus crews.
The strength of the nucleus crews has been
reduced in the new law by one-half, and the
nucleus crews are to comprise one-third instead
of two-thirds of the engine-room personnel, and
one-quarter instead of one-half of the other
personnel.
Of the 72 submarines, 54 are to be provided with
full crews, and the remaining 18 boats are to be kept
in material reserve without crews.
The Fleet for Foreign Service will consist of eight
armoured cruisers. Two will be maintained in full
commission and two in reserve, while four will con-
stitute a detached flying squadron, available for
purposes of reinforcement at home or abroad as
may be required.
There will also be in the Foreign Service Fleet
ten protected cruisers, eight being in full commission
and two in reserve.
By means of this Act Germany proposes to add
over 50 per cent, to the striking power of that
portion of her fleet which is kept constantly ready
for action in the North Sea and the Baltic.
In order that the course of naval legislation in
Germany may be understood, there are appended a
summary of the early Act of 1898, which was to have
run for six years, and the texts of the Act of 1900,
which was to have covered seventeen years,
and of the amending Acts of 1906, 1908, and
1912.
44 THE COMMAND OF THE SEA
FIRST ACT 1898.
In accordance with the provisions of the first of
the German Navy Acts, the Sextennate as it is called,
the German Fleet, exclusive of torpedo craft, training
ships, special service vessels and gunboats, was to
be formed as follows :
Active Fleet.
Home Service :
1 fleet flagship.
2 squadrons each of 8 battleships.
2 divisions each of 4 coast defence ships.
6 large cruisers.
16 small cruisers.
Foreign Service :
3 large cruisers.
10 small cruisers.
Reserve Fleet.
Home Service :
3 battleships.
3 large cruisers.
3 small cruisers.
In summarising this modest measure, the Naval
Annual stated :
The ships completed or in hand on April ist, 1898, and
accepted as forming part of this prescribed establishment,
were 12 battleships, 8 coast defence ships, 10 large and
23 small cruisers, but some of these will pass out of the
active category before the expiration of the Sexennate,
and within the period of six years other battleships and
cruisers are to be laid down and completed to make up
the legal number. The principles regulating the super-
session of ships considered to be antiquated are laid down
GERMAN NAVAL EXPANSION 45
in the Act. The active life of a battleship or coast
defence vessel is reckoned at twenty-five years, of a large
cruiser at twenty years, and of a small cruiser at fifteen
years, these periods being counted from the date of the
first credit for the building of any particular ship up to
the same grant for the laying down of her successor.
The establishment of officers and men to be maintained
is estimated in relation to the strength of the fleet, upon
the following principles : For every ship abroad, half
as many again must be voted as are necessary ; there
must be full companies for the ships belonging to the
active formation of the Home Squadron, for one half
of the torpedo boats and for the training and special
service ships ; there will be a nucleus (two-thirds being
an engineering personnel) for the reserve formations at
home and for the other half of the torpedo boats ; the
necessary number for service ashore, and an addition of
5 per cent, to the whole number.
SECOND ACT 1900.
Within two years that is, within a short time
of the outbreak of the war in South Africa the Act
of 1898 was superseded :
7. Strength of the German Fleet.
i. The Fleet is to consist of :
The Battle Fleet :
2 Fleet Flagships.
4 Squadrons, each of 8 Battleships.
8 large Cruisers 1 for scouting
24 small Cruisers J purposes.
Foreign Fleet :
3 large Cruisers.
10 small Cruisers.
46 THE COMMAND OF THE SEA
Reserve :
4 Battleships.
3 large Cruisers.
4 small Cruisers.
2. Except in case of total loss, ships are to be
replaced :
Battleships after 25 years.
Cruisers after 20 years.
The age of ships to be reckoned from the grant of
the first instalment in payment for the ship to be
replaced, to the passing of the instalment in payment
for the ship to be built as " substitute " (Ersatzschiff).
II. Ships in Commission.
3. The state of Commission of the Battle Fleet
is to be regulated according to the following rules :
(1) The ist and 2nd Squadrons form the Active
Battle Fleet. The 3rd and 4th Squadrons form the
Reserve Battle Fleet.
(2) All the ships of the Active Battle Fleet and
half the number of ships of the Reserve Battle Fleet
are to be kept in permanent commission.
(3) Ships not in commission may be commissioned
temporarily for the manoeuvres.
///. Numbers of all Ranks of Naval Personnel.
4. The numbers of Warrant Officers, Petty Officers
and men for all the different parts of the sea and
other services are to be at the following rate :
(i) Full complements for ships of the Active
Battle Fleet, one half of the Torpedo Boats, School-
ships and special vessels.
GERMAN NAVAL EXPANSION 47
(2) Nucleus crews (technical personnel two thirds,
and for the rest one-half of the full complement),
for the Reserve Battle Fleet and the second half of
the Torpedo Boats.
(3) One and a half the number of men, etc., re-
quired for ships serving abroad.
(4) The men necessary for shore service.
(5) An excess of 5 per cent on the total numbers,
sub. (i) to (4).
/ V. Expenditure.
5. The necessary expenditure must be inserted
in the annual estimates of the Empire, the " Navy
Estimates " forming part of them.
6. If from the financial year 1901 onward the
requirements of the Admiralty in recurring and non-
recurring expenditure exceed the surplus of the
stamp duties above the sum of 53,708,000 mks.
(2,685,000.) and if this difference cannot be borne
upon the ordinary revenue of the Empire, this
remainder is not to be paid by a rise or increase
in the indirect Imperial taxes on articles for con-
sumption of the masses.
V. Conclusion.
This Act comes into force simultaneously with
the Act of April 27th, 1894 (Gazette p. 381), amend-
ing the Stamp duties, and the Imperial Tariff.
The Navy Act of April loth, 1898 (Gazette p. 165)
is herewith repealed.
June itfh, 1900.
THIRD ACT 1906.
The new measure for the amendment of the Navy
Act of June I4th, 1900, was as follows :
48 THE COMMAND OF THE SEA
Single Clause.
The strength of the German Fleet as fixed in
paragraph i of the Navy Act, June i4th, 1900, is
to be increased :
1. The Foreign Fleet by 5 Armoured Cruisers.
2. The Fleet Reserve by i Armoured Cruiser.
Signed with our own hand and sealed, etc.,
June $th, 1906.
FOURTH ACT 1908.
This measure was an amendment to paragraph 2
of Navy Act, June I4th, 1900 :
Single Clause.
Paragraph 2 of the Navy Act of June I4th, 1900,
is herewith repealed, and the following paragraph
takes its place.
2. Except in cases of total loss, Battleships and
Cruisers are to be replaced after 20 years.
The age of a ship is to be reckoned as from the
year of granting the first instalment in payment for
the ship to be replaced, to the granting of the first
instalment in payment of the " substitute " (Er-
satzschiff) .
The building of the substitutes during the period
1908 to 1917 is regulated according to Schedule B.
(This schedule set forth that four large armoured
ships should be laid down annually between 1908
and 1911 instead of three, and that in 1912 onwards
two annually should be built.)
April 6th, 1908.
NOTE. The effect of this measure was to accelerate the con-
struction of battleships, since their effective life was reduced
by one-fifth.
GERMAN NAVAL EXPANSION 49
FIFTH ACT 1912.
The final expansion measure was passed in May,
1912 :
Article i.
The following i replaces i of the Law concerning
the German Fleet of the I4th June, 1900, and the
amendment to this Law of the 5th June, 1906.
There shall be :
1. The Battle Fleet, consisting of
1 fleet flagship,
5 squadrons of 8 battleships each,
12 large cruisers J as scouts
30 small cruisers J
2. The Foreign Service Fleet, consisting of
8 large cruisers,
10 small cruisers.
Article 2.
The following paragraphs replace paragraphs i
and 2 of 3 of the Law concerning the German Fleet
of the I4th June, 1900 :
1. i fleet flagship,
3 squadrons of battleships,
8 large cruisers, and
1 8 small cruisers
form the Active Battle Fleet ;
2 squadrons of battleships,
4 large cruisers, and
12 small cruisers
form the Reserve Battle Fleet.
2. The whole of the Battleships and Cruisers of
E
50 THE COMMAND OF THE SEA
the Active Battle Fleet and a quarter of those of the
Reserve Battle Fleet are to be kept permanently in
commission.
Article 3.
The following paragraphs are to replace the open-
ing sentence and paragraphs i and 2 of 4 of the
law concerning the German Fleet of the I4th June,
1900:
The following proportions of warrant officers,
petty officers, and men of the Seamen, Dockyard,
and Torpedo Divisions, as well as the Submarine
Sections, shall be available :
1. Full crews for the ships belonging to the Active
Battle Fleet, for the whole of the torpedo boats and
submarines with exception of the material reserve
of both these classes of boats, for the school ships
and for the special ships.
2. Nucleus crews (J of the engine-room personnel,
J of the remaining personnel of the full crews) for
the ships belonging to the Reserve Battle Fleet.
Article 4.
The Imperial Chancellor is empowered to publish
the text of the Law concerning the German Fleet
of the I4th June, 1900, with such alterations as
result from the Laws of the 5th June, 1906, 6th
April, 1908, and the present Law.
Argument.
The organisation of the Fleet still suffers from two
serious defects :
The one defect consists in the fact that in the
GERMAN NAVAL EXPANSION 51
Autumn of every year the time-expired men, i.e.,
almost J of the crew in all ships of the Battle Fleet,
are discharged and replaced mainly by recruits from
the inland population. Owing to this, the readiness
of the Battle Fleet for war is considerably impaired
for a prolonged period.
The second defect consists in the fact that at the
present time, with an establishment of 58 capital
ships, only 21 ships are available at first, if the
Reserve Fleet cannot be made ready in proper time.
Since the Fleet Law was drawn up, this latter has
become more and more unlikely, as the moment at
which the Reserve Fleet can be ready for war gets
more and more deferred. This is a consequence of
the ever-growing complexity of modern ships and
of the steadily growing difficulty in training large
organisations. At the present day, therefore, the
Reserve Fleet only comes into consideration as a
second fighting line ; but in view of our great
numerical strength in reserve men, it still maintains
its great importance.
Both these defects are to be removed, or at any
rate considerably ameliorated, by the gradual
formation of a third active squadron.
The requisite ships for this third active squadron
are to be derived :
(a) By dispensing with the Reserve Fleet Flagship.
(b) By dispensing with the present existing
Material Reserve 4 battleships, 4 large and 4 small
cruisers.
(c) By newly constructing 3 battleships and 2
small cruisers.
5 2 THE COMMAND OF THE SEA
As the maintenance in commission of ships in the
Reserve Fleet can be reduced by one-half in con-
sequence of the increase of active organisations, the
formation of a third active squadron only renders
the additional maintenance in commission of 3
battleships, 3 large and 3 small cruisers necessary
beyond those to be maintained in commission already
provided for in the Fleet Law. This involves a
corresponding increase in personnel.
A further increase in personnel is necessary as the
complements of all classes of ships, including torpedo
boats, have had to be augmented.
Moreover, an increase in submarines and the
acquisition of some airships is contemplated. The
submarines, which are still at the present moment
without organisation, are to be organised as regards
manning after the manner of the torpedo boats.
APPENDICES.
1. Comparison of the Amendment with the Fleet
Laws.
2. Programme of Construction.
3. Increased requirements of Personnel.
4. Calculation of Cost.
APPENDIX i.
Comparison of the Amendment with the Fleet Laws.
PROVISIONS OF THE FLEET LAW.
I. Establishment of Ships.
i.
There shall be (i) The Battle Fleet, consisting of
GERMAN NAVAL EXPANSION 53
2 fleet flagships, 4 squadrons of 8 battleships each,
8 large cruisers and 24 small cruisers as scouts.
(2) The Foreign Service Fleet, consisting of 8 large
cruisers and 10 small cruisers. (3) The Material Reserve,
consisting of 4 battleships, 4 large cruisers and 4 small
cruisers.
ALTERATIONS OF THE AMENDMENT.
I. Establishment of Ships.
i.
There shall be (i) The Battle Fleet, consisting of
1 fleet flagship, 5 squadrons of 8 battleships each,
12 large cruisers and 30 small cruisers as scouts.
(2) The Foreign Service Fleet, consisting of 8 large
cruisers and 10 small cruisers.
PROVISIONS OF THE FLEET LAW.
II. Maintenance in Commission.
3-
The following principles obtain regarding the main-
tenance in commission of the Battle Fleet : (i) The
ist and 2nd Squadrons form the Active Battle Fleet,
the 3rd and 4th Squadrons the Reserve Battle Fleet.
(2) The whole of the battleships and cruisers of the
Active Battle Fleet, and one-half of those of the Reserve
Battle Fleet, are to be kept permanently in commission.
ALTERATIONS OF THE AMENDMENT.
II. Maintenance in Commission.
3.
The following principles obtain regarding the main-
tenance in commission of the Battle Fleet : (i) i fleet
flagship, 3 squadrons of battleships, 8 large cruisers,
and 18 small cruisers form the Active Battle Fleet.
2 squadrons of battleships, 4 large cruisers, and 12 small
cruisers form the Reserve Battle Fleet.
54 THE COMMAND OF THE SEA
(2) The whole of the battleships and cruisers of the
Active Battle Fleet and one-quarter of those of the
Reserve Battle Fleet are to be kept permanently in
commission.
PROVISIONS OF THE FLEET LAW.
III. Establishment of Personnel.
4.
The following proportions of warrant officers, petty
officers, and men of the Seamen, Dockyard, and Torpedo
Divisions shall be available :
(1) Full crews for the ships belonging to the Active
Battle Fleet, for half oi the torpedo-boats, for the school
ships, and for the special ships.
(2) Nucleus crews (% of the engine-room personnel,
| of the remaining personnel of the full crews) for the
ships belonging to the Reserve Battle Fleet, as well as
for the second half of the torpedo-boats.
ALTERATIONS OF THE AMENDMENT.
III. Establishment of Personnel.
4.
The following proportions of warrant officers, petty
officers, and men of the Seamen, Dockyard, and Torpedo
Divisions, as well as of the Submarine Sections, shall be
available :
(1) Full crews for the ships belonging to the Active
Battle Fleet, for the whole of the torpedo-boats and sub-
marines with exception of the Material Reserve of both
these classes of boats, for the school ships and for the special
ships.
(2) Nucleus crews (J of the engine-room personnel,
J of the remaining personnel of the full crews) for the
ships belonging to the Reserve Battle Fleet.
The remaining provisions of the Fleet Laws remain
unaltered.
GERMAN NAVAL EXPANSION 55
Explanations.
With regard to I.
The legal establishment of ships experiences an
increase of 3 battleships and 2 small cruisers through
the Amendment :
Previous Future
Establishment. Establishment. Increase.
Battleships . . 38 41 +3
Large cruisers . . 20 20
Small cruisers . . 38 40 + 2
With regard to 3.
Of the legal establishment of ships, there are to
be in commission :
Battleships Large Cruisers Small Cruisers
Previ- In Previ- In Previ- In
ously Future ously Future ously Future
In the Active
Battle Fleet 17 25 4 8 12 18
In the Reserve
Battle Fleet 9 421 63
Total ..26 29 6 9 18 21
Consequently, additionally in commission in
future :
3 battleships, 3 large cruisers, 3 small cruisers.
With regard to 4.
I. In accordance with the Memorandum to the
Estimates of 1906 there are to be :
Altogether 144 Torpedo-boats.
Of which ready for use 99 with full active service
crews.
As Material Reserve 45 without crews.
Nothing is altered in this by the Amendment.
56 THE COMMAND OF THE SEA
4 of the Fleet Law of 1900 provided for 72 full
crews, and 72 nucleus crews, making together a total
of 116 full crews (compare Footnote to Memorandum
accompanying Estimates of 1906).
Only 99 are required, and the Fleet Law, therefore,
demands 17 full crews too many.
Article 3 of the Amendment brings the number of
crews legally to be held in readiness into line with
actual requirements, and therefore reduces the Torpedo
personnel demanded under the Fleet Law by 17 boats'
crews.
2. It is proposed to demand 6 Submarines every
year. With a twelve years' life this gives an
establishment of 72 boats. For 54 of these boats
active service crews are estimated for ; 18 form the
Material Reserve without crews.
APPENDIX 2.
Programme of Construction.
PREVIOUS Programme of Construction.
Large Total Small
Year Battleships Cruisers Large Ships Cruisers
1912 I 2 2
1913 .... I 2 2
1914 .... I 2 2
1915 .... I 2 2
1916 .... I 2 2
1917 .... I 2 2*
FUTURE Programme of Construction.
1912 .... I I 2 2
1913 2f I 3 2
1914 ~ .. I I 2 2
GERMAN NAVAL EXPANSION 57
Large Total Small
Year Battleships Cruisers Large Ships Cruisers
1915 .... I I 2 2
1916 2f I 3 2
1917 .... I I 2 2*
* Including one additional ship outstanding from the Fleet
Law.
t Including one additional ship under the Amendment.
The year of construction of one battleship and two small
cruisers is reserved.
APPENDIX 3.
Additional Personnel required.
(A.) Men of the Seamen, Dockyard, and Torpedo
Divisions, as well as of the Submarine Sections
14,310 ; annual average 1590.*
(B.) Executive Officers 433 ; annual average,
4 8.
(C.) Engineers 116 ; annual average, 13.
(D.) Medical Officers and Sick Berth Staff 175 ;
annual average, 19.
(E.) Paymasters and Accountant Staff 119 ;
annual average, 13.
Remark.
The requisite increase in personnel consists of
(1) The personnel necessary for additional ships
to be maintained in commission under the Amend-
ment.
(2) The personnel to be held in readiness for the
submarines.
* 500 men are to be demanded in excess of the average
annual increase in each of the three years 1912 to 1914. This
increase is to be balanced by a corresponding decrease in the
three years 1918 to 1920.
58 THE COMMAND OF THE SEA
(3) The personnel becoming necessary in conse-
quence of alterations in complements and increased
activity in training.
In regard to (3), the complements of torpedo-
boats, and in part also of the ships, have experienced
an increase which is not taken into account in the
calculations for the requirements of personnel for
the Fleet Law, as this could not be foreseen. The
larger complements have become necessary owing
to growth in size and speed of ships and torpedo-
boats, as well as on account of the greater require-
ments of the guns in guns' crews.
The additional requirements of Training personnel
is a consequence of the increase in active naval
fighting forces.
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DESCRIPTION OF EXP
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Note. The Navy Est
sum required under the A
year (191 1) as calculated
to the increase of pay sar
t In consequence of the
augmented by 49,ooo/. from ic
CONTRIBUTIONS TOWARDS THE NAVY.
INDIA. Maintenance of His Majesty's Ships in Indian waters,
100,000. Indian Troop Service (on account of work
performed by the Admiralty), 3,400. Repayment on
account of services rendered by His Majesty's Ships
engaged in the suppression of the Arms Traffic in the
Persian Gulf, 64,000.
AUSTRALIAN COMMONWEALTH. Survey of the North-West
coast of Australia, ,7,500. Maintenance of an Austral-
asian Squadron and the establishment of a branch of the
Royal Naval Reserve, ,200,000.
DOMINION OF NEW ZEALAND. Maintenance of an Austral-
asian Squadron and of the Imperial Navy generally ; also
for the establishment of a branch of the Royal Naval
Reserve, ,100,000.
CAPE COLONY. General maintenance of the Navy, 50,000.
NATAL. General maintenance of the Navy, 35,000.
NEWFOUNDLAND. Maintenance of a branch of the Royal
Naval Reserve, 3,000. Total, 570,480.
*AUSTRALIAN COMMONWEALTH, DOMINION OF CANADA.
Contribution on account of liability for Retired Pay of
Officers and Pensions of Men lent from the Royal Navy,
The Australian payment will cease in 1913. The Common-
wealth is building a fleet-unit, and will take over the Dockyard at
Sydney, created by the Admiralty. New Zealand has presented
the Royal Navy with a battle cruiser and three destroyers, of
which the former is to be retained as a unit of the Home Fleet.
The Dominion Government will also continue to make an annual
subvention of 100,000 to the Royal Navy. The Canadian
scheme, proposed in 1909, was abandoned by the Borden Admin-
istration in 1911, with a view to consultation with the Admiralty.
The Dominion has never made any contribution to the Royal
Navy. The Government has taken over, free of charge, the Royal
dockyards at Halifax and Esquimalt, with all their equipment.
The South African Colonies have not come to any decision, but
the Union Government still pays to the Admiralty the small sums
formerly remitted by Cape Colony and Natal.
These are merely book-keeping transactions ; certain British officers hare
been lent to these two Governments.
CHAPTER III.
THE DANGER OF THE OVERSEAS DOMINIONS.
IT is now known beyond the shadow of doubt
that there is to be a further expansion of the
German Navy, and this renewal of competition
is already reacting upon neighbouring Powers.
Thus the silent, bloodless warfare is becoming more
intense and the strain is increasing upon British
taxpayers.
We had a naval crisis three years ago. The im-
mediate difficulties of the situation were surmounted
at an added cost to the people of the United
Kingdom of nearly thirty-six millions sterling.*
We are at grips with another crisis, far more grave
in its character. The new situation is one of peril
to the whole Empire, but unless the oversea Domi-
nions come forward the burden will fall on the United
Kingdom. On the one hand we have this admittedly
heavy and increasing naval expenditure borne by
the people of the United Kingdom for all the British
peoples, and upon the other we have the admission
by the Chancellor of the Exchequer that " there are
millions of men, women, and children in the United
Kingdom who through no fault of their own go
through their life sodden in poverty, wretchedness,
* Compared with the expenditure of 1908-9, there was a rise
f ^3>552,2o6 in 1909-10, of ^8,238,027 in 1910-11, of 12,211,191
in 1911-12, and of 11,904,091 in 1912-13.
62 THE COMMAND OF THE SEA
and despair." This is the situation in the mother
country on the eve of the renewed challenge to our
naval supremacy which has come from Germany,
and which is already producing its inevitable effect
upon the shipbuilding proposals of other nations.
France, Russia, Italy, Austria, Spain, Turkey,
Portugal, Denmark, Sweden and Norway each is
embarking upon fresh and costly naval schemes.
Of this renewed activity the taxpayers of the
United Kingdom will feel the cumulative effect.
In face of the new peril a very real peril what
will the oversea dominions do ?
As Lord Rosebery remarked at the time of the
naval crisis of 1909, " We live in the midst of what
I think was called by Petrarch a tacens bellum, a silent
warfare, in which not a drop of blood is shed in anger,
but in which the very last drop is extracted from the
body by the lancets of European statesmen." These
words represented the conditions which existed
three years ago, but they apply more pointedly to
the new situation created by Germany's further
naval expansion. Lord Rosebery added in his
address to the oversea delegates to the Imperial
Press Conference :
We can and we will build Dreadnoughts, or whatever
the newest type of ship may be, as long as we have a
shilling to spend on them, or a man to put into them.
All that we can and will do ; but I am not sure even
that will be enough, and I think it may be your duty
to take back to your young dominions across the seas
this message and this impression, that some personal
duty and responsibility for national defence rests on
every man and citizen of the Empire.
DANGER OF THE DOMINIONS 63
New Zealand and Australia came forward at the
last naval crisis with spontaneous offers of help ;
under a Ministry whose Imperialism was restrained
by a narrower nationalism, Canada held aloof,
and the South African Union did not then exist. A
new Government has been returned to power in the
great Dominion across the Atlantic a Government
which, above all things, is pledged to cement the
bonds of Empire ; and the distinct and separate
colonies of South Africa have been welded into a
great confederation enjoying to the full those self-
governing powers which are the glory and the
strength, as well as the possible weakness, of the
British Imperial system. Will the new challenge
to British supremacy meet with no response either
in Canada or in South Africa, when it is understood
that, grave as were the conditions which were fore-
seen in 1909, those conditions are now destined to
become far more grave ? If these two self-governing
colonies realise the danger which threatens them
no less than the inhabitants of the United Kingdom,
there is no reason to doubt that, when they are
willing to help, the Admiralty will be willing to
smooth the way for applying that help in the
most economical and effective manner without
undermining those autonomous powers in which
they take a natural pride. Mr. Winston Churchill
is not a First Lord who will fear to speak the truth
if the truth is wanted.
I. THE DEFENCE CONFERENCE OF 1909.
The principles upon which the maritime interests
64 THE COMMAND OF THE SEA
of a maritime Empire must be defended are fixed
and permanent ; however the conditions may change,
the underlying principles never change. The views
which the Admiralty expressed at the Conference
with the self-governing dominions in 1909 we may
be sure are the opinions which the present Board
of Admiralty hold no less strongly. It was then
laid down :
If the problem of Imperial naval defence were con-
sidered merely as a problem of naval strategy it would
be found that the greatest output of strength for a given
expenditure is obtained by the maintenance of a single
navy with the concomitant unity of training and unity
of command. In furtherance, then, of the simple
strategical ideal the maximum of power would be gained
if all parts of the Empire contributed according to their
needs and resources to the maintenance of the British
Navy.
In enunciating this principle, which is merely an
elaboration of the axiom that union is strength, the
Admiralty stated a proposition the truth of which
no one, certainly no naval officer, would attempt to
controvert. But at the same time the Admiralty
exhibited the timidity which the Imperial Govern-
ment has almost always shown in its dealings with
the oversea dominions. It has been the fashion in
Downing Street and at the Admiralty and War
Office to treat these growing countries as spoilt
children to whom the undiluted truth must seldom
or never be told. When has the British Government,
for instance, suggested to the oversea dominions,
enjoying the fullest freedom compatible with Im-
DANGER OF THE DOMINIONS 65
perial unity, that the greater part of the vast burden
of debt, which is now costing the people of the
United Kingdom twenty-five millions annually,
was incurred in order to secure those favoured
lands in which Canadians, Australians, New Zea-
landers, and South Africans live and prosper ?
When has the British Government ever had the
courage to remind these citizens of the Empire
overseas of the many years during which their
territories were defended by the British Army
stationed, at least in part, within their borders,
without payment in money or kind for the service
rendered ? * When, again, has the British Govern-
ment ever reminded these oversea dominions of the
heavy expenditure, amounting to upwards of three
millions sterling annually, incurred for many years
in the upkeep of the extra European squadrons
which have patrolled the outer seas and defended
their growing ocean-borne wealth in the past ?
During the period when these daughter lands
were grappling with the problems which face every
new community, it would have been ungenerous to
remind them of the price at which their freedom
had been bought ; but now the situation has changed,
and the relations between the mother country and
these oversea dominions have also changed. The
burden of armaments has become almost unbearable
to an old country with a number of social problems
* The British troops in South Africa cost ,1,152,500 a year
to which the Union Government makes no contribution, while
Mauritius (not being a self-governing Dominion) pays 30,000
towards the military charges of ,123,000, and other Crown
Colonies make generous contributions.
F
66 THE COMMAND OF THE SEA
calling for costly remedies. These daughter lands
have been endowed with the fullest measure of free-
dom, but while they have been permitted to enjoy
all the privileges which the British connection confers,
and have been enabled to go about their business
on the high seas in the full confidence that the
British Fleet is not less their defence than the
defence of the people of the British Isles, the latter
pay, practically unaided, for the maintenance and
defence of the Imperial system.
It has become a tradition in the United Kingdom to
conceal the naked truth from these younger sons of
the Empire, and even to-day, when the British people
are still bearing the burden of Empire with little or
no assistance, paying alike for the British Navy,
the British Army, the British diplomatic service,
the British consular service, and the Crown itself,
statesmen of the United Kingdom treat their fellow-
statesmen from the oversea dominions as perfectly
equal partners in the British Empire, but fail to
remind them of the responsibilities which partnership
involves. Even a junior partner is not permitted
to put his hand into the till and take a share of
the profits without counting the cost at which those
profits have been made.
It was in this spirit of spoon-feeding, unfair to the
British taxpayer and derogatory to the dignity of
self-governing countries, that the Admiralty in 1909
met the representatives of the great oversea nations.
There is not a naval officer in the British service
who does not realise that a single navy, with the con-
comitant unity of training and unity of command, is
DANGER OF THE DOMINIONS 67
the one reasonable and economical and sound principle
upon which to defend the united people of a united
Empire. Sea power in the mother country is cheap,
cheaper by 30 or 40 per cent, than in Canada,
Australia, New Zealand, or South Africa ; sea power
in the mother country, with its teeming population,
is easily created ; sea power in the mother country
reaches a high standard of efficiency because the sea
habit is an inherited instinct.
The Admiralty is a department which must bow
before what are regarded as political considerations.
It was concluded in 1909 that the self-governing
colonies should be still fed with a spoon ; their
delegates should be feted and made much of ; they
should be taken into the inner councils of the Empire
as equals, but under no consideration should they
be told the undiluted truth that the British taxpayer,
with a Budget approaching two hundred millions
sterling annually (of which seventy-two millions is
devoted to defence), is still bearing the white man's
burden almost without assistance. The motto of
the responsible representatives of the British Fleet
at that conference appears to have been this : let us
be pleasant and tactful whatever may befall ; let us
admit the existence of a naval crisis, but let us not
press upon the representatives of the self-governing
dominions the real solution of the crisis, lest the
solution should prove unpalatable.
It was in this spirit that the Admiralty, no doubt
under superior authority, toned down and whittled
away the strategic principle stated so boldly in the
paragraph already quoted. They were permitted
68 THE COMMAND OF THE SEA
to speak honestly this once, but there immediately
followed reservations and the statement of political
considerations which almost entirely robbed their
professional advice of its value. The politico-naval
" bunkum " was expressed in these words :
It has, however, long been recognised that in denning
the conditions under which the naval forces of the Empire
should be developed, other considerations than those of
strategy alone must be taken into account. The various
circumstances of the oversea dominions have to be borne
in mind. Though all have in them the seeds of a great
advance in population, wealth and power, they have at
the present time attained to different stages in their
growth. Their geographical position has subjected them
to internal and external strains, varying in kind and
intensity. Their history and physical environment
have given rise to individual national sentiment, for the
expression of which room must be found.
A simple contribution of money or material may be to
one Dominion the most acceptable form in which to
assist in Imperial defence.
Another, while ready to provide local naval forces,
and to place them at the disposal of the Crown in the
event of war, may wish to lay the foundations upon
which a future Navy of its own could be raised.
A third may think that the best manner in which it
can assist in promoting the interests of the Empire is
in undertaking certain local services not directly of a
naval character, but which may relieve the Imperial
Government from expenses which would otherwise fall
on the British Exchequer.
It was in such circumstances that the foun-
dations were laid for colonial co-operation for
Imperial naval defence.
DANGER OF THE DOMINIONS 69
Sir Joseph Ward, the Prime Minister of New
Zealand, brushed aside these tactful reservations,
and announced that this dominion would abide by
her patriotic decision of the previous March, and
" would supply a Dreadnought for the British Navy
as already offered ; the ship to be under the control
of and stationed wherever the Admiralty considers
advisable." Sir Joseph Ward, on behalf of the
people of New Zealand, stated in so many words
that their attachment to the Empire was not the
less because the Empire was in peril, and although
they numbered only just over one million men,
women, and children they at least were prepared
to recognise that so long as they remained under
the British flag they should contribute to the only
Fleet that could guard that flag from dishonour.
In accordance with the agreement come to by the
Admiralty and the New Zealand Government, it was
determined that two protected cruisers, three des-
troyers, and two submarines should be detached from
the British Navy in time of peace and stationed in
New Zealand waters, in order to provide a measure
of defence for purely local interests, and that so far
as possible any available colonial officers and men
should be drafted into these ships. The New
Zealand Government agreed to pay the whole cost
of this scheme. In this way New Zealand exhibited
her loyalty, and it is now known that she has
decided to make a further sacrifice on behalf of
the Empire. The original intention was that the
splendid battle-cruiser " New Zealand " should form
a part of the British squadron in China waters,
70 THE COMMAND OF THE SEA
periodically paying visits of ceremony to New
Zealand ports. It is now the fixed intention
that this ship, when completed, shall make a world
tour, in the course of which visits will be paid to the
principal New Zealand ports in order that the
inhabitants of this dominion who have set up a
standard of patriotism reached by no other daughter
land may have an opportunity of seeing the first
man-of-war designed at their behest and built with
their money. When these visits of ceremony are
over, this Dreadnought will return to Europe, there
to form an important link in the chain of defence
which protects not less the peoples of the Antipodes
than the inhabitants of the United Kingdom. In
the history of the world there is no more splendid
illustration of devotion to a sound political and
strategical ideal than that furnished by the New
Zealanders' patriotic action.
In the case of the Commonwealth of Australia,
advantage was taken of the smooth sayings of the
Admiralty. It was agreed to provide local naval
forces and to place them at the disposal of the
Crown in the event of war, thus laying the founda-
tions upon which a future colonial navy could be
raised. In the conference with the Admiralty it
was arranged that Australia should provide a fleet-
unit to consist of a battle-cruiser, three protected
cruisers of the Bristol class, six destroyers, and three
submarines. It was agreed that these vessels should
be manned as far as possible by Australian officers
and seamen, and the numbers required to make up
the full complement for manning purposes should
DANGER OF THE DOMINIONS 71
be lent by the Royal Navy. In other words, Aus-
tralia determined to create the nucleus of a local
navy which in war time should be under the control
of the British naval commander-in-chief in Pacific
waters. It was calculated that this scheme would
cost 750,000 a year 150,000 of this being due to
the higher rates of pay in Australia and the cost of
training and subsidiary establishments. In other
words, in British currency Australia was to pay
750,000 a year for sea-power which could be bought
in Great Britain for 600,000. It was further
agreed that this annual cost should eventually be
met by the Commonwealth, but that until such
time as the oversea Government could take over
the whole burden the Imperial authorities should
make an annual contribution of 250,000. Not
only has the Commonwealth Government remained
faithful to this agreement, but it has announced
that it does not intend to ask the Imperial author-
ities to make any contribution towards the ex-
penditure which the scheme involves. At the end
of this year, or the beginning of next, the fleet-unit
will leave for Australian waters, and the Australian
Government receives as a free gift the dockyard at
Sydney, with all its valuable equipment, upon
which the British taxpayers have spent millions
sterling.
The Australian people are thus establishing a
" baby navy " of their own in close association
with the British Fleet. It does not represent as
high a form of Imperial endeavour as has commended
itself to the people of New Zealand ; it contains
72 THE COMMAND OF THE SEA
within it seeds which may bear sour fruit in the
future ; it can be of no appreciable war value for
many years, but it constitutes a source of saving to
the British taxpayer in that he will henceforth be
relieved from the cost and responsibility of the local
defence of these waters.
The conditions of the Commonwealth were peculiar
at the date when this naval agreement was reached,
because it was thought that the alliance with Japan
might soon come to an end, and therefore there was
a feeling of nervousness as to the influence of Japanese
policy upon the colonial ideal of a " white continent."
The Japanese alliance has since been renewed ; the
Australian people have no more to fear than the
people of New Zealand, and it remains to be seen
whether in view of the renewed naval crisis they will
be prepared to make the great sacrifice which their
neighbours are apparently prepared to make, and
will agree that the battle-cruiser Australia, instead
of being permanently stationed in Australian waters,
shall return to Europe, there to strengthen the
metropolitan fleets upon which the main defence of
the British Empire depends to-day, and will continue
to depend so long as the silent war of armaments
continues to be waged in European waters. After
all, this would be nothing more than a reversion to
the original offer which the people -of the Common-
wealth made to the heavily burdened people of the
United Kingdom in 1909. If they determine upon
so effective a reply to the renewed challenge to
British sea-power, they will have the satisfaction
of knowing that the presence of this great and
DANGER OF THE DOMINIONS 73
costly ship in European waters will contribute
materially to the maintenance of peace, upon which
their prosperity and happiness depend.
While New Zealand accepted the undiluted stra-
tegic principle enunciated by the Admiralty at the
Conference of 1909, and while the Commonwealth of
Australia accepted the alternative of a fleet-unit,
Canada, under the guidance of Sir Wilfrid Laurier,
accepted an alternative which had never entered
into the mind of the Admiralty until " the Canadian
representatives," to quote the Blue Book (Cd.
49,498), " explained in what respect they desired
the advice of the Admiralty." The Admiralty at
once stated that " it would be difficult to make any
suggestions or to formulate any plans without know-
ing approximately the sum of money which Canada
would spend." The Canadian representatives then
suggested that two plans might be presented :_ one
incurring an annual expenditure of 400,000, and
the other an expenditure of 600,000, omitting in
both cases the cost of the present fishery service
and hydrographic surveys, but including the main-
tenance of Halifax and Esquimalt dockyards to be
free gifts from the mother country and the wireless
telegraph service, estimated at some 50,000 a year.
It will thus be seen that from the outset the Canadian
representatives had a very modest opinion of the
cost which they could incur. New Zealand, with
her many pressing internal problems, expressed her
willingness to contribute rather more than five
shillings per head of her population, the Common-
wealth agreed to an expenditure equal to just under
74 THE COMMAND OF THE SEA
three shillings per head, but Canada, the richest of
all the dominions, with an over-flowing treasury,
felt able, under Sir Wilfrid Laurier's guidance, to
commit herself to no more than about is. ijrf. per
head, in contrast with i a head paid by the British
taxpayers.
Thus it came about that Canada decided upon a
scheme which was recognised from the first as being
framed, to meet not the peril of the naval situation,
but the political exigencies of the Canadian Govern-
ment dependent upon a section of the population
which, while prepared to enjoy all the benefits
of the British connection, have always expressed
its unwillingness to bear any of the burden. The
agreement, if such a term can be applied to the
understanding with the Admiralty, was embodied
in the Naval Service Act which was passed by the
Canadian Parliament, in spite of the larger views of
the Opposition led by the Hon. R. L. Borden. Under
this Act it was proposed to create a local navy
consisting of four cruisers of the Bristol type, one
of the Boadicea, and six destroyers to be divided
a notable illustration of the influence of political
considerations even upon the diluted strategy
which commended itself to the Canadian Government
between the Atlantic and Pacific coasts. It
was announced that if the vessels were constructed
in the Dominion, as it was afterwards decided they
should be, the capital cost would be increased by 22
per cent. a very low estimate.
What intention Sir Wilfrid Laurier and his col-
leagues really had at the time when this Act was
DANGER OF THE DOMINIONS 75
passed it is impossible to say, but the fact remains
that the Laurier Government went out of office
last year without a single keel having been laid.
From the first Mr. Borden, who is now the Prime
Minister, sharply criticised the proposals. Re-
porting upon the debate on the Bill which took place
at Ottawa on January nth, 1910, the Times
recorded :
He dwelt on the advantages to Canada of her relations
with the Empire, and twitted Sir Wilfrid Laurier with
still holding views in favour of Canadian independence,
as shown by his declaration during this Session that the
proposed Canadian Navy would go to no war unless the
Parliament of Canada chose to send it. Could the rest
of the Empire, he asked, be at war with some great naval
power and Canada be at peace ? The Premier's declara-
tion, he held, meant the complete severance of every tie
which now bound Canada to the Empire. But before
the flag was lowered on Canadian soil there were some
millions of Canadians who would know the reason why.
Mr. Borden declared that he was no militarist, but he
fully realised the necessity of provision for defence.
Canada could not be a hermit nation. Mr. Gladstone
in 1878 said that the strength of England would not be
found in alliances with great military Powers, but in
the efficiency and supremacy of her Navy " a Navy as
powerful as the navies of all Europe." . . . The pro-
posals of the Canadian Government were, in his opinion,
altogether inadequate. They were too much for ex-
periment in the organisation of the Canadian naval
service, and too little for immediate and effective aid.
Mr. Borden's criticisms of the Canadian scheme,
and his interpretation of the situation in Europe,
76 THE COMMAND OF THE SEA
have been proved by events to be well founded.
The Canadian people by their votes have since
admitted that the Laurier proposals are inadequate,
and the crisis to which Mr. Borden referred came
within the three years, but by good luck, or good
statesmanship, fortunately passed without war.
II. THE NEW NAVAL SITUATION.
Another and a greater crisis is now before us,
and in these circumstances the new Canadian
Government, which Mr. Borden leads, has deter-
mined on a strong line of policy in full sympathy
with the newly aroused Imperial spirit in the
Dominion, which found expression during the recent
elections. Speaking in the House of Commons,
the Hon. J. D. Hazen, the Minister of Marine, has
stated :
After such consideration and inquiry as may be
necessary, the Government will present its naval policy
to Parliament and the people. That policy will un-
doubtedly require legislation which will involve the
repeal of the Naval Service Act. In the meantime the
Act will remain on the Statute books for the purposes
in connection with the fishery protection service and
otherwise. Before any permanent naval policy is put
in force the people will be given an opportunity to
pronounce upon it.
Canada has thus a clean slate upon which to write
any naval policy which commends itself to the
Canadian people. South Africa also has a clean slate
upon which she may also write whatever naval
policy she desires. These two oversea dominions
DANGER OF THE DOMINIONS 77
have an opportunity of striking a blow for British
naval supremacy even more dramatic than the blows
which were struck by New Zealand and Australia
three years ago.
The situation is more grave to-day than it was in
1909, because the prospective burden which the
defence of British interests must involve in the future
is now known to be greater. A year ago it was
confidently anticipated that in the present year
Germany would, in accordance with the Navy Law,
revert from a four armoured-ship programme to a
two armoured-ship programme, and that this
reduced output would enable the British naval
authorities automatically to decrease the expenditure
upon the Fleet. It was hoped that the British Navy
Estimates might be eventually brought back to a
forty-million limit, and that at that cost the tra-
ditional superiority of the British Navy could be
maintained year by year. This anticipation can no
longer be entertained. Germany has decided to
amend the Navy Law. She is increasing her
standing fleet by 50 per cent., and her personnel
by over 15,000, and she is going to build more
ships.
It may be said, as it frequently is said, that
whether the Empire existed or not the British people
would be bound in their own interests to maintain
a supreme fleet. This is true, and in the past the
taxpayers of the United Kingdom have, with little
complaint, met year by year the increasing charges
which the upkeep of the Fleet has involved. But
the conditions have changed : the oversea dominions
78 THE COMMAND OF THE SEA
now have a population equal to about one-third of
the population of the United Kingdom, and these
peoples who live overseas bear far lighter burdens
than do we who live in the British Isles.
They are faced by none of those accumulating
social problems which are casting a heavy burden
upon the British Exchequer. While claiming the
privileges of the Imperial connection, they realise
but imperfectly that those privileges carry with
them proportionate responsibilities.
The fact is that Germany to-day aspires not to
such a modest measure of naval power as she aspired
to as recently as 1900, but to the ambition of rising,
step by step, to a position of equality with the
British Fleet. This is the aim of Pan-Germans,
and it is they who, supported by powerful trade
interests, are carrying on the naval agitation in
Germany. They have obtained from the Imperial
Government a new Navy Act, but they are not
satisfied. The new measure is intended to be
but a stepping-stone to yet another Navy Act, by
which it is hoped eventually to create a naval estab-
lishment which shall be admittedly as powerful as
that upon which our very existence depends.
The truth which the new naval situation enforces
is that British interests are not merely the interests
of the United Kingdom. The British Empire may
be compared to a block of flats which adjoins a
powder magazine. Each flat has its separate tenant
who enjoys complete freedom, with his own servants
and his own domestic arrangements. When the
question of fire insurance comes to be discussed, is
DANGER OF THE DOMINIONS 79
it imaginable that the whole cost of insurance should
be borne by those tenants who happen to live on
the side of the block adjoining the powder
magazine ? Would the other tenants urge that by
providing a few fire-grenades they were doing as
much as could be expected of them ? Would it
not be argued that if an explosion occurred, not one
or two of the flats in the block, but the whole struc-
ture, would be razed to the ground ? This is the
situation to-day of the British Empire. It is true
that the United Kingdom lives next to a powder
magazine, but let there be no mistake about the
peril for the whole Empire. If the powder magazine
explodes, while the United Kingdom may feel the
first shock, there is not an inhabitant of the oversea
dominions who will not be affected.
The British Empire is an entity, or it does not
exist. If it is an entity, then surely it is the duty
of every component section to do its part in bearing
the burden of defending that entity. If it is not a
real confederation of self-governing peoples, then
let this be declared now and at once, for only by
such a declaration can the self-governing colonies
save themselves from bearing in time of war the
same horrors of defeat as must fall upon the United
Kingdom once the Fleet has been annihilated. There
is no middle course. The self-governing colonies
cannot take advantage of the British Fleet when
peace reigns, and then when war occurs claim that
they stand outside the conflict. If under peace
conditions they enjoy the blessings which British
supremacy ensures, then if that supremacy is de-
8o THE COMMAND OF THE SEA
throned they must be prepared to share the penalty
of defeat.
The second fact which they can ignore only at
their peril is that the battle of the British Empire
will be fought, not in distant seas, but contiguous to
the naval armaments of the great European Powers.
Canada, South Africa, Australia, New Zealand, and
South Africa the Indian Empire itself, and every
inch of territory over which the British flag flies
are defended by the metropolitan fleets stationed in
European waters. The truth of this statement calls
for no proof. It is self-apparent that where the
danger threatens, there the defence must be offered.
Germany concentrates to-day every armoured ship,
excepting two, most of her cruisers, and all her
torpedo craft, in the North Sea and the Baltic, and
it is Germany which aspires to colonial greatness.
Meanwhile Austria and Italy are expanding their
flcets in the Mediterranean.
The oversea dominions may play with the naval
question to-day they may create little fleets ; but
when the great clash of arms comes those fleets will
have no more influence upon the eventual course of
events than the navies of Colombia, Costa Rica,
Ecuador, and San Domingo. Is it imagined in any
part of the British Empire that a few cruisers and
torpedo-boat destroyers are going to stand between
any oversea dominion and the designs of a great
warlike Empire, with a Fleet costing between twenty
and thirty millions annually, and an Army of
about four million men upon a war footing ?
The German Army contains seven or eight times as
DANGER OF THE DOMINIONS 81
many adult males as the whole of New Zealand ;
it consists of at least three times as many men as
are to be found in the whole of the Commonwealth,
and even Canada itself has not within its boundaries
half as many men as Germany could place under
arms within six weeks of the opening of a war. If
the German Fleet gains command of the sea, the
German army can be transported anywhere to do
anything.
III. AN IMPERIAL SERVICE SQUADRON.
The danger is not immediate, but it is imminent.
If the British Fleet fails at the hour of trial
whether that trial be war or the silent pressure of
armaments behind the diplomatists in council
then the Empire will be in peril. The oversea
Dominions can ensure that the British Fleet shall not
fail, but if they are to take action in time they must
at once realise the gravity of the situation which is
developing. The First Lord of the Admiralty has
made no secret of the danger. He has laid the facts
before all the British peoples. " With every new
development in continental navies," he remarked
on May I5th, 1912, " with every fresh squadron which
takes the water abroad, with every step in the cease-
less accumulation of naval strength with which we
are confronted, the world-wide mobility of the British
Navy becomes restricted." And he added these
cogent words :
And here I think is the great opportunity, the great
chance of the self-governing Dominions, those strong
G
82 THE COMMAND OF THE SEA
young nations which have grown up all over the world
under the shelter of the British flag and by the stimulus
and protection of British institutions. And they have
already begun to seize it. ? ...
If the main developments of the last ten years have
been the concentration of the British Fleet in decisive
theatres, it seems to me, and I dare say it seems to you,
not unlikely that the main naval developments of the
next ten years will be the growth of effective naval
forces in the great Dominions oversea. (Cheers.) Then
we shall be able to make what I think will be found to
be the true division of labour between the Mother Country
and her daughter States that we should maintain a sea
supremacy against all comers at the decisive point and
that they should guard and patrol all the rest of the
British Empire.
I am certainly not going to attempt to forecast or
to prescribe the exact form which these developments
should take. But the march of opinion appears to be
proceeding upon thoroughly practicable lines. This,
however, I will venture to say. The Admiralty see no
reason why arrangements should not be made to give to
the Dominions a full measure of control over the move-
ments in peace of any naval forces which, with our help,
they may bring into efficient existence. We know that
in war our countrymen over the seas will have only one
wish, and that will be to encounter the enemy wherever
the need and the danger is most severe. (Cheers.) The
important thing is that the gap should be filled so that
while we in the Old Country guard the decisive centre,
our comrades and brothers across the seas shall keep the
flag flying on the oceans of the world. (Cheers.)
f
This is the most direct invitation to the oversea
Dominions which has been made by a British
DANGER OF THE DOMINIONS 83
Minister. The way is open. The need of the
moment is apparent.
The Admiralty have felt compelled to withdraw
the Atlantic Fleet from Gibraltar to strengthen the
Home Fleets, and its place has been taken by the
battleships now in the Mediterranean, hitherto based
on Malta, and in an emergency there can be no doubt
that these ships will reinforce the Home Fleets,
since we shall otherwise have only 25 battleships
fully manned at our average moment to the 29
which Germany can send to sea at her selected
moment.* This is apart from the ships with nucleus
crews. If both countries complete these vessels to
full strength, then we shall have 41 vessels and
Germany will have 41 vessels, while we shall also
have the eight ships of the Fourth Squadron the
Gibraltar ships and sixteen older battleships, of
which eight can be manned only after some delay,
and the remaining eight after greater delay. In the
new circumstances the Fourth Squadron will have
to reinforce the Home Fleets, and then there will
not be a single battleship outside northern waters,
and the Mediterranean may be closed to us.
If the Dominions will make some sacrifice, the
scheme of withdrawing the battleships from the
Mediterranean the road to Egypt, India, and the
Antipodes can be abandoned. We can place
eight modern ships preferably the eight Formid-
ables into these waters, with a due proportion of
cruisers and torpedo craft, and when the need
arises, Dreadnoughts can be despatched, if our kith
* Cf. Chapter II, p. 55.
84 THE COMMAND OF THE SEA
and kin will assist in providing an Imperial Service
Squadron to be based on Gibraltar. This would be
the " pivot force " of the Empire, protecting the
entrance to the Channel, where the great trade routes
of the Five Nations converge, protecting the entrance
to the Mediterranean, and protecting also the lines
of Atlantic trade the trade from and to Canada,
the United States, and South America. If the main
strategical theatre in four or five years' time became
the Pacific, then this squadron would steam south.
Naval force is fluid ; it can be moved rapidly and
swiftly, so as to respond to policy. The squadron
to perform this duty would have to be powerful and
mobile a force of unrivalled strength. It has
been suggested* that it might be composed as follows,
its approximate cost being indicated :
Eight Dreadnought cruisers, each mounting: eight
13 5in guns and ten 6in. weapons, and with a speed of
28 knots. Crews (officers and men), 7,200 ; cost of ships,
16,500,000.
Twelve smaller cruisers, each mounting six 6in. guns,
and with a speed of 25 knots. Crews (officers and men),
5,000. Cost of ships, 4,500,000.
Total crews, 12,000; total expenditure on ships,
21,000,000.
An annual payment of about 1,4000,000 would cover
Interest, at 3 per cent., and such a proportion of capital
as in twenty years would extinguish the capital cost
The outlay on upkeep, including the pay of officers
and men, and prospective non-effective charges, such as
pensions, would be about 1,600,000 a year.
Consequently, for a sum of about 3.000.000 annually
this fine squadron of eight Dreadnoughts and a dozen
cruisers could be maintained, and at the end of twenty
years by which time their fighting value would have
been greatly reduced no debt upon them would remain.
* Daily Telegraph, May 28th, 1912.
DANGER OF THE DOMINIONS 85
If the Dominion Parliaments have the will, they
have the power to respond to this invitation without
inflicting on their citizens an onerous burden. A
scheme for the upkeep of the Imperial Service
Squadron might be arranged if each nation agreed to
pay some such sum as follows : Canada, 900,000 ;
Australia, 700,000 ; New Zealand, 400,000 ;
South Africa, 250,000 ; United Kingdom, 750,000.
Total : 3,000,000.
Such payments, which would be accompanied
by local economies, would not press unduly on
the Colonial taxpayers, and by this expenditure
the British peoples would be enabled to continue to
keep the flag flying in the Atlantic and in the
Mediterranean, and we could insure the safety of
those ocean highways on which our welfare as five
federated nations depends.
There is not a Dominion which, by its own effort,
can make such a proportionate contribution to the
strength of the Empire and to its security as these
several payments represent. Australia is proposing
to spend no less than 750,000 annually upon one
armoured ship, three small cruisers, and a few
torpedo craft. Last year the Dominion of Canada
spent more than this sum on her " naval service,"
and neither she nor the Empire is the safer from
attack, for not a modern man-of-war does she yet
possess.
New Zealand has already responded to the Em-
pire's need. She has given one Dreadnought cruiser
for the general service of the Empire, and is making
a payment of 100,000 annually in addition. She
86 THE COMMAND OF THE SEA
has set a splendid example, and would no doubt
come into such a scheme as is here outlined.
The one fact to be realised is that the problem of
the naval defence of the Empire is entering upon a
new phase. Hitherto it has been regarded as one
for the consideration of the people of the United
Kingdom only ; to-day it is coming to be realised,
in face of an increasing peril to our supremacy, that
it is a matter for the peoples of the United Empire.
" For five centuries," the present Minister of Trade
and Commerce in Canada has reminded his fellow-
citizens, " the patient, toiling British taxpayer has
paid the bill, and paid it with a cheerful countenance,
and so far without grumbling." This is the bare
truth. And this Colonial statesman added words
which it is well to recall, for sometimes it is thought
that our kinsmen do not realise what they owe to
the Mother Country : " Can you find in the history
of the world a more sublime figure and instrument-
ality of great and powerful good worked in so un-
selfish a way, and borne so cheerfully and un-
stintingly by the few millions of people who live
in the islands of the North Sea ? To some," he added,
" and I confess to myself, it is time, for very shame's
sake, that we did something, and did something
adequate." Now the opportunity occurs when the
Dominions, enjoying to the full the privileges of
nationhood, can take upon themselves some of the
responsibilities of nationhood, helping, each ac-
cording to its ability, to bear some share of the
burden of Empire.
The stumbling-block hitherto has been the diifi-
DANGER OF THE DOMINIONS 87
culty of arranging that taxation for the provision
of an Imperial Service Squadron, or other form of
co-operative naval movement, shall carry with it
some measure of representation. This difficulty
can be easily removed. The experience of the Com-
mittee of Imperial Defence points to the solution of
this new problem. The First Lord of the Admiralty
has recently admitted that " the Admiralty see no
reason why arrangements should not be made to
give to the Dominions a full measure of control over
the movements in peace of any naval forces which,
with our help, they may bring into effective existence."
Indeed, the matter would prove a comparatively
simple one.
One solution would be the creation of an Imperial
Naval Committee, on which the Admiralty would
be represented by the First Lord, the First Sea Lord,
and the Second Sea Lord, and possibly the Controller,
who has to do with ship design and armament, and
to which each Dominion would send a representative
or representatives, according to the extent of its
contributions. The Imperial Service Squadron
would be under the general authority and control
of the Board of the Admiralty, but its management,
its cruises, and its general well-being under peace
conditions would be watched over by the Imperial
Naval Committee, which would act in an advisory
capacity to the Admiralty, and as the connecting
link between the Mother Country and the Dominions.
One of the most important functions of the
Imperial Naval Committee, apart from the super-
intendence of finance, would be the arrangement of
88 THE COMMAND OF THE SEA
the cruises of the ships. In order to enable them
to carry out this duty the members would be kept
by the Board of Admiralty in close touch with the
movements of events abroad, and in this knowledge
they would settle the itinerary of the Imperial
Service Squadron. If the sky were clear, the vessels
might cross the Atlantic to visit Quebec and Montreal,
or they might make a world tour, showing the flag
in Vancouver and in the great seaports of the Anti-
podes, and, it may be, calling at Durban and Cape
Town. Indeed, this squadron's movements would
be a new link between the Mother Country and the
Dominions, advertising to the world the bonds of
kinship uniting them, and in the summer these ships
would share in the manoeuvres of the Royal Navy.
The squadron would be Imperial in its com-
position and in its character. As officers and
men from the Dominions were available, they would
be passed into this force, and the balance would be
supplied by the Admiralty. Service in these ships
would be regarded as privileged service. Officers
and men would have frequent opportunities of
visiting all parts of the Empire, and the cruises
would not merely provide unique professional
training, but offer a continual reminder of the
great political truth that the Mother Country and
the Dominions are joined together by the seas far
more closely and cheaply than the States of the
United States or the several countries which now
form the German Empire. The crews and the
ships would be Imperial. Each Dominion would
provide and actually own one or more of the vessels,
DANGER OF THE DOMINIONS 89
which would be held on lease by the Imperial Naval
Committee for the Empire. The vessels would not
be merged into the general service of the Royal
Navy, but would be held distinct and separate.
The outstanding merits of such a scheme of co-
operation for the defence of the whole Empire
are many. This squadron would, under normal
conditions, exert its influence where the great trade
routes of the Empire converge, and would be the
guardian of the entrance to the Mediterranean, the
direct road to India and the Far East At other
times it would cruise far afield in the oceans of the
world, showing the flag in the Atlantic and in the
Pacific, and everywhere supporting British prestige
and British trade. For many years to come the
younger nations will need all their manhood for
their internal development. They have labour in
every field of activity requiring labourers, while we
have labourers in tens of thousands requiring labour.
We have the sea habit and all the machinery for
creating sea power at a cheaper rate than any other
country in the world. By co-operation we can pool
what each nation can best spare for Imperial defence,
and by so doing can, at a small sacrifice, make the
Empire as a whole more secure.
This is a scheme of naval co-operation which can
be advocated in the spirit of the larger patriotism.
It has been received favourably by the leading
papers in the oversea Dominions and particularly
by some of the principal newspapers in the Do-
minion of Canada. It would satisfy the natural
desire of our kith and kin that they should have
go THE COMMAND OF THE SEA
some share in the control of the men-of-war for which
they pay, it would not interfere with the general
administration of the Admiralty and it would
enable us to hold our traditional position in the
Mediterranean and defend the trade routes. If the
main strategical theatre became the Atlantic or
the Pacific, then the base of the Imperial Service
Squadron would be changed ; it would be a mobile
force, responding instantly to the call of the
international situation.
If the gravity of the situation which is developing
in Europe were understood by the oversea dominions,
if they could be brought to realise that the seas are
all one and that our peril is also their peril, there
would be no more talk of " baby navies "mere
hand fire-grenades. They would rise to the height
of their Imperial responsibilities and rally to the
support of the one instrument which can ensure to
them a continuance of peace. Local navies, however
generously they may be encouraged, can be of no
war value to the Empire for fifteen, twenty, or
more years, and the danger is in sight. The clouds
which portend the storm are already black on the
horizon ; should they burst it will be too late to
proffer assistance because naval power, on which
the issue of the struggle will mainly depend, unlike
military power, cannot be improvised.
CHAPTER IV.
TRIUMPH OF THE DREADNOUGHT POLICY, 1905-12.
THE dominating factor to be kept in mind
in facing the new naval situation is that
in three or four years' time we shall
have no numerical superiority in service-
able pre-Dreadnought battleships. " Our splendid
fleet of pre-Dreadnought s " will, by 1915, have
shrunk, owing to the disappearance of obsolete
ships, to very limited proportions, and every one
will realise that the Dreadnought policy, which
relegated pre-Dreadnoughts to the background,
has been a triumph of British statesmanship and
economy. The explanation of this apparent
paradox is simple.
Between 1900 and the opening of what may be
described as the Dreadnought era the era of the
all-big-gun ship the number of battleships with
mixed armaments laid down by the leading naval
Powers was as follows :
Number laid down
between 1900 and 1906
Great Britain . . . . . . . . . 15
Germany . . . . . . . . . . 12
United States . . . . . . . . 14
France . . . . . . . . . . n
Italy 5
Austria . . . . . . . . . . 6
Japan 3
92 THE COMMAND OF THE SEA
These are the only battleships (except Dread-
noughts) which will be less than fifteen years old in
1915. Age will have removed all the battleships
built under the Naval Defence Act, and the Spencer
programme and defective design condemned others
not quite so old, and in more or less effective pre-
Dreadnought ships we shall consequently have
fallen to a One Power Standard, and our supremacy
will rest on Dreadnoughts. For this statement
ample evidence will be produced in the course of
this survey of the naval situation.
I. The Danger of 1905 and the Escape.
What was the situation in 1905, when the design
of the Dreadnought was prepared and approved ?
The war in the Far East was drawing to a close.
It was already apparent that Russia would emerge
from the struggle practically denuded of all naval
strength. Therefore the old basis upon which the
Two Power Standard rested, namely, a 10 per cent,
superiority in battleships over the next two greatest
naval Powers, which for many years had been France
and Russia, would no longer exist, and it was realised
that for the future the fleet which would most
powerfully influence British policy would be that
of Germany. The German Navy Law of 1900 was
about to be amended so as to increase the provision
of large cruisers ; an agitation was already under way
for a further acceleration of battleship construction,
and this agitation eventually culminated in the
further amending Act of 1908, which increased the
number of battleships to be provided immediately
THE DREADNOUGHT POLICY 93
for the fleet. These two amendments would have
raised the average expenditure of Germany for
the period of 1908 to 1917 from 11,300,000 to
20,400,000 a growth of upwards of 80 per cent.,
and now a further remarkable expansion has been
decided upon. With no unfriendly feeling, but
merely in recognition of this new factor in the
naval situation, the British authorities had to turn
from the Russian fleet in its weakness and the French
fleet already suffering from years of confused naval
policy, to the consideration of the rapidly growing
navies of Germany and, in a limited sense, the
United States.
At this moment of extreme difficulty, the war in
the Far East, happily for British sea power, shed a
new light upon many naval problems, and in
particular it showed that the decisive factor in a
naval engagement was not, as had been supposed,
the secondary armament of battleships 6-inch
guns but the primary armament of heavy weapons,
12-inch or larger guns. The aim of British policy,
as soon as this truth was recognised, was to design
a new type of battleship carrying the maximum
number of 1 2-inch guns to bear upon the broadside.
The war also illustrated the great strategical and
tactical advantage of high speed, and further showed
the necessity of strengthening the hulls of ships in
order the better to resist torpedo attack.
Realising that the Dreadnought design was
inevitable, the British Admiralty determined to lead
the way and gain every possible naval and economic
advantage. Having what was roughly a numerical
94 THE COMMAND OF THE SEA
equality with the United States, on the one hand,
and with Germany on the other, in modern mixed
calibre ships, we re-asserted our superiority in all-big-
gun ships, with the result that while at this moment
we have 20 of the ships of the new type complete,
Germany has 9, the United States 6, and France and
the other Powers of Europe have none. The present
situation attests the triumph of the Dreadnought,
and conveys a gratifying assurance of present safety.
Nevertheless, the situation in the years ahead, owing
to the large number of vessels now building in
foreign shipyards, is fraught with grave anxiety
unless the British shipbuilding programmes are
adequate to the new needs.
The essential character of the Dreadnought was
not great size, or cost, but great hitting capacity,
great speed, and great power of resistance to an
enemy's attack on a limited displacement. Admiral
of the Fleet Sir Gerard Noel has condemned, with
some violence, the Dreadnought, because he is under
the mistaken impression that this ship marked a
great increase in displacement. If this officer
would turn to any book of reference for 1905 he would
see that before the Dreadnought of 17,900 tons was
laid down, Japan had begun building two ships of
19,000 tons, Russia had in hand two ships of 17,200
tons, and the United States six vessels of over
16,000 tons-all of them ships with mixed armaments.
Would he have had the Admiralty build smaller,
and therefore less powerful, ships than these Powers ?
If not, where does the point of his accusation lie
that the policy of introducing the Dreadnought was
THE DREADNOUGHT POLICY 95
" almost a cut-throat policy " ? It was assuredly,
as will be shown conclusively, a policy of the highest
and wisest statesmanship, which saved our naval
ascendency, and kept millions of pounds in the
pockets of British taxpayers.
The outstanding feature of the Dreadnought was
its gun-power and speed * on a relatively small
displacement. Hitherto, no modern battleship had
been constructed carrying more than four big guns,
or with a greater speed than i8J knots. In the
Dreadnought ten 1 2-inch weapons were mounted
higher from the water, and therefore with a* better
command, in a ship with an armoured belt of greater
resisting power, three knots more speed, and increased
radius, her bunker capacity being sufficient to enable
her to steam about 5,080 sea miles at economical
speed, and about 3,000 sea miles at i8J knots, after
making allowance for bad weather, and a small
amount of coal being left in the bunkers. Provision
was also made for the storage of oil fuel, but this
additional factor is not taken into account in
estimating the radius of action, though it would, of
course, greatly increase it. In order more adequately
to protect the ship from underwater explosion, the
hull was subdivided into an increased number of
watertight compartments, and many other im-
provements were incorporated in the design.
It has been said, by way of criticism, that as soon
* The latest Dreadnought battle-cruiser, Lion, has reached
for a short period a speed of 317 knots, equivalent to
over 36 land miles an hour. The vessel and the others of the
same general type are far better armoured than most pre-
Dreadnought battleships.
96 THE COMMAND OF THE SEA
as the details of the Dreadnought design became
known, the ship was the subject of widespread
" advertisement " in this country, and that foreign
Powers were irritated by boasts that this vessel
rendered all existing battleships obsolete. Lord
Charles Beresford, in particular, has reiterated this
complaint, while himself admitting the excellence
of the Dreadnought type, the advantages of the
rough design of which he himself had " advertised "
at the Royal United Service Institution as early as
February 2nd, 1902, three and a half years before
the ship was begun, when he said :
We have too many sorts of guns in our ships. I was
talking the matter over with my Commander-in-Chief
Lord Fisher the other day, and he used the best
expression I have ever heard on the point. He said :
" What we want in our ships is the biggest smallest gun
and the smallest biggest gun." I entirely agree with
him. I would have those two laid in the ship and not
have the great diversity of armament that we have at
present.
At the same time he pointed out :
It is a very old naval expression that speed now is the
weather gauge. It enables you to get into the position
of advantage, if you know anything about a fleet. . . .
As far as handling a fleet goes, speed is the first con-
sideration ; when once you get into a position of advan-
tage and have anything at all like a head on your
shoulders, you ought never to let the enemy get out of
the position of disadvantage, and that you can ensure
if you have speed.
These features were embodied by Lord Fisher in
THE DREADNOUGHT POLICY 97
the Dreadnought design in 1905, and we thus obtained
great hitting power and " the weather gauge."
II. The Effect of the Dreadnought's Construction.
In the light of the knowledge which we now possess,
it is difficult to see how human nature in British
breasts could have been restrained from a certain
measure of satisfaction at the coup which the
Admiralty achieved when the Dreadnought and her
swift sisters were laid down in secrecy. At the
moment the performance was regarded as a stroke
of craft and statesmanship unparalleled in naval
annals. It is now apparent that, in fact, the
introduction of the Dreadnought was not merely an
excellent stroke of policy, but it represented the
triumph of the British naval authorities over a
combination of disquieting, adverse circumstances.
At the time our naval power rested mainly upon
the very large number of ships which had been built
under the Naval Defence Act of 1889 and under the
Spencer programme. Those ships in 1905 were
becoming obsolete, and it was realised that either
they must be replaced within the next few years or
our naval supremacy would be a thing of the past.
Heavy arrears were accumulating. As a result of a
very careful consideration of all the factors of the
situation, the Dreadnought and her three swifter
sisters were laid down. What was the effect upon
foreign rivalry ?
(i) For over eighteen months the design of
armoured ships in foreign countries ceased,
H
98 THE COMMAND OF THE SEA
because details of our new types were kept secret,
while the British shipyards were engaged in the
construction of the Dreadnought and the three
Invincibles, and their younger sisters.
(2) Simultaneously with the appearance of the
Dreadnought, the pre-Dreadnought ships then in
hand in foreign yards became obsolescent. It is
true the same depreciation was inflicted upon the
vessels in hand for the British Navy, but the effect
at home was slight in comparison with that upon
foreign construction. The British Fleet had in
hand only 7 ships, 5 of the King Edward class of
16,350 tons and the Lord Nelson and Agamemnon
of 16,500 tons ; on the other hand, the United
States had under construction 13 vessels ; Ger-
many, 8 ; France, 6 ; Russia, 5 ; Italy, 4 ; and
Japan, 2. While the Dreadnought affected inju-
riously the value of seven British vessels then under
construction, it relegated to the background thirty-
eight ships then building for the six other great
Powers of the world.
(3) By this courageous stroke of policy, the
Admiralty avoided the necessity of making up the
arrears of armoured shipbuilding which were
mounting up. Instead of replacing the obso-
lescent British battleships with vessels ranking
Pari passu with the men-of-war with mixed arma-
ments then building in foreign yards, it practically
" cleaned the slate " and started upon a fresh
basis with a type of ship so immensely superior
as a fighting machine to anything which had been
known hitherto that at once foreign naval depart-
THE DREADNOUGHT POLICY 99
ments were paralysed. And thus the British Fleet
regained by one stroke of policy the naval supremacy
which it was in serious danger of losing.
(4) The introduction of the Dreadnought con-
sequently effected a vast saving, since we wiped
out arrears in the construction of mixed armament
ships which otherwise would have had to be made
up, and we were enabled to begin afresh with a
start of about eighteen months over all rivals.
The extent of the arrears of shipbuilding which
would have had to be made good if the new type
had not been introduced is apparent from the
following statement, showing the naval programmes
of Great Britain and Germany since the year 1897-8,
when the first of the German Navy Acts was
introduced :
GREAT BRITAIN
GERMANY
1
If
SB
j
S.
|
u y -
Is
j
"S
JU
i!
8
i*
J
.|
iSS
|
i
!<5
1
^
1
4"
U
1
f 1897-8 -
4
4
3
6
__
,
_^
2
6
S3
V
1898-9 -
7
8
12
2
i
2
6
1899-1900
2
2
i
2
3
2
6
c "^
1900-1 -
2
6
i
5
2
2
2
6
5'C '
IOOI-2 -
3
6
2
10
5
2
3
6
I 1
1002-3 -
1903-4 -
2
5
2
4
*6
*4
9
4
2
2
3
2
6
6
g
1904-5 -
2
3
2
3
6
1 1905-6 -
2
3
6
27
35
8
57
13
18
6
22
54
(The Dreadnought period opened in Germany 18 months later
than in England.)
ioo THE COMMAND OF THE SEA
1905-6 -
4
_
_
6
12
_
___
I
_
*->
J3
1906-7 -
3
2
12
2
I
3
12
bo .
si-
1907-8 -
1908-9 -
3
2
i
6
16
12
3
4
_
2
2
12
12
ft
1909-10 -
1910-11 -
8
5
6
5
20
20
4
4
2
2
12
12
s
1911-12 -
S
4
20
4
2
12
1912-13 -
4
*8
20
2
2
12
34t
^"
30
109
^" .,
It
3 6t
,-
15
23:
I
15
8 4
During the same period, 1897-1905, the American Congress
authorised the construction of 18 battleships.
* Eight scouts small cruisers were laid down in 1902 and
1903, and the cruisers of the 1912-13 were designated "light
armoured cruisers."
t These 36 craft are small destroyers, and were built as such.
J These totals include battle cruisers.
Consequently at the date when the Dreadnought
was designed, Germany had built or was building
12 mixed armament battleships authorised since
1900, while the United States had 14, or a total
of 26 for the next two naval Powers, as compared
with 14 for the British Fleet.
III. The pre-Dreadnought Fleets.
By one single act the construction of the Dread-
nought the British Admiralty so seriously de-
preciated the value of the new foreign battleships,
ships with mixed armaments, that in 1915 they will
be of practically negligible importance, for at that
date only Dreadnoughts will figure in the first line
of any of the fleets of the world, and the pre-Dread-
THE DREADNOUGHT POLICY 101
nought ships, though so many of them under foreign
flags are of comparatively modern construction,
will be definitely relegated to the reserve.
In 1915 the pre-Dreadnought battleships of
military value in the four leading fleets will comprise :
No. of
Ships.
8 (a)
8
18
5
5
5
15
5
6
2(c) ..
13
Great Britain.
Class.
Formidable
King Edward VII,
Lord Nelson
Germany.
Wittelsbach
Braunschweig
Deutschland
United States.
Georgia ;
Connecticut ,
Idaho .
France.
Patrie ..
Danton
Tons.
120,000
130,800
33,000
283,800
58,000
65,000
66,000
189,000
74>740
96,000
26,000
196,740
73,250
108.000
ii
181,250
102 THE COMMAND OF THE SEA
(a) Some of these ships will be old in 1915, but they
have been included because of their high fighting value,
while three later ships the " Swiftsure," " Triumph,"
and " Albemarle," though laid down some time later,
have been omitted because in 1915 they will be almost
worthless, owing to their weak armour protection. The
King Edward VII. class are weak in their armament,
some of the guns being too near the water.
(b) It is questionable whether these five small ships,
with no heavier weapon than the 9.4 inch gun, will be
of great value in 1915, though they are well armoured.
(c) These two ships will be of slight value in 1915.
The British Navy will have an advantage in these
mixed armament battleships in tons displacement
owing to the larger size of individual ships, but the
balance will not be considerable, and for all practical
purposes we shall be down to a One Power
Standard.
IV. The Economy of the Dreadnought Policy.
It may be said it has indeed frequently been
mentioned by way of criticism, that the Dread-
nought has involved this country in very heavy
additional naval expenditure. A few figures will
show conclusively that this statement rests upon no
foundation. The simplest way of indicating the
influence of the Dreadnought policy upon British
naval expenditure is to take the official figures of
the average total naval expenditure and the average
sums expended in shipbuilding in the five years prior
to the building of the Dreadnought and in the five
years since the Dreadnought was laid down :
THE DREADNOUGHT POLICY 103
Average Expenditure 1901-1905.
Total Cost of
Expenditure. New Construction
Great Britain .. 33,541,458 .. 11,415,058
Germany . . . . 10,276,000 . . 4,540,127
United States .. 18,733,134 .. 6,108,550
France .. .. 12,665,893 .. 4,864,858
Average Expenditure 1906-1910.*
Great Britain . . 34.248,453 . . 10,735,188
Germany .. .. 16,731,555 .. 8,098,739
United States . . 25,179,213 . . 6,548,750
France .. .. 13,181,337 .. 4>495>993
There is no trace in these figures of that terrible
burden of expenditure in which the Dreadnought is
supposed in some quarters to have involved us. In
the five years after the beginning of the Dread-
nought we actually spent less on new ships than
in the five preceding years, though the outlay of
rivals increased German expenditure being nearly
doubled.
Another indication of the economy effected by the
introduction of the Dreadnought is to be found in a
consideration of the cost of the British pre-Dread-
noughts and British Dreadnoughts. Every ton of
a man-of-war represents a measure of fighting
strength. The cost per ton of the latest pre-
Dreadnoughts and of the Dreadnoughts has been
as follows :
* If 1911 is included, the average for the six years 1906-11
for new construction are: British, ^11,873,803; German,
^8,692,425 ; American, ^6,347,923 ; France, 4,742,771.
104 THE COMMAND OF THE SEA
Cost
Class. per Ton.
King Edward . . Pre-Dreadnought . . 93
Lord Nelson . . . . 100
Dreadnought . . Dreadnought . . 101
Invincible .... . . 101
Bellerophon . . ,, 93
St. Vincent . . 88
Orion .... ..83
These figures show that we are buying our
fighting power more cheaply per ton to-day
owing to the introduction of the Dreadnought
type than we were before, and, moreover, we
are buying it cheaper than any other Power
in the world.
Lord Brassey recently suggested that we were
paying more for our men-of-war than other countries.
It would be surprising, in view of the economic
conditions in this country and abroad, if this were
true, and it would tax Lord Brassey's powers, as
an advocate of Free Trade, to explain away such a
remarkable anomaly it if existed. As a matter of
fact, the relative cost per ton of the latest ships of
the Dreadnought type built and building in this
country and abroad is as follows :
Great Britain (Orion) . . . . . . 83
Germany (Thuringen) . . . . 100
United States (Utah) 87
France (Danton) 122
Italy (Cavour) 118
The cheapness of British shipbuilding is a necessary
THE DREADNOUGHT POLICY 105
corollary to the excellence of the organisation of
industry in this country and to the unrivalled out-
put which is necessary in order to maintain the
supremacy of the world's largest fleet.
Not only are British Dreadnoughts cheap as to
first cost, but they are cheap also in maintenance
far cheaper than the less powerful pre-Dreadnoughts.
During the discussion of the Navy Estimates in
1911, the late First Lord of the Admiralty, Mr.
McKenna, gave official figures which show con-
clusively the continuing economic advantage of the
Dreadnought policy. He said :
The Dreadnoughts, the eight battleships now in
commission, cost 1,710,000 apiece. The cost of those
eight battleships is precisely the same to build as" the
cost of nine King Edwards.
But the upkeep of the eight Dreadnoughts costs
50,000 less a year than the upkeep of the nine King
Edwards. Let any hon. member ask any distinguished
admiral he likes whether he would rather command a
fleet of eight Dreadnoughts or of nine King Edwards,
and I should be surprised if he did not say that he would
prefer to have the eight Dreadnoughts, with their
possible 80 12-inch guns, their speed of 21 knots, and
their very considerable armour protections, to the nine
King Edwards, mounting 36 12-inch guns with a very
much lower speed.
The Army and Navy Gazette, commenting upon
this statement, remarked that " There can be but
one answer to this question of preference in regard
to the types, and, in fact, if the nine King Edwards
were increased to twelve, we doubt whether any
io6 THE COMMAND OF THE SEA
admiral would be willing to take them into action
instead of eight Dreadnoughts. But, by preferring
the latter, as Mr. McKenna went on to remind the
House, he would be saving the country 50,000 a
year as well. Compared in the same way, the
Dreadnoughts show a similar advantage over the
Lord Nelsons. A total of thirty Lord Nelsons could
be built for the cost of twenty-nine Dreadnoughts,
but they would cost 15,000 a year more to maintain
than the latter vessels."
V. The Naval Position.
As to the present position of the British Fleet,
there is no possibility of cavil. It is extremely easy
to produce sophisticated statistics to prove almost
anything, but it will be impossible for any alarmist
to paint a picture of naval peril at present from the
materials at command. But in spite of the satis-
factory standing of the British Fleet to-day, the
position will be one of considerable peril unless
adequate provision is made for new ships in the
immediate future. During the next few years
the British Navy will shed almost all the old vessels
which were built prior to the beginning of the
present century, and thus its strength will be
materially reduced. In pre-Dreadnought battleships
it will have little superiority over either Germany,
the United States, or France. " Our splendid fleet
of pre-Dreadnoughts " will have diminished, as
it was bound to diminish owing to the effluxion
of time. If the Dreadnought had not been built in
1905, we should have had to replace these ships
THE DREADNOUGHT POLICY 107
with ships of more or less the same character,
and these ships would have ranked pari passu with
the thirty-nine modern pre-Dreadnought battleships
of the German, American, and French fleets. By the
introduction of the Dreadnought, the Admiralty
definitely and finally departed from the old designs,
and consequently we are in the fortunate position
of not having to replace the pre-Dreadnoughts a
vast economy.
The immediate responsibility which rests upon
the Admiralty is the comparatively limited one of
laying down sufficient ships of the new type to
neutralise the ships of the new type which are being
built abroad, or will be laid down in the coming
years. This carries with it the inevitable disad-
vantage that in 1915 and the succeeding years we
shall possess practically no numerical advantage in
effective pre-Dreadnoughts, but this will be a matter
of small importance, because, owing to the rapid
development of naval design, the pre-Dreadnoughts
of foreign fleets, in spite of their comparative
modernity, will hardly be taken into account
in comparisons of naval strength. In a very inter-
esting paper which he read before the Institution
of Naval Architects in 1911, Professor J. J. Welch
made a most valuable comparison between the
fighting weight of the pre-Dreadnoughts and Dread-
noughts. He gave a mass of statistics, showing
the weight of the battle broadside of typical vessels
of the British, German, American, Japanese, French,
and Russian fleets. The following figures are
quoted from Professor Welch's paper :
io8 THE COMMAND OF THE SEA
Class
GREAT BRITAIN
Duncan
King Edward
Lord Nelson
Dreadnought
Neptune
Orion
GERMANY
Wittelsbach
Braunschweig
Deutschland
Nassau
Helgoland ...
UNITED STATES
Georgia
Connecticut
Michigan ...
Delaware ...
Arkansas ...
JAPAN
Pre- D read noughts.
Satsuma
Aki
Settsu
FRANCE
Patrie
Danton
Jean Bert ...
RUSSIA
Pre- Dreadnoughts.
Sebastopol ...
Weight Lbs. of Shell
of Battle per Ton
Broadside. Ditplace-
Lbs.
inert.
Pre-Dreadnought
4,000
29
4,400
27
N
5,3oo
32
Dreadnought
6,800
3 8
N
8,500
42
12,500
56
Pre-Dreadnought
2,100
22
3,830
29
H
3,830
29
Dreadnought
6,030
'33
>
9,400
'43
Pre-Dreadnought
5,670
38
?i
5,51
'34
Dreadnought
6,960
'43
i)
8,700
'43
10,440
40
(various)
Dreadnought
3,900-5,00
6,400
3i-'32
'33
6,800
"34
!,
7,3oo
'35
Pre-Dreadnought 3,900 -27
6,130 -34
Dreadnought 9,7oo '42
(various)
Dreadnought
3,410-4,300 -25--30
8,640 -37
Professor Welch, in his interesting paper, added .
Remembering that in recent years tacticians have
increasingly emphasised the necessity for good broadside
fire, it has been considered that the ratio given fairly
measures relative gun power. The increase in the ratio
of weight of bioadside fire to displacement, noted in the
THE DREADNOUGHT POLICY 109
more recent ships, depends in the first place on the
increased number of large guns now installed, as well as
upon the increase of calibre ; but it is also affected by
the now usual method of mounting all these guns on the
centre line, so that the whole of these weapons are
available on either broadside. It must be remembered
that the later guns can be fired more rapidly than those
of the earlier type, so that a comparison of weight of
broadside fire does not completely represent the im-
provement of gun installation in later, as compared with
earlier, vessels.
The most casual examination of the tables shows how
greatly the size of individual battleships has developed,
with corresponding advantages in speed and gun power ;
and the rapidity of the advance may be gauged by the
fact that not more than seven years ago a distinguished
admiral remarked in this room : " We have talked about
i8,ooo-ton ships, but I venture to think that an 18,000-
tons ship would be a mistake." The table shows that
there are already in existence vessels of much greater
displacement than that deprecated by the gallant ad-
miral, and there is no distinct indication that the limit
has yet been reached.
Thus, within the last ten years, British battleships
have increased 60 per cent, in displacement, 35 per cent,
in length, and about 17 per cent, in breadth ; the speed
has been increased-by over 2 knots, whilst the weight
of metal discharged per broadside has risen from 4000 Ibs.
to 12,500 Ibs., an increase of over 200 per cent. The new
type of cruiser-battleships, too, has developed, until it
now includes the " Lion " and " Princess Royal,"
vessels of 26,350 tons displacement, each having a length
of 600 ft. between perpendiculars, and a speed of 28 knots.
The same tendency is as strongly marked in other navies ;
in the United States, for example, the displacement of
no THE COMMAND OF THE SEA
battleships has been more than doubled within the last
ten years, the speed has been increased by three knots,
and the weight of metal thrown per broadside taking
the latest available information has been increased
practically 225 per cent. In the German Navy, too,
the displacement of the battleship has been about
doubled within the period under review, and the weight
of metal discharged per broadside has increased by
about 260 per cent.
As to the reasons leading to the rapid advance in size
in ships, the order of development seems to be somewhat
as follows : As a result of the increasing radius of action
of the torpedo, and of the great increase in accuracy of
gun fire due to improved training of gunners and in-
creased efficiency of apparatus, it was realised that
future naval battles would be fought at much greater
ranges than obtained in the past, and that under such
circumstances the projectiles from smaller guns than the
12-in. would be relatively inefficient against armour.
To make up, in the newer vessels, for the lighter guns
hitherto carried, it was necessary to instal more 12-in.
weapons than the four which had been usual for many
years. To do this to the extent desired necessitated
increase of size, particularly in the direction of length,
although additional beam was also called for to ensure
the requisite stability with the increased top weight.
Increase of length is especially favourable to speed,
and thus it was possible to make simultaneously a
distinct advance in speed without undue increase of
machinery weights, particularly as this advance coin-
cided with the introduction, on a large scale, of the
turbine for marine purposes, by which means much larger
powers could be installed than could with equal con-
venience be developed in reciproacting engines.
Professor Welch's figures and statements carry
THE DREADNOUGHT POLICY in
the most convincing proof of the slight value
which will attach to pre-Dreadnoughts in 1915,
when there will be about one hundred Dreadnoughts
in commission in the world's fleets. At that date
battleships with mixed armaments, and therefore
weak primary armaments, will be a negligible
quantity, and it will be apparent to the most cursory
student of naval policy that when the Admiralty
laid down the Dreadnought and rendered the large
proportion of modern foreign pre-Dreadnoughts
obsolescent, they inaugurated a policy, not of
extravagance, but of economy. For all practical
purposes the later Dreadnoughts have wiped out
of existence the ships of foreign fleets with their
weak broadside fire. From 1915 onwards only
Dreadnoughts will seriously count, and it is by
Dreadnoughts that British supremacy must be
maintained.
The outlook is grave, owing to the large number
of improved Dreadnoughts now under construction
in foreign shipyards. Without going into un-
necessary detail, it may be sufficient to set out the
actual strength of the British and German fleets at
the end of this and the two subsequent years and in
the spring of 1915, showing the proportion of British
over German strength.*
* There is every reason, at the time of writing, to anticipate
that Germany in the present year will begin two Dreadnoughts,
and in that case she will have 23 complete in 1915, as com-
pared with the British 34. This will represent a British
superiority of less than 48 per cent., whereas the only standard
of safety, in view of the position of the British Empire and its
dependence on the sea, is 100 per cent., or Two Keels to One.
ii2 THE COMMAND OF THE SEA
Percentage of
Actual Strength. British over
British. German. German Strength.
End of 1912 . . . . 20 . . 13 . . 53.8
End of 1913 . . . . 25 . . 17 . . 47.0
End of 1914 . . . . 30 . . 21 . . 42.8
End of 1915 . . . . 34* . . 23 . . 47.8
At the last date, the United States will have
12 Dreadnoughts complete, Japan 8, and France,
Russia, Austria, and Italy, 4 each ; while Brazil
and Spain will possess 3 each ; and Argentina,
Chili, and Turkey, 2 each ; or a total for the
whole world of 105.
The Admiralty apparently intend to utilise
pre-Dreadnoughts in the Fourth Squadron based
on Gibraltar, at the very entrance to the Mediter-
ranean, even as late as three years hence, when
Austria and Italy will have eight Dreadnoughts in
commission, and that they will trust to the French
Fleet to readjust the naval balance. This will
amount to an abandonment of our naval pre-
eminence on the route to the Far East, India, and
Australia, and it will presumably lead to the present
Double Entente with France being changed into prac-
tically an alliance with the costly and disturbing mili-
tary obligations on the Continent of Europe which
such an alliance will involve. In effect, it will amount
to this that the Government will provide a
smaller fleet than would be necessary if England still
occupied a position of splendid isolation, while at
the same time she, a maritime Power, will pledge
herself to provide increased military force which
* This excludes the battle-cruisers Australia and New Zealand.
THE DREADNOUGHT POLICY 113
could be employed on the Continent of Europe in
support of French aims. This is a matter of high
policy. It cannot be discussed within the limits of
this survey of the naval situation. But now and here
it should be distinctly emphasised that a policy of
this character, accompanied by a relative decline of
British naval strength vis-a-vis to Germany, is
fraught with the gravest peril not only to the people
of the United Kingdom, dependent for their very
food and for their raw materials upon the freedom
of the seas, but to the existence of the British
Empire.
Fortunately the British position in cruisers and
torpedo craft gives little occasion for anxiety.
From the figures prepared by the American In-
telligence Department, it is apparent that at present
we have more modern cruisers and torpedo craft
than any two Powers. On the other hand, the table
of British construction given on pages 99-100
indicates that a large number of these cruisers and
torpedo craft are well advanced in age, and must be
replaced in the immediate future.
The amount of money which need be devoted in
the immediate future to the construction of cruisers
will be limited in extent owing to the influence which
the introduction of the Dreadnought has had upon
the plans of foreign Powers. According to the last
returns of shipbuilding, the pressure of Dreadnought
construction upon the exchequers of the world
has been so great that most foreign Powers have
practically abandoned the building of cruisers.
All the naval Powers, except Great Britain and
I
ii4 THE COMMAND OF THE SEA
Germany, have for the time being ceased to
construct cruisers, and to this extent the danger
to British commerce is reduced. But at the same
time additional ships must be built for duty upon
the trade routes and for Imperial purposes. Mr.
Winston Churchill, speaking at the annual dinner
of the Incorporated Chambers of Commerce in 1907,
when he was Under Secretary for the Colonies,
stated :
There are a score of things for which we do not require
first-class battleships or cruisers, but for which, never-
theless, we need urgently a squadron of ships of some
sort or other. What I hope the Government may be
able to effect is the institution of a squadron of vessels
that might discharge all those patrol and other duties
absolutely necessary to the efficiency and dignified con-
duct of the administration of an Empire so wide as ours.
Now that Mr. Churchill is First Lord of the
Admiralty business men and our kinsmen overseas
will watch with interest to see the manner in which
he will interpret in naval terms this declaration of
policy.
Future shipbuilding programmes will also have to
make provision for an additional number of torpedo
craft. Last financial year the Admiralty laid down
20 destroyers and 6 submarines ; in the present
year, since Germany will begin at least 12 destroyers
and about 10 submarines, a large British pro-
gramme of torpedo craft had to be faced, and it
may be hoped that, in view of the dramatic success
achieved by the latest type of submarine, the Board
of Admiralty will have the courage to devote more
THE DREADNOUGHT POLICY 115
attention in coming years to these craft, even if
this policy involves, for financial reasons, some
reduction in the number of destroyers laid down.
The submarine is the most effective and decisive
defence against the invasion bogey which from
time to time frightens the British people, and which
might, in a period of grave international disquiet,
deflect the defence policy of the country from its
proper expression in action, as occurred, for instance,
when the plans of the authorities in the United
States had to be recast, owing to the fears of the
people on the Atlantic coast of depredations by
Spanish cruisers.
It is in the light of these facts, and not of the
present satisfactory standing of the British Fleet,
that the naval position must be examined. We have
an ample margin to-day, but the Admiralty's
proposals in future years will have to be based on
the conditions which will exist in the years ahead
in 1915, in 1916, and so on. By 1915 we shall
have in our sea-goings fleet 34 Dreadnoughts,
Germany 23, Russia, Austria, Italy, France, and the
United States, at least 28, or 34 if we include the
6 Dantons of France. If this is not a grave
outlook in view of the kaleidoscopic changes
which are so apt to occur in the groupings
of the Powers and the rapidity with which storm
clouds gather, what adjective can be applied to it ?
Nor can the building of further cruisers and torpedo
craft be avoided. The personnel must also be
increased.
It is apparent that, even if there were to be no
ii6 THE COMMAND OF THE SEA
renewed naval activity abroad and Germany has
adopted a new programme full of grave menace
the outlook is one which flatly negatives any hope
of naval economy.
Since the present century began, national revenue
has been forced up by forty-two millions sterling
from 110,500,000 in 1900 to nearly 177,000,000
in 1912. It is still rising, and all who are concerned
for the maintenance of our unquestionable supremacy
upon the seas must experience serious misgivings
as to the influence of the present extravagance,
in the form of new and increasing permanent charges,
upon the Navy Estimates when the inevitable period
of trade depression occurs, and the receipts of the
Exchequer fall below the present high level. So
far the millions of economy secured by the Dread-
nought policy have been " earmarked " for social
reform, but we must not forget that an unchallenge-
able fleet is vital to poor and rich alike.
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CHAPTER V.
THE NAVY'S NEED OF MEN.
IN naval discussions attention is devoted almost
exclusively to the provision of additional
ships for the Fleet. But battles are won not
by ships, but by men. In an emergency even
the largest armoured vessels can be completed for
sea in about two years. It takes more than twice
as long to train an efficient gunner or torpedo-man,
and rather over seven years to educate a responsible
junior officer from the day when he enters Osborne
Naval College as a raw cadet.
At such times as these, when our sea supremacy
is challenged, a great deal is heard of our needs in
the matter of ships, and there is always the danger
that the essential element of officers and men will be
forgotten. There are half a dozen organisations
which are always ready to raise an agitation in
favour of more ships of all classes, because the
popular idea of naval power is distinctly based on
materiel ; the persistent cry is " Ships, ships, ships."
There is still a widespread impression that at a few
months' notice at most the Admiralty can obtain,
by some indefinite method of compulsion, the re-
quisite number of men for the Fleet. The fact,
on the contrary, is that the naval authorities can
secure as many ships as are required within reason
in twenty-four to thirty-six months, but, under no
THE NAVY'S NEED OF MEN 119
circumstances of pressure, however extreme, can
efficient and well-trained officers and men be obtained
in anything like the same period to fight them.
Any missionary who would go forth on a pilgrim-
age throughout the length and breadth of the
United Kingdom preaching the fundamental truth
that naval supremacy depends not upon ships
exclusively, but upon ships and trained officers
and men and a war organisation elaborated in time
of peace, would be doing more to safeguard our
supremacy of the sea than all the Navy Leagues and
defence associations in existence. Man is still
greater than the instruments he fashions. Man
evolved the steel hull which has replaced first wood
and then iron. Man devised the reciprocating
steam engine, which replaced sails, has now per-
fected the turbine, and is developing the internal
combustion engine for marine purpose. Man in-
vented the wonderful process of hardening steel into
armour. Man experimented, year after year, until
he at last obtained the marvellous 13.5-inch gun of to-
day, which can throw a projectile of 1400 Ibs. with
sufficient velocity to penetrate 22 inches of armour at
a distance of about two miles. Man, after patient
research, has succeeded in devising an automobile
torpedo, in itself as complete a man-of-war as the
Dreadnought, capable of carrying a charge of over
300 Ibs. of gun cotton at a speed of 27 miles an hour
under the water and, running as true as the compass,
hitting an objective at a distance of over four and
a half miles. Man has triumphed over all the
forces of nature, and in a modern warship has
120 THE COMMAND OF THE SEA
pressed steam, electricity, hydraulics, and pneu-
matics into his service.
Much has been heard of what has been styled
" the materiel school " in the Navy ; it does not
exist. The history of modern naval power is the
history of the triumph of man over materiel and not
the triumph of materiel over man. In the old wars
all these latent forces lay to the hand of the great
sailors, but they had not yet learnt how to conquer
them. In process of time the secrets which were
then hidden have been revealed by man's research
and industry, and the greatest danger which threatens
our naval supremacy to-day is the popular impres-
sion that ships are of prime importance and that it
is upon the provision of these that public attention
should be concentrated at a time of crisis such as is
now approaching. The cry is always for ships, more
ships. The more intelligent of those who participate
in naval agitations take it for granted probably
that if they can compel the Government to bend
before a popular demand for an increased number of
men-of-war, the Admiralty, on its part, will take
corresponding action to see that officers and men
are provided in time for manning the ships.
There is, however, no justification for this com-
placency. The Board of Admiralty is after all
only one department of the State, under the control
of the Government of the day, and its policy is
subservient to the financial policy of the party in
power. Since the popular mind is impressed by
the mere fact of building ships, and little or no credit
attaches to a Government which devotes its atten-
THE NAVY'S NEED OF MEN 121
tion to other essential features of naval administra-
tion, including the manning of the Fleet, the temp-
tation to build ships and to economise by refraining
to make adequate provision to fight them has fre-
quently proved irresistible. Even as recently as
1889, the Government of that day introduced a
Naval Defence Act, which made provision for the
construction of men-of-war representing a capital
value of twenty-one millions sterling, and absolutely
no provision was made for manning these new ships
of war. When at last they were completed and
ready to pass into the Fleet, it was discovered that
they could not be placed in commission because
officers and men were wanting. Thus it happened
that the Admiralty were forced to tempt young
officers of the mercantile marine to enter the Navy,
under limited conditions as to pay and promotion-
conditions provocative eventually of unlimited dis-
content and the United Kingdom was also scoured
for youths too old to undergo the ordinary long service
training, but capable of being passed through a short
course of instruction before being drafted to sea to
make good the serious deficiency in seamen which
had arisen. In the light of past naval crises, it is
unsafe to take for granted the assurance that any
Government, whatever its political complexion, will,
in bringing forward a programme of shipbuilding,
take the necessary steps to provide the officers
and men without whom the vessels cannot put to
sea as effective men-of-war.
In the old days, before man had triumphed over
materiel and the ship of war had become a compli-
122 THE COMMAND OF THE SEA
cated box of interdependent mechanical contrivances,
the problem of manning the Fleet was far less difficult
than to-day. Even in the Napoleonic period naval
warfare did not approximate to an exact science.
At that time we did not possess a continuous service
system, because the routine of life at sea was so
simple, and the duties devolving upon the sailors,
though arduous, so rudimentary that any man,
tinker, tailor, masterman, thief, who could be cajoled
or forced to set foot upon a warship could be trans-
formed in a short time into a reputable man-of-war's
man. Times have changed. It has been well
remarked as a fact notable in naval history that
up to the battle of St. Vincent nearly every victory
went to the side which had the most ships, while
since then it has gone to the side which, from causes an-
tecedent to the battle, had the best trained personnel.
In the battle of Trafalgar the French and Spanish
were untrained, it was the same with the Chinese at
Yalu, the Spaniards at Manilla and Santiago, and
lastly it was the same with the Russians in the Far
East, when perfection of training and a high standard
of intelligence gave to the Japanese their series of
comparatively easy victories at sea. The secret of
victory is to be found, not in the number or excellence
of the ships on either side though the best ships
are only just good enough, and there cannot be too
many ships if annihilation and not victory is still
our ideal, as it was Nelson's but in the character
and training and esprit de corps of the officers and
men who man them.
It must be recognised to their credit that during the
THE NAVY'S NEED OF MEN 123
recent period of rigid economy 1904-9 when the
Government was endeavouring by its example to
arrest the rivalries of the Powers in naval armaments,
the present Board of Admiralty fought against the
temptation to adopt the old short-sighted device of
cutting down the regular personnel of the Fleet.
In those five years the expenditure upon the
Fleet was reduced by an aggregate sum of nearly
27,000,000. Of this amount only 11,000,000 was
due to the reduction in the votes for new construc-
tion, and the remainder, a sum of 16,000,000, was
attributable to the reforms which were initiated
during the period when Lord Selborne was at the
head of the Admiralty and called to his aid as First
Sea Lord, Admiral of the Fleet Sir John now Lord
Fisher. The saving on the shipbuilding was a tem-
porary economy, because the money which was un-
spent in the period indicated had to be provided in
the subsequent years, since the challenge to naval
economy, in which Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman
had firm faith, was not taken up by rival Powers,
and was, indeed, flouted by Germany. But this did
not apply to the other economies amounting to
16,000,000. They were due to an improved
method of administration and the elimination of
wasteful channels of expenditure. During former
periods of economy, the Admiralty had permitted
expenditure on the personnel of the Fleet to be
reduced ; on this occasion the Board adopted the
wise policy of building up the personnel. The con-
trast is best perceived by comparing the sums spent
in 1904 and in 1912 under the various votes which
124 THE COMMAND OF THE SEA
are concerned with the personnel :
1904 1912
Numbers voted . . . . 131,000 136,000
Wages, etc., of officers and men 6,785,785 7,801,500
Victualling and clothing . . 2,410,030 3,359,437
Educational services . . 137,745 218,885
Royal Naval Reserve . . 378,879 436,432
In these years the whole scheme of manning the
Navy was changed. The number of regular
officers and men was increased and the allowances
and pensions of the lower deck were improved,
while at the same time reforms were introduced in
the regulations governing the clothing and victualling
votes which secured to the men many advantages.
This, however, is only half the tale. While the
regular personnel of the Fleet was slightly increased,
there was a great expansion in the trained reserves.
The change may be thus explained ; comparative
summary :
RESERVISTS PERIODICALLY TRAINED.
1898 1912
Royal Naval Reserve (merchant,
sailors, fishermen, etc., trained in
1898 at shore batteries, but now
in sea-going ships) . . . . . . 27,600 21,534
Royal Fleet Reserve (men who have
had five or more years' experience
in the Fleet) nil 26,227
Royal Naval Volunteers . . . . nil 4,100
Total .. 27,600 51,861
RESERVISTS NOT PERIODICALLY TRAINED.
Pensioners under 55 . . . . 39,180 7,969
THE NAVY'S NEED OF MEN 125
There is a popular impression that the merchant
navy is the reservoir upon which the Royal Navy
should draw in time of war. This is an old fallacy,
which we have inherited from the sail era. The
truth is that we have every reason for satisfaction
at the decrease in the number of men of the Royal
Naval Reserve merchant seamen and fishermen
since it has been accompanied by an even greater
growth of the Royal Fleet Reserve of ex-naval men.
The Navy does not require the merchant navy type
of reservist. The conditions of naval service have
completely changed and are still changing. The
men who are needed for the arduous service of
the Royal Navy to-day are those who
(1) are instantly available ;
(2) are familiar with the routine of life on board
a man-of-war ; and
(3) have an aptitude for mechanical as distin-
guished from manual work.
Moreover, is it not an anomaly to maintain a
supreme war fleet, at a great cost, in order, among
other things, that the merchant fleet of England
may go about its business in time of war, carrying
to this country the much-needed supplies of food
and raw material, and at the same time to make
plans under which the merchant navy, robbed of
its best hands in the interest of the war Navy,
would be compelled to lie up in our harbours,
idle and useless? The Royal Navy exists that
the merchant navy may keep the seas in time of war
and that we may obtain food. What justification,
126 THE COMMAND OF THE SEA
then, is there for a naval policy such as that of
the immediate past which definitely planned a war
organisation for the Royal Navy based, in part at
least, upon a scheme capable of being carried out
only at the expense of the mercantile marine ? Such
a scheme of war efficiency rested upon no secure
foundation. Apart from this, it necessarily follows
that reservists who are engaged in making long
distance voyages cannot be readily available in time
of war. Even when the Admiralty, under the
pressure of public opinion, devoted itself to the up-
building of the old reserve system, it was recognised
that at best only about one-third of the reservists
enrolled in the merchant navy could be counted upon
on the outbreak of war, and that that one-third would
go afloat unacquainted with the routine of naval life
owing to the fact that their sole war training had been
carried out in their hours of leisure at ill-armed
batteries ashore. The consequence of this plan of
manning the Fleet was that the Admiralty had to
pay three reservists for every one whom they could
expect to secure in an emergency, and this one-third
could be secured only by crippling that very merchant
service which it is the business of the Royal Navy
to preserve.
It may be objected that these are very revolu-
tionary views. They are to be found, however, with
some approach to completeness, in one of those
many Blue Books which lie buried under the dust
of every Government office. In January, 1902, a
former Board of Admiralty appointed a Committee
to consider this very question of the manning of the
THE NAVY'S NEED OF MEN 127
Navy, with Sir Edward Grey as chairman. Asso-
ciated with him in the investigation were Admiral of
the Fleet Sir Edward Seymour, Admiral Sir Reginald
Henderson (formerly Admiral Superintendent of
Coastguards and Reserves), Admiral the Hon.
Sir Hedworth Meux (now Commander-in-Chief at
Portsmouth), Sir Francis Howell, Sir Alfred Jones,
and Mr. J. Clark Hall (Registrar General of Seamen).
As a result of a most painstaking inquiry the
Committee reported, among other things :
One of the objects of a strong Navy is to enable
our merchant ships to keep the sea in time of war,
and this object would be defeated if too many
seamen and firemen were suddenly withdrawn
from the mercantile marine and a considerable
portion of it laid up in consequence of want of
crews. . . .
The Committee note that if for political or other
reasons it should be found necessary to increase
gradually, without mobilisation, the proportion
of ships in commission to those in reserve, the
present manning system would break down be-
cause all the active service ratings would be used
up first and there would only be half-trained
reserves left for the ships commissioned.
The old manning system was so faulty that the
commissioning of a few extra ships would have
occasioned complete dislocation. War vessels would
have put to sea manned almost exclusively by
reservists, trained mainly at shore batteries, many
of which had nothing more modern than muzzle-
loading guns.
128 THE COMMAND OF THE SEA
In these circumstances the Admiralty a few years
ago introduced a new scheme of training for the
reservists of the merchant navy. \Yith few exceptions
they have now to go afloat in order to qualify for
the receipt of their allowances, and the old absurd
system of instructing naval seamen at batteries
ashore has been abolished. It would have been
almost as absurd to take cavalry men afloat in his
Majesty's ships for their summer manoeuvres as
to train naval reservists for the Fleet at shore
batteries armed with muzzle-loading guns. The
system was rotten to the core, and there is every
occasion for satisfaction at the reforms which have
been introduced and which have caused many men
to leave this branch of the Xavy. The Royal Navy
and the merchant navy have become in process of
independent development, distinct organisations,
and it is mere waste of money and energy to endeavour
to retain the old and close connection between the
two except so far as the Navy, by means of a short
service system, limited in application, can assist in
supplying the merchant na\y with a proportion of
trained, disciplined men after they have served five
years under the White Ensign.
A revolution, then, has been effected in the
manning the Navy. Ten years ago it was intended
in time of war to scour the land and sea in order to
obtain sufficient men of the mercantile marine to
supply one-third of the complements of the ships
in the home waters and thus raise them to war
strength. No ship was fully manned with active
service ratings. The Navy the whole of the Navy
THE NAVY'S NEED OF MEN 129
in home waters could be placed on a war footing
only when widely distributed and far distant
reservists had, at least in part, been called in.
How long this process would have taken it is im-
possible to say, because it was never tested and
could never have been tested adequately except on
the eve of actual war.
Under the scheme of naval organisation which
has now proved its efficiency, the first fighting
line of the Navy is manned by the Navy's own
officers and men. Summer after summer, with-
out requisitioning the services of the Royal
Naval Reserve, the Royal Fleet Reserve, or the
pensioners, the Admiralty are able to commission
and send to sea for the manoeuvres every effective ship
of the Navy's first line. The Admiralty have under
their hands sufficient officers and men of the regular
force to send the first fighting line of the Navy to
sea without any such delay as would necessarily
occur if reliance were placed upon naval reservists
as distinct from the men of the Fleet Reserve.
Every fully effective vessel of the fleet is always in
commission, kept ready for any eventuality.
The scheme of mobilisation has been shown by the
experience of manoeuvres to be a triumph of organi-
sation which has no parallel in any other navy in the
world. Public opinion can render valuable service by
preventing any effort to weaken this organisation for
the purpose of short-sighted economies.
There are indications that in the coming dis-
cussions on the Navy an effort will be made to prevail
upon the Government to cut down the numbers
K
130 THE COMMAND OF THE SEA
voted for the Fleet. The demand is supported by
specious but entirely fallacious arguments which
are based upon a comparative statement of the
regular forces of the great navies of the world. The
figures upon which an attack is usually based are
as follows, showing that Great Britain has more
officers and men than any two Powers :
COUNTRY
1904
1905
1906
1907 1908
Great Britain -
131,000
129,000
127,000
127,000 128,000
Germany
38,128
40,843
43,654
46,936 50-531
United States -
45,398
50,049
50,295
51,942 54,867
France
52,559
54,549
57,108
57,461 57,035
Italy
26,994
27,492
28,000
28,476 29,571
Austria- Hungary
10,409
11,989
13,099
13,133 M,o53
Increase
(+)bfi9i2
COUNTRY
1909
1910
1911
1912* ovenoo4
Great Britain -
128,000
131,000
I34,ooo
136,000 4-5,ooo
Germany
53,946
57,373
60,805
65,000 4-26,892
United States -
58,827
61,890
62,285
63,000 4-17,602
France
57,351
58,595
58,649
60,000 4-7,441
Italy
30,613
30,613
30,587
32,000 4-5,006
Austria- Hungary
M,954
16,148
17,277
18,000 4-7,531
It will be seen that England is the country which
in the past nine years has increased the number
of her regular personnel least. Every other country
has made great additions, and these, in the case of
Germany, have amounted to nearly 27,000. The
case of those who urge a further reduction in the
numbers voted for the Fleet rests upon the fact that
while Germany and France combined have at present
only just over 125,000 officers and men, Great
Britain still maintains about 136,000. It is repeatedly
urged that this is considerably more than the Two
Power Standard, and time and again the Government
* These are estimates.
THE NAVY'S NEED OF MEN 131
have been pressed to effect an economy by wholesale
reductions.
The position of Great Britain as a naval power is,
however, so peculiar that its requirements cannot
be settled by such casual methods. In the first
place, the German and French flags are represented
abroad on a much smaller scale. The German Fleet
and the French Fleet are concentrated almost
entirely in home waters ; the British Navy is on
duty in all parts of the world. While Germany has
in the Mediterranean one yacht, Great Britain, in
order to maintain her prestige and to keep open
this essential artery of trade and empire, has hitherto
maintained there a considerable fleet manned by
about 8,000 officers and men. In time of war in the
English Channel or the North Sea this body of
officers and men would be a full week's steaming
from home waters. There are roughly another
12,000 men on duty in the East Indies, in China, in
Australian waters, at the Cape, in the West Indies,
and on the coasts of the American continents,
while others are widely distributed in surveying
ships, for we are still the chart-makers of the
world. We thus reach a total of at least 20,000
men who would be unavailable in time of sudden
war in home waters. They form an essential part
of the naval machine, but they have no corresponding
numbers in foreign fleets, which are mainly concen-
trated in home waters. In round figures, Germany
has on foreign service somewhat less than 3,000 men ;
and France and America about 4,000 each ; while
the numbers in the case of Italy, Russia, Austria-
1 32 THE COMMAND OF THE SEA
Hungary and other smaller navies are, of course,
very much less. In order to arrive, therefore, at a
comparison between the resources of Great Britain
and the next two greatest European Powers
Germany and France it is necessary to make
deductions as indicated, unless those who urge the
cutting down of the British personnel are willing also
to approve the complete withdrawal of the British flag
from the Mediterranean, the Far East, the Pacific,
and the Atlantic. Unless they are in favour of this
policy, the comparison between British and French
and German resources must be made after deducting
in each case those officers and men who are with-
drawn by duty from home waters. Thus the avail-
able resources of Great Britain in the event of
sudden war, are about 116,000 as compared with
62,000 in the case of Germany and nearly 56,000 in
the case of France, or a total of 118,000 for France
and Germany combined.
These considerations, however, do not exhaust
the statement of facts which must underlie Admir-
alty policy in providing for the manning of the Fleet.
Year by year the personnel of foreign navies is still
being rapidly increased. Six years hence the
German Navy will require about 15,000 more
officers and men, and these are to be provided under
the naval law, in due course raising the personnel
to 80,000. In the case of France and the United
States the growth of the personnel will be less rapid,
but considerable. If we are to maintain an adequate
fleet we should have at least twice as many officers
and men as Germany, in order to meet the demands
THE NAVY'S NEED OF MEN 133
of the empire and provide the essential protection
for the mercantile marine in all the world's seas.
In considering the Estimates from year to year it is
necessary therefore to keep in view not the actual
requirements of the Navy as it exists to-day, but
its needs in the future when the fleets of Germany,
France, Russia and the United States will already
have made very great progress.
A second line of argument which is advanced by
those who counsel a reduction of the British personnel
is that Great Britain should place increased reliance
upon naval reserves in order to raise the Navy from
a peace to a war footing. This is a specious con-
tention which unfortunately meets with a certain
measure of support from public speakers and writers.
It is forgotten that the British naval reserves
necessarily poorly trained for war service can be
called out only by means of a Royal proclamation,
which is diametrically opposed to secrecy in war
organisation, apart from the disadvantage that the
naval authorities cannot count upon obtaining more
than one-third or so of the naval reservists enrolled in
a period of a week. During that week, which certainly
would be of critical importance as affecting the issues
of war, ships would lie unmanned or only partly
manned in the dockyards which ought to be at sea.
In naval warfare it is the first few days which count.
In Germany and in France, where reliance under a
conscriptive system a source of weakness must
be placed to some extent upon reservists, these men
can be called to the colours by the mere administra-
tive act of the Navy Departments, without the delay
134 THE COMMAND OF THE SEA
and publicity of a Royal proclamation. Herein lies a
radical distinction vitiating any scheme of British
mobilisation which depends for its efficiency upon the
naval reservists. The virtue of the existing scheme of
naval organisation is that it is so nicely adjusted, as
was illustrated last summer, as to enable all the most
modern and efficient ships to be organised and sent
to sea manned with well-trained crews at a few hours'
notice, leaving the Fleet Reserve men to complete
the crews of the older vessels.
The maintenance of the existing organisation and
its future development on sound lines must depend
on an adequate number of officers and men being
provided. It does not, however, follow that for
every new vessel laid down sufficient officers and men
must be entered to man it. Old ships will auto-
matically pass from the fully commissioned state to
that of a " war nucleus," yet older ships from the
war nucleus to the reduced nucleus, with only a
relatively small number of men on board each as a
maintenance party, and the oldest ships will be
sold out of the service. We have an asset of in-
calculable value in the long-service men of the Fleet.
We cannot count on better built ships, on better
equipment, but we can man them with better officers
and men than any other nation can obtain. " The
men are splendid," was the report from South Africa
during the war. In a naval war victory will depend
mainly not on the type of our ships, but on the type
of our men. Let it be our task to see that there are
enough of them be the cost what it may, for when
the day comes they will be cheap at any price.
CHAPTER VI.
THE POLICY OF HOME DEFENCE : INVASION
OR STARVATION.
It is an axiom held by the British Government that
the Empire's existence depends primarily upon the
maintenance of adequate and efficient naval forces. As
long as this condition is fulfilled, and as long as British
superiority at sea is assured, then it is an accepted
principle that no British dominion can be successfully
and permanently conquered by an organised invasion
from oversea
For this reason it has recently been agreed that the
home forces of the United Kingdom should be so organ-
ised as to compel an enemy contemplating an invasion
to make the attempt on such a scale as to be unable to
evade our naval forces. Field-Marshal Lord Kitchener
in his Memorandum on Australian Defence.
THE British people have a genius of their
own. It has produced a system of
government, a scheme of defence, a plan
of colonisation, a standard of home
life, even a sumptuary regime voluntary and
yet effective which are essentially British and
radically distinct from the modes and manners
on the European Continent. On this founda-
tion the British Empire has been raised. Our
forefathers were proud of their singularity; they
were proud of their island state, of their freedom
i 3 6 THE COMMAND OF THE SEA
to shape their own history in their own way, and,
above all, proud of their dependence on the sea the
mother of an Empire which, in extent, in population,
in loyalty to a single throne, in devotion to a
practical habit of life and thought, and in fealty to
a common code of government, has had no parallel
in the world's history. In the past we have gloried
in our sea traditions. We have realised that " out
of the infinite horizon there grows in the mind and
character of a seafaring people a strong tendency
towards boldness, fortitude, and long-sightedness."
We have boasted and not without warrant that
" seafaring nations have materially contributed to
the enlargement and heightening of political stand-
ards," and that " to them narrow territorial politics
appear but short-sighted policy." When the Con-
tinent ran with the blood of conscript armies we
alone held to the faith that " the wide open sea
serves to enlarge the views of both merchants and
statesmen," and that " the sea alone can produce
truly great Powers."
At a moment when this our own philosophy is
being preached from end to end of the German
Empire, when the eyes of the German people are
being directed overseas, there is a new school of
thought in England intent on a less generous scheme
of life. It preaches a policy of military service
ashore, based not on the higher patriotism which
has been our pride in the past, but on compulsion,
a policy of hedgerow defence instead of the offensive-
defensive of a supreme Fleet. It insists that the
peril of invasion does exist and that we have no
POLICY OF HOME DEFENCE 137
certain hope of preserving our freedom save by
preparing to fight the invader after he has landed.
If one may judge by the babel of voices, the
pamphlets which are being distributed, and the
meetings which are being held in all parts of the
country, the movement in favour of compulsory
service is growing apace. An effort is being made to
turn this country into a " sort of Germany " before
Germany reduced the length of conscript service in
the Army and embraced the naval faith. The
advocates of compulsory service, moved on the one
hand by entirely unfounded fears of invasion, and,
on the other, by the hope of arresting the physical
degeneration of their fellow-countrymen, are making
a determined assault perhaps the most determined
in modern times upon the liberty and freedom of
the subject. He has hitherto been free to render
what naval, military, social, or political service he
cares to render. The majority of the people of
Great Britain, it is true, give no service to the State.
The exponents of military training may be pos-
sibly are right in their assumption that every man
would be a better citizen if he learnt the rudiments
of military drill and all it connotes in submission to
authority, in mutual knowledge, and in inter-
dependence of one individual on another the
highest class upon the lowest, and vice versa.
There is reason to believe that some form of
military service in the United Kingdom or is it
only England ? might prove of advantage to the
youth of this country, but there is no proof such
as the advocates of this change represent. Ger-
1 3 8 THE COMMAND OF THE SEA
many is not the only country on the Continent with
compulsory service. France also possesses a con-
script army, so does Russia, so does Greece, so does
Spain. Compulsory military training did not save
to Spain her colonial empire ; compulsory military
training did not save Russia from humiliation at
the hands of the Japanese ; compulsory military
training has not instilled into the French, Spanish,
or other peoples those solid qualities which are
claimed for the Germans.
I. THE CASE AGAINST COMPULSORY TRAINING.
It is necessary to probe considerably deeper into
the German organisation than the army system if
one would find the true cause of Germany's in-
tellectual and commercial progress and that ap-
parent solidarity of national aim which compels the
admiration of the superficial student of German
affairs. It may be that military service has assisted
in the development of national character, but edu-
cation, directed by a wise bureaucracy, has done
much more. The perseverance and concentration
of aim attributed to the German people there is
only too much reason to believe is more apparent
than real. The face of Germany which appears in
the evolution of German policy as viewed by the
outside world, and which strikes the casual visitor,
is not the real expression of national will, but a
bureaucratic mask which is spread over the natural
features. Hitherto the real public opinion of Ger-
many has found only sporadic expression, owing
to the success with which the " machine " has
POLICY OF HOME DEFENCE 139
succeeded in keeping democracy under and denying
to it that influence in national affairs which the
peoples of England, France, and some more modern
countries have secured. The electoral machinery
of Germany has been carefully manipulated, and the
result is that the world hears little or nothing of the
real Germany, except, periodically, when the million-
fisted knock ineffectively against the doors of the
bureaucracy.
At present the voice of Germany is the voice not
of the people of Germany, increasively Socialistic, but
of those who still retain in their hands the reins of
government, practically uncontrolled by the forces
which in other and more advanced countries tend
towards diffusion of effort. It may be that among
many counsellors there is wisdom, but undoubtedly
the German " machine " presents to the world an
impressive exterior, and this national expression
can be attributed only in very slight degree to the
influence of national military training upon the
national character. The virtue of military service
must be assessed not merely by comparison with
Germany, but by studying the influence which it
has exercised on other nationalities the French, the
Russian, the Greek, the Spanish, the Portuguese,
the Italian and then the success of the United States,
without compulsory service, must be explained.
It may be that military training would be beneficial
to the people of the United Kingdom, but the case
has not been proved and in any event military
training tends to divert the mind of the nation,
which lives on and by the sea, from the great
140 THE COMMAND OF THE SEA
problem of defence on the sea to the narrower pro-
blem of defence on the land. We cannot afford to
barter our whole habit of life for a chimera.
But even if universal military training were proved
to be desirable, the question still remains Is a
compulsory system attainable in this democratic
country ? There is a certain type of person who is
always bent upon compulsion in order to obtain
the performance by others of acts which are thought
to be so admirable and essential as to justify extreme
measures. In years gone by, when the Church
exercised an almost supreme power, it exerted its
influence in order to compel men not only to attend
public worship regularly, but to worship in strict
accordance with the views of the clergy. The
Church was even able to punish rigorously all who
worshipped in any other way. The aim was to make
England virtuous and religious by a penal code.
Similarly there were attempts to make subjects loyal
by compulsion. The pathway along which the
British nation has moved is white with the bones of
those who have fought .to enslave the British people
and with the bones of those others who have struggled
and met death rather than submit to various forms
of compulsion.
In these days, when the conscience of every man is
as free as the air, the old spirit of freedom, sometimes
possibly merely the old spirit of contrariness and
opposition to authority, asserts itself on the slightest
provocation. So long, for instance, as vaccination
was compulsory there were thousands of persons
who resisted the law, as they claimed, on behalf of
POLICY OF HOME DEFENCE 141
their children, and suffered fines and imprisonment.
There is no doubt that during the anti-vaccination
agitation the majority of the British people were
strongly in favour of this precaution against the
spread of smallpox, but nevertheless the old com-
pulsory powers exercised by the State were doomed
to be repealed because little bands of " martyrs "
throughout the country defied the law. At the
instance of Lord Salisbury's Government a new
Vaccination Act was passed which recognised " the
conscientious objector," and empowered magistrates
to issue certificates of exemption. There are some
forms of religious and social faith which live by
persecution.
An even more significant illustration of the power
of the conscientious objector is supplied by
the story of the education controversy. Mr.
Balfour's Act was immediately admitted by all
parties as a great step forward in the direction
of improved facilities for educating young England.
But the Act also contained provisions to which
a section of militant Nonconformists took the
strongest objection, provisions placing Church
schools upon the rates, and at the same time providing
rate-aid for the support of denominational training
colleges for teachers. In the subsequent agitation
the virtues of the measure were entirely lost sight
of. It soon became apparent that a small section
of the ratepayers would passively resist the Act at
all costs. At first the movement was treated in
many quarters with something approaching con-
tempt. " What," it was asked, " could these com-
i 4 2 THE COMMAND OF THE SEA
paratively few conscientious objectors barely i per
cent, of the whole population of England hope to
achieve in face of the apparent acquiescence in the
law of the vast majority of the ratepayers ? "
Subsequent events supplied a convincing answer
to such an argument, and showed, as in the case of
the old Vaccination Act, what can be done by a small
body of earnest persons animated, as they believe,
by the highest motives.
The movement against the Education Act spread
rapidly, but at no time was the number of protestants
large. Throughout the country, however, these
passive resisters held out in their struggle against
the law. They submitted to fines, imprisonment,
and to the seizure of their goods and forced sale by
the local authority in order to obtain the rate money.
Up to November, 1904, summonses were issued
against 35,520 persons, the goods of 1,395 defaulters
were publicly sold, and sixty-one persons manoeuvred
so as to compel the State to send them to prison.
The attitude of this little army of passive resisters
was not without its influence upon many persons who
refused to join in the movement. Month by month
as the prosecution or persecution of these " martyrs "
proceeded, increased sympathy was aroused, and
the strenuous fight against the law welded into a
victorious army all who were not in sympathy with
the Unionist Party, which had been responsible for
this Act. From the date when the passive resistance
movement was initiated, the authority of Mr. Bal-
four's administration began to wane, and at last,
when the inevitable appeal to the electorate took
POLICY OF HOME DEFENCE 143
place, Nonconformists Unionist as well as Radical
Nonconformists who considered that their con-
sciences had been outraged, contributed in large
measure to the dramatic landslide which eliminated
the Unionist majority of 74 and placed the Liberals
in office with a record majority of 354.
Such instances as these are not without their
lesson to those who would attempt to impose upon
the country a compulsory system of military service
which the nation has been assured, on the highest
authority, is not necessary for safety. It matters
not what the term of service might be, nor the rates
of pay ; the mere fact of compulsion would raise up
against such a measure a band of " martyrs "
exceeding by ten-fold if not a thousand-fold those
who were willing to suffer the worst penalties of the
civil law rather than submit in the one case to
vaccination and in the other to what was regarded
as State-aided denominational education. Violent
opposition to any form of military drill would be
created, and not improbably the present Territorial
Army would disappear, and the whole voluntary
movement for defence be set back indefinitely.
It is evident from the pamphlets issued in support
of compulsory service that there is a complete lack
of appreciation on the part of this school of thought
not only of the British defence problem but of the
history of the volunteer movement. The truth is
that the very classes which are responsible for
the agitation for compulsion are mainly deficient
hi the performance of the subsidiary home defence
duties which were formerly regarded as one of the
144 THE COMMAND OF THE SEA
main ends of existence of a British citizen. The cry
for compulsion is not a sign of the awakening of
national spirit, but rather an indication of decadence.
The volunteer movement of 1859, on the other hand,
was a national uprising. It was essentially a
volunteer effort towards defence, and in its early days
recruits were drawn largely from the moneyed,
professional, and tradesmen classes. The Fleet was
notoriously weak, and it was thought that the country
was menaced by the increasing power of France
and the designs which Napoleon III. was supposed
to entertain. The British Government of the day
at first embodied the Militia regiments as a protective
measure. In comparison with the armed forces on
the other side of the English Channel, separated from
English shores by only " the silver streak," this
display of power was glaringly insignificant.* The
people of England, realising the weakness of the Navy,
and without reference to constitutional authority,
began to take up arms. From the conclusion of the
peace in the early years of the nineteenth century
down to the time of this outburst of enmity on the
part of France, England had had no volunteers
only a Regular Army of small dimensions. In face
of an apparent menace, volunteers sprang to arms.
The Government stood aloof ; but still the beacon-
fire of patriotism spread from county to county,
until at last, in view of the increasing state of unrest
in Europe, General Peel, then Minister for War,
issued a circular to the Lords-Lieutenant of the
Counties granting permission for the formation of
* The British Navy was barely equal to that of France alone.
POLICY OF HOME DEFENCE 145
properly organised volunteer corps for home
defence.
The Government gave permission for the enrolment
of volunteers, but withheld all financial aid. No
promise of assistance was forthcoming to meet the
necessary expense of raising these corps, much less
was any mention made of pay or reward. The
patriotic spirit of the people was at such a height
that it was not considered necessary to offer any
inducement to volunteers, and such as came forward
were willing to equip themselves with uniform,
accoutrements, and arms, and supply themselves
with military instructors without State subvention.
The volunteer movement came into being not only
on a volunteer basis of service, but on a volunteer
basis of support. Even when the alarm which first
awakened this martial spirit was proved by events
to be without foundation, and the tense feeling
throughout Europe was relieved, recruits continued
to enlist in their thousands. At this date the
patriotic spirit of the English people was probably
at its height.
Within a few years a significant change occurred.
Lord Kingsburgh, the successful leader of the
Scotch Volunteers, in an interesting risumi of the
movement, records that at length the question arose :
Is this force worth the expense to the country of
providing the necessary armament, clothing, and
equipment ? " The question was made the more
urgent," Lord Kingsburgh remarks, "by its becoming
apparent that the moneyed and well-to-do classes,
who at first had formed the great bulk of the volunteer
146 THE COMMAND OF THE SEA
force, were not so patriotic in time of peace as to
continue to enrol themselves, and sacrifice comfort
and time in drilling and practising at the target for
the country's defence."
It is unpleasant to be compelled to record that year
after year the numbers of the leisured, the professional,
and the middle class volunteers diminished, that it
became impossible to keep up companies recruited from
these ranks, that many of them ceased to exist as such
and were replaced by companies of artisans, and that
many which maintained their existence did so only by
taking into their ranks their employees in the lower
grades of their profession. Merchant companies enrolled
their shopmen, solicitors' companies enrolled their
clerks, barristers' companies dissolved, and gradually
the whole character of the force was changed. It became,
as regards the rank and file, a working-men's force.
The great mass of those now enrolled are men dependent
upon weekly wages or small salaries for their subsistence,
to whom the expense of providing uniform and accoutre-
ments would be altogether prohibitive.
Further, those who in the early days of the movement
had contributed liberally to the funds of the corps in
their district, ceased to do so. The novelty of the
movement was gone, and those whose enthusiasm was
not strong enough to induce them to serve ceased to
yield to appeals to their purses.*
Thus the volunteers came to be paid. From the
control of the Lords-Lieutenant the corps passed in
some degree under State control. In those new
conditions, the volunteer movement still continued
to retain its hold upon the English people, but its
* Chambera's Encyclopadia.
POLICY OF HOME DEFENCE 147
character had changed. The better-to-do classes,
young professional men in particular, refrained from
rendering this service to the State either as officers
or in the ranks. The spirit of patriotism which in
1859 led young men of high birth or wealth to
serve more or less willingly shoulder to shoulder
with their fellow-countrymen of a lower social
order now finds little response among young men in
the United Kingdom. Except in certain class
corps, the rank and file of the volunteers are to-day
drawn almost exclusively from the artisan and
labouring classes. Year by year the burden of
voluntary service has been borne mainly by the
working men of Great Britain, and in steadily de-
creasing ratio by the middle classes, by those with
more means and leisure, who are far more exuberant
in their professions of patriotism under the exciting
influence of public meetings or in the artificial
atmosphere of a music-hall. It is this falling away,
this decline of a patriotic spirit making little of social
distinctions, which has paved the way for the present
movement in favour of compulsory service, sup-
ported by members of the class which, when weighed
in the balance, has been found wanting.
In spite of this abstention of the upper and middle
classes, has voluntary service proved in experience
a failure ? What are the facts ? Though these
classes have fallen away from the standard of sixty
years ago, the working classes have never rendered
the State such efficient service as to-day, and the
military forces of the Empire were never organised
on such a commanding scale organised, moreover,
148 THE COMMAND OF THE SEA
so far as home defence is concerned, for a strictly
limited duty to deal with a raiding force not
exceeding 70,000 men. The progress which has been
made in these sixty years is revealed in the following
comparative statement :
HOME (INCLUDING CHANNEL ISLANDS).
1859 (ALL RANKS).
Regulars
Other Troops :
Enrolled Pensioners
Embodied Militia
Disembodied Militia
Volunteers -
Total other Troops
TOTAL AT HOME
Regulars
Other Troops :
Enrolled Pensioners
Total Abroad
TOTAL AT HOME AND
ABROAD
These figures reveal the progress which has been
made in sixty years. We have a Fleet stronger
relatively and actually than ever before in modern
* Includes 4,387 Indian Native Troops serving in the Colonies-
t Including the Native Indian Army and the local Colonial
forces, the aggregate military resources of the Empire are now
approximately 1,300,000, no mean total for an Empire whose
main defence is its fleets.
s).
66,921
14,770
20,479
80,221
14,981
130,451
1910 (ALL RANKS).
Regulars - - 128,122
Other Troops :
Army Reserve - 133,990
Special - - 70,486
Territorial Force 274,211
Militia - - 4,527
Reserve Dn. Militia 845
Channel Is. Militia 3,010
Total other Troops 487,069
197,372
TOTAL AT HOME 615,191
ABROAD.
151,526
226
151,752
Regulars - - 123,764*
Other Troops :
Militia Malta and
Bermuda - 2,376
Volunteers Ber-
muda - - 208
Total Abroad - 126,348
349,124
TOTAL AT HOME AND
ABROAD - 74L539t
POLICY OF HOME DEFENCE 149
times, and in face of a possible raid of less than
70,000 invaders the official limit fixed by Lord
Roberts when Commander-in-Chief we have in the
United Kingdom ovei 600,000 officers and men, apart
from the resources in the outposts of the Empire.
The contrast between the forces available for home
defence and the extent of the peril is sufficiently
effective, and needs no comment.
Even more remarkable than the numbers available
are the character of the forces and the spirit which
animates the country. We have the only long
service Army in existence, as the following statement
of service with the colours indicates :
United Kingdom . 6 to 8 years in the Cavalry and Ar-
tillery, 7 years in the Infantry.
Austria-Hungary . 3 years in the Cavalry and the
Horse Artillery, 2 years in all
other arms.
France . . 2 years for all arms. In the
colonial army, 3, 4 or 5 years,
according to age on enlistment.
Germany . . 3 years in the Cavalry and the
Horse Artillery, 2 years in the
other arms.
Russia . . 3 years in the Infantry, Field and
Mountain Artillery, 4 years in
all other arms.
If there is any reason for ignoring the Territorial
Army because it has not the two-year standard of
Germany's short-service infantry, then what a
pinnacle of efficiency the long-service Army of the
United Kingdom should occupy in contrast with the
conscript annies of the Continent !
ISO THE COMMAND OF THE SEA
Evidence as to the spirit which now animates the
country or rather the working classes is not far
to seek. Official figures prove that Great Britain
particularly the artisan and working classes is not
dead to patriotism. If they are studied in associa-
tion with the remarkable growth of cadet corps at
the public schools, the officers' corps at the univer-
sities, and the curious story of the rise of the boys'
brigades and scout corps, the outlook from the
standpoint of those who place great virtue in military
training becomes increasingly bright. What are our
resources ? In a pamphlet entitled "Our Birthright,"
published in 1906, the following table appeared
of the number of trained men outside the Regular
Army and its Regular reserve :
fOld Regular Soldiers 45 to 65 years of ag
A 1 Militia
Yeomanry
I Volunteer
e . . 125,000
} 225,000
, 360,000
Total 705,000
( Retired Regular Soldiers 30 to 45 years o
R 1 Militia
| , Yeomanry
f age . 444,000
" } 675,000
n
1 Volunteer .,
. 810,000
Total 1,929,000
("Militia, Present Strength
. 100,000
C [ Yeomany
1 Volunteers ....
. 260,000
Total 385,000
Grand Total 3,019,000
A. Category may be considered s quite equal to the German
Landsturm. B. Category may be considered as quite equal to the
German Landwehr. C. Category may be considered as quite
equal to the German Ersatz Reserve.
POLICY OF HOME DEFENCE 151
There is every indication of an awakening of the
old martial spirit of the nation, and only one
thing can arrest its further growth compulsion
and the inevitable passive resistance which would
at once occur. The whole movement in favour of
military drill on national and personal grounds
would be thrown into the arena of political and
religious strife, and it would be killed. We have
advanced too far in the recognition of democracy
to turn back at this stage and imitate methods of
defence unnecessary in view of our island position,
and entirely antagonistic to our trend of thought.
Under voluntary conditions the leaven is spreading.
We have methods and we have a genius of our own,
and history proves that in the past far less glorious
than the present in its potentialities we were able
to hold our own against the world in arms. If some
of the enthusiasm and energy which is now being
directed to the hopeless propaganda in favour of a
diluted form of conscription were devoted to
strengthening the Territorial Army, providing
physical culture for the youth of the working and
lower-middle classes, and convincing the nation
of its absolute dependence on the supremacy of the
seas, it would be possible to look forward with
increased confidence.
II. THE CASE AGAINST INVASION.
But it may be urged " You do not disprove the
necessity of a larger army in order to defend this
country against the peril of invasion by arguing
against compulsory service. If we are in danger of
a foreign army landing, then we must find some
152 THE COMMAND OF THE SEA
adequate means of defence on our shores." But
is invasion a real peril ? This is the question which
must be first answered in the affirmative before it is
necessary to consider the means of defence against it.
In no country in the world is more heard of the
invasion peril than in England. In France, Germany,
Russia, Austria, Italy, Spain, and Portugal, with
their long, exposed frontiers and their unequal
powers of defence, the possibility of invasion is
seldom discussed. On the Continent the tendency
is towards the reduction of the period of military
service, while in England a powerful propaganda is
being preached in favour of the creation of a great
compulsory national army. At the very moment
when the Continental Powers are devoting vastly
increased sums to the maintenance of their fleets,
and from numerous platforms we have been told
that our naval supremacy is in danger because we
cannot afford an adequate Navy, the country is
being urged to develop further its land defences.
The British people, who of all European peoples
alone have the sea as a bulwark against aggression,
are being terrorised by tens of thousands of pamph-
lets, by declamatory statements at hundreds of
meetings up and down the country, into an abandon-
ment of their privileges. Those who do not join in
the movement are condemned as either careless,
ignorant or unpatriotic. A vague pessimism, a
depreciation of British institutions, and a glorifica-
tion of foreign methods are held to be the shibboleths
of true patriotism, and, above all, it is unpatriotic to
continue to hold the historic, well-tried naval faith.
POLICY OF HOME DEFENCE 153
The " invasion school " insist that we must
presume that the British Navy will be insufficient
or inefficient and will fail to prevent the invaders
reaching our shores in force. The first axiom which
is advanced by the soldier or some soldiers is,
therefore, that the sailor cannot perform the essential
duty which he has performed for centuries even at
times when England had her back to the wall and
was facing the whole of Europe in arms, even at
times when Napoleon strode Europe as a military
Colossus. Where Napoleon failed because of the
British Fleet's success, some modern military com-
mander, we are told, will succeed because of the
British Fleet's failure. Therefore we must have a
" nation in arms " to fight him when he lands.
This is the policy of the last trench. It is the
policy of the householder who, expecting burglars,
takes refuge in the garret and prepares for its defence
instead of keeping out the burglars by precautionary
measures or telephoning to the police. On the
same principle every house would have its armoured
garret with its supply of rifles. We believe in the
police-force-in-being as a prevention of war on life
and property, but we are asked to abandon our
belief in a Fleet-in-being as a prevention of war on
British shores and British interests. When we
glance from our windows we do not always see the
man in blue nor hear his footfall at night, and yet
we are undismayed. But because there are times
when a man-of-war is not to be seen at this or that
point of the coast, we are asked to believe that the
country is in grave peril, that an enemy may land
154 THE COMMAND OF THE SEA
in force at any moment and at any point on the
beach without meeting with resistance, and that the
remedy for this danger is not more ships but more
soldiers that tens of thousands of men should be
compulsorily withdrawn from industry in order to
fight in the last trench.
What is the real basis and justification of the
craven fears which threaten to burden this country
with a sort of conscript army, which threaten to
turn this country into a sort of Germany, with its
millions of soldiers, and which threaten to lose us
even a sort of command of the sea, for we cannot
serve two masters ? Eight years ago, when the
" invasion school " began their work, Lord Roberts
was Commander-in-Chief of the British Army, and
Mr. Balfour has told us that he was asked by the
Government, " given that Great Britain was reduced
to the position occupied during the Boer War that
is, without an army and with practically no naval
force in British waters what is the smallest number
of men with which, as a forlorn hope, some foreign
country could endeavour to invade our shores ? "
The reply given by Lord Roberts was, 70,000 men.
On this hypothesis Mr. Balfour submitted the in-
vasion problem to the consideration of the Committee
of Imperial Defence. That body represents the
highest trained judgment of the country on this
particular problem. It is presided over by the
Prime Minister for the time being, and its members
include six other Cabinet Ministers ; the First Sea
Lord and the Director of Naval Intelligence repre-
senting the Navy, with the Chief of the General Staff
POLICY OF HOME DEFENCE 155
and the Director of Military Operations representing
the Army. The Committee heard a mass of naval
and military evidence, and came to a unanimous
conclusion. In Mr. Balfour's words :
We have endeavoured to picture to ourselves a clear
issue which is very unfavourable to this country, and
have shown at least to our satisfaction that on that
hypothesis, unfavourable as it is, serious invasion of
these islands is not an eventuality which we need
seriously consider.
The " invasion school " then had a short rest, but
it was not silenced. In the words of Mr. Micawber,
it " took a step back in order to take a decisive step
forward." In 1907 it was again active, and claimed
that all the conditions had changed since the inquiry
was held. In November of that year the Committee
of Imperial Defence practically a new Committee
in its constitution again sat (for eleven months),
and again it heard the best evidence on both sides.
In the House of Commons, on July 29th, 1909, the
Prime Minister told the country what the verdict
was, after hearing the views of Lord Roberts and
other military authorities who had associated them-
selves with him, and a great deal of independent
evidence from other officers and from naval and
military experts. The Committee studied with
great care all the changes in the strategical situation
since 1904, when the previous report was made, and
the potentialities of invasion, going minutely into
such matters as the time which would be
needed for the mobilisation of a foreign army, the
facilities for transport both by land and sea, the
i S 6 THE COMMAND OF THE SEA
organisation and distribution of forces, both naval
and military, and the possibilities as regards em-
barkation, transport, and disembarkation incidental
to an invasion on a large scale. The conclusions of
the Committee, as Mr. Asquith stated, were arrived
at after conceding to those who are apprehensive
of the possibilities of invasion the most favourable
hypothesis for their purpose conceding, for in-
stance, that the contemplated invasion would take
place at a time when the Regular forces of this
country were practically absent from our shores on
some foreign expedition, and conceding further that
the attack might be in the nature of a surprise attack
a sort of " bolt from the blue " at a time when
normal diplomatic relations existed between ourselves
and the country which attacked us.
In these circumstances the Prime Minister, speaking
in Committee of Supply in the House of Commons,
stated :
The conclusion at which we unanimously arrived all
the naval as well as all the military members of the
Committee being at one on this point may be summed
up under two heads :
(a) In the first place we decided that so long as the naval
supremacy of this country is adequately assured, invasion
on a large scale, by which I mean invasion on such a
scale as was contemplated by Lord Roberts (in 1907),
involving the transport of 120,000 or 150,000 men, is an
absolutely impracticable operation. On the other hand,
if we permanently lost the command of the sea, whatever
might be the strength and organisation of our military
force at home even if we had an Army as strong as
that of Germany herself it would be impossible for
POLICY OF HOME DEFENCE 157
this country to prevent invasion, and its subjection to
the enemy would be inevitable. It follows from that
proposition that it is the business of the Admiralty to
maintain our naval supremacy at such a point that we
cannot lose the command of the sea. Against any
reasonable and possible combination which may be
brought against us, if we can hold the sea, we make
invasion impracticable.
(b) I come to the second phase : there are disciples of
what is called the blue-water school, who think you can
so rely on your Navy that you do not require to keep up
a home Army at all. That school did not find much
support from the evidence which was laid before us,
and our second proposition is this, that we ought to have
an Army for home defence sufficient in numbers and
organisation for two purposes in the first place to repel
what are called raids, that is to say sporadic offensive
expeditions which are small in numbers and are not
intended permanently to occupy the country, but only
to inflict as much damage as they can ; and in the second
place, adequate to compel an enemy which contemplates
invasion to come with so substantial a force as to make
it impossible for him to evade our Fleets.
It has often been said I do not know how the figure
first came to be mentioned that no one would attempt
an invasion of this country with less than 70,000 men.*
Our Admiralty believe that a force of very much less
than 70,000 could not possibly evade our Fleets. No one,
I think, would undertake the task of invasion with a
force of less than 70,000 men. I do not think 70,000
men will ever get to England at all, but we must have
an ample margin of safety. Our conclusion was that in
order to ensure that margin the force for home defence,
* This was a statement made eight years ago by Lord Roberts.
i 5 8 THE COMMAND OF THE SEA
permanently maintained heie, should be sufficient to
cope with a foreign invasion of 70,000 men.
After the Prime Minister's statement, Mr. Balfour
rose to speak, as Leader of the Unionist Party. " I
suppose," he remarked, " the Committee will expect
me to say a few words after what has fallen from the
Prime Minister, but the agreement between him
and me on this subject is so complete that those
words need be but few." He then expressed his
concurrence with the conclusions of the Committee.
In spite of the teaching of history of over one
thousand years, in spite of the views of the country's
experts and statesmen irrespective of party the
nation is still asked to believe that the immediate
peril of the country is invasion. The peril has been
studied with care by two successive groups of
Ministers, and by the country's leading naval and
military officers the officers mainly responsible for
our defences. The experts who were members of
the Committee of Imperial Defence during the two
inquiries and who agreed in the findings against
invasion were as follows :
FIRST INQUIRY.
Admiral of the Fleet Lord Walter Kerr, First Sea Lord.
Vice-Admiral Prince Louis of Battenberg, Director of
Naval Intelligence.
Field-Marshal Lord Roberts, Commander-in-Chief of
the Army.
Field-Marshal Sir William Nicholson, Director General
of Mobilisation and Military Intelligence.
Secretary : Sir George Sydenham Clarke, late R.E.
POLICY OF HOME DEFENCE 159
SECOND INQUIRY.
Admiral of the Fleet Lord Fisher of Kilverstone,
First Sea Lord.
Rear-Admiral Sir E. J. Slade, Director of Naval
Intelligence.
Field-Marshal Sir William Nicholson, Chief of Staff of
the Army.
Major-General J. S. Ewart, Director of Military
Operations.
General Sir John French, Inspector-General of the
Forces.
Secretary : Rear-Admiral Sir Charles Ottley.
When this or that unattached officer's opinion on
the peril of invasion is quoted, it should be remem-
bered that these two sets of experts responsible for
the policy of defence and with all the facts at their
command have decided that the peril does not exist.
As to the opinion of the responsible military
experts there has been no concealment. Speaking
on December ist, 1911, at a Territorial gathering,
Lord Haldane remarked :
One thing was certain, and that was that a compulsory
and a voluntary system could not exist side by side.
Those in favour of compulsion talked of a four months'
or a six months' training. This was the programme of a
great many civilians and a large number of ladies and
retired officers. But if one asked the soldiers on the
active list, the men whose daily business it was to deal
with military problems, they said it was no use talking
of less than two years' training begun at an age not
lower than 19, if we were to have troops tr> meet on
equal terms trained Continental soldiers. If that were
true, the programme of the National Service League did
160 THE COMMAND OF THE SEA
not suit either the compulsory or the voluntary system,
and it must be remembered that there could not be the
two systems side by side, as we had to raise an enormous
army for service in India, South Africa, and other parts
of the Empire.
The late War Secretary could hardly have been
more explicit. His words can mean only one thing
that the distinguished officers of the General Staff
of the Army are not in favour of the programme of
the National Service League, and that they have
definitely come to the conclusion that we must either
develop our existing military forces on voluntary
lines to the best of our ability, or adopt conscription
on Continental lines. So far as well-informed mili-
tary opinion is concerned, Lord Haldane's declar-
ation, resting on the authority of Field-Marshal Sir
William Nicholson and his colleagues, sounds the
death-knell of such a radically unsound scheme as
that advocated by the National Service League.
The case against invasion on a grand scale has been
proved up to the hilt on the admission of every
responsible naval and military expert. In face of
such unanimity why should any body of men con-
tinue to support a theory which is demonstrably
untrue ? It is not patriotic, because the amount of
money and effort which can be devoted to home
defence is not illimitable ; the more energy and
money are devoted to the defence of the British Isles
against a bogey, the less will be available for the
main defence of an Empire which lives on and by
the sea, and which, without the command of the sea,
must inevitably be shattered into fragments as the
POLICY OF HOME DEFENCE 161
result of the first onslaughts of a determined enemy.
If the country cannot accept the carefully considered
views of the succession of distinguished naval and
military officers who have been responsible for our
defence policy at the Admiralty and the War Office
during the past decade, by whose views is it to be
guided ? Is it not preposterous that an attempt
should be made to deflect national policy from its
proper channel its channel under Conservative,
Unionist, and Liberal Cabinets by an agitation
which events have shown to be ill-informed and
contrary ot the highest expert opinion ?
It is the custom of the " invasion school " to refer
with contempt to the smallness of the British Army,
thereby attempting to mislead unthinking people.
This is one of the " leading lines " in the propaganda
of the National Service League. Its plea is sup-
ported by a few sophisticated naval statistics so
sophisticated as to be grotesque and the following
comparison of military strength, which is intended
to make the flesh of the British people creep with
fear :
Annual Total number of Total number of
Military Trained Men Trained Men
Country. Expenditure, immediately available available after
in peace time. 15 days of war.
Germany ...... 32,000,000 ... 620,000 ... 3,750,000 (a)
France ...... 32,000,000 ... 605,000 ... 3,000,000(3)
United Kingdom 27,300,000 ... 120,000 ... 330.000 (c)
Belgium ...... 2,500,000 ... 50,000 ... 180,000
Holland ...... 2,200,000 ... 41,000 ... 125,000
Denmark ...... 670,000 ... 14,000 ... 75,ooo
(a) 1,150,000 Active Army and ist Reserves ; 600,000
Landwehr ; 2,000,000 Ersatz and Landsturm. Total, 3,750,000.
(6) 1,200,000 Active Army and ist Reserves ; 600,000
Depots ; 1,200,000 Territorial Army. Total, 3,000,000.
(c) 120,000, Regular Troops normally in the U.K.; 129,000
Army Reserves ; 81,000 Special Reserves. Total, 330,000.
M
1 62 THE COMMAND OF THE SEA
The National Service League does not condescend
to include in the military forces of the United King-
dom the Territorial Army. What a recognition
of splendid patriotic service by a patriotic League !
This omission is excused on the plea that, " unlike
Continental reserves, it is not formed of men who
have been trained in the ranks of the active Army." *
It is essential to the League's purpose to ignore this
force, otherwise its contrast with European con-
script armies would be less effective. Had mention
been made of the Territorial Army, the British
military forces would have been increased by
270,000 officers and men, raising the total strength,
apart from the Indian and Colonial Armies, to
600,000 men. The propaganda of the National Ser-
vice League would have been still further weakened
if they had condescended to take notice of the
opinion of the late General Langlois, who, after
visiting several of the Territorial camps in 1910,
formed a very high opinion of the Territorial Army.
This officer, who was a member of the French Su-
preme Council of War, came to this country pre-
judiced against the Territorial Army, and he re-
turned home loud in its praise. He remarked :
" My opinion has been profoundly modified. . . .
The point which struck me most at the outset is
that the Territorial divisions are thoroughly organised
units. All the services in them have been created,
and work regularly without any assistance from the
Regular Army."
* Nothing short of a British conscriptive Army would meet
this objection to the Territorial Army.
POLICY OF HOME DEFENCE 163
Of the officers, he said : " Their tactical know-
ledge leaves something to be desired, but they work
with ardour, and I am inclined to believe that even
now the greater number would give a very good
performance, even in difficult and delicate circum-
stances, owing to their energy, their resolute will,
and, above all, the remarkable spirit of initiative
which they have acquired in their ordinary occu-
pations. They will make mistakes in tactics, but
they will know how to repair them."
Of the men, he remarked that they are character-
ised by a " remarkable energy, a great tenacity, a
goodwill above all praise. With such qualities,
and in face of a national danger, any army should
do great things. I remarked the care with which
they adjusted their sights and took their aim.
Where weakness is most likely to be experienced
is in the control of fire."
His final judgment was that the Territorial Army
is strong and good enough to defend the country
against invasion, especially if it be reinforced with
one regular division, and provided that Germany's
attention is occupied in France. Therefore, it
would be possible for England in a European war
to place five regular divisions on the Continent.*
All foreign observers have come to much the same
opinion as this distinguished French officer. The
Territorial Army in actual experience has exceeded
all expectations. The artillery is weak, but this
weakness, which is disappearing, can hardly be
regarded as justification for entirely disregarding
* LOpinion translated in the Daily Mail.
1 64 THE COMMAND OF THE SEA
a body of 270,000 trained officers and men. It is a
school of voluntary patriotic effort in combination
which has no parallel in history. Lord Haldane has
achieved a great triumph ; the " invasion school "
must suffer a correspondingly crushing defeat.
The fact is that England is not less adequately
defended, but more adequately defended, because
her main armies, instead of being tied to the shore,
have been translated into naval terms and are able
to proceed at will to any part of the sea-united
Empire. Great Britain has in her unrivalled fleets
the equivalent of the armed camps of Europe. The
armies of Europe are immutably tied to limited areas
of land ; the British Navy is the most mobile
instrument of war which the world has ever seen,
and, owing to the inheritance of a series of well-
placed coaling stations, it is free, as no Continental
army is free, to go anywhere and do anything,
except climb mountains or remove our neighbours'
landmarks.
But the favourite argument of fear which is ad-
vanced in favour of compulsory service is that the
" Fleet may be decoyed away." No one has ever
explained by whom, how, or why the Navy is to be
decoyed away, nor what it would do when wireless
messages, passing through space as quick as light,
recalled it to its obvious duty to fight the enemy
and the admiral to be tried by court-martial. It is
not as though the British Navy had only one fleet
or only one squadron. It has a fleet or squadron in
every sea. There is no other European navy repre-
sented in anything approaching the British strength
POLICY OF HOME DEFENCE 165
in these distant seas. The normal defence of British
interests in these foreign waters is already on the spot;
organised and trained for war. In addition we have
the Home Fleets, and these Home Fleets do not
exist and are not so named in order that they may
proceed on some wild-goose chase directly our
relations with any neighbouring European Power
become strained.
The effort of the " invasion school " to recommend
compulsory service by this " decoy " argument is
as though General Sir R. Baden-Powell tried to
justify the girl and boy scout movement by the plea
that when war comes the regular army may be in
bed. There has surely never been a more absurd
suggestion than that at the moment when it is
needed in the area of war, the British Navy
including our Home Fleets of 350 ships of war will
be careering about somewhere else. One hundred
years ago such an argument could have been ad-
vanced without incurring ridicule, because in those
days men-of-war carried provisions for six months,
and the winds of heaven supplied them with motive
power. Now the conditions have changed. Modern
fleets are tied to their bases because they must have
coal, and there is no foreign Power which has such a
chain of bases as would enable its ships to fly far afield
in a decoying movement. A modern ship in these
circumstances can steam only exactly half the dis-
tance of its full radius of action, because it must
save half its coal for the return journey. Therefore,
when it is suggested that the British Fleets the
only fleets with freedom of movement are to be
166 THE COMMAND OF THE SEA
decoyed away, it is a fair argument to ask by whom
they are to be decoyed and by what means, since
ships of an enemy cannot steam on and on for
endless days.
In the past it has been accepted in England as
an axiom that it is far easier to keep an enemy from
getting in than to turn him out when he is in. In
other words, prevention is better than cure. There
are only two main lines of defence which can com-
mend themselves to a logical, self-respecting island
people :
(1) The enemy's coast, the sphere of duty of the
British sea-going Fleet.
(2) The British coast, the sphere of duty of the
mobile coast defence.
A defensive-offensive off the enemy's coast must
be the main defence against invasion. In offer-
ing resistance to invasion by taking the offensive on
the sea, the British people engage with the enemy
when he is at a serious disadvantage owing to the
immense difficulties of transport. If it were asked :
When is an army not an army ? then surely the
reply is : When it is at sea. If a military expedition,
even under naval escort, falls in with a British Fleet,
it is in a position of abject helplessness. The
transports numbering 150 or 200 at least can
not only not assist in the struggle, but must by their
very presence not in tens but in scores multiply
many times the troubles of the admiral in command
of the convoying fleet. It is when the expeditionary
army is afloat, and therefore defenceless, that Eng-
land a3 a naval Power can fight to greatest advantage.
POLICY OF HOME DEFENCE 167
Once the foreign army has landed the enemy can
fight on more equal terms.
There is a second line of defence, not so much
against invasion, but against raids, and this is the
British coast. The High Seas Navy cannot guarantee
this country against raids that is, against a com-
paratively small force which may elude the Fleet
and be quickly disembarked upon some unprotected
portion of the coast.* As in the case of invasion,
the main defence of a maritime people must be on
the sea in the enemy's coast ; so in the case of a
raid it would seem to follow that the most natural
defence must also be on the sea on the British
coast.
In the literature of the " invasion school " little
has been said of the progress which has been made
in the development of the mobile defences on the
east coast of Great Britain. This North Sea littoral
is prepared against raids as the Channel littoral was
never protected during all the years of our strained
relations with France, although, owing to the
narrowness of the Channel, the danger then was
relatively much greater. During this period there
was no mobile defence from Land's End to Dover,
nor was there always a single squadron of men-of-war
* It has never, however, been satisfactorily explained how
such a raiding force of a comparatively few thousand men,
having painted a country-side red, would escape after their
presence had become known to the British Admiralty, nor what
influence such pantomimic excursions could have upon the
course of a war between two great and war-like peoples. On
the admission of the National Service League, the United
Kingdom has 120,000 trained men always immediately available
in peace-time, and nearly three times as many after the first
signal of war.
1 68 THE COMMAND OF THE SEA
in British waters or within a week's steaming.
The small Channel Fleet, then our only fleet nearer
than the Mediterranean, was frequently in the
Atlantic, and sometimes in the Mediterranean. In
those days England held to the old faith and confided
her confidence to a fleet-in-being. There was no
active and visible defence of the British seas during
this time of our enmity with France, and the
English people slept quietly in their beds.
Now, however, the Admiralty have drawn up
plans for keeping watch and ward over the whole
length of the coast line from the Straits of Dover to
the extreme north of Great Britain. There are
flotillas of submarines always on duty in the
narrows of the Channel, with their bases at Ports-
mouth and Dover, and large destroyer flotillas
are associated with them ; there are other
submarines, destroyers, and torpedo boats about
a hundred in the Medway ; we have a group of
submarines at Harwich, with flotillas of sea-going
torpedo-boat destroyers of the most seaworthy type.
All these vessels are continually exercising on the
east coast. And then, finally, further north there
is another flotilla of submarines at Dundee. From
Dover right away northward there is also a series
of war signal stations on the coast wireless tele-
graph stations linking together the whole of the
defences. In this manner a mobile chain has been
created up the north-east coast of Great Britain,
and steps are being taken to strengthen the links
in the chain. In co-operating with this coastal
defence force, the patriotism of the civilian popu-
POLICY OF HOME DEFENCE 169
lation can surely find an outlet without abandoning
the advantages of position which an island people
enjoy.
Whatever may be the intention of the enthusiasts
for military aggrandisement and, no doubt, they
mean well their efforts must be injurious to the
best interests of the Empire. They have sown seed
which is bearing its inevitable fruit : in spite of all
official discouragement, in spite of the most authori-
tative inquiries, they have given thousands of people
the impression that invasion is possible, and that
our defence against invasion must take the form of
an army founded upon compulsory service.* At a
time of approaching crisis in the history of the Navy,
when the national will and the national purse should
be concentrated upon the one end the maintenance
of our naval supremacy public opinion is being
misled into byways which have been trodden before
and which have always led to one inevitable goal
waste of effort and money, as witness the Palmer-
ston fortifications along the south coast monuments
to national folly, melancholy witnesses to the vain
squandering of nine millions sterling. The more the
power of the military arm is exaggerated, the more
the effort directed to the upbuilding of the Fleet is
weakened. Thus the primary defence of the United
Kingdom is neglected.
For every pound spent upon military defence,
* Such an army would have to be in addition to out present
Regular Army, as "a nation in arms'' would not be available
for police work of the Empire, nor for Indian or Colonial
Reliefs. In France and Germany, even this in their case, very
limited duty falls to volunteers.
1 7 o THE COMMAND OF THE SEA
beyond the clear necessities of the case, the
Fleet will lose at least two pounds, because we buy
our naval power in the cheapest market. The sum
which the United Kingdom can afford for defence is
limited so limited that some pessimists say we must
abandon our traditional position on the sea. Owing to
social and economic conditions, military force in the
United Kingdom is costly while naval force is cheap.
According to the National Service League, we are
spending 27,300,000 on an Army of 330,000 officers
and men, while Germany and France, for 32,000,000
each, are able to secure for home defence armies of
3,750,000 and 3,000,000 respectively. This contrast
effectively illustrates the cost of military power in an
island kingdom, which, in spite of the agitation of cen-
turies, has always refused to submit to conscription
to barter the advantage of position. On the other
hand, for an expenditure of rather over 40,000,000,
the United Kingdom obtains a fleet which is at
present whatever may be said of the future more
supreme than ever before in relation to the power
of any two rival fleets. For this expenditure the
Admiralty provide the country with 136,000 regular
officers and men, and 30,000 reservists who have all
been trained for several years in the active Fleet,
apart from several thousand reservists who have not
been so highly trained, and the 30,000 men in the
dockyards. By the association of officers and men
with the instruments of naval warfare, we obtain
a maximum fighting power at a relatively small
cost, because we build cheaply and quickly. The
fighting power of the naval personnel is multiplied
POLICY OF HOME DEFENCE 171
a thousand-fold when it is associated, as it is to-day,
with the ships of war.
While, therefore, the United Kingdom has a re-
latively small and very costly land army, it possesses
an exceedingly large and very cheap sea army.
Consequently, such comparisons of the military
strength of the great nations as are made by the
National Service League are entirely misleading.
Naval forces are also military forces, and in any
careful and complete contrast of military power an
investigator is led to the conclusion that the arma-
ments of Great Britain, situated as she is, with her
children nations oversea, are more powerful than
those of any other country in the world.
England is not the unprotected waif and stray
among the nations. On the Continent the frontiers
which have to be defended are land frontiers, and
therefore the military strength of such Powers takes
the form of soldiers, and the population is compelled
to submit to the burden of conscription. No one
can accurately calculate the actual cost of these
Continental armies, because the burden of the
nation is not shown in any financial statement.
The actual cost is infinitely swollen by the national
loss due to the withdrawal of so many men from
industrial occupations. In the United Kingdom the
defence problem has always called for a different
solution. The frontiers are sea frontiers. The
Empire is bound together not by great strategical
railways, as in Germany, France, and Russia, but
by the Seven Seas. This is not a thing to be deplored
but to be gloried in. Owing to the development of
1 72 THE COMMAND OF THE SEA
steam applied to marine purposes, the British Empire
to-day is more consolidated than was the German
Empire in 1870. For the defence of her strategical
railways and for the protection of her land frontiers,
Germany in the intervening forty years has created
a vast land army ; the United Kingdom, for the
defence of her sea frontiers and the protection of her
strategical sea routes, has created a vast sea army.
It does not follow because Germany, in particular,
is expanding her Fleet, that therefore the people of
the United Kingdom should be cajoled into a great
scheme of military expansion. The logical result of
Germany's new policy is the direct contrary to this.
The mere fact that Germany is devoting so large a
share of her resources including heavy loans to the
building of her Fleet should be sufficient to convince
the British people of the unrivalled value of sea
power and cause them to consecrate their resources
to further naval expansion.
What is, then, to be thought of Englishmen who,
instead of devoting all their energies to measures
for keeping the enemy out of the United Kingdom,
occupy themselves with plans for fighting him when
he is landed, to the inevitable weakening of the
main efforts to keep him out ? This is not the
British policy it is the negation of all common
sense. If there is reason to think that the main
defence the simplest, cheapest, and best, and the
one with which we can fight an invading army when
it is not an army is weaker than is essential to
reasonable security, then it is the main defence
which should be strengthened. If a householder's
POLICY OF HOME DEFENCE 173
doors are flimsy, or the locks faulty, what would be
thought of his wasting his substance in putting
thicker glass in his windows as a protection against
the burglar's visit ? It is surprising that the
arguments by which the new, but ever old, movement
in favour of conscription has been commended to
the British people should have misled a single reason-
able being. They are historically, economically,
and strategically unsound.
The peril which England has to fear is not invasion
but starvation the most terrible of all perils.
Apart from the raw material needed by our factories,
four out of every five loaves which we eat come to us
in ships passing over the frontiers dividing us from
possible enemies, frontiers which soldiers cannot, but
sailors can, and have, defended. The sober facts as
between invasion and starvation may be thus stated :
If you drilled every man in this country to the picture
of perfection now possessed by the German Army, or by
any other great foreign military force, if every young
man of twenty was trained to arms, what would it avail
you if the sea was not free and open to bring to these
shores raw material and the food upon which we depend ?
Your training would be useless, your valour would be
thrown away. Your patriotism would waste itself in
empty effort. You would be beaten without firing a
shot, you would be enslaved without striking a blow,
and that result is absolutely assured unless we have the
patriotism and the energy to see that the fleets of this
country are not merely adequate to fight a battle, but
adequate to preserve the great trade routes which are
the very arteries and veins through which our life-
blood flows.
i 7 4 THE COMMAND OF THE SEA
These are the words not of a pacifist, not of an
opponent of every reasonable precaution against
every probable peril, but of Mr. Balfour, speaking
at York, on January I3th, 1909. England's peril
is starvation not invasion. By cutting off merely
a portion of our supplies of food and raw material
after crippling the British Navy ; by getting across
some of our trade routes and staying there, an enemy
could force this country to a humiliating peace.
At times we have only seven weeks' supply of food,
and there are 13,000,000 people living on the verge
of starvation when commerce is pursuing its peaceful
course and prices are normal. Directly a few ships
were captured at sea by an enemy, prices would rise,
and millions of people, thousands of them idle for
want of raw material to work with, would force any
Government to capitulate. The suffering mob would
take the reins, however large an army were locked
by the sea within these shores also threatened
with starvation. When an enemy, without moving
a soldier over the water, can starve the British people
and their armies by keeping from them one or two
out of every five loaves, why should he go to all
the trouble and risk of carrying out such a risky
and costly operation as invasion ?
It is admitted that a small invasion a raid of a
few thousand men is possible if an enemy can elude
the British Navy. An enemy will fix the size of the
raiding force which shall be embarked, not by the
millions of men it has available, but by the size of the
force it will have to meet if it eludes the main
defence, the sea-going fleets, slips past the mobile
POLICY OF HOME DEFENCE 175
coast defence hundreds of torpedo craft and
gets ashore. The smaller the raiding force, the
greater the possibility of missing the British fleets ;
but, equally, the smaller the raiding force, the more
its incursion approximates to suicide. This is where
the Territorial Army's usefulness comes in. It
deters an enemy, even when the regular British Army
is on distant service, as during the South African
War, from committing suicide ; and in order to
avoid suicide it must increase its raiding force until
the raid becomes an invasion, involving hundreds
of ships and elaborate organisation in embarkation
and disembarkation, and when it becomes an invasion
the project is so big, it involves so much weakness,
that the Navy, in the opinion of the country's best
experts, is an adequate protection. An invading
army, necessitating the collection and movement of
thousands of tons of shipping, cannot be smuggled
into a country like a box of cigars. A few thousand
men in a few ships might be so smuggled, and when
they got ashore, even if the Regular Army were
abroad, they could not do better than get on their
knees and implore the 270,000 officers and men of
the British Territorial Army, organised for war as
never a citizen army was organised before, to
spare their lives.
III. THE DANGER AND THE DEFENCE.
The problem of home defence is revealed on the
highest expert authority as one of easily manageable
proportions. The War Office adopts the extreme
limit a possible invasion of 70,000 men while
1 76 THE COMMAND OF THE SEA
the Admiralty holds that " no force of anything
approaching that strength could land on these
shores." The target at which the British authorities
must aim is therefore 70,000 men at an extreme
figure. At the same time, the home defence force
must be such as can deal with raids by a small force
of 2,000 or so which may slip past the Fleets. This
is the target. What is the force available to hit it ?
The position may be stated thus :
POSSIBLE BRITISH DANGER 70,000.
Maximum force which can be landed by an enemy,
70,000 men.
Raiding force which may elude the British Navy's
double line of defence the sea-going fleets and the
mobile coast defence of destroyers and submarines
2,000 or so.
BRITISH DEFENCE.
(a) In Time of Peace 526,000.
The Two-Power Standard Fleet, supported by a
large and active coast defence.
The Regular Army in the United Kingdom of
251,481 (White Paper C.D. 5594).
The Territorial Army of 260,000 men, and 15,000
to 20,000 National Reservists. (Lord Haldane in
the House of Lords, November 20th, 1911.)
(b) In Time of War About 375,000.
In the absence of the Expeditionary Force, the
Navy would still perform its role, and the land forces
available would include :
(a) 100,000 Special Reservists corresponding to
the old Militia with improved training.
POLICY OF HOME DEFENCE 177
(b) 260,000 or 270,000 men of the Territorial
Army.
(c) 15,000 to 20,000 National Reservists, &c.
The disproportion between the target and the
British force maintained to hit it is completely ex-
posed in this brief summary. The task to which
the Army Council has set itself is the organisation of
the home defence force to deal with the maximum
danger of invasion by 70,000 men and the minimum
danger of sporadic raids. We have had nothing
like the scheme in our history. If the General Staff
had done nothing else, it would deserve the gratitude
of the people of the United Kingdom for its clear
thinking and prompt action in this matter.
From the first it has considered that the
important point is the organisation in suitable units
of a home force for :
(1) Coast defence.
(2) Defence against raids on a comparatively
small scale.
(3) A Central Force capable of reinforcing the
local forces required for defence against raids, and
also capable of dealing with attack on a larger scale.
In the House of Lords on November 20th, 1911,
Lord Haldane explained how these needs were met :
COAST DEFENCE.
We rely, to begin with, on the Regular Royal Garrison
Artillery and Royal Engineers, who are required to man
fixed defences. Next we rely on the Special and Extra
Reserve battalions, which, when they have absorbed
the unfit left behind by Line battalions, and the surplus
Regular Reservists, will amount to 100,000 in all ranks.
N
178 THE COMMAND OF THE SEA
These Special Reserve battalions are small in time of
peace, but the Extra Reservists and the other additions
swell up these third battalions in many cases to uoo and
1200. We also rely for coast defence on certain technical
units of the Territorial Force raised locally in defended
ports and trained there. The Army troop battalions
and a few batteries from certain Divisions of the Terri-
torial Force are also allotted to garrison duties.
DEFENCE AGAINST RAIDS.
This implies that we should have troops along the
coast for the purpose of repelling these raids and being in
superior force when they come, and, above all, being able
to hold them until the Central Force can come up. For
that purpose we have assigned eleven Mounted Brigades
and ten Divisions of the Territorial Force.
THE CENTRAL FORCE.
Three Mounted Brigades and four Divisions of
Territorials are allotted as a Central Force, and in the
event of serious attack tlus Force would be augmented by
Mounted Brigades and Divisions forming part of the
local forces as soon as the main point of attack had been
determined. Arrangements are also made to include
in the Central Force two Divisions of the Regular Army
if, when the necessity for taking expeditionary action
arises, the Territorial Force is not considered capable of
undertaking the duties of home defence without the aid
of Regular troops.
These plans based on the supremacy of the fleets
at sea constitute a well-thought-out and carefully
co-ordinated scheme of defence giving to the
inhabitants of the British Isles an assurance of safety
which they have never had before.
We have reached the parting of the ways. There
POLICY OF HOME DEFENCE 179
is no compromise between the development of our
present home defence organisation on voluntary
lines and the adoption of a full-blooded scheme of
conscription based upon two years with the colours,
in addition to, and not in substitution for, the
present Regular Army which is essential for Imperial
defence. There is no praise too high for those
citizens who have responded with a devotion un-
paralleled in the history of civilisation to the call of
service in the Territorial Army. The fact that over
a quarter of a million officers and men are enrolled
in this force, with its onerous terms of service, is a
complete and final reply to the jeremiads of those
who are continually telling us that patriotism is
dead, and that it is therefore necessary to obtain by
force service which hitherto has been rendered by
choice.
In order to appreciate what has been accomplished,
it may be well to present a contrast between the
Territorial organisation which we now possess and
the force which it superseded. This may be most
effectively done in parallel, comparing the Volunteers
and Yeomanry in 1905 with the Territorial Army.
YEOMANRY & VOLUNTEERS. TERRITORIAL ARMY.
1905. Strength 1911.
Officers 9,982 Officers 9,475* t
Other ranks 254,767* Other ranks ...254,692* *
* Including Chaplains and Isle of Man Volunteers.
* t Exclusive of Chaplains and Isle of Man Volunteers.
* * Besides these there are National Reservists and : 724
R.A.M.C. Officers available on Mobilisation for General Hos-
pitals, etc., and 926 Officers of the C.T.C. and Officers of the
U.L. Total, 1,650.
i8o THE COMMAND OF THE SEA
Numbers at Camp.
8 days 15 days 8 days 15 days
Yeomanry (all Officers* 1,011 6,975
ranks,) 23,oo6*t Other ranks 75,522 148,318
Volunteers (all - -
rank) 148,925 24,882* 76,534 155,293
148,945
Total 196,834 Total 232,827
* Includes Permanent Staff. * Exclusive of Permanent
* t Return does not indicate Staff.
number present for less than 16
days.
Terms of Service.
Imperial Yeomanry : Enlist- 4 Years (and re-engagements for
i , 2, 3, or 4 years on the active
list further re-engagements
for the Territorial Force
ment for 3 years.
Volunteers : Enrolment.
No fixed period.
Reserve).
War Organisation.
Practically non-existent with
the Volunteers. The Infan-
try were grouped into Brig-
ades commanded partly by
Regulars and partly by
Volunteer Officers. There
were no units of R.H.A.,
R.F.A.,Technical Cos. R.E.,
A.S.C., units, or organised
ambulances, so that in no
sense could it be said that
the Volunteers could be
mobilized as a Field Army.
Practically the same for the Ter-
ritorial Army as that of the
Regulars and organised as a
Field Army. The Divisional
organisation of the Territorial
Force was unknown in the
time of the Volunteers.
Imperial Service, October i,
1911, : 1,140 officers and
19,302 other ranks had under-
taken the liability for this ser-
vice, including practically the
whole of King Edward's Horse
and the 7th Middlesex Regt.
Is it not apparent from this brief survey that,
since 1905, when we were still under the shadow of
the war in South Africa and the nation's loins were
girded, British patriotism has risen to new heights ?
Surveying the present situation in contrast with the
old, it is impossible to understand the confusion of
POLICY OF HOME DEFENCE 181
thought which urges some publicists to recommend
that we should scrap the promising military machine
which has been created by the expenditure of so much
money and energy in order to embark upon a new
and untried method of home defence, uncalled for
by the extent of our needs and entirely alien to the
temper of the British people.
We have to-day a Territorial Force organised as a
field army and under the orders of the best regular
officers at the disposal of the War Office. As Lord
Haldane has explained, there are fourteen Divisions
of the Territorial Force, and there are fourteen
Major-Generals of the Regulars who are commanders
of Divisions, each of whom has a General Staff
officer. Those, of course, are all Regulars. In
addition, there are thirty-one Regular Brigade
commanders ; there are some ex- Regular commanders
still commanding Brigades, but the policy is to
substitute active Regular officers on half-pay for the
retired officers who were employed during the earlier
stages of the Force, so that the Brigade commands
may as nearly as possible be filled by Regular officers
who would know that their promotion depended on
the success they made in handling their Brigades.
Nine exceptionally capable Territorial officers have
been promoted to command Brigades. There are
406 Regular adjutants and four ex- Regular adjutants.
The nation has thus obtained a co-ordinated military
machine with a unified policy ; on the one side is
the Regular Army with its Expeditionary Force,
and on the other side is the Territorial Army or-
ganised for home defence, and trained under the
182 THE COMMAND OF THE SEA
superintendence of over 450 Regular officers. This
is the machine which the nation is asked by the
National Service League to put on the " scrap heap,"
for compulsion would ruin the volunteer army and
change its whole spirit.
The duty of the people of the British Isles as-
suredly lies in the opposite direction. The more
they realise what has been already achieved, the
more whole-heartedly will they support the military
administration in its effort to achieve yet greater
things. The Territorial Army has its defects what
human institution has not ? but the Territorial
Army is young, and year by year it is attaining a
higher standard. Destructive criticism may hinder
this work, and it will certainly discourage recruits
from coming forward to render a service which,
however limited the danger of invasion, is one of
the most unquestionable expressions of patriotism.
IV. AN ALTERNATIVE PROGRAMME.
Now that the highest military opinion has con-
demned the scheme of the National Service League,
is it too much to hope that this great organisation,
with its vast influence and considerable funds, will
be turned to useful work ? If the leaders who have
now had their programme condemned by the naval
and military administrations had but the courage to
gather up the strength at their disposal and devote
it to furthering the carefully thought out plans of
the Army Council, what a magnificent work they
might accomplish. Let those who appreciate the
deep patriotic fervour which inspires the country
POLICY OF HOME DEFENCE 183
consider what enthusiasm would run riot through
the counties and towns and villages if the National
Service League adopted some such programme as
the following :
(i) Compulsory continuation schools for all boys and
girls from fourteen to sixteen years of age, the curriculum
to include hygiene, technical instruction, and adequate
physical drill. Only those who are familiar with the
marvellous results of physical drill upon the lads re-
cruited for the Navy can fully appreciate the influence
which this reform would have in developing the physique
of the nation.
(2) Voluntary military training in cadet corps. The
cost of equipment and camp expenses would be provided
by the local education authorities, supplemented by the
large voluntary subscriptions which now go to the support
of the various lads' organisations with an enrolled
strength of about 450,000.
(3) Encouragement of the Territorial Force fed from
the cadet corps. In carrying out this aspect of its work,
the League would occupy very much the same relation
to the Territorial Army as the Navy League occupies
towards the Navy. Every branch throughout the
country would become an educational agency assisting
by meetings and lectures in attracting recruits.
This, in brief outline, is surely a policy which
would be calculated to win the enthusiastic support of
all classes in the community, irrespective of political
complexion or sectarian differences. It may be that
as a preliminary to the success of such a programme,
it would be desirable to carry out a suggestion put
forward in a thoughtful article recently published
in National Defence. Until the main burden of
184 THE COMMAND OF THE SEA
the cost of the Territorial Army is removed from
the Army Estimates, Regular soldiers will always
regard it with jealousy. The cost of the Territorial
Force amounts to over three millions sterling.
It is a large sum, and many soldiers of the Regular
Army view this expenditure of Army funds upon
what is, after all, only a citizen army for home
defence with disfavour. If it were possible to
relieve the Army Estimates, in part, at least, of this
burden, the attitude of Regular officers towards the
Territorial Force would undergo considerable
modification.
Such a change would be in line with present
policy. One of the main features of Lord Haldane's
Territorial Forces Act was the resuscitation of the
military position of the Lord Lieutenant. Not only
was he to be the acknowledged head of the
Territorial County Association, but he was to be
given back his old right of either nominating officers
or granting commissions to officers for the old Militia,
now part of the Territorial Forces. He was to be
President of a County Association, which was to be
composed of men of position, civil and military,
connected with the civil administration, and com-
mercial and professional industry of the country,
and belonging to the Territorial battalions of the
county regiment. The rally was to be a county
rally, and already it has resulted in the drawing
together in a remarkable degree, quite unanticipated
in some quarters, of all that is best in county life.
Under a Unionist Government, this movement will
assuredly make further progress. Therefore there
POLICY OF HOME DEFENCE 185
would be nothing parochial in suggesting a county
rate.
The suggestion is surely one well worthy of con-
sideration if the Territorial Army is to be freed from
those influences which tend to cramp its development
and is to be definitely recognised as a citizen army
for home defence, depending for its efficiency mainly
upon the enthusiasm of county, town and village.
The writer in National Defence indicates the
machinery by which this reform could be carried out.
We can see no practical means of levying a Territorial
rate except through the county machinery. It is ready
to hand. Every householder, as is well known , is supplied
with a demand-note half-yearly, on which is clearly
defined the rates he has to pay police, road, poor, and
other rates. We have shown how these rates have grown
up from the old feudal system of personal service, by a
process of evolution over many centuries. Every one
admits the justice of these rates ; they are naturally
paid on the presentation of the demand-note. All that
would be required would be the addition on this demand-
note of a Territorial rate with four conditions of exemp-
tion :
(1) Have you served in any of the forces, naval or
military ?
(2) Are you serving ?
(3) Will you join any of these forces during the
present year ?
(4) Do you belong to the police force of the county ?
The exact apportionment of this rate is a question for
skilled actuaries and cannot be discussed here, but given
that the fundamental principle on which the rate is based
is not only a just one, but acceptable to the manhood of
the country as not derogatory to the inherent principle.
186 THE COMMAND OF THE SEA
the freedom of the subject, the apportionment should
present no great difficulties. The Swiss rate is calculated
on wages earned and income received, and varies from
five shillings to 125 or thereabouts. This appears a
just apportionment. Its levy would at once remove
the present financial difficulties which hinder the
efficient development of our Territorial Army system.
Here we have a practical suggestion. It might
be possible, on some such basis, to separate the cost
of equipment from the cost of training, leaving the
former relatively small charge upon the Army
Estimates and throwing the latter upon the local
rates. Under such conditions the General Staff of
the Army would continue to exercise a supervision
over the Territorial Forces ; Regular officers would
still be associated with the units. We should have
a Regular Army definitely maintained for Imperial
purposes, and a Territorial Army as definitely
maintained for the purposes of home defence and
drawing its strength from the hearths and homes
of the United Kingdom.
Who can doubt that under such a scheme the
Territorial headquarters throughout the country,
instead of being as at present dreary, unattractive,
prison-like buildings, would become the social centre
in each locality, where members of the force would
not only gather for military duties, but would engage
in those recreations which have been the secret of
the esprit de corps and high standard of efficiency of
the Regular Army and the British Fleet. The coming
of the Armada found the English Admirals playing
bowls on Plymouth Hoe ; the battle of Waterloo was
POLICY OF HOME DEFENCE 187
won on the playing-fields of Eton ; a polo match
immediately preceded the battle of Mirwan ; the
British Fleet at Gibraltar a few years ago played
cricket at a moment when war seemed imminent.
If the Territorial Army is to rise to its full measure
of strength, it must be more intimately associated
with the life of the nation, until it becomes the am-
bition of every able-bodied man to enter its ranks.
Those who urge compulsory military training and
a vast increase in our military expenditure at the
inevitable cost of the Navy, must get back to first
principles, which may be thus summarised :
(1) The United Kingdom consists of two islands,
and, therefore, as Earl St. Vincent was never tired
of reiterating, any enemy must come over the sea.
(2) The sea can be defended only by fleets, and
fleets are, therefore, the main protection not only
of an island people, but of a sea-united Empire.
The fleet-in-being adequate to defend the whole
Empire will be adequate to defend the United
Kingdom. The greater includes the less. So long
as we hold the seas, we hold not only the Empire
but the United Kingdom.
(3) As the Navy (a) cannot fight ashore, we main-
tain an Army which is essentially an oversea force,
and not a home defence force, and as (b) a raiding
force of less than 70,000 might elude the fleets, we
need a Territorial Force.
(4) If we had a " nation in arms "
(a) The maintenance of the existing supreme
sea-going Fleet, with its mobile coast defence
force, would still be necessary ;
i88 THE COMMAND OF THE SEA
(b) We should still require the present oversea
Army, if only for Indian service, and therefore
the burden on the country in service and in money *
would be additional to the expenditure on the
present military establishment ;
(c) Our present naval and military expenditure
of 72,000,000 would be increased purely for the
purposes of fighting an invader which on the
highest authority cannot reach our shores in force
so long as we hold the seas our Imperial frontiers.
These are the immemorial first principles of
British defence principles which, owing to their
breadth, have reacted powerfully on the national
character and national destiny ; they have given
into our keeping an Empire of one-fourth of the
earth's surface. The suggestion that, possessing
such a heritage, we should consecrate our thought
and energy to the mythical danger of invasion, is
the sign not of national health but of national disease.
We shall listen to such invitations to a narrow
habit of thought and action at the peril not only of
the Empire, but of our own well-bring as a people
dependent on the sea for our daily bread and our
daily work.
England's danger is not invasion, but starvation,
and against this there is one, and only one, safeguard
a supreme Fleet a fleet-in-being which, by the
very world-atmosphere which it creates, protects the
uttermost outposts of the Empire as efficiently as
it protects London, the Empire's nerve-centre.
* The cost of " a nation in arms " is put at ^4,000,000 by the
National Service League, and .7,800,000 by the War Office.
CHAPTER VII.
THE INVASION PROBLEM : ITALY'S " BOLT FROM
THE BLUE."
ITALY has provided an object-lesson for the
British people who are periodically frightened
by the dread of invasion. Italy, one of
the great naval and military Powers, has
carried out the invasion of Tripoli and
Cyrenaica. For the first time in European
history since railways were laid to facilitate the
mobilisation of an expeditionary force on the coast
and steam gave to ships a measure of mobility that
they never possessed in the days of sails, a military
force has been safely conveyed across the sea and
disembarked on the exposed littoral of a country
which for all practical purposes is an island, since
it has on one side the sea and on the others either
illimitable stretches of desert or neutral territory.
Tripoli has been very aptly described as "an over-
grown Arab oasis " ; it is backed by sterile hills and
possesses a hinterland of leagues of sand. Tripoli
could not be more isolated more completely cut off
from such land communications as would have
given promise of reinforcements for its defence if
it were completely surrounded by water like Great
Britain itself. Moreover, there is a close maritime
parallel between Tripoli and Italy on the one hand
190 THE COMMAND OF THE SEA
and Great Britain and Germany on the other. The
North Sea, which German transports would have to
traverse, is four hundred miles broad, while from
Naples, the chief Italian port of embarkation for
the expeditionary force to Tripoli, the distance is
about five hundred miles. The Italian operation
thus furnishes an ideal geographical parallel for the
illustration of the alarmists' views as to the British
peril of invasion.
Then, again, Italy succeeded in launching a " bolt
from the blue," thanks to the disorganisation of the
Ottoman Government and the absence of such an
efficient secret service as might have given timely
warning of Italy's preparations. The peoples of
Europe, and least of all the Government of Turkey,
had no inkling of Italian plans. It is now known
that throughout last summer in fact, ever since
the " Panther's " arrival off Morocco disturbed the
tranquillity of Europe the Italian Cabinet had been
preparing for the invasion of Tripoli. A series of
veiled and evidently inspired articles in the Rome
papers appeared early in the autumn, and in dealing
very guardedly with the quarrel with Turkey,
prepared the Italian people for some more energetic
measures than had hitherto been adopted against
the Porte. These articles did not, of course, suggest
even remotely the possibility of a forcible seizure of
Tripoli, but merely prepared the Italian nation for
developments. The Times alone and that paper
only once, on September I3th referred to these
articles, and then with no emphasis. It is now
known officially that Italy did not even confide her
THE INVASION PROBLEM 191
plans to her allies Germany and Austria-Hungary.*
She planned secretly and her purpose was to wait
until her preparations naval and military were
complete, and then, at a moment when Europe was
absorbed in one of the crises which marked the
Franco-German negotiations in connection with
Morocco, to throw down the gage, invade Tripoli by
the lightning use of her navy and army in co-
operation, and present Europe with a fait accompli
before the Powers could, if they would, intervene.
These were Italy's plans. Suddenly Turkey received
an ultimatum to cede Tripoli, twenty-four hours
only for acquiescence was allowed, and then the
fleet proceeded to prepare the way for the ex-
peditionary force, under General Caneva, to which
was entrusted the task of taking Tripoli and
Cyrenaica.
In order to appreciate the full significance of
Italy's design, the character of the expeditionary
force must be studied. The military correspondent
of the Times on October 7th put the numbers at
" possibly 35,000 men," and stated that "adding
the crews of the transports ... it is very likely
true that there may be 50,000 all told with the
armada." On October loth, however, he corrected
this estimate and stated that " in round numbers
the combatant strength of General Caneva's command
may be set down at 25,000 rifles, 1,000 sabres, and
100 guns." The special correspondent at Tripoli,
* The Austrian Prime Minister (Baron Gautsch), on October
24th, stated : " That Italy did not first of all acquaint her allies
with her intention was, as the Government knew, due to Italy's
friendly consideration for her allies."
192 THE COMMAND OF THE SEA
on October 6th, announced that General Caneva
had, with supplementary troops, " about 25,000 in
all." The strength of the Turkish forces in Tripoli
and Cyrenaica was about 4,000.
The conditions for this warlike operation on the
part of Italy were ideal. Italy is one of the world's
great naval Powers : she possesses war material
which in tonnage comes next in order after that of
France, and the character of her personnel, and the
care taken in its training, have always gained the
admiration of sailors. September is the month in
which naval and military manoeuvres are usually
carried out in the Mediterranean, and it was possible,
therefore, to have the fleet mobilised and a large
part of the army on a war footing without attracting
attention. Nearly three months were devoted to
the naval and military preparations, which were
pressed forward with admirable smoothness and
without attracting attention. Before the ultimatum
was sent to Constantinople, the whole Italian navy
was at sea ready to execute the Government's policy
with eclat, and, supported by the military arm, it
was hoped that Italy would take Europe not
excluding the Italian allies, Germany and Austria-
Hungary completely by surprise, and present a
fait accompli before an opportunity had occurred
for the European concert or rather European
pandemonium to intervene, even if it agreed in
disapproval of Italy's abrupt method of dealing
with Turkey. Time was the very essence of the
Italian scheme.
From the moment that the Italian fleet was
THE INVASION PROBLEM 193
mobilised, Italy had absolute command of the sea.
A small an insignificant Turkish naval force,
but containing practically all the effective ships of
the Turkish fleet, was, it is true, at Beyrut under its
British officers, Rear-Admiral Hugh Williams and
his staff, when the ultimatum expired. Italy was
bound to give it safe passage through the Dardanelles
in order to enable the British officers neutrals to
land. Once this squadron two battleships, the
obsolete vessels sold by Germany to her " friend,"
and a few cruisers had entered the Dardanelles
and obtained safety, it remained there, as it was
bound to remain in face of such overwhelming odds.
Italy, without firing a gun or discharging a torpedo,
had the absolute control of the sea so desirable for
the execution in orderly fashion of an invasion
scheme. Lord Roberts with his knowledge as a
field-marshal of sea transport and naval affairs
has always urged that only a merely temporary
and local command of the sea was necessary to
enable an invasion scheme to be carried out : Italy
was infinitely more fortunate, because for all practical
purposes of war the Turkish navy did not exist.
Nor was this Italy's only advantage. Italy had
command of the sea, and Tripoli was in all essential
respects an island a place completely surrounded
by sea and sand. Therefore Turkey could take no
steps to reinforce the few thousand soldiers on whom
the defence of her threatened territory devolved,
with such assistance as Arabs might lend. Both
Powers can place in the field about a million and a
quarter of men. But the loss of the sea-command
194 THE COMMAND OF THE SEA
by Turkey, owing to her naval inferiority, meant
that her army was imprisoned in Europe and could
not strike a blow for her African possessions. There
was no opportunity for Turkey to gather up her
immense military strength and deal with the Italian
invaders, because the Italian fleet held the only
route the sea by which reinforcements could be
dispatched.
Such were the military plans of Italy, long and
carefully prepared. The subsequent events the
actual sequence of the war may be best revealed
in diary form so as to call to mind not only Italy's
action, but the atmosphere in Europe at the time-
one of terror of a general conflagration.
OPENING OF THE WAR.
June 22nd. The Coronation of King George (a)
preceded by a calm throughout Europe ; (b) marked
by the presence in London of the German Crown
Prince and representatives of the nations of the
whole world ; (c) followed by many prophecies of a
period of peace and good will in the West.
July 3rd. The German gunboat " Panther "
arrives at Agadir ; reopening of the Morocco
question by Germany, with a consequent unsettling
of the European situation.
July (middle). Italy decides to make preparations
for the seizure of Tripoli, taking advantage of the
preoccupation of Europe with the Morocco crisis.
Complete silence of the Italian Press.
July, Aug., and Sept. Franco-German negotia-
tions continue, Great Britain supporting France.
THE INVASION PROBLEM 195
Aug. 25th-Sept. I4th. Articles in Italian papers
apparently inspired foreshadowing energetic mea-
sures against Turkey, and preparing the Italian
nation for strong action by the Government.
Sept. i8th-22nd. Grave European crisis owing to
Germany's attitude towards France. Orders issued
to the British Fleet in view of possible eventualities.
Slump on the Berlin Bourse owing to the fear of
an immediate outbreak of war. Great financiers in
Berlin exert their influence in favour of peace.
Sept. 23rd. An agreement between France and
Germany on the former's status in Morocco reached.
Crisis ended.
Sept. 25th. First news published of Italy's demand
upon Turkey for the cession of Tripoli and Cyrenaica.
Sept. 28th. Ultimatum handed to the Ottoman
Government demanding the cession of Tripoli and
the whole of Cyrenaica, " in default of which the
Italian Government will be obliged to proceed to the
immediate execution of the measures destined to secure
the occupation."
Entire fleet of Italy having been mobilised on or
about Sept. iQth, it is announced that it has left for
its war stations.
The Daily Telegraph's correspondent at Rome
telegraphs :
It is impossible at the present moment to obtain or
send full details about the expedition, but it may be
stated beforehand that the operations have been fully
studied and prepared for a long time past. It is expected
that they will have the success hoped for, and be worthy
of Italy and her navy and army.
196 THE COMMAND OF THE SEA
Sept. 29th, 2.30 P.M. Ultimatum expires and war
opens.
Oct. 1st. Italian squadron arrives off Tripoli
and destroyer enters the harbour and demands the
surrender of the town. Turkish authorities refuse.
Oct. 2nd~3rd. Turkish troops withdraw to in-
terior, leaving only a small force in the few forts,
armed with obsolete guns.
Oct. 3rd, 3.30 P.M. Bombardment of Tripoli by
the fleet begins.
Oct. 4th. Bombardment continues, and a portion of
the Italian naval brigade lands to the west of the town.
Oct. 5th. Tripoli formally occupied.
SAILING OF THE EXPEDITIONARY FORCE.
Oct. 7th (Saturday). The military correspondent
of the Times states :
The first transports to leave were naturally those from
the most motherly ports of embarkation, namely, Genoa,
Leghorn and Ancona. From Genoa the first transports
left on Wednesday night. They should have picked up
the Naples convoy on Thursday night and have reached
the Straits of Messina yesterday morning, at which time
the transports coming from the Adriatic should also
have arrived if the movement had been well arranged.
Allowing the greater part of Friday for marshalling
the convoy, which is said to consist of 60 ships, and
assuming that it might be considered advisable to reach
the coast of Tripoli at dawn in order to have a long spell
of light for the landing operations, it is possible that this
morning may see the armada off the coast of North Africa.*
Delays are possible owing to the breakdown of ships,
weather conditions, and reports of hostile naval opera-
* As will be seen this prophecy was not fulfilled.
THE INVASION PROBLEM 197
tions,* but there is no certain proof at present that
there is much amiss with the Italian plan, for the exe-
cution of which preparations appear to have been very
thorough and complete.
Oct. loth (morning). First detachment of the
expeditionary force lands at Marsa Tobruk, a bay
700 miles to the east of Tripoli, without incident.
(Times, Oct. nth).
Oct. nth. Nineteen transports conveying Italian
troops to Tripoli seen to the north-east of Malta,
escorted by three battleships, one cruiser, and eight
torpedo-boats.
Oct. nth, 3 P.M. The van of the Italian expedi-
tionary force arrives at Tripoli in two ocean liners.
" I strongly suspect," the Times' special corres-
pondent telegraphs, " that the arrival was due to an
urgent appeal by the navy for troops."
WORK OF DISEMBARKATION.
Oct. I2th (morning). The nineteen transports
conveying the second division of the expeditionary
army arrive at Tripoli escorted by part of the
Italian fleet and disembarkation begins at once and
proceeds smoothly. Besides the escort accompany-
ing the transports, their passage was further protected
by a chain of war vessels extending to within 180
miles of Tripoli, and consisting of the torpedo-
cruiser " Coatit " and a number of destroyers and
sea-going torpedo-boats. (Reuter's correspondent
at Tripoli.) No stores landed.
The military correspondent of the Times admits
that " There is some evidence of disappointment in
* Turkey had no men-of-war with which to take hostile action*
198 THE COMMAND OF THE SEA
Italy that the dispatch of the armada has been so
long delayed," but he claims, as an afterthought,
apparently, that there is " no military need for haste."
Oct. I3th. General Caneva, Commander-in-Chief,
lands at Tripoli amid the salutes of the fleet.
Oct. I4th. Disebmarkation of the impedimenta of
the first division of the expeditionary force still proceeds.
COMPLETION OF THE INVASION.
Oct. I5th. Fourteen transports conveying the last
portion of the first division of the Italian expedition
drop anchor off Tripoli and disembarkation begins.
Oct. i7th. Italian transports, convoyed by war-
ships under Admiral Aubrey, sail from Port Augusta
and Syracuse for Bengazi and Derna.
Oct. i8th. Derna is bombarded by Italian
warships.
Oct. igth. Bombardment of Bengazi and troops
land. Second convoy of troops arrives off Bengazi,
escorted by eleven men-of-war.
The Times special correspondent at Tripoli states :
It would seem that the first division complete con-
stitutes the legitimate expeditionary force for Tripoli ;
the other mobilised division will be split up and will
supply detachments for Horns, Bengazi, and Bomba,
and for the base of the troops here. The staff announces
that all the troops now landed belong to the first division.
It seems to me a model of completeness, judged by
the standards of European warfare ; but, as an expe-
ditionary force, the rationing of it and of the big field
artillery horses will be a slow affair from an open road-
stead, in spite of the auxiliary transport provided by
Sicilian feluccas.
THE INVASION PROBLEM 199
The Times special correspondent at Tripoli in
another message telegraphs :
The Italians may congratulate themselves that the
weather has held for the disembarkation here. Matters
have become difficult before Horns, where a landing is
delayed owing to the weather, though the fleet has
fulfilled its duty in the reduction of the land defences.
At Derna similar difficulties were encountered.
Oct. 20th. Reuter reports from Tripoli that the
landing operations have been seriously impeded by
bad weather, but that on the iQth work was resumed.
Oct. 22nd. The disembarkation of troops, both
at Bengazi and Horns, proceeds all day without any
disturbance.
A wireless message received at Tripoli from Derna
announces successful occupation of that place.
It is not necessary to continue this diary of the
war further and trace the fortunes or, more cor-
rectly, the misfortunes of the Italian troops. As a
study in invasion the story is complete. The feat
of transportation across a maritime track of about
the same width as the North Sea provides in itself
sufficient material for consideration for the moment.
We have no details of the experiences of the
transports, but it is known that the sea passage
somewhat resembled the voyage of the Baltic Fleet.
The troops, unused to the sea an element full of
mystery and danger to landsmen were in a state of
terror. Such men-of-war as Turkey possessed were
known to be inside the Dardanelles ; the Duke of
the Abruzzi, with no little flourish of achievement,
had dealt with the little Customs' gunboats in the
200 THE COMMAND OF THE SEA
Adriatic, and it was a notorious fact that Turkey
had not a single submarine. Yet the soldiers, in
unfamiliar surroundings, were panic-stricken as the
string of transports, with their heavy naval guard,
supplemented by a chain of mosquito craft, moved
at a ten-knot speed towards Tripoli. The ex-
pedition of sixty ships, as has been stated, moved in
sections. Each section was a straggling mob of
shipping ; the captains had no knowledge how to
manoeuvre their vessels in company, or to keep
station like men-of-war, and the danger of collision,
ever present by day, was so imminent by night that
the ships almost stopped. To the soldiers the night
conditions were thus worse than those by day ;
every shadow on the water was some impossible,
mysterious craft of the enemy destined to launch
torpedoes and send them to the bottom. If only
there was a Pierre Loti or a Kipling on board, what
a picture we may yet have of this armada, split up
into sections and sent forth with loads of terror-
stricken landsmen. The actual achievement bore
no resemblance to a " bolt from the blue " ; the
only " blueness " present was that which assailed
the spirits of the troops.
In the light of Italy's achievement, all pre-
conceived opinions on the question of invasion must
be revised. Here we have not the theory, but the
practice of invasion as carried out by a great Power
with the advantages of
(1) absolute and permanent command of the sea ;
(2) over a million tons of steam shipping capable
of being utilised for army transport ; and
THE INVASION PROBLEM 201
(3) a vast military organisation numbering about
one and a quarter million men.
In preparing the plans for the invasion of Tripoli
and Cyrenaica, the Government at Rome had the
advice of the most competent staffs at the War
Office and at the Admiralty, and from the first
moment that war threatened the Italian authorities
enjoyed the benefit of a practically unanimous public
opinion in support of their policy.
Time was believed to be the essential factor of
success. Italy's aim was to use her naval and military
machines with such rapidity that by the time the
other nations of Europe had realised what was afoot
she would be able to point to a fait accompli. The
whole resources of the Italian Government were con-
centrated in secret upon the project for three months.
According to the military theorists under Lord
Roberts, who pose as expert authorities on the
purely naval operation of the sea-transport of an
army, the Italian scheme ought to have been a
triumphant success. The theory of the invasion
school is admirably summarised in the following
passage from the volume by Lord Roberts entitled
Facts and Fallacies :
There are a dozen German ships that could carry
between them an invading army of much nearer 200,000
than 70,000 men. A dozen, or even two dozen ships,
starting from several different ports and escorted by
destroyers, are something very different from the fleet
of small transports covering twenty miles of sea, with a
whole battle-fleet in attendance, with which our vendors
of soporifics would comfort us. With the magnificent
detraining and berthing facilities of the great German
202 THE COMMAND OF THE SEA
ports,* and the high speed of the vessels themselves, the
period required for the whole operation of invasion, from
the time that the soldiers step on board to the time
that they begin their advance on the other side, is much
more likely to be three days than three weeks.
In spite of Lord Roberts's theories, expounded
from time to time by the military correspondent of
the Times, the Italian scheme of invasion, under
ideal conditions, failed in its essential character,
although the actual declaration of war was delayed
until the moment arrived when it was thought that
everything was in readiness.
The ultimatum was handed to the Turkish Govern-
ment on September 28th, when the Italian fleet had
already been mobilised for over a week. The first
detachment of the expeditionary force was not
landed in Tripoli until twelve days later, and the
disembarkation was not completed until the 22nd
or 23rd of October a period of three weeks and four
days from the time when the ultimatum was issued,
and even then there is no evidence that all the
artillery and stores had been got ashore, so that
probably the actual period was at least a month.
Let it be remembered that Italy transported only
25,000 men, that she enjoyed throughout absolute
command of the sea, and that the transports had to
* Italy has more ports than Germany and they are well
equipped. The difficulty of invasion lies, as Italian experience
shows, not in embarking the troops, but in convoying the
transports and disembarking the men from a roadstead open to
the weather, with the continual danger of attack by submarines
and destroyers. The larger the transports employed, the
further they must remain from the shore and the greater the
peril of attack, and the more onerous the task of disembarkation.
THE INVASION PROBLEM 203
cover only four or five hundred miles, and what
must be the verdict upon Lord Roberts' alarms ?
In the light of Italy's carefully planned and long
delayed operation of invasion, what must be thought
of the soldier's nightmare of an England at the mercy
of an enemy who is secretly to land on our coast
an army of 150,000 or even 200,000 men, without
let or hindrance from the British fleets not one
fleet, as nervous soldiers imagine of greater fighting
strength than any two navies in the world, and
superior at the present moment to the three great
navies of Europe Germany, France, and Italy.
According to the admission of the military corres-
pondent of the Times, Italy requisitioned sixty steam-
ships for the transport of her force of 25,000 men,
or, at the outside estimate, 35,000 men ; what num-
ber of transports then would be actually required by
Germany to bring to the British shores 150,000 men?*
This little sum might provide interesting occupation
during the winter evenings for those who have been
led by soldiers to believe that the sailors' tasks of
embarkation, transportation, and disembarkation
are extremely simple ones, and can be completed in
so short a time as to enable an enemy to be on the
road to London in a matter of three days from the
time of sailing. The fanciful theories spun by the
" invasion school " have been completely exposed
after the most careful investigation first by the
Unionist Government under Mr. Balfour, and then
* Very big ships are unsuitable, as Italy found, for use as trans-
ports, because, owing to their deep draught, they have to keep so
far out from the shore perilously exposed to bad weather and
this factor adds immensely to the difficulties of disembarkation .
204 THE COMMAND OF THE SEA
by the present Government under Mr. Asquith, and
now by the actual experience of war they are shown to
be idle inventions based upon ignorance of ail the
circumstances that govern one of the most difficult
of all naval operations invasion oversea.
The experience of Italy not only reveals the
impracticability of sudden invasion of an island
kingdom by an expeditionary force of the character
so often described by Lord Roberts, but it also shows
the extreme difficulty which an enemy would have
in landing on our shores small raiding forces of even
ten or five thousand men. In the first place, the
difficulty of transport of a small raiding force is
shown by the story of the Italian invasion to be far
greater than has been imagined ; and secondly,
there is no point on the British coast on which a
raiding force could land without the most serious
opposition from the Navy. Tripoli possessed no
system of coastal defence ; Great Britain possesses
a system of mobile defence on her coasts, elastic,
active, and efficient.
There was never a time in our history when our
coasts were so vigilantly guarded as to-day. Com-
menting upon the development of the submarine
and the consequent abolition of fixed mine-fields
which were a more imminent danger to our men-of-
war than to the men-of-war of an enemy a writer in
the Quarterly Review gives the following description
of the progress which has already been made in
evolving a scheme of coastal defence independent
of the main fleets of the Empire, which are thus free
for oversea work as they never were free before :
THE INVASION PROBLEM 205
Before this decision (the abolition of fixed mine-fields)
was reached, the Admiralty had already withdrawn from
their stations the coast and port guard-ships, and utilised
the personnel in strengthening the fighting force of the
Navy. The place of these stationary ships, half-manned
and inefficient, has been taken by large flotillas of
destroyers and torpedo-boats, numbering over 150,
some fully manned and others with large nucleus crews ;
and the Admiralty has established flotillas of submarine
craft, while the money hitherto devoted to the fixed
mine-fields is now expended upon a large and increasing
fleet of mine-laying and mine-sweeping ships.
These changes in the method of defending the
British coast were carried out by the Board of
Admiralty, of which Lord Fisher was the principal
expert member, and they were endorsed and
developed further by his successor, Admiral of the
Fleet Sir Arthur Wilson. This officer has recorded
publicly his opinion as to the impracticability of
invasion of the British Isles under the conditions of
defence which now exist.
Turkey had no submarines, and yet the Italian
troops were terror-stricken. Let it be well realised
what the moral effect of British submarines would be
on the men of an army when on the sea, and therefore
not a disciplined force but a mob of landsmen with
their nerves " on the jump." The more the powers
of the latest British submarines are appreciated,
the more conclusively it will be realised that in
these craft, supported by destroyers and the main
fleets, we have a powerful and complete defence
against invasion. What manner of vessels the new
British submarines of the " D " and " E " classes
206 THE COMMAND OF THE SEA
are a correspondent of the Daily Express has
testified : *
The former are of 600 tons displacement, and the
latter will be of 800, or, perhaps, even 1000 tons. In
speed there is no considerable advance, sixteen knots
on the surface and ten submerged being the figures given
f or " D " class. But the radius of action is enormously
increased. All British boats, from " B " class onwards
that is, sixty-six in number have a surface radius of
2000 miles, which in " D " class is doubled, and in
" E " class will be greater still.
There is no need to give the submerged radius, for
these boats pop under almost like a wild duck, and,
therefore, never need to travel far submerged. The
earlier French boats used to take about five minutes to
submerge. Moreover, instead of being smooth water
craft, they are about the most weatherly ships in the
Navy ; they need no convoy, but can go anywhere with
the aid of a single ship to guide them.
They have traversed the North Sea from the mouth
of the Thames to the Firth of Forth in winter ; even
some of the older ships of the " A " class made the
voyage from Portsmouth to Hong Kong with their crews
living on board.
" D " class and all subsequent ships, at any rate, will
be fitted with a wireless instalment, and will carry one
or more quick-firing guns. The old " hog-back " form
of hull has disappeared, and the boats are now ship-
shape, affording a flush deck on which the guns can be
mounted, a special cam-mounting permitting them to
be brought to the deck level and housed when the boat
is about to be submerged.
They are comfortable beyond the dreams of a few
* These particulars are known to be generally accurate, and
are here admirably stated.
THE INVASION PROBLEM 207
years ago, with hammocks for the officers and men,
and with knee-hole desks for the principal officers.
And now, in the words of the same writer, what is
the significance of this development of the sub-
marine ?
It means that the " mightiest Naval Power " has
taken the defensive weapon designed by a navy conscious
of its own inferiority, and forged from it the very spear-
head of its offensive warfare. It used to be a saying of
Lord Fisher's that, should war break out, the ships which
people expected to be the last to go would be the first.
Whatever the ships to which he referred, next in their
wake will follow the submarines, in advance of the
destroyers, the swift cruisers, the armoured cruiser
squadrons, the battle-fleet.
They will lie off the enemy's ports, or in the estuaries
of his rivers ; fortified islands and shore batteries will
have no terrors for them, and one day, if expectation be
fulfilled, the enemy will find the " devil among his
tailors " ; submarines among his battleships, assembled
at an anchorage thought to be secure from all attack.
Then he must either sink where he lies or go out and
seek his fate in battle.
Some persons may say that two can play at that
game ! Not so. Only the hand that grasps the haft
can drive home the spear-head. It is only the Power
which holds the open sea with its above-water craft
destroyers, cruisers and battleships which can use its
submarines offensively. This is evidently recognised
by the Germans, with their usual clear-sightedness.
Their boats, exceedingly good of their kind, have only a
displacement of 300 tons, according to one authority,
or 180 tons, according to another, and a maximum
radius of 1000 miles. These are vessels meant for
208 THE COMMAND OF THE SEA
defensive warfare, or, at most, for service in the land-
locked waters between Kiel and the Belts.
These British vessels for use as necessity directs
off our own or an enemy's coasts are not in the air ;
they exist with crews trained and ready for war.
They are never absent from our Eastern littoral ;
they can never be " decoyed " away. They are
the final answer to Lord Roberts's nightmare that
the main fleets of the Empire may be " decoyed "
away from the strategic centre which they have
been built and trained to hold against all comers,
and that we shall be at the mercy of a crazy mob of
transports.
As Sir Arthur Wilson, the late First Sea Lord of
the Admiralty, has declared, invasion even by
70,000 men is an impossibility. Lord Roberts, a
soldier most of whose active career was spent on the
plains of India, has endeavoured to convince the
public that on this purely naval question the
transport of an army oversea and its disembarkation
on the shores of an island which never has nor can
have less than 300,000 men under arms the
supreme naval authority, with over fifty years of
sea experience, is wrong, and that he, with fifty
years of land experience, is right. The opinions
expressed by Sir Arthur Wilson are those of every
naval officer who has ever held high naval command
from Jervis, Collingwood, and Nelson downwards.
Finally let it be remembered that the misfortunes
of the Italian Expeditionary Force, owing to the
absence of any Turkish men-of-war in the Medi-
terranean, began after the actual invasion had been
THE INVASION PROBLEM 209
completed. After an interval of about a month from
the declaration of hostilities, the Italians succeeded
in landing 25,000 men on the African coast, and for
many months they have had the greatest difficulty
in holding their positions in face of guerilla warfare
conducted by a few thousand Turks supported by
Arabs a contemptibly small, untrained, and un-
disciplined force. The experiences of the Italian
troops are hardly calculated to encourage an enemy
to invade the British Isles (with never less than
300,000 men under arms), even if he were convinced
that he could triumph over the difficulties attendant
upon an attempt to land in a country possessing a
supreme sea-going Navy and an active and efficient
mobile coast defence.
CHAPTER VIII
DEFENCE AND FINANCE.
NOT since the Volunteer movement sprang
spontaneously into existence in 1859,
owing to the fears occasioned by the
attitude of Napoleon III and the
French Press towards England, has there been
such a widespread feeling as exists to-day,
if not of national insecurity, at least of anxiety,
as to the adequacy of our armaments to pro-
tect British interests. There was never a time
when such influential and well-organised effort was
made to impress upon the nation the necessity for
more effort and greater expenditure. We must have
unassailable supremacy at sea that is admitted
and ashore, it is urged, we must spend and be spent
in order to provide improved fortifications, a larger
expeditionary force, and a national army " a nation
in arms " for home defence.
These suggestions are usually considered separately
and without reference to their bearing on finance.
But it is essential that the proposals should be
grouped in proper perspective in order that we may
ascertain exactly what is demanded, the need which
each scheme is intended to meet, and the probable
burden which it will cast on the Exchequer.
The time has surely come when the nation,
in studying the problems of defence, should
deliberately consider the important question of
DEFENCE AND FINANCE 211
Ways and Means. Every session the House of
Commons, it is true, nominally resolves itself into a
Committee of Ways and Means, but the procedure
is farcical in its results. The debates are divided
into water-tight compartments. On one occasion
the Committee will take into consideration the
Civil Service Estimates, and forty or fifty members,
who are particularly interested in this aspect of
government, will " keep a house," while, one after
another, grievances are brought forward, the remedy
in each case being increased expenditure. On another
occasion the Navy Estimates are discussed without
anyregard to the general problem of Imperial defence,
the supporters of the Government being mainly
occupied in replying to points of criticism on details
of administration which are advanced by members
of the Opposition. The same process of discussion
takes place on the Army Estimates. There is never
a debate in the House of Commons in Committee of
Ways and Means on the relations between the
various national services and the sums involved in
their maintenance. The House has lost all sense of
economy : all its members are for economy in princi-
ple and lavish expenditure in details. Some urge the
claims of social reform, others those of agriculture and
industrial development, others, again, are eloquent
in appealing for further outlay on the Navy, the
Army, the Territorials, aeroplanes, airships or
fortifications. From every quarter of the House
the Government of the day is pressed to spend more
money. In practice, Parliament has forgotten what
economy means, and year by year in thoughtless mood
212 THE COMMAND OF THE SEA
adds to the burden of taxation in a manner which
would fill Mr. Gladstone with indignation, and would
even prompt Lord Beaconsfield also an economist in
his day to a sardonic protest, were these statesmen
still with us. We have reached a stage in national
extravagance when, in view of the new suggestions
for expenditure, taxpayers and ratepayers, in their
own defence, may wisely review the position.
In the first place, can it be said that the defensive
services have been or are being " starved " ? What
burden do the Navy and Army at present cast on
the ratepayers ? This is the first question which
naturally arises in face of suggestions for increased
armaments. The cost of defence must bear some
reasonable relation to the ability of the people to
meet it. Admitting that without security there
can be no Imperial, commercial or social progress,
and that, therefore, defence against inimical forces
outside the Empire has the first claim on a people,
every care must be exercised so to adjust the
expenditure on the sea and land services that it
may not become so oppressive as to arrest Imperial
and national well-being and development. The
amplitude of a nation's armaments is not necessarily
a sign of health or virility. In the effort to provide
against every possible contingency, not by policy but
by arms, a government may gradually impoverish a
people, and thus by the very completeness of the
machinery of defence defeat under peace conditions
the ends in view ability to bear the strain of war.
The British nation does not exist for the Navy or
the Army. These are its two very essential servants.
DEFENCE AND FINANCE 213
It has sea forces because the Empire is a sea Empire,
and it has an Army (which the Navy must be strong
enough to carry on its back to different parts of the
Empire without fear of molestation) because the
fleet's activities are necessarily restricted to the sea.
The two defensive services are instruments of policy.
When policy becomes the instrument of the defensive
services of which there have been illustrations in
recent European, and particularly German, history
then the situation is perilous to the State.
Keeping in view these general considerations, and
the repeated suggestions that the Navy and Army are
being " starved," what is the record of the last twenty
years ? Since 1890 the expenditure has steadily and
rapidly risen, as the following figures illustrate :
Year.
1890
1895
1900
1905
1910
1911
1912
One gratifying fact is revealed in these figures.
For many decades we spent year after year far
larger sums on the Army than were devoted to the
Navy. Down to 1896 the outlay on the former
always exceeded in 1887 by nearly six millions
sterling that on the latter the first line of defence.
Then under the influence of the keen naval rivalry
of France and Russia, and the awakening spirit of
* Apart from war charges. t The Navy Estimates of 191 1
were underspent to the extent of ; 1,600,000.
Navy.
Army.
Total
15,554.929
17,560,023
33,114,952
19,724,000
18,459,800
38,281,800
29,520,000
24,473,000*
53,993,ooo
33,300,000
28,850,000
62,150,000
40,604,000
27,760,000
68,364,000
43,300,ooot
27,690,000
70,990,000
44,600,000
27,860,000
72,460,000
214 THE COMMAND OF THE SEA
the over-sea dominions, successive Governments
Unionist and Liberal made a strenuous effort to
check the expansion of the Army votes. Thus, and
thus only, by limiting our secondary defensive
expenditure has the continued supremacy of the
seas been maintained. Despite this effort, the outlay
upon the Army has increased by upwards of ten
millions in the past two decades, and we have reached
the unparalleled expenditure in 1912 of over 72
millions on the two services, or considerably more
than twice the sum which the War Office and the
Admiralty received in 1890.
But this is only a portion of the burden falling on
the taxpayer and ratepayer who, after all, is in
many cases one and the same. The significance of
the present " war budget " can be appreciated only
when it is studied in association with the growth of
the cost of national and local government. These
figures are essential in considering the new demands
for expenditure on defence, if the nation would see
clearly the road which it is asked to tread. For
corresponding years to those given for the Navy and
Army the statistics are as follows :
Revenue Expenditure Debt
(In millions.) (In millions).
National. Local. Total. National. Local. Tot*].
1890 .
87.7
61.6
149.3
683.5
*
1895 .
97.8
77.2
175.0
652.3
*
1900 .
110.5
97.7
218.2
704.0
381.5
1,185.5
1905 .
142.9
132.6
275.5
789.0
564.7
1,353.7
1910! .
162.3
140.0
302.3
741.0
580.0
1,321.5
* Not available.
f The Estimates for 1911 were ^168,909,000, and in 1912
they rose to ^177,000,000 exclusive of the Local Taxation
Account and of Capital Account.
DEFENCE AND FINANCE 215
These twenty years 1890-1910 can hardly be
regarded as a period of economical administration,
either by the national or local authorities. The sum
raised by taxes and rates has more than doubled
since 1890 ; the National Liabilities have been also
increased, and the local debt though official figures
for 1890 are wanting has certainly been trebled,
while the population has grown by only about four
millions, or 10 per cent.
Colossal as these figures are, they mark only a
stage in the upward incline. Apart from the in-
evitable, and indeed almost automatic rise in future
years of the outlay by the local authorities of the
United Kingdom and of England more particularly
it is common knowledge that we are committed,
or are about to be committed, to a further vast
increase in national expenditure. Last spring the
Government had to provide about two-and-a-half
millions sterling for initiating the twin schemes of
insurance against unemployment and invalidity ;
the " State subsidy " has been fixed on a scale
" twice as liberal as that given by Germany for the
same purpose."
It may be objected that the non-contributory
scheme of Old Age Pensions is unsound, that the
state of the national finances does not justify
expenditure upon insurance against unemployment
or invalidity, that the labour exchanges are costly
and ineffective. These arguments have been, indeed,
advanced, but they are valueless. Whatever may
be the party complexion of the Government in power
in future years, these charges are admitted to be
216 THE COMMAND OF THE SEA
permanent, and they will continue to grow it may
be by a lowering of the qualifying age for pensions,
an increase in the amount of the pension, a variation
in the income debarring receipt of a pension, or in
some other direction. There are many avenues
open to further outlay on these services. The thin
end of the wedge having been inserted, it is impossible
to foresee how far in the battle for power between
parties it may not be driven with a continually
rising charge on the Exchequer. The expenditure
on the social programme is what foreign financiers
would term recurring ordinary expenditure per-
manent charges which will have to be met year by
year. Even in war time they could not be decreased,
and under normal conditions they will increase.
Be the Government in future years Liberal or
Unionist, not a comma in any of the various social
reform Acts will be altered except for the purpose
of increasing the outlay.
If not a single one of the schemes for more costly
defensive arrangements be adopted if the Govern-
ment lays down not a single new man-o'-war, the
Budget for 1913-14 must be framed to provide
about 180,000,000, apart from about 9,500,000
due to the Local Taxation Account or about
190,000,000 in all. Ten years ago, when the pay-
ments from the Exchequer were only just over
120,000,000 including the Local Taxation Ac-
countLord Welby, with thirty-six years of ex-
perience at the Treasury, remarked :
The question is whether, with the large increase of
taxation during the last ten years, we have not got very
DEFENCE AND FINANCE 217
near to the limits of what the country can bear, and
whether there will not inevitably come a cold fit which
will leave the country with its defensive preparations
in a worse condition than they would have been had
expenditure gone on at a more moderate rate.
In this sentence Lord Welby indicated a grave
danger a danger which has increased in proportion
to the growth of expenditure. The pressure of
Imperial and local taxation is being felt seriously
by many sections of the community by less wealthy
professional men, by the middle classes with " ap-
pearances " to maintain, and by the very poor
struggling to keep body and soul together. The
amount of " free income " which any person of
modest means possesses is rapidly decreasing owing
to the high level of expenditure by the State and by
local authorities. This must react on thrift, and
Lord Rosebery has reminded us that it is having
this effect already. In any case it is apparent that
the more revenue the central and local authorities
extract annually from the country, the smaller the
reserve resources available in time of war. Battles
are fought not merely with battleships and battalions
but with money. We overthrew Napoleon mainly
because our reserve financial resources were so great :
we gained ascendancy in South Africa largely by the
same means.
In view of the high standard of expenditure
which we have already reached, of the commitments,
with the more or less tacit concurrence of all parties,
to a yet higher standard, and of the existing capital
liabilities of the central and local authorities, the
2i8 THE COMMAND OF THE SEA
most patriotic taxpayer must feel compelled to
examine critically any suggestion for re-casting our
traditional defensive policy.
Even Lord Roberts' most military-minded sup-
porters admit that the Navy must come first, that
it is the essential defence of a sea Empire,
to which all other measures of defence must be
subsidiary. It is, in fact, the only tangible link of
Empire to the Imperialist, and the bulwark of Free
Trade to the Free Trader. The maintenance of a
sea-united Empire in peace and security depends
absolutely upon the efficiency and sufficiency of the
Fleet. This is one of those axioms which are so
generally accepted that they are in danger of being
ignored. If our dependence upon the sea for all we
need were not frequently forgotten, what speaker or
writer would have the courage to compare the British
defensive organisation with the organisations of such
countries as France, Germany, Russia, and even
Switzerland ? No comparison is possible, because
circumstances differ fundamentally. It is a misfor-
tune that some of the most patriotically-minded
public men, instinct with the desire to safeguard
the Empire, fail to realise that the British Empire is
a thing apart and alone. There has been nothing
like it in the history of the world, and there can be
nothing like it in the future until Britannia loses
her hold on the sceptre of the seas and the Empire
falls or, by some hostile hand, is cut to pieces.
In every school under the British flag there ought
to hang a large map coloured very differently from
any maps now existing. This map would show
DEFENCE AND FINANCE 219
the whole world on Mercator's projection. The
territory forming the British Empire might be
coloured pink, foreign countries might be shown in
some other colour it matters not what so that
the colour red British red were reserved exclu-
sively for the seas. The existing atlases all fail to
remind the student of the fact that the Imperial
federation has been created and can only continue
to exist so long as British supremacy on the world's
seas is maintained in unimpaired strength. The
important fact is not that the British flag floats
over about one-fourth of the world's surface, but that
the British Navy must be so strong as to be able to
dominate the oceans which divide this Imperial
federation into its component parts, or rather unite
it into one vast political body. By some such map
as this, with the sea a uniform British red, it might
be possible to remind all the people of the British
Empire that not a merchant ship can move, bearing
food and raw material, and not a soldier can be
transported from one Dominion to another so as to
carry out a concentrated military movement, unless
the naval forces of the Empire are adequate to keep
open the sea communications. The Navy must
come first, because the Empire exists on and by the
sea. Except the Fleet is supreme the Imperial
federation is dissolved, and every Prime Minister
of the oversea dominions and all the oversea peoples
become virtually prisoners within their own sea-girt
frontiers directly the British people are involved in
war. If the Empire possessed an army as great as the
armies of the Triple Alliance rolled into one, the
220 THE COMMAND OF THE SEA
necessity for a supreme Fleet would still remain.
There can be no difference of opinion on this matter,
and therefore in any consideration of national ways
and means the Navy must come first in our defensive
organisation.
It is also not less generally admitted that in a few
years, owing to the unprecedented efforts of other
Powers to increase their fleets, the Navy Estimates
will probably amount to little short of 50,000,000.
We can either meet this charge entirely out of
revenue, partly out of revenue and partly out of
loan, or entirely out of loan. Financial authorities
agree that a State administered on economic
principles can only borrow for two purposes it may
raise a loan to meet a sudden emergency, such as
war, or to carry out works of permanent utility.
We are not faced by a " naval crisis " in the ordinary
acceptation of that word, but we have to meet a
permanent increased charge for the Fleet. As Mr.
Balfour remarked in his speech at the Albert Hall
on May 8th, 1909, owing to the expansion of foreign
fleets, the British people are called upon " to make
gigantic sacrifices in the next ten years, and perhaps
long after that."
The race of armaments will continue for gener-
ation after generation so far as we can foresee
and the proposal that we of this generation should
meet our liabilities by raising a loan is neither
courageous, finanically sound, nor likely at this
date to check rivalry as a demonstration of
national resolve. It is not courageous because
we should thereby be embarrassing those who
DEFENCE AND FINANCE 221
come after us who will have their own problems
to meet. It is not financially sound because every
addition to the National Debt decreases the resources
available in time of war. It would not be an
effective check on competition. The charges im-
posed upon the country for the Fleet are charges
which must be met out of revenue, and they have the
first claim upon the Exchequer. Thus, in con-
sidering national ways and means, it must be realised
first and foremost that for some years to come the
Navy will absorb annually sums varying in amount
from forty-five to fifty millions sterling.
Admitting the primacy of the Fleet, what is the
exact proportion of the military problem which has
led to the movements for a vast increase of the
Regular Army, and more coastal fortifications, and
a demand that we should have " a nation in arms " ?
So far as the people of the United Kingdom are
concerned, there is no danger of invasion,* so long
as the Fleet is maintained in adequate strength,
* It is well to insist that the peril of invasion has twice been
the subject of exhaustive enquiry by the nation's responsible
naval and military experts : (a) On the authority of Mr. Balfour
and six Unionist Secretaries of State, supported by Field-
Marshal Lord Roberts, Field-Marshal Sir William Nicholson,
Admiral of the Fleet Lord Walter Kerr, and Vice-Admiral Prince
Louis of Battenberg, we were assured in 1904, after the fullest
inquiry, that " serious invasion of these islands is not an
eventuality which we need seriously consider," even under
circumstances unfavourable to this country namely, with the
Regular Army absent. (6) On the authority of the present
Prime Minister and six Liberal Secretaries of State, supported
by Field-Marshal Sir William Nicholson, General Sir John
French, General J. S. Ewart, Admiral of the Fleet Lord Fisher,
and Rear-Admiral E. J. Slade, we were assured in 1909, after
another full inquiry, that " invasion on a large scale is an
absolutely impracticable operation."
222 THE COMMAND OF THE SEA
and the responsibility of the United Kingdom for
the military defence of the oversea dominions is
decreasing year by year as the daughter lands take
upon their shoulders the burden of their own defence.
Except in South Africa there is not a single British
soldier in any of the self-governing dominions.
As soon as the Union Government has adopted a
scheme of defence, the garrison in South Africa will
be decreased.
Then it will be our part in the Old Country to
watch with lively interest the progress of the
oversea dominions in the evolution of defensive
forces planned to secure the freedom of those
outlying parts of the Empire. In a few years
compulsory military training will be in operation
in each of these dominions. Why, it may be asked,
if this system is adopted by these kindred peoples,
should the inhabitants of the Mother Country shirk
a similar responsibility ? The conditions in the
Old Country and in these new countries are so dis-
similar as to vitiate any such implied reproach on
the people of the United Kingdom. Unless every
able-bodied and physically fit male were compelled
to bear arms, neither of these oversea dominions
could hope to raise more than a mere handful of men,
because the population is so sparse. The whole
white population of these dominions is only about
twice that of Greater London alone, and therefore
every man must undertake the primary duty of
defence. The area to be defended is so large, and
the resources for defence are so small, that no other
policy would be adequate. On the other hand, in
DEFENCE AND FINANCE 223
the United Kingdom the population is large, the
area to be defended exceedingly small, and a supreme
Fleet dominates European waters. We have a
population of nearly forty-five millions a popu-
lation which is so great as to leave a considerable
surplus beyond the requirements of industry. In
these circumstances, we have been able to maintain
our defences on a voluntary principle. Without
compulsory measures, we have under arms in the
United Kingdom, serving either ashore or afloat, a
body of soldiers and sailors exceeding in number
the whole population of the dominion of New
Zealand. We are able to provide India with up-
wards of 75,000 white soldiers, we are able to main-
tain an expeditionary force of 150,000 ready to go to
the assistance of any distant part of the Empire,
and we should then retain within our own borders
military forces of nearly 400,000 to deal with any
such raid as the Committee of Imperial Defence
consider possible. Finally, the Fleet has over
130,000 officers and men, and yet we are told by
Lord Esher that the voluntary principle of defence
is breaking down.
Probably the main cause of the present military
agitation is not anxiety for the well-being of the
daughter lands, or very acute anxiety as to the
possibility of these islands being invaded. If the
military propaganda is carefully studied it will be
found that a demand is crystallising for such military
forces to be raised in the United Kingdom as would
enable the British Government to land a considerable
army on the Continent of Europe. The suggestion
224 THE COMMAND OF THE SEA
is that circumstances may occur which will render it
desirable for Great Britain to aid France or one of
the lesser Powers of Northern Europe against
Germany, and it is incumbent upon us, therefore,
to increase our military forces. It has never been
stated authoritatively exactly what role the British
Army would be called upon to play after it had been
safely transported over the sea by the Navy. Pre-
suming that the expeditionary force were increased
to 300,000, instead of 150,000 as at present, what
would be its probable fate ? Any British military
expedition, even if it were of the strength of 300,000
men, would be defeated directly it appeared upon
the Continent. The natural presumption is that
the enemy would direct its overwhelming forces to
one end holding in check the army of France, and
it may be of Russia, while the head and front of its
vast military organisation would be directed to the
extinction of the relatively small body of British
troops, and the ruin of British prestige. The whole
face of Europe has been changed by the adoption
of conscription, and the British Army can never
again take any but a perilous part on the Continent,
except, under exceptional circumstances, as an inci-
dent in the exercise of our naval power. If we had
the will, we could not obtain the men, because our
population is insufficient. The suggestion that the
whole defensive policy of the British people should be
recast, at enormous expense, in order that a relatively
small number of British soldiers, maybe 300,000,
should be held on the leash ready to be cast loose
on the Continent of Europe to manoeuvre against
DEFENCE AND FINANCE 225
either of its vast armies (each of 3,000,000 or
4,000,000 men), is one which the great soldiers of the
past would have laughed to scorn. Europe at war
strength would have over 20,000,000 men under arms.
The final bar to any such development of British
armaments is, however, finance. As has been al-
ready shown, for ten years or more the maintenance
of the British Fleet will impose upon the country an
expense of between 45,000,000 and 50,000,000.
If it be admitted, as presumably it is, that the
Navy of a sea empire is the essential force, and has
the first claim upon the Exchequer, where is the
money to be obtained for a simultaneous expansion
of the military arm ? If the proposals now put
forward for developing the Oversea Expeditionary
Force and creating a national army for home defence
on the lines suggested by Lord Roberts were adopted,
what would be the aggregate cost of defence when
the Navy Votes have reached their probable maxi-
mum of 50,000,000, as there is reason to believe
that they will do in a few years, bearing in mind
that for the development of the Territorial force the
Government will at the same time have to find a sum
of about 2,000,000 if Lord Haldane's scheme is
not to be ruined :
BRITISH EXPENDITURE :
British Navy 50,000,000
British Army ... ... ... 29,000,000
Developing the Oversea Expedi-
tionary Force 10,300,000*
National Service 7,82o.ooof
97,120,000
226 THE COMMAND OF THE SEA
INDIAN AND COLONIAL EXPENDI-
TURE :
Indian Army ^20,000,000
Contribution to the British Fleet
and cost of Indian Marine ... 150,000
Expenditure of the Oversea Do-
minions and Crown Colonies on
Naval and Military Defence, in-
cluding contributions by Crown
Colonies to Imperial expenditure
(about) 5,000,000
25,150,000
Total 122,270,000
* Calculated at the average rate of ^70 per officer and man,
including annuity for capital charges for barracks, guns, &c.
f War Office estimate.
Thus, even if the proposals for large loans for
defensive purposes are ignored as bad defence, bad
finance, and bad politics, and if no expenditure is
made on new coast defences, the bill which would
be rendered to the nation if the twin measures of
military expansion a larger Expeditionary Force
and " a nation in arms " were adopted, is so colossal
as to condemn these proposals even if they were
open to no other objection. If the project for
doubling the Oversea Expeditionary Force were
eliminated, the cost of armaments falling upon
British taxpayers would still amount to nearly
87,000,000. The National Service League, however,
contend that the estimated cost of " a nation in
arms " has been exaggerated by the responsible
experts of the War Office. According to the
calculations of the League the cost would be onl]
4,000,000 or 5,000,000. British legislation
based upon the opinions and calculations of t]
DEFENCE AND FINANCE 227
responsible experts of the Government, and the
estimate of the War Office still stands as a final
barrier to the adoption of national service. Even
if the lower estimate were the correct one and the
sum involved were a matter of only 4,000,000, in
these circumstances the bill for national defence
falling on the British taxpayers would amount to
no less than 83,000,000 annually. If such a vast
sum were available for increased British defences
it would be a question for the Government whether
even the relatively small sum of 4,000,000 could
not be spent to greater advantage on the Navy than
upon such a national army as Lord Roberts has in
view, a national army which would probably be im-
prisoned to starve with the rest of the population of
the British Isles if once the strength of the Fleet were
allowed to fall below the Prime Minister's standard
of " unassailable supremacy." For the sum which
even the National Service League asks, the nation
could add to its naval force sixteen ships of the
Dreadnought type : in other words, according
to the Admiralty, only about 250,000 annually is
required to provide interest on the first cost of a
Dreadnought, the sinking fund for replacement at
the end of twenty years, the pay of officers and men,
the cost of maintenance and stores, and the ex-
penditure upon repairs. If ever some future time
should bring us an overflowing Exchequer, it
would be for the British people to consider
whether they would prefer a surplus of 4,000,000
invested in a national army doomed to starve unless
the Fleet is supreme, or whether they would desire to
228 THE COMMAND OF THE SEA
invest this insurance premium in additional naval
force so as to make yet more sure the means for
defending not only the widely distributed Empire,
but the food and raw material which are essential
to our existence, and which are threatened by the
latest scheme of German naval expansion.
The nation must hold to its old faith ; the Fleet
must be recognised in face of increasing rivalry as,
in fact as well as in name, the first line of defence,
with the first claim upon the Exchequer for its
maintenance in unassailable supremacy; and the
Regular Army and the Territorial Army must be
regarded as essential but subsidiary branches of
his Majesty's services.
CHAPTER IX.
THE BLESSINGS OF NAVAL ARMAMENTS.
THERE is a tendency to regard the heavy
outlay from year to year upon our naval
defences as an unmitigated evil. Reference
is constantly made to "the burden of arma-
ments," and it is sometimes suggested that many of
the social evils of our time may be traced directly to
the money and energy which are devoted to the main-
tenance of our sea supremacy. Strict political econo-
mists look upon the expenditure as "non-productive."
They indulge in wonderful arithmetical calculations
as to the " productive " work which could be paid
for with the forty odd millions now devoted to
naval purposes, and picture the model social system
which might immediately come into being if the
millennium dawned and war-fleets were no more.
The financial burden of naval armaments is
undoubtedly heavy, but there is no country of
importance in the world which obtains its defensive
forces at so relatively small an outlay and with so
little personal inconvenience on the part of the
general population as the United Kingdom. It is
fortunately so wealthy and so well populated that,
apart from the freedom from compulsory military
service which the Navy secures, thus contributing
directly to our productive power, the per capita
contribution to the Fleet's support is exceedingly
230 THE COMMAND OF THE SEA
light. No reasonable person would desire to lay
out upon naval defences a single pound more than
is necessary to security. But below this level we
cannot go, because peace is our highest interest.
The British people themselves, since they adopted
twenty years ago the automatic Two-Power standard,
have had little or no control over the rate of naval
expenditure ; that has depended on the activity of
the " next two greatest Powers " ; as they build we
must build.* In these circumstances a large pro-
portion of the national revenue has to be devoted to
the Fleet. There is no way of escape from the
liability. The Government has tried to negotiate
with rival Powers for a lower scale of expenditure
and failed. Since, therefore, it is necessary to
devote upwards of forty-four millions in a few
years it will probably be fifty millions to the
Fleet annually, it is as well to remember that the
large sums disbursed by the Admiralty are not
" practically thrown into a bottomless sea," as some
perfervid orators suggest, but contribute materially
to the well-being of society as a whole.
It is frequently forgotten that the Board of Ad-
miralty is the largest trading department in the
Government, and exercises a more direct control
over skilled employment than any private firm.
Setting aside the relatively small sums which are
devoted to the pensions of officers and men of the
* The same reasoning applies to the Admiralty's new
standard of a 60 per cent, superiority in armoured ships over
Germany, and a larger margin in cruisers and destroyers, with
any necessary further surplus to provide against the expansion
of other fleets.- - Vide First Lord of Admiralty's speech in intro-
ducing the Navy Estimates for 1912-13.
BLESSINGS OF NAVAL ARMAMENTS 231
Navy, practically the whole amount voted annually
by Parliament for the maintenance of the Navy is
distributed in payment of more or less skilled labour.
Apart from officers and men of the Fleet numbering
over 134,000, and nearly 60,000 reservists, the naval
authorities employ in the Royal Dockyards, victual-
ling yards, hospitals, and ordnance stores an army of
30,000 workers, not including a number of women,
in a multitude of separate trades, and they are part
employers also of the large staff at Woolwich and
other arsenals engaged in the manufacture of
ordnance. Directly or indirectly the Admiralty
also pay wages to a considerable body of men engaged
in the construction of docks and in other naval works,
while for years past the rebuilding of coastguard
stations round the coast has assisted in keeping ihe
building trade active in the various localities affected.
This calculation of the Admiralty's sphere as a
labour-employing department takes no account of
the more or less indirect influence of the orders which
it places with private firms for the construction of
ships, the manufacture of machinery, the fashioning
of guns and torpedoes, and the making of the hundred
and one mechanical appliances which are necessary
to the equipment of a modern man-of-war. A
first-class battleship is too commonly regarded as a
hull round the sides of which are placed a series of
armour-plates, while inside are installed some
marine engines and a few boilers, and then, with the
emplacement of a number of guns on the deck, it is
supposed that the vessel is ready to take her
place in the Fleet. Years ago, when the construction
232 THE COMMAND OF THE SEA
of a warship was less complicated than it is to-day,
Ruskin declared that man put into it " as much of
his human patience, commonsense, forethought,
experimental philosophy, self-control, habits of order
and obedience, thorough-wrought handiwork, de-
fiance of brute elements, careless courage, careful
patriotism and calm acceptance of the judgment of
God as could well be put into a space 300 feet long
by 80 broad."
Later developments have tended to render the
work of constructing a man-of-war far more compli-
cated and delicate than it was in the past. The mere
space measures 545 ft. in length and 88 in breadth.
A modern ship like a " Dreadnought " has not simply
one set of engines for the purposes of propulsion, but,
in addition, about one hundred auxiliary engines, each
of which fulfils some definite purpose. Practically
every operation which a hundred years ago depended
either upon the action of the wind or the muscles of
the crew is now performed by machinery, and it is
no slight task to fashion all these various engines
and fit them within a single hull, while at the same
time making adequate provision for the guns with
their costly, heavy, and elaborate gun mountings,
and the torpedo equipment, in itself constituting a
specialised science to which men devote their waking
hours in the race for perfection. In the mere
manufacture of the machinery of such a ship of
war as a " Dreadnought," many different trades
carried on in various parts of the United Kingdom
are concerned ; different classes of mechanics are
required for the manufacture of the armour and
BLESSINGS OF NAVAL ARMAMENTS 233
armaments, the fashioning of the steel plates, the
making of all the internal fittings in mess rooms and
cabins, and the general sanitary equipment.
It has been calculated that taking the total finished
weight of the vessel as a basis of comparison, in a
battle cruiser or battleship the number of men-
hours varies from 678 to 722 per ton, whereas in
liners it is only 401 per ton, and in purely cargo-
carrying ships 240 men-hours per ton. Con-
sequently, ton for ton, the battleship provides three
times the labour of cargo carriers. In other words,
one battleship is worth about twenty normal sized
cargo boats, so far as labour is concerned. It
has been calculated that, taking the same basis,
the labour value of a Dreadnought is probably
nearly 10,000,000 men-hours : there are yet no
precise figures. That means about 10,000 men
could, on such a ship, find employment for
1,000 hours ; or, assuming the work to be done
within two years, we have full employment during
that period for quite 2,000 men. The Navy Esti-
mates show that on the hull alone about 60 per cent,
of the cost goes for labour in the case of an un-
armoured cruiser like those recently given out, and
from 50 to 53 per cent, in the case of a battleship
like a " Dreadnought." But in the one case labour
gets 74,000, and in the other 230,000. This is
only for the hull ; there has to be added the labour
value of the machinery, which shows an even
greater disparity, while the cruiser has little or no
work for the armour-maker and the gun-working
machinery constructor. While the actual building
234 THE COMMAND OF THE SEA
of the hull and the assembly and fitting of the
various parts of the ship must naturally take place
at the water side, the material which goes to the
creation of the ship is designed and made in far-
distant and widely distributed inland towns, and
there are few " tradesmen " working in iron, steel,
brass, and wood, who are not involved in the general
scheme of work which almost automatically comes
into existence as soon as the Admiralty decides to
add a new man-of-war to the British Fleet.
The scale upon which we maintain our naval
defences brings to us not a few compensating ad-
vantages. As the supreme naval Power, whose
security depends almost entirely upon the sufficiency
and efficiency of our naval forces, we have been led
to create great industries which primarily depend
upon the Fleet for maintenance. The fact that the
Admiralty places year by year large orders for various
kinds of war material has encouraged the upbuilding
of large industries with the best possible indus-
trial organisation, the most efficient labour-saving
machinery, and the most expert mechanics. The
price of any article depends largely upon the efficiency
of the industrial organisation and the scale of pro-
duction. The Admiralty has been a fairy godmother
to the steel and iron industries of the country and
to the many auxiliary trades. The result is that
these industries have reached a pitch of perfection
which enables the great English firms to go out into
the markets of the world and compete for orders on
advantageous terms. There are under construction
in this country battleships for Brazil, Chili, and
BLESSINGS OF NAVAL ARMAMENTS 235
Turkey, a battle-cruiser for Japan, three small
armoured ships for Brazil, besides scout-cruisers for
China, and a number of torpedo craft for different
countries. At the same time British firms are
supervising the reconstruction of the Russian fleet
in the Black Sea and Baltic and of the Spanish
fleet at Cartagena and Ferrol, and British admirals
are managing the navies of Turkey and Greece.
There is not a navy in the world to which
British shipbuilders have not contributed units of
one class or other. Though the British Fleet has
not been on active war service for practically a
hundred years (if we omit subsidiary assistance
which has been given from time to time to the
British Army), there has been no naval engagement
in the past fifty years in which on one side or the
other British-built warships have not been engaged.
British-built ships fought in the China seas during
the struggle between China and Japan ; British-
built ships fought in the Pacific during the contest
between the United States and Spain ; and British-
built ships again were used by Japan with such
surprising results during the war with Russia. In
almost every naval port in the world may be seen
British-built men-of-war flying foreign ensigns and
manned by foreign crews. Had it not been for the
encouragement towards large capital expenditure
on works and machinery given by the British Ad-
miralty, British firms would have been unable to
secure these orders, representing tens of millions
sterling, the larger part of which has been translated
into wage payments to British workmen.
236 THE COMMAND OF THE SEA
This is not the only influence which the Navy
exercises upon trade and industry. It is a common
saying that trade follows the flag and it might be
added that it also follows the missionary but
almost always the British Navy flying the White
Ensign goes first, and the trader follows immediately
upon the heels of the naval officer. During the
last century it was the Navy by its active work which
opened up to the British trader his predominating
sphere of activity in Japan, in China, and throughout
the Far East. It was the British Navy primarily
which secured to us the oversea dominions which
are now emerging into full manhood as autonomous
nations under the British flag. In South America
the trader and the capitalist followed behind the
White Ensign, and built up those close commercial
bonds with the South American Republics which
have proved a benefit alike to the native population
and an advantage to British capitalists in search of
fields for profitable investment. Trade has followed
the flag in the past, and it still follows the flag. It
is under the protection afforded by the White Ensign
carried by British men-of-war that the mercantile
marine has steadily grown from year to year until it
now embraces half the shipping of the world.
England is the world's Carter, Paterson, largely
because she is also the world's supreme naval Power.
Merchant ships would cease to enjoy the freedom of
the seas were it not for the ubiquitous protection
against aggression and interference which the
supreme British Navy provides.
Among the blessings of naval armaments must
BLESSINGS OF NAVAL ARMAMENTS 237
also be included the influence of the Navy as a social
and ameliorative institution. The Fleet is one of the
most powerful temperance organisations of the day.
It is calculated that about 20 per cent, of the men
of the Fleet abstain altogether from alcoholic liquors,
and all the remainder are compelled to be strictly
temperate. No officer or man with ambition to rise
in the profession can afford to indulge to excess.
The daily life at sea in these days of mechanical
complication in the control of his Majesty's ships is
too onerous and exacting for any man who is not of
distinctly abstemious habits. Drunkenness, which
is not necessarily a crime ashore, is a crime in the
Navy, because temperance is required by the Articles
of War in the interest not of the individual but of
the nation. It will be a happy day for England when
it is recognised ashore that drunkenness is not merely
a humiliation of the individual and a hardship on
those who are dependent upon him, but is distinctly
a crime against the State. The Navy sets to the
country generally a high ideal in this respect.
The Fleet also performs an important service as
an academy of physique, quite apart from its in-
fluence for good as a disciplinary force regulated
and controlled without violence. Only those who
are familiar with life afloat can fully appreciate the
influence of the Navy upon the thousands of men
who undergo its training. Unlike the mechanic
ashore, the bluejacket lives with his work. His
thoughts can never be far removed from his daily
task. From early in the morning until late at night
he is always liable to be called upon for service, and
238 THE COMMAND OF THE SEA
week in and week out he has to submit to a rigorous
system of drills, all framed with the single aim of
contributing to the war efficiency of the Fleet. The
result of his daily routine and almost hourly associa-
tion with the various mechanical processes in the gun
barbette, in the torpedo flat, in the magazines, in
the engine room, or in the stokehold, is to produce
in the Navy a quickness of mind, a sensibility of
intelligence, and a promptness of action far above
that which is to be found as a rule in a similar class
ashore. Nor do the naval authorities neglect the
physique of those who enlist for naval service.
They have gradually created a school of gymnasia
with a large staff distributed throughout the different
fleets and squadrons in all the seas of the world.
Week by week these instructors carry on a course of
physical drill which has been found by experience
to produce the most remarkable results in building
up the physique of the men of the Fleet.
Under existing circumstances, the several hundred
professional Sandows who are borne in the ships of
his Majesty's Fleet are engaged in a work which has
more than taken the place of the drills of the old days
of ships, yards, and arms. The personnel of the
Fleet numbers over 134,000. and the thought that so
many men are gaining the advantage of a carefully
thought-out scheme of physical culture is no slight
compensation in these days of degeneration for the
oft-deplored " burden of naval armaments." Owing
to the introduction of a partial system of short service
many men serve only five years in the Fleet, and then
pass back into civil life as reservists, revealing all
BLESSINGS OF NAVAL ARMAMENTS 239
the advantages which undoubtedly accrue from this
course of physical culture in the finest disciplined
force in the world.
Under the new regime of good, well-cooked food,
a high standard of discipline, and a varied course of
physical culture, the health of the Fleet men, despite
exposure to all weathers, continues to improve.
In the past ten years the average loss of service for
each person from illness has steadily declined,
and there has been a remarkable fall in the
ratio of men invalided out of the service in the
past five years, while the death-rate has decreased
to 3.35 per 1,000, a gain of 1.79 in comparison
with the average ratio for the preceding nine years,
in spite of the fact that the Navy is on duty on the
West Coast of Africa, up the rivers of China, and in
other unhealthy localities. It is no slight advantage
to the country to have one branch of the national
service in which temperance is regarded as essential
to efficiency and drunkenness a crime against the
State, and in which men, before passing back into
civil life, gain all the benefits of a strict, rational
discipline and a carefully planned course of physical
culture.
Among the blessings of naval armaments it is
impossible to ignore the influence which our close
association with the sea has had and still has on our
social and political ideals. It is a German writer
who has remarked that " Out of the infinite horizon
there grows in the mind and character of seafaring
people a strong tendency towards boldness, fortitude,
and long-sightedness. Seafaring nations have ma-
240 THE COMMAND OF THE SEA
terially contributed to the enlargement and heighten-
ing of political standards. To them narrow terri-
torial politics appear but short-sighted policy. The
wide, open sea serves to enlarge the views of both
merchants and statesmen. The sea alone can
produce truly great Powers."
In an article which he contributed to the Scientific
A merican, Rear- Admiral Mahan dealt with this aspect
of the matter, in reviewing the development of the
policy of the United States since the acquisition of
the Philippines. He remarked on the gradual, yet
perpetual, process by which a higher civilisation
impinges upon a lower ; that is; upon one that is
lower in virile efficiency, however in some instances
it may have been higher in acquired material comfort,
or even in literary and artistic achievement. This
tendency, he contended, can neither be regulated by
law, nor brought to the bar of law, without injury
to the progress of the world toward better universal
conditions, to which end it is essential that the
efficient supplant the inefficient. On the other hand,
this condition illustrates the importance of the com-
mand of the sea. This also, it should be noted,
has been incidental and determinative in the progress
of the world.
Continuing this line of argument, the distinguished
American \vriter added :
" This moral side of the question is not irrelevant
to the military one of the importance of commanding
the sea ; for granting the end the moral obligation
the means, if not themselves immoral, follow as a
matter of course. Of such means, command of the
BLESSINGS OF NAVAL ARMAMENTS 241
sea is one. Napoleon said that morale dominates
war ; and it is correspondingly true that a sense of
right powerfully reinforces the stability of national
attitude and the steadfastness of national purpose.
If we have been right, morally, step by step, in the
forward march of the past few years, we are morally
bound to sustain the position attained, by measures
which will provide the necessary means. Of these
an adequate navy is among the first ; probably, in
our case, the chief of all."
Having in these sentences stated his contention
in broad terms, Admiral Mahan recurred to experi-
ence to the past in order to comprehend the
present and project the future.
" Why do English innate political conceptions of
popular representative government, of the balance
of law and liberty, prevail in North America from the
Arctic Circle to the Gulf of Mexico, from the Atlantic
to the Pacific ? Because the command of the sea
at the decisive era belonged to Great Britain. In
India and Egypt, administrative efficiency has taken
the place of a welter of tyranny, feudal struggle, and
bloodshed, achieving thereby the comparative wel-
fare of the once harried populations. What underlies
this administrative efficiency ? The British Navy,
assuring in the first instance British control instead
of French and thereafter communication with the
home country, whence the local power without
which administration everywhere is futile. What,
at the moment the Monroe Doctrine was proclaimed,
insured beyond peradventure the immunity from
foreign oppression of the Spanish-American colonies
242 THE COMMAND OF THE SEA
in their struggle for independence ? The command
of the sea by Great Britain, backed by the feeble
navy but imposing strategic position of the United
States, with her swarm of potential commerce-
destroyers, which a decade before had harassed the
trade of even the mistress of the seas.
" Less conspicuously, but no less truly, to what do
Algiers and Tunis, and to what eventually will
Morocco, owe redemption from conditions barely,
if at all, above the barbarous ? To the command of
the sea by a nation which already has restored the
former two, to be fruitful members of the world
community. That South Africa is now a united
commonwealth, instead of two opposing commu-
nities, such as the North and South of our own
country might have been, is due to the same cause ;
a local preponderance of force insured by sea power.
It may safely be claimed that to the navy of the
United States chiefly is owing the present Union,
instead of the existence of two rival nations vying,
or trying to vie, with each other in military prepara-
tions, like the nations of Europe. The four years'
struggle of the Confederate States might not have
ended in exhaustion, had it not been for the blockade,
which shut in their cotton and shut out their
supplies."
And then Admiral Mahan presented the other
side of the picture:
" Contrast this impressive exhibit, where the
command of the sea has been operative, with the
history and achievement of those great States which
have not possessed it. Contrast Bosnia and Herze-
BLESSINGS OF NAVAL ARMAMENTS 243
govina for Austria, Alsace and Lorraine for Germany,
with the expansion of France, Great Britain, Holland,
and with that which Spain once possessed ; now lost
through an inefficiency, one of the first symptoms of
which was the decay of her navy. The magnificent
efficiency of the present German Empire strives now,
against almost hopeless disadvantage, for the op-
portunity to exercise that efficiency outside its Euro-
pean limits. Opportunity was lost through the
absence of naval force, in the past centuries, when the
maritime countries were occupying, and, in accord-
ance with their respective political aptitudes, were
determining the future of immense tracts of the
world. Much time must elapse before we shall know
the inside history of the still unarranged dispute with
France about Morocco (1911), but there is reason
to believe that the consciousness of the British Navy
at the back of France has been one of the large factors
in the negotiations. At least it is apparent that
bitterness against Great Britain has been even
more marked than against France/'
We cannot ignore the influence of the sea at-
mosphere on our history in the past and the influence
which it still exerts in widening the social and
political horizon of the British people and checking
the tendency of political thought to circle round
the parish pump and the market-place. We owe
our rich heritage and our supreme position in the
world's commerce to our habit of mind as a seafaring
nation ; we owe our salvation from revolutionary
movements in no small degree to the same healthful,
broadening influence.
244 THE COMMAND OF THE SEA
Considering the manifold blessings of naval
armaments enjoyed by all the British peoples,
it ill becomes us to wring our hands because
in the competition for these benefits we are
compelled to pay a high price. Naval rivalry is
keen because the blessings which may be derived from
naval armaments are so great. If we would con-
tinue to enjoy the blessings, we must bear the
burden. The world places a heavy price on our
supremacy. That is the best evidence to its intrinsic
value. Fortunately, owing to our industrial position,
we buy our sea power in the cheapest market, and
derive from our Fleet more solid advantages than
any other people in the world.
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