*^
Modern Business
Editor-in-Chief
JOSEPH FRENCH JOHNSON
Dean, New York University School of Commerce, Accounts and Finance
Associate Editors:
PETER P. WAHLSTAP, ROLAND P. FALKNER *
Titles Authors
Business and the Man Joseph French Johnson
Economics OF Business j Joseph French Johnson
{ Frank L. McVey
Organization and Control Charles W.Gersten berg
Factory and Office Administration . . Lee Galloway
Marketing Methods • Ralph Starr Butler
Advertising Principles Herbert F. De Bower
Salesmanship and Sales Management . . John G. Jones
Credit and the Credit Man Peter P, Wahlstad
Accounting Principles Thomas W. Mitchell
Cost Finding Dexter S. Kimball
CoRPORATibN Finance William H. Walker
Business Correspondence Harrison McJohnston
Advertising Campaigns Mac Martin
Inland Traffic Simon J. McLean
Foreign Trade and Shipping Erich W. Ziramerraann
Banking Principles AND Practice . . . E.L.Stewart Patterson
Domestic AND Foreign Exchange . . . E.L. Stewart Patterson
tauRANC. AND Real Estate j ^ar/r'und"";"
Merchandising John B. Swinney
The Exchanges and Speculation .... Albert W. Atwood
Accounting Practice and Auditing . . . John T. Madden
Financial and Business Statements . . . Leo Greendlinger
Investment Edward D. Jones
Commercial Law Walter S. Johnson
EcC ' Modern buji*\t«4
COMMERCIAL LAW
.A'^
BY
WALTER s5"Jt)HNSON, B.A., B.C.L.
Member of the Bar o/ths Province o/Qiisb^, Lecturer on Railway
Laio, and Sometime Sessional Lecturer on Constitutional
and Commercial Law. McGill University
MODERN BUSINESS
VOLUME 24
ALEXANDER HAMILTON INSTITUTE
NEW YORK
COPYRIGHT, 1914, 17, BY
ALEXANDER HAMILTON INSTITUTE
COPYBiaHT IN GREAT BRITAIN, 1914, 17, BT
ALEXANDER HAMILTON INSTITUTE
The title and contents of this volume,
as well as the business growing out of
it, are further protected by laws re-
lating to trade marks and unfair trade.
All right reserved, including transla-
tion into Scandinavian.
Hegiatered trade mark, Reg. U. S. Pal. Off.,
Marca Registrada, M. de F.
Made in U. S. A.
PREFACE
This text on "Commercial Law" must not be deemed
to contain the whole of the law of which it treats. A
work more in the nature of a many volumed encyclo-
pedia would be necessary for that purpose. It does
contain, however, in simple form and with abundant
illusti'ation, the fundamental principles of the gen-
eral law of contracts more frequently encountered in
business. These comprise the contract of sale, con-
tracts between principal and agent, master and serv-
ant, shipper and carrier, and the important contracts
upon bills, notes and checks.
It is part of a modern business man's education that
he should know something of law — the broad and uni-
versal principles — without being a lawyer. This is
necessary quite as much as it is part of his education
that he should know something of banking, insurance
and transportation without necessarily being a banker,
an insurance manager, or a railway superintendent.
The more a man knows of the many phases and ac-
tivities of modern business, the more readily — one
might say the more accurately and instinctively — will
he recognize and adopt the precautions and safeguards
that keep his business affairs in a healthy and progres-
sive condition.
vi PREFACE
"The Law," said Burke, "is in my opinion, one of
the first and noblest of human sciences — a science
which does more to quicken and invigorate the under-
standing than all the other kinds of learning put to-
gether."
Walter S. Johnson.
Montreal, Canada.
y'
TABLE OF CONTEXTS
CHAPTER I
PRELIMINARY TOPICS
SECTION PACK
1. Introduction 1
2. Definition of Law 2
3. Municipal Law 3
4. International Law 3
5. Public Law 5
6. Private Law 5
7. Sources of Law 5
PART I: CONTRACTS IN GENERAL
CHAPTER II
NATURE AXD CLASSIFICATION OF CONTRACTS
1. Definition and General Features II
2. Agreement in General 13
3. Classification of Contracts 14
CHAPTER III
FORMATION OF CONTRACTS: COMPETENCY OF PARTIES
1. Requisites of a Contract 17
2. Capacity 17
3. Minors 17
4. An Infant's Liability for Necessaries .... 18
5. Legal Obligations of Minors 19
6. Disaffirmance by an Infant 20
7. Ratification 22
vii
/
viii COMMERCIAL LAW
SBCTIOK PAGE
8. InSane Persons 23
9. Disaffirmance by an Insane Person 23
10. Return of Consideration by the Insane .... 24
11. Married Women 25
CHAPTER IV
FORMATION OF CONTRACTS: THE CONTRACT ITSELF
1. Offer anfl Acceptance 2T
2. Offer and Acceptance by Mail or Telegraph . . 29
8. Offer to the Public 31
4. Consideration 32
5. What May be a Sufficient Consideration ... 3-1
6. The Statute of Frauds 36
CHAPTER V
FORMATION OF CONTRACTS: VOID AND VOIDABLE
CONTRACTS
1. Legality of Object 40
2. Wagering Contracts 42
S. Usurious Contracts 44
4. Contracts in Restraint of Trade 44
5. Unlawful Combinations ' . . 46
6. Contracts Made on Sunday 50
7. Contracts in Restraint of Marriage .... 51
8. Contracts in Fraud of Third Persons .... 52
9. Contracts Against Liabilitj' for Negligence 53
10. Effect of Illegality 54
11. Reality of Consent 59
12. Mistake or Error 60
13. Misrepresentation and Fraud ; 62
14. Undue Influence 64
15. Duress ; Violence and Fear 66
CONTENTS ix
CHAPTER VI
OPERATION AND INTERPRETATION OF CONTRACTS
8KCTI0X
PAGE
1. Rights and Liabilities of Third Parties ... 69
2. Contracts Made for the Benefit of a Third Person 70
S. Rules of Evidence 72
4. Rules of Construction 74
5. Surrounding Circumstances Given Consideration . 75
6. Matters Implied by Law 76
7. Liquidated Damages 76
8. Joint and Several Contracts 77
CHAPTER VII
ASSIGNMENT AND DISCHARGE OF CONTRACTS
1. Definition of Assignment 79
2. Competent Parties to an Assignment .... 79
3. Assignment of Liabilities 80
4. Other Examples of Assignment 81
5. Modes of Discharging a Contract 82
6. Discharge by Agreement 82
7. Discharge b}' Payment or Performance ... 82
8. Time and Place of Payment or Performance 84
9. Composition with Creditors 85
10. Application or Imputation of Payment ... 86
11. Tender 87
12. Novation 89
CHAPTER VIII
DISCHARGE OF CONTRACTS (Continued)
1. Discharge by Breach 92
2. Breach Thru Failure of Performance .... 93
3. Independent Promises 94
4. Conditional Promises 95
X COMMERCIAL LAW
SECTION' • PAGE
5. Breach of a Subsidiary Promise 98
6. Breach by Renunciation 99
CHAPTER IX
DISCHARGE OF CONTRACTS (Continued)
1. Discharge by Impossibility of Performance . . 103
2. Destruction of the Subject Matter 104<
3. Legal Impossibility 107
4. Incapacity for Personal Services 108
5. Liability Upon Refusing to Work Under Dangerous
Conditions Ill
6. Performance Impossible by the Fault of Either
Party . . . 112
7. Discharge by Operation of Law 113
8. Insolvency; Proceedings in Bankruptcy . . .116
9. By Confusion 117
10. By Compensation 117
11. Remedies for Breach of Contract 117
12. Damages Recoverable for Breach of Contract . .118
PART II: SPECIAL FORMS OF CONTRACT
CHAPTER X
SALES: THE CONTRACT
1. Definition 121
2. Distinguishing Features 122
3. Parties to a Contract of Sale 123
4. Subject Matter of the Sale 125
5. Statute of Frauds 128
6. Satisfaction of the Statute 131
7. Contracts for Work and Labor . . . . .136
8. When Title Passes 137
9. Conditional Sale 141
CONTENTS xi
SECTION PAGE
10. When the Seller Retains Possession .... 145
11. Goods to be Manufactured 146
12. Sales by Sample 146
CHAPTER XI
SALES: PERFORMANCE OF THE CONTRACT
1. Deliver^' of the Goods 151
2. Place of Delivery 152
3. Delivery to a Carrier 154
4. Time of Delivery 156
5. Quantity Specified Must be Delivered . . . .157
6. Quality Specified Must be Delivered . . . .160
7. Symbolic or Constructive Delivery 161
8. Warranties : Definition and Classification . . .162
9. Implied Warranty of Title 165
10. Implied Warranty of Quality, Caveat Emptor . 166
11. Remedies for Breach of an Express Warranty . 168
12. Remedies for Breach of an Implied Warranty . 169
13. Rights of an Unpaid Seller Against the Subject of
the Sale .170
14. Vendor's Right of Resale or Rescission .... 174
15. Actions by Unpaid Vendor for Breach of Contract
of Sale 174
16. Remedies of the Buyer 178
CHAPTER XII
BAILMENTS
1. Definitions 180
2. Distinctions 181
3. Classification of Bailments 182
4. Extraordinary Bailment 183
5. Contract of Bailment 183
6. Use and Care of Bailed Property 184
xii COMMERCIAL LAW
SECTION PAGE
7. Obligations of Bailor in a Bailment for His Sole
Benefit 184
8. Obligations of Bailee in a Bailment for the Sole
Benefit of the Bailor 185
9. Bailment for the Sole Benefit of the Bailee . .186
10. Termination of Bailment for Sole Benefit of one
Party 186
11. Creatioii of a Pledge or Pawn . . . . . . 187
12. Construction and Operation of Pledge . . . .188
13. Rights and Duties of the Bailor 188
14. Rights and Duties of Bailee 189
15. Warehousemen and Wharfingers 190
PART III: NEGOTIABLE CONTRACTS
CHAPTER XIII
NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS IN GENERAL
1. Introductory 194
2. Negotiability 195
3. Presumption of Consideration 196
4. Days of Grace 196
5. Bills of Exchange Act 197
6. Promissory Notes 197
7. Bills of Exchange 199
8. Bills in a Set 204
9. Checks 204
10. Acceptance or Certifying of Checks .... 207
11. To Whom Payable 208
12. Certainty of Drawee 209
13. Blanks 210
14. Alteration of Bill 211
CONTENTS xiii
CHAPTER XIV
TRANSFER AND NEGOTIATION
SKCTIOX PAGE
1. Methods of Transfer 214.
il. By Assignment 214
J3. By Operation of Law 215
4. By Negotiation 216
5. Indorsement 217
6. Requisites of Indorsement 218
7. Kinds of Indorsement 221
8. Indorsements in Blank 221
9. Special Indorsements 222
10. Qualified Indorsements, or Indorsements Without
Recourse 222
11. Conditional Indorsement 223
12. Restrictive Indorsements 224
13. Indorsement Waiving Conditions 224
14. Irregular and Other Indorsements 225
15. Transfer Without Indorsement 226
16. Delivery . < 227
17. Holder in Due Course 229
18. Regularity of Face of Instrument 230
19. Maturity 231
20. Without Notice of Dishonor or Defect . . .232
21. Consideration 234
22. Negotiation of Bill 235
23. Rights of a Holder in Due Course .... 236
CHAPTER XV
CONTRACT OF PARTIES
1. Maker's Contract 238
2. Acceptor's Contract 239
3. Facts Which Acceptor Admits, and Facts Which
He Does Not Admit 241
xiv COMMERCIAL LAW
SECTION PAGE
4. Kinds of Acceptance 241
5. Who May Accept 243
6. Effect of Acceptance and Refusal to Accept . . 244
7. Drawer's Contract 244
8. Indorser's Contract 245
9. Warranties of Indorser 246
10. Liability of Indorsers Among Themselves . . . 246
11. Liability of Other Parties 247
12. Damages 249
♦
CHAPTER XVI
PRESENTMENT AND NOTICE OF DISHONOR
1. Presentment for Acceptance 251
2. Presentment for Payment 252
3. When, Where and How ^lade 253
4. Time and Place of Presentment for Payment . . 255
5. Presentment Waived and Dispensed With . . . 256
6. Payment for Honor 257
7. Notice of Dishonor 258
8. By Whom Notice is Given 259
9. Sufficiency of Notice 259
10. Time Within Which Notice Must be Given . . 2o9
11. Place of Notice 260
12. Notice Waived and Excused 260
13. Protest 261
CHAPTER XVII
DEFENCES
1. Definition 263
2. Fraud and Threats of Violence 263
3. Partial or Total Want of Value or Consideration . 264
4. Illegality 265
5. Release, Renunciation or Payment 266
COxXTENTS XV
SECTION' PAGE
6. Discharge of Persons Secondarily Liable . . . 26T
7. Real Defences 267
8. Cancellation 267
9. Forgery 268
PART. IV: CONDUCT OF BUSINESS
THRU REPRESENTATION
CHAPTER XVIII
PRINCIPAL AXD AGENT
1. Definitions and Distinctions 271
2. How Constituted 273
3. Agency b}- Estoppel 274
4. Agency by Necessity 276
5. Who May be Principal 276
6. When a Business ^lay be a Principal .... 278
7. Who :May be Agent 278
8. What Acts May be Done by an Agent . . . 279
9. Co-Agents 280
10. What Acts May be Ratified 280
11. Conditions Necessary for Ratification .... 284
1,2. Ratification Express or Implied 285
13. Scope of Agent's Authority 285
14. General and Special Agent 287
15. Authority in Ambiguous Terms 288
16. Power of Attorney 288
17. Implied Powers 291
18. ]Must Execute Accepted Mandate 292
19. Delegation of Agent's Authority to a Sub-Agent . 293
20.' Relations of Agent, Sub-Agent and Principal . 295
21. Duties of Agent 295
22. Fiduciary Obligations 296
23. Liability of Agent to Principal 298
24. Measure of Damages 301
xvi COMMERCIAL LAW
SECTION PAGE
25. Agent Not Liable on Agency Contracts . . . 302
26. Actions by Agents 304
27. Remuneration of Agent 305
28. Agent's Right to Indemnity 307
29. Lien of Agents 309
30. Acts Performed Within the Powers of the Mandate 309
31. Acts Exceeding the Scope of Authority . . .311
32. Tei;mination of Agency 312
CHAPTER XIX
MASTER AND SERVANT
1. Definition 315
2. Contract of Hire and Service 316
3. Independent Contractor 316
4. Fellow-Servant and Vice-Principal 318
5. Master Liable for Servant's Acts 319
6. Servant's Personal LiabiHty 320
7. Workmen's Compensation Acts 321
8. Alien Labor Act 323
COMMERCIAL LAW
CHAPTER I
PRELIMINARY TOPICS
1. Introduction. — In recent years increasing at-
tention has been given by business men, and by those
preparing for commercial careers, to a study of mer-
cantile law. Xot only in commercial colleges, but in
the extension courses of the larger universities, a se-
rious effort is made to enable the business man to ac-
quire some knowledge of the general legal principles
applicable in his relations with his fellow men. Apart
from the fact that the study of law affords an excel-
lent training in accuracy of thought and expression,
it is of the utmost practical value in the conduct of
one's affairs.
An extension course of lectures in law or the study
of a book like the present is not, of course, intended to
make a man liis own lawyer. Either should, however,
if it has no other benefit, train a man to perceive or
scent legal difficulties and suffice to warn him of the
advisability of consulting a lawyer. The man of af-
fairs who understands his position, his rights and lia-
bilities, and the rights and liabilities of others, in mat-
ters relating, for instance, to contracts in general, to
XXIT— 2 1
2 COMMERCIAL LAW
negotiable instruments, to agency and partnership,
to corporations, insurance, sales, bailments and car-
riers, is doubly armed for encounters in the arena of
commercial life. Ignorance of the law, it has been
said, is no excuse. The adage supplies its own com-
mentary. Legal rules, it may here be said, are
founded on common sense; they have been formu-
lated out of the accumulated wisdom and experience
of diverse peoples and countless generations; they
represent the striving of men for just and wise guid-
ance and restraints in human relationships.
Economic, social and political conditions thru-
out many centuries have molded the gi*eat body of
general law. The process is going on even now.
The student should approach the study with the de-
sire to understand the rules of law ; but he will under-
stand these better if at the same time he seeks to ap-
preciate their historical background, their wisdom,
justice and harmony, and the point of view of the
legislator.
2. Definition of law. — In its technical sense ( for we
are not here concerned with laws of nature, with di-
vine or moral law) the term law means a general rule
or a body of general rules of human conduct, en-
forceable by the public authority by which it is pre-
scribed. In other words, a law is a general rule of
external human action enforced by a sovereign po-
litical authority.
Technical law may be divided into two classes:
(1) municipal law and (2) international law.
PRELIMINARY TOPICS 8
In another sense it may be divided into : ( 1 ) pub-
lic law and (2) private law.
3. Municipal law. — By municipal law is meant the
body of legal rules, or the system of social order, which
is established and enforced by the state. It differs
from pubhc international law, which is not enforce-
able by any supreme authority. The state — the su-
preme authority — makes and enforces laws. It may
delegate its authority in these respects: as, for ex-
ample, where it grants authority to a province, a city
or a territory, to make and enforce local laws. It
must not be understood that the word "municipal" is
used to designate only laws made by or relating to
"municipalities." The word is used in a teclmical
sense, to include all laws enacted and enforced by a
state or supreme authority, whether they relate to
land, wills, partnerships, criminals or otherwise.
4. International latv. — The affairs of nations
among themselves require and, by consent or custom,
are subject to certain rules and regulations. Public
international law, then, is the body of rules which na-
tions have by common consent recognized in the regu-
lation of their affairs. We have pointed out that it
differs from ordinarj^ law in that it cannot be enforced.
It is then, properly speaking, not law at all in the
technical sense. Yet it forms part of tlie common law
of England. The courts of England, Canada and the
United States would recognize it under proper cir-
cumstances.
The field of international law is verv broad. It
4 COMMERCIAL LAW
covers, for instance, rules for the treatment of con-
traband of war, prize-courts, the status of belligerents
and neutrals, the laws of blockades, and so on. These
and many similar subjects come within what is called
public international law. In more peaceful matters,
rules of international law may be applied to the in-
terpretation of contracts, the validity of documents
and agreements drawn in one country and enforce-
able in another, the determination of the status of
individuals, and so on. These and many similar sub-
jects are governed by rules of private international
law, A\iiich A^ill be enforced in the countries where
they are to be applied.
Questions of international law may arise even as
between persons domiciled in different provinces of
Canada. One example will suffice. A person's ca-
pacity to contract is governed by the law of his domi-
cile, i.e., of the country where he has his permanent
home. A minor is domiciled in Ontario: his perma-
nent home is there. By the law of Ontario, a minor
cannot make a binding contract merely because he is a
trader. In Quebec, a minor who is engaged in trade
may make valid and binding contracts in connection
with his trade. The Ontario minor goes to Montreal
and starts in business. He gives promissory notes to
his creditors, and the notes are not met at maturity.
He is sued in Montreal, but pleads that his capacity
is to be governed by the law of Ontario, where he is
domiciled. His plea will be upheld and the action
dismissed.
PRELIMINARY TOPICS 5
5. Public law. — By a "public person" is meant the
state, or the sovereign part of it, or a body or indi-
vidual holding delegated authority' under it.^ Public
law, then, regulates rights where one of the persons
concerned is "public." Public law also includes con-
stitutional and administrative law. The conquest of
Canada, in 1763, had the effect of substituting the
public law of England for that of France.
6. Private law. — WTiere the parties interested or
affected by a right are private persons, they are gov-
erned by private law, which they may invoke the aid
of the state to regulate and enforce. A given act, it
must be said, may violate both a public and a private
right. If one man assaults another, the private right
of the person injured to be unmolested is violated, as
is also the public right of the state that the public
peace shall not be disturbed. Generally speaking,
private law includes the law relating to contracts,
torts or damages, pleadings, evidence — in a word, all
the subjects that we shall treat of in this book, as well
as many others.
7. Sources of law. — The sources of our law may be
briefly mentioned. They are :
(a) The confederation act, and supplemen-
tary ACTS THE CONSTITUTION OF CANADA. The
Confederation Act was passed by the British Parlia-
ment ]March 29, 1867. On the first day of July,
1867, it came into force. It is the foundation and au-
thority for our Federal system of government. From
1 Holland, "Jurisprudence," p. 124.
6 COMMERCIAL LAW
it flows the authority of the Dominion government
and of the legislative bodies of the various provinces
to make laws and to govern within their various juris-
dictions.
(b) Dominion statutes. The Dominion Parlia-
ment may make laws relating to the classes of subjects
assigned to it by the constitution. In these matters
it is supreme. It must not legislate concerning a
matter within the exclusive jurisdiction of the prov-
inces.
(c) Treaties. Treaties are agreements made be-
tween independent nations. These may be treaties
of alliance, treaties of peace, purely commercial treat-
ies, and so on. The Constitutional Act provides that
the Parliament and government of Canada shall have
all powers necessary for performing the obligations
of Canada or of any province thereof, as part of the
British Empire, towards foreign countries, arising
under treaties between the Empire and such foreign
countries. These powers were exercised in the case
of the Washington Treaty of 1871 between the
United States and England, which settled disputes
arising out of the American Civil War, the Canadian
fisheries and other important matters.
(d) Provincial constitutions. The constitu-
tion of a province is the fundamental law by which it
exists and upon which it builds its system of govern-
ment. The Constitutional Act includes constitu-
tional provisions for the provinces. A province may,
within certain restrictions, amend its constitution.
PRELIMINARY TOPICS 7
Such amendments must not conflict, however, with
the provisions of the Constitutional Act, with Domin-
ion statutes, or with any treaties which the Dominion
must observe.
(e) Provincial statutes. Each province may
legislate freely concerning the classes of subjects as-
signed to it by the Constitutional Act. Its statutes
must not conflict with Dominion legislation. Pro-
vincial statutes may merely re-enact pre-existing laws
concerning the existence or scope of which there is
doubt, repeal existing laws or create new laws.
A glance at the revised statutes of any of the prov-
inces will afford a good idea of the range and di-
versity of provincial legislation. As between a prov-
ince and the Dominion, the residuary power lies with
the Dominion. That is, where a fair doubt exists
whether the Dominion or the province has jurisdiction
in a given matter, the Dominion will get the benefit
of the doubt. Under the American constitution the
residuary power lies with the various states.
(f) Common law. "In its largest sense," says
Sir Frederick Pollock, "the common law means the
whole body of legal principle and usage which is com-
mon to all parts of England, and now to all jurisdic-
tions whose law is of English origin." Custom exists
as law in every country. The existence of custom or
common law is generally proved by reference to de-
cisions by which it has been aflirmed, or to the writings
of commentators who have appealed to it for guid-
ance or authority. The common law then does not
8 COMMERCIAL LAW
depend for its authority upon statutes, treaties or con-
stitutions. It is described as the "unwritten law," in
the sense that the British Constitution is unwritten.
It may be found in the written or printed decisions
of the courts and in the pages of legal authorities, but
it is still "unwritten" in the sense that it has not been
reduced to statutory form or declared by statute to
be law. y
In so far as a given rule of common law is finally
embodied in statutory form, it ceases to exist as com-
mon law and becomes statute law. For instance, the
English Act relating to bills of exchange and prom-
issory notes is largely a codification of old common
law rules found in the customs and usages of mer-
chants and in the decisions of the courts. The laws
of the United States, with the exception of those of
Louisiana, had their origin in the common law of
England. Many of these laws have, of course, been
formulated in Acts of Congress or of state legisla-
tures. The same may be said of the English law
provinces of the Dominion. It will be found that
these provinces have frequently enacted that the law
of England as it existed at a given date shall form
part of the law of the particular province. Thus in
Ontario, the laws of England as to property, civil
rights and evidence, in force on October 15, 1792,
were adopted.* In Manitoba the laws of England
as to property, civil rights, evidence and procedure,
as existing on July 15, 1870, were adopted by an act
1 Consol. stats. U. C, 1859, c. 9.
PRELIMINARY TOPICS 9
passed in 1874.* In British Columbia, English laws
were declared to be in force by the proclamation of
November 19, 1858, and this so far as those laws "are
not from local circumstances inapplicable," and as
modified by past local legislation.
It is unnecessary to go thru the list of provinces.
Since these dates, English statutes have been ex-
pressly adopted in certain provinces. Thus the Eng-
lish Sale of Goods Act was adopted by the Northwest
Territories and by ^Manitoba in 1896, and by British
Columbia in 1897.
In Quebec the case is different. The conquest of
Canada in 1763, while it replaced French public law
by English public law, did not introduce English pri-
vate law. The private law in force in Canada at that
time was of course that of France.^ Canada then in-
cluded what are now Ontario (Upper Canada) and
Quebec ( Lower Canada ) . When Upper Canada
was created in 1791, it at once proceeded to abrogate
the French laws then in force, and introduced the laws
of England. In Quebec, then, from the first settle-
ment by the French in 1608, the conmion law has been
the C out II me de Paris, except in commercial matters.
This law has been greatly modified in the course of
years by statute, and, as modified, is now found in the
Civil Code of Quebec, which came into force in 1866.
In commercial matters, when no provision is found
in the Code, English rules of evidence apply. Sec-
1 Man. 38 V. c. 12, s. 1.
2 Walton, "Scope and Interpretation of the Civil Code," 56.
10 COMMERCIAL LAW
tions 4 and 17 of the English Statute of Frauds, with
certain exceptions which will hereafter be explained,
are also in force. Quebec commercial law, in so far
as it is codified, is a blending of English and French
commercial law. The English law and jurisprudence
are, however, constantly and almost exclusively fol-
lowed in commercial matters.
^ REVIEW
Of what benefit is the knowledge of legal rights and obliga-
tions? How should the study of general law be approached?
Define law in its technical sense and classify technical law in
two ways.
What is meant by municipal law and how docs it differ from
international law?
Explain public international law. Why is it not law in the
technical sense ; what is its field ? Show, by an illustration,
how a question of international law may arise between persons
domiciled in different provinces of Canada.
What is the difference between public law and private law?
What are the six great sources of Canadian law and what does
each cover? Differentiate between common and statute law.
PART I: CONTRACTS IN GENERAL
CHAPTER II
NATURE AND CLASSIFICATION OF CONTRACTS
1. Definition and general features. — A contract is
an agreement by which one or more persons bind
themselves in favor of one or more other persons to
give or to do or not to do something. It is essential
to a contract that there be an agreement. A contract,
to be valid and enforceable, must give rise to an obli-
gation. An obhgation is a legal bond by which one
person is bomid in favor of another to give or to do
or not to do a certain thing. A true contract is, there-
fore, an agreement, but every agreement is not a con-
tract.
If we may repeat, a contract must give rise to an
enforceable obligation. The word "obligation" is de-
rived from the Latin word ohligare, meaning to bind
together. Two persons are thus bound towards each
other and in order that they shall be liberated, the
bond must be severed by pajTnent; that is, by the
handing over of money, or the doing of something, or
the refraining from doing something. In other
words, the contract must be executed.
When we say that there is an obligation, we mean
11
12 COMMERCIAL LAW
that upon one of the parties to the contract a duty is
laid, the fulfilment of which can be enforced by the
other party. The distinction may be made clear by
explaining that a moral obligation lacks this feature.
A moral obligation cannot be enforced thru the
courts.
In a famous case of Laidlaw vs. Sage,^ this prin-
ciple was^clearly brought out. Russell Sage was in
his office one day when a lighted bomb was thrown in
thru the window. Terrified, he pushed his secretary
between himself and the bomb, with the result that
the secretary was seriously injured by the explosion.
The latter brought action against Sage, claiming in-
demnity on the ground that he had saved Sage from
gi'eat injury, and that he himself had been seriously
hurt. The case was thrown out, on the ground that
Sage acted in a moment of extreme panic, and on tlie
ground that it was not proved that the secretary
would not have been as much injured had Sage not
acted as he did. There was no doubt that there was
a moral duty on the part of Mr. Sage to compensate
his secretary, but the court held that his obligation
was an imperfect obligation.
In order that a true contract must exist, there must
be:
(a) Parties legally capable of contracting;
(b) Their consent legally given;
(c) Something which forms the object of the con-
tract ;
1 52 New England Reports, p. 679.
NATURE OF CONTRACTS 18
(d) A lawful cause or consideration.
The matter may be expressed more simply by say-
ing that there must be an agreement, and there must
be a lawful obligation; that is, an enforceable obliga-
tion.
2. Agreement in general. — In order that a person
shall be bound, he must have agreed to be bound.
There must be a common intention. If the terms of
the alleged contract are so doubtful or so contradic-
tory that the court cannot ascertain definitely what
the terms were, an action to enforce the contract will
be dismissed, because of the inability of the court to de-
termine whether there was a contract, or what were
its terms. Thus if A asks B whether he will take
$200 for a certain horse and B replies, "Very possibly
I will," there cannot be said to have been an agree-
ment on the part of B that he would seU A his
horse.
A person wiU be bound where he authorizes an agent
to make a contract on his behalf, or he will be bound
to pay the debts of a succession which he has accepted;
by accepting he has contracted to take the assets and
to pay the debts of the succession ; he has acted by his
free choice and voluntarily, and thus has come under
an obligation.
A person may also come under an obligation by
reason of some quasi contract. For example, if in
paying an account A overpays, there is an obligation
on the part of the person receiving pajTiient to ac-
coimt for such overpajTnent. Under the French law.
14 COMMERCIAL LAW
tho apparently not under the English law, if a
person discovers that the water-pipes in the house of
his neighbor, which is closed for the summer, are burst,
and he employs a plumber to repair them and stop the
leak, he can call upon the owner of the house to pay
him the cost of the work.
Similarly, a person may come under an obligation
by reason of his tort, as it is called under the English
law, or of his offence, or quasi-offence, as it is called
under the French law. An offence of this kind arises
by reason of a person's wilful wrongful act (of-
fence) , and as a result he must pay the damages which
he causes, and generally these damages will be
somewhat increased because of his wilful intention.
Where the act is done involuntarily or in error (quasi-
offence), he will be liable only for the actual damage
caused: as, for example, where a druggist in mixing
a prescription makes a mistake, there has been no wil-
ful intention, and he will be liable only for the dam-
ages that can be proved. The case might be different
if the mistake were due to gross carelessness.
3. Classification of contracts. — There are various
classifications of contracts, which may be briefly ex-
pressed as follows. A contract may be an executed
contract: that is, a contract the terms of which have
been carried out; the obligation has been fulfilled or
paid, and as a result has been discharged. The con-
tract, in reality, by reason of its execution, has ceased
to exist.
The contract may be executory : it has yet to be per-
NATURE OF CONTRACTS 15
formed. The contract may be bilateral, and both
parties be bound to fulfil certain obligations. It may
be unilateral, and one of the parties be bound to ful-
fil his obhgation. A contract may be formal, in that
it requires for vahdity to be made in some solemn
form, as before a notary public or under seal; or it
may be informal, and be a simple writing signed by
one or both of the parties. An informal contract may
be in writing; it may be expressed orally, in which
case it will be subject to certain strict rules as to its
proof. A formal contract in solemn form proves it-
self.
A contract may be valid, void or voidable. If
vahd, it is binding upon the parties to it, because it is
in proper form, the proper consent of the parties ex-
ists, and there is a lawful cause and an object. If the
contract is void, it is a contract only in name and can-
not be enforced ; neither party can hold the other to it.
Thus if a person rents a house for immoral purposes,
such a contract is void, and cannot be enforced.
Where the contract is illegal and void, no action can
be brought to compel the parties ; damages camiot be
asked for breach of performance; and generally, if
money has been paid over under the contract, it can
be recovered. Such contracts are said to be contrary
to good morals and public policy. A contract may
be voidable in that one of the parties may either con-
sent or refuse to be bound by it. Thus if A sells a
horse to a minor, the latter can buy it and pay the
price, but he can refuse to pay the price or to carry
16 COMMERCIAL LAW
out his obligation to complete the contract by pay-
ment, or if he has paid and it can be shown that he has
suffered injury by the bargain, he can have it upset
and recover his money.
Contracts may be express, whether oral or written,
when the terms of the contract are in so many definite
words, and there is a distinct understanding. But the
existence^ of a contract may be also implied, where
from the conduct of the one or the other of the parties,
or from the circumstances, it can be said that they in-
tended to be or should be bound. Thus if a man holds
another out as his agent for the performance of a cer-
tain act, or the making of a certain contract, and does
not repudiate the act or contract made by his agent,
he will generally be bound, in that his consent to what
has been done or contracted will be implied.
REVIEW
Define a contract and show what a true contract must include.
What is the difference between a moral and a lawful obligation?
What part does agreement play in a contract? Is a quasi-
contract binding? What obligation arises out of an offense; a
quasi-offense.
Distinguish between: (a) an executed and executory contract;
(b) a bilateral and unilateral contract; (c) a formal and infor-
mal contract.
When is a contract valid; when void; when voidable?
CHAPTER III
FORMATION OF CONTRACTS: COMPETENCY OF
PARTIES
1. Requisites of a contract. — We have already said
that there are four requisites to the validity of a eon-
tract, namely, parties legally capable of contracting;
consent legally given; an object; and a lawful cause
or consideration. There must not be fraud, error or
undue influence, such as threats or violence.
2. Capacity. — The common law ride is that every
person is capable of making a contract, unless his in-
capacity is expressly declared by law. By capacity is
meant that a person must be of age, he must be in his
right mind and able to understand what he is doing,
and he must not be excluded as falling within the
classes described as incompetent. The following per-
sons are subject to defective capacity:
( 1 ) Minors
(2) Interdicted persons
(3) ^larried women in certain cases
( 4 ) Persons insane or intoxicated, or otherwise un-
able to consent, owing to w^eakness of understanding.
3. Minors. — The legal age of majority is almost
universally the age of twenty-one years. Persons
under that age, both male and female, are infants in
the eyes of the law, and while they may enter into con-
XXIV — 3 17
18 COMMERCIAL LAW
tracts, they cannot as a general rule be bound by
them.
The contracts of a minor are voidable at his option.
He has the privilege of refusing to be bound by his
contracts, the idea being that as an infant he needs
protection, and must be protected against his own
acts, or against the acts of persons better able than he
to judge jof the benefit to be derived from a particular
contract. An infant is, however, bound to pay for
necessaries, tho no more than the reasonable value
thereof.
4. An infant's liability for necessaries. — The term
includes more than the mere food that will keep him
alive, or the mere clothes that will keep him warm.
Such food and clothes as are suitable to his station in
life and to his particular circumstances at the time of
the contract are covered by the term. Necessaries
may, therefore, be food and clothing, medicines and
medical attendance, at least a common school educa-
tion— under certain circumstances even a college edu-
cation, where this is not unreasonable, having regard
always to the minor's station in life. But necessaries
would not include mere luxuries, such as champagne,
unless ordered by a doctor, or a fancy waistcoat, when
he already has several. The term may include a
watch, if the minor has not already one, especially
if the watch is within the minor's means. It has
been held to include a horse, a bicycle and a mod-
erate amount of jewelry, under the same proviso.
But articles of mere ornament and luxury, unless
FORMATION OF CONTRACTS 19
luxurious articles of utility, would certainly be ex-
cluded.
If a minor buys a horse, under the advice of his
doctor, for the purpose of exercise, the bargain would
be binding if the price were reasonable. If he
bought it for use in some business enterprise, it might
be hard to consider it a necessary. Articles which
he buys for the mere pleasure that they may give him,
altho they may be useful, are not necessaries.
If a minor is hving with his father or with a guar-
dian who gives him all reasonable necessaries and sup-
ports him, the minor will not be liable if he buys other
food and clothing on credit, and persons dealing with
him do so at their peril. If they sue bun, they must
be able to show that the minor really needed the
articles in question.
A minor who is married will be held Hable for the
necessaries supplied to his wife. A minor who has
entered into the contract of marriage cannot be re-
leased from his contract on the gi'ound of lesion —
that is, on the ground that he has suffered injury.
5. Legal obligations of minors. — The common law
rule is that a husband is hable for the debts of his wife
contracted before her marriage, and a minor who is a
husband apparently could not plead his infancy as a
defence. In certain cases a minor may contract un-
der the authority or direction of the law (as, for ex-
ample, if he enlists in the army) , and his contract will
be enforced. So also if a minor is a mortgagee, and
upon payment of the debt he reconveys the property.
20 COMMERCIAL LAW
he has performed a legal obligation, and is bound by
his act. Ordinarily speaking, however, and with the
exceptions we have discussed, a minor may at his op-
tion carry out his contracts or treat them as void, un-
less he has been properly authorized to make the con-
tract. If he makes a contract for personal services,
or enters into a partnership, or gives a promissory
note, or buys or sells either movable or immovable
property, he may refuse to be bound.^
6. Disaffirmance by an infant. — The general rule
is that an infant may avoid his voidable contracts
either before or within a reasonable time after becom-
ing of age."
It has been decided that a minor cannot deprive
himself of his privilege of voiding, after he becomes of
age, his contract made during minority. If an infant
pays a sum of money under a contract, says Pollock,
in consideration of which the contract is partly or
wholly performed by the other party, he cannot ac-
quire any right to recover the money by rescinding the
contract when he comes of age.^ So if he enters into
a partnership agreement and pays a premium, he can-
not, while he is a minor or afterwards, recover the
premium. He may repudiate his contract in va-
rious ways; expressly, in wi'iting or in words, or
even by his conduct. If the contract is executory,
that is, a contract under which he is bound to do some-
1 This broad rule is subject to qualification in Quebec law, as explained
in the next section.
2 Pollock, Contracts, 8th Ed., p. 62.
3 Pollock, p. 63.
FORMATION OF CONTRACTS 21
thing, he may refuse to act, and if he is sued he may-
plead the fact of his minority. If he sells a prop-
erty to one person, it would be a sufficient repudiation
of his contract if after becoming of age he sold it to
another person, tho in such case he would have to re-
turn to the first purchaser the money received from
him.
If it can be shown, however, that the express con-
tract which he has entered into is really for his bene-
fit, he will be bound by it, or even sometimes where it
is shown that it is not manifestly to his prejudice.
Or if he enters into an agi-eement of apprenticeship
or employs himself with a firm for a reasonable wage,
he will be bound if he unlawfully absents himself from
his employment. But it has been held that w^here a
minor is allowed to make frequent journeys by a rail-
way on special terms, and in consideration he waives
any claim for accident that may occur, such a contract
is harmful to him, and he is not boimd. But suppos-
ing that he were to buy goods on credit, in order to
taken advantage of a rising market, his contract might
not be manifestly disadvantageous, especially if he
were of years of discretion ; but he could void such a
contract, at least at common law.
If a minor is a shareholder in a company and is in
arrears for calls, he may, upon reaching his majority,
be sued for the unpaid calls, unless he has repudiated
his contract either before majority or within a rea-
sonable time afterwards. It has been held in a Que-
bec case that a minor who has attained his majority
22 COMMERCIAL LAW
can be sued for the recovery of the amount of a prom-
issory^ note made while he was a minor in payment of
the first premium on a policy of insurance on his life,
where he retained the policy, and where he took no
procedure to annul the insurance contract. The in-
surance premium having been so paid, the insurance,
it was held, stands in force for all purposes; and a
minor, having attained his majority, can avoid a con-
tract entered into during his minority only in so far
as he proves legal injury or prejudice. That distinc-
tion brings out clearly the difference between the law
of the Province of Quebec and that of Ontario and
the other English law provinces. In the English law
provinces, a minor's incapacity is greater than in the
Province of Quebec. He can, as a general rule, get
any contract, into which he has entered, set aside. In
the Province of Quebec, the general rule is that he
must show that he has suffered a prejudice by his con-
tract.
If he has represented himself as being at the age of
majority, it may be said as a general rule that he must
restore any advantage he has obtained by reason of
his misrepresentation, if he chooses to void his con-
tract.
7. Ratification. — An infant cannot ratify before
majority the contract which as an infant he could dis-
avow, because his capacity for the one is no greater
than his capacity for the other. His ratification
should be in writing. If he ratifies his contract, he
must ratify it as a whole ; he cannot merely ratify what
FORMATION OF CONTRACTS 23
he thinks will be of advantage to him, and repudiate
the balance. Thus if he buys a piece of real estate
and gives a mortgage for the unpaid balance, he can-
not, upon becoming of age, ratify the purchase and
repudiate the mortgage.
8. Insane persons. — The general rule may be laid
down that the contracts of an insane person are void-
able. The old rule was that he was unable to void
them himself. If he has been legally declared in-
sane, or as the result of an inquisition, he cannot deal
with his property by deed, even in a lucid interval.^
But a lunatic who has not been so found may contract
during lucid intervals.
A person may be insane upon one subject, yet as
regards other matters be quite capable of contracting.
So far as concerns the subject of his insanity or de-
lusion, he cannot contract, tho in other matters h^
may. A person, for example, who is insane upon the
subject of religion, may be quite sane enough to pro-
tect his interests in the purchase of a horse.
9. Disaffirmance by an insane person. — During a
lucid interval, or within a reasonable time after he be-
comes sane, a person who has made a contract while
insane may repudiate it. If he has a guardian the
latter may, during his insanity, repudiate the contract
for him. If he dies, his personal representatives or
heirs may do so. But the other party to the contract,
as well as any third party, cannot disaffirm the con-
tract.
1 Pollock, p. 95.
^84 COMMERCIAL LAW
The marriage of a lunatic is void. That he may
validly enter into the contract of marriage, the same
degree of sanity will be required of him as for making
a will or any other contract. But the burden of prov-
ing his insanity will be upon him.^
10. Return of consideration by the insane. — If an
insane person chooses to repudiate his contract, he
must, if he can, tender back with his claim the con-
sideration he may have received. If he cannot, there
is authority for the view that he will not as a result
be bound by his contract. If, for this reason, he
could not relieve himself of the contract he made
while insane, the rule which entitles him to void his
contracts would be set at naught, and what he could
not do directly would be forced upon him indirectly.
The same weakness which led him into the contract
may have led him to dispose of the consideration, and
the law undertakes to protect him against his weak-
ness. So if in a lucid interval he tenders back a
watch which while insane he has bought, the vendor
is bound to accept the watch and give him back the
price. But if meanwhile he had lost the watch, the
vendor would be bound to return the price.
In Quebec, generally speaking, contracts by per-
sons of this class cannot be voided unless there has
been lesion, that is, injury or loss suffered by such
person and arising out of the contract. The code
expressly declares that when minors, interdicted per-
sons (which would include persons incapable, because
1 Pollock, p. 95.
FORMATION OF CONTRACTS ^ 25
of some mental weakness, of making a contract) or
married women are admitted in those qualities to be
relieved from their contracts, the reimbursement of
what has been paid in consequence of these contracts,
during the minority, interdiction or marriage, cannot
be exacted, unless it is proved that what has been paid
has turned to their profit. It is not for the incapable
to prove that the bargain has not turned out to his
profit, but for his opponent to prove that it has ac-
tually turned out to his profit.
11. Married women. — The old rule of the English
common law was that a married woman could not,
with rare exceptions, make a valid contract apart from
her husband. This has been changed by statute. In
the Enghsh law provinces, it may now be said that a
married woman may deal with her separate property
quite as freely as if she were unmarried and of age.
Her contracts will bind her.
In Quebec, the general rule is that a wife cannot
contract without her husband's authorization. If she
is married without a marriage contract stipulating
separation of property, her property and that of her
husband fall into what is called a community of prop-
erty. In theory, this common property belongs to
both; but the husband is head of the community, and
alone can say how the property, goods or money com-
posing it, shall be spent or disposed of. His wife
cannot, therefore, bind herself by contract without his
consent, for otherwise he might find the property of
the community, of which he is the virtual master and
26 COMMERCIAL LAW
owner, dispersed or dissipated by the wife's contracts.
In every province, excepting Quebec, when a woman
marries she retains control and absolute ownership of
all her property and of all she may earn or acquire.
In Quebec, however, separation of property may be
stipulated by marriage contract, and the wife will
thus be and remain owner of all her property ; but she
cannot alienate her real property, tho she may ad-
minister it. She can deal with and dispose of
her income ; but as to capital, speaking broadly, she is
subject to the authority of her husband. In the Eng-
lish law provinces, a wife may freely be a public trader.
In Quebec a wife needs her husband's authorization
to be a public trader (tho his consent will be implied
where he knows what she is doing and does not pro-
test) ; if she is separate as to property, she binds her
separate property; if she is common as to property,
she binds her husband also. In Quebec a wife cannot
bind her separate property in any contract with or
for her husband, saving the rights of creditors in good
faith.
REVIEW
What are the requisites of a contract? What is meant by
capacity? Who are subject to defective capacity?
Discuss the position of minors in relation to contracts. Are a
minor's contracts void or voidable?
Discuss the liability of infants in regard to necessaries.
How may an infant disaffirm his contract.^ How and when
may he ratify it?
What is the general rule concerning contracts of an insane per-
son?
At common law could a married woman make a valid contract ?
Can she do so by statute?
CHAPTER IV
FORMATION OF CONTRACTS: THE CONTRACT
ITSELF
1. Offer and acceptance. — It is essential to a con-
tract that the parties thereto shall have come to some
agreement. By this is meant that the parties are of
one mind upon some proposed transaction, and that
they have declared this fact. The purpose of both
must be declared; the law cannot deal with the secret
thoughts of men.
Hence if A is willing to sell his horse for $500 to B,
and B has made up his mind to buy the horse, if he can
get it, but neither has referred to or discussed the mat-
ter, A and B are really of one mind on the subject.
But there is no contract, for their wills have not met
in a declaration of willingness to buy and sell.
So it is the declared will and not the secret inten-
tions of the parties that the law will examine. If A
offers to buy B's horse for $500 and B accepts, A may
have no intention of paying the money, but there is a
valid contract. B takes his chance of being paid if
he has not received cash or security. And A cannot
be encouraged and assisted in getting out of his con-
tract when he declares that he did not mean what he
said.
The agreement of the parties is reached by means
27
28 COMMERCIAL LAW
of an offer and an acceptance. Neither need be in
express or formal terms. Some promise or act or
some course of conduct may be quite enough. If A
advertises that he will pay a reward of $5 for the
return of his lost watch, he makes an offer of a prom-
ise for an act, and the finder upon presenting the
watch and claiming the reward accepts the offer and
is entitled to the reward. So a cabman at his stand
must be ready to convey people about town. He of-
fers an act for a promise to pay the amount which, by
tariff, he can charge.
If a piano firm offers a man a piano for $300, and
the latter says he will give $250, there is no contract,
because the minds of the two have not met. But if the
piano firm at once says it will accept the $250, there
is a contract. The acceptance of the offer clinches the
bargain. Hence the acceptance and the offer must
agree — the one must conform to the other. If the ac-
ceptance adds terms or conditions not contemplated
in the offer, the so-called acceptance is rather a rejec-
tion of the offer. If A offered to buy a house from
B on certain terms, possession to be had on July 25,
B agreed to the terms, but fixed the date of posses-
sion as August 1, it would be held there was no
acceptance. If A writes to B that he will pay him
$5,000 for his house, but B must accept by return
mail, and B after waiting a week writes accepting, A
is not bound to buy.
There is this to be said also that the offer must have
in view the immediate formation of a contract by an
THE CONTRACT ITSELF 29
acceptance. For instance, a call for tenders for the
building of a bridge or a warehouse is merely an invita-
tion to builders or contractors to send in proposals
which the person who intends to build may consider.
Such an invitation is an offer to treat rather than a
simple offer which may be at once accepted. The
person offering to treat is not bound to accept the
lowest or any tender. A rather interesting and diffi-
cult case was decided in England in 1893.^ One
Harvey telegraphed to the defendant, Facey, "Will
you sell us Bumper Hall? Telegraph lowest price."
Facey telegraphed : "Lowest price £900." Harvey
replied: "We agree to buy Bimiper Hall for £900."
Facey did not answer this telegram, and refused to
sell. He was sued, and it was held that tho Facey
had quoted a price, he had not said he would sell.
There was really no contract, because Harv^ey's "We
agree to buy Bumper Hall for £900" was really the
offer, and Facey did not acknowledge it.
2. Offer and acceptance by mail or telegraph. — An
offer sent by mail or telegraph is not complete until
it reaches the offeree.. According to the English law
it may be revoked at any time before it is accepted.
Thus if A writes B offering to sell his house, A can
withdraw his offer by telegram or by another letter
which will arrive before the first. If when the revoca-
tion arrives the offeree has not made up his mind, the
offer stands revoked. But if the revocation is merely
on the vf2LY to the offeree, his acceptance of the offer
1 Harvey vs. Facey, 1893, A. C. 552.
30 COMMERCIAL LAW
is none the less good. Until the revocation comes to
the mind of the offeree, he is entitled to accept the
offer and to treat it as expressing the mind of the
offerer. While the French commentators do not as
a rule accept this view, the French courts will allow
damages where the revocation of an offer causes loss.
In Quebec the English rule would probably be fol-
lowed, the balance of convenience in all commercial
transactions, apart from the strict theory of the law,
being distinctly in favor of its application.
Where, however, an offer has been accepted and
the acceptance posted, the acceptance cannot be re-
voked. The acceptance might have gone by mail and
the revocation by telegraph. The telegram may have
arrived first, and the offerer known of the revocation
before he knew of the acceptance, and he may thus
have suffered no prejudice. He can hold the offeree
to his original acceptance. Pollock, commenting on
this rule, says:
This is a startling consequence at first sight, but the hard-
ship is less than it seems, for a party wishing to reserve his
freedom of action as long as possible will still have two ways
of doing so : he may make his acceptance in writing expressly
subject to revocation by telegraph, or he may abstain from
answering by letter at all, and only telegraph his final deci-
sion.
While the revocation of an offer must be made be-
fore it has been accepted and must be received before
the acceptance is posted or telegraphed, apparently
the offer is revoked by the death or insanity of either
party.
THE CONTRACT ITSELF 31
3. Offer to the public. — An offer may be made to
the public in general. That is, it need not be made to
an ascertained person. But it will be binding where
it is accepted by an ascertained person. Thus a shop-
keeper who exposes a certain silk in his window with
a price affixed, will be bound to sell the silk at that
price to anyone who on the strength of what he has
seen in the window wishes to buy. The hotel keeper
and the common carrier make a continuing offer to
the public, and unless they have exceptional reasons
for refusing to receive a certain person, they are bound
to receive all comers, at least up to their capacity.
If a reward is offered thru the newspapers for the
capture of a fugitive or the finding of lost property,
the reward will be due to the person who with knowl-
edge of the offer captures the fugitive or finds the
property. A person who had no knowledge of such
an offer could not claim the reward if before know-
ing of it he gave the desired information. But if,
without knowledge of the offer of a reward at the time
a person finds lost property, before handing it over
he learns of the offer, then he can claim the reward.
Pollock refers to an interesting English case de-
cided in 1893. A company called the Carbolic Smoke
Ball Company advertised an offer to pay £100 to any-
one who contracted influenza after using its smoke
balls according to directions. The plaintiff, one Car-
lill, read the advertisement and so induced bought a
smoke ball and used it according to directions. Un-
fortunately for him, or rather for the company, he
32 COMMERCIAL LAW
contracted influenza after using the remedy, and it
was held in his favor that there was a vahd contract
arising out of an offer and an acceptance.
An offer by public advertisement may, it appears,
be revoked by an advertisement equally public. The
Supreme Court of the United States has so held,^ and
even as against a person who afterwards acts on the
proposal not knowing that it has been revoked, "for
he should have known that it could be revoked in the
manner in which it was made." Sir Frederick Pol-
lock says of this decision:
In other words, the proposal is treated as subject to a
tacit condition that it may be revoked by an announcement
made by the same means. This may be a convenient rule,
and may perhaps be supported as a fair inference of fact
from the habits of the newspaper-reading part of mankind :
yet it seems a rather strong piece of judicial legislation. -
4. Consideration. — In the English law provinces,
as in England and in the United States, a contract is
valid only if it is based upon a valuable consideration.
It may be valid, however, in those jurisdictions where
sealing is necessary, if made by a deed or writing un-
der seal, when the contract is said to be valid without
consideration.
What may be consideration is well defined in an
English case; ^ "either some Vight, interest, profit, or
benefit accruing to the one party, or some forbearance,
detriment, loss, or responsibility, given, suffered, or
1 Shuey vs. United States (1875), 92 U. S. 73.
2 Pollock, p. 23.
"Currie vs. Misa (1875), I.. R. 10, Ex. at p. 162.
THE CONTRACT ITSELF m
undertaken by the other." The party who accepts
the consideration may or may not get any apparent
benefit. It is sufficient if he accepts it. By some act
or forbearance, or the promise thereof, A buys the
promise of B, and B's promise is thereby made en-
forceable. A mere moral obligation will not support
a promise, and cannot be enforced. In this view of
the law, therefore, a promise to contribute money to
charity is not a contract at all, at least under the Eng-
lish law.^
The civil law of Quebec distinguishes "cause or con-
sideration" from "consideration" as we have just been
viewing it. In Quebec it is said that if the contract
has an object, it may be enforced, tlio the promise
was given without consideration. By object is meant
'wliat is due." Thus if A lends a book to B, the
object of the loan is the book — what is due; the cause
of the boiTOwer's obligation — i.e., why there is a debt
on his part — is his receipt of the book. The cause is
the immediate end of the parties — that which impels
every buyer, every seller, eveiy lender and giver.
This "immediate end" in the case of the seller is the
price; in the case of the buyer it is the legal obliga-
tion of the seller to give him delivery and warranty;
in the case of the giver (and here the theory is
strained) it is the desire of the giver to give. The
word "consideration" is used rather as an equivalent
for "cause."
In actual practice, however, "consideration" is used
1 Pollock, p. 176.
XXIV — *
34 COMMERCIAL LAW
almost exclusively. It is impossible to pursue the
theoretical difference any further in this book; to do
so would perplex the layman. But a word further
may be said to show that there is a real distinc-
tion.
We said above that a promise to contribute money
to a charity — a pure gratuity — is not a contract in
English jaw, because there is no consideration. The
giver gets no quid pro quo. In the theory of the
French and Roman law, there is a contract because
there is a cause — the desire of the giver to give or his
satisfaction or pleasure in giving. There is an ob-
ject— that is, something due — the money he has prom-
ised.
5. What may he a sufficient consideration, — It may
be stated as a general principle that the adequacy of
the consideration will not be inquired into. "The
value of all things contracted for is measured by the
appetite of the contractors, and therefore the just
value is that which they be contented to give." ^
The consideration may consist in "some right, in-
terest, profit, or benefit accruing to one party, or some
forbearance, detriment, loss, or other responsibilty
given, suffered, or undertaken by the other." The
Supreme Court of the United States has held that the
release of a supposed right of dower (a wife's interest
in her husband's real estate), which the parties
thought necessarj^ to confirm a title, is a good consid-
eration for a promissory note. Forbearance to prose-
1 Hobbes, Leviathan, pt. 1, c. 15. Cited by Pollock, p. 184.
THE CONTRACT ITSELF 35
cute a meritorious claim made in good faith may also
be sufficient.
But if a person is legally bound to do a certain
thing, a promise to do it is not a sufficient considera-
tion. Thus part paJ^nent of a hquidated claim which
is due is no consideration for a promise to forego the
balance. But if A out of charitj' does some kindly
act for B, and the circumstances are such that B could
have had no intention of papng for what is done, a
promise on his part to pay will not be implied. But
a promise will not be binding if based upon a consid-
eration which fails or which is non-existent. The
rule may be diflPerent where, for instance, a piece of
property is bought, and both vendor and purchaser
understand that the title is doubtful, and it proves
to be faulty.
If the consideration is illegal, it will not support an
action. If the parties contract about somethmg
which they believe exists, but which really does not,
there is no contract. Thus if A in ^lontreal sells a
horse which is in Toronto, but unknown to him the
horse is dead, there is no contract. Similarly if A
insures B's life in which at tlie time he has an insurable
interest, but unkno^\•n to him B is dead, the policy is
void. But A who has a ship at sea may insure it
"lost or not lost," provided he does not actually know
it is lost at the time ; and the insurer will be bound tho
the ship may have been lost when the contract was
made. A could make a contract to buy an auto-
mobile to be made a vear hence: or he could sell a
36 COMMERCIAL LAW
crop of hay which he expects next season. If A
promises B $10 provided he will not drink or smoke
for a month, there is a sufficient consideration.
6. The Statute of Frauds.— The English Statute of
Frauds was enacted in 1676. In the United States
and Canada, provisions similar to those of the Eng-
lish Statute of Frauds are in force. Their purpose
is to prevent frauds and perjury in the proving of
contracts. The general rule is that a contract must
be proved by a writing. But there are exceptions to
the rule:
(a) A contract may be proved orally if the writ-
ten contract is lost by unforeseen accident, or is in the
possession of the adverse party or of a third person
and cannot be produced.
(b) A commencement of proof — i.e., a writing
which, tho it does not set out the contract, makes
its existence probable — may be sufficient. This is the
*'note or memorandum" of the English statute.
(c) A writing is not necessary if the amount in
question does not exceed fifty dollars.
(d) If the adverse party admits the contract under
oath, no writing is necessary.
There is a further exception, that any facts con-
cerning a commercial matter may be proved orally.
But if the amount in question is over fifty dollars, a
writing will be necessary, in Quebec, even in com-
mercial matters:
(a) Upon any promise or acknowledgment
wliereby a debt is taken out of the operation of the
THE CONTRACT ITSELF 3T
law respecting the limitations of actions. Thus, by
the law of Quebec, for example, a promissory note is
prescribed or outlawed in five years. If a plaintiff
is to succeed in an action upon a note made more than
five years before the action is taken, then he must
allege and prove by a writing signed by the defend-
ant that the latter has acknowledged his indebtedness
and promised to pay it. If an amount had been paid
on account and the amount was written on the back
of the note and initialed by the debtor, that would be
sufficient proof that he regarded the note as still un-
paid and payable.
(b) A promise to answer for the debt, default or
miscarriage of another person must be in writing.
(c) A minor after attaining his majority may
ratify a contract made during his minority. His rati-
fication cannot be proved unless it is in writing.
(d) In the case of a contract for the sale of goods
exceeding $50 in value, the contract cannot be proved
unless the buyer has accepted or received part of the
goods or has given something in earnest to bind the
bargain.
The two sections of the English statute relating
particularly to contracts may be briefly summarized.
Section 4 states that the following promises or con-
tracts to be enforceable must be in writing and be
signed by the debtor:
(a) Any promise of an executor or administrator
to pay out of his own estate any debt due from the
estate he is administering.
38 COMMERCIAL LAW
(b) Any promise to answer for the debt, default
or miscarriage of another person.
(c) Any promise to perform some act, such as to
transfer property or pay money, in consideration of
marriage.
(d) Any contract for the sale of lands, tenements
or hereditaments, or any interest in or concerning
them. ^
(e) Any contract which by its terms is not to be
performed within the space of one year from the
making thereof. For example, a lease for more than
one year must be in writing.
The seventeenth section provides that:
No contract for the sale of any goods, wares, or merchan-
dise for the price of ten pounds sterling, or upwards, shall
be allowed to be good, except (1) the buyer shall accept
part of the goods so sold and actually receive the same; (2)
or give something in earnest to bind the bargain; (3) or
that some note or memorandum in writing of the said bar-
gain be made and signed by the parties to be charged by
such contract, or their agents thereunto lawfully author-
ized.
REVIEW
AVhat are the vital features of offer and acceptance?
When is an offer sent by mail or telegraph complete? AVhen
may it be revoked? May a posted acceptance be revoked?
Must the party to whom the offer is made be ascertained? If
an offer is made to the public, when does a contract arise ? Must
the party performing the service have knowledge of the offer?
How may an offer by public advertisement be revoked?
Define consideration. Of what importance is it? Is a moral
obligation enforceable? What is the law concerning considera-
tion in Quebec?
Is the value of a consideration important? If a person is
THE CONTRACT ITSELF 39
»
legally bound to do a certain thing, is a promise a sufficient con-
sideration? May an action be supported by an illegal consid-
eration ?
What is the Statute of Frauds and what are its important pro-
visions ?
CHAPTER V
FORMATION OF CONTRACTS: VOID AND VOIDABLE
CONTRACTS
1. Legality of object. — The law may prohibit the
doing of certain things, or certain acts may be con-
trary to public policy. If an agreement has an object
wliich is thus contrary to law or public policy, an en-
forceable contract cannot result. The contract can-
not be enforced, damages would not be allowed for
non-performance, and what has been paid under the
contract may be recovered. Hence if the perform-
ance of a given contract would consist in doing such
forbidden act, or an act contrary to public policy, the
law will not exact performance, nor will the parties
be entitled to ask the aid of the law. Such contracts
are void, in that they are illegal. If the contract then
involves some violation of rules of decency, morals or
good manners, the law will take notice of the mischiev-
ous nature of such an agreement, to the extent of re-
fusing to recognize that any legal right can arise out
of it. As was said in a leading case :
A thing may be unlawful in the sense that the law will not
aid it, and yet that the law will not immediately punish it.^
Such agreements are void as being immoral. Then
1 Cowan vs. MUbourn, 1867, L. R. 2, Ex. p. 236.
40
VOID AND VOIDABLE CONTRACTS 41
there are agreements which are void as being against
public policy: for example, agreements concerning
matters touching the good government of the com-
monwealth and the administration of justice, or
concerning matters affecting particular legal duties of
individuals whose performance is of public impor-
tance, or concerning things which are law^ful in them-
selves, but which are such that individual citizens
cannot, without general inconvenience, be allowed to
set bounds to their freedom of action in connection
with them as freely as they may with regard to other
things.^
An agreement is also void which provides for some
act involving the commission of a civil wrong:
for example, an agreement of a debtor to defraud his
creditor, or an agi*eement to carry out some fraudu-
lent scheme and divide the profits. A debtor in diffi-
culties who makes a compromise with his creditors, at,
say, fifty cents on the dollar, cannot secretly agree
with one creditor that the latter shall get some prefer-
ence over other creditors ; such an agreement could be
upset. This was well laid down in an English case,
as follows:
Each creditor consents to lose part of his debt in consid-
eration that the others do the same, and each creditor may
be considered to stipulate with the others for a release from
them to the debtor, in consideraion of the release by him.
Where any creditor, in fraud of the agreement to accept
the composition, stipulates for a preference to himself, his
stipulation is altogether void; not only can he take no ad-
1 Pollock, p. 288.
42 COMMERCIAL LAW
vantage from it, but he is to lose the benefit of the composi-
tion.^
It is a general rule of public policy that persons
who are of full age and in the possession of their
faculties should be allowed to contract freely. A
person may make a foolish bargain, but the courts will
not, as a matter of public policy, declare such con-
tracts Void, tho of course if the party to the con-
tract comes within one of the classes we have above
considered, for example, minors or insane persons,
the court will then interfere. When a contract
is set aside as being contrary to public policy, what
is meant is that the contract belongs to some
class of contract which has long been recognized by
the law as unlawful. Lord Halsbury said in a recent
case:
I do not think that the phrase "public policy" is one
which in a court of law explains itself. It does not leave at
large to each tribunal to find that a particular contract is
against public policy. I deny that any court can invent a
new head of public policy. A contract of marriage broker-
age, the creation of a perpetuity, a contract in restraint of
trade, a gaming or wagering contract, or the assisting of
the King's enemies, are all undoubtedly unlawful things ; but
it is because these things have been either acknowledged or
assumed to be by the common law unlawful, and in case a
judge or a court have a right to declare that such things are,
in his or their view, contrary to public policy.
2. Wagering contracts. — Wagering contracts, tho
they were at one time enforceable under the common
iMuUalieu vs. Hodgson, 16 Q. B. D. 689.
VOID AND VOIDABLE CONTRACTS 43
law, are now by statute illegal. A wagering contract
is one by which one party agrees to pay another
money or property upon the happening of some un-
certain event. There is no right of action for the re-
covery of a bet claimed under a gaming contract, and
if the losing party has paid over the money he cannot
get it back, unless he proves that there has been fraud.
The law thus endeavors to discharge gambling.
Buying stock on margin has been held not to be a
gambling contract, tho betting in a bucketshop is. In
a bucketshop transaction the broker does not buy the
stock; he merely makes a bet for his client that the
stock will rise or fall, and it is a gaming contract.
But a broker who buys and sells shares for a client,
altho on margin, actually buys the stock. The con-
tract is not a gaming contract, altho the broker may
know that his client is not investing, but is merely
speculating, and that the client has really insufficient
means and should be saving rather than risking his
money.
A contract of insurance, altho it is in the nature of
a wagering contract, is enforceable; so also are con-
tracts for the sale and delivery of commodities at
different prices. The actual intention of the parties
will decide whether or not the contract is a gaming
contract and, therefore, illegal. Thus if goods are
bought subject to deliverj^ at a future date at a fixed
price, but it is agreed that the goods shall not be de-
livered or the price paid, with the understanding that
when the time for purchase arrives, the intention is
44 COMMERCIAL LAW
merely to make a settlement by one party paying the
difference between the market price and the contract
price, such a contract is a gaming contract and illegal.
A note given in payment of such a settlement would
be void.
3. Usurious contracts. — By statute the legal rate of
interest in Canada is fixed at five per cent, where the
agreement does not fix the rate. The maximum rate
is also fixed by statute, and any excess over this max-
imum is usury. The Bank Act provides that a bank
may stipulate for any rate of interest or discount not
exceeding seven per cent per annum, and may re-
ceive and take any advance in such rate, but no higher
rate of interest shall be recoverable by a bank. By
the Money Lenders Act, any lender who shall stipu-
late for, allow or exact on anj'^ negotiable instrument,
contract or agreement concerning a loan of less than
five hundred dollars, a rate of interest greater than
12 per cent per annum, is liable to one year's im-
prisonment, or a penalty of one thousand dollars. If
a judgment has intervened, the rate is reduced to five
per cent. A bona fide holder, before the maturity of a
negotiable instrument discounted by a preceding
holder at more than 12 per cent, may recover the
amount thereof, but the party paying may reclaim the
excess from the money lender.
4. Contracts in restraint of trade. — The general
principle is that contracts which unreasonably restrain
trade are void. It is contrarj' to public policy for a
man to contract not to engage in business at all.
VOID AND VOIDABLE CONTRACTS 45
There may be circumstances, however, which make it
reasonable that a man should undertake not to en-
gage in a particular business for a certain length of
time. Thus if a man sells a business and he under-
takes not to carry on any business which will compete
with that which he has sold, he may obtain a better
])rice, and such a contract, if not otherwise unreason-
able, wiU be maintained. Even then, however, the
restraint must not be wider than is reasonably neces-
sary. A restraint of this kind may be more reason-
able now, with our modern means of transportation,
than would have been the case fifty years ago. Such
a restraint is not necessarily unreasonable because it
is unlimited as to space. Thus in a leading case in
England,^ Mr. Xordenfelt, who was a manufacturer
of guns and explosives, and who supphed them to the
various governments of Europe, sold his business to
^laxim Xordenfelt & Company, Limited, and under-
took not to compete with the business for twenty-five
years. There was no restriction as to space. The
sale was made in England, and later 'Mr. Xordenfelt
began business again in Belgium. The House of
Lords held that the restraint in this case was not un-
reasonable, and that he was bound by his contract.
So also in another case recently decided by the
House of Lords, where a man was employed to sell
clothing on the instalment plan, and he entered into
a contract for three years, and bound himself that
upon lea\Tng his present employ he would not work
1 Xordenfelt vs. Maxim Xordenfelt & Co., 1891, A. C. 535.
46 COMMERCIAL LAW
for any competing firm or in the clothing trade for a
year at any place within twenty-five miles of the em-
ployer's place of business, or within twenty-five miles
of any place where it might do business, the contract
was held unreasonable and void. Under the contract,
it was pointed out, the employer might have dismissed
the man at any time, and if the contract were good
the en^ployee would find himself unable to earn a
livelihood by perhaps the only business he knew.
In Quebec, an injunction has been refused to re-
strain a bread driver from employing himself with a
competing fii-m, altho he had bound himself to his
employer for a certain period, and had agreed that
he would not engage in the bread business or in the
soliciting of orders for bread for a certain period
in the City of JNIontreal. It was held that his services
were not of such a unique and unusual character tliat
he could not be replaced, and that any loss that might
be caused by his leaving could be reasonably and
adequately compensated for in damages. Appar-
ently, however, it is not a restraint of trade for a
dealer in liquors to bind himself to sell only the liquors
of a certain firm.^ The general rule, as laid do^vn in
the Nordenfelt case, is that the restraint must not be
greater than is reasonably necessary for the protection
of the parties, and so as to be contrary to public
policy.
5. Unlawful combinations. — Combinations in re-
straint of trade are unlawful and criminal. Thus
1 Gervais vs. Paquette, 1907, 37 Que. S. C. 501.
VOID AND VOIDABLE CONTRACTS 47
combinations between dealers in staple commodities
to control and increase the price by decreasing the
production or competition are illegal and void. The
law may be stated as follows: Everyone is guilty of
an indictable offence and liable to a penalty not ex-
ceeding $4,000 and not less than $200, or to two years'
imprisonment, or if a corporation, to a penalty not
exceeding $10,000, who conspires, combines, agrees or
arranges with any other person or with any railway,
steamship, steamboat or transportation company; (a)
to unduly limit the facilities for transporting, pro-
ducing, manufacturing, supplying, storing or dealing
in any article or commodity which may be a subject
of trade or commerce; (b) to restrain or injure
trade or commerce in relation to any such article or
commodity; (c) to unduly prevent, limit or lessen
the manufacture or production of any such article or
commodity, or to unreasonably enhance the price
thereof; (d) to unduly prevent or lessen competi-
tion in the production, manufacture, purchase, barter,
sale, transportation or supply of any such article or
commodity, or in- the price of insurance upon person
or property. This rule, however, is not construed
to apply to combinations of workmen or employes for
their own reasonable protection as such workmen or
employes. As a combination in restraint of trade is
illegal, the Supreme Court of the United States has
held that parties to it have no standing in court, and
the court will not assist in enforcing such contracts.
In the United States, however, it has been held illegal
48 COMMERCIAL LAW
for workmen to combine to enhance the price of their
labor. For example, it was said in an Illinois case : ^
All of the members of the association are engaged in the
same business within the same territory, and the object of
the association is purely and simply to silence and stifle all
competition as between its members. No equitable reason
for such restraint exists, the only reason put forward being
that, under the influence of competition as it existed prior
to the oi'ganization of the association, prices for stenograph-
ical work had been reduced too far, and the association was
organized for the purpose of putting an end to all competi-
tion, at least as between those who could be induced to be-
come members. True, the restraint is not so far-reaching
as it would have been if all the stenographers in the city had
joined the association, but so far as it goes it is precisely
of the same character, produces the same results and is sub-
ject to the same legal objection.
Greenhood, on Public Policy, points out, how-
ever, that where the means contemplated and the ob-
jects sought are not unlawful, combinations of
workmen to control the price of their labor or skill are
not necessary illegal. He says:
Combinations of artisans for their common benefit, as for
the development of skill in their trade, or to prevent over-
crowding therein, or to encourage those belonging to their
trade to enter their fold, or for the purpose of raising the
prices of labor, are valid, provided no force or other unlaw-
ful means be employed to carry out their needs, or their
object be not to impoverish third persons, or to extort
money from employers, or to encourage strikes or breaches
of contract, or to restrict the freedom of members for the
purpose of compelling employers to conform to their rules. ^
1 Moore vs. Bennett, 149 111.
2 Greenhood, Public Policy', Rule 546.
VOID AND VOIDABLE CONTRACTS 49
In an American case, where a wallpaper company
sued to recover the price of wallpapers which it had
supplied, the defendant pleaded that the company was
a combination in restraint of trade, ^ It was clear
from the evidence that the company had a monopoly,
and that it was really an illegal combination of fac-
tories in the wallpaper trade. The Supreme Court
pointed out that to give judgment in favor of the
company would be to legalize and make effective the
illegal agreement constituting the monopoly, and the
court said:
Such a judgment cannot be granted without departing
from the salutary rule long established in the jurisprudence
of both this country and England, that a court will not lend
its aid in any way to enforce or to realize the fruits of an
agreement which appears to be tainted with illegality, al-
tho the result of applying that rule may sometimes be
to shield a defendant who had got something for which, as
between man and man, he ought perhaps to pay, but for
which he is unwilling to pay. In such cases the aid of the
court is denied, not for the benefit of the defendant, but be-
cause it should be denied without regard to the interests of
individual parties.
A case was recently decided by the Supreme Court
of Canada, on an appeal from ^lanitoba. Two junk
dealers, who had practically a monopoly of this trade
in ^Manitoba and elsewhere in the West, agreed to fix
the price which they would pay for junk of various
kinds. The agreement rendered their business more
profitable than ever, and under it they were to divide
1 Continental Wallpaper Co. vs. Voight Decided Feb. 5, 1909.
XXIV— 5
50 COMMERCIAL LAW
the profits. One sued the other to account for profits,
but it was held that no action would lie, because the
agreement was really an illegal combination under the
statute.^
6. Contracts made on Sunday, — The common law
rule is that contracts made on Sunday are valid.
In England, the United States and certain of the
Canadian provinces, however, contracts are generally
illegal if made on Sunday. The Bills of Exchange
Act, for instance, provides that a bill is not invalid by
reason only that it bears date of a Sunday, or other
non- juridical day; but apparently if the bill were
given in pursuance of a contract which under the
statute may be illegal if made on a Sunday, it would
be void as between the immediate parties, and as to
any person who takes it with notice ; but the mere fact
that it is dated on a Sunday would not be such a
notice.
Under a Dominion statute ^ it was made unlawful
for any person to carry on or to transact any business
of his ordinary calling, except works of necessity or
mercy, on the Lord's day, but this act goes on to pro-
vide that it shall not affect any existing provincial law
on the subject. The act apparently would not apply
in a particular province where, under the provincial
law, druggists, tobacconists and fruit dealers kept
open on Sunday. What may be a work of necessity
or charity is a question of fact in each case, but any-
1 Weidman vs. Shragge, 1912, 46 S. C. R., p. 1.
2 6 Ed. 7, Chap. 27 (now R. S. C, Chap. 153).
VOID AND VOIDABLE CONTRACTS 51
thing done to save life or preserve health or property,
which must be done on a Sunday or not at all, would
probably be considered a work of necessity. So also
any act, the object of which is to relieve distress or
suffering, or which relates to religious worship, would
be an act of charity.
It has been held in American cases that notes, deeds
and mortgages which are signed on a Sunday, but
which are not delivered on that day, are valid ; but that
on the contrary, if signed on a secular day and de-
livered on a Sundav, thev are void, savins the rights
of a bona fide holder for value of a negotiable in-
strument.
7. Contracts in restraint of marriage. — Contracts
in restraint of marriage are generally held to be
against public policy, and are therefore void. A con-
tract not to marry a certain person, or not to marry
anyone before attaining the age of twenty-one, or
perhaps twenty-five, may be valid, in that it does not
restrain marriage in general; but a contract not to
marry anyone but a particular person would be void.
A widow or widower may contract not to marry a sec-
ond time, but a person may not contract to remain un-
married. A contract not to marry without the consent
of parents, or during minority, would be valid, be-
cause the restraint is not unreasonable. A contract
not to marry a Hebrew or a Roman Catholic would
be valid. A contract not to marry until one has at-
tained the age of forty would be invalid, because it
discourages matrimony. A bet by one person that he
52 COMMERCIAL LAW
will not marry within a certain time is a wager, akd
void.
Agreements to procure or negotiate marriage for
reward, known as marriage brokerage contracts, are
held to be contrary to public policy, and therefore
void. Pollock remarks ^ that all such agi'eements are
void, whether for procurement of marriage with a
specified person, or of marriage generally, and serv-
ices rendered without request in procuring or forward-
ing a marriage (at all events a clandestine or improper
one) are not merely of no consideration, but an illegal
consideration for a subsequent promise of reward.
It was said in an English case:^ "Both ladies and
gentlemen are frequently induced to promise not to
marry any other persons but the objects of their pres-
ent passion; and if the law should not rescind such
engagements, they would become prisoners for life, at
the will of the most inexorable jailers — disappointed
lovers."
8. Contracts in fraud of third persons. — A contract
is void if it tends to induce some third person to
commit a breach of trust, or if it tends to defraud a
third person. Contracts are opposed to public policy
if they are opposed to open, upright and fair dealing,
and contracts are void which place a person under an
inducement to violate a confidence reposed in him, or
which place him under a wrong influence, or under a
temptation which injures the rights of third persons.
1 Pollock, p. 366. ^ 2 Wilm, 371.
VOID AND VOIDABLE CONTRACTS 53
Thus an agreement to divide the profits of a fraudu-
lent scheme, or even to carry out some lawful object
by means of an apparent trespass, breach of contract
or breach of trust, is void. Thus, if A and B are in-
terested in conmion with other persons in a transaction
which requires the good faith of all persons interested,
and A and B make a secret agreement which is in-
tended to benefit them at the expense of the others,
the agreement is void. Or if B, upon application of
A, agrees to advance money to enable him (A) to buy
certain goods of C ; B goes to C and pays him the
money agreed upon, in order that A may get the
goods ; A and C agree that A shall pay a further simi :
this agreement between A and C is void, as it is a
fraud upon B, who intended to relieve A from paying
any part of the price.
9. Contracts against liahility for negligence, — It is
difficult to express a rule of universal acceptance in
Canada upon this subject. According to French law,
it is very doubtful whether a man may stipulate for
freedom from the consequences of his ordinary negli-
gence. Against his wilful negligence, which is assimi-
lated to fraud, it is said that he cannot stipulate. A
person may stipulate, of course, that he will not be
liable for loss under circumstances. Thus if a re-
pairer of antiques is asked to repair some very fragile
article, he may stipulate that he will not be responsible
if the article goes to pieces in the course of repair.
The effect of the various Workmen's Compensation
64. COMMERCIAL LAW
Acts, whatever may have been the law before, is to
prevent employers stipulating against liability as
toward workmen.
At English common law, it is said that in the ab-
sence of statute to the contrary, a carrier may stipu-
late for total exemption from liability for negligence.
In the English law provinces, this rule has in several
instances been altered by statute. In Quebec, under
the authority of a decision of the Supreme Court, a
carrier may stipulate by express contract that he shall
not be liable for the negligence of his employees or
servants.
The rule laid down by the Dominion Railway Act
is, however, that a railway, that is, a Dominion rail-
way, cannot contract itself out of liability for its negli-
gence or that of its servants by any notice, condition
or declaration. A company may, however, with the
approval of the Railway Board, stipulate that its
liability be limited to a fixed sum, even in case of
negligence. It may also stipulate that unless notice
of claim is given to it within a certain delay, it shall
not be liable. Ordinarily, carriers are liable as in-
surers of goods carried. In other words, a carrier is
bound to deliver in good condition articles received
and carried by it, tho there be no negligence on
its part. It is evident that the carrier may contract
against this liability.
10. Effect of illegality. — Whether an illegal stipu-
lation in a contract will void the contract as a whole
or only in part will depend upon the circumstances.
VOID AND VOIDABLE CONTRACTS 55
It is not sufficient to assert merely that an unlawful
agreement cannot be enforced. Where there is a law-
ful promise made for a lawful consideration, the con-
tract is not necessarily void because there is an un-
lawful promise made at the same time for the same
consideration.
It is well established that if in a deed, for instance,
there are certain covenants or conditions which are
good and lawful, and others which are contrary to
law, the latter will be struck out and the former will
stand good. That is, where there are distinct en-
gagements in a contract by which a party binds him-
self to do certain acts, some of which are legal and
some illegal, at common law the performance of those
which are legal may be enforced, tho the performance
of those which are illegal cannot.^
It has also been laid down that where a transaction
which is partly valid and partly invalid is dehberately
separated by the parties into two agreements, one ex-
pressing the valid and the other the invalid part, the
party who is called upon to perform his part of the
agreement, which is on the face of it valid, will not
be allowed to urge that the transaction as a whole is
unlawful and void. If the illegal cannot be sep-
arated from the legal part of the covenant, the con-
tract is entirely void, but if they can be severed, the
bad part may be rejected and the good part retained.
Thus Kent lays do\^Ti that "if the part which is
good depends upon that which is bad, the whole is
1 Bank of Australasia vs. Breillat, 1847, 6 Moo., P. C. 152.
56 COMMERCIAL LAW
void ; and so I take the rule to be, if any part of the
consideration be malum in se, or the good and the
void consideration be so mixed, or the contract so en-
tire, that there can be no apportionment, the contract
is void."
Where any part of a single consideration for a
promise or set of promises is unlawful, and the con-
sideration cannot be severed so as to assign a lawful
consideration to any of the promises, the contract as
a whole is void. The immediate object or considera-
tion may not be unlawful, but the intention of one
or both parties in making the contract may be unlaw-
ful, in which case there are two possibilities : if the un-
lawful intention when the contract is made is shared
by both parties, or is entertained by one to the knowl-
edge of the other, then the contract is void; if one of
the parties, unknown to the other, has an unlawful
intention when the contract is made, it may be voided
by the innocent party, if he discovers the intention be-
fore the contract is executed.
Thus if the lessee of a house, which he knows is used
by the tenants for immoral purposes, assigns the lease,
and he knows that the person to whom he assigns it in-
tends to continue the same use, he will not be allowed
to recover on a contract made by the person to whom
he assigns the lease to indemnify him against the cove-
nants of the original lease.
A person who owns a property and who has
undertaken to sell or lease it, but who finds that the
purchaser or lessee intends to use it for unlawful
VOID AND VOIDABLE CONTRACTS 57
purposes, is entitled and may even be bound to rescind
the contract. It has been laid down that he need not
even give his reasons for doing so, as he may justify
his refusal later. But where a contract has been com-
pletely executed, as for example by the transfer of
property, the consideration may be paid or the trans-
fer may have been made for some unlawful purpose
of which both parties were aware, but once executed it
cannot be set aside. Thus in an English case, where
two promissory notes were secretly given to a creditor
by a debtor who was making a compromise with his
creditors, the notes being in excess of the amount of
the creditor's rightful composition share, judgment
was given on one of the notes; a third person inter-
vened and gave the creditor a guarantee for the
amount involved, upon the creditor's staying proceed-
ings. An action on this guarantee was dismissed.
If a school teacher who has not the proper license
undertakes to teach and does teach in a school for a
number of months at a good salary, he will not be
entitled to recover for his services. A doctor who
practises without the necessary license or qualification
would be in the same position. The sale of tobacco
may be prohibited by statute on a Sunday; a tobac-
conist who sold tobacco on a Sunday on credit would
not be entitled to collect.
A director of a railway company cannot have a
private interest in a contract with the company.
Thus if a director of a railway company which is put-
ting up a building makes a secret partnership with the
58 COMMERCIAL LAW
contractor who is doing the work, his contract is il-
legal, and he could not sue his partner for a division
of profits.
It is illegal to pay money or undertake to pay
money to avoid or prevent the prosecution of a crim-
inal. Thus the Court of Appeals of the Province of
Quebec has held that where a bank clerk embezzled
money and his father gave the bank a note to cover the
amount stolen, on the condition that the bank would
drop the prosecution, and the bank accepted the note
and went no further with the case, the note could not
be collected.
A contract by which a IMember of Parliament ac-
cepted money in return for his promise to vote as he
might be directed by another person would be illegal.
Contracts between a lawyer and his client which
stipulate that the lawyer, if the action is successful,
will accept for his services a share of the money
recovered, are illegal. Such contracts are deemed
illegal because the lawyer, tho entitled to a reasonable
fee, is able to judge of the outcome of the case, and
hence the client is at a disadvantage.
If a person sells a grocery business and contracts
that he will not, during a period of five years, engage
in the grocery business in the same town, such an
agreement is reasonable, is not in restraint of trade,
and is, therefore, valid; but if the seller agreed
that he would not engage in the grocery business for
the same period in any place in Canada, the contract
would be unreasonable and void.
VOID AND VOIDABLE CONTRACTS 59
A loan to a person to enable him to run a bucket-
shop, it being agreed that the lender is to receive a
share of the profits, would be illegal.
In certain jurisdictions, steamboat excursions may-
be prohibited on a Sunday. The captain or engineer
or other person who assisted in running the excursion
would be unable to collect his wages.
11. Reality of consent. — As we have seen, the con-
sent of the parties to a contract must be expressed in
some way. The minds of the parties must meet, but
there must be something which indicates the fact. In
other words, the consent must be real. The consent
may, therefore, be unlawful or defective owing to mis-
take, misrepresentation, fraud, undue influence or
duress.
Where a party to a contract can show that he gave
his consent without understanding the nature of the
contract, or the thing about which he was contracting,
or something which was the principal consideration
for making the contract, he may have it set aside. He
may be able to prove fraud or misrepresentation by
the other party, or show that by some form of violence
he was coerced into making the contract. In a sense
the contract is good, but a person who has been led
into it by error or fraud may have it declared void
if he takes steps to do so before his right is pre-
scribed.
If a person, who has made a contract under any of
the above circumstances, ratifies the contract or ac-
quiesces in it, he will not then be allowed to set it
60 COMMERCIAL LAW
aside. In certain cases, however, as for example in
the case of a promissory note, the maker may have
signed in error, or as a result of some fraud or mis-
representation, but if the note gets into the hands of
a third party who in good faith without notice of the
defect gives value for it, the maker will be bound
toward such third party.
12. Mistake or error. — A mistake may be one of
fact or of law. A mistake of fact may be either
of intention or expression. If the parties to a con-
tract do not mean the same thing, or one of them
forms an untrue conclusion as to the subject matter
of the contract, there has been a mistake of intention
and the contract is void, because the minds of the par-
ties have not met.
Thus A may lend a horse to B, and B may think that
A is giving it to him : there is no contract of gift. A
man may sign a paper by which he purports to sub-
scribe for shares in a company, and he paj^s $500. At
the time he thought that he was subscribing for five
fully paid-up shares. In the contract as drawn up he
appears to subscribe for fifty shares of $100 upon
which he pays $10 each, or $500 on account. Such
a contract has been set aside. Or if a man signs a
promissory note and thinks it is merely an order for
certain goods, he will not be bound by his mistake.
Where one party is ignorant of the subject matter
of the contract, the law requires the other to disclose
all the material facts of which he has knowledge. So
also if goods are bought in reliance upon the judg-
VOID AND VOIDABLE CONTRACTS 61
ment of the seller, and the buyer finds that goods are
shipped to him which he did not intend to buy, he is
not bound by his contract. If a man buys a quan-
tity of goods and he intends to buy one hundred
pieces, and the other party thinks that he is buying
five hundred pieces, or the buyer thinks that he is pay-
ing $1 and he is actually charged $2, there has been no
consent as to the subject matter of the contract, and
the contract is voidable. So if a man buys plated
goods in mistake for silver, or buys a modern repro-
duction which he thinks is an antique, he may have the
contract set aside. If a person pays do^Ti a sum
of money for some secret process, say, for the man-
ufacture of ginger ale, and it turns out that there
is no secret, he will not be bound. It is different if a
man buys a picture from a dealer by some unknown
painter, and he believes it to be a Rembrandt, with-
out the dealer's declaring it to be a picture by Rem-
brandt. The buyer will then be bound. There was
no guarantee, and the buyer bought in doubt. His
purchase was really a speculation.
A contract is not necessarily invalid because there
has been a mistake of expression. The expression
may be corrected, where the minds of the parties have
met, but their intention has not been exactly set out.
A mistake of law does not void a contract. Thus a
man may make a contract by which he sells a certain
thing, and by law the sale of it carries with it its ac-
cessories ; he cannot have the contract set aside on the
ground that he did not intend that the accessories
62 COMMERCIAL LAW
should go with the thing sold. He may accept a suc-
cession, ignorant of the fact that by accepting it he
accepts also the liabilities attached thereto.
13. Misrepresentation and fraud. — To constitute
misrepresentation or fraud sufficient to set aside a
contract, there must be proof of an intention to de-
ceive; there must be proof that artifice was used by
one party, or with his knowledge, to induce the other
to contract. An innocent misrepresentation in most
cases will not be sufficient, tho in a contract of insur-
ance, and sometimes as between persons who stand in
a confidential relation, the innocent misrepresentation,
if material, will render the contract null. Fraud gen-
erally includes misrepresentation. If there is present
a dishonest intention on the part of the person who
makes the misrepresentation, or recklessness equiva-
lent to dishonesty, fraud will be easily found, because
the mistake of the one party has been induced by the
deliberate words or conduct of the other.
Fraud has been defined as a false misrepresentation
of a material fact, made with knowledge of its falsity,
or in reckless disregard of its truth or falsity, intend-
ing that it be acted upon by another who relies upon
the statement, acts to his injury. The failure to dis-
close material facts, where there was a plain duty to
disclose them, may amount to fraud.
The representation may be made by express words
or by conduct. It may be a positive assertion, or
merely a suggestion of what is false, and relate to a
particular fact or a general state of things.
VOID AND VOIDABLE CONTRACTS 63
It is characteristic of a misrepresentation tainted
with fraud or deceit, that it is made without positive
behef in its truth; there may not be positive knowl-
edge of its falsehood. Thus a person may, in igno-
rance of its truth or falsehood, make a material repre-
sentation which proves to be false. In such case, his
ignorance will be treated as equivalent to knowledge
of falsehood. It was remarked in an Enghsh case
that "if persons take upon themselves to make as-
sertions on subjects of which they are ignorant,
whether they are true or untrue, they must in a civil
point of view be held as responsible as if they had as-
serted that which they knew to be true."
As to the effect of silence, it has been held that it
is equivalent to misrepresentation, if the withholding
of that which is not stated makes that which is stated
absolutely false.
It was said by Lord Campbell that "a single word
or nod or wink, or a shake of the head, or a smile from
the purchaser, intending to induce the vendor to be-
lieve the existence of a non-existent fact, might be
fraud." Thus if A has a picture which he considers
valuable, and he thinks it is a Rembrandt, and takes
it to a dealer who, knowing that it is a Rembrandt,
laughs at A's suggestion, and indicates that he does
not think it is a Rembrandt, and thus induces A to sell
it to him for a trifling amount, A, if he finds out that
the picture is actually a Rembrandt and that the
dealer is disposing of it as such, can recover his
picture.
64 COMMERCIAL LAW
A person who complains of fraud or misrepre-
sentation must not only prove it, but also that it was
false in fact ; that the person who made it knew that it
was false, or made it recklessly without knowing
whether it was true or false; that he was induced by
the misrepresentation to make the contract ; and that
within a reasonable time after he discovered the fraud,
he repu^diated the contract. He cannot act under the
contract after he has knowledge of the fraud, and then
demand to have the contract set aside.
14. Undue influence. — The consent of the parties
to a contract must be given freely. If it is obtained
otherwise, the contract may be set aside, if the person,
whose consent has been forced, so desires. Such con-
tract is voidable, not void ; tho if a person were seized
and his hands were forcibly guided to sign his name,
say, to a promissory note, it is probable that this
contract would be void, because there would be no con-
sent.
To secure consent by undue Influence would mean
that another's weakness of mind, his necessities or dis-
tress, have been taken advantage of in order to induce
his consent. It has been said in a case decided in the
United States.^
Influence obtained by modest persuasion, and arguments
addressed to the understanding, or by mere appeals to the
affections cannot be properly termed undue influence in a
legal sense; but influence obtained by flattery, importunity,
superiority of will, mind, character, or by what art soever
that human thought, ingenuity, art or cunning may employ
which would give dominion over the will to such an extent as
I Schofield vs. Walker, 58 Mich., p. 96.
VOID AND VOIDABLE CONTRACTS 65
to destroy the free agency or constrain a person to do
against his will what he is unable to refuse, is such an influ-
ence as the law condemns as undue.
What may be undue influence in a particular case
it is difficult to say. In attempting to discover
whether a person gave his consent freely and deliber-
ately, the courts will take into consideration the age
and capacity- of the person, the nature of the transac-
tion, and all the other circumstances of the case. It
may be that the parties stand in such a relation that
from habit the one dominates the other, or that under
the circumstances one is in a position to use some
undue influence. Thus it has been laid down in an
English case, that "Where two persons stand in
such a relation that while it continues, confidence is
necessarily reposed by one, and the influence which
naturally grows out of that confidence is possessed by
the other, and this confidence is abused, or the influ-
ence is exerted to obtain an advantage at the expense
of the confiding party, the party so availing himself
of his position will not be permitted to retain the ad-
vantage, altho the transaction could not have been
impeached if no such confidential relation had ex-
isted." And, again. Lord Eldon lays it down that:
In equity, persons standing in certain relations to one an-
other, such as parent and child, man and wife, doctor and
patient, attorney and client, confessor and penitent, guardian
and ward, are subject to certain presumptions when trans-
actions between them are brought into question ; and if a
gift or contract made in favor of him who holds the posi-
tion of influence is impeached by him who is subject to that
XXIV— 6
66 COMMERCIAL LAW
influence, the courts of equity cast upon the former the bur-
den of proof that the transaction was fairly conducted as
if between strangers, that the weaker was not unduly im-
pressed by the natural influence of the stronger, or the inex-
perienced over-reached by him of more mature intellect.
15. Duress; violence and fear. — A person may-
give his consent to a contract, but that consent may
be induced or extorted by fear. If actual violence is
used, or violence is threatened, the party consenting
under such influence may have his contract set aside.
A distinction may be drawn between duress which in-
volves actual compulsion, and menace which means
the threat of actual compulsion. The term duress,
however, covers both, as would also the terms violence
and fear. If a man holds a pistol to another man's
head and threatens to shoot unless that other sign
some deed in his favor, the deed is signed as the
lesser evil. Under some of the English decisions, es-
pecially the older ones, it has been held that to consti-
tute duress or violence there must have been fear of
loss of hfe or hmb or of imprisonment; other cases,
however, require that at least there shall be a reason-
able and present fear of serious injury. Thus mere
idle threats which are not intended nor understood in a
serious sense will not ordinarily be sufficient.
The courts will consider the age, sex, character and
constitution of the party who is threatened. Thus a
threat made against a business man might have no
effect, whereas it might induce an ignorant country-
man to enter into a contract. The threat or violence
VOID AND VOIDABLE CONTRACTS 67
that might terrify a woman into signing might
be held insufficient to bring a man to the same
result.
Physical violence may be used, as for example
where a girl was beaten by her father until she con-
sented to marry a certain person. It may consist of
threats of injury in the future — threats to do physical
injury, or to injure the fortune or honor of the victim
or even of a relative or friend. In France it has been
held to be a case of violence, where the manager of a
company which was in financial difficulties threatened
several of the employes with dismissal unless they
signed bills for it. Again, a young partner in a
firm was informed by his co-partners that the books
showed him to be $9,000 short in his accounts; they
threatened him with criminal proceedings and refused
to let him see the books. Believing that what they
said was true he paid them $6,000. On examining
the books it was found that he did not owe them any-
thing, and the judge held that he was entitled to get
his money back.
It is not violence if a creditor threatens his debtor
with suit, but it would be violence if he threatened the
debtor that unless he paid some sum in excess of the
debt he would sue him. If A has stolen money from
B, B can threaten to have him arrested unless he re-
turns it. But if A admits that he has stolen $50 from
the bank which employs him, and the bank asserts
that he has stolen much more, and induces his mother
to sign a note for $400, this is held to be a case of vio-
68 COMMERCIAL LAW
lence.^ The person who alleges and proves duress,
violence or fear may have his contract set aside.
REVIEW
What does legality of object have to do with the making of a
contract? On what grounds is legality of object based?
What is the legal status of wagering contracts? Is a contract
of insurance enforceable? Is a contract for the sale and deliv-
ery of commodities at different prices enforceable?
What is meant by usury?
What is the general rule regarding contracts in restraint of
trade ?
What do you understand by unlawful combination?
What is the effect of illegality in a contract if some of the
promises are legal; if any part of a single consideration for a
promise is illegal? What part does intention play?
Discuss the differences between mistakes of fact and mistakes
of law.
Define duress. What is the effect of duress, violence or fear
on a contract?
1 Macfarlane vs. Dervey, 1870, 15 L. C. J., p. 85 (Que.),
CHAPTER VI
OPERATION AND INTERPRETATION OF CONTRACTS
1. Rights and U abilities of third parties. — A con-
tract is an agreement conferring rights and imposing
liabilities upon the parties to it. It is their consent
which has made the contract. A creditor can demand
performance of the obligation from the debtor or
his representatives. He cannot, as a rule, demand
performance from a third person, nor can the
debtor require him to do so. Yet the debtor or his
representatives may perform the duty by an agent.
Of course where an agent makes a contract for his
principal and acts within the scope of his agency, the
person with whom he contracts and to whom the fact
of the agency has not been disclosed may, as a general
rule, look to the agent or the principal for pay-
ment or performance. On the other hand, if the
agent gave a promissory note or a check in payment,
he would not be bound. The principal maj^ not only
be held liable on the contract made by his agent, but
he may claim the benefits arising from it. In Eng-
land it is well understood that a third person who ma-
liciously interferes in the performance of a contract,
as between the rightful parties to it, may render him-
self liable in damages : for example, if a third person
mahciously induces an employe to break his engage-
69
70 COMMERCIAL LAW
ment with him employer, he may be liable in damages
to the employer, and under the English cases this
doctrine has been made applicable to contracts in
general.
2. Contracts made for the benefit of a third person.
— In England it is well established that a third person
cannot sue on a contract made for his benefit by oth-
ers, eveh if the contracting parties have agreed that he
may/ In most of the American states the third
party, in whose favor a direct benefit has been con-
tracted for by others, may recover. In New York,
however, the promise must be for the benefit of the
third party, and there must also be such a relation be-
tween him and the promise that the promisor's obliga-
tion constitutes a satisfaction of some duty of the
promisee to the third party.^
In an English case, which is an exception to
the English rule, it was held that a provision in
a partnership contract to the effect that a partner's
widow should be entitled to his share of the business,
might be enforced by the widow. But the court in
rendering judgment pointed out that this provision in
the contract created a trust for the partnership prop-
erty in the hands of the surviving partner, and that if
the widow acquired any right, as indeed she did, she
acquired it because a trust had been created in her
favor.
So it has been held in England that an agreement
between A and B, that B shall pay a sum of money
1 Pollock, p. 223. 2 Gerstenberg & Hughes, p. 71.
• OPERATION AND INTERPRETATION 71
to C (an agreement to which C is not a party, either
directly or indirectly) , will not prevent A and B from
coming to an agreement to the contrary the next day.
If the third person is to have any right, he must be a
party to the contract.
In Quebec the law is stated as follows : a person can-
not, by a contract in his o\^ti name, bind anyone
but himself, his heirs and legal representatives; but
he may contract in his ovm name that another shall
perform an obligation, and in this case he is liable in
damages if such obligation be not performed by the
person indicated. In like manner a party may stipu-
late for the benefit of a third person, when such is
the condition of a contract, as the making of a gift to
another; he who makes the stipulation cannot revoke
it if the third person has signified his assent to it.
Under the English law, while a stipulation may be
made in favor of a third person, the latter camiot en-
force it. Under the law of Quebec, however, it has
been held that a third person, in whose favor a stipula-
tion has been made, and who has signified his accept-
ance of it, may take action to enforce performance,
altho he was not a party to the contract.^
In another case, heard in the Court of Appeals of
Quebec, it was decided that a third party need not in-
tervene in case a gift is made by one person to an-
other, with stipulations in favor of the third party,
and that mere acceptance by the person to whom the
gift is made, confers on the third person the right to
1 Brisebois vs. Campeau, 21 L. C. J., p. 16.
72 COMMERCIAL LAW
exact performance of the charge or benefit stipulated
in his favor/
It may be laid down as a general rule, however,
that creditors may exercise the rights and actions of
their debtor when, to their prejudice, he refuses or
neglects to do so. Thus if a debtor refuses to recover
from third persons, goods belonging to him which are
in their possession, creditors may take action to re-
cover them, in order that their rights may be pro-
tected and creditors may attack fraudulent contracts
made by the debtor, as, for example, a transfer of
personal property which hinders and delays them.
Such an action will fail if the goods which are meant
to be recovered in this way, are not really liable to
answer the claims of the creditors. Thus, it was held
that when a debtor gave certain creditors an agree-
ment for an absolute sale of his property, as security,
with the necessary result of surrendering and delay-
ing his other creditors under circumstances which
would support the preference, the judgment credi-
tors were held to be entitled to such order and direc-
tions from the court as would enable them to reach
all the property of the debtor that remained in the
preferred creditors' hands after the preferred claims
were paid.^
3. Rules of evidence. — When the parties to a con-
tract put into writing what they have agreed upon,
this document is the best evidence of what they in-
1 Pare vs. Pare, 3 D. C. A., p. 359.
2 Beliveau vs. Miller, 20 W. L. R., p. 96.
OPERATION AND INTERPRETATION 73
tended. The purpose in reducing the agreement to
writing, and the actual effect of doing so, are to put
into definite and permanent form what the parties in-
tend, and to render impossible later disputes as to
the terms of the agreement. Having put their agree-
ment into writing, the parties must be held to have in-
tended that it shall fully express their intention and
to have excluded the possibility of altering it by any
oral evidence. It may be stated, therefore, as a gen-
eral rule, that oral evidence will not be admitted to
contradict the terms of a valid written instrument.
If A and B make a contract in writing, neither can
show by oral evidence that he means something dif-
ferent from what is stated in the contract itself.
Oral testimony may be allowed in certain cases,
however, as, for example, to explain abbreviations,
ambiguous words or phrases; to identify the subject
matter of the contract and the parties to it; to show
surrounding circumstances, usage or custom, a condi-
tion precedent, fraud or illegality, delivery, a mistake
of expression and a subsequent oral agreement.
Thus witnesses have been allowed to prove that by lo-
cal custom "a thousand" of rabbits was 1,200 (i.e., ten
long hundreds of six score each) ; to define "year" in
a theatrical contract to pay a weekly salary for three
years, as meaning only the part of the year during
which the theatre w^as open; to identify the wool de-
scribed as "your wool," in a contract to buy wool. To
admit evidence of this kind is not to contradict the
writing, but to get something auxiliary to the writ-
74 COMMERCIAL LAW
ing — supplying, as was stated in an English case,
"the mercantile dictionary in which you are to find the
mercantile meaning of the words which are used."
This is necessary in order to assist the court in its en-
deavor to give effect to the intention of the parties.
4. Rules of construction. — When the courts are
called upon to interpret a contract, they endeavor, as
we have said, to discover the intention of the parties,
and will proceed by means of certain rules of con-
struction. When, for example, the terms of a con-
tract are capable of more than one meaning, there is
thrown upon the courts the task of construction, or of
determining which meaning is to be preferred. The
following are the general rules of construction:
(a) Words are to be given their plain and ordinary
meaning, unless the context or surrounding circum-
stances show an intention to use them in a peculiar
sense.
(b) In determining the intention of the parties,
the agreement is to be construed as a whole ; in other
words, particular terms are to be construed in the
sense which is most consistent with the general in-
tention. The meaning must be collected from what
is expressed in the contract, and not from a mere con-
jecture of some intention which the parties may have
had in their minds and which they might have ex-
pressed had they been better advised.
(c) That construction should obtain which will best
carry out the intention of the parties.
OPERATIOX AND INTERPRETATION 75
There are certain subsidiarj'^ rules, as, for example :
(d) In the case of a contention, as between printed
and written words, the written will govern.
(e) Words are to be construed more strictly
against the party using them,
(f) Where words or clauses are repugnant to one
another, those which are in conflict with the manifest
intention of the parties should be rejected as sur-
plusage.
(g) ^Miere a contract is ambiguous and one inter-
pretation renders it valid and another invalid, the
former will govern.
(h) "Where one interpretation renders the contract
reasonable and another unreasonable, the former will
govern.
( i ) Subsequent acts of the parties, not contrary to
rules of law or the express terms of the contract, are
entitled to strong consideration.
( j ) Obvious errors of grammar are subject to cor-
rection.
(k) Words of general meaning are subject to re-
striction by words of a more specific character.
5. Surrounding circu instances given consideration.
— The intention of the parties may be obscure. The
court will then be entitled to look at the surrounding
circumstances. There is a tendency in the more
recent decisions, especially in England, to pay
greater attention to all admissible indications of what
the intention of the parties actually was, and to ex-
amine the conduct of the parties themselves as an in-
76 COMMERCIAL LAW
dication of their own construction and of the contract.
6. Matters implied by law. — Many contracts carry
with them certain unexpressed obligations attached
to them by law. Thus a man may sell another horse,
and tho he does not warrant it sound, the law imports
that warranty into the contract. On the other hand,
he may sell the horse and stipulate that the sale is
made ^^ithout warranty. In mercantile contracts
there is a presumption that time is an essential condi-
tion, where time is specified ; but even where time is not
specified, or is not so specified as to be of the essence
of the contract, performance within a reasonable time
can be required, and notice may be given that the con-
tract will be rescinded unless performance is made.
If a person contracts to do a certain thing at or be-
fore a specified time, and fails to do so, the contract
becomes voidable in whole or in part, as the case may
be, at the option of the person in whose favor it is to
be performed, provided that it was the intention of
the parties that time should be of the essence of the
contract. If time was not the essence of the contract,
then the general rule is that the contract is not void-
able by the failure to do it at or within the time
specified; and the person in whose favor the contract
is made may obtain damages for the loss he has in-
curred by the delay in performance.
7. Liquidated damages. — The parties to a contract
may stipulate that a certain sum shall be paid for dam-
ages in case of breach of execution of the contract, in
which case such sum and no other, either gi'eater or
OPERATION AND INTERPRETATION 77
less, will be allowed to the creditor for such damages.
This clause, at least under the French law, is fre-
quently called a penal clause, or clause penale. The
Civil Code of Quebec has rejected the doctrine laid
down by some of the older French writers to the effect
that the amount payable under such a clause might be
reduced by the court as being excessive where it was
shown that it was larger than the damage actually
suflPered. Under the English law, penal provisions
inserted in instruments to secure the payment of
money or the performance of contracts will not be
literally enforced if the substantial performance of
that which was really contemplated can otherwise be
secured.
8. Joint and several contracts. — There may be one
or more persons on each side of a contract. Their lia-
bihties or rights may be joint or joint and several.
For example, if there are three joint and several cred-
itors of a debtor, each of them may singly exact per-
formance of the whole obligation, and thereupon give
a discharge in full to the debtor. If the creditors are
merely joint, and not joint and several, then only one
action can be brought against the debtor, and in this
they all should join. There is a joint and several ob-
hgation on the part of co-debtors when they are all
obliged to the same thing in such a manner that each
of them singly may be compelled to the performance
of the whole obligation, and that the performance by
one discharges the others toward the creditor.
An obligation is not presumed to be joint and sev-
78 COMMERCIAL LAW
eral; it must be expressly declared as such. That is
the general rule. A joint and several obligation may
arise of right by virtue of some provision of law and
in commercial transactions joint and several liability
is the rule rather than the exception. In a partner-
ship, for example, the partners are jointly and sev-
erally liable; and in some jurisdictions the obligation
arising from the common offence or quasi-offence of
two or more persons is joint and several.
REVIEW
What is the general rule concerning third parties and con-
tracts ?
May a third person sue on a contract made by others for his
benefit ? What is the general rule regarding the rights of a cred-
itor when a debtor refuses to exercise his own rights ?
What is the best evidence of intention? When is oral testi-
mony allowed?
Give some rules of construction used by the court in interpret-
ing a contract.
Discuss the liabilities or the rights of persons under joint and
several contracts.
CHAPTER VII
ASSIGNMENT AND DISCHARGE OF CONTRACTS
1. Definition of assignment. — Persons other than
a creditor may become entitled by representation or
assignment to stand in the creditor's place, to exercise
his rights under the contract; in other words, the
creditor may transfer his rights against his debtor to
some third person. An assignment, says another au-
thority, is a transfer by one party to another of some
right, title or interest in personal or real property.
The instrument by which the transfer is made is also
frequently called an assignment. The assignment
must not increase the debtor's burden or diminish his
remedies.
2. Competent parties to an assignment. — Persons
who have capacity to contract may make an assign-
ment. Where a partnership has a claim against some
debtor, ordinarily one partner can assign this claim to
some other person. A may assign his claim against B
thru the ministry of his agent C. A tenant, where he
is not forbidden by his contract or by law, may assign
his uiterest in a lease. The person to whom the rights
are assigned, under a contract may bring action in his
own name ; generally, notice in writing must be given
to the debtor of the assignment, as he is entitled to
79
80 COMMERCIAL LAW
know to whom he can pay his debt. Thus if a debtor,
before receiving notice of the assignment, were to pay
his original creditor, he would be discharged. If the
assignee sues him, he will be able to raise against the
assignee any defence he might have raised against the
original creditor. On the other hand, the debtor may
consent to the assignment, in which case no notice will
be necessary.
When there are several competing assignees, their
claims will rank as between themselves, not according
to the order in date of the assignment, but according
to the dates at which they have respectively given no-
tice to the debtor.^ The debtor, on paying the first
who gives notice to him, is discharged. In the case of
negotiable instruments, these difficulties are overcome
in that the absolute benefit of the contract is attached
to the ownership of the document, which according to
ordinary rules would be the only evidence of the con-
tract. The instrument itself when it is transferable
by indorsement is an authentic record of the succes-
sive transfers, and the bona fide possessor of the in-
strument is presumed to be the true owner thereof.
3. Assignment of liabilities. — In the assigning of
liabilities the converse of the rule we have been con-
sidering is followed. Ordinarily speaking, a debtor
may not assign his liability to be performed by some
third person. It is a matter of public policy that
the creditor should know to whom he may look for
satisfaction after considering the character, credit and
1 Dearie vs. Hall, Pollock, p. 232.
ASSIGNMENT AND DISCHARGE 81
substance of the person with whom he contracted.
Of course, if the creditor consents to accept another
debtor a new contract is formed, and the old debtor
will be released to the extent of the new contract.
Where a person has undertaken an obligation which
is not purely personal and does not require the exer-
cise of his own peculiar skill, he may have the contract
performed by some other person, but he will remain li-
able for its due performance according to his contract.
Again, there may be certain servitudes attaching to a
piece of land, as, for example, the servitude by
which low lying land must receive surplus water
flowing from higher land; if the oTVTier of the lower
land assigns or sells it, the person to whom he assigns
or sells must respect the servitude. If a party to a
contract dies, his rights and liabilities pass to his heirs
or representatives, and while they may take advantage
of the rights, they must also carry the liabilities under
the contract made by the deceased.
4. Other examples of assignment. — Bonds and
mortgages are generally assignable, as also the bene-
fits under judgments, insurance policies and contracts
of suretyship. Chattel mortgages may also be as-
signed, in which case the transfer may cover the legal
title to the property mortgaged and all the rights of
the mortgagor under the mortgage, or only the equity
or equitable interest of the assignor. But if a person
has a right of action for breach of promise to marry,
it is contrary to public policy that this right of action
should be assigned to a third person. If A con-
XXIT— 7
82 COMMERCIAL LAW
tracts with a famous artist to paint his portrait, and
the artist assigns the contract to another artist equally
famous and able, A is not bound to accept the picture
by the second artist, or to recognize him in any way.
5. Modes of discharging a contract. — There are
several modes of discharging a contract, all of which
we cannot discuss here. Among them, however, are
the following: discharge by agreement, by paj^ment
or performance, by novation, by breach, by perform-
ance becoming impossible, by operation of law, by
confusion, by compensation.
6. Discharge by agreement. — Naturally the parties
who make a contract may in turn agree to cancel it.
The contract itself may contain a stipulation for its
cancellation under certain conditions. Thus, in an in-
surance policy it may be provided that if the risk in-
sured is increased or changed, the policy shall be im-
mediately void. The release of an obligation may be
made either expressly or tacitly. The release would
be considered to be tacit when the creditor voluntarily
surrenders to the debtor the original title of the obh-
gation, unless there is proof of a contrary intention.
7. Discharge by payment or performance. — By
payment is meant not only the delivery of a sum of
money in satisfaction of an obligation, but the per-
formance of anything to which the parties are respec-
tively obliged. If a contract is bilateral, that is, in-
volves the doing of something by both parties, then
the performance of obligation by one party discharges
that person, but the contract is not wholly discharged,
ASSIGNMENT AND DISCHARGE 83
because he is entitled to enforce performance by the
other party thereto.
Whether the pajTnent or performance is sufficient
will depend upon the construction of the contract.
Generally speaking, if the debtor has substantially
performed his part of the contract, he may recover
payment, but will be subject to a deduction for such
damages as his omission or deviation from the con-
tract may have caused the other party, tho this omis-
sion or deviation must be slight and not such as to
deprive the other party of his rights. If the omission
or deviation cannot be adequately compensated for in
damages, the performance may be held incomplete.
A contract may provide that it must be performed
to the satisfaction of the creditor, and the debtor will
be strictly held to his obligation to meet the personal
taste or judgment of the creditor, where this is in-
tended. It has been held in some cases that under
such circumstances performance will be sufficient if
it satisfies the mind of a reasonable man. The
obligation may be to deliver a thing determined in
kind only; in this case, the debtor need not give a
thing of the best quality, nor can he offer one of the
worst : he must offer a thing of merchantable quality.
Unless the contract so stipulates, a debtor must per-
form or pay his obligation as a w^hole, and not in
parts; and if a creditor has a right under his contract
to receive a specific thing, he is not bound to accept
another, tho it be of greater value than the thing due.
If the obligation is to do a certain thing, the parties
84 COMMERCIAL LAW
to the contract may agree that money shall be paid in
lieu of such performance, and the new contract dis-
charges the old.
Generally speaking, where a negotiable instrument
is given in payment of a debt which is due, under the
English law the original obligation is only condition-
ally discharged, in which case if the instrument is not
paid, the creditor may^sue on the original contract, or
on the instrument.
8. Time and place of payment or performance. —
If the contract does not fix a date for performance, it
is implied that the contract is to be performed within
a reasonable time; but performance on a certain date
may be of the essence of the contract. If so, the con-
tract will be strictly construed. Performance later
will not be binding on the other party, unless he
waives the delay, as, for example, by agreeing to per-
formance at a later date, or by accepting perform-
ance when it is made. In mercantile contracts the
assumption is that time, when specified, is an essen-
tial condition, and when a person promises to do
a thing "as soon as possible," he is bound to do it
within a reasonable time.
Payment must be made in the place expressly or
impliedly indicated by the contract. As a general
rule, if no place is indicated and the thing to be paid
or delivered is a certain specific thing, payment must
be made at the place where the thing was at the time
the contract was made. In all other cases, as, for
example, where money is to be paid, the general rule
ASSIGNMENT AND DISCHARGE 85
is that payment must be made at the domicile of the
debtor. Thus, in a ^lanitoba case it was held that
when a contract is silent as to the place of pajnnent,
and the debtor is a contractor who has done work in
another province, the money will be payable at his
residence.^ In a Quebec case ^ it was held that the
domicile which determines the place of payment is the
debtor's actual domicile at the place of pa\TTient, and
not some different domicile which he had at the time
of the contract. The fact that the debtor may have
paid certain instalments at the domicile of the cred-
itor is not in itself of such a nature as to modify the
law, or the rights of the parties in this respect. The
court refused to hold that the defendant had, by vir-
tue of any such pa\Tnent at the domicile of the cred-
itor, waived his right to pay the subsequent instal-
ments at his own domicile.
9. Composition mth creditors. — As we have al-
ready seen, a debtor may come to an arrangement
with his creditors by which they accept less than the
full amount of their claims on a compromise settle-
ment. If such an agi-eement is made, the creditors
have no claim for any balance. In the case of each
creditor, the consideration for accepting less than is
due to him is the fact that the other creditors also
forbear to exact performance in full. If each for-
bears for part of his claim, each receives a benefit,
because if one or more exacted full pajTiient, some
1 Empire Sash & Door Co. vs. McGreew ; Canadian Pacific Ry. Co.,
22 W. L. R. 373.
2 Coutu vs. Auclair, 18 Rev. de Juri, 435.
86 COMMERCIAL LAW
would be sure to lose thereby. In making such a
composition with his creditors, however, a debtor can-
not benefit one creditor over another, and an agree-
ment to do so would be an agreement in fraud of his
creditors and would be void.
10. Application or imputation of payment. — A
debtor of several debts may, when paying, declare
what debt he means to discharge, and his wishes in
this respect must be observed. His intention may be
discovered from his conduct, or from the circum-
stances under which he pays. If the debtor does not
indicate what debt he means to discharge, the cred-
itor may apply the payment toward any debt due to
him by the person paying, provided the debt is not
illegal. Having made his choice, he will be held to it,
unless the debtor consents to another application of
the payment. If the debtor has accepted a receipt by
which the creditor has imputed the payment in dis-.
charge of a special debt, the debtor cannot afterward
require the imputation to be made upon another debt,
except upon the ordinary grounds for the avoidance
of contracts.
If neither party makes a choice as to which of sev-
eral debts shall be discharged by the payment, the
payment will be imputed in discharge of the debt
actually payable which the debtor has at the time the
greatest interest in paying. This is the rule under
the English law, as also in the Province of Quebec.
Following this rule, it was held in a New York case *
1 Pattison vs. Hull, 9 Cow. N. Y., p. 747.
ASSIGNMENT AND DISCHARGE 87
that tlie amount paid will be applied to a debt se-
cured by a mortgage in preference to a debt which is
not secured.
The Supreme Court of the United States has made
decision, in a sense contrar\^ to this rule, namely, that :
"If the application is made by neither party, it be-
comes the duty of the court, and in its exercise a sound
discretion is to be exercised. It cannot be conceded
that this application is to be made in a manner most
advantageous to the debtor. It would seem reason-
able that an equitable application should be made;
and, it being equitable that the whole debt should be
paid, it cannot be inequitable to extinguish first those
debts for which the security is most precarious."
In Quebec, also, it is laid down that, if only one of
several debts is actually payable, the payment must
be imputed in discharge of such debt, altho it be
less burdensome than those which are not actually
payable; if the debts are of like nature and equally
burdensome, the imputation is made upon the oldest;
all things being equal, it is made proportionately on
each.
11. Tender. — When a creditor refuses to receive
pajTnent, the debtor may make an actual tender of
the money or other thing due. By making a tender,
the debtor offers to carry out his bargain. When the
tender is a sum of money and it is refused, it becomes
equivalent to a payment on the date of the first tender,
provided the tender was unconditional and was made
at a reasonable time and place, and that since making
88 COMMERCIAL LAW
it the debtor has remained ready and wilhng to pay
the money. If the debtor is sued, after making his
tender, he should plead his former tender, renew it
and deposit the money in court. The tender must
be in money — a check or note would not be sufficient.
The tender must be made by a person legally capable
of paying to a creditor legally capable of receiving
payment, or to some one having authority to receive
payment for him. If the obligation of the debtor is
to deliver goods, or to perform an obligation other
than the payment of money, and the creditor refuses
the tender made to him, the debtor is discharged.
Moreover, if the creditor sues him for breach of his
contract, he may plead his tender as a good defence.
The Civil Code of Quebec lays down certain rules
for the tender of specific things.^ Thus if a certain
specific thing is deliverable on the spot where it is,
the debtor must, by his tender, require the creditor to
come and take it there. If the thing is not so deliv-
erable and from its nature it is difficult of transpor-
tation, the debtor must indicate by his tender the place
where it is, the day and hour when he is ready to
deliver it, and the place where payment ought to be
made. If the creditor fails, in the former case, to
take the thing away, or in the latter, to signify his
willingness to accept, the debtor may, if he thinks fit,
remove the thing to any other place for safe keeping
at the risk of the creditor. These rules are of general
application also under the English law.
1 C. C, Article 1165.
ASSIGNMENT AND DISCHARGE 89
12. Novation. — By novation is meant that a debtor
contracts toward his creditor a new debt which is sub-
stituted for the old one, the latter being extinguished ;
or a new debtor is substituted for a former one, who
has been discharged toward the creditor; or by the
effect of a new contract, a new creditor is substituted
for a former one, toward whom the debtor is dis-
charged. In each case,, the consideration is the crea-
tion of new rights and liabilities, and the extinction of
old ones.
Novation can be effected only between persons
capable of contracting. It will not be presumed.
The intention to effect it must be evident. As Pol-
lock puts it,^ whether there has been novation in any
particular case is a question of fact, but assent to a
novation is not to be inferred from conduct, unless
there has been a distinct and unambiguous request.
Thus, it has been held that the mere acceptance of a
renewal note by a bank is only a conditional payment,
and is not a novation of the original note, especially
when the bank retains the original note. The bank
may, at its option, proceed on the original note and
tender the renewal note with its action, or it may pro-
ceed on the renewal note itself.^
It has also been held that when an agent, acting
on behalf of a company, guarantees a contract made
on behalf of the company, and gives his own promis-
sory notes to accommodate a third person w^ith whom
1 Pollock, p. 216.
2 The Bank of British North America vs. Harte et al., 18 Rev. de
Juri, 1834..
90 COMMERCIAL LAW
the contract is made, such giving of notes dfoes not
constitute novation; a new debt and a new debtor
would be substituted for the previous debt and
the previous debtor.^ It has also been held that a
settlement of indebtedness between a debtor and a
creditor, by part payment and by notes of the latter,
does not make "the intention to effect a novation evi-
dent," particularly when the creditor retains accepted
drafts which he holds for the original debt. He has,
therefore, the right to sue and recover on the latter.^
It has been held, however, that an agi'eement be-
tween an employer and an employe, in settlement of
a claim for damages caused by an explosion, operates
as a novation, whereby the delictual obligation is ex-
tinguished and a contractual obligation arises instead.
If the latter be conditional, it only becomes executory
upon the fulfilment of the condition.^
An unpaid vendor of movables, which are delivered
to the purchaser on condition that the property shall
not pass until the price, payable by instalments, is
fully paid up, has the right to revendicate the mov-
ables, notwithstanding the acceptance by him of the
notes of the purchaser, as no novation has thereby
taken place.^ It has also been held that the accept-
ance of a draft, for the amount of an overdue note,
drawn upon the makers by the holder, and the fact
1 French Gas Saving Co., Ltd., vs. Desbarats Advertising Agency, Ltd.,
1 D. L. R. 136.
2 Sabbath vs. Baker, 41 Que. S. C. 75.
sMcKinstry vs. Irvine, 39 Que. S. C. 426.
4 Tremblay vs. Quinn, 39 Que. S. C, p. 215.
ASSIGNMENT AND DISCHARGE 91
that the latter afterward files a claim on the draft
against the estate of one of the acceptors who had
made an assignment, and receives dividends, does not
effect a novation of the note. The indorsee could,
therefore, recover from the maker the amount due on
the note, less the sum received as a dividend.^
There is no substitution of agreements under
the following circumstances. A purchases from B a
case of shoes to be delivered in one week; at the end
of the week A requests B to postpone the delivery of
the shoes for a week longer, and B consents; at the
end of the second week A refuses to accept the shoes,
owing to the fact that the price has very materially
decreased since he gave the order. A must accept the
shoes and pay the price agreed upon.
A distinction must be drawn between a voluntary
forbearance to deliver at the request of another, and a
substitution of one agreement for another. If A re-
quests postponement of performance, he must take the
risk that in the meantime the price of the goods may
change.
REVIEW
Who are competent parties to an assignment? Under what
circumstances may a partner make an assignment ?
Are the liabilities growing out of a contract assignable ?
Give a number of ways in which a contract may be discharged.
Explain discharge by payment or performance. How impor-
tant is the construction of the contract in this kind of discharge ?
When no time is stated in the contract, what is the rule applied
by the courts?
What is the result when the creditor refuses to accept the ten-
der? How must the tender be made?
1 Saint Amaud vs. Guilbault, 39 Que. S. C. 481.
CHAPTER VIII
DISCHARGE OF CONTRACTS (Continued)
1. Discharge by breach. — The failure of one party
to a contract to perform his part or undertaking is a
breach of the contract, and gives rise to an action by
the other party for damages that he may have sus-
tained. The breach may also discharge the other
party from the performance of his obligation.
Whether the breach will have the effect of discharg-
ing the other party will depend upon the circum-
stances of the particular case. A creditor may in cer-
tain cases demand specific performance of the obli-
gation, or he may be authorized to execute it at the
debtor's expense, or the contract be set aside.
There are exceptions to the rule, however. For ex-
ample, the seller of a chattel cannot demand the
dissolution of the sale because the buyer fails to pay
the price, unless there is a special stipulation to that
effect in the contract. But a party to a contract may
be estopped from seeking a recision of it for non-
performance, when he has himself done something that
makes it impossible to restore the debtor to his former
position. It has been held in Quebec that perform-
ance after action brought to rescind a contract is not
a valid ground of defence, and that no notice of fail-
ure to perform the undertakings of a contract is re-
92
DISCHARGE OF CONTRACTS 93
quired as a condition precedent to an action to rescind
the contract for non-performance.
Under the following circumstances there will be a
breach of contract and the contract be discharged ;
1. Wliere one of the parties does not perform his
obligation or promise;
2. AMiere one of the parties renounces his liabili-
ties under the contract;
3. ^Vhere one of the parties does something which
renders performance of the contract impossible.
2. Breach thru failure of performance. — When one
party to a contract has failed in performance, as we
have already said, the injured party may or may not
be discharged from the performance of his part of the
contract. He may merely have a right of action for
damages. The distinction depends upon whether the
contract is divisible or indivisible, or whether the prom-
ises in the contract are independent of one another or
mutually dependent. Thus, if a contract is divisi-
ble and the promises are independent of one another,
as, for example, if the contract as a whole is made up
of a series of contracts, a breach of one of them need
not discharge the others; but if the contract cannot
be broken up into parts, and the promises contained
in it depend upon one another, so that if one is broken
all are broken, a breach of performance by one party
will discharge the other, and also give that other an
action in damages, if he has suffered damages.
The courts differ in their interpretation as to
whether given contracts are divisible or indivisible.
94 COMMERCIAL LAW
The Supreme Court of the United States has held
that if A contracts to sell to B 600 bushels of corn in
three monthly instalments of 200 bushels each, the con-
tract is indivisible, and that if A fails to deliver one
instalment, ;the whole contract is discharged. In
England, the contrary is held to be law. The Su-
preme Court of Canada has held that an agreement
between the parties to several transactions involving
litigation, to do a series of acts in settlement of their
differences, is divisible, and a performance of part of
them will be held binding and effective, notwithstand-
ing the failure to perform the whole, more particularly
as against the party thru whom such failure appears.
A person sold a restaurant to another, and part of
the price was to be paid at the time of the contract,
part when the license should be transferred, and the
balance in monthly payments ; the vendor turned over
the restaurant to the purchaser, but later re-took pos-
session. The purchaser, on the other hand, made no
attempt to get the license transferred, and the vendor
did not offer to assist him. Later, the purchaser asked
that the contract of sale be set aside and that he be re-
imbursed what he had paid, alleging that he had dis-
possessed himself. It was held that, as both parties
had failed to execute their promises and apparently
did not wish to carry out the contract entered into be-
tween them, there was no need to pronounce it dis-
solved.
3. Independent promises. — It may be difficult to
decide whether or not the promises are independent of
DISCHARGE OF CONTRACTS 95
one another. It will be sought to discover what was
the intention of the parties, and that intention may be
disclosed by the order in which the several promises
are to be performed. It was held in an English case
that "whether covenants are or are not independent of
each other must depend on the good sense of the case,
and the order in which the several things are to be
done." Suppose that several different articles are
bought at different prices and at the same time. If it
could be showii that the purchaser intended to take all
or none, then the contract would fail if all the articles
could not be delivered. If it could be shown, however,
that this was not the intention, then the contract
would be severable as to each article.
4. Conditional promises. — A contract is said to be
conditional when it is made to depend upon some event,
future and uncertain, by suspending it until the event
happens, or bj'' dissolving it according as the event
does or does not happen. Generally speaking, if the
contract depends upon some event which, unknown to
; the parties, has actually happened when the contract is
made, the contract is not conditional, but takes effect
or is defeated from the time when it is made.
The condition must not be contrary to law, or in-
1 consistent with good morals, and the contract is void
1 if it is made to depend upon the doing or happening
of something which is impossible. Thus if A con-
tracts, promising to pay B $100 if C shall climb to the
moon, the condition is an impossibility and the prom-
ise void. An obligation must not be conditioned
96 COMMERCIAL LAW
merely on the will of the party promising. Thus a
promise by A to go to Toronto on a certain day if he
feels in the mood to do so, is conditional purely on the
will of A; tho A may validly promise to pay B $100
if he should go to Toronto on a certain day. If no
time is fixed for the fulfilment of the condition, it may
be carried out at any time.
The condition will not be deemed to have failed un-
til it becomes certain that it will not be fulfilled. The
condition may be merely suspensory or floating in its
nature, and non-performance will not discharge the
promisor. The actual carrying out of the promise is
merely suspended. Thus in a fire insurance policy the
liability of the insurer is conjectural, and fulfilment
of the insurer's promises is suspended until the event
insured against takes place. But if A contracts that
he will buy a horse from C if B will buy one from C,
then A's promise is conditional upon B's promise, and
if B does not perform his contract, A need not per-
form his. These are examples of the condition prece-
dent. An action in damages may lie for breach of a
condition precedent, which is vital in its nature and
not merely suspensory. The injured party may also
as a result be discharged from his promise.
If the parties to a contract agree conditionally that
they each must do something simultaneously ( concur-
rent conditions), then in order that one shall have an
action in damages for non-performance, against the
other, he must have been ready and willing, at the time
fixed for performance, to do what he had undertaken.
DISCHARGE OF CONTRACTS 97
If either party is not ready and willing at that time,
the other is discharged.
If a company employs an agent mider a contract by
which it can dismiss him by giving him one week's no-
tice, the condition is fulfilled by the giving of the no-
tice, and the contract is thereby definitely terminated.
This is a condition subsequent.
It is a well-recognized principle of law that a con-
tract for personal services which can be performed
only during the lifetime of the part^' contracting is
subject to the implied condition that he shall be alive
to perform them; if he dies, his executor is not liable
to an action for breach of contract occasioned by his
death. ^ If an employer dies, his sers^ant is dis-
charged and cannot treat the contract as in force
against the master's personal representatives.^ Thus
it has been laid down that "a contract by an author
to write a book or by a painter to paint a picture within
a reasonable time would be deemed subject to the con-
dition that if the author became insane or the painter
paralytic, and so rendered incapable by an act of God,
of performing the contract, he would not be personally
liable in damages, any more than his executors
would be if he had been prevented by death." In an
Enghsh case, the father of a boy entered into a con-
tract with a firm tliat his son should serve as an ap-
prentice for a number of years. The boy fell ill and
the employer sued the father for breach of the con-
1 Jackson vs. Union Marine Insurance Co. 1874, 44 L. J. C. P. 27.
2 Farrow vs. Wilson, 1869, 38 L. J. C. P. p. 36.
XXIV — 8
98 COMMERCIAL LAW
tract. It was held that "it must be taken to have been
in the contemplation of the parties when they entered
into this covenant that the prevention of performance
by the act of God should be an excuse for non-per-
formance," and the action was dismissed.
5. Breach of a subsidiary promise. — If some sub-
sidiary promise in a contract is broken, the contract
may not be discharged, but an action for damages may
arise. The parties may consider that the subsidiary
promise is of such importance that its literal fulfilment
is a condition precedent, and if this is so it will be
treated as a condition precedent. If, on the other
hand, it is clear from the surrounding circumstances
that some subsidiary promise, tho apparently of first
importance and on its face a condition precedent, is
not really vital, and that its non-fulfilment might be
adequately compensated for in damages, then, if such
an intention or understanding is sufficiently expressed,
such a condition will not be treated as a condition
precedent.
There is a distinction to be made between a war-
ranty which gives rise to an action in damages, and a
condition the fulfilment or non-fulfilment of which is
of the essence of the contract, in that it strikes at the
foundation of the contract. Thus if A sells a horse
to B, and he believes it to be sound and warrants that
it has not the heaves, and B could discover by having
the horse examined by a veterinary surgeon whether
it has or has not the heaves, in some jurisdictions B
would have an action in damages against A, if after
DISCHARGE OF CONTRACTS 99
the sale the horse proved to have this weakness. If,
however, A sold a horse to B on the condition that it
should, with training and within three months, de-
velop a certain speed as a racehorse, this would be a
condition precedent, upon the non-fulfilment of which
B could ask to have his contract canceled, and demand
the return of the price upon his handing back the
horse.
6. Breach by renunciation. — Either before or at
the time that a contract is to be performed, a party
may declare that he repudiates or renounces the con-
tract and will not perform his part of it. If he so re-
nounces before the time of performance, the contract
may or may not be discharged, accordingly as the
other party does or does not treat it as discharged.
The other part}' may treat the contract as discharged
and take action at once for any damages, or he may
wait until after the time for performance, in which
case he is entitled meanwhile to insist that the relation
created by the contract shall persist up to the time
fixed for performance. In an English case, it was
held that "the promisee has an inchoate right to the
performance of the bargain, which becomes complete
when the time for the performance has arrived. In
the meantime he has a right to have the contract kept
open as a subsisting and effective contract; its unim-
paired and unimpeached efficacy may be essential to
his interests."
The mere intention of one of the parties to renounce
is not sufficient. The renunciation must be express,
100 COMMERCIAL LAW
positive and unqualified. The contract may be in the
course of performance, and then it being renounced,
the other party may immediately take action for dam-
ages. Thus it was held in an English case, that "when
there is an executory contract for the manufacture
and supply of goods from time to time, to be paid
for after delivery, if the purchaser, having accepted
and paid for a portion of the goods contracted for,
gives notice to the vendor not to manufacture any
more as he has no occasion for them and will not ac-
cept or pay for them, the vendor being desirous
and able to complete the contract, he may, without
manufacturing and tendering the rest of the goods,
maintain an action against the purchaser for breach
of contract." It has been held in a Quebec case
that, where a person contracts for the manufacture of
machinery, and afterwards notifies the manufacturer
that he will not accept delivery of it unless certain
guarantees respecting it, not mentioned in the con-
tract, be given to him, he is thereby held to repudiate
the contract and he becomes liable for the price of the
machineiy, less whatever value it may have for the
manufacturer.^ So also if a person contracts to give
his services to a company, and his personal services are
the foundation of the contract, his refusal to give his
services entitles the other party to rescind the agree-
ment.
If the parties to a contract abandon it by mutual
1 Morgan-Smith et al. vs. Montreal Light, Heat & Power Co. 30,
Que. S. C. 242.
DISCHARGE OF CONTRACTS 101
consent after it has been partly performed by one
party, the latter is entitled to receive a reasonable price
for the work he has done. If, however, a board of
school commissioners employs a teacher for eight
months, and before the school opens informs him that
his serv'ices will not be required, the teacher may treat
the contract as discharged and sue the board for dam-
ages; or he may wait until the expiry of the eight
months and sue on the contract for his salary. Of
course, meanwhile he must not refuse other work, and
what he may earn in the meantime under another
contract will go toward reducing the amount that he
may claim under his original contract.
A enters into a contract with B for the purchase
of B's farm. Payment is to be made in several in-
stalments, and upon payment of the last one B is to
deliver to A the deed of the farm. A refuses to pay
the second instalment when due, and B sues him for
it. B may recover. A's promise to pay each instal-
ment, other than the last one, is independent of the
covenant to convey; hence B may sue him for each
instalment other than the last without offering to con-
vey the farm. But in order that one party may de-
mand the rescission of a contract which is in the course
of being performed, the other party must be actually
in default to fulfil his contract. It is not sufficient
for the other party to allege merely that under the
circumstances it is impossible for the party perform-
ing to fulfil or complete his contract within the delay
specified.
102 COMMERCIAL LAW
REVIEW
What is a breach of contract?
When does failure of performance discharge the contract?
How does the distinction between divisible and indivisible con-
tracts affect discharge by failure of performance ?
When is a contract conditional? What restrictions are put on
the conditions of a contract? What is a condition precedent?
Of what effect is the breach of a subsidiary promise?
What is meant by breach of renunciation? Must the renuncia-
tion be express?
CHAPTER IX
DISCHARGE OF CONTRACTS ^Continued)
1. Discharge hy impossihility of performance. — A
contract may be void or become discharged under cer-
tain circumstances, when performance is impossible at
the time the contract is made, or becomes impossible
afterward. Whether a contract is discharged be-
cause of impossibility of performance or otherwise will
depend upon the circumstances surrounding the par-
ticular contract. Because of impossibility of per-
formance, the contract may never exist, or it may be
discharged. If the impossibility of performance ex-
ists when the supposed contract is made, the contract
is not discharged, as it is void to begin with, it is not
formed. The doing of some impossible thing is not a
proper consideration. The thing which is contracted
to be done may in itself be impossible, as, for example,
if a man made a contract to run a river up-hill,
or to do some other impossible thing. AA^e have said
that the contract may be impossible of performance
when it is made. Thus if a person contracts to dig
1,000 tons of a certain kind of clay on a certain prop-
erty where there is no such clay, or if the subject
matter of the contract is no longer in existence when
the contract is made, the contract is void. So if A
103
104 COMMERCIAL LAW
sells a horse to B, and unknown to A the horse is dead,
there is no contract.
After the contract is made performance may be-
come impossible, and the contract may or may not
be discharged, according to circumstances. It may
become impossible by law as being inconsistent with
some legal principle, or by reason of the existence of
a particular state of things which renders perform-
ance impossible. The courts will examine the inten-
tion of the parties to discover whether they really in-
tended that, should performance accidentally become
impossible, the contract should be altogether dis-
charged; for it must be taken into consideration that
so far as possible a valid contract will be maintained,
and that under certain conditions a person will be
bound to fulfil the duty he has undertaken, altho some
accident may intervene, against which he might have
provided bj'- his contract.
2. Destruction of the subject matter. — Perform-
ance of the contract may depend on the existence of
some specific thing. If performance becomes impos-
sible by reason of its destruction, the contract will, as
a rule, be discharged, unless there is some warranty
express or implied, that the subject matter shall con-
tinue to exist. In a leading English case,^ the de-
fendants agreed to let the plaintiffs have the use of
a music hall on certain days for the purpose of giv-
ing entertainments. Before the hall was used for
this purpose, however, it was destroyed by fire,
1 Taylor vs. Caldwell, 3 B. & S. 826.
DISCHARGE OF CONTRACTS 105
neither party being in fault. It was held that the
defendants were excused, and the general principle
was laid do^vn that "where, from the nature of the
contract, it appears that the parties must have known
from the beginning that it could not be fulfilled
unless, when the time for the fulfilment of the con-
tract arrived, some particular specified thing con-
tinued to exist, so that when entering into the
contract they must have contemplated such con-
tinued existence as the foundation of what was to be
done ; there, in the absence of any express or implied
warranty that the thing shall exist, the contract is
not to be considered a positive contract, but subject
to the implied condition that the parties shall be ex-
cused in case, before breach, performance becomes
impossible from the perishing of the thing, without
default of the contractor."
The rule of the English law is that where the prop-
erty in a specified thing which is to be delivered at a
future date has passed by bargain and sale, and the
thing is destroj^ed before delivery without the fault
of the vendor, he is excused from performing his
contract to deliver. The Civil Code of Quebec lays
down that, when the certain specific thing which is
the object of an obligation perishes, or the delivery of
it from any other cause is impossible, without any act
or fault of the debtor and before he is in default, the
obligation is extinguished. It is also extinguished,
altho the debtor be in default, if the thing would
equally have perished in the possession of the
106 COMMERCIAL LAW
creditor ; unless in either of the above mentioned cases
the debtor has expressly bound himself for fortuitous
events. The rules are therefore similar.
Thus in an English case, where A agreed with M
to erect an engine and other machinery on M's prem-
ises, at certain prices for the separate parts of the
work, and no time was fixed for payment, but while
the work was being done and before completion of
any part the premises and the uncompleted work
and materials were accidentally destroyed by fire,
without fault of either party, it was held that there
was no promise or warranty by M that the premises
should at all times continue fit to receive the machin-
ery; that the burning of the building was a misfor-
tune equally affecting both parties, excusing both
from further performance of the contract, but not giv-
ing a cause of action to either.
It has also been held in England that a contractor
for work, to be paid for in a lump sum, can recover for
part only if he has been prevented from completing
the work thru the other party's default, or if there is
a new contract to pay for what has been done. Pol-
lock remarks that in the United States, however, re-
covery for the work is generally allowed. But if A
agrees to make certain goods in a particular factory
for B and before they are made the factory is acci-
dentally destroyed by fire, the contract is dis-
charged on the principle that it was the intention
of the parties that the contract should depend upon
the continued existence of the particular factory.
DISCHARGE OF CONTRACTS 107
In the same way, if A sells B a crop of rye to be
grown on a particular piece of land, and the crop is
destroyed by a hail-storm before it matures, the con-
tract is discharged, because the subject matter is
destroyed.
The rule arising out of the case of Taylor vs. Cald-
well has in England been extended to cover cases
where, altho some material object is not destroyed, a
state of things which the parties had in mind as es-
sential for performance, ceases to exist.
A number of cases arose out of the fact that vari-
ous contracts were made in preparation for the cor-
onation of King Edward VII, the arrangements
having to be cancelled owing to the postponement of
the coronation. The general principle laid down by
the Court of Appeals to govern these cases was, that
the contract was not voided when the failure of the
condition assumed as its foundation was ascertained,
but all outstanding obligations under it, and those
only, were discharged ; that is, payment already made
could not be recovered back, and any payment which
was actually accrued could be recovered.^
3. Legal impossibility. — The obligation of a per-
son under a contract is discharged if performance is
rendered impossible by law. The performance may
be forbidden, or be impossible by a judgment of the
court, or by the passing of some statute, or otherwise.
In an English case, a lessor covenanted with a lessee
that neither he (the lessor) nor his assignee would
1 Pollock, 440, Bailey vs. DeCrespigny.
108 COMMERCIAL LAW
allow any building on an adjoining piece of land.
Later, acting under an Act of Parliament, a railway
company bought the land and built a station upon it,
while the lease was still in force. An action against
the lessor by the lessee was dismissed, as it was held
by the court that the lessor could not perform his
covenant. The principle of the decision was that by
the Apt of Parliament the lessor had really been
compelled to part with his land to the railway com-
pany; that under the circumstances he was unable to
impose restrictions upon the company, and that the
company was not an assign direct from him, but a
new kind of assign, such as was not contemplated
by the parties when the contract was made. Pol-
lock points out, in commenting upon this decision,
that if the lessor had secured the passing of a private
act upon his own initiative, he would probably have
been bound by his contract toward the lessee.
It has been held in an interesting American case,
that if an employe contracts to work for a definite
period, and to give two weeks' notice of his intention
to leave, or in lieu thereof to forfeit two weeks'
wages, and he is imprisoned for some crime which he
commits, the giving of the notice becomes impossible,
and he is entitled to his wages.
4. Incapacity for personal services. — A contract
for personal services may depend for performance
upon the life or continued health of the person who
promises them. Contracts for personal services,
therefore, which can be performed only during the
DISCHARGE OF CONTRACTS 109
lifetime of the person who promises them are subject
to an implied condition that performance will be pos-
sible and will be made only if he lives or retains his
health. If he dies, his executors or personal repre-
sentatives cannot be sued for breach of the contract,
because the contract has been discharged. Of
course the contract may have provided just the con-
trary, and it may have been stipulated that upon his
death or incapacity certain other persons, among
whom might be his executors or legal representatives,
should be bound to performance.
This point arose in an English case,^ where it was
held, (a person having been under contract to give a
pianoforte recital, and being disabled by illness) :
"This is a contract to perform a service which no
deputy could perform, and which, in case of death,
could not be performed by the executors of the de-
ceased; and I am of the opinion that by virtue of the
terms of the original bargain, incapacity of body o,*
mind in the performer, without default on his or hei
part, is an excuse for non-performance. Of course
the parties might expressly contract that incapacity
should not excuse, and thus preclude the condition
of health from being annexed to their agreement.
Here they have not done so, and, as they have been
silent on that point, the contract must, in my judg-
ment, be taken to have been conditional, and not ab-
solute."
On the same principle a servant is discharged by
1 Robinson vs. Davison, L. R. 6 Ex. 269.
110 COMMERCIAL LAW
the death of his master, and cannot bring action to en-
force the contract against the master's personal rep-
resentatives. In the case of Robinson vs. Davidson,
to which we have referred, the defendant's wife
was a well-known piano player. She made a con-
tract to play at a certain concert. Just before the
concert was to take place she fell ill and was unable
to appjear. The person who had employed her sued
for the loss he had suffered by having to put off the
concert, and judgment was rendered in his favor for
a small amount, on the ground that tho the illness dis-
charged the contract, she had not given notice of her
inability to play within a reasonable time. The
amount awarded was intended to cover the expenses
of the plaintiff in giving notice of postponement to
the public and to subscribers, in excess of what it
might have cost him had she notified him by tele-
graph, instead of by the longer method of writing a
letter. It was laid down in the same case that the
contract became void by her inability to play, and was
not merely voided at her option. She could not have
insisted on performing her engagement when she was
really not in a condition to do so properly. On the
other hand, if the performer had suffered some ac-
cident immediately prior to the hour of engagement,
say while on her way or during the daj^ notice would
hardly be of any use, and there would probably be
no damages which could be assessed against her for
lack of notice. Contracts which are not so personal
that they cannot be performed by a deputy or an
DISCHARGE OF CONTRACTS 111
agent, will not be discharged for such a cause, unless
the parties have agreed that such shall be the case.
5. Liability upon refusing to work under danger-
ous conditions. — There is a good deal of authority' for
the view that a person who has contracted to do a
certain thing will be discharged from his contract if
the performance would bring him into positive dan-
ger, and that under such circumstances he will not be
liable for a breach of his contract if he refuses to per-
form it. If, however, an employer stops work tem-
porarily, as, for example, in the presence of an epi-
demic of scarlet fever, it has been held that he will be
held liable for the wages of his employes during such
time.
Thus if some employes in a mill quit work
because they fear infection owing to an epidemic of
disease, it has been held that they may recover
the value of the work they have done, and as they
were justified, under the circumstances, in refus-
ing to court danger, they will not be liable for dam-
ages for having broken their contract. In a case
decided in Elaine ^ it was laid down: "The plaintiff
was under no obligation to imperil his life by remain-
ing at work in the vicinity of a prevailing epidemic
so dangerous in its character that a man of ordinary
care and prudence, in the exercise of those qualities,
would have been justified in leaving by reason of it,
nor does it make any difference that the men who re-
mained there at work after the plaintiff left were
1 Lakeman vs. Pollard, 43 Me, 463.
112 COMMERCIAL LAW
healthy, and continued to be so. He could not then
have had any certain knowledge of the extent of his
danger. He might have been in imminent peril, or
he might have been influenced by unreasonable ap-
prehensions. He must necessarily have acted at his
peril under the exercise of his judgment."
An epidemic broke out in a school district and
the school authorities closed the school. A teacher
was held entitled in a IVIichigan case to recover his
salary, and the decision laid down that "the plaintiff
continued ready to perform, but the district refused
to open its house and allow the attendance of pupils,
and it thereby prevented performance by the plain-
tiff. Admitting that the circumstances justified the
officers, yet there is no rule of justice which will en-
title the district to visit its own misfortune upon the
plaintiff. He was not at fault. He had no agency
in bringing about the state of things which rendered
it eminently prudent to dismiss the schools. It was
the misfortune of the district, and the district and not
the plaintiff had to bear it." ^ ,
6. Performance impossible by the fault of either
party. — The person promising, the promissor, may
by his own act make it impossible to perform his con-
tract. If so, he is not discharged, and, as he has
committed a breach of his contract, he will be liable
in damages. If, however, by the fault or act of the
promisee, the promissor is prevented from perform-
ing his contract or some part of it, the promissor is
1 Dewey vs. Alpena School District, 43 Mich. 480.
DISCHARGE OF CONTRACTS 113
discharged to that extent. The promissor may in
such case sue for damages; he may also bring action
to rescind the contract and to recover what he may
have paid. Thus if a contractor undertakes to put
up a building and have it completed by a certain date,
and it is stipulated that for every day beyond that
date that he is still engaged on the work he will pay a
penalty of $25, he will not be liable to the penaltj^
or for damages if the delay has been caused by the de-
fault or act of the other party.
It has also been held in an English case ^ that if a
person orders a machine designed to do certain work,
and the contract provides that the machine is to be
accepted only if it prove satisfactory after test, the
buyer will be found to accept and pay for the machine
if he does not provide a fit occasion to make the test,
or if he deals with the machine in such a way as
to prevent a fair test being made, according to the
spirit of the contract. So also if A makes a contract
to buy 1,000 barrels from a manufacturer who agi-ees
to manufacture them. The manufacturer makes and
delivers 500, when he receives a notice from A not to
make any more, as he does not need them and will
not take them. It has been held that A will be liable
in damages to the manufacturer for the breach of his
contract.
7. Discharge by operation of law. — Under certain
conditions, by operation of law, a contract will be
discharged, as, for example, where a contract under
iMackay vs. Dick, 1881, H. L. (S. C. 6 A. C. 351).
XXlV— 9
114 , COMMERCIAL LAW
private signature is replaced by a contract in notarial
form, provided the latter is not intended as a mere
collateral contract or security. The first is said to
be merged in the latter and extinguished. If A and
B enter into a contract, and B, because of A's de-
fault, sues him and secures a judgment against him,
the judgment replaces the contract — the contract is
merged in the judgment. No further action can be
taken upon the contract itself, tho proceedings may
be continued upon the judgment. Where a written
contract is made embodying the terms of an oral con-
tract, the latter is not merged in the former. The
written contract, provided it is not under seal or in
solemn form, is a contract of no higher nature than
the oral contract, but the written contract is better
evidence of what the parties intended, and is given
priority over the other.
A contract may be discharged when some material
alteration or change has been made in it. If it can be
shown that the alteration was made before the docu-
ment was signed, the parties will be held bound. It
may be made after the contract is signed, and the
parties will be bound by it, if it can be shown that
they consented to the change. If, however, after the
contract is made and signed, one of the parties inten-
tionally makes some change in it by an erasure or
otherwise, or gets a third person to make it for him,
without the knowledge and consent of the other party,
then the general rule is that the contract is discharged,
and the person who has not given his consent will not
i
DISCHARGE OF CONTRACTS 115
longer be bound. Occasionally a third person, with-
out the consent of either party, may make some alter-
ation in a written docmnent, and under the later de-
cisions, if the terms of the original contract can be
established, the contract will not be discharged. Gen-
erally speaking, in order that the contract may be dis-
charged, the alteration must be material, in which case
it will not be any question of prejudice.
What may be a material alteration must be de-
cided in each case. As we shall see later when dis-
cussing negotiable instruments, when a bill, note
or other negotiable instrument is materially altered
without the consent of all parties liable on it, the in-
strument is voided, except as against a party who has
himself authorized or assented to the alteration. If,
however, a negotiable instrument has been so altered
that the alteration is not apparent, a person who in
good faith gives value for it before maturity, and with-
out notice of the alteration, may enforce payment of
it. A material alteration is one which alters the op-
eration of the instrument or the liabilit}^ of the parties,
whether the alteration be prejudicial or beneficial.
Thus, a defendant indorsed a note for the accommoda-
tion of the makers ; afterwards they inserted the words
"with interest at 10 per cent," without his knowledge.
He was not liable for value on the note to a bona fide
holder. In an Ontario case, it was held that a note is
discharged by the insertion of the words "jointly and
severally," even tho the holder erased the words before
the objectors became aware of the change. In an-
116 COMMERCIAL LAW
other case decided in England, a draft was materially
altered by the son of the person who accepted it.
The next day the acceptor gave her son full authority
to draw, accept and indorse for her. It was held
that the bill was voided by the alteration.
If the alteration was made by accident or mis-
take, the instrument is not necessarily voided, in
which: case, of course, the burden of proof will be on
the person who alleges that the alteration was not
intentional. It has been laid down, however, that if
the alteration is intentional, but is made under a mis-
taken idea of the rights of the person making the
alteration, the instrument is void. Thus it has been
lield that if a banker cancels a bill by mistake, with-
out any want of due care, he does not incur any lia-
bility; but if there is negligence, he will be held liable
for any loss which results therefrom. The mere fact
that a written contract is lost does not discharge it,
because, upon the loss being proved, oral evidence
maj^ be made of the terms of the contract. Thus
it has been held that where a will is lost, oral evidence
may be given that a will was made, and also a state-
ment of its provisions.
8. Insolvency; proceedings in bankruptcy. — A
debtor may become insolvent, and his assets may be
realized and used to pay his debts, in whole or in part.
If there is not sufficient to pay his creditors in full, he
is not discharged because of insolvency. Under the
Confederation Act, Section 91, the subjects of bank-
ruptcy and insolvency are within the exclusive legis-
DISCHARGE OF CONTRACTS 117
islative jurisdiction of the Dominion Parliament, and
there is no Dominion bankruptcy law. In the
United States, however, where there is a bankruptcy
law, a debtor who makes a general assignment under
the National Act for the benefit of his creditors is
discharged from further liability for his existing
debts. If he turns over all his property for the ben-
efit of his creditors, he can begin business again with-
out fear of being called upon to pay old debts. This
is not the case in Canada.
9. By confusion. — Wlien the qualities of creditor
and debtor are united in the same person, there arises
a confusion, which extinguishes the obligation.^
Thus if A owes B $1,000, and B dies and A is his
universal heir, or B has by will left him all that he has,
A's obligation is discharged. Or if B had been in-
debted to A, and A was B's miiversal heir, the debt
would be extinguished.
10. By compensation. — When two persons are mu-
tually debtor and creditor of each other, both debts
are extinguished by compensation. Compensation
takes place by the sole operation of law between debts
which are equally liquidated and demandable, and
have for object a sum of money or a certain quantity
of indeterminate things of the same kind and quantity.
But compensation does not take place to the preju-
dice of rights acquired by third parties.^
11. Remedies for breach of contract. — It would be
1 Quebec Civil Code, Art. 1198.
2 Quebec CivU Code, Arts. 1188, 1189 and 1196.
118 COMMERCIAL LAW
unfair that where a contract is violated by the act of
one of the parties thereto, the other party should suf-
fer loss. The innocent party is therefore relieved
from performance, and if he has suffered loss he may
bring an action to recover the amount thereof. If
the innocent party has in part performed his side of
the bargain, he may treat the contract as cancelled,
and sue for a reasonable compensation for the part he
has performed, as also for damages, if he has suffered
any. In some cases, as we have seen, specific per-
formance of the contract in full may be demanded.
12. Damages recoverable for breach of contract. —
Where a breach of the contract cannot be justified,
the innocent party is entitled to recover such damages
as he has suffered. He may not have suffered any
damages, but in many cases he will be allowed a
nominal amount. If his loss can be assessed in
money, he is entitled, as was said in an English case,
to be placed, so far as money can do it, in the same situ-
ation, with respect to damages, as if the contract had
been performed. The damages must, however, be
approximate, and they must be capable of being
proved with reasonable certainty. Thus if a Jewish
merchant in Toronto ordered a barrel of special Pass-
over rum from a merchant in New York, to be deliv-
ered in Toronto, and the consignment was delayed in
transit, as, for example, by heavy storms, but under
such conditions that had the carrier been informed
that if the rum was not in Toronto within a reason-
able time before the Passover season it would be use-
DISCHARGE OF CONTRACTS 119
less, it would have made special efforts to forward the
rum in preference to other consignments not required
for a special date, the Toronto merchant could not re-
cover more than a reasonable amount for damages.
He would not, under such conditions, be entitled to
recover speculative damages, namely, the amount
which, in excess of ordinary prices, he might have ob-
tained for the rum because of its special character.
It was laid down in an English case that:
Where a party has broken his contract, the damages which
the other party could recover should be (1) such as may
fairly and reasonably be considered to arise naturally, that
is, according to the usual course of things, from the breach,
or such as may reasonably be supposed to have been in the
contemplation of both parties at the time they made the
contract as the probable result of its breach; that (2) if the
damages arose out of special circumstances, communicated
and so known to both parties when the contract was made,
the damages which the parties would reasonably contemplate
would be the amount of injury which would ordinarily fol-
low from the breach of a contract under those special cir-
cumstances so known and communicated; but (3) if the spe-
cial circumstances were wholly unknown to the party break-
ing the contract, he, at the most, could only be supposed to
have had in his contemplation the amount of injury which
would arise generally, and in the great majority of cases not
be affected by any such special circumstances.
This reasoning applies fully to the case of the Jew-
ish merchant, and is sound law and sense.
REVIEW
What is the effect of impossibility of performance and when
may it occur? When does it discharge the contract?
120 COMMERCIAL LAW
What is the effect of the destruction of the subject matter?
On what does a contract for personal service depend ? Give an
example.
When is a person justified in refusing to carry out a contract
under conditions of danger ?
What is the effect on a contract when the promissor prevents
performance? When the promissor is prevented from perform-
ing?
Give some methods of discharging a contract by operation of
law.
When one party commits a breach of contract, what are the
remedies of the other party to it?
PART II: SPECIAL FORMS OF
CONTRACT
CHAPTER X
SALES: THE CONTRACT
1. Definition. — A sale is a contract by which one
party gives a thing to the other for a price in money,
which the latter puts himself under obligation to pay.
Benjamin defines sale as a transfer of the absolute or
general property in a thing for a price in money.
That there may be a valid sale there must be:
(a) Parties competent to contract.
(b) Mutual assent.
(c) A thing, the absolute or general property in
which is transferred from the seller to the buyer.
(d) A price in money paid or promised.
The difference between the absolute and general
property in the thing sold may be explained in a few
words. In the theory of the law, there may be in a
sense two owners of a thing, one of whom has the gen-
eral and the other a special property in it. The
transfer of the special property is not a sale of the
thing.^ Thus a factor in New Orleans bought a
cargo of corn, with his ot\ti money, on the order of a
1 Benjamin, "Sale," 5th Ed., p. 3.
121
122 COMMERCIAL LAW
London correspondent. He shipped the goods for
account of his correspondent, wrote letters of ad-
vice to that effect, sent invoices to the correspond-
ent, and drew bills of exchange on him for the price ;
but he took bills of lading to his own order, and in-
dorsed and delivered them to a banker, to whom he
sold the bills of exchange. This transaction was held
to be a transfer of the general property to the London
merchant, and therefore a sale to him ; and a transfer
of a special property to the banker by the delivery to
him of the bills of lading, which represented the
goods.^ Benjamin gives as a further illustration the
case where goods are delivered in pawn or pledge ; the
general property remains in the piossession of the
pawnor (which he may transfer to a third person,
subject to the rights of the pawnee), and a special
property is transferred to the pawnee.
2. Distinguishing features. — A sale must be dis-
tinguished from a contract or promise to sell. If A
sells a certain horse outright to B, of course there is
a binding contract of sale; but if A merely promises
to sell a certain horse to B, no sale has taken place, and
the title to the horse is not vested in B — the
title remains in A. B's right is to demand that
the sale be made absolute. Hence an agreement to
sell becomes a sale, when the time elapses or the con-
ditions are fulfilled, subject to which the property in
the goods is to be transferred. The price must be in
money, which is either paid or promised. If goods be
1 Jenkyns vs. Brown, 14 Q. B. 496.
SALES 123
merely exchanged between the parties, there is no sale,
but a barter. If a man does a piece of work and he
receives in consideration thereof certain goods, there
has been a transfer of the general and absolute prop-
erty in the goods, but no sale has taken place. So
also if a person transfers certain goods or things to
another, and receives no consideration in return, there
has been a gift and not a sale. There may be a
transfer of the possession of property, but not of the
ownership, in which case there is a bailment.
3. Parties to a contract of sale. — The general rule
is that the parties to a sale must be competent to con-
tract, and to transfer and acquire property. Only
the owner of the thing or his authorized representa-
tive can give a title, and thus transfer the ownership ;
otherwise the buyer gets no better title than the seller.
Thus if A buys a watch from B which B has stolen
or found, A may pay the full value and be in good
faith, but he cannot claim that he is the owner as
against the true owner who seeks to recover; nor
could A make a valid sale of the watch to some other
person.
The rule apparently does not apply to money which
is stolen. If it is paid over by the thief to other parties
who have given value in good faith, they cannot be
compelled to repay it ; nor would the rule apply to ne-
gotiable instruments which are payable to bearer or
indorsed in blank, if the person who has signed them
has been guilty of negligence which has rendered the
wrongful appropriation more easy. But where a
124 COMMERCIAL LAW
blank acceptance was stolen from the desk of the
signer and filled up, it was held that he was not liable
to a holder in due course, that is, to a person who took
the bill for value before maturity, and without any
knowledge of the facts. The signer was not guilty of
negligence, and had not intended that his signature
should be used without his knowledge and without de-
livery of the instrument by him.
A person may make a valid agreement to sell a
thing which is not his at the moment, and which may
not even be in existence. Thus a person may sell the
crop of wheat which he expects his farm will produce
during the next season, or he may contract to sell
1,000 head of cattle, which he must first go out and
buy.
But a person who finds or steals the goods of an-
other does not get a good title. The general rule is
that the person to whom he transfers the goods, even
tho this person is an innocent purchaser for full value,
does not get a good title. The English rule is that
where goods are sold in market overt (that is, an open,
public and legally constituted market), according to
the usage of the market, the buyer acquires a good
title to the goods, provided he buys them in good
faith and without notice of any defect or want of
title on the part of the seller.
In Quebec, the rule is that if a thing lost or stolen
is bought in good faith in a fair or market, or at a
public sale, or from a trader dealing in similar arti-
cles, the owner cannot reclaim it without reimbursing
SALES 125
to the purchaser the price he has paid for it. If the
thing lost or stolen be sold under the authority of law,
it cannot be reclaimed.^ Apparently the Enghsh
rule of market overt does not prevail in the United
States. Hence, in the United States, if B buys a
horse in a pubhc market from one who is not its owner
and who has no authority, either actual or apparent,
from the owner to sell it, the buyer gets no title which
he can oppose to the owner. B has redi'ess only
against the seller.
4. Subject matter of the sale. — Everji:hing may be
sold which is not excluded by its nature or destination,
or by special provision of law from being an object
of conmierce. A general rule may be stated to
the effect that a present or actual sale can be made
only of things which actually exist at the time and are
owned by the seller. This is now the rule in Eng-
land, tho it was not always so. The English rule
would probably be followed in the Enghsh law prov-
inces. Following that rule, then, one does not sell fu-
ture goods, but makes an agreement to sell them — tho
the contract may be called a sale.
In the United States and in Quebec, on the other
hand, one may make a present sale of future goods
which have a potential existence — and this rule was
formerly recognized in England. Future goods hav-
ing a potential existence are, for example the natural
produce or the expected increase of something al-
ready owned or possessed by the seller. Thus the hay
1 Quebec Civil Code, Arts. 1489-1490.
126 COMMERCIAL LAW
that will grow next season in the seller's field, the wool
that may be clipped from his sheep, the milk that his
cows may yield, and so on. Of these he may make an
immediate grant or assignment by sale. The buyer's
title and right to possession are perfect as soon as the
thing comes into actual existence. Future goods,
such as the hay, or wool, or milk which he may derive
from the field, or sheep, or cows are goods of which he
cannot make an immediate assignment by sale, but
which he can promise or agree to sell. Thus also a
person who is actually employed with some firm may
sell the future earnings of his present employment,
but he cannot make a present sale of the earnings of
an emploj^ment which he expects to get. In the lat-
ter case, the earnings have no potential existence.
He may, however, promise to sell them.
The English rule was laid down in a leading
case : ^
A man cannot in equity, any more than at law, assign
what has no existence. A man can contract to assign prop-
erty which is to come into existence in the future ; and when
it has come into existence, equity, treating as done that
which ought to be done, fastens upon that property, and
the contract to be assigned thus becomes a complete assign-
ment. If a person contracts for value to settle all such
real estate as his father shall leave him by will, or purports
actually to have by the deed of such real estate, the effect is
the same. It is a contract for value which will bind the
property, if the father leaves any property to his son.
This is simply a longer way of saying that while a
1 Collyer vs. Isaacs, 19 Ch. D. 34 Q. at 351, C. A.
SALES 127
sale of future property which has no existence and
does not belong to the seller is invalid, if the seller
subsequently does acquire ownership of the things
which he purports to have sold, the vendee will then
be entitled to treat the contract as a sale.
The distinction may be made clearer by saj^ing that
a person may not make an executed sale of a thing
which has no actual or potential existence ; but he may
make an executory sale of something which he does
not own and which may not exist: that is, he may
make a contract to sell, of which execution may be de-
manded or enforced. As will be readily seen, this is
the kind of contract that is made in the ordinary
course of business, where, for example, a wholesale
house takes orders for goods which it must buy in
order to fulfil its contracts.
If there is an agreement to sell certain specific
goods, which later are destroyed without the fault of
either party and before the risk has passed to the
buj-er, the agreement is discharged, and the buyer,
who may have paid something on account, can get his
money back.
We have spoken so far of goods as things which
may be the subject of sale, that is, of corporeal things.
Incorporeal things, such as rights, may also be bought
and sold. Thus a member of the Toronto Stock Ex-
change has certain membership rights, and he may
sell his stock exchange seat, as it is called. An artist
may protect his drawings by copyright, but he may
sell to other persons the right to print certain repro-
128 COMMERCIAL LAW
ductions of his copyrighted pictures. In an Ameri-
can case, it was held that a man could sell his knowl-
edge of the existence and location of an oil-well. A
ferryman may sell his franchise to conduct a ferry.
A license to carry on mining operations may be the
subject of a sale.
It ha^ long been a question of discussion whether
a person may sell a mere expectancy based upon
chance. In the case of a conditional sale, something
which is hoped for is sold, that is, something which in
the ordinary course of nature it is expected will come
into existence, as a future crop or the young of ani-
mals. If the thing does not come into existence there
is no sale, as the subject matter of the contract has
failed, provided the seller had nothing to do with
preventing the thing from coming into existence.
This is different from the sale of a mere hope or
chance, because here the chance is what is sold: for
example, if a pearl fisherman before starting out sells
his chance of what he may get, the contract is bind-
ing. As was said in an English case: "If a man will
make a purchase of a chance, he must abide by the
consequences." ^
5. Statute of frauds. — The principles of the Eng-
lish Statute of Frauds may be said to apply in a gen-
eral way thruout Canada. The seventeenth section
of the English Statute provides that :
No contract for the sale of goods, wares and merchandise
for the price of £10 sterling or upwards shall be allowed to
1 Benjamin, 5th Ed. 126-127.
SALES 129
be good, except the buyer shall accept part of the goods so
sold, and actually receive the same, or give something in
earnest to bind the bargain, or in part payment, or that some
note or memorandum of said bargain be made and signed by
the parties to be charged by such contract, or their agents
thereunto lawfully authorized.
This statute was later amended by the act knowm
as Lord Tenterden's Act, which provided that the
principles of the statute should apply to agreements
to sell as well as to the sale of goods. Later the Sale
of Goods Act of 1893 was passed, and this act is in
force in some of the English law provinces. The
amount fixed in the various provinces to replace the
£10 sterling of the English act varies. Thus in !Man-
itoba. Alberta, Saskatchewan, British Columbia, Yu-
kon Territory and Quebec, the amount is $50, in On-
tario, Xew Brunswick and Nova Scotia, $40, in
Prince Edward Island, $30 and in Xewfoundland,
$50. Section 4 of the Sale of Goods Acts provides:
(1) A contract for the sale of any goods of the value of
£10 or upwards is not to be enforceable, unless the buyer
shall accept part of the goods so sold and actually receive
the same, or give something in earnest to bind the contract,
or in part payment, or unless some note or memorandum of
the contract in writing be made and signed by the party to
be charged, or his agent in that behalf.
(2) The provisions of this section apply to every such
contract, notwithstanding that the goods may be intended to
be delivered at some future time, or may not at the time of
such future contract be actually made, procured or pro^-ided,
or fit or ready for delivery, or some act may be requisite for
the making or completing thereof, or rendering the same fit
for delivery,
xxrv— 10
130 COMMERCIAL LAW
(3) There is an acceptance of goods within the meaning
of this section, when the buyer does any action in relation to
the goods which recognizes a pre-existing contract of sale,
whether there be an acceptance in performance of the con-
tract or not.
In Quebec the Statute of Frauds, as amended by
Lord Tenter den's Act, is embodied in Article 1235 of
the Civil Code. The article, however, does not adopt
the principles of the Statute of Frauds without mak-
ing certain changes: for example, the Statute of
Frauds fixes the limit at £lO sterling only in the case
of the sale of merchandise, whereas Ai-ticle 1235 ap-
plies the limit of fiftj^ dollars to four different cases.
Again, Lord Tenterden's Act apparently does not
deny the right to prove by witness that some act has
been done to interrupt the prescription which results
from a partial paj^ment, or payment on account;
whereas Article 1235 lays down the opposite rule.^
Article 1235 reads as follows:
In commercial matters in which the sum of money or value
in question exceeds $50, no action or exception can be main-
tained against any party or his representatives, unless there
is a writing signed by the former, in the following cases:
(1) Upon any promise or acknowledgment whereby a debt
is taken out of the operation of the law respecting the limi-
tation of actions; (2) upon any promise or ratification made
by a person of the age of majority of any obligation con-
tracted during his minority; (3) upon any representation
or assurance in favor of a person to enable him to obtain
credit, money or goods thereupon ; (4) upon any contract
for the sale of goods, unless the buyer has accepted or re-
1 Mignault, Vol. 6, p. 98.
SALES 131
ceived part of the goods, or given something in earnest to
bind the bargain.
The foregoing rule applies altho the goods are in-
tended to be delivered at some future time, or are not
ready for delivery at the time of the contract.
In so far as a contract of sale is concerned, how-
ever, the rules in the English law provinces and in the
Province of Quebec are practically alike. In the
United States, there is a conflict of decisions upon the
question, whether or not the rule applies to goods
which have to be manufactured to fulfil the contract.
In the English law provinces and in Quebec this diffi-
culty does not arise. As we have just seen, the Civil
Code provides that the rule is applicable altho the
goods are intended to be delivered at some future
time, or are not ready for delivery at the time of the
contract; and the Sale of Goods Act provides that the
rule applies to the sale of goods which may be in-
tended to be delivered at some future time, or which
at the time of the contract may not be actually made,
or fit for deliver}", or for the making or completing of
which some act may be necessary. Lord Tenterden's
Act specially provides that the principles of the
Statute of Frauds should apply as well to agreements
of sale. Thus this principle is in force thruout Can-
ada either by virtue of Lord Tenterden's Act or by
virtue of the Sale of Goods Act, accordingly as these
are adopted by the various English law pro^Tnces, and
in the Province of Quebec under Article 1235.
6. Satisfaction of the statute. — It is clear, there-
132 COMMERCIAL LAW
fore, that where there is a sale of goods of over fifty
dollars (or over the minimum amount fixed by the
laws of the particular province — see Section 92,
supra), proof cannot be made by oral testimony, im-
less the statute can be satisfied by proof of at least one
of the following circumstances:
(a) That there has been part payment;
(b) Acceptance and receipt by the buyer;
(c) Some written note or memorandum of the con-
tract signed by the parties or their authorized agent.
What may be acceptance under the rule has been
the subject of many decisions. The Sale of Goods
Act provides a rule which would be generally accept-
able, namely, that there is an acceptance of goods
within the meaning of the act when the buyer does
any act in relation to the goods, which recognizes a pre-
existing contract of sale, whether there be an accept-
ance in performance of the contract or not. This
definition brings out the distinction between an ac-
ceptance of the goods and a recognition of the con-
tract. If there has been some act on the part of the
alleged purchaser which shows that he recognized the
fact that there was a contract, an action against him
will be maintained without the necessity of written
proof. He will be held to have accepted.
This does not mean, however, that he will be de-
prived of his right to show that he did not accept the
goods, or that he will not be able to plead that the
goods were not up to sample or otherwise. It means
SALES 133
simply that one of two possible defences is not open
to him. If he had not recognized the contract in any
way, that is, accepted the fact of its existence, and he
had not signed any written document, he could plead
the fact and get the action dismissed, irrespective of
the fact that he might have another plea that the
goods were not up to sample, or were not what he
ordered. But if it is held that there was not sufficient
evidence of his having recognized the existence of the
contract, then, whether he has signed a writing or not,
the creditor may bring action, tho the debtor's right
to raise the question of the proper fulfilment of the
contract is still reserved to him.
Thus in an English case, the defendant, a miller,
orally bought of the plaintiff by sample eighty-eight
quarters of wheat. The wheat was shipped by the
plaintiff's agent on a barge, which arrived at the de-
fendant's mill, and the next morning thirty-eight of
the sacks were hoisted up into the mill and examined
by the defendant, who then directed the bargemen to
send up no more, as the wheat was not equal to
sample. The same day he told the plaintiff's agent
that the wheat was not equal to sample and that he
would not take it. The defendant subsequently re-
turned the thirty-eight sacks to the barge. In an
action for the price, or for damages for non-accept-
ance, the jury were directed that there was evidence
of an acceptance sufficient to satisfy the Statute of
Frauds, altho the defendant was not thereby pre-
134 COMMERCIAL LAW
eluded from rejecting the wheat if not equal to
sample. As a matter of fact, in this case the jury
found that the wheat was equal to sample, and that
the defendant had accepted it within the meaning of
the 17th section of the Statute of Frauds, and gave a
verdict for the plaintiff. This decision was con-
firmed by the English Court of Appeals. It is not
essential in every case that the buyer must have had
actual physical delivery of the goods. He may have
had a constructive possession or delivery of them.
The parties may have agreed that the seller shall hold
the goods as bailee of the buyer, in which case the
buyer has the constructive possession of them. They
may be in the possession of the buyer for some other
purpose, and he and the seller may agree that hence-
forth he shall retain possession as owner. They may
be in the possession of a third party, and it may be
agreed that they shall remain in the possession of such
third party as bailee for the buyer. In all these
cases no actual physical delivery is necessary, because
the buyer has the constructive possession.
The giving of earnest and the part payment of the
price, as they are independent of the main bargain,
may be proved by oral evidence. The part payment
must be accepted as such, and on account of the
price. There is authority for the view that the part
payment or the something given in earnest to bind the
contract "need not be made in money, but that any-
thing of value which by mutual agreement is given
by the buyer and accepted by the seller on account, or
SALES 135
in part satisfaction of the price, will be equivalent to
part pajTiient." ^ And it has been held in England
that under the Statute of Limitations there is part
payment of the debt where there is an agreement that
the debtor should board and lodge the creditor at a
fixed price per week, in deduction of the debt.
It is essential to have some idea of what the note or
memorandimi in writing must be. The parties need
not reduce their contract as a whole to writing: they
may make a contract of which only part is in writing.
Thus A may agree to build a garage for B, and they
may draft a simple writing to that effect, which B
signs. This writing may not mention the price.
Parol evidence may then be made to show what was
the price agreed upon, as the writing is a sufficient
note or memorandum to make possible the rounding
out of the contract of the existence of which it is
proof.
The difference between a mere memorandum and
a ^\Titten contract has been expressed as follows : -
When a memorandum in writing is to be proved as a com-
pliance inth the statute, it differs from a contract in writing
in that it maj- be made at any time after the contract, if be-
fore action commences ; and any number of memoranda may
be made, all being equally originals ; and it is sufficient if
signed by one of the parties only, or his agent ; and if the
terms of the bargain can be calculated from it, altho it be
not expressed in the usual form of an agreement.
The note or memorandum need not be formal. It
1 Benjamin, "Sale,** 5th Ed., p. 227.
aSievewright vs. Archibald, 1851, 17 Q. B. at 107.
136 COMMERCIAL LAW
should contain the terms and subject matter of the
agreement, and the names or descriptions of the
parties, and need be signed only by the person who is
sought to be charged. Generally speaking, if the
note or memorandum consists of several separate
papers, they must be attached to each other, so as to
indicate that they are in reality but one instrument,
or it must be clear from their contents that they relate
to one another. Parol evidence must not be admitted
to connect them.
What may be a note or memorandum has been well
explained as follows : ^
The court is not In quest of the intention of parties, but
only of evidence under the hand of one of the parties to the
contract that he has entered into it. Any document signed
by him and containing the terms of the contract is sufficient
for that purpose. A letter to a third party has been held
enough; an affidavit made in a different matter has been
held to suffice; and I should say that an entry in a man's
own diary, if it were signed by him and its contents were
sufficient, would do. The question is not, what is the inten-
tion of the person signing the memorandum, but is one of
fact, viz., is there a note or memorandum?
7. Contracts for work and labor. — A, who is a
maker of cabinets and desks, accepts an oral order
from B to make a desk for him according to certain
specifications. A makes the desk and tenders it to B,
who refuses to accept it, and upon being sued takes
refuge under the Statute of Frauds. What is the po-
sition of the parties ? A, it is presumed, has supplied
1 Benjamin, p. 346.
I
L
SALES 137
all the materials, as well as the work ; the result of his
work upon his materials is a desk — a chattel. Under
the English law, it is held that such a contract is a
contract of sale between A and B. Conversely, if A
supphes no materials, but only the work and labor,
the contract is one only of work and labor, in which
case B would not be able to plead the Statute of
Frauds.
In certain of the American states, A's contract
would not be looked upon as a contract of sale, but as
a contract for work and labor, and therefore B's plea
would not be good. Thus in Massachusetts, it is held
that since the contract is for a chattel made to a special
order, it is for work and labor. In Xew York, the
view is that since the contract is for a chattel not in
existence when the contract is made, it is for work and
labor. In Quebec, the tendency would be, under the
decisions, to regard the contract as a mixed contract
of sale and for labor, and to allow oral evidence, on
the ground that the transaction is commercial in na-
ture, but is not a contract of sale. This is a very gen-
eral statement of the law, and fuller explanation
would require a complete outline of the decisions to
date.
8. When title passes. — It may be of the utmost im-
portance to determine when title in property which
is sold passes from the seller to the buyer. The gen-
eral rule is that a contract is complete the moment the
consent of the parties is expressed, altho delivery-
may not be then made. If the title does not pass to
138 COMMERCIAL LAW
the purchaser at once, the seller bears the risk of the
loss of the thing before delivery. His creditors may
seize the property, and until the title passes, the sel-
ler is entitled to appropriate any gain or increase that
may arise. If he dies, the title to the property passes
to his heirs or representatives. If the title passes to
the purchaser at the moment of the contract by the
mere consent of the parties, then the vendor's cred-
itors or heirs have no more right to it than he has. If
the thing perishes while in his possession, if he is not
at fault, the purchaser must suffer the loss. The
English rule is to the effect that unless it is otherwise
agreed, the goods remain at the seller's risk until tlie
property therein is transferred to the buyer, but when
the property therein is transferred to the buyer the
goods are at the buyer's risk, whether delivery has
been made or not. If delivery has been delayed by
the fault of one or the other, the goods are said to be
at the risk of the party in fault as regards any loss
which might not have occurred but for such fault.
Whether or not it is intended in a particular case
that the property in the thing sold should pass to the
purchaser will be a question of fact, and will be de-
cided by what appeared to be the intention of the
parties at the time. The risk attaches to the owner-
ship of the goods. The parties may, however, by
agreement arrange that one or the other shall bear the
risk. An agreement to this effect may be inferred
from a course of dealing, or from usage, binding on
both. The courts will not find that the buyer has
SALES 139
assumed the risk before the property has vested in
him, miless his intention to do so is expressed, or is
clearly to be inferred from the circmnstances.^ Thus
in an English case a contract for the sale of a cargo of
ice was under consideration. The contract read in
part as follows:
The vendors forward bills of lading to the purchaser, and
upon receipt thereof the said purchaser takes upon him-
self all risks and dangers of the seas, rivers and navigation,
of whatever nature or kind soever, and the said Playford
agrees to buy and receive the said ice on its arrival at or-
dered port . . . and to pay for the same in cash on delivery
at 20s. per ton, weighed on board during delivery.
The ship was lost at sea. The sellers brought ac-
tion for the price of the ice, and the purchaser pleaded
that the cargo did not arrive at the ordered port. It
was held that as the ice did not arrive, the property
did not pass by the terms of the contract, and would
not pass until the ice was weighed on board ; that con-
sequently the time for payment had not arrived, and
that the defendant was not hable; that the provision
with regard to risk was to protect the seller from lia-
bility for non-delivery caused by dangers of the sea.^
This judgment was reversed in the' Exchequer
Chamber, on the ground that the property passed on
shipment and delivery of the bills of lading, and that
the purchaser had stipulated that upon receipt of the
bills of lading the purchaser "takes upon himself all
risks and dangers of the seas, etc." Having under-
1 Benjamin, pp. 403-3.
2 Castle vs. Playford, 1870, L. R. 5 Ex. 165,
140 COMMERCIAL LAW
taken all the risks and dangers of the seas, and agree-
ing to buy and receive the said ice, the defendant was
bound to his contract to pay if delivery was prevented
by dangers of the sea, and it was immaterial whether
the property passed or not.
In another case 1,090 sugar loaves, comprised in
four batches, marked and lying apart in a warehouse,
were sold by the manufacturer to a broker. Each
loaf weighed from thirty-eight to forty-two pounds
and was, according to usage, weighed on being taken
away by the buyer. The terms were: "Prompt at
one month; goods at seller's risk for two months."
The goods had been paid for in advance of being
weighed, at an approximate sum, which was to be
afterward definitely adjusted and settled when the
goods came to be weighed and delivered; and part of
them had been taken away by the purchaser. The
residue was destroyed by fire after the lapse of the
two months and before being weighed. It was held
that the property had passed to the purchaser, the
parties having, by fixing upon a provisional estimate
of the price, shown an intention that the property
should not depend upon the weighing to fix the exact
amount, and the goods being specific. The fact that
the contract provided that the goods should be at the
seller's risk for two months, showed that it was in-
tended that the property should be in the buyer, as
otherwise such a provision would not be necessary.^
The general rule is that when things which are
1 This decision is reproduced as outlined in Benjamin, p. 404.
SALES 141
movable are sold by weight, number or measure and
not in the lump, the sale is not perfect until they have
been weighed, counted or measured; but the contract
may stipulate the contrary. If, however, the subject
matter of the sale is complete and in a deliverable con-
dition, then, as we have seen, the title or property in
the thing sold passes at once, altho delivery may be
delayed.
9. Conditional sale, — Goods may be sold subject to
some condition: for example, if a thing is sold upon
trial, the presumption is that the sale is made upon a
suspensive condition, unless there is apparent a con-
trary intention. The title would not pass in this case
until the buyer had indicated his approval and his in-
tention to buy. If he retains the thing sold to him on
approval for an unreasonable time, or for a period
longer than that agreed upon, his approval will be
implied. If he in turn sells the goods to another, his
approval will naturally be implied.
It has been laid down in one or more English cases,
that where the contract is to the effect that the buyer
may at his option rescind the sale by the return of
the goods, and the goods are destroyed or injured
while in his possession, but without his fault, he is not
liable to pay the price because of his inability to re-
turn the goods. It is said that the risk attaches to
the person "who is eventually entitled to the property
in the chattel." Of course the buyer who has such a
right of option should exercise it within a reasonable
time.
142 COMMERCIAL LAW
AVhen goods are ordered from a distance, at what
time does the title to them pass to the buyer? A
merchant in Toronto writes to a merchant in Mon-
treal giving him an order to forward one thousand
bars of pig iron of a certain kind. The merchant in
Montreal must proceed to select the bars, and to ap-
propriate them to the contract. The mere fact that
he selects them cannot be said to transfer the owner-
ship of them ; supposing even that he lays them aside
in his warehouse, undoubtedly he may change his
mind and select another lot. It is probable that the
bars are not appropriated to the contract until they
are dispatched by being placed in a car, or until some
other act is done from which it may be inferred that
the seller has divested himself of the possession and
ownership of them.
Benjamin gives the following example: he sup-
poses that A sells out of his brick yard one thousand
bricks to B, who is to send his cart and take them
away. Here B, says Benjamin, is to do the first act,
and cannot do it until the selection is determined.
He may go about the yard from stack to stack and
select the bricks, and he may change his mind from
time to time, up to the point where iinally he de-
termines the selection by putting the bricks into his
cart to be taken away. Once that is done, his selec-
tion is determined, and he cannot change his mind and
replace the bricks he has taken by others. If on the
other hand it had been agreed that A was to load the
bricks into B's cart, A would be free to select the
SALES 143
bricks, and to change his mind as to his selection until
he had finally loaded the bricks into B's cart. Lord
Blackburn has laid it down that:
It follows from this that where from the terms of an exec-
utory agreement to sell unspecified goods, the vendor is to
dispatch the goods, or to do anjthing to them that cannot
be done till the goods are appropriated, he has the right to
choose what the goods shall be; and the property is trans-
ferred the moment the dispatch or other act is commenced,
for then the appropriation is made finally and conclusively
by the authority conferred in the agreement.
And in Lord Coke's language :
The certainty and thereby the property begins by selec-
tion. But however clearly the vendor may have expressed
an intention to choose particular goods, yet until the act
has actually commenced, the appropriation is not final, for
it is not made by the authority of the other party, nor bind-
ing upon him.^
In an interesting English case ^ there was an ap-
propriation by the seller to which the buyer later as-
sented. The seller had a lot of sugar in bulk. The
buyer bought twenty hogsheads of* it. The seller
filled and delivered four hogsheads, and later filled the
sixteen remaining hogsheads, set them aside and then
gave notice to the buyer to take them away. This the
buyer promised to do. It was held that there was an
assent to the appropriation of the sixteen hogsheads,
and that the property therein passed to the buyer.
This decision will be better miderstood when we say,
1 Blackburn on "Sale," p. 139.
2 Rohde vs. Thwaites, 6 B. & C. 388.
144 COMMERCIAL LAW
that when a person buys an unascertained portion of
a larger bulk, he acquires no property in any part
until there has been a separation of the portion, and
until it has been appropriated to the contract by the
consent of both parties, tho this consent may be ex-
press or implied.
Where the goods sold are delivered to the carrier,
the presumption is that they are appropriated to the
contract, because it is assumed that the parties so in-
tended. It may have been intended, however, and if
so it may be shown that the title should not pass until
the buyer actually got delivery. For supposing that
the seller, while he appropriates the goods to the con-
tract and actually dispatches them, keeps control of
them b}^ taking the bill of lading in his own name, it
is clear that, under these circumstances, the seller
has no intention of parting with the title to the goods
until he is sure that the buyer is solvent, and can and
will pay for them.
Frequently goods are sold and shipped C.O.D.
The courts are by no means unanimous in their hold-
ings as to when the title passes to the buyer. It has
been held in some cases that title passes to the buyer
when the goods are received by the carrier; in other
cases that they do not pass until the buyer pays for
them. Certainly, however, if the buyer does not pay
for them he is not entitled to the possession of the
goods.
The general rule is that where things movable are
sold by weight, number or measure, as part only of a
r
SALES 145
mass, and not in the lump, the sale is not perfect until
they have been weighed, counted or measured. In
other words, the part that is sold must be separated
from the mass, and the weight, and number of meas-
ure ascertained before the sale is complete. Ordi-
narily the buyer should have notice or knowledge that
the weighing, measuring or counting has been per-
formed, or he should be present thereat. This case is
distinguishable from the case where several persons
are owners or tenants, in common, of a mass of goods.
Thus A, B and C may own in common, in equal or in
unequal proportions, all the wheat in a certain ele-
vator. Any of them may sell and give a good title to
his portion of the wheat, altho it is mixed with that of
the others. Delivery could be made by merely hand-
ing a delivery order to the purchaser, who would be en-
titled to deal with the portion of the wheat which he
had bought. Such a sale is perfect without the por-
tion which is sold being separated from the mass.
But if A were to sell one thousand bushels of his por-
tion, the sale would not be complete until the thousand
bushels were measured out, and the measure checked
or accepted by the purchaser.
10. When the seller retains possession. — As we
have seen, a sale of an article may be made, upon
which the title to the article passes inmiediately to the
purchaser. The seller may, however, retain posses-
sion. Such a transaction must be in absolute good
faith, and must not be made simply to enable the sel-
ler to say to his creditors that the article in question
XXIV— 11
146 COMMERCIAL LAW
had been sold to B. If in reality there was no sale,
and B did not intend to take delivery, this sale would
probably be held to be void, in so far as it would ap-
pear to have been made solely to benefit the seller.
Tlie purchaser would have to come forward and prove
his honesty of performance, that the title actually
passed to him but that, as a matter of convenience, the
seller retained possession.
11. Goods to he manufactured. — When a contract
is made for goods to be manufactured, a presumption
arises that title is not to pass until the goods are ready
for delivery. This presumption obtains even when
tlie whole of the purchase price is paid at once, or
when the buyer exercises a superintendence or control
over the work. In some cases it is held that title does
not pass until acceptance by the buyer of the manu-
factured article, but by the weight of authority it
passes when the article is put in a dehverable condi-
tion.
It must always be remembered, in this connection,
that there is a difference between an actual sale and a
mere executory agreement to sell. In the case of an
actual sale, the title to the thing sold passes at once to
the buyer (this is the general rule) as soon as the con-
tract is concluded, whether the goods be delivered
to the buyer or remain in the possession of the seller.
In an agreement to sell, the property does not pass
when the contract is made ; the goods remain the prop-
erty of the seller until the contract is executed.
12. Sales by sample. — In the case of a contract for
SALES 147
sale by sample there is an implied condition that the
bulk shall correspond in quahty with the sample ; that
the buyer shall have a reasonable opportunity of com-
paring the bulk with the sample: and that the goods
shall be free from any defect rendering them mi-
merchantable, which would not be apparent on rea-
sonable examination of the sample. These rules are
based upon jurisprudence, and may be taken to be
generally applicable.
The title in goods sold by sample will pass when the
goods are put in a deliverable condition, and are ap-
propriated to the contract. The mere fact that a
sample is exhibited does not make the sale a sale by
sample. The sample may be shown, but the seller
may refuse to sell by it, and it may be agreed that
the buyer shall inspect the whole at his own risk.
On the other hand, the buyer may be unwilling to
trust to the sample, and may demand an express con-
dition or warrant}'. This follows from the rule that
a contract for sale by sample must be express or im-
plied. It may be shown that the sale was a sale by
description and not by sample. For example, where
the seller accepted a sale of sassafras wood and the
buyer inspected it, and he was experienced in buy-
ing such wood, but the seller described the goods in the
contract as "fair merchantable sassafras wood," the
seller was held bound to deliver fair merchantable
sassafras wood, as the goods had been sold upon this
description and not upon the sample.
In an American case decided by the Court of Ap-
148 COMMERCIAL LAW
peals of the State of New York,^ an average sample
was taken of a large quantity of beans contained in a •
number of packages, by drawing samples from all
the packages and mixing them together, it was held
that the purchaser could not reject any of the pack-
ages on the ground that they were inferior to the aver-
age, nor recover for the difference in value on that
ground. It was laid down that the true test was,
provided that the contents of all the packages de-
livered were mixed together, whether the quality of
the bulk so formed was equal to that of the average
sample drawn.
An interesting case was decided by the Supreme
Court of the United States in 1870.^ A commission
merchant in Boston instructed his brokers to sell a
quantity of foreign wool received, but only in case
the purchaser came to Boston and examined the wool
for himself. The broker sent the prospective pur-
chasers at their request samples of the wool, as a re-
sult of which the latter were to make an offer of fifteen
cents a pound, all round, if the goods were equal to the
sample furnished. This offer was accepted, with the
proviso, however, that the purchasers would examine
the wool on the following Monday, and should on
that day declare whether they would take it or not.
The purchasers went to Boston and examined four
bales, as fully as they wished, and were informed that
they could examine the remaining bales or have them
1 Leonard vs. Fowler, 42 N. Y. 289.
2 Barnard vs. Kellog, 10 Wall. 383.
i
»
SALES 149
opened for inspection. This they declined. The
goods were bought, and later, when they were opened
by the purchasers, it was found that some of the bales
had in the middle of them a quantit}^ of rotten
and damaged wool, concealed by the outer layers
which were in good condition. The purchasers
brought action to recover for their loss. The good
faith of the seller was not doubted. The action was
based upon the following grounds: that the sale
was a sale by sample, and that there was a prom-
ise express or implied that the bales should not be
falsely packed. The first court held that there was
no express warranty that the bales which were not ex-
amined should be up to the standard of those which
were examined, but that by the custom of merchants
and dealers in foreign wools in Boston, there was an
implied warranty that the goods were of the same
quality thruout, in view of the fact that to examine
each bale separately would be a work of great length
and practically an impossibility ; and that, as a result,
this warranty arising out of custom was binding on
the seller. In the Supreme Court, however, this de-
cision was set aside on the following grounds: (l)
that as the purchasers had gone to Boston to inspect
the goods for themselves, the sale could not be said
to be a sale by sample; the purchasers had in reality
had an opportunity to examine the goods, and must
be held to have assented that the sale should take place
after such examination as was made ; ( 2 ) that by the
rule of the common law, where a purchaser inspects
150 COMMERCIAL LAW
for himself the specific goods sold, and there is no ex-
press warranty and no fraud on the part of the seller,
who is not the manufacturer nor the grower of the
goods sold, the maxim caveat emptor — let the buyer
beware — applies, and (3) that as by law no warranty
is implied under the circumstances, it is not permis-
sible to make evidence that by custom such a warranty
is implied. This is especially time in this case as it
was not shown that the parties had any knowledge of
the custom, and therefore were not transacting with a
knowledge thereof.^
REVIEW
Distinguish between sale and a contract to sell; between sale
and barter; between sale and gift; between sale and bailment.
Who may be parties to a sale ?
Define actual and potential existence. May a valid sale of in-
corporeal things be effected?
What is the provision of the English Statute of Frauds in re-
gard to the sale of chattels? In what ways may the Statute be
satisfied?
What is the general rule about the completion of a contract?
At what time does the title pass to the buyer in a conditional sale ;
in a C.O.D. sale; in sales by sample?
iThis holding is summarized from the outline given in Benjamin, p.
643-4.
CHAPTER XI
SALES: PERFORMANCE OF THE CONTRACT
1. Deliver ij of the goods. — The principal obliga-
tions of the seller are the delivery and the warranty
of the thing sold: reciprocally, the obligations of the
purchaser are to receive the goods and to pay the
price. The general rule is, where there is no con-
trary arrangement, that upon delivery the price must
be paid. The seller cannot sue for the price before
offering to deliver, nor can the buyer sue for the goods
before tendering the price.
By delivery is meant the transfer of the thing sold
into the power and possession of the buyer. The obli-
gation of the seller to dehver is satisfied when he puts
the buj^er in actual possession of the thing, or consents
to such possession being taken by him, with all
hindrances thereto removed.^ The English Sale of
Goods Act says that delivery means volmitary trans-
fer of possession from one person to another. Deliv-
ery in this sense, then, means a transfer of possession.
The word is, however, capable of various shades of
meaning and apphcation. If the goods are already
in the possession of the buyer when the sale is made,
no further deliver}'' is necessary. The deliver^' in
such a case is completed by the seller's expression of
1 Quebec CivU Code, Article 1493.
151
152 COMMERCIAL LAW
consent that the title shall pass to the buyer and that
he shall remain in possession. When a sale has been
made, the buyer's right is to take possession, and the
seller's duty is to give possession. It may be agreed,
however, that the seller shall retain possession until
some condition is fulfilled, as, for example, until pay-
ment of the price in full or in part, or until the buyer
calls for delivery ; it may be that the parties will agree
that the buyer shall take delivery in instalments.
The goods may be sold on credit, in which case there
is a transfer of title and a transfer of the right of pos-
session. In this case, however, supposing that before
obtaining actual possession the buyer becomes insolv-
ent, the seller may refuse to part with possession, in
order to retain his lien on his only means of obtaining
payment.
When incorporeal things are sold, there must
nevertheless be delivery to complete the sale. The
delivery of incorporeal things is made by delivery of
the titles, or by the use which the buyer makes of such
things to the knowledge of the seller.^
2. Place of delivery. — Where delivery shall take
place is a matter to be arranged by the parties, or to
be implied, according to circumstances. If there is no
contract, express or implied, the place of delivery is the
seller's place of business or, in the absence thereof,
his residence. If the contract is for the sale of specific
articles which, when the contract is made, the parties
1 Quebec Civil Code, Article 1494.
I
PERFORMANCE OF THE CONTRACT 153
know are in some other place, that place will be the
place of delivery, unless it is agreed otherwise. It
may, of com'se, be implied from a course of dealing be-
tween the parties, from general usage, or from the na-
ture of the goods, that deliver}^ is to be made elsewhere
than at the place of business or residence of the seller.
If, under the contract, the seller is bound to send the
goods to the buyer, and no time for doing so is named,
he must send them within a reasonable time. If the
seller is not to deliver until the purchaser has per-
formed some act or fulfilled some condition, the seller
will not be held in default for non-deliveiy until the
purchaser has notified liim of the performance of the
act upon which delivery is to be made. If A, the
o^mer of a ship, buys supplies from B, and the ar-
rangement is that the supplies are to be delivered as
soon as the ship is ready to receive them, A must no-
tify B of the name and berth of the ship, and of his
readiness to take delivery, before he can complain that
delivery has not been made.
Unless it is otherwise agreed, the expenses of de-
livery, which will include the putting of the goods into
a dehverable state, must be borne by the seller, and
unless it is otherwise stipulated, the expenses of re-
moving the thing are at the charge of the buyer.
Hence if the buyer is compelled to pay the expenses
of delivery thru the fault of the seller, he can re-
cover the amount from the latter. If the seller does
not pay the expenses, it has been held that he may be
154 COMMERCIAL LAW
prevented from alleging or proving that he is ready
and willing to deliver, and the buyer may be entitled
to refuse to accept the goods.
3. Delivery to a carrier. — If the seller is, under the
contract, authorized or required to send the goods to
the buyer, his obligation is fulfilled b)?^ delivering them
to a carrier who may or may not be named by the
buyer, but who is nevertheless deemed to be the agent
of the buyer for the purpose of transmission. Hence
delivery to the carrier is as a rule delivery to the
buyer. There can be no doubt about it if the deliv-
ery is made to a carrier who is named by the buyer.
This position will not be altered by the fact that the
seller makes a contract with the carrier; he will be
held to have made it on behalf of the buyer, even
tho he pays the carrier. His contract with the
carrier must be reasonable, having regard to the na-
ture of the goods, the necessity for quick transport,
the necessity for protection against the weather, and
so on.
Under the English law, at least, if the seller omits
to exercise such care in instructing and making his
contract with the carrier, and as a result the goods
are lost or damaged in transit, the buyer may decline
to treat the delivery to the carrier as a delivery to
himself, or he may sue the seller for the damages he
has suffered. Delivery to a carrier of the goods con-
tracted for, to be shipped by a method different from
that provided by the contract, is not such a delivery
as is contemplated by the parties. Thus, where goods
PERFORMANCE OF THE CONTRACT 155
were sold by the plaintiffs to the defendant, and by
the contract between them the goods were to be
shipped by freight, and were handed by the plaintiffs
to a railway company, to be shipped by express to the
defendant, and were not in fact delivered to him, it
was held that the defendant was not liable for the
price of the goods. The fact that the goods were
shipped by a faster means of transportation, which
might be for the benefit of the defendant, but with-
out his knowledge or consent, could not change the
rights of the parties under the contract.^
The presumption that the carrier is the buyer's
agent may be rebutted; for example, if the seller re-
serves the right of disposal of the goods by taking a
bill of lading to the order of himself or a third person,
in order to insure pajTuent of the price, the bill of
lading must be indorsed by the seller or such third
person, and this constitutes dehvery, but not to the
purchaser. In this case the carrier would be deemed
to be the agent of the seller, and if the goods were lost
or damaged in transit, the loss would be upon the
seller. If the seller, in making a sale of goods, should
undertake that he would make the dehvery himself at
some place other than that where they are when sold,
the can'ier is the seller's agent, and the risks of car-
riage are assumed by the latter. Tho the carrier
may be the agent of the seller, the buyer takes the
risk of deterioration in the goods, which is necessarily
incident to the course of transit, because such risks
1 McGowan Cigar Co. vs. O'FIynn, 19 O. L. R. 8T7.
156 COMMERCIAL LAW
would arise whether the carrier were the agent of the
buyer or of the seller. Thus in an English case it was
held that where hoop-iron was sold in Staffordshire,
deliverable in Liverpool in the winter, and the iron
was rusted and unmerchantable when delivered in
Liverpool, the seller had made a good delivery, upon
proving that this deterioration was the necessary re-
sult of the transit, and that the iron was bright and
in good order when it left Staffordshire.*
4. Tiitie of delivery. — If the seller is bound to make
delivery of the goods, either to a carrier or to the
buyer direct, delivery must be made at the time fixed
in the contract. If no time is fixed, delivery must be
made within a reasonable time.
What may be a reasonable time will depend upon
the circumstances in each case. If it is agreed that
delivery is to be made at a time to be fixed later, as,
for example, by the buyer, the seller will be entitled
to await notice from the buyer, calling for deliveiy.
If a time for delivery has been fixed, then the buyer
may refuse to take delivery either before or after such
time. If the contract provides for delivery "imme-
diately," *'forthwith," or "as soon as possible," a rea-
sonable time will be allowed for delivery. What may
be a reasonable time will be a question of fact. If A
makes a contract with B to buy certain goods, which
are to be delivered at some time between the 1st and
the 30th of the next month, B may deliver the goods
1 Bull vs. Robinson, 1854, 10 Ex. 342.
PERFORMANCE OF THE CONTRACT 157
on the 1st or the 30th day of the month, or on any
intervening day.
If the contract does not state the hour at which
delivery is to he made, it must be made at a reason-
able hour. Delivery cannot be demanded or be made
at an unreasonable hour; it should be made or de-
manded as a rule during business hours. It has been
laid do^^Ti that if delivery is to be made at a specified
place, where the buyer must be to receive the goods,
the delivery should be made before sunset. The rule
is not a hard and fast one, however, so that if the buyer
happened to be at the place designated for delivery,
and the goods could be easily examined, a tender of
delivery, tho made at night, would probably be suf-
ficient.
5. Quantity specified must be delivered. — The seller
must deliver the full quantity sold as it is specified in
the contract. The buyer cannot be forced to accept
less or more than he has contracted to buy. Thus it
was held that where a contract for the sale of goods
is an entire one, and tlie vendor withholds any of them,
the purchaser need not accept delivery of the remain-
ing portion, but may repudiate the agreement and
recover any money paid on account of the purchase
price.^
When a person has purchased goods to be delivered
as a whole, he need not accept them in instalments.
It is his privilege to reject fulfilment of the contract
1 Blomquist vs. Tymchorak, 23 W. L. R. 305.
158 COMMERCIAL LAW
in any other way than as specified. If, however, he
accepts less than the goods lie has contracted for, or
accepts instalments thereof, he must pay for them at
the contract rate. Generally speaking, if the seller
delivers a larger quantity of goods than was pur-
chased, ilae buyer may accept the goods covered by the
contract and reject the balance, or he may reject the
whole. If he accepts all that are delivered, he must
pay for them at the contract rate.
Thus if A purchases ten hogsheads of wine from B
and B sends fifteen, A may consider the contract as
not performed, for he is unable to tell which are the
ten that are to be his, and he is not bound to make a
choice of any ten hogsheads, for that would be to force
a new contract upon him. The delivery of more than
ten is really a proposal for a new contract. Ap-
parently, also, if the seller delivers the goods that have
been bought with other goods not covered by the con-
tract, the buyer may accept the goods covered by the
contract and reject the rest, or he may reject the
whole.
Where a person contracted to deliver one hundred
bags of hops on or about January 1, and on December
12 he delivered twelve bags in part performance of his
contract, and no time for payment was mentioned, it
was held that he could not demand payment for the
hops delivered before the expiration of the time fixed
for delivery of the balance.* The fact that the buyer
in this case accepted the twelve bags would not de-
1 Waddington vs. Oliver, 2 B. & P. N. R. 61.
I
PERFORMANCE OF THE CONTRACT 159
prive him of his right to sue for breach of the contract
if the remaining bags were not delivered according to
the contract.
The contract may be severable. A tender of tlie
amomit of any severable part is to the extent thereof
sufficient; thus an instahnent contract may provide
that each delivery shall constitute a separate contract,
in which case each delivery will stand by itself. If the
seller makes default in connection with one such in-
stalment, it is not as a rule open to the buyer to re-
pudiate the remaining instalments. Thus if the con-
tract is for the sale and shipment of iron ore at differ-
ent times, pajTiient to be made upon delivery, and one
instalment of the ore shipped does not fulfil the re-
quirements of the contract, the buyer is not justified,
under ordinary circumstances, in refusing to accept
the remaining shipments which conform to the terms
of the contract. The failure of the seller to deliver a
severable portion of the goods or articles contracted
for, or the failure of the buyer to take delivery thereof,
may, however, give rise to the right to repudiate the
contract as a whole. Benjamin, discussing the mat-
ter, says:
A contract for the delivery of goods by instalments, the
the instalments are to be separately paid for, and the con-
tract is in consequence so far divisible, is, like all other con-
tracts, one that may be repudiated by either party if the
other party refuses to perform it. But the question often
arises whether a mere partial breach by either party justifies
the other in repudiating the unfilled part of the contract.
The rule at common law is that, in the absence of an express
160 COMMERCIAL LAW
refusal, the question to be considered is whether the conduct
of the party in fault amounts to an implied refusal to per-
form the contract, for it is not every breach by one party
which gives to the others the right of rescission. The breach
must be in a matter going to the root of the contract. Such
a breach negatives the readiness and willingness of the party
in fault to be bound by the contractual relation any further,
and may be accepted as an offer to rescind.
Generally speaking, it will depend upon the circum-
stances in each case, whether the breach in the fulfil-
ment of part of the contract is a repudiation of the
whole, or whether it is a severable breach which gives
rise to a claim for compensation, but not to a right to
treat the whole contract as repudiated.
6. Quality specified must he delivered. — Xot only
must the seller deliver the quantity purchased, but he
must deliver goods of the quality specified in the con-
tract. The buyer is entitled to a reasonable opportu-
nity to inspect the goods, in order to determine
whether they are of the quality mentioned in the con-
tract. The seller must, when tendering delivery, give
the buyer such reasonable opportunity as he desires to
examine the goods for this purpose. Ordinarily the
goods will be inspected at the place of delivery. The
purchaser who takes the goods for the purpose and
with the intention of inspecting them does not thereby
accept them; and if he finds that they are not of the
quality contracted for he may reject them. In such
case he is not bound to return them to the seller,
tho he must allow the seller to re-take them.
Where a purchaser was notified that certain goods
PERFORMANCE OF THE CONTRACT 161
which he had bought were lying at a designated wharf
ready for dehvery on payment of the price, and he
went to the wharf and appHed for permission to ex-
amine the goods, and was shown two closed casks
which were said to contain them, but was refused per-
mission to open the casks, it was held that no valid
offer of delivery had been made to him.
It has also been held that where a buyer had in-
spected the goods before the sale, and by the contract
the goods were to be held by the seller subject to the
buyer's orders and in good condition, he was entitled
to further inspection before taking delivery. This
further inspection was refused, and the buyer was held
entitled to refuse deliverj^. If, on the other hand, the
seller offers the buyer a reasonable opportunity to in-
spect the goods, and the buyer refuses to inspect them,
the seller might be justified in refusing to make deliv-
ery.
7. Symbolic or constructive delivery. — An actual
physical transfer of the thing sold to the buyer is not
always essential to constitute delivery and to pass title.
Where, for example, the goods sold are ponderous and
incapable of being handed over physically from seller
to buyer, an actual delivery will be dispensed with.
In such a case the delivery of a key to the warehouse
in which the goods are lodged will be sufficient. Simi-
larly, the transfer to the buyer of bills of lading which
represent the goods is a sufficient delivery. This
would not be sufficient, however, if the goods are sub-
ject to hens or charges in favor of the bailee or other
XXIV— 12
162 COMMERCIAL LAW
person who has the physical possession of the goods,
and who may retain them until his charges are paid.
For example, if A ships goods to B by rail, and A has
undertaken to pay the freight, but does not do so, the
railway is entitled to hold the goods until its charges
are paid. A may have forwarded documents of title
to B, but these will not constitute delivery to B until A
pays the freight charges.
8. Warranties: definition and classification. — A
warranty is an agreement of indemnity, relating to the
character, quality or title of the thing sold, and form-
ing part of the contract of sale, tho collateral to its
express object, by which the seller insures the buyer
against loss or against failure of one or more of its
terms. Warranties may be express or implied.
The parties may by special agreement add to the
obligation of legal or implied warranty, or diminish
its effect, or exclude it altogether.
An express warranty, therefore, is an explicit state-
ment by the seller of some material fact concerning the
subject matter of the sale, and in virtue of which the
buyer is induced to make the contract. Such a war-
ranty is collateral to the main purpose of the contract,
and the breach of it as a rule gives rise to a claim for
damages, but not to a right to reject the goods and to
treat the contract as repudiated. The warranty may
be oral or written. If the contract of sale is a com-
plete document in writing, an oral warranty may not
be admissible under the Parol Evidence Rule, unless
it is fraudulent.
PERFORMANCE OF THE CONTRACT 163
As a rule, antecedent representations made as an
inducement to the buyer, but which do not form part of
the contract when completed, are not warranties. If
the representation is made in the course of the dealings
leading up to the bargain, it will be a warranty, pro-
vided it is incorporated into the bargain as part of it.
Thus a man bought a horse at auction without war-
ranty. The day before the sale he examined the horse
at the stables, and in the course of his examination the
auctioneer said to him: "You have nothing to look
for; I assure you he is perfectly sound in event' re-
spect," to which he replied : "If you say so, I am sat-
isfied," and made no further examination. The horse
proved to be unsound, tho the seller did not know it,
and therefore there was no fraud. The purchaser
brought action, and claimed that the conversation in
question was a private warranty to him, altho the auc-
tioneer put up the horse without warranty. It was
held that this private conversation, and the representa-
tion therein made, did not form part of the contract
which was made by the buyer when he bid for the
horse. The representation was held to be merely an
expression of the seller's opinion and judgment, and
that he could not be held responsible for it, if, when
he made it, he was in good faith.
A warranty may be made after the sale, in which
case, imder the English law at least, there must be
a new consideration to support such subsequent war-
ranty.
Legal or imphed warranty is that which arises by
164 COMMERCIAL LAW
operation of law, without stipulation in the contract:
it may also arise from usage or custom, or from the
conduct of the parties. Thus it is an implied war-
ranty in the case of a sale of goods by sample that the
goods sold shall correspond in quality with the sample.
There is an implied warranty that goods sold are in a
merchantable state or condition ; that there is no latent
defect in the thing sold such as will render it unfit for
the use for which it was intended, or which will so
diminish its usefulness that the buyer would not have
bought it, or would not have given so large a price for
it, had he known that the defect existed. Where, how-
ever, the defects are apparent and are such that the
buyer might have known of them himself, the rule of
caveat emptor will apply.
Generally speaking, if the buyer buj^s on his own
judgment, that is, if he selects or defines the specific
thing or class of things which he requires, there is not
an implied warranty on the part of the seller that the
things bought will fulfil the purpose of the buyer. If,
on the other hand, the buyer tells the seller that he
wants certain goods for a certain purpose, and leaves
the seller to exercise his judgment and supply the
proper goods, then there will be an implied warranty
on the part of the seller that the goods are not only
merchantable but that they are fit for the purpose ex-
pressed. Again, there is an implied warranty that
when a thing is sold it is in existence. If A sells B a
cargo of fruit which is supposed to be in transit be-
tween Havana and New York, and the day before the
PERFORMANCE OF THE CONTRACT 165
sale the ship is wrecked and the fruit is destroyed, the
sale is void, and B may recover what he has paid. It
has been said that in such a case there is an implied
warranty that the fruit is in existence when the con-
tract is made. It is also said that the warranty is
rather in the nature of a condition precedent which is
of the essence of the contract, and not a collateral un-
dertaking.
9. Implied tcarranty of title. — The Civil Code of
Quebec lays down a rule generally applicable. The
seller, it says, is obliged by law to warrant the buyer
against eviction of the whole or any part of the thing
sold, by reason of the act of the former, or of any right
existing at the time of the sale, and against encum-
brances not declared and not apparent at the time of
the sale. In other words, the seller impliedly war-
rants his right to sell : that he has a title, and that he
may give a free and clear title to the purchaser. If it
turns out that the seller had not a good title, then the
buyer may sue for a return of the price where he is
compelled to surrender the thing to the true owner, as
on a total failure of consideration, and may add to
his claim a demand for damages, if he has suffered
any.
If the thing sold is in the possession of the vendor,
there is no doubt as to the presence of an implied war-
ranty of his title and his right to sell. In the United
States apparently there is no implied warranty of
title if the thing is in the hands of a third person when
it is sold. In England, however, this view is not
L
166 COMMERCIAL LAW
accepted. The mere fact that a person sells a chattel
"implies an affirmation by the vendor that the chattel
is his, and therefore he warrants the title unless it be
shown by the facts and circumstances of the sale that
the vendor did not intend to assert ownership, but only
to transfer such interest as he might have in the chattel
sold."
The vendor may have only the constructive posses-
sion of the things sold, as where he is the owner of an
undivided portion of wheat stored in an elevator. The
owner of the elevator has the actual possession, but
the vendor has the constructive possession. In selling
his undivided interest, however, there is an implied
warranty of title.
There are one or two exceptions to the rule. If
goods are sold by a sheriff or bailiff, as under the judg-
ment of a court, the sheriff is not held to any warranty.
So, also, a vendor may merely sell or transfer such title
as he may have in the goods, provided he does so with-
out positive knowledge that he has no title, and he will
be held to no warranty. The liquidator or curator of
the assets of an insolvent debtor is held to no warranty.
It has been held that a contract for the sale or assign-
ment of a patent involves no warranty that the inven-
tion is new, but merely that the patent has been
granted to the seller.
10. Implied ^warranty of quality, caveat emptor. —
In so far as the quality of goods is concerned, tlie
maxim caveat emptor (let the buyer beware) is the
PERFORMANCE OF THE CONTRACT 167
general rule. In other words, if there is no fraud, and
the seller has not given an express warranty, or unless
a warranty is implied from the nature and circimi-
stances of the transaction, the buyer purchases at his
own risk. This is the more true if the buyer inspects
the goods or is given a reasonable opportunity to do so.
If after being given such an opportunity, the buyer
neglects to inspect the goods, it has been held that it is
not the duty of the seller to point out defects. On the
other hand, the seller must not assist in deceiving the
bu3^er.
For example, the seller must not hinder the buyer
in his inspection of the goods in an endeavor to dis-
cover defects. If the buyer purchases goods on his
own judgment, or selects or defines the particular
goods or class of goods which he wants, the seller need
only furnish merchantable goods of the class indi-
cated, altho he may know that the buyer wants the
goods for some special purpose.
If, however, the buyer indicates that he wants the
goods for a specific purpose and asks the seller to sup-
ply him with goods fit for that purpose, and he leaves
the choice to the seller, a warranty at onjce arises on the
part of the seller that the goods chosen by him will
meet the buyer's requirements for the purpose men-
tioned.
If the goods are bought by sample, the buyer has
acted upon his own judgment in that he has examined
the sample, but he relies on the seller's judgment to
168 COMMERCIAL LAW
supply a bulk of the goods sold which will correspond
with the sample; there is, therefore, an implied war-
ranty on the part of the seller that the goods which
he will deliver will be of the same quality as the sample,
and that they will be merchantable. If the goods are
sold by description, a similar warranty arises that the
goods sold are of the kind described. Apparently in
such a case there is not a warranty of merchantability,
unless the seller deals in the goods sold. Thus, where
a man ^ ordered a quantity of "spent madder," and this
substance was not manufactured by the seller, but was
merely a refuse product of his manufacture and was
sold only as such, the buyer's intention being to pro-
duce garrancine, which it was found the madder would
not produce, it was held that the purchaser took the
risk tliat the madder might not produce the desired
by-product. The seller was not a dealer in spent mad-
der.
11. Remedies for breach of an compress warranty. —
Under the English law, in the case of an express war-
ranty, the general rule is that if the goods tendered
under the sale are not as warranted, the purchaser's
remedy is an action in damages, if the title to the goods
has passed to him. If the title has not passed to him,
he may, upon discovering the breach of an express
warranty, reject them. So if A sells to B a certain
engine, and warrants that it will develop 200 h. p.; the
engine is actually delivered to B, and B tries it out and
finds that it will only develop 150 h. p., B cannot, if
1 Turner vs. Mucklow, 1862, C. L. T. N. S. 690.
PERFORMANCE OF THE CONTRACT 169
the title in the engine has passed to him, tender the
engine back and demand the retm*n of what he has
paid. B would have an action in damages for breach
of the warranty, and liis damages would probably be
the difference in value between the engine as repre-
sented and the engine as it really proved to be.
If, however, A sells B certain wheat stored in an ele-
vator and warrants it to be first quality, and nothing
is done by which B is given dehvery, and B, having
agreed to pay so much a bushel, inspects the wheat and
finds it is only of second quality, B may refuse to ac-
cept the wheat, because the title has not passed to him,
and there has been a breach of the warranty of quality.
In the previous case, however, if A, when he made the
warranty that the engine would develop 200 h. p., was
aware that it could not do so, B would then be entitled
to hand back the engine and demand the return of
what he had paid.
12. Remedies for breach of an implied tcarranti/. —
If the goods sold do not conform with the implied war-
ranties as to quahty, fitness, condition, or other's^ise,
the buyer has several remedies.
(a) He may, if he thinks fit, reject the goods and
recover what he has paid.
(b) He may accept and keep the goods and sue for
the damages he has suffered by the breach of the war-
ranty.
(c) If he has not paid the purchase price, he may
set up the damage he has sustained in diminution of
the price.
170 COMMERCIAL LAW
If the buyer decides to reject the goods and rescind
the sale, he must do so within a reasonable time. If
the seller refuses to take back the goods, the buyer may
bring action to have the sale declared null and for
the retuni of what he has paid, meanwhile holding
the goods as bailee for the seller : that is, he holds them
at the risk of the seller, and if they perish thru no
fault of the buyer he is not liable for the loss.
13. Rights of an unpaid seller against the subject of
the sale. — As we have seen, the contract of sale is com-
plete by the consent of the parties to the contract, and
unless it is otherwise provided the title in the goods
passes from the seller to the buyer. The seller is en-
titled to payment.
So long as the seller retains the goods in his posses-
sion he has a lien on them for the price. His lien is
not effective if the sale was made on credit, unless the
time allowed for payment has expired.^ Thus A sells
a carload of pulp to B on sixty days' credit; a bill of
sale is made out and delivered to B, but it is agreed
that A shall keep the pulp in his warehouse for the
time being. B, a month later, assigns the bill of sale
to C, and then becomes insolvent. Upon the demand
of C for delivery of the pulp, A may refuse delivery.
It is true that by making a sale on credit he waived
his lien, but as B became insolvent and A had posses-
sion of the goods, A's right of lien at once became ef-
1 The lien extends only to the price. Charges for warehousing or other-
wise, which the seller may have to pay, are a personal claim against the
buyer, and give no right of retention of the goods.
PERFORMANCE OF THE CONTRACT 171
fective, and C could have no greater right to the goods
than B.
If at the time that A sold the pulp to B, unknown
to A, B was insolvent, and the goods were shipped and
a bill of lading was sent to him, an assignment of the
bill of lading by B to C, who was named as assignee,
would not defeat A's right of stoppage in transit. C
is not a purchaser for value, and has only the right of
B. If, however, B had sold the pulp and delivered the
bill of lading to C before A exercised his right of stop-
page, C would be entitled to receive the goods. The
seller's hen exists therefore, and he can refuse delivery,
where the sale is for cash, or where the sale is on credit
and the buyer has become insolvent before the goods
are delivered to him.
It must be understood that unless it is otherwise
agi-eed the seller's lien exists only so long as he re-
tains possession. If he dehvers the goods to the
buyer, or to the buyer's agent, as, for example, to a
carrier, the right of lien disappears because the seller
has parted with possession.
There is an exception to this rule, in that if the sale
is on credit and the buyer becomes insolvent after the
goods have been delivered to the carrier and while they
are in transit, the seller may retake possession.
Of stoppage in transitu, Benjamin says:
This is a right which arises solely upon the insohency of
the buyer, and is based on the plain reason of justice and
quality that one man's goods shall not be applied to the pay-
ment of another man's debts. If, therefore, after the seller
172 COMMERCIAL LAW
has delivered the goods out of his own possession and put
them in the hands of a carrier for dehvery to the buyer
(which is such a constructive delivery as divests the seller's
lien) he discovers that the buyer is insolvent, he may retake
the goods, if he can, before they reach the buyer's possession,
and thus avoid having his property applied to paying the
debts due by the buyer to other people. The statement that
this right is based on the reason that one man's goods shall
not be applied to the payment of another man's debt is, how-
ever, not literally accurate, for, strictly speaking, the goods
so stopped are no longer the property of the unpaid seller,
and stoppage in transitu takes place only where the goods
have become the property of the buyer. Where they remain
the property of the seller, the latter may witlihold them by
virtue of his ownership, but this is not the peculiar right of
stoppage given by the law merchant . . . the right of stop-
page in transitu is a right to interfere and prevent the buyer
from taking actual possession which he would otherwise have
a right to take, and to undo the effect of an unconditional
delivery to an agent to forward. This power does not exist
except in the case of insolvency.*
The principle has been very clearly laid down also
in an American case, as follows :
Stoppage in transitu is a right which the vendor of goods
upon credit has to recall them or retake them, upon the dis-
covery of the insolvency of the vendee, before the goods have
come into his possession, or any third person has acquired
bona fide rights in them. It continues so long as the carrier
remains in the possession and control of the goods, or until
there has been an actual or constructive delivery to the
vendee, or some third person has acquired a bona fide right
to them. Upon demand by the vendor, while the right of
stoppage in transitu continues, the carrier will become liable
for a conversion of the goods if he declines to redeliver them
to the vendor, or delivers them to the vendee. . . . And no-
1 Benjamin, p. 870.
PERFORMANCE OF THE CONTRACT 173
tice by the vendor, without an express demand to redeliver
the goods, is sufficient to charge the carrier. If the carrier
is clearh' informed that it is the intention and desire of the
vendor to exercise his rights of stoppage in transitu, tlie
notice is sufficient. And notice to the agent of the carrier,
who in the regular course of his agency is in the actual cus-
tody of the goods at the time the notice is given, is notice
to the carrier.^
It has been held that the mere fact that the seller
has received part payment of the price will not defeat
his right of stoppage in transitu. If the contract is
severable and the goods may be delivered by stated
instalments, which are to be paid for separately, and
payment has been made of an instalment, the seller
may exercise his right of stoppage only for the goods
which remain unpaid.
The seller may have to comply with the reasonable
demand of the carrier for a bond to protect it, where
it has issued a negotiable bill of lading. An inter-
esting question arises as to the rights of the seller to
stop goods in transitu, where the bill of lading has been
indorsed to some innocent third party for value
by the buyer, while the goods are in transit. The view
generally accepted is, that if the bill of lading is trans-
ferred by the buyer for value, as by way of sale, to an
innocent third party, before the vendor has exercised
his right of stoppage in transitu, the right of stoppage
is defeated. But where there is no such document of
title, such as a bill of lading issued by the carrier, a sale
of the goods by the buyer does not defeat the seller's
1 Reynolds vs. Railroad, 43 X. H. 580.
174 COMMERCIAL LAW
right, unless the sale has been made with his consent.
14. Vendor's right of resale or rescission. — A ven-
dor who has a lien or has exercised the right of stop-
page in transitu may do one of two things :
(a) He may constitute himself agent of the buyer
and resell the goods/ if the buyer delays an unreason-
able time in paying for them, or he may sell them at
once if they are perishable. Notice of intention to re-
sell should alwaj^s be given, tho in some jurisdictions
it has not been held to be necessary. A mere notice
of intention is sufficient and need not contain a recital
of the actual time and place of the resale. If the re-
sale nets to the vendor less than the amount which the
buyer agreed to pay, the difference may be recovered
by the vendor as damages.
(b) The vendor may rescind the sale and resume
the title to the goods if the buyer does not pay for them
within a reasonable time. Notice of the rescission and
retransfer of title should be given, tho it has been held
not to be necessary. An intention to rescind should
be shown by some word or act, as, for example, the
consumption of the goods by the seller. If the vendor
exercises his right of rescission he may sue the buyer
for loss of profit. He has been allowed to sue for the
entire purchase price.
15. Actions by unpaid vendor for breach of con-
tract of sale, — If the property in the goods has not
been transferred to the buyer, as, for example, where
goods are sold which have to be weighed or measured
1 Where the vendor sells as agent, the sale is subject to the usual rules.
PERFORMANCE OF THE CONTRACT 175
before delivery, the goods are still in the seller's
possession, and if the buyer refuses to take delivery, he
will have only an action for damages. As a rule, he
will not be able to recover the full price of the goods,
but only the actual damages he has suffered. The
rule is that in such a case the proper measure of
damages is the difference between the contract price
and the market price of the goods at the time when the
contract was broken. The idea is that the seller sell
the goods, once the contract is broken, and thus deter-
mine his loss.
In one case goods were sold, to be delivered in the
months of February and March following the con-
tract, which was made in the month of Xovember
previous. The buyer became bankrupt in January.
On the dates fixed by the contract, namely, in Feb-
ruarj^ and ^larch, the goods were tendered, and, not
being accepted, were resold at a heavy loss. It was
proved that had the goods been sold in January, when
the buyer had become bankrupt, the loss would have
been considerably less. It was held, however, that the
assignees could have demanded delivery according to
the contract, which was not rescinded by the bank-
ruptcy; that the seller was not bound to resell before
the time for delivery, and that the damages had to be
estimated according to the market price of the goods
at the times fixed by the contract for dehvery,
Benjamin remarks, in connection with this subject:
Although the buyer's insolvency does not per se put an
end to the contract, yet if the buyer has given to the seller
176 COMMERCIAL LAW
such a notice of his insolvency as amounts to a declaration
of his inability or unwillingness to pay for the goods, the
seller is justified in treating the notice as a repudiation of
the contract, and, after the lapse of a reasonable time to
allow the buyer's trustee, and also, it Avould seem, a sub-
buyer frofti the insolvent, to elect to complete the contract
by paying the price in cash, the seller may, without tender-
ing the goods to the trustee, consider the contract as broken,
and prove against the insolvent's estate for the damages.
If the title to the property has passed to the buyer,
or if under the contract the price is to be paid before
title passes, the seller may bring an actioH for the price
of the goods. This is the seller's only right if the
goods have got into the possession of the buyer. The
remedy is no longer against the goods, but there is a
personal remedy against the buyer. The seller is on
a footing with any other creditor of the buyer. In
some cases, where the market value of the goods might
be hard to ascertain, or where the market value could
not be ascertained, probably a tender delivery and
an action for the price in the case of refusal, would be
upheld. In such a case the seller would act as bailee
of the goods for the buyer. If the buyer wrongfully
repudiates the contract, refuses to accept the goods, or
returns them after delivery and refuses payment, he
subjects himself to an action for such damages as the
seller has sustained.
Where the actual damage sustained is not definitely
ascertainable, the court will endeavor to allow such
damages as are the natural and proximate result of the
breach of contract, or which it may be considered were
PERFORMANCE OF THE CONTRACT ITT
within the contemplation of the parties when the sale
was made. Thus it has been held, in awarding dam-
ages for breach of warranty as to the fitness of an en-
gine for certain work, that a loss of additional profits
which the plaintiff anticipated he would have made
had the engine been available for his work, by reason
of certain competing firms going out of business sub-
sequent to the date of the contract of sale, will not
be presumed to have been in the contemplation of the
parties, and will not be allow^ed.^
It has also been held that the measure of damages
for the unwarranted refusal of a vendor to carry out
the terms of an agreement to sell a hotel property, in-
cludes the expenses to which the purchaser was put in
endeavoring to induce the vendor to carry out his con-
tract, or to refund the money paid on account of the
purchase price ; and the purchaser may be allowed his
traveling expenses from his place of residence to the
place where the property was situated in the same
province.
Again, where a dredge was not delivered within the
time specified in the contract of sale, the estimated net
earnings thereof for the time delivery was delayed
were awarded to the purchaser as damages. The
damages w^ill not include money paid by the purchaser
as a bonus to insure the completion of scows, necessary
for use with the dredge, before the date fixed for deliv-
ery of the dredge, as such loss was not within the con-
1 Alabastine Co., Ltd., vs. Canada Producer & Gas Engine Co., Ltd.,
8 D. L. R. 405.
XXIV— 13
178 COMMERCIAL LAW
templation of the parties at the time the contract was
entered into/
16. Remedies of the buyer. — The buyer may have
cause to complain of some breach of the contract.
The seller may make default in delivery. The goods
may have some defect. Possession may have been
promised and refused. Some warranty of quality or
title may be breached.
The buyer's remedy will depend upon whether or
not the title to the goods had passed to him. If the
title has passed to the buyer, he is, of course, the owner
of the goods and may sue for delivery or may seize tlie
goods in the hands of the seller or of some third per-
son, in order to get possession. If the title has not
passed, the buyer may bring an action for damages, if
the seller wrongfully refuses delivery of the thing
which he has agreed to sell. The damages which the
buyer may recover in such a case will generally be the
difference between the contract price and the market
value of the goods at the time the contract is broken.
In other words, the measure of damages is the profit
which the buyer might have expected to make.
Where, however, the seller knew when the contract was
made that the buyer intended to make some special use
of the goods, or expected some special profit upon the
sale of them, the damages resulting from the breach of
contract which the parties would reasonably contem-
plate, would be the damages which would result to the
buyer from a breach of the contract under the special
1 Brown vs. Hope, 17 B. C. R. 220.
I
PERFORMANXE OF THE CONTRACT 179
circumstances known and communicated to the seller.
If the seller knew of no special circumstances and had
not been notified of them by the buyer, then he could
not be held to have had in contemplation any special
damage to be suffered by the buyer. Thus A sells B
a refrigerator for his cold-storage plant, to be deliv-
ered in one month. When the contract is made, B in-
forms A that the refrigerator is to be installed in a
new plant, which must be ready at the end of the
month in question for the transfer of meat and other
perishables from the old plant, the lease of which has
expired. The refusal or failure of A to deliver the
refrigerator on the due date will entitle B to recover
special damages, because it must have been in the
contemplation of both parties when the contract was
made, that if the refrigerator was not in position at
the moment when it became necessarj- to transfer the
perishables from the old to the new plant, B would
suffer very special injury.
REVIEW
\\Tiat are the principal obligations of the seller; of the pur-
chaser ? What is meant by delivery ? Where does delivery take
place and who bears the expense of it ?
What is the rule about delivery to a carrier?
Discuss the time of delivery.
What may take the place of actual delivery ?
Distinguish between express and implied warranty. What is
implied warranty of title?
Name the remedies for breach of express warranty ; for breach
of implied warranty.
Upon what does the buyer's remedy depend?
CHAPTER XII
BAILMENTS
y
1. Definitions. — Bailment has been defined as a de-
livery of a thing by one person to another for a certain
purpose, upon the promise that the bailee shall return
the same thing to the bailor, or deliver it to someone in
accordance with the bailor's instructions, after the pur-
pose has been fulfilled.
The contract may be express or it may be implied.
All kinds of movable or personal property may be the
subject of a bailment. Altho the word is derived
from a French word, meaning "to deliver," the
delivery may be actual, constructive or by opera-
tion of law. It is not necessary that the bailor
be the owner of the property; it sometimes happens
that a bailee himself becomes a bailor as toward some
new bailee. The new bailee is not regarded as the
bailee of the true owner, and his obligations are toward
his immediate bailor. Thus A finds an unregistered
bond of the X Company, Limited, which has been lost
by B. A borrows money from C, and puts up the
bond as security. By operation of law, A is B's
bailee, and, by actual delivery, C is A's. C could
not refuse to return the bond to A when the debt was
paid on the ground that A did not own it ; but if C did
make a delivery to B, he would be protected.
180
BAILMENTS 181
2. Distinctions. — A bailment must be distinguished
from a sale. A sale transfers the title or ownership
of the thing sold. In the case of a bailment, only the
possession of the thing changes. This distinction is
unsatisfactory, as it is frequently difficult to say
whether the title as well as the possession is trans-
ferred. It has been held, for instance, that when a
farmer delivers wheat to a miller to be ground into
flour, this is only a bailment, and the miller's creditors
cannot seize the flour or the wheat.
The distinction between a bailment and a sale or
barter is important when we consider that, in the case
of a bailment, if the goods bailed are destroyed acci-
dentally, the loss falls upon the bailor ; in the case of a
barter or exchange, as where A delivered to B certain
oats for B's horses, the loss would fall upon B. A
frequent instance of a bailment is the storage of grain
in elevators. A number of owners may store their
grain in the same elevator, the various deliveries being
mixed together. The owner of the elevator is the
common agent or bailee of them all. In such a case
the owner of any part of the grain so stored may sell
his interest in the undivided mass, and, as we have
seen, a valid sale may be made of such an interest
without dividing the portion from the bulk, the order
on the warehouseman to deliver the quantitj^ so sold,
and the acceptance of this order by the warehouseman
or elevator o^^^ler being sufficient.
Instead of being a bailment, however, the trans-
action may be a sale, when, for example, the ware-
houseman, by agi*eement with the various owners, is
182 COMMERCIAL LAW
entitled to sell any part of the grain stored with him,
provided that he substitutes an equal quantity of sim-
ilar grain of his own, or of other persons.
3. Classification of bailments. — Various classifica-
tions of bailments will be found in the different text
books on the subject. The most practical classifica-
tion for our purpose, however, may be set out as fol-
lows:
(a) Those which are for the sole benefit of either
the bailor or bailee.
(b) Those which benefit both bailor and bailee.
Purther classification may be made, viz. :
(1) Gratuitous bailments,
(2) Bailments for reward.
Class (a) or class (1) would include deposits, gratu-
itous loans for use, and mandates. Class (b) or class
(2) would include what are called pledges and hirings.
A bailment may be in the nature of a deposit, as
when A delivers a thing to B to be kept for him. A
may lend goods to B to be used by him without charge.
A may dehver goods to B to be used by him for hire.
Again, A may deliver goods to B as a pawn, or as se-
curity for money borrowed : this is a pawn or pledge.
A may deliver goods to B who is a carrier, or in order
that B may do something to them or with them, and B
is to be paid for his services. A, on the other hand,
may deliver goods to B, to carry them or do something
about them or with them, without any charge for his
work or carriage. So if A, who is going away for the
summer, delivers to B some valuable plants to be kept
BAILMENTS 183
and cared for by him, this is a baihnent for the sole
benefit of A, the bailor. It is a deposit. If A bor-
rows B's automobile, this is a gratuitous loan for the
sole benefit of A, the bailee. If A borrows one hun-
dred dollars from B, and gives B as security for the
loan five shares of stock, this is a bailment for the
benefit of both parties, and is a pledge. If A hires
a horse and carriage from B, and agrees to pay B
two dollars, B gives A the use of his property for
compensation, and this is a baihuent in the nature of
a hiring. If A stores his household furniture with
B at ten dollars a month, this also is a bailment, and
for the benefit of both parties. A gives B a trunk
to take to C, and agrees to pay B one dollar. This
is a bailment in the nature of a contract for carriage
for hire.
4. Eoctraordinani haihnent. — AMien goods are en-
trusted by a guest in a hotel to the care of the pro-
prietor, and when goods are delivered to a common
carrier for transportation, the liability of the hotel
proprietor and of the carrier as bailees is greater than
tliat imposed upon the ordinary bailee. These will
be considered more particularly later.
5. Contract of bailment. — The persons capable of
making a contract of bailment are those who have the
usual capacity to contract. Thus an infant could not
be a party to a baihnent, unless it is a necessitj\
If the contract is not in express terms, an implied
contract will be sought in the presumed intention of
the parties as disclosed by their acts and deeds, and
184 COMMERCIAL LAW
by the surrounding circumstances. Thus, it may be
clear from the surrounding circumstances that a given
bailment is not gratuitous, but was entered into by the
bailee in the expectation of a reward.
6. Use and care of bailed property. — By law, a
bailee mijst givelreasonable care to the thing entrusted
to him. When there is an express contract, how-
ever, which defines the use and care which the bailee
is to make or give, he will be bound strictly by the con-
tract. If he fails in this respect and causes loss or
damage, he will be liable in an action for damages for
breach of contract. If he goes further, and acts as
tho he owned the thing entrusted to him, he may be
guilty of conversion.
7. Obligations of bailor in a bailment for his sole
benefit. — The bailor, when the bailment has been
made for his sole benefit, must recoup the bailee for
what he may have spent in the preservation of the
thing, the expense so incurred being regarded as an
extraordinary and necessary expense, urgent in its na-
ture. The bailor must also notify the bailee of any
defect in the thing which may cause injury. He
must notify the bailee of unapparent risks. Thus, if
A requests B to take care of a parcel for him, and B
accidentally drops it and the contents of the parcel
explode, A will be liable for damages, unless he noti-
fied B of the dangerous qualities of the contents of
the parcel; and if B undertakes to care for A's horse
for a month while A is away and to charge nothing
for his trouble, B will be entitled to reimbursement
BAILMENTS 185
for the extraordinary expense which he may be put
to if the horse becomes ill and a veterinary surgeon
has to be called in.
8. Obligations of bailee in a bailment for the sole
benefit of the bailor. — We will suppose that A has
gratuitously undertaken to keep certain goods en-
trusted to him by B. A must exercise reasonable care
and diligence in keeping the goods. By reasonable
care and diligence is meant such care and diligence as
a person would ordinarily use in connection with his
own property, and such skill as he is possessed of.
In other words, he is bound to take such care as a rea-
sonable, prudent and careful man might fairly be ex-
pected to take of his own property. Generally speak-
ing, the bailee will not be answerable except for gross
negligence, unless he is in bad faith.
Gross negligence might consist in the failure to ex-
ercise reasonable care, skill and diligence, or in the ab-
sence of ordinarj^ care, or in the failure to perform an
undertaken duty. If B allows A to place an automo-
bile in his stable for the winter, B will not be responsi-
ble if A has left water in the cooling apparatus, which
freezes and cracks part of the machinery ; but B must
not use the automobile, as to do so would be contrarj'
to the spirit of the bailment, and if he used it and
damage resulted he would be responsible. B would
be liable for gross negligence if he were to leave the
automobile outside the stable overnight and it were
stolen.
The bailor must return the thing, with any profit
186 COMMERCIAL LAW
or increase derived from it. Thus if B agrees to care
for and pasture A's cow, and during the period of the
baihnent a calf is born, B must hand back at the ex-
piration of the bailment both the cow and the calf.
9. Bailment for the sole benefit of the bailee. — We
will suppose that the bailee is a person who has bor-
rowed an automobile. In this case the bailee will be
held to exercise greater care than in other cases of
bailment. As we have seen, if the bailment is for tlie
sole benefit of the bailor, the bailee is held only for
reasonable care and diligence. In the present case,
however, he must exercise great care. Great care
would be that care which a veiy cautious and vigilant
man would take of his o^vn property. The borrower
in such a case will be liable for the least neglect.
Thus, if B borrows A's automobile, and upon going to
his garage B finds that there is not room for it, B will
be bound to remove his own automobile to make room
for A's, unless he can store A's automobile in some
other place.
10. T elimination of baihnent for sole benefit of one
party. — The general rule is that when a bailment is
made for the benefit of one party only, it may be ter-
minated by either at any time.
The bailment may be determined or ended if the
bailee, the depository in the case we are considering,
acts inconsistently with the terms of the bailment.
It is said that when a bailment is made for the sole
benefit of the bailor, it is terminated by the death or
insanity of either party. The same rule would apply
BAILMENTS 187
when the baihnent was made for the sole benefit of
the bailee, except that if the bailment had been made
for a definite period, the death or insanity of the bailor
would not interrupt the bailment until the period
fixed had elapsed.
11. Creation of a pledge or paxvn. — A pledge is a
contract by w^hich a thing is placed in the hands of a
creditor, or being already in his possession, is retained
by him with the o\\^ler's consent as security for his
debt. The words pledge and pawn are synonymous,
tho pledge includes pawn which is generally used in
a particular sense. A pawnbroker is a pledgee, but
the word pawnbroker is usually used to describe a
person who carries on the trade of pawnbroking. The
word pledge is frequently applied to the article which
is pledged. When the customer of a bank hands
over securities to the bank to guarantee a loan, the
pledge is known as collateral security'.
It has been held that the relation of pledgor and
pledgee arises between a broker and his customer
when the former buys stock for the latter, and the lat-
ter puts up margin which he agrees to keep good.
The same relation does not arise between a commis-
sion merchant and his customer for whom he buys
grain for future dehvery on margin, which the custo-
mer promises to keep good up to the time of deliver}^
In the former case the stocks are actually bought by
the broker, but in the second case the merchant has a
mere executory contract of sale. In an ordinary
stock transaction on margin, the broker buys the stock
188 COMMERCIAL LAW
outright; if he does not do so it is a bucket-shop
transaction.
12. Construction and operation of pledge. — It is
clear from the definition ah-eady given that a pledge
is a delivery of goods to a creditor as security for his
debt. Xlie right to the property vests in the creditor
only in so far as it is necessary to secure the debt.
The general property remains in the pledgor; the spe-
cial property is in the pledgee until the debt is paid.
The pledge, therefore, is a privilege or lien over the
goods pledged for the payment of the debt, together
with interest and reasonable expenses incurred in car-
ing for the goods pledged. The lien or privilege sub-
sists only while the thing pledged remains in the hands
of the creditor or person appointed by the par-
ties to hold it, unless it is otherwise agreed, when the
particular debt is paid which the pledge was given to
secure, that the creditor can retain it to secure some
other debt. Naturally, the pledgor warrants that he
has a title to the thing pledged, otherwise the security
would be illusory.
13. Rights and duties of the bailor. — The person
who rents goods and chattels is presumed to warrant
his title and peaceable possession. He must furnish
things which are reasonably fit and proper for the
purpose intended. Generally speaking, he is an in-
surer against all defects or against such defects as
can be guarded against by reasonable care and skill.
Thus, if A rents a carriage and it breaks down on the
journey, he is liable and not the person who is using
BAILMENTS 189
it. He is supposed to have rented a carriage fit and
proper for the journey.
The bailor is bound to exercise vigilance and
care to discover defects in the thing rented, and
if defects exist, should notify the bailee of any danger
or risk unapparent to the bailee. Thus, in an On-
tario case, in which a person rented a portable engine
and boiler to another, which exploded as soon as it
was first used, and while it was in charge of a compe-
tent engineer, it was held that, as the lettor of the chat-
tel for hire impliedly warrants that it is reasonably
fit for the purpose for which it is let, the plaintiff
(the lettor, who sued for the value of the engine and
boiler) , in the absence of negligence on the part of the
defendant, could not recover.
14. Rights and duties of bailee. — We have ali*eady
seen that the bailee must take such reasonable care of
the property of his bailor in his possession as a pru-
dent man would of his own property. If A sends his
horse to B to be kept at B's stable, and, the stable not
being locked at night, the horse is stolen, B will not be
excused because he shows that he did not lock the
stable while his own horses were therein. It could not
])e said that, in leaving the stable door unlocked^ even
tho his own horses were inside, he was acting as a pru-
dent man would in the care of his own property.
If the bailment of the thing is made for a special
purpose, we have also seen that the bailee must use the
thing for that special purpose, and he is liable for loss
or damage arising during or because of any other use
190 COMMERCIAL LAW
or employment of the thing. Thus, it has been held,
that when a person hires from another a horse and
wagon with seats for two persons, and he places three
seats therein, and the horse during the journey sickens
and dies, he will be liable for the misuser ; or when B
hires a horse to drive to the county fair, but instead
drives to market, where the horse is accidentally
killed, B is liable for the value of the horse.
The bailee or lessee is not ordinarily responsible
when the thing leased is destroyed by fire without
his fault. Thus, when goods are leased, under a
covenant by the lessee to restore them to the lessor
at the expiration of the term in as good order as they
then were, reasonable wear only excepted, and the
goods during the term were destroyed by fire without
the lessee's fault, it was held that the absolute words
of the covenant were controlled by the implied condi-
tion that the goods should continue to exist, and that
the lessee was not liable on the covenant for not re-
storing them at the end of the term.
15. Warehousemen and whariingers. — A ware-
house is a storehouse for goods. A warehouseman is
a bailee who owns or keeps a warehouse in which he
keeps goods in storage for hire. A wharfinger is one
who owns or keeps a wharf for the purpose of receiv-
ing goods for a compensation. The contract between
the bailor and the warehouseman is generally evi-
denced by a warehouse receipt which is handed to the
bailor. Such a receipt may be of prime importance
if a doubt arises whether there has been a sale or a
BAILMENTS 191
bailment. In its absence, or if it is ambiguous, the
circumstances surrounding the transaction will be
carefully examined. Thus, it was held in an Ontario
case in which wheat was left with a warehouse-
man by a farmer (the owner), and the sale price was
to be thereafter fixed, the fact that the risk of fire
was to be borne by the farmer and the wheat to be
kept in a separate bin, was strong evidence that no
sale was effected.^
In a ^Manitoba case it was held that, when wheat is
received in a warehouse or elevator nominally on stor-
age for the person delivering it, but on such terms that
the identical goods are so mixed up with others that
they cannot be returned, and the 'well-iinderstood
course of the business is that, unless a price is agreed
on, the party delivering the goods can only require
an equivalent amount of the same kind and quality to
be accounted for to him, the contract is really one of
sale and not of bailment, whether the vendor is to re-
ceive the price in money or an equal quantity of goods,
or has an option to do either, as the property in the
goods has passed to the warehouseman.^ But ordi-
narily, w^hen the grain of different owners is stored
and mixed in one bin, each bailor becomes an owner
in common of his share of the whole. The elevator
owner is then bound to keep in his bins sufficient grain
to enable him to make delivery of the share of each
bailor. Otherwise he may be held for conversion.
1 Isaac vs. Andrews, 28 U. C. C. P. 40.
2 Lawlor vs. Nicol, 12 Man. Reps. 224.
192 COMMERCIAL LAW
Warehouse receipts are negotiable in that they are
transferable by indorsement and delivery and carrj-
to the transferee the title in the goods covered by
them. The Bank Act defines "warehouse receipt" as
follows : ^
y
WAREHOUSE RECEIPT
( 1 ) Means any receipt given by any person for an^- goods,
wares or merchandise in his actual, visible and continued pos-
session as bailee thereof in good faith and not as of his own
property, and
(2) Includes receipts, given by any person who is the
owner or keeper of a harbor, cove, pond, wharf, yard, ware-
liouse, shed, storehouse or other place for the storage of
goods . . . , for goods . . . delivered to him as bailee, and
actually in the place or in one or more of the places owned
or kept by him, whether such person is engaged in other busi-
ness or not, and
(3) Includes also receipts given by any person in charge
of logs or timber in transit from timber limits or other lands
to the place of such logs or timber.
Clause (3) was enacted because it had been held in
several cases that a "warehouse receipt" for logs lying
in certain lakes on the way from the woods to the mill
was not valid, as the logs were not in a place kept by
the signers of the receipt. The receipt need not be in
any particular form, but the receipt and the facts sur-
rounding its issue should conform to and be brought
within the definition. The owner's name should be
given, a sufficient description of the goods, the
place where the goods are stored or kept, and, in the
1 Section 3 (p).
BAILMENTS 193
case of logs in transit, the place of departure and of
destination.
A warehouseman is bound to use reasonable care
and diligence in caring for the things deposited with
him. He is not an insurer, like a carrier, against all
risks. But, as he holds himself out to care for things
left in his charge, it follows that his care must, unless
otherwise agreed, be adequate. Thus, the owner of a
refrigerator storage warehouse must maintain a tem-
perature in his warehouse suitable for the preserva-
tion of perishables entrusted to him. The warehouse-
man must, for instance, use all reasonable and mod-
ern means for preserving his customers' goods from
theft, fire, water, heat and rats.
A warehouseman has for payment of his charges a
specific lien on the goods stored with him.
REVIEW
How would you distinguish bailment from sale and from bar-
ter?
Classify bailments.
Explain the contract of bailment.
WTiat are the obligations of the bailee in a bailment for the
sole benefit of the bailor.''
What is a pledge ? How does the relation between pledgor and
pledgee arise.'' What does a pledge cover?
What are the rights and duties of the bailor? Of the bailee?
Define warehouse receipt.
XXIV— 14
PART III:
T^EGOTIABLE CONTRACTS
CHAPTER XIII
NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS IN GENERAL
1. Introductory. — Bills, notes and checks are nego-
tiable instruments — that is, they are instruments or
contracts, the legal right to which is transferable from
one person to another by delivery of the instrument
itself. A check, for instance, is transferable by de-
livery when it is payable to bearer; by indorsement
and delivery, when it is payable to order. Bills, notes
and checks are, as the case may be, unconditional
promises or orders by one person to another to pay
money, at a given or ascertainable time. They are
then, not only a substitute for money, but evidences of
indebtedness. Bonds are negotiable instruments.
Bills of exchange, promissory notes, checks and bonds,
are classed together as the typical negotiable instru-
ments.
Certain other instruments, tho often so called, are
not, in the fullest sense, negotiable. Among these are
bills of lading, dock warrants, warehouse receipts and
certain certificates of stock. They are salable and
can pass from hand to hand, and are thus quasi-nego-
194
NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS 195
liable, but are not true negotiable instruments. They
are documents of title.
Speaking of these quasi-negotiable instruments, the
Honorable Mr. Justice Maclaren says :
In England, warehouse receipts were not fully recognized
as negotiable instruments, like bills of lading and other docu-
ments of title, until the Factors' Act, 1877. They are ne-
gotiable only in the lower or secondary sense of the term in
that they may be transferred by indorsement and delivery, or
by delivery alone, and may thereby vest in the transferee the
rights of the transferor. They are not negotiable in the
higher sense, like bills of exchange and promissory notes,
which by indorsement or delivery before maturity may vest
in the bona fide holder for value not only the rights of the
transferer, but the right to claim the full amount for which
the instrument is drawn. If the receipt is in favor of a
certain person or his order, it must be indorsed by him ; if
it is drawn in favor of the bearer or indorsed in blank, it
is transferable by delivery alone. . . . Tlie bill of lading is
a very ancient document, and by the custom of merchants is
negotiable, when made to bearer or order or to assigns.
2. Negotiability. — A^nien a negotiable instrument is
actually negotiated — i.e., transferred for value to a
person without notice of any defect in it — the trans-
feree has an absolute right to collect from the persons
liable upon the instrument as maker, indorser or ac-
ceptor. But if A has bought a horse from B and has
contracted to pay B one hundred dollars, B can assign
or transfer his claim against A to C. If C sues A,
the latter can raise against him any defence that he
might have raised against B — e.g., that he had been
defrauded, that the money was to have been paid only
after he had used the horse for a month, and so on.
196 COMMERCIAL LAW
In effect, C has no better rights against A than B.
He has bought B's rights for what they are worth.
3. Presuvijdion of consideration. — A negotiable in-
strument is always presumed to have been given or
negotiated for value. And when value has, at any
time, been given for a bill, the holder is deemed to be
a holder for value, and entitled to collect as against
any previous acceptor or any parties who became par-
ties to the bill before value was given. In the case of
an ordinary contract, the debtor may show by way of
defence that there was no valid consideration to sup-
port the contract upon which it is attempted to hold
him. In other words, if A gives B the following —
"On demand I promise to pay to B $25. A" — the
debt so incurred by A is non-negotiable, because the
words "or order" are not added after "to pay to B."
B, if he sues A, must prove consideration received by
A. But if A gives B a note — "Thirty days after date
I promise to pay $25 to the order of B" — and B dis-
counts the note at a bank, or indorses it and hands it
to C in payment of a shipment of goods, the bank or
C, as the case may be, can collect from A. A can
raise no defence. If B had held the note until after
maturity and had then sued A, B would not have had
to prove consideration received by A. The burden of
alleging and proving lack of consideration would be
on A.
4. Days of grace. — When a bill is not payable on
demand, three days of grace are added to the time of
payment as fixed by the bill and, unless otherwise
NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS 197
provided, the bill is due and payable on the last day
of grace. ^
5. Bills of Exchange Act. — Our present Bills of
Exchange Act is a revision or consolidation of the Act
of 1890 and its amendments. Before that time the
laws governing bills and notes varied in the different
provinces. In Quebec, a mixture of French and Eng-
lish conmiercial law was enforced. In the other prov-
inces, the English law as it existed when introduced
into the particular province and. as amended by local
statute, was appHed. There were anomalies and con-
tradictions, and it became evident that, in a matter of
such vital importance to our commerce, there should
be a uniform law for the whole of Canada. The Eng-
lish law respecting bills and notes had been codified
m 1882, and our Act of 1890 was largely copied there-
from.
In the United States, where formerly there existed
conflicts between the laws of the different states gov-
erning the subject of bills and notes, a Negotiable
Instrument Law has been adopted in most states.
This law is, in the main, in agreement with the Eng-
lish and Canadian acts.
6. Promissory notes. — Too careful attention can-
not be given to the definitions of the various negotiable
instruments.
A promissory note is an unconditional promise in
1 Provided that whenever the last day of grace falls on a legal holiday
or non-juridical day in the pro\ince where the bill is payable, then, the
day next following, not being a legal holiday or non-juridical day in such
province, shall be the last day of grace.
198 COMMERCIAL LAW
writing made by one person to another, signed by the
maker, engaging to pay, on demand or at a fixed or
determinable future time, a sum certain in money, to,
or to the order of, a specified person, or to bearer.
A note need not be in any particular form of words,
so long^ as the conditions just mentioned as being
necessary to its existence are present. The promise
must be unconditional, hence a document reading, "I
promise to pay, on demand, to A. B. $50, if I can sell
my B. C. Company stock," is not a valid note.
Similarly, as it contained a condition, the following
instrument was declared invalid — "Four months after
date I promise to pay to W. H. or order, $1,264, value
received. This note to be held as collateral secur-
ity."
A "sum certain in money" must be promised.
A promise to pay out of a particular fund is
not a promissory note. The fund may prove inade-
quate or may never exist. Hence a promise to pay
out of the net proceeds of the sale of a cargo is not a
promissory note, because it is not negotiable. Yet the
instrument will serve as an evidence of the debt and
as an assignment of the sum mentioned.
The note is to be "signed by the maker" — which
means that the maker may sign, or someone under
his authority may sign for him. A corporation signs
thru its authorized officers. Only the person who
signs is liable; and so a person whose signature is
forged is not bound. But when an agent signs for a
principal he must be careful to sign so as to avoid
NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS 199
personal liability. He must not sign "Jolm Smith,
agent for J. A. ^IcDonald," but J. A. McDonald,
Per John Smith, or the Estate Company, Limited,
Per John Smith, President.
Thus, when at the left side of a note the words,
"The Estate Company, Limited," were printed, and
the note was signed "John Smith, President," "James
Thompson, Treasurer," Smith and Thompson were
held personally liable. To bind the company and not
the officers the note should have been signed :
The Estate Company, Limited,
Countersigned by Pcr Joliu Smith, President.
James Thompson
As Treasurer.
But the mere signature is not enough; to become a
note the instrument must be delivered ; oi*, if payable
to the maker himself, must be indorsed by him. A
note is payable on demand which is expressed to be so
payable, or in which no time for payment is expressed.
Generally the place at which the note is payable is
mentioned, and whether or not the note is to bear
interest. If interest is stipulated, it w^ill run from the
date of the note; if not, then only from its maturity.
If the rate is not fixed, only the legal rate of five per
cent can be charged.
7. Bills of exchange. — A bill of exchange is an im-
conditional order in writing, addressed by one person
to another, signed by the person giving it, requiring
the person to whom it is addressed to pay, on demand
200 COMMERCIAL LAW
or at a fixed or determinable future time, a sum cer-
tain in money to, or to the order of a specified person,
or to bearer.
The remarks just made concerning promissory
notes are generally applicable to bills of exchange. A
bill of exchange is an order, and is in its nature the
demand of a right, not the mere asking of a favor, and
therefore a supplication made or authority given to
pay an amount is not a bill.^ The person addressed
is "required" to pay the sum named. But mere terms
of courtesy will not render the bill invalid. Hence
it has been held that an order, as follows, "Mr. Nel-
son will much oblige Mr. Webb by paying J. Ruff, or
order, twenty guineas on his account," was held a
good bill; as also the following, "Please let the bearer
have $50. I will arrange it with you this forenoon.
Yours truly." But the following were held to be bad :
"Please to send $10 by bearer, as I am so ill I cannot
wait upon you"; or, "To E. & S. — We hereby au-
thorize you to pay on our account to the order of G.,
$600. de W. & S." All of these examples are in-
formal, and it is difficult often to reconcile the
judgments declaring similar informal orders good or
bad. It is wise, of course, to avoid infoimality in
business matters, and to follow closely the accepted
form of contract. A correct and simple form of bill
of exchange may be here set out :
$500 Montreal, Que., September 10, 1913.
On demand, pay to the order of A. MacNaughton and Com-
1 Daniel, See. 35.
NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS 201
pany, Five Hundred Dollars, value received,
and charge to the account of
Balfour & Company.
To W. L. Booker,
Toronto, Ont.
A bill of exchange is commonly called a draft, and
after it has been accepted by the person to whom it is
addressed, an acceptance. In the above model bill of
exchange or draft, Balfour and Company is the
draxcer, because it draws on W. L. Booker. A. Mac-
Xaughton and Company, Limited, in whose favor the
draft is made, is called the payee, for payment is to be
made to it, or to any one to whom it may negotiate the
bill. Booker, against whom the draft is drawn, is
called the drawee. If Booker accepts the draft, he
writes across the draft the word "accepted," with the
date, and frequently the bank at which it is payable,
and signs his name.
The instrument must be in writing, and tcriting "in-
cludes words printed, painted, engraved, lithographed,
or otherwise traced or copied." * The wTiting may be
in pencil or in ink. If there is a conflict between the
printed and the written words, those written will pre-
vail.
As testimony (that is, parol testimony) cannot in
any case be received to contradict or vary the items
of a valid written instrument, the contract of the par-
ties to notes or bills, as it appears upon the face of the
instrument, cannot be varied by parol evidence.
Hence, in an action upon a bill or note, the defendant
1 Interpretation Act, R. S. C. Ch. 1, S. 34 (31).
202 COMMERCIAL LAW
will not be allowed to prove that, at the making of the
instrument, it was verbally agreed that it should be
renewed or not paid at maturity; or that the instru-
ment expressed to be payable at a certain time should
be payable only in a given event ; or that it should be
payable iji instalments, or in any other manner than
as expressed in the instrument. But it has been held
that parol evidence is admissible to show that the date
of the bill or note is not the true date, and to show the
true date; or that the delivery of the instrument is in-
complete and conditional only, so that the contract is
not operative; or that the contract has been discharged
by payment, release or otherwise.
The definition requires that the bill shall be ad-
dressed by one person to another. "Person" includes
any body corporate, or its representatives, and the
heirs, executors, administrators or other legal repre-
sentatives of such person. The drawee need not be
named, if he is described with reasonable certainty so
that the bill can be duly presented.
The instrument is not a bill of exchange until it is
signed by the drawer, tho he may sign a blank paper
which is later filled up, or he may sign it after it has
been accepted.
A bill is payable on demand, (a) which is expressed
to be payable on demand or on presentation, or (b) in
which no time for payment is expressed. A bill is
payable at a determinable future time when it is ex-
pressed to be payable (a) at sight, or at a fixed period
after the occurrence of a specified event which is cer-
NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS 203
tain to happen, tho the time of happening is uncer-
tain. Thus, "six weeks after the death of my father,
I promise to pay, etc."; "one year after my death";
"on demand after my decease." Similarly, a promis-
sory note, made payable upon the coming of age of a
minor, naming the date, is a good note.
Bills of exchange are either inland bills or foreign
bills. An inland bill is one which is, or on the face of
it purports to be, (a) both drawn and payable within
Canada, or (b) drawn within Canada upon some per-
son resident therein. Hence the following are inland
bills: ^
(a) A bill drawn in Canada upon some person resi-
dent there and payable in Canada.
(b) A bill drawn in Canada upon some person
abroad, but payable in Canada.
(c) A bill drawn in Canada upon some person resi-
dent there, but payable abroad.
( d ) A bill which on its face purports to come within
any of the foregoing classes, but which was
actually drawn abroad, tho dated in Canada.
All other bills are foreign bills. The distinction may
be of importance, because a foreign bill must, in
Canada, be always protested if dishonored by non-
acceptance or non-payment. An inland bill, except in
the Province of Quebec, need not be protested. Un-
less the contrary appears on the face of the bill, the
liolder may treat it as an inland bill.^ In the United
1 Maclaren, "Bills and Notes," 1909, p. 84.
2 Bills of Exchange Act, Sect. 25 (3).
204 COMMERCIAL LAW
States, bills drawn in one state and payable in an-
other are foreign bills.
8. Bills in a set. — Bills in a set were devised to over-
come the delay and uncertainty common enough be-
fore the day of trains and steamships, when mails were
carried in sailing ships. If the ship was lost, a long-
delay, perhaps of months, might ensue before the loss
could be verified and a new bill of exchange dis-
patched. So it became the practice to issue bills in a
set of three or four parts. After the first of ex-
change is mailed, a second of exchange may be for-
warded by the next mail. If the first has been lost,
the second may be used. If the first arrives and is
paid, the second is returned. Where each part is
numbered and contains a reference to the other parts,
the whole of the parts constitutes one bill. Each bill
of the set contains a condition that it shall be payable
only if all the other parts remain unpaid. The fol-
lowing is an example of a "First of Exchange":
MoNTREAi., Quebec, September 10, 19153.
Exchange for £200. Stg.
At sight of this First of Exchange (Second and Third un-
})aid) pay to the order of A. B. & Co., two hundred pounds
sterhng. Value received.
B. C.
To the Bank of Montreal,
London, England.
9. Checks. — A check is a bill of exchange drawn
on a bank, payable on demand. Hence it is an un-
conditional order in writing addressed to a bank by
the person drawing or signing it, requiring the bank
NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS 205
to pay on demand a sum certain in money to, or to the
order of, a specified person, or to bearer.^
If the drawee of a check is a bank, it should not be
addressed to the cashier, manager or agent of the
bank, but to the bank itself. Otherwise the bank
might be held not liable upon it if accepted or certi-
fied. As a check is supposed to be payable on de-
mand, in the absence of other directions, the words "on
demand" need not be on the check. It is not invalid
if not dated, or if antedated or post-dated, or if dated
on a Sunday or other non- juridical day. Nor is it the
less valid if the place where it is drawn is not men-
tioned. When a person gives a post-dated check, he
impliedly undertakes that on the day mentioned he
wiU have funds in the drawee bank sufficient to pay
the check. But if he obtains goods by giving a check
on a bank where he has no account, and does not in-
tend to have an account, he is guilty of the crime of
obtaining money by false pretence, and, if convicted,
may be sentenced to three years' imprisonment.
As checks are bills of exchange drawn on a bank,
they are subject to the same general rules as demand
bills. A bill of exchange must be presented for pay-
ment at the time fixed for payment — on demand, or at
sight, or so many days after sight — or within a rea-
sonable delay thereafter, or the drawer and the in-
dorsers are wholly discharged. In determining what
is a reasonable delay, the act holds that regard should
be had to the nature of the bill, the usage of trade with
1 See the definition of a bill of exchange.
206 COMMERCIAL LAW
regard to similar bills, and the facts of the particular
case. But failure to present a check within a reason-
able time discharges the drawer only to the extent to
which he actually suffers damage by the delay. A
check should be presented for payment, where the
holder and the bank are in the same place, before the
banks close on the next business day following the day
of its issue. If they are in different places, the check
should be deposited for collection by the day after
its receipt.
The act is careful to explain what is meant by the
discharge of the drawer to the extent of the actual
damage suffered. If the drawer handed B a check
for one hundred dollars on a bank where he had funds
sufficient to pay, but B neglects to present the check
for three months, and meanwhile the bank fails and
pays ten cents on the dollar, the drawer would be dis-
charged to the (jxtent of ninetj'- dollars. Of course if
B could show that he used diligence and that the delay
was not unreasonable, he would not lose his recourse
against the drawer. But it has been held that where
it was understood that a bank was likely to suspend
payment, a delay of one day in presenting a check was
unreasonable. Delay in making presentment for
payment of a bill of exchange is excused when the de-
lay is caused by circumstances beyond the control of
the holder, and not imputable to his default, miscon-
duct or negligence. When the cause of delay ceases
to operate, presentment must be made with reason-
able diligence. And this applies as well to checks.
NEGOTIABLE IXSTRUMEXTS 207
If the holder presents the check for acceptance, and
has it accepted or certified without taking payment,
the maker and indorsers are discharged, and if the
bank fails before the check is paid, the holder has no
other recourse.
10. Acceptance or certifying of checks. — The duty
and authority of a bank to pay a check drawn on it by
its customer are terminated by countermand of pay-
ment or by notice of the customer's death. Other-
wise, when a bank has funds of the drawer sufficient
to pay a check, it is bound to pay it or be liable in
damages since the holder may be caused damage and
inconvenience or the drawer's business reputation be
impaired. But after the holder of a check has had
it certified or accepted, the drawer can no longer stop
payment of it. By getting the check certified or
marked, the holder provides against any possibility of
the drawer stopping pa}Tnent or withdrawing from
his account enough money to make pa\Tnent of the
check impossible. Upon acceptance, the bank be-
comes liable to the holder : it virtually sets aside, in its
books, the amount of the check out of the drawer's
account, and the accepted check in the hands of the
holder is the equivalent of a deposit receipt payable
to the holder. The drawer and any indorser are dis-
charged, because the holder has a new debtor, the
bank. He accepts the promise of the bank to pay,
instead of that of the drawer, and not in addition to
it.
A distinction is made where the drawer before
208 COMMERCIAL LAW
issuing a check has it certified. JNIaclaren says that in
this case the bank is in the position of an ordinary ac-
ceptor, its credit being added to that of the drawer;
whereas, if the holder has the check certified, the bank
becomes the sole debtor. And where the drawer has
had his check certified, but does not issue it, or where
he later becomes the holder, the certificate may be
cancelled and the entry reversed, at his request, or by
simply depositing the check to his accoimt.
11. To whom payable. — Negotiable instruments,
from their nature, must be so payable that they are
negotiable. They must, therefore, be either payable
to bearer and thus pass by delivery from hand to hand,
or be payable to the order of some one who by in-
dorsement and delivery negotiates them. Where the
payee of a negotiable instrument is a fictitious or non-
existent person, it is payable to bearer. Fictitious
names in frequent use are "cash," "expense account,"
"labor." A bill payable to "John Jones or bearer,"
is a bill payable to bearer. If the bill is payable to
order, the payee must be a specified person, but it is
not payable to order if it contains words prohibiting
transfer, or indicating an intention that it should not
be transferable. By "specified person" is meant that
he should be so indicated as to be clearly identified.
Thus the payee may be "John Smith," or "the execu-
tors of the Estate A.," or the "Secretary of the Prov-
ince of Quebec." The payee may be the same person
as the maker or drawer, but the instrument is not is-
NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS 209
sued until such maker or drawer has indorsed and
dehvered it. If the name of the payee is WTongly
spelled, or where he is described by his office, he may
be identified by parol evidence; but where the payee
is not named or is not even described, parol evidence
is inadmissible to identify him. If the name of a
payee or indorsee is ^\Tongly spelled, he may indorse
in the same way and add his proper signature, or may
indorse by his own proper signature. Where a bill
is payable to the order of two or more payees or in-
dorsees who are not partners, all must indorse, imless
the one indorsing has authority' to indorse for the
others. If a payee indorses in blank, that is, merely
signs his name without adding words indicating that
he indorses to a particular indorsee, the instrument
thereby becomes at once payable to bearer. If the
payee's name is left in blank, a legal holder of the bill
may fill the blank with any name he chooses.
12. Certainty of drawee. — The drawee of a bill of
exchange must be clearly indicated. An instrument
regular in form, except that it is not addressed to any
drawee, is not a bill of exchange. As in the case of
the payee, however, the drawee need not be named,
but may be described with such certainty that the bill
can be presented to the person intended. Thus, "To
our agent in London" is sufficient, but "To ,
London, England," is not. "\^niere in a bill the
drawer and di*awee are the same person, or where the
drawee is a fictitious person or a person not having
XXIV— 13
no COMMERCIAL LAW
capacity to contract, the holder may treat the instru-
ment, at his option, either as a bill of exchange or as a
promissory note.
13. Blanks. — The general rule is that, prima facie,
a person in possession of an instrument which in some
particular is incomplete, has authority to complete it
by filling the blanks. We have already seen that the
legal holder of an instrument from which the payee's
name has been omitted may insert a payee. Sim-
ilarly, where a bill expressed to be payable at a fixed
date is issued undated, or where the acceptance of a
bill payable at sight, or at a fixed period after sight,
is undated, any holder may insert the true date of issue
or acceptance. But if the holder, in good faith, in-
serts a wrong date, or in any case if a wrong date is
inserted, a subsequent holder in due course is not
prejudiced.* He is entitled to take the bill as he
finds it. Or where a simple signature on a blank
paper is delivered by the signer in order that it may be
converted into a bill, it operates as a prima facie au-
thority to fill it up as a complete bill for any amount,
using the signature for that of the drawer or acceptor,
or an indorser.
But where a signature was obtained ostensibly for
a receipt, and a note was written over it, the signer
1 A holder in due course is one who has taken a bill, complete and regu-
lar on the face of it, provided he became the holder of it before it was
overdue and without notice that it had previously been dishonored, and
that he took it in good faith and for value, and that at the time it was
negotiated to him he had no notice of any defect in the title of the person
who negotiated it.
NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS 211
was not liable/ In that case the signature was not
delivered in order that it should be converted into a
l)ill. But where a note was signed in blank, and was
sent with instructions to be filled up for one hundred
and fifteen dollars, and it was filled up for four hun-
dred and sixty-one dollars, the maker was held liable
for the full amount to a holder in due course. On
the other hand, where a blank acceptance was stolen
from the signer's desk and filled out, he was not held
liable to a holder in due course — he had not delivered
the acceptance or in an^^ way lent his signature or au-
thority. And so, also, where a bill is wanting in a
material particular, the person in possession of it has
a prima facie authority to fill up the omission in any
way he thinks fit. So where the maker of a note de-
livered it with the amount in blank, and it was fraud-
ulently filled out for eight himdred and fifty-five dol-
lars, he was held liable to an innocent indorsee. And
where a biU is drawn payable to or
order, any holder for value may write his own name
in the blank and sue on the bill. Tho an alteration
is not a filling-up, it has been held that where a per-
son indorsed as payee a note for five hundred dollars,
on which there was a blank space to the left of the
word "five," which the maker fraudulently filled out
with the word "twenty," the indorser was liable for
two thousand five hundred dollars to an innocent in-
dorsee. The reason for this decision will now appear.
14. Alteration of hill. — The general rule is that
1 Banque Jacques Cartier vs. Lescard, 13 Que. L. R. 39 (18S6).
212 COMMERCIAL LAW
where a bill or acceptance or a note is materially-
altered, without the assent of all parties liable thereon,
it is voided, except as against a party who has him-
self made, authorized or assented to the alteration,
and subsequent indorsers. This rule makes clear the
reason for the holding just above mentioned. A sub-
sequent indorser is in the position of having lent his
name and credit to the instrument. With these ex-
ceptions, the bill or note is void if materially altered,
provided, however, that where there has been a ma-
terial alteration which is not apparent, a holder in due
course may avail himself of the instrument as if it had
not been altered, and may enforce payment of it ac-
cording to its original tenor.
The first part of our general rule makes a bill void
if materially altered, with the exceptions mentioned.
. This was considered to be a hardship, and so the pro-
viso was added to protect holders in due course who
may sue upon the bill according to its original tenor.
That is, if A makes a note for five hundred dollars
and B fraudulently raises the amount to two thou-
sand five hundred dollars and negotiates it to C who
is a holder in due course, C can sue A for the five
hundred dollars according to the original tenor of the
note.
Two notes were given for patent rights, and the
maker indorsed on them the words "the within notes
not to be sold." The payee cut from one note the
portion containing these words, but without defacing
it. On the other he erased the word "not." The
NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS 213
plaintiff noticed the erasure when buying the notes,
and gave much less than their value for them. It
was held that he was not an innocent holder, and the
notes were void.^
A genuine check for six dollars was altered to one
thousand dollars so skilfully as to escape detection,
and deposited in another bank by the pretended payee,
twenty-five dollars being paid him at the time, and
eight hundred dollars more after collection from the
drawee bank. At the end of the month the forgery
was discovered. It was held that the drawee was en-
titled to recover from the collecting bank.^
REVIEW
Define negotiable instruments and name some instruments that
are not in the fullest sense negotiable.
What consideration is a negotiable instrument presumed to
have? Explain, with examples.
What is a promissory note.'' A\lio must sign it.'' Is delivery
necessary.^ How is interest provided for.''
Define bill of exchange. Who is the drawer? The payee?
What can parol evidence determine? AVhat distinguishes an in-
land bill from a foreign bill?
What is a check? Who is the drawee? What rules apply to
checks ? '
What is certification? What happens when the holder of tlie
check has it certified?
What is the general rule concerning blanks on an instrument?
What is a holder in due course?
iSwaisland vs. Davidson, 3 O. R. 320 (1882).
2 Dominion Bank vs. Union Bank, 40 Can. S. C. R. 366 (1908).
CHAPTER XIV
y
TRANSFER AND NEGOTIATION
1. Methods of transfer. — In the preceding chapter
we have examined the definitions of our subject, and
have obtained some idea of the form and contents of
bills, notes and checks, and of the inception of
negotiable contracts. To be of use, these instru-
ments must circulate, and their circulation is gov-
erned by rules which must now be dealt with. They
circulate by transfer, or passing from hand to hand
by assignment, by operation of law and by negotia-
tion.
2. By assignment. — A check or a bill of exchange
does not operate as an assignment of funds in the
hands of the drawee available for payment. Hence,
the drawee of a bill of exchange who does not accept
it is not liable on the instrument. Similarly, a check
which is a bill of exchange on a banker, unless it is
certified, gives the holder no right against the bank
to claim or enforce payment. We have seen that an
order which is not unconditional, in that it calls for
payment out of some particular fund, is not a bill of
exchange, but may, under a provincial law, operate as
an assignment of the amount in question to him in
whose favor the instrument is drawn. A bill or a note
214
* TRANSFER AND NEGOTIATION 215
may be transferred, as for example, to a purchaser or
a pledgee, without being indorsed by the holder. The
holder thus assigns it. The transfer gives the trans-
feree such title as the transferor had in the bill and
no more, but the transferee can also demand the in-
dorsement of the transferor. The transferee is in no
better position and has not a better title than the
transferor. By receiving and giving value for it,
even before maturity, and before indorsement, he does
not become a holder in due course. "He holds the
bill subject to any defect of title in the transferor,
of which he becomes aware before the indorsement of
the bill to him, and if it is not indorsed before ma-
turity, it is subject to any defects of title that existed
in the transferor." A simple form of assignment
takes place under the following circumstances: A
holds a note of B for five hundred dollars. He en-
trusts it to C. Later he writes to C, telling him to
keep the note in payment of his indebtedness to him
(C) . The note is thus assigned to C, who, neverthe-
less, can demand A's indorsement, not in order to
hold A, but in order to sue B. The point to observe
is that the note has not been transferred by negotia-
tion.
3. By operation of law. — From the preceding par-
agraph it will be understood that negotiable instru-
ments may be treated as personal property, transfer-
able by voluntary assignment. They may also be
transferred by operation of law. ^Mien a testator
holds a note, for instance, it passes to his executor to
216 COMMERCIAL LAW
be dealt with according to the provincial law. When
a person dies without a will — intestate — bills or notes
in his possession pass to the administrator of his per-
sonal estate, or to the heirs, as in Quebec. Similarly,
if a perjson becomes insolvent, and in his estate are
found bills and notes, these pass to the assignee, cura-
tor or trustee to be collected or dealt with as he may
be authorized by the provincial law. On the death of
a joint payee or indorsee, the title vests immediately
in the survivor. And when transfer by operation of
law occurs, the transferee takes the place of the trans-
feror, just as in the case of an assignment.
4. By negotiation. — As to what is a negotiable in-
strument, it may be well to cite the words of a great
authority :
It may therefore be laid down as a safe rule, that wliere an
instrument is by the custom of trade transferable, like cash,
by delivery, and is also capable of being sued upon by the
person holding it pro tempore, then it is entitled to the name
of a negotiable instrument, and the property in it passes to
a bona fide transferee for value.^
Bills of exchange and promissory notes, whether
payable to order or to bearer, are by the law merchant
negotiable in both senses of the word.^
Now a bill or note is negotiated when it is trans-
ferred from one person to another in such a manner
as to constitute the transferee the holder of the bill.
A holder means the payee or indorsee of a bill or note
who is in possession of it, or the bearer thereof. He
iSee Crouch vs. Credit Foncier, L. R. 8 Q. B. (1873), at p. 381.
2 Ibid.
TRANSFER AND NEGOTIATION 217
need not be the legal owner. But if he is in posses-
sion and may legally recover from the person liable
thereon, he is a holder, whether he be the owner or a
holder for discomit or a holder for collection.
As we have seen, a bill or note is negotiable when it
is payable to bearer or to a particular person or to
order. If payable to bearer, it is negotiated by de-
livery ; ^ a bill payable to order is negotiated by the
indorsement of the holder completed by delivery. A
bill is payable to order which is expressed to be so
payable, or which is expressed to be payable to a par-
ticular person, and does not contain words prohibit-
ing transfer or indicating an intention that it should
not be transferable. If the holder of a bill or note
payable to his order dies, his rights pass, as we have
seen, to his executors or personal representatives, who
in turn, may negotiate the instrument by indorsement
thereof. The same would be true of a bill made pay-
able to a dead man by someone not aw^are of his death.
When a bill or note is negotiable in its origin it
continues to be negotiable, until it has been restric-
tively indorsed or has been discharged by payment or
otherwise.^ And a bill or a note negotiable in its ori-
gin is one which is made payable to bearer, or to a
particular person or to his order.
5. Indorsement. — By indorsement is meant in the
1 ITie Act defines a "bearer" as the person in possession of a bill or
note which is payable to bearer. A bill is payable to bearer which is
expressed to be so payable or on which the only or last indorsement is an
indorsement in blank. He does not become the bearer of a bill or note
which is transferred or assigned to him before it is indorsed to him.
- Restrictive indorsement will be explained in the sections following.
218 COMMERCIAL LAW
Act an indorsement completed by delivery. It is the
act of writing one's name on a negotiable instrument,
with the intent either of transferring the title thereto,
or of giving extra security to the holder, or both.
The word implies a writing of the name on the back
of the bill, but it has been held to be immaterial where
it is written. If there are numerous indorsements
and the back of the instrument is filled, frequently
an allonge is added in the form of a piece of
paper attached to the bill. To prevent fraud, the
first indorsement on the allonge should be written so
that it is begun on the bill itself and completed on
the allonge. If the indorsement is given solely to
add to the security, it is said to be for accommodation.
It is clear from what has been said that the act of in-
dorsement is to be distinguished from the act of ne-
gotiation which transfers the instrument.
6. Requisites of indorsement. — An indorsement, in
order to operate as a negotiation, must be written on
the bill itself (an allonge is deemed to form part of
the bill) and be signed by the indorser; and must be
an indorsement of the entire bill. By "written" is
also meant, as we have already seen, words printed,
painted, engraved, and so on. Banks often use a
stamp accompanied by the signature of the officer
using it. The indorsement must be signed by the
indorser, i.e., by the indorser or by some one acting
for him and under his authority. It must be an in-
dorsement of the entire bill, i.e., it must not be a
partial indorsement, and must follow the tenor of the
TRANSFER AND NEGOTIATION 219
instrument. So if A holds a bill reading, "Pay to the
order of B the sum of five hundred dollars," he can-
not indorse it, "Pay to X two hundred and fifty dol-
lars, pay to the order of ^I two hundred and fifty
dollars." Otherwise the maker or drawer might have
to defend two actions. But there may be a partial
acceptance of a bill; and an indorsement of a bill so
accepted, as being an indorsement of the entire bill
as accepted, would be valid.^
When a person is under an obligation to indorse a
bill in a representative capacity, he may indorse it in
such terms as to negative personal liability. Thus, a
tutor or curator or executor, when it becomes neces-
sary to indorse bills or notes payable to the order of
some one who died, or who lost his capacity before in-
dorsing, may indorse in his capacity as such tutor,
curator, executor or otherwise, in such a way as to
negative personal liability. The indorser should,
however, be careful to make it apparent for whom and
on whose behalf he is indorsing, and he will be wise
to add also the words "without recourse," or "with-
out recourse to me personally."
Thus, it was held by Lord Ellenborough, that a man
who puts his name to a bill of exchange makes himself
personally liable, unless he states upon the face of the
bill that he subscribes it for another, or by procuration
of another; unless he says plainly, "I am the mere
scribe," he becomes liable.^ Similarly when a bill
1 Maclaren, p. 207.
2 Leadbitter vs. Farrow, 5 M. & S., p. St9.
220 COMMERCIAL LAW
was drawn on "W. A. Geddes, Treas. W. I. C. Co.,"
and he accepted it, "W. A. Geddes, Treas. W. I. C.
Co.," and affixed the company's seal, he was held per-
sonally liable. Had he accepted as follows: "W. I.
C. Co. per W. A. Geddes, Treas.," the company, as
was intended, would have been held liable. So a bill
addressed "To the Sec. R. G. M. Co.," and accepted
as follows : "The R. G. M. Co. per Jas. Glass, Sec,"
was held not to be the acceptance of the secretary, and
he was not personally liable. It has also been held
that an agreement in writing to indorse a bill is not
an indorsement. An indorsement may be to two or
more persons jointly, or to a third person, who is to
hold it merely as collateral security for a smaller debt
due him from the endorser. The maker or drawer
may thus pay part of the instrument ; if the person re-
ceiving payment writes a receipt on the back of the
instrument, subsequent holders thereof may sue the
prior parties for the balance only.
Maclaren, speaking of the commercial usage in the
matter of endorsement, says:
Use the Christian name or initials, as in the bill or special
indorsement, if there be no mistake in the name as there
given, and no mis-spelling, dropping all prefixes and suffixes,
such as Mr., Mrs., Miss, Messrs., Hon., Esq., etc. Where,
for the purpose of identification, an addition follows, such
as Merchant, M.D., M.P., K.C., or the like, it may be well
to add this to the signature. A bill to the order of Mrs.
John Smith may be endorsed "Mary Smith, wife of John
Smith"; or a bill "To the Estate of John Jones, or order,"
bv "A. B., Executor or Administrator late John Jones" : a
bill "To the order of the City Treas., Toronto," by "A. C,
TRANSFER AND NEGOTIATION 221
City Treas., Toronto" ; a bill to the order of "The Canada
Gas Co.," by "The Canada Gas Co., per E. F., Manager" :
a bill "To the order of John Smith & Co.," if by a partner,
should be indorsed simply "John Smith & Co., " and if by
another person authorized by the firm, "John Smith & Co.,
per G. H., Atty.," or "Per pro. G. H." Signatures such as
the following should be avoided, partly on the ground of
ambiguity and partly on account of the danger of the agent
or representative making himself personally liable: *'A. B.,
agent for C. D.," "Per proc. E. F., G. H.'," "J. K. for the
L. M. Co., «J. K., for L. M. & Co.," "J. K., for the Estate
of L. M." 1
When there are two or more indorsements on a
bill, any indorsement is deemed to have been made in
the order in which it appears on the bill, until the con-
trary is proved.
7. Kinds of indorsement. — There are several kinds
of indorsement which have been for many years rec-
ognized in law and in commercial practice, and it is
well to understand the effect that a particular in-
dorsement may have upon the rights and liabilities of
the parties to a negotiable instrument.
We may take the following form of a promissory'-
note and examine the possible indorsements thereof,
and the result in each case.
MoNTKEAi., Sept 15, 1913.
$5,000.
Three months after date I promise to pay to the order
of John Wilson $5,000 at the Merchants Bank of Canada,
Montreal. Value received.
John Smith.
8. Indorsements in hlanh. — If Wilson indorses by
1 Maclaren, p. 208.
222 COMMERCIAL LAW
simply signing his name, the instrmnent is said to be
indorsed in blank, and becomes payable to bearer.
It may be negotiated by delivery. If, however, Ar-
thur Jones comes into possession of it by delivery to
him, and indorses it as follows, "Pay to the order of
W. Hardy," it cannot be again negotiated until
Hardy indorses it. Hardy is presumed to have come
into possession of the note before maturity. A holder
may thus change an indorsement in blank to a spe-
cial indorsement, by writing above the indorser's
signature a direction to pay the bill to, or to the order
of himself or some other person. If, however, he in-
dorses the bill to himself, he must indorse it again in
order to negotiate it.
9. Special indorsements. — As we have just seen,
a special indorsement specifies the person to whom or
to whose order the bill is to be payable. It is more
than an indorsement in blank, because the indorser
not only signs his name, but gives the direction, "Pay
to A. B." or "Pay to the order of A. B."
A holder may strike out several blank indorse-
ments; he cannot strike out a special indorsement in
order to insert his own name.
10. Qualified indorsements, or indorsements with-
out recourse. — If John Wilson indorses as follows,
"Pay to Arthur Hardy, without recourse, John Wil-
son," or simply "Without recourse, John Wilson,"
his indorsement is said to be qualified. He may use
the French expression, "Sans recours/' or "At the in-
dorsee's own risk." It is necessary for him to use
TRANSFER AND NEGOTIATION 223
words showing his intention to qualify his indorse-
ment. His contract on the bill is that he negotiates
the bill by indorsement, but he does so on condition
that he will not be liable to a subsequent holder.
11. Conditional indorsement. — If John Wilson in-
dorses as follows, "Pay to Arthur Hardy, unless be-
fore pajTiient I give you notice to the contrary, John
Wilson," the indorsement is conditional. A condi-
tional indorsement does not hinder the negotiation of
the note. True, the indorser has added a condition
to his liability, but the Act states that when a bill
purports to be indorsed conditionally, the condition
may be disregarded by the payer, and payment to the
indorsee is valid, whether the condition has been ful-
filled or not. Another example of a conditional in-
dorsement— a condition precedent, the former ex-
ample being a condition subsequent — would be the
following, "Pay to A or order, if he lives until he is
twenty-one," or "If he is alive when the bill becomes
due." The reason for the rule is that it was deemed
unfair that a person who accepted a note as indorsee,
for example, should have thrust upon him the burden
of finding out whether or not the condition had been
fulfilled. He might pay, and, if the condition were
not fulfilled, be compelled to pay a second time; or
had he refused he might be protested. INIacLaren
points out that the rule does not entitle the holder to
compel payment if the condition is not fulfilled; it
merely has the effect of releasing the person who pays
without knowing whether the condition is fulfilled.
2M COMMERCIAL LAW
12. Restrictive indorsements. — An indorsement is
restrictive which contains terms making it restrictive ;
thus, an indorsement is restrictive which prohibits the
further negotiation of the bill, or which expresses that
it is a mere authority to deal with the bill as thereby
directed, and is not a transfer of the ownership
thereof; as, for example, if a bill is indorsed *'Pay D
only," or "Pay D for the account of X," or "Pay D
or order for collection." By indorsing in any of these
ways, John Wilson, the indorser, notifies the world
that, tho he may part with the instrument itself for
the purpose mentioned, he does not part with the title
thereto. Whoever receives payment is not a holder
in due course, but receives payment subject to the
claims of John Wilson.
A restrictive indorsement makes the indorsee an
agent. He may receive payment and may sue any
party on the bill that his indorser could have sued,
but he cannot sell or pledge the bill, and he cannot
transfer his rights as indorsee unless the indorse-
ment expressly authorizes him to do so. If the re-
strictive indorsement authorizes further transfer,
subsequent indorsees take the note with the same
rights and subject to the same liabilities as the first
indorsee under the restrictive indorsement.
13. Indorsement waiving conditions. — John Wil-
son may indorse as follows, "Pay to Arthur Hardy,
waiving protest, John Wilson." He may waive no-
tice of dishonor or waive presentment. Thus, the in-
dorser mav relieve the holder from his duties as such
TRANSFER AND NEGOTIATION 225
to present the note for pajTiient, or to give notice of
dishonor, and so on.
14. Irregular and other indorsements. — The Cana-
dian Bankers' Association has laid do\\Ti that a regu-
lar indorsement must be neither restrictive nor con-
ditional, and must be so placed and worded as to show
clearly that an indorsement is intended: and that an
indorsement, other than a restrictive indorsement,
which is not in accordance with this definition of a
regidar indorsement, or which is so placed or worded
as to raise doubts as to whether it is intended as an
indorsement, is an irregular indorsement.
We have already seen that where the name of a
payee or indorsee is wrongly spelled, he may indorse
by writing the name as mis-spelled and placing under
it his correct name, or by simply indorsing his cor-
rect name. When a person signs a bill otherwise
than as a drawer or acceptor, lie thereby incurs the
liabilities of a drawer to a holder in due course, and
is said to be an indorser pour aval; that is, he has
really entered into a contract of warranty for the
drawer, by putting his signature at the foot of the
bill; for the indorser by signing below the indorse-
ment; or for the acceptor by signing below the ac-
ceptance.
It has been laid do\vn that a signature placed upon
an instrument, in such a way that it is doubtful in
what capacity the person signing intended to sign,
makes the person signing an indorser.
An indorsement to the cashier of a bank or cor-
XXIV— 16
226 COMMERCIAL LAW
poration, while not regular, is deemed to be on its
face, to the bank or corporation of which the cashier
is an officer, and the bank or corporation may nego-
tiate the instrument with its own indorsement, or by
having the cashier indorse it. And where one part-
ner of an English firm did business for the firm in
America in his individual name, the firm was held
liable on indorsements by him. The signature of the
name of the firm is equivalent to the signatures of all
persons liable as partners in that fii'm.
15. Transfer without indorsement. — We have al-
read}^ seen, in an earlier section, that when a nego-
tiable instrument drawn to order is transferred by as-
signment or otherwise, without indorsement, the per-
son to whom it is transferred may demand the in-
dorsement of the transferor. Such a transfer is not
a negotiation of the instrument, which does not become
negotiable until it is indorsed. Without such in-
dorsement the indorsee has merely such rights as the
indorser had. When a person signs a bill in a trade
or assumed name, he is liable thereon as if he had
signed it in his own name. Thus, when a bill was
drawn and indorsed bj^ a wife in her own name in
the presence of her husband and under his direction,
it was treated as the bill of the husband, and he was
held liable.
A partnership note is signed "Evans, Harris &
Co." by a member of the firm, and this signature op-
erates as the signature of all partners in the firm,
whether they are active, dormant or secret ; by holding
TRANSFER AND NEGOTIATION 227
themselves out as partners they are liable as such to
third parties. The reason for this is, as we shall
see later, when we come to study the subject of part-
nership, that each partner is supposed to have the con-
sent from his co-partners for all acts connected with
the partnership business.
16. Delivery. — The first element of negotiation is,
as we have seen, indorsement. The second is de-
livery. Delivery means the transfer of possession,
actual or constructive, from one person to another.
By constructive possession is meant, for instance,
the actual possession which a servant or agent may
have on behalf of his principal, who thus has the con-
structive possession. But, as Maclaren points out,
delivery does not always imply an actual transfer
from one possessor to another. Thus, if A holds a
note for B, A may become the owner of it by some
arrangement between himself and B, and delivery is
complete without an actual change of possession, if it
can be said that it has been made by or under the au-
thority of the party drawing, accepting or indorsing,
as the case may be. Delivery is the final step which
perfects the existence of the contract, and even tho
the bill or note may have been placed in the hands of
an agent for delivery, until it has been delivered it
may be recalled. As between immediate forces, as,
for example, between the maker and the payee, the
indorser and the indorsee, and as regards a holder not
in due course, delivery to be effectual must be ac-
tuallv made. It mav be shown also to have been con-
228 COMMERCIAL LAW
ditional, or for a special purpose only, and not for
the purpose of transferring property in the bill. If,
however, the bill is in the hands of a holder in due
course, a valid delivery by all parties prior to him, so
as to make them liable to him, is presumed. So
when a debtor made a promissory note in favor of a
creditor for the amount of his claim, and died before
delivering it, the note is not valid if delivered subse-
quent to the debtor's death. It has been held, also,
that as a letter, when posted, becomes the property
of the party to whom it is addressed, if it contains a
bill, this is a delivery.^ It has also been held that
when a bill was specially indorsed and inclosed in a
letter addressed to the indorsee, and, having been
placed in the office letter box of the indorser, was
stolen by a clerk before posting or delivery, and the
clerk forged an indorsement and negotiated the
bill, the property in the bill remained in the indorser.
So, when A mailed a note payable to bearer, and it
was stolen by C, who handed it to X upon receiving
the amount of the note, and X did not know that C
had stolen it, X is a liolder in due course and may re-
cover from A; but as between A and C, there was no
delivery, and as they were immediate parties, C could
not recover from A. A would, however, have to show
that the note had been stolen.
The person in possession of a bill payable to bearer
or indorsed in blank is entitled to receive payment in
due course, and tho he may be a thief, the finder or
1 Ex Parte, Cote, L, R. 3 Ch. 27 (1873).
TRANSFER AND NEGOTIATION 229
a fraudulent holder, payment in good faith to him is
valid.
A bill or note may be delivered to be held in escrow,
that is, to be held as a mere blank writing until the
happening of some event, or the fulfilment of some
condition. Upon the happening of the event or the
fulfilment of the condition, the bill or note becomes
operative, and delivery is complete.
17. Holder in due course. — A holder in due course
is a holder who has taken a bill, complete and regular
on the face of it, under the following conditions,
namely: (a) that he became the holder of it before it
was overdue, and without notice that it had been pre-
viously dishonored, if such was the fact; (b) that he
took the bill in good faith and for value, and that at
the time the bill was negotiated to him he had no no-
tice of any defect in the title of the person who nego-
tiated it.
A holder in due course is to be distinguished from a
mere holder. The holder of a bill or note is the payee
or indorsee thereof who is in possession of it, or who is
the bearer thereof. He may or may not be the legal
owner. The term is a general one and may mean a
holder in due course. A person is a holder if he has
possession and is' entitled at law to recover or receive
the contents of a bill or note from another person.
Every holder of a bill is prima facie deemed to be a
holder in due course, unless it is shown that the accept-
ance, issue or subsequent negotiation of the bill is
affected with fraud or other irregularity, when the
230 COMMERCIAL LAW
burden of proof is on the holder to show that he is a
holder in due course, unless he can show that subse-
quent to the alleged fraud or irregularity, value in
good faith has been given by some other holder in due
course. The expression "holder in due course" is the
equivalent of the expression "bona fide holder for
value, Without notice." When value has, at any
time, been given for a bill, the holder is deemed to be
a holder for value as regards the acceptor, and all
parties to the bill who became parties prior to such
time. The holder for value may not be a holder in
due course ; he may only have come into possession of
the bill or note after maturity and dishonor, but he
can recover, tho he has not given value himself,
if he can show that some previous holder has given
value.
18. Regularity of face of instrument. — The statute
requires that to constitute a person a holder in due
course, he must take a bill complete and regular on
the face of it, under the conditions above mentioned.
In other words, the instrument must fulfil the require-
ments of our definition of a bill or note. Thus, an
instrument expressed to be payable on a contingency
is not a bill, and the happening of the event does not
cure the defect. If the bill contains an erasure or
some ambiguous or uncertain clause, or if it is un-
dated and is payable at a fixed period after date, it is
irregular. The transferee should be careful to dis-
cover whether the irregularities are due to the instru-
ment having been issued out of the regular course of
TRANSFER AND NEGOTIATION 231
business, or, if in the regular course of business,
whether they can be corrected or explained.
A bill is not invalid merely because it is undated.
If a person takes a bill which is not complete, it will
not be enforceable against any person who became a
party thereto prior to the completion, unless it is
filled up and completed within a reasonable time, and
strictly in accordance with the authority given. If,
after completion, it is negotiated to a holder in due
course, the latter may enforce it as though it had been
filled up within a reasonable time, and strictly in ac-
cordance with the authority given. It has been held
that a check is not irregular on its face if post-dated.
The bill must not appear on its face to have been can-
celled ; the cancelation, if made unintentionally or mi-
der a mistake, or under the authority of the holder, is
inoperative, but the burden of proof lies on the party
who alleges the mistake or lack of authority.
19. Maturity. — A holder in due course must be-
come the holder of the bill before it is overdue, other-
wise he is not a holder in due course, A note is due
when the principal is to be paid. It has been laid
down that, tho the interest may be overdue, this does
not deprive a holder of his quality as a holder in due
course. A bill payable on demand matures a reason-
able time after demand. It is deemed to be overdue
when it can be seen from the instrument that it has
been in circulation for an unreasonable time. When
a note is payable on demand and has been indorsed,
it must be presented for payment within a reasonable
232 COMIMERCIAL LAW
time, or the indorser is discharged. If, however, it
has been deHvered, with the assent of the indorser as
a collateral or continuing security, it need not be pre-
sented for payment so long as it is held for such se-
curity, y
In determining what is a reasonable time, regard
must be had to the nature of the bill, the usage of
trade with respect to similar bills, and the facts of the
particular case. It has been held that a bill drawn
in Toronto on August sixth by a party dealing in
bills, on New York, payable at sight, in favor of a
party living in Illinois, to be sent there as a remittance
and for circulation, which passed thru a number of
hands and was presented in New York on November
tenth, was presented within a reasonable time.^ With
our better transportation facilities, this delay would
probably be considerably shortened, this decision hav-
ing been rendered in 1850. There is no absolute rule.
MacLaren states that in France there is a limit for
presentment of three months fixed for Europe and
Algeria, four months for Asia, six months for Amer-
ica and Southern Africa, and one year for the rest of
the world.^
20. Without notice of dishonor or defect. — The
holder in due course must have taken the bill without
notice that it had been previously dishonored, or of
any defect in the title of the person who negotiated it
to him. In other words, he must have taken the in-
1 Boyes vs. Joseph, 7 U. C. Q. B. 505 (1850).
2 MacLaren, p. 239.
TRANSFER AND NEGOTIATION 233
strument in good faith. It is not necessary that
formal notice of any kind should have been given him,
if there existed good gromid for suspicion that the
instrument was irregular, or that he was taking it
under improper conditions. He must not wilfully
shut his eyes. He must investigate any circumstances
which to an ordinary business man would appear sus-
picious. Thus, if A, especially if he is a stranger,
offers to give B a note for $500 upon receiving $300
and A had stolen it from X, who made it, B cannot
be considered a holder in due course, because the dif-
ference between the amount of the note and the
amount he paid for it was a sufficient indication that
there was irregularitj'^ in the transfer. He becomes a
mere transferee, and a transferee in bad faith, with
no better rights than A had against X.
jNIere negligence on the part of the transferee is not
enough to deny him the status of a holder in due
course, as it is not altogether a question of diligence
or negligence in making inquiry in every suspicious
case. Good faith is presumed, and a thing is deemed
to be done in good faith when it is in fact done hon-
estly, whether negligently or not. As Lord Black-
burn has pointed out, there is a difference between
honest blundering and dishonest refraining from in-
quiry. WTiat the court will attempt to discover is
whether the transferee acted fairly and honestly. If
the transferee receives notice of a defect in title, or
of previous dishonor, he does not become a holder
in due course; and notice to an agent has been held to
234 COMMERCIAL LAW
be notice to the principal, tlio, if a bill is negotiated
to the agent and notice is given to the principal,
it has been held that a reasonable time must be given
for communication between them. Notice may not
have been given directly. The indorsee may have
come into knowledge of the facts. Thus if he takes
a check from the payee, knowing that the drawer
claimed that it had been delivered only conditionally
and that he had stopped its payment, he is not a
holder in due course. The erasure of the name of
one of the sureties of the note is an irregularity in the
note which should put the purchaser upon inquiry.^
Similarly, the erasure of the indorsement of the payee
by a thief has been held to be an irregularity suffi-
ciently patent to have put the purchaser on his guard.
In another case, in which a bank accepted a bill that
had been given for coal to be delivered, it was held
that the bank became a holder in due course, tho it
turned out that the coal was not subsequently deliv-
ered. As we have already said, good faith is pre-
sumed; it would be impossible to do business if the
history of every negotiable instrument had to be in-
vestigated.
21. Consideration. — A holder must have taken the
bill for value; if he has not paid value he is not a
holder in due course. Value means valuable consid-
eration. Valuable consideration may be constituted
by any consideration sufficient to support a simple
contract, or by an antecedent debt or liability. The
1 McCramen vs. Thompson, 21 Iowa, 244.
TRANSFER AND NEGOTIATION 235
consideration may be some right, interest, profit or
benefit accruing to the one party, or some forbear-
ance, detriment, loss or responsibility given, suffered
or undertaken by the other. ^ Every party whose sig-
nature appears on the bill is prima facie deemed to
have become a party thereto for value, whether the
bill or note contains the words "value received" or
not. When a note is received as collateral securib »
the liolder has a lien on it, and he is deemed *^ he a
holder for value to the extent of the sxnn for which he
has a lien; that is, he has a right to retain possession
of the bill or note until his claim is satisfied.
22. Negotiation of bill. — The bill must have been
negotiated to the holder in due course. That is, it
must have been transferred to him in such a way as
to constitute him the holder. If a bill is payable to
bearer, it is negotiated by dehvery; if payable to a
specified person or to order, it is negotiated by in-
dorsement and delivery. A holder who derives his
title thru a holder in due course, and who is in good
faith and not a party to any fraud or illegality affect-
ing the instrument, has all the rights of such holder
in due course, as against prior parties. It would be
unfair that a person deriving his title from a holder
in due course should find himself unable to further
negotiate the note, owing to some informality or ille-
gality due to the act of a prior holder. Thus, if A
gives a note for five hundred dollars to B, and C steals
it and forges B's signature and thus transfers it to
1 Currie vs. Misa, L. R. 10 Ex. 162.
236 COMMERCIAL LAW
D, and E hears of the circumstances and accepts the
note from D, paying value for it, E can recover from
A, because his predecessor D was a holder in due
course; but if E transferred it to C, the latter, being
the thief, could not collect from A.
23. Rights of a holder in due course. — A holder in
due course holds a bill or note free from any defect of
title of prior parties, as well as from personal defenses
available to prior parties among themselves, and may
enforce payment against all parties liable on the in-
strument. Among these personal defenses would
probably be included the defense of fraud, illegality,
want or failure of consideratioii, threats or a plea of
compensation or set-off. They would not include
want of capacity, want of authority, the defense of
forgery, or the like.
We have said that every holder is presumed to be a
holder in due course. This presumption would be
overcome if one or more of these personal defenses
were proved. Upon such a defense being raised, the
holder must then prove that he is a holder in due
course — that is, a bona fide holder for value, without
notice of any defect. A note given for an illegal
consideration, for example, to induce a witness not to
give evidence in a criminal prosecution, may be col-
lected by a bona fide holder for value before maturity.
A note fraudulently made by a partner in the part-
nership name binds the firm in the hands of a bona
fide holder for value. But a promissory note made
by a married woman, separate as to property, in fa-
TRANSFER AND NEGOTIATION 237
vor of a creditor of her husband, is absolutely null,
and no action, it has been held in Quebec, can be main-
tained thereon by a bank which has discounted the
same in good faith before maturity, in ignorance of
the cause of nullity. The rigor of this rule has been
relaxed, in that a third party in good faith, like the
bank in question, can now recover. The good faith
of the third party will, however, be very zealously
scrutinized. However, it has been held in England, in
Quebec, in Manitoba, in Illinois and in Wisconsin
(the principle is of general acceptance) that when
an illiterate man was led to believe that he was be-
coming a party to an agTeement, but the instrument
proved to be a promissory note, and he was not guilty
of negligence, he is not liable on the note even to a
holder in due course.
REVIEW
WTiat is the eflPect of assignment?
Explain transfer by operation of law.
What is meant by negotiation by simple delivery; by indorse-
ment; by allonge?
Give the chief requisites of an indorsement.
What is an indorsement in blank; a special indorsement; a
conditional indorsement; a restrictive indorsement; an indorse-
ment waiving conditions; an irregular indorsement?
Discuss the holder in due course? How is he distinguished
from a mere holder ? What are his rights ?
y CHAPTER XV
CONTRACT OF PARTIES
1. Maker's contract. — The maker of a negotiable
instrument by making it engages that he will pay it
according to its tenor. By paying according to its
tenor is meant that he will pay according to the con-
tract made by him, and as it appeared on the face of
the instrument when he delivered it. He is precluded
from denying to a holder in due course the existence
of tlie payee and the capacity of the payee to indorse
at the time of indorsement. For all practical pur-
poses, the maker of a note, for example, corresponds
to the unconditional acceptor of a bill of exchange.
His contract is interpreted strictly against him, be-
cause so far as the instrument itself shows, his con-
tract thereon is made voluntarily. He is the primary
debtor. Indorsers are secondarily liable until the
note has been dishonored and notice given to them.
Ordinarily, a promissory note made payable at a par-
ticular place must be presented for payment at that
place, but the maker is not discharged by the omission
to present the note for payment on the day that it
matures. If he is sued upon the note without its hav-
ing been presented, he may plead the fact, and tho
he will not escape liability on the note itself, the costs
of the action will be in the discretion of the court.
238
CONTRACT OF PARTIES 239
If no place of payment is specified in the body of
the note, presentment for pajTnent is not necessary in
order to render the maker liable. The note may be
made by two or more makers, and they may be liable
thereon jointly or jointly and severally, according to
its tenor. Where a note runs, "I promise to pay"
and is signed by two or more persons, it is deemed to
l)e their joint and several note; that is, each can be
sued for and be forced to pay the whole amount of the
note. If they are jointly liable only one action can
be taken. As the maker of a note is, in these respects,
similar to the acceptor of a bill of exchange, the rules
above mentioned apply in so far as they are applicable
to both.
2. Acceptor s contract. — The drawee, that is, the
person upon whom a bill of exchange is drawn, un-
til he accepts, is not liable on the bill. By accepting
he signifies his assent to the order of the drawer, and
his acceptance is irrevocable ; but only delivery of the
instrument so accepted by him gives effect thereto, un-
less after having accepted, but before deliver}^ he
gives notice to the person entitled to the bill that he
has accepted it. His acceptance then becomes com-
plete and irrevocable. Having accepted and deliv-
ered the bill, he of course becomes liable to the holder,
according to the terms of his acceptance. But his ac-
ceptance must be in writing, and must be signed as
such. His acceptance is invalid if it expresses that
he will perform his promise by any other means than
the payment of money. The mere signature of the
240 COMMERCIAL LAW
drawee, however, written on the bill without addi-
tional words is a sufficient acceptance. It has been
held that, tho the acceptance and signature of the
drawee are usually written across the bill, it will be
valid when written below the drawee's name, or above
it, or parallel to it, or even on the back of the bill/
If written on the back of the bill, it may be doubtful
whether an indorsement or an acceptance is intended,
unless the word "accepted" is used in connection with
the signature. The acceptance may be upon a blank
paper and may be delivered to be filled up as a bill,
when it will be binding. It may be accepted before
it has been signed by the drawer, or while otherwise
incomplete. It may be accepted when it is overdue, or
after it has been dishonored by protest, by refusal to
accept or by non-payment. But a bill accepted when
overdue is payable on demand. When a bill payable
at sight or after sight is dishonored by non-acceptance,
and the drawee subsequently accepts it, the holder, in
the absence of any different agreement, is entitled to
have the bill accepted as of the date of first present-
ment to the di'awee for acceptance.
Under our law a promise to accept is not an accept-
ance, tho the drawee who gives such a promise could
be held liable on his contract, tho not as an acceptor.
The act is explicit in stating that the acceptance must
be written on the bill, and while at one time a verbal
acceptance was binding, it is not so now. The drawee
may accept a bill on the day of its due presentment to
1 Daniel, Sec. 498.
CONTRACT OF PARTIES 241
him for acceptance, or at any time within two days
thereafter. If it is not so accepted, the holder should
treat it as dishonored by non-acceptance. If he
does not treat the bill as dishonored, the holder loses
his right of recourse against the drawer and in-
dorsers.
3. Facts which acceptor admits, and facts ichich he
does not admit. — The acceptor of a bill, by accepting
it, is precluded from denying to a holder in due course
the existence of the drawer, the genuineness of his
signature, and his capacity and authority to draw the
bill. If the bill is payable to the bearer's order, the
acceptor is precluded from denying the then capacity
of the drawer to indorse, but not the genuineness or
validity of his indorsement. If the bill is payable to
the order of a third person, the acceptor cannot deny
to a holder in due course the existence of the payee and
his then capacity to indorse, but is not precluded from
denying the genuineness or validity of his indorse-
ment. By this is meant that the acceptor, by the act
of acceptance, admits and warrants to a bona fide
holder that the payee has capacity to indorse, but he
does not warrant the validity or genumeness of the
indorsement.
4. Kinds of acceptance. — An acceptance is either
general or quahfied. A general acceptance assents
without qualification to the order of the drawer. A
general acceptance will be implied where the acceptor
has written his name, with the word "accepted," across
the face of the bill. A qualified acceptance in express
XXIV— 17
242 COMMERCIAL LAW
terms varies the effect of the bill as drawn. An ac-
ceptance is qualified which is:
• (a) Conditional, that is to say, which makes pay-
ment by the acceptor dependent on the fulfil-
ment of a condition therein stated.
(b) Partial, that is to say, an acceptance to pay
part only of the amount for which the bill is
drawn.
(c) Qualified as to time.
(d) The acceptance of some one or more of the
drawees, but not of all.
While a bill of exchange is an unconditional order
to pay, the acceptance is none the less valid if condi-
tional. The acceptor is liable upon the fulfilment of
the condition. Thus, an acceptance is conditional
when it is in the following terms : "If a certain house
shall be finished"; "when in funds from the estate of
C" ; "as soon as he should sell such goods" ; "on condi-
tion that it be renewed." But an acceptance to pay
at a specified place is not on that account conditional
or qualified. A distinction is drawn between an ac-
ceptance which changes the place of payment, which
is a qualified acceptance, and an acceptance which
merely adds another place, which is not a qualified
acceptance.
The holder of a bill may refuse to take a qualified
acceptance, and if he does not obtain an unqualified
acceptance, may treat the bill as dishonored bj^ non-
acceptance. If the drawer or indorser of a bill re-
ceives notice of a qualified acceptance and does nCl
CONTRACT OF PARTIES 243
within a reasonable time express his dissent to the
holder, he is deemed to have assented. When a quali-
fied acceptance is taken, and the drawer or indorser
has not expressly or imphedly authorized the holder
to take it, or does not subsequently assent thereto,
the drawer or indorser is discharged from his hability
on the bill. This rule does not apply, however, when
notice has been given of a partial acceptance. The
holder who takes a quahfied acceptance really does
so at the risk of releasing the drawer and indorser,
unless they assent, as above explained.
5. Who may accept. — The drawee to whom a bill
is addressed must accept it. The authorized agent of
the drawee may, however, accept for him. The rule
suffers an exception or two. The drawer of a bill, or
an indorser, may insert in the bill the name of a per-
son who shall be called the referee in case of need, to
whom the holder ma^^ resort, that is, in case the bill
is dishonored by non-acceptance or non-payment.
But it is at the option of the holder to resort to the
referee in case of need, as he thinks fit. And when
a bill of exchange has been protested for dishonor by
non-acceptance, or has been protested for better se-
curity, and is not overdue, any person who is not a
party already liable on the bill may, with the consent
of the holder, intervene and accept the bill after pro-
test for the honor of any party liable on it, or for
the honor of the person for whose account the bill is
draMTi. The acceptor for honor is only secondarily
liable on the bill. By accepting, he engages that he
244, COMMERCIAL LAW
will, upon the bill being properly presented, pay it
according to the tenor of his acceptance, if it is not
paid by the drawee. But in order to hold the acceptor
for honor, the bill must be duly presented to the
drawee for payment, and be protested if not paid.
Notice of these facts must be given to the acceptor
for honor.
6. Effect of acceptance and refusal to accept. —
When a bill is accepted, it may be held or may be ne-
gotiated until it matures. Upon maturity it is pre-
sented to the acceptor for payment. If he does not
paj^ the bill is dishonored for non-payment. Notice
of dishonor must be given to the drawer and to each
indorser, otherwise they are discharged. But when a
bill is dishonored by non-acceptance, and notice of dis-
honor is not given, the rights of a holder in due course
subsequent to the omission are not prejudiced by the
omission. In the Province of Quebec, whether the
bill is an inland or a foreign bill of exchange, it should
be protested, to hold the drawer and any indorsers.
Elsewhere in Canada only a foreign bill need be pro-
tested under these circumstances.
7. Drawer's contract. — The drawer is the person
who addresses the bill. His contract, as we have
seen, is not complete until delivery. The drawer of a
bill by drawing it engages that on due presentment it
shall be accepted and paid, according to its tenor, and
that if it is dishonored he will compensate the holder
or any indorser ; he is compelled to pay it if the requi-
site proceedings on dishonor, as we have stated
CONTRACT OF PARTIES 245
them, are duly taken. "V^Tien drawing the bill, how-
ever, he may negative or limit his own liability to the
holder, or he may waive as regards himself some or all
of the holder's duties ; for instance, he may waive no-
tice and protest. If he stipulates that he will not be
liable on the bill, then the holder must look to the ac-
ceptor alone and to any indorser who may be liable.
If he Hmits his liability as to the amount, he will be
liable only to that extent. The drawer very infre-
quently makes such a stipulation, but as we have else-
where seen, an indorser very frequently adds to his
indorsement the words, "without recourse," "no per-
sonal liability." The drawer of a bill therefore war-
rants that there is a drawee who will and can accept.
8. Indorser s contract. — The indorser of a bill by
indorsing it engages that on due presentment it shall
be accepted and paid, according to its tenor, and that
if it is dishonored he will compensate the holder or a
subsequent endorsee, who is compelled to pay it, pro-
vided that the proper proceedings on dishonor are
duly taken. Of course, in the case of an indorser of
a note, there is no presentment for acceptance. But
to hold the indorser of a bill there must be present-
ment to the acceptor, as a preliminary. "\Miether the
instrument be a note or a bill, it must be presented for
payment on the due date, and if it is dishonored, notice
must be given to the indorser, with protest when
necessary, in order to hold the indorser liable. Pay-
ment by the indorser does not discharge the bill or
note. He may again negotiate it by striking out his
246 COMMERCIAL LAW
own and subsequent indorsements, and if it is in-
dorsed to him he must re-indorse.
9. Warranties of indorser. — If an indorser in-
dorses without qualification, he warrants to all sub-
sequent holders, and is precluded from denying, the
genuineness and regularity of the drawer's signature
and all previous indorsements. He is also precluded
from denying, and therefore warrants, to his im-
mediate or a subsequent indorser that the bill was,
when he indorsed it, a valid and subsisting bill, and
that he had then a good title to it. So when a part-
ner, having authority to draw and indorse, raised
money for firm use by drawing bills in fictitious names,
and indorsed them in the firm name, his co-partner
was liable to an indorsee. Nor could an accommoda-
tion indorser ^ in an action by a holder in due course
plead that the signature of the maker is forged. It
has also been held that the indorser of a note made
by a corporation cannot allege that it is ultra vires.
When a person indorses "without recourse" or
merely transfers op assigns the instrument, he does
not warrant that it is valid — he transfers no better
rights than he himself has — ^but he does warrant that
he knows of no defect which will invalidate or impair
the validity of the instrument. He does not incur
the liability of an ordinaiy indorser.
10. Liability of indorsers among themselves. —
When there are two or more indorsements on a bill,
1 An accommodation party to a bill or note is a person who has signed
it as drawer, acceptor or indorser, without receiving value therefor, and
for the purpose of lending his name to some other person.
CONTRACT OF PARTIES 247
each indorsement is deemed to have been made in the
order in which it appears on the bill, until the contrary-
is proved. Each indorser therefore obliges himself to
compensate the holder or a subsequent indorser who
pays, if the usual formalities upon dishonor have been
complied with. An agreement may exist as between
the indorsers that they shall not be liable in this order.
They may agree upon any order of liability. A bona
fide holder may, however, call upon the indorsers for
payment in the order of their signatures, even tho
he knew, when he took the instrument, that there was
an agreement between them that they would be liable
in some other order.^ Gerstenberg and Hughes give
the following example. A bill reads, "Pay to the or-
der of B $100. A." The following indorsements
are found on the back thereof — "Pay to C. B" ; "Pay
to E without recourse. D"; "E." At maturity the
bill is presented by the holder, F, and A refuses to
pay. F notifies all the indorsers. He may sue any
or all of them except D, unless there is a breach of
one of the implied warranties spoken of in the previous
section. If he recovers from E, E may recover from
C, B or A. B may recover from A. It is usual
for a holder who has a mature unpaid instrument to
join all parties liable on the instrument as defendants
in one suit.
11. Liability of other parties. — As we have seen,
an accommodation party to a bill may sign as drawer,
acceptor or indorser; to a note as drawer or indorser.
1 Elder vs. KeUy, 8 U. C. Q. B. 240.
248 COMMERCIAL LAW
He is liable to a holder for value, tho as an accommo-
dation party he has signed without receiving value,
whether or not the holder who takes the bill or note
knew that he was an accommodation party. He is
not liable to the person whom he accommodates. He
may set up any defense that the person accommo-
dated could set up. If the holder knows of the rela-
tion between the accommodation party ^ and the party
accommodated, and gives time to the latter to pay,
the former is released. A second accommodation in-
dorser, who has paid a note, msiy, it has been held,
recover from a prior accommodation indorser. But
it has been held that a manufacturing corporation has
no power to bind itself as an accommodation party.
The plaintiff must show both that he paid value and
also that he did not know of the accommodation char-
acter of the instrument.^
When a person gives a guarantee, on a note, for
instance, that it will be paid, he becomes a warrantor
of the obhgations of the drawer or indorser, as the
case may be. He has signed, otherwise than as
drawer or acceptor, and under the act, thereby incurs
1 An accommodation party has been well defined in an American case —
Cheever vs. Railroad, 150 N. Y. 59 — as follows:
An accommodation party is one who has no interest in the considera-
tion, but signs as maker or indorsee merely to lend his credit to the
instrument; he may do this for a consideration or as a friendly act. He
is liable to the holder, but the paper must not be diverted from the pur-
pose for which the accommodation is given. But if wrongfully diverted
paper is taken by the holder bona fide and without knowledge of imper-
fections his rights cannot be defeated.
2 National Bank vs. Snyder Co., 117 App. Div. 370.
CONTRACT OF PARTIES 249
the liabilities of an indorser to a holder in due course.
He is liable without notice of dishonor or protest. He
is bound by any notice given to the person whose lia-
bility he warrants.
12. Damages. — A person who promises to accept a
bill, and does not do so, may be Hable in damages.
When a bill or note is dishonored, the measure of
damages deemed to be liquidated damages will be the
amount of the bill or note, interest from the time of
presentment in case of a bill payable on demand, and
from maturity in the case of a time bill or a note, to-
gether with the expenses of noting and protest.
Among the expenses re-exchange would also be in-
cluded. In case of a bill which has been dishonored
abroad, in addition to the damages just mentioned,
the holder may recover from the drawer or any in-
dorser, and the drawer or an indorser who has been
compelled to pay the bill may recover from any party
liable to him, the amount of the re-exchange with in-
terest thereon until paid. Re-exchange has been de-
jfined as the act of drawing a sight draft on the drawer
to make good the loss on the dishonored bill. The
amount of the re-exchange is the amount of the loss
resulting from the dishonor of a bill in a country
other than that in which it was drawn or indorsed.
The re-exchange is ascertained by proof of the sum
for which a sight bill (dra\^Ti at the time and place of
dishonor at the then rate of exchange on the place
where the drawee or indorser sought to be charged
resides) must be drawn, in order to realize, at the place
of dishonor, the amount of the dishonored bill, and
the expenses consequent on its dishonor.
REVIEW
What is meant by paying a negotiable instrument according to
its tenor? Is presentment necessary to fix the maker's liability?
Discuss the contract made by the acceptor.
What facts are admitted and what not admitted by the act of
acceptance
^
What kind of acceptance may there be? Discuss qualified ac-
ceptance.
Who may accept an instrument?
Explain the indorser's contract. What warranties are made
by an unqualified indorsement? How are indorsers liable among
themselves ?
CHAPTER XVI
PRESENTMENT AND NOTICE OF DISHONOR
1. Presentment for acceptance. — ^'Vlien a bill is
payable at sight or after sight, presentment for ac-
ceptance is necessary in order to fix the maturity of
the instrument : a sight bill being payable on the third
day after acceptance, and a bill payable after sight
being payable on the third day after the expiry of
the time after sight stated in the bill. A bill pay-
able at sight is not, under our law, payable on demand.
So also when a bill expressly stipulates that it shall
be presented for acceptance, or if it is drawn payable
elsewhere than at the residence or place of business
of the drawee, it must be presented for acceptance be-
fore it can be presented for payment. In no other
case, says the act, is presentment for acceptance neces-
sary in order to render Hable any party on the bill.
The drawer and indorsers are entitled to have the
bill presented for acceptance in the cases above men-
tioned; otherwise they are discharged as toward the
holder. When a bill is payable at sight, or at a fixed
period after date, after sight, or after the happening
of a specified event, the time of payment is deter-
mined by excluding the day from which the time
is to begin to run and by including the day of pay-
251
252 COMMERCIAL LAW
ment. If a bill is payable at sight, or at a fixed pe-
riod after sight, the time begins from the date
of the acceptance if the bill is accepted, and from the
date of noting or protest if the bill is noted or
protested for non-acceptance or for non-delivery.
When, in such a case, one or more do not accept, the
acceptance becomes at once qualified, and the drawer
and indorsers will be discharged unless the holder has
notified them, or has treated the bill as dishonored.
When authorized by agreement or usage, a pre-
sentment thru the post office is sufficient. When
the drawee is dead, presentment may be made to his
personal representative. But presentment is excused,
and the bill may be treated as dishonored for non-
acceptance, when the drawee is dead, or is a fictitious
person, or a person not having capacity to contract.
It is also excused when, after the exercise of reason-
able diligence, presentment cannot be made, for in-
stance if the drawee cannot be found. It is not ex-
cused simply because the holder has reason to believe
that the bill, on presentment, will be dishonored. The
duties of the holder with respect to presentment for
acceptance or payment, and the necessity for, or
sufficiency of, a protest or notice of dishonor, are de-
termined by the law of the place where the act is done
or the bill is dishonored.
2. Presentment for payment. — If the bill is not
duly presented for payment, the drawer and indor-
sers are discharged. They are entitled to have every
formality strictly observed. As toward the acceptor
i
NOTICE OF DISHONOR 253
himself, as he is primarily liable, presentment for
payment is not necessary to hold him liable. But, if
he has been sued on the bill, without ha\ang been given
a chance to pay it by having it presented to him for
payment, the court may award the costs in its discre-
tion. When, however, a bill is dishonored by non-
acceptance, an immediate right of recourse against
the drawer and indorsers accrues to the holder, and
no presentment for pajTuent is necessary.
Presentment for pa\Tnent or protest, if the bill is
noted or protested for non-acceptance, is made by
the holder.^
A word should also be said here as to how the due
date of a bill is determined. Every bill which is made
payable at a month or months after date becomes due
on the same numbered day of the month in which it is
made payable as the day on which it is dated, unless
there is no such day in the month in which it is made
payable, in which case it becomes due on the last day
of that month, with the addition, in all cases, of the
days of grace. The term "month" in a bill means
the calendar month.
3. When, where and how made. — A bill is duly
presented for acceptance when it is presented, by or
on behalf of the holder, to the drawee, or to some per-
son authorized to accept or refuse acceptance on his
behalf, at a reasonable hour on a business day and
1 When a bill is lost or destroyed, or is wrongly or accidentally de-
tained from the person entitled to hold it, or is accidentally retained in a
place other than where payable, protest may be made on a copy or writ-
ten particulars thereof. (Section 120.)
254 COMMERCIAL LAW
before the bill is overdue. If it is accepted after ma-
turity, it becomes a demand bill, and subject to the
rule that, in order to hold the indorser liable, it must
be presented for payment within a reasonable time
after its indorsement, and a reasonable time after its
issue, in order to hold the drawer. What is a rea-
sonable hour for presentment will depend on the cir-
cumstances. If presentable at a man's office, it
should be during ordinary office hours, or during
banking hours, if at a bank ; if at his house, probably
at any reasonable hour when he would ordinarily be
there.
When a bill is addressed to two or more drawees,
who are not partners, presentment must be made to
them all, unless one has authority to accept for all,
by some person authorized to receive payment on his
behalf, at the proper place, and either to the person
designated by the bill as payer, or to his representa-
tive or some person authorized to pay or to refuse
payment on his behalf. Delaj^ in making present-
ment for payment is excused when caused by circum-
stances beyond the control of the holder, and not im-
putable to his misconduct or negligence. But when
the delay ceases to operate, presentment must be
made with reasonable diligence. Thus, when a note
was lying at a branch bank where it was payable,
and the new agent was not aware of the fact until
noon of the day after maturity, when he had it pro-
tested and notice given, it was held this was sufficient
to bind the indorser.
NOTICE OF DISHONOR 255
Presentment for payment is dispensed with when,
after the exercise of reasonable dihgence, the present-
ment cannot be effected^ or when the drawee is a fic-
titious person (in which case the instrument may be
treated as a promissory note). It is also dispensed
with as regards the drawer, when the drawee or ac-
ceptor is not bound, as between himself and the
di-awer, to accept or pay the bill, and the drawer has
no reason to believe that it will be paid if presented;
or as regards an indorser, when the bill was ac-
cepted or made for the accommodation of that in-
dorser, and he has no reason to expect that the bill
would be paid if presented. Presentment may also
be waived, expressly or impliedly. It is not dispensed
with merely because the holder has reason to believe
the bill will not be paid when presented. If the ac-
ceptor is dead, the bill may be presented to his execu-
tor or representatives.
If payment is made, the bill or note, as the case
may be, is delivered. If pajTnent is refused, the
drawer and indorsers are notified that the payment
has not been made, and are protested when neces-
sary. Presentment for payment is necessary in order
to hold the indorser of a note liable; and the rules
as to presentment, with the exception of course of
those relating to presentment for acceptance, apply,
in so far as they may, to notes as well as to bills.
4. Time and place of presentment for payment. —
A bill or note is duly presented for payment if, when
not payable on demand, it is presented on the day it
256 COMMERCIAL LAW
falls due. The day on which it falls due is the third
day of grace, unless that be a non-business day. It
would in that case fall due on the next business day.
A demand bill must be presented for payment within
a reasonable time after its issue to render the drawer
liable, and within a reasonable time after its indorse-
ment to render the indorser liable. Checks and de-
mand notes must be presented for payment within a
reasonable time after issue.
Presentment is to be made at the place specified in
the bill or acceptance. Hence, when a bill was pay-
able at the office of the acceptor at Swansea, and was
presented to him personally at Newport, it was held
that an indorser was not liable/ If no place of pay-
ment is specified and no address is given, it must be
presented at tjie drawee's or acceptor's place of busi-
ness, if known, and, if not, at his ordinary residence,
if known; in other cases, at the last known place of
business or residence. If the instrument is at the
bank or other place of payment at maturity, present-
ment is complete.
5. Presentment waived and dispensed with. —
When a bill is presented at the proper place, and
after the exercise of reasonable diligence no person
authorized to pay or refuse payment can there be
found, no further presentment to the drawee or ac-
ceptor is required. The drawee or acceptor is sup-
posed to arrange for payment, and either to be on
hand himself, or to have someone at the place of pay-
1 Beirnstein vs. Usher, 11 T. L. R. 356 (1895).
NOTICE OF DISHONOR 257
ment to represent him. If not, or if the place of
payment, his office for instance, is closed during rea-
sonable hours, no further presentment is necessary.
If the place of payment is specified as a city, town
or village, where there are many banks or none at
all, and no place of payment therein is specified, the
bill or note may be presented at the debtor's known
place of business or knowTi ordinary residence, or, in
lieu thereof, at the post office or principal post office.
Delay in making presentment for payment is excused
when the delay is caused by circumstances beyond the
control of the holder, and not imputable to his de-
fault, misconduct or negligence. But so soon as the
cause of the delay ceases to operate, presentment must
be made with reasonable diligence. Presentment may
be waived by the endorser writing after his name,
"Protest waived," "Presentment waived."
6. Payment for honor. — When a bill has been pro-
tested for non-pajTiient, any person may intervene
and pay it supra protest for the honor of any party
liable thereon, or for the honor of the person for
whose account the bill is drawn. Upon paying the
amount of the instrument and the notarial expenses
incidental to its dishonor, he is entitled to receive the
instrument and the protest. In order that a payment
for honor supra protest shall operate as such, and not
as a mere voluntary pajTiient, what is called a no-
tarial act of honor must be made and be attached to
the protest or form an extension of it. It is based
upon a declaration of the person who pays, declaring
XXI Y — 18
258 COMMERCIAL LAW
his intention to pay for honor, and for whose honor he
pays, and is in the following form:
On the 21st day of September, one thousand nine hundred
and , I, Herbert Barton, Notary Public for the Prov-
ince of Ontario, dwelling at the City of Toronto in said
province, do hereby certify that the original bill of exchange
for five hundred dollars annexed to the protest thereof on
the other side hereof written, was this day exhibited to A. B.,
of Toronto, Manager, who declared before me, that he would
pay the amount of the said bill and protest charges for the
honor of C. D., the last indorser thereof, holding the drawer
and indorsers and all other persons responsible to him, the
said A. B., for the said sum and for all interest, damages
and expenses. I have therefore granted this notarial act of
honor accordingly. Which I attest.
(Seal) Herbert Barton, N. P.
When a bill has been paid for honor, and the for-
malities just mentioned have been observed, all par-
ties subsequent to the party for whose honor it is paid
are discharged, but the payer for honor is subrogated
in, and succeeds to, both the rights and duties of the
holder as regards the party for whose honor he pays,
and all parties liable to that party. So it has been
held that if the holder is a holder in due course, or if
any party subsequent to the party for whose honor the
bill has been paid was a holder in due course, the payer
for honor acquires their rights in this respect. He
must, as one of his duties, give notice of dishonor.^
7. Notice of dishonor. — When a bill has been dis-
honored by non-acceptance or by non-payment (by
non-paj^'ment in the case of a note), notice of dis-
iGoodall vs. Polhill, 14 L. J. C P. 146 (1845).
NOTICE OF DISHONOR 259
honor must be given to the drawer and each indorser ;
a drawer or indorser who is not so notified is dis-
charged, tho a holder in due course subsequent to the
omission is not prejudiced. Notice must be given
not later than the juridical or business day next fol-
lowing the dishonor of the bill.
8. By whom notice is given. — Xotice may be given
by, or on behalf of the holder, or by or on behalf of
an indorser, who at the time of giving it is himself
liable on the bill. Hence, when a note payable at a
bank is sent there for collection, the protest may prop-
erly be made and notice be given by the bank, altho
it has no interest in the note. Each party who re-
ceives notice of dishonor has the next following busi-
ness dayi to send notice to parties whom he, in turn,
may wish to hold liable.
9. Siifpciency of notice. — The return of a dishon-
ored bill to the drawer or an indorser is a sufficient
notice of dishonor. The notice need not be signed.
If insufficient, the notice may be supplemented and
validated by verbal communication. It may be given
in writing or by personal communication, and in any
terms which identify the instrument and intimate that
the bill has been dishonored by non-acceptance or non-
pajTnent. An error in the description of the instru-
ment will not vitiate the notice unless the person to
whom it is given is misled thereby.
10. Time within which notice must he given. — No-
tice of dishonor must be given on the day when pre-
sentment has been made, or on the next following
260 COMMERCIAL LAW
business day. This rule is satisfied if the notice is
either served or posted within this delay. Delay in
giving notice of dishonor is excused when the delay
is caused by circumstances beyond the control of the
party giving notice, and not imputable to his default,
conduct or negligence. Thus the death or sudden ill-
ness of the holder or his agent who has the bill, will be
a good excuse, or delay caused by the indorser having
given a wrong or illegible address.
11. Place of notice. — Notice of dishonor of a bill or
note is sufficiently given if addressed in due time to
the person, entitled to such notice, at his customary ad-
dress or place of residence, or at the place at which the
bill is dated, unless any party so entitled to notice, has
under his signature, designated another place. Where
notice of dishonor is duly addressed and posted, the
sender is deemed to have given due notice of dishonor,
even if the notice miscarries in the post.
12. Notice xicaived and eoccused, — Notice of dis-
honor is dispensed with, when after the exercise of
reasonable diligence, notice cannot be given or does
not reach the drawer or indorser who is sought to be
charged. It may be excused by waiver, express or im-
plied. The waiver may be in writing or oral. Thus
it has been held that where an indorser asked for time
and promised to pay, it was a waiver of notice. No-
tice of dishonor is dispensed with as regards the
drawer, where the drawer and the drawee are the same
person; where the drawee is a fictitious person, or a
person not having capacity to contract; where the
NOTICE OF DISHONOR 261
drawer is the person to whom the bill is presented for
payment ; where the drawee or acceptor is, as between
himself and the drawer, under no obligation to accept
or pay the bill; and where the drawer has counter-
manded payment. It is dispensed with as regards the
indorser where the drawee is a fictitious person, or a
person not having capacity to contract, and the in-
dorser was aware of the fact at the time but indorsed
the bill ; where the indorser is the person to whom the
bill is presented for pajment; and where the bill is
accepted or made for his accommodation.
13. Protest. — The protest of bills and notes is done
by a notary public who establishes and certifies that
the instrument has been presented and dishonored.
The notary's certificate is authentic and makes proof
itself of its contents, and hence while protest is
necessary only for foreign bills of exchange, except
in the Province of Quebec where inland bills also
must be protested, a formal protest in other cases
makes it easy to prove dishonor and notice to the
drawer and indorsers. Protest is not necessary to
render the acceptor of a bill liable. It is dispensed
with by any circumstances which would dispense with
notice of dishonor, as just above set out. Delay in
noting or protest is excused by reason of circum-
stances beyond the control of the holder, where these
are not due to his fault, misconduct or negligence. A
bill which has been protested for non-acceptance or a
bill of which protest for non-acceptance has not been
waived, may be subsequently protested for non-pay-
S62 COMMERCIAL LAW
ment. A bill must be protested at the place where it
is dishonored.
To facilitate the making of protests in country dis-
tricts, the act also provides that protest may be made
at some other place in Canada situated within five
miles of the place of presentment and dishonor of the
bill. Tho, when a bill is presented thru the post of-
fice and is returned by post dishonored, it may be pro-
tested at the place to which it is returned, on the day
of return or on the next day.
REVIEW
When is presentment for acceptance necessary for a bill pay-
able at sight; when after sight?
How is a bill presented for acceptance ? When and where
should it be presented ?
When is presentment for payment necessary ? Where must it
be made? When must it be dispensed with?
At what time is it necessary to present demand bills, checks
and demand notes ? Where must presentment be made ?
Discuss the waiver of presentment.
What are the rights and liabilities of the payer for honor?
How is a bill protested ? When is it necessary and where must
it be made?
CHAPTER XVII
DEFENCES
1. Definition. — Defences are described as personal
defences and real defences.
Personal defences include conditional or equitable
defences, and are good when pleaded by a person as
against his immediate successor, or as against someone
who is not a holder in due course.
The real or absolute defences attack the instrument
itself and strike at the verj^ foundation of the contract.
The real defences are good against all the world.
Personal defences are defences not necessarily at-
tached to or inherent in the instrument. They include
defences such as fraud, threats or violence, illegality
where the illegality does not void the contract, re-
lease, want of title in the person transferring, re-
nunciation of claim or pajTiient, want or failure of
consideration, and others.
2. Fraud and threats of violence. — Fraud enters
where a person is induced to act by some misrepre-
sentation or untrue statement intentionally made for
the purpose. Violence or fear and threats, commonly
included under the word duress, will vitiate a con-
tract. Thus a note given to a person in consequence
of threats to prosecute the maker for forgery and ob-
263
264 COMMERCIAL LAW
taining money under false pretences, cannot be re-
covered by such person. So, too, where a defend-
ant's son had committed forgery, and the notes sued
upon were given to the plaintiff to prevent the scan-
dal becoming public, they were held to be void. But
it has been held that where a master gave a female
servant his note for $1,500 over and above her wages,
on condition that she would not marry but would re-
main in his service as long as he wanted her to, the
note was not void for being in restraint of marriage
for an unreasonable period.^ It has also been held
that where a creditor secured secretly the notes of
the insolvent for the balance of his claim, this was a
fraud on the indorsers of the composition notes, and
they were entitled to the benefit of this payment.
And again, where an illiterate man thought that he
was making his mark to a receipt and the plaintiff
concealed the fact that it was really a promissory note,
the plaintiff could not recover. It has been held, how-
ever, that where an educated man admits his signa-
ture but sets up such a defence, he must make very
clear proof.
3. Partial or total want of value or consideration. —
Valuable consideration for a bill or note may be con-
stituted by any consideration sufficient to support a
simple contract. It may be an antecedent debt or
liability. Every party whose signature appears on a
bill or note is presumed to have become a party to it
for valuable consideration, but he may prove the con-
1 Crowley vs. Sullivan, 9 O. L. R. 27 (1904).
DEFENCES 265
trary. If a total failure of consideration is proved,
and the plaintiff and defendant are immediate par-
ties, the defence is good, or if they are remote parties
it is good, if value has not been given for the bill. A
total failure of consideration is in its effects like an
original want of consideration. There would be a
total failure of consideration where a person under-
took to sell a certain thing to another, and it turned
out that he had absolutely no title to the thing. It
has been held that where a note was given for logs,
on condition that no claim should be made for the
logs, and they were revendicated (that is, seized at
the instance of the owner for non-payment, etc.),
there was a total failure of consideration, and the note
became null. There may be only partial failure of
consideration. It is probable that in most of the
provinces, partial failure may be set up as a defence
to the extent of the consideration that is lacking.
4. Illegality. — Whether the consideration be ille-
gal in whole or in part, the bill is none the less alto-
gether void. Considerations are said to be illegal
which violate the rules of morality, are prohibited by
law, or are contrary to public policy. Nor will the
illegahty be cured by renewing or by substituting a
new instrument for the old. Thus an agreement not
to proceed in a prosecution for permitting unlawful
gambling in a tavern, is an illegal consideration for a
note. A note given to raise money for corrupt pur-
poses at an election where the maker w^as a candidate,
is null. The plaintiff cannot recover on a promissory
266 COMMERCIAL LAW
note given by the proprietor of a bucketshop, in set-
tlement of speculative transactions between them.^
5. Release, renunciation or payment. — A bill is dis-
charged by payment by or on behalf of the drawee or
indorser. Payment in due course means payment
made, at or after maturity of the bill, to the holder
thereof, in good faith, and without notice that his title
to the bill is defective. Payment is what the holder
accepts or recognizes as such. It is the discharge of a
contract to pay money; but payment need not be a
payment of money: it may be a payment of goods,
or any other thing which the creditor is willing to ac-
cept. But to have the effect of discharging a bill,
payment must be made at or after maturity and must
be made to the holder, that is, the payee, indorsee
or the bearer. If an endorsement is forged or is not
authorized, the bill is not discharged, and the acceptor
is not released. It has been held that a renewal bill
or note does not discharge the original, unless the par-
ties have so agreed. Payment before maturity does
not discharge the bill. The ht)lder may still negotiate
it. An accommodation bill is discharged if paid in
due course by the party accommodated. Where the
acceptor of a bill becomes the holder of it in his own
right at or after maturity, the bill is discharged.
When the holder of a bill, at or after its maturity,
actually or unconditionally renounces his rights
1 Bucketshop transactions are speculations on the rise and fall of prices
of stocks where shares are not bought outright by the broker, and where
there is no intention of delivery. The transactions are purely gambling
transactions, and as such are prohibited in Canada.
DEFENCES 267
against the acceptor, the bill is discharged. The
holder may renounce the liabihties of any party to a
bill before, at or after maturity. A renunciation
must be in writing, however, unless the instrument is
delivered up to the debtor.
6. Discharge of persons secondarily liable. — As we
have seen, the maker of a note and the acceptor of a
bill are primary debtors. Drawers and indorsers are
only secondarily liable. A discharge of a debtor op-
erates as a discharge to parties who are liable to pay
only if he fails to pay. Thus if the holder discharges
the maker of a note, he cannot hold the indorser, be-
cause by releasing the maker he is depriving the in-
dorser of his chance to collect from the maker.
7. Beal defences. — As we have already explained,
real defences strike at the root of the contract.
Where the contract, by reason of the minority or in-
sanity of the maker of a note, could not be entered
into, the contract on the note never existed. Thus a
note given in satisfaction of a gambling contract
would be void. An instrument if materially altered
without the assent of all parties liable on it is voided,
except as against a partj^ who himself has made, au-
thorized or assented to the alteration, or subsequent
indorsers; but if the alteration is not apparent, a
holder in due course may enforce payment of it, ac-
cording to its original tenor, as tho it had not been
altered. The defence of paj-ment at or after maturity
is also a real defence.
8. Cancelation. — A holder mav convert a blank in-
268 COMMERCIAL LAW
dorsement into a special indorsement; he may also
strike out one or more blank indorsements, in which
case any indorser subsequent to one struck out is dis-
charged. A holder or his agent may intentionally
cancel a bill or note, and if the cancelation is apparent
thereon it is discharged. Liability of any party liable
on a bill or note may be discharged by the intentional
cancelation of his signature by the holder or his ag:ent.
The usual mode of canceling a bill is to write the word
"paid" or "discharged" across the bill or note. If the
cancelation is made unintentionally, or under a mis-
take or without the authority of the holder, it is in-
operative, tho the burden of proof is on the person
who alleges that the cancelation was made uninten-
tionally or under a mistake.
9. Forgery. — Forgery is the making of a false
document, knowing it to be false, with the intention
that it shall be used or acted upon as genuine, to the
prejudice of any one, whether within Canada or not,
or that some person should be induced, by the belief
that it is genuine, to do or refrain from doing any-
thing. Signing the name of a nonexistent or fictitious
person or firm with fraudulent intention has been held
to be forgery. A forged signature cannot be ratified,
tho where a signature is placed on an instrument
without authorization, but under circumstances not
amounting to a forgery, it may be ratified. Where a
signature on a bill is forged, or is placed thereon with-
out the authority of the person whose signature it
purports to be, the forgery or unauthorized signature
DEFENCES 269
is wholly inoperative. Xo right to retain the bill, or
to give a discharge therefor, or to enforce pajinent
thereof against any party thereto can be acquired
thru or under that signature, unless the part^^ against
whom it is sought to retain payment of the bill is pre-
cluded from setting up forgery or want of authority.
In order to protect a bank which may pay a check
or bill payable to order on demand, where one or more
indorsements may be forged or unauthorized, the
statute provides that when a check payable to order
is paid by the drawee upon a forged indorsement out
of the funds of the drawer, or is paid and charged to
his account, the drawer shall have no right of action
against the drawee for the recovery of the amount so
paid, or any defence to a claim by the drawee for this
amount, unless he, the drawer, gives notice of the
forgery in writing to the drawee within one year after
he has acquired notice thereof. In other words, an in-
dorser whose signature to a check has been forged,
and out of whose account the amount of the check
has been paid by the bank, must make claim upon the
bank at once. If he waits for one year, he has lost
any right to bring action, and the check will be con-
sidered to have been paid in due course. Where a
partner in a commercial firm fraudulently accepts a
bill in the firm name for his private debt, the firm
cannot set up a fraud against a holder for value with-
out notice. The partner was presumed to have au-
thority from his co-partners to do all acts connected
with the partnership business. It has been held, how-
270 COMMERCIAL LAW
ever, that where a defendant's name was signed by his
nephew, for whom he was in the habit of indorsing,
and where he had acknowledged his hability and asked
for time, and only denied his liability after his nephew
had absconded, it was held that he could not dispute
his liability.
If a bill bearing a forged or unauthorized indorse-
ment is paid in good faith, and in the ordinary course
of business, by or on behalf of the drawee or acceptor,
the person by whom or on whose behalf the payment
is made can recover the amount paid from the person
to whom it was paid, or from any indorser who in-
dorsed subsequently to the forged or unauthorized in-
dorsement. But notice of the indorsement being
forged or unauthorized must be given to each such
subsequent indorser, within a reasonable time after
the person seeking to recover has acquired notice that
the indorsement is forged or unauthorized.
REVIEW
Distinguish personal defences from real or absolute defences.
What constitutes valuable consideration? What is the effect
of partial or total want of consideration? When is consideration
illegal ?
Define payment in due course. How must payment be made to
discharge a bill? What is the effect of a forged instrument?
How is an accommodation bill discharged ?
Who are secondarily liable and how are they discharged?
How is the cancelation of a bill accomplished? What is the
effect of unintentional cancelation?
What is forgery and how does it operate as a defence? State
the provisions of the statute in regard to forged checks or bills.
What is the liability of a partnership on negotiable instruments ?
When may recovery be had on a forged instrument?
PART IV: CONDUCT OF BUSINESS
THRU REPRESENTATION
CHAPTER XVIII
PRINCIPAL AND AGENT
1. Definitions and distinctions. — Mandate has been
defined as a contract by which a person, called the
mandator or principal, commits a lawful business to
the management of another, called the mandatory or
agent, who by his acceptance obliges himself to per-
form it. The acceptance may be implied from the
acts of the agent, and in some cases from his silence.
Or again, an agent is a person having express or im-
plied authorit\'^ to represent or act on behalf of an-
other person, who is called his principal. There are
general agents and special agents.
A general agent has authority to act for his prin-
cipal in all matters, or in all matters concerning a par-
ticular trade or business, or of a particular nature ; or
to act in the ordinary course of his business, trade or
profession as an agent, on behalf of his principal — as
a soHcitor, a factor, a broker.
A special agent is an agent who only has authority
to do some particular act, or represent his principal in
some particular transaction, such act or transaction
271 ■
272 COMMERCIAL LAW
not being in the ordinary course of his trade, profes-
sion, or business as an agent.
A factor or commission merchant is an agent who is
employed to buy or sell goods for another, either in
his own name or in the name of his principal, for
which he receives a compensation commonly called a
commission. He is a bailee and is intrusted by his
principal with the possession or control of the goods.
Ordinarily he is entitled to receive payment and to
give a valid and binding discharge. If his principal
resides in another country, he is personally liable to
third persons with whom he contracts, whether his
principal's name be known or not. The principal is
not liable on such contracts to third persons, unless it
is proved that the credit was given to both principal
and factor, or to the principal alone. He has a lien
upon the goods in his hands for any balance of ac-
count in his favor. If he voluntarily relinquishes pos-
session, his lien is lost.
A broker is an agent who exercises the trade and
calling of negotiating between parties, the business of
buj^ing and selling or any other lawful transactions.
He may be the mandatory of both parties and bind
both by his acts in the business for which he is en-
gaged by them. He is not intrusted with the posses-
sion or control of the goods or other property which
he may have contracted to buy or sell.
An auctioneer is an agent whose ordinary course of
business is to sell by pubhc auction to the highest bid-
der, goods or other property of which he may or may
PRINCIPAL AND AGENT 273
not have the possession or control. He sells for cash,
unless he has authority to accept payment in goods or
in negotiable paper, or to sell on credit. The adjudi-
cation of a thing to any person on his bid or offer,
and the entry of his name in the sale book of the auc-
tioneer, completes the sale to him and satisfies the
statute of frauds, i.e., enables the auctioneer or seller
to bring action without the necessity of making other
written proof of the sale. Unless authorized, he can-
not warrant the goods, and he cannot rescind a sale.
A del credere agent is a mercantile agent who, in
consideration of an extra remuneration, which is called
a del credere commission, guarantees to his principal
that third persons with whom he contracts on behalf
of the principal shall duly perform their contracts.
In effect, he makes himself a surety for the due per-
formance of the contract by the person with whom he
deals.
2. How constituted. — It has abeady been said that
agency is a contractual relation. The relation will
not exist unless there is the consent, express or im-
plied, of both principal and agent. The rule suffers
exception where, in case of necessity, the relation is
imposed by operation of law. So that agency will
exist where there is an express appointment by a prin-
cipal, or by someone duly authorized and acting on
his behalf ; and an express acceptance by the agent or
by someone on his behalf similarly authorized. But
the assent of the principal may be implied from his
acts ; or when another person occupies such a position
xxrv— 19
274 COMMERCIAL LAW
that, as a matter of common usage, he would be un-
derstood to be acting with the approval and on be-
half of the principal. Thus a coachman in livery
entered into a contract for the hire of horses, the per-
son from whom he hired them giving credit to the
master. The coachman had, in fact, agreed with the
master to pay for the hire of the horses, but the per-
son from whom they were hired had no notice of the
agreement. It was held that the master was liable on
the contract. A wife gave orders for furniture to be
supplied and work to be done at the house where she
resided with her husband, the husband being present,
giving directions as to the work. It was held that the
husband was liable on the orders, altho he had ex-
pressly forbidden his wife to pledge his credit, and
it had been agreed between them she should pay for
the furniture and work, the plaintiff having had no
notice of such prohibition or agreement. The assent
of the agent may also be implied when he so acts on
behalf of another person that, in an action by the lat-
ter, he could not be heard to deny that in fact the
agency existed. But where a person assumes to act
for another, the consent of that other will not be im-
plied merely because he raises no objection, unless the
circumstances support a presumption that he has au-
thorized the act.
3. Agency by estoppel. — Yet a person will be held
as a principal toward third parties who in good faith
contract with someone who is not his agent, under the
belief that he is so, when by his words or conduct he
PRINCIPAL AND AGENT 275
gives reasonable cause for such belief, as, for example,
when by his words or conduct he represents or per-
mits it to be represented that another is his agent.
He is estopped from denying that such person is his
agent, on the ground that he has really held him out
to be so. The necessity for the rule is obvious. A
might know that B was acting as his agent in a cer-
tain matter and be quite satisfied if B made a profit
for him, but be ready to deny the fact of agency if B
made a loss. That third parties in good faith may
be protected, the person who holds another out as his
agent in such a way, may not deny liability as a prin-
cipal if reverses come.
So it has been held that no estoppel by conduct to
deny an agent's authorit}^ is established on the part
of the principal, merely because one of its directors,
who had no particular management of the property
in question, upon being shown a contract for the sale
of pulp wood from the principal's land made by an
agent who was employed for another purpose and
for that alone, said nothing until he returned to the
head ofiice, where he lost no time in informing the
other directors as to the sale, resulting in the princi-
pal's solicitors at once taking the necessary steps to
protect the principal's interest/
It has also been held that where one learns that an-
other had without authority been purporting to act
in his name, he owes a duty to the third person with
whom the transaction has taken place, to inform him
1 B. X. A. Mining Co. vs. The Pigeon River Lumber Co., -2 D. L. R. 609.
276 COMMERCIAL LAW
that the transaction was without authority, and a
failure in this duty may operate as an estoppel against
a subsequent denial of authority as regards obliga-
tions afterward entered into by such third person on
the faith of the pretended agency.^
4. Agency hy necessity. — Under certain conditions
a person may without express authority bind another.
The authority may even be denied. If a husband de-
serts his wife and leaves her unprovided, she may, as
an agent of necessity, pledge his credit for necessaries
in keeping with her station in life, as he is bound by
law to provide for her. Nor may he revoke her au-
thority in this respect. But it must be shown that
the articles obtained by the wife are necessaries, and
that the husband is in default to supply them. The
same rule is generally applicable in the case of chil-
dren. If a boy's father refuses to supply him with
necessary clothing, a purchase thereof by the boy
binds the father. Or if A ships a horse by railway,
consigned to himself at a station on the company's
line, and he has not arranged for its reception, the
railway company must reasonably care for the horse,
and for that purpose is an agent of necessity of the
shipper. A conductor in charge of a train, in case of
accident, would be an agent of necessity of the com-
pany in summoning medical assistance. The cap-
tain of a ship may be an agent of necessity to buy
supplies, or even to sell the cargo.
5. Who may he principal. — As agency is a matter
1 Ewing vs. Dominion Bank, 35 Can. S. C. R. 133.
PRINXIPAL AND AGENT 277
of contract, the general rule is that any person who
has capacity to contract has capacity to enter into an
agency agreement. Hence an infant or a lunatic may
be held bound under a contract entered into with his
authority by his agent, if under the circumstances he
would be bound had he himself made the contract. If
an insane person appoints an agent at a time when
he has not been adjudged insane, and the agent was
ignorant of his insanity, the appointment is binding
on him. As between such a principal and third par-
ties he will be bound where, tho at the time of the ap-
pointment of the agent he w^as sane, he later became
insane to the knowledge of the agent but not to the
knowledge of the third parties. The third parties
under such circumstances are entitled to protection;
but an insane person is also so entitled, and agency
contracts made on his behalf by an agent with per-
sons aware of his condition may be set aside by the
insane principal, or rather, by his representatives. A
person insane, or whose intellect is clouded, by rea-
son, for instance, of a paralytic stroke, could not give
a valid power of attorney, tho in a lucid interval he
might.
Generally under the Enghsh law, a married woman,
being separate as to property and entitled to deal with
her property and affairs as freely as if she were un-
married, may act as an agent and may appoint agents
by whose contracts in her behalf she will be bound.
In Quebec, a married woman who executes a man-
date given to her, binds the mandator, but she could
278 COMMERCIAL LAW
not be sued unless her husband were made a party to
the action ; nor would an action upon her agency con-
tract succeed unless her husband were a party to the
contract. Tho if she were a public trader, duly au-
thorized by her husband, she could, in the course of
her business, appoint an agent, in which case her hus-
band also would be bound, if they were common as
to property. If separate as to property, she may do
and make alone all acts and contracts connected with
the administration of her property, which might in-
clude the appointment of agents.
6. When a business may be a principal. — A cor-
poration acts thru its agents, the directors, who in
turn may appoint other agents for the carrying on of
the companj'^'s operations. But a corporation cannot
thru an agent do or accomplish any act ultra vires
of its charter. A partnership business is carried on,
as will later appear, on the basis of a reciprocal rela-
tion of principal and agent among the partners.
Probably a partner may appoint an agent to perform
certain of his duties, tho the consent of his co-part-
ners would in some circumstances be necessary. In
the case of an unincorporated society or association,
an agent would ordinarily be appointed by the
members, not by the society which lacks corporate
existence, and the members who appoint him
or ratify his appointment or contracts would be
bound.
7. Who may be agent. — Bowstead states the gen-
eral doctrine as follows:
PRINCIPAL AND AGENT 279
All persons of sound mind, including infants and other per-
sons with limited or no capacity to contract or act on their
own behalf, are competent to contract or act as agents.
Provided that the personal liability of the agent upon the
contract of agency, and upon any contract entered into by
him with any third person, is dependent on his capacity to
contract on his own behalf : ^
But a principal may appoint any person as his
agent and, within the scope of the agent's authority,
will be bound by his acts whether the agent is compe-
tent or not. If he appoints an infant, an insane per-
son, a married woman, a partnership or a corporation,
he is master of his choice and is bound thereby. The
agent is looked upon merely as an instrument. Sup-
pose A appoints B, who cannot read, as his agent,
with authority to make and sign a contract for him.
A caimot set aside the contract on the ground that B
is not able to read it ; he must abide by his own choice
of an incompetent person.
8. What acts may be done by an agent. — The gen-
eral rule is that a man may appoint an agent to do for
him an\i:hing which he has power in his own right to
do. Thus, he may appoint an agent to execute a
deed, to make a contract. The appointment may be
to act in all the principal's affairs, or in some par-
ticular matter ; it may be limited by instructions as to
the agent's conduct, or his conduct may be left to his
own discretion. Tho, where he acts at his own dis-
cretion, he must none the less act according to the gen-
eral usage in the business in which he is employed.
1 Agency, p. 8.
280 COMMERCIAL LAW
While an agent can be appointed by bare words,
without a writing, he cannot bind his principal in some
matters, as for example by a deed, unless he is ap-
pointed by deed. But where a duty is imposed on a
person by statute, or because the exercise of his spe-
cial discretion, skill or knowledge is desired, an agent
cannot replace him. Thus if A undertakes, because
of his special knowledge of the pulp business and be-
cause of his influence, to negotiate a purchase of pulp,
or the placing of a company's pulp products, he can-
not delegate his powers for these purposes to an agent.
9. Co-agents. — When several agents are appointed
for the same business, they are jointly and sev-
erally liable for each other's acts of administration,
unless it is otherwise stipulated. And where they
are appointed to act jointly and severally, one or
more of them could execute the mandate independ-
ently of the others. But if they are appointed to
act jointty, in ordinary cases thej^ must all concur
in the execution of the act, unless they are authorized
to bind their principal by the decision of a majority,
or of a quorum.
10. What acts may he ratified. — By ratification is
meant the adoption by one person of the act or con-
tract done or made in his behalf by another without his
authority. The person doing the act may have had
no authority or he may have exceeded his authority.
When ratified, the act or contract is as valid as if
performed or made by the principal himself. Hence
a person may ratify any act which is not radically
PRINCIPAL AND AGENT 281
void. The act or contract must be ratified as a whole
and not in part. Tlie principal cannot ratify the
part that may be beneficial and reject what is not.
But the person who ratified an act must be the per-
son on whose behalf it is done ; he must have existed at
the time and be an ascertainable person with capacity
to do the act in question, tho he need not be known
in any way to the person who assumes to act as his
agent.
The law concerning ratification of contracts can
best be shown by concrete examples. Take, for ex-
ample, the case of A, who, authorized, insures the
goods of B, the policy of which B ratifies and accepts.
A's contract on his behalf is thus ratified and he must
paj" the premium and may claim under the policy.
A purchases four diamonds from X on behalf of
P, and tells X that P will pay for them. X extends
the credit to P, who upon hearing of the contract rati-
fies it. If A loses one of the diamonds and tells P
all about the contract and his loss of the one diamond,
P would not be permitted to retain the three unless
he paid for all. Having ratified the contract, he
would be bound by the act of his agent and would
have to stand the burden of the latter's negligence.
Where a bank's representative gives instructions to
seize horses covered by a lien note assigned to the
bank, as security for money borrowed by the payee
thereof, and the person so instructed seizes horses
other than those covered by the note, at two different
times, and the bank's representative ratified the act
282 COMMERCIAL LAW
of such person in the second seizure and detaining of
horses, and instructed him not to take back the first
horses seized until he saw that he had the right ones,
the bank is hable for the acts of such person in seiz-
ing the horses.^
But ratification of an agent's unauthorized agree-
ment for the sale of land does not arise from the fact
that the sum paid the agent by the purchaser was,
without the principal's knowledge, included in the
amount of a check given to the principal by the agent
for money actually due from him, which sum the
former returned to the purchaser's agent as soon as
he learned of its inclusion in the check. ^
The S Company had sold goods to the A Company.
The amount was in dispute. The A Company ar-
ranged a settlement with B, the agent of the S Com-
pany, and sent a check to the S Company for the
amount, with a letter stating that it was in full set-
tlement of their claim pursuant to the agreement made
with B. The S Company cashed the check, but wrote
that they did not intend to be bound by the settle-
ment made by B, altho they would credit the amount
on account. Then the S Company sued the A Com-
pany for the balance. It was held they could not
recover. They could not repudiate the settlement and
at the same time use the check sent in pursuance
thereof. Even tho the act of B was unauthorized,
retaining and using the check was a ratification.
I'Thien vs. Bank of B. N. A., 4 D. L. R. 388.
2 Margolis vs, Birnie, 5 D. L. R. 534.
PRINCIPAL AND AGENT 283
But a person cannot ratify an unauthorized act
which was done by the agent in his o^vn name and be-
half. Thus where A is authorized to buy wheat on
the joint account of himself and B, with a limit as to
price, and A, intending to buy on the joint account of
himself and B, and expecting that B will ratify the
contract, but not disclosing such intention to the seller,
enters into a contract in his own name to buy at a
price in excess of the limit, B cannot ratify the con-
tract.'
We have said that a person may ratify any act
which is not radically void. Bowstead asserts that:
Every act, whether lawful or unlawful, which is capable of
being done by means of an agent, except an act which is in its
inception void, is capable of ratification by the person in
whose name or on whose behalf it is done.
As an example, he cites a case where A, an agent
of a corporation, assaults B on its behalf. The cor-
poration ratifies the assault. The corporation was
held civilly liable to B for the assault.^ But such
cases are exceptional, and it may be laid down as a
general rule that illegal acts and contracts may not
be ratified. Thus, if A signs B's name to a note, in-
tended to defraud, A has committed the crime of
forgery. The signature is void ah initio. B cannot
ratify the signature.^ Tho if B, knowing of the
forgery, leads a third party to believe that it is his
iKneightly vs. Durant (1901), A. C. 340.
2 Eastern Counties Ry. vs. Broom, 1851, 6 Ex. 314.
3 Brook vs. Hook, 1871, L, R. 6 Ex. 89.
284* COMMERCIAL LAW
signature, and the third party is, as a result, induced
to act upon such representation to his loss, B will not
be heard to set up that the signature is a forgery if
the third party sues him upon it.^ In some of the
American states, however, a forged signature may be
ratified. But it has been held by the Supreme Court
of Canada that a forgery cannot be ratified.^ Rati-
fication of a forged signature must be distinguished
from that of an unauthorized signature made by the
agent without intent to defraud. Such a signature,
the principal may ratify.
11. Conditions necessary for ratification. — The per-
son who ratifies an unauthorized act must, at the time
of ratification, know all the material circumstances
surrounding the act, unless he takes the risk incident
to incomplete knowledge. Thus, if a bailiff wrong-
fully seizes and sells goods and pays the proceeds to
his principal, the principal will not be bound unless
he knew of the irregularity — unless he intended to
assume any risk. If his agent makes a contract
that is void, the principal is not held to have ratified
if he is in good faith and is not aware that it is avoid-
able. But if an act, to be valid, must be done within
a certain time, the ratification should take place also
within such time, at least in so far as concerns a third
party who would otherwise be prejudiced. The rati-
fication should follow the act or contract within a rea-
sonable time.
1 McKenzie vs. British Linen Co., 1881, 6 A. C. 82 H. L.
2 Merchants Bank vs. Lucas, 18 S. C. R. 704 (1890).
PRINCIPAL AND AGENT 285
12. Ratification express or implied. — Ratification
may be express or implied. It will be implied when
the principal's conduct leads to the beUef that he has
ratified or intends to adopt or recognize the act.
Where an agent exceeds his authority, even the silence
or acquiescence of the principal may be sufficient evi-
dence of his intention. If he adopts part of the act,
he will be held to have adopted and ratified it in its
entirety. Ordinarily, the ratification of a written con-
tract need not be in writing; tho if an agent unau-
thorized executes a formal deed, the ratification should
be by a deed. Directors of a company may ratify
acts of agents if they have the authority to do so;
otherwise the ratification of the shareholders may be
sought. The shareholders may ratify acts ultra vires
of directors if intra vires of the company.
13. Scope of agent's authority. — The nature and
extent of an agent's authority to act may be defined
by a formal deed or an informal writing or by oral
instructions. Where an agent has had a course of
dealings with third parties, the scope of his authority'
may be deduced therefrom; it may also be inferred
from the circumstances surrounding the transaction,
from the custom of trade, or the conduct of the prin-
cipal himself. Thus, if A has usually or frequently
employed B to purchase goods for him and has cus-
tomarily ratified B's acts in this respect, B becomes
his implied agent for all acts done within the appar-
ent scope of his authoritA\ ^^^lere the scope of the
agent's authority is defined in writing, it will gen-
286 COMMERCIAL LAW
erally be easy to deal with him within the terms of his
authority; it will be more difficult where his powers
can only be inferred. In either case, in any impor-
tant transaction, too careful inquiry cannot be made
as to the extent of the agent's mandate.
Even where the authority is expressly given, there
may be uncertainty if it is given in words of uncer-
tain or ambiguous meaning; or if doubt arises as to
the imphed powers which ordinarily would be col-
lateral to the express powers. If the authority is ex-
press, and the agent acts strictly within its terms, the
principal will be bound, tho the agent may have acted
with an eye to his own rather than to his principal's
interest.
The apparent authority is the real authority. And
where the third party had knowledge of the terms of
the agent's special authority, he will not be able to
hold the principal for the acts of the agent which
exceed such authority. If the authority is inferred
from a course of dealings or the conduct of the princi-
pal, then the liability of the principal toward third
persons will be based upon the extent of the agent's
usual or customary authority. Innocent third per-
sons are entitled to deal with an agent so accredited
where he acts within the seeming course of such em-
ployment. Hence the rule that one partner may bind
his co-partners in all acts done in the usual course of
the partnership business. Thus, also, if A sends B
with ready money to buy certain goods, and B gets
the goods and charges them to A, A is not bound.
PRINCIPAL AND AGENT 287
But if A is in the habit of dealing on "tick" with C,
and B buys goods from C for himself and charges
them to A, A will be bound, if C is in good faith.
Or if A allows his clerk B, as a general rule and in the
course of business, to accept drafts or indorse notes,
and B does so on an occasion and does not account
for the money, A may be held liable.
14. General and special agent. — A principal may
attempt to restrict by private instructions the actions
of a general agent, i.e., an agent appointed by the
principal to transact all his business of a particular
kind. The agent may exceed these instructions, and
yet, as towards third parties treating with him as a
general agent, bind his principal. As Lord Black-
burn has said:
Where an agent is clothed with ostensible authority, no
private instructions prevent his acts within the scope of that
authority from binding his principal. Where his authority
depends, and is known to those who deal with the agent to
depend, on a written mandate, it may be necessary to pro-
duce or account for the non-production of that writing, in
order to prove what was the scope of the agent's authority.^
But if the agent is a particular agent, employed for
one special act or transaction, then the third party
must be careful to discover the exact extent of the
agent's authority. Even the general agent, with the
wide powers which the term implies, must act accord-
ing to the custom of trade or the usage of the par-
ticular business. Any departure therefrom will be
1 National Bolivian Navigation Co. vs. Wilson (1880), 5 A. C. 1T6.
288 COMMERCIAL LAW
sufficient to put the third party on his guard. Thus,
a broker is supposed to sell stock for cash. If. he is
authorized to sell shares for a client, he cannot sell on
credit, unless the authorization so provides. Yet a
principal can scarcely object where an agent executes
his mandate in a manner more advantageous to him
than that specified, and in such case the agent will
not be heJd to have exceeded his powers.
15. Authority in ambiguous terms. — If an agent's
instructions fairly admit of more than one interpreta-
tion, and he in good faith adopts one or the other of
them, the principal will be bound — tho he may not
have intended the construction which has been acted
upon. Thus, where an agent is instructed to dispose
of fifty shares of stock at one hundred dollars a share,
or over, he is entitled to sell at one hundred dollars,
tho the market price may be rising. It has also been
held by the House of Lords that where an agent was
authorized to buy and ship five hundred tons of sugar,
and he was told that if he could secure a suitable ves-
sel, fifty tons more or less did not matter, he had
fairly and properly executed his mandate by securing
a shipment of four hundred tons.^
16. Power of attorney. — Where an agent acts un-
der special written authority, he is said to act under
"power of attorney." The writing may be signed be-
fore a notary under seal, or may be executed before
witnesses. Its terms will be strictly interpreted to
1 Ireland vs. Livingston (1872), L. R. 5 H. L. 395,
PRINCIPAL AND AGENT 289
include only the powers mentioned and those which
are an essential corollary thereof.
The following is a form of power of attorney which
might be adopted by a financial firm when giving a
power of attorney to one of its branch managers, and
of course the form could be altered to provide for any
action on the part of the agent. This is a gen-
eral, rather than a special power of attorney.
KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS, that we,
ARNOLD SEVERN AND JAMES McDONALD, carrying
on business together in co-partnership in Montreal and else-
where under the firm name and style of SEVERN & Mc-
DONALD.
Have made, ordained, deputed, constituted, and by these
presents do make, ordain, depute, constitute and appoint,
GEORGE A. BENNETT, of the City and District of
Montreal, Manager.
To be our true and lawful attorney, for us and in our
name :
To take the complete charge and management of the Mont-
real office of the constituents, and to do, transact, manage
and carry on all and every trade, business, transactions and
affairs of them, the said constituents, in connection there-
with ;
To make, draw, sign, accept, transfer and indorse, nego-
tiate, pledge, retire, pay or satisfy all Promissory Notes,
Bills of Exchange, Drafts, Checks and Orders for payment
or delivery of money and securities ; to pay and receive all
moneys, to give acquittance for the same ; to arrange, bal-
ance and settle all books, accounts and dealings ; to sign
script, indorse certificates, negotiate, obtain and sign loans,
either alone or jointly with others, and deposit and hypothe-
cate stocks, bonds and other securities to guarantee and se-
cure such loans and advances from time to time; to draw
XXIV — 20.
290 COMMERCIAL LAW
on the account of the undersigned with the Bank hereinafter
named, and to overdraw the same if he shall think fit; to
guarantee the indorsements and checks of customers ; to buy?
sell, transfer, accept transfer of, assign and otherwise deal
with, for and on behalf of the constituents, all stocks (in-
cluding the stocks of banks), bonds, debentures and deben-
ture stock and other securities ; and further to manage and
transact all manner of business whatsoever with the Bank of
, or with its Manager, or other Officer duly
authorized/ the whole as amply and effectually to all intents
and purposes as they the said constituents could do or have
done in their own proper person if these presents had not
been made — the said constituents hereby relieving the said
Bank from the responsibility, whether in law or in equity,
jn connection with the disposal of moneys paid or advanced
to the said Attorney under these presents, and from any
inquiry and investigation as to the purpose for which such
money is required, or with regard to any transaction con-
nected in any way with such payment or advance;
To ask, demand, sue for, recover and receive, of and from
all and every person or persons, and to arbitrate, adjust,
compound and settle all and every such sum and sums of
money, debts, rents, goods and chattels, dues, duties, claims
and demands whatsoever, as now are or hereafter shall be-
come due, owing, belonging or payable to the constituents,
and for and in their name and on their behalf to give proper
receipts, acquittances and discharges for same respectively,
as to the said Attorney may seem just;
To constitute and appoint, and in his place and stead, to
put one or more Attorney or Attorneys, and such appoint-
ment or appointments again at his pleasure to revoke, and
other or others in his or their place to substitute ;
The said constituents ratifying and confirming, and prom-
ising and agreeing to ratify and confirm, all and whatsoever
their said Attorney or his substitute or substitutes in and
about the premises shall lawfully do or cause to be done by
virtue of these presents.
This letter of Attorney shall be and remain in full force
PRINCIPAL AND AGENT 291
and effect until the said constituents shall have duh' notified
in writing the said Bank, or such other person or persons to
whom these presents may come, that they, the said constit-
uents, have revoked the same, and the receipt of such notice
shall have been acknowledged.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, we, the said constituents,
have hereunto set our hands and seals, this day of
, in the year of our Lord one thousand nine hundred
and , at Montreal, in the Province of Quebec.
Signed, Sealed and Delivered
by one
of the constituents, in the
presence of: Per:
17. Implied powers. — The agent, as was hinted in
the preceding section, has implied authority to do what
may be necessary or incidental to the due and effective
execution of his mandate; and in so doing will bind
his principal. Thus, if an agent is employed to go
thru the countr}-^ and sell goods, he has implied au-
thority to hire a carriage to get to stations or to cus-
tomers. If by careless driving he causes an injury
to horse or carriage, his principal will be bound to-
wards the owner thereof. A person who is author-
ized to buy goods for his firm, has implied authority
to pay for them and to give receipts, and also to ar-
range discounts. But it has been held that where an
agent is instructed to find a purchaser and to make a
contract for the sale of a house, liis duty ends there,
and he has no implied authority to receive the pur-
chase money. A lawyer authorized to sue upon a note
has implied authority to take pa\Tnent and give a
discharge. But an agent who is intrusted with goods
292 COMMERCIAL LAW
which he is to sell, cannot pledge them under any im-
plied authority. The general rule to be observed is
that acts done by way of implied authority in con-
nection with either a special or a general man-
date, must be not only incidental to, but in accord-
ance with, the usage or custom of the particular busi-
ness. Thus, an insurance broker who is authorized
to issue d policy, has no authority to cancel the con-
tract on the policy: his ordinary duty as a broker is
to make contracts of insurance, and not to cancel
them, once they are validly entered upon. As to an
agent's authority implied from special customs. Bow-
stead says:
Every agent has implied authority to act, in the execution
of his express authority, according to the usage and customs
of the particular place, market or business in which he is
employed. Provided that no agent has implied authority to
act in accordance with any usage or custom which is unrea-
sonable, unless the principal had notice of such usage or cus-
tom at the time when he conferred the authority, or to act
in accordance with any usage or custom which is unlawful.
The question whether any particular usage or custom is un-
reasonable or unlawful is a question of law. In particular,
a usage or custom which changes the intrinsic character of
the contract of agency, or a usage or custom whereby an
agent who is authorized to receive payment of money may
receive payment by way of set-off, or by way of a settlement
of accounts between himself and the person from whom he is
authorized to receive payment, is unreasonable.
18. Must execute accepted mandate. — To the ex-
tent of the powers and authority given to him, the
agent must execute his mandate. That is his con-
PRINCIPAL AND AGENT 293
tract, whether the authorization be expressed or im-
phed, tho he is not obliged to carrj'^ obedience to the
point of committing a fraud or some WTongful or un-
lawful act. He can refuse to be made merely an in-
strument for ^\Tongdoing. Strict performance will
be exacted where he is paid for his work. If the man-
date is gratuitous, however, the courts will, as may ap-
pear just in the circumstances, moderate the rigor of
the liability arising even from his negligence or fault —
for it must be understood that an agent, who thru his
negligence or fault in executing his mandate causes
loss to his principal, will be held liable for such loss.
Apparently, tho, where an agent undertakes to do a
thing gratuitously and does not do it, he will not be
liable for his mere non-performance.
19. Delegation of agent's authority to a sub-agent.
— The fundamental rule is that an agent, who in
theory is employed because of his special skill, knowl-
edge, reputation or influence, must carry out in per-
son the mandate which he has accepted, unless he has
express or implied authority to the contrary. He is
appointed because the principal has confidence in him
and his pecuhar ability. So where he is appointed
to act under circumstances which require the exer-
cise of discretion, for example, he may not, as a
general rule, appoint anyone else to exercise that dis-
cretion in his place. Thus a broker, an auctioneer,
the liquidator or the directors of a company must
ordinarily carry out their mandate in person.
The rule, like other rules, suffers exception.
294 COMMERCIAL LAW
Where expressly or impliedly an agent has under-
taken to carry out a mandate in person, he cannot dele-
gate his authority; but in other cases his right to do
so may be imphed. Many forms of agency, especially
mercantile agencies, cannot be carried out by the agent
in person, and it is not intended that they should be.
So it has been laid down in a leading case, that:
The exigencies of business do from time to time render
necessary the carrying out of the instructions of a principal
by a person other than the agent originally instructed for
the purpose, and where that is the case, the reason of the
thing requires that the rule should be relaxed, so as, on the
one hand, to enable the agent to appoint what has been termed
a "sub-agent" or "substitute" ; and, on the other hand, to
constitute in the interests and for the protection of the prin-
cipal a direct privity of contract between him and such sub-
stitute. And we are of opinion that an authority to the
effect referred to may and should be implied where, from the
conduct of the parties to the original contract of agency,
the usage of trade, or the nature of the particular business
which is the subject of the agency, it may reasonably be pre-
sumed that the parties to the contract or agency originally
intended that such authority should exist, or where in the
course of the employment unforeseen emergencies arise, which
impose upon the agent the necessity of employing a substi-
tute. ^
In other words, the principal may know when he
appoints an agent that the latter will employ substi-
tutes; or it may be the custom or usage of the trade
or business that sub-agents should be engaged ; or the
act or duty may be performed without the exercise of
any particular skill or discretion — in these, and under
iDeBussche vs. Alt. (1878), 8 Ch. D. 310.
PRINCIPAL AND AGENT 295
many other circumstances, the agent is free to employ
others to fulfill his contract for him.
20. Relations of agent, sub-agent and principal. —
The authorities are somewhat at variance in ruling
upon these relations, and the Quebec law differs in
details from the English law. It may be said, how-
ever, that where an agent appoints a sub-agent, with-
out the express or implied authority of the principal,
the latter will not be bound by the acts of such sub-
agent. On the other hand, the agent is answerable
for the acts of the person whom he, without authoriza-
tion, substitutes for himself. In an Enghsh case, an
agent was held liable for the acts of his sub-agent who
was appointed with the principal's knowledge.^ Cer-
tainly he would be liable where, being authorized to
appoint an unnamed substitute, he appointed some-
one who was notoriously unfit.
21. Duties of agent. — An agent should act with all
the skill, care and diligence that could reasonably be
expected of anyone engaged in his particular busi-
ness. There are well recognized standards of con-
duct and performance in most callings, and to these
he will be expected to adhere; more especially when
he is being paid for his services. If he is acting
gratuitously, the rigor of the rule is somewhat re-
laxed, and such skill and diligence as he possesses will
be exacted or which he would exercise in the con-
duct of his own affairs. He is bound to keep his prin-
cipal's money and property separate and intact, to
1 Skinner vs. Weguelin, 1882, 1 C. & E. 12.
296 COMMERCIAL LAW
keep and render accounts of his administration, to
keep proper books and vouchers, and to deliver and
pay to his principal all that he has received under
the authority of his mandate. He must pay interest
upon such money of his principal as he employs for
his own use.
22. Fiduciary obligations. — As we have abeady
seen, an agent stands in a relation of confidence to-
ward his principal ; and from a person in a position of
confidence is always exacted the utmost good faith
and fair dealing. He cannot act for both parties 1^
a transaction and accept a commission from each with-
out their full knowledge and consent. Otherwise the
interests of one or the other are likely to be in jeop-
ardy; and an agent, owing to his position of trust,
must not and cannot place himself in the way of temp-
tation. If he is instructed to sell a property, he may
not himself become the purchaser — at least before he
has obtained the consent, based upon as full knowl-
edge of the facts as he has himself, of his principal,
who otherwise could repudiate the transaction as ir-
regular.
Nor could an agent authorized to buy a certain
property for his principal be himself the vendor, un-
less again after full disclosure. His profit would be
secret and illegal; and the transaction could be set
aside by the principal tho he had not thereby lost a
cent. So also where an agent, authorized, for ex-
ample, to buy one thousand bushels of wheat, stipu-
lates with the vendor for a profit in consideration of
PRINCIPAL AND AGENT 297
his getting the sale in preference to another, such a
profit is in the nature of a bribe, and the principal
may repudiate the contract of purchase. Perhaps the
reasoning behind the rule is that, if the vendor can
afford to give a secret bribe to the agent, he can af-
ford to sell just so much cheaper to the principal,
who under the circumstances is entitled to any shad-
ing of prices. Again if an agent is employed to buy
a property and he purchases for himself, he is re-
garded as a trustee for his principal : he cannot set up
any title so acquired against the absolute right of the
principal to have the mandate fulfilled.
The courts are very strict in refusing to counte-
nance any act of an agent which conflicts, however
slightl}^ with his position of trust. For example,
where T, while professing to act as ]M's agent and
stipulating for a commission, by a devious course of
conduct, took from M an agreement of sale to him-
self T, of certain land, resold it to G, at a price
higher than that at which he represented to ^1 that
he had sold it, paid over to M a smaller sum, less the
agreed commission, and divided the balance with
A, who was alleged to have been his partner in the
transaction. It was held that M was entitled to re-
cover, not only the profit made by T including the
commission, but the amount paid to A. All moneys
paid by G to T were received by T in trust for his
principal, ^I.^
Similarly, a secret arrangement between the re-
1 Morison vs. Thompson, L. R. 9 Q. B. 480.
298 COMMERCIAL LAW
spective agents of the vendor and the purchaser of
property, that a price larger than that which the ven-
dor is wilhng to accept shall be demanded from the
purchaser, and that the surplus shall be paid by the
vendor to the agents, will not be countenanced by the
court, and the purchaser, having paid the full price
demanded, without knowledge of the secret arrange-
ment, is entitled to recover such surplus.^
A principal must refund to the party with whom
his agent contracted on his behalf any profit in the
transaction represented by the money he has received
thru the fraud of his agent, whether the principal
authorized the fraud or not.^
23. Liability/ of agent to principal. — An agent is
only an instrument and represents another. As to-
ward his principal he incurs no personal liability
whatever be his due and proper execution of the man-
date. The third person with whom he dealt may not
fulfil his contract, may become insolvent or repud-
iate his agreement — that is no affair of the agent. By
common usage, of course, an insurance broker is liable
to an insurance company for premiums payable upon
policies written by him ; and a del credere agent, from
the nature of his contract, guarantees fulfilment of the
transaction which is the subject of his agency.
But an agent will in all cases be liable to his princi-
pal for the damages resulting from his negligence or
carelessness, his unauthorized acts or other breach of
duty.
1 Peacock vs. Crane, 3 D. L. R. 645.
2 Canadian Financiers, Ltd., vs. Hong Wo, 1 D. L. R. 38.
PRINCIPAL AND AGENT 299
Hence, in an action on a fire insurance policy, the
insurer may recover from its agent (as damages for
the latter's neglect of duty as the insurer's agent, to
give the insurer sufficient information of the haz-
ardous nature of the risk, resulting in too small a
premium being charged) the difference between the
accustomed premium which would have been charged
on a proper discovery of the material facts known to
the agent, and the lower premium which was in fact
charged upon his neghgent classification of the risk.^
A person was employed to secure additional insur-
ance on a certain property. A correct specification of
what was required was given to him. He received the
policy from the underwriters and forwarded it to his
clients without reading it. The policy contained an
erroneous statement of the prior insurance carried by
them. As a result, when a fire occurred, they were
forced to compromise their claim against the insurer.
It was held that the agent was Hable for the damages
suffered by them."
And again, if an agent neglects to keep his princi-
pal's money separate from his own, and, in fact, de-
posits it in his private account at his bank, and the
bank fails, the agent has been held liable.^
And an auctioneer who sells property under condi-
tions requiring the pa\Tnent of an immediate deposit,
has been held liable in an action for negligence if he
1 Stoness vs. Anglo-American Insce. Co., 3 D. L. R. 63.
2 Rudd Paper Box Co. vs. Rice, 3 D. L. R. 253.
3 Wren vs. Kirton (1805), 11 Yes. 3T7.
300 COMMERCIAL LAW
permits the highest bidder to go away without paying
the deposit.^
An agent will not be liable*where he has done an au-
thorized act which in itself may be imprudent and
which may result disastrously to the principal. Nor
will he be liable where damage results from his ac-
tions when he has literally followed his instructions;
or where, in the absence of instructions, he has exer-
cised his best judgment and was entitled to use his
discretion, or has acted under the best obtainable ad-
vice or according to the usage of the particular busi-
ness. If on his premises a principal orders work to
be done lawful in itself, but from which, in the
natural course of things, injurious consequences to
his neighbor must be expected to arise, unless means
are adopted by which such consequences may be pre-
vented, the principal himself is bound to see to the
doing of that which is necessary to prevent the mis-
chief. He cannot relieve himself of his own responsi-
bility by employing someone else (whether servant or
independent contractor) to do what is necessary to
prevent the act he had ordered to be done from be-
coming wrongful.^
It has been held that an agent who had no au-
thority to bind an insurance company, until it had ap-
proved an application for insurance, is not liable for
failure to effect insurance upon property before it was
destroyed by fire, where he agreed with the applicant
1 Hibbert vs. Bayley, 1860, 2 F. & F. 48.
2 Cockshutt Plow Co., Ltd., vs. MacDonald, 8 D. L. R. 112.
PRINCIPAL AND AGENT 301
only to submit his application to the company for ap-
proval, which he did without negligence, and it did not
appear that he unconditionally agreed to place and
effect such insurance.^
A gratuitous agent is liable for gross negligence in
the course of his agency, but not for mere want of
skill, unless he is in a situation from which skill may
be implied. But an omission to exercise such skill as
he actually possesses or has held himself out to possess,
or such skill as may reasonably be implied from his
profession or employment, or to exercise such skill
and diligence as he is in the habit of exercising in re-
gard to his own affairs, is deemed to be gross negli-
gence for the consequences of which he is responsible
to the principal.- So that where a customer de-
posited certain securities with his bankers for safe
keeping, the bankers receiving no reward for taking
care of them, and the securities were stolen by a clerk
in the banker's employ, it w^as held that as the bankers
acted gratuitously, they were not liable, as there was
no evidence of gross negligence on their part.
24. Measure of damages. — Where by his negli-
gence or some other breach of duty an agent causes
loss to his principal, the latter's claim against him
will be for the amount of the actual loss sustained,
i.e., such loss as would naturally result, or such as the
agent, in the circumstances, might reasonably have
known and expected would result. Hence, if an agent
1 Baxter vs. Jones (1903), 6 O. L. R. 360.
2 Wilson vs. Brett (1843), 11 M. & W. 113.
302 COMMERCIAL LAW
employed to insure his principal's goods neglects to
do so, and they are destroyed by fire, he will be just
as liable as the underwriters would have been had he
effected the insurance. In another case, a commis-
sion agent in Hong Kong was instructed to buy a
quantity of a certain kind of opium. He bought and
shipped an inferior kind. It was held that the proper
measure of damages was the loss actually sustained
by the principal in consequence of the opium not be-
ing of the description ordered, and not the difference
between the value of the kind ordered and of that
shipped.^
25. Agent not liable on agency contracts, — An
agent who acts in the name of his principal and within
the bounds of his mandate, is not personally liable to
third persons with whom he contracts. When we
speak of an agent acting within the bounds of his man-
date, we include, of course, acts in excess of his au-
thority which the principal ratifies. If he contracts
personally, tho on behalf of his principal, he may be
sued in his own name, tho the principal may be
known to the third person contracting. So it has
been held that where an agent buys goods at a sale
by auction, and gives his own name which is entered
as that of the buyer he is liable, unless it is clearly
proved that to the knowledge of the auctioneer he did
not intend to bind himself. In such a case, it is
proved that he did not "contract personally." But
where an agent acts for an undisclosed principal, he is,
iCassaboglou vs. Gibb, 1882, 11 Q. B. D. 797. ,
PRINCIPAL AND AGENT 303
in all cases, personally liable. He will even be liable
for damages for non-performance of his contract.
His offer to disclose his principal later will not help
him. So that if an auctioneer, acting for an undis-
closed principal, sold a potato crop still in the earth,
to be removed at the expense of the buyer, he would
be held to have contracted to give authority to enter
the field for the purpose of digging and removing the
potatoes. He would also be considered to have war-
ranted that he had authority to sell.
It follows that if an agent makes a contract with
a third party ostensibly on behalf of his principal, but
in reality beyond the scope of his authority, he is in
the position of having warranted to such third person
that he had the authority he seemed to have. If
he had not such authority, then he has deceived the
third person and has committed a breach of warranty
for which he may be sued. If he wilfully misrepre-
sents facts regarding the thing or matters which are
the subject of his agency, he has deceived and is liable
in damages. If he knowingly declares himself to be
and acts as the agent of a non-existent or incompetent
person, he will be personally liable. There is no cause
of action for breach of implied warranty where there
is no misrepresentation of the fact of authority, e.g.,
where the person signing in a representative capacity
tells the person with whom he is dealing that he has no
authority, but the negotiations proceed in anticipation
of their being confirmed by the principal.^
1 Smith's Mercantile Law, 11th Ed., p. 191.
304 COMMERCIAL LAW
But when, in the course of his agency, he signs a
deed in his own name, thus becoming a party thereto,
tho he may be described as representing a principal
who is named, he will be personally liable. If the
principal is undisclosed, not only will he be person-
ally liable, but he alone could sue the other party
thereto to enforce the contract, on the principle that
a person who is neither a party to a deed nor men-
tioned therein, cannot sue upon it.^ So also when a
person makes a contract, professedly as agent
but actually for himself as principal, he is personally
liable.
An agent will be bound to repay money to a
third person where it has been paid to him for the use
of his principal, and ( 1 ) the agent has contracted per-
sonally and the credit is not given exclusively to the
principal or (2) the agent has obtained payment by
fraud or threat or (3) the agent, having had pay-
ment but before delivery, to his principal, is notified
by the third party that the latter intends to demand
repayment because of error, fraud, threats, and so on.^
26. Actions by agents. — The general rule is that an
agent cannot sue on a contract made professedly on
behalf of a principal. There are certain exceptions
to the rule. Naturally where he contracts personally,
or on behalf of an undisclosed principal, he may sue
in person. But a factor, who according to our defini-
tion has a special property in the subject matter of
1 Thomson vs. Playfair, 2 D. L. R. 37.
2 Bowstead, Loc, Cit., 421-2.
PRINCIPAL AND AGENT 305
the agency, in that he has a lien for any balance due
him on the price of goods sold by him, may person-
ally sue therefor. Generall}^ speaking, he will also
be liable to third persons when his principal resides
in a foreign country. It has been held that both a
factor and an auctioneer may sue personally for the
price of goods sold by them for their principals. If
an agent has paid away his principal's money by error,
he may sue in his own name to recover. Or he may
sue in damages anyone who causes injury to the goods
of his principal which are in his possession. In such
cases the agents sue as trustees for their principals.
But it has been held (and rightly so) that an agent
cannot sue to recover money promised him by a third
person as a bribe, tho he may not have been influenced
in any respect thereby.^
27. Remuneration of agent. — The chief right of an
agent against his principal is to receive his remunera-
tion or commission. The amount to which he is en-
titled depends upon the express or implied contract
between himself and his principal. Where there is
no express contract, an implied contract will be sought
in the custom or usage of the particular trade or busi-
ness entered upon, from the circumstances surround-
ing the employment or from the conduct of the prin-
cipal. In the absence of custom or usage, according
to the English rule, it is said that there is an implied
contract to pay reasonable remuneration.^ The Que-
1 Harrington vs. Victoria Dock Co. (1878), 3 Q. B. D. 5*.
2 Bowstead, Agency, p. 192.
XXIV— 21
306 COMMERCIAL LAW
bee rule is embodied in an article which provides that
the mandate is gratuitous unless there is an agreement
or an established usage to the contrary.^ Where an
agent has carried out his instructions and has, say,
brought a purchaser to the vendor, his principal, and
the principal then does not complete the sale, it has
been held that the agent is entitled to his commission.
But he ^vill not be entitled to commission, in the ab-
sence of a special contract to that effect, where the
precise event which his services were sought to bring
about has not resulted therefrom. And where by ex-
press contract a commission has been named, no im-
plied contract based on custom or usage can be urged
against the express contract. Thus, if an agent. A,
contracts with a wholesale drygoods firm that he shall
receive a commission of five per cent on "all sales ef-
fected or orders executed by him," it has been held
that if one or more purchasers become insolvent be-
fore payment, he is entitled to his commission tho it
may be the custom of the trade that an agent will not
receive commission in respect of bad debts. If the
principal revokes the appointment he pays no com-
mission, tho the agent is entitled to be indemnified for
his labor and expense. So it has been held that
where all that a real estate broker, who had an exclu-
sive right to sell property, did toward making a sale
was to advertise it in a newspaper before the owner
effected a sale thereof, the agency was revoked, and
the agent could recover only for the services actually
1 Civil Code, Article 1702.
PRINCIPAL AND AGENT 307
performed, and not the compensation agreed upon in
case he should make a sale/
In the absence of a contrary agi-eement, an agent is
entitled to commission only on the transaction which
he brings about — he cannot extend his right to some
subsequent transaction. Thus, if an agent is author-
ized to find a lessee of a house and he does so, he re-
ceives his commission; if the tenant later buys the
house, the agent cannot claim a commission on the
sale. The sale does not arise directly from his agency.
Under certain circumstances, also, the agent may be
deprived of his commission. If he has been employed
for an illegal purpose, he can claim no reward; or if
he has been guilty of misconduct — bad faith or fraud,
— or if he has been grossly negligent and as a result
his employer receives no benefit thru his agency, or if
he betrays his trust and acts against his principal.
28. Agenfs right to indemnity. — A principal must
indemnify his agent for all obligations contracted by
him toward third persons, within the limit of his pow-
ers, or even where he has exceeded his powers and his
acts have been ratified. The principal must likewise
reimburse the expenses and charges which the agent
has incurred in the execution of the mandate. This
is true even where, without fault on the part of the
agent, the business undertaken does not turn out suc-
cessfully. An agent is also entitled to receive repay-
ment of all advances he has made on behalf of the
principal in the regular course of employment. Such
1 Cadwell vs. Stephenson, 3 D. L. R. 759.
308 COMMERCIAL LAW
advances the principal is presumed to have asked him
to make.
The principal's request may be inferred, where the ad-
vances are made in the regular course of trade, or even on the
spur of some pressing exigency not provided for by any ordi-
nary rule, since the employer may fairly be taken to have
authorized the employe to do, under any circumstances, that
which a prudent man would conceive necessary for the safe-
guard of his interests, e.g., to insure a cargo, which is in
extraordinary danger on account of the lateness of the sea-
son. But if an agent think fit to make a payment out of the
Tegular course of business, he will not, unless he can show
circumstances from which his principal's authority may be
inferred, or his principal adopts it, be entitled to repayment.
Moreover, tho he is entitled to be repaid his regular expenses,
yet if he conduct himself so negligently as to incur expenses
which would not have been necessary had he acted rightly,
he will be allowed nothing on account of them.
Upon proper advances made by the agent the prin-
cipal must pay interest. The principal must also in-
demnify the agent who is not in fault for losses caused
him by the execution of the mandate, but not for losses
caused by his disobedience or negligence. Hence if
A authorizes an insurance broker, B, to execute a pol-
icy of fire insurance, and he revokes B's authority be-
fore the contract is completed, but B goes ahead, has
the contract completed and pays the premium, he can-
not recover the premium from A, because he has acted
without authority. But where an agent, in ignorance
of the extinction of his mandate by the death of his
principal, or for other cause, continues the execution
of his mandate, he must be indemnified, for all such
PRINCIPAL AND AGENT 309
acts as are within his powers, by the principal or his
legal representatives.
29. Lien of agents. — As we have seen, the princi-
pal is bound to reimburse the expenses and charges
which the agent has incurred in the execution of the
mandate, and to pay him the salary or other compen-
sation to which he may be entitled. To secure pay-
ment, the agent has a privilege and right of prefer-
ence, a lien, for the payment of what is due him, upon
the things placed in his hands and upon the proceeds
of the sale or disposal thereof. There are certain con-
ditions to the existence of his lien — he must have ob-
tained possession lawfully in the course of the agency ;
there must be no agreement adverse to his right; he
must not have received the goods for a purpose or
under instructions incompatible with a right of lien.
Such a lien is known as a possessory lien — which
means that the agent has a right to retain the property
until his claim has been satisfied. But the fact that
he exercises his right of lien does not prevent his tak-
ing action upon the debt. In such case, he holds the
goods which are under lien as a collateral security.^
He may lose his lien by parting voluntarily with the
goods, unless he is fraudulently induced to give up
possession, or unless he gets an agreement that tho he
parts with the goods his lien continues in force. By
contract, express or implied, he may waive his lien.
30. Acts performed within the powers of the man-
date.— The general rule is that the principal is bound
1 Smith: Mercantile Law, Ed. 1905, p. 766,
310 COMMERCIAL LAW
in favor of third persons for all the acts of his agent,
done in execution and within the powers of the man-
date. In particular instances — as in the case of a
factor whose principal resides in a foreign country, or
in case of an agreement or of the usage of trade — the
agent may alone be bound for his acts, but these cases
are exceptional. So that where the agent acts strictly
within the scope of his authority, he binds his principal
toward third persons who deal with him in good faith,
even tho he may have acted adversely to his principal's
interests. So if A is authorized in writing by B to
buy and sell cheese, and A buys a large quantity of
cheese in his principal's name from C, sells it and
pockets the proceeds without paying C, B will be held
toward C, because, tho A acted fraudulently, he was,
so far as C knew, acting strictly within his actual au-
thority. Tho C must be in good faith, it is not re-
quired of him, in the presence of such an express au-
thority, to go behind it to discover whether the agent
is buying for himself or for his principal. The ap-
parent authority is the real authority.
Similarly, every act which an agent does in the
course of his employment, and within the apparent
scope of his authority, is binding upon the principal.
But the agent must not actually be unauthorized, to
the knowledge of the third person, to do the act. If
the third person knows that the agent is exceeding his
authority, he will not be allowed to take advantage of
the principal. Thus the general manager of an
amusement company engages a hall and orders the
PRINCIPAL AND AGENT 311
printing of advertising matter in preparation for the
appearance of a foreign orchestra. The regulations
of the company provide that all transactions shall be
for cash. The company is liable, unless the third per-
son had notice that the manager acted beyond his au-
thority. His acts were within the apparent scope of
his authority as general manager. The test is, then,
that the extent of the agent's authoritj'^ is ( as between
his principal and third persons) to be measured by
the extent of his usual employment — by employing
him the principal holds him out as his representative
for the matter of the employment, and third persons
in good faith are entitled to treat with him in connec-
tion with matters in the usual course of such employ-
ment. So it has been held that where the manager of
a business which was carried on in his name, the real
principal being undisclosed, ordered goods for the
business, and in so doing exceeded his authority, the
undisclosed principal was bound.^
31. Acts exceeding the scope of autliority. — For
such acts the principal is not bound, unless he has au-
thorized or ratified them. What acts are, or are not
within the scope of the agent's authority or in the
course of his employment, will have to be determined
in each case. The courts will generally hold that an
agent may adopt measures necessary or usual for
carrying the main intention of the principal into ef-
fect.^ Thus it has been held that an agent who is
iWatteau vs. Fenwick (1893), 1 Q. B. 346.
2 Smith, Loc. Cit. 160,
312 COMMERCIAL LAW
employed to get a bill discounted, may, perhaps, un-
less expressly restricted, indorse it in the name of his
employer ; that an agent appointed to receive rents and
make leases can fix the period of the lease, and that a
broker who is employed to issue a policy of insurance
may settle the loss. On the other hand, it has been
held that a bank is not bound where one of its man-
agers, without authority, guarantees payment of a
draft, it not being within the ordinary scope of his
authority to do so. 'Not is a principal bound who in-
structed an agent to find a tenant for a property but
not to grant a lease without consulting him, where,
without consulting him, the agent granted a lease for
twelve years.
The principal is not bound toward third persons
who deal with an agent who to their knowledge is
exceeding his authority. Thus a broker has posses-
sion of certain goods upon which he has a lien for
advances. He pledges the goods to a person who
knows that in so doing he is exceeding his authority.
The pledgee acquires no right; he cannot even retain
the goods for the amount of the broker's lien, the lien
not having been transferred under the circumstances.
32. Termination of agency. — The relation of prin-
cipal and agent arises from contract, express or im-
plied. The relation is terminated as other contracts
are terminated, thus :
(a) By the accomplishment of the particular busi-
ness or transaction. If a solicitor is retained to con-
duct a case, unless it is otherwise agi'eed, his man-
PRINCIPAL AND AGENT 313
date ceases upon the rendering of the j udgment. An
auctioneer is instructed to sell certain goods; on the
completion of the sale his authority ceases.
(b) By the expiration of the time for which the
mandate is given. This may depend upon the terms
of the contract. It may depend upon usage or the
custom of trade. Thus a broker is authorized to sell
certain goods. By the custom of trade his authority
to sell may lapse with the expiry of the day during
which the order is given.
(c) By the destruction of the subject matter of the
agency.
(d) By the happening of some event which renders
the agency unlawful, or upon the happening of which
it has been agreed the authority shall cease.
(e) By notice of revocation given by the principal
to the agent, subject to the agent's right to damages in
case of breach of contract.
(f ) By notice of renunciation given by the agent to
the principal. The agent may be liable for damages
if his renunciation is unjustifiable.
(g) By the death of the principal or of the agent,
(h) By some change in the condition of either
party by which his capacity is affected, as by lunacy,
misoundness of mind, interdiction, bankruptcy, or,
where the principal is a corporation or company, by
the dissolution of the corporation or company.
It may be stated as a general rule, that acts of the
agent done in ignorance of the death of the principal
or of any other cause whereby the mandate is extin-
314 COMMERCIAL LAW
guished, are valid. Nor does a revocation by the prin-
cipal affect third parties who may deal with the agent
in good faith, without notice that the agent's authority
has ceased.
REVIEW
What is an agent? Distinguish between special and general
agents ? What is a factor and what are his relations to the prin-
cipal? Exjilain the status of a broker. Define an auctioneer; a
del credere agent.
What is necessary to constitute the relation of principal and
agent? How may the consent be applied?
Discuss agency by estoppel; agency by necessity.
Who may be principal in an agency agreement?
Who may be an agent and what acts may be done by him ?
Describe ratification and conditions which must exist for rati-
fication. Distinguish between express and implied ratification.
Discuss the scope of an agent's authority.
What are some implied powers of an agent?
Discuss the fidiciary obligations between an agent and his prin-
cipal.
For what is an agent liable to his principal?
Name the ways in which an agency may be terminated.
CHAPTER XIX
MASTER AND SERVANT
1. Definition. — The relations between master and
servant are in many respects similar to those between
principal and agent. Frequently the words "serv-
ant" and "agent" are used interchangeably. Strictly
speaking, they are not interchangeable; tho ever}'
servant is, in executing the duties required of him
under his contract with his master, the agent of his
master. An agent is a person authorized to do some
act or acts in the name of another who is his principal.
He acts for and represents liis principal in dealings
with third parties where obligations are created be-
tween the principal and such tliird parties.
A servant, while he is acting as a servant only, and
not as an agent, performs operative acts, menial labor,
office work, and so on, in the performance of which he
does not come into contact with third persons in a
representative capacity. My coaclmian, in the per-
formance of his usual duties as such, is my servant,
and not my agent. But if I send him to buy a horse
for me in my name, he becomes my agent for that pur-
pose, tho he is none the less my servant. So that a
person may be both an agent and a servant at the
same tune. It is said that in order that there may
be a contract of hiring and service there must be a mu-
sic
316 COMMERCIAL LAW
tual agreement, express or implied, by which one per-
son is bound to hire and remunerate and another is
bound to serve for some determinate time. There
will be no contract of hire and service if the under-
standing is that the employer is to pay only while the
servant remains, it being optional whether the serv-
ant will serve or the master employ.
2. Coijiract of hire and service. — If a special agree-
ment is entered into, then the terms of the agree-
ment must be observed and adhered to by both mas-
ter and servant. Where the agreement calls for serv-
ice for a year or longer, generally it must be in
writing and signed by the parties. But a binding
agreement of service cannot be made for a longer pe-
riod than nine years. It has been held that where
services have been rendered without an express con-
tract to pay for them, it is a question of fact whether
or not there was an implied contract to pay for them,
and the onus is upon the one seeking payment.
Usualty, however, where there is no express contract
for hire and service, and the service is performed,
there arises a presimiption of contract, in which
case the wage would be the customary wage paid for
the particular kind of work in the locality. Where
the sei-vices are rendered in such a case as between
near relatives, the presumption is rather to the con-
trary. It then becomes necessary to prove an express
hiring.
3. Independent contractor. — In order to be an in-
dependent contractor, a workman must be free from
MASTER AND SERVANT 317
control, and must not be subject to the orders of any-
one as to the manner in which the work is to be done.
A wishes to have a building torn down to make
way for a new one. He contracts that B shall tear
down the building, take full control of the work, em-
ploy his owii men and use his own methods. B is ex-
perienced in this kind of work, and A exercises no
control or supervision. The work begins, and owing
to the removal of parts of the roof which formed a
counterweight for a heavy stone cornice, a part of the
cornice falls into the street and kills a passerby. A
is not responsible; B is, if negligence on his part is
proved. If B had not been a competent person, and
had not had experience in this class of work, A might
be held liable for his negligence in employing an in-
competent workman. If after the work began, and
before the accident, A had intervened and the work
was henceforth done under their joint supeiTision,
then the accident would be considered to have oc-
cuiTcd thru the negligence of both.^
So it has been held that the act of committing work
to a contractor to be executed, from which, if property
done, no injurious consequences can arise, is to be dif-
ferentiated from the act of turning over to him work
to be done from which mischievous consequences will
arise unless preventive measures are adopted. It may
be just to hold the party authorizing the work in the
former case exempt from liability for injury resulting
1 Dallontania vs. McCormick and the C. P. Rv., 4 O. W. X. 547, 8 D.
L. R. 757.
318 COMMERCIAL LAW
from negligence which he had no reason to anticipate.
There is good reason for holding him liable for injury
caused by an act certain to be attended with injurious
consequences if safeguards are not provided, no mat-
ter thru whose fault the omission to take the necessary
measures for such prevention may arise. Hence, if
an owner upon whose lands works are to be con-
structed, from the construction of which injury to ad-
joining premises must be expected to result, omits to
take the necessary measures to prevent such mischief,
he may be held liable.^
Nor can the employer expect to escape liability by
pleading that work has been intrusted to an independ-
ent contractor, if the thing contracted to be done is
unlawful, or creates a public nuisance, or by statute
must be done efficiently and it is done inefficient^.^
4. Fellow-sei'vant and vice-principal. — Who is a
fellow-servant ? In the English law provinces it will
be of importance to know. A fellow-servant is one
who is engaged with others for the same master in
operative work. Their duties may not be similar, but
they are fellow-servants if they are engaged in the
same general business of their common employer.
One may be of a higher grade than another, and these
may not be engaged in the same particular work. In
that they are performing operative acts for the gen-
eral furthering of the business, they are fellow-serv-
ants. ,
1 Cockshutt Plow Co., Ltd., vs. MacDonald, 8 D. L. R. 112.
2 Berg vs. Parsons, 156 N. Y. 109.
MASTER AND SERVANT 319
In the English law provinces, then, when an em-
ploye is injured by the act or fault of a fellow-em-
ploye, the master is not liable. In the Province of
Quebec, this fellow-sers^ant rule is not followed. The
master is responsible, tho the accident be due to the
neglect or carelessness of the fellow-employe, whether
he is a foreman or an ordinarj^ workman.
A vice-principal, on the other hand, is one whom the
master charges, in his stead, to provide warning of ex-
traordinary danger, safe tools, for the employment of
competent workmen, for the repair of machineiy
and maintenance of guards on dangerous machines.
If the person so charged is careless in the per-
formance of these duties and a workman is injured, it
is as tho the master himself were negligent; and as a
result he is liable in damages. The vice-principal is
not a fellow-servant. The master's duties in these
matters are said to be non-assignable ; he does not rid
himself of responsibility by charging another with the
performance of his own duties.
5. Master liable for servant's acts. — The general
rule is that the master is responsible for the negligent
acts of his servant done in the course and within the
scope of his employment. The servant will also be
liable. The master would not be responsible for the
acts of his servant done contrarj^ to his positive in-
structions. He will be responsible where in the per-
formance of his duties the servant is injudicious and
causes damage, or is drunk and causes damage.
Thus if a servant, in the discharge of his duties, is
320 COMMERCIAL LAW
driving a horse which runs away and dashes thru
a shop window, the master is hable. It would not be
a sufficient plea that the servant was exercising rea-
sonable care. A street-car conductor in the course of
an argument with a passenger strikes and injures a
passenger. The company i-s liable, because carriers
must protect passengers from assaults or injuries by
employes/ES well as by other passengers.
A man was driving a wagon just in front of a street
car. He turned out for it at a street intersection,
where manj'^ people were standing in the roadway
waiting to board the car. He shouted for them to
get out of the way, and drove thru the crowd in such
a reckless manner as to strike a person who was at-
tempting to board the car which was then opposite
the wagon. The person struck was thrown down and
the car ran over and crushed his foot. It was held
that the master was clearly liable.*
6. Servant's personal liability, — A servant may
render himself personally liable in certain cases. As
we have just seen, he is liable with his master where
he negligently causes injury to third persons or to
property. He will be liable where, while acting as
his master's agent, he does not, in dealing with third
persons, disclose the fact of his agency. If he con-
tracts in his own name for his master, he should de-
scribe himself as "agent for," or "per," "pro," and so
on. If he wilfully causes damage, whether acting
within the scope of his employment or not, he is liable
1 Baillargeon vs. St. George, 4 D. L. R. 894.
MASTER AND SERVANT 321
as a principal. So also if, jointly with his master, he
commits any fraud or crime.
7. Workmen s compensation acts. — We have indi-
cated that at common law, in all the provinces, a work-
man who is injm-ed in the com*se of his employment,
has an action in damages against his employer. In
several provinces, the common law rules have been al-
tered by workmen's compensation acts. Under these
acts, speaking generally, the employer is liable to com-
pensate the workman for injuries which result:
(a) From defects in "ways, works, machinery,
plant, buildings or premises" connected with the
business.
(b) From negligence of those who have the super-
intendence of the work.
(c) From negligence of those to whose orders the
workman was bound to conform and did in fact con-
form.
(d) By reason of an act or omission by an employe
in compliance with rules or by-laws of the employer.
(e) By reason of the neghgence of any person in
the employer's service and in charge of any points
or signals, machine, train or car.
If the accident is caused by the workman's wilful
misconduct or negligence, he is not allowed compen-
sation. The accident may have been caused by a fel-
low-employe. The injured workman may proceed
against him or against the employer, but not against
both.
The Quebec Workmen's Compensation Act makes
XXIV— 22
322 COMMERCIAL LAW
the employer liable (except in agricultural industries)
for all accidents occurring to the workman by reason
of or in the course of his employment, unless the acci-
dent was caused intentionally by the workman. If
the workman or the employer is guilty of inexcusable
fault, the courts may diminish or increase the compen-
sation accordingly. Thus it has been held in a Que-
bec casethat the fact that a workman, despite warn-
ings, persists in remaining in a place of danger and
is killed, is inexcusable fault on his part for which
the damages should be diminished. It does not fol-
low, however, that the accident was intentionally in-
duced by him so as to deprive his representatives of
the right of indemnity. The Quebec Act does not
require, as do certain of the other acts, that notice of
the accident or death be given within a stated period,
but action must be brought within a year from the
accident.
In Alberta and New Brunswick the court, in its dis-
cretion, fixes the compensation. In New Brunswick
the payments are limited to a period of ten years. In
the other provinces (except Quebec) the estimated
earnings for the three years preceding the injury are
the basis of computation, or the sum of one thousand
five hundred dollars, whichever is the larger amount.
In Quebec, the workman is entitled to a rent equal
to fifty per cent of his yearly wages, if he is absolutely
and permanently incapacitated ; in case of permanent
partial incapacity, to a rent equal to half the amount
by which his wages have been diminished. For tern-
MASTER AND SERVANT 323
porary incapacity, he is entitled to one-half his daily
wage, beginning on the eighth day after the accident
and while Jiis incapacity lasts. If his yearly wage
exceeds one thousand dollars, he has no claim under
the act; but has his recourse at common law. If his
wage is between six hundred dollars and one thousand
dollars, then on any amount over six hundred dollars
he receives only one-fourth of the compensation pre-
viously mentioned.
8. Alien Labor Act. — The Alien Labor Act is a
veiled measure of retaliation against the United
States, in that the Act applies only to immigration
from countries which have enacted similar legislation
applicable to Canadians who go to such countries.
The Act provides:
That it shall be unlawful for any person, company, part-
nership or corporation in any manner to prepay the trans-
portation, or in any way to assist, encourage or solicit the
importation or immigration of any alien or foreigner into
Canada under contract or agreement, parol or special, ex-
press or implied, made previous to the importation or immi-
gration of such alien, to perform labor or service of any
kind in Canada.
To contravene this provision is to commit a penal
offense, the fine imposed being not less than fifty dol-
lars, nor more than one thousand dollars. Imprison-
ment for a term not exceeding six months, and the
payment of a fine of not more than fifty dollars for
each alien landed, may be ordered in the case of the
master of any vessel who knowingly violates the Act.
The Act does not apply in certain stated cases.
324. COMMERCIAL LAW
Foreigners living in Canada temporarily may con-
tract with foreigners to act for them here as pri-
vate secretaries, servants or domestics. A new in-
dustry is to be favored and to be guarded against loss
for lack of skilled workmen. Hence a company en-
gaged in a new industry not at present established in
Canada may bring in skilled labor if it cannot be
obtained here. There may be workmen of the class
desired in Canada, but they may not be obtainable
because they are already engaged. The Dominion
Carriage Company erected a shop in which to build
steel box-cars. It needed a number of riveters, and
altho there were riveters working in Canada, it could
not secure their services. It brought in several
from the United States. Its action was upheld by
the Court of Appeal of Quebec. The act does not
bar professional actors, artists, lecturers, singers or
persons employed strictly as personal or domestic
servants. It does not prevent any person assisting
some member or members of his family, or some rela-
tive or friend to come here to take a position if the
newcomer's intention is to become a citizen of Canada.
The Act does not affect the powers of the government
of Canada or of any province to encourage immigra-
tion by circulating advertising matter in a foreign
country. This private persons may not do.
REVIEW
Explain the relationship of master and servant and distinguish
from agency.
MASTER AND SERVANT 325
Discuss the contract of hire and service. When does presump-
tion of contract arise?
What is an independent contractor and what are his liabilities?
Define fellow-servant; vice-principal. What are their respec-
tive duties?
Who is liable: (a) for negligence by servants; (b) when a serv-
ant does not disclose the fact that he is his master's agent; (c)
for a servant's wilful torts?
From what cause of injury to workmen is an employer liable?
What is the compensation rule in Quebec ?
What is the Alien Labor Act? What classes are exempt from
the Act?
IXDEX
A Definition, 2
Acceptance,
See Offer and Acceptance
Accommodation Party,
Indorser's warranty, 246; Liability,
247-49; Definition of, 248
Agents,
Type of general, 271; Special, 271-
72: Factor, 272; Broker, 272;
Auctioneer, 272—73; Del credere
agent, 273; Eligibility, 279; Co-
agents' liability, 280; Authority
of, 285-87, 288, 291-94. 310-
12; General and special, 287-88;
Power of attorney, 288-91: Sub-
agent, 293-95; Duties, 295-96;
Liability, 298-304; Suits by, 304-
05; Remuneration, 305—07; In-
demnity, 307-08; Liens, 309;
How contracts terminate, 312-13
Agreement,
When binding, 13—14; Examples of
obligation, 13—14: Offer and ac-
ceptance, 27—32 ; When void, 40—
68
Alien Labor Act,
Retaliatory measure. 323: Provision
of, 323; Exemptions, 324
Assignment,
Definition of, 79 : Competency of
parties, 79—80 ; Negotiable instru-
ments, 80; Of liabilities, 80-81;
Bonds and mortgages, 81; Breach
of promise, 81 : Discharge of con-
tract, methods, 82-91; Trans-
ferring bills and notes, 214—15;
Illustration of, 215
Auctioneer,
Scope of authority, 273
Bailments,
Definition. 180: Delivery, 180; Re-
lation to sales, 181; Classification,
182; Extent of liability, 183;
Contract of, 183: Obligations,
184-85; For sale benefit, 186;
Pledges, 187-88: Rights and du-
ties involved, 188-90; Warehouse
receipt, 190-93
327
Bank Act,
Maximum legal rate, 44; Defines
warehouse receipt, 192
Bills of Exchange,
Unconditional order, 199—200; Draft
and acceptance, 201 ; Parol evi-
dence, 201-2; Inland bills, 203;
In sets, 204; Checks, 204-9;
Drawee, 209; Blanks, 210-11;
Alteration of. 212-13
See also Transfer and Negotiation
Bills of Exchange Act,
Sunday contracts. 50; Negotiable
instruments, 197
Breach of Contract,
Discharge, 92—101 ; When occurring,
93 ; Failure of performance, 93—
94; Renunciation, 99-101; Dam-
ages, 118—19; Warranty, reme-
dies for, 168-70; Vendor's right,
174-77; Buyer's remedy, 178-79
See also Discharge of Contract
Broker,
Authority of, 272
Cause,
See Consideration
Checks,
Negotiability. 204-5, 208-9;' Rules
for, 205—7; Acceptance and cer-
tification, 207-8; Alteration of,
212-13
See also Transfer and Negotiation
Combinations,
See Restraint of Trade
Common Law,
Pollock defines, 7; Unwritten sense
of, 8; English Act, 8; In United
States, 8; Canada, 8-10; Cou-
tume de Paris, 9; Statute of
Frauds, 10
Conditional Sale,
On approval, 141; Distance orders.
142; English opinions, 143;
C. O. D. sales, 144
Confederation Act,
Authority of Federal government, 5
Consideration,
English law provinces, 32, 33; WTiat
328
INDEX
Consideration — continued
may be, 32, 34-35; In Quebec,
33; Distinguished from "cause,"
33, 34; If illegal, 35, 265; Trans-
fer of bills and notes, 234-35;
Consideration in defenses, 264-
65
Constitutional Act,
Provisions of, 6 ; For provinces, 6—
7
Contract of Parties,
Maker of note, 238—39; Acceptor,
239-41; Admission of fact, 241;
Qualified acceptance, 241—44;
Drawer's contract, 244—45; In-
dorsers, 245-47; Accommodation
party, 247-48; Warrantor, 248;
Damages, 249
Contracts,
Definition, 11; Classification of, 11-
16; Formation of, 17-38; Void
and voidable, 40-68; Operation
and interpretation, 69—78; As-
signment and discharge, 79-119;
Sales, 121-79; Bailments, 180-
93; Contract of parties, 238-50;
Principal and agent, 271-314;
Master and servant, 315-24
Damages,
Liquidation, 76—77; Penal clauses,
77
Defenses,
Personal, 263; Real, 263; Fraud in,
263—64 ; Failure of consideration,
264-65; Payment in due course,
266; Secondary liability, 267;
Cancelation, 267-68; Forgery,
268-70
' 'Del Credere' ' Agent,
Relation to principal, 273
Delivery,
Obligations of seller and buyer,
151-62: Sale of Goods act de-
fines, 151; Place of, 152-53; Car-
rier and agent, 154—56; Fixing
time, 156-57; Specified quantity,
157—60; Benjamin on instal-
ments, 159-60; Quality, 160-61;
What may constitute, 161-62;
Warranty, 162-70; Stoppage in
transitu, 171-74; Bailment, 180;
Transfer of bills and notes, 227-
29; Example of, 227-28; Holding
in escrow, 229
Discbarge of Contract,
Agreement, 82; Payment, 82-83,
84; Performance for, 83, 84;
Agreement with creditors, 85-
Dlscharge of Contract — continued
86; Payments, application of, 86—
87; Tender, 87-88; Novation, 89-
91; How agreements operate,
90-91; Breach, 92-94, 98-101;
Promises, 94-99; Impossibility of
performance, 103-4; Destruction
before delivery, 104-7; When per-
formance is impossible, 107—8
Personal services, 108-10; Dan
gerous work conditions, 111—12
Impossibility of performance,
112—13; Alteration of contract
114-16; Insolvency, 116-17
Creditor and debtor the same
person, 117; Compensation, 117
Action to recover loss, 118; Al-
lowing damages, 118-19
Divisions and Sources of Law, 2-10
Dominion Railway Act,
Liability for negligence, 54
Dominion Statutes, 6
Duress,
Violence and fear, 66-68; English
decisions, 66 : Threats, 67 ; Fraud
in defenses, 263
English Act,
Common law rules, 8
Evidence,
Rules of, 72-74; Oral testimony, 73
Factor,
Functions of, 272
Fraud,
Definition of, 62 ; Ignorant asser-
tion, 63 ; Silent approval of, 63 ;
Necessary proof, 64; In defense,
263-64; Illegality of considera-
tion, 265-66; Forgery, 268-70
See also Statute of Frauds
Illegal Covenants,
When contract is void, 54—53 ;
Deeds, 55; Kent on, 55-56;
Leases, 56; Teacher's license,
57; Interest in a contract, 57—
58; Protecting criminals, 58; In-
fluencing votes, 58 ; Restraint of
trade, 58; Gambling loans, 59;
Sunday prohibitions, 59
Incapacity,
Persons subject, 17; Minors, 17—
22; Insane, 23-25; Married
women, 25-26
Indorsement,
What is meant by, 217-18; Requi-
INDEX
329
Indorsement — continued
sites, 218-21: Without liability,
219-20; Maclaren on, 220-21
Kinds, 221: In blank. 221-22
When qualified, 222; Conditional
223; Restrictive, 224; When ir
regular, 225; Liability, 226, 238
Indorser's contract, 245; War
ranties, 246; Accommodation in
dorser, 246; Liability. 246-49
Insane,
Contracts of, 23—25; Disaffirmance
by. 23; Marriage. 24; Return of
consideration, 24-25
International Law,
Broad field of, 3—4 ; Example, 4
Joint and Several Contracts,
Creditor's obligation, 77; Partner-
ship, 78
Lord Tenterden's Act,
Sales contracts, 129, 130
Master and Servant,
When servant is agent, 315; Agree-
ment of service, 316; Independent
contractor, 316—18: Fellow-serv-
ant, liability for, 318-19; Vice-
principal, 319; Master's liability,
319-20; Servant's liability. 320;
Workmen's compensation acts,
321-23; Quebec Compensation
Act, 321-22: Alien Labor Act,
323: Employment of foreigners.
324
Marriage,
Restraint of, 51—52; Pollock on,
52 ; English opinion, 52
Married Women,
English law, 25, 26; In Quebec, 25-
26
Mercantile Contracts,
Time an eussential, 76; When void-
able, 76
Minors,
Competency of, 17-23; Liability
for necessaries. 18—19; Obliga-
tions of. 19-20; Repudiation of
contract, 20-22; Ratification, 22-
23
Money Lenders Act,
Interest rates fixed. 44
Mnnicipal Law,
Enforced by state, 3
Negligence,
Liability for, 53-54; Workmen's
compensation acts, 53-54; Eng-
lish common law, 54; Dominion
Railway Act, 54
Negotiable Instruments,
Classes of, 194—95: Maclaren on
quasi-negotiable instruments, 195:
Consideration, 196; Days of grace,
196; Negotiable Instrument Law.
197: Bills of Exchange Act, 197:
Promissory notes, 197-99; Bills
of exchange, 199-204; "First of
exchange." 204; Checks, 204-9;
Blanks, 210-11; Alterations. 211-
13
See also Transfer and Negotiation
Notice of Dishonor,
To whom given. 259: By whom
given. 259; What constitutes.
259; Time, 259-60; Place, 260:
When waived, 260-61 : Protest,
when necessary, 261—62
Novation, Discharge of contract, 89-
91
Obligation,
Definition. 11; Case of moral. 12;
Lawful obligation, 12—13 ; Agree-
ment, 13—14; Quasi contract. 13-
14; Tort or offense, 14: Contracts
classified, 14—16; Joint and sev-
eral contracts, 77-78; Of seller.
151-70; Of buyer. 151-78; Bail-
ments, 185-86
Offer and Acceptance,
Reaching an agreement. 27—29: Eng-
lish rule, 29, 30: By mail or tele-
graph, 29-30; Revocation, 29, 30.
32; Pollock on, 30. 32; Offer to
public, 31; Rewards, 31; Eng-
lish decision, 31-32: Considera-
tion, 32—36; Public advertisement,
32: Qualified acceptance. 241-43;
General acceptance, 241 ; Ac-
ceptors, 243-44
Pledges,
Use of term. 187: Pawnbroker. 187;
Broker and customer, 187; Opera-
tion. 183
Pollock, Frederick,
Rule of acceptance, 30, 31; On
revocation decision. 32 ; Void
agreements. 41 : Marriage con-
tracts, 52: Assigniment of con-
tract, 80; Discharge by novation.
89
330
INDEX
Power of Attorney, Form of, 289-91
Presentment,
Bill payable at sight, 251-52;
When excused, 252; For payment,
252-57; Protest, 253; Time for,
253-55; To partners, 254; Delay
in, 254; When waived, 255, 256;
Place of, 256; Payment for honor,
257-58
Principal and Agent,
Definitions and functions, 271—73;
Relation between, 273-74; Es-
toppel, 274-76; Agent of neces-
sity, 276; Who may be principal,
276-78; JWho be agent, 279;
Agent's scope of authority, 279-
80, 285-87, 291-94; Acts ratified,
280-85; Fiduciary obligations,
296-98; Damage claims, 301-02;
Agent's commission, 305—07; In-
demnity, 307-08 ; Possessory lien,
309; Authorization, 310-12; Con-
tract terminated, 312—14
Private Law,
What is included, 5 ; In Canada, 9
Promises,
Breach of contract, 93-99; When
independent, 94—95; Conditional,
95-98; Subsidiary, 98-99
Promissory Notes,
Conditions of, 197-98; Invalid
forms, 198; Interest rate, 199;
Payment, 238
Provincial Constitutions, Amendments
restricted, 6-7
Provincial Statutes, Residuary power,
7
Public Law,
What it includes, 5 ; In Canada, 9
Public Policy,
Legality of contract. 40—42 ; Void
agreements, 41; Halsbury on, 42;
Greenwood on, 48
Quebec Workmen's Compensation Act,
321-22
Bestraint of Trade,
Contracts made void, 44—49; Eng-
lish cases, 45; Price control, 47;
Illegal combination, 47—49; Il-
linois decision, 48; Greenwood on
public policy, 48 ; Supreme Court
cases, 49
Rules of Construction,
Court interpretation, 74; Subsidiary
rules, 75
Sale of Croods Act,
When adopted, 9; Sales contracts,
129-30, 131, 132; Delivery of
goods, 151
Sales,
Definition, 121; When valid, 121-22,
124; Transfer minus ownership,
123; Competent parties, 123-25;
Actual and future goods, 125—28;
English rule, 126; Statute of
frauds, 128-31; Lord Tenterden's
Act, 129, 130; Sale of Goods Act,
129, 131, 132; Proof of accept-
ance, 132-36; Part payment, 134-
35; Proving a memorandum, 135—
36; Work and labor contract,
136-37; Purchaser's title, 137-
41 ; Subject to conditions, 141—
45; Unspecified goods, 143; Fu-
ture manufactures, 146; By sam-
ple, 146-50; Supreme Court case,
148—49; Performance of contract,
151-79; Delivery of goods, 151-
62; Warranties, classification of,
162-70; Caveat emptor, 164,166-
67; Remedies for breach, 168-70;
Stoppage in transitu, 171—74;
Resale, 174; Breach of contract,
174-77; Buyer's remedy, 178-
79; Relation to bailments, 181
Sample Sales,
When title passes, 147; Supreme
Court cases, 148, 149-50
Servants, See Master and Servant
Sources of Law,
Confederation Act, 5 ; Dominion
statutes, 6 ; Treaties, 6 ; Provincial
constitutions, 6-7; Provincial
statutes, 7; Common law, 7—10;
English act, 8; United States, 8;
Canada, 8-10; English Sale of
Goods Act, 9
Statute of Frauds,
In Canada, 10. 36-38; Provisions
of. 36—38; Enforceable contracts,
37-38; English statutes, for sales,
128-29; Lord Tenterden's Act,
129, 130, 131: Sale of Goods Act,
129. 131; Work and labor con-
tract. 136-37
Stoppage in Transitu,
Benjamin on, 171—72; American
principle of, 172-73; Instalment
deliveries, 173; Bill of lading
transferred, 173—74; Vendor's
right, 174
Sunday Contracts,
Validity of. 50-51; Bills of Ex-
change Act, 50; Dominion stat-
ute, 50; American cases, 51
INDEX
331
Technical Law,
Classes of, 2 ; Municipal, 3 ; In-
ternational, 3-4; Public law, 5;
Private law, 5
Tender,
Obligation of debtor. 87-88; Civil
Code of Quebec, 88
Third Persons,
Fraudulent contracts, 52-53 ; Rights
and liabilities of, 69-70; Con-
tracts that benefit, 70-72
TiUe,
Sales risks, 137-41; Ice cargo, 139:
General rule, 140—41 ; Conditional
sale. 141-45; C. O. D. sales, 144
Transfer and Negotiation,
Assignment, 214—15; Negotiability.
216—17; Indorsement, requisites
of. 217-26; Delivery, 227-29
Holder in due course. 229-30
236; Regularity of instrument
230-31; Maturity, 231-32; No
tice and good faith, 232-34; Con
sideration, 234-35; Bills negoti
ated. 235
See also Negotiable Instruments
Treaties, Forms of, 6
Undne Inflnence,
Voidable contract, 64—66; United
States decision, 64—65; English
case, 65; Eldon on, 65-66
Usury.
Bank Act, 44; Money Lenders Act,
44 ; Recovery, 44
Void and Voidable Contracts,
Legality of agreement. 40—42; Eng-
lish decisions. 41. 42; Wagering
contracts. 42-43; Insurance. 43
Gaining illegal, 43—44; Usury,
44; Restraint of trade, 44—49
Combinations to control price
47-50; Sunday contracts, 50—51
Restraint of marriage. 51-52
Third persons injured. 52-53
Negligence, liability for, 53-54
Unlawful agreements, 54—59; Se-
curing consent. 59-60; Mistake
of intention. 60—61; Of expres-
sion. 61; Fraud. 62-64; Undue
influence, 64-66; Duress, 66-68
Wagering Contracts,
Illegality of, 42-44; Gambling, 43;
Insurance, 43
Warehouse,
Purpose, 190; Wharfinger, 190
Warehouse receipt and Bank Act
190-92; Warehouseman's respon
sibility, 193 ; Maclaren on ware
house receipts, 195
Warranty,
Definition, 162; Express, 162; Im-
plied. 162, 163-67; Civil Code
of Quebec. 165; Caveat emptor,
166—67; Remedies for breach,
168-70
Workmen's Compensation,
When employer liable, 321 ; Quebec
Workmen's Compensation Act,
321-22 ± ^
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