(navigation image)
Home American Libraries | Canadian Libraries | Universal Library | Community Texts | Project Gutenberg | Children's Library | Biodiversity Heritage Library | Additional Collections
Search: Advanced Search
Anonymous User (login or join us)
Upload
See other formats

Full text of "Communist infiltration in the Army. Hearing before the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigation of the Committee on Government Operations, United States Senate, Eighty-third Congress, first[-second] session, pursuant to S. Res. 40"

rF 



JV9 



<\$A6\Jr»&07 



Bn 




Given By 



*£. 



Tt <: 



v na 



B* 



^ 46.fr 

COMMUNIST INFILTRATION IN THE ARMY 












HEARING 

BEFORE THE 

PERMANENT SUBCOMMITTEE ON 
INVESTIGATIONS OF THE COMMITTEE ON 

GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS 
UNITED STATES SENATE 

EIGHTY-THIRD CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

PURSUANT TO 

S. Res. 40 



SEPTEMBER 28, 1953 



Printed for the use of the Committee on Government Operations 







UNITED STATES 
GOVEENMENT PRINTING OFFICE 
38794 WASHINGTON : 1953 



s 

1/ 



> 



Superintendent , oi .pocujnenta 

i 

COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS 
JOSEPH R. MCCARTHY, Wisconsin, Chairman 
KARL E. MUNDT, South Dakota JOHN T MrPTPMAwn *, 

nljl '" 1 c - *->WUUS>HAK, Idaho HENTRV AT T Ar'TrornvT wr u- 

jwn.N MAhhHALL BUTLER, Maryland STUART SVMTWnnv an. 

CHARTS TT PATTi™ ^ir- !• <V ' - G 10N - Missouri 

CHARLES E. POTTER, Michigan ALTON A. LENNON, North Carolina 

Francis D. Flanagan, Chief Counsel 
Walter L. Reynolds, Chief Clerk 



Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations 
JOSEPH R. MCCARTHY, Wisconsin, Chairman 
KARL E. MUNDTT S outh Dako ta 
EVERETT McKTNLEY LIRKSEN, Illinois 
CHARLES' E. POTTER, Michigan ' 

Roy M. Cohn, Chief Counsel 
Francis P. Carr, Executive Director 
II 












CONTENTS 



Page 

Appendix 44 

Index 81 

Testimony of — 

Bogolepov, Igor 20 

Budenz, Prof. Louis F 28, 33 

Gelfan, Harriet Moore 30 

Lamont , Corliss 1 

Petrov, Prof. Vladimir 38 

EXHIBITS 

Introduced Appears 

on page on page 

1. Statement of Mr. Corliss Lamont, September 23, 1953 1 1 

2. Document entitled "Psychological and Cultural Traits of 

Soviet Siberia," dated January 1952 21 44 

3. Excerpts from A History of Russia, by Bernard Pares 27 77 

4. (a) USSR — A Concise Handbook, edited by Ernest J. Sim- 

mons 28 (*) 

(6) Excerpts from A Concise Handbook, edited by Ernest M. 

Simmons I 28 78 

5. Peoples of the Soviet Union, by Corliss Lamont 38 (*) 

*May be found in the flies of the subcommittee. 

m 



COMMUNIST INFILTRATION IN THE AEMY 



MONDAY, SEPTEMBER 28, 1953 

United States Senate, 
Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations 
of the Committee on Government Operations, 

Washington, D. C. 

The subcommittee met (pursuant to S. Kes. 40, agreed to January 30, 
1953) at 10 a. m., in room 318 of the Senate Office Building, Senator 
Joseph E. McCarthy, chairman of the subcommittee, presiding. 

Present : Senator Joseph R. McCarthy, Republican, Wisconsin. 

Present also : Roy M. Cohn, chief counsel ; Francis P. Carr, executive 
director; Donald A. Surine, assistant counsel; Robert L. Jones, 
research assistant to Senator Potter ; Karl Baarslag, research director, 
and Ruth Young Watt, chief clerk. 

The Chairman. The committee will come to order. I will ask 
the staff to make the executive testimony in the Lamont case part of 
the public record at this point, so that the reason for the citation for 
contempt will be very clear. 

I may say since the appearance of Mr. Lamont I discussed the matter 
with some of the attorneys over in the Justice Department, and we 
are in complete agreement that Mr. Lamont should be cited for con- 
tempt. This is not any official decision from the Justice Department, 
but merely a discussion with some of the lawyers on the staff. 

(The proceedings of the executive session of September 23, 1953, in 
New York City, are as follows :) 

TESTIMONY OF CORLISS LAMONT, ACCOMPANIED BY PHILIP 
WITTENBERG AND IRVING LIKE, ATTORNEYS AT LAW, NEW 
YORK, N. Y. 

Mr. Lamont. Mr. Chairman, I have a statement I would like to read 
into the record objecting to the jurisdiction of the committee. 

The Chairman. Not until we have sworn you. 

Mr. Lamont. I would prefer to affirm, please. 

The Chairman. Pardon me? 

Mr. Lamont. I would prefer to affirm. 

The Chairman. In other words, you don't want to be sworn ; you 
want to affirm. 

Do you solemnly affirm to tell the truth, the whole truth, and noth- 
ing but the truth in this matter now in hearing before this committee ? 

Mr. Lamont. I do. 

The Chairman. Your reason for not being sworn, not wanting to be 
sworn, is what? 

Mr. Lamont. I want to read my statement objecting to the juris- 
diction 



L COMMUNIST INFILTRATION IN THE ARMY 

The Chairman. No. I asked why you want to affirm rather than 
be sworn. Is it because of religious scruples? 
Mr. Lamont. Can I answer? 

Mr. Wittenberg. I don't think he is required to explain that. 
The Chairman. Yes. 

Mr. Wittenberg. A witness 

The Chairman. The Chair is entitled to know. 

Mr. Wittenberg. I don't believe so, sir. A witness is entitled to- 



The Chairman. I will not hear from the counsel. The ruling of 
this committee is you may advise with your client at any time you care 
to. He may advise with you. If a matter comes up which you con- 
sider of sufficient importance that you want a private conference, we 
will arrange a room for that. In other words, that we do not hear 
from counsel. I am asking the witness why do you refuse to be sworn 
and insist upon affirming. 

Mr. Wittenberg. I shall tell the witness it is your right to insist 
on not having any questions asked with regard to your religious 
beliefs. 

Mr. Lamont. Mr. Chairman, regarding that question, I believe it 
is improper because it is trying to probe into my religious beliefs, 
and I think that no — that I am not required to explain why I choose 
to affirm. 

The Chairman. Mr. Lamont, I am not concerned with your re- 
ligious beliefs. I don't care what they are. But we require a witness 
to be sworn unless he tells us because of some religious scruples — he 
needn't explain what they are. If you tell us that you have some 
religious grounds for refusing to be sworn, we will allow you to merely 
affirm. 

Mr. Wittenberg. You may refuse to answer. 

Mr. Lamont. Well, I am sorry, Mr. Chairman, I just have to de- 
cline to answer that because I think it is violating my constitutional 
privileges, and I never heard of such a rule before. 

The Chairman. You are refusing on the ground we are violating 
what constitutional privilege? 

Mr. Wittenberg. Separation of the church and state. 

Mr. Lamont. Separation of church and state and probing and ask- 
ing questions about religious beliefs. 

The Chairman. Mr. Lamont, stand up and be sworn. 

Stand up and be sworn. 

Mr. Lamont. Well 

The Chairman. In this matter now in hearing — stand up and be 
sworn. 

Mr. Lamont. I already affirmed. 

The Chairman. You will be sworn unless you tell us you have got 
some ground for refusing to be sworn. 

Mr. Wittenberg. You may stand — you are standing on your con- 
science. 

Mr. Lamont. I am standing on my conscience, that I affirm, and I 
see no reason for going beyond that. 

The Chairman. You are ordered to raise your right hand and be 
sworn. 

Mr. Wittenberg. You will refuse. 

Mr. Lamont. I decline to do so, Senator McCarthy. 



COMMUNIST INFILTRATION IN THE ARMY 



The Chairman. "What ground? 
Mr. Lamont. I request that you- 
The Chairman. What ground ? 



Mr. Wittenberg. Sa} T it is your conscientious scruples. 

The Chairman. You may advise with counsel. 

Mr. Wittenberg. You may say it is your conscientious scruples 
you are standing on. 

Mr. Lamont. I am standing on my conscientious scruples in pre- 
ferring to affirm rather than to be sworn, and I believe that this is 
proper under our whole American system. 

The Chairman. Have the record show the witness has been ordered 
to stand and be sworn. He refuses to be sworn. 

We will take the matter up with the committee as to what action will 
be taken. 

Sit down, Mr. Lamont. 

Proceed. You had a statement you wanted to make. 

Mr. Lamont. I have a statement I want to read objecting to the 
jurisdiction of the committee. 

The Chairman. You may. 

Air. Lamont. Thank you very much. Here it is. 

I, Corliss Lamont, residing at 450 Riverside Drive, in the Borough 
of Manhattan, city of New York, having been subpenaed before this 
committee by subpena dated the 21st day of September 1953, and 
signed by Joseph R. McCarthy, as chairman, do hereby respectfully 
object to the power and jurisdiction 

The Chairman. I don't think counsel has been identified yet. 

Mr. Wittenberg. I gave him a card. 

The Chairman. And the other gentleman? 

Mr. Wittenberg. Mr. Irving Like, my associate. 

The Chairman. And your name ? 

Mr. Wittenberg. Philip Wittenberg, sir. 

The Chairman. Philip Wittenberg and Irving Like. 

Pardon me, Mr. Lamont, please. 

Mr. Lamont (continuing). Do hereby respectfully object to the 
power and jurisdiction of this committee to inquire into : 

(a) My political beliefs ; 

(6) Any other personal and private affairs ; 

(c) My religious beliefs ; 

(d) My associational activities. 

(2) Let it be understood that I am a private citizen of the United 
States. That I hold no office of public honor or trust and that I am 
not employed in any governmental department, nor am I under salary 
or grant from any governmental department. 

(3) To dispose of a question causing current apprehension, I am a 
loyal American and I am not now and never have been a member of the 
Communist Party. 

(4) The grounds of my objection are : 

(a) As stated in United States v. Rumely (97 L. Ed. 494), a case 
involving a refusal to give testimony before a committee of the House 
of Representatives, the Supreme Court of the United States said, in 
a concurring opinion by Mr. Justice Douglas : 

The power of investigation is also limited. Inquiry into personal and private 
affairs is precluded. 



4 COMMUNIST INFILTRATION IN THE ARMY 

(b) The Supreme Court of the United States has said in Jones v. 
Securities and Exchange Commission (298 U. S. 1), through Mr. 
Justice Sutherland : 

The citizen, when Interrogated about his private affairs, has a right before 
answering to know why the inquiry is made; and if the purpose disclosed is 
not a legitimate one, he is not required to answer. 

(c) Under the first amendment to the Constitution, the power of 
investigation by Congress into matters involving freedom of speech 
and freedom of the press cannot be used in the absence of legislative 
intent or power. The Congress of the United States has no constitu- 
tional right to legislate with regard to prior restraint or utterance in 
either form, and that as to any books already written or statements 
made, no ex post facto law could be passed determining innocence or 
criminality, and that therefore an investigation into my writings is 
beyond the power of this committee. 

(5) Under our Constitution, our Government is a government of 
limited powers, tripartite in form, consisting of the legislative, the 
judicial, and the executive, and any inquiry into personal conduct, 
personal beliefs, associational activity lies within the jurisdiction of 
the judicial department, and the exercise of this power by the legis- 
lature is an unconstitutional invasion of the power of the judiciary. 

The Supreme Court has held that this separation of powers is 
fundamental to the existence of our democracy and that not even an 
emergency warrants an invasion of the powers of one department 
by the other. Yowigstowri Sheet and Tube Co. v. Saicyer (343 
U.S. 579). 

(6) The jurisdiction of this committee is further limited by the 
statutes which constitute and set forth its function and sphere of 
authority. Under the rules of the Senate and the statutes organizing 
the appointment of this standing committee, this committee has no 
authority to examine into the personal and private affairs of private 
citizens. Any action with regard to my books by officials of the Gov- 
ernment was done without any prior knowledge or consultation with 
me. I took no part in any proceedings involving any governmental 
authority and therefore this committee is without power to examine 
me under the rules and statute governing it. 

This committee is not a competent tribunal. The resignation from 
this committee of all members belonging to one of the major parties, 
i. e., the Democratic Party, has deprived this committee of its com- 
petency to act until it has been properly constituted. 

That's all. 

The Chairman. Mr. Lamont, I show you a book entitled "U. S. S. E., 
a Concise Handbook," edited by Ernest J. Simmons, one chapter 
entitled "National and Racial Minorities" by Corliss Lamont. 

And I may say this book is being used by the military to indoc- 
trinate our troops, being purchased by the Government. 

I ask you, No. 1, are you the Corliss Lamont mentioned in that 
book ? 

(Mr. Lamont confers with Mr. Wittenberg.) 

Mr. Lamont. Yes. 

The Chairmax. You recognize that chapter as your work? 

Mr. Lamont. Yes; I do. 

The Chairman. Did you get paid for that ? 

Did you get paid for that work? 



COMMUNIST INFILTRATION IN THE ARMY 5 

(Mr. Lamont confers with Mr. Wittenberg.) 

Mr. Lamont. I am trying to remember, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Chairman, without checking my records, I cannot give a com- 
petent answer on that. 

The Chairman. Well, if you don't know without checking your 
records, you will not be required to answer until you do check your 
records. 

You are asked, then, to check your records and tell us whether you 
were paid any money for this and whether or not to your knowledge 
you received any money because of the number of books purchased 
by the military. 

Mr. Wittenberg. Mr. Chairman, without intruding at all 

The Chairman. Yes? 

Mr. Wittenberg. If we get the answers to these, and I think we 
can, are we in a position to call anybody and just give the answer so 
you can incorporate it in the record ? 

The Chairman. There may be a number of items we will want, so 
let's hold that in abeyance. 

Mr. Wittenberg. If you want to, we would be perfectly willing to 
give the answers to any questions as to which he has no recollection. 

The Chairman. I also want to show you, Mr. Lamont, a document 
entitled "Psychological and Cultural Traits of Soviet Siberia." 

There is a C. Lamont listed as a source for this material, the name 
of the book, Peoples of the Soviet Union, 1946. Would you know 
whether that C. Lamont is you ? 

(Mr. Lamont confers with Mr. Wittenberg.) 

Mr. Lamont. I wrote a book published by Harcourt, Brace in 1946 
called The Peoples of the Soviet Union, so that presumably this refers 
to that book, Mr. Chairman. 

The Chairman. I will hand you, Mr. Lamont, a book entitled "The 
Peoples of the Soviet Union" by Corliss Lamont and ask if that is your 
work. 

Mr. Lamont. Yes ; that certainly is. 

The Chairman. Have you had occasion to read this document 
entitled "Psychological and Cultural Traits of Soviet Siberia?" 

Mr. Lamont. Mr. Chairman, I have been trying to get a copy of 
that after you talked about it in the press and I have been unable to 
get a copy so I can't — I haven't read it at all. I haven't seen it. 

The Chairman. We will furnish you with a copy. 

If you will do that, Mr. Carr. 

And, Mr. Lamont, you are requested to examine the document and 
then mark those passages which come verbatim from your book. 

This document, incidentally, while it quotes you as a source, does 
not show which material comes verbatim from you. We would like 
to have that information. You will be ordered to produce that 
and 

Mr. Lamont. Excuse me, Mr. Chairman. You mean now ? 

The Chairman. No ; not now. I will give you whatever time you 
think necessary, if you get in touch with counsel. I realize it will take 
some time to do that. 

Do you know a Mr. Louis Budenz, Mr. Lamont ? 

(Mr. Lamont confers with Mr. Wittenberg.) 

Mr. Lamont. Mr. Chairman, on the basis of the statement sub- 
mitted, I refuse to answer that question. 

38794—53 2 



6 COMMUNIST INFILTRATION IN THE ARMY 

The Chairman. On what ground? 

Mr. Lamont. On the basis of the statement objecting to your juris- 
diction over 

The Chairman. You refuse to answer on the ground the committee 
does not have jurisdiction to ask the question ? 

Mr. Wittenberg. On the grounds as stated in the objection. 

The Chairman. You will have to give your grounds. 

Mr. Wittenberg. He will have to read it. 

Mr. Lamont. On the grounds as stated in the objections already 
mentioned in this statement. 

Do you want me to read more of it, read it again ? 

The Chairman. No ; you needn't read it again. Is there any ground 
other than the jurisdiction of the committee on which you refuse to 
answer ? 

Mr. Lamont. No. 

The Chairman. You will be ordered to answer that. 

I assume you will still refuse ? 

Mr. Lamont. I have submitted this statement, Mr. Chairman. 

The Chairman. I say, so the record is complete, you are being 
ordered to answer, and I assume you are refusing to answer ? 

Mr. Lamont. Yes ; on the grounds stated. 

The Chairman. Did you ever admit to Mr. Budenz in a telephone 
conversation that you were a member of the Communist Party ? 

Mr. Lamont. Why — I refuse to answer that on the same grounds, 
Mr. Chairman, as set forth in this statement. 

The Chairman. You are not refusing under your rights under the 
fifth amendment, right ? 

Mr. Lamont. No, no. 

The Chairman. You are ordered to answer. 

I assume you still refuse ? 

Mr. Lamont. Well, as you know from the statement 

Mr. Wittenberg. May I consult with my client for just one moment ? 

The Chairman. For your benefit, Mr. Counsel, I order him to 
answer. In the opinion of the Chair, that is necessary where a witness 
refuses to answer. I think it is necessary for the Chair to order him 
to answer in case the committee decides to take contempt proceedings 
against him. 

Mr. Wittenberg. Yes, I realize that. 

(Mr. Lamont confers with Mr. Wittenberg.) 

The Chairman. Do you still refuse to answer ? 

Mr. Lamont. Mr. Chairman 

The Chairman. May I ask, Mr. Reporter, whenever the witness 
confers with counsel, so that the record is complete, have it show he 
confers. 

There is no intimation that that is improper. He has a right to con- 
fer with counsel. 

Mr. Wittenberg. I agree with you that the record should show it. 

The Chairman. Do you refuse to answer ? 

(Mr. Lamont confers with counsel.) 

Mr. Lamont. I am declining to answer on the ground that I do not 
wish to involve myself in controversy with a known provocateur, and 
I am a loyal American. As I said in the statement, I am not and never 
have been a member of the Communist Party. 



COMMUNIST INFILTRATION IN THE ARMY 7 

The Chairman. Do you refuse on the ground you don't want to 
involve yourself with a known provocateur ? 

Who is the known provocateur you don't want to involve yourself 
with? 

Mr. Wittenberg. Refuse to answer that. The person named in the 
statement. 

Mr. Lamont. The person you named in the statement, Mr. Chair- 
man. 

The Chairman. You are ordered to answer, and you still refuse, 
I assume. 

Mr. Lamont. Right. 

The Chairman. Did you know a Clarence Hathaway ? 

Mr. Lamont. I decline to answer that on the same grounds, Mr. 
Chairman. 

The Chairman. On the ground you don't want to involve yourself, 
you mean ? 

Mr. Lamont. No, no. On the grounds of the statement. 

Mr. Wittenberg. "Of my objections to the jurisdiction." 

Mr. Lamont. On objections to the jurisdiction of the committee. 

The Chairman. You are ordered to answer. 

Mr. Lamont. Well, I decline for the reasons stated. 

The Chairman. Did you work with Clarence Hathaway in connec- 
tion with the penetration of various organizations by the Communist 
Party? 

Mr. Lamont. May I consult with counsel ? 

The Chairman. Certainly. 

(Mr. Lamont confers with Mr. Wittenberg.) 

Mr. Wittenberg. May I perhaps — my client is not a lawyer, may I 
tell him what the legal form is ? 

The Chairman. You may discuss with him at any time you care to. 

(Mr.' Lamont confers with Mr. Wittenberg.) 

Mr. Lamont. Well, I object to the form of the question, Mr. Chair- 
man, because it involves this idea that I was somehow penetrating 
something for the Communist Party. I can't answer such a question. 

The Chairman. Your objection will be overruled. 

Mr. Wittenberg. Refuse to answer. 

The Chairman. Are you refusing to answer the question ? 

Mr. Lamont. I refuse to answer on the grounds stated, objecting to 
the committee's jurisdiction. 

The Chairman. Did you ever under instructions from the Com- 
munist Party or instructions from a known Communist work toward 
the penetration of any organizations ? 

(Mr. Lamont confers with Mr. Wittenberg.) 

Mr. Lamont. Mr. Chairman, I object to any question which implies 
any control of me by the Communist Party, and I would decline to 
answer the question on the statement submitted, on the grounds of my 
statement earlier submitted. 

The Chairman. Your objections are noted and they are overruled, 
and you are ordered to answer. 

Mr. Lamont. I decline so. 

The Chairman. Did you ever engage in activities on behalf of or 
for the Communist Party or under the instructions of any individual 
known to you to be a member of the Communist Party ? 



8 COMMUNIST INFILTRATION IN THE ARMY 

Mr. Lamont. I object to the implications of that outrageous ques- 
tion, too, and decline to answer because — on the grounds of the state- 
ment submitted. 

The Chairman. Just so the record is clear, you are declining on no 
grounds other than the grounds 

Mr. Lamont. Included in this 

The Chairman. Raised in your statement. 

Mr. Lamont. Prior statement. That is it. 

The Chairman. So the record will be complete, will you hand that 
statement to the reporter so he will have that and it can be marked for 
identification. 

Mr. Lamont. I am also objecting, as I said, to the form of the 
question which I already mentioned. 

The Chairman. That will be marked "Exhibit 1." 

(The statement of Mr. Lamont above referred to was marked 
"Exhibit 1" for identification.) 

The Chairman. And have the record show the only grounds for 
the refusal on the part of the witness are the grounds referred to in 
exhibit 1 ; that the witness has said he is not relying upon the fifth 
amendment. 

Mr. Lamont 

Mr. Wittenberg. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Senator, please. I think 
he did raise another ground. He objected to the form of the ques- 
tion and its implications. It was not solely the grounds referred to 
in exhibit No. 1, his statement. 

The Chairman. His objection is overruled, and again 

Mr. Wittenberg. But, sir, you were dictating to the stenographer 
the reason for the refusal of the witness, and he should have the full 
record. 

The Chairman. You may show whatever you like in the record. 

Mr. Wittenberg. May I ask something as a courtesy? Since we 
have already made a number of answers referring to the same objec- 
tion, would you instruct the stenographer wherever that objection 
was made to refer to "exhibit 1." 

The Chairman. Very good idea. The reporter is so instructed. 

Mr. Lamont, it appears from the sworn testimony that the United 
States Government purchased some of your works. That is the testi- 
mony at this point. One of the works purchased, which is apparently 
not technically your work but one in which you took part, is a book by 
a Mr. Simmons. 

Did you know that Mr. Simmons was a member of the Communist 
Party at the time you contributed the chapter to this book? 

Mr. Lamont. The question was that Mr. Simmons was — was the 
editor of the book ? As editor of the book, as I recall it 

Mr. Wittenberg. May I, sir — — 

The Chairman. The book is entitled "U. S. S. R., A Concise Hand- 
book," edited by Ernest J. Simmons. That is Ernest Joseph Sim- 
mons. Does that answer your question ? 

Mr. Lamont. I decline to answer, Mr. Chairman, on the grounds of 
exhibit 1 and on the further ground that the book speaks for itself. 

The Chairman. The question was, Did you know that Simmons was 
a Communist at the time 

Mr. Lamont. I decline to 



The Chairman. At the time you contributed to the book ? 



COMMUNIST INFILTRATION IN THE ARMY 9 

Mr. Lamont. I decline. 

The Chairman. You think the book speaks for itself whether he was 

a Communist? 

Mr. Wittexberg. Decline to answer. 

The Chairman. This might be the first time today that I would 
agree with you. I think it does speak for itself. He uses you and 
other men named as Communists almost exclusively. 

Is it your opinion that this publication shows he is a Communist? 

Mr. Wittenberg. Answer you will object to any statements that 

The Chairman. I will not hear from counsel. 

Mr. Wittenberg. May I consult with my client ? 

The Chairman. You may, yes. 

(Mr. Lamont confers with Mr. Wittenberg.) 

Mr. Lamont. I object, Mr. Chairman, to any statements by this 
committee or its chairman insinuating that I am a Communist, member 
of the Communist Party. I have already denied that in my opening 
statement on the jurisdiction of the committee. 

The Chairman. May I say, Mr. Lamont, that as a courtesy to every- 
one, we inform him whether or not there is sworn testimony that he is a 
Communist. It is a courtesy we extend to every witness. I am stating 
for your own benefit, for your own protection, that we have this sworn 
testimony that you have been an active member of the Communist 
Party. Now, if you don't want us to give that information, you can 
disregard it. 

Have you ever been solicited to join the Communist Party? 

Mr. Lamont. I decline to answer that on the same grounds stated 
in exhibit 1. 

The Chairman. You are ordered to answer. 

Mr. Lamont. I decline very respectfully, Mr. Chairman. 

The Chairman. Have you ever attended Communist Party 
meetings ? 

Mr. Lamont. I decline to answer on the same grounds stated in 
exhibit 1. 

The Chairman. At the time you wrote the article, rather, the chap- 
ter, in the Simmons book, which was purchased by the United States 
Government, at the time you wrote the book entitled "The Peoples of 
the Soviet Union," which was also purchased by the United States 
Government, were you advising with, consulting with, or instructed by 
any individuals known by you to be members of the Communist Party ? 

Mr. Lamont. I object to that question and decline to answer it, 
calling your attention, Mr. Chairman, to the first paragraph of the 
book which explains the circumstances under which I wrote it. 

The Chairman. You are ordered to answer. 

Mr. Wittenberg. Decline to answer on the grounds of exhibit 1. 

Mr. Lamont. I decline to do so on the grounds in the statement 
submitted, exhibit 1. 

The Chairman. You can make a very good test case, Mr. Lamont. 

Mr. Lamont. I hope so. 

The Chairman. Did you in 1941 sign a statement addressed to the 
President of the United States defending the Communist Party ? 

Mr. Wittenberg. Not unless it is shown to you for identification. 

The Chairman. To refresh your recollection, may I say the Daily 
Worker, on March 5, 1941, page 2, carries an account of such a state- 
ment by you — signed by you. 



10 COMMUNIST INFILTRATION IN THE ARMY 

The question is, Did you sign such a statement? 

Mr. Lamont. Mr. Chairman, I would have to see some — see the state- 
ment. I can't — that was how many years ago ? A long time ago. I 
don't even know what is was about from what you say. 

The Chairman. Is it your testimony that you do not remember 
having signed a statement addressed to the President of the United 
States defending the Communist Party ? 

Mr. Wittenberg. At this time you have no present recollection 
unless you can refresh 

(Mr. Lamont confers with Mr. Wittenberg.) 

Mr. Lamont. Mr. Chairman, I have no present recollection of sign- 
ing such a statement, unless you can refresh my memory somehow or 
I can read such a statement; 1941 ? 

I just can't recall all those details without checking in some manner. 

The Chairman. Let's skip 11 years and come up to 1952. 

Did you sign an appeal to President Truman requesting amnesty 
for leaders of the Communist Party who were convicted under the 
Smith Act? 

(Mr. Lamont confers with Mr. Wittenberg.) 

Mr. Lamont. Can't — could I see the — could I see the — — 

The Chairman. Could you see what? 

Mr. Lamont. Could I see the statement so I could identify it ? 

The Chairman. I don't know. If you want to search for it you 
will find the Daily Worker, December 10, 1952, apparently carries 
an account of it, page 4. I don't have a copy of your statement, Mr. 
Lamont. You asked 

(Mr. Lamont confers with Mr. Wittenberg.) 

The Chairman. If I had a copy of your statement, you certainly 
could see it. I do not have a copy before me. My question is, Do you 
recall having signed such an appeal to President Truman? 

Mr. Lamont. May I consult with my attorney? 

The Chairman. That is last year. Late last year. December of 
last year. 

(Mr. Lamont confers with Mr. Wittenberg.) 

Mr. Wittenberg. May I have a consultation ? I think he ought to 
answer it. 

(Mr. Lamont confers with Mr. Wittenberg.) 

Mr. Lamont. Mr. Chairman, on that question it is probable in my 
mind that I signed some such statement, but before giving an absolute 
yes or no answer on it, I simply have to verify the statement as printed 
some place. 

The Chairman. Do I understand you will check and tell the com- 
mittee whether or not you signed such a statement ? 

Mr. Lamont. Yes. I am glad to do that. 

The Chairman. O. K. You will be ordered to do that. 

Mr. Wittenberg. Mr. Senator, may I interrupt ? 

The Chairman. Yes. 

Mr. Wittenberg. Do you refer specifically to the Daily Worker, 
which we may not be able to get the files of, or any other newspaper 
which carried such appeals? 

The Chairman. I am not referring to a newspaper account. I 
am referring to the signed appeal. The question is, Did you sign 
an appeal to President Truman in 1952 requesting amnesty on behalf 



COMMUNIST INFILTRATION EST THE ARMY 11 

of the leaders of the Communist Party convicted under the Smith 
Act? 

I understand the witness says he will search his records and tell us 
whether or not he can find such a statement. 

Mr. Wittenberg. No, sir. I am sorry, I am not arguing with you, 
but I think he had an impression you were referring to a specific 
report of that in the Daily "Worker on a certain date. 

The Chairman". I am not asking about the Daily Worker report. 
He is to refresh his recollection, and he can do it by reading any paper, 
the Daily Worker or any other paper. 

Mr. Wittenberg. It was in the New York Times, I think, if it 
was any place. 

The Chairman. I think if he needs to refresh his recollection, he 
has a perfect right to do that. 

Mr. Lamont. I am not sure where that statement appeared pub- 
licly, but I believe that I signed some statement advocating amnesty 
for the Communist leaders convicted under the Smith Act. Was that 
it? 

The Chairman. Yes. 

Mr. Lamont. Believing as I do that the Smith Act is unconstitu- 
tional and that 

The Chairman. I am not asking for reasons. I want to know 
whether you signed it or not. 

Mr. Lamont. Yes, yes. 

The Chairman. Did you write an article attacking the conviction 
of the 11 Communists in a letter to the New York Times? This is in 
1951. 

Mr. Lamont. Have you got the date ? 

The Chairman. The information I have here, and this may not be 
completely accurate, is that the Daily Worker of July 6, 1952, on page 
2, carried an account of such a letter, such an attack. 

Mr. Lamont. I thought you said it was the Times in 1951 ; June 1951. 

The Chairman. Let me — we don't want to confuse you — me ask 
the question. 

The question was, Did you write a letter or article or column at- 
tacking the Supreme Court for having upheld the conviction of the 
11 Communists either — this is either in a letter to the New York Time? 
or an article to the Times ? 

You asked me, as I understood, to refresh your recollection as to the 
date. I do not have the date from the New York Times. I have what 
here purports to be an account from the Daily Worker of July 6, 1951 
on page 2. 

Does that refresh your recollection so you can answer that question ? 

Mr. Lamont. Well, Mr. Chairman, at some date — I cannot give the 
date, exact date, out of the back of my mind because frankly I don't 
remember it and you can't provide me with it. But I did, as I recall 
it, write a letter to the New York Times criticizing the Supreme Court 
decision convicting the 11 Communist defendants and citing the posi- 
tion of the American Civil Liberties Union to support my own 
position. 

The Chairman. Did you consider the Daily Compass as a Com- 
munist publication? 

Mr. Wittenberg. Decline to answer that. 



12 COMMUNIST INFILTRATION IN THE ARMY 

Mr. Lamont. Oh, I decline to answer that, Mr. Chairman, on the 
grounds already stated in exhibit 1. 

The Chairman. Did you do any work for the Daily Compass? 

(Mr. Lamont confers with Mr. Wittenberg.) 

Mr. Lamont. Well, I think it is an improper question, Mr. Chair- 
man, delving into my journalistic activities. And yet I — to avoid 
further controversy here, since there is already so much, it is true I 
wrote some articles for the Daily Compass from time to time. 

The Chairman. Did you consider the Daily Compass a Communist 
paper while you were writing for it? 

Mr. Lamont. I already stated that I decline to answer that par- 
ticular question. 

The Chairman. We will reframe the question, thou. 

Mr. Wittenberg. On the grounds stated. 

The Chairman. Did you work for the Daily Compass, write for the 
Daily Compass — strike that. 

I will ask a preliminary question to the one — 

At the time you were writing for the Daily Compass, were you also 
writing any articles or documents which were being purchased or used 
by the United States Government or any branch of it ? 

(Mr. Lamont confers with Mr. Wittenberg.) 

Mr. Lamont. I object to that on the matter of the form of the ques- 
tion, Mr. Chairman, and also on the grounds stated in my opening, in 
exhibit 1. 

The Chairman. Did you consider the Daily Worker — not the Daily 
Worker but the Daily Compass — to be a — I believe you refused to 
answer the question but so the record is clear — 

Did you consider the Daily Compass to be a Communist publication 
at the time you were writing for it ? 

Mr. Lamont. I already declined to answer that, Mr. Chairman. 

The Chairman. You already 

Mr. Lamont. On the grounds stated. 

Mr. Wittenbfrg. In exhibit 1. 

The Chairman. Exhibit 1. 

Mr. Lamont. In exhibit 1, that is right. 

The Chairman. You are ordered to answer. I assume you still 
decline. 

Mr. Lamont. We have already gone over that, it seems to me. 

The Chairman. I am making the record here. You are ordered 
to answer, and I assume you still decline. 

You may not understand 

Mr. Lamont. I 

The Chairman. Why I always order you to answer. I think you 
are entitled to know why we go through what may seem to you like a 
waste of time. 

I understand I must order you to answer in case the — and get your 
refusal to that order — in case the committee decides to take contempt 
action against you. 

And for that reason we go through this procedure which may seem 
a bit lengthy to you. 

Did you ever do any work for the Daily Worker? 

(Mr. Lamont confers with Mr. Wittenberg.) 

Mr. Lamont. Mr. Chairman, work — what do you mean? Could I 
ask you what you mean, "Work for the Daily Worker" ? 



COMMUNIST INFILTRATION IN THE ARMY 13 

The Chairman. What do you understand by the word "worked"? 

Mr. Wittenberg. Don't answer that. 

Mr. Lamont. I am trying to get an elucidation of that particular 
question. 

The Chairman. If you don't understand, we will reframe it. Did 
you ever write for the Daily Worker? 

Let's make it simple. Did you ever receive money from the Daily 
Worker ? 

Mr. Lamont. Not to my knowledge, Mr. Chairman. 

The Chairman. Did you ever do any writing for the Daily Worker ? 

(Mr. Lamont confers with Mr. Wittenberg.) 

Mr. Lamont. There I certainly am very doubtful of that. I have 
written for so many publications, and once in a while a publication 
will reprint something of mine without ever even notifying me of it. 
I am very doubtful of the question, but I would — I would have to do 
a research job to be sure of the answer on that. 

The Chairman. In other words, your answer is that as of this 
moment you do not ever recall having written for the Daily Worker 
but you are not sure ; it will take further study before you could give 
us a specific, positive answer? 

Mr. Lamont. Yes ; that is it. 

The Chairman. The Chair will order you to make that study and 
furnish the answer the next time you appear before the committee. 

Mr. Wittenberg. Mr. Chairman, may I ask you, it is common 
knowledge that the Daily Worker was published for many years. To 
do a job of studying that — I don't know but constitutionally, sir, 
wouldn't you regard that as cruel and inhuman punishment to make 
a man read the files of the Daily Worker from beginning to end? 
Don't you think he is entitled to have some date, some article, instead 
of saying, "Will you read the Daily Worker from beginning to end 
to find out?" 

The Chairman. I don't think it is necessary to run through it or 
read it from beginning to end. I think he will be able to find out 
from the staff of the Daily Worker. I assume they keep a file. 

Mr. Wittenberg. Sir, again, may I say, their files, like any other 
newspaper's files, or rather their employees change from year to year. 
They have no record. I will say there are articles that both you and 
I have written, and if you ask me where I have written it, or where 
it appeared, I would have to say I can't say whether or not it has 
appeared or how many times or where. To search through the files 
or the papers — that is cruel. 

The Chairman. I may say that you make a good point when you 
say he should not be required to read every issue of the Daily Worker 
over the last 10 years. I think that might be an unreasonable demand. 

Wouldn't you think so, Frank ? 

Let me refresh your recollection. You can make a note of these 
dates. This will serve the purpose and save the difficulty of reading 
the Daily Worker. 

We have information — this isn't under oath so it could be in error — 
probably merely some information we have — in June 1935, starting 
away back in June of 1935 on page 

I beg your pardon. This is Soviet Russia Today, page 25. 

38794—53 3 



14 COMMUNIST INFILTRATION IN THE ARMY 

Mr. Lamont. Did you mean Soviet Russia Today or the Daily 
Worker? 

The Chairman. Just a second. The Daily Worker, January 29, 
1938. 

Mr. Lamont. January 28, 1938? 

The Chairman. Yes, on page 8. Understand, I have no way of 
knowing whether it is your own statement or whether it is merely an 
account of something you did which they carried. I will ask you to 
check it. 

February 2, 1938, page 2. 

March 7, 1938, page 1. This apparently shows a photo of you in 
Russia. It discusses a broadcast which you made over Moscow's short- 
wave radio station. 

The next one, the Daily Worker for May 31, 1938 — let me ask you 
this question if I may break into this, Mr. Lamont. 

Did you make a speech over the Moscow shortwave radio station 
condemning Governor Dewey for an attack on the Moscow purge 
trials? 

(Mr. Lamont confers with Mr. Wittenberg.) 

Mr. Lamont. I believe I made a — I did broadcast in 1938, as you 
state, over some radio station in Moscow, but I don't recall frankly 
whether I mentioned Mr. Dewey or not or what the exact subject or 
what — or indeed everything I covered in said speech. 

Again, I have to check. 

The Chairman. Under whose auspices did you speak ? 

Mr. Lamont. I couldn't possibly recall that offhand, Mr. Chairman. 

The Chairman. Did you speak from Moscow? 

Mr. Lamont. I already stated I did ; yes. 

The Chairman. From Moscow, did you speak in Russian or 
English? 

Mr. Lamont. Well, since I don't know the Russian language, I 
suppose I must have broadcast in English. 

The Chairman. (Speaks in Russian.) 

Mr. Wittenberg. Niet. I will speak for him, since he doesn't 
know. I know "Niet" and "Da." 

The Chairman. How long a trip did you make to Russia ? 

(Mr. Lamont confers with Mr. Wittenberg.) 

Mr. Lamont. I think, Mr. Chairman, that this is an improper ques- 
tion, probing into my personal travels and so I again refuse to answer 
on the grounds of exhibit 1. 

The Chairman. You will, again, be ordered to answer. 

Mr. Lamont. I again decline. 

The Chairman. Just so you can't at any future time in any legal 
action, Mr. Lamont, claim ignorance of the purpose of this inquiry 
today, I think I have told you before, but I will repeat it, we are in- 
vestigating the use of Communist propaganda, the works of Com- 
munist authors used by our Army to indoctrinate and teach our troops. 
We are calling individuals before us who have been named as Com- 
munists, who have been identified as very active in the Communist 
movement. We are asking them questions about their activities. 

One of the purposes, you see, of questioning you today is to find out 
whether you were under Communist Party discipline, whether you 
were instructed by known Communists, whether you were aided by 



COMMUNIST INFILTRATION IN THE ARMY 15 

Communists in writing the material which our Army has purchased 
and used. 

When we ask you whether or not you have spent time in Moscow, 
in Russia, the subsequent questions would deal with whether or not 
this material was written while you were there ; was it under the in- 
structions from the Communist government? 

We intend to inquire into all of your activities having to do with 
material which you sold to the United States Government which has 
been used by our military forces. 

I know you know that, but I want the record absolutely clear so 
that at some future time before a court, you can't say you were de- 
ceived before this committee. 

Mr. Wittenberg. May I consult with my client? 

The Chairman. You may consult with your client. 

(Mr. Lamont confers with Mr. Wittenberg.) 

The Chairman. Have the record also show an additional reason 
for having Mr. Lamont here is to have him identify whether or not 
other individuals who wrote for our military or whose works were 
used by the military were or were not Communists. 

Mr. Lamont. If I may comment on your 

The Chairman. You may comment at as great length as you care 
to answer. 

Mr. Lamont. The exposition just given as to the purpose of this 
inquiry, I feel goes far afield. I have already stated I am not a mem- 
ber and never have been a member of the Communist Party. 

That implies I have never been under so-called discipline of the 
Communist Party and that your inquiries into so-called Communist 
Party activities of mine are therefore totally irrelevant to this inquiry 
about books used by the Army. 

I had no knowledge they were using my books. Lots of scholars and 
college teachers quote my books and I don't have any knowledge of it. 
So I feel I here am being dragged into a fight between you and the 
United States Army, and I really am an innocent bystander, being hit 
over the head for no good reason. 

The Chairman. Did you know Harriet L. Moore ? 

Mr. Lamont. Again I must decline to answer on the grounds stated 
in exhibit 1. 

The Chairman. Did you collaborate with Harriet L. Moore in her 
writing of the chapter which was reproduced in the book entitled 
"U. S. S. R., a Concise Handbook" by — edited by Mr. Ernest J. 
Simmons ? 

Mr. Lamont. Again I 

Mr. Wittenberg. You ought to look at the book. How do you 
know ? May we see the book, sir ? 

The Chairman. Yes. 

Mr. Wittenberg. Thank you, sir. 

(Mr. Lamont confers with Mr. Wittenberg.) 

The Chairman. Have the record show also — this is for Mr. 
Lamont's benefit — that Mr. O'Connor appeared before the committee 
several months ago and raised the question of the jurisdiction of the 
committee after the 3 Democratic members had decided to absent them- 
selves from the committee. 

The subcommittee unanimously voted contempt. The full commit- 
tee voted contempt. The Senate as a body unanimously voted con- 



16 COMMUNIST INFILTRATION IN THE ARMY 

tempt, and Mr. O'Connor's — the grounds for refusing to answer were 
the same as Mr. Lamont's. 

, I merely put this into the record now to notify Mr. Lamont that the 
Senate as a whole has passed on this question before, and I think you 
should know that. 

Mr. Lamont. Mr. Chairman, in— — 

The Chairman. I am not arguing the point. 

Mr. Wittenberg. Don't 

The Chairman. Just notifying you. Just for your information. I 
feel Ave owe that notice to any witness who appears and also, so that 
at some future action, you cannot maintain that the committee kept 
you in the dark or deceived you. 

Mr. Lamont. On this question of collaborating, Mr. Chairman, I 
certainly do not recall or remember collaborating on such an article. 
On this article by Harriet Moore. 

The Chairman. Did you know Harriet Moore was a Communist? 

Mr. Lamont. I decline to answer that. 

The Chairman. On what ground? 

Mr. Lamont. On the ground of exhibit 1. 

The Chairman. Could I have that again, Mr. Counsel ? 

Mr. Wittenberg. Yes. I was just looking at some of the people who 
contributed here. I know some of those. 

The Chairman. Did you know whether Mr. Vladimir Kazekavich, 
who also wrote a chapter in this book which was used by the United 
States Government — whether he was a Communist ? 

Mr. Lamont. I decline to answer that, too, Mr. Chairman, on the 
grounds of exhibit 1. 

The Chairman. You are ordered to answer. 

Mr. Lamont. I refuse to answer. 

The Chairman. I believe I overlooked ordering you to answer on 
the question of Harriet Moore, so I will restate the question and 
order you to answer. 

Did you know that Harriet Moore was a Communist? 

Mr. Lamont. I already refused to answer that, Mr. Chairman. 

The Chairman. Have the record show that the witness is ordered to 
answer and still refused. 

Did you know whether Frederick L. Schuman, whose works also 
have been used by the Government, by our United States Army, was a 
Communist ? 

Mr. Lamont. I also decline to answer that on the same grounds. 

The Chairman. Exhibit 1? 

Mr. Lamont. Of exhibit 1; yes. 

The Chairman. You are ordered to answer. 

Mr. Lamont. I decline. 

(Mr. Lamont confers with Mr. Wittenberg.) 

The Chairman. Did you know that John N. Hazard 

Mr. Wittenberg. Pardon me. He has a question with regard to 
Schuman. 

(Mr. Lamont confers with Mr. Wittenberg.) 

Mr. Lamont. As I said, I decline to answer that. 

Well, the question was about whom now ? 

The Chairman. Frederick L. Schuman. 

Mr. Lamont. I decline ,to answer that question, Mr. Chairman. 



COMMUNIST INFILTRATION IN THE ARMY 17 

The Chairman. Did you know that John N. Hazard, who also wrote 
material which is used by the United States, purchased and used by 
the United States Government, was a member of the Communist 
conspiracy ? 

(Mr. Lamont confers with Mr. Wittenberg.) 

Mr. Lamont. I object to the form of the question, Mr. Chairman, 
and the word "conspiracy." 

I don't know what the dickens that means. 

The Chairman. You don't? You don't know what the question 
means? 

Mr. Lamont. I would hesitate to, without a dictionary and a few 
Senators present, to even define the word "conspiracy" or what is 
meant by it in that question, but 

The Chairman. You mean? 

Mr. Lamont. In any case, I refuse to answer the question on the 
grounds of exhibit 1. 

The Chairman. If you refuse on the ground you do not understand 
the question, we will try and help you to understand it. If you are 
refusing on the grounds of exhibit 1, we will merely note that. 

Mr. Lamont. I stand on exhibit 1. The other was just obiter 
dicta. 

The Chairman. You are ordered to answer. 

Mr. Lamont. At least I talk Latin. 

The Chairman. You are ordered to answer. 

Mr. Lamont. No. I decline to do that. 

The Chairman. Do you feel that the Communist Party is dedicated 
to the overthrow of this Government by force and violence ? 

Mr. Lamont. I also decline to answer that on the grounds stated in 
exhibit 1. 

The Chairman. Did you know that Sergie Kournakoff, who pro- 
duced work which is used by our military, was a member of the Com- 
munist Party? 

Mr. Lamont. I decline to answer that 

The Chairman. Exhibit 1? 

Mr. Lamont. Too, on the ground of exhibit 1. 

The Chairman. You are ordered to answer. 

You will still refuse, I assume. 

You are ordered to answer. 

Mr. Lamont. Yes. Excuse me ; yes, yes. 

The Chairman. Did you know that Henry Sigerist, who also pro- 
duced written material which was used by the military, was a member 
of the Communist Party? 

Mr. Lamont. I decline to answer that on the same grounds of 
exhibit 1. 

The Chairman. Have you ever been at a meeting where there was 
discussed the espionage activities of members of the Communist 
Party? 

Mr. Lamont. I also decline to answer that on the grounds of 
exhibit 1. 

The Chairman. Do you know any member of the Communist Party 
who to your knowledge engaged in either espionage or sabotage? 

(Mr. Lamont confers with Mr. Wittenberg.) 

The Chairman. What is your answer to that question, Mr. Lamont? 



18 COMMUNIST INFILTRATION IN THE ARMY 

Mr. Lamont. Mr. Chairman, this question again I consider im- 
proper. It implies a great deal of knowledge on the part of the 
witness, and I must decline to answer on the grounds of exhibit 1. 
The Chairman. Do you — did you ever attend a Communist meet- 
ing at which any member of the Communist Party, that is, someone 
known to you as a member of the Communist Party, advocated the 
overthrow of this Government by force and violence ? 
Mr. Wittenberg. You can answer. 

Mr. Lamont. On the same grounds, Mr. Chairman, I must decline 
to answer. That is exhibit 1. 
The Chairman. You are ordered to answer. 
Mr. Lamont. I decline again. 

The Chairman. Frank, I don't think I have anything further at 
this time. We have a vast amount of Communist activities here, but 

why waste further time unless there is 

What is that? 

Yes ; I will want him back Monday. 

We will want you back Monday, Mr. Lamont, in Washington, at 10 
o'clock in the morning in room 318 of the Senate Office Building. 
You are ordered to be present at that time. 
Mr. Wittenberg. May I have one moment, Mr. Senator? 
(Mr. Lamont confers with Mr. Wittenberg.) 

Mr. Wittenberg. It isn't possible, in view of the fact you are going 
to want some material looked up — 

The real reason for my asking is that I have got a case out West 
I am about to leave for, and I could possibly by breaking one of my 
legs — I don't suppose a crutch matters — get back Sunday night, but 
I do hate to break the leg, if I could avoid it. If it is possible to put 
it later in the week, could you do it ? It is purely a question of — as 
I say, I am leaving tonight, if they have got that plane for me. The 

worst about it — I understand that Tuesday 

The Chairman. I will be absent starting Tuesday for some time. 
Mr. Wittenberg. I tell you what, Senator, it would be a great con- 
venience to me if you just said Monday afternoon instead of Monday 
morning. I am going to a small town, and making connections is bad- 
The Chairman. Make it 1 o'clock Monday afternoon. 

Mr. Wittenberg. Monday afternoon, 1 o'clock. Yes, sir. Room 

The Chairman. I think it is 318. 
Mr. Carr. Check. 

Mr. Wittenberg. Senate Office Building. 
The Chairman. Yes. If it is not there, you can easily check. 
Mr. Wittenberg. But in the Senate Office Building. 
The Chairman. Yes. 

Incidentally, 1 o'clock means 1 o'clock, not 1 : 30, because I am 
going to be tied up all afternoon. 
Mr. Wittenberg. I understand. 

May I ask whether it is the common practice to provide us with a 
copy of the minutes. 

The Chairman. In executive sessions — if it is a public session, you 
have a perfect right to obtain a copy. In executive sessions we do 
not give out any copies of the record. However, we provide that if — 
we do provide if you want to come down or if your client comes down, 
you can go over the record to make any corrections in what you think 
are stenographic errors, or if the 



COMMUNIST INFILTRATION IN THE ARMY 19 

Mr. Wittenberg. We can't order a copy at our expense for that 
purpose? 

The Chairman. No. I tell you why you can't, because it is strictly 
executive 

Mr. Wittenberg. I understand. If it is a rule- 



The Chairman. The ruling is we don't hand any copies out to any- 
body at all. 

Mr. Wittenberg. May we have the stenographer instructed to in- 
form us when a copy is available for our examination ? 

The Chairman. Frank, will you do that? 

Mr. Wittenberg. Thank you. 

The Chairman. Mr. Keporter, when do you think the record will 
be ready? 

(Discussion off the record.) 

The Chairman. I may say, Mr. Counsel, ordinarily we do not give 
the names of any witnesses who are called in executive session. How- 
ever, it has been general knowledge that Mr. Lamont would be called. 
His name has been used in connection with this, so that the press will 
know Mr. Lamont is here. 

He, of course, has a perfect right to tell them anything he cares 
to. There is no prohibition against his telling the press what he thinks 
happened in this room, if he wants to. That is not a violation of the 
executive session. 

The reason why he is entitled to do that is because I give the press 
a resume of what went on, and he, having been identified, has a perfect 
right to say whatever he wants to the press. He can tell them anything 
and describe anything that went on in this room. 

Mr. Lamont. One question. You were going to give me a copy 
of this very interesting report so I could try and identify 

Mr. Wittenberg. Like every literary man, he wants every book he 
can get for nothing. 

The Chairman. We will have to send you a copy. This is the only 
copy we have. We will send you a copy of that. Some of the material 
we asked you to produce, you won't be able to produce by Monday, but 
we will ask anyhow. 

The session is adjourned. 

Before we go, Mr. Budenz, you have listened to the testimony. Can 
you identify this as the man whom you discussed in your testimony 
before ? 

Mr. Budenz. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. Good. 

(Witness excused.) 

The Chairman. Mr. Cohn, who is your first witness ? 

Mr. Cohn. Mr. Igor Bogolepov. 

The Chairman. Mr. Bogolepov, you have been sworn and you are 
reminded that your oath is still in effect. I would like to make it very 
clear that Mr. Bogolepov is not here at his own request, and he was 
very reluctant to appear and he asked us not to call him. One of the 
reasons he gave was that he appeared before the McCarran com- 
mittee some time ago and he immediately lost his job with the Gov- 
ernment, and he is not too enthusiastic about appearing before com- 
mittees. He is here only under subpena. 

Is that right? 



20 COMMUNIST INFILTRATION EST THE ARMY 

TESTIMONY OF IGOR BOGOLEPOV 

Mr. Bogolepov. That is right. 

The Chairman. Mr. Cohn, do you want to proceed ? 

Mr. Cohn. Could we have your full name, and would you spell it 
for us, please ? 

Mr. Bogolepov. My first name is "Igor," and my last name is 
"Bogolepov." That is B-o-g-o-l-e-p-o-v. 

Mr. Cohn. Now, Mr. Bogolepov, would you give us very briefly a 
background of your career, and tell us where you were born and what 
you did before you came to this country ? 

Mr. Bogolepov. I was born in Siberia in 1904. In 1923, I entered 
the Foreign Service of the Soviet Union, and I was with this service 
until 1942. 

The Chairman. You were in the Russian Foreign Service until 
1942? 

Mr. Bogolepov. I was with the Soviet Foreign Service, sir. I occu- 
pied various positions in Moscow and abroad. For example, I par- 
ticipated in almost all international conferences held in Geneva under 
the League of Nations. I also took part in many international nego- 
tiations which were carried out with the foreign governments, includ- 
ing the Nazi-Soviet Pact of 1939, and all negotiations with repre- 
sentatives of President Roosevelt, Harry Hopkins, in the summer of 
1941. 

The Chairman. I am sorry, I did not quite get that. 

Mr. Bogolepov. And also I participated in negotiations with repre- 
sentatives of President Roosevelt, Harry Hopkins, in the summer of 
1941. 

Then I was sent to France, and it was during World War II, and 
together with other officers and generals of the Red army, I deserted 
over the f rontlines to Germany in order to try to use the German war 
machine for the destruction of the Communist regime in my native 
country. I failed to do this because the Germans were fighting, not 
against communism, but merely against the Russian nation. 

They put me for a while in the Gestapo jail; and after this, after 
my release with the help of some German diplomats from the German 
Foreign Office, I worked on a Bavarian farm in Germany until the 
American troops arrived in the spring of 1945. 

The Chairman. You are under sentence of death at this time, are 
you not, from the present Russian regime? 

Mr. Bogolepov. That is right ; yes. 

Unfortunately, because of the policy of the administration of those 
days, of the American Government, in accordance with the Yalta 
agreement to deliver all anti-Russian Communists to the Soviet police, 
I was obliged to go into hiding, and I was living illegally in the 
American Zone of Germany for about 3 years. 

The Chairman. Let me see if I understood you correctly. You say 
because of the agreement at Yalta to deliver all of the Russian anti- 
Communists to the Soviet secret police, because of that you had to go 
into hiding ? 

Mr. Bogolepov. That is right, sir. 

In 1947, I came out of my hideout because of change in American 
policy, and I talked to the representative of the United States Army 
in Germany, who I am and where I stand, and I was employed by the 



COMMUNIST INFILTRATION IN THE ARMY 21 

United States Army in Germany as an instructor with the Army 
intelligence school in Oberammergau. 

Then I was transferred, or I had better say employed by the General 
Staff school in Eegensberg, Germany. There I was active from 1948 
to 1952 as instructor and lecturer on the Soviet affairs. 

In 1952, 1 was brought by the Army to this country under subpena 
of the United States Senate, and there testified before the Senate 
Internal Security Committee in the case of the Institute of Pacific 
Relations. 

After this time, I mean since last year, I am living in this country on 
temporary basis. 

Mr. Cohn. Now, Mr. Bogolepov, I am going to hand to you at this 
time an Army document entitled "Psychological and Cultural Traits 
of Soviet Siberia," which has been identified and placed in evidence 
before the committee as exhibit No. 2, and which is a document that 
was distributed by the Army in the Far East Command and in other 
areas. 

(Exhibit No. 2 will be found in the appendix on p. 44.) 

The Chairman. We should make it very clear for the record that 
this has not been distributed since the beginning of 1953. 

Mr. Cohn. It has not been distributed certainly since Secretary 
Stevens took office. 

The Chairman. I think we should also make it clear that Secretary 
Stevens has informed us that where we turn up any Communists whose 
writings are being used, he will not under any circumstances use their 
writings to indoctrinate our men. 

Mr. Cohn. Now, Mr. Bogolepov, have you made a careful study 
and examination of this Army document? 

Mr. Bogolepov. Yes, sir, Mr. Cohn ; I did. 

Mr. Cohn. And in making that examination, did you draw on your 
background as one who was born in Siberia, the area dealt with in 
this pamphlet, and one who has had an intimate knowledge of condi- 
tions dealt with in this document, firsthand ? 

Mr. Bogolepov. Yes, sir; I did. 

Mr. Cohn. I would like you to tell the committee whether or not 
you have reached any conclusion as to whether this document is an 
accurate document, and whether it truly gives a true picture of the 
conditions in Soviet Siberia which it seeks to do, and which it is 
supposed to seek to do ? 

Mr. Bogolepov. Unfortunately, I have to give a negative answer 
to your question, Mr. Cohn. In my opinion, to put it briefly and 
bluntly, this is not information about Soviet Siberia, but this is mis- 
information about Soviet Siberia, and the question which I would 
like to put, myself, before the committee is whether it is deliberative 
misinformation, or just out of sheer ignorance. 

Mr. Cohn. Does any of this misinformation favor the Communist 
viewpoint, and does any of it color the facts to fit in with the claims 
of the Communists? 

Mr. Bogolepov. Every misinformation of the free world certainly 
serves the Communist cause, but speaking about this particular docu- 
ment, I would say openly that there is a lot of deliberate misinforma- 
tion which serves the interests of the Communist cause. 

The Chairman. May I interrupt you there ? 

38794—53 4 



22 COMMUNIST INFILTRATION IN THE ARMY 

Mr. Bogolepov, as I read this document, I find some material is 
critical of the Communist regime, and my estimate would be about 
95 percent very favorable and about 5 percent critical. Whenever we 
find a document of this kind, I find that those who are responsible for 
its production, and sometimes those who feel that for some unknown 
reason they must protect the whole team that are responsible, cite the 5 
percent which slaps communism on the wrist. 

You know a lot about Soviet propaganda, and would you tell us 
whether or not tins is the modus operandi, this is the method of oper- 
ating, and would you say it is the normal propaganda method to put 
something in a document critical of the Soviet Union so that the part 
that praises it highly would be more effective ? 

Mr. Bogolepov. I have to make it clear that the Soviet Foreign 
Office, with which I have been cooperating almost 20 years, is less 
a diplomatic institution, and merely it is an institution for political 
intelligence. The main and chief task of the Soviet Foreign Office is 
planting in the western mind false ideas about the Soviet Union and 
its policies. 

In the first period, in the early thirties and twenties, it was possible 
to get out with pro-Soviet propaganda in the open, to simply praise 
openly and overtly that there is a paradise, a Socialist paradise, and 
it lives much better than the United States and every other country 
of the Western World. But when the conditions changed, the Com- 
munist propaganda was obliged also to go underground, so to say, and 
starting with the middle of the thirties, and especially before World 
War II, the instructions were multiplying in their secret files of the 
Soviet Foreign Office to the effect that the Soviet intelligence, and 
police intelligence, and Soviet diplomacy and Soviet propaganda 
abroad, had to use the device of a covert propaganda in order to make 
the people in the West believe that everything is all right with the 
Soviet Union; it wasn't possible any more to say this in black and 
white, but it was always directed to make it appear as objective as 
possible. 

Therefore, the Soviet ambassadors abroad, which were and evidently 
are carrying out the instruction of the fellow travelers in every 
western country, were instructed, first by Litvinov and second by 
Molotov when he became Foreign Commissar just before the war, to 
use the merit of half truth and full lies. Evidently your question 
pointed to this. 

The Chairman. You worked in the Foreign Office, and you knew 
Litvinov and Molotov personally ? 

Mr. Bogolepov. That is right. 

The Chairman". Let me ask you this : Would you think that there 
is any answer other than either stupidity or a deliberate attempt to 
use Soviet propaganda, or any other reason for putting out a document 
such as this ? 

Mr. Bogolepov. I would answer your question this way, by very 
emphatic assertion that in part it was a deliberate intention, due to 
the instruction which the Soviet Government in Moscow gave to the 
Communist Party in the world, and through the Communist Party to 
the fellow travelers from which ranks so-called Russian experts in this 
country are composed of. 



COMMUNIST INFILTRATION IN THE ARMY 23 

The Chairman. Mr. Bogolepov, did you know a Mr. Ernest J. 
Simmons, either personally or through the Soviet diplomatic chan- 
nels? 

Mr. Bogolepov. I saw Mr. Simmons once in Moscow in the office 
of the Press Division of the Soviet Foreign Office. The Press Divi- 
sion of the Kussian Foreign Office was an agency which since long 
ago was used for indoctrination of the foreign fellow travelers, giving 
them instruction, what kind of stuff they have to put out back home 
into the hands of their fellow countrymen. 

The Chairman. I have a book here, Mr. Bogolepov, entitled 
"U. S. S. R., a Concise Handbook," edited by Ernest J. Simmons, and 
this has been used by the military up through 1952, and the new 
Secretary of the Army said he would immediately check to see 
whether it is still being used. We have not received that word yet. 

Do you know whether or not this man Simmons was receiving in- 
structions directly from the Soviet Foreign Office at the time this book 
was being edited by him ? 

Mr. Bogolepov. Well, Senator, in a way, frankly speaking, there 
was instructions, but you must understand that the Communist propa- 
gandists were clever enough to talk to the foreign guests whom they 
wanted to indoctrinate in a way which will not make them just subor- 
dinate his instructions. It was done this way : That Professor Sim- 
mons and a lot of other American and Western European professors, 
lawyers, and even politicians, who came to Moscow to do so-called 
research work — which in a Communist country is a work of indoc- 
trination into Communist and Marxist spirit — they were simply ask- 
ing the questions, and they received the answers which they put in 
their notebooks, which certainly were 101 percent Communist 
propaganda. 

The Chairman. Is it your testimony that Simmons came to the 
Foreign Office and received instructions from the Soviet Foreign Office, 
either through London or Moscow ? 

Mr. Bogolepov. Yes; at least in one instance which is personally 
known to me. 

The Chairman. I interrupted you when you were starting to ana- 
lyze this document, Psychological and Cultural Traits of Soviet Si- 
beria, and will you proceed with your analysis of that document? 

Mr. Bogolepov. As I just mentioned, this document is extremely 
dangerous, because it is confusing, and it is confusing because it gives 
some things which are true, and these true things are used as a cover 
for making use of a lot of things which are not true. That is the 
method of the Communist propagandizes, which, as I testified before, 
was commanded by the Soviet propaganda to use in the Western 
World. It was to make this Communist, pro-Soviet propaganda look 
as objective and neutral as possible. 

In the 75 pages of this document, you see the same method applied 
in various forms. You might see here the very true statements, for 
example, as to the absence of any hostility of the average Russian 
toward Americans. That is true. But this truth is used by the 
authors of this intelligence document to imply that the Russian people, 
having some positive traits like patriotism and benevolence, and so 
on, that the Russian people are devoted to their country, and they 
make the Russian soil and this mother Russia identical with the Soviet 
Union. And with this type of trick, they try to indoctrinate the 



24 COMMUNIST INFILTRATION IN THE ARMY 

United States Army officers in the spirit that the whole Russian people 
are pro-Communist, and in the case of war the American Army has 
to do just one thing; namely, to fight against the whole Russian nation. 

That is just to give you one illustration. 

I say that various methods are used in this pamphlet, in this paper, 
and I was extremely appalled, and I would say even frightened, when 
I discovered that some of the parts of the testimony of American 
intelligence, given to American intelligence officers, are just retelling, 
almost word for word, of the sayings of such Communist leaders as 
Stalin, Lenin, and other Communist documents. 

If you would permit me to give you just a few examples. Starting 
with the very first page of this intelligence document, we might find 
this statement, that "the harsh Soviet Government has liquidated or 
expelled potentially rebellious elements." I have before me the Rus- 
sian edition of the Stalin main book, The Problems of Leninism, and 
here the English version of the same book. We might find on page 
543 the words of Stalin, "The landlord class has already been elimi- 
nated. As for the other exploiting classes, they have shared the fate 
of the landlord class. The capitalist class has ceased to exist. The 
kulak class has ceased to exist. Thus all the exploiting classes have 
now been eliminated." 

That is the same idea of elimination of any opposition inside the 
Soviet Union toward the Communist regime. 

What is the aim, and what is the hidden aim behind such a state- 
ment, gentlemen? To me, it is quite obvious that the officers of the 
United States Army are indoctrinated to believe that in case of con- 
flict, they will have before them the whole Russian nation, and no 
opposition behind this wall of Communist supporters which might 
be used by American Intelligence for the aims of psychological war- 
fare, for getting the friends and allies behind the Communist lines. 
It is a very dangerous conception ; and this conception, unfortunately, 
you may find in most of the writings of the so-called experts on Rus- 
sian affairs. 

Now, on page 4 to 5 of the intelligence document you can find the 
ideological description of how wonderful the life is in the Soviet 
paradise. "The toiler was elevated to the highest level of respectabl- 
ism. It is possible for the outstanding worker to exceed the earning 
power. The farmer's status has also risen sharply, and he is also in 
good shape. The women are virtually on a par with men in all walks 
of life." And it goes on, et cetera, et cetera, and et cetera. 

In The Problems of Leninism, of Stalin, in his speech on the con- 
stitution of the Soviet Union, you might read, and I quote now "The 
Problems of Leninism," by Stalin, so you might compare them : 

"Things are different under the Soviet system. Here the working 
man is held in esteem. Here he works not for the exploiters, but for 
himself. If he works well, and gives society his best, he is a hero of 
labor, and is covered with glory." 

It is almost word-for-word retelling of the statement which we 
find in the intelligence document. 

The Chairman. Do I understand that it is your testimony that you 
find the same material in this Army intelligence document, practically 
word for word, that you find in the Soviet bible, if you can call it 
that, The Problems of Leninism ? 

Mr. Bogolepov. That is right. 



COMMUNIST INFILTRATION EST THE ARMY 25 

The Chairman. And it is your position that from your experience in 
the Soviet Union, this is not true, and this is merely Soviet propa- 
ganda ; is that correct ? 

Mr. Bogolepov. I would say, sir, that my English is not very broad, 
so the word "untrue" is too mild, and the strongest expression I could 
use, it is simply a pattern, 40 years after the existence of the Com- 
munist tyranny, that such words might be uttered in a top secret 
document for the information of American officers. That is, as a 
French diplomat of the last century said, "It is not a crime ; it is worse 
than a crime. It is a mistake." 

Mr. Jones. Are quotes put around any of those identical passages 
that you cited ? 

The Chairman. I do not think Mr. Bogolepov understands. Bob 
Jones is here representing Senator Potter. 

May I say to you, Bob, that there are no quotes any place in this 
document, and there is no way that anyone would know from reading it 
that Lenin is being quoted. 

Mr. Bogolepov. It is from Stalin's The Problems of Leninism, and 
on page 9 of the intelligence document, for example, you might find the 
statement of this type, that "Russia is now a regime of peoples." This 
is taken from this book, that is, the Communist bible, as the Senator 
said, The Short Story of the Soviet Communist Party in the Soviet 
Union, a Textbook for Every Communist in the Soviet Union, and also 
in the Western World. On page 6 of this book of lies and distortions 
I read : "Czarist Russia was known as a regime of peoples." It is 
almost an identical quotation. 

Mr. Cohn. Mr. Bogolepov, in this Army document, they do not 
point out that they are actually virtually quoting from this. 

Mr. Bogolepov. That is what I intended to say, and certainly in a 
document which treats of Soviet affairs, it would be more than natural 
to have the quotation from the Communist leaders, but an intelligent 
and objective research worker should mention where these quotations 
are taken from, and put them in quotation marks so that he would be 
on his guard that he has to do something with Communist propa- 
ganda ; but taking away the quotation any reference, they let speak 
the American Army Intelligence the same words as Lenin and Stalin 
are speaking. 

The Chairman. At this point, I would like to make the record very 
clear that there were some intelligent, loyal people in the Army who 
objected to this document, and we had testimony in executive session 
the other day that a Major Wilson — I think it was a Major Wilson — 
strongly objected to this, and pointed out this was Soviet propaganda, 
Communist propaganda, from beginning to end, and he pointed out 
the danger of using this to indoctrinate intelligence officers and others, 
and he pointed out that this was using verbatim the material from the 
works of Lenin and of Stalin and Karl Marx, and he objected so 
loudly that Army Intelligence finally was forced to call a board to pass 
upon this. And for some unknown reason, this board that was called 
upon to pass upon the question of whether this was Communist propa- 
ganda decided, according to testimony received in executive session 
the other day, that they would make no recommendation one way or the 
other, and they merely said that there were errors in the booklet, but 
they thought it should be used. 



26 COMMUNIST INFILTRATION IN THE ARMY 

I should point out it was a civilian who was selected to head this 
board, and that civilian also is holding a high position as of today 
over in the Pentagon. 

I merely want to make this clear so that it would not appear this 
committee is attributing this to all of the officers in the Army. 

Mr. Bogolepov. If I may make an observation to you, sir. 

The Chairman. Certainly. 

Mr. Bogolepov. I was very glad, and I would say in a way proud, 
because I belonged to the United States Army for several years, of 
the fact that some of the officers opposed the pro-Communist indoctri- 
nation, and especially that you mentioned the name of Major Wilson, 
for Major Wilson was one of my students in Regensberg. 

I wish to say, gentlemen, that what I was told before against this 
document released by Army intelligence has nothing to do with my 
opinion about the personnel of the American Army. I was working 
for the Army for 5 years. My impression, and the impression of a 
Russian of the former college of the Red army who came to this coun- 
try in order to help the American people to fight for their freedom and 
to fight for our Russian freedom, is that the majority of the officers 
and men I met during my stay with the Army were anti-Communist, 
and they were extremely patriotic elements, and I am glad and proud 
to testify that during my work in Regensberg Military School, I met 
a lot of officers of the United States Army who were strongly objecting 
to the Russian propaganda as Major Wilson did 

The Chairman. We have much more we want to ask you. How- 
ever, we have a number of other witnesses, and the chief counsel, Mr. 
Cohn here, has suggested that we ask you to step down, and call Mr. 
Budenz now. 

Mr. Cohn. There is one thing I wanted to cover. 

Mr. Bogolepov, with reference to the bibliography attached to this 
Army report, the place where they list the sources from which they 
have drawn — are you familiar with that ? 

Mr. Bogolepov. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Cohn. I see one of the sources is a book by Bernard Pares, 
entitled "A History of Russia." Are you familiar with that book by 
Sir Bernard Pares? 

Mr. Bogolepov. Yes; I am. 

Mr. Cohn. While you were an official of the Soviet Government, 
did you ever hear anything about this man, Sir Bernard Pares ? 

Mr. Bogolepov. Yes, sir; I did. 

Mr. Cohn. Would you tell us what you heard about Bernard Pares ? 

Mr. Bogolepov. I am sorry, I can't quote the date, because I saw 
during my service in the Foreign Office thousands of fellow travelers, 
and so I couldn't remember any name of the western fellow travelers 
who came to us, but I do remember that sometime in the thirties, per- 
haps in the middle of the thirties, there came a letter from the Soviet 
Ambassador in London, telling that one of the most notorious British 
authorities on Russian and Soviet affairs, Sir Bernard Pares, appeared 
at the Embassy and asked the assistance of the Soviet Ambassador in 
creating, if I make no mistake, of the last chapter of his History of 
Russia, dealing with the Communist period, on the Communist period 
of Russian history. 



COMMUNIST INFILTRATION IN THE ARMY 27 

Certainly he received every assistance possible; and if you have 
before you his book, you would see that this book is written in the 
same way in which this intelligence document is written. I mean, it 
is a misintelligence way. They are saying some nice and true things 
about the Russian people as different from the Communist regime, and 
then they switch to the laudatory that the Russians and Communists 
are all alike, and their life is very happy, and so ; in other words, it 
is a typical pro-Communist propaganda, put into the hands of the 
western scholars in order to confuse the western public opinion 
and to confuse the real issue which stands before the free world in 
its fight against communism. 

Mr. Cohn. Now, this Pares book is cited as one of the works used 
by the Army in preparing the document concerning which you have 
testified. Did you ever see this Pares book used in any other con- 
nection when you were with the Army ? 

Mr. Bogolepov. Not only did I see it, but I got in some trouble in 
connection with the book, so I will remember it for the rest of my life. 
This book was used by the Army school in Oberammergau as a basic 
textbook for indoctrination of the Army personnel. 

Mr. Cohn. This very book, The History of Russia, by Pares, whose 
connection with the Soviet Foreign Office you have described, was 
used by the Army as a basic textbook ? 

Mr. Bogolepov. That is right, Mr. Cohn. And being an instructor 
in the Oberammergau School, I raised some objections against the 
use of this book, and indicated to my superiors some passages which 
are completely untrue and confusing and distorting the truth. I was 
told first to mind my own business ; and when I became perhaps a little 
bit persistent, they had thrown me away from the American Army 
for a while. 

Mr. Cohn. Mr. Chairman, we have some excerpts from this Pares 
book which we have here, and excerpts very fully indicating Commu- 
nist propaganda, and I would ask that those be prepared in proper 
form and that the book be attached to the record as an exhibit and 
that some of those excerpts be received in evidence as soon as they 
are prepared. 

The Chairman. The book will be received as an exhibit, and any 
excerpts which you care to put in the record, Mr. Cohn, will be in- 
serted in the record at this point as exhibit No. 3. 

(The excerpts referred to were marked as "Exhibit No. 3" and will 
be found in the appendix on p. 77.) 

Mr. Cohn. We had discussed Ernest J. Simmons with you before, 
Mr. Bogolepov, and it is a fact that his book, U. S. S. R., a Concise 
Handbook, which we have here was also a source which the Army states 
it used in this document. Is that right? 

Mr. Bogolepov. That is right. 

Mr. Cohn. And another one is Peoples of the Soviet Union, by 
Corliss Lamont? 

Mr. Bogolepov. That is right. 

Mr. Cohn. By the way, was this Simmons book ever used by the 
Army outside of this source ? 

Mr. Bogolepov. Yes, it was. I saw it, along with Pares' book, 
always in the hands of intelligence in Europe. 

Mr. Cohn. May we have the Simmons book received ? 

The Chairman. We will receive it. 



28 COMMUNIST INFILTRATION IN THE ARMY 

(The book referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 4 (a) " and may be 
found in the files of the subcommittee; excerpts from this book were 
marked "Exhibit No. 4 (b)" and will be found in the appendix on 
p. 78.) 

Mr. Cohn. Thank you very much. We appreciate your coming 
down. 

The Chairman. Would you stay in the room ? We may want to call 
you later on in the day, if you will stay, please. 

Mr. Cohn. Professor Budenz. 

The Chairman. You are reminded that you have been sworn, and 
your oath is still in effect. 

TESTIMONY OF LOUIS FRANCIS BUDENZ, ASSISTANT PROFESSOR 
OF ECONOMICS AT FORDHAM UNIVERSITY, NEW YORK, N. Y. 

Mr. Cohn. Very briefly, Professor, because I know you testified be- 
fore this committee before in open session a number of months ago, 
you are an assistant professor of economics at Fordham University, 
and you teach at Seton Hall ; is that correct ? 

Mr. Budenz. That is correct. 

Mr. Cohn. Professor Budenz, you were from 1935 to 1945 a member 
of the Communist Party ? 

Mr. Budenz. That is correct. 

Mr. Cohn. And when you left the party in 1945, you occupied the 
important position of managing editor of the official party publica- 
tion, the Daily Worker, is that correct? 

Mr. Budenz. That is correct. 

Mr. Cohn. And you served on various committees and commissions 
and held various high offices in the Communist Party during the 
period of your membership ; is that right ? 

Mr. Budenz. That is right. 

Mr. Cohn. You have heard the testimony here this morning, and 
we are particularly concerned with this document used by the Army, 
and the bibliography information, which states it used as a source, 
first of all, a book by Corliss Lamont entitled "Peoples of the Soviet 
Union." I will ask you whether or not, while you were in the Com- 
munist Party, you knew Corliss Lamont ? 

Mr. Budenz. Yes, sir, I did. 

Mr. Cohn. Will you tell us briefly what you knew about Corliss 
Lamont in the Communist Party ? 

Mr. Budenz. I knew about Corliss Lamont before I joined the 
Communist Party. I knew him personally before I joined the Com- 
munist Party, but after I joined the Communist Party I not only 
knew him but knew of him, and I met him on several occasions in 
connection with pro-Communist activities, and he was referred to by 
Earl Browder as one of the four prides of the party, which included 
Rockwell Kent, Dr. Harry F. Ward, and the late Dr. Walter Rauten- 
strauch, because of their always being ready to cooperate with any 
Communist front or Communist cause. That was in a national com- 
mittee meeting in the early forties. 

I knew also that Corliss Lamont was, when I was a member of the 
Communist Party, a member of the Communist Party. 

Mr. Cohn. Did you know Mr. Lamont personally % 

Mr. Budenz. Yes, sir. 



COMMUNIST INFILTRATION LN THE ARMY 29 

Mr. Cohn. I will next, Mr. Budenz, if I may, call to your attention 
another work which was used by the Army as a source for this one 
document, and also used itself as a basic text by the Army. That is 
A History of Russia, by Bernard Pares. While you were a functionary 
of the Communist Party, did Sir Bernard Pares come to your atten- 
tion? 

Mr. Budenz. Yes, sir, on a number of occasions as, by the way, did 
Mr. Lamont, because Mr. Lamont has a record of being on a great 
number of Communist fronts which, if we could analyze them, would 
show his devotion to Soviet Russia, including the Friends of Soviet 
Russia, which was an international conspiratorial organization created 
by Moscow, and in the case of the Finnish War, this organization in 
Finland was a great contribution to Moscow's attempt to subdue the 
Finnish people. This was an international organization, and it is 
now known here as the National Council of American-Soviet 
Frienship. 

In regard to Sir Bernard Pares, I did not know him in the same way. 
He was not here in the United States except on 1 or 2 occasions, if I 
remember correctly, but he was called repeatedly to my attention by 
officials of the Communist Party because of the necessity that I know 
his attitude toward the party and his standing with the party as a 
propaganda figure. 

From these official reports and specifically from V. J. Jerome and 
Jack Stachel 

Mr. Cohn. Jack Stachel is one of the convicted first-string leaders, 
and V. J. Jerome one of the convicted second-string leaders ? 

Mr. Budenz. And Mr. Stachel had the obligation of advising me 
on the various personalities in the field of public activities who were 
friendly or hostile to the Communist Party. 

Mr. Cohn. That is something which, as editor of the Daily Worker, 
you had to know? 

Mr. Budenz. I had to supervise the other members of the staff on 
the basis of this knowledge, and I was advised on a number of occa- 
sions that Sir Bernard Pares was a secret member under discipline 
of the British Communist Party. 

Mr. Cohn. Now, Mr. Budenz, we have another book used as a source 
for this Army document, and listed in the bibliography. That is 
a book on the U. S. S. R., by Ernest J. Simmons, which is actually an 
anthology. 

This book, according to Mr. Bogolepov's testimony, was used also 
independently by the Army as a text. 

In this book there are selections from the writings of various au- 
thors. One of them is Corliss Lamont, and I would ask — you have 
already testified about Corliss Lamont. Another one, another author 
a selection from whom is used in this book, is Harriet L. Moore. I 
would like to ask you whether or not you know Harriet L. Moore? 

Mr. Budenz. I know Harriet Lucy Moore personally as closely 
cooperating with Corliss Lamont for' the Communist Party, and as 
having written for Soviet Russia Today, in which Mr. Lamont was 
very much interested, and also as being in the Institute of Pacific Rela- 
tions ; and in all of these actions I know her to be a Communist, because 
I have met her at national committee meetings of the Communist 
Party. That is, these enlarged national committee meetings. And 

38794—53- 5 



30 COMMUNIST INFILTRATION IN THE ARMY 

I have also met her on other occasions, once or twice at the Daily 
Worker, and always as a Communist. 

Mr. Cohn. Your testimony unequivocally is that Harriet Lucy 
Moore was known to you as a member of the Communist Party ? 

Mr. Budenz. Over and over again, she was known to me personally, 
face to face, as a member of the Communist Party. 

Mr. Cohn. Mr. Chairman, Harriet Moore has been subpenaed here, 
and I wonder if we should put her on to answer these statements right 
now. 

The Chairman. Professor Budenz, I am going to ask you to step 
down so that we may put Harriet Moore on the stand. 

Will you raise your right hand? In this matter now in hearing 
before the committee, do you solemnly swear you will tell the truth, 
the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God? 

Miss Moore. I do. 

TESTIMONY OF HARRIET L. MOORE (HARRIET MOORE GELFAN) 

OF NEW YORK CITY, N. Y. 

Mr. Cohn. May we get the name of counsel for Miss Moore ? 

Mr. Rein. David Rein, of Washington. 

Mr. Cohn. Mr. Rein, you have appeared as counsel before the com- 
mittee, and you are familiar with the rules. You represent Harriet 
Moore ? 

Mr. Rein. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Cohn. Could you state your full name? 

Miss Moore. I am Harriet Moore Gelfan. 

Mr. Cohn. Where do you reside? 

Miss Moore. Bronxville, N. Y. 

Mr. Cohn. And your 

The Chairman. May I interrupt ? I think the record should show 
that Harriet Moore was before the committee last Tuesday, and asked 
for additional time in which to obtain counsel, and that time was 
granted to her. 

I am not sure if we explained to you or not, Miss Moore, at that 
time that you may consult with counsel any time you care to, and if a 
matter comes up of sufficient importance to require a conference with 
him in a private room, such a room will be provided. 

Mr. Cohn. Is your maiden name Harriet Moore? 

Miss Moore. That is right. 

Mr. Cohn. Under that name, Harriet L. Moore — that is you, is 
that correct ? 

Miss Moore. That is right. 

Mr. Cohn. Under that name, we have here a selection from your 
writings which was used in the anthology used by the Army as a 
bibliography for one document, and used in and of itself in Army 
courses, and I want to ask you this: Mrs. Gelfan, have you ever been 
a member of the Communist Party? 

Miss Moore. I decline to answer that question under my privilege 
under the fifth amendment. 

M r. Cohn. Are you the author of any books ? 

Miss Moore. Yes. 

Mr. Cohn. At the time you wrote the books of which you are author, 
were you a member of the Communist Party ? 



COMMUNIST INFILTRATION IN THE ARMY 31 

Miss Moore. I decline to answer that question. 

Mr. Cohn. At the time you wrote this  

The Chairman. You decline to answer on the ground that a truth- 
ful answer might tend to incriminate you ? 

Miss Moore. Under the fifth amendment ; yes, sir. 

The Chairman. You are declining on the ground a truthful answer 
might tend to incriminate you ? Are you declining to answer on the 
ground that a truthful answer might tend to incriminate you? 

Miss Moore. I don't understand the question, sir. 

The Chairman It is very simple. Are you declining to answer 
because you feel that a truthful answer might tend to incriminate you ? 

Miss Moore. Well, I have taken an oath to tell the truth, and 
naturally, I mean a truthful answer. 

The Chairman. You feel that a truthful answer might tend to 
incriminate you ? 

Mr. Cohn. You may consult with counsel. 

Miss Moore. It seems to me, as I understand my privilege under the 
fifth amendment, it is to decline to answer on the grounds it might 
tend to incriminate me. 

The Chairman. Miss Moore, the Chair takes the position that you 
are not entitled to the fifth amendment privilege unless you feel that 
the truth will tend to incriminate you, and you are not entitled to 
take advantage of the fifth amendment if you feel that perjury would 
incriminate you; and so, I am merely asking you the very simple 
question: Do you feel a truthful answer would tend to incriminate 
you? And if the answer is "Yes," you are entitled to decline; and 
if the answer is "No," you will be ordered to answer the question. 

Miss Moore. I suppose that that is what I mean. I am telling the 
truth to you, sir. Any answer I gave would be the truth ; and conse- 
quently, I am declining to answer. 

The Chairman. It is a very simple question. Before I can decide 
whether you are entitled to the privilege of the fifth amendment, I 
must ask you the question: Do you think a truthful answer to this 
question might tend to incriminate you? The answer is "Yes" or 
"No." 

Miss Moore. Yes, but I don't like the implication that I might lie 
to you, sir. 

The Chairman. The answer is "Yes," a truthful answer might tend 
to incriminate you? 

Miss Moore. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Cohn. At the time you wrote this selection here 

The Chairman. It is Mrs. Gelfan now, as I understand it. 

Is it correct that anyone under Communist Party discipline is bound 
to lie when they are ordered to lie by the Communist Party? 

Miss Moore. I don't know, sir. 

The Chairman. You do not know. 

Mr. Jones. Mrs. Gelfan, are you a citizen of the United States? 

Miss Moore. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Jones. Would you, as a citizen, oppose any person or any group 
who would advocate the violent overthrow of this Government? 

Miss Moore. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Jones. Does not the Communist Party advocate the violent 
overthrow of this Government? 

Miss Moore. I don't know, sir. 



32 COMMUNIST INFILTRATION IN THE ARMY 

The Chairman. Let us pursue that a little further. Have you 
attended Communist Party meetings where the Communist doctrine 
was expounded, the doctrine that it would be necessary to destroy this 
Government by force and violence if a Communist system could not 
be imposed upon us in any other fashion ? 

Miss Moore. I decline to answer that question. 

The Chairman. You decline to answer that question ? 

Miss Moore. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. Have you attended Communist Party meetings 
where espionage against the United States was discussed? 

Miss Moore. I decline to answer all questions regarding attending 
Communist Party meetings. 

The Chairman. You will have to decline each one individually, and 
you are not entitled to any blanket refusal. 

Miss Moore. All right. 

The Chairman. You refuse to answer on the ground of self- 
incrimination ? 

Miss Moore. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. Are you a member of the Communist Party as of 
this moment? 

Miss Moore. I decline to answer. 

The Chairman. On the ground of self-incrimination? 

Miss Moore. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. Do you know American citizens who, as of today, 
are engaged in espionage against the United States Government? 

Miss Moore. Not to my knowledge. 

The Chairman. Not today? 

Miss Moore. No. 

The Chairman. Do you know anyone who has been engaged in 
espionage, or sabotage, or has advocated espionage or sabotage against 
the United States Government? 

Miss Moore. Not as far as I know. 

The Chairman. Not as far as you know. 

You have not attended Communist meetings where the speaker has 
advocated the necessity of espionage and sabotage? 

Miss Moore. I decline to answer, sir. 

The Chairman. Do you not know individuals who went to the Lenin 
School of Espionage and Sabotage in Moscow and came back and 
reported at Communist meetings as the teachings 

Miss Moore. What is the question, specifically? 

The Chairman. Do you know individuals who went to the Moscow 
School of Espionage and Sabotage and came back and reported at 
Communist meetings as to the teachings of that school? 

Miss Moore. Not as far as I know, I don't know such individuals. 

The Chairman. How long have you been in Russia ? 

Miss Moore. At the most, I was in Russia, at the most, 8 or 9 
months, on 3 different visits. 

The Chairman. Did you attend a school in Moscow ? 

Miss Moore. No, sir. 

The Chairman. Did you attend lectures? 

Miss Moore. I attended a lecture by an American. 

The Chairman. Who was the American? 

Miss Moore. Owen Lattimore. 



COMMUNIST INFILTRATION IN THE ARMY 33 

The Chairman. And 3 T ou attended a lecture by Owen Lattimore in 
Moscow ? 

Miss Moore. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. At that time, were you a member of the Communist 
Party? 

Miss Moore. I decline to answer. 

The Chairman. Was Owen Lattimore a member of the Communist 
Party? 

Miss Moore. Not as far as I knew. 

The Chairman. You did not know ? 

Miss Moore. No. 

The Chairman. Were the others who attended the lecture members 
of the Communist Party? 

Miss Moore. There were lots of people at the lecture, and I didn't 
know most of them, hardly any of them. 

The Chairman. Did you do any lecturing yourself ? 

Miss Moore. No, sir. 

The Chairman. Do you know a Louis Buclenz ? 

Miss Moore. I decline to answer. 

The Chairman. How many American Communists did you meet 
when you were in Moscow ? 

Miss Moore. I don't recall, and I am quite sure I didn't meet any- 
body in Moscow that I knew to be a Communist. 

The Chairman. When you wrote the material which was used by 
the Army for indoctrination purposes, used up through 1952, at that 
time were you under Communist Party discipline ? 

Miss Moore. I was not writing for the Army, sir. 

The Chairman. I don't care who you were writing for, you wrote 
an article used by the Army. 

Miss Moore. I wrote an article on the physical geography of Russia. 

The Chairman. The question is : At the time you wrote this article, 
which was later picked up and used by the Army, were you at that 
time under Communist Party discipline ? 

Miss Moore. I decline to answer. 

Mr. Cohn. I have no further questions. 

The Chairman. You may step down. 

Miss Moore, I do not think that we will need you again. However, 
you will not be released from the subpena. In case we need you, we 
will contact your attorney and let him know. You may leave now, 
unless you are called upon. 

Mr. Eein. I believe Mrs. Gelfan will be given adequate notice. 

The Chairman. We will give you all of the notice you think is 
necessary. 

Mr. Cohn. Could we have Mr. Budenz back for a moment, please? 

TESTIMONY OF LOUIS FRANCIS BUDENZ— Resumed 

Mr. Cohn. Mr. Budenz, was this lady who just testified the Harriet 
Moore you knew as a member of the Communist Party ? 

Mr. Budenz. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Cohn. I have asked you about Corliss Lamont, one of whose 
selections is used in the Simmons book, and I have asked you about 
Harriet Moore, and we have had her as a witness. 



34 COMMUNIST INFILTRATION IN THE ARMY 

I see a selection from a work by Sir Bernard Pares is also used, 
and you have testified about him. 

Just let me go over 1 or 2 more. There is a selection by a man named 
Sergli Kounakoff in this book used by the Army. Did you know 
Sergli Kournakoff? 

Mr. Budenz. I knew Sergli Kournakoff quite well, and he was 
an espionage agent for the Soviet Government, and a courier between 
the Soviet consulate and the Communist Party leadership here, to 
my personal knowledge, and he wrote under the name of Veteran 
Commander for the Daily Worker, and he was also connected with 
the Kussian Communist paper in New York, and was all of the time 
I knew him, we will say, from 1940 to 1945, a very active undercover 
member of the Communist Party. 

Mr. Cohn. Did you say he wrote for the Daily Worker ? 

Mr. Budenz. Yes ; under the name of Veteran Commander. 

Mr. Cohn. The Veteran Commander? 

Mr. Budenz. That is right. 

The Chairman. Mr. Budenz, in executive testimony you identified 
a sizable number of those who contributed to this book by Simmons 
as being very important members of the Communist Party. I am 
not going to ask you to name them in public today, because I feel 
if you did they would be entitled to appear before the committee imme- 
diately in answer, if they care to. It so happens that I am going to 
be absent for a while, so I am going to merely hand you this book 
and ask you to tell us how many of the individuals who have con- 
tributed chapters to this book that was used by the Army, how many 
of them were known to you, either personally or in your position as 
a high functionary in the Communist Party, as being either active 
Communists or espionage agents. I don't want you to name them, just 
tell us how many of the authors. 

Mr. Budenz. 'At least 11, and then there is 1 gentleman who I know 
was reported to be ready and willing to do anything the party asked 
him to do, but was never specifically mentioned as a Communist to 
me. So that makes 11 plus 1 additional. 

Mr. Cohn. Professor Budenz, you have gone into detail in this 
for us in executive session so we can contact these people and arrange 
at a subsequent date to have a hearing at which they will be available 
to answer anything. 

Mr. Budenz. That is correct, with the exception of one other name 
about which I was not asked for in executive session. 

Mr. Cohn. All right. We will go into that later. Could I have the 
book back? 

The Chairman. May I ask, Boy, if it is correct that the Secretary 
of the Army, Mr. Stevens, said he would check and let us know whether 
this book is still being used? We do know it was used up through 
1952; is that correct? 

Mr. Cohn. That is correct, Mr. Chairman. 

The Chairman. Mr. Budenz, may I ask you a question? We find 
these books written by individuals, some of whom were notorious 
Communists, well known as such. We find the indoctrination for the 
intelligence units of the Army gleaned from the works of Commu- 
nists. With your long experience in the Communist Party, would 
you say this is the result of stupidity, or do you think that some place 



COMMUNIST INFILTRATION IN THE ARMY 35 

you had the guiding hand of a Communist dictating what type of 
literature should be used to indoctrinate our military ? 

Mr. Budenz. Well, I can't conceive of stupidity that intense, and 
it is my very humble opinion, though of course it is only based upon 
opinion, that this document, and the reference to this material, is 
the work of a concealed Communist. I can't understand any explana- 
tion that could be given of it that would be logical. For example, m 
this book by Simmons, it isn't only the authors, but a great part of the 
bibliography suggested is written by Communists. There are one 
or two exceptions, but in the main the whole bibliography in the Sim- 
mons book is by Communists. 

The Chairman. I assume you and I would agree, Professor Budenz, 
that if the material were identified in this document as the writings 
of Lenin, of Stalin, if the material were identified as having come from 
what Mr. Bogolepov calls the Bible of the Communist Party, that 
that would rob it of its danger. In other words, if an intelligence 
officer knew he was reading Joe Stalin, Lenin, it might be an excel- 
lent idea. But what makes this dangerous is the fact that this is put 
out under the approval of the Army, with no quotes, no way that an 
Army officer would know that this was the identical language of Lenin 
and Stalin. 

Mr. Budenz. That is correct. As a matter of fact, we should use 
the writings of Stalin, Lenin, and others, because we can expose their 
plans and purposes, and they have stated it very succinctly for us, 
Stalin in The Foundations of Leninism and The Problems of Lenin- 
ism, that their basic intention is to overthrow the Government of the 
United States by force and violence. It is written in there in so many 
words. We should use that. But when we use their fictions and 
myths that they create in order to justify their so-called experiment 
and do not state that these came from these Stalinist-Leninist sources, 
then, of course we are doing just the opposite. We are pawning off 
Communist propaganda under the guise of its being an objective study. 
There are 2 or 3 things in there, Senator, if I might remark, that are 
very interesting. 

The Chairman. Would you like a copy of this ? 

Mr. Budenz. This document on the whole is an appeal for com- 
munism under the guise of criticizing and analyzing it. This is not 
only shown by the authorities which it uses, but also by the fact that 
it gives all the arguments for the Communist system. For example — 
I wish we had more time, but I will go through this very hurriedly. 

It has the absurd idea that neurosis has been destroyed among the 
Russian people. That occupies off and on a number of pages in this 
book. This is the Communist fiction gotten out to show that they 
are developing the perfect man. You will find almost the same words 
in the next to the last chapter of Foster's Twilight of World Capital- 
ism, "The Advent of Socialist Man," where without any proof whatso- 
ever he begins to show that the perfect man is being developed in 
Soviet Russia, and that one of the marks is the lack of neurosis. This 
thing goes on for pages to show that there is practically no neurosis 
there. 

Then, another thing, the basis of all of this is the fact that this 
study shows the Russian people accept communism, that it is part of 
their being, so to speak, because they have the group incentive or col- 
lectivist idea. That goes on for page after page likewise. 



36 COMMUNIST INFILTRATION IN THE ARMY 

This even goes to the absurd point of saying that the Russian people 
are not so criminal as the individualistic people, such as the Germans, 
the Poles, and other nations who I think would be very appreciative 
here as Americans to know that they are peculiarly criminal — while 
this is what it says, it also says this is not a reflection on these people. 

And then it goes on that — by the way, all this fills in with the Com- 
munist picture that they are getting rid of criminality by communism. 
Then it accepts as its authorities the Japanese, allegedly thousands of 
Japanese expatriates, but we don't know who these people are. This 
is a supposedly composite document, and while it accepts what they 
say, apparently, I mean it says they are the people who say some of 
these things with a pro-Communist slant, it urges caution and rejects 
all the statements of anyone who has been a refugee from Soviet 
Russia. That is very significant. That immediately closes the eyes 
and ears of the Army, if it is accepted, to anyone who was escaping 
from this tyranny and could tell the truth about it. 

Further than "that, it presents the picture of security in Soviet 
Russia, as it is represented and appears in the works of Lenin and 
Stalin and even goes so far as to say that this security is exempli- 
fied by the fact that if you are sent to a slave-labor camp, your 
wife has the right to work and take care of your children during the 
time you are there. That is considered to be quite a fine example of 
security. As a matter of fact, the slave-labor system, if you analyze it 
here carefully, though it is criticized in part, is given as an example 
of security, which the Russian people enjoy under communism. As a 
matter of fact, we have no proof that there is any of this security. 
As a matter of fact, everything shows that we haven't any such proof. 
Why they didn't go to such authorities as David J. Dallin and his Real 
Soviet Russia and to many other works that analyze this problem 
thoroughly and in a scholarly manner is just beyond me. That is why 
I can't understand the stupidity, if it is so called. 

The Chairman. I believe Dallin is quoted as one of the sources, but 
reading the document I cannot find anything from Dallin's works in it. 

Mr. Budenz. The only thing is just toward the end, a few little sen- 
tences in regard to the fact that there is slave labor in Soviet Russia. 
In that respect also, this work confuses the whole question of the 
extensive slave labor in Soviet Russia by talking all the time about 
convicts and ex-convicts, and thereby throwing this mantle of being 
a convict over any one who objects to the Soviet regime. 

The Chairman. Could I ask you this, Professor 

Mr. Budenz. There is one other thing, Senator, if I may mention 
it, because I just don't want to seem to be doing this thing arbitrarily. 
That is, there are passages in here which are almost unbelievable, that 
is to say they tell all about this business of workers writing collective 
letters to Stalin, and showing their joy in being labor shock troops 
and all that sort of thing. Now, in that way, they hide the fact that 
Soviet Russia has built up state unionism. That is, this trade union- 
ism in Soviet Russia is merely a production machine, a slave-driving 
machine. We have been opposed in America, rightly, to company 
unionism. This is company unionism to an nth degree, and this is 
pictured as something which the workers accept. As a matter of fact, 
it says that there has been no sign that the Russian workers have ever 
tried to organize secretly. Of course, the penalty for organizing 



COMMUNIST INFILTRATION IN THE ARMY 37 

secretly, as we know from Louis Fischer's Thirteen Who Fled, and 
other documents, is being sent to slave-labor camps. Thus you see 
that while there is mention of the Soviet secret police and a few words 
about slave labor, when you analyze it, you find that slave labor is 
really accepted because it is also said in here that the slave laborers 
really show no objection to this. 

All along this indictment, if you can call it such, very softly phrased, 
is then offset by statements that explain it away and justify it. 

The Chairman. Just one final question. 

Mr. Cohn. I was going to point out, Mr. Chairman, we have to 
stop very close to 11 : 30, and there is one more witness we must hear 
from. 

The Chairman. Well, I think just one more question of the pro- 
fessor. 

Would you say that any military man or any one who read that 
document put out under the approval of our military, would get a 
completely false picture of communism ? 

Mr. Budenz. Yes, sir. He would get the picture that would be 
desired by the Communist conspiracy that he would get, which is one 
of utter hopelessness in opposing communism, because when any sug- 
gestion is made as to what are the vulnerable spots, immediately you 
find them offset by showing those vulnerable spots are not vulnerable, 
that they are really in accord with the mode of thinking and life of 
the Russian people. 

The Chairman. Would you say, Professor, that there are available 
to the Army outstanding, objective, truthful analyses of the Commu- 
nist system which could have been used ? 

Mr. Budenz. There is a whole library today, and it has even been 
incorporated on several occasions in the Congressional Record. It is 
a matter of public documentation. This bibliography contains not 
only books which explain the conspiracy critically and analytically 
here in the United States, but also within Soviet Russia itself. There 
is a great library today of that available. 

The Chairman. Would you say, Professor, that if the head of our 
intelligence believed that all of the facts in this document were true, 
that that would create a very dangerous situation insofar as our 
military is concerned? Do you follow my question? Let's assume 
that the head of Army intelligence were to come up here and say, 
"I believe all this material; it is not false, it is true," would you say 
that that would give an extremely dangerous picture ? 

Mr. Budenz. Well, of course I hesitate to pass upon a gentleman 
in that position, but since you put the question to me, I would say it 
would be very dangerous to the security of the United States. 

The Chairman. Just one other question, Professor ; I ask you this 
because of your long experience in Communist propaganda, your 
intricate knowledge of the Communist conspiracy, and of the great 
help you have given to the various intelligence agencies since then. 
Let us assume that you take a general, let us assume that he is a good 
field commander, and a nice fellow, but assume that he admits that 
he has never read a single work about communism. He does not 
recognize the names of well-known Communists. Assume that he 
comes up and testifies that he is willing to use the works of well-known 
Communists to indoctrinate the military. Would you say that might 
create a situation which is dangerous almost beyond words? 

38794—53 6 



38 COMMUNIST INFILTRATION IN THE ARMY 

Mr. Budenz. I would say that would be catastrophic if that should 
occur, because today we are combating communism. It is the great 
foe of the United States. It is determined to conquer the United 
States. It has written it down definitely and the documents can be 
found. And if it is not known how communism operates and what 
is its nature, by those who are vested with the responsibility of com- 
bating it, then of course America's security is in very grave danger 
indeed. 

The Chairman. Professor, we have many more questions we would 
like to ask you, about other books being used by the military. We 
will have further hearings on this. 

Mr. Cohn. Mr. Chairman, may we have this Lamont book, Peoples 
of the Soviet Union, as an exhibit to the hearing ? 

(The book, Peoples of the Soviet Union was marked as "Exhibit No. 
5," and may be found in the files of the subcommittee.) 

The Chairman. Yes. 

You may step down, Professor. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Cohn. Mr. Petrov. 

The Chairman. You are reminded that you have been sworn, and 
the oath is still in effect. 

TESTIMONY OP VLADIMIR PETROV, YALE UNIVERSITY, 

NEW HAVEN, CONN. 

Mr. Cohn. May we have your full name, please. 

Mr. Petrov. Vladimir Petrov. 

Mr. Cohn. Spell your last name. 

Mr. Petrov. P-e-t-r-o-v. 

Mr. Cohn. Are you a member of the faculty of Yale University SI 

Mr. Petrov. That is right. 

Mr. Cohn. Would you tell us very briefly about your background, 
Mr. Petrov? 

Mr. Petrov. I was born in Odessa, Eussia, 37 years ago. I finished 
the school there, then went to college in Moscow to study engineering. 
Later I went to Leningrad to continue my studies. In 1935, because 
of some frictions with the official government policy, I was arrested 
and sentenced to 6 years of imprisonment, which I served largely in 
northeastern Siberia. I may say also that one of the charges brought 
against me at that time was espionage in favor of the United States 
of America ; the reason being that I was exchanging stamps with one 
fellow traveler in San Francisco. 

I served my sentence, as I said, in Siberia, all 6 years ; was released 
early in 1941 ; came back to European Russia by the time the Germans 
were approaching the area, where I went. Soon after I found myself 
in the German occupied territory ; stayed there for another year and in 
the spring of 1944 I left Russia, departing from Odessa, across the 
Balkans, to Vienna. 

Shortly before the war ended I went to Italy, where I stayed for 2 
years before I got the chance to come over to this country. Since I 
came here, after a couple of months of working in a factory, I have 
been with the Yale University in New Haven, Conn. 

I wrote a couple of books published here 2 or 3 years ago, and some 
articles in national magazines. 



COMMUNIST INFILTRATION IN THE ARMY 39 

Mr. Cohn. Mr. Petrov, have you examined this Army document 
entitled "Psychological and Cultural Traits of Soviet Siberia"? 

Mr. Petrov. Yes. I had a rather doubtful pleasure in examining 
it. 

Mr. Cohn. And you examined that in light of your firsthand knowl- 
edge of conditions in Siberia gained from a 6-year period of incar- 
ceration there, and from other facts, is that correct ? 

Mr. Petrov. That is correct. But I want to add that I don't con- 
sider myself an overall expert on Russia. I believe, however, that so 
far as psychological trends of the Russian people are concerned, I 
know more about it than manv students of the subject in this country. 

Mr. Cohn. In other words, it so happens through your own experi- 
ence and studies you are peculiarly qualified concerning the particu- 
lar subject matter of this document, is that right? 

Mr. Petrov. I would like to think so, yes. 

Mr. Cohn. Mr. Petrov, would you tell the committee whether or 
not, as a result of your examination, your careful examination of this 
document, you have reached any conclusions as to whether or not it 
is an accurate document and accurately sets forth the facts concern- 
ing psychological and cultural traits of Soviet Siberia ? 

Mr. Petrov. This pamphlet, in my opinion, is extremely biased ; it 
is an unscientific paper, written for the purpose of promoting certain 
ideas that the author sets forth well in advance. The author's attitude 
is formulated by himself, and reads as follows. I quote him from 
page 20 : 

Most Americans are fortunate enough never to have knowingly had personal 
contact with the professional Communist. In the U. S. S. R. the Communist is a 
patriot, a civic booster, and frequently a war hero, doing his best to build up 
his country. In the United States the Communist is at best a fool, at the worst 
a traitor, whose primary aim is to destroy his country. Communists in the 
U. S. S. R. enjoy public admiration, while those in the United States are justly con- 
demned as actual or potential felons. 

I must add that nowhere in this paper does the author put in quota- 
tion marks any of the sources he lists in his bibliography, and the bib- 
liography as it was stated here before speaks well for itself in the 
sense that all the books more or less are slanted in favor of communism 
in Russia. 

Mr. Cohn. I want to ask you this: You said in your first sentence 
that you found this to be biased. Biased in whose favor ? 

Mr. Petrov. In favor of the Communist regime in the Soviet Union. 
The only exception was, as it was mentioned here, the book of Dallin, 
which was listed in bibliography but not used actually as a source. 

Mr. Cohn. In other words, the one anti- Communist book is not 
used actively as a source. 

Mr. Petrov. Yes. It suggests that it is a kind of a smoke screen 
only. The author, in my opinion, at least, is aware that he distorts 
and twists the facts about the Soviet Union, and he does what no real 
scientist would ever do: He tries to discredit in advance possible 
sources of information which he knows would contradict him. On 
page 47 he says : 

Extreme caution is required in accepting hearsay data. The opinion of 2 
million white Russian refugees and small numbers of deserters and escapees 
cannot be taken as representative of the 200 million who remain in the U. S. S. R. 



40 COMMUNIST INFILTRATION IN THE ARMY 

Well, small number is not quite so small. Besides those White Rus- 
sians, there are at least several hundred thousand of people like me, 
who left Russia during and after the last war. I must say also that 
some students of Soviet Russia in this country pretending to be ob- 
jective in their studies are, in fact, taking the position of neutrality 
toward communism, thus eliminating all elements of moral judg- 
ment. Anyone who says that communism is evil, they proclaim to 
be biased. In my opinion, a scientist who does not recognize this 
evil of communism is automatically in favor of it, and cannot claim 
to be objective at all. There cannot be any middle ground about 
communism, especially if we consider the present international situa- 
tion and the efforts we put in order to contain communism all over 
the world. I believe this pamphlet to be harmful not only because 
it contains misinformation about the Russians and the Communist 
regime and the Soviet Union, but also because it has been studied with 
reliance and without criticism by high officers of the American Army. 
A logical conclusion of an uninformed reader, after reading this paper, 
would be that the Russians are very happy under the Soviets and that 
in case of war it will be next to impossible for us to win it. 

Another dangerous conclusion would be that the whole idea of the 
psychological warfare against communism is nothing but a senseless 
nonsense. This attitude unfortunately is rather widespread these 
days. As to the author, I don't want to question his good intentions, 
but I am quite positive that they are of the kind that are used for 
paving the road to hell. 

The Chairman. Could I interrupt at this point. I would like to 
point out that while the cover sheet would indicate that a Colonel 
Bratton was responsible for this document, all the information which 
we have indicates that Bratton had nothing to do with the production 
of this document. The major, who is perhaps a colonel by now, I 
don't know, who was in charge, will be called before the committee, 
the major who was responsible for the production of this document. 
I think it is important to make it very, very clear that all the infor- 
mation we have indicates that Bratton merely as a matter of infor- 
mation, because of his particular position, signed the cover sheet. 
Pardon me for interrupting. I wanted to make that clear in the 
record. 

Mr. Petrov. Yes. I would like to ask your permission, Senator, to 
bring in a few direct quotations from this paper in order to make it 
clear what I meant. First of all I want to point out that this docu- 
ment was published in 1952, and not in 1945, when the Soviet Union 
and Communist Government of Russia were so favored by the public 
here; and 1952 was after 2 years of the Korean war. The author 
tries to prove that Communists are loved by the people of Russia. 
On page 6 he says, and I quote : 

It is important to note that the Communist Party membership permeates the 
whole fabric of Soviet society and does not function as an exclusive elite, super- 
imposed on the amorphous mass. The member, in relation to the nonmember, 
is more priest than ruler. If he loses the respect of those around him, he is liable 
to expulsion from the party. 

I can tell only that the idea of a Communist being a priest, or con- 
sidered to be a kind of a priest, in Russia, is only wishful thinking 
of the author. From all my experiences, I have never heard anything 



COMMUNIST INFILTRATION IN THE ARMY 41 

of that kind. And I spent, as I said, 30 years of my life in the Soviet 
Union. 

The author is very much preoccupied with what might happen to 
the Communists. On page 15 he says : 

Even an occupying power in the Soviet Union will have very little difficulty 
with the local population so long as it displays some tolerance and understand- 
ing for their institutions and folkways and confines its expressions of hostility 
to a socially remote Communist hierarchy since the people regularly accept 
local Communist Party members on a basis of friendly equality. 

And further, on the same page — 

It appears that the party member and Konsomolist type would be the most 
amenable to new political doctrines, and could most readily generate public 
interest and understanding on the ideas of political freedom and multiparty 
democracy. It must be remembered that the party member is merely a Russian 
who has mastered party jargon. He is not of the same breed as the handful 
of socially maladjusted pseudo intellectuals among native Americans who 
espouse communism in the United States. 

Well, this is what the Nazis thought when they came to Russia, 
and when every third member of the Party wanted to cooperate with 
them. They thought that the Communists were the best elements to 
take into their system, and with their help to rule the territories they 
occupied. The reaction of the people was strictly negative. Every- 
body said that, well, these Communists were ruling us before the 
Germans came, they are ruling us after the Germans came, so there 
isn't must difference between them anyway, and let's get rid of the 
Germans and this kind of Communist anyway. 

The Chairman. In other words, if I understand your testimony, it 
is your testimony from your experience in Russia, this advice that 
if we ever were to occupy, we should use the Communist leaders as our 
rulers in particular areas, you feel that is completely false and you 
think that the Germans made the mistake of accepting that advice 
when they tried to occupy Russia ? 

Mr. Petrov. Yes. And I believe that in case of war, and in case 
the American Army is in the Soviet territory, this is the best advice 
if we have in mind to alienate the population against ourselves. 

The Chairman. In other words, you think that if we follow the 
advice set forth in this document, the advice to use the Communist 
leaders in case we ever have war with Russia and occupy any portion 
of it, you say that would be the best way to alienate the people of 
Russia ? 

Mr. Petrov. Exactly. And as to the socially maladjusted individ- 
uals in the United States that the author mentions, I wouldn't argue 
with him here. It is a bit outside my line of experience. 

Here is one more example, page 49. He says : 

National leaders are widely respected and admired, but the prevailing public 
attitude is relatively free of emotion. Neither affection nor hostility is ex- 
pressed, but their sincerity and ability are generally unquestioned. 

Here I want to bring up that if, in the author's opinion nothing 
is expressed, how he would know that the national leaders are re- 
spected? It is pure guessing. And he goes on further: 

Those above 40 represent 25 percent of the population have remained convinced 
that communism is undesirable. They frequently state that life was easier and 
better under the Czars, and farmers still express disappointment about their 
limited rights on the land. Those below 40 are generally favorable and the 
enthusiasm mounts in inverse proportion to age, into the middle ranks of the 
Konsomols. 



42 COMMUNIST INFILTRATION IN THE ARMY 

The Communist Party is generally respected as the primary organization 
of the Government and a capable, hard-working party member often earns great 
admiration for his diligence and ability. He is usually on terms of friendly 
intimacy with nonmembers around him. 

Again, here is nothing but wishful thinking of the author. I want 
to point out that I myself was born 2 years before the revolution, and 
my parents did not belong to the former ruling class of Russia. I 
believe I know the state of mind of the younger generation. I say 
that this is nothing but wishful thinking of the author. It is an open 
secret in Russia that the idealists and sincere enthusiasts have long 
since disappeared from the ranks of the Soviet Communist Party. I 
wouldn't hesitate to say that at least 90 percent of the present party 
membership are nothing but opportunists, who are kept together 
by discipline and mutual interests. While it is true that some Com- 
munists are admired by those around them, it is not because they are 
Communists, but because of other qualities of theirs. 

The Chairman. May I interrupt? We are running considerably 
behind in our schedule. I would like to ask you one question and 
then we will ask you, if we may impose upon you, to analyze for us 
some of the other writings by Communists, alleged Communists, 
being used. But let me ask you just one question here, if I may, in 
closing. 

We have had the testimony that 11 individuals who are Commu- 
nists, some of them espionage agents, wrote material which was used 
to indoctrinate our troops, some individuals directly under the dis- 
cipline of the Communist Party. Do you feel that it is possible to 
get an accurate picture of communism by using the works of authors 
who themselves are Communists and dedicated to the theory of 
communism ? 

Mr. Petrov. I believe that any work by a Communist would in- 
evitably be prejudiced in favor of communism and the Soviet Union, 
the Soviet regime in Russia. 

The Chairman. Let me ask you this : You were convicted in Rus- 
sia, you were charged among other things with being an espionage 
agent for the United States. You served 6 years in Siberia. Would 
you like to tell us what you think would have happened in your trial 
if when you were asked questions you said, "I refuse to answer on 
the grounds my answer might incriminate me;" do you think you 
would be living today ? 

Mr. Petrov. Well, the trial in Russia, actually no more than 25 
percent of people accused of political deviations are ever brought to 
any trial. They were sentenced without ever seeing their judges. In 
my case, the atmosphere was quite different. I was tried, there were 
3 judges, myself, 2 friends of mine who were accused along with me, 
3 guards behind us, and a secretary in the room, and nobody else. 
So whatever I said would mean little. The judges came into the 
room without knowing anything about my case, they glanced briefly 
through the papers they had in front of them. The whole trial lasted 
some 20 minutes, and it took another 10 minutes for them to pronounce 
the sentence. So it was a mere formality. Whatever I said meant ex- 
actly nothing. My sentence — well, it was decided long before I was 
brought into the courtroom. 



' 



COMMUNIST INFILTRATION IN THE ARMY 43 

The Chairman. I want to thank you very much. The staff will be 
in touch with you in regard to an analysis of some of these other books 
from time to time. 

May I say that we informed the Secretary of the Army they could 
have as observers here today anyone whom they designated. General 
Partridge is here and some of his aides. They listened to the testi- 
mony. May I say that whenever you have analyzed the testimony, 
and have analyzed these documents, if you care to — and all of this will 
be made available to you — you will have the right to come and testify 
whenever you so desire. 

Mr. Petrov. It is rather hard to volunteer, Senator, once in a while, 
but thank you. 

The Chairman. I may not be present for a while myself, but there 
will be a Senator available whenever you want to appear to testify. I 
think it would be unfair to you to ask you to testify immediately with- 
out analyzing this testimony. 

I may say, however, if you desire we will be glad to hear from you 
at this time. Otherwise, we will wait until you want to come and 
testify. 

General Partridge. Yes, sir. I will notify you of that. 

The Chairman. Fine. Thank you very much. 

All of the testimony, including the testimony in executive session, 
will be available to you. 

The committee will adjourn until further notice. 

(Whereupon, at 11 : 55 a. m., the committee was recessed subject to 
call.) 



APPENDIX 



Exhibit No. 2 
Psychological and Cultural Traits of Soviet Siberia 

General Headquarters, United Nations and Far East Command, Military 
Intelligence Section, General Staff 

TABLE OF CONTENTS 

Bibliography- 
Distribution list 
Preamble 

1. Cultural Background 

A. Impact of Communism 

B. Geographic and Social Mobility 

C. Distinctive Cultural Traits 

D. Personal Security 

2. Soviet Character in Siberia 

A. Psychological Make-up 

B. Social Habits 

C. Morality 

D. Health 

E. Efficiency 

3. Attitudes of the Soviet People 

A. Patriotism 

B. Attitudes Toward Other Countries 

C. Racial Attitudes 

D. Public Attitudes Toward the Soviet Government 

4. Psychology of the Soviet Soldier 

A. General 

B. Psychological Effect of Environment 

C. Psychological Effect of Training 

D. Effect of Indoctrination 

5. Psychological Vulnerability 

A. Vulnerability of the People 

B. Vulnerability of the Soviet Soldier 

6. Conclusion 

BIBLIOGRAPHY 

Japanese Repatriate Interrogations FEAF Wringer Reports No. 1927, 9 Mar 51 
through No. 2223, 9 Jun 51 (Inclusive) 

National Intelligence Survey, Ch. 4, Sociological 
Sect. 40 Introduction Mar 49 
Sect. 42 Characteristics of the People Mar 49 
Sect. 43 Religion, Education & Public Information, Feb 49 

The Soviet Union Intell Div, GSUSA 1946 

ONI Review May 51 

Intelligence Review Intell Div, GSUSA 12 Sep 46, 1 Apr 48 

USSR, General Survey British Intelligence 1948 

Lamont, C Peoples of the Soviet Union 1946 

Maynard, J. Russia in Flux 1948 

Anderson, P. B. People Church and State in Modern Russia 1944 

Simmons, E. J. USSR Concise Handbook 1946 

Pares, B. A History of Russia 1947 

Towster, J. Political Power in the USSR 1948 

Dallin, D. J. Forced Labor in the Soviet Union 1946 

Thompson, R. and Harper, S. N. Government of the Soviet Union 1949 

44 



COMMUNIST INFILTRATION LN THE ARMY 45 

DISTRIBUTION LIST 

Copy No. and Recipient : 

1. C-in-C 

2. Chief of Staff 

3. Deputy Chief of Staff— FEC 

4. Deputy Chief of Staff— SCAP 

5. Gl 

6. G2 

7. G3 

8. G4 

9-10. Psychological Warfare 

11. CG Eighth Army (Attn : ACofS, G2) 

12. CGFEAF (Attn: Director of Intelligence) 

13. COMNAVFE (Attn: Intelligence Officer) 

14. CG XVI Corps (Attn : ACofS, G2) 

15. CG JLCOM (Attn : ACofS, G2) 

16. CG 40th Inf Division (Attn : ACofS, G2) 

17. CG 45th Inf Division (Attn : ACofS, G2) 

18. CG 40th AAA Brigade (Attn: Intelligence Officer) 

19. CG Northern Command (Attn : ACofS, G2) 

20. CG Central Command (Attn: ACofS, G2) 

21. CG Southwestern Command (Attn : ACofS, G2) 

22. CINCPAC (Attn: ACofS, G2) 

23. CINCAL (Attn: ACofS, G2) 

24. Chief— JSPOG 

25. Chief, G2, Intelligence Division 

26. Chief, G2, Security Division 

27. Chief, FEC/LG 

28. Chief, ID Operations 

29. Chief, ID Plans and Estimates 
30-40. Director of Intelligence GSUSA 

Intelligence Division 
ONI 
ASA 

Director of Intelligence, TJSAF 
Deputy Chief of Staff, Plans and Combat Operations 
JIC-JCS 

Office of Psychological Warfare — D/A 
41-100. Reserve (For Later Distribution) 

PREAMBLE 

It is the purpose of this study to develop an understanding of the Soviet people 
which will be militarily useful in case of war. In wartime it will be the Allied 
goal to defeat the Soviet armed forces, to undermine the influence and control 
of the Soviet Government, and to establish effective leadership in occupied areas, 
with a view to assisting the main war effort. These aims require a realistic 
insight into the attitudes, reaction patterns, and social tendencies of the Soviet 
citizen. Such insight provides the means for influencing the Soviet civilian 
as well as the Soviet soldier. Each can be approached only within the 
limits of his own understanding, and within the bounds of his own experience. 
Co mm unism and Communist government are too familiar to seem terrible to him. 
He is fully acclimated to Soviet discipline and control. He has never known 
freedom of movement, speech, or press. He has little understanding of repre- 
sentative democracy, free popular elections, or due process of law. He has neither 
the emigre's perspective, nor the Westerner's access to many points of view. He 
cannot be expected to apply or appreciate typically American concepts of prop- 
erty, justice and government, until he has acquired a fairly intimate under- 
standing of them. 

The problem here is not to demonstrate the political injustice and economic 
tyranny of the Bolshevik Government, but to illuminate the Russian in his exist- 
ing Soviet habitat. The method employed is to describe the social effects of 
communism in the Soviet Union, to outline the militarily pertinent aspects of 
Russian culture, and to denote vulnerabilities subject to Western exploitation in 
a major military effort to disestablish Communist authority in the USSR. The 
most valuable material for this study derives from repatriated Japanese war 



46 COMMUNIST INFILTRATION IN THE ARMY 

prisoners. More than a million of them have spent from three to five years living 
and working among the Soviet people in Siberia and Central Asia, presenting an 
unsurpassed opportunity to acquire information on popular attitudes. Other 
sources are as indicated in the bibliography. The basic viewpoint, wherever 
possible, is that of the middle-class Soviet citizen. Western and American view- 
points are employed only by way of contrast, to clarify the Soviet outlook for the 
American reader. Of course, the Communist scene and the world in general 
look rather strange to Westerners, when seen through the Soviet citizen's re- 
stricted peephole, but Western military strategy, political leadership, propa- 
ganda, and other modes of affecting the thoughts and actions of the Soviet public 
can become intelligible to them only when brought within this narrow conceptual 
field of view. Sound military planning requires a complete, factual estimate of 
popular attitudes, and of the people and soldiers on whom the enemy Power 
will base his war effort. They are at least as important to him, as are weapons 
and other material resources for war. 
For the Assistant Chief of Staff, G2 : 

R. S. Bbatton, 
Colonel, General Staff ivith Troops, 

Deputy. 

1. CULTURAL BACKGROUND 

A. The Impact of Communism 

The present psychological outlook of the Soviet people results from the impact 
of a highly artificial political and economic system on an easy-going agrarian 
people. Long accustomed to authoritarian government under the czarist regime, 
they fell easy prey to the Communist Party, which was the only well-organized 
political force in the country. Being inured to hard manual labor and scanty 
living, the Russian masses found no great contrast in the demanding rule of the 
Communist Government. In a continuing era of rapid social change, this people 
has met the gravest internal and external challenges without developing any 
profound cleavages among social groups. Meanwhile, the harsh Soviet Govern- 
ment has liquidated or expelled potentially rebellious elements. 

The existing format of Soviet society can be understood only in terms of the 
broad outline of events since the October Revolution of 1917, when the Commu- 
nist faction took over control from the feeble Kerensky Interim Government, 
virtually without a struggle. Conservative and upper class groups after a 
belated and poorly coordinated counterrevolutionary attempt, were defeated, 
and literally swept out of the country, peremptorily eliminating a large segment 
of the formally educated, professionally trained, or politically experienced por- 
tions of the population. The resulting social and economic breakdown was 
rendered complete by the radical, visionary reformism of the new Communist 
Government. The most ludicrous elements of this program, such as direct 
worker ownership and control of factories, and equal pay for all workers, were 
quickly discarded, since production almost immediately came to a standstill. 
However, a series of devastating attacks on religion, the family, and the agri- 
cultural system maintained a varying degree of social chaos for about fifteen 
years. 

That these "reforms" succeeded at all, was due to several factors. First, 
there was, from the start a fair measure of support within one or more of the 
main classes involved in each case. For example, the peasantry was very eager 
to see the land redistributed, under a system of private ownership, regardless 
of which form of government should emerge. Only after they felt well-estab- 
lished, in the early 1930's, did the Communists risk alienating agrarian support 
by ending individual farming in the collectivization drive. The land program, 
in turn, was used as a lever to gain support for destroying the position of the 
Orthodox Church, and only the upper age groups were permanently alienated on 
this question. As regards factory control, the workers were among the first to 
realise that direct worker ownership had reduced production (and wages) almost 
to zero. Consequently, the workers made no serious protest when the Central 
Government took over the large factories. 

Second, the Communist Party took great pains to establish itself through all 
levels of the population by organizing parallel hierarchies of Party and civil 
government organizations down to the village level. Party leaders throughout 
were key figures in the corresponding local government agencies, and, as the 
Central Government apparatus expanded its function, became more and more 



COMMUNIST INFILTRATION IN THE ARMY 47 

the de facto channels for transmitting administering, and explaining Party 
orders and policies from above, and for reporting the nature and intensity of 
public responses from below. This technique of "keeping an ear to the ground" 
to maintain political intelligence is analogous to that used in any political ma- 
chine, and in the case of the USSR, enabled the Communists to remain within 
the bounds of public tolerance. For example, Stalin modified the original collec- 
tivization program sufficiently to allow a small measure of private farming and 
private ownership of hand tools and livestock on the collective farms, as a result 
of timely intelligence on the widespread and bitter opposition to the more extreme 
program. 

Third, the Communist Government built up a national organization for inter- 
nal police control, variously known as the OGPU, the NKVD, the MVD, and 
finally as the MGB (Ministry of State Security). These agencies successfully 
prevented the development of any organized opposition, either to the regime in 
general, or to specific policies. They have established a universal network of 
informants and have forcibly laid on all citizens the responsibility of reporting 
suspicious persons or disloyal elements. They have also provided the means for 
apprehending, sentencing and exploiting the labor of millions of citizens, for all 
manner of "crimes against the State." 

Fourth, in a series of four "five-year plans," the Soviet Government has at- 
tempted to establish an extensive industrial base, and to mechanize agriculture. 
Primary emphasis has been placed consistently on heavy industry, at the expense 
of light (mainly consumer goods) industries. In all of these plans, the develop- 
ment of Siberia and the decentralization of industry have been key factors. Con- 
sequently, the bulk of Soviet production has been allocated to the capitalization 
of the still expanding heavy industries, and to defense expenditures. At the 
same time, there was a very rapid growth of population and industry in Siberia 
and Central Asia, including the Ural Mountain complex, as compared with that 
of European Russia. 

The initial sociological effect of the Communist Regime was the partial or 
complete disestablishment of traditional authority and the old modes of living. 
All authority based on wealth, heredity or property vanished at once. The an- 
cient body of Russian law and jurisprudence was annulled, to be replaced by 
an unorganized body of Communist ethics, principles, and day-to-day directives. 
The family structure was gravely weakened by a blunt repudiation of parental 
authority, an official denial of all religious practice and belief, and a renuncia- 
tion of tradional sex morality. Rapid industrialization, railroad and canal 
building, and the growing flood of forced laborers, resulting primarily from op- 
position to the rural collectivization program, accelerated the breakdown of 
familial authoritv. The industrial labor force expanded from about 3,000.000 
in the early 1920's to more than 30.000.000 by 1040. In that brief period the 
urban portion of the population increased from 10 percent to 40 percent, and 
was accomplished by enticing young workers from the farms to enter industry. 
Millions of young people, working away from home, had full opportunity to 
exploit the apparent advantages of rubber-stamp marriage and postcard divorce. 
This, coupled with extreme indiscipline in the schools and the neglect of the 
usual academic studies in favor of Communist indoctrination, soon resulted in 
widespread juvenile delinquency, and complete disorientation of the young. 

By 1936, the Communist Government felt compelled to renounce these radical 
policies. It restored parental and pedagogic authority, and instituted rather 
stringent divorce laws to insure the permanence of the family. However, wages 
were purposely set sufficiently low to require that all adult members of the 
family be continuously employed, both to augment the labor pool, and to ac- 
complish complete exploitation of the nation's labor resources. Consequently, 
school-age children became, in a sense, the wards of the State, and spent most 
of their waking hours under the direct control of the Government, either in day 
nurseries, schools or factory apprenticeships, which greatly enhanced the in- 
fluence of Communist indoctrination. 

The Communist Regime has profoundly altered the status of all elements of 
the Soviet population. The "toiler" was elevated to the highest level of re- 
spectability. Initially, this meant the man who worked with his hands, but was 
later expanded to include those who "labored with the brain," and embraced 
professional and clerical workers generally. With the evolution of a managerial 
class, the economic position of the manual laborer suffered a relative decline, but 
the Soviet Communist code continues to honor the worker above all, and it is 
still possible for the outstanding worker, as a Stakhanovite and "labor hero" to 
exceed the earning power of the intermediate class of supervisors and managers. 



48 COMMUNIST INFILTRATION IN THE ARMY 

The farmer's status has also risen sharply, and he is theoretically on a par with 
the urban worker, though he did not receive political "equality" (equal vote) 
until 1936. Nor does the farmer enjoy equal status as regards personal income, 
since income differentials are calculated to draw labor to the cities. However, 
he is no longer despised as an ignorant country lout, and enjoys such titles as 
"specialist in pig culture," "tractor specialist," and "dairy specialist." 

Women are virtually on a par with men in all walks of life, respecting advan- 
tages and liabilities. Women, like men, have the right and the duty to be 
employed, and are employed on the same footing as regards norms, wages, crim- 
inal liability, and rights of participation in labor, cultural, and political organiza- 
tions. They are employed indiscriminately in heavy and light industry, agricul- 
ture, and the professions, and provide about 10 percent of the convict labor. 
Soviet women retain many of the usual feminine attributes, such as the desire to 
be sexually attractive, the maternal instinct, desire for marriage, and the yearn- 
ing for beauty aids, such as lipstick, silk stockings, and the like. But their 
basic status is quite dissimilar from that of women in conventional western 
society, in that none are dependent on a husband's earning power, and nearly 
all spend their working day outside the home. In comparison to women of the 
western countries they are much more aggressive, frequently take the initiative 
in matters of sex, and are under no disabilities whatever, as regards children 
born out of wedlock. Such children remain with the mother, if she chooses, or 
are raised in State orphanages as "Stalin's children," under circumstances similar 
to those of other children, since no stigma attaches. Japanese internees in Siberia 
were amazed at the position of children in the Soviet home, since the children 
habitually entered conversations and disputes with their parents on equal terms. 
The children also evinced prematurely adult interests in sex problems, and boys 
often started the smoking habit at the age of 7 or 8. Soviet women are patient, 
steady workers, and frequently outdo the men working beside them in surpassing 
their work norms. In the professional role of doctor, judge, technician, or 
teacher, women have fully demonstrated their competence, and enjoy considerable 
respect. For example, about GO percent of Soviet doctors are women, and are 
invariably reported to be as capable and well qualified as those of the opposite 
sex. 

Communist Party members and Young Communists (Komsomols), though they 
do not form a distinct class as regards income and status, are nevertheless, a 
distinct group. Due to their relatively uniform distribution, especially among the 
various income levels of urban workers, they may be said to constitute a govern- 
ing class only in the sense that they are representatives of the Government, 
Socially active and energetic young people are selected for membership in the 
Komsomol. After an apprenticeship of several years (usually in their middle 
20's), those who have demonstrated a sustained interest and capacity in produc- 
tion drives, Communist agitation, propaganda, and various social services are 
admitted to Party membership. However, the liabilities are at least as great 
as the advantages, since the discipline and demands for service on a Party 
member are much greater than for an ordinary citizen. The attitude is some- 
what similar to that prevailing in the United States Army, where the officer is 
expected to live up to a much higher code of service, duty, and conduct than the 
soldier. The worker who is a Communist Party member, however, gets the same 
pay as nonmembers doing the same work. This group includes 6,000,000 Party 
members, 12,000,000 Komsomol members (age 14 to 27), and a comparable num- 
ber of Pioneers (age 7 to 14). This means that at least one fourth of the Soviet 
population either participates directly in a Communist Party group, or is inti- 
mately connected through family ties (assuming that each member of the above 
groups has at least one nonmember in bis immediate family). By this means, 
the Communist Party, with its affiliated organization, maintains the dogma 
that it is the vanguard of the working class, and it has members in every age and 
income bracket. It is important to note that the Communist Party membership 
permeates the whole fabric of Soviet society, and does not function as an exclusive 
elite, superimposed on an amorphous mass. The member, in relation to the non- 
member, is more priest than ruler. He explains, persuades, and points out 
shortcoming. He leads discussion groups, and organizes the factory newspaper. 
If he loses the respect of those around him, he is liable to expulsion from the 
Party, for he is expected to radiate enthusiasm, and to achieve a sound and 
persuasive presentation of official Communist doctrine. If the Communist Party 
member violates the criminal code or the loyalty code, his punishment is normally 
much more severe than in the case of an ordinary citizen. Members convicted of 
disloyalty or criminal acts get most of the publicity in the Communist purge 



COMMUNIST INFILTRATION IN THE ARMY 49 

trials, both in the Soviet and the Western press, but the bulk of those eliminated 
in the purges are simply dropped from the rolls for inability to measure up to the 
trying standards and output requirements imposed on the Party member. The 
true Communist in the USSR, to maintain his standing, must be both a zealot and 
a workhorse. 

B. Geographic and Social Mobility 

Throughout the period of their recorded history, the Russian people have 
been in a state of flux. A long series of invasions from Mongolia, Turkey, 
Poland, Lithuania, Sweden, France, and Germany has invariably left a human 
deposit of conquerors, settlers, or prisoners, often profoundly affecting Russian 
language, manners and customs. At the same time, peasants endeavoring to 
escape the burden of serfdom have steadily migrated, first to the north, then 
to the east. The tide of humanity moving eastward into Siberia and Central 
Asia has grown constantly since the early 1500's, reaching the Bering Strait 
by 1650, and has spread through Alaska and down along the California coast 
within the next hundred years. Although the geographic spread of this move- 
ment was rapid, the rate of influx was slow. The population of Siberia was 
still only about 15,000,000 in 1900, of which the original indigenous population 
still constituted about 50 percent. The Russians were good mixers, and since 
no great gaps in literacy, technique, or wealth separated the immigrants from 
the native Mongol peoples, there was, and is, relatively little racial or cultural 
friction. Both groups found themselves pitted against the constricting influ- 
ence of the Moscow Government and tended to cooperate rather than to develop 
antagonisms. 

The Communist Regime greatly accelerated the flow of immigrants to Siberia, 
and trebeled its population within 25 years, through a combination of forced 
migration, transfer of convict laborers, assignment of technicians and Party 
members, and discriminatory wage and tax inducements. New settlers were 
provided seeds, tools, and land. Perhaps 15/20,000,000 convict laborers were 
required to remain in Siberia on completion of their sentences. Magadan, 
for a typical example, was built up entirely from a steady accretion of ex- 
convicts. Several million war workers and refugees were relocated in Siberia, 
in many instances, along with their factories, and 2/3,000,000 composing local 
national groups such as the Volga Germans, the Crimeans, Chechens and Kalmyks 
were resettled in Siberia for security reasons, or as a punishment for outright 
disaffection or poor cooperation during the War. The present convict popula- 
tion in Siberia is probably more than 5,000,000, including at least a million found 
guilty of collaboration with the Germans. Many of these were women infected 
with venereal disease, presumed to have resulted from fraternization with the 
enemy. About 2,000,000 Soviet soldiers, recovered from German prison camps, 
served 2-year "rehabilitation" terms in the Siberian labor camps, and many 
were pressured or persuaded to remain in Siberia. Most of the German prisoners 
of war apparently were used in the European part of the USSR, but about 
1,000,000 were still in western Siberia in 1948. When the Japanese prisoners 
were repatriated in 1948-50, about 300,000 were retained, predominantly as' 
convicts, though an unknown number of Japanese elected to remain in Siberia 
as Soviet citizens, usually to marry Russian women. 

The present population of Siberia and Central Asia (the whole territory 
east of the Urals ) is about 50,000,000, though the bulk of it is still west of Lake 
Baikal. Many Siberian cities expanded more than 400 percent from 1926 to 
1939, by which time there were 20 of greater than 100,000 population. All 
have continued rapid expansion since then, and Novosibirsk, Sverdlovsk, and 
Tashkent have passed the half-million mark. New towns such as Stalinsk, 
Komsomolsk, and Prokopyevsk have grown up from small villages, and urban 
construction, including housing, streets, and public utilities, has been rapid. 
Aside from the fast-paced urbanization and industrialization of the Soviet Union 
as a whole, the most striking development has been the rapid growth of Siberia. 
Augmented by a continuing stream of convicts', this movement is beginning to 
show marked results in the Soviet Far East. There are six major urban centers 
east of Lake Baikal — Ulan Ude, Chita, Vladivostok, Khabarovsk, Komsomolsk 
and Voroshilov. Metals and petroleum industries, fisheries, canneries, and forest 
exploitation have been steadily expanded, and even the villages of remote Kam- 
chatka Peninsula, the Yakutsk region, and coastal areas of the Sea of Okhotsk, 
have grown rapidly in the past decade. 

Siberia, in a social sense, is rather similar to our Far West of the late 1800's. 
It is a land of wide-open spaces, fast-growing towns, dirt streets, and log houses, 



50 COMMUNIST INFILTRATION IN THE ARMY 

where most villages use oil lamps for lighting. Far more than in western 
USSR, all citizens are on an equal footing, and most are not eager to talk about 
their past. Social relations are cordial and hearty. There is abundant oppor- 
tunity for rapid advancement in the skilled trades' and professions, and a man 
is paid according to what he produces. Even today the outdoor man and indi- 
vidualist can escape the onorous governmental restrictions, and can make a 
comparatively good living by hunting and trapping in the game-filled evergreen 
forests, which extend hundreds of miles northward from the Trans-Siberian 
railroad. Incidentally, these hunters provided a ready source of superlative 
marksmen in World War II. It is said that they are contemptuous of anyone 
who cannot hit small game in the head at 100 yards, and that the best of them 
shoot their game in the eye to avoid spoiling the pelt. 

Russia, long known as the "prison of peoples," still embraces 175 racial and 
linguistic groups, and the Soviet Government regularly publishes books in more 
than 100 languages for its own citizens. Russian is almost universally under- 
stood, but the old languages persist, in many cases among only a few thousand 
people. However, there are no legal or cultural barriers to intermixture. Great 
Russians intermarry freely with all groups and the population is steadily becom- 
ing more homogenous. Even today Great Russians are in the majority in most 
of the Autonomous Republics and National Districts, which were originally estab- 
lished to recognize racial and cultural differences. Consequently, the correspond- 
ing racial groups are gradually losing their identity. Like the United States, 
Russia, and more recently the Soviet Union, has functioned as a cultural melt- 
ing pot. 

Social mobility also represents an important facet of Soviet society. Whatever 
the other restrictions of Soviet authoritarianism, one freedom is maintained : 
that is the freedom of self-improvement and advancement within an occupation. 
To a certain extent, this even applies to convict workers, who may rise to posi- 
tions of limited authority within labor gangs and who may advance in on-the-job 
skills in factories. The ordinary Soviet youth, in most cases, may follow his 
own inclinations in choosing his life's work and is encouraged to study and to 
acquire advanced skills, with the sure prospect of rising to a better position and 
income bracket as rapidly as his ability permits. The same flexibility and oppor- 
tunities inhere in selection and advancement in the Communist Party organiza- 
tions. Almost anyone who is interested can join the Komsomol, and the hard- 
working Komsomolist with a bent for public speaking and Communist orthodoxy 
can usually make the more difficult step into the Party. Within the Party there 
is favoritism at the higher levels, and the fast-dwindling old guard of prerevolu- 
tionary days is firmly ensconced, but in general the criterion is "the best avail- 
able man for the job." This practical attitude is always a necessity in an expand- 
ing economy and applies equally in the ranks of workers, Party men, managers, 
professionals, and servicemen. The corresponding equality of opportunity and 
the air of economic and industrial expansion appears reasonable to the people 
and encourages a fundamental national pride and optimism among them. 

There is theoretically no freedom to choose the place of work or to change to 
another job. However, despite repeated legislation to stop job-hopping, it is 
still a widespread practice. Up to the mid-1930's, for example, the annual turn- 
over of the labor force frequently rose above 100 percent, in some industries 
reached 150 percent, and was still about 50 percent in 1940. The conditions which 
encouraged it were, and remain, manifold. First, new factories were constantly 
being established, and the consequent labor shortages opened up opportunities 
for faster advancement, acceptance in a higher pay bracket, or improved living 
conditions. Managers vied with each other to attract labor, and, of course, were 
not too scrupulous in ascertaining that a new employee had been duly released 
from his former job. Employers were more likely to lose than to gain labor by 
a tough policy, and therefore rarely tried to enforce the law against those who 
left without proper clearance, so there was relatively little prosecution on this 
ground. These conditions still prevail as regards the labor situation in the 
Soviet Union, for it is still definitely a seller's market. An applicant is usually 
hired without question and occasionally even without the inevitable passport 
and labor book in some of the more hard-pressed Siberian establishments. 

The Government has repeatedly attempted to curb job-hopping, absenteeism, 
and tardiness by providing extensive penalties. However, as in the Czarist 
Regime's efforts to prevent the steady migration of peasants from the estates, 
the legislation indicates far more strongly that the "abuse" is widespread and 
deep-rooted than that it is being corrected. If the harried employer insists on 
prosecuting the occasional absentee or tardy worker to the full extent of the 
law, he loses the worker to the MVD labor camps and estranges other workers. 



COMMUNIST INFILTRATION IN THE ARMY 51 

If he is fortunate enough to get convict labor to replace such losses, it is only on 
a loan basis and subject to transfer elsewhere at any time. Moreover, it is less 
productive and requires far more supervision. Therefore, most employers prefer 
temporary fines, admonition, and other on-the-spot correctives. That the em- 
ployer has such laws to fall back on puts teeth into his admonitions, but he in 
fact rarely invokes them, since there are very few instances of workers under 
penal sentence for minor violations of labor discipline, despite the moderately 
high frequency of such violations. 

In summary, there is a high degree of social mobility in the Soviet Union, as 
compared to the more stable societies of Great Britain, France, or to a 
smaller extent, the United States. The industrial labor force is still expanding 
rapidly, along with the national economy, requiring that more workers be 
trained in skilled and semi-skilled trades. Wages are closely geared to skill 
and output for manager and worker alike, and all the incentive devices used in 
capitalist enterprise are rigorously exploited. Bonuses, prizes, and overtime pay 
are used to stimulate the industrious, and deductions more than proportional to 
deficiency of output below the normal is a goad for the slow worker. The capable 
worker gets rapid advancement, and if he shows talents for leadership and 
organization, can readily rise in the managerial ranks regardless of Party 
status. However, the Party man gets preference. The upper bracket worker 
or manager who fails to meet stringent output requirements is readily demoted. 
Although Soviet society is by no means ''classless," the existing classes remain 
fluid, and there is much movement in general both up and down the social ladder. 
No one is exempt from falling into convict status, and even the ex-convict can 
generally start a new life on equal footing with other citizens, except that he 
must normally do it in one of the development areas in Siberia. 

C. Distinctive Cultural Traits 

The Russian people evince a much more gregarious nature than is found among 
the more advanced democracies. Partly as a carry-over from the agrarian past, 
and partly as a basic trait, this pronounced tendency to group living has been 
strongly reinforced and exploited by the Communist Government. Group stand- 
ards, communal activities, and in-group status exert the predominating influence, 
as contrasted with the Western emphasis on individualism, personal rights, and 
private (individual) enterprise. Consequently, though there are exceptions, the 
average Russian lacks the deep antipathy for regimentation and collective enter- 
prises which is normal to Americans. The Russian's easy acceptance of Com- 
munist controls seems incredible from the American viewpoint. Even in pre- 
collectivization clays, when rural Russia included 85 percent of the population, 
farmers lived in small villages, and gathered in gangs to form work camps in 
the fields for the major phases of cultivation and harvest. With the growth of 
Communism, these villages became ready-made centers for collective farms. The 
transition, though stormy, was carried out on a solid basis of ancient work habits, 
and the general opposition was more due to the excessive grain levies and the 
loss of private ownership status than to the relatively moderate difficulties of ad- 
justing to a rather similar organizational pattern. Thereafter, farm workers 
moving into industry found housing construction lagging far behind population 
growth in the cities. In town and country alike, it has been normal for two or 
more families to share the same small house. In his goldfish existence, the 
average Russian of modern times knows neither individual nor family privacy, 
and has little concept of related values. From his eighth week of life, he is in 
constant and immediate contact with others of his own age group in nursery, 
school and factory. Family relationships, both among siblings and in the par- 
ental set, though fairly well developed, cannot supersede or dominate the strong 
influence of extra-family communal relationships. The Russian child receives 
about as much care and attention from the lady in charge of the nursery as from 
his own mother. His teacher and classmates loom about as large in his af- 
fections as do his parents, brothers and sisters. Illustrative of this was the 
favorite device of Soviet wartime propaganda, which, in arousing the hatred of 
the soldiers, regularly cited German atrocities against teachers. Often repeated 
was the charge that "If you don't stop them, the Germans will kill your old 
teacher ; they will burn your little village school. They have murdered thousands 
of teachers in the Ukraine, and have destroyed all our schools there." Similarly, 
the Russian cherishes a life-long affection for his classmates, and invariably 
uses the intimate form of address, regardless of subsequent differences of rank 
and station. 



52 COMMUNIST INFILTRATION IN THE ARMY 

As a natural consequence of his early training and experience, the Russian 
is extremely adaptable in social relations. He can readily adjust in any group, 
and simultaneously participates in several, with a minimum of friction. In-group 
relations are warm and cordial, and disputes, though often heated, are soon 
resolved and forgotten. Incessant group activities are no burden for the 
Russian, as they would be for Americans. The Westerner accepts social obliga- 
tions, often with some enthusiasm, but he tends to become somewhat bored and 
resentful of interminable meetings and discussions. He looks forward to free 
evenings, wants to "spend more time with his family," and to have more "time 
to himself." Not so the Russian, to whom individualist preoccupations are 
rather alien. If he has time on his hands he is likely to go to the local "Klub," 
or join in a song-fest. He is an inveterate talker, and time spent in conversation, 
as an index of the intensity of social relations, puts the Russians high on the 
list, as compared to other peoples. 

An important characteristic of Russian groups is that they are never exclusive. 
There is almost no tendency for members to feel superior to non-members, and 
anyone is free to join on an equal footing, temporarily or permanently. For- 
eigners traveling in the Soviet Union unanimously report the Russians as a 
friendly people, and millions of Russians induced or compelled to migrate to 
other countries have merged with the barest minimum of friction with the 
peoples of China, France, Italy, the United States, and many other countries. 
This facility for adjustment was clearly demonstrated in the United States, 
where the Russian immigrant group totaling more than 1,000,000 failed to produce 
any such clearly defined criminal element as emerged from the numerically 
comparable Italian, German, Polish, and Irish immigrant groups. This does 
not reflect discredit on the latter nationalities, but merely testifies that the 
transition was much easier for the Russians, due to their psychological and 
social makeup. It is, in fact, rather hard for the Russian people to be socially 
uncooperative, which explains in good part, the ease with which the Com- 
munist Government installed itself. Even an occupying power in the Soviet 
Union will have very little difficulty with the local population so long as it 
displays some tolerance and understanding for their institutions and folkways, 
and confines its expressions of hostility to a socially remote Communist hierarchy, 
since the people regularly accept local Communist Party members on a basis 
of friendly equality. By the same token, to avoid public hostility, purely local 
institutions, whether civic or social, would have to be reoriented, rather than 
liquidated, since the people tend to identify themselves with these groups. In 
general, it appears that the Party member and Komsomolist type would be the 
most amenable to new political doctrines, and could most readily generate public 
interest and understanding on the ideas of political freedom, and multi-party 
democracy. In this connection, it must be remembered that the Party member 
is merely a Russian who has mastered Party jargon. The same Russian, granted 
the opportunity, can "see the light," and readily masters other ideas, as is 
demonstrated by the many Soviet officials and soldiers who have become dis- 
enchanted with the Communist credo on seeing America, Germany, of Czecho- 
slovakia. He is not of the same breed as the handful of socially maladjusted 
pseudointellectuals among native Americans who espouse Communism in the 
United States. 

D. Personal Security 

The average Russian has a greater sense of personal security than is generally 
supposed. Soviet citizens are uneasy and apprehensive in occasional contacts 
with foreigners from Western countries, whom his Government regards as 
de facto enemies, but has displayed no such apprehension in talking to the 
thousands of Japanese and German prisoners who worked among them. The 
Russian is well aware that openly anti-Communist statements will get him into 
serious trouble, and therefore, usually avoids the subject. In general, he knows 
that if he observes the well-known rules of conduct, he will have no trouble 
with the MGB (security police), and governs himself accordingly. Morbid 
anxiety about the MGB is generally confined to those in responsible positions in 
government and industry who are having trouble with quotas. There is a strong 
temptation to falsify accounts or to certify substandard material at full quality, 
in an effort to meet a quota, achieve a certain percent of increase or quality for 
a citation. When such malpractices come to light, and they do every day, the 
responsible manager loses his hard-won status by immediate demotion, or more 
likely, by a five to ten year sentence in the labor camps. 



COMMUNIST INFILTRATION LN THE ARMY 53 

The Soviet worker is completely secure as regards employment, and is jmable 
to comprehend the Western worker's profound fear of losing his job. To pass 
this off as the "full employment of the prison" obscures some of the real effects 
of the phenomenon. The Soviet worker's position is analogous to that of a 
soldier in a conventional army. He can't be fired. He can only be reprimanded, 
demoted, or transferred to a less desirable area. Even if he is sentenced for 
criminal activity, he retains a basic worker status within Soviet society. He 
retains the "right" to work, and the x'ight to a (reduced) reward for his work. 
True, he will receive only crude food, clothing, shelter, and pin money for his 
work, but he is never threatened with loss of livelihood, and rarely suffers 
physical violence. This security carries over to his family. If he goes to a 
labor camp, his wife's earnings will maintain the family, and the children will 
be cared for in any case. The effect of this "security" is largely psychological, 
but it accounts for several facets of present-day Russian character, including 
stability of personality, lack of psychopathic tendencies, attitudes toward money 
and property, and other social attitude. 

Security in old age is theoretically provided for in the Stalin constitution 
of 1936, but in practice stipulations as to length of continuous service in the 
same enterprise make retirement income available only for a few. Those past 
retirement age (65 for men, and 60 for women) often remain employed at light 
jobs, such as time-keeping, ticket-taking, or watching the children. Japanese 
prisoners mention the existence of old people's homes, but there is little informa- 
tion on them except that old people prefer not to go there. In general, the 
very aged prefer to live with their children, and are able to do so without 
friction, for babushka and dyedushka (grandma and grandpa) have always 
enjoyed great affection in Russian families. 

Communist Party members and, to a less extent, Komsomolists are consid- 
erably less secure, due to the purge system. The Party purging process goes 
on continuously at a moderate level, but at two to three year intervals, develops 
into a general purge, in which the records of all members are thoroughly re- 
viewed. Both stages of the purge are normally initiated in the process of 
"criticism and self-criticism" at Party meetings on all levels. The Russian 
genius for pointing out personal faults and shortcomings is fully exploited in 
this process, and latent friction and hostilities are relied on to give it driving 
power. A member who has appeared uncooperative, inefficient or indolent may 
be denounced at any time by another member, acting in a private capacity, 
or as spokesman for an official inspection team. If there is a general belief 
that the accusation is well founded, it will be supported by testimony of one 
or several additional members. When a derogatory testimony is heard, members 
of contrary conviction, if any, may speak in the defense of the accused, citing 
his fine record, ability, personal qualities, or loyalty. The accused then must 
choose whether to defend himself and deny the charges, or to "confess every- 
thing," swear repentance, and resolve to mend his ways. He usually confesses, 
and concludes by saying that he is ready to accept any punishment deemed appro- 
priate, but that if he is accorded another chance, he will do his utmost to 
prove worthy of his comrades' confidence. This act of "self criticism" is con- 
sidered very proper and praiseworthy for a good Communist. The wise member 
usually takes this alternative unless the criticism hangs on only one or two 
specific charges which he can conclusively disprove, and he feels he has good sup- 
port among his fellow members. Even then, the astute member will apologet- 
ically dispi'ove the specific charges, "for the sake of scientific objectivity," and 
will then admit grave generalized faults, such as insufficient zeal, deficient un- 
derstanding of Marxist-Leninist-Stalinist doctrines, and resultant errors in 
their practical application. 

When discussion is closed, the Party Secretariat will consider all factors, and 
will decide whether to reprimand, warn, or recommend expulsion to the next 
echelon. If criminal activity is involved, the case is immediately referred to the 
State for prosecution. However, the bulk of these cases result from failure to 
accomplish a difficult assignment, generating too much social friction in fulfilling 
it, or wasteful utilization of materials. One's case is also seriously damaged if 
one has too many enemies, whether they are Party members or not, since MGB 
informants and non-Party activists also bring in reports on the worker's atti- 
tudes and criticisms. More than anyone else, the rank-and-file Party member 
must be careful to generate as little hostility as possible among those around him, 
in performing his assigned duties. This has resulted in a strong tendency toward 
anxiety tensions, ulcers, and over-cautiousness. Everyone procrastinates. The 
Communist official relays his problem to a higher echelon, if at all possible. The 



54 COMMUNIST INFILTRATION LN THE ARMY 

factory manager goes easy on his labor force as long as he can, and consequently, 
to meet his quota, must work his entire establishment at top speed during the 
last ten days of the month. 

The general periodic purge works on the same principles, except that it is 
directed by the Secretariat at the head of the Party, and covers all members. In 
the past, it has often functioned as a large-scale elimination, based on Communist- 
style efficiency ratings. Primary factors in determining efficiency are loyalty, 
practical work, and the attitudes of fellow members. The general purge may 
continue 12 to 15 months, since the record of each member is reviewed individu- 
ally in great detail. One-half to one-quarter of the membership has been expelled 
from the Party in each of the major purges from 1925 to 1933. In 1935, after the 
assassination of Kirov, an old-guard Bolshevik and close friend of Stalin, the 
purge became much more severe, and tens of thousands, including non-Party peo- 
ple received long penal sentences "for lack of vigilance." The Kirov Purge had 
barely run its course, when an alleged anti-Stalin plot was discovered in the top 
brackets of the Army, and the purge of 1936-38 got under way. Several hundred 
army officers were shot, and virtually all Party members underwent a truly mem- 
orable grilling. New thousands of ex-Party members trekked off to the labor 
camps, and again, Party membership declined by a third. Purges since then 
have been mild by comparison, but they loom large in the Party man's nightmares. 
As a major purge approaches its peak, Party members in general are extremely 
apprehensive and distraught. Within the mechanism, Party control is at its 
peak, but practical control over the nation and its people is at a minimum, because 
the Party members, who constitute the main channels of control, are preoccupied 
with their personal danger. Therefore, the Soviet Union's most vulnerable period 
from the sociological viewpoint, occurs as a major purge is approaching its peak, 
and vulnerability is directly proportional to the intensity and spread of the 
purge. This vulnerability, though highly significant, would be exploitable only in 
the immediate area of invasion and occupation. In all remaining areas there is 
little doubt that the purge would be terminated, and that normal Party control 
would be speedily restored. 

2. SOVIET CHARACTER IN SIBERIA 

A. Psychological Makeup 

Numerous misconceptions of the Russian mentality have arisen through 
popular and historical writings of foreigners who appy their own characteristic 
reactions to the supposed condition of the Russian peasant or Soviet "toiler." 
Allegations that the Russians are impassive, stoical, fatalistic, and melancholy 
are both oversimplified and misleading. Russians, like many other peoples, 
genuinely enjoy the pathos of a dolorous song or a tragic play, and are readily 
moved to tears by them. They do accept national and local calamities, such as 
invasions, droughts, famines, and in recent times, increased work norms, and 
more stringent controls, with a quiet dolor which suggests passivity and stoicism. 
They are apt to agree that phenomena outside their control must be endured, 
and that it is useless to oppose the inevitable. This is correctly interpreted as 
fatalistic. The fault lies in regarding these negative attitudes as the character- 
istic and predominant coloring of the Russian mind. Unfortunately Western 
literature has long since pictured Russia as black and gloomy, and has falsely 
extended this psychological set to the people as well. These attitudes and re- 
action patterns do exist, as they do among all other people. However, they 
ordinarily occupy only a small place in Russian thought, and no objective day-to- 
day account of life in Russia fails to note the normal cheerfulness and good 
humor of the ordinary Russian. Like the "downtrodden" peasant of old Russia, 
he seems to enjoy life. 

The Western habit of comparing the real incomes, freedoms, and rights of 
Americans, for example, with those of Soviet citizens also casts the latter in a 
false light with reference to Soviet attitudes. The Soviet citizen cannot make 
such comparisons, except in a remote and speculative way, and is much more 
closely concerned with the real world within his reach. His home, his factory, 
his village, and his country all seem normal and acceptable to him. He is not 
abnormally frustrated in his daily life. His place in society, economically and 
socially, is plainly, though not too rigidly, marked, and he has little difficulty 
maintaining his status within his own group, since the group is quite tolerant 
of all types of personality. Under an authoritarian Government, many of his 
personal problems such as his place of work and of domicile are settled for him. 



COMMUNIST INFILTRATION IN THE ARMY 55 

The discontented man in America must often admit he has "only himself to 
blame." In the USSR, he can blame it on Moscow or more typically, on the 
local administration, and it is not a mental burden to him. As has been men- 
tioned, he does not bear the American's complete financial responsibility for his 
family, since his wife's earning capacity and her share of responsibility are 
usually as great as his own. Free medical care, such as it is, relieves him of 
financial worries on health. Sexual frustrations are non-existent, or nearly so, 
due to the lax standards of sex morality, which are as prevalent in the USSR as 
in other parts of Europe. Particularly in Siberia, women have become nearly 
as aggressive as men in these matters, and adultery is neither ground for divorce 
nor a serious offense, unless an enemy soldier is involved. 

The Russians are generally extroverted and material-minded. To the Japa- 
nese they seemed happy-go-lucky. They live only in the present, and spend 
their money as soon as they get it. When they do save, it is usually for some 
very immediate object. With this realistic orientation, the Russian is very 
unlikely to develop psychopathic troubles. The incidence of mental illness, as 
indicated by suicide, psychotic criminality, and even of neurotic traits, is appar- 
ently very low. Thousands of Japanese prisoners who were intimately 
acquainted with Russians throughout Siberia reported that they had never seen 
or heard of a Russian who was mentally ill, as compared with a fraction of a 
percent who could recall some isolated instances, usually, of senile dementia. 

Russians are not disposed to introspection or moodiness. On the contrary, 
they are almost constantly occupied outside of working hours with social activ- 
ities, household tasks, family life, and reading. Moreover, they are generally 
optimistic even when a Westerner would expect them to be in utter despair. 
Young and middle-aged collective farmers in eastern Siberia still speak, in com- 
plete sincerity, of a golden future, when there will be an abundance of every- 
thing, and a six-hour working day, though the older ones are generally convinced 
that conditions will never improve. The same is generally true of urban workers, 
many of whom sincerely expect a world of plenty by 1960. An outstanding 
example of the strength of Russian optimism is that of a Soviet engineer, sepa- 
rated from his wife seven years by an assignment in Siberia. Having repeatedly 
been refused a transfer, he left without permission, and was picked up a few 
weeks later near Moscow. When returned to the same area as a convict, he told 
a former Japanese acquaintance that he had not given up hope. He still looked 
forward to rejoining his wife when he finished his five year sentence. 

The Soviet people are passionately devoted to small personal possessions. 
They will cheerfully spend all they have for a gold ring, a fountain pen, or a 
wrist watch. They will stint themselves for months to buy a phonograph or a 
bicycle, and take great pride in such possessions. Policemen can often be bribed 
with moderately expensive trinkets, and Japanese intelligence officers, prior to 
the Great Purge of 1936 were able to obtain military information from Soviet 
officers for very modest "gifts" of English woolens, other foreign-made textiles, 
cultured pearls, Scotch whiskey, and the like. These officers all disappeared in 
the purge, but the Russian love of attractive foreign goods remains so powerful 
that many secondary officials will succumb if approached alone, even when the 
prospects of escaping detection are fairly poor. For example, in 1936 a Soviet 
Major General in Moscow accepted such "gifts" of textiles at his wife's insti- 
gation, whereupon she lightened the work of the MVD (then responsible for 
internal security) by appearing at official functions in modish clothing of this 
material. More recently, Japanese prisoners report many instances of bribing 
a guard with a portion of the loot when caught in an act of thievery. 

The universal psychological drive for social recognition, always intensely 
developed among peoples undergoing rapid economic expansion, and the attendant 
social changes, is at least as prominent among present-day Russians as it is 
among Americans. The intense Russian yearning for citations, medals, uniforms, 
prizes, and other insignia of distinction is thoroughly exploited by the Soviet 
Government. Individual citations, such as the "Ready for Labor and Defense" 
medal, the "Mother Hero" medal, and the coveted title of "Stakhanovite Worker" 
and write-ups in the local and national Soviet press for outstanding individual 
production records in agriculture, transportation, and industry are perpetually 
admired and respected. "Stalin prizes" in science, literature, cinematography, 
and many other fields are also powerful, though more distant incentives to indi- 
vidual endeavor. The Russian drive for recognition is even more distinctive 
. in its strong group-achievement emphasis. The Russian's unparalleled condi- 
tioning for group integration makes him extremely amenable to appeals for group 
or work-unit performance, and it is second nature to take pride in the plaques, 
certificates, awards and other marks of recognition accorded to his work-group. 



56 COMMUNIST INFILTRATION IN THE ARMY 

The Soviet press is filled with congratulatory accounts of the achievements of 
individual factories and collective farms. Labor battalions and "shock" brigades 
within a large enterprise compete among themselves. There are continuous com- 
petitions between shifts, departments, and small work gangs. In all political 
subdivisions, down to the urban area, comparative records are regularly pub- 
lished which indicate the degree of quota fulfillment for industries, branches of 
industries, and individual enterprises. Strong practical motives, such as interest 
in work-norms, bonuses, and prizes account for much of the general response to 
these stimuli, but there remains a very significant substratum of altruism, com- 
petitive group spirit, and pride in building national production. This becomes 
a vital factor in times of crisis, such as war, when actual material rewards are 
impossible. A very real spirit of cooperation was required in World War II 
when thousands of factories were moved in toto from threatened areas to Siberia. 
This required maximum sustained endeavor, not only from the workers of the 
factory concerned, but from dozens of allied service branches, concerned with 
transportation and the diversion of raw materials, machine tools, finished goods, 
and general coordination. Some of the proudest stories of the war concern 
factories which achieved full production within 90 days after their migration. 
The workers of many establishments pooled their meager savings to donate a 
tank or airplane to the Red Army, and many enterprises "adopted" a regiment 
on the front or in training, sending gifts, and providing other services to the 
soldiers concerned. After the war, enterprises vied with each other in subscrib- 
ing to government bonds, and many issues were sold out within a few weeks. 
It is also quite common for workers of a farm or factory to write a collective 
letter to Stalin, recounting some exploit on behalf of the native land, and pledg- 
ing still greater efforts, or workers will pledge to surpass their norm by a certain 
percent in honor of May Day, or other special occasion. 

Westerners often find it difficult to acknowledge any element of spontaneity 
or real enthusiasm in these generous outbursts, and attempt to explain them 
as resulting from a vicious and vindictive Party control system, presupposing a 
general hostility for all control agencies. Tins is partly the case, and many of 
these movements originate from the Communist Government, or from Communist 
Party members on the lower levels. Moreover, the habitually obstructive or 
uncooperative worker is likely to be punished for "reactionary tendencies" or 
un-Soviet behavior, especially if his influence is spreading to others. But it must 
be remembered that the Communist Party has a highly developed technique for 
exploiting the generous sentiments of the people, and that there is a vast reservoir 
of such sentiments to exploit. The role of the Party member in the lower strata 
is far more persuasive than compulsive, and the exploitation of reward incentives, 
group spirit, and group pride is an indispensable part of the Soviet social drive 
mechanism, and has always played an essential role in Russian social dynamics. 
The process seems obscure, and even fraudulent to an American, since his cultural 
conditioning, though inclusive of many types of group values, nevertheless gives 
first place to personal ambition, private enterprise, and individual achievement. 
He regards appeals to group spirit as an insufficient stimulus for a strong response 
among adult farm and factory workers, though he would acknowledge their 
effectiveness in schools and colleges. Therefore, he over-emphasizes the im- 
portance of compulsion, fear, and punishment in Russian society. The prospect 
of punishment is an important control factor, but it is not the prime motivation. 
Nor is the average Russian's daily thinking dominated by fear and apprehension, 
as an American's might be under the same circumstances. If he were, a high 
incidence of neuroticism and unstable personality would result, and this is not 
in evidence. 

The foregoing does not imply that all groups and individuals cooperate on the 
Soviet system, nor that the individualist and other varieties of personality 
configuration are absent. The opposite is attested by the millions undergoing 
penal sentence, and by the Government's failure to elicit satisfactory response 
on many occasions. But 90 percent of the workers were able to operate in the 
exacting Soviet system without undue psychological or social strain, and have 
built up enormous capital assets in the process. Their sincerity and fortitude 
were unquestioned during the war, and, in general, they do respond effectively 
to the group-incentive approach in peacetime. 

B. Social Habits 

The Russian is socially aggressive in that he constantly seeks contacts. He 
does not like to be alone. For this reason, Soviet sentries, guards, and watchmen 
always work in pairs, and most Russians prefer larger groups, for real personal 
comfort. The Russian group is flexible and tolerant, and rarely displays char- 



COMMUNIST INFILTRATION IN THE ARMY 57 

acteristics of hostility or exclusiveness. For example, boys' gang-fights would 
be quite abnormal. A Russian actor, however insipid, will never be hissed off 
the stage. Rivalry between groups is often keen, but rarely antagonistic. When 
antagonism does develop, it is usually directed against an individual who con- 
trols, but is not a member of the group, such as a manager or foreman, and is 
expressed not in physical violence, or the threat of it, but in sullen criticism, and 
failure to respond to his attempts to initiate action. In this condition the group 
is likely to fall far short of its production norms until the manager is transferred 
to other work. The dominant member of the group is usually the most voluble, 
friendly, and sociable, and if he functions as the leader, achieves the position by 
general approval, and respect for his judgment. The mentally retarded member 
is readily tolerated and jollied along. The rebellious or uncooperative member 
is subjected to criticism and opposition, and is humored, but is usually not 
ousted, though he may leave the group of his own accord. In that case, he will 
seek another group, and will eventually modify his conduct sufficiently to conform 
to the fairly lax standards involved. The average member is positively oriented, 
on good terms with other members, and genial in his contacts with them. Per- 
sonality clashes within the group are quickly adjusted, though the individuals 
involved may remain estranged. Conflicts between members are invariably oral, 
but after a mutually vigorous tongue-lashing, one party usually makes a concili- 
atory gesture, and the affair is laughed off and forgotten. It is not uncommon 
for such conflicts to occur between a worker and his supervisor, but the outcome 
is the same, and ruptures of friendship are similarly short-lived. Russians are 
keen in criticism, and indulge in malicious gossip, but they are psychologically 
so dependent on continued membership in their social and vocational groups that 
they habitually curb their hostile reactions. 

In their interminable conferences, meetings, and discussion groups, all mem- 
bers take an active, interested part. Meetings are regularly held by members of 
collective farms, "labor unions" (meaning the workers of a given factory), 
villages, political, cultural, and professional groups. No member is reluctant 
to speak, and there is a good deal of give-and-take, particularly on practical 
matters. No one hesitates to criticise the performance or conduct of those 
within one or two steps from his own level, but there is justifiable reluctance 
to criticise highly placed directors, and of course, no one is critical of the 
policies or personalities of the upper levels of the Soviet Government. Within 
the group, the criticized member may seek to refute the allegations, or he may 
recognize that the criticism is justified. He experiences no qualms in admitting 
that he was wrong, since he loses nothing in prestige, and will be respected 
for his candor. This is precisely the process employed in criticism and self- 
criticism in Communist Party meetings, except that it is much more relaxed, 
since, in the ordinary routine, its entails no serious consequences. 

Women workers, women activists, women agitators, and women Party mem- 
bers figure prominently and equally with the men in all group activities. It is 
a commonplace for women speakers to address large audiences on subjects 
ranging from factory management and advanced welding techniques to dialectical 
materialism, agronomy, and analysis of the Five Year Plan. In factory acti- 
vist groups they share in seeking means to improve efficiency, reduce costs, 
and detect falsification of records and reports. Corresponding alterations in 
the standard female personality have drastically modified many of the distinc- 
tive traits commonly accepted as feminine in the West. Having lost her 
sheltered position, the Soviet woman has become brusque, straightforward, and 
practical. She tends to be as aggressive as men in social and vocational con- 
tacts, and has lost much of the traditional "softness" of women, in situations 
which she dominates. Unhampered by differences in intellect, personality, or 
social status, the Soviet woman has virtually doubled the effective "manpower" 
pool. In mining, agriculture, transport, construction, and factory work, she 
contributes as much as her male coworker. In wartime, she contributes equal 
labor in road and railroad maintenance, truck driving, and field engineering. 
Women, as well as men, receive training in rifle marksmanship, grenade throw- 
ing, and other combat techniques, and will undoubtedly play a greater combat 
role in any war of the future. Full integration of women into the labor pool 
has enabled the USSR to continue expanding industry while maintaining 4,000,- 
000 troops under arms. Proportionately greater gains will accrue to the Soviet 
war-making potential, as increased mechanization of agriculture and industry 
frees additional workers for other tasks. 



58 COMMUNIST INFILTRATION IN THE ARMY 

The Russian social group is marked for cheerfulness and geniality. Personal 
relations are extremely cordial, and though it is no longer the practice for Rus- 
sian men to kiss full on the lips in greeting, men and women alike are apt to be 
very demonstrative in overt gestures of friendship and affection. This atti- 
tude extends especially to children, and the Soviet child is confident of receiv- 
ing love and indulgence, wherever he goes. The Russian sense of humor is quite 
similar to that of Americans, and hilarity is normal in all social gatherings. 
Dancing is universally popular. Music is an invariable hallmark of a Russian 
social group, even if it is only a chance gathering of soldiers or workers. At 
the lunch hour and rest period, accordions and balalaikas (a type of mandolin) 
will appear, often to be accompanied by solo or group singing. People flock 
eagerly to attend a concert by the local traveling "orchestra" in the remotest 
Siberian villages, and music of good quality is a daily feature on Soviet radio 
program. Drama is an almost equally popular art form. Most citizens try their 
hand at amateur theatricals, and every town has its theater and local dramatic 
group, though it may lack facilities for showing motion pictures. Old classical 
plays such as those of Tolstoi and Chekov are perennial favorites, but there is 
also a steady stream of new plays, mostly on Communist themes. Drama, as a 
live medium, contrasted to the passivity of the motion picture, is at least as ef- 
fective in inculculating Soviet attitudes and values, and probably accounts for 
the slow development of cinematography. 

The people of Siberia are reasonably clean, within the limits of available hot 
water, but have the unkempt appearance typical of American western towns 
of the ISOO's. Clothing is usually of poor quality, may or may not be pressed, 
and rarely shows a crease in the trousers. From about 1930, the Soviet personnel 
code stressed clean fingernails, regular barbering, and good manners. Conse- 
quently, the sloppy Bolshevik as an old Communist ideal is a thing of the past, 
and Russians present a fairly neat appearance. The same applies to Soviet 
soldiers, who are required to keep their uniforms clean and in good repair, and 
their persons neat, which stimulates the conventional standards of self respect. 

Russians respect and enjoy the physical pleasures of life, chief of which is food. 
They are hearty eaters, and have a well-developed culinary art, within the limits 
of available foodstuffs. Canned goods of vegetables, meats and fish have only 
recently become available through the fast-growing canning industry, and frozen 
foods and fruits are still very scarce. One of the most effective punishment- 
reward systems in the labor camps concerns the quantity and variety of food 
given to various categories of convict laborers, and the most stringent punish- 
ment is a few days on bread and water. And during the war, it was a great 
source of satisfaction to the soldier that he was receiving the best of the nation's 
food, in adequate quantities. Russians drink vodka and beer regularly, so far 
as they can afford it, but psychopathic alcoholism appears to be very rare, and 
the Russian usually holds his, liquor well. 

C. Morality 

Basically, Russian ethics conform to the conventional Christian pattern of the 
West. Ideals of honesty, loyalty, duty and mutual obligation, though rational- 
ized to the point of negation in dealing with the "hostile capitalistic powers," are 
applicable in personal relations within Soviet society. Children are required to 
show respect toward their parents and teachers (since 1936), and their Govern- 
ment. Married couples should be mutually respectful, and should provide gopd 
care for their children. Everyone is expected to appreciate, and to return favors, 
and to repay loans. More important, everyone is expected to have a benevolent 
attitude toward his fellows, and to be congenial with them in daily association, 
and everyone is expected to do his honest share in all communal work. 

These values, though somewhat tampered with by the Soviet Government, con- 
stitute ancient principles of Russian conduct, and have been little changed for 
many centuries. Their deep influence accounts for much of the strength and 
stability of the Russian family, and for the stability of the Russian individual in 
his group. Chief among them is the general habit of benevolence. Though the 
Soviet Regime has been brutal in a sociological sense, it has not altered this 
aspect of Russian character. Russians do not seem to regard any individual as 
inherently good or bad, as is apt to be the case in Western culture. His acts 
may be good or bad, wise or foolish, and he must accept the consequences, either 
way. The man himself, whatever his acts, is usually immune to destruction, 
though liable to punishment. In Western literature, the murderer is hanged, and 
whoever has taken a life loses his own. In the American public conscience as with 
the British, crimes regarded as extremely serious have always deserved the death 



COMMUNIST INFILTRATION IN THE ARMY 59 

penalty. In earlier times the horsethief and the rapist were lynched or hanged 
in due process ; more recently, kidnaping and deliberate murder deserve the ex- 
treme penalty. In Russia these crimes have normally been punished by a 10- 
to 20-year hard-labor sentence, in full consonance with public concepts of justice. 
Both in Czarist and Communist Russia, capital punishment has been declared 
illegal for considerable periods, and when legal, as at present, is reserved for the 
gravest crimes against the state, such as treason and espionage. The villain in 
Russian literature is defeated, humiliated, and disgraced, but he is rarely killed, 
or abused physically, and the hero is under no obligation to overpower him in a 
fist fight. Again, Russian group orientation supersedes individualist orientation. 
The hero- villain relationship is not primarily that of man-versus-man, but involves 
a group-versus-man conflict. The hero is the protagonist of the group, and a 
one-punch fight, with strong group support for the hero is usually more than 
enough to quell the adversary. 

Striking a man is considered a grave insult, and in the rare instances noted by 
Japanese prisoners, a minor crisis invariably arose in consequence. In eastern 
Siberia, for example, a Russian engineer struck an immediate Russian subordi- 
nate, and to hush up the affair, had to bribe his superior with a load of wood. 
Near Irkutsk, a Russian supervisor struck a Japanese furnace tender. All work 
stopped, and there was an investigation. Apparently, the supervisor was vindi- 
cated, since the prisoner was transferred to another factory. Russian children 
threw stones at the Japanese prisoners as long as they regarded them as "enemy" 
soldiers, but the attitude soon gave way to friendly relations. Russian adults, 
from the start, were kindly and sympathetic, giving the Japanese little gifts of 
food, clothing and cigarettes, and frequently invited those who learned a few 
words of Russian to their homes for meals. Russian guards were sometimes 
abusive in speech to individual prisoners, but almost never mistreated them 
physically. Applying "on-the-spot justice" near Khabarovsk, a woman judge gave 
one Russian labor supervisor a five-year sentence for allowing dangerous condi- 
tions in which a Japanese prisoner was accidentally killed on the job, and in 
another instance a Russian doctor received a seven-year sentence for allowing 
a Japanese prisoner to die in a hospital, presumably through negligence. Even 
more illustrative is the case of the Russian truekdriver in the Chita area, who 
received a three-year sentence for calling a Mongol worker a "non-Russian" 
(nye-Russky). The legal principles underlying these cases involve purely Rus- 
sian concepts of justice, which have merely been adopted by the Soviet Govern- 
ment. 

Thievery is probably the most common offense in the U. S. S. R., and in the 
absence of all other punishable offenses, would provide an ample supply of 
convict laborers. State property is everybody's property, and the Russian worker 
feels no qualms in appropriating it. If he is apprehended, he regards it as mere 
misfortune, and goes off to serve his sentence of three to seven years. Nails, 
bits of metal, lumber, cloth, small hand tools, and food are the chief items of 
theft, but personal property is also fair game. The bulk of these thefts are 
neither reported nor punished. Stealing minor items from the place of work 
for personal use is generally condoned, and supervisors are as guilty as the 
workers. As one of them put it, it is less bother to let a man steal a nail to 
fix his door, than to process a formal requisition for it. The general opinion 
on this question is : "Let them take it ; it is theirs anyway." When a man is 
caught with minor items of stolen goods, he is usually scolded and forced to return 
the property to the factory or to the victim. If the plaintiff chooses to press 
charges, however, he will be sentenced. The embezzler is always prosecuted 
and punished with a long term, and thefts of money are usually punished. 
Truekdrivers, whose normal unit of theft is a truckload are heavily sentenced 
when caught, but workers and supervisors often cooperate with them to obtain 
goods or extra norm credit. The convict suffers no opprobrium, and on com- 
pleting his sentence, rejoins ordinary society on an equal footing. 

Sex morality apparently poses no serious problems in the U. S. S. R. Children 
of the crowded Soviet homes are early aware of relations between the sexes. 
Facilities for birth control are generally available, and widely used, due to the 
difficult living conditions. Ardent Komsomolists and serious young people try 
to be "above such things," but extra-family living and the independence of women 
militate against absteniousness. Premarital and extramarital relations are 
common, but do not constitute a factor of serious social disturbance. Homo- 
sexualism is severely punished in the Armed Forces, and is generally as vigorously 
disapproved among Russians as it is in the West. 



60 COMMUNIST INFILTRATION EST THE ARMY 

Religion in the Soviet Union has suffered a tremendous decline since 1920, due 
to Communist efforts to discredit religion and to dissuade the entire population. 
There is also a 'growing and genuine conviction among the young that religion 
is old-fashioned. There are 25,000 Orthodox Churches, 3,000 churches of other 
Christian sects, and several thousand Moslem mosques, which totals less than 
half of the number of pre-Soviet places of worship. Soviet authorities estimate 
that more than half of the people retain religious beliefs, but the distribution is 
heavily weighted in the upper-age brackets, and regular church attendance falls 
well below 50 percent. In Siberia, as in our Far West, religion was a secondary 
matter, as compared with the more immediate business of building up the country. 
Convict camps, of course, had no religious facilities, and ex-convicts normally 
did not revive their religious interests. Many Siberian villages today have 
neither church nor priest, and in many others the church is converted to other 
uses, or is completely unused. Japanese prisoners from Siberia usually described 
individual Russians as neither religious nor superstitious, but said that old 
people often kept a picture of the Saviour on the wall, or maintained a miniature 
shrine, complete with ikons and burning candles. 

D. Health 

The Soviet people display a high level of health and physical fitness. As com- 
pared to the Japanese prisoners, they were much stronger, and more disease 
resistant. The Russian diet is plain but nutritious, and the work, though hard, 
is not exhausting. The eight-hour day is almost universal, and even prisoners 
rest on Sundays. Medical facilities, though limited were available at all fac- 
tories and labor camps mentioned in reports. Persons with more than two 
degrees of fever were excused from work, and those with more than three degrees 
(101.4° F.) were hospitalized. Patients with serious ailments were often hos- 
pitalized for several months. Soviet doctors were generally competent by Soviet 
and Japanese standards, but were often handicapped by shortages in drugs and 
medical supplies. Common colds, malaria, and diarrhea were the most prevalent 
diseases in eastern Siberia. Preventive medicine included periodic inoculation 
for typhus, typhoid, and smallpox, and clothing at labor camps were frequently 
boiled to kill typhus-bearing body lice. Private homes were well kept, and 
collective farms maintained reasonably good sanitary standards. The incidence 
of death from disease and accidents appeared to be low throughout Siberia. 

E. Efficiency 

The Russian worker has great capacity for continued hard labor under extreme 
conditions, and through intensive efforts by the Government to provide technically 
trained cadres, his efficiency and ability have improved steadily. 

However, the Soviet skilled labor force is only about half as large as that of 
the United States, and the average factory worker is only one-fifth as productive. 
Lack of mechanization in industry is the chief reason for this, but the Soviet 
worker also tends to be wasteful of materials. His attitude is that there is 
always plenty of raw material, if he spoils a piece. He is also prone to work hard 
to accomplish his norm, and then stop, and he may forget to turn off the machin- 
ery in his haste to leave at quitting time. It is for this reason that the Soviet 
authorities raise the norm when the workers find means to surpass it regularly, 
or attempt to elicit a pledge from the workers to produce a given percent above 
norm. The Soviet worker is inventive and resourceful in meeting practical 
problems under pressure, but pressure is required to get his best efforts. He is 
normally a willing worker, but may lay down his tools if "roughly spoken to" by 
his supervisor. Nor will he work if he is not paid. In several instances, pay was 
temporarily held up in various Siberian establishments, due to failure of the 
office staff to submit vouchers punctually, and the entire force refused to work 
until properly paid. If anyone was punished due to these short "strikes" it was 
normally the supervisor or the responsible administrator. There were no true 
strikes, in the sense of protests against increased norms, for wage increases, or 
for any other cause, and the workers showed no inclination to organize secretly. 

3. ATTITUDES OF THE SOVIET PEOPLE 

A. Patriotism 

Imbued with a fanatical devotion to their native land, the Russian people have 
never stinted in supporting the most oppressive of governments when attacked by 
foreign forces, and they develop this spirit more powerfully as the situation 
becomes more desperate. The alert Communist Government, appreciating the 
power of Russian patriotism, has foresworn its most cherished dogmas of inter- 
nationalism and atheism to achieve the identification of Stalin, the "Red Army," 



COMMUNIST INFILTRATION IN THE ARMY 61 

and the Soviet State with the object of the people's patriotic devotion. This 
propaganda policy and the course of recent history have led the people to credit 
the Soviet Government with the victories won in "The Great Patriotic War" 
against Germany, and with the rapid industrial growth under the five-year plans. 
They take great pride in both. While thinking individuals are often bored and 
annoyed with the endless flood of official propaganda, the bulk of the people, 
lacking other information, appear to have absorbed the official viewpoint. 

Russian patriotism is both deep and pervasive. The ordinai-y Russian is proud 
of the vigorous elimate, the great open spaces, and the historic rivers and moun- 
tains, and can be moved to tears by a poetic description of the birch trees along 
the Volga. He is proud of the vastness of his country, both geographically, and 
population-wise. He is proud of Russian literature, drama, music, and art. He 
is proud of Russian artists and inventors, and is at least half-ready to believe 
that Russians invented the radio, telephone, and airplane. He is proud of his 
mellifluous (and intricate) Russian language. More recently, he has become 
proud of the fact that his country has risen to become a primary world power, 
and official propaganda gives a heavy play to impressive statistics in this regard. 
Always powerful, pride of country has become a much more conscious force in 
recent years. The Communist Government at first attempted to dismiss these 
ideas as signs of petty provincialism, but soon discovered that this policy es- 
tranged the people. After expelling the internationalist (Trotsky) faction, the 
Government soon surpassed all previous efforts in praise of the Russian culture 
and people. The same will apply to any outsider who seeks to influence Russian 
thinking. To gain their sympathy, he must pay tribute to the deeply admired 
elements of Russian culture, and is well advised to express respect and admira- 
tion for the Russian peoples. 

Much has been made of separatist tendencies in the non-Slavic and Ukrainian 
segments of the Soviet population, but it is doubtful that this factor in itself 
could constitute a vital advantage to a power undertaking military operations 
against the Soviet Union. The Communist Government, from the start, reversed 
the czarist policy, sought to remove the causes of resentment to Russian domina- 
tion among national and linguistic minority groups, and abolished all legal, 
political and social disabilities based on minority group membership. The 
Government has assiduously fostered local languages, literature, art, music, and 
social customs, so far as these were not inimical to national unity, ideals of 
equality between the sexes, Communist ideology, or antireligious policies. The 
official press is lavish in praising the achievements of collective farms, coopera- 
tives, factories, and a long list of cultural achievements among the Azerbaijani, 
Tadzhiks, Ukrainians, Kazakhs, and other minority groups. Peoples from all 
parts of the country are pointedly honored at festivals, celebrations, and all 
union political activities. Latent hunger for regional autonomy and political 
status was at least partially satisfied by granting varying degrees of semi- 
autonomous status to national groups, and by according representation on this 
basis in the Soviet of the Nationalities of the Supreme Soviet at Moscow. Even 
the normally democratic technique of elections is converted into a visible symbol 
of common participation in the Soviet State. The Soviet voter often has only one 
candidate to "choose" on the ballot, and in any case, he is aware that a nomina- 
tion committee of "Party and non-Party Bolsheviks" has selected the candidates 
in conformity with Party policy. No political platforms or policies are involved. 
The successful candidate is merely the recipient of a substantial honor, usually 
in recognition of outstanding achievements in industrial, agricultural, and 
cultural fields, and his popularity in the local community. His reward, aside 
from a very gratifying social recognition, is a free vacation in the capital, and 
the privilege of joining the "unanimous vote" in approving Party-sponsored 
policies. Such as it is, this reward is eagerly sought, and Soviet policy is to 
spread it among the maximum number of eminent citizens of all nationalities. 
Therefore, most deputies serve a single term, and are entirely satisfied in having 
joined the elite of "former deputies." The voter normally participates in meet- 
ings, where the relative merits of potential nominees are discussed, and where 
explicit public opinion has an important negative effect on nominating-com- 
mittee decisions. A nominee who is acceptable to the Party must also be ac- 
ceptable and highly respected by the public. Since elections have no connection 
with political power or political policy, and no important place in Party control, 
they constitute an innocuous and effective means of gaining public participation 
and support. About half of the Deputies of the Supreme Soviet are non-Great 
Russians, and about a third are non-Party members. Moreover, members of all 



62 COMMUNIST INFILTRATION IN THE ARMY 

Soviet nationalities are admitted to the Party without prejudice. Therefore there 
is a convincing illusion of universal and equal participation in the Government, 
Soviet elections generate great interest and enthusiasm. A general holiday is 
declared, and all citizens flock to the local polls to cast their ballots. This is 
followed by oratory, alcoholic conviviality, and a spirited discussion of nominees. 
All nominees are admittedly the best, but there is much good-humored argument 
as to who is the very best. The average Soviet citizen, whatever his nationality, 
is apt to feel that he has full and equal citizenship in the USSR, and shares much 
of the patriotic pride which is so marked in the Great Russian segment. 

The Soviet population is about 55 percent Great Russian, 20 percent Ukrainian, 
and 5 percent White Russian. The remaining 20 percent are represented by 
45 other nationalities. Of these, 15 vary between one and five million, and 
13 number less than 100,000. In general, the entire population supported the 
war effort and shared uncomplainingly in the tremendous wartime sacrifices from 
1941 to 1945. The Chochen, Ingush and Kalmyk peoples, totalling less than 
600,000 combined, were seriously remiss in patriotism, though many individual 
soldiers from these groups distinguished themselves in combat. The Ukraine 
has repeatedly sought special status within the USSR, and was partially satisfied 
when accorded separate membership in the United Nations, and the right to 
have diplomatic relations with other countries. Ukrainians, like Texans, are 
proud of their nationality, and many embraced the opportunity to establish a 
Ukrainian State during the German occupation. However, Ukrainian soldiers 
were completely zealous in defending the USSR, and hundreds of thousands of 
Ukrainian partisans, fully supported by the local population, contributed tre- 
mendously in defeating the German armies. It is impossible to say how much 
of this was caused by "German bestiality," but it is clear that the Ukraine 
provides a large reservoir of patriotic support for the Soviet Union, and that 
even in occupied portions, an invading power would have to contend at least 
initially, with strong partisan forces. It is also clear that extremely sagacious 
occupation policies would be required for the effective handling of the civilian 
population, especially in matters concerning partisans. If there is any chink 
in Soviet patriotism, it is in the Ukraine, and even there, it would be only partial, 
and conditioned on the activities of the occupying force. In general, Soviet 
patriotism has increased as a direct result of the national ordeal of World 
War II. The bulk of the citizenry is aware that the Soviet Union could not have 
coped with the German invasion, had they not made the sacrifices necessary for 
industrialization in the 1930's, and many feel that collectivization of agriculture 
was similarly justified. They feel that Stalin has been vindicated in his con- 
stant warnings on the threat of capitalist aggression, and are strongly inclined 
to believe him, now that these surly suspicions are directed against the United 

States. 

The Soviet people are overwhelmingly unanimous in their boundless confidence 
in Soviet defensive capabilities. They reason that if the Soviet Union could 
single-handedly defeat the colossal German onslaught, demolish Germany as 
a military power, and break the back of Japan in a fortnight's foray, she is bound 
to win in any war. Neither the United States nor the other Western Powers 
are credited for their valiant and crucial role in World War II. Instead, they 
are vilified for having held off until the last moment, as the Communist put it, 
when it had become safe to rush in and share the spoils. As for Lend-Lease, 
and other vitally needed wartime assistance, it is explained to the people as an 
insipid effort to pay for the war in American dollars and Soviet blood. In this 
setting, Stalin's occasional expressions of gratitude for American assistance 
merely made him look magnanimous. (Lend-Lease goods worth $11,000,000,000 
merited two single-column stories in the Soviet Press during the War.) The 
Soviet public was scarcely aware of the atomic bomb until 1949, when Molotov, 
following the Truman announcement on the Soviet atomic bomb tests, calmly 
reminded the people that he had admitted in 1947 that the bomb was no secret 
to the USSR. He went on to say that the Truman announcement was entirely 
correct, but that whereas the United States was interested only in offensive 
military utilization of atomic energy "to enslave the world," the USSR was 
even then employing her atomic resources for peaceful economic development. 
A nationwide series of lectures and press stories on atomic energy followed soon 
after, and the effect on public attitudes was immediate. Individual Soviet 
workers had previously reassured themselves by saying that the atomic bomb 
"could never kill all Russians" due to the vastness of the country. Now it 
became the universal opinion that the USSR had a far better bomb, and was 
more than a match for the West. By subtle implication, Molotov's speech made 



COMMUNIST INFILTRATION IN THE ARMY 63 

it obvious that Soviet atomic resources were abundant, since they could be 
used "primarily for peaceful purposes." Of course, it went without saying that 
defense requirements had already been fully met. Being entirely unaware of 
the technical problems of atomic bomb production, the Soviet mind conceives 
this as similar to producing torpedoes or jet aircraft, and would ignore or 
deny any Western quantitative advantage. 

Soviet people also have great confidence in the fighting ability of their indi- 
vidual soldiers. One Russian probably summarized the general view as follows : 
"One Russian is equal to five Japanese, two Americans, or one German, and in 
the latter case, the Russian will usually win in the end, due to his advantage 
in ingenuity and persistence." Soviet terminology in all fields is replete with 
military concepts, such as the factory "shock brigade," the "assault" on the 
five-year plan, "class warfare" in social struggles, and the "militant camp of 
the people's democracies," as opposed to the "decadent camp of the capitalist 
war-mongering aggressors." Similar military themes pervade literature and 
drama. The Soviet historian or dramatist is obsessed with the exploits of 
Russian and Soviet armed forces, and with partisans, spies and traitors. This 
form of propaganda is well calculated to stimulate the Soviet citizen's patri- 
otic sentiment, which strongly combine a sense of external menace with a mili- 
taristic readiness to meet and overcome hostile forces. 

Militarism is inherent in the theory and practice of Communism, and has 
permeated public attitudes toward the native land. The true communist is, 
ipso facto, half soldier (or guerrilla). In the USSR, military exercises have 
become the daily bread, not only of 18,000,000 Communists and Komsomolists, 
but also of the bulk of non-Communist Soviet youth. The sight of the soldier 
and the tools of war is both normal and acceptable to the Soviet citizen, who 
is convinced that the United States and her allies are plotting another war of 
aggression against his country. Militaristic attitudes are initiated in grade 
schools, where primers and arithmetic books invariably employ military illus- 
trations. In secondary schools, all boys receive military training, and millions 
•of Soviet youths who do not serve in the armed forces join training societies 
connected with the army, naval, or air forces, in what amounts to a reserve 
training system. Millions of other citizens are enjoined to qualify for the 
"Labor and Defense" badge, by passing rather stringent tests in rifle marksman- 
ship, grenade throwing, swimming, running, and first aid. By 1940, nearly 
20,000,000 people had qualified. Through such devices, the Soviet people have 
become psychologoically prepared for war at any time. 

B. Attitude Toward Other Countries 

In the post-war period, the Soviet Government has adroitly blended the peo- 
ple's patriotism with a profound fear of a capitalist coalition to destroy the 
USSR. Love of country plus confidence in Soviet power have been complemented 
and reinforced by fear of attack and the conviction that capitalist nations live 
only to exterminate the Soviet people. "Warlike" statements and threats by 
American military and political officials, and frequent American press items 
on atomic and other ultra-modern weapons are immediately reflected in the 
Soviet press to verify the rectitude of Communist foreign policy, and leave no 
shred of doubt in the USSR that the United States is preparing to attack. This 
highly developed Soviet "logic" is firmly reinforced by the Soviet bloc's "unre- 
mitting efforts to maintain world peace." Peace councils, peace rallies, and 
peace petitions receive a large portion of space in Soviet press and radio. Stalin 
has been most voluble in expressing his desire to live at peace with all nations, 
and has often iterated his belief that capitalist and Communist countries could 
cooperate (if the former could discard their "criminal plans for aggression"). 
The colossal Soviet effort to turn black into white appeared ludicrous to the 
informed peoples of the West, who saw the inadequate defense forces of Western 
countries dwarfed by the huges forces of the USSR, and were all too aware that 
every real threat to world peace from 1946 to 1951 was the direct result of 
Soviet machinations. However, it has long since convinced the people of the 
Soviet Union. In casual conversations with Japanese prisoners, many expressed 
dread in anticipating war with the United States, but none doubted that war 
would come. These factors had been focused into a stereotype of hatred for 
the United States, economically the greatest of the Western Powers. In con- 
sequence, the Soviet public is convinced that the United States and the NATO 
countries are swiftly preparing for a mortal struggle with the Soviet Union 
and her allies. 



64 COMMUNIST INFILTRATION IN THE ARMY 

There is, however, an obverse side to the Soviet people's attitude which will 
steadily redound to the advantage of the United States, both in war and in peace. 
The keynote of this attitude is respect. The profound respect which the peoples, 
and in more recent decades, even the governments of Europe have accorded to 
the United States has long been pervasive in Russia. Impressed from the first 
with the high level of American wages and living conditions, Russians and other 
European peoples later came to respect the United States for her wealth and 
power. Hundreds of thousands of Russian immigrants to the United States 
generated a deep feeling of kinship for the United States through letters and 
remittances to the old country. American famine relief to the Soviet Union in 
1921, and assistance through the UN Relief and Rehabilitation Administration 
in 1945-46, have generated good will toward the United States and recognition of 
her fine humanitarian attributes which the Soviet Government has vainly tried 
to dispel. Even more difficult to counteract has been the Communist Party's 
own veneration of American efficiency, productivity, and industrial might. Many 
American methods of accounting, factory layout, management, and industrial 
techniques were frankly borrowed, and American standards of production were 
established as a goal for Soviet planners. Countless mechanical contrivances 
were copied in toto, particularly in the automotive, aviation, and electronics fields. 
The national goal was to reach and surpass American production through the 
five-year plans, and Stalin even defined Soviet Communism as "American prac- 
ticality plus Russian idealism." In Soviet theory, Communism is justified largely 
on the ground that it can produce a much higher and more uniform standard of 
living than is possible under a capitalist system. It is based on Marx's profound 
misunderstanding of the mechanics of capitalist production and enterprise, and 
remains the most vulnerable point of Communist dogma. Since the "hate Amer- 
ica" campaign is largely a post-war development, the "admire America" campaign 
and the extremely favorable impressions of earlier years are still potentially 
dominant in the Russian mind. 

Public attitudes toward the peoples of European countries are basically favor- 
able, due to the naturally friendly disposition of Russians. They have a deep- 
seated conviction on the fundamental equality and goodness of men, both as 
individuals and as national or cultural groups. The Soviet Government has 
exploited this belief as acceptable to Communist theory, and often stresses that 
the toilers of all countries form a single class. Consequently, the Soviet press 
often features complimentary articles expressing the sympathy and brotherhood 
of the Soviet people for the British, French, Italian, German, and other European 
peoples. It is significant, by comparison, that such references to the American 
people have become quite rare in the post-war period. The more academic ques- 
tion of attitudes toward European governments is decided almost entirely by 
existing political alignments. Soviet people are inclined to accept the official 
view that governments which cooperate in the defense policies of the United 
States or potential or actual enemies, and even this is modified by the thesis that 
such governments are the victims of American economic "exploitation." The 
United States remains the cornerstone of anti-Soviet villainy, and hostile atti- 
tudes toward other countries are secondary. Friendly attitudes to countries 
within the Communist bloc are energetically encouraged, through cultural 
exchanges, delegations, and favorable press. 

It is not known to what extent the people would support large-scale Soviet 
military aggression outside the USSR. Heretofore, Soviet nationalism has 
been nourished on an almost morbid defense psychology. The nation has al- 
ways been pictured as surrounded by powerful enemies under an eternal menace 
of invasion. There can be no doubt as to the power and speed of public support 
when the people feel their country is attacked. Therefore, it is extremely prob- 
able that a Soviet invasion of neighboring territory will be convincingly pre- 
sented as a defensive response to enemy aggression. For several years, the Soviet 
Government has expended great labor to label the United States as a capitalist 
aggressor nation. Any act by non-Communist countries which the government 
may choose to label as aggression will be directly imputed to the United States, 
since these countries are represented as mere American puppets. An excellent 
example is the Republic of Korea's "aggression" against North Korea, in June 
1950. Most Soviet citizens fully believe that the United States deliberately in- 
stigated this, and they could give little credence to the historical facts. What- 
ever the Soviet propaganda line for a war outside the USSR, the public probably 
would not rise spontaneously to the heights of heroism and sacrifice attained in 
World War II, but they would effectively and willingly support it. This sup- 
port would be considerably more firm in efforts to defend or "liberate" neigh- 
boring Slav countries to the west, than in the case of countries in the Far East. 



COMMUNIST INFILTRATION IN THE ARMY 65 

Last minute efforts to arouse public sentiment against Japan in the final stages 
of World War II were quite unsuccessful. First, there has been no hostile 
incursion into the USSR. Second, Japan as well as China seemed remote and 
unimportant to the Soviet people. Much greater importance is accorded to such 
countries as Poland, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia, where the 
lansuaiie differences were hardly greater than those between modern English and 
old Scotch, and the people share a vague, common ideal of Pan-Slavism and 
racial kindred. Since the advent of a Communist Government in China, Soviet 
authorities have attempted to counteract tbis indifference, but it will probably 
require many years to effect any significant change in public attitudes. 

C. Racial Attitudes 

The centuries-old melting-pot process in the Soviet Union has obliterated or 
obscured the lines of racial distinction, Slavs, Greeks, Turks, Poles, Scandinavi- 
ans, Finns, Tatars, and many others have blended into a single people, to the 
point where similarities in culture, tradition, custom, and outlook far outweigh 
the differences. There is a dividing line between Russian and non-Russian, but 
it can readily be crossed by learning the Russian language and by marriage, and 
it rarely operates as a barrier to individual progress. 

As a carryover from strong religious attitudes of the medieval and Czarist 
pact, anti-Semitism is still mildly diffused through the society. However, it is 
undoubtedly waning, due to the decline of religion, and the rigorous legal bans 
on discrimination. The very moderate degree of anti-Semitic feeling among 
the population appears to be similar to that expressed in the American Middle 
West. Most people are only vaguely aware of the "Hebrews" (as the Russians 
call them) as a separate group. Attitudes are typified by such expressions as' 
"Many Jews are fine as individuals, but are not likable as a group," or the 
rather extreme statement of a Siberian woman that "Jews generally are dirty, 
and Birobidzhan (the capital of the Jewish Autonomous Oblast) is the dirtiest 
place in all Russia." These attitudes are by no means universal. Only 25 per- 
cent of the people in the Jewish Oblast are Jewish, and the bulk of the USSR's 
3.000,000 Jews are distributed throughout the country. In education, military 
service, occupation, and criminal liability, Jews are not to be distinguished 
from the rest of the population, and have no military significance as a separate 
group. 

The Soviet Government has derived one marked political advantage from the 
Russians' lack of social and racial exclusiveness. In proselyting for Commu- 
nism among backward peoples, the Soviet political missionary is perfectly at 
ease with the poorest elements of the population, whether in Indo-China, Outer 
Mongolia, or South Africa. By contrast, the French, British or American politi- 
cal representative is impelled to seek out the educated upper class, or westernised 
elements, and even then remains rather painfully conscious of the social gap. 
He is hard pressed to hide his feelings of superiority, and the contact is likely 
to lack warmth and sincerity. Unlike the Western official, the Communist mis- 
sionary, working among the lower or quasi-intellectual elements of the popula- 
tion, has no preestablished system of indigenous political beliefs to contend 
with. The more energetic local inhabitants, impressed by his warm friendliness 
and his "scientific" approach to social problems, are easily swayed to the ideals 
of "giving the worker tbe full fruits of his' labor," and of "recognizing the 
equality of all races and peoples." In assessing the influence of Communist 
agitators it is important to note that tbe impressive ideal of equality is well 
demonstrated in the actual relations between the native and the Russian, and 
the impression is vividly reinforced when the native convert later goes to Moscow 
for extended study. There is nothing to make him feel uncomfortably con- 
spicuous as an alien. His first crude attempts with the language are sympa- 
thetically received. At dances, parties, and other social affairs he is welcomed 
into the group without friction or embarrassment. The social and psychological 
traits underlying this phenomenon are typically Russian, rather than Com- 
munist. However, the Soviet Government has exploited them to the extreme, 
and has made Communism a force to be reckoned with in all countries in the 
Far East. Persuasion has been far more important than compulsion in areas 
such as China, Indo-China, Japan and the Philippines, and even in forcefully 
Communized areas in eastern Europe, the Communist missionaries are making 
strenuous efforts to "educate" the people, and to generate favorable attitudes. 
It is impossible to overstress the point that genuine inner conviction is the 
driving force of Communism. It is identical with the force which spread 
Christianity, Mohammedanism, and other religions over vast areas, and has 



66 COMMUNIST INFILTRATION IN THE ARMY 

little to do with real logic. Terror, riots, and police control, so often the subject 
of Western criticism of Communism, are not employed to compel converts into 
the faith. They are employed by converts either to maintain or to establish a 
Communist form of government. Such criticisms may be effective, though usually 
in a passive sense, where the Communist threat is merely incipient, but are quite 
useless against the converts themselves, who see that such arguments attack only 
the method, and not the substance of Communism. In those areas where Com- 
munists are in power, Soviet influence is growing steadily, if imperceptibly. 
Growth of Soviet influence in backward areas not dominated by Communism may 
be equally steady, but is usually far less perceptible, and may discolse its true 
force only when natural, economic, or political disaster has upset the existing 
social order. In each case the methods are based on the Russian facility for 
establishing firm social contacts, and on the Soviet method of direct approach to 
the lowest classes of society in the target area. 

D. Public Attitudes Toward the Soviet Government 

In the absence of sociological data, public opinion polls, significant voting statis- 
tics, a free press, and other normal indicators of public temper, estimates of Soviet 
attitudes toward the Communist Government and Party must depend on overt 
signs, general analysis, and pure conjecture. The hazards of this process are well 
illustrated by the German's experience in World War II. Innumerable reports 
of widespread discontent, hatred for the MVD (now supplanted by the MGB), 
hostility toward the Government, and contempt for Communism in the USSR 
convinced the Nazi leaders that any severe external pressure would precipitate a 
general revolt in the Soviet hinterland. From the experience in other parts of 
Europe, they assumed there was little to fear from the population in Soviet areas 
which they might occupy. It was on this basis that a six weeks' campaign was 
deemed sufficient to establish German authority there. Instead, the Soviet people 
evinced a solidarity rivaled only by the British, and maintained partisan warfare 
in occupied areas on a scale that is unique in history. The scale and tempo of the 
German defeat was due in good part to their inability to assess Soviet public 
opinion and attitudes. 

Extreme caution is required in accepting hearsay data. The opinion of 2,000,000 
White Russian refugees and small numbers of deserters and escapees cannot be 
taken as representative of the 200,000,000 who remain in the USSR. Foreign 
travelers also tend to distort what they see in terms of their own background, 
and are readily misled by the typically human tendency of the Russian to display 
deference to his correspondent's viewpoint, particularly if the acquaintance is 
casual. The ardent foreign Communist visiting the USSR will attract his own 
kind, and receives few negative impressions from those he talks to. Similarly, 
Russians wishing to vent grievances will seek out the American or British official, 
and casual acquaintances will seem to agree with his opinions. Moreover, the 
outsider is likely to impute his own reactions to the Soviet people, forgetting that 
a situation intolerable to an American may be acceptable as familiar routine to 
a Soviet citizen. 

The primary Soviet attitude to the Government is one of acceptance, generally 
without mental reservations. The idea of actively opposing the Government on 
political questions is incomprehensible to the Soviet citizen. He has neither the 
means nor the inclination to develop organized criticism of the current regime; 
except as regards procedural matters on the lower levels. If permitted political 
freedom, the public presumably would produce variously oriented political parties 
of considerable vigor, since Russians readily develop a keen interest in public 
affairs, and there exists a definite variety of regional and economic interests. As 
matters stand, Soviet individuals can occasionally express politically divergent 
sentiments in pair conversations at no great risk of prosecution, but independent 
group discussions are immpossible, due to the MGB's universal informant net, 
and to the fact that unfavorable remarks would be severely punished. It is 
similarly out of the question to publish materials criticizing the Communist 
Regime, since it is a serious offense to possess duplicating machines without spe- 
cific authorization and control. The Soviet citizen understands and accepts these 
effectively enforced limitations without undue psychological strain. He is irri- 
tated, but in general, critical and hostile attitudes never get beyond the stage of 
private opinion, and therefore are almost never crystallized into a program of 
action. 

Where organized opposition does occur, it is immediately punished and publi- 
sized as treason against the Soviet people. Retribution is directed against a 
small segment of the population, carefully and convincingly labeled as "decadent 
bourgeois elements," "reactionary Kulak (rich peasant) remnants," "enemy-in- 



COMMUNIST INFILTRATION IN THE ARMY 67 

spired saboteurs and wreckers," or as "hirelings and spies of the capitalist aggres- 
sors." Victims usually confess at great length in open court, removing all public 
doubt as to the truth of the charge. Although he resents the MVD system, the 
average man feels that there is no threat to his own security, and is inclined to 
applaud the diligence of the security agencies in rooting out subversive elements. 
Irritating though the rigid surveillance may be, he tends to agree with the Party 
officials that it is necessary for his country's protection. When a member of his 
own group is punished, the "crime" involved has normally been common knowl- 
edge, and there is no surprise when the offender is taken off to the labor camp. 

National leaders are widely respected and admired but the prevailing public 
attitude is relatively free of emotion. Neither affection nor hostility is expressed, 
but their sincerity and ability are generally unquestioned. Maladministration is 
blamed on intermediate officials, and poor living conditions are expected to im- 
prove with the expansion of production. Stalin and Molotov are regarded as 
the "greatest men in the Soviet Union, today" but many in Siberia expressed the 
opinion that Lenin was even greater. Surprisingly, Molotov is often cited as a 
greater man than Stalin. Contrary to Western belief, there appears to be little 
public antipathy toward any of the top Communist leaders. 

Regarding Communism, and the Communist Party, the reaction corresponds 
rather closely to age groups. Those above 40, representing 25 percent of the 
population, have remained convinced that Communism is undesirable. They 
frequently state that life was easier and better under the czars, and farmers still 
express disappointment about their limited rights on the land. Those below 40 
are generally favorable and enthusiasm mounts in inverse proportion to age, into 
the middle ranks of the Komsomols. The Communist Party is generally respected 
as the primary organization of the Govei'nment, and the capable, hard-working 
Party member often earns great admiration for his diligence and ability. He is 
usually on terms of friendly intimacy with nonmembers around him. At the 
same time, the lax or careless Party member is held in some contempt for failure 
to live up to his supposed ideals, and will get little sympathy if he loses his card 
in the purge. In no case is the local Party member held in awe until he has 
risen high in the ranks, and occupies a responsible position. 

The vast difference in the proportion of "communists" in the USSR, as com- 
pared with the United States must be taken into account in assessing the Soviet 
people's attitude. Individuals directly connected with the Communist Party 
through membership in the Party, the Komsomol, or the Pioneers are so numer- 
ous that every Russian is personally acquainted with several of them. The ratio 
of the aggregate of members to non-members in the general population is about 
1 to 12 in rural areas and 1 to 5 in urban areas. The USSR is ruled by a few 
hundred Party members in the highest echelon of government. The great mass 
of Party-affiliated people are distinguishable from the general public only in 
their more intense indoctrination and in their somewhat more immediate liability 
to Government and Party control. There is no apparent friction or ill feeling 
between the two groups. The attitude of the adult nonmember, even when 
mildly anti-Communist, is necessarily tempered by the fact that he has several 
Communist-affiliated members in his immediate family and circle of friends, and 
may well have been a member of one or both junior organizations for several 
years during his childhood. In the United States the ratio of communists and 
Communist sympathizers to the urban population is about 1 to 500. Most Amer- 
icans are fortunate enough never to have knowingly had personal contact with a 
professed communist. In the USSR the communist is a patriot, a civic booster, 
and frequently a war hero, doing his best to build up his country. In the United 
States the communist is at best a fool, and at worst a traitor, whose primary aim 
is to destroy his country. Communists in the USSR enjoy public admiration, 
while those in the United States are justly condemned as actual or potential 
felons. Even a well-informed American has great difficulty in understanding how 
a Russian could fail to share his revulsion toward communists, and the Russian 
is equally incredulous at the American attitude. Therefore, the American critic 
must strive to understand the extreme contrast between the two viewpoints, if 
he hopes to influence the Soviet people. To be intelligible to Russians, criticisms 
must not be directed against communists generally, but against various Commu- 
nist beliefs and against specific malpractices of the Communist Government. 

It is extremely difficult to determine the attitude of the millions of convicts and 
ex-convicts who have received or served 3- to 20-year sentences in the forced labor 
camps. Without attempting to analyze the vague data on numbers, it may be 
assumed that the convict population has averaged not less than 10,000,000 since 
1930, and that the average sentence is 5 years. On this basis, 40,000,000 would 



68 COMMUNIST INFILTRATION LN THE ARMY 

have completed sentence by 1950, of which about half have been permanently 
settled in Siberia. This agrees with Japanese prisoner estimates that about half 
of the free population in Siberia are ex-convicts. Incidentally, Japanese 
prisoners were unable to confirm stories of atrocious conditions and high death 
rates in the labor camps. Working in the same factories with prisoners of war 
and free workers, the convicts appear to have had the same fairly effective medi- 
cal care. Moreover, the convicts applied themselves only when the factory man- 
ager was present, sneaked off to take naps when opportunity offered, and often 
advised the Japanese to work more slowly, to keep the norm from rising. There 
was no suggestion that they were undernourished or physically mistreated. 
Nearly all Japanese prisoners believed that the convicts were "against the 
Regime," but the only specific complaint by the convicts was that their sentence 
was too long for what they did. Nearly all convicts who talked to the Japanese 
expressed this resentment, and many said they hoped there would soon be a 
war between the US and the USSR, because they would then be released to join 
the armed forces without having to serve their sentence. No one expressed the 
hope or the belief that the USSR would be defeated in such a war, nor was there 
any indication of anti-Soviet movements among the convicts. 

Since the millions of ex-convicts in Siberia share the mildly favorable attitude 
of the general public toward the Government, and since there are no observable 
subversive trends among present convicts, it appears that there is no strong 
latent opposition to the Communist Regime. Widespread resentment of various 
types remains inarticulate and gives no promise of becoming a significant 
political force so long as the Soviet Government maintains its present controls, 
and continues positive programs of propaganda, political (Communist) educa- 
tion, and economic and social development. 

4. PSYCHOLOGY OF THE SOLDIER 

A. General 

The Soviet soldier is basically a Soviet citizen in uniform. He shares the same 
attitudes, beliefs, and response patterns, though these are modified and elaborated 
by more intensive indoctrination and training. In joining the military service, he 
is fulfilling an old childhood ambition. He is gratified by the universal admira- 
tion and respect accorded a soldier in the USSR. He has argued the relative 
merits of service in artillery, tank forces, air, and navy since his early school 
days, and is thoroughly predisposed to develop a great pride in the service of his 
choice. The infantry, which was never glamorized like the other services, falls 
at the end of his preference list, but the foot soldier's vital role is recognized and 
respected. In this regard, postservice prospects have an important influence, 
because the ex-service man's civilian earning power will be greatly increased if 
he receives technical training in military transport, communications, or aviation. 

The Soviet soldier develops typical "GI" attitudes after he has completed two 
or three years of service. He will complain about army food, pay, promotions, and 
place of service. Some soldiers serving in Siberia said that the strict discipline 
of army life was more difficult than that of civilians, but in the prevailing opinion 
the army was a welcome relief from the unremitting pressure of labor norms in 
the factories. Soldiers nearing the end of their enlistment looked forward to 
their release, and a few complained bitterly that they had completed eight years' 
service with no release in sight. (The term of service is usually not more than 
three years.) Since the bulk of servicemen, other than officers and noncommis- 
sioned officers, are conscriptees, the civilian orientation toward military life is 
dominant, and soldiers put a good deal of thought in their postservice civilian 
status, though no one tries to avoid military service. 

Regarding health, stamina, and native intelligence, the Soviet soldier is neither 
better nor worse than other European soldiers. Basically healthy through a 
sound diet and hard work, the Soviet recruit acquires much of his stamina from 
rigorous training, and from a mental acclimatization to high standards of indi- 
vidual performance. The old Suvorov doctrine, "Hard on the training ground, 
easy on the battlefield," is readily understood and accepted. In bis patience, 
ingenuity, and initiative, the Soviet soldier was fully comparable to the well- 
trained German troops in World War II, and prejudicial German descriptions 
of him as "stupid, fatalistic, immune to suffering, and indifferent to death" were 
far more unjust to the German forces who had to meet him in battle than they 
were to the Soviet troops. On the other hand, inordinate Allied praise for the 
valor and zeal of Soviet troops, as exemplified in the epic battles of Moscow, Kiev, 
Sevastopol, and Stalingrad, has led to the erroneous impression of an almost 



COMMUNIST INFILTRATION IN THE ARMY 69 

superhuman Soviet fighting man. It must be stressed that in his human charac- 
teristics, innate ability, and basic psychological endowment, the Soviet soldier 
differs little, if at all, from the average European soldier. Insofar as his per- 
formance on the battlefield is unique, it must be accounted for by differences in 
environment, training, and indoctrination. 

B. Psychological Effect of Environment 

The Soviet soldier is, of course, inured to the extremes of Russian weather, 
and need not be taught how to keep warm in winter. Nor is daily existence in 
the field a serious problem, for most Russians were born on the iarm, and per- 
formed their first regular labor there. Being used to what we would call a low 
standard of consumption, the Soviet soldier enjoys better food, clothing, and 
shelter in the Soviet Armed Forces than he knew as a civilian. In most cases 
he has his first direct contact with trucks, radios, telephones, and other interesting 
mechanical equipment in the army. Since he enjoys a higher status and better 
living conditions in the service than in civilian life, the adjustment is stimulat- 
ing rather than painful, and he is generally well disposed toward it. 

The Soviet soldier is fully acclimated to group living. Since privacy and the 
opportunity to be individualistic are unknown to him, he finds little difference 
in the communal life of the soldier, and readily adopts a group orientation in the 
service. The practical significance of this easy sociability is twofold. First, it 
speeds the process of forming, expanding, and training small units. Recruits 
readily fall into place in any desired organization pattern. Due to their posi- 
tive attitude to the members of the group, ideas and techniques rapidly diffuse 
through the unit, and largely compensate for relative Soviet disadvantages in 
formal education. The soldier's practice of throwing himself wholeheartedly 
into all activities of his group is not articulated as an ideal ; it is a habit. Thus, 
the esprit de corps achieved only with considerable effort in Western armies is 
present in a Soviet unit almost from its inception. Second, there is little diffi- 
culty arising from clashes of personality, or "problem children," in the Soviet 
forces. As was stated above, personal differences are speedily resolved, usually 
in a very heated argument. Once resolved, adjustment is usually permanent and 
relations remain cordial. The Soviet infantry company commander gets more 
than his share of dull-normal (above moron level), illiterate, and non-Russian- 
speaking recruits, but he is not troubled by the immature, the psychopathic 
personality, and the "mama's boy" types — all of which develop through insuffi- 
cient group contacts. Therefore, he probably has a net advantage over his 
harried counterpart in the West, particularly under the stress of war. The sub- 
standard Soviet recruit may require a great deal of patience and attention from 
his noncommissioned officers, but he is usually susceptible to individual and 
group pressure, and once trained, he will function efficiently and dependably 
within his limited scope. 

Deeply ingrained in the Russian personality is the "nechevo" attitude. It is a 
centuries-old inheritance of habitual self-discipline which sustains the Soviet 
soldier, as well as the civilian, in time of war. or in any other difficult circum- 
stance. In this usage it may be translated "it's nothing at all," though in an- 
swering direct personal queries, the Russian will use it to indicate that everything 
is all right. It symbolizes the Russian habit of accepting what must be accepted, 
without undue inner turmoil, and enables the soldier to preserve his good humor 
through toil, privation, and disappointment. It operates as a cushion against 
psychological shock. Thus the Russian may become temporarily embittered, or 
display great emotion for a short time, but he soon reverts to normal, and accepts 
the new situation with a minimum of friction. Moreover, successive shocks 
are only slightly cumulative in effect. The Soviet soldier does not "store up" 
insults, disappointments, defeats, and disasters. While his training accentu- 
ates the positive aspect of his situation, he has his own mechanism for "de- 
centuating" the negative aspects. Thus, if Soviet troops withstand the first 
shock of an assult, they are likely to evince an indefatiguable solidarity in facing 
successive assaults. In the offense, they are capable of renewing the attack 
indefinitely, if they are not over-awed at the very start by the power and de- 
termination of the enemy's response. By the same token, the soldier endures 
repeated forced marches, carries out two-day infiltration operations in the midst 
of hostile troops, or goes on half-rations for days on end, without suffering any 
severe decline in morale. 

The "nechevo"' attitude sustains the un't, as well as the individual, but it is 
the unit which receives virtually all emphasis. Praise and censure are more 
often accorded to a unit than to an individual. Even individual awards are 



70 



COMMUNIST INFILTRATION IN THE ARMY 



prized in good part because they confer additional status on the unit. Deaths 
of individuals in battle are more easily accepted through primary emphasis on 
the unit, which no one regards as mortal. In conformity with this attitude, the 
Soviet unit of replacement was the regiment or division, not the individual. 
This marked cultural trait of "groupism" (as opposed to individualism) accounts 
for the Soviet soldier's ability to carry on in spite of heavy losses. Consequently 
a Soviet unit, from a squad or gun crew up to an army, may hold a hopelessly iso- 
lated position for days and weeks after the main battle line has passed to its 
rear, and having become well established in such a position, is likely to fight 
until the last of its firing points is destroyed. 

C. Psychological Effect of Training 

The stimulus of new experience provided incentive to the already partially 
trained and group-oriented Soviet soldier. The Soviet recruit has worked his 
schoolboy arithmetic with military problems. If he had ten years of schooling, 
it included three years of military training. Lacking that, he has probably 
already qualified with the rifle in earning his "Ready for Labor and Defense" 
medal, or he has probably received training in one of the military service 
"friendship" societies. He has full psychological preparation for small-unit 
training, and is soon ready to participate in field maneuvers. 

The bulk of able-bodied Soviet men are inducted at age 19 for a two-to-three 
year training period. To sustain a "normal peace time level," a 4,000,000 men, 
about 1,000.000 draftees pour into the Soviet military units each year for train- 
ing. The training schedule is progressive, simple, and intensive. Equipment is 
simple in design, maintenance, and servicing, so as not to tax the mental powers 
of the trainee. Military doctrine and techniques are drilled into the men by 
simple repetition. The soldiers works hard throughout the strenuous training 
day. Those who readily absorb the training material assist those who are back- 
ward, and as soon as individuals or small units have mastered one phase of 
training, they are hurried into the nest. Pressure is heavy throughout the train- 
ing period, since officers and units are rated by their performance in the fall 
maneuvers, which climax the training year. The Soviet system also presents a 
serious challenge to the corps of regular officers and noncommissioned officers, 
who must instill sound military techniques into the huge annual increments of 
recruits year after year, under circumstances of mass-induction not unlike those 
of wartime. Since the most highly trained elements continuously feed back into 
civilian life, swelling the pool of trained reserves, the Soviet command never 
reaches the point where it can consider its mission accomplished. By this means, 
in-service elements are fully exercised, and the reserves are always available for 
immediate mobilization. Both regular and trainee components are kept at a high 
level of morale by being maintained at peak performance, on the theory that 
a busy soldier is a contented soldier. 

The Soviet soldier's "oft' duty" time is so filled with compulsory meetings, 
lectures, athletic training, and individual study, that he has little opportunity 
to develop other than service-connected interests. Self-study, self-improvement, 
and self-criticism are supposed to keynote these informal group activities, under 
the careful supervision of the political officer, almost invariably an ardent, and 
highly trained Communist Party member. By this means, the soldier acquires 
a considerable "education" along strictly Communist lines, to the extent that it 
is a mistake to judge his educational level solely by his six years of grammar 
schooling. Three-hour orientation meetings often are held three evenings weekly, 
and to avoid humiliation for his ignorance, the soldier must study individually, 
at least one additional evening. The resulting education in a three-year training 
term is analogous to the narrowly prescribed education of a dogmatic religious 
sect, but it is just as useful as the most liberal education would be in a free 
society. It allows the Russian, both as soldier and as civilian, to acquire added 
status in Soviet society, commensurate with his absorptive and expository powers. 
In fact, skill in the understanding, application, and diffusion of Communist 
doctrine is a clear guarantee of advancement in almost any field of endeavor in 
the USSR. 

As is the Communist practice elsewhere, the political officer ingratiates him- 
self with the men, and sells his methods by persuasive means. Along with the 
lectures on Communist theory, the patriotic mission of the soldier, and Soviet 
progress and propaganda, he arranges athletic events, outings, parties and 
dances. Functioning as chaplain, he also attends to individual personal problems 
of the men, and may make recommendations on the issue of furloughs and 
passes. In this congenial role he exercises considerable influence with the men, 



COMMUNIST INFILTRATION IN THE ARMY 71 

and is a strong factor in maintaining morale and "Communist vigilance," which 
constitute his primary responsibility. As a result of his extensive official and 
informal training, the Soviet soldier is apt to be well-informed on small-unit 
military matters, and on Communist doggerel, but on nothing else. The psycho- 
logical effect is to make him a machine which can function well only in a mili- 
tary unit, where he gives a very good account of himself. The Soviet soldier, 
however, is very receptive to new information. He has a highly developed 
faculty of alertness, probably through the constant give-and-take of group living, 
and has forcibly absorbed tremendous quantities of training materials and the 
ever-changing Communist catechism. Since he has no experience with criticism 
of this theoretical material, and is conditioned to accept anything that is not 
too disparate from his culture pattern, the Soviet soldier is very susceptible to 
any well-prepared propaganda. 

Regarding surrender, Soviet doctrine and Russian tradition treat it as a crime 
similar to desertion. The soldier is never instructed "what to do in case of 
capture." Instead, he is solemnly informed that surrender is a shameful betrayal 
of comrades and country and that every prisoner of war will some day answer 
for his crime to a Soviet military court. He knows that the Russian PWs who 
served with the Germans were summarily shot, and that all others have served 
varying terms of forced labor. Most important, he accepts this doctrine as .iust 
and proper, and has developed a powerful psychological block against surrender- 
ing. This block fails under stress in many cases, but in general, Soviet troops 
will continue resisting long after a more balanced soldier would perceive the 
futility of further struggle. Otherwise Soviet discipline is roughly comparable 
to that of Western armies. Minor violations are corrected on the spot by fellow 
soldiers or by superiors. Secondary offenses of a more culpable nature, such 
as petty thefts, drunkenness, unbecoming behavior in public, and in short, any- 
thing that would degrade the -'honorable name of soldier," are tried by Com- 
rades' Courts, or in the case of officers, by Comrades' Courts of Honor. Mem- 
bers of such courts are of comparable rank to that of the accused. Penalties, 
which are announced and executed in public, include vigorous reprimands, lectures 
to the offender, and recommendation for demotion. Since Soviet people in gen- 
eral are very sensitive to group pressure, the deep humiliation of being repri- 
manded before one's own unit is normally sufficient to force the desired change 
in conduct. The soldier is equally responsible for the protection of "state 
property," the fulfillment of all orders from his superiors, and the security of 
military information. For violation of these responsibilities he is liable to trial 
by a military tribunal. He receives graduated punishments for a very wide 
category of offenses, and is rewarded for outstanding performance of duty. 
The intensity of Soviet training, backed up by a system of fairly stringent punish- 
ments and effective rewards, has developed a habit of obedience and an un- 
reasoning confidence in the Soviet fighting man. Never having had any alternative 
to obedience, he is long habituated to carrying out orders. Having: always carried 
out orders, he is confident that all orders can be carried out. If the orders are 
sufficiently flexible to admit of several solutions, he has enough ingenuity to work 
out a good, practical solution which is well adapted to the circumstances. If 
the orders are too specific, however, he will carry them out to the letter. In a 
sense this may be called good discipline, but over-precise and impossible orders 
have often robbed the soldier of the opportunity to exploit his experience and 
intimate knowledge of the situation, and have forfeited whole units needlessly. 

D. Psychological Effect of Indoctrination 

The intense indoctrination of the Soviet citizen and soldier is primarily 
Communist in content, though it has an extended superstructure of distorted 
information on current events, economics, and Soviet policy. Its influence is 
moderately strong in the below-40 brackets, and amounts to an obsession among 
th 16,000,000 Communist Party and Young Communist League members. In 
the Armed Forces, Communist indoctrination is more intensive and more uni- 
formly strong than among parallel civilian groups. Operating in an intellectual 
vacuum, Communism exercises a strong appeal of optimism, progress, and 
righteousness, which is incomprehensible to the more cultivated peoples of the 
West. Even the less receptive of the Soviet soldiers are vaguely but firmly 
convinced that Communism is "right," and the active Communists are certain 
that it is the key to world progress, prosperity, and peace. To the well-indoc- 
trinated soldier, anti-Communist nations are not only the mortal enemies of 
his country; they are also the enemies of "justice," "science," and "advance- 
ment." The military and morale importance of this is twofold. First, it adds 
to the ordinary soldier's already strong patriotic incentive to win. Second, 



72 COMMUNIST INFILTRATION IN THE ARMY 

it supports the unreasoning fanaticism of the ardent Communists, who spark- 
plug Soviet military units down to platoon level. The latter constitute a strong 
factor in the strength and cohesiveness of the Soviet military unit. There is no 
mistaking the genuineness of their appeal, for they do not merely give advice 
and encouragement from' the deep rear. As ordinary soldiers and squad leaders 
in combat, they regularly set a superb example of bravery and skill during 
World War II. Political officers of battalion, regiment, and division level 
l'egularly joined in the worst of the fighting, and Party members suffered such 
disproportionate casualties that it became a serious problem to find suitably 
trained and experienced replacements for them. Soldiers, veterans, and civilians 
alike were so impressed with their heroism and zeal during the "Patriotic War," 
that even the MVD element of the Communist Government came to be sincerely 
admired for its vital role in the struggle. 

Communist indoctrination has convinced both civilians and servicemen that 
the Soviet Army is the finest on earth, and that it is the nation's great bulwark 
against a hostile, wicked world. As a result, the popular Soviet attitude to the 
military is virtually the reverse of that prevailing in the West. The Army 
is a revered institution, and the object of pride and devotion. The people are 
never critical of the army, or of defense expenditure. In wartime, the slogan 
is "Everything for the front," and in peace, "Everything needful for the Armed 
Forces !" Consequently there is very little resentment of military training or 
military service. Even today, the Communist hierarchy could probably put an 
end to public resentment against high norms and low incomes, if the sacrifice 
were justified as essential to national defense and a powerful army. Such an 
explanation, however, would not square with the current fiction that the USSR 
is "employing her resources for peace," while the capitalist countries are "im- 
poverishing their peoples to finance preparations for war." Soviet leaders will 
stress this theme to the utmost when war comes, and economic privation will 
immediately disappear as a psychological warfare target, because those who 
remain civilians are proud to contribute to the war effort by working hard and 
by doing without. 

In war, the nation stresses the victories and defeats of units, not of individuals. 
Th°r« is little, if anv, mention of the individual soldier's privations and suffering, 
and hardly any reference to casualties. Public attitudes do not invite the Soviet 
soldier to pity himself, or to brood on the possibility of death. Instead, he is 
presumed to be personally responsible for defeating the enemy. The slogan in 
World War II was, "Death to the Invader !" and "Kill Him, Kill Him !" Stalin's 
m^«sage to troops in the Battle of Moscow conformed fully with public feeling: 
"The enemy is destroying your country. If you don't stop him, nobody stops 
him." The soldier's job was not to defend himself or his buddies, or to avoid 
death, but to kill and defeat the enemy. The same negative attitude toward 
casualties carried over to the civilian population. Wives and mothers on the 
homefmnt nornially were never informed of the soldier's death or injuries, and 
military units did not burden themselves by keeping permanent records of those 
lost in battle. His family knew, of his condition only when the serviceman 
came home on a hospital furlough or medical discharge. If he returned home 
after the war, his family was grateful for his good fortune. If not, he was 
presumed dead. In this case, certitude could come only gradually, and the 
adjustment, though painful, was made without any devastating shock. This 
technique for accepting what comes permitted a remarkable resilience and 
steadiness in the civilian as well as the military elements. 

"Facing up to the situation" was another technique of indoctrination which 
had a galvanizing effect in wartime. Unlike the perpetual optimist in the 
German propaganda office, or the matter-of-fact British commentator, the Krem- 
lin propagandist stressed the vital importance of the coming battle, the deadly 
consequences if the new line were broken, and the need for greater efforts than 
had yet been made. Stalin was often slower to announce a victory than to 
sound the alarm over a defeat. Days elapsed before he informed the Russian 
people that the Soviet forces had encircled the German forces at Stalingrad, or 
told of the recapture of many key cities in the Ukraine. In no case was a major 
enemy breakthrough glossed over as an insignificant matter, nor a general with- 
drawal euphemized as an "adjustment in the lines to facilitate further offen- 
sives." Every situation was presented as a stern challenge, demanding the 
maximum exertion from everyone. As a result of this aggressive psychological 
fixation, and a keen sense of personal responsibility, the Soviet soldier was 
able to continue fighting in spite of heavy casualties, and to muster even greater 
determination as the situation deteriorated. If the Soviet propaganda machine 
operates unmolested, he will react similarly in crises of the future. 



COMMUNIST INFILTRATION LN THE ARMY 73 

5. PSYCHOLOGICAL VULNERABILITY 

A. Vulnerability of the Soviet People 

The Soviet Union is a fairly difficult psychological target. The people are 
extremely patriotic, and tend to approve of the present government, because 
it has made Russia a world power, and was able to defeat the Germans. Gov- 
ernment control of all propaganda media makes it extremely hard to reach the 
people from outside the country. On the other hand, the Soviet people gossip 
freely, tend to be hypercritical on a personal basis, and like to grumble about 
the petty irritations of daily life. Moreover, for all their superficial antipathy, 
they have a deep admiration for the United States, are susceptible to humani- 
tarian ideals, and eagerly accept new facts from foreign sources, if they appear 
reasonable. 

Propaganda will be effective if it stresses the unfairness of Government 
policies which the Soviet people really think unfair. For example, it would 
be extremely effective to base criticisms on the killing pace of Stakhanovite 
production norms, inadequate wage levels, high prices, and the poor quality 
of consumer goods, because all are within the immediate ken of the average 
Russian. He has been complaining about them for years. In all cases, gen- 
eralizations should be well supported with concreate examples, to establish 
an undeniably factual tie-in to the citizen's own experience. For example, 
one pair of low-quality shoes per year is a poor reward for a man who wears 
them out trying to accomplish an impossible work norm, and it is more unjust 
to require his children to get along with still less. In attacking the convict 
labor system, criticism should be directed against specific inequalities and 
injustices, rather than against the system in general. The Russian understands 
that lawbreakers must be punished, and that the Soviet system fulfills a 
necessary function in this. Moreover, he may be convinced that Soviet juris- 
prudence is more "merciful" than that of the West, regarding many crimes 
of violence. But he does feel that a six-year sentence is far too much for steal- 
ing a sack of potatoes, particularly when he knows that the manager of his 
factory is stealing lumber and bricks by the truckload. Russians generally are 
indifferent to the "corrective labor" sentences imposed on thousands of "reac- 
tionaries" in territories newly acquired during World War II. They have the 
same hostile attitude toward "wreckers, spies, and traitors," as Americans have 
toward Communists who are imprisoned in the United States, but many Rus- 
sians undoubtedly have close relatives or friends who were unjustly or too 
severely punished for "lack of vigilance," and other political "crimes." Only 
the most flagrant and obvious cases can be exploited, however, because political 
opposition, criticism, and discussion, long cherished as inviolable rights in 
Britain and the United States, have always been acknowledged as felonies in 
the Russian State. 

Various Soviet fiscal operations are vulnerable to propaganda attack. The 
most immediate in the mind of the Soviet worker is the semiobligatory govern- 
ment bond subscription, which is launched several times each year. Workers 
frequently express keen resentment against these forced savings, and do not 
regard them as a real asset, since they cannot redeem the bond prior to its 
maturity (normally 10 years), except by proving a case of extreme hardship 
at the bank. Ruble devaluations are extremely unjust in many individual cases, 
though most people have too little cash laid by to be effected. The aggrieved 
persons, however, are exceptionally vulnerable to the influence of hostile propa- 
ganda for several months after a general devaluation. Most vulnerable of all 
is the huge Soviet turnover tax. Most Russians are completely unaware of 
it, since it is applied only to the wholesale price of goods purchased by the 
retail outlet, and does not appear as a s'ales tax. This tax normally represents 
more than 50 percent of the retail price of items of common consumption, such 
as bread, canned foods, and clothing. It rises to 90 percent on "luxury" items, 
such as special foods, alcoholic beverages, bicycles, and phonographs. Tech- 
nically, the turnover tax is a device to control distribution and consumption 
and affords tremendous latitude in price fixing, but the Soviet wage earner 
would readily perceive its expropriative effect on his slender income. Effective 
propaganda on the subject would certainly generate popular discontent, and 
might force the Government to make costly adjustments in its fiscal and economic 
control system. 

Housing is also the source of much discontent in the Soviet Union, and the 
Government would probably be forced to make some adjustments in response 
to criticism for its failure to provide adequate facilities. The prospect of ob- 



74 COMMUNIST INFILTRATION IN THE ARMY 

taining a little more living space has been a strong encouragement to job 
hopping, and the hope of being assigned a small (3 or 4 room) private dwelling 
has spurred those ambitious for managerial positions. There is little evidence 
that the people blame the Soviet regime for thes'e deficiencies, but it should 
be a simple matter to persuade them to it. The average Soviet worker does 
not expect a private house, but he would like to have his own kitchen, running 
water, and perhaps, a separate bedroom for the children. A housing shortage 
in the world's most richly forested country should be hard to explain. 

Soviet inhabitants of occupied areas in wartime would be deeply impressed 
by all humanitarian gestures of occupying forces. For example. America's: 
kindness in times of disaster and famine is gratefully remembered. The im- 
pression could he powerfully reinforced by genuine solicitude for the welfare 
of local inhabitants. Disease control measures, hospitalization, economic assist- 
ance, and unfettered cultural contributions of newspapers and books, despite 
the cost and temporary inconvenience from a military standpoint, would pay 
rich dividends in civilian cooperation, and would weaken civilian resolve in 
enemy-held areas. A going economy, largely administered by freely elected 
local governments, would present compellingly practical evidence that Russia's 
best interests lay in a free Western-type social organization. Nor would the 
cost be prohibitive to the Allies. Russian agriculture and technical skill would 
be quite capable of sustaining the population, if communications were restored 
in war-ravaged areas. Only a moderate degree of supplementary economic 
assistance would he required. 

The most profitable avenue of propaganda approach merges into the field of 
political leadership. For more than a century, the Russian people have been 
very susceptible to political ideas. The surge of political idealism undermined 
the Czarist autocracy, furnished the means for the rise of Communism, and 
remains a potentially invincible challenge to the oppressive system which emerged 
as the Soviet Government. Today, although poorly educated in other respects', 
the peoples of the Soviet Union are keenly alert to political and social problems. 
Permitted to see only the official, Communist side of the picture, they are none- 
theless prepared by intensive political training to understand and adopt the 
democratic ideals of a free society. 

The counter-revolutionary leaders in the Russian Civil War (1918-1920) failed 
to gain public support largely because they offered no convincing political pro- 
gram. The German Government alienated public sympathy in World War II 
when its actions and policies belied earlier promises of democracy and inde- 
pendence. In the event of World War III the Allied Powers, and particularly 
the United States, will have to dispel the recently-established Soviet myths of 
American brutality, greed, and callousness. From the start, they must use every 
means in their power to reach the people with an attractive, detailed, and prac- 
ticable political program. Immediately exploitable is the farmer's hunger for 
his own land. The agricultural population would be strongly attracted by the 
prospect of privately owned farms, and the right to sell their own produce on a 
free market. Industrial workers would be similarly attracted by the prospect 
of having a voice in wages, production quotas, and working conditions, the right 
to organize truly independent labor unions, and the right to choose their habitat 
and place of employment. All elements of the population would respond to the 
promise of personal freedom, and the right to travel in their own country without 
official restrictions. Of less immediate appeal but capable of development, are 
the democratic rights to freedom of speech, freedom of the press, freedom from 
arbitrary arrest, search, and seizure, and the right to organize political parties 
and to hold genuine elections. Considerable time and energy would be required 
to achieve widespread understanding and support for these relatively abstract 
rights, since the peoples of the USSR at present have little knowledge of them. 

The promise of independence for national minority groups is only partially 
exploitable, because support gained within such groups would be offset by alien- 
ation of the many people who would see it as a threat to dismember their country. 
The plebiscite principle would certainly get a mixed reception ; the Union forces 
fought very bitterly in the American Civil War, just to prevent such "self- 
determination." However, a fair-minded proposal to consider the desires of 
minority peoples, and to provide at least a greater degree of local autonomy in 
a federal framework probably would be well received. In any case, the people 
should be assured that all predominantly Russian groups would be included in 
the Russian state, which would be assured its rightful and equal place among the 
free nations of the world. 



COMMUNIST INFILTRATION IN THE ARMY 75 

The peoples of the USSR are also susceptible to ideals of international coop- 
eration, and to the principles of the United Nations. The employment of this 
powerful lever in the Korean War has already compelled the Soviet Communists 
to attempt retaliation with the "World Peace Council" and the idea of the "Peoples 
Democracies." Both devices can profitably be exposed for what they are. In 
the event of World War III, the Western Powers, fighting under the aegis of the 
United Nations, could employ the best of psychological weapons by promising to 
deliver the Russian people from the control of a radical minority, and to restore 
all political power in the Russian state to the people, and to their freely elected 
representatives. Whatever the program adopted, it must provide the fullest 
scope for Russian patriotism and Russian self-respect within the framework of 
the Allied war effort, and the indoctrination effort should be second only to the 
more urgent military requirements, since it should thereby become possible to 
enlist many civilians and prisoners of war in the war of liberation. 

B. Vulnerability of the Soviet Soldier 

The Soviet soldier is a much more difficult target, but he too can be reached. 
Whether openly or secretly, he will read everything he gets from foreign sources. 
Credible propaganda will pass readily through the ranks by word of mouth. 
He will be tremendously impressed with American military equipment, and with 
cheap personal possessions which the American soldier takes as a matter of 
course. It is possible to weaken many of his beliefs, as in the disgrace of sur- 
render, the superiority of Soviet equipment, and the skill of his superiors. 
Regarding surrender, he can be persuaded that it is foolish to squander his life 
in a hopeless situation, when he can continue to serve his country after the war. 
He can be made to doubt the quality of his equipment, as it fails to match the 
performance of Allied equipment, and it is highly desirable, for the same reason, 
to outpace the Soviet forces in developing innovations in materiel, tactics, and 
combat expedients. Soviet commanders are prone to repeat one attack after 
another, employing identical forces, tactics, and direction of attack, as long as 
their forces last, even though each attacking echelon is destroyed in the process. 
Their refusal to take time for developing a new plan on the spot, and their 
unwillingness to recognize an unsound plan cost tens of thousands of lives in 
World War II. The Soviet system of command discipline deprives the commander 
of the necessary freedom of action to correct this attitude, which is clearly 
vulnerable to effective criticism in propaganda to the Soviet troops. For exam- 
ple, "Why fling yourself into the same meatgrinder that destroys the battalion 
ahead of you merely because your commander is too stupid to admit that his 
initial plan was worthless?" 

Of course, the best way to destroy the morale of Soviet troops is to defeat 
them repeatedly in combat. To accomplish this, due cognizance must be ac- 
corded their strengths and weaknesses. Inexperienced units were terrorized 
and reduced to panic with relative ease in World War II, but little advantage 
accrued if they were allowed simply to retreat and restore themselves. Large 
contingents surrounded in wide enveloping attacks (the German pincer tech- 
nique) were captured in several instances by the hundreds of thousands; but if 
allowed any respite, surrounded groups were reorganized, and fought in place 
to the last man. Panic is normally induced by the old principle of over- 
whelming force at the main points of attack. The artillery and air preparation 
should be as impressive and as deadly as it is possible to make it, and the attack 
should follow just as the psychological shock effect has reached its peak. The 
point of maximum mental strain is yet to be determined, but troops under pro- 
longed bombardment eventually relax, and thereafter are able to face an attack 
with great determination. All attacks should be planned as rapid double en- 
velopments, to assure complete destruction of the enemy forces, preferably by 
capture, in the earliest stages of their disorganization. Soviet troops in this 
condition often surrender quite readily, and destruction of enemy forces by 
capture is by far the most economical in casualties among friendly forces. 

The Soviet unit is so important to the soldier's habits of thought and action 
that he is much more likely to feel defeated if he thinks his unit has been over- 
powered. For this reason, it is far more effective to isolate parts of two or 
three units than to surround one complete unit. Intact units, when surrounded, 
are likely to rise to great heights of heroism, wherein fragments of units totalling 
much larger numbers, would be capable of only a modicum of resistance for 
hours and even days after the debacle. If the attack is of sufficient force, it will 
be just as successful against the centers of Soviet companies, battalions, regi- 
ments, and divisions, as it would be against division and corp boundaries. There- 



76 COMMUNIST INFILTRATION IN THE ARMY 

fore, maximum demoralization will result if attacks of all magnitudes are 
planned to break through the centers of the maximum number of opposing units, 
from the company to the division. Meanwhile, Soviet troops should be given 
every practical and propagandist encouragement to surrender, and friendly 
troops should be trained to facilitate the capture of prisoners, as one of the 
most expeditious means of destroying hostile armed forces. 

Tactics should be deliberately varied so that troops of a given Soviet unit 
cannot acquire a sense of familiarity and confidence in combating friendly 
forces. Unsuccessful tactics should never be employed a second time against 
the same unit. The many possible variations in the use of artillery, rockets, 
armor, atomic bombs, infantry, and paratroop forces permit great latitude in 
maintaining a constant element of uncertainty in the minds of the officers and 
men of Soviet units. 

Soviet units should never be permitted to settle into a protracted slug-fest. 
They excell in such fighting, through their unusual qualities of stubborness, 
persistence, and patience. Once their morale has become firm in a position, 
they are capable of pouring in replacement units indefinitely, which appear to 
stimulate mutual heroism in direct proportion to the length of time they have 
held off the attack. In this case it will be more economical to formulate a new 
plan, altering the direction, place, and timing of the attack. In defending 
against Soviet units maximum casualties can usually be exacted by fighting in 
place, since it has been the Soviet practice to hurl wave after wave against the 
same line in as many as five echelons. Heavy casualties, however, cannot be 
expected to have a psychologically crippling effect on those who escape injury, 
since Russian troops are much more immune than other European troops to the 
effects of battle losses. What does depress them is failure to accomplish the 
mission, and a sense of frustration can be built up to the point where it is not 
difficult to overwhelm them in a conteroffensive. 

Surrounded Soviet elements which, in spite of all efforts, are able to stabilize 
their position, should be treated as Soviet line units which have shown in- 
creasing firmness under pressure. Continued assault would be prohibitively 
costly and time-consuming, as the Germans should have learned at Kiev and 
Sevastopol. It is more effective to destroy the food, water, and ammunition 
stocks of such pockets, and to maintain pressure by air, artillery, and probing, 
until they are forced to assume the initiative. 

In wartime the Soviet soldier is too young, too thoroughly indoctrinated, and 
too immediately concerned with the practical requirements of combat to respond 
to the more elaborate abstractions of political and moral propaganda. It would 
be sufficient merely to assure him that his loved ones in occupied areas were 
safe ; that the Allied Powers were restoring adequate living conditions, schools, 
and public services there without delay ; and that Russia would be a free demo- 
cratic country after the war. "News from home" concerning developments in 
occupied Russian towns would be particularly welcome to Soviet troops and 
commanders would find it virtually impossible to prevent the troops' reading 
such leaflets. The Soviet soldier will also accept the "life insurance" implicit in 
the safe-conduct leaflet, at least to the extent of making sure be has one. Soviet 
troops habitually use bits of newspaper to roll cigarettes and would certainly 
welcome packets of regular cigarette papers, even though they bore the caption 
"Use these especially prepared papers to make your cigarettes ; Allied leaflets 
are for your information, not for smoking." World news would not be so attrac- 
tive to them as news from the front, since soldiers often go for weeks without 
information on events in nearby areas. Relevant material might include matter- 
of-fact items on the progress of the war, activities at the prisoner-of-war encamp- 
ments, and civilian conditions in rear areas. Leaflets on good reasons for honor- 
able surrender and the appropriate circumstances and methods for it would 
doubtless be effective over a period of time. The Soviet soldier's interest can 
readily be aroused and sustained by the element of novelty and humor in leaf- 
lets. Occasional cartoons bearing no propaganda message and intended solely 
to amuse would create a strong, moderately favorable impression, and would 
prompt him to look at other leaflets, despite ordei's to the contrary. He would 
also be impressed by occasional "special issues" on good-quality paper, bearing 
color or black-and-white photography with an appropriate greeting, such as 
"Wishing you a happy Christmas and a safe delivery from the perils of war." 
German propaganda often strove to torment and irritate the soldier and only 
succeeded in reinforcing his hostility, since this is what he expected from a 
vicious enemy. A kindly tone, on the other hand, would tend to discount Soviet 
atrocity stories and would generate serious doubts as to whether the Allied 



COMMUNIST INFILTRATION EST THE ARMY 77 

Powers held any real antipathy for the Russian people. The soldier could then 
take a more reasonable view on the question of surrender, the reliability of Allied 
news items, and the sincerity of political assurances. The important thing is to 
gain the soldier's attention and to influence his thinking. How far he can be 
influenced remains to be established, but his alertness and interest make him 
amenable to propaganda efforts and to new ideas. 

6. CONCLUSION 

The American viewpoint of life in the Soviet Union remains valid in all essen- 
tials. The Soviet citizen enjoys neither the liberty nor the civil rights which 
we cherish and insist upon as the natural endowment of all men. The "free" 
worker in the U. S. S. R. is as much chained to his job and local area as is the 
convict. He has no voice in determining his place of work, working conditions, 
or wages. His only advantage over the convict is that he can live with his 
family and can spend his limited income as he sees fit. He has no redress 
against a harsh authoritarian government. He is forbidden to raise his voice 
in criticism, to develop independent views, or to acquire unbiased information. 
His voting rights are a travesty on the ideals and purposes of democracy. He 
enjoys no acknowledged rights for his person, life, or property. He is the help- 
less prisoner of a slave state. As was noted previously, such an existence would 
be intolerable for Americans. American traditions and beliefs militate against 
every facet of government activity in the U. S. S. R. British and American 
Communist sympathizers who visit the U. S. S. R. nearly always return in bitter 
disillusionment. There is no better antidote for radicalism. 

The Russian, however, is habituated to all aspects of his environment. He 
has no information on British or American political theory anil has little concept 
of what life could be like in a free society. Most of the Soviet police controls 
and limitations on movement were previously employed in the czarist regime. 
An undercurrent of discontent has always been manifest; otherwise, stringent 
controls would not be necessary. But the people in general, like the people of 
other low-income countries, have long been adjusted to their living conditions. 
Similarly they have learned to live within the stern limitations imposed by their 
government. Habitually a cheerful, optimistic people, they make the best of 
their situation and are primarily concerned with the immediate, practical con- 
siderations of daily living. They enjoy family life and social activities within 
their circle of friends. They remain patriotic and proud of their national 
accomplishments. 

In the event of a general war, it will become the mission of the free people 
of the West to overcome the menace of communism and to reorient the victimized 
peoples of the U. S. S. R. and other Communist nations. To do so will require 
an unbiased understanding both of the position and outlook of the average Soviet 
citizen. It has been the purpose of this study to demonstrate the contrast be- 
tween the typically Russian and American concepts of life in the U. S. S. R. and 
to render the average Russian's viewpoint sufficiently intelligible to provide the 
basis for a sound psychological approach to the peoples and fighting men of the 
Soviet Union. 

Exhibit No. 3 

Excerpts From A History of Russia, by Bernard Pares 
******* 

There was by now no doubt that the Soviet Government, absorbed in its 
enormous reconstruction of the whole life of Russia, was sincerely desirous of 
maintaining world peace (p. 500). 

******* 

* * * On December 29, 1935, a decree of the first importance swept away all 
class restrictions of birth in admission to the universities. Discipline was fully 
restored in the school ; and the pupils, who were to be put into uniform as in 
the old days, were called upon to show respect for their teachers and elders. 
Several measures dealt with the abolition of juvenile crime, and the help of 
parents was enlisted in this cause. Family ties were to be strengthened, and a 
measure of delay was introduced into the procedure of divorce (p. 500) . 



78 



COMMUNIST INFILTRATION IN THE ARMY 



* * * On February 6 the Premier, Molotov, announced the drafting of a new! 
constitution with universal, equal, direct, and secret suffrage and the restoration 
of the ballot. The peasant vote, which had so far counted as one-fifth of the 
town worker's was now to be equalised with it (p. 501). 

******* 

* * * Large sums were devoted to education, health, and culture, while the 
Army was greatly increased (p. 502). 

******* 

A Supreme Council is instituted, consisting of two Chambers equal in au- 
thority, of which one is representative of the whole population, and the other 
represents the various nationalities of the Soviet Union ; the first is elected on 
the principle of universal, direct, equal, and secret suffrage ; the second by the 
national assemblies of the federal republics respectively (p. 503). 

******* 

All judges are appointed for five years by the Supreme Council, except those 
of the People's Courts, who are elected. The judges are declared to be "inde- 
pendent, and subject only to the law," and the law officers are authorised to 
enforce their decisions, with authority in this respect over administrative offi- 
cials. 

Every citizen has the right to work, to holiday with pay, to social service such 
as free medical help, and to free education. In striking identity with the claims 
of the Liberal movement of 1905 are laid down the principles of freedom of 
conscience, speech, press, meeting, and association. The place reserved to the 
Communist Party is that of an association which acts as a leading nucleus or 
vanguard on all sides of public endeavour. 

Arrests are to be made only on the authority of the law courts, and the draft 
even declares inviolability of dwelling and of correspondence (p. 503). 

******* 

All citizens, male or female, over eighteen have the vote, or can be elected, 
"independently of race, creed, education, place of dwelling, social origin, property 
status, or past activity." Candidates are put forward by any association, such 
as the Communist Party, trade unions, co-operatives, youth organisations or 
cultural societies. Deputies are responsible to their constituents and can be 
recalled. Changes in the constitution require a majority of two-thirds in both 
Chambers. 

The enunciation of these principles is one of the greatest landmarks since 
the accession of the Communists to power (pp. 503, 504). 



Exhibit No. 4 (b) 

Excerpts From USSR, a Concise Handbook, Edited by Ernest J. Simmons 
* * * * * * * 

* * * After prolonged public discussion a new federal constitution was adopted 
by the Eighth Soviet Congress, December 5, 1936 (p. 160). 

******* 

* * * This fundamental law of 13 chapters and 147 articles abolished all class 
discriminations in suffrage and all forms of indirect and occupational representa- 
tion. It provided for "universal, direct and equal suffrage by secret ballot" for 
all elections to all Soviet bodies, Union, republican, and local (p. 160). 

******* 

Similarly the practice of making all votes unanimous in Soviet legislative 
bodies does not mean that all the lawmakers are mere rubber stamps. In enact- 
ing laws, as in electing legislators, long and earnest debate enables the party 
leaders to ascertain popular preferences, even though these may not always 
be followed. In the final action, which records a decision already reached in- 
formally, unanimity is the rule. These devices are widely at variance with 
Anglo-American notions of democratic government. In the USSR the forms 
of democracy are thrown over the persisting and unmistakable substance of 
dictatorsship by the CPSU ( B ) . Yet the forms represent a living ideal, and the 
substance may be regarded not unreasonably as a prelude to government by 
consent of the governed rather than its negation. In a peaceful world the 
Soviet leaders may well be less concerned with painting a portrait of complete 



COMMUNIST INFILTRATION LN THE ARMY 79 

unity for the benefit of foreign and domestic opinion and may be expected to let 
the winds of public controversy bring better ventilation to the house that Lenin 
built. 

* * * An impressive Bill of Rights is included in the 1936 Constitution. In 
the Marxist dispensation economic security and opportunity are valued more 
highly than abstract political privileges (pp. 162, 163). 

******* 
Personal and political rights include complete equality of sexes, races, and 
nationalities, with punishment provided (Article 123) for "any advocacy of racial 
or national exclusiveness or hatred and contempt." These rights are secure, 
for nowhere in the world is there a closer approach to the ideal of equality and 
brotherhood among peoples of all colors, languages, and nationalities than in 
the USSR. The customary civil rights of freedom of religion, speech, press, 
assembly, asociation, and inviolability of persons and homes are also guar- 
anteed (p. 163). 

******* 
A unique feature of the Soviet state is the realization of the social rights 
enumerated in Articles 118-121 of the constitution; full employment and pay- 
ment for work by quality and quantity ; rest and leisure through the seven-hour 
day, annual vacations with pay, sanatoria, rest-homes, and clubs ; maintenance 
in old age, sickness and disability through social insurance, and free medical 
service to all ; and free public education. The economic and social organization 
of the USSR is such that these rights, some of which are merely ideals else- 
where, are concrete realities for all Soviet Union citizens, at least in peacetime. 
They represent the great human gains of the revolution. Whether they have 
been worth the cost in initial suffering, and in the relative absence of political 
and intellectual freedom, outsiders may debate. The Soviet people have shown 
in mortal combat with merciless foes that they deem no sacrifice too great to 
preserve what they have won and to carry socialism forward to a fuller and 
richer life (p. 164). 

******* 

* * * In any event, a new civilization has come into being, based upon the 
conscious and rational direction of human destinies by intelligence and will 

(p. 164). 

(The above excerpts are taken from Chapter V, Government and Politics, 
by Frederick L. Schuman.) 

******* 

Soviet legal theorists believed that only through a strong state in complete 
control of the proletariat would it be possible to achieve socialism, with promise 
of economic democracy. They demanded a dictatorship of the proletariat, at 
least during the period of transition to a socialist economy, as a base upon which 
to build political democracy. They centered their attack upon private ownership 
of the means of production — land, factories, forests, mines, livestock, and the 
means of communication and trade — as the source of power of the bourgeoisie 
against whom they had fought their revolution. Guided in their thinking by 
Nikolai Lenin's State and Revolution, written just before the revolution, they 
drafted the laws to place ownership of these sources of power in the proletarian 
state. They also drafted strict laws to protect this power, once it was achieved 
(pp. 167, 16»). 

******* 

Trials are public unless they concern sex offenses or matters of diplomatic or 
military concern. The accused has the right of counsel (p. 178). 

(The' above is taken from Chapter VI, "Jurisprudence"' by John N. Hazard.) 
******* 

In order to state the fundamental aims and objectives of the Soviet education, 
we must refer to the basic philosophy, especially the ethical and social principles, 
called socialist humanism, to which it is committed. These may be found in the 
writings of Nikolai Lenin, Karl Marx, Friedrich Engels, Joseph Stalin, Maxim 
Gorky, and others, and in the laws, policies, and practices actually operative in 
the country at large. The ideals which dominate the educational process in the 
Soviet Union, taken in terms of their content as standards of individual behavior 
and character, are essentially the generally accepted standards of the ethical 
traditions of Western civilization. It is well to note that the materialist em- 
phasis in Soviet ethics * * * does not involve a rejection of ethical values like 



80 COMMUNIST INFILTRATION IN THE ARMY 

unselfishness, charity, brotherly love, peace, honesty, truthfulness, and the other 
basic precepts expressed, for instance, in the Bible. Like many other naturalistic 
ethical philosophies, socialist humanism, while advocating these ethical stand- 
ards, regards them as man-made, and as mandatory by virtue of their demon- 
strable value in the light of human reason rather than as divinely ordained. 
Thus, the concept of a future life with rewards and punishments is rejected. 
The Soviet viewpoint is that people generally can be educated to see the necessity 
of conforming to such moral standards on the basis of their human values in this 
world, without invoking the hope of reward or the threat of punishment in a life 
after death. 

Socialist humanism manifests an immense confidence in human nature, an 
unbonded faith in the possibilities of development of human beings, if given 
proper educational environment. There is no concept of an elite, or of the inherent 
inferiority or superiority of groups or races. Hence, in the Soviet Union it 
is an offense punishable under the criminal code to exercise any kind of arbitrary 
discrimination, segregation, quota, or disqualification based on race, color, or 
sex in regard to educational, economic, professional, residential, or other oppor- 
tunities. The operating premise is that all people are worth educating. Hence, 
peacetime education has not only been free of charge to every level throughout 
the country, but stipends have provided living expenses for most students beyond 
the secondary level. * * * 

The ideals of life taught by socialist humanism are connected in more than 
one sense with education. They not only supply goals for education ; education 
itself is one of the chief goals. Central in these ideals are intellectual develop- 
ment and cultivation of the emotions, knowledge of and participation in the arts 
and the sciences. This emphasis is evident from the earliest days (pp. 321, 322). 
******* 

A distinguishing characteristic of socialist humanism is its high degree of 
articulation with social institution — its emphasis on the close relation between 
ethical theory and social practice. The position taken is that an indispensable 
requisite in the ethical improvement of the great majority of people is to set up 
on a large social scale those economic and cultural arrangements through which 
the opportunities, resources, and facilities for leading the higher cultured and 
enlightened life will actually be available to them. Soviet thinkers hold the view 
that any realistic ethical program must involve the construction of a type of 
society which can guarantee economic security at the level of qualifications, and 
offer complete education and health care entirely free of economic, race, or sex 
barriers. This is the operational meaning of socialism in terms of the interplay 
of educational ideals and social practice in the Soviet Union (p. 323). 

(The above excerpts are taken from Chapter XVII, "Education System," by 
John Somerville.) 

******* 

By this time Stalin's bid for the cooperation of the Western democracies 
against the threat of German invasion reduced the antireligious laws more and 
more to a dead letter. The war itself, with the alliance of the United Nations 
against Hitler, completed the process. Substantial alleviations for religion fol- 
lowed fast on each other. Priests received the franchise ; icons could again be 
produced and sold ; the great church feasts became national rest days ; Sunday 
was restored ; and the "godless" magazine was suspended. Following the dis- 
solution of the Comintern on May 22, 1943, the patriarchate, which had been 
suspended since the death of Tikhon in April 1925, was restored with the concur- 
rence of Stalin on September 4, 1943, and training colleges for priests were again 
established in Russia (p. 343). 

(The above excerpt was taken from Chapter XVIII, "Religion Under the Czars 
and the Soviets," by Sir Bernard Pares.) 



INDEX 



Page 

Advent of Socialist Man (book) 35 

American Civil Liberties Union 11 

American Civil War *4 

American Zone of Germany -0 

Army Intelligence 21, 24, 27, 37 

Anderson, P. B 44 

Bogolepov, Igor 19, 29, 3o 

Testimony of 20-27 

Bolshevik 45, 54, 58, 61 

Borough of Manhattan 3 

Bratton, Col. R. S 40, 46 

Browder, Earl 28 

Budenz, Louis 5, 6, 19, 26 

Testimony of 28-30, 33-38 

Central Russian Government 46 

Chekov -. 58 

Comintern 80 

Communist Party 6-9, 

14, 15, 17, 18, 22, 28-34, 40-42, 46, 48, 53, 56, 57, 67, 70, 71 

Congress of the United States 4 

Congressional Record 37 

CPSU 78 

Czarist Russia (book) 25 

Daily Compass , 11, 12 

Daily Worker 10-14, 34 

Daliin, David J 36,39,44 

Dewey, Mr 14 

Douglas, Justice 3 

Eighth Soviet Congress 78 

Engels, Friedrich 79 

Far East Command (Military Intelligence Section) 44 

FEAF Wringer Reports 44 

FEC 45 

Fischer, Louis 37 

Five-year plan 57 

Fordham University 28 

Foster 35 

Friends of Soviet Russia 29 

Gelfan, Harriet Moore 15, 16, 29 

Testimony of 30-33 

General Staff School 21 

German Foreign Office 20 

Gorky, Maxim 79 

Government and Politics (book) 79 

Harcourt, Brace 5 

Harper, S. N 44 

Hathaway, Clarence 7 

Hazard, John N 16,17,79 

History of Russia (book) 26,44 

Hitler 80 

Hopkins, Harry 20 

Institute of Pacific Relations 21, 29 

Jerome, V. J 29 

Jones v. Securities and Exchange Commission 4 

Jurisprudence (book) 79 

81 



82 INDEX 

Pago 

Kazekavich, Vladimir 16 

Kent, Rockwell 28 

Kerensky 46 

Kirov 54 

Korean war 75 

Kournakoff, Sergie 17, 84 

Kremlin 72 

Lament, Corliss 27-29, 38, 44 

Testimony of — : 1-19 

Lattimore, Owen 32, 33 

League of Nations i __!_' 20 

Lend-lease _ ?. LLj i — ii 62 

Lenin, Nikolai 24, 25, 35, 36, 53, 67, 79 

Like, Irvin _■ ■_^___: 1, 3 

Litvinov isfij 22 

Marx, Carl ,__ 25, 53, 79 

Mavnard, J : Li 44 

MGB 52, 66 

MGR___ ___:.— 47 

Molotov _— — 22, 62, 67, 78 

Moore, Harriet L , ^__, 15,16,29 

Testimony of - 36-33 

MVD______ 47, 50, 55, 66, 67, 72 

National Council of American-Soviet Friendship , ! 29 

NATO :— - - UUUajfJJtilJUUee 63 

Nazis «: 41 

New York Times 11 

NKVD :UlL'tlL-ii,UU 47 

O'Connor—l ___— I 15,16 

October Revolution (1917) ____■_ 46 

OGPU ^___— _J_____ 47 

Pares, Bernard — — 26, 27, 29, 34, 44, 77, 80 

Partridge, General — , tlj 43 

Patriotic War (Russia) . . 72 

Peoples of the Soviet Union, 1946 (book) Jjo 5,28,44 

Petrov, Vladimiri, testimony of , . . . 38-43 

Psychological and Cultural Traits of Soviet Siberia (book) 5,21,23,39 

Rautenstrauch, Dr. Walter 28 

Red Army_ :,.__ 20, 60 

Regensberg Military School :__^. 26 

Rein, David £U±iI_': :______: 30 

Religion Under the Czars and the Soviet (book) •_!__ 80 

Roosevelt, President 20 

Russia in Flux (book) •_______ 44 

Russian Civil War (1918-20) ! 74 

Russian Foreign Office (Press Division) __; 23 

Russian Foreign Service 20 

SCAP 45 

Schuman, Frederick L 16, 79 

Secretary of the Army : 43 

Senate Internal Security Committee !l 21 

Seton Hall = 28 

Short Story of the Soviet Communist Party in the Soviet Union (book) 25 

Sigerist, Henry _ ^_____ ._ 17 

Simmons, Ernest J 4, 8, 15, 23, 27, 29, 44, 78 

Smith Act = 11 

Somerville, John 80 

Soviet Foreign Office 22, 23 

Soviet Government 9, 22, 24, 38-40, 44, 45, 50, 61, 62, 65, 73, 74, 79, 80 

Soviet Russia Today (book) 13, 14, 29 

Stachel, Jack :___J____ 29 

Stalin, Joseph 24, 25, 35, 36, 53, 54, 56, 60, 62, 64, 67, 72, 79, 80 

Stevens 21, 34 

Supreme Court of the United States i 3, 4, 11' 

Sutherland, Justice : 4 

Thompson, R 44 



INDEX SO 

Page 

Hkhon 80 

rolstoi 58 

rowster, J 44 

frotsky 61 

(Truman, President Harry 10, 62 

Dwilight of World Capitalism (book) 35 

Jnited Nations 44, 64, 75 

-rtited States Air Force (USAF) 45 

fitted States Army 14, 15, 21, 24, 26, 30, 33-35, 48 

' jited States Constitution 3 

' lited States Government 8, 9, 15, 20, 31 

died States v. Runiely 3 

S. S. R., a Concise Handbook 4, 8, 23, 27, 44 

ard, Dr. Harry F 28 

ilson, Major 25, 26 

lttenberg, Philip 1-3, 4-19 

orld War II 20, 22, 50, 62, 64, 68, 73, 75 

• orld War III 75 

ilta 20 

mug Communists (Komsomols) 48, 71 

mngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. Saivyer 4 

o 






COMMUNIST INFILTRATION IN THE ARMY 









HEARING 

BEFORE THE 

PERMANENT SUBCOMMITTEE ON 
INVESTIGATIONS OF THE COMMITTEE ON 

GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS 
UNITED STATES SENATE 

EIGHTY-THIRD CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 
PURSUANT TO 

S. Res. 40 



PART 2 



SEPTEMBER 21, 1953 



Printed for the use of the Committee on Government Operations 




UNITED STATES 
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 
38794 WASHINGTON : 1954 



V 



Poston Public Library 
Superintendent of Documents 

FEB 2 3 1954 



COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS 

JOSEPH R. MCCARTHY, Wisconsin, Chairman 
KARL E. MUNDT, South Dakota JOHN L. McCLELLAN, Arkansas 

MARGARET CHASE SMITH, Maine HUBERT H. HUMPHREY, Minnesota 

HENRY C. DWORSHAK, Idaho HENRY M. JACKSON, Washington 

EVERETT MCKINLEY DIRKSEN, Illinois JOHN F. KENNEDY, Massachusetts 
JOHN MARSHALL BUTLER, Maryland STUART SYMINGTON, Missouri 

CHARLES E. POTTER, Michigan ALTON A. LENNON, North Carolina 

Francis D. Flanagan, Chief Counsel 
Walter L. Reynolds, Chief Clerk 



Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations 

JOSEPH R. MCCARTHY, Wisconsin, Chairman 

KARL E. MUNDT, South Dakota 
EVERETT MCKINLEY DIRKSEN, Illinois 
CHARLES E. POTTER, Michigan 
Roy M. Cohn, Chief Counsel 
Francis P. Carr, Executive Director 

II 






CONTENTS 



Testimony of — Page 

McKee, Samuel, civilian consultant to Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2 — 91 
Partridge, Gen. Richard C, G-2, United States Army 85 



in 



(On September 21, 1953, the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on 
Investigations held hearings in executive session on Communist in- 
filtration in the Army. The testimony of Gen. Richard C. Partridge, 
G-2, United States Army, and Samuel McKee, civilian consultant to 
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, was made public by the members of the 
subcommittee and follows below :) 

COMMUNIST INFILTKATION IN THE AEMY 



SEPTEMBER 21, 1953 

United States Senate, 
Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations or the 

Committee on Government Operations, 

Washington, D. C. 

The subcommittee met (pursuant to S. Res. 40, agreed to January 
30, 1953) at 10:30 a. m., room 155, Senate Office Building, Senator 
Joseph R. McCarthy presiding. 

Present: Senator Joseph R. McCarthy, Republican, Wisconsin. 

Present also: Francis P. Carr, executive director; Roy M. Cohn, 
chief counsel ; Donald A. Surine, assistant counsel ; Ruth Young Watt, 
chief clerk; John Gomien, administrative assistant, Senator Dirksen; 
David Keyser, administrative assistant, Congressman Kersten. 

TESTIMONY OF GEN. RICHARD C. PARTRIDGE, G-2, UNITED STATES 

ARMY 

The Chairman. Will you raise your right hand, please ? 

In the matter now in hearing before this committee do you solemnly 
swear that the testimony you are about to give will be the truth, the 
whole truth and nothing but the truth, so help you God ? 

General Partridge. I do. 

Mr. Cohn. Could we get your full name for the record? 

General Partridge. Richard C. Partridge. P-a-r-t-r-i-d-g-e. 

Mr. Cohn. And your function at the present moment ? 

General Partridge. G-2 of the Army. 

Mr. Cohn. Commanding G-2? 

General Partridge. Yes, I am. 

Mr. Cohn. General, I don't think we have to waste much time on 
preliminaries. You have heard the testimony. What the committee 
is particularly interested in is the origin of this report. Why was it 
issued ? Why used ? Are any of them still around still being used ? 
I wonder if you would care to comment. 

General Partridge. I'd like to very much. The document was 
written in the Far East and as indicated by the date that it was put 
out, very late in 1951. The purpose of the document was to make a 
study of, as objective as possible, of the feeling of the people inside 
of Soviet Siberia toward their government and toward the whole 
Communist regime, the whole setup, with a view to having available 
information for intelligence officers both in FECOM and psychologi- 
cal warfare officers and any commanders who might get concerned 

85 



86 COMMUNIST INFILTRATION IN THE ARMY 

directly with any occupation or other duties connected with the people 
of Russia, to give them some picture of what the Russian himself felt 
and not very distinctly, not to give him the idea of the Communist 
government and the situation in Russia as seen from the United States. 
I can quote from the pamphlet if you wish to substantiate the purpose 
of it, but that was what it was. 

The Chairman. You say that was the purpose. Do you think that 
would tend to accomplish that ? 

General Partridge. Yes, sir. I do. 

The Chairman. Do you approve of the pamphlet ? 

General Partridge. I don't approve of everything but I think it is 
an honest attempt to do what it says it is trying to do. 

The Chairman. Do you think it is an honest attempt to give Ameri- 
can officers an accurate picture ? 

General Partridge. I believe it was. 

The Chairman. Do you know that this quotes directly verbatim 
Stalin's book in describing the workings of communism? 

General Partridge. That has been stated. 

The Chairman. Without attributing it to Stalin ? 

General Partridge. That has been stated, I believe. 

The Chairman. You come here and say it is a good, honest attempt. 
I wonder how much you know about the book. Do you know that this 
book quotes verbatim from Joe Stalin, without attributing it to him, as 
a stamp of approval of the United States Army ? Are you aware of 
that? 

General Partridge. I don't know that it quotes from Joe Stalin 
or not. 

The Chairman. Don't you think before you testify you should take 
time to conduct some research to find out whether it quotes Joe Stalin 
and other notorious Communists? Don't you think you are incom- 
petent to testify before you know that ? 

General Partridge. No, sir. 

The Chairman. I don't want someone here who knows nothing about 
this document, just giving us conversation. 

General Partridge. I think I do know something. 

The Chairman. If you were to learn that the book quotes from Mr. 
Simmons, without showing what part is from the works of Mr. Sim- 
mons ; that Mr. Simmons wrote work under direct instructions of the 
Soviet Embassy in Moscow, would you still say it is an honest attempt 
to give an accurate picture of life in Communist Russia? 

General Partridge. It would all depend on what was said. It seems 
to me that the author of a pamphlet looks into what is said about the 
subject, any books he can get on Russia and then tries to distill this in 
what he thought was the net result of all sources he could use. May 
I bring up the other sources ? 

The Chairman. I know it lists a few anti- Communist sources here, 
but the question is — you quote from a man like Pares, who has been 
identified as a Communist, quote him in detail ; Lamont, a notorious 
apologist for communism, a man who never had an opportunity to 
study Russian people except information gotten through embassies ; a 
man like Simmons; a woman like Mrs. Harriet Moore, identified as a 
Soviet agent. You quote them throughout the book without showing 
that you are quoting and the man reading this would not know you 
are quoting notorious Communists. When you quote Joe Stalin about 



COMMUNIST INFILTRATION IN THE ARMY 87 

the glories of communism, if the officer knew you were quoting Stalin, 
he could take it with a grain of salt, but he doesn't know that. 

Did you know that those were the sources used when you came down 
here to testify? 

General Partridge. I know only that the sources listed here were 
used. 

The Chairman. Do you know the extent Joe Stalin was quoted ? 

General Partridge. No, sir. I do not. 

The Chairman. Do you know that he is quoted verbatim ? 

General Partridge. No, sir, I do not. 

The Chairman. That Harriet Moore is quoted verbatim from the 
Simmons book ? Do you know who Harriet Moore is, General % 

General Partridge. Only in a general way. 

The Chairman. You only know Harriet Moore in a general way 
and you are head of G-2 ? 

General Partridge. Yes. 

The Chairman. You can't mean that ? 

General Partridge. I do mean it, sir. 

The Chairman. You are the head of G-2 ? 

General Partridge. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. One of your tasks, of course, is to dig out and ex- 
pose Communist influences. That is correct ; isn't it? 

General Partridge. That is correct. 

The Chairman. To make sure Communist agents will not be used 
by our enemy to infiltrate our forces. In other words, to keep Com- 
munists from infiltrating into the United States forces. Isn't that 
right? 

General Partridge. That is correct, sir. 

The Chairman. And you say you only know Harriet Moore in a 
general way ? 

General Partridge. I know very little except that she contributed 
to the books we have been discussing, The U. S. R. R. Concise History. 

The Chairman. Did you know that before you came into this room? 

General Partridge. No, sir. 

The Chairman. What did you know about her before you came 
into this room ? 

General Partridge. Nothing. 

The Chairman. Nothing at all ? 

General Partridge. No. 

The Chairman. Did you know who Simmons was when you looked 
at the bibliography ? 

General Partridge. No, sir. 

The Chairman. Before you came and told us it was an honest at- 
tempt to properly indoctrinate 

General Partridge. May I make a point? This is not a book to 
indoctrinate anybody. This is a book written for study by intelli- 
gence officers, who themselves are in this business. It is not an indoc- 
trination pamphlet. 

The Chairman. Maybe we don't have the same understanding of 
"indoctrinate." The book is for the purpose of giving your intelli- 
gence officers a truthful picture of Communist Russia. That is cor- 
rect; isn't it? It isn't for the purpose of lying. 

General Partridge. That is right. It is for the purpose of giving 
as good a picture as we can of what the psychological situation is. 



88 COMMUNIST INFILTRATION IN THE ARMY 

The Chairman. When I talk about indoctrination, that is what I 
mean. I mean works you are putting out giving your people a pic- 
ture of the situation, conditions. What definition do you have of 
indoctrination? What do you mean by indoctrinate? 

General Partridge. By indoctrination — I feel indoctrination means 
the instruction of someone who has not or is not familiar with some- 
thing, with the particular opinion of that held by the indoctrinator. 

The Chairman. Do you think that quoting with approval of Stalin 
is a good way to teach your intelligence officers what communism is 
like? 

General Partridge. Not per se, sir, if that is the whole story but I 
don't think that is the whole story. 

The Chairman. Did you know who Mr. B. Pares was before you 
came into this room? 

General Partridge. No. 

The Chairman. Do you have any knowledge of him now? 

General Partridge. What I have heard here this morning, sir. I 
had heard of Corliss Lamont before. 

The Chairman. Do you have a staff that could properly inform 
you? 

General Partridge. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. Why don't you have them inform you before you 
come down here ? You come down here and say it is an excellent book. 
You don't know that Communists were used and quoted. You make 
the Army look awfully silly. 

General Partridge. I didn't say it was an excellent book. I said 
I thought it was an honest attempt. 

The Chairman. You think it is an honest attempt? 

General Partridge. Yes, sir, I do. 

The Chairman. When you use Communists and Communist writ- 
ings and quote them — do you think they are for America? Do you 
think they are trying to put the Communist system in the true light ? 

General Partridge. I think the author of this book put the Com- 
munist system 

The Chairman. Who is the author ? 

General Partridge. The author is a Major Allen. 

Mr. Cohn. Donald Allen? 

General Partridge. I think Robert Emerson Allen. 

The Chairman. Where is he now ? 

General Partridge. He is now an instructor, an ROTC instructor 
at the University of Missouri in Columbia, Mo. 

His name is Donald Emerson Allen. 

The Chairman. What is his background ? 

General Partridge. I have it here, sir. I have an account of his 
military service here. 

Senator Potter. Is he an intelligence officer ? 

General Partridge. He has been several times. 

Senator Potter. Who assigned him the job of writing this report? 
Did that come from G-2 ? 

General Partridge. No, sir. That was done in FECOM by his 
immediate superiors presumably. I don't know the individual. 

Mr. Cohn. Are you sure somebody assigned him the job or is it pos- 
sible that he volunteered ? 



COMMUNIST INFILTRATION IN THE ARMY 89 

General Partridge. I don't believe that is correct. I believe lie was 
told. 

The Chairman. Did you say you don't believe. What is the basis 
for that belief? 

General Partridge. Because I have asked in the Far East Command 
how it originated. I have made some effort to find out about the 
origin. I have asked how it originated and have been told by FECOM 
Intelligence that he was told to write it, told to make a study of this 
subject. 

The Chairman. Who told you this ? 

General Partridge. G-2 of FECOM. 

The Chairman. Who in G-2 ? 

General Partridge. Gen. Riley F. Ennis. 

The Chairman. What is FECOM? 

General Partridge. Far East Command. 

Senator Potter. Who distributed it after he wrote the pamphlet, 
the booklet ? I assume orders had to be given for printing by the local 
commander, authorizing the printing, or did that have to be O. K.'d 
in Washington ? 

General Partridge. The printing was O: K.'d in FECOM and dis- 
tribution as shown on page 3. You will note distribution is almost 
exclusively to intelligence officers. 

Senator Potter. Is that a common practice — local commanders au- 
thorizing people in their command to write various documents without 
clearance from headquarters ? If that is a common practice, God only 
knows what type of documents we might receive. It seems it would 
be difficult to maintain certain policy unless they did receive the O. K. 
from Washington. 

General Partridge. Well, that, sir, would depend on the level of 
the headquarters about which you are speaking. Theater head- 
quarters 

Senator Potter. Was this a theater commander ? 

General Partridge. It was written and authorized by the intelli- 
gence portion of the Far Eastern Command, which is the theater. 

Senator Potter. And you have, the Department of Army has no 
control over the publications that are put out by theater commanders 
or his staff ? 

General Partridge. We certainly have the general policy of any 
theater — it comes from Washington but we don't go out and check 
every publication before it is published. 

The Chairman. I wish you would give Senator Potter the extent 
of your checking. You set up a three-man committee to check on it. 
He is trying to find out from you now the truth about this document. 
Why don't you give it to him? Why don't you tell him about this 
three-man committee, who was on it, who headed it; that an Army 
officer objected strenuously to this material. That is what Senator 
Potter is trying to get out of you. Am I right, Senator ? 

Senator Potter. Yes. 

General Partridge. Well, this was published by the Far Eastern 
Command and sent back here on the date indicated, January 1952, and 
it aroused some criticism here and we had a committee set up inside 
of G-2, in my own production division here, I believe the date was 
about March 1952, February or March, to examine the document and 

38794— 54r—pt. 2 2 



90 COMMUNIST INFILTRATION LN THE ARMY 

decide whether steps should be taken about it or whether it should 
be left alone. 

The Chairman. Were you at G-2 then ? 

General Partridge. No, sir. 

The Chairman. Who was? 

General Partridge. General Boiling. 

Senator Potter. Was the three-man board one of the officers who 
objected to it ? You say one of the officers objected to it ? 

General Partridge. No, sir. I did not say that. I don't know 
about the officer who objected to it. 

Senator Potter. You know there was some objection to the issuance 
of this report? 

General Partridge. Some of the people who read the report thought 
it was a poor report and ought to be gone over thoroughly, examined 
to see if it should be left in circulation or not. 

Secretary Stevens. Tell the committee who was on the review com- 
mittee. Let's get that out. 

General Partridge. Mr. McKee was the chairman, who is here. He 
is a civilian. Maj. Samuel C. Wilson and a Mr. Henderson, I believe. 

Senator Potter. When was your review ? Was your review before 
the document was distributed or afterward ? 

General Partridge. No, sir. Afterward. After it came back here. 

Senator Potter. Can you set the date approximately ? 

General Partridge. About February or March 1952. 

The Chairman. Let's get this if we may. One of the officers in 
the Far East Command, when he saw this document, objected strenu- 
ously and said this was Communist propaganda pure and simple. He 
pointed out the bad sources immediately to G-2; that the sources 
principally used were Communists, some of them identified as espio- 
nage agents. He pointed out that the use of this would be dangerous. 
He pointed out also that you were dignifying well-known Communists 
by quoting them as sources and he objected about as strenuously as 
anyone could. For that reason a board was convened in G-2, the head 
of which was Mr. McGee. 

General Partridge. Mr. McKee. You are not quite correct in some 
other aspects. Nobody had pointed out that the main sources of this 
document were Communist sympathizers. That really isn't true. The 
main sources of this document were returned Japanese POW's. 

The Chairman. Do you know that to be a fact ? 

General Partridge. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. Have you read this? 

General Partrddge, Yes, sir. More than once. 

The Chairman. And you approve of it? 

General Partridge. I do not say it is an excellent document. I say 
it is an honest attempt to deal with a very difficult subject. 

The Chairman. As a general in G-2, who heads Intelligence in the 
Army, do you approve of this ? Do you think it should be withdrawn 
or still used? 

General Partridge. I think it should be still used for the purpose for 
which it was written. 

The Chairman. Do you know anything about Mr. McKee's 
background ? 

General Partridge. He is here. 



COMMUNIST INFILTRATION IN THE ARMY 91 

The Chairman. Do you know anything about his background ? 

General Partridge. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. Before you appointed him head of this board did 
you check his background? 

General Partridge. I didn't personally but I am sure his back- 
ground has been well known for a long time. He was an employee of 
G-2 several years before I came here. I know he has been in G-2 for 
at least 5 years, I think longer than that. 

The Chairman. Mr. McKee, will you come up beside this gentleman. 

TESTIMONY OF SAMUEL McKEE, CIVILIAN CONSULTANT TO 
ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-2 

The Chairman. Will you raise your right hand? 

In the matter now in hearing, do you solemnly swear that the testi- 
mony you are about to give shall be the truth, the whole truth, and 
nothing but the truth, so help you God ? 

Mr. McKee. I do. 

Senator Potter. General, may I ask you a few questions first ? 

Senator Potter. What function does G-2 have in regard to checking 
the indoctrination material put out by the Army ? 

General Partridge. I didn't understand, sir. 

Senator Potter. What function does G-2 have in respect to check- 
ing the indoctrination material put out by the military ? I mean docu- 
ments and publications. Do you understand the question ? 

General Partridge. Yes, sir, I do. 

Any book which is put out by the Army which is submitted to us 
for check, we check over and comment upon. 

Senator Potter. Are they all submitted to you ? 

General Partridge. I don't believe they are, sir. 

Senator Potter. Who checks indoctrination material % 

General Partridge. I think the T. I. and E. people do. The train- 
ing and indoctrination people. 

Senator Potter. You mean if there is a book on communism put out 
to indoctrinate our troops, G-2 does not check that ? 

General Partridge. I can't say, sir, whether this book was checked. 

Senator Potter. I am not asking about this book. Do you know 
whether it is your function to check indoctrination courses on com- 
munism ? You certainly should know. 

The Chairman. If you don't know, tell us. Do you know whether 
G-2 checks the indoctrination courses on communism put out to the 
troops ? 

General Partridge. I don't know. 

The Chairman. Could you find out for us ? 

General Partridge. Yes. 

The Chairman. I wish you would. 

Do you think books with authors such as Simmons, identified as a 
Communist taking instructions from the Moscow Embassy when he 
wrote this, carrying articles by Corliss Lamont, Harriet Moore, Fred- 
rick Schuman, do you think that type of book should be used to in- 
doctrinate our military ? 

General Partridge. I wouldn't think so. 



92 COMMUNIST INFILTRATION IN THE ARMY 

The Chairman. Do you think it should be withdrawn? Do you 
or don't you ? Do you think a book like that should be withdrawn or 
used to indoctrinate our military ? 

General Partridge. I'd want to read the book first. 

The Chairman. Even though you know it is put out by Communist 
authors ? 

General Partridge. It would all depend on what they say. 

The Chairman. You don't object to Communist authors unless you 
first see what they say, although he is writing books under the in- 
structions of the Moscow Embassy. Is that correct ? 

General Partridge. Certainly, I object to one writing a book under 
direction of Communist Embassy. Does that apply to the book you 
are speaking of ? 

The Chairman. That is the testimony. 

I am asking you a simple question. You are a man who doesn't 
recognize well-known Communists like Harriet Moore. Do you think 
you are competent to judge when you don't recognize the names of 
notorious Communists ? What rule of thumb would you use ? How 
would you decide which books should be used ? You tell me you, your- 
self, don't even recognize notorious Communists like Harriet Moore. 

Is it your testimony that you have no objection to works of Com- 
munist authors per se ; before you reject a Communist author's work, 
before you order it withdrawn from our indoctrination courses you 
want to read the book first. Is that correct? 

General Partridge. If that book is being used per se to indoctrinate 
people who don't know anything about communism, aren't capable of 
making up their own minds, it certainly should not be used. If that 
book is being used by people who are studying communism, I think 
it is perfectly all right to use it. 

The Chairman. You say people who know nothing about com- 
munism. Let's say someone who knows something about communism. 
You send a man from G-2 to a sensitive area of the world. You give 
him the books which will properly help him to recognize the true 
nature of communism. In that case, would you be willing to give him 
books like that for indoctrination, for teaching purposes, for him to 
read and consider, to teach with? 

General Partridge. I would say not to teach by. 

The Chairman. Do you know the difference between a man study- 
ing communism and being indoctrinated in communism ? 

General Partridge. It seems to me there is a difference. 

The Chairman. What is the difference? 

General Partridge. A man who is studying communism, in my 
opinion, should look at material from all sides of the question and 
think about it, distill it in his mind, try to develop his knowledge of 
it. A man who is being indoctrinated or indoctrinating, somebody 
else is giving him a line. 

The Chairman. General, I assume we will both agree that a man 
who is going to fight communism should study the works of Com- 
munist authors, knowing that they were Communist authors. He 
should read Karl Marx, Lenin, Engels. That is one thing. I think 
we will all agree that any intelligence officer worth his salt should 
have read those books to recognize the famous Communists and 
espionage agents. I am now talking about something entirely 
different. 



COMMUNIST INFILTRATION IN THE ARMY 93 

Do you think Communist authors should be used with approval of 
the Army to indoctrinate — if you don't like the word "indoctrinate" — 
to teach people representing the United States in our military forces % 

That is a simple question I think. 

General Partridge. To me that seems just the point. The biblio- 
graphy listed the list of books the author of this pamphlet under dis- 
cussion at sometime or other had read. I think he was perfectly 
proper in reading them and I don't know to what extent he has 
quoted from them in this pamphlet or whether he has quoted verbatim 
or what selection he made. I see nothing wrong in having read these 
books or having listed them in the bibliography of the books he had 
read before he writes this pamphlet. 

The Chairman. Do you think the list of Communist authors as a 
source for this material should put the reader on notice that this may be 
the Communist side of the picture. Is that right ? 

General Partridge. Not necessarily ; no sir. I didn't mean it that 
way. 

The Chairman. What would be the advantage of listing these 
famous Communists? I misunderstood you. What is the advantage 
of listing them ? 

General Partridge. Well, it indicates that he has read these books 
and consequently has studied the subject some. The main source for 
this was Japanese POW's repatriated. 

The Chairman. How do you know ? You say you don't know how 
much came from Lamont. 

General Partridge. I have been told that. 

The Chairman. Who told you ? 

General Partridge. G-2 of the Far East Command. 

The Chairman. Getting back to the question. I gathered you were 
pointing out the advantage of listing the Communist sources. What 
was the advantage of that ? 

General Partridge. I didn't know I pointed out the advantage of it, 
sir. 

The Chairman. Well, do you think that one of your intelligence 
officers reading this would see the sources were Communist and that 
might put him on guard ? 

General Partridge. It might. 

The Chairman. Do you think it should ? 

General Partridge. Yes ; it should if he recognized them. 

The Chairman. Is he competent to be in G-2 if he doesn't ? 

General Partridge. Well, I recognize one, Corliss Lamont. I don't 
know all the others but I recognize one. 

The Chairman. If you, as head of G-2 do not recognize famous 
Communists, can you expect your subordinates to ? 

General Partridge. Some of them would certainly have more deal- 
ing with that than I do. 

Mr. Cohn. As I understand, it is very important to prevent infiltra- 
tion of Communists and to indoctrinate the troops concerning com- 
munism and Communist methods and techniques. Are you familiar 
with Peter's Manual ? 

General Partridge. No ; I am not. 

Mr. Cohn. Do you know what that is? 

General Partruxje. No. 



94 COMMUNIST INFILTRATION IN THE ARMY 

Mr. Cohn. Have you read the History of the Communist Party of 
the Soviet Union ? 

General Partridge. No ; there are many books I haven't read. 

Mr. Cohn. Have you read State and Revolution ? 

General Partridge. No. 

Mr. Cohn. Foundation of Leninism, by Stalin, or Toward Soviet 
America, by William Z. Foster ? 

General Partridge. No, sir. 

Mr. Cohn. What happened concerning the Communist Party of 
the United States in June of 1945 ? 

General Partridge. Well, I don't know what happened then. I was 
in Europe. 

Mr. Cohn. What is meant by the phrase "Marxist-Leninism," as 
distinguished from Marxism? 

I asked you this to test your knowledge of the Communist Party. 

General Partridge. I don't know the answer to that, sir. 

Mr. Cohn. What books have you read on communism to equip your- 
self to be head of G-2, keeping in mind — I assume you consider inter- 
national communism the principal threat to this country. 

General Partridge. I consider Soviet Russia the principal threat. 

Mr. Cohn. Do you consider international communism a threat? 

General Partridge. Yes, sir ; I do. 

Mr. Cohn. I assume as head of G-2 you have made some study of 
communism. That is why I asked you these questions. We don't 
expect you to know absolutely everything about the Communist move- 
ment. We do expect you to know something about it. I would like 
to put my finger on what you know about communism. You don't 
know Marxism as distinguished from Marxism-Leninism. 

General Partridge. No, sir; I don't. 

Mr. Cohn. Can you tell us anything that happened in the Commun- . 
ist movement in this country in the middle forties ? 

General Partridge. Well, I wasn't in this country except 9 months 
in 1945. I haven't studied the Communist movement in this country 
during that time. I was very busy overseas not dealing with the 
Communist Party both up to 1945 and again from 1946 to 1949. I 
was extremely busy in Europe and not paying much attention to read- 
ing books about communism. 

The Chairman. May I say, General, I realize you didn't select 
your job. Most likely you were assigned to that. I have been in 
the military long enough to see excellent truck drivers assigned to 
a job in the Signal Corps, for which they were completely unequipped, 
and I have seen outstanding Signal Corps men assigned to jobs as 
truck drivers. It is no reflection upon them to be assigned to the 
wrong job. He might be excellent in something else, but the thing 
I can't understand today, and I say I assume you didn't apply for 
this job, I can't understand a man being head of G-2, when Com- 
munist Russia and international communism constitutes almost the 
sole threat to this Nation, not having studied the Communist move- 
ment and the background of communism. Again I say I am not 
criticizing you for that. I don't know what job you were taken out 
of. You might have been outstanding in the job you were in and I 
knew nothing about you until I saw you here today. 

What, if any, works on communism have you read or studied ? 



COMMUNIST INFILTRATION IN THE ARMY 95 

General Partridge. Well, I haven't gone out and read works on 
communism. I have read Whittaker Chambers' book and I have 
read, on the boat coming home I read The History of Kussia, a more 
general history rather than a book on communism. 

The Chairman. Who was the book by ? 

General Partridge. I can't remember. 

The Chairman. It wasn't the Army indoctrination course ? 

General Partridge. No, sir ; it wasn't. 

The Chairman. Well, you had a good history on Kussia by the 
Army. Are you sure that wasn't it ? 

General Partridge. I never saw that one until today, sir. 

Mr. Cohn. You see the distinction between quoting Stalin and 
quoting Stalin in quotations marks so the man reading it knows this 
is coming from the head of the world Communist movement. When 
you use what Stalin says under the sponsorship of the United States 
Army, that is certainly a dangerous situation. 

Now, Mr. McKee, could we get your name for the record ? 

Mr. McKee. Samuel McKee, Jr. M-c-K-e-e. 

Mr. Cohn. "What is your function at the present time ? 

Mr. McKee. I am consultant to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, 
General Partridge. 

Mr. Cohn. Did you have any responsibility or connection with the 
issuance of this report here? 

Mr. McKee. None whatsoever. 

Mr. Cohn. For its continued use ? 

Mr. McKee. I had no responsibility for its continued use. 

Mr. Cohn. Did you ever see this report or hear about it before this 
committee took it up ? 

Mr. McKee. The committee which I was on? 

Mr. Cohn. This committee ? 

Mr. McKee. Yes ; I first saw it in March or April of 1952 when a 
committee was formed in G-2 to review it and make recommendations. 
I was designated as the chairman of the committee. There were 
other members also designated. 

Mr. Cohn. Did you make a recommendation? 

Mr. McKee. We did. 

Mr. Cohn. What did you recommend ? 

Mr. McKee. Our recommendation, you have asked for that speci- 
fically, was that comments and the paragraphs which had preceded 
the recommendation be communicated to G-2, Far Eastern Command 
and that any revisions of this publication or any future publications 
along similar lines be coordinated with G-2, Department of Army, 
before issuance. 

Mr. Cohn. What does that mean? Did they continue to use the 
book? Was your recommendation that it be withdrawn from use? 

Mr. McKee. No, sir. 

Mr. Cohn. You made the recommendation that it be allowed to 
be continued in use ? 

Mr. McKee. We made no recommendation. 

Mr. Cohn. I am trying to find out the purpose for the determina- 
tion, whether you recommended that it be continued in use or not after 
these allegations were made. 

Mr. McKee. May I interrupt you a moment. That was not the 
directive of the committee. The committee was told to examine the 
book and to make some statement as to its adequacy. 



96 COMMUNIST INFILTRATION IN THE ARMY 

Senator Potter. Who established the committee, G-2 ? 

Mr. McKee. Not G-2, no. It was made by the Chief of the In- 
telligence Division. We have had a reorganization since then. 

Senator Potter. You were asked to review this publication not to 
determine whether it should be continued in use but to make recom- 
mendations as a foreword to the publication? 

Mr. McKee. To examine its contents. Determine — this is from 
memory you must realize and I haven't seen it in a long time. To 
determine what effects its use might have on the operations of the 
Army and any other recommendations, as I recall. 

Senator Potter. What effect did you think it might have ? 

Mr. McKee. The opinion of the committee was it was a publication 
which had been put out for a narrowly specialized purpose, being dis- 
tributed to experts presumably, the ones conducting psychological 
warfare and that the recipients of it were qualified to determine 
whether they wanted to use parts of it or not. 

Senator Potter. Now, in your recommendation did you cite that 
certain of these authors of the source material were known Com- 
munists ? 

Mr. McKee. There was a specific mention of Corliss Lamont, yes, 
sir. 

Senator Potter. He is the only one ? 

Mr. McKee. As I recall it, there was criticism of the bibliography 
which had secondary work, including one by Corliss Lamont. It 
happened to be the opinion of the committee that in the preparation 
cf this kind of publication use should be made of primary sources, and 
of course, according to the introduction used, be made of such primary 
sources interrogated as repatriated Japanese POWs. 

Senator Potter. To me you would want to use the source material 
of Communist so that the reader would know whose works he might 
be reading. That would be entirely legitimate, but I think it is most 
distorting when you have a pamphlet here which gives a list of names 
and when you in the top echelon of Intelligence have no knowledge 
of the background of these people, distributing these to people of 
lesser intelligence service as an objective document. I wish some- 
body would write my campaign material this way, frankly. 

Mr. McKee. Sir, may I point out that I had nothing whatever to 
do with the preparation of this document. 

The Chairman. The matter came to you after someone in the mid- 
dle objected to this material, objected to it on the ground that it is 
Communist propaganda. Is that correct ? 

Mr. McKee. May I phrase it a little bit different — raised the ques- 
tion as to the soundness of the publication, the document. The man 
who raised the question, or in fact two, both were put on the com- 
mittee. Major Wilson, as I understand, raised the question with the 
Chief of the Intelligence Division, Colonel Houser, and once the 
question had been raised the committee was formed. Major Wilson's 
point of view was adequately represented. He was on it. The other 
person who raised some question was to have been on it. He was off 
on leave or in school or something and was not on the committee. 

The Chairman. Getting back to my question. After Major Wilson 
pointed out that this was Communist propaganda and objected to it, 
then your Board was formed. Is that correct % 



COMMUNIST INFILTRATION IN THE ARMY 97 

Mr. McKeb. No, sir. He didn't say Communist propaganda. He 
said it could be misconstrued as Communist propaganda. 

The Chairman. Said it could be used as Communist propaganda. 

What was his objection? 

Mr. McKee. He raised the question if whether or not somebody 
came across this document, as has subsequently happened, the purpose 
in it could be misunderstood and that it could be read as having 
passages which presented communism in a favorable light. 

The Chairman. In other words he objected to the book because he 
felt it presented communism in an untrue and in a favorable light. 
Is there any question about that ? 

Mr. McKee. I think all he wanted was to have a group look at it. 
Sir, he signed the committee report. 

The Chairman. I am trying to get what his objection was. 

Mr. McKee. Well, sir, may I say this. I was only called into it 
when the Division Chief's 

The Chairman. I don't care when you were called in. I want to 
know — Major Wilson had one objection, one principal objection, and 
that was this was an untrue picture of communism and put commu- 
nism in a very favorable light. Wasn't that his objection? 

Did he not press that same objection all through your hearing ? 

Mr. McKee. No, sir. 

The Chairman. All right, then I will cut it down. Did he object 
during the hearing to this document on the grounds that it was incor- 
rect and that it put communism in too favorable a light ? Wasn't that 
the objection he had on the committee ? 

Mr. McKee. No, sir. 

The Chairman. Did he raise an objection ? 

Mr. McKee. He raised it as a question. He wondered whether it 
could be misconstrued. 

The Chairman. He wondered. And when he got through wonder- 
ing, what happened ? 

Mr. McKee. That was that, sir. 

May I say, sir, that the way the committee worked was to consult 
practically everybody in G-2 who had some competency to pass on it. 
The opinion was a reflection of a collective point of view. 

The Chairman. Do you think this document should be continued in 
use! 

Mr. McKee. Do I personally, sir ? I don't think it is used. 

The Chairman. Do you think it should be used ? You were on the 
committee to decide whether it should be used. Do you think it 
should be used now ? 

In other words, if it was all right in 1952, is it still all right in 1953 ? 

Mr. McKee. Sir, the committee found fault with certain parts of the 
study. They did not think it is all right. The committee thought 
it would satisfactorily serve the purpose for which it was published. 

The Chairman. Just stop a minute. The committee thought it was 
all right. They objected to it. You say it satisfactorily served its 
purpose. I am sorry, I have some trouble following you. You say 
it is not all right but it is satisfactory. I am not trying to twist your 
words. 

Mr. McKee. The committee specifically found certain faults in it. 
For one thing, the publication covers the entire Soviet Union instead 



98 COMMUNIST INFILTRATION IN THE ARMY 

of Soviet Siberia. The emphasis is on Soviet Siberia. There are in 
it, when we went over it very carefully, errors in fact. There are 
questionable interpretations in places. There are errors in fact. 

The Chairman. There are errors in fact, you say ? 

Mr. McKee. Sir, I could not put my finger on them at this point. 
There were several. Before a committee comes up with a recom- 
mendation that is to be communicated to a major overseas command, 
you very carefully check errors in fact. 

Senator Potter. Was this document revised after the committee's 
report to correct the errors in fact ? 

Mr. McKee. There was a subsequent study which did seem to elimi- 
nate the faults we found with it. 

Senator Potter. Was there a corrected document put out after your 
committee had acted? 

Mr. McKee. You mean a revision of this ? 

Senator Potter. A revision of this ? 

Mr. McKee. Not to my knowledge. 

Senator Potter. Any corrected sheets of the errors in fact ? 

Mr. McKee. Not to my knowledge. 

Senator Potter. What disturbs me, we have a document, objective 
to a very few people who should have knowledge of Siberia. After 
it is reviewed and found that errors in fact exist, it still hasn't been 
corrected. These expert people you have need a special document of 
this kind, an objective document which you claim you have. You 
found errors in fact and they weren't correct. Are you serving the 
purpose that you intended by this document ? 

Mr. McKee. The errors in fact were of a very minor nature. I 
can't recall it specifically, but the date given for the formation for a 
legislative body, if you could call it that, in the Soviet Union was a 
year off. I remember another statement that something had been 
dissolved in a year and somebody pointed out that it actually had been 
dissolved 2 years later, and the errors in fact were in the nature that 
would not have substantially, if corrected, modified the study as a 
whole. 

Senator Potter. Besides the errors in fact, I am also interested in 
the errors in judgment. I am particularly interested in a section on 
the racial problem in Siberia. It seems to me they had quite a Jewish 
purge and here it is stated anti-Semitics in Russia, in the Soviet Union, 
is very minor and is decreasing all the time. 

Now, I think that the hundreds of Jewish people that are now 
in labor camps might disagree with the objectivity of that section. In 
your review of that did you consider the judgment of 

Mr. McKee. Sir, I mentioned before that the committee believed 
there were questionable interpretations. I made that distinction, but 
nobody can say exactly what is true from an interpretation of any- 
thing. 

Mr. Cohn. Do you think Corliss Lamont might be right ? 

Mr. McKee. Mr. Cohn, until this came up I never read Corliss 
Lamont. 

Mr. Cohn. Is there anybody in G-2 who has read Corliss Lamont, 
Peter's Manual, History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, 
who knows that in 1945 the Communist Party turned upside down and 
kicked out Earl Browder and formed under a revolutionary principal 



COMMUNIST INFILTRATION IN THE ARMY 99 

to work for the Soviet Union to bring about the day — the destruction 
of this Government, laid out elaborate plans. Does anybody know 
these things? 

Mr. McKee. Yes, indeed. 

Mr. Cohn. Who is it ? 

Mr. McKee. G-2 has a great many responsibilities both for positive 
and counter intelligence. Intelligence requires a high degree of 
specialization. 

The Chairman. Mr. McKee, our time is very limited. Who over 
there has read the works Mr. Cohn names, if you know ? If you don't 
know, tell us. 

Mr. McKee. I don't know the reading of everybody in G-2. 

Mr. Cohn. Do you know anybody over there who has read the im- 
portant Communist works, who has read The Manifesto? 

Mr. McKee. Sir, any educated man has read The Manifesto. 

Mr. Cohn. Have you read it ? 

Mr. McKee. I have read it. I think the first time I read it was as 
a student in 1924 and 1925. 

Mr. Cohn. Wlien was the last time you read it ? 

Mr. McKee. Well, I don't suppose I have had occasion to read the 
Communist manifesto since it went through as a Senate document, 
Senate publication, which has all 

Mr. Cohn. Have you read Karl Marx ? 

Mr. McKee. I once read Das Kapital. 

Mr. Cohn. Have you read Lenin ! 

Mr. McKee. Excerpts. 

Mr. Cohn. Do you know the difference between Marxism and 
Marxism-Leninism ? 

Mr. McKee. Many of these fine distinctions of communism I don't 
know. 

Mr. Cohn. That is no fine distinction. That is a distinction involv- 
ing the United States of America. 

Do you know the distinction ? 

Mr. McKee. I know a distinction. 

Mr. Cohn. What is it? What is the distinction ? 

Mr. McKee. The distinction in my mind is that Lenin took a more 
aggressive view of expanding communism outside the countries in 
which it existed than Marx did. That is something highly contro- 
versial among Communists. 

Mr. Cohn. You refer to some errors in this document. I ask you if 
you consider this a false statement : 

The Communist regime has profoundly altered the Soviet population. The 
toiler was elevated to the highest level of respectability. The Soviet Communist 
code continues to honor the worker above all. 

Do you think that is good Communist propaganda or do you think 
it is an accurate statement? 

Mr. McKee. The Soviet Government certainly tries to make out 
it honors the worker about all. 

The Chairman. Do you think it is an accurate statement ? That is 
a simple question. 

Mr. McKee. You read me 3 or 4 profound 

The Chairman. I said, do you think that is inaccurate ? 



100 COMMUNIST INFILTRATION IN THE ARMY 

Mr. McKee. Again, may I say so many of those statements, before 
I would like to pass judgment on the accuracy, I would like to know 
what goes before. 

Mr. Cohn. This simple statement: The Soviet Communist code 
continued to honor the worker above all. 

Mr. McKee. That seems to be the Soviet Communist code so far 
as I hear. It does that. 

Mr. Cohn. It is important to note— quoting from this document — 

It is important to note that Communist Party membership permeates the whole 
fabric of Soviet society and does not function as an exclusive elite, superimposed 
on an amorphous mass. The member in relation to the nonmember, is more 
priest than ruler. 

Do you think that is a correct description? Do you think that is a 
correct statement? 

Mr. McKee. Let me say, sir, no, sir. I would not express it that 
way. 

Mr. Cohn. Do you think the Communist Party is an influential 
element in the Soviet Union ? Do you think that is a correct statement ? 
Mr. McKee. Not as it is worded ; no, sir. 
Mr. Cohn (reading) : 

Wages are closely geared to output for manager and worker alike. All in- 
centives of the capitalist enterprises are rigorously exploited. 

There is no mention made at all as to the standard of living, no 
mention made of the fact that the average Soviet worker has the 
standard of living comparable to an American laborer getting $8 or $9 
a week. It creates the impression that conditions are rather ideal. 

The Chairman. You were called to the committee for the purpose of 
passing on this document. Were you ever on a committee performing 
the same function in regard to any other documents ? 

Mr. McKee. Not to my recollection, sir, but I have served on all 
sorts of committees. 

The Chairman. Just answer my question. 

Mr. McKee. No, sir ; not to my recollection. 

The Chairman. Did you recommend against the use of this 
document ? 

Just tell me "Yes" or "No." 

Mr. McKee. No. 

The Chairman. Did Major "Wilson want the committee to recom- 
mend against its use? 

Mr. McKee. Sir, he was at liberty to dissent if he so wanted. 

The Chairman. Did he argue in favor of a recommendation against 
the use of this document? Was that the position he took on the 
committee ? 

Mr. McKee. No, sir. 

The Chairman. He did not? 

Mr. McKee. No, sir. 

The Chairman. Do you know who Simmons is ? 

Mr. McKee. I think' I do. 

The Chairman. Who is he? 

Mr. McKee. He is a teacher at Columbia University. 

The Chairman. Do you know whether he is a Communist or not? 

Mr. McKee. No. 

The Chairman. You don't know. Do you know about Pares? 



COMMUNIST INFILTRATION IN THE ARMY 101 

Mr. McKee. Yes ; I know of Pares. 

The Chairman. Do you know whether he is a Communist or not? 

Mr. McKee. I don't know that he is. I suppose he is dead now. 
If he isn't dead, he is a very old man. 

The Chairman. Age has nothing to do with communism. Do you 
know whether or not he is a Communist ? 

Mr. McKee. No, sir. I do not. 

The Chairman. Before you passed on this did you call the FBI 
or the House Un-American Activities Committee to get information 
about the men listed here as authors ? 

Mr. McKee. The committee did check the background, but not the 
FBI. We have our components which checked the background of 
listed authors. 

The Chairman. Did you know that four of the sources had long 
records of Communist activities ? 

Mr. McKee. Sir, the information furnished us was not to that 
effect. 

The Chairman. Did you try to contact the House Un-American 
Activities Committee ? 

Mr. McKee. Sir, I and the committee had confidence in G-2. 

The Chairman. Did you contact the House Un-American Activi- 
ties Committee ? 

Mr. McKee. No, sir. 

The Chairman. Do you think if Stalin is quoted verbatim in this 
document that it is a proper document to send out ? 

Mr. McKee. Sir, I would have to check where and how Stalin is 
quoted verbatim before I am prepared to answer that. I don't know 
that he is quoted without quotation marks. 

The Chairman. Didn't you try to find out before you passed on 
this ? You were called on to pass on the document after you had com- 
plaints that it could be used as Communist propaganda. I would 
like to know what you did. Did you check to find out whether Stalin 
was being quoted in the book ? 

Mr. McKee. Sir, I can only repeat what I said before. 

The Chairman. You needn't bother repeating what you said before. 

Do you think this should be withdrawn or continued in use ? 

Mr. McKee. I do not think it should be withdrawn, sir. 

The Chairman. I sincerely hope you are withdrawn because you 
are certainly incompetent to hold a job in intelligence. This is clear- 
cut use of Communist propaganda, quotations of Joe Stalin, four indi- 
viduals, at least, known to be Communists, quotations by an indi- 
vidual who was an editor of the Daily Worker. To my way of think- 
ing, sir, that makes you completely and hopelessly incompetent for 
that job. I say that while you are here so it will be on the record. 

Senator Potter. What is your position ? 

Mr. McKee. Well, my official title is consultant to the Chief of 
Staff, G-2. My duties are mostly connected with positive intelligence. 

Senator Potter. How long have you been connected with the Intel- 
ligence Branch ? 

Mr. McKee. I have been there as a civilian since 1946. Before that 
I was with G-2 during the war for 4 years. 

Senator Potter. Are you a Reserve officer ? 



102 COMMUNIST INFILTRATION IN THE ARMY 

Mr. McKee. You mean when I came into the war ? 

Senator Potter. No. Are you on Reserve status now ? 

Mr. McKee. I am a Reserve officer. 

Mr. Cohn. I want to ask you this : When you reviewed this in March 
or . A Ppl of 1952, you did check the sources cited here. Just take up 
this Simmons book and glancing over the table of contents you see 
Corliss Lament, the first one they used, he wrote part of the book; 
second, Harriet L. Moore. Do you know Harriet L. Moore? 

Mr. McKee. I have never heard of Harriet L. Moore. 

Mr. Cohn. I am surprised because 2 months before you made this 
study Harriet L. Moore was all over the front pages of the country. 
She was Secretary of the Communist-dominated Institute of Pacific 
Relations. She testified on February 6, 19,52, before the McCarran 
committee after having been named by Hede Massing, Elizabeth Bent- 
ley, and Louis Budenz as a Communist Party member. She testified 
as follows : 

Mr. Morris. Mrs. Gelfan, witnesses before this committee, notably Hede Mass- 
ing, Elizabeth Bentley, and Louis Budenz, have testified you were a member of 
the Communist Party. Were you as a matter of fact a member of the Com- 
munist Party ? 

Mrs. Gelfan. I decline to answer on the grounds that the answer might tend 
to incriminate me. 

I am reading from page 2559, Senate committee hearings on Febru- 
ary 6, 1952, Institute of Pacific Relations. 

Coining down the list we find Sergei Kournakoff, who wrote a 
column for the Daily Worker all during the war, Military Commander 
and is an open and avowed oCmmunist. This is really unbelievable. 
There is hardly a name here that someone who has specialized knowl- 
edge in this field 

Mr. McKee. Mr. Cohn, may I say I checked the authors in the 
bibliography. I did not check the authors listed in the bibliography 
of the bibliography. 

Mr. Cohn. This is not the bibliography of the bibliography. Mr. 
Simmons made a collection here of selections from other people. He 
made a collection of writings of other people so it is not a bibliography 
of Mr. Simmon's book but the names of people whose selections were 
used verbatiin in Simmon's book — Corliss Lamont, Sir Bernard Pares. 
One Communist after another one and the testimony we have is that 
this book is still in use. 

Mr. McKee. Used in what way ? 

Mr. Cohn. In use for Army indoctrination courses. 

Mr. McKee. I know nothing about Army indoctrination. 

Mr. Cohn. These books and the 1945 changeover 

Mr. McKee. It is not any desire of ours to read all those books 

Mr. Cohn. Those books contain the blueprinting spelled out step by 
step, what the Communist Party seeks to do, infiltrate the United 
States Army, National Guard and other establishments of consider- 
able interest to you. I am just wondering who does know anything 
on it. 

Senator Potter. Do you have a division in your G-2 on Communist 
activities or Communist infiltration or Communist propaganda. Do 
you have any experts in that ? 

_ Mr. McKee. Most of that is done outside G-2 but persons who spe- 
cialized in political intelligence; the report was analyzed by other 



COMMUNIST INFILTRATION IN THE ARMY 103 

agencies. For instance, Bixcomb from CIA analyzed it very care- 
fully. 

Senator Potter. I assume Psychological Warfare Division, for 
which this was published 

Mr. McKee. It was published for psychological warfare officers of 
the Far East Command. 

Senator Potter. It seems to me we have been spending billions of 
dollars, at least ever since I have been in Congress, to fight communism. 
People will come up here and testify that the Nation is in great danger 
of various types of Communist aggression. 

Now, that being the case, I would feel a lot more secure from the 
purpose of defense if I felt that we had some people in the Army 
who had, at least, had some knowledge, even better than a layman's 
knowledge, of the type of enemy we are combating. Now, it takes a 
lot of money. We lost a lot of money in the Korean war as you well 
know fighting communism. It seems to me to be elementary to have 
a highly technical trained staff who would be in a position to advise 
G-2 and other people on a top policy-making level, operating level and 
intelligence, to keep abreast of changing conditions, changing tactics 
of the Communist apparatus. After all international communism is 
just the foreign agents of the Soviet Union's foreign policy. It is 
not something that is different or set aside from the Soviet Union at 
all. It is their aggressive Army of the Soviet Union. I would feel a 
lot more secure if I knew, I had assumed that we had technical experts 
in the Army. 

Mr. McKee. Sir, there is such a group. There are several. 

General Partridge. We do have such people. We have a counter- 
intelligence corps whose business is to do exactly that, military in- 
stallations or anything dealing with the military, but of course, the 
combating of the Communist Party within the United States and the 
question of infiltration, except into our own ranks is not our primary 
job. It is the job of the FBI. 

Senator Potter. That is true. I would think by the same token, 
when passing on material which you put out dealing with the Soviet 
Union, such as this pamphlet here, that you would be conscientious and 
get the best advice possible on the tactics and operations of the inter- 
national conspiracy; but I will grant you, it is not your prime duty 
on that score, but for your own security I was a little surprised to find 
the lack of concern, lack of many things displayed here this afternoon. 

The Chairman. Do you consider this document pro-Communist, 
General ? 

General Partridge. I didn't understand you. 

The Chairman. Do you consider this document pro-Communist ? 

General Partridge. In toto, no, sir, I do not. 

The Chairman. Do you consider parts of it pro-Communist ? 

General Partridge. I think parts sound pro-Communist. Other 
parts sound strongly anti- Communist. It all depends on what part 
you are looking at. 

The Chairman. Do you think any parts which are pro-Communist 
are inaccurate ? Do you think it gives a correct picture ? 

General Partridge. I don't know whether it gives an absolutely 
correct picture. I think it attempts to give a correct picture. I 
haven't been able to find the obvious flaws in it. 



104 COMMUNIST INFILTRATION IN THE ARMY 

The Chairman. Do you think Stalin in his book attempts to give a 
correct picture of the Communist movement? 

General Partridge. No, sir. I don't think he was. 

The Chairman. Do you think when Stalin was quoted by the 
author of this pamphlet, Major Allen — Is that his name? 

General Partridge. Yes. 

The Chairman. That he was trying to give a correct picture by quot- 
ing Stalin ? 

General Partridge. I think he was trying to do that. Whether he 
did would depend on what he quoted. I don't think everything Stalin 
says is a lie. He is bound to say something true once in a while. I 
don't know what he quoted from Stalin. 

The Chairman. Do you think Corliss Lamont is trying to give a 
true picture ? 

General Partridge. I don't think he is. 

The Chairman. Do you think when this man quoted him in this 
document he was trying to get a correct picture ? 

You just said you don't think Lamont would give a true picture. 
Do you think the man who quoted him in this document is trying to give 
a correct picture? 

General Partridge. I think he was. 

The Chairman. In other words, Stalin and Lamont are liars but 
you can quote liars and that is perfectly all right ? 

General Partridge. Nobody can be a liar all the time. 

The Chairman. Mr. McKee, do you believe communism is an evil 
system ? 

Mr. McKee. I do, sir. 

The Chairman. Do you think that international communism is one 
of the major threats to this country ? 

Mr. McKee. I think it is the major threat. 

The Chairman. Do you think then that a work which extols non- 
existent virtues of the Communist system should be put out by our 
Army ? 

Mr. McKee. No, sir. I do not regard this as such a study. 

The Chairman. You haven't answered the question. 

Do you think that a work which extols nonexistent virtues of the 
Communist system should be put out by the Army ? 

Mr. McKee. Certainly not, sir. 

Senator Potter. I'd like to ask one question. Assuming that Major 
Allen had used, rather than quoting Lamont and some of the other 
authors which you are unfamiliar with, suppose he quoted Earl Brow- 
der, Davies, Steve Nelson, some that you recognize. Would that have 
made any difference in the evaluation of that report ? 

Mr. McKee. If I had recognized them as quotations without hav- 
ing quotation marks, yes. 

Senator Potter. The point I mentioned there is the fact that 
whether you know it or not, these men were used as source material who 
are Communists. The fact that you didn't know them doesn't make it 
any better. 

Mr. McKee. Sir, I am not sure I understand your point. 

Senator Potter. If I understood you, you said that if you had recog- 
nized the names of those people as known Communists, that would have 
made a difference in your evaluation of the report. Is that correct? 



COMMUNIST INFILTRATION IN THE ARMY 105 

Mr. McKee. No, sir. I thought vou said "made a difference" if I 
had recognized parts of the book as quotations from these known 
Communists. You mentioned persons whose works I am not aware 
figure in it all all. 

Senator Potter. They don't. If they had been the source material, 
if they had been quoted rather than some of these you claim you 
don't know, don't know they have been active in the Communist con- 
spiracy, I wonder if that would make any difference. Would knowl- 
edge or lack of knowledge make any difference? 

Mr. McKee. Sir, I would have disapproved of known insinuations 
into this study, of direct statements by Communists. 

The Chairman. We will want both of you back here Monday. 

Secretary Stevens. Could I make one brief statement? I am most 
appreciative of the opportunity of being here. I think it is fair to say 
from my evaluation of the answers given to your questions that they 
are not very satisfactory to the committee. However, I would like 
to say, in fairness to General Partridge and Mr. McKee, I think they 
have tried to get before you the facts, right or wrong, to the best of 
their ability. There has been no effort to withold whoever the author 
might be, who served on the committee. It seems to me, therefore, on 
the ground of attempt to cooperate, they have made that attempt, even 
though their answers might not have been satisfactory. 

The Chairman. I may say, Mr. Secretary, I have been shocked be- 
yond words by the appearance of the gentlemen here. He came here 
to testify in regard to a document which has been labeled by a student 
on the subject as a work of a Communist agent. We know that much 
of the contents of it is work of identified Communist agents. Why 
Partridge comes here to defend that and say in effect that he in- 
tends to continue more of the same, to me that marks him completely 
incompetent. He may be an excellent field commander, I know noth- 
ing about him. I never met him before, I don't believe. I do think it 
is necessary to have him come down here in public session and let the 
people know what we have inherited from the past. 

I just wonder who selected him for that job. Well, I know you 
didn't. We all know that international communism is the one great 
overpowering threat to this country. Why put a man in this job who 
doesn't know the first thing about communism. 

Why keep on in this position Mr. McKee if Communist propaganda 
is called to his attention and he gives his stamp of approval and sends 
it on. 

Listening to General Partridge, there is no question about the fact 
that if he couldn't get excited about Communist books, can't get 
disturbed about Communist literature coming from the mouth of 
Stalin, the mouth of a man who is editor of the Daily Worker, Harriet 
Moore, then nothing on God's earth is going to disturb him about 
communism. 

Mr. Secretary, we need more than cooperation from a man like 
General Partridge. We need someone who has some conception of 
the danger of communism. I don't blame him. I know he didn't 
select this task. I was in service. I was sometimes assigned to a job 
I was unequipped for too. The general may be one of the most out- 
standing field officers for all I know. Certainly he isn't an authority 
on communism. One of the principal jobs of G-2 is to keep from being 
infiltrated by the Communists. End of speech. 

(Whereupon, the hearing adjourned at 4 : 30 p. m.) 

X 



COMMUNIST INFILTRATION IN THE ARMY 



c~ 









C> 



HEARINGS 

BEFORE THE 

PERMANENT SUBCOMMITTEE ON 
INVESTIGATIONS OF THE COMMITTEE ON 

GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS 
UNITED STATES SENATE 

EIGHTY-THIRD CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 
PURSUANT TO 

S. Res. 189 



PART 3 



JANUARY 30, FEBRUARY 18, AND MARCH 4, 1954 



Printed for the use of the Committee on Government Operations 




UNITED STATES 
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 
38794 WASHINGTON : 1954 



Boston Pu M ; c Library 
Superintendent of Document, 

APR 28 1954 



COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS 

JOSEPH R. MCCARTHY, Wisconsin, ^Chairman 
KARL E. MUNDT, South Dakota JOHN L. McCLELLAN, Arkansas 

MARGARET CHASE SMITH, Maine HUBERT H. HUMPHREY, Minnesota 

HENRY C. DWORSHAK, Idaho HENRY M. JACKSON, Washington 

EVERETT McKINLEY DIRKSEN, Illinois JOHN F. KENNEDY, Massachusetts 
JOHN MARSHALL BUTLER, Maryland STUART SYMINGTON, Missouri 

CHARLES E. POTTER, Michigan ALTON A. LENNON, North Carolina 

Richard J. O'Melia, General Counsel 
Walter Reynolds, Chief Clerk 



Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations 

JOSEPH R. MCCARTHY, Wisconsin, Chairman 

KARL E. MUNDT, South Dakota JOHN L. McCLELLAN, Arkansas 

EVERETT McKINLEY DIRKSEN, Illinois HENRY M. JACKSON, Washington 
CHARLES E. POTTER, Michigan STUART SYMINGTON, Missouri 

Roy M. Cohn, Chief Counsel 
Francis P. Carr, Executive Director 

n 



CONTENTS 



Page 
Index I 

Testimony of — 

Belskv, Dr. Marvin Sanford 159 

Eagle', Miss Ruth 119 

Peress, Irving . 107, 123 

Zwicker, Brig. Gen. Ralph W 145 

EXHIBITS 

Intro- 
duced Appears 
on page on page 

6. Excerpt from Daily Worker, November 22, 1949 129 * 

7. Department of the Armv AGO Form 71, January 1, 1951 132 * 

8. Department of Defense Form 98, April 1, 1950 132 * 

9. Department of Defense Form 98-2, December 1, 1950 132 * 

* May be found in the files of the subcommittee. 

Ill 



COMMUNIST INFILTEATIONJN THE AKMY 

(On January 30, 1954, the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations 
held hearings in executive session on Communist infiltration in the Army. This 
testimony was made public on March 4, 1954, by the members of the subcom- 
mittee and follows below:) 

SATURDAY, JANUARY 30, 1954 

United States Senate, 
Permanent Subcommittee 

on Investigations of the 
Committee on Government Operations, 

New York, N. Y. 

The subcommittee met (pursuant to S. Res. 40, agreed to January 
30, 1953) at 10: 30 a. m., room 36, Federal Building, New York City, 
Senator Joseph R. McCarthy presiding. 

Present : Senator Joseph R. McCarthy, Republican, Wisconsin. 

Present also: Francis P. Carr, executive director; Roy M. Colin, 
chief counsel. 

TESTIMONY OF MAJ. IRVING PERESS, ARMY DENTAL CORPS, 
CAMP KILMER, N. J., ACCOMPANIED BY STANLEY EAULKNER, 
ATTORNEY 

The Chairman. Major, would you raise your right hand and be 
sworn, please. 

In the matter now in hearing, do you solemnly swear that the tes- 
timony you are about to give will be the truth, the whole truth, and 
nothing but the truth, so help you God ? 

Major Peress. I do. 

The Chairman. Will counsel identify himself for the record ? 

Mr. Faulkner. Stanley Faulkner, 9 East 40th Street, New York 
City. 

The Chairman. And would you give your telephone number in case 
the staff has to get in touch with you ? 

Mr. Faulkner. Lexington 2-7780. 

Mr. Cohn. Could we get your full name ? 

Major Peress. Irving, I-r-v-i-n-g Peress, P-e-r-e-s-s. 

Mr. Cohn. Where do you reside ? 

Major Peress. 6139 79th Street, Middle Village, N. Y. 

Mr. Cohn. Now, what is your current rank in the Army ? 

Major Peress. Major. 

Mr. Cohn. For how long a period of time have you held that rank ? 

Major Peress. Almost 3 months. 

Mr. Cohn. And when did you enter the Army ? 

Major Peress. On active duty, you mean? 

The Chairman. Let me interrupt. Do I understand you were pro- 
moted 3 months ago? 

107 



108 COMMUNIST INFILTRATION IN THE ARMY 

Major Peress. That is right. On November 2, 1953. 

The Chairman. When did you go on active duty ? 

Major Peress. January 1, 1952. 

The Chairman. A little over 2 years ago ? 

Major Peress. No, I am sorry, January 1, 1953. 

Mr. Cohn. Now, what were the circumstances of your going on 
active duty. Did you apply or were you called? 

By the way, any time you want to you can consult with counsel. He 
can talk to you or nudge you and you can do likewise. I don't know if 
you have been before the committee before. 

(Witness consults with counsel.) 

Major Peress. I registered under the doctor draft law; I think it 
was the 1950 law. I was called up in July of 1952 to take a physical 
examination, which I passed, and I was tendered a commission in 
approximately October 1952 as captain. I got orders to go on active 
duty January 1, 1953. 

Mr. Cohn. Did you apply for a commission as captain ? 

Major Peress. Yes, the procedure was the draft board notified you 
of your impending induction and between the enlistment on my part — 
the coinciding of dates coming in 2 weeks — I was informed the enlist- 
ment was not recognized so that I went under the normal channels of 
draft induction. 

Mr. Cohn. Then you applied for a commission, and after you filled 
out certain application forms, that commission was tendered as 
captain. Is that right ? 

Major Peress. Yes. 

Mr. Cohn. And you accepted the commission. 

Major Peress. I did. 

Mr. Cohn. Where did you enter on duty ? 

Major Peress. Fort Sam Houston, Tex. 

Mr. Cohn. For how long a period were you down there ? 

Major Peress. I left home January 1 and left there February 7. 

Mr. Cohn. Where did you go from Fort Sam Houston ? 

The Chairman. Let me interrupt. Apparently, Major, the situa- 
tion was — see if I understand you correctly. Correct me if I am 
wrong. You did register for the doctors' draft. 

Major Peress. Every physician and dentist had to register under 
the 1951 law. 

The Chairman. Then there came a time when the draft board noti- 
fied you you had been called up. You were put in a certain priority 
depending on whether the Goverment had helped finance your edu- 
cation or depending on the time you served in the last war. 

Major Peress. Yes. 

The Chairman. After you were classified in one of those priorities, 
you attempted to enlist in the Army. They told you due to the prox- 
imity of enlistment to the time of your classification, they hadn't 
recognized your enlistment and you were about to be inducted ; then 
you applied for a commission — they allow you sufficient time to apply 
for a commission — a commission of captain was tendered to you and 
you accepted it. Is that right ? 

Major Peress. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. In effect you attempted to volunteer for the service. 
Is that correct. 

Major Peress. In effect, yes, sir. 



COMMUNIST INFILTRATION IN THE ARMY 109 

The Chairman. How did you serve in the last war ? 

Major Peress. I had a commission tendered to me and at the last 
moment they discovered I had a physical defect which they would not 
waive and they would not accept me. 

The Chairman. But your physical defect was waived on this oc- 
casion ? 

Major Peress. That is right. 

The Chairman. Had the Government financed, in any way, your 
education ? 

Major Peress. No. 

Mr. Cohn. From Fort Sam Houston, where did you go after that? 

Major Peress. I had orders to go to Yokohama, Japan. When I 
got to the port of embarkation at Fort Lewis, Wash., I had an emer- 
gency leave to come back home. 

The Chairman. Was it a medical question ? 

Major Peress. Yes, sir, a medical question. 

I came home and had further communication with the Department 
of Defense, the Pentagon, I received new orders to report to Kilmer. 

Mr. Cohn. Whose illness was it ? 

Major Peress. My wife and daughter. 

Mr. Cohn. Now, you said something about the Department of De- 
fense. Who did you see in the Department of Defense ? 

Major Peress. Well, I guess I went through the Adjutant General's 
Office in the Pentagon. 

Mr. Cohn. You wrote to the proper authorities and requested a 
change of assignment ? 

Major Peress. They did. 

Mr. Cohn. Where did they station you ? 

Major Peress. Camp Kilmer, N. J. 

Mr. Cohn. How far is that from New York ? 

Major Peress. Thirty miles. 

The Chairman. See if I have this picture correctly in mind. You 
were assigned to Yokohama ; you got as far as the port of embarkation 
and received emergency leave because of illness on the part of your 
wife and daughter. 

Major Peress. That is right. 

The Chairman. When you arrived home you applied for a transfer 
to some other station in the United States ? 

Major Peress. I applied for what is called compassionate 
reassignment. 

The Chairman. Who did you correspond with on this subject? 

Major Peress. The Adjutant General. I don't know who handled 
it in the office — in the Office of the Adjutant General. 

The Chairman. Did you have correspondence other than through 
official channels? 

(Witness consulted with counsel.) 

Major Peress. Before I answer that question, Mr. Senator, I would 
like to state, at this time I am on active duty with the Army and under 
the sole jurisdiction of the Army and the President, who is the Com- 
mander and Chief of the Armed Forces, and do not feel that I come 
under the jurisdiction of this committee. 

The Chairman. Did you have any correspondence with anyone with 
regard to the change of your orders other than through official 
channels ? 



110 COMMUNIST INFILTRATION IN THE ARMY 

Major Peress. In regard to the change of being assigned to Yoko- 
hama to being assigned to the United States, did I have correspond- 
ence — you mean did I write to friends ? 

The Chairman. You understand the question. Did you have cor- 
respondence other than through official channels ? 

Major Peress. The answer is "No." 

The Chairman. In other words, no Congressman, no Senator, no 
one to your knowledge intervened in your behalf to promote your 
change of orders? 

Major Peress. Well, I wrote to nobody, but my wife asked my Con- 
gressman about the advice of how to proceed. There was no official 
correspondence, no intervention. He merely suggested to us the Red 
Cross as a means of coming back from Fort Lewis, Wash., to New 
Jersey. 

The Chairman. Who was your Congressman ? 

Major Peress. I believe his name was Holtzman. 

The Chairman. And he is from where ? 

Major Peress. Queens, where I live. 

The Chairman. You say you had correspondence with him when 
you were on your way to Yokohama ? 

Major Peress. I had no correspondence with him. 

The Chairman. Who did have correspondence with him ? 

Major Peress. Well, I don't remember exactly but my wife either 
called him or wrote to him because he lives in the neighborhood and 
got a telegram back from him to the effect that I get in touch with the 
Red Cross in order to secure time that my appeal be considered. 
As it was, because of the element of time, nothing could be done and 
I would have had to go to the Far East and take it up in the Far 
East. He suggested the Red Cross as an instrument of delaying the 
transfer overseas. 

The Chairman. Do you have copies of the correspondence and the 
application you made at that time? Do you have copies of corres- 
pondence with your Congressman, the Red Cross, Department of 
Army — any correspondence in connection with the delay or change of 
orders? 

Major Peress. I should say 

The Chairman. Do you or do you not have the correspondence ? 

Major Peress. Well, I made copies but I am not real sure I have 
them. 

The Chairman. You don't have any along with you ? 

Major Peress. Let's see. 

(Witness examines record.) 

The Chairman. Any documents having to do with the change of 
orders ? 

Major Peress. I do not have them with me. 

The Chairman. Did anyone in the Army ever ask you whether 
you were a member of the Communist Party or a Communist Party 
organizer ? 

Major Peress. I decline to answer that question under the protec- 
tion of the fifth amendment on the ground it might tend to incriminate 
me. 

The Chairman. You decline to answer whether or not they asked 
you ? Are you a member of the Communist Party today ? 



COMMUNIST INFILTRATION IN THE ARMY 111 

Major Peress. I again decline, claiming the privilege for the reason 
previously stated. 

The Chairman. Were you a member of the Communist Party at 
the time you were inducted ? 

Major Peress. I again claim the privilege. 

The Chairman. Did any Communists intervene to have your orders 
changed so you would not have to leave the country ? 

Major Peress. I again claim the privilege. 

The Chairman. You are entitled to the privilege. 

Is your wife a member of the Communist party ? 

Major Peress. I again claim the privilege. 

Mr. Cohn. Your wife's name is Elaine, is that correct ? 

Major Peress. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. How many children do you have ? 

Major Peress. Two. 

The Chairman. How old are they ? 

Major Peress. Six and a half and eight and a half. 

The Chairman. And you said your orders were changed because 
of illness. What was the illness? 

Major Peress. It is a personal matter I'd rather not discuss. The 
Army has official information on it. 

The Chairman. If it is an illness which is in any way embarrassing, 
we would not require you to discuss it. Otherwise, we will have to 
ask you about it. 

I am curious to know how Communists can get their orders changed 
so easily. The average man would be sent to Yokohama. You can 
suddenly have your orders changed and kept in this country. I am 
curious to know whether the illness was real or imaginary. I am 
curious to know if that was the real factor; if you were telling the 
truth, or you were lying. You told the Army your wife and daugh- 
ter were sick. If the sickness would be embarrassing to discuss it, 
we will not ask about it ; otherwise I want to know about it. 

Major Peress. The Red Cross made an investigation of the nature 
of the illness and the validity of the reason of the change and these are 
on file in the Army records. 

The Chairman. What were the reasons? If the Red Cross made 
an investigation, there is nothing confidential. What were the 
reasons? 

Major Peress. I would still rather not discuss it, Senator, because it 
is personal, and I feel it invades the privacy of the medical profession 
and is not pertinent. 

The Chairman. Mister, I don't know whether the reason is suf- 
ficient. Every clay in my office I have young men writing in saying 
their wives are sick, very ill, asking to have their orders changed so 
they will not have to go overseas. They are sent overseas. I just 
wonder how you Communists have such tremendous luck day after 
day when you come before us. There is no consideration too great. 
I want to find out how you stopped at the port of embarkation ; who 
stopped you when he knew you were a Communist ; whether another 
Communist did it for you, and I am going to order you to tell us what 
the alleged illness was. 

Major Peress. The reason is simply that my wife and daughter 
were undergoing psychiatric treatment, and I am not a psychiatrist 

38794— 54— pt. 3 2 



112 COMMUNIST INFILTRATION IN THE ARMY 

and couldn't detail the reasons. He felt it would be desirable for the 
health of the family to have me stay. 

The Chairman. In other words, there was no physical illness except 
that they were under the care of a psychiatrist because of some emo- 
tional disturbance. Is that correct? 

Major Peress. I don't know if you feel there is a difference between 
physical and mental illness — if there is a different level of the validity 
of illnesses. As I said, they were under psychiatric treatment. 

The Chairman. How old was your daughter when she was under 
this treatment? 

Major Peress. She was at the time just under 6. 

Mr. Cohn. Now, Major, you are a graduate of the leadership train- 
ing course of the Inwood Victory Club of the Communist Party, are 
you not ? 

Major Peress. I decline to answer that question under the fifth 
amendment. 

Mr. Cohn. Did you attend courses in leadership of the Inwood Vic- 
tory Club of the Communist Party at 139 Dyckman Street? 

Major Peress. I claim the privilege. 

The Chairman. Let me ask you this. When you say you claim thii 
privilege, you are claiming it under that part of the fifth amendment 
which provides that you need not give testimony that you feel might 
tend to incriminate you. Is that correct ? 

Major Peress. That is correct. 

The Chairman. You understand that you can only claim that privi- 
lege if you feel a truthful answer might tend to incriminate you ; you 
cannot claim the privilege if you feel perjury would incriminate you. 
Do you understand? 

Major Peress. I understand your question. 

The Chairman. Is your position that you feel a truthful answer 
to this question might tend to incriminate you ? 

Major Peress. That is correct. Since the Constitution, I believe, 
states I may believe my answer may tend to incriminate and not that 
it will incriminate me, I am exercising the right under the fifth 
amendment, which so stated. 

The Chairman. I asked you a simple question, before I can deter- 
mine whether you are entitled to the fifth amendment privilege. The 
question is : Do you feel a truthful answer might tend to incriminate 
you ? If you do, you are entitled to refuse. If you do not, then you 
must answer. 

Major Peress. Yes, I do feel a a truthful answer might tend to 
incriminate me. 

The Chairman. And that is what you mean is your answer to all 
these questions when you say 

Major Peress. That is correct. 

Mr. Cohn. At the leadership training course of the Inwood Victory 
Club, were you taught the doctrine of forcible overthrow of the 
United States Government ? 

Major Peress. I again claim the privilege. 

Mr. Cohn. Did you yourself deliver talks at Communist discussion 
groups at which you discussed the doctrine of Marxism and Leninism 
urging the overthrow of the Government of the United States by force 
and violence ? 

Major Peress. I again claim the privilege. 



COMMUNIST INFILTRATION IN THE ARMY 113 

Mr. Cohn. When you went down to Camp Kilmer, specifically, 
when at Camp Kilmer, did you attempt to recruit any of the military 
personnel there into the Communist Party ? 

Major Peress. I again claim the privilege for the same reason. 

Mr. Cohn. While stationed at Camp Kilmer did you have Commun- 
ist Party meetings at your home, attended by one or more military 
personnel from Camp Kilmer ? 

Major Peress. I again claim the privilege. 

Mr. Cohn. Now, you attended City College from 1933 to 1936. Is 
that right? 

Major Peress. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Cohn. And then you went to NYU Dental School from 1936 
through 1940? 

Major Peress. That is right. 

Mr. Cohn. While you were at Camp Kilmer, were you taking orders 
from any functionaries of the Communist Party ? 

Major Peress. I again claim the privilege. 

Mr. Cohn. In addition to your work in the Dental Corps, did you 
have any other assignment, extra duty, or anything else in connection 
with Army service ? Were you ever on any board or special detail ? 

Major Peress. Repeat the beginning of that question. 

Mr. Cohn. In addition to your regular dental duty, did you ever 
carry out any other assignment, extra duty, or anything else in connec- 
tion with Army service on a part-time basis? 

Major Peress. I carried no assignment, but in the preliminary train- 
ing at Fort Sam Houston it was not all dental work. I had to learn 
how to conduct medical battalions in the field and take over first-aid 
duties. 

Mr. Cohn. Did you ever sit on a board ? 

Major Peress. I took regular duty when my turn came around, that 
is, dental duty. 

Mr. Cohn. You had no duty other than dental duty? 

Major Peress. That is right. 

Mr. Cohn. While at Camp Kilmer, did you, in fact, recruit military 
personnel into the Communist Party ? 

Major Peress. I again claim the privilege. 

The Chairman. Were you promoted after the Army had you in 
and questioned you about your background ? 

Major Peress. You mean in service? 

The Chairman. I mean were you before the security officer, a board, 
or your commanding officer and questioned about your background ? 

Major Peress. I was never before any board in the Army for ques- 
tioning. 

The Chairman. You say you were never before a board of inquiry 
or questioned about your background by any officer of the Army ? 

Major Peress. If this is what you mean, I was never before any 
board of inquiry of one or more members. 

Mr. Cohn. In August of 1953, that is August of this last summer, 
were you asked any questions or given interrogatories concerning Com- 
munist Party affiliations ? 

Major Peress. Would you repeat whether you are asking about 
orally or in writing ? 



114 COMMUNIST INFILTRATION IN THE ARMY 

Mr. Cohn. We will let it cover both. My question was, Were you 
asked written or oral questions concerning Communist Party affilia- 
tions? 

Major Peress. Was I asked these questions? 

Mr. Cohn. In August of 1953 you were given interrogatories by the 
Army which you refused to answer. Isn't that a fact ? 

Major Peress. I answered them. 

Mr. Cohn. You answered all of them ? 

Major Peress. Yes. 

Mr. Cohn. Did you ever refuse to answer interrogatories put to you 
by the Army ? 

Major Peress. What is the meaning of refuse? I was given an in- 
terrogatory and I returned it. 

Mr. Cohn. Did you answer every question on the interrogatory? 

Major Peress. Yes ; or it would not have been accepted. 

Mr. Cohn. I am talking about August 1953. 

Major Peress. It would not have been accepted if I had not an- 
swered all the questions. 

Mr. Cohn. Did you give information in response to every question ? 

(Witness consults with counsel.) 

Mr. Cohn. You were given an interrogatory by the Army in Aug- 
ust 1953. You declined to answer certain of the questions on the basis 
of the fifth amendment. That is a matter of public record, isn't it? 

Major Peress. That is right. 

Mr. Cohn. How many questions did you decline to answer on the 
basis of the fifth amendment? 

Major Peress. (No answer.) 

Mr. Cohn. Is this a fair statement? Let me see if I can save time. 
You refused to answer, under the fifth amendment, any questions deal- 
ing with Communist affiliations or associations. 

Major Peress. If I may see the interrogatory, I can answer that 
question. 

The Chairman. Answer the question. 

Major Peress. Well, do you have a record on it ? 

The Chairman. Answer the question. 

Major Peress. I claim the privilege. 

The Chairman. You are ordered to answer. 

Major Peress. I have no privilege on this question ? 

The Chairman. You are ordered to answer the question. You can 
consult with counsel if you like. The question is, On this applica- 
tion, did you refuse to answer questions relating to Communist Party 
affiliations? 

Major Peress. If you will repeat the specific questions on the in- 
terrogatory to me 

The Chairman. You are ordered to answer counsel's question. 

Major Peress. I claim the privilege on the questions that were pre- 
sented to me on the interrogatory. 

The Chairman. Have the record show that the witness was ordered 
to answer counsel's question. In view of the fact that it is a matter 
of public record, there is no privilege. After the chairman ordered 
him to answer, the witness persisted in refusing to answer. 

Mr. Faulkner. He did answer the question, Mr. Senator. 

Major Peress. I answered the questions on the interrogatory they 
refer to by claiming the fifth amendment. 



COMMUNIST INFILTRATION IN THE ARMY 115 

The Chairman. With reference to those questions on the interroga- 
tory, you answered them to the Army by claiming the fifth amend- 
ment ? 

Major Peress. That is right. 

The Chairman. In what connection was the interrogatory filled 
out? Was it in connection with a loyalty investigation or a promo- 
tional investigation? 

Major Pekess. There was no discussion by the colonel who gave 
them to me. 

Mr. Cohn. Who was that? 

Major Peress. He was in the G-2 office. I don't recall his name. It 
was a short name, Smith or something like that. It might have been 
Smith. 

Mr. Cohn. Did you hear anything further from this colonel after 
you filled out the interrogatory? 

Major Peress. They gave them to me 1 day and I filled them out 
and gave them back the next day. 

The Chairman. You heard nothing from him after that — after 
you refused to answer? 

Major Peress. After I resubmitted the interrogatory with the ques- 
tions answered in writing, I never heard from him again. 

The Chairman. After you refused to answer questions concerning 
Communist Party affiliations, claiming the fifth amendment, in this 
questionnaire, you heard nothing more about the matter from any 
Army officials and you were subsequently promoted; is that correct? 

Major Peress. That is correct. 

The Chairman. Did any Communists aid you in getting this promo- 
tion ? _ 

Major Peress. I again claim the privilege, but I will tell you how the 
promotion was effected if you want to know. 

The Chairman. Do you know any Communist in the military 
today ? 

Major Peress. I again claim the privilege. 

The Chairman. How much of your salary, if any, do you contribute 
to the Communist Party ? 

Major Peress. I again claim the privilege for the same reason. 

The Chairman. Did you attend a Communist Party meeting within 
the last week ? 

Major Peress. I again claim the privilege. 

The Chairman. Have you attempted to recruit soldiers into the 
Communist Party in the last week? 

Major Peress. I again claim the privilege. 

The Chairman. Is there a Communist cell at Camp Kilmer of which 
you are a member ? 

Major Peress. I again claim the privilege. 

The Chairman. Did you not organize a Communist cell at Camp 
Kilmer? 

Major Peress. I again claim the privilege. 

The Chairman. Do you think Communists should be commissioned 
in our military? 

Major Peress. I again claim the privilege. 

The Chairman. You are not entitled to any privilege on that ques- 
tion. You are ordered to answer. 



116 COMMUNIST INFILTRATION IN THE ARMY 

Major Peress. Do I think Communists should be commissioned in 
the Army, I haven't thought about it. I don't feel one way or the 
other. 

The Chairman. Do you think if the Army finds out you are an or- 
ganizer for the Communist Party, organizing a cell, soliciting soldiers 
in the party, they should oust you from the Army or leave you in or 
do you have any opinion on that? 

Major Peress. I feel I haven't any opinion ; that that is a policy for 
the Army to say. 

Mr. Cohn. I meant to ask this. Is the psychiatric treatment of your 
wife and daughter continuing up to the present time? 

Major Peress. Yes. 

Mr. Cohn. Continuing steadily without interruption? 

Major Peress. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Cohn. What is the name of the doctor who gives that psychi- 
atric treatment ? Do you recall that ? 

Major Peress. I am not sure. I know it is connected with NYU. 
There is a clinic at NYU. I don't know if it is affiliated with NYU. 

The Chairman. You don't know the name of the doctor who has 
been treating your wife a year or two. 

Major Peress. There has been more than one physician involved. 

The Chairman. What was the name of the first one you knew ? 

Major Peress. I am not sure. 

The Chairman. You are not sure. You are not sure of the name 
of any doctor or psychiatrist who treated your wife for an ailment 
so serious ? 

Major Peress. Dr. Schecter was involved. I think he is treating 
my daughter, and Dr. Gerwin, who, I think, is treating my wife, or 
the other way around. One is treating my wife and the other my 
daughter. 

The Chairman. Now, when was the last treatment for either your 
wife or daughter? 

Major Peress. Tuesday and Friday they go. 

The Chairman. And what doctor was treating your wife and 
daughter at the time you received this change of orders? 

Major Peress. It is a German name. I don't recall. 

The Chairman. Where is his office ? 

Major Peress. It is in the midwest Manhattan section, and I be- 
lieve in the eighties. 

The Chairman. How long before the application for change of 
orders was your wife and daughter being treated for this psychiatric 
ailment? 

Major Peress. I couldn't say for sure. My wife, I believe, had been 
seeing this doctor for a year or 2 years. 

The Chairman. How long had your daughter been taking treat- 
ments ? 

Major Peress. It may have been at the age of 4 or 3% or 4^2- 

The Chairman. You say you refuse to tell us whether or not a 
Communist helped to get this change of orders ? 

Major Peress. Under the privilege. 

The Chairman. You will be ordered to appear in Washington, in 
room 357, Senate Office Building, on the 16th of February. 

(The chief counsel consults with the chairman.) 



COMMUNIST INFILTRATION IN THE ARMY 117 

We will change that place and date to the 18th of February in New 
York City, in this courthouse. Now, I don't know what room here it 
will be. Counsel will notify your lawyer what room, and make that 
10 : 30 in the morning, unless your counsel is notified of a different time. 

Mr. Faulkner. Will that be executive session ? 

The Chairman. That will be public session. 

Mr. Faulkner. I think the record should show the witness appeared 
here voluntarily without subpena. Will he be subpenaed? 

The Chairman. He is ordered now. 

Mr. Cohn. You understand if a man is notified to appear before a 
congressional committee and given sufficient time, regardless of 
whether he is notified by telephone, telegram, or formal subpena, that 
is a subpena. Now, if you prefer — sometimes counsel prefers subpena. 

Mr. Faulkner. That is what I am coming to. The witness, being 
in the Armed Forces, I think a subpena 

Mr. Cohn. We will be glad to do that. 

The Chairman. Now, Counsel, the committee would like to look at 
the correspondence of the witness relating to military service and 
various assignments he had. I assume he has that with him. 

Mr. Cohn. We just want to look at it. We will return it. We will 
have a copy made if we need it. 

Mr. Faulkner. This has been turned over to me as counsel, and as 
his counsel I am not prepared to turn it over. It is confidential. 

Mr. Cohn. He can't make it a confidential privilege merely because 
he turns it over to you. If it is under his control and in his possession, 
lie has to produce it. This is clearly under his control. 

Mr. Faulkner. On the other hand, I don't see why he should have 
any objection to that. Everything we have here you have a copy of in 
the files. These are just copies of letters going back to 1940, if you are 
interested in 1940. 

Mr. Cohn. All we will do is have an investigator look through it. 
Why don't you stay there with them to see that nothing is removed. 
If anything is of sufficient importance, arrangements will be made with 
you to have it photostated, so you will be sure to have it back. 

Major Peress. These forms I filled out when I entered service, that 
I believe is confidential between me and the Army. 

The Chairman. There is nothing confidential between a member 
of the Communist Party and the Army when the committee is 
investigating. 

Major Peress. I just made copies of them. 

The Chairman. Anything in the hands of the Communist Party is 
no longer confidential, because being in the Communist Party, if they 
tell you to turn things over to the Communist Party, you know you are 
bound to do it, so we don't give the Communist Party any special 
privilege before this committee. The witness is ordered to turn the 
papers over to counsel. 

In case any questions arise, have the record show that the major has 
the material in his hands and will turn it over to his lawyer and he will 
produce it. 

You haven't been asked to resign, have you ? 

Major Peress. Yes, I have. 

The Chairman. Who asked you ? 

Major Peress. Colonel Moore. I am not sure of that name. It 
might be some other name. 



118 COMMUNIST INFILTRATION IN THE ARMY 

The Chairman. Did you refuse to resign ? 

Major Peress. No, I accepted the request. I have a day of termina- 
tion. 

The Chairman. What date are you due to resign ? 

Major Peress. It is no later than the 31st of March, but I can move 
it up if I so desire. 

The Chairman. You are being given an honorable discharge? 

Major Peress. I haven't been given 

The Chairman. So far as you know, you are being allowed to resign 
with no reflection on your record ? 

Major Peress. There was no discussion of that. 

The Chairman. Why were you asked to resign ? 

Major Peress. They wouldn't tell me the reason. 

The Chairman. Did you ever refuse to resign? 

Major Peress. No, I was never requested to before. 

The Chairman. When were you requested to resign? 

Major Peress. A week ago today. 

The Chairman. In other words, you were asked to resign after you 
were ordered to appear before this committee? 

Major Peress. I was ordered to come before this committee yester- 
day morning. 

Mr. Cohn. That was the first time you had ever been asked to 
resign? 

Major Peress. The first time was a week ago this morning at 11 
o'clock. 

The Chairman. O. K., you may step down. 

(Whereupon, the hearing adjourned at 11 : 30 a. m.) 



COMMUNIST INFILTRATION IN THE AEMY 



THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 18, 1954 

United States Senate, 
Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the 

Committee on Government Operations, 

New York, N. Y. 

The subcommittee met at 10 : 45 a. m., pursuant to notice, in room 
110, United States court house, Foley Square, New York, N. Y., Sen- 
ator Josephy R. McCarthy (chairman) presiding. 

Present : Senator Joseph R. McCarthy, Republican, Wisconsin. 

Also present : Roy M. Colin, chief counsel ; Daniel G. Buckley, assis- 
tant counsel; James N. Juliana, investigator; Harold Rainville, ad- 
ministrative assistant to Senator Dirksen ; and Robert Jones, admin- 
istrative assistant to Senator Potter. 

The Chairman. The committee will come to order. 

I am going to have to ask the indulgence of the photographers 
this morning. I am going to have to ask you to move back from the 
table and take no pictures of the first witness until after she has 
testified. She has some very bad experiences with the Communist 
Party and she is very nervous. I am going to ask that no lights be 
turned on the first witness until after she has finished testifying. I 
wonder if the photographers will step aside until after she has testi- 
fied, and then you can get all the pictures you like. 

I want to make it clear this is not any specific request on her part, 
but she is highly nervous and highly excitable. I wonder if you would 
even take the cameras off the table, and turn the lights off the chair, 
also. I know you are here to do your job, but this is a special situation. 

I wonder if you would be sworn. In this matter now in hearing 
before this committee, do you solemnly swear to tell the truth, the 
whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God ? 

Miss Eagle. I do. 

TESTIMONY OF MISS RUTH EAGLE, NEW YORK CITY POLICE 

DEPARTMENT 

Mr. Cohn. Miss Eagle, I would like for you to sit forward, just 
relax and sit forward, and talk into the microphones so we can hear 
you better, and be at ease. Is your name Ruth Eagle ? 

Miss Eagle. Yes. 

Mr. Cohn. And are you a policewoman with the New York City 
Police Department ? 

Miss Eagle. I am. 

Mr. Cohn. For how long a period of time have you been ? 

Miss Eagle. Eleven years. 

38794— 54— pt. 3 3 119 



120 COMMUNIST INFILTRATION IN THE ARMY 

The Chairman. Eleven years? 

Miss Eagle. Eleven years. 

Mr. Cohn. Miss Eagle, during the 11 years you have been a police- 
woman with the New York City Police Department, have you at any 
time had a special assignment? 

Miss Eagle. Yes, I have. 

Mr. Cohn. And what was that special assignment? 

Miss Eagle. I was assigned to special squad 1. 

Mr. Cohn. And what did you do when you were assigned to special 
squad 1? 

Miss Eagle. I became a member of the Communist Party. 

Mr. Cohn. You became a member of the Communist Party ? 

Miss Eagle. I did. 

Mr. Cohn. And for how long a period of time did you remain a 
member of the Communist Party ? 

Miss Eagle. Two and a half years. 

Mr. Cohn. During the 2,y 2 years that you were a member of the 
Communist Party, did you participate in all the usual Communist 
activities, such as attending meetings and paying dues? 

Miss Eagle. I did. 

The Chairman. May I interrupt. I think you should make it clear 
that she was a member of the Communist Partjr at the order of the 
police department. 

Mr. Cohn. This was your assignment for the New York City Police 
Department? Is that right? 

Miss Eagle. Yes, it was. 

Mr. Cohn. While you were in the party, did you submit reports to 
the New York Police Department concerning the knowledge you had 
gained about the Communist Party, who its members were, and what 
its activities were? 

Miss Eagle. I did. 

Mr. Cohn. Were those reports written reports ? 

Miss Eagle. They were. 

Mr. Cohn. Have you, within the last few days, at the request of 
the committee, reviewed those written reports which you made when 
you were in the Communist Party for the police department? 

Miss Eagle. Yes ; I have. 

Mr. Cohn. You have studied them ; is that right ? 

Miss Eagle. Yes. 

Mr. Cohn. Can you tell us, from those written reports, whether or 
not, while in the Communist Party, you knew a man named Irving 
Peress ? 

Miss Eagle. I came in contact with Irving Peress. 

Mr. Cohn. Was he amember of the Communist Party ? 

Miss Eagle. He appeared at our club meetings and I believed that 
he was at that time. 

Mr. Cohn. And did you also know Mrs. Peress to be a member of 
the Communist Party, Elaine Peress ? 

Miss Eagle. I came in contact with Elaine Peress at the club 
meetings ; yes. 

Mr. Cohn. As a Communist? 

Miss Eagle. As a member of the club. 

The Chairman. In other words, there was no doubt in your mind 
then, and no doubt in your mind now, that they were both full-fledged 



COMMUNIST INFILTRATION IN THE ARMY 121 

members of the Communist Party, and you so reported to the police 
department ? 

Miss Eagle. That is my recollection. I believed they were mem- 
bers ; yes. 

Mr. Cohn. And did you refer to Peress and Mrs. Peress throughout 
your reports as Comrade Peress? 
Miss Eagle. I believe I did. 

Mr. Cohn. Did you, in your written reports to the police depart- 
ment, refer to various Communist meetings you had attended with 
Comrade Peress? 

Miss Eagle. To the best of my recollection ; yes, I did. 
The Chairman. May I interrupt, Miss Eagle, and tell you that 
this committee has tremendous respect for individuals like yourself 
who have been willing to submit themselves to the public censure, 
the difficulty they get into with their neighbors, all the unpleasant 
things incident to being a member of the Communist Party. I think 
the person who does what you did shows a very rare and very impor- 
tant type of courage. If we did not have people like you who are 
willing to submit themselves to this abuse, to be undercover agents for 
the police department, for the FBI, we would have 10 times as much 
difficulty digging out the members of this giant conspiracy. 

I just want you to know that you, and people like you, have the 
tremendous respect of this committee. I think you are deserving of 
the undying gratitude of the American people. 
Miss Eagle. Thank you. 

Mr. Cohn. Miss Eagle, did your reports refer to the fact that Com- 
rade Irving Peress acted as sort of liaison between this Communist 
cell and the American Labor Party ? 

Miss Eagle. To the best of my recollection ; yes. 
Mr. Cohn. And did he come with lists of American Labor Party 
members who were Communists and seek certain information and 
other things along those lines, from the Communist Club, according 
to your reports ? 

Miss Eagle. To the best of my recollection, he presented such a 
list to me. 

Mr. Cohn. To you personally ; is that right ? 
Miss Eagle. Yes. 

Mr. Cohn. Of American Labor Party members he was organizing, 
and he indicated on the list those who were also members of the Com- 
munist Party? 
Mr. Eagle. Yes. 

Mr. Cohn. Without going into detail here. I believe your reports 
further reflect the fact that Comrade Peress attended what was known 
as the leadership training course of the party at club headquarters, 
139 Dyckman Street; is that correct? 
Miss Eagle. On one occasion ; yes. 

Mr. Cohn. On one occasion. You attended a course in the leader- 
ship training course with Peress, and that is reported in your reports ; 
is that right ? 

Miss Eagle. It is. 

Mr. Cohn. At these various meetings, I notice here, matters were 
discussed concerning the strategy and the tactics of the party, such 
as class struggle, and I note on one occasion here you reported that 
Comrade Elaine Peress concluded that in spite of the temporary pro- 



122 COMMUNIST INFILTRATION IN THE ARMY 

gram of the party, the class struggle could never be suspended by the 
Communist Party since it was an inherent part of the Communist 
program; is that right? 

Miss Eagle. If it is in the report ; yes, that is right. 

Mr. Cohn. And at the end of each report you filed, when you had 
attended Communist meetings with Peress or when he had engaged 
in other Communist activities, you would at the end of the report set 
forth his name, among the others; is that right? 

Miss Eagle. Yes ; I did. 

Mr. Cohn. And we thus find the name Irving Peress at the end of 
each report. 

The last thing I want to ask you is this, Policewoman Eagle : Since 
you filed these reports, and they go back to 1944, as far as you know, 
they have been available at all times to the Army or any duly author- 
ized agency which can be in contact with the New York City Police 
Department; is that right? 

Miss Eagle. I submitted them to the police department. I don't 
know 

Mr. Cohn. They have been on file as far as you know ever since that 
time available to whatever appropriate agencies the police depart- 
ment has contact with ? 

Miss Eagle. I have no special knowledge of that. 

Mr. Cohn. Your knowledge is that you filed these reports with the 
police department, and that they have been available at all times, and 
when you went to review them this week you found them there in their 
original form ; is that correct ? 

Miss Eagle. That is right. 

Mr. Cohn. Miss Eagle. I am not going to go into this any further, 
except to say this : There came a time, did there not, when the Com- 
munists found out that you had been in the police department and 
there came a time when they gained that knowledge; is that right? 

Miss Eagle. Yes. 

Mr. Cohn. And after that, you suffered some very unpleasant expe- 
riences at the hands of the Communists, is that right? 

Miss Eagle. Yes. Unpleasant experiences which I believe had some 
connection with the work, yes. 

Mr. Cohn. And in which various actions were attempted against 
vou and your house and property and things along that line ? Is that 
right? 

Miss Eagle. There were such incidents, that is right. 

Mr. Cohn. I have nothing further. 

The Chairman. I think that is all. I want to thank you very much. 

Mr. Irving Peress? Major Peress? 

Mr. Faulkner. My client refuses to be photographed or televised, 
Senator. He is not on exhibition. 

The Chairman. If your client does not want to be televised, he has 
a right to refuse. 

Mr. Faulkner. Or photographed. 

The Chairman. He does not have to be photographed. He will not 
be photographed while he is in this courtroom. We have no jurisdic- 
tion of the corridors, you understand. The photographers will not 
photograph the major. 

Will your stand and raise your right hand, Major? 

Mr. Peress. I am not a major, sir. 



COMMUNIST INFILTRATION IN THE ARMY 123 

The Chairman. "Will you raise your right hand? In this matter 
now in hearing before this committee, do you solemnly swear to tell 
the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God? 

Mr. Peress. I do. 

TESTIMONY OF IRVING PERESS (ACCOMPANIED BY HIS COUNSEL, 
STANLEY FAULKNER, NEW YORK CITY) 

The Chairman. You said you were not a major. When did you 
last have the rank of major? 

Mr. Peress. I would like, if possible, to make a statement before 
testifying before the committee. I have a brief statement I would 
like to make. I will answer the question. I stopped being a major 
February 2, 1954. 

The Chairman. February 2, 1954? 

Mr. Peress. May I read a statement before the committee? 

The Chairman. If you have a statement your attorney is aware of 
the rules of the committee. The statement must be submitted 24 hours 
in advance. In other words, if you will hand the statement up, we 
will glance at it and see whether you can read it. If it is pertinent to 
the hearing, you will be allowed to read it. 

(Document handed to chairman.) 

The Chairman. You may read it. Is this an extra copy? 

Mr. Peress. Yes. 

I have been subpenaed to appear before this committee presumably 
to answer certain questions concerning my political beliefs, both past 
and present. So that there may be no mistake about my position in 
this regard, I shall decline to answer any such questions under the 
protection of the fifth amendment to our Constitution. 

The Chairman. May I interrupt you there? You are not being 
subpenaed to answer in regard to your political beliefs. You are here 
to answer in regard to the part you played while an officer in the 
United States Army in the conspiracy designed to destroy this Nation. 
That is what you are being called about. You are not being asked 
about any of your political beliefs. You will not be asked about any 
political beliefs. 

You may proceed. 

Mr. Peress. From my earliest schooling I have been taught that the 
United States Constitution is the highest law of our land and that one 
of the strongest provisions is the protection afforded to all persons of 
the privilege under the fifth amendment. My education has also 
taught me that anyone, even a United States Senator, who would deny 
this constitutional protection to any individual or who under his cloak 
of his immunity would draw inferences therefrom, and publicly an- 
nounce such inferences, is subversive. I use that word advisedly. By 
subversive I mean anyone who would undermine the strength of the 
Constitution and thereby weaken our democratic form of government. 
When I appeared before you, Senator McCarthy, on January 30, 1954, 
at an executive session of your committee, you, acting as a committee 
of one, made certain charges concerning my promotion in rank and 
pending honorable discharge. Just to make the record clear, I was 
promoted and honorably discharged under Public Law 84 of the 83d 
Congress, which incidentally was passed when you, Senator McCarthy, 
were a Member of the Senate. In recognition of my honest and faith- 



124 COMMUNIST INFILTRATION IN THE ARMY 

fill service to my country I was awarded an honorable discharge on 
February 2, 1954. In the period of my service, no one either within 
or without found it necessary to question my loyalty. 

Another bit of schooling which I had as a Jew was a study of the 
Old Testament, which I highly recommend to you, Senator, and your 
counsel, and particularly Book 7 of the Psalms, which reads: 

His mischief shall return upon his own head and his violence shall come down 
upon his own pate. 

The Chairman. Major, you just heard a policewoman for the city 
of New York testify that you attended a Communist leadership school. 
Is that testimony on her part true or false? 

Mr. Peress. I must decline to answer that question, Senator, under 
the protection of the fifth amendment on the ground that it might tend 
to incriminate me. I would also like to say, Senator, that I am not a 
major. The title is "Dr. Peress," not "Major Peress." 

The Chairman. Let me make this very clear: You have been ac- 
cused, Major, of the most dishonest, the worst conduct that anyone in 
the Army can be guilty of. You have been accused under oath of 
being a member of a conspiracy designed to destroy this Nation by 
force and violence. You are here this morning, you are given an op- 
portunity under oath, to tell us whether or not those charges are true 
or false. If you are a part of this treasonous conspiracy, if you have 
attended leadership schools of the Communist conspiracy, obviously 
3 t ou will take the protection of the fifth amendment. If you are inno- 
cent, you will tell us that. Now, let me ask you this question : Is it 
true that as of this moment and during all the time that you were an 
officer in the United States Army, you were an active member of the 
Communist conspiracy ? 

(The witness conferred with his counsel.) 

The Chairman. At the time you received your commission in the 
Army, were you a section organizer for the Communist conspiracy ? 

(The witness conferred with his counsel.) 

Mr. Peress. I claim the privilege. 

The Chairman. What privilege ? 

Mr. Peress. The privilege to decline to answer under the fifth 
amendment. 

The Chairman. On the ground of self-incrimination? 

Mr. Peress. On the ground that it might tend to incriminate me. 

The Chairman. At the time you were promoted from captain to 
major, were you then an active, knowing member of the Communist 
conspiracy ? 

Mr. Peress. I claim the privilege. 

The Chairman. You will have to tell us each time under what 
privilege. 

Mr. Peress. I must decline to answer that question under the pro- 
tection of the fifth amendment on the ground that it might tend to 
incriminate me. 

The Chairman. All right. 

Did you hold Communist meetings in your home while you were 
an officer in the United States Army ? 

Mr. Peress. I claim the first amendment on the ground that it 
might tend to incriminate me. 

The Chairman. Who signed your honorable discharge? 



COMMUNIST INFILTRATION EST THE ARMY 125 

Mr. Peress. John J. McManus, major, Infantry. 
The Chairman. Is that your discharge ? 
Mr. Peress. That is a photostat of it. 
The Chairman. Will you hand it up ? 
(Document handed to the chairman.) 

The Chairman. Where is John J. McManus located ? 

Mr. Peress. I have no idea. 

The Chairman. Who notified you that you would receive an honor- 
able discharge? 

Mr. Peress. I don't believe I was officially notified. It was just 
tendered to me when I left. 

The Chairman. It was handed to you ? 

Mr. Peress. Yes ; as part of my records. 

The Chairman. Let's have the record show that this is signed 
February 2, 1954. This was handed to you on what date ? 

Mr. Peress. February 2, 1954. 

The Chairman. Let us have the record show that this was signed 
and handed to this fifth amendment Communist, Major Peress, after I 
had written the Secretary of the Army suggesting that he be court- 
martialed, suggesting that everyone having anything to do with his 
promotion, with his change of orders, be court-martialed. I did that 
feeling that this would be one way to notify all the officers in the 
Army and all the enlisted men, that there has been a new day in the 
Army, that the 20 years of treason have ended, and that no officer in 
the Army can protect traitors, can protect Communists. I want the 
record to show this was given to you after that letter had been made 
public, before the Secretary of the Army, Robert Stevens, returned 
to the United States. I ask, Mr. Adams, where is John J. McManus 
now ? 

Mr. John Adams (legal counsel to Department of the Army, Wash- 
ington, D. C). I don't know, Mr. Chairman. I presume he is an 
officer in headquarters, First Army. 

The Chairman. Will we have to subpena him, or will he be pro- 
duced ? 

Mr. Adams. He will be produced. 

The Chairman. Good. We will want him in executive session this 
afternoon, unless he feels that he needs additional time to get a lawyer 
to represent him. If he wants additional time, we will give him any 
time that is within reason that he wants. If he doesn't need time to 
get a lawyer, I want him here this afternoon at 2 : 30 o'clock, in ex- 
ecutive session. 

Have you met John J. McManus ? 

Mr. Peress. Not to my knowledge. 

The Chairman. Who handed you this honorable discharge ? 

Mr. Peress. I am not sure. I think it was a sergeant at the separa- 
tion center. I don't know — or it could have been a warrant officer. 

The Chairman. Who is the highest ranking officer with whom you 
spoke after your appearance before the committee? 

Mr. Peress. General Zwicker. 

The Chairman. General Zwicker? What conversation did you 
have with General Zwicker? 

(The witness conferred with his counsel.) 

Mr. Peress. Would you repeat that question, please ? 

The Chairman. Will the reporter read the question ? 



126 COMMUNIST INFILTRATION LN THE ARMY 

(The reporter read from his notes as requested.) 

Mr. Peress. I don't recall the exact word-for-word conversation. I 
requested of General Z wicker, after the hearing before you on Janu- 
ary 30, when I saw him on February 1, that an inquiry be made into 
these charges, that the newspapers had lambasted me with on Sunday 
and Monday. 

The Chairman. Did you tell him whether or not you were a Com- 
munist? 

(The witness conferred with his counsel.) 

Mr. Peress. I decline to answer that question on the grounds 

The Chairman. You wanted an inquiry made as to whether or not 
you are a Communist; is that correct? 

(The witness conferred with his counsel.) 

Mr. Peress. I wanted an inquiry of my conduct at Camp Kilmer. 

The Chairman. Did you want the inquiry to include the question 
of whether or not you had been holding Communist meetings at your 
home, whether you had attended a Communist leadership school, 
whether you had been recruiting military personnel there into the 
Communist conspiracy ? Did you want that included ? 

(The witness conferred with his counsel.) 

Mr. Peress. I could not tell them what to inquire about, but I asked 
for an inquiry of the charges generally. I didn't specify as to which 
charges to inquire into and which not to inquire into. 

The Chairman. Did you tell them whether or not you would tell 
them the truth if they made such an inquiry ? 

Mr. Peress. I told General Zwicker, as you asked me, that I would 
like an inquiry into the charges. I didn't tell him anything further. 

The Chairman. They made an inquiry in August, did they not? 
They sent you a questionnaire. They came to the best_ witness they 
could find on this, assuming a Communist is a gpod witness. They 
asked you practically all the questions this committee has asked you. 
They asked you about all of your alleged activities in this Com- 
munist conspiracy. That was in the inquiry. Did you tell them 
the truth at that time ? 

(The witness conferred with his counsel.) 

Mr. Peress. I decline to answer that question on the grounds that 
it might tend to incriminate me. 

The Chairman. Did you answer the questions as to whether or not 
you were a member of the Communist conspiracy at that time? 

Mr. Peress. I decline to answer. 

The Chairman. You will be ordered to answer. It is a matter of 
public record. You cannot decline. 

(The witness conferred with his counsel.) 

Mr. Peress. If it is a matter of public record, then I decline to 
answer. 

The Chairman. You decline to answer? You decline to answer 
that? 

Mr. Peress. You said it is a matter of public record. 

The Chairman. Are you declining to answer? 

(The witness conferred with his counsel.) 

Mr. Peress. Could you repeat the question, please ? 

The Chairman. The reporter will read it. 

(The reporter read from his notes as requested.) 

Mr. Peress. I decline to answer that question. 



COMMUNIST INFILTRATION IN THE ARMY 127 

The Chairman. Have the record show, so that there can be no claim 
of lack of knowledge at a future legal proceeding 

Mr. Peress. On the fifth amendment. 

The Chairman. That the witness was asked whether or not he 
answered an Army questionnaire, as to whether or not he was part 
of the Communist conspiracy. He declined, invoking the fifth amend- 
ment. The Chair ordered him to answer on the grounds that this 
is an improper invocation of the fifth amendment. Have the record 
show he still declines. 

(The witness conferred with his counsel.) 

Mr. Cohn. Mr. Chairman, in executive session this witness, after 
you overruled his privilege, did answer this question and stated, "I 
answered the questions on the interrogatory by claiming the fifth 
amendment." 

In other words, when the Army submitted interrogatories to this 
witness in August he refused to answer to the Army the pertinent 
questions on Communist activity, and claimed the fifth amendment 
in the Army inquiry at that time. 

The Chairman. Thank you, Counsel, for calling that to my atten- 
tion. Have the record show that an additional ground for the 
Chair's ordering him to answer is the fact that he has already waived 
the fifth amendment privilege as to this area of investigation. Have 
the record show that he still refuses to answer. 

In November 1953, were you promoted to major? 

Mr. Peress. Was I promoted to major in November of 1953? 

The Chairman. Yes. 

Mr. Peress. Yes. 

The Chairman. Did anyone in the military, between August 1953 
and January of 1954, ever ask you about any alleged Communist 
Party activities on your part ? 

(The witness conferred with his counsel.) 

Mr. Peress. Would you read that again, please? 

(The reporter read from his notes as requested.) 

Mr. Peress. I decline to answer that. 

The Chairman. You are ordered to answer. 

Mr. Peress. I decline on the grounds of the fifth amendment, that 
the answer might tend to incriminate me. 

The Chairman. After our hearing here in New York, I believe it 
was about 2 weeks ago, I read a statement which you allegedly made to 
the press, to the effect that the charges that you were a Communist 
were false. Now, I know that you fifth amendment Communists sing 
a different tune under oath. You can lie as much as you like when 
you are not under oath. Do you want to tell us now whether or not 
that statement to the press was a lie, or whether you were telling the 
truth when you told the press you were not a Communist? 

(The witness conferred with his counsel.) 

Mr. Peress. I decline to answer that question on the grounds of the 
fifth amendment, that the answer might tend to incriminate me. 

The Chairman. You are entitled to the privilege. When you at- 
tended Communist leadership school, were you, among other things, 
taught the necessity of the destruction of our Constitution, including 
the fifth amendment upon which you rely today ? 



38794— 54— pt. 3- 



128 COMMUNIST INFILTRATION IN THE ARMY 

t 

Mr. Peress. I decline to answer that question under the protection 
of the fifth amendment to the Constitution on the ground that the 
answer might tend to incriminate me. 

The Chairman. Is it a fact, Mister, that you have attended Com- 
munist schools, leadership schools, you spoke there, your wife spoke 
there, you advocated the destruction of the Constitution, you advo- 
cated the destruction of the very amendment behind which you so 
cowardly hide today ? Is that not a fact ? 

Mr. Peress. I decline to answer that question on the grounds that 
the answer might tend to incriminate me. 

The Chairman. You are entitled to decline . 

I may say that if you were an officer in the Russian Army instead 
of the United States Army, if you were charged with treason against 
Communist Russia, you would not have any fifth amendment there, 
Mister. And you life insurance would be rather high. 

(The witness conferred with his counsel.) 

The Chairman. Mr. Colin? 

Mr. Cohn. Mr. Peress, were you, when commissioned in January of 
1953, section organizer for the Communist Party in Queens County ? 

Mr. Peress. I must decline to answer that question under the pro- 
tection of the fifth amendment on the ground that it might tend to 
incriminate me. 

The Chairman. While you were in the Army, did you contribute a 
percentage of your pay to the Communist Party ? 

Mr. Peress. I decline again on the same privilege. 

Mr. Cohn. Did you attempt to recruit any military personnel into 
the Communist Party? 

Mr. Peress. I decline to answer ; the same privilege. 

The Chairman. Wil you speak a little louder, sir? 

Mr. Peress. I decline to answer the question under the protection 
of the fifth amendment on the grounds that it might tend to incrim- 
inate me. Shall I go through that whole sentence every time, Senator ? 

The Chairman. If that is what you are relying upon, you will state 
the grounds for your refusal. 

Mr. Cohn. Did you ask officers stationed with you to attend Com- 
munist Party meetings with you ? 

Mr. Peress. I must decline to answer that question under the fifth 
amendment. 

Mr. Cohn. Did you make a contribution, through the Daily Worker, 
to the defense fund for the indicted Communist leaders? 

Mr. Peress. I decline to answer under the fifth amendment. 

Mr. Cohn. I will hand you a copy of page 12 of the Daily Worker 
for November 22, 1949, and direct your attention to an article entitled 
"Dollars Keep Coming for Defense Fund." It concludes with a state- 
ment from the Daily Worker — "To all of you wonderful people, 
thanks, thanks a million." There is a short list of names, and on that 
list of names is the name Irv Peress, Queens. I would like for you to 
examine that and tell the committee whether or not you are the Irv 
Peress of Queens who received this commendation from the Daily 
Worker for a contribution to the Communist defense fund. 

The Chairman. While he is examining that, may I have the record 
show that Senator Potter is represented here by his very able assistant, 
Robert Jones. Senator Dirksen is represented by his equally able 
assistant, Mr. Rainville. I want Mr. Rainville and Mr. Jones to know 



COMMUNIST INFILTRATION IN THE ARMY 129 

that as the representatives of the two Senators, you have the same 
right to ask questions which any Senator would have. 

Mr. Cohn. Are you the Irving Peress who received the thanks of 
the Daily Worker for this contribution to the Communist defense 

fund? . . , 

Mr. Peress. I decline to answer on the grounds that it might tend 

to incriminate me. 

The Chairman. Will you speak a little louder? 

Mr. Peress. I decline to answer. 

Mr. Cohn. Of course, Mr. Chairman 

Mr. Faulkner. Did you read into the record that this is dated 

The Chairman. We will not hear from counsel. If you want any- 
thing read into the record, Mr. Peress can read it in. We will not 
hear from counsel. I may say, Mr. Counsel, that this rule was not 
made for you. It was made by the committee and made unanimously. 
We give the witness the right, which he would not have in a court, a 
right to confer with counsel, at any time he cares to. Counsel can 
coach him in his answers, which is a right he would not have in court. 
We do not allow counsel to take part in the proceedings. The reason 
for that is obvious. And I am not speaking about you, Mr. Counsel, 
but I speak about the general situation. If we allowed Communist 
lawyers to take part in a filibuster proceedings, we could never hold 
an intelligible hearing. So if there is anything you want to say, you 
will have to abide by the same rule, which is not directed against you 
personally, but you will have to talk through your client. 

Mr. Faulkner. May I say something on that, what you just referred 
to, Senator? 

The Chairman. No, I said we will not hear from counsel. 

Mr. Faulkner. Not on this point. That is all. 

The Chairman. I will not hear from counsel on any point. I did 
not make the rule. We have 4 Republicans, 3 Democrats. We unani- 
mously passed that rule. I must abide by that rule the same as you 
must. If you have something to say, you can tell your client and he 
will say it. 

(The witness conferred with his counsel.) 

Mr. Cohn. Mr. Chairman, as I indicated when this article was first 
referred to, I read the date into the record, which was November 22, 
1949, and I ask that this entire article and the page from the Daily 
Worker be received into evidence. I might state that an examina- 
tion of the article indicates that Irv Peress, of Queens, had sent in a 
dollar contribution to the defense fund for the Communist leaders to 
accompany an entry which he had made into a contest being run by 
the Daily Worker at that period of time. All of that is set forth on 
this page. I ask that that be received into evidence. 

The Chairman. It will be received. 

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 6" and may be 
found in the files of the subcommittee.) 

Mr. Cohn. I would call to your attention, Mr. Chairman, the fact 
that this was obtained by the committee from a public record which, 
of course, would have been available to the Army well before this man 
was handed a commission. It was listed in the public files. 

Now, referring to public files, Mr. Peress, did you take an ad in 
the 15th anniversary edition of the Journal of the Abraham Lincoln 
Brigade, which journal was sponsored by the Communist Party and 



130 COMMUNIST INFILTRATION IN THE ARMY 

sent greetings to comrades on the celebration of the 15th anniversary 
of the Abraham Lincoln Brigade ? 

Mr. Peress. I decline to answer under the fifth amendment. 

Mr. Cohn. Did you take an ad in the 10th anniversary, appearing 
on the back page of the 10th anniversary edition of the Journal of the 
Abraham Lincoln Brigade? 

Mr. Peress. I decline to answer under the fifth amendment. 

Mr. Cohn. Have you been a subscriber to the Daily Worker for the 
last 14 years? 

Mr. Peress. I decline to answer on the grounds that it might tend 
to incriminate me. 

Mr. Cohn. While you were a captain and a major in the Army, up 
until this month, did you receive the Daily Worker? 

Mr. Peress. I decline to answer under the fifth amendment. 

Mr. Cohn. Did you take the Daily Worker with you to your Army 
assignment ? 

Mr. Peress. I decline to answer under the fifth amendment. 

Mr. Cohn. Did you show the Daily Worker to officers stationed 
with you ? 

(The witness conferred with his counsel.) 

Mr. Peress. I decline to answer under the fifth amendment. 

The Chairman. Mr. Jones ? 

Mr. Jones. Mr. Peress, when you became an officer of the Army of 
the United States, I assume that you took the regular oath of office ? 

(The witness conferred with his counsel.) 

Mr. Peress. Could I have the identification of who is question- 
ing me ? 

The Chairman. Will you try and speak up, sir ? 

Mr. Peress. Could you identify the gentleman who is making the 
inquiry ? 

The Chairman. Mr. Robert Jones, administrative assistant to Sen- 
ator Potter. 

(The witness conferred with his counsel.) 

Mr. Peress. Is he empowered by the Senate to question me ? 

The Chairman. Answer the question. 

Mr. Peress. The question is did I take the regular oath of office 
when I was commissioned, first commissioned? 

Mr. Jones. Do you want to read the question back ? 

(The reporter read from his notes as requested.) 

Mr. Peress. Yes. 

Mr. Jones. You did take the regular oath of office. In other words, 
you did take the oath? 

Mr. Peress. I don't know what you mean by the regular oath. 

Mr. Jones. The regular oath to uphold and defend the Constitution, 
you took that oath, is that correct? 

Mr. Peress. That is right. 

Mr. Jones. Did you ever refuse to take an oath ? 

(The witness conferred with his counsel.) 

Mr. Peress. An oath to uphold the Constitution ? 

Mr. Jones. Exactly. Did you ever refuse to take it ? 

Mr. Peress. No. 

The Chairman. May I have the record straight. Did you ever re- 
fuse to sign any oath or affidavit for the Army ? 

(The witness conferred with his counsel.) 



COMMUNIST INFILTRATION IN THE ARMY 131 

Mr. Peress. None that I can recall. 

Mr. Jones. Now, Mr. Peress, when you took the oath to uphold and 
defend the Constitution, were you a member of the Communist Party 
at that time? 

Mr. Peress. I decline to answer that question on the fifth amend- 
ment, on the grounds that it might tend to incriminate me. 

Mr. Jones. Would you while an officer of the Army of the United 
States having taken the oath to defend the Constitution, oppose any 
group that advocates the violent overthrow of the Government ? 

(The witness conferred with his counsel.) 

Mr. Peress. I would defend and uphold the Constitution of the 
United States, as taken in the oath. 

Mr. Jones. That isn't answering the question. In other words, 
you took the oath to uphold and defend the Constitution of the United 
States. Having taken that oath, would you then oppose any group 
that advocates the overthrow of this Government? 

(The witness conferred with his counsel.) 

Mr. Peress. I would oppose any group that would seek to overthrow 
the 

Mr. Jones. In other words, you would oppose the Communist Party ? 

Mr. Peress. You are answering for me? I would oppose, as my 
oath states, any group that would seek to overthrow the United States 
Government by force and violence and unconstitutional means. 

Mr. Jones. In other words, then, you would oppose the Communist 
Party? 

Mr. Peress. Is that a question or a statement ? 

Mr. Jones. I am asking you. Would you oppose the Communist 
Party? 

Mr. Peress. I decline to answer that question on the grounds that 
it might tend to incriminate me. 

The Chairman. Mr. Peress, at the time you attended Communist 
leadership schools, were you not taught the necessity of the overthrow 
of this Government by force and violence? 

Mr. Peress. I decline to answer under the fifth amendment. 

The Chairman. The witness will be ordered to answer the question 
on the grounds that he has waived the fifth amendment privilege by 
his answer to the previous question. 

Mr. Peress. I decline to answer on the grounds that it might tend 
to incriminate me. 

The Chairman. Just so that counsel and the witness will be fully 
informed, the Chair takes the position that where you answer a ques- 
tion, you have waived the fifth amendment privilege as to that entire 
area of investigation. I have asked the Attorney General for an 
opinion upon that matter. If the Attorney General sustains the view 
of the committee, then we will heavily decimate the ranks of the 
Communist conspiracy by way of contempt actions, and convictions, 
against Communists like you, Major. If the Attorney General ren- 
ders a favorable opinion, we intend to ask for a contempt citation 
against every Communist who comes here and, by answering certain 
questions, waives the fifth amendment, and then tries to invoke the 
fifth amendment in the same area of investigation. 

I tell you that so that you cannot plead ignorance at some future 
legal proceeding. 

I assume you still refuse to answer ? 



132 COMMUNIST INFILTRATION IN THE ARMY 

Mr. Peress. I do. 

The Chairman. Is that correct? 

Mr. Peress. I decline to answer under the fifth amendment. 

The Chairman. I am going to hand you an exhibit — do you want to 
mark this? 

Mr. Cohn. Exhibit 7, Senator. 

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 7," and may 
be found in the files of the subcommittee.) 

The Chairman. I am going to hand you exhibit 7, and ask you if 
this is the oath you signed, either at the time you got your commission 
or about that time? 

(Document handed to the witness.) 

Mr. Peress. I decline to identify this paper under the grounds that 
it might tend to incriminate me. 

The Chairman. The witness will be ordered to identify it. 

(The witness conferred with his counsel.) 

Mr. Peress. This is a blank paper, and I would have to decline to 
answer on the identification of it. 

The Chairman. Is that the type of oath you signed? 

Mr. Peress. I couldn't recall. I would have to decline to answer. 
1 would have to see the papers I signed. 

The Chairman. You are declining because you cannot recall ? 

Mr. Peress. No. I decline to answer on the grounds of the fifth 
amendment, that it might 

The Chairman. Would you read that oath? Kead it out loud so 
I can hear it. 

(The witness conferred with his counsel.) 

Mr. Peress. I decline to read the oath. 

The Chairman. You will be ordered to read it to refresh your rec- 
ollection so that you may be able to answer the question. 

(The witness conferred with his counsel.) 

Mr. Peress. I decline to acknowledge that I have seen this state- 
ment before or signed such a paper, on the grounds that it might tend 
to incriminate me. 

The Chairman. You will be ordered to read it. 

Mr. Peress. I decline to read it. 

The Chairman. Hand that back to me, please. 

(Document handed to the chairman.) 

Mr. Jones. Mr. Peress, you have already stated that you took the 
oath to uphold the Constitution when you were commissioned a cap- 
tain ; is that correct ? 

(The witness conferred with his counsel.) 

Mr. Peress. To my recollection, on getting my commission as a cap- 
tain I was sent a number of forms, and I signed them and sent them 
back. There was no official swearing-in ceremony. 

Mr. Jones. You just said a few minutes ago that you took the oath 
to uphold the Constitution. That is in the official record. 

(The witness conferred with his counsel.) 

Mr. Peress. If the oath was in there, I took the oath. 

(The witness conferred with his counsel.) 

Mr. Jones. Mr. Peress, will you please examine this statement? 

The Chairman. Those will be made exhibits 8 and 9. 

(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibits Nos. 8 and 9," 
and may be found in the files of the subcommittee.) 



COMMUNIST INFILTRATION IN THE ARMY 133 

(Documents handed to the witness.) 

(The witness conferred with his counsel.) 

The Chairman. While the witness is examining that, may I ask a 
question of Mr. Adams, the legal counsel for the Army ? 

The information we have is that this man signed affidavits as to 
nonmembership in the Communist Party and subversive groups. Is 
it the position of the Army that by the honorable discharge which 
he received after he was before the committee, that he had been re- 
moved from the court-martial jurisdiction of the Army; or does the 
Army take the position they have jurisdiction to court-martial this 
fifth-amendment Communist for false swearing, of which he is ob- 
viously guilty? 

Mr. John Adams (legal counsel to the Department of the Army, 
Washington, D. C). I am not quite sure that I know the question. 

The Chairman. The question is — you are the legal counsel for the 
Army, and I assumed you discussed this. I know you are aware of 
the fact that I have been discussing it now since he got the honorable 
discharge. The question is, Has he been removed from the court- 
martial jurisdiction of the Army, or does the Army take the position 
that even though he received his honorable discharge, he can still be 
court-martialed for false swearing or any other crime of which he is 
guilty ? 

Mr. Adams. Mr. Chairman, a separation such as Major Peress re- 
ceived on February 2 is a final action. Under the Uniform Code of 
Military Justice, there is a section in the law T which permits the Army 
to court-martial an individual for offenses which call for penalties in 
excess of 5 years, provided the offenses are known. 

I submitted the questions raised by your letter to the Judge Advo- 
cate General of the Army, who has the responsibility, by statute, in 
the Army for military justice, and he gave me an opinion that prob- 
ably a court-martial against the individual could not be sustained on 
the facts now before the Army. 

The Chairman. In other words, on the grounds that this would not 
call for a penalty in excess of 5 years, he has been removed from the 
jurisdiction of the Army? 

Mr. Adams. He has been removed from the jurisdiction of the Army, 
and the Army is not aware of any offenses which have been brought 
officially to its attention under which he could be tried. 

The Chairman. You say the Army is not aware of any offenses, 
Mr. Adams ? 

Mr. Adams. That is correct, sir. 

The Chairman. I do not pretend to cross-examine the legal counsel 
for the Army. You are here as a guest of the committee. But this 
matter disturbs me very greatly. I have heard that statement before. 
You have the evidence, the sworn testimony, that this man was part 
of the Communist conspiracy. You have that from a policewoman 
of the city of New York. It has been available to the Army for years, 
ever since she has been filing her reports. You have the information 
that he took a false oath when he swore that he was not a member of 
the Communist Party. You have his refusal to answer questions 
before a Senate committee. His refusal to answer questions by the 
Army would certainly constitute conduct unbecoming to an officer. 

I do not think you want the record to stand, John, as saying that 
you were not aware of any offense. You said that was not brought 



134 COMMUNIST INFILTRATION IN THE ARMY 

officially to your attention. May I say that you were here in an official 
capacity. Everything that this committee develops, including what 
we develop in an executive session, is your official knowledge. 

As I say, I do not want to put you on the stand here and cross-exam- 
ine you, but I am just curious about this fantastic procedure where we 
have this man before us, and we invited the legal counsel for the Army 
to sit in, listen to all of his testimony. He refused to answer, invoking 
the fifth amendment. I wrote to the Secretary of the Army and asked 
for his court martial. Before Secretary Stevens could get back to 
the United States, somebody in the Army— and I cannot conceive they 
were acting in good faith — gave him a hurry-up honorable discharge 
My letter was made public on Monday, February 1 ; and Tuesday morn- 
ing, February 2, this man — about whom you have so much testimony 
about organizing Communist cells, holding Communist meetings in 
his home, attending Communist leadership schools, his refusal to 
answer — was given an honorable discharge. 

As you know, John, every Senator receives dozens of letters every 
month from young men who have good reasons for not wanting to 
serve, They want honorable discharges. If this is the pattern that 
is to be followed, if all you need to do is to join the conspiracy against 
this Nation to receive the stamp of honor from your country, get an 
honorable discharge, then the Communist Party perhaps should go out 
and recruit all the— well, although I do not think they would have 
much success, go out and try to recruit the young men who would like 
to get out of the Army. 

I am going to ask you this, but I am not going to ask you to answer 
it now : I am going to ask that you give us the names of every officer, 
every member of the military personnel or any civilian who had any- 
thing to do with this man's 'promotion, knowing that he was a Com- 
munist ; anything to do with his change of orders, knowing that he was 
a Communist ; anything to do with his honorable discharge, knowing 
he was a Communist, knowing I have suggested a court martial for 
him. 

I am curious to know whether or not that information will be forth- 
coming without a subpena. If not, this is something which will not 
be allowed to drop. I want to assure everyone concerned, if it is 
humanly possible I intend to get to the bottom of it. 

I think here you have the key to the deliberate Communist infiltra- 
tion of our Armed Forces, the most dangerous thing. And the men 
responsible for the honorable discharge of a Communist are just as 
guilty as the man who belongs to the conspiracy himself. 
' So may I ask you, will the information be forthcoming without 
subpena ? If not, I intend to take this right to the very limit to get 
the names of all of those individuals, John. If you are not in a posi- 
tion to answer that today, I want to know when you can answer it. 

Mr. Adams. Mr. Chairman, the Secretary has given you a letter, 
which you received yesterday, which discussed the facts of this case 
as he now knows them. He is investigating to determine such addi- 
tional facts as he can. 

If there can be developed any indication of conspiracy of a sub- 
versive nature with reference to the handling of this or any other 
officer assignments, those matters will be prosecuted by the Army. 

The Chairman. John, I will not take any double-talk, any evasion 
on this. Either the Army is going to give me the names of the indi- 



COMMUNIST INFILTRATION IN THE ARMY 135 

victuals responsible for coddling and honorably discharging a known 
Communist — not only a run-of-the-mill but an important member 
of the Communist conspiracy — or the Army is going to refuse. 

I may say now, for the benefit of everyone concerned, if the Army 
refuses, I intend to take this to the floor of the Senate, and I intend 
to try to have cited for contempt any man in the military — and I do 
not care whether he is a civilian or an officer — who tries to cover up 
those responsible for this most shameful, most f antatistic situation. 

If you cannot answer that today, I would like to know when I can 
get the answer. It is a simple decision. I want to know whether or 
not there is a new day in the Army or not. I have a lot of respect for 
Secretary Stevens, and I received a letter which I cannot conceive of 
Secretary Stevens having himself written. He may have. 

Complete double-talk does not answer any of our questions. We 
are not going to take this, John, in this case. We are going to make 
an example here and see if we cannot set the pattern for a cleanout 
of those who have been invited into the military. 

If the new Secretary wants to do that himself, very good. I think 
he will. But I will want to know within 24 hours whether or not the 
Army is going to give us the names of those whom I just indicated. 
We will ask for that information by tomorrow night. 

If that period of time you think is unreasonable, we will give you 
additional time. I will be in Albany holding hearings tomorrow, 
and I will want to get that information there. 

Mr. Peress, just 1 or 2 more questions. While you were an officer 
in the Army, did you ever have access to any decoding or encoding 
machines ? 

(The witness conferred with his counsel.) 

Mr. Peress. No. 

The Chairman. Were you ever O. D. ? Were you ever officer of 
the day ? 

(The witness conferred with his counsel.) 

Mr. Peress. Yes. 

The Chairman. How often did you serve as officer of the day? 

Mr. Peress. Dental O. D. That just covers the dental clinic for 
emergency treatment that may come up. There is no administrative 
responsibility. It is just to take care of emergency dental situations. 
I was O. D. in rotation. It came up depending on the number of 
dental officers. If we had 20 dental officers, it was every 3 weeks. 
When we were down lower, it would come around more frequently. 

The Chairman. Your testimony is, then, that during all the time 
you were in the military, you never had access to any encoding or 
decoding machines? 

Mr. Peress. I don't even know what they are. 

The Chairman. You say you don't know what they are ? 

Mr. Peress. I have never seen such a machine. 

The Chairman. Do you know what an encoding machine is? 

Mr. Peress. No. 

The Chairman. You don't know what is meant by an encoding 
machine ? 

Mr. Peress. No, I don't. 

The Chairman. Do you know what is meant by a decoding 
machine ? 

Mr. Peress. That I can figure out. 

38794 — 54— pt. 3 5 



136 COMMUNIST INFILTRATION IN THE ARMY 

The Chairman. You can figure that out. 

Did you ever see any messages, either before or after they were 
decoded, either while you were an officer of the day or otherwise? 

(The witness conferred with his counsel.) 

Mr. Peress. Unless you mean my orders to take a leave of absence 
or to take part of my annual leave. I don't know if that is a coded 
or decoded message. I thought it was mimeographed. 

The Chairman. I think you know what I mean. I am just trying 
to get the facts. 

Is it your testimony that, as far as you know, other than routine 
orders, change of station, leave orders, other than orders of that kind 
you never saw any material, either before or after it was decoded? I 
have special reference to the times when you served as O. D. 

(The witness conferred with his counsel.) 

Mr. Peress. There is just a dental O. D. form, the name of the 
patient, serial number, and what you did for him. That is the only 
official printed material that you handle on O. D. 

The Chairman. General Zwicker, may I ask you a question. You 
can stay right there. 

Whenever I served as O. D. — and I think this has been general prac- 
tice in the Marine Corps, the Navy, and the Army — you normally had 
access to the encoding and decoding machines. Ordinarily an officer 
of the rank of major or above must take his stint at encoding or 
decoding. 

Could you tell me whether or not that has been the practice at Camp 
Kilmer? 

Brig. Gen. Ralph Zwicker (commanding officer, Camp Kilmer, 
N. J.). It is not. 

The Chairman. In other words, so far as you know, this individual 
never had access to anv confidential or secret material? 

General Zwicker. He did not. 

The Chairman. Your answer is what? 

General Zwicker. He did not. 

The Chairman. Just one other question, General. I did not intend 
to impose upon you this morning. 

His Army file contains reference to his being considered for — and 
I think I am quoting it correctly — sensitive work in May of 1953. 
Would you have any idea what that sensitive work was? If you do 
not know, we will show you the file to refresh your recollection. The 
file shows that in May, that is, after it was fully known that he was a 
Communist, the file shows that he was considered for sensitive work. 

The file does not show whether he was rejected or not. Just offhand, 
yon wouldn't know what that sensitive work would be? 

General Zwicker. I do not. 

The Chairman. I wonder if you can do this: You are appearing 
this afternoon in executive session. I would like to have you here to 
listen to all of this testimony. If you have an aide with you, I wonder 
if you could have somebody call Camp Kilmer and find out just what 
the sensitive work was that he was being considered for. 

Mr. Peress. I might be able to help you on that. 

General Zwicker. Even if I did know, I would not be privileged to 
tell you, under the Executive order which forbids us to discuss matters 
of that nature. 



COMMUNIST INFILTRATION IN THE ARMY 137 

The Chairman. I may say, General, you will be in difficulty if you 
refuse to tell us what sensitive work a Communist was being consid- 
ered for. There is no Executive order for the purpose of protecting 
Communists. I want to tell you right now, you will be asked that 
question this afternoon. You will be ordered to make available that 
information. 

Mr. Peress. I think I might know the answer to that, though I never 
heard about it. May I answer? 

The Chairman. You may. 

Mr. Peress. Apparently I was considered the best dentist at the 
post there, and they needed an extra prosthodontist. And where I was 
doing general dentistry, which is filling and routine dentistry, they 
needed another man to help the prosthodontist. 

In approximately May 1953, 1 was unofficially promoted to the pros- 
thetic section, where I worked through August; and then, because 
there was a falling off in operative work, I was put back to doing 
operative work, because of the production there. The records will 
show that my production in operative was also the greatest in the 
clinic. 

The Chairman. Let us return to the questions. 

Mr. Peress. This referred to a change of M. O. S., they called it. 

The Chairman. We are dealing, not with sensitive nerves in the 
teeth ; we are dealing with a security matter. I asked whether or not 
the general knew what sensitive security work you were being con- 
sidered for. You say that had to do with the teeth. 

Mr. Peress. Well, it was approximately May 1953, that the colonel 
called me down and said that they had been considering me — not 
a promotion in rank, but a promotion in work — to go up to prosthetics 
and work there. It is my own opinion that I was very good. 

The Chairman. Mr. Peress, the record shows that you signed a 
document identical to exhibit 9, which I will show you. You signed 
that under oath, certifying nonmembership in subversive organiza- 
tions, naming the organizations 

Mr. Peress. I decline to answer that question. 

The Chairman. Let me finish before vou decline. 

When you signed that, were you falsely swearing, or were you 
telling the truth? 

I The witness conferred with his counsel.) 

Mr. Peress. I decline to answer that question under the fifth 
amendment. 

The Chairman. You are entitled to decline. 

Mr. Rainville. I am Harold Rainville, from Senator Dirksen's 
office. While the Senator is seeking certain material which he wants 
to question you on, may I just develop one thing which I think has 
been overlooked here. 

Did you ever serve overseas? 

(The witness conferred with his counsel.) 

Mr. Peress. No. 

Mr. Rainville. Were you ever ordered to go overseas? 

Mr. Peress. Yes. 

Mr. Rainville. Were your orders then changed? 

Mr. Peress. Yes. 

Mr. Rainville. Do you know why they were changed ? 

Mr. Peress. I can only surmise. I was given no official reason. 



138 COMMUNIST INFILTRATION IN THE ARMY 

Mr. Rainville. Were you ever interrogated after the change, any 
discussion as to your future assignment ? 

Mr. Peress. I had orders to go to Fort Lewis and to proceed from 
there to Yokohama, Japan. I got to Fort Lewis, and I got in touch 
with the Red Cross. They secured an emergency leave for me. I had 
compassionate reasons to request a reassignment. There are Army 
regulations under the title of "Compassionate Reassignment." 

The Red Cross got — after investigating the case — got the time for 
me, and through channels I was reassigned to Camp Kilmer. 

Mr. Rainville. Do you mind telling us what the emergency was? 

(The witness conferred with his counsel.) 

Mr. Peress. Well, as you know, sir, they are part of the record, and 
I do mind telling you, because I don't feel it is integral to the investi- 
gation that you are carrying on now, the reasons for it. But they 
are part of the official records. 

Mr. Rainville. Well, if I am correct in my information, it was 
because your 6-year-old daughter needed psychiatric treatment ; is that 
right? 

Mr. Peress. She was undergoing it at the time. That was one of 
the reasons. 

Mr. Rainville. Did you get any aid in receiving that cancellation 
of your embarkation orders, other than the Red Cross ? 

(The witness conferred with his counsel.) 

Mr. Peress. Could you be more specific about that, sir ? 

Mr. Rainville. Let me be a little bit explanatory. We in the Sen- 
ators' offices are frequently called upon for emergency help whenever 
there is a situation of this kind. We frequently find that in situa- 
tions which are much more critical, a dying wife who is dying of can- 
cer or a dying child, it makes it very difficult for us to stop an em- 
barkation order even for a temporary reason. 

I have no doubt your daughter needed the treatment. Neverthe- 
less, it seems a little odd to me that you should be completely re- 
assigned. A man with the ability as a dentist such as you have would 
certainly have been needed abroad. I wanted to know, Did you know 
somebody in the Adjutant General's office? You didn't speak to any 
Congressman or Senator, and yet just the Red Cross was able to stop 
it? 

Mr. Peress. I didn't speak to any Congressman or Senator, and the 
reasons are not as far-fetched as you attempt to seem to understand 
them at this point. As I say, the authority exists in the Army regu- 
lations, which are also available to you, and the Red Cross does the 
investigating as to whether there is really a compassionate need for 
consideration of the case as to stop an embarkation. 

The Chairman. I think in fairness to the Red Cross — I do not know 
who investigated this case — as I understand it, the Red Cross merely 
makes an investigation and does not take any active part in getting 
a change or cancellation of orders. The Red Cross merely reports 
the facts. I believe that is correct. I may be wrong in that. 

Mr. Peress. As I was saying, the Red Cross reports on whether 
there exists sufficient reason to warrant a consideration bv the Armv, 
because otherwise the orders cannot be halted in time. 

Mr. Rainville. Very frequently the Red Cross comes to us and asks 
for our aid because very frequently they alone cannot get these things 
done in the time allowed. 



COMMUNIST INFILTRATION IN THE ARMY 139 

My question is, If the Reel Cross did this, and did it alone for you, 
from my experience in handling hundreds of these cases a week, for 
what is trivial compared to other things — not to you, of course, a 
trivial reason — I would like to know if you did not know someone 
some place, somebody in the Adjutant General's office, perhaps a party 
member ? 

Mr. Peress. To my knowledge, I know nobody in the Adjutant 
General's office, without qualification. 

Mr. Rainville. In 1949, did you serve in a Communist cell with 
anybody who might have had influence in the Army, who was an 
officer in the Army ? 

(The witness conferred with his counsel.) 

Mr. Peress. That question I decline to answer, on the fifth amend- 
ment. 

Mr. Rainville. I presume it is useless to ask you whether or not 
that person still is in the Adjutant General's office? 

Mr. Peress. Which person ? 

Mr. Rainville. The person you decline to answer about. 

Mr. Peress. Does such a person exist because of the posing of the 
question ? 

Mr. Rainville. I would presume if he didn't exist, it would be easier 
for you to say no than to decline to answer. 

(The witness conferred with his counsel.) 

The Chairman. You will either talk for the record or you will talk 
only to your counsel. I will hear none of these speeches off the record 
from you. If you want to discuss any matter with your counsel, you 
will do it in an undertone so that only you and he can hear it. Other- 
wise you will speak for the record. 

Mr. Rainville. Just one last question. Your daughter is still 
undergoing these treatments, and that is the reason you were still 
here until February 2 ? 

Mr. Peress. I don't know the reason I am here, but my daughter is 
still undergoing the treatments. 

The Chairman. There is one further question. Did a member of 
the Communist Party help you get your orders changed from Yoko- 
hama to Camp Kilmer? 

(The witness conferred with his counsel.) 

Mr. Peress. I decline to answer that question on the grounds that it 
might tend to incriminate me. 

The Chairman. Were you successful in forming a Communist cell 
at Camp Kilmer ? 

Mr. Peress. I decline to answer that question under the fifth amend- 
ment. 

The Chairman. Did your wife attend a Communist leadership 
school ? 

Mr. Peress. I decline to answer that question. 

The Chairman. Just to refresh your recollection, we will give you 
the name of the school. 

Mr. Cohn. It was the leadership training course at the Inwood 
Victory Club, which was conducted at 139 Dyckman Street. 

The Chairman. With your memory refreshed, did you attend that 
leadership school ? 

Mr. Peress. I decline to answer that question on the grounds that 
it might tend to incriminate me, under the fifth amendment. 



140 COMMUNIST INFILTRATION IN THE ARMY 

The Chairman. How long have you been married? 

Mr. Peress. What is the question ? 

The Chairman. How long have you been married, just roughly? 
(The witness conferred with his counsel.) 

Mr. Peress. Is that relevant to this investigation ? 

The Chairman. Answer the question. 

Mr. Peress. Since June 7, 1942. 

The Chairman. Does your wife have any brothers or sisters work- 
ing for the Government ? 

(The witness conferred with his counsel.) 

The Chairman. Or for any Government agency? 

Mr. Peress. I decline to answer that question. 

The Chairman. You are ordered to answer that question. 

Mr. Peress. I decline to answer that question under the fifth amend- 
ment. 

The Chairman. You go right ahead, Mister, and decline. 

Do you have any brothers or sisters working for any Government 
agency ? 

Mr. Peress. I decline to answer that question. 

The Chairman. You are ordered to answer. 

Mr. Peress. I decline to answer. 

The Chairman. Give us the names of your brothers. 

(The witness conferred with his counsel.) 

Mr. Peress. William 

The Chairman. What is his last name? The same as yours? 

Mr. Peress. The same as mine. 

The Chairman. What is his address? 

(The witness conferred with his counsel.) 

Mr. Peress. Brooklyn. I will have to look it up. 

The Chairman. Is he a member of the Communist Party? 

Mr. Peress. I decline to answer that. 

The Chairman. Whereabouts in Brooklyn does William live? 

Mr. Peress. I don't know the name of the section. 

The Chairman. The last question was: Where does William live 
in Brooklyn? 

Mr. Peress. I said I don't — what do you mean ; the street ? 

The Chairman. Yes, as best you can tell us. 

Mr. Peress. I don't know. 

The Chairman. You don't know what street he lives on? 

Mr. Peress. I am not sure. I know how to go there. 

The Chairman. How do you go there ? 

Mr. Peress. I drive on the Belt Parkway from my house and go 
down Flatlands Avenue. I don't know the streets where I turn over 
to go there. 

The Chairman. What is your brother's occupation ? 

(The witness conferred with his counsel.) 

Mr. Peress. I decline to answer that question. 

The Chairman. You are ordered to answer it. 

Mr. Peress. I decline, sir, under the fifth amendment. 

The Chairman. Does he work for the Government, the United 
States Government? 

Mr. Peress. I decline to answer. 

The Chairman. You are ordered to answer. 

Mr. Peress. I decline. 



COMMUNIST INFILTRATION EST THE ARMY 141 

The Chairman. How many other brothers do you have ? 

Mr. Peress. One. 

The Chairman. What is his name ? 

Mr. Peress. Same last name; Abraham Herbert. 

The Chairman. And where does Abraham work? 

(The witness conferred with his counsel.) 

Mr. Peress. Where does he work ? 

The Chairman. Yes. 

Mr. Peress. 10 Hillside Avenue. 

The Chairman. 10 Hillside Avenue. What kind of work does 
he do? 

(The witness conferred with his counsel.) 

The Chairman. Let's put it this way : Does he work either in a 
defense plant or for any Government agency ? 

Mr. Peress. I decline to answer that question under the fifth amend- 
ment. 

The Chairman. Do you feel if you were to tell us the truth in answer 
to that question that answer might tend to incriminate you? 

Mr. Peress. It might. 

The Chairman. Do you feel it might ? 

Mr. Peress. I feel it might. 

The Chairman. Do you feel if you were to tell us the truth as to 
where William worked that answer might tend to incriminate you? 

Mr. Peress. I feel it might. 

The Chairman. Again, while I don't think I owe any duty to mem- 
bers of the Communist conspiracy, I do want to let you know what this 
committee intends to do, insofar as I, as chairman, can get them to 
do it, so you cannot claim you were entrapped or claim ignorance at 
some future proceedings. I intend to find out, obviously, what your 
two brothers are doing. If their occupation could in no way tend 
to incriminate you, I will ask that you be cited for contempt. I just 
want you to know that. I just want you to know that you Communists 
cannot play with the fifth amendment before this committee. 

Do you have any sisters ? 

(The witness conferred with his counsel.) 

The Chairman. While Mr. Peress is consulting with his counsel, 
Mr. Adams, what I would like to have this afternoon is the name of 
the individual who has been in charge of Peress' personnel file which 
we subpenaed. I would like to have him before us under oath on the 
question of the completeness of the file. 

I want to tell you, in view of the fact that we have always been 
laying our cards strictly on the table with you and with Mr. Stevens, 
that we have an inventory of the file at the time we subpenaed it, and 
we have compared that with the file as handed to us. So I will want 
the man who was in charge of this file, who answered the subpena and 
presented it — I want him here under oath to explain the discrepancy 
between the inventory which we received from another Government 
agency and the inventory as the file was handed to us. 

I assume that you might have some difficulty getting him in here 
this afternoon. If possible, I would like to have him this afternoon; 
and if not, we will want to hear him in Washington next week. 

Mr. Peress. I will decline to answer that under the fifth amendment. 

The Chairman. You decline to answer whether you have any 
sisters ? 



142 COMMUNIST INFILTRATION IN THE ARMY 

Mr. Peress. I thought you were back on the other point. No; I 
have no sisters. 

The Chairman. You have no sisters. Is your father living ? 
Mr. Peress. Yes. 

The Chairman. Is he working for the Government ? 
(The witness conferred with his counsel.) 
Mr. Peress. I decline to answer that question. 
(The witness conferred with his counsel.) 
The Chairman. What is you father's first name ? 
Mr. Peress. On the last question, my father is not working at all. 
The Chairman. Your father is not working ? 
(The witness conferred with his counsel.) 

The Chairman. Mr. Peress, I realize this as a waste of the com- 
mittee's time to ask you this question, except that we want the record 
complete. Can you tell us, can you shed any light at all on the ques- 
tion of why you were commissioned, why you were promoted, why 
you were given an honorable discharge after the public records dis- 
closed that you were a Communist Party leader; after the record 
shows as early as April of 1953 your commanding officer and the com- 
manding officer of the First Army joined in a recommendation to have 
you immediately separated after you refused to tell the Army whether 
you were a part of the Communist conspiracy ? 

: As I say, I realize it is a waste of time asking you to answer the ques- 
tion, but I want to have the record complete. What is your answer? 
Mr. Peress. I really couldn't make a question out of it. Would 
you repeat it please ? 

The Chairman. No, it is not necessary. 
Mr. Peress. What was the significance of April 1953 ? 
The Chairman. May I say, for the benefit of your counsel, while 
this Fifth Amendment Communist may have been removed from the 
court martial jurisdiction of the Army, he has not been removed from 
the jurisdiction of our civil courts. I am referring the entire record 
in this case, both in executive session and in public session, together 
with the affidavits which he has signed, obviously false affidavits, 
to the Justice Department with the suggestion that this be submitted 
to a grand jury for criminal prosecution. 

I may say to counsel, as a courtesy to counsel, if you will keep in 
touch with the chief counsel of our committee, Mr. Eoy Cohn, he will 
keep you informed as to the steps that we take in Mr. Peress' case. 
m Mr. Peress, you are not released from the subpena. You will con- 
sider yourself under subpena. 

Let me ask counsel, when we want this individual again would 
you prefer that we notify you, or would you prefer that the notice 
go directly to Peress ? 

Mr. Faulkner. You may notify me. 

The Charman. We try to give sufficient notice so that it can fit into 
your other work. 

I assume 4 or 5 days or a week's time would be sufficient? 
m Mr. Faulkner. We are ready, willing, and able to testify at any 
time we are called upon. We came down here the last time without 
subpena, in executive session. 

The Chairman. Yes. You were ordered down by the Army. 
Mr. Faulkner. There was no order, Mr. Senator. 



COMMUNIST INFILTRATION IN THE ARMY 143 

The Chairman. We will not waste any time on that. 

You understand, Mr. Peress, you are under subpena. Your coun- 
sel will be notified when you are to return before the committee. 

This afternoon at 2 : 30, we will hear the Army, certain Army offi- 
cers, in executive session. 

Again, may I say that the legal counsel for the Army is invited to 
be present, if he cares to. 

Mr. Faulkner. Are we requested to remain for the rest of the day ? 

The Chairman. No. You will be notified when you are wanted 
again. 

(Whereupon, at 12 : 15 p. m., the public hearing was recessed, subject 
to call.) 



COMMUNIST INFILTRATION IN THE AMY 



(On February 18, 1954, Brig. Gen. Ralph W. Zwicker, U. S. Army, testified 
in executive session during hearings held by the Senate Permanent Subcom- 
mittee on Investigations on Communist Infiltration in the Army. This tes- 
timony was made public on February 22, 1954, by the members of the subcom- 
mittee and follows below:) 

THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 18, 1954 

United States Senate, 
Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the 

Committee on Government Operations, 

New York, N. t. 

The subcommittee met at 4: 30 p. m., in executive session, in room 
110, Federal Building, New York, N. Y., Senator Joseph R. McCarthy 
(chairman) presiding. 

Present : Senator Joseph R. McCarthy, Republican, Wisconsin. 

Present also : Roy M. Cohn, chief counsel ; Daniel G. Buckley, assist- 
ant counsel; Harold Rainville, administrative assistant to Senator 
Dirksen; Robert Jones, administrative assistant to Senator Potter; 
and James N. Juliana, investigator. 

The Chairman. General, would you raise your right hand and be 
sworn ? In this matter now in hearing before the committee, do you 
solemnly swear to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the 
truth, so help you God ? 

TESTIMONY OF BRIG. GEN. RALPH W. ZWICKER, UNITED STATES 
ARMY; ACCOMPANIED BY CAPT. W. J. WOODWARD, MEDICAL 
CORPS, UNITED STATES ARMY 

General Zwicker. I do. 

Before we start, there is no need for a medical officer to be in here. 

The Chairman. That is O. K. 

Mr. Cohn. A man who is his own lawyer has a fool for a client, 
and it is the same thing with a man who tries to be his own doctor. 

General, could we have your full name? 

General Zwicker. Ralph W. Zwicker. 

Mr. Cohn. General, to see if we can save a little time here, isn't the 
situation this — by the way, you have been commanding officer at Kilmer 
since when? 

General Zwicker. Since the middle of July last year. 

Mr. Cohn. Has the Peress case come to your attention since that 
time ? I am not asking questions about it. 

General Zwicker. Yes. 

Mr. Cohn. It has come to your attention and you have a familiarity 
with that case? 

General Zwicker. Yes. 

145 



146 COMMUNIST INFILTRATION IN THE ARMY 

Mr. Cohn. Now, general, would you like to be able to tell us exactly 
what happened in that case, and what steps you took and others took 
down at Kilmer to take action against Peress a long time before action 
was finally forced by the committee ? 

General Zwicker. That is a toughie. 

Mr. Cohn. All I am asking you now is if you could, if you were at 
liberty to do so, would you like to be in a position to tell us that story ? 

General Zwtcker. Well, may I say that if I were in a position to do 
so, I would be perfectly glad to give the committee any information 
that they desired. 

Mr. Cohn. You certainly feel that that information would not 
reflect unfavorably on you ; is that correct? 

General Zwicker. Definitely not. 

Mr. Cohn. And would not reflect unfavorably on a number of other 
people at Kilmer and the First Army ? 

General Zwicker. Definitely not. 

The Chairman. It would reflect unfavorably upon some of them, 
of course? 

General Zwicker. That I can't answer, sir. I don't know. 

The Chairman. Well, you know that somebody has kept this man 
on, knowing he was a Communist, do you not? 

General Zwicker. No, sir. 

The Chairman. You know that somebody has kept him on know- 
ing that he has refused to tell whether he was a Communist, do you 
not? 

General Zwtcker. I am afraid that would come under the category 
of the Executive order, Mr. Chairman. 

The Chairman. What? 

General Zwicker. I am afraid an answer to that question would 
come under the category of the Presidential Executive order. 

The Chairman. You will be ordered to answer the question. 

General Zwicker. Would you repeat the question, please? 

Mr. Cohn. Head it to the general. 

(The question referred to was read by the reporter.) 

General Zwicker. I respectfully decline to answer, Mr. Chairman, 
on the grounds of the directive, Presidential directive, which, in my 
interpretation, will not permit me to answer that question. 

The Chairman. You know that somebody signed or authorized an 
honorable discharge for this man, knowing that he was a fifth amend- 
ment Communist, do you not? 

General Zwicker. I know that an honorable discharge was signed 
for the man. 

The Chairman. The day the honorable discharge was signed, were 
you aware of the fact that he had appeared before our committee ? 

General Zwicker. I was. 

The Chairman. And had refused to answer certain questions? 

General Zwicker. No, sir, not specifically on answering any quea • 
tions. I knew that he had appeared before your committee. 

The Chairman. Didn't you read the news ? 

General Zwicker. I read the news releases. 

The Chairman. And the news releases were to the effect that he had 
refused to tell whether he was a Communist, and that there was evi- 
dence that he had attended Communist leadership schools. It was on 



COMMUNIST INFILTRATION IN THE ARMY 147 

all the wire service stories, was it not ? You knew generally what he 
was here for, did you not ? 

General Zwicker. Yes; indeed. 

The Chairman. And you knew generally that he had refused to tell 
whether he was a Communist, did you not ? 

General Zwicker. I don't recall whether he refused to tell whether 
he was a Communist. 

The Chairman. Are you the commanding officer there ? 

General Zwicker. I am the commanding general. 

The Chairman. When an officer appears before a committee and 
refuses to answer, would you not read that story rather carefully ? 

General Zwicker. I read the press releases. 

The Chairman. Then, General, you knew, did you not, that he 
appeared before the committee and refused, on the grounds of the 
fifth amendment, to tell about all of his Communist activities? You 
knew that, did you not? 

General Zwicker. I knew everything that was in the press. 

The Chairman. Don't be coy with me, General. 

General Zwicker. I am not being coy, sir. 

The Chairman. Did you have that general picture? 

General Zwicker. I believe I remember reading in the paper that 
he had taken refuge in the fifth amendment to avoid answering 
questions before the committee. 

The Chairman. About communism? 

General Zwicker. I am not too certain about that. 

The Chairman. Do you mean that you did not have enough interest 
in the case, General, the case of this major who was in your command, 
to get some idea of what questions he had refused to answer ? Is that 
correct ? 

General Zwicker. I think that is not putting it quite right, Mr. 
Chairman. 

The Chairman. You put it right, then. 

General Zwicker. I have great interest in all of the officers of my 
command, with whatever they do. 

The Chairman. Let's stick to fifth- amendment Communists, now. 
Let's stick to him. You told us you read the press releases. 

General Zwicker. I did. 

The Chairman. But now you indicate that you did not know that he 
refused to tell about his Communist activities. Is that correct? 

General Zwicker. I know that he refused to answer questions for the 
committee. 

The Chairman. Did you know that he refused to answer questions 
about his Communist activities? 

General Zwicker. Specifically, I don't believe so. 

The Chairman. Did you have any idea ? 

General Zwicker. Of course I had an idea. 

The Chairman. What do you think he was called down here for ? 

General Zwicker. For that specific purpose. 

The Chairman. Then you knew that those were the questions he was 
asked, did you not? General, let's try and be truthful. I am going 
to keep you here as long as you keep hedging and hemming. 

General Zwicker. I am not hedging. 

The Chairman. Or hawing. 



148 COMMUNIST INFILTRATION IN THE ARMY 

General Zwicker. I am not hawing, and I don't like to have anyone 
impugn my honesty, which you just about did. 

The Chairman. Either your honesty or your intelligence; I can't 
help impugning one or the other, when you tell us that a major in your 
command who was known to you to have been before a Senate com- 
mittee, and of whom you read the press releases very carefully — to 
now have you sit here and tell us that you did not know whether he 
refused to answer questions about Communist activities. I had seen 
all the press releases, and they all dealt with that. So when you do 
that, General, if you will pardon me, I cannot help but question either 
your honesty or your intellligence, one or the other. I want to be 
frank with you on that. 

Now, is it your testimony now that at the time you read the stories 
about Major Peress, that you did not know that he had refused to 
answer questions before this committee about his Communist 
activities ? 

General Zwicker. I am sure I had that impression. 

The Chairman. Did you also read the stories about my letter to 
Secretary of the Army Stevens in which I requested or, rather, sug- 
gested that this man be court-martialed, and that anyone that pro- 
tected him or covered up for him be court-martialed? 

General Zwicker. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. That appeared in the papers on Sunday and Mon- 
day, right ? 

General Zwicker. I don't recall the exact date. 

The Chairman. At least, it appeared before he got his honorable 
discharge ? 

General Zwicker. I don't know that that was true, either, sir. 

The Chairman. In any event, you saw it in a current paper, did 
you? 

General Zwicker. I did. 

The Chairman. You did not see the story later. So that at the 
time he was discharged, were you then aware of the fact that I had 
suggested a court-martial for him and for whoever got him special 
consideration ? 

General Zwicker. If the time jibes, I was. 

The Chairman. Were you aware that he was being given a dis- 
charge on February 2? In other words, the day he was discharged, 
were you aware of it ? 

General Zwicker. Yes ; yes, sir. 

The Chairman. Who ordered his discharge? 

General Zwicker. The Department of the Army. 

The Chairman. Who in the Department ? 

General Zwicker. That I can't answer. 

Mr. Cohn. That isn't a security matter? 

General Zwicker. No. I don't know. Excuse me. 

Mr. Cohn. Who did you talk to? You talked to somebody? 

General Zwicker. No, I did not. 

Mr. Cohn. How did you know he should be discharged ? 

General Zwicker. You also have a copy of this. I don't know why 
you asked me for it. This is the order under which he was discharged, 
a copy of that order. 

The Chairman. Just a minute. 

You are referring to an order of January 19. 



COMMUNIST INFILTRATION IN THE ARMY 149 

General Zwicker. I am not sure, sir. Just a moment. 

The Chairman. January 18. Will you tell me whether or not you 
were at all concerned about the fact that this man was getting an 
honorable discharge after the chairman of the Senate Investigating 
Committee had suggested to the Department of the Army that he be 
court-martialed ? Did that give you any concern ? 

General Zwicker. It may have concerned me, but it could not have 
changed anything that was done in carrying out this order. 

The Chairman. Did you take any steps to have him retained until 
the Secretary of the Army could decide whether he should be court- 
martialed ? 

General Zwicker. No, sir. 

The Chairman. Did it occur to you that you should? 

General Zwicker. No, sir. 

The Chairman. Could you have taken such steps? 

General Zwicker. No, sir. 

The Chairman. In other words, there is nothing you could have 
done ; is that your statement ? 

General Zwicker. That is my opinion. 

Mr. Rainville. May I interrupt a minute? Doesn't that order 
specifically state that this is subject to your check as to whether he 
is in good health and can be discharged ? 

General Zwicker. May I read it ? 

Mr. Rainville. I read the order. It is in there. 

General Zwicker. Paragraph 5 of this order states : 

Officer will not be separated prior to determination that he is physically quali- 
fied for separation by your headquarters. 

Mr. Rainville. That is a decision that you must make ? 

General Zwicker. Not me personally. My medical officers. 

Mr. Rainville. But he would report to you. He would not make 
the decision without giving you, the commanding general, the order 
for final verification ? 

General Zwicker. It would not be necessary. If something were 
found wrong physically with the man, he would be retained. 

Mr. Rainville. He would report to you ? 

General Zwicker. No. He would be retained. 

Mr. Rainville. It would be automatic, and you would not have to 
sign anything? 

General Zwicker. I would not personally, no. The medical officer 
would make such a report. 

Mr. Rainville. But there was somebody in your outfit who could 
say, "This man can go out or can't go out," and that was the doctor ? 

General Zwicker. He could not keep him in if he were physically 
qualified for separation. 

Mr. Rainville. But he could say he could not go out, so that there 
was discretion within that 90-day period. 

The Chairman. Let me ask this question: If this man, after the 
order came up, after the order of the 18th came up, prior to his get- 
ting an honorable discharge, were guilty of some crime — let us say 
that he held up a bank or stole an automobile — and you heard of that 
the day before — let us say you heard of it the same day that you heard 
of my letter — could you then have taken steps to prevent his discharge, 
or would he have automatically been discharged ? 



150 COMMUNIST INFILTRATION IN THE ARMY 

General Zwicker. I would have definitely taken steps to prevent 
discharge. 

The Chairman. In other words, if you found that he was guilty of 
improper conduct, conduct unbecoming an officer, we will say, then 
you would not have allowed the honorable discharge to go through, 
would you ? 

General Zwicker. If it were outside the directive of this order? 

The Chairman. Well, yes, let us say it were outside the directive. 

General Zwicker. Then I certainly would never have discharged 
him until that part of the case 

The Chairman. Let us say he went out and stole $50 the night 
before. 

General Zwicker. He wouldn't have been discharged. 

The Chairman. Do you think stealing $50 is more serious than being 
a traitor to the country as part of the Communist conspiracy ? 

General Zwicker. That, sir, was not my decision. 

The Chairman. You said if you learned that he stole $50, you would 
have prevented his discharge. You did learn something much more 
serious than that. You learned that he had refused to tell whether he 
was a Communist. You learned that the chairman of a Senate com- 
mittee suggested he be court-martialed. And you say if he had stolen 
$50 he would not have gotten the honorable discharge. But merely 
being a part of the Communist conspiracy, and the chairman of the 
committee asking that he be court-martialed, would not give you 
grounds for holding up his discharge. Is that correct ? 

General Zwicker. Under the terms of this letter, that is correct, Mr. 
Chairman. 

The Chairman. That letter says nothing about stealing $50, and it 
does not say anything about being a Communist. It does not say any- 
thing about his appearance before our committee. He appeared before 
our committee after that order was made out. 

Do you think you sound a bit ridiculous, General, when you say that 
for $50, you would prevent his being discharged, but for being a part 
of the conspiracy to destroy this country you could not prevent his 
discharge? 

General Zwicker. I did not say that, sir. 

The Chairman. Let's go over that. You did say if you found out 
he stole $50 the night before, he would not have gotten an honorable 
discharge the next morning? 

General Zwicker. That is correct. 

The Chairman. You did learn, did you not, from the newspaper 
reports, that this man was part of the Communist conspiracy, or at 
least that there was strong evidence that he was. Did you not think 
that was more serious than the theft of $50 ? 

General Zwicker. He has never been tried for that, sir, and there 
was evidence, Mr. Chairman 

The Chairman. Don't you give me doubletalk. The $50 case, that 
he had stolen the night before, he has not been tried for that. 

General Zwicker. That is correct. He didn't steal it yet. 

The Chairman. Would you wait until he was tried for stealing the 
$50 before you prevented his honorable discharge ? 

General Zwicker. Either tried or exonerated. 

The Chairman. You would hold up the discharge until he was tried 
or exonerated? 



COMMUNIST INFILTRATION IN THE ARMY 151 

General Zwicker. For stealing the $50 ; yes. 

The Chairman. But if you heard that this man was a traitor — in 
other words, instead of hearing that he had stolen $50 from the corner 
store, let us say you heard that he was a traitor, he belonged to the 
Communist conspiracy ; that a Senate committee had the sworn testi- 
mony to that effect. Then would you hold up his discharge until he 
was either exonerated or tried ? 

General Zwicker. I am not going to answer that question, I don't 
believe, the way you want it, sir. 

The Chairman. I just want you to tell me the truth. 

General Zwicker. On all of the evidence or anything that had been 
presented to me as Commanding General of Camp Kilmer, I had no 
authority to retain him in the service. 

The Chairman. You say that if you had heard that he had stolen 
$50, then you could order him retained. But when you heard that he 
was part of the Communist conspiracy, that subsequent to the time the 
orders were issued a Senate committee took the evidence under oath 
that he was part of the conspiracy, you say that would not allow you 
to hold up his discharge ? 

General Zwicker. I was never officially informed by anyone that he 
was part of the Communist conspiracy, Mr. Senator. 

The Chairman. Well, let's see now. You say you were never offi- 
cially informed? 

General Zwicker. No. 

The Chairman. If you heard that he had stolen $50 from someone 
down the street, if you did not hear it officially, then could you hold 
up his discharge? Or is there same peculiar way you must hear it? 

General Zwicker. I believe so, yes, sir, until I was satisfied that he 
had or hadn't, one way or the other. 

The Chairman. You would not need any official notification so far 
far as the 50 bucks is concerned ? 

General Zwicker. Yes. 

The Chairman. But you say insofar as the Communist conspiracy 
is concerned, you need an official notification ? 

General Zwicker. Yes, sir ; because I was acting on an official order, 
having precedence over that. 

The Chairman. How about the $50 ? If one of your men came in a 
half hour before he got his honorable discharge and said, "General, I 
just heard downtown from a police officer that this man broke into a 
store last night and stole $50," you would not give him an honorable 
discharge until you had checked the case and found out whether that 
was true or not ; would you ? 

General Zwicker. I would expect the authorities from downtown to 
inform me of that or, let's say, someone in a position to suspect that 
he did it. 

The Chairman. Let's say one of the trusted privates in your com- 
mand came in to you and said, "General, I was just downtown and I 
have evidence that Major Peress broke into a store and stole $50." 
You would not discharge him until you had checked the facts, seen 
whether or not the private was telling the truth and seen whether or 
not he had stolen the $50 ? 

General Zwicker. No; I don't believe I would. I would make a 
check, certainly, to check the story. 



152 COMMUNIST INFILTRATION IN THE ARMY 

The Chairman. Would you tell us, General, why $50 is so much 
more important to you than being part of the conspiracy to destroy a 
nation which you are sworn to defend ? 

General Zwicker. Mr. Chairman, it is not, and you know that as 
well as I do. 

The Chairman. I certainly do. That is why I cannot understand 
you sitting there, General, a General in the Army, and telling me that 
you could not, would not, hold up his discharge having received 
information 

General Zwicker. I could not hold up his discharge. 

The Chairman. Why could you not do it in the case of an allegation 
of membership in a Communist conspiracy, where you could if you 
merely heard some private's word that he had stolen $50? 

General Zwicker. Because, Mr. Senator, any information that 
appeared in the press or any releases was well known to me and well 
known to plenty of other people long prior to the time that you ever 
called this man for investigation, and there were no facts or no alle- 
gations, nothing presented from the time that he appeared before your 
first investigation that was not apparent prior to that time. 

The Chairman. In other words, as you sat here this morning and 
listened to the testimony you heard nothing new? 

Mr. Cohn. Nothing substantially new? 

General Zwicker. I don't believe so. 

The Chairman. So that all of these facts were known at the time 
he was ordered to receive an honorable discharge? 

General Zwicker. I believe they are all on record ; yes, sir. 

The Chairman. Do you think, General, that anyone who is respon- 
sible for giving an honorable discharge to a man who has been named 
under oath as a member of the Communist conspiracy should himself 
be removed from the military? 

General Zwicker. You are speaking of generalities now, and not 
on specifics— is that right, sir, not mentioning about any one par- 
ticular person ? 

The Chairman. That is right. 

General Zwicker. I have no brief for that kind of person, and if 
there exists or has existed something in the system that permits that, 
I say that that is wrong. 

The Chairman. I am not talking about the system. I am asking 
you this question, General, a very simple question : Let us assume that 
John Jones, who is a major in the United States Army 

General Zwicker. A what, sir? 

The Chairman. Let us assume that John Jones is a major in the 
United States Army. Let us assume that there is sworn testimony 
to the effect that he is part of the Communist conspiracy, has attended 
Communist leadership schools. Let us assume that Maj. John Jones 
is under oath before a committee and says, "I cannot tell you the truth 
about these charges because, if I did, I fear that might tend to incrimi- 
nate me." Then let us say that General Smith was responsible for 
this man receiving an honorable discharge, knowing these facts. Do 
you think that General Smith should be removed from the military, 
or do you think he should be kept on in it ? 

General Zwicker. He should be by all means kept if he were acting 
under competent orders to separate that man. 



COMMUNIST INFILTRATION IN THE ARMY 153 

The Chairman. Let us say he is the man who signed the orders. 
Let us say General Smith is the man who originated the order. _ 

General Zwicker. Originated the order directing his separation? 

The Chairman. Directing his honorable discharge. 

General Zwicker. Well, that is pretty hypothetical. 

The Chairman. It is pretty real, General. 

General Zwicker. Sir, on one point, yes. I mean, on an individual, 
yes. But you know that there are thousands and thousands of people 
being separated daily from our Army. 

The Chairman. General, you understand my question 

General Zwicker. Maybe not. 

The Chairman. And you are going to answer it. 

General Zwicker. Repeat it. 

The Chairman. The reporter will repeat it. 

(The question referred to was read by the reporter.) 

General Zwicker. That is not a question for me to decide, Senator. 

The Chairman. You are ordered to answer it, General. You are 
an employee of the people. 

General Zwicker. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. You have a rather important job. I want to know 
how you feel about getting rid of Communists. 

General Zwicker. I am all for it. 

The Chairman. All right. You will answer that question, unless 
you take the fifth amendment. I do not care how long we stay here, 
you are going to answer it. 

General Zwicker. Do you mean how I feel toward Communists ? 

The Chairman. I mean exactly what I asked you. General ; nothing 
else. And anyone with the brains of a 5-year-old child can understand 
that question. 

The reporter will read it to you as often as you need to hear it so that 
you can answer it, and then you will answer it. 

General Zwicker. Start it over, please. 

(The question was reread by the reporter.) 

General Zwicker. I do not think he should be removed from the 
military. 

The Chairman. Then, General, you should be removed from any 
command. Any man who has been given the honor of being promoted 
to general and who says, "I will protect another general who protected 
Communists," is not fit to wear that uniform, General. I think it is a 
tremendous disgrace to the Army to have this sort of thing given to the 
public. I intend to give it to them. I have a duty to do that. I 
intend to repeat to the press exactly what you said. So you know 
that. You will be back here, General. 

Do you know who initiated the order for the honorable discharge 
of this major? 

General Zwicker. As a person, sir? 

The Chairman. Yes. 

General Zwicker. No, I do not. 

The Chairman. Have you tried to find out? 

General Zwicker. No, I have not. 

The Chairman. Have you discussed that matter with Mr. Adams? 

General Zwicker. As a person, no, sir. 

The Chairman. How did you discuss it with him other than as a 
person ? 



154 COMMUNIST INFILTRATION IN THE ARMY 

General Zwicker. I mean as an individual. This is a Department 
of the Army order. 

The Chairman. Have you tried to find out who is responsible ? 

General Zwicker. Who signed this order? 

The Chairman. Who was responsible for the order ? 

General Zwicker. No, sir ; I have not. 

The Chairman. Are you curious ? 

General Zwicker. Frankly, no. 

The Chairman. You were fully satisfied, then, when you got the 
order to give an honorable discharge to this Communist major? 

General Zwicker. I am sorry, sir ? 

The Chairman. Read the question. 

(The question was read by the reporter.) 

General Zwicker. Yes, sir ; I was. 

Mr. Cohn. General, I have just one or two questions. 

The Chairman. Let me ask one question. 

In other words, you think it is proper to give an honorable dis- 
charge to a man known to be a Communist? 

General Zwicker. No, I do not. 

The Chairman. Why do you think it is proper in this case ? 

General Zwicker. Because I was ordered to do so. 

The Chairman. In other words, anything that you are ordered to 
do, you think is proper? 

General Zwicker. That is correct. Anything that I am ordered 
to do by higher authority, I must accept. 

The Chairman. Do you think that the higher authority would be 
guilty of improper conduct? 

General Zwicker. It is conceivable. 

The Chairman. Do you think they are guilty of improper conduct 
here ? 

General Zwicker. I am not their judge, sir. 

The Chairman. Do you think to order the honorable discharge for 
a Communist major was improper conduct? 

General Zwicker. I think it was improper procedure, sir. 

The Chairman. Do you think it is improper ? 

Mr. Cohn. General, I just want to ask you this: Peress was dis- 
charged on February 2, which was a Tuesday. 

General Zwicker. That is right. 

Mr. Cohn. He appeared before the committee on Saturday. On 
Monday or Tuesday, did you speak to anybody in the Department of 
the Army in Washington, telephonically, about the Peress case ? On 
Monday or Tuesday ? 

General Zwicker. Let me think a minute. 

It is possible that I called First Army to inform them that Peress 
had changed his mind and desired a discharge as soon as possible. 

Mr. Cohn. Who would you have told in the First Army? Who 
would you call ? G-2, or General Burress ? 

General Zwicker. I don't think in that case I would call General 
Burress. 

Mr. Cohn. General Seabree? 

General Zwicker. No. It would have been G-l, or Deputy Chief 
of Staff. 

Mr. Cohn. Who is that? 

General Zwicker. General Gurney. 



COMMUNIST INFILTRATION IN THE ARMY 155 

Mr. Cohn. You don't remember which one it was ? 

General Zwicker. I don't recall that I called. 

Mr. Coiin. Did you talk to Mr. Adams in those days? 

General Zwicker. No, sir. 

Mr. Cohn. Did you ever talk to Mr. Adams before yesterday? 
You recall whether or not you spoke to him. 

General Zwicker. I know Mr. Adams, yes. There was one call, 
but I think that came from a member of your committee, from Wash- 
ington, requesting that this man appear before your committee first. 

The Chairman. You understand the question. Did you talk to 
Mr. Adams before yesterday ? 

General Zwicker. I don't recall. I don't believe so, sir. 

The Chairman. Did you talk to anyone in Washington ? 

General Zwicker. No, sir, about this case. 

The Chairman. Within the week preceding his discharge? 

General Zwicker. No, sir. 

The Chairman. Did you at any time ever object to this man being 
honorably discharged ? 

General Zwicker. I respectfully decline to answer that, sir. 

The Chairman. You will be ordered to answer it. 

General Zwicker. That is on the grounds of this Executive order. 

The Chairman. You are ordered to answer. That is a personnel 
matter. 

General Zwicker. I shall still respectfully decline to answer it. 

The Chairman. Did you ever take any steps which would have aided 
him in continuing in the military after you knew that he was a Com- 
munist? 

General Zwicker. That would have aided him in continuing, sir? 

The Chairman. Yes. 

General Zwicker. No. 

The Chairman. Did you ever do anything instrumental in his ob- 
taining his promotion after knowing that he was a fifth-amendment 
case ? 

General Zwicker. No, sir. 

The Chairman. Did you ever object to his being promoted? 

General Zwicker. I had no opportunity to, sir. 

The Chairman. Did you ever enter any objection to the promotion 
of this man under your command? 

General Zwicker. I had no opportunity to do that. 

The Chairman. You say you did not ; is that correct ? 

General Zwicker. That is correct. 

The Chairman. And you refuse to tell us whether you objected to 
his obtaining an honorable discharge? 

General Zwicker. I don't believe that is quite the way the question 
was phrased before. 

The Chairman. Well, answer it again, then. 

General Zwicker. I respectfully request that I not answer that 
question. 

The Chairman. You will be ordered to answer. 

General Zwicker. Under the same authority as cited before, I can- 
not answer it. 

Mr. Cohn. Did anybody on your staff, General — Colonel Brown or 
anyone in G-2 — communicate with the Department of the Army on 



156 COMMUNIST INFILTRATION IN THE ARMY 

February 1 or February 2? In other words, in connection with the 
discharge? 

General Zwicker. I don't know, but I don't believe so. 

Mr. Cohn. To the best of your knowledge, no ? 

General Zwicker. No. 

Mr. Cohn. In other words, on January 18, 1954, you received a 
direction from the Secretary, signed by the Adjutant General, I as- 
sume that is General Bergin, telling you to give this man an honorable 
discharge from the Army at any practicable date, depending on his 
desire, but in no event later than 90 days ; that that was the order, and 
you had nothing from the order to change that order in view of his 
testimony before the committee ; and therefore, when the man came in 
and wanted an honorable discharge, you felt under this order com- 
pelled to give it to him as a decision that had been made by the 
Adjutant General. Is that correct? 

General Zwicker. That is correct. 

Mr. Cohn. And you received no additional words from the Adju- 
tant General on February 1 or February 2, and before you gave the 
discharge you did not call and say, "In view of all of this, and his 
testimony on Saturday, and Senator McCarthy's request for a court- 
martial, this man is in here now, and is that all right?" You never 
made any such call ? 

General Zwicker. No ; I did not. 

Mr. Rainville. General, I think at one place there you said he 
changed his request to an immediate discharge? 

General Zwicker. That is correct. 

Mr. Rainville. Then he had previously objected to the discharge 
or at least he wanted the full 90 days? 

General Zwicker. No, sir. He requested to be discharged on 
March 31, I think, which would make it 60 days from receipt, rather 
than the full 90. He did not ask for the full 90, but he asked for 
what amounted to 60 days, 2 months. 

Mr. Rainville. Then he came in as soon as he testified, and asked 
for an immediate discharge and it was processed routinely? 

General Zwicker. That is correct. 

Mr. Rainville. But you never thought it necessary after he ap- 
peared before the committee or when he made that request to discuss 
his appearance before the committee with him ? 

General Zwicker. I am sorry. 

Mr. Rainville. My question is this : After he appeared before the 
committee and he was still a member of your command, even though 
he was on separation, you didn't ask him to come in and report what 
he testified to? 

General Zwicker. No, sir. 

Mr. Rainville. And you didn't think it was necessary when he 
came in and asked for an immediate discharge instead of 60 days to 
ask him what transpired so as to get some kind of an idea as to why 
he wanted it immediately, or why he is in a rush to get out now instead 
of taking the 60 days that he wanted before that ? 

General Zwicker. That was beyond my prerogative. I did not. 

Mr. Rainville. As an officer of your command, certainly what we 
usually call the old man's privilege there, prerogative, they may ask 
that sort of question, and so forth, so long as he is one of your com- 
mand. But you didn't do it? 



COMMUNIST INFILTRATION IN THE ARMY 157 

General Zwicker. No. He told me he wanted to be released and 
I said, "All right." 

Mr. Jones. General, did the counsel of the Army advise you not to 
discuss the Peress case? 

General Zwicker. He did not. 

Mr. Jones. He did not advise you ? 

General Zwicker. No, sir. 

The Chairman. Who did advise you ? 

General Zwicker. No one. 

The Chairman. What did you and Mr. Adams talk about yester- 
day? 

General Zwicker. Mr. Adams and I talked about the various pro- 
cedures of prior meetings such as this. He tried to indicate what I 
might expect. 

Mr. Jones. Did Mr. Adams advise anyone not to discuss the Peress 
case to this committee? 

General Zwicker. I am sorry. He did not advise me. 

Mr. Jones. I mean to your knowledge, did he advise any other 
person ? 

General Zwicker. To my knowledge he did not. 

Mr. Jones. General, what is your considered opinion of this order 
here forbidding you to assist this committee in exposing the Com- 
munist conspiracy in the Army ? 

General Zwicker. Sir, I cannot answer that, because it is signed by 
the President. The President says don't do it and therefore I don't. 

Mr. Jones. What is your considered opinion of that order? You 
see now, here is a perfectly good example of a Communist being pro- 
moted right in the ranks, all because of this Executive order here, in 
many respects, where we could not get at these things earlier. What 
is your considered opinion of an order of that nature? 

General Zwicker. I won't answer that, because I will not criticize 
my Commander in Chief. 

The Chairman. General, you will return for a public session at 
10 : 30 Tuesday morning. 

General Zwicker. This coining Tuesday ? 

The Chairman. Yes. 

General Zwicker. Here? 

The Chairman. Yes. 

General Zwicker. At what time ? 

The Chairman. 10 : 30. In the meantime, in accordance with the 
order which you claim forbids you the right to discuss this case, you 
will contact the proper authority who can give you permission to tell 
the committee the truth about the case before you appear Tuesday, 
and request permission to be allowed to tell us the truth above the 

General Zwicker. Sir, that is not my prerogative, either. 

The Chairman. You are ordered to do it. 

General Zwicker. I am sorry $ sir, I will not do that. 

The Chairman. All right. 

General Zwicker. If you care to have me, I will cite certain other 
portions of this. 

The Chairman. You need cite nothing. You may step down. 
(Whereupon, at 5 : 15 p. m., the committee was recessed, subject to 
the call of the Chair.) 



COMMUNIST INFILTBATION IN THE AKMY 



THURSDAY, MARCH 4, 1954 

United States Senate, 
Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the 

Committee on Government Operations. 

Washington, D. G. 

The subcommittee met at 10 : 45 a. m., pursuant to notice, in room 
357 of the Senate Office Building, Senator Joseph R. McCarthy 
(chairman) presiding. 

Present: Senator Joseph R. McCarthy, Republican, Wisconsin; 
Senator Everett McKinley Dirksen, Republican, Illinois; Senator 
Charles E. Potter, Republican, Michigan ; Senator John L. McClellan, 
Democrat, Arkansas; and Senator Henry M. Jackson, Democrat, 
Washington. 

Present also : Roy M. Colin, Chief Counsel ; Francis P. Carr, Execu- 
tive director, Robert Francis Kennedy, counsel to minority ; Donald F. 
O'Donnel, assistant counsel; C. George Anastos, assistant counsel; 
Daniel G. Buckley, assistant counsel ; Ruth Y. Watts, chief clerk. 

The Chairman. The committee will come to order. 

Mr. Belsky, you have been sworn. The witness has requested no 
pictures be taken of him while he is testifying, so none will be taken 
while he is testifying. 

TESTIMONY OF DR. MARVIN SANFORD BELSKY (ACCOMPANIED BY 
HIS COUNSEL, STANLEY FAULKNER, NEW YORK, N. Y.) 

Mr. Cohn. May we get your full name, sir? 

Dr. Belsky. Marvin Sanford Belsky. 

Mr. Cohn. Where do you come from? 

Dr. Belsky. Where I am stationed, that is ? 

Mr. Cohn. Where are you stationed? 

Dr. Belsky. Murphy Army Hospital, Waltham, Mass. 

Mr. Cohn. You do the work of a doctor there ? 

Mr. Faulkner. This is awfully distracting with these cameras in 
front of us, and I am sure the witness can't testify freely and fully 
this way. 

The Chairman. If the lights bother the witness, don't turn the 
lights on the witness. The television cameras will not take any pic- 
tures of the witness while he is testifying. 

You understand, Mr. Belsky, you are under oath ? 

Dr. Belsky. Excuse me, may I make a request ? It is Dr. Belsky 
and not Mr. Belsky. 

The Chairman. You understand that you are under oath? 

Dr. Belsky. Yes, sir. Could I make a statement, Senator ? 

159 



160 COMMUNIST INFILTRATION IN THE ARMY 

The Chairman. You may make a statement. 

Dr. Belsky. Mr. Senator, I have been served with a blank subpena. 
What is the subject matter under consideration by this committee, 
what am I accused of, and who has accused me? 

The Chairman. The subject matter being investigated by the com- 
mittee at this particular hearing is communism in the Army, com- 
munism in war plants, and communism in anything related to our 
defense effort or in any part of the Government. 

You asked what you are accused of, and I am not sure if the word 
"accused" is correct or not, but the information we have, since you have 
asked, is that you are an active member of the Communist conspiracy. 
You are here today because you are a doctor in a hospital which 
services patients from the Lincoln project which is a top, most secret 
radar project we have in this country. I believe that will cover it. 

Dr. Belsky. Senator, I also 

The Chairman. Just a moment, please. 

I think Senator Dirksen has made a good point here that the record 
should be clear that one of the reasons you are here is because you 
are in a position to constantly contact patients who have been working 
on not merely secret, but top secret radar work at the Lincoln project. 

Senator McClellan. 

Dr. Belsky. I would like to raise a question. 

Senator McClellan. I would like to make this observation for the 
record, and I think the record should be very clear, that you are not 
accused of any offense. You are here as a witness to give information 
that this committee deems necessary to help it perform its functions. 

Dr. Belsky. I would like to raise one jurisdictional question. 

The Chairman. You may. 

Dr. Belsky. Under article 2, section II, of the United States Con- 
stitution, I am, as a soldier, only under the jurisdiction of the Presi- 
dent of the United States, who is the Commander in Chief of the 
Army, and this committee has no jurisdiction over me. 

The Chairman. I may say, yesterday the President made a state- 
ment with which I heartily agree, and that is that every person in the 
military or any other branch of the Government should willingly and 
cheerfully testify and give facts so long as their testimony will not 
endanger the security of the United States. 

I may say that that is, I think, a step forward from what we have 
been witnessing for some time in the past. 

Just so that there is no question, you have received no orders either 
from the Commander in Chief, Mr. Eisenhower, or from your com- 
manding officer, not to testify, have you ? 

Dr. Belsky. No. 

The Chairman. So that, as far as you are concerned, as of today, 
you are free to testify unless, of course, you invoke the fifth amend- 
ment ? 

(The witness consulted with his counsel.) 

Dr. Belsky. As free as I can possibly be. 

The Chairman. I may say, that in this case the Army has been 
extremely cooperative. We had some trouble locating the witness, 
and they helped us; they made no objection to your being called 
whatsoever. 

Mr. Cohn. 



COMMUNIST INFILTRATION IN THE ARMY 161 

Mr. Cohn. Now, have you been doing this work at the Murphy 
General Hospital since May of 1953 ? 

Dr. Belsky. What work? 

Mr. Cohn. Are you stationed at Murphy General Hospital? 

Dr. Belsky. Yes. 

Mr. Cohn. Do you perform medical services there ? 

Dr. Belsky. Some. 

Mr. Cohn. Do you interview any of the patients there? 

Dr. Belsky. As part of my medical duties. 

Mr. Cohn. Now, have you been doing that work since May of 1953 ? 

(The witness consulted with his counsel.) 

Dr. Belsky. Except for the time I was out sick. 

Mr. Cohn. Except for the time you have been out sick, you have 
been doing that work since May of 1953. Have you at all times since 
May of 1953 been a member of the Communist Party? 

Dr. Belsky. I respectfully decline to answer that question under 
the protection of the fifth amendment to the Constitution of the 
United States, and that my answer might tend to incriminate me. 

Mr. Cohn. For the benefit of Senator Dirksen, we should show for 
the record that counsel is Stanley Faulkner, of the New York bar. 

The Chairman. I think that we have your address and everything. 
We got that in the Peress case. 

I may say for the benefit of the Senators, this is the same young 
man who appeared and represented Mr. Peress. 

Mr. Faulkner. It was Dr. Peress, Mr. Senator. 

The Chairman. Dr. or Major Peress. 

Mr. Cohn. Did you tell us whether or not you are a member of the 
party today ? 

Dr. Belsky. I respectfully decline to answer that question under 
the protection of the fifth amendment of the Constitution of the 
United States that my answer may tend to incriminate me, 

Mr. Cohn. Since May of 1953, up until the present time, have you 
attempted to recruit people with whom you came in contact at the 
hospital into the Communist Party ? 

Dr. Belsky. I respectfully decline to answer that question under 
the protection of the fifth amendment, that my answer might tend 
to incriminate me. 

The Chairman. There is one thing that puzzles me a bit, Doctor. 
I understood from a statement made yesterday that any doctor who 
was drafted was entitled to a commission automatically" I find that 
you are a private doing the work of a doctor. Can you explain why 
you were not commissioned ? 

(The witness consulted with his counsel.) 

Dr. Belsky. I was drafted as a private. 

Senator Potter. You were drafted under the Doctors Draft Act? 

Dr. Belsky. No. 

The Chairman. Just a second now ; you applied for a commission 
when you were drafted, did you not ? 

(The witness consulted with his counsel.) 

Dr. Belsky. I was subject to the general draft law because I was 
under age. 

The Chairman. Did you hear the question? 

Dr. Belsky. Would you please repeat it? 



162 COMMUNIST INFILTRATION IN THE ARMY 

The Chairman. I don't want to browbeat you, but I would like to 
have your answer. The question is : Did you apply for a commission \ 

Dr. Belskt. Yes; I applied for a commission. 

The Chairman. That is a very simple question. Just try and listen 
to the question, will you, and answer it. Why were you denied a 
commission ? 

(The witness consulted with his counsel.) 

Dr. Belsky. I received notice that my forms were not properly 
completed, and that notice was received after I had been drafted as a 
private. 

The Chairman. In other words, you did not answer the questions 
about your Communist background; therefore, you were denied a 
commission ? 

(The witness consulted with his counsel.) 

Dr. Belsky. They never told me why I didn't properly complete 
the form. 

The Chairman. Well now, you have no idea why you were denied a 
commission ? 

(The witness consulted with his counsel.) 

Dr. Belskt. I couldn't venture on giving you an opinion. 

The Chairman. I just want to know whether you have an idea why 
you were denied a commission? 

Dr. Belsky. I couldn't venture to give you any idea why I was 
denied. 

The Chairman. Have you any idea. I am not asking you whether 
you venture, I am just asking you whether you have any idea why you 
were denied a commission. The record shows you were denied it 
because you were a Communist and because you refused to answer 
questions about your Communist activities. 

Dr. Belsky. No ; I have no idea. 

The Chairman. Do you know that ? 

Dr. Belsky. I have no idea why. 

The Chairman. You had no knowledge of that ? 

Dr. Belsky. Not to my knowledge. 

Senator Jackson. Is that a truthful answer ? 

(The witness consulted with his counsel.) 

Dr. Belsky. I was advised by the Army officially that my form was 
never properly completed, and as far as the official word, what actually 
the official word was, I was never actually advised why my forms 
were never properly completed. 

Senator Jackson. I am not asking you for an official word. You 
are a doctor; you are a well-educated man. You certainly can tell 
this committee truthfully why you were denied a commission, in your 
opinion. 

(The witness consulted with his counsel.) 

Dr. Belsky. As far as I know, the Army never actually told me 
why I was denied a commission except my forms were not properly 
completed. 

Senator Jackson. And you weren't very much interested in your not 
getting a commission. You would rather be in the service as a private 
than as a commissioned officer ? 

(The witness consulted with this counsel.) 

Dr. Belsky. I inquired why I was denied a commission ; they never 
told me ; no one in the Army told me. 



COMMUNIST INFILTRATION IN THE ARMY 163 

Senator Jackson. You haven't the remotest idea why you were 
denied a commission ? 

(The witness consulted with this counsel.) 

Dr. Belsky. It could be many reasons. 

Senator Potter. How did you answer the question as to whether 
you belonged to an organization that believed in the overthrow of 
our Government by force and violence ? 

Dr. Belsky. I respectfully decline to answer that question, under 
the protection of the fifth amendment, in that my answer might tend 
to incriminate me. 

Senator PoTrEK. Is that the answer you put on your application I 

Dr. Bel.sky. I respectfully decline to answer that question, under 
the protection of the fifth amendment, in that my answer might tend 
to incriminate me. 

The Chairman. The witness will be ordered to answer. 

Senator Potter has asked you a question covering a matter which is 
of record and you have no fifth amendment privilege there. You 
will be ordered to answer. 

(The witness consulted with his counsel.) 

Dr. Belsky. Would you repeat the question, please, Senator I 

Senator Potter. How did you answer the form, the question on the 
form, military form, as to whether you belonged to an organization 
that believed in the overthrow of our Government by force and 
violence ? 

(The witness consulted with his counsel.) 

Dr. Belsky. There were several questions on that, and I have to see 
the form in order to be able to answer. 

Senator Potter. You know how you answered that question, don't 

you? 

(The witness consulted with his counsel.) 

Dr. Belsky. Can you show me the form \ 

Senator Potter. We have the form. 

Dr. Belsky. Can you show it to me ? 

Senator Potter. You answer the question. 

Dr. Belsky. Can you show me the form \ 

Senator Potter. I am asking you the question, and you certainly 
know how you answered that question. 

The Chairman. It is a simple question. Senator Potter asks you if 
you know how you answered that question. 

Mr. Faulkner. Mr. Senator 

The Chairman. We will not hear from counsel, we will only hear 
from the witness. 

(The witness consulted with his counsel.) 

Dr. Belsky. There were specific questions on the form. And as far 
as I recall the way Senator Potter asked the question, I don't know 
if that was the specific question on the form. If I could see the form, 
then I would be able to answer. 

Senator Potter. Were you a member of the Communist Party at 
the time you filled out the form ? 

Dr. Belsky. I respectfully decline to answer that question, under 
the protection of the fifth amendment of the Constitution of the 
United States, in that my answer might tend to incriminate me. 

Senator Potter. How would you answer that question today? 

(The witness consulted with his counsel.) 



164 COMMUNIST INFILTRATION IN THE ARMY 

Dr. Belskt. I am answering it today. 

Senator Potter. What is your answer? 

Dr. Belskt. What I just said. 

Senator Potter. I am asking you what you said. 

Dr. Belskt. I respectfully decline to answer that question, under 
the protection of the fifth amendment of the Constitution of the 
United States, in that my answer might tend to incriminate me. 

Senator Jackson. You would not want to convey the impression 
to this committee or the American public that you do not know why 
you were denied a commission. 

(The witness consulted with his counsel.) 

Dr. Belskt. That is an Army policy and the Army never told me 
why I was denied a commission. 

Senator Jackson. I mean you have friends that are doctors, and 
I suppose you tell them that the fact that you are a private and they 
are commissioned is a matter of very little importance to you, and 
you have not the remotest idea why you are a private and why they 
are commissioned officers in the Army as medical doctors. 

(The witness consulted with his counsel.) 

Dr. Belskt. I object to the question in that it calls for an operation 
of my mind. 

Senator Jackson. An operation of your mind ? 

Dr. Belskt. And a question of belief. 

Senator Jackson. How would you operate on your mind ? 

Dr. Belskt. It is a question of belief. 

Senator Jackson. I did not ask you a question of belief. I just 
asked you a reasonable question, that a reasonable person would ask. 
If a friend of yours came along who was a doctor, and he was com- 
missioned, and he said, "Dr. Belsky, how come you are a private in- 
stead of a commissioned officer?" What kind of an answer do you 
give them? Is that an unreasonable question, and is it unusual, and 
is that hurting your mind, and is that inquiring into your beliefs ? 

The Chairman. May I say, Senator Jackson, I wish you would re- 
frain from browbeating this witness. 

Senator Jackson. Mr. Chairman, perhaps the rest of us have that 
license. 

(The witness consulted with his counsel.) 

Dr. Belskt. I am not in a position to answer that question, why 
I was denied a commission, and the Army knows, and that answer 
can come from the Army. 

Senator Jackson. Did you not give any thought to it yourself? 

(The witness consulted with his counsel.) 

Dr. Belskt. Yes ; I thought about it. 

Senator Jackson. What thought came to you as to why you were 
not commissioned? 

(The witness consulted with his counsel.) 

Dr. Belskt. That is an inquiry into my thoughts. 

Senator Jackson. In other words, if a friend of yours — Doctor, let 
me ask you this : If a friend of yours and one of your classmates, 
asked you why you were not commissioned as a doctor, you tell them 
that they should not ask you that question, that you are going to rely 
on the fifth amendment. Is that what you tell them ? 

Dr. Belskt. That they should ask the Army. 



COMMUNIST INFILTRATION IN THE ARMY 165 

Senator Jackson. You tell them they ought to ask the Army, and 
you think that they would be well satisfied with that answer? 

(The witness consulted with his counsel.) 

Dr. Belsky. I. can't say whether they would be satisfied with it or 
not. 

Senator Jackson. What do you tell your friends? Is that what 
y on tell them, to ask the Army ? 

(The witness consulted with his counsel.) 

Dr. Belsky. I decline to answer what I tell my friends in that my 
answer as to what I tell my friends might tend to incriminate me under 
the fifth amendment to the Constitution of the United States. 

Senator Jackson. You tell your friends in the medical profession, 
when they converse with you on subjects such as this, you immediately 
raise to them the fifth amendment ? Tell me, what is their response 
to you when you raise the fifth amendment in your personal conversa- 
tions with them ? 

Dr. Belsky. I don't raise the fifth amendment. 

Senator Jackson. You do not raise the fifth amendment ; what do 
you tell them ? 

(The witness consulted with his counsel.) 

Dr. Belsky. Well, that is a personal matter, and I raise the ques- 
tion of my conversations with my friends, as an inquiry into my be- 
liefs, and on that ground I respectfully decline to answer that ques- 
tion under the protection of the fifth amendment to the Constitution 
of the United States in that my answer might tend to incriminate me. 

The Chairman. At this point, may I ask if the Army is represented 
here? Is the Army represented here? Is Mr. Berry here? For the 
record, this record will be transmitted to the Army, since they are 
not represented here. The thing that puzzles me very much is the 
difference in the treatment of four different Communists who were 
before this committee. We had Peress before us, a fifth-amendment 
Communist, and he was commissioned a major, honorably discharged. 
Winfield was before us, a Communist, and he is being kept in the serv- 
ice. Belsky, a Communist, was put in a hospital treating patients 
who are handling the most sensitive work and not given a commission 
and not discharged. Eubenstein, who used to be a Communist, a very 
frank young man, and very helpful to the committee, and he left the 
party 6 years ago, and he was given a discharge less than honorable. 

The four cases we have had here so far have all been treated in com- 
pletely different fashion. I am very disappointed that the Army does 
not have a representative here to listen to this testimony, and a copy 
will be transmitted to the Army. 

Mr. Keporter, make sure that a copy is sent directly to Mr. Stevens. 

Mr. Cohn. Now, Dr. Belsky, while stationed at Murphy General 
Hospital, have you been attending cell meetings of the Communist 
Party? 

Dr. Belsky. I respectfully decline to answer that question under the 
protection of the fifth amendment in that my answer might tend to 
incriminate me. 

Mr. Cohn. Have you attended cell meetings of the Communist 
Party with other personnel, civilian and military, stationed at the 
Murphy General Hospital? 



166 COMMUNIST INFILTRATION IN THE ARMY 

Dr. Belsky. I respectfully decline to answer that question under 
the protection of the fifth amendment in that my answer might tend 
to incriminate me. 

The Chairman. May I ask counsel, have you established, Mr. Cohn, 
through the investigators, that Murphy General Hospital treats pa- 
tients who, in turn, work on the Lincoln project, which, in turn, is one 
of our topmost secret radar projects? 

Mr. Cohn. Yes; specifically the large number of patients of the 
hospital from Lincoln project come from the Cambridge Research 
Center, which is a part of the Lincoln project. 

Now, have you attended a Communist Party cell meeting within the 
last week? 

Dr. Belsky. I respectfully decline to answer that question under 
protection of the fifth amendment in that my answer might tend 
to incriminate me. 

Mr. Cohn. Have you, within the last week, attempted to recruit 
any personnel at Murphy General Hospital into the Communist 
Party? 

(The witness consulted with his counsel.) 

Dr. Belsky. I respectfully decline to answer that question under 
the protection of the fifth amendment in that my answer might tend 
to incriminate me. 

Mr. Cohn. Have you collected Communist Party dues from mili- 
tary and civilian personnel with whom you have come in contact at 
your present assignment? 

Dr. Belsky. I respectfully decline to answer that question under 
the protection of the fifth amendment to the Constitution of the 
United States in that my answer might tend to incriminate me. 

Mr. Cohn. Have you been in contact with functionaries of the 
Communist Party at least twice a month, since you have been stationed 
at the Murphy General Hospital ? 

Dr. Belsky. I respectfully decline to answer that question under 
the protection of the fifth amendment to the Constitution of the 
United States in that my answer might tend to incriminate me. 

Mr. Cohn. Are functionaries of the Communist Party in the Boston 
area giving you assignments to carry out for the Communist Party ? 

Dr. Belsky. I respectfully decline to answer that question under 
the protection of the fifth amendment in that my answer might tend 
to incriminate me. 

Mr. Cohn. Do you use a name other than your real name in the 
Communist Party cell to which you belong? 

Dr. Belsky. I respectfully decline to answer that question under 
the protection of the fifth amendment in that my answer might tend 
to incriminate me. 

Mr. Cohn. Now, before you entered the service, you resided in 
New York City ; is that correct ? 

(The witness consulted with his counsel.) 

Dr. Belsky. Yes ; that is correct. 

Mr. Cohn. When you were sent to Murphy General Hospital and 
stationed there, was your Communist Party registration transferred 
from New York to Boston ? 

Dr. Belsky. I respectfully decline 

(The witness consulted with his counsel.) 



COMMUNIST INFILTRATION IN THE ARMY 167 

Dr. Belsky. Is that a statement or a question? 

Mr. Cohn. That is a question. 

Dr. Belsky. I respectfully decline to answer that question under 
the protection of the fifth amendment in that my answer might tend 
to incriminate me. 

Mr. Cohn. Have you reported to your superiors in the Communist 
Party that you have recruited three people into the party since 
stationed at Murphy General Hospital ? 

(The witness consulted with his counsel.) 

Dr. Belsky. Is that a statement or a question ? 

The Chairman. Answer the question. 

Mr. Cohn. Have you reported? 

Dr. Belsky. I respectfully decline to answer that question under 
the protection of the fifth amendment in that my answer might tend 
to incriminate me. 

Mr. Cohn. I have nothing further. 

Senator Dirksen. How old are you now ? I beg your pardon, Dr. 
Belsky. 

Dr. Belsky. I was 25 in August, last August. 

Senator Dirksen. And where did you have your medical training? 

Dr. Belsky. New York University Medical School, Bellevue. 

Senator Dirksen. Where did you complete your intern work? 

Dr. Belsky. Beth Israel Hospital in New York City. 

Senator Dirksen. And you have actually been a practicing physi- 
cian how long? 

Dr. Belsky. In the lay term of practice, after your internship, you 
can go on to other and more training and so I actually didn't go into 
what would be called practice. 

Senator Dirksen. Were you in private practice before you entered 
the Army? 

Dr. Belsky. No; I was not. 

Senator Dirksen. You were doing intern work, I take it? 

Dr. Belsky. No ; I had already gone into a residency. 

Senator Dirksen. And it was from there that you went into the 
Army ? 

Dr. Belsky. That is correct. 

Senator Dirksen. You mentioned a moment ago that you did make 
an application for a commission in the Army. 

Dr. Belsky. That is correct. 

Senator Dirksen. I assume you did that on your own volition, did 
you not ; voluntarily sought a commission in the Army ? 

(The witness consulted with his counsel.) 

Dr. Belsky. When I received notice of the date I was to be drafted, 
I made application for a commission. 

Senator Dirksen. You did not make application before that time ? 

(The witness consulted with his counsel.) 

Dr. Belsky. Not that I recall. 

Senator Dirksen. Now, then, to make that application, of course 
you had to file the form that has been discussed here? 

(The witness consulted with his counsel.) 

Dr. Belsky. There were many forms, and I don't know actually 
what form you are referring to. 

Senator Dirksen. Let us see if we can get at it this way, without 
the form actually being before me. Did you in any one of the blank 



168 COMMUNIST INFILTRATION IN THE ARMY 

spaces on the form in response to any question regardless of what it 
may have been, write down Federal constitutional privilege? 

(The witness consulted with his counsel.) 

Dr. Belsky. A form may have noted that I could use my constitu- 
tional privilege, and since a particular form as far as I recall did note 
that I could use my privilege, I may have used my privilege, but I 
can't recall to what question I used my privilege unless I can see the 
form and identify the particular question. 

Senator Dirksen. I was thinking only of a question of fact. Now, 
there were many questions, and I think that you are well within your 
right not to make any specific answers to a question unless the question 
on the form is before us. But it would be a question of fact whether 
you wrote on any form, regardless of what it was, the Federal consti- 
tutional privilege and you would no doubt have a recollection as to 
whether you did write that on the form in response to any question, 
whatever it may have been. Do you recall that you wrote that on any 
form that was submitted to you? 

(The witness consulted with his counsel.) 

Dr. Belsky. Yes, I recall that I may have answered, "Federal con- 
stitutional privilege claimed," as a particular form may have indi- 
cated that I had that right to use that privilege. I don't recall actu- 
ally to what particular question I had used that Federal constitutional 
privilege. 

Senator Dirksen. Now, this question involves wholly a matter of 
your opinion, and you do not have to answer it if you do not desire, 
but do you think that answer, assuming that you did write that on 
the form, may have had something to do with your failure to obtain a 
commission in the Medical Corps of the Army ? It is wholly a matter 
of opinion. 

Dr. Belsky. It calls for an opinion which I would rather not answer. 

Senator Dirksen. You would prefer not to express an opinion? 

Dr. Belsky. That is right. 

Senator Dirksen. What was your first assignment when you were 
inducted into the service? Were you assigned to medical duties, or 
sanitary duties at once ? 

Dr. Belsky. I went to Camp Kilmer, an induction center, during 
which time I fed oil burners, and I kept oil burners going, and I was 
on KP 2 or 3 times, from which I then went to Camp Pickett for my 
basic training where I took basic training as Infantry soldier during 
which time I did the routine basic training and marching and classes 



l in 



and doing no medical duties as far as I recall, at this particular time. 
It was KP and doing duties that any other private would do in the 
Army. At the end of my 8- week basic Infantry training course, I was 
then sent to Murphy Army Hospital in Waltham, Mass. 

Senator Dirksen. How did you report when you got to Murphy 
General Hospital, and did you report to the supervising medical 
officer ? 

(The witness consulted with his counsel.) 

Dr. Belsky. Well, with reference to this question, I can't during the 
past 2 weeks understand or know whether I am permitted to answer 
questions about other Army personnel without having received a di- 
rect order or direct permission with reference to that from either 
Secretary of the Army Stevens or counsel or Adams. 



COMMUNIST INFILTRATION IN THE ARMY 169 

Senator Dlrksen. The only purpose of the question was to ascer- 
tain who assigned you to medical duties. 

(The witness consulted with his counsel.) 

The Chairman. You will be ordered to answer that question. 

(The witness consulted with his counsel.) 

Dr. Belsky. I was told what my duties would be by the personnel, 
the person in charge of personnel, at Murphy Army Hospital. 

The Chairman. Was that an officer or an enlisted man or a non- 
commissioned officer ? 

(The witness consulted with his counsel.) 

Dr. Belsky. He was a major, a commissioned major. 

Senator Dirksen. Do you perform all of the duties that a physician 
would normally perform at Murphy General Hospital ? 

Dr. Belsky. No ; I don't. 

Senator Dirksen. Can you describe for the committee what the lim- 
itations are on your duties, and do you do infirmary duties, applying 
iodine and administering aspirin, and do you do any surgical work, 
any diagnostician work ? 

Dr. Belsky. I am in the outpatient department which is as you de- 
scribe, dispensary or infirmary work. However, I have not been per- 
mitted to be on ward duty, in terms of sitting in on boards and medical 
discharge boards, or any kind of board duties. 

Senator Dirksen. But, generally, you do perform most of the du- 
ties that a physician would normally perforin in the Army, do you 
not, except for that ? 

(The witness consulted with his counsel.) 

Dr. Belsky. Well, there are some limitations, and it is hard to de- 
scribe, but there are in terms of medical duties. 

Senator Dirksen. I did not hear you. 

Dr. Belsky. There are some limitations and it is hard to describe, 
and I also do other work as any other private or enlisted man there 
would do, and I am in the barracks with the enlisted men, and I eat 
with the enlisted men and I do latrine duty. A GI party comes along, 
and I do as any other enlisted man would do. 

Senator Dirksen. Dr. Belsky, how many people would you nor- 
mally see in the course of a day ? 

Dr. Belsky. Twenty or thirty, and I haven't been doing medical 
work for the last month, but when I was doing medical work in the 
outpatient department, or the infirmary, I would see 20 or 30. 
_ Senator Dirksen. Those would be all either GI's or noncommis- 
sioned officers ? 

(The witness consulted with his attorney.) 

Dr. Belsky. I saw Army personnel and civilian dependents. 

Senator Dirksen. And civilians, also ? 

Dr. Belsky. And civilian dependents. 

Senator Dirksen. So that when they come for administrations from 
you, you do have an opportunity to talk to 20 or 30 people in the course 
of a day ? 

Dr. Belsky. Not much. It is a very, very hectic day, and I devel- 
oped an ulcer in the outpatient department. 

Senator Dirksen. As a matter of fact, for a normal day, 20 or 30 
patients is not too many, if they come in with headaches and stuff in 
fingers and that sort of thing and you could certainly see 20 or 30 peo- 
ple a day. 



170 COMMUNIST INFILTRATION LN THE ARMY 

Dr. Belskt. Maybe, I didn't actually keep count, but I know it is 
very hectic. 

Senator Dirksen. When a GI comes in, for instance, and complains 
about an ache in his head, you make some little diagnosis, I suppose, 
and you try to determine what has happened to him, and then you ad- 
minister something, do you not ? 

Dr. Belskt. That is correct. 

Senator Dirksen. Aspirin or you paint his finger with iodine or 
whatever they do, and that is what they used to do when I went to 
the infirmary as a GI a long time ago. Well, it does give you an 
opportunity to talk to GI's, and civilians, when you are diagnosing 
their particular difficulty. That is correct, is it not? 

Dr. Belsky. I have an opportunity to speak to them about medical 
subjects. 

Senator Dirksen. Could you not speak to them about the weather, 
for instance? 

Dr. Belsky. Sure, I could. 

Senator Dirksen. You could speak to them about many things, 
could you not ? 

(The witness consulted with his counsel.) 

Dr. Belsky. Sure, I could speak to them about many things. 

Senator Dirksen. Now, if it were, in your opinion, and I do not 
say it is, because after all you are just a witness before the committee 
and we are endeavoring to elicit a little information, if a person in 
your particular position wanted to talk to a GI, or a civilian, about 
some ideological matter, let us say for instance, general subject of 
security, or loyalty, or even about communism, you would have an 
opportunity to talk to them, would } r ou not ? 

(The witness consulted with his counsel.) 

Dr. Belsky. The same opportunity anyone has to talk, and people 
talk all day long. 

Senator Dirksen. But I am talking about you. You would have an 
opportunity to talk with them, and there would be no limit on the 
range of your conversation, with somebody who is sitting in the chair, 
probably in pain, seeking your administrations, and you could talk to 
them, could you not? 

Dr. Belsky. Sure, I could. 

Senator Dirksen. Now, do you agree with this general premise, and 
this is a matter of opinion, that when a man comes in and he is in 
pain, that he becomes very responsive to suggestions, does he not? 

Dr. Belsky. That calls for opinion. 

Senator Dirksen. Well, as a doctor, certainly, you ought to know. 
I just assumed that every doctor has some knowledge of elementary 
psychology and would know that when a patient sits there before him 
and seeks to have his pain assuaged, that he is very responsive to what 
the doctor says. 

(The witness consulted with his counsel.) 

Dr. Belsky. I am an internist and not a psychiatrist. 

Senator Dirksen. I did not get your response, Dr. Belsky. 

Dr. Belsky. I am an internist and not a psychiatrist, and I am 
interested in internal medicine. 

The Chairman. What is the question? 

(The witness consulted with his counsel.) 



COMMUNIST INFILTRATION IN THE ARMY 171 

Dr. Belsky. I can't answer that because it depends upon opinion 
and upon the individual, what kind of pain he is in, and who the indi- 
vidual is, and the surroundings and who is with him and many many 
factors, and so I certainly cannot venture an opinion on that. 

Senator Dirksen. If I were in your position, Dr. Belsky, and I 
wanted to persuade some patient about a theory in the whole domain 
of relativity, there would be no better time than to have him there in 
a chair when he is holding his hand up and nursing some pain and he 
becomes an easy person for suggestions, does he not? 

(The witness consulted with his counsel.) 

Dr. Belsky. He might. 

Senator Dirksen. You would not know ? 

Dr. Belsky. It depends on many individual factors, as I said be- 
fore, and I think that many doctors can point that out, that many 
individuals have different responses to pain and responses to sedation 
and responses to comforts and surroundings. 

Senator Dirksen. If you were attending a meeting of the New 
York Medical Society and one of your professional brethren asked 
yon that question, would you give him the same response that you are 
giving me this morning ? 

(The witness consulted with his counsel.) 

Dr. Belsky. They would not ask me, and I am not really qualified 
to answer. 

Senator Dirksen. Well, the point I make. Dr. Belsky, and I seek 
not to be invidious and we do seek to treat you fairly, but you have 
had an education and you are a doctor and people who are in pain 
and who are subject to ills of the flesh become very, very responsive 
indeed to suggestions of doctors, and the law infers a very confiden- 
tial relationship between doctor and client, and the doctor when he is 
on the stand can take refuge in that fact. 

Now, I simply make the point that you were in a position when 
these people came to see you, whether civilian or GI, and you had a 
desire, and I do not say that you did, but if you had a desire to per- 
suade them to some line of thinking, or some belief like communism, 
you were in an excellent position to do so. You understand I did 
not say you did, but the facts will have to speak for themselves. 

(The witness consulted with his counsel.) 

Senator Dirksen. Do you agree ? 

Dr. Belsky. Is that a question? 

Senator Dirksen. Yes. 

(The witness consulted with his counsel.) 

Senator Dirksen. That a person in your position is in an extraor- 
dinarily good position to persuade the mind of a person who comes 
in for treatment? 

(The witness consulted with his counsel.) 

Dr. Belsky. It is a matter of opinion and I really can't answer 
that. 

Senator Dirksen. This is a matter of opinion, but if you could 
select any spot in the Army where you would try to promote some 
ideological idea, or thinking, can you think of any better place than 
to be a doctor in the Army where you can talk to people every day ? 

(The witness consulted with his counsel.) 

Dr. Belsky. Well, a captain of the guardhouse also speaks to 
people. 



172 COMMUNIST INFILTRATION IN THE ARMY 

Senator Dirksen. But it is quite evident, Dr. Belsky, that you do 
not want to be responsive to the committee and I do not accuse or do 
not make a charge or do not scold you about it, and I simply say that 
in my judgment you are in a very sensitive spot in the Army of the 
United States, on which we depend in large part for security. A per- 
son with training and with knowledge and with your kind of back- 
ground, could persuade people to a course of action if he were so 
disposed. 

If you were disposed that way, and if the record should indicate 
that you have had some identity with the Communist Party, or a Com- 
munist organization, or if the record should disclose, and I do not say 
that it does unless I firmly know, that you were a card-carrying mem- 
ber of the party, you would be in a position to do some damage by per- 
suading the minds of people who come in to see you. That would be 
particularly so if you were in a spot that was supersensitive and by 
that I mean young men who are working on highly confidential in- 
stallations and materials and research work and so forth. 

Now, I have one other question and then I am through. You are 
in a position by means of questions if somebody in your judgment had 
confidential information, of asking them questions at the very time 
when you were administering to their physical needs and it is easier 
then than it otherwise would be to probably get someone to drop his 
guard a little, and develop some information that should not have 
been developed. 

Do you agree with that or not? 

(The witness consulted with his counsel.) 

Dr. Belsky. It is within the realm of possibility. It is within the 
realm of possibility. 

Senator Dirksen. What is the answer? 

Dr. Belsky. Thank you for your generous response. 

The Chairman. Do you administer drugs to your patients, such as 
morphine ? 

Dr. Belsky. No. Up where I have been stationed, I have never, 
as far as I recall, administered any narcotics, as far as I recall. 

The Chairman. Have you ever discussed any Government secret 
work with any member of the Communist Party ? 

Dr. Belsky. I respectfully decline to answer that question on the 
protection of the fifth amendment of the Constitution of the United 
States in that my answer might tend to incriminate me. 

The Chairman. Your patients deal with top secret radar work, and 
did you ever get information from any of your patients and pass that 
information on to a member of the Communist Party ? 

(The witness consulted with his counsel.) 

Dr. Belsky. What is that question ? 

The Chairman. Will you read the question ? 

(The reporter read from his notes as requested.) 

(The witness consulted with his counsel.) 

Dr. Belsky. No. 

The Chairman. Did you ever discuss any material having to do 
with radar with members of the Communist Party ? 

(The witness consulted with his counsel.) 

Dr. Belsky. I respectfully decline to answer that question, under 
the protection of the fifth amendment, in that my answer might tend 
to incriminate me. 



COMMUNIST INFILTRATION IN THE ARMY 173 

The Chairman. Are you a member of the Communist conspiracy as 
of this moment ? 

Dr. Belsky. I respectfully decline to answer that question under the 
protection of the fifth amendment to the Constitution of the United 
States, in that my answer might tend to incriminate me. 

The Chairman. Have you attended meetings where Communist 
speakers have advocated the destruction of the Constitution, including 
the fifth amendment? 

Dr. Belsky. I respectfully decline to answer that question, under 
the protection of the fifth amendment to the Constitution of the 
United States, in that my answer might tend to incriminate me. 

The Chairman. Do you agree with the Communist Party teaching 
that this Constitution, upon which you are relying today, should be de- 
stroyed and done away with ? Or do you disagree with the Communist 
Party on that ? 

( The witness consulted with his counsel. ) 

Dr. Belsky. That calls for the operation of my mind, and I think it 
is an inquiry into my mind. 

The Chairman. Well, we will call for the operation of that mind, 
then, and you are relying upon the fifth amendment to the Constitu- 
tion. I am asking you a simple question, whether or not you agree 
with the Communist conspiracy that the entire Constitution should be 
destroyed, including the fifth amendment upon which you are relying 
today. Even though that may call for the operation of your mind, 
you are ordered to answer the question. 

(The witness consulted with his counsel.) 

Dr. Belsky. I don't know whether the Communist conspiracy ad- 
vocates that or not. 

The Chairman. You don't know. 

Dr. Belsky. No. 

The Chairman. Have you attended the meetings where that was 
advocated ? 

Dr. Belsky. I respectfully decline to answer that question, under 
the protection of the fifth amendment to the Constitution of the 
United States, in that my answer might tend to incriminate me. 

The Chairman. Do you feel our system is better than the Com- 
munist system ? 

(The witness consulted with his counsel.) 

Dr. Belsky. It calls for an inquiry into my thoughts. 

The Chairman. You are ordered to answer the question. Your 
thoughts are rather important, Mister, when you are dealing 

Dr. Belsky. It is "Dr. Belsky." 

The Chairman. When you are dealing with young men each day, 
who in turn are dealing with our top secret radar material. If your 
thoughts are Communist thoughts, we want to know that. So you are 
ordered to answer that question. 

(The witness consulted with his counsel.) 

Dr. Belsky. I respectfully decline to answer that question about 
my thoughts, under the protection of the fifth amendment to the 
Constitution of the United States, and the first amendment, which 
prohibits inquiry or restriction of political belief, in that the answer 
might tend to incriminate me. 



174 COMMUNIST INFILTRATION IN THE ARMY 

The Chairman. Do you believe in the forcible overthrow of this 
Government, if there cannot be imposed a Communist government 
by peaceful means ? 

(The witness consulted with his counsel.) 

Dr. Belsky. Would you repeat the question, please, Senator? 

The Chairman. Will you read the question? 

(The reporter read from his notes as requested.) 

(The witness consulted with his counsel.) 

Dr. Belsky. I don't believe in the use of force and violence. 

The Chairman. You do not? 

Dr. Belsky. I do not believe in the use of force and violence. 

The Chairman. In other words, if the Communists were ever to 
order you to use any force and violence to destroy this Government, 
you would refuse to obey that order ? 

Dr. Belsky. Yes; I would. 

The Chairman. If the Communist Party were to order you to get 
information from your patients, would you refuse to obey that order ? 

Dr. Belsky. I would. 

The Chairman. Have you ever been asked by any members of the 
Communist Party to get information relating to radar work? 

Dr. Belsky. I respectfully decline to answer that question, under 
the protection of the fifth amendment to the Constitution of the 
United States, in that my answer might tend to incriminate me. 

Senator Jackson. Have you, Dr. Belsky, received any information 
from anyone about radar or any secret classified Government work? 

(The witness consulted with his counsel.) 

Dr. Belsky. I wouldn't even understand what it was. 

Senator Jackson. Just answer the question, have you received any 
information from anyone regarding secret Government work on any 
subject? 

(The witness consulted with his counsel.) 

Dr. Belsky. I respectfully decline to answer that question, under 
the protection of the fifth amendment to the Constitution of the 
United States, in that my answer might tend to incriminae me. 

Senator Jackson. Have you passed any classified material on to 
any other person ? 

Dr. Belsky. I respectfully decline 

(The witness consulted with his counsel.) 

Senator Jackson. I said to any other person. 

Dr. Belsky. To whom, in the Army, or where ? 

Senator Jackson. To anyone, you can answer. Are you handling 
any classified material now or during the time you have been in the 
Army ? 

Dr. Belsky. Senator, could you explain to me what classified mate- 
rial is ? 

Senator Jackson. Well, classified material is any material so 
marked on the document. 

Dr. Belsky. Marked "classified" ? 

Senator Jackson. That is right, classified confidential ; it includes 
a broad range of subjects, secret 

Dr. Belsky. I don't recall ever having seen any, as far as I can 
remember. 



COMMUNIST INFILTRATION IN THE ARMY 175 

The Chairman. Just so that the record will be clear, in case of any 
further legal proceedings, by "classified" we mean anything that is 
either restricted, confidential, secret, or top secret. 

(The witness consulted with his counsel.) 

Dr. Belsky. I respectfully decline to answer that question, under 
the protection of the fifth amendment to the Constitution of the United 
States, in that my answer might tend to incriminate me. 

Senator Jackson. Have you ever seen any such material ? 

(The witness consulted with his counsel.) 

Dr. Belsky. I respectfully decline to answer that question, under 
the protection of the fifth amendment to the Constitution of the 
United States, in that my answer might tend to incriminate me. 

Senator Jackson. During the time you have been in the Army, have 
you had access to any classified material ? 

(The witness consulted with his counsel.) 

Dr. Belsky. Again could I ask you what you mean by "classified 
material" ? 

Senator Jackson. Well, classified material, again, would include 
material marked "Confidential," "secret," "top secret," or "restricted." 
And I think that those are the usual terms or designations. 

(The witness consulted with his counsel.) 

Dr. Belsky. I respectfully decline to answer that question, under 
the protection of the fifth amendment to the Constitution of the 
United States, in that my answer might tend to incriminate me. 

Senator Jackson. Have you seen any of the personnel records of 
the patients that come to see you at the dispensary or any other place ? 

(The witness consulted with his counsel.) 

Dr. Belsky. I see personal records of the soldiers who come to see 
me in terms of medical treatment. 

Senator Jackson. Do you know where they work ? 

Dr. Belsky. In some cases I might know. 

Senator Jackson. Well, what do you recall, where did they work? 

(The witness consulted with his counsel.) 

Dr. Belsky. I don't recall; they were soldiers, and many, many 
people came to see me, some of whom I may have known where they 
came from ; but as far as recalling right now any specific person or 
area from which they came or what they did, I don't know. 

Senator Jackson. Where were most of them assigned that you did 
see ; where are most of them assigned that you see ? 

(The witness consulted with his counsel.) 

Dr. Belsky. In the outpatient department I had more to do with 
civilian dependents. 

Senator Jackson. Civilian dependents? 

Dr. Belsky. Yes, but as far as I know, they were assigned to the 
Murphy Hospital itself ; and when a soldier is transferred, his duty 
station, if it is for lengthy treatment, it is to Murphy, Army. 

The Chairman. May I interrupt; you understood the Senator's 
question? He knows they were assigned to the hospital while they 
are there. He wants to know where they were assigned before they 
came to the hospital, and now please answer that. 

(The witness consulted with his counsel.) 

Dr. Belsky. I might; sometimes I might, and sometimes I might 
not. 



176 COMMUNIST INFILTRATION IN THE ARMY 

Senator Jackson. Well, did you handle or did you treat civilians 
that were not stationed at the hospital but at other Government proj- 
ects, or from other Government projects? 

Dr. Belskt. I might have. 

Senator Jackson. Do you recall ? 

Dr. Belsky. I can't recall exactly ; and I might have. I saw hun- 
dreds of patients in the time I was up there, hundreds. 

Senator Jackson. Did you pass on any classified material, or classi- 
fied again being as previously defined here this morning, and did you 
pass on any classified material to any other person or persons ? 

(The witness consulted with his counsel.) 

Dr. Belsky. I respectfully decline to answer that question, under 
the protection of the fifth amendment of the Constitution of the 
United States, in that my answer might tend to incriminate me. 

Senator Jackson. That is all. 

The Chairman. Senator McClellan. 

Senator McClellan. Doctor, while you have been on the witness 
stand, you have repeatedly invoked the fifth amendment to the Con- 
stitution in respecfully declining to answer questions on the ground 
that if you answered the answers might tend to incriminate you. 1 
wish to ask you, if you now state under oath that you honestly believe 
that if you gave answers to those questions, truthfully, that the 
truthful answer would tend to incriminate you, or might tend to 
incriminate you. 

(The witness consulted with his counsel.) 

Dr. Belsky. That is an inquiry into my belief. 

Senator McClellan. I am inquiring into your belief because I 
think that you must entertain that belief before you are privileged 
to invoke it ; and I want to know under oath whether you are testifying 
truthfully when you say that you refuse on the grounds that the 
answers might tend to incriminate you ; and I want to know if you 
state now under oath that you honestly believe that if you gave truth- 
ful answers to the questions, that the answers would tend to incrimi- 
nate you, or might tend to incriminate you. 

Dr. Belsky. I respectfully decline to answer that question, under 
the protection of the fifth amendment of the Constitution of the 
United States, in that my answer might tend to incriminate me. 

Senator McClellan. Mr. Chairman, I am sure that his counsel 
understands the question, the import of it, and the answer that the 
witness has given. We have so many of these coming before us, 
invoking the privilege under the fifth amendment that I think it is 
pertinent to inquire, and have the record very clear, whether they are 
simply using it as a device to keep from giving information, and to 
keep from testifying as to facts within their knowledge that is perti- 
nent to the inquiry, or if they honestly believe that if they told the 
truth the truthful answers might tend to incriminate them. 

And unless they can say that under oath, I should like to have it 
decided judicially by some procedure whether they are privileged 
to invoke such an amendment unless they can qualify under oath to 
that extent. 

The Chairman. May I say, the Chair heartily agrees with Senator 
McClellan. I think that this case should be promptly referred to 
the Justice Department for presentation to a grand jury for an indict- 
ment for contempt. 



COMMUNIST INFILTRATION EST THE ARMY 177 

Now, so there can be no plea of ignorance on your part of the situa- 
tion at a further legal proceeding, you understand the position of 
the Chair, and the position of Senator McClellan is this : That when 
you say "I refuse to answer on the grounds my answer might tend 
to incriminate me," then when you are asked whether or not you 
honestly believe that a truthful answer might tend to incriminate 
you, you refuse to tell us whether or not you think a truthful answer 
would tend to incriminate you, it is the Chair's position that you 
have no fifth-amendment privilege. 

Senator McClellan. I respectfully ask that you order the witness 
to answer the question that I propounded to him. 

The Chairman. Let me say, Senator McClellan, I don't think I can 
order him to answer whether he feels the answer might tend to in- 
criminate him; but in view of the fact that he has refused to tell 
you whether he feels that a truthful answer might tend to incriminate 
him, I will take the position that he has no fifth-amendment privilege. 
And he is therefore ordered to answer all of the questions which 
were previously asked and on which he wrongfully invoked the fifth 
amendment. 

Senator McClellan. That is what I had in mind. I want him 
again ordered to answer the question previously asked in which he 
has invoked the privileges under the fifth amendment without tell- 
ing this committee under oath that he honestly believes that if he 
answered the question truthfully, the truthful answers might tend to 
incriminate him. 

The Chairman. He will be so ordered. 

(The witness consulted with his counsel.) 

Dr. Belsky. If the same questions were asked, I would give the 
same answers. 

The Chairman. I think we have a quorum, and there is no reason 
why this case should not be referred. 

Senator Dirksen. Dr. Belsky, I have one question. You have had 
unrestricted right here this morning to confer with your counsel 

(The witness consulted with his counsel.) 

Dr. Belsky. Yes. 

Senator Dirksen. I just wanted the record to show that. Other 
than the jurisdictional question that you raised at the outset of this 
proceeding, do you feel that you have been fairly and courteously 
treated at this proceeding this morning? 

(The witness consulted with his counsel.) 

Dr. Belsky. I don't think I have to answ T er that question. Do you 
feel I have to answer the question ? 

Senator Dirksen. Well, to be sure it is a question of fact, Dr. 
Belsky. 

Dr. Belsky. I wonder if in answer to that question I could read a 
statement to the committee ? 

Senator Dirksen. Well, I am not the chairman, and I have no au- 
thority to permit you to read a statement, but I would like to have 
either from you or your counsel an answer whether you had been 
fairly treated this morning and whether you have been courteously 
treated, and whether we have deviated from accepted procedures in 
a case of this kind. 

Mr. Faulkner, would you like to answer that ? 

Mr. Faulkner. Well, I can answer it 



178 COMMUNIST INFILTRATION LN THE ARMY 

The Chairman. I don't think that we should hear from counsel. 
The rule of the committee is that we do not hear from counsel. 

Senator Dirksen. Will the witness ask counsel whether he should 
answer that very simple question, and I don't think anybody should 
find it necessary to have to refer a question to anybody else, because 
it is not legal in character, and it is only a question of immediate 
opinion as to whether the witness has been fairly treated. 

But since the witness does not say he has been unfairly treated, 
perhaps one can gather an inference from that. 

Dr. Belsky. Could I read a statement? 

The Chairman. Who wrote the statement ? 

Dr. Belsky. I did. 

The Chairman. When did you write it ? 

(The witness consulted with his counsel.) 

The Chairman. You need not ask counsel that. When did you 
write the statement ? 

Dr. Belsky. I wrote the statement yesterday. 

Senator McClellan. Let the committee see the statement. 

The Chairman. Let us see the statement. 

(The statement was handed to the chairman.) 

The Chairman. You will have to abide by the committee rule. 
Statements have to be submitted 24 hours in advance, and if you want 
to hand out the statement to the press outside the room, you may do so. 

We will not hear any lectures from any fifth-amendment Communist 
in this committee room. You may step down. 

(The witness was excused.) 

The Chairman. We have six other witnesses here this morning con- 
cerned with another subject matter, concerned with alleged Commu- 
nist infiltration in facilities having to do with telecommunications, 
which in turn handles radar work. 

It is 10 minutes to 12. We cannot dispose of all of those witnesses 
today. What is the desire of the committee? Should we adjourn 
until tomorrow morning, or proceed with one of the other witnesses? 

We will adjourn until 10 : 30 in the morning, at which time we will 
have another public hearing. 

(Whereupon at 11 : 48 a. m., Thursday, March 4, 1954, the commit- 
tee recessed, to reconvene at 10 : 30 a. m.. Fridav. March 5, 1954.) 



INDEX 



Page 

Abraham Lincoln Brigade (Journal) 129,130 

Adams, John 125, 133, 141, 153, 155, 157, 168 

Adjutant General's Office 109, 138, 139, 156 

Albany, N. Y 135 

American Labor Party 121 

Armed Forces 109, 134 

Army (Judge Advocate General) 133 

Army (United States) 107- 

111, 113-117, 123-125, 127-131, 133-136, 138, 139, 142, 143, 145, 146, 
148, 149, 152-157, 159, 160, 162, 164, 165, 167-169, 171, 172, 174, 175. 

Army Dental Corps 107, 113 

Army Dental Corps (Camp Kilmer, N. J.) 107 

Army legal counsel 133 

Army policy 164 

Army questionnaire 127 

Army regulations 138 

Army Secretary 125, 134, 135, 141, 148, 156, 165, 16S 

Article 2, section II, United States Constitution 160 

Attorney General (United States) 131 

Bellevue, New York University Medical School 167 

Belsky, Dr. Marvin Sanford 

Testimony of 159-178 

Bergin, General 156 

Berry, Mr 165 

Beth Israel Hospital (New York City) 167 

Boston (Mass.) 166 

Brooklyn, N. Y — - 140 

Brown, Colonel 155 

Burress, General 154 

Cambridge Research Center 166 

Camp Kilmer, N. J 107,109,113,115,126,136,138,139,145,146,151,168 

Camp Pickett 168 

City College (New York) 113 

Civilian dependents 175 

Commander in Chief 109, 157, 160 

Commanding General (Camp Kilmer) 151 

Communist Club 121 

Communist conspiracy 124, 

126, 131, 133, 135, 141, 142, 150, 151, 152, 157, 160, 173 

Communist defense fund 128 

Communist leadership schools 127, 131, 134, 139, 146 

Communist Party 110-117, 119-122, 

127-129, 131, 133, 134, 139, 140, 142, 161, 163, 166, 167, 172-174 

Communist Party (Boston) 166 

Communist Party (Massachusetts) 166 

Communist Party (Queens County) 128 

Communist Russia 128 

Communist system 173 

Compassionate reassignment 138 

Confidential material 136, 175 

Congress 123 

Congressman 110, 13S 

Constitution of the United States — 112, 

123, 127, 128, 130-132, 160, 161, 163-166, 172-176 
Daily Worker (publication) 12S-130 



n INDEX 

Page 

Defense Department 109 

Democrats 129 

Dental Corps (United States Army) 107, 113 

Dental O. D 135 

Department of the Army 107-111,113-117,123-125,127-131,133-136, 

138, 139, 142, 143, 145, 146, 148, 149, 152-157, 159, 160, 162, 164, 

165, 167-169, 171, 172, 174, 175. 

Department of the Army (order) 154 

Department of Defense 109 

Department of Justice 142 

Deputy Chief of Staff 154 

Doctors draft 108, 161 

"Dollars Keep Coming for Defense Fund" (article in Daily Worker by 

Irv Peress) 128 

Eagle, Miss Ruth 124 

Testimony of 119-122 

Eisenhower, President 160 

Executive order 136, 137, 146, 155, 157 

Far East 110 

Faulkner, Stanley 107, 114, 117, 122, 123, 129, 142, 143, 159, 161, 163, 177 

Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) 121 

Federal constitutional privilege 168 

Fifth amendment Communists 142, 147 

First Army 125, 142, 146, 154 

Fort Lewis, Wash 109, 110, 138 

Fort Sam Houston, Tex 108, 109 113 

G-l____ 154 

G-2 116, 154, 155 

Gerwin, Dr 116 

Government agency 140, 141 

Government projects 176 

Government of the United States 108, 109, 

112, 131, 140-142, 160, 163, 172, 174, 176 

Gurney, General 154 

Holtzman, Congressman 110 

Inwood Victory Club 112, 139 

Jew 124 

Journal of the Abraham Lincoln Brigade 129, 130 

Judge Advocate General of the Army I33 

Justice Department 142 

Lenin 112 

Leninism 112 

Lincoln Brigade (Journal) 129,130 

Lincoln project 160, 166 

Manhattan (NYC) 116 

Marine Corps 136 

Marx, Karl 112 

Marxism H2 

McManus, John J 125 

Medical Corps (United States Army) 145 168 

Middle Village, N. Y ' 107 

Military Justice (Uniform Code) 133 

Moore, Colonel 117 

M. O. S 137 

Murphy Army Hospital (Waltham, Mass.) 159, 161, 165-169, 175 

Navy (United States) 136 

New York Bar 161 

New York City 107, 113, 117, 119, 120, 122-124, 127, 159, 166, 167, 171 

New York City College 113 

New York City Police Department 119, 120, 122, 124 

New York Medical Society 171 

New York policewoman (Miss Ruth Eagle) 124 

New York University Medical School, Bellevue 167 

NYU (New York University) 116 

NYU Dental School 113 

Office of the Adjutant General 109, 138, 139, 156 



INDEX in 

Page 

Office of the Day (O. D.) 135, 136 

Old Testament 124 

Pentagon 109 

Peress, Abraham Herbert (brother of Irving Peress) 141 

Peress, Comrade Elaine 121 

Peress, Comrade Irving 121 

Peress, Dr 124, 161 

Peress, Maj. Irving, 01893642___ 120, 121, 122, 145, 146, 148, 151, 154, 157, 161, 165 

Testimony of 107-118, 123-142 

Peress, Mrs. Elaine 109, 110, 111, 112, 116, 120, 121, 139, 140 

Peress, William (brother of Irving Peress) 140 

Peress's daughter 109, 111, 112, 116, 138, 139 

Peress's father 142 

Police Department (New York City) 119, 120, 122, 124 

President of the United States 109, 136, 137, 146, 155, 157, 160 

Presidential directive 146 

Presidential Executive order 136, 137, 146, 155, 157 

Prosthodontist 137 

Psalms, Book 7 123 

Public Law 84, S3d Congress 123 

Queens (N. Y.) 128, 129 

Radar 160, 166 

Red Cross 110, 111, 138, 139 

Republicans 129 

Restricted material 175 

Rubenstein 165 

Russia 128 

Russian Army 128 

Schecter, Dr 116 

Seabree, General 154 

Secret material 136, 175 

Secret radar work 160, 166 

Secretary of the Army 125, 134, 135, 141, 148, 156, 165, 168 

Senate of the United States 123, 135 

Senator 110, 123, 134, 138 

Stevens, Secretary Robert 125, 134, 135, 141, 148, 156, 165, 168 

Top secret material 175 

Uniform Code of Military Justice 133 

United States Adjutant General's Office 109, 138, 139, 156 

United States Army 107-111, 

113-117, 123-125, 127-131, 133-136, 138, 139, 142, 143, 145, 146, 148, 
149, 152-157, 159, 160, 162, 164, 165, 167-169, 171, 172, 174, 175. 

United States Army legal counsel 133 

United States Army Medical Corps 145, 168 

United States Attorney General 131 

United States Constitution 112, 

123, 127, 128, 130-132, 160, 161, 163-166, 172-176 

United States Department of Justice 142 

United States Government 108, 109, 112, 131, 140-142, 160, 163, 172, 174, 176 

United States Marine Corps 136 

United States Navy 136 

United States Senate 123, 135 

United States Senator 110, 123, 134, 138 

Waltham, Mass 159, 168 

Washington, D. C 116, 125, 141, 154, 155 

Winneld 165 

Yokahoma, Japan 109, 110, 111, 138, 139 

Zwicker, Brig. Gen. Ralph W 125, 126, 136 

Testimony of 145-157 

o 




COMMUNIST INFILTRATION IN THE ARMY 



HEARING 

r ,. BEFORE THE 

PERMANENT ^SUBCOMMITTEE ON 
INVESTIGATIONS OF ' THE COMMITTEE ON 

GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

EIGHTY-THIED CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 
PURSUANT TO 

S. Res. 40 



PART 4 



NOVEMBER 15, 1954 



Printed for the use of the Committee on Government Operations 




UNITED STATES 
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 
3S794 WASHINGTON : 1954 



Boston Public Library 
Superintendent of Documents 

DEC 2 9 1954 



COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS 
JOSEPH R. MCCARTHY, Wisconsin, Chairman 

KARL E. MUNDT, South Dakota JOHN L. McCLELLAN, Arkansas 

MAR3ARET CHASE SMITH, Maine HENRY M. JACKSON, Washington 

HENRY C. DWORSHAK, Idaho JOHN F. KENNEDY, Massachusetts 

EVERETT MCKINLEY DIRKSEN, Illinois STUART SYMINGTON, Missouri 
JOHN MARSHALL BUTLER, Maryland THOMAS A. BURKE, Ohio 

CHARLES E. POTTER, Michigan SAM J. ERVIN, Jr., North Carolina 

Richard J. O'Melia, General Counsel 
Walter L. Reynolds, Chief Clerk 



Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations 

JOSEPH R. MCCARTHY, Wisconsin, Chairman 

KARL E. MUNDT, South Dakota JOHN L. McCLELLAN, Arkansas 

EVERETT McKINLEY DIRKSEN, Illinois HENRY M. JACKSON, Washington 
CHARLES E. POTTER, Michigan STUART SYMINGTON, Missouri 

James N. Juliana, Acting Executive Director 

Robert F. Kennedy, Chief Counsel for the Minority 
II 



CONTENTS 



Testimony of — I'ase 

Watkins, Senator Arthur V., United States Senate 180 

in 



COMMUNIST INFILTBATION IN THE ARMY 



MONDAY, NOVEMBER 15, 1954 

United States Senate, 
Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the 

Committee on Government Operations, 

Washington, D. G. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call at 10 a. m., in room 3'57, 
Senate Office Building, Senator Joseph E. McCarthy (chairman) 
presiding. 

Present: Senator Joseph R. McCarthy, Republican, Wisconsin; 
Senator Everett McKinley Dirksen, Republican, Illinois; Senator 
John L. McClellan, Democrat, Arkansas; Senator Henry M. Jack- 
son, Democrat, Washington; and Senator Stuart Symington, Demo- 
crat, Missouri. 

Present also: Senator Arthur V. Watkins, Republican, Utah; 
James N. Juliana, acting executive director ; Robert F. Kennedy, chief 
counsel to the minority ; Daniel G. Buckley, assistant counsel ; and 
Ruth Young Watt, chief clerk. 

The Chairman. The committee will come to order. 

May I say we have a rule that the flash photographers will not 
take pictures during the hearings. So if you men will desist taking 
pictures of the witness and the members of the committee during 
the hearing, it will be appreciated. 

Senator Watkins, you are called here this morning not in any way 
to answer for your activities as chairman of the Watkins committee. 
To ask you to answer about your activities on that committee would 
be, in my opinion, improper and beyond the jurisdiction of this 
committee. 

However, in your report, you indicate that you have information 
in regard to a fifth amendment Communist, Major Peress. I have 
been trying to find out for months who was responsible for the special 
treatment that this man got by those who knew that he was a fifth 
amendment Communist. 

If I may recite the facts of the case for the record briefly, Peress 
was identified as a Communist by an undercover agent — will you 
desist in taking flash pictures of the witness — Peress was identified 
under oath by a member of the New York Police Department as a 
Communist. He was identified as having attended a Communist 
leadership school. 

We had before us, and you had before you, the affidavit which he 
signed first saying he was not a Communist when he joined the mili- 
tary, which would make him, of course, subject to court martial, up 
to 5 years, and then later the statement which he signed refusing to 
answer whether he was a Communist or not. 

179 



180 COMMUNIST INFILTRATION IN THE ARMY 

The reason you are here, Senator, as I say, has nothing whatsoever 
to do with your activities as chairman of the Watkins committee. 
But in view of the fact that you have indicated that you have infor- 
mation about who promoted him, I felt that I would be derelict in 
my duty if I did not call you here to give you an opportunity to tell 
us what information you have. I will be very much surprised if you 
have any information, but we will get down to that shortly. 

You say, for example, that Peress was in no way responsible for 
the Zwicker matter — strike that — that Zwicker was in no way 
responsible. 

STATEMENT OF HON. ARTHUR V. WATKINS, A UNITED STATES 
SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF UTAH 

Senator Watkins. Will you call my attention to the place in the 
report where that appears ? 

The Chairman. I will be glad to. Page 60 of the report. 

If you will refer to the bottom of the page, the last paragraph, I 
will quote : 

He- 
meaning McCarthy — 

did much to destroy the effectiveness and reputation of a witness who was not in 
any way responsible for the Peress situation, a situation which we do not in any 
way condone. The blame should have been placed on the shoulders of those 
culpable and not attributed publicly to one who had no share in the responsibility. 

We will not get into an argument, Senator, as to whether or not I 
blamed Zwicker for the situation, but you say here that he was in 
no way responsible. You say I should have put the blame on the 
shoulders of those who were culpable. I find that you and I do 
agree that someone was culpable, that someone was at fault for keep- 
ing a Communist in the military while we are spending billions of 
dollars trying to fight communism. 

Therefore, I will ask you, question No. 1 : Do you know who was, 
as you say, culpable? 

Senator Watkins. No ; I do not. 

The Chairman. You do not? 

Senator Watkins. But I think I can help you find the information 
that will show who had the responsibility for the promotion of Peress 
and who also had the responsibility for directing his honorable dis- 
charge. 

The Chairman. If you do that, you will be of great value to this 
committee, Senator. 

We have asked Secretary Stevens for that information time after 
time. He has refused to give it to us. We do know who signed the 
order. We know the Adjutant General signs the order, but we are 
looking for the man, the secret master, if you could call him that, 
who is being protected. 

If you can give us the name of the person who has been responsible, 
No. 1, for the promotion, knowing he was a Communist ; No. 2, the 
change in duty orders to accomplish duty orders; and No. 3, the 
honorable discharge — if you can, as you say, help us get that infor- 
mation, then you would be of great value to this committee. 



COMMUNIST INFILTRATION IN THE ARMY 181 

Senator Watkins. With all the qualifications you put in, descrip- 
tions you put in, I, of course, may not be able to qualify the answer 
to comply strictly with that. But I can give you the source of infor- 
mation where you can get the names of the people who were respon- 
sible for his promotion and for his discharge, honorable discharge. 

So I will proceed, if you will let me. 

The Chairman. I will be delighted to. 

Senator Watkins. The statement you read from the report, of 
course, does not indicate that we knew who the culpable people were. 
We said that Zwicker was not the person. I can call your attention 
to the testimony in the hearing record, if you wish, to substantiate 
just what I am saying about that. Zwicker himself was not the 
responsible person. 

The Chairman. Would you call my attention to that point? 

Senator Watkins. I will read it, if you don't mind. On page 
505 

The Chairman. Just 1 minute until I get it — you may proceed. 

Senator Watkins. It is the first volume of the hearing record. Mr. 
Williams had been examining General Zwicker. 

The Chairman. Just so the record is straight, Senator Watkins is 
now referring not to testimony taken before the investigating com- 
mittee, but testimony taken before the Watkins committee. 

Senator Watkins. That is right. Otherwise known as the select 
committee. 

The Chairman. So when you say I knew what he was testifying to, 
you refer to what I knew after he appeared before your committee ; is 
that right? 

Senator Watkins. That is right, yes. 

I will read the testimony. Mr. Williams had been cross-examining 
General Zwicker, and then he said, "I have no further questions." 

The Chairman. Mr. de Furia, do you have further questions? 

Mr. de Furia. Yes, sir. 

General, did you promote Peress? 

General Zwicker. I definitely did not. 

Mr. de Furia. Did you discharge him with an honorable discharge? 

General Zwicker. I did, sir. 

Mr. de Furia. Was that on your own initiative or under orders, sir? 

General Zwicker. It was under orders. 

Now we can go on and get some additional testimony. 

The Chairman. Senator, I wonder if you would do this for me. In 
your report 

Senator Watkins. May I say that was not contradicted before us. 

The Chairman. I don't want to use the gavel on you. 

Senator Watkins. You don't need to. I am willing to cooperate 
with you a 100 percent. 

The Chairman. May I ask you to do this. Obviously, if there is 
anything in your record which shows who was responsible for covering 
up for this Communist, I will want you to point that out. However, 
at the present time, I am referring to your report which says that, in 
effect, I knew that Zwicker was not responsible. So this had to be 
something antedating the testimony taken before your committee. 

Could you show us any information which you have to show that 
Zwicker was not responsible, prior to what he said before your com- 
mittee? 



182 COMMUNIST INFILTRATION IN THE ARMY 

Senator Watkins. I was not acquainted with the matter prior to 
that time. My information, of course, is based on what he said in the 
committee, on the uncontradicted evidence. No one contradicted 
him. That was his statement, and I assume it is true, and I think 
other information I have discovered since, which I think will answer 
the question that we were talking about, that is to help you find the 
information as to who handled the Peress matter — I can give that to 
you, because I have 

The Chairman. I wish you would, Senator. I wish you would 
have all the facts in mind. I refer you to the testimony taken before 
the investigating committee. [Reading :] 

Question. You know that somebody has kept him on knowing that he has 
refused to tell whether he was a Communist, do you not? 

Zwickeb. I am afraid that would come under the category of the Executive 
order, Mr. Chairman. 

The Chairman. What? 

Zwicker. I am afraid an answer to that question would come under the cate- 
gory of the Presidential order. 

So you know that prior to his appearance before our committee he 
did not deny that he personally as commanding officer was responsible. 
Do you know that ? 

Senator Watkins. I am not sure about that, because all I would 
have is the record, and I have read so many records that I couldn't 
be sure as to that positive statement. But I do have some additional 
information in this record which indicates very clearly that he was 
not the person responsible. 

May I read it ? 

The Chairman. You certainly may, but I want to get this in 
chronological order, if I may. You know, do you not — you know 
when you signed the report, did you not — that Zwicker had refused 
to tell us who had ordered the promotion of Peress? Did you know 
that? 

Senator Watkins. I think I had the evidence. I had the full rec- 
ord of the hearing you held in New York City, at which General 
Zwicker appeared. As I recall, in that he wasn't in a position, and 
he so told you, to give all the information that he would probably 
like to have given, because of orders. 

The Chairman. Do you think today — and time is running out, 
and we have a session starting at 11 o'clock — do you think today you 
can give us information which will help us to nail down the man re- 
sponsible for the protection of this Communist in the military, do you ? 

Senator Watkins. I can give you information as to the men who 
had something to do with it, and probably all to do with it. If you 
will let me, I will proceed. 

The Chairman. Would you do that, please? 

Senator Watkins. Yes; I did want to read that other, but since 
you say time is running out 

The Chairman. Read whatever you care to. 

Senator Watkins. All right. 

After I got your telegram in Salt Lake City, or letter, and after 
I got back here, as soon as I could get to it, I called on Secretary 
Stevens to see what information I could get, and he did furnish me 
some information. 



COMMUNIST INFILTRATION IN THE ARMY 183 

I will read now a letter which I think will tell where the material is. 

Department of the Army, 

Washington, June 23, 195',. 
Dear Senator Mundt : 

This was addressed, so he advised me, ,to Senator Mundt, the acting 
chairman of the committee which is now in session here. 

I refer to the case of Maj. Irving Peress, with which I am sure you are 
familiar. I have recently studied the thorough investigation made by the 
Inspector General of the Army of all the circumstances pertaining to this 
advancement in grade and separation from the service. 

This investigation disclosed no evidence of any subversive conduct with re- 
spect to personnel actions involving Peress. Furthermore, there is no evidence 
of disloyalty, pro-Communist influence, or any other type of misconduct reflect- 
ing on the loyalty, integrity, or patriotism of the officers or civilians who 
processed the case. 

The investigation, however, did reveal that in several instances improper ad- 
ministrative handling of papers resulted in unwarranted delays in processing 
actions concerning Major Peress. 

On the basis of the facts now known and limitations imposed by outmoded 
regulations, and legislation pertaining to doctors and dentists, my original con- 
clusion that the Peress case was not handled as it should have been has been 
substantiated. As will be remembered, when I returned from the Far East, 
February 3, 1954, and in my letter to Senator McCarthy, dated February 16, 1954, 
I readily admitted that this case could have been handled better. 

The Inspector General's findings disclosed inordinate time was consumed in 
the processing of this case. Major commanders have been directed to take the 
appropriate steps against the individuals involved and at all levels of command 
administrative reforms consistent with existing law have been made, which I 
fervently hope will make it impossible for such errors to be made in the future. 

Further reference is made to the sealed envelope marked "confidential," con- 
taining the names of Army personnel who in the course of their duties took some 
type of administrative action with respect to the disposition of Major Peress. 

As you will recall, on February 24, 1954, I agreed to submit to your subcom- 
mittee the names of these individuals as soon as they had been determined. In 
the course of the hearings, pages 1420 and 2253, I reiterated this promise and by 
covering letter of May 13, 1954, I submitted to Mr. Jenkins in an envelope marked 
"confidential" the names of the individuals who had something to do with the 
Peress personnel actions. The covering letter, copy enclosed, was read into the 
transcript of the hearings at page 3761. 

Subsequently, on June' 18, 1954, Lieutenant Murray, of my office, delivered to 
you an additional envelope marked "confidential" to replace the first one. This 
was necessary because a name had been erroneously included in the first com- 
pilation. On this occasion, you inquired about the confidential character of this 
list. In answer to your question, I can only reemphasize my original request, 
that the names of these individuals not be made public under any circumstances. 

As you know, these names were obtained after a thorough investigation by 
the Inspector General of the Army. I wish to emphasize that the mere fact that 
the individuals are named as having some administrative responsibility or knowl- 
edge of the subject should in no way be construed to indicate culpability on their 
part. Should these names be made public, it would unnecessarily subject them 
and their families to unwarranted publicity completely out of proportion to the 
facts. 

I therefore request again that you do not publicize this list. To publicize these 
names without a full explanation of the circumstances surrounding their par- 
ticipation in the case could well cast public discredit upon the individuals 
concerned. 

In addition, such publication would go far to diminish the future effectiveness 
of the Inspector General Corps because, historically, investigations of this char- 
acter have been successful information-gathering devices for commanders be- 
cause of a strict adherence to the maintenance of a confidential relationship 
between the interrogator and the person interrogated. This is another reason 
for my definite desire not to have their names publicized. 

Also in the transcript on pages 2266, Mr. Jenkins stated : "And then the names, 
as I understand it, the chairman ruled are to be submitted to this committee 

38794—54 — pt. 4 2 



184 COMMUNIST INFILTRATION IN THE ARMY 

or me as its counsel, privately and without exposing these names." On page 
2268 you stated : "The other names requested should be submitted confidentially 
and to counsel for our committee." See enclosure for full quote. 

Accordingly, it is my opinion that the confidential character of the list of 
names should be maintained and revealed only on a need-to-know basis to those 
who have a confidential clearance. 

The Secretary advised me as a result of my inquiry that a list of 
30 names, beginning with a general, had been given to Senator Mundt, 
the acting chairman of this committee. Those were the names that 
were to be kept confidential. As I understood it from him, they 
contained all the names of those who had anything to do — any of the 
responsibility for the promotion and the honorable discharge of Major 
Peress. That information, I understand, came into the hands of Sen- 
ator Mundt, was delivered by a messenger — I mean the envelope that 
Ayas marked "confidential" containing the names — and is now in the 
files of this committee and has been since June 23, 1954. 

Now, I was further advised by Secretary Stevens that I could 
have a copy of that list, he exhibited an envelope which was marked 
"confidential" and sealed, that I could have a copy of those names. 
But he would expect me to keep them confidential I said if your 
committee, if the McCarthy committee, has those names now, "it is 
not necessary for me to have them, because that is their job. They 
can immediately go into executive session and call in these various 
persons to determine their share of the responsibility, whatever they 
did about it. I said, "Would you be willing to furnish these officers 
to see that they get here, or this personnel ?" And he said, "We would 
do our level best to get them there upon the demand of this Perma- 
nent Committee on Investigations," the committee over which you 
preside, Senator. 

The Chairman. I do not want to waste my time and the time of 
the Senators here, unless you have some information as to who is 
culpable. You say in your report "Z wicker was in no way responsi- 
ble." I do not know what you know about the military. You should 
know, you made the statement that a man is not promoted, he is not 
honorably discharged, unless his commanding officer makes the rec- 
ommendation. If you read the record, you know that Secretary 
Stevens promised to have an investigation made, that he would tell 
us who was, as you say, culpable— he did not use that word ; he said 
"at fault"; you used the word culpable— in this case. That has never 
been done. 

Now, if you merely intend to read from the transcript of the Mundt 

hearings, which you have been doing so far 

Senator Watkins. I have been reading a copy of the letter from 
the Secretary to Senator Mundt. 

The Chairman. That is in the Mundt hearings, and has been in 
there for months. 

Senator Watkins. He told me this had not been made public before. 
The Chairman. That is part of the Mundt hearings. Do you have 
any information today? Do you have any information today as to 
who was, as you say, culpable in this case ? 

Senator Watkins. I have exactly what I have told you. I had no 
personal knowledge, I came to the conclusion, based on the uncon- 
tradicted testimony in our hearings, before the Watkins committee, 
that General Zwicker was not responsible, Then, in order to help 



COMMUNIST INFILTRATION IN THE ARMY 185 

this committee, because I am a member of the Internal Security Com- 
mittee, which is charged with the responsibility of ferreting out these 
matters just as much as your committee — as a member of it I was 
personally very much interested in finding out, and I would like 
to find out. 

But I do say now, in view of what has been said to me by the Secre- 
tary, as I have related it, that you do now have in your files the names 
of all the people who were responsible for the promotion and the 
discharge, the honorable discharge, of Peress. All you need to do 
is to call those men in in executive session, if you want to abide by 
the confidential request of the Secretary, and you can find out from 
them the part that each one had in that affair. That has been in your 
files since June 23. 

The Chairman. I am afraid we are wasting the time of the Senate, 
if that is all the information you have. 

Senator Watkins. You invited me here I did not 

The Chairman. Just a minute. Please, Senator. I will give you 
a gavel. General Zwicker when called said he could not tell who was 
responsible. We have a list of 30 names, an unusual list. It lists 
the people in headquarters of the First Army, the Office of the Sur- 
geon General, all the doctors in the Surgeon General's Office who 
might have given this man a physical examination when he was 
promoted, the officers in the Adjutant General's Office, again when 
he was appointed to the grade of major all of the doctors who were 
in the Surgeon General's Office, and on down the line. You and I 
know that — you and I know that nothing will be gained by calling 4 
or 8 doctors from the Surgeon General's Office and finding out whether 
or not they examined this man. I thought when you made this state- 
ment, Senator, this very serious statement made in your report — you 
state that I should blame the person who is culpable — I thought maybe 
you had some information. Let us see if I have your testimony clear 
today- It is that you have nothing except what was presented to 
the Mundt committee, including this list of 30 people. You know 
now as you knew at the time you signed this report, that when we had 
one of the individuals before us, he said, "I can't answer because of 
the Presidential order." You are aware of the Presidential order 
which you invoked before your committee in which you said that 
General Lawton could not even tell about the conversation he had with 
General Zwicker. Is it your testimony now that that is all you 
have? You have nothing in addition except this conversation you 
had with Stevens in which he said : 

Here is a list of 30 names. If you want to take a look at them, if you think there 
is some way that I can find out who was the secret master by looking at these 
names, I will give it to you. 

Keep in mind the ruling that you made — hand this down to the 
Senator, will you? 

(Document handed.) 

Keep in mind the ruling you made that one Army officer would not 
have to testify as to conversations he had with another. 

Senator Watkins. I take it you are asking for my advice. That is 
what it sounded like. I would advise you 

The Chairman. Not your advice, Senator. You have signed a for- 
mal report saying that I should blame the person who is culpable. 
That means that you should know. 



186 COMMUNIST INFILTRATION IN THE ARMY 

Senator Watkins. Do you disagree with that ? 

The Chairman. That means you should know. I have been trying 
to find out. I wired you and told you that unless you had some infor- 
mation I did not want you to waste my time and your time. You did 
not answer that wire. I gather today that you have nothing except 
what was before the Mundt committee, and that the Secretary of the 
Army did not give you the result of the Inspector General's report. 
You knew, of course, Senator, you know now, that the Secretary of the 
Army promised that he would have the Inspector General make an 
investigation and that he would try and tell us then who was at fault 
or, using your word, culpable. You know that he has refused to do 
that. I thought maybe when you were— — 

Senator Watkins. Just a moment. I do not know any of those 
things you are saying. Those are your statements, not mine. I am not 
agreeing with them just because I sit here. I am not agreeing with 
what you are saying because I have to sit silently. 

The Chairman. You do not have to sit silently. You can talk all 
you like. I am not going to use a gavel. 

Senator Watkins. You ask me, in effect, as I get the purport of your 
question, how I would go about it to get this information. I would 
tell you exactly how I would go about it. I would serve on the Secre- 
tary of the Army a request for each one of these officers and I would 
have them brought before the committee in executive session so that I 
could protect the families of these people in the event there was noth- 
ing against them any more than administrative work. I am advised 
that this contains the list of the people who had all to do with this 
promotion and with this discharge. 

I would go right down through that list. And then I would say 
to you, in answer to what you said about not being able to get the 
information out of them because of the orders — I would do exactly 
what I did in the select committee case. I called on the Secretary of 
Defense, Mr. Wilson, and I got him to give me a letter which permitted 
General Lawton to testify, which permitted General Zwicker to tes- 
tify on the things that he could not say before. 

The Chairman. Let's keep the record straight. You did not get 
permission for Lawton to testify. Lawton refused to testify. So 
let's keep the record straight. 

Senator Watkins. Lawton came on the second time and testified 
when he was given the opportunity to recount and to give the state- 
ments that General Zwicker had made to him at a conversation with 
respect to Senator McCarthy and how he felt about it. When we 
gave him the opportunity 

The Chairman. Senator Watkins, let's keep the record straight. 

Senator Watkins. I am testifying. If you find it is wrong — you 
said I could talk all I wanted. Now let me go. 

The Chairman. You can talk all you like. 

Senator Watkins. Let me go, then, and I can finish my statement. 
With your permission, I am doing this. 

The Chairman. O. K. Proceed. 

Senator Watkins. All right. 

I have forgotten where I was. Will you give me the last statement ? 

(The record was read by the reporter.) 

Senator Watkins. When we gave him the opportunity to testify he 
could not recount or recall a single statement made by Zwicker. Then 



COMMUNIST INFILTRATION IN THE ARMY 187 

we stretched the rule on giving evidence of that sort and said, "Ordi- 
narily we would like to form our own conclusions from what was said, 
but you can go ahead and give your impressions." Then he did ; that 
General Zwicker was antagonistic to you. Then when we go to 
Zwicker, he was permitted to say that he had been opposed to the 
promotion of Peress, he had been opposed to his honorable discharge, 
lie had been against generals or any officials in the Army claiming the 
protection of the fifth amendment. 

But he was not permitted to say to whom he objected. He had to 
stop there. But we got that through the letter Mr. Wilson and the 
counsel sent over from the War Department. 

Senator, as a part of my advice from an older man, just a little 
older in years, I would say to you I think if you will follow on that 
procedure, if you will cooperate with the Secretary of the Army and 
the Defense Department, they will be able to help you a lot in actually 
pinpointing who, if anybody, is culpable ; that is, any evil culpability, 
for the promotion of Peress and for his discharge honorably. 

Now, I do not know whether this is going to be of any help to you 
or not. You have to decide that matter. But since you asked for it, 
that is the story. You have it in your files and I think there is a 
reasonable procedure to follow. I recommend it strongly to your com- 
mittee. And if you do not want to do it, give us the names in the 
Internal Security Committee and I will ask our chairman to proceed 
on that. 

The Chairman. Then I understand that the only help you can give 
us is that we call additional Army witnesses and hope that they will 
not invoke any secrecy rule and try and get them not to invoke the 
secrecy rule. Beyond that, you can give no information, is that it ? 

Senator W t atkins. I would like to say that the report that you 
called my attention to does not profess to know the name of the person 
culpable. It merely says whoever they are, in effect, they ought to be 
held responsible. It does say positively that Zwicker was not culpable. 
That is all I have to say, Senator. 

The Chairman. Where does it say positively that Zwicker was not 
culpable? 

Senator Watkins. Well, I think, in what we read. 

The Chairman. Where does it say that? I would like to read that 
into the record. You said the report that you got from the Army. 
I handed it to you. I am not asking about your report, Senator 
Watkins. 

Senator Watkins. That is what I thought you said. I am only 
responsible for my own report, nobody else's. 

The Chairman. In other words, you were not referring to the Army 
report? I handed you a report. I thought you were referring to that. 

Senator Watkins. I have the list, yes, the confidential list that you 
just handed me. 

The Chairman. There is nothing on that? 

Senator Watkins. That is to be taken in connection with the letter 
which he gave you. That is to be taken in connection with what he 
told me. I could have had this identical list, and if the select com- 
mittee had any job in connection with it, I would be only too glad to 
proceed and follow it. But that is within the jurisdiction of your 
committee and the Internal Security Committee as I see it. I cannot 



188 COMMUNIST INFILTRATION IN THE ARMY 

do anything about it. I said, "There is no use in giving that to me, Mr 

fcEShJ 7 ' T * haVe m6 , h0ld ifc in a confiden tial capacity, even though 
it might satisfy some of my curiosity." But lie said, "Positively that 
contains the list from the top down in grade, the people who were 
responsible for the handling of the PerSs matter.'' That has K 
in your hies since June 23, 1954. 

sa^h^ltTTi' i Y ° U j 11 ? aware > ? f cour ^ of the fact that Zwicker 
stolen $50 UP ** honorable discharge if a man had 

Senator Watkins. I understand all of that, but you said you were 

Pere g ss. mg ™™ g ° [ng t0 aSk me what * ^ abo ^ 

nJSSi^w 1 ??' l^ you should have told me that y° u ^™ 

nothing about this before we wasted this time this morning. You 
came here this morning and read a letter which is in the Mundt testi- 
mony. You refer to a list of 30 people. The man who signed the hon- 
orable discharge— his name is not here. The commanding officer's 

sTvTtW °Jil \T' f r& al ? T 1 ^ names missin -' although the letter 
says that all those administratively responsible. Your advice is all 
you know is that we should call these men and hope they would' no 
do-would the young man desist while I am talking to the witness? 

to Wl°^p KINS - IS f ° Ut ° f Hne for m ^ administrative assistant 
to nana me some papers ? 

The Chairman. Let me finish my question. The only thing you 

nfflIl S T n U l\ H n > 1S the * dvice th at we call all of the thirty-odd 
officers from the Surgeon General on down and hope that they will 
not invoke the pnvilige which Zwicker invoked. We asked Zwicker 
you understand, who was responsible, and he said he could not answer.' 
1 he only thing you can tell us now is, when you sav I should have 
blamed the person culpable, is that we should call those 80^ple« 

benator Watkins. I called your attention 

The Chairman. Is that roughly it 8 

l f? enat *°AT Wat * ins - ^ot exactly it, no. I call your attention to a 
letter of November 3 1954, addressed to you by Mr. Stevens, in which 
he expressly as I recall, eaves out two officers here. I think McManus 
and deneral Bergm, and it already appeared— 

erai%^°rp7 S R ^nhVi a i nSt M H\ ^ , WUliam R **#*> the Adjutant Gen- 
S thf a S ' } Zwicker, or Maj. John J. McManus, because in the opinion 

of the Army no ac s performed by them manifested the slightest indteatfoS of 

sameTank' ^ * ^ *"* ^ dereliction of ^ These officers SoS the 
?£S^tt5?S : etter t0 y0U ' ^ letter J0U WFOte ^ ^ 

^^^z^r^^r^TZi^^^ B to who was cuipabie 

I have given the information that Zwicker was not, the sworn testi- 
mony, uncontradicted testimony of Zwicker himself. 

This is information for which our investigating committee has been searching 

the U in a fn e ,.^ e /"- ef0re inV \ ed t0 appear before the investigafng  JomSStefS gfe 
the information upon which you base the above statement. C(>mmiccee to S lve 

statemJnt! 1 ^ ^^ ** ^ iS the beSt * Can do and T stand on m ? 
waI h culpableT AN ' *" ° ther W ° rdS ' y ° U and * wiU agree that someb °<*y 



COMMUNIST INFILTRATION IN THE ARMY 189 

Senator Watkins. Somebody actually promoted Peress, yes In 
the same letter that Mr. Stevens sent you under date of November 6, 
it quotes the law with respect to the promotion of these people. It 
seems to me, as a reasonable human being, knowing how these things 
operate, that that probably was largely responsible for almost the 
automatic advancement of this man Peress. I would like to oiler that 

for your record. . . ,, 

The Chairman. Since you bring that up, Senator, we will call your 
attention to the fact that a Doctor Belsky was before the committee 
also. He had the qualifications, apparently as great as Peress. He was 
not given a commission; he was not promoted; he was not honorably 
discharged. I merely call that to your attention so that you will know 
that when you cite a law there was no law that forced the promotion. 1 
will ask you one final question. . ; . , , . 

You and I agree that somebody who covered up for this Ma] oi 

Peress is at fault? » T 

Senator Watkins. I do not think anybody covered up, as tar as 1 
can get it from the statements made by Mr. Stevens. I am relying 
largely on what he said. He has given you the names of the people 
who-all the people-had anything to do with that You already 
knew about Zwicker and you already knew about Bergm and Mc- 
Manus. So you have had all of that list. I cannot go beyond that. 
And when you say "culpable" I do not know whether you mean 
criminally culpable or whether they actually did the work. 
The Chairman. I am using your word. 

Senator Watkins. Culpable as far as we were concerned meant tne 
people who did whatever was done. We do not prejudge people and 
say they are guilty of something simply because they may have 
recommended a promotion of a man or his honorable discharge, that 
would be determined by a proper trial, whether they were criminally 

CU The Chairman. You said the blame should have been placed on the 
shoulders of those culpable. By the term "culpable" you meant nothing 

^Senator Watkins. I did not necessarily mean criminally culpable. 
They were responsible. Responsible would probably have been a 
better word. But you cannot hang a man for writing a report with as 
many words in it as that if you get one word slightly off key. lhere 
was no intention to say that anybody had committed a crime, because 
we did not know that, and we do not step out and judge them m 

a TheCHAiRMAN. I am not asking you about a claim. You say there 
was a wrong done ; is that right ? 

Senator Watkins. It stands for what it says, and I do not care to 

^TheCH airman.' Senator, I am trying to find out You say I should 
have put the blame on the shoulders of those culpable. I am trying to 
find out whether you think there was somebody to blame. 

Senator Watkins. Somebody was responsible for his promotion and 
discharge ; that is what I meant. • 

The Chairman. There was nothing wrong with that i 
Senator Watkins. I do not know whether it was wrong or not. 
That would depend on the facts. 



190 COMMUNIST INFILTRATION IN THE ARMY 

The Chairman. Senator, I perhaps should be censured for what 
1 am about to say if I am to be censured for what I said to Zwicker. 
I might say that a Senator who represents the great State of Utah, 
who comes here and says he does not know whether someone should 
be blamed for promoting, honorably discharging, a man who has 
graduated from a Communist leadership school, a Communist leader, 
a man who owes his duty to a foreign country, a man that was a traitor 
to this country ; a Senator who says, "I don't know whether he is at 
fault, I don't know whether those who protected him are at fault or 
not — I wouldn't say," but who says and argues on the Senate floor 
that the man who tries to find out who has been the secret master 
covering up for this man, that such a Senator certainly is derelict in 
his duty. And that is putting it very, very mildly. 

Senator, you should be just as concerned as I am about finding out 
who is protecting the traitors in this man's Army. We know that 
somebody protected Peress. You know as well as I do that while I 
have been begging and coaxing the Secretary of the Army to give 
us the name of the man responsible, you know as well as I do that 
the Secretary promised that he would have an investigation, that he 
would give us that information. You have indicated in your report 
that you know who was at fault. 

You say that the commanding officer was not at fault, although 
the commanding officer refused to answer whether he was at fault 
or not. I may say I wish you had not wasted our time this morning. 
I wish you had told me you knew nothing about this situation before 
I took this hour's time this morning. 

If the other Senators have any questions to ask, they may proceed. 

Senator McClellan. Are you willing to make a motion in the 
Internal Security Committee to call these officers named in that letter 
and make inquiry of them with regard to their responsibility ? 

Senator Watkins. I certainly am, if Senator McCarthy does not 
move rather promptly in that field. 

Senator McClellan. If this committee does not proceed to do so, 
I will be glad to second your motion in the Internal Security Com- 
mittee. 

Senator Watkins. That is right. You are a member of that com- 
mittee with me. 

Senator McClellan. Yes, sir; I am. 

The Chairman. If they refused to testify, as Zwicker refused, will 
you find them in contempt, or what will you do ? 

Senator Watkins. I think I will get the answers with a little coop- 
eration of the Army and Secretary Stevens. I think I will get the 
answers if I am permitted to proceed with it. 

The Chairman. In other words, you think you can find out who 
has been covering up for Peress ? 

Senator Watkins. I never could find out that which would satisfy 
you. I will say that very frankly. I do not believe you could ever 
be satisfied unless you can find somebody that ought to be shot or 
hung. 

The Chairman. Do you think you could — I may say that I think 
a man who covers up for a traitor under our law should be shot or 
hung. 

Senator Watkins. Right; I will agree with you. 



COMMUNIST INFILTRATION IN THE ARMY 191 

The Chairman. Many American young men have died, many 
American ySuig men will die, Senator, because traitors have been 
covered up. 

IrK^ TlS'tSt^Tunder the law should be shot or 
hung eve^as'our young boys were shot and mutilated out in Korea. 

Senator Watkins. Let me ask you this 

The Chairman. This is no laughing matter, Senator. If you think 
vou have a secret way of finding out who the secret master is who has 
Covered up for Pereses, we will be glad to-very happy to-have you 
?ry Id force the testimony from the witnesses. We will be glad to 

h Teiroi d WATKiNS. I would say this: That I would like to ask you 
this question. Do you think Peress ought to be shot or hung on the 
Qitniti on as it stands at present without atrial? 

TleCH^i^ I did not say Peress should be shot or hung; I said 
any man in our military who covers up for traitors who covers up 
men guilty of treason, under the law there is a dealth penalty. You 
Sy to make a joke of that. You say that I would not be satisfied 
until I can find someone who should be shot or hung. . 

Senator, when we have secret masters in the military covering up, 
covering up, covering up for Communists, then they should be sub- 
jected to the full responsibility of the law. It is no laughing matter, 

Senator Watkins. I was not laughing, and the record will so show, 
the pictures will so show. I was not laughing. But I say this : That 
anv man in the military, any man m this country, is entitled to a 
fair and impartial trial before a jury of his peers when it comes to a 

Cr Now al if a a'full investigation reveals that no one was criminally 
culpable in this matter, that may be a disappointment to you But 
if that is the truth, that is the way it will have to be That is what 
ought to be thoroughly explored. That ought to be done before 
we oo on saying that somebody has committed a crime all the time 
It could have blen negligence, it could have been failure to keep the 
records together as they should have been. It could have happened 
n a large -army with millions of records.. It could have happened 
purely as a matter of a mistake. There is always that possibility 
P Now, as far as I am concerned, in the committee of which I am a 
member, where we are searching for these matters, we try to do it 
hi an orderly way. We do not make a lot of charges, ordinarily, 
unless we are pretty sure of our ground and we have gone into the 
Tatter carefully. Even then we are very modest m the charges we 
make. Up to elate we have been a hundred percent united, I think, 
in all the reports of the Internal Security Committee 111 this country. 
The Chairman. Senator, a boy in Korea who goes to sleep on his 
post of duty is court-martialed and a death penalty is provided for 
him Don't you agree with me that where someone deliberately 
covers up month after month after month for Communists m the 
military, that he is, using your language, much more culpable than 
r y oung kid who have been awake for 18 or 20 hours and who goes 
to sleep on his post of duty ? 



192 COMMUNIST INFILTRATION IN THE ARMY 

Senator Watkins. Yes, I will agree with that; a man who has 
been doing that. But first of all, I want to be dead sure he has been 
doing that. 

The Chairman. Unless the Senators have some questions, I think 
we have wasted one morning. I had hoped that you would tell us 
ahead of time you knew nothing about this situation, Senator. 

Senator Watkins. It was my purpose to come before your com- 
mittee and make such answers as I could make in response to your 
invitation. 

The Chairman. You are asking that I be censured for not placing 
the blame on the shoulders of those culpable. You say now that you 
think by some mysterious process your committee might be able to 
get the witnesses to disregard the Presidential directives. If you 
have such a way of getting that information, you are welcome to 
proceed. I would like to see you try and get it. 

The committee will be adjourned unless there are any questions to 
be asked. 

(Whereupon, at 10 : 45 a. m., the committee recessed, subject to call.) 

X 



BOSTON PUBLIC LIBRARY 



3 9999 05445 3160