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COMMUNIST  INFILTRATION  IN  THE  ARMY 


HEARING 

BEFORE  THE 

PERMANENT  SUBCOMMITTEE  ON 
INVESTIGATIONS  OF  THE  COMMITTEE  ON 

GOVERNMENT  OPERATIONS 
UNITED  STATES  SENATE 

EIGHTY-THIRD  CONGRESS 

FIRST  SESSION 

PURSUANT  TO 

S.  Res.  40 


SEPTEMBER  28,  1953 


Printed  for  the  use  of  the  Committee  on  Government  Operations 


UNITED  STATES 
GOVEENMENT  PRINTING  OFFICE 
38794  WASHINGTON  :  1953 


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1/ 


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Superintendent ,  oi  .pocujnenta 

i 

COMMITTEE  ON  GOVERNMENT  OPERATIONS 
JOSEPH  R.  MCCARTHY,  Wisconsin,  Chairman 
KARL  E.  MUNDT,  South  Dakota  JOHN  T    MrPTPMAwn    *, 

nljl'"1  c-  *->WUUS>HAK,  Idaho  HENTRV  AT    T  Ar'TrornvT    wr      u- 

jwn.N  MAhhHALL  BUTLER,  Maryland  STUART  SVMTWnnv    an. 

CHARTS  TT    PATTi™     ^ir-    !•  <V  '       -  G 10N-  Missouri 

CHARLES  E.  POTTER,  Michigan  ALTON  A.  LENNON,  North  Carolina 

Francis  D.  Flanagan,  Chief  Counsel 
Walter  L.  Reynolds,  Chief  Clerk 


Permanent  Subcommittee  on  Investigations 
JOSEPH  R.  MCCARTHY,  Wisconsin,  Chairman 
KARL  E.  MUNDTT  South  Dakota 
EVERETT    McKTNLEY   LIRKSEN,    Illinois 
CHARLES'  E.  POTTER,  Michigan    ' 

Roy  M.  Cohn,  Chief  Counsel 
Francis  P.  Carr,  Executive  Director 
II 


CONTENTS 


Page 

Appendix 44 

Index 81 

Testimony  of — 

Bogolepov,  Igor 20 

Budenz,  Prof.  Louis  F 28,  33 

Gelfan,  Harriet  Moore 30 

Lamont ,  Corliss 1 

Petrov,  Prof.  Vladimir 38 

EXHIBITS 

Introduced  Appears 

on  page  on  page 

1.  Statement  of  Mr.  Corliss  Lamont,  September  23,  1953 1  1 

2.  Document    entitled    "Psychological    and    Cultural    Traits    of 

Soviet  Siberia,"  dated  January  1952 21  44 

3.  Excerpts  from  A  History  of  Russia,  by  Bernard  Pares 27  77 

4.  (a)   USSR — A  Concise  Handbook,  edited  by  Ernest  J.  Sim- 

mons          28  (*) 

(6)    Excerpts  from  A  Concise  Handbook,  edited  by  Ernest  M. 

Simmons I 28  78 

5.  Peoples  of  the  Soviet  Union,  by  Corliss  Lamont 38  (*) 

*May  be  found  in  the  flies  of  the  subcommittee. 

m 


COMMUNIST  INFILTRATION  IN  THE  AEMY 


MONDAY,   SEPTEMBER   28,    1953 

United  States  Senate, 
Permanent  Subcommittee  on  Investigations 
of  the  Committee  on  Government  Operations, 

Washington,  D.  C. 

The  subcommittee  met  (pursuant  to  S.  Kes.  40,  agreed  to  January  30, 
1953)  at  10  a.  m.,  in  room  318  of  the  Senate  Office  Building,  Senator 
Joseph  E.  McCarthy,  chairman  of  the  subcommittee,  presiding. 

Present :  Senator  Joseph  R.  McCarthy,  Republican,  Wisconsin. 

Present  also :  Roy  M.  Cohn,  chief  counsel ;  Francis  P.  Carr,  executive 
director;  Donald  A.  Surine,  assistant  counsel;  Robert  L.  Jones, 
research  assistant  to  Senator  Potter ;  Karl  Baarslag,  research  director, 
and  Ruth  Young  Watt,  chief  clerk. 

The  Chairman.  The  committee  will  come  to  order.  I  will  ask 
the  staff  to  make  the  executive  testimony  in  the  Lamont  case  part  of 
the  public  record  at  this  point,  so  that  the  reason  for  the  citation  for 
contempt  will  be  very  clear. 

I  may  say  since  the  appearance  of  Mr.  Lamont  I  discussed  the  matter 
with  some  of  the  attorneys  over  in  the  Justice  Department,  and  we 
are  in  complete  agreement  that  Mr.  Lamont  should  be  cited  for  con- 
tempt. This  is  not  any  official  decision  from  the  Justice  Department, 
but  merely  a  discussion  with  some  of  the  lawyers  on  the  staff. 

(The  proceedings  of  the  executive  session  of  September  23, 1953,  in 
New  York  City,  are  as  follows :) 

TESTIMONY  OF  CORLISS  LAMONT,  ACCOMPANIED  BY  PHILIP 
WITTENBERG  AND  IRVING  LIKE,  ATTORNEYS  AT  LAW,  NEW 
YORK,  N.  Y. 

Mr.  Lamont.  Mr.  Chairman,  I  have  a  statement  I  would  like  to  read 
into  the  record  objecting  to  the  jurisdiction  of  the  committee. 

The  Chairman.  Not  until  we  have  sworn  you. 

Mr.  Lamont.  I  would  prefer  to  affirm,  please. 

The  Chairman.  Pardon  me? 

Mr.  Lamont.  I  would  prefer  to  affirm. 

The  Chairman.  In  other  words,  you  don't  want  to  be  sworn ;  you 
want  to  affirm. 

Do  you  solemnly  affirm  to  tell  the  truth,  the  whole  truth,  and  noth- 
ing but  the  truth  in  this  matter  now  in  hearing  before  this  committee  ? 

Mr.  Lamont.  I  do. 

The  Chairman.  Your  reason  for  not  being  sworn,  not  wanting  to  be 
sworn,  is  what? 

Mr.  Lamont.  I  want  to  read  my  statement  objecting  to  the  juris- 
diction  


L  COMMUNIST    INFILTRATION    IN    THE    ARMY 

The  Chairman.  No.     I  asked  why  you  want  to  affirm  rather  than 
be  sworn.     Is  it  because  of  religious  scruples? 
Mr.  Lamont.  Can  I  answer? 

Mr.  Wittenberg.  I  don't  think  he  is  required  to  explain  that. 
The  Chairman.  Yes. 

Mr.  Wittenberg.  A  witness 

The  Chairman.  The  Chair  is  entitled  to  know. 

Mr.  Wittenberg.  I  don't  believe  so,  sir.    A  witness  is  entitled  to- 


The  Chairman.  I  will  not  hear  from  the  counsel.  The  ruling  of 
this  committee  is  you  may  advise  with  your  client  at  any  time  you  care 
to.  He  may  advise  with  you.  If  a  matter  comes  up  which  you  con- 
sider of  sufficient  importance  that  you  want  a  private  conference,  we 
will  arrange  a  room  for  that.  In  other  words,  that  we  do  not  hear 
from  counsel.  I  am  asking  the  witness  why  do  you  refuse  to  be  sworn 
and  insist  upon  affirming. 

Mr.  Wittenberg.  I  shall  tell  the  witness  it  is  your  right  to  insist 
on  not  having  any  questions  asked  with  regard  to  your  religious 
beliefs. 

Mr.  Lamont.  Mr.  Chairman,  regarding  that  question,  I  believe  it 
is  improper  because  it  is  trying  to  probe  into  my  religious  beliefs, 
and  I  think  that  no — that  I  am  not  required  to  explain  why  I  choose 
to  affirm. 

The  Chairman.  Mr.  Lamont,  I  am  not  concerned  with  your  re- 
ligious beliefs.  I  don't  care  what  they  are.  But  we  require  a  witness 
to  be  sworn  unless  he  tells  us  because  of  some  religious  scruples — he 
needn't  explain  what  they  are.  If  you  tell  us  that  you  have  some 
religious  grounds  for  refusing  to  be  sworn,  we  will  allow  you  to  merely 
affirm. 

Mr.  Wittenberg.  You  may  refuse  to  answer. 

Mr.  Lamont.  Well,  I  am  sorry,  Mr.  Chairman,  I  just  have  to  de- 
cline to  answer  that  because  I  think  it  is  violating  my  constitutional 
privileges,  and  I  never  heard  of  such  a  rule  before. 

The  Chairman.  You  are  refusing  on  the  ground  we  are  violating 
what  constitutional  privilege? 

Mr.  Wittenberg.  Separation  of  the  church  and  state. 

Mr.  Lamont.  Separation  of  church  and  state  and  probing  and  ask- 
ing questions  about  religious  beliefs. 

The  Chairman.  Mr.  Lamont,  stand  up  and  be  sworn. 

Stand  up  and  be  sworn. 

Mr.  Lamont.  Well 

The  Chairman.  In  this  matter  now  in  hearing — stand  up  and  be 
sworn. 

Mr.  Lamont.  I  already  affirmed. 

The  Chairman.  You  will  be  sworn  unless  you  tell  us  you  have  got 
some  ground  for  refusing  to  be  sworn. 

Mr.  Wittenberg.  You  may  stand — you  are  standing  on  your  con- 
science. 

Mr.  Lamont.  I  am  standing  on  my  conscience,  that  I  affirm,  and  I 
see  no  reason  for  going  beyond  that. 

The  Chairman.  You  are  ordered  to  raise  your  right  hand  and  be 
sworn. 

Mr.  Wittenberg.  You  will  refuse. 

Mr.  Lamont.  I  decline  to  do  so,  Senator  McCarthy. 


COMMUNIST    INFILTRATION    IN    THE    ARMY 


The  Chairman.  "What  ground? 
Mr.  Lamont.  I  request  that  you- 
The  Chairman.  What  ground  ? 


Mr.  Wittenberg.  Sa}T  it  is  your  conscientious  scruples. 

The  Chairman.  You  may  advise  with  counsel. 

Mr.  Wittenberg.  You  may  say  it  is  your  conscientious  scruples 
you  are  standing  on. 

Mr.  Lamont.  I  am  standing  on  my  conscientious  scruples  in  pre- 
ferring to  affirm  rather  than  to  be  sworn,  and  I  believe  that  this  is 
proper  under  our  whole  American  system. 

The  Chairman.  Have  the  record  show  the  witness  has  been  ordered 
to  stand  and  be  sworn.    He  refuses  to  be  sworn. 

We  will  take  the  matter  up  with  the  committee  as  to  what  action  will 
be  taken. 

Sit  down,  Mr.  Lamont. 

Proceed.    You  had  a  statement  you  wanted  to  make. 

Mr.  Lamont.  I  have  a  statement  I  want  to  read  objecting  to  the 
jurisdiction  of  the  committee. 

The  Chairman.  You  may. 

Air.  Lamont.  Thank  you  very  much.    Here  it  is. 

I,  Corliss  Lamont,  residing  at  450  Riverside  Drive,  in  the  Borough 
of  Manhattan,  city  of  New  York,  having  been  subpenaed  before  this 
committee  by  subpena  dated  the  21st  day  of  September  1953,  and 
signed  by  Joseph  R.  McCarthy,  as  chairman,  do  hereby  respectfully 
object  to  the  power  and  jurisdiction 

The  Chairman.  I  don't  think  counsel  has  been  identified  yet. 

Mr.  Wittenberg.  I  gave  him  a  card. 

The  Chairman.  And  the  other  gentleman? 

Mr.  Wittenberg.  Mr.  Irving  Like,  my  associate. 

The  Chairman.  And  your  name  ? 

Mr.  Wittenberg.  Philip  Wittenberg,  sir. 

The  Chairman.  Philip  Wittenberg  and  Irving  Like. 

Pardon  me,  Mr.  Lamont,  please. 

Mr.  Lamont  (continuing).  Do  hereby  respectfully  object  to  the 
power  and  jurisdiction  of  this  committee  to  inquire  into : 

(a)  My  political  beliefs ; 

(6)  Any  other  personal  and  private  affairs ; 

(c)  My  religious  beliefs ; 

(d)  My  associational  activities. 

(2)  Let  it  be  understood  that  I  am  a  private  citizen  of  the  United 
States.  That  I  hold  no  office  of  public  honor  or  trust  and  that  I  am 
not  employed  in  any  governmental  department,  nor  am  I  under  salary 
or  grant  from  any  governmental  department. 

(3)  To  dispose  of  a  question  causing  current  apprehension,  I  am  a 
loyal  American  and  I  am  not  now  and  never  have  been  a  member  of  the 
Communist  Party. 

(4)  The  grounds  of  my  objection  are : 

(a)  As  stated  in  United  States  v.  Rumely  (97  L.  Ed.  494),  a  case 
involving  a  refusal  to  give  testimony  before  a  committee  of  the  House 
of  Representatives,  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States  said,  in 
a  concurring  opinion  by  Mr.  Justice  Douglas : 

The  power  of  investigation  is  also  limited.  Inquiry  into  personal  and  private 
affairs  is  precluded. 


4  COMMUNIST    INFILTRATION    IN    THE    ARMY 

(b)  The  Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States  has  said  in  Jones  v. 
Securities  and  Exchange  Commission  (298  U.  S.  1),  through  Mr. 
Justice  Sutherland : 

The  citizen,  when  Interrogated  about  his  private  affairs,  has  a  right  before 
answering  to  know  why  the  inquiry  is  made;  and  if  the  purpose  disclosed  is 
not  a  legitimate  one,  he  is  not  required  to  answer. 

(c)  Under  the  first  amendment  to  the  Constitution,  the  power  of 
investigation  by  Congress  into  matters  involving  freedom  of  speech 
and  freedom  of  the  press  cannot  be  used  in  the  absence  of  legislative 
intent  or  power.  The  Congress  of  the  United  States  has  no  constitu- 
tional right  to  legislate  with  regard  to  prior  restraint  or  utterance  in 
either  form,  and  that  as  to  any  books  already  written  or  statements 
made,  no  ex  post  facto  law  could  be  passed  determining  innocence  or 
criminality,  and  that  therefore  an  investigation  into  my  writings  is 
beyond  the  power  of  this  committee. 

(5)  Under  our  Constitution,  our  Government  is  a  government  of 
limited  powers,  tripartite  in  form,  consisting  of  the  legislative,  the 
judicial,  and  the  executive,  and  any  inquiry  into  personal  conduct, 
personal  beliefs,  associational  activity  lies  within  the  jurisdiction  of 
the  judicial  department,  and  the  exercise  of  this  power  by  the  legis- 
lature is  an  unconstitutional  invasion  of  the  power  of  the  judiciary. 

The  Supreme  Court  has  held  that  this  separation  of  powers  is 
fundamental  to  the  existence  of  our  democracy  and  that  not  even  an 
emergency  warrants  an  invasion  of  the  powers  of  one  department 
by  the  other.  Yowigstowri  Sheet  and  Tube  Co.  v.  Saicyer  (343 
U.S.  579). 

(6)  The  jurisdiction  of  this  committee  is  further  limited  by  the 
statutes  which  constitute  and  set  forth  its  function  and  sphere  of 
authority.  Under  the  rules  of  the  Senate  and  the  statutes  organizing 
the  appointment  of  this  standing  committee,  this  committee  has  no 
authority  to  examine  into  the  personal  and  private  affairs  of  private 
citizens.  Any  action  with  regard  to  my  books  by  officials  of  the  Gov- 
ernment was  done  without  any  prior  knowledge  or  consultation  with 
me.  I  took  no  part  in  any  proceedings  involving  any  governmental 
authority  and  therefore  this  committee  is  without  power  to  examine 
me  under  the  rules  and  statute  governing  it. 

This  committee  is  not  a  competent  tribunal.  The  resignation  from 
this  committee  of  all  members  belonging  to  one  of  the  major  parties, 
i.  e.,  the  Democratic  Party,  has  deprived  this  committee  of  its  com- 
petency to  act  until  it  has  been  properly  constituted. 

That's  all. 

The  Chairman.  Mr.  Lamont,  I  show  you  a  book  entitled  "U.  S.  S.  E., 
a  Concise  Handbook,"  edited  by  Ernest  J.  Simmons,  one  chapter 
entitled  "National  and  Racial  Minorities"  by  Corliss  Lamont. 

And  I  may  say  this  book  is  being  used  by  the  military  to  indoc- 
trinate our  troops,  being  purchased  by  the  Government. 

I  ask  you,  No.  1,  are  you  the  Corliss  Lamont  mentioned  in  that 
book  ? 

(Mr.  Lamont  confers  with  Mr.  Wittenberg.) 

Mr.  Lamont.  Yes. 

The  Chairmax.  You  recognize  that  chapter  as  your  work? 

Mr.  Lamont.  Yes;  I  do. 

The  Chairman.  Did  you  get  paid  for  that  ? 

Did  you  get  paid  for  that  work? 


COMMUNIST    INFILTRATION    IN    THE    ARMY  5 

(Mr.  Lamont  confers  with  Mr.  Wittenberg.) 

Mr.  Lamont.  I  am  trying  to  remember,  Mr.  Chairman. 

Mr.  Chairman,  without  checking  my  records,  I  cannot  give  a  com- 
petent answer  on  that. 

The  Chairman.  Well,  if  you  don't  know  without  checking  your 
records,  you  will  not  be  required  to  answer  until  you  do  check  your 
records. 

You  are  asked,  then,  to  check  your  records  and  tell  us  whether  you 
were  paid  any  money  for  this  and  whether  or  not  to  your  knowledge 
you  received  any  money  because  of  the  number  of  books  purchased 
by  the  military. 

Mr.  Wittenberg.  Mr.  Chairman,  without  intruding  at  all 

The  Chairman.  Yes? 

Mr.  Wittenberg.  If  we  get  the  answers  to  these,  and  I  think  we 
can,  are  we  in  a  position  to  call  anybody  and  just  give  the  answer  so 
you  can  incorporate  it  in  the  record  ? 

The  Chairman.  There  may  be  a  number  of  items  we  will  want,  so 
let's  hold  that  in  abeyance. 

Mr.  Wittenberg.  If  you  want  to,  we  would  be  perfectly  willing  to 
give  the  answers  to  any  questions  as  to  which  he  has  no  recollection. 

The  Chairman.  I  also  want  to  show  you,  Mr.  Lamont,  a  document 
entitled  "Psychological  and  Cultural  Traits  of  Soviet  Siberia." 

There  is  a  C.  Lamont  listed  as  a  source  for  this  material,  the  name 
of  the  book,  Peoples  of  the  Soviet  Union,  1946.  Would  you  know 
whether  that  C.  Lamont  is  you  ? 

(Mr.  Lamont  confers  with  Mr.  Wittenberg.) 

Mr.  Lamont.  I  wrote  a  book  published  by  Harcourt,  Brace  in  1946 
called  The  Peoples  of  the  Soviet  Union,  so  that  presumably  this  refers 
to  that  book,  Mr.  Chairman. 

The  Chairman.  I  will  hand  you,  Mr.  Lamont,  a  book  entitled  "The 
Peoples  of  the  Soviet  Union"  by  Corliss  Lamont  and  ask  if  that  is  your 
work. 

Mr.  Lamont.  Yes ;  that  certainly  is. 

The  Chairman.  Have  you  had  occasion  to  read  this  document 
entitled  "Psychological  and  Cultural  Traits  of  Soviet  Siberia?" 

Mr.  Lamont.  Mr.  Chairman,  I  have  been  trying  to  get  a  copy  of 
that  after  you  talked  about  it  in  the  press  and  I  have  been  unable  to 
get  a  copy  so  I  can't — I  haven't  read  it  at  all.     I  haven't  seen  it. 

The  Chairman.  We  will  furnish  you  with  a  copy. 

If  you  will  do  that,  Mr.  Carr. 

And,  Mr.  Lamont,  you  are  requested  to  examine  the  document  and 
then  mark  those  passages  which  come  verbatim  from  your  book. 

This  document,  incidentally,  while  it  quotes  you  as  a  source,  does 
not  show  which  material  comes  verbatim  from  you.  We  would  like 
to  have  that  information.  You  will  be  ordered  to  produce  that 
and 

Mr.  Lamont.  Excuse  me,  Mr.  Chairman.     You  mean  now  ? 

The  Chairman.  No  ;  not  now.  I  will  give  you  whatever  time  you 
think  necessary,  if  you  get  in  touch  with  counsel.  I  realize  it  will  take 
some  time  to  do  that. 

Do  you  know  a  Mr.  Louis  Budenz,  Mr.  Lamont  ? 

(Mr.  Lamont  confers  with  Mr.  Wittenberg.) 

Mr.  Lamont.  Mr.  Chairman,  on  the  basis  of  the  statement  sub- 
mitted, I  refuse  to  answer  that  question. 

38794—53 2 


6  COMMUNIST   INFILTRATION   IN    THE    ARMY 

The  Chairman.  On  what  ground? 

Mr.  Lamont.  On  the  basis  of  the  statement  objecting  to  your  juris- 
diction over 

The  Chairman.  You  refuse  to  answer  on  the  ground  the  committee 
does  not  have  jurisdiction  to  ask  the  question  ? 

Mr.  Wittenberg.  On  the  grounds  as  stated  in  the  objection. 

The  Chairman.  You  will  have  to  give  your  grounds. 

Mr.  Wittenberg.  He  will  have  to  read  it. 

Mr.  Lamont.  On  the  grounds  as  stated  in  the  objections  already 
mentioned  in  this  statement. 

Do  you  want  me  to  read  more  of  it,  read  it  again  ? 

The  Chairman.  No  ;  you  needn't  read  it  again.  Is  there  any  ground 
other  than  the  jurisdiction  of  the  committee  on  which  you  refuse  to 
answer  ? 

Mr.  Lamont.  No. 

The  Chairman.  You  will  be  ordered  to  answer  that. 

I  assume  you  will  still  refuse  ? 

Mr.  Lamont.  I  have  submitted  this  statement,  Mr.  Chairman. 

The  Chairman.  I  say,  so  the  record  is  complete,  you  are  being 
ordered  to  answer,  and  I  assume  you  are  refusing  to  answer  ? 

Mr.  Lamont.  Yes ;  on  the  grounds  stated. 

The  Chairman.  Did  you  ever  admit  to  Mr.  Budenz  in  a  telephone 
conversation  that  you  were  a  member  of  the  Communist  Party  ? 

Mr.  Lamont.  Why — I  refuse  to  answer  that  on  the  same  grounds, 
Mr.  Chairman,  as  set  forth  in  this  statement. 

The  Chairman.  You  are  not  refusing  under  your  rights  under  the 
fifth  amendment,  right  ? 

Mr.  Lamont.  No,  no. 

The  Chairman.  You  are  ordered  to  answer. 

I  assume  you  still  refuse  ? 

Mr.  Lamont.  Well,  as  you  know  from  the  statement 

Mr.  Wittenberg.  May  I  consult  with  my  client  for  just  one  moment  ? 

The  Chairman.  For  your  benefit,  Mr.  Counsel,  I  order  him  to 
answer.  In  the  opinion  of  the  Chair,  that  is  necessary  where  a  witness 
refuses  to  answer.  I  think  it  is  necessary  for  the  Chair  to  order  him 
to  answer  in  case  the  committee  decides  to  take  contempt  proceedings 
against  him. 

Mr.  Wittenberg.  Yes,  I  realize  that. 

(Mr.  Lamont  confers  with  Mr.  Wittenberg.) 

The  Chairman.  Do  you  still  refuse  to  answer  ? 

Mr.  Lamont.  Mr.  Chairman 

The  Chairman.  May  I  ask,  Mr.  Reporter,  whenever  the  witness 
confers  with  counsel,  so  that  the  record  is  complete,  have  it  show  he 
confers. 

There  is  no  intimation  that  that  is  improper.  He  has  a  right  to  con- 
fer with  counsel. 

Mr.  Wittenberg.  I  agree  with  you  that  the  record  should  show  it. 

The  Chairman.  Do  you  refuse  to  answer  ? 

(Mr.  Lamont  confers  with  counsel.) 

Mr.  Lamont.  I  am  declining  to  answer  on  the  ground  that  I  do  not 
wish  to  involve  myself  in  controversy  with  a  known  provocateur,  and 
I  am  a  loyal  American.  As  I  said  in  the  statement,  I  am  not  and  never 
have  been  a  member  of  the  Communist  Party. 


COMMUNIST    INFILTRATION   IN    THE    ARMY  7 

The  Chairman.  Do  you  refuse  on  the  ground  you  don't  want  to 
involve  yourself  with  a  known  provocateur  ? 

Who  is  the  known  provocateur  you  don't  want  to  involve  yourself 
with? 

Mr.  Wittenberg.  Refuse  to  answer  that.  The  person  named  in  the 
statement. 

Mr.  Lamont.  The  person  you  named  in  the  statement,  Mr.  Chair- 
man. 

The  Chairman.  You  are  ordered  to  answer,  and  you  still  refuse, 
I  assume. 

Mr.  Lamont.  Right. 

The  Chairman.  Did  you  know  a  Clarence  Hathaway  ? 

Mr.  Lamont.  I  decline  to  answer  that  on  the  same  grounds,  Mr. 
Chairman. 

The  Chairman.  On  the  ground  you  don't  want  to  involve  yourself, 
you  mean  ? 

Mr.  Lamont.   No,  no.     On  the  grounds  of  the  statement. 

Mr.  Wittenberg.  "Of  my  objections  to  the  jurisdiction." 

Mr.  Lamont.  On  objections  to  the  jurisdiction  of  the  committee. 

The  Chairman.  You  are  ordered  to  answer. 

Mr.  Lamont.   Well,  I  decline  for  the  reasons  stated. 

The  Chairman.  Did  you  work  with  Clarence  Hathaway  in  connec- 
tion with  the  penetration  of  various  organizations  by  the  Communist 
Party? 

Mr.  Lamont.  May  I  consult  with  counsel  ? 

The  Chairman.  Certainly. 

(Mr.  Lamont  confers  with  Mr.  Wittenberg.) 

Mr.  Wittenberg.  May  I  perhaps — my  client  is  not  a  lawyer,  may  I 
tell  him  what  the  legal  form  is  ? 

The  Chairman.  You  may  discuss  with  him  at  any  time  you  care  to. 

(Mr.'  Lamont  confers  with  Mr.  Wittenberg.) 

Mr.  Lamont.  Well,  I  object  to  the  form  of  the  question,  Mr.  Chair- 
man, because  it  involves  this  idea  that  I  was  somehow  penetrating 
something  for  the  Communist  Party.     I  can't  answer  such  a  question. 

The  Chairman.  Your  objection  will  be  overruled. 

Mr.  Wittenberg.  Refuse  to  answer. 

The  Chairman.  Are  you  refusing  to  answer  the  question  ? 

Mr.  Lamont.  I  refuse  to  answer  on  the  grounds  stated,  objecting  to 
the  committee's  jurisdiction. 

The  Chairman.  Did  you  ever  under  instructions  from  the  Com- 
munist Party  or  instructions  from  a  known  Communist  work  toward 
the  penetration  of  any  organizations  ? 

(Mr.  Lamont  confers  with  Mr.  Wittenberg.) 

Mr.  Lamont.  Mr.  Chairman,  I  object  to  any  question  which  implies 
any  control  of  me  by  the  Communist  Party,  and  I  would  decline  to 
answer  the  question  on  the  statement  submitted,  on  the  grounds  of  my 
statement  earlier  submitted. 

The  Chairman.  Your  objections  are  noted  and  they  are  overruled, 
and  you  are  ordered  to  answer. 

Mr.  Lamont.  I  decline  so. 

The  Chairman.  Did  you  ever  engage  in  activities  on  behalf  of  or 
for  the  Communist  Party  or  under  the  instructions  of  any  individual 
known  to  you  to  be  a  member  of  the  Communist  Party  ? 


8  COMMUNIST    INFILTRATION    IN    THE    ARMY 

Mr.  Lamont.  I  object  to  the  implications  of  that  outrageous  ques- 
tion, too,  and  decline  to  answer  because — on  the  grounds  of  the  state- 
ment submitted. 

The  Chairman.  Just  so  the  record  is  clear,  you  are  declining  on  no 
grounds  other  than  the  grounds 

Mr.  Lamont.  Included  in  this 

The  Chairman.  Raised  in  your  statement. 

Mr.  Lamont.  Prior  statement.    That  is  it. 

The  Chairman.  So  the  record  will  be  complete,  will  you  hand  that 
statement  to  the  reporter  so  he  will  have  that  and  it  can  be  marked  for 
identification. 

Mr.  Lamont.  I  am  also  objecting,  as  I  said,  to  the  form  of  the 
question  which  I  already  mentioned. 

The  Chairman.  That  will  be  marked  "Exhibit  1." 

(The  statement  of  Mr.  Lamont  above  referred  to  was  marked 
"Exhibit  1"  for  identification.) 

The  Chairman.  And  have  the  record  show  the  only  grounds  for 
the  refusal  on  the  part  of  the  witness  are  the  grounds  referred  to  in 
exhibit  1 ;  that  the  witness  has  said  he  is  not  relying  upon  the  fifth 
amendment. 

Mr.  Lamont 

Mr.  Wittenberg.  Mr.  Chairman,  Mr.  Senator,  please.  I  think 
he  did  raise  another  ground.  He  objected  to  the  form  of  the  ques- 
tion and  its  implications.  It  was  not  solely  the  grounds  referred  to 
in  exhibit  No.  1,  his  statement. 

The  Chairman.  His  objection  is  overruled,  and  again 

Mr.  Wittenberg.  But,  sir,  you  were  dictating  to  the  stenographer 
the  reason  for  the  refusal  of  the  witness,  and  he  should  have  the  full 
record. 

The  Chairman.  You  may  show  whatever  you  like  in  the  record. 

Mr.  Wittenberg.  May  I  ask  something  as  a  courtesy?  Since  we 
have  already  made  a  number  of  answers  referring  to  the  same  objec- 
tion, would  you  instruct  the  stenographer  wherever  that  objection 
was  made  to  refer  to  "exhibit  1." 

The  Chairman.  Very  good  idea.    The  reporter  is  so  instructed. 

Mr.  Lamont,  it  appears  from  the  sworn  testimony  that  the  United 
States  Government  purchased  some  of  your  works.  That  is  the  testi- 
mony at  this  point.  One  of  the  works  purchased,  which  is  apparently 
not  technically  your  work  but  one  in  which  you  took  part,  is  a  book  by 
a  Mr.  Simmons. 

Did  you  know  that  Mr.  Simmons  was  a  member  of  the  Communist 
Party  at  the  time  you  contributed  the  chapter  to  this  book? 

Mr.  Lamont.  The  question  was  that  Mr.  Simmons  was — was  the 
editor  of  the  book  ?    As  editor  of  the  book,  as  I  recall  it 

Mr.  Wittenberg.  May  I,  sir — — 

The  Chairman.  The  book  is  entitled  "U.  S.  S.  R.,  A  Concise  Hand- 
book," edited  by  Ernest  J.  Simmons.  That  is  Ernest  Joseph  Sim- 
mons.   Does  that  answer  your  question  ? 

Mr.  Lamont.  I  decline  to  answer,  Mr.  Chairman,  on  the  grounds  of 
exhibit  1  and  on  the  further  ground  that  the  book  speaks  for  itself. 

The  Chairman.  The  question  was,  Did  you  know  that  Simmons  was 
a  Communist  at  the  time 

Mr.  Lamont.  I  decline  to 


The  Chairman.  At  the  time  you  contributed  to  the  book  ? 


COMMUNIST    INFILTRATION    IN    THE    ARMY  9 

Mr.  Lamont.  I  decline. 

The  Chairman.  You  think  the  book  speaks  for  itself  whether  he  was 

a  Communist? 

Mr.  Wittexberg.  Decline  to  answer. 

The  Chairman.  This  might  be  the  first  time  today  that  I  would 
agree  with  you.  I  think  it  does  speak  for  itself.  He  uses  you  and 
other  men  named  as  Communists  almost  exclusively. 

Is  it  your  opinion  that  this  publication  shows  he  is  a  Communist? 

Mr.  Wittenberg.  Answer  you  will  object  to  any  statements  that 

The  Chairman.  I  will  not  hear  from  counsel. 

Mr.  Wittenberg.  May  I  consult  with  my  client  ? 

The  Chairman.  You  may,  yes. 

(Mr.  Lamont  confers  with  Mr.  Wittenberg.) 

Mr.  Lamont.  I  object,  Mr.  Chairman,  to  any  statements  by  this 
committee  or  its  chairman  insinuating  that  I  am  a  Communist,  member 
of  the  Communist  Party.  I  have  already  denied  that  in  my  opening 
statement  on  the  jurisdiction  of  the  committee. 

The  Chairman.  May  I  say,  Mr.  Lamont,  that  as  a  courtesy  to  every- 
one, we  inform  him  whether  or  not  there  is  sworn  testimony  that  he  is  a 
Communist.  It  is  a  courtesy  we  extend  to  every  witness.  I  am  stating 
for  your  own  benefit,  for  your  own  protection,  that  we  have  this  sworn 
testimony  that  you  have  been  an  active  member  of  the  Communist 
Party.  Now,  if  you  don't  want  us  to  give  that  information,  you  can 
disregard  it. 

Have  you  ever  been  solicited  to  join  the  Communist  Party? 

Mr.  Lamont.  I  decline  to  answer  that  on  the  same  grounds  stated 
in  exhibit  1. 

The  Chairman.  You  are  ordered  to  answer. 

Mr.  Lamont.  I  decline  very  respectfully,  Mr.  Chairman. 

The  Chairman.  Have  you  ever  attended  Communist  Party 
meetings  ? 

Mr.  Lamont.  I  decline  to  answer  on  the  same  grounds  stated  in 
exhibit  1. 

The  Chairman.  At  the  time  you  wrote  the  article,  rather,  the  chap- 
ter, in  the  Simmons  book,  which  was  purchased  by  the  United  States 
Government,  at  the  time  you  wrote  the  book  entitled  "The  Peoples  of 
the  Soviet  Union,"  which  was  also  purchased  by  the  United  States 
Government,  were  you  advising  with,  consulting  with,  or  instructed  by 
any  individuals  known  by  you  to  be  members  of  the  Communist  Party  ? 

Mr.  Lamont.  I  object  to  that  question  and  decline  to  answer  it, 
calling  your  attention,  Mr.  Chairman,  to  the  first  paragraph  of  the 
book  which  explains  the  circumstances  under  which  I  wrote  it. 

The  Chairman.  You  are  ordered  to  answer. 

Mr.  Wittenberg.  Decline  to  answer  on  the  grounds  of  exhibit  1. 

Mr.  Lamont.  I  decline  to  do  so  on  the  grounds  in  the  statement 
submitted,  exhibit  1. 

The  Chairman.  You  can  make  a  very  good  test  case,  Mr.  Lamont. 

Mr.  Lamont.  I  hope  so. 

The  Chairman.  Did  you  in  1941  sign  a  statement  addressed  to  the 
President  of  the  United  States  defending  the  Communist  Party  ? 

Mr.  Wittenberg.  Not  unless  it  is  shown  to  you  for  identification. 

The  Chairman.  To  refresh  your  recollection,  may  I  say  the  Daily 
Worker,  on  March  5,  1941,  page  2,  carries  an  account  of  such  a  state- 
ment by  you — signed  by  you. 


10  COMMUNIST    INFILTRATION    IN   THE    ARMY 

The  question  is,  Did  you  sign  such  a  statement? 

Mr.  Lamont.  Mr.  Chairman,  I  would  have  to  see  some — see  the  state- 
ment. I  can't — that  was  how  many  years  ago  ?  A  long  time  ago.  I 
don't  even  know  what  is  was  about  from  what  you  say. 

The  Chairman.  Is  it  your  testimony  that  you  do  not  remember 
having  signed  a  statement  addressed  to  the  President  of  the  United 
States  defending  the  Communist  Party  ? 

Mr.  Wittenberg.  At  this  time  you  have  no  present  recollection 
unless  you  can  refresh 

(Mr.  Lamont  confers  with  Mr.  Wittenberg.) 

Mr.  Lamont.  Mr.  Chairman,  I  have  no  present  recollection  of  sign- 
ing such  a  statement,  unless  you  can  refresh  my  memory  somehow  or 
I  can  read  such  a  statement;  1941  ? 

I  just  can't  recall  all  those  details  without  checking  in  some  manner. 

The  Chairman.  Let's  skip  11  years  and  come  up  to  1952. 

Did  you  sign  an  appeal  to  President  Truman  requesting  amnesty 
for  leaders  of  the  Communist  Party  who  were  convicted  under  the 
Smith  Act? 

(Mr.  Lamont  confers  with  Mr.  Wittenberg.) 

Mr.  Lamont.  Can't — could  I  see  the — could  I  see  the — — 

The  Chairman.  Could  you  see  what? 

Mr.  Lamont.  Could  I  see  the  statement  so  I  could  identify  it  ? 

The  Chairman.  I  don't  know.  If  you  want  to  search  for  it  you 
will  find  the  Daily  Worker,  December  10,  1952,  apparently  carries 
an  account  of  it,  page  4.  I  don't  have  a  copy  of  your  statement,  Mr. 
Lamont.     You  asked 

(Mr.  Lamont  confers  with  Mr.  Wittenberg.) 

The  Chairman.  If  I  had  a  copy  of  your  statement,  you  certainly 
could  see  it.  I  do  not  have  a  copy  before  me.  My  question  is,  Do  you 
recall  having  signed  such  an  appeal  to  President  Truman? 

Mr.  Lamont.  May  I  consult  with  my  attorney? 

The  Chairman.  That  is  last  year.  Late  last  year.  December  of 
last  year. 

(Mr.  Lamont  confers  with  Mr.  Wittenberg.) 

Mr.  Wittenberg.  May  I  have  a  consultation  ?  I  think  he  ought  to 
answer  it. 

(Mr.  Lamont  confers  with  Mr.  Wittenberg.) 

Mr.  Lamont.  Mr.  Chairman,  on  that  question  it  is  probable  in  my 
mind  that  I  signed  some  such  statement,  but  before  giving  an  absolute 
yes  or  no  answer  on  it,  I  simply  have  to  verify  the  statement  as  printed 
some  place. 

The  Chairman.  Do  I  understand  you  will  check  and  tell  the  com- 
mittee whether  or  not  you  signed  such  a  statement  ? 

Mr.  Lamont.  Yes.    I  am  glad  to  do  that. 

The  Chairman.  O.  K.     You  will  be  ordered  to  do  that. 

Mr.  Wittenberg.  Mr.  Senator,  may  I  interrupt  ? 

The  Chairman.  Yes. 

Mr.  Wittenberg.  Do  you  refer  specifically  to  the  Daily  Worker, 
which  we  may  not  be  able  to  get  the  files  of,  or  any  other  newspaper 
which  carried  such  appeals? 

The  Chairman.  I  am  not  referring  to  a  newspaper  account.  I 
am  referring  to  the  signed  appeal.  The  question  is,  Did  you  sign 
an  appeal  to  President  Truman  in  1952  requesting  amnesty  on  behalf 


COMMUNIST   INFILTRATION    EST    THE    ARMY  11 

of  the  leaders  of  the  Communist  Party  convicted  under  the  Smith 
Act? 

I  understand  the  witness  says  he  will  search  his  records  and  tell  us 
whether  or  not  he  can  find  such  a  statement. 

Mr.  Wittenberg.  No,  sir.  I  am  sorry,  I  am  not  arguing  with  you, 
but  I  think  he  had  an  impression  you  were  referring  to  a  specific 
report  of  that  in  the  Daily  "Worker  on  a  certain  date. 

The  Chairman".  I  am  not  asking  about  the  Daily  Worker  report. 
He  is  to  refresh  his  recollection,  and  he  can  do  it  by  reading  any  paper, 
the  Daily  Worker  or  any  other  paper. 

Mr.  Wittenberg.  It  was  in  the  New  York  Times,  I  think,  if  it 
was  any  place. 

The  Chairman.  I  think  if  he  needs  to  refresh  his  recollection,  he 
has  a  perfect  right  to  do  that. 

Mr.  Lamont.  I  am  not  sure  where  that  statement  appeared  pub- 
licly, but  I  believe  that  I  signed  some  statement  advocating  amnesty 
for  the  Communist  leaders  convicted  under  the  Smith  Act.  Was  that 
it? 

The  Chairman.  Yes. 

Mr.  Lamont.  Believing  as  I  do  that  the  Smith  Act  is  unconstitu- 
tional and  that 

The  Chairman.  I  am  not  asking  for  reasons.  I  want  to  know 
whether  you  signed  it  or  not. 

Mr.  Lamont.  Yes,  yes. 

The  Chairman.  Did  you  write  an  article  attacking  the  conviction 
of  the  11  Communists  in  a  letter  to  the  New  York  Times?  This  is  in 
1951. 

Mr.  Lamont.  Have  you  got  the  date  ? 

The  Chairman.  The  information  I  have  here,  and  this  may  not  be 
completely  accurate,  is  that  the  Daily  Worker  of  July  6, 1952,  on  page 
2,  carried  an  account  of  such  a  letter,  such  an  attack. 

Mr.  Lamont.  I  thought  you  said  it  was  the  Times  in  1951 ;  June  1951. 

The  Chairman.  Let  me — we  don't  want  to  confuse  you — me  ask 
the  question. 

The  question  was,  Did  you  write  a  letter  or  article  or  column  at- 
tacking the  Supreme  Court  for  having  upheld  the  conviction  of  the 
11  Communists  either — this  is  either  in  a  letter  to  the  New  York  Time? 
or  an  article  to  the  Times  ? 

You  asked  me,  as  I  understood,  to  refresh  your  recollection  as  to  the 
date.    I  do  not  have  the  date  from  the  New  York  Times.    I  have  what 
here  purports  to  be  an  account  from  the  Daily  Worker  of  July  6, 1951 
on  page  2. 

Does  that  refresh  your  recollection  so  you  can  answer  that  question  ? 

Mr.  Lamont.  Well,  Mr.  Chairman,  at  some  date — I  cannot  give  the 
date,  exact  date,  out  of  the  back  of  my  mind  because  frankly  I  don't 
remember  it  and  you  can't  provide  me  with  it.  But  I  did,  as  I  recall 
it,  write  a  letter  to  the  New  York  Times  criticizing  the  Supreme  Court 
decision  convicting  the  11  Communist  defendants  and  citing  the  posi- 
tion of  the  American  Civil  Liberties  Union  to  support  my  own 
position. 

The  Chairman.  Did  you  consider  the  Daily  Compass  as  a  Com- 
munist publication? 

Mr.  Wittenberg.  Decline  to  answer  that. 


12  COMMUNIST    INFILTRATION    IN   THE    ARMY 

Mr.  Lamont.  Oh,  I  decline  to  answer  that,  Mr.  Chairman,  on  the 
grounds  already  stated  in  exhibit  1. 

The  Chairman.  Did  you  do  any  work  for  the  Daily  Compass? 

(Mr.  Lamont  confers  with  Mr.  Wittenberg.) 

Mr.  Lamont.  Well,  I  think  it  is  an  improper  question,  Mr.  Chair- 
man, delving  into  my  journalistic  activities.  And  yet  I — to  avoid 
further  controversy  here,  since  there  is  already  so  much,  it  is  true  I 
wrote  some  articles  for  the  Daily  Compass  from  time  to  time. 

The  Chairman.  Did  you  consider  the  Daily  Compass  a  Communist 
paper  while  you  were  writing  for  it? 

Mr.  Lamont.  I  already  stated  that  I  decline  to  answer  that  par- 
ticular question. 

The  Chairman.  We  will  reframe  the  question,  thou. 

Mr.  Wittenberg.  On  the  grounds  stated. 

The  Chairman.  Did  you  work  for  the  Daily  Compass,  write  for  the 
Daily  Compass — strike  that. 

I  will  ask  a  preliminary  question  to  the  one — 

At  the  time  you  were  writing  for  the  Daily  Compass,  were  you  also 
writing  any  articles  or  documents  which  were  being  purchased  or  used 
by  the  United  States  Government  or  any  branch  of  it  ? 

(Mr.  Lamont  confers  with  Mr.  Wittenberg.) 

Mr.  Lamont.  I  object  to  that  on  the  matter  of  the  form  of  the  ques- 
tion, Mr.  Chairman,  and  also  on  the  grounds  stated  in  my  opening,  in 
exhibit  1. 

The  Chairman.  Did  you  consider  the  Daily  Worker — not  the  Daily 
Worker  but  the  Daily  Compass — to  be  a — I  believe  you  refused  to 
answer  the  question  but  so  the  record  is  clear — 

Did  you  consider  the  Daily  Compass  to  be  a  Communist  publication 
at  the  time  you  were  writing  for  it  ? 

Mr.  Lamont.  I  already  declined  to  answer  that,  Mr.  Chairman. 

The  Chairman.  You  already 

Mr.  Lamont.  On  the  grounds  stated. 

Mr.  Wittenbfrg.  In  exhibit  1. 

The  Chairman.  Exhibit  1. 

Mr.  Lamont.  In  exhibit  1,  that  is  right. 

The  Chairman.  You  are  ordered  to  answer.  I  assume  you  still 
decline. 

Mr.  Lamont.  We  have  already  gone  over  that,  it  seems  to  me. 

The  Chairman.  I  am  making  the  record  here.  You  are  ordered 
to  answer,  and  I  assume  you  still  decline. 

You  may  not  understand 

Mr.  Lamont.  I 

The  Chairman.  Why  I  always  order  you  to  answer.  I  think  you 
are  entitled  to  know  why  we  go  through  what  may  seem  to  you  like  a 
waste  of  time. 

I  understand  I  must  order  you  to  answer  in  case  the — and  get  your 
refusal  to  that  order — in  case  the  committee  decides  to  take  contempt 
action  against  you. 

And  for  that  reason  we  go  through  this  procedure  which  may  seem 
a  bit  lengthy  to  you. 

Did  you  ever  do  any  work  for  the  Daily  Worker? 

(Mr.  Lamont  confers  with  Mr.  Wittenberg.) 

Mr.  Lamont.  Mr.  Chairman,  work — what  do  you  mean?  Could  I 
ask  you  what  you  mean,  "Work  for  the  Daily  Worker"  ? 


COMMUNIST    INFILTRATION    IN    THE    ARMY  13 

The  Chairman.  What  do  you  understand  by  the  word  "worked"? 

Mr.  Wittenberg.  Don't  answer  that. 

Mr.  Lamont.  I  am  trying  to  get  an  elucidation  of  that  particular 
question. 

The  Chairman.  If  you  don't  understand,  we  will  reframe  it.  Did 
you  ever  write  for  the  Daily  Worker? 

Let's  make  it  simple.  Did  you  ever  receive  money  from  the  Daily 
Worker  ? 

Mr.  Lamont.  Not  to  my  knowledge,  Mr.  Chairman. 

The  Chairman.  Did  you  ever  do  any  writing  for  the  Daily  Worker  ? 

(Mr.  Lamont  confers  with  Mr.  Wittenberg.) 

Mr.  Lamont.  There  I  certainly  am  very  doubtful  of  that.  I  have 
written  for  so  many  publications,  and  once  in  a  while  a  publication 
will  reprint  something  of  mine  without  ever  even  notifying  me  of  it. 
I  am  very  doubtful  of  the  question,  but  I  would — I  would  have  to  do 
a  research  job  to  be  sure  of  the  answer  on  that. 

The  Chairman.  In  other  words,  your  answer  is  that  as  of  this 
moment  you  do  not  ever  recall  having  written  for  the  Daily  Worker 
but  you  are  not  sure ;  it  will  take  further  study  before  you  could  give 
us  a  specific,  positive  answer? 

Mr.  Lamont.  Yes ;  that  is  it. 

The  Chairman.  The  Chair  will  order  you  to  make  that  study  and 
furnish  the  answer  the  next  time  you  appear  before  the  committee. 

Mr.  Wittenberg.  Mr.  Chairman,  may  I  ask  you,  it  is  common 
knowledge  that  the  Daily  Worker  was  published  for  many  years.  To 
do  a  job  of  studying  that — I  don't  know  but  constitutionally,  sir, 
wouldn't  you  regard  that  as  cruel  and  inhuman  punishment  to  make 
a  man  read  the  files  of  the  Daily  Worker  from  beginning  to  end? 
Don't  you  think  he  is  entitled  to  have  some  date,  some  article,  instead 
of  saying,  "Will  you  read  the  Daily  Worker  from  beginning  to  end 
to  find  out?" 

The  Chairman.  I  don't  think  it  is  necessary  to  run  through  it  or 
read  it  from  beginning  to  end.  I  think  he  will  be  able  to  find  out 
from  the  staff  of  the  Daily  Worker.    I  assume  they  keep  a  file. 

Mr.  Wittenberg.  Sir,  again,  may  I  say,  their  files,  like  any  other 
newspaper's  files,  or  rather  their  employees  change  from  year  to  year. 
They  have  no  record.  I  will  say  there  are  articles  that  both  you  and 
I  have  written,  and  if  you  ask  me  where  I  have  written  it,  or  where 
it  appeared,  I  would  have  to  say  I  can't  say  whether  or  not  it  has 
appeared  or  how  many  times  or  where.  To  search  through  the  files 
or  the  papers — that  is  cruel. 

The  Chairman.  I  may  say  that  you  make  a  good  point  when  you 
say  he  should  not  be  required  to  read  every  issue  of  the  Daily  Worker 
over  the  last  10  years.    I  think  that  might  be  an  unreasonable  demand. 

Wouldn't  you  think  so,  Frank  ? 

Let  me  refresh  your  recollection.  You  can  make  a  note  of  these 
dates.  This  will  serve  the  purpose  and  save  the  difficulty  of  reading 
the  Daily  Worker. 

We  have  information — this  isn't  under  oath  so  it  could  be  in  error — 
probably  merely  some  information  we  have — in  June  1935,  starting 
away  back  in  June  of  1935  on  page 

I  beg  your  pardon.    This  is  Soviet  Russia  Today,  page  25. 

38794—53 3 


14  COMMUNIST    INFILTRATION    IN    THE    ARMY 

Mr.  Lamont.  Did  you  mean  Soviet  Russia  Today  or  the  Daily 
Worker? 

The  Chairman.  Just  a  second.  The  Daily  Worker,  January  29, 
1938. 

Mr.  Lamont.  January  28,  1938? 

The  Chairman.  Yes,  on  page  8.  Understand,  I  have  no  way  of 
knowing  whether  it  is  your  own  statement  or  whether  it  is  merely  an 
account  of  something  you  did  which  they  carried.  I  will  ask  you  to 
check  it. 

February  2,  1938,  page  2. 

March  7,  1938,  page  1.  This  apparently  shows  a  photo  of  you  in 
Russia.  It  discusses  a  broadcast  which  you  made  over  Moscow's  short- 
wave radio  station. 

The  next  one,  the  Daily  Worker  for  May  31,  1938 — let  me  ask  you 
this  question  if  I  may  break  into  this,  Mr.  Lamont. 

Did  you  make  a  speech  over  the  Moscow  shortwave  radio  station 
condemning  Governor  Dewey  for  an  attack  on  the  Moscow  purge 
trials? 

(Mr.  Lamont  confers  with  Mr.  Wittenberg.) 

Mr.  Lamont.  I  believe  I  made  a — I  did  broadcast  in  1938,  as  you 
state,  over  some  radio  station  in  Moscow,  but  I  don't  recall  frankly 
whether  I  mentioned  Mr.  Dewey  or  not  or  what  the  exact  subject  or 
what — or  indeed  everything  I  covered  in  said  speech. 

Again,  I  have  to  check. 

The  Chairman.  Under  whose  auspices  did  you  speak  ? 

Mr.  Lamont.  I  couldn't  possibly  recall  that  offhand,  Mr.  Chairman. 

The  Chairman.  Did  you  speak  from  Moscow? 

Mr.  Lamont.  I  already  stated  I  did ;  yes. 

The  Chairman.  From  Moscow,  did  you  speak  in  Russian  or 
English? 

Mr.  Lamont.  Well,  since  I  don't  know  the  Russian  language,  I 
suppose  I  must  have  broadcast  in  English. 

The  Chairman.   (Speaks  in  Russian.) 

Mr.  Wittenberg.  Niet.  I  will  speak  for  him,  since  he  doesn't 
know.    I  know  "Niet"  and  "Da." 

The  Chairman.  How  long  a  trip  did  you  make  to  Russia  ? 

(Mr.  Lamont  confers  with  Mr.  Wittenberg.) 

Mr.  Lamont.  I  think,  Mr.  Chairman,  that  this  is  an  improper  ques- 
tion, probing  into  my  personal  travels  and  so  I  again  refuse  to  answer 
on  the  grounds  of  exhibit  1. 

The  Chairman.  You  will,  again,  be  ordered  to  answer. 

Mr.  Lamont.  I  again  decline. 

The  Chairman.  Just  so  you  can't  at  any  future  time  in  any  legal 
action,  Mr.  Lamont,  claim  ignorance  of  the  purpose  of  this  inquiry 
today,  I  think  I  have  told  you  before,  but  I  will  repeat  it,  we  are  in- 
vestigating the  use  of  Communist  propaganda,  the  works  of  Com- 
munist authors  used  by  our  Army  to  indoctrinate  and  teach  our  troops. 
We  are  calling  individuals  before  us  who  have  been  named  as  Com- 
munists, who  have  been  identified  as  very  active  in  the  Communist 
movement.    We  are  asking  them  questions  about  their  activities. 

One  of  the  purposes,  you  see,  of  questioning  you  today  is  to  find  out 
whether  you  were  under  Communist  Party  discipline,  whether  you 
were  instructed  by  known  Communists,  whether  you  were  aided  by 


COMMUNIST    INFILTRATION    IN   THE    ARMY  15 

Communists  in  writing  the  material  which  our  Army  has  purchased 
and  used. 

When  we  ask  you  whether  or  not  you  have  spent  time  in  Moscow, 
in  Russia,  the  subsequent  questions  would  deal  with  whether  or  not 
this  material  was  written  while  you  were  there ;  was  it  under  the  in- 
structions from  the  Communist  government? 

We  intend  to  inquire  into  all  of  your  activities  having  to  do  with 
material  which  you  sold  to  the  United  States  Government  which  has 
been  used  by  our  military  forces. 

I  know  you  know  that,  but  I  want  the  record  absolutely  clear  so 
that  at  some  future  time  before  a  court,  you  can't  say  you  were  de- 
ceived before  this  committee. 

Mr.  Wittenberg.  May  I  consult  with  my  client? 

The  Chairman.  You  may  consult  with  your  client. 

(Mr.  Lamont  confers  with  Mr.  Wittenberg.) 

The  Chairman.  Have  the  record  also  show  an  additional  reason 
for  having  Mr.  Lamont  here  is  to  have  him  identify  whether  or  not 
other  individuals  who  wrote  for  our  military  or  whose  works  were 
used  by  the  military  were  or  were  not  Communists. 

Mr.  Lamont.  If  I  may  comment  on  your 

The  Chairman.  You  may  comment  at  as  great  length  as  you  care 
to  answer. 

Mr.  Lamont.  The  exposition  just  given  as  to  the  purpose  of  this 
inquiry,  I  feel  goes  far  afield.  I  have  already  stated  I  am  not  a  mem- 
ber and  never  have  been  a  member  of  the  Communist  Party. 

That  implies  I  have  never  been  under  so-called  discipline  of  the 
Communist  Party  and  that  your  inquiries  into  so-called  Communist 
Party  activities  of  mine  are  therefore  totally  irrelevant  to  this  inquiry 
about  books  used  by  the  Army. 

I  had  no  knowledge  they  were  using  my  books.  Lots  of  scholars  and 
college  teachers  quote  my  books  and  I  don't  have  any  knowledge  of  it. 
So  I  feel  I  here  am  being  dragged  into  a  fight  between  you  and  the 
United  States  Army,  and  I  really  am  an  innocent  bystander,  being  hit 
over  the  head  for  no  good  reason. 

The  Chairman.  Did  you  know  Harriet  L.  Moore  ? 

Mr.  Lamont.  Again  I  must  decline  to  answer  on  the  grounds  stated 
in  exhibit  1. 

The  Chairman.  Did  you  collaborate  with  Harriet  L.  Moore  in  her 
writing  of  the  chapter  which  was  reproduced  in  the  book  entitled 
"U.  S.  S.  R.,  a  Concise  Handbook"  by — edited  by  Mr.  Ernest  J. 
Simmons  ? 

Mr.  Lamont.  Again  I 

Mr.  Wittenberg.  You  ought  to  look  at  the  book.  How  do  you 
know  ?    May  we  see  the  book,  sir  ? 

The  Chairman.  Yes. 

Mr.  Wittenberg.  Thank  you,  sir. 

(Mr.  Lamont  confers  with  Mr.  Wittenberg.) 

The  Chairman.  Have  the  record  show  also — this  is  for  Mr. 
Lamont's  benefit — that  Mr.  O'Connor  appeared  before  the  committee 
several  months  ago  and  raised  the  question  of  the  jurisdiction  of  the 
committee  after  the  3  Democratic  members  had  decided  to  absent  them- 
selves from  the  committee. 

The  subcommittee  unanimously  voted  contempt.  The  full  commit- 
tee voted  contempt.    The  Senate  as  a  body  unanimously  voted  con- 


16  COMMUNIST    INFILTRATION    IN    THE    ARMY 

tempt,  and  Mr.  O'Connor's — the  grounds  for  refusing  to  answer  were 
the  same  as  Mr.  Lamont's. 

,  I  merely  put  this  into  the  record  now  to  notify  Mr.  Lamont  that  the 
Senate  as  a  whole  has  passed  on  this  question  before,  and  I  think  you 
should  know  that. 

Mr.  Lamont.  Mr.  Chairman,  in— — 

The  Chairman.  I  am  not  arguing  the  point. 

Mr.  Wittenberg.  Don't 

The  Chairman.  Just  notifying  you.  Just  for  your  information.  I 
feel  Ave  owe  that  notice  to  any  witness  who  appears  and  also,  so  that 
at  some  future  action,  you  cannot  maintain  that  the  committee  kept 
you  in  the  dark  or  deceived  you. 

Mr.  Lamont.  On  this  question  of  collaborating,  Mr.  Chairman,  I 
certainly  do  not  recall  or  remember  collaborating  on  such  an  article. 
On  this  article  by  Harriet  Moore. 

The  Chairman.  Did  you  know  Harriet  Moore  was  a  Communist? 

Mr.  Lamont.  I  decline  to  answer  that. 

The  Chairman.  On  what  ground? 

Mr.  Lamont.  On  the  ground  of  exhibit  1. 

The  Chairman.  Could  I  have  that  again,  Mr.  Counsel  ? 

Mr.  Wittenberg.  Yes.  I  was  just  looking  at  some  of  the  people  who 
contributed  here.    I  know  some  of  those. 

The  Chairman.  Did  you  know  whether  Mr.  Vladimir  Kazekavich, 
who  also  wrote  a  chapter  in  this  book  which  was  used  by  the  United 
States  Government — whether  he  was  a  Communist  ? 

Mr.  Lamont.  I  decline  to  answer  that,  too,  Mr.  Chairman,  on  the 
grounds  of  exhibit  1. 

The  Chairman.  You  are  ordered  to  answer. 

Mr.  Lamont.  I  refuse  to  answer. 

The  Chairman.  I  believe  I  overlooked  ordering  you  to  answer  on 
the  question  of  Harriet  Moore,  so  I  will  restate  the  question  and 
order  you  to  answer. 

Did  you  know  that  Harriet  Moore  was  a  Communist? 

Mr.  Lamont.  I  already  refused  to  answer  that,  Mr.  Chairman. 

The  Chairman.  Have  the  record  show  that  the  witness  is  ordered  to 
answer  and  still  refused. 

Did  you  know  whether  Frederick  L.  Schuman,  whose  works  also 
have  been  used  by  the  Government,  by  our  United  States  Army,  was  a 
Communist  ? 

Mr.  Lamont.  I  also  decline  to  answer  that  on  the  same  grounds. 

The  Chairman.  Exhibit  1? 

Mr.  Lamont.  Of  exhibit  1;  yes. 

The  Chairman.  You  are  ordered  to  answer. 

Mr.  Lamont.  I  decline. 

(Mr.  Lamont  confers  with  Mr.  Wittenberg.) 

The  Chairman.  Did  you  know  that  John  N.  Hazard 

Mr.  Wittenberg.  Pardon  me.  He  has  a  question  with  regard  to 
Schuman. 

(Mr.  Lamont  confers  with  Mr.  Wittenberg.) 

Mr.  Lamont.  As  I  said,  I  decline  to  answer  that. 

Well,  the  question  was  about  whom  now  ? 

The  Chairman.  Frederick  L.  Schuman. 

Mr.  Lamont.  I  decline  ,to  answer  that  question,  Mr.  Chairman. 


COMMUNIST    INFILTRATION    IN    THE    ARMY  17 

The  Chairman.  Did  you  know  that  John  N.  Hazard,  who  also  wrote 
material  which  is  used  by  the  United  States,  purchased  and  used  by 
the  United  States  Government,  was  a  member  of  the  Communist 
conspiracy  ? 

(Mr.  Lamont  confers  with  Mr.  Wittenberg.) 

Mr.  Lamont.  I  object  to  the  form  of  the  question,  Mr.  Chairman, 
and  the  word  "conspiracy." 

I  don't  know  what  the  dickens  that  means. 

The  Chairman.  You  don't?  You  don't  know  what  the  question 
means? 

Mr.  Lamont.  I  would  hesitate  to,  without  a  dictionary  and  a  few 
Senators  present,  to  even  define  the  word  "conspiracy"  or  what  is 
meant  by  it  in  that  question,  but 

The  Chairman.    You  mean? 

Mr.  Lamont.  In  any  case,  I  refuse  to  answer  the  question  on  the 
grounds  of  exhibit  1. 

The  Chairman.  If  you  refuse  on  the  ground  you  do  not  understand 
the  question,  we  will  try  and  help  you  to  understand  it.  If  you  are 
refusing  on  the  grounds  of  exhibit  1,  we  will  merely  note  that. 

Mr.  Lamont.  I  stand  on  exhibit  1.  The  other  was  just  obiter 
dicta. 

The  Chairman.  You  are  ordered  to  answer. 

Mr.  Lamont.  At  least  I  talk  Latin. 

The  Chairman.  You  are  ordered  to  answer. 

Mr.  Lamont.  No.     I  decline  to  do  that. 

The  Chairman.  Do  you  feel  that  the  Communist  Party  is  dedicated 
to  the  overthrow  of  this  Government  by  force  and  violence  ? 

Mr.  Lamont.  I  also  decline  to  answer  that  on  the  grounds  stated  in 
exhibit  1. 

The  Chairman.  Did  you  know  that  Sergie  Kournakoff,  who  pro- 
duced work  which  is  used  by  our  military,  was  a  member  of  the  Com- 
munist Party? 

Mr.  Lamont.  I  decline  to  answer  that 

The  Chairman.  Exhibit  1? 

Mr.  Lamont.  Too,  on  the  ground  of  exhibit  1. 

The  Chairman.  You  are  ordered  to  answer. 

You  will  still  refuse,  I  assume. 

You  are  ordered  to  answer. 

Mr.  Lamont.  Yes.     Excuse  me ;  yes,  yes. 

The  Chairman.  Did  you  know  that  Henry  Sigerist,  who  also  pro- 
duced written  material  which  was  used  by  the  military,  was  a  member 
of  the  Communist  Party? 

Mr.  Lamont.  I  decline  to  answer  that  on  the  same  grounds  of 
exhibit  1. 

The  Chairman.  Have  you  ever  been  at  a  meeting  where  there  was 
discussed  the  espionage  activities  of  members  of  the  Communist 
Party? 

Mr.  Lamont.  I  also  decline  to  answer  that  on  the  grounds  of 
exhibit  1. 

The  Chairman.  Do  you  know  any  member  of  the  Communist  Party 
who  to  your  knowledge  engaged  in  either  espionage  or  sabotage? 

(Mr.  Lamont  confers  with  Mr.  Wittenberg.) 

The  Chairman.  What  is  your  answer  to  that  question,  Mr.  Lamont? 


18  COMMUNIST    INFILTRATION    IN    THE    ARMY 

Mr.  Lamont.  Mr.  Chairman,  this  question  again  I  consider  im- 
proper. It  implies  a  great  deal  of  knowledge  on  the  part  of  the 
witness,  and  I  must  decline  to  answer  on  the  grounds  of  exhibit  1. 
The  Chairman.  Do  you — did  you  ever  attend  a  Communist  meet- 
ing at  which  any  member  of  the  Communist  Party,  that  is,  someone 
known  to  you  as  a  member  of  the  Communist  Party,  advocated  the 
overthrow  of  this  Government  by  force  and  violence  ? 
Mr.  Wittenberg.  You  can  answer. 

Mr.  Lamont.  On  the  same  grounds,  Mr.  Chairman,  I  must  decline 
to  answer.     That  is  exhibit  1. 
The  Chairman.  You  are  ordered  to  answer. 
Mr.  Lamont.  I  decline  again. 

The  Chairman.  Frank,  I  don't  think  I  have  anything  further  at 
this  time.     We  have  a  vast  amount  of  Communist  activities  here,  but 

why  waste  further  time  unless  there  is 

What  is  that? 

Yes ;  I  will  want  him  back  Monday. 

We  will  want  you  back  Monday,  Mr.  Lamont,  in  Washington,  at  10 
o'clock  in  the  morning  in  room  318  of  the  Senate  Office  Building. 
You  are  ordered  to  be  present  at  that  time. 
Mr.  Wittenberg.  May  I  have  one  moment,  Mr.  Senator? 
(Mr.  Lamont  confers  with  Mr.  Wittenberg.) 

Mr.  Wittenberg.  It  isn't  possible,  in  view  of  the  fact  you  are  going 
to  want  some  material  looked  up — 

The  real  reason  for  my  asking  is  that  I  have  got  a  case  out  West 
I  am  about  to  leave  for,  and  I  could  possibly  by  breaking  one  of  my 
legs — I  don't  suppose  a  crutch  matters — get  back  Sunday  night,  but 
I  do  hate  to  break  the  leg,  if  I  could  avoid  it.  If  it  is  possible  to  put 
it  later  in  the  week,  could  you  do  it  ?  It  is  purely  a  question  of — as 
I  say,  I  am  leaving  tonight,  if  they  have  got  that  plane  for  me.     The 

worst  about  it — I  understand  that  Tuesday 

The  Chairman.  I  will  be  absent  starting  Tuesday  for  some  time. 
Mr.  Wittenberg.  I  tell  you  what,  Senator,  it  would  be  a  great  con- 
venience to  me  if  you  just  said  Monday  afternoon  instead  of  Monday 
morning.     I  am  going  to  a  small  town,  and  making  connections  is  bad- 
The  Chairman.  Make  it  1  o'clock  Monday  afternoon. 

Mr.  Wittenberg.  Monday  afternoon,  1  o'clock.    Yes,  sir.    Room 

The  Chairman.  I  think  it  is  318. 
Mr.  Carr.  Check. 

Mr.  Wittenberg.  Senate  Office  Building. 
The  Chairman.  Yes.     If  it  is  not  there,  you  can  easily  check. 
Mr.  Wittenberg.  But  in  the  Senate  Office  Building. 
The  Chairman.  Yes. 

Incidentally,  1  o'clock  means  1  o'clock,  not  1 :  30,  because  I  am 
going  to  be  tied  up  all  afternoon. 
Mr.  Wittenberg.  I  understand. 

May  I  ask  whether  it  is  the  common  practice  to  provide  us  with  a 
copy  of  the  minutes. 

The  Chairman.  In  executive  sessions — if  it  is  a  public  session,  you 
have  a  perfect  right  to  obtain  a  copy.  In  executive  sessions  we  do 
not  give  out  any  copies  of  the  record.  However,  we  provide  that  if — 
we  do  provide  if  you  want  to  come  down  or  if  your  client  comes  down, 
you  can  go  over  the  record  to  make  any  corrections  in  what  you  think 
are  stenographic  errors,  or  if  the 


COMMUNIST    INFILTRATION    IN    THE    ARMY  19 

Mr.  Wittenberg.  We  can't  order  a  copy  at  our  expense  for  that 
purpose? 

The  Chairman.  No.  I  tell  you  why  you  can't,  because  it  is  strictly 
executive 

Mr.  Wittenberg.  I  understand.    If  it  is  a  rule- 


The  Chairman.  The  ruling  is  we  don't  hand  any  copies  out  to  any- 
body at  all. 

Mr.  Wittenberg.  May  we  have  the  stenographer  instructed  to  in- 
form us  when  a  copy  is  available  for  our  examination  ? 

The  Chairman.  Frank,  will  you  do  that? 

Mr.  Wittenberg.  Thank  you. 

The  Chairman.  Mr.  Keporter,  when  do  you  think  the  record  will 
be  ready? 

(Discussion  off  the  record.) 

The  Chairman.  I  may  say,  Mr.  Counsel,  ordinarily  we  do  not  give 
the  names  of  any  witnesses  who  are  called  in  executive  session.  How- 
ever, it  has  been  general  knowledge  that  Mr.  Lamont  would  be  called. 
His  name  has  been  used  in  connection  with  this,  so  that  the  press  will 
know  Mr.  Lamont  is  here. 

He,  of  course,  has  a  perfect  right  to  tell  them  anything  he  cares 
to.  There  is  no  prohibition  against  his  telling  the  press  what  he  thinks 
happened  in  this  room,  if  he  wants  to.  That  is  not  a  violation  of  the 
executive  session. 

The  reason  why  he  is  entitled  to  do  that  is  because  I  give  the  press 
a  resume  of  what  went  on,  and  he,  having  been  identified,  has  a  perfect 
right  to  say  whatever  he  wants  to  the  press.  He  can  tell  them  anything 
and  describe  anything  that  went  on  in  this  room. 

Mr.  Lamont.  One  question.  You  were  going  to  give  me  a  copy 
of  this  very  interesting  report  so  I  could  try  and  identify 

Mr.  Wittenberg.  Like  every  literary  man,  he  wants  every  book  he 
can  get  for  nothing. 

The  Chairman.  We  will  have  to  send  you  a  copy.  This  is  the  only 
copy  we  have.  We  will  send  you  a  copy  of  that.  Some  of  the  material 
we  asked  you  to  produce,  you  won't  be  able  to  produce  by  Monday,  but 
we  will  ask  anyhow. 

The  session  is  adjourned. 

Before  we  go,  Mr.  Budenz,  you  have  listened  to  the  testimony.  Can 
you  identify  this  as  the  man  whom  you  discussed  in  your  testimony 
before  ? 

Mr.  Budenz.  Yes,  sir. 

The  Chairman.  Good. 

(Witness  excused.) 

The  Chairman.  Mr.  Cohn,  who  is  your  first  witness  ? 

Mr.  Cohn.  Mr.  Igor  Bogolepov. 

The  Chairman.  Mr.  Bogolepov,  you  have  been  sworn  and  you  are 
reminded  that  your  oath  is  still  in  effect.  I  would  like  to  make  it  very 
clear  that  Mr.  Bogolepov  is  not  here  at  his  own  request,  and  he  was 
very  reluctant  to  appear  and  he  asked  us  not  to  call  him.  One  of  the 
reasons  he  gave  was  that  he  appeared  before  the  McCarran  com- 
mittee some  time  ago  and  he  immediately  lost  his  job  with  the  Gov- 
ernment, and  he  is  not  too  enthusiastic  about  appearing  before  com- 
mittees.    He  is  here  only  under  subpena. 

Is  that  right? 


20  COMMUNIST    INFILTRATION   EST    THE    ARMY 

TESTIMONY  OF  IGOR  BOGOLEPOV 

Mr.  Bogolepov.  That  is  right. 

The  Chairman.  Mr.  Cohn,  do  you  want  to  proceed  ? 

Mr.  Cohn.  Could  we  have  your  full  name,  and  would  you  spell  it 
for  us,  please  ? 

Mr.  Bogolepov.  My  first  name  is  "Igor,"  and  my  last  name  is 
"Bogolepov."    That  is  B-o-g-o-l-e-p-o-v. 

Mr.  Cohn.  Now,  Mr.  Bogolepov,  would  you  give  us  very  briefly  a 
background  of  your  career,  and  tell  us  where  you  were  born  and  what 
you  did  before  you  came  to  this  country  ? 

Mr.  Bogolepov.  I  was  born  in  Siberia  in  1904.  In  1923,  I  entered 
the  Foreign  Service  of  the  Soviet  Union,  and  I  was  with  this  service 
until  1942. 

The  Chairman.  You  were  in  the  Russian  Foreign  Service  until 
1942? 

Mr.  Bogolepov.  I  was  with  the  Soviet  Foreign  Service,  sir.  I  occu- 
pied various  positions  in  Moscow  and  abroad.  For  example,  I  par- 
ticipated in  almost  all  international  conferences  held  in  Geneva  under 
the  League  of  Nations.  I  also  took  part  in  many  international  nego- 
tiations which  were  carried  out  with  the  foreign  governments,  includ- 
ing the  Nazi-Soviet  Pact  of  1939,  and  all  negotiations  with  repre- 
sentatives of  President  Roosevelt,  Harry  Hopkins,  in  the  summer  of 
1941. 

The  Chairman.  I  am  sorry,  I  did  not  quite  get  that. 

Mr.  Bogolepov.  And  also  I  participated  in  negotiations  with  repre- 
sentatives of  President  Roosevelt,  Harry  Hopkins,  in  the  summer  of 
1941. 

Then  I  was  sent  to  France,  and  it  was  during  World  War  II,  and 
together  with  other  officers  and  generals  of  the  Red  army,  I  deserted 
over  the  f rontlines  to  Germany  in  order  to  try  to  use  the  German  war 
machine  for  the  destruction  of  the  Communist  regime  in  my  native 
country.  I  failed  to  do  this  because  the  Germans  were  fighting,  not 
against  communism,  but  merely  against  the  Russian  nation. 

They  put  me  for  a  while  in  the  Gestapo  jail;  and  after  this,  after 
my  release  with  the  help  of  some  German  diplomats  from  the  German 
Foreign  Office,  I  worked  on  a  Bavarian  farm  in  Germany  until  the 
American  troops  arrived  in  the  spring  of  1945. 

The  Chairman.  You  are  under  sentence  of  death  at  this  time,  are 
you  not,  from  the  present  Russian  regime? 

Mr.  Bogolepov.  That  is  right ;  yes. 

Unfortunately,  because  of  the  policy  of  the  administration  of  those 
days,  of  the  American  Government,  in  accordance  with  the  Yalta 
agreement  to  deliver  all  anti-Russian  Communists  to  the  Soviet  police, 
I  was  obliged  to  go  into  hiding,  and  I  was  living  illegally  in  the 
American  Zone  of  Germany  for  about  3  years. 

The  Chairman.  Let  me  see  if  I  understood  you  correctly.  You  say 
because  of  the  agreement  at  Yalta  to  deliver  all  of  the  Russian  anti- 
Communists  to  the  Soviet  secret  police,  because  of  that  you  had  to  go 
into  hiding  ? 

Mr.  Bogolepov.  That  is  right,  sir. 

In  1947,  I  came  out  of  my  hideout  because  of  change  in  American 
policy,  and  I  talked  to  the  representative  of  the  United  States  Army 
in  Germany,  who  I  am  and  where  I  stand,  and  I  was  employed  by  the 


COMMUNIST    INFILTRATION    IN   THE    ARMY  21 

United  States  Army  in  Germany  as  an  instructor  with  the  Army 
intelligence  school  in  Oberammergau. 

Then  I  was  transferred,  or  I  had  better  say  employed  by  the  General 
Staff  school  in  Eegensberg,  Germany.  There  I  was  active  from  1948 
to  1952  as  instructor  and  lecturer  on  the  Soviet  affairs. 

In  1952, 1  was  brought  by  the  Army  to  this  country  under  subpena 
of  the  United  States  Senate,  and  there  testified  before  the  Senate 
Internal  Security  Committee  in  the  case  of  the  Institute  of  Pacific 
Relations. 

After  this  time,  I  mean  since  last  year,  I  am  living  in  this  country  on 
temporary  basis. 

Mr.  Cohn.  Now,  Mr.  Bogolepov,  I  am  going  to  hand  to  you  at  this 
time  an  Army  document  entitled  "Psychological  and  Cultural  Traits 
of  Soviet  Siberia,"  which  has  been  identified  and  placed  in  evidence 
before  the  committee  as  exhibit  No.  2,  and  which  is  a  document  that 
was  distributed  by  the  Army  in  the  Far  East  Command  and  in  other 
areas. 

(Exhibit  No.  2  will  be  found  in  the  appendix  on  p.  44.) 

The  Chairman.  We  should  make  it  very  clear  for  the  record  that 
this  has  not  been  distributed  since  the  beginning  of  1953. 

Mr.  Cohn.  It  has  not  been  distributed  certainly  since  Secretary 
Stevens  took  office. 

The  Chairman.  I  think  we  should  also  make  it  clear  that  Secretary 
Stevens  has  informed  us  that  where  we  turn  up  any  Communists  whose 
writings  are  being  used,  he  will  not  under  any  circumstances  use  their 
writings  to  indoctrinate  our  men. 

Mr.  Cohn.  Now,  Mr.  Bogolepov,  have  you  made  a  careful  study 
and  examination  of  this  Army  document? 

Mr.  Bogolepov.  Yes,  sir,  Mr.  Cohn ;  I  did. 

Mr.  Cohn.  And  in  making  that  examination,  did  you  draw  on  your 
background  as  one  who  was  born  in  Siberia,  the  area  dealt  with  in 
this  pamphlet,  and  one  who  has  had  an  intimate  knowledge  of  condi- 
tions dealt  with  in  this  document,  firsthand  ? 

Mr.  Bogolepov.  Yes,  sir;  I  did. 

Mr.  Cohn.  I  would  like  you  to  tell  the  committee  whether  or  not 
you  have  reached  any  conclusion  as  to  whether  this  document  is  an 
accurate  document,  and  whether  it  truly  gives  a  true  picture  of  the 
conditions  in  Soviet  Siberia  which  it  seeks  to  do,  and  which  it  is 
supposed  to  seek  to  do  ? 

Mr.  Bogolepov.  Unfortunately,  I  have  to  give  a  negative  answer 
to  your  question,  Mr.  Cohn.  In  my  opinion,  to  put  it  briefly  and 
bluntly,  this  is  not  information  about  Soviet  Siberia,  but  this  is  mis- 
information about  Soviet  Siberia,  and  the  question  which  I  would 
like  to  put,  myself,  before  the  committee  is  whether  it  is  deliberative 
misinformation,  or  just  out  of  sheer  ignorance. 

Mr.  Cohn.  Does  any  of  this  misinformation  favor  the  Communist 
viewpoint,  and  does  any  of  it  color  the  facts  to  fit  in  with  the  claims 
of  the  Communists? 

Mr.  Bogolepov.  Every  misinformation  of  the  free  world  certainly 
serves  the  Communist  cause,  but  speaking  about  this  particular  docu- 
ment, I  would  say  openly  that  there  is  a  lot  of  deliberate  misinforma- 
tion which  serves  the  interests  of  the  Communist  cause. 

The  Chairman.  May  I  interrupt  you  there  ? 

38794—53 4 


22  COMMUNIST    INFILTRATION    IN   THE    ARMY 

Mr.  Bogolepov,  as  I  read  this  document,  I  find  some  material  is 
critical  of  the  Communist  regime,  and  my  estimate  would  be  about 
95  percent  very  favorable  and  about  5  percent  critical.  Whenever  we 
find  a  document  of  this  kind,  I  find  that  those  who  are  responsible  for 
its  production,  and  sometimes  those  who  feel  that  for  some  unknown 
reason  they  must  protect  the  whole  team  that  are  responsible,  cite  the  5 
percent  which  slaps  communism  on  the  wrist. 

You  know  a  lot  about  Soviet  propaganda,  and  would  you  tell  us 
whether  or  not  tins  is  the  modus  operandi,  this  is  the  method  of  oper- 
ating, and  would  you  say  it  is  the  normal  propaganda  method  to  put 
something  in  a  document  critical  of  the  Soviet  Union  so  that  the  part 
that  praises  it  highly  would  be  more  effective  ? 

Mr.  Bogolepov.  I  have  to  make  it  clear  that  the  Soviet  Foreign 
Office,  with  which  I  have  been  cooperating  almost  20  years,  is  less 
a  diplomatic  institution,  and  merely  it  is  an  institution  for  political 
intelligence.  The  main  and  chief  task  of  the  Soviet  Foreign  Office  is 
planting  in  the  western  mind  false  ideas  about  the  Soviet  Union  and 
its  policies. 

In  the  first  period,  in  the  early  thirties  and  twenties,  it  was  possible 
to  get  out  with  pro-Soviet  propaganda  in  the  open,  to  simply  praise 
openly  and  overtly  that  there  is  a  paradise,  a  Socialist  paradise,  and 
it  lives  much  better  than  the  United  States  and  every  other  country 
of  the  Western  World.  But  when  the  conditions  changed,  the  Com- 
munist propaganda  was  obliged  also  to  go  underground,  so  to  say,  and 
starting  with  the  middle  of  the  thirties,  and  especially  before  World 
War  II,  the  instructions  were  multiplying  in  their  secret  files  of  the 
Soviet  Foreign  Office  to  the  effect  that  the  Soviet  intelligence,  and 
police  intelligence,  and  Soviet  diplomacy  and  Soviet  propaganda 
abroad,  had  to  use  the  device  of  a  covert  propaganda  in  order  to  make 
the  people  in  the  West  believe  that  everything  is  all  right  with  the 
Soviet  Union;  it  wasn't  possible  any  more  to  say  this  in  black  and 
white,  but  it  was  always  directed  to  make  it  appear  as  objective  as 
possible. 

Therefore,  the  Soviet  ambassadors  abroad,  which  were  and  evidently 
are  carrying  out  the  instruction  of  the  fellow  travelers  in  every 
western  country,  were  instructed,  first  by  Litvinov  and  second  by 
Molotov  when  he  became  Foreign  Commissar  just  before  the  war,  to 
use  the  merit  of  half  truth  and  full  lies.  Evidently  your  question 
pointed  to  this. 

The  Chairman.  You  worked  in  the  Foreign  Office,  and  you  knew 
Litvinov  and  Molotov  personally  ? 

Mr.  Bogolepov.  That  is  right. 

The  Chairman".  Let  me  ask  you  this :  Would  you  think  that  there 
is  any  answer  other  than  either  stupidity  or  a  deliberate  attempt  to 
use  Soviet  propaganda,  or  any  other  reason  for  putting  out  a  document 
such  as  this  ? 

Mr.  Bogolepov.  I  would  answer  your  question  this  way,  by  very 
emphatic  assertion  that  in  part  it  was  a  deliberate  intention,  due  to 
the  instruction  which  the  Soviet  Government  in  Moscow  gave  to  the 
Communist  Party  in  the  world,  and  through  the  Communist  Party  to 
the  fellow  travelers  from  which  ranks  so-called  Russian  experts  in  this 
country  are  composed  of. 


COMMUNIST    INFILTRATION    IN    THE    ARMY  23 

The  Chairman.  Mr.  Bogolepov,  did  you  know  a  Mr.  Ernest  J. 
Simmons,  either  personally  or  through  the  Soviet  diplomatic  chan- 
nels? 

Mr.  Bogolepov.  I  saw  Mr.  Simmons  once  in  Moscow  in  the  office 
of  the  Press  Division  of  the  Soviet  Foreign  Office.  The  Press  Divi- 
sion of  the  Kussian  Foreign  Office  was  an  agency  which  since  long 
ago  was  used  for  indoctrination  of  the  foreign  fellow  travelers,  giving 
them  instruction,  what  kind  of  stuff  they  have  to  put  out  back  home 
into  the  hands  of  their  fellow  countrymen. 

The  Chairman.  I  have  a  book  here,  Mr.  Bogolepov,  entitled 
"U.  S.  S.  R.,  a  Concise  Handbook,"  edited  by  Ernest  J.  Simmons,  and 
this  has  been  used  by  the  military  up  through  1952,  and  the  new 
Secretary  of  the  Army  said  he  would  immediately  check  to  see 
whether  it  is  still  being  used.     We  have  not  received  that  word  yet. 

Do  you  know  whether  or  not  this  man  Simmons  was  receiving  in- 
structions directly  from  the  Soviet  Foreign  Office  at  the  time  this  book 
was  being  edited  by  him  ? 

Mr.  Bogolepov.  Well,  Senator,  in  a  way,  frankly  speaking,  there 
was  instructions,  but  you  must  understand  that  the  Communist  propa- 
gandists were  clever  enough  to  talk  to  the  foreign  guests  whom  they 
wanted  to  indoctrinate  in  a  way  which  will  not  make  them  just  subor- 
dinate his  instructions.  It  was  done  this  way :  That  Professor  Sim- 
mons and  a  lot  of  other  American  and  Western  European  professors, 
lawyers,  and  even  politicians,  who  came  to  Moscow  to  do  so-called 
research  work — which  in  a  Communist  country  is  a  work  of  indoc- 
trination into  Communist  and  Marxist  spirit — they  were  simply  ask- 
ing the  questions,  and  they  received  the  answers  which  they  put  in 
their  notebooks,  which  certainly  were  101  percent  Communist 
propaganda. 

The  Chairman.  Is  it  your  testimony  that  Simmons  came  to  the 
Foreign  Office  and  received  instructions  from  the  Soviet  Foreign  Office, 
either  through  London  or  Moscow  ? 

Mr.  Bogolepov.  Yes;  at  least  in  one  instance  which  is  personally 
known  to  me. 

The  Chairman.  I  interrupted  you  when  you  were  starting  to  ana- 
lyze this  document,  Psychological  and  Cultural  Traits  of  Soviet  Si- 
beria, and  will  you  proceed  with  your  analysis  of  that  document? 

Mr.  Bogolepov.  As  I  just  mentioned,  this  document  is  extremely 
dangerous,  because  it  is  confusing,  and  it  is  confusing  because  it  gives 
some  things  which  are  true,  and  these  true  things  are  used  as  a  cover 
for  making  use  of  a  lot  of  things  which  are  not  true.  That  is  the 
method  of  the  Communist  propagandizes,  which,  as  I  testified  before, 
was  commanded  by  the  Soviet  propaganda  to  use  in  the  Western 
World.  It  was  to  make  this  Communist,  pro-Soviet  propaganda  look 
as  objective  and  neutral  as  possible. 

In  the  75  pages  of  this  document,  you  see  the  same  method  applied 
in  various  forms.  You  might  see  here  the  very  true  statements,  for 
example,  as  to  the  absence  of  any  hostility  of  the  average  Russian 
toward  Americans.  That  is  true.  But  this  truth  is  used  by  the 
authors  of  this  intelligence  document  to  imply  that  the  Russian  people, 
having  some  positive  traits  like  patriotism  and  benevolence,  and  so 
on,  that  the  Russian  people  are  devoted  to  their  country,  and  they 
make  the  Russian  soil  and  this  mother  Russia  identical  with  the  Soviet 
Union.    And  with  this  type  of  trick,  they  try  to  indoctrinate  the 


24  COMMUNIST    INFILTRATION    IN    THE    ARMY 

United  States  Army  officers  in  the  spirit  that  the  whole  Russian  people 
are  pro-Communist,  and  in  the  case  of  war  the  American  Army  has 
to  do  just  one  thing;  namely,  to  fight  against  the  whole  Russian  nation. 

That  is  just  to  give  you  one  illustration. 

I  say  that  various  methods  are  used  in  this  pamphlet,  in  this  paper, 
and  I  was  extremely  appalled,  and  I  would  say  even  frightened,  when 
I  discovered  that  some  of  the  parts  of  the  testimony  of  American 
intelligence,  given  to  American  intelligence  officers,  are  just  retelling, 
almost  word  for  word,  of  the  sayings  of  such  Communist  leaders  as 
Stalin,  Lenin,  and  other  Communist  documents. 

If  you  would  permit  me  to  give  you  just  a  few  examples.  Starting 
with  the  very  first  page  of  this  intelligence  document,  we  might  find 
this  statement,  that  "the  harsh  Soviet  Government  has  liquidated  or 
expelled  potentially  rebellious  elements."  I  have  before  me  the  Rus- 
sian edition  of  the  Stalin  main  book,  The  Problems  of  Leninism,  and 
here  the  English  version  of  the  same  book.  We  might  find  on  page 
543  the  words  of  Stalin,  "The  landlord  class  has  already  been  elimi- 
nated. As  for  the  other  exploiting  classes,  they  have  shared  the  fate 
of  the  landlord  class.  The  capitalist  class  has  ceased  to  exist.  The 
kulak  class  has  ceased  to  exist.  Thus  all  the  exploiting  classes  have 
now  been  eliminated." 

That  is  the  same  idea  of  elimination  of  any  opposition  inside  the 
Soviet  Union  toward  the  Communist  regime. 

What  is  the  aim,  and  what  is  the  hidden  aim  behind  such  a  state- 
ment, gentlemen?  To  me,  it  is  quite  obvious  that  the  officers  of  the 
United  States  Army  are  indoctrinated  to  believe  that  in  case  of  con- 
flict, they  will  have  before  them  the  whole  Russian  nation,  and  no 
opposition  behind  this  wall  of  Communist  supporters  which  might 
be  used  by  American  Intelligence  for  the  aims  of  psychological  war- 
fare, for  getting  the  friends  and  allies  behind  the  Communist  lines. 
It  is  a  very  dangerous  conception ;  and  this  conception,  unfortunately, 
you  may  find  in  most  of  the  writings  of  the  so-called  experts  on  Rus- 
sian affairs. 

Now,  on  page  4  to  5  of  the  intelligence  document  you  can  find  the 
ideological  description  of  how  wonderful  the  life  is  in  the  Soviet 
paradise.  "The  toiler  was  elevated  to  the  highest  level  of  respectabl- 
ism.  It  is  possible  for  the  outstanding  worker  to  exceed  the  earning 
power.  The  farmer's  status  has  also  risen  sharply,  and  he  is  also  in 
good  shape.  The  women  are  virtually  on  a  par  with  men  in  all  walks 
of  life."    And  it  goes  on,  et  cetera,  et  cetera,  and  et  cetera. 

In  The  Problems  of  Leninism,  of  Stalin,  in  his  speech  on  the  con- 
stitution of  the  Soviet  Union,  you  might  read,  and  I  quote  now  "The 
Problems  of  Leninism,"  by  Stalin,  so  you  might  compare  them : 

"Things  are  different  under  the  Soviet  system.  Here  the  working 
man  is  held  in  esteem.  Here  he  works  not  for  the  exploiters,  but  for 
himself.  If  he  works  well,  and  gives  society  his  best,  he  is  a  hero  of 
labor,  and  is  covered  with  glory." 

It  is  almost  word-for-word  retelling  of  the  statement  which  we 
find  in  the  intelligence  document. 

The  Chairman.  Do  I  understand  that  it  is  your  testimony  that  you 
find  the  same  material  in  this  Army  intelligence  document,  practically 
word  for  word,  that  you  find  in  the  Soviet  bible,  if  you  can  call  it 
that,  The  Problems  of  Leninism  ? 

Mr.  Bogolepov.  That  is  right. 


COMMUNIST    INFILTRATION    EST   THE    ARMY  25 

The  Chairman.  And  it  is  your  position  that  from  your  experience  in 
the  Soviet  Union,  this  is  not  true,  and  this  is  merely  Soviet  propa- 
ganda ;  is  that  correct  ? 

Mr.  Bogolepov.  I  would  say,  sir,  that  my  English  is  not  very  broad, 
so  the  word  "untrue"  is  too  mild,  and  the  strongest  expression  I  could 
use,  it  is  simply  a  pattern,  40  years  after  the  existence  of  the  Com- 
munist tyranny,  that  such  words  might  be  uttered  in  a  top  secret 
document  for  the  information  of  American  officers.  That  is,  as  a 
French  diplomat  of  the  last  century  said,  "It  is  not  a  crime ;  it  is  worse 
than  a  crime.    It  is  a  mistake." 

Mr.  Jones.  Are  quotes  put  around  any  of  those  identical  passages 
that  you  cited  ? 

The  Chairman.  I  do  not  think  Mr.  Bogolepov  understands.  Bob 
Jones  is  here  representing  Senator  Potter. 

May  I  say  to  you,  Bob,  that  there  are  no  quotes  any  place  in  this 
document,  and  there  is  no  way  that  anyone  would  know  from  reading  it 
that  Lenin  is  being  quoted. 

Mr.  Bogolepov.  It  is  from  Stalin's  The  Problems  of  Leninism,  and 
on  page  9  of  the  intelligence  document,  for  example,  you  might  find  the 
statement  of  this  type,  that  "Russia  is  now  a  regime  of  peoples."  This 
is  taken  from  this  book,  that  is,  the  Communist  bible,  as  the  Senator 
said,  The  Short  Story  of  the  Soviet  Communist  Party  in  the  Soviet 
Union,  a  Textbook  for  Every  Communist  in  the  Soviet  Union,  and  also 
in  the  Western  World.  On  page  6  of  this  book  of  lies  and  distortions 
I  read :  "Czarist  Russia  was  known  as  a  regime  of  peoples."  It  is 
almost  an  identical  quotation. 

Mr.  Cohn.  Mr.  Bogolepov,  in  this  Army  document,  they  do  not 
point  out  that  they  are  actually  virtually  quoting  from  this. 

Mr.  Bogolepov.  That  is  what  I  intended  to  say,  and  certainly  in  a 
document  which  treats  of  Soviet  affairs,  it  would  be  more  than  natural 
to  have  the  quotation  from  the  Communist  leaders,  but  an  intelligent 
and  objective  research  worker  should  mention  where  these  quotations 
are  taken  from,  and  put  them  in  quotation  marks  so  that  he  would  be 
on  his  guard  that  he  has  to  do  something  with  Communist  propa- 
ganda ;  but  taking  away  the  quotation  any  reference,  they  let  speak 
the  American  Army  Intelligence  the  same  words  as  Lenin  and  Stalin 
are  speaking. 

The  Chairman.  At  this  point,  I  would  like  to  make  the  record  very 
clear  that  there  were  some  intelligent,  loyal  people  in  the  Army  who 
objected  to  this  document,  and  we  had  testimony  in  executive  session 
the  other  day  that  a  Major  Wilson — I  think  it  was  a  Major  Wilson — 
strongly  objected  to  this,  and  pointed  out  this  was  Soviet  propaganda, 
Communist  propaganda,  from  beginning  to  end,  and  he  pointed  out 
the  danger  of  using  this  to  indoctrinate  intelligence  officers  and  others, 
and  he  pointed  out  that  this  was  using  verbatim  the  material  from  the 
works  of  Lenin  and  of  Stalin  and  Karl  Marx,  and  he  objected  so 
loudly  that  Army  Intelligence  finally  was  forced  to  call  a  board  to  pass 
upon  this.  And  for  some  unknown  reason,  this  board  that  was  called 
upon  to  pass  upon  the  question  of  whether  this  was  Communist  propa- 
ganda decided,  according  to  testimony  received  in  executive  session 
the  other  day,  that  they  would  make  no  recommendation  one  way  or  the 
other,  and  they  merely  said  that  there  were  errors  in  the  booklet,  but 
they  thought  it  should  be  used. 


26  COMMUNIST    INFILTRATION    IN   THE    ARMY 

I  should  point  out  it  was  a  civilian  who  was  selected  to  head  this 
board,  and  that  civilian  also  is  holding  a  high  position  as  of  today 
over  in  the  Pentagon. 

I  merely  want  to  make  this  clear  so  that  it  would  not  appear  this 
committee  is  attributing  this  to  all  of  the  officers  in  the  Army. 

Mr.  Bogolepov.  If  I  may  make  an  observation  to  you,  sir. 

The  Chairman.  Certainly. 

Mr.  Bogolepov.  I  was  very  glad,  and  I  would  say  in  a  way  proud, 
because  I  belonged  to  the  United  States  Army  for  several  years,  of 
the  fact  that  some  of  the  officers  opposed  the  pro-Communist  indoctri- 
nation, and  especially  that  you  mentioned  the  name  of  Major  Wilson, 
for  Major  Wilson  was  one  of  my  students  in  Regensberg. 

I  wish  to  say,  gentlemen,  that  what  I  was  told  before  against  this 
document  released  by  Army  intelligence  has  nothing  to  do  with  my 
opinion  about  the  personnel  of  the  American  Army.  I  was  working 
for  the  Army  for  5  years.  My  impression,  and  the  impression  of  a 
Russian  of  the  former  college  of  the  Red  army  who  came  to  this  coun- 
try in  order  to  help  the  American  people  to  fight  for  their  freedom  and 
to  fight  for  our  Russian  freedom,  is  that  the  majority  of  the  officers 
and  men  I  met  during  my  stay  with  the  Army  were  anti-Communist, 
and  they  were  extremely  patriotic  elements,  and  I  am  glad  and  proud 
to  testify  that  during  my  work  in  Regensberg  Military  School,  I  met 
a  lot  of  officers  of  the  United  States  Army  who  were  strongly  objecting 
to  the  Russian  propaganda  as  Major  Wilson  did 

The  Chairman.  We  have  much  more  we  want  to  ask  you.  How- 
ever, we  have  a  number  of  other  witnesses,  and  the  chief  counsel,  Mr. 
Cohn  here,  has  suggested  that  we  ask  you  to  step  down,  and  call  Mr. 
Budenz  now. 

Mr.  Cohn.  There  is  one  thing  I  wanted  to  cover. 

Mr.  Bogolepov,  with  reference  to  the  bibliography  attached  to  this 
Army  report,  the  place  where  they  list  the  sources  from  which  they 
have  drawn — are  you  familiar  with  that  ? 

Mr.  Bogolepov.  Yes,  sir. 

Mr.  Cohn.  I  see  one  of  the  sources  is  a  book  by  Bernard  Pares, 
entitled  "A  History  of  Russia."  Are  you  familiar  with  that  book  by 
Sir  Bernard  Pares? 

Mr.  Bogolepov.  Yes;  I  am. 

Mr.  Cohn.  While  you  were  an  official  of  the  Soviet  Government, 
did  you  ever  hear  anything  about  this  man,  Sir  Bernard  Pares  ? 

Mr.  Bogolepov.  Yes,  sir;  I  did. 

Mr.  Cohn.  Would  you  tell  us  what  you  heard  about  Bernard  Pares  ? 

Mr.  Bogolepov.  I  am  sorry,  I  can't  quote  the  date,  because  I  saw 
during  my  service  in  the  Foreign  Office  thousands  of  fellow  travelers, 
and  so  I  couldn't  remember  any  name  of  the  western  fellow  travelers 
who  came  to  us,  but  I  do  remember  that  sometime  in  the  thirties,  per- 
haps in  the  middle  of  the  thirties,  there  came  a  letter  from  the  Soviet 
Ambassador  in  London,  telling  that  one  of  the  most  notorious  British 
authorities  on  Russian  and  Soviet  affairs,  Sir  Bernard  Pares,  appeared 
at  the  Embassy  and  asked  the  assistance  of  the  Soviet  Ambassador  in 
creating,  if  I  make  no  mistake,  of  the  last  chapter  of  his  History  of 
Russia,  dealing  with  the  Communist  period,  on  the  Communist  period 
of  Russian  history. 


COMMUNIST    INFILTRATION    IN   THE    ARMY  27 

Certainly  he  received  every  assistance  possible;  and  if  you  have 
before  you  his  book,  you  would  see  that  this  book  is  written  in  the 
same  way  in  which  this  intelligence  document  is  written.  I  mean,  it 
is  a  misintelligence  way.  They  are  saying  some  nice  and  true  things 
about  the  Russian  people  as  different  from  the  Communist  regime,  and 
then  they  switch  to  the  laudatory  that  the  Russians  and  Communists 
are  all  alike,  and  their  life  is  very  happy,  and  so ;  in  other  words,  it 
is  a  typical  pro-Communist  propaganda,  put  into  the  hands  of  the 
western  scholars  in  order  to  confuse  the  western  public  opinion 
and  to  confuse  the  real  issue  which  stands  before  the  free  world  in 
its  fight  against  communism. 

Mr.  Cohn.  Now,  this  Pares  book  is  cited  as  one  of  the  works  used 
by  the  Army  in  preparing  the  document  concerning  which  you  have 
testified.  Did  you  ever  see  this  Pares  book  used  in  any  other  con- 
nection when  you  were  with  the  Army  ? 

Mr.  Bogolepov.  Not  only  did  I  see  it,  but  I  got  in  some  trouble  in 
connection  with  the  book,  so  I  will  remember  it  for  the  rest  of  my  life. 
This  book  was  used  by  the  Army  school  in  Oberammergau  as  a  basic 
textbook  for  indoctrination  of  the  Army  personnel. 

Mr.  Cohn.  This  very  book,  The  History  of  Russia,  by  Pares,  whose 
connection  with  the  Soviet  Foreign  Office  you  have  described,  was 
used  by  the  Army  as  a  basic  textbook  ? 

Mr.  Bogolepov.  That  is  right,  Mr.  Cohn.  And  being  an  instructor 
in  the  Oberammergau  School,  I  raised  some  objections  against  the 
use  of  this  book,  and  indicated  to  my  superiors  some  passages  which 
are  completely  untrue  and  confusing  and  distorting  the  truth.  I  was 
told  first  to  mind  my  own  business ;  and  when  I  became  perhaps  a  little 
bit  persistent,  they  had  thrown  me  away  from  the  American  Army 
for  a  while. 

Mr.  Cohn.  Mr.  Chairman,  we  have  some  excerpts  from  this  Pares 
book  which  we  have  here,  and  excerpts  very  fully  indicating  Commu- 
nist propaganda,  and  I  would  ask  that  those  be  prepared  in  proper 
form  and  that  the  book  be  attached  to  the  record  as  an  exhibit  and 
that  some  of  those  excerpts  be  received  in  evidence  as  soon  as  they 
are  prepared. 

The  Chairman.  The  book  will  be  received  as  an  exhibit,  and  any 
excerpts  which  you  care  to  put  in  the  record,  Mr.  Cohn,  will  be  in- 
serted in  the  record  at  this  point  as  exhibit  No.  3. 

(The  excerpts  referred  to  were  marked  as  "Exhibit  No.  3"  and  will 
be  found  in  the  appendix  on  p.  77.) 

Mr.  Cohn.  We  had  discussed  Ernest  J.  Simmons  with  you  before, 
Mr.  Bogolepov,  and  it  is  a  fact  that  his  book,  U.  S.  S.  R.,  a  Concise 
Handbook,  which  we  have  here  was  also  a  source  which  the  Army  states 
it  used  in  this  document.     Is  that  right? 

Mr.  Bogolepov.  That  is  right. 

Mr.  Cohn.  And  another  one  is  Peoples  of  the  Soviet  Union,  by 
Corliss  Lamont? 

Mr.  Bogolepov.  That  is  right. 

Mr.  Cohn.  By  the  way,  was  this  Simmons  book  ever  used  by  the 
Army  outside  of  this  source  ? 

Mr.  Bogolepov.  Yes,  it  was.  I  saw  it,  along  with  Pares'  book, 
always  in  the  hands  of  intelligence  in  Europe. 

Mr.  Cohn.  May  we  have  the  Simmons  book  received  ? 

The  Chairman.  We  will  receive  it. 


28  COMMUNIST    INFILTRATION    IN   THE    ARMY 

(The  book  referred  to  was  marked  "Exhibit  No.  4  (a) "  and  may  be 
found  in  the  files  of  the  subcommittee;  excerpts  from  this  book  were 
marked  "Exhibit  No.  4  (b)"  and  will  be  found  in  the  appendix  on 
p.  78.) 

Mr.  Cohn.  Thank  you  very  much.  We  appreciate  your  coming 
down. 

The  Chairman.  Would  you  stay  in  the  room  ?  We  may  want  to  call 
you  later  on  in  the  day,  if  you  will  stay,  please. 

Mr.  Cohn.  Professor  Budenz. 

The  Chairman.  You  are  reminded  that  you  have  been  sworn,  and 
your  oath  is  still  in  effect. 

TESTIMONY  OF  LOUIS  FRANCIS  BUDENZ,  ASSISTANT  PROFESSOR 
OF  ECONOMICS  AT  FORDHAM  UNIVERSITY,  NEW  YORK,  N.  Y. 

Mr.  Cohn.  Very  briefly,  Professor,  because  I  know  you  testified  be- 
fore this  committee  before  in  open  session  a  number  of  months  ago, 
you  are  an  assistant  professor  of  economics  at  Fordham  University, 
and  you  teach  at  Seton  Hall ;  is  that  correct  ? 

Mr.  Budenz.  That  is  correct. 

Mr.  Cohn.  Professor  Budenz,  you  were  from  1935  to  1945  a  member 
of  the  Communist  Party  ? 

Mr.  Budenz.  That  is  correct. 

Mr.  Cohn.  And  when  you  left  the  party  in  1945,  you  occupied  the 
important  position  of  managing  editor  of  the  official  party  publica- 
tion, the  Daily  Worker,  is  that  correct? 

Mr.  Budenz.  That  is  correct. 

Mr.  Cohn.  And  you  served  on  various  committees  and  commissions 
and  held  various  high  offices  in  the  Communist  Party  during  the 
period  of  your  membership ;  is  that  right  ? 

Mr.  Budenz.  That  is  right. 

Mr.  Cohn.  You  have  heard  the  testimony  here  this  morning,  and 
we  are  particularly  concerned  with  this  document  used  by  the  Army, 
and  the  bibliography  information,  which  states  it  used  as  a  source, 
first  of  all,  a  book  by  Corliss  Lamont  entitled  "Peoples  of  the  Soviet 
Union."  I  will  ask  you  whether  or  not,  while  you  were  in  the  Com- 
munist Party,  you  knew  Corliss  Lamont  ? 

Mr.  Budenz.  Yes,  sir,  I  did. 

Mr.  Cohn.  Will  you  tell  us  briefly  what  you  knew  about  Corliss 
Lamont  in  the  Communist  Party  ? 

Mr.  Budenz.  I  knew  about  Corliss  Lamont  before  I  joined  the 
Communist  Party.  I  knew  him  personally  before  I  joined  the  Com- 
munist Party,  but  after  I  joined  the  Communist  Party  I  not  only 
knew  him  but  knew  of  him,  and  I  met  him  on  several  occasions  in 
connection  with  pro-Communist  activities,  and  he  was  referred  to  by 
Earl  Browder  as  one  of  the  four  prides  of  the  party,  which  included 
Rockwell  Kent,  Dr.  Harry  F.  Ward,  and  the  late  Dr.  Walter  Rauten- 
strauch,  because  of  their  always  being  ready  to  cooperate  with  any 
Communist  front  or  Communist  cause.  That  was  in  a  national  com- 
mittee meeting  in  the  early  forties. 

I  knew  also  that  Corliss  Lamont  was,  when  I  was  a  member  of  the 
Communist  Party,  a  member  of  the  Communist  Party. 

Mr.  Cohn.  Did  you  know  Mr.  Lamont  personally  % 

Mr.  Budenz.   Yes,  sir. 


COMMUNIST    INFILTRATION    LN    THE    ARMY  29 

Mr.  Cohn.  I  will  next,  Mr.  Budenz,  if  I  may,  call  to  your  attention 
another  work  which  was  used  by  the  Army  as  a  source  for  this  one 
document,  and  also  used  itself  as  a  basic  text  by  the  Army.  That  is 
A  History  of  Russia,  by  Bernard  Pares.  While  you  were  a  functionary 
of  the  Communist  Party,  did  Sir  Bernard  Pares  come  to  your  atten- 
tion? 

Mr.  Budenz.  Yes,  sir,  on  a  number  of  occasions  as,  by  the  way,  did 
Mr.  Lamont,  because  Mr.  Lamont  has  a  record  of  being  on  a  great 
number  of  Communist  fronts  which,  if  we  could  analyze  them,  would 
show  his  devotion  to  Soviet  Russia,  including  the  Friends  of  Soviet 
Russia,  which  was  an  international  conspiratorial  organization  created 
by  Moscow,  and  in  the  case  of  the  Finnish  War,  this  organization  in 
Finland  was  a  great  contribution  to  Moscow's  attempt  to  subdue  the 
Finnish  people.  This  was  an  international  organization,  and  it  is 
now  known  here  as  the  National  Council  of  American-Soviet 
Frienship. 

In  regard  to  Sir  Bernard  Pares,  I  did  not  know  him  in  the  same  way. 
He  was  not  here  in  the  United  States  except  on  1  or  2  occasions,  if  I 
remember  correctly,  but  he  was  called  repeatedly  to  my  attention  by 
officials  of  the  Communist  Party  because  of  the  necessity  that  I  know 
his  attitude  toward  the  party  and  his  standing  with  the  party  as  a 
propaganda  figure. 

From  these  official  reports  and  specifically  from  V.  J.  Jerome  and 
Jack  Stachel 

Mr.  Cohn.  Jack  Stachel  is  one  of  the  convicted  first-string  leaders, 
and  V.  J.  Jerome  one  of  the  convicted  second-string  leaders  ? 

Mr.  Budenz.  And  Mr.  Stachel  had  the  obligation  of  advising  me 
on  the  various  personalities  in  the  field  of  public  activities  who  were 
friendly  or  hostile  to  the  Communist  Party. 

Mr.  Cohn.  That  is  something  which,  as  editor  of  the  Daily  Worker, 
you  had  to  know? 

Mr.  Budenz.  I  had  to  supervise  the  other  members  of  the  staff  on 
the  basis  of  this  knowledge,  and  I  was  advised  on  a  number  of  occa- 
sions that  Sir  Bernard  Pares  was  a  secret  member  under  discipline 
of  the  British  Communist  Party. 

Mr.  Cohn.  Now,  Mr.  Budenz,  we  have  another  book  used  as  a  source 
for  this  Army  document,  and  listed  in  the  bibliography.  That  is 
a  book  on  the  U.  S.  S.  R.,  by  Ernest  J.  Simmons,  which  is  actually  an 
anthology. 

This  book,  according  to  Mr.  Bogolepov's  testimony,  was  used  also 
independently  by  the  Army  as  a  text. 

In  this  book  there  are  selections  from  the  writings  of  various  au- 
thors. One  of  them  is  Corliss  Lamont,  and  I  would  ask — you  have 
already  testified  about  Corliss  Lamont.  Another  one,  another  author 
a  selection  from  whom  is  used  in  this  book,  is  Harriet  L.  Moore.  I 
would  like  to  ask  you  whether  or  not  you  know  Harriet  L.  Moore? 

Mr.  Budenz.  I  know  Harriet  Lucy  Moore  personally  as  closely 
cooperating  with  Corliss  Lamont  for' the  Communist  Party,  and  as 
having  written  for  Soviet  Russia  Today,  in  which  Mr.  Lamont  was 
very  much  interested,  and  also  as  being  in  the  Institute  of  Pacific  Rela- 
tions ;  and  in  all  of  these  actions  I  know  her  to  be  a  Communist,  because 
I  have  met  her  at  national  committee  meetings  of  the  Communist 
Party.     That  is,  these  enlarged  national  committee  meetings.     And 

38794—53- 5 


30  COMMUNIST    INFILTRATION   IN    THE    ARMY 

I  have  also  met  her  on  other  occasions,  once  or  twice  at  the  Daily 
Worker,  and  always  as  a  Communist. 

Mr.  Cohn.  Your  testimony  unequivocally  is  that  Harriet  Lucy 
Moore  was  known  to  you  as  a  member  of  the  Communist  Party  ? 

Mr.  Budenz.  Over  and  over  again,  she  was  known  to  me  personally, 
face  to  face,  as  a  member  of  the  Communist  Party. 

Mr.  Cohn.  Mr.  Chairman,  Harriet  Moore  has  been  subpenaed  here, 
and  I  wonder  if  we  should  put  her  on  to  answer  these  statements  right 
now. 

The  Chairman.  Professor  Budenz,  I  am  going  to  ask  you  to  step 
down  so  that  we  may  put  Harriet  Moore  on  the  stand. 

Will  you  raise  your  right  hand?  In  this  matter  now  in  hearing 
before  the  committee,  do  you  solemnly  swear  you  will  tell  the  truth, 
the  whole  truth,  and  nothing  but  the  truth,  so  help  you  God? 

Miss  Moore.  I  do. 

TESTIMONY  OF  HARRIET  L.  MOORE  (HARRIET  MOORE  GELFAN) 

OF  NEW  YORK  CITY,  N.  Y. 

Mr.  Cohn.  May  we  get  the  name  of  counsel  for  Miss  Moore  ? 

Mr.  Rein.  David  Rein,  of  Washington. 

Mr.  Cohn.  Mr.  Rein,  you  have  appeared  as  counsel  before  the  com- 
mittee, and  you  are  familiar  with  the  rules.  You  represent  Harriet 
Moore  ? 

Mr.  Rein.  Yes,  sir. 

Mr.  Cohn.  Could  you  state  your  full  name? 

Miss  Moore.  I  am  Harriet  Moore  Gelfan. 

Mr.  Cohn.  Where  do  you  reside? 

Miss  Moore.  Bronxville,  N.  Y. 

Mr.  Cohn.  And  your 

The  Chairman.  May  I  interrupt  ?  I  think  the  record  should  show 
that  Harriet  Moore  was  before  the  committee  last  Tuesday,  and  asked 
for  additional  time  in  which  to  obtain  counsel,  and  that  time  was 
granted  to  her. 

I  am  not  sure  if  we  explained  to  you  or  not,  Miss  Moore,  at  that 
time  that  you  may  consult  with  counsel  any  time  you  care  to,  and  if  a 
matter  comes  up  of  sufficient  importance  to  require  a  conference  with 
him  in  a  private  room,  such  a  room  will  be  provided. 

Mr.  Cohn.  Is  your  maiden  name  Harriet  Moore? 

Miss  Moore.  That  is  right. 

Mr.  Cohn.  Under  that  name,  Harriet  L.  Moore — that  is  you,  is 
that  correct  ? 

Miss  Moore.  That  is  right. 

Mr.  Cohn.  Under  that  name,  we  have  here  a  selection  from  your 
writings  which  was  used  in  the  anthology  used  by  the  Army  as  a 
bibliography  for  one  document,  and  used  in  and  of  itself  in  Army 
courses,  and  I  want  to  ask  you  this:  Mrs.  Gelfan,  have  you  ever  been 
a  member  of  the  Communist  Party? 

Miss  Moore.  I  decline  to  answer  that  question  under  my  privilege 
under  the  fifth  amendment. 

M r.  Cohn.  Are  you  the  author  of  any  books  ? 

Miss  Moore.  Yes. 

Mr.  Cohn.  At  the  time  you  wrote  the  books  of  which  you  are  author, 
were  you  a  member  of  the  Communist  Party  ? 


COMMUNIST    INFILTRATION   IN    THE    ARMY  31 

Miss  Moore.  I  decline  to  answer  that  question. 

Mr.  Cohn.  At  the  time  you  wrote  this ■ 

The  Chairman.  You  decline  to  answer  on  the  ground  that  a  truth- 
ful answer  might  tend  to  incriminate  you  ? 

Miss  Moore.  Under  the  fifth  amendment ;  yes,  sir. 

The  Chairman.  You  are  declining  on  the  ground  a  truthful  answer 
might  tend  to  incriminate  you  ?  Are  you  declining  to  answer  on  the 
ground  that  a  truthful  answer  might  tend  to  incriminate  you? 

Miss  Moore.  I  don't  understand  the  question,  sir. 

The  Chairman  It  is  very  simple.  Are  you  declining  to  answer 
because  you  feel  that  a  truthful  answer  might  tend  to  incriminate  you  ? 

Miss  Moore.  Well,  I  have  taken  an  oath  to  tell  the  truth,  and 
naturally,  I  mean  a  truthful  answer. 

The  Chairman.  You  feel  that  a  truthful  answer  might  tend  to 
incriminate  you  ? 

Mr.  Cohn.  You  may  consult  with  counsel. 

Miss  Moore.  It  seems  to  me,  as  I  understand  my  privilege  under  the 
fifth  amendment,  it  is  to  decline  to  answer  on  the  grounds  it  might 
tend  to  incriminate  me. 

The  Chairman.  Miss  Moore,  the  Chair  takes  the  position  that  you 
are  not  entitled  to  the  fifth  amendment  privilege  unless  you  feel  that 
the  truth  will  tend  to  incriminate  you,  and  you  are  not  entitled  to 
take  advantage  of  the  fifth  amendment  if  you  feel  that  perjury  would 
incriminate  you;  and  so,  I  am  merely  asking  you  the  very  simple 
question:  Do  you  feel  a  truthful  answer  would  tend  to  incriminate 
you?  And  if  the  answer  is  "Yes,"  you  are  entitled  to  decline;  and 
if  the  answer  is  "No,"  you  will  be  ordered  to  answer  the  question. 

Miss  Moore.  I  suppose  that  that  is  what  I  mean.  I  am  telling  the 
truth  to  you,  sir.  Any  answer  I  gave  would  be  the  truth ;  and  conse- 
quently, I  am  declining  to  answer. 

The  Chairman.  It  is  a  very  simple  question.  Before  I  can  decide 
whether  you  are  entitled  to  the  privilege  of  the  fifth  amendment,  I 
must  ask  you  the  question:  Do  you  think  a  truthful  answer  to  this 
question  might  tend  to  incriminate  you?  The  answer  is  "Yes"  or 
"No." 

Miss  Moore.  Yes,  but  I  don't  like  the  implication  that  I  might  lie 
to  you,  sir. 

The  Chairman.  The  answer  is  "Yes,"  a  truthful  answer  might  tend 
to  incriminate  you? 

Miss  Moore.  Yes,  sir. 

Mr.  Cohn.  At  the  time  you  wrote  this  selection  here 

The  Chairman.  It  is  Mrs.  Gelfan  now,  as  I  understand  it. 

Is  it  correct  that  anyone  under  Communist  Party  discipline  is  bound 
to  lie  when  they  are  ordered  to  lie  by  the  Communist  Party? 

Miss  Moore.  I  don't  know,  sir. 

The  Chairman.  You  do  not  know. 

Mr.  Jones.  Mrs.  Gelfan,  are  you  a  citizen  of  the  United  States? 

Miss  Moore.  Yes,  sir. 

Mr.  Jones.  Would  you,  as  a  citizen,  oppose  any  person  or  any  group 
who  would  advocate  the  violent  overthrow  of  this  Government? 

Miss  Moore.  Yes,  sir. 

Mr.  Jones.  Does  not  the  Communist  Party  advocate  the  violent 
overthrow  of  this  Government? 

Miss  Moore.  I  don't  know,  sir. 


32  COMMUNIST    INFILTRATION    IN    THE    ARMY 

The  Chairman.  Let  us  pursue  that  a  little  further.  Have  you 
attended  Communist  Party  meetings  where  the  Communist  doctrine 
was  expounded,  the  doctrine  that  it  would  be  necessary  to  destroy  this 
Government  by  force  and  violence  if  a  Communist  system  could  not 
be  imposed  upon  us  in  any  other  fashion  ? 

Miss  Moore.  I  decline  to  answer  that  question. 

The  Chairman.  You  decline  to  answer  that  question  ? 

Miss  Moore.  Yes,  sir. 

The  Chairman.  Have  you  attended  Communist  Party  meetings 
where  espionage  against  the  United  States  was  discussed? 

Miss  Moore.  I  decline  to  answer  all  questions  regarding  attending 
Communist  Party  meetings. 

The  Chairman.  You  will  have  to  decline  each  one  individually,  and 
you  are  not  entitled  to  any  blanket  refusal. 

Miss  Moore.  All  right. 

The  Chairman.  You  refuse  to  answer  on  the  ground  of  self- 
incrimination  ? 

Miss  Moore.  Yes,  sir. 

The  Chairman.  Are  you  a  member  of  the  Communist  Party  as  of 
this  moment? 

Miss  Moore.  I  decline  to  answer. 

The  Chairman.  On  the  ground  of  self-incrimination? 

Miss  Moore.  Yes,  sir. 

The  Chairman.  Do  you  know  American  citizens  who,  as  of  today, 
are  engaged  in  espionage  against  the  United  States  Government? 

Miss  Moore.  Not  to  my  knowledge. 

The  Chairman.  Not  today? 

Miss  Moore.  No. 

The  Chairman.  Do  you  know  anyone  who  has  been  engaged  in 
espionage,  or  sabotage,  or  has  advocated  espionage  or  sabotage  against 
the  United  States  Government? 

Miss  Moore.  Not  as  far  as  I  know. 

The  Chairman.  Not  as  far  as  you  know. 

You  have  not  attended  Communist  meetings  where  the  speaker  has 
advocated  the  necessity  of  espionage  and  sabotage? 

Miss  Moore.  I  decline  to  answer,  sir. 

The  Chairman.  Do  you  not  know  individuals  who  went  to  the  Lenin 
School  of  Espionage  and  Sabotage  in  Moscow  and  came  back  and 
reported  at  Communist  meetings  as  the  teachings 

Miss  Moore.  What  is  the  question,  specifically? 

The  Chairman.  Do  you  know  individuals  who  went  to  the  Moscow 
School  of  Espionage  and  Sabotage  and  came  back  and  reported  at 
Communist  meetings  as  to  the  teachings  of  that  school? 

Miss  Moore.  Not  as  far  as  I  know,  I  don't  know  such  individuals. 

The  Chairman.  How  long  have  you  been  in  Russia  ? 

Miss  Moore.  At  the  most,  I  was  in  Russia,  at  the  most,  8  or  9 
months,  on  3  different  visits. 

The  Chairman.  Did  you  attend  a  school  in  Moscow  ? 

Miss  Moore.  No,  sir. 

The  Chairman.  Did  you  attend  lectures? 

Miss  Moore.  I  attended  a  lecture  by  an  American. 

The  Chairman.  Who  was  the  American? 

Miss  Moore.  Owen  Lattimore. 


COMMUNIST    INFILTRATION    IN    THE    ARMY  33 

The  Chairman.  And  3Tou  attended  a  lecture  by  Owen  Lattimore  in 
Moscow  ? 

Miss  Moore.  Yes,  sir. 

The  Chairman.  At  that  time,  were  you  a  member  of  the  Communist 
Party? 

Miss  Moore.  I  decline  to  answer. 

The  Chairman.  Was  Owen  Lattimore  a  member  of  the  Communist 
Party? 

Miss  Moore.  Not  as  far  as  I  knew. 

The  Chairman.  You  did  not  know  ? 

Miss  Moore.  No. 

The  Chairman.  Were  the  others  who  attended  the  lecture  members 
of  the  Communist  Party? 

Miss  Moore.  There  were  lots  of  people  at  the  lecture,  and  I  didn't 
know  most  of  them,  hardly  any  of  them. 

The  Chairman.  Did  you  do  any  lecturing  yourself  ? 

Miss  Moore.  No,  sir. 

The  Chairman.  Do  you  know  a  Louis  Buclenz  ? 

Miss  Moore.  I  decline  to  answer. 

The  Chairman.  How  many  American  Communists  did  you  meet 
when  you  were  in  Moscow  ? 

Miss  Moore.  I  don't  recall,  and  I  am  quite  sure  I  didn't  meet  any- 
body in  Moscow  that  I  knew  to  be  a  Communist. 

The  Chairman.  When  you  wrote  the  material  which  was  used  by 
the  Army  for  indoctrination  purposes,  used  up  through  1952,  at  that 
time  were  you  under  Communist  Party  discipline  ? 

Miss  Moore.  I  was  not  writing  for  the  Army,  sir. 

The  Chairman.  I  don't  care  who  you  were  writing  for,  you  wrote 
an  article  used  by  the  Army. 

Miss  Moore.  I  wrote  an  article  on  the  physical  geography  of  Russia. 

The  Chairman.  The  question  is :  At  the  time  you  wrote  this  article, 
which  was  later  picked  up  and  used  by  the  Army,  were  you  at  that 
time  under  Communist  Party  discipline  ? 

Miss  Moore.  I  decline  to  answer. 

Mr.  Cohn.  I  have  no  further  questions. 

The  Chairman.  You  may  step  down. 

Miss  Moore,  I  do  not  think  that  we  will  need  you  again.  However, 
you  will  not  be  released  from  the  subpena.  In  case  we  need  you,  we 
will  contact  your  attorney  and  let  him  know.  You  may  leave  now, 
unless  you  are  called  upon. 

Mr.  Eein.  I  believe  Mrs.  Gelfan  will  be  given  adequate  notice. 

The  Chairman.  We  will  give  you  all  of  the  notice  you  think  is 
necessary. 

Mr.  Cohn.  Could  we  have  Mr.  Budenz  back  for  a  moment,  please? 

TESTIMONY  OF  LOUIS  FRANCIS  BUDENZ— Resumed 

Mr.  Cohn.  Mr.  Budenz,  was  this  lady  who  just  testified  the  Harriet 
Moore  you  knew  as  a  member  of  the  Communist  Party  ? 

Mr.  Budenz.  Yes,  sir. 

Mr.  Cohn.  I  have  asked  you  about  Corliss  Lamont,  one  of  whose 
selections  is  used  in  the  Simmons  book,  and  I  have  asked  you  about 
Harriet  Moore,  and  we  have  had  her  as  a  witness. 


34  COMMUNIST    INFILTRATION   IN    THE    ARMY 

I  see  a  selection  from  a  work  by  Sir  Bernard  Pares  is  also  used, 
and  you  have  testified  about  him. 

Just  let  me  go  over  1  or  2  more.  There  is  a  selection  by  a  man  named 
Sergli  Kounakoff  in  this  book  used  by  the  Army.  Did  you  know 
Sergli  Kournakoff? 

Mr.  Budenz.  I  knew  Sergli  Kournakoff  quite  well,  and  he  was 
an  espionage  agent  for  the  Soviet  Government,  and  a  courier  between 
the  Soviet  consulate  and  the  Communist  Party  leadership  here,  to 
my  personal  knowledge,  and  he  wrote  under  the  name  of  Veteran 
Commander  for  the  Daily  Worker,  and  he  was  also  connected  with 
the  Kussian  Communist  paper  in  New  York,  and  was  all  of  the  time 
I  knew  him,  we  will  say,  from  1940  to  1945,  a  very  active  undercover 
member  of  the  Communist  Party. 

Mr.  Cohn.  Did  you  say  he  wrote  for  the  Daily  Worker  ? 

Mr.  Budenz.  Yes ;  under  the  name  of  Veteran  Commander. 

Mr.  Cohn.  The  Veteran  Commander? 

Mr.  Budenz.  That  is  right. 

The  Chairman.  Mr.  Budenz,  in  executive  testimony  you  identified 
a  sizable  number  of  those  who  contributed  to  this  book  by  Simmons 
as  being  very  important  members  of  the  Communist  Party.  I  am 
not  going  to  ask  you  to  name  them  in  public  today,  because  I  feel 
if  you  did  they  would  be  entitled  to  appear  before  the  committee  imme- 
diately in  answer,  if  they  care  to.  It  so  happens  that  I  am  going  to 
be  absent  for  a  while,  so  I  am  going  to  merely  hand  you  this  book 
and  ask  you  to  tell  us  how  many  of  the  individuals  who  have  con- 
tributed chapters  to  this  book  that  was  used  by  the  Army,  how  many 
of  them  were  known  to  you,  either  personally  or  in  your  position  as 
a  high  functionary  in  the  Communist  Party,  as  being  either  active 
Communists  or  espionage  agents.  I  don't  want  you  to  name  them,  just 
tell  us  how  many  of  the  authors. 

Mr.  Budenz.  'At  least  11,  and  then  there  is  1  gentleman  who  I  know 
was  reported  to  be  ready  and  willing  to  do  anything  the  party  asked 
him  to  do,  but  was  never  specifically  mentioned  as  a  Communist  to 
me.    So  that  makes  11  plus  1  additional. 

Mr.  Cohn.  Professor  Budenz,  you  have  gone  into  detail  in  this 
for  us  in  executive  session  so  we  can  contact  these  people  and  arrange 
at  a  subsequent  date  to  have  a  hearing  at  which  they  will  be  available 
to  answer  anything. 

Mr.  Budenz.  That  is  correct,  with  the  exception  of  one  other  name 
about  which  I  was  not  asked  for  in  executive  session. 

Mr.  Cohn.  All  right.  We  will  go  into  that  later.  Could  I  have  the 
book  back? 

The  Chairman.  May  I  ask,  Boy,  if  it  is  correct  that  the  Secretary 
of  the  Army,  Mr.  Stevens,  said  he  would  check  and  let  us  know  whether 
this  book  is  still  being  used?  We  do  know  it  was  used  up  through 
1952;  is  that  correct? 

Mr.  Cohn.  That  is  correct,  Mr.  Chairman. 

The  Chairman.  Mr.  Budenz,  may  I  ask  you  a  question?  We  find 
these  books  written  by  individuals,  some  of  whom  were  notorious 
Communists,  well  known  as  such.  We  find  the  indoctrination  for  the 
intelligence  units  of  the  Army  gleaned  from  the  works  of  Commu- 
nists. With  your  long  experience  in  the  Communist  Party,  would 
you  say  this  is  the  result  of  stupidity,  or  do  you  think  that  some  place 


COMMUNIST    INFILTRATION   IN    THE    ARMY  35 

you  had  the  guiding  hand  of  a  Communist  dictating  what  type  of 
literature  should  be  used  to  indoctrinate  our  military  ? 

Mr.  Budenz.  Well,  I  can't  conceive  of  stupidity  that  intense,  and 
it  is  my  very  humble  opinion,  though  of  course  it  is  only  based  upon 
opinion,  that  this  document,  and  the  reference  to  this  material,  is 
the  work  of  a  concealed  Communist.  I  can't  understand  any  explana- 
tion that  could  be  given  of  it  that  would  be  logical.  For  example,  m 
this  book  by  Simmons,  it  isn't  only  the  authors,  but  a  great  part  of  the 
bibliography  suggested  is  written  by  Communists.  There  are  one 
or  two  exceptions,  but  in  the  main  the  whole  bibliography  in  the  Sim- 
mons book  is  by  Communists. 

The  Chairman.  I  assume  you  and  I  would  agree,  Professor  Budenz, 
that  if  the  material  were  identified  in  this  document  as  the  writings 
of  Lenin,  of  Stalin,  if  the  material  were  identified  as  having  come  from 
what  Mr.  Bogolepov  calls  the  Bible  of  the  Communist  Party,  that 
that  would  rob  it  of  its  danger.  In  other  words,  if  an  intelligence 
officer  knew  he  was  reading  Joe  Stalin,  Lenin,  it  might  be  an  excel- 
lent idea.  But  what  makes  this  dangerous  is  the  fact  that  this  is  put 
out  under  the  approval  of  the  Army,  with  no  quotes,  no  way  that  an 
Army  officer  would  know  that  this  was  the  identical  language  of  Lenin 
and  Stalin. 

Mr.  Budenz.  That  is  correct.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  we  should  use 
the  writings  of  Stalin,  Lenin,  and  others,  because  we  can  expose  their 
plans  and  purposes,  and  they  have  stated  it  very  succinctly  for  us, 
Stalin  in  The  Foundations  of  Leninism  and  The  Problems  of  Lenin- 
ism, that  their  basic  intention  is  to  overthrow  the  Government  of  the 
United  States  by  force  and  violence.  It  is  written  in  there  in  so  many 
words.  We  should  use  that.  But  when  we  use  their  fictions  and 
myths  that  they  create  in  order  to  justify  their  so-called  experiment 
and  do  not  state  that  these  came  from  these  Stalinist-Leninist  sources, 
then,  of  course  we  are  doing  just  the  opposite.  We  are  pawning  off 
Communist  propaganda  under  the  guise  of  its  being  an  objective  study. 
There  are  2  or  3  things  in  there,  Senator,  if  I  might  remark,  that  are 
very  interesting. 

The  Chairman.  Would  you  like  a  copy  of  this  ? 

Mr.  Budenz.  This  document  on  the  whole  is  an  appeal  for  com- 
munism under  the  guise  of  criticizing  and  analyzing  it.  This  is  not 
only  shown  by  the  authorities  which  it  uses,  but  also  by  the  fact  that 
it  gives  all  the  arguments  for  the  Communist  system.  For  example — 
I  wish  we  had  more  time,  but  I  will  go  through  this  very  hurriedly. 

It  has  the  absurd  idea  that  neurosis  has  been  destroyed  among  the 
Russian  people.  That  occupies  off  and  on  a  number  of  pages  in  this 
book.  This  is  the  Communist  fiction  gotten  out  to  show  that  they 
are  developing  the  perfect  man.  You  will  find  almost  the  same  words 
in  the  next  to  the  last  chapter  of  Foster's  Twilight  of  World  Capital- 
ism, "The  Advent  of  Socialist  Man,"  where  without  any  proof  whatso- 
ever he  begins  to  show  that  the  perfect  man  is  being  developed  in 
Soviet  Russia,  and  that  one  of  the  marks  is  the  lack  of  neurosis.  This 
thing  goes  on  for  pages  to  show  that  there  is  practically  no  neurosis 
there. 

Then,  another  thing,  the  basis  of  all  of  this  is  the  fact  that  this 
study  shows  the  Russian  people  accept  communism,  that  it  is  part  of 
their  being,  so  to  speak,  because  they  have  the  group  incentive  or  col- 
lectivist  idea.     That  goes  on  for  page  after  page  likewise. 


36  COMMUNIST    INFILTRATION    IN    THE    ARMY 

This  even  goes  to  the  absurd  point  of  saying  that  the  Russian  people 
are  not  so  criminal  as  the  individualistic  people,  such  as  the  Germans, 
the  Poles,  and  other  nations  who  I  think  would  be  very  appreciative 
here  as  Americans  to  know  that  they  are  peculiarly  criminal — while 
this  is  what  it  says,  it  also  says  this  is  not  a  reflection  on  these  people. 

And  then  it  goes  on  that — by  the  way,  all  this  fills  in  with  the  Com- 
munist picture  that  they  are  getting  rid  of  criminality  by  communism. 
Then  it  accepts  as  its  authorities  the  Japanese,  allegedly  thousands  of 
Japanese  expatriates,  but  we  don't  know  who  these  people  are.  This 
is  a  supposedly  composite  document,  and  while  it  accepts  what  they 
say,  apparently,  I  mean  it  says  they  are  the  people  who  say  some  of 
these  things  with  a  pro-Communist  slant,  it  urges  caution  and  rejects 
all  the  statements  of  anyone  who  has  been  a  refugee  from  Soviet 
Russia.  That  is  very  significant.  That  immediately  closes  the  eyes 
and  ears  of  the  Army,  if  it  is  accepted,  to  anyone  who  was  escaping 
from  this  tyranny  and  could  tell  the  truth  about  it. 

Further  than  "that,  it  presents  the  picture  of  security  in  Soviet 
Russia,  as  it  is  represented  and  appears  in  the  works  of  Lenin  and 
Stalin  and  even  goes  so  far  as  to  say  that  this  security  is  exempli- 
fied by  the  fact  that  if  you  are  sent  to  a  slave-labor  camp,  your 
wife  has  the  right  to  work  and  take  care  of  your  children  during  the 
time  you  are  there.  That  is  considered  to  be  quite  a  fine  example  of 
security.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  the  slave-labor  system,  if  you  analyze  it 
here  carefully,  though  it  is  criticized  in  part,  is  given  as  an  example 
of  security,  which  the  Russian  people  enjoy  under  communism.  As  a 
matter  of  fact,  we  have  no  proof  that  there  is  any  of  this  security. 
As  a  matter  of  fact,  everything  shows  that  we  haven't  any  such  proof. 
Why  they  didn't  go  to  such  authorities  as  David  J.  Dallin  and  his  Real 
Soviet  Russia  and  to  many  other  works  that  analyze  this  problem 
thoroughly  and  in  a  scholarly  manner  is  just  beyond  me.  That  is  why 
I  can't  understand  the  stupidity,  if  it  is  so  called. 

The  Chairman.  I  believe  Dallin  is  quoted  as  one  of  the  sources,  but 
reading  the  document  I  cannot  find  anything  from  Dallin's  works  in  it. 

Mr.  Budenz.  The  only  thing  is  just  toward  the  end,  a  few  little  sen- 
tences in  regard  to  the  fact  that  there  is  slave  labor  in  Soviet  Russia. 
In  that  respect  also,  this  work  confuses  the  whole  question  of  the 
extensive  slave  labor  in  Soviet  Russia  by  talking  all  the  time  about 
convicts  and  ex-convicts,  and  thereby  throwing  this  mantle  of  being 
a  convict  over  any  one  who  objects  to  the  Soviet  regime. 

The  Chairman.  Could  I  ask  you  this,  Professor 

Mr.  Budenz.  There  is  one  other  thing,  Senator,  if  I  may  mention 
it,  because  I  just  don't  want  to  seem  to  be  doing  this  thing  arbitrarily. 
That  is,  there  are  passages  in  here  which  are  almost  unbelievable,  that 
is  to  say  they  tell  all  about  this  business  of  workers  writing  collective 
letters  to  Stalin,  and  showing  their  joy  in  being  labor  shock  troops 
and  all  that  sort  of  thing.  Now,  in  that  way,  they  hide  the  fact  that 
Soviet  Russia  has  built  up  state  unionism.  That  is,  this  trade  union- 
ism in  Soviet  Russia  is  merely  a  production  machine,  a  slave-driving 
machine.  We  have  been  opposed  in  America,  rightly,  to  company 
unionism.  This  is  company  unionism  to  an  nth  degree,  and  this  is 
pictured  as  something  which  the  workers  accept.  As  a  matter  of  fact, 
it  says  that  there  has  been  no  sign  that  the  Russian  workers  have  ever 
tried  to  organize  secretly.     Of  course,  the  penalty  for  organizing 


COMMUNIST    INFILTRATION    IN    THE    ARMY  37 

secretly,  as  we  know  from  Louis  Fischer's  Thirteen  Who  Fled,  and 
other  documents,  is  being  sent  to  slave-labor  camps.  Thus  you  see 
that  while  there  is  mention  of  the  Soviet  secret  police  and  a  few  words 
about  slave  labor,  when  you  analyze  it,  you  find  that  slave  labor  is 
really  accepted  because  it  is  also  said  in  here  that  the  slave  laborers 
really  show  no  objection  to  this. 

All  along  this  indictment,  if  you  can  call  it  such,  very  softly  phrased, 
is  then  offset  by  statements  that  explain  it  away  and  justify  it. 

The  Chairman.  Just  one  final  question. 

Mr.  Cohn.  I  was  going  to  point  out,  Mr.  Chairman,  we  have  to 
stop  very  close  to  11 :  30,  and  there  is  one  more  witness  we  must  hear 
from. 

The  Chairman.  Well,  I  think  just  one  more  question  of  the  pro- 
fessor. 

Would  you  say  that  any  military  man  or  any  one  who  read  that 
document  put  out  under  the  approval  of  our  military,  would  get  a 
completely  false  picture  of  communism  ? 

Mr.  Budenz.  Yes,  sir.  He  would  get  the  picture  that  would  be 
desired  by  the  Communist  conspiracy  that  he  would  get,  which  is  one 
of  utter  hopelessness  in  opposing  communism,  because  when  any  sug- 
gestion is  made  as  to  what  are  the  vulnerable  spots,  immediately  you 
find  them  offset  by  showing  those  vulnerable  spots  are  not  vulnerable, 
that  they  are  really  in  accord  with  the  mode  of  thinking  and  life  of 
the  Russian  people. 

The  Chairman.  Would  you  say,  Professor,  that  there  are  available 
to  the  Army  outstanding,  objective,  truthful  analyses  of  the  Commu- 
nist system  which  could  have  been  used  ? 

Mr.  Budenz.  There  is  a  whole  library  today,  and  it  has  even  been 
incorporated  on  several  occasions  in  the  Congressional  Record.  It  is 
a  matter  of  public  documentation.  This  bibliography  contains  not 
only  books  which  explain  the  conspiracy  critically  and  analytically 
here  in  the  United  States,  but  also  within  Soviet  Russia  itself.  There 
is  a  great  library  today  of  that  available. 

The  Chairman.  Would  you  say,  Professor,  that  if  the  head  of  our 
intelligence  believed  that  all  of  the  facts  in  this  document  were  true, 
that  that  would  create  a  very  dangerous  situation  insofar  as  our 
military  is  concerned?  Do  you  follow  my  question?  Let's  assume 
that  the  head  of  Army  intelligence  were  to  come  up  here  and  say, 
"I  believe  all  this  material;  it  is  not  false,  it  is  true,"  would  you  say 
that  that  would  give  an  extremely  dangerous  picture  ? 

Mr.  Budenz.  Well,  of  course  I  hesitate  to  pass  upon  a  gentleman 
in  that  position,  but  since  you  put  the  question  to  me,  I  would  say  it 
would  be  very  dangerous  to  the  security  of  the  United  States. 

The  Chairman.  Just  one  other  question,  Professor ;  I  ask  you  this 
because  of  your  long  experience  in  Communist  propaganda,  your 
intricate  knowledge  of  the  Communist  conspiracy,  and  of  the  great 
help  you  have  given  to  the  various  intelligence  agencies  since  then. 
Let  us  assume  that  you  take  a  general,  let  us  assume  that  he  is  a  good 
field  commander,  and  a  nice  fellow,  but  assume  that  he  admits  that 
he  has  never  read  a  single  work  about  communism.  He  does  not 
recognize  the  names  of  well-known  Communists.  Assume  that  he 
comes  up  and  testifies  that  he  is  willing  to  use  the  works  of  well-known 
Communists  to  indoctrinate  the  military.  Would  you  say  that  might 
create  a  situation  which  is  dangerous  almost  beyond  words? 

38794—53 6 


38  COMMUNIST    INFILTRATION   IN    THE    ARMY 

Mr.  Budenz.  I  would  say  that  would  be  catastrophic  if  that  should 
occur,  because  today  we  are  combating  communism.  It  is  the  great 
foe  of  the  United  States.  It  is  determined  to  conquer  the  United 
States.  It  has  written  it  down  definitely  and  the  documents  can  be 
found.  And  if  it  is  not  known  how  communism  operates  and  what 
is  its  nature,  by  those  who  are  vested  with  the  responsibility  of  com- 
bating it,  then  of  course  America's  security  is  in  very  grave  danger 
indeed. 

The  Chairman.  Professor,  we  have  many  more  questions  we  would 
like  to  ask  you,  about  other  books  being  used  by  the  military.  We 
will  have  further  hearings  on  this. 

Mr.  Cohn.  Mr.  Chairman,  may  we  have  this  Lamont  book,  Peoples 
of  the  Soviet  Union,  as  an  exhibit  to  the  hearing  ? 

(The  book,  Peoples  of  the  Soviet  Union  was  marked  as  "Exhibit  No. 
5,"  and  may  be  found  in  the  files  of  the  subcommittee.) 

The  Chairman.  Yes. 

You  may  step  down,  Professor.    Thank  you  very  much. 

Mr.  Cohn.  Mr.  Petrov. 

The  Chairman.  You  are  reminded  that  you  have  been  sworn,  and 
the  oath  is  still  in  effect. 

TESTIMONY  OP  VLADIMIR  PETROV,  YALE  UNIVERSITY, 

NEW  HAVEN,  CONN. 

Mr.  Cohn.  May  we  have  your  full  name,  please. 

Mr.  Petrov.  Vladimir  Petrov. 

Mr.  Cohn.  Spell  your  last  name. 

Mr.  Petrov.  P-e-t-r-o-v. 

Mr.  Cohn.  Are  you  a  member  of  the  faculty  of  Yale  University  SI 

Mr.  Petrov.  That  is  right. 

Mr.  Cohn.  Would  you  tell  us  very  briefly  about  your  background, 
Mr.  Petrov? 

Mr.  Petrov.  I  was  born  in  Odessa,  Eussia,  37  years  ago.  I  finished 
the  school  there,  then  went  to  college  in  Moscow  to  study  engineering. 
Later  I  went  to  Leningrad  to  continue  my  studies.  In  1935,  because 
of  some  frictions  with  the  official  government  policy,  I  was  arrested 
and  sentenced  to  6  years  of  imprisonment,  which  I  served  largely  in 
northeastern  Siberia.  I  may  say  also  that  one  of  the  charges  brought 
against  me  at  that  time  was  espionage  in  favor  of  the  United  States 
of  America ;  the  reason  being  that  I  was  exchanging  stamps  with  one 
fellow  traveler  in  San  Francisco. 

I  served  my  sentence,  as  I  said,  in  Siberia,  all  6  years ;  was  released 
early  in  1941 ;  came  back  to  European  Russia  by  the  time  the  Germans 
were  approaching  the  area,  where  I  went.  Soon  after  I  found  myself 
in  the  German  occupied  territory ;  stayed  there  for  another  year  and  in 
the  spring  of  1944  I  left  Russia,  departing  from  Odessa,  across  the 
Balkans,  to  Vienna. 

Shortly  before  the  war  ended  I  went  to  Italy,  where  I  stayed  for  2 
years  before  I  got  the  chance  to  come  over  to  this  country.  Since  I 
came  here,  after  a  couple  of  months  of  working  in  a  factory,  I  have 
been  with  the  Yale  University  in  New  Haven,  Conn. 

I  wrote  a  couple  of  books  published  here  2  or  3  years  ago,  and  some 
articles  in  national  magazines. 


COMMUNIST    INFILTRATION    IN    THE    ARMY  39 

Mr.  Cohn.  Mr.  Petrov,  have  you  examined  this  Army  document 
entitled  "Psychological  and  Cultural  Traits  of  Soviet  Siberia"? 

Mr.  Petrov.  Yes.  I  had  a  rather  doubtful  pleasure  in  examining 
it. 

Mr.  Cohn.  And  you  examined  that  in  light  of  your  firsthand  knowl- 
edge of  conditions  in  Siberia  gained  from  a  6-year  period  of  incar- 
ceration there,  and  from  other  facts,  is  that  correct  ? 

Mr.  Petrov.  That  is  correct.  But  I  want  to  add  that  I  don't  con- 
sider myself  an  overall  expert  on  Russia.  I  believe,  however,  that  so 
far  as  psychological  trends  of  the  Russian  people  are  concerned,  I 
know  more  about  it  than  manv  students  of  the  subject  in  this  country. 

Mr.  Cohn.  In  other  words,  it  so  happens  through  your  own  experi- 
ence and  studies  you  are  peculiarly  qualified  concerning  the  particu- 
lar subject  matter  of  this  document,  is  that  right? 

Mr.  Petrov.  I  would  like  to  think  so,  yes. 

Mr.  Cohn.  Mr.  Petrov,  would  you  tell  the  committee  whether  or 
not,  as  a  result  of  your  examination,  your  careful  examination  of  this 
document,  you  have  reached  any  conclusions  as  to  whether  or  not  it 
is  an  accurate  document  and  accurately  sets  forth  the  facts  concern- 
ing psychological  and  cultural  traits  of  Soviet  Siberia  ? 

Mr.  Petrov.  This  pamphlet,  in  my  opinion,  is  extremely  biased ;  it 
is  an  unscientific  paper,  written  for  the  purpose  of  promoting  certain 
ideas  that  the  author  sets  forth  well  in  advance.  The  author's  attitude 
is  formulated  by  himself,  and  reads  as  follows.  I  quote  him  from 
page  20 : 

Most  Americans  are  fortunate  enough  never  to  have  knowingly  had  personal 
contact  with  the  professional  Communist.  In  the  U.  S.  S.  R.  the  Communist  is  a 
patriot,  a  civic  booster,  and  frequently  a  war  hero,  doing  his  best  to  build  up 
his  country.  In  the  United  States  the  Communist  is  at  best  a  fool,  at  the  worst 
a  traitor,  whose  primary  aim  is  to  destroy  his  country.  Communists  in  the 
U.  S.  S.  R.  enjoy  public  admiration,  while  those  in  the  United  States  are  justly  con- 
demned as  actual  or  potential  felons. 

I  must  add  that  nowhere  in  this  paper  does  the  author  put  in  quota- 
tion marks  any  of  the  sources  he  lists  in  his  bibliography,  and  the  bib- 
liography as  it  was  stated  here  before  speaks  well  for  itself  in  the 
sense  that  all  the  books  more  or  less  are  slanted  in  favor  of  communism 
in  Russia. 

Mr.  Cohn.  I  want  to  ask  you  this:  You  said  in  your  first  sentence 
that  you  found  this  to  be  biased.    Biased  in  whose  favor  ? 

Mr.  Petrov.  In  favor  of  the  Communist  regime  in  the  Soviet  Union. 
The  only  exception  was,  as  it  was  mentioned  here,  the  book  of  Dallin, 
which  was  listed  in  bibliography  but  not  used  actually  as  a  source. 

Mr.  Cohn.  In  other  words,  the  one  anti- Communist  book  is  not 
used  actively  as  a  source. 

Mr.  Petrov.  Yes.  It  suggests  that  it  is  a  kind  of  a  smoke  screen 
only.  The  author,  in  my  opinion,  at  least,  is  aware  that  he  distorts 
and  twists  the  facts  about  the  Soviet  Union,  and  he  does  what  no  real 
scientist  would  ever  do:  He  tries  to  discredit  in  advance  possible 
sources  of  information  which  he  knows  would  contradict  him.  On 
page  47  he  says : 

Extreme  caution  is  required  in  accepting  hearsay  data.  The  opinion  of  2 
million  white  Russian  refugees  and  small  numbers  of  deserters  and  escapees 
cannot  be  taken  as  representative  of  the  200  million  who  remain  in  the  U.  S.  S.  R. 


40  COMMUNIST    INFILTRATION    IN    THE    ARMY 

Well,  small  number  is  not  quite  so  small.  Besides  those  White  Rus- 
sians,  there  are  at  least  several  hundred  thousand  of  people  like  me, 
who  left  Russia  during  and  after  the  last  war.  I  must  say  also  that 
some  students  of  Soviet  Russia  in  this  country  pretending  to  be  ob- 
jective in  their  studies  are,  in  fact,  taking  the  position  of  neutrality 
toward  communism,  thus  eliminating  all  elements  of  moral  judg- 
ment. Anyone  who  says  that  communism  is  evil,  they  proclaim  to 
be  biased.  In  my  opinion,  a  scientist  who  does  not  recognize  this 
evil  of  communism  is  automatically  in  favor  of  it,  and  cannot  claim 
to  be  objective  at  all.  There  cannot  be  any  middle  ground  about 
communism,  especially  if  we  consider  the  present  international  situa- 
tion and  the  efforts  we  put  in  order  to  contain  communism  all  over 
the  world.  I  believe  this  pamphlet  to  be  harmful  not  only  because 
it  contains  misinformation  about  the  Russians  and  the  Communist 
regime  and  the  Soviet  Union,  but  also  because  it  has  been  studied  with 
reliance  and  without  criticism  by  high  officers  of  the  American  Army. 
A  logical  conclusion  of  an  uninformed  reader,  after  reading  this  paper, 
would  be  that  the  Russians  are  very  happy  under  the  Soviets  and  that 
in  case  of  war  it  will  be  next  to  impossible  for  us  to  win  it. 

Another  dangerous  conclusion  would  be  that  the  whole  idea  of  the 
psychological  warfare  against  communism  is  nothing  but  a  senseless 
nonsense.  This  attitude  unfortunately  is  rather  widespread  these 
days.  As  to  the  author,  I  don't  want  to  question  his  good  intentions, 
but  I  am  quite  positive  that  they  are  of  the  kind  that  are  used  for 
paving  the  road  to  hell. 

The  Chairman.  Could  I  interrupt  at  this  point.  I  would  like  to 
point  out  that  while  the  cover  sheet  would  indicate  that  a  Colonel 
Bratton  was  responsible  for  this  document,  all  the  information  which 
we  have  indicates  that  Bratton  had  nothing  to  do  with  the  production 
of  this  document.  The  major,  who  is  perhaps  a  colonel  by  now,  I 
don't  know,  who  was  in  charge,  will  be  called  before  the  committee, 
the  major  who  was  responsible  for  the  production  of  this  document. 
I  think  it  is  important  to  make  it  very,  very  clear  that  all  the  infor- 
mation we  have  indicates  that  Bratton  merely  as  a  matter  of  infor- 
mation, because  of  his  particular  position,  signed  the  cover  sheet. 
Pardon  me  for  interrupting.  I  wanted  to  make  that  clear  in  the 
record. 

Mr.  Petrov.  Yes.  I  would  like  to  ask  your  permission,  Senator,  to 
bring  in  a  few  direct  quotations  from  this  paper  in  order  to  make  it 
clear  what  I  meant.  First  of  all  I  want  to  point  out  that  this  docu- 
ment was  published  in  1952,  and  not  in  1945,  when  the  Soviet  Union 
and  Communist  Government  of  Russia  were  so  favored  by  the  public 
here;  and  1952  was  after  2  years  of  the  Korean  war.  The  author 
tries  to  prove  that  Communists  are  loved  by  the  people  of  Russia. 
On  page  6  he  says,  and  I  quote : 

It  is  important  to  note  that  the  Communist  Party  membership  permeates  the 
whole  fabric  of  Soviet  society  and  does  not  function  as  an  exclusive  elite,  super- 
imposed on  the  amorphous  mass.  The  member,  in  relation  to  the  nonmember, 
is  more  priest  than  ruler.  If  he  loses  the  respect  of  those  around  him,  he  is  liable 
to  expulsion  from  the  party. 

I  can  tell  only  that  the  idea  of  a  Communist  being  a  priest,  or  con- 
sidered to  be  a  kind  of  a  priest,  in  Russia,  is  only  wishful  thinking 
of  the  author.    From  all  my  experiences,  I  have  never  heard  anything 


COMMUNIST    INFILTRATION    IN    THE    ARMY  41 

of  that  kind.  And  I  spent,  as  I  said,  30  years  of  my  life  in  the  Soviet 
Union. 

The  author  is  very  much  preoccupied  with  what  might  happen  to 
the  Communists.    On  page  15  he  says : 

Even  an  occupying  power  in  the  Soviet  Union  will  have  very  little  difficulty 
with  the  local  population  so  long  as  it  displays  some  tolerance  and  understand- 
ing for  their  institutions  and  folkways  and  confines  its  expressions  of  hostility 
to  a  socially  remote  Communist  hierarchy  since  the  people  regularly  accept 
local  Communist  Party  members  on  a  basis  of  friendly  equality. 

And  further,  on  the  same  page — 

It  appears  that  the  party  member  and  Konsomolist  type  would  be  the  most 
amenable  to  new  political  doctrines,  and  could  most  readily  generate  public 
interest  and  understanding  on  the  ideas  of  political  freedom  and  multiparty 
democracy.  It  must  be  remembered  that  the  party  member  is  merely  a  Russian 
who  has  mastered  party  jargon.  He  is  not  of  the  same  breed  as  the  handful 
of  socially  maladjusted  pseudo  intellectuals  among  native  Americans  who 
espouse  communism  in  the  United  States. 

Well,  this  is  what  the  Nazis  thought  when  they  came  to  Russia, 
and  when  every  third  member  of  the  Party  wanted  to  cooperate  with 
them.  They  thought  that  the  Communists  were  the  best  elements  to 
take  into  their  system,  and  with  their  help  to  rule  the  territories  they 
occupied.  The  reaction  of  the  people  was  strictly  negative.  Every- 
body said  that,  well,  these  Communists  were  ruling  us  before  the 
Germans  came,  they  are  ruling  us  after  the  Germans  came,  so  there 
isn't  must  difference  between  them  anyway,  and  let's  get  rid  of  the 
Germans  and  this  kind  of  Communist  anyway. 

The  Chairman.  In  other  words,  if  I  understand  your  testimony,  it 
is  your  testimony  from  your  experience  in  Russia,  this  advice  that 
if  we  ever  were  to  occupy,  we  should  use  the  Communist  leaders  as  our 
rulers  in  particular  areas,  you  feel  that  is  completely  false  and  you 
think  that  the  Germans  made  the  mistake  of  accepting  that  advice 
when  they  tried  to  occupy  Russia  ? 

Mr.  Petrov.  Yes.  And  I  believe  that  in  case  of  war,  and  in  case 
the  American  Army  is  in  the  Soviet  territory,  this  is  the  best  advice 
if  we  have  in  mind  to  alienate  the  population  against  ourselves. 

The  Chairman.  In  other  words,  you  think  that  if  we  follow  the 
advice  set  forth  in  this  document,  the  advice  to  use  the  Communist 
leaders  in  case  we  ever  have  war  with  Russia  and  occupy  any  portion 
of  it,  you  say  that  would  be  the  best  way  to  alienate  the  people  of 
Russia  ? 

Mr.  Petrov.  Exactly.  And  as  to  the  socially  maladjusted  individ- 
uals in  the  United  States  that  the  author  mentions,  I  wouldn't  argue 
with  him  here.     It  is  a  bit  outside  my  line  of  experience. 

Here  is  one  more  example,  page  49.    He  says : 

National  leaders  are  widely  respected  and  admired,  but  the  prevailing  public 
attitude  is  relatively  free  of  emotion.  Neither  affection  nor  hostility  is  ex- 
pressed, but  their  sincerity  and  ability  are  generally  unquestioned. 

Here  I  want  to  bring  up  that  if,  in  the  author's  opinion  nothing 
is  expressed,  how  he  would  know  that  the  national  leaders  are  re- 
spected?    It  is  pure  guessing.     And  he  goes  on  further: 

Those  above  40  represent  25  percent  of  the  population  have  remained  convinced 
that  communism  is  undesirable.  They  frequently  state  that  life  was  easier  and 
better  under  the  Czars,  and  farmers  still  express  disappointment  about  their 
limited  rights  on  the  land.  Those  below  40  are  generally  favorable  and  the 
enthusiasm  mounts  in  inverse  proportion  to  age,  into  the  middle  ranks  of  the 
Konsomols. 


42  COMMUNIST    INFILTRATION    IN    THE    ARMY 

The  Communist  Party  is  generally  respected  as  the  primary  organization 
of  the  Government  and  a  capable,  hard-working  party  member  often  earns  great 
admiration  for  his  diligence  and  ability.  He  is  usually  on  terms  of  friendly 
intimacy  with  nonmembers  around  him. 

Again,  here  is  nothing  but  wishful  thinking  of  the  author.  I  want 
to  point  out  that  I  myself  was  born  2  years  before  the  revolution,  and 
my  parents  did  not  belong  to  the  former  ruling  class  of  Russia.  I 
believe  I  know  the  state  of  mind  of  the  younger  generation.  I  say 
that  this  is  nothing  but  wishful  thinking  of  the  author.  It  is  an  open 
secret  in  Russia  that  the  idealists  and  sincere  enthusiasts  have  long 
since  disappeared  from  the  ranks  of  the  Soviet  Communist  Party.  I 
wouldn't  hesitate  to  say  that  at  least  90  percent  of  the  present  party 
membership  are  nothing  but  opportunists,  who  are  kept  together 
by  discipline  and  mutual  interests.  While  it  is  true  that  some  Com- 
munists are  admired  by  those  around  them,  it  is  not  because  they  are 
Communists,  but  because  of  other  qualities  of  theirs. 

The  Chairman.  May  I  interrupt?  We  are  running  considerably 
behind  in  our  schedule.  I  would  like  to  ask  you  one  question  and 
then  we  will  ask  you,  if  we  may  impose  upon  you,  to  analyze  for  us 
some  of  the  other  writings  by  Communists,  alleged  Communists, 
being  used.  But  let  me  ask  you  just  one  question  here,  if  I  may,  in 
closing. 

We  have  had  the  testimony  that  11  individuals  who  are  Commu- 
nists, some  of  them  espionage  agents,  wrote  material  which  was  used 
to  indoctrinate  our  troops,  some  individuals  directly  under  the  dis- 
cipline of  the  Communist  Party.  Do  you  feel  that  it  is  possible  to 
get  an  accurate  picture  of  communism  by  using  the  works  of  authors 
who  themselves  are  Communists  and  dedicated  to  the  theory  of 
communism  ? 

Mr.  Petrov.  I  believe  that  any  work  by  a  Communist  would  in- 
evitably be  prejudiced  in  favor  of  communism  and  the  Soviet  Union, 
the  Soviet  regime  in  Russia. 

The  Chairman.  Let  me  ask  you  this :  You  were  convicted  in  Rus- 
sia, you  were  charged  among  other  things  with  being  an  espionage 
agent  for  the  United  States.  You  served  6  years  in  Siberia.  Would 
you  like  to  tell  us  what  you  think  would  have  happened  in  your  trial 
if  when  you  were  asked  questions  you  said,  "I  refuse  to  answer  on 
the  grounds  my  answer  might  incriminate  me;"  do  you  think  you 
would  be  living  today  ? 

Mr.  Petrov.  Well,  the  trial  in  Russia,  actually  no  more  than  25 
percent  of  people  accused  of  political  deviations  are  ever  brought  to 
any  trial.  They  were  sentenced  without  ever  seeing  their  judges.  In 
my  case,  the  atmosphere  was  quite  different.  I  was  tried,  there  were 
3  judges,  myself,  2  friends  of  mine  who  were  accused  along  with  me, 
3  guards  behind  us,  and  a  secretary  in  the  room,  and  nobody  else. 
So  whatever  I  said  would  mean  little.  The  judges  came  into  the 
room  without  knowing  anything  about  my  case,  they  glanced  briefly 
through  the  papers  they  had  in  front  of  them.  The  whole  trial  lasted 
some  20  minutes,  and  it  took  another  10  minutes  for  them  to  pronounce 
the  sentence.  So  it  was  a  mere  formality.  Whatever  I  said  meant  ex- 
actly nothing.  My  sentence — well,  it  was  decided  long  before  I  was 
brought  into  the  courtroom. 


' 


COMMUNIST    INFILTRATION    IN   THE    ARMY  43 

The  Chairman.  I  want  to  thank  you  very  much.  The  staff  will  be 
in  touch  with  you  in  regard  to  an  analysis  of  some  of  these  other  books 
from  time  to  time. 

May  I  say  that  we  informed  the  Secretary  of  the  Army  they  could 
have  as  observers  here  today  anyone  whom  they  designated.  General 
Partridge  is  here  and  some  of  his  aides.  They  listened  to  the  testi- 
mony. May  I  say  that  whenever  you  have  analyzed  the  testimony, 
and  have  analyzed  these  documents,  if  you  care  to — and  all  of  this  will 
be  made  available  to  you — you  will  have  the  right  to  come  and  testify 
whenever  you  so  desire. 

Mr.  Petrov.  It  is  rather  hard  to  volunteer,  Senator,  once  in  a  while, 
but  thank  you. 

The  Chairman.  I  may  not  be  present  for  a  while  myself,  but  there 
will  be  a  Senator  available  whenever  you  want  to  appear  to  testify.  I 
think  it  would  be  unfair  to  you  to  ask  you  to  testify  immediately  with- 
out analyzing  this  testimony. 

I  may  say,  however,  if  you  desire  we  will  be  glad  to  hear  from  you 
at  this  time.  Otherwise,  we  will  wait  until  you  want  to  come  and 
testify. 

General  Partridge.  Yes,  sir.    I  will  notify  you  of  that. 

The  Chairman.  Fine.    Thank  you  very  much. 

All  of  the  testimony,  including  the  testimony  in  executive  session, 
will  be  available  to  you. 

The  committee  will  adjourn  until  further  notice. 

(Whereupon,  at  11 :  55  a.  m.,  the  committee  was  recessed  subject  to 
call.) 


APPENDIX 


Exhibit  No.  2 
Psychological  and  Cultural  Traits  of   Soviet   Siberia 

General  Headquarters,  United  Nations  and  Far  East  Command,  Military 
Intelligence  Section,  General  Staff 

TABLE  OF  CONTENTS 

Bibliography- 
Distribution  list 
Preamble 

1.  Cultural  Background 

A.  Impact  of  Communism 

B.  Geographic  and  Social  Mobility 

C.  Distinctive  Cultural  Traits 

D.  Personal  Security 

2.  Soviet  Character  in  Siberia 

A.  Psychological  Make-up 

B.  Social  Habits 

C.  Morality 

D.  Health 

E.  Efficiency 

3.  Attitudes  of  the  Soviet  People 

A.  Patriotism 

B.  Attitudes  Toward  Other  Countries 

C.  Racial  Attitudes 

D.  Public  Attitudes  Toward  the  Soviet  Government 

4.  Psychology  of  the  Soviet  Soldier 

A.  General 

B.  Psychological  Effect  of  Environment 

C.  Psychological  Effect  of  Training 

D.  Effect  of  Indoctrination 

5.  Psychological  Vulnerability 

A.  Vulnerability  of  the  People 

B.  Vulnerability  of  the  Soviet  Soldier 

6.  Conclusion 

BIBLIOGRAPHY 

Japanese  Repatriate  Interrogations  FEAF  Wringer  Reports  No.  1927,  9  Mar  51 
through  No.  2223, 9  Jun  51  (Inclusive) 

National  Intelligence  Survey,  Ch.  4,  Sociological 
Sect.  40     Introduction     Mar  49 
Sect.  42    Characteristics  of  the  People    Mar  49 
Sect.  43    Religion,  Education  &  Public  Information,  Feb  49 

The  Soviet  Union     Intell  Div,  GSUSA     1946 

ONI  Review     May  51 

Intelligence  Review     Intell  Div,  GSUSA    12  Sep  46, 1  Apr  48 

USSR,  General  Survey    British  Intelligence    1948 

Lamont,  C    Peoples  of  the  Soviet  Union     1946 

Maynard,  J.    Russia  in  Flux     1948 

Anderson,  P.  B.     People  Church  and  State  in  Modern  Russia     1944 

Simmons,  E.  J.    USSR  Concise  Handbook    1946 

Pares,  B.    A  History  of  Russia     1947 

Towster,  J.     Political  Power  in  the  USSR    1948 

Dallin,  D.  J.     Forced  Labor  in  the  Soviet  Union     1946 

Thompson,  R.  and  Harper,  S.  N.    Government  of  the  Soviet  Union     1949 

44 


COMMUNIST    INFILTRATION    LN    THE    ARMY  45 

DISTRIBUTION  LIST 

Copy  No.  and  Recipient : 

1.  C-in-C 

2.  Chief  of  Staff 

3.  Deputy  Chief  of  Staff— FEC 

4.  Deputy  Chief  of  Staff— SCAP 

5.  Gl 

6.  G2 

7.  G3 

8.  G4 

9-10.  Psychological  Warfare 

11.  CG  Eighth  Army  (Attn  :  ACofS,  G2) 

12.  CGFEAF  (Attn:  Director  of  Intelligence) 

13.  COMNAVFE  (Attn:  Intelligence  Officer) 

14.  CG  XVI  Corps  (Attn  :  ACofS,  G2) 

15.  CG  JLCOM  (Attn  :  ACofS,  G2) 

16.  CG  40th  Inf  Division  (Attn  :  ACofS,  G2) 

17.  CG  45th  Inf  Division  (Attn  :  ACofS,  G2) 

18.  CG  40th  AAA  Brigade  (Attn:  Intelligence  Officer) 

19.  CG  Northern  Command  (Attn  :  ACofS,  G2) 

20.  CG  Central  Command  (Attn:  ACofS,  G2) 

21.  CG  Southwestern  Command  (Attn  :  ACofS,  G2) 

22.  CINCPAC  (Attn:  ACofS,  G2) 

23.  CINCAL  (Attn:  ACofS,  G2) 

24.  Chief— JSPOG 

25.  Chief,  G2,  Intelligence  Division 

26.  Chief,  G2,  Security  Division 

27.  Chief,  FEC/LG 

28.  Chief,  ID  Operations 

29.  Chief,  ID  Plans  and  Estimates 
30-40.  Director  of  Intelligence  GSUSA 

Intelligence  Division 
ONI 
ASA 

Director  of  Intelligence,  TJSAF 
Deputy  Chief  of  Staff,  Plans  and  Combat  Operations 
JIC-JCS 

Office  of  Psychological  Warfare — D/A 
41-100.  Reserve  (For  Later  Distribution) 

PREAMBLE 

It  is  the  purpose  of  this  study  to  develop  an  understanding  of  the  Soviet  people 
which  will  be  militarily  useful  in  case  of  war.  In  wartime  it  will  be  the  Allied 
goal  to  defeat  the  Soviet  armed  forces,  to  undermine  the  influence  and  control 
of  the  Soviet  Government,  and  to  establish  effective  leadership  in  occupied  areas, 
with  a  view  to  assisting  the  main  war  effort.  These  aims  require  a  realistic 
insight  into  the  attitudes,  reaction  patterns,  and  social  tendencies  of  the  Soviet 
citizen.  Such  insight  provides  the  means  for  influencing  the  Soviet  civilian 
as  well  as  the  Soviet  soldier.  Each  can  be  approached  only  within  the 
limits  of  his  own  understanding,  and  within  the  bounds  of  his  own  experience. 
Communism  and  Communist  government  are  too  familiar  to  seem  terrible  to  him. 
He  is  fully  acclimated  to  Soviet  discipline  and  control.  He  has  never  known 
freedom  of  movement,  speech,  or  press.  He  has  little  understanding  of  repre- 
sentative democracy,  free  popular  elections,  or  due  process  of  law.  He  has  neither 
the  emigre's  perspective,  nor  the  Westerner's  access  to  many  points  of  view.  He 
cannot  be  expected  to  apply  or  appreciate  typically  American  concepts  of  prop- 
erty, justice  and  government,  until  he  has  acquired  a  fairly  intimate  under- 
standing of  them. 

The  problem  here  is  not  to  demonstrate  the  political  injustice  and  economic 
tyranny  of  the  Bolshevik  Government,  but  to  illuminate  the  Russian  in  his  exist- 
ing Soviet  habitat.  The  method  employed  is  to  describe  the  social  effects  of 
communism  in  the  Soviet  Union,  to  outline  the  militarily  pertinent  aspects  of 
Russian  culture,  and  to  denote  vulnerabilities  subject  to  Western  exploitation  in 
a  major  military  effort  to  disestablish  Communist  authority  in  the  USSR.  The 
most  valuable  material  for  this  study  derives  from  repatriated  Japanese  war 


46  COMMUNIST    INFILTRATION    IN    THE    ARMY 

prisoners.  More  than  a  million  of  them  have  spent  from  three  to  five  years  living 
and  working  among  the  Soviet  people  in  Siberia  and  Central  Asia,  presenting  an 
unsurpassed  opportunity  to  acquire  information  on  popular  attitudes.  Other 
sources  are  as  indicated  in  the  bibliography.  The  basic  viewpoint,  wherever 
possible,  is  that  of  the  middle-class  Soviet  citizen.  Western  and  American  view- 
points are  employed  only  by  way  of  contrast,  to  clarify  the  Soviet  outlook  for  the 
American  reader.  Of  course,  the  Communist  scene  and  the  world  in  general 
look  rather  strange  to  Westerners,  when  seen  through  the  Soviet  citizen's  re- 
stricted peephole,  but  Western  military  strategy,  political  leadership,  propa- 
ganda, and  other  modes  of  affecting  the  thoughts  and  actions  of  the  Soviet  public 
can  become  intelligible  to  them  only  when  brought  within  this  narrow  conceptual 
field  of  view.  Sound  military  planning  requires  a  complete,  factual  estimate  of 
popular  attitudes,  and  of  the  people  and  soldiers  on  whom  the  enemy  Power 
will  base  his  war  effort.  They  are  at  least  as  important  to  him,  as  are  weapons 
and  other  material  resources  for  war. 
For  the  Assistant  Chief  of  Staff,  G2 : 

R.  S.  Bbatton, 
Colonel,  General  Staff  ivith  Troops, 

Deputy. 

1.    CULTURAL   BACKGROUND 

A.  The  Impact  of  Communism 

The  present  psychological  outlook  of  the  Soviet  people  results  from  the  impact 
of  a  highly  artificial  political  and  economic  system  on  an  easy-going  agrarian 
people.  Long  accustomed  to  authoritarian  government  under  the  czarist  regime, 
they  fell  easy  prey  to  the  Communist  Party,  which  was  the  only  well-organized 
political  force  in  the  country.  Being  inured  to  hard  manual  labor  and  scanty 
living,  the  Russian  masses  found  no  great  contrast  in  the  demanding  rule  of  the 
Communist  Government.  In  a  continuing  era  of  rapid  social  change,  this  people 
has  met  the  gravest  internal  and  external  challenges  without  developing  any 
profound  cleavages  among  social  groups.  Meanwhile,  the  harsh  Soviet  Govern- 
ment has  liquidated  or  expelled  potentially  rebellious  elements. 

The  existing  format  of  Soviet  society  can  be  understood  only  in  terms  of  the 
broad  outline  of  events  since  the  October  Revolution  of  1917,  when  the  Commu- 
nist faction  took  over  control  from  the  feeble  Kerensky  Interim  Government, 
virtually  without  a  struggle.  Conservative  and  upper  class  groups  after  a 
belated  and  poorly  coordinated  counterrevolutionary  attempt,  were  defeated, 
and  literally  swept  out  of  the  country,  peremptorily  eliminating  a  large  segment 
of  the  formally  educated,  professionally  trained,  or  politically  experienced  por- 
tions of  the  population.  The  resulting  social  and  economic  breakdown  was 
rendered  complete  by  the  radical,  visionary  reformism  of  the  new  Communist 
Government.  The  most  ludicrous  elements  of  this  program,  such  as  direct 
worker  ownership  and  control  of  factories,  and  equal  pay  for  all  workers,  were 
quickly  discarded,  since  production  almost  immediately  came  to  a  standstill. 
However,  a  series  of  devastating  attacks  on  religion,  the  family,  and  the  agri- 
cultural system  maintained  a  varying  degree  of  social  chaos  for  about  fifteen 
years. 

That  these  "reforms"  succeeded  at  all,  was  due  to  several  factors.  First, 
there  was,  from  the  start  a  fair  measure  of  support  within  one  or  more  of  the 
main  classes  involved  in  each  case.  For  example,  the  peasantry  was  very  eager 
to  see  the  land  redistributed,  under  a  system  of  private  ownership,  regardless 
of  which  form  of  government  should  emerge.  Only  after  they  felt  well-estab- 
lished, in  the  early  1930's,  did  the  Communists  risk  alienating  agrarian  support 
by  ending  individual  farming  in  the  collectivization  drive.  The  land  program, 
in  turn,  was  used  as  a  lever  to  gain  support  for  destroying  the  position  of  the 
Orthodox  Church,  and  only  the  upper  age  groups  were  permanently  alienated  on 
this  question.  As  regards  factory  control,  the  workers  were  among  the  first  to 
realise  that  direct  worker  ownership  had  reduced  production  (and  wages)  almost 
to  zero.  Consequently,  the  workers  made  no  serious  protest  when  the  Central 
Government  took  over  the  large  factories. 

Second,  the  Communist  Party  took  great  pains  to  establish  itself  through  all 
levels  of  the  population  by  organizing  parallel  hierarchies  of  Party  and  civil 
government  organizations  down  to  the  village  level.  Party  leaders  throughout 
were  key  figures  in  the  corresponding  local  government  agencies,  and,  as  the 
Central  Government  apparatus  expanded  its  function,  became  more  and  more 


COMMUNIST    INFILTRATION   IN   THE    ARMY  47 

the  de  facto  channels  for  transmitting  administering,  and  explaining  Party 
orders  and  policies  from  above,  and  for  reporting  the  nature  and  intensity  of 
public  responses  from  below.  This  technique  of  "keeping  an  ear  to  the  ground" 
to  maintain  political  intelligence  is  analogous  to  that  used  in  any  political  ma- 
chine, and  in  the  case  of  the  USSR,  enabled  the  Communists  to  remain  within 
the  bounds  of  public  tolerance.  For  example,  Stalin  modified  the  original  collec- 
tivization program  sufficiently  to  allow  a  small  measure  of  private  farming  and 
private  ownership  of  hand  tools  and  livestock  on  the  collective  farms,  as  a  result 
of  timely  intelligence  on  the  widespread  and  bitter  opposition  to  the  more  extreme 
program. 

Third,  the  Communist  Government  built  up  a  national  organization  for  inter- 
nal police  control,  variously  known  as  the  OGPU,  the  NKVD,  the  MVD,  and 
finally  as  the  MGB  (Ministry  of  State  Security).  These  agencies  successfully 
prevented  the  development  of  any  organized  opposition,  either  to  the  regime  in 
general,  or  to  specific  policies.  They  have  established  a  universal  network  of 
informants  and  have  forcibly  laid  on  all  citizens  the  responsibility  of  reporting 
suspicious  persons  or  disloyal  elements.  They  have  also  provided  the  means  for 
apprehending,  sentencing  and  exploiting  the  labor  of  millions  of  citizens,  for  all 
manner  of  "crimes  against  the  State." 

Fourth,  in  a  series  of  four  "five-year  plans,"  the  Soviet  Government  has  at- 
tempted to  establish  an  extensive  industrial  base,  and  to  mechanize  agriculture. 
Primary  emphasis  has  been  placed  consistently  on  heavy  industry,  at  the  expense 
of  light  (mainly  consumer  goods)  industries.  In  all  of  these  plans,  the  develop- 
ment of  Siberia  and  the  decentralization  of  industry  have  been  key  factors.  Con- 
sequently, the  bulk  of  Soviet  production  has  been  allocated  to  the  capitalization 
of  the  still  expanding  heavy  industries,  and  to  defense  expenditures.  At  the 
same  time,  there  was  a  very  rapid  growth  of  population  and  industry  in  Siberia 
and  Central  Asia,  including  the  Ural  Mountain  complex,  as  compared  with  that 
of  European  Russia. 

The  initial  sociological  effect  of  the  Communist  Regime  was  the  partial  or 
complete  disestablishment  of  traditional  authority  and  the  old  modes  of  living. 
All  authority  based  on  wealth,  heredity  or  property  vanished  at  once.  The  an- 
cient body  of  Russian  law  and  jurisprudence  was  annulled,  to  be  replaced  by 
an  unorganized  body  of  Communist  ethics,  principles,  and  day-to-day  directives. 
The  family  structure  was  gravely  weakened  by  a  blunt  repudiation  of  parental 
authority,  an  official  denial  of  all  religious  practice  and  belief,  and  a  renuncia- 
tion of  tradional  sex  morality.  Rapid  industrialization,  railroad  and  canal 
building,  and  the  growing  flood  of  forced  laborers,  resulting  primarily  from  op- 
position to  the  rural  collectivization  program,  accelerated  the  breakdown  of 
familial  authoritv.  The  industrial  labor  force  expanded  from  about  3,000.000 
in  the  early  1920's  to  more  than  30.000.000  by  1040.  In  that  brief  period  the 
urban  portion  of  the  population  increased  from  10  percent  to  40  percent,  and 
was  accomplished  by  enticing  young  workers  from  the  farms  to  enter  industry. 
Millions  of  young  people,  working  away  from  home,  had  full  opportunity  to 
exploit  the  apparent  advantages  of  rubber-stamp  marriage  and  postcard  divorce. 
This,  coupled  with  extreme  indiscipline  in  the  schools  and  the  neglect  of  the 
usual  academic  studies  in  favor  of  Communist  indoctrination,  soon  resulted  in 
widespread  juvenile  delinquency,  and  complete  disorientation  of  the  young. 

By  1936,  the  Communist  Government  felt  compelled  to  renounce  these  radical 
policies.  It  restored  parental  and  pedagogic  authority,  and  instituted  rather 
stringent  divorce  laws  to  insure  the  permanence  of  the  family.  However,  wages 
were  purposely  set  sufficiently  low  to  require  that  all  adult  members  of  the 
family  be  continuously  employed,  both  to  augment  the  labor  pool,  and  to  ac- 
complish complete  exploitation  of  the  nation's  labor  resources.  Consequently, 
school-age  children  became,  in  a  sense,  the  wards  of  the  State,  and  spent  most 
of  their  waking  hours  under  the  direct  control  of  the  Government,  either  in  day 
nurseries,  schools  or  factory  apprenticeships,  which  greatly  enhanced  the  in- 
fluence of  Communist  indoctrination. 

The  Communist  Regime  has  profoundly  altered  the  status  of  all  elements  of 
the  Soviet  population.  The  "toiler"  was  elevated  to  the  highest  level  of  re- 
spectability. Initially,  this  meant  the  man  who  worked  with  his  hands,  but  was 
later  expanded  to  include  those  who  "labored  with  the  brain,"  and  embraced 
professional  and  clerical  workers  generally.  With  the  evolution  of  a  managerial 
class,  the  economic  position  of  the  manual  laborer  suffered  a  relative  decline,  but 
the  Soviet  Communist  code  continues  to  honor  the  worker  above  all,  and  it  is 
still  possible  for  the  outstanding  worker,  as  a  Stakhanovite  and  "labor  hero"  to 
exceed  the  earning  power  of  the  intermediate  class  of  supervisors  and  managers. 


48  COMMUNIST    INFILTRATION    IN    THE    ARMY 

The  farmer's  status  has  also  risen  sharply,  and  he  is  theoretically  on  a  par  with 
the  urban  worker,  though  he  did  not  receive  political  "equality"  (equal  vote) 
until  1936.  Nor  does  the  farmer  enjoy  equal  status  as  regards  personal  income, 
since  income  differentials  are  calculated  to  draw  labor  to  the  cities.  However, 
he  is  no  longer  despised  as  an  ignorant  country  lout,  and  enjoys  such  titles  as 
"specialist  in  pig  culture,"  "tractor  specialist,"  and  "dairy  specialist." 

Women  are  virtually  on  a  par  with  men  in  all  walks  of  life,  respecting  advan- 
tages and  liabilities.  Women,  like  men,  have  the  right  and  the  duty  to  be 
employed,  and  are  employed  on  the  same  footing  as  regards  norms,  wages,  crim- 
inal liability,  and  rights  of  participation  in  labor,  cultural,  and  political  organiza- 
tions. They  are  employed  indiscriminately  in  heavy  and  light  industry,  agricul- 
ture, and  the  professions,  and  provide  about  10  percent  of  the  convict  labor. 
Soviet  women  retain  many  of  the  usual  feminine  attributes,  such  as  the  desire  to 
be  sexually  attractive,  the  maternal  instinct,  desire  for  marriage,  and  the  yearn- 
ing for  beauty  aids,  such  as  lipstick,  silk  stockings,  and  the  like.  But  their 
basic  status  is  quite  dissimilar  from  that  of  women  in  conventional  western 
society,  in  that  none  are  dependent  on  a  husband's  earning  power,  and  nearly 
all  spend  their  working  day  outside  the  home.  In  comparison  to  women  of  the 
western  countries  they  are  much  more  aggressive,  frequently  take  the  initiative 
in  matters  of  sex,  and  are  under  no  disabilities  whatever,  as  regards  children 
born  out  of  wedlock.  Such  children  remain  with  the  mother,  if  she  chooses,  or 
are  raised  in  State  orphanages  as  "Stalin's  children,"  under  circumstances  similar 
to  those  of  other  children,  since  no  stigma  attaches.  Japanese  internees  in  Siberia 
were  amazed  at  the  position  of  children  in  the  Soviet  home,  since  the  children 
habitually  entered  conversations  and  disputes  with  their  parents  on  equal  terms. 
The  children  also  evinced  prematurely  adult  interests  in  sex  problems,  and  boys 
often  started  the  smoking  habit  at  the  age  of  7  or  8.  Soviet  women  are  patient, 
steady  workers,  and  frequently  outdo  the  men  working  beside  them  in  surpassing 
their  work  norms.  In  the  professional  role  of  doctor,  judge,  technician,  or 
teacher,  women  have  fully  demonstrated  their  competence,  and  enjoy  considerable 
respect.  For  example,  about  GO  percent  of  Soviet  doctors  are  women,  and  are 
invariably  reported  to  be  as  capable  and  well  qualified  as  those  of  the  opposite 
sex. 

Communist  Party  members  and  Young  Communists  (Komsomols),  though  they 
do  not  form  a  distinct  class  as  regards  income  and  status,  are  nevertheless,  a 
distinct  group.  Due  to  their  relatively  uniform  distribution,  especially  among  the 
various  income  levels  of  urban  workers,  they  may  be  said  to  constitute  a  govern- 
ing class  only  in  the  sense  that  they  are  representatives  of  the  Government, 
Socially  active  and  energetic  young  people  are  selected  for  membership  in  the 
Komsomol.  After  an  apprenticeship  of  several  years  (usually  in  their  middle 
20's),  those  who  have  demonstrated  a  sustained  interest  and  capacity  in  produc- 
tion drives,  Communist  agitation,  propaganda,  and  various  social  services  are 
admitted  to  Party  membership.  However,  the  liabilities  are  at  least  as  great 
as  the  advantages,  since  the  discipline  and  demands  for  service  on  a  Party 
member  are  much  greater  than  for  an  ordinary  citizen.  The  attitude  is  some- 
what similar  to  that  prevailing  in  the  United  States  Army,  where  the  officer  is 
expected  to  live  up  to  a  much  higher  code  of  service,  duty,  and  conduct  than  the 
soldier.  The  worker  who  is  a  Communist  Party  member,  however,  gets  the  same 
pay  as  nonmembers  doing  the  same  work.  This  group  includes  6,000,000  Party 
members,  12,000,000  Komsomol  members  (age  14  to  27),  and  a  comparable  num- 
ber of  Pioneers  (age  7  to  14).  This  means  that  at  least  one  fourth  of  the  Soviet 
population  either  participates  directly  in  a  Communist  Party  group,  or  is  inti- 
mately connected  through  family  ties  (assuming  that  each  member  of  the  above 
groups  has  at  least  one  nonmember  in  bis  immediate  family).  By  this  means, 
the  Communist  Party,  with  its  affiliated  organization,  maintains  the  dogma 
that  it  is  the  vanguard  of  the  working  class,  and  it  has  members  in  every  age  and 
income  bracket.  It  is  important  to  note  that  the  Communist  Party  membership 
permeates  the  whole  fabric  of  Soviet  society,  and  does  not  function  as  an  exclusive 
elite,  superimposed  on  an  amorphous  mass.  The  member,  in  relation  to  the  non- 
member,  is  more  priest  than  ruler.  He  explains,  persuades,  and  points  out 
shortcoming.  He  leads  discussion  groups,  and  organizes  the  factory  newspaper. 
If  he  loses  the  respect  of  those  around  him,  he  is  liable  to  expulsion  from  the 
Party,  for  he  is  expected  to  radiate  enthusiasm,  and  to  achieve  a  sound  and 
persuasive  presentation  of  official  Communist  doctrine.  If  the  Communist  Party 
member  violates  the  criminal  code  or  the  loyalty  code,  his  punishment  is  normally 
much  more  severe  than  in  the  case  of  an  ordinary  citizen.  Members  convicted  of 
disloyalty  or  criminal  acts  get  most  of  the  publicity  in  the  Communist  purge 


COMMUNIST    INFILTRATION    IN   THE    ARMY  49 

trials,  both  in  the  Soviet  and  the  Western  press,  but  the  bulk  of  those  eliminated 
in  the  purges  are  simply  dropped  from  the  rolls  for  inability  to  measure  up  to  the 
trying  standards  and  output  requirements  imposed  on  the  Party  member.  The 
true  Communist  in  the  USSR,  to  maintain  his  standing,  must  be  both  a  zealot  and 
a  workhorse. 

B.  Geographic  and  Social  Mobility 

Throughout  the  period  of  their  recorded  history,  the  Russian  people  have 
been  in  a  state  of  flux.  A  long  series  of  invasions  from  Mongolia,  Turkey, 
Poland,  Lithuania,  Sweden,  France,  and  Germany  has  invariably  left  a  human 
deposit  of  conquerors,  settlers,  or  prisoners,  often  profoundly  affecting  Russian 
language,  manners  and  customs.  At  the  same  time,  peasants  endeavoring  to 
escape  the  burden  of  serfdom  have  steadily  migrated,  first  to  the  north,  then 
to  the  east.  The  tide  of  humanity  moving  eastward  into  Siberia  and  Central 
Asia  has  grown  constantly  since  the  early  1500's,  reaching  the  Bering  Strait 
by  1650,  and  has  spread  through  Alaska  and  down  along  the  California  coast 
within  the  next  hundred  years.  Although  the  geographic  spread  of  this  move- 
ment was  rapid,  the  rate  of  influx  was  slow.  The  population  of  Siberia  was 
still  only  about  15,000,000  in  1900,  of  which  the  original  indigenous  population 
still  constituted  about  50  percent.  The  Russians  were  good  mixers,  and  since 
no  great  gaps  in  literacy,  technique,  or  wealth  separated  the  immigrants  from 
the  native  Mongol  peoples,  there  was,  and  is,  relatively  little  racial  or  cultural 
friction.  Both  groups  found  themselves  pitted  against  the  constricting  influ- 
ence of  the  Moscow  Government  and  tended  to  cooperate  rather  than  to  develop 
antagonisms. 

The  Communist  Regime  greatly  accelerated  the  flow  of  immigrants  to  Siberia, 
and  trebeled  its  population  within  25  years,  through  a  combination  of  forced 
migration,  transfer  of  convict  laborers,  assignment  of  technicians  and  Party 
members,  and  discriminatory  wage  and  tax  inducements.  New  settlers  were 
provided  seeds,  tools,  and  land.  Perhaps  15/20,000,000  convict  laborers  were 
required  to  remain  in  Siberia  on  completion  of  their  sentences.  Magadan, 
for  a  typical  example,  was  built  up  entirely  from  a  steady  accretion  of  ex- 
convicts.  Several  million  war  workers  and  refugees  were  relocated  in  Siberia, 
in  many  instances,  along  with  their  factories,  and  2/3,000,000  composing  local 
national  groups  such  as  the  Volga  Germans,  the  Crimeans,  Chechens  and  Kalmyks 
were  resettled  in  Siberia  for  security  reasons,  or  as  a  punishment  for  outright 
disaffection  or  poor  cooperation  during  the  War.  The  present  convict  popula- 
tion in  Siberia  is  probably  more  than  5,000,000,  including  at  least  a  million  found 
guilty  of  collaboration  with  the  Germans.  Many  of  these  were  women  infected 
with  venereal  disease,  presumed  to  have  resulted  from  fraternization  with  the 
enemy.  About  2,000,000  Soviet  soldiers,  recovered  from  German  prison  camps, 
served  2-year  "rehabilitation"  terms  in  the  Siberian  labor  camps,  and  many 
were  pressured  or  persuaded  to  remain  in  Siberia.  Most  of  the  German  prisoners 
of  war  apparently  were  used  in  the  European  part  of  the  USSR,  but  about 
1,000,000  were  still  in  western  Siberia  in  1948.  When  the  Japanese  prisoners 
were  repatriated  in  1948-50,  about  300,000  were  retained,  predominantly  as' 
convicts,  though  an  unknown  number  of  Japanese  elected  to  remain  in  Siberia 
as  Soviet  citizens,  usually  to  marry  Russian  women. 

The  present  population  of  Siberia  and  Central  Asia  (the  whole  territory 
east  of  the  Urals )  is  about  50,000,000,  though  the  bulk  of  it  is  still  west  of  Lake 
Baikal.  Many  Siberian  cities  expanded  more  than  400  percent  from  1926  to 
1939,  by  which  time  there  were  20  of  greater  than  100,000  population.  All 
have  continued  rapid  expansion  since  then,  and  Novosibirsk,  Sverdlovsk,  and 
Tashkent  have  passed  the  half-million  mark.  New  towns  such  as  Stalinsk, 
Komsomolsk,  and  Prokopyevsk  have  grown  up  from  small  villages,  and  urban 
construction,  including  housing,  streets,  and  public  utilities,  has  been  rapid. 
Aside  from  the  fast-paced  urbanization  and  industrialization  of  the  Soviet  Union 
as  a  whole,  the  most  striking  development  has  been  the  rapid  growth  of  Siberia. 
Augmented  by  a  continuing  stream  of  convicts',  this  movement  is  beginning  to 
show  marked  results  in  the  Soviet  Far  East.  There  are  six  major  urban  centers 
east  of  Lake  Baikal — Ulan  Ude,  Chita,  Vladivostok,  Khabarovsk,  Komsomolsk 
and  Voroshilov.  Metals  and  petroleum  industries,  fisheries,  canneries,  and  forest 
exploitation  have  been  steadily  expanded,  and  even  the  villages  of  remote  Kam- 
chatka Peninsula,  the  Yakutsk  region,  and  coastal  areas  of  the  Sea  of  Okhotsk, 
have  grown  rapidly  in  the  past  decade. 

Siberia,  in  a  social  sense,  is  rather  similar  to  our  Far  West  of  the  late  1800's. 
It  is  a  land  of  wide-open  spaces,  fast-growing  towns,  dirt  streets,  and  log  houses, 


50  COMMUNIST   INFILTRATION   IN   THE    ARMY 

where  most  villages  use  oil  lamps  for  lighting.  Far  more  than  in  western 
USSR,  all  citizens  are  on  an  equal  footing,  and  most  are  not  eager  to  talk  about 
their  past.  Social  relations  are  cordial  and  hearty.  There  is  abundant  oppor- 
tunity for  rapid  advancement  in  the  skilled  trades'  and  professions,  and  a  man 
is  paid  according  to  what  he  produces.  Even  today  the  outdoor  man  and  indi- 
vidualist can  escape  the  onorous  governmental  restrictions,  and  can  make  a 
comparatively  good  living  by  hunting  and  trapping  in  the  game-filled  evergreen 
forests,  which  extend  hundreds  of  miles  northward  from  the  Trans-Siberian 
railroad.  Incidentally,  these  hunters  provided  a  ready  source  of  superlative 
marksmen  in  World  War  II.  It  is  said  that  they  are  contemptuous  of  anyone 
who  cannot  hit  small  game  in  the  head  at  100  yards,  and  that  the  best  of  them 
shoot  their  game  in  the  eye  to  avoid  spoiling  the  pelt. 

Russia,  long  known  as  the  "prison  of  peoples,"  still  embraces  175  racial  and 
linguistic  groups,  and  the  Soviet  Government  regularly  publishes  books  in  more 
than  100  languages  for  its  own  citizens.  Russian  is  almost  universally  under- 
stood, but  the  old  languages  persist,  in  many  cases  among  only  a  few  thousand 
people.  However,  there  are  no  legal  or  cultural  barriers  to  intermixture.  Great 
Russians  intermarry  freely  with  all  groups  and  the  population  is  steadily  becom- 
ing more  homogenous.  Even  today  Great  Russians  are  in  the  majority  in  most 
of  the  Autonomous  Republics  and  National  Districts,  which  were  originally  estab- 
lished to  recognize  racial  and  cultural  differences.  Consequently,  the  correspond- 
ing racial  groups  are  gradually  losing  their  identity.  Like  the  United  States, 
Russia,  and  more  recently  the  Soviet  Union,  has  functioned  as  a  cultural  melt- 
ing pot. 

Social  mobility  also  represents  an  important  facet  of  Soviet  society.  Whatever 
the  other  restrictions  of  Soviet  authoritarianism,  one  freedom  is  maintained : 
that  is  the  freedom  of  self-improvement  and  advancement  within  an  occupation. 
To  a  certain  extent,  this  even  applies  to  convict  workers,  who  may  rise  to  posi- 
tions of  limited  authority  within  labor  gangs  and  who  may  advance  in  on-the-job 
skills  in  factories.  The  ordinary  Soviet  youth,  in  most  cases,  may  follow  his 
own  inclinations  in  choosing  his  life's  work  and  is  encouraged  to  study  and  to 
acquire  advanced  skills,  with  the  sure  prospect  of  rising  to  a  better  position  and 
income  bracket  as  rapidly  as  his  ability  permits.  The  same  flexibility  and  oppor- 
tunities inhere  in  selection  and  advancement  in  the  Communist  Party  organiza- 
tions. Almost  anyone  who  is  interested  can  join  the  Komsomol,  and  the  hard- 
working Komsomolist  with  a  bent  for  public  speaking  and  Communist  orthodoxy 
can  usually  make  the  more  difficult  step  into  the  Party.  Within  the  Party  there 
is  favoritism  at  the  higher  levels,  and  the  fast-dwindling  old  guard  of  prerevolu- 
tionary  days  is  firmly  ensconced,  but  in  general  the  criterion  is  "the  best  avail- 
able man  for  the  job."  This  practical  attitude  is  always  a  necessity  in  an  expand- 
ing economy  and  applies  equally  in  the  ranks  of  workers,  Party  men,  managers, 
professionals,  and  servicemen.  The  corresponding  equality  of  opportunity  and 
the  air  of  economic  and  industrial  expansion  appears  reasonable  to  the  people 
and  encourages  a  fundamental  national  pride  and  optimism  among  them. 

There  is  theoretically  no  freedom  to  choose  the  place  of  work  or  to  change  to 
another  job.  However,  despite  repeated  legislation  to  stop  job-hopping,  it  is 
still  a  widespread  practice.  Up  to  the  mid-1930's,  for  example,  the  annual  turn- 
over of  the  labor  force  frequently  rose  above  100  percent,  in  some  industries 
reached  150  percent,  and  was  still  about  50  percent  in  1940.  The  conditions  which 
encouraged  it  were,  and  remain,  manifold.  First,  new  factories  were  constantly 
being  established,  and  the  consequent  labor  shortages  opened  up  opportunities 
for  faster  advancement,  acceptance  in  a  higher  pay  bracket,  or  improved  living 
conditions.  Managers  vied  with  each  other  to  attract  labor,  and,  of  course,  were 
not  too  scrupulous  in  ascertaining  that  a  new  employee  had  been  duly  released 
from  his  former  job.  Employers  were  more  likely  to  lose  than  to  gain  labor  by 
a  tough  policy,  and  therefore  rarely  tried  to  enforce  the  law  against  those  who 
left  without  proper  clearance,  so  there  was  relatively  little  prosecution  on  this 
ground.  These  conditions  still  prevail  as  regards  the  labor  situation  in  the 
Soviet  Union,  for  it  is  still  definitely  a  seller's  market.  An  applicant  is  usually 
hired  without  question  and  occasionally  even  without  the  inevitable  passport 
and  labor  book  in  some  of  the  more  hard-pressed  Siberian  establishments. 

The  Government  has  repeatedly  attempted  to  curb  job-hopping,  absenteeism, 
and  tardiness  by  providing  extensive  penalties.  However,  as  in  the  Czarist 
Regime's  efforts  to  prevent  the  steady  migration  of  peasants  from  the  estates, 
the  legislation  indicates  far  more  strongly  that  the  "abuse"  is  widespread  and 
deep-rooted  than  that  it  is  being  corrected.  If  the  harried  employer  insists  on 
prosecuting  the  occasional  absentee  or  tardy  worker  to  the  full  extent  of  the 
law,  he  loses  the  worker  to  the  MVD  labor  camps  and  estranges  other  workers. 


COMMUNIST   INFILTRATION   IN   THE    ARMY  51 

If  he  is  fortunate  enough  to  get  convict  labor  to  replace  such  losses,  it  is  only  on 
a  loan  basis  and  subject  to  transfer  elsewhere  at  any  time.  Moreover,  it  is  less 
productive  and  requires  far  more  supervision.  Therefore,  most  employers  prefer 
temporary  fines,  admonition,  and  other  on-the-spot  correctives.  That  the  em- 
ployer has  such  laws  to  fall  back  on  puts  teeth  into  his  admonitions,  but  he  in 
fact  rarely  invokes  them,  since  there  are  very  few  instances  of  workers  under 
penal  sentence  for  minor  violations  of  labor  discipline,  despite  the  moderately 
high  frequency  of  such  violations. 

In  summary,  there  is  a  high  degree  of  social  mobility  in  the  Soviet  Union,  as 
compared  to  the  more  stable  societies  of  Great  Britain,  France,  or  to  a 
smaller  extent,  the  United  States.  The  industrial  labor  force  is  still  expanding 
rapidly,  along  with  the  national  economy,  requiring  that  more  workers  be 
trained  in  skilled  and  semi-skilled  trades.  Wages  are  closely  geared  to  skill 
and  output  for  manager  and  worker  alike,  and  all  the  incentive  devices  used  in 
capitalist  enterprise  are  rigorously  exploited.  Bonuses,  prizes,  and  overtime  pay 
are  used  to  stimulate  the  industrious,  and  deductions  more  than  proportional  to 
deficiency  of  output  below  the  normal  is  a  goad  for  the  slow  worker.  The  capable 
worker  gets  rapid  advancement,  and  if  he  shows  talents  for  leadership  and 
organization,  can  readily  rise  in  the  managerial  ranks  regardless  of  Party 
status.  However,  the  Party  man  gets  preference.  The  upper  bracket  worker 
or  manager  who  fails  to  meet  stringent  output  requirements  is  readily  demoted. 
Although  Soviet  society  is  by  no  means  ''classless,"  the  existing  classes  remain 
fluid,  and  there  is  much  movement  in  general  both  up  and  down  the  social  ladder. 
No  one  is  exempt  from  falling  into  convict  status,  and  even  the  ex-convict  can 
generally  start  a  new  life  on  equal  footing  with  other  citizens,  except  that  he 
must  normally  do  it  in  one  of  the  development  areas  in  Siberia. 

C.  Distinctive  Cultural  Traits 

The  Russian  people  evince  a  much  more  gregarious  nature  than  is  found  among 
the  more  advanced  democracies.  Partly  as  a  carry-over  from  the  agrarian  past, 
and  partly  as  a  basic  trait,  this  pronounced  tendency  to  group  living  has  been 
strongly  reinforced  and  exploited  by  the  Communist  Government.  Group  stand- 
ards, communal  activities,  and  in-group  status  exert  the  predominating  influence, 
as  contrasted  with  the  Western  emphasis  on  individualism,  personal  rights,  and 
private  (individual)  enterprise.  Consequently,  though  there  are  exceptions,  the 
average  Russian  lacks  the  deep  antipathy  for  regimentation  and  collective  enter- 
prises which  is  normal  to  Americans.  The  Russian's  easy  acceptance  of  Com- 
munist controls  seems  incredible  from  the  American  viewpoint.  Even  in  pre- 
collectivization  clays,  when  rural  Russia  included  85  percent  of  the  population, 
farmers  lived  in  small  villages,  and  gathered  in  gangs  to  form  work  camps  in 
the  fields  for  the  major  phases  of  cultivation  and  harvest.  With  the  growth  of 
Communism,  these  villages  became  ready-made  centers  for  collective  farms.  The 
transition,  though  stormy,  was  carried  out  on  a  solid  basis  of  ancient  work  habits, 
and  the  general  opposition  was  more  due  to  the  excessive  grain  levies  and  the 
loss  of  private  ownership  status  than  to  the  relatively  moderate  difficulties  of  ad- 
justing to  a  rather  similar  organizational  pattern.  Thereafter,  farm  workers 
moving  into  industry  found  housing  construction  lagging  far  behind  population 
growth  in  the  cities.  In  town  and  country  alike,  it  has  been  normal  for  two  or 
more  families  to  share  the  same  small  house.  In  his  goldfish  existence,  the 
average  Russian  of  modern  times  knows  neither  individual  nor  family  privacy, 
and  has  little  concept  of  related  values.  From  his  eighth  week  of  life,  he  is  in 
constant  and  immediate  contact  with  others  of  his  own  age  group  in  nursery, 
school  and  factory.  Family  relationships,  both  among  siblings  and  in  the  par- 
ental set,  though  fairly  well  developed,  cannot  supersede  or  dominate  the  strong 
influence  of  extra-family  communal  relationships.  The  Russian  child  receives 
about  as  much  care  and  attention  from  the  lady  in  charge  of  the  nursery  as  from 
his  own  mother.  His  teacher  and  classmates  loom  about  as  large  in  his  af- 
fections as  do  his  parents,  brothers  and  sisters.  Illustrative  of  this  was  the 
favorite  device  of  Soviet  wartime  propaganda,  which,  in  arousing  the  hatred  of 
the  soldiers,  regularly  cited  German  atrocities  against  teachers.  Often  repeated 
was  the  charge  that  "If  you  don't  stop  them,  the  Germans  will  kill  your  old 
teacher ;  they  will  burn  your  little  village  school.  They  have  murdered  thousands 
of  teachers  in  the  Ukraine,  and  have  destroyed  all  our  schools  there."  Similarly, 
the  Russian  cherishes  a  life-long  affection  for  his  classmates,  and  invariably 
uses  the  intimate  form  of  address,  regardless  of  subsequent  differences  of  rank 
and  station. 


52  COMMUNIST    INFILTRATION    IN    THE    ARMY 

As  a  natural  consequence  of  his  early  training  and  experience,  the  Russian 
is  extremely  adaptable  in  social  relations.  He  can  readily  adjust  in  any  group, 
and  simultaneously  participates  in  several,  with  a  minimum  of  friction.  In-group 
relations  are  warm  and  cordial,  and  disputes,  though  often  heated,  are  soon 
resolved  and  forgotten.  Incessant  group  activities  are  no  burden  for  the 
Russian,  as  they  would  be  for  Americans.  The  Westerner  accepts  social  obliga- 
tions, often  with  some  enthusiasm,  but  he  tends  to  become  somewhat  bored  and 
resentful  of  interminable  meetings  and  discussions.  He  looks  forward  to  free 
evenings,  wants  to  "spend  more  time  with  his  family,"  and  to  have  more  "time 
to  himself."  Not  so  the  Russian,  to  whom  individualist  preoccupations  are 
rather  alien.  If  he  has  time  on  his  hands  he  is  likely  to  go  to  the  local  "Klub," 
or  join  in  a  song-fest.  He  is  an  inveterate  talker,  and  time  spent  in  conversation, 
as  an  index  of  the  intensity  of  social  relations,  puts  the  Russians  high  on  the 
list,  as  compared  to  other  peoples. 

An  important  characteristic  of  Russian  groups  is  that  they  are  never  exclusive. 
There  is  almost  no  tendency  for  members  to  feel  superior  to  non-members,  and 
anyone  is  free  to  join  on  an  equal  footing,  temporarily  or  permanently.  For- 
eigners traveling  in  the  Soviet  Union  unanimously  report  the  Russians  as  a 
friendly  people,  and  millions  of  Russians  induced  or  compelled  to  migrate  to 
other  countries  have  merged  with  the  barest  minimum  of  friction  with  the 
peoples  of  China,  France,  Italy,  the  United  States,  and  many  other  countries. 
This  facility  for  adjustment  was  clearly  demonstrated  in  the  United  States, 
where  the  Russian  immigrant  group  totaling  more  than  1,000,000  failed  to  produce 
any  such  clearly  defined  criminal  element  as  emerged  from  the  numerically 
comparable  Italian,  German,  Polish,  and  Irish  immigrant  groups.  This  does 
not  reflect  discredit  on  the  latter  nationalities,  but  merely  testifies  that  the 
transition  was  much  easier  for  the  Russians,  due  to  their  psychological  and 
social  makeup.  It  is,  in  fact,  rather  hard  for  the  Russian  people  to  be  socially 
uncooperative,  which  explains  in  good  part,  the  ease  with  which  the  Com- 
munist Government  installed  itself.  Even  an  occupying  power  in  the  Soviet 
Union  will  have  very  little  difficulty  with  the  local  population  so  long  as  it 
displays  some  tolerance  and  understanding  for  their  institutions  and  folkways, 
and  confines  its  expressions  of  hostility  to  a  socially  remote  Communist  hierarchy, 
since  the  people  regularly  accept  local  Communist  Party  members  on  a  basis 
of  friendly  equality.  By  the  same  token,  to  avoid  public  hostility,  purely  local 
institutions,  whether  civic  or  social,  would  have  to  be  reoriented,  rather  than 
liquidated,  since  the  people  tend  to  identify  themselves  with  these  groups.  In 
general,  it  appears  that  the  Party  member  and  Komsomolist  type  would  be  the 
most  amenable  to  new  political  doctrines,  and  could  most  readily  generate  public 
interest  and  understanding  on  the  ideas  of  political  freedom,  and  multi-party 
democracy.  In  this  connection,  it  must  be  remembered  that  the  Party  member 
is  merely  a  Russian  who  has  mastered  Party  jargon.  The  same  Russian,  granted 
the  opportunity,  can  "see  the  light,"  and  readily  masters  other  ideas,  as  is 
demonstrated  by  the  many  Soviet  officials  and  soldiers  who  have  become  dis- 
enchanted with  the  Communist  credo  on  seeing  America,  Germany,  of  Czecho- 
slovakia. He  is  not  of  the  same  breed  as  the  handful  of  socially  maladjusted 
pseudointellectuals  among  native  Americans  who  espouse  Communism  in  the 
United  States. 

D.  Personal  Security 

The  average  Russian  has  a  greater  sense  of  personal  security  than  is  generally 
supposed.  Soviet  citizens  are  uneasy  and  apprehensive  in  occasional  contacts 
with  foreigners  from  Western  countries,  whom  his  Government  regards  as 
de  facto  enemies,  but  has  displayed  no  such  apprehension  in  talking  to  the 
thousands  of  Japanese  and  German  prisoners  who  worked  among  them.  The 
Russian  is  well  aware  that  openly  anti-Communist  statements  will  get  him  into 
serious  trouble,  and  therefore,  usually  avoids  the  subject.  In  general,  he  knows 
that  if  he  observes  the  well-known  rules  of  conduct,  he  will  have  no  trouble 
with  the  MGB  (security  police),  and  governs  himself  accordingly.  Morbid 
anxiety  about  the  MGB  is  generally  confined  to  those  in  responsible  positions  in 
government  and  industry  who  are  having  trouble  with  quotas.  There  is  a  strong 
temptation  to  falsify  accounts  or  to  certify  substandard  material  at  full  quality, 
in  an  effort  to  meet  a  quota,  achieve  a  certain  percent  of  increase  or  quality  for 
a  citation.  When  such  malpractices  come  to  light,  and  they  do  every  day,  the 
responsible  manager  loses  his  hard-won  status  by  immediate  demotion,  or  more 
likely,  by  a  five  to  ten  year  sentence  in  the  labor  camps. 


COMMUNIST    INFILTRATION   LN    THE    ARMY  53 

The  Soviet  worker  is  completely  secure  as  regards  employment,  and  is  jmable 
to  comprehend  the  Western  worker's  profound  fear  of  losing  his  job.  To  pass 
this  off  as  the  "full  employment  of  the  prison"  obscures  some  of  the  real  effects 
of  the  phenomenon.  The  Soviet  worker's  position  is  analogous  to  that  of  a 
soldier  in  a  conventional  army.  He  can't  be  fired.  He  can  only  be  reprimanded, 
demoted,  or  transferred  to  a  less  desirable  area.  Even  if  he  is  sentenced  for 
criminal  activity,  he  retains  a  basic  worker  status  within  Soviet  society.  He 
retains  the  "right"  to  work,  and  the  x'ight  to  a  (reduced)  reward  for  his  work. 
True,  he  will  receive  only  crude  food,  clothing,  shelter,  and  pin  money  for  his 
work,  but  he  is  never  threatened  with  loss  of  livelihood,  and  rarely  suffers 
physical  violence.  This  security  carries  over  to  his  family.  If  he  goes  to  a 
labor  camp,  his  wife's  earnings  will  maintain  the  family,  and  the  children  will 
be  cared  for  in  any  case.  The  effect  of  this  "security"  is  largely  psychological, 
but  it  accounts  for  several  facets  of  present-day  Russian  character,  including 
stability  of  personality,  lack  of  psychopathic  tendencies,  attitudes  toward  money 
and  property,  and  other  social  attitude. 

Security  in  old  age  is  theoretically  provided  for  in  the  Stalin  constitution 
of  1936,  but  in  practice  stipulations  as  to  length  of  continuous  service  in  the 
same  enterprise  make  retirement  income  available  only  for  a  few.  Those  past 
retirement  age  (65  for  men,  and  60  for  women)  often  remain  employed  at  light 
jobs,  such  as  time-keeping,  ticket-taking,  or  watching  the  children.  Japanese 
prisoners  mention  the  existence  of  old  people's  homes,  but  there  is  little  informa- 
tion on  them  except  that  old  people  prefer  not  to  go  there.  In  general,  the 
very  aged  prefer  to  live  with  their  children,  and  are  able  to  do  so  without 
friction,  for  babushka  and  dyedushka  (grandma  and  grandpa)  have  always 
enjoyed  great  affection  in  Russian  families. 

Communist  Party  members  and,  to  a  less  extent,  Komsomolists  are  consid- 
erably less  secure,  due  to  the  purge  system.  The  Party  purging  process  goes 
on  continuously  at  a  moderate  level,  but  at  two  to  three  year  intervals,  develops 
into  a  general  purge,  in  which  the  records  of  all  members  are  thoroughly  re- 
viewed. Both  stages  of  the  purge  are  normally  initiated  in  the  process  of 
"criticism  and  self-criticism"  at  Party  meetings  on  all  levels.  The  Russian 
genius  for  pointing  out  personal  faults  and  shortcomings  is  fully  exploited  in 
this  process,  and  latent  friction  and  hostilities  are  relied  on  to  give  it  driving 
power.  A  member  who  has  appeared  uncooperative,  inefficient  or  indolent  may 
be  denounced  at  any  time  by  another  member,  acting  in  a  private  capacity, 
or  as  spokesman  for  an  official  inspection  team.  If  there  is  a  general  belief 
that  the  accusation  is  well  founded,  it  will  be  supported  by  testimony  of  one 
or  several  additional  members.  When  a  derogatory  testimony  is  heard,  members 
of  contrary  conviction,  if  any,  may  speak  in  the  defense  of  the  accused,  citing 
his  fine  record,  ability,  personal  qualities,  or  loyalty.  The  accused  then  must 
choose  whether  to  defend  himself  and  deny  the  charges,  or  to  "confess  every- 
thing," swear  repentance,  and  resolve  to  mend  his  ways.  He  usually  confesses, 
and  concludes  by  saying  that  he  is  ready  to  accept  any  punishment  deemed  appro- 
priate, but  that  if  he  is  accorded  another  chance,  he  will  do  his  utmost  to 
prove  worthy  of  his  comrades'  confidence.  This  act  of  "self  criticism"  is  con- 
sidered very  proper  and  praiseworthy  for  a  good  Communist.  The  wise  member 
usually  takes  this  alternative  unless  the  criticism  hangs  on  only  one  or  two 
specific  charges  which  he  can  conclusively  disprove,  and  he  feels  he  has  good  sup- 
port among  his  fellow  members.  Even  then,  the  astute  member  will  apologet- 
ically dispi'ove  the  specific  charges,  "for  the  sake  of  scientific  objectivity,"  and 
will  then  admit  grave  generalized  faults,  such  as  insufficient  zeal,  deficient  un- 
derstanding of  Marxist-Leninist-Stalinist  doctrines,  and  resultant  errors  in 
their  practical  application. 

When  discussion  is  closed,  the  Party  Secretariat  will  consider  all  factors,  and 
will  decide  whether  to  reprimand,  warn,  or  recommend  expulsion  to  the  next 
echelon.  If  criminal  activity  is  involved,  the  case  is  immediately  referred  to  the 
State  for  prosecution.  However,  the  bulk  of  these  cases  result  from  failure  to 
accomplish  a  difficult  assignment,  generating  too  much  social  friction  in  fulfilling 
it,  or  wasteful  utilization  of  materials.  One's  case  is  also  seriously  damaged  if 
one  has  too  many  enemies,  whether  they  are  Party  members  or  not,  since  MGB 
informants  and  non-Party  activists  also  bring  in  reports  on  the  worker's  atti- 
tudes and  criticisms.  More  than  anyone  else,  the  rank-and-file  Party  member 
must  be  careful  to  generate  as  little  hostility  as  possible  among  those  around  him, 
in  performing  his  assigned  duties.  This  has  resulted  in  a  strong  tendency  toward 
anxiety  tensions,  ulcers,  and  over-cautiousness.  Everyone  procrastinates.  The 
Communist  official  relays  his  problem  to  a  higher  echelon,  if  at  all  possible.    The 


54  COMMUNIST    INFILTRATION    LN    THE    ARMY 

factory  manager  goes  easy  on  his  labor  force  as  long  as  he  can,  and  consequently, 
to  meet  his  quota,  must  work  his  entire  establishment  at  top  speed  during  the 
last  ten  days  of  the  month. 

The  general  periodic  purge  works  on  the  same  principles,  except  that  it  is 
directed  by  the  Secretariat  at  the  head  of  the  Party,  and  covers  all  members.  In 
the  past,  it  has  often  functioned  as  a  large-scale  elimination,  based  on  Communist- 
style  efficiency  ratings.  Primary  factors  in  determining  efficiency  are  loyalty, 
practical  work,  and  the  attitudes  of  fellow  members.  The  general  purge  may 
continue  12  to  15  months,  since  the  record  of  each  member  is  reviewed  individu- 
ally in  great  detail.  One-half  to  one-quarter  of  the  membership  has  been  expelled 
from  the  Party  in  each  of  the  major  purges  from  1925  to  1933.  In  1935,  after  the 
assassination  of  Kirov,  an  old-guard  Bolshevik  and  close  friend  of  Stalin,  the 
purge  became  much  more  severe,  and  tens  of  thousands,  including  non-Party  peo- 
ple received  long  penal  sentences  "for  lack  of  vigilance."  The  Kirov  Purge  had 
barely  run  its  course,  when  an  alleged  anti-Stalin  plot  was  discovered  in  the  top 
brackets  of  the  Army,  and  the  purge  of  1936-38  got  under  way.  Several  hundred 
army  officers  were  shot,  and  virtually  all  Party  members  underwent  a  truly  mem- 
orable grilling.  New  thousands  of  ex-Party  members  trekked  off  to  the  labor 
camps,  and  again,  Party  membership  declined  by  a  third.  Purges  since  then 
have  been  mild  by  comparison,  but  they  loom  large  in  the  Party  man's  nightmares. 
As  a  major  purge  approaches  its  peak,  Party  members  in  general  are  extremely 
apprehensive  and  distraught.  Within  the  mechanism,  Party  control  is  at  its 
peak,  but  practical  control  over  the  nation  and  its  people  is  at  a  minimum,  because 
the  Party  members,  who  constitute  the  main  channels  of  control,  are  preoccupied 
with  their  personal  danger.  Therefore,  the  Soviet  Union's  most  vulnerable  period 
from  the  sociological  viewpoint,  occurs  as  a  major  purge  is  approaching  its  peak, 
and  vulnerability  is  directly  proportional  to  the  intensity  and  spread  of  the 
purge.  This  vulnerability,  though  highly  significant,  would  be  exploitable  only  in 
the  immediate  area  of  invasion  and  occupation.  In  all  remaining  areas  there  is 
little  doubt  that  the  purge  would  be  terminated,  and  that  normal  Party  control 
would  be  speedily  restored. 

2.  SOVIET  CHARACTER  IN  SIBERIA 

A.  Psychological  Makeup 

Numerous  misconceptions  of  the  Russian  mentality  have  arisen  through 
popular  and  historical  writings  of  foreigners  who  appy  their  own  characteristic 
reactions  to  the  supposed  condition  of  the  Russian  peasant  or  Soviet  "toiler." 
Allegations  that  the  Russians  are  impassive,  stoical,  fatalistic,  and  melancholy 
are  both  oversimplified  and  misleading.  Russians,  like  many  other  peoples, 
genuinely  enjoy  the  pathos  of  a  dolorous  song  or  a  tragic  play,  and  are  readily 
moved  to  tears  by  them.  They  do  accept  national  and  local  calamities,  such  as 
invasions,  droughts,  famines,  and  in  recent  times,  increased  work  norms,  and 
more  stringent  controls,  with  a  quiet  dolor  which  suggests  passivity  and  stoicism. 
They  are  apt  to  agree  that  phenomena  outside  their  control  must  be  endured, 
and  that  it  is  useless  to  oppose  the  inevitable.  This  is  correctly  interpreted  as 
fatalistic.  The  fault  lies  in  regarding  these  negative  attitudes  as  the  character- 
istic and  predominant  coloring  of  the  Russian  mind.  Unfortunately  Western 
literature  has  long  since  pictured  Russia  as  black  and  gloomy,  and  has  falsely 
extended  this  psychological  set  to  the  people  as  well.  These  attitudes  and  re- 
action patterns  do  exist,  as  they  do  among  all  other  people.  However,  they 
ordinarily  occupy  only  a  small  place  in  Russian  thought,  and  no  objective  day-to- 
day account  of  life  in  Russia  fails  to  note  the  normal  cheerfulness  and  good 
humor  of  the  ordinary  Russian.  Like  the  "downtrodden"  peasant  of  old  Russia, 
he  seems  to  enjoy  life. 

The  Western  habit  of  comparing  the  real  incomes,  freedoms,  and  rights  of 
Americans,  for  example,  with  those  of  Soviet  citizens  also  casts  the  latter  in  a 
false  light  with  reference  to  Soviet  attitudes.  The  Soviet  citizen  cannot  make 
such  comparisons,  except  in  a  remote  and  speculative  way,  and  is  much  more 
closely  concerned  with  the  real  world  within  his  reach.  His  home,  his  factory, 
his  village,  and  his  country  all  seem  normal  and  acceptable  to  him.  He  is  not 
abnormally  frustrated  in  his  daily  life.  His  place  in  society,  economically  and 
socially,  is  plainly,  though  not  too  rigidly,  marked,  and  he  has  little  difficulty 
maintaining  his  status  within  his  own  group,  since  the  group  is  quite  tolerant 
of  all  types  of  personality.  Under  an  authoritarian  Government,  many  of  his 
personal  problems  such  as  his  place  of  work  and  of  domicile  are  settled  for  him. 


COMMUNIST    INFILTRATION    IN   THE    ARMY  55 

The  discontented  man  in  America  must  often  admit  he  has  "only  himself  to 
blame."  In  the  USSR,  he  can  blame  it  on  Moscow  or  more  typically,  on  the 
local  administration,  and  it  is  not  a  mental  burden  to  him.  As  has  been  men- 
tioned, he  does  not  bear  the  American's  complete  financial  responsibility  for  his 
family,  since  his  wife's  earning  capacity  and  her  share  of  responsibility  are 
usually  as  great  as  his  own.  Free  medical  care,  such  as  it  is,  relieves  him  of 
financial  worries  on  health.  Sexual  frustrations  are  non-existent,  or  nearly  so, 
due  to  the  lax  standards  of  sex  morality,  which  are  as  prevalent  in  the  USSR  as 
in  other  parts  of  Europe.  Particularly  in  Siberia,  women  have  become  nearly 
as  aggressive  as  men  in  these  matters,  and  adultery  is  neither  ground  for  divorce 
nor  a  serious  offense,  unless  an  enemy  soldier  is  involved. 

The  Russians  are  generally  extroverted  and  material-minded.  To  the  Japa- 
nese they  seemed  happy-go-lucky.  They  live  only  in  the  present,  and  spend 
their  money  as  soon  as  they  get  it.  When  they  do  save,  it  is  usually  for  some 
very  immediate  object.  With  this  realistic  orientation,  the  Russian  is  very 
unlikely  to  develop  psychopathic  troubles.  The  incidence  of  mental  illness,  as 
indicated  by  suicide,  psychotic  criminality,  and  even  of  neurotic  traits,  is  appar- 
ently very  low.  Thousands  of  Japanese  prisoners  who  were  intimately 
acquainted  with  Russians  throughout  Siberia  reported  that  they  had  never  seen 
or  heard  of  a  Russian  who  was  mentally  ill,  as  compared  with  a  fraction  of  a 
percent  who  could  recall  some  isolated  instances,  usually,  of  senile  dementia. 

Russians  are  not  disposed  to  introspection  or  moodiness.  On  the  contrary, 
they  are  almost  constantly  occupied  outside  of  working  hours  with  social  activ- 
ities, household  tasks,  family  life,  and  reading.  Moreover,  they  are  generally 
optimistic  even  when  a  Westerner  would  expect  them  to  be  in  utter  despair. 
Young  and  middle-aged  collective  farmers  in  eastern  Siberia  still  speak,  in  com- 
plete sincerity,  of  a  golden  future,  when  there  will  be  an  abundance  of  every- 
thing, and  a  six-hour  working  day,  though  the  older  ones  are  generally  convinced 
that  conditions  will  never  improve.  The  same  is  generally  true  of  urban  workers, 
many  of  whom  sincerely  expect  a  world  of  plenty  by  1960.  An  outstanding 
example  of  the  strength  of  Russian  optimism  is  that  of  a  Soviet  engineer,  sepa- 
rated from  his  wife  seven  years  by  an  assignment  in  Siberia.  Having  repeatedly 
been  refused  a  transfer,  he  left  without  permission,  and  was  picked  up  a  few 
weeks  later  near  Moscow.  When  returned  to  the  same  area  as  a  convict,  he  told 
a  former  Japanese  acquaintance  that  he  had  not  given  up  hope.  He  still  looked 
forward  to  rejoining  his  wife  when  he  finished  his  five  year  sentence. 

The  Soviet  people  are  passionately  devoted  to  small  personal  possessions. 
They  will  cheerfully  spend  all  they  have  for  a  gold  ring,  a  fountain  pen,  or  a 
wrist  watch.  They  will  stint  themselves  for  months  to  buy  a  phonograph  or  a 
bicycle,  and  take  great  pride  in  such  possessions.  Policemen  can  often  be  bribed 
with  moderately  expensive  trinkets,  and  Japanese  intelligence  officers,  prior  to 
the  Great  Purge  of  1936  were  able  to  obtain  military  information  from  Soviet 
officers  for  very  modest  "gifts"  of  English  woolens,  other  foreign-made  textiles, 
cultured  pearls,  Scotch  whiskey,  and  the  like.  These  officers  all  disappeared  in 
the  purge,  but  the  Russian  love  of  attractive  foreign  goods  remains  so  powerful 
that  many  secondary  officials  will  succumb  if  approached  alone,  even  when  the 
prospects  of  escaping  detection  are  fairly  poor.  For  example,  in  1936  a  Soviet 
Major  General  in  Moscow  accepted  such  "gifts"  of  textiles  at  his  wife's  insti- 
gation, whereupon  she  lightened  the  work  of  the  MVD  (then  responsible  for 
internal  security)  by  appearing  at  official  functions  in  modish  clothing  of  this 
material.  More  recently,  Japanese  prisoners  report  many  instances  of  bribing 
a  guard  with  a  portion  of  the  loot  when  caught  in  an  act  of  thievery. 

The  universal  psychological  drive  for  social  recognition,  always  intensely 
developed  among  peoples  undergoing  rapid  economic  expansion,  and  the  attendant 
social  changes,  is  at  least  as  prominent  among  present-day  Russians  as  it  is 
among  Americans.  The  intense  Russian  yearning  for  citations,  medals,  uniforms, 
prizes,  and  other  insignia  of  distinction  is  thoroughly  exploited  by  the  Soviet 
Government.  Individual  citations,  such  as  the  "Ready  for  Labor  and  Defense" 
medal,  the  "Mother  Hero"  medal,  and  the  coveted  title  of  "Stakhanovite  Worker" 
and  write-ups  in  the  local  and  national  Soviet  press  for  outstanding  individual 
production  records  in  agriculture,  transportation,  and  industry  are  perpetually 
admired  and  respected.  "Stalin  prizes"  in  science,  literature,  cinematography, 
and  many  other  fields  are  also  powerful,  though  more  distant  incentives  to  indi- 
vidual endeavor.  The  Russian  drive  for  recognition  is  even  more  distinctive 
.  in  its  strong  group-achievement  emphasis.  The  Russian's  unparalleled  condi- 
tioning for  group  integration  makes  him  extremely  amenable  to  appeals  for  group 
or  work-unit  performance,  and  it  is  second  nature  to  take  pride  in  the  plaques, 
certificates,  awards  and  other  marks  of  recognition  accorded  to  his  work-group. 


56  COMMUNIST    INFILTRATION    IN    THE    ARMY 

The  Soviet  press  is  filled  with  congratulatory  accounts  of  the  achievements  of 
individual  factories  and  collective  farms.  Labor  battalions  and  "shock"  brigades 
within  a  large  enterprise  compete  among  themselves.  There  are  continuous  com- 
petitions between  shifts,  departments,  and  small  work  gangs.  In  all  political 
subdivisions,  down  to  the  urban  area,  comparative  records  are  regularly  pub- 
lished which  indicate  the  degree  of  quota  fulfillment  for  industries,  branches  of 
industries,  and  individual  enterprises.  Strong  practical  motives,  such  as  interest 
in  work-norms,  bonuses,  and  prizes  account  for  much  of  the  general  response  to 
these  stimuli,  but  there  remains  a  very  significant  substratum  of  altruism,  com- 
petitive group  spirit,  and  pride  in  building  national  production.  This  becomes 
a  vital  factor  in  times  of  crisis,  such  as  war,  when  actual  material  rewards  are 
impossible.  A  very  real  spirit  of  cooperation  was  required  in  World  War  II 
when  thousands  of  factories  were  moved  in  toto  from  threatened  areas  to  Siberia. 
This  required  maximum  sustained  endeavor,  not  only  from  the  workers  of  the 
factory  concerned,  but  from  dozens  of  allied  service  branches,  concerned  with 
transportation  and  the  diversion  of  raw  materials,  machine  tools,  finished  goods, 
and  general  coordination.  Some  of  the  proudest  stories  of  the  war  concern 
factories  which  achieved  full  production  within  90  days  after  their  migration. 
The  workers  of  many  establishments  pooled  their  meager  savings  to  donate  a 
tank  or  airplane  to  the  Red  Army,  and  many  enterprises  "adopted"  a  regiment 
on  the  front  or  in  training,  sending  gifts,  and  providing  other  services  to  the 
soldiers  concerned.  After  the  war,  enterprises  vied  with  each  other  in  subscrib- 
ing to  government  bonds,  and  many  issues  were  sold  out  within  a  few  weeks. 
It  is  also  quite  common  for  workers  of  a  farm  or  factory  to  write  a  collective 
letter  to  Stalin,  recounting  some  exploit  on  behalf  of  the  native  land,  and  pledg- 
ing still  greater  efforts,  or  workers  will  pledge  to  surpass  their  norm  by  a  certain 
percent  in  honor  of  May  Day,  or  other  special  occasion. 

Westerners  often  find  it  difficult  to  acknowledge  any  element  of  spontaneity 
or  real  enthusiasm  in  these  generous  outbursts,  and  attempt  to  explain  them 
as  resulting  from  a  vicious  and  vindictive  Party  control  system,  presupposing  a 
general  hostility  for  all  control  agencies.  Tins  is  partly  the  case,  and  many  of 
these  movements  originate  from  the  Communist  Government,  or  from  Communist 
Party  members  on  the  lower  levels.  Moreover,  the  habitually  obstructive  or 
uncooperative  worker  is  likely  to  be  punished  for  "reactionary  tendencies"  or 
un-Soviet  behavior,  especially  if  his  influence  is  spreading  to  others.  But  it  must 
be  remembered  that  the  Communist  Party  has  a  highly  developed  technique  for 
exploiting  the  generous  sentiments  of  the  people,  and  that  there  is  a  vast  reservoir 
of  such  sentiments  to  exploit.  The  role  of  the  Party  member  in  the  lower  strata 
is  far  more  persuasive  than  compulsive,  and  the  exploitation  of  reward  incentives, 
group  spirit,  and  group  pride  is  an  indispensable  part  of  the  Soviet  social  drive 
mechanism,  and  has  always  played  an  essential  role  in  Russian  social  dynamics. 
The  process  seems  obscure,  and  even  fraudulent  to  an  American,  since  his  cultural 
conditioning,  though  inclusive  of  many  types  of  group  values,  nevertheless  gives 
first  place  to  personal  ambition,  private  enterprise,  and  individual  achievement. 
He  regards  appeals  to  group  spirit  as  an  insufficient  stimulus  for  a  strong  response 
among  adult  farm  and  factory  workers,  though  he  would  acknowledge  their 
effectiveness  in  schools  and  colleges.  Therefore,  he  over-emphasizes  the  im- 
portance of  compulsion,  fear,  and  punishment  in  Russian  society.  The  prospect 
of  punishment  is  an  important  control  factor,  but  it  is  not  the  prime  motivation. 
Nor  is  the  average  Russian's  daily  thinking  dominated  by  fear  and  apprehension, 
as  an  American's  might  be  under  the  same  circumstances.  If  he  were,  a  high 
incidence  of  neuroticism  and  unstable  personality  would  result,  and  this  is  not 
in  evidence. 

The  foregoing  does  not  imply  that  all  groups  and  individuals  cooperate  on  the 
Soviet  system,  nor  that  the  individualist  and  other  varieties  of  personality 
configuration  are  absent.  The  opposite  is  attested  by  the  millions  undergoing 
penal  sentence,  and  by  the  Government's  failure  to  elicit  satisfactory  response 
on  many  occasions.  But  90  percent  of  the  workers  were  able  to  operate  in  the 
exacting  Soviet  system  without  undue  psychological  or  social  strain,  and  have 
built  up  enormous  capital  assets  in  the  process.  Their  sincerity  and  fortitude 
were  unquestioned  during  the  war,  and,  in  general,  they  do  respond  effectively 
to  the  group-incentive  approach  in  peacetime. 

B.  Social  Habits 

The  Russian  is  socially  aggressive  in  that  he  constantly  seeks  contacts.  He 
does  not  like  to  be  alone.  For  this  reason,  Soviet  sentries,  guards,  and  watchmen 
always  work  in  pairs,  and  most  Russians  prefer  larger  groups,  for  real  personal 
comfort.     The  Russian  group  is  flexible  and  tolerant,  and  rarely  displays  char- 


COMMUNIST    INFILTRATION    IN    THE    ARMY  57 

acteristics  of  hostility  or  exclusiveness.  For  example,  boys'  gang-fights  would 
be  quite  abnormal.  A  Russian  actor,  however  insipid,  will  never  be  hissed  off 
the  stage.  Rivalry  between  groups  is  often  keen,  but  rarely  antagonistic.  When 
antagonism  does  develop,  it  is  usually  directed  against  an  individual  who  con- 
trols, but  is  not  a  member  of  the  group,  such  as  a  manager  or  foreman,  and  is 
expressed  not  in  physical  violence,  or  the  threat  of  it,  but  in  sullen  criticism,  and 
failure  to  respond  to  his  attempts  to  initiate  action.  In  this  condition  the  group 
is  likely  to  fall  far  short  of  its  production  norms  until  the  manager  is  transferred 
to  other  work.  The  dominant  member  of  the  group  is  usually  the  most  voluble, 
friendly,  and  sociable,  and  if  he  functions  as  the  leader,  achieves  the  position  by 
general  approval,  and  respect  for  his  judgment.  The  mentally  retarded  member 
is  readily  tolerated  and  jollied  along.  The  rebellious  or  uncooperative  member 
is  subjected  to  criticism  and  opposition,  and  is  humored,  but  is  usually  not 
ousted,  though  he  may  leave  the  group  of  his  own  accord.  In  that  case,  he  will 
seek  another  group,  and  will  eventually  modify  his  conduct  sufficiently  to  conform 
to  the  fairly  lax  standards  involved.  The  average  member  is  positively  oriented, 
on  good  terms  with  other  members,  and  genial  in  his  contacts  with  them.  Per- 
sonality clashes  within  the  group  are  quickly  adjusted,  though  the  individuals 
involved  may  remain  estranged.  Conflicts  between  members  are  invariably  oral, 
but  after  a  mutually  vigorous  tongue-lashing,  one  party  usually  makes  a  concili- 
atory gesture,  and  the  affair  is  laughed  off  and  forgotten.  It  is  not  uncommon 
for  such  conflicts  to  occur  between  a  worker  and  his  supervisor,  but  the  outcome 
is  the  same,  and  ruptures  of  friendship  are  similarly  short-lived.  Russians  are 
keen  in  criticism,  and  indulge  in  malicious  gossip,  but  they  are  psychologically 
so  dependent  on  continued  membership  in  their  social  and  vocational  groups  that 
they  habitually  curb  their  hostile  reactions. 

In  their  interminable  conferences,  meetings,  and  discussion  groups,  all  mem- 
bers take  an  active,  interested  part.  Meetings  are  regularly  held  by  members  of 
collective  farms,  "labor  unions"  (meaning  the  workers  of  a  given  factory), 
villages,  political,  cultural,  and  professional  groups.  No  member  is  reluctant 
to  speak,  and  there  is  a  good  deal  of  give-and-take,  particularly  on  practical 
matters.  No  one  hesitates  to  criticise  the  performance  or  conduct  of  those 
within  one  or  two  steps  from  his  own  level,  but  there  is  justifiable  reluctance 
to  criticise  highly  placed  directors,  and  of  course,  no  one  is  critical  of  the 
policies  or  personalities  of  the  upper  levels  of  the  Soviet  Government.  Within 
the  group,  the  criticized  member  may  seek  to  refute  the  allegations,  or  he  may 
recognize  that  the  criticism  is  justified.  He  experiences  no  qualms  in  admitting 
that  he  was  wrong,  since  he  loses  nothing  in  prestige,  and  will  be  respected 
for  his  candor.  This  is  precisely  the  process  employed  in  criticism  and  self- 
criticism  in  Communist  Party  meetings,  except  that  it  is  much  more  relaxed, 
since,  in  the  ordinary  routine,  its  entails  no  serious  consequences. 

Women  workers,  women  activists,  women  agitators,  and  women  Party  mem- 
bers figure  prominently  and  equally  with  the  men  in  all  group  activities.  It  is 
a  commonplace  for  women  speakers  to  address  large  audiences  on  subjects 
ranging  from  factory  management  and  advanced  welding  techniques  to  dialectical 
materialism,  agronomy,  and  analysis  of  the  Five  Year  Plan.  In  factory  acti- 
vist groups  they  share  in  seeking  means  to  improve  efficiency,  reduce  costs, 
and  detect  falsification  of  records  and  reports.  Corresponding  alterations  in 
the  standard  female  personality  have  drastically  modified  many  of  the  distinc- 
tive traits  commonly  accepted  as  feminine  in  the  West.  Having  lost  her 
sheltered  position,  the  Soviet  woman  has  become  brusque,  straightforward,  and 
practical.  She  tends  to  be  as  aggressive  as  men  in  social  and  vocational  con- 
tacts, and  has  lost  much  of  the  traditional  "softness"  of  women,  in  situations 
which  she  dominates.  Unhampered  by  differences  in  intellect,  personality,  or 
social  status,  the  Soviet  woman  has  virtually  doubled  the  effective  "manpower" 
pool.  In  mining,  agriculture,  transport,  construction,  and  factory  work,  she 
contributes  as  much  as  her  male  coworker.  In  wartime,  she  contributes  equal 
labor  in  road  and  railroad  maintenance,  truck  driving,  and  field  engineering. 
Women,  as  well  as  men,  receive  training  in  rifle  marksmanship,  grenade  throw- 
ing, and  other  combat  techniques,  and  will  undoubtedly  play  a  greater  combat 
role  in  any  war  of  the  future.  Full  integration  of  women  into  the  labor  pool 
has  enabled  the  USSR  to  continue  expanding  industry  while  maintaining  4,000,- 
000  troops  under  arms.  Proportionately  greater  gains  will  accrue  to  the  Soviet 
war-making  potential,  as  increased  mechanization  of  agriculture  and  industry 
frees  additional  workers  for  other  tasks. 


58  COMMUNIST    INFILTRATION   IN    THE    ARMY 

The  Russian  social  group  is  marked  for  cheerfulness  and  geniality.  Personal 
relations  are  extremely  cordial,  and  though  it  is  no  longer  the  practice  for  Rus- 
sian men  to  kiss  full  on  the  lips  in  greeting,  men  and  women  alike  are  apt  to  be 
very  demonstrative  in  overt  gestures  of  friendship  and  affection.  This  atti- 
tude extends  especially  to  children,  and  the  Soviet  child  is  confident  of  receiv- 
ing love  and  indulgence,  wherever  he  goes.  The  Russian  sense  of  humor  is  quite 
similar  to  that  of  Americans,  and  hilarity  is  normal  in  all  social  gatherings. 
Dancing  is  universally  popular.  Music  is  an  invariable  hallmark  of  a  Russian 
social  group,  even  if  it  is  only  a  chance  gathering  of  soldiers  or  workers.  At 
the  lunch  hour  and  rest  period,  accordions  and  balalaikas  (a  type  of  mandolin) 
will  appear,  often  to  be  accompanied  by  solo  or  group  singing.  People  flock 
eagerly  to  attend  a  concert  by  the  local  traveling  "orchestra"  in  the  remotest 
Siberian  villages,  and  music  of  good  quality  is  a  daily  feature  on  Soviet  radio 
program.  Drama  is  an  almost  equally  popular  art  form.  Most  citizens  try  their 
hand  at  amateur  theatricals,  and  every  town  has  its  theater  and  local  dramatic 
group,  though  it  may  lack  facilities  for  showing  motion  pictures.  Old  classical 
plays  such  as  those  of  Tolstoi  and  Chekov  are  perennial  favorites,  but  there  is 
also  a  steady  stream  of  new  plays,  mostly  on  Communist  themes.  Drama,  as  a 
live  medium,  contrasted  to  the  passivity  of  the  motion  picture,  is  at  least  as  ef- 
fective in  inculculating  Soviet  attitudes  and  values,  and  probably  accounts  for 
the  slow  development  of  cinematography. 

The  people  of  Siberia  are  reasonably  clean,  within  the  limits  of  available  hot 
water,  but  have  the  unkempt  appearance  typical  of  American  western  towns 
of  the  ISOO's.  Clothing  is  usually  of  poor  quality,  may  or  may  not  be  pressed, 
and  rarely  shows  a  crease  in  the  trousers.  From  about  1930,  the  Soviet  personnel 
code  stressed  clean  fingernails,  regular  barbering,  and  good  manners.  Conse- 
quently, the  sloppy  Bolshevik  as  an  old  Communist  ideal  is  a  thing  of  the  past, 
and  Russians  present  a  fairly  neat  appearance.  The  same  applies  to  Soviet 
soldiers,  who  are  required  to  keep  their  uniforms  clean  and  in  good  repair,  and 
their  persons  neat,  which  stimulates  the  conventional  standards  of  self  respect. 

Russians  respect  and  enjoy  the  physical  pleasures  of  life,  chief  of  which  is  food. 
They  are  hearty  eaters,  and  have  a  well-developed  culinary  art,  within  the  limits 
of  available  foodstuffs.  Canned  goods  of  vegetables,  meats  and  fish  have  only 
recently  become  available  through  the  fast-growing  canning  industry,  and  frozen 
foods  and  fruits  are  still  very  scarce.  One  of  the  most  effective  punishment- 
reward  systems  in  the  labor  camps  concerns  the  quantity  and  variety  of  food 
given  to  various  categories  of  convict  laborers,  and  the  most  stringent  punish- 
ment is  a  few  days  on  bread  and  water.  And  during  the  war,  it  was  a  great 
source  of  satisfaction  to  the  soldier  that  he  was  receiving  the  best  of  the  nation's 
food,  in  adequate  quantities.  Russians  drink  vodka  and  beer  regularly,  so  far 
as  they  can  afford  it,  but  psychopathic  alcoholism  appears  to  be  very  rare,  and 
the  Russian  usually  holds  his,  liquor  well. 

C.  Morality 

Basically,  Russian  ethics  conform  to  the  conventional  Christian  pattern  of  the 
West.  Ideals  of  honesty,  loyalty,  duty  and  mutual  obligation,  though  rational- 
ized to  the  point  of  negation  in  dealing  with  the  "hostile  capitalistic  powers,"  are 
applicable  in  personal  relations  within  Soviet  society.  Children  are  required  to 
show  respect  toward  their  parents  and  teachers  (since  1936),  and  their  Govern- 
ment. Married  couples  should  be  mutually  respectful,  and  should  provide  gopd 
care  for  their  children.  Everyone  is  expected  to  appreciate,  and  to  return  favors, 
and  to  repay  loans.  More  important,  everyone  is  expected  to  have  a  benevolent 
attitude  toward  his  fellows,  and  to  be  congenial  with  them  in  daily  association, 
and  everyone  is  expected  to  do  his  honest  share  in  all  communal  work. 

These  values,  though  somewhat  tampered  with  by  the  Soviet  Government,  con- 
stitute ancient  principles  of  Russian  conduct,  and  have  been  little  changed  for 
many  centuries.  Their  deep  influence  accounts  for  much  of  the  strength  and 
stability  of  the  Russian  family,  and  for  the  stability  of  the  Russian  individual  in 
his  group.  Chief  among  them  is  the  general  habit  of  benevolence.  Though  the 
Soviet  Regime  has  been  brutal  in  a  sociological  sense,  it  has  not  altered  this 
aspect  of  Russian  character.  Russians  do  not  seem  to  regard  any  individual  as 
inherently  good  or  bad,  as  is  apt  to  be  the  case  in  Western  culture.  His  acts 
may  be  good  or  bad,  wise  or  foolish,  and  he  must  accept  the  consequences,  either 
way.  The  man  himself,  whatever  his  acts,  is  usually  immune  to  destruction, 
though  liable  to  punishment.  In  Western  literature,  the  murderer  is  hanged,  and 
whoever  has  taken  a  life  loses  his  own.  In  the  American  public  conscience  as  with 
the  British,  crimes  regarded  as  extremely  serious  have  always  deserved  the  death 


COMMUNIST    INFILTRATION    IN    THE    ARMY  59 

penalty.  In  earlier  times  the  horsethief  and  the  rapist  were  lynched  or  hanged 
in  due  process ;  more  recently,  kidnaping  and  deliberate  murder  deserve  the  ex- 
treme penalty.  In  Russia  these  crimes  have  normally  been  punished  by  a  10- 
to  20-year  hard-labor  sentence,  in  full  consonance  with  public  concepts  of  justice. 
Both  in  Czarist  and  Communist  Russia,  capital  punishment  has  been  declared 
illegal  for  considerable  periods,  and  when  legal,  as  at  present,  is  reserved  for  the 
gravest  crimes  against  the  state,  such  as  treason  and  espionage.  The  villain  in 
Russian  literature  is  defeated,  humiliated,  and  disgraced,  but  he  is  rarely  killed, 
or  abused  physically,  and  the  hero  is  under  no  obligation  to  overpower  him  in  a 
fist  fight.  Again,  Russian  group  orientation  supersedes  individualist  orientation. 
The  hero- villain  relationship  is  not  primarily  that  of  man-versus-man,  but  involves 
a  group-versus-man  conflict.  The  hero  is  the  protagonist  of  the  group,  and  a 
one-punch  fight,  with  strong  group  support  for  the  hero  is  usually  more  than 
enough  to  quell  the  adversary. 

Striking  a  man  is  considered  a  grave  insult,  and  in  the  rare  instances  noted  by 
Japanese  prisoners,  a  minor  crisis  invariably  arose  in  consequence.  In  eastern 
Siberia,  for  example,  a  Russian  engineer  struck  an  immediate  Russian  subordi- 
nate, and  to  hush  up  the  affair,  had  to  bribe  his  superior  with  a  load  of  wood. 
Near  Irkutsk,  a  Russian  supervisor  struck  a  Japanese  furnace  tender.  All  work 
stopped,  and  there  was  an  investigation.  Apparently,  the  supervisor  was  vindi- 
cated, since  the  prisoner  was  transferred  to  another  factory.  Russian  children 
threw  stones  at  the  Japanese  prisoners  as  long  as  they  regarded  them  as  "enemy" 
soldiers,  but  the  attitude  soon  gave  way  to  friendly  relations.  Russian  adults, 
from  the  start,  were  kindly  and  sympathetic,  giving  the  Japanese  little  gifts  of 
food,  clothing  and  cigarettes,  and  frequently  invited  those  who  learned  a  few 
words  of  Russian  to  their  homes  for  meals.  Russian  guards  were  sometimes 
abusive  in  speech  to  individual  prisoners,  but  almost  never  mistreated  them 
physically.  Applying  "on-the-spot  justice"  near  Khabarovsk,  a  woman  judge  gave 
one  Russian  labor  supervisor  a  five-year  sentence  for  allowing  dangerous  condi- 
tions in  which  a  Japanese  prisoner  was  accidentally  killed  on  the  job,  and  in 
another  instance  a  Russian  doctor  received  a  seven-year  sentence  for  allowing 
a  Japanese  prisoner  to  die  in  a  hospital,  presumably  through  negligence.  Even 
more  illustrative  is  the  case  of  the  Russian  truekdriver  in  the  Chita  area,  who 
received  a  three-year  sentence  for  calling  a  Mongol  worker  a  "non-Russian" 
(nye-Russky).  The  legal  principles  underlying  these  cases  involve  purely  Rus- 
sian concepts  of  justice,  which  have  merely  been  adopted  by  the  Soviet  Govern- 
ment. 

Thievery  is  probably  the  most  common  offense  in  the  U.  S.  S.  R.,  and  in  the 
absence  of  all  other  punishable  offenses,  would  provide  an  ample  supply  of 
convict  laborers.  State  property  is  everybody's  property,  and  the  Russian  worker 
feels  no  qualms  in  appropriating  it.  If  he  is  apprehended,  he  regards  it  as  mere 
misfortune,  and  goes  off  to  serve  his  sentence  of  three  to  seven  years.  Nails, 
bits  of  metal,  lumber,  cloth,  small  hand  tools,  and  food  are  the  chief  items  of 
theft,  but  personal  property  is  also  fair  game.  The  bulk  of  these  thefts  are 
neither  reported  nor  punished.  Stealing  minor  items  from  the  place  of  work 
for  personal  use  is  generally  condoned,  and  supervisors  are  as  guilty  as  the 
workers.  As  one  of  them  put  it,  it  is  less  bother  to  let  a  man  steal  a  nail  to 
fix  his  door,  than  to  process  a  formal  requisition  for  it.  The  general  opinion 
on  this  question  is :  "Let  them  take  it ;  it  is  theirs  anyway."  When  a  man  is 
caught  with  minor  items  of  stolen  goods,  he  is  usually  scolded  and  forced  to  return 
the  property  to  the  factory  or  to  the  victim.  If  the  plaintiff  chooses  to  press 
charges,  however,  he  will  be  sentenced.  The  embezzler  is  always  prosecuted 
and  punished  with  a  long  term,  and  thefts  of  money  are  usually  punished. 
Truekdrivers,  whose  normal  unit  of  theft  is  a  truckload  are  heavily  sentenced 
when  caught,  but  workers  and  supervisors  often  cooperate  with  them  to  obtain 
goods  or  extra  norm  credit.  The  convict  suffers  no  opprobrium,  and  on  com- 
pleting his  sentence,  rejoins  ordinary  society  on  an  equal  footing. 

Sex  morality  apparently  poses  no  serious  problems  in  the  U.  S.  S.  R.  Children 
of  the  crowded  Soviet  homes  are  early  aware  of  relations  between  the  sexes. 
Facilities  for  birth  control  are  generally  available,  and  widely  used,  due  to  the 
difficult  living  conditions.  Ardent  Komsomolists  and  serious  young  people  try 
to  be  "above  such  things,"  but  extra-family  living  and  the  independence  of  women 
militate  against  absteniousness.  Premarital  and  extramarital  relations  are 
common,  but  do  not  constitute  a  factor  of  serious  social  disturbance.  Homo- 
sexualism is  severely  punished  in  the  Armed  Forces,  and  is  generally  as  vigorously 
disapproved  among  Russians  as  it  is  in  the  West. 


60  COMMUNIST    INFILTRATION    EST    THE    ARMY 

Religion  in  the  Soviet  Union  has  suffered  a  tremendous  decline  since  1920,  due 
to  Communist  efforts  to  discredit  religion  and  to  dissuade  the  entire  population. 
There  is  also  a 'growing  and  genuine  conviction  among  the  young  that  religion 
is  old-fashioned.  There  are  25,000  Orthodox  Churches,  3,000  churches  of  other 
Christian  sects,  and  several  thousand  Moslem  mosques,  which  totals  less  than 
half  of  the  number  of  pre-Soviet  places  of  worship.  Soviet  authorities  estimate 
that  more  than  half  of  the  people  retain  religious  beliefs,  but  the  distribution  is 
heavily  weighted  in  the  upper-age  brackets,  and  regular  church  attendance  falls 
well  below  50  percent.  In  Siberia,  as  in  our  Far  West,  religion  was  a  secondary 
matter,  as  compared  with  the  more  immediate  business  of  building  up  the  country. 
Convict  camps,  of  course,  had  no  religious  facilities,  and  ex-convicts  normally 
did  not  revive  their  religious  interests.  Many  Siberian  villages  today  have 
neither  church  nor  priest,  and  in  many  others  the  church  is  converted  to  other 
uses,  or  is  completely  unused.  Japanese  prisoners  from  Siberia  usually  described 
individual  Russians  as  neither  religious  nor  superstitious,  but  said  that  old 
people  often  kept  a  picture  of  the  Saviour  on  the  wall,  or  maintained  a  miniature 
shrine,  complete  with  ikons  and  burning  candles. 

D.  Health 

The  Soviet  people  display  a  high  level  of  health  and  physical  fitness.  As  com- 
pared to  the  Japanese  prisoners,  they  were  much  stronger,  and  more  disease 
resistant.  The  Russian  diet  is  plain  but  nutritious,  and  the  work,  though  hard, 
is  not  exhausting.  The  eight-hour  day  is  almost  universal,  and  even  prisoners 
rest  on  Sundays.  Medical  facilities,  though  limited  were  available  at  all  fac- 
tories and  labor  camps  mentioned  in  reports.  Persons  with  more  than  two 
degrees  of  fever  were  excused  from  work,  and  those  with  more  than  three  degrees 
(101.4°  F.)  were  hospitalized.  Patients  with  serious  ailments  were  often  hos- 
pitalized for  several  months.  Soviet  doctors  were  generally  competent  by  Soviet 
and  Japanese  standards,  but  were  often  handicapped  by  shortages  in  drugs  and 
medical  supplies.  Common  colds,  malaria,  and  diarrhea  were  the  most  prevalent 
diseases  in  eastern  Siberia.  Preventive  medicine  included  periodic  inoculation 
for  typhus,  typhoid,  and  smallpox,  and  clothing  at  labor  camps  were  frequently 
boiled  to  kill  typhus-bearing  body  lice.  Private  homes  were  well  kept,  and 
collective  farms  maintained  reasonably  good  sanitary  standards.  The  incidence 
of  death  from  disease  and  accidents  appeared  to  be  low  throughout  Siberia. 

E.  Efficiency 

The  Russian  worker  has  great  capacity  for  continued  hard  labor  under  extreme 
conditions,  and  through  intensive  efforts  by  the  Government  to  provide  technically 
trained  cadres,  his  efficiency  and  ability  have  improved  steadily. 

However,  the  Soviet  skilled  labor  force  is  only  about  half  as  large  as  that  of 
the  United  States,  and  the  average  factory  worker  is  only  one-fifth  as  productive. 
Lack  of  mechanization  in  industry  is  the  chief  reason  for  this,  but  the  Soviet 
worker  also  tends  to  be  wasteful  of  materials.  His  attitude  is  that  there  is 
always  plenty  of  raw  material,  if  he  spoils  a  piece.  He  is  also  prone  to  work  hard 
to  accomplish  his  norm,  and  then  stop,  and  he  may  forget  to  turn  off  the  machin- 
ery in  his  haste  to  leave  at  quitting  time.  It  is  for  this  reason  that  the  Soviet 
authorities  raise  the  norm  when  the  workers  find  means  to  surpass  it  regularly, 
or  attempt  to  elicit  a  pledge  from  the  workers  to  produce  a  given  percent  above 
norm.  The  Soviet  worker  is  inventive  and  resourceful  in  meeting  practical 
problems  under  pressure,  but  pressure  is  required  to  get  his  best  efforts.  He  is 
normally  a  willing  worker,  but  may  lay  down  his  tools  if  "roughly  spoken  to"  by 
his  supervisor.  Nor  will  he  work  if  he  is  not  paid.  In  several  instances,  pay  was 
temporarily  held  up  in  various  Siberian  establishments,  due  to  failure  of  the 
office  staff  to  submit  vouchers  punctually,  and  the  entire  force  refused  to  work 
until  properly  paid.  If  anyone  was  punished  due  to  these  short  "strikes"  it  was 
normally  the  supervisor  or  the  responsible  administrator.  There  were  no  true 
strikes,  in  the  sense  of  protests  against  increased  norms,  for  wage  increases,  or 
for  any  other  cause,  and  the  workers  showed  no  inclination  to  organize  secretly. 

3.     ATTITUDES    OF   THE   SOVIET   PEOPLE 

A.  Patriotism 

Imbued  with  a  fanatical  devotion  to  their  native  land,  the  Russian  people  have 
never  stinted  in  supporting  the  most  oppressive  of  governments  when  attacked  by 
foreign  forces,  and  they  develop  this  spirit  more  powerfully  as  the  situation 
becomes  more  desperate.  The  alert  Communist  Government,  appreciating  the 
power  of  Russian  patriotism,  has  foresworn  its  most  cherished  dogmas  of  inter- 
nationalism and  atheism  to  achieve  the  identification  of  Stalin,  the  "Red  Army," 


COMMUNIST    INFILTRATION    IN    THE    ARMY  61 

and  the  Soviet  State  with  the  object  of  the  people's  patriotic  devotion.  This 
propaganda  policy  and  the  course  of  recent  history  have  led  the  people  to  credit 
the  Soviet  Government  with  the  victories  won  in  "The  Great  Patriotic  War" 
against  Germany,  and  with  the  rapid  industrial  growth  under  the  five-year  plans. 
They  take  great  pride  in  both.  While  thinking  individuals  are  often  bored  and 
annoyed  with  the  endless  flood  of  official  propaganda,  the  bulk  of  the  people, 
lacking  other  information,  appear  to  have  absorbed  the  official  viewpoint. 

Russian  patriotism  is  both  deep  and  pervasive.  The  ordinai-y  Russian  is  proud 
of  the  vigorous  elimate,  the  great  open  spaces,  and  the  historic  rivers  and  moun- 
tains, and  can  be  moved  to  tears  by  a  poetic  description  of  the  birch  trees  along 
the  Volga.  He  is  proud  of  the  vastness  of  his  country,  both  geographically,  and 
population-wise.  He  is  proud  of  Russian  literature,  drama,  music,  and  art.  He 
is  proud  of  Russian  artists  and  inventors,  and  is  at  least  half-ready  to  believe 
that  Russians  invented  the  radio,  telephone,  and  airplane.  He  is  proud  of  his 
mellifluous  (and  intricate)  Russian  language.  More  recently,  he  has  become 
proud  of  the  fact  that  his  country  has  risen  to  become  a  primary  world  power, 
and  official  propaganda  gives  a  heavy  play  to  impressive  statistics  in  this  regard. 
Always  powerful,  pride  of  country  has  become  a  much  more  conscious  force  in 
recent  years.  The  Communist  Government  at  first  attempted  to  dismiss  these 
ideas  as  signs  of  petty  provincialism,  but  soon  discovered  that  this  policy  es- 
tranged the  people.  After  expelling  the  internationalist  (Trotsky)  faction,  the 
Government  soon  surpassed  all  previous  efforts  in  praise  of  the  Russian  culture 
and  people.  The  same  will  apply  to  any  outsider  who  seeks  to  influence  Russian 
thinking.  To  gain  their  sympathy,  he  must  pay  tribute  to  the  deeply  admired 
elements  of  Russian  culture,  and  is  well  advised  to  express  respect  and  admira- 
tion for  the  Russian  peoples. 

Much  has  been  made  of  separatist  tendencies  in  the  non-Slavic  and  Ukrainian 
segments  of  the  Soviet  population,  but  it  is  doubtful  that  this  factor  in  itself 
could  constitute  a  vital  advantage  to  a  power  undertaking  military  operations 
against  the  Soviet  Union.  The  Communist  Government,  from  the  start,  reversed 
the  czarist  policy,  sought  to  remove  the  causes  of  resentment  to  Russian  domina- 
tion among  national  and  linguistic  minority  groups,  and  abolished  all  legal, 
political  and  social  disabilities  based  on  minority  group  membership.  The 
Government  has  assiduously  fostered  local  languages,  literature,  art,  music,  and 
social  customs,  so  far  as  these  were  not  inimical  to  national  unity,  ideals  of 
equality  between  the  sexes,  Communist  ideology,  or  antireligious  policies.  The 
official  press  is  lavish  in  praising  the  achievements  of  collective  farms,  coopera- 
tives, factories,  and  a  long  list  of  cultural  achievements  among  the  Azerbaijani, 
Tadzhiks,  Ukrainians,  Kazakhs,  and  other  minority  groups.  Peoples  from  all 
parts  of  the  country  are  pointedly  honored  at  festivals,  celebrations,  and  all 
union  political  activities.  Latent  hunger  for  regional  autonomy  and  political 
status  was  at  least  partially  satisfied  by  granting  varying  degrees  of  semi- 
autonomous  status  to  national  groups,  and  by  according  representation  on  this 
basis  in  the  Soviet  of  the  Nationalities  of  the  Supreme  Soviet  at  Moscow.  Even 
the  normally  democratic  technique  of  elections  is  converted  into  a  visible  symbol 
of  common  participation  in  the  Soviet  State.  The  Soviet  voter  often  has  only  one 
candidate  to  "choose"  on  the  ballot,  and  in  any  case,  he  is  aware  that  a  nomina- 
tion committee  of  "Party  and  non-Party  Bolsheviks"  has  selected  the  candidates 
in  conformity  with  Party  policy.  No  political  platforms  or  policies  are  involved. 
The  successful  candidate  is  merely  the  recipient  of  a  substantial  honor,  usually 
in  recognition  of  outstanding  achievements  in  industrial,  agricultural,  and 
cultural  fields,  and  his  popularity  in  the  local  community.  His  reward,  aside 
from  a  very  gratifying  social  recognition,  is  a  free  vacation  in  the  capital,  and 
the  privilege  of  joining  the  "unanimous  vote"  in  approving  Party-sponsored 
policies.  Such  as  it  is,  this  reward  is  eagerly  sought,  and  Soviet  policy  is  to 
spread  it  among  the  maximum  number  of  eminent  citizens  of  all  nationalities. 
Therefore,  most  deputies  serve  a  single  term,  and  are  entirely  satisfied  in  having 
joined  the  elite  of  "former  deputies."  The  voter  normally  participates  in  meet- 
ings, where  the  relative  merits  of  potential  nominees  are  discussed,  and  where 
explicit  public  opinion  has  an  important  negative  effect  on  nominating-com- 
mittee decisions.  A  nominee  who  is  acceptable  to  the  Party  must  also  be  ac- 
ceptable and  highly  respected  by  the  public.  Since  elections  have  no  connection 
with  political  power  or  political  policy,  and  no  important  place  in  Party  control, 
they  constitute  an  innocuous  and  effective  means  of  gaining  public  participation 
and  support.  About  half  of  the  Deputies  of  the  Supreme  Soviet  are  non-Great 
Russians,  and  about  a  third  are  non-Party  members.    Moreover,  members  of  all 


62  COMMUNIST    INFILTRATION    IN    THE    ARMY 

Soviet  nationalities  are  admitted  to  the  Party  without  prejudice.  Therefore  there 
is  a  convincing  illusion  of  universal  and  equal  participation  in  the  Government, 
Soviet  elections  generate  great  interest  and  enthusiasm.  A  general  holiday  is 
declared,  and  all  citizens  flock  to  the  local  polls  to  cast  their  ballots.  This  is 
followed  by  oratory,  alcoholic  conviviality,  and  a  spirited  discussion  of  nominees. 
All  nominees  are  admittedly  the  best,  but  there  is  much  good-humored  argument 
as  to  who  is  the  very  best.  The  average  Soviet  citizen,  whatever  his  nationality, 
is  apt  to  feel  that  he  has  full  and  equal  citizenship  in  the  USSR,  and  shares  much 
of  the  patriotic  pride  which  is  so  marked  in  the  Great  Russian  segment. 

The  Soviet  population  is  about  55  percent  Great  Russian,  20  percent  Ukrainian, 
and  5  percent  White  Russian.  The  remaining  20  percent  are  represented  by 
45  other  nationalities.  Of  these,  15  vary  between  one  and  five  million,  and 
13  number  less  than  100,000.  In  general,  the  entire  population  supported  the 
war  effort  and  shared  uncomplainingly  in  the  tremendous  wartime  sacrifices  from 
1941  to  1945.  The  Chochen,  Ingush  and  Kalmyk  peoples,  totalling  less  than 
600,000  combined,  were  seriously  remiss  in  patriotism,  though  many  individual 
soldiers  from  these  groups  distinguished  themselves  in  combat.  The  Ukraine 
has  repeatedly  sought  special  status  within  the  USSR,  and  was  partially  satisfied 
when  accorded  separate  membership  in  the  United  Nations,  and  the  right  to 
have  diplomatic  relations  with  other  countries.  Ukrainians,  like  Texans,  are 
proud  of  their  nationality,  and  many  embraced  the  opportunity  to  establish  a 
Ukrainian  State  during  the  German  occupation.  However,  Ukrainian  soldiers 
were  completely  zealous  in  defending  the  USSR,  and  hundreds  of  thousands  of 
Ukrainian  partisans,  fully  supported  by  the  local  population,  contributed  tre- 
mendously in  defeating  the  German  armies.  It  is  impossible  to  say  how  much 
of  this  was  caused  by  "German  bestiality,"  but  it  is  clear  that  the  Ukraine 
provides  a  large  reservoir  of  patriotic  support  for  the  Soviet  Union,  and  that 
even  in  occupied  portions,  an  invading  power  would  have  to  contend  at  least 
initially,  with  strong  partisan  forces.  It  is  also  clear  that  extremely  sagacious 
occupation  policies  would  be  required  for  the  effective  handling  of  the  civilian 
population,  especially  in  matters  concerning  partisans.  If  there  is  any  chink 
in  Soviet  patriotism,  it  is  in  the  Ukraine,  and  even  there,  it  would  be  only  partial, 
and  conditioned  on  the  activities  of  the  occupying  force.  In  general,  Soviet 
patriotism  has  increased  as  a  direct  result  of  the  national  ordeal  of  World 
War  II.  The  bulk  of  the  citizenry  is  aware  that  the  Soviet  Union  could  not  have 
coped  with  the  German  invasion,  had  they  not  made  the  sacrifices  necessary  for 
industrialization  in  the  1930's,  and  many  feel  that  collectivization  of  agriculture 
was  similarly  justified.  They  feel  that  Stalin  has  been  vindicated  in  his  con- 
stant warnings  on  the  threat  of  capitalist  aggression,  and  are  strongly  inclined 
to  believe  him,  now  that  these  surly  suspicions  are  directed  against  the  United 

States. 

The  Soviet  people  are  overwhelmingly  unanimous  in  their  boundless  confidence 
in  Soviet  defensive  capabilities.  They  reason  that  if  the  Soviet  Union  could 
single-handedly  defeat  the  colossal  German  onslaught,  demolish  Germany  as 
a  military  power,  and  break  the  back  of  Japan  in  a  fortnight's  foray,  she  is  bound 
to  win  in  any  war.  Neither  the  United  States  nor  the  other  Western  Powers 
are  credited  for  their  valiant  and  crucial  role  in  World  War  II.  Instead,  they 
are  vilified  for  having  held  off  until  the  last  moment,  as  the  Communist  put  it, 
when  it  had  become  safe  to  rush  in  and  share  the  spoils.  As  for  Lend-Lease, 
and  other  vitally  needed  wartime  assistance,  it  is  explained  to  the  people  as  an 
insipid  effort  to  pay  for  the  war  in  American  dollars  and  Soviet  blood.  In  this 
setting,  Stalin's  occasional  expressions  of  gratitude  for  American  assistance 
merely  made  him  look  magnanimous.  (Lend-Lease  goods  worth  $11,000,000,000 
merited  two  single-column  stories  in  the  Soviet  Press  during  the  War.)  The 
Soviet  public  was  scarcely  aware  of  the  atomic  bomb  until  1949,  when  Molotov, 
following  the  Truman  announcement  on  the  Soviet  atomic  bomb  tests,  calmly 
reminded  the  people  that  he  had  admitted  in  1947  that  the  bomb  was  no  secret 
to  the  USSR.  He  went  on  to  say  that  the  Truman  announcement  was  entirely 
correct,  but  that  whereas  the  United  States  was  interested  only  in  offensive 
military  utilization  of  atomic  energy  "to  enslave  the  world,"  the  USSR  was 
even  then  employing  her  atomic  resources  for  peaceful  economic  development. 
A  nationwide  series  of  lectures  and  press  stories  on  atomic  energy  followed  soon 
after,  and  the  effect  on  public  attitudes  was  immediate.  Individual  Soviet 
workers  had  previously  reassured  themselves  by  saying  that  the  atomic  bomb 
"could  never  kill  all  Russians"  due  to  the  vastness  of  the  country.  Now  it 
became  the  universal  opinion  that  the  USSR  had  a  far  better  bomb,  and  was 
more  than  a  match  for  the  West.     By  subtle  implication,  Molotov's  speech  made 


COMMUNIST    INFILTRATION    IN    THE    ARMY  63 

it  obvious  that  Soviet  atomic  resources  were  abundant,  since  they  could  be 
used  "primarily  for  peaceful  purposes."  Of  course,  it  went  without  saying  that 
defense  requirements  had  already  been  fully  met.  Being  entirely  unaware  of 
the  technical  problems  of  atomic  bomb  production,  the  Soviet  mind  conceives 
this  as  similar  to  producing  torpedoes  or  jet  aircraft,  and  would  ignore  or 
deny  any  Western  quantitative  advantage. 

Soviet  people  also  have  great  confidence  in  the  fighting  ability  of  their  indi- 
vidual soldiers.  One  Russian  probably  summarized  the  general  view  as  follows : 
"One  Russian  is  equal  to  five  Japanese,  two  Americans,  or  one  German,  and  in 
the  latter  case,  the  Russian  will  usually  win  in  the  end,  due  to  his  advantage 
in  ingenuity  and  persistence."  Soviet  terminology  in  all  fields  is  replete  with 
military  concepts,  such  as  the  factory  "shock  brigade,"  the  "assault"  on  the 
five-year  plan,  "class  warfare"  in  social  struggles,  and  the  "militant  camp  of 
the  people's  democracies,"  as  opposed  to  the  "decadent  camp  of  the  capitalist 
war-mongering  aggressors."  Similar  military  themes  pervade  literature  and 
drama.  The  Soviet  historian  or  dramatist  is  obsessed  with  the  exploits  of 
Russian  and  Soviet  armed  forces,  and  with  partisans,  spies  and  traitors.  This 
form  of  propaganda  is  well  calculated  to  stimulate  the  Soviet  citizen's  patri- 
otic sentiment,  which  strongly  combine  a  sense  of  external  menace  with  a  mili- 
taristic readiness  to  meet  and  overcome  hostile  forces. 

Militarism  is  inherent  in  the  theory  and  practice  of  Communism,  and  has 
permeated  public  attitudes  toward  the  native  land.  The  true  communist  is, 
ipso  facto,  half  soldier  (or  guerrilla).  In  the  USSR,  military  exercises  have 
become  the  daily  bread,  not  only  of  18,000,000  Communists  and  Komsomolists, 
but  also  of  the  bulk  of  non-Communist  Soviet  youth.  The  sight  of  the  soldier 
and  the  tools  of  war  is  both  normal  and  acceptable  to  the  Soviet  citizen,  who 
is  convinced  that  the  United  States  and  her  allies  are  plotting  another  war  of 
aggression  against  his  country.  Militaristic  attitudes  are  initiated  in  grade 
schools,  where  primers  and  arithmetic  books  invariably  employ  military  illus- 
trations. In  secondary  schools,  all  boys  receive  military  training,  and  millions 
•of  Soviet  youths  who  do  not  serve  in  the  armed  forces  join  training  societies 
connected  with  the  army,  naval,  or  air  forces,  in  what  amounts  to  a  reserve 
training  system.  Millions  of  other  citizens  are  enjoined  to  qualify  for  the 
"Labor  and  Defense"  badge,  by  passing  rather  stringent  tests  in  rifle  marksman- 
ship, grenade  throwing,  swimming,  running,  and  first  aid.  By  1940,  nearly 
20,000,000  people  had  qualified.  Through  such  devices,  the  Soviet  people  have 
become  psychologoically  prepared  for  war  at  any  time. 

B.  Attitude  Toward  Other  Countries 

In  the  post-war  period,  the  Soviet  Government  has  adroitly  blended  the  peo- 
ple's patriotism  with  a  profound  fear  of  a  capitalist  coalition  to  destroy  the 
USSR.  Love  of  country  plus  confidence  in  Soviet  power  have  been  complemented 
and  reinforced  by  fear  of  attack  and  the  conviction  that  capitalist  nations  live 
only  to  exterminate  the  Soviet  people.  "Warlike"  statements  and  threats  by 
American  military  and  political  officials,  and  frequent  American  press  items 
on  atomic  and  other  ultra-modern  weapons  are  immediately  reflected  in  the 
Soviet  press  to  verify  the  rectitude  of  Communist  foreign  policy,  and  leave  no 
shred  of  doubt  in  the  USSR  that  the  United  States  is  preparing  to  attack.  This 
highly  developed  Soviet  "logic"  is  firmly  reinforced  by  the  Soviet  bloc's  "unre- 
mitting efforts  to  maintain  world  peace."  Peace  councils,  peace  rallies,  and 
peace  petitions  receive  a  large  portion  of  space  in  Soviet  press  and  radio.  Stalin 
has  been  most  voluble  in  expressing  his  desire  to  live  at  peace  with  all  nations, 
and  has  often  iterated  his  belief  that  capitalist  and  Communist  countries  could 
cooperate  (if  the  former  could  discard  their  "criminal  plans  for  aggression"). 
The  colossal  Soviet  effort  to  turn  black  into  white  appeared  ludicrous  to  the 
informed  peoples  of  the  West,  who  saw  the  inadequate  defense  forces  of  Western 
countries  dwarfed  by  the  huges  forces  of  the  USSR,  and  were  all  too  aware  that 
every  real  threat  to  world  peace  from  1946  to  1951  was  the  direct  result  of 
Soviet  machinations.  However,  it  has  long  since  convinced  the  people  of  the 
Soviet  Union.  In  casual  conversations  with  Japanese  prisoners,  many  expressed 
dread  in  anticipating  war  with  the  United  States,  but  none  doubted  that  war 
would  come.  These  factors  had  been  focused  into  a  stereotype  of  hatred  for 
the  United  States,  economically  the  greatest  of  the  Western  Powers.  In  con- 
sequence, the  Soviet  public  is  convinced  that  the  United  States  and  the  NATO 
countries  are  swiftly  preparing  for  a  mortal  struggle  with  the  Soviet  Union 
and  her  allies. 


64  COMMUNIST    INFILTRATION    IN    THE    ARMY 

There  is,  however,  an  obverse  side  to  the  Soviet  people's  attitude  which  will 
steadily  redound  to  the  advantage  of  the  United  States,  both  in  war  and  in  peace. 
The  keynote  of  this  attitude  is  respect.  The  profound  respect  which  the  peoples, 
and  in  more  recent  decades,  even  the  governments  of  Europe  have  accorded  to 
the  United  States  has  long  been  pervasive  in  Russia.  Impressed  from  the  first 
with  the  high  level  of  American  wages  and  living  conditions,  Russians  and  other 
European  peoples  later  came  to  respect  the  United  States  for  her  wealth  and 
power.  Hundreds  of  thousands  of  Russian  immigrants  to  the  United  States 
generated  a  deep  feeling  of  kinship  for  the  United  States  through  letters  and 
remittances  to  the  old  country.  American  famine  relief  to  the  Soviet  Union  in 
1921,  and  assistance  through  the  UN  Relief  and  Rehabilitation  Administration 
in  1945-46,  have  generated  good  will  toward  the  United  States  and  recognition  of 
her  fine  humanitarian  attributes  which  the  Soviet  Government  has  vainly  tried 
to  dispel.  Even  more  difficult  to  counteract  has  been  the  Communist  Party's 
own  veneration  of  American  efficiency,  productivity,  and  industrial  might.  Many 
American  methods  of  accounting,  factory  layout,  management,  and  industrial 
techniques  were  frankly  borrowed,  and  American  standards  of  production  were 
established  as  a  goal  for  Soviet  planners.  Countless  mechanical  contrivances 
were  copied  in  toto,  particularly  in  the  automotive,  aviation,  and  electronics  fields. 
The  national  goal  was  to  reach  and  surpass  American  production  through  the 
five-year  plans,  and  Stalin  even  defined  Soviet  Communism  as  "American  prac- 
ticality plus  Russian  idealism."  In  Soviet  theory,  Communism  is  justified  largely 
on  the  ground  that  it  can  produce  a  much  higher  and  more  uniform  standard  of 
living  than  is  possible  under  a  capitalist  system.  It  is  based  on  Marx's  profound 
misunderstanding  of  the  mechanics  of  capitalist  production  and  enterprise,  and 
remains  the  most  vulnerable  point  of  Communist  dogma.  Since  the  "hate  Amer- 
ica" campaign  is  largely  a  post-war  development,  the  "admire  America"  campaign 
and  the  extremely  favorable  impressions  of  earlier  years  are  still  potentially 
dominant  in  the  Russian  mind. 

Public  attitudes  toward  the  peoples  of  European  countries  are  basically  favor- 
able, due  to  the  naturally  friendly  disposition  of  Russians.  They  have  a  deep- 
seated  conviction  on  the  fundamental  equality  and  goodness  of  men,  both  as 
individuals  and  as  national  or  cultural  groups.  The  Soviet  Government  has 
exploited  this  belief  as  acceptable  to  Communist  theory,  and  often  stresses  that 
the  toilers  of  all  countries  form  a  single  class.  Consequently,  the  Soviet  press 
often  features  complimentary  articles  expressing  the  sympathy  and  brotherhood 
of  the  Soviet  people  for  the  British,  French,  Italian,  German,  and  other  European 
peoples.  It  is  significant,  by  comparison,  that  such  references  to  the  American 
people  have  become  quite  rare  in  the  post-war  period.  The  more  academic  ques- 
tion of  attitudes  toward  European  governments  is  decided  almost  entirely  by 
existing  political  alignments.  Soviet  people  are  inclined  to  accept  the  official 
view  that  governments  which  cooperate  in  the  defense  policies  of  the  United 
States  or  potential  or  actual  enemies,  and  even  this  is  modified  by  the  thesis  that 
such  governments  are  the  victims  of  American  economic  "exploitation."  The 
United  States  remains  the  cornerstone  of  anti-Soviet  villainy,  and  hostile  atti- 
tudes toward  other  countries  are  secondary.  Friendly  attitudes  to  countries 
within  the  Communist  bloc  are  energetically  encouraged,  through  cultural 
exchanges,  delegations,  and  favorable  press. 

It  is  not  known  to  what  extent  the  people  would  support  large-scale  Soviet 
military  aggression  outside  the  USSR.  Heretofore,  Soviet  nationalism  has 
been  nourished  on  an  almost  morbid  defense  psychology.  The  nation  has  al- 
ways been  pictured  as  surrounded  by  powerful  enemies  under  an  eternal  menace 
of  invasion.  There  can  be  no  doubt  as  to  the  power  and  speed  of  public  support 
when  the  people  feel  their  country  is  attacked.  Therefore,  it  is  extremely  prob- 
able that  a  Soviet  invasion  of  neighboring  territory  will  be  convincingly  pre- 
sented as  a  defensive  response  to  enemy  aggression.  For  several  years,  the  Soviet 
Government  has  expended  great  labor  to  label  the  United  States  as  a  capitalist 
aggressor  nation.  Any  act  by  non-Communist  countries  which  the  government 
may  choose  to  label  as  aggression  will  be  directly  imputed  to  the  United  States, 
since  these  countries  are  represented  as  mere  American  puppets.  An  excellent 
example  is  the  Republic  of  Korea's  "aggression"  against  North  Korea,  in  June 
1950.  Most  Soviet  citizens  fully  believe  that  the  United  States  deliberately  in- 
stigated this,  and  they  could  give  little  credence  to  the  historical  facts.  What- 
ever the  Soviet  propaganda  line  for  a  war  outside  the  USSR,  the  public  probably 
would  not  rise  spontaneously  to  the  heights  of  heroism  and  sacrifice  attained  in 
World  War  II,  but  they  would  effectively  and  willingly  support  it.  This  sup- 
port would  be  considerably  more  firm  in  efforts  to  defend  or  "liberate"  neigh- 
boring Slav  countries  to  the  west,  than  in  the  case  of  countries  in  the  Far  East. 


COMMUNIST    INFILTRATION    IN    THE    ARMY  65 

Last  minute  efforts  to  arouse  public  sentiment  against  Japan  in  the  final  stages 
of  World  War  II  were  quite  unsuccessful.  First,  there  has  been  no  hostile 
incursion  into  the  USSR.  Second,  Japan  as  well  as  China  seemed  remote  and 
unimportant  to  the  Soviet  people.  Much  greater  importance  is  accorded  to  such 
countries  as  Poland,  Czechoslovakia,  Bulgaria,  and  Yugoslavia,  where  the 
lansuaiie  differences  were  hardly  greater  than  those  between  modern  English  and 
old  Scotch,  and  the  people  share  a  vague,  common  ideal  of  Pan-Slavism  and 
racial  kindred.  Since  the  advent  of  a  Communist  Government  in  China,  Soviet 
authorities  have  attempted  to  counteract  tbis  indifference,  but  it  will  probably 
require  many  years  to  effect  any  significant  change  in  public  attitudes. 

C.  Racial  Attitudes 

The  centuries-old  melting-pot  process  in  the  Soviet  Union  has  obliterated  or 
obscured  the  lines  of  racial  distinction,  Slavs,  Greeks,  Turks,  Poles,  Scandinavi- 
ans, Finns,  Tatars,  and  many  others  have  blended  into  a  single  people,  to  the 
point  where  similarities  in  culture,  tradition,  custom,  and  outlook  far  outweigh 
the  differences.  There  is  a  dividing  line  between  Russian  and  non-Russian,  but 
it  can  readily  be  crossed  by  learning  the  Russian  language  and  by  marriage,  and 
it  rarely  operates  as  a  barrier  to  individual  progress. 

As  a  carryover  from  strong  religious  attitudes  of  the  medieval  and  Czarist 
pact,  anti-Semitism  is  still  mildly  diffused  through  the  society.  However,  it  is 
undoubtedly  waning,  due  to  the  decline  of  religion,  and  the  rigorous  legal  bans 
on  discrimination.  The  very  moderate  degree  of  anti-Semitic  feeling  among 
the  population  appears  to  be  similar  to  that  expressed  in  the  American  Middle 
West.  Most  people  are  only  vaguely  aware  of  the  "Hebrews"  (as  the  Russians 
call  them)  as  a  separate  group.  Attitudes  are  typified  by  such  expressions  as' 
"Many  Jews  are  fine  as  individuals,  but  are  not  likable  as  a  group,"  or  the 
rather  extreme  statement  of  a  Siberian  woman  that  "Jews  generally  are  dirty, 
and  Birobidzhan  (the  capital  of  the  Jewish  Autonomous  Oblast)  is  the  dirtiest 
place  in  all  Russia."  These  attitudes  are  by  no  means  universal.  Only  25  per- 
cent of  the  people  in  the  Jewish  Oblast  are  Jewish,  and  the  bulk  of  the  USSR's 
3.000,000  Jews  are  distributed  throughout  the  country.  In  education,  military 
service,  occupation,  and  criminal  liability,  Jews  are  not  to  be  distinguished 
from  the  rest  of  the  population,  and  have  no  military  significance  as  a  separate 
group. 

The  Soviet  Government  has  derived  one  marked  political  advantage  from  the 
Russians'  lack  of  social  and  racial  exclusiveness.  In  proselyting  for  Commu- 
nism among  backward  peoples,  the  Soviet  political  missionary  is  perfectly  at 
ease  with  the  poorest  elements  of  the  population,  whether  in  Indo-China,  Outer 
Mongolia,  or  South  Africa.  By  contrast,  the  French,  British  or  American  politi- 
cal representative  is  impelled  to  seek  out  the  educated  upper  class,  or  westernised 
elements,  and  even  then  remains  rather  painfully  conscious  of  the  social  gap. 
He  is  hard  pressed  to  hide  his  feelings  of  superiority,  and  the  contact  is  likely 
to  lack  warmth  and  sincerity.  Unlike  the  Western  official,  the  Communist  mis- 
sionary, working  among  the  lower  or  quasi-intellectual  elements  of  the  popula- 
tion, has  no  preestablished  system  of  indigenous  political  beliefs  to  contend 
with.  The  more  energetic  local  inhabitants,  impressed  by  his  warm  friendliness 
and  his  "scientific"  approach  to  social  problems,  are  easily  swayed  to  the  ideals 
of  "giving  the  worker  tbe  full  fruits  of  his'  labor,"  and  of  "recognizing  the 
equality  of  all  races  and  peoples."  In  assessing  the  influence  of  Communist 
agitators  it  is  important  to  note  that  tbe  impressive  ideal  of  equality  is  well 
demonstrated  in  the  actual  relations  between  the  native  and  the  Russian,  and 
the  impression  is  vividly  reinforced  when  the  native  convert  later  goes  to  Moscow 
for  extended  study.  There  is  nothing  to  make  him  feel  uncomfortably  con- 
spicuous as  an  alien.  His  first  crude  attempts  with  the  language  are  sympa- 
thetically received.  At  dances,  parties,  and  other  social  affairs  he  is  welcomed 
into  the  group  without  friction  or  embarrassment.  The  social  and  psychological 
traits  underlying  this  phenomenon  are  typically  Russian,  rather  than  Com- 
munist. However,  the  Soviet  Government  has  exploited  them  to  the  extreme, 
and  has  made  Communism  a  force  to  be  reckoned  with  in  all  countries  in  the 
Far  East.  Persuasion  has  been  far  more  important  than  compulsion  in  areas 
such  as  China,  Indo-China,  Japan  and  the  Philippines,  and  even  in  forcefully 
Communized  areas  in  eastern  Europe,  the  Communist  missionaries  are  making 
strenuous  efforts  to  "educate"  the  people,  and  to  generate  favorable  attitudes. 
It  is  impossible  to  overstress  the  point  that  genuine  inner  conviction  is  the 
driving  force  of  Communism.  It  is  identical  with  the  force  which  spread 
Christianity,  Mohammedanism,  and  other  religions  over  vast  areas,  and  has 


66  COMMUNIST    INFILTRATION    IN    THE    ARMY 

little  to  do  with  real  logic.  Terror,  riots,  and  police  control,  so  often  the  subject 
of  Western  criticism  of  Communism,  are  not  employed  to  compel  converts  into 
the  faith.  They  are  employed  by  converts  either  to  maintain  or  to  establish  a 
Communist  form  of  government.  Such  criticisms  may  be  effective,  though  usually 
in  a  passive  sense,  where  the  Communist  threat  is  merely  incipient,  but  are  quite 
useless  against  the  converts  themselves,  who  see  that  such  arguments  attack  only 
the  method,  and  not  the  substance  of  Communism.  In  those  areas  where  Com- 
munists are  in  power,  Soviet  influence  is  growing  steadily,  if  imperceptibly. 
Growth  of  Soviet  influence  in  backward  areas  not  dominated  by  Communism  may 
be  equally  steady,  but  is  usually  far  less  perceptible,  and  may  discolse  its  true 
force  only  when  natural,  economic,  or  political  disaster  has  upset  the  existing 
social  order.  In  each  case  the  methods  are  based  on  the  Russian  facility  for 
establishing  firm  social  contacts,  and  on  the  Soviet  method  of  direct  approach  to 
the  lowest  classes  of  society  in  the  target  area. 

D.  Public  Attitudes  Toward  the  Soviet  Government 

In  the  absence  of  sociological  data,  public  opinion  polls,  significant  voting  statis- 
tics, a  free  press,  and  other  normal  indicators  of  public  temper,  estimates  of  Soviet 
attitudes  toward  the  Communist  Government  and  Party  must  depend  on  overt 
signs,  general  analysis,  and  pure  conjecture.  The  hazards  of  this  process  are  well 
illustrated  by  the  German's  experience  in  World  War  II.  Innumerable  reports 
of  widespread  discontent,  hatred  for  the  MVD  (now  supplanted  by  the  MGB), 
hostility  toward  the  Government,  and  contempt  for  Communism  in  the  USSR 
convinced  the  Nazi  leaders  that  any  severe  external  pressure  would  precipitate  a 
general  revolt  in  the  Soviet  hinterland.  From  the  experience  in  other  parts  of 
Europe,  they  assumed  there  was  little  to  fear  from  the  population  in  Soviet  areas 
which  they  might  occupy.  It  was  on  this  basis  that  a  six  weeks'  campaign  was 
deemed  sufficient  to  establish  German  authority  there.  Instead,  the  Soviet  people 
evinced  a  solidarity  rivaled  only  by  the  British,  and  maintained  partisan  warfare 
in  occupied  areas  on  a  scale  that  is  unique  in  history.  The  scale  and  tempo  of  the 
German  defeat  was  due  in  good  part  to  their  inability  to  assess  Soviet  public 
opinion  and  attitudes. 

Extreme  caution  is  required  in  accepting  hearsay  data.  The  opinion  of  2,000,000 
White  Russian  refugees  and  small  numbers  of  deserters  and  escapees  cannot  be 
taken  as  representative  of  the  200,000,000  who  remain  in  the  USSR.  Foreign 
travelers  also  tend  to  distort  what  they  see  in  terms  of  their  own  background, 
and  are  readily  misled  by  the  typically  human  tendency  of  the  Russian  to  display 
deference  to  his  correspondent's  viewpoint,  particularly  if  the  acquaintance  is 
casual.  The  ardent  foreign  Communist  visiting  the  USSR  will  attract  his  own 
kind,  and  receives  few  negative  impressions  from  those  he  talks  to.  Similarly, 
Russians  wishing  to  vent  grievances  will  seek  out  the  American  or  British  official, 
and  casual  acquaintances  will  seem  to  agree  with  his  opinions.  Moreover,  the 
outsider  is  likely  to  impute  his  own  reactions  to  the  Soviet  people,  forgetting  that 
a  situation  intolerable  to  an  American  may  be  acceptable  as  familiar  routine  to 
a  Soviet  citizen. 

The  primary  Soviet  attitude  to  the  Government  is  one  of  acceptance,  generally 
without  mental  reservations.  The  idea  of  actively  opposing  the  Government  on 
political  questions  is  incomprehensible  to  the  Soviet  citizen.  He  has  neither  the 
means  nor  the  inclination  to  develop  organized  criticism  of  the  current  regime; 
except  as  regards  procedural  matters  on  the  lower  levels.  If  permitted  political 
freedom,  the  public  presumably  would  produce  variously  oriented  political  parties 
of  considerable  vigor,  since  Russians  readily  develop  a  keen  interest  in  public 
affairs,  and  there  exists  a  definite  variety  of  regional  and  economic  interests.  As 
matters  stand,  Soviet  individuals  can  occasionally  express  politically  divergent 
sentiments  in  pair  conversations  at  no  great  risk  of  prosecution,  but  independent 
group  discussions  are  immpossible,  due  to  the  MGB's  universal  informant  net, 
and  to  the  fact  that  unfavorable  remarks  would  be  severely  punished.  It  is 
similarly  out  of  the  question  to  publish  materials  criticizing  the  Communist 
Regime,  since  it  is  a  serious  offense  to  possess  duplicating  machines  without  spe- 
cific authorization  and  control.  The  Soviet  citizen  understands  and  accepts  these 
effectively  enforced  limitations  without  undue  psychological  strain.  He  is  irri- 
tated, but  in  general,  critical  and  hostile  attitudes  never  get  beyond  the  stage  of 
private  opinion,  and  therefore  are  almost  never  crystallized  into  a  program  of 
action. 

Where  organized  opposition  does  occur,  it  is  immediately  punished  and  publi- 
sized  as  treason  against  the  Soviet  people.  Retribution  is  directed  against  a 
small  segment  of  the  population,  carefully  and  convincingly  labeled  as  "decadent 
bourgeois  elements,"  "reactionary  Kulak   (rich  peasant)  remnants,"  "enemy-in- 


COMMUNIST    INFILTRATION    IN    THE    ARMY  67 

spired  saboteurs  and  wreckers,"  or  as  "hirelings  and  spies  of  the  capitalist  aggres- 
sors." Victims  usually  confess  at  great  length  in  open  court,  removing  all  public 
doubt  as  to  the  truth  of  the  charge.  Although  he  resents  the  MVD  system,  the 
average  man  feels  that  there  is  no  threat  to  his  own  security,  and  is  inclined  to 
applaud  the  diligence  of  the  security  agencies  in  rooting  out  subversive  elements. 
Irritating  though  the  rigid  surveillance  may  be,  he  tends  to  agree  with  the  Party 
officials  that  it  is  necessary  for  his  country's  protection.  When  a  member  of  his 
own  group  is  punished,  the  "crime"  involved  has  normally  been  common  knowl- 
edge, and  there  is  no  surprise  when  the  offender  is  taken  off  to  the  labor  camp. 

National  leaders  are  widely  respected  and  admired  but  the  prevailing  public 
attitude  is  relatively  free  of  emotion.  Neither  affection  nor  hostility  is  expressed, 
but  their  sincerity  and  ability  are  generally  unquestioned.  Maladministration  is 
blamed  on  intermediate  officials,  and  poor  living  conditions  are  expected  to  im- 
prove with  the  expansion  of  production.  Stalin  and  Molotov  are  regarded  as 
the  "greatest  men  in  the  Soviet  Union,  today"  but  many  in  Siberia  expressed  the 
opinion  that  Lenin  was  even  greater.  Surprisingly,  Molotov  is  often  cited  as  a 
greater  man  than  Stalin.  Contrary  to  Western  belief,  there  appears  to  be  little 
public  antipathy  toward  any  of  the  top  Communist  leaders. 

Regarding  Communism,  and  the  Communist  Party,  the  reaction  corresponds 
rather  closely  to  age  groups.  Those  above  40,  representing  25  percent  of  the 
population,  have  remained  convinced  that  Communism  is  undesirable.  They 
frequently  state  that  life  was  easier  and  better  under  the  czars,  and  farmers  still 
express  disappointment  about  their  limited  rights  on  the  land.  Those  below  40 
are  generally  favorable  and  enthusiasm  mounts  in  inverse  proportion  to  age,  into 
the  middle  ranks  of  the  Komsomols.  The  Communist  Party  is  generally  respected 
as  the  primary  organization  of  the  Govei'nment,  and  the  capable,  hard-working 
Party  member  often  earns  great  admiration  for  his  diligence  and  ability.  He  is 
usually  on  terms  of  friendly  intimacy  with  nonmembers  around  him.  At  the 
same  time,  the  lax  or  careless  Party  member  is  held  in  some  contempt  for  failure 
to  live  up  to  his  supposed  ideals,  and  will  get  little  sympathy  if  he  loses  his  card 
in  the  purge.  In  no  case  is  the  local  Party  member  held  in  awe  until  he  has 
risen  high  in  the  ranks,  and  occupies  a  responsible  position. 

The  vast  difference  in  the  proportion  of  "communists"  in  the  USSR,  as  com- 
pared with  the  United  States  must  be  taken  into  account  in  assessing  the  Soviet 
people's  attitude.  Individuals  directly  connected  with  the  Communist  Party 
through  membership  in  the  Party,  the  Komsomol,  or  the  Pioneers  are  so  numer- 
ous that  every  Russian  is  personally  acquainted  with  several  of  them.  The  ratio 
of  the  aggregate  of  members  to  non-members  in  the  general  population  is  about 
1  to  12  in  rural  areas  and  1  to  5  in  urban  areas.  The  USSR  is  ruled  by  a  few 
hundred  Party  members  in  the  highest  echelon  of  government.  The  great  mass 
of  Party-affiliated  people  are  distinguishable  from  the  general  public  only  in 
their  more  intense  indoctrination  and  in  their  somewhat  more  immediate  liability 
to  Government  and  Party  control.  There  is  no  apparent  friction  or  ill  feeling 
between  the  two  groups.  The  attitude  of  the  adult  nonmember,  even  when 
mildly  anti-Communist,  is  necessarily  tempered  by  the  fact  that  he  has  several 
Communist-affiliated  members  in  his  immediate  family  and  circle  of  friends,  and 
may  well  have  been  a  member  of  one  or  both  junior  organizations  for  several 
years  during  his  childhood.  In  the  United  States  the  ratio  of  communists  and 
Communist  sympathizers  to  the  urban  population  is  about  1  to  500.  Most  Amer- 
icans are  fortunate  enough  never  to  have  knowingly  had  personal  contact  with  a 
professed  communist.  In  the  USSR  the  communist  is  a  patriot,  a  civic  booster, 
and  frequently  a  war  hero,  doing  his  best  to  build  up  his  country.  In  the  United 
States  the  communist  is  at  best  a  fool,  and  at  worst  a  traitor,  whose  primary  aim 
is  to  destroy  his  country.  Communists  in  the  USSR  enjoy  public  admiration, 
while  those  in  the  United  States  are  justly  condemned  as  actual  or  potential 
felons.  Even  a  well-informed  American  has  great  difficulty  in  understanding  how 
a  Russian  could  fail  to  share  his  revulsion  toward  communists,  and  the  Russian 
is  equally  incredulous  at  the  American  attitude.  Therefore,  the  American  critic 
must  strive  to  understand  the  extreme  contrast  between  the  two  viewpoints,  if 
he  hopes  to  influence  the  Soviet  people.  To  be  intelligible  to  Russians,  criticisms 
must  not  be  directed  against  communists  generally,  but  against  various  Commu- 
nist beliefs  and  against  specific  malpractices  of  the  Communist  Government. 

It  is  extremely  difficult  to  determine  the  attitude  of  the  millions  of  convicts  and 
ex-convicts  who  have  received  or  served  3-  to  20-year  sentences  in  the  forced  labor 
camps.  Without  attempting  to  analyze  the  vague  data  on  numbers,  it  may  be 
assumed  that  the  convict  population  has  averaged  not  less  than  10,000,000  since 
1930,  and  that  the  average  sentence  is  5  years.    On  this  basis,  40,000,000  would 


68  COMMUNIST    INFILTRATION    LN    THE    ARMY 

have  completed  sentence  by  1950,  of  which  about  half  have  been  permanently 
settled  in  Siberia.  This  agrees  with  Japanese  prisoner  estimates  that  about  half 
of  the  free  population  in  Siberia  are  ex-convicts.  Incidentally,  Japanese 
prisoners  were  unable  to  confirm  stories  of  atrocious  conditions  and  high  death 
rates  in  the  labor  camps.  Working  in  the  same  factories  with  prisoners  of  war 
and  free  workers,  the  convicts  appear  to  have  had  the  same  fairly  effective  medi- 
cal care.  Moreover,  the  convicts  applied  themselves  only  when  the  factory  man- 
ager was  present,  sneaked  off  to  take  naps  when  opportunity  offered,  and  often 
advised  the  Japanese  to  work  more  slowly,  to  keep  the  norm  from  rising.  There 
was  no  suggestion  that  they  were  undernourished  or  physically  mistreated. 
Nearly  all  Japanese  prisoners  believed  that  the  convicts  were  "against  the 
Regime,"  but  the  only  specific  complaint  by  the  convicts  was  that  their  sentence 
was  too  long  for  what  they  did.  Nearly  all  convicts  who  talked  to  the  Japanese 
expressed  this  resentment,  and  many  said  they  hoped  there  would  soon  be  a 
war  between  the  US  and  the  USSR,  because  they  would  then  be  released  to  join 
the  armed  forces  without  having  to  serve  their  sentence.  No  one  expressed  the 
hope  or  the  belief  that  the  USSR  would  be  defeated  in  such  a  war,  nor  was  there 
any  indication  of  anti-Soviet  movements  among  the  convicts. 

Since  the  millions  of  ex-convicts  in  Siberia  share  the  mildly  favorable  attitude 
of  the  general  public  toward  the  Government,  and  since  there  are  no  observable 
subversive  trends  among  present  convicts,  it  appears  that  there  is  no  strong 
latent  opposition  to  the  Communist  Regime.  Widespread  resentment  of  various 
types  remains  inarticulate  and  gives  no  promise  of  becoming  a  significant 
political  force  so  long  as  the  Soviet  Government  maintains  its  present  controls, 
and  continues  positive  programs  of  propaganda,  political  (Communist)  educa- 
tion, and  economic  and  social  development. 

4.    PSYCHOLOGY  OF  THE  SOLDIER 

A.  General 

The  Soviet  soldier  is  basically  a  Soviet  citizen  in  uniform.  He  shares  the  same 
attitudes,  beliefs,  and  response  patterns,  though  these  are  modified  and  elaborated 
by  more  intensive  indoctrination  and  training.  In  joining  the  military  service,  he 
is  fulfilling  an  old  childhood  ambition.  He  is  gratified  by  the  universal  admira- 
tion and  respect  accorded  a  soldier  in  the  USSR.  He  has  argued  the  relative 
merits  of  service  in  artillery,  tank  forces,  air,  and  navy  since  his  early  school 
days,  and  is  thoroughly  predisposed  to  develop  a  great  pride  in  the  service  of  his 
choice.  The  infantry,  which  was  never  glamorized  like  the  other  services,  falls 
at  the  end  of  his  preference  list,  but  the  foot  soldier's  vital  role  is  recognized  and 
respected.  In  this  regard,  postservice  prospects  have  an  important  influence, 
because  the  ex-service  man's  civilian  earning  power  will  be  greatly  increased  if 
he  receives  technical  training  in  military  transport,  communications,  or  aviation. 

The  Soviet  soldier  develops  typical  "GI"  attitudes  after  he  has  completed  two 
or  three  years  of  service.  He  will  complain  about  army  food,  pay,  promotions,  and 
place  of  service.  Some  soldiers  serving  in  Siberia  said  that  the  strict  discipline 
of  army  life  was  more  difficult  than  that  of  civilians,  but  in  the  prevailing  opinion 
the  army  was  a  welcome  relief  from  the  unremitting  pressure  of  labor  norms  in 
the  factories.  Soldiers  nearing  the  end  of  their  enlistment  looked  forward  to 
their  release,  and  a  few  complained  bitterly  that  they  had  completed  eight  years' 
service  with  no  release  in  sight.  (The  term  of  service  is  usually  not  more  than 
three  years.)  Since  the  bulk  of  servicemen,  other  than  officers  and  noncommis- 
sioned officers,  are  conscriptees,  the  civilian  orientation  toward  military  life  is 
dominant,  and  soldiers  put  a  good  deal  of  thought  in  their  postservice  civilian 
status,  though  no  one  tries  to  avoid  military  service. 

Regarding  health,  stamina,  and  native  intelligence,  the  Soviet  soldier  is  neither 
better  nor  worse  than  other  European  soldiers.  Basically  healthy  through  a 
sound  diet  and  hard  work,  the  Soviet  recruit  acquires  much  of  his  stamina  from 
rigorous  training,  and  from  a  mental  acclimatization  to  high  standards  of  indi- 
vidual performance.  The  old  Suvorov  doctrine,  "Hard  on  the  training  ground, 
easy  on  the  battlefield,"  is  readily  understood  and  accepted.  In  bis  patience, 
ingenuity,  and  initiative,  the  Soviet  soldier  was  fully  comparable  to  the  well- 
trained  German  troops  in  World  War  II,  and  prejudicial  German  descriptions 
of  him  as  "stupid,  fatalistic,  immune  to  suffering,  and  indifferent  to  death"  were 
far  more  unjust  to  the  German  forces  who  had  to  meet  him  in  battle  than  they 
were  to  the  Soviet  troops.  On  the  other  hand,  inordinate  Allied  praise  for  the 
valor  and  zeal  of  Soviet  troops,  as  exemplified  in  the  epic  battles  of  Moscow,  Kiev, 
Sevastopol,  and  Stalingrad,  has  led  to  the  erroneous  impression  of  an  almost 


COMMUNIST    INFILTRATION    IN    THE    ARMY  69 

superhuman  Soviet  fighting  man.  It  must  be  stressed  that  in  his  human  charac- 
teristics, innate  ability,  and  basic  psychological  endowment,  the  Soviet  soldier 
differs  little,  if  at  all,  from  the  average  European  soldier.  Insofar  as  his  per- 
formance on  the  battlefield  is  unique,  it  must  be  accounted  for  by  differences  in 
environment,  training,  and  indoctrination. 

B.  Psychological  Effect  of  Environment 

The  Soviet  soldier  is,  of  course,  inured  to  the  extremes  of  Russian  weather, 
and  need  not  be  taught  how  to  keep  warm  in  winter.  Nor  is  daily  existence  in 
the  field  a  serious  problem,  for  most  Russians  were  born  on  the  iarm,  and  per- 
formed their  first  regular  labor  there.  Being  used  to  what  we  would  call  a  low 
standard  of  consumption,  the  Soviet  soldier  enjoys  better  food,  clothing,  and 
shelter  in  the  Soviet  Armed  Forces  than  he  knew  as  a  civilian.  In  most  cases 
he  has  his  first  direct  contact  with  trucks,  radios,  telephones,  and  other  interesting 
mechanical  equipment  in  the  army.  Since  he  enjoys  a  higher  status  and  better 
living  conditions  in  the  service  than  in  civilian  life,  the  adjustment  is  stimulat- 
ing rather  than  painful,  and  he  is  generally  well  disposed  toward  it. 

The  Soviet  soldier  is  fully  acclimated  to  group  living.  Since  privacy  and  the 
opportunity  to  be  individualistic  are  unknown  to  him,  he  finds  little  difference 
in  the  communal  life  of  the  soldier,  and  readily  adopts  a  group  orientation  in  the 
service.  The  practical  significance  of  this  easy  sociability  is  twofold.  First,  it 
speeds  the  process  of  forming,  expanding,  and  training  small  units.  Recruits 
readily  fall  into  place  in  any  desired  organization  pattern.  Due  to  their  posi- 
tive attitude  to  the  members  of  the  group,  ideas  and  techniques  rapidly  diffuse 
through  the  unit,  and  largely  compensate  for  relative  Soviet  disadvantages  in 
formal  education.  The  soldier's  practice  of  throwing  himself  wholeheartedly 
into  all  activities  of  his  group  is  not  articulated  as  an  ideal ;  it  is  a  habit.  Thus, 
the  esprit  de  corps  achieved  only  with  considerable  effort  in  Western  armies  is 
present  in  a  Soviet  unit  almost  from  its  inception.  Second,  there  is  little  diffi- 
culty arising  from  clashes  of  personality,  or  "problem  children,"  in  the  Soviet 
forces.  As  was  stated  above,  personal  differences  are  speedily  resolved,  usually 
in  a  very  heated  argument.  Once  resolved,  adjustment  is  usually  permanent  and 
relations  remain  cordial.  The  Soviet  infantry  company  commander  gets  more 
than  his  share  of  dull-normal  (above  moron  level),  illiterate,  and  non-Russian- 
speaking  recruits,  but  he  is  not  troubled  by  the  immature,  the  psychopathic 
personality,  and  the  "mama's  boy"  types — all  of  which  develop  through  insuffi- 
cient group  contacts.  Therefore,  he  probably  has  a  net  advantage  over  his 
harried  counterpart  in  the  West,  particularly  under  the  stress  of  war.  The  sub- 
standard Soviet  recruit  may  require  a  great  deal  of  patience  and  attention  from 
his  noncommissioned  officers,  but  he  is  usually  susceptible  to  individual  and 
group  pressure,  and  once  trained,  he  will  function  efficiently  and  dependably 
within  his  limited  scope. 

Deeply  ingrained  in  the  Russian  personality  is  the  "nechevo"  attitude.  It  is  a 
centuries-old  inheritance  of  habitual  self-discipline  which  sustains  the  Soviet 
soldier,  as  well  as  the  civilian,  in  time  of  war.  or  in  any  other  difficult  circum- 
stance. In  this  usage  it  may  be  translated  "it's  nothing  at  all,"  though  in  an- 
swering direct  personal  queries,  the  Russian  will  use  it  to  indicate  that  everything 
is  all  right.  It  symbolizes  the  Russian  habit  of  accepting  what  must  be  accepted, 
without  undue  inner  turmoil,  and  enables  the  soldier  to  preserve  his  good  humor 
through  toil,  privation,  and  disappointment.  It  operates  as  a  cushion  against 
psychological  shock.  Thus  the  Russian  may  become  temporarily  embittered,  or 
display  great  emotion  for  a  short  time,  but  he  soon  reverts  to  normal,  and  accepts 
the  new  situation  with  a  minimum  of  friction.  Moreover,  successive  shocks 
are  only  slightly  cumulative  in  effect.  The  Soviet  soldier  does  not  "store  up" 
insults,  disappointments,  defeats,  and  disasters.  While  his  training  accentu- 
ates the  positive  aspect  of  his  situation,  he  has  his  own  mechanism  for  "de- 
centuating"  the  negative  aspects.  Thus,  if  Soviet  troops  withstand  the  first 
shock  of  an  assult,  they  are  likely  to  evince  an  indefatiguable  solidarity  in  facing 
successive  assaults.  In  the  offense,  they  are  capable  of  renewing  the  attack 
indefinitely,  if  they  are  not  over-awed  at  the  very  start  by  the  power  and  de- 
termination of  the  enemy's  response.  By  the  same  token,  the  soldier  endures 
repeated  forced  marches,  carries  out  two-day  infiltration  operations  in  the  midst 
of  hostile  troops,  or  goes  on  half-rations  for  days  on  end,  without  suffering  any 
severe  decline  in  morale. 

The  "nechevo"'  attitude  sustains  the  un't,  as  well  as  the  individual,  but  it  is 
the  unit  which  receives  virtually  all  emphasis.  Praise  and  censure  are  more 
often  accorded  to  a  unit  than  to  an  individual.     Even  individual  awards  are 


70 


COMMUNIST    INFILTRATION    IN    THE    ARMY 


prized  in  good  part  because  they  confer  additional  status  on  the  unit.  Deaths 
of  individuals  in  battle  are  more  easily  accepted  through  primary  emphasis  on 
the  unit,  which  no  one  regards  as  mortal.  In  conformity  with  this  attitude,  the 
Soviet  unit  of  replacement  was  the  regiment  or  division,  not  the  individual. 
This  marked  cultural  trait  of  "groupism"  (as  opposed  to  individualism)  accounts 
for  the  Soviet  soldier's  ability  to  carry  on  in  spite  of  heavy  losses.  Consequently 
a  Soviet  unit,  from  a  squad  or  gun  crew  up  to  an  army,  may  hold  a  hopelessly  iso- 
lated position  for  days  and  weeks  after  the  main  battle  line  has  passed  to  its 
rear,  and  having  become  well  established  in  such  a  position,  is  likely  to  fight 
until  the  last  of  its  firing  points  is  destroyed. 

C.  Psychological  Effect  of  Training 

The  stimulus  of  new  experience  provided  incentive  to  the  already  partially 
trained  and  group-oriented  Soviet  soldier.  The  Soviet  recruit  has  worked  his 
schoolboy  arithmetic  with  military  problems.  If  he  had  ten  years  of  schooling, 
it  included  three  years  of  military  training.  Lacking  that,  he  has  probably 
already  qualified  with  the  rifle  in  earning  his  "Ready  for  Labor  and  Defense" 
medal,  or  he  has  probably  received  training  in  one  of  the  military  service 
"friendship"  societies.  He  has  full  psychological  preparation  for  small-unit 
training,  and  is  soon  ready  to  participate  in  field  maneuvers. 

The  bulk  of  able-bodied  Soviet  men  are  inducted  at  age  19  for  a  two-to-three 
year  training  period.  To  sustain  a  "normal  peace  time  level,"  a  4,000,000  men, 
about  1,000.000  draftees  pour  into  the  Soviet  military  units  each  year  for  train- 
ing. The  training  schedule  is  progressive,  simple,  and  intensive.  Equipment  is 
simple  in  design,  maintenance,  and  servicing,  so  as  not  to  tax  the  mental  powers 
of  the  trainee.  Military  doctrine  and  techniques  are  drilled  into  the  men  by 
simple  repetition.  The  soldiers  works  hard  throughout  the  strenuous  training 
day.  Those  who  readily  absorb  the  training  material  assist  those  who  are  back- 
ward, and  as  soon  as  individuals  or  small  units  have  mastered  one  phase  of 
training,  they  are  hurried  into  the  nest.  Pressure  is  heavy  throughout  the  train- 
ing period,  since  officers  and  units  are  rated  by  their  performance  in  the  fall 
maneuvers,  which  climax  the  training  year.  The  Soviet  system  also  presents  a 
serious  challenge  to  the  corps  of  regular  officers  and  noncommissioned  officers, 
who  must  instill  sound  military  techniques  into  the  huge  annual  increments  of 
recruits  year  after  year,  under  circumstances  of  mass-induction  not  unlike  those 
of  wartime.  Since  the  most  highly  trained  elements  continuously  feed  back  into 
civilian  life,  swelling  the  pool  of  trained  reserves,  the  Soviet  command  never 
reaches  the  point  where  it  can  consider  its  mission  accomplished.  By  this  means, 
in-service  elements  are  fully  exercised,  and  the  reserves  are  always  available  for 
immediate  mobilization.  Both  regular  and  trainee  components  are  kept  at  a  high 
level  of  morale  by  being  maintained  at  peak  performance,  on  the  theory  that 
a  busy  soldier  is  a  contented  soldier. 

The  Soviet  soldier's  "oft'  duty"  time  is  so  filled  with  compulsory  meetings, 
lectures,  athletic  training,  and  individual  study,  that  he  has  little  opportunity 
to  develop  other  than  service-connected  interests.  Self-study,  self-improvement, 
and  self-criticism  are  supposed  to  keynote  these  informal  group  activities,  under 
the  careful  supervision  of  the  political  officer,  almost  invariably  an  ardent,  and 
highly  trained  Communist  Party  member.  By  this  means,  the  soldier  acquires 
a  considerable  "education"  along  strictly  Communist  lines,  to  the  extent  that  it 
is  a  mistake  to  judge  his  educational  level  solely  by  his  six  years  of  grammar 
schooling.  Three-hour  orientation  meetings  often  are  held  three  evenings  weekly, 
and  to  avoid  humiliation  for  his  ignorance,  the  soldier  must  study  individually, 
at  least  one  additional  evening.  The  resulting  education  in  a  three-year  training 
term  is  analogous  to  the  narrowly  prescribed  education  of  a  dogmatic  religious 
sect,  but  it  is  just  as  useful  as  the  most  liberal  education  would  be  in  a  free 
society.  It  allows  the  Russian,  both  as  soldier  and  as  civilian,  to  acquire  added 
status  in  Soviet  society,  commensurate  with  his  absorptive  and  expository  powers. 
In  fact,  skill  in  the  understanding,  application,  and  diffusion  of  Communist 
doctrine  is  a  clear  guarantee  of  advancement  in  almost  any  field  of  endeavor  in 
the  USSR. 

As  is  the  Communist  practice  elsewhere,  the  political  officer  ingratiates  him- 
self with  the  men,  and  sells  his  methods  by  persuasive  means.  Along  with  the 
lectures  on  Communist  theory,  the  patriotic  mission  of  the  soldier,  and  Soviet 
progress  and  propaganda,  he  arranges  athletic  events,  outings,  parties  and 
dances.  Functioning  as  chaplain,  he  also  attends  to  individual  personal  problems 
of  the  men,  and  may  make  recommendations  on  the  issue  of  furloughs  and 
passes.    In  this  congenial  role  he  exercises  considerable  influence  with  the  men, 


COMMUNIST    INFILTRATION    IN   THE    ARMY  71 

and  is  a  strong  factor  in  maintaining  morale  and  "Communist  vigilance,"  which 
constitute  his  primary  responsibility.  As  a  result  of  his  extensive  official  and 
informal  training,  the  Soviet  soldier  is  apt  to  be  well-informed  on  small-unit 
military  matters,  and  on  Communist  doggerel,  but  on  nothing  else.  The  psycho- 
logical effect  is  to  make  him  a  machine  which  can  function  well  only  in  a  mili- 
tary unit,  where  he  gives  a  very  good  account  of  himself.  The  Soviet  soldier, 
however,  is  very  receptive  to  new  information.  He  has  a  highly  developed 
faculty  of  alertness,  probably  through  the  constant  give-and-take  of  group  living, 
and  has  forcibly  absorbed  tremendous  quantities  of  training  materials  and  the 
ever-changing  Communist  catechism.  Since  he  has  no  experience  with  criticism 
of  this  theoretical  material,  and  is  conditioned  to  accept  anything  that  is  not 
too  disparate  from  his  culture  pattern,  the  Soviet  soldier  is  very  susceptible  to 
any  well-prepared  propaganda. 

Regarding  surrender,  Soviet  doctrine  and  Russian  tradition  treat  it  as  a  crime 
similar  to  desertion.  The  soldier  is  never  instructed  "what  to  do  in  case  of 
capture."  Instead,  he  is  solemnly  informed  that  surrender  is  a  shameful  betrayal 
of  comrades  and  country  and  that  every  prisoner  of  war  will  some  day  answer 
for  his  crime  to  a  Soviet  military  court.  He  knows  that  the  Russian  PWs  who 
served  with  the  Germans  were  summarily  shot,  and  that  all  others  have  served 
varying  terms  of  forced  labor.  Most  important,  he  accepts  this  doctrine  as  .iust 
and  proper,  and  has  developed  a  powerful  psychological  block  against  surrender- 
ing. This  block  fails  under  stress  in  many  cases,  but  in  general,  Soviet  troops 
will  continue  resisting  long  after  a  more  balanced  soldier  would  perceive  the 
futility  of  further  struggle.  Otherwise  Soviet  discipline  is  roughly  comparable 
to  that  of  Western  armies.  Minor  violations  are  corrected  on  the  spot  by  fellow 
soldiers  or  by  superiors.  Secondary  offenses  of  a  more  culpable  nature,  such 
as  petty  thefts,  drunkenness,  unbecoming  behavior  in  public,  and  in  short,  any- 
thing that  would  degrade  the  -'honorable  name  of  soldier,"  are  tried  by  Com- 
rades' Courts,  or  in  the  case  of  officers,  by  Comrades'  Courts  of  Honor.  Mem- 
bers of  such  courts  are  of  comparable  rank  to  that  of  the  accused.  Penalties, 
which  are  announced  and  executed  in  public,  include  vigorous  reprimands,  lectures 
to  the  offender,  and  recommendation  for  demotion.  Since  Soviet  people  in  gen- 
eral are  very  sensitive  to  group  pressure,  the  deep  humiliation  of  being  repri- 
manded before  one's  own  unit  is  normally  sufficient  to  force  the  desired  change 
in  conduct.  The  soldier  is  equally  responsible  for  the  protection  of  "state 
property,"  the  fulfillment  of  all  orders  from  his  superiors,  and  the  security  of 
military  information.  For  violation  of  these  responsibilities  he  is  liable  to  trial 
by  a  military  tribunal.  He  receives  graduated  punishments  for  a  very  wide 
category  of  offenses,  and  is  rewarded  for  outstanding  performance  of  duty. 
The  intensity  of  Soviet  training,  backed  up  by  a  system  of  fairly  stringent  punish- 
ments and  effective  rewards,  has  developed  a  habit  of  obedience  and  an  un- 
reasoning confidence  in  the  Soviet  fighting  man.  Never  having  had  any  alternative 
to  obedience,  he  is  long  habituated  to  carrying  out  orders.  Having:  always  carried 
out  orders,  he  is  confident  that  all  orders  can  be  carried  out.  If  the  orders  are 
sufficiently  flexible  to  admit  of  several  solutions,  he  has  enough  ingenuity  to  work 
out  a  good,  practical  solution  which  is  well  adapted  to  the  circumstances.  If 
the  orders  are  too  specific,  however,  he  will  carry  them  out  to  the  letter.  In  a 
sense  this  may  be  called  good  discipline,  but  over-precise  and  impossible  orders 
have  often  robbed  the  soldier  of  the  opportunity  to  exploit  his  experience  and 
intimate  knowledge  of  the  situation,  and  have  forfeited  whole  units  needlessly. 

D.  Psychological  Effect  of  Indoctrination 

The  intense  indoctrination  of  the  Soviet  citizen  and  soldier  is  primarily 
Communist  in  content,  though  it  has  an  extended  superstructure  of  distorted 
information  on  current  events,  economics,  and  Soviet  policy.  Its  influence  is 
moderately  strong  in  the  below-40  brackets,  and  amounts  to  an  obsession  among 
th  16,000,000  Communist  Party  and  Young  Communist  League  members.  In 
the  Armed  Forces,  Communist  indoctrination  is  more  intensive  and  more  uni- 
formly strong  than  among  parallel  civilian  groups.  Operating  in  an  intellectual 
vacuum,  Communism  exercises  a  strong  appeal  of  optimism,  progress,  and 
righteousness,  which  is  incomprehensible  to  the  more  cultivated  peoples  of  the 
West.  Even  the  less  receptive  of  the  Soviet  soldiers  are  vaguely  but  firmly 
convinced  that  Communism  is  "right,"  and  the  active  Communists  are  certain 
that  it  is  the  key  to  world  progress,  prosperity,  and  peace.  To  the  well-indoc- 
trinated soldier,  anti-Communist  nations  are  not  only  the  mortal  enemies  of 
his  country;  they  are  also  the  enemies  of  "justice,"  "science,"  and  "advance- 
ment." The  military  and  morale  importance  of  this  is  twofold.  First,  it  adds 
to  the  ordinary  soldier's  already  strong  patriotic  incentive  to   win.     Second, 


72  COMMUNIST    INFILTRATION    IN    THE    ARMY 

it  supports  the  unreasoning  fanaticism  of  the  ardent  Communists,  who  spark- 
plug Soviet  military  units  down  to  platoon  level.  The  latter  constitute  a  strong 
factor  in  the  strength  and  cohesiveness  of  the  Soviet  military  unit.  There  is  no 
mistaking  the  genuineness  of  their  appeal,  for  they  do  not  merely  give  advice 
and  encouragement  from'  the  deep  rear.  As  ordinary  soldiers  and  squad  leaders 
in  combat,  they  regularly  set  a  superb  example  of  bravery  and  skill  during 
World  War  II.  Political  officers  of  battalion,  regiment,  and  division  level 
l'egularly  joined  in  the  worst  of  the  fighting,  and  Party  members  suffered  such 
disproportionate  casualties  that  it  became  a  serious  problem  to  find  suitably 
trained  and  experienced  replacements  for  them.  Soldiers,  veterans,  and  civilians 
alike  were  so  impressed  with  their  heroism  and  zeal  during  the  "Patriotic  War," 
that  even  the  MVD  element  of  the  Communist  Government  came  to  be  sincerely 
admired  for  its  vital  role  in  the  struggle. 

Communist  indoctrination  has  convinced  both  civilians  and  servicemen  that 
the  Soviet  Army  is  the  finest  on  earth,  and  that  it  is  the  nation's  great  bulwark 
against  a  hostile,  wicked  world.  As  a  result,  the  popular  Soviet  attitude  to  the 
military  is  virtually  the  reverse  of  that  prevailing  in  the  West.  The  Army 
is  a  revered  institution,  and  the  object  of  pride  and  devotion.  The  people  are 
never  critical  of  the  army,  or  of  defense  expenditure.  In  wartime,  the  slogan 
is  "Everything  for  the  front,"  and  in  peace,  "Everything  needful  for  the  Armed 
Forces !"  Consequently  there  is  very  little  resentment  of  military  training  or 
military  service.  Even  today,  the  Communist  hierarchy  could  probably  put  an 
end  to  public  resentment  against  high  norms  and  low  incomes,  if  the  sacrifice 
were  justified  as  essential  to  national  defense  and  a  powerful  army.  Such  an 
explanation,  however,  would  not  square  with  the  current  fiction  that  the  USSR 
is  "employing  her  resources  for  peace,"  while  the  capitalist  countries  are  "im- 
poverishing their  peoples  to  finance  preparations  for  war."  Soviet  leaders  will 
stress  this  theme  to  the  utmost  when  war  comes,  and  economic  privation  will 
immediately  disappear  as  a  psychological  warfare  target,  because  those  who 
remain  civilians  are  proud  to  contribute  to  the  war  effort  by  working  hard  and 
by  doing  without. 

In  war,  the  nation  stresses  the  victories  and  defeats  of  units,  not  of  individuals. 
Th°r«  is  little,  if  anv,  mention  of  the  individual  soldier's  privations  and  suffering, 
and  hardly  any  reference  to  casualties.  Public  attitudes  do  not  invite  the  Soviet 
soldier  to  pity  himself,  or  to  brood  on  the  possibility  of  death.  Instead,  he  is 
presumed  to  be  personally  responsible  for  defeating  the  enemy.  The  slogan  in 
World  War  II  was,  "Death  to  the  Invader !"  and  "Kill  Him,  Kill  Him  !"  Stalin's 
m^«sage  to  troops  in  the  Battle  of  Moscow  conformed  fully  with  public  feeling: 
"The  enemy  is  destroying  your  country.  If  you  don't  stop  him,  nobody  stops 
him."  The  soldier's  job  was  not  to  defend  himself  or  his  buddies,  or  to  avoid 
death,  but  to  kill  and  defeat  the  enemy.  The  same  negative  attitude  toward 
casualties  carried  over  to  the  civilian  population.  Wives  and  mothers  on  the 
homefmnt  nornially  were  never  informed  of  the  soldier's  death  or  injuries,  and 
military  units  did  not  burden  themselves  by  keeping  permanent  records  of  those 
lost  in  battle.  His  family  knew,  of  his  condition  only  when  the  serviceman 
came  home  on  a  hospital  furlough  or  medical  discharge.  If  he  returned  home 
after  the  war,  his  family  was  grateful  for  his  good  fortune.  If  not,  he  was 
presumed  dead.  In  this  case,  certitude  could  come  only  gradually,  and  the 
adjustment,  though  painful,  was  made  without  any  devastating  shock.  This 
technique  for  accepting  what  comes  permitted  a  remarkable  resilience  and 
steadiness  in  the  civilian  as  well  as  the  military  elements. 

"Facing  up  to  the  situation"  was  another  technique  of  indoctrination  which 
had  a  galvanizing  effect  in  wartime.  Unlike  the  perpetual  optimist  in  the 
German  propaganda  office,  or  the  matter-of-fact  British  commentator,  the  Krem- 
lin propagandist  stressed  the  vital  importance  of  the  coming  battle,  the  deadly 
consequences  if  the  new  line  were  broken,  and  the  need  for  greater  efforts  than 
had  yet  been  made.  Stalin  was  often  slower  to  announce  a  victory  than  to 
sound  the  alarm  over  a  defeat.  Days  elapsed  before  he  informed  the  Russian 
people  that  the  Soviet  forces  had  encircled  the  German  forces  at  Stalingrad,  or 
told  of  the  recapture  of  many  key  cities  in  the  Ukraine.  In  no  case  was  a  major 
enemy  breakthrough  glossed  over  as  an  insignificant  matter,  nor  a  general  with- 
drawal euphemized  as  an  "adjustment  in  the  lines  to  facilitate  further  offen- 
sives." Every  situation  was  presented  as  a  stern  challenge,  demanding  the 
maximum  exertion  from  everyone.  As  a  result  of  this  aggressive  psychological 
fixation,  and  a  keen  sense  of  personal  responsibility,  the  Soviet  soldier  was 
able  to  continue  fighting  in  spite  of  heavy  casualties,  and  to  muster  even  greater 
determination  as  the  situation  deteriorated.  If  the  Soviet  propaganda  machine 
operates  unmolested,  he  will  react  similarly  in  crises  of  the  future. 


COMMUNIST    INFILTRATION    LN    THE    ARMY  73 

5.   PSYCHOLOGICAL  VULNERABILITY 

A.  Vulnerability  of  the  Soviet  People 

The  Soviet  Union  is  a  fairly  difficult  psychological  target.  The  people  are 
extremely  patriotic,  and  tend  to  approve  of  the  present  government,  because 
it  has  made  Russia  a  world  power,  and  was  able  to  defeat  the  Germans.  Gov- 
ernment control  of  all  propaganda  media  makes  it  extremely  hard  to  reach  the 
people  from  outside  the  country.  On  the  other  hand,  the  Soviet  people  gossip 
freely,  tend  to  be  hypercritical  on  a  personal  basis,  and  like  to  grumble  about 
the  petty  irritations  of  daily  life.  Moreover,  for  all  their  superficial  antipathy, 
they  have  a  deep  admiration  for  the  United  States,  are  susceptible  to  humani- 
tarian ideals,  and  eagerly  accept  new  facts  from  foreign  sources,  if  they  appear 
reasonable. 

Propaganda  will  be  effective  if  it  stresses  the  unfairness  of  Government 
policies  which  the  Soviet  people  really  think  unfair.  For  example,  it  would 
be  extremely  effective  to  base  criticisms  on  the  killing  pace  of  Stakhanovite 
production  norms,  inadequate  wage  levels,  high  prices,  and  the  poor  quality 
of  consumer  goods,  because  all  are  within  the  immediate  ken  of  the  average 
Russian.  He  has  been  complaining  about  them  for  years.  In  all  cases,  gen- 
eralizations should  be  well  supported  with  concreate  examples,  to  establish 
an  undeniably  factual  tie-in  to  the  citizen's  own  experience.  For  example, 
one  pair  of  low-quality  shoes  per  year  is  a  poor  reward  for  a  man  who  wears 
them  out  trying  to  accomplish  an  impossible  work  norm,  and  it  is  more  unjust 
to  require  his  children  to  get  along  with  still  less.  In  attacking  the  convict 
labor  system,  criticism  should  be  directed  against  specific  inequalities  and 
injustices,  rather  than  against  the  system  in  general.  The  Russian  understands 
that  lawbreakers  must  be  punished,  and  that  the  Soviet  system  fulfills  a 
necessary  function  in  this.  Moreover,  he  may  be  convinced  that  Soviet  juris- 
prudence is  more  "merciful"  than  that  of  the  West,  regarding  many  crimes 
of  violence.  But  he  does  feel  that  a  six-year  sentence  is  far  too  much  for  steal- 
ing a  sack  of  potatoes,  particularly  when  he  knows  that  the  manager  of  his 
factory  is  stealing  lumber  and  bricks  by  the  truckload.  Russians  generally  are 
indifferent  to  the  "corrective  labor"  sentences  imposed  on  thousands  of  "reac- 
tionaries" in  territories  newly  acquired  during  World  War  II.  They  have  the 
same  hostile  attitude  toward  "wreckers,  spies,  and  traitors,"  as  Americans  have 
toward  Communists  who  are  imprisoned  in  the  United  States,  but  many  Rus- 
sians undoubtedly  have  close  relatives  or  friends  who  were  unjustly  or  too 
severely  punished  for  "lack  of  vigilance,"  and  other  political  "crimes."  Only 
the  most  flagrant  and  obvious  cases  can  be  exploited,  however,  because  political 
opposition,  criticism,  and  discussion,  long  cherished  as  inviolable  rights  in 
Britain  and  the  United  States,  have  always  been  acknowledged  as  felonies  in 
the  Russian  State. 

Various  Soviet  fiscal  operations  are  vulnerable  to  propaganda  attack.  The 
most  immediate  in  the  mind  of  the  Soviet  worker  is  the  semiobligatory  govern- 
ment bond  subscription,  which  is  launched  several  times  each  year.  Workers 
frequently  express  keen  resentment  against  these  forced  savings,  and  do  not 
regard  them  as  a  real  asset,  since  they  cannot  redeem  the  bond  prior  to  its 
maturity  (normally  10  years),  except  by  proving  a  case  of  extreme  hardship 
at  the  bank.  Ruble  devaluations  are  extremely  unjust  in  many  individual  cases, 
though  most  people  have  too  little  cash  laid  by  to  be  effected.  The  aggrieved 
persons,  however,  are  exceptionally  vulnerable  to  the  influence  of  hostile  propa- 
ganda for  several  months  after  a  general  devaluation.  Most  vulnerable  of  all 
is  the  huge  Soviet  turnover  tax.  Most  Russians  are  completely  unaware  of 
it,  since  it  is  applied  only  to  the  wholesale  price  of  goods  purchased  by  the 
retail  outlet,  and  does  not  appear  as  a  s'ales  tax.  This  tax  normally  represents 
more  than  50  percent  of  the  retail  price  of  items  of  common  consumption,  such 
as  bread,  canned  foods,  and  clothing.  It  rises  to  90  percent  on  "luxury"  items, 
such  as  special  foods,  alcoholic  beverages,  bicycles,  and  phonographs.  Tech- 
nically, the  turnover  tax  is  a  device  to  control  distribution  and  consumption 
and  affords  tremendous  latitude  in  price  fixing,  but  the  Soviet  wage  earner 
would  readily  perceive  its  expropriative  effect  on  his  slender  income.  Effective 
propaganda  on  the  subject  would  certainly  generate  popular  discontent,  and 
might  force  the  Government  to  make  costly  adjustments  in  its  fiscal  and  economic 
control  system. 

Housing  is  also  the  source  of  much  discontent  in  the  Soviet  Union,  and  the 
Government  would  probably  be  forced  to  make  some  adjustments  in  response 
to  criticism  for  its  failure  to  provide  adequate  facilities.     The  prospect  of  ob- 


74  COMMUNIST    INFILTRATION   IN   THE    ARMY 

taining  a  little  more  living  space  has  been  a  strong  encouragement  to  job 
hopping,  and  the  hope  of  being  assigned  a  small  (3  or  4  room)  private  dwelling 
has  spurred  those  ambitious  for  managerial  positions.  There  is  little  evidence 
that  the  people  blame  the  Soviet  regime  for  thes'e  deficiencies,  but  it  should 
be  a  simple  matter  to  persuade  them  to  it.  The  average  Soviet  worker  does 
not  expect  a  private  house,  but  he  would  like  to  have  his  own  kitchen,  running 
water,  and  perhaps,  a  separate  bedroom  for  the  children.  A  housing  shortage 
in  the  world's  most  richly  forested  country  should  be  hard  to  explain. 

Soviet  inhabitants  of  occupied  areas  in  wartime  would  be  deeply  impressed 
by  all  humanitarian  gestures  of  occupying  forces.  For  example.  America's: 
kindness  in  times  of  disaster  and  famine  is  gratefully  remembered.  The  im- 
pression could  he  powerfully  reinforced  by  genuine  solicitude  for  the  welfare 
of  local  inhabitants.  Disease  control  measures,  hospitalization,  economic  assist- 
ance, and  unfettered  cultural  contributions  of  newspapers  and  books,  despite 
the  cost  and  temporary  inconvenience  from  a  military  standpoint,  would  pay 
rich  dividends  in  civilian  cooperation,  and  would  weaken  civilian  resolve  in 
enemy-held  areas.  A  going  economy,  largely  administered  by  freely  elected 
local  governments,  would  present  compellingly  practical  evidence  that  Russia's 
best  interests  lay  in  a  free  Western-type  social  organization.  Nor  would  the 
cost  be  prohibitive  to  the  Allies.  Russian  agriculture  and  technical  skill  would 
be  quite  capable  of  sustaining  the  population,  if  communications  were  restored 
in  war-ravaged  areas.  Only  a  moderate  degree  of  supplementary  economic 
assistance  would  he  required. 

The  most  profitable  avenue  of  propaganda  approach  merges  into  the  field  of 
political  leadership.  For  more  than  a  century,  the  Russian  people  have  been 
very  susceptible  to  political  ideas.  The  surge  of  political  idealism  undermined 
the  Czarist  autocracy,  furnished  the  means  for  the  rise  of  Communism,  and 
remains  a  potentially  invincible  challenge  to  the  oppressive  system  which  emerged 
as  the  Soviet  Government.  Today,  although  poorly  educated  in  other  respects', 
the  peoples  of  the  Soviet  Union  are  keenly  alert  to  political  and  social  problems. 
Permitted  to  see  only  the  official,  Communist  side  of  the  picture,  they  are  none- 
theless prepared  by  intensive  political  training  to  understand  and  adopt  the 
democratic  ideals  of  a  free  society. 

The  counter-revolutionary  leaders  in  the  Russian  Civil  War  (1918-1920)  failed 
to  gain  public  support  largely  because  they  offered  no  convincing  political  pro- 
gram. The  German  Government  alienated  public  sympathy  in  World  War  II 
when  its  actions  and  policies  belied  earlier  promises  of  democracy  and  inde- 
pendence. In  the  event  of  World  War  III  the  Allied  Powers,  and  particularly 
the  United  States,  will  have  to  dispel  the  recently-established  Soviet  myths  of 
American  brutality,  greed,  and  callousness.  From  the  start,  they  must  use  every 
means  in  their  power  to  reach  the  people  with  an  attractive,  detailed,  and  prac- 
ticable political  program.  Immediately  exploitable  is  the  farmer's  hunger  for 
his  own  land.  The  agricultural  population  would  be  strongly  attracted  by  the 
prospect  of  privately  owned  farms,  and  the  right  to  sell  their  own  produce  on  a 
free  market.  Industrial  workers  would  be  similarly  attracted  by  the  prospect 
of  having  a  voice  in  wages,  production  quotas,  and  working  conditions,  the  right 
to  organize  truly  independent  labor  unions,  and  the  right  to  choose  their  habitat 
and  place  of  employment.  All  elements  of  the  population  would  respond  to  the 
promise  of  personal  freedom,  and  the  right  to  travel  in  their  own  country  without 
official  restrictions.  Of  less  immediate  appeal  but  capable  of  development,  are 
the  democratic  rights  to  freedom  of  speech,  freedom  of  the  press,  freedom  from 
arbitrary  arrest,  search,  and  seizure,  and  the  right  to  organize  political  parties 
and  to  hold  genuine  elections.  Considerable  time  and  energy  would  be  required 
to  achieve  widespread  understanding  and  support  for  these  relatively  abstract 
rights,  since  the  peoples  of  the  USSR  at  present  have  little  knowledge  of  them. 

The  promise  of  independence  for  national  minority  groups  is  only  partially 
exploitable,  because  support  gained  within  such  groups  would  be  offset  by  alien- 
ation of  the  many  people  who  would  see  it  as  a  threat  to  dismember  their  country. 
The  plebiscite  principle  would  certainly  get  a  mixed  reception ;  the  Union  forces 
fought  very  bitterly  in  the  American  Civil  War,  just  to  prevent  such  "self- 
determination."  However,  a  fair-minded  proposal  to  consider  the  desires  of 
minority  peoples,  and  to  provide  at  least  a  greater  degree  of  local  autonomy  in 
a  federal  framework  probably  would  be  well  received.  In  any  case,  the  people 
should  be  assured  that  all  predominantly  Russian  groups  would  be  included  in 
the  Russian  state,  which  would  be  assured  its  rightful  and  equal  place  among  the 
free  nations  of  the  world. 


COMMUNIST    INFILTRATION    IN    THE    ARMY  75 

The  peoples  of  the  USSR  are  also  susceptible  to  ideals  of  international  coop- 
eration, and  to  the  principles  of  the  United  Nations.  The  employment  of  this 
powerful  lever  in  the  Korean  War  has  already  compelled  the  Soviet  Communists 
to  attempt  retaliation  with  the  "World  Peace  Council"  and  the  idea  of  the  "Peoples 
Democracies."  Both  devices  can  profitably  be  exposed  for  what  they  are.  In 
the  event  of  World  War  III,  the  Western  Powers,  fighting  under  the  aegis  of  the 
United  Nations,  could  employ  the  best  of  psychological  weapons  by  promising  to 
deliver  the  Russian  people  from  the  control  of  a  radical  minority,  and  to  restore 
all  political  power  in  the  Russian  state  to  the  people,  and  to  their  freely  elected 
representatives.  Whatever  the  program  adopted,  it  must  provide  the  fullest 
scope  for  Russian  patriotism  and  Russian  self-respect  within  the  framework  of 
the  Allied  war  effort,  and  the  indoctrination  effort  should  be  second  only  to  the 
more  urgent  military  requirements,  since  it  should  thereby  become  possible  to 
enlist  many  civilians  and  prisoners  of  war  in  the  war  of  liberation. 

B.  Vulnerability  of  the  Soviet  Soldier 

The  Soviet  soldier  is  a  much  more  difficult  target,  but  he  too  can  be  reached. 
Whether  openly  or  secretly,  he  will  read  everything  he  gets  from  foreign  sources. 
Credible  propaganda  will  pass  readily  through  the  ranks  by  word  of  mouth. 
He  will  be  tremendously  impressed  with  American  military  equipment,  and  with 
cheap  personal  possessions  which  the  American  soldier  takes  as  a  matter  of 
course.  It  is  possible  to  weaken  many  of  his  beliefs,  as  in  the  disgrace  of  sur- 
render, the  superiority  of  Soviet  equipment,  and  the  skill  of  his  superiors. 
Regarding  surrender,  he  can  be  persuaded  that  it  is  foolish  to  squander  his  life 
in  a  hopeless  situation,  when  he  can  continue  to  serve  his  country  after  the  war. 
He  can  be  made  to  doubt  the  quality  of  his  equipment,  as  it  fails  to  match  the 
performance  of  Allied  equipment,  and  it  is  highly  desirable,  for  the  same  reason, 
to  outpace  the  Soviet  forces  in  developing  innovations  in  materiel,  tactics,  and 
combat  expedients.  Soviet  commanders  are  prone  to  repeat  one  attack  after 
another,  employing  identical  forces,  tactics,  and  direction  of  attack,  as  long  as 
their  forces  last,  even  though  each  attacking  echelon  is  destroyed  in  the  process. 
Their  refusal  to  take  time  for  developing  a  new  plan  on  the  spot,  and  their 
unwillingness  to  recognize  an  unsound  plan  cost  tens  of  thousands  of  lives  in 
World  War  II.  The  Soviet  system  of  command  discipline  deprives  the  commander 
of  the  necessary  freedom  of  action  to  correct  this  attitude,  which  is  clearly 
vulnerable  to  effective  criticism  in  propaganda  to  the  Soviet  troops.  For  exam- 
ple, "Why  fling  yourself  into  the  same  meatgrinder  that  destroys  the  battalion 
ahead  of  you  merely  because  your  commander  is  too  stupid  to  admit  that  his 
initial  plan  was  worthless?" 

Of  course,  the  best  way  to  destroy  the  morale  of  Soviet  troops  is  to  defeat 
them  repeatedly  in  combat.  To  accomplish  this,  due  cognizance  must  be  ac- 
corded their  strengths  and  weaknesses.  Inexperienced  units  were  terrorized 
and  reduced  to  panic  with  relative  ease  in  World  War  II,  but  little  advantage 
accrued  if  they  were  allowed  simply  to  retreat  and  restore  themselves.  Large 
contingents  surrounded  in  wide  enveloping  attacks  (the  German  pincer  tech- 
nique) were  captured  in  several  instances  by  the  hundreds  of  thousands;  but  if 
allowed  any  respite,  surrounded  groups  were  reorganized,  and  fought  in  place 
to  the  last  man.  Panic  is  normally  induced  by  the  old  principle  of  over- 
whelming force  at  the  main  points  of  attack.  The  artillery  and  air  preparation 
should  be  as  impressive  and  as  deadly  as  it  is  possible  to  make  it,  and  the  attack 
should  follow  just  as  the  psychological  shock  effect  has  reached  its  peak.  The 
point  of  maximum  mental  strain  is  yet  to  be  determined,  but  troops  under  pro- 
longed bombardment  eventually  relax,  and  thereafter  are  able  to  face  an  attack 
with  great  determination.  All  attacks  should  be  planned  as  rapid  double  en- 
velopments, to  assure  complete  destruction  of  the  enemy  forces,  preferably  by 
capture,  in  the  earliest  stages  of  their  disorganization.  Soviet  troops  in  this 
condition  often  surrender  quite  readily,  and  destruction  of  enemy  forces  by 
capture  is  by  far  the  most  economical  in  casualties  among  friendly  forces. 

The  Soviet  unit  is  so  important  to  the  soldier's  habits  of  thought  and  action 
that  he  is  much  more  likely  to  feel  defeated  if  he  thinks  his  unit  has  been  over- 
powered. For  this  reason,  it  is  far  more  effective  to  isolate  parts  of  two  or 
three  units  than  to  surround  one  complete  unit.  Intact  units,  when  surrounded, 
are  likely  to  rise  to  great  heights  of  heroism,  wherein  fragments  of  units  totalling 
much  larger  numbers,  would  be  capable  of  only  a  modicum  of  resistance  for 
hours  and  even  days  after  the  debacle.  If  the  attack  is  of  sufficient  force,  it  will 
be  just  as  successful  against  the  centers  of  Soviet  companies,  battalions,  regi- 
ments, and  divisions,  as  it  would  be  against  division  and  corp  boundaries.    There- 


76  COMMUNIST    INFILTRATION    IN    THE    ARMY 

fore,  maximum  demoralization  will  result  if  attacks  of  all  magnitudes  are 
planned  to  break  through  the  centers  of  the  maximum  number  of  opposing  units, 
from  the  company  to  the  division.  Meanwhile,  Soviet  troops  should  be  given 
every  practical  and  propagandist  encouragement  to  surrender,  and  friendly 
troops  should  be  trained  to  facilitate  the  capture  of  prisoners,  as  one  of  the 
most  expeditious  means  of  destroying  hostile  armed  forces. 

Tactics  should  be  deliberately  varied  so  that  troops  of  a  given  Soviet  unit 
cannot  acquire  a  sense  of  familiarity  and  confidence  in  combating  friendly 
forces.  Unsuccessful  tactics  should  never  be  employed  a  second  time  against 
the  same  unit.  The  many  possible  variations  in  the  use  of  artillery,  rockets, 
armor,  atomic  bombs,  infantry,  and  paratroop  forces  permit  great  latitude  in 
maintaining  a  constant  element  of  uncertainty  in  the  minds  of  the  officers  and 
men  of  Soviet  units. 

Soviet  units  should  never  be  permitted  to  settle  into  a  protracted  slug-fest. 
They  excell  in  such  fighting,  through  their  unusual  qualities  of  stubborness, 
persistence,  and  patience.  Once  their  morale  has  become  firm  in  a  position, 
they  are  capable  of  pouring  in  replacement  units  indefinitely,  which  appear  to 
stimulate  mutual  heroism  in  direct  proportion  to  the  length  of  time  they  have 
held  off  the  attack.  In  this  case  it  will  be  more  economical  to  formulate  a  new 
plan,  altering  the  direction,  place,  and  timing  of  the  attack.  In  defending 
against  Soviet  units  maximum  casualties  can  usually  be  exacted  by  fighting  in 
place,  since  it  has  been  the  Soviet  practice  to  hurl  wave  after  wave  against  the 
same  line  in  as  many  as  five  echelons.  Heavy  casualties,  however,  cannot  be 
expected  to  have  a  psychologically  crippling  effect  on  those  who  escape  injury, 
since  Russian  troops  are  much  more  immune  than  other  European  troops  to  the 
effects  of  battle  losses.  What  does  depress  them  is  failure  to  accomplish  the 
mission,  and  a  sense  of  frustration  can  be  built  up  to  the  point  where  it  is  not 
difficult  to  overwhelm  them  in  a  conteroffensive. 

Surrounded  Soviet  elements  which,  in  spite  of  all  efforts,  are  able  to  stabilize 
their  position,  should  be  treated  as  Soviet  line  units  which  have  shown  in- 
creasing firmness  under  pressure.  Continued  assault  would  be  prohibitively 
costly  and  time-consuming,  as  the  Germans  should  have  learned  at  Kiev  and 
Sevastopol.  It  is  more  effective  to  destroy  the  food,  water,  and  ammunition 
stocks  of  such  pockets,  and  to  maintain  pressure  by  air,  artillery,  and  probing, 
until  they  are  forced  to  assume  the  initiative. 

In  wartime  the  Soviet  soldier  is  too  young,  too  thoroughly  indoctrinated,  and 
too  immediately  concerned  with  the  practical  requirements  of  combat  to  respond 
to  the  more  elaborate  abstractions  of  political  and  moral  propaganda.  It  would 
be  sufficient  merely  to  assure  him  that  his  loved  ones  in  occupied  areas  were 
safe ;  that  the  Allied  Powers  were  restoring  adequate  living  conditions,  schools, 
and  public  services  there  without  delay ;  and  that  Russia  would  be  a  free  demo- 
cratic country  after  the  war.  "News  from  home"  concerning  developments  in 
occupied  Russian  towns  would  be  particularly  welcome  to  Soviet  troops  and 
commanders  would  find  it  virtually  impossible  to  prevent  the  troops'  reading 
such  leaflets.  The  Soviet  soldier  will  also  accept  the  "life  insurance"  implicit  in 
the  safe-conduct  leaflet,  at  least  to  the  extent  of  making  sure  be  has  one.  Soviet 
troops  habitually  use  bits  of  newspaper  to  roll  cigarettes  and  would  certainly 
welcome  packets  of  regular  cigarette  papers,  even  though  they  bore  the  caption 
"Use  these  especially  prepared  papers  to  make  your  cigarettes ;  Allied  leaflets 
are  for  your  information,  not  for  smoking."  World  news  would  not  be  so  attrac- 
tive to  them  as  news  from  the  front,  since  soldiers  often  go  for  weeks  without 
information  on  events  in  nearby  areas.  Relevant  material  might  include  matter- 
of-fact  items  on  the  progress  of  the  war,  activities  at  the  prisoner-of-war  encamp- 
ments, and  civilian  conditions  in  rear  areas.  Leaflets  on  good  reasons  for  honor- 
able surrender  and  the  appropriate  circumstances  and  methods  for  it  would 
doubtless  be  effective  over  a  period  of  time.  The  Soviet  soldier's  interest  can 
readily  be  aroused  and  sustained  by  the  element  of  novelty  and  humor  in  leaf- 
lets. Occasional  cartoons  bearing  no  propaganda  message  and  intended  solely 
to  amuse  would  create  a  strong,  moderately  favorable  impression,  and  would 
prompt  him  to  look  at  other  leaflets,  despite  ordei's  to  the  contrary.  He  would 
also  be  impressed  by  occasional  "special  issues"  on  good-quality  paper,  bearing 
color  or  black-and-white  photography  with  an  appropriate  greeting,  such  as 
"Wishing  you  a  happy  Christmas  and  a  safe  delivery  from  the  perils  of  war." 
German  propaganda  often  strove  to  torment  and  irritate  the  soldier  and  only 
succeeded  in  reinforcing  his  hostility,  since  this  is  what  he  expected  from  a 
vicious  enemy.  A  kindly  tone,  on  the  other  hand,  would  tend  to  discount  Soviet 
atrocity  stories  and  would  generate  serious  doubts  as  to  whether  the  Allied 


COMMUNIST    INFILTRATION   EST    THE    ARMY  77 

Powers  held  any  real  antipathy  for  the  Russian  people.  The  soldier  could  then 
take  a  more  reasonable  view  on  the  question  of  surrender,  the  reliability  of  Allied 
news  items,  and  the  sincerity  of  political  assurances.  The  important  thing  is  to 
gain  the  soldier's  attention  and  to  influence  his  thinking.  How  far  he  can  be 
influenced  remains  to  be  established,  but  his  alertness  and  interest  make  him 
amenable  to  propaganda  efforts  and  to  new  ideas. 

6.    CONCLUSION 

The  American  viewpoint  of  life  in  the  Soviet  Union  remains  valid  in  all  essen- 
tials. The  Soviet  citizen  enjoys  neither  the  liberty  nor  the  civil  rights  which 
we  cherish  and  insist  upon  as  the  natural  endowment  of  all  men.  The  "free" 
worker  in  the  U.  S.  S.  R.  is  as  much  chained  to  his  job  and  local  area  as  is  the 
convict.  He  has  no  voice  in  determining  his  place  of  work,  working  conditions, 
or  wages.  His  only  advantage  over  the  convict  is  that  he  can  live  with  his 
family  and  can  spend  his  limited  income  as  he  sees  fit.  He  has  no  redress 
against  a  harsh  authoritarian  government.  He  is  forbidden  to  raise  his  voice 
in  criticism,  to  develop  independent  views,  or  to  acquire  unbiased  information. 
His  voting  rights  are  a  travesty  on  the  ideals  and  purposes  of  democracy.  He 
enjoys  no  acknowledged  rights  for  his  person,  life,  or  property.  He  is  the  help- 
less prisoner  of  a  slave  state.  As  was  noted  previously,  such  an  existence  would 
be  intolerable  for  Americans.  American  traditions  and  beliefs  militate  against 
every  facet  of  government  activity  in  the  U.  S.  S.  R.  British  and  American 
Communist  sympathizers  who  visit  the  U.  S.  S.  R.  nearly  always  return  in  bitter 
disillusionment.     There  is  no  better  antidote  for  radicalism. 

The  Russian,  however,  is  habituated  to  all  aspects  of  his  environment.  He 
has  no  information  on  British  or  American  political  theory  anil  has  little  concept 
of  what  life  could  be  like  in  a  free  society.  Most  of  the  Soviet  police  controls 
and  limitations  on  movement  were  previously  employed  in  the  czarist  regime. 
An  undercurrent  of  discontent  has  always  been  manifest;  otherwise,  stringent 
controls  would  not  be  necessary.  But  the  people  in  general,  like  the  people  of 
other  low-income  countries,  have  long  been  adjusted  to  their  living  conditions. 
Similarly  they  have  learned  to  live  within  the  stern  limitations  imposed  by  their 
government.  Habitually  a  cheerful,  optimistic  people,  they  make  the  best  of 
their  situation  and  are  primarily  concerned  with  the  immediate,  practical  con- 
siderations of  daily  living.  They  enjoy  family  life  and  social  activities  within 
their  circle  of  friends.  They  remain  patriotic  and  proud  of  their  national 
accomplishments. 

In  the  event  of  a  general  war,  it  will  become  the  mission  of  the  free  people 
of  the  West  to  overcome  the  menace  of  communism  and  to  reorient  the  victimized 
peoples  of  the  U.  S.  S.  R.  and  other  Communist  nations.  To  do  so  will  require 
an  unbiased  understanding  both  of  the  position  and  outlook  of  the  average  Soviet 
citizen.  It  has  been  the  purpose  of  this  study  to  demonstrate  the  contrast  be- 
tween the  typically  Russian  and  American  concepts  of  life  in  the  U.  S.  S.  R.  and 
to  render  the  average  Russian's  viewpoint  sufficiently  intelligible  to  provide  the 
basis  for  a  sound  psychological  approach  to  the  peoples  and  fighting  men  of  the 
Soviet  Union. 

Exhibit  No.  3 

Excerpts  From  A  History  of  Russia,  by  Bernard  Pares 
******* 

There  was  by  now  no  doubt  that  the  Soviet  Government,  absorbed  in  its 
enormous  reconstruction  of  the  whole  life  of  Russia,  was  sincerely  desirous  of 
maintaining  world  peace  (p.  500). 

******* 

*  *  *  On  December  29,  1935,  a  decree  of  the  first  importance  swept  away  all 
class  restrictions  of  birth  in  admission  to  the  universities.  Discipline  was  fully 
restored  in  the  school ;  and  the  pupils,  who  were  to  be  put  into  uniform  as  in 
the  old  days,  were  called  upon  to  show  respect  for  their  teachers  and  elders. 
Several  measures  dealt  with  the  abolition  of  juvenile  crime,  and  the  help  of 
parents  was  enlisted  in  this  cause.  Family  ties  were  to  be  strengthened,  and  a 
measure  of  delay  was  introduced  into  the  procedure  of  divorce  (p.  500) . 


78 


COMMUNIST    INFILTRATION    IN    THE    ARMY 


*  *  *  On  February  6  the  Premier,  Molotov,  announced  the  drafting  of  a  new! 
constitution  with  universal,  equal,  direct,  and  secret  suffrage  and  the  restoration 
of  the  ballot.     The  peasant  vote,  which  had  so  far  counted  as  one-fifth  of  the 
town  worker's  was  now  to  be  equalised  with  it  (p.  501). 

******* 

*  *  *  Large  sums  were  devoted  to  education,  health,  and  culture,  while  the 
Army  was  greatly  increased  (p.  502). 

******* 

A  Supreme  Council  is  instituted,  consisting  of  two  Chambers  equal  in  au- 
thority, of  which  one  is  representative  of  the  whole  population,  and  the  other 
represents  the  various  nationalities  of  the  Soviet  Union ;  the  first  is  elected  on 
the  principle  of  universal,  direct,  equal,  and  secret  suffrage ;  the  second  by  the 
national  assemblies  of  the  federal  republics  respectively   (p.  503). 

******* 

All  judges  are  appointed  for  five  years  by  the  Supreme  Council,  except  those 
of  the  People's  Courts,  who  are  elected.  The  judges  are  declared  to  be  "inde- 
pendent, and  subject  only  to  the  law,"  and  the  law  officers  are  authorised  to 
enforce  their  decisions,  with  authority  in  this  respect  over  administrative  offi- 
cials. 

Every  citizen  has  the  right  to  work,  to  holiday  with  pay,  to  social  service  such 
as  free  medical  help,  and  to  free  education.  In  striking  identity  with  the  claims 
of  the  Liberal  movement  of  1905  are  laid  down  the  principles  of  freedom  of 
conscience,  speech,  press,  meeting,  and  association.  The  place  reserved  to  the 
Communist  Party  is  that  of  an  association  which  acts  as  a  leading  nucleus  or 
vanguard  on  all  sides  of  public  endeavour. 

Arrests  are  to  be  made  only  on  the  authority  of  the  law  courts,  and  the  draft 
even  declares  inviolability  of  dwelling  and  of  correspondence  (p.  503). 

******* 

All  citizens,  male  or  female,  over  eighteen  have  the  vote,  or  can  be  elected, 
"independently  of  race,  creed,  education,  place  of  dwelling,  social  origin,  property 
status,  or  past  activity."  Candidates  are  put  forward  by  any  association,  such 
as  the  Communist  Party,  trade  unions,  co-operatives,  youth  organisations  or 
cultural  societies.  Deputies  are  responsible  to  their  constituents  and  can  be 
recalled.  Changes  in  the  constitution  require  a  majority  of  two-thirds  in  both 
Chambers. 

The  enunciation  of  these  principles  is  one  of  the  greatest  landmarks  since 
the  accession  of  the  Communists  to  power  (pp.  503,  504). 


Exhibit  No.  4  (b) 

Excerpts  From  USSR,  a  Concise  Handbook,  Edited  by  Ernest  J.   Simmons 
*  *  *  *  *  *  * 

*  *  *  After  prolonged  public  discussion  a  new  federal  constitution  was  adopted 
by  the  Eighth  Soviet  Congress,  December  5,  1936  (p.  160). 

******* 

*  *  *  This  fundamental  law  of  13  chapters  and  147  articles  abolished  all  class 
discriminations  in  suffrage  and  all  forms  of  indirect  and  occupational  representa- 
tion. It  provided  for  "universal,  direct  and  equal  suffrage  by  secret  ballot"  for 
all  elections  to  all  Soviet  bodies,  Union,  republican,  and  local  (p.  160). 

******* 

Similarly  the  practice  of  making  all  votes  unanimous  in  Soviet  legislative 
bodies  does  not  mean  that  all  the  lawmakers  are  mere  rubber  stamps.  In  enact- 
ing laws,  as  in  electing  legislators,  long  and  earnest  debate  enables  the  party 
leaders  to  ascertain  popular  preferences,  even  though  these  may  not  always 
be  followed.  In  the  final  action,  which  records  a  decision  already  reached  in- 
formally, unanimity  is  the  rule.  These  devices  are  widely  at  variance  with 
Anglo-American  notions  of  democratic  government.  In  the  USSR  the  forms 
of  democracy  are  thrown  over  the  persisting  and  unmistakable  substance  of 
dictatorsship  by  the  CPSU  ( B ) .  Yet  the  forms  represent  a  living  ideal,  and  the 
substance  may  be  regarded  not  unreasonably  as  a  prelude  to  government  by 
consent  of  the  governed  rather  than  its  negation.  In  a  peaceful  world  the 
Soviet  leaders  may  well  be  less  concerned  with  painting  a  portrait  of  complete 


COMMUNIST    INFILTRATION    LN    THE    ARMY  79 

unity  for  the  benefit  of  foreign  and  domestic  opinion  and  may  be  expected  to  let 
the  winds  of  public  controversy  bring  better  ventilation  to  the  house  that  Lenin 
built. 

*  *  *  An  impressive  Bill  of  Rights  is  included  in  the  1936  Constitution.  In 
the  Marxist  dispensation  economic  security  and  opportunity  are  valued  more 
highly  than  abstract  political  privileges  (pp.  162,  163). 

******* 
Personal  and  political  rights  include  complete  equality  of  sexes,  races,  and 
nationalities,  with  punishment  provided  (Article  123)  for  "any  advocacy  of  racial 
or  national  exclusiveness  or  hatred  and  contempt."  These  rights  are  secure, 
for  nowhere  in  the  world  is  there  a  closer  approach  to  the  ideal  of  equality  and 
brotherhood  among  peoples  of  all  colors,  languages,  and  nationalities  than  in 
the  USSR.  The  customary  civil  rights  of  freedom  of  religion,  speech,  press, 
assembly,  asociation,  and  inviolability  of  persons  and  homes  are  also  guar- 
anteed (p.  163). 

******* 
A  unique  feature  of  the  Soviet  state  is  the  realization  of  the  social  rights 
enumerated  in  Articles  118-121  of  the  constitution;  full  employment  and  pay- 
ment for  work  by  quality  and  quantity ;  rest  and  leisure  through  the  seven-hour 
day,  annual  vacations  with  pay,  sanatoria,  rest-homes,  and  clubs ;  maintenance 
in  old  age,  sickness  and  disability  through  social  insurance,  and  free  medical 
service  to  all ;  and  free  public  education.  The  economic  and  social  organization 
of  the  USSR  is  such  that  these  rights,  some  of  which  are  merely  ideals  else- 
where, are  concrete  realities  for  all  Soviet  Union  citizens,  at  least  in  peacetime. 
They  represent  the  great  human  gains  of  the  revolution.  Whether  they  have 
been  worth  the  cost  in  initial  suffering,  and  in  the  relative  absence  of  political 
and  intellectual  freedom,  outsiders  may  debate.  The  Soviet  people  have  shown 
in  mortal  combat  with  merciless  foes  that  they  deem  no  sacrifice  too  great  to 
preserve  what  they  have  won  and  to  carry  socialism  forward  to  a  fuller  and 
richer  life  (p.  164). 

******* 

*  *  *  In  any  event,  a  new  civilization  has  come  into  being,  based  upon  the 
conscious  and  rational  direction  of  human  destinies  by  intelligence  and  will 

(p.  164). 

(The  above  excerpts  are  taken  from  Chapter  V,  Government  and  Politics, 
by  Frederick  L.  Schuman.) 

******* 

Soviet  legal  theorists  believed  that  only  through  a  strong  state  in  complete 
control  of  the  proletariat  would  it  be  possible  to  achieve  socialism,  with  promise 
of  economic  democracy.  They  demanded  a  dictatorship  of  the  proletariat,  at 
least  during  the  period  of  transition  to  a  socialist  economy,  as  a  base  upon  which 
to  build  political  democracy.  They  centered  their  attack  upon  private  ownership 
of  the  means  of  production — land,  factories,  forests,  mines,  livestock,  and  the 
means  of  communication  and  trade — as  the  source  of  power  of  the  bourgeoisie 
against  whom  they  had  fought  their  revolution.  Guided  in  their  thinking  by 
Nikolai  Lenin's  State  and  Revolution,  written  just  before  the  revolution,  they 
drafted  the  laws  to  place  ownership  of  these  sources  of  power  in  the  proletarian 
state.  They  also  drafted  strict  laws  to  protect  this  power,  once  it  was  achieved 
(pp.  167,  16»). 

******* 

Trials  are  public  unless  they  concern  sex  offenses  or  matters  of  diplomatic  or 
military  concern.     The  accused  has  the  right  of  counsel  (p.  178). 

(The' above  is  taken  from  Chapter  VI,  "Jurisprudence"'  by  John  N.  Hazard.) 
******* 

In  order  to  state  the  fundamental  aims  and  objectives  of  the  Soviet  education, 
we  must  refer  to  the  basic  philosophy,  especially  the  ethical  and  social  principles, 
called  socialist  humanism,  to  which  it  is  committed.  These  may  be  found  in  the 
writings  of  Nikolai  Lenin,  Karl  Marx,  Friedrich  Engels,  Joseph  Stalin,  Maxim 
Gorky,  and  others,  and  in  the  laws,  policies,  and  practices  actually  operative  in 
the  country  at  large.  The  ideals  which  dominate  the  educational  process  in  the 
Soviet  Union,  taken  in  terms  of  their  content  as  standards  of  individual  behavior 
and  character,  are  essentially  the  generally  accepted  standards  of  the  ethical 
traditions  of  Western  civilization.  It  is  well  to  note  that  the  materialist  em- 
phasis in  Soviet  ethics  *  *  *  does  not  involve  a  rejection  of  ethical  values  like 


80  COMMUNIST    INFILTRATION    IN    THE    ARMY 

unselfishness,  charity,  brotherly  love,  peace,  honesty,  truthfulness,  and  the  other 
basic  precepts  expressed,  for  instance,  in  the  Bible.  Like  many  other  naturalistic 
ethical  philosophies,  socialist  humanism,  while  advocating  these  ethical  stand- 
ards, regards  them  as  man-made,  and  as  mandatory  by  virtue  of  their  demon- 
strable value  in  the  light  of  human  reason  rather  than  as  divinely  ordained. 
Thus,  the  concept  of  a  future  life  with  rewards  and  punishments  is  rejected. 
The  Soviet  viewpoint  is  that  people  generally  can  be  educated  to  see  the  necessity 
of  conforming  to  such  moral  standards  on  the  basis  of  their  human  values  in  this 
world,  without  invoking  the  hope  of  reward  or  the  threat  of  punishment  in  a  life 
after  death. 

Socialist  humanism  manifests  an  immense  confidence  in  human  nature,  an 
unbonded  faith  in  the  possibilities  of  development  of  human  beings,  if  given 
proper  educational  environment.  There  is  no  concept  of  an  elite,  or  of  the  inherent 
inferiority  or  superiority  of  groups  or  races.  Hence,  in  the  Soviet  Union  it 
is  an  offense  punishable  under  the  criminal  code  to  exercise  any  kind  of  arbitrary 
discrimination,  segregation,  quota,  or  disqualification  based  on  race,  color,  or 
sex  in  regard  to  educational,  economic,  professional,  residential,  or  other  oppor- 
tunities. The  operating  premise  is  that  all  people  are  worth  educating.  Hence, 
peacetime  education  has  not  only  been  free  of  charge  to  every  level  throughout 
the  country,  but  stipends  have  provided  living  expenses  for  most  students  beyond 
the  secondary  level.  *  *  * 

The  ideals  of  life  taught  by  socialist  humanism  are  connected  in  more  than 
one  sense  with  education.  They  not  only  supply  goals  for  education ;  education 
itself  is  one  of  the  chief  goals.  Central  in  these  ideals  are  intellectual  develop- 
ment and  cultivation  of  the  emotions,  knowledge  of  and  participation  in  the  arts 
and  the  sciences.  This  emphasis  is  evident  from  the  earliest  days  (pp.  321,  322). 
******* 

A  distinguishing  characteristic  of  socialist  humanism  is  its  high  degree  of 
articulation  with  social  institution — its  emphasis  on  the  close  relation  between 
ethical  theory  and  social  practice.  The  position  taken  is  that  an  indispensable 
requisite  in  the  ethical  improvement  of  the  great  majority  of  people  is  to  set  up 
on  a  large  social  scale  those  economic  and  cultural  arrangements  through  which 
the  opportunities,  resources,  and  facilities  for  leading  the  higher  cultured  and 
enlightened  life  will  actually  be  available  to  them.  Soviet  thinkers  hold  the  view 
that  any  realistic  ethical  program  must  involve  the  construction  of  a  type  of 
society  which  can  guarantee  economic  security  at  the  level  of  qualifications,  and 
offer  complete  education  and  health  care  entirely  free  of  economic,  race,  or  sex 
barriers.  This  is  the  operational  meaning  of  socialism  in  terms  of  the  interplay 
of  educational  ideals  and  social  practice  in  the  Soviet  Union  (p.  323). 

(The  above  excerpts  are  taken  from  Chapter  XVII,  "Education  System,"  by 
John  Somerville.) 

******* 

By  this  time  Stalin's  bid  for  the  cooperation  of  the  Western  democracies 
against  the  threat  of  German  invasion  reduced  the  antireligious  laws  more  and 
more  to  a  dead  letter.  The  war  itself,  with  the  alliance  of  the  United  Nations 
against  Hitler,  completed  the  process.  Substantial  alleviations  for  religion  fol- 
lowed fast  on  each  other.  Priests  received  the  franchise ;  icons  could  again  be 
produced  and  sold ;  the  great  church  feasts  became  national  rest  days ;  Sunday 
was  restored ;  and  the  "godless"  magazine  was  suspended.  Following  the  dis- 
solution of  the  Comintern  on  May  22,  1943,  the  patriarchate,  which  had  been 
suspended  since  the  death  of  Tikhon  in  April  1925,  was  restored  with  the  concur- 
rence of  Stalin  on  September  4,  1943,  and  training  colleges  for  priests  were  again 
established  in  Russia  (p.  343). 

(The  above  excerpt  was  taken  from  Chapter  XVIII,  "Religion  Under  the  Czars 
and  the  Soviets,"  by  Sir  Bernard  Pares.) 


INDEX 


Page 

Advent  of  Socialist  Man  (book) 35 

American  Civil  Liberties  Union 11 

American  Civil  War *4 

American  Zone  of  Germany -0 

Army  Intelligence 21,  24,  27,  37 

Anderson,  P.  B 44 

Bogolepov,  Igor 19,  29,  3o 

Testimony  of 20-27 

Bolshevik 45,  54,  58,  61 

Borough  of  Manhattan 3 

Bratton,  Col.  R.  S 40,  46 

Browder,  Earl 28 

Budenz,  Louis 5,  6,  19,  26 

Testimony  of 28-30,  33-38 

Central  Russian  Government 46 

Chekov -. 58 

Comintern 80 

Communist  Party 6-9, 

14,  15,  17,  18,  22,  28-34,  40-42,  46,  48,  53,  56,  57,  67,  70,  71 

Congress  of  the  United  States 4 

Congressional  Record 37 

CPSU 78 

Czarist  Russia    (book) 25 

Daily  Compass , 11,  12 

Daily  Worker 10-14,  34 

Daliin,  David  J 36,39,44 

Dewey,  Mr 14 

Douglas,   Justice 3 

Eighth  Soviet  Congress 78 

Engels,  Friedrich 79 

Far  East  Command  (Military  Intelligence  Section) 44 

FEAF  Wringer  Reports 44 

FEC 45 

Fischer,   Louis 37 

Five-year  plan 57 

Fordham  University 28 

Foster 35 

Friends  of  Soviet  Russia 29 

Gelfan,  Harriet  Moore 15,  16,  29 

Testimony  of 30-33 

General  Staff  School 21 

German  Foreign  Office 20 

Gorky,   Maxim 79 

Government  and  Politics  (book) 79 

Harcourt,   Brace 5 

Harper,   S.  N 44 

Hathaway,   Clarence 7 

Hazard,  John  N 16,17,79 

History  of  Russia  (book) 26,44 

Hitler 80 

Hopkins,   Harry 20 

Institute  of  Pacific  Relations 21,  29 

Jerome,  V.  J 29 

Jones  v.  Securities  and  Exchange  Commission 4 

Jurisprudence  (book) 79 

81 


82  INDEX 

Pago 

Kazekavich,  Vladimir 16 

Kent,  Rockwell 28 

Kerensky 46 

Kirov 54 

Korean  war 75 

Kournakoff,    Sergie 17,  84 

Kremlin 72 

Lament,  Corliss 27-29,  38,  44 

Testimony  of — : 1-19 

Lattimore,   Owen 32,  33 

League  of  Nations i __!_' 20 

Lend-lease _ ?. LLj i — ii 62 

Lenin,    Nikolai 24,  25,  35,  36,  53,  67,  79 

Like,  Irvin _■ ■_^___: 1,  3 

Litvinov isfij 22 

Marx,  Carl ,__  25,  53,  79 

Mavnard,  J : Li 44 

MGB 52,  66 

MGR___ ___:.— 47 

Molotov _— —  22,  62,  67,  78 

Moore,   Harriet   L , ^__, 15,16,29 

Testimony  of - 36-33 

MVD______ 47,  50,  55,  66,  67,  72 

National  Council  of  American-Soviet  Friendship , ! 29 

NATO :— - - UUUajfJJtilJUUee 63 

Nazis «:         41 

New  York  Times 11 

NKVD :UlL'tlL-ii,UU         47 

O'Connor—l ___— I 15,16 

October  Revolution  (1917) ____■_ 46 

OGPU ^___— _J_____         47 

Pares,  Bernard — — 26,  27,  29,  34,  44,  77,  80 

Partridge,    General — , tlj 43 

Patriotic  War    (Russia) . . 72 

Peoples  of  the  Soviet  Union,  1946  (book) Jjo  5,28,44 

Petrov,  Vladimiri,  testimony  of , . . . 38-43 

Psychological  and  Cultural  Traits  of  Soviet  Siberia  (book) 5,21,23,39 

Rautenstrauch,  Dr.  Walter 28 

Red   Army_ :,.__ 20,  60 

Regensberg   Military    School :__^. 26 

Rein,  David £U±iI_': :______: 30 

Religion  Under  the  Czars  and  the  Soviet  (book) •_!__ 80 

Roosevelt,   President 20 

Russia  in  Flux   (book) •_______         44 

Russian  Civil  War  (1918-20) ! 74 

Russian  Foreign  Office  (Press  Division) __; 23 

Russian  Foreign  Service 20 

SCAP 45 

Schuman,  Frederick  L 16,  79 

Secretary  of  the  Army : 43 

Senate  Internal  Security  Committee !l 21 

Seton    Hall = 28 

Short  Story  of  the  Soviet  Communist  Party  in  the  Soviet  Union  (book) 25 

Sigerist,    Henry _ ^_____ ._ 17 

Simmons,  Ernest  J 4,  8,  15,  23,  27,  29,  44,  78 

Smith   Act = 11 

Somerville,    John 80 

Soviet  Foreign  Office 22,  23 

Soviet  Government 9,  22,  24,  38-40,  44,  45,  50,  61,  62,  65,  73,  74,  79,  80 

Soviet  Russia  Today  (book) 13,  14,  29 

Stachel,   Jack :___J____        29 

Stalin,  Joseph 24,  25,  35,  36,  53,  54,  56,  60,  62,  64,  67,  72,  79,  80 

Stevens 21,  34 

Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States i 3,  4,  11' 

Sutherland,  Justice : 4 

Thompson,    R 44 


INDEX  SO 

Page 

Hkhon 80 

rolstoi 58 

rowster,  J 44 

frotsky 61 

(Truman,  President  Harry 10,  62 

Dwilight  of  World  Capitalism  (book) 35 

Jnited  Nations 44,  64,  75 

-rtited  States  Air  Force  (USAF) 45 

fitted  States  Army 14,  15,  21,  24,  26,  30,  33-35,  48 

'  jited  States  Constitution 3 

'  lited  States  Government 8,  9, 15,  20,  31 

died  States  v.  Runiely 3 

S.  S.  R.,  a  Concise  Handbook 4,  8,  23,  27,  44 

ard,  Dr.  Harry  F 28 

ilson,  Major 25,  26 

lttenberg,  Philip 1-3,  4-19 

orld  War  II 20,  22,  50,  62,  64,  68,  73,  75 

•  orld  War  III 75 

ilta 20 

mug  Communists   (Komsomols) 48,  71 

mngstown  Sheet  and  Tube  Co.  v.  Saivyer 4 

o 


COMMUNIST  INFILTRATION  IN  THE  ARMY 


HEARING 

BEFORE  THE 

PERMANENT  SUBCOMMITTEE  ON 
INVESTIGATIONS  OF  THE  COMMITTEE  ON 

GOVERNMENT  OPERATIONS 
UNITED  STATES  SENATE 

EIGHTY-THIRD  CONGRESS 

FIRST  SESSION 
PURSUANT  TO 

S.  Res.  40 


PART  2 


SEPTEMBER  21,  1953 


Printed  for  the  use  of  the  Committee  on  Government  Operations 


UNITED   STATES 
GOVERNMENT  PRINTING  OFFICE 
38794  WASHINGTON  :   1954 


V 


Poston  Public  Library 
Superintendent  of  Documents 

FEB  2  3  1954 


COMMITTEE  ON  GOVERNMENT  OPERATIONS 

JOSEPH  R.  MCCARTHY,  Wisconsin,  Chairman 
KARL  E.  MUNDT,  South  Dakota  JOHN  L.  McCLELLAN,  Arkansas 

MARGARET  CHASE  SMITH,  Maine  HUBERT  H.  HUMPHREY,  Minnesota 

HENRY  C.  DWORSHAK,  Idaho  HENRY  M.  JACKSON,  Washington 

EVERETT  MCKINLEY  DIRKSEN,  Illinois       JOHN  F.  KENNEDY,  Massachusetts 
JOHN  MARSHALL  BUTLER,  Maryland  STUART  SYMINGTON,  Missouri 

CHARLES  E.  POTTER,  Michigan  ALTON  A.  LENNON,  North  Carolina 

Francis  D.  Flanagan,  Chief  Counsel 
Walter  L.  Reynolds,  Chief  Clerk 


Permanent  Subcommittee  on  Investigations 

JOSEPH  R.  MCCARTHY,  Wisconsin,  Chairman 

KARL  E.  MUNDT,  South  Dakota 
EVERETT  MCKINLEY  DIRKSEN,  Illinois 
CHARLES  E.  POTTER,  Michigan 
Roy  M.  Cohn,  Chief  Counsel 
Francis  P.  Carr,  Executive  Director 

II 


CONTENTS 


Testimony  of —  Page 

McKee,  Samuel,  civilian  consultant  to  Assistant  Chief  of  Staff,  G-2 —        91 
Partridge,  Gen.  Richard  C,  G-2,  United  States  Army 85 


in 


(On  September  21,  1953,  the  Senate  Permanent  Subcommittee  on 
Investigations  held  hearings  in  executive  session  on  Communist  in- 
filtration in  the  Army.  The  testimony  of  Gen.  Richard  C.  Partridge, 
G-2,  United  States  Army,  and  Samuel  McKee,  civilian  consultant  to 
Assistant  Chief  of  Staff,  G-2,  was  made  public  by  the  members  of  the 
subcommittee  and  follows  below :) 

COMMUNIST  INFILTKATION  IN  THE  AEMY 


SEPTEMBER   21,    1953 

United  States  Senate, 
Permanent  Subcommittee  on  Investigations  or  the 

Committee  on  Government  Operations, 

Washington,  D.  C. 

The  subcommittee  met  (pursuant  to  S.  Res.  40,  agreed  to  January 
30,  1953)  at  10:30  a.  m.,  room  155,  Senate  Office  Building,  Senator 
Joseph  R.  McCarthy  presiding. 

Present:  Senator  Joseph  R.  McCarthy,  Republican,  Wisconsin. 

Present  also:  Francis  P.  Carr,  executive  director;  Roy  M.  Cohn, 
chief  counsel ;  Donald  A.  Surine,  assistant  counsel ;  Ruth  Young  Watt, 
chief  clerk;  John  Gomien,  administrative  assistant,  Senator  Dirksen; 
David  Keyser,  administrative  assistant,  Congressman  Kersten. 

TESTIMONY  OF  GEN.  RICHARD  C.  PARTRIDGE,  G-2,  UNITED  STATES 

ARMY 

The  Chairman.  Will  you  raise  your  right  hand,  please  ? 

In  the  matter  now  in  hearing  before  this  committee  do  you  solemnly 
swear  that  the  testimony  you  are  about  to  give  will  be  the  truth,  the 
whole  truth  and  nothing  but  the  truth,  so  help  you  God  ? 

General  Partridge.  I  do. 

Mr.  Cohn.  Could  we  get  your  full  name  for  the  record? 

General  Partridge.  Richard  C.  Partridge.     P-a-r-t-r-i-d-g-e. 

Mr.  Cohn.  And  your  function  at  the  present  moment  ? 

General  Partridge.  G-2  of  the  Army. 

Mr.  Cohn.  Commanding  G-2? 

General  Partridge.  Yes,  I  am. 

Mr.  Cohn.  General,  I  don't  think  we  have  to  waste  much  time  on 
preliminaries.  You  have  heard  the  testimony.  What  the  committee 
is  particularly  interested  in  is  the  origin  of  this  report.  Why  was  it 
issued  ?  Why  used  ?  Are  any  of  them  still  around  still  being  used  ? 
I  wonder  if  you  would  care  to  comment. 

General  Partridge.  I'd  like  to  very  much.  The  document  was 
written  in  the  Far  East  and  as  indicated  by  the  date  that  it  was  put 
out,  very  late  in  1951.  The  purpose  of  the  document  was  to  make  a 
study  of,  as  objective  as  possible,  of  the  feeling  of  the  people  inside 
of  Soviet  Siberia  toward  their  government  and  toward  the  whole 
Communist  regime,  the  whole  setup,  with  a  view  to  having  available 
information  for  intelligence  officers  both  in  FECOM  and  psychologi- 
cal warfare  officers  and  any  commanders  who  might  get  concerned 

85 


86  COMMUNIST    INFILTRATION   IN    THE    ARMY 

directly  with  any  occupation  or  other  duties  connected  with  the  people 
of  Russia,  to  give  them  some  picture  of  what  the  Russian  himself  felt 
and  not  very  distinctly,  not  to  give  him  the  idea  of  the  Communist 
government  and  the  situation  in  Russia  as  seen  from  the  United  States. 
I  can  quote  from  the  pamphlet  if  you  wish  to  substantiate  the  purpose 
of  it,  but  that  was  what  it  was. 

The  Chairman.  You  say  that  was  the  purpose.  Do  you  think  that 
would  tend  to  accomplish  that  ? 

General  Partridge.  Yes,  sir.     I  do. 

The  Chairman.  Do  you  approve  of  the  pamphlet  ? 

General  Partridge.  I  don't  approve  of  everything  but  I  think  it  is 
an  honest  attempt  to  do  what  it  says  it  is  trying  to  do. 

The  Chairman.  Do  you  think  it  is  an  honest  attempt  to  give  Ameri- 
can officers  an  accurate  picture  ? 

General  Partridge.  I  believe  it  was. 

The  Chairman.  Do  you  know  that  this  quotes  directly  verbatim 
Stalin's  book  in  describing  the  workings  of  communism? 

General  Partridge.  That  has  been  stated. 

The  Chairman.  Without  attributing  it  to  Stalin  ? 

General  Partridge.  That  has  been  stated,  I  believe. 

The  Chairman.  You  come  here  and  say  it  is  a  good,  honest  attempt. 
I  wonder  how  much  you  know  about  the  book.  Do  you  know  that  this 
book  quotes  verbatim  from  Joe  Stalin,  without  attributing  it  to  him,  as 
a  stamp  of  approval  of  the  United  States  Army  ?  Are  you  aware  of 
that? 

General  Partridge.  I  don't  know  that  it  quotes  from  Joe  Stalin 
or  not. 

The  Chairman.  Don't  you  think  before  you  testify  you  should  take 
time  to  conduct  some  research  to  find  out  whether  it  quotes  Joe  Stalin 
and  other  notorious  Communists?  Don't  you  think  you  are  incom- 
petent to  testify  before  you  know  that  ? 

General  Partridge.  No,  sir. 

The  Chairman.  I  don't  want  someone  here  who  knows  nothing  about 
this  document,  just  giving  us  conversation. 

General  Partridge.  I  think  I  do  know  something. 

The  Chairman.  If  you  were  to  learn  that  the  book  quotes  from  Mr. 
Simmons,  without  showing  what  part  is  from  the  works  of  Mr.  Sim- 
mons ;  that  Mr.  Simmons  wrote  work  under  direct  instructions  of  the 
Soviet  Embassy  in  Moscow,  would  you  still  say  it  is  an  honest  attempt 
to  give  an  accurate  picture  of  life  in  Communist  Russia? 

General  Partridge.  It  would  all  depend  on  what  was  said.  It  seems 
to  me  that  the  author  of  a  pamphlet  looks  into  what  is  said  about  the 
subject,  any  books  he  can  get  on  Russia  and  then  tries  to  distill  this  in 
what  he  thought  was  the  net  result  of  all  sources  he  could  use.  May 
I  bring  up  the  other  sources  ? 

The  Chairman.  I  know  it  lists  a  few  anti- Communist  sources  here, 
but  the  question  is — you  quote  from  a  man  like  Pares,  who  has  been 
identified  as  a  Communist,  quote  him  in  detail ;  Lamont,  a  notorious 
apologist  for  communism,  a  man  who  never  had  an  opportunity  to 
study  Russian  people  except  information  gotten  through  embassies ;  a 
man  like  Simmons;  a  woman  like  Mrs.  Harriet  Moore,  identified  as  a 
Soviet  agent.  You  quote  them  throughout  the  book  without  showing 
that  you  are  quoting  and  the  man  reading  this  would  not  know  you 
are  quoting  notorious  Communists.    When  you  quote  Joe  Stalin  about 


COMMUNIST    INFILTRATION   IN   THE    ARMY  87 

the  glories  of  communism,  if  the  officer  knew  you  were  quoting  Stalin, 
he  could  take  it  with  a  grain  of  salt,  but  he  doesn't  know  that. 

Did  you  know  that  those  were  the  sources  used  when  you  came  down 
here  to  testify? 

General  Partridge.  I  know  only  that  the  sources  listed  here  were 
used. 

The  Chairman.  Do  you  know  the  extent  Joe  Stalin  was  quoted  ? 

General  Partridge.  No,  sir.    I  do  not. 

The  Chairman.  Do  you  know  that  he  is  quoted  verbatim  ? 

General  Partridge.  No,  sir,  I  do  not. 

The  Chairman.  That  Harriet  Moore  is  quoted  verbatim  from  the 
Simmons  book  ?     Do  you  know  who  Harriet  Moore  is,  General  % 

General  Partridge.  Only  in  a  general  way. 

The  Chairman.  You  only  know  Harriet  Moore  in  a  general  way 
and  you  are  head  of  G-2  ? 

General  Partridge.  Yes. 

The  Chairman.  You  can't  mean  that  ? 

General  Partridge.  I  do  mean  it,  sir. 

The  Chairman.  You  are  the  head  of  G-2  ? 

General  Partridge.  Yes,  sir. 

The  Chairman.  One  of  your  tasks,  of  course,  is  to  dig  out  and  ex- 
pose Communist  influences.     That  is  correct ;  isn't  it? 

General  Partridge.  That  is  correct. 

The  Chairman.  To  make  sure  Communist  agents  will  not  be  used 
by  our  enemy  to  infiltrate  our  forces.  In  other  words,  to  keep  Com- 
munists from  infiltrating  into  the  United  States  forces.  Isn't  that 
right? 

General  Partridge.  That  is  correct,  sir. 

The  Chairman.  And  you  say  you  only  know  Harriet  Moore  in  a 
general  way  ? 

General  Partridge.  I  know  very  little  except  that  she  contributed 
to  the  books  we  have  been  discussing,  The  U.  S.  R.  R.  Concise  History. 

The  Chairman.  Did  you  know  that  before  you  came  into  this  room? 

General  Partridge.  No,  sir. 

The  Chairman.  What  did  you  know  about  her  before  you  came 
into  this  room  ? 

General  Partridge.  Nothing. 

The  Chairman.  Nothing  at  all  ? 

General  Partridge.  No. 

The  Chairman.  Did  you  know  who  Simmons  was  when  you  looked 
at  the  bibliography  ? 

General  Partridge.  No,  sir. 

The  Chairman.  Before  you  came  and  told  us  it  was  an  honest  at- 
tempt to  properly  indoctrinate 

General  Partridge.  May  I  make  a  point?  This  is  not  a  book  to 
indoctrinate  anybody.  This  is  a  book  written  for  study  by  intelli- 
gence officers,  who  themselves  are  in  this  business.  It  is  not  an  indoc- 
trination pamphlet. 

The  Chairman.  Maybe  we  don't  have  the  same  understanding  of 
"indoctrinate."  The  book  is  for  the  purpose  of  giving  your  intelli- 
gence officers  a  truthful  picture  of  Communist  Russia.  That  is  cor- 
rect; isn't  it?     It  isn't  for  the  purpose  of  lying. 

General  Partridge.  That  is  right.  It  is  for  the  purpose  of  giving 
as  good  a  picture  as  we  can  of  what  the  psychological  situation  is. 


88  COMMUNIST    INFILTRATION    IN    THE    ARMY 

The  Chairman.  When  I  talk  about  indoctrination,  that  is  what  I 
mean.  I  mean  works  you  are  putting  out  giving  your  people  a  pic- 
ture of  the  situation,  conditions.  What  definition  do  you  have  of 
indoctrination?     What  do  you  mean  by  indoctrinate? 

General  Partridge.  By  indoctrination — I  feel  indoctrination  means 
the  instruction  of  someone  who  has  not  or  is  not  familiar  with  some- 
thing, with  the  particular  opinion  of  that  held  by  the  indoctrinator. 

The  Chairman.  Do  you  think  that  quoting  with  approval  of  Stalin 
is  a  good  way  to  teach  your  intelligence  officers  what  communism  is 
like? 

General  Partridge.  Not  per  se,  sir,  if  that  is  the  whole  story  but  I 
don't  think  that  is  the  whole  story. 

The  Chairman.  Did  you  know  who  Mr.  B.  Pares  was  before  you 
came  into  this  room? 

General  Partridge.  No. 

The  Chairman.  Do  you  have  any  knowledge  of  him  now? 

General  Partridge.  What  I  have  heard  here  this  morning,  sir.  I 
had  heard  of  Corliss  Lamont  before. 

The  Chairman.  Do  you  have  a  staff  that  could  properly  inform 
you? 

General  Partridge.  Yes,  sir. 

The  Chairman.  Why  don't  you  have  them  inform  you  before  you 
come  down  here  ?  You  come  down  here  and  say  it  is  an  excellent  book. 
You  don't  know  that  Communists  were  used  and  quoted.  You  make 
the  Army  look  awfully  silly. 

General  Partridge.  I  didn't  say  it  was  an  excellent  book.  I  said 
I  thought  it  was  an  honest  attempt. 

The  Chairman.  You  think  it  is  an  honest  attempt? 

General  Partridge.  Yes,  sir,  I  do. 

The  Chairman.  When  you  use  Communists  and  Communist  writ- 
ings and  quote  them — do  you  think  they  are  for  America?  Do  you 
think  they  are  trying  to  put  the  Communist  system  in  the  true  light  ? 

General  Partridge.  I  think  the  author  of  this  book  put  the  Com- 
munist system 

The  Chairman.  Who  is  the  author  ? 

General  Partridge.  The  author  is  a  Major  Allen. 

Mr.  Cohn.  Donald  Allen? 

General  Partridge.  I  think  Robert  Emerson  Allen. 

The  Chairman.  Where  is  he  now  ? 

General  Partridge.  He  is  now  an  instructor,  an  ROTC  instructor 
at  the  University  of  Missouri  in  Columbia,  Mo. 

His  name  is  Donald  Emerson  Allen. 

The  Chairman.  What  is  his  background  ? 

General  Partridge.  I  have  it  here,  sir.  I  have  an  account  of  his 
military  service  here. 

Senator  Potter.  Is  he  an  intelligence  officer  ? 

General  Partridge.  He  has  been  several  times. 

Senator  Potter.  Who  assigned  him  the  job  of  writing  this  report? 
Did  that  come  from  G-2  ? 

General  Partridge.  No,  sir.  That  was  done  in  FECOM  by  his 
immediate  superiors  presumably.     I  don't  know  the  individual. 

Mr.  Cohn.  Are  you  sure  somebody  assigned  him  the  job  or  is  it  pos- 
sible that  he  volunteered  ? 


COMMUNIST   INFILTRATION    IN    THE    ARMY  89 

General  Partridge.  I  don't  believe  that  is  correct.  I  believe  lie  was 
told. 

The  Chairman.  Did  you  say  you  don't  believe.  What  is  the  basis 
for  that  belief? 

General  Partridge.  Because  I  have  asked  in  the  Far  East  Command 
how  it  originated.  I  have  made  some  effort  to  find  out  about  the 
origin.  I  have  asked  how  it  originated  and  have  been  told  by  FECOM 
Intelligence  that  he  was  told  to  write  it,  told  to  make  a  study  of  this 
subject. 

The  Chairman.  Who  told  you  this  ? 

General  Partridge.  G-2  of  FECOM. 

The  Chairman.  Who  in  G-2  ? 

General  Partridge.  Gen.  Riley  F.  Ennis. 

The  Chairman.  What  is  FECOM? 

General  Partridge.  Far  East  Command. 

Senator  Potter.  Who  distributed  it  after  he  wrote  the  pamphlet, 
the  booklet  ?  I  assume  orders  had  to  be  given  for  printing  by  the  local 
commander,  authorizing  the  printing,  or  did  that  have  to  be  O.  K.'d 
in  Washington  ? 

General  Partridge.  The  printing  was  O:  K.'d  in  FECOM  and  dis- 
tribution as  shown  on  page  3.  You  will  note  distribution  is  almost 
exclusively  to  intelligence  officers. 

Senator  Potter.  Is  that  a  common  practice — local  commanders  au- 
thorizing people  in  their  command  to  write  various  documents  without 
clearance  from  headquarters  ?  If  that  is  a  common  practice,  God  only 
knows  what  type  of  documents  we  might  receive.  It  seems  it  would 
be  difficult  to  maintain  certain  policy  unless  they  did  receive  the  O.  K. 
from  Washington. 

General  Partridge.  Well,  that,  sir,  would  depend  on  the  level  of 
the  headquarters  about  which  you  are  speaking.  Theater  head- 
quarters  

Senator  Potter.  Was  this  a  theater  commander  ? 

General  Partridge.  It  was  written  and  authorized  by  the  intelli- 
gence portion  of  the  Far  Eastern  Command,  which  is  the  theater. 

Senator  Potter.  And  you  have,  the  Department  of  Army  has  no 
control  over  the  publications  that  are  put  out  by  theater  commanders 
or  his  staff  ? 

General  Partridge.  We  certainly  have  the  general  policy  of  any 
theater — it  comes  from  Washington  but  we  don't  go  out  and  check 
every  publication  before  it  is  published. 

The  Chairman.  I  wish  you  would  give  Senator  Potter  the  extent 
of  your  checking.  You  set  up  a  three-man  committee  to  check  on  it. 
He  is  trying  to  find  out  from  you  now  the  truth  about  this  document. 
Why  don't  you  give  it  to  him?  Why  don't  you  tell  him  about  this 
three-man  committee,  who  was  on  it,  who  headed  it;  that  an  Army 
officer  objected  strenuously  to  this  material.  That  is  what  Senator 
Potter  is  trying  to  get  out  of  you.     Am  I  right,  Senator  ? 

Senator  Potter.  Yes. 

General  Partridge.  Well,  this  was  published  by  the  Far  Eastern 
Command  and  sent  back  here  on  the  date  indicated,  January  1952,  and 
it  aroused  some  criticism  here  and  we  had  a  committee  set  up  inside 
of  G-2,  in  my  own  production  division  here,  I  believe  the  date  was 
about  March  1952,  February  or  March,  to  examine  the  document  and 

38794— 54r—pt.  2 2 


90  COMMUNIST   INFILTRATION   LN    THE    ARMY 

decide  whether  steps  should  be  taken  about  it  or  whether  it  should 
be  left  alone. 

The  Chairman.  Were  you  at  G-2  then  ? 

General  Partridge.  No,  sir. 

The  Chairman.  Who  was? 

General  Partridge.  General  Boiling. 

Senator  Potter.  Was  the  three-man  board  one  of  the  officers  who 
objected  to  it  ?     You  say  one  of  the  officers  objected  to  it  ? 

General  Partridge.  No,  sir.  I  did  not  say  that.  I  don't  know 
about  the  officer  who  objected  to  it. 

Senator  Potter.  You  know  there  was  some  objection  to  the  issuance 
of  this  report? 

General  Partridge.  Some  of  the  people  who  read  the  report  thought 
it  was  a  poor  report  and  ought  to  be  gone  over  thoroughly,  examined 
to  see  if  it  should  be  left  in  circulation  or  not. 

Secretary  Stevens.  Tell  the  committee  who  was  on  the  review  com- 
mittee.    Let's  get  that  out. 

General  Partridge.  Mr.  McKee  was  the  chairman,  who  is  here.  He 
is  a  civilian.     Maj.  Samuel  C.  Wilson  and  a  Mr.  Henderson,  I  believe. 

Senator  Potter.  When  was  your  review  ?  Was  your  review  before 
the  document  was  distributed  or  afterward  ? 

General  Partridge.  No,  sir.     Afterward.     After  it  came  back  here. 

Senator  Potter.  Can  you  set  the  date  approximately  ? 

General  Partridge.  About  February  or  March  1952. 

The  Chairman.  Let's  get  this  if  we  may.  One  of  the  officers  in 
the  Far  East  Command,  when  he  saw  this  document,  objected  strenu- 
ously and  said  this  was  Communist  propaganda  pure  and  simple.  He 
pointed  out  the  bad  sources  immediately  to  G-2;  that  the  sources 
principally  used  were  Communists,  some  of  them  identified  as  espio- 
nage agents.  He  pointed  out  that  the  use  of  this  would  be  dangerous. 
He  pointed  out  also  that  you  were  dignifying  well-known  Communists 
by  quoting  them  as  sources  and  he  objected  about  as  strenuously  as 
anyone  could.  For  that  reason  a  board  was  convened  in  G-2,  the  head 
of  which  was  Mr.  McGee. 

General  Partridge.  Mr.  McKee.  You  are  not  quite  correct  in  some 
other  aspects.  Nobody  had  pointed  out  that  the  main  sources  of  this 
document  were  Communist  sympathizers.  That  really  isn't  true.  The 
main  sources  of  this  document  were  returned  Japanese  POW's. 

The  Chairman.  Do  you  know  that  to  be  a  fact  ? 

General  Partridge.  Yes,  sir. 

The  Chairman.  Have  you  read  this? 

General  Partrddge,  Yes,  sir.    More  than  once. 

The  Chairman.  And  you  approve  of  it? 

General  Partridge.  I  do  not  say  it  is  an  excellent  document.  I  say 
it  is  an  honest  attempt  to  deal  with  a  very  difficult  subject. 

The  Chairman.  As  a  general  in  G-2,  who  heads  Intelligence  in  the 
Army,  do  you  approve  of  this  ?  Do  you  think  it  should  be  withdrawn 
or  still  used? 

General  Partridge.  I  think  it  should  be  still  used  for  the  purpose  for 
which  it  was  written. 

The  Chairman.  Do  you  know  anything  about  Mr.  McKee's 
background  ? 

General  Partridge.  He  is  here. 


COMMUNIST    INFILTRATION    IN    THE    ARMY  91 

The  Chairman.  Do  you  know  anything  about  his  background  ? 

General  Partridge.  Yes,  sir. 

The  Chairman.  Before  you  appointed  him  head  of  this  board  did 
you  check  his  background? 

General  Partridge.  I  didn't  personally  but  I  am  sure  his  back- 
ground has  been  well  known  for  a  long  time.  He  was  an  employee  of 
G-2  several  years  before  I  came  here.  I  know  he  has  been  in  G-2  for 
at  least  5  years,  I  think  longer  than  that. 

The  Chairman.  Mr.  McKee,  will  you  come  up  beside  this  gentleman. 

TESTIMONY  OF  SAMUEL  McKEE,  CIVILIAN  CONSULTANT  TO 
ASSISTANT  CHIEF  OF  STAFF,  G-2 

The  Chairman.  Will  you  raise  your  right  hand? 

In  the  matter  now  in  hearing,  do  you  solemnly  swear  that  the  testi- 
mony you  are  about  to  give  shall  be  the  truth,  the  whole  truth,  and 
nothing  but  the  truth,  so  help  you  God  ? 

Mr.  McKee.  I  do. 

Senator  Potter.  General,  may  I  ask  you  a  few  questions  first  ? 

Senator  Potter.  What  function  does  G-2  have  in  regard  to  checking 
the  indoctrination  material  put  out  by  the  Army  ? 

General  Partridge.  I  didn't  understand,  sir. 

Senator  Potter.  What  function  does  G-2  have  in  respect  to  check- 
ing the  indoctrination  material  put  out  by  the  military  ?  I  mean  docu- 
ments and  publications.    Do  you  understand  the  question  ? 

General  Partridge.  Yes,  sir,  I  do. 

Any  book  which  is  put  out  by  the  Army  which  is  submitted  to  us 
for  check,  we  check  over  and  comment  upon. 

Senator  Potter.  Are  they  all  submitted  to  you  ? 

General  Partridge.  I  don't  believe  they  are,  sir. 

Senator  Potter.  Who  checks  indoctrination  material  % 

General  Partridge.  I  think  the  T.  I.  and  E.  people  do.  The  train- 
ing and  indoctrination  people. 

Senator  Potter.  You  mean  if  there  is  a  book  on  communism  put  out 
to  indoctrinate  our  troops,  G-2  does  not  check  that  ? 

General  Partridge.  I  can't  say,  sir,  whether  this  book  was  checked. 

Senator  Potter.  I  am  not  asking  about  this  book.  Do  you  know 
whether  it  is  your  function  to  check  indoctrination  courses  on  com- 
munism ?    You  certainly  should  know. 

The  Chairman.  If  you  don't  know,  tell  us.  Do  you  know  whether 
G-2  checks  the  indoctrination  courses  on  communism  put  out  to  the 
troops  ? 

General  Partridge.  I  don't  know. 

The  Chairman.  Could  you  find  out  for  us  ? 

General  Partridge.  Yes. 

The  Chairman.  I  wish  you  would. 

Do  you  think  books  with  authors  such  as  Simmons,  identified  as  a 
Communist  taking  instructions  from  the  Moscow  Embassy  when  he 
wrote  this,  carrying  articles  by  Corliss  Lamont,  Harriet  Moore,  Fred- 
rick Schuman,  do  you  think  that  type  of  book  should  be  used  to  in- 
doctrinate our  military  ? 

General  Partridge.  I  wouldn't  think  so. 


92  COMMUNIST    INFILTRATION   IN   THE    ARMY 

The  Chairman.  Do  you  think  it  should  be  withdrawn?  Do  you 
or  don't  you  ?  Do  you  think  a  book  like  that  should  be  withdrawn  or 
used  to  indoctrinate  our  military  ? 

General  Partridge.  I'd  want  to  read  the  book  first. 

The  Chairman.  Even  though  you  know  it  is  put  out  by  Communist 
authors  ? 

General  Partridge.  It  would  all  depend  on  what  they  say. 

The  Chairman.  You  don't  object  to  Communist  authors  unless  you 
first  see  what  they  say,  although  he  is  writing  books  under  the  in- 
structions of  the  Moscow  Embassy.    Is  that  correct  ? 

General  Partridge.  Certainly,  I  object  to  one  writing  a  book  under 
direction  of  Communist  Embassy.  Does  that  apply  to  the  book  you 
are  speaking  of  ? 

The  Chairman.  That  is  the  testimony. 

I  am  asking  you  a  simple  question.  You  are  a  man  who  doesn't 
recognize  well-known  Communists  like  Harriet  Moore.  Do  you  think 
you  are  competent  to  judge  when  you  don't  recognize  the  names  of 
notorious  Communists  ?  What  rule  of  thumb  would  you  use  ?  How 
would  you  decide  which  books  should  be  used  ?  You  tell  me  you,  your- 
self, don't  even  recognize  notorious  Communists  like  Harriet  Moore. 

Is  it  your  testimony  that  you  have  no  objection  to  works  of  Com- 
munist authors  per  se ;  before  you  reject  a  Communist  author's  work, 
before  you  order  it  withdrawn  from  our  indoctrination  courses  you 
want  to  read  the  book  first.    Is  that  correct? 

General  Partridge.  If  that  book  is  being  used  per  se  to  indoctrinate 
people  who  don't  know  anything  about  communism,  aren't  capable  of 
making  up  their  own  minds,  it  certainly  should  not  be  used.  If  that 
book  is  being  used  by  people  who  are  studying  communism,  I  think 
it  is  perfectly  all  right  to  use  it. 

The  Chairman.  You  say  people  who  know  nothing  about  com- 
munism. Let's  say  someone  who  knows  something  about  communism. 
You  send  a  man  from  G-2  to  a  sensitive  area  of  the  world.  You  give 
him  the  books  which  will  properly  help  him  to  recognize  the  true 
nature  of  communism.  In  that  case,  would  you  be  willing  to  give  him 
books  like  that  for  indoctrination,  for  teaching  purposes,  for  him  to 
read  and  consider,  to  teach  with? 

General  Partridge.  I  would  say  not  to  teach  by. 

The  Chairman.  Do  you  know  the  difference  between  a  man  study- 
ing communism  and  being  indoctrinated  in  communism  ? 

General  Partridge.  It  seems  to  me  there  is  a  difference. 

The  Chairman.  What  is  the  difference? 

General  Partridge.  A  man  who  is  studying  communism,  in  my 
opinion,  should  look  at  material  from  all  sides  of  the  question  and 
think  about  it,  distill  it  in  his  mind,  try  to  develop  his  knowledge  of 
it.  A  man  who  is  being  indoctrinated  or  indoctrinating,  somebody 
else  is  giving  him  a  line. 

The  Chairman.  General,  I  assume  we  will  both  agree  that  a  man 
who  is  going  to  fight  communism  should  study  the  works  of  Com- 
munist authors,  knowing  that  they  were  Communist  authors.  He 
should  read  Karl  Marx,  Lenin,  Engels.  That  is  one  thing.  I  think 
we  will  all  agree  that  any  intelligence  officer  worth  his  salt  should 
have  read  those  books  to  recognize  the  famous  Communists  and 
espionage  agents.  I  am  now  talking  about  something  entirely 
different. 


COMMUNIST    INFILTRATION    IN    THE    ARMY  93 

Do  you  think  Communist  authors  should  be  used  with  approval  of 
the  Army  to  indoctrinate — if  you  don't  like  the  word  "indoctrinate" — 
to  teach  people  representing  the  United  States  in  our  military  forces  % 

That  is  a  simple  question  I  think. 

General  Partridge.  To  me  that  seems  just  the  point.  The  biblio- 
graphy listed  the  list  of  books  the  author  of  this  pamphlet  under  dis- 
cussion at  sometime  or  other  had  read.  I  think  he  was  perfectly 
proper  in  reading  them  and  I  don't  know  to  what  extent  he  has 
quoted  from  them  in  this  pamphlet  or  whether  he  has  quoted  verbatim 
or  what  selection  he  made.  I  see  nothing  wrong  in  having  read  these 
books  or  having  listed  them  in  the  bibliography  of  the  books  he  had 
read  before  he  writes  this  pamphlet. 

The  Chairman.  Do  you  think  the  list  of  Communist  authors  as  a 
source  for  this  material  should  put  the  reader  on  notice  that  this  may  be 
the  Communist  side  of  the  picture.    Is  that  right  ? 

General  Partridge.  Not  necessarily ;  no  sir.  I  didn't  mean  it  that 
way. 

The  Chairman.  What  would  be  the  advantage  of  listing  these 
famous  Communists?  I  misunderstood  you.  What  is  the  advantage 
of  listing  them  ? 

General  Partridge.  Well,  it  indicates  that  he  has  read  these  books 
and  consequently  has  studied  the  subject  some.  The  main  source  for 
this  was  Japanese  POW's  repatriated. 

The  Chairman.  How  do  you  know  ?  You  say  you  don't  know  how 
much  came  from  Lamont. 

General  Partridge.  I  have  been  told  that. 

The  Chairman.  Who  told  you  ? 

General  Partridge.  G-2  of  the  Far  East  Command. 

The  Chairman.  Getting  back  to  the  question.  I  gathered  you  were 
pointing  out  the  advantage  of  listing  the  Communist  sources.  What 
was  the  advantage  of  that  ? 

General  Partridge.  I  didn't  know  I  pointed  out  the  advantage  of  it, 
sir. 

The  Chairman.  Well,  do  you  think  that  one  of  your  intelligence 
officers  reading  this  would  see  the  sources  were  Communist  and  that 
might  put  him  on  guard  ? 

General  Partridge.  It  might. 

The  Chairman.  Do  you  think  it  should  ? 

General  Partridge.  Yes ;  it  should  if  he  recognized  them. 

The  Chairman.  Is  he  competent  to  be  in  G-2  if  he  doesn't  ? 

General  Partridge.  Well,  I  recognize  one,  Corliss  Lamont.  I  don't 
know  all  the  others  but  I  recognize  one. 

The  Chairman.  If  you,  as  head  of  G-2  do  not  recognize  famous 
Communists,  can  you  expect  your  subordinates  to  ? 

General  Partridge.  Some  of  them  would  certainly  have  more  deal- 
ing with  that  than  I  do. 

Mr.  Cohn.  As  I  understand,  it  is  very  important  to  prevent  infiltra- 
tion of  Communists  and  to  indoctrinate  the  troops  concerning  com- 
munism and  Communist  methods  and  techniques.  Are  you  familiar 
with  Peter's  Manual  ? 

General  Partridge.  No  ;  I  am  not. 

Mr.  Cohn.  Do  you  know  what  that  is? 

General  Partruxje.  No. 


94  COMMUNIST    INFILTRATION    IN   THE    ARMY 

Mr.  Cohn.  Have  you  read  the  History  of  the  Communist  Party  of 
the  Soviet  Union  ? 

General  Partridge.  No  ;  there  are  many  books  I  haven't  read. 

Mr.  Cohn.  Have  you  read  State  and  Revolution  ? 

General  Partridge.  No. 

Mr.  Cohn.  Foundation  of  Leninism,  by  Stalin,  or  Toward  Soviet 
America,  by  William  Z.  Foster  ? 

General  Partridge.  No,  sir. 

Mr.  Cohn.  What  happened  concerning  the  Communist  Party  of 
the  United  States  in  June  of  1945  ? 

General  Partridge.  Well,  I  don't  know  what  happened  then.  I  was 
in  Europe. 

Mr.  Cohn.  What  is  meant  by  the  phrase  "Marxist-Leninism,"  as 
distinguished  from  Marxism? 

I  asked  you  this  to  test  your  knowledge  of  the  Communist  Party. 

General  Partridge.  I  don't  know  the  answer  to  that,  sir. 

Mr.  Cohn.  What  books  have  you  read  on  communism  to  equip  your- 
self to  be  head  of  G-2,  keeping  in  mind — I  assume  you  consider  inter- 
national communism  the  principal  threat  to  this  country. 

General  Partridge.  I  consider  Soviet  Russia  the  principal  threat. 

Mr.  Cohn.  Do  you  consider  international  communism  a  threat? 

General  Partridge.  Yes,  sir ;  I  do. 

Mr.  Cohn.  I  assume  as  head  of  G-2  you  have  made  some  study  of 
communism.  That  is  why  I  asked  you  these  questions.  We  don't 
expect  you  to  know  absolutely  everything  about  the  Communist  move- 
ment. We  do  expect  you  to  know  something  about  it.  I  would  like 
to  put  my  finger  on  what  you  know  about  communism.  You  don't 
know  Marxism  as  distinguished  from  Marxism-Leninism. 

General  Partridge.  No,  sir;  I  don't. 

Mr.  Cohn.  Can  you  tell  us  anything  that  happened  in  the  Commun- . 
ist  movement  in  this  country  in  the  middle  forties  ? 

General  Partridge.  Well,  I  wasn't  in  this  country  except  9  months 
in  1945.  I  haven't  studied  the  Communist  movement  in  this  country 
during  that  time.  I  was  very  busy  overseas  not  dealing  with  the 
Communist  Party  both  up  to  1945  and  again  from  1946  to  1949.  I 
was  extremely  busy  in  Europe  and  not  paying  much  attention  to  read- 
ing books  about  communism. 

The  Chairman.  May  I  say,  General,  I  realize  you  didn't  select 
your  job.  Most  likely  you  were  assigned  to  that.  I  have  been  in 
the  military  long  enough  to  see  excellent  truck  drivers  assigned  to 
a  job  in  the  Signal  Corps,  for  which  they  were  completely  unequipped, 
and  I  have  seen  outstanding  Signal  Corps  men  assigned  to  jobs  as 
truck  drivers.  It  is  no  reflection  upon  them  to  be  assigned  to  the 
wrong  job.  He  might  be  excellent  in  something  else,  but  the  thing 
I  can't  understand  today,  and  I  say  I  assume  you  didn't  apply  for 
this  job,  I  can't  understand  a  man  being  head  of  G-2,  when  Com- 
munist Russia  and  international  communism  constitutes  almost  the 
sole  threat  to  this  Nation,  not  having  studied  the  Communist  move- 
ment and  the  background  of  communism.  Again  I  say  I  am  not 
criticizing  you  for  that.  I  don't  know  what  job  you  were  taken  out 
of.  You  might  have  been  outstanding  in  the  job  you  were  in  and  I 
knew  nothing  about  you  until  I  saw  you  here  today. 

What,  if  any,  works  on  communism  have  you  read  or  studied  ? 


COMMUNIST    INFILTRATION    IN   THE    ARMY  95 

General  Partridge.  Well,  I  haven't  gone  out  and  read  works  on 
communism.  I  have  read  Whittaker  Chambers'  book  and  I  have 
read,  on  the  boat  coming  home  I  read  The  History  of  Kussia,  a  more 
general  history  rather  than  a  book  on  communism. 

The  Chairman.  Who  was  the  book  by  ? 

General  Partridge.  I  can't  remember. 

The  Chairman.  It  wasn't  the  Army  indoctrination  course  ? 

General  Partridge.  No,  sir ;  it  wasn't. 

The  Chairman.  Well,  you  had  a  good  history  on  Kussia  by  the 
Army.     Are  you  sure  that  wasn't  it  ? 

General  Partridge.  I  never  saw  that  one  until  today,  sir. 

Mr.  Cohn.  You  see  the  distinction  between  quoting  Stalin  and 
quoting  Stalin  in  quotations  marks  so  the  man  reading  it  knows  this 
is  coming  from  the  head  of  the  world  Communist  movement.  When 
you  use  what  Stalin  says  under  the  sponsorship  of  the  United  States 
Army,  that  is  certainly  a  dangerous  situation. 

Now,  Mr.  McKee,  could  we  get  your  name  for  the  record  ? 

Mr.  McKee.  Samuel  McKee,  Jr.    M-c-K-e-e. 

Mr.  Cohn.  "What  is  your  function  at  the  present  time  ? 

Mr.  McKee.  I  am  consultant  to  the  Assistant  Chief  of  Staff,  G-2, 
General  Partridge. 

Mr.  Cohn.  Did  you  have  any  responsibility  or  connection  with  the 
issuance  of  this  report  here? 

Mr.  McKee.  None  whatsoever. 

Mr.  Cohn.  For  its  continued  use  ? 

Mr.  McKee.  I  had  no  responsibility  for  its  continued  use. 

Mr.  Cohn.  Did  you  ever  see  this  report  or  hear  about  it  before  this 
committee  took  it  up  ? 

Mr.  McKee.  The  committee  which  I  was  on? 

Mr.  Cohn.  This  committee  ? 

Mr.  McKee.  Yes ;  I  first  saw  it  in  March  or  April  of  1952  when  a 
committee  was  formed  in  G-2  to  review  it  and  make  recommendations. 
I  was  designated  as  the  chairman  of  the  committee.  There  were 
other  members  also  designated. 

Mr.  Cohn.  Did  you  make  a  recommendation? 

Mr.  McKee.  We  did. 

Mr.  Cohn.  What  did  you  recommend  ? 

Mr.  McKee.  Our  recommendation,  you  have  asked  for  that  speci- 
fically, was  that  comments  and  the  paragraphs  which  had  preceded 
the  recommendation  be  communicated  to  G-2,  Far  Eastern  Command 
and  that  any  revisions  of  this  publication  or  any  future  publications 
along  similar  lines  be  coordinated  with  G-2,  Department  of  Army, 
before  issuance. 

Mr.  Cohn.  What  does  that  mean?  Did  they  continue  to  use  the 
book?     Was  your  recommendation  that  it  be  withdrawn  from  use? 

Mr.  McKee.  No,  sir. 

Mr.  Cohn.  You  made  the  recommendation  that  it  be  allowed  to 
be  continued  in  use  ? 

Mr.  McKee.  We  made  no  recommendation. 

Mr.  Cohn.  I  am  trying  to  find  out  the  purpose  for  the  determina- 
tion, whether  you  recommended  that  it  be  continued  in  use  or  not  after 
these  allegations  were  made. 

Mr.  McKee.  May  I  interrupt  you  a  moment.  That  was  not  the 
directive  of  the  committee.  The  committee  was  told  to  examine  the 
book  and  to  make  some  statement  as  to  its  adequacy. 


96  COMMUNIST    INFILTRATION   IN    THE    ARMY 

Senator  Potter.  Who  established  the  committee,  G-2  ? 

Mr.  McKee.  Not  G-2,  no.  It  was  made  by  the  Chief  of  the  In- 
telligence Division.    We  have  had  a  reorganization  since  then. 

Senator  Potter.  You  were  asked  to  review  this  publication  not  to 
determine  whether  it  should  be  continued  in  use  but  to  make  recom- 
mendations as  a  foreword  to  the  publication? 

Mr.  McKee.  To  examine  its  contents.  Determine — this  is  from 
memory  you  must  realize  and  I  haven't  seen  it  in  a  long  time.  To 
determine  what  effects  its  use  might  have  on  the  operations  of  the 
Army  and  any  other  recommendations,  as  I  recall. 

Senator  Potter.  What  effect  did  you  think  it  might  have  ? 

Mr.  McKee.  The  opinion  of  the  committee  was  it  was  a  publication 
which  had  been  put  out  for  a  narrowly  specialized  purpose,  being  dis- 
tributed to  experts  presumably,  the  ones  conducting  psychological 
warfare  and  that  the  recipients  of  it  were  qualified  to  determine 
whether  they  wanted  to  use  parts  of  it  or  not. 

Senator  Potter.  Now,  in  your  recommendation  did  you  cite  that 
certain  of  these  authors  of  the  source  material  were  known  Com- 
munists ? 

Mr.  McKee.  There  was  a  specific  mention  of  Corliss  Lamont,  yes, 
sir. 

Senator  Potter.  He  is  the  only  one  ? 

Mr.  McKee.  As  I  recall  it,  there  was  criticism  of  the  bibliography 
which  had  secondary  work,  including  one  by  Corliss  Lamont.  It 
happened  to  be  the  opinion  of  the  committee  that  in  the  preparation 
cf  this  kind  of  publication  use  should  be  made  of  primary  sources,  and 
of  course,  according  to  the  introduction  used,  be  made  of  such  primary 
sources  interrogated  as  repatriated  Japanese  POWs. 

Senator  Potter.  To  me  you  would  want  to  use  the  source  material 
of  Communist  so  that  the  reader  would  know  whose  works  he  might 
be  reading.  That  would  be  entirely  legitimate,  but  I  think  it  is  most 
distorting  when  you  have  a  pamphlet  here  which  gives  a  list  of  names 
and  when  you  in  the  top  echelon  of  Intelligence  have  no  knowledge 
of  the  background  of  these  people,  distributing  these  to  people  of 
lesser  intelligence  service  as  an  objective  document.  I  wish  some- 
body would  write  my  campaign  material  this  way,  frankly. 

Mr.  McKee.  Sir,  may  I  point  out  that  I  had  nothing  whatever  to 
do  with  the  preparation  of  this  document. 

The  Chairman.  The  matter  came  to  you  after  someone  in  the  mid- 
dle objected  to  this  material,  objected  to  it  on  the  ground  that  it  is 
Communist  propaganda.    Is  that  correct  ? 

Mr.  McKee.  May  I  phrase  it  a  little  bit  different — raised  the  ques- 
tion as  to  the  soundness  of  the  publication,  the  document.  The  man 
who  raised  the  question,  or  in  fact  two,  both  were  put  on  the  com- 
mittee. Major  Wilson,  as  I  understand,  raised  the  question  with  the 
Chief  of  the  Intelligence  Division,  Colonel  Houser,  and  once  the 
question  had  been  raised  the  committee  was  formed.  Major  Wilson's 
point  of  view  was  adequately  represented.  He  was  on  it.  The  other 
person  who  raised  some  question  was  to  have  been  on  it.  He  was  off 
on  leave  or  in  school  or  something  and  was  not  on  the  committee. 

The  Chairman.  Getting  back  to  my  question.  After  Major  Wilson 
pointed  out  that  this  was  Communist  propaganda  and  objected  to  it, 
then  your  Board  was  formed.    Is  that  correct  % 


COMMUNIST   INFILTRATION   IN   THE   ARMY  97 

Mr.  McKeb.  No,  sir.  He  didn't  say  Communist  propaganda.  He 
said  it  could  be  misconstrued  as  Communist  propaganda. 

The  Chairman.  Said  it  could  be  used  as  Communist  propaganda. 

What  was  his  objection? 

Mr.  McKee.  He  raised  the  question  if  whether  or  not  somebody 
came  across  this  document,  as  has  subsequently  happened,  the  purpose 
in  it  could  be  misunderstood  and  that  it  could  be  read  as  having 
passages  which  presented  communism  in  a  favorable  light. 

The  Chairman.  In  other  words  he  objected  to  the  book  because  he 
felt  it  presented  communism  in  an  untrue  and  in  a  favorable  light. 
Is  there  any  question  about  that  ? 

Mr.  McKee.  I  think  all  he  wanted  was  to  have  a  group  look  at  it. 
Sir,  he  signed  the  committee  report. 

The  Chairman.  I  am  trying  to  get  what  his  objection  was. 

Mr.  McKee.  Well,  sir,  may  I  say  this.  I  was  only  called  into  it 
when  the  Division  Chief's 

The  Chairman.  I  don't  care  when  you  were  called  in.  I  want  to 
know — Major  Wilson  had  one  objection,  one  principal  objection,  and 
that  was  this  was  an  untrue  picture  of  communism  and  put  commu- 
nism in  a  very  favorable  light.     Wasn't  that  his  objection? 

Did  he  not  press  that  same  objection  all  through  your  hearing  ? 

Mr.  McKee.  No,  sir. 

The  Chairman.  All  right,  then  I  will  cut  it  down.  Did  he  object 
during  the  hearing  to  this  document  on  the  grounds  that  it  was  incor- 
rect and  that  it  put  communism  in  too  favorable  a  light  ?  Wasn't  that 
the  objection  he  had  on  the  committee  ? 

Mr.  McKee.  No,  sir. 

The  Chairman.  Did  he  raise  an  objection  ? 

Mr.  McKee.  He  raised  it  as  a  question.  He  wondered  whether  it 
could  be  misconstrued. 

The  Chairman.  He  wondered.  And  when  he  got  through  wonder- 
ing, what  happened  ? 

Mr.  McKee.  That  was  that,  sir. 

May  I  say,  sir,  that  the  way  the  committee  worked  was  to  consult 
practically  everybody  in  G-2  who  had  some  competency  to  pass  on  it. 
The  opinion  was  a  reflection  of  a  collective  point  of  view. 

The  Chairman.  Do  you  think  this  document  should  be  continued  in 
use! 

Mr.  McKee.  Do  I  personally,  sir  ?     I  don't  think  it  is  used. 

The  Chairman.  Do  you  think  it  should  be  used  ?  You  were  on  the 
committee  to  decide  whether  it  should  be  used.  Do  you  think  it 
should  be  used  now  ? 

In  other  words,  if  it  was  all  right  in  1952,  is  it  still  all  right  in  1953  ? 

Mr.  McKee.  Sir,  the  committee  found  fault  with  certain  parts  of  the 
study.  They  did  not  think  it  is  all  right.  The  committee  thought 
it  would  satisfactorily  serve  the  purpose  for  which  it  was  published. 

The  Chairman.  Just  stop  a  minute.  The  committee  thought  it  was 
all  right.  They  objected  to  it.  You  say  it  satisfactorily  served  its 
purpose.  I  am  sorry,  I  have  some  trouble  following  you.  You  say 
it  is  not  all  right  but  it  is  satisfactory.  I  am  not  trying  to  twist  your 
words. 

Mr.  McKee.  The  committee  specifically  found  certain  faults  in  it. 
For  one  thing,  the  publication  covers  the  entire  Soviet  Union  instead 


98  COMMUNIST    INFILTRATION   IN   THE    ARMY 

of  Soviet  Siberia.  The  emphasis  is  on  Soviet  Siberia.  There  are  in 
it,  when  we  went  over  it  very  carefully,  errors  in  fact.  There  are 
questionable  interpretations  in  places.     There  are  errors  in  fact. 

The  Chairman.  There  are  errors  in  fact,  you  say  ? 

Mr.  McKee.  Sir,  I  could  not  put  my  finger  on  them  at  this  point. 
There  were  several.  Before  a  committee  comes  up  with  a  recom- 
mendation that  is  to  be  communicated  to  a  major  overseas  command, 
you  very  carefully  check  errors  in  fact. 

Senator  Potter.  Was  this  document  revised  after  the  committee's 
report  to  correct  the  errors  in  fact  ? 

Mr.  McKee.  There  was  a  subsequent  study  which  did  seem  to  elimi- 
nate the  faults  we  found  with  it. 

Senator  Potter.  Was  there  a  corrected  document  put  out  after  your 
committee  had  acted? 

Mr.  McKee.  You  mean  a  revision  of  this  ? 

Senator  Potter.  A  revision  of  this  ? 

Mr.  McKee.  Not  to  my  knowledge. 

Senator  Potter.  Any  corrected  sheets  of  the  errors  in  fact  ? 

Mr.  McKee.  Not  to  my  knowledge. 

Senator  Potter.  What  disturbs  me,  we  have  a  document,  objective 
to  a  very  few  people  who  should  have  knowledge  of  Siberia.  After 
it  is  reviewed  and  found  that  errors  in  fact  exist,  it  still  hasn't  been 
corrected.  These  expert  people  you  have  need  a  special  document  of 
this  kind,  an  objective  document  which  you  claim  you  have.  You 
found  errors  in  fact  and  they  weren't  correct.  Are  you  serving  the 
purpose  that  you  intended  by  this  document  ? 

Mr.  McKee.  The  errors  in  fact  were  of  a  very  minor  nature.  I 
can't  recall  it  specifically,  but  the  date  given  for  the  formation  for  a 
legislative  body,  if  you  could  call  it  that,  in  the  Soviet  Union  was  a 
year  off.  I  remember  another  statement  that  something  had  been 
dissolved  in  a  year  and  somebody  pointed  out  that  it  actually  had  been 
dissolved  2  years  later,  and  the  errors  in  fact  were  in  the  nature  that 
would  not  have  substantially,  if  corrected,  modified  the  study  as  a 
whole. 

Senator  Potter.  Besides  the  errors  in  fact,  I  am  also  interested  in 
the  errors  in  judgment.  I  am  particularly  interested  in  a  section  on 
the  racial  problem  in  Siberia.  It  seems  to  me  they  had  quite  a  Jewish 
purge  and  here  it  is  stated  anti-Semitics  in  Russia,  in  the  Soviet  Union, 
is  very  minor  and  is  decreasing  all  the  time. 

Now,  I  think  that  the  hundreds  of  Jewish  people  that  are  now 
in  labor  camps  might  disagree  with  the  objectivity  of  that  section.  In 
your  review  of  that  did  you  consider  the  judgment  of 

Mr.  McKee.  Sir,  I  mentioned  before  that  the  committee  believed 
there  were  questionable  interpretations.  I  made  that  distinction,  but 
nobody  can  say  exactly  what  is  true  from  an  interpretation  of  any- 
thing. 

Mr.  Cohn.  Do  you  think  Corliss  Lamont  might  be  right  ? 

Mr.  McKee.  Mr.  Cohn,  until  this  came  up  I  never  read  Corliss 
Lamont. 

Mr.  Cohn.  Is  there  anybody  in  G-2  who  has  read  Corliss  Lamont, 
Peter's  Manual,  History  of  the  Communist  Party  of  the  Soviet  Union, 
who  knows  that  in  1945  the  Communist  Party  turned  upside  down  and 
kicked  out  Earl  Browder  and  formed  under  a  revolutionary  principal 


COMMUNIST   INFILTRATION   IN    THE    ARMY  99 

to  work  for  the  Soviet  Union  to  bring  about  the  day — the  destruction 
of  this  Government,  laid  out  elaborate  plans.  Does  anybody  know 
these  things? 

Mr.  McKee.  Yes,  indeed. 

Mr.  Cohn.  Who  is  it  ? 

Mr.  McKee.  G-2  has  a  great  many  responsibilities  both  for  positive 
and  counter  intelligence.  Intelligence  requires  a  high  degree  of 
specialization. 

The  Chairman.  Mr.  McKee,  our  time  is  very  limited.  Who  over 
there  has  read  the  works  Mr.  Cohn  names,  if  you  know  ?  If  you  don't 
know,  tell  us. 

Mr.  McKee.  I  don't  know  the  reading  of  everybody  in  G-2. 

Mr.  Cohn.  Do  you  know  anybody  over  there  who  has  read  the  im- 
portant Communist  works,  who  has  read  The  Manifesto? 

Mr.  McKee.  Sir,  any  educated  man  has  read  The  Manifesto. 

Mr.  Cohn.  Have  you  read  it  ? 

Mr.  McKee.  I  have  read  it.  I  think  the  first  time  I  read  it  was  as 
a  student  in  1924  and  1925. 

Mr.  Cohn.  Wlien  was  the  last  time  you  read  it  ? 

Mr.  McKee.  Well,  I  don't  suppose  I  have  had  occasion  to  read  the 
Communist  manifesto  since  it  went  through  as  a  Senate  document, 
Senate  publication,  which  has  all 

Mr.  Cohn.  Have  you  read  Karl  Marx  ? 

Mr.  McKee.  I  once  read  Das  Kapital. 

Mr.  Cohn.  Have  you  read  Lenin ! 

Mr.  McKee.  Excerpts. 

Mr.  Cohn.  Do  you  know  the  difference  between  Marxism  and 
Marxism-Leninism  ? 

Mr.  McKee.  Many  of  these  fine  distinctions  of  communism  I  don't 
know. 

Mr.  Cohn.  That  is  no  fine  distinction.  That  is  a  distinction  involv- 
ing the  United  States  of  America. 

Do  you  know  the  distinction  ? 

Mr.  McKee.  I  know  a  distinction. 

Mr.  Cohn.  What  is  it?   What  is  the  distinction  ? 

Mr.  McKee.  The  distinction  in  my  mind  is  that  Lenin  took  a  more 
aggressive  view  of  expanding  communism  outside  the  countries  in 
which  it  existed  than  Marx  did.  That  is  something  highly  contro- 
versial among  Communists. 

Mr.  Cohn.  You  refer  to  some  errors  in  this  document.  I  ask  you  if 
you  consider  this  a  false  statement : 

The  Communist  regime  has  profoundly  altered  the  Soviet  population.  The 
toiler  was  elevated  to  the  highest  level  of  respectability.  The  Soviet  Communist 
code  continues  to  honor  the  worker  above  all. 

Do  you  think  that  is  good  Communist  propaganda  or  do  you  think 
it  is  an  accurate  statement? 

Mr.  McKee.  The  Soviet  Government  certainly  tries  to  make  out 
it  honors  the  worker  about  all. 

The  Chairman.  Do  you  think  it  is  an  accurate  statement  ?  That  is 
a  simple  question. 

Mr.  McKee.  You  read  me  3  or  4  profound 

The  Chairman.  I  said,  do  you  think  that  is  inaccurate  ? 


100  COMMUNIST    INFILTRATION   IN   THE    ARMY 

Mr.  McKee.  Again,  may  I  say  so  many  of  those  statements,  before 
I  would  like  to  pass  judgment  on  the  accuracy,  I  would  like  to  know 
what  goes  before. 

Mr.  Cohn.  This  simple  statement:  The  Soviet  Communist  code 
continued  to  honor  the  worker  above  all. 

Mr.  McKee.  That  seems  to  be  the  Soviet  Communist  code  so  far 
as  I  hear.   It  does  that. 

Mr.  Cohn.  It  is  important  to  note— quoting  from  this  document — 

It  is  important  to  note  that  Communist  Party  membership  permeates  the  whole 
fabric  of  Soviet  society  and  does  not  function  as  an  exclusive  elite,  superimposed 
on  an  amorphous  mass.  The  member  in  relation  to  the  nonmember,  is  more 
priest  than  ruler. 

Do  you  think  that  is  a  correct  description?  Do  you  think  that  is  a 
correct  statement? 

Mr.  McKee.  Let  me  say,  sir,  no,  sir.  I  would  not  express  it  that 
way. 

Mr.  Cohn.  Do  you  think  the  Communist  Party  is  an  influential 
element  in  the  Soviet  Union  ?    Do  you  think  that  is  a  correct  statement  ? 
Mr.  McKee.  Not  as  it  is  worded ;  no,  sir. 
Mr.  Cohn  (reading)  : 

Wages  are  closely  geared  to  output  for  manager  and  worker  alike.  All  in- 
centives of  the  capitalist  enterprises  are  rigorously  exploited. 

There  is  no  mention  made  at  all  as  to  the  standard  of  living,  no 
mention  made  of  the  fact  that  the  average  Soviet  worker  has  the 
standard  of  living  comparable  to  an  American  laborer  getting  $8  or  $9 
a  week.    It  creates  the  impression  that  conditions  are  rather  ideal. 

The  Chairman.  You  were  called  to  the  committee  for  the  purpose  of 
passing  on  this  document.  Were  you  ever  on  a  committee  performing 
the  same  function  in  regard  to  any  other  documents  ? 

Mr.  McKee.  Not  to  my  recollection,  sir,  but  I  have  served  on  all 
sorts  of  committees. 

The  Chairman.  Just  answer  my  question. 

Mr.  McKee.  No,  sir ;  not  to  my  recollection. 

The  Chairman.  Did  you  recommend  against  the  use  of  this 
document  ? 

Just  tell  me  "Yes"  or  "No." 

Mr.  McKee.  No. 

The  Chairman.  Did  Major  "Wilson  want  the  committee  to  recom- 
mend against  its  use? 

Mr.  McKee.  Sir,  he  was  at  liberty  to  dissent  if  he  so  wanted. 

The  Chairman.  Did  he  argue  in  favor  of  a  recommendation  against 
the  use  of  this  document?  Was  that  the  position  he  took  on  the 
committee  ? 

Mr.  McKee.  No,  sir. 

The  Chairman.  He  did  not? 

Mr.  McKee.  No,  sir. 

The  Chairman.  Do  you  know  who  Simmons  is  ? 

Mr.  McKee.  I  think' I  do. 

The  Chairman.  Who  is  he? 

Mr.  McKee.  He  is  a  teacher  at  Columbia  University. 

The  Chairman.  Do  you  know  whether  he  is  a  Communist  or  not? 

Mr.  McKee.  No. 

The  Chairman.  You  don't  know.    Do  you  know  about  Pares? 


COMMUNIST    INFILTRATION    IN    THE    ARMY  101 

Mr.  McKee.  Yes ;  I  know  of  Pares. 

The  Chairman.  Do  you  know  whether  he  is  a  Communist  or  not? 

Mr.  McKee.  I  don't  know  that  he  is.  I  suppose  he  is  dead  now. 
If  he  isn't  dead,  he  is  a  very  old  man. 

The  Chairman.  Age  has  nothing  to  do  with  communism.  Do  you 
know  whether  or  not  he  is  a  Communist  ? 

Mr.  McKee.  No,  sir.    I  do  not. 

The  Chairman.  Before  you  passed  on  this  did  you  call  the  FBI 
or  the  House  Un-American  Activities  Committee  to  get  information 
about  the  men  listed  here  as  authors  ? 

Mr.  McKee.  The  committee  did  check  the  background,  but  not  the 
FBI.  We  have  our  components  which  checked  the  background  of 
listed  authors. 

The  Chairman.  Did  you  know  that  four  of  the  sources  had  long 
records  of  Communist  activities  ? 

Mr.  McKee.  Sir,  the  information  furnished  us  was  not  to  that 
effect. 

The  Chairman.  Did  you  try  to  contact  the  House  Un-American 
Activities  Committee  ? 

Mr.  McKee.  Sir,  I  and  the  committee  had  confidence  in  G-2. 

The  Chairman.  Did  you  contact  the  House  Un-American  Activi- 
ties Committee  ? 

Mr.  McKee.  No,  sir. 

The  Chairman.  Do  you  think  if  Stalin  is  quoted  verbatim  in  this 
document  that  it  is  a  proper  document  to  send  out  ? 

Mr.  McKee.  Sir,  I  would  have  to  check  where  and  how  Stalin  is 
quoted  verbatim  before  I  am  prepared  to  answer  that.  I  don't  know 
that  he  is  quoted  without  quotation  marks. 

The  Chairman.  Didn't  you  try  to  find  out  before  you  passed  on 
this  ?  You  were  called  on  to  pass  on  the  document  after  you  had  com- 
plaints that  it  could  be  used  as  Communist  propaganda.  I  would 
like  to  know  what  you  did.  Did  you  check  to  find  out  whether  Stalin 
was  being  quoted  in  the  book  ? 

Mr.  McKee.  Sir,  I  can  only  repeat  what  I  said  before. 

The  Chairman.  You  needn't  bother  repeating  what  you  said  before. 

Do  you  think  this  should  be  withdrawn  or  continued  in  use  ? 

Mr.  McKee.  I  do  not  think  it  should  be  withdrawn,  sir. 

The  Chairman.  I  sincerely  hope  you  are  withdrawn  because  you 
are  certainly  incompetent  to  hold  a  job  in  intelligence.  This  is  clear- 
cut  use  of  Communist  propaganda,  quotations  of  Joe  Stalin,  four  indi- 
viduals, at  least,  known  to  be  Communists,  quotations  by  an  indi- 
vidual who  was  an  editor  of  the  Daily  Worker.  To  my  way  of  think- 
ing, sir,  that  makes  you  completely  and  hopelessly  incompetent  for 
that  job.    I  say  that  while  you  are  here  so  it  will  be  on  the  record. 

Senator  Potter.  What  is  your  position  ? 

Mr.  McKee.  Well,  my  official  title  is  consultant  to  the  Chief  of 
Staff,  G-2.    My  duties  are  mostly  connected  with  positive  intelligence. 

Senator  Potter.  How  long  have  you  been  connected  with  the  Intel- 
ligence Branch  ? 

Mr.  McKee.  I  have  been  there  as  a  civilian  since  1946.  Before  that 
I  was  with  G-2  during  the  war  for  4  years. 

Senator  Potter.  Are  you  a  Reserve  officer  ? 


102  COMMUNIST    INFILTRATION    IN    THE    ARMY 

Mr.  McKee.  You  mean  when  I  came  into  the  war  ? 

Senator  Potter.  No.    Are  you  on  Reserve  status  now  ? 

Mr.  McKee.  I  am  a  Reserve  officer. 

Mr.  Cohn.  I  want  to  ask  you  this :  When  you  reviewed  this  in  March 
or.APpl  of  1952,  you  did  check  the  sources  cited  here.  Just  take  up 
this  Simmons  book  and  glancing  over  the  table  of  contents  you  see 
Corliss  Lament,  the  first  one  they  used,  he  wrote  part  of  the  book; 
second,  Harriet  L.  Moore.    Do  you  know  Harriet  L.  Moore? 

Mr.  McKee.  I  have  never  heard  of  Harriet  L.  Moore. 

Mr.  Cohn.  I  am  surprised  because  2  months  before  you  made  this 
study  Harriet  L.  Moore  was  all  over  the  front  pages  of  the  country. 
She  was  Secretary  of  the  Communist-dominated  Institute  of  Pacific 
Relations.  She  testified  on  February  6,  19,52,  before  the  McCarran 
committee  after  having  been  named  by  Hede  Massing,  Elizabeth  Bent- 
ley,  and  Louis  Budenz  as  a  Communist  Party  member.  She  testified 
as  follows : 

Mr.  Morris.  Mrs.  Gelfan,  witnesses  before  this  committee,  notably  Hede  Mass- 
ing, Elizabeth  Bentley,  and  Louis  Budenz,  have  testified  you  were  a  member  of 
the  Communist  Party.  Were  you  as  a  matter  of  fact  a  member  of  the  Com- 
munist Party  ? 

Mrs.  Gelfan.  I  decline  to  answer  on  the  grounds  that  the  answer  might  tend 
to  incriminate  me. 

I  am  reading  from  page  2559,  Senate  committee  hearings  on  Febru- 
ary 6, 1952,  Institute  of  Pacific  Relations. 

Coining  down  the  list  we  find  Sergei  Kournakoff,  who  wrote  a 
column  for  the  Daily  Worker  all  during  the  war,  Military  Commander 
and  is  an  open  and  avowed  oCmmunist.  This  is  really  unbelievable. 
There  is  hardly  a  name  here  that  someone  who  has  specialized  knowl- 
edge in  this  field 

Mr.  McKee.  Mr.  Cohn,  may  I  say  I  checked  the  authors  in  the 
bibliography.  I  did  not  check  the  authors  listed  in  the  bibliography 
of  the  bibliography. 

Mr.  Cohn.  This  is  not  the  bibliography  of  the  bibliography.  Mr. 
Simmons  made  a  collection  here  of  selections  from  other  people.  He 
made  a  collection  of  writings  of  other  people  so  it  is  not  a  bibliography 
of  Mr.  Simmon's  book  but  the  names  of  people  whose  selections  were 
used  verbatiin  in  Simmon's  book — Corliss  Lamont,  Sir  Bernard  Pares. 
One  Communist  after  another  one  and  the  testimony  we  have  is  that 
this  book  is  still  in  use. 

Mr.  McKee.  Used  in  what  way  ? 

Mr.  Cohn.  In  use  for  Army  indoctrination  courses. 

Mr.  McKee.  I  know  nothing  about  Army  indoctrination. 

Mr.  Cohn.  These  books  and  the  1945  changeover 

Mr.  McKee.  It  is  not  any  desire  of  ours  to  read  all  those  books 

Mr.  Cohn.  Those  books  contain  the  blueprinting  spelled  out  step  by 
step,  what  the  Communist  Party  seeks  to  do,  infiltrate  the  United 
States  Army,  National  Guard  and  other  establishments  of  consider- 
able interest  to  you.  I  am  just  wondering  who  does  know  anything 
on  it. 

Senator  Potter.  Do  you  have  a  division  in  your  G-2  on  Communist 
activities  or  Communist  infiltration  or  Communist  propaganda.  Do 
you  have  any  experts  in  that  ? 

_  Mr.  McKee.  Most  of  that  is  done  outside  G-2  but  persons  who  spe- 
cialized in  political  intelligence;  the  report  was  analyzed  by  other 


COMMUNIST    INFILTRATION    IN    THE    ARMY  103 

agencies.     For  instance,  Bixcomb  from  CIA  analyzed  it  very  care- 
fully. 

Senator  Potter.  I  assume  Psychological  Warfare  Division,  for 
which  this  was  published 

Mr.  McKee.  It  was  published  for  psychological  warfare  officers  of 
the  Far  East  Command. 

Senator  Potter.  It  seems  to  me  we  have  been  spending  billions  of 
dollars,  at  least  ever  since  I  have  been  in  Congress,  to  fight  communism. 
People  will  come  up  here  and  testify  that  the  Nation  is  in  great  danger 
of  various  types  of  Communist  aggression. 

Now,  that  being  the  case,  I  would  feel  a  lot  more  secure  from  the 
purpose  of  defense  if  I  felt  that  we  had  some  people  in  the  Army 
who  had,  at  least,  had  some  knowledge,  even  better  than  a  layman's 
knowledge,  of  the  type  of  enemy  we  are  combating.  Now,  it  takes  a 
lot  of  money.  We  lost  a  lot  of  money  in  the  Korean  war  as  you  well 
know  fighting  communism.  It  seems  to  me  to  be  elementary  to  have 
a  highly  technical  trained  staff  who  would  be  in  a  position  to  advise 
G-2  and  other  people  on  a  top  policy-making  level,  operating  level  and 
intelligence,  to  keep  abreast  of  changing  conditions,  changing  tactics 
of  the  Communist  apparatus.  After  all  international  communism  is 
just  the  foreign  agents  of  the  Soviet  Union's  foreign  policy.  It  is 
not  something  that  is  different  or  set  aside  from  the  Soviet  Union  at 
all.  It  is  their  aggressive  Army  of  the  Soviet  Union.  I  would  feel  a 
lot  more  secure  if  I  knew,  I  had  assumed  that  we  had  technical  experts 
in  the  Army. 

Mr.  McKee.  Sir,  there  is  such  a  group.   There  are  several. 

General  Partridge.  We  do  have  such  people.  We  have  a  counter- 
intelligence corps  whose  business  is  to  do  exactly  that,  military  in- 
stallations or  anything  dealing  with  the  military,  but  of  course,  the 
combating  of  the  Communist  Party  within  the  United  States  and  the 
question  of  infiltration,  except  into  our  own  ranks  is  not  our  primary 
job.     It  is  the  job  of  the  FBI. 

Senator  Potter.  That  is  true.  I  would  think  by  the  same  token, 
when  passing  on  material  which  you  put  out  dealing  with  the  Soviet 
Union,  such  as  this  pamphlet  here,  that  you  would  be  conscientious  and 
get  the  best  advice  possible  on  the  tactics  and  operations  of  the  inter- 
national conspiracy;  but  I  will  grant  you,  it  is  not  your  prime  duty 
on  that  score,  but  for  your  own  security  I  was  a  little  surprised  to  find 
the  lack  of  concern,  lack  of  many  things  displayed  here  this  afternoon. 

The  Chairman.  Do  you  consider  this  document  pro-Communist, 
General  ? 

General  Partridge.  I  didn't  understand  you. 

The  Chairman.  Do  you  consider  this  document  pro-Communist  ? 

General  Partridge.  In  toto,  no,  sir,  I  do  not. 

The  Chairman.  Do  you  consider  parts  of  it  pro-Communist  ? 

General  Partridge.  I  think  parts  sound  pro-Communist.  Other 
parts  sound  strongly  anti- Communist.  It  all  depends  on  what  part 
you  are  looking  at. 

The  Chairman.  Do  you  think  any  parts  which  are  pro-Communist 
are  inaccurate  ?    Do  you  think  it  gives  a  correct  picture  ? 

General  Partridge.  I  don't  know  whether  it  gives  an  absolutely 
correct  picture.  I  think  it  attempts  to  give  a  correct  picture.  I 
haven't  been  able  to  find  the  obvious  flaws  in  it. 


104  COMMUNIST    INFILTRATION    IN    THE    ARMY 

The  Chairman.  Do  you  think  Stalin  in  his  book  attempts  to  give  a 
correct  picture  of  the  Communist  movement? 

General  Partridge.  No,  sir.    I  don't  think  he  was. 

The  Chairman.  Do  you  think  when  Stalin  was  quoted  by  the 
author  of  this  pamphlet,  Major  Allen — Is  that  his  name? 

General  Partridge.  Yes. 

The  Chairman.  That  he  was  trying  to  give  a  correct  picture  by  quot- 
ing Stalin  ? 

General  Partridge.  I  think  he  was  trying  to  do  that.  Whether  he 
did  would  depend  on  what  he  quoted.  I  don't  think  everything  Stalin 
says  is  a  lie.  He  is  bound  to  say  something  true  once  in  a  while.  I 
don't  know  what  he  quoted  from  Stalin. 

The  Chairman.  Do  you  think  Corliss  Lamont  is  trying  to  give  a 
true  picture  ? 

General  Partridge.  I  don't  think  he  is. 

The  Chairman.  Do  you  think  when  this  man  quoted  him  in  this 
document  he  was  trying  to  get  a  correct  picture  ? 

You  just  said  you  don't  think  Lamont  would  give  a  true  picture. 
Do  you  think  the  man  who  quoted  him  in  this  document  is  trying  to  give 
a  correct  picture? 

General  Partridge.  I  think  he  was. 

The  Chairman.  In  other  words,  Stalin  and  Lamont  are  liars  but 
you  can  quote  liars  and  that  is  perfectly  all  right  ? 

General  Partridge.  Nobody  can  be  a  liar  all  the  time. 

The  Chairman.  Mr.  McKee,  do  you  believe  communism  is  an  evil 
system  ? 

Mr.  McKee.  I  do,  sir. 

The  Chairman.  Do  you  think  that  international  communism  is  one 
of  the  major  threats  to  this  country  ? 

Mr.  McKee.  I  think  it  is  the  major  threat. 

The  Chairman.  Do  you  think  then  that  a  work  which  extols  non- 
existent virtues  of  the  Communist  system  should  be  put  out  by  our 
Army  ? 

Mr.  McKee.  No,  sir.    I  do  not  regard  this  as  such  a  study. 

The  Chairman.  You  haven't  answered  the  question. 

Do  you  think  that  a  work  which  extols  nonexistent  virtues  of  the 
Communist  system  should  be  put  out  by  the  Army  ? 

Mr.  McKee.  Certainly  not,  sir. 

Senator  Potter.  I'd  like  to  ask  one  question.  Assuming  that  Major 
Allen  had  used,  rather  than  quoting  Lamont  and  some  of  the  other 
authors  which  you  are  unfamiliar  with,  suppose  he  quoted  Earl  Brow- 
der,  Davies,  Steve  Nelson,  some  that  you  recognize.  Would  that  have 
made  any  difference  in  the  evaluation  of  that  report  ? 

Mr.  McKee.  If  I  had  recognized  them  as  quotations  without  hav- 
ing quotation  marks,  yes. 

Senator  Potter.  The  point  I  mentioned  there  is  the  fact  that 
whether  you  know  it  or  not,  these  men  were  used  as  source  material  who 
are  Communists.  The  fact  that  you  didn't  know  them  doesn't  make  it 
any  better. 

Mr.  McKee.  Sir,  I  am  not  sure  I  understand  your  point. 

Senator  Potter.  If  I  understood  you,  you  said  that  if  you  had  recog- 
nized the  names  of  those  people  as  known  Communists,  that  would  have 
made  a  difference  in  your  evaluation  of  the  report.     Is  that  correct? 


COMMUNIST    INFILTRATION    IN   THE    ARMY  105 

Mr.  McKee.  No,  sir.  I  thought  vou  said  "made  a  difference"  if  I 
had  recognized  parts  of  the  book  as  quotations  from  these  known 
Communists.  You  mentioned  persons  whose  works  I  am  not  aware 
figure  in  it  all  all. 

Senator  Potter.  They  don't.  If  they  had  been  the  source  material, 
if  they  had  been  quoted  rather  than  some  of  these  you  claim  you 
don't  know,  don't  know  they  have  been  active  in  the  Communist  con- 
spiracy, I  wonder  if  that  would  make  any  difference.  Would  knowl- 
edge or  lack  of  knowledge  make  any  difference? 

Mr.  McKee.  Sir,  I  would  have  disapproved  of  known  insinuations 
into  this  study,  of  direct  statements  by  Communists. 

The  Chairman.  We  will  want  both  of  you  back  here  Monday. 

Secretary  Stevens.  Could  I  make  one  brief  statement?  I  am  most 
appreciative  of  the  opportunity  of  being  here.  I  think  it  is  fair  to  say 
from  my  evaluation  of  the  answers  given  to  your  questions  that  they 
are  not  very  satisfactory  to  the  committee.  However,  I  would  like 
to  say,  in  fairness  to  General  Partridge  and  Mr.  McKee,  I  think  they 
have  tried  to  get  before  you  the  facts,  right  or  wrong,  to  the  best  of 
their  ability.  There  has  been  no  effort  to  withold  whoever  the  author 
might  be,  who  served  on  the  committee.  It  seems  to  me,  therefore,  on 
the  ground  of  attempt  to  cooperate,  they  have  made  that  attempt,  even 
though  their  answers  might  not  have  been  satisfactory. 

The  Chairman.  I  may  say,  Mr.  Secretary,  I  have  been  shocked  be- 
yond words  by  the  appearance  of  the  gentlemen  here.  He  came  here 
to  testify  in  regard  to  a  document  which  has  been  labeled  by  a  student 
on  the  subject  as  a  work  of  a  Communist  agent.  We  know  that  much 
of  the  contents  of  it  is  work  of  identified  Communist  agents.  Why 
Partridge  comes  here  to  defend  that  and  say  in  effect  that  he  in- 
tends to  continue  more  of  the  same,  to  me  that  marks  him  completely 
incompetent.  He  may  be  an  excellent  field  commander,  I  know  noth- 
ing about  him.  I  never  met  him  before,  I  don't  believe.  I  do  think  it 
is  necessary  to  have  him  come  down  here  in  public  session  and  let  the 
people  know  what  we  have  inherited  from  the  past. 

I  just  wonder  who  selected  him  for  that  job.  Well,  I  know  you 
didn't.  We  all  know  that  international  communism  is  the  one  great 
overpowering  threat  to  this  country.  Why  put  a  man  in  this  job  who 
doesn't  know  the  first  thing  about  communism. 

Why  keep  on  in  this  position  Mr.  McKee  if  Communist  propaganda 
is  called  to  his  attention  and  he  gives  his  stamp  of  approval  and  sends 
it  on. 

Listening  to  General  Partridge,  there  is  no  question  about  the  fact 
that  if  he  couldn't  get  excited  about  Communist  books,  can't  get 
disturbed  about  Communist  literature  coming  from  the  mouth  of 
Stalin,  the  mouth  of  a  man  who  is  editor  of  the  Daily  Worker,  Harriet 
Moore,  then  nothing  on  God's  earth  is  going  to  disturb  him  about 
communism. 

Mr.  Secretary,  we  need  more  than  cooperation  from  a  man  like 
General  Partridge.  We  need  someone  who  has  some  conception  of 
the  danger  of  communism.  I  don't  blame  him.  I  know  he  didn't 
select  this  task.  I  was  in  service.  I  was  sometimes  assigned  to  a  job 
I  was  unequipped  for  too.  The  general  may  be  one  of  the  most  out- 
standing field  officers  for  all  I  know.  Certainly  he  isn't  an  authority 
on  communism.  One  of  the  principal  jobs  of  G-2  is  to  keep  from  being 
infiltrated  by  the  Communists.   End  of  speech. 

(Whereupon,  the  hearing  adjourned  at  4 :  30  p.  m.) 

X 


COMMUNIST  INFILTRATION  IN  THE  ARMY 


c~ 


C> 


HEARINGS 

BEFORE  THE 

PERMANENT  SUBCOMMITTEE  ON 
INVESTIGATIONS  OF  THE  COMMITTEE  ON 

GOVERNMENT  OPERATIONS 
UNITED  STATES  SENATE 

EIGHTY-THIRD  CONGRESS 

SECOND  SESSION 
PURSUANT  TO 

S.  Res.  189 


PART  3 


JANUARY  30,  FEBRUARY  18,  AND  MARCH  4, 1954 


Printed  for  the  use  of  the  Committee  on  Government  Operations 


UNITED  STATES 
GOVERNMENT  PRINTING  OFFICE 
38794  WASHINGTON  :  1954 


Boston  PuM;c  Library 
Superintendent  of  Document, 

APR  28  1954 


COMMITTEE  ON  GOVERNMENT  OPERATIONS 

JOSEPH  R.  MCCARTHY,  Wisconsin, ^Chairman 
KARL  E.  MUNDT,  South  Dakota  JOHN  L.  McCLELLAN,  Arkansas 

MARGARET  CHASE  SMITH,  Maine  HUBERT  H.  HUMPHREY,  Minnesota 

HENRY  C.  DWORSHAK,  Idaho  HENRY  M.  JACKSON,  Washington 

EVERETT  McKINLEY  DIRKSEN,  Illinois        JOHN  F.  KENNEDY,  Massachusetts 
JOHN  MARSHALL  BUTLER,  Maryland  STUART  SYMINGTON,  Missouri 

CHARLES  E.  POTTER,  Michigan  ALTON  A.  LENNON,  North  Carolina 

Richard  J.  O'Melia,  General  Counsel 
Walter  Reynolds,  Chief  Clerk 


Permanent  Subcommittee  on  Investigations 

JOSEPH  R.  MCCARTHY,  Wisconsin,  Chairman 

KARL  E.  MUNDT,  South  Dakota  JOHN  L.  McCLELLAN,  Arkansas 

EVERETT  McKINLEY  DIRKSEN,  Illinois        HENRY  M.  JACKSON,  Washington 
CHARLES  E.  POTTER,  Michigan  STUART  SYMINGTON,  Missouri 

Roy  M.  Cohn,  Chief  Counsel 
Francis  P.  Carr,  Executive  Director 

n 


CONTENTS 


Page 
Index I 

Testimony  of — 

Belskv,  Dr.  Marvin  Sanford 159 

Eagle',  Miss  Ruth 119 

Peress,  Irving . 107,  123 

Zwicker,  Brig.  Gen.  Ralph  W 145 

EXHIBITS 

Intro- 
duced  Appears 
on  page  on  page 

6.  Excerpt  from  Daily  Worker,  November  22,  1949 129  * 

7.  Department  of  the  Armv  AGO  Form  71,  January  1,  1951 132  * 

8.  Department  of  Defense  Form  98,  April  1,  1950 132  * 

9.  Department  of  Defense  Form  98-2,  December  1,  1950 132  * 

*  May  be  found  in  the  files  of  the  subcommittee. 

Ill 


COMMUNIST  INFILTEATIONJN  THE  AKMY 

(On  January  30,  1954,  the  Senate  Permanent  Subcommittee  on  Investigations 
held  hearings  in  executive  session  on  Communist  infiltration  in  the  Army.  This 
testimony  was  made  public  on  March  4,  1954,  by  the  members  of  the  subcom- 
mittee and  follows  below:) 

SATURDAY,   JANUARY   30,    1954 

United  States  Senate, 
Permanent  Subcommittee 

on  Investigations  of  the 
Committee  on  Government  Operations, 

New  York,  N.  Y. 

The  subcommittee  met  (pursuant  to  S.  Res.  40,  agreed  to  January 
30,  1953)  at  10:  30  a.  m.,  room  36,  Federal  Building,  New  York  City, 
Senator  Joseph  R.  McCarthy  presiding. 

Present :  Senator  Joseph  R.  McCarthy,  Republican,  Wisconsin. 

Present  also:  Francis  P.  Carr,  executive  director;  Roy  M.  Colin, 
chief  counsel. 

TESTIMONY  OF  MAJ.  IRVING  PERESS,  ARMY  DENTAL  CORPS, 
CAMP  KILMER,  N.  J.,  ACCOMPANIED  BY  STANLEY  EAULKNER, 
ATTORNEY 

The  Chairman.  Major,  would  you  raise  your  right  hand  and  be 
sworn,  please. 

In  the  matter  now  in  hearing,  do  you  solemnly  swear  that  the  tes- 
timony you  are  about  to  give  will  be  the  truth,  the  whole  truth,  and 
nothing  but  the  truth,  so  help  you  God  ? 

Major  Peress.  I  do. 

The  Chairman.  Will  counsel  identify  himself  for  the  record  ? 

Mr.  Faulkner.  Stanley  Faulkner,  9  East  40th  Street,  New  York 
City. 

The  Chairman.  And  would  you  give  your  telephone  number  in  case 
the  staff  has  to  get  in  touch  with  you  ? 

Mr.  Faulkner.  Lexington  2-7780. 

Mr.  Cohn.  Could  we  get  your  full  name  ? 

Major  Peress.  Irving,  I-r-v-i-n-g  Peress,  P-e-r-e-s-s. 

Mr.  Cohn.  Where  do  you  reside  ? 

Major  Peress.  6139  79th  Street,  Middle  Village,  N.  Y. 

Mr.  Cohn.  Now,  what  is  your  current  rank  in  the  Army  ? 

Major  Peress.  Major. 

Mr.  Cohn.  For  how  long  a  period  of  time  have  you  held  that  rank  ? 

Major  Peress.  Almost  3  months. 

Mr.  Cohn.  And  when  did  you  enter  the  Army  ? 

Major  Peress.  On  active  duty,  you  mean? 

The  Chairman.  Let  me  interrupt.  Do  I  understand  you  were  pro- 
moted 3  months  ago? 

107 


108  COMMUNIST    INFILTRATION    IN    THE    ARMY 

Major  Peress.  That  is  right.     On  November  2, 1953. 

The  Chairman.  When  did  you  go  on  active  duty  ? 

Major  Peress.  January  1,  1952. 

The  Chairman.  A  little  over  2  years  ago  ? 

Major  Peress.  No,  I  am  sorry,  January  1, 1953. 

Mr.  Cohn.  Now,  what  were  the  circumstances  of  your  going  on 
active  duty.    Did  you  apply  or  were  you  called? 

By  the  way,  any  time  you  want  to  you  can  consult  with  counsel.  He 
can  talk  to  you  or  nudge  you  and  you  can  do  likewise.  I  don't  know  if 
you  have  been  before  the  committee  before. 

(Witness  consults  with  counsel.) 

Major  Peress.  I  registered  under  the  doctor  draft  law;  I  think  it 
was  the  1950  law.  I  was  called  up  in  July  of  1952  to  take  a  physical 
examination,  which  I  passed,  and  I  was  tendered  a  commission  in 
approximately  October  1952  as  captain.  I  got  orders  to  go  on  active 
duty  January  1,  1953. 

Mr.  Cohn.  Did  you  apply  for  a  commission  as  captain  ? 

Major  Peress.  Yes,  the  procedure  was  the  draft  board  notified  you 
of  your  impending  induction  and  between  the  enlistment  on  my  part — 
the  coinciding  of  dates  coming  in  2  weeks — I  was  informed  the  enlist- 
ment was  not  recognized  so  that  I  went  under  the  normal  channels  of 
draft  induction. 

Mr.  Cohn.  Then  you  applied  for  a  commission,  and  after  you  filled 
out  certain  application  forms,  that  commission  was  tendered  as 
captain.    Is  that  right  ? 

Major  Peress.  Yes. 

Mr.  Cohn.  And  you  accepted  the  commission. 

Major  Peress.  I  did. 

Mr.  Cohn.  Where  did  you  enter  on  duty  ? 

Major  Peress.  Fort  Sam  Houston,  Tex. 

Mr.  Cohn.  For  how  long  a  period  were  you  down  there  ? 

Major  Peress.  I  left  home  January  1  and  left  there  February  7. 

Mr.  Cohn.  Where  did  you  go  from  Fort  Sam  Houston  ? 

The  Chairman.  Let  me  interrupt.  Apparently,  Major,  the  situa- 
tion was — see  if  I  understand  you  correctly.  Correct  me  if  I  am 
wrong.     You  did  register  for  the  doctors'  draft. 

Major  Peress.  Every  physician  and  dentist  had  to  register  under 
the  1951  law. 

The  Chairman.  Then  there  came  a  time  when  the  draft  board  noti- 
fied you  you  had  been  called  up.  You  were  put  in  a  certain  priority 
depending  on  whether  the  Goverment  had  helped  finance  your  edu- 
cation or  depending  on  the  time  you  served  in  the  last  war. 

Major  Peress.  Yes. 

The  Chairman.  After  you  were  classified  in  one  of  those  priorities, 
you  attempted  to  enlist  in  the  Army.  They  told  you  due  to  the  prox- 
imity of  enlistment  to  the  time  of  your  classification,  they  hadn't 
recognized  your  enlistment  and  you  were  about  to  be  inducted ;  then 
you  applied  for  a  commission — they  allow  you  sufficient  time  to  apply 
for  a  commission — a  commission  of  captain  was  tendered  to  you  and 
you  accepted  it.     Is  that  right  ? 

Major  Peress.  Yes,  sir. 

The  Chairman.  In  effect  you  attempted  to  volunteer  for  the  service. 
Is  that  correct. 

Major  Peress.  In  effect,  yes,  sir. 


COMMUNIST    INFILTRATION   IN   THE    ARMY  109 

The  Chairman.  How  did  you  serve  in  the  last  war  ? 

Major  Peress.  I  had  a  commission  tendered  to  me  and  at  the  last 
moment  they  discovered  I  had  a  physical  defect  which  they  would  not 
waive  and  they  would  not  accept  me. 

The  Chairman.  But  your  physical  defect  was  waived  on  this  oc- 
casion ? 

Major  Peress.  That  is  right. 

The  Chairman.  Had  the  Government  financed,  in  any  way,  your 
education  ? 

Major  Peress.  No. 

Mr.  Cohn.  From  Fort  Sam  Houston,  where  did  you  go  after  that? 

Major  Peress.  I  had  orders  to  go  to  Yokohama,  Japan.  When  I 
got  to  the  port  of  embarkation  at  Fort  Lewis,  Wash.,  I  had  an  emer- 
gency leave  to  come  back  home. 

The  Chairman.  Was  it  a  medical  question  ? 

Major  Peress.  Yes,  sir,  a  medical  question. 

I  came  home  and  had  further  communication  with  the  Department 
of  Defense,  the  Pentagon,  I  received  new  orders  to  report  to  Kilmer. 

Mr.  Cohn.  Whose  illness  was  it  ? 

Major  Peress.  My  wife  and  daughter. 

Mr.  Cohn.  Now,  you  said  something  about  the  Department  of  De- 
fense.    Who  did  you  see  in  the  Department  of  Defense  ? 

Major  Peress.  Well,  I  guess  I  went  through  the  Adjutant  General's 
Office  in  the  Pentagon. 

Mr.  Cohn.  You  wrote  to  the  proper  authorities  and  requested  a 
change  of  assignment  ? 

Major  Peress.  They  did. 

Mr.  Cohn.  Where  did  they  station  you  ? 

Major  Peress.  Camp  Kilmer,  N.  J. 

Mr.  Cohn.  How  far  is  that  from  New  York  ? 

Major  Peress.  Thirty  miles. 

The  Chairman.  See  if  I  have  this  picture  correctly  in  mind.  You 
were  assigned  to  Yokohama ;  you  got  as  far  as  the  port  of  embarkation 
and  received  emergency  leave  because  of  illness  on  the  part  of  your 
wife  and  daughter. 

Major  Peress.  That  is  right. 

The  Chairman.  When  you  arrived  home  you  applied  for  a  transfer 
to  some  other  station  in  the  United  States  ? 

Major  Peress.  I  applied  for  what  is  called  compassionate 
reassignment. 

The  Chairman.  Who  did  you  correspond  with  on  this  subject? 

Major  Peress.  The  Adjutant  General.  I  don't  know  who  handled 
it  in  the  office — in  the  Office  of  the  Adjutant  General. 

The  Chairman.  Did  you  have  correspondence  other  than  through 
official  channels? 

(Witness  consulted  with  counsel.) 

Major  Peress.  Before  I  answer  that  question,  Mr.  Senator,  I  would 
like  to  state,  at  this  time  I  am  on  active  duty  with  the  Army  and  under 
the  sole  jurisdiction  of  the  Army  and  the  President,  who  is  the  Com- 
mander and  Chief  of  the  Armed  Forces,  and  do  not  feel  that  I  come 
under  the  jurisdiction  of  this  committee. 

The  Chairman.  Did  you  have  any  correspondence  with  anyone  with 
regard  to  the  change  of  your  orders  other  than  through  official 
channels  ? 


110  COMMUNIST    INFILTRATION    IN    THE    ARMY 

Major  Peress.  In  regard  to  the  change  of  being  assigned  to  Yoko- 
hama to  being  assigned  to  the  United  States,  did  I  have  correspond- 
ence— you  mean  did  I  write  to  friends  ? 

The  Chairman.  You  understand  the  question.  Did  you  have  cor- 
respondence other  than  through  official  channels  ? 

Major  Peress.  The  answer  is  "No." 

The  Chairman.  In  other  words,  no  Congressman,  no  Senator,  no 
one  to  your  knowledge  intervened  in  your  behalf  to  promote  your 
change  of  orders? 

Major  Peress.  Well,  I  wrote  to  nobody,  but  my  wife  asked  my  Con- 
gressman about  the  advice  of  how  to  proceed.  There  was  no  official 
correspondence,  no  intervention.  He  merely  suggested  to  us  the  Red 
Cross  as  a  means  of  coming  back  from  Fort  Lewis,  Wash.,  to  New 
Jersey. 

The  Chairman.  Who  was  your  Congressman  ? 

Major  Peress.  I  believe  his  name  was  Holtzman. 

The  Chairman.  And  he  is  from  where  ? 

Major  Peress.  Queens,  where  I  live. 

The  Chairman.  You  say  you  had  correspondence  with  him  when 
you  were  on  your  way  to  Yokohama  ? 

Major  Peress.  I  had  no  correspondence  with  him. 

The  Chairman.  Who  did  have  correspondence  with  him  ? 

Major  Peress.  Well,  I  don't  remember  exactly  but  my  wife  either 
called  him  or  wrote  to  him  because  he  lives  in  the  neighborhood  and 
got  a  telegram  back  from  him  to  the  effect  that  I  get  in  touch  with  the 
Red  Cross  in  order  to  secure  time  that  my  appeal  be  considered. 
As  it  was,  because  of  the  element  of  time,  nothing  could  be  done  and 
I  would  have  had  to  go  to  the  Far  East  and  take  it  up  in  the  Far 
East.  He  suggested  the  Red  Cross  as  an  instrument  of  delaying  the 
transfer  overseas. 

The  Chairman.  Do  you  have  copies  of  the  correspondence  and  the 
application  you  made  at  that  time?  Do  you  have  copies  of  corres- 
pondence with  your  Congressman,  the  Red  Cross,  Department  of 
Army — any  correspondence  in  connection  with  the  delay  or  change  of 
orders? 

Major  Peress.  I  should  say 

The  Chairman.  Do  you  or  do  you  not  have  the  correspondence  ? 

Major  Peress.  Well,  I  made  copies  but  I  am  not  real  sure  I  have 
them. 

The  Chairman.  You  don't  have  any  along  with  you  ? 

Major  Peress.  Let's  see. 

(Witness  examines  record.) 

The  Chairman.  Any  documents  having  to  do  with  the  change  of 
orders  ? 

Major  Peress.  I  do  not  have  them  with  me. 

The  Chairman.  Did  anyone  in  the  Army  ever  ask  you  whether 
you  were  a  member  of  the  Communist  Party  or  a  Communist  Party 
organizer  ? 

Major  Peress.  I  decline  to  answer  that  question  under  the  protec- 
tion of  the  fifth  amendment  on  the  ground  it  might  tend  to  incriminate 
me. 

The  Chairman.  You  decline  to  answer  whether  or  not  they  asked 
you  ?     Are  you  a  member  of  the  Communist  Party  today  ? 


COMMUNIST    INFILTRATION    IN    THE    ARMY  111 

Major  Peress.  I  again  decline,  claiming  the  privilege  for  the  reason 
previously  stated. 

The  Chairman.  Were  you  a  member  of  the  Communist  Party  at 
the  time  you  were  inducted  ? 

Major  Peress.  I  again  claim  the  privilege. 

The  Chairman.  Did  any  Communists  intervene  to  have  your  orders 
changed  so  you  would  not  have  to  leave  the  country  ? 

Major  Peress.  I  again  claim  the  privilege. 

The  Chairman.  You  are  entitled  to  the  privilege. 

Is  your  wife  a  member  of  the  Communist  party  ? 

Major  Peress.  I  again  claim  the  privilege. 

Mr.  Cohn.  Your  wife's  name  is  Elaine,  is  that  correct  ? 

Major  Peress.  Yes,  sir. 

The  Chairman.  How  many  children  do  you  have  ? 

Major  Peress.  Two. 

The  Chairman.  How  old  are  they  ? 

Major  Peress.  Six  and  a  half  and  eight  and  a  half. 

The  Chairman.  And  you  said  your  orders  were  changed  because 
of  illness.     What  was  the  illness? 

Major  Peress.  It  is  a  personal  matter  I'd  rather  not  discuss.  The 
Army  has  official  information  on  it. 

The  Chairman.  If  it  is  an  illness  which  is  in  any  way  embarrassing, 
we  would  not  require  you  to  discuss  it.  Otherwise,  we  will  have  to 
ask  you  about  it. 

I  am  curious  to  know  how  Communists  can  get  their  orders  changed 
so  easily.  The  average  man  would  be  sent  to  Yokohama.  You  can 
suddenly  have  your  orders  changed  and  kept  in  this  country.  I  am 
curious  to  know  whether  the  illness  was  real  or  imaginary.  I  am 
curious  to  know  if  that  was  the  real  factor;  if  you  were  telling  the 
truth,  or  you  were  lying.  You  told  the  Army  your  wife  and  daugh- 
ter were  sick.  If  the  sickness  would  be  embarrassing  to  discuss  it, 
we  will  not  ask  about  it ;  otherwise  I  want  to  know  about  it. 

Major  Peress.  The  Red  Cross  made  an  investigation  of  the  nature 
of  the  illness  and  the  validity  of  the  reason  of  the  change  and  these  are 
on  file  in  the  Army  records. 

The  Chairman.  What  were  the  reasons?  If  the  Red  Cross  made 
an  investigation,  there  is  nothing  confidential.  What  were  the 
reasons? 

Major  Peress.  I  would  still  rather  not  discuss  it,  Senator,  because  it 
is  personal,  and  I  feel  it  invades  the  privacy  of  the  medical  profession 
and  is  not  pertinent. 

The  Chairman.  Mister,  I  don't  know  whether  the  reason  is  suf- 
ficient. Every  clay  in  my  office  I  have  young  men  writing  in  saying 
their  wives  are  sick,  very  ill,  asking  to  have  their  orders  changed  so 
they  will  not  have  to  go  overseas.  They  are  sent  overseas.  I  just 
wonder  how  you  Communists  have  such  tremendous  luck  day  after 
day  when  you  come  before  us.  There  is  no  consideration  too  great. 
I  want  to  find  out  how  you  stopped  at  the  port  of  embarkation ;  who 
stopped  you  when  he  knew  you  were  a  Communist ;  whether  another 
Communist  did  it  for  you,  and  I  am  going  to  order  you  to  tell  us  what 
the  alleged  illness  was. 

Major  Peress.  The  reason  is  simply  that  my  wife  and  daughter 
were  undergoing  psychiatric  treatment,  and  I  am  not  a  psychiatrist 

38794— 54— pt.  3 2 


112  COMMUNIST    INFILTRATION    IN    THE    ARMY 

and  couldn't  detail  the  reasons.     He  felt  it  would  be  desirable  for  the 
health  of  the  family  to  have  me  stay. 

The  Chairman.  In  other  words,  there  was  no  physical  illness  except 
that  they  were  under  the  care  of  a  psychiatrist  because  of  some  emo- 
tional disturbance.     Is  that  correct? 

Major  Peress.  I  don't  know  if  you  feel  there  is  a  difference  between 
physical  and  mental  illness — if  there  is  a  different  level  of  the  validity 
of  illnesses.     As  I  said,  they  were  under  psychiatric  treatment. 

The  Chairman.  How  old  was  your  daughter  when  she  was  under 
this  treatment? 

Major  Peress.  She  was  at  the  time  just  under  6. 

Mr.  Cohn.  Now,  Major,  you  are  a  graduate  of  the  leadership  train- 
ing course  of  the  Inwood  Victory  Club  of  the  Communist  Party,  are 
you  not  ? 

Major  Peress.  I  decline  to  answer  that  question  under  the  fifth 
amendment. 

Mr.  Cohn.  Did  you  attend  courses  in  leadership  of  the  Inwood  Vic- 
tory Club  of  the  Communist  Party  at  139  Dyckman  Street? 

Major  Peress.  I  claim  the  privilege. 

The  Chairman.  Let  me  ask  you  this.  When  you  say  you  claim  thii 
privilege,  you  are  claiming  it  under  that  part  of  the  fifth  amendment 
which  provides  that  you  need  not  give  testimony  that  you  feel  might 
tend  to  incriminate  you.     Is  that  correct  ? 

Major  Peress.  That  is  correct. 

The  Chairman.  You  understand  that  you  can  only  claim  that  privi- 
lege if  you  feel  a  truthful  answer  might  tend  to  incriminate  you ;  you 
cannot  claim  the  privilege  if  you  feel  perjury  would  incriminate  you. 
Do  you  understand? 

Major  Peress.  I  understand  your  question. 

The  Chairman.  Is  your  position  that  you  feel  a  truthful  answer 
to  this  question  might  tend  to  incriminate  you  ? 

Major  Peress.  That  is  correct.  Since  the  Constitution,  I  believe, 
states  I  may  believe  my  answer  may  tend  to  incriminate  and  not  that 
it  will  incriminate  me,  I  am  exercising  the  right  under  the  fifth 
amendment,  which  so  stated. 

The  Chairman.  I  asked  you  a  simple  question,  before  I  can  deter- 
mine whether  you  are  entitled  to  the  fifth  amendment  privilege.  The 
question  is :  Do  you  feel  a  truthful  answer  might  tend  to  incriminate 
you  ?  If  you  do,  you  are  entitled  to  refuse.  If  you  do  not,  then  you 
must  answer. 

Major  Peress.  Yes,  I  do  feel  a  a  truthful  answer  might  tend  to 
incriminate  me. 

The  Chairman.  And  that  is  what  you  mean  is  your  answer  to  all 
these  questions  when  you  say 

Major  Peress.  That  is  correct. 

Mr.  Cohn.  At  the  leadership  training  course  of  the  Inwood  Victory 
Club,  were  you  taught  the  doctrine  of  forcible  overthrow  of  the 
United  States  Government  ? 

Major  Peress.  I  again  claim  the  privilege. 

Mr.  Cohn.  Did  you  yourself  deliver  talks  at  Communist  discussion 
groups  at  which  you  discussed  the  doctrine  of  Marxism  and  Leninism 
urging  the  overthrow  of  the  Government  of  the  United  States  by  force 
and  violence  ? 

Major  Peress.  I  again  claim  the  privilege. 


COMMUNIST    INFILTRATION   IN   THE    ARMY  113 

Mr.  Cohn.  When  you  went  down  to  Camp  Kilmer,  specifically, 
when  at  Camp  Kilmer,  did  you  attempt  to  recruit  any  of  the  military 
personnel  there  into  the  Communist  Party  ? 

Major  Peress.  I  again  claim  the  privilege  for  the  same  reason. 

Mr.  Cohn.  While  stationed  at  Camp  Kilmer  did  you  have  Commun- 
ist Party  meetings  at  your  home,  attended  by  one  or  more  military 
personnel  from  Camp  Kilmer  ? 

Major  Peress.  I  again  claim  the  privilege. 

Mr.  Cohn.  Now,  you  attended  City  College  from  1933  to  1936.  Is 
that  right? 

Major  Peress.  Yes,  sir. 

Mr.  Cohn.  And  then  you  went  to  NYU  Dental  School  from  1936 
through  1940? 

Major  Peress.  That  is  right. 

Mr.  Cohn.  While  you  were  at  Camp  Kilmer,  were  you  taking  orders 
from  any  functionaries  of  the  Communist  Party  ? 

Major  Peress.  I  again  claim  the  privilege. 

Mr.  Cohn.  In  addition  to  your  work  in  the  Dental  Corps,  did  you 
have  any  other  assignment,  extra  duty,  or  anything  else  in  connection 
with  Army  service  ?     Were  you  ever  on  any  board  or  special  detail  ? 

Major  Peress.  Repeat  the  beginning  of  that  question. 

Mr.  Cohn.  In  addition  to  your  regular  dental  duty,  did  you  ever 
carry  out  any  other  assignment,  extra  duty,  or  anything  else  in  connec- 
tion  with  Army  service  on  a  part-time  basis? 

Major  Peress.  I  carried  no  assignment,  but  in  the  preliminary  train- 
ing at  Fort  Sam  Houston  it  was  not  all  dental  work.  I  had  to  learn 
how  to  conduct  medical  battalions  in  the  field  and  take  over  first-aid 
duties. 

Mr.  Cohn.  Did  you  ever  sit  on  a  board  ? 

Major  Peress.  I  took  regular  duty  when  my  turn  came  around,  that 
is,  dental  duty. 

Mr.  Cohn.  You  had  no  duty  other  than  dental  duty? 

Major  Peress.  That  is  right. 

Mr.  Cohn.  While  at  Camp  Kilmer,  did  you,  in  fact,  recruit  military 
personnel  into  the  Communist  Party  ? 

Major  Peress.  I  again  claim  the  privilege. 

The  Chairman.  Were  you  promoted  after  the  Army  had  you  in 
and  questioned  you  about  your  background  ? 

Major  Peress.  You  mean  in  service? 

The  Chairman.  I  mean  were  you  before  the  security  officer,  a  board, 
or  your  commanding  officer  and  questioned  about  your  background  ? 

Major  Peress.  I  was  never  before  any  board  in  the  Army  for  ques- 
tioning. 

The  Chairman.  You  say  you  were  never  before  a  board  of  inquiry 
or  questioned  about  your  background  by  any  officer  of  the  Army  ? 

Major  Peress.  If  this  is  what  you  mean,  I  was  never  before  any 
board  of  inquiry  of  one  or  more  members. 

Mr.  Cohn.  In  August  of  1953,  that  is  August  of  this  last  summer, 
were  you  asked  any  questions  or  given  interrogatories  concerning  Com- 
munist Party  affiliations  ? 

Major  Peress.  Would  you  repeat  whether  you  are  asking  about 
orally  or  in  writing  ? 


114  COMMUNIST    INFILTRATION    IN    THE    ARMY 

Mr.  Cohn.  We  will  let  it  cover  both.  My  question  was,  Were  you 
asked  written  or  oral  questions  concerning  Communist  Party  affilia- 
tions? 

Major  Peress.  Was  I  asked  these  questions? 

Mr.  Cohn.  In  August  of  1953  you  were  given  interrogatories  by  the 
Army  which  you  refused  to  answer.     Isn't  that  a  fact  ? 

Major  Peress.  I  answered  them. 

Mr.  Cohn.  You  answered  all  of  them  ? 

Major  Peress.  Yes. 

Mr.  Cohn.  Did  you  ever  refuse  to  answer  interrogatories  put  to  you 
by  the  Army  ? 

Major  Peress.  What  is  the  meaning  of  refuse?  I  was  given  an  in- 
terrogatory and  I  returned  it. 

Mr.  Cohn.  Did  you  answer  every  question  on  the  interrogatory? 

Major  Peress.  Yes ;  or  it  would  not  have  been  accepted. 

Mr.  Cohn.  I  am  talking  about  August  1953. 

Major  Peress.  It  would  not  have  been  accepted  if  I  had  not  an- 
swered all  the  questions. 

Mr.  Cohn.  Did  you  give  information  in  response  to  every  question  ? 

(Witness  consults  with  counsel.) 

Mr.  Cohn.  You  were  given  an  interrogatory  by  the  Army  in  Aug- 
ust 1953.  You  declined  to  answer  certain  of  the  questions  on  the  basis 
of  the  fifth  amendment.     That  is  a  matter  of  public  record,  isn't  it? 

Major  Peress.  That  is  right. 

Mr.  Cohn.  How  many  questions  did  you  decline  to  answer  on  the 
basis  of  the  fifth  amendment? 

Major  Peress.   (No  answer.) 

Mr.  Cohn.  Is  this  a  fair  statement?  Let  me  see  if  I  can  save  time. 
You  refused  to  answer,  under  the  fifth  amendment,  any  questions  deal- 
ing with  Communist  affiliations  or  associations. 

Major  Peress.  If  I  may  see  the  interrogatory,  I  can  answer  that 
question. 

The  Chairman.  Answer  the  question. 

Major  Peress.  Well,  do  you  have  a  record  on  it  ? 

The  Chairman.  Answer  the  question. 

Major  Peress.  I  claim  the  privilege. 

The  Chairman.  You  are  ordered  to  answer. 

Major  Peress.  I  have  no  privilege  on  this  question  ? 

The  Chairman.  You  are  ordered  to  answer  the  question.  You  can 
consult  with  counsel  if  you  like.  The  question  is,  On  this  applica- 
tion, did  you  refuse  to  answer  questions  relating  to  Communist  Party 
affiliations? 

Major  Peress.  If  you  will  repeat  the  specific  questions  on  the  in- 
terrogatory to  me 

The  Chairman.  You  are  ordered  to  answer  counsel's  question. 

Major  Peress.  I  claim  the  privilege  on  the  questions  that  were  pre- 
sented to  me  on  the  interrogatory. 

The  Chairman.  Have  the  record  show  that  the  witness  was  ordered 
to  answer  counsel's  question.  In  view  of  the  fact  that  it  is  a  matter 
of  public  record,  there  is  no  privilege.  After  the  chairman  ordered 
him  to  answer,  the  witness  persisted  in  refusing  to  answer. 

Mr.  Faulkner.  He  did  answer  the  question,  Mr.  Senator. 

Major  Peress.  I  answered  the  questions  on  the  interrogatory  they 
refer  to  by  claiming  the  fifth  amendment. 


COMMUNIST    INFILTRATION   IN    THE    ARMY  115 

The  Chairman.  With  reference  to  those  questions  on  the  interroga- 
tory, you  answered  them  to  the  Army  by  claiming  the  fifth  amend- 
ment ? 

Major  Peress.  That  is  right. 

The  Chairman.  In  what  connection  was  the  interrogatory  filled 
out?  Was  it  in  connection  with  a  loyalty  investigation  or  a  promo- 
tional investigation? 

Major  Pekess.  There  was  no  discussion  by  the  colonel  who  gave 
them  to  me. 

Mr.  Cohn.  Who  was  that? 

Major  Peress.  He  was  in  the  G-2  office.  I  don't  recall  his  name.  It 
was  a  short  name,  Smith  or  something  like  that.  It  might  have  been 
Smith. 

Mr.  Cohn.  Did  you  hear  anything  further  from  this  colonel  after 
you  filled  out  the  interrogatory? 

Major  Peress.  They  gave  them  to  me  1  day  and  I  filled  them  out 
and  gave  them  back  the  next  day. 

The  Chairman.  You  heard  nothing  from  him  after  that — after 
you  refused  to  answer? 

Major  Peress.  After  I  resubmitted  the  interrogatory  with  the  ques- 
tions answered  in  writing,  I  never  heard  from  him  again. 

The  Chairman.  After  you  refused  to  answer  questions  concerning 
Communist  Party  affiliations,  claiming  the  fifth  amendment,  in  this 
questionnaire,  you  heard  nothing  more  about  the  matter  from  any 
Army  officials  and  you  were  subsequently  promoted;  is  that  correct? 

Major  Peress.  That  is  correct. 

The  Chairman.  Did  any  Communists  aid  you  in  getting  this  promo- 
tion ?  _ 

Major  Peress.  I  again  claim  the  privilege,  but  I  will  tell  you  how  the 
promotion  was  effected  if  you  want  to  know. 

The  Chairman.  Do  you  know  any  Communist  in  the  military 
today  ? 

Major  Peress.  I  again  claim  the  privilege. 

The  Chairman.  How  much  of  your  salary,  if  any,  do  you  contribute 
to  the  Communist  Party  ? 

Major  Peress.  I  again  claim  the  privilege  for  the  same  reason. 

The  Chairman.  Did  you  attend  a  Communist  Party  meeting  within 
the  last  week  ? 

Major  Peress.  I  again  claim  the  privilege. 

The  Chairman.  Have  you  attempted  to  recruit  soldiers  into  the 
Communist  Party  in  the  last  week? 

Major  Peress.  I  again  claim  the  privilege. 

The  Chairman.  Is  there  a  Communist  cell  at  Camp  Kilmer  of  which 
you  are  a  member  ? 

Major  Peress.  I  again  claim  the  privilege. 

The  Chairman.  Did  you  not  organize  a  Communist  cell  at  Camp 
Kilmer? 

Major  Peress.  I  again  claim  the  privilege. 

The  Chairman.  Do  you  think  Communists  should  be  commissioned 
in  our  military? 

Major  Peress.  I  again  claim  the  privilege. 

The  Chairman.  You  are  not  entitled  to  any  privilege  on  that  ques- 
tion.   You  are  ordered  to  answer. 


116  COMMUNIST    INFILTRATION   IN    THE    ARMY 

Major  Peress.  Do  I  think  Communists  should  be  commissioned  in 
the  Army,  I  haven't  thought  about  it.  I  don't  feel  one  way  or  the 
other. 

The  Chairman.  Do  you  think  if  the  Army  finds  out  you  are  an  or- 
ganizer for  the  Communist  Party,  organizing  a  cell,  soliciting  soldiers 
in  the  party,  they  should  oust  you  from  the  Army  or  leave  you  in  or 
do  you  have  any  opinion  on  that? 

Major  Peress.  I  feel  I  haven't  any  opinion ;  that  that  is  a  policy  for 
the  Army  to  say. 

Mr.  Cohn.  I  meant  to  ask  this.  Is  the  psychiatric  treatment  of  your 
wife  and  daughter  continuing  up  to  the  present  time? 

Major  Peress.  Yes. 

Mr.  Cohn.  Continuing  steadily  without  interruption? 

Major  Peress.  Yes,  sir. 

Mr.  Cohn.  What  is  the  name  of  the  doctor  who  gives  that  psychi- 
atric treatment  ?    Do  you  recall  that  ? 

Major  Peress.  I  am  not  sure.  I  know  it  is  connected  with  NYU. 
There  is  a  clinic  at  NYU.    I  don't  know  if  it  is  affiliated  with  NYU. 

The  Chairman.  You  don't  know  the  name  of  the  doctor  who  has 
been  treating  your  wife  a  year  or  two. 

Major  Peress.  There  has  been  more  than  one  physician  involved. 

The  Chairman.  What  was  the  name  of  the  first  one  you  knew  ? 

Major  Peress.  I  am  not  sure. 

The  Chairman.  You  are  not  sure.  You  are  not  sure  of  the  name 
of  any  doctor  or  psychiatrist  who  treated  your  wife  for  an  ailment 
so  serious  ? 

Major  Peress.  Dr.  Schecter  was  involved.  I  think  he  is  treating 
my  daughter,  and  Dr.  Gerwin,  who,  I  think,  is  treating  my  wife,  or 
the  other  way  around.  One  is  treating  my  wife  and  the  other  my 
daughter. 

The  Chairman.  Now,  when  was  the  last  treatment  for  either  your 
wife  or  daughter? 

Major  Peress.  Tuesday  and  Friday  they  go. 

The  Chairman.  And  what  doctor  was  treating  your  wife  and 
daughter  at  the  time  you  received  this  change  of  orders? 

Major  Peress.  It  is  a  German  name.    I  don't  recall. 

The  Chairman.  Where  is  his  office  ? 

Major  Peress.  It  is  in  the  midwest  Manhattan  section,  and  I  be- 
lieve in  the  eighties. 

The  Chairman.  How  long  before  the  application  for  change  of 
orders  was  your  wife  and  daughter  being  treated  for  this  psychiatric 
ailment? 

Major  Peress.  I  couldn't  say  for  sure.  My  wife,  I  believe,  had  been 
seeing  this  doctor  for  a  year  or  2  years. 

The  Chairman.  How  long  had  your  daughter  been  taking  treat- 
ments ? 

Major  Peress.  It  may  have  been  at  the  age  of  4  or  3%  or  4^2- 

The  Chairman.  You  say  you  refuse  to  tell  us  whether  or  not  a 
Communist  helped  to  get  this  change  of  orders  ? 

Major  Peress.  Under  the  privilege. 

The  Chairman.  You  will  be  ordered  to  appear  in  Washington,  in 
room  357,  Senate  Office  Building,  on  the  16th  of  February. 

(The  chief  counsel  consults  with  the  chairman.) 


COMMUNIST    INFILTRATION   IN    THE    ARMY  117 

We  will  change  that  place  and  date  to  the  18th  of  February  in  New 
York  City,  in  this  courthouse.  Now,  I  don't  know  what  room  here  it 
will  be.  Counsel  will  notify  your  lawyer  what  room,  and  make  that 
10 :  30  in  the  morning,  unless  your  counsel  is  notified  of  a  different  time. 

Mr.  Faulkner.  Will  that  be  executive  session  ? 

The  Chairman.  That  will  be  public  session. 

Mr.  Faulkner.  I  think  the  record  should  show  the  witness  appeared 
here  voluntarily  without  subpena.    Will  he  be  subpenaed? 

The  Chairman.  He  is  ordered  now. 

Mr.  Cohn.  You  understand  if  a  man  is  notified  to  appear  before  a 
congressional  committee  and  given  sufficient  time,  regardless  of 
whether  he  is  notified  by  telephone,  telegram,  or  formal  subpena,  that 
is  a  subpena.     Now,  if  you  prefer — sometimes  counsel  prefers  subpena. 

Mr.  Faulkner.  That  is  what  I  am  coming  to.  The  witness,  being 
in  the  Armed  Forces,  I  think  a  subpena 

Mr.  Cohn.  We  will  be  glad  to  do  that. 

The  Chairman.  Now,  Counsel,  the  committee  would  like  to  look  at 
the  correspondence  of  the  witness  relating  to  military  service  and 
various  assignments  he  had.    I  assume  he  has  that  with  him. 

Mr.  Cohn.  We  just  want  to  look  at  it.  We  will  return  it.  We  will 
have  a  copy  made  if  we  need  it. 

Mr.  Faulkner.  This  has  been  turned  over  to  me  as  counsel,  and  as 
his  counsel  I  am  not  prepared  to  turn  it  over.    It  is  confidential. 

Mr.  Cohn.  He  can't  make  it  a  confidential  privilege  merely  because 
he  turns  it  over  to  you.  If  it  is  under  his  control  and  in  his  possession, 
lie  has  to  produce  it.    This  is  clearly  under  his  control. 

Mr.  Faulkner.  On  the  other  hand,  I  don't  see  why  he  should  have 
any  objection  to  that.  Everything  we  have  here  you  have  a  copy  of  in 
the  files.  These  are  just  copies  of  letters  going  back  to  1940,  if  you  are 
interested  in  1940. 

Mr.  Cohn.  All  we  will  do  is  have  an  investigator  look  through  it. 
Why  don't  you  stay  there  with  them  to  see  that  nothing  is  removed. 
If  anything  is  of  sufficient  importance,  arrangements  will  be  made  with 
you  to  have  it  photostated,  so  you  will  be  sure  to  have  it  back. 

Major  Peress.  These  forms  I  filled  out  when  I  entered  service,  that 
I  believe  is  confidential  between  me  and  the  Army. 

The  Chairman.  There  is  nothing  confidential  between  a  member 
of  the  Communist  Party  and  the  Army  when  the  committee  is 
investigating. 

Major  Peress.  I  just  made  copies  of  them. 

The  Chairman.  Anything  in  the  hands  of  the  Communist  Party  is 
no  longer  confidential,  because  being  in  the  Communist  Party,  if  they 
tell  you  to  turn  things  over  to  the  Communist  Party,  you  know  you  are 
bound  to  do  it,  so  we  don't  give  the  Communist  Party  any  special 
privilege  before  this  committee.  The  witness  is  ordered  to  turn  the 
papers  over  to  counsel. 

In  case  any  questions  arise,  have  the  record  show  that  the  major  has 
the  material  in  his  hands  and  will  turn  it  over  to  his  lawyer  and  he  will 
produce  it. 

You  haven't  been  asked  to  resign,  have  you  ? 

Major  Peress.  Yes,  I  have. 

The  Chairman.  Who  asked  you  ? 

Major  Peress.  Colonel  Moore.  I  am  not  sure  of  that  name.  It 
might  be  some  other  name. 


118  COMMUNIST    INFILTRATION   IN    THE    ARMY 

The  Chairman.  Did  you  refuse  to  resign  ? 

Major  Peress.  No,  I  accepted  the  request.  I  have  a  day  of  termina- 
tion. 

The  Chairman.  What  date  are  you  due  to  resign  ? 

Major  Peress.  It  is  no  later  than  the  31st  of  March,  but  I  can  move 
it  up  if  I  so  desire. 

The  Chairman.  You  are  being  given  an  honorable  discharge? 

Major  Peress.  I  haven't  been  given 

The  Chairman.  So  far  as  you  know,  you  are  being  allowed  to  resign 
with  no  reflection  on  your  record  ? 

Major  Peress.  There  was  no  discussion  of  that. 

The  Chairman.  Why  were  you  asked  to  resign  ? 

Major  Peress.  They  wouldn't  tell  me  the  reason. 

The  Chairman.  Did  you  ever  refuse  to  resign? 

Major  Peress.  No,  I  was  never  requested  to  before. 

The  Chairman.  When  were  you  requested  to  resign? 

Major  Peress.  A  week  ago  today. 

The  Chairman.  In  other  words,  you  were  asked  to  resign  after  you 
were  ordered  to  appear  before  this  committee? 

Major  Peress.  I  was  ordered  to  come  before  this  committee  yester- 
day morning. 

Mr.  Cohn.  That  was  the  first  time  you  had  ever  been  asked  to 
resign? 

Major  Peress.  The  first  time  was  a  week  ago  this  morning  at  11 
o'clock. 

The  Chairman.  O.  K.,  you  may  step  down. 

(Whereupon,  the  hearing  adjourned  at  11 :  30  a.  m.) 


COMMUNIST  INFILTRATION  IN  THE  AEMY 


THURSDAY,   FEBRUARY   18,    1954 

United  States  Senate, 
Permanent  Subcommittee  on  Investigations  of  the 

Committee  on  Government  Operations, 

New  York,  N.  Y. 

The  subcommittee  met  at  10 :  45  a.  m.,  pursuant  to  notice,  in  room 
110,  United  States  court  house,  Foley  Square,  New  York,  N.  Y.,  Sen- 
ator Josephy  R.  McCarthy  (chairman)  presiding. 

Present :  Senator  Joseph  R.  McCarthy,  Republican,  Wisconsin. 

Also  present :  Roy  M.  Colin,  chief  counsel ;  Daniel  G.  Buckley,  assis- 
tant counsel;  James  N.  Juliana,  investigator;  Harold  Rainville,  ad- 
ministrative assistant  to  Senator  Dirksen ;  and  Robert  Jones,  admin- 
istrative assistant  to  Senator  Potter. 

The  Chairman.  The  committee  will  come  to  order. 

I  am  going  to  have  to  ask  the  indulgence  of  the  photographers 
this  morning.  I  am  going  to  have  to  ask  you  to  move  back  from  the 
table  and  take  no  pictures  of  the  first  witness  until  after  she  has 
testified.  She  has  some  very  bad  experiences  with  the  Communist 
Party  and  she  is  very  nervous.  I  am  going  to  ask  that  no  lights  be 
turned  on  the  first  witness  until  after  she  has  finished  testifying.  I 
wonder  if  the  photographers  will  step  aside  until  after  she  has  testi- 
fied, and  then  you  can  get  all  the  pictures  you  like. 

I  want  to  make  it  clear  this  is  not  any  specific  request  on  her  part, 
but  she  is  highly  nervous  and  highly  excitable.  I  wonder  if  you  would 
even  take  the  cameras  off  the  table,  and  turn  the  lights  off  the  chair, 
also.    I  know  you  are  here  to  do  your  job,  but  this  is  a  special  situation. 

I  wonder  if  you  would  be  sworn.  In  this  matter  now  in  hearing 
before  this  committee,  do  you  solemnly  swear  to  tell  the  truth,  the 
whole  truth,  and  nothing  but  the  truth,  so  help  you  God  ? 

Miss  Eagle.  I  do. 

TESTIMONY  OF  MISS  RUTH  EAGLE,  NEW  YORK  CITY  POLICE 

DEPARTMENT 

Mr.  Cohn.  Miss  Eagle,  I  would  like  for  you  to  sit  forward,  just 
relax  and  sit  forward,  and  talk  into  the  microphones  so  we  can  hear 
you  better,  and  be  at  ease.    Is  your  name  Ruth  Eagle  ? 

Miss  Eagle.  Yes. 

Mr.  Cohn.  And  are  you  a  policewoman  with  the  New  York  City 
Police  Department  ? 

Miss  Eagle.  I  am. 

Mr.  Cohn.  For  how  long  a  period  of  time  have  you  been  ? 

Miss  Eagle.  Eleven  years. 

38794— 54— pt.  3 3  119 


120  COMMUNIST    INFILTRATION   IN    THE    ARMY 

The  Chairman.  Eleven  years? 

Miss  Eagle.  Eleven  years. 

Mr.  Cohn.  Miss  Eagle,  during  the  11  years  you  have  been  a  police- 
woman with  the  New  York  City  Police  Department,  have  you  at  any 
time  had  a  special  assignment? 

Miss  Eagle.  Yes,  I  have. 

Mr.  Cohn.  And  what  was  that  special  assignment? 

Miss  Eagle.  I  was  assigned  to  special  squad  1. 

Mr.  Cohn.  And  what  did  you  do  when  you  were  assigned  to  special 
squad  1? 

Miss  Eagle.  I  became  a  member  of  the  Communist  Party. 

Mr.  Cohn.  You  became  a  member  of  the  Communist  Party  ? 

Miss  Eagle.  I  did. 

Mr.  Cohn.  And  for  how  long  a  period  of  time  did  you  remain  a 
member  of  the  Communist  Party  ? 

Miss  Eagle.  Two  and  a  half  years. 

Mr.  Cohn.  During  the  2,y2  years  that  you  were  a  member  of  the 
Communist  Party,  did  you  participate  in  all  the  usual  Communist 
activities,  such  as  attending  meetings  and  paying  dues? 

Miss  Eagle.  I  did. 

The  Chairman.  May  I  interrupt.  I  think  you  should  make  it  clear 
that  she  was  a  member  of  the  Communist  Partjr  at  the  order  of  the 
police  department. 

Mr.  Cohn.  This  was  your  assignment  for  the  New  York  City  Police 
Department?     Is  that  right? 

Miss  Eagle.  Yes,  it  was. 

Mr.  Cohn.  While  you  were  in  the  party,  did  you  submit  reports  to 
the  New  York  Police  Department  concerning  the  knowledge  you  had 
gained  about  the  Communist  Party,  who  its  members  were,  and  what 
its  activities  were? 

Miss  Eagle.  I  did. 

Mr.  Cohn.  Were  those  reports  written  reports  ? 

Miss  Eagle.  They  were. 

Mr.  Cohn.  Have  you,  within  the  last  few  days,  at  the  request  of 
the  committee,  reviewed  those  written  reports  which  you  made  when 
you  were  in  the  Communist  Party  for  the  police  department? 

Miss  Eagle.  Yes ;  I  have. 

Mr.  Cohn.  You  have  studied  them ;  is  that  right  ? 

Miss  Eagle.  Yes. 

Mr.  Cohn.  Can  you  tell  us,  from  those  written  reports,  whether  or 
not,  while  in  the  Communist  Party,  you  knew  a  man  named  Irving 
Peress  ? 

Miss  Eagle.  I  came  in  contact  with  Irving  Peress. 

Mr.  Cohn.  Was  he  amember  of  the  Communist  Party  ? 

Miss  Eagle.  He  appeared  at  our  club  meetings  and  I  believed  that 
he  was  at  that  time. 

Mr.  Cohn.  And  did  you  also  know  Mrs.  Peress  to  be  a  member  of 
the  Communist  Party,  Elaine  Peress  ? 

Miss  Eagle.  I  came  in  contact  with  Elaine  Peress  at  the  club 
meetings ;  yes. 

Mr.  Cohn.  As  a  Communist? 

Miss  Eagle.  As  a  member  of  the  club. 

The  Chairman.  In  other  words,  there  was  no  doubt  in  your  mind 
then,  and  no  doubt  in  your  mind  now,  that  they  were  both  full-fledged 


COMMUNIST    INFILTRATION   IN    THE    ARMY  121 

members  of  the  Communist  Party,  and  you  so  reported  to  the  police 
department  ? 

Miss  Eagle.  That  is  my  recollection.  I  believed  they  were  mem- 
bers ;  yes. 

Mr.  Cohn.  And  did  you  refer  to  Peress  and  Mrs.  Peress  throughout 
your  reports  as  Comrade  Peress? 
Miss  Eagle.  I  believe  I  did. 

Mr.  Cohn.  Did  you,  in  your  written  reports  to  the  police  depart- 
ment, refer  to  various  Communist  meetings  you  had  attended  with 
Comrade  Peress? 

Miss  Eagle.  To  the  best  of  my  recollection ;  yes,  I  did. 
The  Chairman.  May  I  interrupt,  Miss  Eagle,  and  tell  you  that 
this  committee  has  tremendous  respect  for  individuals  like  yourself 
who  have  been  willing  to  submit  themselves  to  the  public  censure, 
the  difficulty  they  get  into  with  their  neighbors,  all  the  unpleasant 
things  incident  to  being  a  member  of  the  Communist  Party.  I  think 
the  person  who  does  what  you  did  shows  a  very  rare  and  very  impor- 
tant type  of  courage.  If  we  did  not  have  people  like  you  who  are 
willing  to  submit  themselves  to  this  abuse,  to  be  undercover  agents  for 
the  police  department,  for  the  FBI,  we  would  have  10  times  as  much 
difficulty  digging  out  the  members  of  this  giant  conspiracy. 

I  just  want  you  to  know  that  you,  and  people  like  you,  have  the 
tremendous  respect  of  this  committee.     I  think  you  are  deserving  of 
the  undying  gratitude  of  the  American  people. 
Miss  Eagle.  Thank  you. 

Mr.  Cohn.  Miss  Eagle,  did  your  reports  refer  to  the  fact  that  Com- 
rade Irving  Peress  acted  as  sort  of  liaison  between  this  Communist 
cell  and  the  American  Labor  Party  ? 

Miss  Eagle.  To  the  best  of  my  recollection ;  yes. 
Mr.  Cohn.  And  did  he  come  with  lists  of  American  Labor  Party 
members  who  were  Communists  and  seek  certain  information  and 
other  things  along  those  lines,  from  the  Communist  Club,  according 
to  your  reports  ? 

Miss  Eagle.  To  the  best  of  my  recollection,  he  presented  such  a 
list  to  me. 

Mr.  Cohn.  To  you  personally ;  is  that  right  ? 
Miss  Eagle.  Yes. 

Mr.  Cohn.  Of  American  Labor  Party  members  he  was  organizing, 
and  he  indicated  on  the  list  those  who  were  also  members  of  the  Com- 
munist Party? 
Mr.  Eagle.  Yes. 

Mr.  Cohn.  Without  going  into  detail  here.     I  believe  your  reports 
further  reflect  the  fact  that  Comrade  Peress  attended  what  was  known 
as  the  leadership  training  course  of  the  party  at  club  headquarters, 
139  Dyckman  Street;  is  that  correct? 
Miss  Eagle.  On  one  occasion ;  yes. 

Mr.  Cohn.  On  one  occasion.  You  attended  a  course  in  the  leader- 
ship training  course  with  Peress,  and  that  is  reported  in  your  reports ; 
is  that  right  ? 

Miss  Eagle.  It  is. 

Mr.  Cohn.  At  these  various  meetings,  I  notice  here,  matters  were 
discussed  concerning  the  strategy  and  the  tactics  of  the  party,  such 
as  class  struggle,  and  I  note  on  one  occasion  here  you  reported  that 
Comrade  Elaine  Peress  concluded  that  in  spite  of  the  temporary  pro- 


122  COMMUNIST    INFILTRATION    IN    THE    ARMY 

gram  of  the  party,  the  class  struggle  could  never  be  suspended  by  the 
Communist  Party  since  it  was  an  inherent  part  of  the  Communist 
program;  is  that  right? 

Miss  Eagle.  If  it  is  in  the  report ;  yes,  that  is  right. 

Mr.  Cohn.  And  at  the  end  of  each  report  you  filed,  when  you  had 
attended  Communist  meetings  with  Peress  or  when  he  had  engaged 
in  other  Communist  activities,  you  would  at  the  end  of  the  report  set 
forth  his  name,  among  the  others;  is  that  right? 

Miss  Eagle.  Yes ;  I  did. 

Mr.  Cohn.  And  we  thus  find  the  name  Irving  Peress  at  the  end  of 
each  report. 

The  last  thing  I  want  to  ask  you  is  this,  Policewoman  Eagle :  Since 
you  filed  these  reports,  and  they  go  back  to  1944,  as  far  as  you  know, 
they  have  been  available  at  all  times  to  the  Army  or  any  duly  author- 
ized agency  which  can  be  in  contact  with  the  New  York  City  Police 
Department;  is  that  right? 

Miss  Eagle.  I  submitted  them  to  the  police  department.  I  don't 
know 

Mr.  Cohn.  They  have  been  on  file  as  far  as  you  know  ever  since  that 
time  available  to  whatever  appropriate  agencies  the  police  depart- 
ment has  contact  with  ? 

Miss  Eagle.  I  have  no  special  knowledge  of  that. 

Mr.  Cohn.  Your  knowledge  is  that  you  filed  these  reports  with  the 
police  department,  and  that  they  have  been  available  at  all  times,  and 
when  you  went  to  review  them  this  week  you  found  them  there  in  their 
original  form ;  is  that  correct  ? 

Miss  Eagle.  That  is  right. 

Mr.  Cohn.  Miss  Eagle.  I  am  not  going  to  go  into  this  any  further, 
except  to  say  this :  There  came  a  time,  did  there  not,  when  the  Com- 
munists found  out  that  you  had  been  in  the  police  department  and 
there  came  a  time  when  they  gained  that  knowledge;  is  that  right? 

Miss  Eagle.  Yes. 

Mr.  Cohn.  And  after  that,  you  suffered  some  very  unpleasant  expe- 
riences at  the  hands  of  the  Communists,  is  that  right? 

Miss  Eagle.  Yes.  Unpleasant  experiences  which  I  believe  had  some 
connection  with  the  work,  yes. 

Mr.  Cohn.  And  in  which  various  actions  were  attempted  against 
vou  and  your  house  and  property  and  things  along  that  line  ?  Is  that 
right? 

Miss  Eagle.  There  were  such  incidents,  that  is  right. 

Mr.  Cohn.  I  have  nothing  further. 

The  Chairman.  I  think  that  is  all.    I  want  to  thank  you  very  much. 

Mr.  Irving  Peress?    Major  Peress? 

Mr.  Faulkner.  My  client  refuses  to  be  photographed  or  televised, 
Senator.    He  is  not  on  exhibition. 

The  Chairman.  If  your  client  does  not  want  to  be  televised,  he  has 
a  right  to  refuse. 

Mr.  Faulkner.  Or  photographed. 

The  Chairman.  He  does  not  have  to  be  photographed.  He  will  not 
be  photographed  while  he  is  in  this  courtroom.  We  have  no  jurisdic- 
tion of  the  corridors,  you  understand.  The  photographers  will  not 
photograph  the  major. 

Will  your  stand  and  raise  your  right  hand,  Major? 

Mr.  Peress.  I  am  not  a  major,  sir. 


COMMUNIST    INFILTRATION    IN    THE    ARMY  123 

The  Chairman.  "Will  you  raise  your  right  hand?  In  this  matter 
now  in  hearing  before  this  committee,  do  you  solemnly  swear  to  tell 
the  truth,  the  whole  truth,  and  nothing  but  the  truth,  so  help  you  God? 

Mr.  Peress.  I  do. 

TESTIMONY  OF  IRVING  PERESS  (ACCOMPANIED  BY  HIS  COUNSEL, 
STANLEY  FAULKNER,  NEW  YORK  CITY) 

The  Chairman.  You  said  you  were  not  a  major.  When  did  you 
last  have  the  rank  of  major? 

Mr.  Peress.  I  would  like,  if  possible,  to  make  a  statement  before 
testifying  before  the  committee.  I  have  a  brief  statement  I  would 
like  to  make.  I  will  answer  the  question.  I  stopped  being  a  major 
February  2,  1954. 

The  Chairman.  February  2,  1954? 

Mr.  Peress.  May  I  read  a  statement  before  the  committee? 

The  Chairman.  If  you  have  a  statement  your  attorney  is  aware  of 
the  rules  of  the  committee.  The  statement  must  be  submitted  24  hours 
in  advance.  In  other  words,  if  you  will  hand  the  statement  up,  we 
will  glance  at  it  and  see  whether  you  can  read  it.  If  it  is  pertinent  to 
the  hearing,  you  will  be  allowed  to  read  it. 

(Document  handed  to  chairman.) 

The  Chairman.  You  may  read  it.    Is  this  an  extra  copy? 

Mr.  Peress.  Yes. 

I  have  been  subpenaed  to  appear  before  this  committee  presumably 
to  answer  certain  questions  concerning  my  political  beliefs,  both  past 
and  present.  So  that  there  may  be  no  mistake  about  my  position  in 
this  regard,  I  shall  decline  to  answer  any  such  questions  under  the 
protection  of  the  fifth  amendment  to  our  Constitution. 

The  Chairman.  May  I  interrupt  you  there?  You  are  not  being 
subpenaed  to  answer  in  regard  to  your  political  beliefs.  You  are  here 
to  answer  in  regard  to  the  part  you  played  while  an  officer  in  the 
United  States  Army  in  the  conspiracy  designed  to  destroy  this  Nation. 
That  is  what  you  are  being  called  about.  You  are  not  being  asked 
about  any  of  your  political  beliefs.  You  will  not  be  asked  about  any 
political  beliefs. 

You  may  proceed. 

Mr.  Peress.  From  my  earliest  schooling  I  have  been  taught  that  the 
United  States  Constitution  is  the  highest  law  of  our  land  and  that  one 
of  the  strongest  provisions  is  the  protection  afforded  to  all  persons  of 
the  privilege  under  the  fifth  amendment.  My  education  has  also 
taught  me  that  anyone,  even  a  United  States  Senator,  who  would  deny 
this  constitutional  protection  to  any  individual  or  who  under  his  cloak 
of  his  immunity  would  draw  inferences  therefrom,  and  publicly  an- 
nounce such  inferences,  is  subversive.  I  use  that  word  advisedly.  By 
subversive  I  mean  anyone  who  would  undermine  the  strength  of  the 
Constitution  and  thereby  weaken  our  democratic  form  of  government. 
When  I  appeared  before  you,  Senator  McCarthy,  on  January  30,  1954, 
at  an  executive  session  of  your  committee,  you,  acting  as  a  committee 
of  one,  made  certain  charges  concerning  my  promotion  in  rank  and 
pending  honorable  discharge.  Just  to  make  the  record  clear,  I  was 
promoted  and  honorably  discharged  under  Public  Law  84  of  the  83d 
Congress,  which  incidentally  was  passed  when  you,  Senator  McCarthy, 
were  a  Member  of  the  Senate.     In  recognition  of  my  honest  and  faith- 


124  COMMUNIST    INFILTRATION   IN    THE    ARMY 

fill  service  to  my  country  I  was  awarded  an  honorable  discharge  on 
February  2,  1954.  In  the  period  of  my  service,  no  one  either  within 
or  without  found  it  necessary  to  question  my  loyalty. 

Another  bit  of  schooling  which  I  had  as  a  Jew  was  a  study  of  the 
Old  Testament,  which  I  highly  recommend  to  you,  Senator,  and  your 
counsel,  and  particularly  Book  7  of  the  Psalms,  which  reads: 

His  mischief  shall  return  upon  his  own  head  and  his  violence  shall  come  down 
upon  his  own  pate. 

The  Chairman.  Major,  you  just  heard  a  policewoman  for  the  city 
of  New  York  testify  that  you  attended  a  Communist  leadership  school. 
Is  that  testimony  on  her  part  true  or  false? 

Mr.  Peress.  I  must  decline  to  answer  that  question,  Senator,  under 
the  protection  of  the  fifth  amendment  on  the  ground  that  it  might  tend 
to  incriminate  me.  I  would  also  like  to  say,  Senator,  that  I  am  not  a 
major.     The  title  is  "Dr.  Peress,"  not  "Major  Peress." 

The  Chairman.  Let  me  make  this  very  clear:  You  have  been  ac- 
cused, Major,  of  the  most  dishonest,  the  worst  conduct  that  anyone  in 
the  Army  can  be  guilty  of.  You  have  been  accused  under  oath  of 
being  a  member  of  a  conspiracy  designed  to  destroy  this  Nation  by 
force  and  violence.  You  are  here  this  morning,  you  are  given  an  op- 
portunity under  oath,  to  tell  us  whether  or  not  those  charges  are  true 
or  false.  If  you  are  a  part  of  this  treasonous  conspiracy,  if  you  have 
attended  leadership  schools  of  the  Communist  conspiracy,  obviously 
3tou  will  take  the  protection  of  the  fifth  amendment.  If  you  are  inno- 
cent, you  will  tell  us  that.  Now,  let  me  ask  you  this  question :  Is  it 
true  that  as  of  this  moment  and  during  all  the  time  that  you  were  an 
officer  in  the  United  States  Army,  you  were  an  active  member  of  the 
Communist  conspiracy  ? 

(The  witness  conferred  with  his  counsel.) 

The  Chairman.  At  the  time  you  received  your  commission  in  the 
Army,  were  you  a  section  organizer  for  the  Communist  conspiracy  ? 

(The  witness  conferred  with  his  counsel.) 

Mr.  Peress.  I  claim  the  privilege. 

The  Chairman.  What  privilege  ? 

Mr.  Peress.  The  privilege  to  decline  to  answer  under  the  fifth 
amendment. 

The  Chairman.  On  the  ground  of  self-incrimination? 

Mr.  Peress.  On  the  ground  that  it  might  tend  to  incriminate  me. 

The  Chairman.  At  the  time  you  were  promoted  from  captain  to 
major,  were  you  then  an  active,  knowing  member  of  the  Communist 
conspiracy  ? 

Mr.  Peress.  I  claim  the  privilege. 

The  Chairman.  You  will  have  to  tell  us  each  time  under  what 
privilege. 

Mr.  Peress.  I  must  decline  to  answer  that  question  under  the  pro- 
tection of  the  fifth  amendment  on  the  ground  that  it  might  tend  to 
incriminate  me. 

The  Chairman.  All  right. 

Did  you  hold  Communist  meetings  in  your  home  while  you  were 
an  officer  in  the  United  States  Army  ? 

Mr.  Peress.  I  claim  the  first  amendment  on  the  ground  that  it 
might  tend  to  incriminate  me. 

The  Chairman.  Who  signed  your  honorable  discharge? 


COMMUNIST    INFILTRATION   EST    THE    ARMY  125 

Mr.  Peress.  John  J.  McManus,  major,  Infantry. 
The  Chairman.  Is  that  your  discharge  ? 
Mr.  Peress.  That  is  a  photostat  of  it. 
The  Chairman.  Will  you  hand  it  up  ? 
(Document  handed  to  the  chairman.) 

The  Chairman.  Where  is  John  J.  McManus  located  ? 

Mr.  Peress.  I  have  no  idea. 

The  Chairman.  Who  notified  you  that  you  would  receive  an  honor- 
able discharge? 

Mr.  Peress.  I  don't  believe  I  was  officially  notified.  It  was  just 
tendered  to  me  when  I  left. 

The  Chairman.  It  was  handed  to  you  ? 

Mr.  Peress.  Yes ;  as  part  of  my  records. 

The  Chairman.  Let's  have  the  record  show  that  this  is  signed 
February  2, 1954.     This  was  handed  to  you  on  what  date  ? 

Mr.  Peress.  February  2,  1954. 

The  Chairman.  Let  us  have  the  record  show  that  this  was  signed 
and  handed  to  this  fifth  amendment  Communist,  Major  Peress,  after  I 
had  written  the  Secretary  of  the  Army  suggesting  that  he  be  court- 
martialed,  suggesting  that  everyone  having  anything  to  do  with  his 
promotion,  with  his  change  of  orders,  be  court-martialed.  I  did  that 
feeling  that  this  would  be  one  way  to  notify  all  the  officers  in  the 
Army  and  all  the  enlisted  men,  that  there  has  been  a  new  day  in  the 
Army,  that  the  20  years  of  treason  have  ended,  and  that  no  officer  in 
the  Army  can  protect  traitors,  can  protect  Communists.  I  want  the 
record  to  show  this  was  given  to  you  after  that  letter  had  been  made 
public,  before  the  Secretary  of  the  Army,  Robert  Stevens,  returned 
to  the  United  States.  I  ask,  Mr.  Adams,  where  is  John  J.  McManus 
now  ? 

Mr.  John  Adams  (legal  counsel  to  Department  of  the  Army,  Wash- 
ington, D.  C).  I  don't  know,  Mr.  Chairman.  I  presume  he  is  an 
officer  in  headquarters,  First  Army. 

The  Chairman.  Will  we  have  to  subpena  him,  or  will  he  be  pro- 
duced ? 

Mr.  Adams.  He  will  be  produced. 

The  Chairman.  Good.  We  will  want  him  in  executive  session  this 
afternoon,  unless  he  feels  that  he  needs  additional  time  to  get  a  lawyer 
to  represent  him.  If  he  wants  additional  time,  we  will  give  him  any 
time  that  is  within  reason  that  he  wants.  If  he  doesn't  need  time  to 
get  a  lawyer,  I  want  him  here  this  afternoon  at  2 :  30  o'clock,  in  ex- 
ecutive session. 

Have  you  met  John  J.  McManus  ? 

Mr.  Peress.  Not  to  my  knowledge. 

The  Chairman.  Who  handed  you  this  honorable  discharge  ? 

Mr.  Peress.  I  am  not  sure.  I  think  it  was  a  sergeant  at  the  separa- 
tion center.     I  don't  know — or  it  could  have  been  a  warrant  officer. 

The  Chairman.  Who  is  the  highest  ranking  officer  with  whom  you 
spoke  after  your  appearance  before  the  committee? 

Mr.  Peress.  General  Zwicker. 

The  Chairman.  General  Zwicker?  What  conversation  did  you 
have  with  General  Zwicker? 

(The  witness  conferred  with  his  counsel.) 

Mr.  Peress.  Would  you  repeat  that  question,  please  ? 

The  Chairman.  Will  the  reporter  read  the  question  ? 


126  COMMUNIST    INFILTRATION    LN    THE    ARMY 

(The  reporter  read  from  his  notes  as  requested.) 

Mr.  Peress.  I  don't  recall  the  exact  word-for-word  conversation.  I 
requested  of  General  Z wicker,  after  the  hearing  before  you  on  Janu- 
ary 30,  when  I  saw  him  on  February  1,  that  an  inquiry  be  made  into 
these  charges,  that  the  newspapers  had  lambasted  me  with  on  Sunday 
and  Monday. 

The  Chairman.  Did  you  tell  him  whether  or  not  you  were  a  Com- 
munist? 

(The  witness  conferred  with  his  counsel.) 

Mr.  Peress.  I  decline  to  answer  that  question  on  the  grounds 

The  Chairman.  You  wanted  an  inquiry  made  as  to  whether  or  not 
you  are  a  Communist;  is  that  correct? 

(The  witness  conferred  with  his  counsel.) 

Mr.  Peress.  I  wanted  an  inquiry  of  my  conduct  at  Camp  Kilmer. 

The  Chairman.  Did  you  want  the  inquiry  to  include  the  question 
of  whether  or  not  you  had  been  holding  Communist  meetings  at  your 
home,  whether  you  had  attended  a  Communist  leadership  school, 
whether  you  had  been  recruiting  military  personnel  there  into  the 
Communist  conspiracy  ?     Did  you  want  that  included  ? 

(The  witness  conferred  with  his  counsel.) 

Mr.  Peress.  I  could  not  tell  them  what  to  inquire  about,  but  I  asked 
for  an  inquiry  of  the  charges  generally.  I  didn't  specify  as  to  which 
charges  to  inquire  into  and  which  not  to  inquire  into. 

The  Chairman.  Did  you  tell  them  whether  or  not  you  would  tell 
them  the  truth  if  they  made  such  an  inquiry  ? 

Mr.  Peress.  I  told  General  Zwicker,  as  you  asked  me,  that  I  would 
like  an  inquiry  into  the  charges.     I  didn't  tell  him  anything  further. 

The  Chairman.  They  made  an  inquiry  in  August,  did  they  not? 
They  sent  you  a  questionnaire.  They  came  to  the  best_  witness  they 
could  find  on  this,  assuming  a  Communist  is  a  gpod  witness.  They 
asked  you  practically  all  the  questions  this  committee  has  asked  you. 
They  asked  you  about  all  of  your  alleged  activities  in  this  Com- 
munist conspiracy.  That  was  in  the  inquiry.  Did  you  tell  them 
the  truth  at  that  time  ? 

(The  witness  conferred  with  his  counsel.) 

Mr.  Peress.  I  decline  to  answer  that  question  on  the  grounds  that 
it  might  tend  to  incriminate  me. 

The  Chairman.  Did  you  answer  the  questions  as  to  whether  or  not 
you  were  a  member  of  the  Communist  conspiracy  at  that  time? 

Mr.  Peress.  I  decline  to  answer. 

The  Chairman.  You  will  be  ordered  to  answer.  It  is  a  matter  of 
public  record.     You  cannot  decline. 

(The  witness  conferred  with  his  counsel.) 

Mr.  Peress.  If  it  is  a  matter  of  public  record,  then  I  decline  to 
answer. 

The  Chairman.  You  decline  to  answer?  You  decline  to  answer 
that? 

Mr.  Peress.  You  said  it  is  a  matter  of  public  record. 

The  Chairman.  Are  you  declining  to  answer? 

(The  witness  conferred  with  his  counsel.) 

Mr.  Peress.  Could  you  repeat  the  question,  please  ? 

The  Chairman.  The  reporter  will  read  it. 

(The  reporter  read  from  his  notes  as  requested.) 

Mr.  Peress.  I  decline  to  answer  that  question. 


COMMUNIST    INFILTRATION    IN    THE    ARMY  127 

The  Chairman.  Have  the  record  show,  so  that  there  can  be  no  claim 
of  lack  of  knowledge  at  a  future  legal  proceeding 

Mr.  Peress.  On  the  fifth  amendment. 

The  Chairman.  That  the  witness  was  asked  whether  or  not  he 
answered  an  Army  questionnaire,  as  to  whether  or  not  he  was  part 
of  the  Communist  conspiracy.  He  declined,  invoking  the  fifth  amend- 
ment. The  Chair  ordered  him  to  answer  on  the  grounds  that  this 
is  an  improper  invocation  of  the  fifth  amendment.  Have  the  record 
show  he  still  declines. 

(The  witness  conferred  with  his  counsel.) 

Mr.  Cohn.  Mr.  Chairman,  in  executive  session  this  witness,  after 
you  overruled  his  privilege,  did  answer  this  question  and  stated,  "I 
answered  the  questions  on  the  interrogatory  by  claiming  the  fifth 
amendment." 

In  other  words,  when  the  Army  submitted  interrogatories  to  this 
witness  in  August  he  refused  to  answer  to  the  Army  the  pertinent 
questions  on  Communist  activity,  and  claimed  the  fifth  amendment 
in  the  Army  inquiry  at  that  time. 

The  Chairman.  Thank  you,  Counsel,  for  calling  that  to  my  atten- 
tion. Have  the  record  show  that  an  additional  ground  for  the 
Chair's  ordering  him  to  answer  is  the  fact  that  he  has  already  waived 
the  fifth  amendment  privilege  as  to  this  area  of  investigation.  Have 
the  record  show  that  he  still  refuses  to  answer. 

In  November  1953,  were  you  promoted  to  major? 

Mr.  Peress.  Was  I  promoted  to  major  in  November  of  1953? 

The  Chairman.  Yes. 

Mr.  Peress.  Yes. 

The  Chairman.  Did  anyone  in  the  military,  between  August  1953 
and  January  of  1954,  ever  ask  you  about  any  alleged  Communist 
Party  activities  on  your  part  ? 

(The  witness  conferred  with  his  counsel.) 

Mr.  Peress.  Would  you  read  that  again,  please? 

(The  reporter  read  from  his  notes  as  requested.) 

Mr.  Peress.  I  decline  to  answer  that. 

The  Chairman.  You  are  ordered  to  answer. 

Mr.  Peress.  I  decline  on  the  grounds  of  the  fifth  amendment,  that 
the  answer  might  tend  to  incriminate  me. 

The  Chairman.  After  our  hearing  here  in  New  York,  I  believe  it 
was  about  2  weeks  ago,  I  read  a  statement  which  you  allegedly  made  to 
the  press,  to  the  effect  that  the  charges  that  you  were  a  Communist 
were  false.  Now,  I  know  that  you  fifth  amendment  Communists  sing 
a  different  tune  under  oath.  You  can  lie  as  much  as  you  like  when 
you  are  not  under  oath.  Do  you  want  to  tell  us  now  whether  or  not 
that  statement  to  the  press  was  a  lie,  or  whether  you  were  telling  the 
truth  when  you  told  the  press  you  were  not  a  Communist? 

(The  witness  conferred  with  his  counsel.) 

Mr.  Peress.  I  decline  to  answer  that  question  on  the  grounds  of  the 
fifth  amendment,  that  the  answer  might  tend  to  incriminate  me. 

The  Chairman.  You  are  entitled  to  the  privilege.  When  you  at- 
tended Communist  leadership  school,  were  you,  among  other  things, 
taught  the  necessity  of  the  destruction  of  our  Constitution,  including 
the  fifth  amendment  upon  which  you  rely  today  ? 


38794— 54— pt.  3- 


128  COMMUNIST    INFILTRATION    IN   THE    ARMY 

t 

Mr.  Peress.  I  decline  to  answer  that  question  under  the  protection 
of  the  fifth  amendment  to  the  Constitution  on  the  ground  that  the 
answer  might  tend  to  incriminate  me. 

The  Chairman.  Is  it  a  fact,  Mister,  that  you  have  attended  Com- 
munist schools,  leadership  schools,  you  spoke  there,  your  wife  spoke 
there,  you  advocated  the  destruction  of  the  Constitution,  you  advo- 
cated the  destruction  of  the  very  amendment  behind  which  you  so 
cowardly  hide  today  ?    Is  that  not  a  fact  ? 

Mr.  Peress.  I  decline  to  answer  that  question  on  the  grounds  that 
the  answer  might  tend  to  incriminate  me. 

The  Chairman.  You  are  entitled  to  decline  . 

I  may  say  that  if  you  were  an  officer  in  the  Russian  Army  instead 
of  the  United  States  Army,  if  you  were  charged  with  treason  against 
Communist  Russia,  you  would  not  have  any  fifth  amendment  there, 
Mister.    And  you  life  insurance  would  be  rather  high. 

(The  witness  conferred  with  his  counsel.) 

The  Chairman.  Mr.  Colin? 

Mr.  Cohn.  Mr.  Peress,  were  you,  when  commissioned  in  January  of 
1953,  section  organizer  for  the  Communist  Party  in  Queens  County  ? 

Mr.  Peress.  I  must  decline  to  answer  that  question  under  the  pro- 
tection of  the  fifth  amendment  on  the  ground  that  it  might  tend  to 
incriminate  me. 

The  Chairman.  While  you  were  in  the  Army,  did  you  contribute  a 
percentage  of  your  pay  to  the  Communist  Party  ? 

Mr.  Peress.  I  decline  again  on  the  same  privilege. 

Mr.  Cohn.  Did  you  attempt  to  recruit  any  military  personnel  into 
the  Communist  Party? 

Mr.  Peress.  I  decline  to  answer ;  the  same  privilege. 

The  Chairman.  Wil  you  speak  a  little  louder,  sir? 

Mr.  Peress.  I  decline  to  answer  the  question  under  the  protection 
of  the  fifth  amendment  on  the  grounds  that  it  might  tend  to  incrim- 
inate me.    Shall  I  go  through  that  whole  sentence  every  time,  Senator  ? 

The  Chairman.  If  that  is  what  you  are  relying  upon,  you  will  state 
the  grounds  for  your  refusal. 

Mr.  Cohn.  Did  you  ask  officers  stationed  with  you  to  attend  Com- 
munist Party  meetings  with  you  ? 

Mr.  Peress.  I  must  decline  to  answer  that  question  under  the  fifth 
amendment. 

Mr.  Cohn.  Did  you  make  a  contribution,  through  the  Daily  Worker, 
to  the  defense  fund  for  the  indicted  Communist  leaders? 

Mr.  Peress.  I  decline  to  answer  under  the  fifth  amendment. 

Mr.  Cohn.  I  will  hand  you  a  copy  of  page  12  of  the  Daily  Worker 
for  November  22, 1949,  and  direct  your  attention  to  an  article  entitled 
"Dollars  Keep  Coming  for  Defense  Fund."  It  concludes  with  a  state- 
ment from  the  Daily  Worker — "To  all  of  you  wonderful  people, 
thanks,  thanks  a  million."  There  is  a  short  list  of  names,  and  on  that 
list  of  names  is  the  name  Irv  Peress,  Queens.  I  would  like  for  you  to 
examine  that  and  tell  the  committee  whether  or  not  you  are  the  Irv 
Peress  of  Queens  who  received  this  commendation  from  the  Daily 
Worker  for  a  contribution  to  the  Communist  defense  fund. 

The  Chairman.  While  he  is  examining  that,  may  I  have  the  record 
show  that  Senator  Potter  is  represented  here  by  his  very  able  assistant, 
Robert  Jones.  Senator  Dirksen  is  represented  by  his  equally  able 
assistant,  Mr.  Rainville.     I  want  Mr.  Rainville  and  Mr.  Jones  to  know 


COMMUNIST    INFILTRATION    IN   THE    ARMY  129 

that  as  the  representatives  of  the  two  Senators,  you  have  the  same 
right  to  ask  questions  which  any  Senator  would  have. 

Mr.  Cohn.  Are  you  the  Irving  Peress  who  received  the  thanks  of 
the  Daily  Worker  for  this  contribution  to  the  Communist  defense 

fund?  .       .  , 

Mr.  Peress.  I  decline  to  answer  on  the  grounds  that  it  might  tend 

to  incriminate  me. 

The  Chairman.  Will  you  speak  a  little  louder? 

Mr.  Peress.  I  decline  to  answer. 

Mr.  Cohn.  Of  course,  Mr.  Chairman 

Mr.  Faulkner.  Did  you  read  into  the  record  that  this  is  dated 

The  Chairman.  We  will  not  hear  from  counsel.  If  you  want  any- 
thing read  into  the  record,  Mr.  Peress  can  read  it  in.  We  will  not 
hear  from  counsel.  I  may  say,  Mr.  Counsel,  that  this  rule  was  not 
made  for  you.  It  was  made  by  the  committee  and  made  unanimously. 
We  give  the  witness  the  right,  which  he  would  not  have  in  a  court,  a 
right  to  confer  with  counsel,  at  any  time  he  cares  to.  Counsel  can 
coach  him  in  his  answers,  which  is  a  right  he  would  not  have  in  court. 
We  do  not  allow  counsel  to  take  part  in  the  proceedings.  The  reason 
for  that  is  obvious.  And  I  am  not  speaking  about  you,  Mr.  Counsel, 
but  I  speak  about  the  general  situation.  If  we  allowed  Communist 
lawyers  to  take  part  in  a  filibuster  proceedings,  we  could  never  hold 
an  intelligible  hearing.  So  if  there  is  anything  you  want  to  say,  you 
will  have  to  abide  by  the  same  rule,  which  is  not  directed  against  you 
personally,  but  you  will  have  to  talk  through  your  client. 

Mr.  Faulkner.  May  I  say  something  on  that,  what  you  just  referred 
to,  Senator? 

The  Chairman.  No,  I  said  we  will  not  hear  from  counsel. 

Mr.  Faulkner.  Not  on  this  point.     That  is  all. 

The  Chairman.  I  will  not  hear  from  counsel  on  any  point.  I  did 
not  make  the  rule.  We  have  4  Republicans,  3  Democrats.  We  unani- 
mously passed  that  rule.  I  must  abide  by  that  rule  the  same  as  you 
must.  If  you  have  something  to  say,  you  can  tell  your  client  and  he 
will  say  it. 

(The  witness  conferred  with  his  counsel.) 

Mr.  Cohn.  Mr.  Chairman,  as  I  indicated  when  this  article  was  first 
referred  to,  I  read  the  date  into  the  record,  which  was  November  22, 
1949,  and  I  ask  that  this  entire  article  and  the  page  from  the  Daily 
Worker  be  received  into  evidence.  I  might  state  that  an  examina- 
tion of  the  article  indicates  that  Irv  Peress,  of  Queens,  had  sent  in  a 
dollar  contribution  to  the  defense  fund  for  the  Communist  leaders  to 
accompany  an  entry  which  he  had  made  into  a  contest  being  run  by 
the  Daily  Worker  at  that  period  of  time.  All  of  that  is  set  forth  on 
this  page.     I  ask  that  that  be  received  into  evidence. 

The  Chairman.  It  will  be  received. 

(The  document  referred  to  was  marked  "Exhibit  No.  6"  and  may  be 
found  in  the  files  of  the  subcommittee.) 

Mr.  Cohn.  I  would  call  to  your  attention,  Mr.  Chairman,  the  fact 
that  this  was  obtained  by  the  committee  from  a  public  record  which, 
of  course,  would  have  been  available  to  the  Army  well  before  this  man 
was  handed  a  commission.     It  was  listed  in  the  public  files. 

Now,  referring  to  public  files,  Mr.  Peress,  did  you  take  an  ad  in 
the  15th  anniversary  edition  of  the  Journal  of  the  Abraham  Lincoln 
Brigade,  which  journal  was  sponsored  by  the  Communist  Party  and 


130  COMMUNIST    INFILTRATION    IN    THE    ARMY 

sent  greetings  to  comrades  on  the  celebration  of  the  15th  anniversary 
of  the  Abraham  Lincoln  Brigade  ? 

Mr.  Peress.  I  decline  to  answer  under  the  fifth  amendment. 

Mr.  Cohn.  Did  you  take  an  ad  in  the  10th  anniversary,  appearing 
on  the  back  page  of  the  10th  anniversary  edition  of  the  Journal  of  the 
Abraham  Lincoln  Brigade? 

Mr.  Peress.  I  decline  to  answer  under  the  fifth  amendment. 

Mr.  Cohn.  Have  you  been  a  subscriber  to  the  Daily  Worker  for  the 
last  14  years? 

Mr.  Peress.  I  decline  to  answer  on  the  grounds  that  it  might  tend 
to  incriminate  me. 

Mr.  Cohn.  While  you  were  a  captain  and  a  major  in  the  Army,  up 
until  this  month,  did  you  receive  the  Daily  Worker? 

Mr.  Peress.  I  decline  to  answer  under  the  fifth  amendment. 

Mr.  Cohn.  Did  you  take  the  Daily  Worker  with  you  to  your  Army 
assignment  ? 

Mr.  Peress.  I  decline  to  answer  under  the  fifth  amendment. 

Mr.  Cohn.  Did  you  show  the  Daily  Worker  to  officers  stationed 
with  you  ? 

(The  witness  conferred  with  his  counsel.) 

Mr.  Peress.  I  decline  to  answer  under  the  fifth  amendment. 

The  Chairman.  Mr.  Jones  ? 

Mr.  Jones.  Mr.  Peress,  when  you  became  an  officer  of  the  Army  of 
the  United  States,  I  assume  that  you  took  the  regular  oath  of  office  ? 

(The  witness  conferred  with  his  counsel.) 

Mr.  Peress.  Could  I  have  the  identification  of  who  is  question- 
ing me  ? 

The  Chairman.  Will  you  try  and  speak  up,  sir  ? 

Mr.  Peress.  Could  you  identify  the  gentleman  who  is  making  the 
inquiry  ? 

The  Chairman.  Mr.  Robert  Jones,  administrative  assistant  to  Sen- 
ator Potter. 

(The  witness  conferred  with  his  counsel.) 

Mr.  Peress.  Is  he  empowered  by  the  Senate  to  question  me  ? 

The  Chairman.  Answer  the  question. 

Mr.  Peress.  The  question  is  did  I  take  the  regular  oath  of  office 
when  I  was  commissioned,  first  commissioned? 

Mr.  Jones.  Do  you  want  to  read  the  question  back  ? 

(The  reporter  read  from  his  notes  as  requested.) 

Mr.  Peress.  Yes. 

Mr.  Jones.  You  did  take  the  regular  oath  of  office.  In  other  words, 
you  did  take  the  oath? 

Mr.  Peress.  I  don't  know  what  you  mean  by  the  regular  oath. 

Mr.  Jones.  The  regular  oath  to  uphold  and  defend  the  Constitution, 
you  took  that  oath,  is  that  correct? 

Mr.  Peress.  That  is  right. 

Mr.  Jones.  Did  you  ever  refuse  to  take  an  oath  ? 

(The  witness  conferred  with  his  counsel.) 

Mr.  Peress.  An  oath  to  uphold  the  Constitution  ? 

Mr.  Jones.  Exactly.     Did  you  ever  refuse  to  take  it  ? 

Mr.  Peress.  No. 

The  Chairman.  May  I  have  the  record  straight.  Did  you  ever  re- 
fuse to  sign  any  oath  or  affidavit  for  the  Army  ? 

(The  witness  conferred  with  his  counsel.) 


COMMUNIST    INFILTRATION   IN    THE    ARMY  131 

Mr.  Peress.  None  that  I  can  recall. 

Mr.  Jones.  Now,  Mr.  Peress,  when  you  took  the  oath  to  uphold  and 
defend  the  Constitution,  were  you  a  member  of  the  Communist  Party 
at  that  time? 

Mr.  Peress.  I  decline  to  answer  that  question  on  the  fifth  amend- 
ment, on  the  grounds  that  it  might  tend  to  incriminate  me. 

Mr.  Jones.  Would  you  while  an  officer  of  the  Army  of  the  United 
States  having  taken  the  oath  to  defend  the  Constitution,  oppose  any 
group  that  advocates  the  violent  overthrow  of  the  Government  ? 

(The  witness  conferred  with  his  counsel.) 

Mr.  Peress.  I  would  defend  and  uphold  the  Constitution  of  the 
United  States,  as  taken  in  the  oath. 

Mr.  Jones.  That  isn't  answering  the  question.  In  other  words, 
you  took  the  oath  to  uphold  and  defend  the  Constitution  of  the  United 
States.  Having  taken  that  oath,  would  you  then  oppose  any  group 
that  advocates  the  overthrow  of  this  Government? 

(The  witness  conferred  with  his  counsel.) 

Mr.  Peress.  I  would  oppose  any  group  that  would  seek  to  overthrow 
the 

Mr.  Jones.  In  other  words,  you  would  oppose  the  Communist  Party  ? 

Mr.  Peress.  You  are  answering  for  me?  I  would  oppose,  as  my 
oath  states,  any  group  that  would  seek  to  overthrow  the  United  States 
Government  by  force  and  violence  and  unconstitutional  means. 

Mr.  Jones.  In  other  words,  then,  you  would  oppose  the  Communist 
Party? 

Mr.  Peress.  Is  that  a  question  or  a  statement  ? 

Mr.  Jones.  I  am  asking  you.  Would  you  oppose  the  Communist 
Party? 

Mr.  Peress.  I  decline  to  answer  that  question  on  the  grounds  that 
it  might  tend  to  incriminate  me. 

The  Chairman.  Mr.  Peress,  at  the  time  you  attended  Communist 
leadership  schools,  were  you  not  taught  the  necessity  of  the  overthrow 
of  this  Government  by  force  and  violence? 

Mr.  Peress.  I  decline  to  answer  under  the  fifth  amendment. 

The  Chairman.  The  witness  will  be  ordered  to  answer  the  question 
on  the  grounds  that  he  has  waived  the  fifth  amendment  privilege  by 
his  answer  to  the  previous  question. 

Mr.  Peress.  I  decline  to  answer  on  the  grounds  that  it  might  tend 
to  incriminate  me. 

The  Chairman.  Just  so  that  counsel  and  the  witness  will  be  fully 
informed,  the  Chair  takes  the  position  that  where  you  answer  a  ques- 
tion, you  have  waived  the  fifth  amendment  privilege  as  to  that  entire 
area  of  investigation.  I  have  asked  the  Attorney  General  for  an 
opinion  upon  that  matter.  If  the  Attorney  General  sustains  the  view 
of  the  committee,  then  we  will  heavily  decimate  the  ranks  of  the 
Communist  conspiracy  by  way  of  contempt  actions,  and  convictions, 
against  Communists  like  you,  Major.  If  the  Attorney  General  ren- 
ders a  favorable  opinion,  we  intend  to  ask  for  a  contempt  citation 
against  every  Communist  who  comes  here  and,  by  answering  certain 
questions,  waives  the  fifth  amendment,  and  then  tries  to  invoke  the 
fifth  amendment  in  the  same  area  of  investigation. 

I  tell  you  that  so  that  you  cannot  plead  ignorance  at  some  future 
legal  proceeding. 

I  assume  you  still  refuse  to  answer  ? 


132  COMMUNIST    INFILTRATION    IN    THE    ARMY 

Mr.  Peress.  I  do. 

The  Chairman.  Is  that  correct? 

Mr.  Peress.  I  decline  to  answer  under  the  fifth  amendment. 

The  Chairman.  I  am  going  to  hand  you  an  exhibit — do  you  want  to 
mark  this? 

Mr.  Cohn.  Exhibit  7,  Senator. 

(The  document  referred  to  was  marked  "Exhibit  No.  7,"  and  may 
be  found  in  the  files  of  the  subcommittee.) 

The  Chairman.  I  am  going  to  hand  you  exhibit  7,  and  ask  you  if 
this  is  the  oath  you  signed,  either  at  the  time  you  got  your  commission 
or  about  that  time? 

(Document  handed  to  the  witness.) 

Mr.  Peress.  I  decline  to  identify  this  paper  under  the  grounds  that 
it  might  tend  to  incriminate  me. 

The  Chairman.  The  witness  will  be  ordered  to  identify  it. 

(The  witness  conferred  with  his  counsel.) 

Mr.  Peress.  This  is  a  blank  paper,  and  I  would  have  to  decline  to 
answer  on  the  identification  of  it. 

The  Chairman.  Is  that  the  type  of  oath  you  signed? 

Mr.  Peress.  I  couldn't  recall.  I  would  have  to  decline  to  answer. 
1  would  have  to  see  the  papers  I  signed. 

The  Chairman.  You  are  declining  because  you  cannot  recall  ? 

Mr.  Peress.  No.  I  decline  to  answer  on  the  grounds  of  the  fifth 
amendment,  that  it  might 

The  Chairman.  Would  you  read  that  oath?  Kead  it  out  loud  so 
I  can  hear  it. 

(The  witness  conferred  with  his  counsel.) 

Mr.  Peress.  I  decline  to  read  the  oath. 

The  Chairman.  You  will  be  ordered  to  read  it  to  refresh  your  rec- 
ollection so  that  you  may  be  able  to  answer  the  question. 

(The  witness  conferred  with  his  counsel.) 

Mr.  Peress.  I  decline  to  acknowledge  that  I  have  seen  this  state- 
ment before  or  signed  such  a  paper,  on  the  grounds  that  it  might  tend 
to  incriminate  me. 

The  Chairman.  You  will  be  ordered  to  read  it. 

Mr.  Peress.  I  decline  to  read  it. 

The  Chairman.  Hand  that  back  to  me,  please. 

(Document  handed  to  the  chairman.) 

Mr.  Jones.  Mr.  Peress,  you  have  already  stated  that  you  took  the 
oath  to  uphold  the  Constitution  when  you  were  commissioned  a  cap- 
tain ;  is  that  correct  ? 

(The  witness  conferred  with  his  counsel.) 

Mr.  Peress.  To  my  recollection,  on  getting  my  commission  as  a  cap- 
tain I  was  sent  a  number  of  forms,  and  I  signed  them  and  sent  them 
back.    There  was  no  official  swearing-in  ceremony. 

Mr.  Jones.  You  just  said  a  few  minutes  ago  that  you  took  the  oath 
to  uphold  the  Constitution.    That  is  in  the  official  record. 

(The  witness  conferred  with  his  counsel.) 

Mr.  Peress.  If  the  oath  was  in  there,  I  took  the  oath. 

(The  witness  conferred  with  his  counsel.) 

Mr.  Jones.  Mr.  Peress,  will  you  please  examine  this  statement? 

The  Chairman.  Those  will  be  made  exhibits  8  and  9. 

(The  documents  referred  to  were  marked  "Exhibits  Nos.  8  and  9," 
and  may  be  found  in  the  files  of  the  subcommittee.) 


COMMUNIST    INFILTRATION   IN    THE    ARMY  133 

(Documents  handed  to  the  witness.) 

(The  witness  conferred  with  his  counsel.) 

The  Chairman.  While  the  witness  is  examining  that,  may  I  ask  a 
question  of  Mr.  Adams,  the  legal  counsel  for  the  Army  ? 

The  information  we  have  is  that  this  man  signed  affidavits  as  to 
nonmembership  in  the  Communist  Party  and  subversive  groups.  Is 
it  the  position  of  the  Army  that  by  the  honorable  discharge  which 
he  received  after  he  was  before  the  committee,  that  he  had  been  re- 
moved from  the  court-martial  jurisdiction  of  the  Army;  or  does  the 
Army  take  the  position  they  have  jurisdiction  to  court-martial  this 
fifth-amendment  Communist  for  false  swearing,  of  which  he  is  ob- 
viously guilty? 

Mr.  John  Adams  (legal  counsel  to  the  Department  of  the  Army, 
Washington,  D.  C).  I  am  not  quite  sure  that  I  know  the  question. 

The  Chairman.  The  question  is — you  are  the  legal  counsel  for  the 
Army,  and  I  assumed  you  discussed  this.  I  know  you  are  aware  of 
the  fact  that  I  have  been  discussing  it  now  since  he  got  the  honorable 
discharge.  The  question  is,  Has  he  been  removed  from  the  court- 
martial  jurisdiction  of  the  Army,  or  does  the  Army  take  the  position 
that  even  though  he  received  his  honorable  discharge,  he  can  still  be 
court-martialed  for  false  swearing  or  any  other  crime  of  which  he  is 
guilty  ? 

Mr.  Adams.  Mr.  Chairman,  a  separation  such  as  Major  Peress  re- 
ceived on  February  2  is  a  final  action.  Under  the  Uniform  Code  of 
Military  Justice,  there  is  a  section  in  the  lawT  which  permits  the  Army 
to  court-martial  an  individual  for  offenses  which  call  for  penalties  in 
excess  of  5  years,  provided  the  offenses  are  known. 

I  submitted  the  questions  raised  by  your  letter  to  the  Judge  Advo- 
cate General  of  the  Army,  who  has  the  responsibility,  by  statute,  in 
the  Army  for  military  justice,  and  he  gave  me  an  opinion  that  prob- 
ably a  court-martial  against  the  individual  could  not  be  sustained  on 
the  facts  now  before  the  Army. 

The  Chairman.  In  other  words,  on  the  grounds  that  this  would  not 
call  for  a  penalty  in  excess  of  5  years,  he  has  been  removed  from  the 
jurisdiction  of  the  Army? 

Mr.  Adams.  He  has  been  removed  from  the  jurisdiction  of  the  Army, 
and  the  Army  is  not  aware  of  any  offenses  which  have  been  brought 
officially  to  its  attention  under  which  he  could  be  tried. 

The  Chairman.  You  say  the  Army  is  not  aware  of  any  offenses, 
Mr.  Adams  ? 

Mr.  Adams.  That  is  correct,  sir. 

The  Chairman.  I  do  not  pretend  to  cross-examine  the  legal  counsel 
for  the  Army.  You  are  here  as  a  guest  of  the  committee.  But  this 
matter  disturbs  me  very  greatly.  I  have  heard  that  statement  before. 
You  have  the  evidence,  the  sworn  testimony,  that  this  man  was  part 
of  the  Communist  conspiracy.  You  have  that  from  a  policewoman 
of  the  city  of  New  York.  It  has  been  available  to  the  Army  for  years, 
ever  since  she  has  been  filing  her  reports.  You  have  the  information 
that  he  took  a  false  oath  when  he  swore  that  he  was  not  a  member  of 
the  Communist  Party.  You  have  his  refusal  to  answer  questions 
before  a  Senate  committee.  His  refusal  to  answer  questions  by  the 
Army  would  certainly  constitute  conduct  unbecoming  to  an  officer. 

I  do  not  think  you  want  the  record  to  stand,  John,  as  saying  that 
you  were  not  aware  of  any  offense.    You  said  that  was  not  brought 


134  COMMUNIST    INFILTRATION    IN    THE    ARMY 

officially  to  your  attention.  May  I  say  that  you  were  here  in  an  official 
capacity.  Everything  that  this  committee  develops,  including  what 
we  develop  in  an  executive  session,  is  your  official  knowledge. 

As  I  say,  I  do  not  want  to  put  you  on  the  stand  here  and  cross-exam- 
ine you,  but  I  am  just  curious  about  this  fantastic  procedure  where  we 
have  this  man  before  us,  and  we  invited  the  legal  counsel  for  the  Army 
to  sit  in,  listen  to  all  of  his  testimony.  He  refused  to  answer,  invoking 
the  fifth  amendment.  I  wrote  to  the  Secretary  of  the  Army  and  asked 
for  his  court  martial.  Before  Secretary  Stevens  could  get  back  to 
the  United  States,  somebody  in  the  Army— and  I  cannot  conceive  they 
were  acting  in  good  faith — gave  him  a  hurry-up  honorable  discharge 
My  letter  was  made  public  on  Monday,  February  1 ;  and  Tuesday  morn- 
ing, February  2,  this  man — about  whom  you  have  so  much  testimony 
about  organizing  Communist  cells,  holding  Communist  meetings  in 
his  home,  attending  Communist  leadership  schools,  his  refusal  to 
answer — was  given  an  honorable  discharge. 

As  you  know,  John,  every  Senator  receives  dozens  of  letters  every 
month  from  young  men  who  have  good  reasons  for  not  wanting  to 
serve,  They  want  honorable  discharges.  If  this  is  the  pattern  that 
is  to  be  followed,  if  all  you  need  to  do  is  to  join  the  conspiracy  against 
this  Nation  to  receive  the  stamp  of  honor  from  your  country,  get  an 
honorable  discharge,  then  the  Communist  Party  perhaps  should  go  out 
and  recruit  all  the— well,  although  I  do  not  think  they  would  have 
much  success,  go  out  and  try  to  recruit  the  young  men  who  would  like 
to  get  out  of  the  Army. 

I  am  going  to  ask  you  this,  but  I  am  not  going  to  ask  you  to  answer 
it  now :  I  am  going  to  ask  that  you  give  us  the  names  of  every  officer, 
every  member  of  the  military  personnel  or  any  civilian  who  had  any- 
thing to  do  with  this  man's  'promotion,  knowing  that  he  was  a  Com- 
munist ;  anything  to  do  with  his  change  of  orders,  knowing  that  he  was 
a  Communist ;  anything  to  do  with  his  honorable  discharge,  knowing 
he  was  a  Communist,  knowing  I  have  suggested  a  court  martial  for 
him. 

I  am  curious  to  know  whether  or  not  that  information  will  be  forth- 
coming without  a  subpena.  If  not,  this  is  something  which  will  not 
be  allowed  to  drop.  I  want  to  assure  everyone  concerned,  if  it  is 
humanly  possible  I  intend  to  get  to  the  bottom  of  it. 

I  think  here  you  have  the  key  to  the  deliberate  Communist  infiltra- 
tion of  our  Armed  Forces,  the  most  dangerous  thing.  And  the  men 
responsible  for  the  honorable  discharge  of  a  Communist  are  just  as 
guilty  as  the  man  who  belongs  to  the  conspiracy  himself. 
'  So  may  I  ask  you,  will  the  information  be  forthcoming  without 
subpena  ?  If  not,  I  intend  to  take  this  right  to  the  very  limit  to  get 
the  names  of  all  of  those  individuals,  John.  If  you  are  not  in  a  posi- 
tion to  answer  that  today,  I  want  to  know  when  you  can  answer  it. 

Mr.  Adams.  Mr.  Chairman,  the  Secretary  has  given  you  a  letter, 
which  you  received  yesterday,  which  discussed  the  facts  of  this  case 
as  he  now  knows  them.  He  is  investigating  to  determine  such  addi- 
tional facts  as  he  can. 

If  there  can  be  developed  any  indication  of  conspiracy  of  a  sub- 
versive nature  with  reference  to  the  handling  of  this  or  any  other 
officer  assignments,  those  matters  will  be  prosecuted  by  the  Army. 

The  Chairman.  John,  I  will  not  take  any  double-talk,  any  evasion 
on  this.    Either  the  Army  is  going  to  give  me  the  names  of  the  indi- 


COMMUNIST    INFILTRATION   IN    THE    ARMY  135 

victuals  responsible  for  coddling  and  honorably  discharging  a  known 
Communist — not  only  a  run-of-the-mill  but  an  important  member 
of  the  Communist  conspiracy — or  the  Army  is  going  to  refuse. 

I  may  say  now,  for  the  benefit  of  everyone  concerned,  if  the  Army 
refuses,  I  intend  to  take  this  to  the  floor  of  the  Senate,  and  I  intend 
to  try  to  have  cited  for  contempt  any  man  in  the  military — and  I  do 
not  care  whether  he  is  a  civilian  or  an  officer — who  tries  to  cover  up 
those  responsible  for  this  most  shameful,  most  f antatistic  situation. 

If  you  cannot  answer  that  today,  I  would  like  to  know  when  I  can 
get  the  answer.  It  is  a  simple  decision.  I  want  to  know  whether  or 
not  there  is  a  new  day  in  the  Army  or  not.  I  have  a  lot  of  respect  for 
Secretary  Stevens,  and  I  received  a  letter  which  I  cannot  conceive  of 
Secretary  Stevens  having  himself  written.    He  may  have. 

Complete  double-talk  does  not  answer  any  of  our  questions.  We 
are  not  going  to  take  this,  John,  in  this  case.  We  are  going  to  make 
an  example  here  and  see  if  we  cannot  set  the  pattern  for  a  cleanout 
of  those  who  have  been  invited  into  the  military. 

If  the  new  Secretary  wants  to  do  that  himself,  very  good.  I  think 
he  will.  But  I  will  want  to  know  within  24  hours  whether  or  not  the 
Army  is  going  to  give  us  the  names  of  those  whom  I  just  indicated. 
We  will  ask  for  that  information  by  tomorrow  night. 

If  that  period  of  time  you  think  is  unreasonable,  we  will  give  you 
additional  time.  I  will  be  in  Albany  holding  hearings  tomorrow, 
and  I  will  want  to  get  that  information  there. 

Mr.  Peress,  just  1  or  2  more  questions.  While  you  were  an  officer 
in  the  Army,  did  you  ever  have  access  to  any  decoding  or  encoding 
machines  ? 

(The  witness  conferred  with  his  counsel.) 

Mr.  Peress.  No. 

The  Chairman.  Were  you  ever  O.  D.  ?  Were  you  ever  officer  of 
the  day  ? 

(The  witness  conferred  with  his  counsel.) 

Mr.  Peress.  Yes. 

The  Chairman.  How  often  did  you  serve  as  officer  of  the  day? 

Mr.  Peress.  Dental  O.  D.  That  just  covers  the  dental  clinic  for 
emergency  treatment  that  may  come  up.  There  is  no  administrative 
responsibility.  It  is  just  to  take  care  of  emergency  dental  situations. 
I  was  O.  D.  in  rotation.  It  came  up  depending  on  the  number  of 
dental  officers.  If  we  had  20  dental  officers,  it  was  every  3  weeks. 
When  we  were  down  lower,  it  would  come  around  more  frequently. 

The  Chairman.  Your  testimony  is,  then,  that  during  all  the  time 
you  were  in  the  military,  you  never  had  access  to  any  encoding  or 
decoding  machines? 

Mr.  Peress.  I  don't  even  know  what  they  are. 

The  Chairman.  You  say  you  don't  know  what  they  are  ? 

Mr.  Peress.  I  have  never  seen  such  a  machine. 

The  Chairman.  Do  you  know  what  an  encoding  machine  is? 

Mr.  Peress.  No. 

The  Chairman.  You  don't  know  what  is  meant  by  an  encoding 
machine  ? 

Mr.  Peress.  No,  I  don't. 

The  Chairman.  Do  you  know  what  is  meant  by  a  decoding 
machine  ? 

Mr.  Peress.  That  I  can  figure  out. 

38794 — 54— pt.  3 5 


136  COMMUNIST    INFILTRATION    IN    THE    ARMY 

The  Chairman.  You  can  figure  that  out. 

Did  you  ever  see  any  messages,  either  before  or  after  they  were 
decoded,  either  while  you  were  an  officer  of  the  day  or  otherwise? 

(The  witness  conferred  with  his  counsel.) 

Mr.  Peress.  Unless  you  mean  my  orders  to  take  a  leave  of  absence 
or  to  take  part  of  my  annual  leave.  I  don't  know  if  that  is  a  coded 
or  decoded  message.     I  thought  it  was  mimeographed. 

The  Chairman.  I  think  you  know  what  I  mean.  I  am  just  trying 
to  get  the  facts. 

Is  it  your  testimony  that,  as  far  as  you  know,  other  than  routine 
orders,  change  of  station,  leave  orders,  other  than  orders  of  that  kind 
you  never  saw  any  material,  either  before  or  after  it  was  decoded?  I 
have  special  reference  to  the  times  when  you  served  as  O.  D. 

(The  witness  conferred  with  his  counsel.) 

Mr.  Peress.  There  is  just  a  dental  O.  D.  form,  the  name  of  the 
patient,  serial  number,  and  what  you  did  for  him.  That  is  the  only 
official  printed  material  that  you  handle  on  O.  D. 

The  Chairman.  General  Zwicker,  may  I  ask  you  a  question.  You 
can  stay  right  there. 

Whenever  I  served  as  O.  D. — and  I  think  this  has  been  general  prac- 
tice in  the  Marine  Corps,  the  Navy,  and  the  Army — you  normally  had 
access  to  the  encoding  and  decoding  machines.  Ordinarily  an  officer 
of  the  rank  of  major  or  above  must  take  his  stint  at  encoding  or 
decoding. 

Could  you  tell  me  whether  or  not  that  has  been  the  practice  at  Camp 
Kilmer? 

Brig.  Gen.  Ralph  Zwicker  (commanding  officer,  Camp  Kilmer, 
N.  J.).  It  is  not. 

The  Chairman.  In  other  words,  so  far  as  you  know,  this  individual 
never  had  access  to  anv  confidential  or  secret  material? 

General  Zwicker.  He  did  not. 

The  Chairman.  Your  answer  is  what? 

General  Zwicker.  He  did  not. 

The  Chairman.  Just  one  other  question,  General.  I  did  not  intend 
to  impose  upon  you  this  morning. 

His  Army  file  contains  reference  to  his  being  considered  for — and 
I  think  I  am  quoting  it  correctly — sensitive  work  in  May  of  1953. 
Would  you  have  any  idea  what  that  sensitive  work  was?  If  you  do 
not  know,  we  will  show  you  the  file  to  refresh  your  recollection.  The 
file  shows  that  in  May,  that  is,  after  it  was  fully  known  that  he  was  a 
Communist,  the  file  shows  that  he  was  considered  for  sensitive  work. 

The  file  does  not  show  whether  he  was  rejected  or  not.  Just  offhand, 
yon  wouldn't  know  what  that  sensitive  work  would  be? 

General  Zwicker.  I  do  not. 

The  Chairman.  I  wonder  if  you  can  do  this:  You  are  appearing 
this  afternoon  in  executive  session.  I  would  like  to  have  you  here  to 
listen  to  all  of  this  testimony.  If  you  have  an  aide  with  you,  I  wonder 
if  you  could  have  somebody  call  Camp  Kilmer  and  find  out  just  what 
the  sensitive  work  was  that  he  was  being  considered  for. 

Mr.  Peress.  I  might  be  able  to  help  you  on  that. 

General  Zwicker.  Even  if  I  did  know,  I  would  not  be  privileged  to 
tell  you,  under  the  Executive  order  which  forbids  us  to  discuss  matters 
of  that  nature. 


COMMUNIST    INFILTRATION   IN    THE    ARMY  137 

The  Chairman.  I  may  say,  General,  you  will  be  in  difficulty  if  you 
refuse  to  tell  us  what  sensitive  work  a  Communist  was  being  consid- 
ered for.  There  is  no  Executive  order  for  the  purpose  of  protecting 
Communists.  I  want  to  tell  you  right  now,  you  will  be  asked  that 
question  this  afternoon.  You  will  be  ordered  to  make  available  that 
information. 

Mr.  Peress.  I  think  I  might  know  the  answer  to  that,  though  I  never 
heard  about  it.    May  I  answer? 

The  Chairman.  You  may. 

Mr.  Peress.  Apparently  I  was  considered  the  best  dentist  at  the 
post  there,  and  they  needed  an  extra  prosthodontist.  And  where  I  was 
doing  general  dentistry,  which  is  filling  and  routine  dentistry,  they 
needed  another  man  to  help  the  prosthodontist. 

In  approximately  May  1953, 1  was  unofficially  promoted  to  the  pros- 
thetic section,  where  I  worked  through  August;  and  then,  because 
there  was  a  falling  off  in  operative  work,  I  was  put  back  to  doing 
operative  work,  because  of  the  production  there.  The  records  will 
show  that  my  production  in  operative  was  also  the  greatest  in  the 
clinic. 

The  Chairman.  Let  us  return  to  the  questions. 

Mr.  Peress.  This  referred  to  a  change  of  M.  O.  S.,  they  called  it. 

The  Chairman.  We  are  dealing,  not  with  sensitive  nerves  in  the 
teeth ;  we  are  dealing  with  a  security  matter.  I  asked  whether  or  not 
the  general  knew  what  sensitive  security  work  you  were  being  con- 
sidered for.    You  say  that  had  to  do  with  the  teeth. 

Mr.  Peress.  Well,  it  was  approximately  May  1953,  that  the  colonel 
called  me  down  and  said  that  they  had  been  considering  me — not 
a  promotion  in  rank,  but  a  promotion  in  work — to  go  up  to  prosthetics 
and  work  there.    It  is  my  own  opinion  that  I  was  very  good. 

The  Chairman.  Mr.  Peress,  the  record  shows  that  you  signed  a 
document  identical  to  exhibit  9,  which  I  will  show  you.  You  signed 
that  under  oath,  certifying  nonmembership  in  subversive  organiza- 
tions, naming  the  organizations 

Mr.  Peress.  I  decline  to  answer  that  question. 

The  Chairman.  Let  me  finish  before  vou  decline. 

When  you  signed  that,  were  you  falsely  swearing,  or  were  you 
telling  the  truth? 

I  The  witness  conferred  with  his  counsel.) 

Mr.  Peress.  I  decline  to  answer  that  question  under  the  fifth 
amendment. 

The  Chairman.  You  are  entitled  to  decline. 

Mr.  Rainville.  I  am  Harold  Rainville,  from  Senator  Dirksen's 
office.  While  the  Senator  is  seeking  certain  material  which  he  wants 
to  question  you  on,  may  I  just  develop  one  thing  which  I  think  has 
been  overlooked  here. 

Did  you  ever  serve  overseas? 

(The  witness  conferred  with  his  counsel.) 

Mr.  Peress.  No. 

Mr.  Rainville.  Were  you  ever  ordered  to  go  overseas? 

Mr.  Peress.  Yes. 

Mr.  Rainville.  Were  your  orders  then  changed? 

Mr.  Peress.  Yes. 

Mr.  Rainville.  Do  you  know  why  they  were  changed  ? 

Mr.  Peress.  I  can  only  surmise.     I  was  given  no  official  reason. 


138  COMMUNIST    INFILTRATION    IN    THE    ARMY 

Mr.  Rainville.  Were  you  ever  interrogated  after  the  change,  any 
discussion  as  to  your  future  assignment  ? 

Mr.  Peress.  I  had  orders  to  go  to  Fort  Lewis  and  to  proceed  from 
there  to  Yokohama,  Japan.  I  got  to  Fort  Lewis,  and  I  got  in  touch 
with  the  Red  Cross.  They  secured  an  emergency  leave  for  me.  I  had 
compassionate  reasons  to  request  a  reassignment.  There  are  Army 
regulations  under  the  title  of  "Compassionate  Reassignment." 

The  Red  Cross  got — after  investigating  the  case — got  the  time  for 
me,  and  through  channels  I  was  reassigned  to  Camp  Kilmer. 

Mr.  Rainville.  Do  you  mind  telling  us  what  the  emergency  was? 

(The  witness  conferred  with  his  counsel.) 

Mr.  Peress.  Well,  as  you  know,  sir,  they  are  part  of  the  record,  and 
I  do  mind  telling  you,  because  I  don't  feel  it  is  integral  to  the  investi- 
gation that  you  are  carrying  on  now,  the  reasons  for  it.  But  they 
are  part  of  the  official  records. 

Mr.  Rainville.  Well,  if  I  am  correct  in  my  information,  it  was 
because  your  6-year-old  daughter  needed  psychiatric  treatment ;  is  that 
right? 

Mr.  Peress.  She  was  undergoing  it  at  the  time.  That  was  one  of 
the  reasons. 

Mr.  Rainville.  Did  you  get  any  aid  in  receiving  that  cancellation 
of  your  embarkation  orders,  other  than  the  Red  Cross  ? 

(The  witness  conferred  with  his  counsel.) 

Mr.  Peress.  Could  you  be  more  specific  about  that,  sir  ? 

Mr.  Rainville.  Let  me  be  a  little  bit  explanatory.  We  in  the  Sen- 
ators' offices  are  frequently  called  upon  for  emergency  help  whenever 
there  is  a  situation  of  this  kind.  We  frequently  find  that  in  situa- 
tions which  are  much  more  critical,  a  dying  wife  who  is  dying  of  can- 
cer or  a  dying  child,  it  makes  it  very  difficult  for  us  to  stop  an  em- 
barkation order  even  for  a  temporary  reason. 

I  have  no  doubt  your  daughter  needed  the  treatment.  Neverthe- 
less, it  seems  a  little  odd  to  me  that  you  should  be  completely  re- 
assigned. A  man  with  the  ability  as  a  dentist  such  as  you  have  would 
certainly  have  been  needed  abroad.  I  wanted  to  know,  Did  you  know 
somebody  in  the  Adjutant  General's  office?  You  didn't  speak  to  any 
Congressman  or  Senator,  and  yet  just  the  Red  Cross  was  able  to  stop 
it? 

Mr.  Peress.  I  didn't  speak  to  any  Congressman  or  Senator,  and  the 
reasons  are  not  as  far-fetched  as  you  attempt  to  seem  to  understand 
them  at  this  point.  As  I  say,  the  authority  exists  in  the  Army  regu- 
lations, which  are  also  available  to  you,  and  the  Red  Cross  does  the 
investigating  as  to  whether  there  is  really  a  compassionate  need  for 
consideration  of  the  case  as  to  stop  an  embarkation. 

The  Chairman.  I  think  in  fairness  to  the  Red  Cross — I  do  not  know 
who  investigated  this  case — as  I  understand  it,  the  Red  Cross  merely 
makes  an  investigation  and  does  not  take  any  active  part  in  getting 
a  change  or  cancellation  of  orders.  The  Red  Cross  merely  reports 
the  facts.    I  believe  that  is  correct.    I  may  be  wrong  in  that. 

Mr.  Peress.  As  I  was  saying,  the  Red  Cross  reports  on  whether 
there  exists  sufficient  reason  to  warrant  a  consideration  bv  the  Armv, 
because  otherwise  the  orders  cannot  be  halted  in  time. 

Mr.  Rainville.  Very  frequently  the  Red  Cross  comes  to  us  and  asks 
for  our  aid  because  very  frequently  they  alone  cannot  get  these  things 
done  in  the  time  allowed. 


COMMUNIST    INFILTRATION    IN    THE    ARMY  139 

My  question  is,  If  the  Reel  Cross  did  this,  and  did  it  alone  for  you, 
from  my  experience  in  handling  hundreds  of  these  cases  a  week,  for 
what  is  trivial  compared  to  other  things — not  to  you,  of  course,  a 
trivial  reason — I  would  like  to  know  if  you  did  not  know  someone 
some  place,  somebody  in  the  Adjutant  General's  office,  perhaps  a  party 
member  ? 

Mr.  Peress.  To  my  knowledge,  I  know  nobody  in  the  Adjutant 
General's  office,  without  qualification. 

Mr.  Rainville.  In  1949,  did  you  serve  in  a  Communist  cell  with 
anybody  who  might  have  had  influence  in  the  Army,  who  was  an 
officer  in  the  Army  ? 

(The  witness  conferred  with  his  counsel.) 

Mr.  Peress.  That  question  I  decline  to  answer,  on  the  fifth  amend- 
ment. 

Mr.  Rainville.  I  presume  it  is  useless  to  ask  you  whether  or  not 
that  person  still  is  in  the  Adjutant  General's  office? 

Mr.  Peress.  Which  person  ? 

Mr.  Rainville.  The  person  you  decline  to  answer  about. 

Mr.  Peress.  Does  such  a  person  exist  because  of  the  posing  of  the 
question  ? 

Mr.  Rainville.  I  would  presume  if  he  didn't  exist,  it  would  be  easier 
for  you  to  say  no  than  to  decline  to  answer. 

(The  witness  conferred  with  his  counsel.) 

The  Chairman.  You  will  either  talk  for  the  record  or  you  will  talk 
only  to  your  counsel.  I  will  hear  none  of  these  speeches  off  the  record 
from  you.  If  you  want  to  discuss  any  matter  with  your  counsel,  you 
will  do  it  in  an  undertone  so  that  only  you  and  he  can  hear  it.  Other- 
wise you  will  speak  for  the  record. 

Mr.  Rainville.  Just  one  last  question.  Your  daughter  is  still 
undergoing  these  treatments,  and  that  is  the  reason  you  were  still 
here  until  February  2  ? 

Mr.  Peress.  I  don't  know  the  reason  I  am  here,  but  my  daughter  is 
still  undergoing  the  treatments. 

The  Chairman.  There  is  one  further  question.  Did  a  member  of 
the  Communist  Party  help  you  get  your  orders  changed  from  Yoko- 
hama to  Camp  Kilmer? 

(The  witness  conferred  with  his  counsel.) 

Mr.  Peress.  I  decline  to  answer  that  question  on  the  grounds  that  it 
might  tend  to  incriminate  me. 

The  Chairman.  Were  you  successful  in  forming  a  Communist  cell 
at  Camp  Kilmer  ? 

Mr.  Peress.  I  decline  to  answer  that  question  under  the  fifth  amend- 
ment. 

The  Chairman.  Did  your  wife  attend  a  Communist  leadership 
school  ? 

Mr.  Peress.  I  decline  to  answer  that  question. 

The  Chairman.  Just  to  refresh  your  recollection,  we  will  give  you 
the  name  of  the  school. 

Mr.  Cohn.  It  was  the  leadership  training  course  at  the  Inwood 
Victory  Club,  which  was  conducted  at  139  Dyckman  Street. 

The  Chairman.  With  your  memory  refreshed,  did  you  attend  that 
leadership  school  ? 

Mr.  Peress.  I  decline  to  answer  that  question  on  the  grounds  that 
it  might  tend  to  incriminate  me,  under  the  fifth  amendment. 


140  COMMUNIST    INFILTRATION   IN   THE    ARMY 

The  Chairman.  How  long  have  you  been  married? 

Mr.  Peress.  What  is  the  question  ? 

The  Chairman.  How  long  have  you  been  married,  just  roughly? 
(The  witness  conferred  with  his  counsel.) 

Mr.  Peress.  Is  that  relevant  to  this  investigation  ? 

The  Chairman.  Answer  the  question. 

Mr.  Peress.  Since  June  7, 1942. 

The  Chairman.  Does  your  wife  have  any  brothers  or  sisters  work- 
ing for  the  Government  ? 

(The  witness  conferred  with  his  counsel.) 

The  Chairman.  Or  for  any  Government  agency? 

Mr.  Peress.  I  decline  to  answer  that  question. 

The  Chairman.  You  are  ordered  to  answer  that  question. 

Mr.  Peress.  I  decline  to  answer  that  question  under  the  fifth  amend- 
ment. 

The  Chairman.  You  go  right  ahead,  Mister,  and  decline. 

Do  you  have  any  brothers  or  sisters  working  for  any  Government 
agency  ? 

Mr.  Peress.  I  decline  to  answer  that  question. 

The  Chairman.  You  are  ordered  to  answer. 

Mr.  Peress.  I  decline  to  answer. 

The  Chairman.  Give  us  the  names  of  your  brothers. 

(The  witness  conferred  with  his  counsel.) 

Mr.  Peress.  William 

The  Chairman.  What  is  his  last  name?    The  same  as  yours? 

Mr.  Peress.  The  same  as  mine. 

The  Chairman.  What  is  his  address? 

(The  witness  conferred  with  his  counsel.) 

Mr.  Peress.  Brooklyn.    I  will  have  to  look  it  up. 

The  Chairman.  Is  he  a  member  of  the  Communist  Party? 

Mr.  Peress.  I  decline  to  answer  that. 

The  Chairman.  Whereabouts  in  Brooklyn  does  William  live? 

Mr.  Peress.  I  don't  know  the  name  of  the  section. 

The  Chairman.  The  last  question  was:  Where  does  William  live 
in  Brooklyn? 

Mr.  Peress.  I  said  I  don't — what  do  you  mean ;  the  street  ? 

The  Chairman.  Yes,  as  best  you  can  tell  us. 

Mr.  Peress.  I  don't  know. 

The  Chairman.  You  don't  know  what  street  he  lives  on? 

Mr.  Peress.  I  am  not  sure.    I  know  how  to  go  there. 

The  Chairman.  How  do  you  go  there  ? 

Mr.  Peress.  I  drive  on  the  Belt  Parkway  from  my  house  and  go 
down  Flatlands  Avenue.  I  don't  know  the  streets  where  I  turn  over 
to  go  there. 

The  Chairman.  What  is  your  brother's  occupation  ? 

(The  witness  conferred  with  his  counsel.) 

Mr.  Peress.  I  decline  to  answer  that  question. 

The  Chairman.  You  are  ordered  to  answer  it. 

Mr.  Peress.  I  decline,  sir,  under  the  fifth  amendment. 

The  Chairman.  Does  he  work  for  the  Government,  the  United 
States  Government? 

Mr.  Peress.  I  decline  to  answer. 

The  Chairman.  You  are  ordered  to  answer. 

Mr.  Peress.  I  decline. 


COMMUNIST    INFILTRATION    EST   THE    ARMY  141 

The  Chairman.  How  many  other  brothers  do  you  have  ? 

Mr.  Peress.  One. 

The  Chairman.  What  is  his  name  ? 

Mr.  Peress.  Same  last  name;  Abraham  Herbert. 

The  Chairman.  And  where  does  Abraham  work? 

(The  witness  conferred  with  his  counsel.) 

Mr.  Peress.  Where  does  he  work  ? 

The  Chairman.  Yes. 

Mr.  Peress.  10  Hillside  Avenue. 

The  Chairman.  10  Hillside  Avenue.  What  kind  of  work  does 
he  do? 

(The  witness  conferred  with  his  counsel.) 

The  Chairman.  Let's  put  it  this  way :  Does  he  work  either  in  a 
defense  plant  or  for  any  Government  agency  ? 

Mr.  Peress.  I  decline  to  answer  that  question  under  the  fifth  amend- 
ment. 

The  Chairman.  Do  you  feel  if  you  were  to  tell  us  the  truth  in  answer 
to  that  question  that  answer  might  tend  to  incriminate  you? 

Mr.  Peress.  It  might. 

The  Chairman.  Do  you  feel  it  might  ? 

Mr.  Peress.  I  feel  it  might. 

The  Chairman.  Do  you  feel  if  you  were  to  tell  us  the  truth  as  to 
where  William  worked  that  answer  might  tend  to  incriminate  you? 

Mr.  Peress.  I  feel  it  might. 

The  Chairman.  Again,  while  I  don't  think  I  owe  any  duty  to  mem- 
bers of  the  Communist  conspiracy,  I  do  want  to  let  you  know  what  this 
committee  intends  to  do,  insofar  as  I,  as  chairman,  can  get  them  to 
do  it,  so  you  cannot  claim  you  were  entrapped  or  claim  ignorance  at 
some  future  proceedings.  I  intend  to  find  out,  obviously,  what  your 
two  brothers  are  doing.  If  their  occupation  could  in  no  way  tend 
to  incriminate  you,  I  will  ask  that  you  be  cited  for  contempt.  I  just 
want  you  to  know  that.  I  just  want  you  to  know  that  you  Communists 
cannot  play  with  the  fifth  amendment  before  this  committee. 

Do  you  have  any  sisters  ? 

(The  witness  conferred  with  his  counsel.) 

The  Chairman.  While  Mr.  Peress  is  consulting  with  his  counsel, 
Mr.  Adams,  what  I  would  like  to  have  this  afternoon  is  the  name  of 
the  individual  who  has  been  in  charge  of  Peress'  personnel  file  which 
we  subpenaed.  I  would  like  to  have  him  before  us  under  oath  on  the 
question  of  the  completeness  of  the  file. 

I  want  to  tell  you,  in  view  of  the  fact  that  we  have  always  been 
laying  our  cards  strictly  on  the  table  with  you  and  with  Mr.  Stevens, 
that  we  have  an  inventory  of  the  file  at  the  time  we  subpenaed  it,  and 
we  have  compared  that  with  the  file  as  handed  to  us.  So  I  will  want 
the  man  who  was  in  charge  of  this  file,  who  answered  the  subpena  and 
presented  it — I  want  him  here  under  oath  to  explain  the  discrepancy 
between  the  inventory  which  we  received  from  another  Government 
agency  and  the  inventory  as  the  file  was  handed  to  us. 

I  assume  that  you  might  have  some  difficulty  getting  him  in  here 
this  afternoon.  If  possible,  I  would  like  to  have  him  this  afternoon; 
and  if  not,  we  will  want  to  hear  him  in  Washington  next  week. 

Mr.  Peress.  I  will  decline  to  answer  that  under  the  fifth  amendment. 

The  Chairman.  You  decline  to  answer  whether  you  have  any 
sisters  ? 


142  COMMUNIST    INFILTRATION    IN    THE    ARMY 

Mr.  Peress.  I  thought  you  were  back  on  the  other  point.  No;  I 
have  no  sisters. 

The  Chairman.  You  have  no  sisters.     Is  your  father  living  ? 
Mr.  Peress.  Yes. 

The  Chairman.  Is  he  working  for  the  Government  ? 
(The  witness  conferred  with  his  counsel.) 
Mr.  Peress.  I  decline  to  answer  that  question. 
(The  witness  conferred  with  his  counsel.) 
The  Chairman.  What  is  you  father's  first  name  ? 
Mr.  Peress.  On  the  last  question,  my  father  is  not  working  at  all. 
The  Chairman.  Your  father  is  not  working  ? 
(The  witness  conferred  with  his  counsel.) 

The  Chairman.  Mr.  Peress,  I  realize  this  as  a  waste  of  the  com- 
mittee's time  to  ask  you  this  question,  except  that  we  want  the  record 
complete.  Can  you  tell  us,  can  you  shed  any  light  at  all  on  the  ques- 
tion of  why  you  were  commissioned,  why  you  were  promoted,  why 
you  were  given  an  honorable  discharge  after  the  public  records  dis- 
closed that  you  were  a  Communist  Party  leader;  after  the  record 
shows  as  early  as  April  of  1953  your  commanding  officer  and  the  com- 
manding officer  of  the  First  Army  joined  in  a  recommendation  to  have 
you  immediately  separated  after  you  refused  to  tell  the  Army  whether 
you  were  a  part  of  the  Communist  conspiracy  ? 

:  As  I  say,  I  realize  it  is  a  waste  of  time  asking  you  to  answer  the  ques- 
tion, but  I  want  to  have  the  record  complete.     What  is  your  answer? 
Mr.  Peress.  I  really  couldn't  make  a  question  out  of  it.     Would 
you  repeat  it  please  ? 

The  Chairman.  No,  it  is  not  necessary. 
Mr.  Peress.  What  was  the  significance  of  April  1953  ? 
The  Chairman.  May  I  say,  for  the  benefit  of  your  counsel,  while 
this  Fifth  Amendment  Communist  may  have  been  removed  from  the 
court  martial  jurisdiction  of  the  Army,  he  has  not  been  removed  from 
the  jurisdiction  of  our  civil  courts.  I  am  referring  the  entire  record 
in  this  case,  both  in  executive  session  and  in  public  session,  together 
with  the  affidavits  which  he  has  signed,  obviously  false  affidavits, 
to  the  Justice  Department  with  the  suggestion  that  this  be  submitted 
to  a  grand  jury  for  criminal  prosecution. 

I  may  say  to  counsel,  as  a  courtesy  to  counsel,  if  you  will  keep  in 
touch  with  the  chief  counsel  of  our  committee,  Mr.  Eoy  Cohn,  he  will 
keep  you  informed  as  to  the  steps  that  we  take  in  Mr.  Peress'  case. 
m  Mr.  Peress,  you  are  not  released  from  the  subpena.     You  will  con- 
sider yourself  under  subpena. 

Let  me  ask  counsel,  when  we  want  this  individual  again  would 
you  prefer  that  we  notify  you,  or  would  you  prefer  that  the  notice 
go  directly  to  Peress  ? 

Mr.  Faulkner.  You  may  notify  me. 

The  Charman.  We  try  to  give  sufficient  notice  so  that  it  can  fit  into 
your  other  work. 

I  assume  4  or  5  days  or  a  week's  time  would  be  sufficient? 
m  Mr.  Faulkner.  We  are  ready,  willing,  and  able  to  testify  at  any 
time  we  are  called  upon.     We  came  down  here  the  last  time  without 
subpena,  in  executive  session. 

The  Chairman.  Yes.     You  were  ordered  down  by  the  Army. 
Mr.  Faulkner.  There  was  no  order,  Mr.  Senator. 


COMMUNIST    INFILTRATION    IN    THE    ARMY  143 

The  Chairman.  We  will  not  waste  any  time  on  that. 

You  understand,  Mr.  Peress,  you  are  under  subpena.  Your  coun- 
sel will  be  notified  when  you  are  to  return  before  the  committee. 

This  afternoon  at  2 :  30,  we  will  hear  the  Army,  certain  Army  offi- 
cers, in  executive  session. 

Again,  may  I  say  that  the  legal  counsel  for  the  Army  is  invited  to 
be  present,  if  he  cares  to. 

Mr.  Faulkner.  Are  we  requested  to  remain  for  the  rest  of  the  day  ? 

The  Chairman.  No.  You  will  be  notified  when  you  are  wanted 
again. 

(Whereupon,  at  12 :  15  p.  m.,  the  public  hearing  was  recessed,  subject 
to  call.) 


COMMUNIST  INFILTRATION  IN  THE  AMY 


(On  February  18,  1954,  Brig.  Gen.  Ralph  W.  Zwicker,  U.  S.  Army,  testified 
in  executive  session  during  hearings  held  by  the  Senate  Permanent  Subcom- 
mittee on  Investigations  on  Communist  Infiltration  in  the  Army.  This  tes- 
timony was  made  public  on  February  22,  1954,  by  the  members  of  the  subcom- 
mittee and  follows  below:) 

THURSDAY,   FEBRUARY   18,    1954 

United  States  Senate, 
Permanent  Subcommittee  on  Investigations  of  the 

Committee  on  Government  Operations, 

New  York,  N.  t. 

The  subcommittee  met  at  4:  30  p.  m.,  in  executive  session,  in  room 
110,  Federal  Building,  New  York,  N.  Y.,  Senator  Joseph  R.  McCarthy 
(chairman)  presiding. 

Present :  Senator  Joseph  R.  McCarthy,  Republican,  Wisconsin. 

Present  also :  Roy  M.  Cohn,  chief  counsel ;  Daniel  G.  Buckley,  assist- 
ant counsel;  Harold  Rainville,  administrative  assistant  to  Senator 
Dirksen;  Robert  Jones,  administrative  assistant  to  Senator  Potter; 
and  James  N.  Juliana,  investigator. 

The  Chairman.  General,  would  you  raise  your  right  hand  and  be 
sworn  ?  In  this  matter  now  in  hearing  before  the  committee,  do  you 
solemnly  swear  to  tell  the  truth,  the  whole  truth,  and  nothing  but  the 
truth,  so  help  you  God  ? 

TESTIMONY  OF  BRIG.  GEN.  RALPH  W.  ZWICKER,  UNITED  STATES 
ARMY;  ACCOMPANIED  BY  CAPT.  W.  J.  WOODWARD,  MEDICAL 
CORPS,  UNITED  STATES  ARMY 

General  Zwicker.  I  do. 

Before  we  start,  there  is  no  need  for  a  medical  officer  to  be  in  here. 

The  Chairman.  That  is  O.  K. 

Mr.  Cohn.  A  man  who  is  his  own  lawyer  has  a  fool  for  a  client, 
and  it  is  the  same  thing  with  a  man  who  tries  to  be  his  own  doctor. 

General,  could  we  have  your  full  name? 

General  Zwicker.  Ralph  W.  Zwicker. 

Mr.  Cohn.  General,  to  see  if  we  can  save  a  little  time  here,  isn't  the 
situation  this — by  the  way,  you  have  been  commanding  officer  at  Kilmer 
since  when? 

General  Zwicker.  Since  the  middle  of  July  last  year. 

Mr.  Cohn.  Has  the  Peress  case  come  to  your  attention  since  that 
time  ?     I  am  not  asking  questions  about  it. 

General  Zwicker.  Yes. 

Mr.  Cohn.  It  has  come  to  your  attention  and  you  have  a  familiarity 
with  that  case? 

General  Zwicker.  Yes. 

145 


146  COMMUNIST    INFILTRATION   IN    THE    ARMY 

Mr.  Cohn.  Now,  general,  would  you  like  to  be  able  to  tell  us  exactly 
what  happened  in  that  case,  and  what  steps  you  took  and  others  took 
down  at  Kilmer  to  take  action  against  Peress  a  long  time  before  action 
was  finally  forced  by  the  committee  ? 

General  Zwicker.  That  is  a  toughie. 

Mr.  Cohn.  All  I  am  asking  you  now  is  if  you  could,  if  you  were  at 
liberty  to  do  so,  would  you  like  to  be  in  a  position  to  tell  us  that  story  ? 

General  Zwtcker.  Well,  may  I  say  that  if  I  were  in  a  position  to  do 
so,  I  would  be  perfectly  glad  to  give  the  committee  any  information 
that  they  desired. 

Mr.  Cohn.  You  certainly  feel  that  that  information  would  not 
reflect  unfavorably  on  you ;  is  that  correct? 

General  Zwicker.  Definitely  not. 

Mr.  Cohn.  And  would  not  reflect  unfavorably  on  a  number  of  other 
people  at  Kilmer  and  the  First  Army  ? 

General  Zwicker.  Definitely  not. 

The  Chairman.  It  would  reflect  unfavorably  upon  some  of  them, 
of  course? 

General  Zwicker.  That  I  can't  answer,  sir.    I  don't  know. 

The  Chairman.  Well,  you  know  that  somebody  has  kept  this  man 
on,  knowing  he  was  a  Communist,  do  you  not? 

General  Zwicker.  No,  sir. 

The  Chairman.  You  know  that  somebody  has  kept  him  on  know- 
ing that  he  has  refused  to  tell  whether  he  was  a  Communist,  do  you 
not? 

General  Zwtcker.  I  am  afraid  that  would  come  under  the  category 
of  the  Executive  order,  Mr.  Chairman. 

The  Chairman.  What? 

General  Zwicker.  I  am  afraid  an  answer  to  that  question  would 
come  under  the  category  of  the  Presidential  Executive  order. 

The  Chairman.  You  will  be  ordered  to  answer  the  question. 

General  Zwicker.  Would  you  repeat  the  question,  please? 

Mr.  Cohn.  Head  it  to  the  general. 

(The  question  referred  to  was  read  by  the  reporter.) 

General  Zwicker.  I  respectfully  decline  to  answer,  Mr.  Chairman, 
on  the  grounds  of  the  directive,  Presidential  directive,  which,  in  my 
interpretation,  will  not  permit  me  to  answer  that  question. 

The  Chairman.  You  know  that  somebody  signed  or  authorized  an 
honorable  discharge  for  this  man,  knowing  that  he  was  a  fifth  amend- 
ment Communist,  do  you  not? 

General  Zwicker.  I  know  that  an  honorable  discharge  was  signed 
for  the  man. 

The  Chairman.  The  day  the  honorable  discharge  was  signed,  were 
you  aware  of  the  fact  that  he  had  appeared  before  our  committee  ? 

General  Zwicker.  I  was. 

The  Chairman.  And  had  refused  to  answer  certain  questions? 

General  Zwicker.  No,  sir,  not  specifically  on  answering  any  quea  • 
tions.    I  knew  that  he  had  appeared  before  your  committee. 

The  Chairman.  Didn't  you  read  the  news  ? 

General  Zwicker.  I  read  the  news  releases. 

The  Chairman.  And  the  news  releases  were  to  the  effect  that  he  had 
refused  to  tell  whether  he  was  a  Communist,  and  that  there  was  evi- 
dence that  he  had  attended  Communist  leadership  schools.     It  was  on 


COMMUNIST   INFILTRATION   IN    THE    ARMY  147 

all  the  wire  service  stories,  was  it  not  ?  You  knew  generally  what  he 
was  here  for,  did  you  not  ? 

General  Zwicker.  Yes;  indeed. 

The  Chairman.  And  you  knew  generally  that  he  had  refused  to  tell 
whether  he  was  a  Communist,  did  you  not  ? 

General  Zwicker.  I  don't  recall  whether  he  refused  to  tell  whether 
he  was  a  Communist. 

The  Chairman.  Are  you  the  commanding  officer  there  ? 

General  Zwicker.  I  am  the  commanding  general. 

The  Chairman.  When  an  officer  appears  before  a  committee  and 
refuses  to  answer,  would  you  not  read  that  story  rather  carefully  ? 

General  Zwicker.  I  read  the  press  releases. 

The  Chairman.  Then,  General,  you  knew,  did  you  not,  that  he 
appeared  before  the  committee  and  refused,  on  the  grounds  of  the 
fifth  amendment,  to  tell  about  all  of  his  Communist  activities?  You 
knew  that,  did  you  not? 

General  Zwicker.  I  knew  everything  that  was  in  the  press. 

The  Chairman.  Don't  be  coy  with  me,  General. 

General  Zwicker.  I  am  not  being  coy,  sir. 

The  Chairman.  Did  you  have  that  general  picture? 

General  Zwicker.  I  believe  I  remember  reading  in  the  paper  that 
he  had  taken  refuge  in  the  fifth  amendment  to  avoid  answering 
questions  before  the  committee. 

The  Chairman.  About  communism? 

General  Zwicker.  I  am  not  too  certain  about  that. 

The  Chairman.  Do  you  mean  that  you  did  not  have  enough  interest 
in  the  case,  General,  the  case  of  this  major  who  was  in  your  command, 
to  get  some  idea  of  what  questions  he  had  refused  to  answer  ?  Is  that 
correct  ? 

General  Zwicker.  I  think  that  is  not  putting  it  quite  right,  Mr. 
Chairman. 

The  Chairman.  You  put  it  right,  then. 

General  Zwicker.  I  have  great  interest  in  all  of  the  officers  of  my 
command,  with  whatever  they  do. 

The  Chairman.  Let's  stick  to  fifth- amendment  Communists,  now. 
Let's  stick  to  him.    You  told  us  you  read  the  press  releases. 

General  Zwicker.  I  did. 

The  Chairman.  But  now  you  indicate  that  you  did  not  know  that  he 
refused  to  tell  about  his  Communist  activities.     Is  that  correct? 

General  Zwicker.  I  know  that  he  refused  to  answer  questions  for  the 
committee. 

The  Chairman.  Did  you  know  that  he  refused  to  answer  questions 
about  his  Communist  activities? 

General  Zwicker.  Specifically,  I  don't  believe  so. 

The  Chairman.  Did  you  have  any  idea  ? 

General  Zwicker.  Of  course  I  had  an  idea. 

The  Chairman.  What  do  you  think  he  was  called  down  here  for  ? 

General  Zwicker.  For  that  specific  purpose. 

The  Chairman.  Then  you  knew  that  those  were  the  questions  he  was 
asked,  did  you  not?  General,  let's  try  and  be  truthful.  I  am  going 
to  keep  you  here  as  long  as  you  keep  hedging  and  hemming. 

General  Zwicker.  I  am  not  hedging. 

The  Chairman.  Or  hawing. 


148  COMMUNIST    INFILTRATION    IN    THE    ARMY 

General  Zwicker.  I  am  not  hawing,  and  I  don't  like  to  have  anyone 
impugn  my  honesty,  which  you  just  about  did. 

The  Chairman.  Either  your  honesty  or  your  intelligence;  I  can't 
help  impugning  one  or  the  other,  when  you  tell  us  that  a  major  in  your 
command  who  was  known  to  you  to  have  been  before  a  Senate  com- 
mittee, and  of  whom  you  read  the  press  releases  very  carefully — to 
now  have  you  sit  here  and  tell  us  that  you  did  not  know  whether  he 
refused  to  answer  questions  about  Communist  activities.  I  had  seen 
all  the  press  releases,  and  they  all  dealt  with  that.  So  when  you  do 
that,  General,  if  you  will  pardon  me,  I  cannot  help  but  question  either 
your  honesty  or  your  intellligence,  one  or  the  other.  I  want  to  be 
frank  with  you  on  that. 

Now,  is  it  your  testimony  now  that  at  the  time  you  read  the  stories 
about  Major  Peress,  that  you  did  not  know  that  he  had  refused  to 
answer  questions  before  this  committee  about  his  Communist 
activities  ? 

General  Zwicker.  I  am  sure  I  had  that  impression. 

The  Chairman.  Did  you  also  read  the  stories  about  my  letter  to 
Secretary  of  the  Army  Stevens  in  which  I  requested  or,  rather,  sug- 
gested that  this  man  be  court-martialed,  and  that  anyone  that  pro- 
tected him  or  covered  up  for  him  be  court-martialed? 

General  Zwicker.  Yes,  sir. 

The  Chairman.  That  appeared  in  the  papers  on  Sunday  and  Mon- 
day, right  ? 

General  Zwicker.  I  don't  recall  the  exact  date. 

The  Chairman.  At  least,  it  appeared  before  he  got  his  honorable 
discharge  ? 

General  Zwicker.  I  don't  know  that  that  was  true,  either,  sir. 

The  Chairman.  In  any  event,  you  saw  it  in  a  current  paper,  did 
you? 

General  Zwicker.  I  did. 

The  Chairman.  You  did  not  see  the  story  later.  So  that  at  the 
time  he  was  discharged,  were  you  then  aware  of  the  fact  that  I  had 
suggested  a  court-martial  for  him  and  for  whoever  got  him  special 
consideration  ? 

General  Zwicker.  If  the  time  jibes,  I  was. 

The  Chairman.  Were  you  aware  that  he  was  being  given  a  dis- 
charge on  February  2?  In  other  words,  the  day  he  was  discharged, 
were  you  aware  of  it  ? 

General  Zwicker.  Yes ;  yes,  sir. 

The  Chairman.  Who  ordered  his  discharge? 

General  Zwicker.  The  Department  of  the  Army. 

The  Chairman.  Who  in  the  Department  ? 

General  Zwicker.  That  I  can't  answer. 

Mr.  Cohn.  That  isn't  a  security  matter? 

General  Zwicker.  No.    I  don't  know.    Excuse  me. 

Mr.  Cohn.  Who  did  you  talk  to?    You  talked  to  somebody? 

General  Zwicker.  No,  I  did  not. 

Mr.  Cohn.  How  did  you  know  he  should  be  discharged  ? 

General  Zwicker.  You  also  have  a  copy  of  this.  I  don't  know  why 
you  asked  me  for  it.  This  is  the  order  under  which  he  was  discharged, 
a  copy  of  that  order. 

The  Chairman.  Just  a  minute. 

You  are  referring  to  an  order  of  January  19. 


COMMUNIST    INFILTRATION    IN    THE    ARMY  149 

General  Zwicker.  I  am  not  sure,  sir.    Just  a  moment. 

The  Chairman.  January  18.  Will  you  tell  me  whether  or  not  you 
were  at  all  concerned  about  the  fact  that  this  man  was  getting  an 
honorable  discharge  after  the  chairman  of  the  Senate  Investigating 
Committee  had  suggested  to  the  Department  of  the  Army  that  he  be 
court-martialed  ?    Did  that  give  you  any  concern  ? 

General  Zwicker.  It  may  have  concerned  me,  but  it  could  not  have 
changed  anything  that  was  done  in  carrying  out  this  order. 

The  Chairman.  Did  you  take  any  steps  to  have  him  retained  until 
the  Secretary  of  the  Army  could  decide  whether  he  should  be  court- 
martialed  ? 

General  Zwicker.  No,  sir. 

The  Chairman.  Did  it  occur  to  you  that  you  should? 

General  Zwicker.  No,  sir. 

The  Chairman.  Could  you  have  taken  such  steps? 

General  Zwicker.  No,  sir. 

The  Chairman.  In  other  words,  there  is  nothing  you  could  have 
done ;  is  that  your  statement  ? 

General  Zwicker.  That  is  my  opinion. 

Mr.  Rainville.  May  I  interrupt  a  minute?  Doesn't  that  order 
specifically  state  that  this  is  subject  to  your  check  as  to  whether  he 
is  in  good  health  and  can  be  discharged  ? 

General  Zwicker.  May  I  read  it  ? 

Mr.  Rainville.  I  read  the  order.    It  is  in  there. 

General  Zwicker.  Paragraph  5  of  this  order  states : 

Officer  will  not  be  separated  prior  to  determination  that  he  is  physically  quali- 
fied for  separation  by  your  headquarters. 

Mr.  Rainville.  That  is  a  decision  that  you  must  make  ? 

General  Zwicker.  Not  me  personally.    My  medical  officers. 

Mr.  Rainville.  But  he  would  report  to  you.  He  would  not  make 
the  decision  without  giving  you,  the  commanding  general,  the  order 
for  final  verification  ? 

General  Zwicker.  It  would  not  be  necessary.  If  something  were 
found  wrong  physically  with  the  man,  he  would  be  retained. 

Mr.  Rainville.  He  would  report  to  you  ? 

General  Zwicker.  No.    He  would  be  retained. 

Mr.  Rainville.  It  would  be  automatic,  and  you  would  not  have  to 
sign  anything? 

General  Zwicker.  I  would  not  personally,  no.  The  medical  officer 
would  make  such  a  report. 

Mr.  Rainville.  But  there  was  somebody  in  your  outfit  who  could 
say,  "This  man  can  go  out  or  can't  go  out,"  and  that  was  the  doctor  ? 

General  Zwicker.  He  could  not  keep  him  in  if  he  were  physically 
qualified  for  separation. 

Mr.  Rainville.  But  he  could  say  he  could  not  go  out,  so  that  there 
was  discretion  within  that  90-day  period. 

The  Chairman.  Let  me  ask  this  question:  If  this  man,  after  the 
order  came  up,  after  the  order  of  the  18th  came  up,  prior  to  his  get- 
ting an  honorable  discharge,  were  guilty  of  some  crime — let  us  say 
that  he  held  up  a  bank  or  stole  an  automobile — and  you  heard  of  that 
the  day  before — let  us  say  you  heard  of  it  the  same  day  that  you  heard 
of  my  letter — could  you  then  have  taken  steps  to  prevent  his  discharge, 
or  would  he  have  automatically  been  discharged  ? 


150  COMMUNIST    INFILTRATION    IN    THE    ARMY 

General  Zwicker.  I  would  have  definitely  taken  steps  to  prevent 
discharge. 

The  Chairman.  In  other  words,  if  you  found  that  he  was  guilty  of 
improper  conduct,  conduct  unbecoming  an  officer,  we  will  say,  then 
you  would  not  have  allowed  the  honorable  discharge  to  go  through, 
would  you  ? 

General  Zwicker.  If  it  were  outside  the  directive  of  this  order? 

The  Chairman.  Well,  yes,  let  us  say  it  were  outside  the  directive. 

General  Zwicker.  Then  I  certainly  would  never  have  discharged 
him  until  that  part  of  the  case 

The  Chairman.  Let  us  say  he  went  out  and  stole  $50  the  night 
before. 

General  Zwicker.  He  wouldn't  have  been  discharged. 

The  Chairman.  Do  you  think  stealing  $50  is  more  serious  than  being 
a  traitor  to  the  country  as  part  of  the  Communist  conspiracy  ? 

General  Zwicker.  That,  sir,  was  not  my  decision. 

The  Chairman.  You  said  if  you  learned  that  he  stole  $50,  you  would 
have  prevented  his  discharge.  You  did  learn  something  much  more 
serious  than  that.  You  learned  that  he  had  refused  to  tell  whether  he 
was  a  Communist.  You  learned  that  the  chairman  of  a  Senate  com- 
mittee suggested  he  be  court-martialed.  And  you  say  if  he  had  stolen 
$50  he  would  not  have  gotten  the  honorable  discharge.  But  merely 
being  a  part  of  the  Communist  conspiracy,  and  the  chairman  of  the 
committee  asking  that  he  be  court-martialed,  would  not  give  you 
grounds  for  holding  up  his  discharge.    Is  that  correct  ? 

General  Zwicker.  Under  the  terms  of  this  letter,  that  is  correct,  Mr. 
Chairman. 

The  Chairman.  That  letter  says  nothing  about  stealing  $50,  and  it 
does  not  say  anything  about  being  a  Communist.  It  does  not  say  any- 
thing about  his  appearance  before  our  committee.  He  appeared  before 
our  committee  after  that  order  was  made  out. 

Do  you  think  you  sound  a  bit  ridiculous,  General,  when  you  say  that 
for  $50,  you  would  prevent  his  being  discharged,  but  for  being  a  part 
of  the  conspiracy  to  destroy  this  country  you  could  not  prevent  his 
discharge? 

General  Zwicker.  I  did  not  say  that,  sir. 

The  Chairman.  Let's  go  over  that.  You  did  say  if  you  found  out 
he  stole  $50  the  night  before,  he  would  not  have  gotten  an  honorable 
discharge  the  next  morning? 

General  Zwicker.  That  is  correct. 

The  Chairman.  You  did  learn,  did  you  not,  from  the  newspaper 
reports,  that  this  man  was  part  of  the  Communist  conspiracy,  or  at 
least  that  there  was  strong  evidence  that  he  was.  Did  you  not  think 
that  was  more  serious  than  the  theft  of  $50  ? 

General  Zwicker.  He  has  never  been  tried  for  that,  sir,  and  there 
was  evidence,  Mr.  Chairman 

The  Chairman.  Don't  you  give  me  doubletalk.  The  $50  case,  that 
he  had  stolen  the  night  before,  he  has  not  been  tried  for  that. 

General  Zwicker.  That  is  correct.    He  didn't  steal  it  yet. 

The  Chairman.  Would  you  wait  until  he  was  tried  for  stealing  the 
$50  before  you  prevented  his  honorable  discharge  ? 

General  Zwicker.  Either  tried  or  exonerated. 

The  Chairman.  You  would  hold  up  the  discharge  until  he  was  tried 
or  exonerated? 


COMMUNIST    INFILTRATION   IN   THE    ARMY  151 

General  Zwicker.  For  stealing  the  $50 ;  yes. 

The  Chairman.  But  if  you  heard  that  this  man  was  a  traitor — in 
other  words,  instead  of  hearing  that  he  had  stolen  $50  from  the  corner 
store,  let  us  say  you  heard  that  he  was  a  traitor,  he  belonged  to  the 
Communist  conspiracy ;  that  a  Senate  committee  had  the  sworn  testi- 
mony to  that  effect.  Then  would  you  hold  up  his  discharge  until  he 
was  either  exonerated  or  tried  ? 

General  Zwicker.  I  am  not  going  to  answer  that  question,  I  don't 
believe,  the  way  you  want  it,  sir. 

The  Chairman.  I  just  want  you  to  tell  me  the  truth. 

General  Zwicker.  On  all  of  the  evidence  or  anything  that  had  been 
presented  to  me  as  Commanding  General  of  Camp  Kilmer,  I  had  no 
authority  to  retain  him  in  the  service. 

The  Chairman.  You  say  that  if  you  had  heard  that  he  had  stolen 
$50,  then  you  could  order  him  retained.  But  when  you  heard  that  he 
was  part  of  the  Communist  conspiracy,  that  subsequent  to  the  time  the 
orders  were  issued  a  Senate  committee  took  the  evidence  under  oath 
that  he  was  part  of  the  conspiracy,  you  say  that  would  not  allow  you 
to  hold  up  his  discharge  ? 

General  Zwicker.  I  was  never  officially  informed  by  anyone  that  he 
was  part  of  the  Communist  conspiracy,  Mr.  Senator. 

The  Chairman.  Well,  let's  see  now.  You  say  you  were  never  offi- 
cially informed? 

General  Zwicker.  No. 

The  Chairman.  If  you  heard  that  he  had  stolen  $50  from  someone 
down  the  street,  if  you  did  not  hear  it  officially,  then  could  you  hold 
up  his  discharge?     Or  is  there  same  peculiar  way  you  must  hear  it? 

General  Zwicker.  I  believe  so,  yes,  sir,  until  I  was  satisfied  that  he 
had  or  hadn't,  one  way  or  the  other. 

The  Chairman.  You  would  not  need  any  official  notification  so  far 
far  as  the  50  bucks  is  concerned  ? 

General  Zwicker.  Yes. 

The  Chairman.  But  you  say  insofar  as  the  Communist  conspiracy 
is  concerned,  you  need  an  official  notification  ? 

General  Zwicker.  Yes,  sir ;  because  I  was  acting  on  an  official  order, 
having  precedence  over  that. 

The  Chairman.  How  about  the  $50  ?  If  one  of  your  men  came  in  a 
half  hour  before  he  got  his  honorable  discharge  and  said,  "General,  I 
just  heard  downtown  from  a  police  officer  that  this  man  broke  into  a 
store  last  night  and  stole  $50,"  you  would  not  give  him  an  honorable 
discharge  until  you  had  checked  the  case  and  found  out  whether  that 
was  true  or  not ;  would  you  ? 

General  Zwicker.  I  would  expect  the  authorities  from  downtown  to 
inform  me  of  that  or,  let's  say,  someone  in  a  position  to  suspect  that 
he  did  it. 

The  Chairman.  Let's  say  one  of  the  trusted  privates  in  your  com- 
mand came  in  to  you  and  said,  "General,  I  was  just  downtown  and  I 
have  evidence  that  Major  Peress  broke  into  a  store  and  stole  $50." 
You  would  not  discharge  him  until  you  had  checked  the  facts,  seen 
whether  or  not  the  private  was  telling  the  truth  and  seen  whether  or 
not  he  had  stolen  the  $50  ? 

General  Zwicker.  No;  I  don't  believe  I  would.  I  would  make  a 
check,  certainly,  to  check  the  story. 


152  COMMUNIST    INFILTRATION   IN   THE    ARMY 

The  Chairman.  Would  you  tell  us,  General,  why  $50  is  so  much 
more  important  to  you  than  being  part  of  the  conspiracy  to  destroy  a 
nation  which  you  are  sworn  to  defend  ? 

General  Zwicker.  Mr.  Chairman,  it  is  not,  and  you  know  that  as 
well  as  I  do. 

The  Chairman.  I  certainly  do.  That  is  why  I  cannot  understand 
you  sitting  there,  General,  a  General  in  the  Army,  and  telling  me  that 
you  could  not,  would  not,  hold  up  his  discharge  having  received 
information 

General  Zwicker.  I  could  not  hold  up  his  discharge. 

The  Chairman.  Why  could  you  not  do  it  in  the  case  of  an  allegation 
of  membership  in  a  Communist  conspiracy,  where  you  could  if  you 
merely  heard  some  private's  word  that  he  had  stolen  $50? 

General  Zwicker.  Because,  Mr.  Senator,  any  information  that 
appeared  in  the  press  or  any  releases  was  well  known  to  me  and  well 
known  to  plenty  of  other  people  long  prior  to  the  time  that  you  ever 
called  this  man  for  investigation,  and  there  were  no  facts  or  no  alle- 
gations, nothing  presented  from  the  time  that  he  appeared  before  your 
first  investigation  that  was  not  apparent  prior  to  that  time. 

The  Chairman.  In  other  words,  as  you  sat  here  this  morning  and 
listened  to  the  testimony  you  heard  nothing  new? 

Mr.  Cohn.  Nothing  substantially  new? 

General  Zwicker.  I  don't  believe  so. 

The  Chairman.  So  that  all  of  these  facts  were  known  at  the  time 
he  was  ordered  to  receive  an  honorable  discharge? 

General  Zwicker.  I  believe  they  are  all  on  record ;  yes,  sir. 

The  Chairman.  Do  you  think,  General,  that  anyone  who  is  respon- 
sible for  giving  an  honorable  discharge  to  a  man  who  has  been  named 
under  oath  as  a  member  of  the  Communist  conspiracy  should  himself 
be  removed  from  the  military? 

General  Zwicker.  You  are  speaking  of  generalities  now,  and  not 
on  specifics— is  that  right,  sir,  not  mentioning  about  any  one  par- 
ticular person  ? 

The  Chairman.  That  is  right. 

General  Zwicker.  I  have  no  brief  for  that  kind  of  person,  and  if 
there  exists  or  has  existed  something  in  the  system  that  permits  that, 
I  say  that  that  is  wrong. 

The  Chairman.  I  am  not  talking  about  the  system.  I  am  asking 
you  this  question,  General,  a  very  simple  question  :  Let  us  assume  that 
John  Jones,  who  is  a  major  in  the  United  States  Army 

General  Zwicker.  A  what,  sir? 

The  Chairman.  Let  us  assume  that  John  Jones  is  a  major  in  the 
United  States  Army.  Let  us  assume  that  there  is  sworn  testimony 
to  the  effect  that  he  is  part  of  the  Communist  conspiracy,  has  attended 
Communist  leadership  schools.  Let  us  assume  that  Maj.  John  Jones 
is  under  oath  before  a  committee  and  says,  "I  cannot  tell  you  the  truth 
about  these  charges  because,  if  I  did,  I  fear  that  might  tend  to  incrimi- 
nate me."  Then  let  us  say  that  General  Smith  was  responsible  for 
this  man  receiving  an  honorable  discharge,  knowing  these  facts.  Do 
you  think  that  General  Smith  should  be  removed  from  the  military, 
or  do  you  think  he  should  be  kept  on  in  it  ? 

General  Zwicker.  He  should  be  by  all  means  kept  if  he  were  acting 
under  competent  orders  to  separate  that  man. 


COMMUNIST    INFILTRATION   IN    THE    ARMY  153 

The  Chairman.  Let  us  say  he  is  the  man  who  signed  the  orders. 
Let  us  say  General  Smith  is  the  man  who  originated  the  order.  _ 

General  Zwicker.  Originated  the  order  directing  his  separation? 

The  Chairman.  Directing  his  honorable  discharge. 

General  Zwicker.  Well,  that  is  pretty  hypothetical. 

The  Chairman.  It  is  pretty  real,  General. 

General  Zwicker.  Sir,  on  one  point,  yes.  I  mean,  on  an  individual, 
yes.  But  you  know  that  there  are  thousands  and  thousands  of  people 
being  separated  daily  from  our  Army. 

The  Chairman.  General,  you  understand  my  question 

General  Zwicker.  Maybe  not. 

The  Chairman.  And  you  are  going  to  answer  it. 

General  Zwicker.  Repeat  it. 

The  Chairman.  The  reporter  will  repeat  it. 

(The  question  referred  to  was  read  by  the  reporter.) 

General  Zwicker.  That  is  not  a  question  for  me  to  decide,  Senator. 

The  Chairman.  You  are  ordered  to  answer  it,  General.  You  are 
an  employee  of  the  people. 

General  Zwicker.  Yes,  sir. 

The  Chairman.  You  have  a  rather  important  job.  I  want  to  know 
how  you  feel  about  getting  rid  of  Communists. 

General  Zwicker.  I  am  all  for  it. 

The  Chairman.  All  right.  You  will  answer  that  question,  unless 
you  take  the  fifth  amendment.  I  do  not  care  how  long  we  stay  here, 
you  are  going  to  answer  it. 

General  Zwicker.  Do  you  mean  how  I  feel  toward  Communists  ? 

The  Chairman.  I  mean  exactly  what  I  asked  you.  General ;  nothing 
else.  And  anyone  with  the  brains  of  a  5-year-old  child  can  understand 
that  question. 

The  reporter  will  read  it  to  you  as  often  as  you  need  to  hear  it  so  that 
you  can  answer  it,  and  then  you  will  answer  it. 

General  Zwicker.  Start  it  over,  please. 

(The  question  was  reread  by  the  reporter.) 

General  Zwicker.  I  do  not  think  he  should  be  removed  from  the 
military. 

The  Chairman.  Then,  General,  you  should  be  removed  from  any 
command.  Any  man  who  has  been  given  the  honor  of  being  promoted 
to  general  and  who  says,  "I  will  protect  another  general  who  protected 
Communists,"  is  not  fit  to  wear  that  uniform,  General.  I  think  it  is  a 
tremendous  disgrace  to  the  Army  to  have  this  sort  of  thing  given  to  the 
public.  I  intend  to  give  it  to  them.  I  have  a  duty  to  do  that.  I 
intend  to  repeat  to  the  press  exactly  what  you  said.  So  you  know 
that.     You  will  be  back  here,  General. 

Do  you  know  who  initiated  the  order  for  the  honorable  discharge 
of  this  major? 

General  Zwicker.  As  a  person,  sir? 

The  Chairman.  Yes. 

General  Zwicker.  No,  I  do  not. 

The  Chairman.  Have  you  tried  to  find  out? 

General  Zwicker.  No,  I  have  not. 

The  Chairman.  Have  you  discussed  that  matter  with  Mr.  Adams? 

General  Zwicker.  As  a  person,  no,  sir. 

The  Chairman.  How  did  you  discuss  it  with  him  other  than  as  a 
person  ? 


154  COMMUNIST    INFILTRATION    IN    THE    ARMY 

General  Zwicker.  I  mean  as  an  individual.  This  is  a  Department 
of  the  Army  order. 

The  Chairman.  Have  you  tried  to  find  out  who  is  responsible  ? 

General  Zwicker.  Who  signed  this  order? 

The  Chairman.  Who  was  responsible  for  the  order  ? 

General  Zwicker.  No,  sir ;  I  have  not. 

The  Chairman.  Are  you  curious  ? 

General  Zwicker.  Frankly,  no. 

The  Chairman.  You  were  fully  satisfied,  then,  when  you  got  the 
order  to  give  an  honorable  discharge  to  this  Communist  major? 

General  Zwicker.  I  am  sorry,  sir  ? 

The  Chairman.  Read  the  question. 

(The  question  was  read  by  the  reporter.) 

General  Zwicker.  Yes,  sir ;  I  was. 

Mr.  Cohn.  General,  I  have  just  one  or  two  questions. 

The  Chairman.  Let  me  ask  one  question. 

In  other  words,  you  think  it  is  proper  to  give  an  honorable  dis- 
charge to  a  man  known  to  be  a  Communist? 

General  Zwicker.  No,  I  do  not. 

The  Chairman.  Why  do  you  think  it  is  proper  in  this  case  ? 

General  Zwicker.  Because  I  was  ordered  to  do  so. 

The  Chairman.  In  other  words,  anything  that  you  are  ordered  to 
do,  you  think  is  proper? 

General  Zwicker.  That  is  correct.  Anything  that  I  am  ordered 
to  do  by  higher  authority,  I  must  accept. 

The  Chairman.  Do  you  think  that  the  higher  authority  would  be 
guilty  of  improper  conduct? 

General  Zwicker.  It  is  conceivable. 

The  Chairman.  Do  you  think  they  are  guilty  of  improper  conduct 
here  ? 

General  Zwicker.  I  am  not  their  judge,  sir. 

The  Chairman.  Do  you  think  to  order  the  honorable  discharge  for 
a  Communist  major  was  improper  conduct? 

General  Zwicker.  I  think  it  was  improper  procedure,  sir. 

The  Chairman.  Do  you  think  it  is  improper  ? 

Mr.  Cohn.  General,  I  just  want  to  ask  you  this:  Peress  was  dis- 
charged on  February  2,  which  was  a  Tuesday. 

General  Zwicker.  That  is  right. 

Mr.  Cohn.  He  appeared  before  the  committee  on  Saturday.  On 
Monday  or  Tuesday,  did  you  speak  to  anybody  in  the  Department  of 
the  Army  in  Washington,  telephonically,  about  the  Peress  case  ?  On 
Monday  or  Tuesday  ? 

General  Zwicker.  Let  me  think  a  minute. 

It  is  possible  that  I  called  First  Army  to  inform  them  that  Peress 
had  changed  his  mind  and  desired  a  discharge  as  soon  as  possible. 

Mr.  Cohn.  Who  would  you  have  told  in  the  First  Army?  Who 
would  you  call  ?     G-2,  or  General  Burress  ? 

General  Zwicker.  I  don't  think  in  that  case  I  would  call  General 
Burress. 

Mr.  Cohn.  General  Seabree? 

General  Zwicker.  No.  It  would  have  been  G-l,  or  Deputy  Chief 
of  Staff. 

Mr.  Cohn.  Who  is  that? 

General  Zwicker.  General  Gurney. 


COMMUNIST    INFILTRATION   IN    THE    ARMY  155 

Mr.  Cohn.  You  don't  remember  which  one  it  was  ? 

General  Zwicker.  I  don't  recall  that  I  called. 

Mr.  Coiin.  Did  you  talk  to  Mr.  Adams  in  those  days? 

General  Zwicker.  No,  sir. 

Mr.  Cohn.  Did  you  ever  talk  to  Mr.  Adams  before  yesterday? 
You  recall  whether  or  not  you  spoke  to  him. 

General  Zwicker.  I  know  Mr.  Adams,  yes.  There  was  one  call, 
but  I  think  that  came  from  a  member  of  your  committee,  from  Wash- 
ington, requesting  that  this  man  appear  before  your  committee  first. 

The  Chairman.  You  understand  the  question.  Did  you  talk  to 
Mr.  Adams  before  yesterday  ? 

General  Zwicker.  I  don't  recall.     I  don't  believe  so,  sir. 

The  Chairman.  Did  you  talk  to  anyone  in  Washington  ? 

General  Zwicker.  No,  sir,  about  this  case. 

The  Chairman.  Within  the  week  preceding  his  discharge? 

General  Zwicker.  No,  sir. 

The  Chairman.  Did  you  at  any  time  ever  object  to  this  man  being 
honorably  discharged  ? 

General  Zwicker.  I  respectfully  decline  to  answer  that,  sir. 

The  Chairman.  You  will  be  ordered  to  answer  it. 

General  Zwicker.  That  is  on  the  grounds  of  this  Executive  order. 

The  Chairman.  You  are  ordered  to  answer.  That  is  a  personnel 
matter. 

General  Zwicker.  I  shall  still  respectfully  decline  to  answer  it. 

The  Chairman.  Did  you  ever  take  any  steps  which  would  have  aided 
him  in  continuing  in  the  military  after  you  knew  that  he  was  a  Com- 
munist? 

General  Zwicker.  That  would  have  aided  him  in  continuing,  sir? 

The  Chairman.  Yes. 

General  Zwicker.  No. 

The  Chairman.  Did  you  ever  do  anything  instrumental  in  his  ob- 
taining his  promotion  after  knowing  that  he  was  a  fifth-amendment 
case  ? 

General  Zwicker.  No,  sir. 

The  Chairman.  Did  you  ever  object  to  his  being  promoted? 

General  Zwicker.  I  had  no  opportunity  to,  sir. 

The  Chairman.  Did  you  ever  enter  any  objection  to  the  promotion 
of  this  man  under  your  command? 

General  Zwicker.  I  had  no  opportunity  to  do  that. 

The  Chairman.  You  say  you  did  not ;  is  that  correct  ? 

General  Zwicker.  That  is  correct. 

The  Chairman.  And  you  refuse  to  tell  us  whether  you  objected  to 
his  obtaining  an  honorable  discharge? 

General  Zwicker.  I  don't  believe  that  is  quite  the  way  the  question 
was  phrased  before. 

The  Chairman.  Well,  answer  it  again,  then. 

General  Zwicker.  I  respectfully  request  that  I  not  answer  that 
question. 

The  Chairman.  You  will  be  ordered  to  answer. 

General  Zwicker.  Under  the  same  authority  as  cited  before,  I  can- 
not answer  it. 

Mr.  Cohn.  Did  anybody  on  your  staff,  General — Colonel  Brown  or 
anyone  in  G-2 — communicate  with  the  Department  of  the  Army  on 


156  COMMUNIST    INFILTRATION   IN    THE    ARMY 

February  1  or  February  2?  In  other  words,  in  connection  with  the 
discharge? 

General  Zwicker.  I  don't  know,  but  I  don't  believe  so. 

Mr.  Cohn.  To  the  best  of  your  knowledge,  no  ? 

General  Zwicker.  No. 

Mr.  Cohn.  In  other  words,  on  January  18,  1954,  you  received  a 
direction  from  the  Secretary,  signed  by  the  Adjutant  General,  I  as- 
sume that  is  General  Bergin,  telling  you  to  give  this  man  an  honorable 
discharge  from  the  Army  at  any  practicable  date,  depending  on  his 
desire,  but  in  no  event  later  than  90  days ;  that  that  was  the  order,  and 
you  had  nothing  from  the  order  to  change  that  order  in  view  of  his 
testimony  before  the  committee ;  and  therefore,  when  the  man  came  in 
and  wanted  an  honorable  discharge,  you  felt  under  this  order  com- 
pelled to  give  it  to  him  as  a  decision  that  had  been  made  by  the 
Adjutant  General.     Is  that  correct? 

General  Zwicker.  That  is  correct. 

Mr.  Cohn.  And  you  received  no  additional  words  from  the  Adju- 
tant General  on  February  1  or  February  2,  and  before  you  gave  the 
discharge  you  did  not  call  and  say,  "In  view  of  all  of  this,  and  his 
testimony  on  Saturday,  and  Senator  McCarthy's  request  for  a  court- 
martial,  this  man  is  in  here  now,  and  is  that  all  right?"  You  never 
made  any  such  call  ? 

General  Zwicker.  No  ;  I  did  not. 

Mr.  Rainville.  General,  I  think  at  one  place  there  you  said  he 
changed  his  request  to  an  immediate  discharge? 

General  Zwicker.  That  is  correct. 

Mr.  Rainville.  Then  he  had  previously  objected  to  the  discharge 
or  at  least  he  wanted  the  full  90  days? 

General  Zwicker.  No,  sir.  He  requested  to  be  discharged  on 
March  31,  I  think,  which  would  make  it  60  days  from  receipt,  rather 
than  the  full  90.  He  did  not  ask  for  the  full  90,  but  he  asked  for 
what  amounted  to  60  days,  2  months. 

Mr.  Rainville.  Then  he  came  in  as  soon  as  he  testified,  and  asked 
for  an  immediate  discharge  and  it  was  processed  routinely? 

General  Zwicker.  That  is  correct. 

Mr.  Rainville.  But  you  never  thought  it  necessary  after  he  ap- 
peared before  the  committee  or  when  he  made  that  request  to  discuss 
his  appearance  before  the  committee  with  him  ? 

General  Zwicker.  I  am  sorry. 

Mr.  Rainville.  My  question  is  this :  After  he  appeared  before  the 
committee  and  he  was  still  a  member  of  your  command,  even  though 
he  was  on  separation,  you  didn't  ask  him  to  come  in  and  report  what 
he  testified  to? 

General  Zwicker.  No,  sir. 

Mr.  Rainville.  And  you  didn't  think  it  was  necessary  when  he 
came  in  and  asked  for  an  immediate  discharge  instead  of  60  days  to 
ask  him  what  transpired  so  as  to  get  some  kind  of  an  idea  as  to  why 
he  wanted  it  immediately,  or  why  he  is  in  a  rush  to  get  out  now  instead 
of  taking  the  60  days  that  he  wanted  before  that  ? 

General  Zwicker.  That  was  beyond  my  prerogative.     I  did  not. 

Mr.  Rainville.  As  an  officer  of  your  command,  certainly  what  we 
usually  call  the  old  man's  privilege  there,  prerogative,  they  may  ask 
that  sort  of  question,  and  so  forth,  so  long  as  he  is  one  of  your  com- 
mand.    But  you  didn't  do  it? 


COMMUNIST    INFILTRATION    IN    THE    ARMY  157 

General  Zwicker.  No.  He  told  me  he  wanted  to  be  released  and 
I  said,  "All  right." 

Mr.  Jones.  General,  did  the  counsel  of  the  Army  advise  you  not  to 
discuss  the  Peress  case? 

General  Zwicker.  He  did  not. 

Mr.  Jones.  He  did  not  advise  you  ? 

General  Zwicker.  No,  sir. 

The  Chairman.  Who  did  advise  you  ? 

General  Zwicker.  No  one. 

The  Chairman.  What  did  you  and  Mr.  Adams  talk  about  yester- 
day? 

General  Zwicker.  Mr.  Adams  and  I  talked  about  the  various  pro- 
cedures of  prior  meetings  such  as  this.  He  tried  to  indicate  what  I 
might  expect. 

Mr.  Jones.  Did  Mr.  Adams  advise  anyone  not  to  discuss  the  Peress 
case  to  this  committee? 

General  Zwicker.  I  am  sorry.     He  did  not  advise  me. 

Mr.  Jones.  I  mean  to  your  knowledge,  did  he  advise  any  other 
person  ? 

General  Zwicker.  To  my  knowledge  he  did  not. 

Mr.  Jones.  General,  what  is  your  considered  opinion  of  this  order 
here  forbidding  you  to  assist  this  committee  in  exposing  the  Com- 
munist conspiracy  in  the  Army  ? 

General  Zwicker.  Sir,  I  cannot  answer  that,  because  it  is  signed  by 
the  President.     The  President  says  don't  do  it  and  therefore  I  don't. 

Mr.  Jones.  What  is  your  considered  opinion  of  that  order?  You 
see  now,  here  is  a  perfectly  good  example  of  a  Communist  being  pro- 
moted right  in  the  ranks,  all  because  of  this  Executive  order  here,  in 
many  respects,  where  we  could  not  get  at  these  things  earlier.  What 
is  your  considered  opinion  of  an  order  of  that  nature? 

General  Zwicker.  I  won't  answer  that,  because  I  will  not  criticize 
my  Commander  in  Chief. 

The  Chairman.  General,  you  will  return  for  a  public  session  at 
10 :  30  Tuesday  morning. 

General  Zwicker.  This  coining  Tuesday  ? 

The  Chairman.  Yes. 

General  Zwicker.  Here? 

The  Chairman.  Yes. 

General  Zwicker.  At  what  time  ? 

The  Chairman.  10 :  30.  In  the  meantime,  in  accordance  with  the 
order  which  you  claim  forbids  you  the  right  to  discuss  this  case,  you 
will  contact  the  proper  authority  who  can  give  you  permission  to  tell 
the  committee  the  truth  about  the  case  before  you  appear  Tuesday, 
and  request  permission  to  be  allowed  to  tell  us  the  truth  above  the 

General  Zwicker.  Sir,  that  is  not  my  prerogative,  either. 

The  Chairman.  You  are  ordered  to  do  it. 

General  Zwicker.  I  am  sorry  $  sir,  I  will  not  do  that. 

The  Chairman.  All  right. 

General  Zwicker.  If  you  care  to  have  me,  I  will  cite  certain  other 
portions  of  this. 

The  Chairman.  You  need  cite  nothing.    You  may  step  down. 
(Whereupon,  at  5 :  15  p.  m.,  the  committee  was  recessed,  subject  to 
the  call  of  the  Chair.) 


COMMUNIST  INFILTBATION  IN  THE  AKMY 


THURSDAY,   MARCH  4,    1954 

United  States  Senate, 
Permanent  Subcommittee  on  Investigations  of  the 

Committee  on  Government  Operations. 

Washington,  D.  G. 

The  subcommittee  met  at  10 :  45  a.  m.,  pursuant  to  notice,  in  room 
357  of  the  Senate  Office  Building,  Senator  Joseph  R.  McCarthy 
(chairman)  presiding. 

Present:  Senator  Joseph  R.  McCarthy,  Republican,  Wisconsin; 
Senator  Everett  McKinley  Dirksen,  Republican,  Illinois;  Senator 
Charles  E.  Potter,  Republican,  Michigan ;  Senator  John  L.  McClellan, 
Democrat,  Arkansas;  and  Senator  Henry  M.  Jackson,  Democrat, 
Washington. 

Present  also  :  Roy  M.  Colin,  Chief  Counsel ;  Francis  P.  Carr,  Execu- 
tive director,  Robert  Francis  Kennedy,  counsel  to  minority ;  Donald  F. 
O'Donnel,  assistant  counsel;  C.  George  Anastos,  assistant  counsel; 
Daniel  G.  Buckley,  assistant  counsel ;  Ruth  Y.  Watts,  chief  clerk. 

The  Chairman.  The  committee  will  come  to  order. 

Mr.  Belsky,  you  have  been  sworn.  The  witness  has  requested  no 
pictures  be  taken  of  him  while  he  is  testifying,  so  none  will  be  taken 
while  he  is  testifying. 

TESTIMONY  OF  DR.  MARVIN  SANFORD  BELSKY  (ACCOMPANIED  BY 
HIS  COUNSEL,  STANLEY  FAULKNER,  NEW  YORK,  N.  Y.) 

Mr.  Cohn.  May  we  get  your  full  name,  sir? 

Dr.  Belsky.  Marvin  Sanford  Belsky. 

Mr.  Cohn.  Where  do  you  come  from? 

Dr.  Belsky.  Where  I  am  stationed,  that  is  ? 

Mr.  Cohn.  Where  are  you  stationed? 

Dr.  Belsky.  Murphy  Army  Hospital,  Waltham,  Mass. 

Mr.  Cohn.  You  do  the  work  of  a  doctor  there  ? 

Mr.  Faulkner.  This  is  awfully  distracting  with  these  cameras  in 
front  of  us,  and  I  am  sure  the  witness  can't  testify  freely  and  fully 
this  way. 

The  Chairman.  If  the  lights  bother  the  witness,  don't  turn  the 
lights  on  the  witness.  The  television  cameras  will  not  take  any  pic- 
tures of  the  witness  while  he  is  testifying. 

You  understand,  Mr.  Belsky,  you  are  under  oath  ? 

Dr.  Belsky.  Excuse  me,  may  I  make  a  request  ?  It  is  Dr.  Belsky 
and  not  Mr.  Belsky. 

The  Chairman.  You  understand  that  you  are  under  oath? 

Dr.  Belsky.  Yes,  sir.     Could  I  make  a  statement,  Senator  ? 

159 


160  COMMUNIST    INFILTRATION    IN    THE    ARMY 

The  Chairman.  You  may  make  a  statement. 

Dr.  Belsky.  Mr.  Senator,  I  have  been  served  with  a  blank  subpena. 
What  is  the  subject  matter  under  consideration  by  this  committee, 
what  am  I  accused  of,  and  who  has  accused  me? 

The  Chairman.  The  subject  matter  being  investigated  by  the  com- 
mittee at  this  particular  hearing  is  communism  in  the  Army,  com- 
munism in  war  plants,  and  communism  in  anything  related  to  our 
defense  effort  or  in  any  part  of  the  Government. 

You  asked  what  you  are  accused  of,  and  I  am  not  sure  if  the  word 
"accused"  is  correct  or  not,  but  the  information  we  have,  since  you  have 
asked,  is  that  you  are  an  active  member  of  the  Communist  conspiracy. 
You  are  here  today  because  you  are  a  doctor  in  a  hospital  which 
services  patients  from  the  Lincoln  project  which  is  a  top,  most  secret 
radar  project  we  have  in  this  country.     I  believe  that  will  cover  it. 

Dr.  Belsky.  Senator,  I  also 

The  Chairman.  Just  a  moment,  please. 

I  think  Senator  Dirksen  has  made  a  good  point  here  that  the  record 
should  be  clear  that  one  of  the  reasons  you  are  here  is  because  you 
are  in  a  position  to  constantly  contact  patients  who  have  been  working 
on  not  merely  secret,  but  top  secret  radar  work  at  the  Lincoln  project. 

Senator  McClellan. 

Dr.  Belsky.  I  would  like  to  raise  a  question. 

Senator  McClellan.  I  would  like  to  make  this  observation  for  the 
record,  and  I  think  the  record  should  be  very  clear,  that  you  are  not 
accused  of  any  offense.  You  are  here  as  a  witness  to  give  information 
that  this  committee  deems  necessary  to  help  it  perform  its  functions. 

Dr.  Belsky.  I  would  like  to  raise  one  jurisdictional  question. 

The  Chairman.  You  may. 

Dr.  Belsky.  Under  article  2,  section  II,  of  the  United  States  Con- 
stitution, I  am,  as  a  soldier,  only  under  the  jurisdiction  of  the  Presi- 
dent of  the  United  States,  who  is  the  Commander  in  Chief  of  the 
Army,  and  this  committee  has  no  jurisdiction  over  me. 

The  Chairman.  I  may  say,  yesterday  the  President  made  a  state- 
ment with  which  I  heartily  agree,  and  that  is  that  every  person  in  the 
military  or  any  other  branch  of  the  Government  should  willingly  and 
cheerfully  testify  and  give  facts  so  long  as  their  testimony  will  not 
endanger  the  security  of  the  United  States. 

I  may  say  that  that  is,  I  think,  a  step  forward  from  what  we  have 
been  witnessing  for  some  time  in  the  past. 

Just  so  that  there  is  no  question,  you  have  received  no  orders  either 
from  the  Commander  in  Chief,  Mr.  Eisenhower,  or  from  your  com- 
manding officer,  not  to  testify,  have  you  ? 

Dr.  Belsky.  No. 

The  Chairman.  So  that,  as  far  as  you  are  concerned,  as  of  today, 
you  are  free  to  testify  unless,  of  course,  you  invoke  the  fifth  amend- 
ment ? 

(The  witness  consulted  with  his  counsel.) 

Dr.  Belsky.  As  free  as  I  can  possibly  be. 

The  Chairman.  I  may  say,  that  in  this  case  the  Army  has  been 
extremely  cooperative.  We  had  some  trouble  locating  the  witness, 
and  they  helped  us;  they  made  no  objection  to  your  being  called 
whatsoever. 

Mr.  Cohn. 


COMMUNIST    INFILTRATION   IN    THE    ARMY  161 

Mr.  Cohn.  Now,  have  you  been  doing  this  work  at  the  Murphy 
General  Hospital  since  May  of  1953  ? 

Dr.  Belsky.  What  work? 

Mr.  Cohn.  Are  you  stationed  at  Murphy  General  Hospital? 

Dr.  Belsky.  Yes. 

Mr.  Cohn.  Do  you  perform  medical  services  there  ? 

Dr.  Belsky.  Some. 

Mr.  Cohn.  Do  you  interview  any  of  the  patients  there? 

Dr.  Belsky.  As  part  of  my  medical  duties. 

Mr.  Cohn.  Now,  have  you  been  doing  that  work  since  May  of  1953  ? 

(The  witness  consulted  with  his  counsel.) 

Dr.  Belsky.  Except  for  the  time  I  was  out  sick. 

Mr.  Cohn.  Except  for  the  time  you  have  been  out  sick,  you  have 
been  doing  that  work  since  May  of  1953.  Have  you  at  all  times  since 
May  of  1953  been  a  member  of  the  Communist  Party? 

Dr.  Belsky.  I  respectfully  decline  to  answer  that  question  under 
the  protection  of  the  fifth  amendment  to  the  Constitution  of  the 
United  States,  and  that  my  answer  might  tend  to  incriminate  me. 

Mr.  Cohn.  For  the  benefit  of  Senator  Dirksen,  we  should  show  for 
the  record  that  counsel  is  Stanley  Faulkner,  of  the  New  York  bar. 

The  Chairman.  I  think  that  we  have  your  address  and  everything. 
We  got  that  in  the  Peress  case. 

I  may  say  for  the  benefit  of  the  Senators,  this  is  the  same  young 
man  who  appeared  and  represented  Mr.  Peress. 

Mr.  Faulkner.  It  was  Dr.  Peress,  Mr.  Senator. 

The  Chairman.  Dr.  or  Major  Peress. 

Mr.  Cohn.  Did  you  tell  us  whether  or  not  you  are  a  member  of  the 
party  today  ? 

Dr.  Belsky.  I  respectfully  decline  to  answer  that  question  under 
the  protection  of  the  fifth  amendment  of  the  Constitution  of  the 
United  States  that  my  answer  may  tend  to  incriminate  me, 

Mr.  Cohn.  Since  May  of  1953,  up  until  the  present  time,  have  you 
attempted  to  recruit  people  with  whom  you  came  in  contact  at  the 
hospital  into  the  Communist  Party  ? 

Dr.  Belsky.  I  respectfully  decline  to  answer  that  question  under 
the  protection  of  the  fifth  amendment,  that  my  answer  might  tend 
to  incriminate  me. 

The  Chairman.  There  is  one  thing  that  puzzles  me  a  bit,  Doctor. 
I  understood  from  a  statement  made  yesterday  that  any  doctor  who 
was  drafted  was  entitled  to  a  commission  automatically"  I  find  that 
you  are  a  private  doing  the  work  of  a  doctor.  Can  you  explain  why 
you  were  not  commissioned  ? 

(The  witness  consulted  with  his  counsel.) 

Dr.  Belsky.  I  was  drafted  as  a  private. 

Senator  Potter.  You  were  drafted  under  the  Doctors  Draft  Act? 

Dr.  Belsky.  No. 

The  Chairman.  Just  a  second  now ;  you  applied  for  a  commission 
when  you  were  drafted,  did  you  not  ? 

(The  witness  consulted  with  his  counsel.) 

Dr.  Belsky.  I  was  subject  to  the  general  draft  law  because  I  was 
under  age. 

The  Chairman.  Did  you  hear  the  question? 

Dr.  Belsky.  Would  you  please  repeat  it? 


162  COMMUNIST    INFILTRATION    IN    THE    ARMY 

The  Chairman.  I  don't  want  to  browbeat  you,  but  I  would  like  to 
have  your  answer.     The  question  is  :  Did  you  apply  for  a  commission  \ 

Dr.  Belskt.  Yes;  I  applied  for  a  commission. 

The  Chairman.  That  is  a  very  simple  question.  Just  try  and  listen 
to  the  question,  will  you,  and  answer  it.  Why  were  you  denied  a 
commission  ? 

(The  witness  consulted  with  his  counsel.) 

Dr.  Belsky.  I  received  notice  that  my  forms  were  not  properly 
completed,  and  that  notice  was  received  after  I  had  been  drafted  as  a 
private. 

The  Chairman.  In  other  words,  you  did  not  answer  the  questions 
about  your  Communist  background;  therefore,  you  were  denied  a 
commission  ? 

(The  witness  consulted  with  his  counsel.) 

Dr.  Belsky.  They  never  told  me  why  I  didn't  properly  complete 
the  form. 

The  Chairman.  Well  now,  you  have  no  idea  why  you  were  denied  a 
commission  ? 

(The  witness  consulted  with  his  counsel.) 

Dr.  Belskt.  I  couldn't  venture  on  giving  you  an  opinion. 

The  Chairman.  I  just  want  to  know  whether  you  have  an  idea  why 
you  were  denied  a  commission? 

Dr.  Belsky.  I  couldn't  venture  to  give  you  any  idea  why  I  was 
denied. 

The  Chairman.  Have  you  any  idea.  I  am  not  asking  you  whether 
you  venture,  I  am  just  asking  you  whether  you  have  any  idea  why  you 
were  denied  a  commission.  The  record  shows  you  were  denied  it 
because  you  were  a  Communist  and  because  you  refused  to  answer 
questions  about  your  Communist  activities. 

Dr.  Belsky.  No  ;  I  have  no  idea. 

The  Chairman.  Do  you  know  that  ? 

Dr.  Belsky.  I  have  no  idea  why. 

The  Chairman.  You  had  no  knowledge  of  that  ? 

Dr.  Belsky.  Not  to  my  knowledge. 

Senator  Jackson.  Is  that  a  truthful  answer  ? 

(The  witness  consulted  with  his  counsel.) 

Dr.  Belsky.  I  was  advised  by  the  Army  officially  that  my  form  was 
never  properly  completed,  and  as  far  as  the  official  word,  what  actually 
the  official  word  was,  I  was  never  actually  advised  why  my  forms 
were  never  properly  completed. 

Senator  Jackson.  I  am  not  asking  you  for  an  official  word.  You 
are  a  doctor;  you  are  a  well-educated  man.  You  certainly  can  tell 
this  committee  truthfully  why  you  were  denied  a  commission,  in  your 
opinion. 

(The  witness  consulted  with  his  counsel.) 

Dr.  Belsky.  As  far  as  I  know,  the  Army  never  actually  told  me 
why  I  was  denied  a  commission  except  my  forms  were  not  properly 
completed. 

Senator  Jackson.  And  you  weren't  very  much  interested  in  your  not 
getting  a  commission.  You  would  rather  be  in  the  service  as  a  private 
than  as  a  commissioned  officer  ? 

(The  witness  consulted  with  this  counsel.) 

Dr.  Belsky.  I  inquired  why  I  was  denied  a  commission ;  they  never 
told  me ;  no  one  in  the  Army  told  me. 


COMMUNIST    INFILTRATION    IN    THE    ARMY  163 

Senator  Jackson.  You  haven't  the  remotest  idea  why  you  were 
denied  a  commission  ? 

(The  witness  consulted  with  this  counsel.) 

Dr.  Belsky.  It  could  be  many  reasons. 

Senator  Potter.  How  did  you  answer  the  question  as  to  whether 
you  belonged  to  an  organization  that  believed  in  the  overthrow  of 
our  Government  by  force  and  violence  ? 

Dr.  Belsky.  I  respectfully  decline  to  answer  that  question,  under 
the  protection  of  the  fifth  amendment,  in  that  my  answer  might  tend 
to  incriminate  me. 

Senator  PoTrEK.  Is  that  the  answer  you  put  on  your  application  I 

Dr.  Bel.sky.  I  respectfully  decline  to  answer  that  question,  under 
the  protection  of  the  fifth  amendment,  in  that  my  answer  might  tend 
to  incriminate  me. 

The  Chairman.  The  witness  will  be  ordered  to  answer. 

Senator  Potter  has  asked  you  a  question  covering  a  matter  which  is 
of  record  and  you  have  no  fifth  amendment  privilege  there.  You 
will  be  ordered  to  answer. 

(The  witness  consulted  with  his  counsel.) 

Dr.  Belsky.  Would  you  repeat  the  question,  please,  Senator  I 

Senator  Potter.  How  did  you  answer  the  form,  the  question  on  the 
form,  military  form,  as  to  whether  you  belonged  to  an  organization 
that  believed  in  the  overthrow  of  our  Government  by  force  and 
violence  ? 

(The  witness  consulted  with  his  counsel.) 

Dr.  Belsky.  There  were  several  questions  on  that,  and  I  have  to  see 
the  form  in  order  to  be  able  to  answer. 

Senator  Potter.  You  know  how  you  answered  that  question,  don't 

you? 

(The  witness  consulted  with  his  counsel.) 

Dr.  Belsky.  Can  you  show  me  the  form  \ 

Senator  Potter.  We  have  the  form. 

Dr.  Belsky.  Can  you  show  it  to  me  ? 

Senator  Potter.   You  answer  the  question. 

Dr.  Belsky.  Can  you  show  me  the  form  \ 

Senator  Potter.  I  am  asking  you  the  question,  and  you  certainly 
know  how  you  answered  that  question. 

The  Chairman.  It  is  a  simple  question.  Senator  Potter  asks  you  if 
you  know  how  you  answered  that  question. 

Mr.  Faulkner.  Mr.  Senator 

The  Chairman.  We  will  not  hear  from  counsel,  we  will  only  hear 
from  the  witness. 

(The  witness  consulted  with  his  counsel.) 

Dr.  Belsky.  There  were  specific  questions  on  the  form.  And  as  far 
as  I  recall  the  way  Senator  Potter  asked  the  question,  I  don't  know 
if  that  was  the  specific  question  on  the  form.  If  I  could  see  the  form, 
then  I  would  be  able  to  answer. 

Senator  Potter.  Were  you  a  member  of  the  Communist  Party  at 
the  time  you  filled  out  the  form  ? 

Dr.  Belsky.  I  respectfully  decline  to  answer  that  question,  under 
the  protection  of  the  fifth  amendment  of  the  Constitution  of  the 
United  States,  in  that  my  answer  might  tend  to  incriminate  me. 

Senator  Potter.  How  would  you  answer  that  question  today? 

(The  witness  consulted  with  his  counsel.) 


164  COMMUNIST    INFILTRATION   IN    THE    ARMY 

Dr.  Belskt.  I  am  answering  it  today. 

Senator  Potter.  What  is  your  answer? 

Dr.  Belskt.  What  I  just  said. 

Senator  Potter.  I  am  asking  you  what  you  said. 

Dr.  Belskt.  I  respectfully  decline  to  answer  that  question,  under 
the  protection  of  the  fifth  amendment  of  the  Constitution  of  the 
United  States,  in  that  my  answer  might  tend  to  incriminate  me. 

Senator  Jackson.  You  would  not  want  to  convey  the  impression 
to  this  committee  or  the  American  public  that  you  do  not  know  why 
you  were  denied  a  commission. 

(The  witness  consulted  with  his  counsel.) 

Dr.  Belskt.  That  is  an  Army  policy  and  the  Army  never  told  me 
why  I  was  denied  a  commission. 

Senator  Jackson.  I  mean  you  have  friends  that  are  doctors,  and 
I  suppose  you  tell  them  that  the  fact  that  you  are  a  private  and  they 
are  commissioned  is  a  matter  of  very  little  importance  to  you,  and 
you  have  not  the  remotest  idea  why  you  are  a  private  and  why  they 
are  commissioned  officers  in  the  Army  as  medical  doctors. 

(The  witness  consulted  with  his  counsel.) 

Dr.  Belskt.  I  object  to  the  question  in  that  it  calls  for  an  operation 
of  my  mind. 

Senator  Jackson.  An  operation  of  your  mind  ? 

Dr.  Belskt.  And  a  question  of  belief. 

Senator  Jackson.  How  would  you  operate  on  your  mind  ? 

Dr.  Belskt.  It  is  a  question  of  belief. 

Senator  Jackson.  I  did  not  ask  you  a  question  of  belief.  I  just 
asked  you  a  reasonable  question,  that  a  reasonable  person  would  ask. 
If  a  friend  of  yours  came  along  who  was  a  doctor,  and  he  was  com- 
missioned, and  he  said,  "Dr.  Belsky,  how  come  you  are  a  private  in- 
stead of  a  commissioned  officer?"  What  kind  of  an  answer  do  you 
give  them?  Is  that  an  unreasonable  question,  and  is  it  unusual,  and 
is  that  hurting  your  mind,  and  is  that  inquiring  into  your  beliefs  ? 

The  Chairman.  May  I  say,  Senator  Jackson,  I  wish  you  would  re- 
frain from  browbeating  this  witness. 

Senator  Jackson.  Mr.  Chairman,  perhaps  the  rest  of  us  have  that 
license. 

(The  witness  consulted  with  his  counsel.) 

Dr.  Belskt.  I  am  not  in  a  position  to  answer  that  question,  why 
I  was  denied  a  commission,  and  the  Army  knows,  and  that  answer 
can  come  from  the  Army. 

Senator  Jackson.  Did  you  not  give  any  thought  to  it  yourself? 

(The  witness  consulted  with  his  counsel.) 

Dr.  Belskt.  Yes ;  I  thought  about  it. 

Senator  Jackson.  What  thought  came  to  you  as  to  why  you  were 
not  commissioned? 

(The  witness  consulted  with  his  counsel.) 

Dr.  Belskt.  That  is  an  inquiry  into  my  thoughts. 

Senator  Jackson.  In  other  words,  if  a  friend  of  yours — Doctor,  let 
me  ask  you  this :  If  a  friend  of  yours  and  one  of  your  classmates, 
asked  you  why  you  were  not  commissioned  as  a  doctor,  you  tell  them 
that  they  should  not  ask  you  that  question,  that  you  are  going  to  rely 
on  the  fifth  amendment.     Is  that  what  you  tell  them  ? 

Dr.  Belskt.  That  they  should  ask  the  Army. 


COMMUNIST    INFILTRATION   IN    THE    ARMY  165 

Senator  Jackson.  You  tell  them  they  ought  to  ask  the  Army,  and 
you  think  that  they  would  be  well  satisfied  with  that  answer? 

(The  witness  consulted  with  his  counsel.) 

Dr.  Belsky.  I. can't  say  whether  they  would  be  satisfied  with  it  or 
not. 

Senator  Jackson.  What  do  you  tell  your  friends?  Is  that  what 
y on  tell  them,  to  ask  the  Army  ? 

(The  witness  consulted  with  his  counsel.) 

Dr.  Belsky.  I  decline  to  answer  what  I  tell  my  friends  in  that  my 
answer  as  to  what  I  tell  my  friends  might  tend  to  incriminate  me  under 
the  fifth  amendment  to  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States. 

Senator  Jackson.  You  tell  your  friends  in  the  medical  profession, 
when  they  converse  with  you  on  subjects  such  as  this,  you  immediately 
raise  to  them  the  fifth  amendment  ?  Tell  me,  what  is  their  response 
to  you  when  you  raise  the  fifth  amendment  in  your  personal  conversa- 
tions with  them  ? 

Dr.  Belsky.  I  don't  raise  the  fifth  amendment. 

Senator  Jackson.  You  do  not  raise  the  fifth  amendment ;  what  do 
you  tell  them  ? 

(The  witness  consulted  with  his  counsel.) 

Dr.  Belsky.  Well,  that  is  a  personal  matter,  and  I  raise  the  ques- 
tion of  my  conversations  with  my  friends,  as  an  inquiry  into  my  be- 
liefs, and  on  that  ground  I  respectfully  decline  to  answer  that  ques- 
tion under  the  protection  of  the  fifth  amendment  to  the  Constitution 
of  the  United  States  in  that  my  answer  might  tend  to  incriminate  me. 

The  Chairman.  At  this  point,  may  I  ask  if  the  Army  is  represented 
here?  Is  the  Army  represented  here?  Is  Mr.  Berry  here?  For  the 
record,  this  record  will  be  transmitted  to  the  Army,  since  they  are 
not  represented  here.  The  thing  that  puzzles  me  very  much  is  the 
difference  in  the  treatment  of  four  different  Communists  who  were 
before  this  committee.  We  had  Peress  before  us,  a  fifth-amendment 
Communist,  and  he  was  commissioned  a  major,  honorably  discharged. 
Winfield  was  before  us,  a  Communist,  and  he  is  being  kept  in  the  serv- 
ice. Belsky,  a  Communist,  was  put  in  a  hospital  treating  patients 
who  are  handling  the  most  sensitive  work  and  not  given  a  commission 
and  not  discharged.  Eubenstein,  who  used  to  be  a  Communist,  a  very 
frank  young  man,  and  very  helpful  to  the  committee,  and  he  left  the 
party  6  years  ago,  and  he  was  given  a  discharge  less  than  honorable. 

The  four  cases  we  have  had  here  so  far  have  all  been  treated  in  com- 
pletely different  fashion.  I  am  very  disappointed  that  the  Army  does 
not  have  a  representative  here  to  listen  to  this  testimony,  and  a  copy 
will  be  transmitted  to  the  Army. 

Mr.  Keporter,  make  sure  that  a  copy  is  sent  directly  to  Mr.  Stevens. 

Mr.  Cohn.  Now,  Dr.  Belsky,  while  stationed  at  Murphy  General 
Hospital,  have  you  been  attending  cell  meetings  of  the  Communist 
Party? 

Dr.  Belsky.  I  respectfully  decline  to  answer  that  question  under  the 
protection  of  the  fifth  amendment  in  that  my  answer  might  tend  to 
incriminate  me. 

Mr.  Cohn.  Have  you  attended  cell  meetings  of  the  Communist 
Party  with  other  personnel,  civilian  and  military,  stationed  at  the 
Murphy  General  Hospital? 


166  COMMUNIST    INFILTRATION   IN    THE    ARMY 

Dr.  Belsky.  I  respectfully  decline  to  answer  that  question  under 
the  protection  of  the  fifth  amendment  in  that  my  answer  might  tend 
to  incriminate  me. 

The  Chairman.  May  I  ask  counsel,  have  you  established,  Mr.  Cohn, 
through  the  investigators,  that  Murphy  General  Hospital  treats  pa- 
tients who,  in  turn,  work  on  the  Lincoln  project,  which,  in  turn,  is  one 
of  our  topmost  secret  radar  projects? 

Mr.  Cohn.  Yes;  specifically  the  large  number  of  patients  of  the 
hospital  from  Lincoln  project  come  from  the  Cambridge  Research 
Center,  which  is  a  part  of  the  Lincoln  project. 

Now,  have  you  attended  a  Communist  Party  cell  meeting  within  the 
last  week? 

Dr.  Belsky.  I  respectfully  decline  to  answer  that  question  under 
protection  of  the  fifth  amendment  in  that  my  answer  might  tend 
to  incriminate  me. 

Mr.  Cohn.  Have  you,  within  the  last  week,  attempted  to  recruit 
any  personnel  at  Murphy  General  Hospital  into  the  Communist 
Party? 

(The  witness  consulted  with  his  counsel.) 

Dr.  Belsky.  I  respectfully  decline  to  answer  that  question  under 
the  protection  of  the  fifth  amendment  in  that  my  answer  might  tend 
to  incriminate  me. 

Mr.  Cohn.  Have  you  collected  Communist  Party  dues  from  mili- 
tary and  civilian  personnel  with  whom  you  have  come  in  contact  at 
your  present  assignment? 

Dr.  Belsky.  I  respectfully  decline  to  answer  that  question  under 
the  protection  of  the  fifth  amendment  to  the  Constitution  of  the 
United  States  in  that  my  answer  might  tend  to  incriminate  me. 

Mr.  Cohn.  Have  you  been  in  contact  with  functionaries  of  the 
Communist  Party  at  least  twice  a  month,  since  you  have  been  stationed 
at  the  Murphy  General  Hospital  ? 

Dr.  Belsky.  I  respectfully  decline  to  answer  that  question  under 
the  protection  of  the  fifth  amendment  to  the  Constitution  of  the 
United  States  in  that  my  answer  might  tend  to  incriminate  me. 

Mr.  Cohn.  Are  functionaries  of  the  Communist  Party  in  the  Boston 
area  giving  you  assignments  to  carry  out  for  the  Communist  Party  ? 

Dr.  Belsky.  I  respectfully  decline  to  answer  that  question  under 
the  protection  of  the  fifth  amendment  in  that  my  answer  might  tend 
to  incriminate  me. 

Mr.  Cohn.  Do  you  use  a  name  other  than  your  real  name  in  the 
Communist  Party  cell  to  which  you  belong? 

Dr.  Belsky.  I  respectfully  decline  to  answer  that  question  under 
the  protection  of  the  fifth  amendment  in  that  my  answer  might  tend 
to  incriminate  me. 

Mr.  Cohn.  Now,  before  you  entered  the  service,  you  resided  in 
New  York  City ;  is  that  correct  ? 

(The  witness  consulted  with  his  counsel.) 

Dr.  Belsky.  Yes ;  that  is  correct. 

Mr.  Cohn.  When  you  were  sent  to  Murphy  General  Hospital  and 
stationed  there,  was  your  Communist  Party  registration  transferred 
from  New  York  to  Boston  ? 

Dr.  Belsky.  I  respectfully  decline 

(The  witness  consulted  with  his  counsel.) 


COMMUNIST   INFILTRATION   IN   THE    ARMY  167 

Dr.  Belsky.  Is  that  a  statement  or  a  question? 

Mr.  Cohn.  That  is  a  question. 

Dr.  Belsky.  I  respectfully  decline  to  answer  that  question  under 
the  protection  of  the  fifth  amendment  in  that  my  answer  might  tend 
to  incriminate  me. 

Mr.  Cohn.  Have  you  reported  to  your  superiors  in  the  Communist 
Party  that  you  have  recruited  three  people  into  the  party  since 
stationed  at  Murphy  General  Hospital  ? 

(The  witness  consulted  with  his  counsel.) 

Dr.  Belsky.  Is  that  a  statement  or  a  question  ? 

The  Chairman.  Answer  the  question. 

Mr.  Cohn.  Have  you  reported? 

Dr.  Belsky.  I  respectfully  decline  to  answer  that  question  under 
the  protection  of  the  fifth  amendment  in  that  my  answer  might  tend 
to  incriminate  me. 

Mr.  Cohn.  I  have  nothing  further. 

Senator  Dirksen.  How  old  are  you  now  ?  I  beg  your  pardon,  Dr. 
Belsky. 

Dr.  Belsky.  I  was  25  in  August,  last  August. 

Senator  Dirksen.  And  where  did  you  have  your  medical  training? 

Dr.  Belsky.  New  York  University  Medical  School,  Bellevue. 

Senator  Dirksen.  Where  did  you  complete  your  intern  work? 

Dr.  Belsky.  Beth  Israel  Hospital  in  New  York  City. 

Senator  Dirksen.  And  you  have  actually  been  a  practicing  physi- 
cian how  long? 

Dr.  Belsky.  In  the  lay  term  of  practice,  after  your  internship,  you 
can  go  on  to  other  and  more  training  and  so  I  actually  didn't  go  into 
what  would  be  called  practice. 

Senator  Dirksen.  Were  you  in  private  practice  before  you  entered 
the  Army? 

Dr.  Belsky.  No;  I  was  not. 

Senator  Dirksen.  You  were  doing  intern  work,  I  take  it? 

Dr.  Belsky.  No  ;  I  had  already  gone  into  a  residency. 

Senator  Dirksen.  And  it  was  from  there  that  you  went  into  the 
Army  ? 

Dr.  Belsky.  That  is  correct. 

Senator  Dirksen.  You  mentioned  a  moment  ago  that  you  did  make 
an  application  for  a  commission  in  the  Army. 

Dr.  Belsky.  That  is  correct. 

Senator  Dirksen.  I  assume  you  did  that  on  your  own  volition,  did 
you  not ;  voluntarily  sought  a  commission  in  the  Army  ? 

(The  witness  consulted  with  his  counsel.) 

Dr.  Belsky.  When  I  received  notice  of  the  date  I  was  to  be  drafted, 
I  made  application  for  a  commission. 

Senator  Dirksen.  You  did  not  make  application  before  that  time  ? 

(The  witness  consulted  with  his  counsel.) 

Dr.  Belsky.  Not  that  I  recall. 

Senator  Dirksen.  Now,  then,  to  make  that  application,  of  course 
you  had  to  file  the  form  that  has  been  discussed  here? 

(The  witness  consulted  with  his  counsel.) 

Dr.  Belsky.  There  were  many  forms,  and  I  don't  know  actually 
what  form  you  are  referring  to. 

Senator  Dirksen.  Let  us  see  if  we  can  get  at  it  this  way,  without 
the  form  actually  being  before  me.    Did  you  in  any  one  of  the  blank 


168  COMMUNIST    INFILTRATION    IN    THE    ARMY 

spaces  on  the  form  in  response  to  any  question  regardless  of  what  it 
may  have  been,  write  down  Federal  constitutional  privilege? 

(The  witness  consulted  with  his  counsel.) 

Dr.  Belsky.  A  form  may  have  noted  that  I  could  use  my  constitu- 
tional privilege,  and  since  a  particular  form  as  far  as  I  recall  did  note 
that  I  could  use  my  privilege,  I  may  have  used  my  privilege,  but  I 
can't  recall  to  what  question  I  used  my  privilege  unless  I  can  see  the 
form  and  identify  the  particular  question. 

Senator  Dirksen.  I  was  thinking  only  of  a  question  of  fact.  Now, 
there  were  many  questions,  and  I  think  that  you  are  well  within  your 
right  not  to  make  any  specific  answers  to  a  question  unless  the  question 
on  the  form  is  before  us.  But  it  would  be  a  question  of  fact  whether 
you  wrote  on  any  form,  regardless  of  what  it  was,  the  Federal  consti- 
tutional privilege  and  you  would  no  doubt  have  a  recollection  as  to 
whether  you  did  write  that  on  the  form  in  response  to  any  question, 
whatever  it  may  have  been.  Do  you  recall  that  you  wrote  that  on  any 
form  that  was  submitted  to  you? 

(The  witness  consulted  with  his  counsel.) 

Dr.  Belsky.  Yes,  I  recall  that  I  may  have  answered,  "Federal  con- 
stitutional privilege  claimed,"  as  a  particular  form  may  have  indi- 
cated that  I  had  that  right  to  use  that  privilege.  I  don't  recall  actu- 
ally to  what  particular  question  I  had  used  that  Federal  constitutional 
privilege. 

Senator  Dirksen.  Now,  this  question  involves  wholly  a  matter  of 
your  opinion,  and  you  do  not  have  to  answer  it  if  you  do  not  desire, 
but  do  you  think  that  answer,  assuming  that  you  did  write  that  on 
the  form,  may  have  had  something  to  do  with  your  failure  to  obtain  a 
commission  in  the  Medical  Corps  of  the  Army  ?  It  is  wholly  a  matter 
of  opinion. 

Dr.  Belsky.  It  calls  for  an  opinion  which  I  would  rather  not  answer. 

Senator  Dirksen.  You  would  prefer  not  to  express  an  opinion? 

Dr.  Belsky.  That  is  right. 

Senator  Dirksen.  What  was  your  first  assignment  when  you  were 
inducted  into  the  service?  Were  you  assigned  to  medical  duties,  or 
sanitary  duties  at  once  ? 

Dr.  Belsky.  I  went  to  Camp  Kilmer,  an  induction  center,  during 
which  time  I  fed  oil  burners,  and  I  kept  oil  burners  going,  and  I  was 
on  KP  2  or  3  times,  from  which  I  then  went  to  Camp  Pickett  for  my 
basic  training  where  I  took  basic  training  as  Infantry  soldier  during 
which  time  I  did  the  routine  basic  training  and  marching  and  classes 


lin 


and  doing  no  medical  duties  as  far  as  I  recall,  at  this  particular  time. 
It  was  KP  and  doing  duties  that  any  other  private  would  do  in  the 
Army.  At  the  end  of  my  8- week  basic  Infantry  training  course,  I  was 
then  sent  to  Murphy  Army  Hospital  in  Waltham,  Mass. 

Senator  Dirksen.  How  did  you  report  when  you  got  to  Murphy 
General  Hospital,  and  did  you  report  to  the  supervising  medical 
officer  ? 

(The  witness  consulted  with  his  counsel.) 

Dr.  Belsky.  Well,  with  reference  to  this  question,  I  can't  during  the 
past  2  weeks  understand  or  know  whether  I  am  permitted  to  answer 
questions  about  other  Army  personnel  without  having  received  a  di- 
rect order  or  direct  permission  with  reference  to  that  from  either 
Secretary  of  the  Army  Stevens  or  counsel  or  Adams. 


COMMUNIST    INFILTRATION    IN    THE    ARMY  169 

Senator  Dlrksen.  The  only  purpose  of  the  question  was  to  ascer- 
tain who  assigned  you  to  medical  duties. 

(The  witness  consulted  with  his  counsel.) 

The  Chairman.  You  will  be  ordered  to  answer  that  question. 

(The  witness  consulted  with  his  counsel.) 

Dr.  Belsky.  I  was  told  what  my  duties  would  be  by  the  personnel, 
the  person  in  charge  of  personnel,  at  Murphy  Army  Hospital. 

The  Chairman.  Was  that  an  officer  or  an  enlisted  man  or  a  non- 
commissioned officer  ? 

(The  witness  consulted  with  his  counsel.) 

Dr.  Belsky.  He  was  a  major,  a  commissioned  major. 

Senator  Dirksen.  Do  you  perform  all  of  the  duties  that  a  physician 
would  normally  perform  at  Murphy  General  Hospital  ? 

Dr.  Belsky.  No  ;  I  don't. 

Senator  Dirksen.  Can  you  describe  for  the  committee  what  the  lim- 
itations are  on  your  duties,  and  do  you  do  infirmary  duties,  applying 
iodine  and  administering  aspirin,  and  do  you  do  any  surgical  work, 
any  diagnostician  work  ? 

Dr.  Belsky.  I  am  in  the  outpatient  department  which  is  as  you  de- 
scribe, dispensary  or  infirmary  work.  However,  I  have  not  been  per- 
mitted to  be  on  ward  duty,  in  terms  of  sitting  in  on  boards  and  medical 
discharge  boards,  or  any  kind  of  board  duties. 

Senator  Dirksen.  But,  generally,  you  do  perform  most  of  the  du- 
ties that  a  physician  would  normally  perforin  in  the  Army,  do  you 
not,  except  for  that  ? 

(The  witness  consulted  with  his  counsel.) 

Dr.  Belsky.  Well,  there  are  some  limitations,  and  it  is  hard  to  de- 
scribe, but  there  are  in  terms  of  medical  duties. 

Senator  Dirksen.  I  did  not  hear  you. 

Dr.  Belsky.  There  are  some  limitations  and  it  is  hard  to  describe, 
and  I  also  do  other  work  as  any  other  private  or  enlisted  man  there 
would  do,  and  I  am  in  the  barracks  with  the  enlisted  men,  and  I  eat 
with  the  enlisted  men  and  I  do  latrine  duty.  A  GI  party  comes  along, 
and  I  do  as  any  other  enlisted  man  would  do. 

Senator  Dirksen.  Dr.  Belsky,  how  many  people  would  you  nor- 
mally see  in  the  course  of  a  day  ? 

Dr.  Belsky.  Twenty  or  thirty,  and  I  haven't  been  doing  medical 
work  for  the  last  month,  but  when  I  was  doing  medical  work  in  the 
outpatient  department,  or  the  infirmary,  I  would  see  20  or  30. 
_  Senator  Dirksen.  Those  would  be  all  either  GI's  or  noncommis- 
sioned officers  ? 

(The  witness  consulted  with  his  attorney.) 

Dr.  Belsky.  I  saw  Army  personnel  and  civilian  dependents. 

Senator  Dirksen.  And  civilians,  also  ? 

Dr.  Belsky.  And  civilian  dependents. 

Senator  Dirksen.  So  that  when  they  come  for  administrations  from 
you,  you  do  have  an  opportunity  to  talk  to  20  or  30  people  in  the  course 
of  a  day  ? 

Dr.  Belsky.  Not  much.  It  is  a  very,  very  hectic  day,  and  I  devel- 
oped an  ulcer  in  the  outpatient  department. 

Senator  Dirksen.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  for  a  normal  day,  20  or  30 
patients  is  not  too  many,  if  they  come  in  with  headaches  and  stuff  in 
fingers  and  that  sort  of  thing  and  you  could  certainly  see  20  or  30  peo- 
ple a  day. 


170  COMMUNIST    INFILTRATION    LN    THE    ARMY 

Dr.  Belskt.  Maybe,  I  didn't  actually  keep  count,  but  I  know  it  is 
very  hectic. 

Senator  Dirksen.  When  a  GI  comes  in,  for  instance,  and  complains 
about  an  ache  in  his  head,  you  make  some  little  diagnosis,  I  suppose, 
and  you  try  to  determine  what  has  happened  to  him,  and  then  you  ad- 
minister something,  do  you  not  ? 

Dr.  Belskt.  That  is  correct. 

Senator  Dirksen.  Aspirin  or  you  paint  his  finger  with  iodine  or 
whatever  they  do,  and  that  is  what  they  used  to  do  when  I  went  to 
the  infirmary  as  a  GI  a  long  time  ago.  Well,  it  does  give  you  an 
opportunity  to  talk  to  GI's,  and  civilians,  when  you  are  diagnosing 
their  particular  difficulty.    That  is  correct,  is  it  not? 

Dr.  Belsky.  I  have  an  opportunity  to  speak  to  them  about  medical 
subjects. 

Senator  Dirksen.  Could  you  not  speak  to  them  about  the  weather, 
for  instance? 

Dr.  Belsky.  Sure,  I  could. 

Senator  Dirksen.  You  could  speak  to  them  about  many  things, 
could  you  not  ? 

(The  witness  consulted  with  his  counsel.) 

Dr.  Belsky.  Sure,  I  could  speak  to  them  about  many  things. 

Senator  Dirksen.  Now,  if  it  were,  in  your  opinion,  and  I  do  not 
say  it  is,  because  after  all  you  are  just  a  witness  before  the  committee 
and  we  are  endeavoring  to  elicit  a  little  information,  if  a  person  in 
your  particular  position  wanted  to  talk  to  a  GI,  or  a  civilian,  about 
some  ideological  matter,  let  us  say  for  instance,  general  subject  of 
security,  or  loyalty,  or  even  about  communism,  you  would  have  an 
opportunity  to  talk  to  them,  would  }rou  not  ? 

(The  witness  consulted  with  his  counsel.) 

Dr.  Belsky.  The  same  opportunity  anyone  has  to  talk,  and  people 
talk  all  day  long. 

Senator  Dirksen.  But  I  am  talking  about  you.  You  would  have  an 
opportunity  to  talk  with  them,  and  there  would  be  no  limit  on  the 
range  of  your  conversation,  with  somebody  who  is  sitting  in  the  chair, 
probably  in  pain,  seeking  your  administrations,  and  you  could  talk  to 
them,  could  you  not? 

Dr.  Belsky.  Sure,  I  could. 

Senator  Dirksen.  Now,  do  you  agree  with  this  general  premise,  and 
this  is  a  matter  of  opinion,  that  when  a  man  comes  in  and  he  is  in 
pain,  that  he  becomes  very  responsive  to  suggestions,  does  he  not? 

Dr.  Belsky.  That  calls  for  opinion. 

Senator  Dirksen.  Well,  as  a  doctor,  certainly,  you  ought  to  know. 
I  just  assumed  that  every  doctor  has  some  knowledge  of  elementary 
psychology  and  would  know  that  when  a  patient  sits  there  before  him 
and  seeks  to  have  his  pain  assuaged,  that  he  is  very  responsive  to  what 
the  doctor  says. 

(The  witness  consulted  with  his  counsel.) 

Dr.  Belsky.  I  am  an  internist  and  not  a  psychiatrist. 

Senator  Dirksen.  I  did  not  get  your  response,  Dr.  Belsky. 

Dr.  Belsky.  I  am  an  internist  and  not  a  psychiatrist,  and  I  am 
interested  in  internal  medicine. 

The  Chairman.  What  is  the  question? 

(The  witness  consulted  with  his  counsel.) 


COMMUNIST    INFILTRATION   IN    THE    ARMY  171 

Dr.  Belsky.  I  can't  answer  that  because  it  depends  upon  opinion 
and  upon  the  individual,  what  kind  of  pain  he  is  in,  and  who  the  indi- 
vidual is,  and  the  surroundings  and  who  is  with  him  and  many  many 
factors,  and  so  I  certainly  cannot  venture  an  opinion  on  that. 

Senator  Dirksen.  If  I  were  in  your  position,  Dr.  Belsky,  and  I 
wanted  to  persuade  some  patient  about  a  theory  in  the  whole  domain 
of  relativity,  there  would  be  no  better  time  than  to  have  him  there  in 
a  chair  when  he  is  holding  his  hand  up  and  nursing  some  pain  and  he 
becomes  an  easy  person  for  suggestions,  does  he  not? 

(The  witness  consulted  with  his  counsel.) 

Dr.  Belsky.  He  might. 

Senator  Dirksen.  You  would  not  know  ? 

Dr.  Belsky.  It  depends  on  many  individual  factors,  as  I  said  be- 
fore, and  I  think  that  many  doctors  can  point  that  out,  that  many 
individuals  have  different  responses  to  pain  and  responses  to  sedation 
and  responses  to  comforts  and  surroundings. 

Senator  Dirksen.  If  you  were  attending  a  meeting  of  the  New 
York  Medical  Society  and  one  of  your  professional  brethren  asked 
yon  that  question,  would  you  give  him  the  same  response  that  you  are 
giving  me  this  morning  ? 

(The  witness  consulted  with  his  counsel.) 

Dr.  Belsky.  They  would  not  ask  me,  and  I  am  not  really  qualified 
to  answer. 

Senator  Dirksen.  Well,  the  point  I  make.  Dr.  Belsky,  and  I  seek 
not  to  be  invidious  and  we  do  seek  to  treat  you  fairly,  but  you  have 
had  an  education  and  you  are  a  doctor  and  people  who  are  in  pain 
and  who  are  subject  to  ills  of  the  flesh  become  very,  very  responsive 
indeed  to  suggestions  of  doctors,  and  the  law  infers  a  very  confiden- 
tial relationship  between  doctor  and  client,  and  the  doctor  when  he  is 
on  the  stand  can  take  refuge  in  that  fact. 

Now,  I  simply  make  the  point  that  you  were  in  a  position  when 
these  people  came  to  see  you,  whether  civilian  or  GI,  and  you  had  a 
desire,  and  I  do  not  say  that  you  did,  but  if  you  had  a  desire  to  per- 
suade them  to  some  line  of  thinking,  or  some  belief  like  communism, 
you  were  in  an  excellent  position  to  do  so.  You  understand  I  did 
not  say  you  did,  but  the  facts  will  have  to  speak  for  themselves. 

(The  witness  consulted  with  his  counsel.) 

Senator  Dirksen.  Do  you  agree  ? 

Dr.  Belsky.  Is  that  a  question? 

Senator  Dirksen.  Yes. 

(The  witness  consulted  with  his  counsel.) 

Senator  Dirksen.  That  a  person  in  your  position  is  in  an  extraor- 
dinarily good  position  to  persuade  the  mind  of  a  person  who  comes 
in  for  treatment? 

(The  witness  consulted  with  his  counsel.) 

Dr.  Belsky.  It  is  a  matter  of  opinion  and  I  really  can't  answer 
that. 

Senator  Dirksen.  This  is  a  matter  of  opinion,  but  if  you  could 
select  any  spot  in  the  Army  where  you  would  try  to  promote  some 
ideological  idea,  or  thinking,  can  you  think  of  any  better  place  than 
to  be  a  doctor  in  the  Army  where  you  can  talk  to  people  every  day  ? 

(The  witness  consulted  with  his  counsel.) 

Dr.  Belsky.  Well,  a  captain  of  the  guardhouse  also  speaks  to 
people. 


172  COMMUNIST    INFILTRATION   IN    THE    ARMY 

Senator  Dirksen.  But  it  is  quite  evident,  Dr.  Belsky,  that  you  do 
not  want  to  be  responsive  to  the  committee  and  I  do  not  accuse  or  do 
not  make  a  charge  or  do  not  scold  you  about  it,  and  I  simply  say  that 
in  my  judgment  you  are  in  a  very  sensitive  spot  in  the  Army  of  the 
United  States,  on  which  we  depend  in  large  part  for  security.  A  per- 
son with  training  and  with  knowledge  and  with  your  kind  of  back- 
ground, could  persuade  people  to  a  course  of  action  if  he  were  so 
disposed. 

If  you  were  disposed  that  way,  and  if  the  record  should  indicate 
that  you  have  had  some  identity  with  the  Communist  Party,  or  a  Com- 
munist organization,  or  if  the  record  should  disclose,  and  I  do  not  say 
that  it  does  unless  I  firmly  know,  that  you  were  a  card-carrying  mem- 
ber of  the  party,  you  would  be  in  a  position  to  do  some  damage  by  per- 
suading the  minds  of  people  who  come  in  to  see  you.  That  would  be 
particularly  so  if  you  were  in  a  spot  that  was  supersensitive  and  by 
that  I  mean  young  men  who  are  working  on  highly  confidential  in- 
stallations and  materials  and  research  work  and  so  forth. 

Now,  I  have  one  other  question  and  then  I  am  through.  You  are 
in  a  position  by  means  of  questions  if  somebody  in  your  judgment  had 
confidential  information,  of  asking  them  questions  at  the  very  time 
when  you  were  administering  to  their  physical  needs  and  it  is  easier 
then  than  it  otherwise  would  be  to  probably  get  someone  to  drop  his 
guard  a  little,  and  develop  some  information  that  should  not  have 
been  developed. 

Do  you  agree  with  that  or  not? 

(The  witness  consulted  with  his  counsel.) 

Dr.  Belsky.  It  is  within  the  realm  of  possibility.  It  is  within  the 
realm  of  possibility. 

Senator  Dirksen.  What  is  the  answer? 

Dr.  Belsky.  Thank  you  for  your  generous  response. 

The  Chairman.  Do  you  administer  drugs  to  your  patients,  such  as 
morphine  ? 

Dr.  Belsky.  No.  Up  where  I  have  been  stationed,  I  have  never, 
as  far  as  I  recall,  administered  any  narcotics,  as  far  as  I  recall. 

The  Chairman.  Have  you  ever  discussed  any  Government  secret 
work  with  any  member  of  the  Communist  Party  ? 

Dr.  Belsky.  I  respectfully  decline  to  answer  that  question  on  the 
protection  of  the  fifth  amendment  of  the  Constitution  of  the  United 
States  in  that  my  answer  might  tend  to  incriminate  me. 

The  Chairman.  Your  patients  deal  with  top  secret  radar  work,  and 
did  you  ever  get  information  from  any  of  your  patients  and  pass  that 
information  on  to  a  member  of  the  Communist  Party  ? 

(The  witness  consulted  with  his  counsel.) 

Dr.  Belsky.  What  is  that  question  ? 

The  Chairman.  Will  you  read  the  question  ? 

(The  reporter  read  from  his  notes  as  requested.) 

(The  witness  consulted  with  his  counsel.) 

Dr.  Belsky.  No. 

The  Chairman.  Did  you  ever  discuss  any  material  having  to  do 
with  radar  with  members  of  the  Communist  Party  ? 

(The  witness  consulted  with  his  counsel.) 

Dr.  Belsky.  I  respectfully  decline  to  answer  that  question,  under 
the  protection  of  the  fifth  amendment,  in  that  my  answer  might  tend 
to  incriminate  me. 


COMMUNIST    INFILTRATION    IN    THE    ARMY  173 

The  Chairman.  Are  you  a  member  of  the  Communist  conspiracy  as 
of  this  moment  ? 

Dr.  Belsky.  I  respectfully  decline  to  answer  that  question  under  the 
protection  of  the  fifth  amendment  to  the  Constitution  of  the  United 
States,  in  that  my  answer  might  tend  to  incriminate  me. 

The  Chairman.  Have  you  attended  meetings  where  Communist 
speakers  have  advocated  the  destruction  of  the  Constitution,  including 
the  fifth  amendment? 

Dr.  Belsky.  I  respectfully  decline  to  answer  that  question,  under 
the  protection  of  the  fifth  amendment  to  the  Constitution  of  the 
United  States,  in  that  my  answer  might  tend  to  incriminate  me. 

The  Chairman.  Do  you  agree  with  the  Communist  Party  teaching 
that  this  Constitution,  upon  which  you  are  relying  today,  should  be  de- 
stroyed and  done  away  with  ?  Or  do  you  disagree  with  the  Communist 
Party  on  that  ? 

( The  witness  consulted  with  his  counsel. ) 

Dr.  Belsky.  That  calls  for  the  operation  of  my  mind,  and  I  think  it 
is  an  inquiry  into  my  mind. 

The  Chairman.  Well,  we  will  call  for  the  operation  of  that  mind, 
then,  and  you  are  relying  upon  the  fifth  amendment  to  the  Constitu- 
tion. I  am  asking  you  a  simple  question,  whether  or  not  you  agree 
with  the  Communist  conspiracy  that  the  entire  Constitution  should  be 
destroyed,  including  the  fifth  amendment  upon  which  you  are  relying 
today.  Even  though  that  may  call  for  the  operation  of  your  mind, 
you  are  ordered  to  answer  the  question. 

(The  witness  consulted  with  his  counsel.) 

Dr.  Belsky.  I  don't  know  whether  the  Communist  conspiracy  ad- 
vocates that  or  not. 

The  Chairman.  You  don't  know. 

Dr.  Belsky.  No. 

The  Chairman.  Have  you  attended  the  meetings  where  that  was 
advocated  ? 

Dr.  Belsky.  I  respectfully  decline  to  answer  that  question,  under 
the  protection  of  the  fifth  amendment  to  the  Constitution  of  the 
United  States,  in  that  my  answer  might  tend  to  incriminate  me. 

The  Chairman.  Do  you  feel  our  system  is  better  than  the  Com- 
munist system  ? 

(The  witness  consulted  with  his  counsel.) 

Dr.  Belsky.  It  calls  for  an  inquiry  into  my  thoughts. 

The  Chairman.  You  are  ordered  to  answer  the  question.  Your 
thoughts  are  rather  important,  Mister,  when  you  are  dealing 

Dr.  Belsky.  It  is  "Dr.  Belsky." 

The  Chairman.  When  you  are  dealing  with  young  men  each  day, 
who  in  turn  are  dealing  with  our  top  secret  radar  material.  If  your 
thoughts  are  Communist  thoughts,  we  want  to  know  that.  So  you  are 
ordered  to  answer  that  question. 

(The  witness  consulted  with  his  counsel.) 

Dr.  Belsky.  I  respectfully  decline  to  answer  that  question  about 
my  thoughts,  under  the  protection  of  the  fifth  amendment  to  the 
Constitution  of  the  United  States,  and  the  first  amendment,  which 
prohibits  inquiry  or  restriction  of  political  belief,  in  that  the  answer 
might  tend  to  incriminate  me. 


174  COMMUNIST    INFILTRATION   IN    THE    ARMY 

The  Chairman.  Do  you  believe  in  the  forcible  overthrow  of  this 
Government,  if  there  cannot  be  imposed  a  Communist  government 
by  peaceful  means  ? 

(The  witness  consulted  with  his  counsel.) 

Dr.  Belsky.  Would  you  repeat  the  question,  please,  Senator? 

The  Chairman.  Will  you  read  the  question? 

(The  reporter  read  from  his  notes  as  requested.) 

(The  witness  consulted  with  his  counsel.) 

Dr.  Belsky.  I  don't  believe  in  the  use  of  force  and  violence. 

The  Chairman.  You  do  not? 

Dr.  Belsky.  I  do  not  believe  in  the  use  of  force  and  violence. 

The  Chairman.  In  other  words,  if  the  Communists  were  ever  to 
order  you  to  use  any  force  and  violence  to  destroy  this  Government, 
you  would  refuse  to  obey  that  order  ? 

Dr.  Belsky.  Yes;  I  would. 

The  Chairman.  If  the  Communist  Party  were  to  order  you  to  get 
information  from  your  patients,  would  you  refuse  to  obey  that  order  ? 

Dr.  Belsky.  I  would. 

The  Chairman.  Have  you  ever  been  asked  by  any  members  of  the 
Communist  Party  to  get  information  relating  to  radar  work? 

Dr.  Belsky.  I  respectfully  decline  to  answer  that  question,  under 
the  protection  of  the  fifth  amendment  to  the  Constitution  of  the 
United  States,  in  that  my  answer  might  tend  to  incriminate  me. 

Senator  Jackson.  Have  you,  Dr.  Belsky,  received  any  information 
from  anyone  about  radar  or  any  secret  classified  Government  work? 

(The  witness  consulted  with  his  counsel.) 

Dr.  Belsky.  I  wouldn't  even  understand  what  it  was. 

Senator  Jackson.  Just  answer  the  question,  have  you  received  any 
information  from  anyone  regarding  secret  Government  work  on  any 
subject? 

(The  witness  consulted  with  his  counsel.) 

Dr.  Belsky.  I  respectfully  decline  to  answer  that  question,  under 
the  protection  of  the  fifth  amendment  to  the  Constitution  of  the 
United  States,  in  that  my  answer  might  tend  to  incriminae  me. 

Senator  Jackson.  Have  you  passed  any  classified  material  on  to 
any  other  person  ? 

Dr.  Belsky.  I  respectfully  decline 

(The  witness  consulted  with  his  counsel.) 

Senator  Jackson.  I  said  to  any  other  person. 

Dr.  Belsky.  To  whom,  in  the  Army,  or  where  ? 

Senator  Jackson.  To  anyone,  you  can  answer.  Are  you  handling 
any  classified  material  now  or  during  the  time  you  have  been  in  the 
Army  ? 

Dr.  Belsky.  Senator,  could  you  explain  to  me  what  classified  mate- 
rial is  ? 

Senator  Jackson.  Well,  classified  material  is  any  material  so 
marked  on  the  document. 

Dr.  Belsky.  Marked  "classified"  ? 

Senator  Jackson.  That  is  right,  classified  confidential ;  it  includes 
a  broad  range  of  subjects,  secret 

Dr.  Belsky.  I  don't  recall  ever  having  seen  any,  as  far  as  I  can 
remember. 


COMMUNIST    INFILTRATION    IN   THE    ARMY  175 

The  Chairman.  Just  so  that  the  record  will  be  clear,  in  case  of  any 
further  legal  proceedings,  by  "classified"  we  mean  anything  that  is 
either  restricted,  confidential,  secret,  or  top  secret. 

(The  witness  consulted  with  his  counsel.) 

Dr.  Belsky.  I  respectfully  decline  to  answer  that  question,  under 
the  protection  of  the  fifth  amendment  to  the  Constitution  of  the  United 
States,  in  that  my  answer  might  tend  to  incriminate  me. 

Senator  Jackson.  Have  you  ever  seen  any  such  material  ? 

(The  witness  consulted  with  his  counsel.) 

Dr.  Belsky.  I  respectfully  decline  to  answer  that  question,  under 
the  protection  of  the  fifth  amendment  to  the  Constitution  of  the 
United  States,  in  that  my  answer  might  tend  to  incriminate  me. 

Senator  Jackson.  During  the  time  you  have  been  in  the  Army,  have 
you  had  access  to  any  classified  material  ? 

(The  witness  consulted  with  his  counsel.) 

Dr.  Belsky.  Again  could  I  ask  you  what  you  mean  by  "classified 
material"  ? 

Senator  Jackson.  Well,  classified  material,  again,  would  include 
material  marked  "Confidential,"  "secret,"  "top  secret,"  or  "restricted." 
And  I  think  that  those  are  the  usual  terms  or  designations. 

(The  witness  consulted  with  his  counsel.) 

Dr.  Belsky.  I  respectfully  decline  to  answer  that  question,  under 
the  protection  of  the  fifth  amendment  to  the  Constitution  of  the 
United  States,  in  that  my  answer  might  tend  to  incriminate  me. 

Senator  Jackson.  Have  you  seen  any  of  the  personnel  records  of 
the  patients  that  come  to  see  you  at  the  dispensary  or  any  other  place  ? 

(The  witness  consulted  with  his  counsel.) 

Dr.  Belsky.  I  see  personal  records  of  the  soldiers  who  come  to  see 
me  in  terms  of  medical  treatment. 

Senator  Jackson.  Do  you  know  where  they  work  ? 

Dr.  Belsky.  In  some  cases  I  might  know. 

Senator  Jackson.  Well,  what  do  you  recall,  where  did  they  work? 

(The  witness  consulted  with  his  counsel.) 

Dr.  Belsky.  I  don't  recall;  they  were  soldiers,  and  many,  many 
people  came  to  see  me,  some  of  whom  I  may  have  known  where  they 
came  from ;  but  as  far  as  recalling  right  now  any  specific  person  or 
area  from  which  they  came  or  what  they  did,  I  don't  know. 

Senator  Jackson.  Where  were  most  of  them  assigned  that  you  did 
see ;  where  are  most  of  them  assigned  that  you  see  ? 

(The  witness  consulted  with  his  counsel.) 

Dr.  Belsky.  In  the  outpatient  department  I  had  more  to  do  with 
civilian  dependents. 

Senator  Jackson.  Civilian  dependents? 

Dr.  Belsky.  Yes,  but  as  far  as  I  know,  they  were  assigned  to  the 
Murphy  Hospital  itself ;  and  when  a  soldier  is  transferred,  his  duty 
station,  if  it  is  for  lengthy  treatment,  it  is  to  Murphy,  Army. 

The  Chairman.  May  I  interrupt;  you  understood  the  Senator's 
question?  He  knows  they  were  assigned  to  the  hospital  while  they 
are  there.  He  wants  to  know  where  they  were  assigned  before  they 
came  to  the  hospital,  and  now  please  answer  that. 

(The  witness  consulted  with  his  counsel.) 

Dr.  Belsky.  I  might;  sometimes  I  might,  and  sometimes  I  might 
not. 


176  COMMUNIST    INFILTRATION   IN    THE    ARMY 

Senator  Jackson.  Well,  did  you  handle  or  did  you  treat  civilians 
that  were  not  stationed  at  the  hospital  but  at  other  Government  proj- 
ects, or  from  other  Government  projects? 

Dr.  Belskt.  I  might  have. 

Senator  Jackson.  Do  you  recall  ? 

Dr.  Belsky.  I  can't  recall  exactly ;  and  I  might  have.  I  saw  hun- 
dreds of  patients  in  the  time  I  was  up  there,  hundreds. 

Senator  Jackson.  Did  you  pass  on  any  classified  material,  or  classi- 
fied again  being  as  previously  defined  here  this  morning,  and  did  you 
pass  on  any  classified  material  to  any  other  person  or  persons  ? 

(The  witness  consulted  with  his  counsel.) 

Dr.  Belsky.  I  respectfully  decline  to  answer  that  question,  under 
the  protection  of  the  fifth  amendment  of  the  Constitution  of  the 
United  States,  in  that  my  answer  might  tend  to  incriminate  me. 

Senator  Jackson.  That  is  all. 

The  Chairman.  Senator  McClellan. 

Senator  McClellan.  Doctor,  while  you  have  been  on  the  witness 
stand,  you  have  repeatedly  invoked  the  fifth  amendment  to  the  Con- 
stitution in  respecfully  declining  to  answer  questions  on  the  ground 
that  if  you  answered  the  answers  might  tend  to  incriminate  you.  1 
wish  to  ask  you,  if  you  now  state  under  oath  that  you  honestly  believe 
that  if  you  gave  answers  to  those  questions,  truthfully,  that  the 
truthful  answer  would  tend  to  incriminate  you,  or  might  tend  to 
incriminate  you. 

(The  witness  consulted  with  his  counsel.) 

Dr.  Belsky.  That  is  an  inquiry  into  my  belief. 

Senator  McClellan.  I  am  inquiring  into  your  belief  because  I 
think  that  you  must  entertain  that  belief  before  you  are  privileged 
to  invoke  it ;  and  I  want  to  know  under  oath  whether  you  are  testifying 
truthfully  when  you  say  that  you  refuse  on  the  grounds  that  the 
answers  might  tend  to  incriminate  you ;  and  I  want  to  know  if  you 
state  now  under  oath  that  you  honestly  believe  that  if  you  gave  truth- 
ful answers  to  the  questions,  that  the  answers  would  tend  to  incrimi- 
nate you,  or  might  tend  to  incriminate  you. 

Dr.  Belsky.  I  respectfully  decline  to  answer  that  question,  under 
the  protection  of  the  fifth  amendment  of  the  Constitution  of  the 
United  States,  in  that  my  answer  might  tend  to  incriminate  me. 

Senator  McClellan.  Mr.  Chairman,  I  am  sure  that  his  counsel 
understands  the  question,  the  import  of  it,  and  the  answer  that  the 
witness  has  given.  We  have  so  many  of  these  coming  before  us, 
invoking  the  privilege  under  the  fifth  amendment  that  I  think  it  is 
pertinent  to  inquire,  and  have  the  record  very  clear,  whether  they  are 
simply  using  it  as  a  device  to  keep  from  giving  information,  and  to 
keep  from  testifying  as  to  facts  within  their  knowledge  that  is  perti- 
nent to  the  inquiry,  or  if  they  honestly  believe  that  if  they  told  the 
truth  the  truthful  answers  might  tend  to  incriminate  them. 

And  unless  they  can  say  that  under  oath,  I  should  like  to  have  it 
decided  judicially  by  some  procedure  whether  they  are  privileged 
to  invoke  such  an  amendment  unless  they  can  qualify  under  oath  to 
that  extent. 

The  Chairman.  May  I  say,  the  Chair  heartily  agrees  with  Senator 
McClellan.  I  think  that  this  case  should  be  promptly  referred  to 
the  Justice  Department  for  presentation  to  a  grand  jury  for  an  indict- 
ment for  contempt. 


COMMUNIST    INFILTRATION   EST    THE    ARMY  177 

Now,  so  there  can  be  no  plea  of  ignorance  on  your  part  of  the  situa- 
tion at  a  further  legal  proceeding,  you  understand  the  position  of 
the  Chair,  and  the  position  of  Senator  McClellan  is  this :  That  when 
you  say  "I  refuse  to  answer  on  the  grounds  my  answer  might  tend 
to  incriminate  me,"  then  when  you  are  asked  whether  or  not  you 
honestly  believe  that  a  truthful  answer  might  tend  to  incriminate 
you,  you  refuse  to  tell  us  whether  or  not  you  think  a  truthful  answer 
would  tend  to  incriminate  you,  it  is  the  Chair's  position  that  you 
have  no  fifth-amendment  privilege. 

Senator  McClellan.  I  respectfully  ask  that  you  order  the  witness 
to  answer  the  question  that  I  propounded  to  him. 

The  Chairman.  Let  me  say,  Senator  McClellan,  I  don't  think  I  can 
order  him  to  answer  whether  he  feels  the  answer  might  tend  to  in- 
criminate him;  but  in  view  of  the  fact  that  he  has  refused  to  tell 
you  whether  he  feels  that  a  truthful  answer  might  tend  to  incriminate 
him,  I  will  take  the  position  that  he  has  no  fifth-amendment  privilege. 
And  he  is  therefore  ordered  to  answer  all  of  the  questions  which 
were  previously  asked  and  on  which  he  wrongfully  invoked  the  fifth 
amendment. 

Senator  McClellan.  That  is  what  I  had  in  mind.  I  want  him 
again  ordered  to  answer  the  question  previously  asked  in  which  he 
has  invoked  the  privileges  under  the  fifth  amendment  without  tell- 
ing this  committee  under  oath  that  he  honestly  believes  that  if  he 
answered  the  question  truthfully,  the  truthful  answers  might  tend  to 
incriminate  him. 

The  Chairman.  He  will  be  so  ordered. 

(The  witness  consulted  with  his  counsel.) 

Dr.  Belsky.  If  the  same  questions  were  asked,  I  would  give  the 
same  answers. 

The  Chairman.  I  think  we  have  a  quorum,  and  there  is  no  reason 
why  this  case  should  not  be  referred. 

Senator  Dirksen.  Dr.  Belsky,  I  have  one  question.  You  have  had 
unrestricted  right  here  this  morning  to  confer  with  your  counsel 

(The  witness  consulted  with  his  counsel.) 

Dr.  Belsky.  Yes. 

Senator  Dirksen.  I  just  wanted  the  record  to  show  that.  Other 
than  the  jurisdictional  question  that  you  raised  at  the  outset  of  this 
proceeding,  do  you  feel  that  you  have  been  fairly  and  courteously 
treated  at  this  proceeding  this  morning? 

(The  witness  consulted  with  his  counsel.) 

Dr.  Belsky.  I  don't  think  I  have  to  answTer  that  question.  Do  you 
feel  I  have  to  answer  the  question  ? 

Senator  Dirksen.  Well,  to  be  sure  it  is  a  question  of  fact,  Dr. 
Belsky. 

Dr.  Belsky.  I  wonder  if  in  answer  to  that  question  I  could  read  a 
statement  to  the  committee  ? 

Senator  Dirksen.  Well,  I  am  not  the  chairman,  and  I  have  no  au- 
thority to  permit  you  to  read  a  statement,  but  I  would  like  to  have 
either  from  you  or  your  counsel  an  answer  whether  you  had  been 
fairly  treated  this  morning  and  whether  you  have  been  courteously 
treated,  and  whether  we  have  deviated  from  accepted  procedures  in 
a  case  of  this  kind. 

Mr.  Faulkner,  would  you  like  to  answer  that  ? 

Mr.  Faulkner.  Well,  I  can  answer  it 


178  COMMUNIST    INFILTRATION    LN    THE    ARMY 

The  Chairman.  I  don't  think  that  we  should  hear  from  counsel. 
The  rule  of  the  committee  is  that  we  do  not  hear  from  counsel. 

Senator  Dirksen.  Will  the  witness  ask  counsel  whether  he  should 
answer  that  very  simple  question,  and  I  don't  think  anybody  should 
find  it  necessary  to  have  to  refer  a  question  to  anybody  else,  because 
it  is  not  legal  in  character,  and  it  is  only  a  question  of  immediate 
opinion  as  to  whether  the  witness  has  been  fairly  treated. 

But  since  the  witness  does  not  say  he  has  been  unfairly  treated, 
perhaps  one  can  gather  an  inference  from  that. 

Dr.  Belsky.  Could  I  read  a  statement? 

The  Chairman.  Who  wrote  the  statement  ? 

Dr.  Belsky.  I  did. 

The  Chairman.  When  did  you  write  it  ? 

(The  witness  consulted  with  his  counsel.) 

The  Chairman.  You  need  not  ask  counsel  that.  When  did  you 
write  the  statement  ? 

Dr.  Belsky.  I  wrote  the  statement  yesterday. 

Senator  McClellan.  Let  the  committee  see  the  statement. 

The  Chairman.  Let  us  see  the  statement. 

(The  statement  was  handed  to  the  chairman.) 

The  Chairman.  You  will  have  to  abide  by  the  committee  rule. 
Statements  have  to  be  submitted  24  hours  in  advance,  and  if  you  want 
to  hand  out  the  statement  to  the  press  outside  the  room,  you  may  do  so. 

We  will  not  hear  any  lectures  from  any  fifth-amendment  Communist 
in  this  committee  room.    You  may  step  down. 

(The  witness  was  excused.) 

The  Chairman.  We  have  six  other  witnesses  here  this  morning  con- 
cerned with  another  subject  matter,  concerned  with  alleged  Commu- 
nist infiltration  in  facilities  having  to  do  with  telecommunications, 
which  in  turn  handles  radar  work. 

It  is  10  minutes  to  12.  We  cannot  dispose  of  all  of  those  witnesses 
today.  What  is  the  desire  of  the  committee?  Should  we  adjourn 
until  tomorrow  morning,  or  proceed  with  one  of  the  other  witnesses? 

We  will  adjourn  until  10 :  30  in  the  morning,  at  which  time  we  will 
have  another  public  hearing. 

(Whereupon  at  11 :  48  a.  m.,  Thursday,  March  4,  1954,  the  commit- 
tee recessed,  to  reconvene  at  10 :  30  a.  m..  Fridav.  March  5,  1954.) 


INDEX 


Page 

Abraham  Lincoln  Brigade    (Journal) 129,130 

Adams,    John 125, 133, 141, 153, 155, 157, 168 

Adjutant    General's    Office 109, 138, 139, 156 

Albany,  N.  Y 135 

American  Labor  Party 121 

Armed    Forces 109, 134 

Army  (Judge  Advocate  General) 133 

Army  (United  States) 107- 

111,  113-117,  123-125,  127-131,  133-136,  138,  139, 142, 143,  145,  146, 
148,  149,  152-157,  159,  160,  162,  164,  165,  167-169,  171,  172,  174,  175. 

Army  Dental  Corps 107, 113 

Army  Dental  Corps  (Camp  Kilmer,  N.  J.) 107 

Army  legal  counsel 133 

Army   policy 164 

Army  questionnaire 127 

Army    regulations 138 

Army  Secretary 125, 134, 135, 141, 148, 156, 165, 16S 

Article  2,  section  II,  United  States  Constitution 160 

Attorney  General  (United  States) 131 

Bellevue,  New  York  University  Medical  School 167 

Belsky,  Dr.  Marvin  Sanford 

Testimony    of 159-178 

Bergin,  General 156 

Berry,    Mr 165 

Beth  Israel  Hospital  (New  York  City) 167 

Boston    (Mass.) 166 

Brooklyn,   N.   Y — -       140 

Brown,    Colonel 155 

Burress,  General 154 

Cambridge  Research  Center 166 

Camp  Kilmer,  N.  J 107,109,113,115,126,136,138,139,145,146,151,168 

Camp  Pickett 168 

City  College  (New  York) 113 

Civilian    dependents 175 

Commander  in  Chief 109, 157, 160 

Commanding  General  (Camp  Kilmer) 151 

Communist   Club 121 

Communist  conspiracy 124, 

126, 131, 133, 135, 141, 142, 150, 151, 152, 157, 160, 173 

Communist  defense  fund 128 

Communist   leadership   schools 127, 131, 134, 139, 146 

Communist  Party 110-117, 119-122, 

127-129, 131, 133, 134, 139, 140, 142,  161, 163, 166, 167, 172-174 

Communist  Party    (Boston) 166 

Communist  Party  (Massachusetts) 166 

Communist  Party  (Queens  County) 128 

Communist   Russia 128 

Communist   system 173 

Compassionate  reassignment 138 

Confidential  material 136, 175 

Congress 123 

Congressman 110, 13S 

Constitution  of  the  United   States —      112, 

123, 127, 128, 130-132, 160, 161, 163-166, 172-176 
Daily  Worker    (publication) 12S-130 


n  INDEX 

Page 

Defense  Department 109 

Democrats 129 

Dental  Corps  (United  States  Army) 107, 113 

Dental  O.  D 135 

Department  of  the  Army 107-111,113-117,123-125,127-131,133-136, 

138,  139,  142,  143,  145,  146,  148,  149,  152-157,  159,  160,  162,  164, 

165, 167-169, 171, 172, 174, 175. 

Department    of   the   Army    (order) 154 

Department  of  Defense 109 

Department  of  Justice 142 

Deputy  Chief  of  Staff 154 

Doctors  draft 108, 161 

"Dollars  Keep  Coming  for  Defense  Fund"    (article  in  Daily  Worker  by 

Irv  Peress) 128 

Eagle,  Miss  Ruth 124 

Testimony    of 119-122 

Eisenhower,  President 160 

Executive  order 136, 137, 146, 155, 157 

Far   East 110 

Faulkner,  Stanley 107,  114,  117,  122,  123,  129,  142,  143,  159,  161,  163,  177 

Federal  Bureau  of  Investigation  (FBI) 121 

Federal  constitutional  privilege 168 

Fifth  amendment  Communists 142, 147 

First  Army 125, 142, 146, 154 

Fort  Lewis,  Wash 109, 110, 138 

Fort  Sam  Houston,  Tex 108, 109  113 

G-l____ 154 

G-2 116,   154,   155 

Gerwin,  Dr 116 

Government    agency 140, 141 

Government   projects 176 

Government  of  the  United  States 108, 109, 

112,  131, 140-142,  160, 163, 172, 174, 176 

Gurney,    General 154 

Holtzman,   Congressman 110 

Inwood  Victory  Club 112, 139 

Jew 124 

Journal   of  the  Abraham  Lincoln   Brigade 129, 130 

Judge  Advocate  General  of  the  Army I33 

Justice  Department 142 

Lenin 112 

Leninism 112 

Lincoln  Brigade    (Journal) 129,130 

Lincoln  project 160, 166 

Manhattan  (NYC) 116 

Marine  Corps 136 

Marx,   Karl 112 

Marxism H2 

McManus,  John  J 125 

Medical  Corps  (United  States  Army) 145  168 

Middle  Village,  N.  Y '  107 

Military  Justice  (Uniform  Code) 133 

Moore,  Colonel 117 

M.  O.  S 137 

Murphy  Army  Hospital  (Waltham,  Mass.) 159,  161,  165-169,  175 

Navy   (United  States) 136 

New  York  Bar 161 

New  York  City 107,  113,  117,  119,  120,  122-124,  127,  159,  166,  167,  171 

New  York  City  College 113 

New  York  City  Police  Department 119,  120,  122,  124 

New  York  Medical  Society 171 

New  York  policewoman  (Miss  Ruth  Eagle) 124 

New  York  University  Medical  School,  Bellevue 167 

NYU   (New  York  University) 116 

NYU  Dental  School 113 

Office  of  the  Adjutant  General 109,  138,  139,  156 


INDEX  in 

Page 

Office  of  the  Day  (O.  D.) 135,  136 

Old   Testament 124 

Pentagon 109 

Peress,  Abraham  Herbert  (brother  of  Irving  Peress) 141 

Peress,  Comrade  Elaine 121 

Peress,  Comrade  Irving 121 

Peress,  Dr 124,  161 

Peress,  Maj.  Irving,  01893642___  120, 121, 122, 145, 146, 148, 151, 154, 157, 161, 165 

Testimony  of 107-118,  123-142 

Peress,  Mrs.  Elaine 109,  110,  111,  112,  116,  120,  121,  139,  140 

Peress,  William  (brother  of  Irving  Peress) 140 

Peress's  daughter 109,  111,  112,  116,  138,  139 

Peress's   father 142 

Police  Department  (New  York  City) 119,  120,  122,  124 

President  of  the  United  States 109,  136,  137,  146,  155,  157,  160 

Presidential  directive 146 

Presidential  Executive  order 136,  137,  146,  155,  157 

Prosthodontist 137 

Psalms,  Book  7 123 

Public  Law  84,  S3d  Congress 123 

Queens   (N.  Y.) 128,  129 

Radar 160,  166 

Red  Cross 110,  111,  138,  139 

Republicans 129 

Restricted  material 175 

Rubenstein 165 

Russia 128 

Russian  Army 128 

Schecter,  Dr 116 

Seabree,  General 154 

Secret  material 136,  175 

Secret  radar  work 160, 166 

Secretary  of  the  Army 125,  134,  135,  141,  148,  156,  165,  168 

Senate  of  the  United  States 123,  135 

Senator 110,  123,  134,  138 

Stevens,  Secretary  Robert 125,  134,  135,  141,  148,  156,  165,  168 

Top  secret  material 175 

Uniform  Code  of  Military  Justice 133 

United  States  Adjutant  General's  Office 109, 138, 139, 156 

United   States  Army 107-111, 

113-117,  123-125,  127-131,  133-136,  138,  139,  142,  143, 145, 146, 148, 
149,  152-157,  159,  160,  162,  164,  165,  167-169,  171,  172,  174,  175. 

United  States  Army  legal  counsel 133 

United  States  Army  Medical  Corps 145,  168 

United   States  Attorney  General 131 

United  States   Constitution 112, 

123, 127, 128, 130-132, 160, 161, 163-166, 172-176 

United  States  Department  of  Justice 142 

United  States  Government 108, 109, 112, 131, 140-142, 160, 163, 172, 174, 176 

United  States  Marine  Corps 136 

United  States  Navy 136 

United  States  Senate 123,  135 

United  States  Senator 110,  123,  134,  138 

Waltham,  Mass 159,  168 

Washington,  D.  C 116,  125,  141,  154,  155 

Winneld 165 

Yokahoma,  Japan 109,  110,  111,  138,  139 

Zwicker,  Brig.  Gen.  Ralph  W 125,  126,  136 

Testimony   of 145-157 

o 


COMMUNIST  INFILTRATION  IN  THE  ARMY 


HEARING 

r,. BEFORE  THE 

PERMANENT  ^SUBCOMMITTEE  ON 
INVESTIGATIONS  OF '  THE  COMMITTEE  ON 

GOVERNMENT  OPERATIONS 

UNITED  STATES  SENATE 

EIGHTY-THIED  CONGRESS 

SECOND  SESSION 
PURSUANT  TO 

S.  Res.  40 


PART  4 


NOVEMBER  15,  1954 


Printed  for  the  use  of  the  Committee  on  Government  Operations 


UNITED  STATES 
GOVERNMENT  PRINTING  OFFICE 
3S794  WASHINGTON  :   1954 


Boston  Public  Library 
Superintendent  of  Documents 

DEC  2  9  1954 


COMMITTEE  ON  GOVERNMENT  OPERATIONS 
JOSEPH  R.  MCCARTHY,  Wisconsin,  Chairman 

KARL  E.  MUNDT,  South  Dakota  JOHN  L.  McCLELLAN,  Arkansas 

MAR3ARET  CHASE  SMITH,  Maine  HENRY  M.  JACKSON,  Washington 

HENRY  C.  DWORSHAK,  Idaho  JOHN  F.  KENNEDY,  Massachusetts 

EVERETT  MCKINLEY  DIRKSEN,  Illinois       STUART  SYMINGTON,  Missouri 
JOHN  MARSHALL  BUTLER,  Maryland  THOMAS  A.  BURKE,  Ohio 

CHARLES  E.  POTTER,  Michigan  SAM  J.  ERVIN,  Jr.,  North  Carolina 

Richard  J.  O'Melia,  General  Counsel 
Walter  L.  Reynolds,  Chief  Clerk 


Permanent  Subcommittee  on  Investigations 

JOSEPH  R.  MCCARTHY,  Wisconsin,  Chairman 

KARL  E.  MUNDT,  South  Dakota  JOHN  L.  McCLELLAN,  Arkansas 

EVERETT  McKINLEY  DIRKSEN,  Illinois       HENRY  M.  JACKSON,  Washington 
CHARLES  E.  POTTER,  Michigan  STUART  SYMINGTON,  Missouri 

James  N.  Juliana,  Acting  Executive  Director 

Robert  F.  Kennedy,  Chief  Counsel  for  the  Minority 
II 


CONTENTS 


Testimony  of —  I'ase 

Watkins,  Senator  Arthur  V.,  United  States  Senate 180 

in 


COMMUNIST  INFILTBATION  IN  THE  ARMY 


MONDAY,   NOVEMBER    15,    1954 

United  States  Senate, 
Permanent  Subcommittee  on  Investigations  of  the 

Committee  on  Government  Operations, 

Washington,  D.  G. 

The  subcommittee  met,  pursuant  to  call  at  10  a.  m.,  in  room  3'57, 
Senate  Office  Building,  Senator  Joseph  E.  McCarthy  (chairman) 
presiding. 

Present:  Senator  Joseph  R.  McCarthy,  Republican,  Wisconsin; 
Senator  Everett  McKinley  Dirksen,  Republican,  Illinois;  Senator 
John  L.  McClellan,  Democrat,  Arkansas;  Senator  Henry  M.  Jack- 
son, Democrat,  Washington;  and  Senator  Stuart  Symington,  Demo- 
crat, Missouri. 

Present  also:  Senator  Arthur  V.  Watkins,  Republican,  Utah; 
James  N.  Juliana,  acting  executive  director ;  Robert  F.  Kennedy,  chief 
counsel  to  the  minority ;  Daniel  G.  Buckley,  assistant  counsel ;  and 
Ruth  Young  Watt,  chief  clerk. 

The  Chairman.  The  committee  will  come  to  order. 

May  I  say  we  have  a  rule  that  the  flash  photographers  will  not 
take  pictures  during  the  hearings.  So  if  you  men  will  desist  taking 
pictures  of  the  witness  and  the  members  of  the  committee  during 
the  hearing,  it  will  be  appreciated. 

Senator  Watkins,  you  are  called  here  this  morning  not  in  any  way 
to  answer  for  your  activities  as  chairman  of  the  Watkins  committee. 
To  ask  you  to  answer  about  your  activities  on  that  committee  would 
be,  in  my  opinion,  improper  and  beyond  the  jurisdiction  of  this 
committee. 

However,  in  your  report,  you  indicate  that  you  have  information 
in  regard  to  a  fifth  amendment  Communist,  Major  Peress.  I  have 
been  trying  to  find  out  for  months  who  was  responsible  for  the  special 
treatment  that  this  man  got  by  those  who  knew  that  he  was  a  fifth 
amendment  Communist. 

If  I  may  recite  the  facts  of  the  case  for  the  record  briefly,  Peress 
was  identified  as  a  Communist  by  an  undercover  agent — will  you 
desist  in  taking  flash  pictures  of  the  witness — Peress  was  identified 
under  oath  by  a  member  of  the  New  York  Police  Department  as  a 
Communist.  He  was  identified  as  having  attended  a  Communist 
leadership  school. 

We  had  before  us,  and  you  had  before  you,  the  affidavit  which  he 
signed  first  saying  he  was  not  a  Communist  when  he  joined  the  mili- 
tary, which  would  make  him,  of  course,  subject  to  court  martial,  up 
to  5  years,  and  then  later  the  statement  which  he  signed  refusing  to 
answer  whether  he  was  a  Communist  or  not. 

179 


180  COMMUNIST    INFILTRATION    IN    THE    ARMY 

The  reason  you  are  here,  Senator,  as  I  say,  has  nothing  whatsoever 
to  do  with  your  activities  as  chairman  of  the  Watkins  committee. 
But  in  view  of  the  fact  that  you  have  indicated  that  you  have  infor- 
mation about  who  promoted  him,  I  felt  that  I  would  be  derelict  in 
my  duty  if  I  did  not  call  you  here  to  give  you  an  opportunity  to  tell 
us  what  information  you  have.  I  will  be  very  much  surprised  if  you 
have  any  information,  but  we  will  get  down  to  that  shortly. 

You  say,  for  example,  that  Peress  was  in  no  way  responsible  for 
the  Zwicker  matter — strike  that — that  Zwicker  was  in  no  way 
responsible. 

STATEMENT  OF  HON.  ARTHUR  V.  WATKINS,  A  UNITED  STATES 
SENATOR  FROM  THE  STATE  OF  UTAH 

Senator  Watkins.  Will  you  call  my  attention  to  the  place  in  the 
report  where  that  appears  ? 

The  Chairman.  I  will  be  glad  to.     Page  60  of  the  report. 

If  you  will  refer  to  the  bottom  of  the  page,  the  last  paragraph,  I 
will  quote : 

He- 
meaning  McCarthy — 

did  much  to  destroy  the  effectiveness  and  reputation  of  a  witness  who  was  not  in 
any  way  responsible  for  the  Peress  situation,  a  situation  which  we  do  not  in  any 
way  condone.  The  blame  should  have  been  placed  on  the  shoulders  of  those 
culpable  and  not  attributed  publicly  to  one  who  had  no  share  in  the  responsibility. 

We  will  not  get  into  an  argument,  Senator,  as  to  whether  or  not  I 
blamed  Zwicker  for  the  situation,  but  you  say  here  that  he  was  in 
no  way  responsible.  You  say  I  should  have  put  the  blame  on  the 
shoulders  of  those  who  were  culpable.  I  find  that  you  and  I  do 
agree  that  someone  was  culpable,  that  someone  was  at  fault  for  keep- 
ing a  Communist  in  the  military  while  we  are  spending  billions  of 
dollars  trying  to  fight  communism. 

Therefore,  I  will  ask  you,  question  No.  1 :  Do  you  know  who  was, 
as  you  say,  culpable? 

Senator  Watkins.  No ;  I  do  not. 

The  Chairman.  You  do  not? 

Senator  Watkins.  But  I  think  I  can  help  you  find  the  information 
that  will  show  who  had  the  responsibility  for  the  promotion  of  Peress 
and  who  also  had  the  responsibility  for  directing  his  honorable  dis- 
charge. 

The  Chairman.  If  you  do  that,  you  will  be  of  great  value  to  this 
committee,  Senator. 

We  have  asked  Secretary  Stevens  for  that  information  time  after 
time.  He  has  refused  to  give  it  to  us.  We  do  know  who  signed  the 
order.  We  know  the  Adjutant  General  signs  the  order,  but  we  are 
looking  for  the  man,  the  secret  master,  if  you  could  call  him  that, 
who  is  being  protected. 

If  you  can  give  us  the  name  of  the  person  who  has  been  responsible, 
No.  1,  for  the  promotion,  knowing  he  was  a  Communist ;  No.  2,  the 
change  in  duty  orders  to  accomplish  duty  orders;  and  No.  3,  the 
honorable  discharge — if  you  can,  as  you  say,  help  us  get  that  infor- 
mation, then  you  would  be  of  great  value  to  this  committee. 


COMMUNIST    INFILTRATION    IN    THE    ARMY  181 

Senator  Watkins.  With  all  the  qualifications  you  put  in,  descrip- 
tions you  put  in,  I,  of  course,  may  not  be  able  to  qualify  the  answer 
to  comply  strictly  with  that.  But  I  can  give  you  the  source  of  infor- 
mation where  you  can  get  the  names  of  the  people  who  were  respon- 
sible for  his  promotion  and  for  his  discharge,  honorable  discharge. 

So  I  will  proceed,  if  you  will  let  me. 

The  Chairman.  I  will  be  delighted  to. 

Senator  Watkins.  The  statement  you  read  from  the  report,  of 
course,  does  not  indicate  that  we  knew  who  the  culpable  people  were. 
We  said  that  Zwicker  was  not  the  person.  I  can  call  your  attention 
to  the  testimony  in  the  hearing  record,  if  you  wish,  to  substantiate 
just  what  I  am  saying  about  that.  Zwicker  himself  was  not  the 
responsible  person. 

The  Chairman.  Would  you  call  my  attention  to  that  point? 

Senator  Watkins.  I  will  read  it,  if  you  don't  mind.  On  page 
505 

The  Chairman.  Just  1  minute  until  I  get  it — you  may  proceed. 

Senator  Watkins.  It  is  the  first  volume  of  the  hearing  record.  Mr. 
Williams  had  been  examining  General  Zwicker. 

The  Chairman.  Just  so  the  record  is  straight,  Senator  Watkins  is 
now  referring  not  to  testimony  taken  before  the  investigating  com- 
mittee, but  testimony  taken  before  the  Watkins  committee. 

Senator  Watkins.  That  is  right.  Otherwise  known  as  the  select 
committee. 

The  Chairman.  So  when  you  say  I  knew  what  he  was  testifying  to, 
you  refer  to  what  I  knew  after  he  appeared  before  your  committee ;  is 
that  right? 

Senator  Watkins.  That  is  right,  yes. 

I  will  read  the  testimony.  Mr.  Williams  had  been  cross-examining 
General  Zwicker,  and  then  he  said,  "I  have  no  further  questions." 

The  Chairman.  Mr.  de  Furia,  do  you  have  further  questions? 

Mr.  de  Furia.  Yes,  sir. 

General,  did  you  promote  Peress? 

General  Zwicker.  I  definitely  did  not. 

Mr.  de  Furia.  Did  you  discharge  him  with  an  honorable  discharge? 

General  Zwicker.  I  did,  sir. 

Mr.  de  Furia.  Was  that  on  your  own  initiative  or  under  orders,  sir? 

General  Zwicker.  It  was  under  orders. 

Now  we  can  go  on  and  get  some  additional  testimony. 

The  Chairman.  Senator,  I  wonder  if  you  would  do  this  for  me.  In 
your  report 

Senator  Watkins.  May  I  say  that  was  not  contradicted  before  us. 

The  Chairman.  I  don't  want  to  use  the  gavel  on  you. 

Senator  Watkins.  You  don't  need  to.  I  am  willing  to  cooperate 
with  you  a  100  percent. 

The  Chairman.  May  I  ask  you  to  do  this.  Obviously,  if  there  is 
anything  in  your  record  which  shows  who  was  responsible  for  covering 
up  for  this  Communist,  I  will  want  you  to  point  that  out.  However, 
at  the  present  time,  I  am  referring  to  your  report  which  says  that,  in 
effect,  I  knew  that  Zwicker  was  not  responsible.  So  this  had  to  be 
something  antedating  the  testimony  taken  before  your  committee. 

Could  you  show  us  any  information  which  you  have  to  show  that 
Zwicker  was  not  responsible,  prior  to  what  he  said  before  your  com- 
mittee? 


182  COMMUNIST    INFILTRATION    IN    THE    ARMY 

Senator  Watkins.  I  was  not  acquainted  with  the  matter  prior  to 
that  time.  My  information,  of  course,  is  based  on  what  he  said  in  the 
committee,  on  the  uncontradicted  evidence.  No  one  contradicted 
him.  That  was  his  statement,  and  I  assume  it  is  true,  and  I  think 
other  information  I  have  discovered  since,  which  I  think  will  answer 
the  question  that  we  were  talking  about,  that  is  to  help  you  find  the 
information  as  to  who  handled  the  Peress  matter — I  can  give  that  to 
you,  because  I  have 

The  Chairman.  I  wish  you  would,  Senator.  I  wish  you  would 
have  all  the  facts  in  mind.  I  refer  you  to  the  testimony  taken  before 
the  investigating  committee.     [Reading :] 

Question.  You  know  that  somebody  has  kept  him  on  knowing  that  he  has 
refused  to  tell  whether  he  was  a  Communist,  do  you  not? 

Zwickeb.  I  am  afraid  that  would  come  under  the  category  of  the  Executive 
order,  Mr.  Chairman. 

The  Chairman.  What? 

Zwicker.  I  am  afraid  an  answer  to  that  question  would  come  under  the  cate- 
gory of  the  Presidential  order. 

So  you  know  that  prior  to  his  appearance  before  our  committee  he 
did  not  deny  that  he  personally  as  commanding  officer  was  responsible. 
Do  you  know  that  ? 

Senator  Watkins.  I  am  not  sure  about  that,  because  all  I  would 
have  is  the  record,  and  I  have  read  so  many  records  that  I  couldn't 
be  sure  as  to  that  positive  statement.  But  I  do  have  some  additional 
information  in  this  record  which  indicates  very  clearly  that  he  was 
not  the  person  responsible. 

May  I  read  it  ? 

The  Chairman.  You  certainly  may,  but  I  want  to  get  this  in 
chronological  order,  if  I  may.  You  know,  do  you  not — you  know 
when  you  signed  the  report,  did  you  not — that  Zwicker  had  refused 
to  tell  us  who  had  ordered  the  promotion  of  Peress?  Did  you  know 
that? 

Senator  Watkins.  I  think  I  had  the  evidence.  I  had  the  full  rec- 
ord of  the  hearing  you  held  in  New  York  City,  at  which  General 
Zwicker  appeared.  As  I  recall,  in  that  he  wasn't  in  a  position,  and 
he  so  told  you,  to  give  all  the  information  that  he  would  probably 
like  to  have  given,  because  of  orders. 

The  Chairman.  Do  you  think  today — and  time  is  running  out, 
and  we  have  a  session  starting  at  11  o'clock — do  you  think  today  you 
can  give  us  information  which  will  help  us  to  nail  down  the  man  re- 
sponsible for  the  protection  of  this  Communist  in  the  military,  do  you  ? 

Senator  Watkins.  I  can  give  you  information  as  to  the  men  who 
had  something  to  do  with  it,  and  probably  all  to  do  with  it.  If  you 
will  let  me,  I  will  proceed. 

The  Chairman.  Would  you  do  that,  please? 

Senator  Watkins.  Yes;  I  did  want  to  read  that  other,  but  since 
you  say  time  is  running  out 

The  Chairman.  Read  whatever  you  care  to. 

Senator  Watkins.  All  right. 

After  I  got  your  telegram  in  Salt  Lake  City,  or  letter,  and  after 
I  got  back  here,  as  soon  as  I  could  get  to  it,  I  called  on  Secretary 
Stevens  to  see  what  information  I  could  get,  and  he  did  furnish  me 
some  information. 


COMMUNIST    INFILTRATION    IN    THE    ARMY  183 

I  will  read  now  a  letter  which  I  think  will  tell  where  the  material  is. 

Department  of  the  Army, 

Washington,  June  23,  195',. 
Dear  Senator  Mundt  : 

This  was  addressed,  so  he  advised  me,  ,to  Senator  Mundt,  the  acting 
chairman  of  the  committee  which  is  now  in  session  here. 

I  refer  to  the  case  of  Maj.  Irving  Peress,  with  which  I  am  sure  you  are 
familiar.  I  have  recently  studied  the  thorough  investigation  made  by  the 
Inspector  General  of  the  Army  of  all  the  circumstances  pertaining  to  this 
advancement  in  grade  and  separation  from  the  service. 

This  investigation  disclosed  no  evidence  of  any  subversive  conduct  with  re- 
spect to  personnel  actions  involving  Peress.  Furthermore,  there  is  no  evidence 
of  disloyalty,  pro-Communist  influence,  or  any  other  type  of  misconduct  reflect- 
ing on  the  loyalty,  integrity,  or  patriotism  of  the  officers  or  civilians  who 
processed  the  case. 

The  investigation,  however,  did  reveal  that  in  several  instances  improper  ad- 
ministrative handling  of  papers  resulted  in  unwarranted  delays  in  processing 
actions  concerning  Major  Peress. 

On  the  basis  of  the  facts  now  known  and  limitations  imposed  by  outmoded 
regulations,  and  legislation  pertaining  to  doctors  and  dentists,  my  original  con- 
clusion that  the  Peress  case  was  not  handled  as  it  should  have  been  has  been 
substantiated.  As  will  be  remembered,  when  I  returned  from  the  Far  East, 
February  3,  1954,  and  in  my  letter  to  Senator  McCarthy,  dated  February  16,  1954, 
I  readily  admitted  that  this  case  could  have  been  handled  better. 

The  Inspector  General's  findings  disclosed  inordinate  time  was  consumed  in 
the  processing  of  this  case.  Major  commanders  have  been  directed  to  take  the 
appropriate  steps  against  the  individuals  involved  and  at  all  levels  of  command 
administrative  reforms  consistent  with  existing  law  have  been  made,  which  I 
fervently  hope  will  make  it  impossible  for  such  errors  to  be  made  in  the  future. 

Further  reference  is  made  to  the  sealed  envelope  marked  "confidential,"  con- 
taining the  names  of  Army  personnel  who  in  the  course  of  their  duties  took  some 
type  of  administrative  action  with  respect  to  the  disposition  of  Major  Peress. 

As  you  will  recall,  on  February  24,  1954,  I  agreed  to  submit  to  your  subcom- 
mittee the  names  of  these  individuals  as  soon  as  they  had  been  determined.  In 
the  course  of  the  hearings,  pages  1420  and  2253,  I  reiterated  this  promise  and  by 
covering  letter  of  May  13, 1954,  I  submitted  to  Mr.  Jenkins  in  an  envelope  marked 
"confidential"  the  names  of  the  individuals  who  had  something  to  do  with  the 
Peress  personnel  actions.  The  covering  letter,  copy  enclosed,  was  read  into  the 
transcript  of  the  hearings  at  page  3761. 

Subsequently,  on  June'  18,  1954,  Lieutenant  Murray,  of  my  office,  delivered  to 
you  an  additional  envelope  marked  "confidential"  to  replace  the  first  one.  This 
was  necessary  because  a  name  had  been  erroneously  included  in  the  first  com- 
pilation. On  this  occasion,  you  inquired  about  the  confidential  character  of  this 
list.  In  answer  to  your  question,  I  can  only  reemphasize  my  original  request, 
that  the  names  of  these  individuals  not  be  made  public  under  any  circumstances. 

As  you  know,  these  names  were  obtained  after  a  thorough  investigation  by 
the  Inspector  General  of  the  Army.  I  wish  to  emphasize  that  the  mere  fact  that 
the  individuals  are  named  as  having  some  administrative  responsibility  or  knowl- 
edge of  the  subject  should  in  no  way  be  construed  to  indicate  culpability  on  their 
part.  Should  these  names  be  made  public,  it  would  unnecessarily  subject  them 
and  their  families  to  unwarranted  publicity  completely  out  of  proportion  to  the 
facts. 

I  therefore  request  again  that  you  do  not  publicize  this  list.  To  publicize  these 
names  without  a  full  explanation  of  the  circumstances  surrounding  their  par- 
ticipation in  the  case  could  well  cast  public  discredit  upon  the  individuals 
concerned. 

In  addition,  such  publication  would  go  far  to  diminish  the  future  effectiveness 
of  the  Inspector  General  Corps  because,  historically,  investigations  of  this  char- 
acter have  been  successful  information-gathering  devices  for  commanders  be- 
cause of  a  strict  adherence  to  the  maintenance  of  a  confidential  relationship 
between  the  interrogator  and  the  person  interrogated.  This  is  another  reason 
for  my  definite  desire  not  to  have  their  names  publicized. 

Also  in  the  transcript  on  pages  2266,  Mr.  Jenkins  stated  :  "And  then  the  names, 
as  I  understand  it,  the  chairman  ruled  are  to  be  submitted  to  this  committee 

38794—54 — pt.  4 2 


184  COMMUNIST    INFILTRATION    IN    THE    ARMY 

or  me  as  its  counsel,  privately  and  without  exposing  these  names."  On  page 
2268  you  stated :  "The  other  names  requested  should  be  submitted  confidentially 
and  to  counsel  for  our  committee."    See  enclosure  for  full  quote. 

Accordingly,  it  is  my  opinion  that  the  confidential  character  of  the  list  of 
names  should  be  maintained  and  revealed  only  on  a  need-to-know  basis  to  those 
who  have  a  confidential  clearance. 

The  Secretary  advised  me  as  a  result  of  my  inquiry  that  a  list  of 
30  names,  beginning  with  a  general,  had  been  given  to  Senator  Mundt, 
the  acting  chairman  of  this  committee.  Those  were  the  names  that 
were  to  be  kept  confidential.  As  I  understood  it  from  him,  they 
contained  all  the  names  of  those  who  had  anything  to  do — any  of  the 
responsibility  for  the  promotion  and  the  honorable  discharge  of  Major 
Peress.  That  information,  I  understand,  came  into  the  hands  of  Sen- 
ator Mundt,  was  delivered  by  a  messenger — I  mean  the  envelope  that 
Ayas  marked  "confidential"  containing  the  names — and  is  now  in  the 
files  of  this  committee  and  has  been  since  June  23, 1954. 

Now,  I  was  further  advised  by  Secretary  Stevens  that  I  could 
have  a  copy  of  that  list,  he  exhibited  an  envelope  which  was  marked 
"confidential"  and  sealed,  that  I  could  have  a  copy  of  those  names. 
But  he  would  expect  me  to  keep  them  confidential  I  said  if  your 
committee,  if  the  McCarthy  committee,  has  those  names  now,  "it  is 
not  necessary  for  me  to  have  them,  because  that  is  their  job.  They 
can  immediately  go  into  executive  session  and  call  in  these  various 
persons  to  determine  their  share  of  the  responsibility,  whatever  they 
did  about  it.  I  said,  "Would  you  be  willing  to  furnish  these  officers 
to  see  that  they  get  here,  or  this  personnel  ?"  And  he  said,  "We  would 
do  our  level  best  to  get  them  there  upon  the  demand  of  this  Perma- 
nent Committee  on  Investigations,"  the  committee  over  which  you 
preside,  Senator. 

The  Chairman.  I  do  not  want  to  waste  my  time  and  the  time  of 
the  Senators  here,  unless  you  have  some  information  as  to  who  is 
culpable.  You  say  in  your  report  "Z wicker  was  in  no  way  responsi- 
ble." I  do  not  know  what  you  know  about  the  military.  You  should 
know,  you  made  the  statement  that  a  man  is  not  promoted,  he  is  not 
honorably  discharged,  unless  his  commanding  officer  makes  the  rec- 
ommendation. If  you  read  the  record,  you  know  that  Secretary 
Stevens  promised  to  have  an  investigation  made,  that  he  would  tell 
us  who  was,  as  you  say,  culpable— he  did  not  use  that  word ;  he  said 
"at  fault";  you  used  the  word  culpable— in  this  case.  That  has  never 
been  done. 

Now,  if  you  merely  intend  to  read  from  the  transcript  of  the  Mundt 

hearings,  which  you  have  been  doing  so  far 

Senator  Watkins.  I  have  been  reading  a  copy  of  the  letter  from 
the  Secretary  to  Senator  Mundt. 

The  Chairman.  That  is  in  the  Mundt  hearings,  and  has  been  in 
there  for  months. 

Senator  Watkins.  He  told  me  this  had  not  been  made  public  before. 
The  Chairman.  That  is  part  of  the  Mundt  hearings.    Do  you  have 
any  information  today?     Do  you  have  any  information  today  as  to 
who  was,  as  you  say,  culpable  in  this  case  ? 

Senator  Watkins.  I  have  exactly  what  I  have  told  you.  I  had  no 
personal  knowledge,  I  came  to  the  conclusion,  based  on  the  uncon- 
tradicted testimony  in  our  hearings,  before  the  Watkins  committee, 
that  General  Zwicker  was  not  responsible,     Then,  in  order  to  help 


COMMUNIST    INFILTRATION    IN    THE    ARMY  185 

this  committee,  because  I  am  a  member  of  the  Internal  Security  Com- 
mittee, which  is  charged  with  the  responsibility  of  ferreting  out  these 
matters  just  as  much  as  your  committee — as  a  member  of  it  I  was 
personally  very  much  interested  in  finding  out,  and  I  would  like 
to  find  out. 

But  I  do  say  now,  in  view  of  what  has  been  said  to  me  by  the  Secre- 
tary, as  I  have  related  it,  that  you  do  now  have  in  your  files  the  names 
of  all  the  people  who  were  responsible  for  the  promotion  and  the 
discharge,  the  honorable  discharge,  of  Peress.  All  you  need  to  do 
is  to  call  those  men  in  in  executive  session,  if  you  want  to  abide  by 
the  confidential  request  of  the  Secretary,  and  you  can  find  out  from 
them  the  part  that  each  one  had  in  that  affair.  That  has  been  in  your 
files  since  June  23. 

The  Chairman.  I  am  afraid  we  are  wasting  the  time  of  the  Senate, 
if  that  is  all  the  information  you  have. 

Senator  Watkins.  You  invited  me  here     I  did  not 

The  Chairman.  Just  a  minute.  Please,  Senator.  I  will  give  you 
a  gavel.  General  Zwicker  when  called  said  he  could  not  tell  who  was 
responsible.  We  have  a  list  of  30  names,  an  unusual  list.  It  lists 
the  people  in  headquarters  of  the  First  Army,  the  Office  of  the  Sur- 
geon General,  all  the  doctors  in  the  Surgeon  General's  Office  who 
might  have  given  this  man  a  physical  examination  when  he  was 
promoted,  the  officers  in  the  Adjutant  General's  Office,  again  when 
he  was  appointed  to  the  grade  of  major  all  of  the  doctors  who  were 
in  the  Surgeon  General's  Office,  and  on  down  the  line.  You  and  I 
know  that — you  and  I  know  that  nothing  will  be  gained  by  calling  4 
or  8  doctors  from  the  Surgeon  General's  Office  and  finding  out  whether 
or  not  they  examined  this  man.  I  thought  when  you  made  this  state- 
ment, Senator,  this  very  serious  statement  made  in  your  report — you 
state  that  I  should  blame  the  person  who  is  culpable — I  thought  maybe 
you  had  some  information.  Let  us  see  if  I  have  your  testimony  clear 
today-  It  is  that  you  have  nothing  except  what  was  presented  to 
the  Mundt  committee,  including  this  list  of  30  people.  You  know 
now  as  you  knew  at  the  time  you  signed  this  report,  that  when  we  had 
one  of  the  individuals  before  us,  he  said,  "I  can't  answer  because  of 
the  Presidential  order."  You  are  aware  of  the  Presidential  order 
which  you  invoked  before  your  committee  in  which  you  said  that 
General  Lawton  could  not  even  tell  about  the  conversation  he  had  with 
General  Zwicker.  Is  it  your  testimony  now  that  that  is  all  you 
have?  You  have  nothing  in  addition  except  this  conversation  you 
had  with  Stevens  in  which  he  said : 

Here  is  a  list  of  30  names.  If  you  want  to  take  a  look  at  them,  if  you  think  there 
is  some  way  that  I  can  find  out  who  was  the  secret  master  by  looking  at  these 
names,  I  will  give  it  to  you. 

Keep  in  mind  the  ruling  that  you  made — hand  this  down  to  the 
Senator,  will  you? 

(Document  handed.) 

Keep  in  mind  the  ruling  you  made  that  one  Army  officer  would  not 
have  to  testify  as  to  conversations  he  had  with  another. 

Senator  Watkins.  I  take  it  you  are  asking  for  my  advice.  That  is 
what  it  sounded  like.    I  would  advise  you 

The  Chairman.  Not  your  advice,  Senator.  You  have  signed  a  for- 
mal report  saying  that  I  should  blame  the  person  who  is  culpable. 
That  means  that  you  should  know. 


186  COMMUNIST    INFILTRATION    IN    THE    ARMY 

Senator  Watkins.  Do  you  disagree  with  that  ? 

The  Chairman.  That  means  you  should  know.  I  have  been  trying 
to  find  out.  I  wired  you  and  told  you  that  unless  you  had  some  infor- 
mation I  did  not  want  you  to  waste  my  time  and  your  time.  You  did 
not  answer  that  wire.  I  gather  today  that  you  have  nothing  except 
what  was  before  the  Mundt  committee,  and  that  the  Secretary  of  the 
Army  did  not  give  you  the  result  of  the  Inspector  General's  report. 
You  knew,  of  course,  Senator,  you  know  now,  that  the  Secretary  of  the 
Army  promised  that  he  would  have  the  Inspector  General  make  an 
investigation  and  that  he  would  try  and  tell  us  then  who  was  at  fault 
or,  using  your  word,  culpable.  You  know  that  he  has  refused  to  do 
that.    I  thought  maybe  when  you  were— — 

Senator  Watkins.  Just  a  moment.  I  do  not  know  any  of  those 
things  you  are  saying.  Those  are  your  statements,  not  mine.  I  am  not 
agreeing  with  them  just  because  I  sit  here.  I  am  not  agreeing  with 
what  you  are  saying  because  I  have  to  sit  silently. 

The  Chairman.  You  do  not  have  to  sit  silently.  You  can  talk  all 
you  like.    I  am  not  going  to  use  a  gavel. 

Senator  Watkins.  You  ask  me,  in  effect,  as  I  get  the  purport  of  your 
question,  how  I  would  go  about  it  to  get  this  information.  I  would 
tell  you  exactly  how  I  would  go  about  it.  I  would  serve  on  the  Secre- 
tary of  the  Army  a  request  for  each  one  of  these  officers  and  I  would 
have  them  brought  before  the  committee  in  executive  session  so  that  I 
could  protect  the  families  of  these  people  in  the  event  there  was  noth- 
ing against  them  any  more  than  administrative  work.  I  am  advised 
that  this  contains  the  list  of  the  people  who  had  all  to  do  with  this 
promotion  and  with  this  discharge. 

I  would  go  right  down  through  that  list.  And  then  I  would  say 
to  you,  in  answer  to  what  you  said  about  not  being  able  to  get  the 
information  out  of  them  because  of  the  orders — I  would  do  exactly 
what  I  did  in  the  select  committee  case.  I  called  on  the  Secretary  of 
Defense,  Mr.  Wilson,  and  I  got  him  to  give  me  a  letter  which  permitted 
General  Lawton  to  testify,  which  permitted  General  Zwicker  to  tes- 
tify on  the  things  that  he  could  not  say  before. 

The  Chairman.  Let's  keep  the  record  straight.  You  did  not  get 
permission  for  Lawton  to  testify.  Lawton  refused  to  testify.  So 
let's  keep  the  record  straight. 

Senator  Watkins.  Lawton  came  on  the  second  time  and  testified 
when  he  was  given  the  opportunity  to  recount  and  to  give  the  state- 
ments that  General  Zwicker  had  made  to  him  at  a  conversation  with 
respect  to  Senator  McCarthy  and  how  he  felt  about  it.  When  we 
gave  him  the  opportunity 

The  Chairman.  Senator  Watkins,  let's  keep  the  record  straight. 

Senator  Watkins.  I  am  testifying.  If  you  find  it  is  wrong — you 
said  I  could  talk  all  I  wanted.    Now  let  me  go. 

The  Chairman.  You  can  talk  all  you  like. 

Senator  Watkins.  Let  me  go,  then,  and  I  can  finish  my  statement. 
With  your  permission,  I  am  doing  this. 

The  Chairman.  O.  K.    Proceed. 

Senator  Watkins.  All  right. 

I  have  forgotten  where  I  was.    Will  you  give  me  the  last  statement  ? 

(The  record  was  read  by  the  reporter.) 

Senator  Watkins.  When  we  gave  him  the  opportunity  to  testify  he 
could  not  recount  or  recall  a  single  statement  made  by  Zwicker.    Then 


COMMUNIST    INFILTRATION    IN    THE    ARMY  187 

we  stretched  the  rule  on  giving  evidence  of  that  sort  and  said,  "Ordi- 
narily we  would  like  to  form  our  own  conclusions  from  what  was  said, 
but  you  can  go  ahead  and  give  your  impressions."  Then  he  did ;  that 
General  Zwicker  was  antagonistic  to  you.  Then  when  we  go  to 
Zwicker,  he  was  permitted  to  say  that  he  had  been  opposed  to  the 
promotion  of  Peress,  he  had  been  opposed  to  his  honorable  discharge, 
lie  had  been  against  generals  or  any  officials  in  the  Army  claiming  the 
protection  of  the  fifth  amendment. 

But  he  was  not  permitted  to  say  to  whom  he  objected.  He  had  to 
stop  there.  But  we  got  that  through  the  letter  Mr.  Wilson  and  the 
counsel  sent  over  from  the  War  Department. 

Senator,  as  a  part  of  my  advice  from  an  older  man,  just  a  little 
older  in  years,  I  would  say  to  you  I  think  if  you  will  follow  on  that 
procedure,  if  you  will  cooperate  with  the  Secretary  of  the  Army  and 
the  Defense  Department,  they  will  be  able  to  help  you  a  lot  in  actually 
pinpointing  who,  if  anybody,  is  culpable ;  that  is,  any  evil  culpability, 
for  the  promotion  of  Peress  and  for  his  discharge  honorably. 

Now,  I  do  not  know  whether  this  is  going  to  be  of  any  help  to  you 
or  not.  You  have  to  decide  that  matter.  But  since  you  asked  for  it, 
that  is  the  story.  You  have  it  in  your  files  and  I  think  there  is  a 
reasonable  procedure  to  follow.  I  recommend  it  strongly  to  your  com- 
mittee. And  if  you  do  not  want  to  do  it,  give  us  the  names  in  the 
Internal  Security  Committee  and  I  will  ask  our  chairman  to  proceed 
on  that. 

The  Chairman.  Then  I  understand  that  the  only  help  you  can  give 
us  is  that  we  call  additional  Army  witnesses  and  hope  that  they  will 
not  invoke  any  secrecy  rule  and  try  and  get  them  not  to  invoke  the 
secrecy  rule.    Beyond  that,  you  can  give  no  information,  is  that  it  ? 

Senator  Wtatkins.  I  would  like  to  say  that  the  report  that  you 
called  my  attention  to  does  not  profess  to  know  the  name  of  the  person 
culpable.  It  merely  says  whoever  they  are,  in  effect,  they  ought  to  be 
held  responsible.  It  does  say  positively  that  Zwicker  was  not  culpable. 
That  is  all  I  have  to  say,  Senator. 

The  Chairman.  Where  does  it  say  positively  that  Zwicker  was  not 
culpable? 

Senator  Watkins.  Well,  I  think,  in  what  we  read. 

The  Chairman.  Where  does  it  say  that?  I  would  like  to  read  that 
into  the  record.  You  said  the  report  that  you  got  from  the  Army. 
I  handed  it  to  you.  I  am  not  asking  about  your  report,  Senator 
Watkins. 

Senator  Watkins.  That  is  what  I  thought  you  said.  I  am  only 
responsible  for  my  own  report,  nobody  else's. 

The  Chairman.  In  other  words,  you  were  not  referring  to  the  Army 
report?    I  handed  you  a  report.    I  thought  you  were  referring  to  that. 

Senator  Watkins.  I  have  the  list,  yes,  the  confidential  list  that  you 
just  handed  me. 

The  Chairman.  There  is  nothing  on  that? 

Senator  Watkins.  That  is  to  be  taken  in  connection  with  the  letter 
which  he  gave  you.  That  is  to  be  taken  in  connection  with  what  he 
told  me.  I  could  have  had  this  identical  list,  and  if  the  select  com- 
mittee had  any  job  in  connection  with  it,  I  would  be  only  too  glad  to 
proceed  and  follow  it.  But  that  is  within  the  jurisdiction  of  your 
committee  and  the  Internal  Security  Committee  as  I  see  it.    I  cannot 


188  COMMUNIST    INFILTRATION    IN    THE    ARMY 

do  anything  about  it.    I  said,  "There  is  no  use  in  giving  that  to  me,  Mr 

fcEShJ7'  T  *  haVe  m6,h0ld  ifc  in  a  confidential  capacity,  even  though 
it  might  satisfy  some  of  my  curiosity."  But  lie  said,  "Positively  that 
contains  the  list  from  the  top  down  in  grade,  the  people  who  were 
responsible  for  the  handling  of  the  PerSs  matter.''  That  has  K 
in  your  hies  since  June  23,  1954. 

sa^h^ltTTi'  iY°U  j11?  aware>  ?f  cour^  of  the  fact  that  Zwicker 
stolen  $50  UP  **  honorable  discharge  if  a  man  had 

Senator  Watkins.  I  understand  all  of  that,  but  you  said  you  were 

Peregss.mg  ™™  g°[ng  t0  aSk  me  what  *  ^  abo^ 

nJSSi^w1??'  l^  you  should  have  told  me  that  y°u  ^™ 

nothing  about  this  before  we  wasted  this  time  this  morning.  You 
came  here  this  morning  and  read  a  letter  which  is  in  the  Mundt  testi- 
mony. You  refer  to  a  list  of  30  people.  The  man  who  signed  the  hon- 
orable discharge— his  name  is  not  here.     The  commanding  officer's 

sTvTtW  °Jil \T'       fr&  al?  T1^  names  missin-'  although  the  letter 
says  that  all  those  administratively  responsible.    Your  advice  is   all 
you  know  is  that  we  should  call  these  men  and  hope  they  would' no 
do-would  the  young  man  desist  while  I  am  talking  to  the  witness? 

to  Wl°^p  KINS-  IS  f  °Ut  °f  Hne  for  m^  administrative  assistant 
to  nana  me  some  papers  ? 

The  Chairman.  Let  me  finish  my  question.    The  only  thing  you 

nfflIlSTn  Ul\  Hn>  1S  the  *dvice  that  we  call  all  of  the  thirty-odd 
officers  from  the  Surgeon  General  on  down  and  hope  that  they  will 
not  invoke  the  pnvilige  which  Zwicker  invoked.  We  asked  Zwicker 
you  understand,  who  was  responsible,  and  he  said  he  could  not  answer.' 
1  he  only  thing  you  can  tell  us  now  is,  when  you  sav  I  should  have 
blamed  the  person  culpable,  is  that  we  should  call  those  80^ple« 

benator  Watkins.  I  called  your  attention 

The  Chairman.  Is  that  roughly  it8 

l  f?enat*°AT  Wat*ins-  ^ot  exactly  it,  no.  I  call  your  attention  to  a 
letter  of  November  3  1954,  addressed  to  you  by  Mr.  Stevens,  in  which 
he  expressly  as  I  recall,  eaves  out  two  officers  here.  I  think  McManus 
and  deneral  Bergm,  and  it  already  appeared— 

erai%^°rp7SR^nhViainSt  MH\  ^  ,WUliam  R  **#*>  the  Adjutant  Gen- 
S  thf  aS'  }     Zwicker,  or  Maj.  John  J.  McManus,  because  in  the  opinion 

of  the  Army  no  ac  s  performed  by  them  manifested  the  slightest  indteatfoS  of 

sameTank'  ^  *  ^  *"*  ^  dereliction  of  ^  These  officers  SoS  the 
?£S^tt5?S :etter  t0  y0U'    ^  letter  J0U  WFOte ^  ^ 

^^^z^r^^r^TZi^^^B  to  who  was  cuipabie 

I  have  given  the  information  that  Zwicker  was  not,  the  sworn  testi- 
mony, uncontradicted  testimony  of  Zwicker  himself. 

This  is  information  for  which  our  investigating  committee  has  been  searching 

theUinafne,.^e/"-ef0re  inV\ed  t0  appear  before  the  investigafng ■  JomSStefS gfe 
the  information  upon  which  you  base  the  above  statement.        C(>mmiccee  to  Slve 

statemJnt!1^  ^^  **    ^  iS  the  beSt  *  Can  do  and  T  stand  on  m? 
waIhculpableTAN'  *"  °ther  W°rdS'  y°U  and  *  wiU  agree  that  someb°<*y 


COMMUNIST    INFILTRATION    IN    THE    ARMY  189 

Senator  Watkins.  Somebody  actually  promoted  Peress,  yes  In 
the  same  letter  that  Mr.  Stevens  sent  you  under  date  of  November  6, 
it  quotes  the  law  with  respect  to  the  promotion  of  these  people.  It 
seems  to  me,  as  a  reasonable  human  being,  knowing  how  these  things 
operate,  that  that  probably  was  largely  responsible  for  almost  the 
automatic  advancement  of  this  man  Peress.    I  would  like  to  oiler  that 

for  your  record.  .  .      ,, 

The  Chairman.  Since  you  bring  that  up,  Senator,  we  will  call  your 
attention  to  the  fact  that  a  Doctor  Belsky  was  before  the  committee 
also.  He  had  the  qualifications,  apparently  as  great  as  Peress.  He  was 
not  given  a  commission;  he  was  not  promoted;  he  was  not  honorably 
discharged.  I  merely  call  that  to  your  attention  so  that  you  will  know 
that  when  you  cite  a  law  there  was  no  law  that  forced  the  promotion.  1 
will  ask  you  one  final  question.       .  ;  .    ,  ,  . 

You  and  I  agree  that  somebody  who  covered  up  for  this  Ma]  oi 

Peress  is  at  fault?  »  T 

Senator  Watkins.  I  do  not  think  anybody  covered  up,  as  tar  as  1 
can  get  it  from  the  statements  made  by  Mr.  Stevens.  I  am  relying 
largely  on  what  he  said.  He  has  given  you  the  names  of  the  people 
who-all  the  people-had  anything  to  do  with  that  You  already 
knew  about  Zwicker  and  you  already  knew  about  Bergm  and  Mc- 
Manus.  So  you  have  had  all  of  that  list.  I  cannot  go  beyond  that. 
And  when  you  say  "culpable"  I  do  not  know  whether  you  mean 
criminally  culpable  or  whether  they  actually  did  the  work. 
The  Chairman.  I  am  using  your  word. 

Senator  Watkins.  Culpable  as  far  as  we  were  concerned  meant  tne 
people  who  did  whatever  was  done.  We  do  not  prejudge  people  and 
say  they  are  guilty  of  something  simply  because  they  may  have 
recommended  a  promotion  of  a  man  or  his  honorable  discharge,  that 
would  be  determined  by  a  proper  trial,  whether  they  were  criminally 

CUThe  Chairman.  You  said  the  blame  should  have  been  placed  on  the 
shoulders  of  those  culpable.   By  the  term  "culpable"  you  meant  nothing 

^Senator  Watkins.  I  did  not  necessarily  mean  criminally  culpable. 
They  were  responsible.  Responsible  would  probably  have  been  a 
better  word.  But  you  cannot  hang  a  man  for  writing  a  report  with  as 
many  words  in  it  as  that  if  you  get  one  word  slightly  off  key.  lhere 
was  no  intention  to  say  that  anybody  had  committed  a  crime,  because 
we  did  not  know  that,  and  we  do  not  step  out  and  judge  them  m 

a  TheCHAiRMAN.  I  am  not  asking  you  about  a  claim.  You  say  there 
was  a  wrong  done ;  is  that  right  ? 

Senator  Watkins.  It  stands  for  what  it  says,  and  I  do  not  care  to 

^TheCH  airman.'  Senator,  I  am  trying  to  find  out  You  say  I  should 
have  put  the  blame  on  the  shoulders  of  those  culpable.  I  am  trying  to 
find  out  whether  you  think  there  was  somebody  to  blame. 

Senator  Watkins.  Somebody  was  responsible  for  his  promotion  and 
discharge ;  that  is  what  I  meant.  • 

The  Chairman.  There  was  nothing  wrong  with  that  i 
Senator  Watkins.  I  do  not  know  whether  it  was  wrong  or  not. 
That  would  depend  on  the  facts. 


190  COMMUNIST    INFILTRATION    IN    THE    ARMY 

The  Chairman.  Senator,  I  perhaps  should  be  censured  for  what 
1  am  about  to  say  if  I  am  to  be  censured  for  what  I  said  to  Zwicker. 
I  might  say  that  a  Senator  who  represents  the  great  State  of  Utah, 
who  comes  here  and  says  he  does  not  know  whether  someone  should 
be  blamed  for  promoting,  honorably  discharging,  a  man  who  has 
graduated  from  a  Communist  leadership  school,  a  Communist  leader, 
a  man  who  owes  his  duty  to  a  foreign  country,  a  man  that  was  a  traitor 
to  this  country ;  a  Senator  who  says,  "I  don't  know  whether  he  is  at 
fault,  I  don't  know  whether  those  who  protected  him  are  at  fault  or 
not — I  wouldn't  say,"  but  who  says  and  argues  on  the  Senate  floor 
that  the  man  who  tries  to  find  out  who  has  been  the  secret  master 
covering  up  for  this  man,  that  such  a  Senator  certainly  is  derelict  in 
his  duty.    And  that  is  putting  it  very,  very  mildly. 

Senator,  you  should  be  just  as  concerned  as  I  am  about  finding  out 
who  is  protecting  the  traitors  in  this  man's  Army.  We  know  that 
somebody  protected  Peress.  You  know  as  well  as  I  do  that  while  I 
have  been  begging  and  coaxing  the  Secretary  of  the  Army  to  give 
us  the  name  of  the  man  responsible,  you  know  as  well  as  I  do  that 
the  Secretary  promised  that  he  would  have  an  investigation,  that  he 
would  give  us  that  information.  You  have  indicated  in  your  report 
that  you  know  who  was  at  fault. 

You  say  that  the  commanding  officer  was  not  at  fault,  although 
the  commanding  officer  refused  to  answer  whether  he  was  at  fault 
or  not.  I  may  say  I  wish  you  had  not  wasted  our  time  this  morning. 
I  wish  you  had  told  me  you  knew  nothing  about  this  situation  before 
I  took  this  hour's  time  this  morning. 

If  the  other  Senators  have  any  questions  to  ask,  they  may  proceed. 

Senator  McClellan.  Are  you  willing  to  make  a  motion  in  the 
Internal  Security  Committee  to  call  these  officers  named  in  that  letter 
and  make  inquiry  of  them  with  regard  to  their  responsibility  ? 

Senator  Watkins.  I  certainly  am,  if  Senator  McCarthy  does  not 
move  rather  promptly  in  that  field. 

Senator  McClellan.  If  this  committee  does  not  proceed  to  do  so, 
I  will  be  glad  to  second  your  motion  in  the  Internal  Security  Com- 
mittee. 

Senator  Watkins.  That  is  right.  You  are  a  member  of  that  com- 
mittee with  me. 

Senator  McClellan.  Yes,  sir;  I  am. 

The  Chairman.  If  they  refused  to  testify,  as  Zwicker  refused,  will 
you  find  them  in  contempt,  or  what  will  you  do  ? 

Senator  Watkins.  I  think  I  will  get  the  answers  with  a  little  coop- 
eration of  the  Army  and  Secretary  Stevens.  I  think  I  will  get  the 
answers  if  I  am  permitted  to  proceed  with  it. 

The  Chairman.  In  other  words,  you  think  you  can  find  out  who 
has  been  covering  up  for  Peress  ? 

Senator  Watkins.  I  never  could  find  out  that  which  would  satisfy 
you.  I  will  say  that  very  frankly.  I  do  not  believe  you  could  ever 
be  satisfied  unless  you  can  find  somebody  that  ought  to  be  shot  or 
hung. 

The  Chairman.  Do  you  think  you  could — I  may  say  that  I  think 
a  man  who  covers  up  for  a  traitor  under  our  law  should  be  shot  or 
hung. 

Senator  Watkins.  Right;  I  will  agree  with  you. 


COMMUNIST    INFILTRATION    IN    THE    ARMY  191 

The  Chairman.  Many  American  young  men  have  died,  many 
American ySuig  men  will  die,  Senator,  because  traitors  have  been 
covered  up. 

IrK^  TlS'tSt^Tunder  the  law  should  be  shot  or 
hung  eve^as'our  young  boys  were  shot  and  mutilated  out  in  Korea. 

Senator  Watkins.  Let  me  ask  you  this 

The  Chairman.  This  is  no  laughing  matter,  Senator.  If  you  think 
vou  have  a  secret  way  of  finding  out  who  the  secret  master  is  who  has 
Covered  up  for  Pereses,  we  will  be  glad  to-very  happy  to-have  you 
?ry  Id  force  the  testimony  from  the  witnesses.    We  will  be  glad  to 

hTeiroidWATKiNS.  I  would  say  this:  That  I  would  like  to  ask  you 
this  question.  Do  you  think  Peress  ought  to  be  shot  or  hung  on  the 
Qitniti  on  as  it  stands  at  present  without  atrial? 

TleCH^i^  I  did  not  say  Peress  should  be  shot  or  hung;  I  said 
any  man  in  our  military  who  covers  up  for  traitors  who  covers  up 
men  guilty  of  treason,  under  the  law  there  is  a  dealth  penalty.  You 
Sy  to  make  a  joke  of  that.  You  say  that  I  would  not  be  satisfied 
until  I  can  find  someone  who  should  be  shot  or  hung.  . 

Senator,  when  we  have  secret  masters  in  the  military  covering  up, 
covering  up,  covering  up  for  Communists,  then  they  should  be  sub- 
jected to  the  full  responsibility  of  the  law.     It  is  no  laughing  matter, 

Senator  Watkins.  I  was  not  laughing,  and  the  record  will  so  show, 
the  pictures  will  so  show.  I  was  not  laughing.  But  I  say  this :  That 
anv  man  in  the  military,  any  man  m  this  country,  is  entitled  to  a 
fair  and  impartial  trial  before  a  jury  of  his  peers  when  it  comes  to  a 

CrNowalifaa'full  investigation  reveals  that  no  one  was  criminally 
culpable  in  this  matter,  that  may  be  a  disappointment  to  you      But 
if  that  is  the  truth,  that  is  the  way  it  will  have  to  be     That  is  what 
ought  to  be  thoroughly  explored.     That  ought  to  be  done  before 
we  oo  on  saying  that  somebody  has  committed  a  crime  all  the  time 
It  could  have  blen  negligence,  it  could  have  been  failure  to  keep  the 
records  together  as  they  should  have  been.     It  could  have  happened 
n  a  large -army  with  millions  of  records..   It  could  have  happened 
purely  as  a  matter  of  a  mistake.     There  is  always  that  possibility 
P  Now,  as  far  as  I  am  concerned,  in  the  committee  of  which  I  am  a 
member,  where  we  are  searching  for  these  matters,  we  try  to  do  it 
hi  an  orderly  way.    We  do  not  make  a  lot  of  charges,  ordinarily, 
unless  we  are  pretty  sure  of  our  ground  and  we  have  gone  into  the 
Tatter  carefully.     Even  then  we  are  very  modest  m  the  charges  we 
make.    Up  to  elate  we  have  been  a  hundred  percent  united,  I  think, 
in  all  the  reports  of  the  Internal  Security  Committee  111  this  country. 
The  Chairman.  Senator,  a  boy  in  Korea  who  goes  to  sleep  on  his 
post  of  duty  is  court-martialed  and  a  death  penalty  is  provided  for 
him     Don't  you  agree  with  me  that  where  someone  deliberately 
covers  up  month  after  month  after  month  for  Communists  m  the 
military,  that  he  is,  using  your  language,  much  more  culpable  than 
ryoung  kid  who  have  been  awake  for  18  or  20  hours  and  who  goes 
to  sleep  on  his  post  of  duty  ? 


192  COMMUNIST    INFILTRATION    IN    THE    ARMY 

Senator  Watkins.  Yes,  I  will  agree  with  that;  a  man  who  has 
been  doing  that.  But  first  of  all,  I  want  to  be  dead  sure  he  has  been 
doing  that. 

The  Chairman.  Unless  the  Senators  have  some  questions,  I  think 
we  have  wasted  one  morning.  I  had  hoped  that  you  would  tell  us 
ahead  of  time  you  knew  nothing  about  this  situation,  Senator. 

Senator  Watkins.  It  was  my  purpose  to  come  before  your  com- 
mittee and  make  such  answers  as  I  could  make  in  response  to  your 
invitation. 

The  Chairman.  You  are  asking  that  I  be  censured  for  not  placing 
the  blame  on  the  shoulders  of  those  culpable.  You  say  now  that  you 
think  by  some  mysterious  process  your  committee  might  be  able  to 
get  the  witnesses  to  disregard  the  Presidential  directives.  If  you 
have  such  a  way  of  getting  that  information,  you  are  welcome  to 
proceed.     I  would  like  to  see  you  try  and  get  it. 

The  committee  will  be  adjourned  unless  there  are  any  questions  to 
be  asked. 

(Whereupon,  at  10 :  45  a.  m.,  the  committee  recessed,  subject  to  call.) 

X 


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