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THE  COMMUNIST  PROGRAM 
FOR  WORLD  CONQUEST 


CONSULTATION  WITH 

GEN.  ALBERT  C.  WEDEMEYER 

UNITED  STATES  ARMY 


COMMITTEE  ON  UN-AMERICAN  ACTIVITIES 
HOUSE  OF  REPRESENTATIVES 

EIGHTY-FIFTH  CONGRESS 
SECOND  SESSION 


JANUARY  21,  1958 
(INCLUDING  INDEX) 


Printed  for  the  use  of  the  Committee  on  Un-American  Activities 


UNITED  STATES 
GOVERNMENT  PPwINTING  OFFICE 
22858°  WASHINGTON  :   1958 


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COMMITTEE  ON  UN-AMERICAN  ACTIVITIES 

United  States  House  of  Representatives 

FRANCIS  E.  WALTER,  Pennsylvania,  Chairman 

MORGAN  M.  MOULDER,  Missouri  BERNARD  W.  KEARNEY.  New  York 

CLYDE  DOYLE,  California  DONALD  L.  JACKSON.  California 

EDWIN  E.  WILLIS.  Louisiana  GORDON  11.  SCHERER.  Ohio 

WILLIAM  M.  TUCK,  Virginia  ROBERT  J.  McINTOSII,  Michigan 

RiciiAKD  AnEXS,  Staff  Director 
n 


:^ 


CONTENTS 


Page 

Synopsis 1 

January  21,  1958,  Consultation  with : 

Gen.  Albert  0.  Wedemeyer,  United  States  Army 5 

Index i 

III 


PuBLio  Law  601,  79th  Congress 

The  legislation  under  which  the  House  Committee  on  Un-American 
Activities  operates  is  Public  Law  601,  79th  Congress  [1946],  chapter 
753, 2d  session,  which  provides : 

Be  it  enacted  by  the  Senate  and  House  of  Representatives  of  the  United  States 
of  America  in  Congress  assembled,  »  *  • 

PART  2— EULES  OF  THE  HOUSE  OF  REPRESENTATIVES 

Rule  X 

SEC.    121.   STANDING   COMMITTEES 

17.  Committee  on  Un-American  Activities,  to  consist  of  nine  Meonbers. 

Rule  XI 

POWERS   AND   DUTIES   OF   COMMITTEES 

*  *  >K  *  •  *  * 

(q)  (1)  Committee  on  Un-American  Activities. 

(A)  Un-American  activities. 

(2)  Tlie  Committee  on  Un-American  Activities,  as  a  wliole  or  by  subcommittee, 
is  autliorized  to  make  from  time  to  time  investigations  of  (i)  the  extent,  char- 
acter, and  objects  of  un-American  propaganda  activities  in  the  United  States, 
(ii)  the  diffusion  within  the  United  States  of  subversive  and  un-American  propa- 
ganda that  is  instigated  from  foreign  countries  or  of  a  domestic  origin  and 
attacks  the  principle  of  the  form  of  government  as  guaranteed  by  our  Constitu- 
tion, and  (iii)  all  other  questions  in  relation  thereto  that  would  aid  Congress  in 
any  necessary  remedial  legislation. 

The  Committee  on  Un-American  Activities  shall  report  to  the  House  (or  to  the 
Clerk  of  the  House  if  the  House  is  not  in  session)  the  results  of  any  such  investi- 
gation, together  with  such  recommendations  as  it  deems  advisable. 

For  the  purpose  of  any  such  investigation,  the  Committee  on  Un-American 
Activities,  or  any  subcommittee  thereof,  is  authorized  to  sit  and  act  at  such  times 
and  places  within  the  United  States,  whether  or  not  the  House  is  sitting,  has 
recessed,  or  has  adjourned,  to  hold  such  hearings,  to  require  the  attendance  of 
such  witnesses  and  the  production  of  such  books,  papers,  and  documents,  and  to 
take  such  testimony,  as  it  deems  necessary.  Subpenas  may  be  issued  under 
the  signature  of  the  chairman  of  the  committee  or  any  subcommittee,  or  by  any 
member  designated  by  any  such  chairman,  and  may  be  served  by  any  person 
designated  by  any  such  chairman  or  member. 

•  «  *  «  *  *  * 

Rule  XII 

LEGISLATIVE  OVEKSIGHT  BY   STANDING   COMMITTEES 

Sec  136.  To  assist  the  Congress  in  appraising  the  administration  of  the  laws 
and  in  developing  such  amendments  or  related  legislation  as  It  may  deem  neces- 
sary, each  standing  committee  of  the  Senate  and  House  of  Representatives  shall 
exercise  continuous  watchfulness  of  the  execution  by  the  administrative  agencies 
concerned  of  any  laws,  the  subject  matter  of  which  is  within  the  jurisdiction  of 
such  committee ;  and,  for  that  purpose,  shall  study  all  pertinent  reports  and  data 
submitted  to  the  Congress  by  the  agencies  in  the  executive  branch  of  the  Govern- 
ment. 


RULES  ADOPTED  BY  THE  85TH  CONGRESS 

House  Resolution  5,  January  3, 1957 

•  **••*• 

Rule  X 

BTANDINQ   COMMITTEES 

1.  There  shall  be  elected  by  the  House,  at  the  commencement  of  each  Congress, 

•  •••••• 

(q)  Committee  on  Un-American  Activities,  to  consist  of  nine  Members. 

•  ***••• 

Rule  XI 

POWERS   AND   DUTIES   OF   COMMirfEES 

17.  Committee  on  Un-American  Activities. 

(a)  Uu-Americau  activities. 

(b)  The  Committee  on  Un-American  Activities,  as  a  whole  or  by  subcommittee. 
Is  authorized  to  make  from  time  to  time  investigations  of  (1)  the,  extent,  cl)ar- 
acter,  and  ol)jects  of  un-American  propaganda  activities  in  the  United  States, 
(2)  the  diffusion  within  the  United  States  of  suliver.<:ive  and  un-American  prop- 
aganda that  is  instigated  from  foreign  countries  or  of  a  domestic  origin  and 
attaclvs  the  principle  of  the  form  of  government  as  guaranteed  by  our  Constitu- 
tion, and  (3)  all  other  questions  in  relation  thereto  that  would  aid  Congress  in 
any  necassary  remedial  legislation. 

The  Committee  on  Un-American  Activities  shall  report  to  the  House  (or  to  tiie 
Clerk  of  the  House  if  the  House  is  not  in  session)  the  results  of  any  such  investi- 
gation, together  with  such  recommendations  as  it  deems  advisable. 

For  the  purpose  of  any  such  investigation,  the  Committee  on  Un-American 
Activities,  or  any  subcommittee  thereof,  is  authorized  to  sit  and  act  at  such  times 
and  places  within  the  United  States,  whether  or  not  the  House  is  sitting,  has 
recessed,  or  has  adjourned,  to  hold  such  hearings,  to  require  the  attendance  of 
such  witnesses  and  the  production  of  such  books,  papers,  and  documents,  and  to 
take  such  testimony,  as  it  deems  necessary.  Subpenas  may  be  issued  under  the 
signature  of  the  chairman  of  the  committee  or  any  subcommittee,  or  by  any 
member  designated  by  any  such  chairman,  and  may  be  served  by  any  person 
designated  by  any  such  chairman  or  member. 

26.  To  assist  the  House  in  appraising  the  administration  of  the  laws  and  in 
developing  such  amendments  or  related  legislation  as  it  may  deem  necessary, 
each  standing  committee  of  the  House  shall  exercise  continuous  watchfulness 
of  the  execution  by  tlie  administrative  agencies  concerned  of  any  laws,  the 
subject  matter  of  which  is  within  the  jurisdiction  of  sucli  committee;  and,  for 
that  purpose,  shall  study  all  pertinent  reports  and  data  submitted  to  the  House 
by  the  agencies  in  the  executive  branch  of  the  Govermneut. 

VI 


SYNOPSIS 

Economic  and  psychological  weapons  rather  than  the  launching  of 
a  third  world  war  comprise  the  current  Communist,  program  for 
world  conquest,  General  Albert  C.  Wedemeyer  warned  in  a  consulta- 
tion with  the  Committee  on  Un-American  Activities.  One  of  the 
top  strategic  planners  of  World  War  II,  General  Wedemeyer  was 
present  at  many  international  conferences  as  adviser  to  the  President. 
He  att-ended  the  conferences  in  Washington,  London,  Cairo,  Quebec, 
and  Casablanca  before  going  to  China  as  theater  commander  in  1944. 

"They  (the  Communists)  are  attaining  their  objectives  without  the 
use  of  military  force,"  General  Wedemeyer  said : 

If  I  were  the  senior  planner  in  the  Soviet  hierarchy,  I 
would  advise  Khrushchev:  "Continue  to  do  exactly  what 
you  are  doing  now.  Do  not  involve  the  Soviet  Union  in  a 
major  war  but  employ  the  satellites  in  brush  fires  or  lim- 
ited wars  against  our  enemies,  the  capitalist  countries.  Con- 
tinue penetration  economically  and  psychologically,  utilize 
economic  or  military  aid  to  as  many  countries  in  the  world 
as  possible.  They  can  be  made  indebted  to  the  Soviet,  and 
if  not  loyal,  at  least  they  will  not  be  opposed  to  the  Com- 
munist movement." 

"I  do  not  believe  that  they  intend  to  precipitate  an  all-out  war," 
he  declared. 

I  have  not  felt  that  war  was  imminent  at  any  time  since 
World  War  II  even  when  there  were  incidents  that  might 
have  easily  touched  off  a  world  struggle.  You  may  recall 
the  Berlin  airlift,  for  example.  There  have  been  many  other 
incidents  that  could  have  started  a  war  if  the  Soviets  had  any 
desire  to  start  an  all-out  war.  They  will  continue  to  spread 
communism  utilizing  economic  and  psychological  weapons. 

General  Wedemeyer  warned  that  the  Soviet  Union  today  has 
"greater  military  capabilities  than  do  we." 

,  This  has  been  true  ever-  since  the  end  of  World  War  II 
when  we  emasculated  our  military  forces  and  at  the  same 
time  permitted  the  Soviet  to  retam  a  massive  army,  a  big 
navy,  and  air  force.  At  one  time  we  had  a  technological  ad- 
vantage, particularly  in  the  atomic  weapon  field,  which  served 
as  a  deterrent. 

General  Wedemeyer  expressed  the  view  that  it  is  now  too  late  for 
the  West  on  the  Soviet  timetable  for  world  domination,  but  he  added : 

However,  I  am  not  completely  pessimistic  about  our  chances 
to  recover  a  sufficiently  strong  strategic  posture  vis-a-vis  the 
Soviet.  If  we  make  a  careful  analysis  of  all  of  the  countries 
■which  endanger  our  position,  evaluate  their  capabilities  and 

1 


THE    COMMUNIST   PROGRAM    FOR   WORLD    CONQUEST 

their  limitations,  and  then  determine  how  much  assistance, 
realistic  or  passive,  that  we  might  expect  from  allies,  and 
finally  consider  our  own  potential  strength,  I  think  that  we 
would  find  our  position  in  the  world  is  not  without  hope,  in 
fact  we  would  be  most  optimistic  if  we  could  foresee  the  coor- 
dinated employment  of  all  the  positive  forces  that  we  have  on 
our  side  to  counter  our  potential  enemies  and  to  overcome  ob- 
stacles ofi'ered  by  them  to  the  attainment  of  our  objectives. 

I  have  confidence  in  American  ingenuity,  in  our  courage, 
and  in  our  capacity  to  plan  intelligently  it  we  are  only  pro- 
vided the  direction  from  responsible  leaders.  But  we  must 
bring  about  concerted  action  to  attain  our  goals  and  stop  the 
indiscriminate  and  uncoordinated  use  of  our  political,  eco- 
nomic, psychological,  and  military  forces. 

General  Wedemeyer  continued : 

We  have  wonderful  opportunities  in  the  struggle  against 
conununism  if  we  would  use  our  economic  weapon  intelligent- 
ly. In  helping  other  peoples  economically  we  should  be  care- 
ful not  to  do  so  on  a  charity  basis.  Such  an  approach  makes 
the  recipient  or  beneficiary  lose  his  self-respect.  Outright 
charity  undermines  the  moral  fiber  of  an  individual  or  of  a 
nation.  But  we  can  provide  economic  or  technical  aid  in  such 
a  manner  as  to  enable  the  recipient  peoples  to  help  themselves 
and  even  make  it  possible  for  them  to  i-eturn  or  pay  back  our 
largess.  One  cannot  help  but  pay  tril)ute  to  the  brave  and 
self-respecting  Finns.  They  were  the  only  people  who  paid 
their  World  War  I  debt  to  the  United  States.  ^  All  other  so- 
called  allies,  the  recipients  of  our  loans  and  aid  in  other  forms, 
reneged. 

He  cautioned,  however,  that — 

I  would  not  vote  one  penny  to  any  country  unless  I  had  evi- 
dence of  their  good  faith  and  of  their  unswerving  loyalty  in 
the  cooperative  effort  with  us  toward  the  attainment  of  com- 
mon objectives:  one  important  one,  of  course,  is  protecting 
the  Free  World  against  the  scourge  of  communism.  I  am 
not  suggesting  that  each  one  of  these  countries  to  whom  we 
give  military  and  economic  aid  shoidd  have  exactly  the  same 
objectives  in  the  international  field,  but  I  would  insist  that 
their  objectives  must  be  compatible'  with  our  own.  In  other 
Avords,  if  the  l^ritish  insist  on  trading  with  Red  China  and 
thus  strengthening  the  Communists  who  present  a  grave 
danger  to  United  States  interests,  then  I  would  discontinue 
military  or  economic  aid  to  the  British. 

When  I  make  a  statement  like  that,  Britishers  and  Ameri- 
can "one-worlders"  will  say  that  they  are  not  trading  in  stra- 
tegic items.  When  they  use  the  term  "strategic  items,"  they 
mean,  of  course,  airplanes,  tanks,  ammunition,  I  presume, 
liut  I  insist  that  any  item  of  trade — a  spool  of  thread,  wheat, 
automobiles,  or  coffee — assists  the  economy  of  Red  China. 
I  believe  in  denying  those  areas  under  Communist  rule 
any  economic  or  military  assistance.  Furthermore  I  would 
break  oil'  diplomatic  relations  with  them. 


THE   COMMUNIST   PROGRAM   FOR   WORILD    CONQUEST  3 

In  suggesting  these  ideas  to  the  committee,  I  wish  to  em- 
phasize that  I  am  not  an  isolationist.  No  country  can  isolate 
itself  from  the  world  today.  If  this  be  a  fact,  the  United 
States  should  participate  in  international  developments  and 
relations  with  intelligence,  always  mindful  of  the  fact  that 
we  must  be  actuated  by  self-respect. 

In  other  words,  every  step  that  we  take  should  protect  our 
security  and  our  economy.  Let  us  be  realistic  and  under- 
stand that  all  other  countries  conduct  their  foreign  policies 
in  that  manner. 

Despite  the  apparent  changes  in  Soviet  tactics,  the  ultimate  objec- 
tives of  communism  are  unchangeable.  General  Wedemeyer  declared  i 

The  objectives  of  the  Soviet  are  clearly  stated  in  the  Com- 
munist Manifesto  and  again  developed  in  the  two  volumes 
of  Das  Kapital  by  Karl  Marx.  These  Soviet  objectives  are 
available  for  the  public  to  read.  Hitler  announced  to  the 
world  in  the  same  unmistakable  manner  his  objectives  in  a 
book,  Mein  Kampf.  But  no  one  paid  any  attention  to  Hit- 
ler's attempt  to  warn  the  world  of  his  intentions.  I  wonder 
if  we  are  paying  sufficient  attention  to  the  Communist  objec- 
tives? The  overall,  clearly  announced  objective  of  interna- 
tional communism  is  to  free  the  proletariat  from  exploitation 
by  the  bourgeoisie.  The  masses  are  to  be  protected  from 
the  scheming  capitalists.    The  world  is  to  be  communized. 

There  is  no  possibility  of  compromise  with  the  Soviet  Union  and 
world  communism.  General  Wedemeyer  asserted,  inasmuch  as  "kill, 
lie,  distort,  torture — all  are  fully  justified  in  the  Soviet  conscience 
because  they  are  so  dedicated  to  the  attainment  of  Marxian,  Leninist, 
or  Stalinist  objectives." 


22858* 


THE  COMMUNIST  PROGRAM  FOR  WORLD  CONQUEST 


TUESDAY,  JANUARY  21,   1958 

United  States  House  of  Representatives, 

Committee  on  Un-American  Activities, 

Washington^  D.  0. 

The  Committee  on  Un-American  Activities  met,  pursuant  to  call,  at 
10  a.  m.,  in  room  225,  Old  House  Office  Building,  Washington,  D.  C, 
Hon.  Clyde  Doyle,  presiding. 

Committee  members  present:  Representatives  Francis  E.  Walter, 
of  Pennsylvania,  chairman  of  the  committee  (appearance  as  noted) ; 
Clyde  Doyle,  of  California ;  Bernard  W.  Kearney,  of  New  York ;  and 
Gordon  H.  Scherer,  of  Ohio. 

Staff  members  present :  Richard  Arens,  staff  director,  and  William 
F.  Heimlich,  consultant. 

Mr.  DoTLE.  In  the  absence  of  the  distinguished  committee  chairman, 
Francis  E.  Walter,  temporarily,  I  am  calling  the  meeting  to  order. 

We  are  favored  this  morning  with  the  testimony  of  Gen.  Albert  C. 
Wedemeyer. 

We  appreciate  very  much.  General,  your  being  with  us. 

What  is  the  first  order  of  business,  Mr.  Arens  ? 

Mr.  Arens.  If  you  please,  Mr.  Chairman,  I  would  suggest  that  the 
general  might  for  our  record,  at  this  time,  give  a  brief  sketch  of  his 
career. 

Mr.  Kearney.  May  I  interrupt,  please.  Is  it  necessary  that  the 
general  be  sworn? 

Mr.  Arens.  It  has  not  been  the  practice  of  the  committee  to  swear 
persons  who  are  in  consultation  on  international  communism  as  distinct 
from  persons  who  might  be  testifying  for  the  purpose  of  identifying 
persons. 

Mr.  Kearney.  In  other  words,  you  mean  the  general  is  not  going  to 
take  the  fifth  amendment. 

Mr.  Arens.  I  do  not  anticipate  so. 

General  Wedemeyer.  I  would  gladly  be  sworn  if  you  want  me  to  be. 

Mr.  Kearney.  No. 

Mr.  Doyle.  I  think  no  doubt  the  record  will  show  the  committee 
members  present. 

Mr.  Arens.  I  respectfully  suggest,  General,  you  might  give  us  the 
highlights  of  your  most  distinguished  career. 

GEN.  ALBERT  C.  WEDEMEYEE,  UNITED  STATES  ARMY  (RETIRED) 

General  Wedemeyer.  My  name  is  Albert  C.  Wedemeyer.  I  am  a 
retired  general  of  the  United  States  Army.  My  career  in  the  Army 
included  cadet  service  at  West  Point,  lieutenant  in  June  1919,  and  the 

5 


6  THE    COMMUNIST   PROGRAM    FOR   WORLD    CONQUEST 

usual  eomjiany  and  field  grades  in  the  infantry  and  finally  reached 
general  oflicer  rank  in  1942. 

After  I  completed  2  years  at  the  United  States  Army  staff  school 
at  Fort  Ijoavenworth,  I  was  assigned  as  a  student  by  the  War  Depart- 
ment to  the  German  War  College  located  in  13erlin,  Germany.  This 
experience  of  2i/^  years  as  a  student  and  resident  in  Germany  greatly 
stimulated  my  interest  in  international  developments. 

i\rr.  Sen  EUER.  What  year  was  tliat,  General  Wedemeyer  ? 

General  Wedemeyer.  I  Avas  in  Germany  from  July  1936  to  October 
1938,  which  of  course  were  very  eventful  years  in  central  Europe. 
During  that  period  nazism  was  at  its  peak  in  power.  While  in  Ger- 
many I  met  many  of  the  Nazi  leaders,  including  Hess,  Goering,  and 
Goebbels,  and  of  course  I  was  thrown  in  contact  even  more  with  the 
senior  military  leaders  as  well  as  the  military  officers  at  the  German 
War  College,  both  students  and  instructors.  For  example,  Jodl,  who 
later  became  Hitler's  strategic  adviser  with  the  rank  of  colonel  gen- 
eral, was  my  instructor.  Count  Klaus  von  Stauffenburg,  the  oflicer 
who  placed  a  bomb  under  a  desk  in  an  abortive  attempt  to  kill  Hitler 
on  July  20, 19-44,  was  my  classmate  in  the  German  War  College.  Von 
Stauffenberg  was  a  very  unusual  man — intelligent,  courageous — and  I 
considered  him  a  good  friend.  All  of  these  contacts  and  the  oppor- 
tunity of  reading  and  hearing  about  nazism,  fascism,  and  communism 
aroused  my  curiosity.  I  tried  to  understand  the.  conditions  that  stim- 
ulated or  generated  those  "isms,"  and  made  it  possible  for  their  propo- 
nents to  gain  the  attention  and  ofttimes  the  fanatic  support  of  so  many 
people.  Obviously  these  were  unique  opportunities  to  observe  and 
ex))(^rience  momentous  events  leading  up  to  World  War  II. 

The  instruction  at  the  German  War  College  was  far  superior  to  that 
which  I  experienced  at  our  own  staff  school  at  Leavenworth.  Tlie 
students  in  Germany  were  required  to  study  history  and  were 
thoroughly  grounded  in  the  fundamentals  of  military  science,  tactics, 
and  strategy. 

At  the  conclusion  of  my  service  in  Germany,  I  submitted  an  official 
report  to  the  War  De])artment.  The  Chief  of  Staff  of  our  Army  at 
that  time  was  Gen.  Malin  Craig. 

Mr.  SciiERER.  What  was  your  rank  at  that  time  ? 

General  AVEDE:NrEYER.  I  was  a  captain.  I  was  17  years  a  lieutenant. 
This  may  seem  unusiuil  but  in  prewar  days  promotion  was  very  slow. 
After  World  War  II  began,  promotion  was  rapid.  Upon  my  return 
from  duty  in  Germany,  I  was  assigned  to  troop  duty  at  Fort  Benning 
and  then  after  1  year  there  I  was  brought  into  the  War  Plans  Division 
of  the  General  Staff  in  Washington.  In  this  assignment  I  assisted 
in  the  preparation  of  our  strategy,  and  during  the  first  few  years  of 
the  war  I  attended  world  conferences  in  London,  Washington,  Casa- 
blanca, Cairo,  and  Quebec  with  General  Marshall.  In  September 
1943  I  was  assigned  to  duty  in  the  Southeast  Asia  Command  with 
Admiral  Mountbatten  and  then  a  year  later,  1944, 1  was  sent  to  China 
to  relieve  General  Stilwell  as  theater  commander.  I  held  that  post 
imtil  May  of  1946  when  the  theater  was  disbanded.  I  returned  to  the 
States  ostensibly  to  be  Ambassador  to  China.  Mr.  Truman  had  asked 
me  to  accept  that  post  after  General  Hurley  resigned  in  the  fall  of 
1945.  General  Marshall  urged  me  to  do  so  and  I  agreed.  However, 
the  news  concerning  my  prospective  appointment  as  Ambassador  to 
China  leaked  in  that  part  of  the  world.    General  Marshall  at  the  time 


THE   COMMUNIST   PROGRAM   FOR   WORI.D    CONQUEST  7 

was  conducting  delicate  negotiations  involving  Nationalists  and  Com- 
munists, and  apparently  he  felt  that  the  news  of  my  appointment  was 
militating  against  the  success  of  his  negotiations,  particularly  because 
the  Communists  objected  violently.  Accordingly  General  Marshall 
radioed  to  President  Truman  requesting  the  appointment  of  Dr^ 
Leighton  Stuart,  an  American  missionary  living  in  China.  In  that 
radiogram  he  asked  that  General  Wedemeyer  be  notified  that  he  would 
be  appointed  later. 

Mr.  Arens.  General,  would  you  give  us  a  thumbnail  sketch  of  the 
functions  you  performed  in  World  War  II  in  strategy  and  policy  for 
the  global  operations  of  the  United  States  ? 

General  Wedemeyer.  Yes;  shortly  after  my  return  from  Europe 
and  immediately  prior  to  World  War  II,  I  was  assigned  to  the  Gen- 
eral Staff,  War  Plans  Division,  and  by  the  spring  of  1942  I  was  put 
in  charge  of  the  strategic  policy  and  plans  group.  This  group  had 
the  responsibility  of  conducting  strategic  studies,  evolving  plans  for 
the  employment  of  our  forces  and  coordinating  our  war  effort  with 
allies.  Our  objective  was  to  insure  that  the  military  effort  would 
protect  America's  interests  and  accomplish  our  objectives  at  home  and 
abroad. 

To  state  this  point  in  another  way,  I  felt  that  it  was  very  important 
at  war's  end  to  insure  that  Anglo-American  forces  would  be  occupying 
most  of  Western  Europe  and  the  Balkans.  Some  of  us  recognized  the 
danger  of  international  communism  and,  although  the  Soviet  Union 
was  an  ally,  we  wanted  to  insure  that  the  Communist  forces  could  not 
fill  the  vacua  created  by  killing  and  destruction  during  the  course 
of  the  war  throughout  Europe. 

Most  of  us  interpreted  nazism  as  a  strong  nationalist  movement 
whereas  we  felt  that  communism  was  an  international  movement  sup- 
ported by  a  worldwide  conspiratorial  effort.  As  we  viewed  it  then, 
nazism  would  take  unfair  advantage^  would  subvert  or  conquer  areas 
in  their  narrow,  strongly  nationalistic  interests,  whereas  communism 
was  worldwide  in  scope  and  visualized  the  enslavement  or  conquering 
of  all  peoples. 

Mr.  Arens.  With  that  brief  personal  sketch  on  the  record,  may  we 
ask  you  to  give  your  characterization  or  appraisal  of  the  struggle  of 
the  world  today  as  between  the  East  and  the  West  ? 

General  Wedemeyer.  In  the  first  instance  I  think  that  the  West 
is  overshadowed  by  international  communism.  I  think  that  com- 
munism is  gaining  instead  of  losing  strength  in  the  world.  You  are 
familiar  with  history  and  therefore  all  of  you  realize  that  a  struggle 
between  nations  and  peoples  haS  always  been  going  on. 

There  is  nothing  new  about  such  struggle,  but  we  Americans  after 
World  War  II  were  either  naive,  or  too  trusting.  There  is  consider- 
able evidence  to  prove  that  there  were  malicious  influences  in  key 
places  of  our  Government.  But  any  one  or  a  combination  of  these  cir- 
cumstances permitted  a  critical  situation  to  develop  after  World  War 
II,  namely,  the  Soviet  emerged  all  powerful — and  our  war  aims  for 
which  we  sacrificed  so  much  were  not  accomplished. 

We  continued  to  give  vast  sums  of  money  and  materials  and  even 
our  moral  support  alter  the  war  to  the  Soviet  Union  and  her  satellites. 
In  other  words,  communism  gained  its  position  as  a  world  power 
through  our  own  lack  of  appreciation  of  the  dangers  inherent  in 
communism. 


8  THE    COMMUNIST    PROGRAM    FOR    WORLD    CONQUEST 

You  gentlemen  may  have  more  knowledge  than  I  do  about  the  re- 
sponsibility for  these  developments.  Today  communism,  in  my  judg- 
ment, is  increasing  in  its  influence  and  strength,  not  only  in  the  militai-y 
field  but  in  scientific  accomplishments.     Sputnik  is  just  one  example. 

Several  years  a^o  they  had  a  fighter  plane — the  MIG-15 — that  was 
superior  to  our  Saner  Jets  in  Korea.  These  planes  could  outmaneuver 
our  fighter  aircraft  and  reach  higher  altitudes.  Recently  they  devel- 
oped an  icebreaker  with  atomic  power.  In  their  schooling,  their  edu- 
cational system,  one  cannot  help  but  be  impressed  by  the  number  of 
engineers  and  applied  scientists  they  have  trained.  In  pure  science 
as  well  as  api)lica  science  they  seem  to  be  ahead  of  us. 

The  Soviets  have  been  improving  steadily  and  they  have  even  forged 
ahead  in  many  fields — education,  production,  technology,  sciences, 
athletics,  for  example. 

If  I  were  the  senior  planner  in  the  Soviet  hierarchy,  I  would  advise 
Khrushchev :  "Continue  to  do  exactly  what  you  are  doinj;  now.  Do 
not  involve  the  Soviet  Union  in  a  major  war  but  employ  the  satellites 
in  brush  fires  or  limited  wars  against  our  enemies,  the  capitalist  coun- 
tries. Continue  penetration,  economically  and  psychologically,  utilize 
economic  or  military  aid  to  as  many  countries  in  the  world  as  possible. 
They  can  be  made  indebted  to  the  Soviet,  and  if  not  loyal,  at  least  they 
will  not  be  opposed  to  the  Communist  movement." 

One  could  cite  numerous  examples  of  their  clever  use  of  the  economic 
aid  as  a  strategic  weapon. 

Mr.  Arens.  As  we  look  at  the  other  side  of  the  coin,  what  do  you 
believe  to  be  the  global  strategy  of  the  Soviets? 

General  Wedemeyer.  I  do  not  believe  that  they  intend  to  precipitate 
an  all-out  war.  I  have  not  felt  that  war  was  imminent  at  any  time 
since  "World  "War  II  even  when  there  were  incidents  that  might  have 
easily  touched  off  a  world  struggle.  You  may  recall  the  Berlin  air- 
lift, for  example.  There  have  been  many  other  incidents  that  could 
have  started  a  war  if  the  Soviets  had  any  desire  to  start  an  all-out 
war.  They  will  continue  to  spread  communism  utilizing  economic 
and  psychological  weapons. 

Mr.  SciiERER.  Mr.  Chairman,  may  I  ask  a  question  that  I  think  is 
pertinent  right  at  this  point? 

Mr.  Doyle.  Yes. 

Mr.  ScHERER.  You  say  Russia  is  not  interested  in  precipitating — or 
you  do  not  believe  they  will  precipitate  a  world  war  or  struggle.  Is 
it  because  they  have  made  so  much  progress  without  such  a  war  that 
you  do  not  believe  that  they  will  precipitate  us  into  another  world  war? 

General  "Wedeiieyer.  Yes ;  I  think  that  is  a  sound  conclusion.  JNfay 
I  just  explain  to  you  my  concept  of  strategy,  in  lay  language. 
The  term  "strategy"  disturbs  many  people  just  as  the  word  "propa- 
ganda" does.  I  define  "strategy"  as  the  art  and  science  of  usin<T  all 
of  a  nation's  available  resources  to  accomplish  national  objectives. 
There  are  four  major  categories  of  resources:  political,  economic, 
psychological,  and  military.  If  the  first  three  of  these  resources — tliat 
is,  political,  economic,  and  psychological — are  employed  intelligently 
and  boldly  in  consonance  with  a  well-thought-out  plan,  it  may  never 
be  necessary  to  use  actively  our  military  force.  Obviously  that  is 
exactly  what  we  should  do  at  all  times — prevent  war  and  yet  accom- 
plish our  national  aims.    But  we  must  retain  military  force — appro- 


THE   COMMUNIST   PROGRAM   FOR  WORLD    CONQUEST  9 

priate  in  strength  and  composition  to  our  possible  need  in  emergency. 
In  our  commmiities  we  employ  the  police  to  maintain  order  and  to 
protect  people  who  respect  the  law  against  those  who  would  violate 
it.  In  the  international  arena  we  must  do  likewise,  only  calling  on  the 
military  when  all  other  means  fail  to  accomplish  our  purposes. 

Mr.  ScHERER.  The  Soviets  have  been  very  successful  in  using  these 
first  three  resources. 

General  Wedemeyer.  In  my  opinion,  yes. 

Mr.  Arens.  I  think  you  may  want  to  clarify  the  record.  The  Con- 
gressman asked  you  about  a  war.  I  am  sure  he  had  in  mind  a  shooting 
war  in  which  guns  and  missiles  would  be  employed.  Is  there  any 
doubt  in  your  mind  but  what  the  Soviet  Union  and  her  satellites  are 
presently  engaged  in  war,  with  the  United  States  as  their  No.  1  target? 

General  Wedemeyer.  We  associate  shooting  and  the  employment  of 
military  force  with  war.  When  we  employ  the  other  three  resources — 
political,  economic,  and  psychological — I  term  such  employment  not  in 
the  sense  of  war  but  as  a  struggle  going  on  with  other  nations. 

Mr.  Arens.  What  is  the  objective  of  the  Soviet  Union  and  its 
satellites  ? 

General  Wedemeyer.  The  objectives  of  the  Soviet  are  clearly  stated 
in  the  Communist  Manifesto  and  again  developed  in  the  two  volumes 
of  Das  Kafital  by  Karl  Marx.  These  Soviet  objectives  are  available 
for  the  public  to  read.  Hitler  announced  to  the  world  in  the  same 
unmistakable  manner  his  objectives  in  a  book,  Mein  Kamff.  But  no 
one  paid  any  attention  to  Hitler's  attempt  to  warn  the  world  of  his 
intentions.  I  wonder  if  we  are  paying  sufficient  attention  to  the  Com- 
munist objectives?  The  overall,  clearly  announced  objective  of  inter- 
national communism  is  to  free  the  proletariat  from  exploitation  by  the 
bourgeoisie.  The  masses  are  to  be  protected  from  the  scheming 
capitalists.    The  world  is  to  be  communized. 

Mr.  Kearney.  General,  you  answered,  as  I  understand  it,  that  Rus- 
sia at  the  present  time  does  not  want  to  have  a  shooting  war  % 

General  Wedemeyer.  I  do  not  believe  they  do,  sir. 

Mr.  Kearney.  Is  that  due  to  the  fact  that  Russia  is  obtaining  its 
objeetives  without  a  shooting  war,  or  is  it  due  to  the  fact  that  they  do 
not  trust  their  satellites  ? 

General  Wedemeyer.  It  is  due  primarily  to  the  fact  that  they  are 
attaining  their  objectives  without  the  use  of  military  force.  It  is  true 
that  they  are  compelled  to  accei)t  reverses  at  times  in  particular  areas 
but  they  invariaoly  are  making  headway  in  some  other  areas. 
Furthermore,  although  they  may  suffer  a  setback  in  a  specific  area, 
later  on  they  conduct  their  plans  in  such  a  way  as  to  recover  their 
losses  and  actually  make  gains  in  that  same  area. 

Mr.  Kearney.  Then  may  I  ask  you,  in  case  of  a  shooting  war,  in 
your  opinion  could  Russia  depend  upon  her  satellites  in  view  of  the 
riots  in  Poland,  the  East  German  June  1953  riots,  and  the  recent 
Hungarian  revolution  ? 

General  Wedemeyer.  It  is  my  opinion  that  the  Soviet  Union  could 
not  depend  upon  her  satellites  or  upon  the  millions  of  oppressed  peo- 
ples within  her  own  borders  in  the  event  of  a  war,  which  would  pro- 
duce opportunities  to  defect  with  a  chance  of  success.  Under  such 
conditions  there  would  be  opportunities  for  the  western  nations  to 
exploit  defections  that  occur  in  the  satellite  countries  and  even  in 


10  THE    CXDMMUlSnST   PROGRAM   FOR   WORLD   CONQUEST 

Russia.  In  connection  M'ith  tlie  attitude  or  the  possible  defection  of 
peoples  behind  the  Iron  Curtain,  may  I  supfgest,  General  Kearney, 
that  vre  consider  extending  our  own  efforts  to  bring  about  and  support 
such  defections.  For  example,  we  are  expending  billions  of  dollars 
for  weapons  that  will  kill  and  destroy.  We  are  assembling  tlie  best 
brains  in  the  country  to  insure  that  we  surpass  other  countries,  partic- 
ularly the  Soviet  Union,  in  the  development  of  ultradestructive  weap- 
ons. But  I,  personally,  would  like  concurrently  to  recommend  the 
collection  of  brains  and  the  expenditure  of  effort — billions  of  dollars, 
if  necessary —  to  find  out  what  we  can  do  to  reach  tlie  minds  of  peoples 
behind  the  Iron  Curtain,  to  win  their  loyalties  and  sympathetic  under- 
standing, and  thus  avoid  the  possibility  of  a  destructive  thermonuclear 
war.  There  are  two  points  that  we  must  make  crystal  clear  to  our 
potential  enemies,  neutrals,  and  friends :  First,  that  we  are  sincere  in 
our  desire  for  peace  and  in  our  willingness  to  cooperate  realistically 
to  protect  the  freedoms  and  improve  opportunities  of  the  individual 
of  any  clime,  race,  or  creed;  and  second,  that  we  are  determined  to  use 
every  resource  at  our  command  to  destroy  communism,  or  any  other 
"ism''  that  jeopardizes  peace  in  the  world.  Unless  we  undertake  suc- 
cessfully such  an  approach  to  our  international  problems,  civilization 
as  we  know  it  will  be  retarded  at  least  a  thousand  years.  Let's  put 
constructive  ideas  instead  of  hydrogen  bombs  in  the  nose  cone  of  our 
missiles. 

Mr.  Kearnky.  With  that  I  thoroughly  agree.  When  you  speak  as 
you  do  about  the  best  brains  now  trying  to  figure  out  ways  and  means 
of  bringing  into  being  weapons  that  can  win  a  shooting  war,  we  have 
only  to  go  back  to  your  original  statement  that  after  World  War  II  we 
just  practically  disbanded  the  greatest  fighting  force  in  the  world 
while  Russia,  without  the  loss  of  a  Russian  soldier,  took  over  about 
800  million  people. 

General  Wedemeyer.  General  Kearney,  we  had  plenty  of  evidence 
before  and  during  AVorld  War  II  of  the  recalcitrance  of  the  Soviet 
Union,  of  their  motives,  and  their  unscrupulous  arrogant  methods. 
They  at  all  times  had  their  selfish  interests  in  mind  and  would  not  co- 
operate except  when  it  would  be  advantageous  to  them,  and  to  them 
alone.  As  a  strategic  planner  on  the  General  Staff  in  Washington 
during  the  early  days  of  the  war,  I  frequently  contacted  Russian  rep- 
resentatives and  asked  them  where,  when,  and  how  they  planned  to  use 
the  equipment  that  they  were  demanding  or  requisitioning  from  us — 
for  example,  airplanes,  tanks,  guns,  thousands  of  tons  of  equipment  of 
all  kinds.  We  were  pouring  war  supplies  into  the  Soviet  Union,  often 
at  great  sacrifice  to  our  own  forces  which  we  were  generating  here  at 
home  and  preparing  for  shipment  to  prosi^ective  areas  of  employment 
against  the  enemy.  But  General  Kearney,  the  Russian  representatives 
would  not  cooperate  with  regard  to  explaining  where  and  wlien  they 
intended  to  use  the  munitions  we  were  shipping  to  them.  In  fact  they 
were  very  cool  and  even  suspicious  when  one  approached  them  con- 
cerning any  problem.  They  refused  to  give  any  indication  of  their 
prospective  plans  in  fighting  the  Germans  yet  they  were  supposed  to 
be  an  ally.  I  tried  to  explain  carefully  my  purpose  in  determining 
where,  how,  and  when  they  would  use  the  tanks,  airplanes,  and  so 
forth,  against  the  common  enemy.  For  example,  I  had  to  recommend 
to  General  ^Marshall  priorities  for  allocation  of  the  equipment,  not 


THE   COMMUNIST  PROGRAM  FOR  WORLD   CONQUEST  11 

only  to  Russia  but  to  England  and  other  allies.  If  England  could 
use  the  tanks  more  effectively  and  more  quickly  against  the  enemy, 
it  seemed  to  me  that  she  should  get  higher  priority.  I  mentioned  my 
difficulty  in  this  regard  to  General  Marshall  and  to  Harry  Hopkins, 
as  well  as  to  others  in  positions  of  responsibility  but  got  nowhere. 
One  of  the  ablest  men  in  the  State  Department,  Mr.  Loy  Henderson, 
considered  an  expert  in  dealing  with  Russia,  attempted  to  help  me. 
He  recognized  the  importance  of  allocating  our  war  materiels  on  the 
basis  of  its  most  effective  use  against  the  enemy.  But  the  Soviet 
representatives  would  not  cooperate  in  any  respect. 

Mr.  Arens.  May  I  ask  you,  General,  concerning  the  instruments 
of  national  policy  which  you  described :  Do  you  feel  that  the  Soviet 
Union  uses  these  instruments  effectively  in  its  designs  for  world  con- 
quest ? 

General  Wedemeyer.  Yes,  I  do.  They  use  economic  and  psycho- 
logical weapons  most  effectively.  We  know  that  the  Soviet  Union  does 
not  honor  any  treaty  or  agreement  unless  advantage  accrues  to  them. 
They  have  been  very  clever  in  penetrating  in  various  countries  the 
Department  of  Interior,  which  is  really  the  department  responsible  for 
internal  security  matters.  After  the  Communists  obtain  control  of  the 
secret  police  and  administrative  setup  of  the  security  department,  they 
can  easily  take  over  the  government  by  intimidating  or  removing  re- 
sponsible officials  in  other  departments.  Czechoslovakia  is  an  example 
of  this  technique,  but  similar  tactics  were  employed  in  Hungary  and 
throughout  the  Balkan  States.  Lithuania,  Estonia,  and  Latvia  were 
overpowered  quickly  and  brought  into  the  Soviet  Union  against  the 
will  of  the  inhabitants. 

We  have  wonderful  opportunities  in  the  struggle  against  comrnu- 
nism  if  we  would  use  our  economic  weapon  intelligently.  In  helping 
other  peoples  economically  we  should  be  careful  not  to  do  so  on  a 
charity  basis.  Such  an  approach  makes  the  recipient  or  beneficiary 
lose  his  self-respect.  Outright  charity  undermines  the  moral  fiber 
of  an  individual  or  of  a  nation.  But  we  can  provide  economic  or  tech- 
nical aid  in  such  a  manner  as  to  enable  the  recipient  peoples  to  help 
themselves  and  even  make  it  possible  for  them  to  return  or  pay  back  our 
largess.  One  cannot  help  but  pay  tribute  to  the  brave  and  self- 
respecting  Finns.  They  were  the  only  people  who  paid  their  World 
War  I  debt  to  the  United  States.  All  other  so-called  allies,  the 
recipients  of  our  loans  and  aid  in  other  forms,  reneged. 

Mr.  Kearney.  And  we  kicked  the  Finns  in  the  pants  later. 

General  Wedemeyer.  YeSj  we  did,  very  much  as  we  turned  our  backs 
on  loyal  allies,  the  Nationalist  Chinese,  after  World  War  II.  May  I 
give  you  a  concrete  example  of  the  manner  in  which  the  Russians  use 
the  economic  weapon  in  their  campaign  to  control  and  communize 
other  countries  ? 

Some  few  years  back  the  Egyptians  wanted  to  buy  wheat  from  the 
United  States.  The  Egyptian  Ambassador  negotiated  here  in  Wash- 
ington with  appropriate  officials.  Nothing  came  of  the  negotiations 
and  as  time  went  on  the  Egyptian  Government  continued  to  prompt 
its  Ambassador  to  do  something  about  it.  However,  he  was  unable  to 
get  a  definitive  answer  from  anyone  in  authority  in  the  State  Depart- 
ment. The  Egyptians  were  perfectly  willing  to  pay  for  the  wheat  in 
dollars  and  they  sorely  needed  it  for  their  people.    Finally  in  some 

22858°— 5S 3 


12  THE    (COMMUNIST   PROGRAM    FOR   WORLD    CONQUEST 

unknown  manner  the  Soviet  Union  learned  of  the  Egyptian  attempt 
to  get  wheat  from  the  United  States.  This  Avas  not  understood  by 
the  Egyptian  Ambassador  or  his  Government  for  all  of  the  negotia- 
tions had  been  conducted  in  the  utmost  secrecy  with  United  States 
officials.  In  a  short  time  the  Soviet  Union  offered  the  Egyptian 
Government  all  the  wheat  it  would  require,  and  at  tirst  there  were  no 
strings  attached.  Gradually,  however,  the  quality  of  the  wheat  de- 
teriorated and  there  were  other  disagreeable  features  injected  by  the 
Soviet  Union.  This  cooperative  action  on  the  part  of  the  Soviet 
Union  was  known  by  all  of  the  Egyptians  and  was,  of  course,  inter- 
preted as  a  friendly  gesture  by  them.  Further,  the  Soviet  Union 
agents  in  Egypt  made  it  their  duty  to  insure  that  all  of  tlie  Egyptians 
were  told  that  the  United  States  refused  to  sell  wheat  to  tlie  Egyptian 
Government  and  the  Soviet  Union  voluntarily  came  forward  and 
provided  the  wheat.  Then  we  wonder  why  people  do  not  know  about, 
or  seem  to  misinterpret,  our  actions  and  policies. 

Another  feature  of  the  Soviet  tactics  in  using  the  economic  weapon : 
Before  Khrushchev  or  Bulganin  visit  a  foreign  country,  the  Soviet 
Union  usually  makes  some  favorable  economic  gesture  to  that  country. 
Then  they  insure  that  all  of  the,  people  are  informed  of  the  great 
Comnninist  largess — the  role  of  helping  the  poor  people.  When 
Khrushchev  or  Bulganin  arrive,  of  course  they  are  the  recipients  of 
praise,  gratitude,  and  extraordinary  manifestation  of  friendship.  On 
the  other  hand,  Ave  Americans,  apparently,  do  nothing  to  mform 
people  of  the  aid  that  we  are  giving  to  them  directly  or  indirectly 
througli  their  government.  The  timing  of  our  aid  apparently  is  never 
coordinated  with  a  visit  of  one  of  our  officials.  It  seems  to  me  that 
■we  have  no  plan  in  this  connection  and  there  apparently  is  no  agency 
of  the  Government  responsible  for  coordination  of  our  efforts  in  the 
political,  economic,  and  psychological  fields. 

I  think  it  is  contemplated  that  the  National  Security  Council  exer- 
cise overall  supervision  of  these  activities  which  we  have  been  dis- 
cussing this  morning,  particularly  the  coordination  of  military 
and  economic  aid  to  friendly  nations,  the  Avorldwide  information 
program,  including  the  dissemination  of  overt  and  covert  propaganda, 
and  finally  the  use  of  trade  agreements  and  political  alliances  to 
strengthen  our  position  vis-a-vis  potential  enemies.  But  I  do  not 
feel  that  the  National  Security  Council  is  the  proper  agency  for  such 
supervision  because  it  com])rises  individuals  who  have  great  responsi- 
bilities in  other  areas.  They  simply  cannot  devote  the  time  neces- 
sary to  function  ])roperly  in  the  National  Security  Council.  For  ex- 
ample, the  President,  the  Secretary  of  State,  the  Secretary  of  Defense 
and  the  head  of  CIA  all  have  day-to-day  administrative  res]ionsibili- 
ties  which  preclude  their  participation  in  the  planning  and  coordi- 
nating of  our  worldwide  policies  and  actions. 

On  the  other  hand,  the  Soviet  Union  apparently  has  an  excellent 
plan  and  organization  through  which  it  is  enjoying  great  success  all 
over  the  world.  The  Russians  are  not  10-foot  men  and  they  have  their 
weaknesses  as  well  as  their  strong  points.  "We  must  not  overemphasize 
their  strength.  We  are  just  as  intellio;ent  as  they  are.  I  think  we 
ere  in  a  weaker  position  today  principally  because  we  have  been  naive 
and  trusting,  as  well  as  somewhat  apathetic  toward  events  occurring 
in  other  parts  of  the  world. 


THE    COMMUNIST   PROGRAM   FOR    WORLD    CONQUEST  13 

Mr.  Kearney.  That  is  true,  General,  but  at  the  same  time  it  is  my 
humble  opinion  that  Russia  has  an  objective  in  mind.  It  seems  to  me, 
and  I  may  be  totally  wrong,  that  most  of  our  people  who  are  engaged 
in  office  work  are  simply  there  because  they  are  drawing  pay.  There 
is  no  plan  as  you  say.  This  goes  way  back  to  the  days  of  UNRRA. 
We  have  never  been  credited  with  doing  the  right  thing  in  the  right 
manner. 

General  Wedemeyer.  I  agree.  Immediately  after  the  war  I  saw 
material  out  in  China  sent  there  by  the  United  States  for  distribution 
by  UNRRA  to  help  the  Chinese.  The  markings  which  would  indicate 
that  this  economic  aid  came  from  the  United  States  had  been  oblit- 
erated, and  the  Russians  had  put  markers  on  the  containers  to  deceive 
the  Chinese  people  into  thinking  that  they,  the  Soviet  Union,  sent  the 
aid.  Later,  when  I  was  in  Iran,  I  learned  officially  that  although 
the  United  States  was  furnishing  large  quantities  of  milk  for  the 
Iranian  children,  the  Soviet  Union  had  given  the  people  of  Iran  the 
impression  that  it  was  the  Communists  who  were  sympathetic  to  the 
needs  of  the  masses  of  people  and  it  was  the  Soviet  Union  that  had  sent 
the  milk  to  their  children.  I  think  this  pattern  was  followed  through- 
out the  world.  We  never  received  credit  for  the  great  humanitarian 
effort  that  we  made  to  restore  and  rehabilitate  the  war-devastated 
areas.  If  there  had  not  been  an  aggressive  country  like  the  Soviet 
Union  with  world-conquering  objectives,  of  course,  we  would  not  have 
been  presented  with  the  problem.  We  must  wake  up  and  insure  that 
our  traditional  generous  efforts  to  help  others  are  understood  and 
that  the  Soviet  Union  does  not  get  credit  for  the  sacrifices  that  we 
are  making. 

Mr.  Kearney.  Is  it  because  we  have  people  in  our  agencies  overseas 
who  do  not  seem  to  care  so  long  as  they  have  a  job  or  are  being  enter- 
tained and  wined  and  dined,  or  is  it  because  the  State  Department  here 
does  not  put  its  foot  down  and  does  not  have  an  overall  plan  ? 

General  Wedebieyer.  Of  course,  a  breakdown  in  the  functioning  of 
an  organization  is  usually  attributed  to  the  responsible  leaders.  In  my 
judgment  our  leaders  have  not  been  trained  properly  in  international 
negotiations  and  operations.  They  are  just  as  worthy,  honest,  and 
efficient  as  they  are  in  any  other  country  but  they  lack  proper  training 
and  guidance.  When  I  first  came  in  contact  with  the  British  during 
the  war,  I  was  greatly  impressed  with  their  unanimity  of  purpose,  their 
loyalty  to  definite  objectives  or  policies  of  the  British  Commonwealth. 
No  matter  where  I  went  in  the  world  this  was  true.  The  British 
representatives  always  seemed  to  be  knowledgeable  about  their  Com- 
monwealth policies  and  they  loyally  supported  them.  There  was  a 
continuity  and  a  high  degree  of  coordination  in  all  of  their  policies 
and  actions  in  the  international  field.  This  was  not  true  in  our  own 
case.  We  Americans  were  not  sure  about  our  country's  objectives. 
There  was  a  lack  of  coordination  between  the  economic,  the  political, 
the  military,  and  the  psychological  efforts  being  made  by  various 
American  departments  and  agencies. 

Mr.  ScHERER.  You  mean  among  the  Americans  in  the  administra- 
tion of  our  foreign-aid  projects  ? 

General  Wedemeyer.  Yes,  sir.  I  definitely  include  the  administra- 
tion of  our  foreign  aid.  Also,  Mr.  Congressman,  I  mentioned  earlier 
that  I  tried  to  compel  an  ally  (the  Soviet  Union)  to  explain  how  they 


14  THE    COMMUNIST   PROGRAM    FOR   WORLD    CONQUEST 

■were  ^oing  to  use,  and  when  they  planned  to  do  so,  the  equipment  that 
they  were  receiving  from  us.  I  tried  to  compel  the  Soviet  representa- 
tives to  tell  me  but  they  refused.  I  could  not  obtain  the  support  of 
people  higher  up  in  our  own  Government  in  this  regard.  We  had  men 
in  our  own  military  forces  training  with  wooden  guns  because  we  had 
shipped  so  many  of  the  real  weapons  to  the  Soviet  Union.  We  had  a 
great  shortage  of  tanks  and  otner  weapons  which  were  needed  ur- 
gently by  our  troops  undergoing  training.  Yet  we  were  shipping 
almost  indiscriminately  and  without  obtaining  information  as  to  their 
use — tons  and  tons  of  weapons  to  the  Soviet  TTnion. 

Mr.  ScHERER.  When  you  use  the  term  "allies,"  do  you  mean  Russia 
or  all  of  our  allies? 

General  Wedemeyer.  I  mean  all  of  our  allies,  Mr,  Congressman,  in- 
cluding the  British  who  were  also  making  demands  upon  us  for 
equipment.  In  the  early  days  of  the  war,  they  too  were  getting  huge 
quantities  of  critical  materiel  from  us  and  there  was  little  or  no 
coordination  concerning  how  and  when  they  were  going  to  use  such 
equipment  against  the  enemy.  Later  we  were  able  to  obtain  better 
cooperation  from  the  British  but  the  Soviet  Union  never  did  cooperate 
as  a  loyal  ally  should  in  this  or  any  other  regard. 

Mr.  Arens.  In  the  light  of  recent  events,  must  we  assume  that  the 
Soviet  Union  has  reached  parity  with  the  United  States  in  military 
capabilities? 

General  Wedemeyer.  I  think  the  Soviet  Union  has  greater  military 
capabilities  than  do  we.  This  has  been  true  ever  since  the  end  of 
World  War  II  when  we  emasculated  our  military  forces  and  at  the 
same  time  permitted  the  Soviet  to  retain  a  massive  army,  a  big  navy, 
and  air  force.  At  one  time  we  had  a  technological  advantage,  par- 
ticularly in  the  atomic  weapon  field,  which  served  as  a  deterrent. 

Mr.  Arens.  How  do  these  comparative  capabilities  affect  our  re- 
lationship with  allied  nations  with  whom  we  have  mutual  defense 
treaties  in  all  parts  of  the  world  ? 

General  Wedemeyer.  This  situation  should  make  our  allies  rather 
reluctant,  at  least  it  suggests  possible  dangerous  implications  of  co- 
operating with  the  United  StateSj  with  reference  to  accepting  Ameri- 
can forces  and  bases  on  their  territory.  For  example,  I  would  under- 
stand a  British  policy  of  excluding  Americans  from  the  British  Isles 
in  the  event  of  an  emergency.  At  present  American  bases  located 
there  may  not  precipitate  a  war  and  they  may  even  serve  as  a  so-called 
deterrent.  In  other  words,  the  Soviet  Union  probably  will  not  start 
military  attacks  until  they  have  absolute  assurance  that  they  have 
supremacy,  including  the  power  to  neutralize  military  installations 
in  the  British  Isles.  But  I  would  like  to  remind  you  aoout  an  earlier 
statement  I  made  this  morning  to  the  effect  that  in  my  judgment  the 
Soviet  leaders  will  not  precipitate  an  all-out  war. 

Mr.  Arens.  You  mean  a  shooting  war  ? 

General  Wedemeyer.  Yes,  I  do.  It  is  my  conviction  that  the  Soviet 
Union  will  continue  to  intensify  its  efforts  in  the  economic,  psychologi- 
cal, and  political  fields.  Unless  and  until  they  are  conironted  wilh 
intelligent,  coordinated  action  on  our  part  in  those  same  fields,  the 
Soviet  Union  will  continue  to  enjoy  success  everywhere.  They  have 
the  initiative  now  in  all  fields  of  strategy.  I  feel  certain  that  they 
will  not  resort  to  the  use  of  military  force  unless  compelled  to  do  so. 


THE    COMMUNIST   PROGRAM   FOR   WORLD   CONQUEST  15 

Of  course,  gentlemen,  no  one  can  predict  what  might  happen  in  a 
state  with  a  chief  executive  like  Khrushchev  who  I  understand  gets 
very  drunk  on  occasion.  If  these  reports  be  true,  he  could  under- 
standably be  impulsive,  arrogant,  and  at  time  irresponsible.  In  such 
a  mood  he  might  take  precipitous  action  which  would  touch  off  a 
global  war.  However,  under  normal  conditions  in  my  judgment 
there  will  not  be  a  shooting  war  for  some  time  to  come. 

Mr.  Arens.  How  late  is  it  on  the  Soviet  timetable  for  world 
domination  ? 

General  Wedemeyer.  From  our  viewpoint? 

Mr.  Arens.  Yes,  sir. 

General  Wedemeyer.  Several  years  ago  when  I  was  still  in  the  mili- 
tary service  I  testified  before  a  congressional  committee  to  the  effect 
that  I  thought  it  was  then  too  late. 

Mr.  Arens.  Do  you  think  it  is  too  late  now  ? 

General  Wedemeyer.  Yes,  sir. 

Mr.  Arens.  That  is  your  honest  judgment.  General,  as  a  military 
man  who  has  served  his  nation  in  the  very  top  echelon  of  global 
planning  ? 

General  Wedemeyer.  Yes,  sir.  That  was  my  viewpoint  several 
years  ago  when  I  testified  before  congressional  committees  to  that 
effect.  It  is  still  my  viewpoint.  However,  I  am  not  completely  pes- 
simistic about  our  chances  to  recover  a  sufficiently  strong  strategic 
posture  vis-a-vis  the  Soviet.  If  we  make  a  careful  analysis  of  all  of 
the  countries  which  endanger  our  position,  evaluate  their  capabilities 
and  their  limitations,  and  then  determine  how  much  assistance,  real- 
istic or  passive,  that  we  might  expect  from  allies,  and  finally  consider 
our  own  potential  strength,  I  think  that  we  would  find  our  position  in 
the  world  is  not  without  hope,  in  fact  we  would  be  most  optimistic  if 
we  could  foresee  the  coordinated  employment  of  all  the  positive  forces 
that  we  have  on  our  side  to  counter  our  potential  enemies  and  to  over- 
come obstacles  offered  by  them  to  the  attainment  of  our  objectives.  I 
have  confidence  in  American  ingenuity,  in  our  courage,  and  in  our 
capacity  to  plan  intelligently  if  we  are  only  provided  the  direction 
from  responsible  leaders.  But  we  must  bring  about  concerted  action 
to  attain  our  goals  and  stop  the  indiscriminate  and  uncoordinated  use 
of  our  political,  economic,  psychological,  and  military  forces. 

Mr.  Arens.  General,  may  I  now  invite  your  attention  to  each  of 
the  several  principal  areas  of  the  world  for  your  appraisal  of  the 
designs  and  objectives  that  the  Soviets  have  in  each  of  them.  First 
of  all,  I  invite  your  attention  to  the  Middle  East.  What  are  the  de- 
signs, objectives,  techniques,  and  strategy  of  the  international  Com- 
munist operation  there  ? 

General  Wedemeyer.  I  have  mentioned  earlier,  in  fact  repeatedly 
this  morning,  that  every  nation  has  four  instruments  of  national 
policy  available  to  use  in  connection  with  the  attainment  of  its  na- 
tional objectives.  I  have  also  stated  that  the  Soviet  Union  has  used 
these  instruments  intelligently,  and  no  doubt  in  consonance  with 
an  overall  plan.  As  Congressman  Kearney  earlier  pointed  out  in 
one  of  his  questions,  the  Soviet  Union  has  an  objective.  Further- 
more, may  I  state  that  aU  of  the  subordinates  in  the  Soviet  Union 
are  knowledgeable  about  and  are  working  continuously,  resorting  to 
any  means,  to  attain  those  objectives.    Now  in  applying  these  ideas 


16  THE    COMMUNIST   PROGRAM   FOR   WORLD   CONQUEST 

to  the  Middle  East  in  answer  to  Mr.  Arens'  pointed  question,  I  think 
that  the  Soviet  Union  is  determined  to  alienate  Arab  friendsliip 
for  the  western  peoples.  Militarily  the  Arab  countries  are  not  very 
important.  Economically  the  Middle  East  is  of  ffreat  importance, 
particularly  to  the  industries  of  Western  Europe,  for  there  exists  in 
the  Middle  East  the  great  reserve  of  black  gold — oil.  To  deny  oil  to 
the  western  European  counti-ies  of  course  would  be  a  tremendous  vic- 
tory for  Soviet  objective  of  weakening  the  militaiy  and  economic 
strength  of  the  West.  So  the  Soviet  effort  in  the  economic  field  will 
be  marked  by  loans  to  Middle  East  nations,  by  making  available  sorely 
needed  products,  foodstull's,  machinery,  and  by  negotiating  favorable 
exchanges  in  order  to  alienate  the  trade  of  western  countri&s  and  to  win 
particularly  the  loyalty  or  at  least  the  dependence  or  gratitude  of  the 
recipient  or  beneficiai-y  nations  and  peoples  throughout  the  Middle 
East.  This  emphasizes  my  contention  that  the  Soviet  will  continue 
the  present  policy  of  avoiding  an  all-out  war  while  employing  to  the 
utmost  the  economic  weapons  available  to  them.  In  the  Middle  East 
the  Soviet  could  easily  infiltrate  the  oil  industrieSj  and  even  the  govern- 
ments in  Saudi  Arabia,  Iran,  and  Iraq,  with  a  view  to  sabotagmg  the 
economic  interests  of  western  European  countries. 

Favorable  economic  relations  lead  to  advantages  in  the  psycho- 
logical field.  As  already  mentioned,  many  people  of  the  world  feel 
grateful  to  the  Soviet  Union  because  they  have  been  given  foodstuffs, 
military  arms,  and  other  products,  whereas  they  may  have  been 
refused  this  same  economic  or  military  aid  by  the  United  States. 
Egypt  is  a  good  example,  having  first  applied  to  the  United  States 
for  wheat  which  they  wanted  to  buy  and  pay  for  from  their  own  dol- 
lar account.  I  mentioned  this  case  earlier  today.  The  Soviet  agents 
are  clever  in  exploiting  economic  aid  so  that  they  derive  the  full 
psychological  advantage. 

Mr.  Arens.  How  about  Africa? 

General  Wedemeter.  In  Africa  we  find  undeveloped  resources  that 
are  also  important.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  only  recently  in  the  Sahara 
Desert  oil  has  been  discovered.  It  is  this  important  commodity 
that  is  so  strongly  influencing  the  adamant  attitude  of  the  French  with 
regard  to  giving  complete  autonomy  to  Algeria.  In  Africa  also  we 
find  a  strong  wave  of  nationalism  which  renders  the  timeworn  policy 
of  colonialism  obsolete  or  dangerous  to  pursue.  It  is  in  our  seli- 
interest  to  build  up  stable  and  friendly  relations  with  the  people  of 
all  races  in  Africa.  Also  we  should  be  sympathetic  to  their  desires 
for  self-government.  Militarily  Africa  affords  many  important  air 
and  naval  bases  favorably  situated  in  the  event  of  military  action 
against  the  Soviet  Union.  Economically  there  are  many  products 
which  are  valuable  to  our  own  highly  integrated  industry  including 
rubber,  bauxite,  magnesium,  diamonds,  ivoi*y,  cotton,  and  uranium. 
Incidentally,  gentlemen,  there  is  an  excellent  book  entitled  "Some- 
where South  of  Suez"  by  Douglas  Reed  which  describes  the  develop- 
ments in  Africa  objectively  and  comprehensively. 

Mr.  Arens.  Do  you  believe  that  the  Soviet  Union  in  this  drive  for 
■world  domination  is  bypassing  Western  Europe  and  concentrating 
on  the  Middle  East  or  Far  East,  or  do  you  think  that  Western  Europe 
plays  a  more  important  role  in  the  Communist  designs  for  world 
domination? 


THE   COMMUNIST   PROGRAM   FOR   WORLD   CONQUEST  17 

General  Wedemeyer.  When  a  commander  is  planning  his  scheme 
of  maneuver  in  combat,  he  tries  to  avoid  strength  and  attack  weak- 
ness. He  conducts  probing  operations  in  order  to  discover  weak  areas 
and  then  maneuvers  his  forces  in  order  to  penetrate  such  areas.  This 
provides  the  greatest  chance  of  success  and  also  will  minimize  losses. 
These  tactics  have  been  employed  since  time  immemorial  by  all  mili- 
tary commanders.  The  Soviet  Union  employs  the  same  tactics  in  the 
use  of  economic,  psychological,  and  political  weapons  as  well  as  mili- 
tary. During  World  War  II  we  all  were  aware  of  the  fact  that 
vacua  would  be  created  in  the  course  of  military  operations.  The 
wholesale  killing,  destruction,  dislocations,  and  disruptions  would 
naturally  create  these  vacua  and  as  soon  as  hostilities  ended,  some 
force  would  be  drawn  inevitably  to  fill  them.  Because  we  were 
naive  or  did  not  realize  the  true  objectives  of  the  Soviet  Union,  we 
made  no  attempt  to  fill  the  vacua  with  our  own  forces.  The  Com- 
munists poured  in  agents,  provocateurs,  saboteui^,  and  propagandists 
in  order  to  exert  the  dominating  influence  in  these  war-torn  areas. 
It  was  the  American  planners'  hope  in  the  early  days  of  World  War 
II,  as  I  indicated  earlier,  that  Anglo-American  forces  would  be  in  a 
favorable  position  at  war's  end  to  fill  those  vacua  and  thus  deny  them 
to  the  Communists. 

It  was  the  contention  of  the  American  planners  that  Anglo-Ameri- 
can forces  should  go  across  the  British  Channel  in  1943  and  drive 
eastward  as  rapidly  and  as  far  as  possible.  It  was  felt  that  such  a 
maneuver  would  be  highly  successful  because  the  bulk  of  the  German 
forces  at  that  time  (early  1943)  were  deeply  and  irretrievably  com- 
mitted far  to  the  east  in  the  vast  expanse  of  Eussia.  But  the  per- 
suasive and  articulate  British  leader,  Winston  Churchill,  successfully 
compelled  the  Allies  to  accept  his  strategy  of  scatterization  or  periph- 
ery pecking.^  Anglo- American  forces  executed  time  and  force  con- 
suming and  indecisive  maneuvers  in  the  Mediterranean.  In  the  plan- 
ning phase  the  Americans  opposed  such  operations  and  in  fact  stated 
that  even  if  Kommel  could  run  rampant  along  the  African  coast  it 
would  not  decisively  affect  the  ultimate  victory,  provided  the  Allied 
effort  concentrated  on  a  drive  toward  the  heartland  of  Germany.  It 
was  felt  by  the  American  planners  that  a  concentration  and  employ- 
ment of  force  for  that  purpose  would  have  resulted  in  Anglo-American 
forces  advancing  eastward  into  the  Balkans  and  at  least  halfway  across 
Poland  by  war's  end.  Obviously  if  this  had  occurred,  the  Communists 
would  not  have  been  in  a  position  to  exercise  their  domination  over 
eastern  Germany,  Poland,  Czechoslovakia,  and  the  Balkans  in  general. 
The  whole  map  of  Europe  would  be  radically  different  today. 

Mr.  Arens.  What  do  you  believe  the  strategy  of  the  Soviet  Union 
or  Red  bloc  is  in  Germany  today.  General  ? 

_  General  Wedemeyer.  I  am  sorry,  Mr.  Arens,  you  asked  that  ques- 
tion, although  phrased  differently,  just  a  few  minutes  ago  and  yet 
I  have  not  answered  it  completely. 

Mr.  Arens.  The  essence  of  my  question  was  "Are  the  Soviet  plans 
bypassing  Europe?" 

General  Wedejieyer.  I  believe  that  they  would  bypass  Europe  if  by 
going  elsewhere  advantages  would  accrue  to  their  world  communiza- 
tion  objective.  For  example,  if  they  find  weaknesses  or  soft  spots 
in  Southeast  Asia,  specifically  in  Indonesia,  they  would  intensify  their 


18  THE    COMMUNIST   PROGRAM   FOR   WORLD   CONQUEST 

efforts  in  tliat  area.  If  it  develops  tliat  labor  unrest  occurs  on  a  large 
scale  in  the  South  American  countries,  the  Soviet  would  take  advan- 
tage of  such  wealcnesses  there  and  would  give  impetus  to  the  unrest 
in  divers  and  insidious  ways. 

As  I  stated  previously,  any  strategic  plan  should  be  flexible  so  that 
the  weaknesses  of  an  opponent  can  be  exploited.  AVhenever  an  oppor- 
tunity is  presented  to  use  aggressively  any  or  all  of  tlio  four  instru- 
ments of  national  policy,  this  should  be  done.  I  think  the  Soviet 
Union  has  followed  such  stratagem  very  effectively  the  past  10  years. 

Mr.  Kearney.  Pardon  me,  General,  but  as  you  mentioned  a  minute 
ago  in  drawing  up  plans  for  an  attack,  the  Soviet  is  continuously 
probing  here  and  there  to  discover  weaknesses,  whether  they  be  in 
the  Middle  East,  Africa,  or  Europe? 

General  Wedemeyer.  That  is  correct,  sir. 

Mr.  Kearney.  They  continually  probe  and  then  promptly  exploit 
the  weaknesses  that  they  discover? 

General  Wedeivieyer.  Yes,  sir. 

Mr.  Arens.  General,  may  I  direct  your  attention  to  the  Far  East 
iii  wliich  we  all  know  you  served  with  great  distinction  for  some  con- 
siderable period  of  time.  Would  you  kindly  give  your  appraisal  of 
the  designs  of  the  Red  leaders  there.  What  can  be  expected  from  the 
standpoint  of  their  strategy  or  tactics?  Please  give  us  any  other  ob- 
servations that  you  think  would  be  helpful  in  this  connection  to  the 
committee  and  via  this  committee,  to  the  American  people. 

General  Wedemeyer.  I  do  not  believe  that  the  majority  of  the 
Chinese  understood  the  full  and  sinister  implications  of  conununism 
when  World  War  II  came  to  an  end.  With  equal  conviction,  1  am 
sure  that  they  did  not  understand  the  meaning  of  democracy.  One 
must  not  forget  that  the  bulk  of  the  Chinese  people  are  illiterate. 
The  cultured  Chinese  with  whom  we  come  in  contact  are  a  very  thin 
minority,  perhaps  a  few  million  in  a  population  exceeding  450  million. 
The  Chinese  people,  that  is  the  masses  who  are  preponderantly  peas- 
ants, are  lovaole,  honest,  energetic,  and  extremely  loyal,  particularly 
to  their  families.  They  respect  authority  and  are  warmly  hospitable. 
The  family  unit  is  nurtured  and  older  people  are  highly  respected; 
also  constituted  authority  is  deferred  to  or  obeyed.  In  other  words, 
China  is  a  country  of  peaceful,  friendly,  cooperative  people.  The 
Communist  propaganda  that  was  so  successfully  employed  in  that  vast 
area  became  extremely  vitriolic  in  the  latter  days  of  the  war.  Every 
morning  on  my  desk  I  would  find  reports  of  monitored  radio  broad- 
casts emanating  from  Vladivostok,  Moscow,  and  Yenan.  The  major 
theme  of  these  broadcasts  was  arousing  the  suspicions  and  fanning 
hatreds  of  the  Chinese  against  Americans.  It  was  done  veiy  cleverly, 
emphasizing  particularly  that  we  Americans  were  in  the  area,  remain- 
ing in  order  to  exploit  the  poor  people  of  China  and  that  we  had  every 
intention  of  subjugating  them  in  our  own  selfish  interests.  I  reported 
these  facts  concerning  Soviet  propaganda  in  the  China  area  to  the 
Joint  Chiefs  of  Staff  who  were  my  bosses  back  in  the  States.  I  was  in- 
formed that  such  information  was  forwarded  to  the  State  Department. 
I  also  contacted  the  Soviet  Ambassador  in  Chungking  and  remon- 
strated strongly  and  tactfully.  The  Ambassador  disclaimed  any 
knowledge  of  the  venomous  propaganda  to  which  I  referred.  He  was 
very  polite  and  firm  in  his  denunciation  of  such  methods,  assuring  me 


THE    COMMUNIST   PROGRAM   FOR   WORIiD    CONQUEST  19 

that  the  Soviet  Union  respected  the  United  States  and  was  a  very  loyal 
ally.  Oddly  enough,  the  denunciatory  broadcasts  discontinued  for 
a  while  but  resumed  with  even  greater  intensity  and  violence  when 
the  Japanese  surrendered.  My  headquarters  were  located  in  Shanghai 
after  the  Japs  surrendered.  I  again  visited  the  senior  Soviet  official 
and  provided  him  with  a  certified  copy  of  the  broadcasts.  He  too  was 
most  apologetic  about  the  whole  matter  and  assured  me  that  the  broad- 
casts must  have  their  genesis  in  Yenan  and  stated  categorically  that 
the  Soviet  Government  had  no  official  connection  with  them.  The 
Chinese  people  heard  daily,  in  fact  hourly,  these  radio  broadcasts 
which  were  widespread  and  which  urged  the  Chinese  to  compel  the 
Yankees  to  get  out  of  the  Orient,  in  fact  suggested  that  all  white 
people  be  driven  out  of  the  Orient,  repeating  over  and  over  again  the 
theme  "the  Orient  for  Orientals." 

Many  years  before  World  War  II  the  Soviet  Union  had  established 
the  Sun  Yat-sen  University  in  Moscow.  ^  This  university  was  the 
training  ground  for  the  Chinese  Communist  leaders  who  are  now  so 
effective  m  organizing  the  people  and  inflaming  them  against  the 
Nationalist  Government  as  well  as  against  Americans.  These  Chi- 
nese Communist  leaders,  including  Chou  En-lai,  Mao  Tse-tung,  Chu 
Teh,  and  other  prominent  members  of  the  Red  party  in  China, 
received  their  basic  training  in  socialism,  subversion,  propaganda, 
organization,  and  distortions  of  the  truth  under  the  tutelage  of  the 
Russian  Communists.  Actually,  in  1945  at  war's  end,  the  Chinese 
Communists  had  very  little  power  and  were  numerically  insignifi- 
cant. However,  their  propaganda  was  increasingly  effective  and  was 
noX  only  inspired  but  was  actually  supported  and  supplemented  by 
the  Soviet  Communists.  On  our  side,  that  is,  the  American  cause 
or  the  Nationalist  Chinese  Government  cause  was  not  presented. 
Yet  there  was  every  opportunity  to  refute  the  Communist  lies  and 
to  put  the  record  straight,  particularly  with  the  masses  of  Chinese 
people.  I  tried  to  enlist  the  support  of  American  diplomatic  officials 
in  China  and  also  submitted  reports  to  responsible  officials  back  in 
Washington.  The  war  was  over  and  the  people  were  celebrating 
victory.  There  was  little  or  no  interest  or  sympathetic  understand- 
ing of  the  situation  in  China.  There  was  strong  pressure  on  all 
theater  commanders  to  return  the  soldiers  back  to  the  homeland. 
No  one  seemed  to  be  thinking  in  terms  of  protecting  our  hard-earned 
victory. 

You  gentlemen  on  this  congressional  committee  would  be  astounded 
if  you  could  read  the  letters  that  I  received  when  serving  as  theater 
commander  in  China,  particularly  at  the  end  of  the  war.  Many  of 
them  were  disrespectful,  derisive,  and  critical.  Most  of  them  con- 
veyed the  idea  that  I  wanted  to  maintain  a  wartime  rank  and  there- 
fore would  not  permit  the  demobilization  of  my  American  forces  in 
China.  Just  as  rapidly  as  men  acquired  the  number  of  points 
decided  upon  by  higher  authority  to  justify  their  evacuation  to  the 
homeland,  I  insisted  that  they  be  put  on  ships  and  sent  to  the  United 
States.  In  doing  this,  often  the  organizational  integrity  and  of 
course  the  overall  efficiency  of  my  command  was  greatly  weakened. 
I  read  reports  about  rioting  in  some  of  the  theaters  because  the  GI's 
were  becoming  restive  in  waiting  for  the  accumulation  of  the  number 
of  points  that  would  entitle  them  to  be  sent  to  their  homes.    I  believe 


20  THE    CXDMMUNIST   PROGRAM    FOR    WORLD    CONQUEST 

there  was  some  rioting  in  Manila  and  also  in  Frankfurt,  Germany, 
but  fortunately  we  did  not  have  such  a  situation  in  China. 

(At  this  point.  Representative  Walter  entered  tlie  room.) 

Mr.  Kearney.  There  was  some  rioting  in  Hawaii  too;  was  there 
not,  General  ? 

General  Wedemeyer.  I  believe  so,  sir. 

Mr.  Kearney.  I  recall  the  situation  in  Guam  where,  although  we 
did  not  have  any  riots  on  the  part  of  the  GI's  there,  I  received  hun- 
dreds of  letters  from  memljers  of  the  Armed  Forces  located  on  that 
island  and  the  gist  of  their  message  was  "No  boats,  no  votes." 

General  Wedemeyer.  Returning  to  the  situation  prevailing  in  China 
immediately  after  the  war  (1945),  I  noted  a  buildup  of  opposition 
against  Chiang  Kai-shek,  the  leader  of  the  Nationalist  Government. 
Criticism  of  the  Generalissimo  and  his  j^overnment  frequently  appeared 
in  the  press  and  was  heard  on  the  radio.  Obviously  if  the  Generalis- 
simo had  been  the  tyrant  that  the  Communists,  both  in  our  country  and 
in  other  areas,  claimed  he  was,  the  press  and  radio  would  have  been 
controlled.  Certainly  the  Generalissimo  could  have  done  this  just 
as  easily  as  it  is  done  in  the  Soviet  Union  and  in  other  Communist- 
dominated  states.  He  chose  to  permit  the  people  to  express  them- 
selves freely.  He  was  making  an  earnest  effort  to  be  a  truly  democratic 
leader. 

Some  of  the  intellectual  Chinese  had  afliliated  themselves  with  com- 
munism and  gradually  others  who  were  worried  about  their  selfish  in- 
terests decided  to  go  over  with  the  Communists  because  they  felt  that 
the  Nationalist  Government  would  be  overthrown  and  they  wanted  to 
be  on  the  winning  side. 

General  Marshall  arrived  as  the  special  envoy  of  the  President  in 
December  of  1945,  It  seems  that  Chiang  Kai-shek  had  had  only  one 
pv'ior  contact  with  the  former  Chief  ot  Staff  and  that  was  at  the 
Cairo  Conference.  The  Generalissimo  seemed  quite  concerned  about 
Marshall's  arrival  and  queried  me  several  times  with  reference  to 
what  Marshall  would  want  to  know  and  see,  and  what  the  real  pur- 
pose of  his  visit  might  be.  I  was  laudatory  in  my  remarks  concern- 
ing Marshall's  capabilities,  integrity,  and  earnest  desire  to  help  the 
Nationalist  Government.  After  Mai-shall  arrived  he  showed  me  his 
directive,  which  required  him  to  amalgamate  all  of  the  various  politi- 
cal fragments  or  parties  in  China. 

Perhaps  I  should  indicate  that  in  my  several  years  of  contact  with 
General  Marshall  prior  to  service  in  China  I  had  formed  the  highest 
regard  for  him  and  felt  that  I  could  at  all  times  frankly  disagree 
with  his  views  and  that  my  own  approach  to  a  problem  would  be  con- 
sidered in  good  faith  by  him.  Of  course  I  was  respectful  but  not 
subservient  and  he  encouraged  such  attitude.  Therefore,  when  I  read 
his  directive  from  the  State  Department  requiring  him  to  bring  to- 
gether the  conflicting  parties,  I  told  him  frankly  that  he  could  not  ac- 
complish this.  I  explained  that  the  Communists  had  very  little  power 
at  that  time  (December  1945)  but  they  were  determined  to  get  all  of  it^ 
On  the  other  hand  the  Nationalist  Government  had  most  of  the  power 
and  they  were  equally  determined  not  to  relinquish  one  iota  of  it. 
Numerically  the  Communists  were  greatly  inferior.  It  is  difficult  to 
estimate  exactly  how  many  Chinese  had  alllliated  themselves  with  the 
Communist  movement.    There  were  extravagant  claims  of  course  by 


? 


THE    COMMUNIST   PROGRAM   FOR   WORILD   CONQUEST  21 

the  leaders,  and  some  of  our  own  Americans  who  were  sympathetic  to 
the  Communists  made  rather  stupidly  high  estimates.  I  think  at  the 
most  a  few  million  out  of  the  total  of  more  than  450  million  people  had 
varying  degrees  of  loyalty  to  the  Communist  cause.  Most  of  the  hard 
core  of  the  Chinese  Communist  movement  was  located  in  the  province 
of  Yenan.  Kegardless  of  what  you  gentlemen  may  have  read  or  heard, 
I  believe  that  I  was  in  a  position  to  state  factually  that  the  Communist 
troops  did  not  contribute  realistically  or  appreciably  to  the  war  effort 
against  the  Japanese.  I  was  on  the  ground  and  certainly  would  have 
known  if  their  claims  that  they  were  the  real  fighters  against  the  Japs 
had  been  correct.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  I  tried  to  bring  about  coordina- 
tion of  effort  between  the  Nationalist  and  Communist  forces  but  it  was 
erfectly  obvious  that  the  Commmiist  leaders  were  biding  their  time. 

am  equally  sure  that  they  had  promises  of  support  from  the  Soviet 
Communists  when  the  propitious  time  arrived  for  them  to  begin 
their  attacks  against  the  Nationalist  Government. 

The  Chinese  Communists  were  constantly  requesting  arms  and  equip- 
ment. My  directive  required  me  to  support  the  Nationalist  Govern- 
ment of  China.  Some  of  my  political  advisers  did  point  out  that  these 
men  were  Chinese  and  that  they  were  fighting  effectively  against  the 
Japanese.  I  stated  earlier  that  my  efforts  to  bring  about  a  modicum 
of  military  assistance  from  the  Communist  forces  were  unsuccessful. 
They  had  some  arms  and  equipment  and  all  that  I  asked  them  to  do 
was  to  exert  pressure  against  the  Japanese  forces  who  were  operating 
in  the  vicinity  of  Yenan.  They  refused  to  do  this  but  would  occasion- 
ally make  sorties  against  a  Japanese  blockhouse  or  outpost,  seizing 
a  few  prisoners,  arms,  and  equipment  but  not  making  a  real  contribu- 
tion to  the  overall  war  effort  of  the  China  theater.  Chou  En-lai 
reported  to  me  that  there  was  an  epidemic  in  Yenan  and  requested 
medical  supplies.  Although  I  had  repeatedly  refused  to  send  mili- 
tary equipment  to  them,  I  did  send  11  tons  of  medical  supplies  into 
the  Communist  area.  This  was  done  with  the  cognizance  and  approval 
of  Generalissimo  Chiang  Kai-shek  and  was  recognized  as  a  humani- 
tarian step. 

When  General  Marshall  arrived  in  China  on  his  special  mission  for 
the  President  (1945),  of  course  the  war  was  over  and  the  repatriation 
of  millions  of  people  who  had  moved  into  the  hinterland  during  the 
Japanese  occupation  and  the  rehabilitation  of  war-stricken  areas  pre- 
sented serious  problems  for  the  Generalissimo  and  his  Government. 
The  Chinese  Communists  supported  by  the  Soviet  Union  spread  their 
propaganda  and  intensified  their  activities  to  subvert  the  Nationalist 
military  forces.  The  people,  warweary  and  confused,  were  taken  in 
by  the  promises  of  the  Communists  for  better  opportunities,  for  food 
and  land,  all  of  which  the  Soviet  propaganda  emphasized.  It  never 
occurred  to  these  simple,  ^Uible  people  that  the  Chinese  Commmiists 
neither  had  the  capability  nor  the  intention  of  fulfilling  their 
promises.  Also,  the  Chinese  Communist  propaganda  distorted  the 
situation  so  much  that  the  people  in  the  United  States  interpreted 
the  conditions  in  China  incorrectly.  Chiang  Kai-shek  was  depicted 
as  an  unscrupulous  dictator  whereas  actually  the  man  was  trying  to 
bring  order  out  of  chaos  and  still  follow  democratic  procedures. 
There  was  much  wrong  in  the  government  and  there  were  dishonest 
and  incompetent  men  m  key  positions.  We  here  in  America  some- 
times experience  these  same  j9onditJ5His  in  our  own  official  ranks. 

(public^ 


22  THE    COMMUNIST    PROGRAM   FOR   WORLD    CONQUEST 

Mr.  Arens.  What  is  your  present  appraisal  of  the  posture  of  inter- 
national coniniunisni  in  the  Far  East  ? 

General  Wedemeyer.  The  Communists  have  the  initiative  through- 
out the  Far  East.  The  degree  will  vary,  of  course,  in  different  areas 
but  on  the  mainland  of  China  they  definitely  have  the  upper  hand. 
Economics  will  be  an  important  factor  in  the  outcome  of  the  struggle 
in  that  area  between  the  forces  of  freedom  and  those  of  enslavement. 
Traditionally  the  Japanese  have  carried  on  heavy  trade  w^th  mainland 
China.  They  would  obtain  their  raw  materials  from  that  area,  ship 
them  back  to  Ja])an  which  was  highly  industrialized,  process  these 
raw  materials,  and  then  send  them  back  as  finished  products  to  markets 
throughout  the  Far  East,  again  principally  in  China.  Japanese  pro- 
cessed goods  are  shipped  to  other  markets  Ijut  they  experience  difficul- 
ties because  their  products  are  so  low-priced  and  inject  a  competition 
difficulty  in  countries  where  labor  costs  are  higher,  for  example  in  the 
United  States.  But  the  overall  picture  of  the  Communists  in  the  Far 
East  is  in  my  judgment  favorable  for  continued  Communist  expansion 
and  retention  of  tiie  initiative  unless  and  until  confronted  by  a  strong, 
realistic  concerted  effort  in  the  political,  economic,  and  psychological 
field  by  the  so-called  free  nations  of  the  world,  principally  the  United 
States,  Great  Britiiin,  and  Japan. 

Mr.  Arens.  General,  you  have  expressed  yourself  in  an  appraisal 
of  the  military,  economic,  psychological,  and  political  superiority  of 
the  Red  bloc  in  the  world  today.  How  does  this  capability  or  superior- 
ity affect  the  relationship  or  posture  of  the  United  States  with  its  allies 
and  neutrals? 

General  Wedemeyer.  I  mentioned  a  little  earlier  during  the  course 
of  this  hearing  that  in  my  judgment  our  allies  will  make  realistic  ap- 
praisals of  the  United  States  strength  in  all  fields  of  strategy,  and 
likewise  of  the  Soviet  Union.  If  an  emergency  occurs,  I  believe  that 
our  allies  will  estimate  the  situation  and  will  take  such  steps  or  adopt 
such  measures  as  will  be  in  their  own  self-interest.  Today  they  are 
accepting  United  States  military  and  economic  aid  because  it  is  in 
their  self-interest.  From  a  short-range  viewpoint  this  would  appear 
to  be  right.  So  far  the  Soviet  Union  has  not  reacted  too  strongly 
but  some  of  these  so-called  allies  are  already  making  careful  reap- 
praisals and  have  agreed  to  carry  on  trade  with  Communist  nations. 
For  example,  some  of  our  friends  who  strongly  proclaim  that  they  are 
opposed  to  communism  and  have  even  pledged  support  to  us  in  the 
event  of  an  emergency  against  Communist  aggression  are  actively  en- 
gaged in  trade  with  Ked  countries.  The  British,  for  example,  are  trad- 
mg  with  Red  China.  As  far  as  I  know,  they  gave  diplomatic  recog- 
nition to  the  Communist  regime  in  China  without  consulting  the 
United  States.  British  trade  has  traditionally  strongly  influenced 
British  policy  in  the  field  of  diplomacy.  If  a  wartime  emergency 
should  develop,  I  believe  that  the  British  would  carefully  analyze 
the  implications  of  cooperating  with  us.  They  might  decide  to  re- 
main strictly  neutral  and  thus  deny  us  access  to  the  military  bases 
which  we  are  now  maintaining  in  the  British  Isles. 

Mr.  Sctierer.  Deny  us  use  of  those  bases  ? 

General  Wedemeyer.  Yes,  sir.  If  I  were  a  Frenchman,  Britisher,  or 
Spaniard  and  felt  that  it  would  be  more  advantageous  to  my  country, 
I  certainly  would  deny  the  use  of  the  bases  to  the  Americans.    Of 


THE    COMMUNIST   PROGRAM   FOR   WORLD    CONQUEST  23 

course,  if  the  Americans  had  the  upper  hand  or  sufficient  strength  to 
assure  me  that  they  could  defend  my  country  against  the  Commu- 
nist juggernaut,  the  Communist  air  armada,  and  a  possible  stream  of 
destructive  missiles,  then  probably  I  would  consent  to  the  use  of  the 
bases  by  the  Americans.  This  is  realism.  All  of  the  people  in 
Europe  want  to  be  on  the  winning  side  in  the  next  war.  There  is 
less  desire  to  take  calculated  risks,  partially  due  to  the  terrifying  effect 
that  the  introduction  of  thermonuclear  bombs  and  missiles  has  had  on 
the  people.  Fortunately  the  Soviet  leaders  realize  too  that  there  will 
be  no  winning  side  in  a  nuclear  war. 

Mr.  Arens.  Suppose  Kussia  issued  an  ultimatum  to  the  effect  that 
if  these  countries  allowed  the  Americans^  to  use  bases  they  would 
use  nuclear  intercontinental  ballistic  missiles  on  cities  in  England, 
Germany,  France,  and  Spain  ? 

General  Wedemeter.  The  Soviets  have  already  issued  veiled  ulti- 
matums. The  countries  you  mentioned  are  accepting  calculated 
risks  now.  They  feel  that  they  can  afford  to  do  this  because  they 
still  feel  that  the  United  States  retaliatory  powers  would  afford  them 
protection.  Also  most  of  the  people  in  Western  Europe  are  quite 
certain  that  there  will  not  be  a  war  in  the  near  future.  The  very 
destructive  power  inherent  in  new  weapons  may  render  their  use 
unthinkable  even  to  dictators.  For  these  reasons  the  people  of 
France,  Spain,  Germany,  and  England  continue  their  collaboration 
with  the  United  States.  Also  they  are  conscious  of  the  fact  that 
considerable  economic  and  psychological  advantage  accrues  by  the 
presence  of  American  bases  in  their  countries.  Our  soldiers  are 
spending  millions  of  dollars  in  those  countries.  Furthermore,  our 
Government  spends  considerable  sums  of  money  on  the  construction 
and  maintenance  of  airdromes  and  the  lines  of  communication,  all  of 
which  will  be  valuable  commercially  to  the  countries  concerned. 

Mr.  ScHERER.  You  refer.  General,  to  the  economic  advantage  such 
as  the  money  we  are  spending  in  Asia  ? 

General  Wedemeter.  Yes,  sir.  I  think  all  of  the  countries  receiv- 
ing aid  from  us  are  watching  developments  very  carefully  and  weigh- 
ing the  implications  of  so  doing.  However,  when  the  chips  are  down, 
I  hope  I  am  wrong,  I  think  that  these  countries  would  be  very  reluc- 
tant allies  and  might  consider  seriously  denying  us  the  use  of  the 
bases  which  we  are  maintaining  today.  I  shall  never  forget  the  atti- 
tude of  so-called  allies  and  of  the  United  Nations  Organization  when 
we,  the  United  States,  made  an  all-out  effort  m  South  Korea  to  stop 
the  advance  of  the  Eed  hordes  from  North  Korea.  Everyone  knows 
today  that  only  two  countries.  South  Korea  and  the  United  States, 
made  a  realistic  contribution  in  that  effort  to  stop  the  spread  of 
communism. 

Mr.  ICearnet.  General,  would  I  be  wrong  in  supplementing  Con- 
gressman Scherer's  remarks  by  including  every  allied  country  in  the 
Western  World,  not  only  the  countries  Congressman  Scherer  men- 
tioned ?  I  am  trying  to  be  realistic  along  with  you  and  therefore  have 
reference  to  every  one  of  the  countries  when  I  ask  you  if  they  would 
stand  by  us  in  the  event  of  trouble  or  in  case  war  did  break  out. 
Don't  you  think  that  we  would  be  left  holding  the  bag,  so  to  speak  ? 

General  Wedemeter.  I  believe  that  we  would  be  left  holding  the 
bag,  General  Kearney,  but  again,  I  hope  that  I  am  wrong.    However, 


24  THE    COMMUNIST   PROGRAM    FOR   WORLD    CONQUEST 

I  have  given  this  matter  considerable  thought  over  the  years  and  have 
expressed  to  this  committee  my  considered  opinions. 

Mr.  SciiERER.  I  am  a  Member  of  Congress  and  have  to  vote  on  the 
expenditure  of  funds  for  more  airfields  and  the  maintenance  of  those 
airfields  in  England,  Germany,  France,  and  Spain  that  we  already 
have.  If  what  you  say  is  true — and  I  had  come  to  the  same  conclu- 
sion before  your  testimony.  General — how  should  I  vote?  Would  it 
not  be  better  to  spend  that  money  presently  used  on  bases  in  other 
countries  for  submarines  and  long-range  missiles  that  do  not  depend 
upon  bases? 

General  Wedetvieyer.  I  would  not  vote  one  penny  to  any  country 
unless  I  had  evidence  of  their  good  faith  and  of  their  unswerving 
loyalty  in  the  cooperative  effort  witli  us  toward  the  attainment  of 
common  objectives;  one  important  one,  of  course,  is  protecting  the 
Free  World  against  the  scourge  of  communism.  I  am  not  suggest- 
ing that  each  one  of  these  countries  to  whom  we  give  military  and 
economic  aid  should  have  exactly  the  same  objectives  in  the  interna- 
tional field,  but  I  would  insist  that  their  objectives  must  be  compatible 
with  our  own.  In  other  words,  if  the  British  insist  on  trading  with 
Red  China  and  thus  strengthening  the  Communists  who  present  a 
grave  danger  to  United  States  interests,  then  I  would  discontinue 
military  or  economic  aid  to  the  British.  Wlien  I  make  a  statement 
like  that,  Britishers  and  American  "one-worlders"  will  say  that  they 
are  not  trading  in  strategic  items.  When  they  use  the  term  "strategic 
items,"  they  mean,  of  course,  airplanes,  tanks,  ammunition,  I  presume. 
But  I  insist  that  any  item  of  trade — a  spool  of  thread,  wheat,  auto- 
mobiles, or  coffee — assists  the  economy  of  Red  China.  I  believe 
in  denying  those  areas  under  Communist  rule  any  economic  or  military 
assistance.  Furthermore  I  would  break  off  diplomatic  relations  with 
them.  In  suggesting  these  ideas  to  the  committee,  I  wish  to  emphasize 
that  I  am  not  an  isolationist.  No  country  can  isolate  itself  from  the 
world  today.  If  this  be  a  fact,  the  United  States  should  participate  in 
international  developments  and  relations  with  intelligence,  always 
mindful  of  the  fact  that  we  must  be  actuated  by  self-respect.  In 
other  words,  every  step  that  we  take  should  protect  our  security  and 
our  economy.  I^t  us  be  realistic  and  understand  that  all  other 
countries  conduct  their  foreign  policies  in  that  manner. 

Mr.  ScHERER.  I  understood  that  at  the  beginning  of  your  testi- 
mony, General,  you  estimated  the  total  firepower  of  the  East  and  West 
to  be  about  equally  balanced,  with  possibly  the  East  having  a  little 
edge  at  this  time  ? 

General  Wedemeter.  When  you  refer  to  firepower,  I  presume  you 
mean  military  potential  or  military  posture  ? 

Mr.  Scherer.  That  is  what  I  mean. 

General  Wedemeyer.  In  my  judgment  the  military  strength  or  pos- 
ture of  the  Soviet  Union  and  satellites  is  stronger  than  that  of  the 
western  countries  or  Free  World. 

Mr.  SciiERER.  Then  if  this  is  a  fact  and  Russia  says,  as  she  has 
hinted  to  England  and  France,  "The  Americans  must  not  use  bases 
on  your  soil,  and  if  you  do  permit  them  to  do  so,  there  will  be  a  nu- 
clear war  waged  against  your  cities,"  do  you  think  for  a  minute  that 
England  and  France  would  permit  us  to  use  these  bases? 

General  Wedeme^-er.  I  doubt  it  very  much.  As  you  have  sug- 
gested, the  Soviet  Communists  have  hinted  that  to  several  countries. 


THE    COMMUNIST   PROGRAM    FOR   WORLD    CONQUEST  25 

I  am  sure  the  British  are  definitely  worried  about  it.  But  again, 
trade  is  an  important  factor  in  the  British  philosophy.  They  prob- 
ably are  weighing  all  of  the  implications  and,  as  we  all  know  today, 
they  are  willing  to  accept  the  calculated  risks  involved.  They  must 
be  evaluating  all  of  the  factors,  principally  that  the  Russians  in  all 
probability  will  not  precipitate  a  war  while  they  are  enjoying  such 
outstanding  success  in  the  use  of  economic  and  psychological  weapons. 
The  British  are  conscious  of  the  fact  that  we  Americans  are  spend- 
ing a  lot  of  money  in  their  country  and  the  door  to  our  Treasury  has 
long  been  ajar. 

Mr.  SciiERER.  Then  we  might  as  well  keep  the  money  coming. 

General  Wedemeyer.  Yes,  sir.  Macmillan's  government  is  accept- 
ing a  calculated  risk  and  I  think  will  continue  to  do  so.  I  believe 
a  Labor  government  would  discontinue  the  use  of  bases  by  Ameri- 
cans. But  again,  I  emphasize  that  if  the  chips  were  down  and  Mac- 
millan  did  not  feel  that  we  Americans  could  prevent  the  Soviet  from 
pouring  missiles  into  his  industrial  and  populated  areas,  he  might 
declare  a  neutral  position  and  in  the  process,  of  course,  deny  us  the 
use  of  bases  in  the  British  Isles.  Perhaps  Macmillan  feels  that  there 
will  be  no  war— particularly  no  thermonuclear  bombs  and  missiles. 

Mr.  ScHERER.  You  take  almost  the  same  point  of  view  as  Gen. 
Bonner  Fellers. 

General  Wedemeyer.  I  did  not  know  that  Gen.  Bonner  Fellers  had 
expressed  similar  views  but  I  am  not  surprised.  Many  other  gen- 
erals and  admirals,  and  many  private  citizens  would  express  similar 
views  I  am  sure.  I  have  high  regard  for  General  Fellers'  judgment 
in  the  field  of  strategy. 

Mr.  Kearney.  Following  Congressman  Scherer's  line.  General, 
what  I  cannot  get  through  my  head  is  this:  Assuming  that  Eng- 
land and  the  rest  of  the  allies  are  wavering  between  the  calculated 
risk  you  mentioned  and  the  moneys  we  are  pouring  in  there,  and 
knowing  Russia  as  they  do — that  they  can't  trust  them  or  trust  their 
word — where  do  we  come  back  to  then  ? 

General  Wedemeyer.  I  can't  answer  that  question.  General 
Kearney.  One  of  the  hopes  for  mankind,  I  think,  was  expressed  by 
Congressman  Scherer  a  little  earlier.  Within  the  satellite  countries 
of  Russia  and  throughout  the  Soviet  Union  there  are  ferments  and 
defections  building  up.  Human  beings  will  not  endure  subordina- 
tion to  the  iron  heel  of  tyranny  for  an  indefinite  time.  Tlie  answer 
to  our  present  dilemma  may  be  essentially  provided  by  uprisings  and 
finally  the  overthrow  of  the  tyrants  behind  the  Iron  Curtain. 

Mr.  Kearney.  I  think  as  far  as  that  statement  is  concerned  that 
we  Americans  are  just  going  along  with  wishful  thinking.  We  have 
been  hoping  that  there  would  be  a  revolution  in  the  satellite  countries 
for  many  years.    The  nearest  that  it  has  come  was  in  Hungary. 

General  Wedemeyer.  That  is  right.  The  Hungarians  were  truly 
fighting  for  freedom.  It  is  interesting  to  note  that  the  front  fighters 
in  their  effort  to  overthrow  their  oppressors  in  Hungary  were  not 
older  people  who  had  enjoyed  freedom  many  years  ago  but  it  was  the 
young  men  and  women  who  had  been  exposed  to  Communist  propa- 
ganda and  false  promises  since  World  War  II  who  led  the  revolt.  And 
as  this  revolutionary  movement  in  Hungary  progressed,  I  asked  my- 
self, where  are  the  Kosciuskos,  the  Pulaskis,  and  the  Laf ayettes  of  this 


26  THE    CX)MMUNIST   PROGRAM   FOR   WORLD   CONQUEST 

or  of  any  other  free  country  ?  When  we  were  fighting  for  our  free- 
dom here  in  Am;erica,  those  patriots  came  to  our  shores,  endured 
liardships,  and  experienced  dangers  to  help  us  attain  our  liberty.  Why 
didn't  some  i\jnerican  general,  or  a  military  leader  from  England  or 
France,  go  to  the  Hungarians  and  offer  his  services?  There  was  not 
one  professional  military  man  like  myself  who  made  himself  available. 
AVhy  am  I  not  willing  to  take  risks  and  to  experience  hardships  as  did 
the  men  wlio  fought  so  gallantly  and  selflessly  shoulder  to  shoulder 
with  our  forefathers  in  this  country?  I  am  serious.  I  have  given 
considerable  thought  to  this  situation.  Are  we  real  patriots?  Are  we 
dedicated  to  liberty  ?    Are  we  getting  soft  ? 

Mr.  ScHERER.  Perhaps  you  would  not  have  been  permitted  to  do 
so. 

General  Wedemeyer.  If  I  were  determined,  I  certainly  could  have 
reached  Hungary  and  offered  my  assistance  to  those  fighters  for 
freedom. 

Mr.  Kearney.  There  was  a  poll  taken  in  every  civilized  country  in 
the  world  as  to  whether  or  not  that  particular  nation  would  assist  any 
of  the  Soviet  satellites  that  might  defect  or  carry  on  a  revolution. 
Every  country  voted  overwhelmingly  "No." 

General  Wedemeyer.  The  frightening  possibility  of  a  nuclear  war 
seems  to  hang  like  a  pall  over  the  world — paralyzing  actions  that 
might  precipitate  war.  I  think  if  a  poll  were  taken  in  ICngland  today 
and  if  such  poll  were  conducted  without  any  duress,  the  British  people 
would  vote  to  move  our  bases  out  of  their  country. 

The  Chairman.  Doesn't  that  all  stem  from  the  terrific  nationalist 
feel  ing  in  each  of  the  nations  ? 

General  Wedemeyer.  Yes,  sir.  I  think  the  existence  or  develop- 
ment of  nationalist  feeling  has  a  very  strong  influence  in  this  con- 
nection. It  is  an  interesting  phenomenon — our  policies  at  home  seem 
to  favor  and  support  internationalism — while  abroad  we  support 
nationalism,  the  principle  of  self-determination. 

The  Chairman.  I  was  in  Yugoslavia  sometime  ago  in  connection 
with  the  refugee  problems  and  talked  with  officials  of  the  Yugoslav 
Government.  They  hate  the  Russians  in  my  judgment  just  as  much 
as  we  do  but  they  are  realistic  to  the  point  that  I  am  concerned  lest 
what  we  do  to  aid  Yugoslavia  would  sometime  or  other  be  used  against 
us  if  it  was  expedient  to  do  so. 

General  Wedemeyer.  Tito  and  his  henchmen  are  avowed  Commu- 
nists opposed  to  everything  we  stand  for.  Why  strengthen  his  posi- 
tion economicallv  or  militarily  with  American  aid? 

Mr.  Sciierer.  That  is  why  I  am  afraid  these  airbascs  in  some  of 
our  neutral  and  allied  countries  will  be  used  against  us. 

General  WEi)EME-iT-:R.  Congressman  Scherer,  related  to  your  con- 
cern in  this  matter,  when  you  cast  your  vote  for  appropriations  cover- 
ing the  installation  and  maintenance  of  bases,  would  it  not  be  a  good 
idea  to  bring  out  clearly  the  motives  and  actions  of  those  allies  who 
are  not  doing  thoir  ])roportionate  share  in  the  struggle  against  com- 
munism? Specifically,  expose  those  nations  in  the  North  Atlantic 
Treaty  Organization  which  are  not  providing  their  proportionate 
share  of  the  military  forces  for  the  NATO  defense.  Everyone  knows 
that  certain  countries  in  NATO  agreed  to  provide  a  stipulated  number 
of  divisions  and  yet  they  are  not  fuliilling  their  commitment.    They 


THE    COMMUNIST   PROGRAM   FOR   WORIiD    CONQUEST  27 

come  asking  us  for  help  but  they  fail  to  keep  faith  with  us  in  the 
firm  agreements  made  ostensibly  to  stop  aggressions  by  the  Commu- 
nists. 

Mr.  Kearney.  The  Korean  war  was  an  excellent  example  of  this. 

General  Wedemeyer.  Yes,  sir.  I  cannot  understand  why  Amer- 
ican leaders  permit  allies  to  ignore  or  abrogate  commitments.  I 
have  lived  abroad  for  approximately  20  years  of  my  life.  In  my 
contacts  with  foreign  peoples  I  found  them  to  be  kind  and  cooperative. 
But  also,  may  I  emphasize  that  they  were  always  realistic.  If  they 
did  something  for  me,  they  expected  gratitude  as  well  as  something 
from  me  in  return.  I  am  convinced  that  if  the  British  were  in  the 
position  of  giving  aid  to  us,  they  would  insure  that  we  were  cooperating 
to  the  fullest  degree  in  the  attainment  of  their  objectives  and  in  pro- 
tecting their  interests.  Some  people  suggest  that  when  we  Americans 
give  aid  to  a  country  that  we  should  not  attempt  to  interfere  with  that 
country's  internal  affairs.  My  approach  would  be  entirely  different. 
In  the  first  place  I  would  not  give  aid,  military  or  economic,  to  any 
country  that  opposed  America's  aims  in  the  international  field.  Also, 
I  would  expect  the  recipient  countries  to  indicate  what  they  were  going 
to  do  with  our  aid  and  when.  Furthermore  I  would  require  those 
countries  to  give  evidence  at  least  of  supporting  objectives  compatible 
with  our  own.  In  general  those  are  the  tests  that  I  would  make  in 
each  instance  before  I  would  approve  of  economic  or  military  aid  for 
any  nation. 

Mr.  ScHERER.  We  just  have  so  much  money  to  spend  and  if  we  don't 
reach  a  conclusion  as  just  stated  by  you,  General,  we  will  ruin  our 
economy. 

General  Wedemeyer.  That's  exactly  the  way  I  feel  about  it.  I 
think  we  should  put  our  aid,  military  and  economic,  in  those  areas 
and  those  countries  where  it  will  do  the  most  to  provide  military 
security  and  economic  stability  for  America  as  well  as  for  the  re- 
cipient nation.  The  present  administration  is  asking  now  for  per- 
mission to  increase  the  debt  limit.  If  I  were  a  Congressman,  I  would 
oppose  such  increase  and  would  cut  down  on  expenditures  both  at 
home  and  abroad — particularly  abroad. 

Mr.  Scherer.  I  repeat,  we  have  just  so  much  money  to  spend  and 
if  we  don't  come  to  the  conclusion  that  there  is  a  limit  at  some  place 
to  these  enormous  expenditures,  we  are  going  to  ruin  our  own  economy. 
If  our  situation  is  as  precarious  as  you  suggest  concerning  our  overseas 
bases,  then  isn't  Admiral  Rickover  right  that  we  should  take  the 
money  we  do  have  available  and  concentrate  it  on  the  construction  of 
submarines  which  are  capable  of  launching  nuclear  weapons  ? 

General  Wedemeyer.  I  am  glad  that  you  asked  that  question.  Con- 
gressman Scherer.  I  agree  that  we  should  carefully  evaluate  the 
expenditure  of  our  money  in  connection  with  military  security.  We 
should  concentrate  our  effort  on  those  weapons  which  will  provide  a 
full  dollar's  return  in  security  for  our  country.  In  my  judgment  the 
atomic  submarine  with  missile  platform  would  be  an  important  addi- 
tion and  would  render  us  less  dependent  on  precarious  bases  located 
in  the  territories  of  reluctant  allies. 

Mr.  Scherer.  This  would  be  much  cheaper  than  foreign  bases. 

General  Wedemeyer.  Yes,  sir.  Our  forces  could  rendezvous  at  any 
designated  place,  discharge  their  missiles  against  hostile  targets,  and 


28  THE    COMMUNIST   PROGRAM    FOR   WORLD    CONQUEST 

submerge,  then  reappear  at  another  predetermined  rendezvous  for 
another  attack, 

Mr.  ScHERER.  One  would  not  have  to  have  permission  to  establish 
bases  on  foreign  soil  if  we  operated  in  that  manner. 

General  Wedemeyer.  That  is  correct.  Furthermore,  there  would 
be  no  bases  to  destroy  when  the  enemy  attemj)ted  to  retaliate,  and 
greater  flexibility  in  the  employment  of  our  missiles  would  be  provided. 

Mr.  SciiEREu.  Yes;  the  submarines  as  platforms  for  missiles  would 
be  moving  and  thus  would  not  present  a  good  target  for  the  enemy. 

General  Wedemeyer.  Yes;  that  is  very  important.  I  believe  that 
Congress  should  carefully  consider  the  research  and  development  pro- 
grams which  provide  for  atomic  and  thermonuclear  weapons  for 
missiles  and  submarines.  I  do  not  agree  with  those  who  advocate 
large  ground  forces.  Also,  I  believe  we  should  remove  all  United 
States  ground  forces  now  located  on  foreign  soil.  The  people  indige- 
nous to  those  countries  do  not  like  foreigners,  particularly  in  military 
uniform,  ])resent  in  their  communities.  They  have  a  nationalistic 
feeling  which  is  understandable  and  resent  the  presence  of  armed  men 
from  other  countries.  Of  course,  the  political  leaders  will  not  ex- 
press such  views,  but  I  am  sure  a  poll  would  reveal  that  the  people 
themselves  would  be  glad  to  have  our  troops  removed.  Most  import- 
ant— let  the  people  indigenous  to  the  area  provide  the  manpower  for 
the  defense  of  their  country.  I  am  sure  this  would  be  a  more  satis- 
factory arrangement,  and  I  expect  the  people  of  those  countries  do  not 
want  our  Armed  Forces  on  their  soil. 

Mr.  Ivearney.  Except  in  time  of  war. 

General  Wedemeyer.  Yes;  then  they  are  glad  to  have  us.  Even 
then  there  are  inevitable  frictions.  Although  we  were  fighting 
shoulder  to  shoulder  with  the  Chinese  during  World  War  II,  there 
were  understandable  incidents  and  frictions  between  my  forces  and 
the  Chinese.  In  general,  however,  the  Chinese  were  cooperative  and 
hospitable. 

To  return  to  the  matter  of  appropriations,  which  Congressman 
Scherer  mentioned  earlier,  I  think  it  is  very  difficult  for  a  Congress- 
man or  for  any  private  citizen  to  know  exactly  how  and  when  to  ap- 
prove of  military  and  economic  aid  to  other  countries.  The  leaders 
m  our  Government — in  fact,  all  officials  occupying  key  positions  in 
the  executive  and  legislative  branches  of  our  Government — are  so 
weio^hed  down  and  harassed  by  daily  administrative  matters  it  is 
hardly  possible  for  them  to  investigate,  analyze,  and  reach  sound 
judgments  concerning  the  complex  situations  in  various  parts  of  the 
world.  It  seems  to  me  that  we  need  a  group  of  disinterested  men  who 
are  not  harassed  with  day-by-day  administrative  responsibilities  but 
who  would  spend  their  time  studying  and  analyzing  world  develop- 
ments in  order  to  submit  sound  recommendations  to  Congress.  I 
think  that  Congress  should  make  the  decisions  concerning  our  various 
commitments  in  the  international  arena.  It  is  the  Congress  that  truly 
represents  the  grassroots — the  people  throughout  our  countiy.  The 
President  and  his  appointees  in  the  State  Department  do  not  neces- 
sarily reflect  the  basic  ideas  of  the  American  people.  Policvmaking 
should  be  in  the  hands  of  those  who  are  responsive  to  the  thinking  and 
the  will  of  tlie  people.  Today  you  gentlemen  on  this  committee  asked 
me,  a  layman,  to  make  suggestions  concerning  appropriations.    I 


THE    COMMUNIST   PROGRAM   FOR   WORLD    CONQUEST  29 

really  do  not  feel  fully  qualified  to  make  comprehensive  recommenda- 
tions because  I  lack  factual  information.  It  seems  to  me  there  is 
need  for  a  group  of  men  who  will  continuously  study  the  international 
situation  based  on  factual  and  complete  information  concerning  devel- 
opments in  all  parts  of  the  world.  Such  a  group  would  have  the 
responsibility  of  evaluating  developments  and  their  imj)lications  upon 
our  own  security  and  economic  stability.  After  their  evaluations, 
they  should  make  appropriate  recommendations  to  the  Members  of 
Congress,  and  thus  facilitate  sound  legislative  action  which  would 
then  not  only  be  based  on  the  best  intelligence  available  but  would 
also  be  supported  by  expert  evaluations  and  judgments. 

The  Chairman.  I  have  been  informed  that  when  the  Japanese  sur- 
rendered in  Java  after  World  War  II,  unlike  other  surrenders,  they 
were  required  to  leave  their  arms.  Do  you  know  anything  about 
that? 

General  Wedemeyer.  Mr.  Congressman,  Java  was  not  in  my  the- 
ater during  World  War  II  but  was  under  the  British  at  the  time  of 
the  Japanese  surrender.  Actually  Admiral  Mountbatten,  who  com- 
manded the  southeast  Asia  area,  was  responsible  for  Java.  I  do  not 
know  what  happened  but  the  Japanese  in  all  areas  were  required  by 
the  orders  issued  by  supreme  commander.  Allied  Powers,  to  turn  their 
arms  over  to  the  Allied  commander  nearest  to  them. 

In  this  connection,  I  had  some  difficulty  with  the  British  concerning 
the  surrender  arrangements  at  Hong  Kong.  The  instructions  that  the 
Generalissimo  and  Lord  Louis  Mountbatten  received  and  also  that  I 
received  from  the  supreme  commander.  Allied  Powers  (General  Mac- 
Arthur),  stipulated  clearly  that  the  Chinese  would  receive  all  sur- 
renders of  Japanese  in  the  China  theater.  Hong  Kong  was  in  the 
China  theater,  yet  the  British  insisted  that  they  would  not  permit  the 
Chinese  to  receive  the  surrender  in  Hong  Kong.  The  Generalissimo 
asked  me  as  his  chief  of  staff  to  go  to  Hong  Kong  and  accept  the  sur- 
render of  the  Japanese  commander  there.  I  refused  but  recommended 
to  the  Generalissimo  that  a  Chinese  general  be  sent  to  Hong  Kong  and 
to  other  key  points  throughout  China  for  that  purpose.  My  reason 
was  that  it  would  be  better  psychologically  for  the  Chinese  to  receive 
the  surrender  of  the  Japs  whom  they  had  been  fighting  for  8  years.  In 
Nanking,  in  Shanghai,  and  in  fact  throughout  the  China  theater  I 
arranged  to  have  a  Chinese  commander  present  at  the  surrender  of 
the  Japanese.  But  the  British  protested  violently  and  even  sent 
messages  to  President  Truman  claiming  that  it  was  their  right  and 
responsibility  to  receive  the  surrender  of  the  Japanese  in  Hong  Kong. 
They  were  arrogant  and  disrespectful  to  the  Generalissimo  in  han- 
dling this  matter.  I  was  surprised  and  disappointed  that  they  should 
be  so  petty  in  this  matter  of  protocol.  After  all,  the  Chinese  had 
fought  8  years  against  the  Japanese  and  had  made  great  sacrifice  in 
carrying  on  against  the  common  enemy.  The  matter  ended  up  with 
the  British  receiving  the  surrender.  They  rushed  an  admiral  there 
for  that  purpose  along  with  a  few  of  their  combat  ships  which  had 
been  operating  in  the  Bay  of  Bengal  during  most  of  the  war. 

The  Chairman.  The  thing  that  disturbs  me  as  one  of  the  most 
serious  situations  in  the  world  today  is  that  which  is  developing  in 
Indonesia. 

General  Wedemeyer.  Yes. 


30  THE    COMMUNIST   PROGRAM   FOR   WORLD   CONQUEST 

The  Chairman.  I  can  just  imagine  what  would  happen  if  a  Com- 
munist state  were  to  develop  in  Indonesia,  situated  there  between  the 
Philippines,  Japan,  and  Australia. 

General  Wedemeyer.  Yes;  that  is  quite  true.  Communism  appar- 
ently is  developing  quite  strongly  in  Malaya  also. 

The  Chairman.  Yes,  and  I  do  not  think  it  was  a  mere  accident 
that  the  surrender  there  in  Malaya  was  different  than  anywhere  else ; 
in  other  words,  the  Japanese  went  away  with  their  arms.  In  Indo- 
nesia, the  Japanese  turned  over  their  arms  to  pro-Communists. 

General  Wedemeyer.  As  another  indication  of  Communist  in- 
fluence in  those  areas,  it  is  reported  that  in  Okinawa  recently  a  mayor 
was  elected  with  pro-Communist  leanings. 

Mr.  Arens.  General,  you  have  given  us  an  appraisal  of  the  rising 
strength  of  the  Red  bloc  in  the  military,  economic,  psychological,  and 
political  fields  as  well  as  the  threat  which  the  Communist  bloc  poses 
to  the  Free  World.  Would  you  care  to  give  your  appraisal  to  this 
committee  of  any  mistakes  which  have  been  made  by  tlie  West  and 
your  suggestion  as  to  a  strategy  or  tactic  of  the  West  to  counter  the 
rising  tide  of  the  Red  bloc? 

General  Wedemeyer.  Our  failures  were  due  to  the  fact  that  we  did 
not  recognize  the  true  implications  of  international  communism  dur- 
ing and  particularly  subsequent  to  World  War  II.  I  think  the  fact 
that  we  were  so  trusting  and  naive  after  World  War  II  concerning  the 
sinister  motives  of  the  Communist  leaders  was  the  most  serious 
blunder  that  western  diplomats  and  western  leaders  made. 

Mr.  Arens.  How  did  that  affect  the  situation  ? 

General  Wedemeyer.  Well,  this  enabled  the  Soviet  to  maintain 
the  initiative  in  Europe  as  well  as  in  the  Far  East.  They  had  com- 
plete initiative  in  the  political,  economic,  and  psychological  fields 
and  thus  extended  their  influence  throughout  those  areas,  drawing 
successfully  into  the  poisonous  orbit  of  communism  countries  and 
millions  of  people. 

Mr.  Arens.  What  are  the  manifestations  in  your  opinion  of  this 
failure  to  recognize  the  nature  of  international  communism? 

General  Wedemeyer.  I  might  give  a  few  examples : 

Let  lis  recall  the  situation  that  developed  in  Czechoslovakia 
where  the  Soviet  moved  in  surreptitiously  after  the  war.  It  was  not 
a  military  operation.  Communist  agents  obtained  positions  in  the 
Government.  They  gradually  took  over  the  control  of  the  Interior 
Department  which  was  responsible  for  the  internal  security  of  the 
country.  The  secret  police  in  Czechoslovakia  operated  within  the 
Interior  Department.  When  the  Communists  obtained  control  over 
that  Department,  obviously  they  could  take  over  the  entire  Govern- 
ment. That  was  exactly  what  they  did.  The  Communists  have  not 
employed  their  own  troops,  that  is,  their  army,  navy,  or  air  force,  in 
any  major  military  action  since  World  War  II  but  they  have  been  very 
successful  in  implementing  troops  of  satellites  in  gaining  control  of 
vast  areas  and  many  countries.  For  example.  Red  China,  North 
Korea,  Poland,  Albania,  Czechoslovakia,  East  Germany,  Hungary, 
Bulgaria,  Rumania.  About  half  the  population  of  the  world,  over  a 
billion  people,  are  now  oriented  toward  the  Kremlin,  and  this  non- 
military  but  effective  method  of  taking  over  the  control  of  countries 
was  accomplished  without  effective  opposition  on  our  part  or  on  the 


THE    COMMUNIST   PROGRAM   FOR   WORILD   CONQUEST  31 

part  of  the  U.  N.  The  western  countries  ignored  Communist  aggres- 
sions while  they  concentrated  on  the  rehabilitation  of  their  own  coun- 
tries after  the  war.  Furthermore,  the  western  countries  have  had  con- 
tinuous difficulty  in  adopting  an  honest,  unified  position  vis-a-vis  the 
Soviet  Union.  However,  they  were  all  doin^  their  utmost  to  get  as 
much  as  they  could  in  the  form  of  United  States  military  and  eco- 
nomic aid.  The  Communists  brazenly  violated  their  agreements  made 
with  the  western  countries  and  of  course  made  a  mockery  of  the 
humane  and  elightened  Charter  of  the  United  Nations. 

Mr.  Arens,  "\Vliat  suggestion  do  you  make,  General,  for  a  strategy 
of  the  West  to  cope  with  this  threat  of  international  communism? 

General  Wedemeyer.  I  think  the  most  important  thing  is  educa- 
tion. All  of  our  people  and  people  of  the  world  should  be  given 
factual  information  concerning  communism.  If  the  American  peo- 
ple had  been  told  the  truth  in  an  unemotional  and  objective  manner 
about  Marx,  Stalin,  Lenin,  and  other  Communists,  they  would  have 
compelled  their  own  leaders  to  take  appropriate  action.  When  the 
American  people  know  what  is  going  on,  they  always  have  exercised 
good  judgment.  I  think  they  would  support  programs  of  firm,  real- 
istic action  against  Communist  aggressions  and  penetrations.  As  I 
travel  around  in  our  country  and  in  other  parts  of  the  world,  I  still  find 
a  lack  of  understanding  of  the  problems  presented  by  international 
communism.  Most  people  don't  understand  the  problem  in  China  or 
in  Hungary.  Many  people  are  woefully  ignorant  about  interna- 
tional affairs.  This  is  sometimes  due  to  their  inability  to  obtain  factual 
information.  Often,  too,  it  is  due  to  apathy  or  indifference.  I 
recently  had  some  dental  work  done.  The  doctor  was  an  excellent 
dentist  and  did  a  very  fine  job.  He  discussed  headlines  that  he 
had  read  in  the  newspaper,  which  revealed  startling  ignorance  con- 
cerning communism.  He  is  not  at  all  left  wing  or  communistically 
inclined  but  he  is  definitely  naive  about  the  motives  of  Khrushchev 
and  Bulganin.  It  seems  to  me  education  is  of  paramount  importance. 
The  American  people  must  be  given  simple  truths — for  example,  that 
communism  is  not  a  political  philosophy — the  Communist  Party  is 
not  at  all  like  our  Republican  or  Democratic  Party.  The  Communist 
Party  is  determined  to  subjugate  the  world  and  will  resort  to  murder, 
lies,  slave  camps,  in  fact  any  means  will  be  employed  to  remove  ob- 
stacles and  opponents  to  their  ruthless  plans.  Communism  must  be 
recognized  as  exactly  what  it  is — an  international  conspiracy  to  de- 
stroy faith  in  God,  faith  in  mankind,  faith  in  our  form  of  gov- 
ernment. In  other  words,  it  is  dedicated  to  the  destruction  of  re- 
ligious, political,  social,  and  economic  freedoms.  My  dentist  friend 
explained  that  he  had  little  time  to  read  but  did  refer  to  an  article 
he  had  just  read  in  a  magazine.  I  recognized  at  once  that  this  maga- 
zine has  been  far  left  of  center. 

The  Chairman.  You  mean  "liberal"  ? 

General  Wedemeyer.  Well,  in  a  sense  I  do,  Mr.  Congressman. 
However,  I  think  both  you  and  I  are  true  "liberals,"  and  that  word 
has  been  bandied  about  so  much  it  is  difficult  to  know  exactly  what 
is  meant  when  one  uses  the  term.  Personally  I  am  always  interested 
in  what  motivates  people  who  write  such  articles. 

Mr.  DoTLE.  May  I  inquire  of  the  general  before  the  bell  rings — 
did  you  state  positively  that  the  Soviets  will  communize  the  world, 
in  your  judgment  ? 


32  THE    COMMUNIST   PROGRAM   FOR   WORLD    CONQUEST 

General  Wedemeyer.  No.  I  didn't  state  positively  that  the  Soviets 
would  communize  the  world  and  I'm  soriy  that  I  gave  j^ou  that 
impression,  I  stated,  sir,  that  at  this  time  they  have  the  initiative 
in  the  political,  economic,  and  psychological  fields,  and,  of  course, 
we  all  know  that  their  objective  is  to  communize  the  world. 

Mr.  Doyle.  In  all  fields  of  strategy  they  have  the  initiative? 

General  Wedemeyer.  Yes,  sir;  thev  do.  In  my  opinion  they  are 
gradually  gaining  in  the  accomplishment  of  their  objectives.  In 
other  words,  they  are  gradually  exercising  greater  influence  in  all 
countries  of  the  world,  including  our  own. 

Mr.  Doyle.  Tliey  do  not  intend  to  precipitate  a  world  war? 

General  Wedemeyer.  I  repeat,  Mr.  Congressman,  I  do  not  think 
that  they  intend  to  use  military  force  as  an  instrument  of  national 
policy  at  this  time.  Why  should  they  when  they  are  successful  in 
-using  the  other  three  important  instruments  of  national  policy; 
namely,  political,  economic,  and  psychological  ? 

Mr.  SciiEUER.  Do  you  think  tliey  will  use  military  force  in  the  im- 
mediate future? 

General  Wedemeyer.  No;  I  don't  believe  that  they  intend  to  use 
military  force  in  the  foreseeable  future. 

Mr.  Doyle.  I  didn't  preface  my  question  in  a  way  to  cross-examine 
you. 

General  Wedemeyer.  I  understand,  sir. 

Mr.  Doyle.  You  have  been  conferring  with  Mr.  A  reus  and  our 
staff  as  consultant.  In  relating  these  experiences  that  you  have  had 
I  note  that  they  do  not  pertain  to  a  specific  political  party.  In  other 
words,  the  failures  to  handle  the  problems  created  by  commimism 
do  not  seem  to  attach  to  a  particular  political  party  but  you  asso- 
ciate those  events  with  the  party  that  happened  to  be  in  the  White 
House  at  the  time.    Is  that  correct  ? 

General  Wedemeyer.  Yes,  sir.  I  have  not  had  any  particular  po- 
litical party  or  any  individual  in  mind  as  I  aswered  questions  this 
morning.  I  would  say  that  both  the  Republicans  and  the  Democrats 
are  equally  culpable. 

Mr.  Doyle.  I  would  like  now  to  come  down  to  us  here  in  Congress. 
This  committee  for  instance  and  the.  Subversive  Activities  Control 
Board  have  certain  responsibilities  to  Congress.  What  have  you  to 
recommend  that  we  do  immediately  in  our  field  of  responsibility — 
something  that  we  can  actually  touch  and  reach  ? 

General  Wedemeyer.  Yes,  sir,  I  believe  I  understand.  I  know 
there  is  an  aversion  to  the  creation  of  more  committees  and  more 
special  bureaus;  but  I  think  that  the  assignment  and  hoped-for  re- 
sults of  the  committee  that  I  suggest  would  be  of  tremendous  help  to 
Congress,  as  well  as  to  the  Executive,  in  reaching  sound  solutions  to 
the  complex  problems  facing  our  Nation.  Such  a  gi'oup  would  com- 
prise economists,  historians,  political  scientists,  educators,  industrial- 
ists, bankers,  farmers — men  who  have  had  varied  and  broad  experi- 
ence in  life.  This  group  would  continuously  study  international 
developments.  This  would  require  a  thorough  examination  of  Com- 
munist methods.  Communist  operations,  and  appropriate  recommen- 
dations could  be  provided  to  the  Congress  and  to  responsible  leaders 
of  our  Government. 

Mr.  Doyle.  You  have  lieard,  of  course,  about  the  Rockefeller  com- 
mittee which  recently  submitted  a  report. 


THE   COMMUNIST   PROGRAM   FOR   WORILD    CONQUEST  33 

General  Wedemeyer.  Yes;  I  read  about  Mr.  Eockefeller's  group. 

Mr.  Doyle.  There  are  many  dedicated  citizens  who  have  studied 
these  problems,  that  is,  individuals  outside  of  Conj^ress. 

General  Wedemeyer.  Yes,  sir.  However,  they  have  no  authority, 
no  official  status.  They  might  make  excellent  recommendations  but 
they  are  not  heeded.  If  we  had  a  group  such  as  I  described  working 
under  the  aegis  of  Congress,  I  believe  sound  counsel  and  recommenda- 
tions would  emerge  as  the  basis  for  appropriate  legislation  to  cope 
realistically  with  communism,  both  at  home  and  abroad. 

Mr.  Doyle.  But  the  President  has  such  committees  now  and  he  has 
so  announced. 

General  Wedemeyer.  I  did  not  realize  that  the  President  had  a 
committee  specifically  for  such  purpose. 

Mr.  Doyle.  Yes,  he  has  named  2  or  3  advisory  committees  and  also 
he  has  the  National  Security  Council  which  should  provide  appro- 
priate recommendations. 

General  Wedemeyer.  Does  the  CongTess  have  access  to  the  informa- 
tion provided  the  National  Security  Council  ? 

Mr.  Doyle.  No. 

General  Wedemeyer.  I  think  the  Members  of  Congress  should  be 
given  the  pertinent  information  collected  by  our  intelligence  agen- 
cies— by  the  Central  Intelligence  Agency  and  by  the  mtelligence 
representatives  of  the  three  military  services.  How  can  one  form  in- 
telligent judgments  without  timely  and  factual  information?  We 
need  courage  and  honesty,  as  well  as  intelligence,  in  our  ranks.  The 
advice  and  recommendations  given  to  our  leaders  and  to  Members  of 
Congress  must  be  based  on  real  knowledge  and/or  personal  experi- 
ence. We  should  avoid  the  counsel  of  individuals  who  would  be  in 
any  way  influenced  by  political  expediency,  personal  popularity,  or 
selfish  interests.  Guts,  courage,  integrity,^  intelligence  must,  char- 
acterize our  defense  of  liberty  or  we'll  lose  it. 

Mr.  Doyle.  General,  I  didn't  lay  the  foundation  for  the  information 
that  I  was  apparently  seeking.  In  other  words,  I  am  primarily  think- 
ing of  our  Committee  on  Un-American  Activities.  The  problem  we 
have  in  our  Nation  of  meeting  the  Communist  threat — the  subversive 
threat.    Have  you  had  time  to  form  any  recommendations  on  that? 

General  Wedemeyer.  Sir,  I  think  you  are  now  doing  a  very  con- 
structive job,  namely,  calling  in  so-called  experts  in  various  lines — 
men  and  women  who  had  some  experience  with  communism — to  give 
you  the  benefit  of  their  knowledge  and  experience.  The  information 
that  you  receive  from  the  many  witnesses  who  appear  here  should  help 
you  m  formulating  plans  and  in  recommending  appropriate  legisla- 
tion to  cope  with  the  Communists  and  related  problems. 

The  Chairman.  For  the  majority  of  the  committee  I  will  answer 
that  in  the  affirmative.    That  is  what  we  are  trying  to  do. 

General  Wedeivieyer.  I  think  you  are  doing  a  very  fine  job.  I  do 
read  most  of  the  material  published  by  this  committee. 

Mr.  Doyle.  So  do  I  think  we  are  doing  a  pretty  good  job.  Don't 
misunderstand  me.  I  am  always  on  the  search,  however,  for  the  con- 
sidered opinion  of  men  who  are  on  the  outside  looking  at  us  objec- 
tively and  apparently  making  a  nonofficial  appraisal  or  our  national 
problem  resulting  from  Communist  subversion.  That  is  what  I  am 
aftei\    In  other  words,  I  am  in  search  for  that  particular  thing  be« 


34  THE    COMMUNIST   PROGRAM   FOR   WORLD   CONQUEST 

cause  that  is  the  area  in  which  presently  I  am  officially  responsible 
as  a  member  of  this  committee. 

General  Wedemeyer.  I  have  no  additional  recommendations  to 
make.  As  I  stated  before,  I  am  reading  the  material  which  is  pub- 
lished by  this  committee.  I  am  certain  that  the  members  are  care- 
fully evaluating]:  the  information  that  they  receive  and  that  they  will 
initiate  appropriate  legislation  at  the  propitious  time.  I  think  there 
has  been  a,  gradual  improvement  in  tne  past  10  years  in  connection 
with  alerting  our  fellow  Americans  to  the  dangei-s  of  communism. 
I  still  would  like  to  see  an  even  gi-eater  effort  made.  Mr.  Doyle,  were 
you  in  Congress  approximately  10  years  ago,  that  is,  immediately 
after  World  War  II? 

Mr.  DoYT.E.  Yes ;  I  have  been  here  about  12  vears. 

General  Wedemeyer.  Then  you  may  recall  the  situation  that  ex- 
isted in  this  country,  in  fact  throughout  the  world,  immediately  after 
World  War  II.  We  were  very  trusting  here  in  America  concerning 
the  Kremlin  and  its  policies  and  actions.  Our  approach  was  naive, 
and,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  in  some  quarters,  we  were  very  enthusi- 
astic about  the  Soviet  leaders  and  people.  We  had  defeated  the  Ger- 
mans and  Italians  in  Europe  and  the  Japanese  in  the  Far  East.  We 
all  wanted  to  celebrate  the  victory  and  to  live  in  peace.  It  would 
have  been  impossible  to  convince  most  of  our  fellow  Americans  that 
there  could  be  another  threat  even  greater  than  nazism,  and  that  this 
very  threat  existed  in  the  Soviet  Union. 

The  Chairman.  That  very  thing  was  made  capital  of  by  the  peo- 
ple who  were  and  are  our  enemies.  They  took  advantage  of  our 
friendly  attitude. 

Mr.  Doyle.  General,  I  take  it  that  in  your  opinion  there  is  no 
question  but  that  the  Soviet  Union  intends  economically,  politically, 
and  psychologically,  and  if  need  be  militarily,  to  conquer  the  world? 

General  Wedemeyer.  That  is  correct,  Mr.  Congressman.  There  is 
no  doubt  in  my  mind  that  the  Soviet  Union,  under  present  circum- 
stances and  leadership,  is  committed  to  those  objectives.  They  are 
steeped  in  the  principles  of  Marxism  which  have  never  changed,  but 
the  methods  of  applying  have  been  changed  and  swit^ihed  aoout  in 
whatever  manner  would  promise  success.  The  people  behind  the  Iron 
Curtain  have  had  approximately  two  generations  of  the  Big  Lie — hate, 
propaganda,  distortion  of  facts,  slave  camps,  police  state^  restrictions, 
and  military  oppression.  When  I  lived  in  Germany  during  the  years 
1936-38,  I  observed  the  manner  in  which  the  young  people  were 
indoctrinated  by  the  Nazis.  The  Communists  use  similar  methods, 
even  more  effectively.  Factual  information  is  excluded  from  every- 
one. The  children  are  gathered  together  at  an  early  impressionable 
age  and  subjected  to  propaganda  of  hate  and  suspicion  against  other 
countries.  Most  of  these  young  people  become  fanatic  believers  in 
communism — it  is  almost  a  religion  with  them.  Imagine  after  sev- 
eral generations  have  passed  wim  this  type  of  indoctrination,  exclud- 
ing the  truth,  distorting  history — the  effect  upon  the  masses  of  people 
behind  the  Iron  Curtain. 

Mr.  Doyle.  That  applies,  you  mean,  to  the  younger  generation  in 
Russia  too? 

General  Wedemeyer.  Exactly.    Yes,  sir. 

Mr.  Doyle.  I  think  that  is  right. 


THE    COMMUNIST   PROGRAM   FOR   WORLD    CONQUEST  35 

General  Wedemeyer.  Yes,  the  Kussian  children  are  being  indoc- 
trinated to  believe  in  the  righteousness  of  their  cause,  that  any  means 
justifies  the  attainment  of  the  Soviet  objectives.  Kill,  lie,  distort, 
torture — all  are  fully  justified  in  the  Soviet  conscience  because  they 
are  so  dedicated  to  the  attainment  of  Marxian,  Leninist,  or  Stalinist 
objectives. 

Mr.  DoTLE.  Thank  you  very  much,  General. 

Mr.  Arens.  Mr.  Chairman,  we  have  no  further  questions. 

The  Chairman.  I  have  none. 

General  Wedemeyer.  I  have  never  met  Congressman  Walter  before 
but  knew  Senator  McCarran  quite  well,  and  admired  and  respected 
him.  I  have  read  very  carefully  the  Walter-McCarran  Act  pertain- 
ing to  immigration.  It  is  excellent  legislation  and  should,  in  my 
considered  opinion,  be  given  a  thorough  and  extended  application 
before  any  modifications  are  accepted  by  the  Congress.  It  may  be 
that  changing  conditions  later  on  would  justify  a  few  modifications, 
iDut  I  think  it  would  be  a  mistake  to  effect  changes  at  the  present  time. 

The  Chairman.  Of  course  we  had  in  mind  in  drafting  the  act,  and 
as  you  know  it  took  us  nearly  5  years  to  put  together  this  measure,  the 
best  interests  of  the  United  States.  We  were  subjected  to  pressures 
from  all  sides  by  all  sorts  of  so-called  minority  groups.  But,  fortu- 
nately, we  had  two  committees  which  withstood  the  pressures. 

General,  on  behalf  of  the  committee — and  I  am  sure  of  the  entire 
Congress — ^I  want  to  extend  to  you  our  thanks  for  this  enlightening 
contribution.  Too  few  people  realize  exactly  the  seriousness  of  this 
world  situation.  We  in  the  United  States  are  fortunate  in  having 
at  our  disposal,  whether  we  use  them  properly  or  not,  people  who 
can  supply  the  sort  of  information  that  will  make  it  possible  for  this 
great  Republic  of  ours  to  survive. 

I  again  extend  to  you  our  thanks. 

General  Wedemeyer.  Thank  you,  sir. 

(Wliereupon,  at  11 :  50  a.  m.,  Tuesday,  January  21,  1958,  the  com- 
mittee was  recessed,  subject  to  call.) 

o 


INDEX 


Individuals 

Page 

Bulganin  (Nikolai  A) 12,  31 

Chiang  Kai-shek 20,  21,  26,  29 

Chou  En-lai 19,  21 

Chu  Teh 19 

Churchill,  Winston 17 

Craig,  Malin 6 

Fellers,   Bonner 25 

Goebbels    (Joseph) 6 

Goering  (Hermann) 6 

Henderson,  Loy 11 

Hess    (Rudolph) 6 

Hitler  (Adolf) 3,  6,  9 

Hopkins,  Harry  L 11 

Hurley  (Patrick  Jay) 6 

Jodl  (Alfred) 6 

Khrushchev  (Nikita) 1,8,12,  15,31 

MacArthur  (Douglas) 29 

Macmillan  (Harold) 25 

Mao  Tse-tung 19 

Marshall  (George  C) L 6,  7,  10,  11,  20,  21 

Marx,  Karl 3,  9 

Mountbatten,  Louis 6,  29 

Reed,   Douglas 16 

Rickover  (Hyuian  G) 27 

Rockefeller  (Nelson  A) 33 

Rommel    (Erwin) 17 

Stilwell  (Joseph  W) 6 

Stuart,  (John)  Leighton ^ 7 

Tito  (Josip  Broz) 26 

Truman  (Harry  S) 6,7,29 

von  Stauffenburg,  Klaus 6 

"Wedemeyer,  Albert  C-^ 1-35  (statement) 

Organizations 

China,  Nationalist  Government '_ 20 

Czechoslovakia,  Government  of.  Interior  Department 80 

Egypt,  Government  of 11,  12 

German  War  College 6 

North  Atlantic  Treaty  Organization. 26 

Sun  Yat-sen  University  (Moscow) 19 

United  Nations  Relief  and  Rehabilitation  Administration  (UNRRA) 13 

United  States  Government,  National  Security  Council 12,  33 

United   Nations 31 

Publications 

Communist  Manifesto 3,  9 

Das  Kapital 3,  9 

Mein  Kampf 3,  9 

Somewhere  South  of  Suez  (book) 16 

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