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Full text of "The communist program for world conquest"

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THE COMMUNIST PROGRAM 
FOR WORLD CONQUEST 



CONSULTATION WITH 

GEN. ALBERT C. WEDEMEYER 

UNITED STATES ARMY 



COMMITTEE ON UN-AMERICAN ACTIVITIES 
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

EIGHTY-FIFTH CONGRESS 
SECOND SESSION 



JANUARY 21, 1958 
(INCLUDING INDEX) 




Printed for the use of the Committee on Un-American Activities 



UNITED STATES 
GOVERNMENT PPwINTING OFFICE 
22858° WASHINGTON : 1958 



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?^-.' I ^,'W^ 



COMMITTEE ON UN-AMERICAN ACTIVITIES 

United States House of Representatives 

FRANCIS E. WALTER, Pennsylvania, Chairman 

MORGAN M. MOULDER, Missouri BERNARD W. KEARNEY. New York 

CLYDE DOYLE, California DONALD L. JACKSON. California 

EDWIN E. WILLIS. Louisiana GORDON 11. SCHERER. Ohio 

WILLIAM M. TUCK, Virginia ROBERT J. McINTOSII, Michigan 

RiciiAKD AnEXS, Staff Director 
n 






:^ 



CONTENTS 



Page 

Synopsis 1 

January 21, 1958, Consultation with : 

Gen. Albert 0. Wedemeyer, United States Army 5 

Index i 

III 






PuBLio Law 601, 79th Congress 

The legislation under which the House Committee on Un-American 
Activities operates is Public Law 601, 79th Congress [1946], chapter 
753, 2d session, which provides : 

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States 
of America in Congress assembled, » * • 

PART 2— EULES OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

Rule X 

SEC. 121. STANDING COMMITTEES 

17. Committee on Un-American Activities, to consist of nine Meonbers. 

Rule XI 

POWERS AND DUTIES OF COMMITTEES 

* * >K * • * * 

(q) (1) Committee on Un-American Activities. 

(A) Un-American activities. 

(2) Tlie Committee on Un-American Activities, as a wliole or by subcommittee, 
is autliorized to make from time to time investigations of (i) the extent, char- 
acter, and objects of un-American propaganda activities in the United States, 
(ii) the diffusion within the United States of subversive and un-American propa- 
ganda that is instigated from foreign countries or of a domestic origin and 
attacks the principle of the form of government as guaranteed by our Constitu- 
tion, and (iii) all other questions in relation thereto that would aid Congress in 
any necessary remedial legislation. 

The Committee on Un-American Activities shall report to the House (or to the 
Clerk of the House if the House is not in session) the results of any such investi- 
gation, together with such recommendations as it deems advisable. 

For the purpose of any such investigation, the Committee on Un-American 
Activities, or any subcommittee thereof, is authorized to sit and act at such times 
and places within the United States, whether or not the House is sitting, has 
recessed, or has adjourned, to hold such hearings, to require the attendance of 
such witnesses and the production of such books, papers, and documents, and to 
take such testimony, as it deems necessary. Subpenas may be issued under 
the signature of the chairman of the committee or any subcommittee, or by any 
member designated by any such chairman, and may be served by any person 
designated by any such chairman or member. 

• « * « * * * 

Rule XII 

LEGISLATIVE OVEKSIGHT BY STANDING COMMITTEES 

Sec 136. To assist the Congress in appraising the administration of the laws 
and in developing such amendments or related legislation as It may deem neces- 
sary, each standing committee of the Senate and House of Representatives shall 
exercise continuous watchfulness of the execution by the administrative agencies 
concerned of any laws, the subject matter of which is within the jurisdiction of 
such committee ; and, for that purpose, shall study all pertinent reports and data 
submitted to the Congress by the agencies in the executive branch of the Govern- 
ment. 



RULES ADOPTED BY THE 85TH CONGRESS 

House Resolution 5, January 3, 1957 

• **••*• 

Rule X 

BTANDINQ COMMITTEES 

1. There shall be elected by the House, at the commencement of each Congress, 

• •••••• 

(q) Committee on Un-American Activities, to consist of nine Members. 

• ***••• 

Rule XI 

POWERS AND DUTIES OF COMMirfEES 

17. Committee on Un-American Activities. 

(a) Uu-Americau activities. 

(b) The Committee on Un-American Activities, as a whole or by subcommittee. 
Is authorized to make from time to time investigations of (1) the, extent, cl)ar- 
acter, and ol)jects of un-American propaganda activities in the United States, 
(2) the diffusion within the United States of suliver.<:ive and un-American prop- 
aganda that is instigated from foreign countries or of a domestic origin and 
attaclvs the principle of the form of government as guaranteed by our Constitu- 
tion, and (3) all other questions in relation thereto that would aid Congress in 
any necassary remedial legislation. 

The Committee on Un-American Activities shall report to the House (or to tiie 
Clerk of the House if the House is not in session) the results of any such investi- 
gation, together with such recommendations as it deems advisable. 

For the purpose of any such investigation, the Committee on Un-American 
Activities, or any subcommittee thereof, is authorized to sit and act at such times 
and places within the United States, whether or not the House is sitting, has 
recessed, or has adjourned, to hold such hearings, to require the attendance of 
such witnesses and the production of such books, papers, and documents, and to 
take such testimony, as it deems necessary. Subpenas may be issued under the 
signature of the chairman of the committee or any subcommittee, or by any 
member designated by any such chairman, and may be served by any person 
designated by any such chairman or member. 

26. To assist the House in appraising the administration of the laws and in 
developing such amendments or related legislation as it may deem necessary, 
each standing committee of the House shall exercise continuous watchfulness 
of the execution by tlie administrative agencies concerned of any laws, the 
subject matter of which is within the jurisdiction of sucli committee; and, for 
that purpose, shall study all pertinent reports and data submitted to the House 
by the agencies in the executive branch of the Govermneut. 

VI 



SYNOPSIS 

Economic and psychological weapons rather than the launching of 
a third world war comprise the current Communist, program for 
world conquest, General Albert C. Wedemeyer warned in a consulta- 
tion with the Committee on Un-American Activities. One of the 
top strategic planners of World War II, General Wedemeyer was 
present at many international conferences as adviser to the President. 
He att-ended the conferences in Washington, London, Cairo, Quebec, 
and Casablanca before going to China as theater commander in 1944. 

"They (the Communists) are attaining their objectives without the 
use of military force," General Wedemeyer said : 

If I were the senior planner in the Soviet hierarchy, I 
would advise Khrushchev: "Continue to do exactly what 
you are doing now. Do not involve the Soviet Union in a 
major war but employ the satellites in brush fires or lim- 
ited wars against our enemies, the capitalist countries. Con- 
tinue penetration economically and psychologically, utilize 
economic or military aid to as many countries in the world 
as possible. They can be made indebted to the Soviet, and 
if not loyal, at least they will not be opposed to the Com- 
munist movement." 

"I do not believe that they intend to precipitate an all-out war," 
he declared. 

I have not felt that war was imminent at any time since 
World War II even when there were incidents that might 
have easily touched off a world struggle. You may recall 
the Berlin airlift, for example. There have been many other 
incidents that could have started a war if the Soviets had any 
desire to start an all-out war. They will continue to spread 
communism utilizing economic and psychological weapons. 

General Wedemeyer warned that the Soviet Union today has 
"greater military capabilities than do we." 

, This has been true ever- since the end of World War II 
when we emasculated our military forces and at the same 
time permitted the Soviet to retam a massive army, a big 
navy, and air force. At one time we had a technological ad- 
vantage, particularly in the atomic weapon field, which served 
as a deterrent. 

General Wedemeyer expressed the view that it is now too late for 
the West on the Soviet timetable for world domination, but he added : 

However, I am not completely pessimistic about our chances 
to recover a sufficiently strong strategic posture vis-a-vis the 
Soviet. If we make a careful analysis of all of the countries 
■which endanger our position, evaluate their capabilities and 

1 



THE COMMUNIST PROGRAM FOR WORLD CONQUEST 

their limitations, and then determine how much assistance, 
realistic or passive, that we might expect from allies, and 
finally consider our own potential strength, I think that we 
would find our position in the world is not without hope, in 
fact we would be most optimistic if we could foresee the coor- 
dinated employment of all the positive forces that we have on 
our side to counter our potential enemies and to overcome ob- 
stacles ofi'ered by them to the attainment of our objectives. 

I have confidence in American ingenuity, in our courage, 
and in our capacity to plan intelligently it we are only pro- 
vided the direction from responsible leaders. But we must 
bring about concerted action to attain our goals and stop the 
indiscriminate and uncoordinated use of our political, eco- 
nomic, psychological, and military forces. 

General Wedemeyer continued : 

We have wonderful opportunities in the struggle against 
conununism if we would use our economic weapon intelligent- 
ly. In helping other peoples economically we should be care- 
ful not to do so on a charity basis. Such an approach makes 
the recipient or beneficiary lose his self-respect. Outright 
charity undermines the moral fiber of an individual or of a 
nation. But we can provide economic or technical aid in such 
a manner as to enable the recipient peoples to help themselves 
and even make it possible for them to i-eturn or pay back our 
largess. One cannot help but pay tril)ute to the brave and 
self-respecting Finns. They were the only people who paid 
their World War I debt to the United States. ^ All other so- 
called allies, the recipients of our loans and aid in other forms, 
reneged. 

He cautioned, however, that — 

I would not vote one penny to any country unless I had evi- 
dence of their good faith and of their unswerving loyalty in 
the cooperative effort with us toward the attainment of com- 
mon objectives: one important one, of course, is protecting 
the Free World against the scourge of communism. I am 
not suggesting that each one of these countries to whom we 
give military and economic aid shoidd have exactly the same 
objectives in the international field, but I would insist that 
their objectives must be compatible' with our own. In other 
Avords, if the l^ritish insist on trading with Red China and 
thus strengthening the Communists who present a grave 
danger to United States interests, then I would discontinue 
military or economic aid to the British. 

When I make a statement like that, Britishers and Ameri- 
can "one-worlders" will say that they are not trading in stra- 
tegic items. When they use the term "strategic items," they 
mean, of course, airplanes, tanks, ammunition, I presume, 
liut I insist that any item of trade — a spool of thread, wheat, 
automobiles, or coffee — assists the economy of Red China. 
I believe in denying those areas under Communist rule 
any economic or military assistance. Furthermore I would 
break oil' diplomatic relations with them. 



THE COMMUNIST PROGRAM FOR WORILD CONQUEST 3 

In suggesting these ideas to the committee, I wish to em- 
phasize that I am not an isolationist. No country can isolate 
itself from the world today. If this be a fact, the United 
States should participate in international developments and 
relations with intelligence, always mindful of the fact that 
we must be actuated by self-respect. 

In other words, every step that we take should protect our 
security and our economy. Let us be realistic and under- 
stand that all other countries conduct their foreign policies 
in that manner. 

Despite the apparent changes in Soviet tactics, the ultimate objec- 
tives of communism are unchangeable. General Wedemeyer declared i 

The objectives of the Soviet are clearly stated in the Com- 
munist Manifesto and again developed in the two volumes 
of Das Kapital by Karl Marx. These Soviet objectives are 
available for the public to read. Hitler announced to the 
world in the same unmistakable manner his objectives in a 
book, Mein Kampf. But no one paid any attention to Hit- 
ler's attempt to warn the world of his intentions. I wonder 
if we are paying sufficient attention to the Communist objec- 
tives? The overall, clearly announced objective of interna- 
tional communism is to free the proletariat from exploitation 
by the bourgeoisie. The masses are to be protected from 
the scheming capitalists. The world is to be communized. 

There is no possibility of compromise with the Soviet Union and 
world communism. General Wedemeyer asserted, inasmuch as "kill, 
lie, distort, torture — all are fully justified in the Soviet conscience 
because they are so dedicated to the attainment of Marxian, Leninist, 
or Stalinist objectives." 



22858* 



THE COMMUNIST PROGRAM FOR WORLD CONQUEST 



TUESDAY, JANUARY 21, 1958 

United States House of Representatives, 

Committee on Un-American Activities, 

Washington^ D. 0. 

The Committee on Un-American Activities met, pursuant to call, at 
10 a. m., in room 225, Old House Office Building, Washington, D. C, 
Hon. Clyde Doyle, presiding. 

Committee members present: Representatives Francis E. Walter, 
of Pennsylvania, chairman of the committee (appearance as noted) ; 
Clyde Doyle, of California ; Bernard W. Kearney, of New York ; and 
Gordon H. Scherer, of Ohio. 

Staff members present : Richard Arens, staff director, and William 
F. Heimlich, consultant. 

Mr. DoTLE. In the absence of the distinguished committee chairman, 
Francis E. Walter, temporarily, I am calling the meeting to order. 

We are favored this morning with the testimony of Gen. Albert C. 
Wedemeyer. 

We appreciate very much. General, your being with us. 

What is the first order of business, Mr. Arens ? 

Mr. Arens. If you please, Mr. Chairman, I would suggest that the 
general might for our record, at this time, give a brief sketch of his 
career. 

Mr. Kearney. May I interrupt, please. Is it necessary that the 
general be sworn? 

Mr. Arens. It has not been the practice of the committee to swear 
persons who are in consultation on international communism as distinct 
from persons who might be testifying for the purpose of identifying 
persons. 

Mr. Kearney. In other words, you mean the general is not going to 
take the fifth amendment. 

Mr. Arens. I do not anticipate so. 

General Wedemeyer. I would gladly be sworn if you want me to be. 

Mr. Kearney. No. 

Mr. Doyle. I think no doubt the record will show the committee 
members present. 

Mr. Arens. I respectfully suggest, General, you might give us the 
highlights of your most distinguished career. 

GEN. ALBERT C. WEDEMEYEE, UNITED STATES ARMY (RETIRED) 

General Wedemeyer. My name is Albert C. Wedemeyer. I am a 
retired general of the United States Army. My career in the Army 
included cadet service at West Point, lieutenant in June 1919, and the 

5 



6 THE COMMUNIST PROGRAM FOR WORLD CONQUEST 

usual eomjiany and field grades in the infantry and finally reached 
general oflicer rank in 1942. 

After I completed 2 years at the United States Army staff school 
at Fort Ijoavenworth, I was assigned as a student by the War Depart- 
ment to the German War College located in 13erlin, Germany. This 
experience of 2i/^ years as a student and resident in Germany greatly 
stimulated my interest in international developments. 

i\rr. Sen EUER. What year was tliat, General Wedemeyer ? 

General Wedemeyer. I Avas in Germany from July 1936 to October 
1938, which of course were very eventful years in central Europe. 
During that period nazism was at its peak in power. While in Ger- 
many I met many of the Nazi leaders, including Hess, Goering, and 
Goebbels, and of course I was thrown in contact even more with the 
senior military leaders as well as the military officers at the German 
War College, both students and instructors. For example, Jodl, who 
later became Hitler's strategic adviser with the rank of colonel gen- 
eral, was my instructor. Count Klaus von Stauffenburg, the oflicer 
who placed a bomb under a desk in an abortive attempt to kill Hitler 
on July 20, 19-44, was my classmate in the German War College. Von 
Stauffenberg was a very unusual man — intelligent, courageous — and I 
considered him a good friend. All of these contacts and the oppor- 
tunity of reading and hearing about nazism, fascism, and communism 
aroused my curiosity. I tried to understand the. conditions that stim- 
ulated or generated those "isms," and made it possible for their propo- 
nents to gain the attention and ofttimes the fanatic support of so many 
people. Obviously these were unique opportunities to observe and 
ex))(^rience momentous events leading up to World War II. 

The instruction at the German War College was far superior to that 
which I experienced at our own staff school at Leavenworth. Tlie 
students in Germany were required to study history and were 
thoroughly grounded in the fundamentals of military science, tactics, 
and strategy. 

At the conclusion of my service in Germany, I submitted an official 
report to the War De])artment. The Chief of Staff of our Army at 
that time was Gen. Malin Craig. 

Mr. SciiERER. What was your rank at that time ? 

General AVEDE:NrEYER. I was a captain. I was 17 years a lieutenant. 
This may seem unusiuil but in prewar days promotion was very slow. 
After World War II began, promotion was rapid. Upon my return 
from duty in Germany, I was assigned to troop duty at Fort Benning 
and then after 1 year there I was brought into the War Plans Division 
of the General Staff in Washington. In this assignment I assisted 
in the preparation of our strategy, and during the first few years of 
the war I attended world conferences in London, Washington, Casa- 
blanca, Cairo, and Quebec with General Marshall. In September 
1943 I was assigned to duty in the Southeast Asia Command with 
Admiral Mountbatten and then a year later, 1944, 1 was sent to China 
to relieve General Stilwell as theater commander. I held that post 
imtil May of 1946 when the theater was disbanded. I returned to the 
States ostensibly to be Ambassador to China. Mr. Truman had asked 
me to accept that post after General Hurley resigned in the fall of 
1945. General Marshall urged me to do so and I agreed. However, 
the news concerning my prospective appointment as Ambassador to 
China leaked in that part of the world. General Marshall at the time 



THE COMMUNIST PROGRAM FOR WORI.D CONQUEST 7 

was conducting delicate negotiations involving Nationalists and Com- 
munists, and apparently he felt that the news of my appointment was 
militating against the success of his negotiations, particularly because 
the Communists objected violently. Accordingly General Marshall 
radioed to President Truman requesting the appointment of Dr^ 
Leighton Stuart, an American missionary living in China. In that 
radiogram he asked that General Wedemeyer be notified that he would 
be appointed later. 

Mr. Arens. General, would you give us a thumbnail sketch of the 
functions you performed in World War II in strategy and policy for 
the global operations of the United States ? 

General Wedemeyer. Yes; shortly after my return from Europe 
and immediately prior to World War II, I was assigned to the Gen- 
eral Staff, War Plans Division, and by the spring of 1942 I was put 
in charge of the strategic policy and plans group. This group had 
the responsibility of conducting strategic studies, evolving plans for 
the employment of our forces and coordinating our war effort with 
allies. Our objective was to insure that the military effort would 
protect America's interests and accomplish our objectives at home and 
abroad. 

To state this point in another way, I felt that it was very important 
at war's end to insure that Anglo-American forces would be occupying 
most of Western Europe and the Balkans. Some of us recognized the 
danger of international communism and, although the Soviet Union 
was an ally, we wanted to insure that the Communist forces could not 
fill the vacua created by killing and destruction during the course 
of the war throughout Europe. 

Most of us interpreted nazism as a strong nationalist movement 
whereas we felt that communism was an international movement sup- 
ported by a worldwide conspiratorial effort. As we viewed it then, 
nazism would take unfair advantage^ would subvert or conquer areas 
in their narrow, strongly nationalistic interests, whereas communism 
was worldwide in scope and visualized the enslavement or conquering 
of all peoples. 

Mr. Arens. With that brief personal sketch on the record, may we 
ask you to give your characterization or appraisal of the struggle of 
the world today as between the East and the West ? 

General Wedemeyer. In the first instance I think that the West 
is overshadowed by international communism. I think that com- 
munism is gaining instead of losing strength in the world. You are 
familiar with history and therefore all of you realize that a struggle 
between nations and peoples haS always been going on. 

There is nothing new about such struggle, but we Americans after 
World War II were either naive, or too trusting. There is consider- 
able evidence to prove that there were malicious influences in key 
places of our Government. But any one or a combination of these cir- 
cumstances permitted a critical situation to develop after World War 
II, namely, the Soviet emerged all powerful — and our war aims for 
which we sacrificed so much were not accomplished. 

We continued to give vast sums of money and materials and even 
our moral support alter the war to the Soviet Union and her satellites. 
In other words, communism gained its position as a world power 
through our own lack of appreciation of the dangers inherent in 
communism. 



8 THE COMMUNIST PROGRAM FOR WORLD CONQUEST 

You gentlemen may have more knowledge than I do about the re- 
sponsibility for these developments. Today communism, in my judg- 
ment, is increasing in its influence and strength, not only in the militai-y 
field but in scientific accomplishments. Sputnik is just one example. 

Several years a^o they had a fighter plane — the MIG-15 — that was 
superior to our Saner Jets in Korea. These planes could outmaneuver 
our fighter aircraft and reach higher altitudes. Recently they devel- 
oped an icebreaker with atomic power. In their schooling, their edu- 
cational system, one cannot help but be impressed by the number of 
engineers and applied scientists they have trained. In pure science 
as well as api)lica science they seem to be ahead of us. 

The Soviets have been improving steadily and they have even forged 
ahead in many fields — education, production, technology, sciences, 
athletics, for example. 

If I were the senior planner in the Soviet hierarchy, I would advise 
Khrushchev : "Continue to do exactly what you are doinj; now. Do 
not involve the Soviet Union in a major war but employ the satellites 
in brush fires or limited wars against our enemies, the capitalist coun- 
tries. Continue penetration, economically and psychologically, utilize 
economic or military aid to as many countries in the world as possible. 
They can be made indebted to the Soviet, and if not loyal, at least they 
will not be opposed to the Communist movement." 

One could cite numerous examples of their clever use of the economic 
aid as a strategic weapon. 

Mr. Arens. As we look at the other side of the coin, what do you 
believe to be the global strategy of the Soviets? 

General Wedemeyer. I do not believe that they intend to precipitate 
an all-out war. I have not felt that war was imminent at any time 
since "World "War II even when there were incidents that might have 
easily touched off a world struggle. You may recall the Berlin air- 
lift, for example. There have been many other incidents that could 
have started a war if the Soviets had any desire to start an all-out 
war. They will continue to spread communism utilizing economic 
and psychological weapons. 

Mr. SciiERER. Mr. Chairman, may I ask a question that I think is 
pertinent right at this point? 

Mr. Doyle. Yes. 

Mr. ScHERER. You say Russia is not interested in precipitating — or 
you do not believe they will precipitate a world war or struggle. Is 
it because they have made so much progress without such a war that 
you do not believe that they will precipitate us into another world war? 

General "Wedeiieyer. Yes ; I think that is a sound conclusion. JNfay 
I just explain to you my concept of strategy, in lay language. 
The term "strategy" disturbs many people just as the word "propa- 
ganda" does. I define "strategy" as the art and science of usin<T all 
of a nation's available resources to accomplish national objectives. 
There are four major categories of resources: political, economic, 
psychological, and military. If the first three of these resources — tliat 
is, political, economic, and psychological — are employed intelligently 
and boldly in consonance with a well-thought-out plan, it may never 
be necessary to use actively our military force. Obviously that is 
exactly what we should do at all times — prevent war and yet accom- 
plish our national aims. But we must retain military force — appro- 



THE COMMUNIST PROGRAM FOR WORLD CONQUEST 9 

priate in strength and composition to our possible need in emergency. 
In our commmiities we employ the police to maintain order and to 
protect people who respect the law against those who would violate 
it. In the international arena we must do likewise, only calling on the 
military when all other means fail to accomplish our purposes. 

Mr. ScHERER. The Soviets have been very successful in using these 
first three resources. 

General Wedemeyer. In my opinion, yes. 

Mr. Arens. I think you may want to clarify the record. The Con- 
gressman asked you about a war. I am sure he had in mind a shooting 
war in which guns and missiles would be employed. Is there any 
doubt in your mind but what the Soviet Union and her satellites are 
presently engaged in war, with the United States as their No. 1 target? 

General Wedemeyer. We associate shooting and the employment of 
military force with war. When we employ the other three resources — 
political, economic, and psychological — I term such employment not in 
the sense of war but as a struggle going on with other nations. 

Mr. Arens. What is the objective of the Soviet Union and its 
satellites ? 

General Wedemeyer. The objectives of the Soviet are clearly stated 
in the Communist Manifesto and again developed in the two volumes 
of Das Kafital by Karl Marx. These Soviet objectives are available 
for the public to read. Hitler announced to the world in the same 
unmistakable manner his objectives in a book, Mein Kamff. But no 
one paid any attention to Hitler's attempt to warn the world of his 
intentions. I wonder if we are paying sufficient attention to the Com- 
munist objectives? The overall, clearly announced objective of inter- 
national communism is to free the proletariat from exploitation by the 
bourgeoisie. The masses are to be protected from the scheming 
capitalists. The world is to be communized. 

Mr. Kearney. General, you answered, as I understand it, that Rus- 
sia at the present time does not want to have a shooting war % 

General Wedemeyer. I do not believe they do, sir. 

Mr. Kearney. Is that due to the fact that Russia is obtaining its 
objeetives without a shooting war, or is it due to the fact that they do 
not trust their satellites ? 

General Wedemeyer. It is due primarily to the fact that they are 
attaining their objectives without the use of military force. It is true 
that they are compelled to accei)t reverses at times in particular areas 
but they invariaoly are making headway in some other areas. 
Furthermore, although they may suffer a setback in a specific area, 
later on they conduct their plans in such a way as to recover their 
losses and actually make gains in that same area. 

Mr. Kearney. Then may I ask you, in case of a shooting war, in 
your opinion could Russia depend upon her satellites in view of the 
riots in Poland, the East German June 1953 riots, and the recent 
Hungarian revolution ? 

General Wedemeyer. It is my opinion that the Soviet Union could 
not depend upon her satellites or upon the millions of oppressed peo- 
ples within her own borders in the event of a war, which would pro- 
duce opportunities to defect with a chance of success. Under such 
conditions there would be opportunities for the western nations to 
exploit defections that occur in the satellite countries and even in 



10 THE CXDMMUlSnST PROGRAM FOR WORLD CONQUEST 

Russia. In connection M'ith tlie attitude or the possible defection of 
peoples behind the Iron Curtain, may I supfgest, General Kearney, 
that vre consider extending our own efforts to bring about and support 
such defections. For example, we are expending billions of dollars 
for weapons that will kill and destroy. We are assembling tlie best 
brains in the country to insure that we surpass other countries, partic- 
ularly the Soviet Union, in the development of ultradestructive weap- 
ons. But I, personally, would like concurrently to recommend the 
collection of brains and the expenditure of effort — billions of dollars, 
if necessary — to find out what we can do to reach tlie minds of peoples 
behind the Iron Curtain, to win their loyalties and sympathetic under- 
standing, and thus avoid the possibility of a destructive thermonuclear 
war. There are two points that we must make crystal clear to our 
potential enemies, neutrals, and friends : First, that we are sincere in 
our desire for peace and in our willingness to cooperate realistically 
to protect the freedoms and improve opportunities of the individual 
of any clime, race, or creed; and second, that we are determined to use 
every resource at our command to destroy communism, or any other 
"ism'' that jeopardizes peace in the world. Unless we undertake suc- 
cessfully such an approach to our international problems, civilization 
as we know it will be retarded at least a thousand years. Let's put 
constructive ideas instead of hydrogen bombs in the nose cone of our 
missiles. 

Mr. Kearnky. With that I thoroughly agree. When you speak as 
you do about the best brains now trying to figure out ways and means 
of bringing into being weapons that can win a shooting war, we have 
only to go back to your original statement that after World War II we 
just practically disbanded the greatest fighting force in the world 
while Russia, without the loss of a Russian soldier, took over about 
800 million people. 

General Wedemeyer. General Kearney, we had plenty of evidence 
before and during AVorld War II of the recalcitrance of the Soviet 
Union, of their motives, and their unscrupulous arrogant methods. 
They at all times had their selfish interests in mind and would not co- 
operate except when it would be advantageous to them, and to them 
alone. As a strategic planner on the General Staff in Washington 
during the early days of the war, I frequently contacted Russian rep- 
resentatives and asked them where, when, and how they planned to use 
the equipment that they were demanding or requisitioning from us — 
for example, airplanes, tanks, guns, thousands of tons of equipment of 
all kinds. We were pouring war supplies into the Soviet Union, often 
at great sacrifice to our own forces which we were generating here at 
home and preparing for shipment to prosi^ective areas of employment 
against the enemy. But General Kearney, the Russian representatives 
would not cooperate with regard to explaining where and wlien they 
intended to use the munitions we were shipping to them. In fact they 
were very cool and even suspicious when one approached them con- 
cerning any problem. They refused to give any indication of their 
prospective plans in fighting the Germans yet they were supposed to 
be an ally. I tried to explain carefully my purpose in determining 
where, how, and when they would use the tanks, airplanes, and so 
forth, against the common enemy. For example, I had to recommend 
to General ^Marshall priorities for allocation of the equipment, not 



THE COMMUNIST PROGRAM FOR WORLD CONQUEST 11 

only to Russia but to England and other allies. If England could 
use the tanks more effectively and more quickly against the enemy, 
it seemed to me that she should get higher priority. I mentioned my 
difficulty in this regard to General Marshall and to Harry Hopkins, 
as well as to others in positions of responsibility but got nowhere. 
One of the ablest men in the State Department, Mr. Loy Henderson, 
considered an expert in dealing with Russia, attempted to help me. 
He recognized the importance of allocating our war materiels on the 
basis of its most effective use against the enemy. But the Soviet 
representatives would not cooperate in any respect. 

Mr. Arens. May I ask you, General, concerning the instruments 
of national policy which you described : Do you feel that the Soviet 
Union uses these instruments effectively in its designs for world con- 
quest ? 

General Wedemeyer. Yes, I do. They use economic and psycho- 
logical weapons most effectively. We know that the Soviet Union does 
not honor any treaty or agreement unless advantage accrues to them. 
They have been very clever in penetrating in various countries the 
Department of Interior, which is really the department responsible for 
internal security matters. After the Communists obtain control of the 
secret police and administrative setup of the security department, they 
can easily take over the government by intimidating or removing re- 
sponsible officials in other departments. Czechoslovakia is an example 
of this technique, but similar tactics were employed in Hungary and 
throughout the Balkan States. Lithuania, Estonia, and Latvia were 
overpowered quickly and brought into the Soviet Union against the 
will of the inhabitants. 

We have wonderful opportunities in the struggle against comrnu- 
nism if we would use our economic weapon intelligently. In helping 
other peoples economically we should be careful not to do so on a 
charity basis. Such an approach makes the recipient or beneficiary 
lose his self-respect. Outright charity undermines the moral fiber 
of an individual or of a nation. But we can provide economic or tech- 
nical aid in such a manner as to enable the recipient peoples to help 
themselves and even make it possible for them to return or pay back our 
largess. One cannot help but pay tribute to the brave and self- 
respecting Finns. They were the only people who paid their World 
War I debt to the United States. All other so-called allies, the 
recipients of our loans and aid in other forms, reneged. 

Mr. Kearney. And we kicked the Finns in the pants later. 

General Wedemeyer. YeSj we did, very much as we turned our backs 
on loyal allies, the Nationalist Chinese, after World War II. May I 
give you a concrete example of the manner in which the Russians use 
the economic weapon in their campaign to control and communize 
other countries ? 

Some few years back the Egyptians wanted to buy wheat from the 
United States. The Egyptian Ambassador negotiated here in Wash- 
ington with appropriate officials. Nothing came of the negotiations 
and as time went on the Egyptian Government continued to prompt 
its Ambassador to do something about it. However, he was unable to 
get a definitive answer from anyone in authority in the State Depart- 
ment. The Egyptians were perfectly willing to pay for the wheat in 
dollars and they sorely needed it for their people. Finally in some 

22858°— 5S 3 



12 THE (COMMUNIST PROGRAM FOR WORLD CONQUEST 

unknown manner the Soviet Union learned of the Egyptian attempt 
to get wheat from the United States. This Avas not understood by 
the Egyptian Ambassador or his Government for all of the negotia- 
tions had been conducted in the utmost secrecy with United States 
officials. In a short time the Soviet Union offered the Egyptian 
Government all the wheat it would require, and at tirst there were no 
strings attached. Gradually, however, the quality of the wheat de- 
teriorated and there were other disagreeable features injected by the 
Soviet Union. This cooperative action on the part of the Soviet 
Union was known by all of the Egyptians and was, of course, inter- 
preted as a friendly gesture by them. Further, the Soviet Union 
agents in Egypt made it their duty to insure that all of tlie Egyptians 
were told that the United States refused to sell wheat to tlie Egyptian 
Government and the Soviet Union voluntarily came forward and 
provided the wheat. Then we wonder why people do not know about, 
or seem to misinterpret, our actions and policies. 

Another feature of the Soviet tactics in using the economic weapon : 
Before Khrushchev or Bulganin visit a foreign country, the Soviet 
Union usually makes some favorable economic gesture to that country. 
Then they insure that all of the, people are informed of the great 
Comnninist largess — the role of helping the poor people. When 
Khrushchev or Bulganin arrive, of course they are the recipients of 
praise, gratitude, and extraordinary manifestation of friendship. On 
the other hand, Ave Americans, apparently, do nothing to mform 
people of the aid that we are giving to them directly or indirectly 
througli their government. The timing of our aid apparently is never 
coordinated with a visit of one of our officials. It seems to me that 
■we have no plan in this connection and there apparently is no agency 
of the Government responsible for coordination of our efforts in the 
political, economic, and psychological fields. 

I think it is contemplated that the National Security Council exer- 
cise overall supervision of these activities which we have been dis- 
cussing this morning, particularly the coordination of military 
and economic aid to friendly nations, the Avorldwide information 
program, including the dissemination of overt and covert propaganda, 
and finally the use of trade agreements and political alliances to 
strengthen our position vis-a-vis potential enemies. But I do not 
feel that the National Security Council is the proper agency for such 
supervision because it com])rises individuals who have great responsi- 
bilities in other areas. They simply cannot devote the time neces- 
sary to function ])roperly in the National Security Council. For ex- 
ample, the President, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense 
and the head of CIA all have day-to-day administrative res]ionsibili- 
ties which preclude their participation in the planning and coordi- 
nating of our worldwide policies and actions. 

On the other hand, the Soviet Union apparently has an excellent 
plan and organization through which it is enjoying great success all 
over the world. The Russians are not 10-foot men and they have their 
weaknesses as well as their strong points. "We must not overemphasize 
their strength. We are just as intellio;ent as they are. I think we 
ere in a weaker position today principally because we have been naive 
and trusting, as well as somewhat apathetic toward events occurring 
in other parts of the world. 



THE COMMUNIST PROGRAM FOR WORLD CONQUEST 13 

Mr. Kearney. That is true, General, but at the same time it is my 
humble opinion that Russia has an objective in mind. It seems to me, 
and I may be totally wrong, that most of our people who are engaged 
in office work are simply there because they are drawing pay. There 
is no plan as you say. This goes way back to the days of UNRRA. 
We have never been credited with doing the right thing in the right 
manner. 

General Wedemeyer. I agree. Immediately after the war I saw 
material out in China sent there by the United States for distribution 
by UNRRA to help the Chinese. The markings which would indicate 
that this economic aid came from the United States had been oblit- 
erated, and the Russians had put markers on the containers to deceive 
the Chinese people into thinking that they, the Soviet Union, sent the 
aid. Later, when I was in Iran, I learned officially that although 
the United States was furnishing large quantities of milk for the 
Iranian children, the Soviet Union had given the people of Iran the 
impression that it was the Communists who were sympathetic to the 
needs of the masses of people and it was the Soviet Union that had sent 
the milk to their children. I think this pattern was followed through- 
out the world. We never received credit for the great humanitarian 
effort that we made to restore and rehabilitate the war-devastated 
areas. If there had not been an aggressive country like the Soviet 
Union with world-conquering objectives, of course, we would not have 
been presented with the problem. We must wake up and insure that 
our traditional generous efforts to help others are understood and 
that the Soviet Union does not get credit for the sacrifices that we 
are making. 

Mr. Kearney. Is it because we have people in our agencies overseas 
who do not seem to care so long as they have a job or are being enter- 
tained and wined and dined, or is it because the State Department here 
does not put its foot down and does not have an overall plan ? 

General Wedebieyer. Of course, a breakdown in the functioning of 
an organization is usually attributed to the responsible leaders. In my 
judgment our leaders have not been trained properly in international 
negotiations and operations. They are just as worthy, honest, and 
efficient as they are in any other country but they lack proper training 
and guidance. When I first came in contact with the British during 
the war, I was greatly impressed with their unanimity of purpose, their 
loyalty to definite objectives or policies of the British Commonwealth. 
No matter where I went in the world this was true. The British 
representatives always seemed to be knowledgeable about their Com- 
monwealth policies and they loyally supported them. There was a 
continuity and a high degree of coordination in all of their policies 
and actions in the international field. This was not true in our own 
case. We Americans were not sure about our country's objectives. 
There was a lack of coordination between the economic, the political, 
the military, and the psychological efforts being made by various 
American departments and agencies. 

Mr. ScHERER. You mean among the Americans in the administra- 
tion of our foreign-aid projects ? 

General Wedemeyer. Yes, sir. I definitely include the administra- 
tion of our foreign aid. Also, Mr. Congressman, I mentioned earlier 
that I tried to compel an ally (the Soviet Union) to explain how they 



14 THE COMMUNIST PROGRAM FOR WORLD CONQUEST 

■were ^oing to use, and when they planned to do so, the equipment that 
they were receiving from us. I tried to compel the Soviet representa- 
tives to tell me but they refused. I could not obtain the support of 
people higher up in our own Government in this regard. We had men 
in our own military forces training with wooden guns because we had 
shipped so many of the real weapons to the Soviet Union. We had a 
great shortage of tanks and otner weapons which were needed ur- 
gently by our troops undergoing training. Yet we were shipping 
almost indiscriminately and without obtaining information as to their 
use — tons and tons of weapons to the Soviet TTnion. 

Mr. ScHERER. When you use the term "allies," do you mean Russia 
or all of our allies? 

General Wedemeyer. I mean all of our allies, Mr, Congressman, in- 
cluding the British who were also making demands upon us for 
equipment. In the early days of the war, they too were getting huge 
quantities of critical materiel from us and there was little or no 
coordination concerning how and when they were going to use such 
equipment against the enemy. Later we were able to obtain better 
cooperation from the British but the Soviet Union never did cooperate 
as a loyal ally should in this or any other regard. 

Mr. Arens. In the light of recent events, must we assume that the 
Soviet Union has reached parity with the United States in military 
capabilities? 

General Wedemeyer. I think the Soviet Union has greater military 
capabilities than do we. This has been true ever since the end of 
World War II when we emasculated our military forces and at the 
same time permitted the Soviet to retain a massive army, a big navy, 
and air force. At one time we had a technological advantage, par- 
ticularly in the atomic weapon field, which served as a deterrent. 

Mr. Arens. How do these comparative capabilities affect our re- 
lationship with allied nations with whom we have mutual defense 
treaties in all parts of the world ? 

General Wedemeyer. This situation should make our allies rather 
reluctant, at least it suggests possible dangerous implications of co- 
operating with the United StateSj with reference to accepting Ameri- 
can forces and bases on their territory. For example, I would under- 
stand a British policy of excluding Americans from the British Isles 
in the event of an emergency. At present American bases located 
there may not precipitate a war and they may even serve as a so-called 
deterrent. In other words, the Soviet Union probably will not start 
military attacks until they have absolute assurance that they have 
supremacy, including the power to neutralize military installations 
in the British Isles. But I would like to remind you aoout an earlier 
statement I made this morning to the effect that in my judgment the 
Soviet leaders will not precipitate an all-out war. 

Mr. Arens. You mean a shooting war ? 

General Wedemeyer. Yes, I do. It is my conviction that the Soviet 
Union will continue to intensify its efforts in the economic, psychologi- 
cal, and political fields. Unless and until they are conironted wilh 
intelligent, coordinated action on our part in those same fields, the 
Soviet Union will continue to enjoy success everywhere. They have 
the initiative now in all fields of strategy. I feel certain that they 
will not resort to the use of military force unless compelled to do so. 



THE COMMUNIST PROGRAM FOR WORLD CONQUEST 15 

Of course, gentlemen, no one can predict what might happen in a 
state with a chief executive like Khrushchev who I understand gets 
very drunk on occasion. If these reports be true, he could under- 
standably be impulsive, arrogant, and at time irresponsible. In such 
a mood he might take precipitous action which would touch off a 
global war. However, under normal conditions in my judgment 
there will not be a shooting war for some time to come. 

Mr. Arens. How late is it on the Soviet timetable for world 
domination ? 

General Wedemeyer. From our viewpoint? 

Mr. Arens. Yes, sir. 

General Wedemeyer. Several years ago when I was still in the mili- 
tary service I testified before a congressional committee to the effect 
that I thought it was then too late. 

Mr. Arens. Do you think it is too late now ? 

General Wedemeyer. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Arens. That is your honest judgment. General, as a military 
man who has served his nation in the very top echelon of global 
planning ? 

General Wedemeyer. Yes, sir. That was my viewpoint several 
years ago when I testified before congressional committees to that 
effect. It is still my viewpoint. However, I am not completely pes- 
simistic about our chances to recover a sufficiently strong strategic 
posture vis-a-vis the Soviet. If we make a careful analysis of all of 
the countries which endanger our position, evaluate their capabilities 
and their limitations, and then determine how much assistance, real- 
istic or passive, that we might expect from allies, and finally consider 
our own potential strength, I think that we would find our position in 
the world is not without hope, in fact we would be most optimistic if 
we could foresee the coordinated employment of all the positive forces 
that we have on our side to counter our potential enemies and to over- 
come obstacles offered by them to the attainment of our objectives. I 
have confidence in American ingenuity, in our courage, and in our 
capacity to plan intelligently if we are only provided the direction 
from responsible leaders. But we must bring about concerted action 
to attain our goals and stop the indiscriminate and uncoordinated use 
of our political, economic, psychological, and military forces. 

Mr. Arens. General, may I now invite your attention to each of 
the several principal areas of the world for your appraisal of the 
designs and objectives that the Soviets have in each of them. First 
of all, I invite your attention to the Middle East. What are the de- 
signs, objectives, techniques, and strategy of the international Com- 
munist operation there ? 

General Wedemeyer. I have mentioned earlier, in fact repeatedly 
this morning, that every nation has four instruments of national 
policy available to use in connection with the attainment of its na- 
tional objectives. I have also stated that the Soviet Union has used 
these instruments intelligently, and no doubt in consonance with 
an overall plan. As Congressman Kearney earlier pointed out in 
one of his questions, the Soviet Union has an objective. Further- 
more, may I state that aU of the subordinates in the Soviet Union 
are knowledgeable about and are working continuously, resorting to 
any means, to attain those objectives. Now in applying these ideas 



16 THE COMMUNIST PROGRAM FOR WORLD CONQUEST 

to the Middle East in answer to Mr. Arens' pointed question, I think 
that the Soviet Union is determined to alienate Arab friendsliip 
for the western peoples. Militarily the Arab countries are not very 
important. Economically the Middle East is of ffreat importance, 
particularly to the industries of Western Europe, for there exists in 
the Middle East the great reserve of black gold — oil. To deny oil to 
the western European counti-ies of course would be a tremendous vic- 
tory for Soviet objective of weakening the militaiy and economic 
strength of the West. So the Soviet effort in the economic field will 
be marked by loans to Middle East nations, by making available sorely 
needed products, foodstull's, machinery, and by negotiating favorable 
exchanges in order to alienate the trade of western countri&s and to win 
particularly the loyalty or at least the dependence or gratitude of the 
recipient or beneficiai-y nations and peoples throughout the Middle 
East. This emphasizes my contention that the Soviet will continue 
the present policy of avoiding an all-out war while employing to the 
utmost the economic weapons available to them. In the Middle East 
the Soviet could easily infiltrate the oil industrieSj and even the govern- 
ments in Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Iraq, with a view to sabotagmg the 
economic interests of western European countries. 

Favorable economic relations lead to advantages in the psycho- 
logical field. As already mentioned, many people of the world feel 
grateful to the Soviet Union because they have been given foodstuffs, 
military arms, and other products, whereas they may have been 
refused this same economic or military aid by the United States. 
Egypt is a good example, having first applied to the United States 
for wheat which they wanted to buy and pay for from their own dol- 
lar account. I mentioned this case earlier today. The Soviet agents 
are clever in exploiting economic aid so that they derive the full 
psychological advantage. 

Mr. Arens. How about Africa? 

General Wedemeter. In Africa we find undeveloped resources that 
are also important. As a matter of fact, only recently in the Sahara 
Desert oil has been discovered. It is this important commodity 
that is so strongly influencing the adamant attitude of the French with 
regard to giving complete autonomy to Algeria. In Africa also we 
find a strong wave of nationalism which renders the timeworn policy 
of colonialism obsolete or dangerous to pursue. It is in our seli- 
interest to build up stable and friendly relations with the people of 
all races in Africa. Also we should be sympathetic to their desires 
for self-government. Militarily Africa affords many important air 
and naval bases favorably situated in the event of military action 
against the Soviet Union. Economically there are many products 
which are valuable to our own highly integrated industry including 
rubber, bauxite, magnesium, diamonds, ivoi*y, cotton, and uranium. 
Incidentally, gentlemen, there is an excellent book entitled "Some- 
where South of Suez" by Douglas Reed which describes the develop- 
ments in Africa objectively and comprehensively. 

Mr. Arens. Do you believe that the Soviet Union in this drive for 
■world domination is bypassing Western Europe and concentrating 
on the Middle East or Far East, or do you think that Western Europe 
plays a more important role in the Communist designs for world 
domination? 



THE COMMUNIST PROGRAM FOR WORLD CONQUEST 17 

General Wedemeyer. When a commander is planning his scheme 
of maneuver in combat, he tries to avoid strength and attack weak- 
ness. He conducts probing operations in order to discover weak areas 
and then maneuvers his forces in order to penetrate such areas. This 
provides the greatest chance of success and also will minimize losses. 
These tactics have been employed since time immemorial by all mili- 
tary commanders. The Soviet Union employs the same tactics in the 
use of economic, psychological, and political weapons as well as mili- 
tary. During World War II we all were aware of the fact that 
vacua would be created in the course of military operations. The 
wholesale killing, destruction, dislocations, and disruptions would 
naturally create these vacua and as soon as hostilities ended, some 
force would be drawn inevitably to fill them. Because we were 
naive or did not realize the true objectives of the Soviet Union, we 
made no attempt to fill the vacua with our own forces. The Com- 
munists poured in agents, provocateurs, saboteui^, and propagandists 
in order to exert the dominating influence in these war-torn areas. 
It was the American planners' hope in the early days of World War 
II, as I indicated earlier, that Anglo-American forces would be in a 
favorable position at war's end to fill those vacua and thus deny them 
to the Communists. 

It was the contention of the American planners that Anglo-Ameri- 
can forces should go across the British Channel in 1943 and drive 
eastward as rapidly and as far as possible. It was felt that such a 
maneuver would be highly successful because the bulk of the German 
forces at that time (early 1943) were deeply and irretrievably com- 
mitted far to the east in the vast expanse of Eussia. But the per- 
suasive and articulate British leader, Winston Churchill, successfully 
compelled the Allies to accept his strategy of scatterization or periph- 
ery pecking.^ Anglo- American forces executed time and force con- 
suming and indecisive maneuvers in the Mediterranean. In the plan- 
ning phase the Americans opposed such operations and in fact stated 
that even if Kommel could run rampant along the African coast it 
would not decisively affect the ultimate victory, provided the Allied 
effort concentrated on a drive toward the heartland of Germany. It 
was felt by the American planners that a concentration and employ- 
ment of force for that purpose would have resulted in Anglo-American 
forces advancing eastward into the Balkans and at least halfway across 
Poland by war's end. Obviously if this had occurred, the Communists 
would not have been in a position to exercise their domination over 
eastern Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and the Balkans in general. 
The whole map of Europe would be radically different today. 

Mr. Arens. What do you believe the strategy of the Soviet Union 
or Red bloc is in Germany today. General ? 

_ General Wedemeyer. I am sorry, Mr. Arens, you asked that ques- 
tion, although phrased differently, just a few minutes ago and yet 
I have not answered it completely. 

Mr. Arens. The essence of my question was "Are the Soviet plans 
bypassing Europe?" 

General Wedejieyer. I believe that they would bypass Europe if by 
going elsewhere advantages would accrue to their world communiza- 
tion objective. For example, if they find weaknesses or soft spots 
in Southeast Asia, specifically in Indonesia, they would intensify their 



18 THE COMMUNIST PROGRAM FOR WORLD CONQUEST 

efforts in tliat area. If it develops tliat labor unrest occurs on a large 
scale in the South American countries, the Soviet would take advan- 
tage of such wealcnesses there and would give impetus to the unrest 
in divers and insidious ways. 

As I stated previously, any strategic plan should be flexible so that 
the weaknesses of an opponent can be exploited. AVhenever an oppor- 
tunity is presented to use aggressively any or all of tlio four instru- 
ments of national policy, this should be done. I think the Soviet 
Union has followed such stratagem very effectively the past 10 years. 

Mr. Kearney. Pardon me, General, but as you mentioned a minute 
ago in drawing up plans for an attack, the Soviet is continuously 
probing here and there to discover weaknesses, whether they be in 
the Middle East, Africa, or Europe? 

General Wedemeyer. That is correct, sir. 

Mr. Kearney. They continually probe and then promptly exploit 
the weaknesses that they discover? 

General Wedeivieyer. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Arens. General, may I direct your attention to the Far East 
iii wliich we all know you served with great distinction for some con- 
siderable period of time. Would you kindly give your appraisal of 
the designs of the Red leaders there. What can be expected from the 
standpoint of their strategy or tactics? Please give us any other ob- 
servations that you think would be helpful in this connection to the 
committee and via this committee, to the American people. 

General Wedemeyer. I do not believe that the majority of the 
Chinese understood the full and sinister implications of conununism 
when World War II came to an end. With equal conviction, 1 am 
sure that they did not understand the meaning of democracy. One 
must not forget that the bulk of the Chinese people are illiterate. 
The cultured Chinese with whom we come in contact are a very thin 
minority, perhaps a few million in a population exceeding 450 million. 
The Chinese people, that is the masses who are preponderantly peas- 
ants, are lovaole, honest, energetic, and extremely loyal, particularly 
to their families. They respect authority and are warmly hospitable. 
The family unit is nurtured and older people are highly respected; 
also constituted authority is deferred to or obeyed. In other words, 
China is a country of peaceful, friendly, cooperative people. The 
Communist propaganda that was so successfully employed in that vast 
area became extremely vitriolic in the latter days of the war. Every 
morning on my desk I would find reports of monitored radio broad- 
casts emanating from Vladivostok, Moscow, and Yenan. The major 
theme of these broadcasts was arousing the suspicions and fanning 
hatreds of the Chinese against Americans. It was done veiy cleverly, 
emphasizing particularly that we Americans were in the area, remain- 
ing in order to exploit the poor people of China and that we had every 
intention of subjugating them in our own selfish interests. I reported 
these facts concerning Soviet propaganda in the China area to the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff who were my bosses back in the States. I was in- 
formed that such information was forwarded to the State Department. 
I also contacted the Soviet Ambassador in Chungking and remon- 
strated strongly and tactfully. The Ambassador disclaimed any 
knowledge of the venomous propaganda to which I referred. He was 
very polite and firm in his denunciation of such methods, assuring me 



THE COMMUNIST PROGRAM FOR WORIiD CONQUEST 19 

that the Soviet Union respected the United States and was a very loyal 
ally. Oddly enough, the denunciatory broadcasts discontinued for 
a while but resumed with even greater intensity and violence when 
the Japanese surrendered. My headquarters were located in Shanghai 
after the Japs surrendered. I again visited the senior Soviet official 
and provided him with a certified copy of the broadcasts. He too was 
most apologetic about the whole matter and assured me that the broad- 
casts must have their genesis in Yenan and stated categorically that 
the Soviet Government had no official connection with them. The 
Chinese people heard daily, in fact hourly, these radio broadcasts 
which were widespread and which urged the Chinese to compel the 
Yankees to get out of the Orient, in fact suggested that all white 
people be driven out of the Orient, repeating over and over again the 
theme "the Orient for Orientals." 

Many years before World War II the Soviet Union had established 
the Sun Yat-sen University in Moscow. ^ This university was the 
training ground for the Chinese Communist leaders who are now so 
effective m organizing the people and inflaming them against the 
Nationalist Government as well as against Americans. These Chi- 
nese Communist leaders, including Chou En-lai, Mao Tse-tung, Chu 
Teh, and other prominent members of the Red party in China, 
received their basic training in socialism, subversion, propaganda, 
organization, and distortions of the truth under the tutelage of the 
Russian Communists. Actually, in 1945 at war's end, the Chinese 
Communists had very little power and were numerically insignifi- 
cant. However, their propaganda was increasingly effective and was 
noX only inspired but was actually supported and supplemented by 
the Soviet Communists. On our side, that is, the American cause 
or the Nationalist Chinese Government cause was not presented. 
Yet there was every opportunity to refute the Communist lies and 
to put the record straight, particularly with the masses of Chinese 
people. I tried to enlist the support of American diplomatic officials 
in China and also submitted reports to responsible officials back in 
Washington. The war was over and the people were celebrating 
victory. There was little or no interest or sympathetic understand- 
ing of the situation in China. There was strong pressure on all 
theater commanders to return the soldiers back to the homeland. 
No one seemed to be thinking in terms of protecting our hard-earned 
victory. 

You gentlemen on this congressional committee would be astounded 
if you could read the letters that I received when serving as theater 
commander in China, particularly at the end of the war. Many of 
them were disrespectful, derisive, and critical. Most of them con- 
veyed the idea that I wanted to maintain a wartime rank and there- 
fore would not permit the demobilization of my American forces in 
China. Just as rapidly as men acquired the number of points 
decided upon by higher authority to justify their evacuation to the 
homeland, I insisted that they be put on ships and sent to the United 
States. In doing this, often the organizational integrity and of 
course the overall efficiency of my command was greatly weakened. 
I read reports about rioting in some of the theaters because the GI's 
were becoming restive in waiting for the accumulation of the number 
of points that would entitle them to be sent to their homes. I believe 



20 THE CXDMMUNIST PROGRAM FOR WORLD CONQUEST 

there was some rioting in Manila and also in Frankfurt, Germany, 
but fortunately we did not have such a situation in China. 

(At this point. Representative Walter entered tlie room.) 

Mr. Kearney. There was some rioting in Hawaii too; was there 
not, General ? 

General Wedemeyer. I believe so, sir. 

Mr. Kearney. I recall the situation in Guam where, although we 
did not have any riots on the part of the GI's there, I received hun- 
dreds of letters from memljers of the Armed Forces located on that 
island and the gist of their message was "No boats, no votes." 

General Wedemeyer. Returning to the situation prevailing in China 
immediately after the war (1945), I noted a buildup of opposition 
against Chiang Kai-shek, the leader of the Nationalist Government. 
Criticism of the Generalissimo and his j^overnment frequently appeared 
in the press and was heard on the radio. Obviously if the Generalis- 
simo had been the tyrant that the Communists, both in our country and 
in other areas, claimed he was, the press and radio would have been 
controlled. Certainly the Generalissimo could have done this just 
as easily as it is done in the Soviet Union and in other Communist- 
dominated states. He chose to permit the people to express them- 
selves freely. He was making an earnest effort to be a truly democratic 
leader. 

Some of the intellectual Chinese had afliliated themselves with com- 
munism and gradually others who were worried about their selfish in- 
terests decided to go over with the Communists because they felt that 
the Nationalist Government would be overthrown and they wanted to 
be on the winning side. 

General Marshall arrived as the special envoy of the President in 
December of 1945, It seems that Chiang Kai-shek had had only one 
pv'ior contact with the former Chief ot Staff and that was at the 
Cairo Conference. The Generalissimo seemed quite concerned about 
Marshall's arrival and queried me several times with reference to 
what Marshall would want to know and see, and what the real pur- 
pose of his visit might be. I was laudatory in my remarks concern- 
ing Marshall's capabilities, integrity, and earnest desire to help the 
Nationalist Government. After Mai-shall arrived he showed me his 
directive, which required him to amalgamate all of the various politi- 
cal fragments or parties in China. 

Perhaps I should indicate that in my several years of contact with 
General Marshall prior to service in China I had formed the highest 
regard for him and felt that I could at all times frankly disagree 
with his views and that my own approach to a problem would be con- 
sidered in good faith by him. Of course I was respectful but not 
subservient and he encouraged such attitude. Therefore, when I read 
his directive from the State Department requiring him to bring to- 
gether the conflicting parties, I told him frankly that he could not ac- 
complish this. I explained that the Communists had very little power 
at that time (December 1945) but they were determined to get all of it^ 
On the other hand the Nationalist Government had most of the power 
and they were equally determined not to relinquish one iota of it. 
Numerically the Communists were greatly inferior. It is difficult to 
estimate exactly how many Chinese had alllliated themselves with the 
Communist movement. There were extravagant claims of course by 



? 



THE COMMUNIST PROGRAM FOR WORILD CONQUEST 21 

the leaders, and some of our own Americans who were sympathetic to 
the Communists made rather stupidly high estimates. I think at the 
most a few million out of the total of more than 450 million people had 
varying degrees of loyalty to the Communist cause. Most of the hard 
core of the Chinese Communist movement was located in the province 
of Yenan. Kegardless of what you gentlemen may have read or heard, 
I believe that I was in a position to state factually that the Communist 
troops did not contribute realistically or appreciably to the war effort 
against the Japanese. I was on the ground and certainly would have 
known if their claims that they were the real fighters against the Japs 
had been correct. As a matter of fact, I tried to bring about coordina- 
tion of effort between the Nationalist and Communist forces but it was 
erfectly obvious that the Commmiist leaders were biding their time. 

am equally sure that they had promises of support from the Soviet 
Communists when the propitious time arrived for them to begin 
their attacks against the Nationalist Government. 

The Chinese Communists were constantly requesting arms and equip- 
ment. My directive required me to support the Nationalist Govern- 
ment of China. Some of my political advisers did point out that these 
men were Chinese and that they were fighting effectively against the 
Japanese. I stated earlier that my efforts to bring about a modicum 
of military assistance from the Communist forces were unsuccessful. 
They had some arms and equipment and all that I asked them to do 
was to exert pressure against the Japanese forces who were operating 
in the vicinity of Yenan. They refused to do this but would occasion- 
ally make sorties against a Japanese blockhouse or outpost, seizing 
a few prisoners, arms, and equipment but not making a real contribu- 
tion to the overall war effort of the China theater. Chou En-lai 
reported to me that there was an epidemic in Yenan and requested 
medical supplies. Although I had repeatedly refused to send mili- 
tary equipment to them, I did send 11 tons of medical supplies into 
the Communist area. This was done with the cognizance and approval 
of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek and was recognized as a humani- 
tarian step. 

When General Marshall arrived in China on his special mission for 
the President (1945), of course the war was over and the repatriation 
of millions of people who had moved into the hinterland during the 
Japanese occupation and the rehabilitation of war-stricken areas pre- 
sented serious problems for the Generalissimo and his Government. 
The Chinese Communists supported by the Soviet Union spread their 
propaganda and intensified their activities to subvert the Nationalist 
military forces. The people, warweary and confused, were taken in 
by the promises of the Communists for better opportunities, for food 
and land, all of which the Soviet propaganda emphasized. It never 
occurred to these simple, ^Uible people that the Chinese Commmiists 
neither had the capability nor the intention of fulfilling their 
promises. Also, the Chinese Communist propaganda distorted the 
situation so much that the people in the United States interpreted 
the conditions in China incorrectly. Chiang Kai-shek was depicted 
as an unscrupulous dictator whereas actually the man was trying to 
bring order out of chaos and still follow democratic procedures. 
There was much wrong in the government and there were dishonest 
and incompetent men m key positions. We here in America some- 
times experience these same j9onditJ5His in our own official ranks. 

(public^ 



22 THE COMMUNIST PROGRAM FOR WORLD CONQUEST 

Mr. Arens. What is your present appraisal of the posture of inter- 
national coniniunisni in the Far East ? 

General Wedemeyer. The Communists have the initiative through- 
out the Far East. The degree will vary, of course, in different areas 
but on the mainland of China they definitely have the upper hand. 
Economics will be an important factor in the outcome of the struggle 
in that area between the forces of freedom and those of enslavement. 
Traditionally the Japanese have carried on heavy trade w^th mainland 
China. They would obtain their raw materials from that area, ship 
them back to Ja])an which was highly industrialized, process these 
raw materials, and then send them back as finished products to markets 
throughout the Far East, again principally in China. Japanese pro- 
cessed goods are shipped to other markets Ijut they experience difficul- 
ties because their products are so low-priced and inject a competition 
difficulty in countries where labor costs are higher, for example in the 
United States. But the overall picture of the Communists in the Far 
East is in my judgment favorable for continued Communist expansion 
and retention of tiie initiative unless and until confronted by a strong, 
realistic concerted effort in the political, economic, and psychological 
field by the so-called free nations of the world, principally the United 
States, Great Britiiin, and Japan. 

Mr. Arens. General, you have expressed yourself in an appraisal 
of the military, economic, psychological, and political superiority of 
the Red bloc in the world today. How does this capability or superior- 
ity affect the relationship or posture of the United States with its allies 
and neutrals? 

General Wedemeyer. I mentioned a little earlier during the course 
of this hearing that in my judgment our allies will make realistic ap- 
praisals of the United States strength in all fields of strategy, and 
likewise of the Soviet Union. If an emergency occurs, I believe that 
our allies will estimate the situation and will take such steps or adopt 
such measures as will be in their own self-interest. Today they are 
accepting United States military and economic aid because it is in 
their self-interest. From a short-range viewpoint this would appear 
to be right. So far the Soviet Union has not reacted too strongly 
but some of these so-called allies are already making careful reap- 
praisals and have agreed to carry on trade with Communist nations. 
For example, some of our friends who strongly proclaim that they are 
opposed to communism and have even pledged support to us in the 
event of an emergency against Communist aggression are actively en- 
gaged in trade with Ked countries. The British, for example, are trad- 
mg with Red China. As far as I know, they gave diplomatic recog- 
nition to the Communist regime in China without consulting the 
United States. British trade has traditionally strongly influenced 
British policy in the field of diplomacy. If a wartime emergency 
should develop, I believe that the British would carefully analyze 
the implications of cooperating with us. They might decide to re- 
main strictly neutral and thus deny us access to the military bases 
which we are now maintaining in the British Isles. 

Mr. Sctierer. Deny us use of those bases ? 

General Wedemeyer. Yes, sir. If I were a Frenchman, Britisher, or 
Spaniard and felt that it would be more advantageous to my country, 
I certainly would deny the use of the bases to the Americans. Of 



THE COMMUNIST PROGRAM FOR WORLD CONQUEST 23 

course, if the Americans had the upper hand or sufficient strength to 
assure me that they could defend my country against the Commu- 
nist juggernaut, the Communist air armada, and a possible stream of 
destructive missiles, then probably I would consent to the use of the 
bases by the Americans. This is realism. All of the people in 
Europe want to be on the winning side in the next war. There is 
less desire to take calculated risks, partially due to the terrifying effect 
that the introduction of thermonuclear bombs and missiles has had on 
the people. Fortunately the Soviet leaders realize too that there will 
be no winning side in a nuclear war. 

Mr. Arens. Suppose Kussia issued an ultimatum to the effect that 
if these countries allowed the Americans^ to use bases they would 
use nuclear intercontinental ballistic missiles on cities in England, 
Germany, France, and Spain ? 

General Wedemeter. The Soviets have already issued veiled ulti- 
matums. The countries you mentioned are accepting calculated 
risks now. They feel that they can afford to do this because they 
still feel that the United States retaliatory powers would afford them 
protection. Also most of the people in Western Europe are quite 
certain that there will not be a war in the near future. The very 
destructive power inherent in new weapons may render their use 
unthinkable even to dictators. For these reasons the people of 
France, Spain, Germany, and England continue their collaboration 
with the United States. Also they are conscious of the fact that 
considerable economic and psychological advantage accrues by the 
presence of American bases in their countries. Our soldiers are 
spending millions of dollars in those countries. Furthermore, our 
Government spends considerable sums of money on the construction 
and maintenance of airdromes and the lines of communication, all of 
which will be valuable commercially to the countries concerned. 

Mr. ScHERER. You refer. General, to the economic advantage such 
as the money we are spending in Asia ? 

General Wedemeter. Yes, sir. I think all of the countries receiv- 
ing aid from us are watching developments very carefully and weigh- 
ing the implications of so doing. However, when the chips are down, 
I hope I am wrong, I think that these countries would be very reluc- 
tant allies and might consider seriously denying us the use of the 
bases which we are maintaining today. I shall never forget the atti- 
tude of so-called allies and of the United Nations Organization when 
we, the United States, made an all-out effort m South Korea to stop 
the advance of the Eed hordes from North Korea. Everyone knows 
today that only two countries. South Korea and the United States, 
made a realistic contribution in that effort to stop the spread of 
communism. 

Mr. ICearnet. General, would I be wrong in supplementing Con- 
gressman Scherer's remarks by including every allied country in the 
Western World, not only the countries Congressman Scherer men- 
tioned ? I am trying to be realistic along with you and therefore have 
reference to every one of the countries when I ask you if they would 
stand by us in the event of trouble or in case war did break out. 
Don't you think that we would be left holding the bag, so to speak ? 

General Wedemeter. I believe that we would be left holding the 
bag, General Kearney, but again, I hope that I am wrong. However, 



24 THE COMMUNIST PROGRAM FOR WORLD CONQUEST 

I have given this matter considerable thought over the years and have 
expressed to this committee my considered opinions. 

Mr. SciiERER. I am a Member of Congress and have to vote on the 
expenditure of funds for more airfields and the maintenance of those 
airfields in England, Germany, France, and Spain that we already 
have. If what you say is true — and I had come to the same conclu- 
sion before your testimony. General — how should I vote? Would it 
not be better to spend that money presently used on bases in other 
countries for submarines and long-range missiles that do not depend 
upon bases? 

General Wedetvieyer. I would not vote one penny to any country 
unless I had evidence of their good faith and of their unswerving 
loyalty in the cooperative effort witli us toward the attainment of 
common objectives; one important one, of course, is protecting the 
Free World against the scourge of communism. I am not suggest- 
ing that each one of these countries to whom we give military and 
economic aid should have exactly the same objectives in the interna- 
tional field, but I would insist that their objectives must be compatible 
with our own. In other words, if the British insist on trading with 
Red China and thus strengthening the Communists who present a 
grave danger to United States interests, then I would discontinue 
military or economic aid to the British. Wlien I make a statement 
like that, Britishers and American "one-worlders" will say that they 
are not trading in strategic items. When they use the term "strategic 
items," they mean, of course, airplanes, tanks, ammunition, I presume. 
But I insist that any item of trade — a spool of thread, wheat, auto- 
mobiles, or coffee — assists the economy of Red China. I believe 
in denying those areas under Communist rule any economic or military 
assistance. Furthermore I would break off diplomatic relations with 
them. In suggesting these ideas to the committee, I wish to emphasize 
that I am not an isolationist. No country can isolate itself from the 
world today. If this be a fact, the United States should participate in 
international developments and relations with intelligence, always 
mindful of the fact that we must be actuated by self-respect. In 
other words, every step that we take should protect our security and 
our economy. I^t us be realistic and understand that all other 
countries conduct their foreign policies in that manner. 

Mr. ScHERER. I understood that at the beginning of your testi- 
mony, General, you estimated the total firepower of the East and West 
to be about equally balanced, with possibly the East having a little 
edge at this time ? 

General Wedemeter. When you refer to firepower, I presume you 
mean military potential or military posture ? 

Mr. Scherer. That is what I mean. 

General Wedemeyer. In my judgment the military strength or pos- 
ture of the Soviet Union and satellites is stronger than that of the 
western countries or Free World. 

Mr. SciiERER. Then if this is a fact and Russia says, as she has 
hinted to England and France, "The Americans must not use bases 
on your soil, and if you do permit them to do so, there will be a nu- 
clear war waged against your cities," do you think for a minute that 
England and France would permit us to use these bases? 

General Wedeme^-er. I doubt it very much. As you have sug- 
gested, the Soviet Communists have hinted that to several countries. 



THE COMMUNIST PROGRAM FOR WORLD CONQUEST 25 

I am sure the British are definitely worried about it. But again, 
trade is an important factor in the British philosophy. They prob- 
ably are weighing all of the implications and, as we all know today, 
they are willing to accept the calculated risks involved. They must 
be evaluating all of the factors, principally that the Russians in all 
probability will not precipitate a war while they are enjoying such 
outstanding success in the use of economic and psychological weapons. 
The British are conscious of the fact that we Americans are spend- 
ing a lot of money in their country and the door to our Treasury has 
long been ajar. 

Mr. SciiERER. Then we might as well keep the money coming. 

General Wedemeyer. Yes, sir. Macmillan's government is accept- 
ing a calculated risk and I think will continue to do so. I believe 
a Labor government would discontinue the use of bases by Ameri- 
cans. But again, I emphasize that if the chips were down and Mac- 
millan did not feel that we Americans could prevent the Soviet from 
pouring missiles into his industrial and populated areas, he might 
declare a neutral position and in the process, of course, deny us the 
use of bases in the British Isles. Perhaps Macmillan feels that there 
will be no war— particularly no thermonuclear bombs and missiles. 

Mr. ScHERER. You take almost the same point of view as Gen. 
Bonner Fellers. 

General Wedemeyer. I did not know that Gen. Bonner Fellers had 
expressed similar views but I am not surprised. Many other gen- 
erals and admirals, and many private citizens would express similar 
views I am sure. I have high regard for General Fellers' judgment 
in the field of strategy. 

Mr. Kearney. Following Congressman Scherer's line. General, 
what I cannot get through my head is this: Assuming that Eng- 
land and the rest of the allies are wavering between the calculated 
risk you mentioned and the moneys we are pouring in there, and 
knowing Russia as they do — that they can't trust them or trust their 
word — where do we come back to then ? 

General Wedemeyer. I can't answer that question. General 
Kearney. One of the hopes for mankind, I think, was expressed by 
Congressman Scherer a little earlier. Within the satellite countries 
of Russia and throughout the Soviet Union there are ferments and 
defections building up. Human beings will not endure subordina- 
tion to the iron heel of tyranny for an indefinite time. Tlie answer 
to our present dilemma may be essentially provided by uprisings and 
finally the overthrow of the tyrants behind the Iron Curtain. 

Mr. Kearney. I think as far as that statement is concerned that 
we Americans are just going along with wishful thinking. We have 
been hoping that there would be a revolution in the satellite countries 
for many years. The nearest that it has come was in Hungary. 

General Wedemeyer. That is right. The Hungarians were truly 
fighting for freedom. It is interesting to note that the front fighters 
in their effort to overthrow their oppressors in Hungary were not 
older people who had enjoyed freedom many years ago but it was the 
young men and women who had been exposed to Communist propa- 
ganda and false promises since World War II who led the revolt. And 
as this revolutionary movement in Hungary progressed, I asked my- 
self, where are the Kosciuskos, the Pulaskis, and the Laf ayettes of this 



26 THE CX)MMUNIST PROGRAM FOR WORLD CONQUEST 

or of any other free country ? When we were fighting for our free- 
dom here in Am;erica, those patriots came to our shores, endured 
liardships, and experienced dangers to help us attain our liberty. Why 
didn't some i\jnerican general, or a military leader from England or 
France, go to the Hungarians and offer his services? There was not 
one professional military man like myself who made himself available. 
AVhy am I not willing to take risks and to experience hardships as did 
the men wlio fought so gallantly and selflessly shoulder to shoulder 
with our forefathers in this country? I am serious. I have given 
considerable thought to this situation. Are we real patriots? Are we 
dedicated to liberty ? Are we getting soft ? 

Mr. ScHERER. Perhaps you would not have been permitted to do 
so. 

General Wedemeyer. If I were determined, I certainly could have 
reached Hungary and offered my assistance to those fighters for 
freedom. 

Mr. Kearney. There was a poll taken in every civilized country in 
the world as to whether or not that particular nation would assist any 
of the Soviet satellites that might defect or carry on a revolution. 
Every country voted overwhelmingly "No." 

General Wedemeyer. The frightening possibility of a nuclear war 
seems to hang like a pall over the world — paralyzing actions that 
might precipitate war. I think if a poll were taken in ICngland today 
and if such poll were conducted without any duress, the British people 
would vote to move our bases out of their country. 

The Chairman. Doesn't that all stem from the terrific nationalist 
feel ing in each of the nations ? 

General Wedemeyer. Yes, sir. I think the existence or develop- 
ment of nationalist feeling has a very strong influence in this con- 
nection. It is an interesting phenomenon — our policies at home seem 
to favor and support internationalism — while abroad we support 
nationalism, the principle of self-determination. 

The Chairman. I was in Yugoslavia sometime ago in connection 
with the refugee problems and talked with officials of the Yugoslav 
Government. They hate the Russians in my judgment just as much 
as we do but they are realistic to the point that I am concerned lest 
what we do to aid Yugoslavia would sometime or other be used against 
us if it was expedient to do so. 

General Wedemeyer. Tito and his henchmen are avowed Commu- 
nists opposed to everything we stand for. Why strengthen his posi- 
tion economicallv or militarily with American aid? 

Mr. Sciierer. That is why I am afraid these airbascs in some of 
our neutral and allied countries will be used against us. 

General WEi)EME-iT-:R. Congressman Scherer, related to your con- 
cern in this matter, when you cast your vote for appropriations cover- 
ing the installation and maintenance of bases, would it not be a good 
idea to bring out clearly the motives and actions of those allies who 
are not doing thoir ])roportionate share in the struggle against com- 
munism? Specifically, expose those nations in the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization which are not providing their proportionate 
share of the military forces for the NATO defense. Everyone knows 
that certain countries in NATO agreed to provide a stipulated number 
of divisions and yet they are not fuliilling their commitment. They 



THE COMMUNIST PROGRAM FOR WORIiD CONQUEST 27 

come asking us for help but they fail to keep faith with us in the 
firm agreements made ostensibly to stop aggressions by the Commu- 
nists. 

Mr. Kearney. The Korean war was an excellent example of this. 

General Wedemeyer. Yes, sir. I cannot understand why Amer- 
ican leaders permit allies to ignore or abrogate commitments. I 
have lived abroad for approximately 20 years of my life. In my 
contacts with foreign peoples I found them to be kind and cooperative. 
But also, may I emphasize that they were always realistic. If they 
did something for me, they expected gratitude as well as something 
from me in return. I am convinced that if the British were in the 
position of giving aid to us, they would insure that we were cooperating 
to the fullest degree in the attainment of their objectives and in pro- 
tecting their interests. Some people suggest that when we Americans 
give aid to a country that we should not attempt to interfere with that 
country's internal affairs. My approach would be entirely different. 
In the first place I would not give aid, military or economic, to any 
country that opposed America's aims in the international field. Also, 
I would expect the recipient countries to indicate what they were going 
to do with our aid and when. Furthermore I would require those 
countries to give evidence at least of supporting objectives compatible 
with our own. In general those are the tests that I would make in 
each instance before I would approve of economic or military aid for 
any nation. 

Mr. ScHERER. We just have so much money to spend and if we don't 
reach a conclusion as just stated by you, General, we will ruin our 
economy. 

General Wedemeyer. That's exactly the way I feel about it. I 
think we should put our aid, military and economic, in those areas 
and those countries where it will do the most to provide military 
security and economic stability for America as well as for the re- 
cipient nation. The present administration is asking now for per- 
mission to increase the debt limit. If I were a Congressman, I would 
oppose such increase and would cut down on expenditures both at 
home and abroad — particularly abroad. 

Mr. Scherer. I repeat, we have just so much money to spend and 
if we don't come to the conclusion that there is a limit at some place 
to these enormous expenditures, we are going to ruin our own economy. 
If our situation is as precarious as you suggest concerning our overseas 
bases, then isn't Admiral Rickover right that we should take the 
money we do have available and concentrate it on the construction of 
submarines which are capable of launching nuclear weapons ? 

General Wedemeyer. I am glad that you asked that question. Con- 
gressman Scherer. I agree that we should carefully evaluate the 
expenditure of our money in connection with military security. We 
should concentrate our effort on those weapons which will provide a 
full dollar's return in security for our country. In my judgment the 
atomic submarine with missile platform would be an important addi- 
tion and would render us less dependent on precarious bases located 
in the territories of reluctant allies. 

Mr. Scherer. This would be much cheaper than foreign bases. 

General Wedemeyer. Yes, sir. Our forces could rendezvous at any 
designated place, discharge their missiles against hostile targets, and 



28 THE COMMUNIST PROGRAM FOR WORLD CONQUEST 

submerge, then reappear at another predetermined rendezvous for 
another attack, 

Mr. ScHERER. One would not have to have permission to establish 
bases on foreign soil if we operated in that manner. 

General Wedemeyer. That is correct. Furthermore, there would 
be no bases to destroy when the enemy attemj)ted to retaliate, and 
greater flexibility in the employment of our missiles would be provided. 

Mr. SciiEREu. Yes; the submarines as platforms for missiles would 
be moving and thus would not present a good target for the enemy. 

General Wedemeyer. Yes; that is very important. I believe that 
Congress should carefully consider the research and development pro- 
grams which provide for atomic and thermonuclear weapons for 
missiles and submarines. I do not agree with those who advocate 
large ground forces. Also, I believe we should remove all United 
States ground forces now located on foreign soil. The people indige- 
nous to those countries do not like foreigners, particularly in military 
uniform, ])resent in their communities. They have a nationalistic 
feeling which is understandable and resent the presence of armed men 
from other countries. Of course, the political leaders will not ex- 
press such views, but I am sure a poll would reveal that the people 
themselves would be glad to have our troops removed. Most import- 
ant — let the people indigenous to the area provide the manpower for 
the defense of their country. I am sure this would be a more satis- 
factory arrangement, and I expect the people of those countries do not 
want our Armed Forces on their soil. 

Mr. Ivearney. Except in time of war. 

General Wedemeyer. Yes; then they are glad to have us. Even 
then there are inevitable frictions. Although we were fighting 
shoulder to shoulder with the Chinese during World War II, there 
were understandable incidents and frictions between my forces and 
the Chinese. In general, however, the Chinese were cooperative and 
hospitable. 

To return to the matter of appropriations, which Congressman 
Scherer mentioned earlier, I think it is very difficult for a Congress- 
man or for any private citizen to know exactly how and when to ap- 
prove of military and economic aid to other countries. The leaders 
m our Government — in fact, all officials occupying key positions in 
the executive and legislative branches of our Government — are so 
weio^hed down and harassed by daily administrative matters it is 
hardly possible for them to investigate, analyze, and reach sound 
judgments concerning the complex situations in various parts of the 
world. It seems to me that we need a group of disinterested men who 
are not harassed with day-by-day administrative responsibilities but 
who would spend their time studying and analyzing world develop- 
ments in order to submit sound recommendations to Congress. I 
think that Congress should make the decisions concerning our various 
commitments in the international arena. It is the Congress that truly 
represents the grassroots — the people throughout our countiy. The 
President and his appointees in the State Department do not neces- 
sarily reflect the basic ideas of the American people. Policvmaking 
should be in the hands of those who are responsive to the thinking and 
the will of tlie people. Today you gentlemen on this committee asked 
me, a layman, to make suggestions concerning appropriations. I 



THE COMMUNIST PROGRAM FOR WORLD CONQUEST 29 

really do not feel fully qualified to make comprehensive recommenda- 
tions because I lack factual information. It seems to me there is 
need for a group of men who will continuously study the international 
situation based on factual and complete information concerning devel- 
opments in all parts of the world. Such a group would have the 
responsibility of evaluating developments and their imj)lications upon 
our own security and economic stability. After their evaluations, 
they should make appropriate recommendations to the Members of 
Congress, and thus facilitate sound legislative action which would 
then not only be based on the best intelligence available but would 
also be supported by expert evaluations and judgments. 

The Chairman. I have been informed that when the Japanese sur- 
rendered in Java after World War II, unlike other surrenders, they 
were required to leave their arms. Do you know anything about 
that? 

General Wedemeyer. Mr. Congressman, Java was not in my the- 
ater during World War II but was under the British at the time of 
the Japanese surrender. Actually Admiral Mountbatten, who com- 
manded the southeast Asia area, was responsible for Java. I do not 
know what happened but the Japanese in all areas were required by 
the orders issued by supreme commander. Allied Powers, to turn their 
arms over to the Allied commander nearest to them. 

In this connection, I had some difficulty with the British concerning 
the surrender arrangements at Hong Kong. The instructions that the 
Generalissimo and Lord Louis Mountbatten received and also that I 
received from the supreme commander. Allied Powers (General Mac- 
Arthur), stipulated clearly that the Chinese would receive all sur- 
renders of Japanese in the China theater. Hong Kong was in the 
China theater, yet the British insisted that they would not permit the 
Chinese to receive the surrender in Hong Kong. The Generalissimo 
asked me as his chief of staff to go to Hong Kong and accept the sur- 
render of the Japanese commander there. I refused but recommended 
to the Generalissimo that a Chinese general be sent to Hong Kong and 
to other key points throughout China for that purpose. My reason 
was that it would be better psychologically for the Chinese to receive 
the surrender of the Japs whom they had been fighting for 8 years. In 
Nanking, in Shanghai, and in fact throughout the China theater I 
arranged to have a Chinese commander present at the surrender of 
the Japanese. But the British protested violently and even sent 
messages to President Truman claiming that it was their right and 
responsibility to receive the surrender of the Japanese in Hong Kong. 
They were arrogant and disrespectful to the Generalissimo in han- 
dling this matter. I was surprised and disappointed that they should 
be so petty in this matter of protocol. After all, the Chinese had 
fought 8 years against the Japanese and had made great sacrifice in 
carrying on against the common enemy. The matter ended up with 
the British receiving the surrender. They rushed an admiral there 
for that purpose along with a few of their combat ships which had 
been operating in the Bay of Bengal during most of the war. 

The Chairman. The thing that disturbs me as one of the most 
serious situations in the world today is that which is developing in 
Indonesia. 

General Wedemeyer. Yes. 



30 THE COMMUNIST PROGRAM FOR WORLD CONQUEST 

The Chairman. I can just imagine what would happen if a Com- 
munist state were to develop in Indonesia, situated there between the 
Philippines, Japan, and Australia. 

General Wedemeyer. Yes; that is quite true. Communism appar- 
ently is developing quite strongly in Malaya also. 

The Chairman. Yes, and I do not think it was a mere accident 
that the surrender there in Malaya was different than anywhere else ; 
in other words, the Japanese went away with their arms. In Indo- 
nesia, the Japanese turned over their arms to pro-Communists. 

General Wedemeyer. As another indication of Communist in- 
fluence in those areas, it is reported that in Okinawa recently a mayor 
was elected with pro-Communist leanings. 

Mr. Arens. General, you have given us an appraisal of the rising 
strength of the Red bloc in the military, economic, psychological, and 
political fields as well as the threat which the Communist bloc poses 
to the Free World. Would you care to give your appraisal to this 
committee of any mistakes which have been made by tlie West and 
your suggestion as to a strategy or tactic of the West to counter the 
rising tide of the Red bloc? 

General Wedemeyer. Our failures were due to the fact that we did 
not recognize the true implications of international communism dur- 
ing and particularly subsequent to World War II. I think the fact 
that we were so trusting and naive after World War II concerning the 
sinister motives of the Communist leaders was the most serious 
blunder that western diplomats and western leaders made. 

Mr. Arens. How did that affect the situation ? 

General Wedemeyer. Well, this enabled the Soviet to maintain 
the initiative in Europe as well as in the Far East. They had com- 
plete initiative in the political, economic, and psychological fields 
and thus extended their influence throughout those areas, drawing 
successfully into the poisonous orbit of communism countries and 
millions of people. 

Mr. Arens. What are the manifestations in your opinion of this 
failure to recognize the nature of international communism? 

General Wedemeyer. I might give a few examples : 

Let lis recall the situation that developed in Czechoslovakia 
where the Soviet moved in surreptitiously after the war. It was not 
a military operation. Communist agents obtained positions in the 
Government. They gradually took over the control of the Interior 
Department which was responsible for the internal security of the 
country. The secret police in Czechoslovakia operated within the 
Interior Department. When the Communists obtained control over 
that Department, obviously they could take over the entire Govern- 
ment. That was exactly what they did. The Communists have not 
employed their own troops, that is, their army, navy, or air force, in 
any major military action since World War II but they have been very 
successful in implementing troops of satellites in gaining control of 
vast areas and many countries. For example. Red China, North 
Korea, Poland, Albania, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, 
Bulgaria, Rumania. About half the population of the world, over a 
billion people, are now oriented toward the Kremlin, and this non- 
military but effective method of taking over the control of countries 
was accomplished without effective opposition on our part or on the 



THE COMMUNIST PROGRAM FOR WORILD CONQUEST 31 

part of the U. N. The western countries ignored Communist aggres- 
sions while they concentrated on the rehabilitation of their own coun- 
tries after the war. Furthermore, the western countries have had con- 
tinuous difficulty in adopting an honest, unified position vis-a-vis the 
Soviet Union. However, they were all doin^ their utmost to get as 
much as they could in the form of United States military and eco- 
nomic aid. The Communists brazenly violated their agreements made 
with the western countries and of course made a mockery of the 
humane and elightened Charter of the United Nations. 

Mr. Arens, "\Vliat suggestion do you make, General, for a strategy 
of the West to cope with this threat of international communism? 

General Wedemeyer. I think the most important thing is educa- 
tion. All of our people and people of the world should be given 
factual information concerning communism. If the American peo- 
ple had been told the truth in an unemotional and objective manner 
about Marx, Stalin, Lenin, and other Communists, they would have 
compelled their own leaders to take appropriate action. When the 
American people know what is going on, they always have exercised 
good judgment. I think they would support programs of firm, real- 
istic action against Communist aggressions and penetrations. As I 
travel around in our country and in other parts of the world, I still find 
a lack of understanding of the problems presented by international 
communism. Most people don't understand the problem in China or 
in Hungary. Many people are woefully ignorant about interna- 
tional affairs. This is sometimes due to their inability to obtain factual 
information. Often, too, it is due to apathy or indifference. I 
recently had some dental work done. The doctor was an excellent 
dentist and did a very fine job. He discussed headlines that he 
had read in the newspaper, which revealed startling ignorance con- 
cerning communism. He is not at all left wing or communistically 
inclined but he is definitely naive about the motives of Khrushchev 
and Bulganin. It seems to me education is of paramount importance. 
The American people must be given simple truths — for example, that 
communism is not a political philosophy — the Communist Party is 
not at all like our Republican or Democratic Party. The Communist 
Party is determined to subjugate the world and will resort to murder, 
lies, slave camps, in fact any means will be employed to remove ob- 
stacles and opponents to their ruthless plans. Communism must be 
recognized as exactly what it is — an international conspiracy to de- 
stroy faith in God, faith in mankind, faith in our form of gov- 
ernment. In other words, it is dedicated to the destruction of re- 
ligious, political, social, and economic freedoms. My dentist friend 
explained that he had little time to read but did refer to an article 
he had just read in a magazine. I recognized at once that this maga- 
zine has been far left of center. 

The Chairman. You mean "liberal" ? 

General Wedemeyer. Well, in a sense I do, Mr. Congressman. 
However, I think both you and I are true "liberals," and that word 
has been bandied about so much it is difficult to know exactly what 
is meant when one uses the term. Personally I am always interested 
in what motivates people who write such articles. 

Mr. DoTLE. May I inquire of the general before the bell rings — 
did you state positively that the Soviets will communize the world, 
in your judgment ? 



32 THE COMMUNIST PROGRAM FOR WORLD CONQUEST 

General Wedemeyer. No. I didn't state positively that the Soviets 
would communize the world and I'm soriy that I gave j^ou that 
impression, I stated, sir, that at this time they have the initiative 
in the political, economic, and psychological fields, and, of course, 
we all know that their objective is to communize the world. 

Mr. Doyle. In all fields of strategy they have the initiative? 

General Wedemeyer. Yes, sir; thev do. In my opinion they are 
gradually gaining in the accomplishment of their objectives. In 
other words, they are gradually exercising greater influence in all 
countries of the world, including our own. 

Mr. Doyle. Tliey do not intend to precipitate a world war? 

General Wedemeyer. I repeat, Mr. Congressman, I do not think 
that they intend to use military force as an instrument of national 
policy at this time. Why should they when they are successful in 
-using the other three important instruments of national policy; 
namely, political, economic, and psychological ? 

Mr. SciiEUER. Do you think tliey will use military force in the im- 
mediate future? 

General Wedemeyer. No; I don't believe that they intend to use 
military force in the foreseeable future. 

Mr. Doyle. I didn't preface my question in a way to cross-examine 
you. 

General Wedemeyer. I understand, sir. 

Mr. Doyle. You have been conferring with Mr. A reus and our 
staff as consultant. In relating these experiences that you have had 
I note that they do not pertain to a specific political party. In other 
words, the failures to handle the problems created by commimism 
do not seem to attach to a particular political party but you asso- 
ciate those events with the party that happened to be in the White 
House at the time. Is that correct ? 

General Wedemeyer. Yes, sir. I have not had any particular po- 
litical party or any individual in mind as I aswered questions this 
morning. I would say that both the Republicans and the Democrats 
are equally culpable. 

Mr. Doyle. I would like now to come down to us here in Congress. 
This committee for instance and the. Subversive Activities Control 
Board have certain responsibilities to Congress. What have you to 
recommend that we do immediately in our field of responsibility — 
something that we can actually touch and reach ? 

General Wedemeyer. Yes, sir, I believe I understand. I know 
there is an aversion to the creation of more committees and more 
special bureaus; but I think that the assignment and hoped-for re- 
sults of the committee that I suggest would be of tremendous help to 
Congress, as well as to the Executive, in reaching sound solutions to 
the complex problems facing our Nation. Such a gi'oup would com- 
prise economists, historians, political scientists, educators, industrial- 
ists, bankers, farmers — men who have had varied and broad experi- 
ence in life. This group would continuously study international 
developments. This would require a thorough examination of Com- 
munist methods. Communist operations, and appropriate recommen- 
dations could be provided to the Congress and to responsible leaders 
of our Government. 

Mr. Doyle. You have lieard, of course, about the Rockefeller com- 
mittee which recently submitted a report. 



THE COMMUNIST PROGRAM FOR WORILD CONQUEST 33 

General Wedemeyer. Yes; I read about Mr. Eockefeller's group. 

Mr. Doyle. There are many dedicated citizens who have studied 
these problems, that is, individuals outside of Conj^ress. 

General Wedemeyer. Yes, sir. However, they have no authority, 
no official status. They might make excellent recommendations but 
they are not heeded. If we had a group such as I described working 
under the aegis of Congress, I believe sound counsel and recommenda- 
tions would emerge as the basis for appropriate legislation to cope 
realistically with communism, both at home and abroad. 

Mr. Doyle. But the President has such committees now and he has 
so announced. 

General Wedemeyer. I did not realize that the President had a 
committee specifically for such purpose. 

Mr. Doyle. Yes, he has named 2 or 3 advisory committees and also 
he has the National Security Council which should provide appro- 
priate recommendations. 

General Wedemeyer. Does the CongTess have access to the informa- 
tion provided the National Security Council ? 

Mr. Doyle. No. 

General Wedemeyer. I think the Members of Congress should be 
given the pertinent information collected by our intelligence agen- 
cies — by the Central Intelligence Agency and by the mtelligence 
representatives of the three military services. How can one form in- 
telligent judgments without timely and factual information? We 
need courage and honesty, as well as intelligence, in our ranks. The 
advice and recommendations given to our leaders and to Members of 
Congress must be based on real knowledge and/or personal experi- 
ence. We should avoid the counsel of individuals who would be in 
any way influenced by political expediency, personal popularity, or 
selfish interests. Guts, courage, integrity,^ intelligence must, char- 
acterize our defense of liberty or we'll lose it. 

Mr. Doyle. General, I didn't lay the foundation for the information 
that I was apparently seeking. In other words, I am primarily think- 
ing of our Committee on Un-American Activities. The problem we 
have in our Nation of meeting the Communist threat — the subversive 
threat. Have you had time to form any recommendations on that? 

General Wedemeyer. Sir, I think you are now doing a very con- 
structive job, namely, calling in so-called experts in various lines — 
men and women who had some experience with communism — to give 
you the benefit of their knowledge and experience. The information 
that you receive from the many witnesses who appear here should help 
you m formulating plans and in recommending appropriate legisla- 
tion to cope with the Communists and related problems. 

The Chairman. For the majority of the committee I will answer 
that in the affirmative. That is what we are trying to do. 

General Wedeivieyer. I think you are doing a very fine job. I do 
read most of the material published by this committee. 

Mr. Doyle. So do I think we are doing a pretty good job. Don't 
misunderstand me. I am always on the search, however, for the con- 
sidered opinion of men who are on the outside looking at us objec- 
tively and apparently making a nonofficial appraisal or our national 
problem resulting from Communist subversion. That is what I am 
aftei\ In other words, I am in search for that particular thing be« 



34 THE COMMUNIST PROGRAM FOR WORLD CONQUEST 

cause that is the area in which presently I am officially responsible 
as a member of this committee. 

General Wedemeyer. I have no additional recommendations to 
make. As I stated before, I am reading the material which is pub- 
lished by this committee. I am certain that the members are care- 
fully evaluating]: the information that they receive and that they will 
initiate appropriate legislation at the propitious time. I think there 
has been a, gradual improvement in tne past 10 years in connection 
with alerting our fellow Americans to the dangei-s of communism. 
I still would like to see an even gi-eater effort made. Mr. Doyle, were 
you in Congress approximately 10 years ago, that is, immediately 
after World War II? 

Mr. DoYT.E. Yes ; I have been here about 12 vears. 

General Wedemeyer. Then you may recall the situation that ex- 
isted in this country, in fact throughout the world, immediately after 
World War II. We were very trusting here in America concerning 
the Kremlin and its policies and actions. Our approach was naive, 
and, as a matter of fact, in some quarters, we were very enthusi- 
astic about the Soviet leaders and people. We had defeated the Ger- 
mans and Italians in Europe and the Japanese in the Far East. We 
all wanted to celebrate the victory and to live in peace. It would 
have been impossible to convince most of our fellow Americans that 
there could be another threat even greater than nazism, and that this 
very threat existed in the Soviet Union. 

The Chairman. That very thing was made capital of by the peo- 
ple who were and are our enemies. They took advantage of our 
friendly attitude. 

Mr. Doyle. General, I take it that in your opinion there is no 
question but that the Soviet Union intends economically, politically, 
and psychologically, and if need be militarily, to conquer the world? 

General Wedemeyer. That is correct, Mr. Congressman. There is 
no doubt in my mind that the Soviet Union, under present circum- 
stances and leadership, is committed to those objectives. They are 
steeped in the principles of Marxism which have never changed, but 
the methods of applying have been changed and swit^ihed aoout in 
whatever manner would promise success. The people behind the Iron 
Curtain have had approximately two generations of the Big Lie — hate, 
propaganda, distortion of facts, slave camps, police state^ restrictions, 
and military oppression. When I lived in Germany during the years 
1936-38, I observed the manner in which the young people were 
indoctrinated by the Nazis. The Communists use similar methods, 
even more effectively. Factual information is excluded from every- 
one. The children are gathered together at an early impressionable 
age and subjected to propaganda of hate and suspicion against other 
countries. Most of these young people become fanatic believers in 
communism — it is almost a religion with them. Imagine after sev- 
eral generations have passed wim this type of indoctrination, exclud- 
ing the truth, distorting history — the effect upon the masses of people 
behind the Iron Curtain. 

Mr. Doyle. That applies, you mean, to the younger generation in 
Russia too? 

General Wedemeyer. Exactly. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Doyle. I think that is right. 



THE COMMUNIST PROGRAM FOR WORLD CONQUEST 35 

General Wedemeyer. Yes, the Kussian children are being indoc- 
trinated to believe in the righteousness of their cause, that any means 
justifies the attainment of the Soviet objectives. Kill, lie, distort, 
torture — all are fully justified in the Soviet conscience because they 
are so dedicated to the attainment of Marxian, Leninist, or Stalinist 
objectives. 

Mr. DoTLE. Thank you very much, General. 

Mr. Arens. Mr. Chairman, we have no further questions. 

The Chairman. I have none. 

General Wedemeyer. I have never met Congressman Walter before 
but knew Senator McCarran quite well, and admired and respected 
him. I have read very carefully the Walter-McCarran Act pertain- 
ing to immigration. It is excellent legislation and should, in my 
considered opinion, be given a thorough and extended application 
before any modifications are accepted by the Congress. It may be 
that changing conditions later on would justify a few modifications, 
iDut I think it would be a mistake to effect changes at the present time. 

The Chairman. Of course we had in mind in drafting the act, and 
as you know it took us nearly 5 years to put together this measure, the 
best interests of the United States. We were subjected to pressures 
from all sides by all sorts of so-called minority groups. But, fortu- 
nately, we had two committees which withstood the pressures. 

General, on behalf of the committee — and I am sure of the entire 
Congress — ^I want to extend to you our thanks for this enlightening 
contribution. Too few people realize exactly the seriousness of this 
world situation. We in the United States are fortunate in having 
at our disposal, whether we use them properly or not, people who 
can supply the sort of information that will make it possible for this 
great Republic of ours to survive. 

I again extend to you our thanks. 

General Wedemeyer. Thank you, sir. 

(Wliereupon, at 11 : 50 a. m., Tuesday, January 21, 1958, the com- 
mittee was recessed, subject to call.) 

o 



INDEX 



Individuals 

Page 

Bulganin (Nikolai A) 12, 31 

Chiang Kai-shek 20, 21, 26, 29 

Chou En-lai 19, 21 

Chu Teh 19 

Churchill, Winston 17 

Craig, Malin 6 

Fellers, Bonner 25 

Goebbels (Joseph) 6 

Goering (Hermann) 6 

Henderson, Loy 11 

Hess (Rudolph) 6 

Hitler (Adolf) 3, 6, 9 

Hopkins, Harry L 11 

Hurley (Patrick Jay) 6 

Jodl (Alfred) 6 

Khrushchev (Nikita) 1,8,12, 15,31 

MacArthur (Douglas) 29 

Macmillan (Harold) 25 

Mao Tse-tung 19 

Marshall (George C) L 6, 7, 10, 11, 20, 21 

Marx, Karl 3, 9 

Mountbatten, Louis 6, 29 

Reed, Douglas 16 

Rickover (Hyuian G) 27 

Rockefeller (Nelson A) 33 

Rommel (Erwin) 17 

Stilwell (Joseph W) 6 

Stuart, (John) Leighton ^ 7 

Tito (Josip Broz) 26 

Truman (Harry S) 6,7,29 

von Stauffenburg, Klaus 6 

"Wedemeyer, Albert C-^ 1-35 (statement) 

Organizations 

China, Nationalist Government '_ 20 

Czechoslovakia, Government of. Interior Department 80 

Egypt, Government of 11, 12 

German War College 6 

North Atlantic Treaty Organization. 26 

Sun Yat-sen University (Moscow) 19 

United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA) 13 

United States Government, National Security Council 12, 33 

United Nations 31 

Publications 

Communist Manifesto 3, 9 

Das Kapital 3, 9 

Mein Kampf 3, 9 

Somewhere South of Suez (book) 16 

i 

o 



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