n Com mittee on Un-American ActlYJt ies ^
THE COMMUNIST PROGRAM
FOR WORLD CONQUEST
GEN. ALBERT C. WEDEMEYER
UNITED STATES ARMY
COMMITTEE ON UN-AMERICAN ACTIVITIES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
JANUARY 21, 1958
Printed for the use of the Committee on Un-American Activities
GOVERNMENT PPwINTING OFFICE
22858° WASHINGTON : 1958
?^-.' I ^,'W^
COMMITTEE ON UN-AMERICAN ACTIVITIES
United States House of Representatives
FRANCIS E. WALTER, Pennsylvania, Chairman
MORGAN M. MOULDER, Missouri BERNARD W. KEARNEY. New York
CLYDE DOYLE, California DONALD L. JACKSON. California
EDWIN E. WILLIS. Louisiana GORDON 11. SCHERER. Ohio
WILLIAM M. TUCK, Virginia ROBERT J. McINTOSII, Michigan
RiciiAKD AnEXS, Staff Director
January 21, 1958, Consultation with :
Gen. Albert 0. Wedemeyer, United States Army 5
PuBLio Law 601, 79th Congress
The legislation under which the House Committee on Un-American
Activities operates is Public Law 601, 79th Congress , chapter
753, 2d session, which provides :
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States
of America in Congress assembled, » * •
PART 2— EULES OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
SEC. 121. STANDING COMMITTEES
17. Committee on Un-American Activities, to consist of nine Meonbers.
POWERS AND DUTIES OF COMMITTEES
* * >K * • * *
(q) (1) Committee on Un-American Activities.
(A) Un-American activities.
(2) Tlie Committee on Un-American Activities, as a wliole or by subcommittee,
is autliorized to make from time to time investigations of (i) the extent, char-
acter, and objects of un-American propaganda activities in the United States,
(ii) the diffusion within the United States of subversive and un-American propa-
ganda that is instigated from foreign countries or of a domestic origin and
attacks the principle of the form of government as guaranteed by our Constitu-
tion, and (iii) all other questions in relation thereto that would aid Congress in
any necessary remedial legislation.
The Committee on Un-American Activities shall report to the House (or to the
Clerk of the House if the House is not in session) the results of any such investi-
gation, together with such recommendations as it deems advisable.
For the purpose of any such investigation, the Committee on Un-American
Activities, or any subcommittee thereof, is authorized to sit and act at such times
and places within the United States, whether or not the House is sitting, has
recessed, or has adjourned, to hold such hearings, to require the attendance of
such witnesses and the production of such books, papers, and documents, and to
take such testimony, as it deems necessary. Subpenas may be issued under
the signature of the chairman of the committee or any subcommittee, or by any
member designated by any such chairman, and may be served by any person
designated by any such chairman or member.
• « * « * * *
LEGISLATIVE OVEKSIGHT BY STANDING COMMITTEES
Sec 136. To assist the Congress in appraising the administration of the laws
and in developing such amendments or related legislation as It may deem neces-
sary, each standing committee of the Senate and House of Representatives shall
exercise continuous watchfulness of the execution by the administrative agencies
concerned of any laws, the subject matter of which is within the jurisdiction of
such committee ; and, for that purpose, shall study all pertinent reports and data
submitted to the Congress by the agencies in the executive branch of the Govern-
RULES ADOPTED BY THE 85TH CONGRESS
House Resolution 5, January 3, 1957
1. There shall be elected by the House, at the commencement of each Congress,
(q) Committee on Un-American Activities, to consist of nine Members.
POWERS AND DUTIES OF COMMirfEES
17. Committee on Un-American Activities.
(a) Uu-Americau activities.
(b) The Committee on Un-American Activities, as a whole or by subcommittee.
Is authorized to make from time to time investigations of (1) the, extent, cl)ar-
acter, and ol)jects of un-American propaganda activities in the United States,
(2) the diffusion within the United States of suliver.<:ive and un-American prop-
aganda that is instigated from foreign countries or of a domestic origin and
attaclvs the principle of the form of government as guaranteed by our Constitu-
tion, and (3) all other questions in relation thereto that would aid Congress in
any necassary remedial legislation.
The Committee on Un-American Activities shall report to the House (or to tiie
Clerk of the House if the House is not in session) the results of any such investi-
gation, together with such recommendations as it deems advisable.
For the purpose of any such investigation, the Committee on Un-American
Activities, or any subcommittee thereof, is authorized to sit and act at such times
and places within the United States, whether or not the House is sitting, has
recessed, or has adjourned, to hold such hearings, to require the attendance of
such witnesses and the production of such books, papers, and documents, and to
take such testimony, as it deems necessary. Subpenas may be issued under the
signature of the chairman of the committee or any subcommittee, or by any
member designated by any such chairman, and may be served by any person
designated by any such chairman or member.
26. To assist the House in appraising the administration of the laws and in
developing such amendments or related legislation as it may deem necessary,
each standing committee of the House shall exercise continuous watchfulness
of the execution by tlie administrative agencies concerned of any laws, the
subject matter of which is within the jurisdiction of sucli committee; and, for
that purpose, shall study all pertinent reports and data submitted to the House
by the agencies in the executive branch of the Govermneut.
Economic and psychological weapons rather than the launching of
a third world war comprise the current Communist, program for
world conquest, General Albert C. Wedemeyer warned in a consulta-
tion with the Committee on Un-American Activities. One of the
top strategic planners of World War II, General Wedemeyer was
present at many international conferences as adviser to the President.
He att-ended the conferences in Washington, London, Cairo, Quebec,
and Casablanca before going to China as theater commander in 1944.
"They (the Communists) are attaining their objectives without the
use of military force," General Wedemeyer said :
If I were the senior planner in the Soviet hierarchy, I
would advise Khrushchev: "Continue to do exactly what
you are doing now. Do not involve the Soviet Union in a
major war but employ the satellites in brush fires or lim-
ited wars against our enemies, the capitalist countries. Con-
tinue penetration economically and psychologically, utilize
economic or military aid to as many countries in the world
as possible. They can be made indebted to the Soviet, and
if not loyal, at least they will not be opposed to the Com-
"I do not believe that they intend to precipitate an all-out war,"
I have not felt that war was imminent at any time since
World War II even when there were incidents that might
have easily touched off a world struggle. You may recall
the Berlin airlift, for example. There have been many other
incidents that could have started a war if the Soviets had any
desire to start an all-out war. They will continue to spread
communism utilizing economic and psychological weapons.
General Wedemeyer warned that the Soviet Union today has
"greater military capabilities than do we."
, This has been true ever- since the end of World War II
when we emasculated our military forces and at the same
time permitted the Soviet to retam a massive army, a big
navy, and air force. At one time we had a technological ad-
vantage, particularly in the atomic weapon field, which served
as a deterrent.
General Wedemeyer expressed the view that it is now too late for
the West on the Soviet timetable for world domination, but he added :
However, I am not completely pessimistic about our chances
to recover a sufficiently strong strategic posture vis-a-vis the
Soviet. If we make a careful analysis of all of the countries
■which endanger our position, evaluate their capabilities and
THE COMMUNIST PROGRAM FOR WORLD CONQUEST
their limitations, and then determine how much assistance,
realistic or passive, that we might expect from allies, and
finally consider our own potential strength, I think that we
would find our position in the world is not without hope, in
fact we would be most optimistic if we could foresee the coor-
dinated employment of all the positive forces that we have on
our side to counter our potential enemies and to overcome ob-
stacles ofi'ered by them to the attainment of our objectives.
I have confidence in American ingenuity, in our courage,
and in our capacity to plan intelligently it we are only pro-
vided the direction from responsible leaders. But we must
bring about concerted action to attain our goals and stop the
indiscriminate and uncoordinated use of our political, eco-
nomic, psychological, and military forces.
General Wedemeyer continued :
We have wonderful opportunities in the struggle against
conununism if we would use our economic weapon intelligent-
ly. In helping other peoples economically we should be care-
ful not to do so on a charity basis. Such an approach makes
the recipient or beneficiary lose his self-respect. Outright
charity undermines the moral fiber of an individual or of a
nation. But we can provide economic or technical aid in such
a manner as to enable the recipient peoples to help themselves
and even make it possible for them to i-eturn or pay back our
largess. One cannot help but pay tril)ute to the brave and
self-respecting Finns. They were the only people who paid
their World War I debt to the United States. ^ All other so-
called allies, the recipients of our loans and aid in other forms,
He cautioned, however, that —
I would not vote one penny to any country unless I had evi-
dence of their good faith and of their unswerving loyalty in
the cooperative effort with us toward the attainment of com-
mon objectives: one important one, of course, is protecting
the Free World against the scourge of communism. I am
not suggesting that each one of these countries to whom we
give military and economic aid shoidd have exactly the same
objectives in the international field, but I would insist that
their objectives must be compatible' with our own. In other
Avords, if the l^ritish insist on trading with Red China and
thus strengthening the Communists who present a grave
danger to United States interests, then I would discontinue
military or economic aid to the British.
When I make a statement like that, Britishers and Ameri-
can "one-worlders" will say that they are not trading in stra-
tegic items. When they use the term "strategic items," they
mean, of course, airplanes, tanks, ammunition, I presume,
liut I insist that any item of trade — a spool of thread, wheat,
automobiles, or coffee — assists the economy of Red China.
I believe in denying those areas under Communist rule
any economic or military assistance. Furthermore I would
break oil' diplomatic relations with them.
THE COMMUNIST PROGRAM FOR WORILD CONQUEST 3
In suggesting these ideas to the committee, I wish to em-
phasize that I am not an isolationist. No country can isolate
itself from the world today. If this be a fact, the United
States should participate in international developments and
relations with intelligence, always mindful of the fact that
we must be actuated by self-respect.
In other words, every step that we take should protect our
security and our economy. Let us be realistic and under-
stand that all other countries conduct their foreign policies
in that manner.
Despite the apparent changes in Soviet tactics, the ultimate objec-
tives of communism are unchangeable. General Wedemeyer declared i
The objectives of the Soviet are clearly stated in the Com-
munist Manifesto and again developed in the two volumes
of Das Kapital by Karl Marx. These Soviet objectives are
available for the public to read. Hitler announced to the
world in the same unmistakable manner his objectives in a
book, Mein Kampf. But no one paid any attention to Hit-
ler's attempt to warn the world of his intentions. I wonder
if we are paying sufficient attention to the Communist objec-
tives? The overall, clearly announced objective of interna-
tional communism is to free the proletariat from exploitation
by the bourgeoisie. The masses are to be protected from
the scheming capitalists. The world is to be communized.
There is no possibility of compromise with the Soviet Union and
world communism. General Wedemeyer asserted, inasmuch as "kill,
lie, distort, torture — all are fully justified in the Soviet conscience
because they are so dedicated to the attainment of Marxian, Leninist,
or Stalinist objectives."
THE COMMUNIST PROGRAM FOR WORLD CONQUEST
TUESDAY, JANUARY 21, 1958
United States House of Representatives,
Committee on Un-American Activities,
Washington^ D. 0.
The Committee on Un-American Activities met, pursuant to call, at
10 a. m., in room 225, Old House Office Building, Washington, D. C,
Hon. Clyde Doyle, presiding.
Committee members present: Representatives Francis E. Walter,
of Pennsylvania, chairman of the committee (appearance as noted) ;
Clyde Doyle, of California ; Bernard W. Kearney, of New York ; and
Gordon H. Scherer, of Ohio.
Staff members present : Richard Arens, staff director, and William
F. Heimlich, consultant.
Mr. DoTLE. In the absence of the distinguished committee chairman,
Francis E. Walter, temporarily, I am calling the meeting to order.
We are favored this morning with the testimony of Gen. Albert C.
We appreciate very much. General, your being with us.
What is the first order of business, Mr. Arens ?
Mr. Arens. If you please, Mr. Chairman, I would suggest that the
general might for our record, at this time, give a brief sketch of his
Mr. Kearney. May I interrupt, please. Is it necessary that the
general be sworn?
Mr. Arens. It has not been the practice of the committee to swear
persons who are in consultation on international communism as distinct
from persons who might be testifying for the purpose of identifying
Mr. Kearney. In other words, you mean the general is not going to
take the fifth amendment.
Mr. Arens. I do not anticipate so.
General Wedemeyer. I would gladly be sworn if you want me to be.
Mr. Kearney. No.
Mr. Doyle. I think no doubt the record will show the committee
Mr. Arens. I respectfully suggest, General, you might give us the
highlights of your most distinguished career.
GEN. ALBERT C. WEDEMEYEE, UNITED STATES ARMY (RETIRED)
General Wedemeyer. My name is Albert C. Wedemeyer. I am a
retired general of the United States Army. My career in the Army
included cadet service at West Point, lieutenant in June 1919, and the
6 THE COMMUNIST PROGRAM FOR WORLD CONQUEST
usual eomjiany and field grades in the infantry and finally reached
general oflicer rank in 1942.
After I completed 2 years at the United States Army staff school
at Fort Ijoavenworth, I was assigned as a student by the War Depart-
ment to the German War College located in 13erlin, Germany. This
experience of 2i/^ years as a student and resident in Germany greatly
stimulated my interest in international developments.
i\rr. Sen EUER. What year was tliat, General Wedemeyer ?
General Wedemeyer. I Avas in Germany from July 1936 to October
1938, which of course were very eventful years in central Europe.
During that period nazism was at its peak in power. While in Ger-
many I met many of the Nazi leaders, including Hess, Goering, and
Goebbels, and of course I was thrown in contact even more with the
senior military leaders as well as the military officers at the German
War College, both students and instructors. For example, Jodl, who
later became Hitler's strategic adviser with the rank of colonel gen-
eral, was my instructor. Count Klaus von Stauffenburg, the oflicer
who placed a bomb under a desk in an abortive attempt to kill Hitler
on July 20, 19-44, was my classmate in the German War College. Von
Stauffenberg was a very unusual man — intelligent, courageous — and I
considered him a good friend. All of these contacts and the oppor-
tunity of reading and hearing about nazism, fascism, and communism
aroused my curiosity. I tried to understand the. conditions that stim-
ulated or generated those "isms," and made it possible for their propo-
nents to gain the attention and ofttimes the fanatic support of so many
people. Obviously these were unique opportunities to observe and
ex))(^rience momentous events leading up to World War II.
The instruction at the German War College was far superior to that
which I experienced at our own staff school at Leavenworth. Tlie
students in Germany were required to study history and were
thoroughly grounded in the fundamentals of military science, tactics,
At the conclusion of my service in Germany, I submitted an official
report to the War De])artment. The Chief of Staff of our Army at
that time was Gen. Malin Craig.
Mr. SciiERER. What was your rank at that time ?
General AVEDE:NrEYER. I was a captain. I was 17 years a lieutenant.
This may seem unusiuil but in prewar days promotion was very slow.
After World War II began, promotion was rapid. Upon my return
from duty in Germany, I was assigned to troop duty at Fort Benning
and then after 1 year there I was brought into the War Plans Division
of the General Staff in Washington. In this assignment I assisted
in the preparation of our strategy, and during the first few years of
the war I attended world conferences in London, Washington, Casa-
blanca, Cairo, and Quebec with General Marshall. In September
1943 I was assigned to duty in the Southeast Asia Command with
Admiral Mountbatten and then a year later, 1944, 1 was sent to China
to relieve General Stilwell as theater commander. I held that post
imtil May of 1946 when the theater was disbanded. I returned to the
States ostensibly to be Ambassador to China. Mr. Truman had asked
me to accept that post after General Hurley resigned in the fall of
1945. General Marshall urged me to do so and I agreed. However,
the news concerning my prospective appointment as Ambassador to
China leaked in that part of the world. General Marshall at the time
THE COMMUNIST PROGRAM FOR WORI.D CONQUEST 7
was conducting delicate negotiations involving Nationalists and Com-
munists, and apparently he felt that the news of my appointment was
militating against the success of his negotiations, particularly because
the Communists objected violently. Accordingly General Marshall
radioed to President Truman requesting the appointment of Dr^
Leighton Stuart, an American missionary living in China. In that
radiogram he asked that General Wedemeyer be notified that he would
be appointed later.
Mr. Arens. General, would you give us a thumbnail sketch of the
functions you performed in World War II in strategy and policy for
the global operations of the United States ?
General Wedemeyer. Yes; shortly after my return from Europe
and immediately prior to World War II, I was assigned to the Gen-
eral Staff, War Plans Division, and by the spring of 1942 I was put
in charge of the strategic policy and plans group. This group had
the responsibility of conducting strategic studies, evolving plans for
the employment of our forces and coordinating our war effort with
allies. Our objective was to insure that the military effort would
protect America's interests and accomplish our objectives at home and
To state this point in another way, I felt that it was very important
at war's end to insure that Anglo-American forces would be occupying
most of Western Europe and the Balkans. Some of us recognized the
danger of international communism and, although the Soviet Union
was an ally, we wanted to insure that the Communist forces could not
fill the vacua created by killing and destruction during the course
of the war throughout Europe.
Most of us interpreted nazism as a strong nationalist movement
whereas we felt that communism was an international movement sup-
ported by a worldwide conspiratorial effort. As we viewed it then,
nazism would take unfair advantage^ would subvert or conquer areas
in their narrow, strongly nationalistic interests, whereas communism
was worldwide in scope and visualized the enslavement or conquering
of all peoples.
Mr. Arens. With that brief personal sketch on the record, may we
ask you to give your characterization or appraisal of the struggle of
the world today as between the East and the West ?
General Wedemeyer. In the first instance I think that the West
is overshadowed by international communism. I think that com-
munism is gaining instead of losing strength in the world. You are
familiar with history and therefore all of you realize that a struggle
between nations and peoples haS always been going on.
There is nothing new about such struggle, but we Americans after
World War II were either naive, or too trusting. There is consider-
able evidence to prove that there were malicious influences in key
places of our Government. But any one or a combination of these cir-
cumstances permitted a critical situation to develop after World War
II, namely, the Soviet emerged all powerful — and our war aims for
which we sacrificed so much were not accomplished.
We continued to give vast sums of money and materials and even
our moral support alter the war to the Soviet Union and her satellites.
In other words, communism gained its position as a world power
through our own lack of appreciation of the dangers inherent in
8 THE COMMUNIST PROGRAM FOR WORLD CONQUEST
You gentlemen may have more knowledge than I do about the re-
sponsibility for these developments. Today communism, in my judg-
ment, is increasing in its influence and strength, not only in the militai-y
field but in scientific accomplishments. Sputnik is just one example.
Several years a^o they had a fighter plane — the MIG-15 — that was
superior to our Saner Jets in Korea. These planes could outmaneuver
our fighter aircraft and reach higher altitudes. Recently they devel-
oped an icebreaker with atomic power. In their schooling, their edu-
cational system, one cannot help but be impressed by the number of
engineers and applied scientists they have trained. In pure science
as well as api)lica science they seem to be ahead of us.
The Soviets have been improving steadily and they have even forged
ahead in many fields — education, production, technology, sciences,
athletics, for example.
If I were the senior planner in the Soviet hierarchy, I would advise
Khrushchev : "Continue to do exactly what you are doinj; now. Do
not involve the Soviet Union in a major war but employ the satellites
in brush fires or limited wars against our enemies, the capitalist coun-
tries. Continue penetration, economically and psychologically, utilize
economic or military aid to as many countries in the world as possible.
They can be made indebted to the Soviet, and if not loyal, at least they
will not be opposed to the Communist movement."
One could cite numerous examples of their clever use of the economic
aid as a strategic weapon.
Mr. Arens. As we look at the other side of the coin, what do you
believe to be the global strategy of the Soviets?
General Wedemeyer. I do not believe that they intend to precipitate
an all-out war. I have not felt that war was imminent at any time
since "World "War II even when there were incidents that might have
easily touched off a world struggle. You may recall the Berlin air-
lift, for example. There have been many other incidents that could
have started a war if the Soviets had any desire to start an all-out
war. They will continue to spread communism utilizing economic
and psychological weapons.
Mr. SciiERER. Mr. Chairman, may I ask a question that I think is
pertinent right at this point?
Mr. Doyle. Yes.
Mr. ScHERER. You say Russia is not interested in precipitating — or
you do not believe they will precipitate a world war or struggle. Is
it because they have made so much progress without such a war that
you do not believe that they will precipitate us into another world war?
General "Wedeiieyer. Yes ; I think that is a sound conclusion. JNfay
I just explain to you my concept of strategy, in lay language.
The term "strategy" disturbs many people just as the word "propa-
ganda" does. I define "strategy" as the art and science of usin<T all
of a nation's available resources to accomplish national objectives.
There are four major categories of resources: political, economic,
psychological, and military. If the first three of these resources — tliat
is, political, economic, and psychological — are employed intelligently
and boldly in consonance with a well-thought-out plan, it may never
be necessary to use actively our military force. Obviously that is
exactly what we should do at all times — prevent war and yet accom-
plish our national aims. But we must retain military force — appro-
THE COMMUNIST PROGRAM FOR WORLD CONQUEST 9
priate in strength and composition to our possible need in emergency.
In our commmiities we employ the police to maintain order and to
protect people who respect the law against those who would violate
it. In the international arena we must do likewise, only calling on the
military when all other means fail to accomplish our purposes.
Mr. ScHERER. The Soviets have been very successful in using these
first three resources.
General Wedemeyer. In my opinion, yes.
Mr. Arens. I think you may want to clarify the record. The Con-
gressman asked you about a war. I am sure he had in mind a shooting
war in which guns and missiles would be employed. Is there any
doubt in your mind but what the Soviet Union and her satellites are
presently engaged in war, with the United States as their No. 1 target?
General Wedemeyer. We associate shooting and the employment of
military force with war. When we employ the other three resources —
political, economic, and psychological — I term such employment not in
the sense of war but as a struggle going on with other nations.
Mr. Arens. What is the objective of the Soviet Union and its
General Wedemeyer. The objectives of the Soviet are clearly stated
in the Communist Manifesto and again developed in the two volumes
of Das Kafital by Karl Marx. These Soviet objectives are available
for the public to read. Hitler announced to the world in the same
unmistakable manner his objectives in a book, Mein Kamff. But no
one paid any attention to Hitler's attempt to warn the world of his
intentions. I wonder if we are paying sufficient attention to the Com-
munist objectives? The overall, clearly announced objective of inter-
national communism is to free the proletariat from exploitation by the
bourgeoisie. The masses are to be protected from the scheming
capitalists. The world is to be communized.
Mr. Kearney. General, you answered, as I understand it, that Rus-
sia at the present time does not want to have a shooting war %
General Wedemeyer. I do not believe they do, sir.
Mr. Kearney. Is that due to the fact that Russia is obtaining its
objeetives without a shooting war, or is it due to the fact that they do
not trust their satellites ?
General Wedemeyer. It is due primarily to the fact that they are
attaining their objectives without the use of military force. It is true
that they are compelled to accei)t reverses at times in particular areas
but they invariaoly are making headway in some other areas.
Furthermore, although they may suffer a setback in a specific area,
later on they conduct their plans in such a way as to recover their
losses and actually make gains in that same area.
Mr. Kearney. Then may I ask you, in case of a shooting war, in
your opinion could Russia depend upon her satellites in view of the
riots in Poland, the East German June 1953 riots, and the recent
Hungarian revolution ?
General Wedemeyer. It is my opinion that the Soviet Union could
not depend upon her satellites or upon the millions of oppressed peo-
ples within her own borders in the event of a war, which would pro-
duce opportunities to defect with a chance of success. Under such
conditions there would be opportunities for the western nations to
exploit defections that occur in the satellite countries and even in
10 THE CXDMMUlSnST PROGRAM FOR WORLD CONQUEST
Russia. In connection M'ith tlie attitude or the possible defection of
peoples behind the Iron Curtain, may I supfgest, General Kearney,
that vre consider extending our own efforts to bring about and support
such defections. For example, we are expending billions of dollars
for weapons that will kill and destroy. We are assembling tlie best
brains in the country to insure that we surpass other countries, partic-
ularly the Soviet Union, in the development of ultradestructive weap-
ons. But I, personally, would like concurrently to recommend the
collection of brains and the expenditure of effort — billions of dollars,
if necessary — to find out what we can do to reach tlie minds of peoples
behind the Iron Curtain, to win their loyalties and sympathetic under-
standing, and thus avoid the possibility of a destructive thermonuclear
war. There are two points that we must make crystal clear to our
potential enemies, neutrals, and friends : First, that we are sincere in
our desire for peace and in our willingness to cooperate realistically
to protect the freedoms and improve opportunities of the individual
of any clime, race, or creed; and second, that we are determined to use
every resource at our command to destroy communism, or any other
"ism'' that jeopardizes peace in the world. Unless we undertake suc-
cessfully such an approach to our international problems, civilization
as we know it will be retarded at least a thousand years. Let's put
constructive ideas instead of hydrogen bombs in the nose cone of our
Mr. Kearnky. With that I thoroughly agree. When you speak as
you do about the best brains now trying to figure out ways and means
of bringing into being weapons that can win a shooting war, we have
only to go back to your original statement that after World War II we
just practically disbanded the greatest fighting force in the world
while Russia, without the loss of a Russian soldier, took over about
800 million people.
General Wedemeyer. General Kearney, we had plenty of evidence
before and during AVorld War II of the recalcitrance of the Soviet
Union, of their motives, and their unscrupulous arrogant methods.
They at all times had their selfish interests in mind and would not co-
operate except when it would be advantageous to them, and to them
alone. As a strategic planner on the General Staff in Washington
during the early days of the war, I frequently contacted Russian rep-
resentatives and asked them where, when, and how they planned to use
the equipment that they were demanding or requisitioning from us —
for example, airplanes, tanks, guns, thousands of tons of equipment of
all kinds. We were pouring war supplies into the Soviet Union, often
at great sacrifice to our own forces which we were generating here at
home and preparing for shipment to prosi^ective areas of employment
against the enemy. But General Kearney, the Russian representatives
would not cooperate with regard to explaining where and wlien they
intended to use the munitions we were shipping to them. In fact they
were very cool and even suspicious when one approached them con-
cerning any problem. They refused to give any indication of their
prospective plans in fighting the Germans yet they were supposed to
be an ally. I tried to explain carefully my purpose in determining
where, how, and when they would use the tanks, airplanes, and so
forth, against the common enemy. For example, I had to recommend
to General ^Marshall priorities for allocation of the equipment, not
THE COMMUNIST PROGRAM FOR WORLD CONQUEST 11
only to Russia but to England and other allies. If England could
use the tanks more effectively and more quickly against the enemy,
it seemed to me that she should get higher priority. I mentioned my
difficulty in this regard to General Marshall and to Harry Hopkins,
as well as to others in positions of responsibility but got nowhere.
One of the ablest men in the State Department, Mr. Loy Henderson,
considered an expert in dealing with Russia, attempted to help me.
He recognized the importance of allocating our war materiels on the
basis of its most effective use against the enemy. But the Soviet
representatives would not cooperate in any respect.
Mr. Arens. May I ask you, General, concerning the instruments
of national policy which you described : Do you feel that the Soviet
Union uses these instruments effectively in its designs for world con-
General Wedemeyer. Yes, I do. They use economic and psycho-
logical weapons most effectively. We know that the Soviet Union does
not honor any treaty or agreement unless advantage accrues to them.
They have been very clever in penetrating in various countries the
Department of Interior, which is really the department responsible for
internal security matters. After the Communists obtain control of the
secret police and administrative setup of the security department, they
can easily take over the government by intimidating or removing re-
sponsible officials in other departments. Czechoslovakia is an example
of this technique, but similar tactics were employed in Hungary and
throughout the Balkan States. Lithuania, Estonia, and Latvia were
overpowered quickly and brought into the Soviet Union against the
will of the inhabitants.
We have wonderful opportunities in the struggle against comrnu-
nism if we would use our economic weapon intelligently. In helping
other peoples economically we should be careful not to do so on a
charity basis. Such an approach makes the recipient or beneficiary
lose his self-respect. Outright charity undermines the moral fiber
of an individual or of a nation. But we can provide economic or tech-
nical aid in such a manner as to enable the recipient peoples to help
themselves and even make it possible for them to return or pay back our
largess. One cannot help but pay tribute to the brave and self-
respecting Finns. They were the only people who paid their World
War I debt to the United States. All other so-called allies, the
recipients of our loans and aid in other forms, reneged.
Mr. Kearney. And we kicked the Finns in the pants later.
General Wedemeyer. YeSj we did, very much as we turned our backs
on loyal allies, the Nationalist Chinese, after World War II. May I
give you a concrete example of the manner in which the Russians use
the economic weapon in their campaign to control and communize
other countries ?
Some few years back the Egyptians wanted to buy wheat from the
United States. The Egyptian Ambassador negotiated here in Wash-
ington with appropriate officials. Nothing came of the negotiations
and as time went on the Egyptian Government continued to prompt
its Ambassador to do something about it. However, he was unable to
get a definitive answer from anyone in authority in the State Depart-
ment. The Egyptians were perfectly willing to pay for the wheat in
dollars and they sorely needed it for their people. Finally in some
22858°— 5S 3
12 THE (COMMUNIST PROGRAM FOR WORLD CONQUEST
unknown manner the Soviet Union learned of the Egyptian attempt
to get wheat from the United States. This Avas not understood by
the Egyptian Ambassador or his Government for all of the negotia-
tions had been conducted in the utmost secrecy with United States
officials. In a short time the Soviet Union offered the Egyptian
Government all the wheat it would require, and at tirst there were no
strings attached. Gradually, however, the quality of the wheat de-
teriorated and there were other disagreeable features injected by the
Soviet Union. This cooperative action on the part of the Soviet
Union was known by all of the Egyptians and was, of course, inter-
preted as a friendly gesture by them. Further, the Soviet Union
agents in Egypt made it their duty to insure that all of tlie Egyptians
were told that the United States refused to sell wheat to tlie Egyptian
Government and the Soviet Union voluntarily came forward and
provided the wheat. Then we wonder why people do not know about,
or seem to misinterpret, our actions and policies.
Another feature of the Soviet tactics in using the economic weapon :
Before Khrushchev or Bulganin visit a foreign country, the Soviet
Union usually makes some favorable economic gesture to that country.
Then they insure that all of the, people are informed of the great
Comnninist largess — the role of helping the poor people. When
Khrushchev or Bulganin arrive, of course they are the recipients of
praise, gratitude, and extraordinary manifestation of friendship. On
the other hand, Ave Americans, apparently, do nothing to mform
people of the aid that we are giving to them directly or indirectly
througli their government. The timing of our aid apparently is never
coordinated with a visit of one of our officials. It seems to me that
■we have no plan in this connection and there apparently is no agency
of the Government responsible for coordination of our efforts in the
political, economic, and psychological fields.
I think it is contemplated that the National Security Council exer-
cise overall supervision of these activities which we have been dis-
cussing this morning, particularly the coordination of military
and economic aid to friendly nations, the Avorldwide information
program, including the dissemination of overt and covert propaganda,
and finally the use of trade agreements and political alliances to
strengthen our position vis-a-vis potential enemies. But I do not
feel that the National Security Council is the proper agency for such
supervision because it com])rises individuals who have great responsi-
bilities in other areas. They simply cannot devote the time neces-
sary to function ])roperly in the National Security Council. For ex-
ample, the President, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense
and the head of CIA all have day-to-day administrative res]ionsibili-
ties which preclude their participation in the planning and coordi-
nating of our worldwide policies and actions.
On the other hand, the Soviet Union apparently has an excellent
plan and organization through which it is enjoying great success all
over the world. The Russians are not 10-foot men and they have their
weaknesses as well as their strong points. "We must not overemphasize
their strength. We are just as intellio;ent as they are. I think we
ere in a weaker position today principally because we have been naive
and trusting, as well as somewhat apathetic toward events occurring
in other parts of the world.
THE COMMUNIST PROGRAM FOR WORLD CONQUEST 13
Mr. Kearney. That is true, General, but at the same time it is my
humble opinion that Russia has an objective in mind. It seems to me,
and I may be totally wrong, that most of our people who are engaged
in office work are simply there because they are drawing pay. There
is no plan as you say. This goes way back to the days of UNRRA.
We have never been credited with doing the right thing in the right
General Wedemeyer. I agree. Immediately after the war I saw
material out in China sent there by the United States for distribution
by UNRRA to help the Chinese. The markings which would indicate
that this economic aid came from the United States had been oblit-
erated, and the Russians had put markers on the containers to deceive
the Chinese people into thinking that they, the Soviet Union, sent the
aid. Later, when I was in Iran, I learned officially that although
the United States was furnishing large quantities of milk for the
Iranian children, the Soviet Union had given the people of Iran the
impression that it was the Communists who were sympathetic to the
needs of the masses of people and it was the Soviet Union that had sent
the milk to their children. I think this pattern was followed through-
out the world. We never received credit for the great humanitarian
effort that we made to restore and rehabilitate the war-devastated
areas. If there had not been an aggressive country like the Soviet
Union with world-conquering objectives, of course, we would not have
been presented with the problem. We must wake up and insure that
our traditional generous efforts to help others are understood and
that the Soviet Union does not get credit for the sacrifices that we
Mr. Kearney. Is it because we have people in our agencies overseas
who do not seem to care so long as they have a job or are being enter-
tained and wined and dined, or is it because the State Department here
does not put its foot down and does not have an overall plan ?
General Wedebieyer. Of course, a breakdown in the functioning of
an organization is usually attributed to the responsible leaders. In my
judgment our leaders have not been trained properly in international
negotiations and operations. They are just as worthy, honest, and
efficient as they are in any other country but they lack proper training
and guidance. When I first came in contact with the British during
the war, I was greatly impressed with their unanimity of purpose, their
loyalty to definite objectives or policies of the British Commonwealth.
No matter where I went in the world this was true. The British
representatives always seemed to be knowledgeable about their Com-
monwealth policies and they loyally supported them. There was a
continuity and a high degree of coordination in all of their policies
and actions in the international field. This was not true in our own
case. We Americans were not sure about our country's objectives.
There was a lack of coordination between the economic, the political,
the military, and the psychological efforts being made by various
American departments and agencies.
Mr. ScHERER. You mean among the Americans in the administra-
tion of our foreign-aid projects ?
General Wedemeyer. Yes, sir. I definitely include the administra-
tion of our foreign aid. Also, Mr. Congressman, I mentioned earlier
that I tried to compel an ally (the Soviet Union) to explain how they
14 THE COMMUNIST PROGRAM FOR WORLD CONQUEST
■were ^oing to use, and when they planned to do so, the equipment that
they were receiving from us. I tried to compel the Soviet representa-
tives to tell me but they refused. I could not obtain the support of
people higher up in our own Government in this regard. We had men
in our own military forces training with wooden guns because we had
shipped so many of the real weapons to the Soviet Union. We had a
great shortage of tanks and otner weapons which were needed ur-
gently by our troops undergoing training. Yet we were shipping
almost indiscriminately and without obtaining information as to their
use — tons and tons of weapons to the Soviet TTnion.
Mr. ScHERER. When you use the term "allies," do you mean Russia
or all of our allies?
General Wedemeyer. I mean all of our allies, Mr, Congressman, in-
cluding the British who were also making demands upon us for
equipment. In the early days of the war, they too were getting huge
quantities of critical materiel from us and there was little or no
coordination concerning how and when they were going to use such
equipment against the enemy. Later we were able to obtain better
cooperation from the British but the Soviet Union never did cooperate
as a loyal ally should in this or any other regard.
Mr. Arens. In the light of recent events, must we assume that the
Soviet Union has reached parity with the United States in military
General Wedemeyer. I think the Soviet Union has greater military
capabilities than do we. This has been true ever since the end of
World War II when we emasculated our military forces and at the
same time permitted the Soviet to retain a massive army, a big navy,
and air force. At one time we had a technological advantage, par-
ticularly in the atomic weapon field, which served as a deterrent.
Mr. Arens. How do these comparative capabilities affect our re-
lationship with allied nations with whom we have mutual defense
treaties in all parts of the world ?
General Wedemeyer. This situation should make our allies rather
reluctant, at least it suggests possible dangerous implications of co-
operating with the United StateSj with reference to accepting Ameri-
can forces and bases on their territory. For example, I would under-
stand a British policy of excluding Americans from the British Isles
in the event of an emergency. At present American bases located
there may not precipitate a war and they may even serve as a so-called
deterrent. In other words, the Soviet Union probably will not start
military attacks until they have absolute assurance that they have
supremacy, including the power to neutralize military installations
in the British Isles. But I would like to remind you aoout an earlier
statement I made this morning to the effect that in my judgment the
Soviet leaders will not precipitate an all-out war.
Mr. Arens. You mean a shooting war ?
General Wedemeyer. Yes, I do. It is my conviction that the Soviet
Union will continue to intensify its efforts in the economic, psychologi-
cal, and political fields. Unless and until they are conironted wilh
intelligent, coordinated action on our part in those same fields, the
Soviet Union will continue to enjoy success everywhere. They have
the initiative now in all fields of strategy. I feel certain that they
will not resort to the use of military force unless compelled to do so.
THE COMMUNIST PROGRAM FOR WORLD CONQUEST 15
Of course, gentlemen, no one can predict what might happen in a
state with a chief executive like Khrushchev who I understand gets
very drunk on occasion. If these reports be true, he could under-
standably be impulsive, arrogant, and at time irresponsible. In such
a mood he might take precipitous action which would touch off a
global war. However, under normal conditions in my judgment
there will not be a shooting war for some time to come.
Mr. Arens. How late is it on the Soviet timetable for world
General Wedemeyer. From our viewpoint?
Mr. Arens. Yes, sir.
General Wedemeyer. Several years ago when I was still in the mili-
tary service I testified before a congressional committee to the effect
that I thought it was then too late.
Mr. Arens. Do you think it is too late now ?
General Wedemeyer. Yes, sir.
Mr. Arens. That is your honest judgment. General, as a military
man who has served his nation in the very top echelon of global
General Wedemeyer. Yes, sir. That was my viewpoint several
years ago when I testified before congressional committees to that
effect. It is still my viewpoint. However, I am not completely pes-
simistic about our chances to recover a sufficiently strong strategic
posture vis-a-vis the Soviet. If we make a careful analysis of all of
the countries which endanger our position, evaluate their capabilities
and their limitations, and then determine how much assistance, real-
istic or passive, that we might expect from allies, and finally consider
our own potential strength, I think that we would find our position in
the world is not without hope, in fact we would be most optimistic if
we could foresee the coordinated employment of all the positive forces
that we have on our side to counter our potential enemies and to over-
come obstacles offered by them to the attainment of our objectives. I
have confidence in American ingenuity, in our courage, and in our
capacity to plan intelligently if we are only provided the direction
from responsible leaders. But we must bring about concerted action
to attain our goals and stop the indiscriminate and uncoordinated use
of our political, economic, psychological, and military forces.
Mr. Arens. General, may I now invite your attention to each of
the several principal areas of the world for your appraisal of the
designs and objectives that the Soviets have in each of them. First
of all, I invite your attention to the Middle East. What are the de-
signs, objectives, techniques, and strategy of the international Com-
munist operation there ?
General Wedemeyer. I have mentioned earlier, in fact repeatedly
this morning, that every nation has four instruments of national
policy available to use in connection with the attainment of its na-
tional objectives. I have also stated that the Soviet Union has used
these instruments intelligently, and no doubt in consonance with
an overall plan. As Congressman Kearney earlier pointed out in
one of his questions, the Soviet Union has an objective. Further-
more, may I state that aU of the subordinates in the Soviet Union
are knowledgeable about and are working continuously, resorting to
any means, to attain those objectives. Now in applying these ideas
16 THE COMMUNIST PROGRAM FOR WORLD CONQUEST
to the Middle East in answer to Mr. Arens' pointed question, I think
that the Soviet Union is determined to alienate Arab friendsliip
for the western peoples. Militarily the Arab countries are not very
important. Economically the Middle East is of ffreat importance,
particularly to the industries of Western Europe, for there exists in
the Middle East the great reserve of black gold — oil. To deny oil to
the western European counti-ies of course would be a tremendous vic-
tory for Soviet objective of weakening the militaiy and economic
strength of the West. So the Soviet effort in the economic field will
be marked by loans to Middle East nations, by making available sorely
needed products, foodstull's, machinery, and by negotiating favorable
exchanges in order to alienate the trade of western countri&s and to win
particularly the loyalty or at least the dependence or gratitude of the
recipient or beneficiai-y nations and peoples throughout the Middle
East. This emphasizes my contention that the Soviet will continue
the present policy of avoiding an all-out war while employing to the
utmost the economic weapons available to them. In the Middle East
the Soviet could easily infiltrate the oil industrieSj and even the govern-
ments in Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Iraq, with a view to sabotagmg the
economic interests of western European countries.
Favorable economic relations lead to advantages in the psycho-
logical field. As already mentioned, many people of the world feel
grateful to the Soviet Union because they have been given foodstuffs,
military arms, and other products, whereas they may have been
refused this same economic or military aid by the United States.
Egypt is a good example, having first applied to the United States
for wheat which they wanted to buy and pay for from their own dol-
lar account. I mentioned this case earlier today. The Soviet agents
are clever in exploiting economic aid so that they derive the full
Mr. Arens. How about Africa?
General Wedemeter. In Africa we find undeveloped resources that
are also important. As a matter of fact, only recently in the Sahara
Desert oil has been discovered. It is this important commodity
that is so strongly influencing the adamant attitude of the French with
regard to giving complete autonomy to Algeria. In Africa also we
find a strong wave of nationalism which renders the timeworn policy
of colonialism obsolete or dangerous to pursue. It is in our seli-
interest to build up stable and friendly relations with the people of
all races in Africa. Also we should be sympathetic to their desires
for self-government. Militarily Africa affords many important air
and naval bases favorably situated in the event of military action
against the Soviet Union. Economically there are many products
which are valuable to our own highly integrated industry including
rubber, bauxite, magnesium, diamonds, ivoi*y, cotton, and uranium.
Incidentally, gentlemen, there is an excellent book entitled "Some-
where South of Suez" by Douglas Reed which describes the develop-
ments in Africa objectively and comprehensively.
Mr. Arens. Do you believe that the Soviet Union in this drive for
■world domination is bypassing Western Europe and concentrating
on the Middle East or Far East, or do you think that Western Europe
plays a more important role in the Communist designs for world
THE COMMUNIST PROGRAM FOR WORLD CONQUEST 17
General Wedemeyer. When a commander is planning his scheme
of maneuver in combat, he tries to avoid strength and attack weak-
ness. He conducts probing operations in order to discover weak areas
and then maneuvers his forces in order to penetrate such areas. This
provides the greatest chance of success and also will minimize losses.
These tactics have been employed since time immemorial by all mili-
tary commanders. The Soviet Union employs the same tactics in the
use of economic, psychological, and political weapons as well as mili-
tary. During World War II we all were aware of the fact that
vacua would be created in the course of military operations. The
wholesale killing, destruction, dislocations, and disruptions would
naturally create these vacua and as soon as hostilities ended, some
force would be drawn inevitably to fill them. Because we were
naive or did not realize the true objectives of the Soviet Union, we
made no attempt to fill the vacua with our own forces. The Com-
munists poured in agents, provocateurs, saboteui^, and propagandists
in order to exert the dominating influence in these war-torn areas.
It was the American planners' hope in the early days of World War
II, as I indicated earlier, that Anglo-American forces would be in a
favorable position at war's end to fill those vacua and thus deny them
to the Communists.
It was the contention of the American planners that Anglo-Ameri-
can forces should go across the British Channel in 1943 and drive
eastward as rapidly and as far as possible. It was felt that such a
maneuver would be highly successful because the bulk of the German
forces at that time (early 1943) were deeply and irretrievably com-
mitted far to the east in the vast expanse of Eussia. But the per-
suasive and articulate British leader, Winston Churchill, successfully
compelled the Allies to accept his strategy of scatterization or periph-
ery pecking.^ Anglo- American forces executed time and force con-
suming and indecisive maneuvers in the Mediterranean. In the plan-
ning phase the Americans opposed such operations and in fact stated
that even if Kommel could run rampant along the African coast it
would not decisively affect the ultimate victory, provided the Allied
effort concentrated on a drive toward the heartland of Germany. It
was felt by the American planners that a concentration and employ-
ment of force for that purpose would have resulted in Anglo-American
forces advancing eastward into the Balkans and at least halfway across
Poland by war's end. Obviously if this had occurred, the Communists
would not have been in a position to exercise their domination over
eastern Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and the Balkans in general.
The whole map of Europe would be radically different today.
Mr. Arens. What do you believe the strategy of the Soviet Union
or Red bloc is in Germany today. General ?
_ General Wedemeyer. I am sorry, Mr. Arens, you asked that ques-
tion, although phrased differently, just a few minutes ago and yet
I have not answered it completely.
Mr. Arens. The essence of my question was "Are the Soviet plans
General Wedejieyer. I believe that they would bypass Europe if by
going elsewhere advantages would accrue to their world communiza-
tion objective. For example, if they find weaknesses or soft spots
in Southeast Asia, specifically in Indonesia, they would intensify their
18 THE COMMUNIST PROGRAM FOR WORLD CONQUEST
efforts in tliat area. If it develops tliat labor unrest occurs on a large
scale in the South American countries, the Soviet would take advan-
tage of such wealcnesses there and would give impetus to the unrest
in divers and insidious ways.
As I stated previously, any strategic plan should be flexible so that
the weaknesses of an opponent can be exploited. AVhenever an oppor-
tunity is presented to use aggressively any or all of tlio four instru-
ments of national policy, this should be done. I think the Soviet
Union has followed such stratagem very effectively the past 10 years.
Mr. Kearney. Pardon me, General, but as you mentioned a minute
ago in drawing up plans for an attack, the Soviet is continuously
probing here and there to discover weaknesses, whether they be in
the Middle East, Africa, or Europe?
General Wedemeyer. That is correct, sir.
Mr. Kearney. They continually probe and then promptly exploit
the weaknesses that they discover?
General Wedeivieyer. Yes, sir.
Mr. Arens. General, may I direct your attention to the Far East
iii wliich we all know you served with great distinction for some con-
siderable period of time. Would you kindly give your appraisal of
the designs of the Red leaders there. What can be expected from the
standpoint of their strategy or tactics? Please give us any other ob-
servations that you think would be helpful in this connection to the
committee and via this committee, to the American people.
General Wedemeyer. I do not believe that the majority of the
Chinese understood the full and sinister implications of conununism
when World War II came to an end. With equal conviction, 1 am
sure that they did not understand the meaning of democracy. One
must not forget that the bulk of the Chinese people are illiterate.
The cultured Chinese with whom we come in contact are a very thin
minority, perhaps a few million in a population exceeding 450 million.
The Chinese people, that is the masses who are preponderantly peas-
ants, are lovaole, honest, energetic, and extremely loyal, particularly
to their families. They respect authority and are warmly hospitable.
The family unit is nurtured and older people are highly respected;
also constituted authority is deferred to or obeyed. In other words,
China is a country of peaceful, friendly, cooperative people. The
Communist propaganda that was so successfully employed in that vast
area became extremely vitriolic in the latter days of the war. Every
morning on my desk I would find reports of monitored radio broad-
casts emanating from Vladivostok, Moscow, and Yenan. The major
theme of these broadcasts was arousing the suspicions and fanning
hatreds of the Chinese against Americans. It was done veiy cleverly,
emphasizing particularly that we Americans were in the area, remain-
ing in order to exploit the poor people of China and that we had every
intention of subjugating them in our own selfish interests. I reported
these facts concerning Soviet propaganda in the China area to the
Joint Chiefs of Staff who were my bosses back in the States. I was in-
formed that such information was forwarded to the State Department.
I also contacted the Soviet Ambassador in Chungking and remon-
strated strongly and tactfully. The Ambassador disclaimed any
knowledge of the venomous propaganda to which I referred. He was
very polite and firm in his denunciation of such methods, assuring me
THE COMMUNIST PROGRAM FOR WORIiD CONQUEST 19
that the Soviet Union respected the United States and was a very loyal
ally. Oddly enough, the denunciatory broadcasts discontinued for
a while but resumed with even greater intensity and violence when
the Japanese surrendered. My headquarters were located in Shanghai
after the Japs surrendered. I again visited the senior Soviet official
and provided him with a certified copy of the broadcasts. He too was
most apologetic about the whole matter and assured me that the broad-
casts must have their genesis in Yenan and stated categorically that
the Soviet Government had no official connection with them. The
Chinese people heard daily, in fact hourly, these radio broadcasts
which were widespread and which urged the Chinese to compel the
Yankees to get out of the Orient, in fact suggested that all white
people be driven out of the Orient, repeating over and over again the
theme "the Orient for Orientals."
Many years before World War II the Soviet Union had established
the Sun Yat-sen University in Moscow. ^ This university was the
training ground for the Chinese Communist leaders who are now so
effective m organizing the people and inflaming them against the
Nationalist Government as well as against Americans. These Chi-
nese Communist leaders, including Chou En-lai, Mao Tse-tung, Chu
Teh, and other prominent members of the Red party in China,
received their basic training in socialism, subversion, propaganda,
organization, and distortions of the truth under the tutelage of the
Russian Communists. Actually, in 1945 at war's end, the Chinese
Communists had very little power and were numerically insignifi-
cant. However, their propaganda was increasingly effective and was
noX only inspired but was actually supported and supplemented by
the Soviet Communists. On our side, that is, the American cause
or the Nationalist Chinese Government cause was not presented.
Yet there was every opportunity to refute the Communist lies and
to put the record straight, particularly with the masses of Chinese
people. I tried to enlist the support of American diplomatic officials
in China and also submitted reports to responsible officials back in
Washington. The war was over and the people were celebrating
victory. There was little or no interest or sympathetic understand-
ing of the situation in China. There was strong pressure on all
theater commanders to return the soldiers back to the homeland.
No one seemed to be thinking in terms of protecting our hard-earned
You gentlemen on this congressional committee would be astounded
if you could read the letters that I received when serving as theater
commander in China, particularly at the end of the war. Many of
them were disrespectful, derisive, and critical. Most of them con-
veyed the idea that I wanted to maintain a wartime rank and there-
fore would not permit the demobilization of my American forces in
China. Just as rapidly as men acquired the number of points
decided upon by higher authority to justify their evacuation to the
homeland, I insisted that they be put on ships and sent to the United
States. In doing this, often the organizational integrity and of
course the overall efficiency of my command was greatly weakened.
I read reports about rioting in some of the theaters because the GI's
were becoming restive in waiting for the accumulation of the number
of points that would entitle them to be sent to their homes. I believe
20 THE CXDMMUNIST PROGRAM FOR WORLD CONQUEST
there was some rioting in Manila and also in Frankfurt, Germany,
but fortunately we did not have such a situation in China.
(At this point. Representative Walter entered tlie room.)
Mr. Kearney. There was some rioting in Hawaii too; was there
not, General ?
General Wedemeyer. I believe so, sir.
Mr. Kearney. I recall the situation in Guam where, although we
did not have any riots on the part of the GI's there, I received hun-
dreds of letters from memljers of the Armed Forces located on that
island and the gist of their message was "No boats, no votes."
General Wedemeyer. Returning to the situation prevailing in China
immediately after the war (1945), I noted a buildup of opposition
against Chiang Kai-shek, the leader of the Nationalist Government.
Criticism of the Generalissimo and his j^overnment frequently appeared
in the press and was heard on the radio. Obviously if the Generalis-
simo had been the tyrant that the Communists, both in our country and
in other areas, claimed he was, the press and radio would have been
controlled. Certainly the Generalissimo could have done this just
as easily as it is done in the Soviet Union and in other Communist-
dominated states. He chose to permit the people to express them-
selves freely. He was making an earnest effort to be a truly democratic
Some of the intellectual Chinese had afliliated themselves with com-
munism and gradually others who were worried about their selfish in-
terests decided to go over with the Communists because they felt that
the Nationalist Government would be overthrown and they wanted to
be on the winning side.
General Marshall arrived as the special envoy of the President in
December of 1945, It seems that Chiang Kai-shek had had only one
pv'ior contact with the former Chief ot Staff and that was at the
Cairo Conference. The Generalissimo seemed quite concerned about
Marshall's arrival and queried me several times with reference to
what Marshall would want to know and see, and what the real pur-
pose of his visit might be. I was laudatory in my remarks concern-
ing Marshall's capabilities, integrity, and earnest desire to help the
Nationalist Government. After Mai-shall arrived he showed me his
directive, which required him to amalgamate all of the various politi-
cal fragments or parties in China.
Perhaps I should indicate that in my several years of contact with
General Marshall prior to service in China I had formed the highest
regard for him and felt that I could at all times frankly disagree
with his views and that my own approach to a problem would be con-
sidered in good faith by him. Of course I was respectful but not
subservient and he encouraged such attitude. Therefore, when I read
his directive from the State Department requiring him to bring to-
gether the conflicting parties, I told him frankly that he could not ac-
complish this. I explained that the Communists had very little power
at that time (December 1945) but they were determined to get all of it^
On the other hand the Nationalist Government had most of the power
and they were equally determined not to relinquish one iota of it.
Numerically the Communists were greatly inferior. It is difficult to
estimate exactly how many Chinese had alllliated themselves with the
Communist movement. There were extravagant claims of course by
THE COMMUNIST PROGRAM FOR WORILD CONQUEST 21
the leaders, and some of our own Americans who were sympathetic to
the Communists made rather stupidly high estimates. I think at the
most a few million out of the total of more than 450 million people had
varying degrees of loyalty to the Communist cause. Most of the hard
core of the Chinese Communist movement was located in the province
of Yenan. Kegardless of what you gentlemen may have read or heard,
I believe that I was in a position to state factually that the Communist
troops did not contribute realistically or appreciably to the war effort
against the Japanese. I was on the ground and certainly would have
known if their claims that they were the real fighters against the Japs
had been correct. As a matter of fact, I tried to bring about coordina-
tion of effort between the Nationalist and Communist forces but it was
erfectly obvious that the Commmiist leaders were biding their time.
am equally sure that they had promises of support from the Soviet
Communists when the propitious time arrived for them to begin
their attacks against the Nationalist Government.
The Chinese Communists were constantly requesting arms and equip-
ment. My directive required me to support the Nationalist Govern-
ment of China. Some of my political advisers did point out that these
men were Chinese and that they were fighting effectively against the
Japanese. I stated earlier that my efforts to bring about a modicum
of military assistance from the Communist forces were unsuccessful.
They had some arms and equipment and all that I asked them to do
was to exert pressure against the Japanese forces who were operating
in the vicinity of Yenan. They refused to do this but would occasion-
ally make sorties against a Japanese blockhouse or outpost, seizing
a few prisoners, arms, and equipment but not making a real contribu-
tion to the overall war effort of the China theater. Chou En-lai
reported to me that there was an epidemic in Yenan and requested
medical supplies. Although I had repeatedly refused to send mili-
tary equipment to them, I did send 11 tons of medical supplies into
the Communist area. This was done with the cognizance and approval
of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek and was recognized as a humani-
When General Marshall arrived in China on his special mission for
the President (1945), of course the war was over and the repatriation
of millions of people who had moved into the hinterland during the
Japanese occupation and the rehabilitation of war-stricken areas pre-
sented serious problems for the Generalissimo and his Government.
The Chinese Communists supported by the Soviet Union spread their
propaganda and intensified their activities to subvert the Nationalist
military forces. The people, warweary and confused, were taken in
by the promises of the Communists for better opportunities, for food
and land, all of which the Soviet propaganda emphasized. It never
occurred to these simple, ^Uible people that the Chinese Commmiists
neither had the capability nor the intention of fulfilling their
promises. Also, the Chinese Communist propaganda distorted the
situation so much that the people in the United States interpreted
the conditions in China incorrectly. Chiang Kai-shek was depicted
as an unscrupulous dictator whereas actually the man was trying to
bring order out of chaos and still follow democratic procedures.
There was much wrong in the government and there were dishonest
and incompetent men m key positions. We here in America some-
times experience these same j9onditJ5His in our own official ranks.
22 THE COMMUNIST PROGRAM FOR WORLD CONQUEST
Mr. Arens. What is your present appraisal of the posture of inter-
national coniniunisni in the Far East ?
General Wedemeyer. The Communists have the initiative through-
out the Far East. The degree will vary, of course, in different areas
but on the mainland of China they definitely have the upper hand.
Economics will be an important factor in the outcome of the struggle
in that area between the forces of freedom and those of enslavement.
Traditionally the Japanese have carried on heavy trade w^th mainland
China. They would obtain their raw materials from that area, ship
them back to Ja])an which was highly industrialized, process these
raw materials, and then send them back as finished products to markets
throughout the Far East, again principally in China. Japanese pro-
cessed goods are shipped to other markets Ijut they experience difficul-
ties because their products are so low-priced and inject a competition
difficulty in countries where labor costs are higher, for example in the
United States. But the overall picture of the Communists in the Far
East is in my judgment favorable for continued Communist expansion
and retention of tiie initiative unless and until confronted by a strong,
realistic concerted effort in the political, economic, and psychological
field by the so-called free nations of the world, principally the United
States, Great Britiiin, and Japan.
Mr. Arens. General, you have expressed yourself in an appraisal
of the military, economic, psychological, and political superiority of
the Red bloc in the world today. How does this capability or superior-
ity affect the relationship or posture of the United States with its allies
General Wedemeyer. I mentioned a little earlier during the course
of this hearing that in my judgment our allies will make realistic ap-
praisals of the United States strength in all fields of strategy, and
likewise of the Soviet Union. If an emergency occurs, I believe that
our allies will estimate the situation and will take such steps or adopt
such measures as will be in their own self-interest. Today they are
accepting United States military and economic aid because it is in
their self-interest. From a short-range viewpoint this would appear
to be right. So far the Soviet Union has not reacted too strongly
but some of these so-called allies are already making careful reap-
praisals and have agreed to carry on trade with Communist nations.
For example, some of our friends who strongly proclaim that they are
opposed to communism and have even pledged support to us in the
event of an emergency against Communist aggression are actively en-
gaged in trade with Ked countries. The British, for example, are trad-
mg with Red China. As far as I know, they gave diplomatic recog-
nition to the Communist regime in China without consulting the
United States. British trade has traditionally strongly influenced
British policy in the field of diplomacy. If a wartime emergency
should develop, I believe that the British would carefully analyze
the implications of cooperating with us. They might decide to re-
main strictly neutral and thus deny us access to the military bases
which we are now maintaining in the British Isles.
Mr. Sctierer. Deny us use of those bases ?
General Wedemeyer. Yes, sir. If I were a Frenchman, Britisher, or
Spaniard and felt that it would be more advantageous to my country,
I certainly would deny the use of the bases to the Americans. Of
THE COMMUNIST PROGRAM FOR WORLD CONQUEST 23
course, if the Americans had the upper hand or sufficient strength to
assure me that they could defend my country against the Commu-
nist juggernaut, the Communist air armada, and a possible stream of
destructive missiles, then probably I would consent to the use of the
bases by the Americans. This is realism. All of the people in
Europe want to be on the winning side in the next war. There is
less desire to take calculated risks, partially due to the terrifying effect
that the introduction of thermonuclear bombs and missiles has had on
the people. Fortunately the Soviet leaders realize too that there will
be no winning side in a nuclear war.
Mr. Arens. Suppose Kussia issued an ultimatum to the effect that
if these countries allowed the Americans^ to use bases they would
use nuclear intercontinental ballistic missiles on cities in England,
Germany, France, and Spain ?
General Wedemeter. The Soviets have already issued veiled ulti-
matums. The countries you mentioned are accepting calculated
risks now. They feel that they can afford to do this because they
still feel that the United States retaliatory powers would afford them
protection. Also most of the people in Western Europe are quite
certain that there will not be a war in the near future. The very
destructive power inherent in new weapons may render their use
unthinkable even to dictators. For these reasons the people of
France, Spain, Germany, and England continue their collaboration
with the United States. Also they are conscious of the fact that
considerable economic and psychological advantage accrues by the
presence of American bases in their countries. Our soldiers are
spending millions of dollars in those countries. Furthermore, our
Government spends considerable sums of money on the construction
and maintenance of airdromes and the lines of communication, all of
which will be valuable commercially to the countries concerned.
Mr. ScHERER. You refer. General, to the economic advantage such
as the money we are spending in Asia ?
General Wedemeter. Yes, sir. I think all of the countries receiv-
ing aid from us are watching developments very carefully and weigh-
ing the implications of so doing. However, when the chips are down,
I hope I am wrong, I think that these countries would be very reluc-
tant allies and might consider seriously denying us the use of the
bases which we are maintaining today. I shall never forget the atti-
tude of so-called allies and of the United Nations Organization when
we, the United States, made an all-out effort m South Korea to stop
the advance of the Eed hordes from North Korea. Everyone knows
today that only two countries. South Korea and the United States,
made a realistic contribution in that effort to stop the spread of
Mr. ICearnet. General, would I be wrong in supplementing Con-
gressman Scherer's remarks by including every allied country in the
Western World, not only the countries Congressman Scherer men-
tioned ? I am trying to be realistic along with you and therefore have
reference to every one of the countries when I ask you if they would
stand by us in the event of trouble or in case war did break out.
Don't you think that we would be left holding the bag, so to speak ?
General Wedemeter. I believe that we would be left holding the
bag, General Kearney, but again, I hope that I am wrong. However,
24 THE COMMUNIST PROGRAM FOR WORLD CONQUEST
I have given this matter considerable thought over the years and have
expressed to this committee my considered opinions.
Mr. SciiERER. I am a Member of Congress and have to vote on the
expenditure of funds for more airfields and the maintenance of those
airfields in England, Germany, France, and Spain that we already
have. If what you say is true — and I had come to the same conclu-
sion before your testimony. General — how should I vote? Would it
not be better to spend that money presently used on bases in other
countries for submarines and long-range missiles that do not depend
General Wedetvieyer. I would not vote one penny to any country
unless I had evidence of their good faith and of their unswerving
loyalty in the cooperative effort witli us toward the attainment of
common objectives; one important one, of course, is protecting the
Free World against the scourge of communism. I am not suggest-
ing that each one of these countries to whom we give military and
economic aid should have exactly the same objectives in the interna-
tional field, but I would insist that their objectives must be compatible
with our own. In other words, if the British insist on trading with
Red China and thus strengthening the Communists who present a
grave danger to United States interests, then I would discontinue
military or economic aid to the British. Wlien I make a statement
like that, Britishers and American "one-worlders" will say that they
are not trading in strategic items. When they use the term "strategic
items," they mean, of course, airplanes, tanks, ammunition, I presume.
But I insist that any item of trade — a spool of thread, wheat, auto-
mobiles, or coffee — assists the economy of Red China. I believe
in denying those areas under Communist rule any economic or military
assistance. Furthermore I would break off diplomatic relations with
them. In suggesting these ideas to the committee, I wish to emphasize
that I am not an isolationist. No country can isolate itself from the
world today. If this be a fact, the United States should participate in
international developments and relations with intelligence, always
mindful of the fact that we must be actuated by self-respect. In
other words, every step that we take should protect our security and
our economy. I^t us be realistic and understand that all other
countries conduct their foreign policies in that manner.
Mr. ScHERER. I understood that at the beginning of your testi-
mony, General, you estimated the total firepower of the East and West
to be about equally balanced, with possibly the East having a little
edge at this time ?
General Wedemeter. When you refer to firepower, I presume you
mean military potential or military posture ?
Mr. Scherer. That is what I mean.
General Wedemeyer. In my judgment the military strength or pos-
ture of the Soviet Union and satellites is stronger than that of the
western countries or Free World.
Mr. SciiERER. Then if this is a fact and Russia says, as she has
hinted to England and France, "The Americans must not use bases
on your soil, and if you do permit them to do so, there will be a nu-
clear war waged against your cities," do you think for a minute that
England and France would permit us to use these bases?
General Wedeme^-er. I doubt it very much. As you have sug-
gested, the Soviet Communists have hinted that to several countries.
THE COMMUNIST PROGRAM FOR WORLD CONQUEST 25
I am sure the British are definitely worried about it. But again,
trade is an important factor in the British philosophy. They prob-
ably are weighing all of the implications and, as we all know today,
they are willing to accept the calculated risks involved. They must
be evaluating all of the factors, principally that the Russians in all
probability will not precipitate a war while they are enjoying such
outstanding success in the use of economic and psychological weapons.
The British are conscious of the fact that we Americans are spend-
ing a lot of money in their country and the door to our Treasury has
long been ajar.
Mr. SciiERER. Then we might as well keep the money coming.
General Wedemeyer. Yes, sir. Macmillan's government is accept-
ing a calculated risk and I think will continue to do so. I believe
a Labor government would discontinue the use of bases by Ameri-
cans. But again, I emphasize that if the chips were down and Mac-
millan did not feel that we Americans could prevent the Soviet from
pouring missiles into his industrial and populated areas, he might
declare a neutral position and in the process, of course, deny us the
use of bases in the British Isles. Perhaps Macmillan feels that there
will be no war— particularly no thermonuclear bombs and missiles.
Mr. ScHERER. You take almost the same point of view as Gen.
General Wedemeyer. I did not know that Gen. Bonner Fellers had
expressed similar views but I am not surprised. Many other gen-
erals and admirals, and many private citizens would express similar
views I am sure. I have high regard for General Fellers' judgment
in the field of strategy.
Mr. Kearney. Following Congressman Scherer's line. General,
what I cannot get through my head is this: Assuming that Eng-
land and the rest of the allies are wavering between the calculated
risk you mentioned and the moneys we are pouring in there, and
knowing Russia as they do — that they can't trust them or trust their
word — where do we come back to then ?
General Wedemeyer. I can't answer that question. General
Kearney. One of the hopes for mankind, I think, was expressed by
Congressman Scherer a little earlier. Within the satellite countries
of Russia and throughout the Soviet Union there are ferments and
defections building up. Human beings will not endure subordina-
tion to the iron heel of tyranny for an indefinite time. Tlie answer
to our present dilemma may be essentially provided by uprisings and
finally the overthrow of the tyrants behind the Iron Curtain.
Mr. Kearney. I think as far as that statement is concerned that
we Americans are just going along with wishful thinking. We have
been hoping that there would be a revolution in the satellite countries
for many years. The nearest that it has come was in Hungary.
General Wedemeyer. That is right. The Hungarians were truly
fighting for freedom. It is interesting to note that the front fighters
in their effort to overthrow their oppressors in Hungary were not
older people who had enjoyed freedom many years ago but it was the
young men and women who had been exposed to Communist propa-
ganda and false promises since World War II who led the revolt. And
as this revolutionary movement in Hungary progressed, I asked my-
self, where are the Kosciuskos, the Pulaskis, and the Laf ayettes of this
26 THE CX)MMUNIST PROGRAM FOR WORLD CONQUEST
or of any other free country ? When we were fighting for our free-
dom here in Am;erica, those patriots came to our shores, endured
liardships, and experienced dangers to help us attain our liberty. Why
didn't some i\jnerican general, or a military leader from England or
France, go to the Hungarians and offer his services? There was not
one professional military man like myself who made himself available.
AVhy am I not willing to take risks and to experience hardships as did
the men wlio fought so gallantly and selflessly shoulder to shoulder
with our forefathers in this country? I am serious. I have given
considerable thought to this situation. Are we real patriots? Are we
dedicated to liberty ? Are we getting soft ?
Mr. ScHERER. Perhaps you would not have been permitted to do
General Wedemeyer. If I were determined, I certainly could have
reached Hungary and offered my assistance to those fighters for
Mr. Kearney. There was a poll taken in every civilized country in
the world as to whether or not that particular nation would assist any
of the Soviet satellites that might defect or carry on a revolution.
Every country voted overwhelmingly "No."
General Wedemeyer. The frightening possibility of a nuclear war
seems to hang like a pall over the world — paralyzing actions that
might precipitate war. I think if a poll were taken in ICngland today
and if such poll were conducted without any duress, the British people
would vote to move our bases out of their country.
The Chairman. Doesn't that all stem from the terrific nationalist
feel ing in each of the nations ?
General Wedemeyer. Yes, sir. I think the existence or develop-
ment of nationalist feeling has a very strong influence in this con-
nection. It is an interesting phenomenon — our policies at home seem
to favor and support internationalism — while abroad we support
nationalism, the principle of self-determination.
The Chairman. I was in Yugoslavia sometime ago in connection
with the refugee problems and talked with officials of the Yugoslav
Government. They hate the Russians in my judgment just as much
as we do but they are realistic to the point that I am concerned lest
what we do to aid Yugoslavia would sometime or other be used against
us if it was expedient to do so.
General Wedemeyer. Tito and his henchmen are avowed Commu-
nists opposed to everything we stand for. Why strengthen his posi-
tion economicallv or militarily with American aid?
Mr. Sciierer. That is why I am afraid these airbascs in some of
our neutral and allied countries will be used against us.
General WEi)EME-iT-:R. Congressman Scherer, related to your con-
cern in this matter, when you cast your vote for appropriations cover-
ing the installation and maintenance of bases, would it not be a good
idea to bring out clearly the motives and actions of those allies who
are not doing thoir ])roportionate share in the struggle against com-
munism? Specifically, expose those nations in the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization which are not providing their proportionate
share of the military forces for the NATO defense. Everyone knows
that certain countries in NATO agreed to provide a stipulated number
of divisions and yet they are not fuliilling their commitment. They
THE COMMUNIST PROGRAM FOR WORIiD CONQUEST 27
come asking us for help but they fail to keep faith with us in the
firm agreements made ostensibly to stop aggressions by the Commu-
Mr. Kearney. The Korean war was an excellent example of this.
General Wedemeyer. Yes, sir. I cannot understand why Amer-
ican leaders permit allies to ignore or abrogate commitments. I
have lived abroad for approximately 20 years of my life. In my
contacts with foreign peoples I found them to be kind and cooperative.
But also, may I emphasize that they were always realistic. If they
did something for me, they expected gratitude as well as something
from me in return. I am convinced that if the British were in the
position of giving aid to us, they would insure that we were cooperating
to the fullest degree in the attainment of their objectives and in pro-
tecting their interests. Some people suggest that when we Americans
give aid to a country that we should not attempt to interfere with that
country's internal affairs. My approach would be entirely different.
In the first place I would not give aid, military or economic, to any
country that opposed America's aims in the international field. Also,
I would expect the recipient countries to indicate what they were going
to do with our aid and when. Furthermore I would require those
countries to give evidence at least of supporting objectives compatible
with our own. In general those are the tests that I would make in
each instance before I would approve of economic or military aid for
Mr. ScHERER. We just have so much money to spend and if we don't
reach a conclusion as just stated by you, General, we will ruin our
General Wedemeyer. That's exactly the way I feel about it. I
think we should put our aid, military and economic, in those areas
and those countries where it will do the most to provide military
security and economic stability for America as well as for the re-
cipient nation. The present administration is asking now for per-
mission to increase the debt limit. If I were a Congressman, I would
oppose such increase and would cut down on expenditures both at
home and abroad — particularly abroad.
Mr. Scherer. I repeat, we have just so much money to spend and
if we don't come to the conclusion that there is a limit at some place
to these enormous expenditures, we are going to ruin our own economy.
If our situation is as precarious as you suggest concerning our overseas
bases, then isn't Admiral Rickover right that we should take the
money we do have available and concentrate it on the construction of
submarines which are capable of launching nuclear weapons ?
General Wedemeyer. I am glad that you asked that question. Con-
gressman Scherer. I agree that we should carefully evaluate the
expenditure of our money in connection with military security. We
should concentrate our effort on those weapons which will provide a
full dollar's return in security for our country. In my judgment the
atomic submarine with missile platform would be an important addi-
tion and would render us less dependent on precarious bases located
in the territories of reluctant allies.
Mr. Scherer. This would be much cheaper than foreign bases.
General Wedemeyer. Yes, sir. Our forces could rendezvous at any
designated place, discharge their missiles against hostile targets, and
28 THE COMMUNIST PROGRAM FOR WORLD CONQUEST
submerge, then reappear at another predetermined rendezvous for
Mr. ScHERER. One would not have to have permission to establish
bases on foreign soil if we operated in that manner.
General Wedemeyer. That is correct. Furthermore, there would
be no bases to destroy when the enemy attemj)ted to retaliate, and
greater flexibility in the employment of our missiles would be provided.
Mr. SciiEREu. Yes; the submarines as platforms for missiles would
be moving and thus would not present a good target for the enemy.
General Wedemeyer. Yes; that is very important. I believe that
Congress should carefully consider the research and development pro-
grams which provide for atomic and thermonuclear weapons for
missiles and submarines. I do not agree with those who advocate
large ground forces. Also, I believe we should remove all United
States ground forces now located on foreign soil. The people indige-
nous to those countries do not like foreigners, particularly in military
uniform, ])resent in their communities. They have a nationalistic
feeling which is understandable and resent the presence of armed men
from other countries. Of course, the political leaders will not ex-
press such views, but I am sure a poll would reveal that the people
themselves would be glad to have our troops removed. Most import-
ant — let the people indigenous to the area provide the manpower for
the defense of their country. I am sure this would be a more satis-
factory arrangement, and I expect the people of those countries do not
want our Armed Forces on their soil.
Mr. Ivearney. Except in time of war.
General Wedemeyer. Yes; then they are glad to have us. Even
then there are inevitable frictions. Although we were fighting
shoulder to shoulder with the Chinese during World War II, there
were understandable incidents and frictions between my forces and
the Chinese. In general, however, the Chinese were cooperative and
To return to the matter of appropriations, which Congressman
Scherer mentioned earlier, I think it is very difficult for a Congress-
man or for any private citizen to know exactly how and when to ap-
prove of military and economic aid to other countries. The leaders
m our Government — in fact, all officials occupying key positions in
the executive and legislative branches of our Government — are so
weio^hed down and harassed by daily administrative matters it is
hardly possible for them to investigate, analyze, and reach sound
judgments concerning the complex situations in various parts of the
world. It seems to me that we need a group of disinterested men who
are not harassed with day-by-day administrative responsibilities but
who would spend their time studying and analyzing world develop-
ments in order to submit sound recommendations to Congress. I
think that Congress should make the decisions concerning our various
commitments in the international arena. It is the Congress that truly
represents the grassroots — the people throughout our countiy. The
President and his appointees in the State Department do not neces-
sarily reflect the basic ideas of the American people. Policvmaking
should be in the hands of those who are responsive to the thinking and
the will of tlie people. Today you gentlemen on this committee asked
me, a layman, to make suggestions concerning appropriations. I
THE COMMUNIST PROGRAM FOR WORLD CONQUEST 29
really do not feel fully qualified to make comprehensive recommenda-
tions because I lack factual information. It seems to me there is
need for a group of men who will continuously study the international
situation based on factual and complete information concerning devel-
opments in all parts of the world. Such a group would have the
responsibility of evaluating developments and their imj)lications upon
our own security and economic stability. After their evaluations,
they should make appropriate recommendations to the Members of
Congress, and thus facilitate sound legislative action which would
then not only be based on the best intelligence available but would
also be supported by expert evaluations and judgments.
The Chairman. I have been informed that when the Japanese sur-
rendered in Java after World War II, unlike other surrenders, they
were required to leave their arms. Do you know anything about
General Wedemeyer. Mr. Congressman, Java was not in my the-
ater during World War II but was under the British at the time of
the Japanese surrender. Actually Admiral Mountbatten, who com-
manded the southeast Asia area, was responsible for Java. I do not
know what happened but the Japanese in all areas were required by
the orders issued by supreme commander. Allied Powers, to turn their
arms over to the Allied commander nearest to them.
In this connection, I had some difficulty with the British concerning
the surrender arrangements at Hong Kong. The instructions that the
Generalissimo and Lord Louis Mountbatten received and also that I
received from the supreme commander. Allied Powers (General Mac-
Arthur), stipulated clearly that the Chinese would receive all sur-
renders of Japanese in the China theater. Hong Kong was in the
China theater, yet the British insisted that they would not permit the
Chinese to receive the surrender in Hong Kong. The Generalissimo
asked me as his chief of staff to go to Hong Kong and accept the sur-
render of the Japanese commander there. I refused but recommended
to the Generalissimo that a Chinese general be sent to Hong Kong and
to other key points throughout China for that purpose. My reason
was that it would be better psychologically for the Chinese to receive
the surrender of the Japs whom they had been fighting for 8 years. In
Nanking, in Shanghai, and in fact throughout the China theater I
arranged to have a Chinese commander present at the surrender of
the Japanese. But the British protested violently and even sent
messages to President Truman claiming that it was their right and
responsibility to receive the surrender of the Japanese in Hong Kong.
They were arrogant and disrespectful to the Generalissimo in han-
dling this matter. I was surprised and disappointed that they should
be so petty in this matter of protocol. After all, the Chinese had
fought 8 years against the Japanese and had made great sacrifice in
carrying on against the common enemy. The matter ended up with
the British receiving the surrender. They rushed an admiral there
for that purpose along with a few of their combat ships which had
been operating in the Bay of Bengal during most of the war.
The Chairman. The thing that disturbs me as one of the most
serious situations in the world today is that which is developing in
General Wedemeyer. Yes.
30 THE COMMUNIST PROGRAM FOR WORLD CONQUEST
The Chairman. I can just imagine what would happen if a Com-
munist state were to develop in Indonesia, situated there between the
Philippines, Japan, and Australia.
General Wedemeyer. Yes; that is quite true. Communism appar-
ently is developing quite strongly in Malaya also.
The Chairman. Yes, and I do not think it was a mere accident
that the surrender there in Malaya was different than anywhere else ;
in other words, the Japanese went away with their arms. In Indo-
nesia, the Japanese turned over their arms to pro-Communists.
General Wedemeyer. As another indication of Communist in-
fluence in those areas, it is reported that in Okinawa recently a mayor
was elected with pro-Communist leanings.
Mr. Arens. General, you have given us an appraisal of the rising
strength of the Red bloc in the military, economic, psychological, and
political fields as well as the threat which the Communist bloc poses
to the Free World. Would you care to give your appraisal to this
committee of any mistakes which have been made by tlie West and
your suggestion as to a strategy or tactic of the West to counter the
rising tide of the Red bloc?
General Wedemeyer. Our failures were due to the fact that we did
not recognize the true implications of international communism dur-
ing and particularly subsequent to World War II. I think the fact
that we were so trusting and naive after World War II concerning the
sinister motives of the Communist leaders was the most serious
blunder that western diplomats and western leaders made.
Mr. Arens. How did that affect the situation ?
General Wedemeyer. Well, this enabled the Soviet to maintain
the initiative in Europe as well as in the Far East. They had com-
plete initiative in the political, economic, and psychological fields
and thus extended their influence throughout those areas, drawing
successfully into the poisonous orbit of communism countries and
millions of people.
Mr. Arens. What are the manifestations in your opinion of this
failure to recognize the nature of international communism?
General Wedemeyer. I might give a few examples :
Let lis recall the situation that developed in Czechoslovakia
where the Soviet moved in surreptitiously after the war. It was not
a military operation. Communist agents obtained positions in the
Government. They gradually took over the control of the Interior
Department which was responsible for the internal security of the
country. The secret police in Czechoslovakia operated within the
Interior Department. When the Communists obtained control over
that Department, obviously they could take over the entire Govern-
ment. That was exactly what they did. The Communists have not
employed their own troops, that is, their army, navy, or air force, in
any major military action since World War II but they have been very
successful in implementing troops of satellites in gaining control of
vast areas and many countries. For example. Red China, North
Korea, Poland, Albania, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary,
Bulgaria, Rumania. About half the population of the world, over a
billion people, are now oriented toward the Kremlin, and this non-
military but effective method of taking over the control of countries
was accomplished without effective opposition on our part or on the
THE COMMUNIST PROGRAM FOR WORILD CONQUEST 31
part of the U. N. The western countries ignored Communist aggres-
sions while they concentrated on the rehabilitation of their own coun-
tries after the war. Furthermore, the western countries have had con-
tinuous difficulty in adopting an honest, unified position vis-a-vis the
Soviet Union. However, they were all doin^ their utmost to get as
much as they could in the form of United States military and eco-
nomic aid. The Communists brazenly violated their agreements made
with the western countries and of course made a mockery of the
humane and elightened Charter of the United Nations.
Mr. Arens, "\Vliat suggestion do you make, General, for a strategy
of the West to cope with this threat of international communism?
General Wedemeyer. I think the most important thing is educa-
tion. All of our people and people of the world should be given
factual information concerning communism. If the American peo-
ple had been told the truth in an unemotional and objective manner
about Marx, Stalin, Lenin, and other Communists, they would have
compelled their own leaders to take appropriate action. When the
American people know what is going on, they always have exercised
good judgment. I think they would support programs of firm, real-
istic action against Communist aggressions and penetrations. As I
travel around in our country and in other parts of the world, I still find
a lack of understanding of the problems presented by international
communism. Most people don't understand the problem in China or
in Hungary. Many people are woefully ignorant about interna-
tional affairs. This is sometimes due to their inability to obtain factual
information. Often, too, it is due to apathy or indifference. I
recently had some dental work done. The doctor was an excellent
dentist and did a very fine job. He discussed headlines that he
had read in the newspaper, which revealed startling ignorance con-
cerning communism. He is not at all left wing or communistically
inclined but he is definitely naive about the motives of Khrushchev
and Bulganin. It seems to me education is of paramount importance.
The American people must be given simple truths — for example, that
communism is not a political philosophy — the Communist Party is
not at all like our Republican or Democratic Party. The Communist
Party is determined to subjugate the world and will resort to murder,
lies, slave camps, in fact any means will be employed to remove ob-
stacles and opponents to their ruthless plans. Communism must be
recognized as exactly what it is — an international conspiracy to de-
stroy faith in God, faith in mankind, faith in our form of gov-
ernment. In other words, it is dedicated to the destruction of re-
ligious, political, social, and economic freedoms. My dentist friend
explained that he had little time to read but did refer to an article
he had just read in a magazine. I recognized at once that this maga-
zine has been far left of center.
The Chairman. You mean "liberal" ?
General Wedemeyer. Well, in a sense I do, Mr. Congressman.
However, I think both you and I are true "liberals," and that word
has been bandied about so much it is difficult to know exactly what
is meant when one uses the term. Personally I am always interested
in what motivates people who write such articles.
Mr. DoTLE. May I inquire of the general before the bell rings —
did you state positively that the Soviets will communize the world,
in your judgment ?
32 THE COMMUNIST PROGRAM FOR WORLD CONQUEST
General Wedemeyer. No. I didn't state positively that the Soviets
would communize the world and I'm soriy that I gave j^ou that
impression, I stated, sir, that at this time they have the initiative
in the political, economic, and psychological fields, and, of course,
we all know that their objective is to communize the world.
Mr. Doyle. In all fields of strategy they have the initiative?
General Wedemeyer. Yes, sir; thev do. In my opinion they are
gradually gaining in the accomplishment of their objectives. In
other words, they are gradually exercising greater influence in all
countries of the world, including our own.
Mr. Doyle. Tliey do not intend to precipitate a world war?
General Wedemeyer. I repeat, Mr. Congressman, I do not think
that they intend to use military force as an instrument of national
policy at this time. Why should they when they are successful in
-using the other three important instruments of national policy;
namely, political, economic, and psychological ?
Mr. SciiEUER. Do you think tliey will use military force in the im-
General Wedemeyer. No; I don't believe that they intend to use
military force in the foreseeable future.
Mr. Doyle. I didn't preface my question in a way to cross-examine
General Wedemeyer. I understand, sir.
Mr. Doyle. You have been conferring with Mr. A reus and our
staff as consultant. In relating these experiences that you have had
I note that they do not pertain to a specific political party. In other
words, the failures to handle the problems created by commimism
do not seem to attach to a particular political party but you asso-
ciate those events with the party that happened to be in the White
House at the time. Is that correct ?
General Wedemeyer. Yes, sir. I have not had any particular po-
litical party or any individual in mind as I aswered questions this
morning. I would say that both the Republicans and the Democrats
are equally culpable.
Mr. Doyle. I would like now to come down to us here in Congress.
This committee for instance and the. Subversive Activities Control
Board have certain responsibilities to Congress. What have you to
recommend that we do immediately in our field of responsibility —
something that we can actually touch and reach ?
General Wedemeyer. Yes, sir, I believe I understand. I know
there is an aversion to the creation of more committees and more
special bureaus; but I think that the assignment and hoped-for re-
sults of the committee that I suggest would be of tremendous help to
Congress, as well as to the Executive, in reaching sound solutions to
the complex problems facing our Nation. Such a gi'oup would com-
prise economists, historians, political scientists, educators, industrial-
ists, bankers, farmers — men who have had varied and broad experi-
ence in life. This group would continuously study international
developments. This would require a thorough examination of Com-
munist methods. Communist operations, and appropriate recommen-
dations could be provided to the Congress and to responsible leaders
of our Government.
Mr. Doyle. You have lieard, of course, about the Rockefeller com-
mittee which recently submitted a report.
THE COMMUNIST PROGRAM FOR WORILD CONQUEST 33
General Wedemeyer. Yes; I read about Mr. Eockefeller's group.
Mr. Doyle. There are many dedicated citizens who have studied
these problems, that is, individuals outside of Conj^ress.
General Wedemeyer. Yes, sir. However, they have no authority,
no official status. They might make excellent recommendations but
they are not heeded. If we had a group such as I described working
under the aegis of Congress, I believe sound counsel and recommenda-
tions would emerge as the basis for appropriate legislation to cope
realistically with communism, both at home and abroad.
Mr. Doyle. But the President has such committees now and he has
General Wedemeyer. I did not realize that the President had a
committee specifically for such purpose.
Mr. Doyle. Yes, he has named 2 or 3 advisory committees and also
he has the National Security Council which should provide appro-
General Wedemeyer. Does the CongTess have access to the informa-
tion provided the National Security Council ?
Mr. Doyle. No.
General Wedemeyer. I think the Members of Congress should be
given the pertinent information collected by our intelligence agen-
cies — by the Central Intelligence Agency and by the mtelligence
representatives of the three military services. How can one form in-
telligent judgments without timely and factual information? We
need courage and honesty, as well as intelligence, in our ranks. The
advice and recommendations given to our leaders and to Members of
Congress must be based on real knowledge and/or personal experi-
ence. We should avoid the counsel of individuals who would be in
any way influenced by political expediency, personal popularity, or
selfish interests. Guts, courage, integrity,^ intelligence must, char-
acterize our defense of liberty or we'll lose it.
Mr. Doyle. General, I didn't lay the foundation for the information
that I was apparently seeking. In other words, I am primarily think-
ing of our Committee on Un-American Activities. The problem we
have in our Nation of meeting the Communist threat — the subversive
threat. Have you had time to form any recommendations on that?
General Wedemeyer. Sir, I think you are now doing a very con-
structive job, namely, calling in so-called experts in various lines —
men and women who had some experience with communism — to give
you the benefit of their knowledge and experience. The information
that you receive from the many witnesses who appear here should help
you m formulating plans and in recommending appropriate legisla-
tion to cope with the Communists and related problems.
The Chairman. For the majority of the committee I will answer
that in the affirmative. That is what we are trying to do.
General Wedeivieyer. I think you are doing a very fine job. I do
read most of the material published by this committee.
Mr. Doyle. So do I think we are doing a pretty good job. Don't
misunderstand me. I am always on the search, however, for the con-
sidered opinion of men who are on the outside looking at us objec-
tively and apparently making a nonofficial appraisal or our national
problem resulting from Communist subversion. That is what I am
aftei\ In other words, I am in search for that particular thing be«
34 THE COMMUNIST PROGRAM FOR WORLD CONQUEST
cause that is the area in which presently I am officially responsible
as a member of this committee.
General Wedemeyer. I have no additional recommendations to
make. As I stated before, I am reading the material which is pub-
lished by this committee. I am certain that the members are care-
fully evaluating]: the information that they receive and that they will
initiate appropriate legislation at the propitious time. I think there
has been a, gradual improvement in tne past 10 years in connection
with alerting our fellow Americans to the dangei-s of communism.
I still would like to see an even gi-eater effort made. Mr. Doyle, were
you in Congress approximately 10 years ago, that is, immediately
after World War II?
Mr. DoYT.E. Yes ; I have been here about 12 vears.
General Wedemeyer. Then you may recall the situation that ex-
isted in this country, in fact throughout the world, immediately after
World War II. We were very trusting here in America concerning
the Kremlin and its policies and actions. Our approach was naive,
and, as a matter of fact, in some quarters, we were very enthusi-
astic about the Soviet leaders and people. We had defeated the Ger-
mans and Italians in Europe and the Japanese in the Far East. We
all wanted to celebrate the victory and to live in peace. It would
have been impossible to convince most of our fellow Americans that
there could be another threat even greater than nazism, and that this
very threat existed in the Soviet Union.
The Chairman. That very thing was made capital of by the peo-
ple who were and are our enemies. They took advantage of our
Mr. Doyle. General, I take it that in your opinion there is no
question but that the Soviet Union intends economically, politically,
and psychologically, and if need be militarily, to conquer the world?
General Wedemeyer. That is correct, Mr. Congressman. There is
no doubt in my mind that the Soviet Union, under present circum-
stances and leadership, is committed to those objectives. They are
steeped in the principles of Marxism which have never changed, but
the methods of applying have been changed and swit^ihed aoout in
whatever manner would promise success. The people behind the Iron
Curtain have had approximately two generations of the Big Lie — hate,
propaganda, distortion of facts, slave camps, police state^ restrictions,
and military oppression. When I lived in Germany during the years
1936-38, I observed the manner in which the young people were
indoctrinated by the Nazis. The Communists use similar methods,
even more effectively. Factual information is excluded from every-
one. The children are gathered together at an early impressionable
age and subjected to propaganda of hate and suspicion against other
countries. Most of these young people become fanatic believers in
communism — it is almost a religion with them. Imagine after sev-
eral generations have passed wim this type of indoctrination, exclud-
ing the truth, distorting history — the effect upon the masses of people
behind the Iron Curtain.
Mr. Doyle. That applies, you mean, to the younger generation in
General Wedemeyer. Exactly. Yes, sir.
Mr. Doyle. I think that is right.
THE COMMUNIST PROGRAM FOR WORLD CONQUEST 35
General Wedemeyer. Yes, the Kussian children are being indoc-
trinated to believe in the righteousness of their cause, that any means
justifies the attainment of the Soviet objectives. Kill, lie, distort,
torture — all are fully justified in the Soviet conscience because they
are so dedicated to the attainment of Marxian, Leninist, or Stalinist
Mr. DoTLE. Thank you very much, General.
Mr. Arens. Mr. Chairman, we have no further questions.
The Chairman. I have none.
General Wedemeyer. I have never met Congressman Walter before
but knew Senator McCarran quite well, and admired and respected
him. I have read very carefully the Walter-McCarran Act pertain-
ing to immigration. It is excellent legislation and should, in my
considered opinion, be given a thorough and extended application
before any modifications are accepted by the Congress. It may be
that changing conditions later on would justify a few modifications,
iDut I think it would be a mistake to effect changes at the present time.
The Chairman. Of course we had in mind in drafting the act, and
as you know it took us nearly 5 years to put together this measure, the
best interests of the United States. We were subjected to pressures
from all sides by all sorts of so-called minority groups. But, fortu-
nately, we had two committees which withstood the pressures.
General, on behalf of the committee — and I am sure of the entire
Congress — ^I want to extend to you our thanks for this enlightening
contribution. Too few people realize exactly the seriousness of this
world situation. We in the United States are fortunate in having
at our disposal, whether we use them properly or not, people who
can supply the sort of information that will make it possible for this
great Republic of ours to survive.
I again extend to you our thanks.
General Wedemeyer. Thank you, sir.
(Wliereupon, at 11 : 50 a. m., Tuesday, January 21, 1958, the com-
mittee was recessed, subject to call.)
Bulganin (Nikolai A) 12, 31
Chiang Kai-shek 20, 21, 26, 29
Chou En-lai 19, 21
Chu Teh 19
Churchill, Winston 17
Craig, Malin 6
Fellers, Bonner 25
Goebbels (Joseph) 6
Goering (Hermann) 6
Henderson, Loy 11
Hess (Rudolph) 6
Hitler (Adolf) 3, 6, 9
Hopkins, Harry L 11
Hurley (Patrick Jay) 6
Jodl (Alfred) 6
Khrushchev (Nikita) 1,8,12, 15,31
MacArthur (Douglas) 29
Macmillan (Harold) 25
Mao Tse-tung 19
Marshall (George C) L 6, 7, 10, 11, 20, 21
Marx, Karl 3, 9
Mountbatten, Louis 6, 29
Reed, Douglas 16
Rickover (Hyuian G) 27
Rockefeller (Nelson A) 33
Rommel (Erwin) 17
Stilwell (Joseph W) 6
Stuart, (John) Leighton ^ 7
Tito (Josip Broz) 26
Truman (Harry S) 6,7,29
von Stauffenburg, Klaus 6
"Wedemeyer, Albert C-^ 1-35 (statement)
China, Nationalist Government '_ 20
Czechoslovakia, Government of. Interior Department 80
Egypt, Government of 11, 12
German War College 6
North Atlantic Treaty Organization. 26
Sun Yat-sen University (Moscow) 19
United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA) 13
United States Government, National Security Council 12, 33
United Nations 31
Communist Manifesto 3, 9
Das Kapital 3, 9
Mein Kampf 3, 9
Somewhere South of Suez (book) 16
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