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Full text of "Communist threat to the United States through the Caribbean. Hearings before the Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act and Other Internal Security Laws of the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, Eighty-sixth Congress, first session .."

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NOVEMBER 5, 1959 

Printed for the use of the Committee on the Judiciary 

*3354 WASHINGTON : 1960 


JAMES 0. EASTLAND, Mississippi, Chairman 



THOMAS C. HENNINGS, Jr., Missouri ROMAN L. HRUSKA, Nebraska 



SAM J. ERVIN, Jr., Nortli Carolina 
JOHN A. CARROLL, Colorado 
THOMAS J. DODD, Connecticut 
PHILIP A. HART, Michigan 

Subcommittee To Investigate the Administration of the Internal Secueity 
Act and Other Internal Security Laws 

JAMES O. EASTLAND, Mississippi, Chairman 
THOMAS J. DODD, Connecticut, Vice Chairman 

OLIN D. JOHNSTON, South Carolina ROMAN L. HRUSKA, Nebraska 


SAM J. ERVIN, Jr., North Carolina KENNETH B. KEATING, New York 

J. G. SoURwrNE, Chief Counsel 
Benjamin Mandel, Director of Research 



Resolved^ hy the Internal Security Subcommittee of the Senate Com- 
mittee on the Judiciary^ That the testimony of Gen. C. P. Cabell given 
in executive session on November 5, 1959, with the consent of the 
witness, be printed and made public. 

James O. Eastland. 
Thomas J. Dodd. 
John L. McClellan. 
Olin D. Johnston. 
Everett M. Dirksen. 
Roman Hruska. 
Sam J. Ervin, Jr. 
K. B. Keating. 
December 14, 1959. 




U.S. Senate, 
Subcommittee To Investigate the Administration 

OF THE Inti:rnal Security Act and Other 
Internal Security Laws, of the Committee on the Judiciary, 

Wa-'ihington, D.C. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:30 a.m., in room 
2300, New Senate Office Building, Senator James O. Eastland (chair- 
man) presiding. 

Present: Senators Eastland, Olin D. Johnston, and Roman L. 

Also present: J, G. Sourwine, chief counsel; Benjamin Mandel, tli- 
rector of research ; and Frank W. Schroeder, chief investigator. 

The Chairman. You may proceed, sir. 



General Cabell. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate very much this oj)- 
portimity to appear before your committee. 

My subject today is, of course, communism in Latin America. 

Boris N, Ponomarev, a key member of the central committee of the 
Communist Party of the Soviet Union, wrote the following regarding 
Latin America in the October 1958, issue of Kommunist, the most 
important official Communist Party, Soviet Union, theoretical maga- 
zine, and I quote : 

Latin America is a seething volcano. As in one country, so in another * * *. 

The Chairman. Have you got another copy of this? I do not have 
that one. I would like to follow you. 

General Cabell. I have made a few clianges. Senator, but I do not 
have another copy. This is the only copy that I have. [Reading:] 

Latin America is a seething volcano. As in one country, so in another, out- 
bursts are taking place which are sweeping away reactionary regimes and loosen- 
ing the nooses which U.S. monopolies have thrown on their economy. The Com- 
munist Parties of Latin America ever more closely coordinate their activities in 
the struggle against the common enemy — U.S. imperialism. The revolutionary 
movement is of a universal nature. Its main support is the socialist camp. 

Collaboration with and infiltration of popular movements, for ex- 
ample that of the Batista in the thirties, and of Castro in the fifties — 
has been communism's most effective weapon in Latin America. 

The Communists base their present strategy on what they call the 
national liberation struggle. 



The Chairman. When he said its main support is the Socialist 
camp, he meant the Communist camp? 

General Cabell. That is their innocuous term or polite term for the 
Communist camp, Senator. 

The Chairman. Yes. 

General Cabell. The so-called national liberation strategy seeks to 
offset Communist numerical and political weakness through inter- 
national organizational support and clandestine techniques of infil- 
tration and coordination. 

The immediate objective of the strategy is to provoke political or 
revolutionary action by sympathetic non-Communists, but politically 
influential elements, for the purpose of establishing an environment 
within which the Communist Party is free to organize and expand. 

The Communists hope for the establishment of governments which 
are, at least, neutral in the East- West struggle, if not actively pro- 
Soviet, and which will guarantee them political opportunity equal to 
that enjoyed by genuine political parties. 

It is within such a framework that the Communists then hope to 
achieve the so-called peaceful transition to socialism, which will find 
a temporary alliance with the national bourgeoisie within a govern- 
ment of national unity gradually replaced by a Communist-controlled 
"people's democracy." 

The program of communism in Latin America is designed to de- 
velop unity of action around popular issues such as antipathy to dic- 
tatorsliips, inflation, a desire for greater industrialization, nationali- 
zation of resources, and wider and more stable markets. 

It particularly strives to develop international and national labor 
unity in support of Communist objectives. 

The program seeks to promote neutralism through exploiting the 
fear of wars, nuclear dangers, unpopular treaty obligations, and ter- 
ritorial sovereignty issues. 

It encourages opposition to U.S. participation in regional programs 
affecting Latin America. 

Tlie program also involves expansion of the Communist propa- 
ganda apparatus to include a network of news correspondents who 
will develop support for the "national liberation" strategy, while 
discrediting free world news agencies as agencies of imperialist 

The techniques of Communist action are both overt and clandestine, 
legal and illegal, national and international. 

The techniques are carried out by the national Communist Parties 
and tlieir fronts, with support from the "fraternal" Communist 
Parties abroad, and the international Communist fronts. All of these 
operate tlirough known Communist Party members and secret party 
members in nominall}^ non-Communist organizations. 

The actions of these national Communist Parties are supported or 
paralleled by actions taken by the Soviet and satellite diplomatic and 
commercial missions and their agents. 

The Communist Party enjoys legal status or de facto legality in 
nine Latin American countries. However, it is able to operate with 
relatively little opposition in a number of other countries, and it is 
organized and active on a clandestine basis in virtually all countries. 


Where it operates legally or semilegally, as in Argentina, Brazil, 
Chile, Cuba, Venezuela, Colombia, Uruguay, Mexico, and Ecuador, 
it strives to expand its membership and its propaganda organs. 

It uses such countries as operational bases for the support of activ- 
ities in countries where the party is proscribed. Thus, activities in 
Paraguay are supported from Argentina and Uruguay. Activities in 
Central America and the Caribbean from Cuba and Venezuela. 

The clandestine organization of the Latin American Communist 
Parties is being improved with the help of training by the Communist 
Party of the Soviet Union, and of China. 

Where necessary, international and national communication is by 
encoded letters sent through accommodation addresses or by couriers, 
who may travel under fales names and with false documentation. 

Communist literature may be imported under false inventories; 
financing is accomplished through a gi'eat variety of channels which 
conceal the extent and origin of funds. 

]\Iass recruiting, as attempted several years ago, has in some cases 
been deemphasized, while emphasis has been given to selective recruit- 
ing of key individuals and secret members. 

More effective use is being made of opportunities to engage in legal 
activities, despite illegal status, such as the development of publica- 
tions defending all points of view. 

Many parties are developing secret directive bodies paralleling the 
overt organizations. 

The actions of the Soviet-bloc governments support the "national 
liberation" strategy, thereby complementing the activities of the 
national Communist Parties and fronts in Latin America. 

These actions involve propaganda support, the expansion of official 
representation, the broadening of cultural contacts, and development 
of commercial relations. 

Official bloc propaganda and news services applaud the role of 
nationalists in revolutions, strikes, and demonstrations to show that 
the masses are in revolt against "North American monopoly capitalism 
and its allies." 

They denounce cooperative actions to defend Latin America against 
communism, or to strengthen national economies without Communist 
participation or Soviet aid. 

Bloc propaganda dissemination is being improved through expan- 
sion of book stores, cultural and friendship societies, and other outlets. 

China, for example, has recently established a press outlet in Latin 
America, and has given more radio time to Latin American broadcasts. 

In addition, Communist propaganda prepared in Western Europe, 
Africa, and Asia, based upon and supported by Soviet-bloc efforts, 
also supports the "national liberation" struggle in Latin America. 

The Communist-bloc countries are also seeking greater official rep- 
resentation and wider official contacts. 

At present, the Soviet Union has diplomatic missions in only three 
Latin American countries, Argentina, Uruguay, and Mexico. 

Missions of satellite countries of a diplomatic, consular, or commer- 
cial nature are located in these countries, as well as Bolivia, Brazil, 
Chile, and Colombia. 

Communist China, North Korea, and North Vietnam have no rep- 


In this effort the Communist governments are using every oppor- 
tunity and channel to urge an expansion of official diplomatic and 
nondiplomatic representation, dangling the bait of profitable trade 
with the bloc before both governments and private interests. 

For example, in 1958 the holding of the meeting of the Interparlia- 
mentary Union in Rio de Janeiro gave bloc delegations a chance to 
campaign for the exchange of diplomatic missions and to hint at great 
trade possibilities. 

The cooperation of influential legislators or other officials is en- 
listed through general campaigns and discreet efforts by visiting 
groups from the bloc or by local friendship societies. 

The Chairman. Could I ask you a question there? 

General Cabell. Certainly. 

The Chairman. What do you think of the possibilities of trade be- 
tween Latin America and the Soviet Union ? 

General Cabell. Meaning do we think that there is a large market 
in Latin America? 

The Chairman. Yes, sir ; for Soviet goods. 

General Cabell. I think there is a market there, Mr. Chairman, be- 
cause they are producers of many ra\v materials. The Soviet Union 
is expanding its industrial base. It would like to get more foreign ex- 
change. It would like to use their trade opportmiities as a cover 
for other and more sinister operations. 

So I think tiiat they would seek to force the pace of trade with Latin 
America, although it might not be completely economically sound 

The Chairman. In otiier words, you think they would take com- 
modities that are needed in the Soviet Union by the Soviet people and 
trade w^ith Latin America in order to further political ends of the 
Soviet Government in Latin America ? 

General Cabell. Yes. I am sure of that. That is their aim. 

The Chairman. Yes. 

Senator Hruska. General, do you have any knowledge of any offer 
reportedly made recently by representatives of the Russian Govern- 
ment of a $200 million credit to be expended in Russia in the acquisi- 
tion of any type of Russian industrial products ? 

A second part to that question would be whether or not that related 
in any way to the sugar business in Cuba. 

General Cabell. We are not aware of a $200 million offer. We 
have heard recently of several offers which, altogether, might total 
around $200 million. It is not unlikely that such a large offer might 
be niade for propaganda purposes and that the implementation might 
be in terms of smaller credits ari-anged through Commmiist "cover" 
firms of Soviet-bloc commercial representatives in Western countries. 
These might be arranged directly with some autonomous agency of 
the Cuban Government, such as the Agrarian Reform Institute. We 
seek to be alert to such reports and attempt to confirm them and 
establish the principals involved. We are also aware of the possi- 
bility that the Cuban Government may turn to the Soviet bloc for 
purchases of jet aircraft or other military equipment. 

Offers, or rumors, of extremely large Soviet credits could not help 
but be related to sugar, Cuba's chief source of income. The Com- 
munists have long advocated less dependence on the U.S. market and 


have propagandized the advantages of trade with the Soviet bloc. 
The Soviets certainly have an interest in supportino; the Cuban Com- 
munist Party program. On the other hand, it is true that anti- 
Conununists have an interest in rumors which will increase our alarm 
over Communist influence in Cuba. 

Shall I continue, Mr. Chairman ? 

The Chairman. Yes. 

Senator Johnston. Are they having any trouble in disposing of 
their sugar in Cuba, all that they produce? 

General Cabell. Yes ; they have to sell. They cannot possibly dis- 
pose of the Cuban 

The Chairman. Would you speak a little louder, please, sir? 

Senator Johnston. What I have reference to is: have they sold 
or are they able to sell all of the sugar? 

General Cabell. About a month ago the Cuban Sugar Stabilization 
Institute stated that the holdover this year would be between 1 mil- 
lion and 1.2 million tons. This will be large compared to last year's 
holdover of some 600,000 tons. 

The Chairman. That sold to us is at a price level that is roughly 
a. hundred percent above the world price. 

General Cabell. I am not knowledgeable on that. 

The Chairman. Yes, sir. 

Senator Johnston. That is about what it amounts to. 

General Cabell. To continue, Mr. Chairman 

The Chairman, Yes. 

General Cabell. Nearly all the bloc govermnents have been active 
in the promotion of cultural contacts. They have used these con- 
tacts to discredit the charges against Communists and derogatory de- 
scriptions of the Communist countries, as a means of cultivating and 
converting carefully selected non-Communists, and as a means of 
establishing a precedent for the development of official contacts. 

The development of a campaign for increased trade with the Soviet 
bloc is presented as a means of freeing the Latin American countries 
from their dependence on the U. S. market. 

This campaign is designed primarily to appeal to bourgeois elements 
in official and business circles, but is also used to appeal to worker 
groups, to whom it is described as the solution to wage and living 
standard problems. This trade campaign has, as yet, had little real 
impact in Latin America. 

The major role of the bloc diplomatic establisliments is to comple- 
ment, rather than direct, the activities of the local Communists, 
through implementation of overt Soviet foreign policy. 

The bloc establishments concentrate on usual objectives, that is, 
cultural interchange, the development of commercial relations, and 
the presentation of Soviet positions on international issues, as a means 
of improving the climate for the growth of the local Communist 
organizations and increasing their prestige. 

Through binational centers, such as the IMexican-Eussian Cultural 
Exchange Institute, they distribute INIarxist literature and propa- 
ganda films, and arrange for the exchange of visits by the various 
individuals and groups. 

Under the cover of the binational centers, the diplomatic establish- 
ments are able to maintain close contact with key Communists or 
Communist sympathizers. 

43354—60 Pt. 3 2 

146 coivoruisriST threat through the Caribbean 

However, the main purpose of these contacts is to develop sympathy 
for the Soviet Union among non-Communist elements rather than to 
direct local Communist Party activities. 

The direction of tlie various local Communist Parties and the vari- 
ous national affiliates of the international fronts is achieved primarily 
through international meetings held in conjunction with a Communist 
Party congress or plenum, or at an international front meeting, or bi- 
lateral meetings of Communist Party representatives in Moscow. 

There is good evidence, however, that certain diplomatic officials are 
also Communist Party of the Soviet Union representatives, who have 
the responsibility for monitoring the activities of national Commu- 
nist Parties and their leaders, and for reporting on these developments 
to IMoscow, 

These representatives also maintain clandestine contact with various 
Communist Party leaders for the purpose of clarifying the Moscow 
line, advising on its application, approving the travel or training of 
party members in the Soviet Union, and attending to minor financial 
details. There is also evidence that certain officials are engaged in 

Soviet and satellite subsidization of national Communist Parties 
through diplomatic missions is known to occur. 

In Latin America, however, such direct subsidization appears less 
significant than financing through any of a number of indirect 

The origin of funds is concealed. Promises of financial aid made 
by the Soviet or Chinese Communist officials to party leaders are in- 
tentionally vague, and implementation is apt to be achieved through 
a variety of devices, such as payment through the translation of books, 
the awarding of a "peace prize" to a local sympathizer, the negotiating 
of a lucrative contract with a local sympathizer, gifts attributed to 
popular collection campaigns and fraternal fronts abroad, or the inter- 
national solidarity fund of the World Federation of Trade Unions, 
the awarding of scholarships or tours on an expense-paid basis. 

On the other hand, the diplomatic establishments do purchase serv- 
ices which may benefit individual Communists, or may negotiate con- 
tracts through which local Communists or sympathizers are enabled 
to realize some financial gain or which may indirectly benefit the 

There are cases, however, where Soviet officials have been reported 
to have made large direct payments to local Communists in an effort 
to promote strike activity or other types of unrest. 

The adoption of the "national liberation struggle" with its concen- 
tration on unity of action with the non-Communist nationalist bour- 
geoisie has been paralleled by an intensive campaign to strengthen the 
internal organization of the national Communist Parties in Latin 
America, and to train the party leaders, as well as the membership, 
in basic Marxist-Leninist theory, and its application. 

The training of Latin American Communist Party leaders at the 
higher party school of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union has 
been going on continuously since 1953, with an increase noted since 

The usual curriculum is based on a 2- or 3-year course of training, 
and the students are active party leaders and functionaries who have 


been selected by their parties and approved by the Communist Party 
of the Soviet Union. . . . 

It is probable that most of the Latin American Communist Parties 
now have a number of leaders who have received this special training. 

Beginning in 1956, the Communist Party of China also undertook 
to give training to Latin American Communist Party leaders. 

They emphasize, among other subjects, the special contributions o± 
the Chinese party in the field of clandestine work, agrarian refonn 
and peasant affairs, guerrilla warfare, and the manipulation ot the 
bouro-eoisie and other elements in the '^anti-imperialist struggle.' _ _ 

Since 1956, there is evidence that the organization of such training 
has been improved, and that the Chinese Communist Party is now 
o-iving regular courses specifically for Latin American Communist 
students, thereby paralleling the Soviet effort. In addition to the 
training offered by the Soviet 

Senator Johnston. Is that in all the South American countries or 

someplace , • • n j; 

General Cabell. Pretty much so. Their aim is to make it m all ot 
the Latin American countries. 

Senator Johnston. I see. i i o • 

General Cabell. In addition to the training offered by the b^oviet 
and Chinese Communist Parties, the better organized and stronger 
Communist Parties have, in accordance with recommendations from 
Moscow, offered training to Communist Party members from the 
smaller and weaker Communist Parties. 

Thus, the Communist Party of Argentina, m 1958, accepted stu- 
dents from a number of other Latin American countries, Bolivia, 
Ecuador, Venezuela, Panama, and Colmnbia, into its cadre school, 
which was raided by the Argentine police in October of 1958. 

It has been reported that other Communist Parties, such as those 
of Chile and Cuba, have also undertaken to train Communists from 
other countries. 

This is in further answer to your question, Senator. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. Mr. Chairman, might I ask a question? 

The Chairman. Yes. . 

Mr. SouRWiNE. General, there has been some training ot Com- 
munists from Latin America in Warsaw, too, has there not ? 

General Cabell. The training of Latin Americans is centered m the 
U.S.S.K., China, and (to a lesser extent) in East Germany. There is 
no evidence of a Polish program in this regard, and there are no inter- 
national front headquarters in Warsaw which might offer on-the- 
job training. However, we are aware of cases where the Interna- 
tional Union of Students (lUS) has given scholarships to Latin 
American students for study in Poland. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. When they go to Europe they go to Moscow ? 

General Cabell. Generally, they want to. 

Mr. Sourwine. 'Wlien they go to Red China, where do they go, 

General Cabell. They go to Peiping, via Moscow, usually. 

ISIr. Sourwine. Thank you, sir. 

General Cabell. There is more prestige connected with going to 
Moscow or Peiping than going to any of the satellites. 


The Chairman. Is there any training of Communist students, Latin 
American Connniinist students, in the United States? 

General Cabell. "We woukl not be the repository of that informa- 
tion, Mr. Chairman. That would be the FBI. 

The Chairman. I wanted to know whether you had that 

General Cabell. No, sir; I do not have it at my fingertips. 

The above training is carried on by schools conducted by the Com- 
munist Parties themselves. 

However, the intensified training program is also being undertaken 
by the Communist fronts. The World Federation of Trade Unions 
held a training school for Latin American labor leaders in Budapest 
from 1953 to 1955, and subsidized a Central American training school 
in Costa Rica in 1958. 

The World Federation of Democratic Youth, and the International 
LTnion of Students have provided on-the-job training for Latin 
Americans at their international headquarters, as has the Women's 
International Democratic Federation. 

Marxist training centers, such as the Workers' University in Mex- 
ico City, are being expanded in an effort to broaden the appeal of 
Marxism, and to stimulate nationalism. 

EfTorts to infiltrate the educational field have been intensified in an 
effort to gain respectability and recognition for Marxist thought, a 
drive which has achieved success in several countries. A notable ex- 
ample is the Brazilian Institute for Advanced Studies. In addition, 
nonpolitical scholarships are offered by the Soviet Union and satellite 
countries for training in the arts and sciences. 

Thus, the international Communist training effort is comprehensive, 
ranging from the political indoctrination of the militant Communist 
nucleus to the provision of opportunities to non-Connnunists which 
will orient them towards the Communist bloc in their future profes- 
sional careers. 

The coordination of Latin American Communist action is planned 
through international, regional, and national meetings of Communist 
Parties or front organizations. 

This is done at bilateral meetings between the Communist Party of 
the Soviet Union and the Latin American Communist Party leaders, 
through the exchange of publications, through the travel of party lead- 
ers, and through continuous training and indoctrination of party mem- 

The fundamental line is established in discussions with Communist 
Party of the Soviet Union officials, and an authoritative — or in au- 
thoritative journals such as Problems of Peace and Socialism (the 
World Marxist Re^aew) which is published in 19 languages, and the 
various party theoretical organs. 

Fundamental Marxist texts, both current and classic, are available 
in Spanish; some are translated and published in Latin America, to 
provide a standardized basis for internal Party training and for in- 
doctrination of non-Communists, 

Spanish translations of Chinese Communist works are increasingly 
used in the effort to apply Chinese tactical lessons in Latin America. 

Latin American delegates to Soviet Communist Party congresses 
have also attended Chinese Communist Party meetings or have met 
with Chinese leaders. 


The general strategy for Communist activity in Latin America in 
1958 was outlined at the Moscow meeting of November 1957. 

Activities in 1959, in continuation of the 1958 program, are believed 
to have been discussed at meetings between Latin America and Soviet 
Communist Party representatives held in Moscow at the time of the 
21st Communist Party of the Soviet LTnion Congress, and at meetings 
between the Latin American and Chinese Communists shortly after- 
ward, in Peiping. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. That was in January of this year? 

General Cabell, Late January and early February. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. All right. 

General Cabell. The current program involves the exploitation of 
the Cuban Revolution as an example of a successful "liberation strug- 
gle," which should be emulated by "anti-imperialist" elements in other 
Latin American countries. 

A significant element of the Communist program for 1959 appears 
to be the support of a "People's Congress," ostensibly sponsored by 
non-Coinmunist patriots and liberals, but oriented by Communist or 
pro-Communist delegates so as to pass anti-U.S. resolutions. 

The Cuban Communist newspaper Hoy recently quoted Raul Castro, 
Chief of the Cuban Armed Forces, as giving his support to such a 

The Chairman. These congresses, while they are composed of lib- 
erals who are not members of the Communist Party, yet the congress 
and its membership are manipulated by the Communists; is that 
correct ? 

General Cabell. That is the purpose of them and the fact of them. 

The Chairman. Yes. 

General Cabell. Mr. Chairman, this type of approach, the exploita- 
tion of non-Conmiunists and the infiltration of crypto- Communists, 
or secret Communist Party members into progressive movements, is 
an old technique, but one which has been particularly emphasized by 
the Chinese. 

It is believed that all Latin American Parties are now under orders 
to recruit new members on a "secret" basis, so that they may remain in 
or be infiltrated into non-Communist groups. 

Li 1958 and 1959 there has been increasing emphasis on the need 
for communism to adapt its tactics to the regional and national situa- 
tion in which it works. 

In Latin America where the "national liberation" strategy is aimed 
at influencing non-Communist liberals, nationalists and intellectuals, 
Communist-front activity and subversion of non-Communist organi- 
zations has been increasingly emphasized. 

The international Communist-front organizations, such as the 
World Federation of Trade Unions, the International Union of Stu- 
dents, the World Federation of Democratic Youth, the Women's Inter- 
national Democratic Federation, and so forth, have tried in their pro- 
grams aimed at Latin America, to pay more attention to national 
questions and peculiarities, and thus to deemphasize Soviet direction 
while developing the basis for unity of action. 

Mr. Sourwine. General 

Mr. Chairman, may I inquire- 
The Chairman. Yes. 


Mr. SouRWiNE. General, is it true that the increasing emphasis of 
which you speak in adajotation to national situations is a tactic; it is 
not a trend toward a development of true so-called national Commu- 
nist parties? That is, it is not a Communist schism; it is simply a 
tactic Avhich the single world conspiracy is using ? 

General Cabell. That is correct. Their emphasis is on that ap- 
proach ; that is, of developing these front organizations, rather than 
the more direct one of open Communist parties themselves. They are 
not in any way denying these Communist parties, but they are putting 
their effort in this indirect approach because they think it will bring 
them a better return. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. And within the Communist parties themselves of 
these various Latin American countries, Moscow still clamps down on 
any deviation. They still have to follow orders from Moscow ; is that 
right ? 

Genei'al Cabell. Yes. 

Senator Hruska. What you have described here is the very essence 
of the "national liberation" movement, is it not ? 

General Cabell. Yes. 

Senator Hruska. In gross, isn't that exactl}^ what that "national 
liberation" movement is ? 

General Cabell. That is right, to surround its own Communist ef- 
forts by this aura of nationalism. 

Senator Hruska. And then it breaks down into different segments, 
in schools, labor unions, and what not ? 

General Cabell. That is right. 

Senator Johnston. They use all kinds of popular movements to 
join them in order to further their cause. 

General Cabell. Any movement that they can possibly grasp. Sen- 
ator, whether that popular movement has been in existence or whether 
they attempt to create a popular movement for the purpose. They 
use both kinds. 

Senator Johnston. If they cannot get into a country one way, then 
they will come in by saying, "We want to put down the dictatorship." 

General Cabell. That is right. 

Shall I continue, Mr. Chairman ? 

The Chairman. Proceed, General. 

General Cabell. In the field of labor increased efforts have been 
made to regain the influence lost during the postwar decade. The 
World Federation of Trade Unions has a reo;ional liaison bureau called 
the Latin American Confederation of Labor, or Confederacion de 
Trabaj adores de America Latina, to give the Spanish name. 

Discussions are underway to strengthen and reorganize it, and so to 
make it a more effective organization, 

A number of instances of international Communist financing of 
Latin American trade unions also has been noted by us. 

Visits of the World Federation of Trade Union and bloc trade 
union officials to Latin American countries have increased, as have 
invitations to Latin American trade unionists to visit Communist 
China, the Soviet Union, and other bloc countries. 

These efforts are designed to increase Communist influence and 
strength in the trade union movement, and are an integral part of the 


Communist strategy which, to be successful, is essentially depend- 
ent upon mass support. 

The tasks of the trade unions in the "national liberation struggle" 
were set forth by the vice president of the "World Federation of 
Trade Unions, who is the Indian Communist, S. A. Dange, at the 
Fourth Congress of the World Federation of Trade Unions in 1957. 

These tasks constitute a blueprint for Communist labor action. 

Trade unions are called upon to support measures taken by the 
national bourgeoisie if these measures are directed against imperi- 
alism and are intended to strengthen the country's independence, and 
develop its economy. 

The unions are advised to oppose military pacts, to support the 
peace movement, to promote nationalization of foreign enterprises, 
and to link economic demands with political actions. 

They are to seek alliances, particularly with the peasantry, as well 
as trade union "unity." 

Finally, those trade unions with a record of success in the "na- 
tional liberation struggle" should advise less experienced unions, and 
the World Federation of Trade Unions promised to strengthen its 
own role in the international exchange of tactical experience. 

Close adherence to these directives is seen in the Communist propa- 
ganda and organizational work in Argentina, Brazil, Cliile, Cuba, 
Mexico, and other Latin American countries. 

Aid and support from the World Federation of Trade Unions and 
its trade departments, the Trade Unions Internationals, as well as 
from trade unions of bloc countries, is apparent. 

Representatives of the Trade Unions Internationals of the World 
Federation of Trade Unions have been particularly active in Latin 

Giacomo Adduci, Italian labor leader, and Secretaiy General of 
the Metal and Engineering Workers of the World Federation of 
Trade Unions, attended the 1958 May Day celebration m Brazil. He 
promised increased World Federation of Trade Unions aid to the 
Brazilian labor movement. Adduci again visited Brazil in April of 
1959 to attend a National Metal Workers Congress, also attended by 
fraternal delegates from neighboring South American countries. 

Paolo Scarponi, a representative of the Trade Unions Interna- 
tional of Textile and Clothing Workers, visited Rio de Janiero, Mon- 
tevideo, Buenos Aires, and Santiago, Chile, in March and April of 

Paul Delanoue, secretary general of the Communist-controlled 
World Federation of Teachers' Unions, visited Chile in May 1959 
to attend the 12th National Convention of the Chilean Teachers 
Union. That is the Union de Profesores de Chile. 

Maurice Boye, a member of the secretariat of the Trade Unions 
International of Public and Allied Workers, was reported to be vis- 
iting in Chile in June 1959 at the invitation of the National Associa- 
tion of Semi-Public Employees, the Asociacion Nacional de Empleados 

The Chairman. General, have American Communists attended 
meetings in Latin America ? 

General Cabell. Yes. 


The Chairman. Could you tell us which Communists, what meet- 
ings they attended ? 

General Cabell. Abe Magil was CPUSA representative at the 
Twelfth CP-Mexico Congress, in September 1954. 

But as a matter of fact, the attendance has not been notable at 
these congresses mainly because they wished to avoid attention. 

Senator Hruska. By "notable" do you mean heavy in numbers? 

General Cabell. Either that or frequent. It has been neither heavy 
in numbers nor frequent. 

Senator Hruska. General, you have given tlie names of several in- 
ternational associations and so on, down in Latin America, like the 
teachers, the public workers, and the metalworkers. Where do these 
men come from ? 

General Cabell. These men come from various countries and they 
are officials in various of the unions, and particularly the World 
Federation of Trade Unions and its subsidiary organizations. 

Senator Hruska. Where are the headquarters for the interna- 
tional — the World Federation of Trade Unions that you just 
mentioned ? 

General Cabell. Prague. Prague is a big center for these various 

Senator Hruska. So that many of .these leaders come from Europe? 

General Cabell. Yes, sir. 

Senator Hruska. From either Poland, Czechoslovakia, or Russia? 

General Cabell. Yes. Many are from Western Europe. 

Senator Hruska. You have not named, so far, any Chinese. Are 
you coming to them ? 

General Cabell. I do not believe I named any Chinese. They are 
not as well known to us as the European ones. 

Senator Hruska. They are relatively recent arrivals on the scene 
then ? 

General Cabell. Yes. I would like to say, as I have said, they 
simply have not traveled in the same or similar capacities as the others. 
They are not heavilv represented, you see, in the same organizations, 
like the WFTU and lUS. 

The people who travel for the WFTU and other front organizations 
are, in the main, Westerners, by culture and background, and people 
wlio have some linguistic connection with the West. 
_ The Chinese started their intensified drive in Latin America only 
since 1956, and then only by stages. Just a handful of correspondents 
came out. 

They are dependent wholly upon the local Communist Party and 
the network of correspondents which I have mentioned. 

Senator Hruska. The tempo of their activity has steadily increased ? 

General Cabell. That is correct. 

Senator Hruska. When I say they, I mean those people from China. 
Isn't that true? 

General Cabell. Chinese activity, both in drawing Latin Amer- 
icans into China for training and consultation, and now coming out 
for the first time, apart from a few cultural acrobatic and ballet troupes 
and tilings like that ; but they are now sending out Red Chinese news- 
paper correspondents to actually set up headquarters, for example, at 
Havana ; that is true. 


Senator Hruska. To what extent is that done to avoid the appear- 
ance of direct Russian interference in the Western Hemisphere ? 

General Cabell. Well, actually the Chinese are operating very 
strongly on their own. They have their concept of their rights within 
the movement, and they send out their representatives as a sovereign 
power within the movement. 

Senator Hruska. Do you think a part of their increased activity 
is due to a desire to not counteract, but to — but in recognition of our 
policy in Formosa, for example, and Quemoy ? Do you think that is 
involved ? 

General Cabell. I would suggest that is a small part of it. I thmk 
the basic reason for it is that they are feeling their oats. 

Senator Heuska. They want to go into business on their own? 

General Cabell. They want to go into business on their own, and 
they want to establish themselves and be recognized as Communist 
ideologists on their own hook. 

Senator Johnstox. In other words, it is a religion with them ? 

General Cabell. That is right. 

Senator Johnston. It is almost like the churches sendmg out the 
missionaries ? 

General Cabell. Yes. 

In organizing Latin American Youth, the International Communist 
movement works through the World Federation of Democratic Youth, 
and the International Union of Students. 

At their fifth congress in Fieping in September of 1958, they gave 
greatly increased importance to Latin America, adopting seven reso- 
lutions of solidarity with students in nine Latin American countries 
or colonies. These are British Honduras, which they described as 
Guatemalan territory, Brazil, Cuba, Guadalupe, Guiana, Martinique, 
Nicaragua, Peru, and Venezuela. They also adopted a separate two- 
page resolution on Latin America as a whole. 

Young Latin American leaders are working at the World Federa- 
tion of Democratic Youth, and International Union of Students head- 
quarters in Budapest and Prague. 

For example, the Brazilian Communist youth leader, Orlando Fun- 
cia Gomez, headed the important Latin American commission at 
World Federation of Democratic Youth headquarters, and then lie 
returned to Brazil. 

He was replaced by Ruben Guedes, also from Brazil. 

Another Latin American World Federation of Democratic Youth 
official. Otto Cesar Vargas Girete, helped organize Latin American 
participation after the Seventh World Youth Festival held in Vieima 
on the 26th of July to the 4th of August of this year. 

Latin American Coimnmiists known to have worked at Interna- 
tional Union of Students headquarters include individuals from Chile, 
Colombia, Cuba, Ecuador, Guatemala, Mexico, and Venezuela. 

The important International Union of Students secretariat includes 
an Ecuadoran, Jorge Galarza, who replaced a fellow Ecuadoran, 
Efrain Alvarez Paredes. 

Cesar Alonso Alvarado, a Colombian, has been working at Interna- 
tional Students headquarters in Prague as the Spanish editor of the 
union's monthly organ. World Student News, since January of 1959, 

43354— 60— pt. 3 3 


when he replaced Antonio Massip, a Cnhan. Massip quickly returned 
to Cuba after the fall of the Batista regime. 

The Chairman. Do you know what he is doing there now? 

General Cabell. Our most recent information indicates that An- 
tonio Massip is engaged in propaganda work for the army at La 
Cabana Fortress in Havana. 

Some of the Latin American Communists who have worked with 
the World Federation of Democratic Youth or the International 
Union of Students headquarters— worked at those headquarters- 
have also received training in party schools in the Soviet Union, and 
on returning to Latin America have been made responsible for clan- 
destine propaganda distribution, and for the organization of strikes 
and demonstrations. 

In the appeal to non-Communist youth, probably the most impor- 
tant of all World Federation of Democratic Youth and International 
LTnion of Students tactics, are the world youth festivals held every 
other year. 

Since the national liberation strategy was initiated about 1954, over 
3,300 young people from Latin America and the European Caribbean 
dependencies have attended these festivals. 

Relatively, Latin American attendance increased sharply at the 1959 
festival in Vienna. 

The festivals are primarily propaganda efforts, but serve to 
strengthen the World Federation of Democratic Youth and the In- 
ternational Union of Students organizationally through the experi- 
ence received by those working on the various preparatory com- 

We believe that close to $1 million was expended for Latin Ameri- 
can delegates' travel to the Sixth Youth Festival in 1957, of which 
less than $100,000 was contributed from Latin America. That is $1 
million cost, but the Latin Americans contributed $100,000 of it. 

In 1958, the bloc expended about $500,000 in order to subsidize the 
travel of Latin American Communists and sympathizers to the bloc. 

This was not at youth festivals, but just travel to the bloc. 

The Yomig Communist, youth and student leaders associated with 
and trained by the World Federation of Democratic Youth, and the 
International Union of Students, are instrumental in the coordination 
of the liberation struggle. 

In 1958 the two organizations sought to emphasize the participation 
of the students in the anti-Batista struggle in Cuba, and in their 
publications called for international support and solidarity with 
the Cuban students. 

In the antipathy to existing dictatorships in Latin America, the 
Communists have fomid a popular issue which allows them to infil- 
trate, or work closely with non-Communist youth and student groups. 

Wlierever possible, they have sought to provide the initiative and, 
with the aid of Communists abroad, to develop international sup- 
port and coordination. 

For example, a number of meetings of youth and student leaders 
were held in Cuba earlier this year, some under Communist sponsor- 
ship or with Communist participation. 

At these meetings, international coordination of antidictatorial ac- 
tion was discussed, including plans for an antidictator congress to be 
held in Havana. 


Similar meetings have been held in other countries, such as that 
held in April by the Uruguayan Communist Youth. 

Some government officials 

The CuAiKMAX. General, right about there, what about the Cuban 
Government, has it encouraged those Commmiist meetings? 

General Cabell. I think the Cuban Government gives them every 
facility for those meetings, and any number of Cuban officials give 
them encouragement. But I think it Avould be improper to say that 
the Cuban Government, as such, gives them the encouragement. It is 
not necessary for the Cuban Government, as such, to give them 

The Chairman. No; but the officials in a private capacity do? 

General Cabell. Or the officials in the Government capacity, but it 
might not be the Government official's responsibility for a certain 
thing that gives these Communists such encouragement, because the 
Government is so disorganized that there is continual crossing of Imes 
by one official of the Government into other departments. So I would 
not want to give the impression that it is governmentally organized en- 
couragement that is taking place. It is rather the encouragement of 
officials and elements within the Government. 

The Chairman. I do not see the difference. 

General Cabell. Well, there is just a legal difference ; that is all. 

The Chairman. That is right. 

Senator Johnston. In other words, the Government is doing noth- 
ing to prevent it ? 

General Cabell, That is right. 

The Chair3ian. No ; they are encouraging it. 

General Cabell. I would say even more than that. 

The Chairman. They take affirmative action, the officials of the 
Government take affirmative action in promoting it. 

General Cabell. I just did not want to give you the impression that 
the Government has officially organized that kind of action. 

Senator Johnston. They encourage it as long as it helps them to 
stay popular. 

General Cabell. Oh, yes. 

Senator Hruska. Well, of course, in Cuba, since Castro took over, 
the Popular Socialist Party, for example, which had previously been 
banned, was allowed to come out in the open. Of course, that is not 
official, that does not make them officially Communists, but it cer- 
tainly is along the same line ; is it not ? 

General Cabell. And there is no inhibition or prohibition of such 
movement whatsoever. 

Some Government officials may be providing the Communists with 
readymade opportunities for expanding their propaganda. 

Senator Johnston. A^^len anybody tries to oppose it they meet it 
by saying, "Oh, we agree ; we give everybody freedom.'" 

General Cabell. That is right. They oppose it on "freedom" 

For example, Raul Castro, who supported the People's Congress in a 
recent speech, as previously mentioned, also supported the idea of 
holding a Latin American Youth and Student Congress in Havana, 
in the name of defending the Cuban Revolution. 

He did not publicly use the earlier antidictatorship theme, pre- 
sumably to minimize the international aspects of the meeting. 


It remains to be seen whether this congress, when held, will reveal 
Communist handiwork through violent attacks on the United States 
in an effort to apply the theme of "national liberation" to other 

The CiiAiEMAN. "\^niat it is is a Communist meeting ; is it not ? 

General Cabell. It is a Communist-influenced meeting, Mr. Chair- 

The Chairman. Yes. 

Cuba has a great many Chinese and other orientals. Do you have 
any information that Red China has attempted to mobilize them 
or to 

General Cabell. Mr. Chairman, I have got a little piece on that, if 
you don't mind, which I will come to a little later. 

The Chairman. Yes, sir. Proceed, General. 

General Cabell. The Communist journalists in Latin America have, 
particularly since 1956, been encouraged and assisted in broadening 
their influence by the Communist-front International Organization 
of Journalists. 

Since that time. Communists and their supporters have sought to 
bring national press associations closer to the International Organiza- 
tion of Journalists, and to sponsor a Latin American Congress of 
Journalists at which they could exploit Latin American nationalism 
and regionalism to the detriment of the United States. 

Important national press associations in Brazil, Peru, and Vene- 
zuela have given some official recognition to the International Organi- 
zation of Journalists. 

In October of 1958, the Venezuelan ISTational Press Congress invited 
Jaroslav Knobloch, of Czechoslovakia, the International Organization 
of Journalists' president, and Renato Leduc, of Mexico, a vice presi- 
dent, to speak. Leduc used this forum to attack the Latin American 
coverage of the so-called commercial news agencies, and called for a 
truly Latin American organization. 

As if in answer to this, the Prensa Latina Agency was organized, 
with headquarters in Cuba, in early 1959. 

Tliis agency denies Communist sponsorship, while claiming the 
backing of Mexican industrialists and promoting the ultranationalist 

Prensa Latina now has correspondents, and sells its service through- 
out Latin America and in the United States. 

The Chairman. You thiiik that is a Communist-controlled news 

General Cabell. This came out very quickly after the encourage- 
ment in the speech by the Communists that such an institution was 

We also call attention to the fact that its line plays this very ultra- 
nationalist line, which is the Communist line. 

Other than that, at this present moment, I do not think we could 
testify to you that it is a Communist organization. 

General Cabell. It is under intensive investigation along the lines 
we have indicated, and it is just ripe for exploitation because of its 
intensely nationalistic character. 

The Chairman. But, in your judgment, it is Communist-influenced ? 

General Cabell. We do not have the evidence to make such a firm 


conclusion, Mr. Chairman. But we certainly strongly suspect that 
is tlie case, and we are watching it like a hawk. 

The Chairman. Yes. 

Senator Hruska. It has many badges which would indicate that? 

General Cabell. That is right. The Communists midoubtedly en- 
couraged or even inspired the organization of Prensa Latina, have 
infiltrated the organization, and have aided it both by providing news 
and utilizing its services. Its correspondents include some known 
Communist Party members, a number of crypto-Communists, and a 
good many ultranationalists. To date, one of the chief customers of 
Prensa Latina appears to be the Cuban Communist newspaper Hoy. 
However, because of its access to Communist and nationalist circles, 
it has also been able to supply material of interest to other newspapers 
and news services, including non-Communist ones. 

The Communist-bloc comitries have increased their press activities 
in the area. 

Tass correspondents are located in Mexico, Uruguay, and Argen- 
tina. The Czechoslovakian News Agency has established an office in 

A group of Soviet journalists visited Argentina, Uruguay, Chile, 
Peru, and Panama in April and May of 1958, establishing contact 
with pro-Communist writers and newsmen. 

In early 1959, the New China News Agency began building a net- 
work of correspondents in Latin America, and established a head- 
quarters in Havana, adjacent to that of the Prensa Latina. In con- 
nection with this effort, a group of Communist Chinese journalists 
traveled to various key Latin American countries. 

Not only have their gains in the field of journalism been significant, 
but Communists have also increased their propaganda in other fields. 

Wherever possible, as in Cuba, Communists have quickly exploited 
opportunities to utilize local radio and television. 

At the special conference held in Moscow in November 1957, em- 
phasis was placed on the revival and diversification of the peace move- 

It was concluded that its main objective in Latin America should 
be to weaken the "war economy" of the United States. Thus, economic 
nationalism was established as a major "peace" objective. 

In accordance with instructions, the Argentine Communists held a 
"Congress for International Cooperation, General Disarmament, and 
National Sovereignty" in May 1958, attended by leaders from through- 
out the hemisphere. 

This served to prepare for Latin American participation in the 
subsequent world meeting in Stockhohn and also to coordinate re- 
gional planning. 

In accordance with a Soviet goal of several years standing, it resolved 
to promote a "Congress of the Peoples of Latin America" which would 
"meet the imperative necessity of integrating the national economies, 
strengthening the homogeneous elements of Latin American cultures, 
and organizing joint action to preserve world peace." 

Originally planned for December 1958, this "People's Congress" — 
which I mentioned earlier — was postponed, and it now appears that 
the Communists are capitalizing on the appeal made by Cuba's youth- 
ful Minister of Education, Dr. Armando Hart, for just such a "Peo- 
ple's Congress." 


This has g-iven them the non-Communist sponsorship which they 
desire, and has also allowed them to develop the "defense" of the Cuban 
revolution as an additional basis for attracting the support of Latin 
American nationalists, and anti-U.S. elements. 

Senator Hruska. Let me ask, do you know^ any new date for the 
meeting of that congress ? 

General Cabell. Luis Carlos Prestes, the secretary general of the 
Communist Party of Brazil, said in August that he expected it to 
come otf in the very near future in Cuba, and that is the last date we 

The national peace movements have also been active in more con- 
ventional "peace" activities such as opposition to military pacts, 
nuclear testing, and activities of U.S. military missions. 

The current trend, however, suggests that the main purpose of the 
national peace committees has become that of coordinating activities 
in behalf of the "liberation struggle" within a wide variety of organ- 
izations, particularly those of an economic and cultural nature. 

Under the heading of other front activities, the labor, youth and 
student, journalistic, and peace-front activities are the most important 
in Latin America. 

There are many others, however, in which increased organizational 
activity is also apparent. 

The Women's International Democratic Federation, for example, is 
seeking to develop a First Latin American Congress of Women, sched- 
uled to be held in Santiago, Chile, between November 19 and 20 of 

Coordination of the activities of the various Soviet friendship 
societies or binational cultural exchange institutes may have been the 
purpose behind the organization of a Soviet Federation for Friend- 
ship and Cultural Cooperation with Latin America in January 1959. 

In addition to the world fronts, the Communists have organized or 
infiltrated numerous national or regional organizations to aid in the 
"national liberation" struggle. 

For example, the Union of Latin American Friendship, Union de 
Amistad Latino Americana, recently established with headquarters 
in Mexico, serves to coordinate and disseminate information from vari- 
ous countries, such as the Dominican Republic, Nicaragua, and 

For each of these countries, and for others as well, there is at least 
one Communist-controlled front, among the various political opposi- 
tion groups, which advocates unified action based on a minimal pro- 
gram for "national liberation." 

Such a front is the Haitian National Liberation Movement, founded 
by the Communist leader Eene Depestre, but claimed to be "composed 
of young persons from all patriotic groups and of all ])olitical tenden- 
cies." The program of this group was recently published in the 
Cuban Communist newspaper Hoy. 

To conclude, it is evident that the Communists have an extremely 
useful formula in the strategy of the "national liberation struggle." 

They have difficulties and are still having problems in allaying the 
distrust of non-Communist elements, w^hich either recognize the true 
nature of communism and the opportunistic nature of the Communist 
alliance which is being offered, or which recognize the beneficial as- 


pects of their national ties with the United States and prefer to nego- 
tiate political and economic difl'erences rather than to destroy these 

To counteract this opposition, the local Commimists, with the help 
of the international Communist apparatus and the Soviet Union, are 
attempting to show, first, that the Communists are sincerely dedicated 
to democracy and "national liberation" and are willing to fight to 
achieve these goals; and, second, that the United States needs no 
longer to be feared, as its influence has been matched by the Soviet 

Mr. SouRwiNE. ]Mr. Chairman, may I ask one question ? 

The Chairman. Yes. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. General, the committee has received from a very 
knowledgeable person, who has been a lifelong student of China, an 
appraisal from which I would like to read two paragraphs, and ask 
wliether you concur or if there is any comment you can give us on 
this : 

Talk of an allegedly "inevitable" SinoSoviet schism may serve as intellectual 
aspirin to repress our policy headaches with both Moscow and Peiping. Like 
aspirin, however, the repressant only postpones coping with the problem ; it 
does not eliminate it. 

All the component parts of the Soviet Empire, including Red China, may be 
compared to the members of a baseball team. Each has a part to play in trying 
to win the game, although each occupies a different position and is called upon 
to do a different sort of thing. Moscow is on the team, too, but its position is 
that of a player-manager, and it flashes the signs. In a given situation, the 
player-manager may call for all kinds of play — squeeze, sacrifice, and so on. 
The player asked to play a certain way cannot give any consideration to his 
own personal record. Mickey Mantle cannot go up to Casey Stengel and say to 
him that, since he (Mantle) is well on the way to beating Babe Ruth's home-run 
record, he had better be given the chance to try the long ball rather than bunting 
for a sacrifice. If the particular situation appears to the manager to call for a 
bunt, Mickey Mantle must bunt, home-run record or no home-run record. The 
idea is to try to win the game, not to achieve a personal glory. Khrushchev is 
a better team player than Stalin. Hence his denunciation of the "personality 
cult." Liu Shao-chi is a better team player than Mao Tze-tung. Hence Mao's 
displacement. Chou En-lai. with his many faces which so bafile Western ob- 
servers, is an excellent team player. Western estimate of world communism 
suffers considerably by paying too much attention to personalities and too little 
to the team concept. To win the game is the all-important thing, and the Com- 
munists, whether Russian,, Polish, or Albanian, mean to win it. 

We must also be careful to draw the proper line of distinction between "total" 
and "limited" wars. The Russians, and to a lesser extent the Chinese, under- 
stand that a "total" war with nuclear weapons may spell the doom of every- 
body, especially the Communists. I say "especially the Communists"' because 
of the ring of strategic bases ax'ound Russia and mainland China. Their propa- 
ganda has been to induce the United States to give up the bases. Before they 
succeed in doing that, the Communists are not likely to risk total war. But 
limited wars are an entirely different thing. They are not he.sitant in provoking 
them here and there as long as they are sure they will not explode into a total 
war. Russia at pi'esent has very little room to stage limited wars. The moment 
she touches Western Europe, total war is on. On the other hand Red China has 
plenty of room to risk limited wars. Surely no total war will break out on 
account of Sikkim or Bhutan for the Indian border. So, on the surface, Russia 
may appear to be pursuing one line and Red China another. To return to the 
baseball analogy, one player may be bunting and the other swinging for the 
fences. The thing to remember is that all are on the same team, putting on 
obviously different plays under different circumstances, but the ultimate objec- 
tive is to win the game. 


General Cabell. Mr. Sourwine, I cannot comment on the whole 
piece. But I will make some comment on it. 

In the first place, I think the aspirin analogy is not a bad one. 

As I pointed out earlier, I think this is a very comforting thought, 
this schism bet wen the two, but I think it is more potential than actual 
at the present time. 

With respect to the baseball team analogy, I would not be as extreme 
as that, because I do not believe that the response to discipline or orders 
is quite as immediate and complete and unquestioning as the ballplayer 
to the manager. 

It is true, however, that the team aspect of international communism 
is often insufficiently considered. One of the chief objectives of com- 
munism in tlie last few years has been to improve international co- 
ordination. Both the Soviets and the Chinese have been doing this, 
with some success. This is particularly true in the undeveloped areas 
where the strengthening of the regional and local Communist move- 
ments is the immediate goal. 

I think, as time goes on, the sensibilities of the Chinese will have 
to be taken more into consideration, and the willingness or ability of 
their team manager to give firm orders and sacrifice, hit instructions, 
and things like that, are going to be somewhat eroded. 

With respect to the limited war elements of your question, I think 
it would take up a long time to deal with that aspect, and I would just 
suggest that we check on that. 

Mr. Sourwine. General, what is the numerical strength of the Com- 
munist movement in Latin America ? 

General Cabell. I would say that, in general, the Communist Par- 
ties have increased their membership. The number of Latin American 
Communists is estimated now at about 220,000 to 240,000, which is 
about a 10-percent increase over our 1958 estimates. The number of 
sympathizers is estimated at about 650,000 to 700,000. 

It should be emphasized that the Communist threat continues to 
be based on the organizational ability and international connections 
of the Communist Parties and their fronts, and individual leaders, 
rather than numerical strength. 

The Chairman. That is true all over the world ? 

General Cabell. Yes ; but I would say it is particularly true in Latin 

The Chairman. Is the Communist drive in Latin America similar 
to their drive in Africa and the Middle East; is it more intense? 

General Cabell. Yes, sir; but I think it started sooner in Latin 

The Chairman. You think it is more intense in Latin America ? 

General Cabell. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. It started sooner there ? 

General Cabell. Yes, sir. 

Senator Hruska. How much sooner ? 

General Cabell. I would say in the nature of several years, sir; 
and I think they, too, realize that the United States is more susceptible 
to hurt in this area than elsewhere. 

The Chairman. They can weaken us more easily in Latin America. 

General Cabell. And there is no doubt about who the principal 
enemy of the Soviet Union is and of the Communist Party. There is 
no doubt about that whatseoever, and that is the United States. 


Mr. SouRWiNE. In other words, the drive in Latin America is 

pointed at us? . 

General Cabell. More than anything else ; yes. •, • „ -P.^f 

Senator Hruska. General, you say it is several years; it is a fact, 
is it nol, thrt^ie^ has been organized Con^mist activity and move- 
ment in Latin America for 25 years? ^ j • ^ 

General Cabell. Oh, yes; I was talking m terms of a drive. 

Senator Hruska. Aild the intensification that we now witness? 

^S'^E^.^^^ SS'^ it be possible for your agency to 
furnish the committee a table showing the estimated strength of the 
Communist Parties in various comitries m Latin America. 

GpneralC\BELL. Yes ; I can do that. . 

The fo Wng table contams approximate figures on Communist 
Par Y strengths These figures are constantly under review, and are 
rub% to cSanges in respolise to new and more reliable information. 

Communist Pakty Membership 


Argentina 80.000 

g?!Sr ::::::::::::: 40;^ 

ChUe 1 30, 000 

Colombia 6, 000 

Costa Rica '^^ 

Cuba I' ^ 

Dominican Republic -^o (\ru\ 

Ecuador ^' ^^ 

El Salvador t*V^ 

Guatemala 1' ^^ 


Honduras V^ 

Mexico '^' ^"Y 

Nicaragua ^n 

Panama JJ^ 

Paraguay ^' ^VV 

Peru b, 000 

Uruguay J' ^^^ 

Venezuela ^^' ^"^ 

Total 238, 725 

General' Cabell. But again let me point out that this table does 
not fncTuderhe Communist-front parties such as L^-bardo To^ed^^^^^ 
Popular Party in Mexico. These m the table are the Communist 
Parties themselves, and not the front parties. ^ , ^   ^„,.f^? 

Seimtor Johnston. The front parties are kind of a training party? 

General Cabell. It is an influence party. 

Senator Johnston. It kind of breaks them ott. 

Th Chairman. General, are you familiar with a ^^-"^^^ P^P^^^^^ 
ino- to be a Castro directive laying the groundwork for the extinction 
ofihe Catholic Church in the Dominican Republic i 

General Cabell. No ; I am not. _ ^-p fi,^ 

Mr SouRWiNE. General, what are your estimates on the scope of t.he 
subsidies which the Communist movement m Latin America is recei.- 

"'toerll^CABELL. The truth about Communist finances is genei;ally 
known only to a very small number of Communist leaders withm 

each local Communist Party. ^ , ^ . , jy^.^ ^f t1-,p Soviet 

Even within the apparatus of the Communist P^rty of the hoyet 
Uiiion and China there are only a few functionaries who handle the 
problem of subsidizing foreign Communist Parties 

^ In addition, the transmission of funds fr«"},.\^^,p^IVt,nnen^^^ 
was pointed oiit earlier, proceeds through a multitude of channels ana 

"tis'rerSoVt fe^'5^S to make an accurate estimate on h^w 
much m" or the Chinese spend on Conunumst subver- 

sion in Latin America. 

43354 — 60 — pt. 3 4 


In general, it appears that the bulk of Soviet subsidies is poured into 
the promotion of Communist front activities, rather than into the 
Communist Parties themselves. 

This is, of course, only a technicality since Communist fronts and 
Communist Parties work hand in liand. 

Nevertheless, it is another indication of how seriously the Soviets 
intended to create a favorable climate for communism in Latin 
America. . 

On the basis of similar observations in other areas, it would be fair 
to state that the Soviets heavily subsidize the Communist Party press 
in Latin America. 

The cost of training Latin American Communists is also borne by 
the Soviets who, obviously, desire that the Communist Parties in 
Latin America be strengthened for the long haul. 

The cost of the Soviets' overall training program for Communists 
in the free world has been estimated at, conservatively, $500,000 per 
year. This is in addition to the approximately $500,000 mentioned 
already as having been spent for travel expenses alone in 1958. 

Indications are that the Chinese Communists may complement 
Soviet subsidies. The Chinese Communist Party bears all expenses 
for the training of Latin American Communists in China, and has 
given the impression of having ample funds for the "fraternal" sup- 
port of foreign Communist Parties. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. General, is the U.S.S.R. or any of its satellites pro- 
viding military aid to the Communist or pro-Communist forces in 
Latin America ? 

General Cabell. Not to our current knowledge. 

The Chairman. It is said that roughly 750 North Korean and 
Communist Chinese fought with the Castro forces. These people 
were not seen in the cities of Cuba, but were kept in the interior of 

Do you hare any knowledge of that ? 

General Cabkll. No, sir; we do not, and we would seriously doubt 
the authenticity of any such figure. We have no evidence of any 
participation in the revolution. Nor do we have any knowledge of 
Chinese Communist No. 1 participation. 

The Chairman. All right. 

What do you have information about? About what Communists 
fought in Castro's forces? 

(rftneral Cabbll. In Cuba? 

The Chairman. Yes, sir. 

General Cabbix. That question is related to the question. Is Cuban 
Prime Minister Fidel Castro a Communist ? 

Let me derelop that thought for you, sir. Our information shows 
that the Cuban Communists do not consider him a Communist Party 
member, or even a pro-Communist. 

On the other hand, they are delighted with the nature of his gov- 
ernment, which has allowed the Communists opportunity, free oppor- 
tunity, to organize, to propagandize, and to infiltrate. 

We know that the Communists consider Castro as a representative 
of the bourgeoisie, and were unable to gain public recognition or com- 
mitments from him during the course of the revolution. 


We know that the Communists were concerned when, at the time 
of his trip to the United States, he showed evidence of a friendly 
attitude toward the United States. 

We know also that it has been the assigned task of the Cuban Com- 
munist Party to prevent Castro's revolution from going to tlie right, 
that is, from establishing friendly relations with the United States, 
or ending its tolerance of Communist activities. 

Our conclusion, therefore, is that Fidel Castro is not a Communist ; 
however, he certainly is not anti-Communist. His extreme policies, 
including confiscation of private property, lead him to take positions 
and make statements such as his violent anti-U.S. outbursts which are 
extremely useful to international communism and are being exploited 
by the Communists to the maximum extent. 

He has delegated authority in key areas to persons known to be pro- 
Communists or who are susceptible to exploitation by Communists. 

In turn, he appears to be increasingly susceptible to Communist 
propaganda, which is designed to exploit "evidence" that the United 
States is an enemy, to discredit charges of Communist influence in 
Cuba and witch hunting — or as they call it, maccartismo — and to 
glorify the Cuban revolution, and particularly the agrarian reform, 
as a pattern for the "liberation" of the masses in other Latin American 

It is questionable whether the Communists desire to recruit Castro 
into the Communist Party, that they could do so if they wished, or 
that he would be susceptible to Communist discipline if he joined. 
As I say, that is subject to question. 

The Communist viewpoint is that he represents leadership of a 
nationalistic, bourgeoise-democratic revolution which precedes a Com- 
munist rise to power. 

The Cormnunist interest is to help further the nationalistic aspects 
of his regime and to preserve a climate of tolerance which will allow 
the Communists to organize and build the foundation for their future 

At present, therefore, their primary interest is to influence Castro 
in favor of an aggressive, "anti-imperialist" nationalism supported by 
non-Communists, but which will defend the rights of Communists 
to express their views openly and engage in legal activity. 

In their attempt to influence Castro, the Communists are known to 
be utilizing five principal channels. 

First, they are seeking to influence him through his close associates 
■who are generally known to be pro-Communist. 

Fidel's brother, Raul, and his close adviser, Ernesto (Che) Guevara, 
are both strong friends of the Communist Party. 

Second, the Communists have sought to guide the program and the 
policies of the Government and of the 26th of July movement. 

They have been able to exert considerable influence through pro- 
Communists or sympathizers who have been appointed to key posts 
and who have virtual autonomy in their fields. 

Such persons have been appointed by Fidel on the basis of friend- 
ships, trust, and loyalty established during the revolution, and he is 
committed to defend their policies. 

Third, the Communists and their sympathizers are seeking to im- 
plant elementary Marxist concepts within the political indoctrination 


courses established by the 26th of July movement, thereby establishing 
the foundation for a pro-Connnunist-Marxist political philosophy to 
eventually replace the highly personalistic philosophy represented by 

Fourth, through their overt propaganda organs, radio and television 
commentary, and selective or false news reporting, the Communists 
hope to shield Fidel, and the Cuban public, from news favorable to 
U.S. policies, and to exploit news unfavoral3le to the United States. 

Fifth, through organizational activity among the peasants, wdthin 
the army, and within labor, they hope to gain control of the public 
demonstrations, mass meetings, and strikes which Fidel is wont to 
call in evidence of the solidarity of the Cuban people with him and 
his policies. 

Although it is evident that the Communists have been able to exploit 
Castro in his movement for their own benefit through these channels, 
as yet they do not appear to control him or his government. In terms 
of mass following, they still represent a minority, though a very well 
organized one. 

In certain areas, as in organized labor, there are experienced non- 
Communist leaders who form an obstacle to rapid Communist 

There are student and professional groups which are also non- 
Communist although firmly supporting Fidel, and within the 26th 
of July movement there is considerable evidence of opposition to 

As evidenced in the recent demonstrations, however, these groups 
are prepared to rally to the defense of the regime. 

Senator Johnston. Is it not true that he is more dangerous than 
if he would come out and let them know that he was a Communist ? 

General Cabell. I personally would agree that Castro would prob- 
ably lose much, or even most, of his popular support should this occur. 
However, w^e believe that Castro is not a member of the Communist 
Party, and does not consider himself to be a Commmiist. 

Senator Johnston. He knows himself that, if he would come out 
openly for the Communists he would lose his usefulness. 

General Cabell. That is right. Insofar as he loses public support, 
he loses the capability to achieve his goals — though he could still be 
portrayed as victim of counterrevolutionary machinations. 

The Chairman. To say the least, the Communist movement has 
made very great progress in Cuba since Castro took over the Cuban 
Government ; has it not ? 

General Cabell. That is correct; yes, sir. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. General, what type of aid is the U.S.S.R. provid- 
ing to revolutionary elements, such as those in the Caribbean ? 

General Cabell. Primarily advice — primarily they are furnishing 
advice and moral support, propaganda materials and services. 

Soviet support to revolutionary elements is channeled through the 
Communist Parties, through the Communist fronts, and through key 
Communists within other organizations. 

The sending of military shipments to Latin American revolutionary 
elements or sending Soviet military advisers is not yet evident. 

Mr. SouRw^NE. To what extent are the Communists responsible for 
the revolutionary expeditions which have appeared in the Caribbean 
area in the past few years? 


General Cabell. The Communists have participated actively in 
such expeditions, but we do not believe that they have organized them 
nor dominated them. 

Communist participation in such expeditions is demanded by their 
^'national liberation" strategy and tactics. Such participation is also 
fully in keeping with specific items and encouragement given them by 
both the Soviet and Chinese Communists in early 1959. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Can you tell us, General, what is the extent of 
Chinese Communist penetration in Latin America ? 

General Cabell. I think this is essentially the question that you 
were driving at, Mr. Chairman. 

The Chairman. Yes, sir. 

General Cabell, Since 1952, the Chinese Communist penetration in 
Latin America has been increasing. 

In that year the Chinese Communists invited delegates from the 
Pacific coast countries to attend a Peace Congress of Asian and Pacific 
peoples in Peiping. 

In 1956 the Chinese Communist penetration effort was intensified 
through the establishment of direct relations with Latin American 
Commimist Party representatives and the founding of a training 
school in Peiping for Latin American Communists. 

Chinese Communist revolutionary instruction is well received by 
Latin American Communist students who find it practical and well 
suited to the conditions in wliich they operate in Latin America. 
They especially appreciate the fact that the Chinese Communists pay 
even their travel expenses. 

In February and March of 1959, Latin American Communist repre- 
sentatives received specific advice and guidance from Mao Tze-tung 
and other leading Chinese Communists concerning international Com- 
munist policy and effective methods of canying on clandestine 

Notably increased "cultural" exchanges and the formation of addi- 
tional "friendship" societies have contributed to further Chinese Com- 
munist penetration of Latin America. 

With the aid of local Communist Parties, the Chinese Communists 
have taken effective steps to establish throughout Latin America a 
network of correspondents for their official New China News Agency. 

Chinese Communist broadcasts to Latin America have been stepped 
up to 14 program hours per week. Trade with Latin America is 
also expanding. 

Senator Hruska. General, what would you know or what would you 
care to tell us about any interaction between the so-called China 
Friendship Societies in Latin America and those here in America, 
in the United States? Is there any interaction? 

General Cabell. I do not think that we have been able to detect 

We have no evidence. The way they do that — they have that inter- 
action, and certainly it occurs — is that the people from here will go 
to a meeting in Moscow or Peiping, and the people from there will 
go to the meeting in Moscow or Peiping, and then subsequently get 
together and get their orders and philosophy and all at that point, 
so that the exchange or the indoctrination does not actually take place 
on U.S. soil. But we know that they attend these joint meetings of 
those various front organizations. 


Mr. SouRWiNE. General, are tlie Chinese fjroiips resident in Latin 
America significant with respect to Communist penetration ? 

General Cabell. There are numerous Chinese colonies in Latin 
America, mostly located in the principal cities. Many of thase Chi- 
nese are second generation or more. 

In Peru, where the largest Chinese population exists, the total, in- 
cluding second generation, is about 50,000. Of these, some 14,000 
are Chinese nationals, that is, immigrants retaining Nationalist Chi- 
nese documentation, and 11,000 are located in Lima, the capital. 

Li Cuba, the total Chinese population is about 40,000, of which 
some 20,000 are in Havana. 

Li Guayaquil, Ecuador, there are over 5,000; in Sao Paulo, Brazil, 
there are over 1,000. 

Mr. SoTJRwiNE. General, may I interrupt at that point, you say of 
the 50,000 Chinese in Peru approximately 14,000 are Chinese Nationals 
and 11,000 are located in Lima. You do not mean 11,000 out of the 
14,000, but 11,000 out of the 50,000 ? 

General Cabell. 11,000 out of the 50,000 is correct. 
Mr. SouRwiNE. Please go ahead, sir. 

General Cabell. In general, these Chinese are non-Communist and 
relatively unimportant in terms of national politics. Many actively 
favor the Nationalists. 

There are, of course, some pro-Conmiunist elements, although very 
few are known to be members of the Communist Party, and the various 
parties have made no significant effort to expand their membership 
within the local Chinese communities up to now. 

However, in seeking to expand its commercial and propaganda re- 
lations, the Chinese Communist Government is seeking to use these 

One of the puq^oses of the recent trip by Chinese journalists to 
various Latin American countries was to establish contact with 
friendly members of the local Chinese communities. 

It is also known that Chinese have used false documentation, ob- 
tained through members of the resident Chinese communities, as a 
means of illegally obtaining documentation as nationals of a Latin 
American country. 

This procedure could very well be used, if required, by Chinese Com- 
munists to infiltrate Asians into Latin America. 

Eecently, there has been an increase in activity favoring Communist 
China within the Chinese colonies. This has been most noticeable in 
Peru and Cuba, but also is evident in countries with smaller Chinese 

In Lima, where the anti-Communist newspaper Man-Sliing-Po has 
a daily circulation of 10,000, the pro-Communist newspaper, the Voice 
of the Chinese Colony has a daily circulation of about 3,000. 

In Cuba, the New China Democratic Alliance, a Communist front, 
has announced the establishment of a Chinese language newspaper in 
Havana, which will be printed at the plant of Hoy, the Cuban Com- 
munist Party organ. 

Communist news sources stress the warm reception given to the 
visiting Chinese newspapermen in Cuba by tlie local Chinese, as well 
as by Eaul Castro and by the staff of Prensa Latina, another bit of 
evidence of Prensa Latina's inclinations. 


The New China News Agency office in Havana, working in close 
contact with the Prensa Latina, will serve to further Chinese Com- 
munist propaganda penetration in Latin America. 

There has been noticeable growth in the establishment of the 
Conununist Chinese-Latin American "friendship societies." A total 
of 18 now exist, of which 12 have been established quite recently. 

With some exceptions, principally in Chile, the societies have not 
drawn their members from the local Chinese communities. This is 
probably not through design, but is the result of the relative lack of 
importance of the Chinese, particularly those of pro-Communist 
tendencies, in local intellectual, academic, and cultural life. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. General, are there any significant pro-Communist 
sympathies among the various Eastern European minority groups 
living in Latin America, such as the Yugoslavs, Poles, the Czechs, and 
the Hungarians ? 

General Cabell. In all of these groups there are pro-Communist 
elements which are seeking to bring these ethnic groups under greater 

Through their special attributes of race, language, culture, family 
ties, business interests, these emigres form a special bridge for Com- 
munist-backed programs calling for the establishment of closer diplo- 
matic, commercial, and cultural ties with the bloc. 

Undoubtedly they facilitate the work of Soviet bloc representatives 
in Latin America. These groups have been targets of repatriation 
programs which have declined from their peak of activity. 

However, their Communist activities and influence are, in general, 
peripheral and subservient to the national Communist Party of the 
country concerned, and the national affiliates of the international 
Communist fronts. 

There are some 1,500 Slav Communists resident in Uruguay, many 
of whom belong to the front organization Slav Union, L^nion Eslava, 
which includes Eastern European emigres such as Poles, Czechs, Bul- 
garians, Hungarians, and Rmnanians, and such independent groups 
as Armenians and Lithuanians. 

It has the mission of grouping together the different Slav comanuni- 
ties under its political control. 

It works in the preparation of conferences, cultural, and other 
activities, in coordination with the Uruguayan-Soviet Cultural Insti- 
tute. It receives abundant propaganda material from the LTnion of 
Soviet Societies of Friendship and Cultural Relations with Foreigii 

In Argentina and Brazil there are also sig-nificant Slavic minority 
groups. As in Uruguay, the chief vehicles for Communist influence 
are the various cultural institutes or "friendship'' societies. 

In Argentina, for example, there are some 13 Soviet cultural centers. 
Such centers are used as distribution outlets for propaganda, as agen- 
cies for sponsoring travel to and from Communist countries, by "cul- 
tural" delegations, and for funding local pro-Comnimiist activities. 

The satellite countries and Yugoslavia also seek to influence the 
local emigre groups. In Chile, the Yugoslav group has been culti- 
vated by the Yugoslav Embassy. The Titoist brand of commmiism 
has met a sympathetic response from the Cliilean Socialists who form 
part, of the political alliance which includes the Communist Party. 


The Cliilean-Czechoslovakian Cultural Institute recently renewed 
its activities, which have included the issuance of propaganda favor- 
able to the establishment of diplomatic relations and expansion of 
commercial relations with Czechoslovakia, and also the coordination 
of propaganda work of the pro-Communist Cultural Institutes and 
Centers in Cliile. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. General, do these Eastern European groups repre- 
sent a signiificant anti-Communist influence? 

General Cabell. Excuse me just a moment. Senator, you had a 
question ? 

Senator Hruska. General, a little while ago I asked about the inter- 
action among the Chinese groups in Latin America and here in 
America. Would your answer be about the same if I had asked the 
same question as to the Slovac groups and the other groups that you 
have just discussed, in regard to tlieir interaction with American 
groups here ? 

General Cabell. I think so, but. Senator, please underetand that I 
am not — we, in our agency, are not very expert as to what happens 
in the United States by these groups. Any information that we 
would have pointing towards that in the United States we would 
furnish to the FBI, and they would develop that. I am not familiar 
with the extent of their development of that activity. 

If I may comment very briefly, the Canadian Slavs have been much 
more active in coordinating with the South American Slavs than the 
Americans have, to the best of our knowledge. 

Senator Hruska. But whatever the answer is in that regard, the 
fact would still remain that there is the avenue of contact and collab- 
oration furnished by visits from the societies and centers in Latin 
America to Moscow or to Prague 

General Cabell. That is correct. 

Senator Hruska, Or Warsaw ? 

General Cabell. That is correct. 

Senator Hruska. Which would be similarly visited by representa- 
tives and leaders of the American groups? 

General Cabell. That is where they would hold their skull sessions. 

Senator Hruska. I wanted to establish that connection. 

General Cabell. So as to avoid being detected in this country. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. General, do these Eastern European groups in Latin 
America represent a significant anti-Communist influence in terms 
of the national life or policies of those countries ? 

General Cabell. We would say no, in terms of the national life or 
policy of any country; they do not represent a significant anti-Com- 
munist group. 

Mv. SouRwiNE. To what extent are the various national Communist 
Parties aided by the receipt of propaganda literature from abroad ? 

General Cabell. The quantity and variety of Communist propa- 
ganda in circulation is literally enormous, and in Latin America 
there are some 250 or more Communist publications, including Com- 
munist Party theoretical journals, newspapers and youth organs, and 
including also the publications of labor, youth, student, women, and 
various professional or cultural fronts. 

Increasing emphasis has been placed on developing publications 
appealing to the intellectuals and the business community in which 


tile Commimist inspiration is concealed, or is of a more subtle and 
more disarming nature, and wliich tend to offer nationalistic solutions 
to national problems. 

These publications are exchanged within the Latin American area. 

In addition, propaganda is received from the Communist movement 
in other free world countries and the bloc, and from the International 
Communist headquarters. 

Soviet bloc and Chinese Communist radio propaganda beamed at 
Latin America now amomits to about 85 hours weekly in Spanish and 
Portuguese, and 21 hours in Polish and other languages. 

In recent years, the number of its outlets handling Communist 
propaganda has increased, and the Soviet Union has moved into the 
publishing field in Latin America. 

For example, Editorial Grijalbo, a Communist publishing house 
in Mexico City, published two basic Marxist tests in recent years, 
along with other lesser works. 

These are "Historical Materialism" by Konstantinov, and the 
"Manual of Political Economy," both translated into Spanish in 

The influence of these books can already be seen. 

It may be noted also that "Problems of Peace and Socialism," that is 
the World ISIarxist Review, the most important international Com- 
munist theoretical journal, has been published in Spanish locally 
at two points in Latin America, Bogota and Buenos Aires, and in 
Portuguese in Brazil, in an effort to effect, to insure its dissemination. 

Senator Hruska. General, you have mentioned the publishing house 
in Mexico City. I do not know that you would care to comment on 
it, but repeatedly we hear from various sources that there is a big 
plant, a big printing plant, printing establishment right outside of 
Mexico City where the Russians have approximately 800 persons em- 
ployed and they are turning out Communist propaganda for ship- 
ment into Latin American countries. 

Would you care to comment on that ? 

General Cabell. I am unable to identify this plant from your de- 
scription. Most of the Soviet propaganda, including much that is 
published in Spanish, is imported to Mexico where it is redistributed 
through a number of outlets. The translation and publication and 
distribution effort in Mexico involves a number of firms. We do not 
have information on the present number of employees of the various 
publishers and bookstores, but we believe that none employs anywhere 
near 800 persons. In addition to Editorial Grijalbo, there is also 
the Talleres Graficos de Libreria Madero S. A. which prints the fort- 
nightly Information Bulletin of the Soviet Embassy and the Em- 
bassy's newssheet, which appears 5 days a week. These publications 
are prepared in the press office of the Soviet Embassy. Another pub- 
lisher is the Fondo de Cultura Popular, A. C. (Editorial Popular), 
which is the publishing house and bookstore of the Communist Party 
of Mexico. The Libreria Nacional is a bookstore reportedly owned 
by the Mexican Workers' and Peasants Party, a Communist splinter 
group which is in contact with the CP of the Soviet Union. The In- 
stitute of Mexican-Russian Cultural Exchange also runs a bookstore. 
The regidar publication of the Institute, entitled Intercambio Cul- 
tural, is printed by the Imprenta Cosmos. The Popular Party of Lorn- 


barclo Toledano and Workers' University, also run bookstores. The 
Libreria Navarro, the Editorial Atlante and a number of other book- 
stores sell Soviet publications or Communist, pro-Communist or leftist 
publications originating in Latin America. There are also publishers 
who specialize in material of a strongly Marxist or nationalist nature 
which is of value to the Communist "national liberation" strategy. 

The Latin American Confederation of Labor (CTAL) publishes 
and distributes its own organ as well as the Spanish language editions 
of the World Trade Union News and the bulletins of various trade 
union internationals. It also publishes posters, resolutions, essays, 
and other propaganda or training materials. The regiilar Spanish 
language edition of the World Federation of Trade Unions' publica- 
tion, edited by the CTAL, is printed by a finn named Impresiones 

Mr. SouRwiNE. To Avhat extent, sir, have the Communist gains in 
Latin America given concern to the governments of the Latin Ameri- 
can nations, and what can you tell us about the counter measures these 
governments have taken ? 

General Cabell. Although apathy concerning the threat of com- 
munism continues to prevail in some Latin American countries, there 
is evidence that other Latin American governments are becoming more 
concerned about the Communist threat, and are also more aware of the 
nature of the clandestine tactics employed by the Communists. 

Some governments are increasing the efficiency of their anti-Commu- 
nist investigative work. 

This is required if the illegal aspects of Communist Party opera- 
tions, which are essential to Communist manipulation of non-Com- 
munist leftists and nationalists, are to be rendered ineffective. 

The arbitraiy suppression of political opposition groups as being 
Communist or Conununist-front groups has been somewhat discred- 
ited, and this is essential if the international Communist movement 
with its Soviet direction is to be accurately identified. 

Despite Communist claims, such arbitrary actions have never served 
our best interests. 

Concrete examples of recent governmental action, prompted by 
increased awareness of the Communist threat, are seen in Argentina 
and Mexico. 

In Argentina, President Frondizi, tlirough executive decrees, has 
banned certain Communist activities as part of a subversive plan 
involving collaboration with agents of a foreign power, and jeop- 
ardizing national sovereignty. 

It will be recalled that in early 1959 Argentina and Mexico both 
declared several bloc diplomats persona non grata for interfering 
in internal aff'airs in connection with labor agitation. 

In Venezuela, President Betancourt, an anti-Communist wlio is 
aware of the opportunism, as well as the ultimate objectives of the 
Communist program, has seen to it that the Communist Party is not 
represented in the coalition government. 

Mr. Chairman, that ends my prepared material, and I will be 
happy to answer what questions your committee would like to put 
to me. 

The Chatrmax. Do the Communist Parties in Latin America make 
it a practice to give financial aid to political stooges so that non- 
Commmiist candidates receive Coimnunist support? 


General Cabell. Yes; in the following sense. In a number of 
countries we have seen that the Communist Party is prepared actively 
to campaign in favor of strongly nationalistic or opportunistic poli- 
ticians, with or without open acknowledgment of this support, on the 
understanding, or assumption, that Communists may win minor posts 
or be given appointive posts. In some cases, where the Communist 
Parties are legal, they have been able to form alliances with other 
parties to support a joint slate, in which some Communist or pro- 
Commmiist candidates are represented. 

It is possible, in some cases, that the Communist Party might reward 
a politician directly (rather than giving him campaign support only) 
in return for certain guarantees. In general, however, we believe 
that such payoffs would not be handled through the Communist 
Party, but rather through clandestine non- Communist channels of 
which only a few high Communist Party leaders are aware. It would 
be poor policy to permit party members to Iviiow that funds are avail- 
able and are being diverted to non-Communist politicians. Thus a 
variety of covers might be used to explain the financing. For ex- 
ample, a politician might be given an opportmiity to participate in 
an import business, in partnership with a local agent who does 
business with the Communist bloc. Or a politician, if he has written 
nationalist books or articles, might be paid for the translation of 
these articles for republication in some otlier countiy — not neces- 
sarily in the Soviet bloc, but where it will serve to further the "anti- 
imperialist" campaign. Again, a politician might be influenced by 
an expenses-paid trip to the bloc and payments for subsequent lec- 
tures or articles praising conditions there. In all these cases, it is 
probable that the politician would have to commit himself to some 
action sympathetic or helpful to the bloc Avliich is used to justify the 
political support of the local Communist Party. 

The Chairmax. Do you have infonnation about a reported Com- 
munist program to oust U.S. interests from the copper mines in Chile ? 

General Cabell. It is the great hope of the Communist Party of 
Chile that such action will be taken. It is an integral part of every 
Communist program in Latin America to oust U.S. interests from 
every mine and every petroleum company in Latin America. 

The Chair^iax. That is time of the tin mines in Bolivia ? 

General Cabell. It goes for anythmg the United States possesses. 

The Chairmax. Yes, sir. 

Can you give the names of any known Russian agents operating in 

General Cabell. "We do not have the names currently of any 
Russian agents, Soviet agents, operating in Cuba, to my knowledge. 
Do you have in mind Vadim Kotchergin of last May ? We have evi- 
dence of the visits of Soviet agents in Cuba, but the fact that they 
are now in residence we do not have that. 

The Chairmax. But they do visit the country ? 

General Cabell. Yes. 

The Chairmax. Is that also true of Red Chinese ? 

General Cabell. We have the record of Red Chinese visiting. Now, 
whether you would label them as intelligence agents or not is another 


The Chairman. Do you have evidence of agents of either country 
operating in other parts of Latin America? 

General Cabell. I would give the same answer with respect to the 

Now, with respect to whether or not any of them remain in those 

Senator Johnston. It is not a question of whether they came over 
here to spread their propaganda or not; we liave them coming into 
the United States, too, even Khrushcliev came. 

General Cabell. Without specifying cases, we have known of So- 
viet intelligence activities in Mexico, in Buenos Aires, and Uruguay. 

Tlie Chairman. Do you have any evidence of the activities of 
agents from Russia ? 

General Cabell. Well, I was referring to So^det espionage carried 
out through the installations, because the general pattern is, if you 
have a Soviet Embassy, somebody in there is charged with espionage 
and clandestinely he gets into operation. Without specifying cases, 
we have known concretely of Soviet espionage in the countries I have 

The Chairman. Do you have any knowledge of a report that the 
central committee of the Spanish Communist Party has been trans- 
ferred from Mexico City to Havana * 

General Cabell. No. The members of the central committee of the 
Spanish Communist Party are scattered, with the majority — or at 
least the most important members — resident within the Soviet bloc. 
The last meeting of the central committee was held within the Soviet 
bloc. Certain central committee membei*s have lived in Mexico, but 
we know of none resident in Cuba. 

The Chairman. To what extent can the recent riots in the Canal 
Zone be attributed to Communist influence ? 

General Cabell. Mr. Chairman, there is do doubt but what the 
Communists in Panama have been agitating over the years to get the 
Americans out of the Canal Zone or in any other way to interfere 
with our continued operation of the Canal and enjoyment of all of 
our rights down there. 

Certainly, therefore, that agitation played a role in the riots of the 
last few days in Panama. 

We do not know as of this stage, that these particular riots at these 
particular times and places were directed by or organized by or con- 
trolled by any known Communists. 

The Chairman. Do you have knowledge 

Senator Hruska. Would the Chairman yield, and may I follow up 
on that particular topic ? 

The Chairman. Yes. 

Senator HfeusKA. A little bit ago you suggested that one of the aims 
of tlie Communist Party was to affect — that is, to deprive America of 
anything that she owns or controls in any of the Latin American 
countries, mines, petroleum fields, and so on. 

General Cabell. And the Panama Canal. 

Senator Hruska. Would that extend to installations like the 
Panama Canal? 

General Cabell. It most certainly does. 

Senator Hruska. Or Guantanamo Bay in Cuba, and that sort of 


General Cabell. It most certainly does. 

Senator Hruska. So it is not only in the nature of investment fields 
but military holdings, as well ? 

General Cabell. Yes. 

Senator Hruska. Well now, what will be the effect there in Latin 
America if there is — and this is highly suppositious, if the United 
States abandons its traditional strong attitude toward the naval base 
in Cuba, for example, or makes additional concessions in the Panama 
Canal, what effect will that have on the attitude of Latin American 
countries toward America ? 

General Cabell. I am not very much an expert on this subject, but 
I would say that the question of abandonment per se is not as im- 
portant as the case that the United States would put up in its in- 
sistence upon retention of the base. 

If the United States said, "We no longer have a requirement for 
the base at Guantanamo and, therefore, we are abandoning that base," 
that is one set of circumstances. 

But if the United States said that "We have no alternative but to 
pick up here and leave because you are forcing us out," I think that 
latter circumstance would have a disadvantageous bearing upon the 
United States position in Latin America generally. 

Senator Hruska. Let us get to a little narrower field. There has 
been what amounts to virtual expropriation of American property 
in Cuba. If that is suffered to remain in that state, is that apt to 
have the impact on the otlier Latin American countries to embolden 
them to similar confiscation of American properties within their 
borders ? 

General Cabell. From the standpoint of commonsense and hu- 
man nature I would answer that in the affinnative, but not on the 
basis of any evidence that I have in the other country. 

Senator Johnston. General, are you familiar with the operation 
of the Panama Canal ? 

General Cabell. Yes, sir. 

Senator Johnston. We have a very delicate situation there in 
regard to Panamanian laborei'S that we employ there. It is hell if 
we do and hell if we don't with regard to their pay. 

If we go up on the pay and pay them more, then we will interfere 
with tlie economy of the Panamanians, and if we do not go up they 
criticize us for not paying them, so since I have to handle that situa- 
tion, that is the reason I am familiar with it, and we have had a 
great deal of trouble in that particular field, and it makes no differ- 
ence what you do, you are cussed; isn't that right? 

General Cabell. That is right. 

I was stationed in Panama for 3 years a number of years ago, and 
I know well that situation and I personally do not know the answer 
to it. 

Senator Johnston. No, I do not know either, but it is causing a 
great deal of trouble there, and it leaves an open field for a great 
deal of criticism by the Panamanians. It makes no difference what 
we do. 

General Cabell. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. Do you know about the book "Lessons in Read- 
ing and Writing" published by the Castro government which is being 
used in the schools in Cuba ? 


General Cabfxl. We have a copy of this book, which is designed f 
primarily for teachino; adults. It is being used, for example, in the 
education classes ^Yhich the army holds for illiterates. 

The book is extremely simple, but nevertheless is strongly na- 
tionalistic. In itself, it is neither pro-Communist nor anti-American. 
It glorifies the revolution and its principal leadei-s — Fidel Castro, 
Raul Castro, and "Che" Guevara. 

The Chairman. Do you have knowledge of a secret military or- 
ganization known as Amere, composed of ex-combatants of the Span- 
ish civil war, which is now functioning in Cuba? 

General Cabell. No; or not by this title. We are aware of the 
UCE (Union de Combatientes Espanoles — Union of Spanish Combat- 
ants), which is the military group associated with Gen. Alberto 
Bayo, who trained the nucleus of the Castro guerrilla force. There 
are other leftist groups also, such as the APLE (Agrupacion por la 
Libertad de Espana^Group for the Liberty of Spain) . Another is 
the FUDE (Frente Unido Democratico Espanol — United Spanish 
Democratic Front), which is closely related to the MLE (Movimiento 
por la Libertad de Espana — Movement for the Liberty of Spain) . All 
of these are active in Cuba. There is also a group known as the 
ARDE (Accion Republicana Democratica Espanola), with head- 
quarters in Paris, which may have* a branch or members in Cuba. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Mr. Chairman, so that the record may be clear 
about the Panamanian riots of which the chairman spoke, perhaps it 
might be desirable to put in the record in connection with that ques- 
tion the New York Times' story about what happened. 

The Chairman. It will be admitted. 

(The article referred to reads as follows :) 

[From the New York Times, Nov. 4, 1959] 

Anti-U.S. Mobs Riot in Panama, Stone Canal Police and Rip Flag — 36 Ake 

Reported Injured 

(By Paul P. Kennedy) 

Panama, November 3. — Repeated mob attempts to invade the Canal Zone 
were broken up this morning by Canal Zone police using clubs, tear gas, and 
high pressure hoses. 

Demonstrators hurled rocks and at least six policemen were treated for con- 
tusions. Two youths were arrested. Later, mobs in the city of Panama burned 
cars, tore down the Stars and Stripes in front of the U.S. Embassy and stoned 
U.S. agencies. 

After 4 hours of rioting, U.S. troops with bayonets and machine guns took 
over the guarding of the border. 

The Panamanian authorities said 30 Panamanians were in a hospital here as 
a result of today's violence, 9 of them with birdshot wounds inflicted by the U.S. 
forces and 1 with a bayonet wound. 

Violence also was reported in the Panamanian city of Colon, at the At- 
lantic end of the canal, where the U.S. consulate was attacked. 

The demonstrations were in commemoration of the 56th anniversary of Pana- 
ma's independence from Colombia. The clashes occurred in the course of at- 
tempts by Panamanians, who described themselves as National University stu- 
dents, to plant the Panamanian flag in the Canal Zone. 

The flag invasion was organized by former Foreign Minister Aquilino Boyd 
to symbolize Panamanian sovereignty over the zone. Dr. Boyd, a candidate for 
the presidency next year, has also called for Panama to get 50 percent of the 
Canal tolls. 

The first wave of students, bearing a large Panamanian flag, was turned back 
at 10 :21 this morning after marching about 50 feet into the zone. 



At the order of the Canal Zone's police chief, Maj. B. A. Darden, U.S. police- 
men in crash helmets and with mob sticks began pushing the crowds back into 
Panamanian territory. 

The crowd, mostly youths, sang the Panamanian anthem and then paraded 
along Tivoli Avenue, which is the border between the zone and the capital city. 
Five Panamanian National guardsmen accompanied the marchers, keeping them 
on the Panamanian side. 

More than two companies of U.S. troops with bayonets were stationed behind 
the canal police but did not engage in the action. 

Violence broke out shortly after 11 o'clock when a youth apparently of high 
school age edged too far over. Canal Zone policemen tried to push him back and 
a scuffle ensued. 

When policemen put the youth into a Canal Zone patrol car, Panamanians pelted 
the car and the police with rocks from a rubble heap. Shortly afterward, the 
canal police began using tear gas and water hoses. 

A Panamanian patrol car paused at the riot scene briefly but moved off. 

At one point the demonstrators crossed the avenue in the face of tear gas and 
pressure hoses and tied a flag to a traffic signal post. It was torn down by zone 
policemen. Another wave of Panamanians advanced to put it up again, but they 
were driven back. 

From the telegraph office near by, which remained open only to correspondents, 
fires could be seen in two directions. In one direction, automobiles belonging to 
U.S. citizens were being burned in a parking lot. In another, a passenger car of 
the U.S. -owned Panama Railroad was being burned in front of its station. 

A block away, the plate glass windows of Pan American Airways were being 
demolished. Farther off, windows of the U.S. Information Service were being 

Acts of vandalism, incendiarism, and violence were reported throughout the 
city, adding up to the worst anti-U.S. outbreak here in memory. 

Canal Zone authorities estimated the number of demonstrators and onlookers 
at the border at 2,000. 

The U.S. Embassy said it had presented a note of "strongest protest" to 
Panama against the desecration of the flag and damage to U.S. property. 

It warned that the attacks might have "serious consequences" and demanded 
protection by the National Guard. 

Maj. Gen. William E. Potter, Governor of the Canal Zone, said he had called 
for U.S. troops after damage had been done to zone property and at least one 
canal patrol car had been burned. He said he had asked the Embassy to pro- 
test against the failure of the Panamanian National Guard to act when the 
rioting began. 

The Governor charged that the Panamanian authorities "did not at any time 
attempt to control" the attackers. He said the authorities had shown a "strange 
lack of will." "Much earlier, the authorities could have prevented the attacks," 
he said. General Potter ordered that the zone radio broadcast a warning for all 
zone residents to remain in their neighborhoods and not approach the borders, 
where "agitators" were seeking to provoke incidents. 

The U.S. Ambassador, Julian F. Harrington, said angrily that at the time of 
the attack on the Embassy, he and his staff were In the National Palace "felici- 
tating Panama on its independence." 

He added that the flag that had been torn down "was being flown in honor 
of Panama's independence and, ironically enough, the window display in the 
ruined showcase of the Information Service was dedicated to Panamanian 

Mr. Harrington said he had received word that the U.S. consulate in Colon, 
Panama, had been attacked. He said he had asked Panama "for adequate 

The day's incidents began quietly before 8 a.m. when Dr. Boyd led a party into 
the zone. He was accompanied in what he termed "a peaceful invasion" by Dr. 
Ernesto Castillero, Jr., a professor of history at the National University and a 
leading nationalist. 

The group posed with Panamanian flags before the monument to George Wash- 
ington Goethals, builder of the canal. Then they left. 

Pablo Othon, president of the National assembly, who visited the scene of the 
fighting, said : "I look at this as a very bad thing and not helping anyone." 


Under a treaty signed with Panama after she was split off from Colombia in 
1903, the United States has a perpetual lease on the 10-mile-wide Canal Zune. 
The terms give the United States rights "as if" it held sovereignty, which has 
long been a subject of dispute here. 

Senator IIruska. General, ayb had testifying before us in open ses- 
sion some months ago Pedro Diaz Lanz, and he gave testimony re- 
specting indications that Communist military supplies were furnished 
to the Castro forces. 

Can you tell us anything about the extent to which such aid was 
provided through those sources ? 

General Cabell. I could not ofi'hand. I have not seen any informa- 
tion indicating such aid was given. 

I think our answer there would be that we doubt that any large 
amounts of arms were provided on any extensive scale or else we would 
have more evidence of it than we now have. If we had it, it would be 
in my testimony. 

Senator Hruska. There was also testimony with reference to sub- 
marines, Russian submarines, having been observed in Cuban waters, 
Caribbean waters and Cuban waters. Can you tell us anything about 
those ? 

General Cabell. "We have been unable to verify any such reports. 

Senator Hruska. And part of the testimony was to the effect that 
certain supplies and equipment were landed from the submarines. 
Have you had anything along that line ? 

General Cabell. We have not. 

Senator Hruska. This Pedro Diaz Lanz has testified before us 
here, and I notice he has been arrested down in Florida. Castro has 
been demanding his extradition. 

General Cabell. Yes. 

Senator Hruska. Have you any comment as to the effect of such 
extradition, if it is even considered, let alone granted, upon this whole 
situation, the Latin American operation of the Communist Party? 

General Cabell. Any comment I would make. Senator, would be 
very highly speculative. I think it would all depend upon the cir- 
cumstances of his extradition, the extent of the evidence against him 

The Chairman. Do you have any information that this man Diaz 
dropped a bomb or machinegunned anyone or did anything but drop 

General Cabell. Of course, the Cuban Government is trying at 
least to show that he machinegunned or dropped bombs. But there 
would be a judge or a commission that will hear that evidence. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. Isn't the tradition of political asylum pretty deeply 
ingrained in the policies of all the Latin American countries? 

General Cabell. Yes, political asylum; but criminal asylum is 
another matter. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. Well, do not the Latin American countries tradi- 
tionally grant political asylum even in the face of the inevitable 
charges of criminality which are always brought against such persons? 

The Chakman. Even as against Batista. 

General Cabell. It is pretty complicated in view" of the question of 
when political asylum includes asylum for a man who has assassinated 
people in the course of his political activity. 


Senator Hruska. And we are going to rim into that. In fact we 
have encountered that already, because there have been charges by 
various members of tlie Castro government, that certain people who 
are here in the United States were members of the Batista government 
and with great abandon did mow down people with horse pistols and 
with machineguns, and so on. And then the question arises at that 
point, does it not, whether political asylum can be granted or is the 
record outright criminal? Is it in that regard, Mr. Sourwine, that 
you ask about the well-ingrained political asylum principle? 

Mr. SouKwiNE. I ask about it, because it seems a little bit anomalous 
that, with this deeply ingrained tradition of political asylum in the 
Latin American countries, there should be so much concern about 
political asylum awarded to one Latin American in this country. 

Senator Hruska. General, Dr. Emilio Nunez Portuondo, formerly 
President of the Security Council of the United Nations, made a tour 
of Latin American countries not too long ago, and he came back pre- 
dicting that a substantial part, if not all, of Latin America will fall 
to the Communists within 6 or 7 months. Is the situation that im- 
mediate ? What comment would you have on that remark of his ? 

General Cabell. I think that is entirely too alarmist. 

On the other hand, the whole thrust of my presentation here to 
you today has been to the effect that it is a serious situation. But I 
would not attach any such timetable as he has. 

Senator Hruska. It impressed most of us as being very, very ex- 
treme, and I wondered what your testimony was. Certainly the tenor 
of your testimony this morning was that it was a much more long- 
range proposition than that. 

Senator Johnston. What is the population of Argentina ? 

General Cabell. Senator, I would be guessing. I would not like to 
put a guess in your record. 

Mr. Sourwine. General, does your agency have any knowledge 
about the present situation of Eafael Del Pino, who is an American 
citizen shot in Cuba or taken into custody ? 

General Cabell. Del Pino was in prison in Havana as of September 
1959. His trial has been delayed due to the injuries he suffered. Our 
most recent information is that it had been set for November 20, 1959. 

Senator Hruska. There was an organization in Cuba referred to as 
BRAC, Bureau Of Resistance To Communist Activities is a liberal 
translation of its official name. Is it still functioning ? 

General Cabell. It is not functioning. Senator. As a matter of fact, 
one of the first targets of the Castro forces, Castro and his entourage, 
was the complete destruction of BRAC. 

Senator PIruska. At least a removal of its records. We do not know 
if they were destroyed ; do we ? 

General Cabell. No, sir ; there was a very large element of destruc- 
tion involved in the records. 

Senator Hruska. And w^hen you said records you refer to 

General Cabell. Whatever information BRAC might have assem- 
bled on the activities of the Communist Party. 

Senator Hruska. And tliose records go back a long wav, as long as 
30 years? 

General Cabell. I doubt if the BRAC had records going back that 
far. BRAC was established only a few years ago— in 1954 or 1955 — 


although the Comnninist Party in Cuba was founded over 30 years 
ago and it is probable that they had some information on it eoins 
back that far. ^ 

Senator Hruska. BRAC had a predecessor of some kind; didn't 

General Cabell. Well, there was no office or agency for the investi- 
gation of Communist Party and international Comnninist conspira- 
torial activities. There were investigative agencies, such as the De- 
partment of Investigation, but these were not primarily interested in 

The Chairman. What caused Batista to fall? Just what hap- 
pened ? 

General Cabell. Well, :Mr. Chairman, he did not have a sound base 
for his regime. 

The Chairman. Was his army whipped in the field ? Was he de- 
posed by his generals ? 

General Cabell. The army disintegrated. Its morale just com- 
pletely disintegrated in the face of the growing nmiibers in the Castro 
movement. It became helpless. 

Senator Johnston. Did they continue to pay the soldiers ? 

General Cabell. Essentially; yes. * I do not think that it disbanded 
through lack of pay. That was not it. 

Their heart was not in it. They recognized the Batista regime as 
being corrupt, and they were generally impressed by the slogans that 
the revolutionaries were putting out, and so they did not have the will 
to fight or the leaders did not have the courage to attempt to fight, so 
there really was no fight. 

The Chairman. We received testimony from the President-elect 
of Cuba, who never took office, that representatives of the American 
Government in November or December, which was it 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Sir, I think it was November. 

The Chairman. Called on the generals and stated that our Govern- 
ment would not recognize the election of the new government in Cuba 
and that, thei'efore, the Army lost confidence, and that the Army 
caused Batista to leave the country and attempted to make a deal with 

General Cabell. Are you asking me the question, Mr. Chairman ? 

The Chairman. If you have any information about it. 

General Cabell. Mr. Chairman, there was no such approach made 
by members of CIA. I do not know whether or not any such ap- 
proach was made by any Government agencies, but my best belief is 
that it is incorrect. It did not happen. 

And, as a matter of fact, the lack of an army forced him to run, but 
not the army. 

The Chairman. Yes, sir. 

But what I got was just the sense of what he said, as I remember it. 
I think he said the army then caused Batista to leave. They at- 
tempted to make a deal with Castro, and each one of those generals 
was killed. 

General Cabell. As a matter of fact, Mr. Chairman, Batista put 
in arrest several of his principal army leaders before his flight. 

Senator Hruska. General, Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands are 
pretty much down in that neighborhood where there is a lot of ac- 


tivity. Has anything come to your attention as to any efforts along 
subversive lines there along tlie same approach you have described 
in other countries ? 

General Cabell. Senator, we are not knowledgeable or expert in 

Senator Hruska. If there were not any such activities they would 
have to start someplace and end there. I just wondered if there was 
anything that came to your attention in connection with the effort 
that you make. 

General Cabell. I do not know of any concerted or organized move- 
ment against the Virgin Islands or against Puerto Rico or against 
U.S. interests in those places, based outside the area. 

Senator Johnston. What was Batista's attitude toward the Com- 
munists ? 

General Cabell. Batista was opposed to the Communists, but with- 
out a great depth of feeling. 

As a matter of fact, it was in Batista's regime that BRAC was estab- 
lished for the purpose of combating the Communists. 

Senator Hruska. Might it be said that his opposition to them was 
that he conceived of them as a political enemy of his own ? 

General Cabell. That is right. He was not really interested in — 
he did not hoist aboard the idea of an international Communist 

Senator Johnston. Isn't that also true now of Castro ? A lot of 
those were leaders with him against Batista, and he is appointmg 
them in the Government. 

General Cabell. But I would say in the case of Batista there was 
just an unawareness of it. But in the case of many of the leaders 
around Castro they do not seem to care. 

The Chairman. They cooperate with them. 

General Cabell. Yes. 

Senator Hruska. In connection with Puerto Rico, particularly, we 
have heard evidence that there were mailings of Communist literature, 
emanating from presumably Mexico, made into Puerto Rico on a basis 
not as large as in some other countries, because it is a smaller area, but 
we do have evidence on that score. 

Senator Johnston. We do have evidence that it is coming into the 
United States, too. 

General Cabell. Yes. 

Senator Johnston. In New York, if you go up there, you see a room 
three times as big as this, covered with such mailings. 

The Chairman. Any further questions ? 

Gentlemen, we thank you. 

General Cabell. It is a pleasure, Mr. Chairman. 

(Whereupon, at 1 :05 p.m., the committee adjourned.) 


Note: The Senate Internal Security Subcommittee attaches no significance to 
the mere fact of the appearance of the name of an individual or an organization 
In this index. 



Adduci, Giacomo (Italian labor leader) 151 

Africa 143 

Agrarian reform 163 

Agrarian Reform Institute 144 

Alvarado, Cesar Alonso 153 

Anti-Batista struggle 154 

"Anti-imperialist struggle" 147, 149 

"Anti-U.S. Mobs Riot in Panama" (New York Times, November 1959) 

(by Paul P. Kennedy) 174-176 

APLE (Agrupacion por la Libertad de Espana— Group for the Liberty 

of Spain) 174 

ARDE (Accion Republicana Democratica Espanola) 174 

Argentina 143, 151, 157, 167, 170, 177 

Armenians 167 

Asia 143 

Batista 141, 176, 178, 179 

Bayo, Gen Alberto 174 

Betancourt, President 170 

Bhutan 159 

Bogota 169 

Bolivia 143, 147, 171 

Boyd, Aquilino (former Foreign Minister of Panama) 174 

Boye, Maurice 151 

BRAG (Bureau of Resistance to Communist Activities) 177-179 

Brazil 143, 151, 153, 156, 167, 169 

(Sao Paulo) 166 

Brazilian Institute for Advanced Studies 148 

British Honduras 153 

Buenos Aires 169, 172 

Budapest ___— 148 

Buenos Aires 151 

Cabell, Gen. C. P. (Deputy Director, VIA), statement of 141 

Canal Zone 172, 176 

Caribbean waters 176 

Castillero, Ernesto, Jr 175 

Castro, Fidel 141, 155, 161, 163, 164, 174, 179 

Castro forces 162, 174, 176 

Castro government 173 

Castro, Raul (Chief of Cuban Armed Forces) 149,155,163,166,174 

"Che" Guevara 174 

Chile 147, 151, 153, 157, 167, 168 

Santiago 151, 158 

Chilean-Czechoslovakian Cultural Institute 168 

Chilean Socialists 167 

Chilean Teachers Union (12th National Convention of) 151 



China/Chinese 143, 149, 152, 153, 159, IGl 

Red China 147, 150, 152, 156, 159, 171 

China Friendship Societies 165 

Chou Ea-lai 159 

CIA 178 

Colombia 143, 147, 153, 176 

Communist Party : 

Argentina 147 

Brazil 158 

China 143, 147, 148, 162, 165 

Cuba 145, 178 

Latin America 143, 148, 149 

Mexico 169 

Of Soviet Union 141, 143, 146-149, 165 

Communist Party membership in Latin America (table) 161 

"Congress for International Cooperation, General Disarmament and Na- 
tional Sovereignty" 157 

"Congress of the Peoples of Latin America" 157 

Costa Rica 148 

Cuba 143-145, 147, 151, 153, 154, 156, 158, 162, 166, 171, 173, 174, 177 

Cuban Government 144, 155, 176 

Havana 152, 166, 167, 172 

Cuban Sugar Stabilization Institute 145 

Cuban Revolution 149, 155 

Cuban waters . 176 

"Cultural" exchanges 165 

Cultural Institutes and Centers (pro-Communist in Chile) 168 

Czechoslovakia 152, 156 

(Czechs) 167 

Czechoslovakian News Agency 157 


Dange, S. A. (Indian Communist) 151 

Darden. Maj. B. A. (Canal Zone's police chief ) 175 

Delanoue, Paul 151 

Del Pino, Rafael 177 

Department of Investigation 178 

Despestre, Rene 158 

Dominican Republic 158, 161 


Eastland, Senator James O 141 

East-West struggle 142 

Ecuador 143, 147, 153 

(Guayaquil) 166 

Editorial Atlante 170 

Editorial Grijalbo (Communist publishing house) 169 

Europe 147, 152 

(Western) 147, 152 


FBI 148, 168 

First Latin American Congress of Women 158 

Florida 176 

Fondo de Cultura Popular, A.C. (Editorial Popular) 169 

Formosa 153 

"Friendship" societies 165, 167 

Frondizi, President 170 

FUDE (Frente Unido Democratico Espanol — United Spanish Democratic 

Front) 174 

Galarza, Jorge 153 

Germany (East) 147 

Girete, Otto Cesar Vargas 153 

Gomez, Orlando Funcia (Brazilian Communist youth leader) 153 



Guadalupe 153 

Guantanamo Bay 172, 173 

Guatemalan territory 153 

Guedes, Ruben 153 

Guevara, Ernesto (Che) 163 

Guiana 153 


Haitian National Liberation Movement 158 

Harrington, Julian F. (U.S. Ambassador) 175 

Hart, Dr. Armando (Minister of Education) 157 

Havana 152, 166, 167, 172 

"Historical Materialism" 169 

Honduras 158 

Hoy (Cuban Communist newspaper) 149, 157, 158, 166 

Hruska, Senator Roman L 141 

Hungarians 167 


Imprenta Cosmos 169 

Impresiones Modernas 170 

Information Bulletin (of Soviet Embassy) 169 

Institute of Mexican-Russian Cultural Exchange 169 

Intercambio Cultural 169 

International Communist movement 153 

International Organization of Journalists 156 

International Union of Students (lUS) 147-149, 153, 154 

Interparliamentary Union 144 

lUS 152 


Jaroslav Knobloch 156 

Johnston, Senator Olin D 141 


Khrushchev 159, 172 

Kommunist (Soviet Communist Party magazine) 141 

Konstantinov 169 

Korea, North 143, 162 

Kotchergin, Vadim 171 


La Cabana Fortress (Havana) 154 

Lanz, Pedro Diaz 176 

Latin American Confederation of Labor (CTAL) ( Conf ederacion de 

Trabajadores de America Latina) 150, 170 

Latin America Congress of Journalists 156 

Latin American Youth 153 

Latin American Youth & Student Congress 155 

Leduc, Renato 156 

"Lessons in Reading and Writing" (book), 173 

Libreria Nacional 169 

Libreria Navarro 170 

Lithuanians 167 

Liu Shao-chi 159 

Lombardo Toledano's Popular Party in Mexico 161 


Magil, Abe (CPUSA representative at 12th CP-Mexico Congress) 152 

Maudel, Benjamin 141 

Man-Shing-Po (anti-Communist newspaper) 166 

"Manual of Political Economy" 169 

Mao Tze-tung 159, 165 



Martinique 153 

Marxist/ism 145, 148 

Marxist-Leninist theory 146 

Massip, Antonio 154 

Mexican-Russian Cultural Exchange Institute 145 

Mexican Workers' and Peasants' Party 169 

Mexico 143, 151, 153, 156-158, 170, 172, 179 

Mexico City 169 

ML) (Movimiento por la Libertad de Espana — Movement for the Liberty 

of Spain) "_ 174 

Montevideo 151 

Moscow 146, 147, 149, 165, 168 


National assembly 175 

National Association of Semi-Public Employees (Asociacion Nacional de 

Empleados Semi-Fiscales) 151 

"National liberation" struggle 143, 146, 149-151, 158 

"National liberation" strategy and tactics 165, 170 

National Metal Workers Congress 151 

National University 175 

New China Democratic Alliance 166 

New China News Agency 157, 165, 167 

New York 179 

Nicaragua * 153, 158 

1958 May Day celebration 151 

Othon, Pablo 175 

Panama 147, 157, 172, 174 

(Canal) 172, 173 

(Colon) 175 

Pan American Airways 175 

Paredes, Efrain Alvarez 153 

Paris 174 

Peace Congress of Asian and Pacific peoples 165 

"Peaceful invasion" 175 

"Peace prize" 146 

Peiping 147, 149, 153, 159, 165 

"People's Congress" 149, 155, 157 

Peru 153, 157, 166 

Poland 147, 152 

Poles 167 

Ponomarev, Boris N 141 

Popular Party in Mexico 161 

Popular Party of Lombardo Toledano and Workers' University 170 

Popular Socialist Party 155 

Portuguese 169 

Portuondo, Dr. Emilio Nunez 177 

Potter, Maj. Gen. William E. (Governor of Canal Zone) 175 

Prague 152. 168 

Presna Latina Agency 156, 157, 166 

Prestes, Luis Carlos 158 

Problems of Peace and Socialism (World Marxist Review) 148, 169 

Puerto Rico 178, 179 


Quemoy 153 




Rio de Janeiro 144, 151 

Rumanians 167 

Russia 144, 152, 172 

Russian submarines 176 


Scarponi, Paolo 151 

Schroeder, Frank W 141 

Seventh World Youth Festival 153 

Sikkim 159 

Sixth Youth Festival 154 

Slav/s : 

(Communist 167 

(Union) 167 

(Canadian)—. ____- ___________„___ 168 

(South American) . 168 

Spanish 169 

Sourwine, J. G 141 

Soviet Embassy 169, 172 

Soviet Federation for Friendship and Cultural Cooperation 158 

Soviet/s 145 

Soviet/s foreign policy 145 

Soviet Union 143, 144, 146-148, 150, 154, 159-161, 169 

Stalin 159 

Stockholm 157 


Talleres Graficos de Libreria Madero S. A 169 

Tass 157 

Toledano, Lombardo 161 

Trade Unions International of Public & Allied Workers 151 

Trade Unions International of Textile & Clothing Workers 151 

Trade Unions Internationals 151 

Twelfth CP-Mexico Congress 152 

21st Communist Party of the Soviet Union Congress 149 


UCB (Union de Combatientes Espanoles — Union of Spanish Ck)mbatants)_ 174 

Union Eslava 167 

Union of Latin American Friendship (Union de Amistad Latino Ameri- 
cana) 158 

Union of Soviet Societies of Friendship and Cultural Relations 167 

United Nations, Security Council of 177 

Uruguay 143, 157, 167, 172 

Uruguayan Communist Youth 155 

Uruguayan-Soviet Cultural Institute 167 

U.S. Embassy 175 

U.S. Information Service 175 

U.S.S.R 162, 164 


Venezuela 143, 147, 153, 156, 170 

Venezuelan National Press Congress 156 

Vienna 153 

Vietnam (North) 143 

Virgin Islands 178, 179 

Voice of the Chinese Colony 166 




Warsaw jgg 

Western Hemisphere ikq 

wFTu :-:::::::::::::::::::::: li 

Women's International Democratic Federation 148 149 158 

Workers' University (Mexico City) "I '___ ' 148 

World Federation of Democratic Youth ^"149" 153 154 

World Federation of Teachers' Unions _V_V_ I. ' 151 

World Federation of Trade Unions 146, 148^150 ~152 170 

(4th Congress of) '_ '___ ' 15^^ 

(Metal & Engineering Workers of) ~~~~ ~ ~ 151 

World Student News (monthly organ of International UnronoYstudents)" 153 
World Trade Union News 17q 


Yugoslav/s/ia _ jg^ 

Yugoslav Embassy I™~1~1IZ1I1~1~_I1 167 



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