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COMMUNIST THREAT TO THE UNITED STATES
THROUGH THE CARIBBEAN
HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE
ADMINISTEATION OF THE INTEENAL SECURITY
ACT AND OTHEE INTERNAL SECUEITY LAWS
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY
UMTEeT STATES SENATE
EIGHTY-SIXTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
PART III
TESTIMONY OF GEN. C. P. CABELL, DEPUTY DIRECTOR,
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
NOVEMBER 5, 1959
Printed for the use of the Committee on the Judiciary
UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
*3354 WASHINGTON : 1960
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY
JAMES 0. EASTLAND, Mississippi, Chairman
ESTES KEFAUVER, Tennessee ALEXANDER WILEY, Wisconsin
OLIN D. JOHNSTON, South Carolina EVERETT McKINLEY DIRKSEN, Dllnols
THOMAS C. HENNINGS, Jr., Missouri ROMAN L. HRUSKA, Nebraska
JOHN L. McCLELLAN, Arkansas KENNETH B. KEATING, New York
JOSEPH C. O'MAHONEY, Wyoming '
SAM J. ERVIN, Jr., Nortli Carolina
JOHN A. CARROLL, Colorado
THOMAS J. DODD, Connecticut
PHILIP A. HART, Michigan
Subcommittee To Investigate the Administration of the Internal Secueity
Act and Other Internal Security Laws
JAMES O. EASTLAND, Mississippi, Chairman
THOMAS J. DODD, Connecticut, Vice Chairman
OLIN D. JOHNSTON, South Carolina ROMAN L. HRUSKA, Nebraska
JOHN L. McCLELLAN, Arkansas EVERETT McKINLEY DIRKSEN, Ellnols
SAM J. ERVIN, Jr., North Carolina KENNETH B. KEATING, New York
J. G. SoURwrNE, Chief Counsel
Benjamin Mandel, Director of Research
II
RESOLUTION
Resolved^ hy the Internal Security Subcommittee of the Senate Com-
mittee on the Judiciary^ That the testimony of Gen. C. P. Cabell given
in executive session on November 5, 1959, with the consent of the
witness, be printed and made public.
James O. Eastland.
Thomas J. Dodd.
John L. McClellan.
Olin D. Johnston.
Everett M. Dirksen.
Roman Hruska.
Sam J. Ervin, Jr.
K. B. Keating.
December 14, 1959.
m
COMMUNIST THREAT TO THE UNITED STATES
THROUGH THE CARIBBEAN
THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 5, 1959
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee To Investigate the Administration
OF THE Inti:rnal Security Act and Other
Internal Security Laws, of the Committee on the Judiciary,
Wa-'ihington, D.C.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:30 a.m., in room
2300, New Senate Office Building, Senator James O. Eastland (chair-
man) presiding.
Present: Senators Eastland, Olin D. Johnston, and Roman L.
Hniska.
Also present: J, G. Sourwine, chief counsel; Benjamin Mandel, tli-
rector of research ; and Frank W. Schroeder, chief investigator.
The Chairman. You may proceed, sir.
STATEMENT OF GEN. C. P. CABELL, DEPUTY DIEECTOR, CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
General Cabell. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate very much this oj)-
portimity to appear before your committee.
My subject today is, of course, communism in Latin America.
Boris N, Ponomarev, a key member of the central committee of the
Communist Party of the Soviet Union, wrote the following regarding
Latin America in the October 1958, issue of Kommunist, the most
important official Communist Party, Soviet Union, theoretical maga-
zine, and I quote :
Latin America is a seething volcano. As in one country, so in another * * *.
The Chairman. Have you got another copy of this? I do not have
that one. I would like to follow you.
General Cabell. I have made a few clianges. Senator, but I do not
have another copy. This is the only copy that I have. [Reading:]
Latin America is a seething volcano. As in one country, so in another, out-
bursts are taking place which are sweeping away reactionary regimes and loosen-
ing the nooses which U.S. monopolies have thrown on their economy. The Com-
munist Parties of Latin America ever more closely coordinate their activities in
the struggle against the common enemy — U.S. imperialism. The revolutionary
movement is of a universal nature. Its main support is the socialist camp.
Collaboration with and infiltration of popular movements, for ex-
ample that of the Batista in the thirties, and of Castro in the fifties —
has been communism's most effective weapon in Latin America.
The Communists base their present strategy on what they call the
national liberation struggle.
141
142 COMMUNIST THREAT THROUGH THE CARIBBEAN
The Chairman. When he said its main support is the Socialist
camp, he meant the Communist camp?
General Cabell. That is their innocuous term or polite term for the
Communist camp, Senator.
The Chairman. Yes.
General Cabell. The so-called national liberation strategy seeks to
offset Communist numerical and political weakness through inter-
national organizational support and clandestine techniques of infil-
tration and coordination.
The immediate objective of the strategy is to provoke political or
revolutionary action by sympathetic non-Communists, but politically
influential elements, for the purpose of establishing an environment
within which the Communist Party is free to organize and expand.
The Communists hope for the establishment of governments which
are, at least, neutral in the East- West struggle, if not actively pro-
Soviet, and which will guarantee them political opportunity equal to
that enjoyed by genuine political parties.
It is within such a framework that the Communists then hope to
achieve the so-called peaceful transition to socialism, which will find
a temporary alliance with the national bourgeoisie within a govern-
ment of national unity gradually replaced by a Communist-controlled
"people's democracy."
The program of communism in Latin America is designed to de-
velop unity of action around popular issues such as antipathy to dic-
tatorsliips, inflation, a desire for greater industrialization, nationali-
zation of resources, and wider and more stable markets.
It particularly strives to develop international and national labor
unity in support of Communist objectives.
The program seeks to promote neutralism through exploiting the
fear of wars, nuclear dangers, unpopular treaty obligations, and ter-
ritorial sovereignty issues.
It encourages opposition to U.S. participation in regional programs
affecting Latin America.
Tlie program also involves expansion of the Communist propa-
ganda apparatus to include a network of news correspondents who
will develop support for the "national liberation" strategy, while
discrediting free world news agencies as agencies of imperialist
propaganda.
The techniques of Communist action are both overt and clandestine,
legal and illegal, national and international.
The techniques are carried out by the national Communist Parties
and tlieir fronts, with support from the "fraternal" Communist
Parties abroad, and the international Communist fronts. All of these
operate tlirough known Communist Party members and secret party
members in nominall}^ non-Communist organizations.
The actions of these national Communist Parties are supported or
paralleled by actions taken by the Soviet and satellite diplomatic and
commercial missions and their agents.
The Communist Party enjoys legal status or de facto legality in
nine Latin American countries. However, it is able to operate with
relatively little opposition in a number of other countries, and it is
organized and active on a clandestine basis in virtually all countries.
COMMUNIST THREAT THROUGH THE CARIBBEAN 143
Where it operates legally or semilegally, as in Argentina, Brazil,
Chile, Cuba, Venezuela, Colombia, Uruguay, Mexico, and Ecuador,
it strives to expand its membership and its propaganda organs.
It uses such countries as operational bases for the support of activ-
ities in countries where the party is proscribed. Thus, activities in
Paraguay are supported from Argentina and Uruguay. Activities in
Central America and the Caribbean from Cuba and Venezuela.
The clandestine organization of the Latin American Communist
Parties is being improved with the help of training by the Communist
Party of the Soviet Union, and of China.
Where necessary, international and national communication is by
encoded letters sent through accommodation addresses or by couriers,
who may travel under fales names and with false documentation.
Communist literature may be imported under false inventories;
financing is accomplished through a gi'eat variety of channels which
conceal the extent and origin of funds.
]\Iass recruiting, as attempted several years ago, has in some cases
been deemphasized, while emphasis has been given to selective recruit-
ing of key individuals and secret members.
More effective use is being made of opportunities to engage in legal
activities, despite illegal status, such as the development of publica-
tions defending all points of view.
Many parties are developing secret directive bodies paralleling the
overt organizations.
The actions of the Soviet-bloc governments support the "national
liberation" strategy, thereby complementing the activities of the
national Communist Parties and fronts in Latin America.
These actions involve propaganda support, the expansion of official
representation, the broadening of cultural contacts, and development
of commercial relations.
Official bloc propaganda and news services applaud the role of
nationalists in revolutions, strikes, and demonstrations to show that
the masses are in revolt against "North American monopoly capitalism
and its allies."
They denounce cooperative actions to defend Latin America against
communism, or to strengthen national economies without Communist
participation or Soviet aid.
Bloc propaganda dissemination is being improved through expan-
sion of book stores, cultural and friendship societies, and other outlets.
China, for example, has recently established a press outlet in Latin
America, and has given more radio time to Latin American broadcasts.
In addition, Communist propaganda prepared in Western Europe,
Africa, and Asia, based upon and supported by Soviet-bloc efforts,
also supports the "national liberation" struggle in Latin America.
The Communist-bloc countries are also seeking greater official rep-
resentation and wider official contacts.
At present, the Soviet Union has diplomatic missions in only three
Latin American countries, Argentina, Uruguay, and Mexico.
Missions of satellite countries of a diplomatic, consular, or commer-
cial nature are located in these countries, as well as Bolivia, Brazil,
Chile, and Colombia.
Communist China, North Korea, and North Vietnam have no rep-
resentation.
144 COMMUNIST THREAT THROUGH THE CARIBBEAN
In this effort the Communist governments are using every oppor-
tunity and channel to urge an expansion of official diplomatic and
nondiplomatic representation, dangling the bait of profitable trade
with the bloc before both governments and private interests.
For example, in 1958 the holding of the meeting of the Interparlia-
mentary Union in Rio de Janeiro gave bloc delegations a chance to
campaign for the exchange of diplomatic missions and to hint at great
trade possibilities.
The cooperation of influential legislators or other officials is en-
listed through general campaigns and discreet efforts by visiting
groups from the bloc or by local friendship societies.
The Chairman. Could I ask you a question there?
General Cabell. Certainly.
The Chairman. What do you think of the possibilities of trade be-
tween Latin America and the Soviet Union ?
General Cabell. Meaning do we think that there is a large market
in Latin America?
The Chairman. Yes, sir ; for Soviet goods.
General Cabell. I think there is a market there, Mr. Chairman, be-
cause they are producers of many ra\v materials. The Soviet Union
is expanding its industrial base. It would like to get more foreign ex-
change. It would like to use their trade opportmiities as a cover
for other and more sinister operations.
So I think tiiat they would seek to force the pace of trade with Latin
America, although it might not be completely economically sound
otherwise.
The Chairman. In otiier words, you think they would take com-
modities that are needed in the Soviet Union by the Soviet people and
trade w^ith Latin America in order to further political ends of the
Soviet Government in Latin America ?
General Cabell. Yes. I am sure of that. That is their aim.
The Chairman. Yes.
Senator Hruska. General, do you have any knowledge of any offer
reportedly made recently by representatives of the Russian Govern-
ment of a $200 million credit to be expended in Russia in the acquisi-
tion of any type of Russian industrial products ?
A second part to that question would be whether or not that related
in any way to the sugar business in Cuba.
General Cabell. We are not aware of a $200 million offer. We
have heard recently of several offers which, altogether, might total
around $200 million. It is not unlikely that such a large offer might
be niade for propaganda purposes and that the implementation might
be in terms of smaller credits ari-anged through Commmiist "cover"
firms of Soviet-bloc commercial representatives in Western countries.
These might be arranged directly with some autonomous agency of
the Cuban Government, such as the Agrarian Reform Institute. We
seek to be alert to such reports and attempt to confirm them and
establish the principals involved. We are also aware of the possi-
bility that the Cuban Government may turn to the Soviet bloc for
purchases of jet aircraft or other military equipment.
Offers, or rumors, of extremely large Soviet credits could not help
but be related to sugar, Cuba's chief source of income. The Com-
munists have long advocated less dependence on the U.S. market and
COMMUNIST THREAT THROUGH THE CARIBBEAN 145
have propagandized the advantages of trade with the Soviet bloc.
The Soviets certainly have an interest in supportino; the Cuban Com-
munist Party program. On the other hand, it is true that anti-
Conununists have an interest in rumors which will increase our alarm
over Communist influence in Cuba.
Shall I continue, Mr. Chairman ?
The Chairman. Yes.
Senator Johnston. Are they having any trouble in disposing of
their sugar in Cuba, all that they produce?
General Cabell. Yes ; they have to sell. They cannot possibly dis-
pose of the Cuban
The Chairman. Would you speak a little louder, please, sir?
Senator Johnston. What I have reference to is: have they sold
or are they able to sell all of the sugar?
General Cabell. About a month ago the Cuban Sugar Stabilization
Institute stated that the holdover this year would be between 1 mil-
lion and 1.2 million tons. This will be large compared to last year's
holdover of some 600,000 tons.
The Chairman. That sold to us is at a price level that is roughly
a. hundred percent above the world price.
General Cabell. I am not knowledgeable on that.
The Chairman. Yes, sir.
Senator Johnston. That is about what it amounts to.
General Cabell. To continue, Mr. Chairman
The Chairman, Yes.
General Cabell. Nearly all the bloc govermnents have been active
in the promotion of cultural contacts. They have used these con-
tacts to discredit the charges against Communists and derogatory de-
scriptions of the Communist countries, as a means of cultivating and
converting carefully selected non-Communists, and as a means of
establishing a precedent for the development of official contacts.
The development of a campaign for increased trade with the Soviet
bloc is presented as a means of freeing the Latin American countries
from their dependence on the U. S. market.
This campaign is designed primarily to appeal to bourgeois elements
in official and business circles, but is also used to appeal to worker
groups, to whom it is described as the solution to wage and living
standard problems. This trade campaign has, as yet, had little real
impact in Latin America.
The major role of the bloc diplomatic establisliments is to comple-
ment, rather than direct, the activities of the local Communists,
through implementation of overt Soviet foreign policy.
The bloc establishments concentrate on usual objectives, that is,
cultural interchange, the development of commercial relations, and
the presentation of Soviet positions on international issues, as a means
of improving the climate for the growth of the local Communist
organizations and increasing their prestige.
Through binational centers, such as the IMexican-Eussian Cultural
Exchange Institute, they distribute INIarxist literature and propa-
ganda films, and arrange for the exchange of visits by the various
individuals and groups.
Under the cover of the binational centers, the diplomatic establish-
ments are able to maintain close contact with key Communists or
Communist sympathizers.
43354—60 Pt. 3 2
146 coivoruisriST threat through the Caribbean
However, the main purpose of these contacts is to develop sympathy
for the Soviet Union among non-Communist elements rather than to
direct local Communist Party activities.
The direction of tlie various local Communist Parties and the vari-
ous national affiliates of the international fronts is achieved primarily
through international meetings held in conjunction with a Communist
Party congress or plenum, or at an international front meeting, or bi-
lateral meetings of Communist Party representatives in Moscow.
There is good evidence, however, that certain diplomatic officials are
also Communist Party of the Soviet Union representatives, who have
the responsibility for monitoring the activities of national Commu-
nist Parties and their leaders, and for reporting on these developments
to IMoscow,
These representatives also maintain clandestine contact with various
Communist Party leaders for the purpose of clarifying the Moscow
line, advising on its application, approving the travel or training of
party members in the Soviet Union, and attending to minor financial
details. There is also evidence that certain officials are engaged in
espionage.
Soviet and satellite subsidization of national Communist Parties
through diplomatic missions is known to occur.
In Latin America, however, such direct subsidization appears less
significant than financing through any of a number of indirect
channels.
The origin of funds is concealed. Promises of financial aid made
by the Soviet or Chinese Communist officials to party leaders are in-
tentionally vague, and implementation is apt to be achieved through
a variety of devices, such as payment through the translation of books,
the awarding of a "peace prize" to a local sympathizer, the negotiating
of a lucrative contract with a local sympathizer, gifts attributed to
popular collection campaigns and fraternal fronts abroad, or the inter-
national solidarity fund of the World Federation of Trade Unions,
the awarding of scholarships or tours on an expense-paid basis.
On the other hand, the diplomatic establishments do purchase serv-
ices which may benefit individual Communists, or may negotiate con-
tracts through which local Communists or sympathizers are enabled
to realize some financial gain or which may indirectly benefit the
party.
There are cases, however, where Soviet officials have been reported
to have made large direct payments to local Communists in an effort
to promote strike activity or other types of unrest.
The adoption of the "national liberation struggle" with its concen-
tration on unity of action with the non-Communist nationalist bour-
geoisie has been paralleled by an intensive campaign to strengthen the
internal organization of the national Communist Parties in Latin
America, and to train the party leaders, as well as the membership,
in basic Marxist-Leninist theory, and its application.
The training of Latin American Communist Party leaders at the
higher party school of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union has
been going on continuously since 1953, with an increase noted since
1956.
The usual curriculum is based on a 2- or 3-year course of training,
and the students are active party leaders and functionaries who have
COMMUNIST THREAT THROUGH THE CARIBBEAN 147
been selected by their parties and approved by the Communist Party
of the Soviet Union. . . .
It is probable that most of the Latin American Communist Parties
now have a number of leaders who have received this special training.
Beginning in 1956, the Communist Party of China also undertook
to give training to Latin American Communist Party leaders.
They emphasize, among other subjects, the special contributions o±
the Chinese party in the field of clandestine work, agrarian refonn
and peasant affairs, guerrilla warfare, and the manipulation ot the
bouro-eoisie and other elements in the '^anti-imperialist struggle.' _ _
Since 1956, there is evidence that the organization of such training
has been improved, and that the Chinese Communist Party is now
o-iving regular courses specifically for Latin American Communist
students, thereby paralleling the Soviet effort. In addition to the
training offered by the Soviet
Senator Johnston. Is that in all the South American countries or
someplace , • • n j;
General Cabell. Pretty much so. Their aim is to make it m all ot
the Latin American countries.
Senator Johnston. I see. i i o •
General Cabell. In addition to the training offered by the b^oviet
and Chinese Communist Parties, the better organized and stronger
Communist Parties have, in accordance with recommendations from
Moscow, offered training to Communist Party members from the
smaller and weaker Communist Parties.
Thus, the Communist Party of Argentina, m 1958, accepted stu-
dents from a number of other Latin American countries, Bolivia,
Ecuador, Venezuela, Panama, and Colmnbia, into its cadre school,
which was raided by the Argentine police in October of 1958.
It has been reported that other Communist Parties, such as those
of Chile and Cuba, have also undertaken to train Communists from
other countries.
This is in further answer to your question, Senator.
Mr. SouRWiNE. Mr. Chairman, might I ask a question?
The Chairman. Yes. .
Mr. SouRWiNE. General, there has been some training ot Com-
munists from Latin America in Warsaw, too, has there not ?
General Cabell. The training of Latin Americans is centered m the
U.S.S.K., China, and (to a lesser extent) in East Germany. There is
no evidence of a Polish program in this regard, and there are no inter-
national front headquarters in Warsaw which might offer on-the-
job training. However, we are aware of cases where the Interna-
tional Union of Students (lUS) has given scholarships to Latin
American students for study in Poland.
Mr. SouRWiNE. When they go to Europe they go to Moscow ?
General Cabell. Generally, they want to.
Mr. Sourwine. 'Wlien they go to Red China, where do they go,
Peiping?
General Cabell. They go to Peiping, via Moscow, usually.
ISIr. Sourwine. Thank you, sir.
General Cabell. There is more prestige connected with going to
Moscow or Peiping than going to any of the satellites.
148 COMMUNIST THREAT THROUGH THE . CARIBBEAN
The Chairman. Is there any training of Communist students, Latin
American Connniinist students, in the United States?
General Cabell. "We woukl not be the repository of that informa-
tion, Mr. Chairman. That would be the FBI.
The Chairman. I wanted to know whether you had that
information.
General Cabell. No, sir; I do not have it at my fingertips.
The above training is carried on by schools conducted by the Com-
munist Parties themselves.
However, the intensified training program is also being undertaken
by the Communist fronts. The World Federation of Trade Unions
held a training school for Latin American labor leaders in Budapest
from 1953 to 1955, and subsidized a Central American training school
in Costa Rica in 1958.
The World Federation of Democratic Youth, and the International
LTnion of Students have provided on-the-job training for Latin
Americans at their international headquarters, as has the Women's
International Democratic Federation.
Marxist training centers, such as the Workers' University in Mex-
ico City, are being expanded in an effort to broaden the appeal of
Marxism, and to stimulate nationalism.
EfTorts to infiltrate the educational field have been intensified in an
effort to gain respectability and recognition for Marxist thought, a
drive which has achieved success in several countries. A notable ex-
ample is the Brazilian Institute for Advanced Studies. In addition,
nonpolitical scholarships are offered by the Soviet Union and satellite
countries for training in the arts and sciences.
Thus, the international Communist training effort is comprehensive,
ranging from the political indoctrination of the militant Communist
nucleus to the provision of opportunities to non-Connnunists which
will orient them towards the Communist bloc in their future profes-
sional careers.
The coordination of Latin American Communist action is planned
through international, regional, and national meetings of Communist
Parties or front organizations.
This is done at bilateral meetings between the Communist Party of
the Soviet Union and the Latin American Communist Party leaders,
through the exchange of publications, through the travel of party lead-
ers, and through continuous training and indoctrination of party mem-
bers.
The fundamental line is established in discussions with Communist
Party of the Soviet Union officials, and an authoritative — or in au-
thoritative journals such as Problems of Peace and Socialism (the
World Marxist Re^aew) which is published in 19 languages, and the
various party theoretical organs.
Fundamental Marxist texts, both current and classic, are available
in Spanish; some are translated and published in Latin America, to
provide a standardized basis for internal Party training and for in-
doctrination of non-Communists,
Spanish translations of Chinese Communist works are increasingly
used in the effort to apply Chinese tactical lessons in Latin America.
Latin American delegates to Soviet Communist Party congresses
have also attended Chinese Communist Party meetings or have met
with Chinese leaders.
COMMUNIST THREAT THROUGH THE CARIBBEAN 149
The general strategy for Communist activity in Latin America in
1958 was outlined at the Moscow meeting of November 1957.
Activities in 1959, in continuation of the 1958 program, are believed
to have been discussed at meetings between Latin America and Soviet
Communist Party representatives held in Moscow at the time of the
21st Communist Party of the Soviet LTnion Congress, and at meetings
between the Latin American and Chinese Communists shortly after-
ward, in Peiping.
Mr. SouRWiNE. That was in January of this year?
General Cabell, Late January and early February.
Mr. SouRwiNE. All right.
General Cabell. The current program involves the exploitation of
the Cuban Revolution as an example of a successful "liberation strug-
gle," which should be emulated by "anti-imperialist" elements in other
Latin American countries.
A significant element of the Communist program for 1959 appears
to be the support of a "People's Congress," ostensibly sponsored by
non-Coinmunist patriots and liberals, but oriented by Communist or
pro-Communist delegates so as to pass anti-U.S. resolutions.
The Cuban Communist newspaper Hoy recently quoted Raul Castro,
Chief of the Cuban Armed Forces, as giving his support to such a
congress.
The Chairman. These congresses, while they are composed of lib-
erals who are not members of the Communist Party, yet the congress
and its membership are manipulated by the Communists; is that
correct ?
General Cabell. That is the purpose of them and the fact of them.
The Chairman. Yes.
General Cabell. Mr. Chairman, this type of approach, the exploita-
tion of non-Conmiunists and the infiltration of crypto- Communists,
or secret Communist Party members into progressive movements, is
an old technique, but one which has been particularly emphasized by
the Chinese.
It is believed that all Latin American Parties are now under orders
to recruit new members on a "secret" basis, so that they may remain in
or be infiltrated into non-Communist groups.
Li 1958 and 1959 there has been increasing emphasis on the need
for communism to adapt its tactics to the regional and national situa-
tion in which it works.
In Latin America where the "national liberation" strategy is aimed
at influencing non-Communist liberals, nationalists and intellectuals,
Communist-front activity and subversion of non-Communist organi-
zations has been increasingly emphasized.
The international Communist-front organizations, such as the
World Federation of Trade Unions, the International Union of Stu-
dents, the World Federation of Democratic Youth, the Women's Inter-
national Democratic Federation, and so forth, have tried in their pro-
grams aimed at Latin America, to pay more attention to national
questions and peculiarities, and thus to deemphasize Soviet direction
while developing the basis for unity of action.
Mr. Sourwine. General
Mr. Chairman, may I inquire-
The Chairman. Yes.
150 COMMUNIST THREAT THROUGH THE CARIBBEAN
Mr. SouRWiNE. General, is it true that the increasing emphasis of
which you speak in adajotation to national situations is a tactic; it is
not a trend toward a development of true so-called national Commu-
nist parties? That is, it is not a Communist schism; it is simply a
tactic Avhich the single world conspiracy is using ?
General Cabell. That is correct. Their emphasis is on that ap-
proach ; that is, of developing these front organizations, rather than
the more direct one of open Communist parties themselves. They are
not in any way denying these Communist parties, but they are putting
their effort in this indirect approach because they think it will bring
them a better return.
Mr. SouRWiNE. And within the Communist parties themselves of
these various Latin American countries, Moscow still clamps down on
any deviation. They still have to follow orders from Moscow ; is that
right ?
Genei'al Cabell. Yes.
Senator Hruska. What you have described here is the very essence
of the "national liberation" movement, is it not ?
General Cabell. Yes.
Senator Hruska. In gross, isn't that exactl}^ what that "national
liberation" movement is ?
General Cabell. That is right, to surround its own Communist ef-
forts by this aura of nationalism.
Senator Hruska. And then it breaks down into different segments,
in schools, labor unions, and what not ?
General Cabell. That is right.
Senator Johnston. They use all kinds of popular movements to
join them in order to further their cause.
General Cabell. Any movement that they can possibly grasp. Sen-
ator, whether that popular movement has been in existence or whether
they attempt to create a popular movement for the purpose. They
use both kinds.
Senator Johnston. If they cannot get into a country one way, then
they will come in by saying, "We want to put down the dictatorship."
General Cabell. That is right.
Shall I continue, Mr. Chairman ?
The Chairman. Proceed, General.
General Cabell. In the field of labor increased efforts have been
made to regain the influence lost during the postwar decade. The
World Federation of Trade Unions has a reo;ional liaison bureau called
the Latin American Confederation of Labor, or Confederacion de
Trabaj adores de America Latina, to give the Spanish name.
Discussions are underway to strengthen and reorganize it, and so to
make it a more effective organization,
A number of instances of international Communist financing of
Latin American trade unions also has been noted by us.
Visits of the World Federation of Trade Union and bloc trade
union officials to Latin American countries have increased, as have
invitations to Latin American trade unionists to visit Communist
China, the Soviet Union, and other bloc countries.
These efforts are designed to increase Communist influence and
strength in the trade union movement, and are an integral part of the
COMMUNIST THREAT THROUGH THE CARIBBEAN 151
Communist strategy which, to be successful, is essentially depend-
ent upon mass support.
The tasks of the trade unions in the "national liberation struggle"
were set forth by the vice president of the "World Federation of
Trade Unions, who is the Indian Communist, S. A. Dange, at the
Fourth Congress of the World Federation of Trade Unions in 1957.
These tasks constitute a blueprint for Communist labor action.
Trade unions are called upon to support measures taken by the
national bourgeoisie if these measures are directed against imperi-
alism and are intended to strengthen the country's independence, and
develop its economy.
The unions are advised to oppose military pacts, to support the
peace movement, to promote nationalization of foreign enterprises,
and to link economic demands with political actions.
They are to seek alliances, particularly with the peasantry, as well
as trade union "unity."
Finally, those trade unions with a record of success in the "na-
tional liberation struggle" should advise less experienced unions, and
the World Federation of Trade Unions promised to strengthen its
own role in the international exchange of tactical experience.
Close adherence to these directives is seen in the Communist propa-
ganda and organizational work in Argentina, Brazil, Cliile, Cuba,
Mexico, and other Latin American countries.
Aid and support from the World Federation of Trade Unions and
its trade departments, the Trade Unions Internationals, as well as
from trade unions of bloc countries, is apparent.
Representatives of the Trade Unions Internationals of the World
Federation of Trade Unions have been particularly active in Latin
America.
Giacomo Adduci, Italian labor leader, and Secretaiy General of
the Metal and Engineering Workers of the World Federation of
Trade Unions, attended the 1958 May Day celebration m Brazil. He
promised increased World Federation of Trade Unions aid to the
Brazilian labor movement. Adduci again visited Brazil in April of
1959 to attend a National Metal Workers Congress, also attended by
fraternal delegates from neighboring South American countries.
Paolo Scarponi, a representative of the Trade Unions Interna-
tional of Textile and Clothing Workers, visited Rio de Janiero, Mon-
tevideo, Buenos Aires, and Santiago, Chile, in March and April of
1958.
Paul Delanoue, secretary general of the Communist-controlled
World Federation of Teachers' Unions, visited Chile in May 1959
to attend the 12th National Convention of the Chilean Teachers
Union. That is the Union de Profesores de Chile.
Maurice Boye, a member of the secretariat of the Trade Unions
International of Public and Allied Workers, was reported to be vis-
iting in Chile in June 1959 at the invitation of the National Associa-
tion of Semi-Public Employees, the Asociacion Nacional de Empleados
Semi-Fiscales.
The Chairman. General, have American Communists attended
meetings in Latin America ?
General Cabell. Yes.
152 COMMUNIST THREAT THROUGH THE CARIBBEAN
The Chairman. Could you tell us which Communists, what meet-
ings they attended ?
General Cabell. Abe Magil was CPUSA representative at the
Twelfth CP-Mexico Congress, in September 1954.
But as a matter of fact, the attendance has not been notable at
these congresses mainly because they wished to avoid attention.
Senator Hruska. By "notable" do you mean heavy in numbers?
General Cabell. Either that or frequent. It has been neither heavy
in numbers nor frequent.
Senator Hruska. General, you have given tlie names of several in-
ternational associations and so on, down in Latin America, like the
teachers, the public workers, and the metalworkers. Where do these
men come from ?
General Cabell. These men come from various countries and they
are officials in various of the unions, and particularly the World
Federation of Trade Unions and its subsidiary organizations.
Senator Hruska. Where are the headquarters for the interna-
tional— the World Federation of Trade Unions that you just
mentioned ?
General Cabell. Prague. Prague is a big center for these various
unions.
Senator Hruska. So that many of .these leaders come from Europe?
General Cabell. Yes, sir.
Senator Hruska. From either Poland, Czechoslovakia, or Russia?
General Cabell. Yes. Many are from Western Europe.
Senator Hruska. You have not named, so far, any Chinese. Are
you coming to them ?
General Cabell. I do not believe I named any Chinese. They are
not as well known to us as the European ones.
Senator Hruska. They are relatively recent arrivals on the scene
then ?
General Cabell. Yes. I would like to say, as I have said, they
simply have not traveled in the same or similar capacities as the others.
They are not heavilv represented, you see, in the same organizations,
like the WFTU and lUS.
The people who travel for the WFTU and other front organizations
are, in the main, Westerners, by culture and background, and people
wlio have some linguistic connection with the West.
_ The Chinese started their intensified drive in Latin America only
since 1956, and then only by stages. Just a handful of correspondents
came out.
They are dependent wholly upon the local Communist Party and
the network of correspondents which I have mentioned.
Senator Hruska. The tempo of their activity has steadily increased ?
General Cabell. That is correct.
Senator Hruska. When I say they, I mean those people from China.
Isn't that true?
General Cabell. Chinese activity, both in drawing Latin Amer-
icans into China for training and consultation, and now coming out
for the first time, apart from a few cultural acrobatic and ballet troupes
and tilings like that ; but they are now sending out Red Chinese news-
paper correspondents to actually set up headquarters, for example, at
Havana ; that is true.
COMMUNIST THREAT THROUGH THE CARIBBEAN 153
Senator Hruska. To what extent is that done to avoid the appear-
ance of direct Russian interference in the Western Hemisphere ?
General Cabell. Well, actually the Chinese are operating very
strongly on their own. They have their concept of their rights within
the movement, and they send out their representatives as a sovereign
power within the movement.
Senator Hruska. Do you think a part of their increased activity
is due to a desire to not counteract, but to — but in recognition of our
policy in Formosa, for example, and Quemoy ? Do you think that is
involved ?
General Cabell. I would suggest that is a small part of it. I thmk
the basic reason for it is that they are feeling their oats.
Senator Heuska. They want to go into business on their own?
General Cabell. They want to go into business on their own, and
they want to establish themselves and be recognized as Communist
ideologists on their own hook.
Senator Johnstox. In other words, it is a religion with them ?
General Cabell. That is right.
Senator Johnston. It is almost like the churches sendmg out the
missionaries ?
General Cabell. Yes.
In organizing Latin American Youth, the International Communist
movement works through the World Federation of Democratic Youth,
and the International Union of Students.
At their fifth congress in Fieping in September of 1958, they gave
greatly increased importance to Latin America, adopting seven reso-
lutions of solidarity with students in nine Latin American countries
or colonies. These are British Honduras, which they described as
Guatemalan territory, Brazil, Cuba, Guadalupe, Guiana, Martinique,
Nicaragua, Peru, and Venezuela. They also adopted a separate two-
page resolution on Latin America as a whole.
Young Latin American leaders are working at the World Federa-
tion of Democratic Youth, and International Union of Students head-
quarters in Budapest and Prague.
For example, the Brazilian Communist youth leader, Orlando Fun-
cia Gomez, headed the important Latin American commission at
World Federation of Democratic Youth headquarters, and then lie
returned to Brazil.
He was replaced by Ruben Guedes, also from Brazil.
Another Latin American World Federation of Democratic Youth
official. Otto Cesar Vargas Girete, helped organize Latin American
participation after the Seventh World Youth Festival held in Vieima
on the 26th of July to the 4th of August of this year.
Latin American Coimnmiists known to have worked at Interna-
tional Union of Students headquarters include individuals from Chile,
Colombia, Cuba, Ecuador, Guatemala, Mexico, and Venezuela.
The important International Union of Students secretariat includes
an Ecuadoran, Jorge Galarza, who replaced a fellow Ecuadoran,
Efrain Alvarez Paredes.
Cesar Alonso Alvarado, a Colombian, has been working at Interna-
tional Students headquarters in Prague as the Spanish editor of the
union's monthly organ. World Student News, since January of 1959,
43354— 60— pt. 3 3
154 COMIVIUNIST THREAT THROUGH THE CARIBBEAN
when he replaced Antonio Massip, a Cnhan. Massip quickly returned
to Cuba after the fall of the Batista regime.
The Chairman. Do you know what he is doing there now?
General Cabell. Our most recent information indicates that An-
tonio Massip is engaged in propaganda work for the army at La
Cabana Fortress in Havana.
Some of the Latin American Communists who have worked with
the World Federation of Democratic Youth or the International
Union of Students headquarters— worked at those headquarters-
have also received training in party schools in the Soviet Union, and
on returning to Latin America have been made responsible for clan-
destine propaganda distribution, and for the organization of strikes
and demonstrations.
In the appeal to non-Communist youth, probably the most impor-
tant of all World Federation of Democratic Youth and International
LTnion of Students tactics, are the world youth festivals held every
other year.
Since the national liberation strategy was initiated about 1954, over
3,300 young people from Latin America and the European Caribbean
dependencies have attended these festivals.
Relatively, Latin American attendance increased sharply at the 1959
festival in Vienna.
The festivals are primarily propaganda efforts, but serve to
strengthen the World Federation of Democratic Youth and the In-
ternational Union of Students organizationally through the experi-
ence received by those working on the various preparatory com-
mittees.
We believe that close to $1 million was expended for Latin Ameri-
can delegates' travel to the Sixth Youth Festival in 1957, of which
less than $100,000 was contributed from Latin America. That is $1
million cost, but the Latin Americans contributed $100,000 of it.
In 1958, the bloc expended about $500,000 in order to subsidize the
travel of Latin American Communists and sympathizers to the bloc.
This was not at youth festivals, but just travel to the bloc.
The Yomig Communist, youth and student leaders associated with
and trained by the World Federation of Democratic Youth, and the
International Union of Students, are instrumental in the coordination
of the liberation struggle.
In 1958 the two organizations sought to emphasize the participation
of the students in the anti-Batista struggle in Cuba, and in their
publications called for international support and solidarity with
the Cuban students.
In the antipathy to existing dictatorships in Latin America, the
Communists have fomid a popular issue which allows them to infil-
trate, or work closely with non-Communist youth and student groups.
Wlierever possible, they have sought to provide the initiative and,
with the aid of Communists abroad, to develop international sup-
port and coordination.
For example, a number of meetings of youth and student leaders
were held in Cuba earlier this year, some under Communist sponsor-
ship or with Communist participation.
At these meetings, international coordination of antidictatorial ac-
tion was discussed, including plans for an antidictator congress to be
held in Havana.
COMMUNIST THREAT THROUGH THE CARIBBEAN 155
Similar meetings have been held in other countries, such as that
held in April by the Uruguayan Communist Youth.
Some government officials
The CuAiKMAX. General, right about there, what about the Cuban
Government, has it encouraged those Commmiist meetings?
General Cabell. I think the Cuban Government gives them every
facility for those meetings, and any number of Cuban officials give
them encouragement. But I think it Avould be improper to say that
the Cuban Government, as such, gives them the encouragement. It is
not necessary for the Cuban Government, as such, to give them
The Chairman. No; but the officials in a private capacity do?
General Cabell. Or the officials in the Government capacity, but it
might not be the Government official's responsibility for a certain
thing that gives these Communists such encouragement, because the
Government is so disorganized that there is continual crossing of Imes
by one official of the Government into other departments. So I would
not want to give the impression that it is governmentally organized en-
couragement that is taking place. It is rather the encouragement of
officials and elements within the Government.
The Chairman. I do not see the difference.
General Cabell. Well, there is just a legal difference ; that is all.
The Chairman. That is right.
Senator Johnston. In other words, the Government is doing noth-
ing to prevent it ?
General Cabell, That is right.
The Chair3ian. No ; they are encouraging it.
General Cabell. I would say even more than that.
The Chairman. They take affirmative action, the officials of the
Government take affirmative action in promoting it.
General Cabell. I just did not want to give you the impression that
the Government has officially organized that kind of action.
Senator Johnston. They encourage it as long as it helps them to
stay popular.
General Cabell. Oh, yes.
Senator Hruska. Well, of course, in Cuba, since Castro took over,
the Popular Socialist Party, for example, which had previously been
banned, was allowed to come out in the open. Of course, that is not
official, that does not make them officially Communists, but it cer-
tainly is along the same line ; is it not ?
General Cabell. And there is no inhibition or prohibition of such
movement whatsoever.
Some Government officials may be providing the Communists with
readymade opportunities for expanding their propaganda.
Senator Johnston. A^^len anybody tries to oppose it they meet it
by saying, "Oh, we agree ; we give everybody freedom.'"
General Cabell. That is right. They oppose it on "freedom"
grounds.
For example, Raul Castro, who supported the People's Congress in a
recent speech, as previously mentioned, also supported the idea of
holding a Latin American Youth and Student Congress in Havana,
in the name of defending the Cuban Revolution.
He did not publicly use the earlier antidictatorship theme, pre-
sumably to minimize the international aspects of the meeting.
156 COMMUNIST THREAT THROUGH THE CARIBBEAN
It remains to be seen whether this congress, when held, will reveal
Communist handiwork through violent attacks on the United States
in an effort to apply the theme of "national liberation" to other
countries.
The CiiAiEMAN. "\^niat it is is a Communist meeting ; is it not ?
General Cabell. It is a Communist-influenced meeting, Mr. Chair-
man,
The Chairman. Yes.
Cuba has a great many Chinese and other orientals. Do you have
any information that Red China has attempted to mobilize them
or to
General Cabell. Mr. Chairman, I have got a little piece on that, if
you don't mind, which I will come to a little later.
The Chairman. Yes, sir. Proceed, General.
General Cabell. The Communist journalists in Latin America have,
particularly since 1956, been encouraged and assisted in broadening
their influence by the Communist-front International Organization
of Journalists.
Since that time. Communists and their supporters have sought to
bring national press associations closer to the International Organiza-
tion of Journalists, and to sponsor a Latin American Congress of
Journalists at which they could exploit Latin American nationalism
and regionalism to the detriment of the United States.
Important national press associations in Brazil, Peru, and Vene-
zuela have given some official recognition to the International Organi-
zation of Journalists.
In October of 1958, the Venezuelan ISTational Press Congress invited
Jaroslav Knobloch, of Czechoslovakia, the International Organization
of Journalists' president, and Renato Leduc, of Mexico, a vice presi-
dent, to speak. Leduc used this forum to attack the Latin American
coverage of the so-called commercial news agencies, and called for a
truly Latin American organization.
As if in answer to this, the Prensa Latina Agency was organized,
with headquarters in Cuba, in early 1959.
Tliis agency denies Communist sponsorship, while claiming the
backing of Mexican industrialists and promoting the ultranationalist
line.
Prensa Latina now has correspondents, and sells its service through-
out Latin America and in the United States.
The Chairman. You thiiik that is a Communist-controlled news
service?
General Cabell. This came out very quickly after the encourage-
ment in the speech by the Communists that such an institution was
needed.
We also call attention to the fact that its line plays this very ultra-
nationalist line, which is the Communist line.
Other than that, at this present moment, I do not think we could
testify to you that it is a Communist organization.
General Cabell. It is under intensive investigation along the lines
we have indicated, and it is just ripe for exploitation because of its
intensely nationalistic character.
The Chairman. But, in your judgment, it is Communist-influenced ?
General Cabell. We do not have the evidence to make such a firm
COMMUNIST THREAT THROUGH THE CARIBBEAN 157
conclusion, Mr. Chairman. But we certainly strongly suspect that
is tlie case, and we are watching it like a hawk.
The Chairman. Yes.
Senator Hruska. It has many badges which would indicate that?
General Cabell. That is right. The Communists midoubtedly en-
couraged or even inspired the organization of Prensa Latina, have
infiltrated the organization, and have aided it both by providing news
and utilizing its services. Its correspondents include some known
Communist Party members, a number of crypto-Communists, and a
good many ultranationalists. To date, one of the chief customers of
Prensa Latina appears to be the Cuban Communist newspaper Hoy.
However, because of its access to Communist and nationalist circles,
it has also been able to supply material of interest to other newspapers
and news services, including non-Communist ones.
The Communist-bloc comitries have increased their press activities
in the area.
Tass correspondents are located in Mexico, Uruguay, and Argen-
tina. The Czechoslovakian News Agency has established an office in
Argentina.
A group of Soviet journalists visited Argentina, Uruguay, Chile,
Peru, and Panama in April and May of 1958, establishing contact
with pro-Communist writers and newsmen.
In early 1959, the New China News Agency began building a net-
work of correspondents in Latin America, and established a head-
quarters in Havana, adjacent to that of the Prensa Latina. In con-
nection with this effort, a group of Communist Chinese journalists
traveled to various key Latin American countries.
Not only have their gains in the field of journalism been significant,
but Communists have also increased their propaganda in other fields.
Wherever possible, as in Cuba, Communists have quickly exploited
opportunities to utilize local radio and television.
At the special conference held in Moscow in November 1957, em-
phasis was placed on the revival and diversification of the peace move-
ment.
It was concluded that its main objective in Latin America should
be to weaken the "war economy" of the United States. Thus, economic
nationalism was established as a major "peace" objective.
In accordance with instructions, the Argentine Communists held a
"Congress for International Cooperation, General Disarmament, and
National Sovereignty" in May 1958, attended by leaders from through-
out the hemisphere.
This served to prepare for Latin American participation in the
subsequent world meeting in Stockhohn and also to coordinate re-
gional planning.
In accordance with a Soviet goal of several years standing, it resolved
to promote a "Congress of the Peoples of Latin America" which would
"meet the imperative necessity of integrating the national economies,
strengthening the homogeneous elements of Latin American cultures,
and organizing joint action to preserve world peace."
Originally planned for December 1958, this "People's Congress" —
which I mentioned earlier — was postponed, and it now appears that
the Communists are capitalizing on the appeal made by Cuba's youth-
ful Minister of Education, Dr. Armando Hart, for just such a "Peo-
ple's Congress."
158 COMMUNIST THREAT THROUGH THE CARIBBEAN
This has g-iven them the non-Communist sponsorship which they
desire, and has also allowed them to develop the "defense" of the Cuban
revolution as an additional basis for attracting the support of Latin
American nationalists, and anti-U.S. elements.
Senator Hruska. Let me ask, do you know^ any new date for the
meeting of that congress ?
General Cabell. Luis Carlos Prestes, the secretary general of the
Communist Party of Brazil, said in August that he expected it to
come otf in the very near future in Cuba, and that is the last date we
have.
The national peace movements have also been active in more con-
ventional "peace" activities such as opposition to military pacts,
nuclear testing, and activities of U.S. military missions.
The current trend, however, suggests that the main purpose of the
national peace committees has become that of coordinating activities
in behalf of the "liberation struggle" within a wide variety of organ-
izations, particularly those of an economic and cultural nature.
Under the heading of other front activities, the labor, youth and
student, journalistic, and peace-front activities are the most important
in Latin America.
There are many others, however, in which increased organizational
activity is also apparent.
The Women's International Democratic Federation, for example, is
seeking to develop a First Latin American Congress of Women, sched-
uled to be held in Santiago, Chile, between November 19 and 20 of
1959.
Coordination of the activities of the various Soviet friendship
societies or binational cultural exchange institutes may have been the
purpose behind the organization of a Soviet Federation for Friend-
ship and Cultural Cooperation with Latin America in January 1959.
In addition to the world fronts, the Communists have organized or
infiltrated numerous national or regional organizations to aid in the
"national liberation" struggle.
For example, the Union of Latin American Friendship, Union de
Amistad Latino Americana, recently established with headquarters
in Mexico, serves to coordinate and disseminate information from vari-
ous countries, such as the Dominican Republic, Nicaragua, and
Honduras.
For each of these countries, and for others as well, there is at least
one Communist-controlled front, among the various political opposi-
tion groups, which advocates unified action based on a minimal pro-
gram for "national liberation."
Such a front is the Haitian National Liberation Movement, founded
by the Communist leader Eene Depestre, but claimed to be "composed
of young persons from all patriotic groups and of all ])olitical tenden-
cies." The program of this group was recently published in the
Cuban Communist newspaper Hoy.
To conclude, it is evident that the Communists have an extremely
useful formula in the strategy of the "national liberation struggle."
They have difficulties and are still having problems in allaying the
distrust of non-Communist elements, w^hich either recognize the true
nature of communism and the opportunistic nature of the Communist
alliance which is being offered, or which recognize the beneficial as-
COMMUNIST THREAT THROUGH THE CARIBBEAN 159
pects of their national ties with the United States and prefer to nego-
tiate political and economic difl'erences rather than to destroy these
ties.
To counteract this opposition, the local Commimists, with the help
of the international Communist apparatus and the Soviet Union, are
attempting to show, first, that the Communists are sincerely dedicated
to democracy and "national liberation" and are willing to fight to
achieve these goals; and, second, that the United States needs no
longer to be feared, as its influence has been matched by the Soviet
Union.
Mr. SouRwiNE. ]Mr. Chairman, may I ask one question ?
The Chairman. Yes.
Mr. SouRwiNE. General, the committee has received from a very
knowledgeable person, who has been a lifelong student of China, an
appraisal from which I would like to read two paragraphs, and ask
wliether you concur or if there is any comment you can give us on
this :
Talk of an allegedly "inevitable" SinoSoviet schism may serve as intellectual
aspirin to repress our policy headaches with both Moscow and Peiping. Like
aspirin, however, the repressant only postpones coping with the problem ; it
does not eliminate it.
All the component parts of the Soviet Empire, including Red China, may be
compared to the members of a baseball team. Each has a part to play in trying
to win the game, although each occupies a different position and is called upon
to do a different sort of thing. Moscow is on the team, too, but its position is
that of a player-manager, and it flashes the signs. In a given situation, the
player-manager may call for all kinds of play — squeeze, sacrifice, and so on.
The player asked to play a certain way cannot give any consideration to his
own personal record. Mickey Mantle cannot go up to Casey Stengel and say to
him that, since he (Mantle) is well on the way to beating Babe Ruth's home-run
record, he had better be given the chance to try the long ball rather than bunting
for a sacrifice. If the particular situation appears to the manager to call for a
bunt, Mickey Mantle must bunt, home-run record or no home-run record. The
idea is to try to win the game, not to achieve a personal glory. Khrushchev is
a better team player than Stalin. Hence his denunciation of the "personality
cult." Liu Shao-chi is a better team player than Mao Tze-tung. Hence Mao's
displacement. Chou En-lai. with his many faces which so bafile Western ob-
servers, is an excellent team player. Western estimate of world communism
suffers considerably by paying too much attention to personalities and too little
to the team concept. To win the game is the all-important thing, and the Com-
munists, whether Russian, Chine.se, Polish, or Albanian, mean to win it.
We must also be careful to draw the proper line of distinction between "total"
and "limited" wars. The Russians, and to a lesser extent the Chinese, under-
stand that a "total" war with nuclear weapons may spell the doom of every-
body, especially the Communists. I say "especially the Communists"' because
of the ring of strategic bases ax'ound Russia and mainland China. Their propa-
ganda has been to induce the United States to give up the bases. Before they
succeed in doing that, the Communists are not likely to risk total war. But
limited wars are an entirely different thing. They are not he.sitant in provoking
them here and there as long as they are sure they will not explode into a total
war. Russia at pi'esent has very little room to stage limited wars. The moment
she touches Western Europe, total war is on. On the other hand Red China has
plenty of room to risk limited wars. Surely no total war will break out on
account of Sikkim or Bhutan for the Indian border. So, on the surface, Russia
may appear to be pursuing one line and Red China another. To return to the
baseball analogy, one player may be bunting and the other swinging for the
fences. The thing to remember is that all are on the same team, putting on
obviously different plays under different circumstances, but the ultimate objec-
tive is to win the game.
160 COMMUNIST THREAT THROUGH THE CARIBBEAN
General Cabell. Mr. Sourwine, I cannot comment on the whole
piece. But I will make some comment on it.
In the first place, I think the aspirin analogy is not a bad one.
As I pointed out earlier, I think this is a very comforting thought,
this schism bet wen the two, but I think it is more potential than actual
at the present time.
With respect to the baseball team analogy, I would not be as extreme
as that, because I do not believe that the response to discipline or orders
is quite as immediate and complete and unquestioning as the ballplayer
to the manager.
It is true, however, that the team aspect of international communism
is often insufficiently considered. One of the chief objectives of com-
munism in tlie last few years has been to improve international co-
ordination. Both the Soviets and the Chinese have been doing this,
with some success. This is particularly true in the undeveloped areas
where the strengthening of the regional and local Communist move-
ments is the immediate goal.
I think, as time goes on, the sensibilities of the Chinese will have
to be taken more into consideration, and the willingness or ability of
their team manager to give firm orders and sacrifice, hit instructions,
and things like that, are going to be somewhat eroded.
With respect to the limited war elements of your question, I think
it would take up a long time to deal with that aspect, and I would just
suggest that we check on that.
Mr. Sourwine. General, what is the numerical strength of the Com-
munist movement in Latin America ?
General Cabell. I would say that, in general, the Communist Par-
ties have increased their membership. The number of Latin American
Communists is estimated now at about 220,000 to 240,000, which is
about a 10-percent increase over our 1958 estimates. The number of
sympathizers is estimated at about 650,000 to 700,000.
It should be emphasized that the Communist threat continues to
be based on the organizational ability and international connections
of the Communist Parties and their fronts, and individual leaders,
rather than numerical strength.
The Chairman. That is true all over the world ?
General Cabell. Yes ; but I would say it is particularly true in Latin
America.
The Chairman. Is the Communist drive in Latin America similar
to their drive in Africa and the Middle East; is it more intense?
General Cabell. Yes, sir; but I think it started sooner in Latin
America.
The Chairman. You think it is more intense in Latin America ?
General Cabell. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. It started sooner there ?
General Cabell. Yes, sir.
Senator Hruska. How much sooner ?
General Cabell. I would say in the nature of several years, sir;
and I think they, too, realize that the United States is more susceptible
to hurt in this area than elsewhere.
The Chairman. They can weaken us more easily in Latin America.
General Cabell. And there is no doubt about who the principal
enemy of the Soviet Union is and of the Communist Party. There is
no doubt about that whatseoever, and that is the United States.
COMMUNIST THREAT THROUGH THE CARIBBEAN 161
Mr. SouRWiNE. In other words, the drive in Latin America is
pointed at us? .
General Cabell. More than anything else ; yes. •, • „ -P.^f
Senator Hruska. General, you say it is several years; it is a fact,
is it nol, thrt^ie^ has been organized Con^mist activity and move-
ment in Latin America for 25 years? ^ j • ^
General Cabell. Oh, yes; I was talking m terms of a drive.
Senator Hruska. Aild the intensification that we now witness?
^S'^E^.^^^ SS'^ it be possible for your agency to
furnish the committee a table showing the estimated strength of the
Communist Parties in various comitries m Latin America.
GpneralC\BELL. Yes ; I can do that. .
The fo Wng table contams approximate figures on Communist
Par Y strengths These figures are constantly under review, and are
rub% to cSanges in respolise to new and more reliable information.
Communist Pakty Membership
15
Argentina 80.000
g?!Sr ::::::::::::: 40;^
ChUe 1 30, 000
Colombia 6, 000
Costa Rica '^^
Cuba I' ^
Dominican Republic -^o (\ru\
Ecuador ^' ^^
El Salvador t*V^
Guatemala 1' ^^
Haiti
Honduras V^
Mexico '^' ^"Y
Nicaragua ^n
Panama JJ^
Paraguay ^' ^VV
Peru b, 000
Uruguay J' ^^^
Venezuela ^^' ^"^
Total 238, 725
General' Cabell. But again let me point out that this table does
not fncTuderhe Communist-front parties such as L^-bardo To^ed^^^^^
Popular Party in Mexico. These m the table are the Communist
Parties themselves, and not the front parties. ^ , ^ ■ ■ ^„,.f^?
Seimtor Johnston. The front parties are kind of a training party?
General Cabell. It is an influence party.
Senator Johnston. It kind of breaks them ott.
Th Chairman. General, are you familiar with a ^^-"^^^ P^P^^^^^
ino- to be a Castro directive laying the groundwork for the extinction
ofihe Catholic Church in the Dominican Republic i
General Cabell. No ; I am not. _ ^-p fi,^
Mr SouRWiNE. General, what are your estimates on the scope of t.he
subsidies which the Communist movement m Latin America is recei.-
"'toerll^CABELL. The truth about Communist finances is genei;ally
known only to a very small number of Communist leaders withm
each local Communist Party. ^ , ^ . , jy^.^ ^f t1-,p Soviet
Even within the apparatus of the Communist P^rty of the hoyet
Uiiion and China there are only a few functionaries who handle the
problem of subsidizing foreign Communist Parties
^ In addition, the transmission of funds fr«"},.\^^,p^IVt,nnen^^^
was pointed oiit earlier, proceeds through a multitude of channels ana
"tis'rerSoVt fe^'5^S to make an accurate estimate on h^w
much m" or the Chinese spend on Conunumst subver-
sion in Latin America.
43354 — 60 — pt. 3 4
162 COMMUNIST THREAT THROUGH THE CARIBBEAN
In general, it appears that the bulk of Soviet subsidies is poured into
the promotion of Communist front activities, rather than into the
Communist Parties themselves.
This is, of course, only a technicality since Communist fronts and
Communist Parties work hand in liand.
Nevertheless, it is another indication of how seriously the Soviets
intended to create a favorable climate for communism in Latin
America. .
On the basis of similar observations in other areas, it would be fair
to state that the Soviets heavily subsidize the Communist Party press
in Latin America.
The cost of training Latin American Communists is also borne by
the Soviets who, obviously, desire that the Communist Parties in
Latin America be strengthened for the long haul.
The cost of the Soviets' overall training program for Communists
in the free world has been estimated at, conservatively, $500,000 per
year. This is in addition to the approximately $500,000 mentioned
already as having been spent for travel expenses alone in 1958.
Indications are that the Chinese Communists may complement
Soviet subsidies. The Chinese Communist Party bears all expenses
for the training of Latin American Communists in China, and has
given the impression of having ample funds for the "fraternal" sup-
port of foreign Communist Parties.
Mr. SouRwiNE. General, is the U.S.S.R. or any of its satellites pro-
viding military aid to the Communist or pro-Communist forces in
Latin America ?
General Cabell. Not to our current knowledge.
The Chairman. It is said that roughly 750 North Korean and
Communist Chinese fought with the Castro forces. These people
were not seen in the cities of Cuba, but were kept in the interior of
Cuba..
Do you hare any knowledge of that ?
General Cabkll. No, sir; we do not, and we would seriously doubt
the authenticity of any such figure. We have no evidence of any
participation in the revolution. Nor do we have any knowledge of
Chinese Communist No. 1 participation.
The Chairman. All right.
What do you have information about? About what Communists
fought in Castro's forces?
(rftneral Cabbll. In Cuba?
The Chairman. Yes, sir.
General Cabbix. That question is related to the question. Is Cuban
Prime Minister Fidel Castro a Communist ?
Let me derelop that thought for you, sir. Our information shows
that the Cuban Communists do not consider him a Communist Party
member, or even a pro-Communist.
On the other hand, they are delighted with the nature of his gov-
ernment, which has allowed the Communists opportunity, free oppor-
tunity, to organize, to propagandize, and to infiltrate.
We know that the Communists consider Castro as a representative
of the bourgeoisie, and were unable to gain public recognition or com-
mitments from him during the course of the revolution.
COMMUNIST THREAT THROUGH THE CARIBBEAN 163
We know that the Communists were concerned when, at the time
of his trip to the United States, he showed evidence of a friendly
attitude toward the United States.
We know also that it has been the assigned task of the Cuban Com-
munist Party to prevent Castro's revolution from going to tlie right,
that is, from establishing friendly relations with the United States,
or ending its tolerance of Communist activities.
Our conclusion, therefore, is that Fidel Castro is not a Communist ;
however, he certainly is not anti-Communist. His extreme policies,
including confiscation of private property, lead him to take positions
and make statements such as his violent anti-U.S. outbursts which are
extremely useful to international communism and are being exploited
by the Communists to the maximum extent.
He has delegated authority in key areas to persons known to be pro-
Communists or who are susceptible to exploitation by Communists.
In turn, he appears to be increasingly susceptible to Communist
propaganda, which is designed to exploit "evidence" that the United
States is an enemy, to discredit charges of Communist influence in
Cuba and witch hunting — or as they call it, maccartismo — and to
glorify the Cuban revolution, and particularly the agrarian reform,
as a pattern for the "liberation" of the masses in other Latin American
countries.
It is questionable whether the Communists desire to recruit Castro
into the Communist Party, that they could do so if they wished, or
that he would be susceptible to Communist discipline if he joined.
As I say, that is subject to question.
The Communist viewpoint is that he represents leadership of a
nationalistic, bourgeoise-democratic revolution which precedes a Com-
munist rise to power.
The Cormnunist interest is to help further the nationalistic aspects
of his regime and to preserve a climate of tolerance which will allow
the Communists to organize and build the foundation for their future
control.
At present, therefore, their primary interest is to influence Castro
in favor of an aggressive, "anti-imperialist" nationalism supported by
non-Communists, but which will defend the rights of Communists
to express their views openly and engage in legal activity.
In their attempt to influence Castro, the Communists are known to
be utilizing five principal channels.
First, they are seeking to influence him through his close associates
■who are generally known to be pro-Communist.
Fidel's brother, Raul, and his close adviser, Ernesto (Che) Guevara,
are both strong friends of the Communist Party.
Second, the Communists have sought to guide the program and the
policies of the Government and of the 26th of July movement.
They have been able to exert considerable influence through pro-
Communists or sympathizers who have been appointed to key posts
and who have virtual autonomy in their fields.
Such persons have been appointed by Fidel on the basis of friend-
ships, trust, and loyalty established during the revolution, and he is
committed to defend their policies.
Third, the Communists and their sympathizers are seeking to im-
plant elementary Marxist concepts within the political indoctrination
1(U COMMUNIST THREAT THROUGH THE CARIBBEAN
courses established by the 26th of July movement, thereby establishing
the foundation for a pro-Connnunist-Marxist political philosophy to
eventually replace the highly personalistic philosophy represented by
Fidel.
Fourth, through their overt propaganda organs, radio and television
commentary, and selective or false news reporting, the Communists
hope to shield Fidel, and the Cuban public, from news favorable to
U.S. policies, and to exploit news unfavoral3le to the United States.
Fifth, through organizational activity among the peasants, wdthin
the army, and within labor, they hope to gain control of the public
demonstrations, mass meetings, and strikes which Fidel is wont to
call in evidence of the solidarity of the Cuban people with him and
his policies.
Although it is evident that the Communists have been able to exploit
Castro in his movement for their own benefit through these channels,
as yet they do not appear to control him or his government. In terms
of mass following, they still represent a minority, though a very well
organized one.
In certain areas, as in organized labor, there are experienced non-
Communist leaders who form an obstacle to rapid Communist
progress.
There are student and professional groups which are also non-
Communist although firmly supporting Fidel, and within the 26th
of July movement there is considerable evidence of opposition to
cominunism.
As evidenced in the recent demonstrations, however, these groups
are prepared to rally to the defense of the regime.
Senator Johnston. Is it not true that he is more dangerous than
if he would come out and let them know that he was a Communist ?
General Cabell. I personally would agree that Castro would prob-
ably lose much, or even most, of his popular support should this occur.
However, w^e believe that Castro is not a member of the Communist
Party, and does not consider himself to be a Commmiist.
Senator Johnston. He knows himself that, if he would come out
openly for the Communists he would lose his usefulness.
General Cabell. That is right. Insofar as he loses public support,
he loses the capability to achieve his goals — though he could still be
portrayed as victim of counterrevolutionary machinations.
The Chairman. To say the least, the Communist movement has
made very great progress in Cuba since Castro took over the Cuban
Government ; has it not ?
General Cabell. That is correct; yes, sir.
Mr. SouRwiNE. General, what type of aid is the U.S.S.R. provid-
ing to revolutionary elements, such as those in the Caribbean ?
General Cabell. Primarily advice — primarily they are furnishing
advice and moral support, propaganda materials and services.
Soviet support to revolutionary elements is channeled through the
Communist Parties, through the Communist fronts, and through key
Communists within other organizations.
The sending of military shipments to Latin American revolutionary
elements or sending Soviet military advisers is not yet evident.
Mr. SouRw^NE. To what extent are the Communists responsible for
the revolutionary expeditions which have appeared in the Caribbean
area in the past few years?
COMMUNIST THREAT THROUGH THE CARIBBEAN 165
General Cabell. The Communists have participated actively in
such expeditions, but we do not believe that they have organized them
nor dominated them.
Communist participation in such expeditions is demanded by their
^'national liberation" strategy and tactics. Such participation is also
fully in keeping with specific items and encouragement given them by
both the Soviet and Chinese Communists in early 1959.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Can you tell us, General, what is the extent of
Chinese Communist penetration in Latin America ?
General Cabell. I think this is essentially the question that you
were driving at, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Yes, sir.
General Cabell, Since 1952, the Chinese Communist penetration in
Latin America has been increasing.
In that year the Chinese Communists invited delegates from the
Pacific coast countries to attend a Peace Congress of Asian and Pacific
peoples in Peiping.
In 1956 the Chinese Communist penetration effort was intensified
through the establishment of direct relations with Latin American
Commimist Party representatives and the founding of a training
school in Peiping for Latin American Communists.
Chinese Communist revolutionary instruction is well received by
Latin American Communist students who find it practical and well
suited to the conditions in wliich they operate in Latin America.
They especially appreciate the fact that the Chinese Communists pay
even their travel expenses.
In February and March of 1959, Latin American Communist repre-
sentatives received specific advice and guidance from Mao Tze-tung
and other leading Chinese Communists concerning international Com-
munist policy and effective methods of canying on clandestine
activities.
Notably increased "cultural" exchanges and the formation of addi-
tional "friendship" societies have contributed to further Chinese Com-
munist penetration of Latin America.
With the aid of local Communist Parties, the Chinese Communists
have taken effective steps to establish throughout Latin America a
network of correspondents for their official New China News Agency.
Chinese Communist broadcasts to Latin America have been stepped
up to 14 program hours per week. Trade with Latin America is
also expanding.
Senator Hruska. General, what would you know or what would you
care to tell us about any interaction between the so-called China
Friendship Societies in Latin America and those here in America,
in the United States? Is there any interaction?
General Cabell. I do not think that we have been able to detect
any.
We have no evidence. The way they do that — they have that inter-
action, and certainly it occurs — is that the people from here will go
to a meeting in Moscow or Peiping, and the people from there will
go to the meeting in Moscow or Peiping, and then subsequently get
together and get their orders and philosophy and all at that point,
so that the exchange or the indoctrination does not actually take place
on U.S. soil. But we know that they attend these joint meetings of
those various front organizations.
166 COMMUNIST THREAT THROUGH THE CARIBBEAN
Mr. SouRWiNE. General, are tlie Chinese fjroiips resident in Latin
America significant with respect to Communist penetration ?
General Cabell. There are numerous Chinese colonies in Latin
America, mostly located in the principal cities. Many of thase Chi-
nese are second generation or more.
In Peru, where the largest Chinese population exists, the total, in-
cluding second generation, is about 50,000. Of these, some 14,000
are Chinese nationals, that is, immigrants retaining Nationalist Chi-
nese documentation, and 11,000 are located in Lima, the capital.
Li Cuba, the total Chinese population is about 40,000, of which
some 20,000 are in Havana.
Li Guayaquil, Ecuador, there are over 5,000; in Sao Paulo, Brazil,
there are over 1,000.
Mr. SoTJRwiNE. General, may I interrupt at that point, you say of
the 50,000 Chinese in Peru approximately 14,000 are Chinese Nationals
and 11,000 are located in Lima. You do not mean 11,000 out of the
14,000, but 11,000 out of the 50,000 ?
General Cabell. 11,000 out of the 50,000 is correct.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Please go ahead, sir.
General Cabell. In general, these Chinese are non-Communist and
relatively unimportant in terms of national politics. Many actively
favor the Nationalists.
There are, of course, some pro-Conmiunist elements, although very
few are known to be members of the Communist Party, and the various
parties have made no significant effort to expand their membership
within the local Chinese communities up to now.
However, in seeking to expand its commercial and propaganda re-
lations, the Chinese Communist Government is seeking to use these
people.
One of the puq^oses of the recent trip by Chinese journalists to
various Latin American countries was to establish contact with
friendly members of the local Chinese communities.
It is also known that Chinese have used false documentation, ob-
tained through members of the resident Chinese communities, as a
means of illegally obtaining documentation as nationals of a Latin
American country.
This procedure could very well be used, if required, by Chinese Com-
munists to infiltrate Asians into Latin America.
Eecently, there has been an increase in activity favoring Communist
China within the Chinese colonies. This has been most noticeable in
Peru and Cuba, but also is evident in countries with smaller Chinese
populations.
In Lima, where the anti-Communist newspaper Man-Sliing-Po has
a daily circulation of 10,000, the pro-Communist newspaper, the Voice
of the Chinese Colony has a daily circulation of about 3,000.
In Cuba, the New China Democratic Alliance, a Communist front,
has announced the establishment of a Chinese language newspaper in
Havana, which will be printed at the plant of Hoy, the Cuban Com-
munist Party organ.
Communist news sources stress the warm reception given to the
visiting Chinese newspapermen in Cuba by tlie local Chinese, as well
as by Eaul Castro and by the staff of Prensa Latina, another bit of
evidence of Prensa Latina's inclinations.
COMMUNIST THREAT THROUGH THE CARIBBEAN 167
The New China News Agency office in Havana, working in close
contact with the Prensa Latina, will serve to further Chinese Com-
munist propaganda penetration in Latin America.
There has been noticeable growth in the establishment of the
Conununist Chinese-Latin American "friendship societies." A total
of 18 now exist, of which 12 have been established quite recently.
With some exceptions, principally in Chile, the societies have not
drawn their members from the local Chinese communities. This is
probably not through design, but is the result of the relative lack of
importance of the Chinese, particularly those of pro-Communist
tendencies, in local intellectual, academic, and cultural life.
Mr. SouRwiNE. General, are there any significant pro-Communist
sympathies among the various Eastern European minority groups
living in Latin America, such as the Yugoslavs, Poles, the Czechs, and
the Hungarians ?
General Cabell. In all of these groups there are pro-Communist
elements which are seeking to bring these ethnic groups under greater
control.
Through their special attributes of race, language, culture, family
ties, business interests, these emigres form a special bridge for Com-
munist-backed programs calling for the establishment of closer diplo-
matic, commercial, and cultural ties with the bloc.
Undoubtedly they facilitate the work of Soviet bloc representatives
in Latin America. These groups have been targets of repatriation
programs which have declined from their peak of activity.
However, their Communist activities and influence are, in general,
peripheral and subservient to the national Communist Party of the
country concerned, and the national affiliates of the international
Communist fronts.
There are some 1,500 Slav Communists resident in Uruguay, many
of whom belong to the front organization Slav Union, L^nion Eslava,
which includes Eastern European emigres such as Poles, Czechs, Bul-
garians, Hungarians, and Rmnanians, and such independent groups
as Armenians and Lithuanians.
It has the mission of grouping together the different Slav comanuni-
ties under its political control.
It works in the preparation of conferences, cultural, and other
activities, in coordination with the Uruguayan-Soviet Cultural Insti-
tute. It receives abundant propaganda material from the LTnion of
Soviet Societies of Friendship and Cultural Relations with Foreigii
Countries.
In Argentina and Brazil there are also sig-nificant Slavic minority
groups. As in Uruguay, the chief vehicles for Communist influence
are the various cultural institutes or "friendship'' societies.
In Argentina, for example, there are some 13 Soviet cultural centers.
Such centers are used as distribution outlets for propaganda, as agen-
cies for sponsoring travel to and from Communist countries, by "cul-
tural" delegations, and for funding local pro-Comnimiist activities.
The satellite countries and Yugoslavia also seek to influence the
local emigre groups. In Chile, the Yugoslav group has been culti-
vated by the Yugoslav Embassy. The Titoist brand of commmiism
has met a sympathetic response from the Cliilean Socialists who form
part, of the political alliance which includes the Communist Party.
168 COMMUNIST THREAT THROUGH THE .CARIBBEAN
The Cliilean-Czechoslovakian Cultural Institute recently renewed
its activities, which have included the issuance of propaganda favor-
able to the establishment of diplomatic relations and expansion of
commercial relations with Czechoslovakia, and also the coordination
of propaganda work of the pro-Communist Cultural Institutes and
Centers in Cliile.
Mr. SouRwiNE. General, do these Eastern European groups repre-
sent a signiificant anti-Communist influence?
General Cabell. Excuse me just a moment. Senator, you had a
question ?
Senator Hruska. General, a little while ago I asked about the inter-
action among the Chinese groups in Latin America and here in
America. Would your answer be about the same if I had asked the
same question as to the Slovac groups and the other groups that you
have just discussed, in regard to tlieir interaction with American
groups here ?
General Cabell. I think so, but. Senator, please underetand that I
am not — we, in our agency, are not very expert as to what happens
in the United States by these groups. Any information that we
would have pointing towards that in the United States we would
furnish to the FBI, and they would develop that. I am not familiar
with the extent of their development of that activity.
If I may comment very briefly, the Canadian Slavs have been much
more active in coordinating with the South American Slavs than the
Americans have, to the best of our knowledge.
Senator Hruska. But whatever the answer is in that regard, the
fact would still remain that there is the avenue of contact and collab-
oration furnished by visits from the societies and centers in Latin
America to Moscow or to Prague
General Cabell. That is correct.
Senator Hruska, Or Warsaw ?
General Cabell. That is correct.
Senator Hruska. Which would be similarly visited by representa-
tives and leaders of the American groups?
General Cabell. That is where they would hold their skull sessions.
Senator Hruska. I wanted to establish that connection.
General Cabell. So as to avoid being detected in this country.
Mr. SouRwiNE. General, do these Eastern European groups in Latin
America represent a significant anti-Communist influence in terms
of the national life or policies of those countries ?
General Cabell. We would say no, in terms of the national life or
policy of any country; they do not represent a significant anti-Com-
munist group.
Mv. SouRwiNE. To what extent are the various national Communist
Parties aided by the receipt of propaganda literature from abroad ?
General Cabell. The quantity and variety of Communist propa-
ganda in circulation is literally enormous, and in Latin America
there are some 250 or more Communist publications, including Com-
munist Party theoretical journals, newspapers and youth organs, and
including also the publications of labor, youth, student, women, and
various professional or cultural fronts.
Increasing emphasis has been placed on developing publications
appealing to the intellectuals and the business community in which
COMMUNIST THREAT THROUGH THE CARIBBEAN 169
tile Commimist inspiration is concealed, or is of a more subtle and
more disarming nature, and wliich tend to offer nationalistic solutions
to national problems.
These publications are exchanged within the Latin American area.
In addition, propaganda is received from the Communist movement
in other free world countries and the bloc, and from the International
Communist headquarters.
Soviet bloc and Chinese Communist radio propaganda beamed at
Latin America now amomits to about 85 hours weekly in Spanish and
Portuguese, and 21 hours in Polish and other languages.
In recent years, the number of its outlets handling Communist
propaganda has increased, and the Soviet Union has moved into the
publishing field in Latin America.
For example, Editorial Grijalbo, a Communist publishing house
in Mexico City, published two basic Marxist tests in recent years,
along with other lesser works.
These are "Historical Materialism" by Konstantinov, and the
"Manual of Political Economy," both translated into Spanish in
Mexico.
The influence of these books can already be seen.
It may be noted also that "Problems of Peace and Socialism," that is
the World ISIarxist Review, the most important international Com-
munist theoretical journal, has been published in Spanish locally
at two points in Latin America, Bogota and Buenos Aires, and in
Portuguese in Brazil, in an effort to effect, to insure its dissemination.
Senator Hruska. General, you have mentioned the publishing house
in Mexico City. I do not know that you would care to comment on
it, but repeatedly we hear from various sources that there is a big
plant, a big printing plant, printing establishment right outside of
Mexico City where the Russians have approximately 800 persons em-
ployed and they are turning out Communist propaganda for ship-
ment into Latin American countries.
Would you care to comment on that ?
General Cabell. I am unable to identify this plant from your de-
scription. Most of the Soviet propaganda, including much that is
published in Spanish, is imported to Mexico where it is redistributed
through a number of outlets. The translation and publication and
distribution effort in Mexico involves a number of firms. We do not
have information on the present number of employees of the various
publishers and bookstores, but we believe that none employs anywhere
near 800 persons. In addition to Editorial Grijalbo, there is also
the Talleres Graficos de Libreria Madero S. A. which prints the fort-
nightly Information Bulletin of the Soviet Embassy and the Em-
bassy's newssheet, which appears 5 days a week. These publications
are prepared in the press office of the Soviet Embassy. Another pub-
lisher is the Fondo de Cultura Popular, A. C. (Editorial Popular),
which is the publishing house and bookstore of the Communist Party
of Mexico. The Libreria Nacional is a bookstore reportedly owned
by the Mexican Workers' and Peasants Party, a Communist splinter
group which is in contact with the CP of the Soviet Union. The In-
stitute of Mexican-Russian Cultural Exchange also runs a bookstore.
The regidar publication of the Institute, entitled Intercambio Cul-
tural, is printed by the Imprenta Cosmos. The Popular Party of Lorn-
170 COMMUNIST THREAT THROUGH THE CARIBBEAN
barclo Toledano and Workers' University, also run bookstores. The
Libreria Navarro, the Editorial Atlante and a number of other book-
stores sell Soviet publications or Communist, pro-Communist or leftist
publications originating in Latin America. There are also publishers
who specialize in material of a strongly Marxist or nationalist nature
which is of value to the Communist "national liberation" strategy.
The Latin American Confederation of Labor (CTAL) publishes
and distributes its own organ as well as the Spanish language editions
of the World Trade Union News and the bulletins of various trade
union internationals. It also publishes posters, resolutions, essays,
and other propaganda or training materials. The regiilar Spanish
language edition of the World Federation of Trade Unions' publica-
tion, edited by the CTAL, is printed by a finn named Impresiones
Modernas.
Mr. SouRwiNE. To Avhat extent, sir, have the Communist gains in
Latin America given concern to the governments of the Latin Ameri-
can nations, and what can you tell us about the counter measures these
governments have taken ?
General Cabell. Although apathy concerning the threat of com-
munism continues to prevail in some Latin American countries, there
is evidence that other Latin American governments are becoming more
concerned about the Communist threat, and are also more aware of the
nature of the clandestine tactics employed by the Communists.
Some governments are increasing the efficiency of their anti-Commu-
nist investigative work.
This is required if the illegal aspects of Communist Party opera-
tions, which are essential to Communist manipulation of non-Com-
munist leftists and nationalists, are to be rendered ineffective.
The arbitraiy suppression of political opposition groups as being
Communist or Conununist-front groups has been somewhat discred-
ited, and this is essential if the international Communist movement
with its Soviet direction is to be accurately identified.
Despite Communist claims, such arbitrary actions have never served
our best interests.
Concrete examples of recent governmental action, prompted by
increased awareness of the Communist threat, are seen in Argentina
and Mexico.
In Argentina, President Frondizi, tlirough executive decrees, has
banned certain Communist activities as part of a subversive plan
involving collaboration with agents of a foreign power, and jeop-
ardizing national sovereignty.
It will be recalled that in early 1959 Argentina and Mexico both
declared several bloc diplomats persona non grata for interfering
in internal aff'airs in connection with labor agitation.
In Venezuela, President Betancourt, an anti-Communist wlio is
aware of the opportunism, as well as the ultimate objectives of the
Communist program, has seen to it that the Communist Party is not
represented in the coalition government.
Mr. Chairman, that ends my prepared material, and I will be
happy to answer what questions your committee would like to put
to me.
The Chatrmax. Do the Communist Parties in Latin America make
it a practice to give financial aid to political stooges so that non-
Commmiist candidates receive Coimnunist support?
COMMUNIST THREAT THROUGH THE CARIBBEAN 171
General Cabell. Yes; in the following sense. In a number of
countries we have seen that the Communist Party is prepared actively
to campaign in favor of strongly nationalistic or opportunistic poli-
ticians, with or without open acknowledgment of this support, on the
understanding, or assumption, that Communists may win minor posts
or be given appointive posts. In some cases, where the Communist
Parties are legal, they have been able to form alliances with other
parties to support a joint slate, in which some Communist or pro-
Commmiist candidates are represented.
It is possible, in some cases, that the Communist Party might reward
a politician directly (rather than giving him campaign support only)
in return for certain guarantees. In general, however, we believe
that such payoffs would not be handled through the Communist
Party, but rather through clandestine non- Communist channels of
which only a few high Communist Party leaders are aware. It would
be poor policy to permit party members to Iviiow that funds are avail-
able and are being diverted to non-Communist politicians. Thus a
variety of covers might be used to explain the financing. For ex-
ample, a politician might be given an opportmiity to participate in
an import business, in partnership with a local agent who does
business with the Communist bloc. Or a politician, if he has written
nationalist books or articles, might be paid for the translation of
these articles for republication in some otlier countiy — not neces-
sarily in the Soviet bloc, but where it will serve to further the "anti-
imperialist" campaign. Again, a politician might be influenced by
an expenses-paid trip to the bloc and payments for subsequent lec-
tures or articles praising conditions there. In all these cases, it is
probable that the politician would have to commit himself to some
action sympathetic or helpful to the bloc Avliich is used to justify the
political support of the local Communist Party.
The Chairmax. Do you have infonnation about a reported Com-
munist program to oust U.S. interests from the copper mines in Chile ?
General Cabell. It is the great hope of the Communist Party of
Chile that such action will be taken. It is an integral part of every
Communist program in Latin America to oust U.S. interests from
every mine and every petroleum company in Latin America.
The Chair^iax. That is time of the tin mines in Bolivia ?
General Cabell. It goes for anythmg the United States possesses.
The Chairmax. Yes, sir.
Can you give the names of any known Russian agents operating in
Cuba?
General Cabell. "We do not have the names currently of any
Russian agents, Soviet agents, operating in Cuba, to my knowledge.
Do you have in mind Vadim Kotchergin of last May ? We have evi-
dence of the visits of Soviet agents in Cuba, but the fact that they
are now in residence we do not have that.
The Chairmax. But they do visit the country ?
General Cabell. Yes.
The Chairmax. Is that also true of Red Chinese ?
General Cabell. We have the record of Red Chinese visiting. Now,
whether you would label them as intelligence agents or not is another
question.
172 COMIMUNIST THREAT THROUGH THE CARIBBEAN
The Chairman. Do you have evidence of agents of either country
operating in other parts of Latin America?
General Cabell. I would give the same answer with respect to the
visits.
Now, with respect to whether or not any of them remain in those
countries
Senator Johnston. It is not a question of whether they came over
here to spread their propaganda or not; we liave them coming into
the United States, too, even Khrushcliev came.
General Cabell. Without specifying cases, we have known of So-
viet intelligence activities in Mexico, in Buenos Aires, and Uruguay.
Tlie Chairman. Do you have any evidence of the activities of
agents from Russia ?
General Cabell. Well, I was referring to So^det espionage carried
out through the installations, because the general pattern is, if you
have a Soviet Embassy, somebody in there is charged with espionage
and clandestinely he gets into operation. Without specifying cases,
we have known concretely of Soviet espionage in the countries I have
mentioned.
The Chairman. Do you have any knowledge of a report that the
central committee of the Spanish Communist Party has been trans-
ferred from Mexico City to Havana *
General Cabell. No. The members of the central committee of the
Spanish Communist Party are scattered, with the majority — or at
least the most important members — resident within the Soviet bloc.
The last meeting of the central committee was held within the Soviet
bloc. Certain central committee membei*s have lived in Mexico, but
we know of none resident in Cuba.
The Chairman. To what extent can the recent riots in the Canal
Zone be attributed to Communist influence ?
General Cabell. Mr. Chairman, there is do doubt but what the
Communists in Panama have been agitating over the years to get the
Americans out of the Canal Zone or in any other way to interfere
with our continued operation of the Canal and enjoyment of all of
our rights down there.
Certainly, therefore, that agitation played a role in the riots of the
last few days in Panama.
We do not know as of this stage, that these particular riots at these
particular times and places were directed by or organized by or con-
trolled by any known Communists.
The Chairman. Do you have knowledge
Senator Hruska. Would the Chairman yield, and may I follow up
on that particular topic ?
The Chairman. Yes.
Senator HfeusKA. A little bit ago you suggested that one of the aims
of tlie Communist Party was to affect — that is, to deprive America of
anything that she owns or controls in any of the Latin American
countries, mines, petroleum fields, and so on.
General Cabell. And the Panama Canal.
Senator Hruska. Would that extend to installations like the
Panama Canal?
General Cabell. It most certainly does.
Senator Hruska. Or Guantanamo Bay in Cuba, and that sort of
thing?
COMMUNIST THREAT THROUGH THE CARIBBEAN 173
General Cabell. It most certainly does.
Senator Hruska. So it is not only in the nature of investment fields
but military holdings, as well ?
General Cabell. Yes.
Senator Hruska. Well now, what will be the effect there in Latin
America if there is — and this is highly suppositious, if the United
States abandons its traditional strong attitude toward the naval base
in Cuba, for example, or makes additional concessions in the Panama
Canal, what effect will that have on the attitude of Latin American
countries toward America ?
General Cabell. I am not very much an expert on this subject, but
I would say that the question of abandonment per se is not as im-
portant as the case that the United States would put up in its in-
sistence upon retention of the base.
If the United States said, "We no longer have a requirement for
the base at Guantanamo and, therefore, we are abandoning that base,"
that is one set of circumstances.
But if the United States said that "We have no alternative but to
pick up here and leave because you are forcing us out," I think that
latter circumstance would have a disadvantageous bearing upon the
United States position in Latin America generally.
Senator Hruska. Let us get to a little narrower field. There has
been what amounts to virtual expropriation of American property
in Cuba. If that is suffered to remain in that state, is that apt to
have the impact on the otlier Latin American countries to embolden
them to similar confiscation of American properties within their
borders ?
General Cabell. From the standpoint of commonsense and hu-
man nature I would answer that in the affinnative, but not on the
basis of any evidence that I have in the other country.
Senator Johnston. General, are you familiar with the operation
of the Panama Canal ?
General Cabell. Yes, sir.
Senator Johnston. We have a very delicate situation there in
regard to Panamanian laborei'S that we employ there. It is hell if
we do and hell if we don't with regard to their pay.
If we go up on the pay and pay them more, then we will interfere
with tlie economy of the Panamanians, and if we do not go up they
criticize us for not paying them, so since I have to handle that situa-
tion, that is the reason I am familiar with it, and we have had a
great deal of trouble in that particular field, and it makes no differ-
ence what you do, you are cussed; isn't that right?
General Cabell. That is right.
I was stationed in Panama for 3 years a number of years ago, and
I know well that situation and I personally do not know the answer
to it.
Senator Johnston. No, I do not know either, but it is causing a
great deal of trouble there, and it leaves an open field for a great
deal of criticism by the Panamanians. It makes no difference what
we do.
General Cabell. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. Do you know about the book "Lessons in Read-
ing and Writing" published by the Castro government which is being
used in the schools in Cuba ?
174 COMMUNIST THREAT THROUGH THE CARIBBEAN '
General Cabfxl. We have a copy of this book, which is designed f
primarily for teachino; adults. It is being used, for example, in the
education classes ^Yhich the army holds for illiterates.
The book is extremely simple, but nevertheless is strongly na-
tionalistic. In itself, it is neither pro-Communist nor anti-American.
It glorifies the revolution and its principal leadei-s — Fidel Castro,
Raul Castro, and "Che" Guevara.
The Chairman. Do you have knowledge of a secret military or-
ganization known as Amere, composed of ex-combatants of the Span-
ish civil war, which is now functioning in Cuba?
General Cabell. No; or not by this title. We are aware of the
UCE (Union de Combatientes Espanoles — Union of Spanish Combat-
ants), which is the military group associated with Gen. Alberto
Bayo, who trained the nucleus of the Castro guerrilla force. There
are other leftist groups also, such as the APLE (Agrupacion por la
Libertad de Espana^Group for the Liberty of Spain) . Another is
the FUDE (Frente Unido Democratico Espanol — United Spanish
Democratic Front), which is closely related to the MLE (Movimiento
por la Libertad de Espana — Movement for the Liberty of Spain) . All
of these are active in Cuba. There is also a group known as the
ARDE (Accion Republicana Democratica Espanola), with head-
quarters in Paris, which may have* a branch or members in Cuba.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Mr. Chairman, so that the record may be clear
about the Panamanian riots of which the chairman spoke, perhaps it
might be desirable to put in the record in connection with that ques-
tion the New York Times' story about what happened.
The Chairman. It will be admitted.
(The article referred to reads as follows :)
[From the New York Times, Nov. 4, 1959]
Anti-U.S. Mobs Riot in Panama, Stone Canal Police and Rip Flag — 36 Ake
Reported Injured
(By Paul P. Kennedy)
Panama, November 3. — Repeated mob attempts to invade the Canal Zone
were broken up this morning by Canal Zone police using clubs, tear gas, and
high pressure hoses.
Demonstrators hurled rocks and at least six policemen were treated for con-
tusions. Two youths were arrested. Later, mobs in the city of Panama burned
cars, tore down the Stars and Stripes in front of the U.S. Embassy and stoned
U.S. agencies.
After 4 hours of rioting, U.S. troops with bayonets and machine guns took
over the guarding of the border.
The Panamanian authorities said 30 Panamanians were in a hospital here as
a result of today's violence, 9 of them with birdshot wounds inflicted by the U.S.
forces and 1 with a bayonet wound.
Violence also was reported in the Panamanian city of Colon, at the At-
lantic end of the canal, where the U.S. consulate was attacked.
The demonstrations were in commemoration of the 56th anniversary of Pana-
ma's independence from Colombia. The clashes occurred in the course of at-
tempts by Panamanians, who described themselves as National University stu-
dents, to plant the Panamanian flag in the Canal Zone.
The flag invasion was organized by former Foreign Minister Aquilino Boyd
to symbolize Panamanian sovereignty over the zone. Dr. Boyd, a candidate for
the presidency next year, has also called for Panama to get 50 percent of the
Canal tolls.
The first wave of students, bearing a large Panamanian flag, was turned back
at 10 :21 this morning after marching about 50 feet into the zone.
COMMUNIST THREAT THROUGH THE CARIBBEAN 175
FIEST ENTRY REPELLED
At the order of the Canal Zone's police chief, Maj. B. A. Darden, U.S. police-
men in crash helmets and with mob sticks began pushing the crowds back into
Panamanian territory.
The crowd, mostly youths, sang the Panamanian anthem and then paraded
along Tivoli Avenue, which is the border between the zone and the capital city.
Five Panamanian National guardsmen accompanied the marchers, keeping them
on the Panamanian side.
More than two companies of U.S. troops with bayonets were stationed behind
the canal police but did not engage in the action.
Violence broke out shortly after 11 o'clock when a youth apparently of high
school age edged too far over. Canal Zone policemen tried to push him back and
a scuffle ensued.
When policemen put the youth into a Canal Zone patrol car, Panamanians pelted
the car and the police with rocks from a rubble heap. Shortly afterward, the
canal police began using tear gas and water hoses.
A Panamanian patrol car paused at the riot scene briefly but moved off.
At one point the demonstrators crossed the avenue in the face of tear gas and
pressure hoses and tied a flag to a traffic signal post. It was torn down by zone
policemen. Another wave of Panamanians advanced to put it up again, but they
were driven back.
From the telegraph office near by, which remained open only to correspondents,
fires could be seen in two directions. In one direction, automobiles belonging to
U.S. citizens were being burned in a parking lot. In another, a passenger car of
the U.S. -owned Panama Railroad was being burned in front of its station.
A block away, the plate glass windows of Pan American Airways were being
demolished. Farther off, windows of the U.S. Information Service were being
stoned.
Acts of vandalism, incendiarism, and violence were reported throughout the
city, adding up to the worst anti-U.S. outbreak here in memory.
Canal Zone authorities estimated the number of demonstrators and onlookers
at the border at 2,000.
The U.S. Embassy said it had presented a note of "strongest protest" to
Panama against the desecration of the flag and damage to U.S. property.
It warned that the attacks might have "serious consequences" and demanded
protection by the National Guard.
Maj. Gen. William E. Potter, Governor of the Canal Zone, said he had called
for U.S. troops after damage had been done to zone property and at least one
canal patrol car had been burned. He said he had asked the Embassy to pro-
test against the failure of the Panamanian National Guard to act when the
rioting began.
The Governor charged that the Panamanian authorities "did not at any time
attempt to control" the attackers. He said the authorities had shown a "strange
lack of will." "Much earlier, the authorities could have prevented the attacks,"
he said. General Potter ordered that the zone radio broadcast a warning for all
zone residents to remain in their neighborhoods and not approach the borders,
where "agitators" were seeking to provoke incidents.
The U.S. Ambassador, Julian F. Harrington, said angrily that at the time of
the attack on the Embassy, he and his staff were In the National Palace "felici-
tating Panama on its independence."
He added that the flag that had been torn down "was being flown in honor
of Panama's independence and, ironically enough, the window display in the
ruined showcase of the Information Service was dedicated to Panamanian
independence."
Mr. Harrington said he had received word that the U.S. consulate in Colon,
Panama, had been attacked. He said he had asked Panama "for adequate
protection."
The day's incidents began quietly before 8 a.m. when Dr. Boyd led a party into
the zone. He was accompanied in what he termed "a peaceful invasion" by Dr.
Ernesto Castillero, Jr., a professor of history at the National University and a
leading nationalist.
The group posed with Panamanian flags before the monument to George Wash-
ington Goethals, builder of the canal. Then they left.
Pablo Othon, president of the National assembly, who visited the scene of the
fighting, said : "I look at this as a very bad thing and not helping anyone."
176 COMMUNIST THREAT THROUGH THE CARIBBEAN
Under a treaty signed with Panama after she was split off from Colombia in
1903, the United States has a perpetual lease on the 10-mile-wide Canal Zune.
The terms give the United States rights "as if" it held sovereignty, which has
long been a subject of dispute here.
Senator IIruska. General, ayb had testifying before us in open ses-
sion some months ago Pedro Diaz Lanz, and he gave testimony re-
specting indications that Communist military supplies were furnished
to the Castro forces.
Can you tell us anything about the extent to which such aid was
provided through those sources ?
General Cabell. I could not ofi'hand. I have not seen any informa-
tion indicating such aid was given.
I think our answer there would be that we doubt that any large
amounts of arms were provided on any extensive scale or else we would
have more evidence of it than we now have. If we had it, it would be
in my testimony.
Senator Hruska. There was also testimony with reference to sub-
marines, Russian submarines, having been observed in Cuban waters,
Caribbean waters and Cuban waters. Can you tell us anything about
those ?
General Cabell. "We have been unable to verify any such reports.
Senator Hruska. And part of the testimony was to the effect that
certain supplies and equipment were landed from the submarines.
Have you had anything along that line ?
General Cabell. We have not.
Senator Hruska. This Pedro Diaz Lanz has testified before us
here, and I notice he has been arrested down in Florida. Castro has
been demanding his extradition.
General Cabell. Yes.
Senator Hruska. Have you any comment as to the effect of such
extradition, if it is even considered, let alone granted, upon this whole
situation, the Latin American operation of the Communist Party?
General Cabell. Any comment I would make. Senator, would be
very highly speculative. I think it would all depend upon the cir-
cumstances of his extradition, the extent of the evidence against him
here.
The Chairman. Do you have any information that this man Diaz
dropped a bomb or machinegunned anyone or did anything but drop
leaflets?
General Cabell. Of course, the Cuban Government is trying at
least to show that he machinegunned or dropped bombs. But there
would be a judge or a commission that will hear that evidence.
Mr. SouRWiNE. Isn't the tradition of political asylum pretty deeply
ingrained in the policies of all the Latin American countries?
General Cabell. Yes, political asylum; but criminal asylum is
another matter.
Mr. SouRWiNE. Well, do not the Latin American countries tradi-
tionally grant political asylum even in the face of the inevitable
charges of criminality which are always brought against such persons?
The Chakman. Even as against Batista.
General Cabell. It is pretty complicated in view" of the question of
when political asylum includes asylum for a man who has assassinated
people in the course of his political activity.
COMMUNIST THREAT THROUGH THE CARIBBEAN 177
Senator Hruska. And we are going to rim into that. In fact we
have encountered that already, because there have been charges by
various members of tlie Castro government, that certain people who
are here in the United States were members of the Batista government
and with great abandon did mow down people with horse pistols and
with machineguns, and so on. And then the question arises at that
point, does it not, whether political asylum can be granted or is the
record outright criminal? Is it in that regard, Mr. Sourwine, that
you ask about the well-ingrained political asylum principle?
Mr. SouKwiNE. I ask about it, because it seems a little bit anomalous
that, with this deeply ingrained tradition of political asylum in the
Latin American countries, there should be so much concern about
political asylum awarded to one Latin American in this country.
Senator Hruska. General, Dr. Emilio Nunez Portuondo, formerly
President of the Security Council of the United Nations, made a tour
of Latin American countries not too long ago, and he came back pre-
dicting that a substantial part, if not all, of Latin America will fall
to the Communists within 6 or 7 months. Is the situation that im-
mediate ? What comment would you have on that remark of his ?
General Cabell. I think that is entirely too alarmist.
On the other hand, the whole thrust of my presentation here to
you today has been to the effect that it is a serious situation. But I
would not attach any such timetable as he has.
Senator Hruska. It impressed most of us as being very, very ex-
treme, and I wondered what your testimony was. Certainly the tenor
of your testimony this morning was that it was a much more long-
range proposition than that.
Senator Johnston. What is the population of Argentina ?
General Cabell. Senator, I would be guessing. I would not like to
put a guess in your record.
Mr. Sourwine. General, does your agency have any knowledge
about the present situation of Eafael Del Pino, who is an American
citizen shot in Cuba or taken into custody ?
General Cabell. Del Pino was in prison in Havana as of September
1959. His trial has been delayed due to the injuries he suffered. Our
most recent information is that it had been set for November 20, 1959.
Senator Hruska. There was an organization in Cuba referred to as
BRAC, Bureau Of Resistance To Communist Activities is a liberal
translation of its official name. Is it still functioning ?
General Cabell. It is not functioning. Senator. As a matter of fact,
one of the first targets of the Castro forces, Castro and his entourage,
was the complete destruction of BRAC.
Senator PIruska. At least a removal of its records. We do not know
if they were destroyed ; do we ?
General Cabell. No, sir ; there was a very large element of destruc-
tion involved in the records.
Senator Hruska. And w^hen you said records you refer to
General Cabell. Whatever information BRAC might have assem-
bled on the activities of the Communist Party.
Senator Hruska. And tliose records go back a long wav, as long as
30 years?
General Cabell. I doubt if the BRAC had records going back that
far. BRAC was established only a few years ago— in 1954 or 1955 —
178 COMMUNIST THREAT THROUGH THE CARIBBEAN
although the Comnninist Party in Cuba was founded over 30 years
ago and it is probable that they had some information on it eoins
back that far. ^
Senator Hruska. BRAC had a predecessor of some kind; didn't
it?
General Cabell. Well, there was no office or agency for the investi-
gation of Communist Party and international Comnninist conspira-
torial activities. There were investigative agencies, such as the De-
partment of Investigation, but these were not primarily interested in
communism.
The Chairman. What caused Batista to fall? Just what hap-
pened ?
General Cabell. Well, :Mr. Chairman, he did not have a sound base
for his regime.
The Chairman. Was his army whipped in the field ? Was he de-
posed by his generals ?
General Cabell. The army disintegrated. Its morale just com-
pletely disintegrated in the face of the growing nmiibers in the Castro
movement. It became helpless.
Senator Johnston. Did they continue to pay the soldiers ?
General Cabell. Essentially; yes. * I do not think that it disbanded
through lack of pay. That was not it.
Their heart was not in it. They recognized the Batista regime as
being corrupt, and they were generally impressed by the slogans that
the revolutionaries were putting out, and so they did not have the will
to fight or the leaders did not have the courage to attempt to fight, so
there really was no fight.
The Chairman. We received testimony from the President-elect
of Cuba, who never took office, that representatives of the American
Government in November or December, which was it
Mr. SouRwiNE. Sir, I think it was November.
The Chairman. Called on the generals and stated that our Govern-
ment would not recognize the election of the new government in Cuba
and that, thei'efore, the Army lost confidence, and that the Army
caused Batista to leave the country and attempted to make a deal with
Castro.
General Cabell. Are you asking me the question, Mr. Chairman ?
The Chairman. If you have any information about it.
General Cabell. Mr. Chairman, there was no such approach made
by members of CIA. I do not know whether or not any such ap-
proach was made by any Government agencies, but my best belief is
that it is incorrect. It did not happen.
And, as a matter of fact, the lack of an army forced him to run, but
not the army.
The Chairman. Yes, sir.
But what I got was just the sense of what he said, as I remember it.
I think he said the army then caused Batista to leave. They at-
tempted to make a deal with Castro, and each one of those generals
was killed.
General Cabell. As a matter of fact, Mr. Chairman, Batista put
in arrest several of his principal army leaders before his flight.
Senator Hruska. General, Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands are
pretty much down in that neighborhood where there is a lot of ac-
COMMUNIST THREAT THROUGH THE CARIBBEAN 179
tivity. Has anything come to your attention as to any efforts along
subversive lines there along tlie same approach you have described
in other countries ?
General Cabell. Senator, we are not knowledgeable or expert in
that.
Senator Hruska. If there were not any such activities they would
have to start someplace and end there. I just wondered if there was
anything that came to your attention in connection with the effort
that you make.
General Cabell. I do not know of any concerted or organized move-
ment against the Virgin Islands or against Puerto Rico or against
U.S. interests in those places, based outside the area.
Senator Johnston. What was Batista's attitude toward the Com-
munists ?
General Cabell. Batista was opposed to the Communists, but with-
out a great depth of feeling.
As a matter of fact, it was in Batista's regime that BRAC was estab-
lished for the purpose of combating the Communists.
Senator Hruska. Might it be said that his opposition to them was
that he conceived of them as a political enemy of his own ?
General Cabell. That is right. He was not really interested in —
he did not hoist aboard the idea of an international Communist
movement.
Senator Johnston. Isn't that also true now of Castro ? A lot of
those were leaders with him against Batista, and he is appointmg
them in the Government.
General Cabell. But I would say in the case of Batista there was
just an unawareness of it. But in the case of many of the leaders
around Castro they do not seem to care.
The Chairman. They cooperate with them.
General Cabell. Yes.
Senator Hruska. In connection with Puerto Rico, particularly, we
have heard evidence that there were mailings of Communist literature,
emanating from presumably Mexico, made into Puerto Rico on a basis
not as large as in some other countries, because it is a smaller area, but
we do have evidence on that score.
Senator Johnston. We do have evidence that it is coming into the
United States, too.
General Cabell. Yes.
Senator Johnston. In New York, if you go up there, you see a room
three times as big as this, covered with such mailings.
The Chairman. Any further questions ?
Gentlemen, we thank you.
General Cabell. It is a pleasure, Mr. Chairman.
(Whereupon, at 1 :05 p.m., the committee adjourned.)
INDEX
Note: The Senate Internal Security Subcommittee attaches no significance to
the mere fact of the appearance of the name of an individual or an organization
In this index.
A
Page
Adduci, Giacomo (Italian labor leader) 151
Africa 143
Agrarian reform 163
Agrarian Reform Institute 144
Alvarado, Cesar Alonso 153
Anti-Batista struggle 154
"Anti-imperialist struggle" 147, 149
"Anti-U.S. Mobs Riot in Panama" (New York Times, November 1959)
(by Paul P. Kennedy) 174-176
APLE (Agrupacion por la Libertad de Espana— Group for the Liberty
of Spain) 174
ARDE (Accion Republicana Democratica Espanola) 174
Argentina 143, 151, 157, 167, 170, 177
Armenians 167
Asia 143
Batista 141, 176, 178, 179
Bayo, Gen Alberto 174
Betancourt, President 170
Bhutan 159
Bogota 169
Bolivia 143, 147, 171
Boyd, Aquilino (former Foreign Minister of Panama) 174
Boye, Maurice 151
BRAG (Bureau of Resistance to Communist Activities) 177-179
Brazil 143, 151, 153, 156, 167, 169
(Sao Paulo) 166
Brazilian Institute for Advanced Studies 148
British Honduras 153
Buenos Aires 169, 172
Budapest ___— 148
Buenos Aires 151
Cabell, Gen. C. P. (Deputy Director, VIA), statement of 141
Canal Zone 172, 176
Caribbean waters 176
Castillero, Ernesto, Jr 175
Castro, Fidel 141, 155, 161, 163, 164, 174, 179
Castro forces 162, 174, 176
Castro government 173
Castro, Raul (Chief of Cuban Armed Forces) 149,155,163,166,174
"Che" Guevara 174
Chile 147, 151, 153, 157, 167, 168
Santiago 151, 158
Chilean-Czechoslovakian Cultural Institute 168
Chilean Socialists 167
Chilean Teachers Union (12th National Convention of) 151
n INDEX
Pagre
China/Chinese 143, 149, 152, 153, 159, IGl
Red China 147, 150, 152, 156, 159, 171
China Friendship Societies 165
Chou Ea-lai 159
CIA 178
Colombia 143, 147, 153, 176
Communist Party :
Argentina 147
Brazil 158
China 143, 147, 148, 162, 165
Cuba 145, 178
Latin America 143, 148, 149
Mexico 169
Of Soviet Union 141, 143, 146-149, 165
Communist Party membership in Latin America (table) 161
"Congress for International Cooperation, General Disarmament and Na-
tional Sovereignty" 157
"Congress of the Peoples of Latin America" 157
Costa Rica 148
Cuba 143-145, 147, 151, 153, 154, 156, 158, 162, 166, 171, 173, 174, 177
Cuban Government 144, 155, 176
Havana 152, 166, 167, 172
Cuban Sugar Stabilization Institute 145
Cuban Revolution 149, 155
Cuban waters . 176
"Cultural" exchanges 165
Cultural Institutes and Centers (pro-Communist in Chile) 168
Czechoslovakia 152, 156
(Czechs) 167
Czechoslovakian News Agency 157
D
Dange, S. A. (Indian Communist) 151
Darden. Maj. B. A. (Canal Zone's police chief ) 175
Delanoue, Paul 151
Del Pino, Rafael 177
Department of Investigation 178
Despestre, Rene 158
Dominican Republic 158, 161
E
Eastland, Senator James O 141
East-West struggle 142
Ecuador 143, 147, 153
(Guayaquil) 166
Editorial Atlante 170
Editorial Grijalbo (Communist publishing house) 169
Europe 147, 152
(Western) 147, 152
P
FBI 148, 168
First Latin American Congress of Women 158
Florida 176
Fondo de Cultura Popular, A.C. (Editorial Popular) 169
Formosa 153
"Friendship" societies 165, 167
Frondizi, President 170
FUDE (Frente Unido Democratico Espanol — United Spanish Democratic
Front) 174
Galarza, Jorge 153
Germany (East) 147
Girete, Otto Cesar Vargas 153
Gomez, Orlando Funcia (Brazilian Communist youth leader) 153
INDEX m
Page
Guadalupe 153
Guantanamo Bay 172, 173
Guatemalan territory 153
Guedes, Ruben 153
Guevara, Ernesto (Che) 163
Guiana 153
H
Haitian National Liberation Movement 158
Harrington, Julian F. (U.S. Ambassador) 175
Hart, Dr. Armando (Minister of Education) 157
Havana 152, 166, 167, 172
"Historical Materialism" 169
Honduras 158
Hoy (Cuban Communist newspaper) 149, 157, 158, 166
Hruska, Senator Roman L 141
Hungarians 167
I
Imprenta Cosmos 169
Impresiones Modernas 170
Information Bulletin (of Soviet Embassy) 169
Institute of Mexican-Russian Cultural Exchange 169
Intercambio Cultural 169
International Communist movement 153
International Organization of Journalists 156
International Union of Students (lUS) 147-149, 153, 154
Interparliamentary Union 144
lUS 152
J
Jaroslav Knobloch 156
Johnston, Senator Olin D 141
K
Khrushchev 159, 172
Kommunist (Soviet Communist Party magazine) 141
Konstantinov 169
Korea, North 143, 162
Kotchergin, Vadim 171
L
La Cabana Fortress (Havana) 154
Lanz, Pedro Diaz 176
Latin American Confederation of Labor (CTAL) ( Conf ederacion de
Trabajadores de America Latina) 150, 170
Latin America Congress of Journalists 156
Latin American Youth 153
Latin American Youth & Student Congress 155
Leduc, Renato 156
"Lessons in Reading and Writing" (book), 173
Libreria Nacional 169
Libreria Navarro 170
Lithuanians 167
Liu Shao-chi 159
Lombardo Toledano's Popular Party in Mexico 161
M
Magil, Abe (CPUSA representative at 12th CP-Mexico Congress) 152
Maudel, Benjamin 141
Man-Shing-Po (anti-Communist newspaper) 166
"Manual of Political Economy" 169
Mao Tze-tung 159, 165
IV INDEX
Paw
Martinique 153
Marxist/ism 145, 148
Marxist-Leninist theory 146
Massip, Antonio 154
Mexican-Russian Cultural Exchange Institute 145
Mexican Workers' and Peasants' Party 169
Mexico 143, 151, 153, 156-158, 170, 172, 179
Mexico City 169
ML) (Movimiento por la Libertad de Espana — Movement for the Liberty
of Spain) "_ 174
Montevideo 151
Moscow 146, 147, 149, 165, 168
N
National assembly 175
National Association of Semi-Public Employees (Asociacion Nacional de
Empleados Semi-Fiscales) 151
"National liberation" struggle 143, 146, 149-151, 158
"National liberation" strategy and tactics 165, 170
National Metal Workers Congress 151
National University 175
New China Democratic Alliance 166
New China News Agency 157, 165, 167
New York 179
Nicaragua * 153, 158
1958 May Day celebration 151
Othon, Pablo 175
Panama 147, 157, 172, 174
(Canal) 172, 173
(Colon) 175
Pan American Airways 175
Paredes, Efrain Alvarez 153
Paris 174
Peace Congress of Asian and Pacific peoples 165
"Peaceful invasion" 175
"Peace prize" 146
Peiping 147, 149, 153, 159, 165
"People's Congress" 149, 155, 157
Peru 153, 157, 166
Poland 147, 152
Poles 167
Ponomarev, Boris N 141
Popular Party in Mexico 161
Popular Party of Lombardo Toledano and Workers' University 170
Popular Socialist Party 155
Portuguese 169
Portuondo, Dr. Emilio Nunez 177
Potter, Maj. Gen. William E. (Governor of Canal Zone) 175
Prague 152. 168
Presna Latina Agency 156, 157, 166
Prestes, Luis Carlos 158
Problems of Peace and Socialism (World Marxist Review) 148, 169
Puerto Rico 178, 179
Q
Quemoy 153
INDEX 'V
B
Page
Rio de Janeiro 144, 151
Rumanians 167
Russia 144, 152, 172
Russian submarines 176
S
Scarponi, Paolo 151
Schroeder, Frank W 141
Seventh World Youth Festival 153
Sikkim 159
Sixth Youth Festival 154
Slav/s :
(Communist 167
(Union) 167
(Canadian)—. ____- ___________„___ 168
(South American) . 168
Spanish 169
Sourwine, J. G 141
Soviet Embassy 169, 172
Soviet Federation for Friendship and Cultural Cooperation 158
Soviet/s 145
Soviet/s foreign policy 145
Soviet Union 143, 144, 146-148, 150, 154, 159-161, 169
Stalin 159
Stockholm 157
T
Talleres Graficos de Libreria Madero S. A 169
Tass 157
Toledano, Lombardo 161
Trade Unions International of Public & Allied Workers 151
Trade Unions International of Textile & Clothing Workers 151
Trade Unions Internationals 151
Twelfth CP-Mexico Congress 152
21st Communist Party of the Soviet Union Congress 149
U
UCB (Union de Combatientes Espanoles — Union of Spanish Ck)mbatants)_ 174
Union Eslava 167
Union of Latin American Friendship (Union de Amistad Latino Ameri-
cana) 158
Union of Soviet Societies of Friendship and Cultural Relations 167
United Nations, Security Council of 177
Uruguay 143, 157, 167, 172
Uruguayan Communist Youth 155
Uruguayan-Soviet Cultural Institute 167
U.S. Embassy 175
U.S. Information Service 175
U.S.S.R 162, 164
V
Venezuela 143, 147, 153, 156, 170
Venezuelan National Press Congress 156
Vienna 153
Vietnam (North) 143
Virgin Islands 178, 179
Voice of the Chinese Colony 166
VI INDEX
W
Page
Warsaw jgg
Western Hemisphere ikq
wFTu :-:::::::::::::::::::::: li
Women's International Democratic Federation 148 149 158
Workers' University (Mexico City) "I '___ ' 148
World Federation of Democratic Youth ^"149" 153 154
World Federation of Teachers' Unions _V_V_ I. ' 151
World Federation of Trade Unions 146, 148^150 ~152 170
(4th Congress of) '_ '___ ' 15^^
(Metal & Engineering Workers of) ~~~~ ~ ~ 151
World Student News (monthly organ of International UnronoYstudents)" 153
World Trade Union News 17q
Y
Yugoslav/s/ia _ jg^
Yugoslav Embassy I™~1~1IZ1I1~1~_I1 167
X
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