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Full text of "Communist threat to the United States through the Caribbean. Hearings before the Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act and Other Internal Security Laws of the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, Eighty-sixth Congress, first session .."

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AUGUST 27, 30, 1960 

Printed for the use of the Committee on the Judiciary 

61355 O WASHINGTON : 1960 


JAMES O. EASTLAND, Mississippi, Chairman 


THOMAS C. HENNINOS, Jr., Missouri ROMAN L. HRUSKA, Nebraska 



SAM J. ERVIN, Jr., North Carolina 
JOHN A. CARROLL, Colorado 
THOMAS J. DODD, Connecticut 
PHILIP A. HART, Michigan 

Subcommittee To Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security 
Act and Other Internal Security Laws 

JAMES O. EASTLAND, Mississippi, Chairman 
THOMAS J. DODD, Connecticut, Vice Chairman 
OLIN D. JOHNSTON, South CaroUna ROMAN L. HRUSKA, Nebraska 


SAM J. ERVIN, JR., North Carolina KENNETH B. KEATING, New York 

. NORRIS COTTON, New Hampshire 
J. Q. SouRWiNE, Counsel 
Benjamin Mandbl, Director- of Research 


Testimony of — Page 

Arthur Gardner 663 

Earl E. T. Smith 681 



AUGUST 27, 1960 

U.S. Senate, 
Subcommittee to Investigate the 
Administration of the Internal Security Act 

AND Other Internal Security Laws, 
OF THE Committee on the Judiciary, 

Watch Hill, R.L 
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 5 :40 p.m., at the home 
of Arthur Gardner, Watch Hill, R.I., Senator Thomas J. Dodd 

Senator Dodd. Let the record show this is a hearing taking place 
at the home of Mr. Arthur Gardner, Watch Hill, R.I. 

I should say to you, Mr. Gardner, that the purpose of our inquiry 
is to help us to determine whether or not there is any need for remedial 

We of the Internal Security Subcommittee of the Judiciary Com- 
mittee are under a mandate from the U.S. Senate to concern our- 
selves with this type of problem. 

Now, Mr. Gardner, I will have to ask you to stand and be sworn. 
Raise your right hand. Do you solemnly swear the testimony you 
will give at this hearing will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing 
but the truth, so help you God ? 
Mr. Gardner. I do. 



Senator Dodd. Mr, Gardner, would you state your full name, your 
address, and your business and profession ? 

Mr. Gardner. Arthur Gardner. My business is chairman of the 
board of Bundy Tubing Co., which is in Detroit, but I live in 

Senator Dodd. What is your legal address ? 

Mr. Gardner. You want the home address or the office ? 

Senator Dodd. Your legal address, where you have your residence. 

Mr. Gardner. Well, that is 2111 30th Street, NW. 

Senator Dodd. Washington, D.C. ? 

Mr. Gardner, D.C. 

Senator Dodd. Mr. Gardner, have you held any positions with the 
U.S. Government ? 

Mr. Gardner. Yes. 
^ Senator Dodd. Would you tell us what they have been, please ? 


Mr. Gardner. The first ^vas — you mean — now, let me get this 
straight. I was in the Army in World Waw I. Is that interesting? 

Senator DoDD. Yes. 

Mr. Gardner. And then in World War II, I went to the War Pro- 
duction Board as a dollar-a-year man. After I left that, I was 
assistant to the Secretary of the Treasury, John Snyder. And then 
I was appointed Ambassador. 

Senator Dodd. When were you appointed Ambassador ? 

Mr. Gardner. 1953. 

Senator DoDD. 1953? 

Mr. Gardner. That is right. 

Senator Dodd. You were in World War II, I believe, Mr. Gardner. 

Mr. Gardner. That is right. Well, I was in this particular po- 
rtion, the War Production Board, because they thought I was too old 
io be in the thing I knew most about, which is the Tank Corps. 

Senator Dodd. Am I right in understanding that you held the rank 
of major in the U.S. Army ? 

Mr. Gardner. Well, I would have been — I was captain. And then 
the war ended. 

Senator Dodd. Did you serve in the Army close to General Eisen- 
hower ? 

Mr. Gardner. No; I used to go up to Gettysburg, where he was 
then Major Eisenhower, in command of the camp at Gettysburg. 

Senator Dodd. I see. Now, Mr. Gardner, you tsay you were ap- 
pointed, as we know, Ambassador to Cuba, in 1953. Would you tell 
us briefly but concisely and adequately, what were the economic con- 
ditions in Cuba when you went there, in 1953 ? 

Mr. Gardner. Well, they had started to boom. And during the 
course of the time that I was there the economy rose tremendously. 
The building boom was sensational. If you had been in Havana 10 
years earlier, as I had, and then saw it the day I left, you wouldn't 
recognize the city. 

It was due to circumstances. But I think that the real reason for 
it was the feeling of definite security that the Cubans themselves had, 
'politically perhaps not, but financially, yes. And they felt that the 
time had finally come when they could begin investing money in Cuba, 
rather than putting their money, as they had in previous years, in 
banks in Switzerland and New York. When I left there, it was 
astonishing to see the improvement, and so far as I was concerned 
in the entire time I was there I never heard anybody use the word 
"Gringo," or say "get out of — Yanqui get out," or anything like that. 

Senator Dodd. Mr. Gardner, you have been quoted as referring to 
Cuba as the show window of Latin America. 

Mr. Gardner. I believe that. 

Senator Dodd. Would you tell us what you mean by that ? 

Mr. Gardner. Because the relationship was so close between Cuba 
and the United States, we having obtained their independence for 
them, and basically we have always given them that preferential on 
sugar. It made the country feel that the bond between us was' 
stronger than anybody else. In addition to the fact that it was only 90 
miles from Key West. And I think that the majority of Cubans felt 
that this was the one place that they could look to for comfort and 
support. So that in my opinion, the other countries of the Caribbean, 


in fact almost all of Latin America, always expected to see us treating 
Cuba and working with Cuba closer than anybody else. And that is 
the reason I coined the expression, which has been used a great deal.  

Senator Dodd. Mr. Gardner, you have said in a newpaper interview 
that the United States was "just 2 years late" in acknowledging that 
Cuba under Castro is more of a police state than it was under Batista. 
Will you explain this for us, and perhaps expand on it, if you can? 

Mr. Gardner. Well, during the time that I was there, the last year, 
Castro had landed, and was hiding in the hills. And there had been 
an endless number of shipments of arms and other things to Cistro, 
which could only come from the United States, Every once in a while 
we were able, to catch such a sliipment, and stop it. But we were not 
very active about it. And one factor which I tliink was one of the most 
serious was that the former President, named Prio, was living in 
Miami. I don't know whether you know this or not, but he was 
arrested, convicted, and paid a fuie of $5,000 for ^unrunning. And 
he was also indicted a second time. And yet no action was ever taken 
on it. My personal reason for thinking it was serious was that many 
times Batista would send for me and ask me why this was. I don t 
know whether I have gotten off the track there, but that is my answer. 
The 2 years were 2 years of gradually making Batista feel we were 
pulling the rug out from under him. 

Senator Dodd, Yes. 

Mr, Gardner, when did you first have doubt about Castro, do you 
remember ? 

Mr, Gardner, Well, I saw a manifesto that he had printed in 
Mexico, which stated his principles, what he was goin^ to do. He was 
going to take over the American industries, he was going to national- 
ize everything, I mean I don't remember the words of this particular 
manifesto, I have a copy of it in Washington, That, to me, meant 
only one thing, that this man was a radical, I couldn't tell you how 
much of a radical. 

Senator Dodd. Did you once see a picture of Castro with a tele- 
scopic rifle, boasting that he could kill a man at a thousand 

Mr. Gardner. I heard somebody tell me that. I never saw a photo- 
graph of it. 

Senator Dodd. That had some influence on your judgment of him ? 

Mr. Gardner. Very definitely. 

Senator Dodd. Mr. Gardner, you have been quoted as saying that 
Washington, "pulled the rug out" from under Batista. Is this a 
correct quote, and, if so, what did you mean by that ? 

Mr. Gardner. Yes, I think it is a correct quote, I mean that Batista 
had always leaned toward the United States. I don't think we ever 
had a better friend. It was regrettable, like all South Americans, that 
he was known — although I had no absolute knowledge of it — to be get- 
ting a cut, I think is the word for it, in almost all the things that were 
done. But, on the other hand, he was doing an amazing job, and I 
will give you a specific example. 

Former presidents had built roads, and they put cement on the 
sand, and he made them put rock ballast in. The other people were 
doing it because each year they could build a new road, and get their 
cut. But everything we did, from the time I went there, I think en- 
couraged Batista. Then just at the end he began to get extremely 


worried about this development. He had made rather insignificant 
efforts to send troops down to get Castro, but fighting in the moun- 
tains was not what the Cuban troops were ever taught. So that when 
we talk about pulling out the rug, I mean there are a number of 
factors that occurred repeatedly which showed that the State Depart- 
ment did not want to have anything to do with Batista. 

Senator Dodd. Well, would you say that these things that occurred 
also showed that the State Department was anxious to replace Batista 
with Castro? 

Mr. Gardner. I think they were. 

Senator Dodd. Mr. Gardner, you have been quoted as saying that 
while you were Ambassador to Cuba in 1953 to 1957, you fought all 
the time with the State Department over whether Castro merited the 
support or friendship of the United States. Would you explain this 
for us, and then perhaps more fully develop it, if you can? 

Mr. Gardner. Well, it wasn't a question of my officially writing let- 
ters, but in my conversations, in my everyday contact with the State 
Department, I always stressed this point — that I felt that Batista 
had proved a great friend to this country, and his administration 
had proved a great ability to develop the country itself, and develop 
the friendship with us. And I feel it very strongly, that the State 
Department was influenced, first, by those stories by Herbert Mat- 
thews, and then it became kind of a fetish with them. I mean I 
don't care about it myself, although most ambassadors are asked to 
come and be debriefed, but they never asked me. So the only time 
I ever was able to get into the State Department was making special 
appointments, and that was only done after — maybe a year after I 
had actually resigned. 

Senator Dodd. Would it be accurate to say, Mr. Gardner, that you 
felt that you were to some extent ignored ? 

Mr. Gardner. Yes. 

Senator Dodd. When would you say that this 

Mr. Gardner. I think I was 

Senator Dodd. Let me complete my question, please. When would 
you say you first had the feeling that you were being ignored or over- 
looked ? 

Mr. Gardner. Well, right away, when I got back. It is rather 
petty, and I would like not to have it go — can I hold this up and tell 
you and see whether you think it is of any importance ? 

• Senator Dodd. Well, why don't we suspend, go off the record for 
a minute. i 

(Discussion off the record.) 

Mr. Gardner. Well, I think just that I wasn't asked to be de- 
briefed is about as conclusive as anything, because if I in my 

Senator Dodd. Is it fair to say, Mr. Gardner, that the way that you 
were treated on the occasion of your visit to the State Department 
made you feel that you were being ignored and overlooked and cir- 
cumvented ? 

Mr. Gardner. Yes, that is right. 

Senator Dodd. Mr. Gardner, are you able to tell us who particularly 
you talked with in the State Department at this particular time ? 

Mr. Gardner. Well, I went to see Secretary Murphy, who has now 


Senator Dodd. Robert Murphy ? 

Mr. Gardner. Yes. 

Senator Dodd. Anyone else ? 

Mr. Gardner. I had one conversation with Christian Herter, in 
which I recommended that in order to help him, and help the Cuban 
picture, and also help the Latin American desk, as they call it, that 
he should get somebody with the practical know-how, somebody with 
experience. I mentioned three or four men. One of them was the 
vice president of the American Foreign Power. He spent his whole 
life in countries in Latin America. I mean I mentioned the names 
of people. And he said, "Well, that sounds very interesting." But 
he never called me in to do anything about it. 

Senator Dodd. Besides Eobert Murphy, and Christian Herter 

Mr. Gardner. Well, I talked to Loy Henderson. 

Senator Dodd. Mr. Rubottom ? 

Mr. Gardner. Yes, I talked to Rubottom. But he was not at all 

Senator Dodd. You mean by that he was not interested in your 
views in the situation ? 

Mr. Gardner. Yes. He is a nice chap, and means well, and I have 
nothing but high regard for him personally, but I think he was en- 
tirely off on the wrong track, and it has been proved. Without 
putting it down, let me just explain what I mean. 

(Discussion off the record.) 

Senator Dodd. Did you discuss this situation — ^by this situation I 
mean the Castro-Batista situation, with Robert Murphy ? 

Mr. Gardner. Yes. 

Senator Dodd. And what did you find his reaction to be? 

Mr. Gardner. I found he was so badly advised. We had a pleasant 
talk, but got nowhere. He had an idea that Batista was a gorilla. 

Senator Dodd. Did he think favorably of Castro ? 

Mr. Gardner. No. But he felt so strongly against Batista, that 
anybody would have been better, I imagine, is the way he would 
put it. 

Senator Dodd. I see. During these conversations with these several 
persons whom you have named, did you, from time to time, tell any 
one of them, or all of them, that Castro talked and acted like a Com- 
munist, and should not be supported by the United States? 

Mr. Gardner. Yes. But the purpose of these conversations always 
seemed to be was whether Castro carried a Communist card or not. 
We all knew — I think everybody knew — that his brother, Raul, was 
a Communist. But they seemed to argue about it as if that was 

Senator Dodd. You mean the technicality of party membership was 
made a matter of importance rather than his general attitude? 

Mr. Gardner. Yes, that is right. 

Senator Dodd. I understand. 

Mr. Gardner, can you tell us again specifically, if you remember, 
did you say this to Mr. Murphy, and to Mr. Rubottom, and to 
Mr. Herter, or to anyone else ? 

Mr. Gardner. No, I didn't say it to Herter. 

Senator Dodd. Did you say it to Rubottom ? 

Mr. Gardner. In a nice way — ^yes, I said it to Rubottom. And I 
talked to Loy about it. And Murphy, I did talk to him about it. I 

61355 O-60-pt. 9-2 


don't remember the conversation, but that was my reason for going 
to see him. 

Senator Dodd. But you generally did discuss this matter ? 

Mr. Gardner. Yes, that is right. 

Senator Dodd. And you gave him this warning? 

Mr. Gardner. That is right. 

Senator Dodd. And you felt, I take it, from your testimony, that 
you got no interest, no encouragement ? 

Mr. Gardner. No. 

Senator Dodd. And no reaction which would indicate that these men 
agreed with you ? 

Mr. Gardner. Nothing but a negative. 

Senator Dodd. You have been quoted, Mr. Gardner, as referring to 
"Castro worship" in the State Department in 1957. What did you 
mean by this ? 

Mr. Gardner. Well, did you read the article that Matthews wrote, 
after he went up in the hills and saw him ? 

Senator Dodd. . Yes. 

Mr. Gardner. He wrote a Richard Harding Davis type of article, 
and he made Castro appear to be a Robin Hood, a savior for the coun- 

Senator Dodd. Yes. But Mr. Herbert Matthews wasn't in the State 

Mr. Gardner. No, but he was actually — he briefed Earl Smith 

Senator Dodd. Your successor as Ambassador to Cuba was briefed 
by Herbert Matthews ? 

Mr. Gardner. Yes, that is right. 

Senator Dodd. Well, before we get into that, let me ask you if you 
know of anything else, or anyone else in the State Department, at that 
time — that is in 1957 — which made you feel that there was a cult of 
Castro worship, as you have put it. 

Mr. Gardner. Well, that may not be the right word. Senator. I 
meant by that that they built him up to being the Robin Hood or the 
savior of the country. 

Senator Dodd. Now, who do you mean by "they" ? 

Mr. Gardner. I mean the people in the State Department, and I 
think 90 percent of the people in this country thought that Castro 

Senator Dodd. I know. But we are trying to get here a record 
that we can pin down, in which we can pin down our information. 
When you say, "they," are you referring again to the Messrs. Murphy 
and Rubottom, Henderson, Herter, or who are you referring to? 

Mr. Gardner. Well, now, Herter wasn't a party. I never told 
Herter anything, but made the suggestion about men that could help 

Senator Dodd. I see. 

Mr. Gardner. The other men — I mean I always found completely 
deaf to anything I had to say about it. 

Senator Dodd. Mr. Gardner, it has been said that there was a plot 
by the Castro forces to kidnap you. Do you know anything about this, 
and if you do could you tell us about it? 

Mr. Gardner. Yes, sure. The last 3 months, somebody in — I don't 
know whether it was FBI or not, but that is what they said down 
there — I mean that was conversation — told our security people at the 


Embassy that he had this plot to kidnap and hold for some sort of a 
ransom, such as recognition of Castro, all top officers, and me par- 
ticularly, on the top floor of the chancellery. The place is right on the 
Malacon. And then if attention wasn't paid to this, they were going 
to drop off one man after the other, from the balcony. I thought it was 
perfectly ridiculous. But the State Department, the Security De- 
partment, insisted upon my having a Marine sleep next to me every 
night, and go wherever we went. And we were followed whenever 
we went out on any kind of a trip, to go to dinner, or do anything, by 
a police car, with four policemen with tommyguns. It was perfectly 
ridiculous. They had devices to listen whether I was breathir^ in 
there. It was a comedy of the world, but you couldn't help it. They 
thought it was serious. 

Senator Dodd. This is approximately when, what year ? 

Mr. Gardner. This is in 1957. 

Senator Dodd. Mr. Gardner, we have talked about Mr. Roy R. Ru- 
bottom, Jr., who, by the way, was replaced as Assistant Secretary of 
State for Latin American Affairs on July 30, and who, incidentally, is 
scheduled to go to Argentina as our Ambassador. 

Mr. Gardner. I understand that he has just been approved, which 
is astonishing to me. 

Senator Dodd. I don't know he has been. 

Mr. Gardner. It was in the paper. 

Senator Dodd. I think it was committee approval. I don't 

Mr. Gardner. I think that is the most remarkable thing I ever 

Senator Dodd. Well, Mr. Gardner, if you know, can you tell us any- 
thing about Rubottom's background, or what competence he has or had 
for the positions which he has occupied in the State Department ? 

Mr. Gardner. Well, I understand that he left the Navy, and was a 
third secretary, or something of the sort, in Madrid. For a very short 
time, he was in one of the Latin American countries. And then he 
came to Washington, and was assistant — or I don't know what par- 
ticular rank he had — in the Latin American Department. Why they 
put him in, I will never know. In the first place, he was in the process 
of learning Spanish. In the second place, I felt he had absolutely no 
background of experience. , 

Senator Dodd. When you say he was in the process of learning 
Spanish, you mean while he was Assistant Secretary for Latin Ameri- 
can affairs ? 

Mr. Gardner. I think he probably started before. But during the 
time he was, he did learn it. 

Senator Dodd. Yes. Was he a protege of Dr. Milton Eisenhower? 

Mr. Gardner. That I never knew. I have read it in the paper. I 
can't understand it if he is. 

Senator Dodd. While you were the Ambassador to Cuba, Mr. Ru- 
bottom was the Assistant Secretary for Latin American Affairs, was 
he not ? 

Mr. Gardner. Yes, just the last year. I think it was just the last 

Senator Dodd. And prior to last year, do you remember what his 
job was in the State Department? 



Mr. Gardner. He was an assistant of some sort in the Latin Ameri- 
can Division. 

Senator Dodd. Do you know what his attitude was toward Castro ? 

Mr. Gardner. Well, he was a funny fellow. We talked with him. 
He came down to stay in Cuba with us. And both my wife and I 
had long, long talks with him. And we would ask him questions, 
whether he didn't agree with us, and he would never answer. So I 
don't know. 

Senator Dodd. Do you know, Mr. Gardner, whether or not it was 
Mr. Rubottom who was principally responsible for arranging Castro's 
visit to the United States in April of 1958 ? 

Mr. Gardner. I don't know who did that. I think he must have 
given his consent to it. 

Senator Dodd. Certainly he was the Under Secretary, or Assistant 
Secretary for Latin American Affairs. 

Mr. Gardner. That is right. He must have. 

Senator Dodd. Is it fair to assume that he certainly favored the 

Mr. Gardner. Oh, well, he favored Castro. There is no question 
about it. 

Senator Dodd. I see. You remember, Mr. Gardner, that the State 
Department announced publicly that Castro would be welcomed as a 
distinguished leader, and would be given an official security guard if 
necessary, even though his visit was unofficial. Do you rememoer this ? 

Mr. Gardner. Very well. 

Senator Dodd. Mr. Gardner, did you protest this announcement at 
the time ? 

Mr. Gardner. No, except to my friends. I didn't go to the Depart- 

Senator Dodd. I take it because by that time you were rather dis- 

Mr. Gardner, I was worn out. 

Senator Dodd. By your efforts to get some kind of attention in the 
State Department. 

Mr. Gardner. It got so bad that my wife got worried because I 
couldn't sleep nights worrying about the picture as it developed. 

Senator Dodd. Do you know a Mr. Thomas Mann, who is scheduled 
to replace Mr. Rubottom ? 

Mr. Gardner. I have never met him. 

Senator Dodd. So you do not know his attitude with respect to 

Mr. Gardner. No. 

Senator Dodd. I think it was reported that you have stated on at 
least one occasion that in your opinion the U.S. Government needs 
a strong man with a thorough understanding of Latin American 
affairs in the State Department. 

Mr. Gardner, That is right. 

Senator Dodd, Well, is it fair to say that this means you do not 
think we have such now ? 

Mr, Gardner, Well, I don't know anybody in there that really 
knows — I know two men — one of them is now Ambassador to Costa 
Rica, and the other is the present Ambassador to Mexico. 

Senator Dodd. Robert Hill 


Mr. Gardner. Both those men. 
Senator Dodd. And the Ambassador to Costa Rica ? 
Mr. Gardner. His name is Whitetower. 
Senator Dodd. Do you know Wieland ? 
Mr. Gardner. He was in the Embassy for a very short time. 
Senator Dodd. He was in your Embassy ? 
Mr. Gardner. Well, for a very short time. 
Senator Dodd. What was his job ? 

Mr. Gardner. I think he was in the economics section, but I am 
not certain. But I mean — I can tell you — I was very glad to see him 

Senator Dodd. How long was he there, sir ? 

Mr. Gardner. Well, as I remember, it was only a month or 6 weeks. 

Senator Dodd. And was this in 1957 ? 

Mr. Gardner. I can't be certain of that. I know, for instance, his 
record, because a man named William Pawley, who was Ambassador 
to Brazil, had him down there, and got him out. He felt that he was 
much too — leaning much too far to the left. 

Senator Dodd. Do you know what position he had occupied in the 
State Department before his assignment to your office? 

Mr. Gardner. No, I never knew anything about him. 

Senator Dodd. And you don't know what has become of him since ? 

Mr. Gardner. No, I think he is one of Eubottom's assistants. I 
know he is, as a matter of fact. 

Senator Dodd. He is still, as far as you know ? 

Mr. Gardner. Yes. 

Senator Dodd. In your opinion, did he play any part in Castro's 
rise to power in Cuba ? 

Mr. Gardner. I think he had a strong influence on Rubottom. But 
I haven't any way to prove it. 

Senator Dodd. I see. 

Mr. Gardner. Just because I know the way he thinks. 

Senator Dodd. I see. Is it true, or do you know, that shipments of 
military equipment to Batista were stopped on the New York docks? 

Mr. Gardner. That is true. A shipment, I only knew of one. 

Senator Dodd. A shipment. Is it also true that these shipments 
were ordered under a mutual aid pact ? 

Mr. Gardner. That is right. 

Senator Dodd. And that Batista had paid cash for them at that 

Mr. Gardner. Well, I can't guarantee he paid cash, out I know he 
had the cash to pay for them. And I know that the mutual aid pact, 
which represented a contract which we made with many Latin Amer- 
ican countries, enabled us to dispose of secondhand military equip- 
ment, tanks, guns, and everything else, which we could never use. 
And that in return for it, that we set up in each of the countries that 
signed this pact an Army, an Air Force, and a Navy commission, let's 
call it — I mean men there to train them and get them to use it. 

Senator Dodd. Do you know who stopped those shipments, or that 
shipment, rather ? 

Mr. Gardner. Only the common gossip, that Rubottom was the 
only man who could have stopped it. 


Senator Dodd. Do you know of any — do you have any information 
concerning the shipment of arms and ammunition from the United 
States to Castro ? 

Mr. Gardner. "Well, those are things that I mentioned. I said thev 
were being sent down surreptitiously almost every night. I don t 
believe that the Kussians sent them stuff in a submarine. But I knew 
these shipments were being made. 

Senator Dodd. No. My question rather was, Do you know whether 
arms were shipped to Castro from the United States ? 

Mr. Gardner. That is what I think — from up and down the Keys, 
all of Florida, they were riddled with these expeditions. 

Senator Dodd. From the United States? 

Mr. Gardner. From the United States. 

Senator Dodd. So, of course, such shipments were illegal ? 

Mr. Gardner. Illegal. And that was the reason they indicted, as 
I told you, this fellow Prio. And he paid a fine of $5,000. 

Senator Dodd. Mr. Gardner, do you know, do you have any idea 
why the United States allowed Castro to get arms from the United 
States, and would not allow Batista to have arms to preserve his 
government ? 

Mr. Gardner. All I can tell you is that the consensus among my 
friends, Cuban and otherwise, is that Castro made a howl about Ba- 
tista getting these arms to kill Cubans. I mean it was a lopsided 
idea. Castro didn't mind getting them to kill other Cubans, but he 
didn't want Batista. But he had the airways, and he was able to tell 
people that. He screamed about it. 

Senator Dodd. Did you ever have any indication prior to Batista's 
flight from Cuba "on December 31, 1958, that the State Department 
or State Department officials knew that this was going to happen ? 

Mr. Gardner. I don't think they knew. 

Senator Dodd. You don't think they knew ? Or at least you had no 

Mr. Gardner. I had no way of knowing. It wouldn't make any 
difference, but I know that people from the United States went down 
to see Batista for New Year's, close friends, and came back to this 
country, and they had no idea of when Batista was leaving, or if he 
was leaving. 

Senator Dodd. You have been quoted as saying, Mr. Gardner, that 
you didn't know why the United States withheld from Batista help 
and support in his effort to carry out a normal election program, 
when it could have been given with such superior results from the 
American and the Cuban points of view. 

I think you have also said Washington just didn't seem to have 
the slightest comprehension of the situation. 

Could you tell us j>erhaps in more detail what you meant by that ? 

Mr. Gardner. Well, I used the expression before that Batista felt 
the rug had been pulled out, and that in having a proper election, and 
with a proper candidate, which is what we had all hoped he would 
have, that he had lost all interest, and apparently at that stage was 
to leave. I mean he figured there wasn't any hope for him. 

Senator Dodd. There was an election in Cuba shortly before 
Castro's takeover — Marquez Sterling 

Mr. Gardner. No, he wasn't the candidate. If he had been the 
candidate, the story would have been different. 


Senator Dodd. I see. I thought Marquez Sterling was elected. 
Mr. Gardner. No. 
Senator Dodd. Who was ? 

Mr. Gardner. I can't remember his name. He was a dummy and 
a figurehead and had no prestige whatever. Marquez 3terling had 
real prestige in Cuba. And I think he is a man of outstanding char- 
acter. That was a great blow to all of us who loved Cuba. 

Senator Dodd. It has been said that Batista sent a regiment of 
troops to put down the Castro rebellion. Do you know, have you any 
idea, why the Batista government was incapable, on the surface, so 
it seems, of suppressing this rebellion, of a handful, relatively, of 
Castro rebels ? 

Mr. Gardner. Yes. There are many reasons. 

No. 1, his troops are not trained for mountain fighting. That is 
No. 1. No. 2 is that it is like a rabbit running under a cover, or 
through a field. I mean you can get up in an airplane, and you could 
not see them, or what they were doing. So his air force could never 
spot them. And then I think that, thirdly, the troops got so dis- 
couraged by the position we had taken about not giving them arms 
and so on that they just didn't want to fight. And when that regi- 
ment went down, and the colonel was supposed to be the toughest 
colonel they had, he didn't want to fight, because he took all the 
money that was supposed to feed the soldiers, and they had to bring 
them back. It was general demoralization, that they felt that Ba- 
tista was finished. 

Senator Dodd. Was this largely because it was known or felt that 
the United States had abandoned Batista and supported Castro? 
Mr. Gardner. That is right. 

Senator Dodd. And this was rather common knowledge in the mili- 
tary and other circles in Cuba ? 

Mr. Gardner. That is right ; everybody. There are a ^eat many 
Cubans, I understand, who paid large sums to Castro, thinking that 
he was going to make the country over. And now they are the worst 
disappointed people in the world, of course. 

Senator Dodd. Mr. Gardner, do you know about the incident of the 
killings at the Haitian Embassy ? 
Mr. Gardner. Very well. 

Senator Dodd. Would you tell us about that, please ? 
Mr. Gardner. Well, there is a code among Latin American coun- 
tries, that if you want to seek asylum, all you have to do is to go to an 
embassy, and the embassy is required — it didn't apply to the United 
States, but it applies to other countries— that the embassy will take 
the man in and protect him. There were in the Haitian Embassy— 
our own people knew it— maybe 8 or 10 of these 26 of July Movement 
people, and they were there for a long time. And then somebody got 
word to the police that they had been armed, which is against the 
code. And the chief of the police, who was a very tough fellow, and 
a very courageous man, got a group of his men and went up to the 
embassy, knocked on the door. He found out that the embassy em- 
ployees were all out. And he said in a loud voice that he had come 
to arrest these men, because they had broken the code. He was shot 
right at the door, just killed like a dog. And the police went m and 
found the men all armed, and promptly killed them. They called it 


a slaughter. There really wasn't any slaughter. It is what any police 
would have done. They would shoot through the mattress, if the 
man was under the mattress. And they got them all. It made a 
good deal of a shambles of the place. 

I never understood this, but Batista not very long afterward had 
the whole building refurnished and put in fine shape again. That 
was one of the things that I talked particularly to Murphy about, 
and he didn't believe me. He didn't believe this would happen. Half 
the people don't know that Batista had Castro in jail, and let him 
out, just out of kindness. 

Senator Dodd. Sometime 

Mr. Gardner. Yes, previously. 

Senator Dodd. Mr. Gardner, do you feel that your expressed atti- 
tude with regard to Castro had a part in bringing about your replace- 
ment as our Ambassador to Cuba ? 

Mr. Gardner. Senator, I don't know. I only know that I was very 
 aiixious to stay. I felt that if I had stayed it was encouraging to the 
Batista regime, which was through. They had until January. And 
when they had an election, I felt sure they would have as fair an 
election as they could have, and I think Marquez Sterling would have 
been the president. But they didn't seem to think that was necessary. 

Senator Dodd. In any event, you wanted to stay ? 

Mr. Gardner. Yes. 

Senator Dodd. And it was not 

Mr. Gardner. It was a great sacrifice to me, because my wife, who 
had ulcers, couldn't be with me. 

Senator Dodd. But you were willing to stay and continue your 

Mr. Gardner. I wanted to stay. 

Senator Dodd. But you were not allowed to do so ? 

Mr. Gardner. That is right. 

Senator Dodd. And in any event, this followed your attitude as ex- 
pressed to high officials of the State Department with respect to 

Mr. Gardner. That is right. 

Senator Dodd. Now, Mr. Gardner, you were succeeded as Ambassa- 
dor to Cuba by Earl Smith ? 

Mr. Gardner. That is right. 

Senator Dodd. I understand Mr. Smith was an investment broker. 
I don't know, and I wonder if you can tell us, what experience he had, 
'" other than this. 

Mr. Gardner. None. 

Senator Dodd. Did you have any diplomatic experience at all ? 

Mr. Gardner. No. 

Senator Dodd. Do you know what arrangements were made for 
briefing Mr. Smith with regard to taking over this important position 
' as Ambassador to Cuba ? 

Mr. Gardner. Well, I imagine he spent, as I did, nearly a month 
going through all the departments that had any bearing on Cuba, and 
studying and working with them. I imagine he did that. But as I 
told you, the fantastic thing was that he was asked to talk to Herbert 

Senator Dodd. Herbert L. Matthews, of the New York Times ? 

Mr. Gardner. That is right. 


Senator Dodd. And he did talk to him ? 

Mr. Gardner. He did. 

Senator Dodd. And that is where he got a lot of his briefing ? 

Mr. Gardner. I imagine that is. 

Senator Dodd. Do you know, Mr. Gardner, what position Mr. Smith 
took with respect to Castro after he replaced you as the Ambassador 
to Cuba? 

Mr. Gardner. Well, I think Earl made a very unfortunate start. 

Senator Dodd. Avery 

Mr. Gardner. Unfortunate start. I wouldn't, and I didn't think 
he would, ever go down near where Castro was, which is the Santiago 
de Cuba, it is right down in the foothills of the mountains. But he 
did go down. And they put on a professional parade for him — the 
women all in black, supposedly the widows and so on of Castro people 
that had been killed or murdered, or whatever they talked about. 
And, unfortunately, the police, in order to break up this meeting, used 
a hose on them. The result was that he. Smith, said that in his 
country nothing like that would ever happen, we never treat them 
that way, an oratorical speech on the subject. And the Cuban Govern- 
ment became infuriated — that is the Congress and Batista, and they 
wanted to have him declared persona non grata, which very fortu- 
nately they didn't do. But I think Earl Smith had a hard time, be- 
cause later on I know that he appreciated that Batista was really doing 
a job for the country, and that it was unfortunate that he made this 

Senator Dodd. Mr. Gardner, do you regard Herbert L. Matthews 
as an expert on Latin American affairs ? 

Mr. Gardner. I do not. 

Senator Dodd. Or Cuban affairs ? 

Mr. Gardner. Any affairs. I think his history, if you look it 
up — I am sure you know of it — I mean in Spain — is indicative of his 

Senator Dodd. What part, if any, do you think Herbert L. Matthews 
played in bringing Castro to power ? 

Mr. Gardner. I don't think he did anything, physically. But his 
articles were such that he created a biased situation against Batista. 

Senator Dodd. And pro-Castro ? 

Mr. Gardner. Pro-Castro, very strongly. 

Senator Dodd. Did Herbert Matthews ever contact you while you 
were the Ambassador in Cuba about 

Mr. Gardner. I made every effort, and saw him a good many times, 
tried to get his friendship, because he and a man named Dubois, who 
worked for a Chicago paper — ^both of them were considered by us to 
be radicals. And I even arranged meetings for him. And I made it 
possible actually for Herbert Matthews to go down and have this inter- 
view, because he asked me. 

Senator Dodd. Yes. I wanted to ask you about that. He did ask 
for your assistance in arranging an interview with Castro? 

Mr. Gardner. He did. 

Senator Dodd. And this was arranged? 

Mr. Gardner. Yes. 

Senator Dodd. How did you arrange it? 

Mr. Gardner. Only under the condition that when he came back he 
would tell me his reactions. 

61355 O-60-pt. 9-3 


Senator Dodd. Yes. But how could you arrange a meeting with 

Mr. Gardner. Well, I mean in those days Batista was all for the 
U.S. Ambassador, no matter who he would have been. And he was 
very loath to do it, but he said, "All right, if you think it won't do 
any harm, it is all ri^ht," and he let him go down. 

Senator Dodd. This would indicate to be that Batista knew where 
Castro was, all right. 

Mr. Gardner. Oh, they aJl knew where he was. But they couldn't 
put their finger on him. He was moving every night. 

Senator Dodd. But certainly they Imew how to get in touch with 
him if they wanted to. 

Mr. Gardner. There isn't any doubt about that. But I think Ba- 
tista was afraid he would make a martyr of him if he dragged him 

Senator Dodd. How soon after Castro landed in Cuba did Herbert 
Matthews seek an opportunity to see Castro ? 

Mr. Gardner. I would say, offhand, 4 or 5 months after. It wasn't 

Senator Dodd. And I think you started to say that you agreed to 
help him — or help arrange for him — to see Castro. But you made 
him promise that he would come bEick and see you and tell you 

Mr. Gardner. Tell me. 

Senator Dodd (continuing). About his meeting with Castro. 

Mr. Gardner. Senator, to be perfectly clear about this, the only 
thing I could do was help nim, so that he would have a pass to go down 
the island, so that he could make this trip. 

Senator Dodd. I understand — whatever it was that he thought you 
could do, he wanted you to do it to help him get there ? 

Mr. Gardner. That is right. 

Senator Dodd. And in return for this he promised he would come 
back and tell you about this conversation with Castro? 

Mr. Gardner. That is right. And to this day I never have seen 

Senator Dodd. He never did return and never did tell you ? 

Mr, Gardner. No. It was a big shock to me, as a matter of fact. 

Senator Dodd. Mr. Gardner, do you feel that Matthews' accounts 
of his visit to Castro, as he wrote it up, had considerable influence on 
the American people with respect to favoring Castro ? 

Mr. Gardner. I don't think there is any question about it. I think 
almost all the newspapers in this country became sort of hypnotized 
by the thing. 

Senator Dodd, Do you know, Mr. Gardner, that there was abundant 
information available about Castro's background at that time? 

Mr. Gardner. Oh, certainly. 

Senator Dodd. It was well known that he had been in Colombia, 
and of his associations and his activities. You know this to be a fact? 

Mr. Gardner, Absolutely. 

Senator Dodd. And Matthews was well aware of this? 

Mr. Gardner. They all knew he was a professional rabblerouser. 

Senator Dodd. And a revolutionary ? 

Mr, Gardner. A revolutionary — it was his business. 

Senator Dodd, Do you think that Matthews' stories about Castro 
affected the State Department's thinking about Castro ? 


Mr. Gardner. I can't think of any other possible cause for their 
thinking what they thought. 

Senator Dodd. You think his articles did have 

Mr. Gardner. Yes, they did have a great effect. 
Senator Dodd. Yes. 

Mr. Gardner. I think the answer we brought up a minute ago is 
that he was briefing Smith. 

Senator Dodd. Well, to put it baldly, Mr. Gardner, do you think 
of Matthews as a partisan of Castro ? 

Mr. Gardner. No. I think his visit to Castro was a very unfortu- 
nate thing. But I basically think that Herbert Matthews is one of 
these people, the do-gooder type, who the minute you mention the 
word — anybody as a dictator — is out to try to break him. 

Senator Dodd. Is this true of Communist dictators, or just other 
than Communists ? 

Mr. Gardner. I think it is only other than Communist. He has 
been a foreign correspondent throughout Latin America, and so it was 

the natural place for him to start in his 

Senator Dodd. But as far as you know his opposition to dictators is 
limited to non-Communist dictators ? 
Mr. Gardner. I have never heard him say anything about Russia. 
Senator Dodd. Or about the Commimist tyranny or dictatorship ? 
Mr. Gardner. No. 

Senator Dodd. In your own mind, Mr. Gardner, do you consider 
Castro a Communist tool, or do you think he is an important Com- 
munist himself ? 

Mr. Gardner. I think he is a tool. 

Senator Dodd. Would you agree that insofar as the security and 
welfare of the United States is concerned, it doesn't make too much 

difference — it is not important whether he is a tool 

Mr. Gardner. I don't think it makes any difference. The condi- 
tions that he has brought about are so hideous, that I wouldn't care 
what he was. 

Senator Dodd. Now, referring again to Mr. Herbert L. Matthews, 
and Ambassador Smith, do you know that after Castro established his 
headquarters in the Oriente Province, Herbert Matthews saw Am- 
bassador Smith and persuaded Mr. Smith to visit Santiago de Cuba? 
Mr, Gardner. I don't think he did. 
Senator Dodd. You don't think he did ? 

Mr. Gardner. I think Earl Smith is a very determined, self- 
opinionated lad. And he just made up his mind that he would like to 
make the trip down there. 

Senator Dodd. I see. And you think he did this on his own ? 
Mr. Gardner. Yes. I know that two of the most important people 
in the Embassy were there when I left — urged him not to do it. 

Senator Dodd. Yes, so you told us. He had, of course, been briefed 
by Mr. Herbert Matthews. 

Mr. Gardner. I know. And that may have had some bearing. 
But I don't think Herbert Matthews told him he ought to go down 

Senator Dodd. I see. Do you now or did you know a Mr. Earl J. 
Williamson, political officer of the State Department? 
Mr. Gardner. Yes. 


Senator Dodd. Do you know if he liad anything to do with the 
Cuban situation ? 

Mr. Gardner. Not any that I remember. I mean he was — he would 
get information. I don't remember just exactly what his job was. 

Senator Dodd. Did you know 

Mr. Gardner. Wasn't he a legal aid ? 

Senator Dodd. Well 

Mr. Gardner. I don't know. I think that is what he called it. 

Senator Dodd. Do you or did you know Park F, Wollam, American 
consul at Santiago de Cuba ? 

Mr. Gardner. No, I never saw him. 

Senator Dodd. Do you know Mr. Kirkpatrick, of the CIA ? 

Mr. Gardner. Yes. He came down a couple of times to Cuba. 

Senator Dodd. Do you know of any activities by which he — in 
which he engaged in Cuba in connection with the Castro rise to 

Mr. Gardner. No. 

Senator Dodd^ You do not. What can you tell us, Mr. Gardner, 
if anything, about Russian and Communist Chinese influence in Cuba ? 

Mr. Gardner. Well, there is a large Chinese colony there. At the 
time that I was there they were minding their own business, shop- 
keepers and so on. We did know that there were some Communists 
there. There was one particular instance. The radio station CMQ, 
was the biggest chain radio station there. And they had a known 
Communist as leader of the orchestra. And I tried very hard, and 
had many rows and fights with the chap who heads this organiza- 
tion, and his answer to me was that the orchestra had never been 
easier to handle, and he was making money out of it. That was his 
position. And the net was that we were able to persuade two or three 
of the bigger advertisers not to use his orchestra. But that is about 
the story. So far as I know, there wasn't anything. 

Senator Dodd. Mr. Gardner, do you believe that the U.S. Guan- 
tanamo Base is safe from Cuban aggression? 

Mr. Gardner. I do. 

Senator Dodd. You think it is safe ? 

Mr. Gardner. I don't think he would dream of touching it. 

Senator Dodd. You made a suggestion, sir, that the United States 
operate a Spanish-language radio station at Key West, or in that area, 
to acquaint Cubans, better acquaint Cubans, with the position of the 
United States, and the attitude of the United States. Do you know 
why this has not been done ? 

Mr. Gardner. I haven't any idea. I have been talking and talking 
about it. 

Senator Dodd. This would not be a very huge task. 

Mr. Gardner. No, they have got plenty of equipment. 

Senator Dodd. Who has the authority to do this, Mr. Gardner, if 
you know ? 

(Mr. Gardner shakes head.) 

Mr. Gardner. I want to make very clear to you. I don't know that 
it should be run by the United States. I think it really ought to be 
done as a private thing. Shortwave would be no good, because it is 
amazing the number of people that have radio sets in Cuba. And if 


Castro were to make a statement that nobody was to listen to the sta- 
tion, every Cuban would listen. I know them. 

Senator Dodd. Well, sir, I don't want to detain you longer. I 
know you have not been feeling well. 

Is tnere anything more you can tell us about the part America or 
Americans played m helping to bring Castro to power in Cuba ? 

Mr. Gardner. I don't thmk very many Americans — I think the 
man, this Prio, made tliis statement to a man who was formerly 
Cuban Ambassador to the United States, who asked to go over and 
find out what his attitude was. We had failed to get anybody to move 
against him. You can get information, if you want to, from Immi- 
gration or any one of the organizations why they didn't do it. But 
none of them would do it. 

Senator Dodd. Finally, sir, Mr. Gardner, what would be your rec- 
ommendations as to how the United States — what our policy should 
be, what we should do with respect to Cuba and the Castro govern- 
ment ? 

Mr. Gardner. I mentioned to you the radio station. If the United 
States took a strong position against Castro, I think you would find, 
without any doubt, that the Cubans themselves would perform what 
has got to be performed sooner or later — we have got to get rid of 

Senator Dodd. Well, don't you think by now already the Russian 
and Chinese influence there is making it more difficult for the Cuban 
people to get rid of Castro ? 

Mr. Gardner. Well, I say I don't agree with a lot of people. I 
don't think they are enough indoctrinated. 

These young people, it is waving a flag, and they are told what to 
do. It is hurrah, boys, it is a great show. He promised to give them, 
land and then he doesn't give them the land. 

Senator Dodd. What do you think we ought to do? He is con- 
fiscating our property. He is causing trouble. He has created an 
espionage beachhead in the hemisphere. 

Mr. Gardner. I think we ought to morally support any movement 
of Cubans that is willing to take the job on. And I don't think 
there is any question that there are such people. I think we can't 
do it ourselves, because you know we can't send Marines down. That 
would be the most terrible thing in the world. But we can, under 
cover, support and let them know that we want to have a change. 

Senator Dodd. Well, all right. 

For the record, I should like to say that I appreciate your helpful- 
ness and frankness, and I am sure that the committee will as well. 
Many people are troubled about this Cuban situation. You are a 
respected man, a former Ambassador to that country. And it is, I 
think, valuable to the committee and to the Senate of the United 
States to have your views. 

Mr. Gardner. Any time. As soon as I get settled here, I will come 
and be glad to talk to you or anybody else about it. 

Senator Dodd. I would like to have it app>ear on the record that we 
held this hearing at your home, at your invitation. I wouldn't want 
to have it appear that we barged in on you. 

Mr. Gardner. No, certainly. 


Senator Dodd. And I came up because you were not feeling well, 
and it would be difficult for you to travel to Washington. 
Mr. Gardner. That is fine. 
(Whereupon, at 6 :40 p.m., the executive session was adjourned.) 


AUGUST 30, 1960 

U.S. Senate, 
Subcommittee to Investigate the 
Administration of the Internal Security Act 

AND Other Internal Security Laws, 

OF the Committee on the Judiciary, 

Washington^ D.C. 
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:40 a.m., in room 
2300, New Senate Office Building, Washington, D.C, Senator Thomas 
J. Dodd presiding. 

Present: Senators Dodd; James O. Eastland, chairman; and Ro- 
man L. Hruska. 

Also present: J. G. Sourwine, chief counsel; Benjamin Mandel, 
research director, and Frank W. Schroeder, chief investigator. 

Senator Dodd. Mr. Ambassador, will you rise and raise your right 
hand ? Do you solemnly swear that the testimony you will give before 
this subcommittee will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but 
the truth, so help you God ? 
Mr. Smith. So help me God. 
Senator Dodd. Mr. Sourwine. 

Mr. Sourwine. Mr. Smith, would you give the reporter your name 
and your address, please ? 


Mr. Smith. Earle E. T. Smith ; residence, 1021 North Ocean Boule- 
vard, Palm Beach, Fla. 

Mr. Sourwine. You are a native of Rhode Island ? 

Mr. Smith. I was bom in Rhode Island. 

Mr. Sourwine. A graduate of Yale University in 1926 ? 

Mr. Smith. I attended Yale University for 2 years, class of 1926. 

Mr. Sourwine. You had service in the U.S. Army in World 
War II? 

Mr. Smith. That is correct. 

Mr. Sourwine. You reached the rank of lieutenant colonel ? 

]^Ir. SiNHTH. That is correct. 

Mr. Sourwine. Had oversea service ? 

Mr. Smith. That is correct. 

Mr. Sourwine. You have been an investment broker ? 

Mr. Smith. Yes. 

Mr. Sourwine. A member of the New York Stock Exchange ? 

Mr. Smith. That is correct. 

Mr. Sourwine. A partner in an investment firm ? 



Mr. Smith. That is correct. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. You were special assistant in the Office of Price 
Management, the War Production Board, in 1941 and 1942? 

Mr. Smith. Office of Production Management. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Office of Production Management ? 

Mr. Smith. Which is the predecessor of the War Production Board. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Yes, sir. You were appointed Ambassador Extraor- 
dinary and Plenipotentiary to Cuba, June 3, 1957 ? 

Mr. Smith. Confirmed by the Senate in May 1957. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. And you served until when, sir ? 

Mr. Smith. Until January 20, 1959. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. Mr. Smith, when you were appointed Ambassador 
to Cuba, were you briefed on the job ? 

Mr. Smith. Yes ; I was. 

Mr. SouRWTNE. Who gave you this briefing ? 

Mr. Smith. I spent 6 weeks in Washington, approximately 4 days 
of each week, visiting various agencies and being briefed by the State 
Department and. those whom the State Department designated. 

Mr. SoTJRwiNE. Any particular individual or individuals who had 
a primary part in this briefing ? 

Mr. Smith. The answer is, in the period of 6 weeks I was briefed 
by numbers of people in the usual course as every Ambassador is 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Is it true, sir, that you were instructed to get a 
briefing on your new job as Ambassador to Cuba from Herbert Mat- 
thews of the New York Times ? 

Mr. Smith. Yes ; that is correct. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Who gave you these instructions ? 

Mr. Smith. William Wieland, Director of the Caribbean Division 
and Mexico. At that time he was Director of the Caribbean Division, 
Central American Affairs. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Did you, sir, in fact see Matthews ? 

Mr. Smith. Yes ; I did. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. And did he brief you on the Cuban situation ? 

Mr. Smith. Yes ; he did. 

Mr. SoTTRwiNE. Could you give us the highlights of what he told 

Mr. Smith. Are you going into a special line of this, because I have 
prepared a statement that I would like to read to the committee, if I 
may have the opportunity. It is a brief statement. 

Senator Dodd. You certainly maj, but I think it is better for our 
record if we proceed with our questions, and then if you want to make 
any statement, of course you will have full opportunity to do so- 

Mr. Smith. Would you mind repeating the last question ? 

Mr. SouRwiNE. I asked if you could give us the highlights of what 
Matthews told you. 

Mr. Smith. We talked for 21^ hours on the Cuban situation, a 
complete review of his feelings regarding Cuba, Batista, Castro, the 
situation in Cuba, and what he thought would happen. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. What did he think would happen ? 

Mr. Smith. He did not believe that the Batista government could 
last, and that the fall of the Batista government would come relatively 


Mr. SouRwiNE. Specifically what did he say about Castro ? 

Mr. Smith. In February 1957 Herbert L. Matthews wrote three 
articles on Fidel Castro, which appeared on the front page of the New 
York Times, in which he eulogized Fidel Castro and portrayed him 
as a political Robin Hood, and I would say that he repeated those views 
to me in our conversation. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Did he, sir, call your attention to those articles? 

Mr. Smith. No ; he did not. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. Did the State Department call your attention to 

Mr. Smith. I don't believe anybody called attention to them. At 
that time I recall that I was going to be Ambassador to Cuba, and I 
read them with great interest. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. What did Mr. Matthews tell you about Batista ? 

Mr. Smith. Mr. Matthews had a very poor view of Batista, con- 
sidered him a rightist ruthless dictator whom he believed to be cor- 
rupt. Mr. Matthews informed me that he had very knowledgeable 
views of Cuba and Latin American nations, and had seen the same 
things take place in Spain. He believed that it would be in the best 
interest of Cuba and the best interest of the world in general when 
Batista was removed from office. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. It was true that Batista's government was corrupt, 
wasn't it? 

Mr. Smith. It is true that Batista's government was corrupt. 
Batista was the power behind the Government in Cuba oS. and on for 
25 years. The year 1957 was the best economic year that Cuba had 
ever had. 

However, the Batista regime was disintegrating from within. It 
was becoming more corrupt, and as a result was losing strength. The 
Castro forces themselves never won a military victory. The oest mili- 
tary victory they ever won was through capturing Cuban guardhouses 
and military skirmishes, but they never actually won a military 

The Batista government was overthrown because of the corruption, 
disintegration from within, and because of the United States and the 
various agencies of the United States who directly and indirectly 
aided the overthrow of the Batista government and brought into 
power Fidel Castro. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. What were those agencies, Mr. Smith ? 

Mr. Smith. The U.S. Government agencies— may I say something 
off the record ? 

( Discussion off the recx)rd. ) 

Senator Dodd. Let it appear on the record that Ambassador Smith 
at this point has a statement which he feels will answer more com- 
pletely some of the questions already asked, and questions which may 
be asked later on. 

Mr. Smith. Shall I proceed ? 

Senator Dodd. You may resume. 

Mr. Smeth. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, as I 
am not aware of the line of questioning which your committee will fol- 
low today, I have prepared the following brief statement: 

First let me say that to date I have made no public statement re- 

farding my experiences in Cuba because I did not feel that, as a 
ormer Ambassador, it was my function to say anything which 

61335 O-60-pt. 9-4 


might be interpreted as critical of the administration which I had 
served. I have only the greatest respect and admiration for Presi- 
dent Eisenhower, whose integrity is beyond question. 

However, the establishment of a Communist regime in Cuba in- 
volves the defense and safety of this country and as you asked me to 
testify before you, I do so, recognizing that the welfare of the United 
States must transcend personal desires and reticence. 

From personal experience I have learned that many very influential 
sources m the United States are dedicated to the overthrow of all 
dictatorships. They are as opposed to anti-Communist rightest dicta- 
tors, who are friendly to the United States, as to the Communist 
dictators whom they regard as progressive. They adopt a doctrinaire 
attitude toward this question which is so impractical that they ulti- 
mately unwittingly defeat themselves. If dictatorship versus democ- 
racy were the only question that faced us, it would not be difficult 
to make a decision. However, as we are in the midst of a struggle 
for survival, other considerations are pertinent. 

If the policy of the United States is to bring about the overthrow 
of dictators in "the hope that democracy will follow, then I believe 
that the United States must be prepared to take whatever steps are 
necessary to preserve law and order and prevent chaos during that 
interim period of transition. If free and open elections are to be 
held, when a dictator is overthrown, a provisional government must 
be formed and such government noeds outside support to maintain law 
and order. To do otherwise leaves a vacuum for the Communists to 
gain control. Such a vacuum did not occur in Cuba while I was the 
U.S. Ambassador there. Instead, a group was ready to seize power — 
a Communist group. 

If we are to intervene sufficiently to bring about the overthrow of 
dictatorships, then we should intervene to whatever extent is required 
to fulfill our purpose. Otherwise, in my opinion, we must wait for 
the normal self-development of a people and not assist revolution. 
And we must be prepared to receive the criticism of supporting 
friendly governments recognized by the United States, although they 
have been labeled dictatorships. To make my point more clear, let 
me say that we helped to overthrow the Batista dictatorship which 
was pro- American only to install the Castro dictatorship which is pro- 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Mr. Smith, the pending question before you read 
your statement was : What agencies of the U.S. Government had a hand 
in bringing pressure to overthrow the Batista government, and how 
did they do it? 

Mr. oMnH. Well, the agencies, certain influential people, influen- 
tial sources in the State Department, lower down echelons in the CIA. 
I would say representatives of the majority of the U.S. Government 
agencies which have anything to do with the Embassy. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Mr. Smith, when you talked with Matthews to get 
the briefing before you went to Cuba, was he introduced to you as hav- 
ing any authority from the State Department or as being connected 
with the State Department in any way ? 

Mr. Smith. Let me ^o back. You asked me a short while ago who 
arranged the meeting with Mr. Matthews. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. Ajid you said Mr. Wieland. 


Mr. Smith. I said William Wieland, but William Wieland also 
had to have the approval of Roy Rubottom, who was then Assistant 
Secretary of State for Latin American Affairs. Now, to go back to 
this question, as I understood it you said — would you mind repeating 
that again ? 

Mr. SouRWiNE. I asked if, when you were sent to Mr. Matthews for 
this briefing, he was introduced to you as having any official connection 
with the State Department or any authority from the Department? 

Mr. Smith. Oh, no. I knew who he was, and they obviously knew 
I knew who he was, but I believe that they thought it would be a good 
idea for me to get the viewpoint of Herbert Matthews, and also I 
think that Herbert Matthews is the leading Latin American editorial 
writer for the New York Times. Obviously the State Department 
would like to have the support of the New York Times. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Mr. Matthews was not, as far as you know then, a 
consultant for the State Department or otherwise connected with the 
Department ? 

Mr. SanTH. I do not believe that he was ever a consultant or ever 
employed by the State Department. I believe there was a close con- 
nection, though, between the Latin American desk and Herbert 

Mr. SouKwiNE. And, by "the Latin American desk" whom do you 
mean ? 

Mr, Smith. I would say the Latin American desk would go from 
the Assistant Secretary of State for Latin American Affairs right 
down to the man who presides over the Cuban desk. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. And who was that ? 

Mr. Smith. The individual who presided over the Cuban desk in 
himself is not important, I don't think, in what you are trying to 
arrive at. 

I would say that Mr. Wieland and all those who had anything to 
do with Cuba had a close connection with Herbert Matthews. 

I will go further than that. I will say that when I was Ambas- 
sador, that I was thoroughly aware of this, and sometimes made the 
remark in my own Embassy that Mr. Matthews was more familiar 
with the State Department thinking regarding Cuba than I was. 

Senator Eastland. Mr. Smith, when were you Ambassador ? 

Mr. Smith. I was confirmed by the Senate in May 1957, and was 
in Cuba until January 20, 1959. 

Senator Eastland. You were then Ambassador when Castro came 
to power. 

Mr. Smith. Castro landed on the shores of South Oriente in De- 
cember 1956, and he was still considered an outlaw in the hills, I will 
say, until just about the time when I arrived in Cuba, so I was in 
Cuba during the last year and a half of Batista's regime, during that 
whole period of time 

Senator Eastland. You were there when Batista fled? 

Mr. Smith, Oh, yes, sir. 

Senator Eastland. Mr. Smith, we have had hearings, a great many, 
in Miami, with prominent Cubans, and there is a thread that runs 
through the whole thing that people connected with some Govern- 
ment agency went to Cuba and called on the chiefs of the armed 
forces and told them that we would not recognize the government of 


the President-elect, and that we would not back him, and that because 
of that the chiefs of the armed forces told Batista to leave the coun- 
try, and they set up a government in which they attempted to make 
a deal with Castro. That is accurate, isn't it, Tom ? 

Senator Dodd. I would say so, yes. 

Senator Eastland. That thread runs through the whole series of 
hearings. Do you know anything about that ? 

Mr. Smith. Well, it is going to take a little while to answer that, 
because it is not as simple as that. Senator Eastland. You are talk- 
ing now about Rivero Aguero who was elected November 3, 1958, 
as President of Cuba. 

Senator Eastland. Yes. 

Mr. Smith. Let me just read, if I may, something that I wrote here 
that I may publish and may not — this is part of it — which will an- 
swer part of your question. I will have to go back over it step by 
step, because what you have heard, Senator Eastland, is partly true 
and partly untrue. 

Senator Eastland. Yes. 

Mr. Smith. I "have been asked many times what part if any the 
United States played in Castro and Communist rise to power in Cuba. 
The U.S. Government agencies and the U.S. press played a major role 
in bringing Castro to power. 

Three front-page articles in the New York Times in early 1957, 
written by the editorialist Herbert Matthews, served to inflate Castro 
to world stature and world recognition. Until that time, Castro had 
been just another bandit in the Oriente Mountains of Cuba, with a 
handful of followers who had terrorized the campesinos, that is the 
peasants, throughout the countryside. 

Fidel Castro landed on the south coast of Oriente in December of 
1956 from Mexico with an expeditionary force of 81 men. Inter- 
cepted by Cuban gunboats and patrol planes, Castro and a handful of 
stragglers managed to ensconce themselves in the rugged 8,000-foot 
Sierra Maestra Range. 

After the Matthews articles which followed an exclusive interview 
by the Times editorial writer in Castro's mountain hideout and which 
likened him to Abraham Lincoln, he was able to get followers and 
fimds in Cuba and in the United States. From that time on arms, 
money, and soldiers of fortune abounded. Much of the American 
press began to picture Castro as a political Robin Hood. 

Also because Batista was the dictator who unlawfully seized power, 
American people assumed Castro must, on the other hand, represent 
liberty and democracy. The crusader role which the press and radio 
bestowed on the bearded rebel blinded the people to the leftwing 
political philosophy with which even at that time he was already on 

His speeches as a student leader, his interviews as an exile while in 
Mexico, Costa Rica, and elsewhere clearly outlined a Marxist trend 
of political thought. 

The official U.S. attitude toward Castro could not help but be in- 
fluenced by the pro-Castro press and radio; certain Membei^ of Con- 
gress picked up tne torch for him. 

From there, to get back to your question, there were a number of 
times, number of occasions when I was asked as the Ambassador if we 


would help the church in its efforts to establish a bridge between 
Castro and Batista, or if we, in any way, would support a national 
unity government. Such government would act as a provisional 
government in Cuba to maintain law and order while elections were 
being held. 

The United States would never agree to support or would never 
permit me to negotiate, because it would be considered as intervening 
in the internal affairs of Cuba. 

Batista made three big mistakes. The last big mistake he made was 
when he did not hold honest elections, which he had promised me on 
numerous and many occasions that he would have. Rivero Aguero, 
the former Prime Minister of Cuba, was elected, I believe it was 
November 8, 1958, to succeed Batista. It is true, in reply to your 
question. Senator, that the U.S. Government instructed me through 
the State Department to say that we would not give aid and support 
to the Rivero Aguero government when installed because we did not 
feel that he could maintain effective control of the country. As far 
as the disintegration of the armed forces around the Batista govern- 
ment, the answer to your last question is that this negative action 
helped shatter the morale of the existing government. The responsi- 
bility for the deterioration in the morale of the army, navy, and 
Cuban Air Force dates back to many other forms of direct and 
indirect — I use the word "intervention" advisedly. 

Primarily I would say that when we refused to sell arms to the 
Cuban Government and also by what I termed intervening by innu- 
endo (which was persuading other friendly governments not to sell 
arms to Cuba) that these actions had a moral, psychological effect 
upon the Cuban armed forces which was demoralizing to the nth 

The reverse, it built up the morale of the revolutionary forces. 
Obviously when we refused to sell arms to a friendly government, the 
existing government, the people of Cuba and the armed forces knew 
that the United States no longer would support Batista's government. 

It is also true, and I believe that I can confirm the story now be- 
cause the following story was reported by associates of Batista. 
Further, I was asked by the press last winter to comment on whether 
we had told Batista to leave the country. At that time I refused 
to answer the question and referred all comments to the State 

It is also that, upon instructions, I spent 2 hours and 35 minutes 
on December 17, 1958, with Batista, and I told him that the United 
States or rather certain influential people in the United States be- 
lieved that he could no longer maintain effective control in Cuba, and 
that they believed it would avoid a great deal of further bloodshed 
if he were to retire. 

Senator Eastland. That was on instructions of the State Depart- 
ment ? 

Mr. Smith. An ambassador never would have a conversation like 
that, sir, unless it was on instructions of the State Department. 

Senator Eastland. Yes. 

Senator Dodd. When you say the State Department, to be more 
exact, who? 

Mr. Smith. Pardon me, Senator? 


Senator Dodd. What human being in the State Department, who in 
the State Department? 

Mr. Smith. Well, an ambassador receives his orders by cable and it 
is signed always by the Secretary of State. Whoever writes those 
cables I couldn't answer, but I have a part here 

Senator Eastland. Your judgment is it was the Latin American 
desk, Mr. Rubottom, wasn't it? 

Mr. Smith. That brings up what I consider a very important point. 
I believe that the policies are determined in the lower echelon, and by 
the time the higher echelon receives them, policies have already been 
made, and they have to live by them. 

I would like to recommend that some higher authority, such as the 
National Security Council of the United States, determine what our 
attitude toward another nation should be. Then all the actions of the 
State Department should be guided according to such policy as laid 
down by the National Security Council. I am sure the decision of 
the National Security Council would be arrived at from what is in the 
best interest of the United States. 

If they believed it was in the best interest of the United States to be 
friendly to another power and to give aid to that power, then our 
actions along that line should be guided accordingly. 

A decision such as prohibiting the sale of arms to a friendly nation 
can have devastating effects upon the government in power. 

We even did not fulfill our promise to deliver 15 training planes, 
which had been bought and paid for by the Batista government. In 
accordance with instructions from the State Department I informed 
Batista that delivery would be suspended, because we feared some 
harm might come to the 47 kidnaped Americans. The kidnaping by 
Raul Castro of 30 U.S. marines and sailors, 17 American citizens, and 
3 Canadians occurred at this time. 

After the kidnaped Americans were returned we still refused to 
deliver these training planes because we feared that bombs could be 
put on the planes even though they were strictly for training purposes. 

I reiterate that decisions such as these may determine whether a 
government can remain in power. 

Although they could buy arms and ammunition from other sources, 
the psychological impact on the morale of the government was crip- 
pling. On the other hand, it gave a great uplift to the morale of the 

Senator Eastland. Let me ask you this question. As a matter of 
fact, isn't it your judgment that the State Department of the United 
States is primarily responsible for bringing Castro to power in Cuba? 

Mr. Smith. No, sir, I can't say that the State Department in itself 
is primarily responsible. The State Department played a large part 
in bringing Castro to power. The press, other Government agencies. 
Members of Congress are responsible. 

Senator Eastland. Would you say that the American Government 
then, including all of its agencies, was largely responsible for bring- 
ing Castro to power ? 

Mr. Smith. The American Government, yes, sir, and the people in 
the American Government. 
Senator Eastland. Yes. 

Mr. Smith. We refused to sell arms to a friendly government, and 
we persuaded other friendly governments not to sell arms to Cuba, 


Yet on the other hand revolutionary sympathizers were delivering 
arms, bodies and ammunition daily from the United States. "We were 
lax in enforcing our neutrality laws. 

Senator Eastland. To Castro. 

Mr. Smith. Yes, sir, to revolutionaries under Castro. 

Senator Eastland. You had been warning the State Department 
that Castro was a Marxist ? 

Mr. Smith. Yes, sir. 

Senator Eastland. And that Batista's government was a friendly 
government. That is what had been your advice as to the State De- 
partment ? 

Mr. Smith. Let me answer that this way, which will make it very 
clear. When I went to Cuba, I left here with the definite feeling ac- 
cording to my briefings which I had received, that the U.S. Govern- 
ment was too close to the Batista regime, and that we were being ac- 
cused of intervening in the affairs of Cuba by trying to perpetuate 
the Batista dictatorship. 

After I had been in Cuba for approximately 2 months, and had 
made a study of Fidel Castro and the revolutionaries, it was perfectly 
obvious to me as it would be to any other reasonable man that Castro 
was not the answer ; that if Castro came to power, it would not be in 
the best interests of Cuba or in the best interests of the United States. 

Senator Eastland. Why? 

Mr. Smith. Because I feared he was a Marxist. 

Senator Eastland. That is right. 

Mr. Smith. Because of his statements. 

Senator Eastland. That is right. Now in the light of that infor- 
mation that he was a Marxist, that for him to come to power was not 
in the best interest of our country, in the light of that information 

Mr. Smith. I want to correct something I said if I may for the 

Senator Eastland. All right. 

Mr. Smith. When I said because he was a Marxist, he at that time 
gave every indication of being a Marxist from the statements which 
had been made in Mexico, Costa Rica, at Bogota (also he had been 
active in the FEU) . I did not have the proof at that time that he 
was. However, there was no question that there was Communist 
infiltration and Commimist control of this movement. 

Senator Eastland. All right, but your advices were that it was 
not in the best interest of the United States for him to come to power, 
and in spite of that then you say that the American Government is 
primarily responsible for putting him in power ? 

Mr. Smith. You are making the statement, sir. Are you asking a 

Senator Eastland. Yes, I ask it in the form of a question. 

Mr. Smith. You made a very good statement, Senator Eastland, 
I don't know how I can comment on that statement. 

Senator Eastland. Do you agree with it ? 

Mr. Smith. Would you repeat that, what Senator Eastland said, 

Senator Eastland. I said that your advices were that it was not 
in the best interest of the United States for Castro to come to power. 

Mr. Smith. Yes, sir. 


Senator Eastland. And yet in spite of that, of your advices to our 
Government, you say that our Government was primarily responsible 
in bringing Castro to power. 

Mr. Smith. That is absolutely correct. 

Senator Dodd. May I ask a question ? Did you ever discuss Castro 
with Mr. Rubottom? 

Mr. Smith. Yes, on numerous occasions. 

Senator Dodd. Can you tell us what his attitude was toward Castro ? 

Mr. Smith. In all due justice to Roy Rubottom, I think that Roy 
Rubottom was under terrific pressure from segments of the press, 
from certain Members of Congress, from the avalanche of Castro 
sympathizers and revolutionary sympathizers who daily descended 
upon the State Department, also their official representative, Betan- 
court, and Rubottom may have taken the line of least resistance. 

Senator Dodd. Did he ever tell you that he knew about Castro in 
Colombia ? 

Mr. Smith. I don't believe we discussed what is known as 

Senator Dodd. Do you know that he was in Bogota when Castro 

Mr. Smith. I did not know that. 

Senator Dodd. That is all I have. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. May I inquire ? 

To go back just a little bit, you spoke of the 15 training planes which 
were held up, and I understood you to say they were held up because 
this Government feared that if they were sent, there might be some 
harm to the kidnaped Americans ? 

Mr. Smith. That is correct. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. Did you mean by this that the Government of the 
United States was yielding to blackmail ? 

Mr. Smith. No, I do not think the U.S. Government was yielding to 
blackmail, but I think the State Department did not want to take any 
action which might help the Batista government and receive the pro- 
tests of the revolutionaries. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Are you saying then that this was simply an excuse 
which was given ? 

Mr. Smith. I believe the Department was happy to have a reason 
to justify reversing their decision. What happened was this. 

The Batista government paid for these planes. They were 15 train- 
ing planes which were allegedly to be used for the one and only pur- 
poses of training a few pilots taking Air Force training m the 
United States. 

I received instructions to tell Batista that we could make delivery 
of those 15 planes. I recall this very clearly because I remember that 
it was received with great pleasure by the Government of Cuba be- 
cause they felt that here was an indication that the United States was 
not going to be too severe. Batista reported my message to his 

Shortly thereafter, before the planes could be delivered, the kid- 
naping of the Americans took place. I received instructions to notify 
the Batista government that the 15 training planes could not be de- 
livered because the United States feared that bodily harm might come 
to the Americans who were kidnaped. 


I conveyed this information to the President of Cuba, informed him 
that this was only a temporary suspension for the reasons outlined 
above. When the kidnaped Americans were returned, I sent numer- 
ous telegrams urging delivery of the training planes. 

The subject was carried on for approximately 2 or 3 months, trying 
to obtain these training planes for the Batista government; not that 
the training planes themselves were so important to the Batista gov- 
ernment, but because of the psychological effect it would have upon 
those associated with the Government of Cuba. 

However, the State Department refused to grant permission to have 
these planes released from Fort Lauderdale, Fla., where they were 

Mr. SouRWiNE. Do you know, sir, whether there was any threat con- 
veyed to the State Department by or on behalf of Castro that if these 
planes were sent, the kidnaped Americans would be harmed ? 

Mr. Smith. I do not believe there was. To the best of my knowl- 
edge, the Castro people — I will correct that. I was about to say the 
Castro people had no knowledge. 

However, the espionage system of the Castro people was so good 
that I could not say they didn't have knowledge of anything of such 
importance, because they seemed to know — ^they knew nearly every- 
thing that was going on. They had their spies planted in the Cuban 
Embassy, and they had the very finest espionage system. 

Senator Dodd. By "the Cuban Embassy" you mean their Embassy 
here in Washington ? 

Mr. Smith. The Cuban Embassy in Washinj^on. I warned Gon- 
zalo Guell, the Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of Cuba, and I 
also warned President Batista that there were spies in the Cuban Em- 
bassy in Washington, I received this information from the State 
Departnlent, from the Cuban desk in the State Department. 

We knew that the leakages were coming from the Cuban Embassy 
in Washington. If you wish me to go into details, I can tell you how 
they knew it. 

However, the Cuban Government never took effective measures. 
First of all I warned the Government of Cuba when De La Campa 
was Cuban Ambassador, later when Arroya became Ambassador I 
again warned him. I went even further. I told Arroya it would be in 
his best interests if he removed everybody in the Cuban Embassy 
and obtained completely new personnel so as to be awfully sure he had 
divested the Embassy of the spies. 

However, no steps were taken. That is where most of the leakages 
came from. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. I think it would be interesting if you could tell us 
how the State Department knew that these leaks occurred through 
the Embassy ? 

Mr. Smith. In March 1957, 1,950 Garand rifles were on the docks 
and prepared to be delivered by boat to the Cuban Government. 
Cuban revolutionaries and sympathizers in New York had informa- 
tion of this. They brought a great deal of pressure to bear on the 
State Department to halt shipment. 

The State Department issued an order canceling the shipment of 
these 1,950 Garand rifles— it is not Garland— G-a-r-a-n-d, canceling 



this shipment. This was the beginning of when we suspended the 
shipment of arms to Cuba. 

The reason that the Cuban desk of the State Department felt that 
the laakages were coming out of the Cuban Embassy was that the 
revolutionary sympathizers in New York and in Washington had the 
numbers on those rifles. There were only two places that you could 

fet the numbers of those rifles, and that was from either our War 
)epartment or the Cuban Embassy. 

Senator Hruska. When you say "numbers," do you mean serials? 

Mr. SMrrH. Numbers on the rifles, the serial numbers on the rifles. 
The Cuban Embassy had those serial numbers because they were ad- 
vised of their shipments. It later turned out that a secretary, I 
believe it was the secretary to the Ambassador and also the sergeant 
who was in charge of the code room, were Castro revolutionaries 
planted in the Cuban Embassy in Washington, and they were the ones 
who were relaying this information to Castro. 

Senator Eastland. Mr. Smith, you said that in justice to Mr. Ru- 
bottom that he was under pressure in this country. 

Mr. Smith. Yes, sir. 

Senator Eastland. But regardless of pressure, Mr. Rubottom knew 
that Castro was a Marxist and was unfriendly to the United States. 

Mr. Smith. I do not believe that Rubottom believed that Castro 
was a Marxist, knew that he was a Marxist, and I do not believe that 
Rubottom knew that Castro was unfriendly to the United States. I 
believe that Rubottom was disillusioned as were many influential peo- 
ple in the United States. 

Senator Eastland. But he had your advices as Ambassador to 
Cuba, the man on the site ? 

Mr. Smith. Senator, I cannot unequivocally say that right from 
the beginning I knew that Castro was a Marxist. When I first went 
over there, I was instructed, not instructed but I was briefed, to the 
effect that we had been too close to the Batista regime, and I went 
to Cuba thinking that Batista wore horns and that Castro perhaps was 

The Communists are too smart to infiltrate too openly at the begin- 
ning and disclose their hand. Many times when I was in Cuba I said 
that the 26th of July Movement, the revolutionary movement, was a. 
Boy Scout movement compared to the Communists, and that the Com- 
munists would apply the blotting paper to the 26th of July Movement 
as they saw fit, and they did sop it up as they saw fit. 

Senator Eastland. You said you went there thinking Batista wore 
horns, that we were so close to him — what was the rest of the answer, 
that we were too close to him ? 

Mr. Smith. I said that when I went to Cuba, I went over there with 
the feeling which I had received from my briefings, and nothing 
specific but the thought 

Senator Eastland. Wait just a minute now. You have answered 
the question. That was from briefings, that your opinion was based 
on briefings and information you had received through the State 
Department ? 

Mr. Smith. I repeat. Senator, I said that nothing specific was said, 
but I clearly received the impression from my briefings when I was 


in Washington that we were too close to the Batista government, and 
when I went to Cuba, I felt that I had. three missions. 

Two of the missions I planned on arrival in Cuba. The third I 
assumed after I got over there. Mission No. 1 was to have the United 
States Embassy assume an impartial stand, have it generally under- 
stood that the U.S. Embassy took an impartial view in the political 
affairs of Cuba. 

No. 2, to assist and do everything that I could to see that the press 
censorship was lifted and that constitutional guarantees were again 
restored. And, No. 3, was to do everything that I could — without 
intervening in any way in the internal affairs of Cuba — to bring 
about, through Batista, free and open elections. 

I was successful in step 1. I was successful in step 2. However, 
the revolutionaries stepped up their terroristic activities and forced 
Batista to again clamp on the press censorship and to again suspend 
constitutional guarantees. 

Then I concentrated on trying to persuade Batista to hold free and 
open elections. On numerous occasions, Batista gave me his solemn 
word he would hold honest elections. He not only said he would hold 
free and open elections, but he also promised me that he would ask 
the world press to witness these elections, that he would ask the 
United Nations to send representatives to witness these elections, that 
he would ask the Organization of American States to send represent- 
atives to witness these elections. He failed in that promise. 

I have reviewed the answers to these questions a little bit, sir, 
because if I answer them yes or no, I am afraid it may give the wrong 

Senator Hruska. Mr. Smith, in that same field you have made sev- 
eral references to pressure on Roy Rubottom. Could you tell us the 
source or the nature of this pressure? 

Mr. Smith. The pressure on Rov Rubottom came from Members of 
Congress who it is not necessary for me to name because you gentler 
men know them. 

Pressures on Roy Rubottom came from some sections of the press 
in the United States. Pressure on Roy Rubottom came from the 
representatives and sympathizers of the 26th of July Movement in 
the United States and particularly those in Washington. 

Senator Eastland. What is the name that you named as one of 
them who is now President of 

Mr. Smith. No, he is not. He has the same name. It is not the 
same man. His name was Betancourt. He was the legal official rep- 
resentative, registered and legally accepted of the Cuban revolution- 
aries in Washington. 

Many of these people, who later became members of the first Cabi- 
net of Castro were asylees in the United States. They had close con- 
tacts with members of the State Department. 

To name a few: Urrutia, the first President of Cuba, Agramonte, 
the first Foreign Minister of Cuba, the first Prime Minister of Cuba, 
Miro Cardona. As a matter of fact, the first time that I met Cardona 
was after Batista had left the country. It was about J;he 4th of 
January of 1959 in the Presidential palace. He turned to me and 
said, "I am a good friend of William Wieland, a very good friend of 
William Wieland." 



Also, many other revolutionary sympathizers had access to the 
State Department. These people brought continual pressure on the 

Senator Eastland. Do you know at the same time the Latin Ameri- 
can desk was receiving advices from other Latin American coun- 
tries of Castro's Communist affiliation ? 

Mr. Smith. No, sir, I did not. They never told me that. No, sir, 
I did not. 

In my own Embassy there were certain ones of influence who were 
pro-26th of July, pro-Castro, and anti-Batista. 

Senator Eastland. Who were they? 

Mr. Smith. Do I have to answer that question. Senator ? 

Senator Eastland. Yes, I think you have to. We are not going 
into it unnecessarily. 

Mr. Smith. I don't want to harm anybody. That is the reason I 

I would say the Chief of the Political Section, John Topping, and 
the Chief of the CIA Section. It was revealed that the No. 2 CIA 
man in the embassy had g-ven unwarranted and undue encouragement 
to the revolutionaries. This came out in the trials of naval officers 
after the Cienfuegos revolution of September 1957. 

Senator Eastland. Did Castro ever win a battle ? 

Mr. Smith. Castro never won a military victory. The best victories 
that Castro ever won were raids upon Cuban guardhouses that are 
spread out through the hinterland and small skirmishes with Govern- 
ment troops. 

Senator Eastland. How did he come to power? First, why did 
Batista leave ? 

]Mr. Smtth. Why did Batista leave ? 

Senator Eastland. Yes. 

Mr. Smith. If the United States had been completely impartial, in 
my opinion, Batista would not have had to leave Cuba until after the 
inauguration of the president-elect (Rivero Aguero) . 

Senator Eastland. He didn't have to leave. He had not been de- 
feated by armed force. 

Mr. Smith. Let me put it to you this way : that there are a lot of 
reasons for Batista's moving out. Batista had been in control off and 
on for 25 years. His government was disintegrating at the end due 
to corruption, due to the fact that he had been in power too long. Po- 
lice brutality was getting worse. 

On the other hand there were three forces that kept Batista in power. 
He had the support of the armed forces, he had support of the labor 
leaders. Cuba enjoyed a good economy. 

Nineteen hundred and fifty-seven was one of the best years in the 
economic history of Cuba. The fact that the United States was no 
longer supporting Batista had a devastating psychological effect upon 
the armed forces and upon the leaders of the labor movement. This 
went a long way toward bringing about his downfall. 

On the other hand, our actions in the United States were responsi- 
ble for the rise to power of Castro. Until certain portions of the 
American press began to write derogatory articles against the Batista 
government, the Castro revolution never got off first base. 

Batista made the mistake of overemphasizing the importance of 
Prio, who was residing in Florida, and underestimating the impor- 


tance of Castro. Prio was operating out of the United States, out of 
Florida, supplying the revolutionaries with arms, ammunition, bodies 
and money. 

Batista told me that when Prio left Cuba, Prio and Alameia took 
$140 million out of Cuba. If we cut that estimate in half, they may 
have shared $70 million. It is believed that Prio spent a great many 
millions of dollars in the United States assisting the revolutionaries. 
This was done right from our shores. 

Senator Eastlaxd. No effort was made to stop it ? 

Mr. Smith. The Batista govenmient complained continually about 
the airlifts and airdrops of bodies and arms from the United States. 
I always kept the State Department fully informed. 

But we seemed to have great trouble in enforcing our neutrality 
laws. I have sometimes wished that we had been half as diligent at 
that time in enforcing our neutrality laws as we have been lately. 

Senator Hruska. Mr. Smith, you mentioned the time when the 
United States through the press did these things and so on. Do you 
mean the United States officially or the press as an institution ? 

Mr. Smith. Certain elements of the American press I should say. 

Senator Hruska. The American press. 

Mr. Smith. Well, let us say world press. 

Senator Hruska. The world press, yes, the press in general ? 

Mr. Smith. Certain elements of the press in general. 

Senator Hruska. Didn't they have access to the same information 
that you and other people did with reference to the Marxist influences 
in Castro's thinking and his actions? 

Mr. Smith. There are certain influential people in the United 
States who are definitely antirightist dictators, but seem to look upon 
leftist dictators as being progressive. 

Now whether that is an answer to your question or not, sir, I don't 
know. I do believe that too much concentration sometimes is placed 
upon the removal of a dictator and not enough thought is given upon 
what will take place afterward. I tried to cover that in the statement 
which I read here before Senator Eastland came in. 

Senator Eastland. You said that you wished that we had been as 

Mr. Smith. Pardon me? 

Senator Eastland. You said that you wished we had been as zealous 
in enforcing our neutrality laws 

Mr. Smith. That is correct, sir. 

Senator Eastland. In dealing with Castro. 

Mr. Smith. That is correct. 

Senator Eastland. As we are at the present time. 

Mr. Smith. That is correct. 

Senator Eastland. Of course when we enforce them now, we are in 
fact aiding Castro, are we not ? 

Mr. Smith. I would say that when Castro came to power, that we 
were very diligent in enforcing our neutrality laws. We even moved 
people out of Florida ; people whom the United States thought might 
be active in any counterrevolutionary movement. 

However, when I was Ambassador to Cuba, we seemed to have great 
trouble in enforcing our neutrality laws. 

Senator Eastland. I know, but enforcing those laws now is an aid 
to the present Government of Cuba, is it not ? 


Mr. Smith. Yes, sir. 

Senator Hruska. Mr. Smith, moving into another area, what was 
the attitude and what were the manifestations on the part of Ameri- 
can investors in Cuba in regard to Batista and Castro prior to the time 
that Castro actually took charge ? 

Mr. Smith. I would say that American business was for the Gov- 
ernment of Cuba, because the Government of Cuba gave normal pro- 
tection to American business. 

Senator Hruska. What truth is there to some representations that 
some of the big business investments there, investors there, paid a part 
of their taxes to Castro and a part of their taxes to Batista in the 
latter time of Batista's administration ? 

Mr. Smith. All right, sir ; I am glad you brought that question up. 

The revolutionaries under Fidel Castro demanded tribute through- 
out Cuba. By the fall or the late summer of 1958, they decided to also 
demand tribute from American business and American property 

As soon as I heard this, I wrote a letter to every American business 
in Cuba in which I clearly stated that Americans should not pay trib- 
ute, and I asked them not to give any money to the revolutionaries, that 
we were still doing business with a friendly government, and that as 
Americans we had no right to pay money to active revolutionaries 
who were trying to overthrow a friendly government by force. 

This letter was approved by the State Department before it was 
sent out. Every week I regularly had a meeting in my Embassy, of 
some of the leading businessmen in Havana, and they assured me that 
the Americans were not paying money. 

However, toward the closing days of the Batista regime, I believe 
some Americans did pay protection money. They were paying taxes 
to the Batista government and were also paying taxes to the Castro 
people. I couldn't prove it. They wouldn't let me know. 

It was unofficially reported that the revolutionaries demanded 
$500,000 from a large oil company. Otherwise, the rebels said, they 
would blow up the refinery of this oil company. The American offi- 
cials of the company refused to pay tribute. I give you this as an 
example of what took place. 

Senator Hruska. To the extent that it might have gone on, that 
would be testimony to the idea that Batista's hold and control and 
ability to protect property was dissipating ? 

Mr. Smith. That is true. 

Senator Hruska. His ability to protect was dissipating? 

Mr. Smith. Disappearing ? 

Senator Hruska. Yes, was disappearing. 

Mr. Smith. That is correct; it was disappearing toward the end, 
but now you are speaking of the last 2 or 3 months of Batista's regime. 

In the middle of November 1958 — I do not recall exactly the date — 
I went to the State Department and I informed Wieland and Kubot- 
tom that the Batista government was on its last le^s. 

They said, "Why do you say that now?" This was a complete re- 
versal from my previous position. My previous position had been 
that the Batista government was surviving. For many months I had 
found it necessary to counteract the slanted opinions of certain people 
who wanted to portray chaotic conditions in Cuba and who wanted to 


give the impression that the Government of Cuba would momentarily 

It was an uphill fight to keep reports factual. 

In November, I virtually informed the Department that the Batista 
government could not survive much longer. They said : "Why is it 
going to go? Why do you say that?" 

And I said, "Because, until now, the revolutionaries have been tak- 
ing amateurish acts in trying to destroy the economy" — the amateur- 
ish acts were such things as Duming the sugar cane, kidnapping the 
Argentine automobile driver, hijackmg airplanes, kidnapping Ameri- 
cans — "but now they are getting professional advice." 

They said, "What do you mean by 'professional advice?' " 

I said, "Now they are learning how to destroy the economy by 
disrupting the main arteries of transportation." 

They have learned how to blow up the correct bridges, to bomb the 
main highways so that commerce cannot move in Cuba. 

And I said, "They obviously are receiving professional advice." 

That was in November. By that time it was clearly obvious that the 
tide had swung the other way. 

Senator Eastland. Who were those individuals in the State De- 
partment ? 

Mr. Smith. That were doing what, sir ? 

Senator Eastland. That were slanting the news that way; that 
were telling falsehoods ; that were pro-Castro. 

Mr. Smith. There were quite a few. Senator. 

Senator Eastland. Who were they ? 

Mr. SMiiaa:. I repeat again, Do I have to mention names? 

Senator Eastland. Yes. We have reasons, Mr. Smith. 

Mr. Smith. Yes, sir. You see my point : I do not want to get peo- 
ple in trouble, either. 

Senator Eastland. Well, I know that. 

Mr. Smith. Because I do not believe that they are dangerous. 
If I thought they were dangerous, I would not hesitate. 

Senator Eastland. I am not certain about that. 

Mr. SiMiTH. All right, sir. 

Senator Eastland. We have sources of information. 

Mr. Smith. Yes. 

I believe Wieland, William Wieland, and that is as far as I would 
like to go in the State Department. I had my own troubles in the 
Embassy, but I corrected it in the Embassy by never allowing one sin- 
gle cable to go out that did not have my signature. 

I wrote practically every political cable that went out. 

Senator Eastland. Who is William Wieland ? 

Mr. Smith. He is Director of the Caribbean Division and Director 
of Mexican Affairs in charge of San Domingo, Cuba, Haiti, Mexico. 

At that time he had all of Central America in addition to these. 

In an embassy where I served as Ambassador at that time, when I 
first went there, I saw the difference. Those in the economic field 
were pro-Batista because they were dealing with American business. 
Those in the political section and the intelligence section were pro- 
revolutionary. We could say for humanitarian reasons, or whatever 
the reasons may be. 

698 CORCVrUNIST threat to U.S. through the CARIBBEAN 

Mr. SoTTRwiNE. Mr. Smith, you spoke earlier of the No. 2 CIA man 
in your mission having been caught giving aid and comfort to the 
Castro forces. 

Would you tell us just what it was he did ? 

Mr. Smith. Yes. In September 1957, the Navy had an uprising at 
Cienfuegos, Cuba. We in the American Embassy were familiar that 
a revolt of some type would take place. That information came to 
us through the CIA, or some other source in the Embassy. 

If I may divert for a minute, that is the trouble with Cubans; they 
talk too much. We did not know when it was going to to take place. 

We finally heard that the revolt at Cienfuegos had been called off. 
However, the Navy in Havana forgot to notify the Navy at Cien- 
fuegos, and they went on with the revolt while the Navy m Havana 
did not participate. 

This revolt was squashed by the Batista government. 

In the trial of the naval officers, it came out that the No. 2 man 
had said that if the revolution was successful, that the United States 
would recognize the revolutionaries. 

I do not believe that the No. 2 man in the CIA intended to convey 
that thought. His story to me was that he had been called over to 
interview some men believed to be doctors, because they were dressed 
in white coats, and when they advised him of the revolt that was to 
take place, they wanted to know what the position of the United 
States would be. 

And he inadvertently intimated something to the effect of which I 
am not quite sure, that the United States might give recognition. 

As soon as the Embassy learned of this, I called a meeting of the 
Embassy staff and laid down the law that the Ambassador, nor any- 
one, could give word as to whom the United States would recognize ; 
that there were only two people in the United States that had that 
authority : 

One was the Secretary of State and the other was the President of 
the United States. 

The information of what had taken place was brought to me by 
Batista. Batista was very indignant. However, I explained what 
happened and told him — Batista — that the CIA man had done this 
inadvertently and had not realized what he was saying or to whom he 
was talking. 

Batista was cooperative and did not ask to have the man leave the 

Senator Hruska. Mr. Smith, a little bit ago you made reference 
to the press, certain segments of the press, certainly here in America 
or even perhaps the world press, who are hostile to the rightist dic- 
tators but rather are receptive to leftist dictators. 

Mr. Smith. I did not use the word "receptive." 

Senator Hruska. Sympathetic ? 

Mr. Smith. I said certain influential sources in the United States 
who are strongly against dictatorships sometimes seem to feel that 
leftist dictators are progressive. 

Senator Hruska. Are progressive. 

What is your observation or appraisal of the present attitude of 
those people with reference to Castro ? 


Mr. Smith. I note with interest that certain portions of the press 
who strongly advocated Castro have not yet admitted their error. 

Senator Hruska. Have some admitted ? 

Mr. Smith. Yes, sir, I do not want to mention them. There is no 
point in my being crucified by the press, too. But there are certain 
very important groups who had a great deal to do with Castro's rise 
to power who I note even today still speak — well, this I can't say defi- 
nitely, but I was told that a certain newspaper wrote an editorial 
saying it would be better to have the fall of the Generalissimo Trujillo 
in San Domingo and take a chance of having another bearded man 
as there is in Cuba than to have the present dictator remain. 

I note that such papers still do not admit the error of their ways. 

Senator Hruska. It is of interest and it is of importance, as you can 
appreciate, because, after all, this is a composite picture. 

Mr. Smith. Yes. 

Senator Hruska. You indicated that yourself : that there were Mem- 
bers of Congress, there were the press. 

Mr. Smith. That is right. 

Senator Hruska. There were certain business interests. 

Mr. Smith. That is true. 

Senator Hruska. There were certain people in the Government, 
State Department, and elsewhere. 

Mr. Smith. That is true. 

Senator Eastland. He said more than that, Koman. He said the 
American Government, he would say, through all of its branches. 

Mr. Smith. When I say the "American Government," obviously, we 
are talking about the agencies which compose the American Govern- 

Senator Eastland. Of course, but they were primarily responsible 
for the rise of Castro. 

Mr. Smith. Without the United States, Castro would not be in 
power today. I will put it as straight as that to you, sir. 

Senator Hruska. But the responsibility for that is a composite 

Mr. Smith. Is a composite, that is correct. 

Senator Hruska. There may have been certain quarters in which 
there were more virulent advocates than others, but, just the same, it is 
a composite thing. Without that composite nature, very likely, the 
result which did follow may not have happened. 

Mr. Smith. That is correct. 

In other words, I do not think it is fair to say that this individual 
or that individual or that particular agency, in itself, per se, is respon- 
sible for Castro coming to power. It is the composite. 

Senator Eastland. The composite of the U.S. Government, is that 
it, and its branches ? 

Mr. Smith. Composite of those elements that formed the U.S. 

Senator Eastland. That formed the U.S. Government. 

Mr. Smith. I mentioned segments of the press, certain Members of 
Congress, the CIA, the State Department. All of them took a hand 
in this, Senator. 


Senator Dodd. But in any composite picture, I think we all rec- 
o^ize that there are some influences that are stronger than others. 
They are never all the same. 

Mr. Smith. No. Some must share a greater part of the guilt than 

Senator Dodd. And some can do more than others. 

Mr. Smith. And some are in a position to do much more. 

Senator Dodd. That is what I think we are driving at. 

Senator Eastland. And the agencies of the U.S. Government could 
do, of course, more than Members of Congress or the press or anyone 

Mr. Smith. That is true. You have all sorts of agencies. 

Senator Dodd. Certainly, you can say it the other way. You can 
say that without the U.S. Government, the other factors of the com- 
posite picture could not do anything. If the Government had stood 
firm and said, "We will not assist Castro," the fact that there were 
many other elements of our society who were sympathetic to him 
could not have brought it about ; isnx that true ? 

Senator Hruska. Conversely, if the other elements — and I take 
what we would consider exterior elements; let's take business and 
the press — for example, had the press, in its opinion-making power, 
been antagonistic toward Castro, no amount of formal governmental 
action could have overcome that massive factor. 

Mr. Smith. That is true. 

Senator Hruska. The same thing is true with reference to imple- 
menting Castro. If and when business located and having invest- 
ments in Cuba would either by blackmail or by so-called taxes support 
financially the Castro movement, that was something which, likewise, 
would be very helpful to those who in formal government circles 
would say, "Let us also help Castro." 

Mr. Smith. Those who paid tribute at the end were doing it for 
their own self -protection because they felt that if they did not do it 
they were going to lose their holdings. ^ 

Senator Eastland. As a matter of fact, now, wasn't it the im- 
partiality of the U.S. Government that brought Castro to power? 

Mr, Smith. Wasn't it the impartiality ? 

Senator Eastland. Yes. 

Mr. Smith. Senator, we are responsible for bringing Castro in 
power. I do not care how you want to word it. 

Senator Dodd. Wouldn't you want to say the partiality ? 

Senator Eastland. I mean the partiality, certainly. 

Mr. Smith. Senator, let me explain to you that the United States, 
until the advent of Castro, was so overwhelmingly influential in Cuba 
that, as I said here a little while ago, the American Ambassador was 
the second most important man in Cuba ; sometimes even more impor- 
tant than the President. 

That is because of the reason of the position that the United States 
played in Cuba. Now, today, his importance is not very great. I 
think there is one point I would like to bring up, Senator, and that is 
the recognition of Castro. 

It has always been the policy of the U.S. Government not to be one 
of the first or one of the last to recognize a friendly government. It 
has always been the policy of the U.S. Government, before they recog- 


nized a new Government, to be sure of the following. I do not place 
them in order of their importance, but they are— 

(a) If a government is Communist or too much infiltrated 
with communism. 

(b) Whether a Government will honor its international 

(c) That the new Government can maintain law and order. 
And we always hope that they have the support of the people. 

In this case, I believe that we were very hasty in the recognition of 
the Castro government. 

Senator Eastland. How long? 

Mr. Smith. Batista left in the early morning hours of January 1, 
1959. Several days later, a few days later, a very few days later, 
I was called by telephone — Rubottom told me to come to the United 

I said I could not do it right away because at that time I was in the 
process of evacuating 2,000 American students and tourists. There 
was a complete general strike in effect. I was primarily interested 
in seeing that no harm would come to any of these Americans 
stranded in Cuba. 

I said I could not leave the country and occupy a seat on a plane as 
long as an American was trying to get out, so they said, "All right, 
when do you think you can come?" 

I said I would come as soon as possible. 

As soon as all the Americans had been evacuated, I flew to 

We evacuated all the Americans in two or three days, the whole 

Then as soon as I arrived in Washington, they told me that we were 
going to recognize the new Government and I was to rush back and 
do it. 

I think it was approximately about 5 days — the 5th, or let's say 
around the 6th, of January. At that time Castro had not even arrived 
in Havana. Castro was still out in the eastern part of the islands, 
wending his way toward Havana. 

I am sorry that we did not take more pains in trying to insure that 
Castro would honor his international obligations before we recog- 
nized him. 

I think we were very hasty in our recognition. 

Mr. SouRWliNE. Mr. Chairman, I have a few points here that I 
think, for the record, would be helpful. When you were appointed 
Ambassador and before you took that post, did you consult with your 
predecessor, former Ambassador Arthur G ardner ? 

Mr. Smith. We had lunch together at the 1925 F Street Club, and 
I believe that was the only time we met before I went down there. 

Mr. Sour WINE. Did you have any instructions from the State De- 
partment with regard to seeing Gardner or not seeing him? 

Mr. Smith. I do not believe I was told anything one way or an- 
other. I do not believe his name was mentioned in that regard. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. After Castro had established his headquarters in 
Oriente Province, were you interviewed by Herbert Matthews in the 
New York Times ? 

Mr. Smith. After Castro had what ? 


Mr. SouRWiNE. Had established his headquarters in Oriente Prov- 

Mr. Smith. Yes. He was already in Oriente Province. Matthews 
wrote his articles which appeared on the front pa^es of the New York 
Times in February 1957, and my interview with Castro took place 
in the city of New York in May or June of 1957. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. I was asking if you had an interview with Mat- 
thews after 

Mr. Smith. What did I say— Castro? 

Senator Dodd. Yes. 

Mr. Smith. Would you mind reading back what I said. I want to 
correct that. 

Senator Dodd. You meant Matthews? 

Mr. Smith. Let me correct that. 

Matthews' articles appeared in the New York Times in February 
1957. My interview with Matthews was in New York in May 1957. 

Castro landed in the southern portion of Oriente in December 1956. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. I mean after you were Ambassador, and while Cas- 
tro was still in Oriente Province, did you have another interview with 

Mr. Smith. I saw Matthews a number of times when he came to 
Havana ; he would either come to my office at the chancery or he came 
to see me at the residency. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Do you remember a specific occasion on which Mat- 
thews suggested to you, or urged upon you, that you visit Santiago ; 
that you go by the heart of rebel territory ? 

Mr. Smith. I do not believe that we ever had a conversation along 
those lines. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. Did you, in fact, visit Santiago, Cuba ? 

Mr. Smith. I visited Santiago de Cuba in the latter part of July 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Did something occur there about which you pro- 
tested ? 

Mr. Smith. Yes, it did. 

Mr. Squrwine. What was that ? 

Mr. Smith. The rough handling of the women in the square of the 
city of Santiago, the women who were known as the Mothers of Santi- 
ago. . . 

Mr. SoijRwiNE. That is, rough handling by the Batista forces ? 

Mr. Smith. By the police. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. Did you protest this by issuing a statement to the 
press ? 

Mr. Smith. When I came out of the cit^ hall, having received the 
keys to the city, the police were then putting the firehoses and using 
the clubs on the women and the press asked me for a statement. 

I made the following statement : 

"I regret that the people of Santiago are using my presence in San- 
tiago to protest against their Government." 
. Whereupon, the press said : 

"In other words, are you going to condone these actions? Is this 
all you have to say ? " 

The press demanded to know if the appointment of a new Ambassa- 
dor didn't mean a change in U.S. policies. Did the U.S. approve such 
violence or not ? Diplomatic doubletalk would not suffice. 


I said that I would have a press conference later in the afternoon. 
This was at approximately 12 :00. 

I went to a luncheon, had a meeting with the approximately six or 
seven members of the embassy staff who accompanied me to Santiago, 
and I issued the following statement, to the best of my recollection : 

I repeated what I had said above : that I was sorry that the people 
of Santiago were using my presence to protest against their Govern- 

And then I added the sentence : 

•'And I abhor police brutality." 

I also added another sentence : 

That I had received a letter from the Mothers of Santiago which I 
could not answer but would read with careful consideration, something 
along those lines. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. In doing this, were you acting upon instructions 
from the State Department ? 

Mr. Smith. No. I went to Santiago with the approval of the State 
Department and with the approval of the Batista government. 

At that time I had been in Cuba approximately 2 weeks, and I felt 
that sooner or later, that I would have to meet up with the issue, 
which had us portrayed as being too close to Batista — when I say 
"issue," let me explain that. 

I would have to meet the issue, "the issue" being that we were con- 
sidered too close to the Batista government ; and I was trying to ac- 
complish step No. 1 — to have the U.S. Embassy considered as being 
impartial. If I was to carry out the Department's briefings to detach 
ourselves gradually from our past overfriendliness with Batista, this 
was the time to do it. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. When you made that protest, did you consider it 
an intervention in the internal affairs of Cuba ? 

Mr. Smith. No, sir, I did not, and I explained that at great length 
to Batista, and Batista agreed with me that he would have done the 
same thing under all the circumstances. 

Mr. SouRw^iNE. Did you subsequently discuss that protest with Por- 
tuondo Nunez ? 

Mr. Smith. Did I subsequently discuss that protest? When I 
came to New York or when I went to Washington and went through 
New York, to the best of my recollection, it was shortly after that I 
stopped in at the United Nations and had a talk with Senator Lodge 
and then I met Nunez Portuondo at the Brook Club at 111 East 54th 
Street, and we had about an hour's conference, in which I tried to 
explain to him the reasons for my statement, and we had a very 
friendly exchange of views. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Former Ambassador Gardner has told this com- 
mittee that William Wieland had a strong influence on Mr. Rubottom. 
I take it you agree with that ? 

Mr. Smith. That is correct. 

Mr. SouRwiNE, Mr. Smith, did you have anything to do with the 
arrangements for Castro's visit to the United States in April of 1958, 
to address the American Society of Newspaper Editors ? 

Mr. Smith. I most certainly did not. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Did you ever talk with Mr. Rubottom about this 



Mr. Smith. No, sir. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. Did Mr. Herbert Matthews of the New York Times 
have anything to do with the arrangements for Castro's visit to the 
United States ? 

Mr. Smith. I would not know that. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Did you ever express yourself to the Department 
regarding the wisdom of this visit ? 

Mr. Smith. It took place before I became Ambassador. Therefore, 
it would not be incumbent upon me to make any remarks. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. From your testimony 

Senator Eastland. Before you became Ambassador ? 

Mr. Smith. It took place before I became Ambassador. 

Senator DoDD. Castro's visit ? 

Mr. Smith. Castro's visit. 

Senator Dodd. That cannot be so. 

Mr. Smith. After I was Ambassador. Castro's visit took place in 
the spring of 1960. 

(Discussion off the record.) 

Mr. Smith. Correction on that. Castro's visit to the United States 
took place several months after I was no longer Ambassador to Cuba. 

Senator Eastland. He came here in April 1959. 

Mr. Smith. And I left Cuba January 20, 1959. 

Senator Easisland. That is right. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. From your testimony, it would appear that prior 
to about September or October of 1958, it was the policy of the United 
States to furnish arms and other supplies to the Batista government; 
is that right ? 

Mr. Smith. Prior to when ? 

Mr. SouRwiNE. About September or October of 1958. 

Mr. Smith. Would you mind reading that question again? I am 
sorry I did not get that. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Prior to about September or October of 1958, it was 
the policy of the United States to furnish arms and other supplies to 
the Batista government ? 

Mr. Smith. No, sir ; that is not correct. 

Mr. SoiTRWiNE. That is not correct? 

Mr. Smith. No, sir. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Would you correct that, please ? 

Mr. Smith. The policy of the U.S. Government to stop the ship- 
ment of arms to Cuba ended in March of 1958 — March of 1958. 

Earlier in this testimony, I spoke about the Garand rifles, the 1950 
Garand rifles. That was stopped, I believe, in March 1958. From 
that time on, we no longer licensed the shipment of arms or permitted 
the shipment of arms to Cuba. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. Former Ambassador Gardner told this committee 
that during his last year as Ambassador to Cuba^ there had been an 
endless number of shipments of arms and other things to Castro from 
the United States. 

You testified these shipments continued during your term as Am- 
bassador ? 

Mr. Smith. The tempo increased. 

Mr. Sourwtne. And they were not suspended or curtailed when we 
stopped sending arms and supplies to Batista ? 


Mr. Smith. The United States did stop and did apprehend certain 
individuals from time to time, but according to the statement of the 
revolutionaries themselves, for about every one that the United States 
apprehended, nine would get through. 

It was about a 10-to-l ratio. 

So I want to make it clear in the testimony that not all shipments 
got through. There was an effort made, and they did stop shipments. 

Senator Eastland. It was not as effective as the effort now ? 

Mr. Smith. That is correct, sir ; nowhere near — nowhere near. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. Do you know whether any arms for Castro came 
from the American base at Guantanamo ? 

Mr. Smith. The revolutionaries did steal some arms out of Guan- 
tanamo Base through the Cubans which are attached there. At Guan- 
tanamo Base there are about 10,000 people, 2,500 marines and sailors, 
2,500 American dependents, and about 5,000 Cubans who work there. 
The Cubans would steal arms and ammunition ; yes. 

Mr. Sour wine. Former Ambassador Gardner expressed the opin- 
ion in testifying before this committee that the State Department was 
anxious, in his words, "to replace Batista with Castro," 

Do you agree with this ? 

Mr. Smith. "Was anxious to replace"? No: I do not agree with 
that. I think that the State Department did not believe that Batista 
should remain in power. However, on the other hand, I am sure that 
those who are on the fifth floor of the State Department did not think 
very highly of Castro. 

Senator DoDD. Who is on the fifth floor ? 

Mr. Smith. The top, the top echelon. That is the mistake we made. 
Decisions were made on the fourth floor. 

Senator Eastland. That is right; that is what you have said, at 
the lower echelons. 

Mr. Smith. And the people on the fifth floor, which is the top 
echelon, did not think much of Castro. 

Senator Eastland. But you have said they did not make the 

Mr. Smith. I said the policies were made on the fourth floor. 

Senator Eastland. All right. 

Now, how did they feel toward Castro ? 

Mr. Smith. That is another question. 

Senator Eastland. Well, how did they feel? They were pro- 
Castro, were they not ? 

Mr. Smith. I think most of these things, in light of the events, are 

Senator Eastland. That they were pro-Castro ? 

Mr. Smith. The word "pro-Castro," Senator, is very strong. I 
think that they were sympathetic to Castro. 

Senator Dodd. Do I understand correctly from what you tell us— 
let me put it two ways: (1) The fifth floor did not know what the 
fourth floor was doing. Is that your position ? 

Senator Eastland, Yes ; he said 

Mr, Smith. I say it this way : I think that the fifth floor was not 
as interested in the affairs of Cuba, until late in 1958, as I had hoped 
they would be. 

I have learned from experience and observation that m our system 
the actions by the lower echelon and those who are influential m the 


lower echelon form our policy, and when those higher up act upon 
them, the policies have already been determined by events. 

That is the reason why a little earlier I said I would like to make a 
recommendation that, when something; as important as our attitude 
toward a friendly government arises, the National Security Council J 
or some such body determine what is in the best interests of the United " 
States. All governmental department actions should be unified and 
guided according to the policy laid down from above. 

Senator Eastland. That means you had no confidence in the fourth 
floor, then ? 

Mr. Smith. When you are an Ambassador, you have nothing to do 
with policy. You follow your instructions. 

Senator Eastland. I understand that. 

Mr. Smith. All you can do is recommend, and I recommended 
plenty. I am not bashful. Senator. If you will subpena records, you 
will see I recommended plenty of them, sir. 

Senator Eastland. It means you had no confidence in the fourth 
floor, doesn't it ? 

Mr. Smith. At times there was disagreement between me and the 
fourth floor of the State Department. 

Senator Eastland. Yes. 

Mr. Smith. Yes. 

Senator Dodd. Where did Rubottom — where was his office, fourth 
or fifth floor? 

Mr. Smith. He is the top man on the fourth floor. 

Senator Dodd. He is the upper, upper middle ? 

Mr. Smith. No, sir. He is the Assistant Secretary of State for 
Latin American Affairs, and he sits on the fourth floor, and Avhen you 
go to the fifth floor, that is where the Secretary of State and the 
Under Secretaries are. 

Mr. Sourwine. Former Ambassador Gardner told us there was no 
question — in his words — "that Mr, Roy Rubottom, while he was in 
charge of Latin American Affairs for the State Department, favored 

Do you agree with this ? 

Mr. Smith. Once I had made up my mind, which was obvious, 
that if Castro succeeded to power, that it was not in the best interests 
of the United States, and also not in the best interests of Cuba, I used 
every power within my means to try to have the State Department 
cooperate with the existing government and to adhere strictly to a 
nonintervention policy. 

I believe that Roy Rubottom, when I first went down to Cuba, 
would like to have cooperated with the existing regime. 

He was, I repeat, under terrific pressure by Members of Congress, 
I repeat. He was called before a subcommittee such as this on a 
number of occasions, by the press, by all these various sources that I 
mentioned. He told me once over the telephone thatit was perfectly 
evident to him now that as far as the sympathy of the United States 
was concerned, it was no longer with Batista. 

I think that is the best answer I can give you to the question. 

Senator Eastland. Yet, he yielded to the pressure? 

Mr, Smith, He sure yielded, yes, sir ; he said he did, 

Mr. Sourwine. Mr. Smith, did you have, or do you have, any 
reason to believe that the State Department or State Department offi- 


cials knew in December 1958 that Castro was coming into power at 
the end of the year ? 

Mr. Smith. The State Department knew that Batista was through 
in December 1958, and as soon as Batista was through, it was obvious 
that only one person was going to come into power, and that was 
Fidel Castro. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Did you know that Mr. Dulles had urged a Cuban 
diplomat in December 1958 to leave Cuba immediately with his entire 
family and without giving anyone any explanation ? 

Mr. Smith. A Cuban diplomat ? 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Yes. 

Mr. Smith. To leave ? 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Yes. 

Mr. Smith. No, sir ; I did not. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. Do you know of any warnings that were given any- 
one by the State Department, or State Department officials, to get out 
before Castro came in ? 

Mr. Smith. No ; I do not think we gave anybody any warnings to 
leave. Thirty days before Batista left, I sent a telegram to the State 
Department reporting a meeting of the leading American businessmen 
and myself at the Embassy, and I said that Batista probably would 
not survive beyond January 1. 

We hit the date right on the nose — the day he left. 

I further went on to say that we would either have to step in and 
support a broadly based provisional government or Castro would take 
over and that if Castro took over, the only ones that would benefit 
would be the Communists. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. Mr. Smith, former Ambassador Gardner expressed 
the view that Castro was a Communist tool rather than being himself 
an active Communist. 

Do you agree with that ? 

Mr. Smith. Castro was a revolutionary and a terrorist. 

From the time that he was a university student, he was a gun-toter. 
I was informed by a diplomat that he had killed one nun and two 
priests in Bogota during the uprising in 1948. 

I checked very carefully into Mr. Castro's background shortly after 
I was there and talked to people in Cuba who were anti-Batista but 
who knew Castro well ; I would rather not mention their names because 
I do not want to get them into trouble. There \vere many. 

There is no question that Castro was a revolutionary and a terrorist 
but whether he started out as a Communist or not, I doubt, I believe 
that the beginning of his 26th of July Movement was a leftist revo- 
lutionary movement. There are many that exist in the world. But his 
brother Kaul was different; "Che'' Guevara was different. Guevara 
was and is a Marxist. 

I do not think there is any question or doubt about their Marxist 

But Fidel Castro did make a number of statements at Costa Rica 
and out of Mexico which clearly showed his Marxist line of thinking. 
He was also an active member, as a student, of the FEU (a radical 
group ) . 

I brought that to the attention on numerous occasions of various 
newspaper people when they came down and asked them, when they 


visited Castro in the hills, whether they would get Castro to repudiate 
any of those statements. To the best of my knowledge, he never did. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Is there any doubt in your mind that the Cuban 
Government, under Castro, is a Communist government? 

Mr. Smith. Now? 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Yes. 

Mr. Smith. I would go further. I believe it is becoming a satellite. 

Senator Dodd. You mean a Communist satellite ? 

Mr. Smith. A Communist satellite. I made a speech in Miami 
early last winter in which I said that I believe that there would be a 
mutual security pact formed between Cuba and the U.S.S.R. and the 
reasons for it were : 

That there was no doubt that Fidel Castro was now close to the 
Soviets. Otherwise, he would not have been as brazen in his attacks 
upon the United States. It was perfectly obvious that he knew he 
could get support from the Soviets. 

The Russians for some time have been very piqued — the word 
"piqued" is probably a mild word — with the fact that the United 
States has mutual security pacts with Turkey and Iran, which are 
directly on the borders of Russia. 

The Chinese, as you know, do not like our mutual security pact with 
Formosa and are particularly indignant at our having the position we 
have taken regarding the islands of Quemoy and Matsu. 

The logical thing for the Russians to do would be to move into Cuba 
which they had already done, and to take over, which they would do 
by a mutual security pact. 

Then, when the United States objects, all they have to say is: 

"We will get out of Cuba when you get out of Turkey." 

Senator Dodd. You are not suggesting 

Mr. Smith. That is a speech I made in February: 

Senator Dodd. Yes, but you are not suggesting that the Communists 
will cease and desist from their activities in Cuba and Central and 
South America, or anywhere else, if we get out of these other places? 

Mr. Smith. Out of Turkey? 

Senator Dodd. Yes. 

Mr. Smith. It would mean a great deal to them if we got out of 
Turkey. I am no expert on Turkey. 

Senator Dodd. You do not have to be an expert on Turkey, but you 
ought to be a little bit of an expert on the Communists to know this 
would not follow at all. 

Every time we have retreated from one place, they have moved into 
new areas. 

Mr. Smith. Senator, I did not say what they would do. 

Senator Dodd. I know, but 

Mr. Smith. That they would move into Cuba to retaliate with us. 

Senator Dodd. This is a statement being made all the time. It is 
not very pertinent to our inquiry today, but I think it is doing great 
damage in the sense it is confusing the American people. 

People like you are telling the American people if we get out of 
Formosa, oft Quemoy and Matsu, and abandon our bases in Turkey 
and other places, which we have there because of the aggressive con- 
duct of the Communists, that, therefore, the Communists would cease 
to be aggressive. 


It is one of the most sinister and, I think, damaging things that is 
being said and done. I am sorry to say that to you but I must say so. 

Mr. Smith. Senator, I did not sa^y 

Senator Dodd. I do not say it is intentional, but it is confusing our 

Mr. Smith. Senator, I did not say that what we were doing in For- 
mosa or in Turkey was not correct. I merely said that if you think 
through the Russian point of view, it was logical to assume that they 
would move into Cuba as a retaliation for what we are doing to them. 
That is all I said. 

Senator Dodd. I do not want to argue the point. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. I have just one or two more questions, sir. 

Do you, or did you, know Greneral Tabernilla, the former chief of 
staff of the Cuban Army ? 

Mr. Smith. Yes, sir. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. General Tabernilla has told this committee that 
just before he resigned his post, he conferred with you. 

Mr. Smith. That is correct. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Do you remember this ? Can you give us briefly the 
gist of that conference? 

Mr. Smith. I believe it was the day after Christmas, December 26, 
1958. I received word from the military attache that General Taber- 
nilla, who was in charge of all the Armed Forces of Cuba, and his 
son, Gen. Carlos Tabernilla, who was in charge of the Air Force, 
and Gen. Del Rio Chaviano, who had formerly been in charge of the 
forces in Oriente Province, wanted to have an interview. 

So it was arranged at the American Embassy. 

They arrived in their police cars and they came into the Embassy 

General Tabernilla said he wished to talk with me alone and his 
son and the other general went in the adjoining room. 

At the time General Tabernilla said that the Cuban soldiers would 
not fight any longer and that the Cuban Government, per se, would 
not be able to last. 

He stated that the purpose of his visit to me was to save Cuba from 
chaos, Castro, and communism. 

He said he wanted to form a military junta comprised of himself, 
I believe the names were General Cantillo, General Soa Quesada, 
Colonel Casores, and an officer of the navy. 

He said that they wanted to give Batista safe convoy out of the 
country, wanted to know whether I would support such a junta. 

I said that I would report the conversation to the State Department, 
but that I was sure they would not give me a direct reply to give to 
him, and I said that would be correct, because I added : 

"If we answer you directly, it would be undermining General Ba- 
tista, and I can only do business with Batista because I am accredited 
to him." 

General Tabernilla asked me what suggestions I had to make. 

I said, "Have you mentioned this visit to me to Batista? 

And he said, "No, I have not." He said, "I have not told him I 
was coming to see you, but I have discussed in general our future 
possibilities with Batista." 



I asked him what Batista said, and he replied, "He told me to come 
up with a plan." 

I told Tabemilla he should go back and talk it over with Batista 
and that any suggestion coming from Batista, I would relate to the 
State Department. Then we could continue our exchange of views. 

If you wish me to go into more detail on this meeting, I would be 
very glad to do it. That is generally in capsule form what took place. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Was this after you had seen Batista and advised 
him that the American Government felt that his Government could 
not persist and he had to get out ? 

Mr. Smiths I saw Batista on December 17, 1958, and this confer- 
ence you are talking about took place December 26, 1958. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. So when you saw Tabernilla, you already had told 
Batista he ought to get out ? 

Mr. Smith. I did not tell Batista he ought to get out. I would not 
put it so bluntly as that. I spent 2 hours and 35 minutes trying to 
tactfully explain that the Department believed he had lost effective 
control. To avoid further bloodshed, did he not think it might be in 
the best interests of all concerned if he retired. This had to be done 
without giving the impression that I was intervening. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. I have just two more little matters. 

One, do you think the U.S. Naval Base at Guantanamo is in any 
danger ? 

Mr. Smith. I think five platoons of Marines could lick the rebels. 
How could the naval base at Guantanamo be in any danger? 

Mr. SouRWiNE. One more thing. 

What do you think of the proposal that a Spanish language radio 
station be established at Key West or some similar point to acquaint 
the Cubans with the U.S. position ? 

Mr. Smith. I think that would be very helpful. 

Senator Eastland. Mr. Smith, we certainly thank you. I would 
bke to have a little executive session. 

(Whereupon, at 12 :30 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.) 


Note.— The Senate Internal Security Subcommittee attaches no significance 
to the mere fact of the appearance of the name of an individual or an organi- 
zation in this index. 

^ Page 

Aguero, Rivero 686, 687, 694 

Ambassador to Brazil gyj^ 

Ambassador to Costa Rica "~ ^-jq gjj^ 

Ambassador to Cuba 664, 666~668~ 669,~674, 675,' 679 

Ambassador to Mexico gjQ 

American Embassy (in Cuba) _'____ 697,698,703,707,709 

American Foreign Power 667 

American Society of Newspaper Editors II~ 703 

Agramonte 1 l^l^I 693 

Argentina II_IIII 669 

Army, U.S II""" 664 

Arroya 691 


Batista 665-667, 671-676, 682-684, 686-690, 693, 

694, 696, 698, 701-705, 707, 709, 710 

Batista government 684, 688-690, 693 

Betancourt 690, 693 

"Bogoloza" — ^ — 690 

Bogota ^ , 689, 707 

Brazil ^ 671 

Brook Club, 111 East 54th Street I II 703 

Bundy Tubing Co , 663; 


Campa, De La ,__ 691 

Cantillo, General . ^ 709 

Cardona, Miro 693 

Caribbean Division, Central American Affairs 682 

Casores, Colonel 709 

Castro, Fidel ... 665-668, 670-677, 679, 682-684, 686, 

687, 689-692, 694-701, 701-708 

Castro, Raul 667, 688, 707 

"Castro worship" 668 

Chicago paper 675 

Chief of CIA Section 694 

Chinese 678, 679 

CIA 1... 678, 684, 698, 699 

Cienfuegos, Cuba 698 

Cienfuegos revolution 694 

CMQ (radio station) , 678 

Colombia 676, 690 

Communist card 667 

Communist dictators : 677 

Costa Rica 670, 671, 686, 689. 707 

Cuba—,, ^__^_, ^ 664-710 

Cuban Air Force___ 687 

Cuban. Army _!__ __. 709 

Cuban Embassy : 691, 692 



D Page 

Del Rio Chaviano, Gen 709 

Davis, Richard Harding 668 

Detroit 663 

Dodd, Senator Thomas J 663, 681 

Dubois 675 

Dulles, Mr i 707 


Eastland, Senator James 681 

Eisenhower, General 664 

Eisenhower, Dr. Milton 669 


FBI 668 

FEU (a radical group) 689, 707 

Florida 672, 695 

Formosa 708 

Fort Lauderdale, Fla 691 


Garand rifles 704 

Gardner, Ambassador Arthur 701, 703-707 

Testimony of ^ 663-680 

Gettysburg 664 

"Gringo" 664 

Guantanamo Base 678, 705, 710 

Guell, Gonzalo -^ 691 

Guevara, "Che" 707 


Haiti 697 

Haitian Embassy 673 

Havana 664, 696, 698, 701, 702 

Henderson, Loy 667, 668 

Herter, Christian 667, 668 

Hill, Robert 670 

Hruska, Senator- 681 


Immigration 679 

Iran 708 


Key West 664, 678, 710 

Keys 672 

Kirkpatrick 678 


Latin America 665, 671, 673, 677 

Latin American Affairs, Assistant Secretary of State for 669, 670 

Latin American Department 669, 670 

Latin American desk 667 

Lodge, Senator ^ 703 


Madrid 668 

Malacon 669 

Mann, Thomas 670 

Matsu 708 

Matthews, Herbert L 666, 668, 674r-677, 682-686, 701, 702, 704 

Mexico 670, 686, 689, 697, 707 

Miami_, u 665, 708 




Murphy, Secretary 666, 668, 674 

Murphy, Robert 667 

Mutual aid pact 671 


National Security Council 688, 706 

New York Stock Elxchange ' 681 

New York Times: _ 674, 682, 683, 685, 686, 701~702, 704 

No. 2 CIA man___ 698 

Nunez, Portuondo 703 


OfHce of Production Management 6^ 

Organization of American States 693 

Oriente Mountains of Cuba 686 

Oriente Province : 677, 701, 702, 709 


Pawley, WiUiam 671 

President (United States) 698, 700 

Prio, President 694, 665, 672, 679 

Pro-Castro 675 

Quemoy 708 


Radio station OMQ 678 

Rhode Island 681 

Robin Hood 668 

Rubottom, Roy R., Jr 667-671, 685, 688, 690, 692, 693, 696, 701, 703, 706 

Russia 677 

Russian 672, 678, 679 


San Domingo 697, 699 

Santiago deCuba 675, 677, 678, 702, 703 

Secretary of State 608 

Security Department (State) 660 

Sierra Maestra Range 686 

Smith, Earl E. T 668, 674, 675, 677 

Testimony of 681-710 

Snyder, John 664 

Soa Quesada, Gen 709 

South Oriente 685 

Spain 675, 683 

State Department, U.S 666-670, 

672, 674, 676, 677, 682, 683, 685, 687-690, 694-697, 699, 701, 703-707, 

709, 710. 

Sterling, Marquez 672, 673 

Switzerland 664 


Tabemilla, General 709, 710 

TabemiFa, Gen. Carlos 709 

Tank Corps 664 

Topping, John 694 

Treasury, Secretary of 664 

Trujillo, Generalissimo 669 

Turkey 708 

Twenty-sixth of July Movement 673, 692, 693, 707 


U Page 

United Nations 693, 703 

Urrutia 693 

U.S.S.R 708 


War Department 692 

War Production Board 664, 682 

Watch Hill, R.I 663 

Whitetower__'_ 671 

Wieland, William 671, 682, 684, 685, 693, 696, 697, 703 

Williamson, Earl J 677 

WoUam, Park F 678 

World War I 664 

World War II 664 

Yale University 681 



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